�
¿
&&&&
¿
ģ**
¿&#&#ț¢:#;&aeliº*** .*ſ-3 ***§ 3. ſaeğțķ}'
¿¿¿.*; *（***）¿?-§§§§
！4. ***-~įšš-·«.-~ț¢;§§§§
···· -** .…….，;***） -·--、。
ſººſ:·-·¿ºğ#æ3· ·…· · -§§
！---#.*;
±-··-¿?
¿

R. Tº
Tºll intº
• W
“Tº Tiji
rººlººſºº-º-º-º:
' .! ;-）
¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡TĪTĪTĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĪĚãé%ſ%&{{ſ/\{|||}||[[jij ſłº
ſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſ№ſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſſ.
u l-
: I 1.''} { } |.
*
(
'I' i I 1.
Z 1 Sv. 12'i'
* I. F. X.A.NI) i. 1;
-
1 * 1: ( , ;".
I
illiulliluliiliuluiului.
ii i ! : i , , , ; ; ;
i t . . . if : ; ;













WV)
$Q\
. S727-
A$3.
N.3

44…}<x
MEMOIRS OF ERNEST II
ſº • * * * *
s e. "
Euke of $axe-Coburg-Gotha
VOLUMES III AND IV
E M B R A C IN G P E R I O D
1850 – 18 70
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
BY
PE R C Y AND RE A E, P H. D.
V O L. I I I
£ 6 m b 0 m
R E M I N G T O N & C O., PUBLISH E R S
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN
1890
ALI. RIGHTS RESERVED
Tºº, Alex, Awer
4t-,
'o- 14-1423
C O N T E N T S
— . O. —
CHAPTER T
CONVERSATIONS OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS WITH SIR HAMILTON
SEYMOU R.—CHARACTER OF THE EMPEROR.—HIS INFLUENCE ON
THE EUROPEAN CABINETS.—LOUIS NAPOLEON.—HIS PRIVATE LIFE
IN ENGLAND.—HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC.—FIRST SYMPTOMS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
SECOND EMPIRE-PRINCE ALBERT's DISLIKE OF NAPOLEON.—
THE GREAT EXHIBITION IN LONDON.—DEATH OF SIR, ROBERT PEEL.
—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT,--THE ECCLESIASTICAL TITLES’
BILL.—THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF COBURG IN LONDON.—SUCCESS
OF THE EXHIBITION.—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCE ALBERT's
MERITS.—POLITICAL EFFECT OF THE EXHIBITION.—ENTENTE
CoRDIALE BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.—THE COUP D’ÉTAT
IN PARIS.–LORD PALMERSTON's APPROVAL AND FALL-LETTER
FROM PRINCE ALBERT.-LORD DERBY's MINISTRY.-FEAR OF
BONAPARTISM. —LETTERS FROM KING . LEOPOLD OF BELGIUM TO
PRINCE METTERNICH.-SYMPATHY IN ENGLAND WITH ITALY.—
INDIGNATION AGAINST AUSTRIA.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT,
—SEQUESTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE ORLEANS IN FRANCE.
—THE DUKE CALLED UPON TO PROTEST.-PRINCE ALBERT
APPROVES.—LOUIS NAPOLEON's MARRIAGE PLANS.–DONA EUGENIA
MONTIJO.—VISIT OF THE DUKE TO LONDON.—NEGOTIATIONS WITH
PRINCE ALBERT RELATING TO THE DOMAINS OF COBURG AND
GOTHA.—THE DUKE OF GENOA, THE NEW KING AND QUEEN OF
HANoveR, AND THE PRINCE AND PRINCESS OF PRUSSIA, AT THE
ENGLISH COURT.—THE CAMP AT CHATHAM.—THE ABERDEEN
MINISTRY. —THE ORIGIN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.—LETTERS
FROM PRINCE ALBERT.-PALMERSTON'S RESIGNATION AND RETURN.
—THE WAR POPULAR . e e e ſe & * I
COWTENTS
sº CHAPTER II
THE YEAR 1854.—CHANGE IN THE DUKE's POLITICAL ATTITUDE.—HIS
JUSTIFICATION.—THE POSITION OF THE GREAT POWERS.—RUPTURE
BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA. ——THE TREATY OF FIRANCE AND
ENGLAND WITH TURKEY. —THE WAR WITH RUSSIA.—THE COBURGS
SUSPECTED OF SYMPATIIISING WITH THE EASTERN POWERS.—
ATTACKS IN THE ENGLISH PRESS ON PRINCE ALBERT. —KING
LEOPÖLD OF BELGIUM AND LOUIS NAPOLEON.—THE DUKE OFFERS
TO GO TO PARIs.—LETTER FROM KING LEOPOLD.—THE DUKE's
VISIT TO PARIS ARRANGED.—PRINCE ALBERT's DISPLEASURE.-
CORRESPONDENCE.--THE DURE GOES FIRST TO BERLIN.—HIS
MEMORANDUM TO KING FREDERICK WILLIAM IV.--THE RUSSIAN
PARTY IN BERLIN.—KING LEOPOLD SETS FORTH THE POINTS TO BE
DISCUSSED WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—THE DUIKE IN PARIS.—
HIS FIRIENDLY RECEPTION.—KING JEROME.-IMPRESSIONS AT THE
COURT.—THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH.-CON-
VERSATIONS WITH NAPOLEON.—THE EMPEROR'S ANXIETY FOR AN
ALLIANCE WITH AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.—HIS WILLING NESS TO
MEET PRUSSIA’s WISHES.—DISCUSSIONS ON THE PLAN OF OPERA-
TIONs.—NAPoleon’s FUTURE PLANS.–HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BERLIN
AFFAIRS.—HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE KING OF
PRUSSIA.—PRINCE CHIMAY.—THE ENDEAVOUR'S OF THE EMPRESS
EUGENIE TO DRAW THE DUKE ON THE SUBJECT OF QUEEN VICTORIA
AND PRINCE ALBERT.--THE DUKE's DILEMMA.—THE CHARACTER
of Louis NAPOLEON.—THE DUKE's VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT 39
CHAPTER III
EFFECT OF THE DUKE'S STAY IN PARIS.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.
—THE DUKE GOES TO BERLIN.—KIND RECEPTION BY THE KING.-
STRONG LETTER FROM QUEEN VICTORIA TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.
—THE APRIL TREATY BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.—
FREDERICK WILLIAM IV SEEKS TO CONCILIATE THE EMPEROR OF
RUssíA.—BUNSEN's RESIGNATION, BONIN's DISMISSAL, AND THE
PRINCE OF PRUSSIA’s DISAGREEMENT WITH THE KING-PRINCE
ALBERT ON THE CHEVALIER DE BUNSEN.—THE KREUZZEITUNG
PARTY IN BERLIN.—PARTICULARS OF THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE
KING OF PRUSSIA AND HIS BROTHER.—HOW BONIN WAS DISMISSED.
—LETTER FROM THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA TO THE DUKE.--THE
DUKE PROPOSES TO GO TO VIENNA.—THE SITUATION THERE.—
LETTER FROM THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO THE DUKE.--THE
RUSSIAN PARTY IN VIENNA.—UNCERTAINTY OF AUSTRIA’s INTEN-
TIONS.–FAR REACHING PLANs.--THE DUKE's NAME MENTIONED IN
CONTENTS vii
CONNECTION WITH THEM. —THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH.--—HIS
CHARACTER AND VIEWS.—PRUSSIA’s INDECISION CAUSEs HIM UN-
EASINESS.—WHAT HE THINKS OF NAPOLEON AND HIS PROJECTS.--—
PRINCE METTERNICH.-LETTER FROM PHINCE ALBERT. —COLONEL
voN MANTEUFFEL ARRIVES IN VIENNA, AND THE SKY BECOMEs
OVER-CAST.--THE RACE BACK TO BERLIN.—COLONEL VON MAN-
TEUFFEL GETS THE START OF THE DUKE.-CURIOUS RECEPTION
OF THE DUKE BY THE RING...—CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER WON
MANTEUFFEL.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.--THE FOUR POINTS.
—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. –WRATH OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—
HIS LETTER TO THE DURE. –THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA TO THE
DUKE. – DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS . e * 79
CHAPTER IV
A COUNCIL OF WAR IN PARIS.—THE TONE IN THE FRENCII ARMY. —THE
FIRST ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COMBINED FLEETS.— THE ALLIED
ARMIES IN GALLIPOLI.—LETTERS FROM PRINCE CHIMAY TO THE
DUKE.—THE SIEGE OF SILISTRIA.—RUSSIA’s MISFORTUNES IN
TURREY.—THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON's PATIENCE witH AUSTRIA
AND PRUSSIA.—MISMANAGEMENT OF FRENCH MILITARY AFFAIRS.—
DISSATISFACTION IN FRANCE.-LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.-
THE SPANISH REVOLUTION.—ITS EFFECT ON NAPOLEON.—LETTER
FROM PRINCE CHIMAY TO KING LEOPOLD OF BELGIUM.–THE FIRST
IDEA OF THE EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA.—PRINCE ALBERT's
SHARE IN IT.-LETTER FROM THE PRINCE.-PRINCE ALBERT'S VISIT
TO NAPOLEON AT BOULOGNE.—LETTER FROM THE DUKE TO PRINCE
ALBERT.--THE BATTLE ON THE ALMA. —–RUMOURED FALL OF
SEBASTOPOL.--THE ENGLISH ARMY AND THE BATTLE OF INKER-
MAN.——THE FOREIGN LEGION.—DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION.
—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT TO THE KING OF BELGIUM.–
LETTER FROM NAPOLEON TO THE DUKE,--HE COMPLAINS OF THE
WANT OF ENERGY ON THE PART OF THE ENGLISH COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF.—DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.—FRESH NEGOTIA-
TIONS.—AUSTRIA LEAVES THE WESTERN POWERS IN THE LURCH. —
LETTER FROM COUNT BUOL TO THE DUKE. –VISIT OF THE EMPEROR
AND THE EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH TO ENGLAND.—LETTER FROM
PRINCE ALBERT ON ENGLISH POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—PRUSSIA AND
THE CONFERENCES IN VIENNA.—LETTERS FROM THE KING OF
PRUSSIA AND HIS BROTHER.—THE DUKE IN PARIS AND LONDON.
HIS LETTER TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.--REPORT OF PRINCE
WILLIAM OF BADEN ON THE CONDITION OF RUSSIA.—THE STORM-
ING OF SEBASTOPOL.—THE THEFT OF RUSSIAN DESPATCHES IN
BERLIN.—THE END OF THE WAR . * Ö e e 35
Viji CONTENTS
CHAPTER W
THE FIRST PARIS EXHIBITION.—THE QUEEN AND PRINCE ALBERT IN
PARIS.—THE DUKE's OPERA SANTA CHIARA PERFORMED AT THE
GRAND OPERA.—CONVERSATIONS WITH NAPOLEON.—HIS SUFFER-
INGS AND PHYSICAL DECA.Y. —BITTERNESS AGAINST AUSTRIA.—THE
DUKE AND THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR.—THE DUKE’s LETTER TO
COUNT BUOL.—COUNT BUOL's ANSWER.—AUSTRIA SUBMITS AN
ULTIMATUM IN ST PETERSBURG.—THE KING OF PRUSSIA’s UN WILL-
INGNESS To MEDIATE.—HE SUPPORTS AUSTRIA’s ULTIMATUM.—
PARIS CHOSEN AS THE SEAT OF THE FUTURE CONFERENCES.—
ENGLAND ATTEMPTS TO EXCLUDE PRUSSIA. —LETTER FROM THE
DUKE TO PRINCE ALBERT.--THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON's SATISFAC-
TION AT THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE.--—HIS LETTER TO THE DUIKE.
—RUSSIAN INTRIGUES. —BIRTH OF THE PRINCE IMPERIAL. —THE
DUKE ON THE SITUATION * e g & e te I 9o
CHAPTER WI
NEw FAMILY ALLIANCES.–PRINCESS VICTORIA’s BETROTHAI. To
FREDERICK WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA.— FIRST INDICATIONS OF THE
MATCH.—ENGAGEMENT OF THE PRINCE REGENT OF BADEN TO
PRINCESS LOUISA OF PRUSSIA.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.-
THE ENGAGEMENT IN ENGLAND KIEPT SECRET.-ATTACKS ON
PRUSSIA IN THE ENGLISH PRESS. —THE FEELING ON THE PROPOSED
MARRIAGE IN BERLIN.—INDEPENDENCE OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.
—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BELGIUM AND FRANCE.-KING LEoPold's
JUBILEE.—MARRIAGE OF THE PRINCE REGENT OF BADEN AND
PRINCESS LOUISA OF PRUSSIA.—THE DUKE CHOOSES A WIFE FOR
THE SON OF THE DUKE OF AUGUSTENDURG.—MARRIAGE OF PRINCE
FREDERICK WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA AND THE PRINCESS ROYAL. —
LETTERS FROM PRINCE ALBERT AND THE PRINCE AND PRINCESS OF
PRUSSIA.— CHARACTER OF PRINCE FREDERICK WILLIAM AND THE
PRINCESS Roy AL-THE DUKE's INFLUENCE ON THE YOUNG PRINCE.
—MARRIAGE OF THE ARCHDUKE MAXIMILIAN OF AUSTRIA AND
PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF BELGIUM,-LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.
—MARRIAGE BETWEEN KING PEDRO OF PORTUGAL AND PRINCESS
STEPHANIE OF HOHIENZOLLERN * & g * Ç 229
CHAPTER VII
GENERAL SITUATION AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR.—NAPOLEON's CON-
TINENTAL PLANS.–ENGLAND’s ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM.—THE
FRENCH REGENCY L.A.W.—THE PROPOSED UNION OF MOLDAVIA AND
CONTENT'S ix
WALLACHIA.—LETTER FROM THE DUIKE TO PRINCE ALBERT.--THE
PRINCE's ANSWER.—RUSSIA PROPOSES TO SUMMON THE POWERS TO
AN AFTER-CONFERENCE.-NAPOLEON's ITALIAN POLICY.--ENG-
LAND’s DISAPPROBATION.—COOLNESS BETWEEN FRANCE AND
ENGLAND.—LETTER FROM PRINCE CIIIMAY.— PILGRIMAGE OF
EUROPEAN PRINCES TO PARIS. —THE GRAND-DUKE CONSTANTINE IN
PARIS.—EFFECT OF HIS VISIT IN ENGLAND.—THE EMPEROR AND
THE EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH IN OSBORNE.—HOW NAPOLEON
INFORMS PRINCE ALBERT OF HIS INTENDED MEETING WITH THE
EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.-CAVOUR
AND NAPOLEON.— THE PLOTS OF THE POLITICAL REFU GEES.—THE
DUKE IN PARIS.—THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON ON THE POSTAL AND
RAILWAY SYSTEM.—THE ATTEMPT ON THE EMPEROR's LIFE AT THE
GRAND OPERA.—ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN FRANCE AND
ENGLAND.—LETTERS FROM PRINCE ALBERT.—THE QUEEN AND
THE PRINCE IN CHERBOURG.—RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NAPOLEON
AND PRINCE JEROME.-NAPOLEON's SECRET TREATY WITH SARDINIA.
—AUSTRIA's ISOLATION g * e * º § 229
CHAPTER VIII
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S WORDS TO THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR AT
NEW YEAR 1859.—THEIR EFFECT.—LETTER FROM PRINCE CHIMAY
To THE DUKE.--THE DUKE's ANSWER.—NAPOLEON's DESIRE To
SEE THE DUKE IN PARIS.—KING LEOPOLD's LETTER ON THE SUB-
JECT. —THE WAR UNPOPULAR WITH THE FRENCH NATION.—
NAPOLEON DETERMINED.—OPPORTUNITY FOR PRUSSIA.—LETTER
FROM PRINCE ALBERT.--THE DUKE's LETTERS ON THE SITUATION
TO THE PRINCE AND KING LEOPOLD.—NAPOLEON BELIEVES THE
HOUSE OF COBURG TO BE WORKING AGAINST HIM.—THE DUKE IN
BERLIN.—LORD COWLEY’s MISSION TO VIENNA.—PRINCE ALBERT's
POLITICAL LETTER TO THE PRINCESS OF PRUSSIA.—RUSSIA PRO-
POSES A CONGRESS.—CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON.—THE DUKE TAKES
UP HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNT VON BUOL.—THE COUNT's
LETTER.—THE DUKE IN LONDON.—HIS IMPRESSIONS THERE.—
PRUSSIA UN WILLING TO TAKE DEFINITE ACTION, UNLESS ENGLAND
GUARANTEES THE NEUTRALITY OF THE NORTH SEA AND THE
BALTIC.—THE ENGLISH CABINET DECLINES.—THE MEMORANDUM OF
THE PRINCESS OF PRUSSIA TO THE ENGLISH COURT.-FEARS OF A
UNIVERSAL WAR.—PRINCE HOHENZOLLERN SUMS UP THE SITUATION
IN BERLIN . º gº e e g e * se 266
CHAPTER IX
THE KING OF SARDINIA's LETTER TO THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.-
AUSTRIA COMMENCES THE WAR.—INADEQUACY OF HER FORCES.—
CONTENTS
THE FRENCH ARMY. —WILLISEN's MISSION TO VIENNA.—NEGOTIA-
TIONS BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.—THE BATTLE OF MAGENTA,
AND NAPOLEON's ENTRY INTo MILAN.—EFFECT IN ENGLAND
AND PRUSSIA.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.--THE DUKE's
REPORT TO QUEEN VICTORIA.—PRINCE ALBERT ANSWERS.—THE
BATTLE OF SOLFERINo.—NAPOLEON's DESIRE FOR PEACE.--THE
TRUCE OF VILLAFRANCA.—AUSTRIA’s Double-DEALING WITH
PRUSSIA.—LETTER FROM THE PRINCE REGENT OF PRUSSIA, -
AUSTRIA’s CIRCULAR NOTE To THE GERMAN GOVERNMENTS.—
PRINCE ALBERT ON THE SITUATION e e tº & 296
filemoirs of
35ukt (Ernest of Saxe-Coburg-(50tha
CHAPTER I
CONVERSATIONS OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS WITH SIR HAMILTON
SEYMOUR. —CHARACTER OF THE EMPEROR.—HIS INFLUENCE ON
THE EUROPEAN CABINETS.—LOUIS NAPOLEON.—HIS PRIVATE LIFE
IN ENGLAND.—HIS ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCII
REPUBLIC.—FIRST SYMIPTOMS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
SECOND EMPIRE,-PRINCE ALBERT's DISLIKE OF NAPOLEON.—
THE GREAT EXHIBITION IN LONDON.—DIEATH OF SIR. ROBERT PREL.
—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.--THE ECCLESIASTICAL TITLES'
BILL.—THE DUKE AND DUCIIESS OF COBURG IN LONDON.—SUCCESS
of THE EXHIBITION.—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRINCE ALBERT's
MERITS.—POLITICAL EFFECT OF THE EXHIBITION.—ENTENTE
CoRDIALE BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND.—THE COUP D’ÉTAT
IN PARIS.–LORD PALMERSTON's APPROVAL AND FALL.-LETTER
FROM PRINCE ALBERT.-LORD DERBY's MINISTRY. —FEAR OF
BONAPARTISM. — LETTERS FROM KING LEOPOLD OF BELGIUM TO
PRINCE METTERNICH. —SYMPATHY IN ENGLAND WITH ITALY.—
INDIGNATION AGAINST AUSTRIA.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALRERT.
—SEQUESTRATION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE ORLEANS IN FRANCE
—THE DUKE CALLED UPON TO PROTEST.-PRINCE ALBERT
APPROVES. —LOUIS NAPOLEON's MARRIAGE PLANS.—DONA EUGENIA
MONTIJO.—VISIT OF THE DUKE TO LONDON.—NEGOTIATIONS WITII
PRINCE ALBERT RELATING TO THE DOMAINS OF COBURG AND
GOTHA.—THE DUKE OF GENOA, THE NEW KING AND QUEEN OF
IIANOVER, AND THE PRINCE AND PRINCESS OF PRUssi A, AT THE
ENGLISH COURT.—THE CAMP AT CHATHAM.—THE ABERDEEN
MINISTRY. —THE ORIGIN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.—LETTERS
FROM PRINCE ALBERT-PALMERSTON'S RESIGNATION AND RETURN.
—THIE WAR POPULAR.
IN the famous conversations of the Emperor Nicholas with
the English Ambassador, Sir G. Hanmilton Seymour, at the
beginning of the year 1853, occasion offered to indicate plainly
WOL. III, A
2 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA X E-CO BURG-GOTHA
enough the attitude of Russia and England towards the rest
of the Powers. The Emperor treated politics like a geometrical
problem, drawing from the parallelogram of the revolutionary
forces in France, Italy, Austria, and Prussia, the resultant
force, and reasoning with startling consistency and simplicity
that, in like wise as England's supremacy at sea could not
be contested, so were he and his holy Russia destined to rule
the European continent. In offering to the Ambassador of the
British Empire the division of the ‘sick man’s’ inheritance, he
thought himself entitled to leave the rest of the continental
Powers, as mere dependents on his will, all but entirely out of
account.
When, after the lapse of a year, the English published
Seymour's despatches, the Prussian and Austrian statesmen
read with shame and amazement the expression of the con-
tempt which the Emperor Nicholas had manifested with
regard to his good friends in Berlin, and more particularly
those in Vienna. All at once a picture was mirrored to them
from the Neva, in which they had to recognise themselves in
their dependence on the will of the all-powerful Czar. He
expressly declared the possibility of any attempt on their part
to emancipate themselves from him, to be an almost childish
assumption of the English Ambassador.
The Emperor Nicholas was really the last actual autocrat
in Europe. I reckon it as one of my most instructive experi-
ences and reminiscences to have obtained of the most remark-
able man of my time a personal impression, which, through
my connections with many persons who stood in the same
degree of relationship to him and to me, I was at all times
able to add to and complete.
But it was indeed necessary to have received immediate
impressions of him, in order to form an adequate idea of a
despot mature, such as the world hardly produces any more
to-day. In the person of the Emperor Nicholas all vague
abstraction of State, Church, and Nationality, disappeared. .
Men saw him, and rested assured that everything powerful
expressed in these ideas was he himself in person. Next to
him nothing existed, nor did anything seen able to exist. The
CHARACTER OF THE EMPEROR 3
indefinable Muscovite bugbear, by whom the imaginations
of the civilized nations are from time to time tortured, vanished
at his appearance. He stood a tangible being, with no
frightful form, but rather beautiful and glorious, enticing and
seductive, firm, bold, and like a kind of religious guardian
spirit, before the adoring world. And this colossal phenomenon
of an absolutely ruling mind, proved on closer inspection—a
mere outward sham, a painted picture.
He was the most perfect uniform wearer among all the
European sovereigns, a model for every kind of parade
exhibition. His principle of living and ruling was uniform
and formality. He represented both the statesman and the
general in so eminent a degree, that his perfect qualification
for both offices appeared to everyone, as it were, a matter of
course. He effected all and everything by the innate great
sense which is expressed in the term, nimbus of the autocrat.’
He managed to preserve this nimbus, in the most brilliant
manner, better than any one of the contemporary emperors and
kings. But with equal skill he was capable of giving to the
social expressions of his feelings a trait of a certain good-
naturedness, which corresponded to the change of the uniforms
of his wardrobe.
Above all things he understood how to take one aback,
and his gallant and chivalrous bearing had a fascinating
influence on men and women alike.
His influence was everywhere and nowhere, like the
wandering Jew, who is for ever roaming through the world.
Men listened on all sides, directly or indirectly, to St
Petersburg, and even in the most insignificant of actions the
sole consideration was what the Czar would say to it. The
Russian embassies were everywhere at work with counsel
and kind intentions, enquiring discreetly, but answering all
the more firmly. Great Governments at last began to feel
this tutoring from St Petersburg as a sort of necessity. I
confess that the ever-increasing state of dependence of so
many Governments had for years been working up my
feelings to the highest pitch. It had become evident to me
that, unless all hopes for Germany were to be resigned, the
4 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
first thing to be accomplished was the destruction of Russian
influence. However, to get anyone to share this opinion
proved then a difficulty, which in our days is almost incom-
prehensible. Even with a Sovereign so entirely unbiassed as
King Leopold I never arrived at an understanding on this
point, not to speak of many other men who appeared
absolutely incapable of understanding in what Russia's
injurious influence on the state of Europe consisted.
Under these circumstances it was only too conceivable that
the mighty Czar looked upon old England as the sole factor
with which he had to reckon in his great Eastern plans. He
was well aware, indeed, how little favourably the English
Sovereign and her Consort were disposed towards him, and in
the Cabinet sat for the most part men who were everywhere
in alliance with the enemies of Russian power, and who
supported the revolutionary movements. But the Czar could
not free himself from the notion that by a few concessions,
such as the possession of the Island of Candia, and the like, he
would draw the English Government over to his side. But
even if this calculation had been less mistaken than it actually
was, the Emperor Nicholas ought never to have overlooked
the fact that the France of the Revolution of 1848 was no
longer to be compared with the Empire of 1853.
It will suffice here to recall in a few words the well-known
facts of French history since the downfall of Louis Philippe.
Little as had been the faith in the permanence of republican
nstitutions in France since the June battles of the year 1848,
still the remainder of Europe could not make up its mind to
regard the inconvenient revival of Bonapartism as possible.
The bearer of the name and traditions of Napoleon had left,
since the days of Strasbourg and Boulogne, too unfavourable
a memory for people to regard him as qualified to play the
role of his uncle in France. He had made manifold attempts
( establish for himself a social position in England, but he
was at first only able to interest a very small portion of the
aristocracy in his person. It proved particularly prejudicial
to him that the Queen refused to receive him, and that
he was in consequence, as it were, banished from all Court
LOUIS WAPOLEON PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 5
circles. The general opinion was that Louis Napoleon was
a dull and insignificant man. His mode of living, moreover,
was looked upon as hardly commendable. I had the oppor-
tunity of seeing and conversing with him several times in
London, in the houses of his not very numerous acquaintances,
and I must confess to having, at that period, been not quite
free from the general prejudice against him, although it would
be in the highest degree unjust to assert that his personal
bearing was in any way unpleasing. I once had a more
intimate meeting with him, on the occasion of purchasing horses
in London, and this chance event left upon us both a firm
and lively remembrance of our first encounter in life.
When, at the end of 1848, the French Republic, in
accordance with the statute of the constitution, was about to
proceed to the election of a President, it was Louis Napoleon's
principal advantage that, with the exception of General
Cavaignac, who was violently disliked among the workmen, and
all but entirely unknown to the rural population, there could
be no question of any serious rival. Notwithstanding, there
was no end to the amazement in Europe, when Louis Napoleon
appeared on the list of candidates for the presidentship.
It had not been noticed how carefully and systematically
the Napoleonic legend had been cherished in the whole of
France, nor what sums of money had been lavished in
canvassing for the bearer of that great name. When it at
last became evident, the fact was regarded as the less com-
prehensible the more men knew that the bearer of the
illustrious name had never enjoyed a pecuniarily favourable
position, but had actually been harassed in London by the
most petty cares of life. -
The 10th of December, 1848, resulted in a number of five-
and-a-half million votes in his favour, and the new President
now prepared his way slowly and carefully, avoiding every-
thing that might cause uneasiness to monarchic Europe.
Partly in remembrance of the history of his great uncle, and
partly in consideration of the threatening situation of the
Apennine Peninsula, the belief prevailed that the aggressive
Napoleonic tendencies would take shape first of all in the
6 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
plains of Lombardy. But the President of the Republic
opposed no obstacles to the victorious progress of the Austrian
army in Piedmont. He not only did nothing that could en-
danger Austrian possessions, as secured by the battle of
Novara, but he declared and proved himself, on the contrary,
the guardian and restorer of the Papal throne.
This attitude of Napoleon was sufficient, in the period of
reaction, to turn the opinion of a considerable portion of the
diplomatic world in his favour. His tours in France, and his
manifold public and private speeches, no doubt managed to
remind the newspaper reader at every moment that the
President of the Republic was the author of the Idées
Napoléoniennes. But his Ministries and his ambassadors in-
spired the Governments more and more with confidence in his
conservative principles. His parliamentary bills were of a
kind to rejoice the hearts of the most reactionary German
ministers: Raising of the newspaper caution-moneys;
limitation of the electoral franchise; severe measures of
deportation against political prisoners; all this seemed a fine
and praiseworthy commencement of a vigorous government,
as men then expressed it. It was already no longer rare to
hear from the lips of the most reactionary people words of
sympathy with the little nephew of the great uncle, as Victor
Hugo had first called him.
His military banquets, indeed, found less favour; still less
the reports of various thoughtless public demonstrations, at
which the ‘Emperor’ was cheered. Moreover, it was particu-
larly suspicious that the President himself at times spoke of
himself as of the one who represented the will of the people,
and who, in case of need, would not draw back, should France
impose a greater burden upon him. Thus the year 1851
approached, and the symptoms of the establishment of the
second Empire increased in an alarming degree.
From all parts of France the demand came for a revision
of the Constitution, and the President made no secret of the
fact that he, too, considered such a revision necessary. The
Chamber still kept the Republican banner aloft, but it was
liable to fall at any moment.
THE GREAT' EXHIBITION IN LONDON 7
In this state of things serious politicians could no longer
leave the question unanswered, as to what attitude would
have to be taken up towards the rising monarchy. Not only .
the Cabinets and the Ministries, but more immediately the
Courts and the reigning families of Europe, were called
upon to decide what line of conduct they would pursue with
regard to the new Sovereign of France.
The reigning Sovereigns were much troubled in mind, as to
whether they might resolve to bestow upon the new Emperor
the title of brother. -
Curiously enough, Napoleon found, just at those two
Courts whose principles of government were most opposed to
one another, in Russia and in England, the very greatest
repugnance and the most obstinate resistance to his ambitions.
My brother was not only an opponent of the Napoleonic
traditions and of the Empire, in virtue of his very decided
theoretical convictions, but he was at that time also particularly
unfavourably disposed towards the representative of these
ideas himself.
Although Albert was fond of entering into relations with
all sorts of personages who had permanently or temporarily
chosen England as their home, if it had fallen to their lot to
play a part in the political or literary world on the Continent,
yet he had never experienced the desire to enter into con-
nection with Louis Napoleon. In former days no points of
common interest could be found between the two men, hence
even the President of the Republic was kept at a cool distance.
The intimate intercourse between the English Court and the
closely related Orleans may not have been without some
influence in preventing this personal antipathy from becoming
softened, even when Louis Napoleon was already regarded
as the man of the future, and English policy seemed to
demand a friendly advance to the new regime.
My brother was at that moment preparing for the greatest
deed of his life, and was working with all his might at the
scheme of the Great International Exhibition, which was his
idea and his merit, and which has insured his name a place
for all time to come in the history of European civilisation.
8 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAxEcoBURG-GOTHA
Although the President of the French Republic was the first
who with full intelligence took up my brother's great idea,
who furthered it in every way, popularised it in France, and
contributed without question much to the success of the
great work, yet even this did not materially better his own
position with the English Court. I think that I owe it to
historical truth to recall these facts with all the greater
impartiality the more friendly the treatment which the
Emperor, until his end, and, after his death, those he left
behind him, have since met with at the hands of the
English Court.
In England all foreign questions had now receded into the
background before the preparations for this great Jubilee of
Nations, as, in allusion to the ancient jubilee years once de-
creed by the Popes, the first International Exhibition has been
termed. The conception, development, and execution, of this .
great idea have been so elaborately and exquisitely described
that it would be impossible to say anything new to the reader
on that score.* The difficulties, too, which Albert encountered
with the powerful Protectionists of the kingdom, and the
disgusting ill-will against the fertile mind of the German man,
which had not yet been overcome in stiff English circles, has
been admitted by English historical writers themselves with
laudable impartiality. *
When Robert Peel so unexpectedly died, my brother enter-
tained grave fears for his great enterprise, and expressed to
me, probably with greater frankness than he could in England,
how many difficulties his opponents were causing him. Thus
he wrote on July 4, 1850:
‘We are unfortunately plunged into the deepest mourning,
for a blow has struck us, from which we are not likely soon
to recover. Peel is a loss for the whole of Europe, a dreadful
one for England, but an incalculable one for the Crown and
for us personally The manner of his death was so sad too.
We now entirely lack all that support in Parliament and with
* Martin, Life of the Prince Consort, ii. 205, iii. 304, etc, 367, etc. Cf. Pauli,
Geschichte Englands, iii, 434, and M*Carthy. History of Our Own Times, chapter xx.
THE DUKE AND DUCIIESS OF COBURG IN LONDON 9
public opinion, which he afforded to the throne. Parties will
rush into extremes again. . . . Our Exhibition is to be
turned out of London : The Protectionists, who are afraid of
it ; the Radicals, who want to prove their power over the
crown-properties (the parks); the Times, whose Solicitor has
bought a house near Hyde-Park; all storm and rail. The
matter is to be settled to-night. But Peel, who had under-
taken the defence, is no more, so we shall probably be beaten,
and shall give up the whole Exhibition.
You see that we are not exactly lying on a bed of roses.
. . . . . But God will aid your faithful brother A.’
Fortunately the apprehensions of the Prince proved to
have been exaggerated. The affairs of the Exhibition took a
decidedly favourable course, although the enterprise was still
regarded on many sides with unfriendly eyes. After spend-
ing the first days of the spring of the year 1851 in Osborne,
in order to recruit himself, Prince Albert returned to London
on March 25, and the opening work in the Crystal Palace
commenced forthwith. As just then the unedifying so-called
Ecclesiastical Titles' Bill had come to an end in Parliament,
Albert expressed himself characteristically enough on the
state of things, when he wrote on March 26:
‘We returned here yesterday from Osborne, where we
have almost been washed away by the rain. To-day the
unpacking begins in the Exhibition, and it is to be hoped
that at the same time the debate on the Papal question will
have come to an end, and that the priestly rabble will have
been well trumped.’ - -
In the same letter my brother wrote that he had reserved
May for my visit to London: ‘If you are not afraid of the
crowding which will then take place.” Notwithstanding, I
resolved to start at once with the Duchess on this modern
pilgrimage, in the first month of the Great Exhibition. We
crossed the Sea in a Government vessel to Dover, whence a
special train, kindly placed at our disposal by the Queen, con-
veyed us to London, at noon on the 17th May. We stayed
there until the 13th of June.
Io MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GOTHA
Little as it may be my business here to minutely describe
those stirring days, it would be none the less impossible for
the impressions of this first London International Exhibition
to drop out of my memory. I have visited and seen all the
really international exhibitions, and a great many of the
smaller exhibitions, but nothing of all the numerous enter-
prises which have since sprung up, whether for single countries,
or for the entire world, can be even approximately compared
with the significance of the first London Exhibition.
All and everything that was to be seen here was new, and
this complete originality of the thing struck the spectator
most deeply. It was at the same time the last great occasion
on which the English aristocracy made an effort to appear
once more in its full glory before all Europe.
The Nobility undertook the representation of England in
a manner such as it has never done again on any other
occasion. Every imaginable splendour and luxury was dis-
played, as if this, too, had belonged to the ‘Exposition.” Later
exhibitions had a more popular and a more industrial
character. The first London exhibition was pre-eminently
aristocratic. On the opening day nearly 4000 state equipages
appeared, and the Royal party drove up almost daily in full
splendour to visit the Exhibition rooms. The Queen and her
Consort stood in the zenith of their glory.
The busier people had been prophesying the most terrible
dangers from the conflux of such large masses of people,
and the more they had threatened and menaced with
revolutions and plots, the more imposing was the reverence
paid on every occasion to the Royal couple by the millions
who arrived in London during the next six months for
the purpose of visiting the Exhibition. The Court was
hospitable to excess, and showed itself grand and brilliant in
every respect. Prince Albert did not content himself with
conducting the Exhibition merely as its Supreme head, but he
was in the full sense of the word the soul of everything.
Even his most bitter enemies acknowledged the greatness
of his achievements with rare frankness at the time, and it
may not be out of place in these commemorative pages,
POLITICAL EFFECT OF THE EXA/IBITION I I
dedicated to him as they are with all my heart, to insert here
the following words of a German admirer of my brother:
‘Like the Memorial erected to him by his Royal widow,
which towers aloft in the neighbourhood where he once
enjoyed his purest triumphs in life, so will the memory of
Prince Albert, who passed so much too early from this life,
ever remain connected with the success and the results of that
enterprise, the financial proceeds of which practically enabled
further institutions of general utility to be founded. A
disciple of Peel, and related to him in mind, both as regards
practical sense and noble tastes, he was able to breathe some-
thing of his own spirit into this work, the effect of which,
indeed, has been felt from New Zealand to California.”
Meanwhile the great world-festival had not failed to react
also in a political respect. The numerous princely personages
who appeared in London took away impressions that contrasted
diametrically with the absolutistic doings, which had of late
become the order of the day on the Continent. It was of no"
little importance, too, in a personal respect, that many of the
German Sovereigns had convinced themselves that the liberal
tendencies, which my brother so emergetically maintained,
and which he expressed with so much unreserve to everybody,
were after all capable of attaining very practical ends. I will
not omit to mention particularly how enthusiastically the
Prince of Prussia, who was present at the opening of the
Exhibition, spoke to me about my brother's success, and how
he described to me the favourable impression which this
civilising movement had produced upon him. It accorded, he
said, so well with his feelings to see the highest spheres of
society evincing so much care for the welfare of the working
classes.
But also in the relations of the nations among each other
a very remarkable change had taken place, since, and through,
* I take this opportunity of gratefully acknowledging the fact that my brother
should have found so warm a defender in a German scholar, now, I regret to say,
recently deceased, whose works have contributed much towards silencing the
malevolent opinions that were from time to time still prevalent against my brother
in Germany. In this respect both Pauli’s essays and his excellent History of
England have had greater effect than the ‘Life of the Prince Consort,” which has
been made too little accessible to the German public. .
I 2 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXEcoBURG-60THA
the International Exhibition. If, during the reign of Louis
Philippe, all attempts at mutual advances between England
and France had been seen to fail, one of the reasons for this
failure was thought to consist necessarily in the inextinguish-
able national jealousy existing between these two nations.
It was this prejudice which most unmistakably collapsed
in the summer of the year 1851. At that period the intimate
union between the two great nations took place, which resulted
in the most important political consequences of the century.
Transcending by far the ephemeral interest of the festivities
which Englishmen and Frenchmen mutually afforded one
another in London and in Paris, there was formed between
the Western Powers a certain harmony of views and convic-
tions, with which they armed themselves against the rest of
the world. -
Still this entente cordiale, which proceeded from the con-
sciousness of the nations themselves, was very far from
bridging over the antipathy which at that time still prevailed
between the two Governments, and some time was to elapse
before the aversion felt in England against the President of
the Republic and his Imperial aspirations became softened.
Thus the 2nd of December approached, on the history of
which, obscure as it in part still remains, it is neither within
the range of my task, nor does it accord with my intentions,
to throw any light. I was personally, moreover, only in a
position accurately to observe the effects of the event, but not
its origin and history, although I learned various particulars
later on from persons who possessed an intimate knowledge
of the circumstances. The personally invidious reports
especially, which were spread concerning Napoleon's lack of
courage, and which afterwards became part of French literature
in the ‘Histoire d'un Crime,’ appeared to me to be devoid of all
foundation. -
The manner, however, in which the Cowp d’Etat was viewed
and judged in the most in portant circles of Europe, belonged
to the most noteworthy experiences that could be made at
that epoch. In England both the Queen and my brother
regarded the matter in the full sense of the word from a
LORD PALMERSTON'S APPROVAL AND FALL 13
moral point of view. Both were indignant at the breach of
faith and the character of conspiracy which marked the
preparations for this act of violence. The Governments in
Austria and Prussia, on the other hand, instantly viewed the
Coup d'Etat from the high horse of politics, and proclaimed
the parole of the ‘Deliverance of European Society, issued
from Paris, with a zeal, which made it probable that the truth
of this defence had really been believed. Consciences were
appeased, and the fact rejoiced in, that in France also the
revolution had at last been smothered.
But if Lord Palmerston was among those who approved
of the Cowp d’Etat, he no doubt had quite other motives than
the politicians in Germany and Austria, who were not exactly
to be commended for their great foresight in extolling the
successful deliverance of the State. It is well-known that, in
consequence of these conflicting tendencies, there took place in
England one of the most remarkable ministerial crises that
are recorded in modern Constitutional History, and Lord
Palmerston paid for his too ready approval of the Coup d'Etat
with his portfolio.
Prince Albert had certainly not improved his position with
the self-willed Minister of Foreign Affairs by the very strong
influence which he had thought it his duty to exercise on this
occasion. But it was a matter of conscience with him to
preserve the dignity of the Crown against an individual
member of the Privy Council. Hence the famous dismissal
of Lord Palmerston came about, which in English constitu-
tional history has become an important example of the fact
that even in England Ministers are by no means only over-
thrown by parliamentary majorities and minorities.
That my brother experienced, under these circumstances,
a feeling of unmixed satisfaction at the retirement of Lord
Palmerston, I can prove in the fullest measure from his
correspondence. But nothing was more mistaken than the
opinion, which prevailed here and there on the Continent, that
the Prince, in his opposition to the protector of continental
revolutions, had at last yielded to a consideration for the
reactionary Governments. There could be no greater error
14 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
than such a supposition, for if my brother's relation to Lord
Palmerston were to be generally indicated, it might rather be
said that the sole point on which they were united was a
certain dislike which they had in common to many persons
and circumstances.
‘I cannot complain of the past, Albert wrote at the close
of the year. ‘The Great Exhibition, the immense difficulties
of which had often caused me great anxiety, has gone off in
an incredibly fortunate and honourable way, without our
having the slightest contretemps to look back upon. And
now the year closes with the happy circumstance for us, that
the man who embittered our whole life, by continually placing
us before the shameful alternative of either sanctioning his
misdeeds throughout all Europe, and rearing up the Radical
party here to a power under his leadership, or bringing about
an open conflict with the Crown, and thus plunging the only
country where liberty, order, and lawfulness exist together
into the general chaos—that this man has, as it were, cut his
own throat. Give a rogue rope enough and he will hang
himself, is an old English adage with which we have some-
times tried to console ourselves, and which has proved true
again here. . . . We shall have all sorts of trouble with
Palmerston, who is furious; and with a Reform Bill besides,
which has been promised, and on the practical carrying through
of which a great deal depends for the whole of Europe.'
In the latter respect the Prince was not mistaken. Pal-
merston managed to apply the lever to the Reform Bill in
such a way as to overthrow every one of his old colleagues,
and the new Ministry of Lord Derby afforded but little
prospect of a long existence.
‘Lord Derby, even my brother said, on March 10, 1852,
is an excellent man, but he himself calls his Ministry “the
Derbyshire Militia, fresh from the plough, ready to be dis-
banded immediately.” Not one of them has ever filled a
public office before; “people one never saw or heard of
before,” says the old Duke. Hence the phase must be regarded
as a transition phase, and we are principally labouring to
make it lead to something sound and solid. However, to this
FEAR OF BOMA PARTISM I 5
end it will be necessary to reduce the political parties once
more to two, and to settle, once for all, the question of
Protection and Free Trade. For this purpose Parliament will
probably have to be dissolved towards the month of June.
‘Meanwhile our defensive measures are to be continued,
and a Militia of 120,000 men, which existed from 1688–
1832, will be introduced. Also a reserve force of marines, and
an increase of our artillery and coast defences. The navy is
in the very best condition.’
It was very remarkable that the nation was at that time
seized with a regular rage for securing itself, by all sorts of
the most extraordinary fortifications, against attacks of some
neighbour or other, which were as improbable as they would
have been useless from a military point of view. The English
public, and in part also the Royal Court, were then dreaming
of an impending war with France, and of an unforeseen
landing of the French army in England. Hence the carrying
out of the precautionary measures of the English Government
mentioned by my brother, which, from a strictly military
standpoint, were of very trifling importance.
It gave one the impression as if Palmerston's policy in
years gone-by had so heavily burdened the conscience of the
English, that they now saw the spectre of foreign invasions
starting up on all sides.
Whilst in Paris the undecided, wavering, and in reality
very anxious, Imperial Candidate was casting longing looks
at England, in the hopes that he would after all succeed in
obtaining some token of love from the Royal House, the world
thought it necessary to fear his rolling eye, and to arm itself
against his hidden designs.
It was no doubt Stockmar, whose more historical con-
ception of Bonapartism had the effect of causing the deep
distrust with which people thought it desirable to watch
every step taken by the Lord of France, as my brother expressed
himself. But King Leopold, too, had his share in increasing
this general fear, and in furthering in every way the tendencies
of the coalition of 1815.
I had visited Brussels on my journey to London in 1851,
16 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GO THIA
and had thoroughly discussed the political situation with my
uncle. He was not able positively to deny that the condition
of Germany had become intolerable and untenable through
Austria's conduct and Prussia's pliancy, but he declared that,
in face of the general state of affairs, he knew of no means
to escape from this dilemma. Persuaded that Napoleon
speculated on nothing else but the disunion of the Powers, in
order to take the left bank of the Rhine, the King had just
then entered into an intimate correspondence with Prince
Metternich, for the purpose of gaining influence on the
Eastern Powers through this statesman, who had now once
more come forward as the most distinguished, and, without
doubt, the most experienced, counsellor in Vienna. In this
sense he repeatedly wrote to the aged Chancellor, not merely
to warn him, but also to prove to him the necessity of
definitely, removing the inner difficulties existing between
Prussia, Russia, and Austria. It will be of great historical
interest to insert here a few passages from the letters of King
Leopold to Prince Metternich. -
‘LAEKEN, February 7, 1852.
“At last an opportunity offers to recall myself to the
memory of Your Serene Highness, which I have long been
wishing to do. Of your health, this indispensable blessing, I
hear to my hearty satisfaction the best reports.
‘Many and unexpected things have now happened again in
the country, which for sixty years has been keeping poor
Europe in a state of continual anxiety and suspense. There
is much in the step which could only be regarded with satis-
faction, as it might lead to a strengthening of authority, of
which there is indeed great need. But now the fear arises
that the programme of the Emperor Napoleon is henceforward
to be the aim of all endeavours. Against this danger there is
but one remedy : the three Great Powers of the Continent
must remain firmly and faithfully united in their common
defence. An intelligent study of the history of 1792 till
August 1813 shows what was the ruin of the Powers, and
what then saved them. By no means let us under-estimate
LETTERS FROM KING LEOPOLD TO METTERNICH 17
France. Only the three Powers wrvited can make their weight
felt, and maintain the condition which has after all been the
means of preserving peace for thirty-five years, If it is seen
that the breaking of engagements will be resented with united
forces, it will not be attempted. But if there should be any
hope of severing the ties existing between the Powers, then
there is no doubt that an attack will be made.
‘Would that this truth might take thorough hold of the
conviction of the Powers, and they may be almost certain that
the result will be a grand one. Our position here is extremely
difficult; still I hope we shall succeed in so modifying it, that
it will become no cause for embarrassment. The press has
already considerably modified its tone, and as to what the
need of the moment is and may be, that will have to be taken
into consideration.
‘My health has suffered so much these last two years, that
I sometimes doubt whether it will not leave me in the lurch
altogether. Will Your Highness have the kindness to re-
member me to the Princess, and to accept the expression of
my very sincere friendship.’ -
‘LAEKEN, March 15, 1852.
“A good opportunity is afforded me to thank Your High-
ness for your very friendly and interesting letter of February
27, and I seize it with genuine pleasure. The danger which
was imminent at the end of last year, was undoubtedly the
struggle that was to be apprehended on the part of the
anarchists against all regular forms of government. The
Coup d'Etat, as the saying is, completely nonplussed people by
its unexpectedness. Managed with moderation it was, and it
still is, capable of giving Louis Napoleon an excellent position,
similar to that of Napoleon in 1804. We now seem to be
moving more and more in a fatalistic direction; the career of
the uncle with a few embellishments, dermière édition com-
siderablement ameliorée. That is our future | Something
was still to have been added by way of a surprise, this seems
pretty certain, and concerned us here. But it appeared on
maturer consideration after all rather risky.
VOL. III. B
18 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA.XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
<i>
‘I have now been known to Your Highness for many years.
I have never let myself be surprised in any extravagance, in
any worship of false gods, or confused opinions, mad as the
confusion has after all been. I therefore hope to keep an un-
biassed opinion also at the present crisis. My belief is that,
in face of too many difficulties, a good deal will be postponed,
but that at any rate the uncle is to be continued with a ven-
geance. Whether this will succeed, is a different question.
What caused the ruin of the uncle, was the notion, which after
all was not quite correct, that it would be impossible for him
to rule the French without occupying them with Foreign
Affairs and wars. In the case of the nephew this idea will
perhaps prevail on better grounds, for it is manifest that the
difficulties he has to contend with at home are incomparably
greater. -
‘For his leadership of France he deserves the good wishes
of the great monarchic States. Against her inclination to
encroach and break out' of bounds, France must be impressed
with the fact that Europe is, and will remain, united. The
moral impression produced upon the French by this fact will
be immense, and that it is a fact is a perfect blessing for
France herself and for Europe. The idea will have less in-
fluence on the nephew, because he builds great hopes upon the
separation of the Powers. The chief thing that remains,
therefore, both against anarchy and personal ambition, is
alliance in international politics, above all the alliance of the
three great Continental Powers.
‘England is not likely to be the first to come forward with
declarations, excepting as regards us here, but should amibition
show itself, she will soon be seen in the lists. Austria, my
ever dear Austria, has of late gained an immense deal of
ground. I only wish that by simple means, which you spoke
to me about here only last year, her finances might be brought
into a normal condition. To raise the paper-money to its true
value, and by this means again bring about a healthy circula-
tion of wealth, will not be so difficult. The way to do it is
indicated by the measure which banks adopt to procure
money-value for their notes. . . . But my letter is drawing
LETTERS FROM KING LEOPOLD TO METTERNICH 19
out to an endless length. I will therefore only add that
circumstances now allow of the Polish officers being removed,
the rather for its having been proved that all of them have
secret engagements, which would make them unreliable in a
contest where their interests were concerned.
‘May your voice, my dear and beloved Prince, still be
heard in the glorious old monarchy, helpfully as ever, and
for a long time to come. May your health too bear up
bravely, and may I always keep a place in your friendly
sentiments, which I reciprocate with such genuine sincerity.’
‘LAEKEN, Wovember 17, 1852.
‘Your Highness has had no news from me for a long time,
but I have not been very well, and have been overwhelmed,
besides, with business, which is increased and aggravated
beyond human capacity by the political organisation under
which we exist. But the sincere desire seizes me to have a
frank and confidential talk with you. Would that I could do
so verbally.
‘In a few days hence we shall have Napoleon III: And
he has a programme, with which he is occupied day and
night, and this is to bring France back again into exactly the
same position, to which Napoleon I had brought her in the
epoch of her culmination 1 May the Powers do what they
will; may only one thing not occur again: that they should
let themselves be induced to separate. Their holding together
has preserved peace for us since 1815. Their separation
would be the ruin of Europe, and of the Powers themselves.
The most remarkable part of the matter is, that every national
whim that might be worked upon is at the present moment
being sharply scrutinised in France. It is advisable, therefore,
to take every possible heed, and the traces will soon be found,
and will be found, indeed, everywhere. Even propagandist
measures will not be disdained. Morny, who sometimes
expresses himself very plainly, mentioned it only a short time
ago. So long as the Powers do not let themselves be
separated, they will be difficult to conquer, and their union,
moreover, will have an extremely in posing effect upon France.
20 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
But Your Highness must recall past memories, and consider
how every peace, every truce, has always been employed to
take still more than it had been possible to obtain in open
war: the pretty mixture de fraude et de violence. Every-
thing can still be preserved through unity among the Powers.
It will be Your Highness' most precious laurel, to have
strengthened and preserved this unity in every possible way.
‘Here we are continuing quietly, though rather trouble-
somely for me, on our own, after all very sensible, way. We
shall make every effort to give our neighbour no pretext, but
we shall at the same time do everything in our power to
defend ourselves. By the spring Antwerp will be one of the
grandest defensive positions that can be imagined, and of the
greatest importance to Europe. I must now close for to-day,
begging you to remember me kindly to the Princess, and ever
to believe in the true friendship and sincere admiration, with
which I remain Your Highness's, etc.'
As may be seen from the foregoing letters, King Leopold
had been watching, not without apprehension, the encouraging
attitude of Austria and Prussia towards Louis Napoleon, and
he hoped, through Prince Metternich, to awaken all the
reminiscences of the times of the Holy Alliance. The only
evil was, that it was simply impossible to bridge over certain
conflicting interests which existed between the Powers who
represented the Coalition of 1815. On the one hand the
circumstances in Italy, and on the other hand the eastern
plans of Russia, had become serious obstacles to a really
unanimous course of action on the part of the Great Powers.
A change in the grouping of the allied Powers might be
expected at any time, and Napoleon had but to wait patiently,
until some fine day the longed for friendship of England
would fall to his share like a ripe fruit from the tree.
As to Italy, nearly all parties in England were agreed
to oppose absolutism there by every possible means. My
brother's feelings had been so much stirred by the descriptions
of the state of affairs in Italy, that no tolerance could ever be
expected from him again towards the absolute powers there.
IN DIGNATION AGAINST A USTRYA 2 I
When Gladstone's famous pamphlet on the prisons of Naples
appeared, which, as had to be confessed later on, was written
with very doubtful accuracy, Albert wrote to me: “If you want
to picture to yourself how far the reactionaries carry things,
you must read Mr Gladstone's report on the state of affairs in
Naples. I am sending you his letter to Lord Aberdeen by the
next post. It makes one's hair stand on end to read it.'
My brother's indignation was soon directed in the same
measure against Austria. Public opinion in England had been
especially enraged by the flogging system that had been
employed in Milan against men and women. At length the
tlecrees of confiscation threatened to create a commotion in the
diplomatic circles of England, and my brother was by no
means inclined to exert a soothing influence in the matter.
Very interesting is what he wrote to me on the subject in
March, 1853:
‘To give you a conception of the maxims of justice and
policy, which Austria has lately been developing, I enclose an
extract of a report from Turin, which treats of the decrees of
confiscation in Italy.” People here will be very indignant, and
* The enclosed English report says:–
The information, which the Sardinian Government has received from Vienna,
appears to consist, as I am informed, of a report of the remonstrances addressed
verbally by M. de Revel, the Sardinian Minister at Vienna, to Count Buol;--of the
replies of that Minister, and of a note which the Cabinet of Vienna has addressed to
Count Appony, the Austrian Minister at Turin.
M. de Revel appears to have dwelt principally upon the great wrong done to
Piedmont by the illegal and violent proceedings of the Austrian authorities in
Lombardy, as affecting Sardinian subjects.
To this Count Buol replied that Austria was dying of legality, or, to use his own
words, “la legalité / la legalité mous tue /? M. de Revel then urged that the acts of
Austria, were in direct violation of the 4th Article of the treaty of 1851 between
Austria and Sardinia.
Count Buol answered, that Austria would not be bound by that international
compact. He said, ‘that treaty is poison to us, and knowing it to be poison is
good reason for not drinking it.’
M. de Revel then urged that the decree included all classes of emigrants within
its sweep, which was clearly unjust, as there are instances of persons, who emigrated
from Austria thirty years ago, who are affected by it ; of orphan children, who cannot
have plotted; of widows, who are powerless against Austria ; and of other helpless
inoffensive persons. He held that a distinction ought to be made in these several
classes, if only for form's sake. -
Count Buol declared that no distinction was possible, or should be made, that
those of the emigrants who are not ‘assassins’ would be willing and ready to hire and
pay assassins, that he considered them all, in short, as assassins, and Austria would
deal with them as such.
M. de Revel told him, that a note should be addressed without delay to Count
Appony for presentation to the Sardinian Government. This note has arrived in
Turin. It is dated the 9th inst. It cuts off every hope of a reasonable adjustment
22 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA.KE-COBURG-GOTHA
would scarcely take Austria's part against Germany and
Prussia again so vehemently as they did before. The majority
among the higher grades of the English public was to all
intents and purposes thoroughly Austrian. This has been so
little appreciated in Vienna, that the Camarilla has succeeded
in incensing the whole of England against Austria, and there
is no longer anyone to defend her That is bad, for times .
may come when England's friendship might be of the greatest
importance, and Italy, thus tormented, oppressed, and trampled
in the dust, will never be appeased. The last rising was
Mazzinist, and looked upon as an abomination by the upper
classes. Now the repressive measures are directed against
the upper classes themselves. How clumsy An English
proverb says even of so small a creature as a rat: “Never pen
a rat up in a corner, for it must then fly to your face.”
Meanwhile the assumption of the Imperial title had
actually taken place on the part of Louis Napoleon, and,
reading the biography of Prince Albert by Martin, it might
almost be supposed that the hostile feeling of the English
Court against him had then already been overcome.
Napoleon having given conclusive promises concerning the
preservation of peace and the respecting of France's frontier,
the Queen, in contrast to the Emperor Nicholas, declared her-
self ready to concede to the new Emperor the honours which
of the question at issue between Austria and Sardinia. I have reason to believe that
there is no argument advanced, no reason given, for the attack by Austria upon the
right of Piedmont. -
This note declares, broadly and distinctly, that, if Piedmont does not perform the
office of a police agent for Austria, she shall be crushed. The supreme will of the
Emperor, and the safety of the Austrian Empire, is the sole ground put forward for
the conduct of the one State towards the other.
There is a broad hint that a change of Government in Piedmont—a radical
alteration of the Constitution—the destruction of the liberties of the Piedmontese
Press, may soften the blow which Austria declares she is ready to deal at Piedmont :
but even with these conditions it is clear that the part subsequently assigned to
Piedmont is that of police agent to Austria.
Lord Westmoreland to Lord Clarendom. Vienna, March 13, 1853.
“With respect to the sequestrations in Lombardy, Buol states the ground upon
which it has been done to be the positive knowledge that the money arising from the
various properties, which have been sequestered, is employed in supporting the
conspiracies carried on against the Austrian Government ; that is, employed to pay
a most hostile Press, and to carry on the schemes of the revolutionary agitators, and
as he holds, that persons having property in a State, although they are maturalised in
another, yet are bound to act as loyal subjects to that State, consequently that their
property can justly be made responsible for the acts, which they may be proved to
have committed contrary to the loyalty which was due from them.’
LOUIS NAPOLEON'S MARRIAGE PLANS 23
he expected. But inwardly the opposition still smouldered
OI) . -
‘L'empire will now be launched in Paris, and Europe may
prepare for a fright ! We are polishing our rusty cannons,
and building fortifications. We have established a Militia of
eighty thousand men, are improving our arms, and are very
active. As to the latter, it would be very desirable if I could
get a Prussian needle-gun, like those now carried by the army.'
If, on the part of the great families, Louis Napoleon was
in truth still far from being regarded as an equal among the
sovereigns of Europe, he had created this awkward position
for himself, in part through his despoliation of the Orleans
family, which hardly anybody had forgiven him. I myself
became involved in this affair, as both the Duke of Nemours
and Duke Augustus requested me to raise a protest in my
capacity as head of the house, which was concerned in many
respects in the confiscations of the fortunes of the Orleans.
My brother much approved of this, and desired me to accede
to the request of the Orleans: g
“I just hear,’ he wrote to me, ‘that you have been asked b
Nemours to protest, as head of the house, for Augustus and
Victoire and their children, against their shameful despoliation
through Louis Napoleon. I write to you at once to express
my hope that you will do so without delay, and with all the
energy at your command. But I would advise that the
protest be drawn up on purely legal grounds, and everything
political be kept out of it. I presume that you are provided
with all the necessary documents, and that you possess copies
of the marriage contracts.’
These circumstances had perhaps done most towards
damaging Louis Napoleon's credit with the legitimate Courts,
and, at my first meeting with him as Emperor, I could not
conceal from him that the confiscation of the private fortune
of the Orleans had been one of the greatest mistakes of his
Government. This act of violence was doubly unreasonable
at a moment when the Emperor was cherishing the idea of
seeking closer relations with the old families by means of his
marriage. -
24 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
He had cast his eyes first, apparently because an approach
in that quarter would not be so difficult, upon a grand-
daughter of the Grand Duchess Stephanie of Baden, but, just
as he believed the matter was successfully set on foot, he was
surprised by the news of the very happy engagement of that
much admired Princess. Afterwards he sought to gain his
purpose with a mediatised princely house, to which I myself
am closely related. But the father of the amiable Princess
was not to be shaken in his opinion that German considera-
tions of rank made it impossible for his daughter to marry a
Napoleon. Thereupon Napoleon declared that he would never
make another attempt to enter into an alliance with the old
families, for they were incorrigible in their prejudices. The
object of his first choice now adorns a German Royal throne.
The other, blessed by a happier fate than the French Emperor
had in store for her, has become the mother of a rich
Imperial race.
|For the initiated it had, under these circumstances, a
flavour of quite especial piquancy, when Napoleon, some weeks
later, announced his selection of Donna Eugenia Montijo to
the French in the words: “Dynastic alliances only produce
a delusive security, and place family interest in the stead
of national interest. For seventy years all foreign Princesses
married in France have been unhappy. There is only one
whom the people remember with pleasure, and she did not
spring from Royal blood.’
If, moreover, the Emperor of the French called himself,
with evident intention, a parvenu, which he declared to be a
glorious title, it was astonishing enough that he thereby not
only gained the favour of the great mob, but even reaped the
highest praise from people like Lord Palmerston. These
arguments ought only not to have been the consequence of
discomfitures such as followed his courtships in the sovereign
families For as to the sympathy which Palmerston ex-
pressed with the French Emperor's marriage plans, showing,
as they did, his disdain of princely alliances, the ever-active
tongue of scandal pretended to know of a particular explana-
tion. Indeed, the question was propounded, whether the
DONMA EUGEN IA MONTIJO 25
noble lord might not be experiencing a pleasure, something
akin to that of a father-in-law, at the Emperor's marriage
with Donna Eugenia. However in spite of the phrases with
which Napoleon's proclamation abounded, it could not be
asserted that his marriage was a very popular one, even with .
people in France. The aristocratic world said, the family
Montijo does not belong to our circles, and the other part of
the Parisian world was of opinion that the Emperor might
have made just as good a choice among the ladies of France.
The consequence was, that the most unfounded rumours were
circulated concerning the antecedents of the young lady.
They were ultimately, indeed, only overcome by the personal
charm and the incomparable beauty of the Empress herself,
who, in spite of all her fanciful views of life, produced upon
everyone who really knew her the noblest impression of
innocence and female virtue.
At any rate, the newly established Empire had taken such
deep root in France that the marriage of Napoleon could be
made an excuse for carrying out great demonstrations, which
proclaimed aloud to all the world the Imperialistic basis and
tendencies of the French national will.
It was a peculiar coincidence that just at the same time
the marriage of the Heir-Apparent in the neighbouring
kingdom of Belgium with an Austrian Princess was being
contemplated, and that by this means two families were
united, between which history had no marriage to record
since the founding of the Ernestine House of Saxony.
It gave my uncle the more satisfaction to have brought
about this, in a certain measure, memorable connection of his
house with the Austrian family, as he had himself long been
regarded at the Eastern Courts as the representative of a re-
volutionary tendency. On the 22nd of August the marriage
of Leopold II with the Archduchess Maria, daughter of the
deceased Palatine Joseph, took place. On the occasion of this
journey I had for the last time the pleasure of seeing my ex-
cellent uncle in Gotha.
The year 1853 produced all sorts of changes in the personal
relations of the European sovereign houses. The end of the
26 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
year was to bring about a sad event in our own widely con-
nected family, in the death, on the 15th November, of Queen
Donna Maria. According to the laws of the Portugese State
my cousin was obliged to carry on the Government himself,
until his eldest son came of age, and he had many difficulties
to contend with. Everywhere, both in German affairs, and in
the general affairs of Europe, new, uncertain, and entirely
unstable, situations had to be reckoned with. In the midst of
these increasing political changes I was obliged to proceed to
England on business of a chiefly political character. I had
many important matters to discuss and negotiate with my
brother, which it was hardly possible to bring to a satisfactory
conclusion by letter. On the one hand our domestic affairs,
relating to the questions of the Constitution and the property
of the Thuringian Duchies, had to be settled ; on the other
hand the general political circumstances made an understand-
ing between us necessary. ſº
I travelled from Berlin, in company with my wife, first
via Cologne to Brussels, where we received at Laeken, on June
12, the news of the above-mentioned betrothal of the Duke of
Brabant to the Archduchess Maria. Late at night on the
13th of June, after a stormy passage from Calais to Dover, we
reached London, where Herr von Seebach, our Minister, had
already arrived. -
The negotiations we had to carry on with Prince Albert, in
relation to the domains of the Duchies of Coburg and Gotha,
were not likely to lead to any result by writing, because my
brother in principle absolutely adhered to the agnatic protest *
which he had raised against the law concerning the State
domains of March 25, 1849. The Diet of Gotha, on the other
hand, in revising the Constitution, which was accomplished
by the new law concerning the State domains of May 3, 1852,
persisted in its entirely opposite view in the question of the
domains. Everything, therefore, depended upon our giving
the Prince fuller particulars of the situation, and I had reason
to hope that Herr von Seebach, who, during the short tenure
of his office, had not only won the greatest respect in the
* See vol. i., p. 246.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH ALBERT RELATING TO GOTHA 27
country, but who also possessed my fullest confidence, would
best overcome these difficulties by his personally convincing
Iſla, Ill le]".
The recollections of this little English episode have been
so gracefully recorded by Herr von Seebach, in an historical
pamphlet, which was written at my desire, that I cannot do
better than employ his words in reporting on this more
practical side of our stay in London.
“After the course which the discussions with the
Chamber of Deputies in Gotha had taken, Herr von Seebach
reports, ‘I was firmly persuaded that any fresh attempt to
bring about an agreement with the representatives of the
country, on the basis of the proposal made by the Prince, would
fail by reason of their opposition. But on the other hand I
could entertain no doubt, in face of one or two casual remarks
of the Prince and his attorney, that the Prince was by no
means disposed to abandon the view hitherto maintained by
him. -
“At the desire of the Duke, who entertained the same
apprehension, I therefore, before opening the discussion,
requested Baron Stockmar, who was also present in London,
to let me make a detailed report to him on the whole matter,
and to give me the advantage of his support, provided my
report convinced him that the view I represented deserved
preference, as matters lay, to that of the Prince.
‘Baron Stockmar acquiesced, and after listening with great
attention to my long report, in which I fully expounded the
reasons for the ministerial proposal, and those in disfavour of
the Prince's, and after putting one or two questions, said, “You
are right, the Prince is wrong, and will be sure to give way.”
‘The discussion had been appointed several times, but had
always been postponed, and it only took place a short
time before the departure of the Duke, in Baron Stockmar's
study in Buckingham Palace, in the presence of the Duke,
Prince Albert, and Court Councillor Briegleb. It was opened
by me with a report explaining in detail the whole history of
the matter, and illustrating the reasons and counter reasons
respecting the two proposals in question.
28 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURGº-GO THIA
‘The discussion, which then ensued, was interrupted by a
message from Her Majesty the Queen, who wished to speak
with the Prince.
‘Until then, Baron Stockmar, sitting in his arm-chair, with
his eyes half-closed, had maintained complete silence, and I
was already afraid that I had reckoned in vain upon his
support.
“But when Prince Albert, who had risen to comply with
the Queen's wish, answered to the Duke's suggestion that he
should stay at least long enough to allow of the matter being
settled: “I cannot possibly decide at once. I must first con-
sider the matter carefully,” Baron Stockmar also rose, and,
going up to the Prince, said: “Prince you have already con-
sidered the matter. I know you too well, not to be aware that
you had made up your mind to abandon your position directly
after the Minister had finished his report. You had better say
yes soon, for you will do so to-morrow after all.”
‘The Prince smiled, gave the Baron his hand, and left the
room with the words : “To-morrow, then.”
‘The next day, then, he really declared his consent to the
ministerial proposal, and afterwards explained his motives for
doing so in a detailed memorandum, which was to be placed
on the records of the Ministry, and which is still preserved here.
‘Thus the basis was gained, which the Government con-
sidered suitable for further negotiations with the representa-
tives of the country, and upon which the legal agreement
regarding the domains in Coburg and Gotha was afterwards
actually concluded.’
If, therefore, our journey to London could becalled successful
as regards the inner affairs of my Duchies, it was also inter-
esting in every other respect, and has remained ever memor-
able to me, by reason of the many noteworthy meetings and
events which followed in its train.
It chanced that, during those fine and stirring spring days
at the Court of the Queen, also the Duke of Genoa, the
new King and Queen of Hanover, and finally the Prince
and Princess of Prussia appeared, partly together, and part y
in succession, as guests at the Royal Court.
THE QUEEN AND THE DUKE OF GENOA 29
In the brother of King Victor Immanuel, whom I saw
here for the first time, I became acquainted with one of the
cleverest and most amiable men of our time. Sunny Italy
appeared to have sent him to England in the prime of his age,
so that, by his mere presence alone, he might make propaganda
for the cause of his country. And, indeed, nothing could be
compared with the attentions that poured in upon him from
all sides. Prince Albert's enthusiasm for Italy had at that
time, properly speaking, reached its highest pitch. Through
artists who dabbled in politics, like Marochetti in particular,
his artistic tendencies received, as it were, unnoticed and
imperceptibly, a highly political character.
It was characteristic of the outspoken sympathies for Italy
that the Queen presented the Duke of Genoa with a handsome
riding horse. When the Duke thanked her with considerable
emotion for this great attention, this Queen spoke the following
memorable words, which said perhaps more than a whole
book full of diplomatic Notes on the Italian question ; ‘I hope
you will ride this horse, when the battles are fought for the
liberation of Italy.'
At the present day, when the accomplished facts are
recognised by everybody, it is hardly possible to conceive the
effect which the amiable encouragement of the Queen of
England was calculated to produce on the course of events
which were then developing.
However, the King of Hanover took care that the conver-
sations did not enter into any too aggressive paths. With
the persistency of a man who, on account of his infirmity,
appeared in the habit of expecting every possible considera-
tion, he lectured from morning till evening on the aims and
purposes of his Christianly Germanic reign. That Prince
Albert at times gave free scope to his satire against every-
thing that lost itself in romantic chimeras, seemed to discon-
cert him very little. The arrival of the Prince of Prussia,
which took place on June 27th, at length brought us back to
the practical problems of politics.
I believe I am not asserting too much, when I declare that
the pronounced tendency of the Prince, which made itself felt
30 MEMOIRS OF THE. DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
in the following years, in German and general European
affairs, raising such great hopes, and affording, as it did, the
first basis for the sympathies extended to the future King,
had some connection with this visit of his to England.
We found on this neutral ground, as it were, abundant
opportunity for an interchange of political ideas. As my
brother had already gained a complete insight into the
situation which Russia ultimately brought about, he did not
neglect to exert every means to win over the Prince of Prussia
to the position which the latter, to the astonishment of many,
afterwards really took up and maintained. It is certain that
the origin of the political ideas, which, in the course of the
next years, the Prince of Prussia considered himself bound to
uphold, even in opposition to his brother, were at least con-
nected with his stay in London in the year 1853. Our inter-
course here had, in the most natural way, assumed a very
confidential character, and I will not omit to mention, that it
was just at this period, too, that we adopted a more intimate
form of addressing each other.
Whilst the Court was still taken up with the festivities
connected with the christening of the Queen's youngest son,
Prince Leopold, the great Camp at Chatham had attracted
the attention of the country and the foreign Powers. For
a long time no similar military spectacle had been seen on the
plains of England. On the 21st of June,” the Queen, accom-
panied by Albert, King George, and myself, visited the camp,
where the troops were quartered in a vast city of tents. She
hereupon held a review of all the troops, and then watched
from an adjoining height a few tactical evolutions, which
appeared to us to be rather childish.
Probably no one then believed that these troops were so
soon to face the most serious tasks of war, nor had anybody
yet an idea that in a short time the English army was to
prove its sterling qualities on the distant battle-fields of the
Crimea.
* Not on the 24th of June, as Martin states: “Life of the Prince Consort,” ii.,
510. With regard to all more personal events, to which the epidemic of measles is
principally to be reckoned, which then attacked all the members of the Royal Family,
and which was carried by us to Brussels, I refer the reader to the accounts given in
that work.
THE ABER DEEN MINISTRY 3 I
In the inner relations of the powerful Empire, however,
the severe tension and irritability of the parties was already
felt. My brother, at such moments, concealed, behind principles
of the strictest constitutional doctrine, not unfrequently a
certain reserve when appearing in public. On these occasions
he avoided creating the appearance, as if he personally inclined
more to one or the other party, or opinion. I still have a
lively recollection of a little scene, though quite of a friendly
character, which occurred between us in this respect.
I had been introduced by some acquaintances, amongst
which was Mr Oliphant, into the Cosmopolitan Club, where
the publisher of the Times, and other personages of pronounced
political views, concocted, as the saying went, so-called public
opinion. To me it was of the most instructive interest to
attend gatherings of this kind in London. But when Prince
Albert heard of these acquaintances and visits of mine, he
assailed me with no slight fraternal reproaches for indulging,
as his brother, in such political intercourse. That I, as a
German and a Sovereign, was in a position to hold intercourse
with all parties, he would by no means allow, so far as England
was concerned.
The Aberdeen Ministry, which had been in office since
December 27, 1852, glittered in many colours, and my brother
therefore thought he ought to show a particular degree of
objectivity, in order, as he expressed it, not to disturb the
adjustment of parties. Yet everybody was aware that the
attempt at a coalition, on which the title Ministry of all the
Talents had ironically been bestowed, gave no guarantee of a
long duration. Protectionists and Peelites had found a place
in the Cabinet; also Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston;
and there was no harmony to be found between Home and
Foreign policy. Palmerston, as Home Secretary, could not
indulge much in his favourite activity, and had to confine
himself to bringing his influence to bear on Lord Clarendon,
who conducted the Foreign Office, and who was an enemy of
all intriguing policy.
A unanimous national conviction really only existed on
the one point, that England ought to offer steady resistance
32 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
to the allurements of the Emperor Nicholas respecting the
division of the Turkish inheritance. When, in the middle of
the year 1853, the Emperor had convinced himself that he
would persuade neither England nor France to take part in
the robbery, nothing remained to deceive him with regard to
the position of affairs but his absolute confidence in the
followership of Austria and Prussia.
I will only allude in a few words to the origin of the
Eastern complications. It is well-known how the simple
dispute about the Holy Places soon opened up the question of
the Emperor Nicholas's protectorship of the Greek Church in
the East, and how, with this turn of affairs, the rest of Europe
became more and more involved in the diplomatic conflict
going on at the Porte.
I will not repeat what has been said so often, that the
treaties afforded the Emperor Nicholas no means of proving
his sovereign right over all the Greek Christians in Turkey.
But, glancing retrospectively at these things, it may be said
that it was a delusion on the part of the Western Powers, if
they hoped to procure a tolerable position for the Christian
nations in the East, by means of Turkish promises and decrees
of the Sultan. . It had been acknowledged by Lord Aberdeen
himself, in the course of the negotiations of the year 1853,
that no reliance could be placed upon the promises made from
time to time by Turkey, in respect of reforms. But a solution
of the Eastern Question by forcible means was far from being
desired, and it was endeavoured to check the outbreak of a
war between Russia and Turkey at any price.
At the beginning of the year, Austria and Russia, by means
of special missions, had sought to bring pressure to bear on
Turkey. Austria espoused the cause of the Montenegrines,
sent Count Leiningen to Constantinople, and was gratified by
a brilliant success with the Porte. Russia, on the other hand,
by the mission of General Mentschikoff, undertook to draw
the attention of the Slavonic and Orthodox population of
Turkey away from Austria, and to represent herself as the
true patron of those subjects of the Sultan, who were related
to her both by race and by creed.
THE ORIGIN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION 33
The draft of the treaty presented to Reschid Pasha by
Mentschikoff on May the 20th was declined by the Porte, and
Mentschikoff took his departure without having effected his
purpose. Even after diplomatic relations between Russia and
Turkey had been broken off, the preservation of peace was
still by no means despaired of in England, although the Court,
the Cabinet, and the public, were every day talking them-
selves more into a state of the greatest exasperation against
Russia.
Quite in contrast with this temper in England, Napoleon,
remarkably enough, showed himself, in those days, reserved
and extremely pacific. It was more the persuasion of the
English Cabinet, and particularly the urgent appeals of Lord
Palmerston, which induced the Emperor of the French to offer
his assent to the co-operation of the two fleets in the Bay of
Besica. But when in July the Russians occupied the Danu-
bian Principalities, England once more endeavoured to allay
the fanatic desire for war, which had seized the Turks, and,
by Lord Stratford's advice, the Porte, in order to show her
moderation in the strongest light, refused to regard the
invasion as a declaration of war. It was rather more difficult,
however, to induce the Porte to make material concessions
with regard to the Russian demands, and the influence of all
the Powers proved of no avail in face of the firm will of the
Porte not to admit anything in the shape of a protectorate of
Russia over the orthodox subjects of the Sultan.
Thus it came to Omer Pasha's letter to Gortschakoff, in .
which he called upon him to quit the Danubian Principalities
within a fortnight, which Gortschakoff of course refused to
do. On the part of the European Powers the programme
now arrived at was the greatest possible limitation of the
dangers of war, and they still hesitated to let the fleets enter
the Black Sea, lest they should encourage the war-like ardour
of the Turks. .
The Emperor Nicholas had been endeavouring, since
September, to obtain successively the alliance of Austria and
Prussia, indeed, even that of France. After having convinced
himself that he could not induce England to abandon her
VOL. III. - C
34 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAKE-COBURG-GOTHA
traditional policy, he tried to take advantage of the jealousy
and the ill-humour against ‘perfidious Albion,’ which un-
doubtedly prevailed, both in Austria, in natural contrast to .
the favour shown by England to the revolutionary move-
ments, and with Louis Napoleon, in consequence of the
personal slights he had sustained.
In Olmütz, where the Russian Czar had a meeting with
the Emperor Francis Joseph, and in Berlin, where he soon
after paid a visit to the King of Prussia, it was said to have
been observed that the relations of the old allies were no
longer absolutely secure. Notwithstanding, Russian policy
had no lack of faithful abettors both in Prussia and in Austria.
Various circles in Berlin, to which Prince Charles and his
adherents were no strangers, thought they might indulge in
hopes of a sort of conservative crusade against the revolu-
tionary doings encouraged by England. A curious attempt was
made to exclude several English subjects resident in Berlin
from the entertainments and festivities of the Court. That
part of society in the capital which was known for its Russian
sympathies made great show of celebrating Russian birthday
anniversaries, and matters were always so arranged that at
Court levees, and at the houses of the princes, as many
Russians appeared as possible.
In Austria the Emperor Nicholas had, besides, managed to
attain a diplomatic success. The Cabinet there, in compliance
with a Russian suggestion, came forward with the venturesome
proposal that the four Courts should assure Turkey that the
personal explanations of the Emperor Nicholas had fully con-
vinced them of his disinterested intentions. However, the
Western Powers no longer entered into this game. So far as
Prussia was concerned, no doubt the Czar had succeeded in
violently stirring up the King's feelings against Napoleon. But
the Prussian Government declared that it would not swerve
from its position of neutrality.
All these strong currents and counter-currents at the Courts
of the old allies did not prevent Gortschakoff, as ambassador
in Stuttgart, from again proposing to the Emperor Napoleon,
through his ambassador Count Béarn, a separate agreement
LETTERS FROM PRINCE ALBERT 35
on the whole Eastern difference. If these attempts failed, the
reason lay in the circumstance that the personal wishes of
Napoleon with regard to the recognition of his family were
not complied with on the part of Russia.
As to the really diplomatic course of the negotiations, which
proved unable to stay the ultimate clash of arms in Turkey, so
many documents and intimate correspondences relating to those
days have been published, that it would scarcely be possible to
say anything new on the subject. There are, however, several
erroneous impressions still prevailing with regard to the posi-
tion which individual personages of distinction occupied towards
one another at that time, and in this respect I can add, to the
facts which are already known, a few further explanations
from the correspondence of my brother.
‘You are right, he writes on October 20, 1853, to enquire
anxiously after the position of European politics. It is truly
a sad one, and depends chiefly upon whether the Emperor
Nicholas really desires war, or not. That he wishes for forbid-
den things, there can be no longer any doubt, after Nesselrode's
long explanatory memorandum. But as to whether he is ready
to pay for them with an European war, we are still unaware.
Much will depend on what attitude the Powers take up. And
the comedy which recently came to grief in Berlin, is the best
thing in this respect that could have happened for the preserva-
tion of peace. -
‘The Emperor desired a league, offensive and defensive, with
Austria and Prussia against England and France. In other
words, that Germany should once more pay the bill for his
Russian hankerings in the East. Austria assented, provided
that Prussia joined. . . . The Emperor summoned the King to
Warsaw, went at last to Berlin himself, succeeded, too, in lashing
the King into the greatest fury against France (which as it
happens, keeps quite quiet and pacific in the whole matter),
but failed in consequence of Manteuffel's firmness, who de-
clared that he would never deviate from Prussia's policy of
neutrality.”
* However, Manteuffel's merit is here decidedly over-estimated by my brother.
The idea of absolute neutrality was already originally the King's own, and was the
beginning of the vacillations which marked his behaviour towards Russia and the
Western Powers during the whole of the ensuing Crimean War.
36 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAACE-COBURG-GOTHA
‘We are forced to an entente cordiale with Louis Napoleon.
It is of advantage to him; they are just now very intent upon
making money in Paris; the Emperor is often ailing, etc. etc;
in short the temper over there is unusually quiet, and, with
regard to us here, docile and yielding. People here are
indignant with Russia, yet determined to preserve peace, as
long as it can be done. Our fleet (combined) has orders to
repel all attacks on the Turkish coast with force, but fresh
attempts at mediation are to be made, based upon the treaty
of 1841, including the latest Russian declarations from
Olmütz, avoiding the obstacles which Reschid Pasha dis-
covered in the Vienna note, and referring back to the treaties
of Kainardji and Adrianople. -
‘It is still undecided whether the Porte is to be threatened
that, if she resists a fair solution, she will be left in the lurch.
I am for doing so, because otherwise the mad fanatics,
reckoning on our assistance, will be capable of the silliest
follies, such as the present declaration of war. But I own
that it is difficult, because, whether they are right or wrong,
a moment may come, and probably would come in their war,
when we might be obliged to step in, not by any means for
their sakes, but on account of our own interests and those of
Europe. That is to say, we cannot let the Russians take
Constantinople. The difficulties there are enormous, those
with the mia!ed Cabinet here no less so, those in Petersburg
enough to drive one crazy; and still—an honest and manly
attitude on the part of Austria would make the fair and
peaceable solution of the dispute a matter of immediate
certainty.’
As may be seen, Prince Albert did not deceive himself as
to the difficulty of the situation, and he wrote a few days
later again in this sense:
‘There is still no end to be seen to the Eastern complication.
There are abominable elements at work, and ineffable skill
and perseverance will be necessary, especially on our part, to
prevent great mischief.'
The conclusion which was gradually being drawn from
these circumstances by German politicians, was that it would
PALMERSTON'S RESIGNATION AND RETURN 37
now be possible firmly to oppose the principles of the Holy
Alliances. All my hopes were now fixed on the non-realisa-
tion of the wishes, expressed a short time ago by my uncle,
with regard to the unity of the Eastern Powers. However,
public opinion in England had been driven by a portion of
the Ministry itself into an ever increasing agitation for war.
The conflict going on between the calmer and the more violent
views on the question, led to various misunderstandings, from
which my brother and the Queen had a great deal to suffer.
Particularly Lord Palmerston's withdrawal from the Cabinet
gave rise to the opinion, that disunion of a deeper kind
prevailed in the Government than was actually the case.
But as the motives which led to Lord Palmerston's step,
were then and afterwards very differently construed, it will
be only fair to hear what my brother himself says in the last
days of the year 1853 on this subject, which was soon after
to raise a good deal more dust.
‘I do not give up the hope yet, Albert wrote on December
19, that we shall still enforce peace. But the unreasonable-
ness, both on the part of the Russians, and on that of the
Turks, is incredible. One element of war quitted the Cabinet,
the day before yesterday, in the person of Lord Palmerston.
But merely on a question of Home Affairs. The great liberal
Bramarbas, who is striving to force free institutions upon all
countries, finds a reform-measure, approved of by Lord
Aberdeen, too liberal / / What a deal of trouble that man
has caused us already His cession from the Cabinet of
course weakens the Ministry, and gives the Protectionists and
Ultra-tories a leader in the Lower House, at whose head it is
probably his intention, one of these days, to force himself
upon us as Prime Minister.’
If Lord Palmerston, by his cession from the Cabinet, had
really had the intention of overthrowing the Aberdeen
Ministry, of placing himself at the head of the Government,
and then rigorously carrying through the warlike policy ad-
vocated by him, he had simply deceived himself. None of the
members of the Cabinet followed his example. Lord Aberdeen
remained undisturbed as Prime Minister, and a week
38 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
later Palmerston was received back again by his colleagues,
after having dropped his sham opposition to Russell's Reform
Bill. Among the public who held fast to the belief that
Palmerston had only come into conflict with the Cabinet on
account of the Eastern Question, his stay was regarded as a
sign that the policy of the Government was now approaching
warlike action. - -
Under these circumstances, a disposition arose which en-
tirely crushed all prudent and peaceable tendencies. The idea
of drifting on to war at the side of Louis Napoleon, which
was still so distasteful to my brother, had gradually to give
way to the conviction that the war, as the Queen wrote to
King Leopold at the time, was “incredibly popular.’ Curiously
enough, it was still to have a prelude in the well-known, and
not altogether harmless, attack of the Palmerstonian and
Napoleonic organs on my brother, with which the stirring
year 1854 was introduced.
CHAPTER II
THE YEAR 1854.—CHANGE IN THE DUKE's POLITICAL ATTITUDE.—HIS
JUSTIFICATION.—THE POSITION OF THE GREAT POWERS.—RUPTURE
BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA.——THE TREATY OF FRANCE AND
ENGLAND WITH TU RKEY. —THE WAR WITH RUSSIA.—THE COBU RGS
\ SUSPECTED OF SYMPATHISING WITH THE EASTERN POWERS.—
ATTACKS IN THE ENGLISH PRESS ON PRINCE ALBERT. —KING
LEOPOLD OF BELGIUM AND LOUIS NAPOLEON.—TIIE DUKE OFFERS
TO GO TO PARIS.——LETTER FROM KING LEOPOLD.—THE DUKE's
VISIT TO PARIS ARRANGED.—PRINCE ALBERT's DISPLEASURE. –
CORRESPONDENCE.—THE DUKE GOES FIRST TO BERLIN.—HIS
MEMORANDUM TO KING FREDERICK WILLIAM IV. —THE RUSSIAN
PARTY IN BERLIN.—KING LEOPOLD SETS FORTH THE POINTS TO BE
DISCUSSED WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—THE DUKE IN PARIS.—
HIS FRIENDLY RECEPTION.—KING JEROME. –IMPRESSIONS AT THE
COURT.—THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH.-CON-
VERSATIONS WITH NAPOLEON.—THE EMPEROR'S ANXIETY FOR AN
ALLIANCE WITH AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.—HIS WILLINGNESS TO
MEET PRUSSIA’s WISHEs.—DISCUSSIONS ON THE PLAN OF OPERA-
TIONS.—NAPOLEON's FUTURE PLANS.–HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BERLIN
AFFAIRs.—HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE KING OF
PRUSSIA.— PRINCE CIHIMAY.—THE ENDEAVOURS OF THE EMPRESS
EUGENIE TO DRAW THE DUKE ON THE SUBJECT OF QUEEN VICTORIA
AND PRINCE ALBERT.--THE DUKE's DILEMMA.—THE CHARACTER
of LOUIS NAPOLEON.—THE DUKE's VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.
THE year 1854 marks one of the greatest crises in the history
of European diplomacy, of European alliances, and of the modern
system of States altogether. What the revolution of 1848–
1850, the public opinion of half of Europe, the liberal and
national tendencies of the peoples, were not able to bring about,
had been set on foot by the Holy Places of the East and the
Turkish goings-on in Constantinople, by the Russian occupa-
tion of Wallachian territories, and by the roar of the cannon
40 MEMOIRs of THE DUKE of SAXEcoBURG-60THA
at Sinope. If both lawful and revolutionary risings against
the supremacy of the Holy Alliance had only served to fasten
the old ties all the more firmly, within and without, it was now
the policy of the Emperor Nicholas himself that was to
explode the antiquated alliances and friendships.
Over night, as it were, the moment had come when the
liberal minded portion of the West, and in particular of
Germany, could indulge in the well-justified hope that the
shackles of the Russian Colossus might at last be loosened,
and perhaps cast off for ever. And at any rate our subsequent
development, at least, was in chief part rendered possible, or
facilitated, by the weakening of Russia in the Crimean war.
If, then, the year 1854 marks an important chapter in the
general conditions of Europe, a certain change had at this
time also taken place in my own political mode of action and
bearing, for which the reader of these following pages will
expect some kind of justification. I thought it desirable at
that time to adopt a different, and, if the term may pass, a more
personal, course of proceeding, not as to the purposes and
aims, but as to the methods and means, of my public activity.
Amidst the commotion of the reaction which, in conse-
quence of the combined efforts of Russia, Prussia, and Austria,
still exercised its influence on every petty State in Germany,
I thought it incumbent on me to take my place on the public
stage, occupied by the movers and prompters of events, in a
far more decided and open manner than may be explainable
from the nature and character of my immediate and official
position. I had, by degrees, become personally involved in
political matters, and a host of negotiations and relations
were forced upon me, which, in the regular course of affairs,
are wont to fall almost exclusively to the lot of diplomatists
by profession.
The more all political life, since 1850, had become restricted
to the Cabinets, the more surely a participation in it could
only be gained, by treading the tortuous paths of secret nego-
tiations and personal action. But it was in the nature of a
small confederate State, that its Sovereign, unless he were
willed to altogether renounce all political activity, was obliged
THE POSITION OF THE GREAT POWERS 41
to act as his own foreign minister, his own ambassador, and
his own agent
This, then, may answer the question, which was perhaps
raised here and there at the time, as to how I came to meddle,
uninvited, in the international concerns of Europe. But the
answer to such objection was at bottom very simple. It was
quite intelligible and welcome, at the time, to every honest
German man who knew that every one is called upon, accord-
ing to his position, to help and save in the general distress as
much as he can. The state of things brought about by
Prussia's and Austria's dependence on Russia was so galling,
the general patriotic temper in Germany so envenomed, the
despair with which the future of Germany was regarded so
all-pervading, that an improvement of the inner situation
could only be hoped for by extraordinary means and efforts.
To use the favourable opportunity which the moment offered
me, to this purpose, appeared to me, under the circumstances,
merely a patriotic duty, and innumerable friends who shared
my sentiments, urged and pressed me every day to take the
fullest advantage of my position, in order that the long-desired
ends might be attained.
My object, in the first instance, was to separate Prussia in
connection with Austria from Russia, to overthrow in this
manner the prevailing political system, and, by the round-
about paths of diplomacy, to help the German Confederation,
buried since 1850, on to its legs again. Nor can I even now
regret having had at least a trifling share in the attainment
of the negative part of the task, because it admits of no doubt
that, much as Russia's friendship is to be desired, it would
have been quite impossible to have brought Germany to her
present exalted position, if the ascendency of Russia had
lasted. Russia could not have admitted it, in justice to herself,
bad she been spared the experiences of these years.
Seeing what aspect the personal and general state of
affairs had assumed at the end of the year 1853, there was no
longer anything to be hoped, or expected, from the exertion of
a direct—it may almost be said–loyal influence on the inner
concerns of the Diet, particularly in face of the composition of
42 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
the Berlin Chambers, the firm structure of the Kreutz-Zeitung
party, and the complete ascendency of a more and more
Ultramontane system in Austria. If, on the other hand, the
German Governments were urged more towards the policy of
the Western Powers in the great European question, and if, by
distinctly attaching themselves to England, at least in respect
of Eastern affairs, they were severed from Russia, the effect
on the inner affairs of Germany could not fail to be soon felt.
I therefore urged on in this direction, from my place, as much
as I could, and thus succeeded, at the very beginning of the
year, in taking some decisive steps in Paris, which could not
remain unheeded at a time when the Prussian and Austrian
Courts were still at a loss to find an official point of contact
with the nephew of the uncle,
But it will be necessary briefly to recall to mind the
position of the diplomatic negotiations between the Great
Powers, before I can relate the particulars of my first visit to
the Court of the Tuileries.
After the manifesto with which the Emperor Nicholas
had responded to Turkey's declaration of war on November
l, the attempts at mediation on the part of the Western
Powers had to be regarded as having failed. The Emperor
Nicholas declared that he had been forced to the war, and was
obliged to take up arms, not only in order to force Turkey to
keep her contracts, but to demand satisfaction for the insults
which the Sultan had offered to the Emperor personally, in
his solicitude for the welfare of the Holy Church, the same
Church to which the Russian nation belongs. The Czar had
thereupon issued a summons to a kind of religious war, from
which the threats of the Western Powers could no longer
deter him. If European diplomacy still desired to attain
anything in the interests of peace, this was surely only
possible by means of the co-operation of Austria and Prussia,
who, in December, 1853, were perhaps still able to prevent
war by some determined action. The Emperor Nicholas had
himself frankly acknowledged that the four Great Powers
combined had it in their hand to force him to give up his
attack on Turkey. But he did not believe in the Quadruple
BUPTURE BET' WEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA 43
Alliance of the Powers, nor was he inclined to over-estimate
the seriousness of their attempts at an understanding.
The pains, indeed, by dint of which the diplomatists in
Vienna had, on December 5, brought about the first joint note
on the Eastern Question, was not calculated to inspire the
Russian Cabinet with much alarm. The fact that the Note
laid stress on the integrity of European Turkey, could be
regarded by the Emperor with all the more indifference, as
he had never neglected, either in Berlin or Vienna, to
proclaim his beneficent and entirely disinterested attentions
towards Turkey. He could, therefore, reckon on the sym-
pathies of his old allies, both after and before the 5th of
December. The actions of the Powers united by the Note
directed itself, in fact, rather against Turkey than against
Russia, seeing that the Sultan was requested to intimate the
conditions on which he would be willing to conclude peace.
On the 31st of December the answer of the Porte arrived.
On the 13th of January, 1854, the Conference in Vienna
declared the answer to be satisfactory, and the four Powers
together then negotiated the proposed conditions of Peace
in St Petersburg. But on January 31, they were declined
by the Emperor Nicholas with the greatest firmness. Then
followed the mission of Count Orloff to Vienna, and the steps
taken by M. de Budberg in Berlin, in order to neutralise one
Cabinet by the other. Although these endeavours failed, and
the Emperor Nicholas became particularly incensed against
Prussia, yet there had nowhere been any deviation, even by a
hair's breadth, from the line of diplomatic intervention. Of
any serious threat, or even of mere dissuasion, there was no
question in Vienna, and still less so in Berlin. Such a thing,
for the present, hardly entered men's thoughts with reference
to the mighty Czar. -
Even after so rigorous a refusal as that of January 31,
Count Buol thought it desirable to come forward, again and
again, with renewed attempts at mediation, and minds in
Berlin were so elated by the joint rejection of Count Orloff's
proposals, that people thought they now had a right to sit with
their hands in their laps for some time to come. There was
44 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXEcoBURG-GOTHA
much inward vexation on the subject of the St Petersburg
brother-in-law; the French Emperor was distrusted; and im-
petuous England was begrudged its successes at the Golden
Horn. Hence no absolute treaty engagement with Austria, in
respect of Turkey, was desired, nor any firm alliance with the
Western Powers.
The King declared that he would never sign a convention
which might give the Western Powers an opportunity to draw
Prussia into a war with Russia, and when France and England
decided on issuing their wiltimatum of February 27, 1854, he
could no longer be prevailed upon to go even so far as Austria,
and give the ultimatum his support in St Petersburg.
In France the war was certainly very unpopular. The
prospect of a severe contest in the far East had produced a
feeling of depression in the country, and the Emperor
Napoleon was, at the beginning of the year 1854, still far from
being in a war-like frame of mind. It required a fresh and
especially strong act on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, to
rouse French military ardour.
On the 29th of January, 1854, Napoleon had addressed an
autograph letter, couched in the most pacific terms, to the Czar,
which the latter answered with the most unfortunate allusion
that he could possibly make, assuring the French, in fact,
that they would find Russia still just as patriotic now, as they
had found her in Moscow in 1812.
‘The Emperor Nicholas, my brother wrote on the 23rd of
February, “has broken off the bridges, by his answer to
Napoleon's letter, and recalled the memory of 1812. We are
arming. . . . How Russia can accept war under such
circumstances, the gods only know. The Emperor must be
mad, if he does. But whether he does, or not, the magic wand
with which he ruled Europe, is broken. The poor German
Kings who made it their pride to be his . . . , are truly
to be pitied.’ .
On the 19th of February the ambassadors of France and
England announced to the Porte, the intention of the two
Powers to muster a considerable land-force on this side of the
Balkans. On the 27th the w!timatwm already mentioned was
THE COBURGS AND THE EASTERN POWERS 45
sent to St Petersburg, and finally, on March 12, the decisive
treaty of the Western Powers with Turkey was concluded.
The one most powerful half of Europe was now engaged in
open war with Russia; the other half of the Powers still
wavered and balanced between attempts at neutrality and
mediation, between desire for war and want of peace,
between fear of Russia and fear of France. The excitement
in Germany was tremendous. Memories of the Rhenish Con-
federation and Cossack invasions preyed upon the troubled
imagination of the nations in the East and the West, and the
helplessness of the politically abandoned Confederation once
more impressed the minds of all thinking men. -
The situation was now at least thoroughly altered, and th
alliances hitherto entered into seemed entirely loosened.
Even the most extreme of optimists could no longer believe
in a firm maintenance of the Holy Alliance of the Conser-
vative Powers of Europe. In Berlin the watchword issued by
the Krew22eitung was now merely to save what could be
saved, and in Vienna the extravagant friends of Russia were
disturbed in their political circles by the voice of the aged
Metternich himself.
Among the Sovereigns who, though not surprised by this
turn of affairs, were yet forced by it to a very different view
of the political situation than they had hitherto entertained,
was my uncle, King Leopold of Belgium. ' If all his counsels
during the past years had aimed at averting the dangers
threatening from Bonapartistic France, by strengthening the
friendship between Russia, Prussia, and Austria, he could now
no longer doubt that the support once afforded by the alliances
of the Eastern Powers was gone for ever. It was very
painful to him that in France, and even in England, the
House of Coburg had latterly become suspected of gravitating
very strongly towards the opposite side of the Eastern
Powers, and the unpleasantness and the attacks to which my
brother was just then exposed in the Palmerstonian and
Napoleonic press, made his desire of a public change of front
appear only too justifiable.*
* In the ‘Life of Prince Albert’ this episode is described with such extraordinary
46 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
Besides, it was regarded as far from sufficient, in respect of
the general position of things, that the malevolent aspersions
cast on the Prince had of necessity met with a complete
refutation in the English parliamentary debates in February.
For my uncle, as France's nearest neighbour, it was, of
course, desirable, under all circumstances, to enter as soon as
possible into friendly relations with Louis Napoleon. Whilst
my brother was still of the opinion that the alliance of the
English and French States might be continued, and grow
more intimate, without its becoming necessary, in any way to
alter the cool and distant manner adopted towards the
representative of Imperialism personally, our experienced old
uncle had at once acknowledged to himself that the personal
attitude which had hitherto been assumed, was by no means
altogether free from serious objections. He recognised the
necessity of bringing about a closer intimacy with the French
Emperor, and, with his usual firmness, grasped the next
opportunity that offered itself for the purpose.
Louis Napoleon, who, for more than a twelvemonth, had
been cherishing nothing but the longing desire to be treated on
an equal footing by the old families of Europe, had at various
times made strenuous efforts to obtain the assistance of my
uncle towards this end. He therefore caused the young Prince
Jerome to pay a visit to Brussels, hoping by this means to gain
King Leopold's interest in inducing the English Royal Family
to enter into personal intercourse with him.
The son of the former King of Westphalia met with the
best reception at the hands of the Belgian Court and the Bel-
gian Government, and my uncle showed himself so cordial and
friendly towards the young Bonaparte, that this visit, character-
istically enough, in face of the still prevailing disposition at
minuteness, that I may presume it to be sufficiently well-known. Still, I will insert
here a letter written to me by the Prince on the 7th of January, 1854.
Albert certainly takes off the English papers with great humour, when he writes:
“The rage for war has risen here to a pitch, such as I should hardly have considered
possible. The public has graciously selected me as its scape-goat, to answer for its
not yet having come to war, and says, “logically,” the interest of the Coburg family,
which is Russian, Belgian, Orleanistic, Fusionistic, is preferred to the alliance with
Louis Napoleon. The Emperor of Russia now governs England. He telegraphs to
Gotha, you to Brussels, Uncle Leopold to me, I whisper in Victoria's ear, she gets
round old Aberdeen, and the voice of the only English Minister, Palmerston, is not
listened to, ay, he is always intrigued against, at the Court, and by the Court.”
THE DUATE OF/PERS TO GO TO PARIS 47
most of the Courts, was spoken of as a most remarkable event.
However, with regard to the chief tendency pursued by Louis
Napoleon, to enter into closer relations with the Queen of
England and Prince Albert, the visit of young Jerome proved,
for the time being, unsuccessful, as King Leopold by no means
ventured to intercede in favour of such personal relations in
London. Napoleon, on the other hand, tried to make at least
as much capital as possible out of the “event,’ and generalised,
to the best of his power, the relations which he had gained
with the House of Coburg, as he expressed himself. He
thought, by this means, to make an impression upon the
adherents of the Orleans family in France, as our nearest rela-
tions, and at the same time to contradict the opinion which pre-
vailed abroad, that he was on a bad footing with Prince Albert.
About the middle of February I received from the French
Legation in Dresden information of a circular of the French
Minister, in which the significance of Prince Napoleon's visit
to Brussels had been represented in the most brilliant colours.
The document concluded with the words: “L’emperewr, envoyant
wn Prince de so famille à, Brucelles, rendre visite & wav
Sowveraim qui, par sa position et son &ge, est le veritable Chef
(les Cobowºgs, se fait wºn plaisin' d'établin' publiquement qu'il
m'est pas wn membre de cette illustre maison, qu'il ne croie
animé dº som, 69ard des sentiaments les plus loyawa.”
I at once acquainted King Leopold with this manifestation
of the French Cabinet, and added: “I believe it to be the
interest of the House not to contradict this assumption in any
way, particularly at the present critical moment.
“If it should be your intention to return this visit, and if
you should have any reason for not wishing any of your sons
to go to Paris just yet, I shall be most happy, if you desire it,
to undertake a mission in this sense. Many objects might be
furthered by it.’
King Leopold answered in a letter, in which he entered,
almost enthusiastically, into my proposal, and at once dis-
coursed, in his own peculiar way, on the points of view that,
according to his opinion, would have to be discussed at a
meeting with the Emperor Napoleon. In a certain sense, his
48 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
resolve marked a turning point in the relations of the
European Courts to each other. I cannot refrain, therefore,
from inserting this memorable letter here in full.
LAEKEN, February 19, 1854.
‘MY DEAR ERNEST, Your kind letter surprised me most
agreeably, and I hasten to reply to it by special messenger,
who can then bring me back your answer. The present
moment is extremely important, and I accept yowr offer to go
to Paris, with great pleasure. The more the Coburgs have
been accused of being opposed to the policy of civilisation
and of Western Europe, the more important it would be, as
an answer to this accusation, to see you in Paris. The future
of Germany, in which you rightly take so great an interest, is
now at stake. By your presence in Paris, you can find out a
good many things, in this respect, that escape the diplomatists,
who don't see the wood for the trees.
‘It will be agreeable to Prussia, too, if you proceed, at this .
important juncture, to the place which must needs exercise so
great an influence on her future. Prussia's behaviour has
been good and proper throughout. The latest position is as
follows: Russia says, sa dignité does not allow of her accept-
ing the proposals of the four Powers, two of whom are so
thoroughly well-disposed towards Russia. She desires no
conquests; she does not desire the overthrow of the Porte;
but, on the other hand, she does require certain engagements.
This is too childish. Not diplomatic Notes, but political
situations, give influence. Russia has no interest as yet in
overthrowing the Porte, for she can't make use of the inherit-
ance. By the dissolution of Turkey, therefore, she would
get confusion and Eastern ideas for neighbours. Unless the
Emperor Nicholas has become somewhat crazy, he will have
to seek the means, in common with Austria and Prussia, of
getting himself out of the net with a good grace. Prussia
can do a good deal here, by a sensible policy, in restraining
Austria from committing mistakes, to which she might be
misled by her individual opinions. -
‘The Emperor Napoleon desires, in these matters, to play
THE DUKE'S VISIT TO PARIS ARRANGED 49
the part forced upon him by Russia. It is that of umpire.
England has armed, and seeing that Russia behaved so
inexplicably, the majority of the Cabinet was obliged to go
forward, whether it wanted to or not. Nor will it now let
itself be deterred any longer, and by the blockade of the
Baltic Russia can be immensely incommoded and disturbed.
This is inevitable.
‘Meanwhile, there exists in Paris, under the pretext that
Austria is not acting honestly, the desire to manoeuvre in
Italy. This would be an extremely dangerous thing for
Germany. To look on, would be to recall the old policy of
the Peace of Basle, where every one was slaughtered singly.
To help, and have the war on the Rhine, would not be agree-
able either. My resumé is like yours, to keep the two great
German Powers, together with the Confederation, united.
By this means alone will they escape all danger themselves,
and finally be the peace-makers. Your mission to Paris
will place the Coburgs just where they appear MERELY
USEFUL, and will therefore be regarded favourably by all
parties.’ & - -
At the end of this letter, the King expressed the wish that
I should set out on my journey very soon. He reserved the
last days of February for a personal conference, which was to
take place between us, before I ventured on the hot pavement
of Paris. -
Hereupon, I requested my uncle to have the announcement
of my visit to Paris made by the Belgian Embassy, promising
to communicate the day of my arrival in Paris from Brussels,
which I intended to reach on February 28. Moreover, I was
determined, at the outset, to accomplish my journey via Berlin,
because, as I wrote expressly to King Leopold, everything
depended on my acting in conformity with this Government's
views—if it have any firm view, which God grant it may. I
left it to my uncle to acquaint my brother with our whole
undertaking, the more so as I was quite uncertain as to how
the news of my journey would be received at the English
Court. g -
I was now all of a sudden placed in the midst of the great
VOL. III. D
5o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
political action. My journey had a character which it is not
altogether simple to define. Though announced by the
Belgian Government, I was far from being its representative,
seeing that I was only to appear at the Parisian Court at the
personal desire of the King, my uncle. If I succeeded, as I
hoped I should, in obtaining the approval of Prussia too, I
might consider myself the mediator of the individual relations
of two Kings, Leopold and Frederick William IV. But J
could undertake such a mission only as a reigning Sovereign,
and was unable, in any way, to avoid the ceremonial connected
with the journey of such a Sovereign. I had to appear in
Paris with a large suite, and accompanied by a court, marshal,
aide-de-camp, and secretary. In these respects King Leopold
had undertaken to have all that was necessary settled
in advance in Paris, and I was therefore soon able to prepare
for the journey. The only difficulty about the situation was
the consideration for my brother, whose position in England
made it impracticable for me to declare myself to the Emperor
Napoleon straight out as a representative of the House of
Coburg. In consequence, too, of the personal sympathies and
antipathies, in respect of which I was naturally not entitled
to anticipate the Queen and the Prince, my relations to the
English Court had to be left entirely out of account. 3.
Notwithstanding, my brother was highly displeased at my
whole enterprise, and it came to a rather unedifying corres-
pondence between us, in consequence of which I saw myself
obliged to despatch a specially soothing message to London,
the bearer of which was fortunately able to return with the
following letter from the Prince. -
‘I have received your letter through Sam wer, who is
returning to you again this evening. As I have spoken a
great deal with him, I shall write all the less, and must refer
you to him. I now entirely understand how you came to
enact this episode, and that Uncle Leopold is alone re-
sponsible for it. Although this does not in any way alter
the matter, nor the manifold dangers that it conceals, yet it
must be as agreeable to you to know that I acquit you of
direct responsibility, as it is agreeable to me to know you quit
MEMORANDUM TO FREDERICK WILLIAM IV 5 I
of it. If you are extremely careful, as I firmly believe you
will be, we may hope that fortune will aid us and avert the
dangers that have been conjured up. But even if Fate should
ordain it otherwise, my brotherly love for you shall and will
remain unaltered. Victoria sends you her best love.’
On the 3rd of March, when this letter, characteristic as it
was of the view taken by the English Royal Family, was
written, I had already set out on my diplomatic journey. I
left Gotha on the 25th of February, in order first to proceed
to Berlin. I had already applied to the King of Prussia in a
letter asking him to receive me on the following day. I wrote
to him that I was repairing to the Court of the Tuileries, at
the desire of my relations, and that I presumed it would be
agreeable to His Majesty to find, in my insignificant person, a
devoted mediator, in respect of various ticklish points in the
present questions, or at least to gain information through me
on many things, which it might be difficult to obtain by the
usual means of diplomacy.
Frederick William IV was prepared in every way, when I
came to confer with him. Nor was the intrinsic purpose of
my journey, and my view of the whole situation, a secret to
him. A fortunate circumstance had afforded me the oppor-
tunity, but a few weeks before, of stating my views and hopes
in a memorandum to the King.
I cannot spare the reader the communication of this
document, which was addressed to the King at a time
when there was not the slightest idea of my journey to
Paris; because everything that Frederick William then said to
me for my guidance in Paris, gains far more significance in
the light of this communication. The reasons for my diplo-
matic document are to be found in the circumstancé that at
the command of His Majesty a Circular Note, dated February
9, had reached my Government from the Prussian Minister,
with the express notice that an answer on the part of the
allies of Prussia would be very welcome. I therefore took
this occasion to write to the King at once personally:
‘. . . Although I have given orders to my Ministry to
express in an official answer my pleasure at the resolutions
52 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE COBURG-60TIIM
arrived at by Your Majesty's Government, I cannot refrain
from personally communicating to Your Majesty my own
humble opinions in face of the present critical position of
affairs. They spring from a German patriotic heart, which is
most especially devoted to Your Majesty.
‘It cannot have escaped Your Majesty how warmly I have
interested myself, since the year 1848, for specially German
affairs, nor how I have succeeded, with my humble powers, in
exercising an influence on so many factions in our great
fatherland, and in gaining, as I may say without vain-glory,
the confidence of a large portion of the intelligent middle
class.
‘Your Majesty will recollect, moreover, how I always placed
at the head of my arguments the opinion, that it is only
through Prussia that a Germany can be obtained, great danger
and great humiliation averted, and the real kernel of Europe
made what it possesses both the title and the qualification
to be. - ‘.
“So many endeavours in the years of agitation have re-
mained fruitless owing to the circumstances of the times. But
the period of weakness, of humiliation, and of moral relaxation
in the nation has not discouraged me. I have remained true
to my opinions, in spite of all animosities, and the greater the
difficulties that offered themselves to me, the greater has been
the activity that I have thought it incumbent on me to
employ. The result has been, that I have been enabled to
ascertain exactly the views and wishes in the German Father-
land; that, so far as the inner life of the nation is concerned,
I have had to deal, not with phantoms, but with truth ; that
the hearts of many have opened themselves to me, and that I
have been able secretly to appease, advise, and prepare.
‘The dark power of Democracy, too, I have seen by day-
light, and have found my view confirmed, that in itself it is
merely a negative power, but that it will be a mighty one, if
it should ever be established as a positive truth, that the
nations are governed wrongly. Democracy, as a party, has
destroyed itself. Its faint glimmer is maintained by the mis-
taken endeavours of the extreme opposite party. This latter
MEMORANDUM TO FREDERICK WILLIAM IV 53
was bound to wish it kept alive, because it was only in this
thought that it discovered its own power. So many measures
of so many German Governments have vied with one another
in these endeavours, and I may perhaps ascribe it to personal
efforts alone, if, from disgust, impatience, and perhaps want of
judgment, many a distinguished ability has not joined the
Scum of our population. - -
‘I will not enter into a description of the indirect pressure
to which Russian preponderance is subjecting all Europe, and
which, with an iron hand, has been brought to bear upon
Germany particularly. Your Majesty has not remained un-
aware of it. Neither will I recall the wounds which, pro-
ceeding from that influence, have been inflicted upon German
life and German honour. But I should like to convince Your
Majesty that, with the faintest hope of seeing the true
equilibrium established, a feeling of delight is already per-
vading every German land. All eyes are turned upon Your
Majesty. Everybody's hope rests in Prussia, and I have con-
sidered it my duty to nourish this hope more and more.
‘Though it will be attempted by many, whom I will not
name, to inspire Your Majesty with the belief that, by alien-
ating yourself from the East, Your Majesty would be led nearer
to the camp of this imagined power of democracy, you may
believe me, that it will have exactly the opposite tendency.
Democracy will be vanquished the moment this foreign pres-
sure, which is felt and hated by all, is withdrawn from the
nation and the Governments. -
‘The situation appears to me to be simply as follows: The
great ascendency which Russia has dexterously obtained, by
taking advantage of every possible circumstance, was likely
to induce her to think also of territorial changes. The war
against the Porte, which is as unreasonable as it is unjust, has
opened the eyes of Europe on this point. The Western
Powers, although they have never desired the war, are now
the first to endeavour to force Russia to keep within the
bounds within which she must move, unless the rest of Europe
is positively to suffer. If the Western Powers receive no
assistance, a great European war will be the inevitable conse-
54 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
quence. In this war, like in a revolution, all things will be
subverted. To the fortunes of war, and, to many an accident,
will then be left the decision of questions which cannot be
permanently decided, except in the council of kings, and in
unison with their peoples. That Germany cannot go with
the East, is a positive fact. The question is merely, in what
way the German Great Powers, and particularly how Prussia,
can assist the Western Powers, in order to prevent this great
calamity,+a universal war.
‘Your Majesty has often deplored with me the fact that so
many Germans work in direct opposition to the interests
of the joint fatherland, and some have, unfortunately, not
given up the idea of a coalition for the East and against
Your Majesty's Government. Steps have even been taken to
win over Your Majesty's most faithful allies to this idea.
Only the correct view on the part of Austria has momentarily
checked a further advance in this direction. But it will de-
pend upon Your Majesty's determination, whether all these
plans will vanish like an idle vapour. If Your Majesty is
firmly resolved to afford assistance to the West, you will have
to find voluntary allies in the German people—forced ones in
their Governments.
‘May Your Majesty believe that no one can conceive, like
I can, how hard it must be for you to have to offer such.
serious opposition to a beloved brother-in-law, a man of the
greatest qualities, and an ally who in other respects is so
greatly reverenced. But the welfare of Europe demands it,
and—much as it is endeavoured on many sides to persuade
Your Majesty of the contrary—it is the desire of the entire
nation. You will be acting in a just cause, and fulfilling the
sacred duty of restraining your powerful neighbour from an
enterprise that cannot but prove ruinous to himself.
‘May Your Majesty pardon me this frank language. But
I feel justified in using it, as your faithful adherent, as a
German Sovereign, and as the head of a house which has a
positive interest in this question, and whose views I am
expressing to you.’
The King had not yet answered this letter, when I had
THE POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED WITH NAPOLEON 55
to announce to him, immediately afterwards, my journey to .
Paris and arrival in Berlin. I could therefore assume that,
following on my memorandum, he would at once recognise the
significance of my journey, and take his measures accordingly,
The more agreeable to me was the unusually friendly reception
accorded to me by the King, when I called upon him on the
26th of February. He said that my mediation gave him
genuine satisfaction, and that he had been highly pleased on
hearing of my determination; that I might give the Emperor
Napoleon every assurance of his friendship, and convey to him
the King's wish for the most active personal relations. I
could expect, according to this, that the King would be willing
to receive any hints of mine from Paris, supposing I were to
be in a position to give any.
The Russian party in Berlin, on the other hand, exerted its
utmost endeavours to weaken the significance of my mission.
Whilst some of the newspapers indulged in all sorts of gibes
on the subject of my journey to Paris, the King, during my
presence at the Court of Napoleon III, was successfully pre-
vailed upon to take steps which, though not absolutely opposed
to, yet weakened as much as possible, the effect of my negotia-
tions. Frederick William IV had suddenly entered into a new
phase of friendly intimacy with Russia. A few days after
I had spoken with him in Berlin, he sent General von
Lindheim with assurances of neutrality to St. Petersburg,
and wrote a letter to the Emperor Napoleon, which the Prince
of Hohenzollern was to deliver personally. This letter was
expected just at the time when I was about to leave Paris.
Meanwhile, I had arrived at my uncle's in Brussels, to
confer with him in detail on the questions that had to be
discussed in Paris. The King had sent me a specification of
the points which, according to his opinion, were essential, and
had indicated the attitude which I was to maintain in the
several questions towards the Emperor. King Leopold, in his
quick and ingenuous manner, chiefly took account of the
practical facts, and thereby materially facilitated our subse-
quent conversation. It is of some interest to know the exact
views of my uncle at this important juncture. ‘The various
56 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
points,’ he wrote, ‘present themselves, it may be said, in the
following order -
‘1. A great many courteous messages from here, with the
expression of satisfaction that our neighbourly relations have
now become so good.
“2. A polite acknowledgment of the circular,” which was
written in a kindly sense. However, a little opening for Albert's
objection might perhaps be found, unless just the sole family
policy that appeared very suspicious to the Emperor Louis
Napoleon, should be that of acting against him. Momentané-
ment, Albert has been mentioned as cherishing particularly
hostile feelings against him. To soften this impression is of
direct practical advantage, whatever the future may have in
store.
‘3. To speak with the utmost precaution on general politics.
To praise the Emperor Napoleon for his peaceful endeavours.
To call upon him to continue to devote himself to this noble
end, for which his position is especially favourable.
‘4. To say that an immense deal depends upon the two
German Powers. That Austria and Prussia, let it be hoped,
would take up the same line as the maritime Powers. To
advert casually to Prussia's wish, but with caution, as they
are purposely very indiscreet in Paris, and anything of the
kind from Prussia would alarm rather than please them.
‘5. By no means to express hostile feelings against the
Emperor Nicholas. If these matters should be touched upon,
observe, what is true, that the Emperor Nicholas has deceived
himself—perhaps, too, in consequence of his servants not always
daring to tell him the truth. To take up this position is
desirable, because we shall always be able to operate with
more advantage, if we are not considered as averse to Russia,
whereas joining in the chorus against exaggerated Russian
influences would lead to nothing but the idea that in case of
need we should be good for mothing.
‘6. It is desirable to let the Emperor himself talk as much
as possible, which he is not fond of doing. His ambition
is now to appear particularly loyal and honest and disin-
* The one mentioned above on page 47 is meant.
THE DUKE IN PARIS 57
terested. This is especially desirable for his personal position,
and for that of Europe. Perhaps, too, it is true. The greatest
prudence in every kind of utterance will be extremely
necessary. -
‘7. To speak of Victoria and Albert, as coming from you,
can be avoided. If he begins on this subject, the strict truth
should be told, that Victoria and Albert can be relied upon,
and that they will be most faithful allies. If he gives a polite
message, you will listen to it politely. He will probably
confine himself to generalities, as it is.
‘I would not remain too long. If you live in the Tuileries,
it will be more costly and embarrassing. It would be
pleasanter only to accept the carriage, and to live in an hotel.
I send you this little aperçu, as an avant-gward with my best
“good-morning.”.” *
My uncle referred me, besides, to Mr de Praedt and Wicomte
de Conway in Brussels, who were to coach me especially
‘with regard to the Parisian terraim.”
In the ensuing conversations with the King himself, how-
ever, the differences between my opinions and those of my
uncle took so decided a shape, that I had some trouble in
dissuading him from his point of view. Pleased as the King
had been at my journey, which he called a service of love
rendered to him, he could not familiarise himself with the
idea that, in consequence of that journey, the Russian connec-
tions would have to be broken with. He was hardly to be
dissuaded from his idea, propounded under the fifth of the
above-mentioned heads, that there should be no show of .
animosity against the Emperor Nicholas. My objections,
which were based upon the circumstance that the latest
Franco-Russian correspondence, with its allusion to Moscow,
made it scarcely possible to refrain any longer from declaring
ourselves either as friendly or hostile, produced but little
impression upon my uncle.
Just at this moment, however, the news arrived that the
Anglo-French ultimatum had been delivered in St Petersburg.
Thereupon the King confessed, though with a heavy heart,
that there appeared, for the moment, to be no possibility of
58 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
adjustment, and that it would scarcely be advisable to “punt.”
on the old friendship of the Emperor Nicholas, if we in-
tended to approach Napoleon.
Also with regard to the outward arrangements in connection
with my journey, everything came differently from what we had
expected. Louis Napoleon had at once determined to let his
hospitality shine forth in such a brilliancy of official reception,
that all half intentions or ambiguity as to the form of my
visit came to an end.
It was the first time that a reigning Prince appeared in
the new Empire, and the first time, for many years, that the
gates of the Tuileries could be thrown open again to receive
a German Sovereign as a guest.
My official reception commenced at the frontier. The
moment I had touched the soil of France, I was treated as
the guest of the Emperor. A special train conveyed me to
Paris. I had to submit to all the honourable distinctions that
are customary on such occasions: The orderly officers of the
Emperor, General Roguet, Captain Maurand, and the Emperor's
chamberlain, Bellmont, received me in Valenciennes. I walked
along the front of the guard of honour, lunched in company
with the staff-officers of the garrison, was waited on at several
stations by the Prefects, and was received in Paris in the
afternoon by Marshal Vaillant. A battalion of infantry did
the honours, and, accompanied by a squadron of Chasseurs, I
drove to the Tuileries, saluted by the crowds who thronged
the streets. The Emperor, with his whole Court, received me
in the rooms of the Marsan pavilion, which had been got
ready for me, and which was for once to witness conversations
such as seemed scarcely in harmony with its traditions. It
reminded one of the mutability of time. The Emperor him-
self conducted me to the rooms of the Empress, where I had
not been expected so soon, and where, in consequence, there
was at first a little scene of embarrassment. I thereupon
remained alone with the Emperor and the Empress, was over-
whelmed by both with attentions and expressions of thanks
for my visit, and at once felt that, not only could my enter-
prise be considered useful in a political respect, but that I
IMPRESSIONS AT THE COURT 59
personally might hope to have acquired a valuable connec-
tion. - -
After a few visits, which I paid to the Grand-Duchess
Stephanie, Princess Matilda, and King Jerome, we met at
seven o'clock at dinner in the Tuileries, directly after which a
larger reception was held. -
At dinner every one appeared in civilian dress. The well-
known names of the company that assembled later on in the
evening, might have made one fancy oneself transferred back
to the beginning of the century. There before me stood the
King of Westphalia himself, and next to him a young Prince
Murat. 4
All the recollections which my father and my uncle had
kept of the first Empire, and which many a story, told by
them, had deeply impressed upon my youthful mind, seemed to
have assumed life and form again before my very eyes.
My interest was excited most by King Jerome, as the real
and genuine representative of the older times, who was still
moving about the salons of the Tuileries, as active and
talkative as I so well remembered him from innumerable de-
scriptions in history and romance in his palace at Cassel. I
entered that evening into an animated conversation with the
old gentleman, and was invited by him to discuss the position
of affairs with him at greater length in the course of the
next few days.
The King gave me the impression as if he judged the
position of the Napoleons in Europe without any personal
aspirations, taking a really unbiassed and, as it were, bird'seye
view of it. He said that, for his nephew's sake, and for that of
the Bonapartist cause, he was obliged to watch carefully that
the Emperor was not driven by his surroundings into the dan-
gerous course pursued by Napoleon I. For of nothing had his
experiences given him a firmer conviction, than that by ven-
turesome wars the Napoleons would again forfeit their throne.
He was a man of peace, who would always strenuously oppose
any member of the family who showed a spirit of enterprise.
In later years, as is well-known, King Jerome really aimed
at paralysing the restless spirit of the Empress by means of
6o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-CO BURGº-GO THA
his influence. In those first conversations which I had with
the old King, he once went so far as to say that, of all the
Napoleons, he was the one who knew the German nation best ;
he was therefore of opinion, that the safety of the Imperial
throne in France could only be attained by an alliance with
Germany. The English alliance was not sufficient, and was,
besides, much too dangerous, by reason of England's many
entanglements. ‘The Napoleons,’ he went on to say, ‘had no
luck. To assume the contrary was to disregard this truth.
The Emperor could only maintain his position by means of
the greatest prudence and reserve.’
Indeed, on glancing at the persons who were now assembled
in the Tuileries, there was hardly a man to be found among
them, from the highest downwards, who did not remind one of
the vicissitude of human fortunes : -
Men and things seemed to be present here merely as proofs
of the rapid changes that take place in the affairs of this earth.
Whilst the new host in the Tuileries seemed to revive the
memories of the great world-conqueror of the century, all
the household surroundings bore witness, in every detail, to
the existence of the Monarchy. All and everything reminded
one of the exiled Louis Philippe, in particular the appoint-
ments, the plate, even the very napkins, which still bore the
monogram of the last King of France. I recognised the
furniture and pictures, and even some of the Court-servants,
whom I had so often seen here under Louis Philippe.
The Emperor was little changed since I had made his
acquaintance in London. He had only grown stouter, and the
well known disproportion between his body and his short legs
had become more conspicuous than in former days. His
manner in receiving me was in every respect natural and easy,
indeed, like that of an old acquaintance, so that our intercourse
from the first evening was divested of all restraint.
The Empress did fullest justice to the reputation of her
great beauty and amiability. We remembered at table that
I had seen her at Buckingham Palace on the occasion of a ball,
when I might have numbered myself among so many other
admirers of her charming manner. But she turned the con-
CON VERSATIONS WITH MAPOLEON 6 I
versation very quickly, and without further ceremony, to the
present state of politics. She said it was dreadful to her to
think that we were on the eve of a horrible war, which nobody
had desired, and nobody would profit by. The present com-
plication was due exclusively to the blunders of the diplo-
matists in St Petersburg and Constantinople. The personal
ambition and the personal attitudes of these men had led to
the abominable dissensions, which were, in fact, hardly intel-
ligible to Frenchmen. Nobody here could feel the slightest
enthusiasm for the war. -
When I expressed my entire concurrence in all these
things, and added, that the period of cabinet wars, which had
so often been called forth by diplomatists, had always been
believed to be over, she remarked, with an amiable allusion to
my visit, that the only pleasant circumstance she could see in
the matter, was the fact that the reigning Sovereigns were at
last becoming personally acquainted with each other. I
replied that it would afford me infinite pleasure, if my arrival
had given their Majesties satisfaction. I assured her, at the
same time, that I had always made it my task to be truthful
and frank in everything, but particularly in political matters,
whereupon she expressed herself as convinced that the
Emperor, too, valued these qualities above everything, and
that she was glad to be able to tell the Emperor what I had
said.
The following morning I had an opportunity of hear-
ing the Emperor enlarge on the political situation, and I
really gained the impression that he meant to discuss these
matters with unexpected freedom and candour.
Napoleon sent to announce his visit, and when he entered,
I delivered to him the insignia of the Order of the House of
Coburg, which he accepted with great pleasure. We entered
at once into a long conversation, which lasted an hour-and-a-
half, and during which he frequently paced up and down
the room, becoming very animated.” He explained the policy
* The following account of my conversations with the Emperor Napoleon
was written down at the time when the impressions they left were still fresh in my
memory. In reproducing it here, I have therefore thought it desirable not to alter
anything. What might perhaps have become more polished in style, would probably
have lost in faithfulness and originality.
62 MEMOIRs of THE DUKE of SAXEcoBURG-60THA
he had pursued during the past years, his love of peace, and
his intentions, which, as he assured me again and again,
differed entirely from those of his uncle. His speech some-
times quite assumed the form of an academic lecture. He
launched forth into the history of the first and the second
Empire, and the distinctions to be drawn between them. His
mode of discoursing had something extremely instructive, and
reminded one of the reasonings which Germans are fond of
commending as objective.’
He said the policy of his uncle had aimed much too much
at influencing the course of other States, and at oppressing
them. The consequence had been a reaction on the part of
the humiliated nations, and the events of 1814 and 1815.
Now, however, the consciousness of their national rights had
so grown in the people, that it would be crediting him with
folly to think that he could once more tread the mistaken
paths of his uncle.
As to the present complication, the cause of all the evil
was the immense influence of Russia, which he himself had
encountered in all corners for ever so many years. In illus-
tration, as it were, he cited the question of the recognition of
his title. If Prussia and Austria had not been so entirely
subject to the despotic commands of Russia, the Eastern
Question would never have been raised. ‘I do not like the
war, he said, “but it has become a necessity, and I only wish
it may end as soon as possible. But this is only possible by
an alliance with Austria and Prussia, which I am seeking
solely and exclusively to this end.
‘The neutrality of one of these two Powers, Prussia,
seems to me to be very dangerous, because it is not only pro-
longing the war, by diminishing the means of action, but it
would also have the inevitable result of opening the gates to
all kinds of intrigue, and bringing about new complications. .
To my great regret, and in spite of my wishes, the necessity
might arise of attacking the neutral Power, the consequence
of which would be war in the heart of Europe.’
When the discussion took this turn, I put an end to the
conversation, during which neither England nor Belgium had
HIS WILLING WESS TO MEET PRUSSIA'S WISHES 63
been mentioned, by repeating the friendly messages I had
been commissioned to deliver from the King of Prussia. I
hoped still to find an opportunity of enlightening the Emperor
on the subject of German affairs, and tried to avoid creating
the false impression, as if I were in a position to interpret
the official steps of the Prussian Government.
A day or two after the above conversation, the Emperor
expressed the desire to discuss with me, in a more detailed
fashion, the question of an alliance with the two German
Powers. He appointed the 6th of March for the purpose,
reserving a sufficient portion of that day to allow of our
devoting ourselves to the object in view without fear of inter-
ruption. When I visited him in his study, he began by
saying he had received information from Berlin, that no
decision had as yet been arrived at. This troubled him a good
deal, as the question of the embarking of the troops was
approaching nearer every day. “We will discuss the matter
to-day,’ he added, “as if we were private individuals, and as
we have ample time before us, I would ask you to give me a
detailed statement of your views. I will take the liberty of
expressing mine, without any regard for persons or nations.'
I replied at once that I would follow his suggestion with
pleasure, but that he must accept my assurance that the views
I expressed were chiefly my own. . He must therefore take
all I said as the expression of my private opinions. He there-
upon held out his hand to me, and said, ‘Allom's domc, emtre
&mis on me se trahit pas. I now discussed the question of
the alliances, and put forward the premise that it would be
impossible to bring the Prussians to a speedy decision : (1),
unless the dangers were first removed which, even supposing
them to have an anti-Russian leaning, would necessarily deter
them from entering at once into the desired alliance; (2), unless
direct advantages were offered to them.
The Emperor acknowledged this to be correct, and said:
‘As to the advantages, it was impossible for him to take any
steps, even if it were officially demanded, because of the
binding declarations made to England. But he would leave it
to Prussia's own good sense to see that, if she took an active
64 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAME-COBURG-GOTHA
part in the war, it could not be to Prussia's disadvantage.’
He then added, laughing, in German, ‘The Prussians surely
do not imagine that they are to go to war for nothing, or to
gain no territorial advantages by it.
“But, after all, what are the wishes of Prussia 2 Hanover ?
Saxony ?”
I replied that the disinterested policy of Prussia would
never permit her to cherish any decided wishes of this sort,
but that sound common-sense made it intelligible, if she
thought of a future union of her two great territorial expanses
in the East and in the West.
We agreed, after this, on the one point, that it was impos-
sible, in the first instance, to induce Prussia, by promises, to
enter into the alliance. I explained, moreover, the difficulties
Prussia would have to contend with in mobilizing her army,
and surprised the Emperor considerably, by pointing out the ,
dangers to which Prussia's left flank would be exposed from
Denmark and Sweden, if it came to mustering her forces
against Russia. Besides, that Prussia was greatly hampered
by the affairs of the Confederation, whose desire was to
preserve a neutral attitude, in consequence of which it was
rendered difficult for Prussia, to advance alone.
The Emperor was of opinion, that if Prussia and Austria
were equally desirous of the alliance, the rest of the confedera-
tion, true to the two colours to which they belonged, would
be glad to follow suit. *
I replied that he appeared to forget the position of
Bavaria, whereupon he said, ‘J’ai ch'u que la Bavière soit
emtièrement awtrichiem me.’ t
That this was a mistake, was not difficult to prove. I
ventured to add, however, that, apart from all this, there was
one thing which particularly prevented Prussia from declaring
herself against Russia, and this was the distrust which was
everywhere cherished against France, and especially against
the person of the Emperor. At this remark he put on one of
his most pleasant faces, and said that he found this very
intelligible, but that he was at a loss to conceive in what the
reason for such distrust could consist, now that his actions lay
DISCUSSIONS ON THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS 65
open before the eyes of all Europe. He could only wish for
peace, because the biem-ètre of France, and the mood of the
French themselves, rigorously demanded it. It was just for
this reason that he was urging the union of Europe against
Russia, in order to avoid a long and fatal war. As to the fear
that France might make common cause with the revolution
in the other States, these ideas had been taken into account,
not by him, but by others, in case Europe should once more
unite against France, of which there was just now no pro-
spect.
The conversation then turned to the plan of operation,
which was about to be carried out against Russia. On this
point the Emperor showed extraordinary perspicacity and
foresight. Hence we quickly agreed in the assumption that
Russia would never be forced to make peace by the move-
ments of the Western Powers on the Danube, and by the
appearance of the combined fleets in the Black Sea and the
Baltic. It was just this circumstance which appeared to cause
the Emperor real anxiety, and to produce in him the feeling
of heavy responsibility, for he was about to embark his troops
on an expedition which he regarded as almost fruitless.
I therefore alluded to the neutrality of the Scandinavian
Powers, and observed that, instead of their being quietly
suffered to remain neutral, an alliance ought to be urged upon
them, for Russia would never submit to a settlement, unless
she were made to fear an attack upon her in Finland. I had
already pointed out this circumstance on the previous days,
when the Emperor, in occasional and shorter conversations,
repeatedly declared that all the fleets and armies in the world
would never induce Russia, either to make peace, or to come
to terms, so long as the point were not found where she was
weakest. When I suggested that Finland should be given to
Sweden, the Emperor smiled, and said that I appeared really
to be no friend of the Russians, a remark to which I thought
I could offer no contradiction in the present instance.
Upon weighing the situation afresh, Napoleon took up the
matter more seriously, and enlarged upon it, as if it were a
new idea which was worth considering. He observed, how-
WOL. III. E
66 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
ever, with regard to the policy of Sweden and Denmark,
‘Nows som/mes très vaguement informes; on mous dit que le
Roi de Swede est très faible, et pemche vers la Russie, mais que
le Prince Royal, l'armée et le pewple sont plutót contre la
Russie.’
He recognised that it was in the interest of the Western
Powers to obtain better information on this point, but he
remarked that after all most, if not everything, depended on
Austria and Prussia. Of the former he said that she probably
had more decided reasons than Prussia to enter into an alliance
with the Western Powers, and after pausing for a moment, he
added, with a significant accentuation, as nearly as possible
the following words, which were not to be misconstrued: ‘If
it depended upon me, I should be most happy to let Austria
have the Danubian Principalities; and if I were the Emperor
of Austria, I should cling with less interest to Lombardy,
which ever remains a yawning wound, always causes unsafety,
and demands incessant sacrifices, whereas, tát ow tard, a general
rising will after all take place in Italy.’
Thereupon the Emperor passed on to the idea of the
restoration of Poland, and said that he did not reckon in that
case on the Prussian and Austrian provinces. He made no
mention of the dynasty that would be necessary for a restored
Poland. He enlarged, rather, in a general way upon the idea
‘that when the war with Russia had resulted satisfactorily, a
European Peace Congress would be absolutely necessary, to
solve all the questions that had not been completely decided
at the Vienna Congress, and to give the nations a permanent
peace at last.’
What impression the Emperor's disclosures made upon me,
it would be difficult for me to describe at the present day.
Since that time the Idées Napoléoniennes have been frequently
discussed. Much of what the Emperor hinted at, rather than
expressed, in those days, is now sealed by facts known to
everyone, and a good deal has at least been the subject of
official discussions. At that time there was hardly anybody
in Europe who could boast of having heard from the taciturn
Emperor, clearly and distinctly, what he really anticipated
7'HE EMPEROR'S FUTURE PLANS 67
from the future, and what course he meant to give to the
political world. -
I was the first Sovereign to whom Napoleon had expressed
himself with so much frankness and unreserve, and after
these declarations I could not doubt that he really had much
to find fault with in the map of Europe, and a good deal, if
not everything, in the treaties of 1815. He considered the
Eastern Question a matter which was suitable for territorial
compensations. He kept his finger on Italy, and on Poland,
and declared the idea of a Scandinavian Empire to be worthy
of consideration. He did not doubt that Prussia would have
to be enlarged into Germany, and he looked upon the German
Confederation as just as decrepit as the state of the Apennine
Peninsula. And this man was now Emperor of the French,
and was on the eve of entering upon a great war, apparently in
pursuance of a conservative programme, seeing that, for the
so-called integrity of Turkey, the lives of thousands of French
citizens were put to the stake.
Surprised, and even startled, as I in a certain measure was,
by what Napoleon told me, I was none the less firmly con-
vinced that the war which was about to be commenced, was
only the beginning of a series of enterprises, in respect of
which the Great Powers would recognise the necessity of
taking up a decided attitude.
I therefore continued to write from Paris to Minister von
Manteuffel in Berlin, in order, to some extent, to inform him
of the facts. I thought I could assure the Prussian Govern-
ment that I had succeeded in quieting the Emperor's mind
with regard to the difficulties of an alliance. But nevertheless
I added: “He thinks, however, he should in any case require
actual guarantees, to enable him to send large bodies of
troops without apprehension into distant parts. On this
ground he insists that the question, whether Prussia is an ally
of the Western Powers or not, must be decided before the
troops are embarked. The Emperor admits it to be fair that
Prussia should render her participation subject to certain
conditions.” -
In the meantime I had a third conversation with the
68 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
Emperor with reference to the immediate situation, in which
he asked me whether I was not inclined to take a letter to
the King himself. He said he had altered his opinion concern-
ing an immediate negotiation of the alliance with Austria and
Prussia, and, as I had convinced him that it would involve
the King in difficulties, he should prefer to submit to the
Cabinets in Berlin and Vienna a plan of the war-operations,
which might, later on, facilitate their entry into the alliance.
I declined this mission, with the remark, that I should only
charge myself with such a letter, if I was first acquainted with
its contents, and could approve of them. Hereupon the Em-
peror became very animated, and discussed the matter with me,
as it were, before the eyes of the public. For he had linked
his arm in mine, and we were walking up and down on the
front esplanade of the garden of the Tuileries.
After having unfolded his plan of operation, he adverted
again, and more pressingly than before, to the necessity of
compensating Prussia and Austria. The opportunity afforded
by this war, he said, must be used powr régler la carte de
l'Ewrope. And when I drew his attention to the fact that
all his plans were purely subjective, and that nobody would
enter into them ; that the policy pursued by Prussia in par-
ticular could merely be to increase her influence, but not her
territory, in Germany, he suddenly became silent, paced up
and down for a while, and then said dreamily, with the
inimitable smile so peculiar to him : ‘Ma foi, powr ma France
ce m'est bien Égal, si on me dédom/mage 8wr le Rhim ow em.
Italie.”
I observed here that all these questions appeared to me of
no immediate consequence, whereupon the Emperor expressed
the wish, on general grounds, that the European Powers might
learn to understand and agree with one another better than
hitherto, adding that he would be only too glad, if his loyal
intentions towards Austria and Prussia were taken note of in
Vienna and Berlin. -
We left the esplanade during these remarks, and the
Emperor proceeded to examine me on the affairs of the Danish
State and Royal Family, in respect of both of which he was
HIS KNO WI, EDGE OF BAERI, IN AFFAIRS 69
indeed so singularly uninformed, that he might well conclude
with the words: Mais toujow's mows som/mes très mal ren-
Seignés. -
The next morning the Emperor surprised me with a visit
at breakfast, and handed me the draft of a letter to the King
of Prussia, upon which he asked me to give him my opinion.*
The Emperor's letter, however, appeared to me to afford
little prospect of causing the Prussian Government to abandon
its neutral attitude. Fortunately, I was relieved from the onus
of delivering it to the King, by the circumstance that in the
meantime the mission of the Prince of Hohenzollern had been
announced, respecting whom I could assure the Emperor that
he personally took the same view as myself.
When Napoleon informed me that he shortly expected to
receive ‘wme lettre de conscience’ from the King, he made all
sorts of remarkable observations concerning him, and unfolded
among other things, to my great surprise, a host of details as
to the mode in which the King of Prussia was fond of shaping
his policy. He said that the King was also in this respect
thoroughly original, so that it had cost him great study to
get to the bottom of it. I could not deny that the Emperor
had, on the whole, a surprisingly accurate knowledge, both
concerning State affairs in Berlin, and concerning the King
himself. But I was still more astonished, when Napoleon told
me, in his most ingenuous manner, that he was carrying on a
peculiar kind of correspondence with the King. The King,
it appeared, wrote to a German officer residing in Paris, in such
wise that the letters were arranged for the Emperor, while
the Emperor answered the King, in a similar way, through the
same officer. tº
The Emperor, however, was already informed of the fresh
changes of front which Frederick William IV had made during
* The contents of the intended letter are not without historical interest : Mon-
sieur mon frare . . . A la veille d'une guerre Sérieuse—it would be of the greatest
consequence to know whether the King would agree to the plan of mustering in
conjunction with Austria, a body of about 120,000 men near Cracow, whilst the Western
Powers advanced with 70,000 men through the Danubian Principalities. To cover
any attack on the part of the Danes and Swedes, the participation of Sweden in the
war should be secured, and a French army corps should enter Finland. After the
overthrow of Russia, it says in conclusion : L'Europe verrait bientôt les Souverains
*gumis en congrès, fixer les bases de la paia: et former entr'eua, whbien indissoluble . .
7o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
the period of my presence in Paris in the first weeks of March,
and his accounts agreed with those I had received myself.
Whilst General von Groeben was to make the English Cabinet
acquainted “with the grounds of the simple and dispassionate
policy of the King,' and to bear a letter to Queen Victoria, the
“lettre de conscience, as Napoleon expressed it, which the
King had addressed to the Emperor, was a document, strange
in more than one respect, in which the sentence actually
occurred : Le seul but de cette lettre est de prier V. M. du
fond de ma conscience de me pas refuser d’avance l’eacamen d
ce sujet, et de me seconder dams la marche consciencieuse et
toujours renowvellée.* -
Though not a word had been exchanged on the subject,
between Napoleon and myself, we seemed to be inwardly agreed
that the King of Prussia would let the opportunity to act
pass. His doing so appeared all the more regrettable, 8,S
public opinion in France was extremely favourable to a great
coalition. The money-market regularly besieged the Govern-
ments that had determined to take up arms against Russia.
On the 4th of March, Rothschild declared, during a visit
which he paid me, that for a war with Russia any sum
was at command ; he would furnish at once ‘as many millions
as were desired.’
In spite of all this, it had become clear that the Emperor
could not carry out his wish, only to embark his troops, if
Prussia took up a decided attitude. Besides, the uncertainty
and suspense of the situation, which seemed to weary the
army and the public in France, could not possibly last for
long. The Emperor once asked the captain of the guard
during dinner, how his regiment had received the news of its
impending departure. “Sire,' answered the captain, ‘there was
not a man among them who did not shout with joy on
hearing the news.’
If I had desired, however, that my excursion into the
region of great international relations should end in Paris
itself, I was soon to find out my mistake. Once involved in
these affairs, I soon saw a burden laid on my shoulders, which
* Geffcken, Zur Geschichte des Orientalischen Kriegs, pp. 81, 82.
PRINCE CHIMA. Y. 7 I
forced me to a diplomatic activity that seemed never to end.
The Emperor wished to continue communicating and
exchanging opinions with me, though our direct correspond-
ence was to be confined to the smallest possible limits.
We agreed to employ an agent, whom I shall often have
to name in the following chapters, and who belonged to that
class of high political personages, little known and still less
often mentioned, who, just by virtue of the unofficial
character of their positions, not unfrequently exercise an
important influence on the course of affairs.
My uncle had referred me in Paris to Prince Chimay,
whose services he had enlisted in my behalf. It was here
that I first made his acquaintance, and we entered at once into
personal and extremely intimate relations. Prince Chimay
was not exactly the ambassador of the Belgian Government,
but the family representative of King Leopold at the Court of
the Emperor. He was the son of Theresa Cabarrus, from
whom he had inherited the proud consciousness of her famous
name. He belonged, in consequence, as naturally to the
modern aristocracy of mind as, in virtue of his descent and
estate in France and Belgium, to the most distinguished,
though perhaps not exactly ancient, nobility.
He was an acute observer and an excellent correspondent. He
wrote with cleverness and ease, and was unpretending enough
to let his excellent reports on persons and affairs in France be
buried in my and my uncle's archives. He was an intimate
friend of King Jerome, and had obtained, through him, a
more familiar acquaintance with the Emperor. His amiable
wife was connected with the family of Napoleon by birth, and
was treated by Napoleon himself like a friend and kinswoman,
which facilitated in many ways the intercourse of the Prince.
The relations which I kept up with Chimay, as long as he
lived, were so comprehensive, that the reader of my Memoirs
will still find ample opportunity of becoming acquainted with
him. For years my correspondence with Napoleon passed
through Chimay's hands. The Emperor had authorised me to
make suitable use of our confidential communications in
Germany, and particularly at the Prussian and Austrian
72 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA.XE-COBURG-GOTHA
Courts. It was taken as a matter of course, too, that I should
give confidential information, both in Vienna and Berlin, of
the ever recurring points of the revision of the European map,
as contemplated by Napoleon.
It was more difficult for me to fulfil the wishes of the
Emperor and the Empress with regard to my English relations,
and in this respect I had frequently to endure the most
painful situations. Those who in later years may have read
in the newspapers the touching accounts of the friendship
of Queen Victoria for her unfortunate sister of France,
or those who consider my brother's rapturous descriptions
of his intercourse with Louis Napoleon in the ‘Life of the
Prince Consort, will hardly picture to themselves that there
was a time when, at the mere mention of my brother's name
at the Court of the French Imperial family, many a drop of
perspiration might have been seen on my brow.
The Empress, in particular, by questions, allusions, and re-
marks, respecting the English Royal Family, managed to cause
me many a trying hour at the Imperial dinner-table. On one
of these occasions, I had succeeded for a long time in keeping
the conversation confined to the newest Parisian fashions, and
to the little gallantries which, in the society of this charming
woman, were at all times as gladly offered as they were
received. But, with great dexterity, the Empress suddenly
contrived to again introduce the topic of the English family,
asking very naively, how the Duke of Cambridge, who was
shortly to pass through Paris, was related to the Queen of
England. Although it was easy to satisfy this thirst of the
Empress for genealogical knowledge, I still had the presen-
timent that I should not be likely to get off the rocks of
English family affairs so soon, and my brother rose up at once
before my mind's eye, with his most forbidding look, and in
the act, as it were, of strictly weighing every word I uttered.
Indeed, the Empress had already launched into a flow of
personal admiration for Queen Victoria, my brother, and their
children. She spoke of her longing to become better ac-
quainted with them, and of the duties of a Sovereign, which
it must be doubly difficult for a woman to fulfil.
THE SUBJECT OF THE QUEEN & PRINCE ALBERT 73
The compliments I interposed, with reference to the venera-
tion which the Empress herself enjoyed, did not prevent her
from ingeniously continuing in her argument: “Ah, if only
all queens had been as excellent and virtuous as the late Queen
of Portugal and Queen Victorial' But one need but look at
her own unhappy country, to see what harm could be done by
a queen. She was excessively devoted to Queen Isabella, who
was a very good woman, but her Court was after all too badly
regulated, and King Louis Philippe had caused, all the mis-
fortune of the Queen and her country, by bringing about her
unhappy marriage. The French had always been unpopular
in Spain, and she herself had been a witness of the dangers
that at all times attended the public appearance of the Duke
of Montpensier in Madrid.
At last, looking me straight in the face, she concluded with
the words: L’Espagne m' a qu'un espoir, c'est le roi
Ferdimand. At the mention of my cousin, my brother's
threatening looks at once occurred to me again, and as the
Empress, alluding to the fact that the Spaniards had not yet
got over their preference of Prince Leopold as a husband for
the Queen, appeared desirous of starting the subject of a
second Spanish marriage, I turned the conversation with a
little pleasantry, saying that every European prince would be
happy to receive a crown from the fair hands of the Empress:
and whether she had not got one for me !
The merriment which this remark caused, and in which
the Emperor joined, brought me relief, and put an end to the
dangerous dialogue.
However, though I could not submit to be cross-examined
by the Empress with regard to my nearest relations, it was
impossible for me to leave Louis Napoleon unsatisfied on these
points. Being only too well aware of the obstinate prejudice
that still existed against him in London, he urgently re-
quested me to suggest to him some means of winning over the
English Royal Family.
I thought it my duty to keep nothing from him that might
serve him in attaining his purpose. I gave him various
explanations and hints, drew his attention to the peculiarities
74 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
of the Queen and the Prince, and in this manner no doubt
contributed something towards the satisfactory result of the
memorable visits and meetings which took place in the course
of the year between the English and French Sovereigns.
I felt all the more justified in venturing upon this rather
dangerous ground, as I had meanwhile heard from Lord
Cowley that my visit in Paris had given satisfaction in
England, and that my brother was appeased.
The extraordinary and positively demonstrative friendli-
ness with which the Emperor treated me before the eyes of all
the world, did not admit the shadow of a doubt as to the
brilliant success of my expedition. The embassies of all
countries had, for many days, ample matter to correspond
about, if they undertook to report to their Sovereigns what
the Emperor had done for me. -
He drove me about Paris for the most part himself, and
showed me everything that was new and likely to interest me.
Almost every day there was some grand festivity. Especially
splendid were the Court concerts and the performances at the
opera, where Cruvelli, then at the height of her fame, was cele-
brating her greatest triumphs.
The Emperor seemed particularly desirous to let me see
modern France shine also in her military glory. Two days
after my arrival, a review took place at Versailles, and,
the day after, another in the court-yard of the Tuileries. On
the latter occasion, four regiments of infantry, four regiments
of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery, were led past. The
Emperor likewise showed me the arsenals of Vincennes, and
conducted me all through them himself. We drove there
without any kind of escort. Even in the worst Faubourgs
the people saluted us in a quiet and friendly manner. Still,
the Emperor remarked that he had thought it judicious to
have the streets macadamized. The Bourbons, who were
otherwise most excellent people, had possessed no foresight,
and had always lost their heads in times of revolutions. As
he said this, the Emperor pointed to a spot in one of the
trenches near Vincennes, where we were passing: ‘The Duke
of Enghien was shot here,' he observed, in a low voice, and
CHARACTER OF LOUIS WAPO LEON 75
then added: c’etait wºme grande imjustice de Napoléon. As
we entered the arsenals of Vincennes, it struck me that the
soldiers scarcely recognised the Emperor. When their atten-
tion was roused, they showed themselves attached, but very
quiet.
During our various drives through Paris, and at our
meetings before and after dinner, in the theatre, or at the
concerts, I had always an opportunity of listening to remark-
able and instructive observations on the part of the Emperor,
which enabled me, in a short time, to gain a pretty accurate
idea of his inner character and being. He was far above the
common run of men, and contrasted in every respect with his
surroundings, and with everything that may be called specifi-
cally French. -
Sometimes, during a quiet chat, when he would sit in his
arm chair, smoking one cigarette after another, and conversing
in a dreamy sort of way, he gave me more the impression of
a German scholar, than of a ruler of France. On such
occasions, he used to recite whole poems from Schiller, and took
a pleasure in passing suddenly from French conversation to
German.
Even when discussing politics, unless questions of a direct
practical character were under consideration, he often spoke
in such a way, that any one might have fancied himself in the
midst of a society of German doctrinaires. “I have an idea as
to how Germany might best be constituted, he once said, and
thereupon developed with great complacency the system of
the Trias, as if it were something quite new. When I observed
to him that it had been condemned as often as it had been
set up, and told him the reasons why, he answered with
philosophic Serenity: ‘C'est wºme des idées qui em theorie
Seraient eacellentes, mais qui m'ont pas d'avenir, parcequ'elles
Somt impracticables.’
“But, he then continued, suddenly speaking in German,
‘as to great united Germany, it can neither be liked, nor.
tolerated, from the French point of view, because, if Austria
were included, it would signify, after all, nothing but an
aggrandizement of Austria.' What he admired in the
76 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-COBURG-GOTHA
Germans, he then went on to say, was that they had not yet
lost the hope of a united empire. The national sense of the
Germans was really a power which was much stronger than
all armies.
He would own, however, that he should be an ardent
enthusiast for the union himself, if he were a German. But,
under the circumstances, he could only regret, for Germany's
Sake, that the confederation of 1815 had afforded so little scope,
and still fewer guarantees, for these ideas.
It seemed to me, after my stay in Paris, simply unintel-
ligible, and only to be explained by the hatred of the parties
whom the Emperor had vanquished, that he should be con-
sidered devoid of abilities.
I wrote at the time a short sketch of Napoleon, which I
still consider to be correct, and in which I characterised the
unfavourable view so widely current as to his ability, as a
positive piece of absurdity.
A short conversation with him suffices to dispel this notion.
Not that he ever tries to express himself on a subject at once
in pregnant words, but every interesting side of it that is
touched upon, produces a change in his otherwise immovable
countenance, which shows the lively interest it awakens in
him. He then expresses himself naturally and sensibly,
Sometimes wittily, and always without empty phrases and
declamatory effect.
It is true, on the other hand, that he had a very slow
manner of thinking, and that he struck one as having difficulty
in understanding. He had a very cultivated mind, but his
positive knowledge did not appear to exceed the ordinary
measure in any subject. It was only in military matters that
he was rightly credited with greater discernment, but he had
no innate predilection for military pursuits. He showed a
striking indifference with regard to the troops that were
bound for the East.
As to his character, what was said of his close reserve and
his distrustfulness, appeared to me to be in general well-
founded. But when he liked, he could also be so frank and
kindly that I was fully able to understand the remark of a
THE DUKE'S VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT 77
person closely connected with him, who said: ‘C'est wn.
homme qui me ment jamais."—Strange as this opinion may
appear, I thought it only required a partial qualification.
Though Louis Napoleon differed decidedly from his uncle,
in so far as the latter had declared positive lying to be a
necessary means of Government, still the truthfulness of the
nephew by no means excluded a policy coupled with surprises
and intentional inconsistencies.
I conclude here with the words which I employed at the
time in my sketch of Napoleon III. In carrying out his plans,
the Emperor shows calmness, assurance, and consistency, and
according to what has been told me, on good authority,
concerning his behaviour on December 2nd, he possesses
a personal courage by far excelling that of his uncle. His
firmness appears as the result of exact calculation. He has
the great quality of not thinking himself infallible.
Mistakes that are pointed out to him, he acknowledges
readily. Of self-conceit there is not a vestige in his nature,
nor can he be accused of vanity. He has, it appears, a pro-
pensity to pleasure, and finds in pleasure an obvious satisfac-
tion. He expressed to me, in a significant way, his desire for
a pleasant life of retirement, such as was customary in the
time of Louis XV. So far as I could see, he was moderate in
the ordinary enjoyments of life.
He appears to love the amiable Empress truly, and with
simple sincerity. But while grateful for favours received, he
is said to have an unextinguishable memory for injuries.
These outlines, which, from the nature of the subject,
exhibit chiefly the favourable sides of his character, may serve
to qualify the unfavourable ones, as represented by History.
In any case, the Emperor is a man of extraordinary parts. To
have overlooked this has been the mistake, and at the same
time the misfortune, of his opponents, both in France and on
the thrones. He undoubtedly entertains great plans. If he
at present comes forward as the defender of the liberty of
Europe, the time may still come, when that liberty will have
to be defended against him. To Germany he may become
more dangerous than his uncle was.
78 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
It was on the 11th of March that I took leave of the
Emperor, with the conviction that our relations could not have
commenced under better auspices.
The Empress gave me some very tasteful presents for the
Duchess, and Napoleon parted from me with the warmest
messages for my uncle, to whom he had at the same time
written a letter full of cordial thanks for my visit. His words
with regard to my brother were characteristic: ‘Remember
me to your brother, whose great qualities I can appreciate, and
who, I believe, is as friendly disposed towards me as you are.
I should be pleased to be able to speak with him, as I have
with you : Mais la merest entre mows.’
CHAPTER III
EFFECT OF THE DUKE’s STAY IN PARIS.–LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.
—THE DUKE GOES TO BERLIN.—KIND RECEPTION BY THE KING.——
STRONG LETTER FROM QUEEN VICTORIA TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.
—THE APRIL TREATY BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.—
FREDERICK WILLIAM IV SEEKS TO CONCILIATE THE EMPEROR OF
RUSSIA.—BUNSEN's RESIGNATION, BONIN's DISMISSAL, AND THE
PRINCE OF PRUSSIA’s DISAGREEMENT WITH THE KING. —PRINCE
ALBERT ON THE CHEVALIER, DE BUNSEN.—THE KREUZZEITUNG
PARTY IN BERLIN.—PARTICULARS OF THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE
KING OF PRUSSIA AND HIS BROTHER.—HOW BONIN WAS DISMISSED.
—LETTER FROM THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA TO THE DUKE.--THE
DUKE PROPOSES TO GO TO WIENNA.——THE SITUATION THERE.---
LETTER FROM THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA TO THE DUKE.--THE
RUSSIAN PARTY IN VIENNA.—UNCERTAINTY OF AUSTRIA’s INTEN-
TIONS.—FAR REACHING PLANs.—THE DUKE's NAME MENTIONED IN
CONNECTION WITH THEM.—THE EMPEROR FRANCIS. JOSEPH. —HIS
CHARACTER AND VIEWS.—PRUSSIA’s INDECISION CAUSES HIM UN-
EASINESS.—WHAT HE THINKS OF NAPOLEON AND HIS PROJECTS.—
PRINCE METTERNICH.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT. —COLONEL
voN MANTEUFFEL ARRIVES IN VIENNA, AND THE SKY BECOMES
OVER-CAST.--THE RACE BACK TO BERLIN.—COLONEL VON MAN-
TEUFFEL GETS THE START OF THE DUICE. —CURIOUS RECEPTION
OF THE DUKE BY THE KING.-CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER WON
MANTEUFFEL.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT. —THE FOUR POINTS.
—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.--—WRATH OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—
HIS LETTER TO THE DURE.—THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA TO THE
DUKE.—DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
WHEN I returned from Paris to Brussels, on the 12th of March,
I found my uncle extremely satisfied with the success of my
visit to the Tuileries. But he felt himself, nevertheless, more
than ever confirmed in his conviction that it was undesirable
to make an enemy of the Emperor Nicholas. Napoleon's open
expression of his aversion to the treaties of 1815 struck him
8O MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
as suspicious and unpleasant. Hence it was easily to be con-
ceived that the friends of Russia declared all over Europe that
my uncle, quite in contrast to my own political opinions, was
at bottom a thorough Russophile, and at any rate a true friend
of peace.
Princess Lieven, the most famous of the agents in Russia's
employ, was especially indefatigable in persuading her corres-
pondents, both in England and in Paris, that my uncle was far
from agreeing with his politizing nephew. Of my brother, too,
the same people asserted that the Russian Emperor possessed
numerous letters from him, which clearly showed his leaning
towards the cause of Russia.-Albert remarked to me on this
score: ‘My correspondence with the Emperor Nicholas has
been confined to announcements of the births of my children;
it may therefore be presumed to be as uninteresting as it is
harmless.’
All these intrigues, however, proved, what importance the
Russians attached to the relations into which I had entered
with the Emperor of the French.
My brother was also satisfied with my visit to Paris, and
wrote me, on the 22nd of March, the following gratifying
letter: -
‘I postponed answering your hasty lines from Brussels,
until I had read the memorandum which you handed to Uncle
Leopold for transmission to us. It reached me only yesterday,
and I hasten to express my pleasure at the way in which you
have treated the various questions with the Emperor, and at
the clearness with which your aperçw of these interesting
conversations is written. I agree with every word you have
said to him, and I find in his answers just the ideas and the
spirit which we have hitherto had reason to attribute to him.
For Germany—if she desired, or were able, to do her duty—
there could be no happier combination, in this serious crisis,
than the intimate alliance of France with us. Prussia's
behaviour . . . . will yet end in bringing down a curse on the
poor fatherland.
‘That Prussia cannot allow herself to be pushed forward
first in the war, or that she ought not to be pushed forward,
THE DUKE GOES TO BERLIN 8 I
this I understand perfectly. Besides, it would be a matter of
tolerable indifference to the Western Powers, when she entered
into the contest, provided they had some certainty as to the
intentions, the firmness, and the consistency, of the Prussian
Government. The idle talk of Prussia's not being interested
in the question is simply preposterous. Prussia has a much
more direct interest in the matter, than either England or
France. It is a question of life or death for Germany, whereas
for us it is of quite a secondary kind. The Russian Colossus
is pressing heavily against the whole long, long line of the
Prussian and Austrian frontiers, whereas we have no point of
contact with him whatever, excepting that of the indignation
excited here by his monstrous violations of rights in all parts
of the Continent. I am sending you the secret documents
which have just been published. (The Emperor Nicholas and
Sir Hamilton Seymour). Whose eyes are not opened on
reading and comparing their contents with what has now
happened, him God hath stricken with blindness, and He seeks
to destroy him. That some clear-sighted people still exist in
Germany, is proved by the pamphlet: Russia, Germany and
the Eastern Question, by Gutaw Diezel, published in Stuttgart.
It is a master-piece.
‘Our war preparations are progressing apace, and twice as
quickly as those of the French. The fleet in the Baltic will
be magnificent, unless it be somewhat too heavy for that
shallow sea. The 25,000 men for Constantinople are organized;
10,000 of them have already arrived in Malta; the artillery
has left; and the cavalry will go by way of France, and march
through Paris, at the Emperor's desire Who could have
imagined such a thing a year ago.
‘I can't understand the Prussian Chambers, who are accept-
ing their fate in sullen silence. But now farewell. I am
sending this letter to Berlin. If you should have left already,
it will be sent on to you in Coburg.’
I had, indeed, gone to Berlin on the 19th of March,
immediately after my return from Brussels, in order to report
personally to the King on my stay with Louis Napoleon. He
received me with the exclamation: ‘You have ventured, a
VOL. III. F
82 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
second Daniel, into the den of lions.’ He could not find words
enough to commend my expedition, which he called a most
meritorious and fortunate one. He was very glad, he said,
that the ice had at last been broken between Napoleon and
the old families, and that means were now at hand of establish-
ing a friendly intercourse with the Emperor of the French.
With reference to my attitude on the question of Prussia's
position, I was especially praised by the King for having so
correctly and effectively managed to state the reasons for
Prussia's reserve. It was as if a load were taken off the
King's heart, when he heard from me, and afterwards also
from the Prince of Hohenzollern, that Napoleon did not mean
to press the Prussian Cabinet too much for the present, but
would quietly and confidently await its decisions. Unfortun-
ately, the only inference the King drew from this assurance,
was that he would be left to carry on his present unintelligible
policy undisturbed. He was highly delighted at having
gained time to shake hands once more with the Emperor
Nicholas. The indecision of the Prussian Cabinet was per-
ceptible everywhere.
Altogether, the situation seemed to be regarded with far
less anxiety in Berlin, than in the rest of Europe, and the
friends of Russia looked down with a sort of pity upon the
political amateurs who were opposing the good old traditions
of Prussia. Only the Queen appeared to take matters rather
more seriously, and showed me less kindness than usual.
When she expressed any opinion at all, it was only in words
of distrust against Napoleon and his ogling with German
liberalism. -
When I came to take leave of the King, I was surprised to
find that the Queen was present at the audience, and endeav-
oured, purposely, as it seemed, to keep the conversation on
indifferent matters. The King, therefore, found no opportunity
to speak of politics. That I could consider myself sufficiently
enlightened, under these circumstances, will be easily conceived,
and I may say, that the surprises to which the King treated
the world in the course of the following weeks, did not
altogether produce a very strong impression upon me.
STRONG LETTER FROM QUEEN VICTORIA 83
If the direct answer which Louis Napoleon gave to the
King, in consequence of the mission of the Prince of Hohen-
zollern, was, on the whole, full of consideration, attention, and
patience, I will not exactly represent this as a result of my
conversations with the Emperor. But it may be confidently
asserted that, had the Emperor of the French at that moment
poured the full vials of his wrath upon the head of the Prussian
Cabinet, he would have met with the heartiest approval in
England.
The simultaneous mission of General von der Groeben, as
is well known, caused very great resentment in England, and
the General returned from there with far worse experiences
than the Prince of Hohenzollern from Paris. The letter which
he brought back with him from Queen Victoria, and which
had been written with the full approval of the English
Cabinet, was couched in such plain terms, that it must have
produced an almost stupefying effect on diplomatic circles.
Queen Victoria has probably never put her signature to
stronger words, than those with which she rejected Prussia's
appeal for peace. In the sharp points of the style, the pen of
my brother was easily recognisable: ‘Your Majesty calls upon
me to consider the matter in a conciliatory spirit, and to build
a bridge for the Imperial honour . . . . All the ingenuity and
devices of diplomacy and of good will have been wasted in
vain, during the last nine months, in attempts to construct such
a bridge. The Projets des Notes, des Conventions, des Protocols,
etc., have issued in shoals from the chanceries of the different
Powers, and the ink that has been squandered in writing them,
might be called a second Black Sea. But everything has failed,
owing to the obstinacy of your Imperial brother-in-law. When
Your Majesty informs me that you are now resolved to main-
tain an entirely neutral attitude, pleading in justification the
desire of your people, I am at a loss to understand you. I
should understand such language if it came from the Kings of
Hanover or Saxony. But I have, until now, regarded Prussia
as one of the five Great Powers, etc. etc.”
*This letter, which was carefully kept secret at the time, because it was feared
that it might become known through the German Press, has now been published in
the Life of the Prince Consort, III, 44, etc.
$4 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAME-COBURG-GOTHA
Whilst the King was receding further and further from
the Western Powers, he at least endeavoured, as much as
possible, to arrive at a better understanding with Austria, lest
he should be left entirely isolated. The ends which he pursued
in this direction, however, have never been clearly understood.
Not without some reason, the Kreuzzeitung party declared it
to be the intention of the Prussian Cabinet, by entering into a
close alliance with Austria, to restrain her from taking any
hasty steps against Russia, and, indeed, the agents whom the
King was most fond of employing in his negotiations with the
Emperor Francis Joseph, were men of the colour of Colonel
von Manteuffel and General Gerlach.
Thus, on the 9th of April, the protocol between Austria and
Prussia was concluded, upon which the treaty of the 20th of
that month was based. The two German Powers guaranteed
each other their territories, and agreed upon certain military
measures, in case one or the other of them should be attacked
while defending its interests, or in case the Russians should
continue to occupy the Danubian Principalities, or should
cross over the Balkans.
The Austro-Prussian treaty of April certainly did not
evince any kind of aggressive tendency against Russia, and I
have never been able to find that it was intended in Vienna
to put any very comprehensive construction upon it. Not-
withstanding, in St Petersburg, naturally, the greatest resent-
ment was felt against the Prussian brother-in-law, and the
latter endeavoured again and again, by small favours and
great resolutions, to conciliate the Emperor Nicholas.
Among such small favours might, at that moment, be
reckoned the cold treatment accorded at Court to the staff of
the English Embassy, and on the other hand the marks of
particular distinction conferred on persons whom the Emperor
Nicholas had sent to Berlin. Moreover, every license was
permitted to the reactionary Press in abusing the French and
English Governments, and all those German Sovereigns who
were suspected of being hostile to Russia. As I had at that
time entered into a detailed correspondence on German affairs
with my brother-in-law in Carlsruhe, certain sharp eyes,
PRIVCE ALBERT ON THE CHEVALIER DE BUNSEN 85
which were accustomed to penetrate into all secrets, were
naturally most keenly fixed upon us two. * -
Among the more serious steps, however, which Frederick
William IV took for the satisfaction of the Emperor Nicholas,
there were three of particular significance. The removal of
Chevalier de Bunsen from his post as Ambassador in London,
the dismissal of General von Bonin as Minister of War, and
the deplorable rupture between the King and his brother, the
true-minded Prince of Prussia. Each of these events created
much surprise, both among the general public, and in exclu-
sively diplomatic circles. They were discussed in every
possible shape, and gave rise to a good many false views. I
was pretty well-informed on all these matters, and may
perhaps be able to contribute something towards rectifying a
good deal of what then gained currency. -
As to Bunsen, my brother wrote a very detailed letter to
Stockmar, which has been published in the newspapers only a
short time ago.” -
The origin of the quarrel was no doubt to be sought in the
fact of Bunsen's having written a memorial in which he aimed
at a division of Russia. The King gave his beloved Chevalier
leave of absence, which the latter did not accept, demanding
an investigation. As this was not fully granted, Bunsen
resigned his appointment, and incensed the King to such a
degree, that he declined all intercession in Bunsen's favour,
even that of the Prince of Prussia.
However, Bunsen's faults were so well-known to all
politicians in England, that his retirement cannot be believed
to have been greatly regretted; and, in reading the letter my
brother wrote to Stockmar, it should not be lost sight of, that
the latter was Bunsen's friend, but not the former. To me
Prince Albert had represented the matter rather more soberly,
and since his letter of the 2nd of May enlarges in a general
way on the situation, the greater part of it may be suitably
inserted here :
‘. . . . Our alliance with Napoleon is, I believe, sincere and
firm, and the national bickerings, at least on our side, have
* Cf. The National-Zeitung of January 7, 1882.
86 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
ceased. But there is a Russian party in Paris, of which we
have no vestige here. Morny is said to be a Russian agent,
and to intend accomplishing the ruin of Persigny. He is just
now in Brussels with Princess Lieven, where Brunnow, Kisse-
leff, and Creptowitch, are executing their weird witch-dance
round the seething cauldron. Uncle Leopold . . . . . . . . . .
is always made content with the honourable prospect of being
able to render Europe great services as future mediator. This
harms him, and weakens me here. We preach, and—I fear—
even give offence.
‘Sweden would be easily induced to take action against
Russia, but everything must depend on the policy of Austria.
That country holds the scales in this question. We have no
reason to be dissatisfied with her. We have not once been
belied by Austria during these complications, nor have we
ever asked anything of her. But her own interests must
drive her to turn Russia out of the Principalities. That it is
desired in Austria that we should be the first engaged, is
intelligible to us. We build no hopes on Austrian policy, but
take our measures independently of her. Yet there is every
reason to expect that Austria will take an active part against
Russia later on. The Austro-Prussian treaty is still a secret
to us . . . . But we trust again to the force of circumstances.
As to bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on Prussia, we
consider it would be no better than threshing straw . . . .
Bunsen's fall is known to you.
‘I entirely share your view, however, that it is best so for
all parties. Bumsen is the very reverse of a diplomatist. His
best qualities are the most dangerous ones he could have in
this calling. In particular, his incredible fertility of mind and
his imagination. In 1848, I saw at least five complete con-
stitutions for Germany, and as many again for Prussia, all
composed by him, and worked out down to the very smallest
detail, and every one of them started from quite different
principles. His conquest and division of Russia was a similar
production. I took him to task at once—when I saw it—
with regard to the Ernestine branch and Poland, and asked
him: “Do you not see how this may compromise us all, and
ACCOUNT OF HERR WON BONIN'S DISMISSAL 87
what harm this patriotic fancy may do us?”—“Dear me, that
is true. I am very sorry; I never thought of that,” was his
answer. Bunsen himself will be much happier at a distance
from diplomatic affairs. That he has done me frequent and
even very considerable harm, I know very well.'
Nor had I myself much regretted Bunsen's retirement.
However, the agitation of Frederick William IV at the be-
haviour of this man, whom he had known and trusted so well,
was after all greater than might have been expected. “His
chevalier had gone quite mad, he said again and again, and
since he only made this discovery, after the chevalier had violated
the sanctity of Russia, the latter's fall, as well as that of the
Minister of War, von Bonin, could safely be looked upon as
the outcome of his great consideration and friendship for
Russia.
As far as the Minister of War, in particular, was concerned,
the measure adopted against him was the more surprising, as
Herr von Bonin had just at that time been keeping strictly to
the line of Manteuffel's policy, and had placed himself in full
harmony with his Prime Minister. But Manteuffel had a
better past, and was more agreeable to the Emperor Nicholas,
than Bonin, whose whole attitude in latter years had appeared
to argue opposition against Russia's policy. The effect of this
difference was that the one remained and the other went.
From the point of view of military affairs, the dismissal of
so excellent an organiser as Bonin was a matter of the great-
est regret. It was no doubt chiefly this circumstance, coupled
with the high estimation in which General von Bonin was
held in army circles, that induced the Prince of Prussia him-
self to address the King in language more energetic than he
had ever used until that moment, in spite of many a difference
of opinion that had otherwise existed between him and his
brother.
I had received accounts of these events from a friend in
Berlin, who was very well informed, and to whose remarks
therefore, the reader may probably attach some interest.
My correspondent first gives a good description of the
feeling in certain circles of the capital, when he says: ‘Your
S8 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
Highness, who has had the courage to suggest the establish-
ment of sound and genuine relations between France and
Germany, is now declared by certain factions at Court, whose
voice certainly has the ear of the Sovereign, to be the secret
head of the Gotha party in Germany. The journey of your
Highness to Paris is looked upon, in the pietistic Russian
parties and camps here, as the starting point, or point of
crystallisation, round which the liberal party in Germany,
with the French sympathies of which it has always been
accused, has once more gathered and constituted itself . These
aspersions, which have suddenly dressed up a far-reaching and
complicated conception of Gothaism under Your Highness'
standard, might be regarded as an idle quibble on the part of
our canting Muscovite friends, were it not for the intention to
strip the party that is opposing Russia of its national import-
ance.’
After having set forth how the Kreuzzeitung party in-
tended to turn the Austro-Prussian treaty in favour of
Russia, my friend goes on to say:
‘This party spirit, fighting as it does with every weapon,
has already succeeded in causing the Minister of War, von
Bonin, who, in company with Herr von Manteuffel, has hitherto
been endeavouring to balance the influence of the Kreuzzeitung
men in the Cabinet, to resign his position. His portfolio has
been taken by Count Waldersee, a trusty and devoted adherent
of the Kreuzzeitung party. The King is said only to have
given his consent after a long resistance, and not in an exactly
cheerful mood.
‘Herr von Bonin was opposed on principle to the policy of
the Russophiles. He would have made absolute earnest of the
military musterings suggested by the Austro-Prussian treaty.
The political position of Herr von Manteuffel, if his present
lingering at the head of the Cabinet can still be called so,
has been deprived of an essential personal support by the
resignation of Herr von Bonin.
“But it can hardly be said, whether the Prussian Prime
Minister still requires such support, for, according to the
present condition of affairs, his position can only be either
THE KING OF PRUSSIA AND HIS BROTHER 89
hopelessly lost, or hopelessly gained, and the men who have
hitherto placed their hopes in him, are now almost obliged
to fear the latter. Through his wife, who is entirely devoted
to the Kreuzzeitung party, Herr von Manteuffel has always
stood with his half on the ground of this party, and he has
now declared himself quite agreeable to the task of fetching
the chestnuts out of the fire for them. His enjoyments are
not of the most pleasant kind withal, for he complains of not
being able to digest his food, because his conferences with his
Majesty are now generally fixed for after dinner.’
A few days later, the same correspondent reported the
following particulars of Bonin's dismissal, and the share taken
by the Prince of Prussia in this event.
‘The letter which the Prince wrote to the King,
immediately after the dismissal of our excellent Bonin, was
not only couched in by far stronger terms than is generally
known, but also contained declarations and renunciations
which should have caused the King, according to remarks
that were let fall by those nearest to him, to confine the Prince
in a fortress.
‘If the King, just at this juncture, showed rare moderation,
such as he has scarcely ever exercised before, this was least of
all a merit of the party who have his ear, and who are not
wanting in endeavours of every kind to render the breach
between the King and the Prince an irreparable and glaring
one . . . . The . . . . influence of Prince Charles, who has
opposed the Prince of Prussia, step by step, since the year 1848,
seems just in this last conflict to have been more actively at
work again.
But this time it was the King's own excellent nature
which made him gain a remarkable victory, both over himself
and over the party which surrounded him and urged him on.
He declared that the letter of the Prince was one which ought
not to be answered at once, and on which he would postpone
his decision for twenty-four hours . After this time had elapsed,
the King penned an autograph answer to the Prince, in which
all the motives and declarations contained in the Prince's
letter of renunciation were entirely ignored, and the Prince
go MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
was merely informed, that the King granted him a furlough
of four weeks to recreate himself in Baden-Baden, but that he
reckoned all the more surely on the Prince's appearing before
him again on the 6th of June, because the King this time felt a
lively desire to commemorate, in loving union with his brother,
the anniversary of the death of their father, the late King, on
the 7th of June ! My authority, whom I may name as a very
intimate friend of the Prince, adds that the Prince, who, in the
meantime, had already regretted several expressions in his
letter, was much moved and touched by this turn.'
In a further letter he says:
‘The dismissal of the War Minister, von Bonin, was not
merely a personal concession on the part of the King, but the
consequence of a direct request of the Cabinet in St Peters-
burg. This circumstance, which I learned afterwards, may
justify my referring to the subject again to-day. The King
sent for Herr von Manteuffel, and announced to him the
occasion that had arisen, to necessitate Bonin's leaving the
Cabinet. Manteuffel replied that His Majesty's commands
should be carried out at once, and retired to draw up the
necessary Cabinet order.
‘The next day, Herr von Bonin had an audience of the
King, at the conclusion of which His Majesty said: “I can only
assure you of my unqualified approval, and express to you
my fullest acknowledgment for all you have done for your
department. But, nevertheless, I have to tell you, at the same
time, that the ties which have hitherto wedded us, must be
dissolved, and that I shall give you another appointment in a
more distant garrison.” Herr von Bonin bowed. When he re-
entered the ante-chamber, Count Dohna, now the real head of
the Prussian Russophile party, approached him and delivered
into his hands the Cabinet order of the King, which had
already been drawn up, and which transferred Herr von Bonin
to Neisse. This is a garrison where the late War Minister
will be under the command of Herr von L., a completely
Russianized Prussian soldier, and a personal favourite of the
Czar. -
‘Count Dohna entered into a conversation with Bonin, in
LETTER FROM THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA 9 :
the course of which he reproached him with having been
about to produce a schism in the Prussian army by his anti-
Russian principles; upon which Bonin replied that it must
have come to a pretty pass with the Prussian army, if it
could divide on the question of its adherence or non-adherence
to Russia. At this moment, the King, who had heard the
very loud voices of the two gentlemen, sent out his Chamber-
lain to command Herr von Bonin's presence at the Royal
dinner-party that same day. At the dinner table, Bonin
received his place next to the Russian Ambassador, M. de
Budberg, and on the other side a Russophile General, who had
been placed on the retired list, a short time before, through
Bonin's influence.
‘Madame von Bonin recently put the question to Herr von
Manteuffel at some party, how he could have sacrificed his
best friend, whereupon Manteuffel replied, that His Majesty
was entirely at liberty to keep and dismiss his Ministers,
according to his wants and requirements.’
The incidents just described here, were in substance con-
firmed to me by Bonin, when he visited me in Coburg a few
days after his discharge. Indeed it was unmistakable that a
deep agitation had seized several very distinguished circles
in the capital, and throughout all Prussia, and the question
was already being raised on many sides, whether it would not
be opportune to proceed to the formation of a party under the
leadership of the Prince of Prussia. Several men were men-
tioned, who were said to be ready to go over to a strong
opposition, such as Count Pourtales, Bethmann-Hollweg,
Count von der Goltz, and others.
I had long ago entered into relations with this circle of
politicians, but was not of opinion that the Prince of Prussia
would, or could, place himself at the head of any party.
The moment I received the first news of the Prince's
departure from Berlin, I at once addressed myself to him in a
letter, the copy of which I have unfortunately lost, but in
which I expressed my grateful approbation of the Prince's
energetic behaviour. His extremely friendly answer from
Baden, characteristic as it was of his whole manner, bore the
92 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
date of the 19th of May, and was couched in the following
terms:
‘Your kind lines of the 16th inst. were a very precious
proof to me of your sympathy and friendship. No less so .
your former interesting communications, some of which came
from here—(of my knowledge of which, however, I have made
no mention here). The bearer of those documents, S--,
will have written to you, that I was about to reply to you—
when the catastrophe occurred that has brought me here; so
that I have not yet found leisure to write to you.
‘Although I never intended, by my momentary absence
from Berlin, either to force the King to keep Bonin, or to
follow my political views—since he is master, and entitled,
after listening to advice, to issue his commands, and
indicate the course which he intends to pursue—still, he
could not demand of me that I should give up all my political
convictions, known to all the world as they were, in order to
assist him in changing over to another course: Lest, therefore,
I should become inconsistent with myself, and before the
world, I considered it advisable, by absenting myself from
Berlin, to leave the King to decide as he liked, showing the
world that I, as his first subject, am also the first to obey
the King's commands, but that I am not capable of helping
him in executing a political change of front which runs
counter to my convictions.
‘A lasting schism between the King and me must not occur,
‘I am therefore going with my family to Berlin, for the cele-
bration of my silver wedding, on the 11th of June, whereby,
it is to be hoped, the family peace will be re-established.
However, I shall only remain there five or six days, and shall
henceforward take no further part in political affairs, unless
indeed this change of front towards the East should
mot succeed. The world has already recognised what my
momentary absence signifies. It will see, by my future con-
duct, that I must keep peace with the King, but that I cannot
identify myself with his intended policy, though I must obey
him.
‘In what light I regard Alvensleben's mission to Vienna,
LETTER FROM THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA 93
I need not tell you. If I approved of it, I should be in
Berlin, and not in Baden How Prussia is to face the world
with such political vacillations, I am at a loss to conceive.
The alliance of the 20th of June was the end to which I firmly
steered, and to the success of which I lent a helping hand,
in obedience to the King's command. And should I now lend
the same helping hand to destroy it 2 Nobody can demand
this of me. Nothing but the fact of all Germany's joining this
alliance, is capable of bringing back peace quicker and under
different circumstances—perhaps even without bloodshed on the
part of the Germans. But if Germany, out of fear for war,
hesitates to join the alliance, then the schism in Germany will
be sown again for a long time to come, and will be taken
advantage of by the East and by the West I find the temper
of the people here excellent. But how will an understanding
be possible in Bamberg, when Alvensleben's mission takes
effect in the direction of that town 2 Thus Prussia will be-
come the disturbing element in Germany, instead of being her
safe-guard and leader.
‘The rescript of the Emperor of Austria, on the occasion of
the enormous levy of troops, is extremely fine and charac-
teristic. It is possible to speak thus, when one's actions are
consistent - -
“When you discuss affairs in Vienna, take special heed of
one thing, viz., that the basis of the Conference of Vienna be
strictly abided by. Let there be no running after the chimera
de la rectification de la carte de l’Ewrope, but rather let the
Western Powers be restrained in this respect. f
‘I am writing to your brother for the second time
to-day. My wife thanks you warmly for your remembrances,
and sends you her kind regards. She is very downcast.
—Your faithful friend,
‘WILLIAM.’
Two points in the foregoing letter will require further
explanation. As to the mission of Count Alvensleben to
Vienna, it stood in direct connection with the retrogressive
movements of the King in the beginning of May.
94 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA.KE-COBURG-GOTHA
He required, that Austria should fix a term in respect of
her demand that Russia should evacuate the Danubian
Principalities. He had doubtless already been informed by
the Emperor Nicholas, that the latter intended doing so of
his own accord, as soon as the Western Powers had determined
to attack him openly. His and the Czar's hopes were at that
time founded on the assumption that the French, if they carried
the war into the interior of Russia, were sure to experience a
second Moscow, owing to the natural limitedness of their
means. All, therefore, depended on restraining Austria, as long
as possible, from taking any summary steps. Alvensleben
was to gain this end in Vienna, by saying that the King of
Prussia desired first to make personal representations to the
Emperor Nicholas.
The other matter mentioned in the Prince of Prussia's letter,
and touching me directly, had its special history, and will
take up a good deal of space here. The Austrian Government
could not fail to see that the moment when the question of
the alliance would have to be considered by the Confederate
States, could no longer be postponed for any length of time.
In Court and Government circles in Vienna, I was credited
with having a certain influence on a number of Sovereigns,
and on public opinion in Germany.
After my return from Paris, it naturally became my task to
seek relations also in Vienna, in order to bring the influence
of my observations and my tendencies to bear on those who
were in authority there. When the Prince of Prussia wrote
to me, he knew that I was on the eve of carrying out
this purpose, and he therefore gave me, in the letter I have
just communicated, the sensible and well-meant advice
respecting the restraint which it was desirable to place on the
intentions of the French.
I did not find it so easy, however, to obtain a ready
welcome in Vienna, and had to go to work slowly and
carefully. Immediately after my return from Paris, I had
received the agreeable news that my journey had been well-
received at the Foreign Office in Vienna. I therefore in-
structed Baron Borsch, who was my Chargé d'Affaires there,
THE SITUATION IN VIEW WA 95
to intimate personally to Count Buol, how greatly I valued
his appreciation of my negotiations in Paris, and altogether
the sound Western policy of Austria, and that I should not
fail to use my influence in Berlin to the same effect.
Count Buol gratefully received this communication, and
begged to be allowed to report on the letter of instruction to
my Ambassador to his Majesty, the Emperor personally.
There was no time to be lost in making use of this favourable
moment. I therefore wrote a memorandum for the Emperor
of Austria, and gave it, together with a private letter to His
Majesty, to Herr von Borsch, who had in the meantime come
to Gotha, to take back to Vienna.
Baron von Borsch wrote to me, in a report of the 4th and
5th of April, ‘that the Minister had received my communica-
tion with many thanks, and with the promise that he would
immediately deliver it to the Emperor.’
It must by no means be imagined, however, that in April
1854 there was not also a strong Russian current at the Court
of Vienna. Not only from the ambassadors of the German
Central States, but also from the high aristocracy of the
Imperial capital, the Russian Ambassador met with the very
best support. It was said, that M. de Meyendorf would have
presented his letters of recall long ago, had he not been so
well served in Vienna by the numerous friends of Russia.
Count Buol himself complained of the ambassadors of the
Central German States, and used to say, that it was impossible
to make any communication to them, because, if he had any-
thing to say to them, it was much better to say it direct to the
Russian Ambassador.
My own Chargé d'Affaires suffered very much from these
party movements. He was made to feel, in his social position,
that he was the representative of the radical Duke. Nothing
is more strongly characteristic of the diplomatic complications
with Russia at that time, than the circumstance that this great
question was looked upon, in all German States, almost as a
home affair. This fact must be well borne in mind, in
order to gain a correct idea of the nature and the character
of the political contrasts then existing. Since those days,
96 MEMOIRS O.J.' 7"HE DUATE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO 7"I/A
Europe has frequently seen the Eastern Question rise up
again, and discussed, without the inner factions of the various
States, or even the body of the nations themselves, being so
entirely engrossed by this matter of foreign policy, as they
were in 1854.
The moment for direct personal intercourse with the
Emperor of Austria, so ardently desired by me, appeared
just then not altogether favourable. At the beginning of
the month, as Herr von Borsch informed me, Count Buol had
chanced to have little opportunity of speaking with the
Emperor, and it took some days before he could deliver my
memorial. On the 24th of April, the brilliant festivities took
place, in connection with the young Emperor's marriage with
the fair Bavarian Princess whom he had selected from purest
affection.
I was all the more pleased, and took it as a favourable
omen, under the circumstances, that the letter with which His
Majesty honoured me, bore the date of April the 25th :
‘MOST ILLUSTRIOUS DUKE,--I fulfill with pleasure the
agreeable duty of thanking Your Highness sincerely for the
communication you have so obligingly made to me.
‘In face of the importance of the subject matter, Your
Highness' letter and the enclosed memorandum could not fail
to engage my fullest attention. Your Highness is not only .
placed in a most favourable position as an observer of
contemporary history, but your connections have also the
advantage of enabling you to fertilise the convictions you gain
from your independent point of view. Your Highness has
given a fresh proof of this, by the influence you have exercised
at a critical moment in Paris and Berlin.
“All the more must I value Your Highness' letter, in which
you so characteristically point out, how urgently the novelty
of the present political situation calls for fresh efforts on the
part of all friends of the monarchic cause and of law and
order. German affairs, in particular, weigh heavily upon my
mind at the present crisis.
“To act in close union with Prussia; to secure, in common
THE RUSSIAN PARTY IN VIENNA 97
with this Power, a unanimous and firm attitude on the part
of all the German Governments; to strengthen afresh the
sense of common political interests in Germany, which has
unfortunately been disturbed in so many ways; to invest the
acts of the Confederation, in its totality, with dignity and
authority: these are the ends I am most ardently striving for,
and for the attainment of which I hope, in the interest of all
Germany, to have gained a firm and Secure basis by my recent
negotiations with the King of Prussia. -
‘Your Highness will ever find me ready to listen to your
views with the same pleasure. Those you have already in-
timated to me, give me an agreeable guarantee for the manner
in which you will in future continue to profit by the favour
of your circumstances. *
“I beg Your Highness to accept the assurance of sincere
esteem, with which - * -
“I remain - -
‘Your Highness' friendly-disposed
‘FRANCIS JoSEPH. .
‘Vienna, April 25, 1854.
‘TO THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS
‘DUKE ERNEST AUGUSTUS OF SAXE-CoBURG-GoTHA,
“OUR DEAR UNCLE AND DUKE.’
What appeared especially noteworthy in the letter of the
Emperor of Austria, was his repeated mention of German
affairs, the representation of which, according to the declara-
tions of the Minister Count Buol, was to be the chief aim of
the policy of the Empire. Meanwhile, the state of affairs in
Vienna itself had by no means become more settled. No
doubt, after the views of the Emperor had been more
definitely expressed, and the April treaties with Prussia were
concluded, a portion of the aristocracy gave up its opposition
against the Western tendency, and my Chargé d'Affaires in-
formed me that friendship for Russia was no longer preached
in illustrious circles, like it formerly was. Still, a number of
generals adhered firmly to their late companionship in arms
with the Russian army, nor did that significant military
WOL. III. G
98 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
trifolium, Radetzky, Jellacic, and Windischgraetz, even now
subdue the tone of their fears with regard to the revolutionary
ideas of Western Europe.
The nuptials of the Emperor caused a conflux of all the
higher officers in the capital, and it was not without some
effect on the political situation, when old Radetzky appeared
in Vienna, about the middle of April, declaiming very loudly
against Count Buol, and holding demonstrative intercourse
with the Russian Ambassador, M. de Meyendorf. Even the
more highly educated officers, like Schoenhals, Wimpfen, and
others, declared themselves warmly for the Russian cause, and
the only one who formed an exception in the concert of the
military friends of Russia, was Field-Marshal Hess. -
The Russians, on their part, managed, with extraordinary.
dexterity, to further and increase the spirit so favourably
disposed to them. The Czar sent Lieutenant-General de
Gruenwald, who was very well-known in Vienna, and liked
in court circles there, to represent him at the marriage of the
Emperor. In order to give a more poetic colouring to the
matter, it was reported that, when the grey-headed old soldier
came out from his audience with the Emperor, the tears were
streaming down his cheeks. From what I knew of the General,
this report appeared to me to be quite credible, and very
easy to account for. -
At what pitch of hesitation and uncertainty all and every-
thing had arrived, in consequence of the movements of
Austrian politics, could best be gathered from the fact that
it was possible to construe every event from two sides. When
the Russians evacuated Little Wallachia, it was done,
according to the opinions of the one side, in order to preserve
the friendship of Austria, and, in the opinion of the other side,
in order to prepare for an attack on the part of Austria.
Every movement in the Austrian army received its double
comment, and there were always authorities to be found for
the one and the other view. The only incident that appeared
to disconcert the friends of Russia, was the presence of the
Duke of Cambridge in Vienna, who had been distinguished in
a rather conspicuous manner during the marriage festivities.
FAR REACHING PLANS 99
Just as friendly had been the reception accorded by the
Emperor to the Duke of Brunswick, nor had the Duke, on
his part, neglected to strengthen the Emperor in his
sympathies with the Western Powers. It was talked of at
Court, that the Archduke Max Ferdinand would shortly re-
turn the visit of the Duke of Cambridge in England. -
In the meantime, Herr von Borsch reported to me, on the
7th of May, that he had received a letter from Count Buol, in
which the latter informed him that the Emperor expected my
visit in Vienna towards the 1st of June, when His Majesty
intended starting on a journey to Prague, in company with
the Empress. In order to be better prepared for my stay in
the Austrian capital, I had still to wait for various tidings
from Paris and Berlin. Thus a fortnight elapsed before I
could reach Vienna, after a wearisome journey along the
Danube, via Ratisbon, Passow, and Greinburg.
My Chargé d'Affaires had been urging me every day not
to delay my journey any longer, because, as he said, the
moment was so important, and my presence might be of such
great consequence. ‘Austria, he was assured by well-in-
formed and competent men, ‘was on the point of cutting off
the last thread of her connection with Russia, and the
orders had already been given to hold the Transylvanian and
Galician army corps in readiness to march.’
I remembered, however, the old songs about the Austrian
militia in the wars of independence, and confidently expected
to arrive before the action had begun, the more so, indeed, as
at this moment the moving spirits round the seething cauldron
of Viennese diplomacy appeared to be much more intent on
dividing the spoils than on conquering them. -
Some not uninteresting information was still given me
before my arrival by Herr von Borsch, concerning the far
reaching plans that were gaining favour in certain Austrian
circles, hand in hand, as it were, with the very opposite ideas.
My name, too, so my Minister assured me, had been brought
into connection with various distributions of territories that
were to take place in the East. ‘Contrary to the settlements
of the Conferences in Vienna, he wrote, ‘the preservation, and
I oo MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
the integrity, of Turkey is suddenly doubted here, and people
are forthwith beginning to draw up a new map of Eastern
Europe. Austria could then demand that the Danubian
Principalities should be governed by quite independent
Sovereigns, enjoying the protection of all the Great Powers,
by which means alone the wishes expressed with regard to
commerce, and freedom of rivers and seas, could be satisfied.
Austria can demand that, as long as the Western Powers take
a firm footing in the South of Turkey, she shall be allowed to
install herself in the North. By Occupying Bosnia and the
Herzegovina, Austria would strengthen Dalmatia, and acquire
a country in its rear which would round off the kingdom and
increase its forces on land and at Sea, to some extent as
England and France had done by occupying those glorious
countries of the South.’
The Greek Question was likewise being ventilated in
Vienna circles, and as it was assumed that King Otto's position
was untenable, Herr von Borsch thought he could assure me,
that it was seriously contemplated to offer me the crown which
my Royal uncle had declined.
‘May it please Your Highness,' my correspondent continued,
‘to see by this how public attention is directed towards you.
But there is still another political conjecture in which Your
Highness is actively concerned. It is believed that England
and France see the possibility of re-establishing a Polish
Kingdom, as the best bulwark against Russia. If Austria
should be inclined to let herself be compensated in the South,
the question, here too, would soon arise of calling upon some
dynasty to assume the Government, and, in this case also, a
branch of the Sovereign House of Saxony, which once ruled
there, would have the best chances.’
Although these plans, conjectures, and discussions, which
were all to gain more or less practical importance in the course
of the next decennaries, produced little impression upon me at
the time, still it interested me to know that the Napoleonic
idea of achieving great transformations in the States was not
so absolutely repudiated in the diplomatic circles of Vienna.
It was, after all, remarkable enough, that even the more con-
THE EMPEROR FRANCIS. JOSEPH IOI
servative circles in Austria did not shrink from discussing
topics which had just been set going by Napoleonic organs
like the Siècle, or by the scheming mind of M. de Bunsen.
Were discussions of this kind merely confined to the
ante-chambers of the ruling sovereigns, or were the persons at
the helm themselves on the point of giving free scope to their
state-forming fancy 2 I should no doubt soon be enlightened
on the subject. e
It was very agreeable to me, on arriving in Vienna, to be
able to take up my quarters again, as I had done two years
ago, in the Golden Lamb Hotel, which was familiar to me of
old, and where I could move with the greatest ease and
freedom, and hold intercourse with personages of every
variety and description. The Emperor, with his young wife,
had taken up his abode for the most part in Laxenburg,
and it was there where I was summoned to my first audience
with His Majesty. -
The exhaustive conversation which I there had the privilege
of carrying on with His Majesty, was followed, the same day
at dinner, and at our meetings on frequeut subsequent
occasions, by a series of supplementary discussions, so that I
hardly found it necessary to keep to the strict rules of
chronology in noting down all the particulars that were
entered into with the Emperor.
I found the Emperor greatly changed to his advantage,
since I had last seen him. He had grown much stronger, and
showed greater ease and determination in his movements. In
spite of the troubled state of affairs, and the frostiness of the
situation, there was a certain happy animation observable in
the vigorous young monarch, and the founding of his domestic
happiness appeared to have had the most beneficial effect on
his mind. During my intercourse with him, I became more
and more confirmed in my conviction that he possessed the
talent of governing in an eminent degree, and that he would
become of great importance to the old Hapsburg State. A
calm and dispassionate view of things seemed combined in
His Majesty with firmness and determination in the execution
of purposes which he had once resolved upon. He had in-
Io.2 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THIA
wardly grown since two years, especially in this latter respect,
and had attained his full consciousness of power.
However, frankly and vigorously as he was wont to enter
into the discussion of affairs, he yet appeared to have set
himself certain bounds, beyond which he was personally not
inclined to go. With regard to all details and final decisions,
he used to refer me to his Ministers. In this method of
treating matters, there manifested itself a tradition of the old
Austrian art of government, coupled with natural and personal
prudence. -
The Emperor met me with unusual heartiness on the
occasion of my first reception, and thanked me at once, in
friendly terms, for the readiness with which I had responded
to his wish to see me there. He enlarged, in well-chosen
words, on the necessity of a more intimate intercourse between
those persons who stood in close connection with great affairs,
and in particular between the German Sovereigns among one
another. -
Taking the opportunity at once to remark, that in the
present anxious time this idea of a close alliance between the
German Sovereigns must suggest itself to every mind, I
brought the conversation immediately on to the politics of the
day. * we
The Emperor expressed himself without restraint on the
subject of Russia. “In consideration of the great veneration
I entertain for the Emperor Nicholas, he said, ‘I feel the
need of assuming, to the honour of the Czar, that he has been
driven to these many false and almost unworthy steps by a
powerful party and by treacherous counsellors. Nothing,”
he then continued, “has given me greater pain, than the
thought of waging war against Russia. But it is evident
that the Russians did not wish it otherwise.’
On another occasion, when I spoke of the fact that
Russian diplomacy was developing uncommon activity at the
German Courts, the Emperor replied: “Oh yes, they first
tried it on with us great ones; now they are trying it on with
the little ones.’ He was very accurately informed as to the
intrigues of Russian emissaries in the Sclavonic provinces of
PRUSSIA'S INDECISION CAUSES HIM UNEASINESS ſo;
Austria, and the idea that the same Russians who had just
helped him to suppress the Hungarian revolution, were now
at once beginning to exchange loving looks with the malcon-
tents, appeared to have wounded the Emperor to the very
core. Besides, remarks of Russian generals and statesmen, on
Austria, the army, and the Imperial family itself, had become
known to him, and had, for the moment at least, increased his
hostile feelings towards Russia in a very considerable degree.
It was not easy to imagine a more favourable ground for my
view of the whole European situation.
The Emperor's language in reference to these subjects was
so outspoken, that he frequently and on various occasions ex-
pressed his great regret, that a so wide-spread Russian party
existed in Berlin and Vienna. “In that respect, he said, “we
are by no means better off in Austria than in Berlin.” In
Vienna too, he remarked with a smile, there existed circles of
this sort, but they knew well enough here, how little influence
their caviling would have on him (the Emperor).
But for all the clearness of his disposition and decisions,
the Emperor, as was but natural, was rendered anxious and
uneasy by the attitude of Prussia. During one of my first
interviews with him, the Emperor said, half jokingly: ‘It
cannot be denied, after all, that they do very extraordinary
things in Berlin. However, he added, in a consoling tone,
‘they will not be able to break the treaty for all that.'
What seemed to render him most uneasy, was the thought
that, just at the beginning, he would stand alone in the great
action against Russia, with an exposed flank, and an ally who
was on friendly terms with the enemy. He said, there was
great danger, too, in the circumstance, that the Russian party
might mislead the King to take improper steps against
France, and that, on the other hand, the Emperor Napoleon
might then be provoked to retaliate.
I réplied, that I could not recognise such a danger. The
King of Prussia shrunk from engaging in war as long as
possible, and, under the present circumstances, would be the
very last to provoke France. On the other hand, Napoleon
was intimately acquainted with the circumstances in Berlin,
IoA MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-COBURG-GOTHA
and I had made it my task, when on my visit in Paris, to
quiet his mind on this score particularly. Very characteristic
was the remark of the Emperor, that, as to the substance of
the thing, he could no doubt entirely rely on Prussia. He
only wished, he said, that he had many such true Austrians
in his monarchy as King Frederick William was. *
As to Louis Napoleon, it was not easy for me to gain a
clear idea of the personal opinions of the Emperor of Austria,
and it took some time before. I heard him express more
decided views on this subject.
The Emperor always evinced himself very grateful and
full of interest for my accounts of the French Court, but, as
the opinions of his surroundings appeared to be very divided,
I had need of a certain caution in touching upon the wishes
expressly communicated to me by Napoleon.
Only when the Emperor once assured me, that he was
extremely pleased to find that I took a more favourable view
of Louis Napoleon than he was generally accustomed to hear,
did I think the opportunity come, to give expression to the
wider ideas of the French Emperor. “I have always been of
the opinion that Napoleon's intentions are honest, the Emperor
said. “I am convinced that he can be relied upon, and I am
extremely glad to find my good opinions confirmed by what
you have told me.’
Under these circumstances, I thought I ought no longer
to put off representing to the Emperor the Napoleonic ideas
concerning the future rectification of the European map, as
being something that might one day obtain actual significance.
I could speak of these things with all the more ease, as I
myself was in no way interested, and could take it for granted
that the Emperor had, by this time, become sufficiently well
acquainted with me, to know how little cause I had given for
all the rumours and combinations which had connected my
name with various kinds of State projects. *
The Emperor Francis Joseph seemed to have, generally, a
pretty fair knowledge of the French projects, but he appar-
ently placed little faith in the utterances of the Siècle and
other newspapers. I thought it well to confirm this view, with
WHAT' HE THINKS OF MAPOLEON AND HIS PLANS 105
regard to the great transformations that were in question, but
without, therefore, being able to conceal the full seriousness
of two points, which Napoleon wished the Emperor of Austria
to take into consideration.
That the war should end in a great Peace Congress, which
would, formally at least, deprive the Congress of Vienna of its
international title, was an idea which Napoleon desired to
have discussed with the greatest frankness; nor did he wish to
have any secret made of his hopes regarding the territorial
compensation of France, who was not inclined to carry on the
war merely powr les beawa: ſeway of the Sultan.
I could assure him, with regard to this latter point, that I
was far from entertaining any personal opinion in the matter,
the more so, as the so-called disinterestedness of the war was
looked upon as of the utmost importance in England, and as
my brother, in particular, fanatically upheld this point of view.
But, after all, I had to point out that Napoleon was rather
awkwardly situated towards the French nation, which neither
took, nor could take, any pleasure in a so totally fruitless
Eastern war. * *
As the Emperor permitted me to say, whether—apart from
all dreams of the future—Napoleon really had any substantial
aims in view, and what they were, I gave him a resumé of the
conversations I had had with him, touching the development
of Austria in the East. I told him that Napoleon looked upon
Austria's acquisition of the Danubian Principalities as quite a
matter of course; that he would leave the Austrian Govern-
ment free to act as it liked in regard to Servia; and that he
was convinced that the possession of Bosnia, on the part of the
Austrian Empire, was, after all, merely a question of time.
Although the Emperor raised the objection, that all these
countries were unproductive, and would cost the State more
than they brought in, still he did not exactly decline to
discuss the matter, and I was able to reply, that Napoleon
believed Milan to be a much greater difficulty for Austria,
than those Eastern provinces, and that, according to him, it
was not likely that Italy would ever be pacified.
The Emperor appeared to become very uneasy at this
I of MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GOTHA
information, and most strongly repudiated any idea of relin-
quishing Italian territory. I gained, at that moment, the firm
conviction that all Napoleon's expectations of attaining his
desired end by means of conventions, treaties, and compen-
sations, were purely chimerical, nér could I conceal this fact
afterwards from the Emperor of the French. It had the
effect, that Napoleon still consoled himself, for a time, with the
idea that circumstances would prove the stronger, and that
Austria, when she had once engaged in the action of war,
would also experience its consequences. But afterwards, when
Austria's participation in the war against Russia ended in
vapour, as events will show, his interest in the Eastern war
cooled with increasing rapidity. º
With regard to all the details of the political and military
operations, the Emperor Francis Joseph had referred me to
Count Buol, and Field-Marshal Hess, and I saw a great deal of
these two men, who treated me with the greatest confidence.
The relations which were established between me and
Count Buol, were, from this time forth, of a very peculiar kind.
The more this cautious diplomatist was at first alarmed by my
appearance in Vienna, the more confidential he afterwards
became, in the correspondence which he entered into with me.
Count Buol was a man of character, reliable, and of very
conservative and sober opinions, without any personal pre-
tensions, but also far from possessing any political initiative.
Like the Emperor Francis Joseph himself, he had been
driven out of his former range of ideas, chiefly by the exciting
policy of the Russians, and was, in consequence, all the more
angry at having had his pretty circles so frivolously destroyed.
Now, however, he was determined to break the bonds with
which Austria had only too long been burdened. He spoke
very kindly and frankly with me, but evaded, just as anxiously,
all questions of public law, and became, at first, the more re-
served, the more energetically I tried to push forward.
The Earl of Westmoreland, who was an old acquaintance
of mine, told me, the Minister had said to him, that it had after
all done his heart good to hear a German Sovereign speak in
that way; ‘but,’ added my English friend, ‘Buol tells me you
THE MILITA R Y PLA MS OF OPERATION IO7
had the devil in you.’ In the latter days of my stay in Vienna,
Count Buol threw off his shy reserve, and grew more and more
confidential. He finally asked to be allowed to write to me
direct, and I promised him every assistance, in the action
against Russia, towards bringing the German Confederation
over to Austria's side."
In the hope that Prussia and the German Confederation
would, after all, not decline to co-operate with Austria, the
deliberations on the mustering of troops, the plans of war, and
the posts of command, which had been held by order of the
Emperor, both before and during the time of my stay, were
already pretty far advanced. In settling these matters, the
opinion had gained favour that, in virtue of my political
bearing, I too should be fitted for an important post of com-
mand in the combined army corps. I was, in consequence,
to some extent informed by Field-Marshal Hess of the military
plans of operation, and, from the experiences I gained in this
respect, I drew a picture at the time, which will probably
serve better than anything else to illustrate the situation.
How Austria intends to carry on the war, I am able to
conclude from various allusions made in our conversations,
and from the facts already before me. The Austrian troops
are now being concentrated in two directions. (1.) The cavalry
is proceeding from the German provinces, the infantry and
artillery from Bohemia and Moravia, to Galicia. (2) The army.
of the Archduke Albrecht, which is already mobilised, is
marching from the Danube to Grosswardein. It is doubtful
whether it is to advance to the Bukovina, or towards the
passes of Bistritz. The Galician army, which is forming, may
be estimated at about 150,000 men, including a force of cavalry
amounting to 30,000 horse. The army of the Archduke
Albrecht at 110,000. Since, on the other hand, the troops which
are to be concentrated in Transylvania amount to scarcely
more than 30,000 men, it appears to be certain that the
Austrians do not intend to strike a decisive blow in Wallachia.
Such a blow will, however, no doubt be struck in the direction
of Jassy or Kiew. -
Whether the operations of the Galician army will be
108 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-COBURG-GOTHA
defensive or offensive, will probably depend most on the action
of Prussia. On the whole, the Austrian army is looked upon
in Vienna as the right wing, the Prussian as the left, and it is
desired that the Confederate troops should commence oper-
ations at the centre, in the neighbourhood of Cracow. It is
hoped that the Confederation will furnish half the contingent
for this war, and will consequently enter into action in two
corps of over 30,000 men each. These two corps are to be
formed out of the Bavarian, and the three mixed, army corps.
Each of these four army corps would become a division of
about 15,000 men. The corps comprising the 7th and 8th
army corps would operate jointly with the Austrian army, and
the corps formed out of 9th and 10th Confederate army corps
jointly with the Prussian army. Both corps, in the opinion of
the Emperor and General von Hess, would have Austrian and
Prussian troops attached to them, according to desire and
requirement, in order to give them a firmer support.
From a remark of the Emperor, I should conclude that he
himself will assume the chief command of his army. It is
desired that the Prince of Prussia should take the command
of the Prussian army. As regards the Confederate corps, it
will be endeavoured to give the command of the one corps to
Prince Charles of Bavaria, that of the other to me.
Field-Marshal von Hess not only belonged to the most
refined and able officers of the army, but was also in a political
respect a clear-sighted and unbiassed man, with whom it was
possible to discuss matters easily and frankly. It did one's
heart good to see the youthful enthusiasm with which the old
man had set about his task, and the confidence of victory with
which he was organising the great war against Russia. In a
letter which I received from the worthy General, soon after
my departure from Vienna, and in which he again repeated
what he had already told me verbally, he adverted in a more
direct manner to my post of command. .
With the public, Hess was excessively popular at the time
of my stay in Vienna. I had a good deal of instructive inter-
course, both with higher officials who knew, and in great part
shared, the feeling in liberal circles, and with eminent repre-
. MINISTER WOW BACH'S POSITION IN VIEWNA Io9
sentatives of the Press, like Kuranda, who, in his Ostdeutsche
Post, advocated Buol's views. An important position was
occupied by the Lloyd, whose impassioned articles against
Russia, mostly from the pen of Warrens, caused a great “,
sensation, both in Vienna, and all over Germany. The
attitude of the Austrian Press in those years reconquered, in a
very remarkable way, many lost sympathies for the monarchy
and the Imperial dynasty; and what had long been considered
a sheer impossibility, that Austria would once more gain the
start of Prussia in the public opinion of Germany, was one of
the most extraordinary consequences of these diplomatic
complications. -
However, when I looked around me in the circles of the
nobility, I must confess that I could never quite rid myself of
the fear, that all this anti-Russian enthusiasm might here too
prove to be nothing more than a straw-fire. In the drawing-
rooms of Count Ficquelmont and the Princes Lichtenstein and
Schwarzenberg, the old hatred against France, and particularly
against England, was fostered, and Russia still extolled as the
safeguard of law and order, and of feudal government,
which latter was the chief consideration in these circles. It
was curious enough, that even Lord Westmoreland, who had
become rather obtuse on the whole, did not, as the represen-
tative of England, oppose these goings on, but rather laid him-
self open to the suspicion of being a secret friend of Russia.
Only the French Ambassador, Baron Bourqueney, made a
laudable exception in the chorus of busy diplomatists, by
calmly, indulgently, and courteously, but with firmness and a
frank representation of the dangers which such a system of
illusions was sure to bring about, taking the field against
these Russian influences.
Curious was the position which Minister von Bach oc-
cupied, in the midst of these conflicting tendencies of Vienna
society. I knew him already too well, not to have
endeavoured to converse with him as much as possible. It was
to his communications that I really owed the key to Austria's
wheeling round against Russia. Bach told me that, already
at the time when the great inner plans of organising a uniform
11o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
monarchy had been conceived, he had prepared the Emperor
for a rupture, which at no far distant date was sure to ensue
with Russia. It was nothing but a result of inner reforms,
he said, that now enabled Austria to raise such an army, nor
did he give up the hope of still seeing the finances regulated
and brought to unexpected prosperity by means of the new
national loan.
He promised himself a great deal from a close alliance
with Germany, and, altogether, showed himself, now again, as
one of the few who had some conception of the affairs of
Germany. That Austria's approach to the West must give
the Empire a tremendous start in its home and foreign
relations, and win, or at least materially improve, the sym-
pathies of Germany, this the shrewd Minister knew very well.
If, nevertheless, he was not without great distrust regarding
France, the reason of this lay in his correct view of the
Napoleonic ideas. He gave himself up to no illusions on the
Italian question, but he was either conscious that no settle-
ment was possible here, or he had no mind to admit of any.
He expounded the facts, however, excellently. He referred
particularly to the attacks of the Piedmontese Press, and
declared that the more indulgence Austria showed, the more
she was attacked. -
No doubt, Bach observed, nothing was feared in Italy.
Austria had a good position and a good army. Yet the state
of affairs was unbearable. France was to blame for it.
Napoleon only needed to speak a word, and this state of
things would be changed immediately. But the Emperor of
France was forced to act thus and not otherwise, and he could
and would never give up the idea of an aggrandisement in
Italy. Austria, however, would never separate with one of
her provinces.
This ‘Never’ of the Minister appeared to me to be, at the
same time, an answer to the proposals which I had made to
the Emperor himself, at Napoleon's desire; hence I thought it
well to drop this topic in all further conversations.
To the most interesting reminiscences of my stay in
Vienna belongs my visit to the aged Chancellor of the ante-
PRINCE METTERAVIC II I I I
revolutionary period, Prince Metternich, who lived a life of
retirement in his beautiful villa on the Rennweg. He
appeared to have little influence, and received the numerous
visits paid him by strangers, with the kindness and pleasure
of a private man, without troubling to enquire whether his
views accorded with the prevailing tendencies of the Govern-
ment, or not. -
The part he took in current affairs, was over-estimated in
the rest of Europe, and my uncle himself, who had remained
in uninterrupted correspondence with Metternich, never let
an opportunity pass without giving good advice, which no
doubt vanished unused into the letter-book of the aged
Chancellor. However, it is certain that I owed it chiefly to
the active and friendly intercourse which was still kept up
between King Leopold and Metternich, that I was received
by the latter with the most easy familiarity, as if I had
always belonged to his most faithful adherents. -
I had not spoken very long, when he seized the oppor-
tunity of expounding to me his extremely philosophic method
of viewing the general state of the world's affairs, in an
academic lecture which contained many sayings of a rich and
experienced mind. He enlarged upon the history of every
possible alliance that had been concluded, since the time
of the Emperor Joseph II, for and against Turkey, and then
observed, that he must regard the one desired at the present
moment as something entirely novel, as a combination, in
fact, that had no precedent, and the consequences of which
it was therefore impossible to judge of. He said that, in view
of Russia's plans, a European coalition was much to be
recommended, but whether it would answer, was another
question.
He had, in general, little good to say about Russia. The
Emperor Nicholas he called a politician of petty means, who
had always been bent on playing the prompter to all Europe.
It was this that had so greatly incensed the Germans,
especially against the old alliance, which, inasmuch as it
secured peace, had been a great blessing for Europe. The
Emperor Nicholas should cease to play this part of the
II 2 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-CO BURG-GOTHA
prompter: the feeling in Germany would then become
pacified again.
Metternich discussed German affairs with a sort of for-
bearance towards myself, for, though he pretended, from an
objective point of view, to see no means of satisfying the
national feeling, still he declared to me, that he was very well
able to understand the sentiments that had prevailed in
Germany for so long, and that he himself would no doubt
once have been capable of feeling thoroughly German, had he
not preferred to become Austrian Chancellor.
Very neat was a remark of the old statesman on the
difference between ordinary old age and great age in the full
sense of the term, of both of which he had now had abundant
experience. He had found the former, he said, very oppressive
and wearisome, but the latter ultimately agreeable and
pleasant. ‘An old man, he added, ‘when he passes the
flowers in the garden, only sees their decay, whilst the very
old man still finds pleasure in the withering flower, and be-
holds in decay merely the power of regeneration.’
“Whilst in old age,’ he continued, ‘all duties weigh more
heavily on a man, and the tasks of life, which he still thinks it
impossible to dispense with, are more than ever difficult to fulfil,
the modest pretensions of hoary old age afford an undreamed
of source of life's little pleasures and simple enjoyments.’
And, indeed, one had the sensation, as if something of the
beautiful ease and comfort of this hoary existence com-
municated itself to his surroundings, and I could have listened
to Metternich for a long time, whilst he expounded his views
of the world, which he had led so long, and which loved him
so little. He was now, as it were, reconciled to all conflicting
tendencies, hence his great age afforded him the privilege of
calling up a pleasant image of the past, also in the minds of
those, who, like myself, had learnt, from their earliest child-
hood, rather to fear him than to love him.
As I had every reason to place full faith in his assurance
that he was not listened to at all, or, at any rate, very rarely,
I was consequently not able to expect any assistance from
him in furthering the details of political affairs.
I, ETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT" II 3
However, in the last days of my stay in Vienna, I was in
the latter respect still to be rather rudely startled out of all
my dreams of ultimate success. I knew that every effort was
being made in Berlin to extinguish, in good time, the fiery
spirit of war which prevailed in Vienna; when I suddenly
learnt that Colonel von Manteuffel had arrived in Vienna with
important letters from the Queen to the Archduchess Sophia.
In addition to this, I had just received the following letter
from my brother, who did not draw a more favourable picture
of the situation:
“In order to be sure of your receiving my letter, I am
sending it direct to Vienna. I received yours last night, and
as you intend leaving on the 19th, my answer would hardly
have reached you in time. I have communicated its con-
tents to Lord Clarendon. The Russian faction in Berlin has
now entirely gained the day, and turned every good German
and Prussian out of office. Whether Manteuffel will take
alarm at the consequences of these events, remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, I believe Austria has nothing to fear from
Prussia, and could confidently continue on her forward course.
That they are still loath to believe in Vienna that the Western
Powers are earnestly resolved on war, is intelligible to me,
for the Russians take advantage of every circumstance to
foster this idea on the part of the German Powers. In France
the war is really not popular . . . . Here it is just the
reverse. The English are incredibly eager for war against a
Power, whose form of Government, and whose foreign policy,
they abhor. The opposition, which desires to keep on the
popular side, has no weapons against the Ministry, except to
run it down as being luke-warm in respect of the war, and to
cast suspicion on Lord Aberdeen especially, who is the only
one who keeps the coalition together.
‘The Russians, therefore, by simply letting our newspaper
articles appear in the German Press, have no difficulty in
making the continental public believe that the Government
is not earnestly resolved on war. The fact that mew taxes
to the amount of ten millions have been imposed, is a proof of
our earnest. This represents 120,000,000 florins, which are
WOL. III. - H
I 14 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAATE-CO BURG-GO7I/A
raised annually. It is not a loan, like in Prussia and France,
but is to be raised annually, as long as the war lasts.
‘Our difficulty is our prosperity; we cannot get any soldiers,
Sailors, and ships. So enormous is the progress of our
commerce, industry, and emigration. We are fearfully busy
building ships; but are immediately out of stock again. We
have 40,000 sailors in America alone, 10,000 in Australia, etc.
The war will not be a rapid one, unless the German Powers
join. But the longest purse will carry the victory in a long
struggle, whatever the numerical strength of the army may
be in the beginning. We have already captured fifty vessels,
and destroyed twelve at Odessa. Russia is not to be
conquered, but can be blown up financially, to which end the
one-and-a-half million troops which she brings into the field,
contribute most usefully. If we could only get hold of
Sebastopol. The Greek episode is abominable, and shows
that Russia plays the revolutionist too, when it suits her
purpose. Now good-bye.
‘BUCKINGHAM PALACE, May 16, 1854.’
Meanwhile, Colonel von Manteuffel was making strenuous
efforts in Vienna to secure a fresh start for his party and
cause. It was most curious to observe how, from the moment
this favourite of all ladies appeared at the Austrian Court,
everything, even the sun and the moon, seemed obscured. An
air of coolness was perceptible in circles where I had but just
found the warmest zeal for the good cause, and even the
Emperor himself had become quieter and almost taciturn.
Without his telling me anything about the latest accounts
from Berlin, I comprehended very well what it signified, when
he casually remarked: “After all, the King of Prussia will
scarcely mobilise his army.” Notwithstanding, I still retained
the impression that the chivalrous Emperor was personally by
no means shaken at heart, but only seemed to waver.
At my parting audience with him, he thanked me, as he
had done on my arrival, most cordially for my zeal and for
the services I had rendered to the good cause. He concluded
THE DUKE AT THE PRUSSIAN COURT 115
by expressing his wish to see me there again very soon.
When I replied that this would not be possible for the present,
he said with a certain hearty emotion: ‘Well, then, I reckon
upon meeting you again in the great action.
Considering the news which Colonel von Manteuffel would
presumably take back with him from Vienna, it was now my
intention to get the start of him with King Frederick
William IV, so I resolved to travel as quickly as possible
straight to Berlin, without touching home first.
I might then yet hope, by a truthful description of the
situation in Vienna, to produce some impression on the King;
whereas it was only too certain that a personage like Colonel
Manteuffel must have had, both at Court and in the higher
society of the Imperial capital, abundant material afforded
him for a brilliant representation of the reverse of the medal.
He would then find it easy enough, by concealing the personal
intentions of the Emperor Francis Joseph, to determine the
King to proceed still further on his backward course. -
It therefore appeared important to me to make my report
to the King, before Colonel von Manteuffel made his. But the
same reasoning had also occurred to the other party, and so it
happened that Manteuffel actually got the start of me by one
train, and had already skilfully managed to trouble the
political waters in Berlin, when I arrived there.
However, since the King, on my arrival being announced
to him, at once summoned me to an audience in SANSSOUCI,
I already fancied that everything could still be saved. But
this was to prove a delusion, and though I had already seen
many extraordinary things in my life, one of the most remark-
able experiences now awaited me.
When I reached the ante-chamber of the King, I was
somewhat surprised to find myself kept waiting rather long,
which was contrary to the usual habit of the King. At last
the doors opened, and the King appeared, in the best of
humours, leaning on the arm of the Queen, who greeted me in
the most friendly way. He was extremely communicative,
and the Queen, as she said, was curious to hear how I had
found the newly married Imperial couple, to whom she was
116 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
related, and how her sister, the Archduchess Sophia, had borne
the fatigues of the marriage festivities. Politics were not
touched upon ; whereas at dinner, which soon followed, all the
most famous friends of Russia sat round the table, and talked
politics after their own fashion.
I described my situation, at the time, in a letter to my
brother as follows:
‘Although I had verbal messages to the King from the
Emperor of Austria, the Queen and the Russian party skilfully
contrived to prevent my speaking with him in private, in spite
of his having invited me to do so. Our bitterest opponents,
and the members of the Russian Embassy, had been invited to
the Royal table, whilst the few persons with whom I am on
friendly terms, were nearly all absent. Politics were dis-
cussed purposely at table, and the Emperor of Russia and the
policy of peace shown up in a rosy light, whilst disdainful
mention was made of the Western Powers, and lies were told
to the King about the feeling in the country. I did not enter
into politics with a single word, and instead of pretending to
be vexed or offended, which was, after all, the sole object in
view, I could not help giving way to unfeigned mirth, for the
whole affair was extremely comical.
“After coffee, which was served on the terrace, the King at
last took me aside, and asked me about the state of political
affairs in Vienna. But, hardly a few minutes had elapsed, when
the Court-Marshal, Count Keller, came to make a report to
the King, and, directly afterwards, it was General von Gerlach
who managed to excite the attention of the King. At last, the
Queen herself got up, approached the King and said: “Don’t
let us plague the poor Duke with these horrid politics, as he is
sure to be tired from his long journey, and will be glad to get
back to Berlin.” The King rose at once, and quickly took
leave of me.’ t
Whilst I was waiting at the station in Potsdam for the
train to start, Alexander von Humboldt came after me, and
said that the King had ordered him to accompany me to
Berlin, and give me an account of the position of affairs. I
need not say that this account was spiced with occasional
CO WVERSATION WITH VON MANTEUFFEI, II 7
remarks on the part of my informant, which were not exactly
in harmony with the views of the Berlin Cabinet. But the
best was, that the King desired me to speak with Minister von
Manteuffel. On the following day, therefore, I had a con-
versation with Manteuffel, which I at once noted down, and can
insert here without any further comment.
The Minister first gave vent to his curiosity as to the
real military position of Austria, and the seriousness of the
measures that were being taken there. I gave him a truthful
account of my experiences in Vienna on that score. He
pretended that the Russians under-estimated Austria's power,
and spoke here of dictating peace before the gates of Vienna.
They would try to take Silistria, but would not go beyond
the Balkan. The Russian party here had the upperhand.
The King was in a depressed frame of mind, but extremely
pacific. In any case, he would not leave Austria in the lurch.
The King desired that the separate States should join the
alliance. He, Manteuffel, encouraged him in this view, and
had, in consequence, incurred a great deal of enmity. The
conference of Bamberg was entirely in favour of Russia, and
the debates in the German Diet would afford the picture of a
Polish parliament.
He assured me that he would support Austria there in
every way, and complained bitterly of Bavaria and Saxony.
I remarked hereupon, that the behaviour of these Govern-
ments was only encouraged by the events in Berlin; that the
sympathies of the German nation went, neither with the small
Kings, nor with Prussia; and that Prussia's most faithful
adherents, amongst whom I numbered myself, stood deserted
and betrayed through the machinations of the Kreuzzeitung
party; that Austria managed skilfully to make use of this
circumstance, and was indirectly already drawing the greatest
advantage from it.
He stated further that the Russian party had announced
to the Prussian Government, in a Note which Budberg
had delivered, that it was the intention of the Emperor
Napoleon to send a corps by water to Holstein, in order to
threaten Berlin in the rear.
II 8 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GOTHA
To this I gave a decided denial, but expressed the opinion
that France was tired of asking and waiting so long; that she
would undertake nothing, however, without her faithful allies,
England and Austria; nor would such a threat, if it were to
be made, have anything but fatal consequences in every
direction.
In this he admitted that I was right. He asked me if I
intended to speak with the King again on the state of affairs,
to which I replied very decidedly in the negative, as I could
not anticipate any result whatsoever by doing so. But I
should not evade a conversation, if the King himself desired
it.
He finally told me that the Russian party was now
triumphing, and that its insolence was almost beyond endur-
ance. I could only laugh at this. We separated like friends
who are of the same opinion.
Whoever desired, as a non-Prussian German, to remain the
friend of Prussia, to receive credit as such, and not to resign
all his trust in that Power, now came to look upon himself
more and more as a sort of voluntary martyr. I sent my
brother an account of my experiences in Vienna and Berlin,
and the echo from London sounded as usual like the chorus of
the antique tragedy:
‘I have not found time until to-day, my brother wrote, on
the 12th of June, from Buckingham Palace, ‘to answer your
kind letter of the 3rd inst. from Berlin. The description you
give of the state of affairs in Vienna is encouraging, and has
given old Westmoreland particularly great satisfaction, because
it accords with his own often repeated, and often doubted, as-
surances. Unfortunately, your accounts from Berlin, too, agree
with our own, and show a terrible state of affairs. The King
has written an extraordinary letter to Victoria, which is
sixteen pages long, and in which he accuses Bunsen, Bonin,
and . . . . of all possible crimes against their Sovereign—
down to the tricoloured shirt-buttons which Bunsen wore in
1848, and the infatuation which caused him, at that time, to
mistake the stinking Frankfort crown for the crown of Charles
the Great.
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT II9
“Over and above this, he expresses himself deeply hurt at
being unjustly reproached and abused for pursuing a vacil-
lating policy, whereas he considers his policy a strictly
consistent one. We entirely overlook, he says, the “enormous
advantage,” we gain from his not having let the French carry
the Turkish war beyond their own frontier, which he has
merely done out of love of peace, because Russia is in the
wrong, and out of friendship for England. Victoria's answer
had tried to make it plain, that, the more consistently the
King acted, and the more consistently he carried out a policy
which was based on a contradiction, the more contradictory
would his actions necessarily be. It was, after all, an unheard
of contradiction, to bear France a grudge, because Russia
did wrong.
“In spite of all this, we are still rendered uneasy by the
meeting in Tetschen, for there is no mistaking the intention,
on so many sides, to build up a bridge for Russia, over which
she may beat a retreat, and which is then to be taken to pieces
before our very nose; whereas, when Russia has reached the
other side, the way is to be paved for her to unite with Prussia
and . Austria. The Bavarian proposals in Bamberg are in-
credible. As the purpose of the alliance, they hold up to .
England the maintenance of King Otto on the throne of Greece,
and the closure of the Dardanelles. The defectiveness of the
German constitutions shows itself again very plainly. . . .
‘Two divisions of ours are now in Warna. The French, on
the other hand, hesitate, on account of their imperfect prepar-
ations. The distance, you see, makes everything extremely
difficult.’
I may be permitted here to draw, in a few words, the sum
total of the experiences I gathered in Vienna and Berlin in the
month of May.
The difference between the relations of the two Powers to
Russia lay chiefly in the fact, that Prussia was altogether
determined to spare the Emperor Nicholas, whereas Austria
seemed particularly bent on hurting him. Whilst Frederick
William desired, as my brother said, to see ‘golden bridges’
built up for his brother-in-law, Austria's policy showed, that
I 2 o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THIA
she had no clear idea as to the objects to be attained in a war
which she desired, and that she was afraid of her own deeds
and enterprises. She wanted to see Russia humiliated, but
wanted to do nothing which could be followed by such conse-
quences. .
In my discussions in Vienna, I had, in more than one quarter,
quite apart from Napoleon's commissions, adverted to the
necessity of Austria's acquiring the Danubian Principalities, or
Bosnia, and I vindicated this idea in all directions. But the
utmost that Bach, who still appeared to be the most courageous
of all, would admit, was the expectation that Austria, after a
successful war, would have to assume the protectorate which
Russia now occupied. Otherwise, the restitution of these
countries to Turkey was advocated.
There was just as little firmness with regard to the question,
whether a definite weakening of Russia ought to be effected. I
was at that time much inclined to view the tendencies of the
Austrian statesmen in as favourable a light as possible. Still,
I thought I could only give an uncertain answer on this sub-
ject, in the memorandum which I drew up for my friends.
The general impression which my conversations in Vienna
produced in me, was, that no one knew what was to be done
with Poland. Austria would have liked to deliver Poland
from the hands of Russia, but she feared the establishment of
such a State just as much.
There could be the less idea of a political advance towards
a fixed end, as the Minister who was best qualified to serve
the Emperor with talent and ability, Bach, shrank from any
responsibility that might arise through a discussion of great
European questions. In face of the hatred with which the
most important man in the Government was pursued by the
Conservative parties, any energetic step might result in the
immediate overthrow of the Minister. Characteristic of this
situation was a remark of Count Orloff's about the two anti-
Russian counsellors of the Emperor, which was passed with
great relish from mouth to mouth in the drawing-rooms of the
nobility. He had called, as Herr von Borsch wrote to me,
Count Buol wºme crwche, and Bach towt bom/mement wºme camaille,
THE FOUR POINTS T 2 I
A time now came, when the situation changed constantly,
from one day to the next, in the most extraordinary manner.
Everything seemed calculated to drive speculation on all
European Stock Exchanges to a pitch such as it had never
been known to reach before. -
In an often published despatch to Count Esterhazy in
Petersburg, dated June 3, the Austrian Cabinet demanded, on
the part of Russia, the unconditional evacuation of the
Danubian Principalities, and Herr von Manteuffel supported
this ultimatum by a despatch to Baron Werthern of June 12.
The answers, which came at last from Count Nesselrode, were
at first evasive, and still started from the assumption that the
position of the two German Powers towards Russia was chiefly
that of friendly intervention. -
The confusion was all the greater, as Austria had, in the
meantime, also concluded a treaty with the Porte, in which
she bound herself to enforce the evacuation of the Danubian
Principalities, if need be, by dint of arms. Turkey conferred,
in that case, all her sovereign rights on Austria, in return for
which the latter guaranteed the integrity of Turkey in so
positive a form, that it might well be asked, indeed, what
object Austria, and above all Prussia, could have in plunging
into a great war with Russia, merely for the sake of prolonging
all the evils of Turkish dominion.
Prussia now protested against the treaty with the Porte;
Austria pleaded the treaty of April : Manteuffel sent Count
Alvensleben to Vienna; and Gortschakoff took the place of
Count Meyendorf, Gortschakoff was to bring about a rupture
in Vienna, and Count Alvensleben to prevent Austria from
marching her forces into the Danubian Principalities. The
King of Prussia declared himself released from all his obliga-
tions to take part in the war, whilst General Hess was daily
expecting orders to set out from Bukovina and attack Russia
in Moldavia.
Prussia's renewed attempts to intervene were firmly re-
jected by the Western Powers, and, in the midst of the general
confusion, Count Buol drew up a stipulation embodying four
122 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
points.” In all the negotiations that followed, these points
remained the sole, though much riddled, standard, around
which the European diplomatists, who were now cast helplessly
adrift, at times grouped themselves, only too soon to separate
again in all directions.
These four points were a sort of diplomatic magic wand, by
means of which the friends and the enemies of Russia might
be united in happy concord. In the course of the ensuing
months, indeed, these four points even found an occasional
encomiast in the King of Prussia himself, whose Cabinet, con-
scientious in theart of interpretation, carefully watched whether
they were really strictly kept to in despatches or notes, or
were here and there perhaps exceeded.
Russia at first simply rejected the four points, but she
evacuated, from strategic considerations, the Danubian Princi-
palities, which were soon after occupied by the Austrians.
Napoleon subsequently asserted that, whilst Austria had
assured the Western Powers that she was occupying the
Danubian Principalities in order to keep the Russians out of
them, she had at the same time told Russia that she was doing
so in order to leave the Russian Army free to operate against
the allied Powers. The Emperor of France, who made this
communication to my brother, pretended to have been informed
of the fact by Russia herself.
Granted the truth of Napoleon's assertion, which I can
neither confirm nor refute, it would have to be assumed that
Austria, in view of the impossibility of coming to an under-
standing with Prussia, had only recently become inspired with
the wish to postpone her warlike measures, and had thus been
induced to make a declaration of the kind to Russia. As for
us in Germany, there appeared to be no reason for doubting
the honesty of Austria's proceeding. The summons of the
* These points, as is well known, stated the lowest measure of the guarantees
that were to be asked for, the right being reserved of making further demands : 1.
European guarantee of the rights of the Danubian Principalities. 2. Free navigation
at the mouth of the Danube. 3. Revision of the Treaty of 1841 in the interest of
the European equilibrium, and with a view to restricting the Power of Russia in the
Black Sea. 4. Furtherance of the emancipation of the Christians on the part of all
the Powers together, in so far as this was compatible with the sovereign rights of the
Sultan, and in such wise that Russia resigned her claims to a special protectorship.
WRATH OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA I 23
Great Powers to get ready for war, was daily expected by the
German Diet, but meanwhile the Confederate States had not
even declared their intention of joining the alliance between
Austria and Prussia; though they had not declined to do so at
the Conference of Bamberg.
Matters remained in this uncertain state, until the middle
of November, when Austria once more called upon Prussia to
declare her intentions in a more positive manner. This was
after Count Nesselrode, in a note of the 6th of November, had
given an unfriendly, and not very delicately worded, response
to Austria's proposal for peace. On the 20th, an additional
clause in the treaty of the 20th of April was agreed upon
between Prussia and Austria, and the joint carrying through
of the ‘four points' by the two Powers was declared to be the
object of their alliance.
But the short intimacy between Prussia and Austria, to
which the treaty of November still bore testimony, was soon
destroyed again, and the relations between the two Courts
became very strained. The cause of this was, that, at the time
when the above-mentioned additional clause in the treaty of
April was being agreed upon, Austria was negotiating with
the Western Powers, in the greatest secrecy, a regular league.
offensive and defensive, which was concluded on the 2nd of
December, 1854. When a few days later the world was in-
formed of this astonishing fact, the greatest resentment was
felt in Berlin; nor did the King—and, it may be said, with good
cause—ever get over this proceeding of the Vienna Cabinet.
In the management of diplomatic affairs in those years,
misunderstandings, and surprises of the most extraordinary
description, were a matter of every day occurrence. A decided
plan, or a plain intention, was nowhere to be found, and mutual
suspicion of ill-will reigned supreme. It would take too long
to relate how painfully this state of things affected all those
who were still striving to bring about a united action on the
part of Germany, against the greatest national enemy she then
possessed. According to reliable accounts which I received
from Berlin, all sorts of efforts had been made there to arouse
the King's suspicions also with regard to the tendencies of my
124 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
own humble person, and I therefore resolved, when the con-
fusion had reached its highest point, to state my views, both
to the Prince of Prussia and to the King himself, in the most
out-spoken language I could command.
A short time afterwards, I received detailed answers, both
from the King and from the Prince, which, as may easily be
seen, were written quite independently of one another, and
may consequently be looked upon as two historical sources of
the first order with regard to the situation in Berlin at the
end of January. The King wrote:
‘CHARLOTTENBURG, January 27th, 1855.
‘DEAREST DUKE,--I bless the lines you entrusted to Herr
von Freskow. Yes, my Lord Duke, there are many powers
endeavouring to cast suspicion on the actions of Your Highness.
Thus I was assured, on many sides, that it had been your
influence, dearest Duke, that had caused the Thuringian vote
to incline so positively towards the Austrian side: but all this
is no excuse for the unfriendly words that have reached Gotha
from my Foreign Office. Minister von Manteuffel has just
left me. If I was dismayed on hearing of an affair of which
I knew nothing, he was dismayed, because he had never told
'me a word of the matter | The correctness of the remark
once made by King John, “that my Government consisted of
a series of misunderstandings,” is again confirmed in this case.
+ + .# 3& + 3& +
‘Your Highness mentions Usedom's mission. My Ad-
jutant-General, Lieutenant-General von Wedell (Governor of
Luxembourg), is going on a similar mission to Paris. The
question is, whether their orders correspond with your wishes.
‘On my part they are plain, true, and honest, the more so,
as I neither understand, nor do I like, tricky negotiations.
1 have represented to both Courts, in the plainest terms, how
far I can and may go, and I know that will give satisfaction
neither in London nor in Paris. I am sorry for it, but beyond
J. ETTER FROM THE RIWG OF PRUSSIA I 25
the limits where I must necessarily become a scoundrel, I am
firmly resolved not to go. I consider it most dishonourable
to let myself be prevailed upon to thrash one man, because
another threatens to thrash me. I rather show my teeth at
him who threatens me. A man of honour does not refuse a
necessary duel, though he may know that his opponent is a
ten times better shot, or better fencer, than he is.
‘I desire most urgently, that there should be no illusion in
London or Paris with regard to this incontestable truth. To
start from any other basis, would be reckoning without the
host. And the host questionis is neither the Sovereign of
Bueckeburg nor of Vadutz. After being so impudently
deceived by Austria (November 28th and December 2nd, 1854)
I shall NO LONGER treat with that Power. The lesson was too
STRONG ! But I propose that the Western Powers should con-
clude with me, as they have concluded with Austria—of course
—due consideration being paid to the difference of our
positions. I offer to place myself, by treaty, entirely on the
side of the Western Powers, as I have done throughout the
whole of the year 1854. I will muster a considerable force
along the Russian frontier. But I make it a strict condition
that I shall not be bound to any sort of offensive co-operation,
unless (1.) the casus foederis with Austria (April 20th, and
second additional clause)—to which all Germany has assented
—should occur, or (2.) Russia's behaviour towards Prussia
should render it necessary. By Prussia's thus joining the
league, Austria would obtain freedom for offensive action,
which is a sheer impossibility, unless Prussia does join.
‘Consider this incontestable truth, and the real and very
great advantage contained in this circumstance, and in that of
the withdrawal of perhaps 200,000 men that Russia must re-
call from the real seat of the war, in order to confront us. In
return for these very essential advantages, I demand from the
Western Powers the solemn guarantee : 1. that Poland shall
not be restored by revolutionary means; 2. that no French
troops shall pass through the territory of the German Con-
federation (exclusive of Austrian territory). Matters stood
thus on my side, when I received the tidings that the mice
1 26 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-CO BURG-GO THA
Triple Alliance was resolved not to allow Prussia to participate
in the negotiations for peace in Vienna. THAT ALTERS EVERY-
THING. That touches Prussia's honour, position, and credit.
Point d' argent, point de Swisses. No participation at the
Peace Congress, no treaty with Prussia. That is settled, my
Lord Duke.
‘We shall see, in a few days, whether the Western Powers
will carry through this piece of illegality. I shall then declare
myself exempt from all the engagements which I entered into
on the 9th of April, as a member of the Conference of Vienna,
and—God in Heaven knows—which I have truly and honestly
carried out. My firm language in favour of the four points
caused a momentary impression in St Petersburg, which made
me fear for the safety of my Baltic sea-board, and for the time
when the allies would be obliged to abandon that horrid sea.
‘Notwithstanding, I did not let myself be prevented from
flatly refusing three proposals which I considered incompatible
with the duties I had undertaken on the 9th of April, and which
I was to make in London and Paris, in Frankfort, and finally in
Vienna. The consequence was the speedy acceptance of the
four points, with promising modifications on the part of Russia.
The consequence of Usedom's journey was the unconditional
acceptance of the four points.
“Neither England nor France give me credit for this, and I
cannot deny, that the way in which those two Powers are now
intriguing, in order to cause ‘an impossible interpretation' of
their sense on the part of the Emperor Nicholas, and to force a
rupture fills my innermost soul with indignation.
‘The Governments that make real or pretended public
opinion and its alleged bloodthirstiness a pretext for treading
paths which are so crooked and so unworthy of Great Powers,
cam/not last long. The blood that is shed, will cry to heaven.
But I am going too far, and beg you to bury these things in
your bosom.
‘Treskow asked me, in Your Highness' name, whether I
should like to see you here now. I am always glad to see
Your Highness in Berlin, at all times and all seasons. But,
just for this reason, I am unable to give any advice. Your
I, E7'7" EP I'ROM THIE KING OF PRUSSIA I 27
journey will, in any case, cause umbrage in Vienna and Paris,
and alarm our German Courts (which I need not name).
“I know my Pappenheimers.” Now let me thank you once
more, from the bottom of my heart, for your kind and PRECIOUS
letter. May your friendship and your confidence, dearest
Duke, never be withdrawn from
‘Your Highness' truly devoted friend and cousin,
* FREDERICK WILLIAM.
‘P.S.–In the dreadful hurry in which I am writing to
Your Highness, I have overlooked many corrections and other
things, which afterwards compromise the beauty of my letter.
I therefore entreat your kind indulgence. But far worse is
the omission which I must make up for here. In the question
of mobilising the troops, which is now being discussed in the
Diet, I shall mot give way AT ALL. If the majority should
declare in favour of the matter, which is terrible to think of,
I am nevertheless resolved to remain steadfastly firm and to
protest alome and decidedly, let come of it what may.
That the institution of executory measures on the part
of the Confederation is the object of Buol-Austria's desire,
I know since last October. The whole thing is an old
concocted plan, and is based on a Liga catholica, whose
designs have been betrayed to me. If there were still a
drop of old English blood in the present English Cabinet, it
would have awakened long ago from the delusive dreams into
which Napoleon has rocked it, and made it—DEFENCELESS ( !
Your Highness will tell me, that my attitude with regard to
the possible resolution of the Confederation will break up the
German Confederacy. I know it will, and I know, too, what I
am doing. But rather that, than contribute towards effecting
the usurpation of the old Imperial throne, and the sovereignty
over Germany, with the aid of French troops . With such
wine the young Emperor has been made drunk | | | The
Rubicon is passed, the way to Rome is open. God help us !
Austria's circular Note of the 14th, which is indescribable,
has, thank heaven, opened the eyes of many a Sovereign. No
one doubts that Prussia is to furnish the promised advantages.
I 28 MEMO II'S O I' 7"HE DUATE O J SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
They are afraid, then, after all, that my treasure and my army
might spoil their teeth. I know the full danger of my situa-
tion. But I look it straight in the face, and, with God and
my good cause for allies, I am not afraid.’
In explanation of this last remark of the King, it might be
desirable to recall the fact here, that the Austrian Circular
Note of the 14th of January had caused, in many places, and
especially in the Catholic Rhenish provinces, an unexpected
excitement, which produced an extremely unpleasant im-
pression in Berlin. Also in the following letter from the
Prince of Prussia, it will easily be observed that the somewhat
frank and sudden disclosure of the Austrian Imperial dream
had caused the House of Hohenzollern many an anxious hour.
The Prince wrote to me, in answer to my letter of the 19th of
January:
BERLIN, January 26, 1855.
‘DEAREST FRIEND,-You will have grown impatient at my
having left your confidential communication Solong unanswered.
But the confusion of affairs here is so great, that, after being
here a full week, I must still own to having gained no clear
idea as to what our intentions are Hence I can only tell
you my view, as to how I look at the situation, without
therefore being able to indicate distinctly where we are going to.
‘I find your explanation of your attitude in 1850, and at
the present day, forcible in few words. It fully corresponds
with my opinions, and I therefore entirely understand the
dilemma in which your feelings and your resolutions are
placed. A similar dilemma exists for us too, between feelings
and resolutions, but they are of a different nature. Here, it is
the personal relationship to the Emperor Nicholas that is in
contradiction with the simply traced out policy which Prussia
should pursue, for it is forgotten that there is a Russian policy
which is not personal. The King is much too clear not to see
this, but he cannot become master of his feelings. This is
taken advantage of by G. N. and B. who only value one
tendency in Russia: that of the conservatives, not recognising
that progress, in the rational sense of the term, is paving its
way in that direction too. The King is, up to the present
LETTER FROM THE PRINCE OF PRUSSIA I29
moment, determined not to place himself on Russia's side, but,
feeling as he does, he cannot make up his mind to employ such
serious language towards his brother-in-law, as would have to
be followed up by still more serious action. Hence our un-
certain, changeable, often angry, and then relenting, language
and actions. Our-horrid—special private missions to London
and Paris have proved that the King does not want to break
with the Western Powers, but the nature of their demands
always bears the impress of the aforesaid dilemma; for the
counter-services we offer in return are = O, so long as persons
have influence, who, for nearly a year, have always contrived
to throw obstacles in the way of our best resolutions.
‘That the great world-problem will be delayed, but not
stayed, in its progress towards its ultimate end, by this policy
of Prussia, appears to me unquestionable. And, since the force
of circumstances will prove stronger than the policy of sentiment
and all intrigues, I draw, from what I have said, the conclusion
that, unless peace be established by next spring, Prussia will
be actively drawn into the movement from the West to the
East. But I start, of course, from the assumption that, in pro-
claiming the four points, Austria and the Western Powers will
not go so far as to demand anything from Russia that would
dishonour her, such as the razing of Sebastopol and the reducing
of the Russian fleet, before they have got it, for such demands
would necessarily give offence, not only here, but to public
opinion generally, and would damage the position of those
who made them.
‘The four points, construed pure, as they must be, contain
the rejection of Russia with her Menzikoffian pretensions;
moreover, a guarantee against her coming forward with them
again (for some time, at least); nor do they exclude the establish-
ment of a coast-station for the Western Powers, say at Sinope.
Austria has double cause not to provoke Russia still further
than she did on December 2; although we ourselves cannot
ride too high a horse, for, between you and me, we have only
got what we have been preparing for ourselves during the last
nine months.
“In thus comparing the facts, I draw the conclusion that,
VOL. III. I
130 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAME-COBURG-GOTI/A
unless peace is concluded, Prussia, in the course of the
year, will be obliged to take active measures against the
East. • -
“I should therefore be inclined to construe your position
towards the Austrian Note of the 14th inst., in connection
with the proposal to mobilise, made by Austria in Frankfort
on the Main, as follows: Although I must characterise this
proposal as premature, I understand very well the security
that Austria wants to gain by it for her own eventual position.
I call the proposal premature, because it is made just at the
moment when the preliminaries to the treaty for peace are
beginning. For this reason, I should not be surprised if it
did not obtain the majority in Frankfort on the Main.
“Should this prove to be the case, it appears to me that
the reply to the Note of the 14th should likewise be given in
dilatory terms, seeing that the same reasons that dictate the
answer in Frankfort on the Main, must needs also dictate the ,
answer to the Note. For, an evasive answer to the invitation
to join Austria unconditionally, and to place the contingent
forces under the immediate command of the Emperor, would
be justified by the fact, that the moment for so decided a
measure had not yet arrived. On the other hand, if the
proposal to mobilise should obtain the majority in the Diet,
then the Note of the 14th will need no further reply, and,
in as much as the election of a commander-in-chief of the
confederate forces will then have to take place, the question
as to the placing of the contingents under the command of
the Emperor falls away.
It appears to me that Germany's whole position in the
Eastern Question, as already fixed by treaty, would justify us
in giving Austria to understand, in our dilatory reply, that, in
case the negotiations should prove fruitless, she may reckon
on our not leaving her to pursue the great European and
specially German interests unaided. For, in my opinion, it
ought always to be borne in mind, that Russia must never be
allowed to gain the favourable position of victor in this drama,
in other words, to carry through her claims against the
Porte. But this will be possible, if the European coalition is
I, E7'7"ER FROM THE DUKE I 3 I
brokem w/p by Russia, because she may then hope to prove an
easy match for its remnants. If she gains the victory in
this question, her moral and physical supremacy in Europe is
inevitable; Holsteim, amd Olmwtz will them have been merely
feeble fore,'wmmers of it.
‘I will even go so far as to deny that the Emperor Nicholas
and his immediate successor would then harbour thoughts of
conquest, but own dancing as Russia pipes will be inevitable,
because the orchestra represents a million bayonets. This, then,
is the point of view, which leads me to assume that Prussia
ultimately must and will take part in the action : If this
were firmly and categorically brought to Russia's knowledge,
—we should have peace in a week
“By what other means Prussia thinks to extricate herself
honourably from this dilemma, I am at a loss to foresee. My
influence here is destroyed, and I don't see yet how it is to
revive again. However, I am keeping a strict watch for the
moment when it may be revived - -
‘In true affection,
‘Your devoted friend,
‘WILLIAM.’
The remarkable contents of these two letters from the
King and his brother, so different in their tenor, speedily
ripened the resolution I had already formed, to go to Berlin,
though the King might not be wrong in what he said in his
letter, as to my visit at that moment giving umbrage.
I believe I cannot give the reader a better picture of the
situation, as I found it there, than by selecting among the
many accounts I wrote at the time about my stay in Berlin,
the one I sent to my brother, and inserting it here in
full .
‘I have not written to you, since my journey to Berlin,
because it served chiefly to confirm the contents of my former
letter, and I wished, moreover, to await the development of the
situation. This development, however, is now drawing out to
an ever increasing length.
“With regard to the success of my journey, I can only say
132 ME MOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
that I have every reason to be satisfied with it. I was re-
ceived, not only by the King, but by all the members of the
Royal family, in a way that was almost new to me in Berlin.
My chief object was to keep up my personally amicable re-
lations with Prussia, even though politics should still further
separate me from her. Hence I had, on several occasions,
long and detailed conversations with the King, and, though
we were nearly always of a different opinion, this time at
least a free interchange of views was possible.
‘I will mention particularly the following points:
‘1. It is still the longing desire of the King to step out of
his isolated position, partly in order not to involve himself in
further difficulties with the West, partly, too, as I frankly told
him, to unite his voice with that of Russia at the Conferences
of Peace.
‘2. He will not hear of an alliance with Russia. On this
point he is quite firm. Besides, he declares Russia to be quite
in the wrong in the real dispute, but says that, if the allies are
not content with Russia's concessions, it is they who put them-
selves in the wrong. Should the King, therefore, be forced to
choose between the right and the left, I have no doubt, after
my interviews with him, that he would decide against Russia.
This may serve as a sure basis for all our calculations.
‘3. The King, it is true, will not hear of admitting any
offensive action against Russia. But meanwhile, General
Wedell has received very comprehensive instructions, by means
of which an alliance may perhaps be effected. That his
negotiations in Paris have, until now, led to no positive result,
you will probably know.
‘4. The old Austrian idea still survives in the King. How-
ever, like most people in Berlin, he is just now greatly in-
censed against Austria. He believes in the existence of a
great liga catholica. He attributes to the Emperor Francis
Joseph the wildest schemes of rulership over Germany, nor
was he put out by my answer, that Austria, if she had liked,
could have had the German Imperial Crown long ago, and
from his own hands. Nevertheless, he expressed the old view
that it was not only necessary to give Austria the Roman-
DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS I 33
German Imperial Crown, (in which case Prussia is to receive
a sort of constableship—the German Royal Crown) but he
also declared his positive intention of coming to the assistance
of the Austrians, in case they should be defeated by Russia,
and beaten back over their frontier. He would never let
Austria fall, he said. This is evidently one of the granitic
parts in the mind of the King. -
‘5. He said some hard words about the Gerlachs and the
Niebuhrs, when I drew his attention to the want of con-
fidence which Prussia was everywhere meeting with. He
called them “not crack-brained, but pig-headed,” (nicht hirm-
ºverbrammte, Sondern verrammte Köpfe), and said that he had
long ceased to place any confidence in them. He did not speak
much better of Manteuffel, but declared, notwithstanding, that
he now obeyed him. He had placed a constable, he said,
before each of his doors.
“From all this, I conclude that the King is by no means
altogether in earnest with his refusal to enter into the offen-
sive action against Russia, and that he will be inclined, in
order to obtain easier access to the conferences of peace,
eventually to promise some offensive measures. What these
will prove to be, however, cannot be gathered as yet. Still,
it would be a great thing, if Prussia were only to enter at all
into a league offensive with the Western Powers. The
carrying out of the alliance will, after all, always be to some
extent in the hands of the generals commanding, provided
that men like the Prince of Prussia are placed at the head.
‘P.S.–Meanwhile, I learn from Berlin that my assumption
with regard to the King of Prussia is about to be realised.
The King, then, has really approved of the draft of a treaty
analagous to the treaty of December, and even specifying the
particulars of the offensive measures. This treaty would
already be concluded, if Manteuffel had given Count Hatzfeld
the order to conclude it, as quickly as the King gave it to his
special envoy. The French project, which has been submitted
in the meantime, appears to be putting the matter in question
again, because it is giving them time in Berlin to change their
minds again. The Kreuzzeitung party will exert all its efforts.
134 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
Manteuffel is opposed to any negotiations carried on outside
Berlin, and to the special missions of the King. It is possible,
therefore, that he and others will succeed in inducing the King,
after he has yielded in principle, to raise difficulties as to the
details. My advice would be, not to cling too anxiously to
details.’
The negotiations entered into with the Western Powers
led to no result, and the mission of Count Wedell to Paris was
only a last attempt on the part of the King to assume a
decided attitude in this great European complication. Mean-
while, the death of the Emperor Nicholas changed the aspect
of international affairs more than anything else. But I may
be permitted to advert to this incident in connection with the
general events that had been keeping the world busy since the
outbreak of the Crimean war.
CHAPTER IV
A COUNCIL OF WAR IN PARIS.–TIIE TONE IN THE FRENCH ARMY. —THE
FIRST ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COMBINED FLEETS.—THE ALLIED
ARMIES IN GALLIPOLI.—LETTERS FROM PRINCE CHIMAY TO THE
DUKE,--THE SIEGE OF SILISTRIA.——RUSSIA’s MISFORTUNES IN
TURKEY. —TIIE EMPEROR NAPOLEON's PATIENCE WITH AUSTRIA
AND PRUSSIA. —MISMAN AGEMENT OF FEENCII MILITARY AFFAIRS. —-
DISSATISFACTION IN FRANCE. –LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.—.
TIIE SPANISII REVOLUTION.—ITS EFFECT ON NAPOLEON.—LETTER
FROM PRINCE CHIMAY TO KING LIEOPOLD OF BELGIUM. —THE FIRST
IDEA OF THIE EXPEDITION TO THE CRIMEA...— PRINCE ALBERT's
SHARE IN IT.-LETTER FROM THE PRINCE.-PRINCE ALBERT's VISIT
TO NAPOLEON AT BOULOGNE.—LETTER FROM THE DUIKE TO PRINCE
ALBERT. —THE BATTLE ON THE ALMA.—RUMOURED FALL OF
SEBASTOPOL.--THE ENGLISH ARMY AND THE BATTLE OF INKER-
MIAN.—THE FOR FIGN LEGION.—DIFFICULTIES OF THE SITUATION.
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT TO THE KING OF BELGIUM. —
LETTER FROM NAPOLEON TO THE DUKE. —IIE COMPLAINS OF THE
WANT OF ENERGY ON THE PART OF THE ENGLISH COMMANDER-IN-
CIIIEF.—DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.–FRESH NEGOTIA-
TIONS.—AUSTRIA LEAVES THE WESTERN POWERS IN THE LURCH.-
LETTER FROM COUNT HUOL TO THE DUKE. –VISIT OF THE EMPEROR
AND THE EMPRESS OF THE FRENCH TO ENGLAND.—LETTER FROM
PRINCE ALBERT ON ENGLISH POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—PRUSSIA AND
TIII, CONFERENCES IN VIENNA.—LETTERS FROM THE KING OF
PRUSSIA AND HIS BROTHER.--TIIE DUKE IN PARIS AND LONDON.——
HIS LETTER TO THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—REPORT OF PRINCE
WILLIAM OF BADEN ON THE CONDITION OF RUSSIA.—THE STORM-
ING OF SEBASTOPOL.—THE THEFT OF RUSSIAN DESPATCHES IN
BERLIN.—THE END OF THE WAIR. .
DURING my first stay with the Emperor Napoleon, in 1854, I
became witness of a scene, which was extremely characteristic
of the state of the French army, and could not fail to pro-
136 MEMOIRS OF TIME DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
duce a painful and almost alarming impression upon me.
Later on, I had reason enough to remember my experiences in
the Tuileries, when others thought the accounts of the progress
of the war and the state of affairs in the armies incredible.
It was after one of my conversations with the Emperor,
which I have reported in the first chapter of this volume,
when Napoleon invited me to accompany him into another
room, where a number of new inventions with regard to guns
and projectiles were being shown by Colonel Mignet and a few
Englishmen. Hereupon followed reports of various descrip-
tions, and at length the Emperor took his place at a conference
table, round which a large number of Generals had gathered,
apparently to hold a council. The Emperor hesitated a
moment, and then said to me in German: ‘We have no secrets
to hide from you. Listen.’
I assisted, in consequence, at a council which afforded me
an opportunity to make acquaintance with a number of
eminent officers, whose names were afterwards mentioned often
enough. But, strange to say, Marshal St Arnaud, who had
already been chosen as commander-in-chief, was missing among
them. When we were all leaving, I expressed my surprise at
this circumstance to Marshal Magnan, whom I knew intimately
from Brussels, where he had been my military superior. He
answered however, in a tone of the greatest indifference, that
it was of little consequence whether the man was there or not ;
that St Arnaud was in failing health, as it was, and would
not carry out the affair. La cama'ille crèvera em rowte, he
wound up with great assurance. w
I said to myself at the time, that, if as little harmony pre-
vailed in the army as there did among the marshals of the
empire, its military successes did not promise to be very
brilliant. And, indeed, the equipment of the army left much
to be desired, and the troops which were ordered to the East,
and which the Emperor showed me, gave me by no means a
very high conception of their military ability. I was involun-
tarily reminded of the apprehensions, which I had expressed a
year before to my brother, with regard to the English troops;
and these, combined with the French, who made a no better
FIRST ACHIEVEMENT'S OF THE COMBINED FLEETS 137
impression, were now to undergo a war, in far distant parts,
against a probably much more numerous army
Under these circumstances, it was a proof of a certain kind
of self-knowledge, that the allied Powers, at the commencement
of the war, placed all their hopes in the English navy, which
Charles Napier was about to lead into the Baltic. But, what
the English ships wanted in that dangerous sea, with its inhos-
pitable coasts, and what they were intended to do, on this
point there was not the slightest certainty, either in England,
or in France. As to the English fleet being assisted by the
French, there was no idea of such a thing. Awcwn marim
français, so Prince Chimay assured me, ‘me connait la
Baltique.”
The English, on their part, were convinced that the mere
appearance of the allied fleets in the Baltic would so terrify
the Government and the people in St Petersburg, that peace
would speedily be concluded. A few weeks later, Prince
Chimay wrote to me very characteristically: ‘Lord Cowley
a dit, il y a dewa, jours: Lorsque les flottes russes seront
brûlées dams la Baltique et dams la mer moire, la gue're awra.
perdw beawcowp de son intérêt, Ce proposest dºwme maiveté
charmamte et towt britannique.”
When I asked Lord Cowley, in Paris, what was really
intended in the Baltic, if the fleet had not orders to effect the
landing of troops in Finland, he replied with the avowal that
there was nobody, either on this side of the channel, or on the
other, who could answer the question.
How rapidly the disappointments afterwards followed, and
how the unfortunate Charles Napier was made the scapegoat
for an expedition which had no object from the very outset,
is presumably still in everyone's memory. The mighty fleet
knew little better means to make itself talked of, than by
petty destructions, and by the burning of villages and wood
and tar stores. It sailed to Cronstadt, merely to convince itself
that the fortress was unassailable, and, in August, landed a few
troops on the Aland islands, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, who
conquered the little fortress of Bomarsund.
Meanwhile, the English army, under Raglan, and the French
138 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
under St Arnaud, had left Marseilles in April. The English
at first meant to muster 10,000 men, and Lord Raglan had
difficulty in getting double that number. That far more
troops would be required, was only reluctantly admitted in
public. On the French side, the first division was led by
Canrobert, who spoke of St Arnaud as slightingly as Prince
Jerome Napoleon did, who was destined to take part in the
war, as it were, in order to connect at least the great name
with the standards of the Empire, since the talent of the leader
was wanting. Gallipoli was the first destination of the French
troops, and they had scarcely arrived there, when the worst
accounts came in, and the Generals declared: Chaque jour
démontre les damger's de l' expedition impwissamte dams les
conditions actuelles. r
Whilst the Generals were disputing as to which was the
best means of coming to the assistance of the Turks, my
excellent friend Chimay made the splendid remark, si l'om me
se hôte pas, on cowrt grand risque de me plus trouver que des
twrbans, mais pas de Turcs. In the middle of April, a council
of war had been held in Paris, in which the Duke of Cam-
bridge took part, and which decided that the French army
should take the offensive in Europe, and the English in Asia.
When Gallipoli was reached, everyone agreed in the opinion
that the Anglo-French army ought to be concentrated in
Warna. But the transport of the troops proceeded at so slow
a pace, that there could be no idea of opening the campaign
before the end of May.
By the 28th of April, no less than fifteen ships, with a large
portion of the cavalry, had returned to Marseilles, after three
weeks of stormy weather, and, in the nieantime, news was not
wanting from the East, according to which the idle and ill-
humoured English and French troops were fighting there
amongst each other. It was not to be wondered at, if Prince
Chimay wrote to me, on the 5th of May, in behalf of the
Emperor: s -
L'empereur me charge tout specialement de remercier Votre
Altesse de la communication que je viens de lui faire en Son nom.
LETTERS FROM PRINCE CHIMA Y TO THE DUKE 139
Il désire recevoir le plus souvent possible des renseignements
analogues.
Il est hors de doute aujourd'hui que l'Allemagne sera obligée de
prendre une part active à la lutte, si elle tient à prévenir une con-
flagration générale. La situation actuelle deviendra promptement
intolérable pour tout le monde. On n'a aucune nouvelle sérieuse du
théatre de la guerre, mais on s'attend d'un jour à l'autre à un acte
décisif de la part de Paskiewitsch' etc., etc. .
The chief reason for delaying the military development of
the French active forces was, no doubt, more of a political
than a strategic kind, and I fear I must subject the reader to
a still further trial of patience by referring back to a letter of
the previous March, which shows the feelings of the Emperor
at the outbreak of the war more plainly than any other docu-
ment, and proves how extremely loath Napoleon was to let
his troops proceed to the East, so long as he was uncertain
whether the alteration of the European map, as desired by
him, would be attainable or not. Qi
L'empereur,' Prince Chimay then wrote to me * m'a chargé
d'exprimer à Votre Altesse sa vive reconnaissance. . . . Sa Majesté
m'a paru impressionée de tout ce qui concerne Berlin et M. de
Manteuffel, et je pense que sur terre comme sur mer ce côté sera
l'objet d'une active surveillance et d'une certaine pression dans
l'ordre des idées de Votre Altesse, c'est à dire en dehors de toute
pensée aggressive contre l'Allemagne Rhénane. Sa Majesté ne m'a
laissé aucun doute sur ce point capital. 4
Quant à l'Autriche, l'Empereur m'a dit, en termes formels, qu'il
croyait être sûr de son concours actif, exclusivement subordonné à
la présence des alliés à Constantinople, présence destinée à devenir
le signal de ce concours. Je ne puis, a-t-il ajouté, partager les
apprehensions du Duc à cet égard, d'abords voilà deux ans que je
négocie avec la Prusse et l'Autriche sans jamais les avoir vues
d'accord. Au fond, elles disent pis que pendre l'une à l'autre.
Tous les intérêts matériels de l'Autriche la ramènent vers moi, si
elle est bien, elle peut défendre sa Hongrie, moi je lui garantis
l'Italie. -
Si elle est mal, j'entre en Piedmont et elle grandit la Russie,
car alors je ne resterai pas en Orient, il ne me faudra pas longtemps
14o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
pour ramener mon armée à Triest et à Venise et laisser l'Autriche
se débattre sur le Danube. Ceci est bien remarquable, Monseigneur
car j'y vois une preuve que l'hypothèse Italienne n'a nullement été
perdue de vue dans les mesures que la France va prendre. L'Autriche
doit se le tenir pour dit.
Sa Majesté m'a dit encore qu'elle avait trop de confiance dans
la jeune loyauté et le caractère de l'Empereur François Joseph pour
admettre la moindre duplicité dans ces declarations. Je le crois
d'autant plus que le moyen d'y remédier est prompt et efficace et
que par conséquent il n'y a pour la France aucun inconvénient à
affecter la plus grande sécurité dans la sincérité Autrichienne jus-
qu'au jour des explications décisives et finales. #
Les alliés seront à Constantinople dans une quinzaine de jours,
nous verrons donc promptement les effets de la reconnaissance de
l'Autriche en faveur de son sauveur de 1848, ou l'armée de Lyon sur
les Alpes !
Le dénouement sera d'autant plus pressé que de jour en jour
l'expédition d'Orient devient moins populaire, à mesure qu'on en
apprécie mieux la parfaite inutilité pratique. La baisse constante
des fonds Anglais et Français, l'inquiétude croissante de l'industrie,
tout commande aux gouvernements une solution prompte et décisive
. etc.
The rapid decisions, however, which Napoleon had so
ardently desired, did not take place in the politics of Austria
and Prussia, as has been shown in the foregoing chapter. In
consequence, the military operations of the allied Western
Powers were also limited to half measures. The French
. Government occupied itself almost more in mustering troops
along the frontier of France, from Lyons to St Omer, than
in sending the army to the East. Hence, the forces of the
allies assembled very slowly, and it lasted until July before
50,000 men were united near Varna. But the worst was that,
here too, the troops found scarcely anything better to do,
than to die of fever and cholera.
The changeable war which had been carried on, since last
February, between the Turks and the Russians on the Danube,
afforded the Russians so few chances of making conquests
that it hardly appeared advisable just yet for the Western
RUSSIA’s MISFORTUNES IN TURKEY I4 I
Powers to take a strong offensive. After all, the Turks were
showing themselves strong enough to keep the army of their
hereditary enemy at bay, and even Paskiewitsch, when the
Emperor placed him at the head of the army, in the middle of
April, was no longer able to lay the fearful demon of mis-
fortune, which, from the very outset, appeared to be pursuing
the Russians. The siege of Silistria followed, which was
defended by the Turks, with much-praised valour, until the
13th of June. On this day, which became so fatal to the
Russians, Omer Pasha effected the relief of the fortress by a
well-arranged attack from the side of Little Wallachia, made.
simultaneously with a brave sortie on the part of the besieged
garrison.
As the hero of Erivan had already previously laid down
his command in a fit of ill-humour, and the Emperor had
entrusted Gortschakoff, for the second time, with the leadership
of the army, the catastrophe before Silistria doubly injured
the credit of Russia. With a loss of 12,000 combatants,
including the technical director of the siege-works, General
Schilder himself, and with the retreat of the whole army to
the left banks of the Danube, on the 20th of April, ended the
attack of the great Czar on the Turkish Power, which he had
so rashly believed to be defunct.
The allies, therefore, might have quietly awaited the eva-
cuation of Wallachia, but the retreating army subjected the
Turks to a defeat near Tschernavoda, which roused the French
out of their inactivity. General Espinasse was to pursue the
Russians, and set out for this purpose from Kustendjeh. But
by imprudent marches through swampy country, with which
|he was unacquainted, he lost half of his troops, without even
having seen the enemy.
The retreat of the Russian army out of the Principalities
was effected at last, as has been mentioned before, from reasons
of general policy. Thus it could well be said, that the
expedition of the Western Powers, up to that time, had been, if
not entirely fruitless, at least not very glorious. The dissatis-
faction in France had consequently reached a very dangerous
pitch in the months of June and July, and although the general
142 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
discontent respecting the proceedings in the East found com-
paratively little expression in public, yet the embarrassments
of the situation, in which Louis Napoleon was placed, were
very great and almost overwhelming.
According to the secret reports which I received from the
best sources through Prince Chimay, the sole means of saving
the Empire appeared, on more than one day, to lie in a violent
outburst against the hesitating German Powers, which had
become necessary owing to the feeling in the country. To pre-
vent this was, in fact, my foremost endeavour, and the Emperor
still let himself be appeased by the hope that Austria and
Prussia would ultimately after all have to abandon their re-
serve. Considering the state of affairs that really existed in
Berlin, and even in Vienna, I had to acknowledge it as an
act of political patience on the part of the Emperor that he
allowed himself to be kept in this opinion so long, and chiefly,
as Chimay wrote to me, owing to the reports he received from
me. La note remarquable de votre Altesse, Chimay wrote to
me on the 24th of May, a 6té lºwe attentivement par l'Em-
perewr et a parw l'impressioner beawcowp. Je crains plws
qwe jamais wrve issue fatale à la Swite de towtes ces lentewrs.
To the evils of politics was added, just at that moment, the
personal suffering of the Emperor. It was then that his
serious kidney disease first declared itself, from which he
never recovered again, and he was so exhausted by violent
neuralgic pains, that he appeared to grow older, from day to
day, under the very eyes of those who surrounded him.
Discord and rivalries among the Generals embittered in every
way the mood of the Emperor, who was, on the other hand, not
strong enough to put a stop to the goings-on of his minions,
and the favouritism shown by the Ministers to every kind of
incapacity. “Notorious blockheads,’ as Chimay assured me,
were made Generals in consequence of their comradeship with
Fould or Baraguay d'Hilliers, and the public scoffed and
railed at the bad selection of the leaders of this costly and
in every respect unpopular enterprise. -
Les nouvelles d'Orient, Prince Chimay wrote on the 18th June,
/, ETTER FROM PR I VC E CHIMA V I.4.3
deviennent chaque jour de plus en plus rares à Paris, encore sont
elles presque toutes fausses. Les derniers rapports de St Arnaud
sont très sombres. Il part chaque mois de Marseille vingt millions
en or pour le service de l'armée, independamment de tous les
| approvisionnements, et plus on ira, plus la dépense augmentera.
Chaque voyage d'une frégate à vapeur entre Toulon et Constan-
tinople coûte, aller et retour, mille francs. Tout cela est effrayant
pour les finances et l'avenir, car ce n'est qu'un début.
· Le camp de midi est douteux. On s'occupe surtout de celui du
nord. Les soldats manquent, l'armée a été epuisée et désorganisée
par la formation de l'armée d' Orient.
Dieu sait ce qu'il adviendrait de la France en présence d'une
coalition que beaucoup de gens persistent à entrevoir derrière les
lignes russes sur la Vistule.
The confidence which was reposed in the Emperor Napoleon
personally, vanished, even in the most faithful of his adherents,
in face of the many blunders that were being committed every-
where : La politique impériale manque nUn peu d'ensemble et
de prévoyance, it was said in Paris, and how could this be other-
wise, si l'initiative des idées est dévolue dans l'absolutisme
à vme seule personvne ou intelligemce. -
In many towns in France, there were bread riots, behind
which the party of the Red Republic appeared to be rearing
its head threateningly. The Ministry had seriously to avoid
denuding the country too much of troops. In the Government,
Morny and King Jerome were disputing who was to have the
greatest influence. For Morny's party, the appointment of
Billault in the place of Persigny in the management of affairs
was a great defeat.
Monsieur Billault, ami de Jérôme, va naturellement développer
la pensée de l'Empire dynastique, un homme très habile et qui
rendra à l' administration intérieure une énergie qu'elle avait
malheureusement et totalement perdue sous Persigny.
· Speeial interest attached to the scenes which had preceded
this change of government in the council of the Emperor.
When Persigny was reproached with being incapable, he said
144 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
to Fould : Je puis perdre la France pan incapacité, mais
dw moims je ave la vends pas.
Meanwhile, the new Ministry was not in a position to
maintain peace in the country, and the police were everywhere
finding traces of prepared attempts and revolutionary risings.
Napoleon was excessively alarmed, and repaired to Boulogne,
in order to await, in the midst of his troops, better news from
the seat of war.
My brother forcibly described the situation of the Emperor, .
when he said that he was like the manager of a theatre, in
which the French took their seats as spectators, expecting to
See a new piece produced every day. But this was difficult
to accomplish, particularly as the English and the French
were mutually taxing one another with being the cause of
their having to lie idle at Varna.
Although the English Press was not sparing with reproaches
of every kind against its own Government, still it showed far
less consideration in its criticism of the French state of affairs.
It was this mood that dictated a letter of my brother's, dated
the end of June, which was characteristic of the position of
both parties.
‘My chief aim here is that our policy should be distinguished
in the judgment of others by its consistent tendency and its
fairness. The former quality, being in accordance with the
national character, is easily to be attained here. The latter,
inasmuch as it is incompatible with the character of an insular
people, who are devoid of all and every knowledge of the Con-
tinent, is much more difficult, but, for that very reason, requires
my special attention. The Ministry causes us much trouble.
Aberdeen is still in 1814, Palmerston in 1848, and Lord John
in 1830. Parliament and the Press are, one and all, suddenly
born generals, and are only prevented from conquering Russia
by the army, which (as they say) is good for nothing, by the
War Department, which should only be conducted by Palmer-
ston, and by the Court, which keeps Palmerston out of it.
‘Our great anxiety is Marshal St Arnaud, who is a
Chevalier d’Industrie through and through, and in the hands
of a certain T., of whom the French themselves do not doubt
THE INSUR RECTION IN MADRID I 45
that he is capable of accepting silver, or even paper, roubles.
We cannot induce the French army to advance, until it has
all its cavalry, which may last until the end of July.’
If, in spite of its enormous costs, the alliance of the
Western Powers proved extremely unfruitful in a military
respect, it was also destined, at a most inopportune moment,
to be subjected to a severe political test by the state of affairs
in Spain, where, since February, the revolution had been
rearing its head more boldly than ever, and was every day
threatening to overthrow the rule of Queen Isabella. Napoleon
had been seized by the curious idea of bringing about a
union of the Kingdoms of Portugal and Spain. He thought
he ought to offer to our house a further extension of its
power, and hoped to be encouraged in this undertaking by
the English Royal Family.
The Emperor was with great difficulty persuaded that
such a union of the Hiberian peninsula ran quite counter to
English interests, and that no English Minister would give
his consent to it. .
When, on the 17th of July, the general insurrection broke
out in Madrid, it was feared in Paris that this event would
react directly on France, and the Emperor Napoleon, to the
great vexation of King Jerome, repaired to Biarritz, in order
to escape from all consequences, and more particularly from the
necessity of taking any decisions. He remained there, against
the advice of his Ministers, even when the Progressist party
under Espartero had taken the Government in Madrid into
their own hands, after the expulsion of the Queen Mother.
At the end of July, Prince Chimay wrote a characteristic
account of the Emperor to King Leopold, of which the King
sent me a copy: g
Il parait que malgré les vives instances de ses ministres, l'Em-
pereur reste à Biarritz, seulement il leur a enjoint de ne pas sortir
de Paris. Cette nouvelle preuve d'imperturbable tenacité à ses idées
jusque dams des détails secondaires, pourrait cependant amener des
conséquences bien Sérieuses, et, comme le disait son oncle hier encore,
c'est vraiment tenter la providence. -
VOL. III. K
146 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
En effet, il faut que les partis soient bien désorganisés et affaiblis
pour ne pas chercher à profiter de l'occasion peut-être unique qui
semble s'offrir à eux. L'Empereur est absent, il n'y a aucune
cohésion dans l'autorité, pas un homme, pas un ministre assez fort,
assez osé pour prendre la moindre initiative en cas de danger ; les
maréchaux divisés et rivaux, l'armée de Paris disloquée, remplacée
par des régiments nouveaux et étrangers à la stratégie émeutière de
Paris, le commerce mécontent, la population effrayée par la misère et
le choléra, tel est l'ensemble que l'Empereur livre aux heureuses
chances de son étoile. . . .
Les nouvelles d'Orient sont confuses comme toujours. Les
Autrichiens demandent que les Turcs se retirent des principautés
avant leur entrée. Le prince croit que les Turcs refuseront, et la
question lui semble se compliquer à chaque pas. L'expédition de
Crime est en deliberé, et chaque jour St Arnaud montre plus
d'incertitude et d'appréhension. L'armée souffre des maux et de
l'insuffisance de toutes choses. Le Prince Napoléon est dans les
meilleurs iermes avec le duc de Cambridge, dont il partage largement
l'extrème ennui.
When,a short time afterwards, the wretched news of the fail-
ure of the expedition of General Espinasse reached Paris, even
the officers and soldiers were seized with dangerous misgivings
as to the capability and the skill of the army. Under these cir-
cumstances, the two allied Governments became more and more
bent on carrying out the project of a great expedition against
the Crimea. In the hope of striking the Eastern Giant a rapid
and decisive blow in the only vulnerable spot that seemed
accessible to the Western Powers, and thus forcing him to
make peace, a war was now commenced, which was to drag on
throughout a whole year, and to swallow up thousands of
human lives to little or no purpose.
The expedition which is connected with the name of Sebas-
topol, was, without question, one of the most unfortunate that
has ever been recorded by the history of warfare in any
century. It recalled the times of the crusaders, when an
obstinate and fanatic multitude used to work with insufficient
means at the siege of Damietta or Acre, in order to invest the
superstitious belief in the ultimate triumph of the Christian
THE PLAN OF THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN I 47
and occidental cause with all the charms of romantic adven-
ture. Sebastopol was now fought for, like Richard the Lion-
hearted and King Philip Augustus fought for Ptolemais, for
the sole purpose of returning with empty hands, and relating
at home that the robber-haunt of the enemy had been
destroyed.
However that might be, the Western Powers could not
suffer it to appear as if they were returning from the war
without having effected their purpose. The French needed,
above all things, a success, and so the Crimean project, which
had been fluttering in the air, as it were, for months, gradually
gained an ever increasing significance. History has frequently
raised the question who was the real inventor of this peculiar
and, in a military respect, surprising plan, without being able
to give a positive answer to it. Military men have often
asserted that the idea was a specifically ‘civilian' one, and
could only have arisen in the head of a diplomatist.
The misfortune of the Turks at Sinope had, no doubt,
long ago drawn the attention of the statesmen of the Western
Powers to the Russian navy arsenal on the Black Sea. The
idea of conquering Sebastopol, says a modern English
historian, gained, as a matter of justice, a kind of dramatic
interest with the English public.
Just this point of view was, no doubt, also in accordance
with my brother's mode of thinking, and although I believe
I may utterly repudiate the notion of ascribing to Prince
Albert the authorship of the plan of the Crimean campaign,
yet impartiality obliges me to confess that the Prince had a
certain share in promoting this curious scheme, after it had
once been proposed. He vied with Lord Palmerston in
recommending the attack on Sebastopol, and he expressed
his hopes in this regard long before the Emperor Napoleon,
for whom the originality of the idea has been claimed without
any foundation whatever.
I was always of opinion that no one had reason to boast
much of being the author of this plan of campaign. However,
at the beginning of May, my brother was urging the neces-
sity of obtaining possession of Sebastopol. It is known from the
148 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTI/A
Life of the Prince Consort that he thereupon began to occupy
himself more seriously with this question, and that he wrote
a memorandum which did not remain without some influence
on the actual execution of the plan. Apart from this now
published memorial,” the reader may attach some interest
to the letter in which my brother informed me of the intended
expedition to Sebastopol. As he here brings chiefly political
reasons into the field, the letter serves as a welcome supplement
to the memorandum.
‘It is the military movements that make me anxious.
The raising of the siege of Silistria is a fearful humiliation
for the Russians, and delivers Turkey from the momentary
danger of invasion. On the other hand, by abandoning
Wallachia, the Russians gain a much stronger military posi-
tion, and a strong basis for their operations, which is not only
difficult to break through, but is also very dangerous for
Austria. -
‘The right thing for ws to do, is undowbtedly to attack the
Crimea. In whatsoever way the war may end, the East has
not the slightest chance of life, so long as Sebastopol remains
as it is.
‘It is the Only port in the Black Sea, and juts right into
the middle of it. If the Russians transform their fleet into a
fleet of screw-steamers, they will in future no longer let
50,000 men perish before a few old fortresses, but will be in
Constantinople, fifteen hours after their fleet sets sail, with
any army they like | Quicker, indeed, than the telegraph can
announce the fact to the remainder of Europe . All our efforts
will then have been to no purpose, and nobody will in future be
able to prevent this.
‘On the other hand, Austria, in her position towards Russia,
* The Memorandum in the Life of the Prince Consort, iii, 84. The remark is
there made, (iii, 80) that the Duke of Newcastle had, in March, sent to the Queen
the copy of a plan which had been sketched by the Emperor Napoleon. But these
projects were still quite immature, and stand on a level with the conquest of
Finland. Without Austria and Prussia, of course, only the North or the South of
the Russian Empire could be taken into consideration. But Napoleon seriously
thought of Poland, and not of the Crimea. The treatment of the whole question
by Kinglake, who declares that, when the decisive despatch was being read in
Newcastle's Cabinet, on the 28th of June, the English Ministers went fast asleep,
has raised so much dust that I do not feel called upon to add anything from my
standpoint. See McCarthy Ch. 27. -
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT" I49
has always reckoned on the allied armies co-operating with
her own, and you will recollect that the answer to all urgings
from the West was ever the same: You are not yet on the
Danube. We are much nearer. When you are once at the
seat of war, the matter will be different.
‘We are now there, and Austria seems about to arrive at a
decision. Will she not expect, with good cause, that we should
cover her right wing, and operate on the left flank of the
enemy? And yet this means the certain ruin of our armies,
which, just now, in this unwholesome season of the year, would
be sure to die of fever in the swamps on the Lower Danube,
like flies, or like the Russians have done before
‘Besides, they have now completely sucked the country
dry, and we have extremely few means of transport; we
should lose our connection with the sea, and place ourselves
against an overwhelming force, in a plain, without sufficient
cavalry. It is here that the difficulty will lie. A refusal to
advance along the Danube will alarm Austria, and, if we do so,
it will do her no good, and ruin us. I consider the diversion
towards Sebastopol to be politically the correct thing, and in
a military respect the most effective. I should consider even
a landing at Odessa in the rear of the Russians to be more
effective than an attack on their left wing. Besides, our
public, and the position of the Emperor Napoleon III, have to
be taken into account. We require a success, such as even a
battle gained in Moldavia cannot afford us.
‘To-day, 10,000 French are embarking at Calais in one of
our fleets, in order to be conveyed to the Baltic. 5000 mixed
troops are already there. We are also sending an additional
5000 men to the East, which will bring our infantry there up
to 29,000 bayonets, with cavalry and artillery 35,000 men.
The French have not yet reached, or exceeded, 45,000. We
are beginning to organise the Turks, and shall shortly have
to pay them too. Their irregular troops are the chief difficulty
in every kind of operation. They have plundered everything
round about Varna, and we have not even found any
inhabitants there. My military disquisition has become
lengthy, and I will therefore close.’
150 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
The most curious circumstance connected with the expe-
dition to the Crimea, was that the whole world had long been
talking about it, and that the Governments had, as it were,
themselves given notice to the Russians of the attack that
was planned. In every newspaper, mention was made of the
orders which had been issued to the Generals in Warna, and
in Paris and London the great expedition was talked of as a
matter that would shortly bring the war to a speedy end.
What effects this was bound to produce, may be best
measured, if it is remembered that the decisive Cabinet Council
in England had been held on the 28th of June, and the landing
of the allies in the Crimea began on the morning of the 14th
of September. The fact that the allies, on setting foot on the
peninsula, did not meet with a fearful catastrophe, can only
be explained by the fortunate circumstance, that the military
incapacity of the Russians in profiting by this advantage was
just as great, as the want of caution shown by the allied
armies in carrying out their operations.
A few days before the great and fatal landing of the
troops of the Western Powers in the Crimea, the ‘Entente
cordiale” between the two allied States had received an out-
ward recognition, and a personal confirmation, which marked
the summit of the political situation in the Eastern compli-
cation.
Prince Albert and Napoleon saw and conversed with one
another, from the 5th to the 9th of September, in the camp at
Boulogne, burying the antipathy which they had so long
cherished against one another in a pleasant interchange of
their convictions and experiences. Indeed, the intimacy that
sprung up between them during the personal intercourse of
those few days, was far more friendly than could ever have
been expected.
It may be said, that, since those days, the whole of Old
England had totally changed its manner towards the Tuileries.
Nobody, who, but a year ago, had observed the relations
between the two Courts, ventured to entertain the hope that
a meeting which was afterwards to have so important a
bearing on the history of all Europe, would pass off so
PRINCE ALBERT"S VISIT TO WAPOLEO W. I5 I
satisfactorily, and it may easily be imagined with what
interest I looked forward to my brother's accounts.
Far as I had been from working towards this event by
means of indiscreet influences, nevertheless it was plain to me
that the close relations which I had established with the Em-
peror of the French would, sooner or later, either be taken up, or
be violently crossed, by my brother. Hence, what I could do,
indirectly, towards facilitating an understanding between Louis
Napoleon and Prince Albert, had been taken in hand during
my visit in March, and had been continued later on through the
mediation of Prince Chimay. It was particularly agreeable
moreover, that the visit of my uncle and his son to Boulogne
had preceded that of my brother. -
As to the outward character of the meeting, and the im-
pressions which my uncle and my brother received, everybody
is now fully informed on that subject by the Life of the Prince
Consort. In his “Memorandum on my visit to Boulogne, Prince
Albert, in a measure, sent a frank and honourable declaration
to his relations and friends, in which, while acknowledging
the more eminent qualities of Napoleon, he in a certain sense
disavowed the attitude he had hitherto assumed towards him.
Thus, whilst the English and French troops were about to pro-
ceed to the Tauric Chersonesus, and put the alliance of the
two Western nations to the test of fire, personal relations
were being established in Boulogne between two men, who,
by a curious concatenation of circumstances, possessed rather
a moral and ideal, than an inherited, influence in the
great nations of Western Europe.
‘The day after to-morrow evening, my brother wrote to
me, on September 2, ‘I shall embark here for Boulogne, and
the wind is already making every effort in its power to lash
the sea into fury.” Not only the sea voyage, which was un-
pleasant to him in itself, had somewhat depressed my brother's
spirit, but he was also dissatisfied with the course of events in
the East. 2
‘Particularly in Varna, an incredible fertility is being
developed in creating and discovering difficulties, which are
said to stand in the way of the expedition to Sebastopol, and I
152 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-6-0THA
am dividing my vexation between this circumstance and the
state of affairs in Berlin, where they are in very sooth leading
the Almighty into temptation
The more unfavourable the auspices therefore seemed, under
which the visit to Boulogne took place, the pleasanter was the
news which my brother sent me from Osborne, immediately after
his return there from Paris, on the 12th of September. His
accounts of Napoleon were quite in accord with the notes and
descriptions of the visit which are already known, and were
as enthusiastic as it was possible for the critical nature of
Prince Albert to be. I answered him on the 19th of Septem-
ber, taking occasion to advert to a few less noticed points of
view with regard to the general political situation, and
especially the expedition to the Crimea.
* CALLENBERG, September 19, 1854.
‘I have not written to you for some time, and owe you an
answer to two kind letters. During your excursion, I did
not wish to bother you with my letters. Besides, I hoped
to hear from you myself about your impressions in Boulogne.
This has now taken place, and I cammot deny that a great
load is off my mind, seeing that on this interview, and the im-
pression which you made upon one another, the welfare of
Europe in chief part depends.
‘Considering the peculiar character of the Emperor, and the
circumstance that he is, after all, the absolute ruler, of France,
it was a positive necessity, that, unless your alliance was to be
exposed to constant petty dangers, the Emperor should be
strengthened in his confidence by personal intercourse with
you. He himself shared this opinion, though it was with a
certain anxiety that he looked forward to the results of the
interview. It is highly gratifying, not only that your letter
expresses satisfaction, but that also the accounts I have from
France are of the same tenor.
‘In face of the hopeless condition of Central Europe, the
tardiness of Austria in advancing on the straight course, and
the reluctance of Prussia, our sole hope, and perhaps our
safety, is to be sought in an alliance between yourselves and
LETTER FROM THE DUKE TO PRI.VCE ALBERT 153
France. As long as you remain united, and each restrains the
other from pursuing purely a policy of self-interest, the general
subversion of European affairs may still be delayed. For this
reason, we are quietly working for this great end, in the same
degree as Russia and her adherents are working against it.
‘How cunningly she operates, and what accurate knowledge
she possesses of the moral force and the sentiments of the
German Sovereigns, can be gathered from the circumstance
that she has found it so easy to bind the hands of all the
Sovereigns, each by different representations and different
means. Austria is no less bound for the moment. In fact, the
steps she may shortly take, will depend solely on the success
of the expedition in the Black Sea.
‘As to that expedition, I share your hopes for its success in
every respect. But the enterprise is of too great a magnitude
to be staked on mere chance events. I regret that a great part
of the plan has been made so public. The strength and the pre-
ponderance of the one belligerent Power lies in the fact that,
when once master of the Sea, it can concentrate a certain numer-
ical force of troops, and unexpectedly swoop down with them on
any single point, whereas the other has daily to be on the qui vive
with regard to every point where an attack is possible, and con-
sequently finds it impracticable to appear in equal force at
every point.
‘The more the manoeuvres of the fleet and the transport of
the troops are kept secret, the greater the advantage. The
battle of Fredericia, with all its useless bloodshed, would never
have taken place, if General Bonin could have ascertained that
eleven batallions of Danes had landed at midnight opposite
Fredericia. As it happened, however, he was attacked
at 3 o'clock, and expected only to find the well-known force of
the garrison of Fredericia opposed to him. In spite of all speed,
it was impossible for me to inform the General before the battle
commenced, of the intended landing, which had been betrayed to
l]] 62.
‘I will not enter into further details here, and not give
scope to my apprehensions. Heaven, let us hope, will not
forsake the good cause.’
154 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA KE-COBURG-GOTHA
The day after I had written this letter, my faith in the
latter respect was to be brilliantly justified by the happy
event of the battle on the Alma. This was the first great
news which filled all occidental nations with the same genuine
enthusiasm.
By the combined attack of the French and the English,
who, but a few days before, had landed to the south of
Eupatoria, on the Western coast of the Crimea, the Russians
were driven with the greatest bravery out of their fortified
positions on the Alma, and only the lack of cavalry on the
part of the allies saved the army of Mentschikoff from total
destruction. The siege of Sebastopol now commenced, after
the opportunity of taking the fortress by a speedy attack
had, as some said, been neglected.
I am far from wishing to discuss the details of the opera-
tions of the combined armies, or to recall here the history of the
Crimean war, which has had so many and such excellent military
describers. But it is not easy for any one to relate the
experiences of this war, without adverting to one of the most
remarkable mystifications that have ever occurred in our
century of telegraphs. The whole of Europe believed, after
the battle on the Alma, in the news, sent by the Tartars, of
the fall of Sebastopol, and it is worthy of mention, that even
the Emperor of Austria was induced to congratulate the
Governments of the Western Powers prematurely on this
event. -
Louis Napoleon was extremely pleased at this attention on
the part of the Emperor of Austria, and, later on, after
Sebastopol had really fallen, and the relations between
Austria and France had become strained, he took it
just as amiss when, at the right moment, and on the suitable
occasion, the congratulations were not forthcoming.
This singular disappointment was all the more bitter, the
more obstinately the defence of Sebastopol was afterwards
carried on by the Russians, and the more bloody and lasting
the battles became, which had to be fought for this fearful
stronghold. The approaching winter and the spread of severe
disease, the miserable condition of the troops, and the helpless-
THE BATTLE OF IN KERMAN I 55
ness of the Generals—all these things produced, during the
next months of the war, such an abundance of distress and
woe, that the very last spark of enthusiasm for this war was
bound to be extinguished. In its stead, there arose, in France
especially, a deep hatred against those Powers who, in their
alliance against Russia, had behaved doubtfully, like Prussia,
or hesitatingly like Austria, and had thus, according to the
opinion of the Western populations, caused the thousand-
fold misery on the Crimean Peninsula.
A few days after the battle on the Alma, St Arnaud died,
and General Canrobert assumed the chief command of the
French army. The English took up their position in the Bay
of Balaclava, the French in that of Camiesch, and the regular
siege of Sebastopol now began on the south side of Sebastopol.
On the 17th of October, fire was opened on the fortress from
the fleet and from the land, but it had by no means the desired
effect, which was to render possible an attack by storm.
When, on the 25th of October, Mentschikoff, who had been
continually reinforced by the arrival of fresh troops, attacked
the English at Balaclava, the Russians remained master of the
field. Only the tremendous battle at Inkerman, on the 25th
of November, enabled the allies to secure their positions for the
long and severe winter, during which the situation became, in
a military respect, the most unfavourable that could be
imagined. The besieging army of the allies was almost
entirely shut in from the land by a very numerous Russian
army, and could only protect itself by means of tremendous
entrenchments and ditches, which themselves made the impres-
sion of a fortress that, in its turn, had to be besieged by the
Russians. - -
In England, the utter unsoundness of the military
arrangements of the great kingdom were at last beginning
to be recognised. Indeed, nothing was perhaps more indica-
tive of the insufficiency of its forces for a great undertaking,
than the following calculations with regard to the troops
employed by England, which my brother, in order to some
extent to vindicate the English Government, drew up,
after Sebastopol had fallen, “As to our army, I will
156 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-COBURG-GOTHA
only mention, that we began the war in the Crimea with
25,000 men and 35 guns, and after losing nearly our whole
army in the winter, have mow (in November 1855), 51,000
men with 94 cannon and 4000 cavalry on the spot, who will
be in first-rate condition by next spring.’
Hence, it may be said that the English Government was
just two years behindhand with its military measures,
and that the Crimean campaign, which had been under-
taken in September, 1854, unfortunately with but too
little preparation, ought not to have been commenced until
the spring of 1856. Meanwhile, however, the allied Powers
had uselessly sacrificed their troops in the land of the ancient
Scythini, and, with a patience that would have been worthy
of a better cause, had been obliged to inform European news-
paper readers of heroic deeds which, though by no means in-
ferior to those of the mediaeval crusades, could only be regarded
by our realistic age as quite as imprudent as those of Louis
the Holy against the Mamelukes. I used sometimes to rouse
my brother's opposition at that period, by making remarks of a
similar nature in my letters to him. But his own accounts
certainly left little room for any other view ; as, for instance,
when he wrote, at the end of November, 1854, when the armies
were only at the beginning of their horrible sufferings:
“I owe you an answer to your kind lines of the 10th. But
I am little disposed for writing, for I have but one thought,
and that is with our heroes in the Crimea. The poor fellows are
suffering much, and behaving admirably. At Inkerman 6000
English resisted for two hours, then altogether 8000 for four
hours, and when at last reinforced by 6000 French—these 14,000
all in all nine hours—a storm of 60,000 Russians, and repulsed
them. The Russian dead, whom we had to bury, amounted to
4500 ! Multiply by 5, as is customary, in order to ascertain
the number of the wounded, and there results that these 14,000
men put 15-20,000 of the enemy hors de combat: a unique fact
in the history of warfare. Unfortunately, we also, as is but
natural, have suffered enormously, for the Russians had
brought sixty cannon against us, and a steamer with mortars.
George (the Duke of Cambridge) behaved excellently; poor
7"I/ E IFOREIGM LEGION I 57
Seymour is wounded in the hand; Gordon got off; Sir George
Cathcart is our greatest loss. -
‘Our operation cannot properly be termed a siege, for we
ourselves are besieged by a stronger army than our besieging
army, and the town is quite open in the north towards the sea,
with a large fleet sunk in it, whilst in the east, towards the
land, it is in connection with the relieving army.'
And, on the 26th of December, my brother gave a descrip-
tion of the sad state of things, which is in a certain measure
only a continuation of the foregoing letter.
‘The accounts from Sebastopol contain nothing but many
sufferings of the poor troops. All communications are
rendered quite impossible by the total breaking up of the soil.
But this must be the same with the enemy, and must embar-
rass him still more.
‘Since the 5th of November, the Russian army has given no
sign of life. It has how retreated by way of Tschernaya, and
is gathering on the north side of the port. As soon as our new
guns are in position, the firing will commence again. But
meanwhile the Russians have been making enormous efforts in
erecting further defences in the interior, and they possess a
great number of guns.' -
The military extremity in which the English were placed,
caused a project to ripen, in the course of the winter, which
is scarcely remembered to-day, but which is extremely char-
acteristic of the state of things which existed in those days.
The idea was conceived of organising a foreign legion, and of
enlisting, for this purpose, chiefly German soldiers, as in the
tinues of the North American rising in the last century.
The strangest thing was, moreover, that the measure was
very unpopular in England, and that, as Albert wrote on the
30th of December, it was conceived as a mark of ingratitude
towards the brave army in the Crimea. My brother com-
plained to me, that the matter was regarded as the ‘notion'
of a foreigner, and that there was some inclination to make
him responsible for it.
In a somewhat later letter, in which the successful equip-
ment of the Foreign Legion is reported, my brother writes
158 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
characteristically enough of the modern desertion of German
and Swiss subjects:
‘I will only say one word about the Foreign Legion, which
will interest you. We have seen 3408 under arms at Shorn-
cliff, and were very satisfied, both with their bearing, and
with their spirit. The English uniform stood in singular
contrast with the German faces, but was decidedly better
made than usual. The Germans consist of a complete batallion
of riflemen under Colonel Schroer, and two still incomplete
batallions of the line, one under Major Aller, the other under
Colonel Woolridge. The Swiss batallion is under Colonel
Sulzberger. The German legion is under Colonel von
Stutterheim. The organisation under Colonel Rinloch.' .
Meanwhile, the general dissatisfaction, uncertainty, and
anxiety, with regard to the political and military situation,
had produced, at the beginning of the year 1855, its long
anticipated effect on the stability of the Aberdeen Ministry.
In consequence of a motion of Mr Roebuck in Parliament for
the appointment of a committee to inquire into the manage-
ment of the war in the Crimea, Russell left the Ministry, since
he did not want to resist his colleagues with Lord Aberdeen.
The coalition which had been kept together with so much
difficulty, at once fell to pieces, and, after a vote of censure
against the Ministry had been carried with a large majority,
on the 29th of January, the resignation of the whole Ministry
was announced on the 1st of February.
The forming of the new Cabinet was attended with great
difficulties, as both Russell and Derby declined to undertake
it. Thus it became necessary to call Palmerston, who entered
on his first Ministry on the 8th of February. The Queen and
my brother were anything but pleased, when matters took this
turn, but, thanks to the good relations existing between the
Emperor of the French and the new Premier, at least the
coherence of the great alliance was placed beyond the dangers
of petty frictions and misunderstandings, which had become
more and more unavoidable, owing to the unfortunate course
of affairs in the East.
In Paris, all enthusiasm had long cooled down, since the
I) II'FICULTIES OF THE SITUATION I 59
battle of Inkerman. ‘Les mowvelles d'Orient somt toujours
Sombres,’ was the everlasting refrain of the accounts sent to
me from the Tuileries. ‘ Paris est triste, le gowvermement très
occupé de la cherté des growims.’ The Emperor himself grew
more and more disappointed at the attitude of the German
Powers. The war with Russia gradually appeared to him as
an intolerable and resultless burden. Ideas of the most varied
description crossed one another in his mind. When, in
December, Princess Lieven, whose Russian business-zeal was
well enough known, asked his permission to return to Paris,
and, in doing so, wrote expressly, ‘que la France et la Russie
me resteraient pas longtemps browillées, he answered with
more than customary politeness, and her return was generally
regarded as the sign of wave temdam.ce conciliatrice. Between
the Tuileries and the Palais Royal the relations became very
strained, “et chaque jour, so Prince Chimay concluded his
account of the 18th of December, ‘gramdit le danger de la
Tevision de la carte européenne.’
However, little attentions on the part of Austria, such as
the delivery of the insignia of the Order of St Stephen,
softened the impatience of the Emperor, whose bad state of
health was giving rise to the desire in his family to see the
future of Bonapartism and the succession secured by law.
This latter circumstance was scarcely calculated to increase
the concord between the Emperor and his relations. When
Prince Napoleon returned from the Crimea, he openly opposed
the policy of the Government, and preached against the war
with Russia and the alliance with Austria. Public feeling
appeared to applaud him. The financial resources of the Em-
pire were gradually becoming exhausted, and the opposition
papers took an especial delight in calculating the enormous
costs of the war. Even Prince Chimay asserted, in one of his
reports, that the Crimean army swallowed three million francs
a-day.
Doubtless, all France wished, as quickly as possible, to
obtain an honourable peace. Under these circumstances, the
negotiations with Sardinia were accelerated, which, on the 26th
of January, led to the conclusion of the well-known treaty,
160 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
according to which Austria's most dangerous neighbour
joined the great alliance with 15,000 men. It was not with-
out great apprehension that this turn in the policy of the
Emperor Napoleon was watched in Vienna, where this fresh
step appeared to prove that Napoleon had by no means gone
back from the ideas expressed by him at the beginning of the
WàI’.
The situation grew more and more complicated and
strained, and, if the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas in
accepting the four points had only been to some extent
honest, peace would probably have been concluded by the
harassed Western Powers in February, without the fall of
Sebastopol. This was also the opinion of my brother, who
wrote to that effect to King Leopold, on the 20th of January,
1855. I received a copy of his letter at the time, and believe
that it indicates the deep desire for peace on the part of the
Western Powers more plainly than many other documents,
which, destined for public perusal, only too easily produced
the belief that the Western Powers would never have
determined to end this uncertain and grievous war, before
Sebastopol had been taken.
‘MOST GRACIOUS UNCLE,-Nobody believes here in Russia's
honesty in accepting our interpretation of the four points. A
comparison of her acceptance with Nesselrode's despatches to
Gortschakoff, on the 26th of August, is the chief justification
of our mistrust. In those despatches, the four points were
rejected, because they were not to be interpreted “otherwise"
than we have since then interpreted them, and it is said that
Russia would only agree to them, if she were in extremis, and
even then only temporarily, seeing that she would not be able
to maintain such a peace.
‘Therefore, we have Nesselrode's own words for it,
that we are not to trust him. Moreover, Russia has a great
interest in disturbing the completion of our alliance with
Austria, and preventing that State from taking any active
measures. If, at the conference, she is able to expose any
differences of opinion between Austria and the Western
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT I61,
Powers, it will also be possible for her to separate us. Indeed,
she might by-and-by draw Austria herself over to her side,
especially if she were able to bring Prussia into the conference,
which she is now endeavouring to do by every means in her
power. Then they would be three against two, and our posi-
tion would be greatly endangered. This appears to us to be.
the sole object of Russia's present acceptance, and Austria
already shows considerable dishonesty.
‘Westmoreland and Bourqueney were fooled by Buol into
not drawing up a protocol of the first conference, so that it has
never been recorded what Russia really accepted. Buol privately
accepted a memorandum from Gortschakoff, which Westmore-
land and Bourqueney had refused, and in the despatch in
which he gives his version of the conference, he now speaks of .
the memorandum as practically quite in unison with the inter-
pretation of the three Powers, whereas it contains everything
against which we have been carrying on war . . . .
“I sum up therefore : I do not believe in Russia's honest
intention to make peace, but I do believe that the greatest
danger for the rest of Europe consists in the possible success
of Russian intrigue in separating Austria again from the
Western Powers. If it should twºrn out differently, I shall be
quite content. If Russia intends homestly to carry out the
interpretation of the four points, them PEACE IS MADE.
* ALBERT.
‘WINDsor CASTLE, January 20, 1855.”
At that time, affairs in Paris wore a no less desperate
aspect. Hardly anyone was any longer inclined to set him-
self up as the defender of this unfortunate war, except the
Turkish Ambassador, Vely Pasha, who made use of the carnival
in order to inspire society, at balls and evening parties, with
courage and hope for the speedy fall of Sebastopol. When, a
few days later, the Duke of Cambridge returned from the
Crimea, and stayed some time in Paris, people were astonished
to hear all the worst accounts which Prince Napoleon has
already given, confirmed.
‘Le Duc de Cambridge, Chimay wrote, ‘est an’rivé à Paris
VOI, III. L
I62 MEMOIRS OF T'HE DU KE 0 l' SAXE-C'O BUZ?G-G'0THA
exaspéré contre son gouvernement, decouragé et décourageant
à l'excès. ll a presque reproché à Lady Cowley d'avoir laissé
partir son fils pour l'exposer inutilement à des périls sans
gloire.'
The misfortunes and the inactivity of the armies could not
fail to produce certain dissensions between the allies, which,
even in the remarks of Louis Napoleon, became every day
more bitterly evident In spite of our having agreed that
our whole correspondence should be carried on through Prince
Chimay, the Emperor had, already during the summer,
occasionally written me little notes, which, however, were
mostly confined to courtesies and references to what he had
commissioned Chimay to write to me. But a somewhat longer
· letter of the middle of February was very characteristic of
the situation in general, and of the mood of the Emperor in
particular :
TUILERIES, le 16 Février, 1855.
v
MoN CoUsIN,—J'ai bien des excuses à vous demander pour ne
pas vous avoir répondu plus tôt. Mais j'espérais vous apprendre
quelque chose de définitif sur nos transactions diplomatiques ; cela
· traîne si longtemps que je ne veux pas tarder plus longtemps à vous
exprimer ma reconnaissance des preuves d'amitié que vous ne cessez
de me donner. Votre dernière lettre était un chef d'œuvre de bon
sens ; aussi en ai-je communiqué quelques passages à l'Empereur de
l'Autriche, qui m'a répondu une lettre très aimable, mais où il
exprime sa confiance dans la paix.
Le roi de Prusse paraît revenu à de meilleurs sentiments, et M.
de Wedell est ici avec l'espoir de signer un traité.
J'ai reçu de bonnes nouvelles de Crimée, mais ce qui a rendu ce
siège interminable c'est le défaut d'énergie dans le chef de l'armée
· anglaise. Après quatre mois d'attente, ils n'ont pas pu terminer
leurs travaux de siège qui etaient dirigés vers la partie la plus impor-
tante, et quoique nous leur donnions tous les soins possibles en leur
ouvrant nos magasins, en leur portant leurs malades et leurs muni-
tions leur donnant même du pain, Lord Stratford à Constantinople
joue tous les tours possibles !
* Enfin j'espère que tout va mieux aller avec Lord Palmerston.
L'impératrice me charge de la rappeler au souvenir de Votre Altesse
DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS 163
Royale, et moi je vous prie de croire aux sentiments de haute estime
et d’amitié avec lesquels je suis votre bon cousin,
L. NAPOLéON.
The expectations which were attached to the mission of
M. de Wedell in Paris, and which the Emperor, as may be seen
from the foregoing letter, appeared to share, were not realised.
Though the King of Prussia was ready to conclude a firm
alliance with the Western Powers, on the basis of the four
points, such as Austria, on her part also, had independently
entered into, on the 2nd of December, Wedell had neither
orders regarding the interpretation of the four points, which
were at that moment after all principally in question, nor was
he himself able to make any decided declarations on the
subject. Hence I received, on the 2nd of February, from
several sides, the news that the attempted understanding
between the Western Powers and Prussia had again met with
difficulties. And, in accordance with these facts, it was
reported to me from Frankfort, that the conviction had now
taken root, that Prussia would never, and under no circum-
stances, draw her sword against Russia. - -
At this date, the position of affairs had been altered by the
death of the Emperor Nicholas, and the determination of King
Frederick William to again break off the alliance with, the
Western Powers, which he had been seeking and wishing for
since the beginning of February, was in great part due to this
unexpected event in St Petersburg, which had powerfully
stirred the feelings of the Prussian family.
The Emperor Nicholas died at a moment, when he had just
made the attempt, by sending fresh troops to the Crimea, once
for all to put a war-like end to all proposals of peace, and all
idle interpretations of the four points. On the 10th of
February, the Emperor had ordered a general arming of
the Russian nation. He believed that he was able to face
the terrors of the winter better than the Western Powers, and
repeatedly called upon his Generals in the Crimea to take the
offensive. -
On the 16th of February, General Wrangel actuall
164 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
attempted to make an attack on Eupatoria, but was repulsed;
whereupon Omer Pasha Sallied forth with his army, and
pursued the Russians. The Turks were thus credited with a
fresh, though very doubtful, success and victory over the
Russian enemy. The Emperor was already in failing health,
when he received this vexatious news. ~.
With regard to his diplomatic action, even the slightest
military failure was an irremediable injury. Urged more and
more by Austria, and now too by Prussia, to give a loyal and
pacific interpretation to the four points, which had already
been accepted by him in principle, nothing but a fortunate and
decided change of the military situation in the Crimea could
deliver him from his political extremity. Hence it is easy
to explain how the saying could gain currency, that the
Emperor Nicholas had died of disappointed hopes. A modern
English historian finds Schiller's words with reference to
Max Piccolomini applicable to him : They say he wished
to die.
More correct and to the point, according to the information
I then had, was the opinion that the Emperor, in order to
raise the military spirit of the country and the population in
every way, had devoted himself personally with particular
zeal to all military duties.
The Emperor Nicholas had always belonged to those rulers
who set the highest value on the punctual observance of all
forms of the service in times of peace. He always looked
upon the military parade as the school of the soldier, and it
was therefore only consistent, if he doubled these efforts of
his in time of war. It is the custom in St Petersburg for the
Emperor, on certain Sundays, to hold the so-called parade of
orderlies. He was already very unwell on Sunday the 26th
of February, when, in spite of the remonstrances of his
physicians, he insisted on fulfilling this physically fatiguing
duty. From the parade, he first drove in an open sledge to
visit a lady friend. By the time he had returned home, he
was already seized with high fever. The doctors recognised a
severe affection of the lungs, and on Thursday, the 2nd of
March, he was dead. The impression produced throughout
AUSTRIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS I65
all Europe by the news of the death of this much-feared man,
was very great, but nowhere, as I was only too well able to
judge, more heartfelt and sincere than at the Prussian Court.
In the diplomatic negotiations, which were now begun with
a new zest, the third of the famous four points was the subject
of strenuous resistance on the part of the new Sovereign.
The idea of giving way with regard to Russia's position in
the Black Sea, or the sacrificing of the Russian fleet and the
razing of the fortifications of Sebastopol, could not be
whispered as yet in St Petersburg.
On the 15th of March, new conferences were opened in
Vienna. Prussia had been excluded from them, which put the
King in a violent passion. My brother, as is well known,
endeavoured to represent this measure to the King as a
necessary consequence of his vacillating behaviour, but
Frederick William IV—this may be said—never got over the
heavy blow of his exclusion from the March and April con-
ferences.
However, the excessively harsh treatment of Prussia did
not bring the Western Powers the golden fruits they had pro-
mised themselves from it. The Vienna Conferences were
carried on with infinite secrecy. For a long time, nothing was
heard of the proceedings, and still less of the results. It was
only known that, at the first Conferences, a further specification
of the four points had taken place, and that Lord Russell had
shown himself very obliging, whilst Bourqueney, dreaming of
the glory still to be acquired by France, maintained a studious
reSer’We.
Soon, however, a great change occurred in the concert of
the Powers. Austria suddenly declared herself quite incapable
of agreeing with the Western Powers in a stricter interpreta-
tion of the third of the four points, respecting the question of
the Russian active forces in the Black Sea. The result was a
complete split in the camp of the allies of the 2nd of December.
Russian policy could not have experienced a happier hour.
Even if the Emperor Alexander II had been firmly resolved
on making peace, he could scarcely have let this fine oppor-
tunity escape, to insist, under the given circumstances, on the
166 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
full maintenance of his power in the Black Sea. I will not
recapitulate here all the proposals which were made on various
sides with regard to the solution of this question.
Thanks to a series of publications on the subject, nearly
every one of the many useless words which were exchanged
by the representatives of the four Great Powers in Vienna,
is now known. The secret was strictly kept at the time, and
only a few stray accounts arrived from Paris, according to
which the relations of the Western Powers to Austria had
become very strained.
‘As might have been foreseen,” my brother wrote to me on
the 5th of April, ‘Austria is leaving us in the lurch on the
third point, after having got the first and second decided in
accordance with her particular interests, and not exactly in
favour of the West. She now declares that she does not see
any casus belli in the fact of Russia's not consenting to some
practical means or other powr faire cesser sa prépondérance
dams la mer noire. But this was just in question, and the
idea of providing a counterpoise, by condemning England, for
all time to come, to keep a navy equal to her whole present
war-navy in the Black Sea, is too absurd to require any
illustration. -
‘Besides, we should have to take away important towns and
territories from the Turks, build large fortresses and war-
ports, arsenals, etc., etc., and be continually passing with our
fleets before the windows of the poor Sultan's Serail.
- ‘The proposal may be likened to the following example:
A horde of robbers threaten a house, and attack it. The
inhabitants and the neighbours come out to defend it. After
heavy blows peace is to be made, and is to consist not in the
robbers remaining posted in front of the house, but in their
permitting the inhabitants to pass the rest of their lives as
sentries in front of their own houses.’
The situation in Vienna was still the same as I had
found it the year before. One part of the more influential
men, at their head Field-marshal von Hess, was always
expecting the ultimate conclusion of the alliance with the
Western Powers. The other part was still friendly disposed
LETTER FROM COUNT BUOL TO THE DUKE 167
towards Russia, and, more particularly since Lord Palmerston
had become Premier, extremely distrustful towards England.
This tendency had been considerably strengthened by Baron
Bruck, who was now assuming the Ministry of Finance, after
having so frequently proved himself hostile to English
influence in the East. Of Bach it was said, that the days of
his ministry were numbered, and Buol was, properly speaking,
always moving in a circle of busy activity, like the advancing
horse in the tread-mill. An excellent illustration of this
movement, which never stirs from the spot, is afforded by one
of his letters, written to me on the 24th of April, and in which
he attempts to explain the attitude of Austria.
“MOST SERENE DUKE, . . . . Perhaps I have not been alto-
gether wrong in not availing myself of Your Highness's per-
mission before, as the really critical moment, which will in all
probability decide the issue of the Peace Conferences, is only
now awaiting us. -
‘My Emperor has the great purpose in view of overcoming
this crisis by means of the alliance with France and England,
without exposing the world to the consequences of a general
shock to the existing system of the States. The means to
this end lie simply and solely in the loyal and complete
carrying out of the programme of the four points. This
programme has been drawn up in the interest of Europe.
Austria has bound herself to it, but to nothing else, and the
events of the war render no new demands necessary.
‘Austria cannot renounce her own judgment on the
difficult third point, nor can she allow war to be dictated to
her. But the Emperor, my most gracious Sovereign, has said
to himself, that he will rather be too severe against Russia,
than not sufficiently just towards the Western Powers, and in
the conditions we are willing to lay down, we are going far
enough, to be able to declare fearlessly before all the world
that we are honestly, and in spite of every danger, redeeming
ur pledged word.
‘Lord John Russell, who started yesterday on his return
journey, will not be able to deny us this acknowledgment in
168 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
his conscience; in fact, he has led us to hope that he will speak
in England in favour of the solution which we have proposed.
Minister Drouyn de l'Huys also shows himself personally in-
clined to it. - -
‘There may be room for dispute as to the value of the
different systems of neutralisation, limitation, and counterpoise,
of the Powers in the Black Sea, but they all contain a
decided victory of general interests over Russian ambition.
We desire this victory, as much as England and France do.
We do not undervalue the greatness of the sacrifices which
have been made by these Powers, and we wish to give Russia
no pretext for saying that her opponents are not aiming at
guarantees of peace, but at humiliating her, and at continuing
the war. -
“When Your Highness is initiated into the particulars,
you will give the preference to one or the other system, but
you will certainly not find the difference great enough to be
seriously weighed against such essential aims as the re-estab-
lishment of the peace of the world and the continuation of our
alliance with the West. If people in England and France
allow themselves to be carried away by motives of self-love
to continue the war in opposition to our opinion, then I cer-
tainly foresee, not only the material, but the moral, triumph of
Russia.
‘How much better would the future present itself, supposing
England and the Emperor Napoleon were to content themselves
with just and moderate conditions, and remain peacefully
united with us, for the purpose of watching that such condi-
tions were properly fulfilled. After all, the true counterpoise
against the growth of Russia's power only lies in the perman-
ence of this system of alliances, which has been called forth by
Russia's encroachments; and both Prussia, in spite of all her
vacillations, and the German Courts, in spite of all their
desire for Russian protection, must, in the course of time,
necessarily join this system.
‘The opinion and the advice of Your Highness, listened to
at this moment by your illustrious relatives in England, are
certainly calculated to produce a great impression, and Your
NAPOLEON'S PROPOSAL TO GO TO THE CRIMEA 169
Highness will lay the Emperor and all Germany under a great
obligation, if you contribute towards winning opinions in
favour of an honest peace, established under the auspices of
the Imperial Power. -
“I regret that I am not able to submit to Your Highness
all the particulars of the negotiations. I should then be
better able to defend my thesis. Filled with gratitude for
the honour of Your Highness's confidence and friendly senti-
ments, I beg for their continuance, and remain, with the
sincerest respect, my most gracious Duke,
- - ‘Your Highness's
‘devoted and humble servant,
* - “COUNT VON BUOL.
‘VIENNA, April 24, 1855.”
The language which, as is seen, Austria was beginning to
employ, was such as was not likely to prove successful, either in
France, or in England. I may honestly say, and if I were not
afraid of fatiguing the reader by producing further documen-
tary evidence, I could prove it by numerous letters, that I
really and actually endeavoured, both in Paris and in London,
to gain at least some sort of ground for the Austrian view.
But I did so at the time with slight hopes of success; for
what, after all, in face of the national excitement which
prevailed everywhere, were the two Western Powers engaged
in this costly war, to think of an empty phrase like this: that,
under the auspices of the Austrian Imperial power, peace
should be established, and a rotten peace to boot -
It was not to be denied, that the favourable political situa-
tion, and more particularly the circumstance that Prussia had
so completely retired into the back-ground, could lead Austria
into assuming a tone, as if she were once more in a position to
settle all Europe, East and West, in the old Metternichian
style. Unfortunately, this pretty dream had no other effect
than that of calling forth, in Paris and London, a feeling of
extreme dissatisfaction with Austria.
The Emperor Napoleon, who had just been entertaining
the plan of going to the Crimea himself, and, if possible, putting
17o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAATE-COBURG-GOTHA
an end to the war, before the 15th of May, now attached
himself with renewed enthusiasm to England and her national
aspirations in the East. Since the end of March, he had been
planning a visit to the English Royal Family, in company
with the Empress, and, in April, he quickly and ener-
getically carried out his idea. The French thus obtained a
new proof of the hearty accord existing between their Emperor
and the popular and powerful Royal House of England, and
the diplomatic world of Europe saw the alliance against over-
bearing Russia cemented afresh.
On the 16th of April, the Emperor and the Empress of
France arrived in Dover, where Prince Albert was awaiting
them, and, for a succession of brilliant days, they were almost
uninterruptedly fêted and loaded with honours and distinctions
by the Court and the English nation. If my brother had
already altered his opinion of Napoleon, after his stay in
Boulogne in the previous autumn, the Queen was now
likewise changed. The diaries of the Queen, as is well
known, are full of her delight with the Emperor, and the
beautiful Eugenie now appears as having ‘the most perfect
manner ever seen—so gentle and graceful, and kind, her
courtesy so charming, and so modest and retiring withal.' *
At the great conference, which was held in the Emperor's
room, on the 18th of April, at 11 o'clock, and at which Prince
Albert drew up the protocol, the vigorous continuation of the
war, and the taking of Sebastopol at any price, was decided :
upon, but the Emperor was urgently dissuaded from proceeding
to the Crimea himself. The news of this decision brought
the enthusiasm of the English to its highest pitch.
However, in spite of the overflowing delight which spoke
out of all the English and French accounts, of the happy
harmony between the Royal and Imperial parties, the actual
position of affairs had by no means been regarded in a rosy
light. Although the change in the Chief Command of the
French army, where Pelissier had taken the place of Canrobert,
had been very favourably received at the seat of war, the
almost simultaneous replacing of Drouyn de l'Huys by Count
* Diary of the Queen in ‘The Life of the Prince Consort’ III, 245.
PRINCE ALBERT ON EAGLISH POLITICAL AFFAIRS 171
Walewski at the head of the French Cabinet, was regarded in
England as a mistake on the part of the Emperor. And whilst
the foreign diplomacy of the Western Powers had nothing but
defeats to record, the parliamentary debates in London
assumed from day to day a more unfavourable and confused
aspect. It is a sad picture, which the sharp pen of my brother,
in striking contrast to the festivities of the Imperial visit, had
occasion to draw, only a few days later, on the 1st of May:
‘By the entry of our light draught steam flotille into the
Sea of Azof, we are enabled to confine the Russian Com-
missariat lines to the road of Perecop, and to push forward to
the Don, and break up, or destroy, their large corn magazines
on the way. By this means, their troops in the Crimea will
be reduced to a quantity, which we shall be quite able to cope
with. In General Pelissier, the French have at last a leader again
who is determined and enterprising, and who will once more
raise the spirit of the French army, which has sunk through
Canrobert's mildness. The English troops are again 30,000
men under arms, and their spirit is excellent.
‘In proportion as the condition of the army is satisfactory,
the aspect of diplomatic affairs is bad. Austria will probably
establish her own shame in the face of all Europe. The new
French Ministry is as incapable as was to be expected from . . .
Walewski, and the position of the Emperor is extremely
unpleasant. Here, everybody appears desirous to contribute
his share towards making all government impossible. Lord
Derby and the Protectionists wanted to make cause com/mwne
with Layard and Associates, for the purpose of overthrowing
Palmerston's Ministry. Beaten in the Upper House, owing to
the clumsiness of Lord Ellenborough, who was to lead the
assault there, Disraeli is now renewing the attack in the
Lower House. There, Gladstone and the Peelites are taking
up the cry for peace, declaring themselves against all further
continuation of the war, and putting on Aberdeen and his
ex-colleagues all the blame for the former bad and feeble
management of the war, for which the public has so long been
seeking a scapegoat.
“Disraeli, who had been chiefly endeavouring to injure Lord
172 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE.COBURG-GOTIIA
John, and had attacked his pacific policy in Vienna, and the
uncertain spirit of Palmerston's Cabinet, is now enabled, with
the support of the whole liberal and patriotic party, to set
everybody against the Peelites. Palmerston gets a great
majority, but is now compelled to resort to extreme measures
of war, and is freed from all control, which might force him
to be moderate in his foreign policy. All this while, the
Russian party in Europe have been enabled to use the
utterances of the most eminent English statesmen for their
own purposes, and to represent the war as a mere
battle of wild passions against Russia. But everybody has
been outstripped by Lord Grey, who, revelling in the delight
of contradicting the whole House of Lords, and perhaps the
whole world, has made a motion, in which he goes so far as
to approve even of Mentschikoff's mission and the invasion of
the Principalities. The Vienna Conferences, which it would
have been better to leave open, must now be closed, were it
only for the sake of obtaining peace for the Ministry in
Parliament. * -
“Oh Oxenstirn, Oxenstirn l'
The conferences in Vienna had closed, in fact, on the 26th
of April. At the last moment, after Lord Russell had departed
on the 23rd, Gortschakoff almost tauntingly made the motion
that the Black Sea should be entirely closed to all the Powers,
and that the Sultan alone should have the authority to open
the Straits to every fleet, whenever weighty circumstances
made it appear necessary to him. In Austria, this was looked
upon as concealing some sinister design against her particular
interests, so Count Buol rejected the proposal, to which Gort-
schakoff had attached a declaration, saying that he was
about to leave the Conference, as all his motions had been
rejected. -
Prussia's behaviour now appeared justified, for the moment,
by the unfavourable issue of the Vienna Conferences, but she
had neither got over the mortification she had suffered by
being excluded from them, nor was she inclined to take ad-
vantage of a situation which was so much more favourable to
LETTERS FROM THE KING OF PRUSSIA 73
her views, in order, by an energetic attitude, to restore her lost
influence. The circumstance that the Conferences ended with-
out any result, produced in Germany nothing but a fresh re-
vival of Russian sympathies, and all those who for some time
had had to impose considerable restraint upon themselves, now
began again to side openly with Russia.
The Prussian Court, however, even during the crisis of the
Vienna April Conferences, had not for one moment got beyond
the phase of hesitation and leaning towards both parties. I
intended going to Paris and London, in the beginning of May,
in order to gain some information about the situation, which
was in a state of confusion all round, and to see whether it
would not be possible again, like the year before, to bring
about a better understanding between the leading monarchs.
I communicated my determination to the King and the Prince
of Prussia, and, by reviving the correspondence between
Frederick William IV and my brother, succeeded in softening
the somewhat strained relations between these two men.”
‘How kind and good you were, the King answered on the
28th of April, 1855, on the announcement of my journey, “to
send Treskow to me with so welcome a letter. If my physical
condition, which has been somewhat compromised by a very
effective use of the Kreuzbrunnen, and by a great deal of
drilling, permits it, I shall accept your kind offer with a
thousand thanks, and write the dear precious Queen a little
letter. May God conduct you safely over sea and land, dearest
Duke -
“I beg Your Highness to make no secret, on the other side
of the Channel, of the fact that the English Ministry has in-
sulted me personally, seeing that, in return for the certainty,
worth a hundred millions, of having Prussia, for and not
against it, it would not even do me the small favour of inviting
Prussia to the Peace Congress. But I would have overlooked
that, if it were not that a slight had thus been put upon
Prussia's crown and honour. And such a slight I neither may
nor will, neither can nor shall put up with.'
* Martin, “Life of the Prince Consort, III, chapters 63 and 64, may to some
extent be supplemented by what follows. -
174 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
The answer of the Prince of Prussia was also clear and
decided, and his representation of the state of affairs in Berlin,
as will always be perceived, deserves to be cited as a pattern
of truthful and honest political criticism.
‘BERLIN, the 28th of April, 1855.
“I give you my best thanks for your letter, received to-day
through Treskow. Much as I envy you your journey to
London, I understand very well why you are not this time
travelling through Berlin. -
“The prospects of peace, which you gather from some letter
from Buol, do not agree with to-day's news here, which repre-
sents the Conference of the day before yesterday as having
ended without any result. Count Buol, in his letter to you,
probably hoped more from that conference. Whether Austria,
in face of the breaking up of the Conferences, is already firmly
resolved to take active measures, is not to be ascertained as yet.
‘You say Russia should now win . . . . by means of small
concessions. In what these concessions are to consist, I am at
a loss to see, since the chief demand, the reduction of the fleet,
can hardly be reckoned to the small ones, the less so, as nothing
has happened, up till now, which forces Russia to bring such a
sacrifice.
“But I must still regard this demand as unfair, before a
decisive victory, as I have often written to you and your
brother. On the other hand, the Russian counter-proposals
are so elastic, that they, too, cannot be agreed to. But, if
there had been some bomne volomté, the parties would surely
have met half-way, for it is an old principle that all proposals
are made in such a way as to leave something to be conceded
by negotiations. -
‘What I look to most, is that the peace which is to be
concluded, should give Russia a political lesson, which will
restrain her, for the present, from repeating the same thing
over again. This I find attained in the three accepted points.
The fourth (third), as the chief point, could have been attained,
in my opinion, by the allies securing strong positions in the
Black Sea. These nose-pincers for Russia would have been a
THE DUKE IN PARIS AAWD LO.WDOW I75
great annoyance to her, when the straits were opened, and the
costs to the allies do not come into account, in face of the
result to be attained. Will not the costs, even if only occur-
ring once (though they may possibly continue still for years to
come), be immense, if the war is continued, in order, by the
war, to obtain nothing more than what is fair Ž
‘However, you know well enough, that I do not desire a
peace that will ultimately cause Russia's wrong to triwmph.
I therefore keep to my opinion, that we others must not lose
sight of this, that Russia should never, even indirectly, be
enabled to gain the victory in this contest, because then the
tables would be turned, and Russia would dictate peace to us!
This will happen, however, if the allies are not relieved by a
diversion on the part of Austria in Bessarabia. But Austria
will not be able to make this diversion, unless Prussia secures
her left flank against Paskievitsch. Neither of the German
Great Powers, however, will resolve on taking active measures,
if the Western Powers make such exorbitant demands as the
reduction of the fleet. Thus one thing paralyses the other,
and I see no end to it.
‘The fortnight's bombarding will lead to nothing before
Sebastopol. At 8wch distances, no practicable breaches are
fired. The terror of the bombardment is mil, if there are no
inhabitants. The munition must be exhausted again, as it
was on the 17th of October, consequently things are no
farther than they were then. This is a sad supposition
‘Who knows what will happen in the four weeks of your
absence.
- ‘Your faithful friend,
‘WILLIAM.'
I had fixed the 4th of May for my departure for Paris and
London. But, as the King was attacked by a fever, which
prevented him from working for some length of time, I only
received the letter he had promised me for the Queen of
England, subsequently in London, through the Prussian
Ambassador Count Bernstorff. The King added the following
176 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
postscript to the few lines which accompanied his letter to
Queen Victoria. - -
‘My letter to Her Majesty is very confidential. I shall
feel greatly obliged to Your Highness, if you will do your best.
to prevent its getting abroad, that is, neither to Downing
Street, nor to the “Tile-Kilns,” on the strand of the Sequana,
où l’om me vewt infimiment de mal.—0m me comprend pas que
le ridicule échafawdage qu'om momme le royawme de Prusse
(Madame la Marquise de Créqui) pewt avoir wm. senfiment d’
hommewr et de dignité et faire paraſitºre wºme volont 2 .
When I presented myself at the Tuileries to the Emperor
and the Empress, on the 5th of May, I met with a reception
friendly beyond all expectation, and I had the feeling that I
should not lack some influence here, wherewith to further
the establishment of a permanent peace and more intimate
relations between Germany and the Western Powers. The
Emperor and the Empress were still quite full of their visit
to England. The unity and friendship of the allies were not
only completely re-established, but had reached their summit.
The Emperor asked me, with reference to his newly
strengthened relations to England, and not without an allu-
sion to the triumphs he had enjoyed there, whether Germany
was still as ill-advised as heretofore, and what was thought of
the continuation of the war, which, owing to the duplicity of
the German Powers, would never come to an end ?
I answered, that, as to the majority of the nation, the fear
of the Russian Colossus had by no means diminished, but
that, owing to the clumsiness of the English Press, which took
no account whatever of the difficult and sad circumstances
of dismembered Germany, but chiefly continued to belabour
her, the Western Powers had lost many sympathies. That,
with many governments, the predilection for Russia had only
grown stronger, and that the nation was averse to taking
part in the war. In spite of all my personal feeling to the
contrary, I observed, I could not shut my eyes to the fact
that the moment for warlike action appeared to be past.
The Emperor then turned to the subject of Austria, and
asked me, a little ironically, whether I was still of opinion that
IIIS CONVERSATION WITH NAPOLEON 177
she was prompted by sincere and honest intentions. I answered
decidedly in the affirmative, and adduced all the reasons,
with which I had become only too familiar, as to why
she could not make up her mind to take offensive measures.
He admitted every single point, and, summing up all my
objections, added, with a sharp accent: Emfin wºn mamque
(le cowrage.
The most surprising fact was, that the Emperor spoke of
Prussia, quite in contrast to his judgment of Austria, in a
tone of the greatest kindness. He was even now still, he
added, dams les meille wrs termes with the King, although he
was convinced that he would never be induced to take active
measures. However, the King of Prussia was only uncertain
in his resolutions, but he never made promises.
Napoleon had in his heart already completely broken with
the Austrian alliance, and it was now manifestly merely a .
question with him of bringing the Russian war to a close
honourable to the Western Powers. Nevertheless, he thought
he ought to discuss theoretically, as it were, the chances of a
great conflict with Russia. If the Russian Colossus was to
be rendered harmless to Europe, he saw no other possibility of
doing so than by restoring Poland. But, as the States adjoining
Russia resisted such a project, all measures which aimed at
humiliating Russia, appeared to him to be of ephemeral im-
portance. For that reason, he said, Wedell's mission, well-
meant as it had been in itself, had proved entirely fruitless.
The King of Prussia had latterly shown the kind desire to
approach France, but an alliance which had no definite
purpose, would never signify anything in politics.
We then discussed the intrigues of the Russian party in
Germany, and the very clever way in which the Russians had
protracted and ended the conferences. The Emperor appeared
to be still quite in the dark as to the means by which peace
was to be obtained, and he characterised the situation before
Sebastopol as one that would not be tenable for any length
of time. Unless the fall of the fortress could be effected at
an early date, the siege would have to be given up.
The Emperor was as dissatisfied as possible with the state
VOL. III. M
178 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
of political affairs, and his projects and plans were already
roving about in quite other directions than in Eastern affairs.
He spoke much of the merits of Sardinia, and enquired eagerly
after the Augustenburgers. He had lately made the acquaint-
ance of the Prince of Noer, with whom he was extremely
pleased, and of whom he declared, that he had materially
increased his interest in the rights of succession of the
Augustenburgers.
I promised the Emperor to come to Paris again towards
the autumn, after the opening of the International Exhibition,
which was to take place shortly. I was in hopes, too, of
seeing one of my operas performed there, in the course of the
SeaSOI).
I now first hastened to London, where I just arrived, as
preparations were being made for the solemn distribution of
the Crimean medals, which the Queen intended, for the first
time, to deliver with her own hands to the brave soldiers: a
touching and imposing ceremony, such as I have rarely seen
the like. The enormous misery of the Crimean War was in
those days, as it were, exposed to everybody's view, owing to
the constant arrival of the wounded, the sick, and the con-
valescent. In Buckingham Palace, the invalids had been given
a lunch, which almost entirely engrossed my brother, in heart
still more than in mind, and at which all the heads of the
army and of the public offices had appeared, to fête the heroes
of the Crimean War.
In those stirring days, there was hardly any room left for
the political business of the future. The uncertainty of the
situation, and the complete helplessness with regard to the
conclusion of peace, embittered all social pleasures. The
violent conflict of parties in Parliament, the beginning decay
of Palmerston's Cabinet, which was but a few weeks old, and
the loud cry raised by the apostles of peace at the cruel and
useless bloodshed, all this found its echo in the Royal Palace,
where the fact could scarcely be concealed, that its inhabitants
at bottom shared the same feeling, and were yet unable to
advise, or do anything in the matter.
At the English Court, it was Prussia and her King on
HIS LETTER TO THE KING OF PRUSS/A I 79
whom the principal blame for the horrible situation was cast,
whereas the feeling towards Austria appeared, quite in con-
trast to Paris, rather more mild and indulgent.
I delivered to the Queen the letter of Frederick William
IV, the rather unofficial contents of which appeared to cause
some uncertainty. A difficulty, which had already frequently
occurred in the correspondence with the King, arose, as to
whether, according to constitutional notions, the Ministry
ought to be informed of the contents of the letter, or not.
However, as the King had so expressly deprecated this, in the
letter he addressed to me, and as no further mention was ever
made of the letter, I must assume that the matter was never
officially settled. What I was commissioned to communicate
to the King myself, I still possess, in the draft of the letter
which I addressed to His Majesty, and for which, therefore, an
interest may be claimed, far exceeding any that may attach to
my own personal opinion.
‘..May 21, 1855.
‘MOST GRACIOUS KING !—Returned yesterday from my
journey, I hasten at once to inform Your Majesty of the exe-
cution of the commission graciously entrusted to me. I
delivered Your Majesty's letter, which came to me through
Count Bernstorff, to the Queen, who will shortly answer Your
Majesty herself.
‘The assurances of your unaltered sentiments of friendship,
which you authorised me to make, find a lively echo in the
hearts of the Queen and the Prince. Nor can I let this
occasion pass, without mentioning that, in opposition to a
passage in Your Majesty's letter, the Emperor Napoleon also
gave me to understand that he was dams les meilleurs termes
with Your Majesty.
‘On the political situation I write nothing. Your Majesty
will be fully informed on that subject by Count Bernstorff,
and by Herr von Usedom, who is still well-received in
England. Your Majesty's most gracious letter, however,
obliges me to touch upon one point. I did not hesitate,
according to your desire, to point out that the omission to
18o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTIIA
invite Your.Majesty to the Vienna, Conferences had necessarily
offended you.
‘The reply was, that such had by no means been the in-
tention of the allied Governments. It was only regretted, that
Your Majesty's Government had not made decided and posi-
tive proposals, which would have given the West the guarantee
that Prussia, in her view of the situation, was on the same
line with the allied Powers. -
‘The prospect of peace has all but entirely vanished, owing
to the fruitless dispute about limitation and counterpoise in
the Black Sea. The war will be continued, but I have taken
the glad hope away with me, that it will for the present be
attended with no danger to our German fatherland. Its issue
lies in the Black Sea. If it should be decided, and still no
peace be established, the war would, of course, assume a more
violent character and greater dimensions. g
“I should always be inclined to regard it as a fortunate
circumstance, if at least North Germany were to approach the
West under the shield of Your Majesty. It would be fortu-
nate, too, for the time after the war, when it will after all be
of the utmost consequence, if, in the inevitable event of fresh
European differences, Prussia can lean her back against the
island kingdom, with which she has been allied of old, both by
race and by sympathy.
‘May Your Majesty rest assured, that, howsoever the im-
mediate and the more distant future may shape itself, you
will always find in me a Sovereign who knows how to appre-
ciate Prussia's importance to Germany. It is with sincere
grief that I, as well as the, English Royal Family, have learned
that Your Majesty has lately been suffering in health.
Heaven be praised that you are now restored again. With
the best wishes for your welfare, I remain Your Majesty's, etc.
‘ERNEST.
‘P.S.—The contents of Your Majesty's letter to the Queen
have, in accordance with your desire, been treated as strictly
confidential.'
If I had succeeded, during my stay in London, in exercising
T'/IE DUKE'S INFLUENCE IN LONDON I8 I
a not altogether disadvantageous influence on the relations of
the Court to the King of Prussia, I had also gained the con-
viction, through my conferences with the English Ministers,
that there was for the present no means of successfully
contending with the deep feeling of bitterness which prevailed
there against everything that was German, and above all
Prussian. If Napoleon had, at that time, been inclined to turn
the war-like action of the Western Powers against Germany
and Prussia, he would not have met with much resistance in
England. -
The Ministers assured me, that the only reason why they
did not like to attack Prussia, was because they were not
possessed of the means to do so, and because they did not
wish to carry on the war with Russia in Germany. They
feared too, by complicating affairs, to excite ‘the greed of
their own allies.” As to non-Prussian Germany, there pre-
vailed in England at that time a contempt, shared by all
classes, such as I had not even met with during the period of
the last revolution. . .
Still, I found, on the other side, in single English statesmen,
and particularly in Lord Clarendon, a fertile soil to work for
our national interests. I drew a faithful picture of the
situation of our individual Governments; of the reaction,
which was increasing with the increasing power of Russia;
the certain ruin of all constitutional life; the ever growing
alienation from all those views which were prized in England;
and lastly of the danger which England would incur, if
Germany, driven by her own Governments, were urged more
and more towards the East. I attempted to explain the
oppressed spirit of the German nation, as represented in its
liberal and intelligent classes, in order to accentuate the
necessity of England's re-awakening the national interest, and
affording the liberal views a means of support.
I really succeeded, at the time, in obtaining from the
English Ministry the promise of their energetic support of
the cause I represented, and I was enabled to open up certain
negotiations, to which I intend to advert again, later on, in
another connection.
182 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
I will merely observe here, that, both with the English
Government, and in Paris, the consciousness prevailed, that
the diplomatic means of obtaining peace had been entirely
exhausted. Nobody thought it possible to give way in the
question of the Black Sea, nor had anybody a notion, how it
would be possible once more to set the interrupted Vienna
Conferences going. -
The busy diplomacy of all the States concerned lapsed
more and more into silence. Only Austria did not grow weary,
but came forward once more, on the 4th of June, with a feeble
proposal to leave the limitation of the Russian fleet in the
Black Sea to be settled by a free agreement between the Turks
and the Russians. But the Western Powers rejected the idea,
as one little worthy of them, and Austria seized this oppor-
tunity to lay down her arms, recall her forces from Galicia,
and thus enable the Russians to send strong divisions of troops
from Poland to the Crimea.
Everybody in Europe now knew that the time for
negotiating was over. Only the iron mouths of the cannons
before Sebastopol still discussed the question, as to how the
war was to be concluded, and the last fearful act of the drama
took its course. - -
Of the exhaustion of the forces which were squandered in
this war, the public had but a slight notion. A calculation of
the losses, which reached me from official sources in Paris,
says as follows: Jusqu'aw Juillet on a expedié pour l'Orient
deway-cent-wn mille et 500 homºmes.
Tues jusqu'au 1 Juillet tremte-sept mille; remºvoyés, blessés
ow malades soia ante-quatorze mille; mais ce qui est affrewa.
c'est que swr ce dermier mombre tremte-quatre mille 80mt morts.
If, on the other hand, the figure represented as official in
the newspapers, spoke of 14,000 killed in the Crimean war, it
is easy to conceive how my correspondent could say: Le chiffre
officiel des morts em. Crimée provoque wiv Sowrive amer aw
Departement de la guerre.
But far more dreadful were the ravages which the war
made in Russia, and amongst her naturally scanty population.
I received in May a touching and very authentic picture of
WILLIAM OF BADEN ON THE CONDITION OF RUSSIA 183
the state of the Holy Empire of the Czar, from my brother-in-
law William of Baden. His accounts, both of the political and
the military situation, were so detailed, that I noted them
down word for word, and, considering the ignorance which
then prevailed in the West of Europe on everything concern-
ing Russia, their very completeness will render them a note-
worthy source of history.
I also brought them to my brother's notice, and wrote on
the 31st of May, 1855:
‘My brother-in-law William is staying here since yesterday,
and has given us the following interesting accounts, which I
will not withhold from you. William had taken the usual
overland route from the Prussian frontier to St Petersburg,
and, after staying there for some length of time, returned by
rail to Moscow, and from there by carriage home via Warsaw.
I only mention his route, in order to show you that he passed
Just through all those districts of the Russian Empire, in
which their immense forces are mustered.
‘The Imperial family, he says, were on the whole very
pleasant. Politics, and the events of the war, were not talked
of much in the Imperial circle itself. When this did happen,
it was merely by way of a casual remark on the fidelity of
Prussia and the infidelity of Austria. The other German
States were alluded to with the greatest contempt: “They
had no national feeling,” it was said. This is the more
characteristic, as our German Sovereigns had expected praise
from Russia for the attitude they had assumed.
‘The Court, however, and the higher military and State
officials, expressed themselves in a louder key. An invincible
hatred, and thirst for revenge, against England, was met with
everywhere; but, on the other hand, the manifest intention to
take the part of France and her Emperor. The French troops
were praised beyond all measure, and regret expressed, un-
reservedly, that the Russians were not able to unite with them
and attack Europe.
‘Although no positive enthusiasm for the war pervades all
Russia, yet the national feeling is excited to the highest pitch.
The forces of the nation, however, are likewise strained to the
184 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
very utmost. St Petersburg is said to have suffered little, as
yet, through the blockade. In fact, the blockade itself is said
to have been of little use, and to have merely contributed
towards alienating the sympathies of the Fins from the allies.
‘As to the military operations and the forces mustered, my
brother-in-law, in the first place, confirmed what we already
knew here in Germany, from the secret reports sent to Berlin.
The whole disposable force is distributed along the frontier.
In the interior, as well as in St Petersburg and Moscow, only
reserves remain, which are formed, partly of children, partly
of old men, each company having but one officer, often none
at all, but the equipment and baggage being excellent.
‘The corps of the Guards and Grenadiers, however, which
stands in New and Old Poland, has, according to the lists
which my brother-in-law himself has seen, already lost a
third of its men through typhus and cholera, since it marched
out, a fate which also the Austrian troops are meeting with in
Galicia. It is said, that the famine has reached its highest
pitch, and that people are frequently found starving to death
in the streets. -
‘Besides, all disposable provisions have been brought from
Poland into the interior. It appears to be the intention of the
Russian Government, to thoroughly weaken Poland, for fear
that, should she be attacked by the allied Powers, it would be
impossible to hold her. A fourfold conscription has already
taken all the youths and men, who are capable of bearing
arms, out of the country, and every weapon, down to the little
hatchets and carvers of the wood-cutter, have been carried
away. Many trades can, in consequence, scarcely be carried
on any more. The state of things is said to be fearful.
Notwithstanding, the Warsaw ladies still have the courage to
wear mourning for their fatherland, in spite of Russian
dominion.
‘William constantly found the fact confirmed, that Russia
had not sent sufficient troops to the Crimea; indeed, that it
was even supposed that the allies were numerically the stronger.
The operations of the Russian army, it was said, had hitherto
been so unfortunate, because the Russian commanders had
THE STORMING OF SEBAST'OPOJ, 185
not been allowed, nor perhaps had they wished, to take
sufficient responsibility on themselves. The chief manage-
ment had always proceeded from St Petersburg. The forti-
fications of Warsaw and Modlin had now been completed,
down to the smallest detail, and would probably only yield
to an enormous army. This is also one of the reasons why
Austria hesitated so much to take the offensive.
‘William's views of Cronstadt, which he inspected em.
detail, quite accord with our own, that it is impossible to
destroy and take it from the water side, but all the easier to
blockade it. The Russian army, as it is now mustered, may
altogether amount to 870,000 men, of course including the
troops in the Caucasus and in Asia. There are alone 83
regular regiments of cossacks assigned to the army. The
lack of officers is throughout extremely perceptible. The
chief management is in the hands of old people, and men who
are unfit for a long campaign.
‘Although the Emperor has the best will to continue to
act with the wonted energy of his father, still, it can already
be felt, it is said, how soon this force is likely to be crippled
by the opposition which is beginning to germinate on all
sides, at Court and in its immediate surroundings of course
more than anywhere else. The death of the Emperor Nicholas
has deprived the Colossus of his head. But the rest of the
body is still dangerous enough.”
Only a fortnight afterwards, the latter unintentional
prophecy was to find an infinitely sad verification at the seat
of war in the Crimea. Since the middle of May, the French
had been extending their trenches closer and closer to the
Russian fortifications. On the 7th of June, they stormed the
so-called Green Mamelon, and, on the anniversary of the battle
of Waterloo, the 18th of June, the Generals intended to
execute the chief assault. But the day was to remain a day
of misfortune for the French, nor had even the English any
reason to look upon it as a day of honour. For, in spite of
their most tremendous efforts, the attempt failed, with a loss of
5000 French and 1570 English. What the excellent Prince
of Prussia, with an unfailing military eye, had already seen
I86 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
some time before, from Berlin: “At such great distances, no
practicable breaches can be fired, proved only too correct, on
the day of the battle.
In London, the news of the intended storming of Sebastopol
had been received on the evening of the previous day, the
17th. The anxiety, during the next few hours, was therefore
just as boundless, as the disappointment and the dejection
which followed, on the reception of the fatal news.
‘You can imagine our and all London's state of mind, my
brother wrote on the 24th. ‘In Paris there has not been a
scrap of news since the 18th.’
People were already prepared for the very worst, when a
fresh blow came, through the death of old Lord Raglan, who
succumbed to the cholera on the 28th of June. In the pressure
of the moment, no one could be suggested to fill his place but
Lord Simpson, who was scarcely known, and could therefore
awaken but little confidence. The effect of these terrible days
of the war was long felt by the political portion of the English
public. -
Nothing but the fearful battle on the Tchernaja, on the
16th of August, was capable of giving fresh courage to the
Western public, who had become accustomed to look on at the
gladiatorial contest in the Crimea, like at a game in the circus.
People were still busy reading the endless details of this
bloody battle, which procured the victor scarcely the slightest
advantage, when the allied armies were again preparing for
a fresh storm on Sebastopol.
Since the 5th of September, the allies had kept up the fire
out of eight hundred cannon of the heaviest calibre, uninter-
ruptedly throughout four days and nights, and it was said
that the bombardment alone cost the lives of 5000 Russians.
The cannons had been run up so close to the walls, that
nothing could resist them any more, and the Russian batteries
were buried under the ruins of their own bastions. All the
art, energy, and cunning, of Todleben, whose fortifications had
defied the allies throughout a whole year, appeared to be at an
end.
The Emperor Napoleon had already been informed,
TILEFT OF RUSSIAM DESPATCHES IN BERLIN 187
towards the end of August, of the bad position of the defenders
of Sebastopol. He was therefore able to write to Pelissier,
that the Russian army would not remain master of the Crimea
for another winter. When this letter was published in the
Momitewr, on the 27th of August, it became a matter for sur-
prise that the Emperor should have been able to refer in it to
news which he declared to be positive.
Such news had, in fact, come to him via Berlin, where, at
that time, the stealing of despatches was of such ordinary occur-
rence, that the French ambassador appears to have obtained easy
possession of the reports of the Prussian military attaché in
St Petersburg. As the latter, Count Munster, had been a
great favourite at the Court of the Czar, his immediate reports
to General von Gerlach were extremely well-informed and
authentic. It is probable that the situation of the Russian
army in Sebastopol may have become known to the Emperor
Napoleon by this means, and he had every reason, therefore, to
urge the acceleration of the siege-works.” The bombardment
begun on the 5th of September, was thus in a certain measure
traceable to an express order of the Emperor. But, in any
case, also the regular siege-works had just about this time
made such progress, that the storming of the Malakoff and the
Redan could be contemplated with a greater prospect of
success, than on the 18th of June.
To describe here in detail the fearful catastrophe of the
3th of September, is far from my purpose. I know of nothing
special to add from my recollections, which the already
published letters of my brother have not rendered the
common property of all historical writers on the subject.
But, to say nothing of the general impression created by the
event, would be impossible to anybody who experienced the
effect of the redeeming news, and has treasured it in his
memory.
* Geffcken also knows of the thefts of the Berlin despatches (loc. cit. 192). But
what was told me, at the time, is not what is asserted by Geffcken, that the informa-
tion in question concerned some particular remark of the Emperor Alexander. Be-
sides, such a remark would have had but slight weight with those judging of the
position of Sebastopol. Count Beust informed me from Berlin, that a servant of M.
von L– had been able to procure the particular plans indicating the positions and
operations of the Russians from General Gerlach's writing-table. As is well-known,
the whole affair was afterwards suppressed. w
I 88 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-CO BURG-GO THA
The frequent previous disappointments, with regard to the
real or supposed fall of the fortress, had given birth to con-
siderable scepticism. In addition to this, the reports were of
a very contradictory nature. The fall of Sebastopol was
talked of, and soon after it proved only to be the Malakoff
which was in the hands of the allies.
That this powerful fort actually represented the key of
Sebastopol, only became known, after it had been taken, and
after events had proved those to have been right, who,
months ago, had found fault with the allies for not con-
centrating all their forces against the Malakoff.
Still more exciting were the tidings regarding the fate of
the English on the 8th of September. The Redan had been
taken and lost again, thus ran the unwelcome news, with
which the first impressions of this great event concluded.
The laconic communication of General Simpson, that the
storming of the Redan had not succeeded, called forth many
an unflattering comment on the operations of the English
army, which, it was said, had utterly lacked a firm hand to
lead it.
It was only after many days, that men were in a position
to understand the full consequence of the conquest of the
Malakoff, and to pronounce, without fear of a fresh dis-
appointment, in England and France, the great words:
‘Sebastopol ours, and the Russian fleet destroyed.’
As to what was now to be done, on that point there
existed no clear idea in English Government circles. This is
evident from the correspondence of my brother, already
published in Martin's work. Although, but a short time
before, the liveliest intercourse had been going on between
the French and English Sovereigns, all and everything in
this horrible war, to the bitter end, was to be left to chance
and uncertainty. In England, great and daring projects of
conquering the whole of the Crimea were at once taken in
hand, and hopes of a fanciful kind entertained with regard
to the possibility of cutting off the retreat of the Russian
army, and capturing it on the peninsula like in a mouse-trap.
But, that General Gortschakoff had all the more surely borne
T'/IE END OA' THE JJ’A Hº 189
this danger in mind, the less the Russians had deceived
themselves as to the tenableness of Sebastopol, and the more
they were determined to preserve to the Russian Empire that
most important conquest of Catherine II, this consideration,
it appears, hardly commended itself to the English statesmen.
The French, on the other hand, had considered their war
as good as ended, and what happened further, was like a
slow subsiding of the rage of the fearful conflict, without any
intention of making conquests, or maintaining them. Pelissier
had two movements executed against Gortschakoff's fortified
position, the centre of which was in Simpheropol, one from
Sebastopol through the Baidar valley, the other from Eupa-
toria. But both columns met with far superior Russian forces,
and found the ground unfavourable, and the position of the
Russian army much too strong to attack them.
The war was now only continued in Caucasia, until, on
the 27th of November, the Turks had to deliver up to the
Russians the fortress of Kars, which was besieged by Mura-
view. Curiously enough, people were of opinion, that the
Emperor of Russia would now be more easily prevailed upon
to conclude peace, because the conquest of Kars could be set
as an equivalent against the fall of Sebastopol, and hence the
honour of the combatants would be satisfied on all sides.
In point of fact, however, the negotiations for peace, and
the mediations and conferences, had been continued all along,
as in the time of the thirty years war, almost regardless of
the events of the war. The diplomatists sat, as they once
did in Osnabruck and Munster, with enviable calm round
their ever green table, whilst, in the field, many a life was
falling a victim to the consequences of the war, and, in Europe,
the conviction was growing, that this severe war had been
uselessly carried on, for the sake of home questions and the
foreign prestige of the Western powers.
CHAPTER W
THE FIRST PARIS EXIIIBITION.—THE QUEEN AND PRINCE Al,BERT IN
PARIs.—THE DUKE's OPERA SANTA CHIARA PERFORMED AT THE
GRAND OPERA.—CONVERSATIONS WITH NAPOLEON.—HIS SUFFER-
INGS AND PHYSICAL DECA.Y. —BITTERNESS AGAINST AUSTRIA.—THE
DUKE AND THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR.—THE DUKE’s LETTER. To
Count BUOD.—COUNT BUOL's ANSWER.—AUSTRIA SUBMITS AN
ULTIMATUM IN ST PETERSBURG.—THE KING OF PRUSSIA’s UN WILL-
ING NESS TO MEDIATE.—HE SUPPORTS AUSTRIA’s ULTIMATUM.—
PARIS CHOSEN AS THE SEAT OF THE FUTURE CONFERENCES.
ENGLAND ATTEMPTS TO EXCLUIDE PRUSSIA. —LETTER FROM THE
DUKE TO PRINCE ALBERT.--THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON's SATISFAC-
TION AT THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE.---IIIS LETTER TO THE DUIKE.
—RUSSIAN INTRIGUES. —BIRTII OF THIE PRINCE IMPERIAL. —THE
DUKE ON THE SITUATION.
WHILST, in the Black Sea and the Baltic, the war was still
raging in its most terrible shape, the first French Inter-
national Exhibition had been opened in Paris, on the 15th of
May, 1855. All nations assembled in the newly embellished
capital of the Empire, in order mutually to assure themselves,
how necessary and desirable peace was in our part of the
globe.
The culminating point of this epoch was an event which,
in more than one respect, was looked upon as a political one :
the sojourn of the Queen of England and the Prince Consort
at the Court of Louis Napoleon, who was exerting every
effort to fasten and deepen the recently gained friendship of
the English Royal Family.
Just this purpose was declared, on both sides, to have been
completely attained, and, although my brother wrote to Uncle
Leopold, that there had been little conversation about politics,
THE DUKE'S OPERA ‘SA NTA CIIIA JęAſ I 9 I
still, in face of the pending questions of war and peace, the
attention of the whole world was directed to this meeting of
the rulers of the Western Powers. *
However, a few weeks later, when I myself was in the
position to visit Paris and her International Exhibition, the
political horizon was already thoroughly changed, and the
fall of Sebastopol, which had in the meantime taken
place, afforded a welcome opportunity to discuss with Louis
Napoleon the questions which diplomacy was again exerting
every effort to solve. I may therefore say, that I arrived in
Paris at a politically much more important moment than my
brother. Hence, I had a better opportunity of studying
Napoleon's further plans.
But, before I speak of the course of the negotiations for
peace, and of my experiences and impressions in that respect,
I must first mention a purely personal matter, which was the
chief cause of my journey to Paris, and my long stay there.
Although this matter had nothing to do with great politics
and the welfare of States, it occupied, in all the greater
measure, my little ambition in matters of art, to which I had
for a long time devoted the one, and, I may add, the by far
happier, half of my existence and my time.
During my first stay at the Imperial Court in Paris, in the
previous year, I had endeavoured to take the preliminary
steps to get my opera ‘Samta Chiara ' accepted there. The
Emperor interested himself in person most kindly for the per-
formance of my work. But, before this could be attained,
there were extraordinary difficulties to overcome, ‘Je crois,'
Napoleon wrote to me, on the 25th of July, in one of his letters
from Biarritz: ‘que le public Parisiem sera charmé d'applaudir
l'opéra de votre altesse Royale et de la juger comme maestro
après l’avoir déjà jugé si favorablement comme Primce.
But the Imperial patronage could only aid in deciding Minister
Fould to receive the ‘Santa Chiara’ into the repertoire of the
Grand Opera. The performance itself depended upon a
number of circumstances, which would have grown to insuper-
* The English visit to Paris is minutely described by Martin, Life of the Prince
Consort III, 333-365. For Prince Albert's letter to King Leopold, cf. ibid. III, 367.
192 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
able obstacles, unless Meyerbeer had offered me a helping
hand. The old maestro had visited me in Paris, in March,
1854, and, since that time, had been treating for the per-
formance of the opera with me in the most friendly way.
I may therefore believe, as he often assured me, that he took
a real and professional interest in my musical productions.
In company with Meyerbeer, I paid visits to all the chief
performers, and found everywhere the most ready support.
The performance was fixed for the 24th of September. I had
been invited by the Emperor to be his guest in the Tuileries,
like a year ago, but I urgently requested to be allowed to live
with my friend Prince Chimay, who had been taking the
greatest trouble to ensure the success of my excursion into
the regions of Parisian art. -
I arrived in Paris just in time to conduct the rehearsals,
and was able to look forward to the first night, with my mind
fully at ease, as to the perfect nature of the performance.
Every effort the Grand Opera was capable of making, was
made with an enthusiasm quite peculiar to the French. Yet
I was only too well aware, upon what chances the success of
first performances, and especially of foreign productions in
Paris, depended, and I was doubly anxious as to the result,
seeing that I had to await the fate of my ‘Santa Chiara' at
the side of the Emperor and the Empress, whom I accompanied
into their box.
However, I was very soon able to recognise the feeling of
the public on that evening as friendly, and the performance
had a most brilliant success. The Opera was given more than
sixty nights running.
In spite of all my lively intercourse with singers and com-
posers, and of my busy occupation with the theatre, the
Emperor had afforded me frequent opportunities to speak with
him privately and at considerable length, and thus to gain a
deeper insight into the recesses of his heart. If I had ever
been in doubt, as to the difference that exists in the world,
between the official routine, if it may be so termed, of
exterior political work, and the real ideas and intentions of
the powers working in the background, I could have seen at
CON VERSATIONS WITH MAPOLEON I93
that moment, when the official cry of war and the diplomatic
skirmishing for peace were still the order of the day, that the
thoughts of the most powerful man in Europe hardly took
any share in those affairs, but were already moving in quite
other directions. - -
It was extremely interesting, just at this juncture, decisive
as it was for the future of Europe, to hear the Emperor
Napoleon discuss the situation in the confidential tone which
he both adopted and invited in his conversations with me.
The Emperor had taken advantage of the fine September days,
to give a few hunting-parties in Versailles and Fontainebleau,
as he knew that they would afford me great pleasure. He
himself was evidently ill, and if I had formerly attached less
importance to the accounts which repeatedly spoke of his bad
state of health, his appearance now, and the trait of suffering
in his countenance, could not fail to convince me that no very
long lease of life would be meted out to him. I saw plainly
that it was a question of the beginning of a serious evil. He
was frequently tormented by such pains, that he had to pause
in his speech. When he was sitting, he was sometimes unable
to rise without assistance. It was a very sad sight to see this
man, who knew himself just arrived at the summit of his
position, and secured in the possession of his power, in a state
of the plainest physical decay.
But this did not prevent him from expressing himself with
full interest, and with all the vivacity which it was given to
him to show, on the prospects of peace and war. Only, what
he said, was in every respect, and on every subject, different
from what was occupying the diplomacy of the period.
Napoleon's way of sketching political plans, in great outlines,
over the heads of his own Ministers, and without regard to the
momentary doings of the statesmen, was once forcibly de-
scribed by my brother, in one of his later letters, as ‘the good-
humoured indifference of this ruler towards all things that
were in a stage of development.’ -
How, in spite of the momentary difficulties, peace might
be obtained ; what means were to be adopted to put an end to
the war; and whether the war would ever end at all; all these
VOL. III. N
194 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
matters appeared to be of secondary interest, and not to
concern the Emperor, as it were, personally. But he had
firmly resolved in his heart on two things, and had become
quite hardened in this respect through the course of the war.
He was now more than ever intent on having the treaties of
1815 annulled, and saw in Austria, the chief obstacle to his
plans. -
I should hesitate to repeat, merely from my own memory,
certain remarks of the Emperor, which had a decided bearing
on the events of the next years, and to give the exact date,
too, when Napoleon first made them. But I fortunately
committed all my conversations with the Emperor to paper at .
the time, or at least summed them up in a concise form.
PARIs, September 25, 1855.
The results of the two detailed conversations which I had
with the Emperor yesterday and to-day, may be summed up
as follows. The Emperor, who, last May, was not quite
satisfied with his position, now considers his and England's
position very favourable. He sees, the desirability of peace,
but he thinks nothing obliges him to conclude a peace which
does not answer the interests of France. He said, such a
peace would be easy to make, if only Russia would show
some compliance. Still, the Emperor said, any peace that
was brought about now, would cause a certain degree of regret
in England and France. For, a peace concluded now, would
have nothing but the character of a great truce. *
Greater satisfaction could only be felt, not merely by the
two Powers of the West, who, after all, did not stand alone in
the Concert Evropéem, but by all the other States, if the
conclusion of peace were at the same time to bring about a
solution of those questions which had either been badly
settled at the conference of Vienna, or which had arisen since
then. -
Poland, Italy, etc., said the Emperor, belong to these open
questions.
The Emperor observed, that interest ought to be enlisted
for the idea of a great Peace Congress. He told me straight
BITTERN ESS AGAINST AUSTRIA I95
out, that I might speak of this with the King of Prussia, as
being an idea which he had communicated to me.
The Emperor thinks of a congress, at which all the great
and small sovereigns would have to appear in person. I
replied, that such a congress would certainly be quite in
accordance with my views, but that the congress could only
be the form, whereas the matter itself would have to be
prepared beforehand. The Emperor then expounded his
general political views, saying that it was an impossibility, in
our time, to carry on great wars, and make great political
arrangements, which were opposed to the interests of the
nations. The voice of the nations would always break
through again, and undo everything that had been done
contrary to their interests. He would remind me of the
liberation wars. &
Finally, the Emperor said, Austria had played her part so
badly, that nothing could be done with this State. Above all,
it was desirable to win Prussia, over to the cause of the West.
The Emperor then told me, that he had recently said to
Minister von der Heydt : ‘je throwve toujours que la Prusse est
wn pew trop maigre.’ He then went on to say, that Austria
had not even congratulated him on the taking of Sebastopol.
He added, with the bitterest irony, that it was after all a little
too bad to congratulate him, when Sebastopol had mot been
taken, and not to do so, now that it had really fallen.
On the last day of my stay, the Emperor informed me
that Austria had excused herself for omitting to congratulate
on the plea that she had first wished to hear how great the
losses had been. An excuse, the Emperor added, which was
almost worse than the omission itself.
PARIs, September 26, 1855.
The Emperor said to-day, that, in face of such great losses
as the Crimean war had caused, we ought to have either a
good peace or an everlasting war. Altogether, before con-
ditions could be spoken of, it must be ascertained whether
Russia was disposed to make peace. The honour of the com-
196 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
batants on both sides was saved. Of conferences like those
of Vienna, there could be no more question.
We thereupon spoke of the attitude of the two German
Powers. I remarked, that, in any case, only one of those two
Powers could undertake the mediation. The Emperor agreed,
and said he should always like Prussia best. ‘It is quite clear
that it is better to attach oneself to a woman who hates us, than
to one who has cheated us once before, and that is the case
with Austria.
He then explained, that he could not take the King of
Prussia's mode of acting amiss, for, after all, he had never
entered into an alliance with the Western Powers.
- From all he said, there resulted : 1. That the Emperor
would not like to conclude a peace, such as Russia would
probably accept.
2. That he hoped it would be possible to make up for the
alliance with Austria by an alliance with Prussia, and this, too,
at Austria's expense.
3. That he still adhered to his plan of reconstituting the
suppressed nationalities, but that he still thought it possible
to carry out this plan by means of peace and not of war.
From the foregoing records, the reader will have gained the
conviction, that the thoughts of the Emperor, after the fall of
Sebastopol, were moving on quite other lines than the official
exchange of notes, which European diplomacy had not only
commenced with a busy hand, but was carrying on with great
publicity, communicating the details to the chambers and the
journals with a rapidity hardly known until then. I had
reason to assume that, especially in Vienna, men were labour-
ing under great delusions, for, in spite of the deplorable per-
sonal position, of which the Austrian Ambassador in Paris had
only too clear a conception, they were yet far from believ-
ing in any danger that might be impending over Austria.
The time of suffering which Herr von Huebner had to go
through in Paris, was evident to everybody. The Austrian
statesmen in Vienna, on the other hand, were Scarcely in-
clined to admit the existence of a situation, in which their
indefatigable attempts at mediating peace almost assumed
T'/IE DUKE"S LETTER TO COULWT BUOI, I97
the appearance of diplomatic fancies. Whilst, at the time
of the Queen of England's visit, Herr von Huebner had been
playing a very difficult part at the Court of the Tuileries, he
still thought it advisable to declare, that Austria had not for
one moment altered her kindly sentiments towards the
Western Powers.
‘Monsieur de Huebner,’ a correspondent wrote to me in
August, ‘n’ a pas paru au bal; on se demandait s'il y avait rancune
de Sa part à la suite des soirées plus intimes de St Cloud, où il n’
avait plus été prič. D'autres disaient qu'il avait peut-être pris en
mauvaise part les sourires de la loge impériale au moment oil dans
les Demoiselles de St. Cyr un acteur se plaint du coeur noir de
l'Autriche.’ se
It was explainable, under these circumstances, that Herr
von Huebner urgently requested me to use my influence in
Vienna to induce the Government to act. On my showing
myself somewhat reserved, he expressed the desire, that I
should at least write and tell Buol how matters stood here, as
his own reports did not find sufficient credence. -
I fulfilled the wish of the Austrian diplomatist, who, both
before and afterwards,experienced much unmerited misfortune
in his difficult mission, directly after my return from Paris,
with far greater freedom and frankness than he may have ex-
pected. But I must leave it to the reader himself to form his
own opinion from the contents of my correspondence with
Count Buol, as to whether my well-meant endeavours bore
any fruit. -
‘ October 5, 1855.
‘I have not written to Your Excellency for a long time.
The observations, however, which I have taken during my stay
in Paris, inspire me with the wish to communicate with you
again.
‘It is evident that the fall of Sebastopol has not yet
definitely altered the views of the French Court with regard
to its position towards the two German Powers. But I have
not been able to shut my eyes to the fact that the policy of
France might, in consequence of that event, still be induced to
198 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
adopt another view. It appeared to me, as if Austria entered
less than formerly into the calculations of future action, and
as if it were believed, that Austria desired, once for all, to
maintain a separate position; as if, in fact, a cooling of the
good relations between Austria and France were preparing.
‘I have always been of opinion, that the present Emperor
of the French has given great guarantees of an attitude
favourable to us all, not merely in respect to order in general,
but, by the tendency of his foreign policy, in respect to
Germany in particular. Hence, I always thought it correct
to show him confidence, and to make use of the present
favourable state of affairs in France, in order to procure for
Germany a better position towards the East, than she has
been occupying for a long time in the South-east, and, since
1815, in the North-east.
‘As to what Austria could do, in a political respect, towards
this end, I will not pretend to have formed any positive
judgment. Only on one point I think I may express myself
more decidedly, after what I have observed during my stay
in Paris. If your most gracious Sovereign, so far as I can
see, still considers himself the ally of the West, it would be
very desirable to give the Emperor of the French some
outward sign of the fact. Owing to his position with the
French people, the Emperor necessarily sets great value on
such outward tokens. They have given to the English
alliance that high degree of intimacy which elevates it above
ordinary political alliances. º
“A good understanding with France would be of all the
greater value to Germany, as the fall of Sebastopol has rather
postponed peace than brought it nearer. It is known that
Russia's importance now only lies in her power of resistance
by virtue of her dimensions, in short, that her distances are
her protection, and no longer her troops. -
“But all these facts are not only well known in Paris and
London, but are even admitted by the Prussian Court.
‘Begging you to remember me very humbly to your most
gracious Sovereign, I remain your Excellency's, etc.
‘ERNEST.’
COUNT BUOL'S ANSWER I99
Count Buol's answer took a long time coming. The con-
viction had really been arrived at in Vienna, that something
decided ought to be done, but an understanding as to a basis
of peace which would be recognised by England and France
alike, was not very rapidly attained. The French and English
views were several times in direct opposition to one another,
and Count Buol had difficulty in finding the desired medium,
which was to enable him to put an ultimatum in St Petersburg.
As, during these negotiations, Austria's relations to France
appeared to have somewhat improved again for the moment,
Count Buol was at last able to answer my letter, on the 16th
of December, with a sort of proud consciousness:
‘Your Highness has been graciously pleased, after your
return from Paris, to give me some extremely valuable hints
with regard to the policy and the feeling of the French Court.
I have not failed to make use of them, and it affords
me particular satisfaction to mention the truly intimate
relations which just now exist between the two Imperial
cabinets. The good fruits will, I hope, shortly manifest
themselves in the treatment of Eastern affairs.
“In consequence of an exchange of ideas with Paris, and the
influence of the Emperor Napoleon on the English Cabinet,
Austria, France, and England, have just agreed on a basis of
peace, which, in my opinion, would completely solve the ques-
tion that gave rise to the war.
‘Our Ambassador is taking it to St Petersburg to-day, and
we have to await the reception which these proposals, energeti-
cally urged as they are by Us, will meet with there. As we
imposed the strictest secrecy on ourselves during the negotia-
tions, my consideration for the Russian Emperor imperatively
demands that I should not say a word of the text, until it has
been submitted to him. Meanwhile, I could not deny myself
the satisfaction of informing Your Highness of the fact, and
at the same time adding the comforting assurance that the
conditions are of such a kind, that Russia's ascendency would
be thoroughly broken, and Germany's interests duly con-
sidered.
2Oo MEMOIRS OF THE DUATE OF SA_XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
‘Whether Russia's pride will admit of their acceptance,
lies outside the sphere of my calculations. At any rate, there
appear to me to be very weighty grounds for earnestly con-
sidering the serious consequences of a direct refusal.
“If Russia should, this time again, refuse to accept the means
of settling the difference, our further steps would have to be
decided upon by mutual agreement. I have every reason to
hope that, also in this last phase, the good understanding
between the three Powers will continue. As to the part, on
the other hand, which Germany will play in that case, my
mind is less at ease, for reasons on which I need not enlarge,
because they are too well known to Your Highness. Should
I be in the position to add any interesting fact to these pre-
liminary remarks, I ask Your Highness's gracious permission
to do so. Until then, I remain, with the deepest respect, Your
Highness's most humble and devoted servant, w
“COUNT BUOL.
‘VIENNA, December 16, 1855.”
This letter the Austrian Minister supplemented a few days
afterwards:
‘MOST GRACIOUS DUKE –In pursuance of the communi-
cation which I recently took the liberty of addressing to Your
Highness, I now beg to submit to the enlightened judgment
of Your Highness the text of the preliminaries which we have
sent to St Petersburg. I likewise take the liberty to add a
copy of the accompanying instructions to Count Valentine
Esterhazy.
‘The conditions of this programme may perhaps appear
severe to Russia and her absolute adherents, but they find
their justification in the situation of affairs, and, that the
stricter guarantees which have been demanded since the
Vienna Conferences, are to the special advantage of German
Danubian interests, should redound to the credit of our step
in Germany. Unfortunately, an unfavourable feeling appears
to prevail in Berlin, and I reckon the less on the first impres-
sion in St Petersburg, as only a lasting general pressure can
A USTRIA SUBMIT'S AAW UL TIMAT'UM 2 O I
succeed in inducing Russia to yield. We know to-day, through
the telegraph, that Count Esterhazy arrived in St Petersburg
yesterday afternoon, but nothing as yet about his first doings.
‘Were it not for France's loyalty, however, there would
be no lack of tools in Germany, who would work towards
bringing about a direct understanding between France and
Russia, without taking too exact an account of the present
disadvantages and future dangers arising therefrom to
Germany. Let us hope that the more correct view may also be
the general one.
‘I remain, with the renewed expression of my deepest
respect,
‘Your Highness's most devoted and obedient servant,
“COUNT BUOL.
‘VIENNA, December 27, 1855.”
For the moment, Austria, by her measures against Russia,
as designated in the foregoing letters, had certainly managed
to place herself in a better position. Although it was not
believed in England, that the Russians would yield to the
Austrian ultimatum, and although the opinion was spread by
Prussia, that the ultimatum was a piece of paper in the
importance of which the Austrian Cabinet itself did not
believe, in France, on the other hand, the boldest hopes were
attached to Austria's intervention.
I wrote to the Emperor of the French at New Year, that
the communications of Count Buol had convinced me afresh,
that Austria had quite honest intentions, and I endeavoured,
in every way, to oppose the personally resentful feelings of
Napoleon against Austria. At the same time, I gave expres-
sion to my hope, that, if not a lasting alliance, at least an
understanding, with Austria might prove obtainable, as it had
proved with England, in order, at last to establish an alliance
of peace in the interests of civilisation.
With regard to the distinct grouping of the Powers
against Russia, however, the position of Prussia still remained
an open question. The bitter feeling in England against
Prussia was just as great as that of France against Austria.
202 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
Neither Prussia's mediation, nor her alliance, nor, indeed, her
participation in any negotiations or conferences, was desired.
The prevailing interest in the complete humiliation of
Russia, and the express desire to continue the war, gave rise
to a tendency on the part of the English, which made it appear
quite natural to them that the war against Russia should be
continued in the spring by the French on the Rhine. They
then hoped, with the assistance of Austria, to make I don't
know what conquests in Bessarabia, in the Crimea, and in the
Caucasus. -
My uncle, who derived his information chiefly from English
sources, prophesied, innumerable times, in his letters to me, the
Franco-Prussian war as a necessary continuation of the un-
happy conflict, and it was difficult to make English politicians
understand, that Napoleon thought of nothing less than
weakening Prussia, and that nothing was farther from his
mind than waging war against Germany, whose friendship
was at that period his most ardent, and, it may be said, his
enthusiastic, desire.
In fact, the personal feeling of the Emperor of the French
in some measure really came to the help of the Prussian
Ministry in its disagreeable position. For, since the fall of
Sebastopol, the King had almost entirely withdrawn from
international politics. Towards the end of September, directly
after my stay in Paris, I had gone to Coblentz, to meet the
King and the Prince of Prussia. I found the King in a very
excited frame of mind, which the Prince of Prussia was en-
deavouring to moderate and turn to good purpose. In our
conversations about the political situation, it was extremely
difficult to follow the passionate utterances of the King.
Indeed, it would be impossible to remember them to-day, had
I not taken the trouble, at the time, to commit the most salient
points in His Majesty's views to paper.
The most singular feature about the King's view of things
was his under-estimation of the power and position of his own
State. He said repeatedly, that it was quite immaterial
whether Prussia or Baden undertook the mediation. People
were constantly doing him wrong, by asserting that he was
KING OF PRUSSIA'S UN WILLING NESS TO MEDIATE 203
prejudiced against the West. He always wished for the
equilibrium, but, as a German, he had no interest at all in the
Eastern war. If merely diplomatic intervention was desired,
Baden could manage it just as well as Prussia.
He admitted that there was ‘a party’ in the country that
wanted to drive him towards an impossible goal, and was en-
deavouring to compromise him everywhere as friendly disposed
towards Russia. But he himself was clever enough to see
through these people, and he did not require to be tutored by .
strangers.
He disliked Russian doings, now as much as formerly, and
the war had proved that the army was good for nothing, for
which reason it would be folly in him to ally himself with
Russia. -
When I tried to catch him at this word, and pointed out
what a favourable position Prussia occupied in consequence,
the King answered, that nobody listened to Prussia, and that
what he said was the last thing the Powers took account of,
if, indeed, they took any account of it at all. He then went
on to say, that all counsels were superfluous, after the fall of
Sebastopol, for it would now be shown, whether the Emperor
of the French was as good as his word. He had promised
him to make peace, as soon as Sebastopol had fallen.
This last very striking remark determined me to enquire,
who had brought this admission of Napoleon's to the knowledge
of the King. But I could never learn how the King had come
to make this assertion, as Hatzfield, Wedell, and Usedom,
assured me that they knew absolutely nothing of the matter.
Whilst matters were in this position, the news arrived, that
Austria had submitted an ultimatum. The Emperor Francis
Joseph himself communicated its contents to the King in an
autograph letter, and begged him to urge its acceptance in St
Petersburg.* - -
The King hesitated for some days, but at last both he and
Manteuffel were seized with a kind of peace-fever, and both
did their best to bring about the acceptance of the Austrian
ultimatum. It was not only the King's letter to the Emperor
º * Geffcken, l.c. 209.
204 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
Alexander, but, above all, Manteuffel's strict instructions to
Baron Werther in St Petersburg to insist, firmly and uncon-
ditionally, on the conclusion of peace, which actually brought
about the decision.
As for the Emperor of the French, the end of the war was
welcome to him under any circumstances, so long as the
English could not be induced to give up their principle of
‘désimtéressement’ in continuing it. But there was no hope
of this, and thus Napoleon was able to communicate to his
Parisians, with unconcealed delight, Frederick William IV’s
news of the acceptance of the articles of peace in St Petersburg.
He had the satisfaction of having subjected the proverbial
‘disinterestedness of England's war-zeal' to a little defeat.
At the same time he was in the position to designate Paris
as the seat of the future conferences, before the situation
itself had become quite clear to minds in England; and, though
nobody was altogether inclined to hear of a Congress, still,
newspapers and diplomatists were already busy in publicly
discussing all sorts of subjects and questions, which the Con-
ferences were to settle. -
The English revenged themselves a little on Prussia, by
attempting to prevent her from entering the Conferences of
Paris. But it had to be recognised, ultimately, that the ex-
clusion of the fifth Great Power from a Congress, which was
already about to open its doors to Sardinia, would have been
a proceeding unheard of in the annals of Europe. However,
in consequence of the everlasting temporising of Prussia, the
bitter feelings of English politicians had reached such a pitch,
that even my brother gave full scope to his sarcastic vein
against the fifth Great Power. §
Thus he once wrote, not unwittily, about Berlin: ‘One is
obliged to say with Schiller's Diver, “Da wntem aber ist's
fürchterlich l’ (Down there 'tis horrible, indeed). The con-
fusion in the realm of ideas must be something awful, and it
is only to be marvelled at, and recognised as a proof of the
sound nature of the Prussian State, that it has not yet been
entirely ruined by it. - -
‘The protocol has now been signed in Vienna, and the
LETTER FROM THE DUKE TO PRINCE ALBERT 2.05
negotiations are to commence in Paris this day three weeks.
I am beginning to believe that the Russians seriously mean
peace. That they intend to shave us on this occasion, stands
to reason, but the King of Prussia must not be surprised, if
we here do not wish him to assist by tying the napkin round
our necks. In Paris, there are many who, for a little money,
will be ready to prepare the lather for the occasion.’
º In face of all this, I considered it my duty, from my
modest standpoint, to draw attention to the fact, that it would
be an impossible and unheard of thing to exclude Prussia
from a European Congress. Moreover, the Prussian Cabinet
had, on the 3rd of February, 1856, communicated a despatch to
the Austrian Government, in which all the conditions stipu-
lated for Prussia's entrance into the Conferences, were acceded
to. In the need of the moment, it was even contemplated in
Berlin, to demand Prussia's entrance into the Conference
chiefly as the representative of the German Confederation. It
was the Saxon Minister, Herr von Beust, who particularly
recommended this idea, so little worthy of a Great Power.
In a report which I made to my brother on the position
of affairs, I endeavoured more definitely to state the points of
view indicated. But I refrain from communicating that
extensive document here in full, because it scarcely contains
any new matter, and shall confine myself to dwelling on a few
of its chief points. -
‘Enclosed I send you the newest Prussian utterance, which
perhaps may not reach you through any other channel. It
contains pretty well everything that can be demanded of
Prussia, before she is admitted into the conference chamber.
It contains both the offer to sign the preliminaries, and the
promise not to let them be prejudiced. If you like, the King
will make up his mind to sign a treaty similar to the one
signed by Austria in December. He feels that, by being
excluded from the Conferences, he would be injured in the eyes
of Europe and his own subjects. The opportunity is now
favourable . . . . Not only for the King of Prussia, but for
Prussia herself, it is a matter of real interest, that she should
at least formally participate in the settlement of an acknow-
ledged European Question . . . .
206 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXECOBURG-GOTHA
‘The fear of not being admitted to the Conference prompts
the King to think that, if he should not be admitted as King
of Prussia, he would surely be granted admittance as the
representative of Frankfort. Hence his new fraternisation
with Saxony . . . . by this union, Beust intends to render
Prussia's entrance into the Conference still more difficult.
Prussia is to cease being a Great Power, and to rest modestly
content with the same share in European politics as Bavaria
and Saxony. The King believed in all earnest that he would
get on better by this means.
‘These latest tidings were brought by N. N., who has had
long conferences with the King and the Minister, and who
thinks and acts quite in accordance with my views. Before
Beust came, the King was ready to side entirely with Austria.
But he now finds, to use his own words, that the Trias might
form a fine transition to German affairs.”
A few painful weeks still elapsed before Prussia's plenipo-
tentiaries succeeded in obtaining admission to the Conference.
Until the 18th of March, when the immediate dispute about
the differences of the belligerents appeared to be adjusted, the
German Great Power—even at the present day, it cannot be
mentioned without the deepest grief—was condemned to wait
in the ante-chamber. She was afterwards allowed to share in
such business as concerned the ‘general interests of Europe.’
The political situation was at this moment entirely
altered, and the profound change in French policy, which I
had been in a position to follow, step by step, since my
September visit in Paris, now appeared before the eyes of
Europe in all its inexorable distinctness. The slight sulkiness
that was perceptible between the allied Western Powers,
showed itself also in my brother's letters. But it was never
strong enough to cause any anxiety with regard to the per-
manence of the alliance. On the other hand, the position of
the two German Great Powers changed, in proportion as, not
only peace, but the mutual understanding between France
and Russia, became assured. - *
Prince Chimay wrote, on the 28th of February, very
pertinently : “L’Empereur est heurewa et très fier dw
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON A.VD THE PEACE 207
+6le vrai ment imcroyable et magnifique que la Providence lwi
assigne dams les affaires d'Europe.' And another corres-
pondent reports about the commencement of the ceremonies
on the occasion of the arrival of the Ambassadors at the
Congress, on the 25th : ‘Yesterday evening there was a
concert at His Majesty's, to which few, but select, invitations
had been issued. One of the happy select told me, that all
possible courtesies and attentions had been showered on Count
Orloff and M. de Brunnow, whereas a visible coolness was
observable towards the Austrian plenipotentiary.’
The Emperor himself was fully determined to bring about
peace with Prussia at any price. Before the Conference had
yet met, I had represented to him, through Prince Chimay,
that the moment appeared to have arrived, when a future
understanding with Prussia, and consequently with Germany,
would be possible. But the Emperor answered me chiefly
with unconcealed delight at being rid of the disagreeable
Eastern war. -
PALAIs DEs TUILERIES, le 11 Mars, 1856.
Mon CHER DUC, Je n'ai pas répondu plutót a Votre Altesse
Royale, parceque je voulais lui donner quelques nouvelles sur les
conférences. Aujourd’hui je puis vous dire, que la paix est assurée,
car on est d’accord sur toutes les conditions principales. Certes,
j’ai apprécié, comme elles le meritent, les communications dont vous
avez chargées le Prince de Chimay de me faire part, mais aujourd’-
hui la paix me donne bien des avantages et la guerre en Crimée
était trop coutante pour pouvoir etre prolongée. Les sacrifices
n'étaient pas en rapport avec les bénéfices qu'on pouvait espérer en
retirer. Je suis toujours bien recommaissant à Votre Altesse Royale
des sentiments d’amitié qu’elle me conserve et j'espère qu’elle me
doutera jamais des miens. Je les lui renouvelle donc avec toute
l'assurance de messentiments d’estime et de véritable affection.
VOTRE FRERE NAPOLéON.
The French Emperor's blissful confidence in peace could
only be correctly judged by those who understood the secret
thoughts which then occupied the Emperor's mind. Never
has a congress been looked upon so entirely as a mere
208 MEMOIAES OF THE DUKE OF SaxEcoBURG-GoTHA
curtain to the scenery that was about to be built up, as that
of Paris. What the diplomatists had to say to one another,
may have contained much that was precious. But it had a
chiefly decorative significance, and need therefore scarcely be
mentioned in particular here. On what went on behind the
curtain, I received manifold reports, which were all of the same
tenor, and sufficiently explained why the English were grow-
ing more and more discontented, the longer the Conferences
lasted. -
‘There is a zeal and a rapidity, a correspondent wrote to
me, at the end of March, “in everything the Russians do, say,
and prepare, here, which makes it evident that the misfortune
of war has bestowed new wings on their Government, instead
of crushing it. It hastens and urges the conclusion of peace;
it does not let itself be deterred by unexpected little demands;
it submits and gives way, in order to gather its forces, to
complete them, or to create fresh ones. They are an elastic
nation, who conceive their plans with boldness and execute
them with energy. Russia is henceforward to take the place in
the alliance with France, which is now occupied by England
and Austria. They regularly throw themselves at the Emperor
Napoleon's head. All the Russians here make a show of
admiring everything the French monarch does and says, which
borders on enthusiasm.
‘Whenever disputes arise on questions before the Congress,
Count Orloff appeals to the verdict of Louis Napoleon, declar-
ing that he will abide by his decision. Le Nord has received
instructions, in accordance with which this paper, hitherto so
spiteful against Napoleon, will, in a month, be ardently
Bonapartistic. Its debit is already assured in France for that
time.
‘Among the German and French writers here, recruits are
being made for far-reaching plans. Before a year has elapsed,
more than ten journals will take their pass-word from the
Russian embassy. On the Rhine, too, and in Leipzig, Stuttgart,
Vienna, Prague, and Pesth, new papers are to be founded, or
existing ones purchased. This plan is a fact.
‘The reswmé of the Russian programme may therefore be
BIRTH OF THE PRINCE IMPERIAL 209
stated under the following three heads: Alliance with France;
speedy construction of the military railway lines in the interior
of the Empire; cultivation of public opinion in Central
Europe.’
The March of the year 1856 appeared, in every respect,
destined to raise the Emperor of the French to the summit of
his fortune, and my uncle tersely described the situation, when
he said: ‘My neighbour can do everything for good and for
evil. We shall see how he manages it, for he has good reason
to praise his fortune in these latter years, and his star shines
brighter than ever.’ -
And it was not only the political world which Napoleon
at this moment saw at his feet; he also believed his boldest
wishes and hopes for the future of his house fulfilled. For,
whilst the attention of the whole world was directed towards
the decisions of the Conference in Paris, Fate seemed desirous
to seal the fortunes of the House of the Bonapartes, as it were,
in quite a special way. In the early morning of the 16th of
March, I, too, received one of the innumerable telegrams say-
ing: L’impératrice est he wreusement accouchée d'um primoe.
Sa Majesté et l'enfant se portent bien.
The ambassador whom I sent to the Emperor with my
letter of congratulation, found Paris in ecstasies. The Con-
gress seemed only to exist to play the part of the three
holy Kings before the manger. The paternal delight of the
Emperor was reflected in the amiable letter of thanks which
he sent me, in great haste, on the 27th of March, and which
contained, among other things, the passage : ‘L'impératrice a
bien souffert, mais elle va, towte bien aujowrd'hwi awssi que le
petit garçon, qui est gros et gras.’
Three days later, on the 30th of March, at one o'clock,
peace was signed, and the Congress closed. The same evening,
Paris shone forth in the brilliancy of the grandest illumination
imaginable, as if to prove how little popular the war had been.
‘La France trouve certainement une grande compensation,”
Prince Chimay wrote, in a long report, the next day, ‘à ses projets
intimes dans la position qui lui est moralement faite, et d'ailleurs la
VOL. III. O
2 Io MEMOIRS OF THE DU/CE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
guerre lui devenait une trop lourde charge dans les conditions
données, mais enfin, je crois que Votre Altesse pensera avec moi
qu’elle espérait peut-être autre chose. -
‘Peut-on considérer la Sardaigne et la Turquie comme satisfaites?
Au point de vue anglais la situation de la Russie n'est-elle pas
fortifiée en Asie' De toutes ces graves réflexions que j'aborde à
peine, il me semble bien difficile de conclure à un long repos pour
l'Europe.” -
It was not difficult, in fact, to play the prophet at that
moment, and the feeling was pretty general, that the war had
been useless. For us in Germany, an opportunity had been
neglected to make good the mistakes of the years 1848 and
1850. Maybe that a hundred years hence, when history will
no longer take strict account of a decennary or so, people will
think with more indifference of the chapter of German sins of
omission. But the generation of those who stood for the
greater part of their lives in the midst of the battle, and
whose national existence was, so to say, stunted by full twenty
years, will not be likely to look back coolly and calmly on
those years. And thus may this chapter of my life close with
the following lines addressed to my brother:
“Probably no tidings of peace have ever made so sad an
impression upon a patriotic party, as the present ones. How-
ever, Germany's destiny is bound to be fulfilled. I preach
patience on all sides, and quiet preparation for the battle that
must and will come. - -
‘Although the peace itself contains a complete fulfilment
of the programme set up at the beginning of the war, and
perhaps something still beyond that, one's heart could bleed
at the thought of what might have been attained, and what
successes gained. .
‘The Russians now appear desirous of making up for the
mistakes of the Emperor Nicholas. They are joining France
everywhere, and want to make believe, that there is nothing
more in the way of an alliance with France. This alliance
was, in fact, already under the former Government, the
Eldorado of the Old Russian party. They hoped by this
THE DUKE ON THE SITUATION 2 II
means to push forward the frontier of Russia to the mouth of
the Vistula, and were willing to give France the left bank of
the Rhine in return. They reproached the Emperor with not
wishing for the alliance with France. -
‘Last summer, some distinguished Russians still expressed
the opinion that the genuine Russians regarded the Imperial
family as a noble race of immigrants, who sacrificed the great-
ness of Russia to their family connection with Prussia. This
passion for aggrandisement at the expense of Germany will
now break out all the more vehemently, after their defeat in
the Eastern question. The mot d'ordre of the Russians and
the friends of Russia is : Franco-Russian alliance, revenge on
Austria, revenge on England. -
‘In the course of the next weeks and months, we shall see
the Russians in full activity in Germany. All the important
German newspapers, it is said, are to be bought up by Russia,
and are then, under the protection of the police and the police
administrations, to ply the general public, which is confused
enough without that. An opposition press is almost impossible,
as it is. The slightest word is followed by the confiscation of
the paper, judicial investigation, and banishment of the editors
and writers. If this state of things continues, and matters
go too far, the result will be a fearful reaction among the
people towards the left. But if the authorities are cautious,
and keep the public in its morbid sleep; if they support this
newly arisen money-craze and the inclination to pluck the
unripe fruits of economic improvements all at once, a dissolu-
tion of the nation will probably take place, similar to that
which is increasing day by day in France.’ . .
W
CHAPTER WI
NEW FAMILY ALLIANCES.—PRINCESS VICTORIA’s BETROTHAI. To
FREDERICK WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA.—FIRST INDICATIONS OF THE
MATCH. —ENGAGEMENT OF THE PRINCE REGENT OF BADEN TO
PRINCESS LOUISA OF PRUSSIA.—LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT. —
THE ENGAGEMENT IN ENGLAND KEPT SECRET.-ATTACKS ON
PRUSSIA IN THE ENGLISH PRESS.—THE FEELING ON THE PROPOSED
MARRIAGE IN BERLIN.—INDEPENDENCE OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.
—DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BELGIUM AND FRANCE.-KING LEOPOLD's
JUBILEE.—MARRIAGE OF THE PRINCE REGENT OF BADEN AND
PRINCESS LOUISA OF PRUSSIA.—THE DUKE CHOOSES A WIFE FOR
THE SON OF THE DUKE OF AUGUSTENEURG.—MARRIAGE OF PRINCE
FREDERICK WILLIAM OF PRUSSIA AND THE PRINCESS ROYAL. —
LETTERS FROM PRINCE ALBERT AND THE PRINCE AND PRINCESS OF
PRUSSIA.— CHARACTER OF PRINCE FREDERICK WILLIAM AND THE
PRINCESS ROYAL.--THE DUKE's INFLUENCE ON THE YOUNG PRINCE.
—MARRIAGE OF THE ARCHDUKE MAXIMILIAN OF AUSTRIA AND
PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF BELGIUM. —LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.
—MARRIAGE BETWEEN KING PEDRO OF PORTUGAL AND PRINCESS
STEPHANIE OF HOHENZOLLERN.
AFTER the storms of the Crimean war, a short pause ensued
in the development of great European affairs, which was em-
ployed by the diplomatists in bringing about new situations
and new alliances. But, also in the sovereign houses, the
momentary calm in our hemisphere appeared opportune for
establishing, or contemplating, new relations between the
ruling families. In this way it happened that, in the time
between the fall of Sebastopol and the Italian war, a series of
matrimonial alliances was concluded, which became of im-
portance to Germany, and had a considerable influence on
the relations of all the monarchic Powers of Europe. The
Crimean war had more than ever opened men's eyes to the
NE W FAMILY ALLIANCES 2 I 3
difficulty of bringing the old monarchies out of the track of
old alliances and existing family ties. But the ideas and
hopes which had come to grief on the paths of diplomacy and
politics, seemed realisable in a more distant future, in the
shape of princely betrothals and marriages, for the founding
of new pedigrees—so it was then thought—must needs result
to the coming generation in an entirely new grouping and dis-
tribution of the relations of the European Powers.
The genealogical relations of the Prussian Royal house
had long afforded a curious picture in their fluctuations
between the West and the East. Whereas family alliances
between orthodox Russia and catholic Austria were almost
entirely excluded, the protestant creed of the Hohenzollerns
by no means prevented their being strongly drawn to the
family of the Czar, and the relations that were thus estab-
lished, unquestionably exercised their influence upon Germany.
The Crimean war had just given the world a political lesson
on this connection of things.
Now, was it not extremely curious that, before peace with
Russia was yet concluded, the matrimonial plans of the
Prussian Royal house were on the point of taking a decided
tendency towards the West of Europe 2 The union of a
Prussian heir-apparent with a Princess of my widely connected
house was no doubt an event which, at that moment at least,
appeared to be opposed to the Russian traditions; and when.
it was considered, how men were accustomed to regard my
brother, (at the end of the war in striking contrast to its com-
mencement) as the moving power against Russia, the marriage
of a daughter of the Queen of England with a Prussian prince,
who was next but one in succession to the crown, could not
fail to have an eminently political character attributed to it.
My brother, however, loved his eldest daughter much too
tenderly, to yield at the outset to exclusively political points of
view, in settling her future marriage. For many years, as
I often had occasion to notice, his heart's desire had been
to see his favourite child, in whose development he had had
the greatest personal share, in a great position. He took a
paternal delight in fancying his promising, talented, and pre-
2 14 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAME-COBURG-GOTHA
cocious, daughter on a powerful throne, but, above all, I knew
how much he also desired to render her inwardly happy.
Among the princes of Royal houses, the son of the Prince
of Prussia had, since the beginning of the fifties, been rais-
ing the highest expectations in every respect. Maybe that
a union was already thought of at a somewhat earlier date
than the outward facts allow of our supposing. Still, there
was so marked a difference of age between the young Prince
Frederick William of Prussia and the Princess Victoria, that
any speculations which may have been indulged in at a very
early date, were not very likely of fulfilment. Notwith-
standing, in the ‘Life of the Prince Consort’ there are
indications which admit of the supposition that Baron
Stockmar had, I don't know since when, been contemplating
the union of the Prussian and the English houses as a desirable
political object.*
The parents of Prince Frederick William had frequently
seen Princess Victoria during their stay in England in the
year 1853, when she, then at the age of thirteen, made a most
winning impression on all hearts, and especially on the guests
then present at the English Court.f Previous to this date,
probably, no serious idea of a marriage between the future
Prussian Crown Prince and the daughter of my brother had
ever suggested itself. In the year 1855, it was said that Prince
Frederick William would set out on his travels for the purpose
of selecting his future wife. He came to England at the same
time that I went to the International Exhibition in Paris, and
arrived on the 14th of September in Balmoral, where the
Court was then residing. When Irepaired to Coblentz, to visit
the Prussian Royal family on my return journey from Paris,
the confidential news of the betrothal of the young people,
which had meanwhile taken place, had arrived under the seal
of strict secrecy.
But a second family event had just then occurred in
Coblentz, which gave me and my wife no less pleasure, and
which was the special cause of our presence there, together
* Martin, “Life of the Prince Consort’ iii. 385, iv. 168.
f Cf. vol. III. p. 28
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT 2 I 5
with the mother of my wife, the Dowager Grand-Duchess of
Baden. My brother-in-law, the Prince Regent of Baden, had
become betrothed to Princess Louisa, the daughter of the
Prince of Prussia and Princess Augusta. -
Frederick William IV, who was then staying with
the Queen in Stolzenfels, hailed the two betrothals of his
brother's children with the greatest enthusiasm, and my
brother set especial value on the fact that his daughter's
engagement so entirely accorded with the wishes of the King,
the uncle of the bridegroom.
Under these circumstances, the news of the happy event
could not be prevented from reaching the public sooner than
had been the intention of the Royal parties. The more this
engagement had been desired in Germany, the sooner and the
more readily the rumour of it was believed in. Indeed, a
more pleasing and promising picture of the probable happiness
and the political importance of an impending marriage could
hardly be conceived.
Notwithstanding, my brother did not wish the betrothal
to be officially announced just yet. The reader will, at the
present day, be doubly glad to learn his view of this whole
event, from the confidential remarks which he addressed to me
on the subject; and, although I am well aware that particu-
lars of this kind cannot have any historical importance, still,
I may be sure that, in face of the interest which attaches to
each single person concerned, my accounts will be received
with a sort of reverent feeling, similar to that with which I
myself have always clung to these family reminiscences.
‘I received yesterday, my brother wrote on the 24th of
September, ‘your letter of the 20th, according to which you
will arrive in Coblentz to-day, on your return from Paris.
You will perhaps have heard there, what I am writing
you to-day, that our guest has already expressed to us his
desire to unite himself with Vicky, with the King's approval.
We have readily consented, but have requested him not to
make his proposal to Vicky herself, before her confirmation
next spring. There can be no idea of a marriage, before her
seventeenth birthday in November 1857. You will recognise
2I 6 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
with us the importance of this event, and share our pleasure
in it. The parents in Coblentz are extremely delighted, and
the betrothal of the sister with your brother-in-law includes
you and Alexandrine too all the more closely in these ties.
“If I close, it is only my lame hand and bad shoulder that
force me to do so. It is only since yesterday that I am again
able to hold a pen, though badly enough. Fritz William
leaves us again to-morrow. And now the general request to
keep our secret under the given circumstances. The whole
world will talk of the event, but, so long as none of us do so,
it does not matter.’
The latter supposition of my brother was all the more
justified, as, in spite of the postponement at first intended,
the formal proposal of the Prince to the Princess had already
taken place in the course of the next few days, and the Prince
had left England as an accepted suitor. It was no doubt the
secrecy of the matter that enabled several newspapers, which,
like the Times, were violently incensed against Prussia, to
raise their voices against the merely suspected union in a
manner which caused deep distress to the Queen and my
brother. The hardest words were to be heard that have ever
fallen in the English Press against Prussia and the House
of Hohenzollern.
But, also in various reactionary circles of the Prussian
capital, the family events of Balmoral and Stolzenfels excited
all manner of discontent. The greater the delight with which
the more liberal papers in Germany hailed them, the more
keenly the opposite party felt the unfavourable tendencies of
the time, that were threatening, at the Court of Berlin, to in-
crease the influence of princely relatives whose sentiments
were so little liked. However, it was one of the peculiarities
of Frederick William IV, that he would submit to no restraint
in respect of his personal sympathies, least of all from those
whom he trusted in politics and affairs of State. Hence, the
secret opponents had to be very careful not to give vent to
their dissatisfaction with the new family alliances. r
In the beginning of the year 1856, the festival of the
Order of the Black Eagle afforded a special occasion for a
DIFFERENCES BET WEEN BELGIUM AND FRANCE 217
manifestation of the more intimate impulses of the Royal
grace. My brother-in-law of Baden and I were summoned to
the chapter, in order to receive the chain of the Order of the
Black Eagle, and the King took this opportunity to distinguish
us both in a very marked manner.
I travelled home from Berlin by way of Dresden, where I
received abundant information with regard to the future
prospects of peace and war, from several old acquaintances and
friends, among others the Austrian Ambassador Prince Richard
Metternich, whose correct judgment and good knowledge of
affairs I had already repeatedly learned to value. As I have
mentioned in a former chapter, the very decided need of peace
at this juncture so fully outweighed all future plans of war,
that the favourable issue of the Congress in Paris was reckoned
upon as certain. .
Thus, with the in-corhing spring of the year 1856, people
were again able to devote themselves to affairs of peace.
Festivities and weddings started out of the ground, as it were,
on every side. My uncle in Brussels notably belonged to
those rulers whom the restoration of peace seemed to have
released from a heavy night-mare. During the Paris Con-
gress, he had had occasion to complain of a serious
difficulty, which the French Minister Walewski had caused him,
by accusing the Belgian Press of continually agitating in a
manner hostile to the Western Powers, and in particular to
France. When the English Ambassador addressed an inter-
pellation on the subject to the French Minister, the latter, as
my brother wrote to me on the 12th of May, committed ‘the
still greater folly of representing the matter, as if our uncle
had himself desired the attack.’
The King always regarded his dangerous neighbour with
a certain feeling of anxiety, to which he had already repeatedly
given expression in reference to the Congress in Paris.”
Thus he wrote to me, at the time: ‘The future will in any
case bring fresh wars. . . . . . The affair could be adjusted
in the old style, but, as matters stand, something will very
probably soon have to be settled again by the sword.”
* Cf. vol. III, p. 209.
218 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GOTHA
In face of such apprehensions, which were perhaps more
serious than the King was at that moment justified in enter-
taining with regard to the plans and intentions of Napoleon,
it afforded him the greatest satisfaction to be able to look
forward to the jubilee of his twenty-five years' reign, under
circumstances which were calculated to let the condition of his
kingdom shine forth in renewed splendour, and to strengthen
afresh the attachment of the nation to the Royal house.
In the beginning of July, my uncle went with his younger
son and his daughter to England, and had the intention of
persuading my brother to assist at the ceremonies of his
jubilee. However, considering the less friendly feeling that
prevailed between the two Western Powers since the end of
the Congress, it did not seem advisable for the Prince Con-
sort of England to appear in person, unless the other Great
Powers were also officially notified and invited Hence it was
decided, on the part of England, to send only Lord Westmore-
land to Brussels, as the representative of the Royal Family.
The unconstrained and sincere way in which the Royal
anniversary was celebrated throughout the whole country,
produced a deep impression over all Europe, and the con-
stitutional principles seemed once more splendidly vindicated.
The words which the former president of the Congress of the
year 1831, standing, after the lapse of twenty-five years, at
the head of the still surviving members of that brilliant elec-
tive assembly, now addressed to King Leopold, met with a
powerful echo, particularly in those States where personal
government prevailed, either entirely, or in the form of a
sham constitutionalism.
The most obstinate adherents of absolute monarchy,
although they might look upon so young a State as Belgium
as hardly affording an adequate test, could not remain
indifferent to the remark of the aged Herr von Gerlache:
Aw miliew des commotions qui ont ébramlé tant de gowverme-
ments, la Belgique est demewrée fidèlement attachée d' son,
Primce et awa, institutions qu’elle s'est données. Cette sorte
de phénomène, rare dams motre siècle, me pewt seapliquer
qwe par l'heurewa, accord du roi et du peuple, cimenté par
MARRIAGE OF PRINCESS LOUISA OF PRUSSIA 2 I 9
lewr mutuel respect powr la foi jurée et pow, la com-
stitution mationale. -
The festivities in Brussels lasted three days, and were
attended, besides by myself, also by Prince George, as the
representative of the Saxon house. The whole jubilee went
off in so truly satisfactory a manner, that I could only regret
not being able to accompany the King, when he started on his
tour through Belgium, which proved, in the full sense of the
word, a triumphal progress for him.
It was not without the heartiest satisfaction, therefore,
that he wrote to me: ‘I thank you once more for your kind
visit, and for the sincere and friendly way in which you have
taken part in our festival. For the house, as a whole, it is
after all a handsome monument, upon which it can look with
Some pride. - -
‘We are continuing to celebrate festivities of an extremely
beautiful and satisfactory kind. After good old Bruges,
came Namur, also extremely enthusiastic, the weather being
glorious, though rather too hot. Dinant likewise; Luxembourg
was kind and hearty; I saw a part of the country which is
very pretty, and was still quite new to me, on the Semoy,
adjoining France. Good old Antwerp has distinguished itself
quite especially. A new reservoir is being erected there, which
has the largest and finest flood-gates that exist until now.
Unfortunately, the fine weather has changed to storm and rain.
I presume that you are shortly going to Berlin, for the
wedding of your brother-in-law.”
The marriage of the Prince Regent of Baden with Princess
Louisa of Prussia took place on September 20. I had joined
my wife, on the 18th, in Berlin, whither I had repaired
straight from the autumn manoeuvres in East Prussia, in
order to assist, with her, at the happy union of our brother
and friend with the spirited and strong-willed daughter of
the future King, and—as we had at least not ceased to dream
—the future Emperor, of Germany. A few weeks before this
event, another sovereign family had been added to the train
of relationships now in course of formation; a family which,
through its misfortunes and its existence, might, in a measure,
22 o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
be termed a living protest against the old Europe of the
congresses and protocols: the family of Holstein.
I had been requested by the old Duke of Augustenburg
to choose a wife for the Crown Prince Frederick, which,
considering their position at that time, presented a difficulty
that will be easily conceived. I proposed my niece, who was
at the same time the niece of the Queen of England, the
daughter of Victoria's only sister Ada Hohenlohe, and, on
the 11th of September, the marriage was speedily carried
out. By this means the heavily oppressed and almost deserted
house of Holstein-Augustenburg was brought into the closest
connection with one of the most powerful thrones in Europe.
In whatever way the Holstein question might be solved, one
thing was certain, that it was sure to react very considerably
on the affairs of all Germany. The dramatic threads became
the less easy to unravel, the more the house of Augustenburg
grew into the great and leading families of Europe.
. But it was, of course, of incomparably greater importance
to the whole circle of new European constellations, that the
almost romantic engagement which had taken place in the
Scotch Highlands, in the previous year, between Prince
Frederick William of Prussia and the young Princess Victoria
of England, really came to be fulfilled. Although no one
had ever doubted it, people waited with anxious longing for
the official word which was to break the spell of deep secrecy,
the long observance of which after all only gave opponents
an opportunity to cavil, whereas friends were hindered in the
open expression of their pleasure.
In April, my brother at last made leastways a half admis-
sion, by unsealing, as it is done in the college of cardinals,
the lips of those who belonged to his more intimate circle.
‘The brevity of my letter,’ he wrote on the 4th, ‘must be
counterbalanced to-day by its contents. The accomplishment
of Vicky's confirmation, and the conclusion of peace in Paris,
work together in unsealing our lips, and we may now tell our
relations, what they have perhaps taken the liberty to imagine
without our permission, that Vicky and Fritz William of
Prussia are a betrothed couple. You will fully share our joy
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT 22 I
at this event, and will need no comment, seeing that all the
personages, as well as all the situations, relations, etc., etc., are
well known to you. I will now merely mention that, before
Vicky has passed her seventeenth birthday, the wedding is
not to be thought of, and that, before that time approaches,
we do not intend to make any communication to the public,
either English or German. It may think, in the meantime,
what it likes. Fritz will pay us a visit in May.’
Nearly at the same time, I received the official announce-
ment of the betrothal from the Prince and Princess of Prussia,
whose letters afforded, besides the familiar interest, also
various glimpses into current political affairs.
‘Although, the Prince wrote, ‘I am telling you no news,
by hereby officially informing you of the engagement of my
son with your niece, the Princess Royal, which is now to be
proclaimed in both the Royal Families, still, considering our
close relationship, which is now about to become still closer, I
could not omit to send you this intimation, and to claim, on
behalf of the young couple, the sympathy which my wife and
myself are so sure of receiving from you. My son will go to
England for the 24th of May. We ourselves hope to pay a
visit there in July. -
‘You will, no doubt, have heard from your brother, that
the proclamation of the engagement is only to take place pro
forma in the respective families, so that the official announce-
ment will be delayed, until Parliament has been duly informed
in the coming session.
“So we have peace . The Russian manifesto gilds the pill
on all sides. Nevertheless, the humiliation for Russia is of a
very serious kind, though also well-merited. The Franco-
Russian flirtation is rather too palpable. The intention is
obvious ! The countries situated in-between this Imperial
union in spe will now have to be very much on their guard.
I should like to know la vraie pensée in St Petersburg with
regard to the Te Dewm in Charlottenburg and the Order of
the Black Eagle telegraphed to Paris. It is just as if, for
222 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
three years, no other bliss had been desired, than that of
obtaining peace of such a kind for Russia etc.
‘Your faithful cousin and friend,
* PRINCE OF PRUSSIA.’
The Princess of Prussia, too, attached an importance to this
union, which was indicative both of its general and its special
circumstances, and I think I may be certain of her kind per-
mission, if, for completeness sake, I add here the amiable
and gracious note of the Empress Augusta on the marriage of
her son. Although it was scarcely intended to be reckoned
among political documents, it will still be welcome to posterity,
as a memorial of the noble sentiments of the illustrious
lady.
‘CoBLENTZ, the 12th of April.
‘DEAR ERNEST, I am not only satisfying a mere form, but
obeying a true impulse of my heart, in expressing to you, in
these lines, my delight at the consummation of our dearesthopes,
which is now no longer to be concealed : God bless this union,
for our children, for our family, and for our poor German
fatherland, which can naturally only rise from its present
position, in alliance with England. To thank you, our faithful
friend, on this occasion, for the many proofs of your sympathy,
is a duty which I perform with all the more pleasure, as I am
always fond of calling up remembrances of Gotha. I send
my best love to your excellent wife. Farewell, and keep your
..affection for your faithful cousin,
“A.”
Prince Frederick William himself described to me, in
enthusiastic words, the great happiness he had found in the
possession of this amiable creature, and, although it is
universally known, I would not omit expressly to confirm,
what the correspondence of the bridegroom in those days
has vividly recalled to my memory, how entirely this union
was a product of the truest and deepest affection on both
sides.
FREDERICK WILLIAM AND THE PRINCESS ROYAL 223
I will not enter here into a detailed description of these
two excellent people, who were destined by fate for a position
exalted even beyond their own expectations, and to whom it
was reserved, as it were, to enjoy, as a ripe and secure posses-
sion, all that which German patriotism, in those years, regarded
as the highest aim of its ideal endeavours. The illustrious
couple, as I wrote to my brother at the time, possessed, in the
years of their youth, in common all those qualities that enable
human beings to awaken ready and lasting love and enthu-
siasm. The manly and vigorous bearing of the Prince, his
frank manner, and his unbiassed view of things, soon won for
him the true friendship even of one who was his senior by
years. In face of his great gifts, and his rare knowledge and
ability, almost the only fear was, that the narrow circle
of affairs and activity to which he was confined, might not
suffice fully to develope his rich mind, and elevate it still
more. It seemed as if the powerful nature of the young man,
richly endowed as he was, both in body and in mind, was
unable, in the position he then held, to find the congenial
occupation that would perfect him,
His by far younger bride possessed a mind capable of
fully grasping the intellectual and political interests which
Frederick William opened up to her. Richly developed as were
the qualities of her heart, she was almost too much advanced
in knowledge and skill, and had, in the true sense of the word,
ripened in a masculine school. In her, the pedagogic and ethic
ideals were in a measure fulfilled, in the setting up of which
my brother had, from the earliest times, shown a positively
inventive skill. In this respect, the Princess was entirely the
pupil of Prince Albert, and she not only always remained the
favourite, but, in many things, also the image, of her father.
That my brother, besides, also instructed her himself in the
positive sciences, and acted, in some subjects, in the full sense
of the term as her tutor, was a matter of secondary import-
ance. What peculiarly distinguished her, in early youth,
from those of her own age, was her strict adherence to
fixed principles a peculiarity which my brother himself
224 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
possessed, and which he succeeded in conferring upon his
favourite daughter.
With the Princess, therefore, my brother lost also a peda-
gogic occupation, which had become dear to him, and which
had exercised an extremely refreshing influence on his mind.
The boys of the family had too little softness, to make any
immediate occupation with them agreeable, and the other girls
were still too little. Hence the great depression and sadness,
which were, for a long time, perceptible in the letters of the
Prince, with regard to his separation from the young Princess.
The time for the marriage had not been fixed, and my brother
adhered to his original determination, not to allow it to take
place, before the Princess had accomplished her 17th year.”
During this long interval, I had frequent opportunities of
seeing Prince Frederick William. Although I myself was far
from seeking an undue influence on the views of the future
heir to the Prussian throne, I cannot refrain from saying, that
the Princess of Prussia, in letters which I still gratefully
preserve at the present day, repeatedly expressed her desire,
that I should hold constant intercourse with her son, and
particularly discuss political affairs and German questions
with him, in exactly the same sense as I had at all times
advocated them, in full harmony with the sentiments of
Princess Augusta herself.
The views of the Princess of Prussia were at all times
very decided on the one point, that it was desirable for her
son to avoid a certain one-sidedness in his political inter-
course, such as was only too likely to be developed by his exclu-
sive residence in single garrison towns of Prussia. In answer
to what the Princess communicated to me on this subject, I
wrote to her, among other things:
‘. . . . It lies in the nature of young people, when they
have once out-grown the nursery, and follow paths of their
own shaping, to take the one or the other course, as it
were, instinctively. This applies especially to their more
* I only mention all these family affairs here, inasmuch as it may perhaps not be
undesirable to add to, and supplement, the extensive characteristics contained in
Martin’s work with regard to these matters. Cf. ibid. III. chap. 67, 71; IV. chap.
82, 83.
THE DUKE'S INFLUENCE ON THE YOUNG PRINCE 2.25
intimate acquaintances, and to their leaning towards one or
the other class of individuals. We must wait and see what
course the young man intends to take, in order to be able to
determine to what people he is most likely to attach himself.
To approach, or force oneself upon him, would certainly have
the opposite result. Should it, therefore, in this case, be
Fritz's desire and intention to seek intercourse with me, you
may rest assured, dear cousin, that he could find no truer and
more devoted friend, and that my heart would welcome him
warmly.
‘I am always ready to do any kind of service, whether by
imparting counsel, or in whatsoever other respect, if it is asked
of me, and if I see the real intention of joining our circle of
ideas. In the contrary case, I should consider it positively
dangerous for us to seek a greater intimacy than good breeding
and the ties of relationship render necessary.
‘The physical sufferings of our respected Prince, your
consort, the fearful situation which he has to endure, and the
burden of affairs, which only fatigue, instead of refreshing,
him, are so often the subject of my melancholy thoughts.' . .
At the moment when this correspondence was being
carried on, not only relatives and friends were busy in
showing their hearty sympathy with the promising and
amiable young couple, but all the world, and every newspaper,
was full of discussions and prophecies concerning them, and
no one in Germany believed otherwise, than that, on the life
of these two gifted Royal children, all the blessings depended
which were to be expected from the future of the German
nation.
No one could imagine a more elevating impression, than
that which the newly married pair produced personally on
their arrival in Germany, after the wedding had been
celebrated in London on the 25th of January, 1858. I can
abstain here from giving an account of the events, both in
England and in Germany, on the occasion of the long-desired
union of the two Royal Families. All these things have been
described with the greatest minuteness in Martin's book on
the Life of the Prince Consort, nor could anything of import-
VOL. III. P
226 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-CO BURG-GO THA
ance be added to the details given there, from diaries and
letters of the time. -
However, I cannot close this chapter of my reminiscences,
without mentioning two further scions of the House of Coburg,
who entered about the same time into matrimonial alliances,
both under the happiest auspices, and without anybody's
dreaming of the dark future that was in store for them :
Princess Charlotte of Belgium and King Pedro of Portugal,
both of them personages endowed with the rarest gifts of
intellect and great energy of character. -
On the 27th of July, 1857, the marriage of the Archduke
Maximilian of Austria with the daughter of King Leopold
took place in Brussels, and almost at the same time King
Pedro became engaged to a daughter of the Prince of Hohen-
zollern. Archduke Max had gone on a visit to the English
Court in June, and as, in his capacity as Governor of Milan,
he possessed great enthusiasm for Italy, and had, at the
same time, gained great knowledge of the world, he could not
fail to produce an extremely pleasing impression on my
brother.
‘Archduke Max has been with us since the 14th, Albert
wrote to me on the 21st of June, 1857. ‘We have learnt to
know in him a very distinguished and promising young man,
whom we are pleased to see enter our family through his
marriage with Charlotte. His religious tolerance, and his
liberal-minded political views, afford some prospect of a
happier fate for the Italians, and of peace in that country.
He is glad to become more intimately connected with the
Coburg family.
“Under the seal of secrecy, I must tell you of another event,
which is interesting to you, and will have an influential
bearing on our family. I have been busy, for some time, in
arranging a marriage between Don Pedro and the daughter
of the Prince of Hohenzollern, who I believe is well known to
you. The young lady is said to be pretty and well brought
up, and will bring views of life with her, which will not be
those of the other old Catholic houses, such as those of Spain
and Italy. New blood and German culture, with Prussia and
KING PEDRO AND PRINCESS STEPHANIE 227
the North to lean upon, will strike you at once as being
the advantages of the selection P
Unfortunately, little blessing was to rest on these two
alliances. I had hastened to Brussels, on the 25th of July, for
the wedding of the Archduke Max, and met my brother there,
who had come over to Brussels for a few hours to assist at
the chief ceremony on the 27th. My uncle, and even my
brother, were exceedingly impressed with the mission which
the Archducal pair hoped to be able to fulfil in Milan, with the
view to pacifying Italy. Only too soon, however, was the
disappointment to set in, which will form the contents of the
next chapters of my memoirs. .
That, on the other hand, death would so soon and so
prematurely dissolve the auspicious marriage between Don
Pedro and Princess Stephanie of Hohenzollern, no one would
have imagined, who saw the young couple, in the full vigour
of life, at their marriage on May 18, 1858.
I had become more intimately acquainted with the distin-
guished son of my cousin Ferdinand in July, 1854, when he and
his younger brother, the present King Louis, paid me a long visit
in Reinhardtsbrunn and Coburg. From that time he remained
friendly attached to me, until his death on the 17th of November,
1861. When, on September 16, 1855, he assumed the reins of
government as an independent sovereign, Portuguese affairs
seemed to be advancing towards a vigorous settlement. The
whole country bowed before the truly superior intellect of the
young monarch, and all the foreign governments looked with
the greatest confidence upon the new and firm constitutional
power that appeared to be making a new Belgium, as it were,
out of this State, which had so long been torn and shaken by
conflicting parties. -
Of the numerous communications which I received from
the young King, I still preserve among my papers a compre-
hensive memorandum of the 15th of June, 1856, which gives
an extraordinary description of the financial and political
position of Portugal, and betokens a clearness of mind and a
strength of will, which leave me no doubt that Don Pedro
would have become one of the most distinguished monarchs
228 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA_XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
of Europe. The King manipulated the German language with
remarkable skill, which suffered but little from a few foreign
expressions and constructions of style. He could speak and
write, too, with the same ease and facility, in nearly all the
languages of the West. His education had been under the
influence of Court Councillor Diez, whom I have mentioned
before, and who proved also in this case that, in spite of the
animosities of the English, his activity was a true blessing for
King Ferdinand and the whole Portuguese Royal Family.
In the daughter of the Prince of Hohenzollern, Don Pedro
found a wife who was intellectually his equal. Princess
Stephanie quickly and intelligently adapted herself to the
circumstances of the Romanic South. She supplemented the
King in his thoroughly German mode of thinking, and was in
return won over by the amiable character of her husband to
the sphere of Portuguese ideas.
Before her departure to Lisbon, the Princess visited us
with her parents in Gotha, and she left on me and the Duchess
an ever memorable impression, which her early death has not
impaired.
CHAPTER VII
GENERAL SITUATION AFTER THE CRIMEAN WAR.—NAPOLEON's CON-
TINENTAL PLANS.–ENGLAND’s ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM.—THE
FRIENCH REGENCY L.A.W. —THE PROPOSED UNION OF MOLIDAVIA AND
WALLACHIA.—LETTER FROM THE DUKE TO PRINCE ALBERT.—-THE
PRINCE's ANSWER.—RUSSIA PROPOSES TO SUMMON THE POWERS TO
AN AFTER-CONFERENCE.--NAPOLEON's ITALIAN POLICY. —ENG-
LAND’s DISAPPROBATION.—CoolNESS BETWEEN FRANCE AND
ENGLAND.—LETTER FROM PRINCE CHIMAY.—-PILGRIMAGE OF
EUROPEAN PRINCES TO PARIS.—THE GRAND-DUKE CONSTANTINE IN
PARIS.—EFFECT OF HIS VISIT IN ENGLAND.—THE EMPEROR AND
THE EMPRESS OF THE FRENICH IN OSBORNE.—HOW NAPOLEON
INFORMs PRINCE ALBERT of HIS INTENDED MEETING WITH THE
EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.--LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT, -CAVOUR
AND NAPOLEON.—THE PLOTS OF THE POLITICAL REFU GEES.—THE
DUIKE IN PARIS.—THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON ON THE POSTAL AND
RAILWAY systEM.—THE ATTEMPT ON THE EMPEROR's LIFE AT THE
GRAND OPERA.—ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN FRANCE AND
ENGLAND.—LETTERS FROM PRINCE ALBERT.--THE QUEEN AND
THE PRINCE IN CHERBOURG.——RECONCILIATION BETWEEN NAPOLEON
AND PRINCE JEROME.-NAPOLEON's SECRET TREATY WITH SARDINIA.
—AUSTRIA's ISOLATION.
Soon after the close of the Congress of Paris, my friend
Chimay wrote me a few words, which might be employed as a
motto for the Imperial policy in the years 1857 and 1858:
Les politesses eacagérées de la Russie, he said at the end of a
letter of the 16th of September, 1856, somt aceeptées sows bend-
fice d'inventaine. On m'y ajowte Qw'wme confiance illimitée,
mais aw fond elles plaisent.
Although Napoleon was far from wishing to surrender the
friendship of England, he had convinced himself that the
English neither could, nor would, assist him in his continental
plans. Everything he had to hear from England, became
230 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
extremely inconvenient to him, for, as to the chief questions of
Napoleon's programme, Poland and Italy, both the English
Court and the Cabinet observed a striking reserve. All
interests in England were exclusively concentrated in Eastern
affairs, the more so, as the Indian mutiny just appeared to be
disclosing the sorest side of the ocean-ruling nation, and the
idea was beginning to dawn upon her, that Russia might one
day endanger the position of the English in Asia.
Under these circumstances, England was just as persistent
in demanding that the Russians should strictly fulfil the
stipulations of peace, as the French were on their part inclined,
in many points, to allow such interpretations as were most
agreeable to the Northern Power. Lord Palmerston wrote
the most voluminous and serious diplomatic notes, now about
the true and the false Bolgrad, whose doubtful situation on
the maps had plunged Parisian diplomatists into grave de-
lusions, now about the importance of the Serpent's Island for
the navigation of the Danube, and now again about the
demolition of the fortifications of Kars, Ismail, and Reni.
There was an irritability and an agitation in everything the
English Cabinet undertook with regard to Russia, that the
Emperor of the French had no difficulty in representing him-
self as the real pillar of the peace of Europe.
Various reasons seemed to render it advisable for the Em-
peror to preserve the tranquillity of the Globe for some time.
After the conclusion of peace, the extravagant speculation in
the money-market soon led to a crisis, which reacted on com-
merce and industry, and impoverished the working classes in
France. Manifold symptoms of conspiracies in Paris and in
the provinces kept the police in continual motion, and, as there
were repeated reports of happily frustrated attempts on the life
of the Emperor, the Stock Exchange classes gradually became
accustomed to take systematic advantage of the rumours that
were thus incessantly hovering in the air. On the life of the
French monarch depended, according to most people's notions,
the peace and order of Europe.
The Italian enigrants in London and Switzerland were
actually determined to do away with the Emperor, and
THE FRENCII REGENCY LA W 23 I
Tibaldi's, Bartolini's, Grilli's, and Pianori's, attempts on his life
appeared to confirm the opinion of Cavour, that the revolution
could only be prevented by a liberated Italy. At the French
Court itself, a ‘red party’ was talked of, which thwarted the
conservative and loyal intentions of the Emperor. The wishes
and claims of Italy, which had been proclaimed in mighty
words at the Congress, but had not been listened to by the
Powers, found representatives amongst the nearest relatives of
the Emperor, and ever ready advocates in Prince Jerome and
Count Morny. That Cavour, before leaving the Congress,
had spoken frankly and unreservedly with the Emperor,
seemed quite sufficient, in the opinion of the world, to neces-
sitate the latter's following up his moral approbation of
Sardinian policy in course of time with actual assistance.
- In addition to general political questions, there was a grave
dispute in the family of the Emperor himself about a Regency
law, which circumstances seemed to render urgently necessary.
In July, 1856, it came to bad scenes between the Emperor and
Prince Napoleon, who considered himself set aside, because,
according to one project, the princes of the family were ex-
cluded from the council of the regency, whilst Count Morny
was in the general opinion secretly designated as Regent.
Om, commait trop l'absolutisme de Sa Majesté, swrtowt em.
pareille matière, Prince Chimay wrote to me. He thought it
plausible, that Prince Napoleon should threaten to resign his
seat in the Senate, and declare that he would rather go into
voluntary exile again, far from France:
‘Quoiqu'il en soit,” Prince Chimay added, “Votre Altesse recon-
maitra dans ces faits une nouvelle preuve de tiraillements de tous
genres qui se produisent chaque jour autour et dans le sein même
du gouvernement Impérial. On l’a dit et je le répète avec une
conviction croissante : Ce reposest incompatible avec le caractère
français, et la paix sera bien plus difficile à maintenir que l'état de
guerre.’
During the summer, the wildest rumours had been pur-
posely spread in Paris, not only about the physical health of
232 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
the Emperor, but also about the state of his mind. People
went so far as to say, that an article of the Constitutionel,
in which it was asserted that Socrates had suffered from
hallucinations, pursued no other purpose than that of pre-
paring France for the mental aberration of her illustrious
head. Meanwhile, owing to the state of affairs in Italy and
Spain and the unsolved questions in the East, men were in a
state of constant anxiety and expectation of war.
With regard to the affairs of the Danubian Principalities, I
myself was to some extent concerned, the rumour having been
spread in one or two political circles in Vienna, that France
and England had determined to erect a throne on the Lower
Danube. But I need hardly say that, so far as my person was
brought into connection with this question, there existed, at no
time, and in nobody's mind, even the slightest intention of ex-
pecting a sacrifice of such a kind from me.
Unfortunately, my Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna had not
checked this idle talk promptly and firmly enough, and I my-
self had been informed of it too late. My strict instructions
to contradict the thing, could no longer prevent the empty
combination from maintaining the field for a while.
As a matter of fact, however, it was quite correct that the
Western Powers were more and more earnestly bent on uniting
Moldavia and Wallachia into one Roumanian principality,
whereas Austria saw nothing but dangers and difficulties in
the establishment of such a State. If it is remembered that,
two years previously, I had been commissioned to propose to
the Emperor of Austria that he should acquire these two pro-
vinces for his house, and that all idea of such a combination
was coldly rejected in Vienna, the difficult position in which
Austria was placed by the conclusion of peace in Paris, could
not be expressed more plainly, than by the fact that she now
feared to see an Eastern Piedmont rise up in Roumania.
It was not without an ulterior object, that the candidature
of two other German Princes had been discussed, whose inti-
mate relations to myself made it desirable for me to enter into
communication on the subject with my brother. I therefore
wrote to London, on the 17th July :
LETTER FROM THE DUKE TO PRINCE ALBERT' 233
‘What I am writing to you about to-day, concerns a
matter of politics and a direct question. There is a good deal
of talk about the Danubian Principalities receiving a German
Prince as Regent, whether under Turkish swzerainty, or
sowveraine is still undecided. It is said, that you English and
the Emperor Napoleon would like Prince Nicholas of Nassau.
I know from Berlin, that they have the Crown Prince of
Augustenburg in their eye there. In Vienna, they want neither
of the two. The matter would not concern me at all, as the
Danubian Principalities in themselves have nothing to do with
Germany. But both candidates are friends of mine, and belong,
with so many others, to the closer circle which unites political
views and patriotic feelings in Germany. Both the young
people have received hints from various sides. Both, too, are
intimate friends of one another, and neither of them desires to
prejudice the other in any way. There are other opinions pro
or contra, and there is nowhere any certainty as to how far
the aforementioned Governments really mean to give effect to
their views. I should look upon it as a great proof of con-
fidence on your part, if you were to tell me the plain truth of
the matter, in so far as it concerns you. Stockmar says he
knows nothing of the matter. - -
‘As to us others, we are decidedly of opinion that Augus-
tenburg should not be chosen for that position, nor will you be
in any doubt as to the reason for putting forward this can-
didate. So much is certain, the two Princes must not be
compromised vis-à-vis of one another. If I know your views,
it will be easy for me to give effect to them in our own way.
‘The fact is, you must show me a little confidence in the
matter, and you may rest assured that, in this affair, as in
every other, if I can approve of it from our German stand-
point, I shall act entirely in accordance with your wishes.
This utter uncertainty, however, is not only painful to me,
but deprives me of every possibility of counteracting en-
deavours, which are just as unpleasant to us, as they perhaps
are to you. Pardon my frankness, and let me hear from you
on the subject.’ - - -
My brother's answer fully indicated the views of the
234 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
Powers with regard to the Roumanian question, which, as is
well-known, only found its unfortunate solution, after three
years, in the election of Prince Cusa. But I consider it super-
fluous to enter here into the further details of the matter.
After receiving my letter, my brother wrote to me, on the 24th
of July, as follows:
‘I have safely received your letter of the 17th inst. The
stories which are being hawked about in Germany, are all in-
vented. The affair of the Principalities is still quite in embryo.
A commission of the Powers is to effect their organisation.
France desires that they should be united, and that the Powers
should announce this decision to them. Russia is willing.
Austria and the Porte do not want the union, and the former
insists that the question of the union should be formally
excluded from the subjects to be discussed by the Divan of the
Principalities. We are resisting both these courses. We
adhere to the protocol, in which it is stated that the wishes
of the Principalities are to be consulted, and insist on the
principle that no obstacle should be offered to the free ex-
pression of the Divan's will, as no arrangement promises to
last in the future, that is not based on the wishes of the
nation itself.
‘Whether the nation desires the union or not, it has not yet
been possible to ascertain. The Porte wants an elective king-
dom, with Hospodars for life, of which three should be
proposed to, and one selected by, the Porte. Our Ministry
inclines to this suggestion. I am declaiming against it, because
it would be a repetition of Polish history, the origin of endless
intrigues, and the ultimate division between Austria and
Russia. I believe the hereditary principle will carry the day,
but that the Governor, or Governors, will be placed in such a
position, that they cannot emancipate themselves from Turkey
as independent sovereigns, as the whole war and subsequent
peace, had, after all, merely the integrity of Turkey for their
object. Russia insists that the Regent, or Regents, should be
of the Greek religion. But whether he, or they, are to be
chosen from the country itself, or whether a foreign Prince is
to be selected, is uncertain. In the first case, we should get
MAPOL EON'S ITA LIAN POLICY 235
uncivilised, intriguing fellows; in the second case, we must
think of the smaller German Courts . . . . at the mention of
which, people here at once exclaim : “What ? Another King
Otto ? We have enough with one.” What ideas they have on
the subject in Paris, I don't know. I have often mentioned
Prince Nicholas of Nassau . .
‘Now you have the whole matter before you, and you will
see from it, that it will be long before there can really be any
question of candidatures. *
“Ever, etc.’
In the month of September, the disagreement of the Powers
described in the foregoing letter, afforded a suitable occasion
for the Russian Cabinet to propose calling the Powers to an
after-conference in Paris, in order to settle those points which
had not been cleared up at the Congress. In a Note which
Brunnow delivered to Count Walewski on the 27th of October,
the necessity of finally solving the pending questions, by
calling together the signatory Powers, was pointed out, and
complaint made of the imperfect carrying out of the treaty of
peace. In the question of the Danubian Principalities especi-
ally, Austria was accused of purposely protracting the
occupation, and thereby violating article 31, which had
demanded the evacuation of Turkish territory by all foreign
troops within six months.
France was willing to enter into a sort of continuation of
the Congress. A difference which had just arisen between
the Emperor and Lord Palmerston, concerning the occupation
of the territory of Naples, seemed to warrant the French
Government in putting an end to all further considerations
for England. The Emperor of the French had, already at that
date, sufficiently comprehended the feeling of Russia, and
knew that she would leave him freedom of action in all points
of his programme, with the exception of the Polish question.
Louis Napoleon, therefore, did not hesitate for a moment to
give the Russians every assurance that he would not touch
this wound again, and Russia tacitly left it to the Emperor to
decide the fate of Italy.
236 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAAE-COBURG-GOTHA
In Sardinia, meanwhile, Count Cavour had skilfully
and successfully managed that the affairs of the peninsula
should not for one instant be struck off the political orders of
the day. Scarcely had people heard of the after-conferences,
when it was demanded on all sides, that those subjects should
be considered again, which had been left unsettled at the
Congress.
Endeavours to profit by this opportunity were also made
by Denmark, which had no longer any prospect of seeing the
complaints of the states of Holstein simply buried in the
German Diet. No sooner, therefore, had the after-conferences
been taken in view by Russia, than the Danish Government
at once declared its determination to submit the Holstein
question, which, as an European one, would have to be dis-
cussed as it is, to the Paris Congress.
In Germany, great fears were entertained, that, here, too,
Napoleon might show himself in favour of Russia's influence
and interests, and therefore meet the wishes of the Danes. I
was consequently requested, on many sides, to use my influence
in Paris, to prevent the Emperor from making any promises
in this respect. Through Prince Chimay, I once more adverted
to the Holstein question, which I had often discussed with the
Emperor, and was confidentially informed, that the French
Government in no way intended to support the misrule of
Denmark in the Duchies.
Whilst the German Diet was just beginning to adopt more
decided measures against the Danes, it became evident to me,
for the first time in foreign politics, that this affair appeared,
after all, gradually to be regarded from a different point of
view to that in 1852. In the attitude of the Emperor of the
French, a perceptible change had taken place, since my
endeavours had convinced him, that he could not hurt the
national feeling in Schleswig-Holstein, without bringing all
Germany up in arms against him.
But Napoleon feared nothing more than a hostile feeling
in Germany, at the moment when his Italian policy was
necessarily bringing him more and more into violent collision
with Austria. The Emperor's determination, of which I had
E.WGLAND’S DISAPI’ROBATION 237
long been aware, to turn the edge of his daily increasing
power against Austria, was growing more and more per-
ceptible.
England was dissatisfied with this political attitude of
Louis Napoleon. Whilst the ideas of Italian independence
had formerly met with undivided sympathy in that country,
people now observed a rather cool demeanour there towards
everything that appeared to be connected with Cavour's
policy. If the influence of French policy in Italy was
formerly looked upon as too reactionary, it had now fallen
into disfavour, because it was beginning to turn against the
treaties of Europe.
The personal affection for the dynasties of Italy had, it is
true, by no means increased at the English Court, and it was
significant enough, that the proposed visit to Balmoral of the
hereditary Grand Duke of Tuscany, during his stay in 1856,
was politely declined, ‘because,’ as my brother wrote to me,
“we do not want to stamp our little resort as the rendezvous
of European potentates, Nevertheless, Napoleon's connection
with the Italian cause was, for all that, not viewed with less
disfavour and disapproval. People saw, in this conspicuous
tendency of the Emperor, mainly a swerving round to-
wards Russia, and the Imperialistic flirtation with detested
Russianism cast a drop, bitter as wormwood, into the alliance
of the Western Powers.
My brother could not find words strong enough to express
his disapprobation of this fickleness of the French, and his
letters were full of harsh remarks against Napoleon and his
friendliness towards Russia. - -
‘In politics, he wrote, on the 5th of October, ‘things look
confused. Russia has evidently suffered more than she likes
to admit, and needs a few years of repose, but merely in order
then to take up her game again. Meanwhile, she is en-
deavouring to break up the Western Alliance, for which
purpose she finds excellent material in the roguery of
the French State officials, and the good-humoured in-
difference of their sovereign towards all things that are
in course of development. We here are easily placed with
238 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
our backs to the wall, because we are governed by fixed
principles.'
Under these circumstances, it could not be concealed for
long in Paris, that France no longer stood on the old footing
with England, and it sounded to me like an unconscious echo
of the just quoted words of my brother, when, some time later,
Prince Chimay reported to me :
L'alliance anglaise acceptée comme nécessité est encore sur les
lèvres, mais elle n'est plus dans le cœur. Non pas que l'Empereur,
très Anglais, ne soit vraiment affectionné à la Reine, mais je parle
ici du cabinet et de l'Empereur représentant le sentiment national.
Il me paraît impossible, Monseigneur, que si Lord Palmerston reste
au pouvoir et continue à soulever partout le sentiment démagogique,
le refroidissement ne dégénère avant peu en rupture complète.
Voici ce qu'on m'écrit de Paris : * Les positions s'altèrent et n'ont
guère de netteté,' les conférences qui vont avoir lieu s'engageront
sous de fâcheuses influences. L'attitude de la Russie dans la haute
Asie, en présence de l'Angleterre qui a déclaré la guerre à la
Perse ; l% langage que tient le gouvernement Français au sujet de
Neufchâtel ; ne sont pas de nature à disposer les esprits à la concili-
ation. L'Angleterre, en particulier, arrivera aux conférences avec
des griefs de plus d'un genre, et tous les autres gouvernements,
excepté ceux d'Autriche et de Piémont, avec des griefs contre elle.
Ce tableau est assez exact, Monseigneur. Il faut y ajouter
l'irritation profonde des démagogues et ne pas oublier qu'à l'égard
de tous les trônes leur mot d'ordre est l'assassinat.
In spite of all the distrust which sprung up against French
policy, it cannot be denied, however, that the prestige of the
Empire had never risen higher than it did now. A singular
mixture of propriety and fear determined most of the reigning
families no longer to delay the payment of the honours which
French Imperialism had so long and so earnestly desired.
The appearance of Prince Frederick William, then already
Victoria's betrothed, in December 1856, at the Court of the
Emperor, was the signal for a regular prilgrimage of reigning
sovereigns and princes to Paris. All at once, there was a
regular race among the old houses of Europe to pay courtesies
THE GRAND DUKE CONSTANTINE IN PARIS 239
of every description in the Tuileries. I should be afraid of
exhausting the patience of my readers, were I to relate every-
thing that was said, or overheard, within the walls of the
Tuileries during the year 1857, and which appears to have
made the round of Europe in letters and confidential documents.
Since Russia and France had been exchanging loving
looks, the visits of high society to Paris were watched and
recorded with almost jealous eyes. But the greatest and
most painful sensation was caused in England, when it be-
came certain that the Grand Duke Constantine would appear
in Paris, a fact that almost had a more stirring effect on the
cabinet and the nation, than the news of a revolution on the
Continent. * t r
The Emperor of the French had himself announced the
impending event to the Queen, and my brother had to consult
with Clarendon and Palmerston, what answer should be given
to so important a communication. Greatly edified by the
Prince's draft on this great affair, the two Ministers declared,
that the letter would be likely to open the Emperor's eyes
to the consequences of his flattering behaviour towards Russia.
But the Emperor of France had no intention of renouncing
the halo which he obtained in the eyes of the French through
this Russian visit. Palmerston revenged himself by doing as
if he had to go back in the Eastern questions to England's old
ally Austria. The old sinner now found it in his heart to
overwhelm Count Buol in Vienna with the most touching
flatteries. -
Meanwhile, the Grand Duke Constantine was really present
in Paris, and, for a fortnight, engaged the curiosity and the in-
terest of the public. When he took his leave the Emperor
said to him: ‘qu'il était triste de Sé Séparer quand om com-
memgait dº Se commattre, d. S'apprécier, Sams Savoir si on se re-
verrait jamais. The Grand Duke, who had not been very
satisfied during the first week of his stay, seems to have de-
parted with somewhat better impressions.
Nor was the French public at that time much inclined to
give up the aversion which, since the days of Moscow, it had
always entertained against everything that was Russian.
24o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
And, though even in the nation itself, the friendship of Russia
was sought with instinctive ambition, men were nevertheless
very apt to give too ready expression to their harsh views of
individual Russians. -
When General Bosquet was asked by somebody, what im-
pression the Grand Duke had produced upon him, he said,
according to an account of Prince Chimay, in the frank
manner which he rarely repressed : Il me produit l'effet d'un
homme peint, comme la plupart des Russes. Beaucoup de
vermis sur du bois grossier ; il m'aurait plu davantage s'il
nous avait moins parlé de notre valeur. Il a été trop flag-
armeur, l'armée m'aime pas cela.
The visit of the Grand Duke Constantine was scarcely an
exception from the purely decorative significance which most
of these meetings had received on the part of the Emperor.
He knew exactly how to choose the personages with whom he
discussed the political situation, and skilfully managed to
bring others into surroundings, where it was not easy for them
to look into the Emperor's cards. Very characteristic in this
respect, was what Prince Chimay observed with regard to the
visit of the King of Bavaria, who was staying in Fontainebleau
at the same time :
Sa Majesté [he is speaking of Maximilian II] est physiquement
très raide ; mais moralement très disposé à se montrer aimable. Je
doute que son esprit, éminemment litéraire et artistique, trouve à
s'exercer (en égard à la société réunie pour lui faire honneur) autre-
ment que sur les historiques et poétiques murailles de ce magnifique
château. La cour va s'installer à St Cloud la semaine prochaine.
Sa Majesté Bavaroise restera à Paris.
On ne peut s'imaginer combien au fond l'Empereur attache
d'importance à toutes ces démonstrations de l'Europe monarchique.
J'ai souvent eu l'occasion de signaler cette heureuse faiblesse que
l'Europe n'a pas su apprécier assez tôt, mais qu'il est bon de me pas
oublier à l'occasion.
Whilst, in this way, care was taken of the dignity of the
Emperor, both in Europe and among the French, a sort of
THE FRENCH EMPEROR AND EMPRESS AT OSBORME 24. I
standstill was perceptible in politics, which Napoleon himself
favoured. All attempts at solving the questions which had
been left open at the Paris Congress, by means of Conferences,
failed, and not one of those points which England desired to
see settled, was advanced by a single step. -
In the Danubian Principalities, Austria, Russia, and Turkey,
vied in opposing one another, and Napoleon confined himself
to preventing the question from being settled at all. His real
intentions were directed towards Italy, but he believed the
preparations for action to be still far from completed, and he
restrained, and put off, his Sardinian allies from spring to
Spring. -
At a moment when the question of the Danubian Princi-
palities in Constantinople was nearly leading to a break-off
of diplomatic relations on the part of Russia, France, and
Sardinia, Louis Napoleon sought a personal meeting with the
Queen of England and my brother. On the 6th of August,
the Emperor and the Empress paid a visit to the English
Royal Family in Osborne. In order to give no occasion for
misconstructions, the Queen thought it necessary to invite the
Ministers Clarendon and Palmerston to be present at Court
during the whole visit of the French guests. Notwithstanding,
the most detailed political conversation which probably took
place at all at that time, was held in quite a confidential way
between Napoleon and my brother on a walk which they took
in each other's company. r
The contents of this remarkable conversation, as is well-
known, were noted down with the greatest accuracy by Prince
Albert, and are now accessible to every one.”
But what came least of all to the knowledge of politicians
at the time, was the circumstance that the English view of the
situation, with which my brother entirely identified himself,
was not only not shaken by Napoleon's eloquence, but the
creeping discord between the two Powers was rather increased
and strengthened by the visit of the French Emperor. -
That Louis Napoleon, when in Osborne, personally found
and took occasion to inform the English Royal Family that
* “Life of the Prince Consort,” iv. 101, etc.
VOL. III. Q
242 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
he would shortly have a meeting with the Emperor Alexander
in Stuttgart, probably provoked my brother all the more, the
less the form of the communication enabled him to offer any
objections. The Emperor managed to turn the conversation
so skilfully, that Prince Albert could avowedly do no more
than approve of the pretended exchange of courtesies between
the friend and the enemy of England. -
In Germany, the feelings were naturally very mixed, when
the news spread of the impending meeting of the two Em-
perors in Stuttgart.
The Emperor of Austria endeavoured to arrange a meeting
with the Emperor Alexander in Weimar, where it was intended
that every vestige of an estrangement between the two
Powers should disappear, and the steadfastness of the old
European alliances be demonstrated.
I could not help thinking that these Imperial journeys at
this juncture, had altogether very little significance, and least
of all could I believe that they would lead to any sort of
settlement with regard to the pending political questions.
As I was just then going to the Tyrol, I could not refrain from
writing to my brother, in a playful tone: “We are now
getting out of the way of all troubles and annoyances, and are
going to the Alps. It is to be hoped that the glaciers there
will not melt from all the declarations of love exchanged at
the meeting of the Emperors.’
My brother, however, whose views were influenced by the
distrust with which Napoleon had inspired him in Osborne,
looked at the matter in a very serious and wrathful spirit,
and wrote, on the 9th of October: ‘The interviews of the
Emperors must have carried a pretty confusion into German
affairs. The events are still too fresh to allow of our recog-
nising their effect, and perhaps their purpose. In Paris, I
already see the unhappy delusion springing up, that the German
nation has manifested great enthusiasm for Napoleonism.
That much was discw8sed, I don't believe. The visit of the
second Imperial couple will have rather startled the French
Emperor, and may perhaps have reminded him of what I told
him in Osborne, that his strength lay in the break-up of the
LOUIS WAPOLEON AND THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER 243
old Northern alliance against France, which the Eastern war
had brought about ; but that the moment he attempted to
ally himself with Russia, he would force Austria to make her
peace with Russia, in fact, to place herself under Russia's rule,
and that this would be an easy matter, whereas he possessed
no materials for his Franco-Russian alliance, except by dis-
turbing the peace of Europe, which nobody was inclined to
do. If Count Buol is sacrificed, my prediction will be fulfilled,
and L. N. will have served to throw Austria back into the
arms of Russia.” -
It was easy to see that my brother over-estimated the
meetings of the three Emperors, for, in inner politics, they
produced not the slightest change. Count Buol was not
sacrificed in Austria, nor was the Czar able to separate
Napoleon entirely from his old English ally. Napoleon
always declared with the same frankness, that the conditions
of Europe were untenable, and, as to the point where he was
threatening the treaties most, he was well aware that England
would be the last place where he would meet with any serious
reproach, as it was just there where, for years, the “emancipa-
tion of Italy' had been both openly and secretly favoured.
Should the sympathies for this oppressed nation have now
suddenly diminished, because the Emperor of the French was
more and more openly avowing them 2
It is true, that the Power which was ever urging and
pushing forward, little Sardinia and her great Minister, had,
in the previous year, made bad experiences in England; but
Cavour reckoned more on the feelings of the English, the
existence of which Clarendon himself had admitted in Paris,
than on the official assurances of the English Cabinet in
favour of the maintenance of European peace. Thus Victor
Immanuel was able, step by step, to prepare the emancipation
of Italy, which his Ministers, with a boldness hardly heard of
before, advocated and vindicated, diplomatically and officially,
in all the Cabinets of Europe, declaring that the only choice
that now remained, was whether it should come in the form of
international justice, or in the fearful shape of revolution and
regicide.
244 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-CO BURG-GOTHA
For the correctness of the latter alternative, there was no
lack of powerful testimony. Like an international power in
themselves, Mazzini and his companions went to work unim-
peded by the English Government, and carried out their plots
with the greatest security, just in the very country where
the mere fact of the French Emperor's pursuing his own
policy in the question of the Danubian Principalities and in
Piedmont was construed as a breach of the alliance. -
The emigrants had been in a state of feverish activity
ever since the end of the Crimean war. French anarchists
and Mazzinists had combined with one another to produce an
outbreak of the revolution in France and Italy. However,
their ways did not always go together. Some of the most
radical sects would not unconditionally submit to Mazzini's
command. In the execrable crime which was being hatched
in London, with fearful deliberation, ever since the end of the
year 1857, Frenchmen, and not Mazzinists, stood in the fore-
ground. It was only an accident, that Orsini and his companions
had just then quarrelled with the ‘old man of the mountain,
and refused to obey him. Their connection with Bernard no
doubt gave the first impulse to the plan of a personal attempt
on the life of the Emperor. But the French emigrants had,
apart from, and independently of, the intention of Orsini and
his associates, prepared an act on their own account, which
was to take place all over France, about the middle of
January.
The existence and the connection of this conspiracy of
French Radicalism against the Empire is wrapped in deep
obscurity, and will probably always remain so. The imperfect
accounts of the proceedings against Orsini and his associates
absorbed the whole interest of the public after the attempt.
The wider connection of the conspiracy the Government itself
had good reason to conceal, as it was more than probable that
a number of persons would have been compromised, who
were in close connection with the nearest surroundings of the
Imperial Family.
Out of regard for these inner circumstances of France, the
rottenness of which an impartial investigation would have
THE DUKE IN PARIS 245
brought to light with dangerous clearness, a further sifting of
the revolution planned for the 12th of January was abstained
from, and people were satisfied that the attempt, in all its
details, bore outwardly a purely Italian character, which even
afforded an opportunity to employ the unfortunate incident
in foreign politics.
Of the terrible circumstances which accompanied the
attempt of the Italians, no further mention was made, nor,
indeed, of the intended French revolution; and, if the historical
accounts, which are mostly copied from the official reports of
those days, were to be relied upon, I could say that the world
possesses an Orsini legend which agrees very imperfectly
with the reality of the events, of which I was destined by an
accident to become a close eye-witness.
Towards the end of December, I had determined to visit
Paris on my way to the wedding of my niece Victoria with
Prince Frederick William of Prussia, in January 1858. I
therefore informed Prince Chimay, that I intended to arrive
in Paris on the 12th, and remain there until the 15th. On
the 8th of January, I wrote to the Emperor, and was at once
invited by him to reside in the Tuileries. But I preferred to
take up my quarters with Prince Chimay, as I had done
before. Previous to my departure, I informed King Leopold
of the programme of my journey, and said that I had chosen
the route over Paris, because I considered it my duty, on this
fitting occasion, to pay my respects to the Emperor, who had
always shown me so much kindness.
I arrived in Paris on the morning of Tuesday the 12th,
and heard afterwards, from a more reliable source, that just on
this day a general rising had been expected in the capital and
in the provinces. On the same 12th of January, Bernard had
held a public speech in London, which was full of allusions to
the events that were just going to take place in France. The
French police took no notice of these disclosures on the part
of the daring agitator. In consequence, the Minister Billault
was afterwards blamed in France for having so exclusively
kept his eye on the conspiracies of the Legitimists and Orleanists,
as to give free scope to the anarchists and red republicans.
246 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
To all appearances, the greatest tranquillity and content reigned
in Paris, and the Emperor was in the best of spirits. On
my seeing him again, for the first time, he only expressed
his regret at the tension, so extremely unpleasant to him,
which was becoming more and more perceptible in the relations
between the two Western nations, and the origin of which, he
pretended, was unintelligible to him. He spoke with the
greatest esteem of the English Cabinet, and of each individual
Minister, and dwelt with evident pleasure on his visit to
Osborne, and his exhaustive academic discussions with Prince
Albert. It was long since I had seen him so cheerful and
fresh, both in body and in mind. Not the shadow of any
discontent or anxiety appeared to be disturbing his political
position, or his domestic peace.
The Emperor had invited me to shoot in the preserves of
Fontainebleau on the following Thursday, the 14th. We
were to start from the station at nine o'clock in the morn-
ing. It was one of the clearest and sunniest of winter days,
the thermometer registered about 13 degrees above zero, and
we were able to look forward to some good sport. On arriving
at the station, I found a number of gentlemen in white
chokers, who seemed destined to travel with us to Fontaine-
bleau, but were evidently not sporting guests. When the
Emperor arrived at the station, a few minutes after me, he
presented the gentlemen to me. They were higher railway
officials, and a few money-princes. He had summoned them
to attend here, he said, in order that he might discuss on the
journey a few questions and projects concerning railway and
postal affairs, which were of the greatest importance, and
upon which he would like to know the opinion of these
gentlemen. .
The latter, however, did not seem to be altogether
pleased at this intimation of the Emperor's. After we had
taken our seats in the Saloon carriage, the Emperor, with a
jocose preamble, commenced to speak of the necessity of
facilitating travelling for the public. He said that the rail-
ways were far from fulfilling their real object, and that the
traffic of individuals was much too expensive, in comparison
NAPOLEON ON THE POSTAL AND RAILWAY SYSTEM 247
with that of goods and letters. He would therefore make a
suggestion, and propound the question, whether it were not
possible, without distinction of distances, to effect the con-
veyance of an individual, on one and the same ticket, from
any given centre to the periphery of a certain circle; that is
to say, in such wise, that people should be allowed to travel
on all lines from Paris to the French frontier, it being left to
the discretion of the passenger whether he made greater or
smaller use of his railway ticket. The Emperor thought this
was a natural application of the principle of the postage
stamp to the passenger traffic. He then took occasion to
defend the introduction of international postage stamps, and
discussed at some length the many difficulties that had been
artificially created in our postal and railway system.
Like in everything he applied his mind to, the Emperor
showed, here too, an unmistakable foresight. But, in the
means which he used to suggest for the attainment of his
ends, there was a certain want of clearness, which made it
easy for the experts to oppose him, and prove the impossibility
of carrying out his ideas. The matter was debated long and
vehemently, without the Emperor's owning himself beaten,
and without his appearing at all fatigued or annoyed. When
the discussion had to be broken off, owing to our arrival in
Fontainebleau, the Emperor, in getting out, said to me in the
best humour in German: ‘In France, the word “impossible”
is met with much oftener than anywhere else, but I don’t
consider myself refuted.’
The chase took its course, and, in honour of the fine
winter's day, we also lunched in the open air. We only
returned to Paris in the afternoon, and it had grown dark,
when we arrived at the gare du midi. The Emperor insisted
on driving me himself to my lodging, which was situated on
the Quai Malaquais. To this end, we had to cross the Seine
by the Pont Neuf. As we drove past the monument of
Henry IV, the Emperor, after a short silence, made the
following remark with reference to the statue of the King:
Of all attempts at assassination, only that with the dagger is
dangerous, for the murderer surrenders his own life in per-
248 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
petrating it. In every other attempt on the life of a sovereign,
the traitor has still some hope of saving himself by flight.”
It will easily be conceived, that these words of the Emperor,
uttered a few hours before one of the most fearful attempts at
assassination that have ever occurred, impressed themselves
deeply on my memory, and appeared to me afterwards almost
like a wonderful presentiment, which, however, stood in com-
plete contrast with the rare cheerfulness and tranquillity of
mind enjoyed by the Emperor on that eventful day. Nothing,
therefore, astonished me more, than the news which was after-
wards spread, that the Emperor had on this very day been
warned by the police director Pietri of an anticipated attempt
on his life.
When we had arrived at Chimay's house, the Emperor in-
vited me to visit the Grand Opera with him after dinner.
The Empress, he said, would, after a long interval, appear with
him to-day for the first time again in the theatre. He offered
to fetch me himself, which I declined, however, owing to the
long round the Emperor would have been obliged to make in
doing so. I rather asked permission to await him at the Opera,
and drove there, after half past-nine, in the Imperial carriage
which had been placed at my disposal.
A short time before, as is well-known, a special entrance to
the old Opera house had been built for the use of the Emperor,
in order the better to obviate the dangers of any attempt on
his life. This gate-way gave access to a little hall, whence a
not very spacious stair-case led straight to the Imperial box.
The only approach was from the Rue Pelletier, where the
carriages turned into a little blind alley, at the end of which
the private entrance to the theatre was situated.
At the Rue Pelletier, a company of infantry had shut off
* The foregoing remarks, as well as those that follow, had long been committed
to paper, when I read, in the recently published work of a French diplomatist, the
following sentence with reference to Pianori's attempt on the Emperor's life:
“L’Empereur continua sa promenade au pas, sans manifester d’émotion; le pistolet
ne l’effrayait pas, il ne redoutait que le poignard, car ceux qui s'en servent, disait-il,
me tremblent pas, ils ont, d’avance, fait le sacrifice de leur vie.’ It is to be concluded
herefrom, that Napoleon's remark to me, which was made in almost identical words,
must have been frequently repeated. As, however, the author of that work general-
ises the fact of Napoleon’s fear of the dagger (his remark to me was made with
respect to Henry IV) I may possibly have been the source of that story myself.
THE ATTEMPT ON THE EMPEROR'S LIFE 249
the little alley, so that mone of the general public could gain
access to it. Along the houses opposite the theatre, about
twenty to twenty-five policemen had been stationed, who were
easily recognisable by their three-cornered hats and short blue
mantles. The windows of the neighbouring houses, which
opened into the alley, were all lighted up by gas-flames, like
at an illumination, and at each window a policeman was
visible.
Before the entrance into the blind alley, my carriage—
which, as an Imperial State carriage, with two servants on the
footboard, was easily distinguishable—was obliged to proceed
at a walking pace, owing to the dense crowd of people in the
Rue Pelletier. Just as the company stationed there wheeled
about to let me pass, I noticed an individual who seized hold
of the bridle of the horses. The carriage was arrested for a
few seconds, and I heard some one mention my name. With-
out taking any notice, I descended the next instant at the
stair-case of the theatre, where I was received by General
Fleury and three other persons belonging to the Imperial
intendancy of the theatre. Instead of going upstairs into the
box, I stayed in the open air, in response to the General's
suggestion that we should smoke a cigar until the Emperor
arrived.
The evening was as mild as if we were in the South, and
the cloudless moonlight night seemed to invite us to lounge
a little longer up and down in front of the theatre. Involun-
tarily, the conversation turned upon the precautionary measures
which had lately been adopted here, and General Fleury
declared, with great vivacity, that, owing to the arrangements
now made, the safety of the Emperor was so great, that to
perpetrate an attempt at this house, like the last one at the
Opera Comique, was scarcely possible.
And, indeed, I can truthfully aver that, on that fatal
evening, not a single person was to be seen in the alley, who
had not evidently some office to perform there.
Meanwhile, the cry ‘vive l’ Emperewſ'' sounded from the
Rue Pelletier. From the order of the officer commanding the
company at the entrance, and the beating of the drums, it was
25o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
to be gathered that the Emperor would drive up in another
instant.
We threw our cigars away, and re-entered the hall. At
that moment, we heard a detonation, which at first gave me
the impression as if the company had fired. We turned to
the door, to see what had happened. In the same instant, a
second bomb exploded under the approaching carriage of the
Emperor, by which the coachman, horses, servants, and lancers
of the escort, were knocked down. Cries sounded from the
street, and the lamentations of the wounded were heard,
intermingled with cries for help. I was still standing there,
petrified with horror, when the Emperor and the Empress
rushed in. They seemed about to fall. The Empress seized
me, as it were, mechanically, by the arm, and said, pretty
calmly: Sawvez—moi ! The Emperor was like one stunned ;
he staggered, and I thought he was wounded. His hat was a
little knocked in, and torn on one side by a bullet. But, before
I had collected myself, and could take in the situation, a third
and still more fearful explosion followed quite close to us.
The bomb must have been thrown straight at the door of the
hall. Fragments of the petard, and bullets, smashed the
windows, and rebounded from the ceiling.
Curiously enough, directly after the Emperor and Empress,
a number of people had forced their way into the inner room,
as if by magic, and amongst them not a few wounded. I
dragged the Empress, whom I had on my arm, away with me,
and recollect having knocked down some person who blocked
the way, as I was endeavouring to reach the stair-case leading
to the box. The Emperor appeared at a loss to know in
which direction to turn. Then he followed us up the stairs,
and at last we all reached the box. f
In the meantime, the acting and singing had commenced
in the theatre. We just entered, to hear the oath in the
Rutli scene in William Tell. A series of scenes out of various
operas was being given, and Ristori was to appear in the
death scene in Marie Stuart. In the first entr’acte, during
which the whole audience must have already heard of the
attempt, as the wounded were receiving their first bandages
THE ATTEMPT ON THE EMPEROR'S LIFE 25 I
in the corridors of the theatre, the Emperor and the Empress
stepped to the front of the box. But they met with no
reception. Not a hand stirred, not a sound was raised. The
Emperor said to me in German: ‘There you see the Parisians,
—they are never treated harshly enough.”
The Empress, after having convinced herself that she and
the Emperor were entirely unhurt, had regained her full com-
posure. The Emperor, on the other hand, remained in a
fearful state of excitement; he was very pale, and showed a
nervous trembling which alarmed me, The situation was a
fearful one, because nobody could judge of what might be
occurring meanwhile in the streets of Paris. At last, Marshal
Vaillant entered. The Emperor ordered him to alarm the
garrison, and to station troops in accordance with the rules
provided in case of riots.
In the course of the evening, two unexploded bombs were
picked up, numerous fragments and little leaden bullets
brought and shown, and reports made on the number of killed
and wounded. The first of the Ministers and dignitaries, who
gradually all came to congratulate the Emperor, and place
themselves at his service, was the Minister of Police, Pietri.
The Emperor rushed at him. The little man looked very pale,
and his features were quite distorted. Eh biem, said the
Emperor. Nows me Savoms riem du towt, the Police Minister
replied again and again to the pressing questions of the
Emperor, whereupon the latter turned to me, and exclaimed
in German: ‘There you see the famous Napoleonic police l’
The Emperor dismissed Pietri, with instructions to make
another report to him in the box after the lapse of an hour,
which was done. When the Minister of Police thus appeared
for the second time, he uttered the following words, which I
remember exactly, and which I have all the more reason for
having treasured in my memory, as they appeared so little in
harmony with what was afterwards officially reported: Nows
avons fait des arrestations, mais mous me 80mmes pas plus
avancés qu’ awparavant. Hereupon the Emperor: Pas de
moms ? Pietri: Non 1
In the interval, a number of other marshals, and gradually
252 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
too, the members of the Imperial Family, made their appearance
in the box. Marshal Canrobert wept like a child. A scene of
passionate excitement occurred, when Princess Matilda arrived,
who had lost all control over herself. Quite late in the even-
ing, Prince Napoleon also put in an appearance. When he
approached their Majesties, the Empress turned her back upon
him, whilst the Emperor said to him coldly, before the Prince
had time to make any fine phrases: ‘C'est bien, c'est bien l’
He left the box, without the Emperor having given him his
hand, as he had done to everybody else who had come. The
Prince is said to have come from a banquet, at which many
members of the opposition were present. Thus the evening
passed, in an almost uninterrupted series of excitements.
The performance had long been at an end, when report was
made, that the streets from the Opera to the Tuileries were
lined by troops. The Imperial Family had been compelled,
not only to be present throughout the whole performance, but
to hold out in the box, long after it had closed. When we left
the theatre, the city had become quite tranquil. Only the
traces of blood at the Rue Pelletier still bore testimony to the
horrible occurrence. Among my more intimate acquaintances,
with whom I still discussed the remarkable circumstances of
the attempt that same night, was General Roguet, who had
escaped with a slight wound on the neck. He assured me
that, owing to my much greater stature, I should have been a
dead man without fail, had I been seated in the carriage with
their Majesties, in accordance with the Emperor's offer, because
the bullets and the fragments of the bombs had all passed over
the heads of the occupants towards the ceiling of the carriage.
My observations on that fatal evening fully agreed with
those of General Roguet, also in this respect, that it remained
inexplicable to us both, from where the bombs could have
really been thrown. As to the reports that were made to the
Emperor in his box, with regard to the origin of the attempt,
they were utterly obscure and unintelligible, when compared
with the police reports which immediately appeared on the
morning of the 15th. The official account had at once received
a fabulous colouring, which clearly showed the intention of
ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 253
letting it appear, as if France and her parties had had no
share whatsoever in the event.
I must point out once more, that, throughout the whole
evening, during which the Emperor had not for one instant
conversed apart with anybody, no report had mentioned the
name of any individual as being suspected of the authorship
of the attempt.
Over many circumstances a deep veil seemed to be spread.
It was characteristic of this fact, that, during a visit which I
paid in Paris a few weeks later, and on which occasion I again
paid my respects to the Imperial Family, not the slightest
mention was made of the matter, a circumstance which was
all the more surprising, as I had left for London immediately
after the attempt, and had not seen the Emperor again, since
he left the opera. Nor did he, in later years, ever say a word
to me on the subject, so that I always had the feeling, as if it
were unpleasant to him to recall to my memory an event,
which had been communicated and explained to the world
with the strangest inaccuracies.
To the curious and sad consequences of this attempt
belonged, as everybody knows, the deep excitement against
England, and the immediate danger of a complete rupture
of the alliance of the Western Powers. But the most striking
part of the matter was, that this agitation of the public mind
in France against England immediately took the most in-
credible shapes, on the very first day after the event. On the
17th of January, Prince Chimay wrote to me: Hier le
maréchal Baraguay d'Hillier, qui m'a qu'un bras, s'écriait aw
club qu'il Serait he wrewa de perdre l'autre em combattamt wn
pays qui cowrait de Som pavillon de Sembables monstres.
The Imperial Cabinet itself hesitated a good deal at first,
as to what attitude it ought to assume, in face of the various
feelings of the country with regard to England :
Legouvernement impérial a €videmment cédé depuis cet horrible
crime à deux courants différents. Dans le premier moment on
semblait vouloir amoindrir toutes choses, et le Monitewr s'est montré
d’un laconisme presque inconvenant. Quelques heures plus tard au
254 MEMOIRs of THE DUKE of SaxEcoBURG-607BA
contraire, soit à cause du nombre des victimes, soit écho du senti-
ment public violemment surexcité, l’attitude a totalement changé.
Déjà ce matin on parlait de rupture, même d’ hostilités avec l’Angle-
terre: la coupe était pleine, il fallait qu’elle débordät.
Against Belgium, too, complaints were raised. It was pre-
tended that the conspirators had been residing in Brussels.
Ne mégligez awcwme précaution, Prince Chimay warned King
Leopold, on the 17th of January, towt va vite dams ce
pays. . . . Je me pºwis assez insister swr l’eactréme gravité
politique de l'horrible incident qui vient premdre wºme si
jumeste place dams les causes déjà très nombrewses d'ébramle-
'ment Ewropéem. -
In its outer relations, the French Cabinet at first confined
itself to approaching England with distinct demands. In the
interior, measures of safety were adopted, which were not
quite in harmony with the calmness and assurance displayed
by the Emperor and the Empress. General Espinasse assumed
the Ministry of Home Affairs, and arrests and proscriptions
became the order of the day. The Emperor decided to follow
the advice of his surroundings, and no longer to leave the
Tuileries at night-time during the winter.
In reference to the recognitions which the Emperor
granted to the police officials who were on duty on the 14th of
January, intimation was conveyed to me of the desire that
I should bestow a decoration on one or two officials who
were already in possession of the Légion d’Hom/newr. Three
severely wounded functionaries out of the Emperor's retinue
were pointed out to me, whose services I gladly thus acknow-
ledged. With regard to a fourth member of the police, who
was likewise urgently recommended to me for decoration,
I will not omit to mention, that the services rendered by him
on that evening, were brought into immediate connection with
my own person. .
According to the account of the matter given by the police,
it would seem to have been no less a person than Orsini's
associate Pierri, who, when my carriage drove up to the
theatre, exclaimed, that I was not the Emperor, but the Duke
ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 255
of Coburg. This, it appears, had excited the attention of the
afore-mentioned police official, a certain Hebert, who then ar-
rested Pierri, just as he was evidently warning his helpmates
not to throw their bombs by mistake against my carriage.
According to this account, I really owed my life to Pierri.
However, it was impossible that Hebert himself could have
ascertained the name of the man he arrested, as that zealous
police official had remained on the spot, until the arrival of the
Emperor, and was certainly present at the moment when the
bombs were actually thrown. He had received no less than
seventeen wounds.”
It is only too plausible, that, in face of the unheard of con-
fusion which had reigned, an objective determination of all
the particulars would have been scarcely possible after the
event, even if the investigation had been a more careful one.
Neither Orsini, nor Pierri, had any interest in judicially clear-
ing up the facts of the case in every detail; hence I confess
that, after reading everything that was published concerning
their trial, it never seemed to me to be possible to gain an un-
contradictory picture of this most awful event, which had,
after all, taken place before my own eyes.
When Orsini's condemnation and execution took place on
the 13th of March, the scenery in Paris had already under-
gone a complete change. The attempt had been stamped as a
purely Italian enterprise, for which neither England nor
Belgium, and least of all the French themselves, were said to
blame. The attitude of a martyr for the liberation of Italy,
which Orsini was permitted to assume, gave political imagi-
nation a telling material to busy itself with. Jules Favre
made it his task to defend, not the life, but the honour, of the
accused, and the Monitewr itself assisted the great advocate,
by publishing Orsini's famous letters to the Emperor
Napoleon.
* Prince Chimay, after informing me that three of the officials had been
decorated in the presence of the Minister of Police, Pietri, went on to say: ‘Le
quatrième décoré, Hebert, celui qui a arrété Pierri, a côté de la voiture de Votre
Altesse et l’a sans doute Sauvée, en disant, dans le groupe, où se trouvait le misér-
able prêt à lancer la bombe, que ce n'était pas la voiture de l’Empereur, est encore
alité à la suite de ses dix-sept blessures. Je me suis fait conduire chez lui, et je ne
puis dire à V. A. tout ce que j’ai requ de remerciments et de benedictions pour Elle.”
256 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
If a communication of Kossuth is to be believed, it was no
less a person than the Chief of the Police, Pietri, who attri-
buted to himself the merit of having caused Orsini, when in
prison, to compose his remarkable letter of the 11th of Febru-
ary. On the other hand, considerable doubts have been raised
against the genuineness of Orsini's second letter of the 11th of
March, and its publication, after Orsini's execution, has been
traced back, by many not uninitiated persons, to an agreement
between Napoleon and Cavour. Pierri, as is well-known, died
on the scaffold, together with Orsini, whilst the sentence of
the two criminals, who were said to have thrown the bombs,
Rudio and Gomez, was commuted to transportation for life.
Before the drama of this attempt on the Emperor's life .
had yet reached its close, the draconic laws of Espinasse had
been accepted by the legislative body and the Senate, and
the so-called security in the interior guaranteed by the dis-
cretionary powers granted to the prefects in matters relating
to political agitations.
Before long, the arbitrary rule of the police during the
epoch of Espinasse's administration numbered 2000 victims. A
few vain attempts had been made to prevail on the Emperor
to alter his form of government in favour of constitutional
arrangements. But, as he was unable to detach himself from
the idea that it was impossible to find a man in France, to
whom he could safely entrust a constitutional ministerial
power, there was no other means of saving Bonapartism,
than by foreign enterprises.
Threatening Europe with war, now became an expedient
of Imperial policy, to remove, or make people forget, the
difficulties in the interior. No one doubted Napoleon's firm
determination to solve the Italian question by dint of arms.
Seeing that the Emperor, in order to realise these ideas of
his, was advancing more and more towards the Russian
Power, and withdrawing from his old ally, I confess that
this feature of the time, menacing Europe as it did, was
enough to startle every thinking German. Upon Prince
Chimay's faithful descriptions of the state of France, I
answered without reserve, that I looked upon a system of
CRISIS IN THE ENG LISH MINISTRY 257
despotism, combined with a Russian alliance, as calculated to
make the greater part of Germany a willing ally of Austria
against Bonapartism. France, I said, had never had a more
advantageous ally than England, and would never find in
Russia anything else but a rival who was biding his time.
Reſſharks of this kind had already passed between me and
Chimay, at a time when nobody yet believed in agreements,
such as afterwards came about between Napoleon and Cavour
in Plombières. For the present, all attention was exclusively
directed to the diplomatic dispute between France and
England, in which the weak attitude of Lord Palmerston was
leading to a crisis in the Ministry, which broke out in the
parliamentary debates with a violence, such as had not been
experienced for a long time.
On the 19th of February, a vote of censure against the
Ministry, for its correspondence with the French Government
on the subject of England's right of asylum, was moved by
Milner Gibson in the House of Commons, and carried by a
majority. Lord Palmerston at once resigned office. Aberdeen's
second Ministry, with Malmesbury as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, entered into activity on the 1st of March. After the
lapse of a fortnight, Lord Malmesbury submitted a correspond-
ence with the French Government, which, as he affirmed,
settled the difference honourably, and in a manner satisfactory
to both parties.
Although the subsequent acquittal of Bernard, who had
been tried before an English tribunal, once more roused the
resentment of Bonapartistic France, everything possible had
been done, both on the part of the Emperor and the English
Ministers, to check the national ill-will. The Queen of
England and Prince Albert were in a position to return the
visit which the Imperial Family had paid them the year before
in Osborne.
Under the existing circumstances, it was quite conceivable
that the Emperor should set great value on a fresh meeting
with the English Royal Family, and the English Ministers
likewise warmly advocated the Queen's visit to Cherbourg,
where the French were busied with the most extensive pre-
VOL. III. R
258 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
parations, as though there were a question of invading
England.
Owing to all the differences which had so long existed
between the two Cabinets, my brother had a very sore feeling
against Napoleon, and it was to be feared that the old anti-
pathy would awaken again, which, for so many years, had pre-
vented a friendly approach between the two Courts. Although
there were moments, when my brother was so full of his
personal relations to the Emperor, that his letters, and
especially those he addressed to King Leopold, Stockmar, and
others, sometimes appeared to bear testimony to a certain
enthusiasm for the ruler of France, nevertheless, since the end
of the Crimean war, and notably since the beginning of the
year 1858, he always manifested great distrust of Napoleon.
Directly after the first diplomatic skirmishes between the two
Governments, my brother wrote to me, on my return home
from my journey to Paris and London:
‘Our meeting again so frequently, though only for so short
a time, has once more proved highly desirable and useful.
Two people need only sit in two different rooms, and confine
themselves to conversing by letter, and they will immediately
misunderstand one another—vide Government departments.
Your statement of the results of your observations in Paris
was very valuable to me, and exactly confirms what we have
heard. Walewski's nonsense, and the Emperor's imprudence,
have now ended by demolishing our Ministry, disgusting all
his old friends, and exciting the nation here to the highest
pitch. They are said to be rather alarmed in Paris at the
result of their own grenades.
‘The nation here would just now run the risk of war, and
the greatest tact will be necessary on Lord Derby's part, to
get us out of a position, into which he himself has done his
utmost to bring us. -
“At the present moment, as you can imagine, we are quite
overwhelmed with business. The complete collapse, and the
necessary complete reconstruction, of the Government and
Royal household machine, with reference to which, of course,
all possible personal interests, wishes, intrigues, etc. etc. come
LETTERS FROM PRINCE ALBERT 259
into full play, are giving us a fearful deal of trouble, and re-
quire the greatest attention.
We are so far ready, that the transfer of the seals, offices,
and functions, from the old Government to the new one, will
take place to-day. On Monday, Lord Derby will make his
statement in the Upper House, and then the fortnight's
vacation will ensue for the re-election of all those members of
the Lower House who have accepted office from the Crown.
‘We mean to take a little rest in Osborne, during this fort-
night, of which we stand in great need. The new Ministry,
with a minority of 123 votes in the Lower House, and 10 in
the Upper House, is now plagued with the Conspiracy Bill,
the India. Bill, and the promised Reform Bill. We shall urge
upon it to proceed with all three, which it will not well be able
to avoid, curious as this will appear in people who have been
vehemently opposing all three.'
Subsequently, when the relations to France became rather
aggravated than improved, my brother gave vent to his angry
feelings in a letter of the 22nd of April, the greater part of
which referred to family matters, but which contained, besides,
the following pertinent remarks:
“From Paris we hear nothing good. The whole machine
has grown unsafe and unsteady. The Chief sees himself
attracted towards Italy, where he is about to produce a con-
flagration, which we must endeavour to prevent, unless all
Europe is to be set on fire. The fact is, they are still playing
with the most sacred and dangerous things, and are bewailing
Orsini. -
‘The feeling in Paris against England is on the increase, and
the acquittal of Bernard, together with the violent speech of
the defending counsel, Mr James, against the Emperor and the
Empire, and the indecent ecstasy of the public at the verdict
of the Jury, must have given the utmost offence. The
Government does not dare now to proceed any further with
the trials, because a repetition of the same result is certain,
and can only cause further injury.
‘The public here are determined not to act as the bailiff,
jailor, or executioner, of a foreign tyrant, and they have the
260 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
motion that this part was expected from them, and that they
were to be forced by threats to accept it. Here lies the reason
for the overthrow of Palmerston, and the falling through of
the Refugee Bill* and the trials, and at bottom there is some-
thing noble in it all. Only that a nation does not reason, it
only feels. -
‘We like the Duke of Malakoff, our new Ambassador, very
much. He is simple, straightforward, and friendly, quite
unused to les w8ages dw moºde, and unhappy in Society; still,
shrewd enough to make his arrangements. He is very
loquacious, and downright in his expressions. He carries on
conversation, such as a general in command, that is to say a
French one, would carry on with other officers at his dinner-
table, mixed with a good deal of légèreté. About the measures
of his Sovereign, he speaks very frankly, and not at all
flatteringly. In person, he is extremely small and stout, but
not as stout as had been said. He is slow in his movements,
quick with his glittering black eyes, and very sensible of the
favour of ladies.’
The Emperor Napoleon, however, who knew, better than
most statesmen on the Continent, that the feelings and rela-
tions of the Court in England have a very great influence on
everything comprised under the head of public opinion,
appeared to have been informed by the Duke of Malakoff
that my brother subjected all his acts, measures, and intentions,
to a very sharp criticism. If Prince Albert was able to remark
that the French General did not speak very well of his master,
it was probably not difficult for the General to report to
Napoleon the same thing of my brother.
This induced the Emperor to redouble his efforts to conceal
from the eyes of the world the inner differences which
existed between the Royal and Imperial Families. About
the beginning of July, therefore, he urgently requested the
visit of the Queen and the Prince on the occasion of the great
military and naval festivities in Cherbourg, which were to
take place in August, in celebration of the opening of the
arsenals. The English Ministry decidedly advised them to
* The Conspiracy to Murder Bill is evidently meant.—Ed.
THE QUEEN AWD THE PRINCE IV CHER BOURG 261
accept the invitation, so my brother, to his secret annoyance,
was obliged, though with a considerable modification of the
French programme, to let the great State visit be inaugurated.
On the 10th of July, directly after the first invitation from
Napoleon had arrived, my brother confessed to me his great
displeasure, both with the English Ministry, and with the
Emperor's invitation : -
‘We have now been here three days,’ he wrote from
Osborne, “but pursued by business of the most difficult and
disagreeable kind, just like in London. A Tory Ministry
with radical programmes, which carries through republican
measures with a conservative majority against a well-orga
nised liberal opposition, is a matter of infinite difficulty for
constitutional monarch.
‘We are urged by the Emperor and these Ministers to go
to Cherbourg. As the festivities there contain, in their inner-
most kernel, a glorification of the naval and military prepara-
tions against England, and we are not inclined, either to be
harnessed to the triumphal chariot of the French, or to kiss
the rod—we shall pay a private visit, and leave again, before
the festivities.’
Albert's intentions, however, were only partly realised.
It is true that the English Royal party arrived in Cherbourg
on the 5th of August, whereas the great festivities only
commenced on the 6th. But the French newspapers took care
to characterise the interview as an eminently political one.
Nothing was wanting in outward courtesies, which could
let the old relations appear entirely unclouded. But, in respect
of actual affairs, nothing essential was discussed. Even the
most notorious facts, such as the present state of the question
of the Danubian Principalities, and a great many other things,
were only touched upon quite superficially. Not one of the
previous meetings between Napoleon and my brother was so
unprofitable in a political sense. Least of all was there any
mention of Italy, whereas the whole world was already
whispering about a mysterious reception of Cavour by
Napoleon in Plombières, which was said to have taken place
in July.
262 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-G, OTHA
The great host of day-politicians may, for the moment, not
have paid sufficient attention to the piece covertly played in
the watering-place of the Vosges, or they may have quickly
forgotten it. It was no secret to my brother, that something
important had occurred there. But it appears that he never
received the slightest intimation on the subject from Napoleon,
for, when I saw him a few weeks later, he had just as little
certain knowledge of the Franco-Sardinian pact as all the rest
of the world. & -
So far as there was any news to be obtained at all, con-
cerning the course of Napoleon's policy in the Italian question,
the man from whom I could most surely expect it, was Prince
Chimay, who was carefully watching the turn of all affairs
in the Tuileries. In April, the Prince's reports enabled
me to recognise that the unfriendly relations between the
Emperor and his cousin Jerome, which I had observed on the
14th of January, had given way to an understanding, which
was hardly to be otherwise explained, than in connection with
plans of conquest in Italy. Among the public, the strangest
rumours were current, in reference to the Emperor's quarrel
with the Prince. Prince Chimay gave King Leopold some
particulars on the subject, of which he sent me a copy.
Une longue visite que m'a fait hier le Prince Jérôme, tout à fait
remis de sa grave maladie, me permet de rectifier ce qui a pu ètre
rapporté à Votre Majesté sur le prétendu refroidissement survenu
entre l’Empereur et son cousin. Ce dernier a conservé de sa maladie
de Crimée un ébranlement intestinal, que le moindre refroidissement
rend très pénible. Il avait diné la veille de l'inauguration du boule-
vard chez l'Empereur; la température était excessive, et le courant
d’air résultant de l'ouverture des fenêtres força le Prince de rentrer
malade chez lui. L'Empereur que le Prince Jerôme venait de quitter
avant de se rendre chez moi, lui avait lui-même raconté en riant les
rumeurs auxquelles l'absence du Prince Napoléon avait donné lieu.
Cela n'empêche pas, Sire qu'il n'y ait entre les deux cousins des
discussions fréquentes et des dissentiments sur la marche des choses
et la direction de la politique impériale ; mais rien n'est venu jusqu’
ici porter une attaque sérieuse à une entente, peu rassurante au
fond pour le parti avancé, dont le Prince semble se constituer le
NAPOLEON'S SECRET TREATY WITH SARDINIA 263
protecteur. Je ne puis, Sire, entrer dans tous les détails d'une con-
versation fort longue et très diversifiée, mais je puis dire à Votre
Majesté, que je n'ai rien à modifier a tout ce que j'ai eu l'honneur
de lui écrire précèdemment sur l'extrême tension des liens qui
momentanément unissent encore la France et l’Angleterre. . . .
However, the relations once more established between the
Emperor and the Prince, were most distinctly expressed by a
step which the Emperor took in Turin, at the very moment
when the foregoing letter was written. About the middle of
April, one of those obscure personages whom the Emperor
employed in secret affairs, M. Bixio, had gone to see Cavour,
and inform him that the Emperor was determined to attach
himself to the policy of the King of Sardinia with all its con-
Sequences. The programme of the agreement already contained
all the points which were afterwards formally settled in the
treaty of Plombières, i.e. negotiations with the rest of the
Powers, for the purpose of establishing the so-called rights of
Italy; war, in case the negotiations should fail; emancipation
of the countries, as far as the Adriatic, from the dominion of
Austria; cession of the conquered parts to the King of
Sardinia, in return for the cession of Nice and Savoy; and
lastly, the marriage of Prince Napoleon with Princess Clotilde
The only important condition that was added in Plombières,
was the reservation of the Emperor, that he should have the
sole and exclusive right of choosing the suitable moment
for carrying out the treaty.
The secret of this treaty was very carefully kept, and
Austria would, no doubt, have been surprised in still greater
measure than was afterwards actually the case, had not the
preparations and the agitation in Piedmont been more and
more ostentatiously paraded before all the world. In the in-
terior of France itself, there was an incessant fermentation,
quite apart from the war-like attitudes of the Emperor.
Every moment, rumours of fresh conspiracies and attempts
were flying through the air, and people in Paris were always
relating the strangest things about the Imperial Court,
whether it was residing in Fontainebleau, in Plombières, or in
Cherbourg.
264 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
Whilst the Emperor was making every effort to put an
end to the incessant rumours of threatened attempts on his
life, the conviction gained an ever greater hold on the political
circles of Europe, that his whole policy was governed by his
fear of the daggers and bullets of the revolutionists, and, above
all, the Italians. My brother also, as well the Prince Regent
of Prussia, inclined to this view ; indeed, it was said to be a
position of the most pitiable description, that the ruler of
France should be forced to consider the most important
European questions, perhaps against his better convictions,
merely from the point of view of obviating murderous plots
against his own person.
Considering all the symptoms of mistrust and aversion,
which had arisen against the Emperor Napoleon amongst al-
most all the Powers, towards the end of the year 1858, it
might have been thought that Austria would find it extremely
easy to arm herself against the ever-increasing intentions of
France.
Never before, had so good an opinion prevailed of the un-
happy victim of Napoleon's attack and the enmity of Sardinia.
Never before, could the idea of an alliance between Austria,
Prussia, and England, have, even for a moment, gained a footing,
such as it now did.
My uncle in Brussels was particularly fond of talking of
this great alliance between Prussia, Austria, and England; in
fact, he thought and declared that Russia, too, in remembrance
of better times, would ultimately cling to it. Napoleon him-
self, who took these rather hopeless ideas of a coalition on the
part of my uncle very much amiss, was, all the same, mightily
afraid of them, and, in Prussia, the turn taken by affairs in
October, had brought a government to the helm, which would
assuredly have been favourably disposed towards a national
rising.
And yet Austria had no allies To explain this strange
circumstance, particularly with regard to Germany, it would
be necessary to enter into a description of the inner conditions
and relations of Austria. Ecclesiastical and political reaction
had, in these years, reached its highest pitch, and the Austrian
AUSTRIA'S ISO LATION 265
Concordat, whose doubtful blessings were just about to be
forced upon other German States by the influence of the
Vienna Cabinet, formed an easily conceivable, and insuperable,
barrier between the State on the Danube and the thinking
politicians of the German nation.
There was no lack of those who honestly endeavoured to
point out the right course to the Austrian Government. But
all such representations were, in those hard times, made to deaf
ears, even when they proceeded from men who, neither in
respect of their position, nor their age, could be numbered
among German ideologists. Instead of cultivating the powers
of Germany, the old polity staggered everywhere, partly from
a feeling of paralysing fear, partly from an excessive over-
estimation of itself, over into the year 1859, which was to
raise French Imperialism to the highest pinnacle of its glory.
CHAPTER VIII
THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON's WoRDS TO THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR AT
NEW YEAR 1859..——THEIR EFFECT.-LETTER FROM PRINCE CHIMAY
TO THE DUKE.--THE DUKE's ANSWER.—NAPOLEON's DESIRE TO
SEE THE DUKE IN PARIS.–KING LEOPOLD's LETTER ON THE SUB-
JECT. —THE WAR UNPOPULAR WITH THE FRENCEI NATION.—
NAPOLEON DETERMINED.—OPPORTUNITY FOR PRUSSIA.—LETTER
FROM PRINCE ALBERT.--THE DUKE's LETTERS ON THE SITUATION
To THE PRINCE AND KING LEOPOLD.—NAPOLEON BELIEVES THE
HOUSE OF COBURG TO BE WORKING AGAINST HIM.–THE DUKE IN
BERLIN.—LoRD COWLEY’s MISSION TO VIENNA.—PRINCE ALBERT's
POLITICAL LETTER TO THE PRINCESS OF PRUSSIA.—RUSSIA PRO-
POSES A CONGRESS...—CAVOUR AND NAPOLEON.—THE DUIKE TAKES
UP HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH COUNT VON BUOL.—THE COUNT's
LETTER.—THE DUKE IN LONDON.—HIS IMPRESSIONS THERE. –
PRUSSIA UN WILLING TO TAKE DEFINITE ACTION, UNLESS ENGLAND
GUARANTEES THE NEUTRALITY OF THE NORTH SEA AND THE
BALTIC.—THE ENGLISH CABINET DECLINES.—THE MEMORANDUM OF
THE PRINCESS OF PRUSSIA TO THE ENGLISH COURT.—FEARS OF A.
UNIVERSAL WAR.—PRINCE HOHENZOLLERN SUMS UP THE SITUATION
IN BERLIN.
ON the 1st of January, 1859, the corps diplomatique assembled
in the Tuileries, as it did every year, to offer the Emperor its
customary felicitations. After the official addresses were con-
cluded, the Emperor approached the separate Ambassadors,
and said to Baron Huebner, the Austrian Ambassador, some-
thing like the following words: “I regret that our relations
to your Government are no longer so good as they were in the
past. But I beg you to assure the Emperor Francis Joseph,
that my personal feelings are not altered in the least.’
As the words of the Emperor were not at once officially
determined, they circulated in manifold readings through the
LETTER FROM PRINCE CHIMAY TO THE DUKE 267
world, and the New Year's greeting soon received an excessive
consequence, which subsequently even alarmed the Emperor
himself.
Baron Huebner appears to have received the Emperor's
words with signs of the most painful embarrassment, and
there was no lack of persons in the corps diplomatique, who
put the worst construction on them. In the drawing-rooms of
Paris, people talked, during the ensuing days, of nothing else
but the Imperial words, to which also the Court in Vienna
attached a threatening meaning. Whilst Austria pretended
to be hurt and surprised, Louis Napoleon endeavoured, by
every means, to weaken the effect of his idle phrase. But the
world was no longer to be deprived of the belief, that the
second Empire had now also entered into the phase of its
extemporaneous threats of war against other Powers. Nor
were sober politicians inclined to conceal from themselves, that
the situation must after all be a very serious one, seeing that
the Emperor, as Mérimée forcibly wrote at the time to M.
Panuzzi in London, had considered it necessary thus to fore-
warn the public, on an occasion when it would have been so
easy and simple to say nothing.
In point of fact, the Emperor, just at the time when he was
universally said to have quite entered into the footsteps of his
uncle, really had great apprehensions of a dangerous coalition,
which, in his opinion, was beginning to be formed against him.
After Chimay had informed me on the 3rd of January,
1859, of his having found the belief current in leading circles, .
that a complete understanding had been brought about between
Prussia and Austria, with respect to which I also was credited
with a doubtful merit in the eyes of the Emperor, he wrote on
the 22nd of January, after having spoken with Napoleon
himself, the following characteristic despatch, which, owing to
its importance, I must subjoin here in full:
Rassurá hier par M. de Meyern sur la bonne arrivée de ma
dernière communication je me hāte d'édifier Votre Altesse sur ce que
j'ai constatá depuis. Lorsque j'ai vu l'Empereur, il y’a environ dix
jours, Sa Majesté m'a dit savoir de Londres, de Berlin, de Vienne
268 MEMOIRS OF THE DU KE OF SA X E-CO BURG-GOT'HA
même, que notre Roi n'était pas étranger aux efforts qui se faisaient
· sur plusieurs points pour reconstituer une unité allemande dans un
but hostile. Sa Majesté ajouta que sans ajouter foi à tout ce qui se
disait, elle s'en préoccupait cependant, et que je devais comprendre
l'impossibilité pour la France d'accepter autour d'Elle rien qui
ressembla ou put conduire à une nouvelle coalition. Je n'ai pas
besoin de dire à Votre Altesse avec quelle énergie je combattis tout
ce qui était personnel à mon auguste maître dans l'esprit de
l'Empereur, mais vous savez autant que personne, Monseigneur, la
ténacité des idées Impériales. J'ai rencontré dans cette conversa-
tion avec plus d'assurance et de netteté les principes énoncés par M.
de Montessay, et j'ai tout lieu de croire que les relations de la famille
Royale de l'Angleterre, comme les vôtres, Monseigneur, avec Berlin
et les autres cours, sont largement exploitées par le zèle des agents
Français, dans le sens compromettant qu'ils croient le mieux flatter
l'opinion ou les préventions du cabinet des Tuileries. J'ai remis à
l'Empereur une lettre du Roi, et j'ai reçu la réponse Impériale que
je viens de transmettre à Bruxelles. Cet échange intime de pensées
ne peut être que favorable, mais je n'en crois pas moins à l'absolue
nécessité d'une excessive réserve en toutes choses de notre part tant
que dure la crise actuelle, l'une des plus ménaçantes qui depuis 1848
aient pesé sur la politique Européenne.
On ne peut ou on ne veut pas comprendre aux Tuileries, que
l'union qu'on redoute et qu'on dit vouloir combattre, est avant tout
provoquée et nécessitée par les inquiétudes que les Tuileries répandent
elles-mêmes ; quoiqu'il en soit, le fait existe, et moins il est accept-
able ici, plus il devient compromettant pour la stabilité de la paix,
aussi longtemps qu'on aura l'espérance d'isoler les intérêts allemands,
de les neutraliser les uns par les autres, ou de les battre en détail.
Je sais, Monseigneur, qu'on cherche à se rassurer, par l'absence d'un
prétexte suffisant à une rupture directe entre Vienne et Paris, mais
la question n'est pas là, elle est à Turin et à Milan. Sans doute la
présence du Comte Buol et de Hubner contribuent à fausser et à
aigrir les rapports, mais le véritable danger reside bien plus d'une
part dans la position intolérable de Cavour, forcé de sortir d'embarras
par un éclat quelconque, et d'autre part dans le principe de la
puissance Autrichienne en Italie. Je ne pense pas que personne
puisse espérer que Cavour propose de licencier l'armée qu'il ne peut
plus payer et d'abandonner la fantasmagorie qu'on appelle l'unité et
la patrie Italienne. L'Autriche de son côté, peut-elle désarmer et
THE DU KE"S A N S JVER} 269
s'en rapporter pour la conservation du Milanais à Emanuel et au
Comte Borromeo ? Je crois toujours, Monseigneur, que rien n'est
plus dangereux em politique, comme en beaucoup d'autres choses,
que de substituer les hypothèses et des convenances à la réalité.
Je suis autorisé à croire sans doute que la chute de Buol, le rappel
de Hubner, une proposition de conférences prolongeraient la situa-
tion, et en pareille matière le temps gagné est chose immense pour
tout le monde, mais ce n'est pas une conclusion, et il ne faut pas se
dissimuler que celle qu'on veut ici, c'est l'expulsion de l'Autriche
du Milanais. Y a-t-il au monde un seul Autrichien qui consente
à discuter cette question autrement qu'à coups de canon ? Evidem-
ment non ; et c'est ce qui effraye, Monseigneur, tous les hommes
sérieux et de bonne foi qui reconnaissent en même temps l'impossi-
bilité d'un statu quo italien ruineux et agaçant pour tout le monde.
Je recommande tout spécialement à Votre Altesse les cor-
respondances du journal Le Nord. Elles dépeignent très exactement
la situation, depuis 15 jours surtout. L'armée de Lyon est sur le
qui vive. Les armements et les préparatifs militaires de tous genres
s'exécutent sur une large échelle, et cela explique le découragement
et la prostration qu'on remarque ici chez tout le monde officiel, si
largement compromis dans les oscillations financières.
Ailleurs, on pourrait espérer une réaction sur la pensée gouverne-
mentale de la part de tous ces intérêts menacés, mais ici, plus les
circonstances sont graves, plus on est près de ces grandes et subites
résolutions qui étonnent et compromettent l'Europe, plus la pensée
directe ici se concentre en elle-même et devient impénétrable même
pour ses intimes.
Walewski ignorait encore il y a quinze jours le mariage de Turin.
En resumé, Monseigneur, la situation est des plus graves et
mérite toute la sollicitude des hautes intelligences préposées par la
Providence à la Sauve-garde des peuples et des intérêts sociaux.
De Votre Altesse
le très humble et fidèle serviteur
PRINCE DE CHIMAY.
I did not delay answering Chimay's interesting letter, as
I was persuaded that he would find an opportunity to com-
municate direct to the Emperor Napoleon the observations
which I was in the position to make concerning the state of
affairs in Germany. I denied, first of all, the official assertions
27o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA-XE-COBURG-GOTHA
of the French Ambassadors, according to which a coalition of
the Eastern Powers against France was on the point of being
formed, but, at the same time, I frankly expressed my con-
viction, that, in the contingency of a war between France and
Austria, no doubt all friends of peace would unite, and that,
what appeared to be feared in France as already existing at
the present moment, was more likely to be formed at some
future time, as a consequence of the war. ‘ Vows sentez bien,
I remarked to Prince Chimay, ‘qw’om commence dº se fatiguer
de se trowver tow8 les ams vis-á-vis dºwn bowleversement général
ow dºwne guerre destructive qui nows vient eacclusivement de
la France. . . . . C'est d Paris oº il faut bien se garder de
me pas experimenter avec la patience et le Semtiment mational
des peuples étrangers.’
Much as I was attached to the Emperor—so I went on to
say in my elaborate letter—and much as I appreciated his
good qualities, I was obliged to warn him very decidedly
against the false reports of his agents. Just as the Emperor
Nicholas had once been driven to a fatal delusion, through such
information on the situation of Europe, so, too, was Louis
Napoleon in danger of materially under-estimating the feeling
in Germany, in case of an attack upon Austria. I remarked,
that, both in Vienna and in Berlin, the French embassies were
beset by a number of people who pursued nothing but
personal ends, making believe that an understanding between
the German Powers was never to be expected.
My hints appeared to the Emperor, who read my letter to
Prince Chimay, of sufficient weight for him to entertain the
wish to speak with me personally. On the 11th of February,
I received a telegraphic invitation from the Emperor to come
to Paris. That I did not respond to it, was one of those
political sins of omission, which I repented very much later
on. But, as matters stood, I thought it desirable to take King
Leopold into my confidence, and he answered with the
following interesting letter.
‘Laeken, February 14th, 1859.
‘MY DEAR ERNEST, LI thank you for having asked me,
KING LEOPOLD'S LETTER ON THE SUBJECT 271
before taking any resolution, and have already answered
telegraphically with ‘Non.’ The matter stands thus: The
Emperor Napoleon is for the present, owing to the universal
feeling against war, at least momentarily restrained. He
wants to see you, in order to find out what the feeling in
Germany really is, perhaps, too, in order to exercise a tran-
quillising effect on the Paris public, and to make believe in
France, that the disposition in Germany is very swbmissive.
He would therefore endeavour to draw advantage from your
immediate visit, whilst you, on your side, would attain mothing,
and run the risk, besides, of having subsequently to declare in
all directions, that you had mot said this or that which was
imputed to you.
‘My advice, therefore, is to postpone the matter very
politely and kindly, for reasons which are easily found.
Perhaps in a month or so, we can hope that he will be
induced to give up his ideas of war, and a decent attitude on
the part of Prussia and Germany may save us from much
evil.
“If he sees, and if he can be made to believe, that Germany
has no intention of again enjoying the blessings of 1806-7, he
will drop the matter. If he imagines the thing to be easy, and
thinks Prussia is inclined to see Austria ruined, he will most
assuredly make war. He is not wrong in believing that a
little success would reverse public feeling in France, and he is
personally very desirous of commanding a victorious army.
Cavour is behaving disgracefully, and is entirely taken up
with his own interests. To describe Italy as so unhappy, is
well-known to be pure humbug. The Sardinians will attempt
a collision, in order to enforce war. It must be made plain to
them, that this will lead to nothing. An able Austrian Chief
might try and give the Sardinians a good drubbing, before
Napoleon could be on the spot, but it is too risky, on account
of the consequences. I sum up: (1) In a month, or thereabouts,
your visit to the Emperewr Napoleon may have a very useful
effect, and give you the merit of having beneficially influenced
affairs. (2) When the time comes, it will always be necessary
to convince Napoleon, that the Germany of 1806 does not
272 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
exist any more, but a German nation, which is determined
courageously to resist any foreign dominion.
‘The Emperor Napoleon wrote to me himself, a short time
ago, that nothing had left so disagreeable an impression in
France, as the coalition of the years 1813, 14, 15. Raison de
plus, as there is no question of any coalition of war, for coming
to a sensible understanding on a coalition of peace. I am
sending this letter to Berlin. Write me a few words, as to
how you are satisfied with Austria's behaviour, and what is
intended and believed in Berlin.
‘Your faithful old uncle,
• ‘LEOPOLD.’
The allusions of my uncle to the aversion of the French
for the war, were only too correct, and were confirmed more
and more every day. Though it was almost forgotten, after
the result of the actual events, it is nevertheless certain that,
in the then preparatory stage of the war, a single energetic
word on the part of Prussia and Germany would have sufficed
to prevent the fearful war of 1859. *
The French in general thought with terror of the con-
sequences of a contest that was to be fought out in their
vicinity. They took not the slightest interest in the affairs of
Italy. The fluctuations which the money-market had been
undergoing, since Huebner's New Year's greeting, excited the
wealthy classes, and the opposition declared that the Emperor
wanted to sacrifice the blood of the French, chiefly from fear
of the Italian attempts on his life, of which two fresh ones
had again been planned at the end of December. -
A person of my acquaintance, who took a high position in
financial circles, wrote to me, on the 8th of February, from
Paris :
‘The general opinion, in so far as it is allowed to express
itself under the existing circumstances, has declared itself
energetically against the venture of a war, not only in Paris,
but, according to the reports of the prefects and the com-
manders of the gendarmerie, which are made direct to the
Emperor, in the provinces too.”
THE WAR UNPOPULAR WITH THE FRENCH 273
After a few days, the same authority illustrated this
assertion by further particulars, which are still worthy of
notice, even at the present day:
‘Since the 8th inst., no important change has taken place in
the political situation. The comments on the Speech from the
Throne have afforded no means of finding any new motives in
it to hope for a peaceful adjustment of the existing differences,
and diplomatists are more alarmed than ever. The most
effective means of preserving peace would be, according to
their opinion, some energetic proceeding on the part of
England, coupled with the sending of a strong fleet to the
Mediterranean.
‘Of the current bruits de Salom, one or two are perhaps
not without interest, and may throw some light on the position
of affairs. The Minister for Home Affairs, M. Delangle, repre-
sented to His Majesty that the war was unpopular, which was
not admitted on the part of the Emperor. Delangle thereupon
proposed that, for the purpose of sounding public opinion, no
ordres d'acclamation should be given for the entrée of the
Prince and Princess Napoleon. His Majesty accepted the pro-
posal, and the result was, that the illustrious young couple
was received in complete and almost uncourteous silence.
The Princess is said to have been no less astonished than dis-
tressed at this reception.
‘Meanwhile, the violence of Prince Napoleon sometimes
leads to unpleasant scenes in the Council of Ministers. During
one discussion, he is said to have called the Minister of Foreign
Affairs “mal appris.” There is talk now, on many sides, of the
resignation of this Minister, who, by his given assurances of a
pacific policy, is said to have engaged himself too far in this
respect. His resignation would therefore be a bad symptom,
for which reason it has probably not been accepted up to the
present.
‘The Pope is said to be declaring himself very energetically
against any sort of abatement of his temporal power. His
Holiness is said to have expressed himself towards an impor-
tant, though not official, personage, about as follows: “On
vewt me spolier, me dépowüller de mom indépendance, me
VOL. III. S
274 MEMOIRs of THE DUKE of SaxEcoBURG-60THA
priver de Domaine de St Pierre. Et bien / Je préférerai,
plwtót que de consentir, m'eloigner et faire wºn appel à towte
la catholicité.” º
‘On the 8th inst., there was a grand Court ball, which the
Emperor did not attend, owing to indisposition. The Empress
received the Corps Diplomatique, and said to Prince Reuss,
first secretary to the Royal Prussian Embassy, and just now
Chargé d'Affaires: “Eh bien, Prince, comment avez-vous
trouvé le discours de l'Emperew, 3 J'espère que la Prusse sera,
avec mows, elle me powrºra qu'y gagmer.”
‘The latter remark showed plainly, that a decided position
had been taken up in the Tuileries, and that war had been
resolved on there, whilst French diplomatists were declaring
the reverse to be the case. Prince Chimay, too, who had an
interview with the Emperor about this time, wrote to me in
the same sense. He summed up the result of his interview in
the words: “Cette attitude eaſpectamte de l'Emperewr prowve
Swrabondamºment, Selon moi, ce dont je m'ai jamais dowté, le
parti pris Sur le fond de la question. La discussion, s'il y
en a, ne portera que Sur l'opportunité et la forme.” -
Walewski caused assurances to be given at all the
European Courts, that nothing was farther from the intention
of the Imperial Cabinet, than a one-sided alteration of the
treaties. But, at the same time, comprehensive concentrations
of troops were noticed in southern France, and it was said
that the passes of the Mont Cénis were already being cleared
of the snow and made practicable for the passage of the
army. -
In the meantime, the idea of a Congress gradually sprung
up, because it was after all intended to alter the treaties of
1815, and pretend that such was only admissible with the
general consent of the Powers. It was taken as a matter of
course, however, that the conflicting parties in Italy were
thereby not to be prevented from continuing their preparations
for war. -
In making these proposals, Cavour had taken particular
account of the bad financial position of Austria, which was
unable to bear a long continuance of armed negotiations, and
OPPORTUAVITY FOR PRUSSIA 275
would therefore needs be disposed to bring about a speedy
determination of the question of war or peace.
Under such circumstances, I had gained the conviction, the
moment the complications arose, that an incomparably favour-
able situation in respect to general German affairs must result
again for Prussia, and that the course of things would once
more afford her an opportunity to make up for that which
Frederick William IV had neglected to do during the Crimean
War. I regarded the war, on the whole, as a great misfortune,
because, supposing the French proved victorious, it was bound
to give Napoleon an overwhelming ascendency. Even if the
Emperor were to renounce the ideas of his youth concerning
an extension of the French frontier, still, he was sure of so
tremendous a superiority after defeating Austria, that the
liberal and national development of Germany would necessarily
suffer a severe blow.
Now, I had the firm belief that Austria would not gain
the victory, without support on all sides from Prussia and
Germany. The moment, therefore, appeared at hand, when the
inner national reorganisation might be demanded and expected
from the old Empire, as the certain price of such support.
At any rate, the gravity of the events that were sure to occur
in a conflict between the two, at that time, strongest military
monarchies of Europe, rendered it advisable, that Germany
should not be timidly slow in taking up a decided attitude.
The quicker she was, in throwing her weight into the scales,
the more surely would she gain the advantage of an arbitrat-
ing Power. -
Above all, the question of the reorganisation of the
German army, the chief command of the Federal forces, and
the management of the war altogether, must not be postponed
now for another instant. Prussia would have to take the
lead of the movement, as a matter of course, and it was merely
a question of time, and of firm will, to employ these circum-
stances in effecting the political union of Germany.
I did not want Austria to be hurt; but Prussia and
Germany might surely offer their assistance for the price of
their independent consolidation and reformation. In short, it
276 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
was necessary to advert once more, in a plain and decided way,
to the programme of the union of 1850, and receive Austria
into a further alliance, which would once for all secure her
possessions and her position as a Power. I based all my hopes
on the energy of the Prince of Prussia, who inclined to these
ideas, and who now had it in his hand to speedily carry out
the plan he had formerly approved of.
In the midst of these turbulent days, I exchanged frequent
letters with my brother, and gave him a faithful account of
the situation. This was at the same time an answer to his
question, as to how Germany would be able to hold her own,
in case of an attack by Napoleon, which Prince Albert then
regarded as certain.
‘The times are dark and troublous,” he wrote to me, on the
10th of February, from Windsor, and friends do well to hold
peaceful intercourse with one another, before the storm bursts,
The Emperor Napoleon appears bent on producing the storm,
and much blood will flow, amongst which a great deal of
noble German blood When, and how, we here are to be
drawn into the vortex, I am unable to calculate. But, that
we shall not be able to escape it in the long run, this I
consider certain : God have mercy on him, who is all of a
sudden so frivolously bringing so much misfortune upon the
world ! If you want the text to the speech of the Emperor,
read up pages 244-270 in the first volume of the “Memoirs of
Prince Eugene.” Napoleon I there sends word to his son, in
the year 1805, of his preparations for the campaign of Auster-
litz, and orders touching the language of peace which he is to
employ. And later on, too, he always reiterates: parlez paia,
agissez guerre.’
I answered immediately on receipt of these lines:
BERLIN, February 15.
‘The troubles of the time, and the unusual activity called
forth by them, have engrossed me for the last few weeks, to
the exclusion of everything else. One would like to make
oneself double and tenfold. . . . .
‘I have quite understood the hints in your letter. They
THE DUKE'S LETTERS ON THE SITUATION 27.7
agree with my views in the fullest sense of the term, as has
happily often been the case with us in critical positions. I
wished to hear you express hopes of peace, which I myself
have long been lacking, and unfortunately only found con-
firmed, what I should have so much liked to be mistaken in.
‘The Emperor Napoleon is fulfilling to the last point,
what he, curiously enough, predicted to me in the year 1854,
and what I then vainly endeavoured to make them un-
derstand in Vienna and Berlin. The failure of the joint
operations against Russia was bouud to produce the crisis of
1859. This was already then perfectly clear to me. From a
despot constructed as Louis Napoleon is, without a friend,
with a bad past behind him, and an obscure misty future
before him, that which now will happen, was necessarily to
be expected.
‘The situation in Berlin is as follows:
‘They desire to preserve peace. They neither intend to,
nor will they, give France any provocation, and they are just
as averse to neutrality. However, in face of the imprudent
steps of Austria, which, with the assistance of the small and
middle States, would like to vote Prussia into the war, they
are still uncertain what to do.
‘I enclose a copy of the unfortunate Note which has been
issued from Vienna, to all of us, with the exception of Prussia.
If Austria could be prevailed upon to negotiate de bom/ne foi
with Prussia, and to come to an understanding with her, as to
how far she intends to assert her pretensions in the Italian
question—(I mean towards us, not France)—a joint action of
the two Great Powers would be possible. Austria is stirring
up the Press in Germany, and is prematurely putting the fire-
brand into the hands of the German Michael; on the one hand
in order to force Prussia indirectly to join company with her;
on the other hand, in order, should they cautiously hesitate in
Berlin, to direct public opinion against Prussia.
“A great number of the German sovereigns are fanatically
in favour of the war. The Duke of Nassau has just left us
here. He insists, as, unfortunately, so many of the others do,
on immediate grand military demonstrations. The situation
278 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
for all of us—towards Prussia and Germany—is just as painful
as it is critical. We are discussing day and night. But events
always proceed again at a quicker pace, and I can assure you
that, apart from the sad feeling of seeing ourselves on the eve
of a great war, our position at this moment is a desperate one.
‘However, bad as the state of foreign affairs is, I find things
looking very much better at home, so far as Prussia is con-
cerned. I found the Ministry stronger than I expected. My
friends, and with them the Lower Chamber, sensible and
prudent . . . .”
At the same time, I wrote to King Leopold :
‘I have found the state of affairs here on the whole satis-
factory. The Prince Regent and his Ministers comprehend
very well, that France cannot be permitted to destroy the basis
of European relations. However, they conceive the European
crisis now preparing more from a European, than from a
specifically German, point of view. They don't place them-
selves absolutely on Austria's side. . . . .
‘On this basis, so long as, to all appearances, central Italy
is in question, the participation of the German Governments,
or of the Confederation, as desired by Austria, will be refused
as completely inopportune, in spite of the urgings of many
German Governments, and, in part too, of the German nation;
nor is Austria by any means being encouraged in the main-
tenance of her preponderance in the central Italian States.
She has rather been advised, in case a revolt should break out
in one or the other of those countries, not to exercise her right
of intervention.
“Should, therefore, any negotiations take place with regard
to Italy, they will not agree with Austria, inasmuch as Prussia
will show herself inclined to advocate the building up of a
different political order in non-Austrian Italy.
‘This attitude is, besides, rendered necessary by the fact
that they do not yet see any decided and diplomatically
tangible reason for opposing France. It is thought, too, that
the Emperor Napoleon should be deprived of every pretext.
‘Furthermore, I have gained the conviction, that, should
THE DUKE IN BERLIN 279
the war once break out in Italy, Prussia will very soon be in
motion, and appear at the head of the German Federal States
against France. It is perfectly understood, that the weaken-
ing of Austria's position as a Power, apart from German affairs,
is a weakening of Germany herself, and that France is begin-
ning with Austria, in order to end with Prussia. I am not
afraid of a repetition of 1805. * {
‘It would be desirable, that Austria should facilitate and
hasten this active assistance. They are proceeding in Vienna
in many respects with great clumsiness. Instead of putting
themselves on a friendly footing with Prussia, and instead of
comprehending that the rest of Germany is a military cipher,
unless Prussia places herself at the head, they are following
suggestions dictated by petty jealousies, and are endeavouring
to stir up the other German Governments, in order ultimately
to get Prussia voted into the war.
‘It was such an intention that inspired the unfortunate
Austrian circular despatch, by which nothing has been attained,
except to encourage France. It would be satisfactory if you
were to use your influence in Vienna towards causing them,
at least in face of such great danger, to give up the high tone
which they have accustomed themselves to adopt towards
Prussia. Such a tone only keeps the distrust alive here, and
strengthens our common enemies.’
My accounts from Berlin were very kindly received by my
uncle, and he characterised my views as mild and firm. Still,
he probably found little ground in Vienna for his counsels,
for, on the 1st of March, he wrote to me in great distress
‘They seem to be in a war-like frame of mind in Vienna.
Isolated as they are, however, this will lead to no result.’
Meanwhile, the preparations for the christening of the
Crown Prince's son in Berlin inspired the foreign members of
our family with the wish to assist personally at the ceremony.
However, it was significant of the situation, that my uncle,
out of consideration for his turbulent neighbour, thought it
unsuitable at this moment to visit the Prussian Court. For,
whilst he requested me to act as his representative at the
christening of the Crown Prince's son, “whom may Heaven
28o MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GO THA
protect, he declared a few days later, that he noticed ‘ that
his journey to Berlin at that moment would have caused too
great a stir in Paris.’
In fact, Louis Napoleon's agents had entirely imbued his
mind with the idea, that my uncle and our whole house were
actively engaged in calling forth a coalition against him.
Numerous remarks of the Emperor to this effect are to be
found in the letters which have been published in the ‘Life
of the Prince Consort.’ By far the most characteristic com-
munication on the subject, however, was what my brother
wrote to me personally on the 21st of February. It may not
be superfluous, therefore, if, to the many documents which
proceeded from his industrious pen at this period, and which
have since been made public, I here add his whole letter,
remarkable as it is, in more respects than one.
‘DEAR ERNEST, Shortly after my last letter was gone, I
received yours of the 8th, with the enclosed memorandum.
This letter, which was to come into my hands safely (through
Becker), was sent to him by post to Paris, together with his
other letters, and reached me from there through our Embassy.
As it was not your intention to entrust this letter just to the
French post, I was somewhat startled. But, as your letter
was dated the 8th, and was, in spite of its round-about route,
in my hands on the 12th, and as your Memorandum is long,
and written in German, I don't think it ran any risk,
particularly as Becker's presence in Paris will scarcely have
been known.
‘I can only say, that I quite agree with the views you
propound. But, as you argue from the party standpoint, I
don't think that your Memorandum will have produced much
impression upon the Regent, who is especially afraid and
loath to be made a party man, or a party tool.
‘We are very satisfied here with Prussia's attitude in the
Italian business. It is firm and moderate, and does not lose
sight of Germany's interests. I am glad that the national
feeling in Germany goes beyond the line kept to by Prussia,
as, if a further advance should be necessary, this will bear a
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT 28 I
German, and not a Prussian character, and it is just the
German character which inspires Europe with respect, because
it is sure to be patriotic and disinterested. Prussia has at
once ambitious, interested, and dishonest, motives imputed to
her. In spite of the moderation in Berlin, however, they are
furious in Paris against Germany, Prussia, and especially the
Regent, and are threatening the most bloody revenge.
‘The Emperor is expressing himself vehemently in this
sense, and he still insists on seeing coalitions, where the
national instinct has spoken, and is still speaking. You, too,
are looked upon as having a hand in this cabal; Uncle Leopold
in the first, and I in the second, instance. How we two have
been conspiring together, is proved by our active (! ?) corres-
pondence.
“Should peace be preserved, Europe will have only Germany
and the attitude of England to thank for it. The Emperor
says, indeed, that the attitude assumed by Germany makes him
anxious that it will in future no longer be possible to main-
tain any peace at all in Europe, but it may perchance also be
just the reverse.
‘However, we here must after all endeavour to bring the
Italian dispute back to the field of diplomatic understanding,
for the war would assuredly be a terrible misfortune for the
world, and Austria does not appear so immaculate and
innocent, as to make others wish to shed their blood for her.
In Lombardy and Venice, she is at least in her right, though
she governs harshly. But the occupation of Central Italy by
her and France, now lasting over ten years, and the fearful
oppression and demoralisation resulting from it, is surely an
abnormal condition, contrary to all national law, and a crass
immorality : An occupation surely only takes place for the
sake of establishing a new state of order under the protection
of foreign arms, and not in stupid indifference as to what will
come of it, or how long it may last, and without any plan or
purpose that might justify such violent measures.
‘I envy you for having seen Vicky. How did you find
her ? She was very pleased to see you, and is said to have
cried when she heard your voice in the corridor, which you
282 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA.XE-CO BURG-GOTHA
know how to make audible, and which, they say, so greatly
resembles my own, a fact that is probably less noticeable to
us, than it is to others. Farewell. A thousand pretty messages
to Alexandrine.
‘Your faithful brother,
* ALBERT.
‘BUCKINGHAM PALACE, February 21, 1859.'
A few days after the receipt of this letter, I again hastened
to Berlin, in order to be nearer to the great diplomatic
operations, which were almost every minute bringing about a
change of scenery on the political stage. On the 5th of March,
the christening of little Prince William took place, which
ceremony (seeing that the English and Belgian relatives, as I
have already observed, were, to their great regret, obliged to
keep away), I attended as the sole representative of the family
of the Hohenzollern infant on the mother's side. I prolonged
my stay from the 28th of February to the 14th of March, and
witnessed during that time a series of the most important
transactions in the field of world-stirring questions of war.
At the beginning of March, lively apprehensions had arisen in
many quarters, that the Prince Regent might be about to lose
the credit again which he had recently gained. My brother
was quite in despair, because, amidst the tremendous uproar
that filled Europe, Prussia still remained silent, whilst the rest
of Germany, without a leader, was employing a language, such
as almost warranted men in doubting the political capacity of
our nation. 0.
Towards the end of February, the English Government had
resolved on sending Lord Cowley on a mediatory mission.
Thinking it was merely necessary to build up a bridge for the
Emperor Napoleon, in order to dissuade him from his deter-
mination on war, the English Cabinet sent its Ambassador,
who had just returned full of hopes of peace from Paris, to
Vienna. However, he was not to touch Berlin. On Prince
Albert devolved the task of explaining to the Prince Regent
the grounds for this setting aside of the Prussian Cabinet.
Notwithstanding, it was only too natural that they were
ALBERT"S LETTER TO THE PRINCESS OF PRUSSIA 283
greatly put out in Berlin, just at the time I was staying there,
in the beginning of March. In consequence of these circum-
stances, a good many exciting scenes were enacted at Court, and
people lived in the continual fear of being deceived by England.
In Martin's ‘Life of the Prince Consort’ these things are
obscurely alluded to. As it still frequently happened in such
situations at that period, the Princess of Prussia had been
obliged to form the van-guard, in order to obtain through my
brother explanations touching the tendencies of the British
Government. He informed me of the answer he gave her, and
remarked upon it:
‘I have just written a long political letter to the Princess,
and have therefore no more time to repeat myself. Prussia
appears to me to possess, in the presence of the Chambers, every
means to explain her attitude to them and to the Emperor of
the French, to reply to Austria, to keep Germany on the right
track, and to secure to herself the sympathies of Europe.
Let her only express herself. There is a parliamentary
language which can be very dignified and cautious, and still
retain the semblance of the lightest expression of opinion,
which the lowest understands, and which neither Austria in
Notes, nor Napoleon in the Monitewr or in pamphlets, can
employ. It is to this kind of language, and to what I would
say, that I have taken the liberty to draw attention.’
The letter my brother alludes to, which is quoted by
Martin, IV, 396, etc., but not with the correct address, may
now, I think, be safely communicated in full.
‘Many thanks, he writes, ‘for your confidential letter of
the 26th. I have since then explained to my dear cousin the
reasons which induced our Government not to let Lord Cowley
travel by way of Berlin.
‘I understand, and Lord Malmesbury also understands per-
fectly, the difficulty and awkwardness of Prussia's position.
Austria naturally seeks protection from Germany. On Prussia
will fall the odium of either having provoked France by threats
of war, and brought her down upon Germany, or of having, by
her reserve, prevented the patriotic unanimity in Germany
against France, which it was hoped would keep France in
284 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GOTHA
check. And still, Prussia must, in my opinion, preserve this
expectant attitude, unless she is to expose herself and Europe
to great risks. For, the very fact of their being certain in
Vienna, that Prussia and Germany would take the blows of
France upon themselves, might lead them to show the greatest
obstinacy there.
“But your position is not so bad as it looks, for you have
most effective means at your disposal. What are your
Chambers there for 2 Why does not Hohenzollern, or
Schleinitz, come forward and declare to Prussia, Germany, and
Europe, in a well-considered, but courageous, public speech,
“that Prussia is ready to fulfil her Federal duties; ready to
throw her weight into the scales for the preservation of peace;
ready to afford her fraternal protection to Austria, if unjustly
attacked ; but not ready to provoke France, without the
most cogent reasons and the clearest right; to bring war upon
Germany; to forbid Austria, while insisting on help from Ger-
many, to resist just claims in Italy; that she is intent on
raising the defensive power of Germany; compelled to remind
Austria that Germany owes no duties to Austria in respect of
Italy, but that Austria owes Federal duties to Germany; that
Austria's army corps must be ready to proceed to the Rhine,
before there can be any question of a declaration of war
on the part of Germany against France; that all rights
have their corresponding duties, and all duties their corre-
sponding rights; that help in Italy would be an act of
pure friendship and generosity on the part of Germany, in re-
turn for which Austria, too, must concede to Germany an
influence on her Italian policy, as Germany could not pledge
her possible existence, leaving Austria free to dispose of such
pledge ; that, where an equal right of decision does not exist
for both parties, there is also no possibility of any solidarity.”
The treaties of 1815 recognised such solidarity as 'lawfully
existing in respect of Germany, but not in respect of Italy.
Prussia, it should therefore be said, stands in the European
question in closer fraternal kinship to Austria, and is also
geographically and historically more concerned in it, but in all
other respects she is in a position not unlike that of England,
RUSSIA PROPOSES A CONGRESS 285
on whose free attitude and efforts in favour of peace praise
ought to be bestowed.
‘Thus Prussia, whatever she might be compelled to do,
would secure for herself the support of the rest of Europe,
and cowld not incur any enmity in Germany, whilst she
would acquire the right to adopt precautionary measures
against France, in case of war. By the importance which is
attached in Paris to a speech by Lord Palmerston, Derby, or
Lord John Russell, I am able to recognise the weight which
such a parliamentary declaration must carry, for it speaks,
not only to the Cabinets, but to every thinking individual in
every nation. If it can be assumed, therefore, that such
speeches have contributed towards preserving peace, we are
justified in expecting the same effect from similar utterances
in Prussia.
‘I have no news to give from here. We hope the best
from the promised evacuation of the States of the Church,
which substantially proves a com/mway accord between France
and Austria, would strengthen public opinion in demanding
the maintenance of peace as the main object in view, and
considerably diminish Sardinia's means of bringing about the
War, etc.
* ALBERT.
‘BUCKINGHAM PAIACE, March 2, 1859.’
Meanwhile, programmes similar to those suggested by my
brother for promulgation in the Chambers, had already been
discussed in many ways at the frequent meetings which I had
both with the Ministers, and with the Prince Regent himself.
A ministerial communication in both houses of the Diet
appeared to the Prince Regent for a time not altogether super-
fluous. He was undecided, however, as to what could be said,
and how it could be said. The proposals made by my brother
appeared totally incompatible with the right of interference
in Foreign Affairs vested in the Chambers in Prussia. I sug-
gested a more moderate explanation, in which the ultimate
aims of Prussian policy should be briefly indicated, merely by
way of soothing the public mind. Everything that could
286 MEMOIRS OF THIE DUKE OF SA XE-CO BURG-GOT HA
resemble a criticism of the attitude of the other Powers, was
carefully avoided. The need of peace, and the steps which
Prussia had taken for the maintenance of a good understand-
ing between the Powers were to be explained.
Finally, everything was dropped. “Subjoined I beg re-
spectfully to hand you the Prince Consort's letter, Prince
von Hohenzollern wrote to me on the 8th of March : ‘The
lack of harmony with our views here does not lie in the
contents of the counsel given, but in the inopportuneness of
such explanations to the representatives of the country. With
the prevailing spirit in Germany, no matter whether artificially
produced, or considered as the result of real feelings and senti-
ments, every single word of such an explanation would contain
a weapon against ourselves, and we should be playing an open
game with Austria, who, in face of such declarations, would be
swºre to win the match.'
Since the 10th of March, the rumour was current in Paris,
that the Emperor of the French had arrived at a complete
understanding with Russia, and the war-like disposition there
was daily augmented by the hopes of a Franco-Russian
alliance. The Momitewr brought articles of a more and more
threatening character against Germany.
According to reports from other quarters, the preparations
for war were being continued in Sardinia and in the south of
France, and thousands of workmen were keeping open the
‘passage over the Mont Cenis.
Russia's share in the matter, however, resulted for the
present merely in the proposal, well-meant for France, of a
Congress of the five Powers.
From the fresh accounts I was always receiving from
Paris, I had meanwhile gained the conviction, that the idea of
the Congress was also merely intended as a stage in Napoleon's
preparations for war, and that the whole matter was arranged
out of kindness on Russia's part, in order to give France time
for her preparations, and to exhaust the financial resources of
Austria, before the war broke out.
The strange antics which Cavour and Victor Immanuel
played, in order to create the appearance as if they held Louis
Z
CA VOUR AND MAPOLEON 287
Napoleon by magic power in their clutches, and as if they
were free to let loose the revolution at any moment, were in
great part also merely a concerted game, in order to exonerate
the Emperor of the French from all responsibility in the eyes
of his subjects. Louis Napoleon, so I was informed at the
time, regarded Cavour's diplomatic attitudes with unconcealed
mirth, and never spoke of him in his familiar circle otherwise
than as the Jupiter tommant transalpin.
I know that the extensive literature which has accumulated
on the life of Cavour, always manages to represent even the
smallest details of his actions in the light of a kind of heroic
epopee. In particular, Cavour's intentions of retiring, together
with Victor Immanuel's plans of abdication, were taken much
more seriously by those who were outside affairs, than by
people in the Tuileries. But I have good reason to believe
that, at the end of March, the most perfect understanding
prevailed between Turin and Paris. Chimay wrote to me
among other things:
Cavour, qui a eu le mauvais goût de ne pas mettre même une
carte chez Huebner, part très content de la famille Impériale, et
très froissé de l'accueil des Ministres. Le theme des Tuileries est
de le représenter comme très modéré et de rejeter toutes les diffi-
cultés sur l'Autriche. L’Empereur a dit a plusieurs personnes que
le Congrès ne pouvait abouter qu’à la guerre ou ä une éclatante
satisfaction pour sa politique.
The Emperor had then got the idea, that it would be
possible to localise the war. The great word with which
he afterwards actually kept the Powers in check, was already
found, que la guerre Sera localisée et me pewt em, comSéquence
engager towte la comfödération.
At the same time, another acquaintance of mine, who had
just come from Paris, also confirmed the fact that the Emperor
thought he could resolutely adhere to the idea of war, and
localise the conflict in Italy. He had still the same secret fear
of German national feeling, and of any sort of quarrel with
the whole of Germany, that I had already noticed in him five
288 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SA XE-COBURG-GOTHA
years ago. But he relied implicitly upon Prussia's and Eng-
land's neutrality.
There was a time, when he purposely separated himself
from everything which his Ministry caused to be said or
written. It may be asserted that, since the middle of March,
all the utterances of the French Cabinet—Notes, articles,
explanations, and newspaper accounts, were throughout far
removed from the real plans of the autocrat, who rather felt
that he was perfectly screened and covered by them.
Under these circumstances, I thought it opportune to renew
my former relations to the Austrian Minister von Buol, and
turn them to advantage, in order, on the one hand, to caution
the Viennese Government against trusting to a false feeling of
security, and, on the other hand, to pave the way for an under-
standing between Austria and Prussia.
In my letter to Buol, I particularly vindicated Prussia's
attitude, by saying that it would evidently not be her duty to
provoke her nearest and most powerful neighbour, but that
the matter would be different, the moment the question arose
of establishing an alliance against the aggressive tendencies
of France.
Count Buol's reply to my letter was delayed somewhat
longer than I had expected. It showed, however, that an
irritability against all the world had taken hold of men's
minds in Vienna.
‘The policy of the Emperor Napoleon,’ he wrote, ‘appears
to Your Highness to be capable of a double construction. I
must confess that we have regarded it, since the peace of Paris,
in a melancholy, but not in a doubtful, light. Of the two
methods of explaining it, which Your Highness sets up, neither
agrees with our own. We have not started a priori from the
assumption that Napoleon desired the war under certain
circumstances, and we were just as little able to persuade
ourselves that the sole object he had in view, was, by an idyllic
humanitarian amelioration of the condition of Italy, merely to
settle with certain impressions dating from his past. We
kept to the fact, that France has a Chief who requires the
glory of a commanding position towards foreign Powers, in
THE DUKE'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH WOW BUOL 289
order to maintain his rule in the interior, and who is bent on
breaking through the bounds of the treaties of 1815.
‘This end he would wºndoubtedly prefer to gain by peace,
rather than by war, that is to say, by cowing and
isolating Austria, and taking advantage of the pliancy of
other Powers. If he now believes he must choose the war,
lest he should endanger his existence by a retreat, Europe
will not be exonerated from blame, for not having resorted to
the only effective means of peace, that of openly, consistently,
and jointly, standing up for the lawful order of things, instead
of vainly spending her efforts in idle attempts at mediation.
My Imperial master has proved that he considers the peace
of Europe worth a sacrifice. But to unseemly pretensions
Austria will not submit, nor will she let herself be forced out
of Italy by the monstrous alliance of Napoleonism with the
revolution. A fresh—and the last possible—proof of our love
of peace has been given by our acceptance of the proposal of
a congress, providing only an honest guarantee be offered, that
France does not meditate choosing her own time for the
contest she is determined on. If Piedmont is to remain in
arms, and if France continues her preparations, the mask will
be thrown off, and I may be permitted to repeat a statement
which Your Highness heard in Berlin, and with which you
eventually agreed, viz.: that the question for us is not one
of finding mediators, but allies.
‘Now, the whole of Germany will be our ally with a
cheerful and energetic will, as soon as the Prince Regent
shows the plain determination to place himself on our side.
I earnestly request Your Highness to rest assured, that the
successful union of Germany at this present momentous
juncture depends solely upon this determination, and not upon
some question or other of form and method. With the one
exception, that we are not able to regard Prussia as a Power
standing entirely outside Germany, everything has been
done, and is still continually being done, on our side, in order
to bring about, between ourselves and the Great Power Prussia,
an agreement, first from Cabinet to Cabinet, which ultimately
the whole of Germany could join.
VOL. III. T
290 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
‘Your Highness will connect your name with an impressive
moment in the history of Germany, if you can bring your
relations in Berlin, and the authority of your counsel, to bear,
in preventing the right opportunity from being lost, to awaken
France from her dream of eventually engaging Austria alone
in a war.
‘The chief command of the Federal army appears to us to
fall so naturally to the Prince of Prussia, the moment he is
inclined to assume it, that we do not even believe we can take
any credit to ourselves in Berlin, for offering him our vote.
Nor could we doubt the general assent of the Confeder-
ation.
“I beg Your Highness graciously to accept the renewed
assurance of the perfect respect, etc.:
‘Your Highness's humble and obedient servant,
“COUNT VON BUOL.’
Much as one might be inclined to look upon the situation
of the Austrian Cabinet as a difficult one, there could be just
as little doubt, after the perusal of the foregoing letter, that,
in leading circles in Vienna, a more intimate approach to the
Prince Regent was not thought of, let alone any concessions
held in readiness for Prussia in German political affairs. The
sole question touched upon by Count Buol, was that of the
Chief Command of the army, and even there the terms of his
letter showed that Austria at bottom held out nothing but
the prospect of the offer of her vote in the German Diet. -
The view specially entertained in Berlin, was that the
coast of Germany could only be protected against enterprises
of the French naval power by the co-operation of England.
Although they believed themselves perfectly certain in the
Prussian capital, that no sort of danger threatened from Russia,
they nevertheless declined to enter into anything without
England's help.
In order to obtain information in this respect, touching the
state of things in England, the Prince Regent commissioned
me to find out, during my approaching stay in England,
whether the strong current prevailing at the Court there
THE DUKE IN LONDON 291
against the Emperor Napoleon had any serious support from
the Ministry and from Parliament.
My brother wished me to be present in London at the
confirmation of Princess Alice, which took place in Passion-
week. I travelled via Brussels, where I had several hours'
conversation with King Leopold, as quickly as possible to
London, where I arrived on the 20th of April, and stayed
until the 3rd of May. Simultaneously with my arrival, the
news reached London of the fatal ultimatum of the 19th of
April, which Austria delivered in Turin through Baron
Kellersberg, and which contained the summons to disarm
within three days.
This incident brought about a very great change in the
feeling and views all over England. If formerly the distrust
of Napoleon's tortuous ways and dangerous plans had by far
outweighed the antipathy against Austria's arbitrary rule in
Italy, the parties in favour of Italy now found courage to
speak their mind more openly, and Lord Palmerston no longer
hesitated to declare, that there was only one remedy on the
. Continent against Austria's brutalities, and that was the
French Emperor.
Upon the whole, I summed up my impressions in London
in the following terms: ‘There are three kinds of feelings
conflicting with one another. Firstly, the general desire for
peace, or at least for neutrality; secondly, the pronounced
preference shown to Piedmont and Italian liberty; and
thirdly, the aversion against France, and the distrust of Louis
Napoleon.' -
The Queen and the Prince looked more anxiously into the
future, than the English public, because they did not share the
wide-spread hope that England could remain neutral. . How-
ever, during the first stages of the war-difficulty, the com-
plete dependence of the Crown on the Ministers and on
Parliament in this question became evident to me.
I therefore took every opportunity, in my intercourse with
the Ministers, to gain a clear idea as to what support Prussia.
had to expect from England, in case she should take part in
the war. In these endeavours, I was vigorously supported
292 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
by the Prussian Ambassador, Count Bernstorff, who, in his
official capacity, had been trying long enough in vain to
induce Lord Malmesbury to declare himself more distinctly
on the subject. I consequently sent word to the latter, to say
that I should pay him an official visit, adding expressly, that
I was greatly desirous of taking a message on the great
question of the day from him to Berlin, whither I shortly
intended going.
On the same day on which my conversation with Lord
Malmesbury took place, Count Bernstorff informed me of a
telegraphic despatch which had just reached him, saying that
it had been decided in Berlin to put the whole army on a
war-footing, ‘not only on account of the dangers threatening
from without, but also in order to remain master of the move-
ment in Germany.’
Hence, the occasion was plain enough for the English
Government to declare itself in face of these measures. I
found England occupied with the most extensive military
preparations, and could therefore start my conversation with
Lord Malmesbury by asking what these military preparations,
which I had been admiring for the last fortnight, signified, if
there was no intention of coming to some understanding with
Prussia, even on the preliminary questions. I had received
special instructions from the Prince Regent to use all my
endeavours to persuade the English Government to guarantee
the neutrality of the Baltic, as, in the contingency of a war on
the Rhine, no corps of observation could be left in the extreme
East. I therefore tried to draw the attention of the English
Minister to this question of neutrality, above all other things,
but I was soon forced to see that such settlements on principle
would never be entered into, and that it was at best the
intention of the Cabinet to restrain the French fleet from
ventures of a wider description.
From all this, the conclusion could be drawn, that England
would on no account make up her mind to afford any direct
help, or interfere actively between the belligerent Powers,
and that the most she would do, was independently to choose
her own time for opposing the Emperor of the French.
FEARS OF A UNIVERSA I, WAR’ 293
Besides, it was very uncertain whether the Ministry would
be able to maintain itself during the next few weeks, so that,
side by side with all these considerations, was the contingency
of a new Cabinet, which would support the Italian cause still
more directly, and therefore be all the more friendly disposed
towards the Emperor Napoleon.
The policy of the English Cabinet thus appeared quite
plain to my mind, so that I thought I ought to scruple no
longer in recommending the Government in Berlin to build
no further hopes on England.
On the 25th of April, the Princess of Prussia sent
an excellent memorandum to the English Sovereign, which
reached England on the 3rd of May, and certainly improved
the already favourable feeling at Court, but would scarcely
have altered anything fundamental in the English decisions,
even if the Ministry had not soon succumbed to its opponents
in Parliament. For, on the 17th of June, as is well-known,
Lord Palmerston formed his second and last Ministry, which
he carried on until his death in 1865.
This memorial on the situation of Germany and Prussia,
which the wife of the Prince Regent forwarded to England,
contained a warm appeal to the sentiment of common interests,
which existed on a well-established historical basis between
Prussia and England with respect to their position towards
France. But it lapsed rather too much into the mistake of
taking far-reaching contingencies into account. The Princess
took so decided a view of the ‘instability of the present
dynasty in France,’ and ‘the basis, upon which the treaties
altogether might be re-established,’ that it was hardly possible
to make the memorial a subject for discussion.
As matters stood, a universal war was at that moment be-
lieved in, at least all over the Continent. Even my uncle,
whom I spoke to in Brussels on my return journey, had during
the last fortnight been startled out of his otherwise so
characteristic tranquillity by the actual outbreak of the Italian
war. Also in Belgium, orders had been issued all on the quiet
to make considerable preparations. The mood of the nation
itself was oppressed, and full of fear of the French neighbour.
2.94 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
The King was of opinion that it was necessary for Germany
to hold herself in complete readiness for war, and to summon
up all her resources; although he admitted that, before pro-
ceeding to blows, she ought to wait until the French armies
had taken actual possession of Austrian States, or at least of
Lombardy, which he had not the slightest doubt they would.
As to the situation in Germany, it was so forcibly described
by Prince Hohenzollern in a letter which he sent to me in
London, that I think I cannot do better than employ his own
words:
‘BERLIN, April 30, 1859.
‘The irresistible pressure of the ever-advancing facts makes
it scarcely possible to fix any single incident, and to express
oneself on the situation and the contingencies which are al-
ways changing their shape from one day to the next.
‘Hence, our present policy is no longer a question of war or
peace, but a question of whether Prussia, or Austria, is to take
the initiative as leader of German affairs. -
‘We are endeavouring to determine the latter by every
means we can employ. For the purpose of inspiring the
German States with confidence—for confidence is the chief
thing, in face of the highly strung feeling of Germany—the
order has been issued to-day to place the entine army on a
war-footing. In addition to this, the fortresses are being
armed. Thus we are approaching the possibility of war, and
are awaiting the further development of events with calm and
serious deliberation. Austria will inform the Diet on the 2nd
of May, that she has commenced the war in Italy. Whether
she intends to combine further proposals with this announce-
ment, on that point we are not yet clear. At any rate, we
presume that, evading article 46 of the Act of Confederation,
she will interpret and assume article 47 to be in point. If the
majority of the Confederation agrees to a discussion of $47,
there is no longer any doubt as to the result of the decision,
which will be synonymous with a declaration of war against
France. Now, it is our duty to restrain our confederates from
a too hasty declaration in this direction, and to reserve it to
PRINCE HOHENZOLLERN SUMS UP THE SITUATION 295
ow, judgment to decide when the admissibility of the dis-
cussion of $47 sets in.
“In order plainly to indicate our position, we intend
now to effect those preparations for war, which are to prove
to Germany that we are capable of making our influence felt,
not only with cheap words, but also with deeds.
‘We shall be able to ask this proof of confidence from
Germany, because our readiness for war is to show that we can
take part at any moment, and with the weight of our whole
power, in the defence of the integrity of German Federal
territory, and of a confederate who is unlawfully attacked.
The right to determine that moment, however, is one which
we must reserve to ourselves. It is to be hoped, that Austria
will be reasonable and, in spite of her defiant manifesto to the
Imperial nations (which, among ourselves, savors somewhat of
a hankering after the German Imperial dignity), not want to
force her Prussian ally out of Germany, and in this way take
up an untenable position of power, which could only result
in a schism in the heart of Germany.
‘Austria may, will, and shall, make use of us, but the form
and the measure of our assistance cannot be dictated to us,
but must be the outcome of our very own decision. Monday
will determine the issue for Germany. From England we
want neither a sacrifice, nor a precise declaration. We resign
claim to both. Only one thing we do hope for, and this con-
cession cannot fail us; that is, the declaration of the neutrality
of the North Sea and the Baltic, in so far as these seas wash
German coasts. Our Chambers will be closed the end of next
week. We are still demanding a credit of 50-70 millions.
And now good-bye.
‘In great haste, for the post came a day later, but with
sincerest devotion,
‘Yours, etc.
‘A. VON HOHENZOLLERN.’
CHAPTER IX
THE KING oF SARDINIA's LETTER To THE EMPERoR oF THE FRENCH.—
AUSTRIA COMMENCES THE WAR.—INADEQUACY OF HER FORCES.—
THE FRENCH ARMY.—WILLISEN's MISSION TO VIENNA.—NEGOTIA-
TIONS BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA.—THE BATTLE oF MAGENTA,
AND NAPOLEON's ENTRY INTO MILAN.—-EFFECT IN ENGLAND
AND PRUSSIA.-LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT.—THE DUKE's
REPORT TO QUEEN VICTORIA.—PRINCE ALBERT ANSWERS.—THE
BATTLE oF soLFERINO.—NAPOLEON's DESIRE FOR PEACE.—THE
TRUCE OF VILLAFRANCA.—AUSTRIA's DOUBLE-DEALING WITH
PRUSSIA.—LETTER FROM THE PRINCE REGENT OF PRUSSIA. -
AUSTRIA's CIRCULAR NOTE TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENTs.—
PRINCE ALBERT ON THE SITUATION.
IN the beginning of April, a letter became known, at first only
in private Court and diplomatic circles, which the King of
Sardinia had addressed to the Emperor Napoleon, and in
which it was said :
Si par des considérations de politique intérieure, dont il ne
m appartient pas de me faire juge, le gouvernement de Votre Majesté
devait abandonner la cause de l'Italie, cette défection de la France
serait mille fois plus sensible pour le Piémont que la perte de la
bataille de Novare,
En présence d'une pareille eventualité, que je veux croire im-
possible, il ne me resterait plus qu'à suivre l'exemple de mon père,
le Roi Charles-Albert, et à déposer une couronne que je ne pourrais
désormais porter avec honneur pour moi, ni avec sécurité pour mon
peuple. Forcé de renoncer au trône de mes Pères, ce que je me dois
à moi-même, à la gloire de ma race, à l'intérêt de ma patrie, je me
verrais obligé de faire connaître au monde les causes qui m'auront
mis dans la nécessité d'accomplir un si douloureux sacrifice !
A USTRIA COMMENCES THE WAR 297
Prince Chimay communicated this extraordinary letter to
my uncle and myself, with the remark, that its partial, though
still very limited, publicity was traced to an indiscretion, either
on the part of Count Cavour, or of Prince Napoleon. At any
rate, the matter itself was of the greatest moment, and if any
doubt still existed in the Emperor's mind, as to whether the
war was inevitable, his scruples were now gradually being
lessened by the inconsiderateness of Sardinian policy. The
Emperor used every means in those days, to make those who
were urging him on, understand, ‘qwe chaqwe jowr de délai
éqwivalait d whe perte powr l'Autriche et à 'wo gain powr la
France.’
The preparations which were actually being made for the
war, bould be effected all the more quietly and imperceptibly,
the longer matters were deferred, and the more time was taken.
Besides, France had the immense advantage, that she was able
to accomplish her preparations, thanks—as Chimay expressed
it—to the admirable wheel-work of her military administra-
tion and her full treasury, without employing any extra-
ordinary means at all.
In face of this decisive fact, it appeared to me to
be excessively hard on the part of the mediating Powers,
that they should so anxiously control Austria in every step
she took, and incessantly require her to abstain from every-
thing that might incur the semblance of aggression. There
was no doubt that, owing to this circumstance, the position of
the Emperor of Austria became absolutely intolerable. Just
at the moment when I hastened to England, as related above,
the negotiations concerning the Congress had assumed so
distressingly tedious a character, that any one who reads all
those totally worthless diplomatic despatches, which are
recorded with merciless elaboration in historical works, may
well lay claim to our pity. As a matter of fact, no one who
knew what was going on, then placed the very slightest
weight on the documents of Walewski, Cowley, and associates,
in reference to this Congress question. But I thought it
characteristic of English politicians, that they still inveighed
most vehemently against the public disturbers of peace on the
298 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
Seine, whilst they were, unintentionally perhaps, but in actual
effect, binding their Austrian protégé hand and foot.
That the latter at last disengaged himself, and endeavoured
to stand on his own legs, was after all to be foreseen, and, if
justly judged, could not be misconstrued. Just those, however,
who, for the last three months, had been abusing Louis
Napoleon's duplicity and cunning all over Europe, were sub-
sequently the first to declare that Austria had now manifestly
put herself in the wrong, as she had begun the war without
any pretext, had addressed the ultimatum to Sardinia, and
crossed over the Tessin. -
The circumstances under which the Austrian Government
was led to take this much-blamed and fatal step, are up to
the present day still unexplained, and will probably remain so
for some time to come. I find a few particulars in my cor-
respondence, which at the time permitted me at least to enter-
tain certain suspicions on the subject, and we shall probably
not be very much mistaken, if we look to St Petersburg to
find the motives for Austria's sudden and incautious outburst.
At any rate, the strangest suggestions had reached Vienna from
there, in the days preceding the ultimatum. They managed,
in every way, to make the Emperor of Austria's mind easy
as to the intentions and plans of Russia. After all—it was
said—there could be no doubt about the identity of the
interests of the old dynasties :
Little as such assurances on Russia's part were to be relied
upon, their value was none the less greatly over-estimated by
certain persons in the Emperor of Austria's suite, who, for the
last ten years, had been indefatigable in bearing the Russian
train. Count Buol had bitter complaints to make of the
interference of the military Cabinet under the superintendence
of Count Gruenne, and, according to accounts I received later
on from Berlin, he is said to have been as good as dismissed
from his post, from the moment that he declared his dis-
approval of the so-called energetic military measures against
Sardinia. -
In this way, the decisive step which the Emperor Francis
Joseph took in Turin, on the 23rd of April, was also fatal in
INADEQUACY OF HER FORCES 299
this respect, that a unity of will did not exist in the Vienna
Government, or in any of its diplomatic and military pro-
ceedings. Whilst Austria's diplomatic action was becoming
more and more pressing and vehement, her military prepara-
tions were delayed, so that the w!timatwm was actually
delivered at a moment, when it must have been known in the
Foreign Office, that there were by no means yet sufficient
active forces mustered in Italy.
At any rate, led astray by Russia, the party which appears
to have brought its influence to bear through Count Gruenne,
was carried away by thoughts of vengeance against Sardinia.
Everything possible and impossible had been done in
Vienna to extricate themselves from the undoubtedly most
painful and unfair situation that can be conceived. Only the
one thing which could really help them, a plain, open, and
candid understanding with Prussia, and the recognition of the
legitimate position of the German Confederation, under the
uniform leadership of the sole German Great Power, this
idea appeared to be quite excluded. In glancing back to-day
at this distressful period of history since 1848, it might be
imagined, that this so simple solution of the problem we are
treating of, was actually something quite unknown in leading
quarters. Unfortunately, what prevented me especially from
entertaining this opinion, was the fact, that I myself had,
both verbally and by letter, repeatedly discussed the position
of affairs in this sense, and was, therefore, at least certain that
ignorance of what the German nation demanded could neither
be pleaded in Vienna, nor in Berlin.
The old Empire, which had every reason to be greatly
exasperated, now attacked its Italian neighbour without allies,
but only to stop short again, after the first hesitating steps,
and leave all the threats unexecuted, which it had launched
forth with such big words. -
One of the most unfortunate struggles of the century
began, in which chance seemed more than ever to have
possessed itself of the general's baton. In Germany, no slight
astonishment was felt, when the true numbers of Austria's
disposable forces became known. After the mustering of the
3oo MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTI/A
fourth batallions, her Italian army, at the outbreak of the war,
was not stronger than 154,000 men, of which 33,000 would have
been necessary for the garrisons in Lombardy and Venice, and
11,000 for the occupation of the Romagna. With 112,000
men, who were concentrated on the Tessin, the invasion of the
Kingdom of Sardinia had been begun, although the Master of
the Ordnance, Count Gyulai, had most positively declared
this force to be insufficient to carry through the expedition
entrusted to him.
The most inexplicable contradiction in Austria's measures,
however, was undoubtedly the fact, that the Archduke
Albrecht had offered in Berlin, a few days before the ultimatum,
to muster 250,000 men on the Rhine, whereas at that time
the number of disposable troops for the Italian campaign alone
was, according to the most positive declaration of the General
in command there, entirely insufficient.
The Austrian army, by crossing over the Tessin, had raised
expectations which led the whole world astray, although it
can now be regarded as proved, that the speedy march to
Turin, as it was dreamed of in Germany and England, was
neither expected, nor could it enter the head, of the Master
of the Ordnance.
At head-quarters, the delusion prevailed, that the French
would appear in Upper Italy much sooner than was actually
the case. For, here too, half-measures and tardiness, imperfect
preparations, and dissension among the Generals, had built up
impediments of every description, so that it was afterwards
easy enough to say, that, up to the 14th of May, when the
Emperor Napoleon took up his head-quarters in Alessandria,
the Austrians had had ample time left them to knock the
Sardinian army on the head. *
As a matter of fact, the Master of the Ordnance was so
strictly bound to the orders which were sent to him from
Vienna, that, day after day, the case occurred at head-quarters,
that his own decisions and orders had to be counter-
manded, owing to instructions received from the Military
Chancery.
I was furnished by a friend with such reliable accounts
7"/IE I'RENCH ARMY 3OI
from Austrian head-quarters, that I was able, at an early date,
to foresee the sad course of events. *
About the middle of May, the French stood with a force
of 150,000 men and 162 guns on Italian soil. Napoleon had
quitted Paris on the 10th of May, in order personally to as-
sume the command of his army.
At the beginning of the war, he was in a kind of military
excitement, and disposed, quite contrary to his usual custom,
to sudden and energetic ventures. With somewhat of the
nervousness of a dilettante, he began his preparations for an,
if possible, decisive blow. But the execution of the details of
his plans fatigued him ; he grew undecided, and at last de-
layed the attack as long as possible. Whilst he used at first
to encourage his Generals: “Il mous fawt a'river avec la
rapidité de la fowdre, the anxiety with regard to the pro-
visions and the munition for his army, grew too much
for him, after his arrival in Italy, so that he did not dare to
undertake anything. Sº l’on me fait pas des efforts heroiques,
he now declared, pow, créer wme réserve de biscuits et de
fowrage, qu'om me pewt former ici, où les admimistrations
m’abowtissent qu' à peine à faire vivre l'armée aw jow, le jowr,
je me trowverai dams des grandes difficultés et je me pow'raft
pas me porter em avant dams wry pays dévasté par l'ennemi.
On a closer personal inspection of the army, when in the
field, Napoleon found its equipment altogether very imperfect.
He wrote long-winded letters to the War Minister in Paris, in
which he made bitter complaints, and added only too correctly :
‘Ce n'est pas wn reproche que je vows fais. Je me l'adresse qu’
aw système général, qui fait qu’em France mous me sommes
jamais préts powr la guerre.’ -
The vain expectation of the attack on the part of the
French army was already causing some anxiety in the Austrian
camp. The inactivity of the one party could not marvel
enough at the inactivity of the other. Thus Gyulai resolved,
on the 20th of May, on a great reconnoitring expedition, which
was to be carried out in the direction of Alessandria-Novi by
General Stadion, with twenty-five batallions from Stradella.
The battle of Montebello ensued, the unfavourable issue of
302 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE.COBURG-GOTHA
which instantly produced a depressing effect on Austria's
friends in Germany. Owing to the taciturnity of the
Austrians, people were dependent for their news on the French,
who announced unconceivable losses on the part of their
adversaries.
A few days afterwards, the battle of Palestro followed, and,
towards the end of May, Prince Chimay wrote to me from
Paris, characteristically enough of the position of affairs:
Awjowrd'hwi on parle encore du Mincio; qui sait, si wry pew
plus tard on me parlera pas de Vemise.
Under such unfavourable auspices, the news arrived from
Vienna, that the Emperor Francis Joseph himself would
shortly proceed to the seat of war, in order to inspire his
troops with fresh courage, and bring better order into the
management of the army. He had General Hess at his side,
of whom the greatest expectations were entertained, above all
in Germany. Favourable as, under these circumstances, the
effect of the Emperor's impending departure for Italy was, it
was just as deplorable that, owing to his absence, the political
and diplomatic action was now sure to come to a sort of close,
to be followed, as far as could be foreseen, by a fresh stand-
still in the preparations and proceedings of Prussia and
Germany.
Willisen's mission to Vienna was undoubtedly the most
important step that could be taken, and news from Vienna
was therefore listened for with the most anxious attention.
It was very difficult, however, to ascertain anything certain
and reliable concerning Willisen's settlements. I was conse-
quently compelled to send a trusted friend to Berlin, to whom
the Prince of Hohenzollern, upon guarantee of the strictest
secrecy, explained the position of affairs. -
Before the Emperor of Austria's departure to Italy,
Willisen had received the assurance from him, that he still
maintained his hopes of a firm alliance, and would, therefore,
for the next three weeks, take no kind of independent step in
the Diet. Hence, it could be assumed that, within a very short
time, these agreements and preliminaries were sure to lead to
a firm treaty. Mysteriously enough, however, these negotia-
MEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA 303
tions, too, died a natural death, and, as scarcely anything
certain ever became known about them, a report which
reached me at the time, may not be unwelcome:
‘Your Highness will be glad to hear that matters are after
all not so bad as they have been represented. I therefore
hasten to give you a short, but quite authentic, preliminary
account of the result of Willisen's mission.
‘It is true that Willisen had no authority to make any
binding concessions. But the result of his interviews with
the Emperor and with Rechberg has been embodied in a
résumé drawn up by Rechberg, which is now ready for
consideration here.
‘In brief outlines, this résumé contains the following points.
1. Austria leaves it to Prussia's discretion to fix the moment
whem, and the way how, she will take an active part in the
war. 2. She leaves the leadership of the Federal army to
Prussia. 3. In return, she demands from Prussia the guaran-
tee of her territorial possessions in Italy.
‘I am told that the Prince Regent and the Prince of
Hohenzollern are in favour of the simple acceptance of this
programme of future German policy, and that its opponents,
not daring to propose its simple rejection, are advocating its
acceptance on conditions which it is expected Austria will not
consent to.
‘This is principally the aim of Pourtalès, who is said to be
demanding, among other things, that Austria shall recall her
Ambassadors from the German Courts.
‘I add, by way of a supplement, that Austria is willing, in
return for Prussia's support in this war on the given con-
ditions, to resign to her, not only the military, but also the
political, leadership of Germany, and furthermore, that the
guarantee of Lombardy, or rather of Austria's Italian posses-
sions, is understood to be given, not as a permanent thing, but
as only lasting for the present period. The latter fact is of
importance.
‘This guarantee, however, was offered by Willisen from
the beginning. But Austria always made further demands,
304 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
until at last the Emperor, before his departure to Italy, sent
for Willisen, and left the matter as it now stands.
- ‘The Prince tells me, that a Council was held yesterday,
and that, although no definite resolution was arrived at,
he has no doubt that the decision will result simply in favour
of accepting the résumé. The Prince Regent is decidedly for
it, and, besides the Prince (of Hohenzollern), also Auerswald.
To-day there is to be another Council. The Prince requests
that, before the matter is settled, Your Highness will be kind
enough to keep the substance of Willisen's arrangements very
secret. He says that he is looking forward to the moment
when the bomb will explode. But that at present no one has
an inkling of it, as the Austrians have also said nothing of
the matter.’ - - .
Meanwhile, the anticipated announcement of a definite
acceptance of the arrangements between Prussia and Austria
did not arrive. In the first instance, they were loath
in Berlin to declare themselves publicly, because they feared
it might interfere with the underwriting of the loan that was
being brought out. Afterwards, again, the situation was
altered every day by the rapid course of events at the seat
of war, so that the military portion of Willisen's arrange-
ments in Vienna fell to the ground, as it were, of their own
accord. Austria required all her active forces in Italy. The
war on the Rhine would presumably fall entirely to Prussia's
lot, if it once came to action.
For, whilst they were discussing, meditating, and calculat-
ing, in Berlin, the battle of Magenta had been fought in
Italy. I will not enter into a description of the military
details of this desperate event. It is sufficiently well-known,
what fortunate success attended the covered march of the
French along the upper Ticino, and how the unsuspecting
Master of the Ordnance, in the everlasting expectation of a
battle on the Po, was startled, on the 4th of June, by hearing
the fatal thunder of the cannon at Turbigo and Buffalora.
The result of the struggle, which was now concentrated round
about Magenta, became characteristic of both parties, owing
to the fact that, two days after the battle, total uncertainty
7"HE BA 7'7"LE OF MAG ENTA 305
regarding the situation still reigned in the hostile camps, and
neither party really had the courage to attribute the victory
to itself.
The effect of this circumstance was, that Germany had no
positive news of the fatal results of the battle, so far as
Austria was concerned, until quite late. In Dresden, where
they were in possession of numerous good sources of informa-
tion on the events of the war, the opinion still prevailed on
the 8th of June, that the battles on the Ticino were continuing
without interruption, and it was only on the 9th of June, that
exact information reached them of the hasty and fatal retreat
of the Austrians to the Mincio.
Napoleon's entry into Milan, and the tremendous effect
caused by this event in Paris, now made it appear much more
difficult for the Government in Berlin to ratify, Willisen's
much-discussed arrangements. Each day that rendered
Austria less able to maintain the struggle, increased, not only
the danger of transferring the war to German soil, but also
the disinclination to do so.
Disappointment set in everywhere among the friends of
Austria. Thus it was reported to me from Dresden: ‘The
lost battle of Magenta, and Napoleon's entry into Milan, have
produced a very depressing effect here. Many a French-hater
will now see what a formidable enemy has been brought
down upon us by Austria's imprudent behaviour, imprudent,
because this Power has hitherto shown that she possesses
neither the means, nor the capacity, to resist her opponent.
Germany, therefore, has good cause to consider well, before she
enters into a contest, the issue of which nobody doubts.’
In England, too, there was no staying the Napoleonic
current. It was tragic to see how all the hatred of Napoleon,
which had but recently been so vehemently proclaimed, grew
silent in face of the accomplished facts, and how the con-
sideration which had just been shown for the treaties in
favour of Austria, suddenly changed to the pure reverse.
Immediately after receiving the first news of the course of
events at the seat of war, my brother wrote to me on the
3rd of June, before Magenta: -
VOL. III. U
306 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
‘Yesterday evening, I received your telegram in ciphers.
I knew that matters stood something like what you describe.
In spite of all their arrogance and insolence, the Austrians
have now, after all, let themselves be beaten on every occasion,
whether great or small. They have already lost 10 guns and
4000 dead and wounded, a great deal of ground, and their
lines of communication between their centre and Milan, and
have surrendered the Lakes and the Alps to Garibaldi The
desire for neutrality now predominates here entirely. Pal-
merston hopes soon to see the Austrians turned out of the
whole of Italy; he himself is trusting to the Address to
overthrow the Ministry. Since the elections, the Ministers
stand 300 against 350. Therefore, if the opposition really
means to hold together, they will be in a most decided min-
ority. Until yesterday, the opposition was disunited. But
yesterday, Lord John and Mr Bright are said to have con-
cluded their pact, and Lord John and Palmerston had already
come to an understanding before.
‘The Allgemeine Zeitung, by a stupid article, in which it
insinuates that the Germans should march on Paris, because
the French are unprepared, has produced a bad feeling here,
and has caused even the Times to publish a very anti-German
article ! The great conspiracy powr localiser la guerre is
gaining ground daily, owing to the present state of affairs. . .”
Although I knew that Prince Albert's observations on
English affairs were only too exact, and that the tendency
indicated must have been further strengthened by subsequent
events, I thought I might turn the fact of my having, by
chance, received a personal letter from Queen Victoria on the
6th of June, to advantage, by making a direct and detailed
report on the situation and its dangers to the Queen herself.
In this report, I represented that the time for an understanding
with Prussia on a joint attitude was now necessarily at hand,
and, in the hope that the Queen would communicate my letter
to the Cabinet, I requested that a position should be taken up
by England, which would at least render it possible for the
German Powers, whilst covered against Russia, at the last
moment to parry the threatening preponderance of France.
LETTER FROM PRINCE ALBERT 307
My brother answered, immediately upon receipt of this
report, on the anniversary of Waterloo, in a letter which
showed the whole alteration of the situation with undeniable
distinctness, one might say, indeed, with letters hewn in stone:
‘Your long letter to Victoria, the argumentation of which
is perfectly correct, and its logic irrefragable, nevertheless
appears to me not to embrace the whole case, and induces me
to make the following observations: The English Govern-
ment is a popular institution, and the constitution is becoming
daily more and more democratic. Nations do not calculate;
as masses, they cannot calculate, they only feel. Hence, they
are not led by their interests, and still less by principles of, or
deductions from, public or international law, but only by feel-
ings and instincts. To these belong the feeling of justice, the
feeling of liberty, and chiefly the instinct of self-preservation.
Since 1817, the English nation has been striving for the further
development of freedom and self-determination, at home as
well as in Europe. Just as long, Austria has been standing at
the head of all attacks against the nations, their freedom, and
their independence. Since 1830, Democracy has been gaining
the day in England, and French democracy is joining her.
From that time until the Spanish marriages, Austria has been
her pronounced antagonist on the Continent. In the storm of
nations from 1848-49, it was Austria's cruelty in Italy and
Hungaria, and her harshness in Germany, which were contin-
ually being held up to the English people by Palmerstonian
diplomacy, the Press, and the refugees. The Concordat and
Jesuitism, coupled with the persecution of the Protestants,
filled the cup to the brim. That Sardinia, as the sole consti-
tutional and tolerant State in Italy, in spite of its sad position
between Austria, France, and the Pope, has had England's
fullest sympathy, needs no mention.
‘It required the immorality of Napoleon's and Sardinia's
conspiracy against Austria, to vanquish all these feelings, and
make the feeling of justice supervene to outvie them. This
had occurred, when you were still here. Thereupon, then,
Austria invaded Sardinia, and suddenly violated this feeling
of justice, and transferred it to the enemy Hence, all that
308 MEMOIRs or THE DUKE of SAXEcoBURG-GoTHA
was left, was the instinct of self-preservation. This is still
strong, and incites to hatred against France. The Austrians,
however, have now evacuated Lombardy, the States of the
Church, Parma, Modena, etc. The Italians are giving vent to
their sense of liberty and national feeling, and their acclama-
tions of joy fill the ears of the English nation. What states-
man could adopt measures to force Austrian rule again upon
delighted free Italy And sacrifice for this the safety and
the peace of his own country
“All we can do, therefore, is to maintain the strictest
neutrality. New facts are required to awaken new feelings.
* Ever, etc.,
- * ALBERT.
‘WINDSOR CASTLE, June 18, 1859.’
A few days afterwards, Derby's Cabinet was overthrown,
and the friends of Italy and of the French Emperor brought
England's influence to bear in exactly the direction predicted
by my brother. This happened at a moment, when they were
beginning to think in Paris and London, that the conclusion of
peace was imminent. For, after the unfortunate battles along
the line of the Ticino, the leaders of the Austrian army had
determined to retreat, and concentrate their forces on the
Mincio, where the Franco-Sardinian power was to be shattered
against the famous ‘invincible fortress-square.’ The Emperor
of Austria had himself assumed the chief command, and the
unfortunate Master of the Ordnance resigned his baton. The
real management of the operations now fell to Lieutenant-
Fieldmarshal Hess. On the 21st of June, after having fought
the severe battle of Melegnano on the Adda during their
retreat, the Austrian forces were once more united under the
protection of their fortifications, and hoped, by a decisive
battle, to be able to reconquer Lombardy, and prevent the
attack on Venice, which was being prepared by the French
fleet.
The allied armies had followed so rapidly in pursuit, that,
when on the morning of the 24th of June the battle of
Solferino commenced, they hardly had any idea on either side,
THE BATTLE OF SOL FERINO 309
how near the main armies were to one another. This bloody
battle has been so often and so thoroughly discussed from the
military point of view, that it appears to me superfluous to
make special mention of the trifling details that were com-
municated to me from various sides. In the Austrian army,
so my cousin Mensdorff wrote to me a few days after the
battle, the opinion prevailed, that the retreat ordered by the
Emperor would not have been absolutely necessary. My
cousin appealed especially to the fact, which was subsequently
also pointed out by many other Austrian officers, that “our
right wing had been decidedly victorious, the left wing half
and half, and only the centre really defeated.’
“With three weak regiments of cavalry, Mensdorff went
on to say, ‘I kept the enemy's whole cavalry, and his
numerous artillery, which was drawn up in the centre, in
check from eight o'clock in the morning until five o'clock in.
the afternoon, so that they dared not advance. Had I had
double the men, and only a few batteries of heavy calibre, I
should have broken through this part. Only an hour and a
half's walk from the field of battle, our whole army crossed
over the Mincio on a few narrow bridges, without a French-
man having ventured to pursue us. The cannons that were
taken, were mostly such as were shot to pieces, and had to be
abandoned, with the exception of a few solitary guns, which
stood in Solferino, and of which all the men and horses lay
dead on the spot. 17,000 to 18,000 dead and wounded, amongst
which over 800 officers, covered the battle-field on our side.
The Franco-Sardinians themselves admit that they have lost
18,000 men. There was a broiling sun withal, such as is only
known in the plains of Italy, so that some men went mad
from sun-stroke during the battle. I myself saw such a man,
dancing about, with his coat off, in the midst of the fire from
the cannons, and throwing clods of earth at the cavalry. Add
to this, that many men belonging to the newly arrived
detachments had scarcely descended from the waggons; more-
over, that they had themselves been only just recruited, and
were obliged to be taught, while still in the waggons, how to
load the new sort of guns; that neither officers nor men were
3ro MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHIA
acquainted with the very difficult ground of Italy, which
resembles a forest of mulberry trees. Consider all this, and a
good deal will be explained. Many divisions gave way, because
all their officers were dead or wounded, and because they them-
selves hardly yet knew their own companies, and were utterly
at a loss to find their way on ground which rendered all
supervision impossible.
‘May the manes of the many fallen, so my cousin closed
his sad description, “sometimes appear in the dreams, and
disturb the night's rest, of those who are meanwhile sitting
comfortably at their writing desks, and laying political addle
eggs.' -
On the 25th of June, the Austrian army was in pretty
nearly the same positions as it occupied on the 23rd. During
the following days, it retreated, with the aid of Verona, beyond
the Adige, where it managed, on the 27th, to take up a secure
position, and proceed to reorganise itself. The French and
the Italians still remained in their former positions, and ap-
peared to be taking no steps to cross over the Mincio. Inde-
cision on both sides, with regard to the attack as well as the
defence, seemed to be the only thing left of the efforts and
sufferings of the June days; indeed, the two Imperial leaders
are said to have been personally quite exhausted by the
impressions which the last battle and its terrors only too
naturally produced on their sense of humanity.
In certain circles in Paris, it was asserted that Louis
Napoleon had, for the last week or two, been urgently longing
for peace. It was said, that he had undergone various kinds
of personal dangers on the Ticino, and had been very near
falling into the hands of the enemy. Such possibilities, which
the war inevitably brought home to men's minds, furnished,
not only the autocrat himself, but also his adherents in Paris,
with a good deal of material for meditation. They avoided
telling the public, so they wrote to me from Paris, that the
Emperor's epaulet had been torn away by a bullet at
Magenta, because they did not want to let the feeling arise,
that Imperialism might suddenly disappear with its bearer
from the surface of the canvas. ‘Sa réputation de bravowre
NA POLEO W’S DESIRE FOR PEAGE 3II
est établie maimtenant, et les soldats m'aiment pas à le voir
ea posé.’ -
Thus it was even talked of in the army, that the time had
come for the Emperor to exhibit the fruits of his acquired
glory in Paris, and quietly return home. But would it not
have been very dangerous for him to transfer his command to
one of the Marshals, who were so jealous of one another, with
the result, perhaps, of creating a rival for himself Ż
For Napoleon, it seemed desirable on all sides, that the
war should soon come to an end. A year after the war, I had
an opportunity of hearing the Emperor speak about it him-
self. In Baden-Baden, where I saw him again, he made no
secret to me of the fact, that he looked upon his Italian
victories as the purest chance. On this occasion, he also told
me that the most prodigious lies had been spread about the
personal dangers he had been exposed to. ‘Je m'ai jamais
entendu, Siffler wme balle.' Notwithstanding, the war had
appeared to him to be a most detestable thing : ‘Le hazard y
jowe wrv trop gramd rôle.’ His forces had been in the worst
possible condition, and his Generals had shown no capacity for
leading a large army. The Austrians, he added, had fought
much better than the French, and there was no doubt that
they would have taken Solferino, if the Emperor had let the
reserves advance. The Emperor of Austria, he said, was a
man of great eminence, mais malhewrewSement illwi mamque
l'énergie de la volomté. I was told, however, by other French
acquaintances, that, during the battle of Solferino, Louis
Napoleon had been in the unpleasant situation of suffering
from a violent attack of diarrhoea, which kept him prisoner
nearly the whole day, in a villa in the immediate neighbour-
hood. There is not the slightest doubt that Louis Napoleon
was determined to end the unhappy war as quickly as
possible.
Prince Chimay, who was staying in London during the
time of the war, received a report from a source intimately
connected with the Government, which he sent to me, and
which contained, on the 14th of June, among other things
the following account:
312 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
“Il est question, que l'Empereur écrive à l'Empereur d'Autriche
une lettre, taillée sur le modèle de celle envoyée par le premier
Consul aux Anglais afin d'offrir la paix, et surtout de faire preuve
de modération.' [And, further on, it says in the report, that, all over
the world, men were apprehensive of a universal war, which was
supposed to be brewing, although the French thought quite
differently on the subject]: ‘Les Français, et j'entends par lä le
monde officiel, s'attendent, à une nouvelle victoire, a quelques sièges,
à l'expulsion des Autrichiens des Alpes à l’Adriatique, puis d wne
paña, immédiate, á whe eactreme moderation, et en un mot a la cloture
dw dwel de la France et d’Autriche.'
If such sentiments and intentions could be revealed after
Magenta, it was surely remarkable that, after Solferino, the
views as to peace were not quicker in gaining the upperhand.
It is true, that the Stock Exchanges at once appeared to be
discounting some such solution, but, after a good many days
had elapsed, without the expected tidings of peace arriving,
the course of exchange sunk again.
It was well-known, that Russia and England had offered
their services in mediating peace, and that Napoleon was
merely waiting for an opportunity to end the war with
honour. But nobody supposed that a turn was to be expected,
such as occurred a few days afterwards in Villafranca. In
consequence of the latter event, the Government in Berlin lost
themselves in the deepest diplomatic mire imaginable. Nothing
was more significant of this, than Schleinitz' Note of the 6th of
July, in which, a few days before Villafranca, the affairs of
the Confederation were discussed, and the measures adopted
by the Prussian Cabinet treated of, with a thoroughness, as if
the peace of Europe would shortly be dictated by the German
Confederation. In the Foreign Office in Berlin, they had no
idea of what was meanwhile going on in leading quarters. On
the same day, Lord Palmerston had written to Russell, saying
that England was on no account to have anything to do with
the French conditions, as proposed by Persigny for the basis of
mediation. For Palmerston found that these conditions were
much too unfavourable towards Italy, and made too many
concessions to the Austrians. Diplomatists were busying
THE TRUC E OF VILLA FRANCA 3I3
themselves at that time with the scheme of an Italian con-
federation, in which Venice and Modena were to be united
under an Austrian Archduke. The Pope was to be at the
head of this peculiar Italian unity. Lord Palmerston abhorred
both these notions. “Soyez bien Sør,’ he wrote a few days later
to Persigny, qué si l'Autriche m'est pas SoigmewSement eacclve de
towte ingérence de towte espèce dams les affaires de l’Italie, le
Sang français a 6té versé en vain, et la gloire de l'Emperewr
ove Sera, qve de cowrte dwrée.’
Napoleon, whilst in his camp in Upper Italy, possessed but
little accurate knowledge of the sentiments of the mediating
Powers, which were so greatly in his favour. Still, it was
made exceedingly easy for him, under these circumstances, to
prove to the Emperor of Austria, that his proposals and in-
tentions were after all more favourable to Austria, than what
she had to expect from England and Russia. Prussia's attitude
seems altogether to have had but very slight weight, although
some afterwards asserted that it had been her mobilisation
which determined Napoleon to hasten the conclusion of peace,
whilst others said he had managed to persuade the Emperor
of Austria, that, in case of a mediation, the Prussian Govern-
ment would not be willing to draw up any better conditions
than England and Russia.
Thus it came to the truce, and the interview of the two
Emperors in Villafranca, about which latter the European
Press brought the most contradictory accounts. As for my-
self, only one thing was certain, as I wrote to my brother on
the 13th of June, that a state of affairs was being created,
‘which, at a more or less distant date, was sure to bring about
complications, which neither Notes nor speeches in Parliament
could remedy.’ - -
So far as the position of things in Berlin was specially
concerned, people there were surprised and disappointed. On
the 4th of July, the Emperor of Austria had sent Prince
Windischgrätz to Berlin, in order, at the last moment, to set a
joint military action on foot. This mission seemed the best
possible vindication of all the courses hitherto adopted by
Prussian policy. The rumour spread, that three more army
314 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
corps were to be mobilised, and that the long expected
appointment of the commanders would now definitely take
place.
No doubt, Prince Windischgrätz could have no difficulty
in making it clear from a military point of view, that a longer
delay was impossible under all circumstances. His stirring
descriptions of the sad position of Austria appeared to produce
a deep impression on the Prince Regent, who was sincerely
and painfully affected by the misfortunes of his kinsman's
house.
As to political questions, Prince Windischgrätz was unfor-
tunately furnished with no other instructions, than such as
could be inferred from the attitude which had been assumed
towards Germany for months. He knew of nothing to say
in this respect, except that Austria now intended to make the
motion in the Diet, of which mention has been made, for
transferring the whole chief command to the Prince Regent.
With this intimation he made little impression; indeed, Herr
von Schleinitz took occasion in consequence, to add a highly
diplomatic postscript to his circular despatch of the 6th of
July, already alluded to above, in which he declared that, even
in spite of this motion of Austria's, “he must adhere to all the
opinions and reasonings which he had specified in the fore-
going document.’
However, on the same day, the French Ambassador, Moustier,
informed Herr von Schleinitz, that the two Emperors were
about to join hands across the Mincio, and conclude peace,
regardless of Prussia and her mobilisation, and without the
mediation of England and Russia. Soon afterwards, there
followed the news of the meetings in Villafranca, and the
prospects of peace. An easily conceivable excitement reigned
in military and political circles in Berlin, and, although they
assumed the air, as if everything had been in the best train,
and as if the very fear of the mobilised six army corps had
determined the Emperor Napoleon to conclude peace at any
price, there could scarcely be any doubt as to Austria's
behaviour allowing of a very different interpretation.
This double-dealing was all the more evident, as the
LETTER FROM THE PRINCE REGENT OF PRUSSIA 315
special envoy of the Emperor Francis Joseph himself in
Potsdam was so surprised at the tidings of peace, that he
telegraphed to Vienna, in order to obtain positive certainty as
to the truth of the matter. It was no doubt a mistake on
Austria's part, so seriously to offend the only friends she
could possibly have. For, when the Emperor Francis Joseph
said in his proclamation to the nations of Austria, that he
had concluded peace, because he had been abandoned by his
natural allies, they were by no means insensible to this re-
proach in Berlin, and were placed in a very painful position.
Significant of this feeling in high quarters, is a letter which
the Prince Regent wrote to me in reference to the sudden
turn of events.
‘BERLIN, July 14, 1859.
“But what a different aspect everything has now assumed !!
There is peace, but what sort of peace I must first of all
stop my troops, which have already started on their march,
then let them return to their garrisons, and finally demobilise
them. Hence, also the corps which I had intended for you,
the fifth, is affected by this measure. As it had commenced
its first march on the 10th, your appointment was to have
been made in these days, since it could not take place before
Wrangel had received his instructions on the 11th, to concen-
trate the five army corps on the Rhine, whereby a position
ad interim became open for Count Waldersee. As the fifth
was, for the present, the only corps that was to be settled, I
desired to offer it to you at once, leaving it to you, however,
to decide whether you would assume the command imme-
diately, or only after the outbreak of the war. I may trust
that you will recognise in these arrangements my readiness
to enter into your wishes, which are so flattering to the
Prussian army, in whose ranks you have already so often
shown that you take the military profession seriously, and
where you have given proofs of your ability.
‘Now, however, everything has come to nought. But our
turn will soon come ; in a much more serious way, in fact,
than if we had set out, in five or six weeks, with our 300,000
316 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
men from the Rhine; for, according to my conviction, the
iron dies would have fallen for us, if the truce had not resulted
in peace I conclude with the proverb: Deferred for a time,
is not deferred for ever. - -
‘Your faithful friend,
‘WILLIAM.’
When I received the foregoing letter from the Prince
Regent, we were both as little prepared as the rest of the
Federal Sovereigns for the extraordinary steps which the
Austrian Cabinet took immediately afterwards, in order to
give the most unrestrained expression that diplomatic language
would allow, to her full wrath against Prussia. Count Rech-
berg managed, with exquisite subtlety, to clothe his accusations
in a form, the confidential character of which was to enable
him to express himself with the most unheard of want of
consideration against Prussia.
He instructed his Ambassadors to explain, in special Notes
to each separate Minister of the Federal States, the motives
which had actuated the Emperor Francis Joseph in concluding
the peace of Villafranca. The formula which was sent for
this purpose, has now probably been made public through the
newspapers. However, in order not to lose the thread of
events here, I will at any rate recapitulate the main com-
plaints which Count Rechberg was permitted to hurl at the
Prussian Government.
‘Fighting for the sacredness of the treaties, it said in the
Note of the Austrian Ambassador to my Minister von Seebach,
‘the Austrian Imperial Court was conscious of entering the
lists, not only for its own rights, but in defence of a great
and general interest of the congregation of European States.
It believed that it possessed a well-founded claim to the
sympathy and support of the Great Powers of Europe, the
co-signers and guardians of the treaties. It indulged, at the
same time, in the hope that Germany above all would place
herself with her whole power on the side of the Empire, in
defence of the authority and the possessions of the first
German Power, of possessions once acquired by the same joint
AUSTRIA'S CIRCULAR MOTE TO GERMAA Y 317
struggles to which Germany owes her own independence and
territorial possessions. The great majority of the Federal
Governments, supported by a noble and just outburst of
German national feeling, showed its appreciation of this con-
fidence with a determination, warmth, and sincerity, for which
the Imperial Court feels that its unbounded thanks are due
to its confederates, and which will ever remain unforgotten
by Austria's government and people. But the Cabinets of
London, Berlin, and St Petersburg, judged differently. Since
the commencement of the difficulty, the Vienna Court has left
no stone unturned to induce these Cabinets to support its
cause. All its endeavours have been without the desired
effect. Still in the last days before the conclusion of the truce,
the Imperial Government had to learn, that England did not
yet consider the progress of French arms complete enough to
warrant her in then proceeding, with any prospect of success,
to make proposals for peace.*
“From another Power, connected with Austria by the
closest ties, the promise not to allow the territorial posses-
sions of Austria to be prejudiced, had, at an earlier date,
been claimed in vain by a Prince of the Imperial House, and,
immediately before the proposals of the Emperor of the
French, again by another confidential envoy of high rank. In
Willafranca, at length, the Emperor obtained the certainty, that
certain conditions for peace, which the Cabinet of the Tuileries
had originally formulated, and communicated to London—
conditions, which not only demanded heavy sacrifices from the
Austrian Crown, but also expected it to desert sovereigns
connected by ties of blood and friendship with the Imperial
Family, and to sacrifice the rights of third parties, that these
conditions, as they appear in the enclosed draft, had met with
the approval and the emphatic support of the three said
Cabinets.t
* This allusion to Lord Palmerston's letter, mentioned by me above, (cf. Ashley
ii, 161) was an anticipation on the part of the Austrian Government. . Before the
conclusion of the truce, it can only have been the generally known opinion of the
English Minister which the Imperial Government had “to learn.” The decisive letter
to Persigny, however, is dated the 6th of July, and was therefore certainly not the
cause of the truce.
+ This draft contains the well-known seven points, with the idea of the congress,
and the principle rendre l’Italie à elle-même. Napoleon, when in Villafranca, could
318 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
‘It was, therefore, certain that Austria, if she continued the
struggle for the integrity of her territory, could not only
promise herself no material assistance, but would even have
found the moral weight of the influence of England, Prussia,
and Russia, on the side of her adversaries. The Emperor, the
illustrious Sovereign of the undersigned, saw himself placed
before the choice, whether he, etc. - -
‘The Emperor has, therefore, accepted the conditions which
are specified in the second enclosure.” -
At the end of the despatch, the thanks of the Imperial
Cabinet were tendered to my Government for its readiness to
bring sacrifices in the joint interest of Germany, it being
announced, at the same time, that the motions made by Austria
in the Federal Assembly on the 7th of July, were withdrawn,
and that it would be proposed to reduce the contingents and
fortresses of the Confederation to their normal footing in
times of peace. -
The accusations against Prussia expressed in the foregoing
despatch, called forth, as was to be expected, a very great
skirmish of diplomatic recriminations and remonstrations,
which I can truly say excited my interest in a very slight
degree. I will, therefore, not weary the reader with these
performances of the various Foreign Offices, but will only
mention in reference to the seven points, what Usedom com-
municated on the subject on the 23rd of July. He considered
them “an independent work of Lord John's, which Austria
had allowed to be foisted upon her, as an agreement between
the three neutral Powers, without even enquiring by telegraph
in Berlin, London, and St Petersburg, whether this ‘agree-
ment' really existed.
The conflicting tendencies among the leading statesmen of
Prussia, which had been great enough before, now of course
grew to an immeasurable extent. Whilst Usedom threw all
the blame for the miserable result of Prussia's operations on
to Schleinitz, in the other corner of the high cabinet, Hohen-
not possibly have declared the position of the three Powers to these points to be one
and the same. England and Prussia had much to find fault with in them, the former
to the disadvantage, the latter to the advantage, of Austria.
* These are the well-known conditions of Villafranca.
PRINCE ALBERT ON THE SITUATION 3I 9
zollern and friend Duncker were wailing, with historical
erudition, at that horrid new ‘Do-well’ Austria, who ‘had
concluded a peace of Campo-Formio, before a peace of Basle
was owing.' Indeed, even Prince Windischgrätz, so Duncker
assured me on the 18th of July, had been intentionally made
to prefer demands which were impossible of fulfilment ; and
this merely to enable Austria to gain a pretext for concluding
the truce, which, notwithstanding the despatches of Prince
Windischgrätz, entreating them ‘not to conclude it, as he had
the best hopes'—was signed in Villafranca.
The sharpest and most forcible expression for the desperate
situation was, as usual, found by my brother, whose observa-
tions once more sounded in the sorrowful chorus of statesmen,
like the deep tones of the grumbling bass:
‘C'est wºme perfidie de l'Autriche, cried the French, when
Austria evacuated the States of the Church, and Perugia rose
up in revolt. England and Prussia are now tempted to say
the same, that Austria has neither gained the victory, nor
been vanquished. She has now come to an understanding
with the enemy, and saved her Venetian territory. Germany
ought to be heartily glad of it, and would be so, if she herself
had contributed something towards this result. Prussia's
situation is excessively disagreeable and dishonourable. Pal-
merston is furious that his victim has escaped him, and his
bosom friend has led him by the nose. -
‘Johnny was just going to settle stately, and is left stand-
ing like a stupid fellow with mouth wide open. The
blind. . . . . . They still hope for a Congress, where Italian
liberty can be advocated. Austria is now safe and sound, but
how Napoleon means to get out of his net of inconsistencies,
I don't know. Russia is working to loosen the knot for him.
For Austria, the loss of Lombardy is a gain, but her lost
battles remain. . . . .
‘An alliance between Austria and France would be a fearful
danger to Germany, would re-establish the Rhenish Con-
federacy, annihilate Prussia, and make Napoleon all-powerful.
‘I must close, thanking you for the pamphlet: “Despots
as Revolutionists.” He is now no longer anything of the kind,
320 MEMOIRS OF THE DUKE OF SAXE-COBURG-GOTHA
but is holding the Pope's stirrup, and will soon give orders to
fire on the revolutionists in Italy. Mazzini bombs have just
been intercepted in Milan, while he was passing through.”
Just in those days of high political excitement, our own
house, and that of our friend Hohenzollern, were visited by a
severe common misfortune, which was calculated to add to the
general feeling one of bitter personal sorrow, and shall there-
fore not be left unmentioned at the close of this chapter.
The gifted young wife of the King of Portugal, Stephanie,
whom we had, a short time ago, seen quit our circles for the
Court of our kinsman with so many fair hopes, died on the
17th of July. In reference to this sad event, my brother
closed his letter with the words.
‘By the death of our dear Stephanie, which the telegraph
announced to us yesterday with its heartless, but heartrending,
indifference, you, too, will, I am sure, have been fearfully
grieved. Poor Pedro and poor Hohenzollern are incessantly
in my mind, and take away my thoughts for the moment
from the great European catastrophe which lies before-us.
“Ever your faithful brother,
‘A.
‘Osborne, July 18, 1859.'
ALPHABETICAL INDEX
A
Aberdeen, Lord, 31, 32, 37, 257
Albert, Prince, 7, 8-12, 13, 14, 15, 21,
22, 23, 26-31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 45,
46, 47, 50, 56, 57, 72, 73, 74, 78, 79,
85, 86, 87, 113, 116, 118, 119, 144, 147,
148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157,
158, 160, 165, 166, 170, 171, 173, 183,
190, 204, 213, 214, 215, 218, 220, 223,
224, 226, 233, 234, 237, 239, 241, 242,
257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 276, 280,
; 283, 286, 291, 305, 306, 307, 319,
Albrecht, Archduke of Austria, 107, 300
Alºnder II, Emperor of Russia, 165,
42
Alice, Princess, 291
Alvensleben, Count, Prussian Statesman,
92, 93, 94, 121
Apponyi, Count, Austrian Ambassador
in Turin, 21, 22
Arnaud, Marshal St, 138, 155
Augusta, Princess of Prussia, afterwards
#prº of Germany, 222, 224, 283,
293
Augustenburg, Crown Prince of, 233
B
Bach, Baron von, Austrian Statesman,
109, 110, 120, 167
Béarn, Count, French Ambassador in
Stuttgart, 34
Bernard, French Emigrant, 244, 245,
257, 259
Bernstorff, Count, Prussian Ambassador
in London, 292
Beust, Herr von, Saxon Statesman, 205,
200
O
Billault, French Statesman, 143, 245
Bonin, General von, Prussian Minister
of War, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 118
Porromeo, Comte de, 269
Bºº, Baron von, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100,
Bosquet, Marshal of France, 240
Bourqueney, Baron, French Ambassador
in Vienna, 109, 165
Bright, John, English Statesman, 306
Bruck, Baron, Austrian Statesman, 167
Brunn, Baron, Russian Ambassador in
London, 235
Budberg, M. de, Russian Ambassador in
Berlin and Vienna, 43
Bunsen, Chevalier de, Prussian Ambas-
sador in London, 85, 86, 87, 118
Buol, Count von, Austrian Statesman,
21, 43, 95, 96, 99, 106, 107, 120, 121,
167, 168, 169, 172, 174, 197, 199, 200,
239, 243, 268, 269, 288, 290, 298
C
Cabarrus, Thérèsa, 71,
Cambridge, George, Duke of, 72, 98, 138,
156, 161
Canrobert, General, 138, 155, 170
Cavaignac, General, 5
Cavour, Count, Italian Statesman, 231,
236, 237, 243, 257, 261, 263, 268, 274,
286, 287. 297
Charles, Prince of Prussia, 34, 89
Charles, Prince of Bavaria, 108
Charlotte, Princess of Belgium, after-
wards Empress of Mexico, 226
Chimay, Prince, Belgian Ambassador in
Paris, 71, 137, 138, 139, 142, 145, 151,
159, 161, 192, 207, 209, 229, 231, 236,
238, 239, 245, 254, 256, 257, 262, 267,
269, 270, 274, 287, 297, 302, 311
322
IAWDEX
Clarendon, Lord, English Statesman, 22,
31, 239, 241, 243
Clotilde, Princess, 263
cºntine Grand Duke of Russia, 239,
Conway, Vicomte de, 57
Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in
Paris, 74, 137, 282, 297
Cruvelli, Sophia, Prima Donna, 74
D
Delangle, Claude French
Statesman, 273
Derby, Lord, English Statesman, 14, 171,
258, 259, 308
Disraeli, Benjamin, afterwards Lord
Hºwield, English Statesman, 171,
72
Pº, Count, Prussian Fieldmarshal,
Drouin de L'Huys, Edouard, French
Statesman, 168, 170
Duncker, Professor Max, 319
Alphonse,
E.
Blizabeth, Queen of Prussia, 116
D'Enghien, Duke, 74
*::: Esprit Charles, General, 146,
4, 256
Esterhazy, Count, Austrian Ambassador
in St Petersburg, 121, 200, 201
Eugénie de Montijo, afterwards Empress
of the French, 24, 25, 58, 59, 60, 61,
72, 77, 170,241, 250, 252, 274
F
Favre, Jules, French Statesman, 255
Ferdinand, King of Portugal, 227, 228,
Ferdimand, Duke of Genoa, 28, 29
Fleury, Emil Felix, General, 249
Francis, Joseph, Emperor of Austria, 34,
84, 95, 96, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 108, 114, 115, 132, 154, 167, 173,
198, 203, 242, 266, 297, 298, 302, 303,
304, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314,
315, 316, 317, 318
Frederick William IV, King of Prussia,
34, 35, 44, 50, 51, 55, 63, 68, 69, 70,
82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89,90, 92, 103, 104,
114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122,
123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 133, 134,
162, 163, 165, 176, 179, 202, 204, 206,
215, 275
|Frederick William, Prince of Prussia,
afterwards Emperor Frederick, 214,
215, 220, 222, 223, 224, 238, 245, 279
G
Garibaldi, Guiseppe, 306
George V, King of Hanover, 29
Gºne Herr von, Belgian Statesman,
Gladstone, W. E., English Statesman,
21, 171 W! 1 , .
Gortschakoff, Prince Alexander, Russian
Statesman, 34, 121, 141, 160, 172
Gortschakoff, Prince Michael, Russian
General, 33, 189
Grey, Lord, 172
Groeben, General von, 70, 83
Gruenne, Count, Austrian Lieutenant-
Field-Marshal, 298, 299
Gruenwaldde, Russian Lieut.-General, 98
Gyulai, Count, 300, 301
H
Hess, Austrian Field Marshal, 98, 106,
107, 108, 121, 166, 302, 304, 308
Hohenzollern, Karl Anton, Prince of,
Prussian Minister-President, 55, 69,
83, 226, 286, 294, 302, 303, 319, 320
Huebner, Herr von, Austrian Ambas-
sador in Paris, 197, 266, 267, 268, 269,
272
Humboldt, Alexander von, 116
J
Jellacic, Austrian General, 98
Jerome, Bonaparte, King of Westphalia,
Jerome, Bonaparte, Prince, 46, 47, 231,
252, 262, 263, 273, 297
K
Kossuth, Louis, 256
L

Leiningen, Count, 32
Leopold, I, King of the Belgians, 4, 16, 20,
45, 46, 47,49, 50, 55, 70, 78, 79, 80,
111, 160, 217, 218, 219, 254, 258, 262,
264, 268, 270, 271, 278, 279, 293
Leopold II, King of the Belgians, 25
Leopold, Prince, afterwards Duke of
Albany, 30, 73
Lieven, Dorothea, Princess, 80, 159
Lindheim, von, Prussian General, 55
Louis Napoleon, afterwards Emperor of
the French, 4, 8, 22, 25, 33, 34, 36,44,
46,47, 55, 80, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107.
122, 139, 140, 142, 145, 150, 151, 152,
154, 159, 162, 169, 170, 176, 177, 186,
187, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199,
201, 202, 204, 207, 209, 229, 230, 232,
235, 236, 237,238, 239, 240, 241, 242,
243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 252,
253,254, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262,
263,264, 266, 267, 26), 270, 271, 272,
273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 280, 281, 282,
286, 287, 288, 291, 293, 296, 5
301, 305, 306, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312,
313, 314, 317, 319, 320
INDEX
Louis, King of Portugal, 227
Louis Philippe, King of France, 60, 73
Louisa, Princess of Prussia, afterwards
Grand Duchess of Baden, 215, 219
M
Malmesbury, Lord, 257, 286, 292
Malakoff, Duke of, see Pélissier
Manteuffel, Minister, 67, 87, 88, 89,90,
91, 117, 118, 121, 124, 133, 134, 203
Manteuffel, Colonel von, 114, 115
Maria, Queen of Portugal, 26, 73
Matilda, Princess Bonaparte, 59
Maurand, Captain, 58
Max Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria,
afterwards Emperor of Mexico, 99,
226, 227
Mazzini, Guiseppe, 244
Mensdorf, Count Alexander, afterwards
Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
309, 310
Mentschikoff, General, 32, 33, 155
Merimée, Prosper, 267
Metternich, Prince, 16, 17, 45, 111,
112
Meyerbeer, Giacomo, composer, 192
Meyendorf, M. de, 98, 121
Montessay, M. de, 268
Montpensier, Duke of, 73
Morny, Duke of, 19, 143,231
Moustier, Marquis de, French Ambas-
sador in Berlin, 314
Münster, Count, 187
Murat, Prince, 59
N
Napier, Sir Charles, British Admiral,
137
Napoleon, I, 59, 63, 276
Napoleon III, see Louis Napoleon
Nemours, Louis, Duke of, 23
Nesselrode, Count, Russian Chancellor,
121, 123, 160
Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, 1, 2, 4,
32, 33, 34, 35, 40, 42, 43, 44, 48, 56, 57,
79, 80, 84, 94, 98, 102, 111, 119, 134,
163, 164, 270
Nicholas, Prince of Nassau, 233,235
Noer, Frederick, Prince of, 178
O
323
P
Palmerston, Lord, English Statesman,
13, 14, 24, 31, 37, 38, 147, 158, 167,
171, 192, 230, 235, 238, 239, 241, 257,
259, 291, 293, 306, 312, 313, 317, 319
Panuzzi, M. de, 267
Paskiewitsch, Iwan Fedorowitch, Russian
General, 141
Pºking of Portugal, 226, 227, 228,
Peel, Sir Robert, English Statesman, 8, 9
Pelissier, Duke of Malakoff, French
*do in London, 170, 171, 187,
1
Persigny, Duke of, French Statesman,
143, 312, 313, 317
Pierri, 254, 255, 256
Pi; Police Director in Paris, 248,251,
9
Pius IX, Pope, 273, 313
Pourtalès, Count, Prussian Ambassador
in Paris, 303
Praedt, Jules de, 57
R
Raglam, Lord, English Field-Marshal,
138, 186
Radetzky, Count, Austrian Field-Marshal,
98
Rechberg, Count, Austrian Ambassador
at the German Diet, 303, 316, 317
Reschid, Pasha, 36
Reuss, Prince, Prussian Ambassador, 274
Revel, M. de, Sardinian Ambassador in
Vienna, 21, 22
Roguet, French General, 58, 252
Rothschild, Paris Banker, 70
Russell, Lord John, English Statesman,
31, 158, 165, 167, 172, 306, 312, 318
S
Oliphant, Mr, 31
Omer Pasha, Turkish General, 33, 141,
164
Orleans Family, 23, 47
Orloff, Count, Russian Statesman, 43,
120
Orsini, Count Felix, 244, 255, 256, 259
sºver, Privy Councillor in [Coburg,
0
Sardinia, King of, 263, 296
Schleinitz, Baron Alexander, Prussian
Statesman, 312, 314, 318
Seebach, Herr von, 26, 28, 316
Seymour, Sir G. Hamilton,
Diplomate, 1, 2,
Simpson, General, 186
Stadion, Austrian General, 301
Stephanie, Princess of Hohenzollern,
afterwards Queen of Portugal, 226,
227, 228, 320
Stephanie, Grand-Duchess, 59
Stockmar, Baron, 15, 27, 28, 85, 214,
233, 258
Stratford de Redcliffe, i Lord, British
Minister in Constantinople, 33
British
324
INDEX
U
Usedom, Guido von, Prussian Ambassador
at the German Diet, 124, 126, 318
V
Vaillant, Marshal of France, 58, 251
Victor Immanuel, King of Italy, 243,
286, 287
Victoria, Queen of England, 29, 37, 38,
57, 70, 72, 74, 83, 118, 119, 170, 176,
178, 190, 215, 239, 241, 257, 260, 291,
293, 306
Victoria, Princess Royal, 213, 215, 220,
223, 238, 245, 281
W
º
Walewski, Count, French Statesman,
171, 235, 258, 269, 274, 297
Wedell, Prussian Lieutenant-General,
124, 132, 134, 162, 163
Wellington, Duke of, 14
Werthern, Baron, 121, 204
Westmoreland, Lord, English Diplomate,
22, 106, 109, 118, 218
William, Prince of Prussia, afterwards
Emperor of Germany, 11, 29, 30, 85,
87, 89,90, 91, 92,93, 94, 108, 124, 128,
129, 130, 131, 174, 202, 221, 276, 282,
285, 289, 290, 292, 293, 303, 304, 314,
315, 316
William, Prince of Prussia, afterwards
Emperor William II, 282
William, Prince Regent of Baden, 183,
215, 219
William, Duke of Brunswick, 99
Wºen, Prussian General, 302,303, 304,
Windischgrätz, Prince, 98, 313, 314,
315, 319
Wrangel, Prussian General, 163, 315
wºrse, Count, Prussian General, 88,
END OF VOL. III.
| -T-
3 9015 01466 2210



tº:
;:
*,