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SCIENTIA
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UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
& PLURIBUS UNUM
TUEBOR
SI-QUERIS PENINSULAM AMOLNAK.
CIRCUMSPICE
THE GIFT OF
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The
History
of
Hannibal
by
Jасоб Abbott
Harper & Brothers
New York.
HISTORY
Г
OF
{
1
HANNIBAL THE CARTHAGINIAN.
BY JACOB ABBOT T.
With Engravings.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
82 CLIFF STREET
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand
eight hundred and forty-nine, by
HARPER & BROTHERS,
}
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District
of New York.
Tappa... Bres. Assoon.
1849
7-144-1924
PREFACE.
THE author of this series has made it his spe-
cial object to confine himself very strictly, even
in the most minute details which he records, to
historic truth. The narratives are not tales
founded upon history, but history itself, without
any embellishment or any deviations from the
strict truth, so far as it can now be discovered
by an attentive examination of the annals writ-
ten at the time when the events themselves oc-
curred. In writing the narratives, the author
has endeavored to avail himself of the best
sources of information which this country af-
fords; and though, of course, there must be in
these volumes, as in all historical narratives,
more or less of imperfection and error, there is
no intentional embellishment. Nothing is stat-
ed, not even the most minute and apparently
viii
PREFACE.
imaginary details, without what was deemed
good historical authority. The readers, there-
fore, may rely upon the record as the truth, and
nothing but the truth, so far as an honest pur-
pose and a careful examination has been effect-
ual in ascertaining it.
i
CONTENT S.
Chapter
Page
I. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR
13
II. HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
33
III. OPENING OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.
52
IV. THE PASSAGE OF THE RHONE
69
V. HANNIBAL CROSSES THE ALPS.
90
VI. HANNIBAL IN THE NORTH OF ITALY
126
VII. THE APENNINES..
144
VIII. THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
163
IX. THE BATTLE OF CANNE.
185
X. SCIPIO
205
XI. HANNIBAL A FUGITIVE AND AN EXILE..... 235
XII. THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.
262
ENGRAVINGS.
Page
MAP
.Frontispiece.
THE BATTLE IN THE RIVER.
42
THE ELEPHANTS CROSSING THE RHONE.
87
HANNIBAL ON THE ALPS..
111
CROSSING THE MARSHES.
161
HASDRUBAL'S HEAD
THE BURNING OF THE CARTHAGINIAN FLEET.... 242
227

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HANNIBA L.
Hannibal.
CHAPTER I.
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.
Rome and Carthage
ANNIBAL was a Carthaginian general
He acquired his great distinction as a war-
rior by his desperate contests with the Romans.
Rome and Carthage grew up together on oppo-
site sides of the Mediterranean Sea. For about
a hundred years they waged against each other
most dreadful wars. There were three of these
Rome was successful in the end, and
wars.
Carthage was entirely destroyed.
There was no real cause for any disagreement
between these two nations. Their hostility to
each other was mere rivalry and spontaneous
hate. They spoke a different language; they
had a different origin; and they lived on oppo-
site sides of the same sea. So they hated and
devoured each other.
Those who have read the history of Alexander
the Great, in this series, will recollect the diffi-
14
[B.C. 280.
HANNIBAL.
Tyre.
Founding of Carthage.
Its commercial spirit
culty he experienced in besieging and subduing
Tyre, a great maritime city, situated about two
miles from the shore, on the eastern coast of the
Mediterranean Sea. Carthage was originally
founded by a colony from this city of Tyre, and
it soon became a great commercial and mari-
time power like its mother. The Carthaginians
built ships, and with them explored all parts of
the Mediterranean Sea. They visited all the
nations on these coasts, purchased the commod-
ities they had to sell, carried them to other na-
tions, and sold them at great advances. They
soon began to grow rich and powerful. They
hired soldiers to fight their battles, and began
to take possession of the islands of the Mediter-
ranean, and, in some instances, of points on the
main land. For example, in Spain: some of
their ships, going there, found that the natives
had silver and gold, which they obtained from
veins of ore near the surface of the ground. At
first the Carthaginians obtained this gold and
silver by selling the natives commodities of va-
rious kinds, which they had procured in other
countries; paying, of course, to the producers
only a very small price compared with what
they required the Spaniards to pay them. Fi-
nally, they took possession of that part of Spain
B.C. 280.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
15
Gold and silver mines.
New Carthage.
Ships and army.
where the mines were situated, and worked the
mines themselves. They dug deeper; they em-
ployed skillful engineers to make pumps to raise
the water, which always accumulates in mines,
and prevents their being worked to any great
depth unless the miners have a considerable de-
gree of scientific and mechanical skill. They
founded a city here, which they called New Car-
thage-Nova Carthago. They fortified and
garrisoned this city, and made it the center of
their operations in Spain. This city is called
Carthagena to this day.
Thus the Carthaginians did every thing by
power of money. They extended their opera-
tions in every direction, each new extension
bringing in new treasures, and increasing their
means of extending them more. They had, be-
sides the merchant vessels which belonged to
private individuals, great ships of war belong-
ing to the state. These vessels were called
galleys, and were rowed by oarsmen, tier above
tier, there being sometimes four and five banks
of oars. They had armies, too, drawn from dif-
ferent countries, in various troops, according as
different nations excelled in the different modes
of warfare. For instance, the Numidians, whose
country extended in the neighborhood of Car-
16
[B.C. 280.
HANNIBAL.
Numidia.
Balearic Isles.
The sling.
thage, on the African coast, were famous for
their horsemen. There were great plains in
Numidia, and good grazing, and it was, conse-
quently, one of those countries in which horses
and horsemen naturally thrive. On the other
hand, the natives of the Balearic Isles, now call-
ed Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica, were famous
for their skill as slingers. So the Carthagini-
ans, in making up their forces, would hire bod-
ies of cavalry in Numidia, and of slingers in the
Balearic Isles; and, for reasons analogous, they
got excellent infantry in Spain.
The tendency of the various nations to adopt
and cultivate different modes of warfare was
far greater, in those ancient times, than now.
The Balearic Isles, in fact, received their name
from the Greek word ballein, which means to
throw with a sling. The youth there were
trained to perfection in the use of this weapon
from a very early age. It is said that mothers
used to practice the plan of putting the bread
for their boys' breakfast on the branches of trees,
high above their heads, and not allow them to
have their food to eat until they could bring it
down with a stone thrown from a sling.
Thus the Carthaginian power became great-
ly extended. The whole government, however,
B.C. 280.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
17
The government of Carthage.
The aristocracy.
was exercised by a small body of wealthy and
aristocratic families at home. It was very much
such a government as that of England is at the
present day, only the aristocracy of England is
based on ancient birth and landed property,
whereas in Carthage it depended on commer-
cial greatness, combined, it is true, with hered-
itary family distinction. The aristocracy of
Carthage controlled and governed every thing.
None but its own sons could ordinarily obtain
office or power. The great mass of inhabitants
were kept in a state of servitude and vassalage.
This state of things operated then, as it does
now in England, very unjustly and hardly for
those who were thus debased; but the result
was-and in this respect the analogy with En-
gland still holds good-that a very efficient and
energetic government was created. The gov-
ernment of an oligarchy makes sometimes a
very rich and powerful state, but a discontent-
ed and unhappy people.
Let the reader now turn to the map and find
the place of Carthage upon it. Let him imag-
ine a great and rich city there, with piers, and
docks, and extensive warehouses for the com-
merce, and temples, and public edifices of splen-
did architecture, for the religious and civil serv-
B
18
[B.C. 280.
HANNIBAL.
Geographical relations of the Carthaginian empire.
ice of the state, and elegant mansions and pal-
aces for the wealthy aristocracy, and walls and
towers for the defense of the whole. Let him
then imagine a back country, extending for
some hundred miles into the interior of Africa,
fertile and highly cultivated, producing great
stores of corn, and wine, and rich fruits of every
description. Let him then look at the islands
of Sicily, of Corsica, and Sardinia, and the Ba-
leares, and conceive of them as rich and prosper-
ous countries, and all under the Carthaginian
rule. Look, also, at the coast of Spain; see, in
imagination, the city of Carthagena, with its
fortifications, and its army, and the gold and
silver mines, with thousands and thousands of
slaves toiling in them. Imagine fleets of ships
going continually along the shores of the Med-
iterranean, from country to country, cruising
back and forth to Tyre, to Cyprus, to Egypt,
to Sicily, to Spain, carrying corn, and flax, and
purple dyes, and spices, and perfumes, and pre-
cious stones, and ropes and sails for ships, and
gold and silver, and then periodically returning
to Carthage, to add the profits they had made to
the vast treasures of wealth already accumula-
ted there. Let the reader imagine all this with
the map before him, so as to have a distinct
B.C. 280.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
19
Rome and the Romans.
Their character
conception of the geographical relations of the
localities, and he will have a pretty correct idea
of the Carthaginian power at the time it com-
menced its dreadful conflicts with Rome.
Rome itself was very differently situated.
Rome had been built by some wanderers from
Troy, and it grew, for a long time, silently and
slowly, by a sort of internal principle of life and
energy. One region after another of the Italian
peninsula was merged in the Roman state.
They formed a population which was, in the
main, stationary and agricultural. They tilled
the fields; they hunted the wild beasts; they
raised great flocks and herds. They seem to
have been a race-a sort of variety of the human
species-possessed of a very refined and superior
organization, which, in its development, gave
rise to a character of firmness, energy, and force,
both of body and mind, which has justly excited
the admiration of mankind. The Carthaginians
had sagacity-the Romans called it cunning-
and activity, enterprise and wealth. Their ri-
vals, on the other hand, were characterized by
genius, courage, and strength, giving rise to a
certain calm and indomitable resolution and en-
ergy, which has since, in every age, been strong-
ly associated, in the minds of men, with the very
word Roman.
20
[B.C. 280.
HANNIBA L.
Origin of the first Punic war.
Progress of Carthage and Rome.
The progress of nations was much more slow
in ancient days than now, and these two rival
empires continued their gradual growth and ex-
tension, each on its own side of the great sea
which divided them, for five hundred years, be-
fore they came into collision. At last, however,
the collision came. It originated in the follow-
ing way:
By looking at the map, the reader will see.
that the island of Sicily is separated from the
main land by a narrow strait called the Strait
of Messina. This strait derives its name from
the town of Messina, which is situated upon it,
on the Sicilian side. Opposite Messina, on the
Italian side, there was a town named Rhegium.
Now it happened that both these towns had
been taken possession of by lawless bodies of
soldiery. The Romans came and delivered Rhe-
gium, and punished the soldiers who had seized
it very severely. The Sicilian authorities, ad-
vanced to the deliverance of Messina. The
troops there, finding themselves thus threaten-
ed, sent to the Romans to say that if they, the
Romans, would come and protect them, they
would deliver Messina into their hands.
+
The question, what answer to give to this ap-
plication, was brought before the Roman sen-
B.C. 280.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
21
Rhegium and Messina.
A perplexing question
ate, and caused them great perplexity. It seem-
ed very inconsistent to take sides with the reb.
els of Messina, when they had punished so se-
verely those of Rhegium. Still the Romans had
been, for a long time, becoming very jealous of
the growth and extension of the Carthaginian
power. Here was an opportunity of meeting
and resisting it. The Sicilian authorities were
about calling for direct aid from Carthage to
recover the city, and the affair would probably
result in establishing a large body of Carthagin-
ian troops within sight of the Italian shore,
and at a point where it would be easy for them
to make hostile incursions into the Roman ter-
ritories. In a word, it was a case of what is
called political necessity; that is to say, a case
in which the interests of one of the parties in a
contest were so strong that all considerations of
justice, consistency, and honor are to be sacri-
ficed to the promotion of them. Instances of
this kind of political necessity occur very fre-
quently in the management of public affairs in
all ages of the world.
The contest for Messina was, after all, how-
ever, considered by the Romans merely as a pre-
text, or rather as an occasion, for commencing
the struggle which they had long been desirous
22
[B.C. 280.
HANNIBAL.
The Romans determine to build a fleet.
Preparations.
of entering upon. They evinced their charac-
teristic energy and greatness in the plan which
they adopted at the outset. They knew very
well that the power of Carthage rested mainly
on her command of the seas, and that they could
not hope successfully to cope with her till they
could meet and conquer her on her own element.
In the mean time, however, they had not a sin-
gle ship and not a single sailor, while the Med-
iterranean was covered with Carthaginian ships
and seamen. Not at all daunted by this pro-
digious inequality, the Romans resolved to be-
gin at once the work of creating for themselves
a naval power.
The preparations consumed some time; for
the Romans had not only to build the ships,
they had first to learn how to build them. They
took their first lesson from a Carthaginian gal-
ley which was cast away in a storm upon the
coast of Italy. They seized this galley, collect-
ed their carpenters to examine it, and set wood-
men at work to fell trees and collect materials
for imitating it. The carpenters studied their
model very carefully, measured the dimensions
of every part, and observed the manner in which
the various parts were connected and secured
together. The heavy shocks which vessels are
B.C.259.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
23
Training the oarsmen.
The Roman fleet puts to sea.
exposed to from the waves makes it necessary
to secure great strength in the construction of
them; and, though the ships of the ancients
were very small and imperfect compared with
the men-of-war of the present day, still it is sur-
prising that the Romans could succeed at all in
such a sudden and hasty attempt at building
them.
They did, however, succeed. While the ships
were building, officers appointed for the purpose
were training men, on shore, to the art of row-
ing them. Benches, like the seats which the
oarsman would occupy in the ships, were ar-
ranged on the ground, and the intended seamen
were drilled every day in the movements and
action of rowers. The result was, that in a
few months after the building of the ships was
commenced, the Romans had a fleet of one hun-
dred galleys of five banks of oars ready. They
remained in harbor with them for some time, to
give the oarsmen the opportunity to see wheth-
er they could row on the water as well as on the
land, and then boldly put to sea to meet the
Carthaginians.
There was one part of the arrangements made
by the Romans in preparing their fleets which
was strikingly characteristic of the determined
24
|B.C. 259.
HANNIBAL.
Grappling irons.
Courage and resolution of the Romans.
resolution which marked all their conduct.
They constructed machines containing grap-
pling irons, which they mounted on the prows
of their vessels. These engines were so con-
trived, that the moment one of the ships con-
taining them should encounter a vessel of the
enemy, the grappling irons would fall upon the
deck of the latter, and hold the two firmly to-
gether, so as to prevent the possibility of either
escaping from the other. The idea that they
themselves should have any wish to withdraw
from the encounter seemed entirely out of the
question. Their only fear was that the Cartha-
ginian seamen would employ their superior skill
and experience in naval maneuvers in making
their escape. Mankind have always regarded
the action of the Romans, in this case, as one
of the most striking examples of military cour-
age and resolution which the history of war has
ever recorded. An army of landsmen come
down to the sea-shore, and, without scarcely
having ever seen a ship, undertake to build a
fleet, and go out to attack a power whose na-
vies covered the sea, and made her the sole and
acknowledged mistress of it. They seize a
wrecked galley of their enemies for their model;
they build a hundred vessels like it; they prac-
B.C. 254.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
25
Success of the Romans.
The rostral column.
tice maneuvers for a short time in port; and
then forth to meet the fleets of their power-
go
ful enemy, with grappling machines to hold
them, fearing nothing but the possibility of
their escape.
The result was as might have been expected.
The Romans captured, sunk, destroyed, or dis-
persed the Carthaginian fleet which was brought
to oppose them. They took the prows of the
ships which they captured and conveyed them
to Rome, and built what is called a rostral pil-
lar of them. A rostral pillar is a column orna-
mented with such beaks or prows, which were,
in the Roman language, called rostra. This col-
umn was nearly destroyed by lightning about
fifty years afterward, but it was repaired and
rebuilt again, and it stood then for many cen-
turies, a very striking and appropriate monu-
ment of this extraordinary naval victory. The
Roman commander in this case was the consul
Duilius. The rostral column was erected in
honor of him. In digging among the ruins of
Rome, there was found what was supposed to be
the remains of this column, about three hun-
dred years ago.
The Romans now prepared to carry the war
into Africa itself. Of course it was easy, after
26
[B.C. 254.
HANNIBAL.
The consuls.
Government of Rome.
their victory over the Carthaginian fleet, to trans-
port troops across the sea to the Carthaginian
shore. The Roman commonwealth was govern-
ed at this time by a senate, who made the laws,
and by two supreme executive officers, called
consuls. They thought it was safer to have
two chief magistrates than one, as each of the
two would naturally be a check upon the other.
The result was, however, that mutual jealousy
involved them often in disputes and quarrels. It
is thought better, in modern times, to have but
one chief magistrate in the state, and to provide
other modes to put a check upon any disposition
he might evince to abuse his powers.
The Roman consuls, in time of war, took com-
mand of the armies. The name of the consul
upon whom it devolved to carry on the war with
the Carthaginians, after this first great victory,
was Regulus, and his name has been celebrated
in every age, on account of his extraordinary
adventures in this campaign, and his untimely
fate. How far the story is strictly true it is
now impossible to ascertain, but the following
is the story, as the Roman historians relate it:
At the time when Regulus was elected con-
sul he was a plain man, living simply on his
farm, maintaining himself by his own industry,
B.C. 254.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
27
Story of Regulus.
He is made consul.
and evincing no ambition or pride. His fellow-
citizens, however, observed those qualities of
mind in him which they were accustomed to ad-
mire, and made him consul. He left the city
and took command of the army. He enlarged
the fleet to more than three hundred vessels.
He put one hundred and forty thousand men on
board, and sailed for Africa. One or two years
had been spent in making these preparations,
which time the Carthaginians had improved in
building new ships; so that, when the Romans
set sail, and were moving along the coast of
Sicily, they soon came in sight of a larger Car-
thaginian fleet assembled to oppose them. Reg-
ulus advanced to the contest. The Carthagin-
ian fleet was beaten as before. The ships which
were not captured or destroyed made their es-
cape in all directions, and Regulus went on,
without further opposition, and landed his forces
on the Carthaginian shore. He encamped as
soon as he landed, and sent back word to the
Roman senate asking what was next to be done.
The senate, considering that the great diffi-
culty and danger, viz., that of repulsing the
Carthaginian fleet, was now past, ordered Reg-
ulus to send home nearly all the ships and a
very large part of the army, and with the rest
28
[B.C. 254.
HANNIBAL.
His difficulties.
Regulus marches against Carthage.
to commence his march toward Carthage. Reg-
ulus obeyed; he sent home the troops which
had been ordered home, and with the rest began
to advance upon the city.
Just at this time, however, news came out
to him that the farmer who had had the care of
his land at home had died, and that his little
farm, on which rested his sole reliance for the
support of his family, was going to ruin. Reg-
ulus accordingly sent to the senate, asking
them to place some one else in command of the
army, and to allow him to resign his office, that
he might go home and take care of his wife and
children. The senate sent back orders that he
should go on with his campaign, and promised
to provide support for his family, and to see that
some one was appointed to take care of his land.
This story is thought to illustrate the extreme
simplicity and plainness of all the habits of life
among the Romans in those days. It certainly
does so, if it is true. It is, however, very ex-
traordinary, that a man who was intrusted, by
such a commonwealth, with the command of a
fleet of a hundred and thirty vessels, and an
army of a hundred and forty thousand men,
should have a family at home dependent for sub-
istence on the hired cultivation of seven acres
of land. Still, such is the story.
B.C. 254.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
29
Successes of Regulus. Arrival of Greeks. The Romans put to flight.
Regulus advanced toward Carthage, conquer-
ing as he came. The Carthaginians were beat-
en in one field after another, and were reduced,
in fact, to the last extremity, when an occur-
rence took place which turned the scale. This
occurrence was the arrival of a large body of
troops from Greece, with a Grecian general at
their head. These were troops which the Car-
thaginians had hired to fight for them, as was
the case with the rest of their army. But these
were Greeks, and the Greeks were of the same
race, and possessed the same qualities, as the
Romans. The newly-arrived Grecian general
evinced at once such military superiority, that
the Carthaginians gave him the supreme com-
mand. He marshaled the army, accordingly,
for battle. He had a hundred elephants in the
van. They were trained to rush forward and
trample down the enemy. He had the Greek
phalanx in the center, which was a close, com-
pact body of many thousand troops, bristling
with long, iron-pointed spears, with which the
men pressed forward, bearing every thing before
them. Regulus was, in a word, ready to meet
Carthaginians, but he was not prepared to en-
counter Greeks. His army was put to flight,
and he was taken prisoner. Nothing could ex-
30
[B.C.254.
HANNIBAL.
Regulus a prisoner.
He is sent to Rorne.
ceed the excitement and exultation in the city
when they saw Regulus, and five hundred oth-
er Roman soldiers, brought captive in. A few
days before, they had been in consternation at
the imminent danger of his coming in as a ruth-
less and vindictive conqueror.
The Roman senate were not discouraged by
this disaster. They fitted out new armies, and
the war went on, Regulus being kept all the
time at Carthage as a close prisoner. At last
the Carthaginians authorized him to go to Rome
as a sort of commissioner, to propose to the Ro-
mans to exchange prisoners and to make peace.
They exacted from him a solemn promise that
if he was unsuccessful he would return. The
Romans had taken many of the Carthaginians
prisoners in their naval combats, and held them
captive at Rome. It is customary, in such ca-
ses, for the belligerent nations to make an ex-
change, and restore the captives on both sides
to their friends and home. It was such an ex-
change of prisoners as this which Regulus was
to propose.
When Regulus reached Rome he refused to
enter the city, but he appeared before the sen-
ate without the walls, in a very humble garb,
and with the most subdued and unassuming de-
B.C. 249.] FIRST PUNIC WAR.
31
Regulus before the Roman senate.
meanor.
Result of his mission.
He was no longer, he said, a Roman
officer, or even citizen, but a Carthaginian pris-
oner, and he disavowed all right to direct, or
even to counsel, the Roman authorities in re-
spect to the proper course to be pursued. His
opinion was, however, he said, that the Romans
ought not to make peace or to exchange prison-
ers. He himself and the other Roman prison-
ers were old and infirm, and not worth the ex-
change; and, moreover, they had no claim
whatever on their country, as they could only
have been made prisoners in consequence of
want of courage or patriotism to die in their
country's cause. He said that the Carthagin-
ians were tired of the war, and that their re-
sources were exhausted, and that the Romans
ought to press forward in it with renewed vigor,
and leave himself and the other prisoners to
their fate.
The senate came very slowly and reluctantly
to the conclusion to follow this advice. They,
however, all earnestly joined in attempting to
persuade Regulus that he was under no obliga-
tion to return to Carthage. His promise, they
said, was extorted by the circumstances of the
case, and was not binding. Regulus, however,
insisted on keeping his faith with his enemies.
32
[B.C. 249.
HANNIBAL.
Death of Regulus.
Conclusion of the war.
He sternly refused to see his family, and, bid-
ding the senate farewell, he returned to Car-
thage. The Carthaginians, exasperated at his
having himself interposed to prevent the suc-
cess of his mission, tortured him for some time
in the most cruel manner, and finally put him
to death. One would think that he ought to
have counseled peace and an exchange of pris-
oners, and he ought not to have refused to see his
unhappy wife and children; but it was certainly
very noble in him to refuse to break his word.
The war continued for some time after this,
until, at length, both nations became weary of
the contest, and peace was made. The follow-
ing is the treaty which was signed. It shows
that the advantage, on the whole, in this first
Punic war, was on the part of the Romans:
"There shall be peace between Rome and
Carthage. The Carthaginians shall evacuate
all Sicily. They shall not make war upon any
allies of the Romans. They shall restore to the
Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners which
"they have taken from them, and pay them with-
in ten years three thousand two hundred talents
of silver."
The war had continued twenty-four years.
B.C. 234.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
33
Parentage of Hannibal.
Character of Hamilcar.
CHAPTER II.
HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
THE name of Hannibal's father was Hamil-
car. He was one of the leading Cartha-
ginian generals. He occupied a very prominent
position, both on account of his rank, and wealth,
and high family connections at Carthage, and
also on account of the great military energy
which he displayed in the command of the ar-
mies abroad. He carried on the wars which
the Carthaginians waged in Africa and in Spain
after the conclusion of the war with the Romans,
and he longed to commence hostilities with the
Romans again.
At one time, when Hannibal was about nine
years of age, Hamilcar was preparing to set off
on an expedition into Spain, and, as was usual
in those days, he was celebrating the occasion
with games, and spectacles, and various religious
ceremonies. It has been the custom in all ages
of the world, when nations go to war with each
other, for each side to take measures for propi-
tiating the favor of Heaven. Christian nations
at the present day do it by prayers offered in
C
34
[B.C. 234.
HANNIBAL.
Religious ceremonies.
Hannibal's famous oath of enmity to Rome.
each country for the success of their own arms.
Heathen nations do it by sacrifices, libations,
and offerings. Hamilcar had made arrange-
ments for such sacrifices, and the priests were
offering them in the presence of the whole as-
sembled army.
Young Hannibal, then about nine years of
age, was present. He was a boy of great spirit
and energy, and he entered with much enthu-
siasm into the scene. He wanted to go to Spain
himself with the army, and he came to his fa-
ther and began to urge his request. His father
could not consent to this. He was too young
to endure the privations and fatigues of such an
enterprise. However, his father brought him
to one of the altars, in the presence of the other
officers of the army, and made him lay his hand
upon the consecrated victim, and swear that, as
soon as he was old enough, and had it in his
power, he would make war upon the Romans.
This was done, no doubt, in part to amuse young
Hannibal's mind, and to relieve his disappoint-
ment in not being able to go to war at that
time, by promising him a great and mighty en-
emy to fight at some future day. Hannibal re-
membered it, and longed for the time to come
when he could go to war against the Romans.
B.C. 234.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
35
Hamilcar in Spain.
Hasdrubal.
Death of Hamil car.
Hamilcar bade his son farewell and embarked
for Spain. He was at liberty to extend his con-
quests there in all directions west of the River
Iberus, a river which the reader will find upon
the map, flowing southeast into the Mediterra-
nean Sea. Its name, Iberus, has been gradu-
ally changed, in modern times, to Ebro. By
the treaty with the Romans the Carthaginians
were not to cross the Iberus. They were also
bound by the treaty not to molest the people of
Saguntum, a city lying between the Iberus and
the Carthaginian dominions. Saguntum was
in alliance with the Romans and under their
protection.
Hamilcar was, however, very restless and un-
easy at being obliged thus to refrain from hos-
tilities with the Roman power.
mediately after his arrival in
plans for renewing the war.
He began, im-
Spain, to form
He had under
him, as his principal lieutenant, a young man
who had married his daughter. His name was
Hasdrubal. With Hasdrubal's aid, he went on
extending his conquests in Spain, and strength-
ening his position there, and gradually matur-
ing his plans for renewing war with the Ro-
mans, when at length he died. Hasdrubal suc-
ceeded him. Hannibal was now, probably, about
36
[B.C. 221
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal sent for to Spain.
Opposition of Hanno,
twenty-one or two years old, and still in Car-
thage. Hasdrubal sent to the Carthaginian gov-
ernment a request that Hannibal might receive
an appointment in the army, and be sent out to
join him in Spain.
On the subject of complying with this re-
quest there was a great debate in the Cartha-
ginian senate. In all cases where questions of
government are controlled by votes, it has been
found, in every age, that parties will always be
formed, of which the two most prominent will
usually be nearly balanced one against the oth-
er. Thus, at this time, though the Hamilcar
family were in power, there was a very strong
party in Carthage in opposition to them. The
leader of this party in the senate, whose name
was Hanno, made a very earnest speech against
sending Hannibal. He was too young, he said,
to be of any service. He would only learn the
vices and follies of the camp, and thus become
corrupted and ruined. "Besides," said Hanno,
"at this rate, the command of our armies in
Spain is getting to be a sort of hereditary right.
Hamilcar was not a king, that his authority
should thus descend first to his son-in-law and
then to his son; for this plan of making Han-
nibal," he said, "while yet scarcely arrived at
B.C. 221.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
37
Hannibal sets out for Spain.
Favorable impression on the army.
manhood, a high officer in the army, is only a
stepping-stone to the putting of the forces wholly
under his orders, whenever, for any reason, Has-
drubal shall cease to command them.”
The Roman historian, through whose narra-
tive we get our only account of this debate,
says that, though these were good reasons, yet
strength prevailed, as usual, over wisdom, in
the decision of the question. They voted to
send Hannibal, and he set out to cross the sea to
Spain with a heart full of enthusiasm and joy.
A great deal of curiosity and interest was felt
throughout the army to see him on his arrival.
The soldiers had been devotedly attached to his
father, and they were all ready to transfer this
attachment at once to the son, if he should prove
worthy of it. It was very evident, soon after
he reached the camp, that he was going to prove
himself thus worthy. He entered at once into
the duties of his position with a degree of ener-
gy, patience, and self-denial which attracted
universal attention, and made him a universal
favorite. He dressed plainly; he assumed no
airs; he sought for no pleasures or indulgences,
nor demanded any exemption from the dangers
and privations which the common soldiers had
to endure. He ate plain food, and slept, often,
38
[B.C. 221.
HANNIBAL.
Character of Hannibal.
He is elevated to the supreme command.
in his military cloak, on the ground, in the
midst of the soldiers on guard; and in battle he
was always foremost to press forward into the
contest, and the last to leave the ground when
the time came for repose. The Romans say
that, in addition to these qualities, he was in-
human and merciless when in open warfare
with his foes, and cunning and treacherous in
every other mode of dealing with them. It is
very probable that he was so. Such traits of
character were considered by soldiers in those
days, as they are now, virtues in themselves,
though vices in their enemies.
However this may be, Hannibal became a
great and universal favorite in the army. He
went on for several years increasing his military
knowledge, and widening and extending his in-
fluence, when at length, one day, Hasdrubal
was suddenly killed by a ferocious native of the
country whom he had by some means offended.
As soon as the first shock of this occurrence
was over, the leaders of the army went in pur-
suit of Hannibal, whom they brought in tri-
umph to the tent of Hasdrubal, and instated
him at once in the supreme command, with one
consent and in the midst of universal acclama-
tions. As soon as news of this event reached
B.C. 221.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
39
The River Iberus.
Hannibal secks a war with the Romans.
Carthage, the government there confirmed the
act of the army, and Hannibal thus found him-
self suddenly but securely invested with a very
high military command.
His eager and restless desire to try his strength
with the Romans received a new impulse by his
finding that the power was now in his hands.
Still the two countries were at peace. They
were bound by solemn treaties to continue so.
The River Iberus was the boundary which sep-
arated the dominions of the two nations from
each other in Spain, the territory east of that
boundary being under the Roman power, and
that on the west under that of the Carthagin-
ians; except that Saguntum, which was on the
western side, was an ally of the Romans, and
the Carthaginians were bound by the treaty to
leave it independent and free.
Hannibal could not, therefore, cross the Ibe-
rus or attack Saguntum without an open in-
fraction of the treaty. He, however, immedi-
ately began to move toward Saguntum, and to
attack the nations in the immediate vicinity of
it. If he wished to get into a war with the Ro-
mans, this was the proper way to promote it;
for, by advancing thus into the immediate vi-
cinity of the capital of their allies, there was
40
[B.C. 219.
HANNIBAL.
Stratagem of Hannibal.
Fording the river.
great probability that disputes would arise which
would sooner or later end in war.
The Romans say that Hannibal was cunning
and treacherous, and he certainly did display,
on some occasions, a great degree of adroitness
in his stratagems. In one instance in these pre-
liminary wars he gained a victory over an im-
mensely superior force in a very remarkable
manner. He was returning from an inroad
upon some of the northern provinces, laden and
encumbered with spoil, when he learned that
an immense army, consisting, it was said, of a
hundred thousand men, were coming down upon
his rear.
There was a river at a short distance
before him. Hannibal pressed on and crossed
the river by a ford, the water being, perhaps,
about three feet deep. He secreted a large body
of cavalry near the bank of the stream, and push-
ed on with the main body of the army to some
little distance from the river, so as to produce
the impression upon his pursuers that he was
pressing forward to make his escape.
The enemy, thinking that they had no time
to lose, poured down in great numbers into the
stream from various points along the banks;
and, as soon as they had reached the middle of
the current, and were wading laboriously, half

THE BATTLE IN THE RIVER.
B.C.219.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
43
Great battle in the River Tagus.
Victory of Hannibal.
submerged, with their weapons held above their
heads, so as to present as little resistance as pos-
sible to the water, the horsemen of Hannibal
rushed in to meet and attack them. The horse-
men-had, of course, greatly the advantage; for,
though their horses were in the water, they were
themselves raised above it, and their limbs were
free, while their enemies were half submerged,
and, being encumbered by their arms and by
one another, were nearly helpless. They were
immediately thrown into complete confusion,
and were overwhelmed and carried down by the
current in great numbers. Some of them suc-
ceeded in landing below, on Hannibal's side;
but, in the mean time, the main body of his
army had returned, and was ready to receive
them, and they were trampled under foot by
the elephants, which it was the custom to em-
ploy, in those days, as a military force. As
soon as the river was cleared, Hannibal march-
ed his own army across it, and attacked what
remained of the enemy on their own side. He
gained a complete victory, which was so great
and decisive that he secured by it possession of
the whole country west of the Iberus, except
Saguntum, and Saguntum itself began to be
seriously alarmed.
44
[B.C. 218.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal attacks it.
Saguntum.
The Saguntines sent embassadors to Rome
to ask the Romans to interpose and protect them
from the dangers which threatened them. These
embassadors made diligent efforts to reach Rome
as soon as possible, but they were too late. On
some pretext or other, Hannibal contrived to
raise a dispute between the city and one of the
neighboring tribes, and then, taking sides with
the tribe, he advanced to attack the city. The
Saguntines prepared for their defense, hoping
soon to receive succors from Rome. They
strengthened and fortified their walls, while
Hannibal began to move forward great military
engines for battering them down.
Hannibal knew very well that by his hostili-
ties against this city he was commencing a con-
test with Rome itself, as Rome must necessa-
rily take part with her ally. In fact, there is
no doubt that his design was to bring on a gen-
eral war between the two great nations. He
began with Saguntum for two reasons: first,
it would not be safe for him to cross the Iberus,
and advance into the Roman territory, leaving
so wealthy and powerful a city in his rear; and
then, in the second place, it was easier for him
to find pretexts for getting indirectly into a
quarrel with Saguntum, and throwing the odi-
B.C. 218.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
45
Progress of the siege.
Hannibal wounded.
um of a declaration of war on Rome, than to
persuade the Carthaginian state to renounce
the peace and themselves commence hostilities.
There was, as has been already stated, a very
strong party at Carthage opposed to Hannibal,
who would, of course, resist any measures tend-
ing to a war with Rome, for they would con-
sider such a war as opening a vast field for grat-
ifying Hannibal's ambition. The only way,
therefore, was to provoke a war by aggressions
on the Roman allies, to be justified by the best
pretexts he could find.
Saguntum was a very wealthy and powerful
city. It was situated about a mile from the
sea. The attack upon the place, and the de-
fense of it by the inhabitants, went on for some
time with great vigor. In these operations,
Hannibal exposed himself to great danger. He
approached, at one time, so near the wall, in
superintending the arrangements of his soldiers
and the planting of his engines, that a heavy
javelin, thrown from the parapet, struck him on
the thigh. It pierced the flesh, and inflicted so
severe a wound that he fell immediately, and
was borne away by the soldiers. It was sever-
al days before he was free from the danger in-
curred by the loss of blood and the fever which
46
[B.C. 218.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal recovers.
The falarica.
follows such a wound. During all this time hist
army were in a great state of excitement and
anxiety, and suspended their active operations.
As soon, however, as Hannibal was found to
be decidedly convalescent, they resumed them
again, and urged them onward with greater en-
ergy than before.
The weapons of warfare in those ancient days
were entirely different from those which are now
employed, and there was one, described by an
ancient historian as used by the Saguntines at
this siege, which might almost come under the
modern denomination of fire-arms. It was call-
ed the falarica. It was a sort of javelin, con-
sisting of a shaft of wood, with a long point of
iron. This point was said to be three feet long.
This javelin was to be thrown at the enemy
cither from the hand of the soldier or by an en-
gine. The leading peculiarity of it was, how-
ever, that, near to the pointed end, there were
wound around the wooden shaft long bands of
tow, which were saturated with pitch and other
combustibles, and this inflammable band was
set on fire just before the javelin was thrown.
As the missile flew on its way, the wind fanned
the flames, and made them burn so fiercely, that
when the javelin struck the shield of the soldier
B.C. 218.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
47
Arrival of the Roman embassadors.
Hannibal's policy
opposing it, it could not be pulled out, and the
shield itself had to be thrown down and aban-
doned.
While the inhabitants of Saguntum were
vainly endeavoring to defend themselves against
their terrible enemy by these and similar means,
their embassadors, not knowing that the city
had been attacked, had reached Rome, and had
laid before the Roman senate their fears that
the city would be attacked, unless they adopted
vigorous and immediate measures to prevent it.
The Romans resolved to send embassadors to
Hannibal to demand of him what his intentions
were, and to warn him against any acts of hos-
tility against Saguntum. When these Roman
embassadors arrived on the coast, near to Sa-
guntum, they found that hostilities had com-
menced, and that the city was hotly besieged.
They were at a loss to know what to do.
It is better for a rebel not to hear an order
which he is determined beforehand not to obey.
Hannibal, with an adroitness which the Cartha-
ginians called sagacity, and the Romans treach-
ery and cunning, determined not to see these
messengers. He sent word to them, at the shore,
that they must not attempt to come to his camp,
for the country was in such a disturbed condi-
48
[B.C. 218.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal sends embassadors to Carthage.
The Roman embassadors.
tion that it would not be safe for them to land;
and besides, he could not receive or attend to
them, for he was too much pressed with the ur-
gency of his military works to have any time to
spare for debates and negotiations.
Hannibal knew that the embassadors, being
thus repulsed, and having found, too, that the
war had broken out, and that Saguntum was
actually beset and besieged by Hannibal's ar-
mies, would proceed immediately to Carthage
to demand satisfaction there. He knew, also,
that Hanno and his party would very probably
espouse the cause of the Romans, and endeavor
to arrest his designs. He accordingly sent his
own embassadors to Carthage, to exert an influ-
ence in his favor in the Carthaginian senate, and
endeavor to urge them to reject the claims of
the Romans, and allow the war between Rome
and Carthage to break out again.
The Roman embassadors appeared at Car-
thage, and were admitted to an audience before
the senate. They stated their case, represent-
ing that Hannibal had made war upon Sagun-
tum in violation of the treaty, and had refused
even to receive the communication which had
been sent him by the Roman senate through
them. They demanded that the Carthaginian
B.C. 218.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
49
Parties in the Carthaginian senate.
Speech of Hanno.
government should disavow his acts, and deliver
him up to them, in order that he might receive
the punishment which his violation of the treaty,
and his aggressions upon an ally of the Romans,
so justly deserved.
The party of Hannibal in the Carthaginian
senate were, of course, earnest to have these pro-
posals rejected with scorn. The other side, with
Hanno at their head, maintained that they were
reasonable demands. Hanno, in a very ener-
getic and powerful speech, told the senate that
he had warned them not to send Hannibal into
Spain. He had foreseen that such a hot and
turbulent spirit as his would involve them in
inextricable difficulties with the Roman power.
Hannibal had, he said, plainly violated the treaty.
He had invested and besieged Saguntum, which
they were solemnly bound not to molest, and
they had nothing to expect in return but that
the Roman legions would soon be investing and
besieging their own city. In the mean time,
the Romans, he added, had been moderate and
forbearing. They had brought nothing to the
charge of the Carthaginians. They accused no-
body but Hannibal, who, thus far, alone was
guilty. The Carthaginians, by disavowing his
acts, could save themselves from the responsi-
D
50
[B.C. 218.
HANNIBAL.
Defense of Hannibal's friends.
Hanno proposes to give up Hannibal.
bility of them. He urged, therefore, that an
embassage of apology should be sent to Rome,
that Hannibal should be deposed and delivered
up to the Romans, and that ample restitution
should be made to the Saguntines for the inju-
ries they had received.
On the other hand, the friends of Hannibal
urged in the Carthaginian senate their defense
of the general. They reviewed the history of
the transactions in which the war had origina-
ted, and showed, or attempted to show, that the
Saguntines themselves commenced hostilities,
and that consequently they, and not Hannibal,
were responsible for all that followed; that, un-
der those circumstances, the Romans ought not
to take their part, and if they did so, it proved
that they preferred the friendship of Saguntum
to that of Carthage; and that it would be cow-
ardly and dishonorable in the extreme for them
to deliver the general whom they had placed in
power, and who had shown himself so worthy
of their choice by his courage and energy, into
the hands of their ancient and implacable foes.
Thus Hannibal was waging at the same time
two wars, one in the Carthaginian senate, where
the weapons were arguments and eloquence, and
the other under the walls of Saguntum, which
B.C. 218.] HANNIBAL AT SAGUNTUM.
51
Hannibal triumphant.
Saguntum falls.
was fought with battering rams and fiery jave-
lins. He conquered in both. The senate de-
cided to send the Roman embassadors home
without acceding to their demands, and the
walls of Saguntum were battered down by Han-
nibal's engines. The inhabitants refused all
terms of compromise, and resisted to the last,
so that, when the victorious soldiery broke over
the prostrate walls, and poured into the city, it
was given up to them to plunder, and they killed
and destroyed all that came in their way. The
disappointed embassadors returned to Rome
with the news that Saguntum had been taken
and destroyed by Hannibal, and that the Car-
thaginians, far from offering any satisfaction for
the wrong, assumed the responsibility of it them-
selves, and were preparing for war.
Thus Hannibal accomplished his purpose of
opening the way for waging war against the
Roman power. He prepared to enter into the
contest with the utmost energy and zeal. The
conflict that ensued lasted seventeen years, and
is known in history as the second Punic war.
It was one of the most dreadful struggles be-
tween rival and hostile nations which the gloomy
history of mankind exhibits to view. The events
that occurred will be described in the subse-
quent chapters.
52
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Fall of Hanno's party.
Power of Hannibal,
CHAPTER III.
OPENING OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.
WHEN the tide once turns in any nation
in favor of war, it generally rushes on
with great impetuosity and force, and bears all
before it. It was so in Carthage in this in-
stance. The party of Hanno were thrown en-
tirely into the minority and silenced, and the
friends and partisans of Hannibal carried not
only the government, but the whole community
with them, and every body was eager for war.
This was owing, in part, to the natural conta-
giousness of the martial spirit, which, when felt
by one, catches easily, by sympathy, in the heart
of another. It is a fire which, when once it be-
gins to burn, spreads in every direction, and con-
sumes all that comes in its way.
Besides, when Hannibal gained possession of
Saguntum, he found immense treasures there,
which he employed, not to increase his own
private fortune, but to strengthen and confirm
his civil and military power. The Saguntines
did every thing they could to prevent these
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
53
Desperate valor of the Saguntines. Hannibal's disposition of the spoils.
treasures from falling into his hands. They
fought desperately to the last, refused all terms
of surrender, and they became so insanely des-
perate in the end, that, according to the narra-
tive of Livy, when they found that the walls
and towers of the city were falling in, and that
all hope of further defense was gone, they built
an enormous fire in the public streets, and heap-
ed upon it all the treasures which they had time
to collect that fire could destroy, and then that
many of the principal inhabitants leaped into
the flames themselves, in order that their hated
conquerors might lose their prisoners as well as
their spoils.
Notwithstanding this, however, Hannibal ob-
tained a vast amount of gold and silver, both in
the form of money and of plate, and also much
valuable merchandise, which the Saguntine mer-
chants had accumulated in their palaces and
warehouses. He used all this property to
strengthen his own political and military posi-
tion. He paid his soldiers all the arrears due
to them in full. He divided among them a
large additional amount as their share of the
spoil. He sent rich trophies home to Carthage,
and presents, consisting of sums of money, and
jewelry, and gems, to his friends there, and to
54
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal chosen one of the suffetes.
Nature of the office
those whom he wished to make his friends. The
result of this munificence, and of the renown
which his victories in Spain had procured for
aim, was to raise him to the highest pinnacle
of influence and honor. The Carthaginians
chose him one of the suffetes.
As
The suffetes were the supreme executive offi-
cers of the Carthaginian commonwealth. The
government was, as has been remarked before,
a sort of aristocratic republic, and republics are
always very cautious about intrusting power,
even executive power, to any one man.
Rome had two consuls, reigning jointly, and
France, after her first revolution, a Directory
of five, so the Carthaginians chose annually two
suffetes, as they were called at Carthage, though
the Roman writers call them indiscriminately
suffetes, consuls, and kings. Hannibal was now
advanced to this dignity; so that, in conjunc-
tion with his colleague, he held the supreme
civil authority at Carthage, besides being in-
vested with the command of the vast and vic-
torious army in Spain.
When news of these events—the siege and
destruction of Saguntum, the rejection of the
demands of the Roman embassadors, and the
vigorous preparations making by the Cartha-
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
55
Great excitement at Rome.
Foarful anticipations.
ginians for war-reached Rome, the whole city
was thrown into consternation. The senate
and the people held tumultuous and disorderly
assemblies, in which the events which had oc-
curred, and the course of proceeding which it
was incumbent on the Romans to take, were
discussed with much excitement and clamor.
The Romans were, in fact, afraid of the Car-
thaginians. The campaigns of Hannibal in
Spain had impressed the people with a strong
sense of the remorseless and terrible energy of
his character; they at once concluded that his
plans would be formed for marching into Italy,
and they even anticipated the danger of his
bringing the war up to the very gates of the
city, so as to threaten them with the destruc-
tion which he had brought upon Saguntum.
The event showed how justly they appreciated
his character.
Since the conclusion of the first Punic war,
there had been peace between the Romans and
Carthaginians for about a quarter of a century.
During all this time both nations had been ad-
vancing in wealth and power, but the Cartha-
ginians had made much more rapid progress
than the Romans. The Romans had, indeed,
been very successful at the onset in the former
56
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Warm debates.
New embassy to Carthage.
war, but in the end the Carthaginians had
proved themselves their equal. They seemed,
therefore, to dread now a fresh encounter with
these powerful foes, led on, as they were now to
be, by such a commander as Hannibal.
They determined, therefore, to send a second
embassy to Carthage, with a view of making
one more effort to preserve peace before actual-
ly commencing hostilities. They accordingly
selected five men from among the most influ-
ential citizens of the state-men of venerable
age and of great public consideration-and
commissioned them to proceed to Carthage and
ask once more whether it was the deliberate
and final decision of the Carthaginian senate
to avow and sustain the action of Hannibal.
This solemn embassage set sail. They arrived
at Carthage. They appeared before the senate.
They argued their cause, but it was, of course,
to deaf and unwilling ears. The Carthaginian
orators replied to them, each side attempting to
throw the blame of the violation of the treaty
on the other. It was a solemn hour, for the
peace of the world, the lives of hundreds of
thousands of men, and the continued happiness,
or the desolation and ruin of vast regions of
country, depended on the issue of the debate.
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
57
Fruitless negotiations.
The embassadors return.
Unhappily, the breach was only widened by the
discussion. "Very well," said the Roman
commissioners, at last, "we offer you peace or
war, which do you choose?" "Whichever you
please," replied the Carthaginians; "decide for
yourselves." "War, then," said the Romans,
"since it must be so." The conference was
broken up, and the embassadors returned to
Rome.
They returned, however, by the way of
Spain. Their object in doing this was to ne-
gotiate with the various kingdoms and tribes in
Spain and in France, through which Hannibal
would have to march in invading Italy, and en-
deavor to induce them to take sides with the
Romans. They were too late, however, for
Hannibal had contrived to extend and establish
his influence in all that region too strongly to
be shaken; so that, on one pretext or another,
the Roman proposals were all rejected. There
was one powerful tribe, for example, called the
Volscians. The embassadors, in the presence
of the great council of the Volscians, made
known to them the probability of war, and in-
vited them to ally themselves with the Romans.
The Volscians rejected the proposition with a
sort of scorn. "We see," said they, "from the
58
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL
Reply of the Volscians.
Council of Gauls.
fate of Saguntum, what is to be expected to re-
sult from an alliance with the Romans. After
leaving that city defenseless and alone in its
struggle against such terrible danger, it is in
vain to ask other nations to trust to your pro-
tection. If you wish for new allies, it will be
best for you to go where the story of Saguntum
is not known." This answer of the Volscians
was applauded by the other nations of Spain, as
far as it was known, and the Roman embassa-
dors, despairing of success in that country, went
on into Gaul, which is the name by which the
country now called France is known in ancient
history.
On reaching a certain place which was a cen-
tral point of influence and power in Gaul, the
Roman commissioners convened a great martial
council there. The spectacle presented by this
assembly was very imposing, for the warlike
counselors came to the meeting armed complete-
ly and in the most formidable manner, as if
they were coming to a battle instead of a con-
sultation and debate. The venerable embassa-
dors laid the subject before them. They des-
canted largely on the power and greatness of
the Romans, and on the certainty that they
should conquer in the approaching contest, and
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
59
Tumultuous scene.
Repulse of the embassadors
they invited the Gauls to espouse their cause,
and to rise in arms and intercept Hannibal's
passage through their country, if he should at-
tempt to effect one.
The assembly could hardly be induced to hear
the embassadors through; and, as soon as they
had finished their address, the whole council
broke forth into cries of dissent and displeasure,
and even into shouts of derision. Order was at
length restored, and the officers, whose duty it
was to express the sentiments of the assembly,
gave for their reply that the Gauls had never
received any thing but violence and injuries
from Rome, or any thing but kindness and good-
will from Carthage; and that they had no idea
of being guilty of the folly of bringing the im-
pending storm of Hannibal's hostility upon their
own heads, merely for the sake of averting it
from their ancient and implacable foes. Thus
the embassadors were every where repulsed.
They found no friendly disposition toward the
Roman power till they had crossed the Rhone.
Hannibal began now to form his plans, in a
very deliberate and cautious manner, for a march
into Italy. He knew well that this was an ex-
pedition of such magnitude and duration as to re-
quire beforehand the most careful and well-con-
60
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Ilaunibal's kindness to his soldiers.
IIe matures his designs.
sidered arrangements, both for the forces which
were to go, and for the states and communities
which were to remain. The winter was com-
ing on. His first measure was to dismiss a
large portion of his forces, that they might visit
their homes. He told them that he was intend-
ing some great designs for the ensuing spring,
which might take them to a great distance, and
keep them for a long time absent from Spain,
and he would, accordingly, give them the inter-
vening time to visit their families and their
homes, and to arrange their affairs. This act
of kind consideration and confidence renewed
the attachment of the soldiers to their command-
er, and they returned to his camp in the spring
not only with new strength and vigor, but with
redoubled attachment to the service in which
they were engaged.
Hannibal, after sending home his soldiers, re-
tired himself to New Carthage, which, as will
be seen by the map, is further west than Sa-
guntum, where he went into winter quarters,
and devoted himself to the maturing of his de-
signs. Besides the necessary preparations for
his own march, he had to provide for the gov-
ernment of the countries that he should leave.
He devised various and ingenious plans to pre-
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
61
Hannibal's plan for the government of Spain in his absencc.
vent the danger of insurrections and rebellions
while he was gone. One was, to organize an
army for Spain out of soldiers drawn from Af
rica, while the troops which were to be em-
ployed to garrison Carthage, and to sustain the
government there, were taken from Spain. By
thus changing the troops of the two countries,
each country was controlled by a foreign sol-
diery, who were more likely to be faithful in
their obedience to their commanders, and less
in danger of sympathizing with the populations
which they were respectively employed to con-
trol, than if each had been retained in its own
native land.
Hannibal knew very well that the various
states and provinces of Spain, which had refused
to ally themselves with the Romans and aban-
don him, had been led to do this through the
influence of his presents or the fear of his pow-
er, and that if, after he had penetrated into It-
aly, he should meet with reverses, so as to di-
minish very much their hope of deriving benc-
fit from his favor or their fear of his power, there
would be great danger of defections and revolts
As an additional security against this, he adopt-
ed the following ingenious plan. He enlisted a
body of troops from among all the nations of
62
HANNIBAL.
[B.C. 217.
Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal.
He is left in charge of Spain.
Spain that were in alliance with him, selecting
the young men who were enlisted as much as
possible from families of consideration and influ-
ence, and this body of troops, when organized
and officered, he sent into Carthage, giving the
nations and tribes from which they were drawn
to understand that he considered them not only
as soldiers serving in his armies, but as hosta-
ges, which he should hold as security for the
fidelity and obedience of the countries from
which they had come. The number of these
soldiers was four thousand.
Hannibal had a brother, whose name, as it
happened, was the same as that of his brother-
in-law, Hasdrubal. It was to him that he com-
mitted the government of Spain during his ab-
sence. The soldiers provided for him were, as
has been already stated, mainly drawn from
Africa. In addition to the foot soldiers, he pro-
vided him with a small body of horse. He left
with him, also, fourteen elephants. And as he
thought it not improbable that the Romans
might, in some contingency during his absence,
make a descent upon the Spanish coast from
the sea, he built and equipped for him a small
fleet of about sixty vessels, fifty of which were
of the first class. In modern times, the mag-
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
63
Preparations of the Romans.
Their plan for the war
nitude and efficiency of a ship is estimated by
the number of guns she will carry; then, it
was the number of banks of oars. Fifty of
Hasdrubal's ships were quinqueremes, as they
were called, that is, they had five banks of oars.
The Romans, on the other hand, did not neg-
lect their own preparations. Though reluct-
ant to enter upon the war, they still prepared
to engage in it with their characteristic energy
and ardor, when they found that it could not
be averted. They resolved on raising two pow-
erful armies, one for each of the consuls.
plan was, with one of these to advance to meet
Hannibal, and with the other to proceed to Sic-
ily, and from Sicily to the African coast, with
a view of threatening the Carthaginian capital.
This plan, if successful, would compel the Car-
thaginians to recall a part or the whole of Han-
nibal's army from the intended invasion of It-
aly to defend their own African homes.
The
The force raised by the Romans amounted to
about seventy thousand men. About a third of
these were Roman soldiers, and the remainder
were drawn from various nations dwelling in
Italy and in the islands of the Mediterranean
Sea which were in alliance with the Romans.
Of these troops six thousand were cavalry. Of
64
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
The Roman fleet.
Drawing lots.
course, as the Romans intended to cross into
Africa, they needed a fleet. They built and
-equipped one, which consisted of two hundred
and twenty ships of the largest class, that
is, quinqueremes, besides a number of smaller
and lighter vessels for services requiring speed.
There were vessels in use in those times larger
than the quinqueremes. Mention is occasion-
ally made of those which had six and even sev-
en banks of oars. But these were only employ-
ed as the flag-ships of commanders, and for
other purposes of ceremony and parade, as they
were too unwieldy for efficient service in action.
Lots were then drawn in a very solemn man-
ner, according to the Roman custom on such
.occasions, to decide on the assignment of these
two armies to the respective consuls. The one
destined to meet Hannibal on his way from
Spain, fell to a consul named Cornelius Scipio.
The name of the other was Sempronius. It
devolved on him, consequently, to take charge
of the expedition destined to Sicily and Africa.
When all the arrangements were thus made,
the question was finally put, in a very solemn
and formal manner, to the Roman people for
their final vote and decision. 'Do the Roman
people decide and decree that war shall be de
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
65
Religious ceremonies.
Hannibal's march.
clared against the Carthaginians ?" The de-
cision was in the affirmative. The war was
then proclaimed with the usual imposing cere-
monies. Sacrifices and religious celebrations
followed, to propitiate the favor of the gods, and
to inspire the soldiers with that kind of cour-
age and confidence which the superstitious,
however wicked, feel when they can imagine
themselves under the protection of heaven.
These shows and spectacles being over, all
things were ready.
In the mean time Hannibal was moving on,
as the spring advanced, toward the banks of the
Iberus, that frontier stream, the crossing of
which made him an invader of what was, in
some sense, Roman territory. He boldly passed ·
the stream, and moved forward along the coast.
of the Mediterranean, gradually approaching the
Pyrenees, which form the boundary between
France and Spain. His soldiers hitherto did
not know what his plans were. It is very lit-
tle the custom now for military and naval com-
manders to communicate to their men much in-
formation about their designs, and it was still
less the custom then; and besides, in those days,
the common soldiers had no access to those
means of information by which news of every
E
66
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
The Pyrenees.
Discontent in Hannibal's army.
sort is now so universally diffused. Thus,
though all the officers of the army, and well-
informed citizens, both in Rome and Carthage,
anticipated and understood Hannibal's designs,
his own soldiers, ignorant and degraded, knew
nothing except that they were to go on some
distant and dangerous service. They, very like-
ly, had no idea whatever of Italy or of Rome,
or of the magnitude of the possessions, or of the
power held by the vast empire which they were
going to invade.
When, however, after traveling day after day,
they came to the foot of the Pyrenees, and found
that they were really going to pass that mighty
chain of mountains, and for this purpose were
actually entering its wild and gloomy defiles,
the courage of some of them failed, and they be-
gan to murmur. The discontent and alarm
were, in fact, so great, that one corps, consist-
ing of about three thousand men, left the camp
in a body, and moved back toward their homes.
On inquiry, Hannibal found that there were ten
thousand more who were in a similar state of
feeling. His whole force consisted of over one
hundred thousand. And now what does the
reader imagine that Hannibal would do in such
an emergency? Would he return in pursuit
B.C. 217.] SECOND PUNIC WAR.
67
Hannibal's address.
The discontented sent home.
of these deserters, to recapture and destroy them
as a terror to the rest? or would he let them
go, and attempt by words of conciliation and en-
couragement to confirm and save those that yet
remained? He did neither. He called togeth-
er the ten thousand discontented troops that
were still in his camp, and told them that, since
they were afraid to accompany his army, or un-
willing to do so, they might return. He want-
ed none in his service who had not the courage
and the fortitude to go on wherever he might
lead. He would not have the faint-hearted and
the timid in his army. They would only be a
burden to load down and impede the courage
and energy of the rest. So saying, he gave or-
ders for them to return, and with the rest of the
army, whose resolution and ardor were redoubled
by this occurrence, he moved on through the
passes of the mountains.
This act of Hannibal, in permitting his dis-
contented soldiers to return, had all the effect
of a deed of generosity in its influence upon the
minds of the soldiers who went on. We must
not, however, imagine that it was prompted by
a spirit of generosity at all. It was policy. A
seeming generosity was, in this case, exactly
what was wanted to answer his ends. Hanni-
68
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's sagacity.
The Pyrenees passed.
bal was mercilessly cruel in all cases where he
imagined that severity was demanded. It re-
quires great sagacity sometimes in a command-
er to know when he must punish, and when it
is wisest to overlook and forgive. Hannibal,
like Alexander and Napoleon, possessed this sa-
gacity in a very high degree; and it was, doubt-
less, the exercise of that principle alone which
prompted his action on this occasion.
Thus Hannibal passed the Pyrenees. The
next difficulty that he anticipated was in cross-
ing the River Rhone.
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
69
Difficulties anticipated.
Reconnoitering party.
HA
CHAPTER IV.
THE PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
ANNIBAL, after he had passed the Pyr-
enees, did not anticipate any new diffi-
culty till he should arrive at the Rhone. He
knew very well that that was a broad and rap-
id river, and that he must cross it near its
mouth, where the water was deep and the banks
low; and, besides, it was not impossible that
the Romans who were coming to meet him,
under Cornelius Scipio, might have reached
the Rhone before he should arrive there, and be
ready upon the banks to dispute his passage
He had sent forward, therefore, a small detach-
ment in advance, to reconnoiter the country and
select a route to the Rhone, and if they met
with no difficulties to arrest them there, they
were to go on till they reached the Alps, and
explore the passages and defiles through which
his army could best cross those snow-covered
mountains.
It seems that before he reached the Pyrenees
—that is, while he was upon the Spanish side of
70
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Some tribes reduced.
Alarm of the Gauls.
them, some of the tribes through whose territo-
ries he had to pass undertook to resist him,
and he, consequently, had to attack them and
reduce them by force; and then, when he was
ready to move on, he left a guard in the terri-
tories thus conquered to keep them in subjec-
tion. Rumors of this reached Gaul. The
Gauls were alarmed for their own safety. They
had not intended to oppose Hannibal so long as
they supposed that he only wished for a safe
passage through their country on his way to
Italy; but now, when they found, from what
had occurred in Spain, that he was going to
conquer the countries he traversed as he passed
along, they became alarmed. They seized their
arms, and assembled in haste at Ruscino, and
began to devise measures of defense. Ruscino
was the same place as that in which the Ro-
man embassadors met the great council of the
Gauls on their return to Italy from Carthage.
While this great council, or, rather, assembly
of armies, was gathering at Ruscino, full of
threats and anger, Hannibal was at Illiberis, a
town at the foot of the Pyrenean Mountains
He seems to have had no fear that any opposi
tion which the Gauls could bring to bear against
him would be successful, but he dreaded the
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
71
The Alps.
Difficulty of their passage.
delay. He was extremely unwilling to spend.
the precious months of the early summer in
contending with such foes as they, when the
road to Italy was before him. Besides, the pass-
es of the Alps, which are difficult and laborious
at any time, are utterly impracticable except
in the months of July and August. At all
other seasons they are, or were in those days,
blocked up with impassable snows.
In modern
times roads have been made, with galleries cut
through the rock, and with the exposed places
protected by sloping roofs projecting from above,
over which storms sweep and avalanches slide
without injury; so that now the intercourse
of ordinary travel between France and Italy,
across the Alps, is kept up, in some measure,
all the year. In Hannibal's time, however, the
mountains could not be traversed except in the
summer months, and if it had not been that the
result justified the undertaking, it would have
been considered an act of inexcusable rashness
and folly to attempt to cross with an army at
all.
Hannibal had therefore no time to lose, and
that circumstance made this case one of those
in which forbearance and a show of generosity
were called for, instead of defiance and force.
72
[B.C.217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's message to the Gauls.
Success of his policy.
He accordingly sent messengers to the council
at Ruscino to say, in a very complaisant and
affable manner, that he wished to see and con-
fer with their princes in person, and that, if
they pleased, he would advance for this pur-
pose toward Ruscino; or they might, if they
preferred, come on toward him at Illiberis,
where he would await their arrival. He in-
vited them to come freely into his camp, and
said that he was ready, if they were willing to
receive him, to go into theirs, for he had come
to Gaul as a friend and an ally, and wanted
nothing but a free passage through their terri-
tory. He had made a resolution, he said, if
the Gauls would but allow him to keep it, that
there should not be a single sword drawn in his
army till he got into Italy.
The alarm and the feelings of hostility which
prevailed among the Gauls were greatly allay-
ou by this message. They put their camp in
motion, and went on to Illiberis. The princes
and high officers of their armies went to Han-
nibal's camp, and were received with the high-
est marks of distinction and honor. They were
loaded with presents, and went away charmed
with the affability, the wealth, and the generos-
ity of their visitor. Instead of opposing his
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
73
Cornelius Scipio.
He embarks his army.
progress, they became the conductors and guides
of his army. They took them first to Ruscino,
which was, as it were, their capital, and thence,
after a short delay, the army moved on without
any further molestation toward the Rhone.
In the mean time, the Roman consul Scipio,
having embarked the troops destined to meet
Hannibal in sixty ships at the mouth of the
Tiber, set sail for the mouth of the Rhone.
The men were crowded together in the ships,
as armies necessarily must be when transport-
ed by sea. They could not go far out to sea,
for, as they had no compass in those days,
there were no means of directing the course of
navigation, in case of storms or cloudy skies,
except by the land. The ships accordingly
made their way slowly along the shore, some-
times by means of sails and sometimes by
oars, and, after suffering for some time the
hardships and privations incident to such a voy-
age-the sea-sickness and the confinement of
such swarming numbers in so narrow a space
bringing every species of discomfort in their
train-the fleet entered the mouth of the Rhone.
The officers had no idea that Hannibal was
near. They had only heard of his having cross-
ed the Iberus. They imagined that he was
74
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Both armies on the Rhone.
Exploring party
still on the other side of the Pyrenees. They
entered the Rhone by the first branch they
came to for the Rhone, like the Nile, divides
near its mouth, and flows into the sea by sev-
eral separate channels-and sailed without con-
cern up to Marseilles, imagining that their en-
emy was still hundreds of miles away, entangled,
perhaps, among the defiles of the Pyrenees. In-
stead of that, he was safely encamped upon the
banks of the Rhone, a short distance above them,
quietly and coolly making his arrangements for
crossing it.
When Cornelius got his men upon the land,
they were too much exhausted by the sickness
and misery they had endured upon the voyage
to move on to meet Hannibal without some
days for rest and refreshment. Cornelius, how-
ever, selected three hundred horsemen who were
able to move, and sent them up the river on an
exploring expedition, to learn the facts in re-
spect to Hannibal, and to report them to him.
Dispatching them accordingly, he remained him-
self in his camp, reorganizing and recruiting
his army, and awaiting the return of the party
that he had sent to explore.
Although Hannibal had thus far met with no
serious opposition in his progress through Gaul,
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
75
Feelings of the Gauls in respect to Hannibal.
it must not, on that account, be supposed that
the people, through whose territories he was
passing, were really friendly to his cause, or
An
pleased with his presence among them.
army is always a burden and a curse to any
country that it enters, even when its only ob-
ject is to pass peacefully through. The Gauls
assumed a friendly attitude toward this dreaded
invader and his horde only because they thought
that by so doing he would the sooner pass and
be gone. They were too weak, and had too few
means of resistance to attempt to stop him; and,
as the next best thing that they could do, re-
solved to render him every possible aid to hast-
en him on. This continued to be the policy of
the various tribes until he reached the river
The people on the further side of the river, how-
ever, thought it was best for them to resist.
They were nearer to the Roman territories, and,
consequently, somewhat more under Roman in-
fluence. They feared the resentment of the Ro-
mans if they should, even passively, render any
co-operation to Hannibal in his designs; and, as
they had the broad and rapid river between them
and their enemy, they thought there was a rea-
sonable prospect that, with its aid, they could
exclude him from their territories altogether.
76
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
The Gauls beyond the river oppose Hannibal's passage.
Thus it happened that, when Hannibal came
to the stream, the people on one side were all
eager to promote, while those on the other were
determined to prevent his passage, both parties
being animated by the same desire to free their
country from such a pest as the presence of an
army of ninety thousand men; so that Hanni-
bal stood at last upon the banks of the river,
with the people on his side of the stream wait-
ing and ready to furnish all the boats and ves-
sels that they could command, and to render
every aid in their power in the embarkation,
while those on the other were drawn up in bat-
tle array, rank behind rank, glittering with
weapons, marshaled so as to guard every place
of landing, and lining with pikes the whole extent
of the shore, while the peaks of their tents, in
vast numbers, with banners among them float-
ing in the air, were to be seen in the distance
behind them. All this time, the three hundred
horsemen which Cornelius had dispatched were
slowly and cautiously making their way up the
river from the Roman encampment below.
After contemplating the scene presented to
his view at the river for some time in silence,
Hannibal commenced his preparations for cross-
ing the stream. He collected first all the boats
B.C.217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
77
Preparations for crossing the river.
Boat building.
of every kind which could be obtained among
the Gauls who lived along the bank of the riv-
er. These, however, only served for a begin-
ning, and so he next got together all the work-
men and all the tools which the country could
furnish, for several miles around, and went to
work constructing more. The Gauls of that re-
gion had a custom of making boats of the trunks
of large trees. The tree, being felled and cut
to the proper length, was hollowed out with
hatchets and adzes, and then, being turned bot-
tom upward, the outside was shaped in such a
manner as to make it glide easily through the
water. So convenient is this mode of making
boats, that it is practiced, in cases where suffi-
ciently large trees are found, to the present day.
Such boats are now called canoes.
There were plenty of large trees on the banks
of the Rhone. Hannibal's soldiers watched the
Gauls at their work, in making boats of them,
until they learned the art themselves. Some
first assisted their new allies in the easier por-
tions of the operation, and then began to fell
large trees and make the boats themselves.
Others, who had less skill or more impetuosity
chose not to wait for the slow process of hol
lowing the wood, and they, accordingly, would
78
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
Rafts.
The enemy look on in silence.
fell the trees upon the shore, cut the trunks of
equal lengths, place them side by side in the wa-
ter, and bolt or bind them together so as to form
a raft. The form and fashion of their craft was
of no consequence, they said, as it was for one
passage only. Any thing would answer, if it
would only float and bear its burden over.
In the mean time, the enemy upon the oppo-
site shore looked on, but they could do nothing
to impede these operations. If they had had ar-
tillery, such as is in use at the present day, they
could have fired across the river, and have blown
the boats and rafts to pieces with balls and shells
as fast as the Gauls and Carthaginians could
build them. In fact, the workmen could not
have built them under such a cannonading;
but the enemy, in this case, had nothing but
spears, and arrows, and stones, to be thrown
either by the hand, or by engines far too weak
to send them with any effect across such a
stream. They had to look on quietly, there-
fore, and allow these great and formidable prep-
arations for an attack upon them to go on with-
out interruption. Their only hope was to over-
whelm the army with their missiles, and prevent
their landing, when they should reach the bank
at last in their attempt to cross the stream.
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
79
Difficulties of crossing a river,
Hannibal's tactics
But
If an army is crossing a river without any
enemy to oppose them, a moderate number of
boats will serve, as a part of the army can be
transported at a time, and the whole gradually
transferred from one bank to the other by re-
peated trips of the same conveyances.
when there is an enemy to encounter at the
landing, it is necessary to provide the means of
carrying over a very large force at a time; for
if a small division were to go over first alone,
it would only throw itself, weak and defense-
less, into the hands of the enemy. Hannibal,
therefore, waited until he had boats, rafts, and
floats enough constructed to carry over a force
all together sufficiently numerous and powerful
to attack the enemy with a prospect of success
The Romans, as we have already remarked,
say that Hannibal was cunning. He certainly
was not disposed, like Alexander, to trust in
his battles to simple superiority of bravery and
force, but was always contriving some strata-
gem to increase the chances of victory. He
did so in this case. He kept up for many days
a prodigious parade and bustle of building boats
and rafts in sight of his enemy, as if his sole
reliance was on the multitude of men that he
could pour across the river at a single transpor-
80
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's stratagem.
Detachment under Hanno.
tation, and he thus kept their attention closely
riveted upon these preparations. All this time,
however, he had another plan in course of exe-
cution. He had sent a strong body of troops
secretly up the river, with orders to make their
way stealthily through the forests, and cross
the stream some few miles above. This force
was intended to move back from the river, as
soon as it should cross the stream, and come
down upon the enemy in the rear, so as to at-
tack and harass them there at the same time
that Hannibal was crossing with the main body
of the army. If they succeeded in crossing the
river safely, they were to build a fire in the
woods, on the other side, in order that the col-
umn of smoke which should ascend from it
might serve as a signal of their success to Han-
nibal.
This detachment was commanded by an offi-
cer named Hanno-of course, a very different
man from Hannibal's great enemy of that name
in Carthage. Hanno set out in the night, mov-
ing back from the river, in commencing his
march, so as to be entirely out of sight from
the Gauls on the other side. He had some
guides, belonging to the country, who promised
to show him a convenient place for crossing.
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
81
Success of Hanno.
The signal.
The party went up the river about twenty-five
miles. Here they found a place where the wa-
ter spread to a greater width, and where the
current was less rapid, and the water not so
deep. They got to this place in silence and se-
crecy, their enemies below not having suspect-
ed any such design. As they had, therefore,
nobody to oppose them, they could cross much
more easily than the main army below. They
made some rafts for carrying over those of the
men that could not swim, and such munitions
of war as would be injured by the wet. The
rest of the men waded till they reached the
channel, and then swam, supporting themselves
in part by their bucklers, which they placed
beneath their bodies in the water. Thus they
all crossed in safety. They paused a day, to
dry their clothes and to rest, and then moved
cautiously down the river until they were near
enough to Hannibal's position to allow their sig-
nal to be seen. The fire was then built, and
they gazed with exultation upon the column of
smoke which ascended from it high into the air.
Hannibal saw the signal, and now immedi-
ately prepared to cross with his army. The
horsemen embarked in boats, holding their
horses by lines, with a view of leading them
F
82
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Passage of the river.
Scene of confusion
into the water so that they might swim in com-
pany with the boats. Other horses, bridled and
accoutered, were put into large flat-bottomed
boats, to be taken across dry, in order that they
might be all ready for service at the instant of
landing. The most vigorous and efficient por-
tion of the army were, of course, selected for
the first passage, while all those who, for any
cause, were weak or disabled, remained behind,
with the stores and munitions of war, to be
transported afterward, when the first passage
should have been effected. All this time the
enemy, on the opposite shore, were getting their
ranks in array, and making every thing ready
for a furious assault upon the invaders the mo-
ment they should approach the land.
There was something like silence and order
during the period while the men were embarking
and pushing out from the land, but as they ad-
vanced into the current, the loud commands, and
shouts, and outcries increased more and more,
and the rapidity of the current and of the eddies
by which the boats and rafts were hurried down
the stream, or whirled against each other, soon
produced a terrific scene of tumult and confu-
sion. As soon as the first boats approached the
land, the Gauls assembled to oppose them rush-
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
83
Attack of Hanno.
Flight of the Gauls.
ed down upon them with showers of missiles,
and with those unearthly yells which barbarous
warriors always raise in going into battle, as a
means both of exciting themselves and of terri-
fying their enemy. Hannibal's officers urged
the boats on, and endeavored, with as much
coolness and deliberation as possible, to effect a
landing. It is perhaps doubtful how the con-
test would have ended, had it not been for the
detachment under Hanno, which now came
suddenly into action. While the Gauls were
in the height of their excitement, in attempting
to drive back the Carthaginians from the bank,
they were thunderstruck at hearing the shouts
and cries of an enemy behind them, and, on
looking around, they saw the troops of Hanno
pouring down upon them from the thickets
with terrible impetuosity and force. It is very
difficult for an army to fight both in front and
in the rear at the same time. The Gauls, after
a brief struggle, abandoned the attempt any
longer to oppose Hannibal's landing. They fled
down the river and back into the interior, leav-
ing Hanno in secure possession of the bank,
while Hannibal and his forces came up at their
leisure out of the water, finding friends instead
of enemies to receive them.
*I
[B.C.217.
HANNIBAL.
Transportation of the elephants.
Manner of doing it.
The remainder of the army, together with
the stores and munitions of war, were next to
be transported, and this was accomplished with
little difficulty now that there was no enemy to
disturb their operations. There was one part
of the force, however, which occasioned some
trouble and delay. It was a body of elephants
which formed a part of the army. How to get
these unwieldy animals across so broad and rap-
id a river was a question of no little difficulty.
There are various accounts of the manner in
which Hannibal accomplished the object, from
which it would seem that different methods
were employed. One mode was as follows:
the keeper of the elephants selected one more
spirited and passionate in disposition than the
rest, and contrived to teaze and torment him so
as to make him angry. The elephant advanced
toward his keeper with his trunk raised to take
vengeance. The keeper fled; the elephant pur-
sued him, the other elephants of the herd fol-
lowing, as is the habit of the animal on such
occasions. The keeper ran into the water as
if to elude his pursuer, while the elephant and
a large part of the herd pressed on after him.
The man swam into the channel, and the ele-
phants, before they could check themselves,
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
85
A new plan.
Huge rafts.
found that they were beyond their depth. Some
swam on after the keeper, and crossed the river,
where they were easily secured. Others, terri-
fied, abandoned themselves to the current, and
were floated down, struggling helplessly as they
went, until at last they grounded upon shallows
or points of land, whence they gained the shore
again, some on one side of the stream and some
on the other.
This plan was thus only partially successful,
and Hannibal devised a more effectual method
for the remainder of the troop. He built an
irnmensely large raft, floated it up to the shore,
fastened it there securely, and covered it with
earth, turf, and bushes, so as to make it resem-
ble a projection of the land. He then caused a
second raft to be constructed of the same size,
and this he brought up to the outer edge of the
other, fastened it there by a temporary connec-
tion, and covered and concealed it as he had
done the first. The first of these rafts extend-
ed two hundred feet from the shore, and was
fifty feet broad. The other, that is, the outer
one, was only a little smaller. The soldiers
then contrived to allure and drive the elephants
over these rafts to the outer one, the animals
imagining that they had not left the land. The
86
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
The elephants got safely over.
The reconnoitering parties
two rafts were then disconnected from each
other, and the outer one began to move with its
bulky passengers over the water, towed by a
number of boats which had previously been at-
tached to its outer edge.
As soon as the elephants perceived the mo-
tion, they were alarmed, and began immediate-
ly to look anxiously this way and that, and to
crowd toward the edges of the raft which was
conveying them away. They found themselves
hemmed in by water on every side, and were
terrified and thrown into confusion. Some
were crowded off into the river, and were drift-
ed down till they landed below. The rest soon
became calm, and allowed themselves to be
quietly ferried across the stream, when they
found that all hope of escape and resistance
were equally vain.
In the mean time, while these events were
occurring, the troop of three hundred, which
Scipio had sent up the river to see what tidings
he could learn of the Carthaginians, were slow-
ly making their way toward the point where
Hannibal was crossing; and it happened that
Hannibal had sent down a troop of five hundred,
when he first reached the river, to see if they
could learn any tidings of the Romans. Nei-
44

DIDIER_DEL
THE ELEPHANTS CROSSING THE RHONE.
ROBEATESA
B.C. 217.] PASSAGE OF THE RHONE.
89
The detachments meet.
A battle ensues.
ther of the armies had any idea how near they
were to the other. The two detachments met
suddenly and unexpectedly on the way. They
were sent to explore, and not to fight; but as
they were nearly equally matched, each was
ambitious of the glory of capturing the others
and carrying them prisoners to their camp.
They fought a long and bloody battle. A great
number were killed, and in about the same
proportion on either side. The Romans say
they conquered. We do not know what the
Carthaginians said, but as both parties retreat-
ed from the field and went back to their respect-
ive camps, it is safe to infer that neither could
boast of a very decisive victory.
90
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
The Alps.
Their sublimity and grandeur,
IT
CHAPTER V.
HANNIBAL CROSSES THE ALPS.
T is difficult for any one who has not actual-
ly seen such mountain scenery as is present-
ed by the Alps, to form any clear conception
of its magnificence and grandeur. Hannibal
had never seen the Alps, but the world was
filled then, as now, with their fame.
Some of the leading features of sublimity and
grandeur which these mountains exhibit, result
mainly from the perpetual cold which reigns
upon their summits. This is owing simply to
their elevation. In every part of the earth, as
we ascend from the surface of the ground into
the atmosphere, it becomes, for some mysteri-
ous reason or other, more and more cold as we
rise, so that over our heads, wherever we are,
there reigns, at a distance of two or three miles
above us, an intense and perpetual cold. This
is true not only in cool and temperate latitudes,
but also in the most torrid regions of the globe.
If we were to ascend in a balloon at Borneo at
midday, when the burning sun of the tropics
B.C. 217. CROSSING THE ALPS.
91
Perpetual cold in the upper regions of the atmosphere.
was directly over our heads, to an elevation of
five or six miles, we should find that although
we had been moving nearer to the sun all the
time, its rays would have lost, gradually, all
their power. They would fall upon us as bright-
ly as ever, but their heat would be gone. They
would feel like moonbeams, and we should be
surrounded with an atmosphere as frosty as that
of the icebergs of the frigid zone.
It is from this region of perpetual cold that
hail-stones descend upon us in the midst of sum-
mer, and snow is continually forming and falling
there; but the light and fleecy flakes melt be-
fore they reach the earth, so that, while the hail
has such solidity and momentum that it forces
its way through, the snow dissolves, and falls
upon us as a cool and refreshing rain. Rain
cools the air around us and the ground, because
it comes from cooler regions of the air above.
Now it happens that not only the summits,
but extensive portions of the upper declivities of
the Alps, rise into the region of perpetual win-
ter. Of course, ice congeals continually there,
and the snow which forms falls to the ground
as snow, and accumulates in vast and perma-
nent stores. The summit of Mount Blanc is
covered with a bed of snow of enormous thick-
92
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
:
Avalanches.
Their terrible force.
ness, which is almost as much a permanent ge-
ological stratum of the mountain as the granite
which lies beneath it.
Of course, during the winter months, the
whole country of the Alps, valley as well as
hill, is covered with snow. In the spring the
snow melts in the valleys and plains, and high-
er up it becomes damp and heavy with partial
melting, and slides down the declivities in vast
avalanches, which sometimes are of such enor-
mous magnitude, and descend with such resist-
less force, as to bring down earth, rocks, and
even the trees of the forest in their train.
the higher declivities, however, and over all the
rounded summits, the snow still clings to its
place, yielding but very little to the feeble beams
of the sun, even in July.
On
There are vast ravines and valleys among the
higher Alps where the snow accumulates, being
driven into them by winds and storms in the
winter, and sliding into them, in great avalanch-
es, in the spring. These vast depositories of
snow become changed into ice below the sur-
face; for at the surface there is a continual
melting, and the water, flowing down through
the mass, freezes below. Thus there are val-
leys, or rather ravines, some of them two or
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
93
The glaciers.
Motion of the ice.
three miles wide and ten or fifteen miles long,
filled with ice, transparent, solid, and blue, hun-
dreds of feet in depth. They are called glaciers.
And what is most astonishing in respect to these
icy accumulations is that, though the ice is per-
fectly compact and solid, the whole mass is found
to be continually in a state of slow motion down
the valley in which it lies, at the rate of about
a foot in twenty-four hours. By standing upon
the surface and listening attentively, we hear,
from time to time, a grinding sound. The rocks
which lie along the sides are pulverized, and are
continually moving against each other and fall-
ing; and then, besides, which is a more direct and
positive proof still of the motion of the mass, a
mark may be set up upon the ice, as has been
often done, and marks corresponding to it made
upon the solid rocks on each side of the valley,
and by this means the fact of the motion, and
the exact rate of it, may be fully ascertained.
Thus these valleys are really and literally
rivers of ice, rising among the summits of the
mountains, and flowing, slowly it is true, but
with a continuous and certain current, to a sort
of mouth in some great and open valley below.
Here the streams which have flowed over the
surface above, and descended into the mass
94
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
Crevices and chasms.
Situation of the Alps
through countless crevices and chasms, into
which the traveler looks down with terror, con-
centrate and issue from under the ice in a tur-
bid torrent, which comes out from a vast arch-
way made by the falling in of masses which the
water has undermined. This lower end of the
glacier sometimes presents a perpendicular wall
hundreds of feet in height; sometimes it crowds
down into the fertile valley, advancing in some
unusually cold summer into the cultivated coun-
try, where, as it slowly moves on, it plows up
the ground, carries away the orchards and fields,
and even drives the inhabitants from the villa-
ges which it threatens. If the next summer
proves warm, the terrible monster slowly draws
back its frigid head, and the inhabitants return
to the ground it reluctantly evacuates, and at-
tempt to repair the damage it has done.
The Alps lie between France and Italy, and
the great valleys and the ranges of mountain
land lie in such a direction that they must be
crossed in order to pass from one country to the
other. These ranges are, however, not regular.
They are traversed by innumerable chasms,
fissures, and ravines; in some places they rise
in vast rounded summits and swells, covered
with fields of spotless snow; in others they
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
95
Roads over the Alps.
Sublime scenery
tower in lofty, needle-like peaks, which even
the chamois can not scale, and where scarcely
a flake of snow can find a place of rest. Around
and among these peaks and summits, and
through these frightful defiles and chasms, the
roads twist and turn, in a zigzag and constant-
ly ascending course, creeping along the most
frightful precipices, sometimes beneath them
and sometimes on the brink, penetrating the
darkest and gloomiest defiles, skirting the most
impetuous and foaming torrents, and at last,
perhaps, emerging upon the surface of a glacier,
to be lost in interminable fields of ice and snow,
where countless brooks run in glassy channels,
and crevasses yawn, ready to take advantage
of any slip which may enable them to take down
the traveler into their bottomless abysses.
And yet, notwithstanding the awful desola-
tion which reigns in the upper regions of the
Alps, the lower valleys, through which the
streams finally meander out into the open plains,
and by which the traveler gains access to the
sublimer scenes of the upper mountains, are in-
expressibly verdant and beautiful. They are
fertilized by the deposits of continual inunda-
tions in the early spring, and the sun beats
down into them with a genial warmth in sum-
96
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Beauty of the Alpine scenery.
Picturesque scenery.
mer, which brings out millions of flowers, of the
most beautiful forms and colors, and ripens rap-
idly the broadest and richest fields of grain.
Cottages, of every picturesque and beautiful
form, tenanted by the cultivators, the shepherds
and the herdsmen, crown every little swell in
the bottom of the valley, and cling to the decliv-
ities of the mountains which rise on either hand.
Above them eternal forests of firs and pines
wave, feathering over the steepest and most
rocky slopes with their somber foliage. Still
higher, gray precipices rise, and spires and pin-
nacles, far grander and more picturesque, if not
so symmetrically formed, than those construct-
ed by man.
Between these there is seen, here
and there, in the background, vast towering
masses of white and dazzling snow, which crown
the summits of the loftier mountains beyond.
Hannibal's determination to carry an army
into Italy by way of the Alps, instead of trans-
porting them by galleys over the sea, has al-
ways been regarded as one of the greatest un-
dertakings of ancient times. He hesitated for
some time whether he should go down the
Rhone, and meet and give battle to Scipio, or
whether he should leave the Roman army to its
course, and proceed himself directly toward the
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
97
Hannibal determines to cross the Alps.
His army follows.
Alps and Italy. The officers and soldiers of
the army, who had now learned something of
their destination and of their leader's plans,
wanted to go and meet the Romans. They
dreaded the Alps. They were willing to en-
counter a military foe, however formidable, for
this was a danger that they were accustomed
to and could understand; but their imagina-
tions were appalled at the novel and awful im-
ages they formed of falling down precipices of
ragged rocks, or of gradually freezing, and be-
ing buried half alive, during the process, in eter-
nal snows.
Hannibal, when he found that his soldiers
were afraid to proceed, called the leading por-
tions of his army together, and made them an
address. He remonstrated with them for yield-
ing now to unworthy fears, after having suc-
cessfully met and triumphed over such dangers
as they had already incurred. "You have sur-
mounted the Pyrenees," said he, "you have
crossed the Rhone. You are now actually in
sight of the Alps, which are the very gates of
access to the country of the enemy. What do
you conceive the Alps to be? They are noth-
ing but high mountains, after all. Suppose
they are higher than the Pyrenees, they do not
G
98
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's speech to his army.
Its effects.
reach to the skies; and, since they do not, they
can not be insurmountable. They are sur-
mounted, in fact, every day; they are even in-
habited and cultivated, and travelers continual-
ly pass over them to and fro. And what a sin-
gle man can do, an army can do, for an army
is only a large number of single men. In fact,
to a soldier, who has nothing to carry with him
but the implements of war, no way can be too
difficult to be surmounted by courage and en-
ergy.'
99
After finishing his speech, Hannibal, finding
his men reanimated and encouraged by what
he had said, ordered them to go to their tents
and refresh themselves, and prepare to march on
the following day. They made no further op-
position to going on. Hannibal did not, how-
ever, proceed at once directly toward the Alps.
He did not know what the plans of Scipio might
be, who, it will be recollected, was below him,
on the Rhone, with the Roman army. He did
not wish to waste his time and his strength in
a contest with Scipio in Gaul, but to press onl
and get across the Alps into Italy as soon as
possible. And so, fearing lest Scipio should
strike across the country, and intercept him if
he should attempt to go by the most direct
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
99
Scipio moves after Hannibal.
Sad vestiges.
route, he determined to move northwardly, up
the River Rhone, till he should get well into
the interior, with a view of reaching the Alps
ultimately by a more circuitous journey.
It was, in fact, the plan of Scipio to come up
with Hannibal and attack him as soon as possi-
ble; and, accordingly, as soon as his horsemen, or,
rather, those who were left alive after the battle,
had returned and informed him that Hannibal
and his army were near, he put his camp in mo-
tion and moved rapidly up the river. He arrived
at the place where the Carthaginians had crossed
a few days after they had gone. The spot was
in a terrible state of ruin and confusion. The
grass and herbage were trampled down for the
circuit of a mile, and all over the space were
spots of black and smouldering remains, where
the camp-fires had been kindled. The tops and
branches of trees lay every where around, their
leaves withering in the sun, and the groves and
forests were encumbered with limbs, and reject-
ed trunks, and trees felled and left where they
lay. The shore was lined far down the stream
with ruins of boats and rafts, with weapons
which had been lost or abandoned, and with the
bodies of those who had been drowned in the
passage, or killed in the contest on the shore.
100
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Perplexity of Scipio.
He sails back to Italy.
These and numerous other vestiges remained,
but the army was gone.
There were, however, upon the ground
groups of natives and other visitors, who had
come to look at the spot now destined to become
so memorable in history.
From these men
Scipio learned when and where Hannibal had
gone. He decided that it was useless to at-
tempt to pursue him. He was greatly perplex-
ed to know what to do. In the casting of lots,
Spain had fallen to him, but now that the great
enemy whom he had come forth to meet had
left Spain altogether, his only hope of intercept-
ing his progress was to sail back into Italy, and
meet him as he came down from the Alps into
the great valley of the Po. Still, as Spain had
been assigned to him as his province, he could
not well entirely abandon it. He accordingly
sent forward the largest part of his army into
Spain, to attack the forces that Hannibal had
left there, while he himself, with a smaller
force, went down to the sea-shore and sailed
back to Italy again. He expected to find Ro-
man forces in the valley of the Po, with which
he hoped to be strong enough to meet Hanni-
bal as he descended from the mountains, if he
should succeed in effecting a passage over them.
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
101
Hannibal approaches the Alps.
A dangerous defile.
In the mean time Hannibal went on, draw-
ing nearer and nearer to the ranges of snowy
summits which his soldiers had seen for many
These ranges
days in their eastern horizon.
were very resplendent and grand when the sun
went down in the west, for then it shone di-
rectly upon them. As the army approached
nearer and nearer to them, they gradually with-
drew from sight and disappeared, being con-
cealed by intervening summits less lofty, but
nearer. As the soldiers went on, however, and
began to penetrate the valleys, and draw near
to the awful chasms and precipices among the
mountains, and saw the turbid torrents descend-
ing from them, their fears revived. It was, how-
ever, now too late to retreat. They pressed for-
ward, ascending continually, till their road grew
extremely precipitous and insecure, threading
its way through almost impassable defiles, with
rugged cliffs overhanging them, and snowy sum-
mits towering all around.
At last they came to a narrow defile through
which they must necessarily pass, but which
was guarded by large bodies of armed men as-
sembled on the rocks and precipices above, ready
to hurl stones and weapons of every kind upon
them if they should attempt to pass through.
102
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
The army encamps.
The mountaineers.
The army halted. Hannibal ordered them to
encamp where they were, until he could consid-
er what to do. In the course of the day he
learned that the mountaineers did not remain
at their elevated posts during the night, on ac-
count of the intense cold and exposure, know-
ing, too, that it would be impossible for an army
to traverse such a pass as they were attempt-
ing to guard without daylight to guide them;
for the road, or rather pathway, which passes
through these defiles, follows generally the course
of a mountain torrent, which flows through a
succession of frightful ravines and chasms, and
often passes along on a shelf or projection of the
rock, hundreds and sometimes thousands of feet
from the bed of the stream, which foams and
roars far below. There could, of course, be no
hope of passing safely by such a route without
the light of day.
The mountaineers, therefore, knowing that it
was not necessary to guard the pass at night-
its own terrible danger being then a sufficient pro-
tection-were accustomed to disperse in the even-
ing, and descend to regions where they could find
shelter and repose, and to return and renew their
watch in the morning. When Hannibal learned
this, he determined to anticipate them in getting
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
103
Hannibal's stratagem.
Its success.
up upon the rocks the next day, and, in order to
prevent their entertaining any suspicion of his
design, he pretended to be making all the ar-
rangements for encamping for the night on the
ground he had taken.
He accordingly pitched
more tents, and built, toward evening, a great
many fires, and he began some preparations in-
dicating that it was his intention the next day
to force his way through the pass. He moved
forward a strong detachment up to a point near
the entrance to the pass, and put them in a for-
tified position there, as if to have them all ready
to advance when the proper time should arrive
on the following day.
The mountaineers, seeing all these prepara-
tions going on, looked forward to a conflict on
the morrow, and, during the night, left their
positions as usual, to descend to places of shel-
ter. The next morning, however, when they
began, at an early hour, to ascend to them again,
they were astonished to find all the lofty rocks,
and cliffs, and shelving projections which over-
hung the pass, covered with Carthaginians.
Hannibal had aroused a strong body of his men
at the earliest dawn, and led them up, by steep
climbing, to the places which the mountaineers
had left, so as to be there before them. The
104
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Astonishment of the mountaineers.
Terrible conflict in the defile
mountaineers paused, astonished, at this spec-
tacle, and their disappointment and rage were
much increased on looking down into the val-
ley below, and seeing there the remainder of
the Carthaginian army quietly moving through
the pass in a long train, safe apparently from
any molestation, since friends, and not enemies,
were now in possession of the cliffs above.
The mountaineers could not restrain their
feelings of vexation and anger, but immediately
rushed down the declivities which they had in
part ascended, and attacked the army in the de-
file. An awful scene of struggle and confusion
ensued. Some were killed by weapons or by
rocks rolled down upon them. Others, contend-
ing together, and struggling desperately in pla-
ces of very narrow foothold, tumbled headlong
down the rugged rocks into the torrent below;
and horses, laden with baggage and stores, be-
came frightened and unmanageable, and crowd-
ed each other over the most frightful precipices.
Hannibal, who was above, on the higher rocks,
looked down upon this scene for a time with
the greatest anxiety and terror. He did not
dare to descend himself and mingle in the affray,
for fear of increasing the confusion. He soon
found, however, that it was absolutely necessa-
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
105
Attack of Hannibal.
The mountaineers defeated.
ry for him to interpose, and he came down as
rapidly as possible, his detachment with him.
They descended by oblique and zigzag paths,
wherever they could get footing among the rocks,
and attacked the mountaineers with great fury
The result was, as he had feared, a great in-
crease at first of the confusion and the slaugh-
ter. The horses were more and more terrified
by the fresh energy of the combat, and by the
resounding of louder shouts and cries, which
were made doubly terrific by the echoes and
reverberations of the mountains. They crowd-
ed against each other, and fell, horses and men
together, in masses, over the cliffs to the rugged
rocks below, where they lay in confusion, some
dead, and others dying, writhing helplessly in
agony, or vainly endeavoring to crawl away.
The mountaineers were, however, conquered
and driven away at last, and the pass was left
clear. The Carthaginian column was restored
to order. The horses that had not fallen were
calmed and quieted. The baggage which had
been thrown down was gathered up, and the
wounded men were placed on litters, rudely con-
structed on the spot, that they might be borne
on to a place of safety. In a short time all were
ready to move on, and the march was accord-
106
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
The army pauses to refresh.
Scarcity of food.
ingly recommenced. There was no further dif-
ficulty. The column advanced in a quiet and
orderly manner until they had passed the defile.
At the extremity of it they came to a spacious
fort belonging to the natives. Hannibal took
possession of this fort, and paused for a little
time there to rest and refresh his men.
One of the greatest difficulties encountered
by a general in conducting an army through
difficult and dangerous roads, is that of provid-
ing food for them. An army can transport its
own food only a very little way. Men travel-
ing over smooth roads can only carry provisions
for a few days, and where the roads are as dif-
ficult and dangerous as the passes of the Alps,
they can scarcely carry any.
The commander
must, accordingly, find subsistence in the coun-
try through which he is marching. Hannibal
had, therefore, now not only to look out for the
safety of his men, but their food was exhausted,
and he must take immediate measures to secure
a supply.
The lower slopes of lofty mountains afford
usually abundant sustenance for flocks and
herds. The showers which are continually fall-
ing there, and the moisture which comes down
the sides of the mountains through the ground,
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
107
Herds and flocks upon the mountains.
Foraging parties.
keep the turf perpetually green, and sheep and
cattle love to pasture upon it; they climb to
great heights, finding the herbage finer and
sweeter the higher they go. Thus the inhab-
itants of mountain ranges are almost always
shepherds and herdsmen. Grain can be raised
in the valleys below, but the slopes of the mount-
ains, though they produce grass to perfection,
are too steep to be tilled.
As soon as Hannibal had got established in
the fort, he sent around small bodies of men to
seize and drive in all the cattle and sheep that
they could find. These men were, of course,
armed, in order that they might be prepared to
meet any resistance which they might encoun-
ter. The mountaineers, however, did not at-
tempt to resist them. They felt that they were
conquered, and they were accordingly disheart-
ened and discouraged. The only mode of saving
their cattle which was left to them, was to drive
them as fast as they could into concealed and
inaccessible places. They attempted to do this,
and while Hannibal's parties were ranging up
the valleys all around them, examining every
field, and barn, and sheepfold that they could
find, the wretched and despairing inhabitants
were flying in all directions, driving the cows
108
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Collecting cattle.
Progress of the army.
and sheep, on which their whole hope of sub-
sistence depended, into the fastnesses of the
mountains. They urged them into wild thick
ets, and dark ravines and chasms, and over dan
gerous glaciers, and up the steepest ascents,
wherever there was the readiest prospect of get-
ting them out of the plunderer's way.
These attempts, however, to save their little
property were but very partially successful.
Hannibal's marauding parties kept coming
home, one after another, with droves of sheep
and cattle before them, some larger and some
smaller, but making up a vast amount in all.
Hannibal subsisted his men three days on the
food thus procured for them. It requires an
enormous store to feed ninety or a hundred
thousand men, even for three days; besides, in
all such cases as this, an army always waste
and destroy far more than they really consume.
During these three days the army was not
stationary, but was moving slowly on. The
way, though still difficult and dangerous, was
at least open before them, as there was now no
enemy to dispute their passage. So they went
on, rioting upon the abundant supplies they had
obtained, and rejoicing in the double victory
they were gaining, over the hostility of the peo-
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
109
Cantons.
An ernbassage
ple and the physical dangers and difficulties of
the way. The poor mountaineers returned to
their cabins ruined and desolate, for mountain-
eers who have lost their cows and their sheep
have lost their all.
Some
The Alps are not all in Switzerland.
of the most celebrated peaks and ranges are in
a neighboring state. called Savoy. The whole
country is, in fact, divided into small states,
called cantons at the present day, and similar
political divisions seem to have existed in the
time of the Romans. In his march onward
from the pass which has been already described,
Hannibal, accordingly, soon approached the
confines of another canton. As he was advanc-
ing slowly into it, with the long train of his
army winding up with him through the valleys,
he was met at the borders of this new state by
an embassage sent from the government of it.
They brought with them fresh stores of provis-
ions, and a number of guides. They said that
they had heard of the terrible destruction which
had come upon the other canton in consequence
of their effort to oppose his progress, and that
they had no intention of renewing so vain an at-
tempt. They came, therefore, they said, to of-
fer Hannibal their friendship and their aid.
110
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL
Hostages.
Hannibal's suspicions.
They had brought guides to show the army the
best way over the mountains, and a present of
provisions; and to prove the sincerity of their
professions they offered Hannibal hostages.
These hostages were young men and boys, the
sons of the principal inhabitants, whom they
offered to deliver into Hannibal's power, to be
kept by him until he should see that they were
faithful and true in doing what they offered.
Hannibal was so accustomed to stratagem
and treachery himself, that he was at first very
much at a loss to decide whether these offers
and professions were honest and sincere, or
whether they were only made to put him off his
guard. He thought it possible that it was their
design to induce him to place himself under their
direction, so that they might lead him into some
dangerous defile or labyrinth of rocks, from which
he could not extricate himself, and where they
could attack and destroy him. He, however, de-
cided to return them a favorable answer, but to
watch them very carefully, and to proceed un-
der their guidance with the utmost caution and
care. He accepted of the provisions they of
fered, and took the hostages. These last he de-
livered into the custody of a body of his soldiers,
and they marched on with the rest of the army.

WRIBEFTS:
HANNIBAL ON THE ALPS.
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
113
Treachery of the mountaineers.
They attack Hannibal.
Then, directing the new guides to lead the way,
the army moved on after them. The elephants
went first, with a moderate force for their protec-
tion preceding and accompanying them. Then
came long trains of horses and mules, loaded
with military stores and baggage, and finally
the foot soldiers followed, marching irregularly
in a long column. The whole train must have
extended many miles, and must have appeared
from any of the eminences around like an
enormous serpent, winding its way tortuously
through the wild and desolate valleys.
The
Hannibal was right in his suspicions.
embassage was a stratagem. The men who
sent it had laid an ambuscade in a very narrow
pass, concealing their forces in thickets and in
chasms, and in nooks and corners among the
rugged rocks, and when the guides had led the
army well into the danger, a sudden signal was
given, and these concealed enemies rushed down
upon them in great numbers, breaking into their
ranks, and renewing the scene of terrible uproar,
tumult, and destruction which had been wit-
nessed in the other defile. One would have
thought that the elephants, being so unwieldy
and so helpless in such a scene, would have been
the first objects of attack. But it was not so.
H
114
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
The elephants.
Hannibal's army divided.
The mountaineers were afraid of them. They
had never seen such animals before, and they
felt for them a mysterious awe, not knowing
what terrible powers such enormous beasts might
be expected to wield. They kept away from
them, therefore, and from the horsemen, and
poured down upon the head of the column of
foot soldiers which followed in the rear.
They were quite successful at the first onset.
They broke through the head of the column,
and drove the rest back. The horses and ele-
phants, in the mean time, moved forward, bear-
ing the baggage with them, so that the two por-
tions of the army were soon entirely separated.
Hannibal was behind, with the soldiers. The
mountaineers made good their position, and, as
night came on, the contest ceased, for in such
wilds as these no one can move at all, except
with the light of day. The mountaineers, how-
ever, remained in their place, dividing the army,
and Hannibal continued, during the night, in a
state of great suspense and anxiety, with the
elephants and the baggage separated from him,
and apparently at the mercy of the enemy.
During the night he made vigorous prepara-
tions for attacking the mountaineers the next
day. As soon as the morning light appeared,
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
115
Hannibal's attack on the mountaineers.
They embarrass his march.
he made the attack, and he succeeded in driving
the enemy away, so far, at least, as to allow
him to get his army together again. He then
began once more to move on. The mountain-
eers, however, hovered about his way, and did
all they could to molest and embarrass his
march. They concealed themselves in ambus-
cades, and attacked the Carthaginians as they
passed. They rolled stones down upon them,
or discharged spears and arrows from eminen-
ces above; and if any of Hannibal's army be-
came, from any reason, detached from the rest,
they would cut off their retreat, and then take
them prisoners or destroy them. Thus they
gave Hannibal a great deal of trouble. They
harassed his march continually, without pre-
senting at any point a force which he could
meet and encounter in battle. Of course, Han-
nibal could no longer trust to his guides, and he
was obliged to make his way as he best could,
sometimes right, but often wrong, and exposed
to a thousand difficulties and dangers, which
those acquainted with the country might have
easily avoided. All this time the mountaineers
were continually attacking him, in bands like
those of robbers, sometimes in the van, and some-
times in the rear, wherever the nature of the
116
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's indomitable perseverance.
He encamps.
ground or the circumstances of the marching
army afforded them an opportunity.
?
Hannibal persevered, however, through all
these discouragements, protecting his men as
far as it was in his power, but pressing earn-
estly on, until in nine days he reached the sum-
mit. By the summit, however, is not meant
the summit of the mountains, but the summit
of the pass, that is, the highest point which it
was necessary for him to attain in going over.
In all mountain ranges there are depressions,
which are in Switzerland called necks,* and the
pathways and roads over the ranges lie always
in these. In America, such a depression in a
ridge of land, if well marked and decided, is
called a notch. Hannibal attained the highest
point of the col, by which he was to pass over,
in nine days after the great battle. There
were, however, of course, lofty peaks and sum-
mits towering still far above him.
He encamped here two days to rest and re-
fresh his men. The enemy no longer molested
him. In fact, parties were continually coming
into the camp, of men and horses, that had got
lost, or had been left in the valleys below.
*The French word is col. Thus, there is the Col de Balme,
the Col de Géant, &c.
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
117
Return of straggling parties.
Dreary scenery of the summit.
They came in slowly, some wounded, others
exhausted and spent by fatigue and exposure.
In some cases horses came in alone. They were
horses that had slipped or stumbled, and fallen
among the rocks, or had sunk down exhausted
by their toil, and had thus been left behind, and
afterward, recovering their strength, had fol-
lowed on, led by a strange instinct to keep to
the tracks which their companions had made,
and thus they rejoined the camp at last in safety.
In fact, one great reason for Hannibal's de-
lay at his encampment on or near the summit
of the pass, was to afford time for all the miss-
ing men to join the army again, that had the
power to do so. Had it not been for this ne-
cessity, he would doubtless have descended some
distance, at least, to a more warm and sheltered
position before seeking repose. A more gloomy
and desolate resting-place than the summit of
an Alpine pass can scarcely be found. The
bare and barren rocks are entirely destitute of
vegetation, and they have lost, besides, the sub-
lime and picturesque forms which they assume
further below. They spread in vast, naked
fields in every direction around the spectator,
rising in gentle ascents, bleak and dreary, the
surface whitened as if bleached by the perpet-
118
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
Storms in the mountains.
A dreary encampment.
ual rains. Storms are, in fact, almost perpet-
ual in these elevated regions. The vast cloud
which, to the eye of the shepherd in the valley
below, seems only a fleecy cap, resting serenely
upon the summit, or slowly floating along the
sides, is really a driving mist, or cold and stormy
rain, howling dismally over interminable fields
of broken rocks, as if angry that it can make
nothing grow upon them, with all its watering.
Thus there are seldom distant views to be ob-
tained, and every thing near presents a scene
of simple dreariness and desolation.
Hannibal's soldiers thus found themselves in
the midst of a dismal scene in their lofty en-
campment. There is one special source of dan-
ger, too, in such places as this, which the low-
er portions of the mountains are less exposed to,
and that is the entire obliteration of the path-
way by falls of snow. It seems almost absurd
to speak of pathway in such regions, where
there is no turf to be worn, and the boundless
fields of rocks, ragged and hard, will take no
trace of footsteps. There are, however, gener-
ally some faint traces of way, and where these
fail entirely the track is sometimes indicated by
small piles of stones, placed at intervals along
the line of route. An unpracticed eye would
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
119
Landmarks.
A snow storm.
scarcely distinguish these little landmarks, in
many cases, from accidental heaps of stones
which lie every where around. They, howev-
er, render a very essential service to the guides
and to the mountaineers, who have been accus-
tomed to conduct their steps by similar aids in
other portions of the mountains.
But when snow begins to fall, all these and
every other possible means of distinguishing the
way are soon entirely obliterated. The whole
surface of the ground, or, rather, of the rocks,
is covered, and all landmarks disappear. The
little monuments become nothing but slight in-
equalities in the surface of the snow, undistin-
guishable from a thousand others. The air is
thick and murky, and shuts off alike all distant
prospects, and the shape and conformation of
the land that is near; the bewildered traveler
has not even the stars to guide him, as there is
nothing but dark, falling flakes, descending from
an impenetrable canopy of stormy clouds, to be
seen in the sky.
Hannibal encountered a snow storm while on
the summit of the pass, and his army were very
much terrified by it. It was now November.
The army had met with so many detentions
and delays that their journey had been protract-
120
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
The army resumes its march.
Hannibal among the pioneers.
ed to a late period. It would be unsafe to at-
tempt to wait till this snow should melt again.
As soon, therefore, as the storm ended, and the
clouds cleared away, so as to allow the men to
see the general features of the country around,
the camp was broken up and the army put in
motion. The soldiers marched through the snow
with great anxiety and fear. Men went be-
fore to explore the way, and to guide the rest
by flags and banners which they bore. Those
who went first made paths, of course, for those
who followed behind, as the snow was tram-
pled down by their footsteps. Notwithstanding
these aids, however, the army moved on very
laboriously and with much fear.
At length, however, after descending a short
distance, Hannibal, perceiving that they must
soon come in sight of the Italian valleys and
plains which lay beyond the Alps, went forward
among the pioneers, who had charge of the ban-
ners by which the movements of the army were
directed, and, as soon as the open country be-
gan to come into view, he selected a spot where
the widest prospect was presented, and halted
his army there to let them take a view of the
beautiful country which now lay before them.
The Alps are very precipitous on the Italian
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
121
First sight of Italy.
Joy of the army.
Hannibal's speech.
side. The descent is very sudden, from the cold
and icy summits, to a broad expanse of the most
luxuriant and sunny plains. Upon these plains,
which were spread out in a most enchanting
landscape at their feet, Hannibal and his sol-
diers now looked down with exultation and de-
light. Beautiful lakes, studded with still more
beautiful islands, reflected the beams of the sun.
An endless succession of fields, in sober autum-
nal colors, with the cottages of the laborers and
stacks of grain scattered here and there upon
them, and rivers meandering through verdant
meadows, gave variety and enchantment to the
view.
Hannibal made an address to his officers and
men, congratulating them on having arrived, at
last, so near to a successful termination of their
toils. "The difficulties of the way," he said,
“are at last surmounted, and these mighty bar-
riers that we have scaled are the walls, not only
of Italy, but of Rome itself. Since we have
passed the Alps, the Romans will have no pro-
tection against us remaining. It is only one
battle, when we get down upon the plains, or
at most two, and the great city itself will be
entirely at our disposal."
The whole army were much animated and
122
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
T.
Fatigues of the march.
New difficulties.
encouraged, both by the prospect which present-
ed itself to their view, and by the words of Han-
nibal. They prepared for the descent, antici-
pating little difficulty; but they found, on re-
commencing their march, that their troubles
were by no means over. The mountains are
far steeper on the Italian side than on the other,
and it was extremely difficult to find paths by
which the elephants and the horses, and even
the men, could safely descend. They moved on
for some time with great labor and fatigue, un-
til, at length, Hannibal, looking on before, found
that the head of the column had stopped, and
the whole train behind was soon jammed to-
gether, the ranks halting along the way in suc-
cession, as they found their path blocked up by
the halting of those before them.
Hannibal sent forward to ascertain the cause
of the difficulty, and found that the van of the
army had reached a precipice down which it
was impossible to descend. It was necessary
to make a circuit in hopes of finding some prac-
ticable way of getting down. The guides and
pioneers went on, leading the army after them,
and soon got upon a glacier which lay in their
way. There was fresh snow upon the surface,
covering the ice and concealing the crevasses,
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
123
March over the glacier.
A formidable barrier.
as they are termed that is, the great cracks
and fissures which extend in the glaciers down
through the body of the ice. The army moved
on, trampling down the new snow, and making
at first a good road-way by their footsteps; but
very soon the old ice and snow began to be
trampled up by the hoofs of the horses and the
heavy tread of such vast multitudes of armed
men. It softened to a great depth, and made
the work of toiling through it an enormous la-
bor. Besides, the surface of the ice and snow
sloped steeply, and the men and beasts were
continually falling or sliding down, and getting
swallowed up in avalanches which their own
weight set in motion, or in concealed crevasses.
where they sank to rise no more.
They, however, made some progress, though
slowly, and with great danger. They at last.
got below the region of the snow, but here they
encountered new difficulties in the abruptness
and ruggedness of the rocks, and in the zigzag
and tortuous direction of the way. At last they
came to a spot where their further progress ap-
peared to be entirely cut off by a large mass of
rock, which it seemed necessary to remove in
order to widen the passage sufficiently to allow
them to go on.
The Roman historian says that
124
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal cuts his way through the rocks.
Hannibal removed these rocks by building great
fires upon them, and then pouring on vinegar,
which opened seams and fissures in them, by
means of which the rocks could be split and
pried to pieces with wedges and crowbars. On
reading this account, the mind naturally pauses
to consider the probability of its being true. As
they had no gunpowder in those days, they were
compelled to resort to some such method as the
one above described for removing rocks. There
are some species of rock which are easily crack-
ed and broken by the action of fire. Others re-
sist it. There seems, however, to be no reason
obvious why vinegar should materially assist in
the operation. Besides, we can not suppose
that Hannibal could have had, at such a time
and place, any very large supply of vinegar on
hand. On the whole, it is probable that, if any
such operation was performed at all, it was on
a very small scale, and the results must have
been very insignificant at the time, though the
fact has since been greatly celebrated in history.
In coming over the snow, and in descending
the rocks immediately below, the army, and es-
pecially the animals connected with it, suffered
a great deal from hunger. It was difficult to
procure forage for them of any kind.
At
B.C. 217.] CROSSING THE ALPS.
125
The army in safety on the plains of Italy.
length, however, as they continued their de-
scent, they came first into the region of forests,
and soon after to slopes of grassy fields descend-
ing into warm and fertile valleys. Here the
animals were allowed to stop and rest, and re-
new their strength by abundance of food. The
men rejoiced that their toils and dangers were
over, and, descending easily the remainder of
the way, they encamped at last safely on the
plains of Italy.
126
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Miserable condition of the army.
Its great losses.
CHAPTER VI.
HANNIBAL IN THE NORTH OF ITALY.
WHEN Hannibal's army found themselves
on the plains of Italy, and sat down qui-
etly to repose, they felt the effects of their fa-
tigues and exposures far more sensibly than
they had done under the excitement which they
naturally felt while actually upon the mount-
ains. They were, in fact, in a miserable con-
dition. Hannibal told a Roman officer whom
he afterward took prisoner that more than thir-
ty thousand perished on the way in crossing the
mountains; some in the battles which were
fought in the passes, and a greater number still,
probably, from exposure to fatigue and cold, and
from falls among the rocks and glaciers, and
diseases produced by destitution and misery.
The remnant of the army which was left on
reaching the plain were emaciated, sickly, rag-
ged, and spiritless; far more inclined to lie
down and die, than to go on and undertake the
conquest of Italy and Rome.
After some days, however, they began to ro-
cruit. Although they had been half starved
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
127
Feelings of Hannibal's soldiers.
Plans of Scipio
among the mountains, they had now plenty of
wholesome food. They repaired their tattered
garments and their broken weapons. They
talked with one another about the terrific scenes
through which they had been passing, and the
dangers which they had surmounted, and thus,
gradually strengthening their impressions of the
greatness of the exploits they had performed,
they began soon to awaken in each other's
breasts an ambition to go on and undertake the
accomplishment of other deeds of daring and
glory.
We left Scipio with his army at the mouth
of the Rhone, about to set sail for Italy with a
part of his force, while the rest of it was sent
on toward Spain. Scipio sailed along the coast
by Genoa, and thence to Pisa, where he landed.
He stopped a little while to recruit his soldiers
after the voyage, and in the mean time sent or-
ders to all the Roman forces then in the north
of Italy to join his standard. He hoped in this
way to collect a force strong enough to encoun-
ter Hannibal. These arrangements being made,
he marched to the northward as rapidly as pos-
sible. He knew in what condition Hannibal's
army had descended from the Alps, and wished
to attack them before they should have time to
128
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Feelings of Hannibal and Scipio.
The armies approach each other.
recover from the effects of their privations and
He reached the Po before he saw
sufferings.
any thing of Hannibal.
Hannibal, in the mean time, was not idle.
As soon as his men were in a condition to move,
he began to act upon the tribes that he found at
the foot of the mountains, offering his friendship
to some, and attacking others. He thus con-
quered those who attempted to resist him, mov-
ing, all the time, gradually southward toward
the Po. That river has numerous branches, and
among them is one named the Ticinus. It was
on the banks of this river that the two armies
at last came together.
Both generals must have felt some degree of
solicitude in respect to the result of the contest
which was about to take place. Scipio knew
very well Hannibal's terrible efficiency as a war-
rior, and he was himself a general of great dis-
tinction, and a Roman, so that Hannibal had no
reason to anticipate a very easy victory. What-
ever doubts or fears, however, general officers
may feel on the eve of an engagement, it is al-
ways considered very necessary to conceal them
entirely from the men, and to animate and en-
courage the troops with a most undoubting con-
fidence that they will gain the victory.
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
129
Address of Scipio to the Roman army.
Both Hannibal and Scipio, accordingly, made
addresses to their respective armies-at least so
say the historians of those times-each one ex-
pressing to his followers the certainty that the
other side would easily be beaten. The speech.
attributed to Scipio was somewhat as follows:
66
"I wish to say a few words to you, soldiers,
before we go into battle. It is, perhaps, scarce-
ly necessary. It certainly would not be neces-
sary if I had now under my command the same
troops that I took with me to the mouth of the
Rhone. They knew the Carthaginians there,
and would not have feared them here. A body
of our horsemen met and attacked a larger body
of theirs, and defeated them. We then advanced
with our whole force toward their encampment,
in order to give them battle. They, however,
abandoned the ground and retreated before we
reached the spot, acknowledging, by their flight,
their own fear and our superiority. If you
If you had
been with us there, and had witnessed these
facts, there would have been no need that I
should say any thing to convince you now how
easily you are going to defeat this Carthaginian
foe.
"We have had a war with this same nation
before. We conquered them then, both by land
I
130
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Address of Scipio to the Roman army.
and sea; and when, finally, peace was made, we
required them to pay us tribute, and we contin-
ued to exact it from them for twenty years.
They are a conquered nation; and now this.
miserable army has forced its way insanely over
the Alps, just to throw itself into our hands.
They meet us reduced in numbers, and exhaust-
ed in resources and strength. More than half
of their army perished in the mountains, and
those that survive are weak, dispirited, ragged,
and diseased. And yet they are compelled to
meet us. If there was any chance for retreat,
or any possible way for them to avoid the ne-
cessity of a battle, they would avail themselves
of it. But there is not. They are hemmed in
by the mountains, which are now, to them, an
impassable wall, for they have not strength to
scale them again. They are not real enemies;
they are the mere remnants and shadows of en-
emies. They are wholly disheartened and dis-
couraged, their strength and energy, both of
soul and body, being spent and gone, through
the cold, the hunger, and the squalid misery
they have endured. Their joints are benumbed,
their sinews stiffened, and their forms emacia-
ted. Their armor is shattered and broken, their
horses are lamed, and all their equipments worn
B.C.217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
131
Ilannibal's ingenious method of introducing his specch.
out and ruined, so that really what most I fear
is that the world will refuse us the glory of the
victory, and say that it was the Alps that con-
quered Hannibal, and not the Roman army.
Easy as the victory is to be, however, e
must remember that there is a great deal at
stake in the contest. It is not merely for glory
that we are now about to contend. If Hannibal
conquers, he will march to Rome, and our wives,
our children, and all that we hold dear will be
at his mercy. Remember this, and go into the
battle feeling that the fate of Rome itself is de-
pending upon the result."
An oration is attributed to Hannibal, too, on
the occasion of this battle. He showed, howev-
er, his characteristic ingenuity and spirit of con-
trivance in the way in which he managed to at-
tract strong attention to what he was going to
say, by the manner in which he introduced it.
He formed his army into a circle, as if to wit-
ness a spectacle. He then brought in to the
center of this circle a number of prisoners that
he had taken among the Alps-perhaps they
were the hostages which had been delivered to
him, as related in the preceding chapter. Who-
ever they were, however, whether hostages or
captives taken in the battles which had been
132
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Curious combat.
Effect on the army.
fought in the defiles, Hannibal had brought
them with his army down into Italy, and now
introducing them into the center of the circle
which the army formed, he threw down before
them such arms as they were accustomed to use
in their native mountains, and asked them wheth-
er they would be willing to take those weapons.
and fight each other, on condition that each one
who killed his antagonist should be restored to
his liberty, and have a horse and armor given
him, so that he could return home with honor.
The barbarous monsters said readily that they
would, and seized the arms with the greatest
avidity. Two or three pairs of combatants were
allowed to fight. One of each pair was killed,
and the other set at liberty according to the
promise of Hannibal. The combats excited the
greatest interest, and awakened the strongest
enthusiasm among the soldiers who witnessed
them. When this effect had been sufficiently
produced, the rest of the prisoners were sent
away, and Hannibal addressed the vast ring of
soldiery as follows:
"I have intended, soldiers, in what you have
now seen, not merely to amuse you, but to give
you a picture of your own situation. You are
hemmed in on the right and left by two seas,
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
133
Hannibal's speech to his army.
His words of encouragement.
and you have not so much as a single ship upon
either of them. Then there is the Po before
you and the Alps behind. The Po is a deeper,
and more rapid and turbulent river than the
Rhone; and as for the Alps, it was with the ut-
most difficulty that you passed over them when
you were in full strength and vigor; they are
an insurmountable wall to you now.
You are
therefore shut in, like our prisoners, on every
side, and have no hope of life and liberty but in
battle and victory.
"The victory, however, will not be difficult.
I see, wherever I look among you, a spirit of
determination and courage which I am sure will
make you conquerors. The troops which you
are going to contend against are mostly fresh
recruits, that know nothing of the discipline of
the camp, and can never successfully confront
such war-worn veterans as you. You all know
each other well, and me. I was, in fact, a pu-
pil with you for many years, before I took the
command. But Scipio's forces are strangers to
one another and to him, and, consequently, have
no common bond of sympathy; and as for Scipio
himself, his very commission as a Roman gen-
eral is only six months old.
"Think, too, what a splendid and prosperous
134
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's promises.
His real feelings.
career victory will open before you. It will
conduct you to Rome. It will make you mas-
ters of one of the most powerful and wealthiest
cities in the world. Thus far you have fought
your battles only for glory or for dominion ;
now, you will have something more substantial
to reward your success. There will be great
treasures to be divided among you if we con-
quer, but if we are defeated we are lost. Hem-
med in as we are on every side, there is no
place that we can reach by flight. There is,
therefore, no such alternative as flight left to us.
We must conquer."
It is hardly probable that Hannibal could
have really and honestly felt all the confidence
that he expressed in his harangues to his sol-
diers. He must have had some fears. In fact,
in all enterprises undertaken by man, the indi-
cations of success, and the hopes based upon
them, will fluctuate from time to time, and
cause his confidence in the result to ebb and
flow, so that bright anticipations of success and
triumph will alternate in his heart with feelings
of discouragement and despondency. This ef
fect is experienced by all; by the energetic and
decided as well as by the timid and the falter-
ing. The former, however, never allow these
B.C.217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
135
Hannibal's energy and decision.
His steady resolution.
fluctuations of hope and fear to influence their
action. They consider well the substantial
grounds for expecting success before commenc-
ing their undertaking, and then go steadily for-
ward, under all aspects of the sky-when it
shines and when it rains-till they reach the
end. The inefficient and undecided can act
only under the stimulus of present hope. The
end they aim at must be visibly before them all
the time. If for a moment it passes out of view,
their motive is gone, and they can do no more,
till, by some change in circumstances, it comes
in sight again.
Hannibal was energetic and decided. The
time for him to consider whether he would en-
counter the hostility of the Roman empire,
aroused to the highest possible degree, was
when his army was drawn up upon the banks
of the Iberus, before they crossed it. The Ibe-
rus was his Rubicon. That line once over-
stepped, there was to be no further faltering.
The difficulties which arose from time to time
to throw a cloud over his prospects, only seem-
ed to stimulate him to fresh energy, and to awa-
ken a new, though still a calm and steady reso-
lution. It was so at the Pyrenees; it was so
at the Rhone; it was so among the Alps, where
136
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's unfaltering courage.
Movements of Scipio
the difficulties and dangers would have induced
almost any other commander to have returned;
and it was still so, now that he found himself
shut in on every hand by the stern boundaries
of Northern Italy, which he could not possibly
hope again to pass, and the whole disposable
force of the Roman empire, commanded, too, by
one of the consuls, concentrated before him.
The imminent danger produced no faltering,
and apparently no fear.
The armies were not yet in sight of each oth-
er. They were, in fact, yet on opposite sides
of the Rivci Po. The Roman commander con-
cluded to march his troops across the river, and
advance in search of Hannibal, who was still
at some miles' distance. After considering the
various means of crossing the stream, he deci-
ded finally on building a bridge.
Military commanders generally throw some
sort of a bridge across a stream of water lying
in their way, if it is too deep to be easily forded,
unless, indeed, it is so wide and rapid as to make
the construction of the bridge difficult or im-
practicable. In this latter case they cross as
well as they can by means of boats and rafts,
and by swimming. The Po, though not a very
large stream at this point, was too deep to be
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
137
Scipio's bridge over the Po.
The army crosses the river.
forded, and Scipio accordingly built a bridge.
The soldiers cut down the trees which grew in
the forests along the banks, and after trimming
off the tops and branches, they rolled the trunks
into the water. They placed these trunks side
by side, with others, laid transversely and pinned
down, upon the top. Thus they formed rafts,
which they placed in a line across the stream,
securing them well to each other and to the
banks. This made the foundation for the bridge,
and after this foundation was covered with oth-
er materials, so as to make the upper surface a
convenient roadway, the army were conducted
across it, and then a small detachment of sol-
diers were stationed at each extremity of it as
a guard.
Such a bridge as this answers a very good
temporary purpose, and in still water, as, for
example, over narrow lakes or very sluggish
streams, where there is very little current, a
floating structure of this kind is sometimes built
for permanent service. Such bridges will not,
however, stand on broad and rapid rivers liable
to floods. The pressure of the water alone, in
such cases, would very much endanger all the
fastenings; and in cases where drift wood or
ice is brought down by the stream, the floating
138
HANNIBAL.
[B.C. 217.
Hannibal's warlike operations.
He concentrates his army.
masses, not being able to pass under the bridge,
would accumulate above it, and would soon
bear upon it with so enormous a pressure that
nothing could withstand its force. The bridge
would be broken away, and the whole accumu-
lation-bridge, drift-wood, and ice-would be
borne irresistibly down the stream together.
Scipio's bridge, however, answered very well
for his purpose. His army passed over it in
safety. When Hannibal heard of this, he knew
that the battle was at hand. Hannibal was him-
self at this time about five miles distant. While
Scipio was at work upon the bridge, Hannibal
was employed, mainly, as he had been all the
time since his descent from the mountains, in
the subjugation of the various petty nations and
tribes north of the Po. Some of them were
well disposed to join his standard. Others were
allies of the Romans, and wished to remain so.
He made treaties and sent help to the former,
and dispatched detachments of troops to intim-
idate and subdue the latter. When, however,
he learned that Scipio had crossed the river, he
ordered all these detachments to come immedi-
ately in, and he began to prepare in earnest for
the contest that was impending.
He called together an assembly of his soldiers,
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
139
Hannibal addresses his soldiers.
He promises them lands.
and announced to them finally that the battle
was now nigh. He renewed the words of en-
couragement that he had spoken before, and in
addition to what he then said, he now promised
the soldiers rewards in land in case they proved
victorious. "I will give you each a farm," said
he, "wherever you choose to have it, either in
Africa, Italy, or Spain. If, instead of the land,
any of you shall prefer to receive rather an equiv-
alent in money, you shall have the reward in
that form, and then you can return home and
live with your friends, as before the war, under
circumstances which will make you objects of
envy to those who remained behind. If any of
you would like to live in Carthage, I will have
made free citizens, so that you can live there
in independence and honor."
you
But what security would there be for the
faithful fulfillment of these promises? In mod-
ern times such security is given by bonds, with
pecuniary penalties, or by the deposit of titles
to property in responsible hands. In ancient
days they managed differently. The promiser
bound himself by some solemn and formal mode
of adjuration, accompanied, in important cases,
with certain ceremonies, which were supposed
to seal and confirm the obligation assumed.
In
140
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Ratifying a promise.
Omens.
this case Hannibal brought a lamb in the pres-
ence of the assembled army. He held it before
them with his left hand, while with his right
he grasped a heavy stone. He then called aloud
upon the gods, imploring them to destroy him
as he was about to slay the lamb, if he failed
to perform faithfully and fully the pledges that
he had made. He then struck the poor lamb a
heavy blow with the stone. The animal fell
dead at his feet, and Hannibal was thenceforth
bound, in the opinion of the army, by a very
solemn obligation indeed, to be faithful in ful-
filling his word.
The soldiers were greatly animated and ex-
cited by these promises, and were in haste to
have the contest come on. The Roman sol-
diers, it seems, were in a different mood of
mind. Some circumstances had occurred which
they considered as bad omens, and they were
very much dispirited and depressed by them.
It is astonishing that men should ever allow
their minds to be affected by such wholly acci-
dental occurrences as these were. One of them
was this: a wolf came into their camp, from
one of the forests near, and after wounding sev-
eral men, made his escape again. The other
was more trifling still. A swarm of bees flew
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
141
The battle.
The Romans thrown into confusion.
into the encampment, and lighted upon a tree
just over Scipio's tent. This was considered,
for some reason or other, a sign that some ca-
lamity was going to befall them, and the men
were accordingly intimidated and disheartened.
They consequently looked forward to the battle
with uneasiness and anxiety, while the army of
Hannibal anticipated it with eagerness and
pleasure.
The battle came on, at last, very suddenly,
and at a moment when neither party were ex-
pecting it. A large detachment of both armies
were advancing toward the position of the other,
near the River Ticinus, to reconnoiter, when
they met, and the battle began. Hannibal ad-
vanced with great impetuosity, and sent, at the
same time, a detachment around to attack his
enemy in the rear. The Romans soon began
to fall into confusion; the horsemen and foot
soldiers got entangled together; the men were
trampled upon by the horses, and the horses
were frightened by the men. In the midst of
this scene, Scipio received a wound. A consul
was a dignitary of very high consideration. He
was, in fact, a sort of semi-king. The officers,
and all the soldiers, so fast as they heard that
the consul was wounded, were terrified and dis-
142
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Scipio wounded.
The Romans driven back across the river.
mayed, and the Romans began to retreat.
Scipio had a young son, named also Scipio, who
was then about twenty years of age. He was
fighting by the side of his father when he re-
ceived his wound. He protected his father, got
him into the center of a compact body of caval-
ry, and moved slowly off the ground, those in
the rear facing toward the enemy and beating
them back, as they pressed on in pursuit of
them. In this way they reached their camp.
Here they stopped for the night. They had
fortified the place, and, as night was coming on,
Hannibal thought it not prudent to press on and
attack them there. He waited for the morning.
Scipio, however, himself wounded and his army
discouraged, thought it not prudent for him to
wait till the morning. At midnight he put his
whole force in motion on a retreat.
He kept
the camp-fires burning, and did every thing else
in his power to prevent the Carthaginians ob-
serving any indications of his departure. His
army marched secretly and silently till they
reached the river. They recrossed it by the
bridge they had built, and then, cutting away
the fastenings by which the different rafts were
held together, the structure was at once de-
stroyed, and the materials of which it was com-
B.C. 217.] HANNIBAL IN ITALY.
143
The Romans destroy the bridge over the Ticinus.
posed floated away, a mere mass of ruins, down
the stream. From the Ticinus they floated,
we may imagine, into the Po, and thence down
the Po into the Adriatic Sea, where they drifted
about upon the waste of waters till they werc
at last, one after another, driven by storms upon
the sandy shores.
144
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal pursues the Romans.
He takes some prisoners.
S
CHAPTER VII.
THE APENNINES.
As soon as Hannibal was apprised in the
morning that Scipio and his forces had left.
their ground, he pressed on after them, very
earnest to overtake them before they should
reach the river. But he was too late. The
main body of the Roman army had got over.
There was, however, a detachment of a few
hundred men, who had been left on Hannibal's
side of the river to guard the bridge until all
the army should have passed, and then to help
in cutting it away. They had accomplished
this before Hannibal's arrival, but had not had
time to contrive any way to get across the river
themselves. Hannibal took them all prisoners.
The condition and prospects of both the Ro-
man and Carthaginian cause were entirely
changed by this battle, and the retreat of Scipio
across the Po. All the nations of the north of
Italy, who had been subjects or allies of the Ro-
mans, now turned to Hannibal. They sent
embassies into his camp, offering him their
B.C. 217.J
145
THE APENNINES.
Revolt of some Gauls from the Romans.
Ilannibal crosses the river.
friendship and alliance. In fact, there was a
large body of Gauls in the Roman camp, who
were fighting under Scipio at the battle of Ti-
cinus, who deserted his standard immediately
afterward, and came over in a mass to Hanni-
bal. They made this revolt in the night, and,
instead of stealing away secretly, they raised a
prodigious tumult, killed the guards, filled the
encampment with their shouts and outcries, and
created for a time an awful scene of terror.
Hannibal received them, but he was too sa-
gacious to admit such a treacherous horde into
his army. He treated them with great consid-
eration and kindness, and dismissed them with
presents, that they might all go to their respect-
ive homes, charging them to exert their influ-
once in his favor among the tribes to which they
severally belonged.
Hannibal's soldiers, too, were very much en-
couraged by the commencement they had made.
The army made immediate preparations for
crossing the river. Some of the soldiers built
rafts, others went up the stream in search of
places to ford. Some swam across. They could
adopt these or any other modes in safety, for the
Romans made no stand on the opposite bank to
oppose them, but moved rapidly on, as fast as
K
1-46
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Dismay of the Romans.
Sempronius recalled to Italy.
Scipio could be carried. His wounds began to
inflame, and were extremely painful.
In fact, the Romans were dismayed at the
danger which now threatened them. As soon
as news of these events reached the city, the
authorities there sent a dispatch immediately
to Sicily to recall the other consul. His name
was Sempronius. It will be recollected that,
when the lots were cast between him and Scip-
io, it fell to Scipio to proceed to Spain, with a
view to arresting Hannibal's march, while Sem-
pronius went to Sicily and Africa. The object
of this movement was to threaten and attack
the Carthaginians at home, in order to distract
their attention and prevent their sending any
fresh forces to aid Hannibal, and, perhaps, even
to compel them to recall him from Italy to de-
fend their own capital. But now that Hanni-
bal had not only passed the Alps, but had also
crossed the Po, and was marching toward Rome
-Scipio himself disabled, and his army flying
before him—they were obliged at once to aban-
don the plan of threatening Carthage. They
sent with all dispatch an order to Sempronius
to hasten home and assist in the defense of
Rome.
Sempronius was a man of a very prompt and
B.C. 217.]
147
THE APENNINES.
Sufferings of Scipio from his wound.
He is joined by Sempronius.
impetuous character, with great confidence in
his own powers, and very ready for action. He
came immediately into Italy, recruited new sol-
diers for the army, put himself at the head of
his forces, and marched northward to join Scipic
in the valley of the Po. Scipio was suffering
great pain from his wounds, and could do but lit-
tle toward directing the operations of the army.
He had slowly retreated before Hannibal, the
fever and pain of his wounds being greatly ex-
asperated by the motion of traveling. In this
manner he arrived at the Trebia, a small stream
flowing northward into the Po. He crossed this
stream, and finding that he could not go any
further, on account of the torturing pain to which
it put him to be moved, he halted his army,
marked out an encampment, threw up fortifica-
tions around it, and prepared to make a stand.
To his great relief, Sempronius soon came up
and joined him here.
There were now two generals. Napoleon
used to say that one bad commander was bet-
ter than two good ones, so essential is it to suc-
cess in all military operations to secure that
promptness, and confidence, and decision which
can only exist where action is directed by one
single mind. Sempronius and Scipio disagreed
148
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
The Roman commanders disagree.
Skirmishes.
as to the proper course to be pursued. Sempro-
nius wished to attack Hannibal immediately.
Scipio was in favor of delay. Sempronius at-
tributed Scipio's reluctance to give battle to the
dejection of mind and discouragement produced
by his wound, or to a feeling of envy lest he,
Sempronius, should have the honor of conquer-
ing the Carthaginians, while he himself was
helpless in his tent. On the other hand, Scipio
thought Sempronius inconsiderate and reckless,
and disposed to rush heedlessly into a contest
with a foe whose powers and resources he did
not understand.
In the mean time, while the two command-
ers were thus divided in opinion, some skirmish-
es and small engagements took place between
detachments from the two armies, in which Sem-
pronius thought that the Romans had the ad-
vantage. This excited his enthusiasm more
and more, and he became extremely desirous to
bring on a general battle. He began to be quite
out of patience with Scipio's caution and delay.
The soldiers, he said, were full of strength and
courage, all eager for the combat, and it was
absurd to hold them back on account of the fee-
bleness of one sick man. "Besides," said he,
"of what use can it be to delay any longer?
B.C. 217.]
149
THE APENINNES.
Sempronius eager for a battle.
Hannibal's stratagem.
We are as ready to meet the Carthaginians now
as we shall ever be. There is no third consul
to come and help us; and what a disgrace it is
for us Romans, who in the former war led our
troops to the very gates of Carthage, to allow
Hannibal to bear sway over all the north of It-
aly, while we retreat gradually before him,
afraid to encounter now a force that we have
always conquered before."
Hannibal was not long in learning, through
his spies, that there was this difference of opin-
ion between the Roman generals, and that Sem-
pronius was full of a presumptuous sort of ardor,
and he began to think that he could contrive
some plan to draw the latter out into battle un-
der circumstances in which he would have to
act at a great disadvantage. He did contrive
such a plan. It succeeded admirably; and the
case was one of those numerous instances which
occurred in the history of Hannibal, of success-
ful stratagem, which led the Romans to say that
his leading traits of character were treachery
and cunning.
Hannibal's plan was, in a word, an attempt
to draw the Roman army out of its encamp-
ment on a dark, cold, and stormy night in De-
cember, and get them into the river. This riv
150
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Details of 1Iannibal's scheme.
The ambuscado.
er was the Trebia. It flowed north into the Po,
between the Roman and Carthaginian camps.
His scheme, in detail, was to send a part of his
army over the river to attack the Romans in the
night or very early in the morning. He hoped
that by this means Sempronius would be induc-
od to come out of his camp to attack the Car-
thaginians. The Carthaginians were then to
fly and recross the river, and Hannibal hoped
that Sempronius would follow, excited by the
ardor of pursuit. Hannibal was then to have a
strong reserve of the army, that had remained
all the time in warmth and safety, to come out
and attack the Romans with unimpaired strength
and vigor, while the Romans themselves would
be benumbed by the cold and wet, and disor-
ganized by the confusion produced in crossing
the stream.
A part of Hannibal's reserve were to be plac-
ed in an ambuscade. There were some moad-
ows near the water, which were covered in
many places with tall grass and bushes. Han-
nibal went to examine the spot, and found that
this shrubbery was high enough for even horse-
men to be concealed in it. He determined to
place a thousand foot soldiers and a thousand
horsemen here, the most efficient and coura-
B.C. 217.]
151
THE APENNINES.
Two thousand chosen men.
Hannibal's manner of choosing them.
geous in the army. He selected them in the
following manner:
He called one of his lieutenant generals to
the spot, explained somewhat of his design to
him, and then asked him to go and choose from
the cavalry and the infantry, a hundred each,
the best soldiers he could find. This two hund-
red were then assembled, and Hannibal, after
surveying them with looks of approbation and
pleasure, said, "Yes, you are the men I want,
only, instead of two hundred, I need two thou-
sand. Go back to the army, and select and
bring to me, each of you, nine men like your-
selves." It is easy to be imagined that the sol-
diers were pleased with this commission, and
that they executed it faithfully. The whole
force thus chosen was soon assembled, and sta-
tioned in the thickets above described, where
they lay in ambush ready to attack the Romans
after they should pass the river.
Hannibal also made arrangements for leaving
a large part of his army in his own camp, ready
for battle, with orders that they should partake
of food and refreshments, and keep themselves
warm by the fires until they should be called
upon. All things being thus ready, ho detach-
ed a body of horsemen to cross the river, and
152
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
1
Attack on the Roman camp.
Success of Hannibal's stratagem.
see if they could provoke the Romans to come
out of their camp and pursue them.
"Go," said Hannibal, to the commander of
this detachment, "pass the stream, advance to
the Roman camp, assail the guards, and when
the army forms and comes out to attack you, re-
treat slowly before them back across the river."
The detachment did as it was ordered to do.
When they arrived at the camp, which was
soon after break of day-for it was a part of
Hannibal's plan to bring the Romans out before
they should have had time to breakfast-Sem-
pronius, at the first alarm, called all the soldiers
to arms, supposing that the whole Carthaginian
force was attacking them. It was a cold and
stormy morning, and the atmosphere being fill-
ed with rain and snow, but little could be seen.
Column after column of horsemen and of in-
fantry marched out of the camp. The Cartha-
ginians retreated. Sempronius was greatly ex-
cited at the idea of so easily driving back the
assailants, and, as they retreated, he pressed on
in pursuit of them. As Hannibal had antici-
pated, he became so excited in the pursuit that
he did not stop at the banks of the river. The
Carthaginian horsemen plunged into the stream
in their retreat, and the Romans, foot soldiers
B.C. 217.]
153
THE APENNINES.
Sempronius crosses the river.
Impetuous attack of Hannibal.
and horsemen together, followed on. The stream
was usually small, but it was now swelled by
the rain which had been falling all the night.
The water was, of course, intensely cold. The
horsemen got through tolerably well, but the
foot soldiers were all thoroughly drenched and
benumbed; and as they had not taken any food
that morning, and had come forth on a very
sudden call, and without any sufficient prepara-
tion, they felt the effects of the exposure in the
strongest degree. Still they pressed on. They
ascended the bank after crossing the river, and
when they had formed again there, and were
moving forward in pursuit of their still flying
enemy, suddenly the whole force of Hannibal's
reserves, strong and vigorous, just from their
tents and their fires, burst upon them. They
had scarcely recovered from the astonishment
and the shock of this unexpected onset, when
the two thousand concealed in the ambuscade
came sallying forth in the storm, and assailed
the Romans in the rear with frightful shouts
and outcries.
All these movements took place very rapidly.
Only a very short period elapsed from the time
that the Roman army, officers and soldiers, were
quietly sleeping in their camp, or rising slowly
154
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Situation of the Roman army.
Terrible conflict.
to prepare for the routine of an ordihary day, be-
fore they found themselves all drawn out in bat-
tle array some miles from their encampment,
and surrounded and hemmed in by their foes.
The events succeeded each other so rapidly as
to appear to the soldiers like a dream; but very
soon their wet and freezing clothes, their limbs
benumbed and stiffened, the sleet which was
driving along the plain, the endless lines of Car-
thaginian infantry, hemming them in on all sides,
and the columns of horsemen and of elephants
charging upon them, convinced them that their
situation was one of dreadful reality. The ca-
lamity, too, which threatened them was of vast
extent, as well as imminent and terrible; for,
though the stratagem of Hannibal was very sim-
ple in its plan and management, still he had ex-
ecuted it on a great scale, and had brought out
the whole Roman army. There were, it is said,
about forty thousand that crossed the river, and
about an equal number in the Carthaginian
army to oppose them. Such a body of combat-
ants covered, of course, a large extent of ground,
and the conflict that ensued was one of the most
terrible scenes of the many that Hannibal as-
sisted in enacting.
The conflict continued for many hours, the
B.C. 217.]
155
THE APENNINES.
Utter defeat of the Romans.
Scene after the battle.
Romans getting more and more into confusion
all the time. The elephants of the Carthagin-
ians, that is, the few that now remained, made
great havoc in their ranks, and finally, after a
combat of some hours, the whole army was
broken up and fled, some portions in compact
bodies, as their officers could keep them togeth-
er, and others in hopeless and inextricable con-
fusion. They made their way back to the riv-
er, which they reached at various points up and
down the stream. In the mean time, the con-
tinued rain had swollen the waters still more,
the low lands were overflowed, the deep places
concealed, and the broad expanse of water in
the center of the stream whirled in boiling and
turbid eddies, whose surface was roughened by
the December breeze, and dotted every where
with the drops of rain still falling.
When the Roman army was thoroughly bro-
ken up and scattered, the Carthaginians gave
up the further prosecution of the contest. They
were too wet, cold, and exhausted themselves
to feel any ardor in the pursuit of their enemies.
Vast numbers of the Romans, however, attempt-
ed to recross the river, and were swept down
and destroyed by the merciless flood, whose force
they had not strength enough remaining to with-
156
|B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Various battles of Hannibal.
Scarcity of food.
stand. Other portions of the troops lay hid in
lurking-places to which they had retreated, un-
til night came on, and then they made rafts on
which they contrived to float themselves back
across the stream. Hannibal's troops were too
wet, and cold, and exhausted to go out again
into the storm, and so they were unmolested in
these attempts. Notwithstanding this, howev-
er, great numbers of them were carried down
the stream and lost.
It was now December, too late for Hannibal
to attempt to advance much further that season,
and yet the way before him was open to the
Apennines, by the defeat of Sempronius, for
neither he nor Scipio could now hope to make
another stand against him till they should re-
ceive new re-enforcements from Rome. During
the winter months Hannibal had various battles
and adventures, sometimes with portions and de-
tachments of the Roman army, and sometimes
with the native tribes. He was sometimes in
great difficulty for want of food for his army,
until at length he bribed the governor of a cas-
tle, where a Roman granary was kept, to deliver
it up to him, and after that he was well supplied.
The natives of the country were, however,
not at all well disposed toward him, and in the
B.C. 217.J
157
THE APENNINES.
Valley of the Arno.
Crossing the Apennines.
course of the winter they attempted to impede
his operations, and to harass his army by every
means in their power. Finding his situation
uncomfortable, he moved on toward the south,
and at length determined that, inclement as the
season was, he would cross the Apennines.
By looking at the map of Italy, it will be
seen that the great valley of the Po extends
across the whole north of Italy. The valley of
the Arno and of the Umbro lies south of it, sep-
arated from it by a part of the Apennine chain.
This southern valley was Etruria. Hannibal
decided to attempt to pass over the mountains
into Etruria. Ho thought he should find there
a warmer climate, and inhabitants more well-
disposed toward him, besides being so much
nearer Rome.
But, though Hannibal conquered the Alps,
the Apennines conquered him. A very violent
storm arose just as he reached the most exposed
place among the mountains. It was intensely
cold, and the wind blew the hail and snow direct-
ly into the faces of the troops, so that it was im-
possible for them to proceed. They halted and
turned their backs to the storm, but the wind
increased more and more, and was attended
with terrific thunder and lightning, which filled
158
[B.C. 217
HANNIBAL.
?
Terrific storm.
Death of the elephants.
the soldiers with alarm, as they were at such
an altitude as to be themselves enveloped in the
clouds from which the peals and flashes were
emitted. Unwilling to retreat, Hannibal order-
ed the army to encamp on the spot, in the best
shelter they could find. They attempted, ac-
cordingly, to pitch their tents, but it was impos-
sible to secure them. The wind increased to a
hurricane. The tent poles were unmanageable,
and the canvas was carried away from its fast-
enings, and sometimes split or blown into rags
by its flapping in the wind. The poor elephants,
that is, all that were left of them from previous
battles and exposures, sunk down under this
intense cold and died. One only remained alive.
Hannibal ordered a retreat, and the army
went back into the valley of the Po. But Han-
nibal was ill at ease here. The natives of the
country were very weary of his presence. His
army consumed their food, ravaged their coun-
try, and destroyed all their peace and happiness.
Hannibal suspected them of a design to poison
him or assassinate him in some other way. He
was continually watching and taking precau-
tions against these attempts. He had a great
many different dresses made to be used as dis-
guises, and false hair of different colors and
B.C. 217.]
159
THE APENNINES.
Hannibal's uneasiness.
He crosses the Apennines.
fashion, so that he could alter his appearance
at pleasure. This was to prevent any spy or
assassin who might come into his camp from
identifying him by any description of his dress
and appearance. Still, notwithstanding these
precautions, he was ill at ease, and at the very
earliest practicable period in the spring he made
a new attempt to cross the mountains, and was
now successful.
On descending the southern declivities of the
Apennines he learned that a new Roman army,
under a new consul, was advancing toward him
from the south. He was eager to meet this
force, and was preparing to press forward at
once by the nearest way. He found, however,
that this would lead him across the lower part
of the valley of the Arno, which was here very
broad, and, though usually passable, was now
overflowed in consequence of the swelling of the
waters of the river by the melting of the snows
upon the mountains. The whole country was
now, in fact, a vast expanse of marshes and fens.
Still, Hannibal concluded to cross it, and, in
the attempt, he involved his army in difficulties
and dangers as great, almost, as he had encoun-
tered upon the Alps. The waters were rising
continually; they filled all the channels and
160
[B.C. 217.
HANNIBAL.
Perilous march.
Hannibal's sickness.
spread over extended plains. They were so
turbid, too, that every thing beneath the surface
was concealed, and the soldiers wading in them
were continually sinking into deep and sudden
channels and into bogs of mire, where many
were lost. They were all exhausted and worn
out by the wet and cold, and the long continu-
ance of their exposure to it. They were four
days and three nights in this situation, as their
progress was, of course, extremely slow. The
men, during all this time, had scarcely any
sleep, and in some places the only way by which
they could get any repose was to lay their arms
and their baggage in the standing water, so as
to build, by this means, a sort of couch or plat-
form on which they could lie. Hannibal him-
self was sick too. He was attacked with a vio-
lent inflammation of the eyes, and the sight of
one of them was in the end destroyed. He was
not, however, so much exposed as the other
officers; for there was one elephant left of all
those that had commenced the march in Spain,
and Hannibal rode this elephant during the four
days' march through the water. There were
guides and attendants to precede him, for the
purpose of finding a safe and practicable road,
and by their aid, with the help of the animal's
sagacity, he got safely through.

CROSSING THE MARSHES.
VRCEERTS,
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
163
Alarm at Rome.
The consul Flaminius.
IN
SORANT
CHAPTER VIII.
THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
N the mean time, while Hannibal was thus
rapidly making his way toward the gates of
Rome, the people of the city became more and
more alarmed, until at last a general feeling
of terror pervaded all the ranks of society. Cit-
izens and soldiers were struck with one common
dread. They had raised a new army and put
it under the command of a new consul, for the
terms of service of the others had expired.
Flaminius was the name of this new command-
er, and he was moving northward at the head
of his forces at the time that Hannibal was con-
ducting his troops with so much labor and diffi-
culty through the meadows and morasses of the
Arno.
This army was, however, no more successful
than its predecessors had been. Hannibal con-
trived to entrap Flaminius by a stratagem, as
he had entrapped Sempronius before. There is
in the eastern part of Etruria, near the mount-
ains, a lake called Lake Thrasymene. It hap-
164
[B.C. 216
HANNIBAL.
Another stratagem.
Confidence of Flaminius
pened that this lake extended so near to the
base of the mountains as to leave only a narrow `
passage between-a passage but little wider
than was necessary for a road. Hannibal con-
trived to station a detachment of his troops in
ambuscade at the foot of the mountains, and
others on the declivities above, and then in some
way or other to entice Flaminius and his army
through the defile. Flaminius was, like Sem-
pronius, ardent, self-confident, and vain. He
despised the power of Hannibal, and thought
that his success hitherto had been owing to the
inefficiency or indecision of his predecessors.
For his part, his only anxiety was to encounter
him, for he was sure of an easy victory. He
advanced, therefore, boldly and without concern
into the pass of Thrasymene, when he learned
that Hannibal was encamped beyond it.
Hannibal had established an encampment
openly on some elevated ground beyond the pass,
and as Flaminius and his troops came into the
narrowest part of the defile, they saw this en-
campment at a distance before them, with a
broad plain beyond the pass intervening. They
supposed that the whole force of the enemy was
there, not dreaming of the presence of the strong
detachments which were hid on the slopes of
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
165
Complete rout of the Romans.
Effects of the battle
the mountains above them, and were looking
-down upon them at that very moment from be-
hind rocks and bushes. When, therefore, the
Romans had got through the pass, they spread
out upon the plain beyond it, and were advan-
cing to the camp, when suddenly the secreted
troops burst forth from their ambuscade, and,
pouring down the mountains, took complete pos-
session of the pass, and attacked the Romans in
the rear, while Hannibal attacked them in the
van. Another long, and desperate, and bloody
contest ensued. The Romans were beaten at
every point, and, as they were hemmed in be-
tween the lake, the mountain, and the pass,
they could not retreat; the army was, accord-
ingly, almost wholly cut to pieces. Flaminius
himself was killed.
The news of this battle spread every where,
and produced the strongest sensation. Hanni-
bal sent dispatches to Carthage announcing
what he considered his final victory over the
great foe, and the news was received with the
greatest rejoicings. At Rome, on the other
hand, the news produced a dreadful shock of dis-
appointment and terror. It seemed as if the
last hope of resisting the progress of their terri-
hle enemy was gone, and that they had nothing
166
[B.C. 216
HANNIBAL.
Panic of the Romaus.
Their superstitious fears.
now to do but to sink down in despair, and await
the hour when his columns should come pour-
ing in through the gates of the city.
The people of Rome were, in fact, prepared
for a panic, for their fears had been increasing
and gathering strength for some time. They
were very superstitious in those ancient days
in respect to signs and omens. A thousand tri-
fling occurrences, which would, at the present
day, be considered of no consequence whatever,
were then considered bad signs, auguring terri-
ble calamities; and, on occasions like these,
when calamities seemed to be impending, every
thing was noticed, and circumstances which
would not have been regarded at all at ordinary
times, were reported from one to another, the
stories being exaggerated as they spread, until
the imaginations of the people were filled with
mysterious but invincible fears. So universal
was the belief in these prodigies and omens, that
they were sometimes formally reported to the
senate, committees were appointed to inquire
into them, and solemn sacrifices were offered to
"expiate them," as it was termed, that is, to
avert the displeasure of the gods, which the
omens were supposed to foreshadow and portend.
A very curious list of these omens was re-
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
167
Omens and bad signs.
Their influence.
ported to the senate during the winter and
spring in which Hannibal was advancing to-
ward Rome. An ox from the cattle-market
had got into a house, and, losing his way, had
climbed up into the third story, and, being fright-
ened by the noise and uproar of those who fol-
lowed him, ran out of a window and fell down
to the ground. A light appeared in the sky in
the form of ships. A temple was struck with
lightning. A spear in the hand of a statue of
Juno, a celebrated goddess, shook, one day, of it-
self. Apparitions of men in white garments
were seen in a certain place. A wolf came into
a camp, and snatched the sword of a soldier on
guard out of his hands, and ran away with it.
The sun one day looked smaller than usual.
Two moons were seen together in the sky. This
was in the daytime, and one of the moons was
doubtless a halo or a white cloud. Stones fell
out of the sky at a place called Picenum. This
was one of the most dreadful of all the omens,
though it is now known to be a common occur-
rence.
These omens were all, doubtless, real occur-
rences, more or less remarkable, it is true, but,
of course, entirely unmeaning in respect to
their being indications of impending calamities.
168
[B.C. 216.
HANNIBAL.
Curious transformations.
Importance attached to these stories.
There were other things reported to the senate
which must have originated almost wholly in
the imaginations and fears of the observers.
Two shields, it was said, in a certain camp,
sweat blood. Some people were reaping, and
bloody ears of grain fell into the basket. This,
of course, must have been wholly imaginary,
unless, indeed, one of the reapers had cut his
fingers with the sickle. Some streams and
fountains became bloody; and, finally, in one
place in the country, some goats turned into
sheep. A hen, also, became a cock, and a cock.
changed to a hen.
Such ridiculous stories would not be worthy
of a moment's attention now, were it not for the
degree of importance attached to them then.
They were formally reported to the Roman sen-
ate, the witnesses who asserted that they had
seen them were called in and examined, and a
solemn debate was held on the question what
should be done to avert the supernatural influ-
ences of evil which the omens expressed. The
senate decided to have three days of expiation
and sacrifice, during which the whole people of
Rome devoted themselves to the religious ob-
servances which they thought calculated to ap-
pease the wrath of Heaven. They inade vari-
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
169
Feverish excitement at Rome.
News of the battle.
ous offerings and gifts to the different gods,
among which one was a golden thunderbolt of
fifty pounds' weight, manufactured for Jupiter,
whom they considered the thunderer.
All these things took place before the battle
at Lake Thrasymene, so that the whole com-
munity were in a very feverish state of excite-
ment and anxiety before the news from Flamin-
ius arrived. When these tidings at last came,
they threw the whole city into utter consterna-
tion. Of course, the messenger went directly
to the senate-house to report to the government,
but the story that such news had arrived soon
spread about the city, and the whole population
crowded into the streets and public squares, all
eagerly asking for the tidings. An enormous
throng assembled before the senate-house call-
ing for information. A public officer appeared
at last, and said to them in a loud voice, “We
have been defeated in a great battle." He would
say no more. Still rumors spread from one to
another, until it was generally known through-
out the city that Hannibal had conquered the
Roman army again in a great battle, that great
numbers of the soldiers had fallen or been taken
prisoners, and that the consul himself was slain.
The night was passed in great anxiety and
170
[B.C. 216.
HANNIBAL.
Gatherings of the people.
Arrival of stragglers.
terror, and the next day, and for several of the
succeeding days, the people gathered in great
numbers around the gates, inquiring eagerly for
news of every one that came in from the coun-
try. Pretty soon scattered soldiers and small
bodies of troops began to arrive, bringing with
them information of the battle, each one having
a different tale to tell, according to his own in-
dividual experience in the scene. Whenever
these men arrived, the people of the city, and
especially the women who had husbands or sons
in the army, crowded around them, overwhelm-
ing them with questions, and making them tell
their tale again and again, as if the intolerable
suspense and anxiety of the hearers could not
be satisfied. The intelligence was such as in
general to confirm and increase the fears of
those who listened to it; but sometimes, when
it made known the safety of a husband or a son,
it produced as much relief and rejoicing as it
did in other cases terror and despair. That ma-
ternal love was as strong an impulse in those
rough days as it is in the more refined and culti-
vated periods of the present age, is evinced by
the fact that two of these Roman mothers, on
seeing their sons coming suddenly into their
presence, alive and well, when they had heard
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
171
Appointment of a dictator.
Fabius.
that they had fallen in battle, were killed at
once by the shock of surprise and joy, as if by a
blow.
In seasons of great and imminent danger to
the commonwealth, it was the custom of the
Romans to appoint what they called a dictator,
that is, a supreme executive, who was clothed
with absolute and unlimited powers; and it de-
volved on him to save the state from the threat-
ened ruin by the most prompt and energetic ac-
tion. This case was obviously one of the emer-
gencies requiring such a measure. There was
no time for deliberations and debates; for delib-
erations and debates, in periods of such excite-
ment and danger, become disputes, and end in
tumult and uproar. Hannibal was at the head
of a victorious army, ravaging the country which
he had already conquered, and with no obstacle
between him and the city itself. It was an
emergency calling for the appointment of a dic-
tator. The people made choice of a man of
great reputation for experience and wisdom,
named Fabius, and placed the whole power of
the state in his hands. All other authority was
suspended, and every thing was subjected to
his sway. The whole city, with the life and
property of every inhabitant, was placed at his
172
[B.C.216.
HANNIBAL.
Measures of Fabius.
Religious ceremonies.
disposal; the army and the fleets were also un-
der his command, even the consuls being sub-
ject to his orders.
Fabius accepted the vast responsibility which
his election imposed upon him, and immediately
began to take the necessary measures. He first
made arrangements for performing solemn re-
ligious ceremonies, to expiate the omens and
propitiate the gods. He brought out all the
people in great convocations, and made them
take vows, in the most formal and imposing
manner, promising offerings and celebrations in
honor of the various gods, at some future time,
in case these divinities would avert the threat-
ening danger. It is doubtful, however, whether
Fabius, in doing these things, really believed
that they had any actual efficiency, or whether
he resorted to them as a means of calming and
quieting the minds of the people, and producing
that composure and confidence which always.
results from a hope of the favor of Heaven. If
this last was his object, his conduct was emi-
nently wise.
Fabius, also, immediately ordered a large levy
of troops to be made. His second in command,
called his master of horse, was directed to make
this levy, and to assemble the troops at a place
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
173
Minucius.
Supreme authority of a dictator.
called Tibur, a few miles east of the city.
There was always a master of horse appointed
to attend upon and second a dictator. The
name of this officer in the case of Fabius was
Minucius. Minucius was as ardent, prompt,
and impetuous, as Fabius was cool, prudent,
and calculating. He levied the troops and
brought them to their place of rendezvous. Fa-
bius went out to take the command of them.
One of the consuls was coming to join him, with
a body of troops which he had under his com-
mand. Fabius sent word to him that he must
come without any of the insignia of his author-
ity, as all his authority, semi-regal as it was in
ordinary times, was superseded and overruled
in the presence of a dictator. A consul was
accustomed to move in great state on all occa-
sions. He was preceded by twelve men, bear-
ing badges and insignia, to impress the army
and the people with a sense of the greatness of
his dignity. To see, therefore, a consul divest-
ed of all these marks of his power, and coming
into the dictator's presence as any other officer
would come before an acknowledged superior,
made the army of Fabius feel a very strong
sense of the greatness of their new commander's
dignity and power.
174
[B.C' 216.
HANNIBAL.
Proclamation of Fabius.
Progress of Hannibal.
Fabius then issued a proclamation, which he
sent by proper messengers into all the region of
country around Rome, especially to that part
toward the territory which was in possession of
Hannibal. In this proclamation he ordered all
the people to abandon the country and the towns
which were not strongly fortified, and to seek
shelter in the castles, and forts, and fortified
cities. They were commanded, also, to lay
waste the country which they should leave, and
destroy all the property, and especially all the
provisions, which they could not take to their
places of refuge. This being done, Fabius
placed himself at the head of the forces which
he had got together, and moved on, cautiously
and with great circumspection, in search of his
enemy.
In the mean time, Hannibal had crossed over
to the eastern side of Italy, and had passed down,
conquering and ravaging the country as he went,
until he got considerably south of Rome. He
seems to have thought it not quite prudent to
advance to the actual attack of the city, after
the battle of Lake Thrasymene; for the vast
population of Rome was sufficient, if rendered
desperate by his actually threatening the cap-
ture and pillage of the city, to overwhelm his
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
175
Policy of Fabius.
He declines fighting.
army entirely. So he moved to the eastward,
and advanced on that side until he had passed
the city, and thus it happened that Fabius had
to march to the southward and eastward in or-
der to meet him. The two armies came in
sight of each other quite on the eastern side of
Italy, very near the shores of the Adriatic Sea.
The policy which Fabius resolved to adopt
was, not to give Hannibal battle, but to watch
him, and wear his army out by fatigue and de-
lays. He kept, therefore, near him, but always
posted his army on advantageous ground, which
all the defiance and provocations of Hannibal
could not induce him to leave. When Hanni-
bal moved, which he was soon compelled to do
to procure provisions, Fabius would move too,
but only to post and intrench himself in some
place of security as before. Hannibal did every
thing in his power to bring Fabius to battle,
but all his efforts were unavailing.
In fact, he himself was at one time in im-
minent danger. He had got drawn, by Fabi-
us's good management, into a place where he
was surrounded by mountains, upon which Fa-
bius had posted his troops, and there was only
one defile which offered any egress, and this,
too, Fabius had strongly guarded. Hannibal
176
|B.C. 216.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's danger.
Stratagem of the fiery oxen.
resorted to his usual resource, cunning and
stratagem, for means of escape. He collected
a herd of oxen. He tied fagots across their
horns, filling the fagots with pitch, so as to make
them highly combustible. In the night on which
he was going to attempt to pass the defile, he
ordered his army to be ready to march through,
and then had the oxen driven up the hills
around on the further side of the Roman de-
tachment which was guarding the pass. The
fagots were then lighted on the horns of the
oxen. They ran about, frightened and infuri-
ated by the fire, which burned their horns to
the quick, and blinded them with the sparks
which fell from it. The leaves and branches of
the forests were set on fire. A great commo-
tion was thus made, and the guards, seeing the
moving lights and hearing the tumult, suppos-
ed that the Carthaginian army were upon the
heights, and were coming down to attack them.
They turned out in great hurry and confusion
to meet the imaginary foe, leaving the pass un-
guarded, and, while they were pursuing the
bonfires on the oxens' heads into all sorts of dan-
gerous and impracticable places, Hannibal qui-
etly marched his army through the defile and
reached a place of safety.
B.C.216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
177
Unpopularity of Fabius.
Hannibal's sagacity.
Although Fabius kept Hannibal employed
and prevented his approaching the city, still
there soon began to be felt a considerable de-
gree of dissatisfaction that he did not act more
decidedly. Minucius was continually urging
him to give Hannibal battle, and, not being
able to induce him to do so, he was continually
expressing his discontent and displeasure. The
army sympathized with Minucius. He wrote
home to Rome too, complaining bitterly of the
dictator's inefficiency. Hannibal learned all
this by means of his spies, and other sources of
information, which so good a contriver as he
has always at command. Hannibal was, of
course, very much pleased to hear of these dis-
sensions, and of the unpopularity of Fabius.
He considered such an enemy as he-so pru-
dent, cautious, and watchful-as a far more
dangerous foe than such bold and impetuous
commanders as Flaminius and Minucius, whom
he could always entice into difficulty, and then
easily conquer.
Hannibal thought he would render Minucius
a little help in making Fabius unpopular. He
found out from some Roman deserters that
the dictator possessed a valuable farm in the
country, and he sent a detachment of his troops
M
178
[B.C. 216.
HANNIBAL.
Plots against Fabius.
He goes to Rome,
there, with orders to plunder and destroy the
property all around it, but to leave the farm of
Fabius untouched and in safety. The object
was to give to the enemies of Fabius at Rome
occasion to say that there was secretly a good
understanding between him and Hannibal, and
that he was kept back from acting boldly in
defense of his country by some corrupt bargain
which he had traitorously made with the enemy.
These plans succeeded. Discontent and dis-
satisfaction spread rapidly, both in the camp
and in the city. At Rome they made an ur-
gent demand upon Fabius to return, ostensibly
because they wished him to take part in some
great religious ceremonies, but really to remove
him from the camp, and give Minucius an
opportunity to attack Hannibal. They also
wished to devise some method, if possible, of
depriving him of his power. He had been ap-
pointed for six months, and the time had not
yet nearly expired; but they wished to shorten,
or, if they could not shorten, to limit and di-
minish his power.
Fabius went to Rome, leaving the army un-
der the orders of Minucius, but commanding
him positively not to give Hannibal battle, nor
expose his troops to any danger, but to pursue
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
179
Minucius risks a battle.
Speech of Fabius.
steadily the same policy which he himself had
followed. He had, however, been in Rome only
a short time before tidings came that Minucius
had fought a battle and gained a victory. There
were boastful and ostentatious letters from Mi-
nucius to the Roman senate, lauding the ex-
ploit which he had performed.
Fabius examined carefully the accounts. He
compared one thing with another, and satisfied
himself of what afterward proved to be the truth,
that Minucius had gained no victory at all. He
had lost five or six thousand men, and Hanni-
bal had lost no more, and Fabius showed that
no advantage had been gained. He urged upon.
the senate the importance of adhering to the
line of policy he had pursued, and the danger
of risking every thing, as Minucius had done,
on the fortunes of a single battle. Besides, he
said, Minucius had disobeyed his orders, which
were distinct and positive, and he deserved to
be recalled.
In saying these things Fabius irritated and
exasperated his enemies more than ever. "Here
is a man,” said they, "who will not only not
fight the enemies whom he is sent against him-
self, but he will not allow any body else to fight
them. Even at this distance, when his second
180
[B.C. 216.
HANNIBAL.
Fabius returns to the army.
He is deprived of the supreme power.
in command has obtained a victory, he will not
admit it, and endeavors to curtail the advant-
ages of it. He wishes to protract the war, that
he may the longer continue to enjoy the su-
preme and unlimited authority with which we
have intrusted him."
The hostility to Fabius at last reached such a
pitch, that it was proposed in an assembly of the
people to make Minucius his equal in command.
Fabius, having finished the business which call-
ed him to Rome, did not wait to attend to the
discussion of this question, but left the city, and
was proceeding on his way to join the army again,
when he was overtaken with a messenger bear-
ing a letter informing him that the decree had
passed, and that he must thenceforth consider
Minucius as his colleague and equal. Minu-
cius was, of course, extremely elated at this re-
sult. "Now," said he, " we will see if some-
thing can not be done."
The first question was, however, to decide on
what principle and in what way they should
share their power.
"We can not both command
at once," said Minucius. "Let us exercise the
power in alternation, each one being in author-
ity for a day, or a week, or a month, or any
other period that you prefer.”
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
181
C
Division of power.
Ambuscade of Hannibal.
"No," replied Fabius, "we will not divide
the time, we will divide the men. There are
four legions. You shall take two of them, and
the other two shall be mine. I can thus, per-
haps, save half the army from the dangers in
which I fear your impetuosity will plunge all
whom you have under your command."
This plan was adopted. The army was di-
vided, and each portion went, under its own lead-
er, to its separate encampment. The result was
one of the most curious and extraordinary oc-
currences that is recorded in the history of na-
tions. Hannibal, who was well informed of all
these transactions, immediately felt that Minu-
cius was in his power. He knew that he was
so eager for battle that it would be easy to en-
tice him into it, under almost any circumstan-
ces that he himself might choose to arrange.
Accordingly, he watched his opportunity when
there was a good place for an ambuscade near
Minucius's camp, and lodged five thousand men
in it in such a manner that they were concealed
by rocks and other obstructions to the view.
There was a hill between this ground and the
camp of Minucius. When the ambuscade was
ready, Hannibal sent up a small force to take
possession of the top of the hill, anticipating
182
[B.C. 216
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's success.
that Minucius would at once
er force to drive them away.
nibal then sent up more as
Minucius, whose spirit and
Fabius comes to the rescue.
send up a strong-
He did so. Han-
a re-enforcement.
pride were now
aroused, sent up more still, and thus, by degrees,
Hannibal drew out his enemy's whole force,
and then, ordering his own troops to retreat be-
fore them, the Romans were drawn on, down
the hill, till they were surrounded by the am-
buscade. These hidden troops then came pour-
ing out upon them, and in a short time the Ro-
mans were thrown into utter confusion, flying
in all directions before their enemies, and en-
tirely at their mercy.
All would have been irretrievably lost had it
not been for the interposition of Fabius. He
received intelligence of the danger at his own
camp, and marched out at once with all his
force, and arrived upon the ground so oppor-
tunely, and acted so efficiently, that he at once
completely changed the fortune of the day. He
saved Minucius and his half of the army from
utter destruction. The Carthaginians retreat-
ed in their turn, Hannibal being entirely over-
whelmed with disappointment and vexation at
being thus deprived of his prey. History relates
that Minucius had the candor and good sense,
B.C. 216.] THE DICTATOR FABIUS.
183
Speech of Minucius.
The Roman army again united.
after this, to acknowledge his error, and yield to
the guidance and direction of Fabius. He call-
ed his part of the army together when they
reached their camp, and addressed them thus :
"Fellow-soldiers, I have often heard it said that
the wisest men are those who possess wisdom
and sagacity themselves, and, next to them,
those who know how to perceive and are will-
ing to be guided by the wisdom and sagacity
of others; while they are fools who do not know
how to conduct themselves, and will not be
guided by those who do. We will not belong
to this last class; and since it is proved that we
are not entitled to rank with the first, let us
join the second. We will march to the camp
of Fabius, and join our camp with his, as before.
We owe to him, and also to all his portion of
the army, our eternal gratitude for the noble-
ness of spirit which he manifested in coming to
our deliverance, when he might so justly have
left us to ourselves."
The two legions repaired, accordingly, to the
camp of Fabius, and a complete and permanent
reconciliation took place between the two divis-
ions of the army. Fabius rose very high in the
general esteem by this transaction. The term
of his dictatorship, however, expired soon after
!
184
[B.C. 216
HANNIBAL.
Character of Fabius.
His integrity.
this, and as the danger from Hannibal was now
less imminent, the office was not renewed, but
consuls were chosen as before.
The character of Fabius has been regarded
with the highest admiration by all mankind.
He evinced a very noble spirit in all that he
did. One of his last acts was a very striking
proof of this. He had bargained with Hanni-
bal to pay a certain sum of money as ransom
for a number of prisoners which had fallen into
his hands, and whom Hannibal, on the faith of
that promise, had released. Fabius believed
that the Romans would readily ratify the treaty
and pay the amount; but they demurred, be-
ing displeased, or pretending to be displeased,
because Fabius had not consulted them before
making the arrangement. Fabius, in order to
preserve his own and his country's faith unsul-
lied, sold his farm to raise the money. He did
thus most certainly protect and vindicate his
own honor, but he can hardly be said to have
saved that of the people of Rome.
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANNÆ.
185
Interest excited by the battle of Cannæ. Various military operations.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BATTLE OF CAN NÆ.
HE battle of Canna was the last great bat-
THE
tle fought by Hannibal in Italy. This con-
flict has been greatly celebrated in history, not
only for its magnitude, and the terrible despera-
tion with which it was fought, but also on ac-
count of the strong dramatic interest which the
circumstances attending it are fitted to excite.
This interest is perhaps, however, quite as much
due to the peculiar skill of the ancient historian
who narrates the story, as to the events them-
selves which he records.
It was about a year after the close of the dic-
tatorship of Fabius that this battle was fought.
That interval had been spent by the Roman
consuls who were in office during that time in
various military operations, which did not, how-
ever, lead to any decisive results. In the mean
time, there were great uneasiness, discontent,
and dissatisfaction at Rome. To have such a
dangerous and terrible foe, at the head of forty
thousand men, infesting the vicinage of their
186
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
State of the public mind at Rome.
The plebeians and patricians.
city, ravaging the territories of their friends and
allies, and threatening continually to attack the
city itself, was a continual source of anxiety
and vexation. It mortified the Roman pride,
too, to find that the greatest armies they could
raise, and the ablest generals they could choose
and commission, proved wholly unable to cope
with the foe. The most sagacious of them, in
fact, had felt it necessary to decline the contest
with him altogether.
This state of things produced a great deal of
ill humor in the city. Party spirit ran very
high; tumultuous assemblies were held; dis-
putes and contentions prevailed, and mutual
criminations and recriminations without end.
There were two great parties formed: that of
the middling classes on one side, and the aris-
tocracy on the other. The former were called
the Plebeians, the latter the Patricians. The
division between these two classes was very
great and very strongly marked. There was,
in consequence of it, infinite difficulty in the
election of consuls. At last the consuls were
chosen, one from each party. The name of the
patrician was Paulus Æmilius. The name of
the plebeian was Varro. They were inducted
into office, and were thus put jointly into pos-
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CAnnÆ.
187
The consuls Æmilius and Varro.
A new army raised.
session of a vast power, to wield which with
any efficiency and success would seem to re-
quire union and harmony in those who held it,
and yet Æmilius and Varro were inveterate
and implacable political foes. It was often so
in the Roman government. The consulship
was a double-headed monster, which spent half
its strength in bitter contests waged between
its members.
The Romans determined now to make an
effectual effort to rid themselves of their foe.
They raised an enormous army. It consisted
of eight legions. The Roman legion was an
army of itself. It contained ordinarily four
thousand foot soldiers, and a troop of three
hundred horsemen. It was very unusual to
have more than two or three legions in the field
at a time. The Romans, however, on this oc-
casion, increased the number of the legions, and
also augmented their size, so that they contain-
ed, each, five thousand infantry and four hund-
red cavalry. They were determined to make
a great and last effort to defend their city, and
save the commonwealth from ruin. Æmilius
and Varro prepared to take command of this
great force, with very strong determinations to
make it the means of Hannibal's destruction.
188
[B.C. 215
HANNIBAL.
Self-confidenco of Varro.
Caution of Æmilius.
The characters of the two commanders, how-
ever, as well as their political connections, were
very dissimilar, and they soon began to mani-
fest a very different spirit, and to assume a
very different air and bearing, each from the
other. Æmilius was a friend of Fabius, and
approved of his policy. Varro was for greater
promptness and decision. He made great prom-
ises, and spoke with the utmost confidence of
being able to annihilate Hannibal at a blow.
He condemned the policy of Fabius in attempt-
ing to wear out the enemy by delays. He said
it was a plan of the aristocratic party to pro-
tract the war, in order to put themselves in
high offices, and perpetuate their importance
and influence. The war might have been end-
ed long ago, he said; and he would promise the
people that he would now end it, without fail,
the very day that he came in sight of Hannibal.
As for Æmilius, he assumed a very different
tone. He was surprised, he said, that any man
could pretend to decide before he had even left
the city, and while he was, of course, entirely
ignorant, both of the condition of their own
army, and of the position, and designs, and
strength of the enemy, how soon and under
what circumstances it would be wise to give
B.C.215.] BATTLE OF CANNE.
189
Views of Emilius.
Counsel of Fabius.
him battle. Plans must be formed in adaptation
to circumstances, as circumstances can not be
made to alter to suit plans. He believed that
they should succeed in the encounter with
Hannibal, but he thought that their only hope
of success must be based on the exercise of
prudence, caution, and sagacity; he was sure
that rashness and folly could only lead in fu-
ture, as they had always done in the past, to
discomfiture and ruin.
It is said that Fabius, the former dictator,
conversed with Æmilius before his departure
for the army, and gave him such counsel as his
age and experience, and his knowledge of the
character and operations of Hannibal, suggest-
ed to his mind. "If you had a colleague like
yourself," said he, "I would not offer you any
advice; you would not need it. Or, if you
were yourself like your colleague, vain, self-
conceited, and presumptuous, then I would be
silent; counsel would be thrown away upon
you. But as it is, while you have great judg-
ment and sagacity to guide you, you are to be
placed in a situation of extreme difficulty and
peril. If I am not mistaken, the greatest diffi-
culty you will have to encounter will not be the
open enemy you are going to meet upon the
190
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
}
Conversation between Fabius and Æmilius.
field. You will find, I think, that Varro will
give you quite as much trouble as Hannibal.
He will be presumptuous, reckless, and head-
strong. He will inspire all the rash and ardent
young men in the ariny with his own enthusi-
astic folly, and we shall be very fortunate if
we do not yet see the terrible and bloody scenes
of Lake Thrasymene acted again. I am sure
that the true policy for us to adopt is the one
which I marked out. That is always the proper
course for the invaded to pursue with invaders,
where there is the least doubt of the success of
a battle. We grow strong while Hannibal
grows continually weaker by delay. He can
only prosper so long as he can fight battles and
perform brilliant exploits. If we deprive him
of this power, his strength will be continually
wasting away, and the spirit and courage of
his men waning. He has now scarce a third
part of the army which he had when he crossed
the Iberus, and nothing can save this remnant
from destruction if we are wise."
Æmilius said, in reply to this, that he went
into the contest with very little of encourage-
ment or hope. If Fabius had found it so diffi-
cult to withstand the turbulent influences of
his master of horse, who was his subordinate
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANNÆ.
191
Resolution of Emilius.
The consuls join the army.
officer, and, as such, under his command, how
could he expect to restrain his colleague, who
was entitled, by his office, to full equality with
him. But, notwithstanding the difficulties which
he foresaw, he was going to do his duty, and
abide by the result; and if the result should be
unfavorable, he should seek for death in the con-
flict, for death by Carthaginian spears was a far
lighter evil, in his view, than the displeasure
and censures of his countrymen.
The consuls departed from Rome to join the
army, Æmilius attended by a moderate number
of men of rank and station, and Varro by a much
larger train, though it was formed of people of
the lower classes of society. The army was or-
ganized, and the arrangements of the encamp-
ments perfected. One ceremony was that of ad-
ministering an oath to the soldiers, as was usu-
al in the Roman armies at the commencement
of a campaign. They were made to swear that
they would not desert the army, that they would
never abandon the post at which they were sta-
tioned in fear or in flight, nor leave the ranks ex-
cept for the purpose of taking up or recovering
a weapon, striking an enemy, or protecting a
friend. These and other arrangements being
completed, the army was ready for the field.
192
[B.C. 215
HANNIBAL.
Situation of Hannibal.
Scarcity of food.
The consuls made a different arrangement in
respect to the division of their power from that
adopted by Fabius and Flaminius.
It was
agreed between them that they would exercise
their common authority alternately, each for a
day.
In the mean time, Hannibal began to find him-
self reduced to great difficulty in obtaining pro-
visions for his men. The policy of Fabius had
been so far successful as to place him in a very
embarrassing situation, and one growing more
and more embarrassing every day. He could
obtain no food except what he' got by plunder,
and there was now very little opportunity for
that, as the inhabitants of the country had car-
ried off all the grain and deposited it in strong-
ly-fortified towns; and though Hannibal had
great confidence in his power to cope with the
Roman army in a regular battle on an open
field, he had not strength sufficient to reduce
citadels or attack fortified camps. His stock
of provisions had become, therefore, more and
more nearly exhausted, until now he had a sup-
ply for only ten days, and he saw no possible
mode of increasing it.
His great object was, therefore, to bring on
a battle. Varro was ready and willing to give
1
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANNE.
193
Sufferings of Hannibal's troops.
Defeat of a foraging party.
him battle, but Æmilius, or, to call him by his
name in full, Paulus Æmilius, which is the ap-
pellation by which he is more frequently known,
was very desirous to persevere in the Fabian
policy till the ten days had expired, after which
he knew that Hannibal must be reduced to ex-
treme distress, and might have to surrender at
once to save his army from actual famine. In
fact, it was said that the troops were on such
short allowance as to produce great discontent,
and that a large body of Spaniards were pre-
paring to desert and go over together to the Ro-
man camp.
Things were in this state, when, one day,
Hannibal sent out a party from his camp to pro-
cure food, and Æmilius, who happened to hold
the command that day, sent out a strong force
to intercept them. He was successful. The
Carthaginian detachment was routed. Nearly
two thousand men were killed, and the rest fled,
by any roads they could find, back to Hanni-
bal's camp. Varro was very eager to follow
them there, but Æmilius ordered his men to
halt. He was afraid of some trick or treachery
on the part of Hannibal, and was disposed to be
satisfied with the victory he had already won.
This little success, however, only inflamed
N
194
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's pretended abandonment of his camp.
Varro's ardor for a battle, and produced a gen-
eral enthusiasm in the Roman army; and, a day
or two afterward, a circumstance occurred which
raised this excitement to the highest pitch.
Some reconnoiterers, who had been stationed
within sight of Hannibal's camp to watch the
motions and indications there, sent in word to
the consuls that the Carthaginian guards around
their encampment had all suddenly disappeared,
and that a very extraordinary and unusual si-
lence reigned within. Parties of the Roman
soldiers went up gradually and cautiously to
the Carthaginian lines, and soon found that the
camp was deserted, though the fires were still
burning and the tents remained. This intelli-
gence, of course, put the whole Roman army
into a fever of excitement and agitation.
crowded around the consuls' pavilions, and clam-
orously insisted on being led on to take posses-
sion of the camp, and to pursue the enemy.
"He has fled," they said, "and with such pre-
cipitation that he has left the tents standing and
his fires still burning. Lead us on in pursuit
of him."
They
He
Varro was as much excited as the rest. He
was eager for action. Æmilius hesitated.
made particular inquiries. He said they ought
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CAN NÆ.
195
Mission of Statilius.
The stratagem discovered
to proceed with caution. Finally, he called up
a certain prudent and sagacious officer, named
Statilius, and ordered him to take a small body
of horsemen, ride over to the Carthaginian camp,
ascertain the facts exactly, and report the re-
sult. Statilius did so. When he reached the
lines he ordered his troops to halt, and took
with him two horsemen on whose courage and
strength he could rely, and rode in. The three
horsemen rode around the camp and examined
every thing with a view of ascertaining whether
Hannibal had really abandoned his position and
fled, or whether some stratagem was intended.
When he came back he reported to the army
that, in his opinion, the desertion of the camp
was not real, but a trick to draw the Romans
into some difficulty. The fires were the larg-
est on the side toward the Romans, which indi-
cated that they were built to deceive. He saw
money, too, and other valuables strewed about
upon the ground, which appeared to him much
more like a bait set in a trap, than like property
abandoned by fugitives as incumbrances to flight.
Varro was not convinced; and the army, hear-
ing of the money, were excited to a greater ea-
gerness for plunder. They could hardly be re-
strained. Just then, however, two slaves that
196
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
Chagrin of Hannibal and the Romans.
Apulia.
had been taken prisoners by the Carthaginians
some time before, came into the Roman camp.
They told the consuls that the whole Cartha-
ginian force was hid in ambush very near, wait-
ing for the Romans to enter their encampment,
when they were going to surround them and
cut them to pieces. In the bustle and move-
ment attendant on this plan, the slaves had es-
caped. Of course, the Roman army were now
satisfied. They returned, chagrined and dis-
appointed, to their own quarters, and Hannibal,
still more chagrined and disappointed, returned
to his.
He soon found, however, that he could not
remain any longer where he was.
His provis-
ions were exhausted, and he could obtain no
more. The Romans would not come out of
their encampment to give him battle on equal
terms, and they were too strongly intrenched
to be attacked where they were. He determ-
ined, therefore, to evacuate that part of the coun-
try, and move, by a sudden march, into Apulia.
Apulia was on the eastern side of Italy. The
River Aufidus runs through it, having a town
named Cannæ near its mouth. The region of
the Aufidus was a warm and sunny valley,
which was now waving with ripening grain.
B.C.215.] BATTLE OF CANN Æ.
197
Hannibal marches into Apulia.
The Romans follow him.
Being further south than the place where he
had been, and more exposed to the influence of
the sun, Hannibal thought that the crops would
be sooner ripe, and that, at least, he should have
a new field to plunder.
He accordingly decided now to leave his camp
in earnest, and move into Apulia. He made
the same arrangements as before, when his de-
parture was a mere pretense. He left tents
pitched and fires burning, but marched his
army off the ground by night and secretly, so
that the Romans did not perceive his departure;
and the next day, when they saw the appear-
ances of silence and solitude about the camp,
they suspected another deception, and made no
move themselves. At length, however, intel-
ligence came that the long columns of Hanni-
bal's army had been seen already far to the
eastward, and moving on as fast as possible,
with all their baggage. The Romans, after
much debate and uncertainty, resolved to fol-
low. The eagles of the Apennines looked down
upon the two great moving masses, creeping
slowly along through the forests and valleys,
like swarms of insects, one following the other,
led on by a strange but strong attraction, draw-
ing them toward each other when at a distance,
198
[B.C. 215
HANNIBAL.
The new encampments.
Dissensions between the consuls
but kept asunder by a still stronger repulsion
when near.
The Roman army came up with that of Han-
nibal on the River Aufidus, near Cannæ, and
the two vast encampments were formed with
all the noise and excitement attendant on the
movements of two great armies posting them-
selves on the eve of a battle, in the neighbor-
hood of each other. In the Roman camp, the
confusion was greatly aggravated by the angry
disputes which immediately arose between the
consuls and their respective adherents as to the
course to be pursued. Varro insisted on giv-
ing the Carthaginians immediate battle. Emil-
ius refused. Varro said that he must protest
against continuing any longer these inexcusa-
ble delays, and insist on a battle. He could
not consent to be responsible any further for
allowing Italy to lie at the mercy of such a
scourge. Æmilius replied, that if Varro did
precipitate a battle, he himself protested against
his rashness, and could not be, in any degree,
responsible for the result. The various officers
took sides, some with one consul and some with
the other, but most with Varro. The dissension
filled the camp with excitement, agitation, and
ill will.
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF Fl
199
CANNÆ.
Flight of the inhabitants.
Maneuvers.
In the mean time, the inhabitants of the
country into which these two vast hordes of
ferocious, though restrained and organized com-
batants, had made such a sudden irruption,
were flying as fast as they could from the aw-
ful scene which they expected was to ensue.
They carried from their villages and cabins
what little property could be saved, and took
the women and children away to retreats and
fastnesses, wherever they imagined they could
find temporary concealment or protection. The
news of the movement of the two armies spread
throughout the country, carried by hundreds of
refugees and messengers, and all Italy, looking
on with suspense and anxiety, awaited the result.
The armies maneuvered for a day or two,
Varro, during his term of command, making
arrangements to promote and favor an action,
and Æmilius, on the following day, doing every
thing in his power to prevent it. In the end,
Varro succeeded. The lines were formed and
the battle must be begun. Æmilius gave up
the contest now, and while he protested earnest-
ly against the course which Varro pursued, he
prepared to do all in his power to prevent a de-
feat, since there was no longer a possibility of
avoiding a collision.
200
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
The battle of Canna.
Another stratagem.
The battle began, and the reader must imag-
ine the scene, since no pen can describe it. Fif-
ty thousand men on one side and eighty thou-
sand on the other, at work hard and steadily,
for six hours, killing each other by every possi-
ble means of destruction-stabs, blows, strug-
gles, outcries, shouts of anger and defiance, and
screams of terror and agony, all mingled to-
gether, in one general din, which covered the
whole country for an extent of many miles, all
together constituted a scene of horror of which
none but those who have witnessed great battles
can form any adequate idea.
It seems as if Hannibal could do nothing
without stratagem. In the early part of this
conflict he sent a large body of his troops over
to the Romans as deserters. They threw down
their spears and bucklers, as they reached the
Roman lines, in token of surrender. The Ro-
mans received them, opened a passage for them
through into the rear, and ordered them to re-
main there. As they were apparently unarm-
ed, they left only a very small guard to keep
them in custody. The men had, however, dag-
gers concealed about their dress, and, watching
a favorable moment, in the midst of the battle,
they sprang to their feet, drew out their weap-
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANN.
201
Defeat of the Romans.
Æmilius wounded.
ons, broke away from their guard, and attacked
the Romans in the rear at a moment when they
were so pressed by the enemy in front that they
could scarcely maintain their ground.
It was evident before many hours that the
Roman forces were every where yielding. From
slowly and reluctantly yielding they soon began
to fly. In the flight, the weak and the wound-
ed were trampled under foot by the throng who
were pressing on behind them, or were dispatch-
ed by wanton blows from enemies as they pass-
ed in pursuit of those who were still able to fly.
In the midst of this scene, a Roman officer nam-
ed Lentulus, as he was riding away, saw before
him at the road-side another officer wounded,
sitting upon a stone, faint and bleeding. He
stopped when he reached him, and found that it
was the consul Emilius. He had been wound-
ed in the head with a sling, and his strength
was almost gone. Lentulus offered him his
horse, and urged him to take it and fly. Emil-
ius declined the offer. He said it was too late
for his life to be saved, and that, besides, he had
no wish to save it. "Go on, therefore, your-
self,” said he, "as fast as you can.
Make the
best of your way to Rome. Tell the authorities
thore, from mo, that all is lost, and they must
202
[B.C. 215
HANNIBAL.
Death of Æmilius.
Escape of Varro.
do whatever they can themselves for the defense
of the city. Make all the speed you can, or
Hannibal will be at the gates before you."
Æmilius sent also a message to Fabius, de-
claring to him that it was not his fault that a
battle had been risked with Hannibal. He had
done all in his power, he said, to prevent it, and
had adhered to the policy which Fabius had
recommended to the last. Lentulus having re-
ceived these messages, and perceiving that the
Carthaginians were close upon him in pursuit,
rode away, leaving the consul to his fate. The
Carthaginians came on, and, on seeing the
wounded man, they thrust their spears into his
body, one after another, as they passed, until
his limbs ceased to quiver. As for the other
consul, Varro, he escaped with his life. At-
tended by about seventy horsemen, he made his
way to a fortified town not very remote from
the battle-field, where he halted with his horse-
men, and determined that he would attempt to
rally there the remains of the army.
The Carthaginians, when they found the vic-
tory complete, abandoned the pursuit of the en-
emy, returned to their camp, spent some hours
in feasting and rejoicing, and then laid down to
sleep. They were, of course, well exhausted
B.C. 215.] BATTLE OF CANNÆ.
203
Condition of the battle-field.
The wounded and dying.
by the intense exertions of the day. On the
field where the battle had been fought, the
wounded lay all night mingled with the dead,
filling the air with cries and groans, and writh-
ing in their agony.
/ Early the next morning the Carthaginians
came back to the field to plunder the dead bod-
ies of the Romans. The whole field presented
a most shocking spectacle to the view. The
bodies of horses and men lay mingled in dread-
ful confusion, as they had fallen, some dead, oth-
ers still alive, the men moaning, crying for wa-
ter, and feebly struggling from time to time to
disentangle themselves from the heaps of car-
-casses under which they were buried. The dead-
ly and inextinguishable hate which the Cartha-
ginians felt for their foes not having been ap-
peased by the slaughter of forty thousand of
them, they beat down and stabbed these wretch-
ed lingerers wherever they found them, as a sort
of morning pastime after the severer labors of
the preceding day. This slaughter, however,
could hardly be considered a cruelty to the
wretched victims of it, for many of them bared
their breasts to their assailants, and begged for
the blow which was to put an end to their pain.
In exploring the field, one Carthaginian soldier
204
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
The Roman and Carthaginian soldier.
Immense plunder.
was found still alive, but imprisoned by the dead
body of his Roman enemy lying upon him. The
Carthaginian's face and ears were shockingly
mangled. The Roman, having fallen upon him
when both were mortally wounded, had contin-
ued the combat with his teeth when he could
no longer use his weapon, and had died at last,
binding down his exhausted enemy with his own
dead body.
The Carthaginians secured a vast amount of
plunder. The Roman army was full of officers
and soldiers from the aristocratic ranks of soci-
ety, and their arms and their dress were very
valuable. The Carthaginians obtained some
bushels of gold rings from their fingers, which
Hannibal sent to Carthage as a trophy of his
victory.
B.C. 215.]
205
SCIPIO.
Reason of Hannibal's success.
The Scipios.
CHAPTER X.
SCIPIO.
HE true reason why Hannibal could not
THE
be arrested in his triumphant career seems
not to have been because the Romans did not
pursue the right kind of policy toward him, but
because, thus far, they had no general who was
his equal. Whoever was sent against him soon
proved to be his inferior. Hannibal could out-
maneuver them all in stratagem, and could con-
quer them on the field. There was, however,
now destined to appear a man capable of coping
with Hannibal. It was young Scipio, the one
who saved the life of his father at the battle of
Ticinus. This Scipio, though the son of Han-
nibal's first great antagonist of that name, is
commonly called, in history, the elder Scipio;
for there was another of his name after him,
who was greatly celebrated for his wars against
the Carthaginians in Africa. These last two
received from the Roman people the surname
of Africanus, in honor of their African victories,
and the one who now comes upon the stage was
206
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
Fragments of the Roman army.
Scipio elected commander
called Scipio Africanus the elder, or sometimes
simply the elder Scipio. The deeds of the Scipio
who attempted to stop Hannibal at the Rhone
and upon the Po were so wholly eclipsed by
his son, and by the other Scipio who followed
him, that the former is left out of view and
forgotten in designating and distinguishing the
others.
Our present Scipio first appears upon the
stage, in the exercise of military command, aft-
er the battle of Cannæ. He was a subordinate
officer, and on the day following the battle he
found himself at a place called Canusium, which
was at a short distance from Cannæ, on the way
toward Rome, with a number of other officers
of his own rank, and with broken masses and
detachments of the army coming in from time
to time, faint, exhausted, and in despair. The
rumor was that both consuls were killed. These
fragments of the army had, therefore, no one to
command them. The officers met together, and
unanimously agreed to make Scipio their com-
mander in the emergency, until some superior
officer should arrive, or they should get orders
from Rome.
An incident here occurred which showed, in
a striking point of view, the boldness and energy
B.C. 215.]
207
SCIPIO.
Scipio's energy.
Case of Metellus.
of the young Scipio's character. At the very
meeting in which he was placed in command,
and when they were overwhelmed with perplex-
ity and care, an officer came in, and reported
that in another part of the camp there was an
assembly of officers and young men of rank,
headed by a certain Metellus, who had decided
to give up the cause of their country in despair,
and that they were making arrangements to
proceed immediately to the sea-coast, obtain
ships, and sail away to seek a new home in
some foreign lands, considering their cause in
Italy as utterly lost and ruined. The officer
proposed that they should call a council and de-
liberate what was best to do.
"Deliberate!" said Scipio; "this is not a
case for deliberation, but for action. Draw your
swords and follow me." So saying, he pressed
forward at the head of the party to the quarters.
of Metellus. They marched boldly into the
apartment where he and his friends were in con-
sultation. Scipio held up his sword, and in a
very solemn manner pronounced an oath, bind-
ing himself not to abandon his country in this
the hour of her distress, nor to allow any other
Roman citizen to abandon her. If he should be
guilty of such treason, he called upon Jupiter, by
208
[B.C. 215.
HANNIBAL.
Metellus yields.
Consternation at Rome.
the most dreadful imprecations, to destroy him
utterly, house, family, fortune, soul, and body.
"And now, Metellus, I call upon you," said
he, "and all who are with you, to take the
same oath. You must do it, otherwise you
have got to defend yourselves against these
swords of ours, as well as those of the Cartha-
ginians." Metellus and his party yielded. Nor
was it wholly to fear that they yielded. It was
to the influence of hope quite as much as to
that of fear. The courage, the energy, and the
martial ardor which Scipio's conduct evinced,
awakened a similar spirit in them, and made
them hope again that possibly their country
might yet be saved.
The news of the awful defeat and destruction
of the Roman army flew swiftly to Rome, and
produced universal consternation. The whole
city was in an uproar. There were soldiers in
the army from almost every family, so that ev-
cry woman and child throughout the city was
distracted by the double agitation of inconsola-
ble grief at the death of their husband or their
father, slain in the battle, and of terrible fear
that Hannibal and his raging followers were
about to burst in through the gates of the city
to murder them. The streets of the city, and
B.C. 215.]
209
SCIPIO.
The senate adjourns.
Hannibal refuses to march to Rome.
especially the Forum, were thronged with vast
crowds of men, women, and children, who filled
the air with loud lamentations, and with cries
of terror and despair.
The magistrates were not able to restore or-
der. The senate actually adjourned, that the
members of it might go about the city, and use
their influence and their power to produce si-
lence at least, if they could not restore compos-
ure. The streets were finally cleared. The
women and children were ordered to remain at
home. Armed patrols were put on guard to
prevent tumultuous assemblies forming. Men
were sent off on horseback on the road to Canu-
sium and Cannæ, to get more accurate intelli-
gence, and then the senate assembled again, and
began to consider, with as much of calmness as
they could command, what was to be done.
The panic at Rome was, however, in some
neasure, a false alarm, for Hannibal, contrary
to the expectation of all Italy, did not go to
Rome. His generals urged him very strongly
to do so. Nothing could prevent, they said, his
gaining immediate possession of the city. But
Hannibal refused to do this. Rome was strongly
fortified, and had an immense population. His
army, too, was much weakened by the battle of
210
[B.C. 214.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal makes his head-quarters at Capua.
Cannæ, and he seems to have thought it most
prudent not to attempt the reduction of Rome
until he should have received re-enforcements
from home. It was now so late in the season
that he could not expect such re-enforcements
immediately, and he accordingly determined to
select some place more accessible than Rome,
and make it his head-quarters for the winter.
He decided in favor of Capua, which was a
large and powerful city one or two hundred
miles southeast of Ronie.
Hannibal, in fact, conceived the design of re-
taining possession of Italy and of making Capua
the capital of the country, leaving Rome to it-
self, to decline, as under such circumstances it
inevitably must, to the rank of a second city.
Perhaps he was tired of the fatigues and haz-
ards of war, and having narrowly escaped ruin
before the battle of Cannæ, he now resolved that
he would not rashly incur any new dangers.
It was a great question with him whether he
should go forward to Rome, or attempt to build
up a new capital of his own at Capua. The
question which of these two he ought to have
done was a matter of great debate then, and it
has been discussed a great deal by military men
in every age since his day. Right or wrong,
B.C. 214.]
211
SCIPIO.
Hannibal sends Mago to Carthage.
Mago's speech.
Hannibal decided to establish his own capital
at Capua, and to leave Rome, for the present,
undisturbed.
He, however, sent immediately to Carthage
for re-enforcements. The messenger whom he
sent was one of his generals named Mago.
Mago made the best of his way to Carthage
with his tidings of victory and his bushel of
rings, collected, as has been already said, from
the field of Cannæ. The city of Carthage was
greatly excited by the news which he brought.
The friends and patrons of Hannibal were elat-
ed with enthusiasm and pride, and they taunt-
ed and reproached his enemies with the opposi-
tion to him they had manifested when he was
originally appointed to the command of the ar-
my of Spain.
Mago met the Carthaginian senate, and in a
very spirited and eloquent speech he told them
how many glorious battles Hannibal had fought,
and how many victories he had won. He had
contended with the greatest generals that the
Romans could bring against him, and had con-
quered them all. He had slain, he said, in all,
over two hundred thousand men. All Italy was
now subject to his power; Capua was his capi-
tal, and Rome had fallen. He concluded by
212
B.C. 214.
HANNIBAL.
The bag of rings.
Debate in the Carthaginian senate.
saying that Hannibal was in need of considera-
ble additional supplies of men, and money, and
provisions, which he did not doubt the Cartha-
ginians would send without any unnecessary
delay. He then produced before the senate the
great bag of rings which he had brought, and
poured them upon the pavement of the senate-
house as a trophy of the victories which he had
been announcing.
This would, perhaps, have all been very well
for Hannibal if his friends had been contented
to have left the case where Mago left it; but
some of them could not resist the temptation of
taunting his enemies, and especially Hanno,
who, as will be recollected, originally opposed
his being sent to Spain. They turned to him,
and asked him triumphantly what he thought
now of his factious opposition to so brave a
warrior. Hanno rose. The senate looked to-
ward him and were profoundly silent, wonder-
ing what he would have to reply. Hanno,*
with an air of perfect ease and composure,
spoke somewhat as follows:
"I should have said nothing, but should have
allowed the senate to take what action they
pleased on Mago's proposition if I had not been
particularly addressed. As it is, I will say that
B.C. 214.]
213
SCIPIO.
The speech of Hanno in the Carthaginian senate.
I think now just as I always have thought.
We are plunged into a most costly and most
useless war, and are, as I conceive, no nearer
the end of it now than ever, notwithstanding
all these boasted successes. The emptiness of
them is clearly shown by the inconsistency of
Hannibal's pretensions as to what he has done,
with the demands that he makes in respect to
what he wishes us to do. He says he has con-
quered all his enemies, and yet he wants us to
send him more soldiers. He has reduced all
Italy-the most fertile country in the world-
to subjection, and reigns over it at Capua, and
yet he calls upon us for corn. And then, to
crown all, he sends us bushels of gold rings as
a specimen of the riches he has obtained by
plunder, and accompanies the offering with a
demand for new supplies of money. In my
opinion, his success is all illusive and hollow.
There seems to be nothing substantial in his
situation except his necessities, and the heavy
burdens upon the state which these necessities
impose."
Notwithstanding Hanno's sarcasms, the Car-
thaginians resolved to sustain Hannibal, and to
send him the supplies that he needed. They
were, however, long in reaching him. Various
214
[B.C. 214.
HANNIBAL.
Progress of the war.
Enervation of Hannibal's army.
difficulties and delays occurred. The Romans,
though they could not dispossess Hannibal from
his position in Italy, raised armies in different
countries, and waged extended wars with the
Carthaginians and their allies, in various parts
of the world, both by sea and land.
The result was, that Hannibal remained fif
teen or sixteen years in Italy, engaged, during
all this time, in a lingering struggle with the
Roman power, without ever being able to ac-
complish any decisive measures. During this
period he was sometimes successful and victori-
ous, and sometimes he was very hard pressed
by his enemies. It is said that his army was
very much enervated and enfeebled by the com-
forts and luxuries they enjoyed at Capua. Cap-
ua was a very rich and beautiful city, and the
inhabitants of it had opened their gates to Han-
nibal of their own accord, preferring, as they
said, his alliance to that of the Romans. The
officers-as the officers of an army almost al-
ways do, when they find themselves established
in a rich and powerful city, after the fatigues
of a long and honorable campaign-gave them-
selves up to festivities and rejoicing, to games,
shows, and entertainments of every kind, which
they soon learned infinitely to prefer to the toil
and danger of marches and battles.
B.C. 214.]
215
SCIPIO.
Decline of the Carthaginian power.
Marcellus.
Whatever may have been the cause, there is
no question about the fact that, from the tine
Hannibal and his army got possession of their
comfortable quarters in Capua, the Carthagin-
ian power began gradually to decline. As Han-
nibal determined to make that city the Italian
capital instead of Rome, he, of course, when es-
tablished there, felt in some degree settled and
at home, and was less interested than he had
been in plans for attacking the ancient capital.
Still, the war went on; many battles were
fought, many cities were besieged, the Roman
power gaining ground all the time, though not,
however, by any very decisive victories.
In these contests there appeared, at length, a
new Roman general named Marcellus, and, ei-
ther on account of his possessing a bolder and
more active temperament, or else in consequence
of the change in the relative strength of the two
contending powers, he pursued a more aggress-
ive policy than Fabius had thought it prudent
to attempt. Marcellus was, however, cautious.
and wary in his enterprises, and he laid his
plans with so much sagacity and skill that he
was almost always successful. The Romans
applauded very highly his activity and ardor,
without, however, forgetting their obligations
216
[B.C. 214.
HANNIBAL.
Success of the Romans.
Siege of Capua,
to Fabius for his caution and defensive reserve.
They said that Marcellus was the sword of
their commonwealth, as Fabius had been its
shield.
The Romans continued to prosecute this sort
of warfare, being more and more successful the
longer they continued it, until, at last, they ad-
vanced to the very walls. of Capua, and threat-
ened it with a siege. Hannibal's intrenchments
and fortifications were too strong for them to
attempt to carry the city by a sudden assault,
nor were the Romans even powerful enough to
invest the place entirely, so as completely to
shut their enemies in. They, however, en-
camped with a large army in the neighbor-
hood, and assumed so threatening an attitude
as to keep Hannibal's forces within in a state
of continual alarm. And, besides the alarm, it
was very humiliating and mortifying to Car-
thaginian pride to find the very seat of their
power, as it were, shut up and overawed by an
enemy over whom they had been triumphing
themselves so short a time before, by a contin-
ued series of victories.
Hannibal was not himself in Capua at the
time that the Romans came to attack it. He
marched, however, immediately to its relief, and,
B.C. 214.]
217
SCIPIO.
Hannibal's attack on the Roman camp.
He marches to Rome.
attacking the Romans in his turn, endeavored
to compel them to raise the siege, as it is tech-
nically termed, and retire. They had, however,
so intrenched themselves in the positions that
they had taken, and the assaults with which he
encountered them had lost so much of their
former force, that he could accomplish nothing
decisive. He then left the ground with his
army, and marched himself toward Rome. He
encamped in the vicinity of the city, and threat-
ened to attack it; but the walls, and castles,
and towers with which Rome, as well as Capua,
was defended, were too formidable, and the
preparations for defense too complete, to make
it prudent for him really to assail the city. His
object was to alarm the Romans, and compel
them to withdraw their forces from his capital
that they might defend their own.
There was, in fact, some degree of alarm
awakened, and in the discussions which took
place among the Roman authorities, the with-
drawal of their troops from Capua was propos-
ed; but this proposal was overruled; even Fa-
bius was against it. Hannibal was no longer
to be feared. They ordered back a small de-
tachment from Capua, and added to it such
forces as they could raise within the city, and
218
[B.C. 214.
HANNIBAL.
Preparations for a battle.
Prevented by storms.
then advanced to give Hannibal battle. The
preparations were all made, it is said, for an en-
gagement, but a violent storm came on, so vio-
lent as to drive the combatants back to their
respective camps. This happened, the great
Roman historian gravely says, two or three
times in succession; the weather immediately
becoming serene again, each time, as soon as
the respective generals had withdrawn their
troops from the intended fight. Something like
this may perhaps have occurred, though the
fact doubtless was that both parties were
afraid, each of the other, and were disposed to
avail themselves of any excuse to postpone a
decisive conflict. There was a time when Han-
nibal had not been deterred from attacking the
Romans even by the most tempestuous storms.
Thus, though Hannibal did, in fact, in the
end, get to the walls of Rome, he did nothing
but threaten when he was there, and his en-
campment near the city can only be considered
as a bravado. His presence seems to have ex-
cited very little apprehension within the city.
The Romans had, in fact, before this time, lost
their terror of the Carthaginian arms. To show
their contempt of Hannibal, they sold, at public
auction, the land on which he was encamped,
B.C. 206.]
219
SCIPIO.
Sales at auction.
Hasdrubal crosses the Alps.
while he was upon it besieging the city, and it
brought the usual price. The bidders were,
perhaps, influenced somewhat by a patriotic
spirit, and by a desire to taunt Hannibal with
an expression of their opinion that his occupa-
tion of the land would be a very temporary en-
cumbrance. Hannibal, to revenge himself for
this taunt, put up for sale at auction, in his own
camp, the shops of one of the principal streets
of Rome, and they were bought by his officers
with great spirit. It showed that a great change
had taken place in the nature of the contest be-
tween Carthage and Rome, to find these vast
powers, which were a few years before grap-
pling each other with such destructive and ter-
rible fury on the Po and at Cannæ, now satis-
fying their declining animosity with such squib-
bing as this.
When the other modes by which Hannibal
attempted to obtain re-enforcements failed, he
made an attempt to have a second army brought
over the Alps under the command of his broth-
er Hasdrubal. It was a large army, and in their
march they experienced the same difficulties,
though in a much lighter degree, that Hannibal
had himself encountered. And yet, of the whole
mighty mass which set out from Spain, noth-
220
[B.C. 206.
HANNIBAL.
.
Livius and Nero.
Division of the provinces.
ing reached Hannibal except his brother's head.
The circumstances of the unfortunate termina-
tion of Hasdrubal's attempt were as follows:
When Hasdrubal descended from the Alps,
rejoicing in the successful manner in which he
had surmounted those formidable barriers, he
imagined that all his difficulties were over. He
dispatched couriers to his brother Hannibal, in-
forming him that he had scaled the mountains,
and that he was coming on as rapidly as possi-
ble to his aid.
The two consuls in office at this time were
named, the one Nero, and the other Livius.
To each of these, as was usual with the Roman
consuls, was assigned a particular province, and
a certain portion of the army to defend it, and
the laws enjoined it upon them very strictly not
to leave their respective provinces, on any pre-
text whatever, without authority from the Ro-
man Legislature. In this instance Livius had
been assigned to the northern part of Italy, and
Nero to the southern. It devolved upon Livius,
therefore, to meet and give battle to Hasdrubal
on his descent from the Alps, and to Nero to
remain in the vicinity of Hannibal, to thwart
his plans, oppose his progress, and, if possible,
conquer and destroy him, while his colleague
B.C. 200.j
221
SCIPIO.
The intercepted letters.
Nero's perplexity.
prevented his receiving the expected re-enforce-
ments from Spain.
Things being in this state, the couriers whom
Hasdrubal sent with his letters had the vigi-
lance of both consuls to elude before they could
deliver them into Hannibal's hands. They did
succeed in passing Livius, but they were inter-
cepted by Nero. The patrols who seized these
messengers brought them to Nero's tent. Nero
opened and read the letters. All Hasdrubal's
plans and arrangements were detailed in them
very fully, so that Nero perceived that, if he
were at once to proceed to the northward with
a strong force, he could render his colleague such
aid as, with the knowledge of Hasdrubal's plans,
which he had obtained from the letters, would
probably enable them to defeat him; whereas,
if he were to leave Livius in ignorance and
alone, he feared that Hasdrubal would be suc-
cessful in breaking his way through, and in ulti-
mately effecting his junction with Hannibal.
Under these circumstances, he was, of course,
very earnestly desirous of going northward to
render the necessary aid, but he was strictly for-
bidden by law to leave his own province to enter
that of his colleague without an authority from
Rome, which there was not now time to obtain.
222
[B.C. 206.
HANNIBAL.
Laws of military discipline.
Their strictness and severity.
The laws of military discipline are very strict
and imperious, and in theory they are never to
be disobeyed. Officers and soldiers, of all ranks
and gradations, must obey the orders which they
receive from the authority above them, without
looking at the consequences, or deviating from
the line marked out on any pretext whatever.
It is, in fact, the very essence of military sub-
ordination and efficiency, that a command, once
given, suspends all exercise of judgment or dis-
cretion on the part of the one to whom it is ad-
dressed; and a good general or a good govern-
ment would prefer generally that harm should
be done by a strict obedience to commands,
rather than a benefit secured by an unauthor-
ized deviation from them. It is a good prin-
ciple, not only in war, but in all those cases in
social life where men have to act in concert, and
yet wish to secure efficiency in action.
And yet there are cases of exception-cases
where the necessity is so urgent, or the advant-
ages to be derived are so great; where the in-
terests involved are so momentous, and the suc-
cess so sure, that a commander concludes to
disobey and take the responsibility. The re-
sponsibility is, however, very great, and the
danger in assuming it extreme. He who in-
B.C. 206.]
223
SCIPIO.
Danger of violating discipline.
An illustration.
curs it makes himself liable to the severest
penalties, from which nothing but clear proof
of the most imperious necessity, and, in addi-
tion to it, the most triumphant success, can save
him. There is somewhere in English history
a story of a naval commander, in the service of
an English queen, who disobeyed the orders of
his superiors at one time, in a case of great
emergency at sea, and gained by so doing a very
important victory. Immediately afterward he
placed himself under arrest, and went into port
as a prisoner accused of crime instead of a com-
mander triumphing in his victory. He sur-
rendered himself to the queen's officers of jus-
tice, and sent word to the queen herself that he
knew very well that death was the penalty for
his offense, but that he was willing to sacrifice
his life in any way in the service of her majesty.
He was pardoned!
Nero, after much anxious deliberation, con-
cluded that the emergency in which he found
himself placed was one requiring him to take
the responsibility of disobedience. He did not,
however, dare to go northward with all his for-
ces, for that would be to leave southern Italy
wholly at the mercy of Hannibal. He selected,
therefore, from his whole force, which consisted
224
[B.C. 206
HANNIBAL.
Plans of Nero.
A night march.
of forty thousand men, seven or eight thousand
of the most efficient and trustworthy; the men
on whom he could most securely rely, both in
respect to their ability to bear the fatigues of
a rapid march, and the courage and energy with
which they would meet Hasdrubal's forces in
battle at the end of it. He was, at the time
when Hasdrubal's letters were intercepted, oc-
cupying a spacious and well-situated camp.
This he enlarged and strengthened, so that
Hannibal might not suspect that he intended
any diminution of the forces within. All this
was done very promptly, so that, in a few hours
after he received the intelligence on which he
was acting, he was drawing off secretly, at
night, a column of six or eight thousand men,
none of whom knew at all where they were going.
He proceeded as rapidly as possible to the
northward, and, when he arrived in the north-
ern province, he contrived to get into the camp
of Livius as secretly as he had got out from his
own. Thus, of the two armies, the one where
an accession of force was required was greatly
strengthened at the expense of the other, with-
out either of the Carthaginian generals having
suspected the change.
Livius was rejoiced to get so opportune a re-
B.C. 206.]
225
SCIPIO.
Livius and Nero attack Hasdrubal.
Hasdrubal orders a retreat.
enforcement. He recommended that the troops
should all remain quietly in camp for a short
time, until the newly-arrived troops could rest
and recruit themselves a little after their rapid
and fatiguing march; but Nero opposed this
plan, and recommended an immediate battle.
He knew the character of the men that he had
brought, and he was, besides, unwilling to risk
the dangers which might arise in his own camp,
in southern Italy, by too long an absence from
it. It was decided, accordingly, to attack Has-
drubal at once, and the signal for battle was
given.
It is not improbable that Hasdrubal would
have been beaten by Livius alone, but the ad-
ditional force which Nero had brought made
the Romans altogether too strong for him. Be-
sides, from his position in the front of the bat-
tle, he perceived, from some indications that his
watchful eye observed, that a part of the troops
attacking him were from the southward; and
he inferred from this that Hannibal had been
defeated, and that, in consequence of this, the
whole united force of the Roman army was ar-
rayed against him. He was disheartened and
discouraged, and soon ordered a retreat. He
was pursued by the various divisions of the Ro-
P
226
[B.C. 206.
HANNIBAL.
Hasdrubal's death,
Butchery of Hasdrubal's army.
man army, and the retreating columns of the
Carthaginians were soon thrown into complete
confusion. They became entangled among riv-
ers and lakes; and the guides who had under-
taken to conduct the army, finding that all was
lost, abandoned them and fled, anxious only to
save their own lives. The Carthaginians were
soon pent up in a position where they could not
defend themselves, and "from which they could
not escape. The Romans showed them no mer-
cy, but went on killing their wretched and de-
spairing victims until the whole army was al-
most totally destroyed. They cut off Hasdru-
bal's head, and Nero sat out the very night after
the battle to return with it in triumph to his own
encampment. When he arrived, he sent a troop
of horse to throw the head over into Hannibal's
camp, a ghastly and horrid trophy of his victory.
Hannibal was overwhelmed with disappoint-
ment and sorrow at the loss of his army, bring-
ing with it, as it did, the destruction of all his
hopes. "My fate is sealed," said he: "all is lost.
I shall send no more news of victory to Car-
thage. In losing Hasdrubal my last hope is gone."
While Hannibal was in this condition in Ita-
ly, the Roman armies, aided by their allies, were
gaining gradually against the Carthaginians in

DIDIER.DEL.
ROBERTS. SC
HASDRUBAL'S HEAD.
B.C. 204.]
229
SCIPIO.
Progress of the Roman arms.
Successes of Scipio
various parts of the world, under the different
generals who had been placed in command by
the Roman senate. The news of these victories
came continually home to Italy, and encouraged
and animated the Romans, while Hannibal and
his army, as well as the people who were in al
liance with him, were disheartened and depress
ed by them. Scipio was one of these general:
commanding in foreign lands. His province was.
Spain. The news which came home from his
army became more and more exciting, as he
advanced from conquest to conquest, until it
seemed that the whole country was going to be
reduced to subjection. He overcame one Car-
thaginian general after another until he reached
New Carthage, which he besieged and conquer-
ed, and the Roman authority was established
fully over the whole land.
Scipio then returned in triumph to Rome.
The people received him with acclamations
At the next election they chose him consul.
On the allotment of provinces, Sicily fell to him,
with power to cross into Africa if he pleased.
It devolved on the other consul to carry on the
war in Italy more directly against Hannibal.
Scipio levied his army, equipped his fleet, and
sailed for Sicily.
230
[B.C. 204.
HANNIBAL.
Scipio in Africa.
Carthage threatened.
The first thing that he did on his arrival in
his province was to project an expedition into
Africa itself. He could not, as he wished, face
Hannibal directly, by marching his troops into
the south of Italy, for this was the work allotted
to his colleague. He could, however, make an
incursion into Africa, and even threaten Car-
thage itself, and this, with the boldness and ardor
which marked his character, he resolved to do.
He was triumphantly successful in all his
plans. His army, imbibing the spirit of enthu-
siasm which animated their commander, and
confident of success, went on, as his forces in
Spain had done, from victory to victory. They
conquered cities, they overran provinces, they
defeated and drove back all the armies which
the Carthaginians could bring against them,
and finally they awakened in the streets and
dwellings of Carthage the same panic and con-
sternation which Hannibal's victorious progress
had produced in Rome.
The Carthaginians being now, in their turn,
reduced to despair, sent embassadors to Scipio
to beg for peace, and to ask on what terms he
would grant it and withdraw from the country.
Scipio replied that he could not make peace
It rested with the Roman senate, whose servant
B.C. 204.]
231
SCIPIO.
A truce.
Hannibal recalled.
he was.
He specified, however, certain terms
which he was willing to have proposed to the
senate, and, if the Carthaginians would agree
to them, he would grant them a truce, that is,
a temporary suspension of hostilities, until the
answer of the Roman senate could be returned.
The Carthaginians agreed to the terms. They
were very onerous. The Romans say that they
did not really mean to abide by them, but ac-
ceded for the moment in order to gain time to
send for Hannibal. They had great confidence
in his resources and military power, and thought
that, if he were in Africa, he could save them.
At the same time, therefore, that they sent their
embassadors to Rome with their propositions for
peace, they dispatched expresses to Hannibal,
ordering him to embark his troops as soon as
possible, and, abandoning Italy, to hasten home,
to save, if it was not already too late, his native
city from destruction.
When Hannibal received these messages, he
was overwhelmed with disappointment and sor-
row. He spent hours in extreme agitation,
sometimes in a moody silence, interrupted now
and then by groans of despair, and sometimes
uttering loud and angry curses, prompted by
the exasperation of his feelings. He, however,
232
[B.C. 204.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal raises a new army.
The Romans capture his spies.
could not resist. He made the best of his way
to Carthage. The Roman senate, at the same
time, instead of deciding on the question of
peace or war, which Scipio had submitted to
them, referred the question back to him. They
sent commissioners to Scipio, authorizing him
to act for them, and to decide himself alone
whether the war should be continued or closed,
and if to be closed, on what conditions.
Hannibal raised a large force at Carthage,
joining with it such remains of former armies
as had been left after Scipio's battles, and he
went forth at the head of these troops to meet
his enemy. He marched five days, going, per-
haps, seventy-five or one hundred miles from
Carthage, when he found himself approaching
Scipio's camp. He sent out spies to reconnoi-
ter. The patrols of Scipio's army seized these
spies, and brought them to the general's tent,
as they supposed, for execution. Instead of
punishing them, Scipio ordered them to be led
around his camp, and to be allowed to see every
thing they desired. He then dismissed them,
that they might return to Hannibal with the in-
formation they had obtained.
Of course, the report which they brought in
respect to the strength and resources of Scipio's
B.C.201.]
233
SCIPIO.
Negotiations.
Interview between Hannibal and Scipio.
army was very formidable to Hannibal. He
thought it best to make an attempt to negoti-
ate a peace rather than to risk a battle, and he
accordingly sent word to Scipio requesting a
personal interview. Scipio acceded to this re-
quest, and a place was appointed for the meet-
ing between the two encampments. To this
spot the two generals repaired at the proper
time, with great pomp and parade, and with
many attendants. They were the two greatest
generals of the age in which they lived, having
been engaged for fifteen or twenty years in per-
forming, at the head of vast armies, exploits
which had filled the world with their fame.
Their fields of action had, however, been wide-
ly distant, and they met personally now for the
first time. When introduced into each other's
presence, they stood for some time in silence,
gazing upon and examining one another with
intense interest and curiosity, but not speaking
a word.
At length, however, the negotiation was open-
ed. Hannibal made Scipio proposals for peace.
They were very favorable to the Romans, but
Scipio was not satisfied with them. He de-
manded still greater sacrifices than Hannibal
was willing to make. The result, after a long
234
[B.C. 201.
HANNIBAL.
The last battle.
Defeat of the Carthaginians.
and fruitless negotiation, was, that each general
returned to his camp and prepared for battle.
In military campaigns, it is generally easy
for those who have been conquering to go on to
conquer: so much depends upon the expectations
with which the contending armies go into bat-
tle. Scipio and his troops expected to conquer.
The Carthaginians expected to be beaten. The
result corresponded. At the close of the day
on which the battle was fought, forty thousand
Carthaginians were dead and dying upon the
ground, as many more were prisoners in the Ro-
man camp, and the rest, in broken masses, were
flying from the field in confusion and terror, on
all the roads which led to Carthage. Hannibal
arrived at the city with the rest, went to the
senate, announced his defeat, and said that he
could do no more. "The fortune which once
attended me," said he, "is lost forever, and
nothing is left to us but to make peace with
our enemies on any terms that they may think
fit to impose."
B.C. 200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
235
Peaceful pursuits.
Hannibal's conquests.
CHAPTER XI.
ANNIBAL A FUGITIVE AND AN EXILE.
HA
ANNIBAL'S life was like an April day.
Its brightest glory was in the morning.
The setting of his sun was darkened by clouds
and showers. Although for fifteen years the
Roman people could find no general capable of
maintaining the field against him, Scipio con-
quered him at last, and all his brilliant con-
quests ended, as Hanno had predicted, only in
placing his country in a far worse condition
than before.
In fact, as long as the Carthaginians confined
their energies to useful industry, and to the pur-
suits of commerce and peace, they were pros
perous, and they increased in wealth, and in-
fluence, and honor every year. Their ships
went every where, and were every where wel-
come. All the shores of the Mediterranean were
visited by their merchants, and the comforts and
the happiness of many nations and tribes were
promoted by the very means which they took
to swell their own riches and fame. All might
236
[B.C. 200.
HANNIBAL.
The danger of a spirit of ambition and conquest.
have gone on so for centuries longer, had not
military heroes arisen with appetites for a more
piquant sort of glory. Hannibal's father was
one of the foremost of these. He began by con-
quests in Spain and encroachments on the Ro-
man jurisdiction. He inculcated the same feel-
ings of ambition and hate in Hannibal's mind
which burned in his own. For many years, the
policy which they led their countrymen to pur-
sue was successful. From being useful and
welcome visitors to all the world, they became
the masters and the curse of a part of it. So
long as Hannibal remained superior to any Ro-
man general that could be brought against him,
he went on conquering. But at last Scipio
arose, a greater than Hannibal. The tide was
then turned, and all the vast conquests of half
a century were wrested away by the same vio-
lence, bloodshed, and misery with which they
had been acquired.
We have described the exploits of Hannibal,
in making these conquests, in detail, while those
of Scipio, in wresting them away, have been
passed over very briefly, as this is intended as
a history of Hannibal, and not of Scipio. Still,
Scipio's conquests were made by slow degrees,
and they consumed a long period of time. He
B.C. 200.1 HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
237
Gradual progress of Scipio's victories.
was but about eighteen years of age at the bat-
tle of Cannæ, soon after which his campaigns
began, and he was thirty when he was made
consul, just before his going into Africa. He
was thus fifteen or eighteen years in taking
down the vast superstructure of power which
Hannibal had raised, working in regions away
from Hannibal and Carthage during all this
time, as if leaving the great general and the
great city for the last. He was, however, so
successful in what he did, that when, at length,
he advanced to the attack of Carthage, every
thing else was gone. The Carthaginian power
had become a mere hollow shell, empty and
vain, which required only one great final blow
to effect its absolute demolition. In fact, so far
spent and gone were all the Carthaginian re-
sources, that the great city had to summon the
great general to its aid the moment it was
threatened, and Scipio destroyed them both to-
gether.
And yet Scipio did not proceed so far as lit-
erally and actually to destroy them. He spared
Hannibal's life, and he allowed the city to stand;
but the terms and conditions of peace which he
exacted were such as to put an absolute and
perpetual end to Carthaginian dominion. By
238
[B.C. 200
HANNIBAL.
Severe conditions of peace exacted by Scipio.
these conditions, the Carthaginian state was al-
lowed to continue free and independent, and
even to retain the government of such territo-
ries in Africa as they possessed before the war;
but all their foreign possessions were taken
away; and even in respect to Africa, their ju-
risdiction was limited and curtailed by very hard
restrictions. Their whole navy was to be given
to the Romans except ten small ships of three
banks of oars, which Scipio thought the govern-
ment would need for the purposes of civil ad-
ministration. These they were allowed to re-
tain. Scipio did not say what he should do with
the remainder of the fleet: it was to be uncon-
ditionally surrendered to him. Their elephants
of war were also to be all given up, and they
were to be bound not to train any more. They
were not to appear at all as a military power
in any other quarter of the world but Africa,
and they were not to make war in Africa ex-
cept by previously making known the occasion
for it to the Roman people, and obtaining their
permission. They were also to pay to the Ro-
mans a very large annual tribute for fifty years.
There was great distress and perplexity in
the Carthaginian councils while they were de-
bating these cruel terms. Hannibal was in fa-
B.C. 200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
239
Debates in the Carthaginian senate.
vor of accepting them. Others opposed.
They
thought it would be better still to continue the
struggle, hopeless as it was, than to submit to
terms so ignominious and fatal.
Hannibal was present at these debates, but
he found himself now in a very different posi-
tion from that which he had been occupying for
thirty years as a victorious general at the head
of his army. He had been accustomed there to
control and direct every thing. In his councils
of war, no one spoke but at his invitation, and
no opinion was expressed but such as he was
willing to hear. In the Carthaginian senate,
however, he found the case very different
There, opinions were freely expressed, as in a
debate among equals, Hannibal taking his place
among the rest, and counting only as one.
yet the spirit of authority and command which
he had been so long accustomed to exercise, lin-
gered still, and made him very impatient and
uneasy under contradiction. In fact, as one of
the speakers in the senate was rising to animad-
vert upon and oppose Hannibal's views, he un-
dertook to pull him down and silence him by
force. This proceeding awakened immediately
such expressions of dissatisfaction and displeas-
ure in the assembly as to show him very clearly
And
240
[B.C. 200.
HANNIBAL.
Terms of peace complied with. Surrender of the elephants and ships.
that the time for such domineering was gone.
He had, however, the good sense to express the
regret he soon felt at having so far forgotten the
duties of his new position, and to make an am-
ple apology.
The Carthaginians decided at
cede to Scipio's terms of peace.
length to ac-
The first in-
stalment of the tribute was paid. The elephants
and the ships were surrendered. After a few
days, Scipio announced his determination not to
take the ships away with him, but to destroy
them there. Perhaps this was because he
thought the ships would be of little value to the
Romans, on account of the difficulty of manning
them. Ships, of course, are useless without sea-
men, and many nations in modern times, who
could easily build a navy, are debarred from
doing it, because their population does not fur-
nish sailors in sufficient numbers to man and
navigate it. It was probably, in part, on this
account that Scipio decided not to take the Car-
thaginian ships away, and perhaps he also want-
ed to show to Carthage and to the world that his
object in taking possession of the national prop-
erty of his foes was not to enrich his own coun-
try by plunder, but only to deprive ambitious
soldiers of the power to compromise any longer

KOETRIS.
THE BURNING OF THE CARTHAGINIAN FLEET.
B.C. 200.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE
243
Scipio burns the Carthaginian flect.
Feelings of the spectators.
the peace and happiness of mankind by expe-
ditions for conquest and power. However this
may be, Scipio determined to destroy the Car-
thaginian fleet, and not to convey it away.
On a given day, therefore, he ordered all the
galleys to be got together in the bay opposite
to the city of Carthage, and to be burned.
There were five hundred of them, so that they
constituted a large fleet, and covered a large ex-
panse of the water. A vast concourse of peo-
ple assembled upon the shores to witness the
grand conflagration. The emotion which such
a spectacle was of itself calculated to excite
was greatly heightened by the deep but stifled
feelings of resentment and hate which agitated
every Carthaginian breast. The Romans, too,
as they gazed upon the scene from their en-
campment on the shore, were agitated as well,
though with different emotions. Their faces.
beamed with an expression of exultation and
triumph as they saw the vast masses of flame
and columns of smoke ascending from the sea,
proclaiming the total and irretrievable ruin of
Carthaginian pride and power.
Having thus fully accomplished his work,
Scipio set sail for Rome. All Italy had been
filled with the fame of his exploits in thus de-
244
[B.C. 200
HANNIBAL.
Scipio sails to Rome.
His reception.
stroying the ascendency of Hannibal. The city
of Rome had now nothing more to fear from its
great enemy. He was shut up, disarmed, and
helpless, in his own native state, and the terror
which his presence in Italy had inspired had
passed forever away. The whole population of
Rome, remembering the awful scenes of con-
sternation and terror which the city had so of-
ten endured, regarded Scipio as a great deliverer.
They were eager to receive and welcome him
on his arrival. When the time came and he
approached the city, vast throngs went out to
meet him. The authorities formed civic pro-
cessions to welcome him. They brought crowns,
and garlands, and flowers, and hailed his ap-
proach with loud and prolonged acclamations of
triumph and joy. They gave him the name of
Africanus, in honor of his victories. This was
a new honor-giving to a conqueror the name of
the country that he had subdued; it was in-
vented specially as Scipio's reward, the deliv-
erer who had saved the empire from the great-
est and most terrible danger by which it had
ever been assailed.
Hannibal, though fallen, retained still in Car-
thage some portion of his former power. The
glory of his past exploits still invested his char-
B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
245
Hannibal's position and standing at Carthage.
acter with a sort of halo, which made him an
object of general regard, and he still had great
and powerful friends. He was elevated to high
office, and exerted himself to regulate and im-
prove the internal affairs of the state. In these
efforts he was not, however, very successful.
The historians say that the objects which he
aimed to accomplish were good, and that the
measures for effecting them were, in themselves,
judicious; but, accustomed as he was to the
authoritative and arbitrary action of a military
commander in camp, he found it hard to prac-
tice that caution and forbearance, and that
deference for the opinion of others, which are
so essential as means of influencing men in the
management of the civil affairs of a common-
wealth. He made a great many enemies, who
did every thing in their power, by plots and in-
trigues, as well as by open hostility, to accom-
plish his ruin.
His pride, too, was extremely mortified and
humbled by an occurrence which took place
very soon after Scipio's return to Rome. There
was some occasion of war with a neighboring
African tribe, and Hannibal headed some forces
which were raised in the city for the purpose,
and went out to prosecute it. The Romans.
246
[B.C. 192.
HANNIBAL..
Orders from Rome.
Hannibal's mortification
who took care to have agents in Carthage to
keep them acquainted with all that occurred,
heard of this, and sent word to Carthage to
warn the Carthaginians that this was contrary
to the treaty, and could not be allowed. The
government, not willing to incur the risk of
another visit from Scipio, sent orders to Han-
nibal to abandon the war and return to the city.
Hannibal was compelled to submit; but after
having been accustomed, as he had been, for
many years, to bid defiance to all the armies
and fleets which Roman power could, with their
utmost exertion, bring against him, it must
have been very hard for such a spirit as his to
find itself stopped and conquered now by a word.
All the force they could command against him,
even at the very gates of their own city, was
once impotent and vain. Now, a mere message
and threat, coming across the distant sea, seeks
him out in the remote deserts of Africa, and in
a moment deprives him of all his power.
Years passed away, and Hannibal, though
compelled outwardly to submit to his fate, was
restless and ill at ease. His scheming spirit,
spurred on now by the double stimulus of re-
sentment and ambition, was always busy, vainly
endeavoring to discover some plan by which he
B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
247
Syria and Phoenicia.
King Antiochus,
might again renew the struggle with his ancient
foe.
It will be recollected that Carthage was orig-
inally a commercial colony from Tyre, a city
on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
The countries of Syria and Phoenicia were in
the vicinity of Tyre. They were powerful com-
mercial communities, and they had always re-
tained very friendly relations with the Cartha-
ginian commonwealth. Ships passed continu-
ally to and fro, and always, in case of calami-
ties or disasters threatening one of these regions,
the inhabitants naturally looked to the other
for refuge and protection, Carthage looking
upon Phoenicia as its mother, and Phoenicia re-
garding Carthage as her child. Now there was,
at this time, a very powerful monarch on the
throne in Syria and Phoenicia, named Antiochus.
His capital was Damascus. He was wealthy
and powerful, and was involved in some diffi-
culties with the Romans. Their conquests,
gradually extending eastward, had approached
the confines of Antiochus's realms, and the two
nations were on the brink of war.
Things being in this state, the enemies of
Hannibal at Carthage sent information to the
Roman senate that he was negotiating and plot-
248
[B.C. 192.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's intrigues with Antiochus.
Embassy from Rome.
ting with Antiochus to combine the Syrian and
Carthaginian forces against them, and thus
plunge the world into another general war.
The Romans accordingly determined to send an
embassage to the Carthaginian government, and
to demand that Hannibal should be deposed
from his office, and given up to them a prisoner,
in order that he might be tried on this charge.
These commissioners came, accordingly, to
Carthage, keeping, however, the object of their
mission a profound secret, since they knew very
well that, if Hannibal should suspect it, he
would make his escape before the Carthaginian
senate could decide upon the question of sur-
rendering him. Hannibal was, however, too
wary for them. He contrived to learn their
object, and immediately resolved on making his
escape. He knew that his enemies in Carthage
were numerous and powerful, and that the ani-
mosity against him was growing stronger and
stronger. He did not dare, therefore, to trust
to the result of the discussion in the senate, but
determined to fly.
He had a small castle or tower on the coast,
about one hundred and fifty miles southeast of
Carthage. He sent there by an express, order-
ing a vessel to be ready to take him to sea. He
B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
249
Flight of IIannibal.
Island of Cercina.
also made arrangements to have horsemen ready
at one of the gates of the city at nightfall.
During the day he appeared freely in the public
streets, walking with an unconcerned air, as if
his mind was at ease, and giving to the Roman
embassadors, who were watching his move-
ments, the impression that he was not medi-
tating an escape. Toward the close of the day,
however, after walking leisurely home, he im-
mediately made preparations for his journey.
As soon as it was dark he went to the gate of
the city, mounted the horse which was provided
for him, and fled across the country to his cas-
tle. Here he found the vessel ready which he
had ordered. He embarked, and put to sea.
There is a small island called Cercina at a
little distance from the coast. Hannibal reach-
ed this island on the same day that he left his
tower. There was a harbor here, where mer-
chant ships were accustomed to come in. He
found several Phoenician vessels in the port,
some bound to Carthage. Hannibal's arrival
produced a strong sensation here, and, to ac-
count for his appearance among them, he said
he was going on an embassy from the Cartha-
ginian government to Tyre.
He was now afraid that some of these vessels
250
[B.C. 192.
HANNIBAL.
Stratagem of Hannibal.
He sails for Syria
that were about setting sail for Carthage might
carry the news back of his having being seen at
Cercina, and, to prevent this, he contrived, with
his characteristic cunning, the following plan:
He sent around to all the ship-masters in the
port, inviting them to a great entertainment
which he was to give, and asked, at the same
time, that they would lend him the main-sails
of their ships, to make a great awning with, to
shelter the guests from the dews of the night.
The ship-masters, eager to witness and enjoy.
the convivial scene which Hannibal's proposal
promised them, accepted the invitation, and or-
dered their main-sails to be taken down. Of
course, this confined all their vessels to port. In
the evening, the company assembled under the
vast tent, made by the main-sails, on the shore.
Hannibal met them, and remained with them
for a time. In the course of the night, how-
ever, when they were all in the midst of their
carousing, he stole away, embarked on board a
ship, and set sail, and, before the ship-masters
could awake from the deep and prolonged slum-
bers which followed their wine, and rig their
main-sails to the masts again, Hannibal was far
out of reach on his way to Syria.
In the mean time, there was a great excite-
B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
251
Excitement at Carthage.
Hannibal safe at Ephesus.
ment produced at Carthage by the news which
spread every where over the city, the day after
his departure, that he was not to be found.
Great crowds assembled before his house. Wild
and strange rumors circulated in explanation
of his disappearance, but they were contradic-
tory and impossible, and only added to the uni-
versal excitement. This excitement continued
until the vessels at last arrived from Cercina,
and made the truth known. Hannibal was
himself, however, by this time, safe beyond the
reach of all possible pursuit. He was sailing
prosperously, so far as outward circumstances
were concerned, but dejected and wretched in
heart, toward Tyre. He landed there in safe-
ty, and was kindly received. In a few days he
went into the interior, and, after various wan-
derings, reached Ephesus, where he found Anti-
ochus, the Syrian king.
As soon as the escape of Hannibal was made
known at Carthage, the people of the city im-
mediately began to fear that the Romans would
consider them responsible for it, and that they
should thus incur a renewal of Roman hostility.
In order to avert this danger, they immediately
sent a deputation to Rome, to make known the
fact of Hannibal's flight, and to express the re-
252
[B.C. 192.
-HANNIBAL.
Carthaginian deputies.
The change of fortune.
gret they felt on account of it, in hopes thus to
save themselves from the displeasure of their
formidable foes. It may at first view seem very
ungenerous and ungrateful in the Carthaginians
to abandon their general in this manner, in the
hour of his misfortune and calamity, and to take
part against him with enemies whose displeas-
ure he had incurred only in their service and
in executing their will. And this conduct of
the Carthaginians would have to be considered
as not only ungenerous, but extremely incon-
sistent, if it had been the same individuals that
acted in the two cases. But it was not. The
men and the influences which now opposed
Hannibal's projects and plans had opposed them.
always and from the beginning; only, so long as
he went on successfully and well, they were in
the minority, and Hannibal's adherents and
friends controlled all the public action of the
city. But, now that the bitter fruits of his am-
bition and of his totally unjustifiable encroach-
ments on the Roman territories and Roman
rights began to be realized, the party of his
friends was overturned, the power reverted to
the hands of those who had always opposed him,
and in trying to keep him down when he was
once fallen, their action, whether politically
B.C. 192.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
253
Hannibal's unconquerable spirit.
His new plans
right or wrong, was consistent with itself, and
can not be considered as at all subjecting them
to the charge of ingratitude or treachery.
One might have supposed that all Hannibal's
hopes and expectations of ever again coping with
his great Roman enemy would have been now
effectually and finally destroyed, and that hence-
forth he would have given up his active hostility,
and would have contented himself with seeking
some refuge where he could spend the remain-
der of his days in peace, satisfied with securing,
after such dangers and escapes, his own person-
al protection from the vengeance of his enemies.
But it is hard to quell and subdue such indomit-
able perseverance and energy as his. He was
very little inclined yet to submit to his fate.
As soon as he found himself at the court of An-
tiochus, he began to form new plans for making
war against Rome. He proposed to the Syrian
monarch to raise a naval force and put it under
his charge. He said that if Antiochus would
give him a hundred ships and ten or twelve
thousand men, he would take the command of
the expedition in person, and he did not doubt
that he should be able to recover his lost ground,
and once more humble his ancient and formida-
ble enemy. He would go first, he said, with
254
[B.C. 190.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal sends a secret messenger to Carthage.
his force to Carthage, to get the co-operation
and aid of his countrymen there in his new
plans. Then he would make a descent upon.
Italy, and he had no doubt that he should soon
regain the ascendency there which he had for-
merly held.
Hannibal's design of going first to Carthage
with his Syrian army was doubtless induced
by his desire to put down the party of his ene-
mies there, and to restore the power to his ad-
herents and partisans. In order to prepare the
way the more effectually for this, he sent a se-
cret messenger to Carthage, while his negotia-
tions with Antiochus were going on, to make
known to his friends there the new hopes which
he began to cherish, and the new designs which
he had formed. He knew that his enemies in
Carthage would be watching very carefully for
any such communication; he therefore wrote no
letters, and committed nothing to paper which,
on being discovered, might betray him. He ex-
plained, however, all his plans very fully to his
messenger, and gave him minute and careful
instructions as to his manner of communicating
them.
The Carthaginian authorities were indeed
watching very vigilantly, and intelligence was
B.C. 190.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
255
The Placards.
Excitement produced by them.
brought to them, by their spies, of the arrival
of this stranger. They immediately took meas-
ures for arresting him. The messenger, who
was himself as vigilant as they, got intelligence
of this in his secret lurking-place in the city,
and determined immediately to fly. He, how-
ever, first prepared some papers and placards,
which he posted up in public places, in which
he proclaimed that Hannibal was far from con-
sidering himself finally conquered; that he was,
on the contrary, forming new plans for putting
down his enemies in Carthage, resuming his
former ascendency there, and carrying fire and
sword again into the Roman territories; and, in
the mean time, he urged the friends of Hanni-
bal in Carthage to remain faithful and true to
his cause.
The messenger, after posting his placards,
fled from the city in the night, and went back
to Hannibal. Of course, the occurrence pro-
duced considerable excitement in the city. It
aroused the anger and resentment of Hannibal's
enemies, and awakened new encouragement and
hope in the hearts of his friends. Further than
this, however, it led to no immediate results.
The power of the party which was opposed to
Hannibal was too firmly established at Carthage
256
[B.C. 190.
HANNIBAL.
Roman commissioners.
Supposed interview of Hannibal and Scipio.
to be very easily shaken. They sent informa-
tion to Rome of the coming of Hannibal's emis-
sary to Carthage, and of the result of his mis-
sion, and then every thing went on as before.
In the mean time, the Romans, when they
learned where Hannibal had gone, sent two or
three commissioners there to confer with the
Syrian government in respect to their intentions
and plans, and watch the movements of Hanni-
bal. It was said that Scipio himself was joined
to this embassy, and that he actually met Han-
nibal at Ephesus, and had several personal in-
terviews and conversations with him there.
Some ancient historian gives a particular ac-
count of one of these interviews, in which the
conversation turned, as it naturally would do
between two such distinguished commanders,
on military greatness and glory. Scipio asked
Hannibal whom he considered the greatest mil-
itary hero that had ever lived. Hannibal gave
the palm to Alexander the Great, because he
had penetrated, with comparatively a very small
number of Macedonian troops, into such re-
mote regions, conquered such vast armies, and
brought so boundless an empire under his sway.
Scipio then asked him who he was inclined to
place next to Alexander. He said Pyrrhus.
B.C. 190.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
257
Hannibal's opinion of Alexander and Pyrrhus.
Anecdotes.
Pyrrhus was a Grecian, who crossed the Adri-
atic Sea, and made war, with great success,
against the Romans. Hannibal said that he
gave the second rank to Pyrrhus because he
systematized and perfected the art of war, and
also because he had the power of awakening
a feeling of personal attachment to himself on
the part of all his soldiers, and even of the in-
habitants of the countries that he conquered,
beyond any other general that ever lived. Scip-
io then asked Hannibal who came next in or-
der, and he replied that he should give the third
rank to himself. "And if," added he, "I had
conquered Scipio, I should consider myself as
standing above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all the
generals that the world ever produced."
Various other anecdotes are related of Han-
nibal during the time of his first appearance in
Syria, all indicating the very high degree of
estimation in which he was held, and the curi-
osity and interest that were every where felt to
see him. On one occasion, it happened that a
vain and self-conceited orator, who knew little
of war but from his own theoretic speculations,
was haranguing an assembly where Hannibal
was present, being greatly pleased with the op-
portunity of displaying his powers before so dis-
R
258
[B.C. 190.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's efforts prove vain.
Antiochus agrees to give him up.
tinguished an auditor. When the discourse
was finished, they asked Hannibal what he
thought of it. "I have heard," said he, in reply,
66 many
old dotards in the course of my life, but
this is, verily, the greatest dotard of them all."
Hannibal failed, notwithstanding all his per-
severance, in obtaining the means to attack the
Romans again. He was unwearied in his ef-
forts, but, though the king sometimes encour-
aged his hopes, nothing was ever done. He re-
mained in this part of the world for ten years,
striving continually to accomplish his aims, but
every year he found himself further from the
attainment of them than ever. The hour of
his good fortune and of his prosperity were ob-
viously gone. His plans all failed, his influence
declined, his name and renown were fast pass-
ing away. At last, after long and fruitless
contests with the Romans, Antiochus made a
treaty of peace with them, and, among the art-
icles of this treaty, was one agreeing to give up
Hannibal into their power.
He
Hannibal resolved to fly. The place of refuge
which he chose was the island of Crete.
found that he could not long remain here. He
had, however, brought with him a large amount
of treasure, and when about leaving Crete again,
B.C. 190.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
259
Hannibal's treasures.
His plan for securing them.
he was uneasy about this treasure, as he had
some reason to fear that the Cretans were in-
tending to seize it. He must contrive, then,
some stratagem to enable him to get this gold
away. The plan he adopted was this:
He filled a number of earthen jars with lead,
covering the tops of them with gold and silver.
These he carried, with great appearance of cau-
tion and solicitude, to the Temple of Diana, a
very sacred edifice, and deposited them there,
under very special guardianship of the Cretans,
to whom, as he said, he intrusted all his treas-
ures. They received their false deposit with
many promises to keep it safely, and then Han-
nibal went away with his real gold cast in the
center of hollow statues of brass, which he car-
ried with him, without suspicion, as objects of
art of very little value.
Hannibal fled from kingdom to kingdom, and
from province to province, until life became a
miserable burden. The determined hostility of
the Roman senate followed him every where,
harassing him with continual anxiety and fear,
and destroying all hope of comfort and peace.
His mind was a prey to bitter recollections of
the past, and still more dreadful forebodings for
the future. He had spent all the morning of
260
[B.C. 182.
HANNIBAL.
Hannibal's unhappy condition.
The potion of poison.
his life in inflicting the most terrible injuries on
the objects of his implacable animosity and hate,
although they had never injured him, and now,
in the evening of his days, it became his des-
tiny to feel the pressure of the same terror and
suffering inflicted upon him. The hostility
which he had to fear was equally merciless with
that which he had exercised; perhaps it was
made still more intense by being mingled with
what they who felt it probably considered a just
resentment and revenge.
When at length Hannibal found that the Ro-
mans were hemming him in more and more
closely, and that the danger increased of his fall-
ing at last into their power, he had a potion of
poison prepared, and kept it always in readiness,
determined to die by his own hand rather than
to submit to be given up to his enemies. The
time for taking the poison at last arrived. The
wretched fugitive was then in Bithynia, a king-
dom of Asia Minor. The King of Bithynia
sheltered him for a time, but at length agreed
to give him up to the Romans. Hannibal,
learning this, prepared for flight. But he found,
on attempting his escape, that all the modes of
exit from the palace which he occupied, even
the secret ones which he had expressly contriv-
B.C. 182.] HANNIBAL AN EXILE.
261
Hannibal fails in his attempt to escape.
He poisons himself.
ed to aid his flight, were taken possession of and
guarded. Escape was, therefore, no longer pos-
sible, and Hannibal went to his apartment and
sent for the poison. He was now an old man,
nearly seventy years of age, and he was worn
down and exhausted by his protracted anxieties
and sufferings. He was glad to die. He drank
the poison, and in a few hours ceased to breathe.
CHAPTER XII
THE DESTRUCTION OF CARTHAGE.
THE conscquences of Hannibal's reckless
ambition, and of his wholly unjustifiable
aggression on Roman rights to gratify it, did
not end with his own personal ruin. The flame
which he had kindled continued to burn until
at last it accomplished the entire and irretriev-
able destruction of Carthage. This was effect-
ed in a third and final war between the Cartha-
ginians and the Romans, which is known in
history as the third Punic war. With a narra-
tive of the events of this war, ending, as it did,
in the total destruction of the city, we shall
close this history of Hannibal.
It will be recollected that the war which
Hannibal himself waged against Rome was the
second in the series, the contest in which Reg-
ulus figured so prominently having been the
first. The one whose history is now to be giv-
en is the third. The reader will distinctly un-
derstand the chronological relations of these
contests by the following table:
B.C. 148. CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
263
Chronological table of the Punic wars.
TABLE.

Date.
B.C.
Events.
Punic Wars.
264
War commenced in Sicily
262
Naval battles in the Mediterranean
I.
249
Regulus sent prisoner to Rome
24 years.
241
Peace concluded
Peace for 24 years.
217
Hannibal attacks Saguntum
218
Crosses the Alps
•
II.
216
Battle of Cannæ
17 years.
205
Is conquered by Scipio
200
Peace concluded
Peace for 52 years.
148
War declared..
145
Carthage destroyed.
III.
3 years.
These three Punic wars extended, as the ta-
ble shows, over a period of more than a hund-
264
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Intervals between them.
Character of the Punic wars.
red years. Each successive contest in the se-
ries was shorter, but more violent and desper-
ate than its predecessor, while the intervals of
peace were longer. Thus the first Punic war
continued for twenty-four years, the second
about seventeen, and the third only three or
four. The interval, too, between the first and
second was twenty-four years, while between
the second and third there was a sort of peace
for about fifty years. These differences were
caused, indeed, in some degree, by the accident-
al circumstances on which the successive rup-
tures depended, but they were not entirely ow-
ing to that cause. The longer these belligerent
relations between the two countries continued,
and the more they both experienced the awful
effects and consequences of their quarrels, the
less disposed they were to renew such dreadful
struggles, and yet, when they did renew them,
they engaged in them with redoubled energy
of determination and fresh intensity of hate.
Thus the wars followed each other at greater
intervals, but the conflicts, when they came,
though shorter in duration, were more and more
desperate and merciless in character.
We have said that, after the close of the second
Punic war, there was a sort of peace for about
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
265
Animosities and dissensions.
Numidia.
fifty years. Of course, during this time, one gen-
eration after another of public men arose, both
in Rome and Carthage, each successive group,
on both sides, inheriting the suppressed animos-
ity and hatred which had been cherished by their
predecessors. Of course, as long as Hannibal
had lived, and had continued his plots and
schemes in Syria, he was the means of keeping
up a continual irritation among the people of
Rome against the Carthaginian name. It is
true that the government at Carthage disavowed
his acts, and professed to be wholly opposed to
his designs; but then it was, of course, very
well known at Rome that this was only because
they thought he was not able to execute them.
They had no confidence whatever in Carthagin-
ian faith or honesty, and, of course, there could
be no real harmony or stable peace.
There arose gradually, also, another source
of dissension. By referring to the map, the read-
er will perceive that there lies, to the westward
of Carthage, a country called Numidia. This
country was a hundred miles or more in breadth,
and extended back several hundred miles into
the interior. It was a very rich and fertile re-
gion, and contained many powerful and wealthy
cities. The inhabitants were warlike, too, and
266
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Numidian horsemen.
Masinissa.
were particularly celebrated for their cavalry.
The ancient historians say that they used to
ride their horses into the field without saddles,
and often without bridles, guiding and controll-
ing them by their voices, and keeping their
seats securely by the exercise of great personal
strength and consummate skill. These Nu-
midian horsemen are often alluded to in the
narratives of Hannibal's campaigns, and, in fact,
in all the military histories of the times.
Among the kings who reigned in Numidia
was one who had taken sides with the Romans
in the second Punic war. His name was Mas-
inissa. He became involved in some struggle
for power with a neighboring monarch named
Syphax, and while he, that is, Masinissa, had al-
lied himself to the Romans, Syphax had joined
the Carthaginians, each chieftain hoping, by
this means, to gain assistance from his allies
in conquering the other. Masinissa's patrons
proved to be the strongest, and at the end of the
second Punic war, when the conditions of peace
were made, Masinissa's dominions were en-
larged, and the undisturbed possession of them
confirmed to him, the Carthaginians being bound
by express stipulations not to molest him in any
way.
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
267
Parties at Rome and Carthage.
Their differences.
In commonwealths like those of Rome and
Carthage, there will always be two great par-
ties struggling against each other for the pos-
session of power. Each wishes to avail itself
of every opportunity to oppose and thwart the
other, and they consequently almost always take
different sides in all the great questions of pub-
lic policy that arise. There were two such par-
ties at Rome, and they disagreed in respect to
the course which should be pursued in regard
to Carthage, one being generally in favor of
peace, the other perpetually calling for war.
In the same manner there was at Carthage a
similar dissension, the one side in the contest
being desirous to propitiate the Romans and
avoid collisions with them, while the other par-
ty were very restless and uneasy under the
pressure of the Roman power upon them, and
were endeavoring continually to foment feelings
of hostility against their ancient enemies, as if
they wished that war should break out again.
The latter party were not strong enough to
bring the Carthaginian state into an open rup-
ture with Rome itself, but they succeeded at
last in getting their government involved in a
dispute with Masinissa, and in leading out an
army to give him battle.
268
[B.C. 148
HANNIBAL.
Masinissa prepares for war.
Hasdrubal.
Fifty years had passed away, as has already
been remarked, since the close of Hannibal's
war. During this time, Scipio-that is, the
Scipio who conquered Hannibal-had disappear-
ed from the stage. Masinissa himself was very
far advanced in life, being over eighty years of
age. He, however, still retained the strength
and energy which had characterized him in his
prime. He drew together an immense army,
and mounting, like his soldiers, bare-back upon
his horse, he rode from rank to rank, gave the
necessary commands, and matured the arrange-
ments for battle.
The name of the Carthaginian general on
this occasion was Hasdrubal. This was a very
common name at Carthage, especially among
the friends and family of Hannibal. The bear-
er of it, in this case, may possibly have receiv-
ed it from his parents in commemoration of the
brother of Hannibal, who lost his head in de-
scending into Italy from the Alps, inasmuch as
during the fifty years of peace which had elaps-
ed, there was ample time for a child born after
that event to grow up to full maturity. At any
rate, the new Hasdrubal inherited the inveter-
ate hatred to Rome which characterized his
namesake, and he and his party had contrived
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
269
Carthage declares war.
Parallel between Hannibal and Hasdrubal.
to gain a temporary ascendency in Carthage,
and they availed themselves of their brief pos-
session of power to renew, indirectly at least,
the contest with Rome. They sent the rival
leaders into banishment, raised an army, and
Hasdrubal himself taking the command of it,
they went forth in great force to encounter
Masinissa.
It was in a way very similar to this that
Hannibal had commenced his war with Rome,
by seeking first a quarrel with a Roman ally.
Hannibal, it is true, had commenced his ag-
gressions at Saguntum, in Spain. Hasdrubal
begins in Numidia, in Africa, but, with the ex-
ception of the difference of geographical locality,
all seems the same, and Hasdrubal very proba-
bly supposed that he was about to enter him-
self upon the same glorious career which had
immortalized his great ancestor's name.
There was another analogy between the two
cases, viz., that both Hannibal and Hasdrubal
had strong parties opposed to them in Carthage
in the incipient stages of their undertakings.
In the present instance, the opposition had been
violently suppressed, and the leaders of it sent
into banishment; but still the elements remain-
ed, ready, in case of any disaster to Hasdrubal's
270
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Battle with Masinissa.
Defeat of the Carthaginians.
arms, or any other occurrence tending to dimin-
ish his power, to rise at once and put him down.
Hasdrubal had therefore a double enemy to con-
tend against: one before him, on the battle-
field, and the other, perhaps still more formida-
ble, in the city behind him.
The parallel, however, ends here. Hannibal
conquered at Saguntum, but Hasdrubal was
entirely defeated in the battle in Numidia. The
battle was fought long and desperately on both
sides, but the Carthaginians were obliged to
yield, and they retreated at length in confusion
to seek shelter in their camp. The battle was
witnessed by a Roman officer who stood upon
a neighboring hill, and looked down upon the
scene with intense interest all the day. It was
Scipio-the younger Scipio-who became after-
ward the principal actor in the terrible scenes
which were enacted in the war which followed.
He was then a distinguished officer in the Ro-
man army, and was on duty in Spain. His
commanding general there had sent him to Af-
rica to procure some elephants from Masinissa
for the use of the army. He came to Numidia,
accordingly, for this purpose, and as the battle
between Masinissa and Hasdrubal came on
while he was there, he remained to witness it.
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
271
The younger Scipio.
A spectator of the battle.
This second Scipio was not, by blood, any
relative of the other, but he had been adopted
by the elder Scipio's son, and thus received his
name; so that he was, by adoption, a grand-
son. He was, even at this time, a man of high
consideration among all who knew him, for his
great energy and efficiency of character, as well
as for his sound judgment and practical good
sense. He occupied a very singular position at
the time of this battle, such as very few great
commanders have ever been placed in; for, as
he himself was attached to a Roman army in
Spain, having been sent merely as a military
messenger to Numidia, he was a neutral in this
contest, and could not, properly, take part on
either side. He had, accordingly, only to take
his place upon the hill, and look down upon the
awful scene as upon a spectacle arranged for
his special gratification. He speaks of it as if
he were highly gratified with the opportunity
he enjoyed, saying that only two such cases had
ever occurred before, where a general could
look down, in such a way, upon a great battle-
field, and witness the whole progress of the fight,
himself a cool and disinterested spectator. He
was greatly excited by the scene, and he speaks
particularly of the appearance of the veteran
272
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Negotiations for peace.
Scipio made umpire.
Masinissa, then eighty-four years old, who rode
all day from rank to rank, on a wild and impet-
uous charger, without a saddle, to give his orders
to his men, and to encourage and animate them
by his voice and his example.
Hasdrubal retreated with his forces to his
camp as soon as the battle was over, and in-
trenched himself there, while Masinissa advanc-
ed with his army, surrounded the encampment,
and hemmed the imprisoned fugitives in. Find-
ing himself in extreme and imminent danger,
Hasdrubal sent to Masinissa to open negotiations
for peace, and he proposed that Scipio should
act as a sort of umpire or mediator between the
two parties, to arrange the terms. Scipio was
not likely to be a very impartial umpire; but
still, his interposition would afford him, as Has-
drubal thought, some protection against any
excessive and extreme exorbitancy on the part
of his conqueror. The plan, however, did not
succeed. Even Scipio's terms were found by
Hasdrubal to be inadmissible. He required
that the Carthaginians should accord to Masi-
nissa a certain extension of territory. Hasdru-
bal was willing to assent to this. They were
to pay him, also, a large sum of money. He
agreed, also, to this. They were, moreover, to
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
273
Hasdrubal surrenders.
Terms unposed by Masinissa.
allow Hasdrubal's banished opponents to return
to Carthage. This, by putting the party op-
posed to Hasdrubal once more into power in
Carthage, would have been followed by his own
fall and ruin; he could not consent to it. He
remained, therefore, shut up in his camp, and
Scipio, giving up the hope of effecting an ac-
commodation, took the elephants which had
been provided for him, and returned across the
Mediterranean to Spain.
Soon after this, Hasdrubal's army, worn out
with hunger and misery in their camp, com-
pelled him to surrender on Masinissa's own
terms. The men were allowed to go free, but
most of them perished on the way to Carthage.
Hasdrubal himself succeeded in reaching some
place of safety, but the influence of his party
was destroyed by the disastrous result of his
enterprise, and his exiled enemies being recall-
ed in accordance with the treaty of surrender,
the opposing party were immediately restored
to power.
Under these new councils, the first measure
of the Carthaginians was to impeach Hasdrubal
on a charge of treason, for having involved his
country in these difficulties, and the next was
to send a solemn embassy to Rome, to acknowl-
S
274
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Carthaginian embassy to Rome.
Their mission fruitless
edge the fault of which their nation had been
guilty, to offer to surrender Hasdrubal into
their hands, as the principal author of the deed,
and to ask what further satisfaction the Romans
demanded.
In the mean time, before these messengers
arrived, the Romans had been deliberating what
to do. The strongest party were in favor of
urging on the quarrel with Carthage and de-
claring war. They had not, however, come to
any positive decision. They received the depu-
tation, therefore, very coolly, and made them no
direct reply. As to the satisfaction which the
Carthaginians ought to render to the Romans
for having made war upon their ally contrary
to the solemn covenants of the treaty, they said
that that was a question for the Carthaginians
themselves to consider. They had nothing at
present to say upon the subject. The deputies
returned to Carthage with this reply, which, of
course, produced great uneasiness and anxiety.
The Carthaginians were more and more de-
sirous now to do every thing in their power to
avert the threatened danger of Roman hostility.
They sent a new embassy to Rome, with stil!
more humble professions than before. The em
passy set sail from Carthage with very littl
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
275
Another embassy.
The Romans declare war.
hope, however, of accomplishing the object of
their mission. They were authorized, never-
theless, to make the most unlimited conces-
sions, and to submit to any conditions what-
ever to avert the calamity of another war.
But the Romans had been furnished with a
pretext for commencing hostilities again, and
there was a very strong party among them now
who were determined to avail themselves of this
opportunity to extinguish entirely the Cartha-
ginian power. War had, accordingly, been de-
clared by the Roman senate very soon after the
first embassy had returned, a fleet and army
had been raised and equipped, and the expedi-
tion had sailed. When, therefore, the embassy
arrived in Rome, they found that the war, which
it was the object of their mission to avert, had
been declared.
The Romans, however, gave them audience.
The embassadors expressed their willingness to
submit to any terms that the senate might pro-
pose for arresting the war. The senate replied
that they were willing to make a treaty with
the Carthaginians, on condition that the latter
were to surrender themselves entirely to the
Roman power, and bind themselves to obey such
orders as the consuls, on their arrival in Africa
276
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Negotiations for peace.
The Romans demand hostages.
with the army, should issue; the Romans, on
their part, guarantying that they should con-
tinue in the enjoyment of their liberty, of their
territorial possessions, and of their laws. As
proof, however, of the Carthaginian honesty of
purpose in making the treaty, and security for
their future submission, they were required to
give up to the Romans three hundred hostages.
These hostages were to be young persons from
the first families in Carthage, the sons of the
men who were most prominent in society there,
and whose influence might be supposed to con-
trol the action of the nation.
The embassadors could not but consider these
as very onerous terms. They did not know what
orders the consuls would give them on their ar-
rival in Africa, and they were required to put
the commonwealth wholly into their power.
Besides, in the guarantee which the Romans
offered them, their territories and their laws
were to be protected, but nothing was said of
their cities, their ships, or their arms and mu-
nitions of war. The agreement there, if execu-
ted, would put the Carthaginian commonwealth
wholly at the mercy of their masters, in respect
to all those things which were in those days
most valuable to a nation as elements of power.
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
277
Cruelty of the hostage system.
Return of the embassadors.
Still, the embassadors had been instructed to
make peace with the Romans on any terms, and
they accordingly acceded to these, though with
great reluctance. They were especially averse
to the agreement in respect to the hostages.
This system, which prevailed universally in
ancient times, of having the government of one
nation surrender the children of the most dis-
tinguished citizens to that of another, as secu-
rity for the fulfillment of its treaty stipulations,
was a very cruel hardship to those who had to
suffer the separation; but it would seem that
there was no other security strong enough to
hold such lawless powers as governments were
in those days, to their word. Stern and rough
as the men of those warlike nations often were,
mothers were the same then as now, and they
suffered quite as keenly in seeing their children
sent away from them, to pine in a foreign land,
in hopeless exile, for many years; in danger, too,
continually, of the most cruel treatment, and
even of death itself, to revenge some alleged
governmental wrong.
Of course, the embassadors knew, when they
returned to Carthage with these terms, that
they were bringing heavy tidings. The news,
in fact, when it came, threw the community
278
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Consternation in Carthage.
Its deplorable condition.
into the most extreme distress. It is said that
the whole city was filled with cries and lamen-
tations. The mothers, who felt that they were
about to be bereaved, beat their breasts, and
tore their hair, and manifested by every other
sign their extreme and unmitigated woe. They
begged and entreated their husbands and fathers
not to consent to such cruel and intolerable con-
ditions. They could not, and they would not
give up their children.
The husbands and the fathers, however, felt
compelled to resist all these entreaties. They
could not now undertake to resist the Roman
will. Their army had been well-nigh destroy-
ed in the battle with Masinissa; their city was
consequently defenseless, and the Roman fleet
had already reached its African port, and the
troops were landed. There was no possible
way, it appeared, of saving themselves and their
city from absolute destruction, but entire sub-
mission to the terms which their stern conquer-
ors had imposed upon them.
The hostages were required to be sent, with-
in thirty days, to the island of Sicily, to a port
on the western extremity of the island, called
Lilybæum. Lilybæum was the port in Sicily
nearest to Carthage, being perhaps at a distance
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
279
Selecting the hostages.
The hour of parting.
of a hundred miles across the waters of the
Mediterranean Sea. A Roman escort was to
be ready to receive them there and conduct
them to Rome. Although thirty days were al-
lowed to the Carthaginians to select and send
forward the hostages, they determined not to
avail themselves of this offered delay, but to
send the unhappy children forward at once, that
they might testify to the Roman senate, by this
their promptness, that they were very earnestly
desirous to propitiate their favor.
The children were accordingly designated,
one from each of the leading families in the
city, and three hundred in all. The reader
must imagine the heart-rending scenes of suf-
fering which must have desolated these three
hundred families and homes, when the stern
and inexorable edict came to each of them that
one loved member of the household must be se-
lected to go. And when, at last, the hour ar-
rived for their departure, and they assembled
upon the pier, the picture was one of intense
and unmingled suffering. The poor exiles stood
bewildered with terror and grief, about to part
with all that they ever held dear-their parents,
their brothers and sisters, and their native land
-to go they knew not whither, under the care
280
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
The parting scene.
Grief and despair.
of iron-hearted soldiers, who seemed to know
no feelings of tenderness or compassion for their
woes. Their disconsolate mothers wept and
groaned aloud, clasping the loved ones who
were about to be torn forever from them in their
arms, in a delirium of maternal affection and
irrepressible grief; their brothers and sisters,
and their youthful friends stood by, some almost
frantic with emotions which they did not at-
tempt to suppress, others mute and motionless
in their sorrow, shedding bitter tears of anguish,
or gazing wildly on the scene with looks of de-
spair; while the fathers, whose stern duty it
was to pass through this scene unmoved, walk-
ed to and fro restlessly, in deep but silent dis-
tress, spoke in broken and incoherent words to
one another, and finally aided, by a mixture of
persuasion and gentle force, in drawing the
children away from their mothers' arms, and
getting them on board the vessels which were
to convey them away. The vessels made sail,
and passed off slowly from the shore. The
mothers watched them till they could no longer
be seen, and then returned, disconsolate and
wretched, to their homes; and then the grief
and agitation of this parting scene was succeed-
ed by the anxious suspense which now pervad-
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
281
Advance of the Roman army.
Surrender of Utica
ed the whole city to learn what new dangers
and indignities they were to suffer from the ap-
proaching Roman army, which they knew must
now be well on its way.
The Roman army landed at Utica. Utica
was a large city to the north of Carthage, not
far from it, and upon the same bay. When
the people of Utica found that another serious
collision was to take place between Rome and
Carthage, they had foreseen what would prob-
ably be the end of the contest, and they had de-
cided that, in order to save themselves from the
ruin which was plainly impending over the sis-
ter city, they must abandon her to her fate, and
make common cause with Rome. They had,
accordingly, sent deputies to the Roman senate,
offering to surrender Utica to their power. The
Romans had accepted the submission, and had
made this city, in consequence, the port of de-
barkation for their army.
As soon as the news arrived at Carthage
that the Roman army had landed at Utica, the
people sent deputies to inquire what were the
orders of the consuls, for it will be recollected
they had bound themselves by the treaty to
obey the orders which the consuls were to bring.
They found, when they arrived there, that the
282
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Demands of the Romans.
The Carthaginians comply.
bay was covered with the Roman shipping.
There were fifty vessels of war, of three banks
of oars each, and a vast number of transports
besides. There was, too, in the camp upon the
shore, a force of eighty thousand foot soldiers
and four thousand horse, all armed and equipped
in the most perfect manner.
The deputies were convinced that this was a
force which it was in vain for their countrymen
to think of resisting. They asked, trembling,
for the consuls' orders. The consuls informed
them that the orders of the Roman senate were,
first, that the Carthaginians should furnish them
with a supply of corn for the subsistence of their
troops. The deputies went back to Carthage
with the demand.
The Carthaginians resolved to comply. They
were bound by their treaty and by the hostages
they had given, as well as intimidated by the
presence of the Roman force. They furnished
the corn.
The consuls, soon after this, made another
demand of the Carthaginians. It was, that they
should surrender to them all their vessels of
war. They were more unwilling to comply
with this requisition than with the other; but
they assented at last. They hoped that the de-
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
283
The Romans demand all the munitions of war. Their great number.
mands of their enemies would stop here, and
that, satisfied with having weakened them thus
far, they would go away and leave them; they
could then build new ships again when better
times should return.
But the Romans were not satisfied yet. They
sent a third order, that the Carthaginians should
deliver up all their arms, military stores, and
warlike machines of every kind, by sending them
into the Roman camp. The Carthaginians were
rendered almost desperate by this requisition.
Many were determined that they would not
submit to it, but would resist at all hazards.
Others despaired of all possibility of resisting
now, and gave up all as lost; while the three
hundred families from which the hostages had
gone, trembled for the safety of the captive
children, and urged compliance with the de-
mand. The advocates for submission finally
gained the day. The arms were collected, and
carried in an immensely long train of wagons
to the Roman camp. There were two hundred
thousand complete suits of armor, with darts
and javelins without number, and two thousand
military engines for hurling beams of wood and
stones. Thus Carthage was disarmed.
All these demands, however unreasonable
284
[B.C. 148.
HANNIBAL.
Brutal demands of the Romans.
Carthage to be destroyed.
and cruel as the Carthaginians deemed them,
were only preliminary to the great final determ-
ination, the announcement of which the con-
suls had reserved for the end. When the arms
had all been delivered, the consuls announced.
to their now defenseless victims that the Roman
senate had come to the determination that Car-
thage was to be destroyed. They gave orders,
accordingly, that the inhabitants should all leave
the city, which, as soon as it should be thus vacat-
ed, was to be burned. They might take with
them such property as they could carry; and
they were at liberty to build, in lieu of this their
fortified sea-port, an inland town, not less than
ten miles' distance from the sea, only it must
have no walls or fortifications of any kind. As
soon as the inhabitants were gone, Carthage,
the consuls said, was to be destroyed.
The announcement of this entirely unparal-
leled and intolerable requisition threw the whole
city into a phrensy of desperation. They could
not, and would not submit to this.
The en-
treaties and remonstrances of the friends of the
hostages were all silenced or overborne in the
burst of indignation and anger which arose from
the whole city. The gates were closed. The
pavements of the streets were torn up, and
B.C. 148.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
285
Desperation of the people.
Preparations for defense.
buildings demolished to obtain stones, which
were carried up upon the ramparts to serve in-
stead of weapons. The slaves were all liberat-
ed, and stationed on the walls to aid in the de-
fense. Every body that could work at a forge
was employed in fabricating swords, spear-
heads, pikes, and such other weapons as could
be formed with the greatest facility and dis-
patch. They used all the iron and brass that
could be obtained, and then melted down vases
and statues of the precious metals, and tipped
their spears with an inferior pointing of silver
and gold.
In the same manner, when the sup-
plies of flax and hempen twine for cordage for
their bows failed, the beautiful sisters and moth-
ers of the hostages cut off their long hair, and
twisted and braided it into cords to be used as
bow-strings for propelling the arrows which
their husbands and brothers made. In a word,
the wretched Carthaginians had been pushed
beyond the last limit of human endurance, and
had aroused themselves to a hopeless resistance
in a sort of phrensy of despair.
The reader will recollect that, after the bat-
tle with Masinissa, Hasdrubal lost all his influ-
ence in Carthage, and was, to all appearance,
hopelessly ruined. He had not, however, then
286
[B.C. 146
HANNIBAL.
Hasdrubal.
Destruction of the Roman fleet.
given up the struggle. He had contrived to as-
semble the remnant of his army in the neigh-
borhood of Carthage. His forces had been grad-
ually increasing during these transactions, as
those who were opposed to these concessions to
the Romans naturally gathered around him.
He was now in his camp, not far from the city,
at the head of twenty thousand men. Finding
themselves in so desperate an emergency, the
Carthaginians sent to him to come to their suc-
cor. He very gladly obeyed the summons. He
sent around to all the territories still subject to
Carthage, and gathered fresh troops, and col-
lected supplies of arms and of food. He ad-
vanced to the relief of the city. He compelled
the Romans, who were equally astonished at
the resistance they met with from within the
walls, and at this formidable onset from with-
out, to retire a little, and intrench themselves
in their camp, in order to secure their own safe-
ty. He sent supplies of food into the city. He
also contrived to fit up, secretly, a great many
fire-ships in the harbor, and, setting them in
flames, let them drift down upon the Roman
fleet, which was anchored in supposed security
in the bay. The plan was so skillfully man-
aged that the Roman ships were almost all de-
B.C. 146.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
287
Horrors of the siege.
Heroic valor of the Carthaginians.
stroyed. Thus the face of affairs was changed.
The Romans found themselves disappointed for
the present of their prey. They confined them-
selves to their encampment, and sent home to
the Roman senate for new re-enforcements and
supplies.
In a word, the Romans found that, instead
of having only to effect, unresisted, the simple
destruction of a city, they were involved in what
would, perhaps, prove a serious and a protract-
ed war.
The war did, in fact, continue for two
or three years-a horrible war, almost of exterm-
ination, on both sides. Scipio came with the
Roman army, at first as a subordinate officer;
but his bravery, his sagacity, and the success
of some of his almost romantic exploits, soon
made him an object of universal regard. At
one time, a detachment of the army, which he
succeeded in releasing from a situation of great
peril in which they had been placed, testified
their gratitude by platting a crown of grass, and
placing it upon his brow with great ceremony
and loud acclamations.
The Carthaginians did every thing in the
prosecution of this war that the most desperate
valor could do; but Scipio's cool, steady, and
well-calculated plans made irresistible progress,
288
[B.C. 145.
HANNIBAL.
Battering engines.
Attempt to destroy them.
and hemmed them in at last, within narrower
and narrower limits, by a steadily-increasing
pressure, from which they found it impossible
to break away.
Scipio had erected a sort of mole or pier upon
the water near the city, on which he had erect-
ed many large and powerful engines to assault
the walls. One night a large company of Car-
thaginians took torches, not lighted, in their
hands, together with some sort of apparatus for
striking fire, and partly by wading and partly
by swimming, they made their way through
the water of the harbor toward these machines.
When they were sufficiently near, they struck
their lights and set their torches on fire. The
Roman soldiers who had been stationed to guard
the machines were seized with terror at seeing
all these flashing fires burst out suddenly over
the surface of the water, and fled in dismay.
The Carthaginians set the abandoned engines
on fire, and then, throwing their now useless
torches into the flames, plunged into the water
again, and swam back in safety. But all this
desperate bravery did very little good. Scipio
quietly repaired the engines, and the siege went
on as before.
But we can not describe in detail all the par-
B.C. 145.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
289
The city stormed.
A desperate struggle.
ticulars of this protracted and terrible struggle.
We must pass on to the closing scene, which,
as related by the historians of the day, is an al-
most incredible series of horrors. After an im-
mense number had been killed in the assaults
which had been made upon the city, besides the
thousands and thousands which had died of fam
ine, and of the exposures and hardships incident
to such a siege, the army of Scipio succeeded
in breaking their way through the gates, and
gaining admission to the city. Some of the in-
habitants were now disposed to contend no long-
er, but to cast themselves at the mercy of the
conqueror. Others, furious in their despair, were
determined to fight to the last, not willing to
give up the pleasure of killing all they could of
their hated enemies, even to save their lives.
They fought, therefore, from street to street,
retreating gradually as the Romans advanced,
till they found refuge in the citadel. One band
of Scipio's soldiers mounted to the tops of the
houses, the roofs being flat, and fought their
way there, while another column advanced in
the same manner in the streets below. No im-
agination can conceive the uproar and din of
such an assault upon a populous city-a horrid
mingling of the vociferated commands of the
T
290
[B.C. 145.
HANNIBAL.
The people retreat to the citadel.
The city fired.
officers, and of the shouts of the advancing and
victorious assailants, with the screams of terror
from affrighted women and children, and dread-
ful groans and imprecations from men dying
maddened with unsatisfied revenge, and biting
the dust in an agony of pain.
The more determined of the combatants, with
Hasdrubal at their head, took possession of the
citadel, which was a quarter of the city situ-
ated upon an eminence, and strongly fortified.
Scipio advanced to the walls of this fortifica-
tion, and set that part of the city on fire which
lay nearest to it. The fire burned for six days,
and opened a large area, which afforded the Ro-
man troops room to act. When the troops were
brought up to the area thus left vacant by the
fire, and the people within the citadel saw that
their condition was hopeless, there arose, as
there always does in such cases, the desperate
struggle within the walls whether to persist in
resistance or to surrender in despair. There
was an immense mass, not far from sixty thou-
sand, half women and children, who were de-
termined on going out to surrender themselves
to Scipio's mercy, and beg for their lives. Has-
drubal's wife, leading her two children by her
side, earnestly entreated her husband to allow
B.C. 145.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
291
Hasdrubal's wife.
Hasdrubal surrenders.
There
her to go with them. But he refused.
was a body of deserters from the Roman camp
in the citadel, who, having no possible hope of
escaping destruction except by desperate re-
sistance to the last, Hasdrubal supposed would
never yield. He committed his wife and chil-
dren, therefore, to their charge, and these de-
serters, seeking refuge in a great temple with-
in the citadel, bore the frantic mother with them
to share their fate.
Hasdrubal's determination, however, to resist
the Romans to the last, soon after this gave
way, and he determined to surrender. He is
accused of the most atrocious treachery in at-
tempting thus to save himself, after excluding
his wife and children from all possibility of es-
caping destruction. But the confusion and din
of such a scene, the suddenness and violence
with which the events succeed each other, and
the tumultuous and uncontrollable mental agi-
tation to which they give rise, deprive a man
who is called to act in it of all sense and rea-
son, and exonerate him, almost as much, from
moral responsibility for what he does, as if he
were insane. At any rate, Hasdrubal, after
shutting up his wife and children with a furi-
ous gang of desperadoes who could not possibly
292
[B.C. 145.
HANNIBAL.
The citadel fired.
Resentment and despair of Hasdrubal's wife.
surrender, surrendered himself, perhaps hoping
that he might save them after all.
The Carthaginian soldiers, following Hasdru-
bal's example, opened the gates of the citadel,
and let the conqueror in. The deserters were
now made absolutely desperate by their danger,
and some of them, more furious than the rest,
preferring to die by their own hands rather than
to give their hated enemies the pleasure of kill-
ing them, set the building in which they were
shut up in on fire. The miserable inmates ran
to and fro, half suffocated by the smoke and
scorched by the flames. Many of them reached
the roof. Hasdrubal's wife and children were
among the number. She looked down from
this elevation, the volumes of smoke and flame
rolling up around her, and saw her husband
standing below with the Roman general-per-
haps looking, in consternation, for his wife and
children, amid this scene of horror. The sight
of the husband and father in a position of safe-
ty made the wife and mother perfectly furious
with resentment and anger. "Wretch !" she
screamed, in a voice which raised itself above
the universal din, "is it thus you seek to save
your own life while you sacrifice ours?
I can
not reach you in your own person, but I kill
B.C. 145.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
293
Carthage destroyed.
Its present condition.
you hereby in the persons of your children."
So saying, she stabbed her affrighted sons with
a dagger, and hurled them down, struggling all
the time against their insane mother's phren-
sy, into the nearest opening from which flames
were ascending, and then leaped in after them
herself to share their awful doom.
The Romans, when they had gained posses-
sion of the city, took most effectual measures
for its complete destruction. The inhabitants
were scattered into the surrounding country,
and the whole territory was converted into a
Roman province. Some attempts were after-
ward made to rebuild the city, and it was for a
long time a place of some resort, as men lin-
gered mournfully there in huts that they built
among the ruins. It, however, was gradually
forsaken, the stones crumbled and decayed, veg-
etation regained possession of the soil, and now
there is nothing whatever to mark the spot
where the city lay.
War and commerce are the two great antag-
onistic principles which struggle for the mas-
tery of the human race, the function of the one
being to preserve, and that of the other to de-
stroy. Commerce causes cities to be built and
294
[B.C. 145
HANNIBAL.
War and commerce.
Antagonistic principles.
fields to be cultivated, and diffuses comfort and
plenty, and all the blessings of industry and
peace. It carries organization and order every
where; it protects property and life; it disarms
pestilence, and it prohibits famine. War, on
the other hand, destroys. It disorganizes the
social state. It ruins cities, depopulates fields,
condemns men to idleness and want, and the
only remedy it knows for the evils which it
brings upon man is to shorten the miseries of
its victims by giving pestilence and famine the
most ample commission to destroy their lives.
Thus war is the great enemy, while commerce
is the great friend of humanity. They are an-
tagonistic principles, contending continually for
the mastery among all the organizations of men.
When Hannibal appeared upon the stage, he
found his country engaged peacefully and pros-
perously in exchanging the productions of the
various countries of the then known world, and
promoting every where the comfort and happi-
ness of mankind. He contrived to turn all these
energies into the new current of military ag-
gression, conquest, and war. He perfectly suc-
ceeded. We certainly have in his person and
history all the marks and characteristics of a
great military hero. He gained the most spl
B.C. 145.] CARTHAGE DESTROYED.
295
Hannibal's greatness as a military hero.
did victories, devastated many lands, embarrass-
ed and stopped the commercial intercourse which
was carrying the comforts of life to so many
thousand homes, and spread, instead of them,
every where, privation, want, and terror, with
pestilence and famine in their train. He kept
the country of his enemies in a state of inces-
sant anxiety, suffering, and alarm for many
years, and overwhelmed his own native land,
in the end, in absolute and irresistible ruin. In
a word, he was one of the greatest military he-
roes that the world has ever known.
THE END.
ABBOTT'S HISTORIES,
PUBLISHED BY
Barper & Brothers, Cliff Street, J. H.
*** The Volumes of the Series are printed and bound
uniformly, and are adorned with richly Illuminated Title-
pages, Maps, and numerous Engravings. 16mo, Muslin, 60
cents per Volume; Muslin, gilt edges, 75 cents per Volume.
Each Volume sold separately.
Josephine.
This series of historical narratives is scarcely inferior in interest to Sit
Walter Scott's "Tales of a Grandfather." Mr. Abbott has a remarkable
power of seizing on the most available features of the character which he
undertakes to delineate, and is never at a loss for forcible and felicitous
expression.-Courier and Enquirer.
The style of illustration might be advantageously adopted in histories de-
signed for old as well as young readers; the literary execution, also, is a
plain, clear narrative of facts, interspersed with reflections.-London Spect.
Madame
Roland.
This book ranks fairly with its predecessors in that beautiful series which
we have so often noticed and approved. The story of Madame Roland and
the French Revolution, as far as necessary to make her memoirs intelligi-
ble, is told with that graceful case and transparent perspicuity which mark
all these books of Mr. Abbott.-Richmond Watchman.
Maria Antoinette.
We have read each and all of them successively in the order of their is
sue with far more intorest than it is possible for us to feel in any work of
fiction; and there has been no series of books published in this country
that we would honor or more confidently place in the hands of the youth
ful reader than “Abbott's Historical Series.”—Mirror.
2 Abbott's Franconia Stories.
Beechnut.
The whole tendency of this series is in favor of a high tone of
morals, and these graceful and simple lessons of life can not fail
to be useful to those who read them.- Watchman and Observer
Mr. Abbott is doing very much for the instruction and health-
ful amusement of the young. The "Franconia Stories" are de
lightful reading for young people of both sexes.-Providence
Daily Journal.
Suited to the tastes and capacities of young people, and the
tendency of which is to call into action the nobler sympathies and
the best affections of the youthful heart.-Northern Budget.
Mary Erskine.
The author is so well known to the juvenile world that he
needs no introduction from us. His histories for children have
long been the delight of our little circle, and it welcomes his new
and beautiful story-books as it would the visit of an old friend.-
National Era.
Mr. Abbott's books have been, and doubtless always will be,
popular with all.-Worcester Palladium.
The fertility of invention manifested by the writer of this se-
ries of stories seems literally to have no limit.-N. Y. Observer.
Mary Bell.
No better or more acceptable present could be made from
parent to child than a set of the "Franconia Stories."-Buffalo
Courier.
A delightful series of stories.-American Spectator.
These little volumes belong to the series of good Jacob Abbott's
books, now in course of publication in handsome style by the Har-
pers. The aim of the author is to instruct and entertain youth,
by stories in which the moral sentiments are exercised and
strengthened.-Savannah Daily Morning News.
It is not often we meet with better told fictions.-ALFRED B.
STREET.
HARPER & BROTHERS, Publishers, New York.
ABBOTT'S HISTORIES.
3
Julius Cæsar.
The author seems gifted with that peculiar faculty, possessed by so few
of holding communion with and drawing out ardent imagination and bud
ding genius, and at the same time of directing both into the great channel
of truth. The labors of such a man are productive of incalculable good,
and deserve the highest reward.-New Hampshire Patriot.
Cyrus the Great.
The style is smooth, easy, and attractive, and the whole preparation of
the work is such as will secure a large popularity for the series. The
great condensation of facts, and the picturesqueness of the style will com-
mend these books to the young. The illuminated title-pages are very
beautiful.-Southern Methodist Pulpit.
Xerxes the Great.
Our admiration for the manner in which Mr. Abbott executes his task
is increased by each addition to the series. We are glad to learn that no
works of the kind have ever been more highly appreciated, as evinced by
the extent of the sales.-American Whig Review.
They possess more than the interest of fiction, and yet are replete with
solid information. The youth that becomes interested in these glowing
pictures will find a growing taste for historical reading generally.-Chris-
tian Parlor Magazine.
Alfred the Great.
History, under the pen of Mr. Abbott, discloses its narratives and uttera
its lessons in a style of great simplicity and intelligence, and, above all,
with no danger of detriment to morals. He has selected his field with
excellent taste. In their line, these volumes have never been surpassed
· Baptist Recorder.
Mary Queen of Scots.
Charming compendiums of history.
We know of few books we are
more ready to commend to the public than Mr. Abbott's.
tle place which has heretofore been empty.-Two Worlds.
They fill a lit
4
ABBOTT'S HISTORIES.
William the Conqueror.
These historical works by Mr. Abbott have so much merit for the inter
esting style in which they are written, and the beauty of their mechan-
ical execution, that we place them at the head of the more unpretending
histories. We know of no works extant calculated to produce a more sal-
utary effect upon the young reader of history; certainly none where lead-
ing historical incidents are communicated in a more fascinating manner.—
Buffalo Courier.
Queen Elizabeth.
Full of instructive and heart-stirring incident, displayed by the hand of
a master. We doubt whether old Queen Bess ever before had so much jus-
tice done to her within the same compass. Such a pen as Jacob Abbott
wields, especially in this department of our litorature, has no right to lie
still. Albany Express.
They are admirable works for youth, and make a valuable fund of reading
for the fireside and for schools.-Evangelist.
Charles the First.
We incline to think that there never was before so much said about this
unfortunate monarch in so short a space; so much to the purpose; with
so much impartiality; and in such a style as just suits those for whom it
is designed-the "two millions" of young persons in the United States,
who ought to be supplied with such works as these. The engravings rep-
resent the prominent persons and places of the history, and are well exe-
cuted. The portrait of John IIampden is charming. The antique title-
page is rich.-Southern Christian Advocate.
Charles the Second.
A valuable engraving of Lely's portrait of Cromwell opens the book, and
there are several illustrative wood-engravings and an illuminated title-page.
This is a comprehensive and simple narration of the main features of the
period during which Charles the Second reigned, and it is done with the
clear scope and finely-written style which would be expected from the pen
of Jacob Abbott-one of the most able and useful literary men of his time
--Home Journal.
Abbott's Franconia Stories.
Franconia Stories:
BY THE
Author of the "Kollo Books."
Complete in Five Volumes, 16mo, elegantly bound in
Muslin, with engraved Title-pages and numerous Illustra-
tions, price Fifty Cents per Volume. Each Volume sold
separately.
Malleville.
Pleasing pictures of still life in the country, which the young
will gladly read, and gather much useful knowledge, while they
find pleasure in the story.-Presbyterian.
The pleasing simplicity of style in which these volumes are
written the amusing anecdotes related-and the little sketches
of scenery so naturally introduced, can not fail to secure for them
the warm appreciation of that class of readers for which they are
prepared.-Toronto Globe.
Wallace.
Delightful stories for children.-Albany State Register.
If any of our readers are troubled with noisy urchins, who dis-
turb their evening's comfort, they may find an effective opiate in
these attractive volumes. We hope the experiment may be fairly
tested-Christian Chronicle.
An admirable series of tales for children.-New Orleans Bee.
The most attractive tales for children which have been issued
from the press for years.-Cincinnati Gazelle.
2
ABBOTT'S HISTORIES.
Cleopatra.
Another of the crimson-garbed works of the historic series that have
proved themselves so popular, not only with the young, but all classes of
readers. *** The details are given with clearness and simple beauty; the
style suitable to the comprehension of the child, as being interesting to the
adult.-ALFRED B. STREET.
Bannibal.
A new volume of the series projected by the skillful book-manufacturer,
Mr. Abbott, who displays no little tact in engaging the attention of that
marvelous body, "the reading public," in old scholastic topics hitherto al-
most exclusively the property of the learned. The latter, with their ingen-
ious implements of lexicons and scholia, will be in no danger of being su-
perseded, however, while the least-furnished reader may gain something
from the attractively-printed and easily-perused volumes of Mr. Abbott.
The story of Hannibal is well adapted for popular treatment, and loses noth-
ing for this purpose in the present explanatory and pictorial version.-Lit-
erary World.
Alexander the Great.
The history of Alexander the Great, as penned by Jacob Abbott, will be
read with thrilling interest. It is profusely embellished, containing maps
of the Expedition of Alexander, of Macedon and Greece, the plain of Troy,
the Granicus, and the plain of Issus; and engravings of Alexander and
Bucephalus; Paris and Helen; the bathing in the River Cyndus; the siege
of Tyre; Alexander at the siege of Susa; and the proposed improvement of
Mount Athos. It is written in a graphic and attractive style.-Spectator.
Darius the Great.
Mr. Abbott's design to write a succession of histories for the young is
admirable, and worthy of all encouragement, and the manner in which he
has executed the work thus far is most excellent. Let him be encour-
aged to proceed till he has reached the last volume of history, that the
coming generation may turn from the world of romance to that of reality,
and learn that what is and has been is as brilliant in character, as glorious
in description, and as captivating in detail, as that which the genius of
fiction ever created.-New York Observer.
❤
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the Conqueror, Queen Elizabeth, Mary Queen of Scots,
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of living at the outset.-Churchman.
This is decidedly a book for the million: it contains all that precise kind of
information adapted to the use of families, and which one may seek a long
ime for in vain elsewhere.-New-York Evening Gazette.
A complete library for every household: a work which every husband should
puy for his wife, and every father for his daughter.-N. Y. Com. Advertiser.
V.
ANTHON'S GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES.
A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, from the
best Authorities, and imbodying all the recent Discoveries of
the most eminent German Philologists and Jurists. Edited by
William Smith, Ph.D. Illustrated by a large number of En-
gravings. First American Edition, corrected and enlarged,
and containing also numerous Articles relative to the Botany,
Mineralogy, and Zoology of the Ancients. By Charles Anthon,
LL.D. 8vo. Sheep. $4 75.
VI
ANTHON'S CLASSICAL DICTIONARY.
A Classical Dictionary, containing an Account of the princi-
pal Proper Names mentioned in Ancient Authors, and intended
to elucidate all the important Points connected with the Geog-
raphy, History, Biography, Mythology, and Fine Arts of the
Greeks and Romans, together with an Account of the Coins,
Weights, and Measures of the Ancients, with Tabular Values
of the same. By Charles Anthon, LL.D. Royal 8vo. Sheep.
$4 75.
The distinguished reputation of the editor is a sufficient voucher for the
excellence of these productions, independently of the original claims of the
works themselves, which rank among the first of acknowledged authorities in
the British schools of learning.—Commercial Advertiser.
PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS.
3
VII.
COPLAND'S DICTIONARY OF PRACTICAL MEDICINE.
A Dictionary of Practical Medicine; comprising a General
Pathology, the Nature and Treatment of Diseases, Morbid
Structures, &c. By James Copland, M.D., F.R.S. Edited,
with Additions, by Charles A. Lee, M.D. Now publishing in
Parts, price 50 cents each. About 25 Parts to complete the
Work, 12 of which are now published.
Dr. Copland's fame is so well established, that it would be a work of super-
erogation to expatiate on the merit of anything written or compiled by him.
The great recommendation of this dictionary is its terseness and precision.
His references to the sources whence he derives the information he conveys
are admirably placed, giving the essence of the knowledge necessary to be
communicated in order to a right understanding of the subject which is treated,
without entering into the diffuseness of the original text.-N. Orleans Bulletin.
Dr. Copland has here published a series of essays which may be justly said
to be unrivalled for extent and accuracy of information, methodic arrangement,
and the condensed form in which they are composed. If he proceeds as he
has commenced, he will produce a work which is yet unrivalled in the Eng-
lish language.-Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal.
VIII.
COOPER'S SURGICAL DICTIONARY.
A Dictionary of Practical Surgery; comprehending all the
most interesting Improvements; an Account of the Instru-
ments and Remedies employed in Surgery, the Etymology and
Signification of the principal Terms, &c. By Samuel Cooper,
M.D. With numerous Notes and Additions, derived from the
Practice of American Surgeons, together with a Supplementary
Index, in which the Science of Surgery is brought down to the
1 vol. 8vo.
present Period. By David M. Reese, A.M., M.D.
Sheep extra.
$3 871.
IX.
HOOPER'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY.
Lexicon Medicum; or, Medical Dictionary. Containing an
Explanation of the Terms in the various Branches of Science
connected with Medicine. With Additions from American
Authors. By Samuel Akerly, M.D. Sheep extra. $3.00.
X.
THIRLWALL'S HISTORY OF GREECE.
A History of Greece. By the Rt. Rev. Connop Thirlwall,
Bishop of St. David's. 2 vols. 8vo. Muslin gilt. $3 50.
Although the author's fancy is everywhere subject to his correct historical
taste, the student will not fail to detect traces of that scholar-like delight in
the graceful and lovely fictions of antiquity, which is so peculiarly attractive
to minds of congenial temper. It animates the reader through the toilsome
intricacy of some parts of his progress, like a brook by the wayside, which,
though it only sparkles occasionally in the traveller's eye, yet enlivens him by
the sense of its constant companionship.-Edinburgh Review.
4
VALUABLE STANDARD PRODUCTIONS
XI.
ROLLIN'S ANCIENT HISTORY.
The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyr
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nians; including the History of the Arts and Sciences of the
Ancients. By Charles Rollin. With a Life of the Author, by
James Bell. Only complete American Edition. 8vo. Maps
and Engravings. Sheep extra. Bound in 1 vol., $3 50; 2
vols., $3 75.
From the useful moral reflections which Rollin's works contain, and the
constant regard which he pays to the great interests of religion and morality,
they have obtained a high degree of popularity.-Edinburgh Encyclopædia.
XII.
PRESCOTT'S CONQUEST OF MEXICO.
The History of the Conquest of Mexico, with a preliminary
View of Ancient Mexican Civilization. By William H. Pres-
cott, Esq. 3 vols. 8vo. Muslin gilt. $6.00.
There is no exaggeration in stating that the "Conquest of Mexico" contains
most of the valuable qualities which distinguish the most popular historical
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XIII.
PRESCOTT'S FERDINAND AND ISABELLA.
History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Catholic.
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XIV
PRESCOTT'S BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL MISCELLANIES.
Biographical and Critical Miscellanies. By William H.
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Walter Scott-Chateaubriand's English Literature - Ban-
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:
XV.
TYTLER'S UNIVERSAL HISTORY.
Universal History, from the Creation of the World to the
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Tytler and Rev. Edward Nares, D.D. 6 vols. 18mo. $2 70.
XVI.
RUSSELL'S HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE.
History of Modern Europe: with a View of the Progress of
Society, from the Rise of the Modern Kingdoms to the Peace
of Paris in 1763. By William Russell, LL.D. With a Contin-
uation of the History by William Jones, Esq. 3 vols. 8vo.
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XVII.
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Thomas Keightley. Edited by an American. 5 vols. 18mo.
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XVIII.
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markable public favour, as they are the guarantees for its permanent popular-
ity. Blackwood.
The most elegantly written and powerfully dramatic history ever produced;
for the intensity of its interest it is unsurpassed.-Democratic Review.
XIX.
MILMAN'S EDITION OF GIBBON'S ROME.
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. By
Edward Gibbon. New Edition, with Notes, by Rev. H. H.
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If this work be not always history, it is often something more than history,
and above it; it is philosophy, it is theology, it is wit and eloquence, it is crit-
icism the most masterly on every subject with which literature can be con
nected.-Professor Smyth.
XX.
ROBERTSON'S HISTORICAL WORKS.
The Historical Works of William Robertson, D.D. 3
8vo. Maps and Engravings. Sheep. $5 00.
"The talents of Dr. Robertson as an historian were for some time reckoned
superior to those of any rival author; his Charles V. unites the requisites of
good writing in the greatest degree
""
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XXI.
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XXII.
HALLAM'S CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND,
The Constitutional History of England, from the Accession
of Henry VII. to the Death of George II. By Henry Hallam.
1 vol. 8vo. [In press.]
XXIII.
HALLAM'S LITERARY HISTORY,
Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the 15th, 16th,
and 17th Centuries. By H. Hallam. 2 vols. 8vo. Shp. $375.
To all lovers of literature this work will be acceptable; to the young, we
conceive, invaluable.-Quarterly Review.
The most important contribution to literary history which English libraries
have received for many years. Mr. Hallam has great industry and acuteness;
his knowledge is extensive, various, and profound; his mind is equally distin-
guished by the amplitude of its grasp, and by the delicacy of its tact.-Edin-
burgh Review.
XXIV.
PLUTARCH'S LIVES OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.
Lives of Ancient Philosophers. By Plutarch. Translated
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By John Langhorne, M.D., and William Langhorne, A.M. 8vo.
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XXV.
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English Synonymes, with copious Illustrations and Expla-
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We find in this work a patient examination of words in all their bearings,
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XXVI.
UPHAM'S MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.
Elements of Mental Philosophy: embracing the two Depart-
ments of the Intellect and the Sensibilities. By Prof. T. C.
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$2 50.
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PUBLISHED BY HARPER & BROTHERS.
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XXVII.
ALISON ON THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF TASTE.
By Ar-
An Essay on the Nature and Principles of Taste.
chibald Alison, LL.B., F.R.S. With Notes and Emendations.
By Abraham Mills, Esq. 12mo. Muslin. 75 cents.
XXVIII.
BURKE ON THE SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL.
A Philosophical Inquiry into our Ideas of the Sublime and
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XXIX.
BURKE'S WORKS.
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It argues something in proof of a wide-spreading taste for elegant literature,
and a strong desire for political knowledge of the highest order, when a series
of voluminous works-in form and fashion addressed to another age, whose
spirit was very different from ours, and appealing in tone and composition to
cultivated tastes and intellects raised above the general-can be published for
the people with a prospect of popular success.-Spectator.
XXX.
DRAPER ON THE ORGANIZATION OF PLANTS.
A Treatise on the Forces which produce the Organization
of Plants. With an Appendix, containing several Memoirs on
Capillary Attraction, Electricity, and the Chemical Action of
Light. By John William Draper, M.D. Muslin gilt. 4to.
Engravings. $250.
XXXI.
HANNAH MORE'S WORKS.
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XXXII.
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entire.
Including "The Spectator"
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XXXIII.
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The Works of
XXXIV.
LAMB'S WORKS.
Charles Lamb. With his Letters, and a
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XXXV.
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XXXVI.
CAMPBELL'S RHETORIC.
The Philosophy of Rhetoric.
By George Campbell, D.D.,
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XXXVII.
HARPER'S FAMILY LIBRARY.
The Family Library. Now comprising 173 vols. 18mo.
Abundantly illustrated by Maps, Portraits, and Engravings.
Bound uniformly, but each work sold separately. $77 05 per
set.
A title which, from the valuable and entertaining matter the collection con-
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family, indeed, in which there are children to be brought up, ought to be
without this library, as it furnishes the readiest resources for that education
which ought to accompany or succeed that of the boarding-school or the acad-
emy, and is infinitely more conducive than either to the cultivation of the in
tellect. Monthly Review.
We recommend the whole set of the Family Library as one of the cheapest
means of affording pleasing instruction, and imparting a proper pride in books
with which we are acquainted.- United States Gazette.

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