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Wollaston, William
THE
RELIGION
OF
NATURE
DELINEATED.
Ἔνιοι φεύγοντες τὴν Δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπίπλεσιν εἰς ᾿Αθεότητα
τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπεδήσαντες ἘΝ ΜΕΣΩ
κειμένην τω Ευσέβειαν. Plutarch.
i
Χαίρειν ἦν ἐάσας τὰς Τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων,
τω ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΝ σκοπῶν, πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἄν δύνωμαι βέλο
τιτος ὢν καὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐπιδὰν ἀποθνήσκω, ἀποθνήσκειν. Plato,
The SIXTH EDITΙ Ο Ν.
To which is added a PREFACE, containing a General
Account of the Life, Character, and Writings of the AUTHOR.
LONDON:
Printed for JOHN and PAUL ΚΝΑΡΤΟΝ, at the Creten in
Ludgate-Street. MDCCXXXVIII,
English
C./- 2.4-31
Sanders
10-3-30
22646
A
PREFACE
CONTAINING
A General Account of the Life, Character,
and Writings of the AUTHO R.
P
ERHAPS the Perufal of the following Sheets may ex-
cite the Curiofity of the Reader to wiſh for fome Gene-
ral Account concerning the AUTHOR of them: And it
is not improbable that He may defire to know, in par-
ticular, Whether the Perſon who compofed them was
a mere Speculative Admirer of VIRTUE; or whether
He was HIMSELF an Example of that MORALITY which He has fo
ſtrongly recommended to the Practice of OTHERS. If fuch a Curioſity
ſhall happen to be raiſed in any One who was quite a Stranger to THIS
GENTLEMAN'S Life and Character, This SLIGHT SKETCH of Both
may chance in fome Meaſure to gratify it.
A 2
Mr. WILLIAM
iv
A PREFACE
Mr. WILLIAM WOLLASTON, the Author of the RELIGION OF
NATURE DELINEATED, was deſcended from a Family which ap-
pears to have been ancient and confidérable in the County of Stafford.
It was, long fince, divided into Two Branches: The former of which
continued ſeated in Staffordshire; But the latter was in proceſs of Time
tranſplanted into other Counties. The Head of the Second Branch
flouriſhed formerly at Oncot in the County of Stafford; but, of late Years,
at Shenton in the County of Leicefler: and was poffeffed of a very con-
fiderable Eftate in thoſe and other Counties. From this Second Branch
was our Author defcended: And from a younger Brother of the fame.
Branch fprung Sir JOHN WOLLASTON, Lord Mayor of London, well
known in that City at the Time of the late Civil War.
Mr. WOLLASTON was born upon the 26th of March 1659. at Coton-
Clanford in Staffordshire. When He was in the 10th Year of his Age,
a Latin School was opened at Shenfton in Staffordshire, where his Fa-·
ther, a private Gentleman, of a ſmall Fortune, then refided: And
Mr. WOLLASTON was immediately fent to the Mafter of it for fuch
Inftruction as He was capable to give Him; and continued near two
Years under his Care. Afterwards He was fent to Litchfield School:
in which a great Confufion foon after happened, and the Magiftrates
of the City turned the Mafter out of the School-Houfe. Many Scho-
lars followed the Ejected Mafter: And Mr. WOLLASTON amongſt
the Reft. He remained with Him till He quitted his School, which was
about three Years: And then, the Schifm being ended, He returned into
the Free-School, and continued there about a Year. This was All the
Schooling Mr. WOLLASTON ever had: And this Time was paffed, not
without Uneafinefs. For, though He was always a great Lover of his
Book, and defirous of Improvement, Yet the Rudeness of a Great School
was particularly diſagreeable to his Nature; and, what was ſtill worſe,
He began to be much infefted with the Head-Ach, which feems to have
been conftitutional in Him.
Upon the 18th of June 1674. He was admitted a Penfioner in Sidney
College in Cambridge; being then fo much upwards of 15 Years of Age
as from the 26th of the preceding March. But here He laboured under
various Difadvantages: to which a Perfon fo circumftanced as He then
3
was,
A PREFACE.
V
ونم
was, could not but be fubject. He had no Acquaintance in the College,
nor even in the Univerſity (to which He was come a Country Lad from
a Country School ;) few Books or Materials to work with; no Affiftance
or Direction from any Body; nor fufficient Confidence to fupply that De-
fect by inquiring from Others. Add to this, That his State of Health was
not quite firm: And that his Allowance was by no Means more than fuf-
ficient for bare Neceffaries; his then Situation being that of a Second Son
of a Third Son of a Second Son of a Second Son. (Tho' indeed, notwith-
ſtanding this Series of younger Brothers, his Grandfather, who ſtands in
the middle of it, had had a confiderable Eftate both Real and Perfonal,
together with an Office of 700 l. per Annum.) However, under All
theſe Diſadvantages, Mr. WOLLASTON acquired a great Degree of RE-
PUTATION in the Univerſity: perhaps too much; For had it been leſs,
it might have eſcaped the Tax of Envy, which probably was the Cauſe
of His miffing a Preferment in the College, which a Young Man of his
Character had Reafon to expect.
Upon the 29th of September 1681 He left the Univerſity: being then
Twenty two Years and an Half Old. He had commenced Master of
Arts the Summer before: And it ſeems to have been about this Time,
that He took Deacon's Orders.
From Cambridge He went to pay his Duty to his Father and Mother,
who now lived at Great Bloxwyche: having firſt made a Three Weeks Viſit
to the then Head of this Branch of the Family, his Coufin WOLLASTON
of Shenton. And He remained at Bloxwyche, with his Father and Mo-
ther (whom He had not feen for many Years before) till May or June
1682. About which Time, feeing no Profpect of Preferment, He fo
far conformed Himſelf to the Circumftances of his Fortune as to become
Affiftant to the Head-Mafter of Birmingham School: Who readily em-
braced the Opportunity of fuch a Co-Adjutor, and confider'd Mr. WOL-
LASTON as one that prudentially ſtooped to an Employment below what
He might have reaſonably pretended to. And his Coufin of Shenton was
far from being diſpleaſed at this Inſtance of his Relation's humble Induſtry.
In a ſhort Time He got a ſmall Lectorſhip at a Chappel about two
Miles diftant. But He did the Duty of the Whole Sunday: Which, to-
gether
AT
vi
A PREFACE.
gether with the Bufinefs of a Great Free-School, for about four Years
began to break his Conſtitution; and, if continued, had probably over-
come it quite, though the Stamina of it were naturally very ſtrong.
During this Space He likewife fuffered many Anxieties and underwent
a Deal of Trouble and Uneafinefs, in order to extricate Two of his Bro-
thers from fome Inconveniencies to which their own Imprudencies had
ſubjected them. And in the good Offices which He did them at this
Time, He ſeems to have rather over-acted his Part: For He indulged
his Affection for them more than was confiftent with a due Regard to
his own Welfare, as He was then circumftanced.
When He had been about four Years at Birmingham, He was choſen
Second Maſter of the School: In which there were three Maſters, two
Affiſtants, and a Writing-Mafter. It was pretended that He was too
Young to be Head-Maſter of fo great a School: But in Reality, the Old
Maſter was turned out in order to make way for a particular Perfon to
fucceed Him. In this Matter fome of the Governors themſelves owned
that Mr. WOLLASTON had Wrong done Him. He kept this new Sta-
tion about two Years. It was worth to Him about 70 l. per Annum.
Upon this Occafion He took Prieft's Orders: For the Words of the Char-
ter were interpreted to require that the Maſters ſhould be in Thofe Or-
ders, and yet muft take no Ecclefiaftical Preferment.
The late Chief Maſter, a valuable and good Old Man, and for whom
Mr. WOLLASTON of Shenton had an Eſteem, retired after his Expulfion
to his Brother's Houfe in the Neighbourhood of Shenton. He once or
twice waited upon Mr. WOLLASTON of Shenton: And undoubtedly in-
formed Him of the Character, Learning, Converfation and Conduct of
our AUTHOR; which He was very capable of doing, becauſe they had
lived together till the Time of the Old Gentleman's leaving Birmingham.
Mr. WOLLASTON of Shenton having now lately loft his only Son, and
never intending (as appears from his whole Conduct) to give his Eſtate to
his Daughters, purſued his Father's Deſign of continuing it in the MALE
Line, and refolved to fettle it upon our Author's Uncle and Father (his
own firſt Cousins and his neareſt Male Relations) in the fame Proportions
and Manner exactly in which it had been intailed formerly upon them by
his
2
A PREFACE.
vii
his Father. And accordingly He made fuch a Settlement: fubject how-
ever to a Revocation.
Mr. WOLLASTON all this While applied Himſelf to his Buſineſs: and
never ſo much as waited upon his Coufin, or employed any one to ſpeak
fo
or act any thing in his Behalf; (tho' many then blamed Him for not do-
ing fo.) Only One Vifit He made Him, in the November before his
Death: left a Total Abfence ſhould be taken for Ingratitude. He went
upon a Saturday in the Afternoon; gave Him a Sermon the next Day;
received his Hearty Thanks; and the next Morning told Him that He
came only to pay thofe Refpects which were due from Him, and to thank
Him for all his Favors; and having done that, defired Leave to return
to the Duties of his Station: But not one Syllable did He ſpeak, or even
infinuate, in relation to his ESTATE. His Coufin difmiffed Him with
great Kindneſs: And by his Looks and Manner ſeemed to have a PAR-
TICULAR REGARD for him, but difcovered nothing of his Intention
by Words.
Mr. WOLLASTON of Shenton was uſed to employ Perfons privately,
to obſerve our Author's Behaviour: (who little fufpected any
fuch Mat-
ter.) And his Behaviour was found to be fuch, that the ſtricter the Ob-
fervations were upon it, the more they turned to his Advantage. In
Fine, Mr. WOLLASTON of Shenton became ſo thoroughly ſatisfied of our
Author's Merit, that He revoked the before mentioned Settlement, and
made a WILL in his Favor.
In August following Mr. WOLLASTON of Shenton fell fick and fent
Secretly to our Author to come over to Him as of his own Accord with-
out any
Notice of his Illneſs. He complied with the Meffage: and ſtaid
fome Days at Shenton. But whilft He was gone Home again, under a
Promiſe of returning, his Coufin died.
It was the 19th of August 1688. when this Gentleman died. His
WILL gave a new and a great Turn to Mr. WOLLASTON'S Affairs: who
found Himſelf intitled by it to a very ample Eſtate.
The Circumstances relating to the Means whereby Mr. WOLLASTON
came to the Poffeffion of his Eftate, and the Steps which led to it, have
been
vin
A PREFACE.
been the more minutely particularized here; Becauſe COMMON FAME
has fomehow caught up and forwarded a groundless Imagination, That
our Author was AN ABSOLUTE STRANGER to the former Poffeffor
and his Family, and happened to fall into his Company by MERE Ac-:
CIDENT at an Inn. Which is fo far from being true or even bearing
any Refemblance to Truth, That they were very near Relations, and this
very Estate had been twice entailed upon Mr. WOLLASTON'S Uncle
and Father.
Such a Sudden and Advantageous Alteration of Affairs would have intox-
icated Many a One. But the fame FIRMNESS OF MIND which fupport-
ed this Gentleman under the Preffures of his more Adverfe Fortune enabled
Him to bear his Profperity with Moderation: And his RELIGION and PHI-
LOSOPHY taught Him to maintain a due Equanimity under either EXTREME.
In November 1688 He came to London: And about a Twelve-month
after, upon the 26th of November 1689, He married Mrs. CATHARINE
CHARLTON, Daughter of Mr. NICHOLAS CHARLTON, an eminent
Citizen of London, a fine Woman, with a good Fortune and a moſt ex-
cellent Character. They lived extremely happy in each other, till her
Death left Him a mournful Widower upon the 21st of July 1720. By
Her He had eleven Children; Of whom four died in his Life-time; the
reft furvived Him,
He may most truly be faid to have fettled in London: For He very
feldom went out of it. He took no Delight in unneceffary Journies;
And for above Thirty Years before his Death had not been abſent from his
Habitation in Charter-House Square, fo much as ONE whole Night.
In this his Settlement in London He chofe a Private and Retired
Life. His Carriage was nevertheleſs Free and Open. He acted like one
that aimed at folid and real CONTENT, rather than SHEW and GRAN-
DEUR: and manifeſted his Diſlike of POWER and DIGNITY, by refufing
one of the highest Preferments in the Church when it was offered to
Him. He endeavoured to excell in SINCERITY and USEFULL SENSE,
more than in FORMALITIES and TRIFLES,
He had now Books and Leifure: And it was no fmall Ufe He made
of them. He was perfectly acquainted with the Elementary Parts of
Learning:
A PREFACE.
ix
Learning: And with the learned Languages; Latin, Greek, Hebrew,
Arabic, &c. He thought it neceffary to add to Thefe fuch a Degree
of Philology and Criticism as ſeemed likely to be Uſeful to Him; Mathe-
matical Sciences, or at leaſt the Fundamentals of them, The General Phi-
lofophy of Nature, The Hiftory and Antiquities of the more known and
noted States and Kingdoms; and fuch like ERUDITION. And in order
to attain the Knowledge of TRUE RELIGION and the DISCOVERY OF
TRUTH, (the Points which He always had particularly in View, and to
which He chiefly directed all his Studies,) He diligently inquired into the
Idolatries of the HEATHENS: And made Himſelf MASTER of the Sen-
timents, Rites, and Learning of the Jews; the HISTORY of the first
Settlement of CHRISTIANITY, and the Opinions and Practices introdu❤
ced into it fince. In the mean time He exerciſed and improved his Mind
by throwing off PREJUDICES; ufing Himself to clear IMAGES; obferv
ing the Influence and Extent of AxIOMS, the Nature and Force of Con-
SEQUENCES, and the Method of inveſtigating TRUTH. In General,
He accuſtomed Himſelf to THINK MUCH.
}
By this Method indeed He was rather qualified for private Inftruction,
than accompliſhed for public CONVERSATION and SHEW. But the latter
was not his Point. He looked upon that Specious Sort of KNOWLEDGE
which often gains a Man the Reputation of a SCHOLAR at a very cheap
Rate, to be a FALSE LEARNING and of no kind of Service to HIM
who was in Queſt of REAL KNOWLEDGE.
He was of Opinion too That a man might eafily read too much:
And he confidered the HELLUO LIBRORUM and the TRUE SCHOLAR
as two very different. Characters.
*
£
The Love of TRUTH AND REASON made Him love FREE
THINKING:,and, as far as the World would bear it, FREE SPEAKING
too. This tended, He thought, to the Discovery of ERROR. Tho'
He was not infenfible that This might render Him leſs acceptable to
many Perfons: To thofe who perhaps have only juft fenfe enough
to perceive their own Weakness or judge of Things by the Vogue
they bear, or the Refpect they have to their own Intereft or Par-
ty; or can neither bear the Trouble of an honeſt Inquiry themfelves,
B
nor
X
.
A PREFACE*
nor yet that another ſhould know what they do not know; and, in fhort,
to every Prejudiced Perfon whatſoever. But He took all Opportunities
to affert feriously and inculcate ftrenuously the BEING AND PERFECTI-
ONS of GOD; his PROVIDENCE, both General and Particular; the OB-
LIGATIONS we are under to adore HIM; the REASONABLENESS of all
VIRTUE; the IMMATERIALITY and IMMORTALITY of the SOUL
FUTURE REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS; and other High and effen-
tial Points of NATURAL RELIGION and the CHRISTIAN REVELATI-
In Fine, To reafon impartially, and to know where to ftop, was the
Mark He always aimed at.
ON.
And He loved TRUTH, not in Speculation only, but also in Practice:
For he loved PUNCTUAL HONESTY.
He likewife delighted in METHOD and REGULARITY: And chofe
to have his Labours and Refreshments Periodical; and that his Family
and Friends ſhould obferve the proper Seafons of their Revolutions. The
Reverſe of this being the prevailing Temper, or at leaft Practice of Man-
kind, oftentimes either deprived Him of Converfation or rendered it dif
agreeable to Him.
The GENERAL CHARACTER of his NATURE was, That it was
TENDER AND SENSIBLE. This TENDERNESS difpofed Him to feel
and Compaffionate the Miferies of others: Infomuch that He many times
fuffered more perhaps in another man's Cafe than the man did in his
own. This TENDERNESS induced Him always to endeavour to ſa-
tisfie and convince in Cafes where He might have commanded moſt def-
potically and abfolutely. Tho' it is not improbable that in this He was
frequently miſunderſtood as if He meant to chide, when He only intend-
ed to explain and convince. To this TENDERNESS may alſo be afcribed
that exceffive Modefty and Diffidence of Himfelf, which made Him de-
light in Privacy and Retirement; and incapacitated Him in a great
Meaſure from appearing in Public at all like what He really was;
and even occafioned Him ſometimes to feem inferior to thoſe who
exceeded Him in nothing but FORWARDNESS AND CONCEIT. Some-
thing of this might indeed be owing to the Depreffion of his Spirits
in
A PREFACE
xi
in his younger Days. From the fame Caufes might arife his ftrong Ap-
prehenfion of the UNREASONABLENESS AND INJUSTICE of thofe who
were defignedly the Beginners of Quarrels or Abuſes, or invaded without
Provocation Another's Good Name. The fame TENDERNESS rendered
Him in a high Manner fenfible of the Defertion, Unkindneſs or Indiffer-
ence of FRIENDS.
He never indulged his PASSIONS to the Hurt of any One. If in any
reſpect He ſhewed that He was not fo compleat a Sroic as to have era-
dicated his PASSIONS, or fo perfect a PHILOSOPHER as never to be fur-
prized by them, it was in the Eſcape of an hafty Word or Expreffion now
and then, when He was put off of his Guard by Hurries, Indifpofitions,
or fuch like Occafions. Yet He was not always angry, when the Ur-
gency of Business, the Straitnefs of Time, the Importunity of impertinent
People, or the like, cauſed Him to talk louder or quicker than ordinary ;
nor often, (if at all) without fufficient Reafon; nor ever fo angry with any
One elfe, as He would be with HIMSELF for having been fo. In ſhort,
If every One would reſtrain their Anger within the fame Bounds as He
did, there might be a hasty Word or Expreſſion dropped ſometimes upon
Provocation or Indifpofition: But there would never be RESENTMENT,
WRATH OF QUARREL more in the World.
He was moſt remarkably Chearful and Lively in PRIVATE CONVER-
SATION, and by his Inclination ready, as well as by his Treaſures of Learn-
ing abundantly qualified to be ferviceable to all forts of Perfons. This render-
ed his Company agreeable: and Himſelf worthy to be courted by the Learn-
ed and Virtuous. But a GENERAL ACQUAINTANCE was what He never
cultivated: and it grew more and more his Averfion. So that He paffed his
Days moſtly at Home, with a few Friends: with whom He could enjoy
an agreeable RELAXATION OF MIND, and receive All the Advantages of
a fincere and open FRIENDSHIP. This Exceffive Retirement was however
attended with fome Inconveniencies. His Intimates were dropping off, and
their Places remained unfupplied; His own Infirmities were increaſing;
The Frequent Remiffion of Study growing more and more neceſſary; and
his Solitudes at the fame Time becoming less and less pleasant and agree-
able.
B 2
What
xii
A PREFACE.
What Decays foever there might be in his BODILY STRENGTH, He
nevertheleſs retained to the last the Clearness and Perfpicuity of his
THOUGHTS. But perceiving his Defigns fruftrated by the daily Attacks
of NATURE, and that it would be impoffible to finiſh and compleat them
in the Manner He wished, it feems as if He had intended to deſtroy with
his own Hand the greatest Part of his WORKS: And that thoje few
Manuſcripts which were found after his Death were indebted to the
Treachery of his Memory for their Prefervation. For He had within the
laft two or three Years of his Life actually burnt feveral Treatifes, in the
Compofition whereof He had beftowed no fmall Quantity of Time and
Pains. The following indeed happened to be spared: But from the Place in
which they were depofited, and from fome other Circumstances, 'tis probable
that they owed their Eſcape to mere Forgetfulness. They were in Number
thirteen, (beſides about Fourſcore Sermons) viz. 1. An Hebrew Grammar.
2. Tyrocinia Arabica & Syriaca. 3. Specimen Vocabularii Biblico-Hebrai-
ci, literis noftratibus quantum fert Linguarum Diffonantia defcripti. 4. For-
mulæ quædam Gemarina. 5. De variis generibus pedum, metrorum, carmi-
num, &c. Apud Judæos, Græcos & Latinos. 6. De Vocum Tonis Monitio
ad Tyrones. 7. Rudimenta ad Mathefin & Philofophiam ſpectantia. 8.
Mifcellanea Philologica. 9. Opinions of the Ancient Philofophers.
10. 'loudaina: five Religionis & Literatura Judaica Synopfis. 11. A
Collection of fome Antiquities and Particulars in the Hiſtory of Mankind :
tending to ſhew that Men have not been here upon this Earth from ETER-
NITY, &c. 12. Some Paffages relating to the Hiftory of CHRIST; col-
lected out of the Primitive Fathers. 13. A Treatiſe relating to the Jews:
of their Antiquities, Language, &c. And what renders it the more pro-
bable, or indeed almoſt beyond Doubt, That He would have deſtroyed
thefe likewiſe if He had remembered them, is That ſeveral of theſe which
remain undeftroyed are only Rudiments or rougher Sketches of what He
afterwards reconfidered and carried on much farther: and which even
after fuch Revifal He nevertheleſs committed to the Flames, as being ſtill
(in his Opinion) fhort of that PERFECTION to which He defired and had
intended to bring them.
It
A PREFACE.
xiii
It muſt be owned indeed that He had formerly publiſhed a PARA-
PHRASE on part of the Book of ECCLESIASTES, which He had not cor-
rected. But for that very Reaſon He was afterwards earnestly defirous to fup-
press it. And He likewiſe compoſed and printed a little LATIN GRAM-
MAR. But this was only for the Uſe of his Family. The former was
printed in the Year 1690: The latter in 1703.
Not long before his Death, He publiſhed the ENSUING TREATISE,
intitled "THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED;" in which
the Picture of his LIFE is most fully drawn. There you may behold
Him in his REAL CHARACTER: in the humble SUBMISSION AND
RESIGNATION of Himſelf to the unerring Will of the DIVINE BEING;
in his TRUE CONJUGAL AND PATERNAL AFFECTION to his Family;
in his KIND REGARD AND BENEVOLENCE towards his Fellow-Creatures,
according to their reſpective Stations in Life. For HE HIMSELF Steadily
practifed thofe DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS which He ſo earneſtly re-
commended to OTHERS. The Public Honors paid to his MEMORY, and
the Great Demand for THIS BOOK (of which more than Ten Thouſand
were fold in a very few Years) are fufficient Teftimonies of its Value.
He had, in the Year 1722, printed off a few Copies of it for private Ufe.
And as foon as he had done fo, He began to turn his Thoughts to the
THIRD QUESTION: as appears by a Manuſcript intitled Heads and
Materials for an Answer to Question 3. fet down rudely and any how,
in order to be confidered, &c. after they are got into fome Order.
July 4, 1723. Underneath which He has added. They are writ-
ten at Length (not in my Short-hand) that fo if this Anfwer Should
never be finiſhed, they may however not be totally loft. However,
in this Defign He had Opportunity to make but a very small Progrefs.
For it was just about this Time that, at the Inftances and Perfuafion of
his Friends, He fet about revifing and publishing the following Work:
wherein he had anfwered the two first of the propofed Queſtions: Re-
folving, as ſoon as that ſhould be done, to return to and finiſh his Anſwer
to the THIRD QUESTION.
But
xiv
A PREFACE
But in that He was difappointed. For immediately after he had com-
pleated the Revifal and Publication of the following Treatife, an acci-
dent of breaking his Arm increaſed his Diftempers, and accelerated
his Death; which happened upon the 29th of October 1724, and
has abfolutely put an End to the Expectation of feeing any
more of his WORKS in Print. For it would be equally injurious to the
AUTHOR and disrespectful to the PUBLIC, if his Family fhould expofe his
more IMPERFECT SKETCHES in Print after his Death: when HE HIM-
SELF had destroyed ſeveral more finished PIECES, becauſe He judged them
not fufficiently accurate.
His Body was carried down to Great Finborough in Suffolk, One of
his Eſtates, and the Principal Refidence of his now Eldeſt Son and Suc-
ceffor in his Eſtate: who repreſents the neighbouring Burrough of Ipfwych
in Parliament.
From all that has been faid concerning Mr. WOLLASTON, it appears
that notwithſtanding his Declining to accept of any Public Employment,
yet his STUDIES were defigned to be of Public Ufe: And his SOLITUDE
was far from being employed in vain and trifling Amuſements terminating
in Himfelf alone.
His lateſt Moments were calm and eafy, Such as might be expected
to cloſe a Life ſpent like his : And He left the World, as He fojourned in
it, quietly and refignedly. Both the Manner of his LIFE and that of his
DEATH were well worthy of Imitation.
It is ſcarce worth while to take any Notice of an idle or malicious Re-
flection which has been caft, by fome over-zealous Perfons, upon this
Gentleman's Memory, as if He had put a Slight upon CHRISTIANITY
by laying ſo much Strefs upon the Obligations of TRUTH, REASON,
and VIRTUE: Or as if He could not have believed aright, becauſe He
did not think it neceffary to digress from his Subject in Order to INSERT
HIS CREED. Surely, a Sufpicion thus founded can deſerve no Regard.
However, it may not be amifs to obferve that it has probably been in-
creaſed by a vulgar miſtake that Mr. WOLLASTON, the Author of the
RELIGION
4
A PREFACE.
XV
RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED, was the fame Perfon with
Mr. WOOLSTON who wrote feveral Pieces which groffly attacked the
Literal Truth of the Miracles of JESUS CHRIST. And this Miſtake,
which aroſe originally from the Similitude of Names, might happen to be
further confirmed by Mr. WOOLSTON's intitling Himſelf " Late Fellow
" of SIDNEY COLLEGE in Cambridge:" At which College Mr. WoL-
LASTON Himſelf and Four of his Sons were educated,
THE
www
M
The Religion of Nature delineated.
*
To A. F. Efq;
j
WAS. much furprifed, SIR, when (fome time ago) you
'fo importunately defired my thoughts upon theſe queſtions,
1. Is there really any fuchthing as natural religion, properly.
and truly fo called?
II. If there is, what is it?
III. How may a man qualify himself, fo as to be able to judge,
for himself, of the other religions profeft in the world; to fettle
his own opinions in diſputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mind, neither
disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what paffes among them?
With what view you did this; whether in expectation of fome little degree of
fatisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kind-
3
B
nefs
+
6
The RELIGION of NATURE.
nefs to amuſe me at a time, when I wanted fomething to divert melancholy reflexi-
ons, I ſhall not venture to gueſs. I fhall only fay, that could I have foreſeen in due
time, that ſuch a task was to be impofed upon me, I might have been better
pre-
pared for it. I might have marked what was fuitable to my purpoſe in thoſe books,
which I have red, but fhall fcarce ever return to read any more: many more I
might have red too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have
neglected, and now have neither leifure nor patience to perufe: I might have no-
ted what the various occurrences and cafes, that happen in life, fuggeſted: and,
in general, I might have placed more of my time on fuch parts of learning, as
would have been directly ſerviceable to me on the preſent occaſion.
However, as I have not ſpent my days without thinking and reflecting fe-
riouſly within my ſelf upon the articles and duties of natural religion, and they are
my thoughts which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditati-
ons, and confulting a few ſcatterd papers, in which I had formerly for my own uſe
fet down fome of them (briefly, and almoft foleciſtically), to give an anſwer to the
two first of your queſtions, together: tho I muſt own, not without trouble in
adjuſting and compacting looſe fentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the
chaos into the fhape of fomething like a fyftem.
Notwithſtanding what I have faid, in a treatiſe of natural religion, a ſubject fo
beaten and exhauſted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which fo ma-
ny notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and fo many things
require to be proved, which can ſcarce be proved by any other but the old ar-
guments (or not fo well), you must not expect to find much that is new. Yet
ſomething perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers,
concerning the nature of moral good and evil, and is the prevailing thought that
runs thro them all, I never met with any where. And even as to thofe matters,
in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common,
you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they uſed to appear to
me in my walks and folitudes. So that they are indeed my thoughts, fuch as have
been long mine, which I fend you; without any regard to what others have, or
have not faid: as I perfuade my felf you will eafily perceive. It is not hard to
difcern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece; and to diſtinguiſh the
genuine hand of an author from the falle wares and patch-work of a plagiary.
Tho after all, it would be madneſs in a man to go out of his right way, only be
cauſe it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.
Senfible how unfiniſhed this performance is,
rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip,
I call it only a Delineation, or
I hope you will excuſe a friend,
who
5
7
Of Moral Good and Evil.
7
+
who has now paffed the threshold of old age; and is, upon that and other ac-
counts, not able to bear much ſtudy or application. And thus I commit to your
candor what follows: which, for the fake of order and perfpicuity, I have di-
vided into fections, and propofitions.
TH
SECT. I. Of Moral Good and Evil.
HE foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men,
which diſtinguiſhes them into good, evil, indifferent. For if there is fuch
a difference, there muſt be religion; & contra. Upon this account it is that fuch
a long and laborious inquiry hath been made after fome general idea, or fome
rule b, by comparing the forefaid acts with which it might appear, to which
kind they reſpectively belong. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one,
yet one certainly there muft bed. That, which I am going to propofe, has always
ſeemd to me not only evidently true, but withal fo obvious and plain, that per-
haps for this very reaſon it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the uſe
and application of it is ſo eaſy, that if things are but fairly permitted to ſpeak for
themſelves their own natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be
found themſelves to proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; that is, whether
they are diſagreeable to it, or not. Ifhall endeavour by degrees to explain my
meaning.
I. That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a
being capable of diſtinguiſhing, choofing, and acting for himſelf : or more briefly, of
an intelligent and free agent. Becauſe in proper fpeaking no act at all can be afcribed
to that, which is not indued with theſe capacities. For that, which cannot di-
اد ارج
ησ ท
اد
* So, in Plato, Socrates requires of Euthyphro not evrin déo didáža, z xoxãv ócíær áж' ¿zéro autò
εἶδα, ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐςι, κτλ. And again, ταύτίω τοίνων με αὐτὴν δίδαξον τὴν Ἰδέαν τις ποτέ ἐσιν·
ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνίω Σποβλέπων, ἢ χρώμμα αὐτῇ παραδεί[ματι, ὃ μὲ ἂντοιῖτον ᾖ, ὧν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τις πράτῃ, φῶ
è Ý,
ὅσιον εἶναι· ὁ δ᾽ ἂν μὴ τοι τον, μὴ φῶ. Ρofce exemplar honefi. Luc. κ οἶδε τό γ' αιχρόν, κανόνι ξ' καλά
pulár. Eurip. Adfit Regula, peccatis qua poenas irroget aquas, fays Horace. Now by the famerale,
by which puniſhments are juftly proportiond, crimes must be diſtinguiſhd among themſelves; and there-
fore much more, crimes from no-crimes, and crimes from good actions. So that it is at bottom a rule
which can do this, that is required. Formula quadam conflituenda eft: quam fi fequemur in compa-
ὁ Πῶς οἷόν τε ἀτέκμαρτα εἶναι καὶ ἀνεύρετα τὰ ἀναγ
`ratione rerum, ab officio nunquam recedemus. Cic.
καιόταλα εν ἀνθρώποις; ἔσιν εν [κανών τις] Arrian.
y
e Ubi virtus, fi nihil fitum eft in ipfis nobis ? Cic.
.Maim רשות לכל אדם נתונה אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה- הוא עמוד התורה והמצוה
Nabb. Ab .הרשות היא הבחירה
24
B 2
ſtinguiſh,
ខ
Sect. I.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
ftinguiſh, cannot chooſe: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty
of chooſing for itſelf, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts,
if it acts at all, under a neceffity incumbent ab extra. But that, which acts thus,
is in reality only an inftrument in the hand of fomething which impoſes the neceſ-
fity; and cannot properly be faid to act; but to be acted. The act must be the
act of an agent: therefore not of his inftrument.
A being under the above-mentiond inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts,
in the ſtate of inert and paffive matter, and can be but a machine: to which no
language or philoſophy ever afcribed on or mores.
II. Thofe propofitions are true, which exprefs things as they are: or, truth is the
conformity of thoſe words or figns, by which things are expreft, to the things them-
felves. Defin.
III. A true propofition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are,
by deeds, as well as by expreſs words or another propofition. It is certain there is a
meaning in many acts and geftures. Every body underſtands weeping, laugh-
ing, fhrugs, frowns, &c. theſe are a fort of univerſal language. Applications
are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintaind only by cafts of the eye
and motions of the adjacent muſcles b. And we read of feet, that ſpeak©; of a
philofopher, who anfwerd an argument by only getting up and walking d; and of
one, who pretended to express the fame fentence as many ways by gefticulation,
as even Cicero himſelf could by all his copia of words and eloquence e. But theſe
inſtances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of other kinds,
fuch as conſtitute the character of a man's conduct in life, which have in nature,
and would be taken by any indifferent judge to have a fignification, and to imply
Some propofition, as plainly to be underſtood as if it was declared in words: and
therefore if what fuch acts declare to be, is not, they must contradict truth, as
much as any falſe propofition or affertion can.
If a body of foldiers, fecing another body approach, ſhould fire upon them,
would not this action declare that they were enemies, and if they were not enemies,
would not this military language declare what was falfe? No, perhaps it may be
faid; this can only be called a miſtake, like that which happend to the Athenians
Lacryma pondera vocis habent. Ov. ↳ Oculi, fupercilia, frans, vultus denique totus, qui fermo
quidam tacitus mentis eft, &c. Cic. Nutu fignifque loquuntur. Ov. Et actio quafi fermo corporis·
Cic. & fim. paff.
4 Τὸν κατὰ τὸ κινήσεως λόγον σιωπών, περιεπά
.Prov .איש און מולל ברגליו •
rnor. Sext. Emp. So Menedemus reproved luxury by eating only olives. Diog. L. And others are
mentiond by Plutarch, who did arse pains à des sppάsv. • Macrob.
in
1.2.2
9
Of Moral Good and Evil
}
7.
in the attack of Epipola, or to the Carthaginians in their laft incampment a-
gainst Agathocles in Africa b. Suppofe then, inftead of this firing, fome officer
to have ſaid they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that
fentence affirming them to be enemies be falfe, notwithstanding he who ſpoke it
was miſtaken? The truth or falfhood of this affirmation doth not depend upon
the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: because there is a certain fenfe affixt to the
words, which muft either agree or difagree to that, concerning which the affir-
mation is made, The thing is the very fame ftill, if into the place of words be
fubftituted actions. The falute here was in nature the falute of an enemy, 'but
fhould have been the falute of a friend: therefore it implied a falfity. Any fpecta-
ter would have underſtood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other
were enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a
meaning, may be either true or falfe: which is as much as can be faid of any ver-
bal fentence.
t
1.
i
When Popilius Lenas folicited to have Cicero profcribed, and that he might
find him out and be his executioner, would not his carriage have fufficiently fig-
nified to any one, who was ignorant of the cafe, that Tully either was fome very
bad man, and deſerved capital punishment; or had fome way grievously injured
this man; or at leaſt had not faved his life, nor had as much reafon to expect his
fervice and good offices upon occafion, as he ever had to expect Tully's? And
all theſe things being falfe, were not his behaviour and actions expreffive of that
which was falfe, or contradictions to truth? It is certain he acted as if thoſe things
had been true, which were not true, and as if thofe had not been true which
were true (in this confifted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words
had faid they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were
fo: why then ſhould not to act as if they were true or not true, when they were o-
therwife, contradict truth as much as to fay they were fo, when they were not fod?
A pertinacious objector may perhaps ftill fay, it is the bufinefs of foldiers to de-
fend themſelves and their country from enemics, and to annoy them as opportu
nity permits; and ſelf-prefervation requires all men not only barely to defend
themſelves against aggreffors, but many times alfo to profecute fuch,and only fuch,
as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is natural to conclude, that they are
enemies againſt whom we fee foldiers defending themſelves, and thofe men wic-
ked and dangerous, whom we fee profecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that
?
18
n
រ
DT85
• Where we find φίλες τε φίλοις, ες πολίτας πολίταις εἰς χεῖρας ἀλλήλοις ἐλθόντας. Thucyd.
οικείες ὡς πολεμίες ἠμύνοντο. Diod:S.
© Val. Max. ὁ ᾿Ανθρώποισιν σὺν ἐχρῆν ποτὲ τ' πραγμάτων τὴν
thofe
girãoar iqúew wλéov. Eurip. Quafi interfit, audiam, an videam. Cic.
10
Sect. I.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
thoſe acts of defending and profecuting ſpeak or fignify ſo much: but conjectures
are raiſed upon the common fenfe, which mankind has of fuch proceedings. Anf.
If it be natural to conclude any thing from them, do they not naturally convey
the notice of fomething to be concluded? And what is conveying the notice of
any thing but notifying or fignifying that thing? And then again, if this fignifi-
cation is natural and founded in the common principles and fenfe of mankind, is
not this more than to have a meaning which reſults only from the uſe of ſome
particular place or country, as that of language doth?
If A fhould enter into a compact with B, by which he promises and ingages
never to do fome certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this caſe it
muſt be granted, that his act interferes with his promife, and is contrary to it.
Now it cannot interfere with his promiſe, but it muſt alſo interfere with the
truth of that propofition, which fays there was ſuch a promiſe made, or that there
is fuch a compact fubfifting. If this propofition be true, A made fuch a certain
agreement with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement with B.
Why? Becauſe the truth of this latter is inconfiftent with the agreement aſſerted
in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a de-
nial, is this inconfiftence. If then the behaviour of A be inconfiftent with the a-
greement mentiond in the former propofition, that propofition is as much denied
by A's behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other propofition. Or thus,
If one propofition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is containd
in another, it is faid to contradict this other, and denies the exiſtence of what
is containd in it. Juft fo if one act imports that which is contrary to the import
of another, it contradicts this other, and denies its existence. In a word, if Aby
his actions denies the ingagements, to which he hath fubjected himſelf, his acti-
ons deny them; juſt as we ſay, Ptolomy by his writings denies the motion of the
earth, or his writings deny it 2.
When the queſtion was asked, Whofe sheep are these? the anſwer was, Agon's:
for he committed them to my care b (he uſes and diſpoſes of them as his). By this
act Damætas underſtood them to be his; and if they had not been his, bút Al-
phondas's or Melibaus's, Egon, by an act very intelligible to Damætas, had ex-
preſſed what was not true. What is faid here is the ſtronger, becauſe he, who
has the uſe and difpofal of any thing, has all that he can have of it; and v. v. he
who has the all (or property) of any thing, muſt have all the use and difpofal of
it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be his, than by using
it, &c. But of this ſomething more hereafter.
3 Ἡμεῖς
ὠνέμθρον βιβλία Πλάτων ώνείας φαμό Πλάτωνα κλ. Plut.
b Virg. & Theocr.
I
In
Of Moral Good and Evil.
I I
›
In the Jewish history we read, that when Abimelek faw Ifaac fporting with
Rebekah, and taking conjugal liberties b, he preſently knew her to be Ifaac's
wife; and if ſhe had not been his wife, the cafe had been as in the preceding in-
ftance. If it be objected, that she might have been his miſtreſs or a harlot; I an-
fwer, that fo fhe might have been, tho Ifaac had told him by words that ſhe was
his wife. And it is fufficient for my purpoſe, and to make acts capable of contra-
dicting truth, if they may be allowd to express things as plainly and determinately
as words can. Certainly Abimelek gave greater credit to that information which
paffed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear; and to what
Ifaac did, than to what he faid, For Ifaac had told him, that fhe was not his
wife, but his fifter d. Father o
A certain author writes to this purpoſe, "If a foldier, who had taken the
"oath to Cafar, fhould run over to the enemy, and ſerve him againſt Cæfar,
❝and after that be taken; would he not be puniſhd as a deferter, and a perjur-
❝ed villain? And if he ſhould plead for himſelf, that he never denied Cæfar;
"would it not be anfwerd, That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with
"his actions (or by facts) he did?" And in another place, "Let us, fays he,
"ſuppoſe fome tyrant command a Chriſtian to burn incenfe to Jupiter, without
"adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of Chrift: if the Chriftian fhould
"do this, would it not be manifeſt to all, that by that very a&t he denied him ; "
(and I may add, confequently denied thoſe propofitions which affirm him to be the
Chrift, a teacher of true religion, and the like f)?
When a man lives, as if he had the eftate which he has not, or was in other
regards (all fairly caft up) what he is not, what judgment is to be paſſed upon
him? Doth not his whole conduct breath untruth? May we not fay (if the pro-
priety of language permits), that he lives a lye &? Caps thes
به
In common ſpeech we fay fome actions are infignificant, which would not be
ſenſe, if there were not fome that are fignificant, that have a tendency and mean-
ing. And this is as much as can be faid of articulate founds, that they are either
fignificant or infignificant h.
משמש מטתו :
.according to albek ענון בשוק וחיבוק b Only
Inun wnun. Raſhi.
- Ωτα η τυγχά
νὰ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐόνια απισότερα ὀφθαλμῶν. Herod. d That inftance of Menelaus and his gueſt Alexan-
der,in Arrian, might be fubjoind to this. Εἰ τὶς αὐτὲς εἶδε φιλοφρονες μέρες αλλήλες, ἐπίσησεν ἂν τῷ λέγοντε
οὐκ εἶναι φίλες αυτές. • De Dupl. Mart. f Something like this is that in one of Greg. Naz.'s
orations. When fome Chriftians, who had been infnared by Julian, asked, mõç Xgısò iguala; they.
were anfwerd ὅτι κατὰ δ' πυρὸς ἐθυμιάσατε. ε τα ψευδή πράγματα διώκων. Chryf. Καὶ σολισμός
ἀνδρὸς, καὶ γέλως, το βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγγέλει εὶ αὐτο, as Bafil. fpeaks: and therefore greater things mu
do it more. ↳ As that Bλirpi ap. Diog. L. in v. Zen.
It
"
12
Sect. I.
The RELIGION of NATURE
1
J
It may not be improperly obferved by the way, that the fignificancy here attri-
buted to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but fometimes from cuftom
and agreement among people, as that of words and founds moftly doth.
Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have diffèrent, or even
contrary fignifications. The generality of Chriftians, when they pray, take off
their hats: the Jews, when they pray b or fay any of their Berakoth, put thein
on. The fame thing which among Chriftians denotes reverence, imports irre-
verence among the Jews. The reafon is, becauſe covering the head with a hat
(if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itſelf an indifferent thing, and peo
ple by ufage or confent may make it interpretable either way. Such acts feem to
be adopted into their language, and may be reckond part of it. But acts of the
former kind, fuch as I chiefly here intend, have an unalterable fignification, and
can by no agreement or force ever be made to exprefs the contrary to it. Egon's
treating the flock, and difpofing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought
to fignify, that it was not his. From whence it appears, that facts exprefs more
ftrongly, even than words themſelves; or to contradict any propofition by facts
is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, thian can poffibly be made by words
only d. Words are but arbitrary figns of our ideas, or indications of our
thoughts (that. word, which in one: language denotes poverty f; in another de-
notes riches): but fatts may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the
thoughts themſelves produced into act; as the very conceptions of the mind brought
εν
>
C
e
Maim, or al. pa המתפלל לא יעמוד בתפלה---בראש מגולה - 5
51.
Αἰγύπτιοι τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαλιν τοῖσι ἄλλοισι ἀνθρώποισι ἐξήσαντο ήθεά τε καὶ κόμες, κτλ.
ο Θεόν
Herod.
ὁμολογεῖσιν ἐιδέναι, τοῖς ἔργοις ἀρνεῖλαι. Εpiβt. ad Τit. And τὸ ἔργοις ἀρνεῖος, Θεὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶπεν & σόματι.
Chryf. d. Aóyleye dxín. Plut. Res loquitur ipfa: que femper valet plurimum. Cic. Quid ver
<. This we
ba audiam, cum facta videam? Id. Airà coup, Tÿ ÿíã. Baf.
Φύση ονομάτων
know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them as we pleafe, reuod & ovojŃTwy
idevisw, àm² öтay yerlas ouμiboron Arift. And tho Plata feems to be of another mind, yet when Cratylus
fays Ονόματα ὀρθότηα εἶναι ἑκάσῳ ἢ ἐντων φύση πεφυκυίαν, it is much to be queftiond whether any thing,
more be meant than this, that fome names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he fays
that this rectitude of names is the fame “Enσ Bagbagois; that it is [only] ſuch as-is fufficient dhašv.
οἷον ἕκασόν ἐςι ν ὄντων ; fuch as may render them κατὰ τὸ δύνατον όμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, &c. That lepi-
dum & festivum argumentum, which P. Nigidius. up. A. Gell. makes ufe of to fhew, cur videri poffint
f won Hoars & T
verba eſſe natumalin magis quam arbitraria, deferves only to be laughd at. Helys
Arab. So Ab. Ezra obferves, that in Heb. is to will, in a to nil (tho in Arab, the word is
written ): and in another place, that the fame word even in the fame language fometimes fignifies
123771 727, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words
have different ſenſes and ufes. May in Arabic, according to Giggeius and Golius, has 70-or-86, and
fome (two at least), contrary the one to the other.
រឺ
►
•
forth
2
Of Moral Good and Evil.
13
forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the moft natural and expreſs re-
preſentations of them. And, befide this, they bear certain respects to things,
which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any ratio's are in:
mathematics. For the facts and the things they reſpect are just what they are,
as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the refpects interceding
between thoſe muſt be as fixt, as the ratio is which one of theſe bears to the
other: that is, they muſt remain the fame, and always ſpeak the fame language,
till things ceaſe to be what they are.
I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things
were ſo, or not fo, doth by his acts declare, that they are fo, or not ſo; as plainly
as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwiſe,
his acts contradict thofe propofitions, which affert them to be as they are.
IV. No act (whether word bor deed) of any being, to whom moral good and
evil are imputable, that interferes with any true propofition, or denies any thing to
be as it is, can be right. For,
1. If that propofition, which is falſe, be wrong, that act which implies
fuch a propofition, or is founded in it, cannot be right becauſe it is the very
propofition itſelf in practice.
1
2. Thoſe propofitions, which are true, and exprefs things as they are, expreſs
the relation between the ſubject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either
affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of that relation. And fur-.
ther, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determind and
fixt by the natures of the things themſelves. Therefore nothing can interfere
with any propofition that is true, but it muſt likewiſe interfere with nature (the
nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themſelves too), and confe-
quently be unnatural, or wrong in nature. So very much are thoſe gentlemen mif-
taken, who by following nature mean only complying with their bodily inclinati-
ons, tho in oppofition to truth, or at leaſt without any regard to it. Truth is but
a conformity to nature and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth ª.
This is Tod. Apocal. Plato ufes the fame way of fpeaking. Yed, fays he, undsis
μηδέν μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξεις. The contrary to this is in Arifotle ἀληθεύειν ὁμήσως ο λόγους
#ęážeσiv; and < ßíæ ààntsúew. And in S. B. ɲnna nɔɔ, and NON 777.
Actum generale
verbum eft, five verbis five re quid agatur. Juftin. Dig.
As it muſt be, becauſe 'Oged
ὰ τῷ λογικά ζώῳ ἡ αυτή πράξις κατὰ φύσιν ἔτι καὶ κατὰ λόγον (that is, ac-
cording to truth, which it is the office of reafon to diſcover). Anton. Nunquam aliud natura, `aliud
ἡ ἀλήθει ἀεί. Soph.
fapientia dicit. Juv.
d
[
C
A
3. If
14
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. I.
3. If there is a fupreme being, upon whom the exiſtence of the world de-
pends; and nothing can be in it but what He either cauſes, or permits to be
then to own things to be as they are is to own what He caufes, or at leaft permits,
to be thus caufed or permitted: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go
into His conftitution of the world, and to fubmit to His will, reveald in the
books of nature. To do this therefore muſt be agreeable to His will. And
if ſo, the contrary muſt be diſagreeable to it; and, fince (as we ſhall find in due
time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly wrong.
I defire that I may not be miſunderſtood in reſpect to the actings of wicked
men. I do not fay, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is ill done by
them, ſhould be ſo done; i. e. that they fhould uſe their liberty ill: but I fay,
when they have done this and committed ſome evil, it is agreeable to His will,
that we ſhould allow it to have been committed: or, it would be difagreeable
to His will, that we fhould deny it to have been committed.
As the owning of things, in all our conduct, to be as they are,is direct obedi-
enceb: fo the contrary, not to own things to be or to have been that are or have
been, or not to be what they are, is direct rebellion againſt Him, who is the
Author of nature. For it is as much as to fay, "God indeed cauſes ſuch a
"thing to be, or at leaſt permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies be-
tween this and that, is of ſuch a nature, that one may be affirmed of the o-
"ther, &c. this is true: but yet to me it ſhall not be fo: I will not indure it,
or act as if it were fo: the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I mind
"them, or what follows from them: even exiſtence ſhall be non-exiſtence,
"when my pleaſures require". Such an impious declaration as this attends
every voluntary infraction of truth.
4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any inftance or manner what-
foever, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For fuch are theſe: every
thing is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone; and the like. And then if
thoſe truths be confiderd as having always fubfifted in the Divine mind, to which
they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himſelf, to do
this is to act not only in oppofition to His government or foveraignty, but to His
• What Hierocles fays of his ἐγκόσμιοι Θεό
• Ἔδωκεν [ὁ Θεὸς] ἀντὶ δέλτες ἳ κόσμον. Chryf.
ol, is true in refpect of every thing. Τα Θείῳ νόμῳ κατακολυθέντων ἐςὶ—τότο αυτὸς εἶναι τίθεος, ὃ
yɛyávaσt. There is a paffage fomewhere in S. Iqqar. much like this: where it is faid (as I remem
ber) that he, who worships an Angel 'n bu inne ny (as being what he is, the meffenger of
God) is not guilty of idolatry..
nature
Of Moral Good and Evil.
15
ན་
nature
alfo:
which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but
what is moſt right, muſt alſo upon this account be moſt wrong.
Pardon theſe inadequate ways of fpeaking of God. You will apprehend my
meaning: which perhaps may be better repreſented thus. If there are fuch
things as axioms, which are and always have been immutably true, and conſe-
quently have been always known to God to be fob, the truth of them cannot be
denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the Divine know-
ledge muſt be denied too.
5. Deſignedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greateft poffible
abſurdity. It is to put bitter for fweet, darkneſs for light, crooked for
ftreight, &c. It is to fubvert all ſcience, to renounce all ſenſe of truth, and
flatly to deny the exiſtence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing
does exist, if things are not what they are.
To talk to a poft, or otherwiſe treat it as if it was a man, would furely be
reckond an abfurdity, if not distraction. Why? becauſe this is to treat it as
being what it is not. And why ſhould not the converſe be reckond as bad; that
is, to treat a man as a poftd; as if he had no fenfe, and felt not injuries, which
he doth feel; as if to him pain and forrow were not pain; happineſs not hap-
pineſs. This is what the cruel and unjuſt often do.
Laftly, to deny things to be as they are is a tranfgreffion of the great law of
our nature, the law of reafon. For truth cannot be oppofed, but reafon muſt
be violated. But of this more in the proper place.
Much might be added here concerning the amiable nature, and great force of
truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my ſelf, the leaft truth cannot be
-
• 'IDI NON NIP "ap. In Reſh. hhokm. & al. And S. Chryfoftom defines truth in the fame
words, which philofophers apply to the Deity. 'Alýðein Tò övtwg öv.
Η Αλήθεια η οπαδός
Oeš. Ph. Jud.
Ο Ποιμνας ὡς ἄνδρας ἔχων is in Soph. the character of Ajax, when his
head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monſtrous and mad extravagances of C. Ca.....
ligula one is, that he treated his horſe Incitatus as a man. Suet.
d Horace argues after the
fame manner. Si quis lectica nitidam geftare amet agnam; Huic veſtem, ut natæ, paret, &c. Inter-
dicto huic omne adimat jus Prætor, &c. Quid, fiquis natam pro mutâ devovet agnâ. Integer eft ani-
mi? ne dixeris. If it be againſt truth and nature to uſe a lamb as a daughter, it will be as much
againſt truth to uſe a daughter as a lamb.
• Καθ' αυτό με ψεύδω φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν· τὸ
jaandes xañòv xj zaró. Arift. Eft quiddam, quod fuâ vi nos alliciat ad fefe, non emolumento cap-
tans aliquo, fed trahens fua dignitate: quod genus, virtus, fcientia, veritas eft. Cic. Taxù ý áàýðuæ
a feſtival ſaying in Plut.
f ✪ magna vis veritatis, &c. Cic. A good man ND87 7WIV
.Maim מפני שהוא אמת
e
C 2
contradicted
16
Sect. I.
The RELIGION of NATURE
contradicted without much reluctance: even to fee other men diſregard it
does fomething more than diſpleaſe; it is ſhocking.
V. What has been faid of acts inconfiftent with truth, may also be faid of many
omiffions, or neglects to act: that is, by thefe also true propofitions may be denied
to be true; and then thofe omiffions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the
fame reaſons with thofe affigned under the former propofition.
Nothing can be afferted or denied by any act with regard to thoſe things,
to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when
acts do bear fuch relations to other things, as to be declaratory of fomething
concerning them, this commonly is vifible; and it is not difficult to determin,
whether truth fuffers by them, or not. Some things cannot poffibly be done,
but truth muſt be directly and pofitively denied ; and the thing will be clear.
But the cafes arifing from omiffions are not always fo well determind, and plain:
it is not always eafy to know when or how far truth is violated by omitting.
Here therefore more latitude muſt be allowd, and much muſt be left to every
one's own judgment and ingenuity.
This may
be faid in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting,
the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth a.
And there may be omiffions in other cafes, that are filent as to truth. But yet
there are ſome neglects or refuſals to act, which are manifeftly inconfiftent with
it (or, with fome true propofitions).
c
We before b fuppofed A to have engaged not to do fome certain thing, &c. if
now, on the other fide, he ſhould by fome folemn promife, oath, or other act
undertake to do ſome certain thing before fuch a time, and he voluntarily omits
to do it, he would behave himſelf as if there had been no fuch promiſe or en-
gagement; which is equal to denying there was any and truth is as much
contradicted in this as in the former inftance.
Again, there are fome ends, which the nature of things and truth require ust
to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, nature and truth are denied.
If a man does not defire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his
own nature and the nature and definition of happineſs to be what they are. And.
then further, willingly to neglect the means, leading to any fuch end, is the
fame as not to propofe that end, and muft fall under the fame cenfure. As
retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and
• Plura vera difcrepantia effe non poffunt. Cic.
taria.. Cic.
b p.. 10.
• Oblivione volun-
that
}
17
Of Moral Good and Evil.
that
may
be confiderd as an act, many omiffions of this kind may be turned
over to the other fide, and brought under the foregoing propofition.
It must be confeft there is a difficulty as to the means, by which we are to
confult our own preſervation and happineſs; to know what thofe are, and
what they are with refpect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not
equal fome labor under difadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the
true natures of things, of their operations and effects in fuch an irregular dif-
temperd world, and of thoſe many incidents, that may happen either to further
or break our meaſures, deprive us of certainty in theſe matters. But ftill we
may judge as well as we can, and do what we can b; and the neglect to do this
will be an omiffion within the reach of the propofition.
There are omiffions of other kinds, which will deferve to be annumerated
to theſe by being either total, or notorious, or upon the ſcore of fome other
circumftance. It is certain I fhould not deny the Phaniffe of Euripides to be
an excellent drama by not reading it: nor do I deny Chihil-menâr to be a
rare piece of antiquity by not going to fce it. But fhould I, having leifure,
health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in or-
der to improve my mind, and attain fuch knowledge as may be uſeful to me,
I fhould then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what
it is. And if it doth not appear preciſely, into what kind of ftudies this re-
ſpect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige
him to continue his purſuit after knowledge, and where the difcontinuance
begins to be no offence againſt truth, he must confult his own opportunities
and genius, and judge for himſelf as well as he can. This is one of thoſe cales
which I faid before were not fo well determind.
If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no parti-
cular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be poor, any more than I ſhould
deny a man to have a fqualid beard by not fhaving him, to be nafty by not
waſhing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.
Many things are here to be taken into confideration (according to the next
propofition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by doing this; and then I
cannot by not doing itd. But if I, being of ability to afford now and then
fomething in charity to the poor, fhould yet never give them any thing at all,
a In the Civil Law he is faid to act, who does omit. Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur
facere adverfus ea que non facit. Dig. b Eft quodam prodire tenus. Hor.
• Difces quam-
C
diu voles: tamdiu antem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non pœnitebit, ſays Cicero to his
fan..
₫ Nulla virtus virtuti contraria eft. Sen.
I. fhould
1-8
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. I.
*I fhould then certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and
my own to be what it is: and thus truth would be injured. So, again,
If I ſhould not ſay my prayers at ſuch a certain hour, or in fuch a certain place
and manner, this would not imply a denial of the exiſtence of God, His provi-
dence, or my dependence upon Him: nay, there may be reafons perhaps againſt
that particular time, place, manner. But if I fhould never pray to Him, or
worſhip Him at all, fuch a total omiffion would be equivalent to this affertion,
There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored: which, if there is fuch abe-
ing, muſt be contrary to truth. Alſo generally and notoriouſly to neglect this du-
ty (permit me to call it fo), tho not quite always, will favor, if not directly
proclaim the fame untruth. For certainly to worſhip God after this manner is on-
ly to worſhip him accidentally, which is to declare it a great accident that he is wor-
ſhipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is poffible to a total neglect. Be-
fide, ſuch a ſparing and infrequent worſhiper of the Deity betrays fuch an ha-
bitual difregard of Him, as will render every religious act infignificant and null.
Should I, in the laſt place, find a man grievously hurt by fome accident,
faln down, alone, and without preſent help like to periſh; or fee his houſe on fire,
no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him
my afſiſtance immediately, I do not do it at all: and by this refuſing to do it
according to my ability, I deny his cafe to be what it is; human nature to be
what it is; and even thoſe deſires and expectations, which I am conſcious to
my ſelf I ſhould have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.
VI. In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be confiderd not only
what it is in it ſelf or in one respect, but alſo what it may be in any other respect,
which is capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole defcription of
the thing ought to be taken in.
If a man ſteals a horſe, and rides away upon him, he may be faid indeed by
riding him to uſe him as a horſe, but not as the horſe of another man, who gave
him no licence to do this. He does not therefore confider him as being what
he is, unleſs he takes in the reſpect he bears to his true owner. But it is not
neceffary perhaps to confider what he is in reſpect to his color, fhape or age: be-
cauſe the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be
of any particular color, &c. I fay therefore, that thofe, and all thoſe proper-
ties, refpects, and circumſtances, which may be contradicted by practice, are
to be taken into confideration. For otherwife the thing to be confiderd is but
im-
Of Moral Good and Evil.
19
imperfectly furveyd; and the whole compaſs of it being not taken in, it is
taken not as being what it is, but as what it is in part only, and in other re-
ſpects perhaps as being what it is not.
If a rich man being upon a journey, ſhould be robbed and ſtript, it would
be a ſecond robbery and injuftice committed upon him to take from him part
of his then character, and to confider him only as a rich man. His charac- ¿
ter completed is a rich man robbed and abuſed, and indeed at that time a poor
man and diſtreſt, tho able to repay afterwards the affiftance lent him.
Moreover a man in giving affiſtance of any kind to another ſhould confider
what his own circumftances are, as well as what the others are b. If they do
not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to
want it but if he ſhould give it, and by that deny his own or his family's
circumſtances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And
fince (as I have obferved already) all truths are confiftent, nor can any thing
be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when
both parties are placed in a right light, and the caſe properly ſtated for a judg-
ment, the latter may indeed be truly faid to want affiftance, but not the affiftance
of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be faid to want
a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be truly known what
the latter is with reſpect to the former.
The cafe becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under ſome promife or
compact to affiſt another (B), and at the fame time bound to confult his own
happineſs, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do theſe, if he does that,
effectually. For what muft A do? Here are not indeed oppofite truths, but
there are truths on oppofite fides. I answer: tho there cannot be two incom-
patible duties, or tho two inconfiftent acts cannot be both A's duty at the
fame time (for then his duty would be an impoffibility); yet an obligation,
which I will call mixt, may arife out of thoſe differing confiderations. A fhould
affiſt B; but ſo, as not to neglect himſelf and family, &c. and ſo to take care
of himſelf and family, as not to forget the other ingagement, as well and ho-
neftly as he can. Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other
fide ſhould be diligently compared: and there muft in fuch caſes be always
fome exception or limitation understood. It is not in man's power to promiſe
t
• Myw ¡MIND "y: according to that determination in a cafe fomething like this, which occurs
in Talm. Maff. Phe. * Utrique fimul confulendum eft. Dabo egenti; fed ut ipfe non egeam, &c.
Sep. Ita te aliorum miferefcat, ne tui alios mifereat. Plaut.
abfolutely
20
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. I.
abfolutely. He can only promife as one, who may be difabled by the weight,
and incumbency of truths not then exifting.
I could here infert many inftances of partial thinking, which occur in au-
thors: but I fhall chooſe only to fet down one in the margin 2.
In fhort, when things are truly eftimated, perfons concerned, times, places b,
ends intended, and effects that naturally follow, muft be added to them.
VII. When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right:
likewife when the omiſſion of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not
omitting it) must be right. Becauſe contrariorum contraria eft ratio.
VIII. Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. For that
cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right.
IX. Every act therefore of fuch a being, as is before defcribed, and all thoſe
omiffions which interfere with truth (i.e. deny any propofition to be true, which
is true; or ſuppoſe any thing not to be what it is, in any regard d) are morally
evil, in ſome degree or other: the forbearing ſuch acts, and the acting in oppofition
to fuch omiffions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not
done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.
I would have it to be minded well, that when I ſpeak of acts inconfiftent
with truth, I mean any truth; any true propofition whatſoever, whether con-
taining matter of fpeculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken
to be what in fact and truth it is e.
• Sextus Emp. ſeems to be fond of that filthy faying of Zeno, in relation to what is ftoried of
Pocaha and Oedipus : μὴ ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μορίον τῆς μητρὸς τρίψαι, κλ. any more, than to rub with
the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only res is confiderd; as if all was nothing
more, but barely rgs; but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For rgis Fogís is more than
τρίψις by it felf: and τρίψις δ' μορίς το μηρός is fill more : and certainly τρίβειν τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ ἐς
a different thing from ręíbly zò pogíov za pogiw, &c. He might as well have faid, that to ruba red
hot piece of iron with one's bare hand is the fame as to rub one that is cold, or any other innocent
piece of matter: for all is but rgs. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, fhew themſelves
to be but half-thinkers, or less: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be confiderd.
ს
م
↳ Sunt res quadam ex tempore, & ex confilio, non ex fua natura confideranda. — Quid tempora pe_
tant, aut quid perfonis dignum fit, confiderandum eft, &c. Cic. · Οὐ λέγεις φιλόπονον ταλα παι
5 Τὸ κράτισον
dionágiov áýguzvšvra. Arr. Amico agro aliquis affidet: probamus. at hoc fi hareditatis causâ facit,
vultur eft, cadaver expectat. Sen. • Où j$ eïç ¿gvýσews isɩ rgón&. Chryf.
ELS
ἀγαθῶν ἡ ἀλήθεια, καὶ ὁ ἔματα όρα σε πονηρίας τὸ ψεῦδα. Βaf.
2
It
Of Moral Good and Evil.
21
It may be of uſe alfo to remember, that I have added thoſe words in fome
degree or other. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal. Thoſe
truths which they refpect, tho they are equally true, may compriſe matters of
very different importance b; or more truths may be violated one way than
another and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be e-
qually (one as well as the other) faid to be crimes, but not equal crimes ª.
If A ſteals a book from B which was pleafing and uſeful to him, it is true A is
guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B,
who is the proprietor of it, and one whofe happineſs partly depends upon it:
but ſtill if A ſhould deprive B of a good eftate, of which he was the true own
er, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we ſuppoſe the book
to be worth to him one pound, and the eftate 10000l. that truth, which is
violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by rob-
bing him of his eſtate. It is the fame as to repeat the theft of one pound
10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all
together greater than one, one equal to 10000 muſt be greater too: greater
than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, fure. Then, tho the conve-
nience and innocent pleaſure, that B found in the ufe of the book, was a degree
of happineſs yet the happineſs accruing to him from the eftate, by which he
was fupplied not only with neceffaries, but alſo with many other comforts and
harmleſs injoyments, vaftly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in
the former cafe was, B had a property in that, which gave him fuch a degree of
happiness: that violated in the latter, B had a property in that, which
gave him
a happiness vaftly fuperior to the other. The violation therefore in the latter
caſe is upon this account a vaſtly greater violation than in the former. Lastly,
the truths violated in the former cafe might end in B, thofe in the latter may
perhaps be repeated in them of his family, who fubfift alfo by the eftate, and
• Notwithftanding that paradox of the Stoics, Ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, Αφ.
Cic. Plut. Diog. L. & al. which might eaſily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. For if
finning be like paffing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, to fin being equal
to going beyond that line, to go more (or farther) beyond that line muſt be to fin more. Who fees
not the falfity of that, nec bono viro meliorem,nec forti fortiorem, nec fapiente fapientiorem poſſe
fieri? And ſo on. Nullum inter fcelus & erratum difcrimen facere (as S. Hier. expreffes their opi-
nion: if that epiſtle to Celantia be his) is to alter or deſtroy the natures of things. Sure that Wife-
anan was but a bad accountant, who reckond, την μεγίσω ἐσίαν δπιβαλών, δραχμήν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι.
Ap. Plut.
• This is confeft in Cic. Illud intereft, quod in fervo necando, fi adfit injuria, fe-
mel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur, &c. Multitudine peccatorum praftat, &c.
d This may ferve for an anfwer to Chryfippus, and them who fay, ἐι ἀληθὲς ἀληθῆς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔσιν,
δε ψεῦδα ψεύδος· ὅτως ἐδὲ ἀπάτη ἀπάτης ἐδὲ ἁμάρτημα ἁμαρτήματα, κλ. Ap. Diog. L.
D
are
22
Sect. I.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
are to be provided for out of it. And theſe truths are very many in reſpect of
every one of them, and all their defcendents. Thus the degrees of evil or
guilt are as the importance and number of truths violated. I fhall only add, on
the other fide, that the value of good actions will rife at leaſt in proportion to
the degrees of evil in the omiffion of them: and that therefore they cannot be
equal, any more than the oppofite evil omiffions.
But let us return to that, which is our main fubject, the diftinction between
moral good and evil. Some have been fo wild as to deny there is any fuch
thing: but from what has been faid here, it is manifeft, that there is as cer-
tainly moral good and evil as there is true and falſe; and that there is as natural
and immutable a difference between those as between thefe, the difference at the
bottom being indeed the fame. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed
moral good and evil; but they want ſome criterion, or mark, by the help of
which they might know them afunder. And others there are, who pretend
to have found that rule, by which our actions ought to be fquared, and may
be diſcriminated; or that ultimate end, to which they ought all to be refer-
red: but what they have advanced is either falfe, or not fufficiently guarded, or
not comprehenſive enough, or not clear and firm, or (fo far as it is juft) re-
ducible to my rule. For
They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call honeftume, may
denominate actions according as that is, or is not the caufe for ends of them:
but then what is honeftumh? Something is ftill wanting to meafure things by,
and to ſeparate the honefta from the inhonefta.
They who place all in following nature, if they mean by that phrafe acting
according to the natures of things (that is, treating things as being what they
1
기
​Queis paria effe ferè placuit peccata, laborant Cùm ventum ad verum eft: fenfus moresque repug-
nant, Atque ipfa utilitas. Hor. b Therefore they, who denied there was either good or evil (Púod
¿yadorü xaxè»), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to ſay there was nothing in na-
ture either true or false. V. Sext. Emp. & Diog. L. c Quod [extremum, s. ultimum bonorum]
omnium philofophorum fententiâ tale debet effe, ut ad id omnia referri oporteat: ipfum autem nufquam. Cic.
a There was among the old philofophers fuch an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the
fines bonorum & malorum, that if Varro computes rightly, the number might be raiſed to 288. S. Aug.
Quod honeftum eft, id bonum folum habendum eft. Cato ap. Cic. f Qui [omnes] permulta ob
eam unam caufam faciunt quia honeftum eft. Cic. It is commonly placed among ends: and
Τέλο
is confiderd as fuch in thoſe ways of fpeaking; honeftum effe propter fe expetendum, Cic. Finem bono-
rum eſſe honeſtè vivere, ib. and the like. h To fay, Quod laudabile eft, omne honeftum eft, or any
thing like that, is to fay nothing. For how ſhall one know what is truly laudabile ?
εἶπε [Ζήναν] τὸ ὁμολογομύως (al. ακολέθως) τῇ φύση ζῇν, ὅπερ ἐςὶ κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Αγγ γδ πρὸς ταύτω
*µãs i qúois. Diog. L.
4
in
Of Moral Good and Evil.
23
in nature are, or according to truth) fay what is right. But this does not
ſeem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man muſt follow his own
nature a, fince his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him,
which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will
miſlead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational
part. At beft this talk is looſe.
They who make right reafonb to be the law, by which our acts are to be
judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them
lawful or unlawful, good or bad, fay fomething more particular and precife.
And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reaſon, is right;
and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reaſon
is meant that which is found by the right uſe of our rational faculties, this is the
fame with truth: and what is faid by them, will be comprehended in what I
haye faid. But the manner in which they have deliverd themſelves, is not yet
explicit enough c. It leaves room for fo many difputes and oppofite right-reafons,
that nothing can be fettled, while every one pretends that his reaſon is right.
And befide, what I have faid, extends farther: for we are not only to reſpect
thoſe truths, which we diſcover by reafoning, but even fuch matters of fact, as
are fairly diſcoverd to us by our fenfes. We ought to regard things as being
what they are, which way foever we come to the knowledge of them.
e
They, who contenting themſelves with fuperficial and tranfient views, de-
duce the difference between good and evil from the common fenfe of mankind,
and certain principles that are born with us f, put the matter upon a very infirm
foot. For it is much to be fufpected there are no fuch innate maxims as they
pretend, but that the impreffions of education are miſtaken for them: and be-
fide that, the fentiments of mankind are not ſo uniform and conftant, as that we
may fafely truft fuch an important diftinction upon them s.
с то
a Nec folum
• Vivere ex hominis naturâ. Cic. It is true he adds, undique perfectâ & nihil requirente: but thofe
words have either no meaning, or fuch as will not much mend the matter. For what is natura un-
dique perfecta & nihil requirens? Be fide, moral religion doth not confiſt in following nature already per-
fect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures.
b Celebrated
every where.
· Τὸ μὲ ἐν ἔτω διορίσας τὰς ἀγαθὰς πράξις, τὰς κατὰ ὶ ὀρθὸν γινομβρίας λόγον,
καὶ τὰς πονηρὰς τέναντίον, ἀληθὲς με, οὐκ ἔτι ἡ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξις σημάναι. Andr. Rh.
jus & injuria a natura dijudicatur, fed omnino omnia honefta & turpia. Nam communis intelligentia
nobis notas res efficit, eafque in animis noftris inchoavit, ut honefia in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.
Cic. Κριτήριά φησιν [ ὁ Χρύσιππο ] εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν. Diog. L.
• They are ufually
called principia natura, lex (or leges) natura, xgoλú↓ds, xowal, Of Quoizai évvoras, vóμ& quoixòs, &c.
← The ſet of theſe practical principles (or a habit flowing from them) is, what, I think, goes by
the name of Synterefis.
Uaaquaque gens hoc legem natura putat, quod didicit. Hieron.
e
D 2
They,
24
Sect, I.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
:
a
They, who own nothing to be good but pleaſure, or what they call jucundum,
nothing evil but pain ª, and diſtinguiſh things by their tendencies to this or that,
do not agree in what this pleaſure is to be placed, or by what methods and act-
ings the most of it may be obtaind. Theſe are left to be queftions ftill. As
men have different tafts, different degrees of ſenſe and philoſophy, the ſame
thing cannot be pleafant to all: and if particular actions are to be proved by
this teft, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the fame act may be
of one nature to one man, and of another to another. Befide, unleſs there be
ſome ſtrong limitation added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to fink into
grofs voluptuoufnefs, as in fact the generality of Epicurus's herd have done d
(notwithſtanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, &c.);
and the bridle will be ufurped by thoſe appetites which it is a principal part
of all religion, natural as well as any other, to curb and reſtrain. So theſe
men ſay what is intelligible indeed: but what they fay is falfe. For not all
pleaſures, but only fuch pleaſure as is true, or happineſs (of which afterwards),
may be reckond among the fines, or ultima bonorum.
He, who, having confiderd the two extremes in mens practice, in condemn-
ing both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the middle,and ſeems to
raiſe an idea of it from its fituation at an equal diftance from the oppofite extremes £
• Under which word theſe delicate men comprehend labor. When Epicurus, in Lucian, is asked, Ka-
κὸν ἡγῇ ἳ πόνον; he anfwers, Ναί. And Mindyrides (Σμινδυρίδης, ap. Herod. ὃς ἐπὶ πλεῖσον δὲ χλιδῆς εἷς ἀ
ing àñíxero) proceeded ſo far in his averfion to labor, that ejus latus alieno labore condoluit—: qui cups
vidiſſet fodientem, & altiùs raſtrum allevantem, laſſum ſe fieri (ïñywa λabuv, in Athen.) queſtus vetuis
illum opus in confpectu fuo facere. Sen. b Ad hac [voluptatem, & dolorem] & qua fequamur,
c Velim definias, quid fit voluptas: de quo
do qua fugiamus, refert omnia [Aristippus]. Cic.
omnis hac quaftio eft. Cic. The diſputes about pleaſure between the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, Hieronymus.
&c. are well known whether the end was pleaſure of body or mind: whether it was voluptas in mo-
su, or in ftatu (Stabilitate); que fuavitate aliqua naturam ipfam movet, or qua percipitur, omni dolo-
re detracto; i cv xviod, or i xaтasnuarixh, &c. Cic. Diog. L. & al.
d Negat Epicurus ju-
:
eundè vivi poffe, nifi cum virtute vivatur. Cic. But for all that their pleaſures have not continued
to be always like thoſe in the little gardens of Gargettus. Nor indeed do they ſeem to be very vir-
tuous even there. For Epicurus not only had his Leontium (or, as he amorously called her, Aɛová-
ριον,) a famous harlot; but the πᾶσί τε τοῖς Ἐπικυρείοις σευῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις. Athen. And in his book
τέλος he is faid to have written thus, Οὐ δ᾽ ἔγωἱε ἔχω τι νοήσω τἀγαθὸν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲ τὰς νὰ χυλῶν (χει
hav, Athen.) vdovas, à qargŵr ÿj s ràs di godiσív, xλ. See this and more in Diog.L.
Ferom uſes the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. Philofophorum fententia
ει, μεσότηας ἀρετὰς, υπερβολάς κακίας εἶναι. * Ἡ ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνε), καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγει, τὸ
e St.
5 μέσον ἐπαινεῖ). Ἔσιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, εν μεσότη, ὅσα, κτλ. Μεσότης 5, δύο κακιῶν·
fifù nať zweębohý. √xer. Arift. Perhaps Pythagoras (and after him Plato, and others),
when he faid (ap. Diog. L.) Tv άperv άpovíav sivas, might have fome fuch thought as this.
could
}
Of Moral Good and Evil.
25
$
could only deſign to be underſtood of fuch virtues, as have extremes. It muſt
be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward either extreme,
muſt be ſo far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) di-
vides the diſtance, and declines neither way, must be right: alfo, that this notion
ſupplies us with a good direction for common uſe in many cafes. But then there
are feveral obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: ſcarce more
than fuch, as reſpect the virtues couched under the word moderation. And even
as to theſe, it is many times difficult to diſcern, which is the middle point ª.
This the author himſelf was fenfible of b.
a
And when his maſter Plato makes virtue to confift in fuch a likeness to God
as we are capable of (and God to be the great exemplar), he fays what I fhall
not difpute. But fince he tells us not how or by what means we may attain
this likeneſs, we are little the wifer in point of practice: unleſs by it we un-
derſtand the practice of truth, God being truth,and doing nothing contrary to itd.
Whether any of thoſe other foundations, upon which morality has been built,
will hold better than theſe mentiond, I much queſtion. But if the formal ratio of
moral good and evil be made to confift in a conformity of mens acts to the truth
of the cafe or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the diftinction feems to be
ſettled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant
by a true propofition and matter of fact is perfectly underſtood by every body; fo
will it be eafy for any one, fo far as he knows any fuch propofitions and facts, to
compare not only words,but alſo actions with them. A very little skill and attention
will ſerve to interpret even theſe, and diſcover whether they ſpeak truth, or note.
X. If there be moral good and evil, diftinguifhd as before, there is religion; and
Such as may most properly be styled natural. By religion I mean nothing elſe but an
obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind.
I fay, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be
• That
• When he fays, it muſt be taken rwg ås äv ö ögdòs aóy posáž, it is not by that aſcertaind.
See before.
ο οὐ ήδ ράδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς, καὶ τίσι, κλ. Therefore R. Albo might have fpared
that cenfure, where he blames him for expreffing himſelf too generally, when he fays, 1 1,
FIND CIPDAI "ny without telling him what that manner, time, place is.
man, ſays he, cannot be neglected, who endeavours d'ina víſvet, xj šπITndsúwv άgetny, Big öσov Juwa
τὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοι πς θεω. And in another place, our φυγὴ ἐνθένδε is ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ διωατόν
St. Augufin feems to agree with him, in that ſentence of his, Religionis fumma eft imitari quem colis
• Πυθαγόρας ἐξωτηθεὶς, τί ποιῆσιν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ ὅμοιον, ἔφη, ἐὰν ἀληθεύωσι. Stob.
certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which Cicero feems to fuppofe, when he fays,
Confuetudo exercitatioque capienda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum effe poffimus.
e There is
done.
26
Sect. I.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
1
1
done. So that there must be religion, if there are things, of which fome ought
not to be done, fome not to be omitted. But that there are fuch, appears from
what has been faid concerning moral good and evil: becauſe that, which to omit
would be evil,and which therefore being done would be good or well done,ought
certainly by the terms to be done; and fo that, which being done would be evil,and
implies fuch abfurdities and rebellion againſt the fupreme being, as are mentiond
under propofition the IVth. ought moft undoubtedly not to be done. And then
fince there is religion, which follows from the diftinction between moral good and
evil; fince this diftinction is founded in the refpect, which mens acts bear to truth;
and fince no propofition can be true, which expreffes things otherwife than as
they are in nature: fince things are ſo, there muſt be religion, which is founded
in nature, and may upon that account be moft properly and truly called the religion
of nature or natural religion; the great law of which religion, the law of nature, or
rather (as we ſhall afterwards find reafon to call it) of the Author of nature is,
·
XI. That every intelligent, active, and free being ſhould fo behave himself, as by
no act to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is.
Objections I am fenfible may be made to almoſt any thing; but I believe none
to what has been here advanced but fuch as may be anfwerd. For to confider a
thing as being ſomething else than what it is, or (which is the fame) not to conſidér
it as being what it is, is an abfurdity indefenfible. However, for a ſpecimen, I will
fet down a few. Let us fuppofe fome gentleman, who has not fufficiently confiderd
theſe matters, amidſt his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after fome
fuch manner as this. "If every thing muſt be treated as being what it is, what
"rare work will follow? For, 1. to treat my enemy as fuch is to kill him, or re-
venge my ſelf foundly upon him. 2. To use a creditor, who is a fpend-thrift, or
"one that knows not the uſe of money, or has no occafion for it, as fuch, is not to
pay him. Nay further, 3. If I want money, don't I act according to truth, if I
"take it from fome body elſe to fupply my own wants? And more, do not I act
contrary to truth, if I do not ? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a defign
"of killing another, or doing him fome great mifchief, if he can find him, ſhould
"ask me where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to fave life, fay I do
not know, tho that be falfe? 5. At this rate I may not, in a frolick, break a
"glaís, or burn a book: becauſe forfooth to uſe theſe things as being what they
.66
6C
6C
* What it is in nature. Ninu
2, to uſe Maim.'s words. And thus that in Arrianus is true
Νόμα βιωτικός ἐσιν ἔτῶν, τὸ ἀκόλεθον τῇ φύση πράσιν.
cet. Cic. This is indeed the way of truth.
b
Omni in re quid fit veri, videre & tueri dies
Becauſe there is ſcarce any thing, which one
or other will not fay. Quid enim poteft dici de illo, quinigram dixit effe nivem, &c. Lact.
are,
!
Ife Of &
27
Moral Good and Evil.
are,
is to drink out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not
« burn it. Lastly, how fhall a man know what is true: and if he can find out
❝ truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?" PRA
To the first objection it is eaſy to reply from what has been already faid. For
if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was nothing more than his ene-
my, there might be fome force in the objection; but fince he may be con-
fiderd as fomething elſe befide that, he muſt be uſed according to what he is
in other refpects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the ob-
jector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the firft place is a man; and as fuch may
claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it
to him, he wounds truth in a very fenfible part. And then if O and E are
fellow-citizens, living under the fame government, and fubject to laws, which
are ſo many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another,
and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, eftate, &c.
O cannot treat E as being what he is, unleſs he treats him alfo as one, who
by common confent is under fuch a protection. If he does otherwife, he
denies the exiſtence of the forefaid laws and public compacts: contrary to
truth. And befide, O fhould act with refpect to himself as being what he is;
a man himſelf, in fuch or fuch circumftances, and one who has given up all
right to private revenge (for that is the thing meant here). If truth there-
fore be obſerved, the refult will be this. O muft treat E as fomething com-
pounded of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: that is, he muſt
only proſecute him in fuch a way, as is agreeable to the ftatutes and methods,
which the ſociety have obliged themſelves to obſerve. And even as to legal
proſecutions, there may be many things ſtill to be confiderd. For E may ſhew
himſelf an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which
yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are fuch things,
as really affect the ſafety or happiness of O or his family, then he will find him-
felf obliged, in duty and fubmiffion to truth, to take refuge in the laws; and
to puniſh E, or obtain fatisfaction, and at leaft fecurity for the future, by the
means there preſcribed. Becauſe if he does not, he denies the nature and ſenſe
of happineſs to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we ſhall
fhew hereafter he is under to his family a, to be what they are; a dangerous and
wicked enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the end of laws, and fociety itſelf, to be
the fafety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, puniſhing offenders,&c.
à litibus verò quan-
Habenda eft autem ratio rei
* Conveniet cùm in dando munificum effe, tum in exigendo non acerbum : -----
tùm liceat, & nefcio an paulo plus etiam quàm liceat, abhorrentem.
familiaris, quam quidem dilabi finere flagitiofum eft. Cic.
which
と​なり​た
​28
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. I.
:
which it will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But if the enmity
of E rifes not beyond trifling, or more tolerable inftances, then O might act againſt
truth, if he ſhould be at more charge or hazard in profecuting E than he can afford,
or the thing loft or in danger is worth; fhould treat one that is an enemy in lit-
tle things, or a little enemy, as a great one; or fhould deny to make ſome al-
lowances, and forgive fuch peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature
makes it neceflary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. Laftly,
in cafes, of which the laws of the place take no notice, truth and nature would
be fufficiently obferved, if O fhould keep a vigilant eye upon the fteps of his
adverſary, and take the moſt prudent meaſures, that are compatible with the
character of a private perfon, either to affwage the malice of E, or prevent the
effects of it; or perhaps, if he ſhould only not uſe him as a friend a. For this if
he ſhould do, notwithſtanding the rants of fome men, he would cancel the na-
tural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.
The debtor in the fecond objection, if he acts as he ſays there, does, in the firft
place, make himſelf the judge of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays
him under a heavy fentence, an incapacity in effect of having any eftate, or any
more eftate. In the next place, he arrogates to himſelf more than can be true:
that he perfectly knows, not only what his creditor and his circumſtances are,
but alſo what they ever will be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant,
or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwife. And, which is to be
confiderd above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be
the creditor's. For it is ſuppoſed to be owing or due to him (otherwiſe he is no
creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it and if he has a right
to it, of right it is his (or, it is his). But the debtor by detaining it uſes it,
as if it was his own, and therefore not the other's; contrary to truth. To pay
a man what is due to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him ex-
travagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no fuch fignification. It only
fignifies, that he who pays thinks it due to the other, or that it is his and
this it naturally doth fignify. For he might pay the creditor without having
any other thought relating to him, but would not without this.
Anf. to objection the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phrafe is uſed in
the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, fo to act that no truth
may be denied by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence
is a forbearance, which does not fignify, that I do not want money, or which
denies any truth. But taking it denies that to be his, which (by the fuppofition)
• Τὸν φιλέοντ᾽ ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, ἢ δι᾽ ἐχθρὸν ἐᾶσαι. Hef.
is
of Moral Good and Evil.
29
is his. The former is only as it were filence, which denies nothing: the lat-
ter a direct and loud affertion of a falfity; the former what can contradict no
truth, becauſe the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extra-
vagance and vice, there can be no pretence for making another man to pay for
his wickedness or folly. We will ſuppoſe therefore the man, who wants mo-
ney, to want it for neceſſaries, and to have incurred this want through fome mis-
fortune, which he could not prevent. In this cafe, which is put as ftrong as
can be for the objector, there are ways of expreffing this want, or acting ac-
cording to it, without trefpaffing upon truth. The man may by honeft labor
and induſtry ſeek to ſupply his wants; or he may apply as a fupplicant, not as
an enemy or robber, to fuch as can afford to relieve him; or if his want is very
preffing, to the firft perfons he meets, whom truth will oblige to affiſt him ac-
cording to their abilities: or he may do any thing but violate truth; which is
a privilege of a vaſt ſcope, and leaves him many reſources. And fuch a beha-
viour as this is not only agreeable to his cafe, and expreffive of it in a way that
is natural; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If
there is no way in the world, by which he may help himſelf without the vio-
lation of truth (which can ſcarce be fuppofed. If there is no other way) he
muſt e'en take it as his fate. Truth will be truth, and muſt retain its charac-
ter and force, let his caſe be what it will. Many things might be added. The
man, from whom this money is to be taken, will be proved fect. vi. to have
a right to defend himſelf and his, and not fuffer it to be taken from him; per-
haps he may ftand as much in need of it, as the other, &c.
Anf. to obj. the 4th. It is certain, in the first place, that nothing may wil-
lingly be done, which in any manner promotes murder: whoever is acceffary
to that, offends againſt many truths of great weight. 2. You are not obliged
to anſwer the furiofo's queftion. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No
one can tell, in ſtrict ſpeaking, where another is, if he is not within his view.
Therefore you may truly deny, that you know where the man is. Lastly, if
by not diſcovering him you ſhould indanger your life (and this is the hardeſt
circumſtance, that can be taken into the objection), the caſe then would be
the fame, as if the inquirer fhould fay, "If you do not murder fuch a one, I
will murder you.
And then be fure you muſt not commit murder; but
muft defend your felf againſt this, as againſt other dangers, againſt Banditi, &c.
as well as you can. Tho' merely to deny truth by words (I mean, when they
""
4 Τὸ πένες οὐκ ὁμολογεῖν
y' ¿der cuid. Hef.
modis detrahendum. Cic.
τινὶ αἰχξὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πεφεύγαν ἔργῳ αἴχιον. Thucyd.
b For gyor
• Suum cuique incommodum ferendum eft potius, quam de alterius com-
According to Plato, a man fhould chooſe to die ngò Fádíxv.
E
are
:
30
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. I.
are not productive of facts to follow; as in judicial tranſactions, bearing wit-
nefs, or paffing ſentence) is not equal to a denial by facts; tho an abuse of lan-
guage is allowable in this caſe, if ever in any; tho all fins againſt truth are
not equal, and certainly a little trefpaffing upon it in the prefent cafe, for the
good of all parties, as little a one as any; and tho one might look on a man
in fuch a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a man but a mad
man: yet truth is facred, and there are other ways of coming off with inno-
cence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in affiftance, or
taking the advantage of fome ſeaſonable incident .
The 5th objection feems to reſpect inanimate things, which if we muſt treat ac-
cording to what they are, it is infinuated we ſhall become obnoxious to many tri-
fling obligations; fuch as are there mentiond. To this I answer thus. If the
glass be nothing elſe but an uſeful drinking-glaſs, and theſe words fully exprefs
what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is oc-
cafion and it is truly uſeful, and to break it defignedly is to do what is wrong 4.
For that is to handle it, as if it neither was uſeful to the objector himſelf, nor
could be ſo to any one elfe; contrary to the deſcription of it. But if there be any
reaſon for breaking the glaſs, then fomething is wanting to declare fully what it
is. As, if the glaſs be poiſond: for then it becomes a poifond drinking-glaſs, and
to break or deſtroy it is to uſe it according to this true deſcription of it. Or if
by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the lofs
of it, it becomes a glass with that circumftance: and then for the objector to break
it, if it be his own, is to uſe it according to what it is. And if it fhould become
by fome circumftance uſeleſs only, tho there fhould be no reaſon for breaking it,
yet if there be none againſt it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty.
This anſwer, mutatis mutandis, may be adapted to other things of this kind;
books, or any thing elſe. As the uſefulneſs or excellence of fome books renders
them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to fecure them to pofterity;
fo ſome may be uſed more like what they are, by tearing or burning them,
b To that question, Si
• Ούτω καὶ ἰατρὸς νοσῶντα ἐξαπατᾷ, καὶ δεινὸν ἐδέν. Μax. Τyr.
quis ad te confugiat, qui mendacio tuo poffit à morte liberari, non es mentiturus? S. Austin anfwers
in the negative, and concludes, Reftat ut nunquam boni mentiantur. Quantò fortiùs, quanto excel-
lentiùs dices, nec prodam, nec mentiar.
In fuch preffing cafes, under imminent danger, the
world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ ἀιχρὸν ἡγῇ δῆτα τὰ ψευδή λέγον ;Οὐκ, ἐν τὸ σωθή
vai Y rò Laudo péęt. Soph. Even they, who fay nwyna naiy пbua nn'w nwn, and 7275 y tɔ
.אבל לשים שלום מותר day alfo המשקר כאלו עובר ע"ז and אמת אפילו במילי דעלמא
S. Hhared (& al. paſſ.). And Ab. Ezra fays of Abraham, nуwn Thiyana Jbaran ann.
In fhort, ſome have permitted, in defperate, cafes, mendacio tanquam veneno uti. Sext. Pythag.
.S. Hhaf .אסור ---- לשבר כליו בחמתו וכו )
gula de Homeri carminibus abolendis, &c? Suet..
e Who doth not deteſt that thought of Cali-
than
4
Of Moral Good and Evil.
31
than by preſerving or reading them: the number of which, large enough alrea
dy, I wiſh you may not think to be increaſed by this, which I here ſend you.
Here two things ought to be regarded. 1. That tho to act againſt truth in
any cafe is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things,
in ſome caſes the importance one way or t'other may be fo little as to render the
crime evanefcent or almost nothing. And, 2. that inanimate beings cannot be con-
fiderd as capable of wrong treatment, if the reſpect they bear to living beings is
ſeparated from them. The drinking-glafs before mentiond could not be confiderd
as fuch, or be what it now is, if there was no drinking animal to own and ufe
it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it felf, which is void of all
life and perception. So that when we compute what fuch things are, we muſt
take them as being what they are in reference to things that have life.
The laſt and moſt material objection,or question rather, fhall be anfwerd by and by.
In the mean time I fhall only fay, that if in any particular caſe truth is inacceffible,
and after due inquiry it doth not appear what, or how things are, then this will be
true, that the cafe or thing under confideration is doubtful: and to act agreeably
unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obſtinate, but modeft, cautious, do-
cile, and to endeavour to be on the fafer fide. Such behaviour fhews the cafe to be
as it is. And as to the want of power to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be
known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, he
may take to himſelf the fatisfaction, which he will find in fect. IV.
TH
SECT. II. Of Happineſs.
HAT, which demands to be next confiderd, is happiness; as being in it felf
moſt conſiderable; as abetting the cauſe of truth; and as being indeed fo
nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the reſpects due
to one, unleſs we regard the other. Happineſs muſt not be denied to be what it is:
and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at that happineſs, which is true.
In the few following propofitions I fhall not only give you my idea of it, but
alſo fubjoin ſome obfervations, which tho perhaps not neceffary here, we may fome-
time hereafter think no loſs of time or labor to have made en passant: fuch as
• The Stoics muſt certainly therefore be much too fcrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in
earneft), that de JXTURON AS ETUXE σaλsúty rã code i oyinirgint. Clem. Alex. Efpecially fince
this is, at leaſt ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by pr. ix.
E 2
men
32
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. II.
men of ſcience would call, fome of them porifmata, or corollaries, and ſome
fcholia, I fhall take them as they fall in my way promiſcuouſly.
I. Pleaſure is a consciousness of fomething agreeable, pain of the contrary: &v.v.
the consciousness of any thing agreeable is pleaſure, of the contrary pain. For as no-
thing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the fame time, and as fuch; nor a-
ny thing diſagreeable pleaſant, by the terms; foneither can any thing agreeable
be for that reafon (becauſe it is agreeable) not pleaſant, nor any thing diſagree-
able not painful, in fome meaſure or other.
Obf. 1. Pleaſures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and fenfe of their
Jubjects, or the perfons affected with them. For conſciouſneſs and perception cannot
be feparated: becauſe as I do not perceive what I am not conſcious to my ſelf
I do perceive, ſo neither can I be conſcious of what I do not perceive, or of
more or leſs than what I do perceive. And therefore, fince the degrees of plea-
fure or pain muſt be anſwerable to the conſciouſneſs, which the party affected
has of them, they muſt likewife be as the degrees of perception are.
Obſ. 2. Whatever increaſes the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more fuf-
ceptive of pleasure or pain. This is an immediate confequence; and to add more is
needleſs: unleſs, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward
ſenſe of things may in many cafes be heightend and increaſed, the principal are
reflexion, and the practice of thinking. As I cannot be confcious of what I
do not perceive: fo I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That
which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every inftance therefore of con-
fcioufnefs and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the
more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions; ſo v. v.
the more frequent or intenſe the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more
conſciouſneſs there. and the ſtronger is the perception. Further, all perceptions are
produced in time: tine paffes by moments: there can be but one moment pre-
fent at once: and therefore all preſent perception confiderd without any relation
to what is paft, or future, may be lookd upon as momentaneous only In this
kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing
before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a re-
petition of what is paſt, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet
to come: there is a connexion of paſt and future, which by this are brought
into the fum,and fuperadded to the preſent or momentaneous perceptions. Again,
by reflecting we practiſe our capacity of apprehending: and this practiſing will in-
creaſe, and as it were extend that capacity, to a certain degree. Lastly, reflexion
doth
Of Happineſs.
33
doth not only accumulate moments paft and future to thoſe that are preſent,
but even in their paffage it ſeems to multiply them. For time, as well as ſpace,
is capable of indeterminate diviſion: and the finer or nicer the advertence or
reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilft the mind
confiders thoſe parts as fo many feveral moments, is in effect renderd by this fo
much the longer. And to this experience agrees.
Obf. 3. The causes of pleaſure and pain are relative things: and in order to efti-
mate truly their effect upon any particular fubject they ought to be drawn into the
degrees of perception in that fubject. When the cauſe is of the fame kind, and acts
with an equal force, if the perception of one perſon be equal to that of another,
what they perceive muſt needs be equal. And fo it will be likewiſe, when the
forces in the producing cauſes and the degrees of perception in the fentients are
reciprocal. For (which doth not ſeem to be confiderd by the world, and there-
fore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the cauſe of pleaſure or pain
ſhould act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the perceptivity
of A be double to that of B, the fum of their pleaſures or pains will be equal.
In other cafes they will be unequal. As, if the caufa dolorifica fhould act with
the fame impetus on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two de-
grees of perception, and D had three, the pain fuftaind by D would be half
as much more as that of C: becauſe he would perceive or feel the acts and im-
preffions of the cauſe more by fo much. If it fhould act with twice the force
upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D
as 2 to 6: i. e. as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception.
to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And fo on.
Obf. 4. Mens refpective happineſſes or pleafures ought to be valued as they are to
the perfons themſelves, whofe they are; or according to the thoughts and fenfe,
which they have of them: not according to the eſtimate put upon them by o-
ther people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor can know what they
are; may compute by different rules; have lefs fenſe; be in different circum-
ſtances; or ſuch as guilt has renderd partial to themſelves. If that prince,
who having plenty and flocks many, yet ravifhd the poor man's fingle ewe-
lamb out of his bofom, reckond the poor man's lofs to be not greater, than
the lofs of one of his lambs would have been to him, he muſt be very defective
in moral arithmetic, and little underſtood the doctrine of proportion. Every
• Tu ſi bîc fis, aliter fentias. Ter.
man's
34
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. II.
i
man's happineſs is his happineſs, what it is to him; and the loſs of it is an-
fwerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to
his wants and circunftances".
Obf.5. How judicious and wary ought princes,lawgivers,judges,juries,and even ma-
fters to be! They ought not to confider fo much what a ftout,refolute,obftinate,
hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker fort, or at leaſt (if that can be
known) the perfons immediately concernd can bear: that is, what any puniſh-
ment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former
kind; and therefore fhould not be uſed as if they were. Some are drawn into
crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public juftice, they ſcarce know
how themſelves: fome fall into them through neceffity, ftrength of temptation,
deſpair, elafticity of ſpirits and a ſudden eruption of paffion, ignorance of laws,
want of good education, or fome natural infirmity or propenfion, and fome who
are really innocent, are oppreft by the iniquity or miſtakes of judges, witneſſes, ju-
ries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their ſenſe or their
honeſty has not permitted them to join. What a difference muſt there be be-
tween the ſufferings of a poor wretch ſenſible of his crime or misfortune, who
would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and thoſe of a ſturdy vete-
ran in roguery: between the apprehenfions, tears, faintings of the one, and the
brandy and oaths of the other; in fhort, between a tender nature and a brickbat!
Obf. 6. In general, all perfons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other
is concernd. Otherwiſe they may do they know not what. For no man can
tell, by himſelf, or any other way, how another may be affected.
Obf. 7. There cannot be an equal diftribution of rewards and punishments by any
flated human laws b. Becauſe (among other reaſons) the fame thing is rarely
either the fame gratification, or the fame puniſhment to different perfons.
Obf. 8. The fufferings of brutes are not like the fufferings of men. They perceive
by moments, without reflexion upon paſt or future,upon cauſes,circumſtances,&c.
Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to nothing, to no-time and
no-lifed. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remain-
כדרכיו שוה בשוה ולשער העונשים במדה ובמשקל וכו'
a Felicitas cui pracipua fuerit homini, non eft humani judicii: cùm profperitatem ipfam alius alio modo,
& fuopte ingenio quifque terminet. Pliny. b It is not poffible (in Albo's words) N nnb
c Inter hominem & belluam
boc maximè interefi, quod hac-ad id folum quod adeft, quodque prafens eft, fe accommodat, paululum
admodum fentiens prateritum aut futurum, &c. Cic. Nos & venturo torquemur & præterito. Timoris
·enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum prafentibus mifer eſt. Sen.
• Prafens tempus breviffimum eft, adeo quidem, ut quibuſdam nullum videatur, &c. Sen. "Orav go
αυτοὶ μηθὲν μεταβάλλωμάρι την Αμάνοιαν, ἢ λάθωμλμ μεταβάλλοντες, ἐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι ο χρόνο. Arift.
der
Of Happiness.
35
der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be
more applicable to ſome animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be
taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unneceffarily;
when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be a; and that
here.
way
no young be left to languifh. So much by the
II. Pain confiderd in itſelf is a real evil, pleaſure a real good. I take this as a
poftulatum, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,
III. By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleafure] is in it felf defirable, the
other [pain] to be avoided. What is here ſaid, reſpects mere pleaſure and pain, ab-
ftracted from all circumftances, confequences, &c. But becauſe there are fome of
theſe generally adhering to them, and fuch as enter fo deep into their nature, that
unleſs theſe be taken in, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor
can it therefore be known what happiness is, I muft proceed to fome other propo-
fitions relating to this fubject.
IV. Pleaſure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or less: alfo plea-
fures may be compared with other pleaſures b, and pains with pains. Becauſe all the
moments of the pleaſure must bear fome refpect or be in fome ratio to all the mo-
ments of pain: as alfo all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and
fo muſt thoſe of one pleaſure, or one pain, be to thoſe of another. And if the
degrees of intenfenefs be multiplied by the moments of duration, there muſt ſtill
be fome ratio of the one product to the other.
That this propofition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind,
tho in fome particulars they may err, and wrong themſelves, fome more, fome
lefs. For what doth all this hurry of buſineſs, what do all the labors and tra--
vels of men tend to, but to gain fuch advantages, as they think do exceed all their
trouble? What are all their abſtinences and ſelf denials for, if they do not think
fome pleaſures leſs than the pain, that would fucceed them? Do not the various
methods of life fhew, that men prefer one fort of pleasure to another, and fub--
mit to one fort of pain rather than to have another? And within our felves we
cannot but find an indifference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the
בא לדין וכו'...Ez .4 .אין השם חפץ שתמות בהמה חנם וכו' : עושה צער לבהמה חנם
اد
S. Hhas.
εν
ท
The rants of thoſe men, who affert, µin QaÞégdv údovùv údovñs, pendè ¿detov ti sivai:
nay, Quod ¿dèv údù, ĥ åndès, ap. Diog. L. can furcly affect no body, who has fenfe, or is alive. Nor-
that of the Stoics in Plut. ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος σόκ αΰξη προσγινόμβυον, κτλ. As if an age was not
more than a moment, and (therefore), an age's happineſs more than a moment's.
I
pain
36
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. II.
៩
:
pain with the pleaſure obtaind by it, or miſs the pleaſure, being excufed from
the pain.
1
V.When pleafures and pains are equal, they mutually deftroy each other: when the
one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleaſure or pain. For nine degrees
of pleaſure, lefs by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of
one, leſs by three degrees of the other, give fix of the former net and true.
VI. As therefore there may be true pleaſure and pain: fo there may be fome plea-
fures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vaniſh into
nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckond as pains; and
v. v. fome pains, that may be annumerated to pleasures. For the true quantity of
pleaſure-differs not from that quantity of true pleaſure; or it is ſo much of that kind
of pleaſure, which is true (clear of all diſcounts and future payments): nor can the
true quantity of pain not be the fame with that quantity of true or mere pain. Then,
the man who enjoys three degrees of fuch pleaſure as will bring upon him nine
degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are fet off to balance and fink the
three of pleaſure, can have remaining to him only fix degrees of pain: and in-
to theſe therefore is his pleaſure finally refolved. And fo the three degrees of
pain, which any one indures to obtain nine of pleaſure, end in fix of the latter.
By the fame manner of computing fome pleaſures will be found to be the lofs of
pleaſure, compared with greater: and fome pains the alleviation of pain; becauſe
by undergoing them greater are evaded . Thus the natures of pleaſures and pains
are varied, and fometimes tranfmuted: which ought never to be forgot.
:
Nor this neither. As in the ſenſe of moſt men, I believe, a little pain will
weigh againſt a great deal of pleafure: fo perhaps there may be fome pains, which
exceed all pleaſures; that is, fuch pains as no man would chooſe to fuffer for
any pleaſure whatever, or at leaft any that we know of in this world. So that
it is poffible the difference, or excefs of pain, may rife fo high as to become im-
menfe and then the pleafure to be fet againſt that pain will be but a point, or
cypher; a quantity of no value.
VII. Happineſs differs not from the true quantity of pleafare, unhappineſs of pain.
Or,any being may be faid to be fo far happy, as his pleasures are true, &c. That cannot
• Nocet (fit noxa) empta dolore voluptas. Hor. And-multo corrupta dolore voluptas. Id.
when that Pompey mentiond by Val. Max. by burning his finger eſcaped the torture.
malis paria non funt, etiam pari numero: nec latitia ulla minimo morore penfanda. Plin.
b As
· Bona
be
as Of Happineſs.
37
be the happineſs of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happineſs be
difagreeable. It must be fomething therefore, that is both agreeable and good
for the poffeffor. Now prefent pleaſure is for the preſent indeed agreeable;
but if it be not true, and he who injoys it muſt pay more for it than it is
worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot
be his happiness. Nor, again, can that pleaſure be reckond happineſs, for which
one pays the full price in pain: becauſe theſe are quantities which mutually
deſtroy each other. But yet fince happineſs is ſomething, which, by the ge-
neral idea of it, muſt be defirable, and therefore agreeable, it muſt be fome
kind of pleaſure and this, from what has been faid, can only be fuch plea-
fure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And
thus every one's happineſs will be as his true quantity of pleaſure.
One, that loves to make objections, may demand here, whether there may not
be happineſs without pleaſure: whether a man may not be ſaid to be happy in re-
ſpect to thoſe evils, which he eſcapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether
there may not be fuch a thing as negative happineſs. I answer, an exemption
from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we ſhould not be fenfible what
thoſe misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are deliverd, and in the larger
uſe of the word may be ſtyled a happineſs. Alſo, the abſence of pain or unhap-
pineſs may perhaps be called negative happineſs, ſince the meaning of that phrafe
is known. But in proper ſpeaking happineſs always includes ſomething pofitive.
For mere indolence refulting from infenfibility, or joind with it, if it be happi-
neſs, is a happineſs infinitely diminiſhd: that is, it is no more a happineſs, than it
is an unhappineſs; upon the confine of both, but neither. At beft it is but the
happineſs of ſtocks and ſtones: and to theſe I think happineſs can hardly be in
ftrictneſs allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a ſtock to be what it is, rather than to be
a miferable being: this we are fenfible of, and therefore, joining this privilege
with our own ſenſe of it, we call it happineſs; but this is what it is in our manner
of apprehending it, not what it is in the ſtock it ſelf. A ſenſe indeed of being free
from pains and troubles is attended with happineſs: but then the happiness flows
from the ſenſe of the caſe, and is a pofitive happineſs. Whilſt a man reflects up-
on his negative happineſs, as it is called, and injoys it, he makes it poſitive:
and perhaps a ſenſe of immunity from the afflictions and miferies every where
fo obvious to our obfervation' is one of the greatest pleafures in this world.
2 Θιόμεθα δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμίχθαι τῇ ευδαιμονία. Arift.
Arift. ap. Diog. L.
F
ο Οι οιονεί καθεύδοντος κατάςασις.
VIII. That
38
Sect. II.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
VIII. That being may be faid to be ultimately happy, in fome degree or other,
the fum total of whofe pleasures exceeds the fum of all his pains: or, ultimate
happiness is the fum of happiness, or true pleasure, at the foot of the account.
And fo on the other fide, that being may be faid to be ultimately unhappy, the
fum of all whofe pains exceeds that of all his pleafures.
IX. To make itſelf happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its ca-
pacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be fuppofed to
aim at, in general. For happineſs is fome quantity of true pleaſure: and that
pleaſure, which I call true, may be confiderd by itſelf, and fo will be juſtly
defirable (according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappineſs is
certainly to be avoided becauſe being a quantity of mere pain, it may be
confiderd by it felf, as a real, mere evil, &c. and becauſe if I am obliged to
purſue happineſs, I am at the fame time obliged to recede, as far as I can,
from its contrary. All this is felf-evident. And hence it follows, that,
X. We cannot act with respect to either our felves, or other men, as being what we
and they are, unleſs both are confiderd as beings fufceptive of happineſs and unhappineſs,
and naturally defirous of the one and averse to the other. Other animals may be con-
fiderd after the fame manner in proportion to their feveral degrees of apprehenfion.
But that the nature of happineſs, aud the road to it, which is ſo very apt
to be miſtaken, may be better underſtood; and true pleaſures more certainly
diſtinguiſhd from falfe; the following propofitions muft ftill be added.
XI. As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing,
that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: fo neither can the practice
of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature
and truth, oppoſes the will of the Author of nature (whofe exiſtence, &c. Ifhall
prove aſterwards); and to fuppofe, that an inferior being may in oppofition to
His will break through the conftitution of things, and by fo doing make himſelf
happy, is to fuppofe that being more potent than the Author of nature, and con-
fequently more potent than the author of the nature and power of that very
very be-
ing himſelf, which is abfurd. And as to the other part of the propofition, it is
alſo abfurd to think, that, by the conſtitution of nature and will of its author,
* This is truly Bonum fummum, quò tendimus omnes. Lucr. "Azarta S wg itûï, érégu xópw αi-
σέμεθα, πλὴν δ' ευδαιμονίας· τέλος δ αύτη. Ανέβει
L
any
Of Happineſs.
39
:
any being ſhould be finally miferable only for conforming himſelf to truth, and
owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It
is much the fame as to fay, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or un-
natural, and therefore punishable, to act according to nature and reality. If fuch
a blunder(excuſe the boldneſs of the word)could be, it muſt come either through
a defect of power in Him to caufe a better and more equitable ſcheme, or from
fome delight, which he finds in the miſery of his dependents. The former can-
not be aſcribed to the Firft caufe, who is the fountain of power: nor the lat-
ter to Him, who gives fo many proofs of his goodneſs and beneficence. Many
beings may be faid to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not ma-
ny injoyments: whereas did he delight in the infelicity of thoſe beings, which
depend upon Him, it must be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not
one of them would be otherwiſe in any reſpect. The world in that caſe inſtead of
being ſuch a beautiful, admirable fyftem, in which there is only a mixture of
evils, could have been only a ſcenc of mere miſery, horror, and torment.
That either the enemies of truth (wicked men) ſhould be ultimately happy, or
the religious obfervers of it (good men) ultimately unhappy, is ſuch injuſtice, and
an evil fo great, that fure no Manichean will allow fuch a fuperiority of his evil
principle over the good, as is requifite to produce and maintain it.
XII. The genuine happiness of every being must be fomething, that is not incompatible
with or deftructive of its nature, or the fuperior or better part of it, if it be mixt.
For inftance, nothing can be the true happineſs of a rational being, that is incon-
fiftent with reafon. For all pleaſure, and therefore be fure all clear pleaſure and
true happineſs muſt be fomething agreeable (pr. I.): and nothing can be agreeable
to a reaſoning nature, or (which is the fame) to the reafon of that nature, which
is repugnant and diſagreeable to reafon. If any thing becomes agreeable to a
rational being, which is not agreeable to reaſon, it is plain his reaſon is loft,
his nature depreft, and that he now lifts himſelf among irrationals, at leaſt as to
that particular. If a being finds pleaſure in any thing unreaſonable, he has an unrea-
fonable pleafure; but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a
contradiction to itſelf. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary
to what it is. Laftly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with rea
fon, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the fame thing;
then what has been faid under the former propofition, does alfo confirm this:
as what has been faid in proof of this, does alſo confirm the former.
• Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo qua poffides? qua
αυτό κακία ή κακοδαιμονία ἐτί. Αrr.
Sen.
F 2
• Παντὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν
XIII. Thoſe
40
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. II.
1
XIII. Thoſe pleasures are true, and to be reckond into our happpiness, against
which there lies no reason. For when there is no reafon againſt any pleaſure, there
is always one for it, included in the term. So when there is no reaſon for un-
dergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one againſt it.
Obf. There is therefore no neceffity for men to torture their inventions in find-
ing out arguments to juſtify themſelves in the purſuits after worldly advantages
and injoyments, provided that neither theſe injoyments, nor the means by which
they are attaind, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjuft, immode-
rate, or the like. For in this caſe there is no reaſon why we ſhould not defire
them, and a direct one, why we ſhould; viz. becauſe they are injoyments.
XIV. To conclude this fection, The way to happiness and the practice of truth
incur the one into the other c. For no being can be ftyled happy, that is not ulti-
mately ſo: becauſe if all his pains exceed all his pleaſures, he is ſo far from be-
ing happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miferable, in proportion to that ex-
cefs. Now by prop. XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happineſs of any
being, which interferes with truth: and therefore whatever doth produce that,
muſt be ſomething which is confiftent and coincident with this.
Two things then (but fuch as are met together, and embrace each other), which
are to be religiouſly regarded in all our conduct, are truth (of which in the pre-
ceding fect.) and happiness (that is, fuch pleafures, as accompany, or follow the
practice of truth, or are not inconfiftent with it: of which I have been treat-
ing in this). And as that religion, which arifes from the diftinction between mo-
ral good and evil, was called natural, becauſe grounded upon truth and the na-
tures of things: fo perhaps may that too, which propoſes happineſs for its
end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true
pleaſure and pain, which are phyfical (or natural) good and evil. And ſince both
theſe unite fo amicably, and are at laft the fame, here is one religion which
may be called natural upon two accounts.
3 Τίνων ἡδονῶν καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὀξθὸν μεταλαμβάνομαι : Simpl. Re&te facit, animo quando obfequitur fuo :
quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo fiat bono. Plaut. 6 Habebit philofophus am-
plas opes; fed nulli detractas, &c. Sen. Here he feems to confefs the folly of the Stoics, who denied
themſelves many pleaſures, that were honeſt and almost neceffary; living in tubs,. feeding upon raw
herbs and water, going about in a fordid garment, with a rough beard, ſtaff and fatcbel, &c.
rectum fit, apparet: quid expediat, obfcurum eft: ita tamen, ut-dubitare non poffimus, quin ea
maximè conducant, qua funt rectiſſima. Cic.
C
Quid
SECT.
Of Reaſon, and the ways, &c.
41
SECT. III. Of Reaſon, and the ways of
diſcovering truth.
Y manner of thinking, and an objection formerly a made, oblige me in the
MY
next place to ſay ſomething concerning the means of knowing, what is
true: whether there are any, that are fure, and which one may fafely rely upon.
For if there be not, all that I have written is an amuſement to no purpoſe. Be-
fides, as this will lead me to ſpeak of reaſon, &c. fome truths may here (as fome
did in the former fection) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many
occafions; and what has been already afferted, will alſo be further confirmed.
I. An intelligent being, fuch as is mentiond before, muſt have ſome immediate ob-
jects of his underſtanding; or at least a capacity of having fuch. For if there be no ob-
ject of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there
are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: becauſe every object must be
fuch (an object) either in itſelf immediately; or by the intervention of another,
which is immediate: or of feveral, one of which muft at leaſt be immediate.
II. An intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have fome,
that are abſtract and general. I fhall not at preſent inquire, how he comes by them
(it matters not how), fince this muſt be true, if there is any ſuch thing as a rational
being. For that reaſon is ſomething different from the knowledge of particulars
may appear from hence; becauſe it is not confined to particular things or cafes.
What is reaſon in one inftance, is fo in another. What is reaſonable with refpect
to Quinctius, is fo in reſpect of Nævius c. Reaſon is performed in fpecies. A ratio-
nal being therefore must have fome of thefe fpecies (I mean fpecific and abſtract
ideas) to work with; or fome fuperior method, fuch as perhaps fome higher
order of reafoners may have, but we have not.
The knowledge of a particular idea is only the particular knowledge of that
idea or thing: there it ends. But reafon is fomething univerfal, a kind of ge-
neral inftrument, applicable to particular things and cafes as they occur. We
reaſon about particulars, or from them; but not by them.
The laſt objection, p. 27.
↳ Sect. I. prop. I.
fit in Quinctium, id iniquum effe in Navium? Cic..
c Quis hoc ftatuit, quod aquum
In
42
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
In fact we find within our felves many logical, metaphyfical, mathematical ideas,
no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing: but they com-
prehend whole claſſes and kinds. And it is by the help of theſe that we reaſon,
and demonftrate. So that we know from within our felves, that intelligent beings
not only may have fuch abſtract ideas, as are mentiond in the propofition, but
that fome actually have them: which is enough for my purpoſe.
III. Thoſe ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known
to that mind, whofe ideas they are. For ideas can be no further the ideas of any
mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them: and therefore that
mind muſt perceive the whole of them; which is to know them adequately.
Again, theſe ideas being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to in-
creaſe, diminiſh, or any way alter them. And to fay the mind does not know them
truly, implies a contradiction: becaufe it is the fame as to fay, that they are mif-
repreſented; that is, that there are intervening and mifrepreſenting ideas.
And lastly, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not;
nor therefore of any immediate object otherwiſe, than as it is. We have indeed
many times wrong notions, and mifperceptions of things: but then theſe things are
not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help
of organs and media, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defective at beft and
incapable of tranſmitting things as they are in themſelves, and therefore occafion
imperfect and falfe images. But then, even in this caſe, thoſe images and ideas
that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are: and that is the
very reaſon, why the originals, which they ſhould exhibit truly, but do not,
are not perceived as they are. In fhort, I only fay the mind muſt know its
own immediate ideas.
IV. What has been faid of theſe ideas, which are immediate, may be faid alſo of
thoſe relations or reſpects, which any of thofe ideas bear immediately each to other: they
must be known immediately and truly. For ifthe relation be immediate, the ideas can-
not fubfift without it; it is of their nature: and therefore they cannot be known
adequately, but this muſt be known too. They are in this refpect like the ideas of
whole and part. The one cannot be without the other: nor either of them not
diſcover that relation, by which the one muſt be always bigger and the other lefs.
To fay no more, we may fatisfy our felves of the truth of this, as well as of the
foregoing propofitions, from the experiences of our own minds: where we find ma-
4
ny
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c.
43
ny relations, that are immediately ſeen, and of which it is not in our power to
doubt. We are confcious of a knowledge, that confifts in the intuition of theſe
relations. Such is the evidence of thoſe truths, which are uſually called axi-
oms, and perhaps of fome ſhort demonſtrations.
V.Thofe relations or respects, which are not immediate, or apparent at the firft view,
may many times be difcoverd by intermediate relations; and with equal certainty. If
the ratio of B to D does not inſtantly ſhew itſelf; yet if the ratio of B to C does,
and that of C to D, from hence the ratio of B to Dd is known alfo. And
if the mean quantities were ever ſo many, the fame thing would follow; pro-
vided the reaſon of every quantity to that, which follows next in the ſeries, be
known. For the truth of this I vouch the mathematicians: as I might all,
that know any ſcience, for the truth of the propofition in general. For thus
theorems and derivative truths are obtaind.
VI. If a propofition be true, it is always fo in all the inftances and uſes, to which it
is applicable. For otherwiſe it muſt be both true and falfe. Therefore
VII. By the help of truths already known more may be difcoverd. For
1. Thoſe inferences, which arife prefently from the application of general truths
to the particular things and cafes containd under them, muſt be juft. Ex. gr. The
whole is bigger than a part: therefore A (fome particular thing) is more than half A.
For it is plain that A is containd in the idea of whole, as half A is in that of part.
So that if the antecedent propofition be true, the confequent, which is included
in it, follows immediately, and muſt alſo be true. The former cannot be true, un-
lefs the other be fo too. What agrees to the genus, fpecies, definition, whole, muft
agree to the fpecies, individuals, thing defined, the part. The exiftence of an effect
infers directly that of a caufe; of one correlate that of the other; and ſo on. And
what is faid here holds true (by the preceding propofition) not only in reſpect of
axioms and firſt truths, but alſo and equally of theorems and other general truths,
when they are once known. Thefe may be capable of the like applications: and
the truth of fuch confequences, as are made by virtue of them, will always
be as evident as that of thofe theorems themſelves.
α
si'tıç égoilo
• That queftion in Plato, Τί ἄν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον αποδεῖξαι, εἴ τις ἔροπο νῦν ἔτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πό-
τεξον καθεύδομῳ, καὶ πάντα ἃ Δανούμεθα ὀνἠρώτομβρ, κτλ. may have place among the velitations of phi-
lofophers: but a man can ſcarce propoſe it ſeriouſly to himſelf. If he doth, the anſwer will attend
e V. Tacq. El. Geom. 1. 5. p. 3. n. XII.
But the thing appears from the bare inſpection of theſe quantities: 6, ab, aeb, aeib, aeiob, &c.
it.
b
a.
ce.
dae.
2. All
44
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
2. All thoſe conclufions, which are derived through mean propofitions, that
are true, and by juft inferences, will be as true as thofe, from which they are
derived. My meaning is this: every juft confequence is founded in fome known
truth, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of
fteps in an algebraic operation: and if inferences are fo founded, and juft, the
things inferred muſt be true, if they are made from true premiffes.
Let this be the form of an argument. MP: SM: ergo SP. Here if
S = M be falſe, nothing is concluded at all: becauſe the middle propofition is in
truth not S = M, but perhaps S = Ma, which is foreign to the purpoſe. IfS=M
be true, but MP falfe, then the conclufion will indeed be a right conclufion
from thoſe premiffes: but they cannot fhew, that SP, becauſe the firſt pro-
pofition if it was expreft according to truth would be Me P, which is ano-
ther thing, and has no place in the argument. But if theſe two propofitions
are both true, MP, SM, then it will not only be rightly concluded, but
alſo true, that S = P. For the fecond or middle propofition does ſo connect
the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to ſpeak
with the logicians, by ſeparately comparing the predicate or major term of the
conclufion with the medium in the firſt propofition, and the ſubject or minor
term with it in the fecond), that if the first and fecond are true, the third muft
be ſo likewiſe: all being indeed no more than this, P=M=S. For here the infe-
rence is juſt by what goes before, being founded in fome fuch truth as this, and
refulting immediately from the application of it, Quæ eidem æqualia funt, & in-
ter fe funt æqualia; or Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter fe conveniunt ;
or the like. Now if an inference thus made is juſtifiable, another made af-
ter the fame manner, when the truth diſcoverd by it is made one of the premif-
fcs, muſt be ſo too; and fo muſt another after that; and ſo on. And if the laſt, and
all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the firſt is fuppofed to be, it is no mat-
ter to what length the proceſs is carried. All the parts of it being locked together
by truth, the last refult is derived through fuch a fucceffion of mean propoſitions,
as render its title to our affent not worfe by being long.
Since all the forms of true fyllogifms may be proved to conclude rightly, all the
advances made in the fyllogiftic method toward the difcovery or confirmation of
truth, are ſo many inftances and proofs of what is here afferted. So alſo are the
performances of the mathematicians. From fome felf-evident truths, and a few eaſie
■ If men in their illations, or in comparing their ideas, do many times not actually make ufe of
fuch maxims; yet the thing is really the fame. For what thefe maxims exprefs, the mind fees
without taking notice of the words.
theorems,
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c.
45
theorems, which they fet out with at firft, to what immenfe lengths, and through
what a train of propofitions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous
are their theorems and diſcoveries now, ſo far once out of human ken! A
I do not enter fo far into the province of the logicians as to take notice of
the difference there is between the analytic and ſynthetic methods of coming at
truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the difquifition from the
fubject, or from the attribute. If by the uſe of proper media any thing can be
fhewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonſtration or
argument takes its rife. Either way propofitions may beget their like, and
more truth be brought into the world.
VIII. That power, which any intelligent being has of furveying his own ideas, and
comparing them; of forming to himſelf out of thoſe, that are immediate and abſtract,
fuch general and fundamental truths, as he can be fure ofª; and of making ſuch in-
ferences and conclufions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes
to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove ſome aſſertion, re-
folve fome question, determin what is fit to be done upon occafion, &c. the cafe or
thing under confideration being firſt fairly ſtated and prepared, is what I mean by the
faculty of reafon, or what intitles him to the epithet rational, Or in ſhort, Reaſon
is a faculty of making fuch inferences and conclufions, as are mentiond under the
preceding propofition, from any thing known, or given.
The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things,
with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious
to His eye or at leaſt we may ſafely fay, that He is not obliged to make uſe
of our operofe methods by ideas and inferences; but knows things in a man-
ner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to fuperior finite natures, what
other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing
not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding
truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumftances. Reaſon muſt be
underſtood, when it is afcribed to God, to be the Divine reafon; when to o-
ther beings above us, to be their reaſon; and in all of them to tranſcend ours,
as much as their natures reſpectively do our nature b.
G
It
a Under the word reafon I comprehend the intuition of the truth of axioms. For certainly to
diſcern the reſpect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the propofition
neceſſarily true, is an act of reason, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once.
believed, according to Socrates ap. Luc. that ὅσην ἔχε τὸ μέγεθος τ' κόσμο τὴν ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὸ Σω-
b If many
κράτες
46
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
It cannot be amiſs to note further, that tho a man, who truly uſes his ratio-
nal
has abſtract and univerfal ideas, obtaind by reflexion; out of theſe
powers,
frames to himſelf general truths, or apprehends the ftrength of fuch, and ad-
mits them, when they occur to him; by theſe, as by fo many ſtandards, mea-
fures and judges of things; and takes care to have the materials, which he
makes uſe of in reafoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them: yet
by a habit of reaſoning he may come to ſerve himſelf of them, and apply them
fo quick, that he himſelf ſhall ſcarce obferve it. Nay, moft men ſeem to reaſon
by virtue of a habit acquired by converfation, practice in buſineſs, and exam-
ples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the folidity even to their
own juſt reaſonings: juft as men ufually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their
accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the uſe of
them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the demonftration
of
any one of them. But ftill tho this be fo, and men reaſon without advert-
ing upon general ideas and abſtract truths, or even being aware that there are
any fuch, as it were by rule or a kind of rote; yet fuch there are, and upon
them refts the weight of reaſon as its foundation.
This, by the way, helps us to detect the cauſe, why the generality of people are fo
little under the dominion of reafon : why they facrifice it to their interefts and paffi-
ons fo eafily; are fo obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and
din of a party; fo apt to change, tho the cafe remains the very fame; fo unable to
judge of things, that are ever fo little out of the way; and fo conceited and po-
fitive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to difcerning perfons manifeftly
falfe. Their reaſoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into,
and out of which they know not one ftep, but all is to them Terra incognita; be-
ing ignorant of the ſcientific part, and thoſe univerfal, unalterable principles, up-
on which true reaſoning depends, and to find which and the true ufe of them
are required cool hours and an honeft application, befide many preparatives.
In the next place it muſt be noted, that one may reafon truly from that, which
is only probable, or even falfe. Becaufe juft inferences may be made from propo-
fitions of theſe kinds: that is, fuch inferences may be made as are founded in cer-
tain truths, tho thofe propofitions themſelves are not certainly true. But then what
follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or falfe, according to
κράτες ἢ χαιρεφῶντο εἶδα, τηλικα τον εν τὴν δύναμιν αυτό, καὶ τὴν φρόνησιν, καὶ πλάνοιαν ἀνάλογον Σαφέ
etv zu wei iµãs Afg.dows, what may we think of the God of the world? Therefore Tully ſeems to
expreſs himſelf too boldly where he writes, Eft-homini cum Deo rationis focietas. Inter quos au-
tem ratio, inter eofdem etiam recta ratio communis eft.
Upon this account it is, that I add the word given at the end of my deſcription of reaſon.
A
the
Of Reaſon, and the ways, &c.
47
the quality of that propofition, or thofe propofitions, from which the inference
is made.
Again; it ſhould be obſerved, that what I have faid of reaſoning, chiefly belongs
to it as it is an internal operation. When we are to preſent our reaſonings to o-
thers, we muſt transfer our thoughts to them by fuch ways as we can. The cafe is
to be ſtated in a manner ſuitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of
fact, and their circumſtances, to be made; many times perſons and things to be de-
ſcribed by proper diatypofes, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take
up much room in diſcourſes and books, and are performed by different authors,
upon different ſubjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety
of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many
times not without a neceffity of fome condefcenfions, afcititious advantages, and e-
ven applications to the paffions. But notwithſtanding this, in ſtrict reaſoning no-
thing is required, but to lay fteps in a due order, firmly connected, and expreſt pro--
perly, without flouriſh; and to arrive at truth by the ſhorteſt and clearest gra-
dation we are able.
Once more; perhaps diſputacious men may ſay I aſcribe the inveſtigation of
truth to one faculty, when it is in reality the joint buſineſs of ſeveral. For when
we go about this work, we are forced to make uſe of fubordinate powers, and e-
ven external helps; to draw diagrams, and put cafes in our own imagination; to
correct the images there, compound them, divide them, abſtract from them; to
turn over our memory, and ſee what has been enterd and remains in that regiſter;
even to confuit books, and uſe pen and ink. In ſhort, we affemble all fuch axioms,
theorems, experiments and obfervations, as are already known, and appear capa-
ble of ſerving us, or preſent themſelves upon the opening and analyſis of the quef-
tion, or cafe before us. And when the mind has thus made its tour, fetched in ma-
terials from every quarter,and fet them in its own view; then it contemplates, com-
pares, and methodizes them; gives the first place to this, the fecond to that, and
fo on;
and when trials do not fucceed rightly, rejects fome, adopts others, ſhifts
their order, &c. till at last the feries is fo difpofed, that the thing required comes up
refolved, proved, or diſproved by a just concluſion from proper premiffes. Now in
this proceſs there ſeem to be many faculties concerned ; in theſe acts of circumfpec-
tion, recollection, invention, reflexion, comparing, methodizing, judging. But
what if all this be fo? I do not exclude the uſe of fuch fubfervient powers, or other
helps, as are neceffary to the exerting this faculty of reafon; nor deny the mind
• Simplex & nuda veritas eft luculentior; quia fatis ornata per fe eft: adeoque ornamentis extrin-
fecus additis fucata corrumpitur: mendacium verò fpecie placet alienâ, &c. Lactant.
G2
matter
48
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
I
matter to work upon. I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offi
ces, and yet
make reaſon to be what I have defcribed it to be.
IX. There is fuch a thing as right reafon: or, Truth may be difcoverd by reaſon-
inga. The word reafon has ſeveral acceptations. Sometimes it is uſed for that pow-
er mentiond in the laft propofition; as when we fay, Man is a being indued with
reaſon. And then the ſenſe of this propofition muſt be this; that there is fuch a
ufe to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifeft truth. Sometimes it
feems to be taken for thoſe general truths, of which the mind poffeffes it ſelf from
the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illati-
ons and conclufions; as when we fay, Such a thing is agreeable to reafon: for
that is as much as to fay, it is agreeable to the faid general truths, and that authen-
tic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the ſenſe
of this propofition is, that there are fuch general truths, and fuch a right way of
inferring. Again; fometimes it ſeems to ftand only for ſome particular truth, as it
is apprehended by the mind with the cauſes of it, or the manner of its derivation
from other truth: that is, it differs not from truth except in this one refpect, that
it is confiderd not barely in itſelf, but as the effect and refult of a procefs of reafon-
ing; or it is truth with the arguments for our affent, and its evidences about it;
as when it is faid, that fuch or fuch an affertion is reafon. And then the ſenſe of
the propofition is, that there are truths fo to be apprehended by the mind. So
all comes to this at laft; truth (or there are truths, which) may be diſcoverd,
or found to be fuch, by reasoning.
If it were not fo, our rational faculties, the nobleſt we have, would be vain.
Befide, that it is fo, appears from the foregoing propofitions and what we know
within our felves. "Tis certain we have immediate and abſtract ideas: the relations
of theſe are adequately known to the mind, whofe ideas they are: the propofitions
expreffing theſe relations are evidently known to be true: and theſe truths muft
have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the parti-
culars and uſes, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to
us by the help of our fenfes, or prefent themſelves by any other way or means, to
That way, which fome Sceptics take to prove the inexiſtence of truth, has nothing in it, unleſs
it be a contradiction. If any thing, fay they, is demonftrated to be true, how fhall it be known,
that that demonftration is true! Ei + αποδείξεως, ζητηθήσει πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι καὶ τᾶτο ἀληθές ἐσι ; κ
Srwg big kædpov. Sext. Emp. Nor do I well comprehend St. Chryfoftom's meaning, when he fays, Tò
λογισμοῖς αποδειχθεν, κἂν ἀληθὲς ᾖ, ἐδέπω πληροφορίαν τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχε, καὶ πίσιν ἱκανήν. For as no man
truly believes any thing, unless he has a reafon for believing it: fo no reafon can be ftronger than
demonſtration.
which
Of Reaſon, and the ways, &c.
49
which theſe truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may
be made after the forementiond manner, new truths may be thus collected. And
fince theſe new truths, and the numerous deſcendents, that may ſpring from their
loins,may be uſed ftill in the fame manner, and be as it were the feed of more truth,
who can tell at what undefcried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive?
At leaſt no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind,
which is moſt uſeful to us in our conduct here, is difcoverable by this method.
They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reaſon, and treat right reafon as a
Chimera, muft argue againſt reafon either with reafon, or without reafon. In the
latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own caufe, and
eſtabliſh that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no fuch thing as
right reaſon by any good argument, is indeed impoffible: becauſe that would be
to fhew there is fuch a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.
And further, if this propofition be not true, there is no right reaſoning in Eu-
clid; nor can we be fure, that what is there demonftrated, is true. But to fay this
I am fure is abfurd. Nor do I defire, that this propofition, which I here main-
tain, ſhould be eſteemd more certain than thofe demonftrated by him: and ſo cer-
tain it muſt be; becauſe there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.
The great objection againſt all this is taken from the many inftances of falſe rea-
foning and ignorance, with which the practices, difcourſes, writings of mankind
are too juſtly taxed. But,in anſwer to it, I would have it minded, that I do not fay,
men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries
prematurely, before they have taken a fufficient ſurvey of things; that they may
not be prepoffeffed with inveterate errors, biaffed by intereft, or carried violently
down with the ſtream of a fect or faſhion, or dazled by fome darling notion or
bright name; that they may not be unprovided of a competent ftock of præcognita
and preparative knowledge; that (among other things) they may not be ignorant
of the very nature of reaſoning, and what it is that gives finews to an inference,
and makes it juſt; that they may not want philoſophy, hiftory, or other learning
requifite to the underſtanding and ſtating of the queftion truly; that they may not
have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to
judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not
be impotent in their elocution,and mifrepreſent their own thoughts, by expreffing
themſelves ill, even when within themſelves they reaſon well; that many under-
ftandings may not be naturally grofs, good heads often indifpofed, and the ableft
judges fometimes overſeen, through inadvertence or hafte: I fay none of theſe
• Haud alio fidei proniore lapfu, quàm ubi falſa rei gravis autor exiftit. Pliny.
things
t
1
50
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
things. The contrary I confeſs is manifcft: and it is in oppofition to thoſe er-
rors, which appear in theſe cafes under the name of reaſon, that we are forced
to add the epithet right, and to fay right reafon inſtead of reafon only; to diftin-
guish it from that, which wrongfully affumes that appellation. Nor, more-
over, do I fay, that by reaſoning the truth is to be diſcoverd in every cafe: that
would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only
ſay, that there is ſuch a thing as right reaſon, and truth diſcoverable by it.
I might add, that he, whofe faculties are intire and found, and who by a proper
exerciſe of his mind in fcientific ſtudies firft opens and enlarges its capacity, and
renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furniſh himſelf with
fuch leading truths, as may be uſeful to him, and of which he is affured in his
own breft; and in treating any ſubject keeps them ſtill in his eye, ſo that his
difcourfe may be agreeable to them: I fay, fuch a one is not in much danger of
concluding falſely. He muft either determin rightly, or foon find, that the ſub-
ject lies out of his reach. However he will be fenfible, that there are many things
within his ſphere, concerning which he may reaſon; and that there are truths to
be found by this uſe of his faculties, in which he may fecurely acquiefce.
Thus that queftion ſuppoſed to be asked p. 27. How shall a man know, what is
true? is in part anfwerd. More fhall be added by and by: only a propofition or
two, which ought not to be omitted, muſt be firſt inſerted.
X. To act according to right reason, and to act according to truth are in effect the
fame thing. For in which ſenſe ſoever the word reaſon is taken, it will ſtand either
for truth itſelf, or for that, which is inftrumental in diſcovering and proving it
to be fuch: and then, with reſpect to this latter fenfe, whoever is guided by that
faculty, whofe office confifts in diftinguiſhing and pointing out truth, muſt be
a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or
power is to act according to the genuin decifions and dictates of it.
That reaſon, which is right (by the meaning of the words) muſt conclude
rightly: but this it cannot do, if the conclufion is not true, or truth.
That is, (for fo I would be underſtood), if the principles and premiffes from
whence it reſults are true, and certainly known to be ſo, the conclufion may
be taken as certain and abſolute truth: but otherwiſe the truth obtaind at the
end of the argument is but hypothetical, or only this, that fuch a thing is ſo,
if fuch another, or fuch others are ſo or fo.
• That manner of demonſtration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from
that which is falſe, is only a way of fhewing, that an affertion is true, becauſe its contradictory is
falſe; founded in that known rule, Contradictoria nec fimul vera, nec fimul falfa eſſe poſſunt, &c.
XI. To
Of Reaſon, and the ways, &c.
51
XI. To be governed by reafon is the general law impofed by the Author of nature *
upon them, whofe uppermost faculty is reafon : as the dictates of it in particular cafes
are the particular laws, to which they are fubject. As there are beings, which have
not ſo much as fenſe, and others that have no faculty above it; fo there may be
fome, who are indued with reaſon, but have nothing higher than that. It is fuf-
ficient at preſent to fuppofe there may be fuch. And then if reaſon be the upper-
moſt faculty, it has a right to controll the reſt by being fuch. As in ſenſitive ani-
mals ſenſe commands gravitation and mechanical motions in thoſe inſtances, for
which their ſenſes are given, and carries them out into fpontaneous acts: fo in ra-
tional animals the gradation requires, that reaſon fhould command ſenſe.
It is plain, that reaſon is of a commanding nature: it injoins this, condemns
that, only allows fome other things, and will be paramount (in an old word rò ùye-
povixò ) if it is at all. Now a being, who has fuch a determining and governing
power fo placed in his nature, as to be effential to him, is a being certainly
framed to be governed by that power. It ſeems to be as much defigned by na-
ture, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals ſhould uſe their rea-
fon, and ſteer by it; as it is by the ſhipwright, that the pilot ſhould direct the
veffel by the uſe of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be
there, if it was not to be uſed: nor would reafon be implanted in any nature
only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be uſed,
but it muſt command: fuch is its nature.
It is not in one's power deliberately to refolve not to be governed by reafon.
For (here the ſame way of arguing may be ufed, that was lately) if he could
do this, he muſt either have ſome reaſon for making that refolution, or none..
If he has none, it is a refolution, that ftands upon no foundation, and there-
fore in courſe falls: and if he has fome reafon for it, he is governed by reafon.
This demonftrates that reaſon muſt govern.
XII. If a rational being, as fuch, is under an obligation to obey reason, and this
obedience, or practice of reafon, coincides with the obfervation of truth, thefe things
plainly follow.
a
• Cujus [fummi rectoris & domini] ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & fumma lex à philofaphis.
dicitur. Cic. Νόμο αψευδής ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγω, εχ ὑπὸ δεῖν ἢ ' δείνα θνητό φθαρτός, ἐν χαρτιδίοις
ἢ δήλαις άψυχες, αψύχοις, ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀθανάτε φύσεως ἄφθαρτῷ ἐν ἀθανάτῳ Agvoiᾳ τυπωθείς. Philo Fud
More to this purpoſe might be easily collected. Ο ΛόγΘ ἐςὶν ἐσκὼν Θε8. Ph. Jud.
• Tò nye-
μονικὸν καὶ κυριεύον τ' ψυχῆς μέρα. Μ. Anton. Or as it is in Plutarch, ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρω. Prin-
cipatus in Tully, Summus in anima gradus. Tert.
1. That
52
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
*f
1. That what is faid fect. I. prop. IV. muſt be true with reſpect to fuch a being for
this further caufe; becauſe to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reaſon,
and nothing can interfere with truth, but it muſt interfere with reaſon. Such a har-
mony there is between them. For whatever is known to be true, reaſon either finds
it, or allows it to be fuch. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being, if he has
a reaſon to the contrary. 2. That there is to a rational being fuch a thing as religion
which may alſo upon this further account properly be called natural. For certain-
ly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion: and
to obey the law, which He has given or reveald to him by making it to refult from
the right uſe of his own natural faculties, muſt be to him his natural religion. 3.A
careful obfervation of truth, the way to happineſs, and the practice of reafon are
in the iffue the fame thing. For, of the two laſt, each falls in with the firſt, and
therefore each with other. And fo, at laſt, natural religion is grounded upon this
triple and ſtrict alliance or union of truth, happiness, and reafon; all in the fame in-
tereft,and confpiring by the fame methods,to advance and perfect human nature :
and its trueft definition is, The purſuit of happiness by the practice of reaſon and truth.
Permit me here again to infert an obſervation obiter.
Obf. The giúpov of right reaſon and truth, or that which is to be regarded in
judging of right and truth is private: that is, every one muft judge for himſelf.
For fince all reafoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own pri-
vate ideas, by virtue of which he becomes confcious of fome firſt truths, that
are undeniable; by which he governs his ſteps in his purſuits after more truths,
&c. the criterion, or that by which he tries his own reaſonings, and knows them
to be right, muſt be the internal evidence he has already of certain truths, and
the agreeableneſs of his inferences to them. One man can no more difcern the
objects of his own underſtanding, and their relations, by the faculties of a-
nother, than he can fee with another man's eyes, or one ſhip can be guided by
the helm of another. They must be his own faculties and confcience, that
muft determin him. Therefore to demand another man's affent to any thing
without conveying into his mind ſuch reaſons, as may produce a ſenſe of the
truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his underſtanding, and to demand a tri-
bute which it is not poffible for him to pay ª. It is true indeed, tho I cannot fee
with another man's eyes, yet I may be affifted by another, who has better eyes,
in finding an object and the circumſtances of it; and fo men may be aſſiſted in
making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they
did not know before, and which yet require a place among thoſe that are to be
a
Religio cogi non poteft,verbis potiùs quàm verberibus res agenda eft, ut fit voluntas. Lact.
confiderd;
Of Reaſon, and the ways, &c53
.
c.
confiderd: and they may be directed what to advert principally upon; how to ſtate
the queſtion; how to methodize their thoughts,and in general how to reafon : efpe-
cially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little converfant
in cloſe reflexions, and doth not teach them to reafon, or (as the cafe too often is)
teaches them not to reafon. But ftill this is all in order to produce fuch a light in
them, that by it they may ſee and judge for themſelves. An opinion, tho ever ſo true
and certain to one man, cannot be transfuſed into another as true and certain by
any other way, but by opening his underſtanding, and affifting him fo to order
his conceptions, that he may find the reaſonableneſs of it within himſelf.
To prevent miſtakes I pray take notice here, that, tho I ſay men muft judge for
themſelves, I do not ſay they muft in all cafes act according to their private and fin-
gle judgments. In reſpect of fuch things, as are private, and concern themſelves
only, or fuch as are left open and fubject to every man's own fenfe, they may and
ought; only preferving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are
known upon other occafions to have more knowledge and literature than them-
felves: but when a fociety is concerned, and hath determind any thing, it may be
confiderd as one perſon, of which he, who diffents from the reft, is only perhaps a
fmall particle; and then his judgment will be in a manner abforbed and drownd in
that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intruſted. But I
muſt not digress too far from the main buſineſs, the ways of coming at truth.
XIII. The reports of fenfe are not of equal authority with the clear demonftrations
of reason, when they happen to differ. It is true, the ideas cauſed by the impreffion
of ſenſible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in
themſelves; and the mind may uſe them, and reaſon truly upon them: that is,
the mind may make a right uſe of the ideas, which it finds in itſelf. But then whe-
ther theſe are the true ectypes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many
times a queſtion; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has
been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, muſt be acknowled-
ged. They are conveyd through media and by inftruments fufceptive of different
difpofitions and alterations, and may confequently produce different repreſentati-
ons and theſe cannot all be right. But fuppofe thoſe inſtruments and media
to be as intire and pure, as when intireſt and pureft; yet ſtill there may be in
many reſpects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things juſt as they are. How
mightily are the ſhape and ſize of a viſible object varied upon us according to its
diſtance, and the fituation of the place, from whence the proſpect is taken?
Now theſe things cannot be faid of the reports, or rather determinations of rea-
fon. For in pure reaſoning we uſe our own ideas for themſelves, and fuch as the
mind knows them to be, not as reprefentatives of things, that may be falfely
H
exhibited.
54
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
exhibited. This internal reaſoning may indeed be wrongly applied to external
things, if we reafon about them as being what they are not: but then this is
the fault not of reafon, but of fenfe, which reports the cafe wrong; or per-
haps of the perfon, who has not been fufficiently induftrious to inform himſelf.
That fame familiar inftance of vifion proves further, that reaſon may be appli-
ed to over-rule and correct fenfe. For when the pictures of objects are pricked out
by the pencils of rays upon the retina of the eye, and do not give the true figure
of thoſe objects (as they not always do, being diverfly projected, as the lines
proceeding from the feveral points happen to fall upon that concave furface);
this, tho it might impofe upon a being, that has no faculty fuperior to ſenſe,
doth not impoſe upon our reafon, which knows how the appearance is alterd,
and why. To think the fun is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be b,
ſeems to be the laft degree of ftupidity. He must be a brute (fo far from being
a philofopher), who does not know, that the fame line (v. g. the diameter of
the fun) at different diſtances fubtends different angles at the eye. A ſmall mat-
ter of reaſon may ferve to confute ſenſe in this and the like cafes.
a
Obj. How can reaſon be more certain than ſenſe, fince reaſon is founded in ab-
ftractions, which are originally taken from fenfible objects? Anf. Perhaps the
mind may by being exerciſed at firſt about particular objects by degrees find in
itſelf this capacity of confidering things by their fpecies, making abftractions,
&c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of theſe particulars.
But then after it has found this capacity in itſelf, and attaind to the knowledge
of abſtract and general ideas, I do not fee why this capacity of reaſoning by
the help of them may not be uſed, upon this proficience, to cenfure and cor-
rect the advices of fenſe concerning even fuch particulars, as firft gave occafion
to the mind to exert this capacity and raiſe it ſelf. Is it a new thing for a ſcho-
lar to make ſuch a progreſs in learning, as to be able afterward to teach the
mafter, from whom he received his firſt rudiments? May not the modern phi-
lofophers correct the ancients, becauſe theſe firſt fhewd them the way, and led
them into the ſtudy of nature? If we look impartially into the hiftory of learning,
and even of religion, we ſhall find that truth has generally advanced by de-
grees, and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing
knowledge among men) rifen out of fable and error, which gave occafion to
thoſe inquiries, by which themſelves were detected. Thus blind ignorance was
fucceeded by a twilight of ſenſe: this brightend by degrees: at laft the fun as
• Tantulus ille fol. Lucr. Poor creature!
↳ Nec nimio folis major rota Effe poteft
noftris quàm fenfibus effe videtur. Lucr. Epicurus autem poſſe putat etiam minorem effe quàm videa-
tur, &c. Cic.
it
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c.
55
F
it were rofe upon fome parts of the commonwealth of learning, and cleard up many
things: and I believe many more will in time be cleard, which, whatever men
think, are yet in their dark and uncultivated ſtate. The underſtanding, tho it
ſtarts from particulars, in time makes a further progreſs, taking in generals, and
fuch notions logical, metaphyfical,&c. as never could poffibly come in by the fen-
fesa. Befide, further, the capacity itſelf of admitting and confidering general ideas
was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences
communicated by ſenſe are only an occaſion of uſing what it had before ¹. Juſt as
a maſter may, by the exerciſes he fets, excite the fuperior capacity of his ſcholar.
In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his fenfes, when he has a
reaſon againſt it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reaſon is above ſenſe and
controlls it. But,
XIV. The reports of fenfe may be taken for true, when there is no reafon against
it c. Becauſe when there is no reaſon not to believe, that alone is a reaſon for
believing them. And therefore,
XV. In this cafe to act according to them (i. e. as taking the informations of
fenſe to be true) is to act according to reafon and the great law of our nature.
Thus it appears that there are two ways, by which we may affure our felves
of the truth of many things d; or at leaſt may attain fuch a degree of certainty,
as will be fufficient to determin our practice: by reason, and by fenſe under the
government of reafon; that is, when reaſon fupports it, or at leaſt doth not op-
poſe it. By the former we diſcover ſpeculative truths; by the latter, or both
together matters of fact.
XVI. Where certainty is not to be hade, probability muſt be ſubſtituted into the
place of it: that is, it must be confiderd, which fide of the question is the more probable.
Probability, or that, which in this cafe may incline one to believe any propofi-
tion to be true rather than falfe, or any thing to be rather than not to be, or the
a Natura etiam nullo docente profecta ab iis, quorum, ex prima inchoata intelligentia, genera
b ↳ Semina nobis fcientia dedit [natu-
cognovit, confirmat ipfa per fe rationem, & perficit. Cic.
ra] fcientiam non dedit. Sen.
obftant
impediunt. Cic.
c Si fani funt [fenfus], & valentes, & omnia removentur, qua
d Socrates's faying, ap. Cic. nihil fe fcire, nifi id ipfum, favours
of an affected humility, and muſt not be underſtood ſtrictly. But they, who followd, went further
(omnes pane veteres: qui nihil cognofci, nihil percipi, nihil fciri poffe dixerunt): and particularly
Arcefilas negabat effe quidquam quod fciri poffet, ne illud quidem ipfum, quod Socrates fibi reliquiſſet.
And thus the abfurdity grew to a fize, that was monftrous. For no man can act, or even be alive,
if he knows nothing at all. Befide, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiction: and not
to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing or not; and that
is to know for ought he knows.
• Nec fcire fas eft omnia. Hor.
H 2
contrary,
56 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
contrary, will generally ſhew itſelf upon the application of theſe and ſuch like
rules. 1. That may be reckond probable, which, in the eſtimation of reaſon,
appears to be more agreeable to the conſtitution of nature. No body can certain-
ly foretell, that fice-ace will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before ambs-
ace: yet any one would chooſe to lay the former, becauſe in nature there are
twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a ftrolling wolf ſhould
light upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb: but
there is ſuch a natural propenfion in that kind to do it, that no body would much
queſtion the event. (This inftance might have been taken from amongſt men,
who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent
caufes his child to be inftructed in the foundations of uſeful learning, educates
him virtuouſly, and gives him his firſt impulſe and direction in the way to true
happineſs, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would
be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he was left to himſelf to be carried
away by his own paffions, or the influence of thoſe people, into whofe hands
he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, and mifery in the end,
and the plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So
that the advantage in point of probability is on the fide, of good education.
When Herodotus writes, that the Egyptian prieſts reported the fun had within
the compaſs of 11340 years twice riſen where it now fets, and fet where it rifes b
what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others),
is eaſily diſcernable by this rule. Herodotus, poffibly delighting in teratical
ftories, might tell what he never heard: or the paffage may be an interpolati-
on; or it may be alterd in tranfcribing: or the prieſts, who pretended much to a
knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to fhew what chil-
dren the Greeks were in refpect of them, invent fuch a monftrous relation, and im-
pofe it upon them, whom they thought to have not much ſcience among them:
or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to He-
rodotus, and fo paſs upon poſterity, as many other fictions and legends have done.
Theſe are ſuch things, as are well known to have happend often. But that
the diurnal rotation of the earth about her axis ſhould be inverted, is a phæno-
menon, that has never been known to happen by any body elfe, either before
or fince; that is favourd by no obſervation; and that cannot be without grcat
alteration
חנוך לנער על פי דרכו גם כי יזקין לא יסור ממנה .This was the opinion of a wife man •
הלימוד בימי הנערות הוא כפתוח על האבן --- והלימוד בימי הזקנה כפתוח על החול Prov. For
99
Dab ven. Οὐ μικρὸν Διαφέρὶ τὸ ὕτως ἢ ὅτως ἐυθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐπίζεως, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πᾶν.
Arift.
b
· Τετράκις ἔλεγον ἐξ ἠθέων δ' ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι· ἔνθα τε νῦν καταδύεται ἐνθεῦτεν δὶς ἐπαι
πόλεμος καὶ ἔνθεν νῦν ἀνατέλλη, ἐνθαῦτα δὶς καταδύναι.
j
:
1
Of Reaſon, and the ways, c.
57
alteration in the mundane fyftem, or thoſe laws by which the motions of the
planets, and of our earth among the reft, are governd. That this account them
may be falfe is very confiftent with the humor and circumftances of mankind:
but that it should be true is very inconfiftent with thofe laws, by which the mo-
tions of the celestial bodies feem to be regulated, and tend to perfevere in their
prefent courſes and directions. It is therefore in nature much more probable, that
this account is falfe. The odds are on that fide. 2. When any obfervation hath
hitherto conftantly held true, or most commonly proved to be ſo, it has by this ac-
quired an eſtabliſhd credit; the cauſe may be prefumed to retain its former force;
and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the cafe before us there doth not
appear fomething particular, ſome reaſon for exception. No man can demon-
ftrate, that the fun will rife again, yet every one doth, and muft act, as if that
was certainª: becauſe we apprehend no decay in the cauſes, which bring about
this appearance, nor have any other reaſon to miſtruft the event, or think it will
be otherwiſe a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodicti-
cal argument to prove, that any particular man will die but yet he muſt be
more than mad, who can prefume upon immortality here, when he finds fo
many generations all gone to a man, and the fame enemies, that have laid them
proftrate, ftill purſuing their victories. Theſe and fuch like, tho in ſtrictneſs per-
haps not certainties, are juftly current for fuch. So great is their probability.
There are other obfervations, which, tho not fo infallible as thofe, deſerve yet
to be thought of, and to have a fhare in the direction of our judgments. Ex.gr.
There have been men in the world and no doubt ſtill are, who, having had op-
portunities of impofing falfities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing o-
ther wickedness, have yet in fpite of temptation preferved their integrity and
virtue: but, fince opportunity has fo feldom faild to corrupt them who have
been in poffeffion of her, and men's interefts and paffions continue in general
the fame, it is more probable her charms will ftill have the fame power and ef-
fect, which they uſe to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofully
obnoxious to be abuſed by frauds pious and impious b. Briefly, when there is no
particular reafon for the contrary, what has oftneft happend, may from experi-
ence moſt reaſonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor
other obſervations point out the probable conjecture to us, we muſt be deter-
mind (if it be neceffary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and
fenſe of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the beft skill we
,Prov. (which fure one may convert thus. פתי יאמין לכל דבר 5
עולם כמנהגו הולך
a
המאמין לכל דבר פתי הוא
have
58
I
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
i
have a, to be moſt knowing b and honeft. Of all theſe rules the firft is that which
deſerves the principal regard: the other two are of ufe, when nature fo utterly ex-
cludes us from her bofom, that no opportunity is allowd of making a judgment.
Lastly, when nature, the frequent repetition of the fame event, and the opinion of
the beſt judges concurr to make any thing probable, it is fo in the highest degree.
It appears from what has been faid concerning the nature and foundations of pro-
bability, that the force of it refults from obfervation and reafon together. For here
the one is not fufficient without the other. Reafon without obfervation wants
matter to work upon: and obfervations are neither to be made juftly by our felves,
nor to be rightly chofen out of thoſe made by others, nor to be aptly applied,
without the affiftance of reafon. Both together may fupport opinion and practice
in the abſence of knowledge and certainty. For thoſe obſervations upon the na-
ture of men and things, which we have made our felves, we know; and our
own reaſoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from
hence there cannot but arife in many caſes an internal obligation to give our affent
to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And as to the
obfervations of others, they may be fo cautiouſly and skilfully ſelected, as to be-
come almoft our own; fince our own reafon and experience may direct us in the
choice and uſe of them. The remarks and advice of old men, who have gone
through variety of ſcenes, lived long enough to ſee the conſequences of their own
and other peoples actings, and can now with freedome look back and tell where
they erred, are ordinarily fure to be preferred to thofe of young and raw actors.
The gnome, apologues, &c. of wife men, and fuch as have made it their buſineſs
to be uſeful ſpies upon nature and mankind, national proverbs, and the like, may
be taken as maxims commonly true. Men in their ſeveral profeffions and arts, in
which they have been educated, and exerciſed themſelves all their days, muſt
be ſuppoſed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can uſually
b Non numero hac
• Statuere enim, qui fit fapiens, vel maximè videtur effe fapientis. Cic.
judicantur, fed pondere, as Tully fpeaks upon another occafion. Therefore I cannot without a degree
of indignation find a fort of writers pleafing themſelves with having diſcoverd fome uncivilized na-
tions, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, &c. and then applying their obfervations to
the fervice of atheifm. As if ignorance could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general!
C
او
И
c. Arifotle's known rule is "Ένδοξα τα δεκόντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείσεις, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς· καὶ τέτοις, ἢ τοῖς
πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείσοις, ἢ τοῖς μάλισα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. But it is not applicable to all cafes.
او
او
ท
d Dorst
μοι χρῆναι παρ' αυτῶν [πρεσβυτῶν] πιθάνως, ὥσπερ τινα ὁδὸν προεληλυθότων, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἴσως δεήση που
ρεύεως, ποία τις ἐσι. Plato.
e When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, nos éxts apòs
τ' αφροδίσια, he anfwerd, Εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπο ἀσικές αλα μελώ τοι αυτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυτῶ τά τινα
καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότων αποφυγών.
παντάπασι δ - γε τοιέτων ἐν τῷ γήρας πολλὴ ἐιρήνη γίνε) και ἐλόνα
Jegíu. Plato, & al.
* Εν βραχεῖ σφυρήλατον νῦν αειέχοντα. Plut.
have:
Of Reaſon, and the ways, &c.
59*
have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honefty they do not either
lofe, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in refpect of thoſe
things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And,✨
laftly, hiftories written by credible and induſtrious authors, and red with judg-
ment, may ſupply us with examples, parallel cafes, and general remarks, profit-
able in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perufal of
them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cafes is ac-
quired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and drift of their
counfels, much of the courſe of Divine providence is vifible in them.
To conclude; that we ought to follow probability, when certainty leaves us,
is plain: becauſe then it becomes the only light and guide we have. For unleſs it
is better to wander and fluctuate in abfolute uncertainty than to follow fuch a
guide; unleſs it be reaſonable to put out our candle, becauſe we have not the light
of the fun, it muſt be reaſonable to direct our ſteps by probability, when we
have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reaſonable, we are obliged to do it
by prop. XI. When there is nothing above probability, it doth govern: when
there is nothing in the oppofite ſcale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the
courſe of nature must turn the beam. Tho a man, to reſume the inftance be-
fore, cannot demonftrate that fice-ace will come up before ambs-ace, he would
find himſelf obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that fide:
nor could he not chooſe to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance,
he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which fide it lay.
Here then is another way of diſcovering, if not truth, yet what in practice may
be ſuppoſed to be truth. That is, we may by this way diſcover, whether fuch
propoſitions as theſe be true, I ought to do this, rather than that; or, to think ··
fo, rather than the contrary.
Obf. I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that,`,
we may almoſt from the premiffes collect,
Firſt, the principal cauſes of error, which I take to be fuch as theſe. 1. Want
of faculties; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As fome (ſtray-
ing out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no...
ideas but their own dreams, come to) affert what they have no reaſon to affert :
fo others deny what there is the higheſt reaſon to believe, only becauſe they can-
not comprehend it. 2. Want of due reflexion upon thoſe ideas we have, or may ·
have: by which it comes to paſs, that men are deftitute of that knowledge,
which is gaind by the contemplation of them, and their relations; mifapply
names, confuſedly: and ſometimes deal in a fet of words and phraſes, to which
I
?
noc
}
ار
:
бо
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. III.
no ideas at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is,
3. Want of proper qualifications and gonadsúpera. As, when illiterate pco-
ple invade the provinces of ſcholars; the half-letterd are forward, and arro-
gate to themſelves what a modeft, ftudious man dares not, tho he knows
more; and ſcholars, that have confined themſelves to one fort of literature,
lanch out into another: unſucceſsfully all. 4. Not underſtanding in what the
nature and force of a juft confequence confifts. Nothing more common than
to hear people affert, that ſuch a thing follows from fuch a thing; when it
doth not follow: i.. when fuch a confequence is founded in no axiom, no
theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of memory and imagination.
For men in reaſoning make much uſe of theſe: memory is upon many occa-
fions confulted, and fometimes draughts made upon the phantafy. If then they
depend upon theſe, and theſe happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way,
things may be miſrepreſented, and men led out of the way by miſ-ſhapen ap-
paritions. There ought to be therefore a little diftruft of theſe faculties, and
fuch proper helps ought to be uſed, as perhaps the best judgments want the moſt.
6. Attributing too much to fenfe. For as neceffary as our ſenſes are to us,
there are certainly many things, which fall not within their notice; many,
which cannot be exhibited after the manner of fenfible objects, and to which
no images belong. Every one, who has but juft faluted the mathematics and
philoſophy, muſt be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which
feem abfurd to ſenſe, and yet muſt be admitted. 7. Want of retirement, and the
practice of thinking and reaſoning by our felves b. A rambling and irregular
life must be attended with a looſe and irregular head, ill-connected notions,
and fortuitous conclufions. Truth is the offspring of filence, unbroken medi-
tations, and thoughts often reviſed and corrected. 8. The ſtrength of appetites,
paffions, prejudices. For by theſe the underſtanding may be corrupted, or over-
born: or at leaf the operations of the mind muſt be much obftructed by the in-
trufion of fuch folicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet ſtrong,
and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which
you muſt have obferved to be one of the greatest cauſes of modern irreligion.
Whilſt ſome opinions and rites are carried to fuch an immoderate height, as ex-
poſes the abfurdity of them to the view of almoſt every body but them who raiſe
them,not only gentlemen of the belles lettres, but even men of common ſenſe, many
• Sicut àµadía ♫ Dęáo✪, Aogioµès ɔ̃ öxvov Pégd (è Thucyd.) ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia,
perverfa confirmat audacia. Plin. jun. * Όταν το βελόμεθα ἀκριβὲς νοῆσαι, εις ἐρημίαν δίποδος
δράσκομυ, καταμύομαι τὰς ὄψις, τὰ ὦτα ἐπιφράττομαι, αποτατόμεθα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι. Ph. Jud.
times
Of Reafon, and the ways, &c.
61
times fee through them; and then out of indignation and an exceffive renitence,
not ſeparating that which is true from that which is falfe, they come to deny both,
and fall back into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general
9. Ill ſtating of a queſtion; when men either put it wrong themſelves, or accept it
fo put from others. A ſmall addition or falfity flipped into the caſe will ferment,
and ſpread itſelf: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may
perplex one. The queſtion ought to be preſented before its judge clean, and in its
natural ſtate, without diſguiſe or diſtortion. To this laſt may be ſubjoind another
cauſe, nearly allied to it; not fixing the fenfe of terms, and (which muſt often fol-
low) not rightly underſtanding what it is, that is to be examind and refolved.
Secondly, the reaſon why the many are commonly in the wrong and fo wretch-
edly misjudge things. The generality of people are not ſufficiently prepared,
by a proper education, to find truth by reaſoning. And of them, who have
liberal education, fome are foon immerſed and loft in pleaſures, or at leaſt in
faſhionable methods of living, rolling from one vifit or company to another b,
and flying from nothing ſo much as from themſelves and the quiet retreats proper
for meditation and reafoning: others become involved in buſineſs and the intri-
cate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingrofs their time: others fall
into a flothful neglect of their ſtudies and diſuſe of what they have learnt, or
want help and means to proceed, or only defign to deceive life and gratify
themſelves with the amuſements and fenfual parts of learning: and others there are,
whoſe misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclufion; taking their
opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to
their fituation in the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by which
they are to get their bread, before they have ever confiderd them; and then
making the ſubſequent buſineſs of their lives to difpute for them, and maintain
them, right or wrong. If fuch men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part
of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be
in the wrong, the more they ſtudy, and the more learning they get, the more they
are confirmed in their errors; and having ſet out with their backs upon truth,
the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of
negative quantity, fo much worfe or leſs than no knowledge. Of this fort there
are many and very few indeed (with refpect to the bulk of mankind), whofe de-
terminations and tenents were ever in the form of queſtions: there could not other-
wiſe be ſo many fects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon
Aliis nullus eſt deorum reſpectus, aliis pudendus. Plin. Sen. The former part of this obſervation
is in truth the effect of the latter.
Pudet dicere frequentiam (alutandi, &c. Hieron.
I
the
62
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IV:
the face of the earth. The fum of all in a few words is this: many qualificati-
ons are requifite in order to judge of ſome truths, and particularly thoſe which
are of greatest importance: proper learning and penetration, vacancy from bufi-
neſs, a detachment from the intereft of all parties, much fincerity and a perfect
refignation to the government of reaſon and force of truth; which are things
not to be reconciled with the ufual ignorance, paffions, tumultuary lives, and
other circumſtances which carry moſt men tranſverſe.
Sect. IV. Of the Obligations of imperfect Beings
with respect to their power of acting.
T
Here remains yet another question, fuppofed alſo to be propofed by an
objector, which muſt not be forgot; and upon which I ſhall beſtow
this very ſhort ſection. The question was this, If a man can find out truth,
may be not want the power of acting agreeably to it?
I. Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the fame as not
to oblige.
II. So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, ſo far is
that being incapable of any obligation to do it: or, no being is capable of any obligation
to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do. For that being, which
has not the faculties or opportunity neceffary to the doing of any thing, is in re-
ſpect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to
that act nothing at all.
To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power
ſuperior to the reſiſtence to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply
fuch a power is the fame as to require that his power of fuch a kind and degree be
applied. But if he has no fuch power, then his power of that kind and degree
is nothing and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing
is required to be done. It is juſt the ſame, as if a man was commanded to do
fomething with his third hand, when he has but two which would be the
fame as to bid him to do it with no hand, or not bid him do it.
Without more ado, it is a truth confeft by every body, that no body is obli-
ged to impoffibilities.
From hence will follow, after the manner of corollaries, the two following
propofitions.
III. Inani-
Of the Obligations, &c.
63
III. Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely fen-
fitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above fenfe.
IV. The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to
their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.
V. To endeavour may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers, that
any intelligent and active, but imperfect, being hath to act. For to endeavour is
to do what one can: and this as every fuch being may do, where ever he ſtands in
the ſcale of imperfects, fo none can do more. One may exert his endeavours
with greater advantage or fuccefs, than another; yet ftill they are but endeavours.
VI. The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of underſtanding and
acting must be in proportion to their endeavours: or, their obligations reach, as far as
their endeavours may. This follows again from what has been faid: and fo does this
VII. and laftly, They who are capable of difcerning truth, tho not all truths, and
of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all cafes, are nevertheless obliged to
do thefe, as far as they are able: or, it is the duty of ſuch a being fincerely to en-
deavour to practice reafon; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in
ſhort, to treat every thing as being what it is.
Thus the general duties of rational beings, mentiond in or refulting from the
preceding fections, are brought together, and finally fixt under the correction or
limitation in this laft propofition. This is the fum of their religion, from which
no exemption or excufe lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do
what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in earnest, and to ex-
ert himſelf heartily; not ſtifling his own conſcience, not diffembling, fuppreſs-
ing, or neglecting his own powers.
And now needless to me ſeem thoſe diſputes about buman liberty, with which
men have tired themſelves and the world. The cafe is much the fame, as if a
man ſhould have ſome great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get
up and go to fuch a place to accept it, or do fome certain thing for it, and he,
inſtead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious difquifition about his own
freedom; whether he has the power to ftir, or whether he is not chaind to his
feat, and neceffitated to fit ftill. The fhort way of knowing this certainly is to
try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be loft; but if he is capable of acting,
and doth not act, the confequences and blame muſt be juftly chargeable upon
I 2
himſelf.
64
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IV.
himſelf. And I am perfuaded, if men would be ſerious, and put forth them-
felves, they would find by experience, that their wills are not fo univerſally
and peremptorily determind by what occurs, nor predeſtination and fate ſo ri-
gid, but that much is left to their own conduct. Up and try 4.
ત
Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is alſo in
his power to forbear excefs in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his
own feet, fo as to go either this way or that or no whither, as fure he has, it is in
his power to abſtain from ill company and vicious places. And fo on e.
This ſuggeſts a very material thought: that forbearances, at leaſt in all ordinary
cafes, are within our powerf; fo that a man may if he will, forbear to do that,
which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his
power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and fo may ſeem to contradict
truth by his omiffion, which, if his infirmities and diſadvantages were taken into
the account, and the cafe was rightly ſtated, he would be found not to do.
οσα
b
פאת
• Τὰ χρης᾽ ἐπιτάμεθα, τα γιγνώσκομαι, Οὐκ ἐκπονεμθμ ε'· οἱ μὲ ἀργίας ὑπο, κλ. Eurip.
in Arabic is to die: and from hence the word fatum ſeems to come (as many Latin words do from
that and other Eaſtern languages), death, if any thing, being fatal and neceffary. Yet it doth not fol
low, that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixt. Où άvta xaduçãs ¿de HaŔŔň-
dnv in špagufón weiixi, ám´öra nadóλs. Plut. Ebryfippus ap. A. Gell. ſeems to explain himſelf much
after the ſame manner. The ancients moreover ſeem many times to make fate conditional. Similis
fi cura fuiffet, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant Stare, &c. Virg.
• What
the Pharifees fay, according to Jofephus, feems to be right. Oi Dagirałoí тwa sỳ & πávтa rus
ειμαρμθύης εἶναι λέγεσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ᾽ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ὑπάρχεν, συμβαίνην τε καὶ ἐ γίνεθζ. R. Albo, in rela-
tion to human actions (and the confequent events), explains this opinion thus.
nypp
*
४
But for men to charge their own .ומקצתן מכרחות ומקצתן מעורבות מן ההכרח והבחירה וכו
faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐθελοκακήσαντας-ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐκείνων Σπολογίαν
καταφυγεῖν, κλ. Luc.
d Dimidium facti, qui cœpit, habet. fapere aude. Hor. Ariftotle goes
faying (ἀρχὴ ἥμισυ παντός). His words are Δοκεῖ πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἥμισυ τῆ
Οὐδὲν γδ έτω κακῶς συντέτακται ἢ ψυχὴν ἐχόντων, ὥσε ἀβέλοντα αν
further than that old adagial
παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή.
•
Tõ mgoïívaι módas, ù poéɣſeds yλãrlav, xλ. Plut. That in Tibullus, Cùm bene juravi, pes tamen ipfe
redit, is a little poetic fally.
§ Όλως 5 πᾶσα ἀργία καὶ νὰ τεχέσης πράξεως ἐσιν ευμαρετέραν οἷον
ἐ φονεύσας, ἐ μοιχεύσες, κτλ. Baf.
SECT.
Truths relating to the Deity.
65
SECT. V. Truths relating to the Deity. Of his
exiſtence, perfection, providence, &c.
Have fhewn in what the nature of moral good and evil confifts; viz. a confor-
I to
1
mity or diſagreement to truth, and thoſe things that are coincident with it, rea-
fon and happiness: alfo, how truth is diſcoverd; by fenfe, or reafon, or both. I fhall
now ſpecify fome of thofe truths, which are of greateft importance and influence,
and require more reaſoning to diſcover them; leaving the reft (common, matters of
fact) to the common ways of finding them. They refpect principally either the De-
ity, or our felves, or the rest of mankind. The firſt fort are the fubject of this fection.
I. Where there is a fubordination of cauſes and effects, there must neceſſarily be a
cauſe in nature prior to the reft, uncaufed. Or thus, Where there is a feries, in which
the existence of one thing depends upon another, the exiſtence of this again upon ſome
other, and fo upwards, as the cafe ſhall be, there must be ſome independent being,
upon whom it doth originally depend.
If Z (fome body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is
plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are firſt moved, X by W,
and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are moveds, or rather Z more Y more X, taken to-
gether, are one moved: that W ftands here as the firſt mover, or author of the
motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a
moved without a mover, which is abfurd b: and laſtly, that of what length foever
the ſeries may be, the caſe will be ever the fame; i. e. if there be no. Firſt mover
unmoved, there muſt be a moved without a mover.
Further, if W, whom we will ſuppoſe to be an intelligent being, and to have:
a power of beginning motion, hath this power originally in himſelf and independently
of all others, then here not only the firſt mover in this feries, but a Firft being and
original cauſe is found. Becauſe that, which has a power of beginning motion in
dependent of any other, is a mover independent; and therefore is independent,. or has:
an independent exiſtence, fince nothing can be a mover without being. But if W
deny, that there is any
the fame, a first mover.
One might with the Erari@ras (fo called by Ariftotle, ap. S. Emp:) as well
fuch thing as motion, as ſay there is motion without a mover; or, which is
- Πρῶτον μεταβάλλον. Plato,. ᾿Αρχὴ κινήσεως ἁπάσης. Ι4. Πρῶτον κινῶν. Διέλε.
hass
66
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
has not this power independently in himſelf, then he must receive it from fome o-
ther, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of
conferring a faculty of producing motion originally and independently in himſelf,
here will be a Firft, independent caufe. And if it can be fuppofed, that he has it not
thus, and that the feries fhould rife too high for us to follow it; yet however we
cannot but conclude, that there is ſome ſuch cauſe, upon whom this train of beings
and powers muſt depend, if we reaſon as in the former paragraph. For,
Univerſally, if Z be any effect whatſoever, proceeding from or depending upon
Y as the cauſe of its exiſtence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifeft that the ex-
iſtence of all, Z, Y, X does originally come from W, which ſtands here as the
Supreme caufe, .depending upon ǹothing: and that without it X could not be,
and conſequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents),
or rather Z more Y more X one effect, without W there would be an effect without
a cauſe. Laſtly, let this retrogreffion from effects to their cauſes be continued ever
fo far,the fame thing will ſtill recur, and without fuch a cauſe as is before mentiond
the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any
thing to depend upon; i. e. dependent, and not dependent.
Obj. The feries may aſcend infinitely, and for that reaſon have no firſt mover or
cauſe. Anf. If a ſeries of bodies moved can be fuppofed to be infinite, then taken
together it will be equal to an infinite body moved: and this moved will not leſs re-
quire a mover than a finite body, but infinitely more. If I may not be permitted
to place a firſt mover at the top of the feries, becauſe it is fuppofed to be infinite,
and to have no beginning; yet ſtill there muft of neceffity be fome cauſe or author
* The greateſt men among the ancients denied the poffibility of fuch an aſcent. Our ródłľ ése
Tõde duvatòr iévai sandgov. Arift. If there could be fuch a proceſs, then all the parts of it but the
haft would be μέσα : and then εἴπερ μηδέν ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἴτιον ἐδὲν ἔχι, κλ. Το fuppofe one thing
moved by another, this by another, and fo ἐπ᾽ ἀπέρον, is to fuppofe ὅπερ ἐτὶν ἀδύνατον· ἐδὲν τὰ ἔτως
ἔτε κινῶν ἔσαι ἔτε κινέμήνον, μη ἔσης ἀρχῆς ο κινέσης. Simpl. Not only thofe Arabian philofophers
but many of the elder fews have agreed with the Greeks אלמתכלמון .4rab מדברים .called Hebr
in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former fee Mor. nebok. & al. particularly
S.Kozri: where their firft argument ſeems to be ſtrong (and much the fame with the fourth in S. Emu-
אם היה חולף אין לו ראשית הנה האישים הנמצאים בזמן החולף עד העת הזאת אין .(moth
-For tho, as Mufeatus obferves, thefe rea תכלית להם ומה שאין לו תכלית לא יצא אל הפועל
yet moft certainly let the Jeries of caufes לא לרצון היו לפניו [המורה fonings of the Medabberim
and effects be what it will, it is juſt as long downward as upward; and if they are infinite and inex-
hauſtible one way, they muſt be fo the other too: and then what Saad. Ga. fays, takes place ON
121 117) N2 19ÒN M yan. There is another argument of this kind in Justin M. which de-
ferves notice, what freis foever may be laid upon it. Εἰ τὸ μέλλον μέρα εν χρόνο, fays he, ἔπω ἐσίν
ἦν ἢ καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς μέρα. Ο χρόνος πρὸ δ' γενέας μέλλον· ἦν ἄρα ὅτε σοκ ἦν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρα ο χρόνο.
of
Truths relating to the Deity.
67
of the motion, different from all thefe bodies, becauſe their being (by the
fuppofition) no one body in the feries, that moves the next, but only in confe-
quence of its being moved firſt itſelf, there is no one of them that is not moved,
and the whole can be confiderd together but as an infinite body moved, and
which must therefore be moved by ſomething.
The fame kind of anſwer holds good in reſpect of all effects and their cauſes
in general. An infinite ſucceffion of effects will require an infinite efficient, or
a cauſe infinitely effective. So far is it from requiring none.
b
Suppoſe a chain hung down out of the heavens from an unknown height, and
the every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was
not viſible, yet it did not defcend, but kept its fituation; and upon this a quefti-
on fhould arife, What fupported or kept up this chain: would it be a fufficient an-
fwer to fay, that the first (or loweſt) link hung upon the ſecond (or that
next above it), the ſecond or rather the first and fecond together upon the third,
and ſo on ad infinitum? For what holds up the whole? A chain of ten links would
fall down, unleſs fomething able to bear it hinderd: one of twenty, if not ſtaid
by fomething of a yet greater ſtrength, in proportion to the increaſe of weight:
and therefore one of infinite links certainly, if not ſuſtaind by ſomething infi-
nitely ſtrong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a chain
of cauſes and effects tending, or as it were gravitating, towards fome end.
The laſt (or loweft) depends, or (as one may fay) is fufpended upon the cauſe a-
bove it: this again, if it be not the firft caufe, is fufpended as an effect upon
fomething above it, &c. d. And if they fhould be infinite, unleſs (agreeably
c
Aristotle himſelf, who afferts the eternity of motion, afferts alfo the neceffity of a firſt and
eternal mover.
b Zeigny xevosilu igavó. Hom. Aurea de colo-funis is mentiond
Σειρὴν χρυσείλω ἐξ ἐρανόθεν
C
.S. Iggar אי אפשר שישתלשל ענין מעלה ועלול אל בלתי תכלית •
d The
too by Lucr.
Where more may be ſeen of this bubnun out of Ibn Sinai, Maim. &c.
chain muſt be faſtende fío Oùμ. Invenietur, fays Macrobius, preffius intuenti à fummo
Dec ufque ad ultimam rerum facem-connexio: & hac eft Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de
cœlo in terras Deum juffiffe commemorat. This matter might be illuftrated by other fimilitudes
(even bapa busu might ferve for one): but I fhall fet down but one more : and in that in-
deed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the fame taken either way. It occurs in Hhob, halleb.
and afterward in Reh. hhokm. Suppoſe a row of blind men, of which the laſt laid his hand upon
the fhoulder of the man next before him, he on the fhoulder of the next before him, and ſo on till
the foremoſft grew to be quite out of fight; and fome body asking, what guide this ſtring of blind
men had at the head of them, it ſhould be anſwerd, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one
held by another, and fo went on, ad infin. would any rational creature accept this for a juſt anſwer?
Is it not to ſay, that infinite blindneſs (or blindneſs, if it be infinite) ſupplies the place of fight, or
of a guide?
to
68
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
to what has been faid) there is fome caufe upon which all hang or depend, they
would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to affert there is any
fuch thing, would be as great an abfurdity, as to fay, that a finite or little weight
wants fomething to fuftain it, but an infinite one or the greatest does not.
II. A Cauſe or Being, that has in nature no fuperior caufe, and therefore (by the
terms) is alſo unproduced, and independent, must be felf-exiftent: i. e. existence muft
be effential to him; or, fuch is his nature, that he cannot but be, For
For every be-
ing muft either cxift of itſelf, or not of itself: that which exifts not of itſelf
muft derive its exiſtence from fome other, and fo be dependent: but the Being
mentiond in the propofition is fuppofed to be independent, and uncauſed. There-
fore He muſt exift, not this way, but the other. The root of His exiſtence
can be fought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where
elfe is to make a caufe fuperior to the Supreme.
III. There must be fuch a Being. For (befide what has been ſaid already) if
there was not at leaſt one fuch Being, nothing could be at all b. For the uni-
verſe could not produce itself; nor could any part of it produce itſelf, and
then produce the reft: becauſe this is fuppofing a thing to act before it is.
3 So Arifotle fays of the Firft mover, Οὐκ ἀδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχον· ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐςι, κλ. And af-
ter him the Arabic philofophers, Maimonides, Albo, & al. paff. teach all that God exifts neceffarily.
nya pun 1: to fuppofe him not to be implies a falfity; or, He cannot be ſuppoſed not to be.
This feems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himſelf in Moſes's hiftory; UN'AN
77; or in one word, ; which in the mouth of one who ſpeaks of Him in the third perſon
אני אהיה בעבור שאהיה כי ;So Philo explains it; Eives sipure. So Abarbanel .יהוה or והיה is
adding moreover, that it ihewd God to be not, like other ;אין מציאותי תלוי בזולתי אלא בעצמי
,a Neceffary being. And fo R. L. 6. Gerb מחוייב המציאות מצר עצמו but איפשרי המציאות,beings
.I omit others, who write after the fame man יורה זה השם שהוא הנמצא אשר ימצא מעצמותו
ner. There have been even Heathens,
the Deity, and for the fame reafon.
fays, that in addreffing to Him the fecond perfon E
who feemd to think, that ſome fuch name as this belongd to
For as 1 and thence are used above, fo Plutarch
(77, or 1) is urOTEλNG TOES Agorayón
ρούσις καὶ προσφώνησις : and that by this compellation we give Him ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀψευδή επί μόνους μόνον
προσήκεσαν τὴν δ' εἶναι προσαγόξουσιν. Ἡμῖν μερὺ τὸ ὄντως ν' εἶναι μέτεσιν ἐδέν· it is τὸ ἀἴδιον καὶ ἀγενητὸν
καὶ ἄφθαρτον that is ὄντως ὄν.
b
לא יהיה otherwife מחוייב המציאות Something muft be
.c. Mor. neb. die al, אפשר מציאות every thing cannot be : דבר נמצא כלל
c This
needs no demonftration. But there is a very old one in S. Emun. and after in Hhob. halleb. nwıy
את עצמו אל ימלט מאחד משני דברים שעשה את עצמו קודם הויתו או אחר הויתו ושניהם אי
אפשר וכן!
IV. Such
Truths relating to the Deity
69
IV. Such a Being, as is before deſcribed, muft not only be eternal, but infinite.
Eternal He must be, becauſe there is no way, by which fuch a Being can either
begin or ceaſe to be, exiſtence being of His effence. And infinite He muſt be, be-
cauſe He can be limited by no other as to his exiſtence. For if there was any being
able to limit Him, He must be inferior to that being. He muſt alſo in that caſe
be dependent: becauſe he muſt be beholden to that being for his being what He
is, and that He is not confined within narrower limits. Befide, if His prefence
(whatever the manner of it is) was any where excluded, He would not be there:
and if not there, He might be ſuppoſed to be not elsewhere: and thus he might
be fuppofed not to be at all. But fuch a Being, as is deſcribed in the II.
cannot fo much as be fuppofed not to be.
prop.
V. Such a Being is above all things, that fall under our cognizance: and there-
fore his manner of existence is above all our conceptions. For He is a neceſſary ex-
iftent: but nothing within our comprehenfion is of this kind. We know no
being, but what we can imagine not to be without any contradiction or repug-
nance to nature: nor do we know of any befide this Supreme being himſelf. For
with refpect to Him indeed we know, by reaſoning, that there must be One be-
ing who cannot be fuppofed not to be; juft as certainly as we know there is
any thing at all: tho we cannot know Him, and how he exifts. Adequate
ideas of eternity a and infinity are above us, us finites b.
• What relation or analogy there is between time (a flux of moments) and eternal (unchangeable)
exiſtence; how any being ſhould be not older now, than he was 5000 years ago, &c. are ſpecula-
tions attended with infuperable difficulties. Nor are they at all cleard by that of Timaus ap. Plat.
Ὡς ποτ᾽ ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα το ιδανικὸν κόσμον ὅδε ὡρανὸς ἐγεννάθη, ὅτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τ αιώνα δε
χρόνου σὺν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιεργήθη; or that in Philo, Αιὼν ἀναγράφεται ν' νοητέ βία κόσμε, ὡς αισθητε
Xpó. Many philofophers therefore have thought themſelves obliged to deny, that God exifts in
time. Τό, τ᾽ ἦν, τό, τ' ἔσαι, χρόνε γεγονότα εἴδη, φέροντες λανθάνομθμ ἐπὶ τὴν αἴδιον ἐσίαν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς, κλ.
Plato. Εσιν ὁ Θεός, χρὴ φάναι, ἢ ἔσι κατ' ἐδένα χρόνον ἀλλὰ κατὰ τ ἀιῶνα τ ἀκίνητον, ἢ ἄχρονον ἢ ἀνέγκλ
τον, Ε κ πρότερον, ἐδὲν ἔσιν, ἐσ᾽ ὕσερον ἐδὲ νεώτερον· ἀλλ᾽ εἷς ἂν ἐνὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ ἀεὶ πεπλήρωκε, κλ. Plut.
-Albo has a whole Chap .14 .אינו מצוי בזמן .Maim .השם יתעלה אין יחס בינו ובין הזמן וכו
But then he owns, that their Rabbis do not mean .שה"י אינו נופל תחת הזמן ter to hey
בלתי נספר ומשוער והוא המשך שהיה קודם מציאות or that ,זמן סתם or הזמן בשלוח
,In hort .הזמן המשוער בתנועת הגלגל נקרא סדר זמנים לא זמן בשלוח וכו' but ; הגלגל וכו'
And fo .שזמן האמתי הוא נברא והמשך אינו קרוי זמן (they reckon (to ufe R. Gedales words
what they ſay, doth not include all the preſent difficulty, time in their uſe of the word being confi-
ned to the duration of this world, which according to them is new. Yet fee b. 2. c. 19. 'N "UNJ
שיאמר עליו שיש לו יותר זמן היום ממה שהיה לו בימי רויך וממה שהיה לו כשברא העולם
ti
ら
​ο οίδα με πολλὰ οὐκ ἐπισάμθρον ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ τρόπον. - ότι αναρχός έσιν [ ὁ Θεὸς ], καὶ ἀγέννητο, κα
aído, oldu. To ÿãs con oida. So Chryfoftom.
K
In
70
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
In inquiring after the cauſes of things, when we find (or fuppofe) this to be
the cauſe of that, another thing to be the cauſe of this again, and ſo on, if we
can proceed, it may always be demanded with refpect to the laft caufe that we
can comprehend, What is the cauſe of that? So that it is not poſſible for us to
terminate our inquiries of this kind but in fomething, which is to us incompre-
benfible. And therefore the Supreme cauſe muſt certainly be fuch. But tho
it is impoffible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of exiſtence,
yet we may be fure that,
VI. He exifts in a manner, which is perfect. For He, who exifts of himſelf, de-
pends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme caufe) is the fountain
of exiſtence to other beings, muft exift in the uppermost and best manner of ex-
ifting. And not only fo, but (fince He is infinite and illimited) He muſt exiſt
in the beſt manner illimitedly and infinitely. Now to exiſt thus is infinite good-
neſs of exiſtence; and to exiſt in a manner infinitely good is to be perfect.
VII. There can be but One fuch Being b. That is, as it appears by prop. III.
that there muſt be at leaſt one independent Being, ſuch as is mentiond in prop. I.
fo now, that in reality there is but One c. Becauſe his manner of exiſtence
being perfect and illimited, that manner of being (if I may ſpeak fo) is exhauſt-
ed by Him, or belongs folely to Himd. If any other could partake with Him
in it, He muſt want what that other had; be deficient and limited. Infinite
and illimited incloſe all e.
If there could be two Beings each by himſelf abfolutely perfect, they muſt be
either of the ſame, or of different natures. Of the fame they cannot be; becauſe
thus, both being infinite, their exiſtences would be coincident: that is, they would
be but the fame or one. Nor can they be of different natures: becauſe if their na-
tures were oppofite or contrary the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and
every where meeting the one with the other), the one would juſt deſtroy or be
dum. Hor.
a Simonides had good reaſon ſtill to double upon Hiero the number of days allowd for anſwering
that question, Quid, aut quale fit Deus? Ap. Cic.
b Nec viget quidquam fimile aut fecun-
c In Mor. neb. Maimonides having proved, that there must be fome Being, who
cxifts neceſſarily, or whoſe exiſtence is neceſſary by na, proceeds from this neceffity of exi-
ſtence to derive incorporeity, abfolute fimplicity, perfection, and particularly unity, my na
d Therefore by Plato He is called
.אי אפשר בו השניות כלל לא דומה ולא הפך וכו
Ο εἷς, the One.
e Deus, fi perfectus eft,
ut effe debet, non poteft effe nifi unus, ut in
eo fint omnia. If there could be more Gods than one, tantum fingulis deerit, quantum in cateris
fuerit. Lact.
the
Truths relating to the Deity.
71
the negation of the other: and if they are fuppofed to be only different, not op-
pofite, then if they differ as difparates, there muſt be ſome genus above them;
which cannot be: and however they differ, they can only be faid at moſt to be
beings perfect in their respective kinds. But this is not to be abfolutely perfect;
it is only to be perfect in this or that refpect: and to be only thus implies im-
perfection in other reſpects.
What has been here ſaid is methinks fufficient to ruin the Manichean cauſe
and exclude the independent principle of evil. For if we cannot account for the
exiſtence of that evil, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but
one inftance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reaſons for it, tho we
do not know them. And certainly no fuch experience muſt make us deny axioms
or truths equally certain b. There are, befide, fome things relating to this ſub-
ject, which deſerve our attention. For as to moral good and evil, they ſeem to
depend upon our felves. If we do but endeavour, the most we can, to do what
we ought, we ſhall not be guilty of not doing it (fect. IV.): and therefore it is
our fault, and not to be charged upon any other being d, if guilt and evil be in-
troduced by our neglect, or abuſe of our own liberty and powers. Then as to
phyfical evil; without it much phyfical good would be loft,the one neceffarily infer-
ring the other f. Some things feem to be evil, which would not appear to be fuch,
if we could fee through the whole contexture of things 8. There are not more e-
vil than good things in the world, but furely more of the latter h. Many evils of
this kind, as well as of the former, come by our own fault; fome perhaps by way
of punishment; fome of phyfici; and fome as the means to happiness, not otherwiſe
to be obtaind. And if there is a future ftate, that which feems to be wrong now
may be rectified hereafter. To all which more may yet be added. As, that matter
is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concernd, there muſt be
imperfections, and confequently evils k. So that to ask, why God permits evil, is
ἁμαρτάνεις, ἔτε κατὰ τύχω πορνεύεις, κλ. Cyr. Hier.
μη ζητήσῃς ἐτέξωθεν. S. Baf.
C
• As light and darknefs are. Δύο δ ἐξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ' ἐναντίωσιν φθαρτικὰ ἔσαι πάντως τῆς
åЯńλwv ovsάoɛwç. Baf. There can be no fuch law between them, as is faid to be among the Hea-
ἀλλήλων συσάσεως.
then deities. Θεοῖσι δ' ώδ' ἔχε νόμω. Οὐδεὶς ἀπαντᾶν βάλεται προθυμία. Τη 5 θέλοντα, κλ. Eurip.
Β'Απόλωλεν ἡ ἀλήθει, ἐπεὶ σὺ δυσυχείς: Ι.
Ψυχὴν ἔχες αυτεξέσιον κατά γένεσιν
& D
ο Ὧν αυτὸς εἶ κύριΘ, τόταν τὰς ἀρχὰς
e Muji God extinguiſh fun, moon, and stars, because some peo-
ple worfhip them? Mifhn. Αὐτῷ τῷ ἑλομθύς αιτία, Θεὸς ἀναίτιΘ. Μιχ. Τ.
ματι παρασκευάζει ἡδονὴν ποτέ, κλ. Μax. Τ. This obfervation might be extended a great way. It
there was, v. g. no ſuch thing as poverty, there could be no riches, or no great benefit by them
there would be fcarce any arts or fciences, &c. Ἂν δὲ ἀνέλης τὴν πενίαν, δ βίς την σύσασί,
ἀνεῖλες ἅπασαν, κλ. Chry(
* Η δίψα με σώ
5 Τὰ μέρη πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐι σύμφωνα ἢ ἁρμότοντα
I V. Mor. nebok. 3. 12.
* Κακία βλάςημα το ύλης. Plut.
K 2
evo (with more to this purpoſe). Plot.
* Θε8 ιατρική. Simpl.
: Πολυειδής ή
to
72
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
1
с
to ask, why he permits a material world, or fuch a being as man is; indowd in-
deed with fome noble faculties, but incumberd at the fame time with bodily paf-
fions and propenfions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He
permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold de-
mand, and the anſwer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be de-
fignd for a palestra, where men bare to exercife their faculties and their virtues,
and by that prepare themſelves for a fuperior ftate (and who can fay it is not?)
there must be difficulties and temptations, occafions and opportunities for this ex-
erciſe. Laſtly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true origin; yet
if they would but feriouſly reflect upon the many marks of reafon, wisdom and
goodneſs every where to be obſerved in inſtances, which they do or may under-
ftand, they could ſcarce doubt but the fame things prevaild in thoſe, which
they do not underſtand. If I ſhould meet with a book, the author of which I
found had difpofed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his ſubjects with
reafon and exactnefs; but at last, as I red on, came to a few leaves written in a
language which I did not know: in this cafe I fhould cloſe the book with a full
perfuafion, that the fame vein of good fenfe, which fhewd itſelf in the former
and much greater part of it, ran thro the other alfo : eſpecially having argu-
ments à priori, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the
fame perfon. This I ſhould certainly do, rather than deny the force of thoſe
arguments, in order to affert two authors of the fame book. But the evil prin-
ciple has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return.
VIII. All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propofi
tions for their exiſtence. For fince there can be but one perfect and independent
being, the reſt muſt be imperfect and dependent and fince there is nothing
elfe, upon which they can, ultimately, depend befide Him, upon Him they
muſt and do depend.
IX. He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but
what He either caufes (immediately, or mediately), or permits. All beings (by the laſt)
depend upon Him for their exiſtence: upon whom depends their exiſtence, upon
him alſo muſt depend the intrinfic manner of their exiſtence, or the natures of theſe
او
3 To that queftion. Why are we not fo made, ώσε μηδὲ βελομθύοις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν;
S. Bafil anfwers, Becaufe ἀρετὴ ἐκ προαιρέσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνά[κης γίνεται. And he who blames the Dei,
S. cả
ty becaufe we are not impeccable, ὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν ο λογικῆς προτιμᾷ, καὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον ε
ἀνόρμητον δε προαιρετικῆς ἢ ἐμπράκτο.
b Αθληταὶ ἀρετῆς, as. Philo.
< In Chryfoftom's
Ayle, ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖος, ο καθάπερ & παλαίσρᾳ ἐπὶ δὲ παρόντα βίς ἀγωνίζεως, ἵνα μὴ τὸ λυθῆναι τὸ
θέατρον λαμπρὸν ἀναδήσαπς διανοηθώρα σέφανον.
नै
2
ভ
beings:
Truths relating to the Deity.
73
beings and again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend
the neceffary effects and confequences of their being, and being fuch as they are in
themſelves. Then, as to the acts of fuch of them as may be free agents, and the ef-
fects of them, He is indeed not the Author of thoſe; becauſe by the terms and
ſuppoſition they proceed from agents, who have no neceffity impofed upon
them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however theſe free agents
muft depend upon Him as fuch: from Him they derive their power of acting:
and it is He, who permits them to uſe their liberty; tho many times, through
their own fault, they uſe it amifs. And, laftly, as to the nature of thoſe relations,
which lie between ideas or things really exifting, or which arife from facts already
done and paſt, theſe reſult from the natures of the things themſelves: all which the
Supreme being either caufes, or permits (as before). For fince things can be but
in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, difagree-
ments, &c. are nothing but their manners of being with respect to each other,
the natures of theſe relations will be determind by the natures of the things.
From hence now it appears, that whatever expreffes the exiſtences or non-ex-
iſtences of things, and their mutual relations as they are, is true by the conftitution
of nature: and if ſo, it muſt alſo be agreeable to His perfect comprehenfion of all
truth, and to His will, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (fome free a-
gent) is the effect of his liberty, and can only be faid to be permitted by the Su-
preme being; yet when it is once done, the relation between the doer and the deed,
the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed fuch a
fact, is a fixt relation. From thenceforward it will always be predicable of
him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one ſhould deny this, he would
go
counter to nature and that great Author of it, whoſe exiſtence is now proved.
And thus thofe arguments in fect. I. prop. IV. which turned only upon a ſup-
pofition that there was ſuch a Being, are here confirmed and made abſolute.
X. The one fupreme and perfect Being, upon whom the existence of all other beings
and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the word GOD.
There are other truths ftill remaining in relation to the Deity, which we may
know, and which are neceſſary to be known by us, if we would endeavour to de-
mean ourſelves toward Him according to truth and what He is. And they are
fuch, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attri-
butes; but alſo may ſerve at the fame time as further proofs of His exiſtence, and
an amplification of fome things touched perhaps too lightly. As,
XI. GOD
74
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
XI. GOD cannot be corporeal: or, there can be no corporeity in God. There
are many things in matter utterly inconfiftent with the nature of fuch a Being,
as it has been demonftrated God muft be.
Matter exiſts in parts, every one of which, by the term, is imperfecta : but
in a Being abfolutely perfect there can be nothing that is imperfect.
Theſe parts, tho they are many times kept cloſely united by fome occult in-
fluence, are in truth ſo many diftin&t bodies, which may, at leaſt in our ima-
gination, be disjoind or placed otherwiſe: nor can we have any idea of matter,
which does not imply a natural diſcerpibility and ſuſceptivity of various fhapes
and modifications: i. e. mutability ſeems to be eſſential to it. But God, exiſt-
ing in a manner that is perfect, exifts in a manner that must be uniform, always
one and the fame, and in nature unchangeable.
Matter is incapable of acting, paſſive only, and ftupid: which are defects,
that can never be aſcribed to him who is the Firft caufe or Prime agent, the
Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.
Then, if He is corporeal, where ever there is a vacuum, He must be excluded,
and fo becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chafms.
;
Laſtly, there is no matter or body, which may not be ſuppoſed not to be
whereas the idea of God or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves
in it exiſtence.
XII. Neither infinite ſpace, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended,
or eternally exifting, nor any, nor all of thefe taken together, can be God. For,
Space taken feparately from the things, which poffefs and fill it, is but an
empty ſcene or vacuum: and to fay, that infinite fpace is God, or that God is
infinite ſpace, is to fay that He is an infinite vacuum: than which nothing can
be more abfurd, or blafphemous. How can space, which is but a vaſt void, ra-
ther the negation of all things, than pofitively any thing, a kind of diffuſed no-
2 Εἰ σῶμά ἐσι, φύσις ἢ σώματα μεριζομθύη εις πλείω, ἕκασον τ' μερῶν μὴ τὸ αυτὸ εἶναι (F. ἔται) τῷ
λw, fays Plotinus even of the Soul. ο Δέδεικται 5 καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ἐδὲν ἐνδέχε) ἔχιν ταύτίων
ἐσίαν· ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ἐσιν. τίλιο
b
!
thing;
Truths relating to the Deity.
75
thing; how can this, I fay, be the Firft caufe, &c. or indeed any cauſe?
What attributes befide penetrability and extenfion, what excellencies, what
perfections is it capable of a?
As infinite space cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or ſpace;
fo tho He is eternal, yet eternity or infinite duration itſelf is not God b. For
duration, abſtracted from all durables, is nothing actually exifting by itſelf:
it is the duration of a being, not a being.
Infinite Space and duration, taken together, cannot be God: becauſe an inter-
minable ſpace of infinite duration is ftill nothing but eternal ſpace; and that
is at moſt but an eternal vacuum.
Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconfiftent with Divine
perfection, tho matter ſhould be infinitely extended, or there ſhould be an infinite
quantity of it, yet ftill, where ever it is, it carries this inconfiftence along with it.
If to matter be added infinite duration, neither does this alter the nature of it.
This only ſuppoſes it to be eternally what it is, i. e. eternally incapable of Di-
vine perfection.
And if to it you add the ideas of both infinite extenfion (or ſpace) and dura-
tion too; yet ftill, fo long as matter is matter, it muſt always and every where
be incapable of Divinity.
Laſtly, not the universe, or fum total of finite beings, can be God. For if
it is, then every thing is divine, every thing God, or of God; and fo all things
together muſt make but one being c. But the contrary to this we fee, there be-
ing evidently many beings diftinct, and feparable one from another, and inde-
pendent each of other. Nay, this diſtinction and ſeparation of exiſtence, be-
'fide what we fee without us, we may even feel within our felves. We are ſe-
verally confcious to our felvcs of the individuation and diſtinction of our own
Thilibi. Or, as לפי שהוא מקום הכל ואין הכל מקומו do it, מקום They, who call God :
Phil. Aquin, from the ancients, pinbiy rai obiy hu op 'p. où go weiixetai [ö
Ocòs], àñà werext tò nãv. Ph. Jud. By which ways of ſpeaking (tho there is a Cabbaliſtic reaſon
affigned too) they intend chiefly to expreſs his omniprefence and immenfity. That in Act. Ap.
feems to be of the fane kind, Ἐν αυτῷ γ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινέμεθα, καί ἐσρθρ.
t Such things as
theſe, how incongruous and wild foever they are, have bin affirmed; that God is infinite du-
ration, ſpace, &c. What can be meant by that, Kadõs av diyosto ò àíàÿ Isòs, in Plotinus ?
• Were not they, who converſe with books, accuſtomd to fuch trials, it would be ſhocking to find
Balbus in Cicero afferting, eſſe mundum deum : and yet in another place, that it is quafi communis de-
orum, atque hominum domus, aut urbs utrorumque; and deorum, hominumque caufa factus: in ano-
ther, providentia deorum mundum, & omnes mundi partes initio conftitutas effe, & omni tempore
adminiſtrari: in another, mundum ipſum naturâ adminiſtrari; with other like inconfiftences.
2
minds
76
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of which we can be more cer-
tain. Were we all the fame being, and had one mind, as in that caſe we
muſt have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one
perfon; but they muſt be common acts of the whole mind, and there could be
but one confcience common to us all. Befide, if all things conjunctly are God
or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of ſuch things, tho it be in order to
refute them), how comes this remarkable inftance of imperfection, among
many others, to cleave to us, that we ſhould not know even our ſelves, and what
we areb? In short, no collection of beings can be one being; and therefore not
God. And the univerſe itſelf is but a collection of diftinct beings .
XIII. It is ſo far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no
fuch thing as either matter or motion, if there was not fome Superior being, upon
whom they depended. Or, God is fuch a being, that without Him there could be nei-
ther matter nor motion. This muſt be true of matter: becauſe it has been proved
already, that there can be but one independent being; that he is incorporeal ;
and that the exiſtence of all other beings muft depend upon Him. But the fame
thing may be proved otherwiſe. If matter (I mean the exiſtence of it) does
not depend upon fomething above it, it must be an independent being; and if
an independent being, a neceffary being; and then there could be no fuch thing
as a vacuum: but all bodies muſt be perfectly folid; and, more than that, the
whole world could be but one fuch body, five times as firm as brafs, and incapa-
ble of all motion. For that being which exifts neceffarily does neceffarily exift:
that is, it cannot not exist. But in a vacuum matter does not exiſt.
Morcover, if matter be an independent, neceffary being, and exifts of itſelf, this
muſt be true of every particle of it: and if fo, there could not only be no vacuum
a
४
• Ατοπον ἐι μία ἡ ἐμὴ [ψυχή] καὶ ἡ ὁτιῶν ἄλλων ἐχρῶν τὸ ἐμὲ ἀισθανομής, το ἄλλον αισθάνες,
πως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλες, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. Plot. Here this author is clear, tho at fome other
times very dark. b Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, fi effet Deus? Cic.
• The
fyftem of Spinofa is fo apparently falfe, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not
be faid againſt it: the much might be. What Velleius fays in Cicero, is not only true, Si mundus eft
deus,— dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda funt: but, if there is but one fub-
ſtance, one nature, one being, and this being is God, then all the follies, madneſſes, wickedneſſes that
are in the world, are in God; then all things done and fufferd are both done and ſufferd by Him;
He is both cauſe and effect; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the fame
things at the fame time, &c. That ſuch groſs Atheiſm as this ſhould ever be faſhionable! Atheiſm:
for certainly when we inquire, whether there is a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourſelves
and all other things which are viſible about us do exiſt: fomething different from them muſt be in-
tended. Therefore to fay, there is no God different from them, is to fay, there is no God at all.
but
S
Truths relating to the Deity.
77
but every particle muſt be every where. For it could not be limited to occupy only
a place of fuch certain dimenſions by its own nature; fince this confinement of
exiſtence within certain bounds implies non-exiſtence in other places beyond.
thoſe bounds, and is equal to a negation of exiſtence; and when existence is effen
tial to any being, a negation of existence cannot be fo. Nor, in the next place,
could its exiſtence be limited by any thing elſe, becauſe it is ſuppoſed to have its
exiſtence only of itſelf; i. e. to have a principle of exiſtence in itſelf, or to have
an exiſtence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.
And I may add ſtill, if matter be felf-exiſtent, I do not fee, not only how it
comes to be reſtraind to a place of fome certain capacity, but alſo how it comes
to be limited in other refpects; or why it ſhould not exift in a manner that is in all
refpects perfect. So that thus it appears, matter muft derive its exiftence from
fome other being, who cauſes it to be juſt what it is. And the being, who can
do this, muſt be God.
It is to no purpoſe to object here, that one cannot conceive, how the exiſtence
of matter can be derived from another being. For God being above our conceptions,
the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, muſt
alſo be unconceivable. Reaſon diſcovers, that this vifible world muſt owe its ex-
iſtence to ſome invifible Almighty being; i. e. it diſcovers this to be fact, and we
muſt not deny facts becauſe we know not how they are effected. It is far from
being new, that our faculties ſhould diſcloſe to us the exiſtence of things, and
then drop us in our inquiry how they are. Thus much for matter.
As for motion; without a Firft caufe, fuch as has been deſcribed, there could be
none: and much leſs ſuch motions as we ſee in the world. This may be immediately
deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if matter itſelf could not be without
fuch a cauſe, it is certain motion, which is an affection of matter, could never be.
But further, there could be no motion,unleſs either there be in matter itſelf a pow-
er of beginning it; or it is communicated from body to body in an infinite fucceffion,or
in a circle, and fo has no beginning; or elfe is produced by fome incorporeal being,
or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices,
tho never fo repugnant to reaſon, I can hardly believe any one will affert, that a par-
cel of mere matter (let it be great or ſmall, of any figure whatſoever, &c.) left alto-
gether to itſelf, could ever of itſelf begin to move. If there is any fuch bold aſſertor,
let him fix his eyes upon fome lump of matter, ex. gr. a ftone, piece of timber, or a
clod (cleard of all animals), and peruſe it well; and then ask himſelf ſeriouſly, whe-
ther it is poffible for him in earneſt to believe, that that ftone, log, or clod, tho no-
thing corporeal or incorporeal ſhould excite or meddle with it, might fome time or
other of itſelf begin to creep. However, to be fhort, a power of beginning motion
L
is
do con
78
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
is not in the idea of matter. It is paffive, as we fee, to the impreffions of mo-
tion, and fufceptive of it; but cannot produce it. On the contrary, it will al-
ways perfift uniformly in its prefent ftate, either of reft or motion, if nothing
ftirs, diverts, accelerates, or ftops it. Nor is there any thing in all phyfics bet-
ter fettled than that, which is called' vis inertia, or the inertia of matter.
The propagation of motion from body to body, without any First mover, or
immaterial cauſe of motion, has been proved impoffible, prop. I.
The fuppofition of a perpetual motion in a circle is begging the queſtion. For
if A moves B, B moves C, and fo on to Z, and then Z moves A; this is the fame
as to fay, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, ---Z: that is,
A moves itself, or can begin motion ª.
It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from fome mover
incorporeal: which muſt be either that Supreme and ſelf-exiſting ſpirit himſelf,
who is God; or fuch, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is
fuch a Being, Turn back to p. 65.
If we confider qurfelves, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may
there fee the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or fome members of
them, and by theſe move other things, as they again do others; and know theſe
motions to ſpring from the operations of our minds: but then we know alſo, that
we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could
not be fo limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to ſmall
quan
tities and certain circumftances only: we ſhould have had it from eternity, nor
could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are neceffitated to look up and
acknowledge fome Higher being, who is able not only to produce motion, but
to impart a faculty of producing it.
And if the petty motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a
God, much more may thofe greater motions we ſee in the world,, and the phano-
mena attending them: I mean the motions of the planets and heavenly bodies.
For theſe muſt be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, act-
ing upon
them immediately, or by cauſes and laws of His appointment;, or by
their reſpective movers, who, for reaſons to which you can by this time be no
ftranger, muft depend upon ſome Superior, that furniſhd them with the power
of doing this. And granting it to be done either of theſe ways, we can be at
no great diſtance from a demonſtration of the existence of a Deity.
a What Cenforinus charges upon many great men (but upon fome of them furely unjustly) is to me
unintelligible. He fays, they believed femper homines fuiffe, &c. and then, Itaque omnium, que in
fempiterno ifto mundo femper fuerunt, futuraque funt, aiunt principium fuiffe nullum; fed orbem eſſe
quemdam generantium, nafcentiumque, in quo uniufcujufque geniti initium fimul & finis effe videatur.
4
It
Truths relating to the Deity.
79
It may perhaps be faid, that tho matter has not the power of moving itſelf,
yet it hath an attractive force, by which it can move other parts of matter: fo
that all matter equally moves and is moved. But, allowing thoſe things which
are now uſually aſcribed to attraction, we fhall ftill be neceffitated to own ſome
Superior being, whoſe influence mixes itſelf with matter, and operates upon it ✈
or at leaſt who, fome way or other, imparts this force. For attraction, accord-
ing to the true ſenſe of the word, ſuppoſes one body to act upon another at a
diſtance, or where it is not; but nothing can be an agent, where it is not at all.
Matter can act only by contact, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put
into motion by fomething elfe, or refilting thoſe which ftrike againſt it, when
it is at reft. And this it does as matter; i. e. by being impenetrable to other
matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is
called attraction, is fo called only becauſe the ſame things happen, as if the parts
of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of fome-
thing, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of
matter ſeem not only to gravitate towards each other, but many of them to
fly each other. Now theſe two contrary motions and feeming qualities cannot
both proceed from matter quà matter; cannot both be of the nature of it: and
therefore they muſt be owing to fome external cauſe, or to fome other being,
which exites in them this, as it were love and diſcord ².
Befide, as to the revolution of a planet about the fun, mere gravitation is not
fufficient to produce that effect. It must be compounded with a motion of pro-
jection, to keep the planet from falling directly into the fun, and bring it about:
and from what hand, I defire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)?
Who impreffed it?
{
What a vaſt field for contemplation is here opend! Such regions of matter a-
bout us, in which there is not the leaſt particle that does not carry with it an ar-
gument of God's exiſtence; not the leaſt ſtick or ftraw, or other trifle that falls
to the ground, but fhews it; not the flighteſt motion produced, the leaft whis-
per of the air, but tells it.
XIV. The frame and conftitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of
it, the various phænomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity obſerved in the pro-
ductions of things, the uſes and ends for which they ferve, &c. do all fhew that there
is fome Almighty defigner, an infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things:
So what we call attraction and averfion (centripetal and centrifugal, forces) feem to have been
called by Empedocles: país youyngivas['à 50%], è vex & diangívilas. Diog. L. (v. Emp.) V. Arift.
Cic. & al.
τα
L 2
Such
80
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
fuch marks there are of both. Or, God is that Being, without whom fuch a
frame or conftitution of the world, ſuch a magnificence in it, &c. could not be. In
order to prove to any one the grandneſs of this fabric of the world, one needs
only to bid him confider the fun with that infupportable glory and luftre that
furrounds it to demonftrate the vaft diftance, magnitude, and heat of it: to re-
prefent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in
their ſeveral orbits about it; affording a regular variety of aſpects; guarded
fome of them by fecondary planets, and as it were emulating the ſtate of the
fun; and probably all poffeft by proper inhabitants: to remind him of thoſe
furpriſing viſits the comets make us; the large trains, or uncommon fplen-
dor, which attends them; the far country they come from; and the curiofity
and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other
planets, who alfo may be up to fee the entry and progreſs of theſe miniſters
of fateb to direct his eye and contemplation, through thoſe azure fields and
vaſt regions above him, up to the fixt ftars, that radiant numberleſs hoſt of
heaven; and to make him underſtand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they
fhould be placed there only to adorn and befpangle a canopy over our heads
(tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much leſs to ſupply
the places of fo many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or
even to all our fellow-planets: to convince him, that they are rather fo many
other funs, with their feveral regions and fets of planets about them: to fhew
him, by the help of glaffes, ſtill more and more of theſe fixt lights, and to be-
get in him an apprehenfion of their unaccountable numbers, and of thoſe im-
menſe ſpaces, that lie retired beyond our utmoſt reach and even imagination: I
fay, one needs but to do this, and explain to him ſuch things as are now known
almoft to every body; and by it to fhew that if the world be not infinite, it is
infinito fimilis ; and therefore fure a magnificent ſtructure, and the work of an
infinite Architect. But if we could take a view of all the particulars containd
within that aſtoniſhing compaſs, which we have thus hastily run over, how
would wonders multiply upon us? Every corner, every part of the world is as
it were made up of other worlds. If we look upon this our feat (I mean this
c
• So far is that from being true, Nequaquam-divinitus effe creatam Naturam mundi, qua tantâ eft
pradita culpâ. Lucret. Men rafhly (impiouſly) cenfure what they do not underſtand. Like that king
of Caſtile, who fancied himſelf able to have contrived a better ſyſtem of the world; becauſe he knew
not what the true ſyſtem is, but took it to be as aſcribed to him by R. If. ab. Sid, and other aſtrono-
mers of thoſe times.
↳ Since they have, or may have great effects upon the ſeveral parts of
the folar fyftem, one may speak thus without falling into the fuperftition of the multitude, or meaning
what is intended by that, Nunquam calo fpectatum impune cometen (in Claud), or the like.
aitus, & infinite fimilis. Plin.
• Fix
carth),
Truths relating to the Deity.
8 r
a
earth), what ſcope is here for admiration? The great variety of mountains, hills,
valleys, plains, rivers, feas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different animals,
with which it is ſtocked! The multifarious inventions and works of one of thefe;
that is, of us men, &c. And yet when all theſe (heaven and earth) are furveyd as
nicely as they can be by the help of our unaffiſted ſenſes, and even of teleſcopical
glaffes, by the affiſtance of good microſcopes in very ſmall parts of matter as ma-
ny new wonders may perhaps be diſcoverd, as thofe already obſerved; new
kingdoms of animals; new architecture and curiofity of work. So that as before
our ſenſes and even conception fainted in thoſe vaft journeys we were obliged to
take in confidering the expanſe of the univerſe; fo here again they fail us in our
reſearches into the principles and conſtituent parts of it. Both the beginnings and
the ends of things, the least and the greateſt, all conſpire to baffle us: and which
way ever we proſecute our inquiries, we ftill fall in with freſh ſubjects of amaze-
ment, and freſh reaſons to believe that there are indefinitely ſtill more and more
behind, that will for ever eſcape our eagereft purſuits and deepeſt penetration.
This mighty building is not only thus grand, and the appearances ſtupendous
in it, but the manner in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible,
and their cauſes too profound for us. There are indeed many things in nature,
which we know; and fome, of which we ſeem to know the cauſes: but, alas!
how few are theſe with reſpect to the whole fum? And the caufes which we af-
fign, what are they? Commonly fuch, as can only be expreffed in general
terms, whilft the bottoms of things remain unfathomable. Such, as have been
collected from experience, but could fcarcely be known beforehand, by any ar-
guments à priori, to be capable of rendering fuch effects: and yet till cauſes
are known after that manner, they are not thoroughly underſtood. Such, as
ſeem difproportionate and too little, and are fo infufficient and unfatisfactory,
that one cannot but be inclined to think, that ſomething immaterial and inviſi-
ble muſt be immediately concerned. In fhort, we know many times, that fuch
a thing will have fuch an effect, or perhaps that fuch an effect is produced
by fuch a cauſe, but the manner how we know not; or but grofly, and if
fuch an hypothefis be true. It is impoffible for us to come at the true prin-
ciples of things, or to fee into the oeconomy of the finest part of nature
and workings of the firft fprings. The caufes that appear to us, are but
effects of other caufes: the vessels, of which the bodies of plants and ani-
mals confift, are made up of other, fmaller veffels: the fubtileft parts of matter,
which we have any notion of (as animal fpirits, or particles of light), have their
parts, and may for ought we know be compound bodies: and as to the fubftances
Η Ποικίλη θαυματεργία. Plat.
S
them-
82 The
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
themſelves of all theſe things, and their internal conftitution, they are hid from
our eyes. Our philoſophy dwells in the furface of nature.
However, in the next place, we ourſelves cannot but be witneſſes, that there
are ftated methods, as fo many fet forms of proceeding, which things punctu-
ally and religiouſly keep to. The fame caufes, circumſtanced in the fame man-
ner, have always the fame fuccefs: all the ſpecies of animals, among us, are
made according to one general idea; and fo are thoſe of plants alfo, and even
minerals: no new ones are brought forth or ariſen any where: and the old are
preſerved and continued by the old ways.
Laſtly,it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that
there is a contrivance and a refpect to certain reaſons and ends. How the fun is
po-
fited near the middle of our fyftem for the more convenient difpenfing of his benign
influences to the planets moving about him; how the plain of the earth's aqua-
tor interſects that of her orbit, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to
diverſify the year, and create a uſeful variety of ſeaſons, and many other things
of this kind, tho a thouſand times repeated, will always be pleafing meditati-
ons to good men and true ſcholars. Who can obſerve the vapors to aſcend,
eſpecially from the ſea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condenſation,
and not underſtand this to be a kind of diftillation in order to clear the water
of its groffer falts, and then by rains and dews to ſupply the fountains and rivers
with freſh and wholfom liquor; to nourish the vegetables below by ſhowers,
which defcend in drops as from a watering-pot upon a garden, &c. who can
view the ftructure of a plant or animal; the indefinite number of their fibres
and fine veffels, the formation of larger veffels and the ſeveral members out of
them, and the apt difpofition of all thefe; the way laid out for the reception and
diſtribution of nutriment; the effect this nutriment has in extending the veffels,
bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expanſion, continuing
the motion of the feveral fluids, repairing the decays of the body, and preſerving
life: who can take notice of the ſeveral faculties of animals, their arts of ſaving
and providing for themſelves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the
uſes of plants to animals, and of fome animals to others, particularly to man-
kind; the care taken that the feveral Species fhould be propagated out of
their proper feeds (without confufion), the ſtrong inclinations implanted
in animals for that purpoſe, their love of their young, and the like: I fay, who
can do this, and not fee a defign, in fuch regular pieces, fo nicely wrought, and
fo preferved? If there was but one animal, and in that cafe it could not be doubt-
• If any one, fitting upon mount Ida, had feen the Greek army coming on in proper order [per
πολλέ κόσμο Ε τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιᾶσαν], he ought moft certainly, notwithftanding what Sext.
Limper. fays, to have concluded, that there was fome commander, under whoſe conduct they moved.
el
Truths relating to the Deity.
83
ed but that his eyes were made that he might fee with them, his ears that he might
bear with them and fo on, through at leaſt the moſt confiderable parts of him;
if it can much lefs be doubted, when the fame things are repeted in the individuals
of all the tribes of animals; if the like obſervations may be made with reſpect
to vegetables, and other things: and if all theſe kinds of things, and therefore
much more their particulars, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceiv-
ably numerous (as moft evidently they are), one cannot but be convinced from
that, which is fo very obvious to every underſtanding, and plainly runs through
the nobler parts of the viſible world, that not only they, but other things, even
thofe that ſeem to be lefs noble, have their ends too, tho not fo well underſtood.
And now fince we cannot ſuppoſe the parts of matter to have contrived this won-
derful form of a world among themſelves, and then by agreement to have taken
their reſpective pofts, and purfued conftant ends by certain methods and mea-
fures concerted (becauſe theſe are acts, of which they are not capable), there muſt
be ſome other Being, whofe wisdom and power are equal to fuch a mighty work,
as is the ſtructure and preſervation of the world. There muſt be ſome almighty
Mind, who models and adorns it; lays the cauſes of things fo deep; preſcribes
them fuch uniform and fteady laws; deftines and adapts them to certain purpo-
fes; and makes one thing to fit and anſwer to another a
That ſuch a beautiful ſcheme, fuck a juft and geometrical arrangement of things,
compoſed, of innumerable parts, and placed as the offices and uſes and wants
of the feveral beings require, through fuch an immenfe extent, fhould be the
effect of chance only, is a conceit fo prodigiously abfurd, that certainly no one
can eſpouſe it heartily, who underſtands the meaning of that word. Chance feems
to be only a term, by which we express our ignorance of the cauſe of any thing.
For when we fay any thing comes by chance, we do not mean, that it had no
other caufe; but only, that we do not know the true caufe, which produced
it, or interpofed in fuch a manner, as to make that fall out which was not ex-
pected. Nor can I think, that any body has fuch an idea of chance, as to
make it an agent or really exifting and acting cauſe of any thing, and much
lefs fure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they muſt pro-
ceed from fome agent or caufe, which is either free or not free (that is, neceffa-
ry). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is pro-
duced is produced with defign, not by chance. If it acts neceffarily, the event
muft neceſſarily be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by
accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident only, that
T
* Τίς ὁ ἁρμόζων τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς ἢ κολεόν, ε τ κολεὸν πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κτλ; Arr. Even fuch a
thing as this doth not come by accident.
it
84
Sect. V.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
it is. There can be therefore no fuch cauſe as chance. And to omit a great deal that
might yet be faid, matter is indefinitely divifible, and the firſt particles (or atoms)
of which it confifts muſt be fmall beyond all our apprehenfion; and the chances,
that muſt all hit to produce one individual of any Species of material beings (if
only chance was concerned), muft confequently be indefinitely many: and if
Space be alſo indefinitely extended, and the number of thoſe individuals (not to
fay of the ſpecies themſelves) which lie diſperſed in it indefinite, the chances re-
quired to the production of them all, or of the univerſe, will be the rectangle
of one indefinite quantity drawn into another. We may well call them infinite.
And then to fay, that any thing cannot happen, unleſs infinite chances coincide,
is the fame as to fay, there are infinite chances againſt the happening of it, or
odds that it will not happen: and this again is the fame as to ſay, it is impoſſible to
happen; ſince if there be a poffibility that it may happen, the hazard is not in-
finite. The world therefore cannot be the child of chance a. He must be lit-
tle acquainted with the works of nature, who is not fenfible how delicate and
fine they are and the finer they are, the groffer were thoſe of Epicurus.
If it should be objected, that many things feem to be useless, many births
are monstrous, or the like, fuch anſwers as theſe may be made. The uses of
fome things are known to fome men, and not to others: the uſes of ſome are
known now, that were not known to any body formerly: the ufes of
many
may be diſcoverd hereafter: and thoſe of ſome other things may for ever re-
main unknown to all men, and yet be in nature, as much as thoſe diſcoverd were
before their diſcovery, or are now in reſpect of them who know them not.
Things have not therefore no uſes, becauſe they are conceald from us. Nor is na-
ture irregular, or without method, becauſe there are ſome ſeeming deviations from
the common rule. Thefe are generally the effects of that influence, which free
agents and various circumftances have upon natural productions; which may
be deformed, or hurt by external impreffions, heterogeneous matter introduced,
or diſagreeable and unnatural motions excited: and if the cafe could be truly put,
it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as regularly (or the laws of na-
ture have as regular an effect), when a monster is produced, as when the uſual iffue in
common cafes. Under thefe circumſtances the monſter is the genuine iffue: that is,
* Hoc qui exiftimat fieri potuiffe, non intelligo cur non idem putet, fi innumerabiles unius & viginti
forma literarum,aliquò conjiciantur, poffe ex his in terram excuffis annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi
poffint, effici: quod nefcio anne in uno quidem verfu poffit tantum valere fortuna. Cic. But alas, what
are Ennius's annals to fuch a work as the world is! b He was πολυγραφώτατα, πάντας ὑπερβαλ
Xóμer Tänder Bißhiwy. D. L. But that part of his phyfics is here meant, in which he treated of the
λόμενα πλήθει βιβλίων.
origin of the world; or rather of infinite worlds, which makes his thought the groffer ftill. For in-
finite worlds require infinite chances infinitely repeted.
in
Truths relating to the Deity.
85
in the famé circumſtances there would always be the fame kind of production.
And therefore if things are now and then mif-ſhaped, this infers no unſteadineſs
or miſtake in nature. Befide, the magnificence of the world admits of fome
perturbations; not to fay, requires fome variety. The question is, Could all
thoſe things, which we do know to have uſes and ends, and to the production
of which fuch wonderful contrivance and the combinations of fo many things
are required, be produced,and method and regularity be preſerved ſo far as it is,
if nothing but blind chance prefided over all? Are not the innumerable inſtances
of things, which are undeniably made with reference to certain ends, and of
thoſe which are propagated and repeted by the ſame conſtant methods, enough
to convince us, that there are ends propoſed, and rules obferved, even where we
do not ſee them. And, laſtly, if we ſhould defcend to particulars, what are thoſe
feemingly uſeleſs or monftrous productions in refpect of the rest, that plainly de-
clare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by
the uſual ways, with the uſual perfection of their ſeveral kinds? If the com-
pariſon could be made, I verily believe theſe would be found to be almoſt infi-
nituple of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as nothing.
2
They, who content themſelves with words, may aſcribe the formation of the
world to fate or nature, as well as to chance, or better. And yet fate, in the firſt
place, is nothing but a ſeries of events, confiderd as neceffarily following in fome
certain order; or, of which it has always been true, that they would be in their
determinate times and places. It is called indeed a feries of caufes : but then
they are fuch cauſes as are alfo effects, all of them, if there is no Firſt cauſe; and
may be taken for fuch. So that in this deſcription is nothing like fuch a cauſe,
as is capable of giving this form to the world. A feries of events is the fame
with events happening feriatim: which words declare nothing concerning the
cauſe of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, ne-
ceffity are but circumstances of things that come to paſs; not cauſes of their ex-
iſtence, or of their being as they are. On the contrary, fome external and ſupe-
rior cauſe muſt be fuppofed to put the feries in motion, to project the order,
to connect the cauſes and effects, and to impofe the neceffity b.
• Series implexa caufarum. Sen.
Seneca fays himſelf, that in this ſeries God is prima
omnium caufa, ex quâ catera pendent. Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the an-
cients meant by fate. Sometimes it ſeems to follow the motions of the heavenly bodies and their
afpects. Of this kind of fate is that paffage in Suetonius to be underſtood, where he fays that Tibe-
rius was addictus mathematica, perfuafionifque plenus cuncta-fato agi. Sometimes it is confounded
with fortune. So in Lucian we find την τύχην πράξησαν τα μιεμοιραμλία, καὶ ἃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἑκάσῳ ἐπε
λn. And ſometimes it is the fame with God: as when the Stoics fay, v Te siva. Fráv sỳ võv sy
swagusón sỳ Día, ap. Diog. L. and the like elſewhere.
M
7.
Then
86
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
b
C
Then for nature, 1. If it be used for the intrinfic manner of exiſting; that con-
ftitution, make, or difpofition, with which any thing is produced or born, and
from which refult thofe properties, powers, inclinations, paffions, qualities, and
manners, which are called natural (and ſometimes nature), in oppofition to ſuch
as are acquired, adventitious, or forced (which uſe is common): then to fay,
that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of exiſtence, is to fay, that
it formed itſelf, or that the effect is the efficient. Befide, how can manner (man-
ner of exiſting) be the cauſe of exifting, or properly do any thing. An agent
is an acting being, fome fubftance, not a manner of being. 2. If it be uſed
in that other fenfe, by which it ftands for the ideas of things, what they are in
themſelves, and what in their circumftances, cauſes, confequences, refpects; or,
in ſhort, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we fay,
the nature of juſtice requires this or that; i.e. the idea of juſtice requires or fup-
poſes it a crime is of fuch a nature; that is, bears fuch a reſpect to the law,
and is attended with ſuch circumſtances, or the like): then none of theſe fenfes
can do an atheiſt any ſervice. 3. If it be uſed for the world (as, the laws of
nature may be underſtood to be the laws of the world, by which it is govern-
ed, and the phænomena in it produced; after the fame manner of ſpeaking as
when we ſay, the laws of England, France, &c.) then it ſtands for that very
thing, the former and architect of which is the object of our inquiry; and there
fore cannot be that architect itself. Under this fenfe may be comprehended
that, when it denotes reality of existence, as when it is faid that ſuch a thing is
not in nature (not to be found in the world). 4. If it fignifies the forementiond
laws themſelves; or that courſe, in which things by virtue of theſe laws pro-
ceed (as when the effects of theſe laws are ftyled the works of nature): then,
laws fuppofe fome legiflator, and are pofterior to that of which they are the
laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are of which that
nation confiſts. 5. If it be uſed after the fame manner as the word habit fre-
quently is; to which many things are aſcribed (juſt as they are to nature), though
it be nothing exiſting diſtinct from the habits, which particular men or beings
contract: then nature is a kind of abstract notion, which can do nothing, Per-
haps nature may be put for natures, all natures, after the manner of a collective
noun; or it may be mentiond as an agent, only as we perfonify virtues and at-
tributes, either for variety, or the ſhorter and more convenient expreffing of
As when Strato Lamps. according to Tully, docet omnia eſſe effecta naturâ.
B Vis éga
natura juftitia. Cic.
• Almoſt as if it ſtood for nata, or res nata; all things, that are pro
duced. (So fatura feems to be put fometimes for fatus.) Sunt, qui omnia natura nomine appel-,
fent ;
corpora, & inane, quaque his accidant. Cic.
things
Truths relating to the Deity.
87
things. Laſtly, if it denotes the Author of nature, or God (the effect ſeeming,
tho by a hard metonymy in this cafe, to be put for the efficient): then, to Him
it is that I afcribe the formation of the world, &c. To all which I muft fub-
join, that there is an unaccountable liberty taken in the uſe of this word: and
that frequently it is uſed merely as a word, and nothing more, they who uſe it
not knowing themſelves, what they mean by it. However, in no fenfe can it
fuperfede the being of a Deity.
XV. Life, fenfe, cogitation, and the faculties of our own minds fhew the existence
of fome fuperior Being, from whom they are derived. Or, God is that Being, with-
out whom neither could these be, any more than the things before mentiond. That
they cannot flow from the nature of any matter about us as matter, or from any
modification, fize, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps
be proved more fully afterwards. And that our fouls themſelves are not felf
exiſtent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, follows
from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we muſt neceffarily be indebted for what we
have of this kind to fome great Benefactor, who is the fountain of them. For
fince we are conſcious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our
felves, we muſt have them from fome other.
A man has little reafon, God knows, to fancy the fuppofitum of his life, ſenſe,
and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he confiders how
tranfitory and uncertain at beſt his life and all his injoyments are; what he is,
whence he came, and whither he is going. The mind acts not, or in the moſt
imperceptible manner in animalculo, or the feminal ſtate of a man; only as a
principle of vegetation in the ſtate of an embryon; and as a fenfitive foul in the
ftate of infancy, at leaſt for fome time, in which we are rather below, than a-
bove, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exerciſe and pro-
per opportunities, it ſeems to open itſelf, find its own talents, and ripen into a
rational being. But then it reaſons not without labor, and is forced to take ma-
ny tedious ſteps in the purfuit of truth; finds all its powers fubject to great eclip-
ª Natura, inquit, hec mihi praftat. Non intelligis te, cùm hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid
enim aliud eft Natura, quàm Deus, & divina ratio, &c.? Sen. When it is faid, Neceſſe eſt mundum
ipſum natura adminiſtrari, ap. Cic. what ſenſe are thoſe words capable of, if by nature be not
really meant God? For it muſt be fomething different from the world, and fomething able to go-
vern it.
↳ Alii naturam cenfent eſſe vim quandam fine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus
neceſſarios, &c. fays Balbus in Cic. What can this vis be: vis by itſelf, without the mention of
any fubject, in which it inheres; or of any caufe, from whence it proceeds? A foul of the world,
plastic nature, bylarchic principle, yw, and the like, are more intelligible than that.
.16 .P .מאין באת ולאן אתה הולך וכו
M 2
דע :
Jes
88
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
fes and diminutions, in the time of fleep, indifpofition, fickneſs, &c. and at
beſt reaching but a few objects in reſpect of all, that are in the immenſity of
the univerſe; and, laftly, is obnoxious to many painful fenfations and reflexions.
Had the foul of man the principle of its own exiſtence and faculties within it-
ſelf, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all theſe limitations and de-
fects, to all thefe alterations and removes from one ſtate to another: it muft cer-
tainly be conſtant to itſelf, and perfift in an uniform manner of being.
There may be perhaps who will fay, that the foul, together with life, ſenſe,
&c. are propagated by traduction from parents to children, from them to their
children again, and fo from eternity: and that therefore nothing can be collect-
ed from the nature of them as to the exiſtence of a Deity. Anf. If there could be
fuch a traduction, yet to fuppofe one traduced to come from another traduced,
and fo ab æterno, without any further account of the original of mankind, or
taking in any author of this traductive power, is the fame as to fuppofe an in-
finite ſeries of moveds without a mover, or of effects without a caufe: the abfur-
dity of which is fhewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but
think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by tradux anime
ought to be clearly explaind: for it is not eaſy to conceive how thought, or
thinking fubftances, can be propagated after the manner of branches, or in any
manner that can be analogous to it, or even warrant a metaphorical uſe of that
phraſe b. It ſhould alſo be told, whether this traduction be made from one or from
both the parents. If from one, from which of them is it? And if from both,
then the fame tradux or branch muſt always proceed from two ſtocks: which is
a thing, I prefume, that can no where elſe be found, nor has any parallel in na-
And yet ſuch a thing may much better be fuppofed of vines, or plants,
than of thinking beings, who are fimple and uncompounded fubftances c.
ture.
a For I cannot think that any body will now ſtand by that way of introducing men firſt into
the world, which is mentiond by Diodorus Sic. but afferted by Lucretius. Ubi quaque loci regio
opportuna dabatur, Crefcebant utcri terra radicibus apti, &c.
What by Tertullian in one
b
place is called anima ex Adam tradux, in another is velut furculus quidam ex matrice Adam in pro-
paginem deducta, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himſelf better, when he confeffes
there to be duas fpecies feminis, corporalem & animalem (al. corporis femen & anima): or more fully
Semen animale ex anima diftillatione, ficut & virus illud, corporale femen, ex carnis defecatione.
According to the fore-cited author the foul is derived from the father only, genitalibus fami
na foveis commendata: and all fouls from that of Adam. Definimus animam, fays he, Dei flatu na-
tam, ex una redundantem: and in another place, ex uno homine tota has animarum redundantia agi-
tur. But this doth not well confift with his principal argument for traduction, that children take
after their parents. For befide what will here be faid by and by, if there is a traduction of all men
from one man, and traduction caufes likeness; then every man must be like the firft, and (confe-
quently) every other.
This
ས
89
Truths +
relating to the Deity.
This opinion of the traduction of fouls feems to me to ſtand upon an unfound
foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on theſe two things: the
fimilitude there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and
thoſe of their parents; and the difficulty men find in forming the notion of
a fpirit. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other
ſubſtance but matter: and that the foul refulting from fome difpofition of the
body, or fome part of it, or being fome merely material appendix to it, muſt
attend it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is
a derivation of the one, fo there muſt be alfo of the other at the fame time.
Now the former of thefe is not always true; as it ought to be, to make the
argument valid. Nothing more common than to ſee children differ from their
parents, in their underſtandings, inclinations, fhapes, complexions, and (I am
Jure) one from another. And this diffimilitude has as much force to prove there
is not a traduction, as fimilitude, whenever that happens, can have to prove there
is. Beſides, it ſeems to me not hard to account for ſome likeneſs without the
help of traduction. It is visible the meat and drink men take, the air they
breath, the objects they fee, the founds they hear, the company they keep, &c.
will create changes in them, fometimes with respect to their intellectuals, fome-
times to their paffions and humors, and fometimes to their health and other cir-
cumſtances of their bodies: and yet the original ſtamina and fundamental parts
of the man remain ftill the fame. If then the femina, out of which animals are
produced, are (as I doubt not) animalcula already formed; which being dif-
tributed about, eſpecially in fome opportune places, are taken in with aliment,
or perhaps the very air; being feparated in the bodies of the males by ftrainers
proper to every kind, and then lodged in their feminal veffels, do there receive
fome kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the
wombs of the females, are there nouriſhd more plentifully, and grow, till they be-
come too big to be longer confined: I fay, if this be the cafe, why may not
mts,
the
• Unde, oro te, fays the fame author, fimilitudine anima quoque parentibus de ingeniis refponde-
-fi non ex anima femine educimur? Then to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus:
in illo ipfo voluptatis ultimo aftu quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque fentimus
exire? I am afhamed to tranfcribe more.
b Therefore the faid father makes the foul to
be corporeal.
• This might ſeem to be favord by them who hold, that all fouls were crea
ted in the beginning (an opinion mentiond in Nahh.ab. & al. often), did not the fame authors de-
rive the body in non: as may be feen in P. Abb. & paff. Particularly R. D. Qimbhi fays
נובו נברא מטיפת הזרע אשר תהפך לדם ומשם יגדל מעט ער שישתלמו איבריו,,of man
d This account deſtroys that argument, upon which Cenforinus fays many of the old philofophers
afferted the eternity of the world: quod negent omnino poſſe reperiri, avene ante, an ova generata
Lint
90
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
in
the nutriment received from the parents, being prepared by their veſſels, and of
the fame kind with that with which they themſelves are nouriſhd, be the fame
great meaſure to the animalcula and embrya that it is to them, and confequent-
ly very much affimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing elſe from
them? Many impreffions may be made upon the fetus, and many tinctures given
to the fluids communicated to it from the parents; and yet it, the animal itſelf,
may not be originally begun in them, or traduced from them. This hypothefis
(which has long been mine) fuggefts a reafon, why the child is fometimes more
like the father, fometimes the mother: viz. becauſe the veffels of the animalculum
are diſpoſed to receive a greater proportion of aliment fometimes from the one,
fometimes from the other: or the fluids and fpirits in one may ferment and ope-
rate more ſtrongly than in the other, and ſo have a greater and more fignal effect.
(Here it ought to be obſerved, that tho what the animalculum receives from the
father, is in quantity little in reſpect of all that nutriment, which it receives by
the mother; yet the former, being the firſt accretion to the original ſtamina, ad-
hering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect it more.)
Since there cannot be a proper traduction of the child (one mind, and one bo-
dy) from both the two parents, all the fimilitude it bears to one of them muſt
proceed from fome fuch caufe as I have affigned, or at least not from traduction.
For the child being ſometimes like the father, and ſometimes the mother, and
the traduction either always from the father, or always from the mother, there
muſt ſometimes be fimilitude, where there is no traduction: and then if the
child may reſemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The ac-
count I have given, appears, many times at leaſt, to be true in plants, which
raiſed from the fame feed, but in different beds and foil, will differ. The dif
ferent nutriment introduces ſome diverſity into the feed or original plant, and
affimilates it in fome meaſure to the reft raiſed in the fame place.
The other thing, which I take to be one of the principal fupports to this doc-
trine of traduction (a fuppofition, that the foul is merely material, or but the
refult of fome difpofition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter.
But I may premife this here: tho we can have no image of a ſpirit (becauſe no
being can be portraid or repreſented by an image, but what is material), yet we
may have reaſon to affert the exiſtence of fuch a fubftance. Matter is a thing,
which we converfe with, of which we know pretty well the nature, arred pro-
fint ; cùm & ovum fine ave, & avis fine ovo gigni non poffit. This queſtion was once much agitated
in the world, as may be ſeen by Macrobius and Plutarch; who calls it, rò άñogov » ñoñà пęáɣμaḥa
τοῖς ζητητικοῖς παρέχουν πρόβλημα.
This is as much as Epicurus had to fay for his atoms: for they were only ráμara Xoya Dew-
ζητά, κλ. 7. Μ.
perties
Truths relating to the Deity.
91
perties; and fince we cannot find among them any that are cogitative, or fuch a
thing as life, but feveral things inconfiftent with them, we are under a neceffity
of confeffing that there is fome other fpecies of fubftance befide that which is
corporeal, and that our fouls are of that kind (or rather of one of thoſe kinds,
which are not merely corporeal: for there muſt be more than one), tho we can
draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all furprifing, that we fhould
not be able to do this: for how can the mind be the object of itſelf a? It may
contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be conſcious of its own acts, and
reflect the ideas it finds: but of its own fubftance it can have no adequate
upon
notion, unleſs it could be as it were object and spectator both. Only that per-
fect Being, whofe knowledge is infinite, can thus intimately know himſelf.
They, who found the traduction of the foul upon this prefumption, that it is
material, and attends the body as fome part or affection of it, feem further to be
moſt wofully miſtaken upon this account: becauſe the body itſelf is not propa-
gated by traduction. It paffes indeed through the bodies of the parents, who af-
ford a tranſitory habitation and ſubſiſtence to it: but it cannot be formed by the
parents, or grow out of any part of them. For all the vital and effential parts of
it muſt be one coeval ſyſtem, and formed at once in the firſt article of the naſcent
animalculum; fince no one of theſe could be nourishd, or ever come to any thing,
without the reft: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be.be-
fore the reft, it would foon wither and decay again for lack of nouriſhment re-
ceived by proper veſſels ; as we ſee the limbs and organs of animals do, when
the fupply due from the animal œconomy is any way intercepted or obſtructed.
And fince an organized body, which requires to be thus fimultaneouſly made (fa-
ſhiond as it were at one ſtroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and graduat
procefs, I cannot but conclude, that there were animalcula of every tribe origi-
nally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the feed of all future generations of
animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is uſual-
ly called equivocal or fpontaneous generation, and with great reaſon now gene-
rally exploded. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other inſtances,
and microſcopical obſervations do abet what I have ſaid ſtrongly.
Laftly, if there is no race of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man
who is not deſcended from two first parents: and then the fouls of thoſe two firſt
parents could be traduced from no other. And that there is no fuch race (none
that has been upon this earth from eternity), is apparent from the face of earth-
ly things, and the history of mankind, arts, and ſciences. What is objected
τό
2. Củ gỗ có tại Sines phía và Seage. Plot.
↳ Si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrai & cali—
Gur fupra bellum Thebanum & funera Troja Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poeta. Lucr.
againf
92
Sect. V.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
againſt this argument from fancied inundations, conflagrations, &c. has no weight
with me. Let us fuppofe fome fuch great calamity to happen now. It must be
either univerfal, or not. If univerſal, ſo that no body at all could be faved, then ei-
ther there muſt never be any more men, or they muſt begin again in fome first pa-
rents. If it was only topical, affecting fome one tract of the globe, or if the tops
of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffected, or if there
were any natural means left by which men might eſcape, confiderable numbers
muſt certainly ſurvive: and then it cannot be imagined, that they ſhould all be
abfolutely fo ignorant of every thing, that no one ſhould be able to give an ac-
count of fuch things as were common; no one able to write, or read, or even to
recollect that there were fuch things as letters; none, that underſtood any trade;
none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they uſed to be
clothed, how their meat dreft, or even what their food was: not can it be thought,
that all books, arms, manufactures of every kind, fhips, buildings, and all the
product of human skill and induſtry now extant in the world ſhould be ſo uni-
verfally and utterly aboliſhd, that no part, no veftigium of them ſhould remain;
not fo much, as to give a hint toward the ſpeedy reſtoration of neceffary arts at
leaſt. The people eſcaping muſt ſure have clothes on, and many neceffaries a-
bout them, without which they could not eſcape, nor outlive fuch a dreadful
ſcene. In short, no conflagration, no flood, no deftruction can ſerve the objectors
purpoſe, to reduce mankind to that ſtate, which by ancient memoirs and many
undeniable ſymptoms we find them to have been in not many thouſands of years
fince; I fay, no deftruction can ferve his purpoſe, but ſuch an one as makes
thorough work, only ſparing two or three couples, ftript of every thing, and the
moſt ſtupid and verieſt blocks b to be picked out of the whole number: natural
fools, or mere homines fylveftres would retain habits, and fall to their old way of liv-
ing, as ſoon as they had the opportunity to do it. And ſuppoſe they never ſhould
have fuch an opportunity; yet neither would this ferve him effectually: fince with-
out fome fupernatural Power interpofing fuch a revolution could not be brought a-
bout, nor the naked creatures preferved, nor the earth reformed out of its afhes and
ruins after fuch a calcination, or diffolution, fuch a total demolition of every thing.
To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vul-
cano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memo-
ry or teftimony of any ſuch thing, that has ever been univerfale, except per-
Πολλαι καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ φθοραί γεγόνασιν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἔσονται, πυρὶ μὲ καὶ ὕδατι μέγισαι. Plato.
* Τὰς ἀγραμμάτες καὶ ἀμέσως, as Piato fpeaks.
For what has been faid only in general,
$
and prefumptively, to ſerve a cauſe, fignifies nothing: no more than that teftimony in Arnobius,
where he ſeems to allow, tha there have been univerſal conflagrations. Quando, fays he, mundus
În cenfus in favillas & cineres diffolutus eft? Non ante nos ?
I
haps
Truths relating to the Deity.
93
haps of one deluge: and as to that, if the genius of the language in which the
relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing hiſtory in it were well under-
ſtood, fome labord and moliminous attempts to account for it might have been
prevented. And befide that, the fame record, which tells the thing was, tells
alfo how immediately God was concernd in it; that ſome perſons actually were
faved; and that the people who then perifhd, as well as they who furvived, all
defcended from two firft parents: and if that authority be a fufficient proof of
one part of the relation, it muſt be ſo of the rest.
We may conclude then, that the human foul with its faculties of cogitation,
&c. depends upon a Superior being. And who can this be but the Supreme be-
ing, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,
XVI. Though His effence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehenfi-
ble, yet we may fay with affurance, that He is free from all defects: or One, from
whom all defects muſt be removed.
This propofition hath in effect been proved already 2. However I will take
the liberty to inlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are finite,
they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is infinite. And if they
were inlarged to ever fo great a capacity, yet fo long as they retain their ge-
neral nature, and continue to be of the fame kind, they would by that be only
renderd able to apprehend more and more finite ideas; out of which, howsoever
increaſed or exalted, no pofitive idea of the perfection of God can ever be form-
ed. For a Perfect being muſt be infinite, and perfectly One and in ſuch a
nature there can be nothing finite, nor any compofition of finites.
How ſhould we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being,
or how He exiſts, when we comprehend not the nature of the moſt inferior
Spirits, nor have any conception even of matter itſelf divefted of its acci-
dents? How fhould we attain to an adequate knowledge of the Supreme au-
thor of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the extent of the
world itſelf, and the numberless undefcried regions, with their ſeveral ſtates
and circumſtances, containd in it, never to be frequented or vifited by our phi-
loſophy; nor can turn our felves any way, but we are ſtill accofted with ſome-
thing above our underſtanding? If we cannot penetrate ſo far into effects, as to
diſcover them and their nature throughly, it is not to be expected, that we
fhould, that we can ever be admitted to fee through the myfteries of His nature,
• Prop. V, VI.
N
who
94
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
who is the Cauſe, ſo far above them all. The Divine perfection then, and man-
ner of being muft be of a kind different from and above all that we can conceive.
However, notwithſtanding our own defects, we may pofitively affirm there
can be none in God: fince He is perfect, as we have feen, He cannot be defective
or imperfect. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would
have to be well underſtood and rememberd: viz. that from Him muſt be re-
moved want of life and activity, ignorance, impotence, acting inconfiftently with
reaſon and truth, and the like. Becauſe theſe are defects; defect of knowledge,
power, &c. Theſe are defects and blemiſhes even in us. And tho his perfection
is above all our ideas, and of a different kind from the perfections of men or
any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in them, would be much more
fuch in Him, and can by no means be aſcribed to Him 2.
Though we underſtand not His manner of knowing things; yet ignorance
being uniform and the fame in every ſubject, we underſtand what is meant by
that word, and can literally and truly deny that to belong to Him. The like
may be faid with refpect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And
when we fpeak of the internal effential attributes of God pofitively, as that
He is omniſcient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the intent is only to fay, that there
is no object of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do,
He exifts without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep ftill within the
limits allowd by the propofition b. That is, we may ſpeak thus without pre-
tending to comprehend His nature. And fo,
XVII. We may confider God as operating in the production and government of
the world, and may draw conclufions from His works, as they are called, notwith-
fanding any thing which has been faid c. Becauſe this we can do without com-
prehending the manner of His exiſtence. Nay, the contemplation of His
works leads us into a neceffity of owning, that there muſt be an incomprehen-
fible Being at the head of them.
Though I do not comprehend the mode, in which the world depends upon Him
and He influences and diſpoſes things, becauſe this enters into His nature, and
the one cannot be underſtood without the other: yet if I fee things, which
I know cannot be felf-exiftent, and obferve plainly an oeconomy and deſign in the
difpofition of them, I may conclude that there is ſome Being, upon whom
their exiſtence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld; may call this
If that in Terence had been (not a queſtion, as it is there, but) an affirmation, Ege homuncio
hoc non facerem, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity?
3 séroule à
μή ἐσιν· ὁ δέ ἐσιν, ο λέγομλν. Plotin.
.Maim אין דרך להשיגו אלא ממעשיו :
Being
Truths relating to the Deity.
95
Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the world, &c. without con-
tradicting my ſelf or truth as I hope it will appear from what has been faid,
and is going to be faid in the next propofition.
XVIII. God, who gives existence to the world, does alfo govern it by His pro-
vidence. Concerning this grand queftion, Whether there is a Divine providence,
or not, I uſe to think, for my felf, after the following manner.
ἀκυβέρνητ
First, The world may be faid to be governed (at leaſt cannot be faid to be
xvbigr, or left to fluctuate fortuitoufly), if there are laws, by which natural
caufes act, the feveral phænomena in it fucceed regularly, and, in general, the
conſtitution of things is preſerved: if there are rules obferved in the production
of herbs, trees, and the like: if the feveral kinds of animals are, in proportion
to their ſeveral degrees and ſtations in the animal kingdom, furnifhd with fa-
culties proper to direct and determin their actions; and when they act accord-
ing to them, they may be faid to follow the law of their nature: if they are
placed and provided for fuitably to their reſpective natures and wants ², or
(which amounts to the fame thing) if their natures are adapted to their cir-
cumſtances b: if, laſtly, particular cafes relating to rational beings are taken
care of in ſuch a manner, as will at laft agree beſt with reafon.
a
Secondly, If there are fuch laws and provifions, they can come originally from
no other being, but from Him who is the Author of nature. For thoſe laws,
which refult from the natures of things, their properties, and the uſe of their
faculties, and may be faid to be written upon the things themſelves, can be
the laws of no other: nor can thoſe things, whofe very being depends upon
God, exiſt under any condition repugnant to His will; and therefore can be
ſubject to no laws or difpofitions, which He would not have them be fubje&t
to; that is, which are not His. Befide, there is no other being capable of
impofing laws, or any ſcheme of government upon the world; becauſe there
is no other, who is not himſelf part of the world, and whofe own exiſtence
doth not depend upon Him.
Thirdly, By the providence of God I mean His governing the world by fuch
laws, and making fuch provifions, as are mentiond above. So that if there
are fuch, there is a Divine providence.
.as the fems fpeak מקרני ראמים עד ביצי כנים •
b I fhall not pretend here to meddle
with particular cafes relating to inanimate or irrational beings; fuch as are mentiond in Mo.ngbok.
(a leaf's falling from a tree, a ſpider's catching a flie, &c.) and which are there ſaid to be a nippa.
Tho it is hard to ſeparate theſe many times from the cafes of rational beings; as alſo to compre-
N 2
.perfect accident, is מקרה גמור hend what
Laftly,
96
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
Laftly, It is not impoffible, that there fhould be fuch: on the contrary, we have
juſt reaſons to believe there are. It would be an abfurd affertion to fay, that
any thing is impoffible to a being whoſe nature is infinitely above our compre-
henfion, if the terms do not imply a contradiction: but we may with confidence
affert, that it is impoffible for any thing, whofe exiflence flows from fuch a being,
ever to grow ſo far out of His reach, or be ſo emancipated from under Him,
that the manner of its exiſtence ſhould not be regulated and determind by Him.
As to inanimate fubftances, we fee the cafe to be really juft as it was fuppofed
before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their ſtations, or perſevere
to go the fame circuits over and over by a certain law. Little bodies or particles,
of the ſame kind, obferve continually the fame rules of attracting, repelling, &c.
When there are any feeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the
different circumftances and combinations of things, acting all the while under
their ancient laws. We are fo far acquainted with the laws of gravitation and
motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and ferve our felves of them,
fupplying upon many occafions the defect of power in our felves by mechani-
cal powers, which never fail to anſwer according to the establishment. Briefly,
we ſee it ſo far from being impoffible, that the inanimate world fhould be go-
vernd by laws, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to laws by them inviolable.
As to vegetables, we fee alfo how they are determind by certain methods pre-
ſcribed them. Each fort is produced from its proper feed; hath the ſame tex-
ture of fibres; is nouriſhd by the fame kind of juices out of the earth, digeft-
ed and prepared by the fame kind of veffels, &c. Trees receive annually their
peculiar liveries, and bear their proper fruits: flowers are dreft, each fa-
mily, in the ſame colors, or diverfify their faſhions after a certain manner pro-
per to the kind, and breath the fame effences: and both theſe and all other
kinds obferve their feafons; and feem to have their feveral profeffions and trades
appointed them, by which they produce fuch food and manufactures (pardon
the catachrefis), as may fatisfy the wants of animals. Being fo very neceffary,
they, or at leaſt the moſt uſeful, grow easily being fixt in the earth, inſen-
fible, and not made for fociety, they are generally approdλea: being liable to a
great conſumption both of them and their feeds, they yield great quantities of
theſe, in order to repair and multiply their race, &c. So that here is evi-
dently a regulation, by which the feveral orders are preſerved, and the ends of
them anſwerd according to their firſt eſtabliſhment too.
Then as to animals, there are laws, which mut. mutand. are common to them
with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at leaſt ſuch as reſemble a their laws, The
2 Pliny in his chapter De ordine natura in fatis, &c. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.
individuals
:
97
Truths relating to the Deity.
individuals of the feveral kinds of thofe, as of thefe, have the fame (general)
ſhape and members, to be managed after the fame manner: have the fame veffels
repleniſhd with the fame kinds of fluids, and furniſhd with the fame glands for
the ſeparation and diſtribution of ſuch parts of them, as anſwer the fame inten-
tions in them all are ftimulated by the fame appetites and uneafineffes to take
in their food, continue their breed, &c. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus
in a manner ſo like to that of vegetables, according to fixt methods, and keeps
in the fame general track as they do, may be ſaid to obferve and be under fome
like rule or law, which either operates upon and limits it ab extra, or was given
it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations reſulting from the
ſeveral degrees of reaſon and ſenſe, or fenſe only, of which we cannot but be con-
ſcious in our ſelves, and obferve fome faint indications in the kinds belows us, and
which can be lookt upon as nothing lefs than laws, by which animals are to move
and manage themſelves: that is, otherwife expreft, by which the Author of their
natures governs them. 'Tis true thefe laws may not impoſe an abſolute neceffity, nor
be of the fame rigor with thofe of inanimate and merely paffive beings, becauſe the
beings which are ſubject to theſe (men at leaſt) may be fuppofed in fome meaſure
free,and to act upon fome kind of principles or motives: yet ftill they may have the
nature of laws, tho they may be broken; and may make a part of that providence by
which God adminifters the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by
my own free endeavours, and right uſe of thoſe faculties and powers I have, I look
upon them to be as much the effects of God's providence and government, as if they
were given me immediately by Him, without my acting; fince all my faculties and
abilities (whatever they are) depend upon Him, and are as it were inftruments of
His providence to me in reſpect of fuch things as may be procured by them.
To finiſh this head: it is fo far from being impoffible, that the feveral tribes of a-
nimals ſhould be fo made and placed, as to find proper ways of fupporting and
defending themſelves (I mean, fo far as it is confiftent with the general oeconomy
of the world: for fome cannot well fubfift without the deftruction of ſome others),
that, on the contrary, we fee men, beaſts, birds, fiſhes, infects all have organs and
faculties adapted to their refpective circumftances and opportunities of finding
their proper food or prey, &c. even to the aftoniſhment of them who attend to
the hiſtory of nature. If men, who ſeem to have more wants than any other
kind, meet with difficulties in maintaining life, it is becauſe they themſelves,
not contented with what is decent and convenient only, have by their luxuries and
fcandalous neglect of their reafon made life expenfive.
Hay
f
a Therefore if thofe Effenes in Jofephus, who are faid it!
Eſſenes iri
human endeavours, they must be much in the wrong.
for their use
☺s xeruλitš rà táita, excluded
Θεῷ καταλιπεῖν πάντα,
The
}
98
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
The world then being not left in a ſtate of confufion or as a chaos, but reduced in-
to order and methodized for ages to come; the feveral fpecies of beings having their
offices and provinces affignd them; plants and animals fubfiftence fet out for them;
and as they go off, fucceffors appointed to relieve them, and carry on the ſcheme,
&c. that the poffibility only of a general providence ſhould be allowd, is certainly too
modeft a demand. We fee, or may fee, that in fact there is fuch a providence".
The great difficulty is, how to account for that providence, which is called par-
ticular;
or that, which reſpects (principally) particular men. For rational beings
and free agents are capable of doing and deferving well, or ill. Some will make a
right ufe of their faculties and opportunities, fome will not: the vicious may, or
may not repent, or repent and relapfe: fome fall into evil habits through inadver-
tence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any defign: and theſe want to be re-
claimd: fome may be ſuppoſed to worſhip God and to crave His protection and
bleffing, &c. and then a proper anfwer to their prayers may be humbly expected.
Hence many and great differences will arife, which will require from a governor
fuitable incouragements, rewards, correptions, puniſhments; and that fome ſhould
be protected and fortunate, others not, or lefs. Now the good or ill ftate of a
man here, his fafety or danger, happineſs or unhappineſs depend upon many
things, which feem to be ſcarce all capable of being determind by providence.
They depend upon what he does himself, and what naturally follows from his
own behaviour: upon what is done by others, and may either touch him at the fame
time, or reach him afterward: upon the course of nature, which muft affect him:
and, in fine, upon many incidents, of which no account is to be given. As to what
be does himſelf, it is impoffible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know
always what tends to happineſs, and what not: or if he could know, that, which
ought to be done, may not be within the compaſs of his powers. Then, if the
actions of other men are free, how can they be determind to be only fuch, as
may be either good or bad (as the cafe requires) for fome other particular man;
fince ſuch a determination feems inconfiftent with liberty? Befide, numbers of
men acting every one upon the foot of their own private freedom, and the
feveral degrees of ſenſe and ability which they reſpectively have, their acts, as
they either confpire, or croſs and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet
• Ut fiquis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnaſium, aut in forum venerit, cùm videat omnium rerum
rationem, modum, difciplinam, non poffit ea fine caufa fieri judicare, fed effe aliquem intelligat, qui pra-
fit, & cui pareatur, &c. Cic.
Little things have many times unforeſeen and great effects:
& contra. The bare fight of a fig, fhewn in the fenate-houſe at Rome, occafiond Carthage to be
deftroyd: quod non Trebia, aut Trafymenus, non Canna bufto infignes Romani nominis perficere potuere;
non caftra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portaque Collina adequitans ipfe Hannibal. Plin.
and
Truths relating to the Deity.
99
and oppoſe each other, and have different effects upon men of different makes, or
in different circumstances, muſt cauſe a ſtrange embarras, and intangle the plot.
And as to the course of nature, if a good man be paffing by an infirm building, juſt
in the article of falling, can it be expected, that God fhould fufpend the force
of gravitation till he is gone by, in order to his deliverance; or can we think
it would be increaſed, and the fall haftend, if a bad man was there, only that
he might be caught, cruſhd, and made an example? If a man's fafety or profpe-
rity ſhould depend upon winds or rains, muſt new motions be impreſt upon the
atmoſphere, and new directions given to the floating parts of it, by fome ex
traordinary and new influence from God? Muft clouds be fo precipitated, or
kept in fufpence, as the cafe of a particular man or two requires? To which
add, that the differing and many times contrary intereſts of men are ſcarce to
be reconciled. The wind, which carries one into the port, drives another back
to fea; and the rains, that are but juſt ſufficient upon the bills, may drown the
inhabitants of the valleys. In ſhort, may we expect miracles: or can there
be a particular providence, a providence that ſuits the ſeveral cafes and prayers of
individuals, without a continual repetition of them, and force frequently com-
mitted upon the laws of nature, and the freedom of intelligent agents? For
my part, I verily believe there may. For,
1. It ſeems to me not impoſſible, that God fhould know what is to come: on
the contrary, it is highly reaſonable to think, that He does and muſt know
things future. Whatever happens in the world, which does not come imme-
diately from Him, muſt either be the effect of mechanical cauſes, or of the
motions of living beings and free agents. For chance we have ſeen already is
no cauſe. Now as to the former, it cannot be impoffible for Him, upon whom
the being and nature of every thing depends, and who therefore muft intimate-
ly know all their powers and what effects they will have, to fee through the
whole train of caufes and effects, and whatever will come to pafs in that
a While every one puſhes his own deſigns, they muft interfere, and hinder one another. Adfum-
mum fuccedere honorem Certantes, iter infeftum fecere viai. Lucr.
اد
αν
Or is it not more like
1y, πιπτέσης οικοδομίας, ἳ ὑποπεσόντα αποθανεῖν, ὁ ποιὸς ποτ' ἂν ᾖ (in Plotinus's words) ?
• Some
thing more than this we meet with in Onq.'s paraphrafe, where it is faid, that upon Mofes's prayer
; Which fame place Rabi explains after the fame manner .מטרא דהוה נחית לא מטא על ארעא
[מטר] לא הגיע [ארצה ] ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ
d In Lutian, Tây
e Some
πλεόντων ὁ μθύ βορέαν ηύχετο ἐπιπνεῦσαι· ὁ 5, νότον· ὁ 5 γεωργὸς ἔτει ὑετόν ὁ 5 κναφεύς, ἥλιον.
have talked to this purpoſe. So R. Albo fays of fome prophets and hhafidim, IN yaun lɔw'u
Onlaya —ɔnw. So R. If. Abuh. that the good or evil, which happens to a man in this world
אין זה רק במעשה הנס והוא נס נסתר יחשוב בו הרואה,by way of reward or punishment
And .היכולת האלהי הוא משנה, הטבעים בהשגחתו וכו' .So Abarb .שהוא מנהגו של עולם
מורים אנחנו... על נסיך שבכל יום עמנו :accordingly in Sed. teph. we find this thanksgiving
F
way
100
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
a
way nay, it is impoffible, that He fhould not do it. We our felves, if we
are fatisfied of the goodneſs of the materials of which a machine is made, and
underſtand the force and determination of thofe powers by which it is moved,
can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to thoſe things
which depend upon the voluntary motions of free agents, it is well known, that
men (by whom learn how to judge of the reft) can only be free with refpect
to fuch things as are within their ſphere; not great, God knows: and their free-
dom with reſpect to theſe can only confiſt in a liberty either to act, without
any incumbent neceffity, as their own reason and judgment ſhall determin them;
or to neglect their rational faculties, and not uſe them at all, but fuffer themſelves
to be carried away by the tendences and inclinations of the body, which left
thus to itſelf acts in a manner mechanically. Now He, who knows what is in
mens power, what not; knows the make of their bodies, and all the mechanifm
and propenfions of them; knows the nature and extent of their underſtandings,
and what will determin them this or that way; knows all the proceſs of natu-
ral (or fecond) cauſes, and conſequently how theſe may work upon them: He,
I fay, who knows all this, may know what men will do, if He can but know
this one thing more, viz. whether they will use their rational faculties or not.
And fince even we our felves, mean and defective as we are, can in ſome meaſure
conceive, how ſo much as this may be done, and feem to want but one ſtep to
finiſh the account, can we with any fhew of reafon deny to a Perfect being this
one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; eſpecially if we call to
mind, that this very power of using our own faculties is held of Him <?
Obferve what a fagacity there is in fome men, not only in refpect of phyfi-
cal cauſes and effects, but alſo of the future actings of mankind; and how
very eafie it is many times, if the perfons concernd, their characters, and cir-
cumſtances are given, to foreſee what they will do: as alfo to foretel many
general events, tho the intermediate tranfactions upon which they depend are
not known d. Confider how much more remarkable this penetration is in
Some men, than in others: confider further, that if there be any minds more
perfect than the human, (and who can be fo conceited of himſelf as to quefti-
on this?) they muſt have it in a ſtill more eminent degree, proportiona-
ble to the excellence of their natures: in the laft place, do but allow
2 What Seneca fays of the Gods (in the heathen ſtyle), may be faid of the true God. Nota eft ill;
operis fui feries: omniumque illi rerum per manus fuas iturarum fcientia in aperto femper efl; nobis ex
abdito fubit, &c.
Βοηδ ζωοπλάστης θεὸς ἐπίσαται τὰ ἑαυτῶν καλῶς δημιεργήματα. Ph. Fud
C
S. Auft.
Ipfe noftra voluntates in caufarum ordine funt, qui certus eft Deo, ejufque prafcientia continetur, &c.
d Etfi quem exitum acies habitura fit, divinare nemo poteft; tamen belli exitum
video, &c. and after, quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, qua oculis cernimus. Cic.
S
(as
Truths relating to the Deity.
101
(as you muſt) this power of difcerning to be in God proportionable to His nature,
as in lower beings it is proportionable to theirs, and then it becomes infinite;
and then again, the future actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and
expoſed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to
things paft or prefent or which come to pass neceffarily.
After all, what has been faid is only a feeble attempt to fhew, how far even we
can go toward a conception of the manner, in which future things may be
known but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His
powers, and among them His power of knowing, muft infinitely paſs all our un-
derſtanding. It must be fomething different from and infinitely tranfcending
all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of a.
We know matters of fact by the help of our fenfes, the ſtrength of memory,
impreffions made upon phanfy, or the report of others (tho that indeed is compre-
hended under ſenſes. For that, which we know only by report, in proper fpeak-
ing we only know the report of, or we have heard it); and all theſe ways do fup-
poſe thoſe matters either to be prefent, or once to have been: but is it therefore
impoffible, that there ſhould be any other ways of knowing? This is fo far from
being true, that, fince God has no organs of fenfation, nor fuch mean faculties
as the beſt of ours are, and confequently cannot know things in the way which
we know them in, if He doth not know them by fome other way, He cannot
know them at all, even tho they were preſent: and therefore there must be o-
ther ways, or at leaſt another way of knowing even matters of fact. And fince
the difficulty we find in determining, whether future matters of fact may be
known, ariſes chiefly from this, that we in reality confider, without minding
it, whether they may be known in our way of knowing; it vaniſhes, when we
recollect, that they are and muſt be known to God by fome other way and not
only ſo, but this muſt be ſome way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. Future, or
what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, as prefent is
of ours: nor can web tell, what refpect past, prefent, to come, have to the Divine
mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no fuch thing as found, te
blind no fuch thing as light or color: nor, when theſe things are defined and ex-
plaind to them in the beſt manner, which their circumſtances admit, are they ca-
pable of knowing how they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell how future
things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what founds or co-
lors are, and how they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing thoſe,
.14 ברב ובמעט לבר אבל במין המציאה Maim. It differs not אין זה ידיעה ממין ידיעתנו 4
↳ Ignari, quid queat effe, Quid nequeat: to uſe Lucretius's words more properly.
O
as
102
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
FT
as well as there is of perceiving theſe. As they want a fifth fenſe to perceive
founds or colors, of which they have no notion: fo perhaps we may want a ſixth
fenſe, or fome faculty, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor
have we any more reaſon to deny, that there is in nature ſuch a ſenſe or faculty,
than the deaf or blind have to deny, that there is ſuch a ſenſe as that of hearing
or ſeeing.
We can never conclude, that it is impoſſible for an infinitely perfect Being to
know what a free agent will chooſe to do, till we can comprehend all the powers
of fuch a Being, and that is till we our ſelves are infinite and perfect. So far
are we from being able to pronounce with any fhew of reaſon, that it is impoſſible
there ſhould be fuch knowledge in God.
In the last place, this knowledge is not only not impoffible, but that which has
been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth neceffarily
infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if ignorance be an imperfecti-
on, the ignorance of future acts and events muſt be fo: and then if all imper-
fections are to be denied of Him, this muft.
There is indeed a common prejudice againſt the prefcience (as it is ufually call-
ed) of God; which ſuggeſts, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows
them infallibly or certainly and if fo, then they are certain; and if certain,
then they are no longer matter of freedom. And thus prefcience and freedom are
inconfiftent. But fure the nature of a thing is not changed by being known, or
known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and
therefore is not alterd by this. The truth is, God forefees, or rather fees the actions
of free agents, becauſe they will be; not that they will be, becaufe He forefees
them. If I fee an object in a certain place, the veracity of my faculties fup-
poſed, it is certain that object is there: but yet it cannot be faid, it is there becauſe
I fee it there, or that my feeing it there is the caufe of its being there: but be-
cauſe it is there, therefore I ſee it there. It is the object, that determins my fen-
fation and fo in the other cafe, it is a future choice of the free agent, that deter-
mins the prefcience, which yet may be infallibly true .
Let us put theſe two contradictory propofitions, B (fome particular man) will
go to church next Sunday, and B will not go to church next Sunday; and let us fup-
• To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the fame as to endeavour
.Maim .אנחנו הוא Maim. Muci .יריעתו במה שיהיה לא יוציא הרבר האפשר מטבעו b
© Sicur
might be inferted upon this fubject (out of Abarb. particularly) which I ſhall omit.
ením tu memoriâ tuâ non cogis facta effe qua praterierunt; fic Deus prafcientiâ fuâ non cogit facienda
qua futura funt. S. Auſt.
poſe
!
Truths relating to the Deity.
103
poſe withall, that B is free, and that his going or not going depends merely upon
his own will. In this cafe he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but one of
theſe two things, either go, or not go; and one he muſt do. One of theſe pro-
pofitions therefore is now true; but yet it is not the truth of that propofition,
which forces him to do what is containd in it: on the contrary, the truth of the
propofition ariſes from what he ſhall choose to do. And if that truth doth not
force him, the foreknowledge of that truth will not. We may ſure ſuppoſe B
himſelf to know certainly before hand, which of the two he will chooſe to do,
whether to go to church or not (I mean fo far as it depends upon his choice on-
ly): and if ſo, then here is B's own foreknowledge confiftent with his freedom :
and if we can but, further, ſuppoſe God to know as much in this reſpect as B does,
there will be God's foreknowledge confiftent with B's freedom.
In a word, it involves no contradiction to affert, that God certainly knows
what any man will chooſe; and therefore that he ſhould do this cannot be faid
to be impoffible.
ture a
2. It is not impoffible, that fuch laws of nature, and fuch a ſeries of caufes and
effects may be originally defignd, that not only general provifions may be made
for the ſeveral ſpecies of beings, but even particular cafes, at leaft many of them,
may alſo be provided for without innovations or alterations in the courſe of na-
It is true this amounts to a prodigious ſcheme, in which all things to
come are as it were comprehended under one view, eſtimated, and laid together:
but when I confider, what a maſs of wonders the univerſe is in other regards;
what a Being God is, incomprehenfibly great and perfect; that He cannot be igno-
rant of any thing, no not of the future wants and deportments of particular men;
and that all things, which derive from Him as the Firſt cauſe, muſt do this ſo as to
be confiftent one with another, and in fuch a manner, as to make one compact ſy-
ftem, befitting fo great an Author: I fay, when I confider this, I cannot deny
ſuch an adjuſtment of things to be within His power b. The order of events, pro-
ceeding from the ſettlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and rea-
fonable fuccefs of my endeavours and prayers (as inconfiderable a part of the world
as I am ), as with any other thing or phænomenon how great foever.
ELY.
• Things come to pals ἢ κατὰ φυσικὰς ἀκολεθίας ἢ κατὰ λόγοι" and even τὰ σμικρότερα δεσωτε
Táxda. É ouvvpárda voie. Plot. That in Seneca looks fomething like this: Hoc dico, fulmina
non mitti a Fove, fed fic omnia difpofita, ut ea etiam, que ab illo non fiunt, tamen fine ratione non
fiant: qua illius eft.– Nam etfi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut fierent.
b This feems
to be what Eufebius means, when he fays, that Divine providence does (among other things) 7
εκτός συμβαίνεσε την δισσαν τάξιν απονέμειν, - Την δ ἐθένειαν τὴν ἐμαυτῶ μετρεῖν ἔμαθον, in Phil's
words.
O2
Perhaps
104
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppofe M (fome
man) certainly to foreknow fome way or other that, when he fhould come to be
upon his death-bed, L would petition for fome particular legacy; in a manner fo
earneſt and humble, and with fuch a good difpofition, as would render it pro-
per to grant his requeft: and upon this M makes his last will, by which he devifes
to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the will; and all this many
years before the death of M, and whilft L had yet no expectation or thought of
any fuch thing. When the time comes, the petition is made, and granted; not
by making any new will, but by the old one already made, and without altera-
tion: which legacy had, notwithſtanding that, never been left had the petition
never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and
depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had
been foreſeen, that L would not fo much as ask, and had therefore been left
out of the will; this preterition would have been cauſed by his carriage, tho
much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted,
if M be allowd to foreknow the cafe ª. And thus the prayers, which good men
offer to the All-knowing God, and the neglects of others, may find fitting effects
already forecaſted in the courſe of nature. Which poffibility may be extended
to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general.
a
It is obvious to every one's obfervation, that in fact particular men are very com-
monly (at leaſt in ſome meaſure) rewarded or puniſhd by the general laws and me-
thods of nature. The natural (tho not conftant) attendents and confequences of
virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice, lofs of philofophical pleaſures, a
diſeaſed body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be virtuous and happy, C vi-
tious and at laſt miferable, laboring under a late and fruitless remorfe; tho this
comes to pass through the natural tendence of things, yet thefe two cafes, being
fuppofed fuch as require, the one that B fhould be favord, the other that C
fhould fuffer for his wickedness, are as effectually provided for, as if God ex-
erted his power in fome peculiar way on this occafion.
3.
It is not impoffible, that men, whofe natures and actions are foreknown, may
be introduced into the world in fuch times, places, and other circumstances, as that.
their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the general plan of things, but
alfo anſwer many private cafes too b. The planets and bigger parts of the world.
צועק לשעבר הרי זו תפלת שוא וכו'
>
The cafe here put may perhaps fupply an anſwer to that, which is faid in Mifhn. maff. Berak
b If Plato had not been born in the time of Socrates, in
all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with Lactantius's favor, he might have
reaſon to thank God, quòd Athenienfis [natus effet], & quòd temporibus Socratis. Juſt as M. Antoni-
nus afcribes, gratefully, to the Gods rò yyñvæı 'Azemávlov, Pósixey, Mážimov.
4
we
Truths relating to the Deity..
105
we cannot but fee are difpofed into fuch places and order, that they together
make a noble ſyſtem, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the
force of that which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion re-
ftraind or alterd. On the contrary, being rightly placed, they by the obfervation of
thefe become fubfervient to the main defign. Now why may there not be in
the Divine mind ſomething like a projection of the future history of mankind,
as well as of the order and motions and various aſpects of the greater bodies
of the world? And then why ſhould it not be thought poſſible for men, as well
as for them, by fome fecret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the prefi-
dence and guidance of an unfeen governing power, to be brought into their
places in fuch a manner as that by the free uſe of their faculties, the conjunctions
and oppofitions of their interefts and inclinations, the natural influence and weight
of their ſeveral magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may
confpire to make out the ſcheme? And then again, fince generals conſiſt of par-
ticulars, and in this ſcheme are comprehended the actions and cafes of particular
men, they cannot be ſo fituated reſpectively among the reſt of their ſpecies as to
be ſerviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the general dia-
gram of affairs, unleſs they and their ſeveral actings and cafes do in the main cor-
reſpond one to another, and fit among themſelves, or at leaſt are not inconfiftent.
Here is no implication of any contradiction or abfurdity in all this: and therefore
it may at leaſt be fairly fuppofed. And if fo, it will follow, that a particular
providence may be compatible with the natural freedom of mens actions. Such
a fuppofition is certainly not beyond the power of an almighty, perfect Being:
it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon
thoſe words, and take their import, muft believe.
The ancients I am perfuaded had fome fuch thoughts as thefe. For they
were generally fatalifts, and yet do not ſeem to have thought, that they were
not masters of their own actions ª.
4. It is not impoffible (for this is all that I contend for here), that many things,
fuitable to ſeveral cafes, may be brought to paſs by means of fecret and fome-
times fudden influences on our minds, or the minds of other men, whofe acts
may, affect us. For inſtance; if the caſe ſhould require, that N fhould be de-
• Plato and the Stoics, ap. Plut. make fate to be συμπλοκὴν ἀιτιῶν τεταγμθύων, ἐν ᾗ συμπλοκῇ καὶ τὸ
παρ' ἡμᾶς· ὥσε τὰ μὺ ἐιμάρθαι, τὰ ἢ ἀνειμάρθαι. ↳ The Heathen were of this opinion : other-
う
​اد
wife Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Tỡ läg ἐπὶ
φρεσὶ θῆκε θεά γλαυκώπις Αθήνη. Αλλά τις ἀθανάτων τρέψε φρένας· and the like often. Plutarch explains
thefe paflages thus. Οὐκ ἀναιρέντα ποιεῖ Γ' Όμηρα] τ θεὸν, ἀλλὰ κινέντα τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐσὺ ὁρμᾶς ἐρ-
γαζόμθμον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγές and afterwards the Gods are faid to help men, & ψυχῆς τὸ
πρακτικὸν καὶ προαιρετικὸν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινοίαις ἐγείροντες, ἢ συναντίον αποτρέφοντες καὶ ἐσαλες.
liverd
اد
106
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
liverd from fome threatening ruin, or from fome misfortune, which would cer-
tainly befall him, if he ſhould go fuch a way at fuch a time, as he intended:
upon this occafion fome new reafons may be preſented to his mind, why he
fhould not go at all, or not then, or not by that road; or he may forget to go.
Or, if he is to be deliverd from fome dangerous enemy, either fome new turn
given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the enemy will be, or
the enemy may be after the fame manner diverted from coming where he fhall
be, or his [the enemy's] refentment may be qualified, or fome proper method
of defence may be fuggefted, or degree of refolution and vigor excited. After
the fame manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advanta-
ges and fucceffes may be conferred: or on the other fide, men may, by way of
puniſhment for crimes committed, incurr miſchiefs and calamities. I fay, thefe
things and fuch like may be. For fince the motions and actions of men, which
depend upon their wills, do alfo depend upon their judgments, as theſe again do
upon the preſent appearances or non-appearances of things in their minds; ifa new
profpect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are ſeen
alterd, new forces and directions impreſt upon the ſpirits, paffions exalted or
abated, the power of judging inlivend or debilitated, or the attention taken off,
without any fufpenfion or alteration of the ſtanding laws of nature, then with-
out that new volitions, defigns, meaſures, or a ceffation of thinking may alſo be
produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwife would be, and many
brought about, that would not. But that this is far from being impoſſible, ſeems
clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great meaſure the pre-
fent difpofition of the body, fome thoughts and defigns, or abfences of mind, may
proceed from corporeal cauſes, acting according to the common laws of matter
and motion themſelves; and fo the caſe may fall in with n. 2. or they may be oc-
cafiond by fomething faid or done by other men; and then the cafe may be brought
under n. 3. or they may be cauſed by the fuggeftion, and impulfe, or other filent
communications of ſome ſpiritual being; perhaps the Deity himſelf. For that fuch
imperceptible influences and ſtill whiſpers may be, none of us all can pofitively
deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no fuch things. On
the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made obfervations
upon themſelves and their affairs, but muft, when they reflect on life paſt and
the various adventures and events in it, find many inftances, in which their uſual
judgment and fenfe of things cannot but feem to themſelves to have been over-
ruled, they knew not by what, nor how, nor why (i.e. they have done things,
• Σφαλείς [ὁ μειρακίσκω] σόκ οἶδ' ὅπως, ἐμοὶ μὲ τὸ φάρμακον, Πτοιοδώρῳ ἢ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα ]
iridons, fays Callidemidas, who deſignd the poiſon for Ptoodorus, in Lucian.
which
Truths relating to the Deity.
107
which afterwards they wonder how they came to do); and that theſe actions
have had confequences very remarkable in their hiftory. I fpeak not here of
men dementated with wine, or inchanted with fome temptation: the thing
holds true of men even in their ſober and more confidering ſeaſons.
That there may be poſſibly ſuch inſpirations of new thoughts and counfels
may perhaps further appear from this; that we fo frequently find thoughts a-
riſing in our heads, into which we are led by no diſcourſe, nothing we read, no
clue of reaſoning; but they furpriſe and come upon us from we know not what
quarter b. If they proceeded from the mobility of fpirits, ftraggling out of or-
der, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of dreams, why
are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that
the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore ſeems to have experien-
ced fome affiſtance and directions given to good men by the Deity; that men
have been many times infatuated, and loft to themſelves, &c. If any one
fhould object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actings, then they are
deprived of their liberty, &c. the anſwer is, that tho man is a free agent, he
he may
not be free as to every thing. His freedom may be reſtraind, and he only ac-
countable for thoſe acts, in refpect of which he is free.
If this then be the cafe, as it ſeems to be, that men's minds are fufceptive of
fuch infinuations and impreffions, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them,
and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be
brought to pass by theſe means without fixing and refixing the laws of nature:
any more than they are unfixt, when one man alters the opinion of another by
throwing a book, proper for that purpoſe, in his way? I fay, how many things
may be brought about thus, not only in regard of our felves, but other people,
who may be concerned in our actions, either immediately, or in time through
perhaps many intermediate events? For the profperity or improfperity of a man,
or his fate here, does not intirely depend upon his own prudence or imprudence,
but in great meaſure upon his fituation among the reſt of mankind, and what
they do. The natural effect of his management meeting with fuch things, as
are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them,
the reſult may be ſomething not intended or foreſeen.
5. There poffibly may be, and moft probably are beings invifible, and fupe-
rior in nature to us, who may by other means be in many reſpects miniſters of
* When Hannibal was in fight of Rome, non aufus eft obfidere. S. Hier. Sed religione quadam
abftinuit, quod diceret, capienda urbis modo non dari voluntatem, modo non dari facultatem, ut teftatur
do Orofius. Schol.
↳ Non enim cuiquam in poteftate eft quid veniat in mentem. S. Außt.
They who call'd Simonides out from Scopas and his company, as if it were to ſpeak with him,
faved his life. The ſtory known.
God's
C
التمر
Colbar
108
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
God's providence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men,
without altering the laws of nature. For it implies no contradiction or abfurdi-
ty to fay there are fuch beings: on the contrary we have the greateſt reaſon to
think what has been intimated already; that fuch imperfect beings, as we are,
are far below the top of the ſcale. Tho pictures of fpiritual beings cannot be
drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reafoning part
of the mind the idea of /piritual fubftance may perhaps be as clear, as that of
corporeity. For what penetrability is, muſt be known juft as well as what im-
penetrability is: and ſo on.
And fince it has been proved (p. 77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed
originally from fomething incorporeal, it muſt be as certain, that there are incor-
poreal ſubſtances, as that there is motion. Befide, how can we tell but that there
may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capa-
ble of mighty things, which yet may have corporeal vehicles as we have, but fi
ner and inviſible? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of theſe many
orders, rifing in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above ano-
ther? It is no way below the philofophy of theſe times, which feems to delight
in inlarging the capacities of matter, to affert the poffibility of this. But how-
ever, my own defects fufficiently convince me, that I have no pretenfion to
be one of the first rank, or that which is next under the All-perfect.
Now then, as we our felves by the ufe of our powers do many times interpoſe
and alter the courſe of things within our ſphere from what it would be, if they
were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being faid to
alter thoſe laws; fo may theſe fuperior beings likewiſe in reſpect of things with-
in their ſpheres, much larger be fure, the leaſt of them all, than ours is only
with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extenfive, their intellects
purer, their reaſon better, they may be much properer inftruments of Divine
providence with reſpect to us, than we can be with refpect one to another, or
to the animals below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of thefe beings
is fo large, as to alter or fufpend the general laws of the world; or that the world
is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft fet backward or
forward by them; or that they can at pleaſure change their condition to ape us,or
inferior beings; and confequently am not apt haftily to credit ſtories of portents,
&c.fuch as cannot be true, unless the natures of things and their manner of being be
a They, who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or fee (oi de amo dióµes eivas à
νὰ ἀπὸ ξ τοῦ χερῶν λαβέως — τῶν ἢ τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμθμοι ὡς ἐν ἐσίας μέρει) are by
rò
mul to be void of all philofophy, αμύητοι, σκληροί, ἀντίτυποι, μάλ' εὖ ἄμεσοι,
quite
Truths relating to the Deity.
109
quite renverſed: yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be fo placed as to become,
even by the free exerciſe of their own powers, inftruments of God's particular
providence to other men (or animals); fo may we well fuppofe, that theſe higher
beings may be fo diftributed through the univerfe, and fubject to fuch an œco-
nomy (tho I pretend not to tell what that is),as may render them alfo inftruments
of the fame providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abi-
lities, be capable, confiftently with the laws of nature, fome way or other, tho
not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.
Laftly, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be fo un-
derſtood, as if I peremptorily afferted things to be juſt in this manner, or pre-
tended to impofe my thoughts upon any body elſe: my defign is only to fhews
how I endeavour to help my own narrow conceptions. There muſt be other
ways above my underſtanding, by which fuch a Being as God is may take care
of private cafes without interrupting the order of the univerſe, or putting any
of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be fure He regards every
thing as being what it is; and that therefore His laws must be accommodated to
the true genius's and capacities of thofe things, which are affected by them.
The purely material part of the world is governd by fuch, as are fuited to the
ſtate of a being, which is infenfible, paſſive only, and every where and always
the fame and theſe ſeem to be fimple and few, and to carry natural agents
into one conſtant road. But intelligent active, free beings muſt be under a govern-
ment of another form. They muft, truth requiring it, be confiderd as beings,
who may behave themſelves as they ought, or not; as beings fufceptive of plea-
fure and pain; as beings, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but
are (or may be) ſenſible of this, and to whom therefore it muſt be natural upon
many occafions to fupplicate Him for mercy, defence, direction, affiſtance; laſtly,
as beings, whoſe caſes admit great variety: and therefore that influence, by which
He is preſent to them, muſt be different from that, by which gravitation and
common phænomena are produced in matter. This ſeems to be as it were a pub-
lic influence, the other private, anfwering private cafes, and prayers; this to o-
perate directly upon the body, the other more eſpecially upon the mind, and up-
on the body by it, &c. But I forbear, left I ſhould go too far out of my depth : on-
ly adding in general, that God cannot put things fo far out of His own pow-
er, as that He fhould not for ever govern tranfactions and events in His own
world; nor can perfect knowledge and power ever want proper means to atchieve
• Ουχ ὁμοίως ἄνθρωπο ἀμύνεται C. Θεός. Ph. Jud.
P
what
IIO
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
:
what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced fhould ftand for
nothing, there may still be a particular providence notwithſtanding the foremen-
tiond difficulty. And then, if there may be one, it will unavoidably follow, that
there is one: becauſe in the deſcription of providence, p. 95, nothing is fuppo-
fed with reſpect to particular cafes, but that they ſhould be provided for in fuch a
manner as will at last agree best with reafon; and to allow, that this may be done,
and yet fay, that it is not done, implies a blaſphemy that creates horror; it is
to charge the Perfect being with one of the greateſt imperfections, and to make
Him not ſo much as a reaſonable being.
I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a particular providence, as
that God is a Being of perfect reafon. For if men are treated according to reaſon,
they muſt be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the juft, the com-
paffionate, &c. as fuch, and the vitious, unjuft, cruel, &c. according to what
they are and their feveral cafes muſt be taken and confiderd as they are: which
cannot be done without fuch a providence.
Againſt all this it has been, as one might well expect, objected of old, that
things do not ſeem to be dealt according to reafon, virtuous and good men very
oft laboring under adverfity, pains, perfecutions, whilft vitious, wicked, cruel men
prevail and flourish. But to this an anſwer (in which I fhall a little further ex-
plain my ſelf) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given
to the Manichean objection under prop. VII. But I fhall here give one more
direct: and let that and this be mutually affifting and fupplements each to the
other. 1. We are not always certain, who are good, who wicked b. If we truft to
fame and reports, theſe may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendſhip,
or flattery; on the other, from ill-natured furmiſes and conftructions of things,
envy, or malice; and on either, from ſmall matters aggrandized, from mif-
take, or from the unskilful relation even of truth itſelf. Oppofite parties
make a merit of blackening their adverfaries, and brightening their friends,
• Si curent [Dij] homines, benè bonis fit, malè malis: quod nunc abest. Ap. Cic. The Jews, who
call this cafe 1101 yurib ynı piy, have written many things about it, to be feen in their
books: Mo.nebok. S. Iqquar. Men. hamma. Nahh. ab.c. So have the Heathen philofophers too;
Seneca, Plutarch, Plotinus, Simplicius, al. But the anſwers of neither are always juft. God forbid
that ſhould be thought true, which is afferted by Glauco, ap. Plat. that the juft, if they had Gyges's
ring, would do as the unjuſt, and őr, ¿das ixàv dixa:O, åmà àvaynagó, xλ. Or that in S. Hhafid.
and Men. hamma. yun 12 pinyab yni py. The reafon affigned for this cafe in another place
ων
και
But the way of falving .כדי שלא יאמרו אם לא היה בטובה לא היה צדיק : is fomething better
b Cadit
Dis aliter vifum. Virg.
it in Niſhm. bhaiy. by ninun biaba, or what the Cabbalifts call 'y, is worst of all.
Ripheus, juftiffimus unus Qui fuit in Teucris, & fervantiffimus aqui.
* Virtutes ipfas invertimus. Hor.
undefervedly
Truths relating to the Deity.
III
undeſervedly and unmeafurably: and to idle companions and goffips it is diverfi-
on, and what makes the principal part of their converſation, to rehearſe the
characters of men, dreft up out of their own dreams and inventions. And befide
all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great meaſure upon mean
people, who carry their ſtories from family to family, and propagate them very
faft: like little infects, which lay apace, and the lefs the fafter. There are
few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to repre-
fent things truly b. Befide the matters of fact themſelves there are many cir-
cumſtances which, before ſentence is paffed, ought to be known and weighed,
and yet ſcarce ever can be known, but to the perſon himſelf who is concernd.
He may have other views, and another ſenſe of things, than his judges have: and
what he underſtands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a fecret confined
to his own breſt. A man may through bodily indifpofitions and faults in his
conftitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be ſubject to ſtarts and
inadvertencies, or obnoxious to fnares, which he cannot be aware of; or through
want of information or proper helps he may labor under invincible errors, and
act as in the dark in which caſes he may do things, which are in themſelves
wrong, and yet be innocent, or at leaſt rather to be pitied, than cenfured with
ſeverity. Or perhaps the cenfurer, notwithſtanding this kind of men talk as if
they were infallible, may be miſtaken himſelf in his opinion, and judge that to
be wrong, which in truth is right. Nothing more common than this. Igno-
rant and fuperftitious wretches meaſure the actions of letterd and philofophical
men by the tattle of their nurfes or illiterate parents and companions, or by
the faſhion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and con-
demn each other by their own tenents; when both of them cannot be in the
• Ουδέν δ έτως ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· ς μάλισα ἐὰν τύχωσιν ὑπ᾽ ἐυνόιας τινὸς
ἢ μίσος ἑλκόμενοι, ὑφ᾽ ὧν & φιλεῖ κλέπτες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Greg. Νaz. b Therefore, with
И
Socrates in Plato, we ought not much to care what the multitude [è] fay of us, áæ´´ö, Tí ö
ἐπαίων περὶ ν δικάιων, ἢ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς, ε αυτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια. c Or, v. v. he may judge that to be right, which
ó
is wrong. This ſeems to be pretty much the cafe in that enumeration of good men, who fufferd,
ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortiffimos & optimos viros, in Hipania Poenus oppreffit? Cur Maximus ex-
tulit filium confularem? Cur Marcellum Annibal interemit, &c. For here they are reckond boni, only
becauſe they were fortes; that is, becauſe they had been zealous and fucceſsful inſtruments in conquer.
ing and deſtroying them, who happend to be fo unfortunate as to be neighbours to the Romans,
upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to inlarge their own territories. Ishis to be good?
Doth it deſerve fuch a particular obſervation, that F. Maximus buried a fon, after he had been Conful
too? How doth it appear, that Marcellus was a better man than Hannibal? Is it fuch a wonder, if
they, who ſpend their lives in flaughter, ſhould at length be flain themſelves? If the margin permit-
ted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as alfo fome upon that, which follows in
the fame place, of others, quibus improbis optime evênit.
P 2
right,
112
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
right, and it is well if either of them are. To which may be added, that the
true characters of men muſt chiefly depend upon the unfeen part of their lives;
fince the trueft and beft religion is moft private, and the greatest wickedness.
endeavours to be ſo. Some are modeſt, and hide their virtues: others hypo-
critical, and conceal their vices under fhews of fanctity, good nature, or fome-
thing that is fpecious. So that it is many times hard to diſcern, to which
of the two forts, the good or the bad, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It
rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the good or bad fortune of o-
ther people b. That, which is diſagreeable to one, is many times
times agreeable to
another, or difagreeable in a lefs degree. The mifery accruing from any in-
fliction or bad circumftance of life is to be computed as in p. 32, 33: or ac-
cording to the refiftence and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If
one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another
can the weight of one hundred, by theſe different weights they will be equally
loaded. And fo the fame poverty or difgrace, the fame wounds, &c. do not
give the ſame pain to all men. The apprehenfion of but a vein to be opend is
worſe to ſome, than the apparatus to an execution is to others: and a word may
be more terrible and fenfible to tender natures, than a fword is to the fenfelefs,
or intrepid breed. The fame may be faid with reſpect to injoyments: men have
different tafts, and the uſe of the fame things does not beget equal pleaſure in all.
Befide, we ſcarce ever know the whole cafe. We do not fee the inward ſtings
and fecret pains, which many of thoſe men carry about them, whofe external
fplendor and flouriſhing eſtate is fo much admired by beholders : nor perhaps fuffi-
ciently confider the filent pleaſures of a lower fortune, arifing from temperance,
moderate defires, eafy reflexions, a confcioufnefs of knowledge and truth; with o-
ther pleaſures of the mind,much greater many times than thoſe of the body d. Before
one can pronounce another happy or otherwiſe, he ſhould know all the other's.
• Feli-
• Vita poftfcenia celant (in Lucr.) may be aptly applied to the wicked. Multi famam, confcientiam
pauci verentur. Plin. jun. b Neq; mala vel bona, que vulgus putat: multi, qui conflictari
adverfis videntur, beati ; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miferrimi, &c. Tacit.
ciorem tu Mecanatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, & morofa uxoris quotidiana repudia deflenti, fomnus
per fymphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo bene refonantium, queritur? Mero fe licet fopiat,; tam
vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille [Regulus] in cruce.ut dubium [non] fit, an electione fati datâ, plures
Reguli nafci, quàm Mecenates velint. Sen. Ifti, quos pro felicibus afpicitis, fi non qua occurrunt, fed
qua latent, videritis, miferi funt. Id. d Archimedes, having found the way of folving a problem
(examinandi, an corona aurea prorfus effet), ran in an ecſtaſy out of the bath, crying Eugrxa: but who
eve. heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the injoyment of a woman, ran out thus, cry-
ing Βέβρωκα, οι πεφίληκα ? Plut.
injoy™
¡
Truths relating to the Deity.
113
b
injoyments and all his fufferings. Many misfortunes are compenfated by
fome larger indowments, or extraordinary felicities in other refpects. But fup-
pofe the pleaſures of fome, and the ſufferings of fome others, to be juſt as they
appear: ſtill we know not the confequences of them. The pleaſures of thoſe men
may lead to miferies greater than thoſe of the latter, and be in reality the greater
misfortune: and, again, the fufferings of theſe may be preludes to fucceeding
advantages d. So that indeed we know not how to name theſe outward appea-
rances of particular men, nor which to call happiness, which the contrary; un-
lefs we knew the inward fenfe of the perfons themſelves, all their true circum-
ſtances, and what will be hereafter confequent upon their preſent ſucceſs or
adverfity. 3. Men ought to be confiderd as members of families, nations, man-
kind, the univerſe, from which they cannot be feparated: and then from the
very condition of their being it will appear, that there muſt be great inequali-
ties; that the innocent cannot but be fometimes involved in general calamities or
puniſhments, nor the guilty but ſhare in public profperities; and that the good
of the whole fociety or kind is to be regarded preferably to the prefent pleaſure of
any individual, if they happen to clafhs. Lastly, if the virtuous man has under-
gone more in this life, than it would be reaſonable he fhould fuffer, if there was
no other; yet thoſe fufferings may not be unreaſonable, if there is another. For
they may be made up to him by fuch injoyments, as it would be reaſonable for
him to prefer, even with thoſe previous mortifications, before the pleafures of
this life with the lofs of them. And moreover, fometimes the only way to the
felicities of a better ftate may lie through dark and difficult paffes, difci-
pline to fome men being neceffary, to bring them to reflect, and to force
them into fuch methods as may produce in them proper improvements; fuch,
as otherwiſe and of themfelves they would never have faln into. On the o-
ther fide, if vitious and wicked men do profper and make a figure; yet
it is poffible their fufferings hereafter may be fuch, as that the excess of
Fatis contraria fata rependens. Virg. See what Pliny writes of Agrippa, the other great favorite:
and miniſter of Auguftus, whom he reckons to be the only inſtance of felicity among them who
were called Agrippa. Is quoq; adverfa pedum valetudine, mifera juventa, exercito avo inter arma
morteſque,―infelici terris ftirpe omni,-praterea brevitate avi,—in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis,
Ο Οφθαλμων μθμ άμερσε
foceriq; pragravi fervitio, luiffe augurium prapofteri natalis exifiimatur. b
dido d' ideñar άoidúv. Hom.
c Zeno reckond he made a good voyage, when he was ſhip-
wracked. Diog. L.
d If a good man labors under poverty, fickneſs, or the like, såyadóv to
TEλEUTÁσEI, CâvTI » odavóvti, for how can he be neglected of God, who ſtudies according to his
poor abilities to be like Him? Plato.
e Who blames a drama, becauſe all the perfons are not
heroes? Plot.
£ 1217 708 (17) Oblyn. Abarb, & paſſ.
1. Μέρα μ' ἕνεκα όλες
ἢ ἐχι ὅλον μέρος ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, κτλ. Plato,
them
114 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
them above their paſt injoyments may be equal to the juſt mult of their villanies
and wickedneſs. And further, their worldly pleaſures (which muſt be ſuppoſed
to be fuch as are not philofophical, or moderated and governed by reaſon and ha-
bits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingrofs the whole man, and by that
means to exclude almoſt all right reflexions, with the proper applications of
them, may be the very cauſes of their ruin; whilft they leave them under ſuch
defects at the end of their days, as we ſhall ſee afterward tend to unhappiness.
If what is objected be in many inftances true, this only infers the neceffity of
a future ftate: that is, if good and bad men are not reſpectively treated ac-
cording to reaſon in this life, they may yet be ſo treated, if this and another to
follow be taken together into the account. And perhaps it is (as I have been
always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future ftate,
that inftances of that kind have been fo numerous. For he muſt not only be
guilty of blafphemy, but reduced to the greateſt abfurdity, who, rather than
he will own there is ſuch a ſtate, is forced to make God an unreaſonable Be-
ing which I think amounts to a ſtrong demonftration, that there is one.
But of that more hereafter.
XIX. If we would behave ourselves as being what we cannot but be fenfible we
are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoing propofitions; or,
if we would endeavour to behave our felves towards him according to truth, we
muft obferve theſe following and the like particulars.
1. We must not pretend to repreſent Him by any picture or image whatſoever .
Becauſe this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehenfible nature, &c d.
2. We ought to be fo far from doing this, that even the language we use, when
we speak of Him, and especially of His pofitive nature and effential properties,
ought not only to be chofen with the utmost care, but also to be underflood in the fubli-
meſt ſenſe: and the fame is true with respect to our thoughts,mut. mutand e. Or thus:
او
• Divine providence and immortality of the foul muſt ſtand and fall together. Oάrepov 8x ésıv
Σπλιπεῖν ἀναιρέντα θάτερον. Plut. ο Τέτο ταυτόν ἐςι τὸ μὴ διεσθαι είναι Θεόν· ἢ ὄντα μὴ προνοεῖο
προνοῦντα μὴ ἀγαθὸν είναι ~ δίκαιον. Hierocl. Sure no body ever did in reality pretend to do this.
According to Diog. L. the Egyptians fet up ἀγάλματα in their temples τῷ μὴ ἐιδέναι τὴν δ᾽ Θεῖ μορ-
Qúy for that very reaſon, becauſe they did not know his thape; or, how to repreſent Him. Their
images feem to have been fymbols or hieroglyphics, expreffing fomething of their fenfe or opinion
concerning Him. For, as Maimonides obferves, no man ever did or ever will worſhip an idol, made
of metal, ſtone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth.
& Non eft dubium, quin
religio nulla fit, ubicunq; fimulachrum eft. Lact. • Ως η ἔργον σώματα τὸ σωματικῶς τι ἐπι-
τελέσαι, ἔτω νὶ ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ταῖς ευνοίαις τὰς ἀρεσκέσας φαντασίας τελησιεργῆσαι ὡς θέλε, διὸ καὶ τὰς
ἐννοία ἁμαρτίας μὴ ὡς φαντασίας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔργα ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμθμα δίκαιον κρίνεθζ. S. Baf.
d
we
:
115
Truths relating to the Deity.
t
{
we muſt endeavour to think and ſpeak of Him in the moſt reverent terms and
moſt proper manner we are able; keeping withal this general conclufion, and
as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the beſt we can,
He is ſtill ſomething above all our conceptions; and defiring, that our faint ex-
preffions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more proportionable meaning.
To do otherwiſe implies not only, that His mode of exiftence and eſſential at-
tributes are comprehenfible by us, but alfo (which is more) that our words and
phraſes, taken from among our felves b and the objects of our faculties, are ad-
equate expreffions of them: contrary to truth.
To explain myſelf by a few inftances. When we aſcribe mercy to God, or im-
plore His mercy, it muſt not be underſtood to be mercy like that, which is called
compaffion in us. For tho this be a very diftinguiſhing affection in human nature,
to which we are made ſubject for good reaſons, the conftitution of the world
and circumſtances of our preſent ftate making it neceffary for us to compaſſio-
nate each the ſufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with uneaſineſs, and
muſt therefore not be afcribed ftrictly to God in that fenfe, in which it is uſed
when aſcribed to our felves. It perhaps may not be amiſs to call it Divine mer-
cy, or the like; to diftinguiſh it: and to fhew, that we mean fomething, which,
tho in our low way of ſpeaking and by way of analogy we call it by the fame
name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may confider
it in general as the manner, in which God refpects poor fuppliants and proper
objects for their good. For certainly the respect or relation, which lies hetween
God, confiderd as an unchangeable Being, and one that is humble and fupplicates
and endeavours to qualify himſelf for mercy, cannot be the fame with that,
which lies between the fame unchangeable God and one that is obftinate, and
will not fupplicate, or endeavour to qualify himſelfª: that is, the fame thing,
or Being, cannot refpect oppofite and contradictory characters in the fame man-
ner; him who does behave himſelf as before, and him who does not. Therefore
when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of him to pity our infirmities and
wants, the deſign is not to move His affections, as good ſpeakers move their audi-
tors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and
tears; but to exprefs our own ſenſe of our felves and circumſtances in fuch a manner,
as may render us more capable of the emanations of Divine goodneſs, and fit
• Θεοπρεπῶς ἅπαντα νοῦντες. S. Chryf.
b We uſe them (and fpeak, as the Jews every where
τὰ ὀνόματα παρ' ἡμῖν ἀγαπώμε
inculcate, N 197 11wba) only årogía oixsíus agoonyogías
να μεταφέροντες. Plot.
• Molliffima corda Humano generi dare fe natura fatetur, Qua la-
chrymas dedit, hac noftri pars optima fenfûs.—ſeparat hoc nos à grege mutorum, &c. Juv.
ratio of G to M + q is different from that of G to M-q: and yet G remains unalterd,
I
d The
to
116
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
to receive fuch inftances of His beneficence, as to us may feem to be the effects of
compaſſion, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be,
and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reafon always and without alteration, that he,
who labors under a fenſe of his own defects, honeftly uſes his beft endeavours to
mend what is amifs, and (among other things) flies for relief to Him, upon whom
his being and all that he has do depend, fhould have many things granted him,
which are not given to the carelefs, obdurate, unasking a part of mankind; tho
his expreffions and manner of addrefs, with all his care, are ftill inadequate, and
below the Divine nature. In fhort, by our applications we cannot pretend to
produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our felves we may al-
ter the relation or refpect lying between him and us.
As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of mercy, justice, &c.
cannot be as we conceive them : becauſe in him they are one. Perhaps they
may more properly be called together Divine reafon: which, as it exerts itſelf
upon this or that occafion, is by us variously denominated.
Here it muſt not be forgot, that mercy or mercies are many times taken for ad-
vantages or benefits injoyd by us and then they are properly afcribed to God,
from whom they proceed as the effects of His beneficence and providence.
When we fpeak of the knowledge of God, we muſt not mean, that He knows
things in the way that we do: that any intention or operation of His mind is re-
quifite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impreffions made upon
Him: that He reafons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which
in us is moſt intuitive and immediate, does in any degree come up to the mode
in which He knows things. We muſt rather intend, in general, that there is
nothing, of which He is, or can be ignorant: which has been faid already ;
and is, I am afraid, as much as we can fafely fay.
When glory, bonor, praiſe bare given to God; or He is faid to do any thing for
His own glory, or we to propofe the glory of His name in what we do; thoſe words
ſhould not be taken as ſtanding for that kind of glory and applauſe, which is ſo induſ-
triouſly fought, and capricioufly diftributed among us mortals, and which I will
take this opportunity to handle a little more largely,in order to give here a ſpecimen
of the world, and fave that trouble in another place. Among us fome are celebrated
c
• Πῶς ἂν δοίη τῷ πρὸς τὰς ὁρμᾶς ἀντεξεσίῳ μὴ ἀιτῶντι ὁ διδόναι πεφυκώς Θεός ; Hierocl.
αν
ὁ τῶν
ἀρίσων σοκ ἔσιν ἔπαινΘ, ἀλλὰ μεῖζόν τι καὶ βέλτιον. Therefore ὁ Θεὸς καὶ τἀγαθὸν are above praife. Arift.
Οἱ τὸς θεὸς ἐπαινῶντες γελοῖοί εισιν, ἡμῖν αὐτὸς ἐξισόντες. Andron. Rh.
c Cleon, only a fongſter
[des], had a ſtatue at Thebes, kept as facred, when Pindar himſelf had none. See the ftory in
Athenaus.
:
2
for
Truths relating to the Deity.
117
1
for ſmall matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of
a faction, the advantage of great friendſhips, the uſual deference paid to men in
eminent ſtations, or mere good luck; and others for atchieving fuch things, as if
they were duly weighed, and people were not impoſed upon by falfe notions, firſt
introduced in barbarous times, and fince poliſhd and brought into faſhion by hif
torians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a difgrace to favages than
any recommendation of rational and civilized natures. Strength, and courage, and
beauty, and parts, and birth are followd with encomiums and honors, which, the
they may be the felicities and privileges of the poffeffors, cannot be their merit, who
received them gratis, and contributed nothing themſelves toward the acquifition
of them: whilft real virtue and induſtry (which, even when unſucceſsful, or op-
preft by ill health or unkind fortune, give the trueft title to praife) lie difregarded.
Thirſt after glory, when that is defired merely for its own fake, is founded in
ambition and vanity: the thing itſelf is but a dream, and imagination; fince, ac-
cording to the differing humors and ſentiments of nations and ages, the fame thing
may be either glorious or inglorious: the effect of it, confiderd ſtill by itſelf, is nei-
ther more health, nor eftate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it; or if
that be any thing, it is but what must ceafe when the man ddies: and, after all, as
it lives but in the breath of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things
extinguiſhes it, or perhaps it goes quite out of itſelf f. Men pleaſe them-
felves with notions of immortality, and fancy a perpetuity of fame fecured to
themſelves by books and teftimonies of hiftorians: but, alas! it is a ſtupid delu-
fion, when they imagin themſelves prefent, and injoying that fame at the read-
ing of their ſtory after their death. And, befide, in reality the man is not
known ever the more to pofterity, becauſe his name is tranſmitted to them: be
doth not live, becauſe his name does. When it is ſaid, J. Cæſar ſubdued Gaul,
beat Pompey, changed the Roman commonwealth into a monarchy, &c. it is
the fame thing, as to fay, the conqueror of Pompey, &c. was Cæfar: that is,
Cæfar and the conqueror of Pompey are the ſame thing; and Cæfar is as much
known by the one defignation as by the other. The amount then is only this:
that the conqueror of Pompey conquerd Pompey; or fome body conquerd Pom-
JAS.
• Gla.
• What Seneca fays of Alexander, is true of many an other heroe: pro virtute erat felix temeri-
b Tumes alto Druforum fanguine, tanquam Feceris ipfe aliquid, &c. Juv.
ria quantalibet quid erit, ſi gloria tantum eft? Juv.
• Κτήμα σφαλερώτατον. Ph. Fud.
.S. Hhaf .ומחר רימה
היום כאן ומחר בקבר היום חי 4
in Egypt, tho it ſtill remains, hath not been able to preſerve the true
loft, one may justly wonder how.
е
f Even the great pyramid
name of its builder; which is
pey;
118
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
pey; or rather, fince Pompey is as little known now as Cæfar, fome body con-
querd fome body. Such a poor buſineſs is this boaſted immortality b; and fuch,
as has been here defcribed, is the thing called glory among us! The notion of it
may ſerve to excite them, who having abilities to ferve their country in time
of real danger, or want, or to do fome other good, have yet not philofophy
enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to fee through the glories of the
world (juft as we excite children by praifing them; and as we fee many good
inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity): but to dif
cerning men this fame is mere air, and the next remove from nothing; what
they defpife, if not fhun. I think there are two confiderations, which may
juſtify a defire of fome glory or honor: and fcarce more. When men have per-
formed
any
virtuous actions, or fuch as fit cafy upon their memories, it is a
reaſonable pleaſure to have the teſtimony of the world added to that of their
own confciences, that they have done well d: and more than that, if the repu-
tation acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any real com-
fort or advantage (if it be only protection from the infolencies and injuſtice of
mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to
have this privilege must be a great fatisfaction, and what a wife and good man
may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propofe to himſelf. But then he pro-
poſes it no farther than it may be uſeful: and it can be no farther uſeful than he
wants it. So that, upon the whole, glory, praiſe, and the like, are either mere
vanity, or only valuable in proportion to our defects and wants. If then thoſe
words are underſtood according to the import and value they have among men,
how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propofe fuch a mean end
to Himſelf as our praiſes? He can neither want, nor value them. Alexan-
der, according to his tafte of things, it may well be ſuppoſed would have
been proud to have heard that he ſhould be the ſubject of ſome ſecond Homere
in whoſe ſheets his name might be imbalmed for ages to come; or to have
been celebrated at Athens, the mother of ſo many wits and captains: but fure
even be, with all his vanity, could not propoſe to himſelf as the end of all his
fatigues and dangers only to be praiſed by children, or rather by worms and.
infects, if they were capable of fhewing fome faint fenfe of his great-
D. Mixgor
* Τὰ ὀνόματα ἳ πάλαι πολυυμνήτων νῦν τρόπον τινα γλωσστήματά ἐςι. M. Anton.
ή μηκίς η ετεροφημία, καὶ αυτὴ ἢ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνθρωπαρίων τάχισα τεθνηξομένων, καὶ ἐκ ειδότων ἐδὲ ἑαυτῆς,
ἔτε γε τὸν πρόπαλαι τεθνηκότα. Ι4.
C Expende Hannibalem: quot libras in duce fummo Invenies ?.
d
• Μέχρι τέδε οι ἔπαινοι ἀνεκτοί εισιν, εἰς ὅσον ἂν ὁ ἐπαινέμενα γνωρίζῃ ἕκαστον λεγομένων προσὸν ἑαυτῷ·
૬
τὸ ἡ ὑπὲρ τῆτο, ἀλλότριον, κλ. Luc.
τήσεις μεγάλες κήρυκΘ- έτυχε. Plut.
e
ο Μακαρίσας αυτὸν [᾿ Αχιλλέα] ὅτι καὶ ζῶν φίλε πισε, και τελευ
nelsa.
Truths relating to the Deity.
119
nefs. And yet how far fhort is this compariſon! In conclufion therefore, the
men have been accuftomd to ſpeak of the Deity in terms taken from princes,
and fuch things as they have, in their weakneſs, admired; tho theſe are now
incorporated into the language of Divines; and tho, confidering what defects
there are in our ways of thinking and fpeaking, we cannot well part with them
all yet we muſt remember to exalt the fenfe of them, or annex fome mental
qualification to the uſe of them. As, if God be faid to do things for His own
glory, the meaning I humbly conceive muſt be, that the tranſcendent excellence
of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and adminiftra-
tion of things in it; where there occurr fuch marks of inexpreffible wiſdom
and power, that He needed not to have given us greater, had He only intend-
ed His own glory: or fomething to this purpoſe. Or if the glory of what we
do, be aſcribed to Him; by this muſt be ſignified, that no glory is due to us,
who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we
defire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which
is laudable in us b.
When we thank God for any deliverance or injoyment, this muſt not be ſo
underſtood, as if He could value Himſelf upon our ceremonious acknowledgments,
or wanted complements, or any return from us. It is rather a profeffion of
the ſenſe we have of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature,
and the greatneſs or ſeaſonableneſs of the mercies received: an effort of a poor
dependent being, who defires to own things, as far as he is able, to be what
they are; and eſpecially to beget in himſelf ſuch a diſpoſition of mind, as he
ought to have towards his Almighty benefactor.
When we are faid to be fervants of God, or to ferve Him, or do Him fervice,
theſe phraſes are not to be taken as when one man is ſaid to be fervant of ano-
ther, or to do him ſervice. For here it implies the doing of fomething, which is
uſeful and beneficial to the man who is ſerved, and what he wants, or fancies he
wants: but nothing of want can be fuppofed in God, nor can we any way be pro-
fitable or ferviceable to Him. To ferve Him therefore muſt rather be to worship
or adore Him (of which fomething by and by). And thus that word in another
language, of which our ferve is but the tranflation, is frequently ufed: as to ferve
bus aucti
↳ Honori-
• As Pfaphon was celebrated by the birds, finging Méyas Deòs VάQwv. M. Tyr.
-cùm diis gratias agimus, tum nihil noftra laudi affumptum arbitramur. Cic.
Ὅτι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πράττης εις Θεὸν ἀνάπεμπε. A faying of Bias ap. Diog. L.
c Ei 2 s μm
δυνάμεθα κατ' αξίαν ποτέ τέτο ποιῆσαι ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἐυχαρισίαν δίκαιον ἐν
n. Chryf
Q 2
I 20 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
a graven image ª is to worship the image; but cannot fignify the doing of any thing,
which may be ſerviceable or uſeful to the dead ftone. Or to ferve God may be un-
derſtood in a ſenſe ſomething like that: Serve the king of Babylon. For they were
faid to ferve the king of Babylon, who ownd his authority, and lived according to
his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be parti-
cularly ſerviceable to him: and ſo they may be faid to ferve God, or to be His fer-
vants, who live in a continual ſenſe of His foveraign nature and power over them,
and endeavour to conform themſelves to the laws which He has impoſed upon
them. In theſe ſenſes we pray, that we may live to ſerve Him : that is, we
pray, that we may live to worſhip Him, and practice thofe laws of reaſon and
virtue, to which rational natures are by Him fubjected d.
Many more reflexions might be made upon epithets and ways of speaking, intro-
duced by cuſtom, from rude antiquity, or by neceffity following from the nar-
rowneſs either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that love, anger, hands,
eyes, &c. when afcribed to God, cannot import fuch bodily parts or paffions as
are found in us. Even the pronouns my, thy, his (as His people, His houſe, &c.)
require much temper in the uſe of theme,
3. We shall find our felves bound to worship Him, in the best manner we can. For
by worshipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be what He is, and
ourfelves to be what we are, by fome more folemn and proper act: that is, by ad-
dreffing our felves as His dependents to Him as the Supreme caufe, and Governor of
the world, with acknowledgments of what we injoy, petitions for what we really
want, or He knows to be convenient for us, and the like. As if, ex. gr. I ſhould
in fome humble and compoſed manner & pray to that Almighty being, upon whom
depends the existence of the world, and by whofe providence I have been preferved to this
moment, and injoyd many undeſerved advantages, that He would graciously accept my
grateful ſenſe and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that he would
deliver me from the evil confequences of all my tranſgreſſions and follies: that He would
indue me with ſuch difpofitions and powers, as may carry me innocently and ſafely
g
b
fin.
paff.
Deut. 11. mention is made of the כל עובדי פסל : את פסיליהם היו עוברים •
.עברו את מלך בבל 5
places, '12101127 DW 10y WN: in Chald. par. 1759, Sept.
Vulg. v. coluerunt.
the laws themfelves in that phrafe, δελέυειν τοῖς νόμοις.
xagéxorres. Ph. Jud.
משכיל יבין *
λárpavorav (in the eccleſiaſtical ſenſe),
• Plato applies the word ſerve even to
ὁ Ἐκείνῳ ἐδὲν ἔξω φιλοδεσπότες γνώμης
↑ Care must be taken how we pray, left we ſhould
ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐκοι δοκεῖ πολλῆς προμηθείας με προσδείας, όπως μια λήσῃ τις αυτὸν
ευχόμενο μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθά. Plato. Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipfis, Di faciles,
¿e, is a poet's obfervation. The author of S. Hhaſ, adds, that we ſhould not pray for that
שיעשה הקב"ה נס בשנוי עולם or שאינו ראוי or, שאין נעשה כפי הטבע or,,שאי אפשר לעשות
עיני למט לבי למעלה 4
through
Truths relating to the Deity.
1 21
through all future trials; and may inable me upon all occafions to behave my ſelf con-
formably to the laws of reason, piously, and wifely: that He would fuffer no being to in-
jure me, no misfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt myself by any error or misconduct of
my own: that He would vouchsafe me clear and diftinct perceptions of things; with
So much health and profperity, as may be good for me: that I may at least pass my time in
peace, with contentment, and tranquillity of mind: and that, having faithfully dif-
charged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve myself in vir-
tuous habits and uſeful knowledge, I may at last make a decent and happy exit, and
then find my ſelf in fome better ftate. Not to do this, or fomething like it, will
certainly fall among thoſe criminal omiſſions mentiond fect. I. prop. V. For never
to acknowledge the injoyments and privileges we have received, and hold of God,
is in effect to deny that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for
what we want is to deny, either our wants, or His power of helping us ; and fo on :
all contrary to truth 2.
a
It muſt ever be ownd, that no worſhip can be proportionable to the Divine na-
ture and perfections; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: therefore
I added thoſe word's in the beſt manner we can. And it muſt be acknowledged
further, that thoſe words do not oblige us to be always at our devotions neither b.
For as in the worſhip of God we own Him to be what He is, fo muſt we do
this as not denying our felves to be what we are: beings not capable of bearing
continual intention of mind; beings, that are incompaffed with many wants,
which by the conſtitution of our nature require to be ſupplied, not without care
and activity joind to our prayers; beings, that are made for many harmleſs injoy-
ments; beings, that have many offices to perform one for another; and beings
in whom, all things confiderd, it would be less respect to be conſtantly in the for-
mal act of devotion, than it is to addrefs our felves to Him with prepared minds,
at certain times, or upon certain occafions. To be always thus ingaged, if it
could be, would be to make God what He is not: fince it ſeems to fuppofe,
that He wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what
we ask, without our endeavouring; or, at leaft, that He is a Being obnoxious
to importunity and teafing. For theſe reaſons I have alfo in the explication of
my meaning inferted that limitation, by fome folemn and proper act.
Tho every man knows beſt his own opportunities and circumſtances, and there-
fore may be moſt able to judge for himſelf, how he may best perform this duty;
כל מאמין בהשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו וכו' Albo .התפלה-----ענף מסתעף מן ההשגחה :
Id. b Like thoſe Axonràs at Conftantinople particularly, who continued divine fervice night and
day without intermiſſion. Or the Meffalians perhaps (b, 'Euxira), who placed (or pretended to
place) all religion in prayer,, μόνη χολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ προσποιέμενοι. V. Skie.
yet
122
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
yet in general it may be faid, that to the doing of it folemnly and in the beſt man-
ner we can theſe things are required: an intent minda, proper times and places,
a proper form of words, and a proper posture. For if the mind be abfent, or
attends not to what is faid, it is not the man that prays: this is only as it were
the noiſe of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any con-
ſciouſneſs of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving lips, but ali-
cnated thoughts, is not to pray in the best manner we can: becauſe it is not in a
manner agreeable to what we are, or to truth. For this is to do it only as ſpeak-
ing, and not as thinking beings.
Upon this account it will be certain, that all times and places cannot be equal-
ly proper b. Some times are ingroffed by the buſineſs of life, and fome places
lie expoſed to interruptions. Thoſe of retreat and filence ought to be ſought,
and, as far as fairly it may be, contrived. And for this further reafon, becauſe
the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we ftand of
all oftentation: that is, the more we do it upon the ſcore of truth and duty; and
this is again, the more truely and dutifully we do it.
Our next care is a proper form of words. All prayer muft either be vocal, or
mental. Now even that which is called mental can ſcarce be made without words c
or fomething equivalent d. (I believe, that even the deaf and dumb form to them-
felves fome kind of language: I mean fomething, which fupplies the room of
language.) For thoughts in their naked ſtate, deveſted of all words, and taken
merely by themselves, are ſuch ſubtle and fleeting things, as are fcarce capable of
making any appearance in the mind; at leaſt of being detaind, compared toge-
ther, and ranged into fentences. If a ſentence may be ſo made up of fenfible ideas
as to fubfift in the mind by the help of thofe images which remain in the phantafy,
after the manner of a ſentence expreſt in pictures, or by hieroglyphics: yet fuch a
ſentence muſt be very imperfect, through the want of grammatical inflexions,
particles, and other additions neceſſary to modify and connect the ideas, of which
S. Hba. and the like every where.התפלה תלויה בלב,Maim .כל תפלה שאינה בכוונה אינה תפלה 2
This in general is true: notwithſtanding which I do not deny but there may be occafions, when d
κωλύει τόπω, ἐδὲ ἐμποδίζει καιρός· ἀλλὰ καν γόνατα μη κλίνης —διάνοιαν δὲ μόνον ἐπιδεξίῃ θερμήν, τὸ
πᾶν ἀπήρτισας τῆς ἐυχῆς· ἔξεσι C γυναικα ηλακάτην κατέχεσαν τα ίσερχόταν ἀναβλέψαι εἰς τὸν ἐρανὸν τῇ
διανοία, δ καλέσαι μετά θερμότητα τὸν θεόν· ἔξεσι ἢ ἄνθρωπον εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλοντα & καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν βα-
δίζοντα ευχάς ποιεῖος ἐκτενεῖς, κλ. S. Chryf. . Ὁ μὲν λόγω ἑξμηνευς διανοιας πρὸς ἀνθρώποις· ἡ δὲ διά
d
Cogitation itſelf, according to Plato, is a kind
νοια γίνεται τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Ph. Jud.
of fpeech of the mind. For he calls τὸ διανοείς (cogitation) λόγον, ὃν αυτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχή διεξέρχε
ται, πεὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. And fo Plotinus, ο εν φωνῇ λόγω μίμημα δε ψυχή.
(par-
Truths relating to the Deity.
123
(particles, &c.) there can be no images; and indeed little more than a fet of dis-
jointed conceptions, fcarce exhibiting any fenſe without the affiſtance of language
to fill up the blanks: and beſide that, a prayer cannot be made out of ſuch ſenten-
ces as thoſe. It is by the help of words, at leaft in great meaſure, that we even rea-
ſon and diſcourſe within our ſelves, as well as communicate our thoughts and diſ-
courſe with others: and if any one obferves himſelf well, he will find, that he
thinks,as well as ſpeaks in fome language, and that in thinking he ſuppoſes and runs.
over filently and habitually thoſe ſounds, which in ſpeaking he actually makes.
This is the cauſe, why men can ſcarce write well in any language but their own: for
whilſt they think in their own, their ſtyle and ſpeech, which is but the portraiture
of their thoughts, muſt have the turn and genius of their own language, to what
language foever the particular words belong. In fhort, words feem to be as it were
bodies or vehicles to the ſenſe or meaning, which is the ſpiritual part, and which
without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuouf-
ly, whether he can think over but that ſhort prayer in Plato, Ta pèrdÃœ, xta. C
abſtracted quite from thoſe and all other words. One may apply his mind to the
words of a prayer pronounced by another, and by taking them in make them his
or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them himself; or he
may lay before him a prayer in writing, and fo carry his eyes and his mind toge-
ther through it; or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his memory
or he may put words together in his mind ex tempore: but ſtill in all theſe ways
words and language are uſed. And fince to think over a fet of words cannot be
a more adequate manner of addreffing to God (who neither ſpeaks, nor thinks
like us) than to ſpeak it over and think too;, and moreover, fince the very found
of the words affects us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind
freed from the labor of compofing, doth really help attention: I fay, fince this
is the cafe, it muſt be better, when we have opportunity, to pronounce a pray-
ere, than only to think it over. But then it ſhould be ſpoken no louder (I mean
when we pray privately), than juſt to make it audible to our felves. It is not
upon God's account that we ſpeak, fince he would know even our thoughts:
own;
2. Multa funt verba, qua, quafi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, que formari fimilitudine nulla
רבור אדם הוא בכונה וכו' 4 .2 .Nabb. ab. calcii תפלה בלא כונה כגוף בלא נשמה .Pefiunt.Cic
זהובים
Abarb. That in S. Hhared. quoted out of PDD explains this thus: ibi nba ba papri
-Ut eos [deos, in the ſtyle of the Heathens] femper puramente & voce veneremur. Cic..
τῇ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὑπὸ σᾶ, Δέσποτα, κρείττονες γεγόναμεν, τέτῳ τὴν σ' ἐυλογεῖν μεγαλειότητα πρέπει, fays Sola
mon in his prayer ap. Foſ. This we find often among the Dinim of the Jews. T
DDIN NIJU MD IN y''. Maim. And R. Elaz. Azquari, having cited this paffage, adds
Maimonides in another place expreffes himself .רוב הפוסקים שאם לא השמיע לאזניו לא יצא וכו'
לבר That) לא יתפלל בלבו [לבר] אלא מחתך הדברים בשפתיו ומשמיע לאזניו בלחש :thus
I inferted from Shulhh, aruk.) The fame occurs in Or hhadaſh, & pass.
4.
but.
124
The RELIGION of NATURE.
Sect. V.
but it is upon our own account, and to make our adorations, tho imperfect at the
beſt, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an anſwer to them,
who object againſt prayer the impertinence of talking to God.) This being pre-
miſed, and it being found that we muſt make uſe of words, it cannot be denied
that we ought to use the best and propereft we can. This cannot be done in extem-
poraneous effufions and therefore there muſt be forms premeditated; the best, that
we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worſhip God to the beſt of
our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of ſeriouſneſs and being in
earneſt, it ought to be the plainest, and at the ſame time is perhaps the hardeſt of
all compofitions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have injoyd, what
we want, what we have done, &c. and every thing ought to be expreſt with
method, in phraſes that are grave and pointing, and with fuch a true eloquence, as
ingages all our attention,and repreſents our deepest fenfe, without affectation or need-
lefs repetitions. Theſe confiderations have cauſed me many times to wonder at
thoſe men, who diſpute againſt pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk
fo much of the ſpirit of prayer, ſeem to know but little of it.
As to the pofture, that is beft, which beft expreffes our humility, reverence, and
carneſtneſs, and affects us moft. Tho perhaps fome regard is to be paid to the cu-
ſtoms of the place where we are; or of our own country, to which we have been
moſt uſed. Several nations may denote the fame thing by different geftures:
and we may take thefe, as we do their words; i. e. as having that fignification
which they put upon them.
Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be alfo a public worship
of the Deity. For a man may be confiderd as a member of a fociety, and as fuch
he ought to worſhip God (if he has the opportunity of doing it: if there are
proper prayers uſed publicly, which he may refort to; and his health, &c. per-
mit). Or the fociety may be confiderd as one body, that has common intereſts and
concerns, and as ſuch is obliged to worſhip the Deity, and offer one common
prayer. Befide, there are many, who know not of themſelves, how to pray;
perhaps cannot fo much as read. Theſe too muſt be taken as they are, and con-
ſequently ſome time and place appointed, where they may have fuitable prayers
red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keep-
ing mankind in order, it is neceſſary there ſhould be fome religion profeſt, and
even eſtabliſhd ; which cannot be without fome public worship. And were it not
for that ſenſe of virtue, which is principally preſerved (fo far as it is preferved) by
national forms and habits of religion, men would foon lofe it all, run wild, prey
upon one another, and do what elſe the worst of favages do.
.or bbaiy .המתפלל ---יחשוב כאילו שכינה כנגדו וכו'
But
Truths relating to the Deity.
125
But how does this public worship, it may be demanded, comport with that re-
treat and privacy recommended above? Ans. I ſpoke there of prayer in general, to
which thoſe circumſtances give a great advantage: but then they are recommend-
ed no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them.
Excuſe a ſhort reflexion here, which if it be not directly for the purpoſe, is not al-
together foreign to it. Tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to
all at the fame time, that all may unite in one common act, which otherwiſe
they could not do: yet ftill every particular perſon, who minds the prayers at all,
has a ſeparate perception of the words in his mind, and there he offers them, or
the ſenſe containd under them, with more or less application and ardor. And fince
no man can be ſaid to pray any further than he does this; and it cannot be known
to any body in the congregation befide himſelf, how far he doth do it; his prayer
is in reality as private, as if he was incloſed within a thouſand walls. So that, though
there are reaſons for a public worship, yet I will venture to affirm, that all true
prayer is private: and the true feat of it being in the mind, toward the intereſting
of whoſe powers all the circumſtances of worſhip are mainly defigned to con-
tribute, it may be faid upon that account to be always made in the moſt retired and
undiſcerned of all retreats ª: nor can more be faid in reſpect of a worſhip, which
by the terms is in other refpects public. A man may be preſent in a congrega-
tion, and either pray the fame prayer in which others feem to join, or fome o-
ther, or none at all b, for ought any body there can tell befides himſelf.
I am not infenfible how much I may expofe myſelf by theſe things to the laugh-
ter of fome, who are utter ſtrangers to all this language. What a ftir is here, ſay
they, about praying? Who ever obſerved, that they who pray are more fuccessful or
happy, than they are who do not? Anf. All obſervations of this kind muſt be very
lubricous and uncertain. We neither know what other men are inwardly and really ©,
nor how they pray d, nor what to call fuccefs. That, which is good for one,
may
be bad for another: and that, which feems good at preſent, may at length
be evil, or introduce fomething which is fof. And as to the profperity of them,
• Ἐν τῷ ἔίσω οἷον νεῷ. Plotin.
S. Chryfoftom fays fome are fo unmindful of what they are
about, that they know not fo much as what they fay themfelves. Εισέρχονται πολλοι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησία,
—καὶ ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἐκ ἔδασι τί ἔἶπον· τὰ χειλη κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ ἐκ ακέει.
c The very
Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bias happening to be
with fome fuch in the fame fhip, when a great ftorm arofe and they (being now frighted) began
to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὴ ἄνθωνται ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλέοντας. D. L.
d C. Ceftius
ap. Tac. fays, principes quidem inftar deorum effe: fed neque a diis nifi jufas fupplicum preces audiri.
e Sometimes πλέον ἥμισυ παντός: that is, as Plato paraphrafes thole words of Hefiod, το ήμισυ το
παντὸς πολλάκις ἐςὶ πλέον, ὁπόταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιώδες, κλ. f Quid quod ifte cal-
culi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit ? Quam multos accepta afflixere imperia? quam multos
bona perdidere, & ultimis merfere fuppliciis? Plin.
R
who
126
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. V.
who endeavour to worſhip God in a proper and reaſonable manner, whatever it
is, perhaps it might be less, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be greater :
who can be certain of the contrary? If theſe gentlemen have any way of difco-
vering it, I wiſh they would impart their fecret. In the mean time fure they
cannot expect, that even in the moſt imperfect sketch of natural religion the
worſhip of the Deity ſhould be omitted: that very thing, which hath been
principally intended by the word religion ª.
4. And lastly, to deliver what remains, fummarily; Rational beings, or they,
to whom reafon is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themselves as
above, fhould confider in earnest, what a mighty being He is, who by the conftitu-
tion of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and
whofe laws the dictates of right reafon may be faid to be. They ought to keep it
well impreft upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their
very ex-
iftence depends: that it is He who fuperintends and adminifters the affairs of the
the world by His providence: that the effects of His power and influence are viſible
before their faces, and round about them, in all the phenomena of nature, not
one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His prefence: that
He is a being of perfect reason: that, if it be reaſonable, that the tranfgreffors
of reaſon fhould be puniſhd, they will moſt certainly, one time or other, be
puniſhd, &c. And then, if they do this, it is eaſy to ſee what effect it muſt
have upon all their thoughts, words b, and actions.
:
By what is faid here, no fuperftition is intended to be introduced: it is only
the practice of reafon and truth, which is required and any thing, that is not
inconfiftent with them, may be freely done, though under the infpection of our
great Lawgiver himfelf.
Religio deorum cultu pio continetur. Cic. Qui omnia, que ad cultum deorum pertinerent, dili-
genter retra&tarent, & tanquam relegerent, funt dicti religiofi, &c. Id.
b Particularly with
refpect to customary fwearing;, which, befide the ill confequences it has in making oaths cheap, c.
is a great inftance of difregard and irreverence. For they, who uſe themſelves to it do, at leaſt, make
the tremendous name of God to ferve for an expletive only; and commonly to rude, paffionate, or de-
bauched difcourfe (λόγων αναπλήρωμα ποιέμενοι τὸ ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεῖον ὄνομα, Ph. Fud)
SECT.
Truths refpecting Mankind, &c.
127
SECT. VI. Truths refpecting Mankind in ge-
neral, antecedent to all human laws.
N this and the following ſections I ſhall proceed as in the foregoing.
IN
I. Every man bath in himſelf a principle of individuation, which diſtinguiſhes and
Separates him from all other men in ſuch a manner, as may render him and them capa-
ble of diftinct properties in things (or diſtinct ſubjects of property). That is, B and C
are fo diftinguiſhd, or exift fo diftinctly, that if there be any thing which B can call
his, it will be for that reaſon not C's: and v. v. what is C's will for that reaſon
not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own confcience. Let us
fee then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.
II. There are ſome things, to which (at least before the cafe is alterd by voluntary
fubjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, fuch a na-
tural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his.
The life, limbs, &c. of B are as much his, as B is himself. It is impoffible
for C, or any other to fee with the eyes of B: therefore they are eyes only to B:
and when they ceaſe to be his eyes, they ceaſe to be eyes at all. He then has the
fole property in them, it being impoffible in nature, that the eyes of B fhould
ever be the eyes of C.
Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C: becauſe it is the application
of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of fomething; and there-
fore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties made uſe of are his.
Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C:
and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the labor was
B's, and not C's b. Becauſe, what the labor of B caufes or produces, B produces
3 Οὐδὲν ἔτως ἡμέτερόν ἐσιν, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. Xen.
And therefore the produce of a
.in Pfalm יגיע כפיך תאכל and : יבזו זרים יגיעו man's labor is often ftill called his labor. So.
al. paſſim.Iliadumque labor veftes. Virg.
R 2
by
128
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VI.
by his labor; or it is the product of B by his labor: that is, it is B's product,
not C's, or any other's. And if C ſhould pretend to any property in that, which
B only can truly call his, he would act contrary to truth ª.
Laftly, there may be many things, which B may truly call his in ſome ſuch ſenſe,
or upon ſome fuch account, as no other can; and to which C has no more right
than D, nor D than F, &c. the property of which will therefore be in B. Becauſe
C has no more title than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one
befides B has an equal title, no one befides B can have any title to at all, their
pretences mutually balancing and deftroying each other, whilft his only remains.
And in this caſe a ſmall matter, being oppofed to nothing, will be ftrong enough
to maintain the claim of B.
III. Whatever is inconfiftent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of man-
kind, is inconfiftent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable. Thoſe max-
ims may be eſteemd the natural and true laws of any particular fociety, which
are moſt proper to procure the happiness of it. Becauſe happiness is the end of fo-
ciety and laws: otherwiſe we might fuppofe unhappiness to be propoſed as the
right end of them; that is, unhappineſs to be deſirable, contrary to nature and
truth. And what is faid of a particular fociety is not leſs true, when applied to
the univerſal fociety of mankind. Now thofe things are most apt to produce hap-
pineſs, which make the most men happy. And therefore thoſe maxims or princi-
ples, which promote the general tranquillity and well being of mankind, if thoſe
words exprefs the happiness of mankind, muſt be the true laws of humanity, or
the bafis of them: and all fuch practices, as interfere with theſe, muſt alſo in-
terfere with thoſe. It is contradictory to fay, that any thing can be a general law:
of human nature, which tends only to favor the pleaſures of fome particulars
to the prejudice of the reft, who partake of the fame common nature; and eſ-
pecially if theſe pleaſures are of the lower and brutal kind. As a million of men
are more than one; fo in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what
ought to be,. or not to be, they muſt in reaſon.be more regarded by a million of
times for here we confider men only as men.
It will be cafy now to fhew, that the tranfgreffion of theſe laws, conducing to
the general good of the world, is wrong and morally evil. For if mankind may be
faid in general to be a rational animal, the general welfare of it muſt be the wel-
fare of a rational nature: and therefore that, and the laws which advance it,
2 If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the cafe. He
may commute them for money, becauſe they are his. b. Tanquam Sparti illi poetarum, fic fe
invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus reftet, as Lactantius fays in another cafe.
muft
7
129
Truths refpecting Mankind, &c.
muſt be founded in reafon; nor can be oppoſed by any thing, but what is op-
pofite to reaſon, and confequently to truth.
Let us fuppofe ſome rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern
themſelves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, fuch a practice
would be agreeable to the nature and circumftances of mankind. If all men ſhould
tranfgrefs this rule, what would be the confequence of fuch an univerfal
revolt? A general evil, or fomething difagreeable to our nature and the
truth of our circumftances for of contrary practices there muſt be con-
trary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the fame thing.
This then would be wrong by the terms. And as wrong it would be in
one man: becauſe all the individuals have equal right to do it, one as much as ano-
ther; and therefore all as much as any one. At leaſt it is certain, that whoever
fhould violate that rule, would contribute his ſhare towards the introduction of
univerfal diſorder and mifery; and would for his part deny human circumſtances to
be what they are, public happineſs to be what it is, and the rule to be what it real-
ly is, as much as if all others confpired with him in this iniquity and madneſs.
any
With what face can any particular man put his own humor or unreaſonable
pleaſure into the ſcale againſt fuch a weight of happinefs as that of all the world?
Does not he, who thus centers in himself, difregards the good of every body elſe,
and intirely ſeparates his injoyments and interefts from thoſe of the public; does
not he, I fay, ftrike himſelf out of the roll of mankind? Ought he to be ownd
as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an alien and e-
nemy to the common happineſs and tranquillity of our Species ?
IV. Whatever is either reafonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would
be just the fame in C with respect to B, if the cafe was inverted b. Becauſe reafon is:
univerfal, and refpects cafes, not perfons. (See fect. III. pr. II.)
Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in re-
lation to other men, is to confider what we ſhould take things to be were we in
their circumftances d.
V. In a state of nature men are equal in refpect of dominione. I except for the pre-
fent the cafe of parents and their children, and perhaps of fome few other near relati-
• 'ArdpwzóµogPcr Ingiov. Ph. Jud.
אל תרין d
↳ Nec enim aquus judex aliam de fuâ, aliam de
alienâ causâ, fententiamfert. Sen. • Αε ταυτά περί γεν αυτῶν γίνωσκε. Ifocr.
Eo loco nos conftituamus, que ille eft, cui irafcimur. Sen.
.P. Aboth .חברך עד שתגיע למקומו
e. He was a mere flatterer, who told Cyrus, Βασιλεὺς μὲν ἔμοι γε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι ἐδὲν ἧττον
ὁ ἐν τῷ σμένει φυόμενΘ. * μελιτῶν ἡγεμών. Xen.
ons.
130
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VI.
警
​ons. Here let me be underſtood to mean only thofe, between whom there is
no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vaniſhd).
In a ſtate, where no laws of fociety make any fubordination or diſtinction, men
can only be confiderd as men, or only as individuals of the fame ſpecies, and equal-
ly ſharing in one common definition. And fince by virtue of this fame definiti-
on B is the fame to C, that C is to B; B has no more dominion over C than C
reciprocally has over B: that is, they are in this regard equal.
Perfonal excellencies or defects can make no difference here: becauſe, 1. Who
muft judge, on which fide the advantage lies? To fay B (or D, or any body elſe)
has a right to judge to the diſadvantage of C, is to fuppofe what is in queſtion, a
dominion over him; not to prove it. 2. Great natural or acquired indowments
may be privileges to them who have them: but this does not deprive thofe, who
have lefs, of their title to what they have; or, which is the fame, give any
-one, who has greater abilities, a right to take it, or the uſe of it from them. If
B has better eyes than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this,
that C ſhould not therefore ſee for himſelf, and uſe his eyes, as freely as B may his.
C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his ufe, and fo are B's to his; and each has
the fole property in his own: fo their reſpective properties are equal. The cafe
would be parallel to this, if B fhould happen to have better intellectual faculties
than C. And further, if B fhould be stronger than C, he would not yet for that
reafon have any right to be his lord. For C's lefs degree of ftrength is
as much his, as B's greater is his therefore C has as much right to his,
and (which is the natural conſequence) to uſe his, as B has to uſe his :
that is, C has as much right to refift, as B has to impofe or command,
by virtue of his ftrength: and where the right (tho not the power) of
refifting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or do-
minion is nothing. 3. Since ftrength and power are moſt apt to pretend a title
to dominion, it may be added further, that power and right, or a power of
doing any thing, and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they
may be feparated, nor does one inferr the other. Lastly, if power, quà power,
gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to every thing, that is obnoxious to it;
and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For no body can do any thing which
he has not the power to do.) But this is not only contrary to what has been pro-
ved in fect. I. but to affert it would be to advance a plain abfurdity or contradiction
• Nihil et unum uni tam fimile, tam par, quàm omnes inter nofmet ipfos fumus. Quæcunq;
eſt hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. Cic.
b When the Romans, in Livy, asked the Galls,
Quodnam id jus effet, agrum à poffefforibus petere, aut minari arma, they anfwerd, fe in armis jus
ferre, & omnia fortium virorum effe. Like barbarians indeed!
rather.
Truths reſpecting Mankind, &c.
131
rather. For then to oppoſe the man who has this power, as far as one can, or (which
is the fame) as far as one has the power to do it, would not be wrong: and yet ſo
it muſt be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not oppoſed. Moreover, that
a man ſhould have aright to any thing, merely becauſe he has the power to take
it, is a doctrine indeed, which may ferve a few tyrants, or fome banditi and
rogues, but directly oppofite to the peace and general good of mankind; and.
therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is alſo what the powerful themſelves
could not allow, if they would but imagine themfelves to be in the ſtate of the
weak and more defenceless; and therefore unreaſonable, by prop. IV.
VI. No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another. Be-
cauſe, in the firſt place, this ſuppoſes a dominion over him, and the moſt abfolute
too that can be. In the next, for B to begin to diſturb the peace and happineſs
of C is what B would think unreasonable, if he was in C's cafe. In the laft, fince
it is ſuppoſed, that C has never invaded the happineſs of B, nor taken any thing.
from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the whole tranfaction begins origi-
nally from B. (for all this is couchd in the word begin), C can have nothing that is.
B's; and therefore nothing, to which C has not at leaſt as good a title as B´has;
or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to keep as B to claim.
Theſe two rights being then at least equal, and counterpoifing each other, no al-
teration in the preſent ſtate of things can follow from any fuperiority of right
in B: and therefore it muſt of right remain as it is; and what C has muft, for any
right that B has to oppoſe this fettlement, remain with C in his undisturbed pof-
feffion. But the argument is ſtill ſtronger on the fide of C.: becauſe he ſeems to
have ſuch a property in his own happineſs, as is mentiond in prop. II. fuch a
one as no other can have b
VII. Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happineſs, or
to hurt him ; yet every man has a right to defend himſelf and his against violence, to re-
cover what is taken by force from him, and even to make repriſals, by all the means that
truth and prudence permits. We have feen already, that there are fome things, which
• Hofephus, when he fays, νόμον γε μὴν ὡρίας, σε παρὰ θηρσὶν ἰσχυρότατον, ἃ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις, ἔσκειν
Teis dewarwrégois, can only mean, that neceffity, or perhaps prudence, obliges.to do this; not any law.
in the stricter fenfe of that word. b Societatis [inter homines] ar&tiffimum vinculum eft magis
arbitrari eſſe contra naturam, hominem homini detrahere, fui commodi caufa, quàm omnia incommoda
All this is fuppoſed to be in a ſtate of nature and the abfence of human.
fubire, &c. Cic..
:
·
laws..
a man.
132
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect, VI.
a man may truly call his; and let us for the prefent only fuppofe, that there may
be more. This premiſed, I proceed to make good the propoſition.
To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to affert, contrary to truth, either
that he has not the faculties and powers, which he has; or that the Author of na-
ture has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not
ufe them? And how may he uſe them, if not for his own prefervation, when he is
attacked, and like to be abuſed, or perhaps deftroyd.
All animals have a principle of ſelf-preſervation, which exerts itſelf many times
with an uncontrolable impetuofity. Nature is uniform in this, and every where
conſtant to itſelf. Even inanimate bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And
one may be fure, that no pofition can have any foundation in nature, or be con-
fiftent with it and truth (thoſe infeparable companions), which turns upon nature
itſelf, and tends to its deftruction.
Great part of the general happineſs of mankind depends upon thoſe means, by
which the innocent may be faved from their cruel invaders: among which the op-
portunities they have of defending themſelves may be reckond the chief. There-
fore to debar men of the uſe of theſe opportunities, and the right of defending
themſelves againſt injurious treatment and violence must be inconfiftent with the
laws of nature by prop. III.
If a man has no right to defend himſelf and what is his, he can have no right to
any thing (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be
more amply proved); fince that cannot be his right, which he may not maintain
to be his right.
If a man has no right to defend himſelf againſt infults, &c. it muſt be becauſe the
aggreffor has a right to affail the other, and ufurp what is his: but this pretenfion
has been prevented in the foregoing propofition. And, more than that, it includes
a great abfurdity, to commence an injury, or to begin the violence, being in nature
more than only to repell it. He, who begins, is the true cauſe of all that follows:
and whatever falls upon him from the oppofition made by the defending party, is
but the effect of his own act: or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, re-
flected back upon himſelf. It is as when a man fpits at heaven, and the ſpittle falls
back upon his own face.
Since he, who begins to violate the happineſs of another, does what is wrong,
he, who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that violence, does in that refpect
what is right, by the terms.
Laftly, fince every man is obliged to confult his own happineſs, there can be no
doubt but that he not only may, but even ought to defend it (fect. II. prop. IX.);
}
ERNGULJA
in
Truths refpecting Mankind, &c.
133
in fuch a manner I mean, as does not interfere with truth, or his own defign of
being happy. He ought indeed not to act rafhly, or do more than the end propof-
ed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wife forecaſt to ſhut up, if
he can, the avenues by which he may be invaded; and when that cannot be done, to
ufe arguments and perfuafives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm: but
when theſe meaſures are ineffectual or impracticable, he must take fuch other as he
can, and confront force with force. Otherwiſe he will fail in his duty to himſelf, and
deny happineſs to be happineſs.
By the fame means, that a man may defend what is his, he may certainly endea-
vour to recover what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him.
For it has been fhewn already, that the power to take any thing from another gives
no right to it. The right then to that, which has been taken from its owner againſt
his will, remains ſtill where it was: he may ftill truly call it his : and if it be his, he
may uſe it as his: which if he who took it away, or any other, fhall hinder
him from doing, that man is even here the aggreffor, and the owner does but
defend himſelf and what is his. Beſides, he, who uſes any thing as his, when it
is his, acts on the fide of truth: but that man, who oppoſes him in this, and
confequently afferts a right to that, which is not his, acts contrary to truth.
The former therefore does what cannot be amifs: but what the latter does, is
wrong by that fundamental propofition, fect. I. prop. IV.
Then further, if a man hath ftill a right to what is forceably or without his con-
ſent taken from him, he muſt have a right to the value of it. For the thing is to him
what it is in value to him: and the right he has to it, may be confiderd as a right to
a thing of fuch a value. So that if the very thing which was taken be deſtroyd, or
cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheleſs retains his right to a thing of fuch
a value to him; and ſomething muſt be had in lieu of it: that is, he has a right to
make repriſals. Since every thing is to every man what it is in value to him, things
of the fame value to any one may be reckond as to him the fame, and to recover the
equivalent the fame as to recover the thing itself: for otherwiſe it is not an equiva-
lent. If the thing taken by way of repriſal ſhould be to the man, from whom it is
taken, of greater value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he muſt
charge himſelf with that loſs. If injuſtice be done him, it is done by himſelf, the
other has no more than what he has a right to. To which add, that as a man has a
right to recover what is his, or the equivalent, from an invader; fo he ſeems for the
fame reaſons to have a right to an equivalent for the expenfe he is at in recovering his
own, for the loſs of time and quiet, and for the trouble,bazards, and dangers under-
* For ἐι ὁ ἀδικῶν κακῶς ποιεῖ, ὁ ἀντιποιῶν κακῶς ἐδὲν ἧττον ποιεῖ κακῶς, καν ἀμύνηται. Μax. Τ.
S
gone:
134
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VI.
gone: becauſe all theſe are the effects of the invafion, and therefore to be added
to the invader's account.
VIII. The firſt poſſeſſion of a thing gives the poſſeſſor a greater right to it, than any
other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinct. For,
1. till then no other man can be the firft poffeffor again: which is more than nothing;
fince he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were donation. 2. That, which
no man has yet any title to 2, the finder may take without the violation of any
truth. He doth not deny that to be another man's, which is another man's: he doth
not begin to interrupt the happineſs of any body, &c. Therefore to poffefs him-
felf of it is not wrong. So far from it, that, fince every man is obliged to confult his
own happineſs (that is, his own intereft and advantages, whenever he can do it
without the violation of truth) not to act confonantly to this obligation is an omif-
fion that would be wrong. What he does therefore is right. And then if he does
right in taking poffeffion of it, he muſt from thence be the rightful poffeffor; or, it
becomes his. 3. There are many things, which cannot be poffeft without cultiva-
tion and the contrivance and labor of the firſt poffeffor. This has generally been
the cafe of lands: and theſe are indeed more eminently meant by the word poffeffi
ons. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of his own cares and fweat, and to enter
upon it, as if it was the effect of the intruder's pains and travel, is a moft mani-
feft violation of truth. It is afferting in fact that to be his, which cannot be
his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doctrine, viz. that prime occupancy gives
no right, interferes with prop. III. for it muſt certainly be inconſiſtent with
the peace and happiness of mankind in general to be left in endleſs wars and
ftruggles for that, which no man can ever have any right to. And yet thus it
muſt be, if that doctrine was true: becauſe it has been demonftrated, that power
confers no right; and therefore the first right to many things can only accrue
from the firſt poffeffion of them. 5. If B ſhould endeavour by force (or fraud)
to eject C out of the poffeffion of any thing, which C injoys, and obtaind
without expelling or disturbing any body, he would certainly do that, which he
himſelf would judge unreasonable, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as
if that was not reafon with reſpect to C, which would be reaſon in reſpect of B;
contrary to the nature of reafon, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man
violently out of his poffeffions is the fame as to command him to leave them, upon
pain of fuffering for non-obedience. But this is ufurping a dominion, which he has
no right to; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his
• Nam propria telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nec quenquam ftatuit, Hor.
poffeffion
Truths refpecting Mankind, c.
55
.
poffeffion without beginning to interrupt his happineſs: nor can any one do this
without contravening the truth containd in prop. VI. This therefore fecures
the poffeffor in his poffeffion for ever: that is, it confirms his right to the thing
poffeft. Lastly, the first poffeffor, of whom I have been ſpeaking, has undoubt-
edly a right to defend his perfon, and fuch other things as can only be his, againſt
the attempts of any aggreſſor (ſee prop. II.): therefore theſe no one can have a
right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably diſpoſſeſt
without violence offerd to thefe, no one has any right to difpoffefs him. But
this muſt be the cafe, where the poffeffor does not quit his poffeffion willing-
ly. The right confequently muft. remain ſolely in him, unleſs he conſents to
quit it.
N. The fucceffors of an invader, got into poffeffion wrongfully, may acquire
a right in time, by the failure of fuch, as might claim under him who had the
right. For he, who happens to be in poffeffion, when all theſe are extinct, is
in the place of a prime occupant.
IX. A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation b. If B has
the ſole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the difpofal of them
befides B: and he has a right. For diſpoſing of them is but uſing them as his.
Therefore the act of B in exchanging them for fome thing elſe, or beftowing them.
upon C, interferes not with truth: and fo B does nothing that is wrong. Nor
does C do any thing againſt truth, or that is wrong, in taking them: becauſe
he treats them as being what they are; as things, which come to him by the act
of that perſon, in whom is lodged the fole power of difpofing of them. Thus
C gets the title innocently.
But in the caſe of compact the reafon,on which this tranſaction ſtands, is more evi-
dent ſtill. For the contractors are fuppofed to receive each from other the equiva-
lent of that which they part with, or at leaft what is equivalent to them refpectively,
or perhaps by each party preferable. Thus neither of them is hurt: perhaps both
advantaged. And fo each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the
innocent exchange, as being what it is: better for him, and promoting his con-
venience and happineſs. Indeed he, who receives the value of any thing, and
what he likes as well, in effect has it ftill. His property is not diminiſhd: the
fituation and matter of it is only alterd.
ار
• Τὰς κλήσεις, τὰς ἰδίας καὶ τὰς κοινὰς. ἣν ἐπιγένηται πολὺς χρόνο, κυρίας καὶ πατρῷας ἅπαντες εἶναι νο
μίζεσιν. Ifocr.
To this may be reduced that title to things, which Tully mentions as con.
ferred by fome law (lege); and even thofe, which accrue conditione, or forte. For I fuppofe the go-
vernment to have a right of giving them thus.
S 2
Mankind
136
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VI.
Mankind could not well fubfift without bartering one thing for another:
therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourſe, is incon-
fiftent with the general good of mankind, &c. If a man could find the neceДa-
ries of life without it, and by himſelf, he muſt at least want many of the com-
forts of it.
X. There is then fuch a thing as property, founded in nature and truth: or,
there are things, which one man only can, confiftently with nature and truth, call
his by prop. II, VIII, IX..
XI. Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain
bis, till he agrees to part with them (if they are ub, as he may part with) by com-
pact or donation; or (which must be underſtood) till they fail, or death extin-
guiſhes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man.
Becauſe no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the de-
priver muſt uſe them as his, when they are not his, in contradiction to truth. For,
XII. To have the property of any thing and to have the fole right of using and dif-
pofing of it are the fame thing: they are equipollent expreffions. For when it is faid,
that P has the property, or that ſuch a thing is proper to P, it is not ſaid, that
P and Qor P and others have the property (proprium limits the thing to P only):
and when any thing is ſaid to be his, it is not ſaid that part of it only is his. Phas
therefore the all or all-hood of it, and confequently all the use of it. And then,
fince the all of it to him, or all that P can have of it, is but the use and difpofal
of it, he who has this has the thing itſelf, and it is his .
c
e
Laws
• Which must not give way to opinions of fitness, &c. The mafter was in the right, who cor-
rected Cyrus for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was
not rỡ aguórfors ngirns, but of property. Omnium, qua in hominum doctorum difputatione verfan-
tur, nihil eft profecto praftabilius, quam planè intelligi nos ad juftitiam effe natos, neque opinione,
fed naturâ conftitutum effe jus. Cic.
b. There is another way of acquiring a title
mentiond: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. Sunt privata nulla natura: fed aut ve-
teri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt ; aut victoria, ut qui bello potiti funt, &c.
Cic. And fo in Xenophon it is faid to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war,
the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may poffefs them as their
own, not aжórpia. But fure this wants limitations.
4 Πολλάκις ἐγέλασα
διαθήκας ἀναγινώσκων λεγέσας ὁ δεῖνα μὲν ἐχέτω τὴν
οικίας, τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν
ἄλλω. Πάντες γδ τὴν χρῆσιν ἔχομεν, δεσποτείαν δὲ ἐδείς. ἑκόντες, ἢ ἄκοντες ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ παρα
Tŷ
χωρήσομεν ἑτέροις, τὴν χρῆσιν καρπωσάμενοι μόνον. S. Chryf.
c Allodium.
δεσποτέιαν ἢ ἀγρῶν, ἢ τῆς
-
Τέτων μὲν φύσει ἐδενός ἐσμεν κύριοι, νόμῳ δὲ
Truths refpecting Mankind, &c.
137
Laws indeed have introduced a way of ſpeaking, by which the property and
the ufufruct are diftinguiſhd; but in truth the ufufructuary has a temporary, or
limited property; and the proprietary has a perpetual ufufruct, either at preſent,
or in reverfion. Propriety without the uſe (if the ufe is never to come to the
proprietary) is an empty found.
1 have before upon fome occafions taken it as granted, that he, who ufes
any thing as his, when it is not his, acts againſt truth, &c. but now I fay fur-
ther, that,
XIII. He, who uses or difpofes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his. Be-
cauſe this is all, that he, whoſe it really is, can do. Borrowing and hiring af-
ford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uſes the thing borrowd
or hired, he uſes what is his own for the time allowd: and his doing fo is only
one of thoſe ways, in which the true proprietary difpofes of it.
a
XIV. To ufurp or invade the property of another man is injuftice: or, more ful-
ly, to take, detain, uſe, deſtroy, hurt, or meddle ² with any thing that is bis without
his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of
theſe, or aſſiſt them, who do, are acts of injustice. The contrary; to render and
permit quietly to every one what is his, is juftice. Def.
b
XV. He that would not violate truth, muft avoid all injuftice: or, all injustice
is wrong and evil. It interferes with the truths here before laid down, and per-
haps more. It denies men to be ſubjects capable of diſtinct properties: in fome
caſes it denies them to have a property even in their own bodies, life, fame, and
the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the peace and happineſs of man-
kind: it is what every man thinks unreaſonable in his own cafe, when the inju-
ry
is done to himſelf: to take any thing from another only becauſe I think I
want it, or becauſe I have power to take it, and will have it, without any title
e
ε διαδοχῇ τὴν χρῆσιν ἀυτῶν ἐἰς ἀόρισον παραλαμβάνοντες, ὀλιγοχρόνιοι δεσπόται νομιζόμεθα, καπειδὰν ἡ
προθεσμία παρέλθη τηνικαυτα παραλαβὼν ἄλλα Σπολαύει τῇ ὀνόματα. Luc.
Qui te pafcit
ager, tuus eft, &c. Horace, alluding to this truth. eg avres, fays Plato, èv žigýw rolóvde déto vóμes-
το νόμισο
μον βιάιων πέρι· τῶν ἀλλοτρίων μηδένα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἄγειν. and then proceeds, μηδ' ἂν χρήος μηδενι
τῶν δὲ πέλας, ἐὰν μὴ πέισῃ τὸν κεκτημένον, κτλ. In Plutarch the thing is carried farther: where it is
ſaid, that a man paffing by another man's door ought n Bañow, xλ. according to a faying of
Xenocrates, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τῆς πόδας ἢ τὲς ὀφθαλμὸς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οικίαν τιθέναι.
मै
اد
• Furtum fit,—cum quis alienam rem invito domino contrectat. Just. inft.
On the contrary
noa nwyɔ---(17 nwy: A faying of "27. And Cicero more than once ufes verum for juſtum,
and veritas for bonitas or probitas.
to
138
The RELIGION of NATURE.
NATURE. Sect. VI.
to it, is the higheſt pretence to dominion, and denial of our natural equality :
it is ſetting up a right to begin to diſturb the happineſs of others: and laftly, it
is to deny there is any fuch thing as property, contrary to truth.
Briefly, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call bis, then,
if T takes or uſes it without the conſent of P, he declares it to be his (for if
it was his he could do no more) when it is not his, and ſo acts a lie ª: in which
confifts the idea and formal ratio of moral evil.
a
The very attempting any inſtance of injuftice, or affifting others in fuch an at-
tempt, fince it is attempting and promoting what is wrong, is being in the
wrong as much as one is able to be
or doing what one can to achieve that
which is evil: and to do this, by the terms, must be wrong and evil.
•
ز
Even the defire of obtaining any thing unjustly is evil: becauſe to defire to
do evil, by the terms again, is an evil or criminal defire. If the act follows
fuch a defire, it is the child and product of it: and the defire, if any thing
renders the fulfilling of it impracticable, is the act obftructed in the beginning,
and ftifled in the womb.
:
Let it be obſerved here by way of Scholion concerning the thing called cove-
tousness, that there ſeem to be three ſorts of it. One is this here mentiond
a defire of getting from others, tho it be unjustly. This is wrong and wicked.
Another is an immenfe defire of heaping up what one can by juſt methods, but
without any reasonable end propofed b, and only in order to keep, and as it were
bury it and the more he accumulates, the more he craves. This alſo in-
trenches upon truth, and feems to be a vice. But to covet to obtain what is
another man's by just means, and with his confent, when it may contribute to
the happineſs of our felves or families, and perhaps of the other perfon too,
has nothing furely that looks unfriendly upon truth, or is blameable, in it. This,
if it may be called covetoufnefs, is a virtuous covetousness.
* Account τὸ σὸν μόνον σὸν ἔιναι, τὸ δὲ ἀλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐσὶν, ἀλλότριον. Epid's words. Fuftitia pri-
mum munus eſt, ut ne cui quis noceat, nifi laceffitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus
utatur, privatis ut fuis. Cic. This is to uſe things as being what they are. b Blepfias ò du-
Vans, in Lucian, dies of hunger (dλ® éλéyeto åñeoxλnzéves). Ridiculous enough.
-only agès rò ågiðµw, as Anacharfis faid of fome Greeks. Athen.
પ્રદ
c Or
d As that man, in Athe-
e (f
naus, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money,
before he died he fwallowd as much of it as he could (καταπιόντα ἐκ ὀλίγες χρυσές Σποθανεῖν).
fuch it is, that Diogenes used to fay, 'Opoles rès Pihagyógus Tois vdpwxIxõis, xλ. Stob. The Mamfhilim,
לצמא שישתה מהמים המלוחים כי כל עור שישתה mentioned in Nakh, di, compare them
יוסיף צמא
I
XVI. When
Truths refpecting Mankind, &c.
139
XVI. When a man cares not what fufferings he causes to others, and especially if
be delights in other men's fufferings and makes them his fport, this is what I call
cruelty. And not to be affected with the fufferings of other people, tho they proceed
not from us, but from others, or from caufes in which we are not concerned, is un-
mercifulness. Mercy and humanity are the reverse of theſe.
XVII. He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust,
but (more)not unmerciful, and much less cruel. Not to be affected with the afflicti-
ons of others, fo far as we know them, and in proportion to the feveral degrees
and circumftances of them, tho we are not the cauſes of them, is the fame as
to-confider the afflicted as perfons not in affliction; that is, as being not what
they are, or (which is the fame) as being what they are not: and this contra-
dicts matter of fact.
One can ſcarce know the fufferings of another without having at leaſt fome image
of them in his mind: nor can one have theſe images without being conſcious of
them, and as it were feeling them. Next to fuffering itſelf is to carry the reprefen-
tation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of
others, fo far as they fall within his knowledge, may be faid to know and not to
know; or at leaſt to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conſcience.
There is fomething in human nature a refulting from our very make and conftitu-
tion, while it retains its genuin form, and is not alterd by vitious habits; not per-
verted by tranſports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or falſe philofo-
phy b; nor oppreſt by ſtupidity and neglecting to obferve what happens to others: I
fay, there is fomething, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, caufes us
to fympathize with them, and almoft comprehends us in their cafe. It is grievous to
ſee or hear (and almoſt to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in tor-
ment. This compaffion appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are
juſtly reckond amongſt the best of men : in fome degree it appears in almoſt all; nay,
a
• Properly called humanity; becauſe nothing of it appears in brutes. nwwINI NEPAMI'N 7072
nnnan nyya, S. Hbaf.
b When Seneca fays, Clementiam- →omnes boni praftabunt, miſe-
ricordiam autem vitabunt, he ſeems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this fub-
ject. That, fuccurret [ fapiens] alienis lachrymis, non accedet, owns one ufe of tears: they obtain fuc-
cour even from a Stoic. c'Ayadoi àpidánques avopes. They, who of all writers undertake to imi-
tate nature moſt, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer repreſents Ulyffes Od..
151, ·2, ·7- 8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejulations
of children. They are filent ftreams, and flow from other cauſes; commonly fome tender, or perhaps
philofophical, reflexion. It is eaſy to fee how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be faſhionable. But
for all that, it is certain the glandula lacrymales are not made for nothing.
even
140
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VI.
even fometimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in thofe hardend and ex-
ecrable monſters of cruelty themſelves, who ſeem juft to retain only the leaſt tinc-
ture of humanity that can be. The Pheraan tyrant, who had never wept over any
of thofe murders he had cauſed among his own citizens, wept when he ſaw a trage-
dy but acted in the theatre: the reaſon was, his attention was caught here, and
he more obſerved the fufferings of Hecuba and Andromache, than ever he had
thoſe of the Phereans; and more impartially, being no otherwiſe concerned in
them but as a common fpectator. Upon this occafion the principle of compassion,
implanted in human nature, appeard,overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through
his petrifaction, and would fhew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is there-
fore according to nature to be affected with the ſufferings of other people: and
the contrary is inhuman and unnatural.
Such are the circumstances of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us,
God knows) make our way through this world without encountering dangers and
fuffering many evils: and therefore fince it is for the good of fuch, as are fo expoſed
or actually ſmarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and affiſtance from
others, without which they muſt commonly continue to be miferable, or periſh, it
is for the common good and welfare of the majority at leaſt of mankind, that they
Thould compaſſionate and help each other b. To do the contrary must therefore be
contrary to nature and wrong by prop. III. And befide, it is by one's behaviour and
actions to affirm, that the circumſtances of men in this world are not what they are;
or that peace, and health, and happineſs, and the like, are not what they are.
Let a man fubftitute himself into the room of fome poor creature dejected with
invincible poverty, diſtracted with difficulties,or groaning under the pangs of fome
diſeaſe, or the anguiſh of fome hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want
and pain. In this diſtreſs what reflexions can he imagine he ſhould have, if he found
that every body neglected him, no body fo much as pitying him, or vouchſafing to
take notice of his calamitous and fad condition? It is certain, that what it would
be reaſonable or unreaſonable for others to do in reſpect of him, he muſt allow to
be reaſonable or unreaſonable for him to do in reſpect of them, or deny a manifeſt
truth in prop. IV.
If unmercifulneſs, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be ſpent in pro-
ving that cruelty is fo. For all that is culpable in unmercifulneſs is containd in cruel-
ty, with additions and aggravations. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the ſuffer-
b A generous nature pitics even an enemy in diftrefs. Εποικτείρω δέ νιν Δύσηνον
• Plut.
ἔμπης, κάιπερ ὄντα δυσμενη. Soph.
ings
Truths refpecting Mankind, c.
141
ings of others, but causes them; or perhaps delights in them, and (which is the
moft infolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a jest and fubject of raillery. If
the one be a defect of humanity, the other is diametrically oppofite to it. If the
one does no good, the other does much evil. And no man, how cruel foever in rea-
lity he was, has ever liked to be reckond a cruel man: fuch a confeffion of guilt
does nature extort; fo univerfally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.
XVIII. The practice of justice and mercy is just as right, as injuftice, unmerci-
fulness, and cruelty are wrong. This follows from the nature of contraries. Be-
fide, not to be juſt to a man is to be not juft, or unjuſt to him: and ſo not to
be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.
Here I might end this ſection: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a
little more particular. Therefore,
XIX. From the foregoing propofitions may be deduced the heinouſneſs of all fuch
crimes, as murder, or even burting the perfon of another any how, when our own
neceffary defence does not require it (it being not poffible, that any thing ſhould be
more his, than his own perfon, life and limbs); robbing, ftealing, cheating, be-
traying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, et cæt. with all
the approaches and tendencies to them. For theſe are not only compriſed within
the definition of injuſtice, and are therefore violations of thoſe truths, which
are violated by that; but commonly, and ſome of them always, come within
the deſcription of cruelty too. All which is evident at firſt fight with reſpect
to murder, robbery, cheating, flandering, &c. eſpecially if a man brings him-
felf into the cafe, and views himſelf in his own imagination as renderd fcanda-
lous by calumniators and liers; ftript by thieves; ruind in his fortunes and un-
done by knaves; ftruggling to no purpoſe, convulfed and agonizing under the
knife of ſome truculent ruffian; or the like.
The fame is altogether as plain in the caſe of adultery, when any one infnares,
and corrupts the wife of another; notwithſtanding the protection it gains from
falſe notions, great examples d, and the commonneſs of the crime. For (the na-
ture of matrimony being for the prefent ſuppoſed to be fuch, as it will appear by and
by to be) the adulterer denies the property a husband has in his wife by compact,
the moſt expreſs and facred that can poffibly be made: he does that, which
Eft hominum natura, quam fequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas. Cic.
ὁ κλέπτης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐχ έτω ὡς ὁ μοιχός. Chryf.
orum, as they are called in Val. Max.
Ο Δεινόν μεν
One of the Subfeffores alienorum matrimoni-
d Palam apparet, adhuc atate Divi Hieronymi adul-
e For hence follows
terium capite folere puniri: nunc magnatum lufus eft. Schol.in S. Hier.
.Milon .משרבו מנאפים פסקי מים המרים.inspunity, doc
T
tends
142
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VI.
tends to fubvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether in-
confiftent with the order and tranquillity of the world, and therefore with the
laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think reaſonable,
or even tolerable, were he the perſon wrongd: briefly, he impudently treats a
woman as his own woman (or wife b), who is not his, but another's, contrary to
justice, truth and fact. Nor is this fimple injuftice only, but injuftice, for which
no reparation can be made if the injured man thinks fo; as he generally does
(ſee fect. II. prop. I. obf. 4.) injuftice accompanied with the greateſt cruelty; ſo
complicated, as ſcarce any other can be. The husband is for ever robbed of
all that pleaſure and fatisfaction, which arifes from the wife's fidelity and af-
fection to him; prefuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner
of his bed, but the companion of his life, and fharer in all his fortunes: and
into the room of them fucceed painful and deftructive paffions. The poor woman f
herſelf, tho ſhe may be deluded 8, and not ſee at preſent her guilt, or the con-
ſequences of it, uſually pays dear for her fecurity and want of guard, the hus-
band becoming cold and averfe to her, and ſhe full of apprehenfions and fears¹,
with a particular dread of his further refentment. And their affairs,in this disjointed
and diſtracted condition, are neglected; innocent children flighted, and left unpro-
vided for, without ſo much as the comfort of any certain relations to pity them,&c.
The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by fuch impertinent
fimile's and rakiſh talk, as are commonly uſed for that purpoſe. When any one
wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of what it is to him, the proprie-
tor: and the value muſt be ſet according to what he eſteems it to be, not what
h
b
a Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupifcit, idem uxorem fuam afpici non vult: & fidei acerrimus
exactor, eft perfidus: & mendacia perfequitur, ipfe perjurus. Sen.
ΜΠΟΝ, τὴν ἑαυτῇ γυναικα.
< What a monſter in nature muſt he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act againſt all theſe,
(to uſe Seneca's words again) fatis juſtam caufam putat amandi, quod aliena eſt [uxor]?
d'Oude 25
τότ᾽ ἔνεσιν ἐἰπεῖν, ὡς τὸ σῶμα μόνον διαφθείρεται τῆς μοιχευομένης γενναικός, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δεῖ τἀληθὲς ἐἰπεῖν, ἡ
ψυχὴ πρὸ τῆ σώματα εἰς ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἐθίζεται, διδασκομένη πάντα τρόπον δποτρέφεις και μισεῖν ἢ ἄνδρα,
καὶ ἧττον ἂν ἦν δεινὸν, ἐν τὸ μῖσα ἐπεδείκνυτο ἐμφανές, κτλ. Ph. Jud. e Marriage is κοινωνία παντὸς τ
βία, οικειοτέρα & μείζων άλλων κοινωνιῶν]. Ifocr.
ভা
* Απαλὸν ζῶον. S. Baf.
T
aas, fays the penitent woman in Soph. ap. Plut.
ZÚVεUV. Soph.
i Quid enim falvi eft mulieri, amiffa
Ἔπεισας,
Γυνή κακή
Η ψυχρόν παραγκάλισμα
pudicitia? Livy. * Οἱ μηδὲν ἠδικη
κότες άθλιοι παιδες μηδ' ἑτέρῳ γένει προσνεμηθῆναι δυνάμενοι, μή τε τῷ τὸ γήμαντα, μή τε τῷ τῇ
μοιχε. Ph. 7.
1 Such as Ariſtippus uſes to Diogenes, ap. Athen. "Apa ys μn to σol aToTOV
δοκεῖ είναι Διογενές δικίαν οικειν, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον ᾤκησαν ἄλλοι; ἐ γδ ἔφη. τί 5 ναον, ἐν ᾗ πόλλοι πεπλευκασιν ;
¿dì rõTo'lQn. ¿Twg—- Senfelefs ftuff. Nor is that of the adulterous woman in Prov. S. better:
τέτο ἔφη. ἔτως
where by 22 777 is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a ferpent upon a rock, and
ર
४
1
מקנחת פיה של and therefore the ; שלא יעשה בה רושם יוכר אחר שעה,of a flip in the fea
,See ab venari אחר זה תוכל לומר לא פעלתי און and then thinks that ,מטה
4
the
Truths refpecting Mankind, &c.
143
the injurer, who perhaps has no tafte of virtuous pleaſures, may think it to be.
(See p. 33. obf. 3,4.) Nor may theſe thefts be excuſed from their fecrecy. For
1. the injuſtice of the fact is the ſame in itſelf, whether known, or not. In either
caſe truth is denied: and a lie is as much a lie, when it is whiſperd, as when it is
proclaimd at the market-crofs. 2. It has been fhewd (fect. II.) that the rectitude of
our actions and way to happineſs are coincident; and that fuch acts, as are difa-
greeable to truth, and wrong in themſelves, tend to make men ultimately unhappy ².
Things are fo orderd and difpofed by the Author of nature, or fuch a conftitution
of things flows from him, that it must be fo. And fince no retreat can be impervi-
ous to his eye, no corner ſo much out of the way, as not to be within his plan,
no doubt there is to every wrong and vitious act a ſuitable degree of unhappineſs
and puniſhment annext, which the criminal will be fure to meet with ſome time or
other b. For his own fake therefore he ought not to depend upon the darkneſs of
the deed. But lastly, it can hardly be, but that it muſt be difcoverde. People ge-
nerally rife in vice, grow impudent and vain and careleſs, and diſcover themſelves d
the opportunities contrived for it muſt be liable to obfervation: ſome confidents
muſt be truſted, who may betray the fecret, and upon any little diſtaſte probably
will do it: and befide, love is quick of apprehenfion .
It will be eaſily perceived from what has been faid, that if to murder, rob,
&c. are unjust and crimes of a heinous nature, all thoſe things which have any
tendency toward them, or affinity with them, or any way countenance them, muft
be in their degree criminal f: becauſe they are of the fame complexion with that
which they tend to, tho not of the fame growth, nor matured into the grofs act,
or perhaps do not operate fo preſently, apparently, or certainly. Envy, malice,
and the like, are conatus's toward the deftruction or ruin of the perfon, who is
the object of theſe unhappy paffions. To throw duft & upon a man's reputation
by innunendo's, ironies, &c. may not indeed fully it all at once, as when dirt is
thrown, or gross calumnies; yet it infects the air, and may deſtroy it by a lin-
gring poiſon. To expose another by the ſtrength of a jefting talent, or
harder temper of face, is to wound him, though it be in an invisible
a Nemo malus felix: minimè corruptor, &c. Juv.
اد
g
Β. Αναπόδρας
• Και η ἂν παραυτίκα κρύψης, ύσερον ὀφθήσῃ. Ifocr. Μαρτυρήσεσιν
D85. Luc.
αν
4 Ηδονή μεν ηδ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονέςατον. Plato.
ηδ' ὁ θεῖο νόμο. Plot.
ἡ κλίνη κι ὁ λύχνο ὁ Μεγαπέ
€
† Αγαθὸν ἢ τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν. A gnome of Democrates.
T
ò
Quid non fentit amor? Ov.
אבק לשון הרע 8
;
T 2
place 2.
144
Sect. VI.
1
The RELIGION of NATURE. place. Many freedoms and reputed 'civilities of barbarian extract, and eſpeci-
ally gallantries, that proceed not to confummate wickedness, nor perhaps are
intended to be carried fo far, may yet divert peoples affections from their proper
object, and debauch the mind. By ftories or infinuations to fow the feeds of dif
cord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand.
Even for men to intermeddle in other peoples affairs, as bufy bodies and org-
ixo do, is to affume a province, which is not theirs; to concern themſelves
with things, in which they are not concernd; to make that public, which in
itſelf is private; and perhaps to rob the perfon, into whoſe buſineſs they intrude
themſelves, of his quiet, if of nothing elſe. For indeed this: intermeddling
looks like fetting up a pretence to fomething further; like an unjuſt attack be-
gun at a diſtance: All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable
to truth, this pragmatical humor is. And ſo on.
$70
If theſe things are fo, how guilty muft they be, who are defignedly the pro-
moters or inflruments of injustice and wickedneſs; fuch as mercenary ſwearers,
and falſe witneffes; traders in fcandal; folicitors in vice; they who intend by
their converſation to relax mens principles too much, and (as it ſeems) prepare
them for knavery, lewdnefs, or any flagitious enterprize d
There are other crimes, fuch as infidelity to friends or them who intruft us with
any thing, ingratitude, all kinds of wilful perjury, and the like, which might have
been mentiond in the propofition, being great inſtances of injuftice: but becauſe
they are viſibly ſuch, and their nature cannot be miſtaken, I compriſe them in the
et cat, there. Any one may fee, that he, who acts unfaithfully, acts againſt his pro-
miſes and ingagements, and therefore denies and fins againſt truth; does what it
can never be for the good of the world ſhould become an univerfal practice; does.
what he would not have done to himself; and wrongs the man, who depends
upon him, of what he juſtly might expect. So the ungrateful man treats his be-
nefactor as not being what he is, &c. And the falfe-fwearer refpects neither
things, nor himſelf, nor the perſons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God.
himſelf as being what they are. All this is obvious e.
anyb pbn 15 '
. Maim. & fim. paff. For, according to the
b See how chaft the
in jus vocanti matro-
Jewiſh doctors, he who does this breaks the fixth commandment. Abarb.
Romans were once. Quo matronale decus verecundia munimento tutius effet,
nam corpus ejus attingere non permiferunt, ut inviolata manûs aliena tactu ftola relinqueretur. Val. M.
And it is told of P. Menius, that trifti exemplo pracepit [filia fua], ut non folum virginitatem illibatam,
fed etiam ofcula ad virum fincera perferret. Id.
pore, tanto fceleratiùs corrumpitur. S. Auſt.
ἄγειν φιλονεικόντες, κλ. S. Baf.
α
Quanto autem præftantior eft animus cor-
ουτοι εισιν οι λοιμοι οι τὸ ἴδιον κακὸν ἐπὶ πάντας
e Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt. Cic. And the fame
may be faid of the unfaithful, perjured, &c.
jia
[
24.
SECT
>
Truths respecting particular Societies, &c. 145
SECT. VII. Truths refpecting particular Societies
of Men, or Governments.
I.
M
AN is a focial creature: that is, a fingle man, or family, cannot fubfift,
or not well, alone out of all fociety. More things are neceffary to fuf-
tain life, or at leaſt to make it in any degree pleaſant and defirable, than it is pof-
fible for any one man to make and provide for himſelf merely by his own labor and:
ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and houſe, and that frugal furniture-
which is abfolutely requifite, with a little neceſſary phyfic, ſuppoſe many arts and
trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a fhift in time of health to
live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon fuch
fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth fhould afford, and happen to
preſent to him; yet what could he do in fickneſs, or old age, when he would not
be able to ftir out, or receive her beneficence.
If he ſhould take from the other fex fuch a help, as the common appetite might
prompt him to feek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks; yet ftill if
the bands are doubled, the wants are doubled too: nay more, additional wants,
and great ones, attending the bearing and education of children.
If we could ſuppoſe all theſe difficulties furmounted, and a family grownup,
and doing what a ſingle family is capable of doing by it ſelf; ſupporting them-
felves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have fome
how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no mar-
kets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their
little flock, or herd for other things; no fhops to repair to for tools; no fer-
vant, or laborer to affift; nor any public invention, of which they might ſerve
themſelves in the preparation of their grain, dreffing their meat, manufacturing
their wool, and the like); yet ſtill it is only the cortex of the man, which is pro-
vided for: what muſt become of the interior part, the minds of theſe people?
How would thoſe be fed, and improved? Arts and Sciences, fo much of them
as is neceſſary to teach men the uſe of their faculties, and unfold their reaſon,
are not the growth of fingle families fo imployd. And yet for men to lay out:
ª Quid ergo, anima nullane habet alimenta propria? an ejus eſca ſcientia nobis videtur ? S. Auſk.
all.
146 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VII.
all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood
and humors in circulation, without any further views, or any regard to the
nobler part of themſelves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being form-
ed for rational exerciſes.
If all the exceptions againſt this ſeparate way of living could be removed; yet
as mankind increaſes, the little plots, which the ſeveral families poffefs, and cul-
tivate, muſt be inlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themſelves
ſtraitend: and there would foon be a collision of interefts, from whence diſputes
and quarrels would enfue. Other things too might miniſter matter for theſe.
And befide all this, fome men are naturally troubleſome, vitious, thieviſh, pùg-
nacious, rabid; and theſe would always be diſturbing and flying upon the next
to them as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have
any advantage or fuperiority in power, would not fail to make themſelves yet
greater or ſtronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments
they might grow to be formidable ".
a
Under fo many wants, and fuch apprehenfions, or prefent dangers, neceffity
would bring fome families into terms of friendſhip with others for mutual com-
fort and defence: and this, as the reaſon of it increaſed, would become ſtronger,
introduce ftricter ingagements, and at laft bring the people to mix and unite.
And then the weak being glad to ſhelter themſelves under the protection and
conduct of the more able, and fo naturally giving way for theſe to afcend, the
ſeveral forts would at length ſettle into their places, according to their ſeveral
weights and capacities with refpect to the common concern. And thus fome
form of a fociety muſt arife: men cannot fubfift otherwiſe.
But if it was poffible for a man to preſerve life by himself, or with his petit
company about him: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely better
for him, and them, to live in a fociety, where men are ſerviceable to them-
ſelves and their neighbours at the fame time, by exchanging their money, or
goods, for fuch other things as they want more; where they are capable of do
ing good offices each for other in time of need; where they have the protection of
laws, and a public fecurity againſt cheats, robbers, affaffines, and all enemies
to property; where a common force or army is ready to interpofe between
them and foreign invaders; and where they may injoy thoſe diſcoveries which
have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by converfa-
tion and innocent conflicts of reaſon, and (tò ſpeak out) may be made men.
• Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur. Sen.
If
Truths refpecting particular Societies, c. 147
If, when we have the privilege of fociety and laws, we can ſcarce preferve
our own, or be fafe, what a woful condition ſhould we be in without them; ex-
poſed to the infults, rapines, and violence of unjuft and merciless men, not
having any fanctuary, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithſtand-
ing the help of friends and thofe about us, and fuch conveniences as may be
had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melan-
choly hours, how irksome would life be, if in fickneſs or other trouble there
was no body to adminiſter either remedy or confolation?
a
Laſtly, fociety is what men generally defire. And tho much company may be
attended with much vanity, and occafion many evils yet it is certain, that ab-
folute and perpetual folitude has fomething in it very irkſome and hideous b. Thus
the focial life is natural to man; or, what his nature and circumſtances require.
II. The end of fociety is the common welfare and good of the people affociated. This
is but the conſequence of what has been juſt ſaid. For becauſe men cannot ſubſiſt
well, or not ſo well, feparately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is,
the end of their uniting is their better fubfiftence; and by how much their manner
of living becomes better, by fo much the more effectually is this end anfwerd.
III. A fociety, into which men enter for this end, ſuppoſes fome rules or laws, ac--
cording to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding to
them as occafion ſhall require. A number of men met together without
any rules,
by which they ſubmit to be governed, can be nothing but an irregular multi-
tude. Every one being ftill fui juris, and left intirely to his own private choice,
by whatever kind of judgment or paffion or caprice that happens to be de-
termind, they muſt needs interfere one with another: nor can fuch a concourſe
of people be any thing different from an indigefted chaos of diffenting parts,
which by their confufed motions would damnify, and deſtroy each other. This
muſt be true, if men differ in the fize of their underſtandings, in their man-
ner of thinking, and the ſeveral turns their minds take from their education,
way of living, and other circumſtances; if the greateſt part of them are un-
der the direction of bodily affections; and if theſe differ as much as their ſhapes,
their complexions, their conftitutions do c. Here then we find nothing but
confufion and unhappineſs.
Ari,otle fays a good man would be neither &q1a®, nor woλúpia☺. This is juft. Therefore Seneca
feems to go a little too far, when he writes, Omnes amicos habere operofum effe, fatis effe inimicos
non habere.
Ο Ζωον συναγελασικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπο. S. Baf.
words, τὸ πολυτροπώτατον το ζώων, τα ποικιλώτατον.
b
Man is, in Greg. Naz.'s
Such
1
148 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VII.
Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their common good and
happiness, must be fuch a one as in the first place, may render them compatible
one with another: which cannot be without rules, that may direct and adjuſt
their feveral motions and carriages towards cach other, bring them to fome de-
gree of uniformity, or at leaft reftrain fuch excurfions and enormities, as would
render their living together inconfiftent.
Then, there muſt be fome expreſs declarations and ſcita to aſcertain properties
and titles to things by common confent: that fo, when any altercations or diſputes
Thall happen concerning them (as be fure many muft in a world fo unreaſonable and
prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to their own fettlements; and by the
application of a general undisputed rule to the particular cafe before them it may
appear, on which fide the obliquity lies, the controverfy may be fairly decided,
and all mouths eternally ſtopped. And then again, that they may be protected and
perfevere in this agreeable life, and the injoyment of their respective properties
be fecured to them, feveral things must be forecafted by way of precaution a-
gainſt foreign invafions; punishments muſt be appointed for offences committed
amongſt themſelves, which being known may deter men from committing
them, &c. Theſe rules, methods, and appointments of puniſhments, being in-
telligibly and honeſtly drawn up, agreed to, and publiſhd, are the mutual com-
pacts a under which the fociety is confederated, and the laws of it.
If then to have the members of a ſociety capable of fubfifting together, if to
have their reſpective properties afcertaind, if to be fafe and quiet in the poffeffion
of them be for the general good of the fociety, and theſe things cannot be had
without laws; then a fociety, whoſe foundation and cement is the public good,
muſt have fuch laws, or be fuppofed at leaſt to deſign fuch.
As to the making of any further laws, when the public intereſt and welfare re-
quire them,that is but repeating the fame power in other inftances, which they made
ufe of before in making their first laws: and as to altering or repealing, it is certain
the power of making and unmaking here are equal. Beſide, when men are incorpo-
rated and live together for their mutual good, this end is to be confiderd at one time
as much as at another; not only in their firft conftitution and fettlement.
IV.Thefe laws and determinations must be fuch, as are not inconfiftent with natural
justice. For 1. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the fame as to or-
dain, that what is true fhall be falfe; or v. vb. which is abfurd. 2. To pretend
by a law to make that to be just, which before and in itſelf was unjust, is the
fame as to ordain that which interferes with truth: becauſe juftice is founded in
4 πᾶς ἐτι νόμΘ πόλεως συνθήκη κοινή. Demofth. 6 Noμ is! F 17 Evgeois. Stob. è Plat.
truth
Truths reſpecting particular Societies, &c. 149
truth (as before), and every where the fame. Therefore, 3. by a law to enact
any thing which is naturally unjuſt is to enact that which is abfurd; that which
by fect. I. is morally evil; and that which is oppofite to those laws, by which
it is manifeftly the will of our Creator we ſhould be governed b. And to enact
what is thus evil muſt be evil indeed. Lastly, to eſtabliſh injuſtice muſt be
utterly inconfißent with the general good and happineſs of any fociety; unleſs
to be unjuſtly treated, pilled, and abuſed can be happineſs c. And if ſo, it is
utterly inconfiftent with the end of fociety; or, it is to deny that to be the end
of it, which is the end of it.
V. A fociety limited by laws fuppofes magiftrates, and a fubordination of powers:
that is, it ſuppoſes a government of ſome form or other. Becauſe, where men are
to act by rules or laws for the public weal, fome muft of neceflity be appointed
to judge, when thoſe laws are tranfgreft, and how far; to decide doubtful cafes,
and the like there muſt be ſome armed with authority to execute thofe judg-
ments, and to punish offenders: there muſt be perfons choſen not only to puniſh
and prevent public evils, but alſo to do many other things, which will be re-
quired in advancement of the public good: and then the power of making new
laws, and abrogating or mending old ones, as experience may direct or the cafe
at any time require, as alfo of providing preſently and legally for the fafety of
the public in time of fudden danger, muſt be lodged fomewhere.
If there are no executors of the laws, the laws cannot be executed: and if ſo,
they are but a dead letter, and equal to none: and if the fociety has none, it is in-
deed no fociety, or not ſuch a one as is the ſubject of this propofition. Guardi-
ans and executors of laws are therefore the vitals of a fociety, without which
there can be no circulation of justice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it conti-
nue. And fince men can be but in one place at once, there muſt be numbers
of theſe proportionable to the bignefs and extent of it.
ZKIEL
κει
ᎢᏤ
છે
• Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν· ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις
násl. Arift.
b Even the Heathens believed, that above all human xnguyμara there were
άγραπτα κασφαλή θεῶν νόμιμα, which mortals ought not to tranfgrefs : ἐ γάρ τι νῦν γε καχθες
à¤' del TÓTE Čỹ TŒUтa. Soph. Nec fi regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Roma fcripta lex de ftupris, id-
circo non contra- legem fempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretia-attulit. Erat enim ratio pro-
fecta à rerum natura, & ad rectè faciendum impellens, & à delicto avocans: que non tum deniq;
incipit lex eſſe, cùm fcripta eſt, ſed tum cùm orta eft. Orta autem fimul eft cum mente divina. Cic.
• Si tanta poteftas eft ftultorum fententiis atq; juſſis, ut eorum fuffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur
nov fanciunt, ut, que mala perniciofaq; funt, habeantur pro bonis, ac falutaribus? aut cùr, cum jus ex
injuria lex facere poffit, bonum eadem facere non poffit ex malo? Cic.
V
And
150
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VII.
And further, fince the concerns of a whole fociety, and fuch things as may fall
within the compaſs of a ſtatute book, are various,requiring ſeveral forts and fizes of
abilities, and lying one above another in nature; fince not only private men want
to be inspected, but even magiftrates and officers themſelves, who (tho they oft for-
get it) are ſtill but men; and fince the whole fociety is to be one, one compact bo-
dy: Ifay, fince the cafe is thus, there must be men to act in feveral elevations and
qualities as well as places, of which the inferior fort in their ſeveral quarters muſt act
immediately under their reſpective ſuperiors; and fo this clafs of fuperiors in their
feveral provinces under others above them; till at laft the afcent is terminated in
fome bead, where the legislative power is depofited, and from whence ſpirits and
motion are communicated through the whole body.An army may as well be ſuppo-
fed to be well diſciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either general
or officers, as a fociety without governors and their fubalterns, or (which is the fame)
without fome form of government, to anſwer the end of its being.
VI. A man may part with fome of his natural rights, and put himself under the
government of laws, and thofe, who in their ſeveral ſtations are intrufted with the
execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of are-
gular fociety. Becauſe by this he doth but exchange one thing for another,
which he reckons equivalent, or indeed preferable by much: and this he may do
without acting against any truth. For the liberties and natural rights, which
he exchanges, are his own, and therefore no other man's property is denied by
this: nor is the nature of happineſs denied to be what it is, fince it is happineſs
which he aims at in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend a-
gainſt truth, and deny happiness to be what it is, if he did not do it; eſpecial-
ly feeing, that here his own happineſs coincides with the general happineſs and
more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his lot falls,
or his choice determins him to live.
If the queſtion ſhould be asked, what natural rights a man may part with, or how
far he may part with them; the general anſwer, I think, may be this. Some things
are effential to our being, and fome it is not in our power to part with. As to the
reft, he may depart from them fo far as it is confiftent with the end, for which he
does this: not further, becauſe beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot
give away the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to preferve
or retain that property: but he may confent to contribute part of his eſtate, in
order to preferve the reft, when otherwiſe it might all be loft; to take his ſhare
of danger in defence of his country, rather than certainly perish, be inflaved,
or ruind by the conqueft or oppreffion of it; and the like.
VII. Min
Truths refpecting particular Societies, &c. 151
VII. Men may become members of a fociety (i. c. do what is mentiond in the fore-
going propofition) by giving their confent, either explicitly, or implicitly. That a
man may fubject himſelf to laws, we have feen. If he does this, he muſt do
it either in his own perſon; or he muſt do it by fome proxy, whom he ſubſtitutes
in his room to agree to public laws; or his conſent muſt be collected only from
the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the fociety, accepting the be-
nefits of its conſtitution, and acquieſcing in the cftabliſhd methods and what
is done by virtue of them. By the two firft ways he declares himſelf explicitly,
and directly: nor can he after that behave himſelf as if he was no member of
the fociety, without acting as if he had not done what he has done. And this
is the cafe not only of them, who have been concerned in the first formation
of any government, but alſo of them, who have in the faid manners ª given
their conſent to any ſubſequent acts, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came
into what their anceſtors had done, or who have by oaths put themſelves under
obligations to the public. By the last of the three ways mentiond a man's
confent is given indeed implicitly, and lefs directly; but yet it is given, and he
becomes a party. For fuppofe him to be born in ſome certain kingdom or com-
monwealth, but never to have been party to any law, never to have taken any
oath to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himſelf by any other
act. In this caſe he cannot methinks but have ſome love and ſympathy for that
place, which afforded him the firſt air he drew; fome gratitude towards that
conflitution, which protected his parents, while they educated and provided
for him; fome regard to thoſe obligations, under which perhaps they have laid
`him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of
the world by them) conveyd to him his very life.
If he inherits or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no
indefeaſible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could
not tell how to get, or keep, without the aid of laws and advantage of fociety;
then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, with it he takes and
owns the laws which give it him.
Indeed fince the fecurity he has from the laws of the country in refpect of his
perfon, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter,
is the general equivalent for his fubmiffion to them, he cannot accept that with-
out being obliged in equity to pay this.
a In perfon, or by proxy.
V 2
Nay
152
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VII.
Nay, laftly, his very continuing and fettling in any place fhews, that either he
likes the conſtitution, or likes it better than any other, or at leaſt thinks it bet-
ter in his circumstances to conform to it than to ſeek any other: that is, he con-
ſents to be comprehended in it ª.
VIII. When a man is become a member of a fociety, if he would behave himself
according to truth, he ought to do these things: viz. to confider property as founded
not only in nature, but alſo in law; and men's titles to what they have, as
ſtrengthend by that, and even by his own conceffion and covenants; and therefore by
So much the more inviolable and facred: inſtead of taking fuch meaſures to do him-
felf right, when he is molefted, or injured, as his own prudence might fuggeft in
a ſtate of nature, to confine himſelf to fuch ways as are with his own conſent markt
out for him: and, in a word, to behave himſelf according to his fubordination or
place in the community, and to obferve the laws of it. For it is containd in the
idea of a law, that it is intended to be obſerved: and therefore he, who is a party to
any laws, or profeffes himſelf member of a fociety formed upon laws, cannot
willingly tranfgrefs thofe laws without denying laws to be what they are, or him-
felf to be what he is fuppofed or profeffes himſelf to be: and indeed without con-
tradicting all or moſt of thoſe truths containd in the foregoing propofitions.
IX. In respect of those things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of,
or when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of those laws cannot be bad
(tor fo it may ſometimes happen. I fay, in refpect of fuch things), be who is a
member of a fociety in other refpects retains his natural liberty, is ftill as it were in
a ſtate of nature, and muſt endeavour to act according to truth and his beſt prudence.
For in the former cafe there is nothing to limit him, by the fuppofition, but
truth and nature. And in the other it is the fame as if there was nothing; fince
in effect there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had. As, for
example, if a man ſhould be attacked by thieves or murderers, and has no op-
portunity or power to call the proper magiftrate or officer to his affiſtance.
There is a third cafe, which perhaps may demand admiffion here: and that
is, when laws are plainly contrary to truth and natural juftice. For tho they
may paſs the ufual forms, and be ftyled laws; yet, fince no fuch law can abro-
gate that law of nature and reaſon, to which the Author of our being hath
fubjected us, or make falfhood to be truth; and two inconfiftent laws cannot
• Plato ſays, when any man has feen our form of government, &. and remains under it, non que-
μὲν τ τον ὡμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῖν.
l
I
both
Truths refpecting particular Societies, &c. 153
both oblige, or fubfift together; one of them muft give way: and it is eaſy to
difcern, which ought to do it.
There remains one truth more to be annexed here, which may be contra-
dicted by the practices and pretences of Enthufiafts b.
X. The focieties intended in this fection, fuch as kingdoms and commonwealths,
may defend themselves against other nations: or, war may lawfully be waged in de-
fence and for the fecurity of a fociety, its members and territories, or for reparation of
injuries. For if one man may in a ſtate of nature have a right to defend himſelf,
(ſee ſect. VI. prop. VII.), two may, or three, and fo on. Nay, perhaps two
may have a double right, three a threefold right, &c. At leaft, if the right
be not greater, the concern is greater: and there will be more reaſon, that two,
or three, or more ſhould be faved, than one only; and therefore that two, or
three, or more ſhould defend themſelves, than that one fhould. And if this
may be done by men in a ſtate of nature, it may be done by them when con-
federated among themſelves: becauſe with reſpect to other nations they are
ftill in that state. I mean, fo far as they have not limited themſelves by leagues
and alliances.
Beſide, if a man may defend himſelf, he may defend himſelf by what methods
he thinks moſt proper, provided he treſpaſſes againſt no truth; and therefore,
by getting the aid and affiftance of others. Now when war is levied in defence
of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be confiderd as if every
particular man was defending himſelf with the affiftance of all the reft, and fo
be turned into the fame cafe with that of a fingle man.
In truth the condition of a nation feems to be much the fame with that of a
fingle perfon when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had: and what one
man may do to another in that poſition,may be done by one nation or politic body
with reſpect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has
been deliverd in fect. VI. the justice of foreign wars may be not untruly eſtimated.
Mutual defence is one of the great ends of fociety, if not the greateft, and in a
particular and eminent manner involves in it defence againſt foreign enemies. And
whoever fignalizes himſelf, when there is occafion for his fervice, merits the grate-
ful acknowledgements and celebrations of his country-men: fo far at leaſt as he
acts generouſly and with a public ſpirit, and not in purſuance only of private views.
• Illud ftultiffimum, exiftimare omnia jufta effe, qua fcita fint in populorum inftitutis, aut legibus.—
si populorum juſſis, fi principum decretis, fi fententiis judicum, jura conftituerentur, jus effet latrocinari:
jus, adulterare: jus, teſtamenta falſa ſupponere, ſi hac fuffragiis aut ſcitis multitudinis probarentur. Cic.
b Manicheans of old, and fome moderns.
As
154
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII.
As to thoſe wars, which are undertaken by men out of ambition, merely to
inlarge empire, or to fhew the world, how terrible they are, how many men
they are able to flay, how many flaves to make b, how many families to drive
from their peaceful habitations, and, in fhort, how much mischief and mifery
they are able to bring upon mankind; theſe are founded upon falfe notions of
glory: imbellifhd indeed by fervile wits and mifplaced eloquence, but condemned
by all true philofophy and religion.
SECT. VIII. Truths concerning Families and
Relations.
HIS fection fhall begin as relation itſelf does, with marriage.
THIS
I. The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happiness of the
couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itself. The difference of the
fexes, with the ftrong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the o-
ther, is plainly ordaind by the author of nature for the continuance of the fpe-
cies, which without that muſt be ſoon extinguiſhd. And tho people, when
they marry, may have many times not fo much the increaſe of their family
in their defign or wishes, as the gratification of an importunate appetite; yet
fince nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, nature (or rather
its great Author) may be faid to make this an end of the marriage, tho the
bridegroom and bride themfelves do not.
* Like thoſe particularly of J. Cafar: of whom it is reported, that, animadversâ apud Herculis
templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quafi pertafus ignariam fuam, quod nihil dum à fe me-
morabile actum effſet in atate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum fubegiſſet. Suet.
b Some
go to war ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήξαν ἢ κωηγεσίαν ἀνθρώπων. Plut. Not out of neceffity, and in order to
peace; which is the true end of war. Пoλµµv, iva sipúvnu dywer. Ariſt. Ita bellum fufcipiatur, ut
ένα
- Οι άνθρωποι & μόνον το τεκνοποιΐας χάριν συνοι
aihil aliud quàm pax quafita videatur. Cic.
κὅσιν, ἀλλὰ ς ἳ εἰς τὸν βίον, κλ. Αrift.
اد
"
C
Η Ανδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρ
Ὡς δ ή μαγνήτις λίθω..
χειν. άνθρωπο γ τῇ φύσει συνδυατικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν. Ιd.
πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τ' σίδηρον ἕλκει· ἔτω τὸ θήλεο σώμα
6. Baf.
τὸ δ' ἄρρενα σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ἕλκει.
And
Truths concerning Families, &c.
155
And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforefaid
end of marriage, or is (as in many cafes it can only be) the end itself a, the
joint happineſs of the conjuges, no body can be fuppofed to marry in order
and on fet purpoſe to make him or herſelf unhappy: no nor without a pre-
fumption of being more happy. For without an apprehenfion of fome degree of
happineſs to accrue, or what prefents itſelf to the imagination as fuch, and is
taken for fuch, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something
there muſt be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they think to better it.
And indeed if their circumstances are fuch, as may inable them to maintain a fa-
mily, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares,
and if they in good earneſt reſolve to behave themſelves as they ought, and recipro-
cally to be helpful and loving each to other, much comfort and happineſs b may
juſtly be expected from this intimate union, the interchange of affections, and a
confpiration of all their counfels and meaſures, the qualities and abilities of the
one fex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to
paſs over in filence thofe joys, which are trueft when moſt concealde, many things
there are, which may be uſeful, perhaps neceffary to the man, and yet require the
delicater hand or nicer management and genius of the woman f: and fo, viciffim,
Cup) y'n
When Ocellus Lucanus
* That fure is a hard law in Plato, which injoins ἀπέχεις ἀρέρας θηλείας πάσης, ἐν ᾗ μὴ βουλοιτο ἄν
ooi queas rò σnagév. That mentiond in S. Hhared. fays otherwife: 1 y
131 NhaiyD INWNUD. Many opinions are taken up upon flight reaſons.
fays, Αυτὰς τὰς δυνάμεις, ἢ τὰ ὄργανα, καὶ τὰς ορέξεις τὰς πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ὑπὸ θεῖ δεδομένας ἀνθρώποις,
ἐχ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα δεδόας συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον διαμονής το γένες, how doth he know that
they were not given for both theſe ends, in a regular way? And fo when Clemens Alex. thews his zeal
againt τὰς ἀκάρτες σποράς, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἐγκύες ὁμιλίαν, &c. adding, ψιλή η ηδονή, κἂν ἐν γάμῳπα-
ραληφθῇ, παράνομος ἐσι, κλ. he does this becaufe ὁ Μωσῆς ἀπάγει τῶν ἐγκύων τὲς ἄνδρας; and then
cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpoſe, nor I believe any where to be found
Oùx édeσαi Trayav, ide Thy dawav. (Quem interpretem fecutus fit Clemens nefcio. Gent. Herv.) Cer
tainly the Jews underſtand their lawgiver otherwife. See how that my mentiond in the law is ex-
plaind by Maim, in hilk. iſh. Nor are the fuffrages of Chriſtians wanting. Deus, cum cæteras ani-
mantes, fufcepto fœtu, maribus repugnare voluiffet, folam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit ;-ne
feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret viros aliud appetere, &c. that is, that the man and wife might be
kept infeparably together. Lact. Ο Και τὸ χρήσιμον είναι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλία. Αrift.
καθάπερ ἑνὸς ζών
.Ref. bookm .כשאיש ואשה נוהגים כראוי שכינה ביניהם
διπλά τμήματα εἰς ταυτὸν ἁρμότλεται. Ph. 7.
C
ο Εξως
d True love is to be found in marriage, or no
where. Πόρνη δ φιλεῖν ἐκ ἐπίσαται, ἀλλ' ἐπιβελέυει μόνον. S. Chryf. 10120 25
a homely, but true faying of a Jewish commentator. e Quod facere turpe non eft modò occultè
id dicere obfcanum eft. Cic. § Εάν ή ή κοσμία καὶ ἐπιεικής, 8 μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας παραμυ
θίαν παρέξει τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι πολλὴν τῆς ἑαυτῆς χρειαν ἐπιδείξεται, κλ. S. Chryf.
3
the
156 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII
the woman cannot but want many things, which require the more robuft and ac-
tive powers or greater capacity of the man. Thus, in lower life, whilft the
wheel, the needle, &c. imploy her, the plough or fome trade perhaps demands
the muſcles and hardineſs of him: and, more generally, if ſhe infpects domeſtic
affairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, ſpent frugally,
and injoyd with neatneſs and advantage, he is bufied in that profeffion, or the
overfight and improvement of that eftate, which muft fuftain the charge of all
this; he prefides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preſerves order
in the family by a gentle and prudent government, &c b.
As then I founded the greater focieties of men upon the mutual convenience,
which attends their living regularly together; fo may I found this lefs, but ftric-
ter alliance between the man and the woman in their joint-happiness. Nature
has a further aim, the prefervation of the kind.
II. That marriages are made by fome folemn contract, vow,or oath (and theſe perhaps
attended with fome pledge, or nuptial rites), by which the parties mutually ingage to
a
α
το
live
* Διῄρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔσιν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς, Ε γυναικός. ἐπαρκᾶσιν ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια.
Arift. b See the converſation between Ifchomachus and his wife in Xenophon.
c Tho
Plato (like moſt of the old Greeks and Romans) among many very fine things hath now and then fome
that are weak, and even abfurd; yet I cannot think, that by his community of women he meant any
thing like that, which is faid, ap. Athen. to have been practifed nuga Tuppnvoïs irózwę z¡v¶hoασw ;
or that his thought could be ſo grofs, as Lactantius repreſents it: Scilicet ut ad eandem mulierem
multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent. For thus, property being taken out of the world, a great part
of virtue is extinguiſhd, and all induftry and improvements are at an end.
And befide that, many
of the moſt ſubſtantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are deſtroyd at once. Siomnes om-
nium fuerint & mariti, & patres, & uxores, & liberi, qua ifta confufio generis humani eft? Quis
aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diligit, nifi habitaverint femper unà? nifi devota mens, ¿ fer-
vata invicem fides individuam fecerit caritatem, &c. Id. However it muſt be confeft, that Plato has
advanced more than was confiftent with his own gravity, or with nature. The beſt excufe to be
made for him, that I know of, is that in Athenaus, "Εοικεν ὁ Πλάτων μὴ τοῖς ἔσιν ἀνθρώποις γράψαι
τὲς νόμες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπ᾽ αυτό διαπλαττομένοις : or perhaps to fay, that he was fo intent upon
ſtrengthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men muft live after his manner,
there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear.
d Every one knows how marriages were made among the Romans, confarreatione, coemptione, ufu:
of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies and the legitima tabella or
at leaſt conſent of friends (which could not be given without fome folemnity) preceded all, aufpicia
were uſually taken, public notaries and witneſſes affifted, &c. Among the Greeks men and women
were eſpouſed by mutual promiſes of fidelity: befide which there were witneffes, and dotal writings
(Teoixão);
JV Truths concerning Families, &c.
157
live together in love, and to be faithful, affifting, and the like, each to other, in all
circumftances of health and fortune, till death parts them, I take for granted.
For all nations have fome form or other upon theſe occafions: and even pri-
vate contracts cannot be made without fome words in which they are containd,
no perhaps without fome kind of fignificant, tho private, ceremony between
the lovers; which lofe nothing of force with refpect to them by their being
both parties and witneſſes themſelves. Something muſt paſs between them,
that is declarative of their intentions, expreſſes their vows, and binds them each
to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of man and wife
upon any other foot.
III. That intimate union, by which the conjuges become poffeft each of the other's
perfon, the mixture of their fortunes, and the joint-relation they have to their chil-
drend, all ftrengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every aɛt done
in purſuance of a covenant, fuch as the matrimonial is, that covenant is ownd,
ratified, and as it were made de integro, and repeted.
Poſſeſſion is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a
former title, the title muſt needs be corroborated.
When two perfons throw their all into one ftock as joint-traders for life, nei-
ther of them can confiftently with truth and honeſty take his ſhare out and be
gone (i. e. diffolve the partnerſhip) without the concurrence of the other; and
fometimes it may not be eaſy, perhaps poffible, to do it at all. Each therefore
is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.
And as to the preſent caſe, if the marriage to be not altogether unfruitful, fince
both the parents are immediately related to the ſame child, that child is the medium of
a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the fame blood with
(xfox@a); at the wedding, facrifices to Diana and other deities, and the yapźkio, iuxai; and after
that, perhaps the being fhut up together, eating the xudanov, a formal is óvns, &c. The UTP
the ceremonies accompanying which :בביאה or (בשטר or בכסף of the fems have been performed
may be feen particularly in Shulhh. ar. with the additions of R. Mo. Iferles (Eben ez.) And (to pafs
by other nations) the form of folemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which perfons mar-
ricd give their troth each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may
be feen by fuch, as feem to have forgot what they are.
a Connubio ſtabili. Virg.
והיו לבשר אחר וכך דרכה לאת ייחרא דכר ונוקבא בקירוב בשר-ולא יהא דבר חוצץ וכו' b
In Refp. khokm.
• Αὕτη χρημάτων κοινωνια προσήκε μάλισα τοῖς γαμέσιν, εις μίαν
ἔσιαν πάντα καταχεαμλύοις καὶ ἀναμίξασι, μὴ τὸ μέρα ἴδιον, καὶ τὸ μέρος ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἴδιον μαγει
πιανό, και μηδὲν ἀλλότριον. Plut.
4 Σύνδεσμο τα τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Aril
X
the
158 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII.
X
the child, they themselves come to be of the fame blood: and fo that relation
which at firſt was only moral and legal, becomes natural; a relation in nature,
which can never ceaſe, or be difannulled. It follows now that,
IV. Marrying, when there is little or no profpect of true happiness from the match
and especially if there are plain prefages of unhappiness; after marriage adultery ;
all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of
nature ought to preferve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a friend-
fhip of a fuperior kind, and the like, are all wrongd. Becauſe the firſt of theſe
is belying ones own fenfe of things, and has an air of diftraction; or however it is
to act as if that was the leaft and moſt trifling of all tranfactions in life, which
is certainly one of the greatest and most delicate. And to offend in any of the o-
ther is to behave, as if the end of marriage was not what it is; as if no
fuch league had been made between the perfons married, as has been made, aɛtu-
ally, and folemnly, and is ftill fubfifting between them; as if they were not pof
feft each of the other; their fortunes not interwoven; nor their children fo e-
qually related to them, as they are; and therefore the misbehaviour, being re-
pugnant to truth, is a fin againſt it, and the mighty Patron of it.
ways
If the most exprefs and folemn contracts, upon which perfons, when they mar-
ry, do fo far depend, as in confidence of their being religiously obferved to alter quite
their condition, begin a new thred of life, and riſque all their fortune and happi-
nefs: Ifay, if fuch facred compacts as theſe are allowd to be broken, there is an
end of all faith; the obligation of oaths (not more binding than marriage vows)
ceaſes; no juſtice can be adminiſterd; and then what a direful influence muſt this
have upon the affairs of mankind upon that, and other accounts?
с
3 In refped of which that in Plutarch particularly is true, Ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι τα σωμάτων ἡμᾶς,
ἣν ἐξ ἑκατέρων μέρα λαβᾶσα, καὶ τυ[χέασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις δπιδῶ τὸ γενόμθμον.
b Socrates ab
adoleſcentulo quodam confultus, uxorem duceret, an fe omni matrimonio abſtineret, refpondit, Utrum
eorum feciſſet, acturum pœnitentiam. Hic te, inquit, folitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic ha-
res alienus excipiet: illic perpetua folicitudo contextus querelarum,—incertus liberorum eventus. Val.M.
Χρόνῳ συνηθείας εντεκάσης πάθα αισθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φίλειν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμθμον. Plut.
d It is vifible that polygamy, pellicate, &c. muſt be included here. They are not only inconfiftent
with our forms and the very letter of the marriage-contract, but with the effence of marriage, which
lies in fuch a union and love as can only be between two. Ariftotle doth not allow there can be
even perfect friendſhip between more than two: much leſs therefore, perfect love. Пomoîs sirai Qi-
λον, κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχε), ὥσπερ ἐδ᾽ ἐρῶν πολλῶν ἅμα. Eth. Ἔσι η φίλω άλλο αν
Tóg. Ibid.
e Facunda culpa facula nuptias Primùm inquinavere, & genus, & domos. Hôc
fonte derivata elades In patriam, populumque fluxit. Hor.
Allowance,
433
159
Truths concerning Families,&c.
Allowance, by fect. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary fail-
ings. A perfon's age, health, eftate, or other circumftances may be fuch, and with-
out any fault, that he or ſhe cannot do what they would; or perhaps inſtead of
that one of them may come to want the pity and affiftance of the other. In this
cafe (which requires the philofophy and fubmiffion proper in afflictions) it is the
duty of the one not only to bear with, but alſo to comfort, and do what may be
done for the other. This is part of the happineſs propofed, which conſiſts not
only in poſitive pleaſures, but alſo in leffening pains and wants; whilft the pair
have each in the other a refuge at hand.
N. I have defignedly forborn to mention that authority of a husband over his
wife, which is ufually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by
laws; becauſe I think it has been carried much too high. I would have them live
fo far upon the level, as (according to my conſtant leſſon) to be governd both by
reafon. If the man's reafon be ftronger, or his knowledge and experience
greater (as it is commonly ſuppoſed to be), the woman will be obliged upon that
ſcore to pay a deference, and ſubmit to him ".
Having now confiderd the man and woman between themſelves, I proceed in
the order of nature to confider them as parents; and to fee (in a few propofiti-
ons following) how things will be carried between them and their children, as alfo
between other relations, coming at firſt from the fame bed, if truth and matters
of fact (to be named, where the argument fhall call for them) are not denied.
V. Parents ought to educate their children, take the best care of them they can,
endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to affift them. Becauſe other-
wife they do not carry themſelves towards their children as being what they
arc, children and theirs: they do not do what they would defire to have done
to themſelves, were they again to pafs through that feeble and tender ſtate; or
perhaps what has been done to them : and befide, they tranſgreſs the law eſta-
bliſhd by nature for the prefervation of the race, which, as things are, could
not without a parental care and affection be continued; a law, which is in force
among all the other tribes of animals, fo far as there is occafion for it.
e
* Κρατεῖν δεῖ τὰ ἄνδρα το γεναικὸς ἐχ ὡς δεσπότων κτήματα, ἀλλ' ὡς ψυχήν σώματα, συμπαθόντα
È σvμxsQuxótα Tŷ žuvoice. Plut. (A fentence, which deferves to be written in letters of gold.) "O
συμπεφυκότα
σὺ Γαϊ, ἐγὼ Γαία όπε σὺ κύριος και οικοδεσπότης, ἢ ἐγὼ κυρία ἓ οικοδέσποινα. Αp. exord
σύ
b Kale
φύσιν οἱ ἄῤῥενες ἐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις άρχεσι. Plato ap. Diog. L.
ο Πολυπλήθος δέ σοι γυίας Λέιψω. πατρὸς τὰ ταῦτ' ἐδεξάμίω πάρα. Eur. Parentes vos alendo nepo-
tum nutriendorum debito (fi quis eft pudor) alligaverunt. V. M.
C
X 2
Not
160
}
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII.
$
Not to do what is here required, is not barely to act against truth and nature,
not only ſuch an omiffion as is mentiond in fect. I. pr. V. but a heinous inſtance of
cruelty. If any one can deny this, let him better confider the cafe of an infant,
neglected, helpless, and having nothing fo much as to folicite for him, but his cries
and (that which will do but little in this world) his innocence: let him think what
it would be to turn a child, tho a little grown up, out of doors, deſtitute of every'
thing, not knowing whither to fly, or what to do; and whether it is not
the fame thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body elfe hereafter, or (in
general) to conflict with want and mifery: let him reflect a while upon the
circumſtances of poor orphans b left unprovided for, to be abuſed by every'
body, &c. and then let him fay, whether it is poffible for a parent to be ſo
void of bowels, as not to be moved with theſe confiderations; or what epithet
he deſerves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and
turned adrift, have done well, thofe inſtances ought to be placed among parti-
cular providences: as when a veffel at fea, without pilot or failor, happens to
be blown into the port.
Not only the care, but the early care of parents is required, left death fhould
prevent them; death, which skips none, and ſurpriſes many. Not to remem-
ber this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the most cer-
tain and obvious of all truths.
VI. In order to the good of children, their education, &c. there must be ſome
authority over them lodged by nature in the parents: I mean, the nature of the caſe
is fuck, as neceſſarily requires there should be in the parents an authority over their
children in order to their good. At firſt if ſome body did not nurſe, feed, clothe,
and take care of children, the interval between their firſt and laſt breath would
be
very ſhort.
ſhort. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly
their parents: to do this is their duty by the foregoing propofition. But then
they muſt do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plain-
ly an act of authority, to order and diſpoſe of another according to one's judg-
ment, tho it be done according to the best of one's judgment.
As the child grows up, the cafe is ftill the fame in fome degree or other, till
he arrives at the age reckond mature; and very often longer. He is become able
perhaps to walk by himſelf, but what path to chooſe he knows not; cannot
b See that moving
a Incertus quò fata ferant, ubi fiftere detur, in the poet's language.
defcription of the Ἦμας ὀρφανικὸν in Homer.
without pity, The barber [OxanbN] learns to ſhave upon the head of an orphan,
< I could never think of that Arabic ſaying
4
diſtinguiſh
Truths concerning Families, &c.
161
diſtinguiſh his fafety and his danger, his advantages and difadvantages; nor, in
general, good and evil: he muſt be warned, and directed, and watched ſtill by
his parents, or fome body intrufted by them, or elſe it might have been poffi-
bly much better for him to have expired under the midwife's hands, and pre-
vented the effects of his own ignorance.
When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himſelf capable of go-
verning himself, by how much the more he thinks himſelf capable, by fo much
the less capable may he be, and the more may he want to be governed. The
avenues of ſenſe are opend: but the judgment, and intellectual faculties are not
ripend but with time and much practice. The world is not eafily known by per-
fons of adult abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it,
yet they find things in it fo intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times
hard for them to refolve, what meaſures are fitteft to be taken: but they, who
are not, or but lately, paſt their nuts, cannot be ſuppoſed to have any extent of
knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themſelves, any thing elſe but a prey to
the villain who firſt ſeizes upon them. Inſtead of judgment and experience
we find commonly in youth fuch things as are remoteft from them, childish ap-
petites, irregular paffions, peevish and obftinate humors; which require to be
fubdued, and taught to give way to wholfom counfels. Young people are not
only obnoxious to their own humors and follies, but alſo to thoſe of their compa-
nions. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one anothers mif-
conduct: and thus folly mingles with folly, and increaſes prodigiouſly. The
judgment therefore of the parents muſt ſtill interpoſe, and prefide, and guide
through all theſe ftages of infancy, childhood, and youth; according to their
power improving the minds of their children, breaking the ſtrength of their in-
ordinate paffions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and ſhewing
them the way which they ought to be found in.
Theſe things are ſo in fact, and a parent cannot acquit himſelf of the duty impo-
fed
upon him in the preceding propofition, if he acts fo as to deny them: but
then he cannot act fo as not to deny them (that is, fo as to fubdue the paffions of
the child, break his ftomach, and cauſe him to mind his inftructions) with-
out ſome fort of diſcipline, and a proper ſeverity; at leaſt very rarely ª.
a
To all this, and much more that might be urged, muft be fuperadded,
that the fortunes of children, and their manner of fetting out in the world
• For certainly, when it can be, Hoc patrium eft, potius confuefacere filium fua fponte recte facere,
quàm alieno metu. Ter.
depending
162 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII.
1
depending (commonly) upon their parents, their parents must upon this account
be their directors, and govern their affairs.
N. 1. It appears now from the premiffes, that even parents have not properly a
dominion over their children, fuchas is intended fect. VI. prop. V. from which this
parental authority is a very different thing. This only reſpects the good of the chil-
dren, and reaches not beyond the means, which the parents, acting according to
the beſt of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find moſt conducive to that
end: but dominion only reſpects the will of the lord, and is of the ſame extent
with his pleaſure. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command
their children to do any thing which is in itſelf evil: and if they do, the chil-
dren ought not to obey a. Nor may they do any thing, what they pleaſe, to
them. They may not kill, or maim, or expoſe them: and when they come
to be men or women, and are poffeft of eftates, which either their
parents
(or any body elſe) have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor,
management, or frugality, they have the fame properties in theſe with reſpect to
their parents, which they have with reſpect to other people: the parents have no
more right to take them by force from them, than the reſt of the world have.
So that what occurs in the place abovementiond remains firm, notwithſtanding
any thing that may be objected from the cafe of parents and children. And
moreover,
N. 2. They, who found monarchy in paternal authority, gain little advantage
with refpect to defpotic or abfolute power. A power to be exerciſed for the good of
fubjects (like that of parents for the good of their children), and that principally,
where they are incapable of helping themſelves, can only be derived from hence.
The father of his countrey cannot by this way of reafoning be demonftrated to be
the abfolute lord of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to diſpoſe
of them as he pleases. The authority of parents goes not this length. Befide,
if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the
eldeft fon fhould have the fame authority, be it what it will, over his brothers
d
• Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπέθεντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θείοις νόμοις ο πείθονται. Hierocl.
▸ The barbarity of the thing at length put a ſtop to the cuſtom of expofing children: but it had
been practiſed by the Perfians, Greeks, &c. Romulus's law only reftraind it, but did not aboliſh it.
For it injoind his citizens only, ἅπασαν ἄῤῥενα γενεὰν εκτρέφιν, καὶ θυγατέρων τας πρωτογόνες αποικισμ
είναι 5 μηδὲν τῶν γενομθύων νεώτερον τριετᾶς, πλὴν εἴ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κλ. Dion. Halicarn. And
beide, ἅπασαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν ἔδωκεν ἐξεσίαν πατρὶ καθ᾽ ὑιῖ, καὶ παρὰ πάντα τ ε βίε χρόνον, κλ. Id.
ο Ῥωμαιοις ἐθὲν ἰδιόν ἐσι κτῆμα ζώντων ἔτι ἢ πατέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὰ σώματα ἢ παιδων ὅ,
πατράσιν δποδέδωι. Id. There are inftances of fuch laws, as fhould not be,
c
τι βόλοι) αατιθέναι τοῖς
by prop. IV. fec. VII.
ἡμῶν άρξον. Αγγ.
d
c
• Roma patrem patria Ciceronem libera dixit. Juv. ẹ sig hoɣixãov
and
Truths concerning Families, &c.
163
and ſiſters: and much leſs, that the heir of the first parent ſhould in fucceeding ge-
nerations have it over all the collaterals. The very relation between them foon va-
nishes, and comes at laft in effect to nothing, and this notion with it.
VII. As parents are obliged to educate their children, &c. So children ought to
confider parents as the immediate authors (authors under the firft and great Caufe) of
their being; or to speak more properly, of their being born. I know children are apt
(not very reſpectfully, or prudently) to fay; that their parents did not beget them
for their fakes, whom they could not know before they were born, but for their
own pleaſure. But they, who make this a pretext for their diſobedience, or dif-
regard, have not fufficiently thought, what pain, what trouble, how many frights
and cares, what charges, and what felf-denials parents undergo upon the ſcore
of their children: and that all thefe, if parents only rufhd into pleaſure, and
confulted nothing elſe, might eafily be avoided, by neglecting them and their wel-
fare. For as to thofe parents, who do this, let them ſpeak for themſelves: I
fhall not be their advocate.
VIII. A great fubmiſſion and many grateful acknowledgements, much respect and
piety are due from children to their parents. For if there is an authority in parents
(as before) this muſt be anſwerd by a proportionable fubmiffion on the other fide:
fince an authority, to which no obedience is due, is equal to no authority.
If the thought of annihilation be generally diſagreeable, as it feems to be, then
merely to be conſcious of existence muſt have in it ſomething defireabled. And if
fo, our parents muſt be confiderd as the authors, or at leaſt the inftruments of that
good to us, whatever it is: which cannot be done, unleſs they are treated with
diftinction and great regard, being to us what no other is, or ever can be.
God, as the firſt cauſe of all beings, is often ftyled metaphorically, or in a large
fenſe of the word, the Father of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave our
felves towards Him as being fuch, we cannot (according to fect. V. pr. XIX. n. 3.):
but adore Him. Something analogous, tho in a low degree, to the cafe between God
and his offspring there feems to be in the cafe between parents and their children. If
that requires divine worship, this will demand a great respect and reverence e.
,S, Hhared שלשתן שותפין ביצירתם :
S.
↑ Utinam oculos in pecora poffent Inferere, &
+
५
patrias intus deprendere curas.
• I confefs, in Seneca's words, minimum effe beneficium pa-.
tris matrifque concubitum, nifi accefferint alia, que profequerentur hoc initium muneris, & aliis offi-
ciis hoc ratum facerent.
4 Τὸ αισθάνεως ότι ζῇ ἡδέων καθ' αυτό φύση γ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ζωή.
Arift. The fenfe of life (of being alive) ſeems to be fomething more than what Seneca calls muſca--
rum ac vermium bonum.
ε Οἱ παλαιοι - Ρωμαίων νόμοι, κ.λ. οἱ 5 ἔτι παλαιότεροι του το
τὰς γονέας ἐσέφθησαν, ὡς καὶ θεὸς αὐτὸς ὁρμῆσαι καλεῖν. Simpl.
$
ته شده ام
For not
2:
ཨཱཉཱཎཏནཝིསྶ
Nort
164
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII.
Nor can I believe, that a child, who doth not honor his parent, can have any dif
pofition to worſhip his Creator. The precept of honoring parents, to be found
in almoſt all nations and religions, feems to proceed from fome fuch ſentiment :
for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that
of worshipping the Deity b. In laying children under this obligation they have
all confpired, tho ſcarce in any thing elſe
The admonitions of a parent muſt be of the greateſt weight with his children,
if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occafions
to confider things, and obferve events; hath cooler paffions, as he advances in years,
and fees things more truly as they are; is able in a manner to predict what they
themſelves will defire to have done, when they fhall arrive at his age; may upon
thefe accounts, ordinarily, be prefumed to be a more competent judge than them-
felves; and laſtly from his relation to them muſt be more fincerely inclined to
tell them truth, than any other person in the world can be fuppofed to be. I
fay, if young people reflect well upon theſe things, they cannot in prudence, or
even kindneſs to themselves, but pay the utmoſt deference to the advertiſements
and directions of a parent.
And to conclude, if parents want the affiftance of their children, eſpecially in the
declenſion of their age, and when they verge towards a helpless condition again
they cannot deny or withhold it, but they muft at the fame time deny to requite the
care and tenderneſs fhewd by their parents towards them in their helpleſs and dan-
gerous years; that is, without being ungrateful; and that is, without being unjuſt,
if there be injuftice in ingratitude f. Nor (which is more ftill) can they do this with-
The fame author reckons among
Meo judicio pietas fundamentum eft omnium virtutum. Cic.
thoſe things, that are laudable, parentem vereri ut deum (neq; enim multo fecus parens liberis). Ovð`
αν πάλιν μείζων ἐπίδειξις ἀθές γέγονε τ' αεί γονεῖς ὀλιγωρίας και πλημμελείας. Plut.
TES
</
b
Ο Πάν
λέγεσι καὶ άδεσιν, ὡς γονεῦσι τιμὴν μετὰ θεὸς πρώτην μεγίσην ἥ τε φύσις, ὅ, τε τὴν φύσιν
σώζων νόμο απέδωκε. Plut. Γονέων τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν δευτέραν ἔταξε [Μωυσης]. 7o. Weindeed ufually
divide the two tables of Moses's law fo, that the fifth commandment (Honor thy father and thy mother)
falls in the fecond: but the Jews themſelves divide them otherwise; va e resões apaçñs rùn åpzéňu
Oïòv rý zaréga—§ Tavròs, Tò j séλ@ yovels, xλ. Ph. Jud. Agreeably to this, Jofephus fays that
εἰ δέκα λόγοι were written upon two tables, ἀνὰ πέντε μελὺ ἐἰς ἑκατέραν [πλάκα] : Abarbanel reckons
the fifth commandment the laft of the firft table; and fays their Hhakamim do ſo: and in the offices
c
c Pri-
40 χρόνο, ταλα
.על הלוחות חמשה חמשה of that nation thefe commandments are mentiond as written
,ask toy father : שאל אביך ויגדך *
e
ma igitur & optima rerum natura pietatis eft magiftra, &c. Val. Max.
πάντ᾽ ἀφαιρῶν, τῷ γήρα προςίθησι τὴν ἐπισήμω. Plut.
and he will shew thee. Deut.
او
* Δόξηε δ' ἂν προφῆς γονεῦσι δεῖν μάλις᾽ ἐπαρκεῖν, ὡς ὀφείλοντας,
αν
καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις δ' εἶναι. — τιμήν ή καθάπερ θεοῖς.. Arif. Among the ancients θρεπτήρια and τροφεία
were reckond due. And he, who doth not requite to his parents
on yur in S. Hhar,
nav non, is called zur'
out
Truths concerning Families, &c.
165
out denying what they may in their turn require of their children. In effect
they do thus by their actions deny that to have been, which has been; and
thoſe things to be poffible, which may be hereafter.
Not only bodily infirmities of parents, but ſuch decays of their minds as may
happen, ought to be pitied, their little haſtineſſes and miſtakes diffembled, and
their defects ſupplied, decently ↳.
IX. That sogy or affection on both fides, which naturally and regularly is in
parents towards their children, and viciffim, ought to be obferved and followd,
when there is no reaſon to the contrary.
We have ſeen before, and it is evident from the terms, that fenfe ought to
govern, when reafon does not interpofe; i. e. when there is no reason, why it
ſhould not. If then this sopy or mutual affection be an inward fenfe of the cafe
between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, is
felt by them, and fits upon their natures, it may be compriſed in prop. XIV,
and XV. of fect. III. But whether it is or not, the fame may be faid (which
muſt be repeted in another place) of every affection, paffion, inclination in ge-
neral. For when there is no reaſon, why we ſhould not comply with them,
their own very follicitation, and the agreeableneſs we apprehend to be in com-
plying, are preponderating arguments. This muſt be true, if fomething is more than
nothing, or that ought to be granted, which there is no reaſon to deny. So that
if this sopy be only taken as a kind of attraction, or tendence, in the mere matter
of parents and children; yet ftill this phyfical motion or ſympathy ought not to be
over-ruled, if there be not a good reaſon for it. On the contrary, it ought to be ta-
ken as a ſuggeſtion of nature, which ſhould always be regarded, when it is not
ſuperſeded by ſomething fuperior; that is, by reaſon. But further, here reaſon
doth not only not gainfay, by its filence confent, and fo barely leave its right of
commanding to this bodily inclination; but it comes in ftrongly to abet and
inforce it, as deſignd for a reaſonable end: and therefore not to act according to it
is not to act according to reafon, and to deny that to be which is.
X. The fame is true of that affection, which other relations naturally have, in fome
proportion or other, each for other. To this they ought to accommodate themſelves
a Tolst©
اد
* Τουτο γίνει πε τὰς γονεῖς, οἷς ἂν ἔυξαιο τεὶ σεαυτὸν γενέας τες σεαυτές παῖδας. Ιfocr.
epithet pius (pius Æneas) fhines in Virgil.
tentio, dederint majora, an receperint. Sen.
b. That
Pofita eft inter parentes ac liberos honefta con-
c
d That is, methinks, a moving deſcription in
S. Bafil (Пegi πλsovs.) of a conflict which a poor man had within himſelf, when he had no other
way left to preſerve life but by felling one of his children.
Y
where
166
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. VIII.
where reafon does not prohibit. The proof of this affertion is much the fame
with that of the foregoing mut. mutand.
The foundation of all natural relation is laid in marriage. For the busband
and wife having folemnly attachd themſelves each to other, having the fame
children, interefts, &c. become ſo intimately related as to be reckond united,
one flesh, and in the laws of nations many times one perfon b. Certainly they are
fuch with respect to the pofterity, who proceed from them jointly. The
children of this couple are related between themſelves by the mediation of the
parents. For every one of them being of the fame blood with their common
parents, they are all of the fame blood (truly confanguinei), the relations, which
they reſpectively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their center. This
is the nearest relation that can bed, next to thoſe of man and wife, parents and
their children, who are immediately related by contact or rather continuity of
blood, if one may ſpeak fo. The relation between the children of theſe chil-
dren grows more remote and dilute, and in time wears out. For at every remove
the natural tincture or fympathy may be ſuppoſed to be weakend; if for no o-
ther reaſon, yet for this. Every remove takes off half the common blood deri-
ved from the grand parents. For let C be the ſon of A and B, D the ſon of
C, E of D, F of E: and let the relation of C to A and B be as I then the
relation of D to A and B will be but; becauſe C is but one of the parents of
D, and ſo the relation of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears
to them. By proceeding after the fame manner it will be found, that the rela-
tion of E to A and B is (or half of the half), of F: and ſo on. So that
the relation, which defcendents in a direct line have by blood to their grand pa-
rents, decreasing thus in geometrical proportion, the relation between them of
sollateral lines, which paſſes and is made out through the grand parents, muſt
foon be reduced to an inconfiderable matter f
1
4
Prima focietas in ipfo conjugio eft: proxima in liberis, &c. Cic.
conceſſit in unum. Lucr. 'n N1 777. Ap. R. Elak. Azq.
[φιλία] φάινεται πολυειδής εἶναι, καὶ ἠρτᾶς πᾶσα ἐκ τ' πατρικῆς·
ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα· τὰ 5 τέκνα τὰς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι όντα, —
· αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι.
اد
& paſſ.
τ
↳ Mulier conjunéta viro
«Η συγΓενική
οἱ γονεῖς μὲ τὸ σέργεσι τὰ τέκνα, ὡς
Αδελφοὶ ἢ ἀλλήλες [φιλέσι] τῷ ἐκ
Ανέψιοι 5 ε οἱ λοιποί συγγενείς τῷ ἀπὸ ἢ αὐτῶν εἶναι· γίνονται δ' οἱ
Quàm copiofa fuavitatis illa recordatio eft!
In eodem domicilio, antequam nafcerer, habitavi: in iifdem incunabulis infantia tempora peregi: eofdem
appellavi parentes, &c. Val. Max.
• There is no name for any defcendent, who is more
εδώ οικειότερον, οἱ δ᾽ ἀλλοτριώτεροι, κτλ. Αrif.
d
than trinepos.
£ It becomes aµvdgá. Andr. Rhod.
If
Truths concerning Families, &c.
167
If then we fuppofe this affection or ſympathy, when it is permitted to act re-
gularly and according to nature, no reaſon intervening to exalt or abate it, to ope-
rate with a ſtrength nearly proportionable to the quantity or degree of relation,
computed as above, we may perhaps nearly difcern the degrees of that obliga-
tion, which perfons related lie under, to affift each other, from this motive.
But there are many circumftances and incidents in life capable of affecting this
obligation, and altering the degrees of it. A man muſt weigh the wants of
himſelf and his own family againſt thoſe of his relations: he muſt confider their
Sex, their age, their abilities and opportunities, how capable they are of good
offices, how they will take them, what uſe they will make of them, and the
like. He, who defigns to act agreeably to truth, may find many fuch things
demanding his regard; fome juſtly moving him to compaffion, others holding
back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, that next
after our parents and own offspring a nature directs us to be helpful, in the firſt
place to brothers and fifters, and then to other relations according to their re-
ſpective diſtances in the genealogy of the family, preferably to all foreigners b
And tho our power.
or opportunities of helping them in their wants ſhould be
but little; yet we ought to preſerve our affection towards them, and a difpofi-
tion to ſerve them, as far as we honeftly and prudently can, and whenever the
proper opportunity fhall prefent itſelf. This nature and truth require.
SECT. IX. Truths belonging to a Private Man,
and respecting (directly) only himſelf.
I. EVERY man knows (or may know) beft, what his own faculties, and per-
fonal circumftances are, and confequently what powers he has of acting, and
governing himself. Becauſe he only of all mankind has the internal knowledge
of himſelf, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by reflexion and ex-
periments of himſelf to find, what his own abilities, paffions, &c. truly are d.
a Man and Wife are fuppofed to be one, and therefore have no place here; any more than a man
and his felf. Otherwiſe confiderd diftinctly, the one of them ought always to be the first care of
• Μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖς ἑταῖρον. Hef.
For many I acknowledge
the other.
there are, who feem to be without reflexion, and almost thought. Tís àyvoeî Tuv oixéiav qúow; mod-
λόι τάχα 5 πάντες πλὴν ὀλίγων. S. Chryf. d. Nec fe qualiverit extra.
Y 2
II He
168
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
บ
II. He, that well examines himself, I fuppofe, will find these things to be true".
1. That there are fome things common to him not only with fenfitive animals
and vegetable, but alſo with inanimate matter: as, that his body is fubject to
the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being ſeparated, or
diflocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impreffions of
violence.
2. That there are other things common to him with vegetables and fenfitive ani-
mals: as, that he comes from a feed (fuch the original animalculum may be taken
to be); grows, and is preferved by proper matter, taken in and diftributed
through a ſet of veffels; ripens, flouriſhes, withers, decays, dies; is fubject to
diſeaſes, may be hurt, or killed; and therefore wants, as they do, nouriſh-
ment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.
3. That he has other properties common only to him and the fenfitive tribe: as,
that he receives by his fenfes the notice of many external objects, and things;
perceives many affections of his body; finds pleaſure from fome, and pain from.
others; and has certain powers of moving himſelf, and acting: that is, he is
not only obnoxious to hurts, diſeaſes, and the caufes of death, but also feels
them; is not only capable of nourishment, and many other provifions made
for him, but alſo injoys them; and, befide, may contribute much himſelf to ei--
ther his injoyments, or his fufferings.
4. That befide thefe he has other faculties, which he doth not apprehend to
be either in the inert maſs of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the ſenſitive
kind, at leaſt in any confiderable degree; by the help of which he inveſtigates
truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not,
after the manner fet down in fect. III. or, in a word, that he is animal rationale
5. That he is conſcious of a liberty in himſelf to act or not to act; and that
therefore he is ſuch a being as is defcribed fect. I. prop. I. a being, whoſe acts
may be morally good or evil.. Further,.
6. That there are in him many inclinations and averfions; from whence flow
fuch affections, as defire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, forrow, pity, anger, &c. all
which prompt him to act this or that way.
7. That he is fenfible of great defects and limitations in the ufe of his rational
faculties, and powers of action, upon many occafions: as alſo, that his paffions
Illud yvadi σeaurov noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam folùm effe dictum, verùm etiam ut, be-
na noftra norimus. Cic. ad Qu. fr.
b Non fentire mala fua non eft hominis: & non ferre non
eft viri. Sen. who condeſcends here to be ſomething like other men. As alfo when he ſays, Alia
funt, qua fapientem feriunt, etiamfi non pervertunt ; ut dolor capitis, &c.
Qui fe ipfe norit, aliquid fentiet fe habere divinum,
entem, &c.
C
Hac non nego fentire ſapi»
&c. Cic.
arc
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 169
are many times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, exceffive.
In other words, that he is in many refpects fallible, and infirm '.
Laſtly, that he defires to be happy
what is meant by that word.
as every thing muft, which underſtands
III. If he doth find these things to be fo, then if he will act as he ought to do (that
is, agreeably to truth and fact) he must do fuch things as thefe.
C.
1. He muſt ſubject his fenfual inclinations, his bodily paſſions, and the motions of all
his members to reafon; and try every thing by it. For in the climax fet down he
cannot but obſerve, that as the principle of vegetation is fomething above the iner-
tia of mere matter, and ſenſe ſomething above that again; foreafon muſt be ſome-
thing above all thefed: or, that his uppermoft faculty is reafone. And from hence
it follows, that he is one of thoſe beings mentiond fect III. prop. XI. and that
the great law impofed upon him is to be governed by reafon.
Any man may prove this to himſelf by experiment, if he pleaſes. Becauſe he
cannot (at leaſt without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a
greater reafon againſt the doing of it than for it. When men do err againſt
reaſon, it is either becauſe they do not (perhaps will not) advert, and uſe their
reafon, or not enough; or becauſe their faculties are defective.
And further, by fect. III. prop. X. to endeavour to act according to right rea--
fon, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the fame thing.
We cannot do the one, but we muſt do the other. We cannot act according
to truth, or ſo as not to deny any truth, and that is we cannot act right, unleſs
we endeavour to act according to right reafon, and are led by it.
Therefore not to ſubject one's fenfitive inclinations and paffions to reaſon is to
deny either that he is rational, or that reafon is the fupreme and ruling faculty in
שאור בעיסה (are (in Jewish language טבע החומר ויצר הרע :
θρωπόν τινα ἀναμάρτητον. Chryf.
c
Β'Αμήχανον είναι ένα
The author of S. Hbared. reckons eight, the right uſe of
which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, noſe, ear, hand, foot, and
711127 WND. The duties refpecting theſe are the ſubject of that (not bad) book.
d Cùm
tria fint bac, effe, vivere, intelligere: & lapis eft, & pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut
pecus intelligere: qui autem intelligit, eum & eſſe & vivere certiſſimum eft. Quare non dubito id
excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria infunt, quàm id cui duo vel unum defit. S. Aug. Thus reafon
fets man above the other viſible orders of beings, &c. e Prafto eft domina omnium & regina :
ratio—. Haç ut imperet illi parti animi, qua obedire debet, id videndum eſt viro. Cic.
3:
his
170
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
his nature: and that is to defert mankind, and to deny himself to be what he
knows himſelf by experience and in his own confcience upon examination to be,
and what he would be very angry if any body ſhould fay he was not.
If a beaft could be fuppofed to give up his fenfe and activity; neglect the
calls of hunger, and thoſe appetites by which he (according to his nature) is to be
guided; and refufing to uſe the powers, with which he is indued in order to get
his food and preſerve his life, lie ftill in fome place, and expect to grow, and be
fed like a plant; this would be much the fame cafe, only not fo bad, as when a
man cancels his reafon, and as it were ftrives to metamorphize himſelf into a
brute. And yet this he does, who purſues only fenfual objects, and leaves him-
felf to the impulfes of appetite and paffion. For as in that cafe the brute neglects
the law of his nature, and affects that of the order below him: fo doth the man
diſobey the law of his nature, and put himſelf under that of the lower animals;
to whom he thus makes a defection b.
If this be fo, low wretchedly do they violate the order of nature, and tranfgrefs
againſt truth, who not only reject the conduct of reaſon to follow fenfe and paffion,
but even make it ſubfervient to them; who uſe it only in finding out means to
effect their wicked ends, but never apply it to the confideration of thofe ends,
or the nature of thofe means, whether they are juft or unjuft, right or wrong? This
is not only to deviate from the path of nature, but to invert it, and to become
fomething more than brutiſh; brutes with reafon, which muſt be the moſt enormous
and worst of all brutes. When the brute is governed by fenfe and bodily appetites,
he obferves his proper rule; when a man is governed after that manner in defiance
of reaſon, he violates his; but when he makes his rational powers to ferve the bru-
tifh part, to affift and promote it, he heightens and increaſes the brutality, inlarges
its field, makes it to act with greater force and effect, and becomes a monster.
His duty then, who is confcious to himſelf of the truth of thofe things recounted
under the foregoing propofition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to fee
a
• Abjetto homine in fylveftre animal tranfire. Ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωριζόμεθα ; τῶν θηρίων.
"Oga ir po ti nas ws Ingiov oinoys. Arr. Pertinet ad omnem officii queftionem femper in promptu ha-
reliquifque belluis antecedat. Cic.
bere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus
θηρίων ἀλογίαν ἐκπεσών. Chryf.
A thing too often done, Qua enim libido,
quod facinus aut fufcipitur nifi confilio capto, aut fine- ratione perficitur? Cotta ap. Cic.
thing like him, who in Chryfoftom's words, 2 olánav zaradús to σxá‡0.
Ο Πρὸς τὴν τῶν
que avaritia,
d Some-
e This makes
Cotta fay, Satius fuit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam eſſe rationem, quàm tanta cum
pernicie datam: with other bitter things. Tho an anſwer to this may be given in the words
which follow afterward: A deo tantùm rationem habemus, fi modò habemus: bonam autem rationem,
aut non bonam, à nobis.
I
that
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 171
a
that he complies with no corporeal inclination at the expenſe of his reaſon; but
that all his affections, concupifcible and irafcible, be directed towards fuch ob-
jects, and in fuch measure, time, and place, as that allows. Every word ª and ac-
tion, every motion and ſtep in life ſhould be conducted by reaſon. This is
the foundation and indeed the fum of all virtue.
C
d
2. He must take care not to bring upon himſelf ‹ want, diſeaſes, trouble; but,
on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable
fubfiftence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth (that is, without
denying matters of fact, and fuch propofitions, as have been already or will in
the ſequel here be fhewn to be true, concerning God, property, the ſuperiority
of reason, &c.) To explain this limination: if a man fhould confider himself
as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, difeafes, and the reft; then, to fup-
ply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at laſt, in vindica-
tion of himſelf, fay, "I act according to what I am, a being obnoxious to
"hunger, &c. and to act otherwife would be incompliance with truth"; this
would not be fufficient to juſtify him. The grand rule requires, that what he
does, fhould interfere with no truth: but what he does interferes with feveral.
For by taking that, which (by the ſuppoſition) is his neighbour's, he acts as if
Ti,
2130
νομο
a This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off thoſe reſtraints which
men have from nature or a modeft education, and is fo utterly deftructive of virtue, that Aristotle
banifhes it out of the commonwealth. Όλως με αιχρολογίαν ἐκ τε πόλεως, ὥσπερ ἄλλο
θέτω εξορίζει εκ τ' γδ ἐυχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιν ἢ ἀιχρῶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγυς.
reaſon: which is a very different thing from that fuperftitious preciſeneſs, which carries things too
far. As v. g. when the Jews not contented to condemn 1 or 7 nibas, and every
b True, manly
There are other fay-
ings of this kind to be feen, many of them, among thoſe, which R. El. de Vidas has collected: as
אפי' שיחה קלה שאדם משיח go fo far as to comprehend under it גודל האסור where to exprefs
.מוציא מלה לבטלה כמוציא זרע לבטלה וכו',and to add ; עם אשתו
-What Elian reports of Anaxa כן ענין ראות צריך שלא להוציאו לבטלה וכו',that particularly
.46 . אם אין אני לי מי לי :
goras and others, belongs to this place; that they never laughed with many other unneceffary au-
fterities, which might be added.
c
Ι
·
4 Προσδεῖται τέ
των [τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν] ὁ ἀνθρώπινα βίου· κύριας δ᾽ ἐἰσὶν ἁι κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεαι τ ευδαιμονίας. Αrift.
They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely &órgia, diftinguishing between
rà nµétega and rà Fréal, making theſe latter to be de gès us, and leaving the body as it
were to itfelf (αυτό [σωμάτιον] μεριμνάτω,εἴ τι πάχε): they, I fay, might injoy their own philo
ſophy; but they would ſcarce gain many profelytes now a days, or ever perfuade people, that the
pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many ſtories that
are told of ſome old philofophers: as that of Anaxarchus, when he was put to a moft cruel death
by Nicocreon; & Φροντίσαντα τ' τιμωξίας, ἐιπεῖν Πτίστε το Αναξάρχες θύλακον, Ανάξαρχον ἢ ἐ πλήξεις.
See Epid. Arr. Simpl. Anton. D. Laert. and others.
it
172
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
it was not his neighbour's, but his own, and therefore plainly contradicts fact, and
thoſe truths in fect. VI, VII. refpecting property: when by not taking what is
his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny dimſelf to be
obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of furniſhing himſelf with
conveniences, or at leaſt neceffaries, which are conſiſtent with property and all
truth: and he can only be faid to deny himſelf to be what he is by omitting to
provide againſt his wants, when he omits to provide againſt them by fome of
thoſe ways; and then indeed he doth do it., (See p. 28. Anf. to Obj. 3.)
So again, when a man does any thing to avoid preſent fuffering or dangers con-
trary to the expreſs dictates of reaſon, and the tenor of forementiond truths, he
acts as a fenfitive being only, not as being what he really is, fenfitivo-rationalis.
But when there is no good argument against his doing of any thing, that may
gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look
upon himſelf only as a being, who needs that which is to be obtaind by doing
it: and in that cafe, if he fhould not do it, he would be falfe to himſelf, and
deny the circumſtances of his own nature.
Certainly when a man may without tranfgreffing the limits preſcribed confult his
own ſafety, ſupport, and reaſonable fatisfaction, and does not; and efpecially
when he takes a counter-courfe, and expofes himſelf, he forgets many of the
foregoing truths, and treats himſelf as not being what he is. This is true with
refpect to futurity, as well as the prefent time: and indeed by how much future
time is more than the prefent, by fo much the more perhaps ought that to be
regarded. At leaſt injoyments ought to be taken and adjuſted in ſuch a manner,
that no one ſhould preclude, or ſpoil more, or greater to come.
It may eafily be underſtood here,that thoſe evils, which it is not in a man's power
to prevent, he muft endeavour to bear patiently and decently, i. e. as fuch; and
moreover, fuch as are made by this means lighter b: for when they cannot be to-
tally prevented, as much of the effect must be prevented, or taken off, as can
be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; eſpecially
the laft, great one c.
3. He must confider even bodily and fenfual affections, paffions, and inclinations as in-
timations, which many times he not only may, but ought to hearken to. What is faid be-
fore of the ſubjection of paffions and appetites to reafon must always be rememberd.
They are not to proceed from unjuſtifiable caufes, or terminate in wrong objects;
• Ne offeramus nos periculis fine caufa: quo nihil poteft effe ftultius.In tranquillo tempeftatem ad-
verſam optare dementis eft. Cic.
↳ Levius fit patientia, Quicquid corrigere eft nefas. Hor.
5 Miλéry duvúrs was a great man's definition of philoſophy.
1
not
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 173
not be unfeaſonable or immoderate. Being thus regulated, fet to a true biafs, and
freed from all eruptions and violence, they become fuch as are here intended; gentle
ferments working in our breaſts, without which we ſhould fettle in inactivity a;
and what I think may be taken for juſt motives and good arguments to act upon.
For if a man finds, that he has not only a ſuperior faculty of reaſon, but alſo an
inferior appetitive faculty, under which are containd many propenfions and aver-
fions, theſe cannot be denied to be any more than that; tho they muſt be taken in-
deed for what they really are, and not more. When they are checked by reaſon
and truth, or there lies a reafon against them (as there always will, when they are
not within the forefaid reſtrictions), they muſt be taken as clogd with this circum-
ftance, as things overruled and diſabled: but when they are under no prohibition
from the fuperior powers and truth, then they are to be confiderd as unfetterd and
free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been obſerved upon a par-
ticular occafion before p. 165.) when there is no reafon against the complying
with our fenfes, there is always one for it by prop. XIV. fect. III. the inclinati-
on itſelf, being precluded by nothing above it, is in this caſe uppermoft, and in
courſe takes the commanding poft: and then a man muſt act as being what he
is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this ſection.
The ſprings of all human actions are in fact, either a ſenſe of duty, or a proſpect
of fome pleaſure or profit to be obtaind, fome evil or danger to be avoided; that
is, either the reaſonableneſs of what is done, or the manner, in which fomething
doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded
either in reaſon, or paſſion and inclination. (I need not add they may be in both.)
This being fo, what ſhould hinder, when reafon does not work, but that the
inferior Springs should retain their nature, and act.
Bodily inclinations and paffions, when they obferve their due fubordination to
reaſon, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to
be as it were affeffors to it upon the throne, are of admirable uſe in life, and tend ma-
ny times to noble ends. This is applicable to the irafcible, as well as the concu-
pifcible affections and the whole animal fyftem. Love of that which is amiable,
compaſſion toward the miferable and helpleſs, a natural abhorrence and refentment
b
C
3 Ἡ ὀργή—ὑπνηλὸν ἡμῶν διεγείρει. Chryf.
b When the Stoics fay, that a wife man may
relieve one, who wants his help, without pitying him; I own indeed he may, but I very much doubt
whether he would. If he had not fome compaflion, and in ſome meaſure felt the ails or wants of the
other, I ſcarce know how he ſhould come to take him for an object of his charity. · Ὁ μὲν ἐφ᾽
εις δεῖς καὶ δις δεῖ ὀργιζόμενο, ἔτι 5 € ὡς δεῖ, ἢ ὅτε, ἢ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται. Αrift. Τo be angry under
theſe conditions is a different thing from rage, and thoſe tranſports which perhaps fcarce comply with
any one of them: fuch as that of Alexander, who, becauſe his sgp died, commanded the 'Arxλy-
α to be all burnt. Arr.
Z
of
174
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
b
`of that which is villainous or vitious or baſe³, fear ↳ of evils, are things, which
duly temperd have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well
fubfift. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed theſe cona-
tus's, theſe tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to difpofe us for action, when
there are no arguments of a higher nature to move us. So far are they, rightly
managed, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the philofopher, who pre-
tends to abfolute apathy, maims nature, and fets up for a half-man, or I don't
know what c.
I muſt confeſs however, that our paffions are ſo very apt to grow upon us, and
become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an exact difcipline, that by way of
prevention or caution it is adviſable rather to affect a degree of apathy, or to recede
more from the worſe extreme d. This very propofition itſelf, which, when reafon
is abfent, places fenfe and inclination in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins
to our paffions, or give them their full carreer; becauſe if we do, they may (and
will) carry us into fuch exceffès, fuch dangers and mischiefs, as may fadly affect the
fenfitive part of us: that part itſelf, which now governs. They ought to be
watched, and well examind; if reafon is on their fide, or ſtands neuter, they are
to be heard (this is all, that I fay): in other cafes we muſt be deaf to their appli-
cations, ftrongly guard againſt their emotions, and in due time prevent their rebel-
ling againſt the fovereign faculty.
I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I fhall tire you with repetitions, that from
what is faid here and juft before, not only the liberty men take in preferring
what they like beft, among preſent injoyments, meats, drinks, &c. fo far as they
are innocent; but all thoſe prudential and lawful methods, by which they endea-
vour to ſecure to themſelves a comfortable and pleaſant being, may be juſtified,
and that obf. under prop. XIII. in fect. II. ftrengthend.
Plut.
■ There is, according to Tully, Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus.
b Dobóμeda dy.
λονότι τα φοβερά, φοβέμεθα δε πάντα τὰ κακά· ὅσον ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον.
Grice & der Pobεias, Exañór to de µn, dioxgov, xλ. Arift. When one called Xenophanes coward,
η δεν καλόν· τὸ μὴ, ἀἰσχρὸν,
becaufa he would not play at dice with him, ὁμολογεῖ πάνυ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ ἀισχρὰ καὶ ἄτολμα.
• A wife man is not άradus, but perforad's. Arift. ap. Diog. L..
• An *
σοχαζόμενον μέσο αποχωρεῖν ἢ μᾶλλον ἐναντία. γδ άκρων, τὸ μὲν ἐσὶν ἁμαρτωλότερον· τὸ δὲ ἦτα
F
≈ tò
Tov. Arift.—In the fame chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but fet down
here. Σκοπεῖν δεῖ πρὸς ἃ αυτοὶ ἐυκατάφοροι ἐσμεν εἰς τομυαντίον δ᾽ ἑαυτὸς ἀφέλκειν —ὅπερ οι τὰ
τα
διετραμμένα ξύλων ὀρθόντες ποιεσιν. And after, Ἐν παντὶ ἢ μάλισα φυλακτεον τὸ ἡδὺ, ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν·
α
* γ ἀδέκατοι κρίνομεν αυτήν.
4
If
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 175
If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with reafon and truth, to
treat that appetite according to what it is, is to deny it but if it is not, to uſe
it as it is, is to confider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this muſt be
to comply with it. The humoring of fuch appetites, as lie not under the inter-
dict of truth and reafon, feems to be the very means, by which the Author of
nature intended to ſweeten the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as
well muffle himſelf up againſt fun-fhine and blue sky, and expofe himſelf bare
to rains and ſtorms and cold, as debar himſelf of the innocent delights of his na-
ture for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,
4. He muſt uſe what means he can to cure his own defects, or at leaſt to prevent
the effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper diſtance²;
even mortify, where mortification is neceſſary; and always carry about him the
fenfe of his being but a man. He who doth not do this, doth not conform
himfelf to the feventh particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that
to be true, which he is fuppofed to have found true in himſelf); denies a de-
fect to be what it is, to be fomething which requires to be fupplied, or amend-
ed; and is guilty of an omiffion, that will fall under fect. I.
prop. V.
I might here mention fome precautions, with fome kinds and degrees of mor-
tification or felf-denial, which men will commonly find to be neceffary. But I
fhall not preſcribe; leaving them, who beſt know their own weak places and
diſeaſes, to felect for themſelves the proper remedies.
I ſhall only take notice, that ſince the ſelf-denial here recommended can only
reſpect things in themſelves lawful and not unreaſonable, and in favor of fuch
our bare inclinations have been allowd to be taken for arguments and directions,
it looks as if this advice to deny ones felf or inclinations inferred a contradiction.
But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in
order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow thoſe inclinations
might otherwise be right; yet in thefe circumstances and under this view there a-
rifes a good reaſon againſt it, and they, according to the establifhd rule, muſt
therefore give way: which is all that is intended c.
t
”
• Αγεσιλάῳ μέχρι τ' ὀφθαλμῶν προσελθὼν ὁ ἔρως, ἐντᾶυθα ἔτη ἐπὶ θύραις τε ψυχῆς. Max. Τyr.
To appoint things, as the Jewish Doctors have done, to be in D, or a pab
Jay, would be right, if they were judiciously chofen, and not fo very particular and
לא יסתכל אדם באשת איש ובשאר triding. Some of their cautions are certainly juft: as that
.Pajim .עריות פן ינקש בם
↳ What ſhould a man do to live? nyy M'n'. Miſlm.
monkery, no fuperftitious or phantaftical mortifications are here recommended.
c © No
Z 2
The
176
1.
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
5..
a
The laſt clauſe of the propofition takes in a great compass. It will oblige men,
if they do but think well what they are, and conſequently what others of the fame
kind with themſelves alfo are, not to be proud, conceited, vain;; but modeft, and
humble, and rather diffident of themſelves: not to cenfure the failings of others
too hardly, not to be over-fevere in puniſhing or exacting juſtice 2, and parti-
cularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, manfuete: and fo forth.
b.
He ought to examine ↳ his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has
tranfgreffed, to repent. That is, if the tranfgreffion be againſt his neighbour,
and the nature of it admits, to make reparation, or at leaſt as far as he can: in
other cafes, when that which is done cannot be recalled, or repaird, or termi-
nates in himſelf only, to live however under a ſenſe of his fault, and to prove
by fuch acts as are proper, that he defires forgiveness, and heartily wishes it un--
done; which is as it were an effay towards the undoing of itd, and all that now
can bee and laſtly, to uſe all poffible care not to relapfe. All this is involved.
in the idea of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it preſents itſelf to a rational
mind. For fuch a mind cannot approve what is unreaſonable, and repugnant
to truth; that is, what is wrong, or a fault: nay more, it cannot but diſapprove
it, deteft it. No rational animal therefore can act according to truth, the true
nature of himſelf and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to
commit it; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at leaſt ſhew
himſelf to be penitent f.
If when a man is criminal, he doth not behave himſelf as fuch; or; which is
the fame, behaves himself as being not fuch, he oppoſes truth confidently.
And further, to act agreeably to what he is ſuppoſed to find himſelf to be,
is to act as one who is in danger of relapfing :, which is to be upon his guard.
for the future..
6. He must labor to improve his rational faculties by fuch means, as are (fairly).
practicable by him, and confiftent with his circumſtances. If it be a difadvantage to
be obnoxious to error, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know fuch
truths as may prevent this: if fo, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capa
ble of knowing, more fuch truths 8: and then again, not to endeavour to improve
which words I underftand in the fenfe, that Rafibi) חסיר עושה טובה לפנים משורת הדין
ſeems to put upon them, Gen. xliv. 10.) ·
Aur, carm.
b
» Πῇ παρέβην ; τι δ᾽ ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον ἐκ ἐτελέσθη ;
ε Τίς δ' εἰς τὰ ἀγῶνα 5 βίε παρελθὼν ἄπτωτα ἔμεινε; τίς δ' εχ ὑποσκελισθείς;
ευδαιμων ὁ μὴ πολλάκις. Ph. Jud.
d
a Quem panitet peccaffe, penè eft innocens. Sen: e Even..
..S. abafid .[תשובה שקולה כנגד כל הקורבנות,a few days
ἐπλεονέκτησας; ἀπόδον ἐμεθύπης; νήσευσιν, S. Baf.
xrйpecs. Just. M..
f Ελοιδόρησας; ευλόγησον
8 Ἔσι δ τῷ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγισον.
thofe
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 177
thoſe faculties, by which theſe truths are apprehended, is to fhut them out, as
being not what they are.
And moreover, by the inlargement of our rational faculties we become moré
rational; that is, we advance our natures, and become more attentive to rati-
onal injoyments.-
The ordinary means indeed of improving our minds are the inftruction of able
men, reading, obſervation, meditation: but every man has not proper opportuni-
ties, or capacity for thefe, or but in fome low degree; and no man is obliged be-
yond his abilities, and opportunities (by fect. IV. prop. II.) Therefore that-mol-
lification is added, by fuch means, &c.
-
Befide health, a comfortable and ſuitable provifion of externals is fo neceffary
to the well-being of the whole man, that without it the rational part cannot
dwell eafy, all purfuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improve-
ments (commonly) imperfect. And fo reafon itſelf (which cannot betray its
own intereſt) muft for its own fake concurr in feeking and promoting that,
which tends to the preſervation and happineſs of the whole. But the doing of
this ingroffes time and induſtry; and before that which is fought can be obtaind
(if it is ever obtaind), probably the use of it is loft: except where men live by
the profeffion of fome part of learning.
And as to them who are more free from worldly cares, or whoſe buſineſs and
imployment brings them into a ſtricter acquaintance with letters, after all their
endeavours (fuch is the great variety of human circumftances in other respects)
they muſt be contented with ſeveral degrees and portions of knowledge. Some
are bleft with clean and ſtrong conſtitutions, early inſtructions and other helps,
fucceeding incouragements, ufeful acquaintance, and freedom from diſturbance:
whilſt others, under an ill ftate of body, or other difadvantages, are forced to
be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can
But notwithſtanding all this, every man may in fome degree or other endeavour
to cultivate his nature, and poffefs himſelf of uſeful truths. And not to do this
is (again) to caft off reafon (which never can be reafonable), apoftatize from.
humanity, and recoil into the beſtial life d.
γονται φύσει. Ακέ.
• And perhaps as if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες άνθρωποι δ' εἰδέναι ὀρέ
b Ariftotle being asked, what he got by philofophy, anfwerd, Tò άvstitάx-
τως ποιειν ἅ τινες & από το νόμων φόβον πειᾶσιν. And another time, how the learned diferd from
& &
the unlearned, faid, Ὅσῳ οἱ ζῶντες ἃ τηθνηκότων την παιδειαν ἔλεγεν εν μθρ ευτυχίαις είναι κόσμον, c
ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καταφυγήν. D. Laert.
- Αδύνατον γδ,
Εντα· πολλὰ μαρί η πράτεται καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, κτλ. Arift.
cum in-agris homines paffim beftiarum modo vagabantur, &c. Cic.
25
५ ४
ἢ ἐ ῥᾴδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητ
d Nam fuit quoddam tempus,
"
7. He
178 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
7. He must attend to inftruction", and even ask advice; especially in matters of
confequence. Not to do this is to deny, that his faculties are limited and defec-
tive, or that he is fallible (which is contrary to that, which he is prefumed to
be conſcious of); and perhaps, that it is poffible for another to know what he
doth not.
Advice every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improve-
ments are, the more doth truth prefs him to ſubmit to the counſel and opinions of
others. Nor is every one only capable, but every one wants upon fome occafions
to be informed. In how many countrey affairs muft the Scholar take the ruftic
for his maſter? In how many other men of buſineſs, traders and mechanics? And
on the other fide, in refpect of how many things does the generality of the world
want to be taught by them, who are learned and honeft?
There is or ſhould be a commerce or interchange of counſel and knowledge, as
well as of other things: and where men have not theſe of their own growth,
they ſhould thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters.
I do not mean, that a man ought implicitly and blindly to follow the opinion
of another b (this other being fallible too, as well as himſelf), unleſs he has in him-
felf a good reaſon fo to do, which many times happens; but by the affiſtance of
another, and hearing what he has to fay, to find out more certainly on which
fide reaſon, truth, and happineſs (which always keep cloſe together) do lie. And
thus it is indeed a man's own reafon at laft, which governs.
He, who is governed by what another fays (or does) without underſtanding
it and making the reaſon of it his own, is not governed by his own reafon, and
that is, by no reaſon that he has. To ſay one is led by the noſe (as we com-
monly ſpeak) gives immediately the idea of a brute d
a The effect, which Xenocrates's lecture had upon Polemo, is remarkable: unius orationis faluber-
rima medicina fanatus, ex infami ganeonę maximus philofophus evafit. Val. M.
b Like them,
In
S. Iqqar. Many אפילו יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל וכו',who fubmit to their Hhahamim
more inftances might eaſily be given.
Not only we. Tas pivòs taxea was uſed in the
fame fenfe by the Greeks.
d Nihil magis praftandum eft, quàm ne, pecorum ritu, fequamur
antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum eft, fed qua itur. Sen. Something may perhaps be
expected in this place concerning vogue and faſhion, which feem to be public declarations of fome
general opinion; fhewing how far they ought to fway with us. I think, fo far as to keep us
from being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done ;
eſpecially in reſpect of trifling and little matters. But further a wife man will ſcarce mind them.
That is a good fentence in Demophilus, Ποίει ἃ κρίνεις ειναι καλὰ, καν ποιῶν μέλλης ἀδοξήσεων φαύλα δ
· κριτής καλά πράγματα όχλο.
Laſtly,
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 179
Laftly, He must labor to clear his mind of those preoccupations and incumbrances
which hang about it, and binder him from reafoning freely, and judging impartially.
We ſet out in life from fuch poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under
fuch remains of fuperftition and ignorance, fuch influences of company and
faſhion, fuch infinuations of pleaſure, &c. that it is no wonder, if men get ha-
bits of thinking only in one way; that theſe habits in time grow confirmed and
obftinate; and fo their minds come to be overcaft with thick prejudices, fcarce
penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reaſon. He therefore, who would
ufe his rational faculties, muft in the firſt place diſentangle them, and render
them fit to be ufed and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that
he doth not intend to ufe them; that is, he proclaims himſelf irrational, con-
trary to truth, if fuppofition the fourth be true:
The ſum of all is this: it is the duty of every man, if that word expreſſes ſuch a
being as is before deſcribed, to behave himſelf in all refpects (which I cannot
pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reafon. And from hence
it will follow, further, that,
IV. Every man is obliged to live virtuously and piouſly. Becauſe to practice
reaſon², and truth is to live after that manner. For from the contents of the
foregoing ſections it is apparent, that one cannot practice reafon (or act accor--
ding to truth) without behaving himſelf reverently and dutifully toward that
Almighty being, on whom he depends; nor without juſtice and a tender regard
to the properties of other men: that is, unleſs his injoyments be free from im-
piety, virtuous and harmleſs. And as to thoſe virtues, which reſpect a mans
felf, the fame thing will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by
fome of the principal ones.
C
Prudence, the queen of virtues, is nothing but chooſing (after things have
d
been duly weighd) and uſing the moſt reaſonable means to obtain fome end, that
is reaſonable. This is therefore directly the exerciſe of reaſon.
Temperance permits us to take meat and drink not only as phy fic for hunger and
thirſt,but alſo as an innocent cordial and fortifier againſt the evils of life,or even fome--
times, reaſon not refuſing that liberty, merely as matter of pleaſure. It only con-
fines us to fuch kinds, quantities, and feafons, as may beſt confift with our health,
• Ipfa virtus breviffimè recta ratio dici poteft. Cic.
b Idem effe dicebat Socrates veritatem & virtutem. Id.
་་་
Que non aliud eft quàm recta ratio. Sen
c Viz. That a man cannot practiſe rea-
e That faying
fon without practiſing them. 4 Τα τ' ἐόντα, τά τ' ἐεπόμενα, πρό τ' ἐόντα.
of Timotheus to Plato, with whom he had fupped the night before in the Academy, fhould be remem-
berd. Ὑμεῖς ἔν δειπνέιτε
εν
εἰς τὰ ὑπεράσαν τα ημέραι, p. Athen,
the
180
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
a
the ufe of our faculties 2, our fortune, &c. and fhew, that we do not think our ſelves
made only to eat and drink here; that is, fuch as fpeak us to be what we are.
Chastity does not pretend to extinguiſh our tender paffions, or cancel one part
of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them againſt reafon and truth i
not give up the man to humor the bruted; nor hurt others to pleaſe our ſelves ;
to divert our inclinations by buſineſs, or fome honeft amuſement, till we can
gratify them lawfully, conveniently, regularly and even then to participate of
the myſteries of love with modefty, as within a veil or facred incloſure, not with
a canine impudence f.
Frugality indeed looks forward, and round about; not only confiders the man
himſelf, but compaffionates his family; knows, that, when the exacteft com-
putation is made that can be beforehand, there will still be found many unfore-
feen defiderata in the calendar of his expences; is apprehenfive of the world,
and accidents, and new occafions, that may arife, tho they are not yet in bẹ-
ing 8; and therefore endeavours wifely to lay in as much, as may give him fome
kind of fecurity againſt future wants and cafualties, without which provifion
no man, whoſe fenfe is not quite loft, or circumfcribed within the preſent mi-
nute, can be very eafy h. To this end it not only cuts off all profufion and ex-
travagance, but even deducts fomething from that, which according to the
preſent appearance might be afforded; and chooſes rather that he ſhould live
upon half allowance now, than be expoſed (or expofe any body elfe) to the
danger of ſtarving hereafter, when full meals and former plenty ſhall make
poverty and faſting more infupportable. But ftill it forbids no inftance of gene-
rofity, or even magnificence, which is agreeable to the man's ftation and circum-
ftances, or (which is tantamount) to the truth of his caſe ¹.
b Quibus
a Corpus onuftum Hefternis vitiis animum quoq; pragravat unà, &c. Hor.
in folo vivendi caufa palato eft. Juv. Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos canaturi (Leonid.
ap.Val M.) may be turned to a general memento, no nian knowing, how near his death may be.
c Tí ésdes; ——xadhy; "Eñoye ` xxvivu. Arr.
d Venerem incertam rapientes, more ferarum
Hor.
xε6).
κανόνα.
e In which words are comprehended naturally (Τὸ μὴ τὰς παρὰ φύσιν ἡδονὰς διώ
f Not as Crates and Hipparchia (of whom fee Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.), and indeed
the Cynics in general are faid to have done: quibus in propatulo, coire cum conjugibus mos fuit.
Lactant. Of whom therefore Cicero fays with good reaſon, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota cft eji-
cienda. Eft enim inimica verecundia, fine qua nihil rectum effe poteft, nihil honeftum. Nina N
Ny]Y] [U'N]. S. Hhas. That in Herodotus, “Apa xidãvi in dvouévy ovvendústa. È sky didü quina
ought not to be true. Verecundiâ naturali habent provifum lupanaria ipfa fecretum. Aug.
τὸ τῆς τύχης ἀτεκμαρτιν ἀφορᾶσα: Ph. 7.
↳ Simonides was wont to fay, Brλósjen av Lo-
i Non intelligunt homines quàm
πανων τοῖς ἐχθροῖς μᾶλλον δπλιπεῖν, ἢ τῶν δεῖς ἢ φίλων. Stob.
magnum vectigal fit parfimonia. Cic.
HUTAVAKÍTX80.v, as in Athen.
Cie.
1 Ea liberalitate utamur,
اد
γυνα
& Eis
k Like them, who & τῇ νεότητι τα ξ' γήρως ἐφόδια προ-
que profit amicis, noceat nemini.
After
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 181
After the fame manner I might proceed upon other particular virtues. But my
notion of them muft by this time be fufficiently underſtood: and therefore I
fhall only give this general advice. That you may take the truer proſpect of
any act, place your felf in your imagination beyond it (beyond it in time), and
fuppofe it already done, and then fee how it looks; always remembring, that a
long repentance is a diſproportionate price for a ſhort injoyment. Or, fancy it done
by fome other man, and then view it in that fpeculum: we are commonly ſhar-
per-fighted in diſcerning the faults of others, than of our felves 2. And further,
as to thoſe virtues, which are faid to confift in the mean, it may be fometimes
fafer to incline a little more to one of the extremes, than to the other: as, rather
to ſtingineſs, than prodigality; rather to inflexibility, and even a degree of ill
nature, than to dangerous complaifance, or eaſineſs in refpect of vice, and fuch
things as may be hurtful; and fo on b.
a
Since then to live virtuously is to practiſe reafon and act conformably to truth, he,
who lives fo, muſt be ultimately happy, by fect. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not
only the commands of reafon, but even the defire of happineſs (a motive, that can-
not but work ſtrongly upon all who think) will oblige a man to live ſo.
It may be collected even from experience, that the virtuous life compared with
the contrary, if one looks no further than the preſent ftate, is the happier life; or,
that the virtuous pleaſures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer d
Who fees not, that the vitious life is full of dangers and folicitudes, and ufually ends
ill; perhaps in rottennefs and rags, or at leaſt in a peeviſh and deſpicable difcon-
tente ?
I am not of opinion, that virtue can make a man happy upon a rack under avio-
lent fit of the ftone, or the likes; or that virtue and prudence can always exempt
him from wants and ſufferings, mend a ſtrait fortune, or rectify an ill conſtitu-
• Non eft incommodum, quale quodq; fit, ex aliis judicare: ut fi quid dedeceat in aliis, vi-
temus & ipfi. Fit enim nefcio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quàm in nobiſmet ipfis, fi quid
delinquitur. Cic.
ο Οιον, εν δέιπνῳ προπίνει τις άδην ἔχοντι; μὴ δυσωπηθῇς, μηδὲ προσβιάσῃ σεαυ
τὸν, ἀλλὰ κατάθε τὸ ποτήριον, κλ. Plut.
• Even Epicurus himfelf ἀχώρισον φησί τ' ἡδονῆς τὴν
ἀρετὴν μόνην and aὰὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῖν ἁιρεῖς. Diog. L.
d Ifocrates gives one reafon
for this, where he compares vitious pleafures with virtue. Ἐκεῖ μολὺ πρῶτον ἡθέντες, ὕτερον ἐλυπήθη-
μεν ἐνταυθα με τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν.
ή
e Whereas virtue is ἐφόδιον πρὸς γήρας.
Bias ap. S. Baf.
fame.
f For who can bear fuch rants as that, Epicurus ait, fapientem, fi in Pha-
laridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce eft, & ad me nihil pertinet? Sen. Tully reports the
It is in the power of very few to act like him, qui dum varices exfecandas praberet,
legere librum perfeveravit: or him, qui non defiit ridere, cum ob hoc ipfum irati tortores omnia inftru-
menta crudelitatis experirentur. Sen.
A a
tion:
:
182 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
tion: amidſt ſo many enemies to virtue, fo many infirmities as attend life, he
cannot but be ſometimes affected. But I have faid, and fay again, that the natu-
ral and uſual effect of virtue is happineſs; and if a virtuous man ſhould in
fome refpects be unhappy, yet ftill his virtue will make him less unhappy: for at
leaft he injoys inward tranquillity, and a breaſt conſcious of no evil. And which
kind of life I pray ought one to prefer: that, which naturally tends to happiness,
tho it may be diſturbed; or that, which naturally tends to unhappiness? In brief,
virtue will make a man bere, in any given circumftances, as happy as a man
can be in thoſe circumftances: or however it will make him happy hereafter in
fome other ſtate: for ultimately, all taken together, happy he must be.
Some may poffibly wonder, why among virtues I have not fo much as once
named one of the cardinal, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to:
İmean fortitude. That that, by which fo many heroes have triumphed over
enemies, even the greateft, death itself; that, which diſtinguiſhes nations,
raiſes empires, has been the grand theme of almoſt all wits, attracts all eyes,
opens all mouths, and affumes the name of virtue by way of excellence; that
this fhould be forgot!
To attone for this omiffion I will make this appendix to the foregoing brief
account. If fortitude be taken for natural courage (i. e. ſtrength, activity, plen-
ty of ſpirits, and a contempt of dangers reſulting from thefe), this is conftitu-
tion and the gift of God, not any virtue in us: becauſe if it be our virtue, it
muſt conſiſt in ſomething, which we produce, or do our felves b. The cafe is
the fame with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or:
ftrong walls, which may indeed be great advantages, but were never called vir-
tues c. To have thefe is not virtue; but to use them rightly, or according to
reafon, if we have them.
That this is juſtly faid, may perhaps appear from what is to be faid on the o-
ther fide. It may be a man's misfortune, that he has not more courage, a grea-
ter ſtock of fpirits, firmer health, and ſtronger limbs, if he has a juſt oc-
cafion to uſe them; but it never can be reckond a vice or fault not to use what.
he has not: for otherwiſe it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thoufand
pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.
b
• Εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἐστι, θεός πε σοὶ τόν ἔδωκεν. Ηom. Propter virtutem jure laudamur, fr
&os.
in virtute reste gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, fi id donum à deo, non à nobis haberemus. Cic.
• As that word is uſed here. For when it is uſed as in that ap. Luc. 'Aper'n µji odpar✪ ixus, and the
like paffages, it has another meaning.
Fortitude
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 183
Fortitude confiderd as a virtue confifts in ftanding and endeavouring to overcome
dangers and oppofitions, when they cannot be avoided without the violation of rea-
fon and truth. Here it is, that he, who is endowd with natural bravery, a healthful
conftitution, good bones and muſcles, ought to use them, and be thankful to the
Doner: and he who is not fo favord, muft yet do what he can: if he cannot con-
quer, he muſt endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is natural-
ly timorous, or weak, or otherwiſe infirm, may have as much, or more of the vir-
tue of fortitude, than the hero himfelf; who apprehends little, and feels little, com-
pared with the other, or poffibly may find pleaſure in a ſcene of dangerous action.
If a man can prevent, or eſcape any peril or trouble, ſalvâ veritate, he ought
to do it: otherwiſe he neither confiders himſelf, nor them as being what they
are; them not as unneceſſary, himſelf not as capable of being hurt by them; and
fo daſhes againſt truth on the worſe fide 2. But where that cannot be done, he
muſt exert himſelf according to his abilities, whether great or little, and refer
the ſucceſs to the Divine providence. This is the true virtue of fortitude, which
is nothing but endeavouring firmly and honeftly to act as truth requires; and
therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded
the morality of human acts.
It has for its object not only adverfaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings,
but in general all the evils of life; which a man muſt labor by prudence to ward
off, and where this cannot be done to bear with refignation, decency, and an hum-
ble expectation of an adjuſtment of all events in a future ftate: the belief of which
I am now going to prove, in my manner, to be no vain nor groundleſs conceit.
V. Every one, that finds himself as before in prop. I. finds in himself at the fame
time a confciousness of his own existence and acts (which is life), with a power of
apprehending, thinking, reaſoning, willing, beginning and ſtopping many kinds and de-
grees of motion in his own members, &c. c. He, who has not theſe powers, has
no power to diſpute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any
difpute here, unleſs it be concerning the power of beginning motion. For they,
who ſay there is always the fame quantity of motion in the world, muft not allow
the production of any new; and therefore muft fuppofe the animal fpirits not to
اد
ท
• Καπνό και κύματα ἐκτὸς ἔεργε Νῆα. Hom. b Εἰσὶ δ᾽ ὁι εὶ ἐν ὀικίᾳ διατρίβοντες, ἳ σωμάτων
αυτοῖς ἢ μακρᾶις νόσοις, ἢ ἐπιπόνῳ γήρας κατεσκελετευμένων,τω ἀληθῆ διαπονᾶσιν ἀνδρίαν, ἀσκηταὶ σου
Pías ¿vres. Ph. J. Non in viribus corporis & lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria eft, fed magis in
virtute animi.-Fure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unufquifque feipfum vincit, iram continet, nullis il-
lecebris emollitur a que inflectitur, non adverfis perturbatur, non extollitur fecundis, &c. S. Ambr.
Qui fe ipfe norit, primùm aliquid fentiet fe habere divinum, &c. Cic.
с
A a 2
be
184
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX,
be put into motion by the mind, but only being already in motion to receive
from it their directions into theſe or thofe canals, according as it intends to move
this or that limb. But to this may be anfwerd, that, if the mind can give theſe
new directions and turns to the fpirits, this ferves my purpoſe as well, and what
I intend will follow as well from it. And befides, it could not do this, if it could
not excite thoſe ſpirits being at reft.
It is plain I can move my hand upward or downward or horizontally, fafter
or flower or not at all, or ſtop it when it is in motion, just as I will. Now if
my hand and thoſe parts and ſpirits, by which it is put into motion, were left.
to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already impreſt
upon them, the effects would be determind by rules of mechanifm, and be ne-
cesary: the motion or reft of my hand would not attend upon my will, and
be alterable upon a thought at my pleasure. If then I have (as I am fenfible I
have) a power of moving my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by
thoſe laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitati-
on would obferve, this motion depends folely upon my will, and begins there 2:
VI. That, which in man is the subject or fuppofitum of felf-consciousness,
thinks, and has the forefaid faculties, must be ſomething different from his body or
carcass.
For, firft, he doth not I ſuppoſe find himſelf to think, fee, hear, &c. all
over, in any part of his body: but the feat of cogitation and reflexion he finds
in his head band the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects are
conveyd to him, all tend to the fame place. It is plainly fomething, which
refides there, in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of theſe nerves
governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by fo many reins, or wires) d,
feels what is done to it, fees through the eyes, hears through the ears, &c...
A
c "078 0
d Ta
* Εἰ μήτε ἔξωθεν κινεῖται [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα, μήτε φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦρ, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχής
xiveτai, xλ. Greg. Thaum. b Which, ὡς ἐιπεῖν, οικός ἐσι ἢ ἀισθήσεων. Artem.
βασιλεὺς, ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁι δορυφόροι δορυφόροι δὲ αισθήσεις τ' να, πεί κεφαλήν ἔσαι. Ph. 7.
μέρη σώματα άλογά ἔσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντα ὥσπερ ἡνίας ξ λογισμό, πάντα τέτακται
καὶ συνῆκται δ' ὑπακουει. Plut.
e Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus ea, qua videmus: neque
enim eft ullus fenfus in corpore, fed-vie quafi quadam funt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à fede
animi perforata. Itaque fape aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris &
oculis & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facilè intelligi poſſit, animum & videre, & audire,
non eas partes, qua quafi feneftra funt animi: quibus tamen fentire nihil queat mens, nifi id agat, &
adfit. Cic.
Upon
Truths belonging to a Private Man,
185
&c.
Upon amputation of a limb this thing (whatever it is) is not found to be
diminishd, nor any of its faculties loft. Its fphere of acting, while it is con-
fined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its inftrument loft. It can-
not make uſe of that which is not, or which it has not.
or,
If the eyes be fhut, or the ears ftopt, it cannot then fee, or hear: but remove
the obſtruction, and it inſtantly appears that the faculty, by which it apprehends
the impreffions made upon the organs of fenfation, remaind all that while intire;
and that fo it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had never been opend again;
if the eyes had been out, or the cars quite difabled. This fhews in general,
that, when any fenfe or faculty feems to be impaird or loft by any bodily hurt,
after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pafs, becauſe it is the body
that perceives and has theſe faculties in itſelf; but becauſe the body loſes its in-
ftrumentality, and gives that which is the true fubject of theſe faculties no opportu-
nity of exerting them, or of exerting them well: tho it retains them as much as im
the cafe before, when the eyes or ears were only fhut. Thus diftinct are it and
its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the foul.
Again, as a man peruſes and confiders his own body, doth it not undeniably
appear to be fomething different from the confiderer? And when he uſes this
expreffion my body, or the body of me, may it not properly be demanded, who
is meant by me, or what my relates to? It cannot be the body itſelf: that can-
not fay of itſelf, it is my body, or the body of me. And yet this way
way of fpeak-
ing we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual ſenſe of our felves, and
what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.
What I mean is this. A man being fuppofed a perfon confifting of two parts,
foul and body, the whole perfon may ſay of this or that part of him, the foul of
me, or the body of me: but if he was either all foul, or all body, and nothing elſe,
he could not then ſpeak in this manner: becauſe it would be the fame as to fay
the foul of the foul, or the body of the body, or the I of me.. The pronoun there-
fore (in that ſaying my body, or the body of me) muſt ſtand for ſomething elſe, to
which the body belongs d; or at leaſt for fomething, of which it is only a part,
viz. the perfon of the whole mane. And then even this implies, that there is
another part of him, which is not body.
* Or even detracto corpore multo, as Lucretius fpeaks..
κομμένων, ὁλόκληρα ἐκείνη [ή ψυχή] μένει. Chryf.
a young man's eye, ßλéñoι äv
Ο Πολλάκις και
χειρῶν Ε τ ποδῶν ἐκ
• Therefore Ariftotle fays, if an old man had
βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ ἢ ὁ νέα. Ὥσε τὸ γῆρας, ἐ τῷ τίω ψυχήν πεπονθέναι τι, ἀλλ᾽ ον
a Hierocles (with others) accounts the foul to be the true
e So Plato uſes Auros for the whole of the man; by
ᾧ καθάπερ εν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις, κτλ.
man. Σὺ γδ ει ἡ ψυχή, τὸ δὲ σῶμα σόν.
which the foul, as one part of it, is called xrña..
It
186
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
It is plain there are two different interefts in men, on the one fide reaſon, on
the other paffion: which, being many times directly oppofite, muft belong to dif
ferent fubjects. There are upon many occafions conteſts, and as it were wars be-
tween the mind and the body: fo far are they from being the ſame thing.
Laftly, there is we may perceive fomething within us, which fupports the body
(keeps it up), directs its motion for the better preſervation of it, when any hurts
or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which
it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The bo-
dy therefore muſt be confiderd as being under the direction and tuition of fome
other thing, which is (or fhould be) the governor of it, and confequently upon
this account must be concluded to be different from it.
VII. The foul cannot be mere matter. For if it is, then either all matter muſt
think;
or the difference muſt ariſe from the different modification, magnitude,
figure, or motion b of fome parcels of matter in refpect of others; or a faculty
of thinking muſt be fuperadded to fome fyftems of it, which is not fuperadded
to others. But,
In the first place, that pofition, which makes all matter to be cogitative, is con
trary to all the apprehenfions and knowledge we have of the nature of it; nor can
it be true, unleſs our fenfes and faculties be contrived only to deceive us. We per-
ceive not the leaſt ſymptom of cogitation, or fenfe in our tables, chairs, &c.
Why doth the ſcene of thinking lie in our heads, and all the minifters of ſenſa-
tion make their reports to fomething there, if all matter be apprehenfive, and co-
gitative? For in that cafe there would be as much thought and underſtanding
in our heels, and every were elſe, as in our heads.
If all matter be cogitative, then it muſt be ſo quatenùs matter,and thinking muſt
be of the effence and definition of it: whereas by matter no more is meant but a
ſubſtance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And fince, for this reafon,
it cannot be neceſſary for matter to think (becauſe it may be matter without this
property), it cannot think as matter only.
If it did, we ſhould not only continue to think always, till the matter of which
we confift is annihilated, and fo the affertor of this doctrine would ftumble upon
a
ö
2 Φάινεται ἐν αὐτοῖς εἰς ἀλλό τι παρὰ τ λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται τε ἢ ἀντιτείνει τα λόγῳ. Αrif
b Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human foul, ſeems to be much fuch
another queſtion as that in one of Seneca's epiftles, An juftitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteraque vir-
tutes, animalia fint.
immor-
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 187
immortality unawares; but we muſt alſo have thought always in time past, ever
fince that matter was in being; nor could there be any the leaft intermiffion of
actual thinking : which does not appear to be cur caſe.
If thinking, felf-conſciouſneſs, &c. were eſſential to matter, every part of it
muſt have them: and then no ſyſtem could have them. For a fyftem of mate-
rial parts would be a ſyſtem of things conſcious every one by itself of its own ex-
iſtence and individuality, and conſequently thinking by itself: but there could
be no one ast of ſelf-conſciouſneſs or thought common to the whole. Juxta-
pofition in this cafe could fignify nothing: the diftinction and individuation of
the ſeveral particles would be as much retaind in their vicinity, as if they were
ſeparated by miles.
In the next place, the faculties of thinking, &c. cannot ariſe from the fize, figure,
texture, or motion of it: becauſe bodies by the alteration of theſe only become grea-
ter or leſs; round or fquare, &c. rare, or denſe; tranſlated from one place to another
with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: all which ideas are quite
different from that of thinking; there can be no relation between them. Theſe
modifications and affections of matter are ſo far from being principles or caufes
of thinking and acting, that they are themſelves but effects, proceeding from the
action of ſome other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its paffivity,
deadneſs, and utter incapacity of becoming cogitative. This is evident to ſenſe.
They, who place the effence of the foul in a certain motion given to fome matter
(if any fuch men there really be) fhould confider, among many other things, that:
to move the body ſpontaneouſly is one of the faculties of the foulb; and that
this, which is the fame with the power of beginning motion, cannot come from
motion already begun, and impreft ab extra.
Let the materialiſt examine well, whether he does not feel fomething within
himſelf, that acts from an internal principle: whether he doth not experience fome
liberty fome power of governing himſelf, and choofing: whether he does not injoy a
kind of inviſible empire, in which he commands his own thoughts, fends them to
this or that place, imploys them about this or that buſineſs, forms ſuch and fuch -
αν
b That the foul is the
3 Νόμω ἐδὲν σῶμα γεννῇ· πῶς δ᾽ ἂν τὰ ἀνόητα νόμυ γεννήσοι. Salluft.
principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no teftimony) often faid by the
ancients. Φασὶ η ἔνιοι, καὶ μάλισα, ο πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινουν. Αrift. Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἔνδοθε, κινουν τὰς
σώματα, καὶ αυτοκίνητον. Simpl. ᾿Αρχή κινήσεως, Plotin.
• Ἡ ψυχὴ πεξίεισι πᾶσαν γῆν, ἐκ γῆς
C
ἐπ᾽ ἔρανον, κλ. Μax. Τ.
defigns ·
188
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
defigns and ſchemes: and whether there is any thing like his in bare matter, how-
ever faſhiond, or proportiond; which, if nothing fhould protrude or communicate
motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an e-
ternal monument of its own being dead. Can fuch an active being as the foul is ",
the ſubject of ſo many powers, be itſelf nothing but an accident?
When I begin to move my felf, I do it for fome reason, and with respect to fome
end, the means to effect which I have, if there be occafion for it, concerted within
my
felf: and this doth not at all look like motion merely material (or, in which
matter is only concernd), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine matter to
be moved by arguments, or ever placed fyllogifms and demonftrations among levers
and pullies?
We not only move our felves upon reafons, which we find in our felves, but up-
on reaſons imparted by words or writing from others, or perhaps merely at their
defire or bare fuggeftion. In which cafe, again, no body fure can imagine, that the
words ſpoken or written (the found in the air, or the ſtrokes on the paper) can
by any natural or mechanical efficience cauſe the reader or hearer to move in any
determinate manner (or at all). The reafon, requeſt, or friendly admonition,
which is the true motive, can make no impreffion upon matter. It muſt be fome
other kind of being, that apprehends the force and ſenſe of them.
Do not we ſee in converfation, how a pleaſant thing faid makes people break
out into laughter, a rude thing into paſſion, and ſo on? Theſe affections cannot be
the physical effects of the words ſpoken: becauſe then they would have the fame
effect, whether they were underſtood, or not. And this is further demonſtrable
from hence, that tho the words do really contain nothing, which is either plea-
fant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be ſpoken, which are not ſpoken;
yet if they are apprehended to do that, or the found to be otherwiſe than it
the effect will be the fame. It is therefore the ſenſe of the words, which is an
immaterial thing, that by paffing through the understanding and caufing that,
which is the ſubject of the intellectual faculties, to influence the body, produces
theſe motions in the fpirits, blood, muſcles.
was,
a What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the foul is that in Lucretius? Ubi propellere
membra, Conripere ex fomno corpus, &c. videtur (Quorum nil fieri fine tactu poffe videmus, Nec tactum
porro fine corpore); nonne fatendum eft Corpored naturâ animum conftare, animamq; ? If nothing can
move the body, but another body, what moves this? The body might as well move itſelf, as be moved
by one that does.
Ο Τάχισον νας τα παντὶς γδ τρέχει. Thal. ap. Diog. L.
4
They,
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 189
They, who can fancy, that matter may come to live, think, and act ſpontane-
'oufly, by being reduced to a certain magnitude, or having its parts placed after a
certain manner, or being inveſted with fuch a figure, or excited by ſuch a particular
motion: they, Ifay, would do well to diſcover to us that degree of fineneſs, that
alteration in the fituation of its parts, &c. at which matter may begin to find itſelf
alive and cogitative; and which is the critical minute, that introduces theſe impor-
tant properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any particular cri-
fis, it is a fign they have no good reaſon for what they fay. For if they have no rea-
fon to charge this change upon any particular degree or difference,one more than an-
other, they have no reaſon to charge it upon any degree or difference at all; and
then they have no reaſon, by which they can prove that fuch a change is made
at all. Befides all which, fince magnitude, figure, motion are but accidents of
matter, not matter, and only the ſubſtance is truly matter; and fince the ſubſtance of
any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if any matter can be by
nature cogitative, all muſt be fo. But this we have feen cannot be.
So then in conclufion, if there is any fuch thing as matter that thinks, &c.
this muſt be a particular privilege granted to it: that is, a faculty of thinking
muſt be fuperadded to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, muſt
infer the exiſtence of fome Being able to confer this faculty; who, when the
ineptneſs of matter has been well confiderd, cannot appear to be leſs than omni-
potent, or God. But the truth is, matter feems not to be capable of ſuch im-
provement, of being made to think. For fince it is not of the effence of mat-
ter, it cannot be made to be fo without making matter another kind of ſubſtance
from what it is. Nor can it be made to arife from any of the modifications or
accidents of matter; and in reſpect of what elſe can any matter be made to dif-
fer from other matter.
:
The accidents of matter are fo far from being made by any power to produce
cogitation, that ſome even of them ſhew it incapable of having a faculty of think-
ing fuperadded. The very divifibility of it does this. For that which is made
to think muſt either be one part, or more parts joind together. But we know
no ſuch thing as a part of matter purely one (or indivifible). It may indeed
have pleaſed the Author of nature, that there ſhould be atoms, whofe parts are
actually indifcerpible, and which may be the principles of other bodies but
ftill they confift of parts, tho firmly adhering together. And if the feat of cogi-
tation be in more parts than one (whether they lie cloſe together, or are looſe, or
in a ſtate of fluidity, it is the fame thing), how can it be avoided, but that either
there muſt be ſo many ſeveral minds, or thinking fubftances, as there are parts (and
then the conſequence, which has been mentiond, would return upon us again);
B b
:
01
190
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
or elfe, that there must be fomething elſe fuperadded for them to center in, to
unite their acts, and make their thoughts to be one? And then what can this
be, but fome other fubftance, which is purely one?
Matter by itself can never intertain abſtracted and general ideas, fuch as many
in our minds are. For could it reflect upon what paffes within itſelf, it could
poffibly find there nothing but material and particular impreffions; abftractions
and metaphyfical ideas could not be printed upon it b. How could one abſtract
from matter who is himſelf nothing but matter? And then as to material images
themſelves, which are uſually fuppofed to be impreft upon the brain (or fome
part of it), and ſtock the phantafy and memory, that which peruſes the impref-
fions and traces there (or any where) muſt be ſomething diftinct from the brain,
or that upon which theſe impreffions are made: otherwiſe it muſt contemplate
itſelf, and be both reader and book. And this other diftinct contemplating being
cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think
without a foul. For fuch a corporeal being muft require fenfe, and fuitable or-
gans, to perceive and read theſe characters and veftigia of things; and ſo another
organized body would be introduced, and the fame queſtions and difficulties re-
doubled, concerning the foul of that body and its faculties c.
If my foul was mere matter, external viſible objects could only be perceived
within me according to the impreffions they make upon matter, and not other-
wife. Ex.gr. the image of a cube in my mind (or my idea of a cube) muſt be
always under fome particular profpect, and conform to the rules of perspective;
nor could I otherwiſe repreſent it to my felf: whereas now I can form an idea
of it as it is in itſelf, and almoft view all its bedre at once, as it were incom-
paffing it with my mind.
I can within myſelf correct the external appearances and impreffions of objects;
and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my fenfes, to form ideas of
things that are not extant in matter. By feeing a material circle I may learn to
form the idea of a circle, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its cen-
ter: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occafions, I can con-
clude there is no exact material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was
raiſed from the hints I received from without, but is not truly to be found there. If I
fee a tower at a great diſtance, which according to the impreffions made upon my
• Diogenes, tho he could fee the table, and the pot, could not by his eyes fee Plato's TeamCÓTUS, &
xvadórne, Diog. L.
b Plato, & di ropot (more generally) fay, that the foul indeed perceives
objects of ſenſe by the mediation of the body; but there are vonra, which it doth xadurní cvdu-
μüa. Id. • Such a foul muſt be indeed as Greg. Thaum. has it, σõue qu‡uxov. "Arozov »
ψυχῆς ψυχήν λέγειν.
기
​material
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 191
material organs ſeems little and round, I do not therefore conclude it to be either:
there is fomething within, that reafons upon the circumftances of the appearance,
and as it were commands my fenfe, and corrects the impreffion: and this muſt be
fomething fuperior to matter, fince a material foul is no otherwiſe impreffible itſelf,
but as material organs are. Inftances of this kind are endleſs. (v. p. 53, 54.)
If we know any thing of matter, we know, that by itſelf it is a lifeleſs thing,
inert, and paſsive only; and acts neceſſarily (or rather is acted) according to the laws
of motion and gravitation. This paſsiveneſs ſeems to be effential to it. And if we
know any thing of our felves, we know, that we are conſcious of our own exiſtence
and acts (i.e. that we live); that we have a degree of freedom; that we can move
our ſelves ſpontaneously; and in ſhort, that we can, in many inftances, take off the
effect of gravitation, and impreſs new motions upon our fpirits (or give them new
directions), only by a thought. Therefore to make mere matter do all this is to change
the nature of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity,
neceſsity into liberty. And to fay, that God may fuperadd a faculty of thinking,
moving itſelf, &c. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be
the ſuppofitum of theſe faculties (that ſubſtance, in which they inhere), is the fame
in effect as to fay, that God may fuperadd a faculty of thinking to incogitativity, of
acting freely to neceffity, and fo on. What fenfe is there in this? And yet ſo it
muſt be, while matter continues to be matter.
That faculty of thinking, fo much talked of by ſome as fuperadded to certain
Systems of matter, fitly diſpoſed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be fo
called, muſt in reality amount to the fame thing as another fubftance with the
faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking alone will not make up the idea
of a human foul, which is indued with many faculties; apprehending, reflect-
ing, comparing, judging, making deductions and reaſoning, willing, putting
the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its preſence, and gi-
ving life; and therefore, whatever it is that is fuperadded, it muſt be ſomething
which is indued with all thoſe other faculties. And whether that can be a fa-
culty of thinking, and ſo theſe other faculties be only faculties of a facul-
tya; or whether they muſt not all be rather the faculties of fome fub-
The author of
To ask, fays he,
ability another abi-
• This is worſe than Yuxǹ Yuxus in Max. Tyr. and the place juſt before cited.
the Effay conc. Hum. Underft. has himſelf exploded it, or what is very like it.
whether the will has freedom, is to ask, whether one power has another power, one
lity; a queſtion at firſt fight too groſly abfurd to make a diſpute, or need an answer. For who is it that
fees not, that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes only of ſubſtances, and not of powers them-
felves? There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another paffage fome where in the fame book as
much (or more) to my purpoſe: but at prefent I cannot find it.
Bbz
ftance,
192
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
ftance, which, being (by their own concefsion) fuperadded to matter, muſt be
different from it, I do leave the unprejudiced to determin.
If men would but ſeriouſly look'into themſelves, I am perfuaded the foul would
not appear to them as a faculty of the body, or kind of appurtenance to it; but ra
ther as fome fubftance, properly placed in it, not only to uſe it as an inftrument, and
act by it, but alſo to govern it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, &c.)
according to its own reafon. For I think it is plain enough, that the mind, tho it
acts under great limitations, doth however in many inftances govern the body ar-
bitrarily: and it is monftrous to ſuppoſe this governor to be nothing but ſome fit
difpofition or accident (fuperadded) of that matter which is governed. A ship it is
true would not be fit for navigation, if it was not built and provided in a proper
manner: but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a ſyſtem of materials
fitly diſpoſed, it is not this difpofition that governs it. It is the man, that other fub-
ſtance, who fits at the helm, and they, who manage the fails and tackle,that do this.
So our veſſels without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be
capable of being acted as they are; but ſtill it is not the ſhape, or mcdification, or
any other accident, that can govern them. The capacity of being governed or
uſed can never be the governor, applying and uſing that capacity. No there
muſt be at the helm fomething diftinct, that commands the body, and without
which it would run adrift, or rather fink.
For the foregoing reafons it ſeems to me, that matter cannot think, cannot be
made to think. But if a faculty of thinking can be fuperadded to a fyftem of matter,
without uniting an immaterial ſubſtance to it; I fay, if this can be, yet a human
body is not ſuch a ſyſtem, being plainly void of thought, and organized in ſuch a
manner as to tranſmit the impreffions of fenfible objects up to the brain, where the
percipient, and that which reflects upon them, certainly refides: and therefore
that, which there apprehends, thinks, and wills, muſt be that ſyſtem of matter
to which a faculty of thinking is fuperadded. All the premiffes then well con-
fiderd, judge I beseech you, whether inſtead of faying, that this inhabitant of
our heads (the foul) is a fyftem of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is
fuperadded, it might not be more reaſonable to fay, it is a thinking fubftance in-
timately united to fome fine material vehicle, which has its refidence in the brain.
• If the foul is only an accident (or attribute) of the body, how comes this accident to have (or
be the ſupport of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we fay, '1ɔi nbɔp wajinbƆN VDI
Ο Ἕτερον δη τότε χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρῆται. Plato.
Or, if to a thinking fub-
ftance can be fuperadded the modification of folidity. Which way of fpeaking, tho I do not remember
to have met with it any where, nor doth it ſeem to differ much from the other, yet would pleaſe
me better.
S. Haemun.
c
The
!
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 193
Tho I underſtand not perfectly the manner, how a cogitative and ſpiritual ſub-
ſtance can be thus cloſely united to ſuch a material vehicle; yet I can underſtand
this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as
how the particles of the body itſelf cohere together), and much better than how
a thinking faculty can be fuperadded to matter: and beſide, ſeveral phænomena
may more eaſily be folved by this hypothefis; which (tho I ſhall not pertinacioufly
maintain it) in ſhort is this. Viz. that the human foul is a cogitative ſubſtance, clo-
thed in a material vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were infeparably mixt (I
had almoſt ſaid incorporated) with it: that theſe act in conjunction, that, which af
fects the one, affecting the other: that the ſoul is detaind in the body (the head or
brain) by fome ſympathy or attraction between this material vehicle and it, till the
habitation is ſpoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned
into an averfion, that makes it fly off), by fome hurt, or diſeaſe, or by the de-
cays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body: and that in the inte
rim by means of this vehicle motions and impreſsions are communicated to and fro.
But of this perhaps fomething more by and by.
VIII. The foul of man fubfifts after the diffolution of his body: or, is immortal. For,
1. If it is immaterial, it is indifcerpible, and therefore incapable of being dif
folved or demoliſhd, as bodies are b. Such a being can only periſh by annihila- ·
tion: that is, it will continue to fubfift and live, if ſome other being, able to do
this, doth not by a particular act annibilate it. And if there is any reaſon to
believe, that at the death of every man there is always fuch a particular anni--
hilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any fubftance
into nothing requires juft the fame power as to convert nothing into fomething: and
I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the foul, will be cautious how they
admit any ſuch power.
2. If the foul could be material; that is, if there could be any matter, that might
be the ſubject of thoſe faculties of thinking, willing, &c. yet ftill, fince we cannot.
but be fenfible, that all theſe are faculties of the ſelf-ſame thing; and that all the ſeve
ral acts of the mind are acts of the fame thing, each of them individual and truly one:
I fay, fince it is fo, this matter. muſt be ſo perfectly united in itſelf, ſo abſo-
It is worth our confideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of fpirit, and paſſive
power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally feparate from matter,
because they are both active and paffive. Pure fpirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only paf
five; thofe Beings, that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both. Hum. Underſt.
b This is Socrates's argument in Plato. The foul is altogether dur, and therefore váλp.
Which Cicero interprets thus: nec diſcerpi, nec diftrahi poteft ; nec interire igitur.
3
lutely
:
•
194
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
lutely one, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the least that can be
allowd is that it ſhould be truly folid, and not actually divifible; that is, fuch as
no natural cauſe could deſtroy.`
To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a thinking matter, is to in-
troduce matter with a new and oppofite property; and that is to introduce a new
fpecies of matter, which will differ as effentially from the other common unthink-
ing kind, as any ſpecies whatſoever doth from its oppofite in fcala prædicamentali,
even as body doth from fpirit. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal
and incorporeal. And if fo, this thinking matter muſt always continue to think,
till either it is annihilated, or there is a tranfmutation of one fpecies into ano-
ther: and to take refuge in either of theſe expectations is at leaſt to expect om-
nipotence ſhould interpofe to help out a bad caufe.
If any one ſhould ſay, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence fuperadd
to certain parcels of matter a fourth dimension, I fhould not perhaps diſpute the
Divine power: but I might fay, that ſuch matter, exifting under four dimenfi-
ons, would eſſentially differ from that, which cannot exiſt under four, or which
can exiſt but only under three; and that this four-dimenſiond matter muſt always
remain fuch, becauſe no ſubſtance can be changed into or become another, ef-
fentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the courſe of nature ceafes
totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.
3. The next argument fhall proceed by way of objection and anſwer. Becauſe a
removal of the principal objection against any thing is a good argument for it.
Obj. It ſeems as if thinking was not effential to the foul, but rather a capacity of think-
ing under certain circumſtances. For it doth not think, when it lies conceald in the
primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infan-
cy, in fleep, in afwoon: and the reafon of this ſeems to lie in the circumſtances of
the body, which either is not fufficiently extended, and prepared; or for a while im-
ploys the ſpirits wholly in the digeftion of its aliment,and other offices in the animal
œconomy; or by fome external attack, or the working of fome enemy got into it,
hath its parts diforderd, and the paffages fo poffeft, that the blood and other fluids
can ſcarce break through; or after fome fuch manner is preternaturally affected.
And therefore the queſtion to be refolved is not, whether the foul is material or im-
material; and much leſs, whether it will be annihilated at death; but, whether that
foul (be it what it will), which ceaſes to think, when the body is not fitly difpofed,
• Lucretius feems to be aware of this.
funt ad fenfum cuncta creandum, &c.
tur: ea eft omnino nominis expers.
Jam triplex animi el natura reperta: Nec tamen hac fat
Quarta quoq; his igitur quædam natura neceffe eft Attribua-
can
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 195
can think at all, when the body is quite diffolved, and leaves the foul no opportu-
nity of actuating it any more, or operating by it a. Anf. If this objection can-
not be fully anſwerd, till we know more of the nature of ſpiritual beings, and of
that vinculum, by which the foul and body are connected, than we do at preſent,
it muſt not therefore be lookd upon as certainly unanswerable in it ſelf; and much
lefs, if only it cannot be anfwerd by me. It may perhaps be poffible to turn it even
into an argument for the immortality of the foul.
The foul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts under li-
mitations: theſe limitations at different times are different, its activity and faculties
being more obſtructed or clogd at one time than another, and moſt of all in ſleep,
or a deliquium: as thefe obftructions are removed, it acts more clearly and freely :
and therefore if the ſtate of the foul in the body (its confinement there) may be
confiderd as one general and great limitation, why, when this limitation fhall be
taken off (this great obſtruction removed), may it ↳ not be allowd to act with
ftill greater freedom and clearneſs; the greateft it is capable of? Whilft it remains
in the brain, it can as it were look out at a few apertures; that is, receive the no-
tices of many things by thofe nerves and organs, which are the inftruments of
ſenſation: but if any of thofe avenues to it be flopt, that branch of its knowledge
is for a time cut off. If thoſe tracks in the brain, or thofe marks, whatever they
are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our memory and images of
things ſeem to depend, are filled up or overcaſt by any vapor, or otherwiſe dar-
kend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is diſperſed. (For it cannot read
what is not legible, and indeed for the preſent not there.) And fince even in
abftracted reflexions the mind is obliged to make ufe of words, or fome kind of
figns, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and ſtable enough to be peru-
fed, compared, &c. and this kind of language depends upon memory; whilſt this
is intermitted, the uſe of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it.
This is the preſent ftate of the foul: and from hence the reafon appears in ſome
meaſure, why we do not think in found fleep, &c. but it does not follow from
hence, that the foul cannot fubfift and act under more inlarged circumstances. That,
which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the op-
• If Lucan by fenfus means all manner of apprehenfion and knowledge, there is no room for that
disjunction: Aut nihil eft fensûs animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipfa nihil. For if the former
part be true, the other will follow.
▷ Velut è diutino carcere emiffus [animus]. Sen.
• Thoſe kinds of animals, which do not speak, do not reafon: but thofe, which do the one, do the
other. Therefore 27 (or Arab. DUN) is a rational animal; and óy fignifies both speech
and reafon, as going together.
I
portunities
196
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
portunities this affords, can now perceive viſible objects only with two eyes (at
two windows a), becauſe there are no more, might doubtless fee with four, if
there were fo many properly placed and difpofed; or if its habitation were all
eye (window all round), might fee all round. And fo, in general, that, which
now can know many things by the impreffions made at the ends of the nerves,
or by the intervention of our preſent organs, and in this fituation and incloſure can
know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be loofed out of
that prifon, know them immediately, or by fome other medium. That, which
is now forced to make ſhift with words and figus of things in its reaſonings, may,
when it ſhall be ſet at liberty and can come at them, reafon upon the intuition of
things themselves, or ufe a language more fpiritual or ideal. I fay, it is not impoffible,
that this fhould be the cafe; and therefore no one can fay, with reason, that it is
not: eſpecially, fince we find by experience, that the foul is limited; that the
limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of ſpirit to de-
termin, how theſe limitations are effected: and therefore cannot tell, how far they
may be carried on, or taken off. This fuffices to remove the force of the objec-
tion. But further,
A man, when he wakes, or comes to himſelf (which phraſe implies what I am go-
ing to fay), immediately knows this, and knows himſelf to be the fame foul that he
was before his fleep, or fainting away. I will fuppofe, that he is alſo conſcious to
himſelf, that in thoſe intervals he thought not at all (which is the fame the objector
muſt ſuppoſe): that is, if his body had been cut to pieces, or moulderd to duſt,
he could not have thought lefs: for there is no thinking leſs than thinking not
at all. From hence then I gather, that the foul preferves a capacity of thinking,
&c. under thoſe circumſtances and indifpofitions of the body, in which it thinks
no more, than if the body was deftroyd; and that therefore it may, and will preſerve
it, when the body is deſtroyd. And if ſo, what can this capacity be preſerved for?
Certainly not, that it may never be exerted. The Author of nature doth not uſe
to act after that manner. So that here is this dilemma to be oppoſed to the objec-
tion. In fleep and fwoonings the foul doth either think, or not. If it does, the objec-
tion has no foundation: and if it doth not, then all that will follow, which I have
juſt now faid.
If we ſhould fuppofe the foul to be a being by nature made to inform fome
body, and that it cannot exiſt and act in a ſtate of total feparation from all body;
it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, muſt therefore reduce it
&
Θυρίδες γδ όντως η ψυχῆς ότι αποθήσεις. Βaf.
θεάτρω διημερεύεσα. Ph. 7.
Ασαρκος ἢ ἀσώματα ἐν τῷ ν παντὸς
to
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 197
to a ſtate of abfolute infenfibility and inactivity, which to it would be equal to
non-existence. For that body, which is ſo neceffary to it, may be fome fine ve-
hicle, that dwells with it in the brain (according to that hypothefis p. 193.) and
goes off with it at death. Neither the anſwers to the objection, nor the cafe
after death will be much alterd by fuch a fuppofition. And fince I confess I fee
no abfurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are ſenſible of
many material impreffions (impreffions made upon us by material caufes, or bo-
dies) that there are fuch we are fure. Therefore there must be fome matter
within us, which being moved or preffed upon, the foul apprehends it immedi-
ately. And therefore, again, there muſt be ſome matter to which it is immediate-
ly and intimately united, and related in ſuch a manner, as it is not related to any
other. Let us now ſuppoſe this faid matter to be ſome refined and ſpirituous
vehicleª, which the foul doth immediately inform; with which it fympathizes;
by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is vitally and inſeparably
united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the brain, among the heads
and beginnings of the nerves. Suppoſe we alſo, that when any impreſſions are
made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by
the nerves up to their fountain, and the place, where the foul in its vehicle is ;
and there they communicate their ſeveral motions or tremors to this material ve-
hicle (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, preſs upon it); ſo that the ſoul,
which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly poffeft of it, fhall be
apprehenfive of theſe motions or preffures: and moreover, that this vehicle fo
guarded and incompaſſed by the body as it is, can be come at or moved by exter-
nal objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves; nor the foul, by
confequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correſpondence
with them, any other way. And as we fuppofe the foul to receive notices of things
from without inthis manner, fo let us fuppofe, on the other fide, that by mo-
ving its own vehicle it may produce motion in the contiguous fpirits and nerves,
• So Hierocles diftinguifhes τὸ ἀυγοειδὲς ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὁ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα, from that, which
he calls rò dunròv spãv oãμa, and to which the former communicates life. Τῷ ἀυγοειδεῖ ἡμῶν σώ
ματι προσέφει σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν. Id. This fne body he calls alfo ψυχικὸν σῶμα, and πνευματικὸν ἔχημα.
In Nihm, bhaiy, there is much concerning that fine body, in which the foul is clothed, and from
which it is never to be feparated, according to an old tradition. Men. b. Ifr. gives us the fum of it
.and af : יש גוף דק עד מאר בו מתלבש הנשמה טרם ביאה לעולם .in fuch words as thee
הנשמות המה בבריאתם הראשונה נקשרות עם גשמים דקים רוחניים מהטבע,terward
והנשמות לא יתפררו מאותם הגשמים הריקים
השמימי בלתי מושגים לחוש הראות.
הרוחניים כל ימי עולם אם קורם בואם לגוף ואם בהיותם עמו וגם אחרי הפררם
רק יותר זך מן which he fays is ; עצם רק Saadias long before him joins to the foul ממנו
.c& ,הגלגלים
С с
and
198
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
and fo move the body: I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved.
Let us fuppofe further, that the foul by means of this vehicle feels or finds thoſe
prints and portraits, or thoſe effects and remains left by objects on the mind in
fome manner or other, which cauſe the remembrance of words and things: I
mean again, when they are not filled up, or obfcured by any thing; or, when
there are any fuch to be felt. And lastly, let us fuppofe, that if the foul in its
more abftracted and purer reaſonings, or more fpiritual acts, has any occafion for
matter, to ſerve it, the matter of this vehicle is that which is always with it, and
ſerves it. All which it is eafy to underſtand, and perhaps not very difficult to fup-
poſe. On the contrary, by many fymptoms it appears most probable, that that
matter, to which the mind is immediately preſent, and in which is its true ſhekinah,
is not the whole grofs body, but fome fubtile body, placed (as I have faid) in the
region of the brain. For there all the conveyances of fenfible Species confpire to
meet, and there in reflexion we find our felves: when a limb is loft, the foul, 'tis
true, loſes an opportunity of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of ufing it,
but perceives no lofs in itſelf: and tho the body, many parts of it at leaſt, are in a
perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the ſubſtance, which
thinks within me now (or rather, which is I), is, notwithſtanding all the changes
my body has undergone, the very fame which thought above fifty years ago, and
ever fince; when I playd in ſuch a field, went to fuch a fchool, was of fuch a
univerſity, performed fuch and fuch exerciſes, &c. If you would permit me to
uſe a ſchool term, I would fay the egoity b remains. Now to answer the objecti-
on, and apply all this to our purpoſe. Why do we not perceive external objects
in our fleep, or a fwoon? Becauſe the paſſages are become impracticable, the win-
dows fhut, and the nerves, being obftructed, or fome how renderd for the time
uſeleſs, can tranſmit no information to it. Why however does it not reaſon and
think about ſomething or other? Becauſe, all the marks by which things are remem-
berd being for the prefent choked up or diforderd, the remembrance of thoſe ob-
jects,about which it is wont to imploy itſelf, and even of the words (or other figns),
in which it uſes to reaſon, and to preſerve the deductions and conclufions it makes,
is all ſuſpended and loft for the time; and fo its tables being coverd, its books cloſed,
and its tools locked up, the requifites for reaſoning are wanting, and no fubject of-
fers itſelf, to exercife its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportunity to
• Cùm corpora quotidie noftra fluant, & aut crefcant aut decrefcant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot
quotidie commutamur ? aut alius fui, cùm decem annorum effem ; alius, cùm triginta ; alius cùm quinqua-
ginta, alius, cùm jam toto cano capite fum? S. Hier. So it must be, if our fouls are nothing different from
our bodies.
↳ Tully has Lentulitas and Appietas; in the fame form, tho not just the like ſenſe.
b
3
take
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c.
199
take in higher objects and more refined matter for contemplation. And to conclude,
if it be demanded, why any one ſhould imagin, that the foul may think, perceive,
act after death, when it doth not do this in fleep, &c. the anſwer is; becauſe thoſe
incloſures and impediments, which occafiond the formentiond intermiffions, and
thoſe great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be removed with its
inlargement out of the body. When it ſhall in its proper vehicle be let go, and take
its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the immediate impref-
fions of objects: and why ſhould not thofe impreffions, which affected the nerves
that moved and affected the vehicle and foul in it,affect the vehicle immediately,when
they are immediately made upon it, without the interpofition of the nerves? The
hand, which feels an object at the end of a staff, may certainly be allowd to feel the
fame much better by immediate contact, without the ſtaff. Nay, why ſhould we
not think, that it may admit of more objects and the knowledge of more things,than
it can now; fince being expofed all round to the influences of them,it may be moved
not only by viſible objects juſt at the extremities of the optic nerves, by founds at
the ends of the auditory, &c. but become as it were all eye to vifible objects, all ear
to audible, and ſo on? And why ſhould we not think this the rather, becauſe then
the foul may be alfo perceptive of finer impreffions and ethereal contacts, and con-
fequently of more kinds of objects, fuch as we are now incapable of knowing? And
then, this being fo, why ſhould we not prefage, that other indowments, as faculties
of reaſoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be proportionable to fuch
noble opportunities of knowledge? There feems to be nothing in this account
impoſſible; and therefore nothing, but what may be.
If we do but attend, we muſt fee every where, that many things are by ways,
which we do not, nor can underſtand; and therefore we muſt be convinced, even
from hence, that more may be; and therefore that the objection before us, tho we
could not falve the difficulties in it, and what is fuppofed here ſhould be all rejected
as chimerical, yet ought to be no prejudice againſt the belief of the immortality of
the foul, if there is any (but one) good reaſon for it.
But if we can in any tolerable manner (which in our preſent circumftances is as
much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and thoſe the grea-
teſt belonging to this matter, and ſhew how it is poſſible that they may conſiſt with
immortality, this will greatly corroborate the arguments for it, if not be one it-
felf. This I hope is done: or if I have not ſpoke directly to every part of the ob-
jection, from what has been done that defect may eafily be fupplied.
4. We may conclude the fouls of men to be immortal from the nature of God.
For if he is (which fure no body doubts) a Perfect being, He, as fuch, can do no-
thing
Cc 2
200
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
thing inconfiftent with perfect or right reafon. And then no being, nor circum-
ftance of any being, can come from Him as its caufe, which it is not agreeable to
fuch reafon should be: or (which is the fame), He cannot but deal reasonably with
all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of theſe, and
the mortality of the human foul does not confiſt with reaſon, we may be ſure it
is immortal: as fure as we can be of any thing by the ufe of our faculties; and
that is, as fure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth confift
with reafon, or not, is to be inquired.
To produce a being into a ſtate of clear happineſs, in any degree, can be no in-
jury to it; or into a state of mixt happiness, provided the happineſs certainly over-
balances the contrary, and the unhappy or fuffering part be not greater than what
that being would choofe in order to obtain the happineſs, or rather than loſe it.
Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being fubject to more mifery
than happineſs, if that being hath it in his own power to avoid the mifery,
or fo much of it, as may leave the remainder of mifery not greater, than what
he would rather fuftain than mifs the proportion of happineſs. The only cafe
then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when
it is neceſſarily and irremediably to be miferable, without any recompenfe, or ba-
lance of that miferya: and this indeed is a caſe ſo grievous, fo utterly irrecon-
cilable to all reason, that the heart of a reafoning and confidering man can ſcarce
bear the thought of it. So much every one muft underſtand of the nature of
reaſon and juſtice as to allow theſe things for truths inconteftable.
Now then he, who fays the foul of man is mortal, muſt fay one of theſe two things:
either that God is an unreaſonable, unjuft, cruel Being; or that no man in reſpect of
this life (which according to him is all), has a greater ſhare of mifery, unavoidable,
than of happineſs. To fay the former is to contradict that, which I prefume has
been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow
fuch an unworthy, impious notion of the Supreme being, as one would not entertain
without caution even of the worst of men; fuch a one, as even the perfon himſelf,
who fays this, muft know to be falfe. For he cannot but fee, and muſt own many
inftances of the reaſonableness and beneficence of the Deity: not one of which could
be, if cruelty and unreaſonableneſs were His inclination; fince He has power to ex-
ecute His own inclinations thoroughly, and is a Being uniform in his nature. Then
to fay the latter is to contradict the whole ftory of mankind, and even ones own fenfes.
• That paffage in S. Iqqar. imports much the fame thing, that has been faid here: 17
הוא
מבואר שהדבר שמציאותו טוב ראוי שימצא והרבר שמציאותו רע אין ראוי שימצא ומה
שמציאותו מעורב מן הטוב והרע אם הטוב הוא הגובר ראוי שימצא ואם הרע הוא הגובר אין
ראוי שימצא
Confi-
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c.
201
Confider well the dreadful effects of many wars, and all thoſe barbarous defola-
tions, which we read of: what cruel tyrants there are, and have been in the
world, who (at leaſt in their fits) divert themſelves with the pangs and convulfi-
ons of their fellow-creatures: what flavery is, and how men have been brought
into that lamentable ſtate: how many have been ruind by accidents unforeſeen :
how many
have fufferd or been undone by unjust laws, judges, witneſſes, &c.
how many have brought incurable difeafes, or the causes of them, and of
great
torments, into the world with them: how many more, fuch bodily infirmities
and diſadvantages, as have renderd their whole lives uneafy : how many are
born to no other inheritance but invincible poverty and trouble? Inftances are
endleſs: but, for a little taste of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon
that ſtory related by Strabo (from Polybius) and Plutarch, where, even by or-
der of the Roman fenate, P. Æmylius, one of the beſt of them too, at one
prefixt hour facked and deſtroyd ſeventy cities, unawares, and drove fifteen my-
riads of innocent perfons into captivity; to be fold, only to raiſe pay for the
mercileſs foldiers and their own executioners. Perufe that account of the gold-
works in the confines of Egypt given by Diodorus: and think over the circum-
ſtances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men
taken in war, but even fuch as calumny, or unjust power had doomd (perhaps
for being too good) to that place of torment; many times with all their relations
ad lucernam decollabat.
a C.Cafar
Senatores & Equites - cecidit, torfit, non quæftionis, fed animi causâ. Deinde quof-
dam ex illis
Torferat per omnia, qua in rerum natura triſtiſſima funt,
fidiculis, &c.Sen. Homo, facra res, jam per lufum & jocum occiditur. Id.
b Slaves were rec-
kond among beafts of old. Οὔτε η γυνὴ πέφυκας, ἔντ᾽ ἐν ἀνδράσι σύγ᾽ ἔν. Εurip. And fometimes as
mere inftruments and tools. Ὁ δ δέλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον· τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον ἄψυχος δόλος. Arifs. Their
fad condition I will fet down in Plato's words. Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τᾶτό γ' ἐςὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖος ἀλλὰ
ἀνδραπόδε τινὸς, ᾧ κρεῖτιον τεθνάναι ἔσιν ἢ ζῆν· ὅσις ἀδικέμενος καὶ προπηλακιζόμενος, μὴ διόςτε ἔσὶν αυτὸς
â
αυτῷ βοηθεῖν, μηδὲ ἄλλῳ ᾗ ἂν κήδεται. c Thore ἄῤῥητοι & άπισοι δυςυχίαι, which the τελῶναι lad
اد ہے
brought upon the cities of Aſia, are too many to be tranſcribed: but ſome account of them is to be
ſeen in Plut. v. Luc. which may ferve for one inſtance out of thouſands. It may be reckond madneſs
indeed, maximas virtutes, quaſi graviſſima delicta, punire; as Val. M. fays, ſpeaking of Phocion's cafe: but
ſuch madneſs has been very common, and men have ſuffered even for their virtue. Ochus cruelly put to
death, Ocham fororem—, & patruum cum centum ampliùs filiis ac nepotibus—, nulla injuria laceſſitus,
fed quòd in his maximam apud Perfas probitatis & fortitudinis laudem confiftere videbat. Id. And Seneca
having recommended the example of Gracinus Julius (Julius Gracinus, ap. Tacit. the father of Ju-
lius Agricola), adds, quem C. Cafar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior vir erat, quàm eſſe quemquara
tyranno expediret.
and
202
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
}
e
σκα
and poor children. Or, once for all, take a view of fervitude, as it is defcribed by
Pignorius. To paſs over the Sicilian tyrants, him of Phera, Apollodorus and
the like, of which hiſtory ſupplies plenty; confider thoſe terrible profcriptions
among the Romans, with the reigns of moft of their emperors, more bloody
than Lybic lion, or Hyrcanian tiger, even fome of the Chriftian emperors not
excepted. Read the direful and unjuft executions reported by Amm. Marcelli-
nus: among hundreds of others that of Eufebius d. Every whisper in thoſe times
or light fufpicion brought upon men the queſtion and tortures inconceivable.
Men's very dreams were once interpreted to be treafon; and they durft ſcarce
own, that they had ever ſlept . What inhuman puniſhments were uſed a-
mong the Perfians f, in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to
whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concerned &? But inſtead of enume-
rating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, ra
4rops, &c. I chooſe to refer you to thofe authors, who have defignedly treated
of the torments and questions of the ancients. Look into the hiſtory of the Chrifti-
an Church, and her martyrologies: examin the priſons of the inquifition, the
groans of which thoſe walls are conſcious, and upon what flight occafions men
are racked and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finiſh this detail (hide-
ous indeed, but too true) as faft as I can, confider the many maffacres, perſecu-
tions, and miſeries conſequent upon them, which falſe religion has cauſed, au-
thorized, fanctified. Indeed the history of mankind is little elſe but the hifto-
ry of uncomfortable, dreadful paffages: and a great part of it, however things
are palliated and gilded over, is ſcarcely to be red by a good natured man without
amazement, horror, tears. One can ſcarce look into a news-paper, or out at his
window, but hardſhips and ſufferings preſent themſelves, in one ſhape or other.
Now among all thofe millions, who have ſufferd eminently, can it be imagind, that
there have not been multitudes, whoſe griefs and pangs have far outweighd all their
injoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their
ह
* Οἱ ἀδίκοις διαβολᾶις περιπεσόντες, καὶ διὰ θυμὸν ἐις φυλακὰς παραδεδομένοι, ποτὲ μὴὺ αυτοί, ποτε ἢ καὶ
μετά πάσης συγγενείας. b Mentiond by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of Caffandria, and
is reprefented (out of Polyanus) as φονικώτα ἢ ἡμότατο πάντων, ὅσοι παρ' Ἕλλησινὴ παρὰ Βαρβά
ροις ἐτυράννησαν. Yet #lian fays, Εκ δ' ὄρνε ὑπαναφλεγόμενα ὑπεξαπλόμενΘ, ἐγίνετο φονικώτερος, κλ.
• It is faid of Sylla's peace, after Marius's party were broken, Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, &
vicit. S. Auſt. d Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deeffent, implorans calo juftitiam,
torvùm renidens fundato pectore manfit immobilis, &c. In the reign of Conftantius. • Marebant-
que do&ti quidam, quòd apud Atlanteos nati non effent, ubi memorantur fomnia non videri.
in v. Artox. & Ob⋅ noxam unius omnis propinquitas perit. Amm. Marc.
f V. Plut.
prudence,
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 203
prudence, or any power in them, to escape that bitter draught, which they have
drunk? And then, how can we acquit the justice and reaſonableness of that Being,
upon whom theſe poor creatures depend, and who leaves them fuch great lofers
by their exiſtence, if there be no future ftate, where the proper amends may be
made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable iffue; if the ſoul of
man is not immortal, either there is no God, upon whom we depend; or He is
an unreaſonable Being; or there never has been any man, whoſe fufferings in this
world have exceeded his injoyments, without his being the cauſe of it himſelf.
But furely no one of theſe three things can be faid. Ergo---.
That, which aggravates the hard caſe of the poor ſufferers mentiond above, if
there be no future ftate, in which their paſt ſufferings may be brought into the ac-
count, and recompenſed, is, that many times their perfecutors and tormentors paſs
their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the innocent have not only the portion,
that properly belongs to the criminal and unreaſonable part of mankind, but:
the guilty have that, which belongs rather to the innocent. Such a transpo-
fition of rewards and puniſhments, ending in itſelf, without any reſpect to ſome- -
thing which is to follow hereafter, can never confift with the nature of a Go-
vernor, who is not very much below rational: a thought, which God forbid any
one ſhould dare to admit of Him. To fuppofe the virtuous and wife left ultimate-
ly but in the fame ſtate with the unjuſt and profligate is to fuppofe fuch a confti-
tution of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reafon, a God of truth
and equity and therefore fuch a conftitution, as leaves the former in a worfe con-
dition than the other, can much leſs be ſuppoſed.
Obj. It hath been faid, that virtue tends to make men's lives happy even here, &c.
and how then can the virtuous be fuppofed ever to be ſo very miferable? Anf. In or-
dinary cafes virtue doth produce happineſs: at leaſt it has indeed a natural tendency
to it; is the mean,by which it is moſt likely to be attaind; and is therefore the way,
which a wife man would chooſe for his own fake. But then it doth not follow from
hence, that there are no perturbations in human affairs; no cafes, in which the uſual
effect of virtue may be overpowerd by diſeaſes, violence, dyfafters. It doth not ren-
der men invulnerable; cannot command the feafons; nor prevent many great cala-
mities, under which virtue and vice muft fall undiftinguifhd. (There may be a direct
road to a place, and fuch a one, as he, who fets out for that place, ought to be found
in, and yet it is poffible he may meet with robbers or accidents in it, that may incom-
mode, or hurt him in his journey.) On the other fide, vice and wickedness may be fo
• Dies deficiet, fi velim numerare, quibus bonis malè evenerit: nec minùs, fi commemorem, quitus
improbis optimè. Cic. This is juftly faid; tho I account his inftances not the moſt appofite.
cir-
204
Sect. IX.
The RELIGION of NATURE.
circumſtantiated as to be attended with much greater pleaſure than pain, contrary
to the tendency of its nature: that is, a wicked man may be of a healthful make,
born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the
advantage of a ſtrong body, an ample fortune, many friends, or lucky hits, he
may derive pleaſures, which fhall exceed the preſent inconveniences and fufferings
naturally following from his vices a.
Men's circumstances have a natural influence with reſpect to the prefent pleaſures
or ſufferings, as well as their virtue or vice. No body fure ever faid, that all de-
pends only upon theſe: nor, when the natural tendence of them is afferted, is the
natural tendence or effect of the other denied. Therefore indeed, when it is faid
that virtue naturally tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is,
that it tends to make men happy in proportion to their circumſtances; and vice
does the contrary. It is naturally productive of that part of happineſs, which is
in our own power, and depends upon our felves; makes men more truly happy,
whatever their circumftances are, than they could be without it, and commonly
tends to mend their worldly circumſtances too: but it is not afferted, that vir-
tue can always intirely correct them, or make men fo completely happy in this
life, as that their injoyments fhall exceed their mortifications; no more than
the vices of fome particular men, tho they bercave them of many folid pleaſures,
and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly injoyments from be-
ing greater than their prefent fufferings. Not only our being, but our place,
with the time, and manner of our being in this world depend upon the Author of
the ſcheme the manner of behaving our felves in our ſtation (according to our in-
dowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which
has been hinted already) He has fo orderd things on purpoſe, that from the various
compofitions of men's circumſtances with the natural effects of their virtues and vi-
ccs, and the many inequalities arifing thence, they might fee the neceffity and cer-
tainty of another ftate: and that for this reaſon there fhould always be fome re-
markable inftances of oppreft innocence and flourishing wickedness.
The upshot is, that upon comparing thofe pleaſures, which are the natural ef-
fects of virtue with thofe fufferings, which are the natural effects of ill conftitu-
tion or other calamity, thefe are many, very many times found to exceed: and è con-
trario, upon balancing thofe evils, which are the genuin effects of vice, againſt the
• Yet according to Ariftotle he cannot be happy for all that.
thus: τω ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀυτάρκη πρὸς ἐυδαιμονίαν προδεῖς
τῶν
His opinion Diog. L. repreſents
τε τε σώμα & ἢ ἐκτὸς ἀγα-
τὴν μαζί του κακίαν ἀντάξκη πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, καν ὅτι μάλισα παρῇ αὐτῇ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ κ
τὰ πει σώμα.
ad-
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 205
advantages refulting from a fortunate eftate, theſe may often be found to outdo the
other. Both contrary to reaſon, if all ends with this life, and after death be nothing.
For my part, if there were only fome few, nay but one inftance of each kind in the
world (unfortunate virtue, and profperous wickedness), it would be to me a fuffici-
ent argument for a future ftate: becauſe God cannot be unjuſt or unreaſonable in
any one inſtance. It muſt not be forgot here, that many times men of great vices have
alſo great virtues, and the natural effect of theſe may qualify that of the other, and
being added to their favourable circumftances may help to turn the ſcale.
If there is no other befide the preſent being, the general and ufual ſtate of man-
kind is ſcarce confiftent with the idea of a reaſonable Caufe. Let us confider it a lit-
tle. Not to mention what we muſt ſuffer from the very fettlement and condition of
this world by hunger, thirft, heat, cold, and indifpofitions; like leaves one gene-
ration drops, and another ſprings up, to fall again, and be forgotten b. As we come
into the world with the labor of our mothers, we foon go out of it with our own.
Childhood and youth are much of them loft in infenfibility or trifling, vanity and
rudeneſs; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are ſpent in
the beſt manner, are attended with labor and diſcipline. When we reach that
flage of life, which uſually takes us from our neareft relations, and brings us out
into the world, with what difficulty are proper imployments and ftations found
for us? When we are got out, and left to fcramble for ourſelves, how many-
hardſhips and tricks are put upon us, before we get the fagacity and dexterity
to fave ourſelves? How many chances do we ftand? How troubleſome is buſineſs
made by unreaſonableneſs, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the per-
ſons with whom we deal? How do we find ourſelves inſtantly ſurrounded with
Snares from defigning men, knaves, enemies (of which the beſt men have ſomc),
oppoſite intereſts, factions, and many times from a miſchievous breed, whole chil-
diſh or diabolical humor feeks pleaſure in the uneafineſs of other people? Even
in many of thoſe injoyments, which men principally propofe to themſelves, they
are greatly diſappointed, and experience fhews, how unlike they are to the an-
tecedent images of them. They are commonly mixt: the apparatus to most of
them is too operofe: the completion of them feldom depends upon ourselves
• Et valet annales noftrorum audire laborum. For, as Seneca fays, Nulli contigit impunè naſci.
Β' Οιππερ φύλλων γενεή, τοιήδε ἢ ἀνδρῶν. is ufù qúeo, ÿd Stoλya. Hom. This is true not only of
fingle men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may fay the fame concern-
ing many of them, that Florus fays of Veii: Laborat annalium fides, ut Veios fuiffe credamus.
c Labor voluptafq; diffimillima naturâ, focietate quadam inter fe naturali funt junta. Liv.
D d
alone,
206 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
alone, but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit all right: they are
generally not only leſs in practice, than in theory, but die almoſt as ſoon as they
are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To
go on with the hiſtory of human life: tho affairs go profperouſly, yet ftill per-
haps a family is increafing, and with it new occafions of folicitude are introdu-
ced, accompanied with many fears and tender apprehenfions. At length, if a
man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at old age,
then he feels moſt commonly his preffures rather increaſed, than diminiſhd, and
himſelf less able to fupport them b. The bufinefs he has to do grows urgent
upon him, and calls for dispatch: moſt of his faculties and active powers begin
now to fail him apace: relations and friends, who might be helpful to him (and
among them perhaps the dear Confort of all his joys, and all his cares ) leave
him, never to return more: wants and pains all the while are multiplying upon
him and under this additional load he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and
bending toward the earth; till he either ſtumbles upon ſomething which throws
him into the grave, or fainting falls of himſelf. And muſt he end here? Is
this the period of his being? Is this all? Did he come into the world only to
make his way through the preſs, amidſt many juſtlings and hard ftruggles, with
at beſt only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleafures interfperfed, and fo go out
of it again? Can this be an end worthy a firſt Cauſe perfectly reasonable? Would
even any man, of common ſenſe and good nature, fend another upon a difficult
journey, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little ſmooth
way, get an interval for reft and contemplation, or be flatterd with fome ver-
dures and the ſmiles of a few daifies on the banks of the road; yet upon the
whole he muſt travel through much dirt, take many weariſom ſteps, be conti-
nually inquiring after fome clew or directions to carry him through the turnings
and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent viaticum and pay his
reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being loft in deep waters, and befide
forced all the while to fence againſt weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who
are every where lying in wait for him: I fay, would any one ſend a man upon
fuch a journey as this, only that the man might faint and expire at the end of it,
and all his thoughts perish; that is, either for no end at all, or for the punishment
of one, whom I fuppofe never to have hurt him, nor ever to have been capable
a Senfible of this, Socrates uled to fay, δεῖν τὰς ἡδονας, μή παρ' άλλων, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἡμῶν θηράς. Stob.
• Senex, & leviffimis quoq; curis impar: as Seneca, of himſelf, in Tac.
Rogus afpiciendus
amata Conjugis, &c. Juv. Ο Σμίκρα παλαιά σώματ' ευνάζει ροπή, Soph.
4
of
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 207
of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the
common fize of men a ?
I am apt to think, that even among thofe, whoſe ſtate is beheld with envy, there
are many, who, if at the end of their courſe they were put to their option, whe-
ther, without any reſpect to a future ftate, they would repeat all the pleaſures
they have had in life, upon condition to go over again alſo all the fame diſappoint-
ments, the fame vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the ſame ſe-
cret pangs and tedious hours, the fame labors of body and mind, the fame
pains and fickneffes, would be far from accepting them at that price b.
But here the cafe, as I have put it, only refpects them, who may be reckond
among the more fortunate paſſengers: and for one, that makes his voyage fo well,
thousands are toft in tempefts, and loft. How many never attain any comforta-
ble ſettlement in the world? How many fail, after they have attaind it, by various
misfortunes? What melancholy, what diſtractions are caufed in families by inhu-
mane or vitious husbands, falfe or peevish wives, refractory or unhappy chil-
dren; and, if they are otherwife, if they are good, what forrow by the loſs of them?
How many are forced by neceffity upon drudging and very fhocking imploy-
ments for a poor livelihood? How many ſubſiſt upon begging, borrowing, and o-
ther ſhifts, nor can do otherwiſe? How many meet with fad accidents, or fall into
deplorable diſeaſes? Are not all companies, and the very ſtreets filled with com-
plaints, and grievances, and doleful ſtories? I verily believe, that a great part
of mankind may aſcribe their deaths to want and dejection. Seriously, the pre-
fent ftate of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not fome connexion with ano-
ther, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it d.
There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who
carefully peruſes the ſtory and face of the world, what appears to prevail in it? Is
it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at leaft? Are not debauching, getting
per fas aut nefas, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other,
2
C
اد
ভা
* Πάντες ἐσμεν ἐν ὁδῷ εἶδες ἐπὶ τ ὁδὸ φυτὸν ἢ πόαν ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ὅ, τι αν τύχῃ ἢ ἀξίων θεάματα.
μικρὸν ἐτέςφθης; ειτα παρέδραμες· πάλιν ἐνέτυχες λίθοις τὴ φάραγξιν & κρήμνοις & σκοπέλοις, ἤ που σ
ή
θηρίοις, κλ. Τοιότου ό βιθ. Βaf.
b Non mehercule quifquam accepiffet [vitam], nifi da-
retur infciis. Sen.
• Paulifper te crede fubduci in montis ardui verticem celfiorem ; fpecu-
lare inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; & oculis in diverfa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi turbines in-
tuere. Fam feculi ipfe miferaberis, &c. Cypr.
eo fi poffis in illa fublimi fpecula conftitutus oculos tuos infe-
rere fecretis, recludere cubiculorum obductas fores, & ad confcientiam luminum penetralia occulta re-
ferare, &c. Cypr.
2an oblyn. P. Aboth.
•
העולם הזה דומה לפרוזדור בפני d
Dd 2
pro-
208 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
propagating empty and fenfeleſs opinions with bawling and fury the great bufi-
neſs of this world? And are not all theſe contrary to reafon? Can any one then
with reafon imagine, that reaſon fhould be given, tho it were but to a few, only
to be run down and trampled upon, and then extinguiſhd? May we not rather
conclude, that there muſt be ſome world, where reafon will have its turn, and
prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of reafon to come a?
۲۰۰
In the laſt place, that great expectation, which men have, of continuing to
live in another ſtate, beyond the grave, has I fuppofe been commonly admitted as one
proof, that they shall live; and does feem indeed to me to add fome weight to
what has been faid. That they generally have had ſuch an expectation, can ſcarce
be denied. The hiſtories of mankind, their deifications, rites, ftories of appari-
tions, the frequent mention of a bades, with rewards and puniſhments hereafter,
&c. all teftify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the fouls of men furvi-
ved their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the feats and circumſtances of the de-
parted has begot many errors and fuperftitions; and theſe have been multiplied by
licentious poets and idle vifionairs: but this, being no more than what is ufual in
the like cafes, ought to be no prejudice againſt the fundamental opinion itſelf.
Cicero b, tho he owns there were different opinions among the Greek philo-
fophers about this matter; that, quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit,
animos hominum effe fempiternos; that Pythagoras and his ſchool confirmed this
opinion; that Plato was the man, who brought a reaſon for it, &c. yet tells us
plainly, naturam ipfam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare; that nefcio
quomodo inhæret in mentibus quafi fæculorum quoddam augurium; that permanere
animos arbitramur confenfu nationum omnium; and more to this purpoſe. Now
if this conſent was only the effect of fome tradition, handed from parents to
their children; yet fince we meet with it in all the quarters of the world (where
there is any civility or fenfe), and in all ages, it feems to be coeval to mankind
itſelf, and born with it. And this is fufficient to give a great authority to this
opinion of the foul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is fupported by all
the foregoing arguments, and many other reaſonings and ſymptoms which we
may find within ourſelves. All which, put together, may at leaft justify an
expectation of a future ftate: that is, render it a juft or reaſonable expectation:
and then this reaſonable expectation grows, by being fuch, into a further ar-
gument, that there will be fuch a ſtate.
a
Befide, there being no fatiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities,
when our faculties fall be exalted, &c. Τῆς ἀληθείας ε θέας ξ' ὄντα ἐδεὶς ἐνταυθα τ ἐρώντων
ενέπλησεν ἑαυτὸν ἱκανῶς, κτλ, Plut.
b In Tufc; difp.
Fancy
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 209
Fancy a man walking in fome retired field, far from noife, and free from pre-
judice, to debate this matter with himſelf: and then judge, whether fuch me-
ditations as theſe would not be juft." I think I may be ſure, that neither lifeless
"matter, nor the vegetative tribe, that ftone, that flower, that tree have any
"reflex thoughts: nor do the fenfitive animals, that ſheep, that ox, feem to have
CC any ſuch thing, or but in the loweſt degree, and in reſpect of preſent objects
"only. They do not reafon, nor difcourfe. I may therefore certainly pretend to
"be fomething much above all theſe things. I not only apprehend and confi-
"der theſe external objects acting at prefent upon my nerves, but have ideas
"raiſed within my felf of a higher order, and many: I can, not only repreſent:
"to my ſelf things, that are, or have been, but deduce many other from them,
"make excurfions into futurity, and foreſee much of what will be, or at leaſt
66 may be; by ſtrict thinking I had almoſt faid, get into another world before-
"hand: and, whether I fhall live in ſome other ſtate after death, or not, I am
"certainly a being capable of fuch an expectation, and cannot but be folicitous a-
"bout it: none of which things can be faid of thefe clods, or thoſe brutes b. Can:
"I then be defignd for nothing further, than just to eat, drink, fleep, walk about,
"and act upon this earth; that is, to have no further being, than what theſe
"brutes have, fo far beneath me? Can I be made capable of ſuch great expectati-
ons, which thoſe animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I
"am, if we muſt die alike), only to be disappointed at laft? Thus placed, juft upon
"the confines of another better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it,
"and injoying it, only to make a short appearance hered, and then to be shut out,
" and totally funk? Muſt I then, when I bid my laſt farewell to theſe walks, when
"I cloſe theſe lids, and yonder blue regions and all this ſcene darken upon me and
"go out, must I then only ferve to furniſh duft to be mingled with the aſhes of
“theſe herds and plants, or with this dirt under my feet? Have I been fet ſo far a-
"bove them in life, only to be leveld with them at death?
CC
This argument grows ftronger in the apprehenfion of one, who is confcious of a-
bilities and intellectual improvements, which he has had no opportunity here of
fhewing and ufing, through want of health, want of confidence, want of pro-
b Alexander after:
• Methinks thoſe philoſophers make but an odd appearance in ſtory, who, looking big and faftur.
ous, at the ſame time profeffed, that their own fouls were not fuperior to thoſe of gnats, &c. ¿
τας ὀφοῦς ἀνεσπακότες μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐσίαν διαφέρειν ἀπεφήναντο ἐμπίδα τε καὶ ἐυλῆς, @ μύιας,
και συός ψυχῆς
death might be in the fame ftate with his muletier (M. Anton.), but fure not with his mulė.
c. Brevis eft hic fructus bomullis, may be juftly faid for all Lucretius.
4 Ο κόσμος σκηνή,
ὁ βίος πάροδος ἦλθες, ίδες, ἀπῆλθες. Democrat.
xỳ
τίω σφῶν αὐτῶν φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχήν, as Eufeb.
..Prov. .א צנועים חכמה :
.א
perr
210
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
per place, want of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge confequent
upon them, cannot ultimately reſpect this ftate: they can be only an inlargement,
and preparation for another. That is all they can be: and if they are not that, they
are nothing. And therefore he may be fuppofed thus, further, to argue within
himſelf. "Can the Author of my reafoning faculties be Himſelf ſo unreasonable
❝as to give me them, either not to imploy them, or only to weary my felf with
"ufeless purſuits, and then drop me? Can He, who is privy to all my circum-
ſtances, and to theſe very thoughts of mine, be fo infenfible of my cafe, as to
❝ have no regard to it, and not provide for it?
··66
It grows ftronger ftill upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard
treatment he has met with from this world, the little cauſe he has given for it,
the pains and fecret uneafineſs he has felt upon that ſcore, together with many
other ſufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a
filent, humble appeal to that Being, who is his laft and true refuge, and who he
muſt believe will not defert him thus.
Laſtly, it is strongest of all to one, who, befides all this, endeavours in the con-
duct of his life to obferve the laws of reafon (that is, of his nature; and that is, of
the Author of nature, upon whom he depends); laments, and labors againſt his
own infirmities; implores the Divine mercy; prays for fome better ftate hereafter;
acts and lives in the hopes of one; and denies himſelf many things upon that view:
one, who by the exaltation of his reaſon and upper faculties, and that, which is
certainly the effect of real and uſeful philofophy, the practice of virtue, is ftill
approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taſte ſomething
ſpiritual and above this world. To fuch a one there muſt be a ſtrong expecta-
tion indeed, and the argument built upon it muſt be proportionable. For can he
be indowd with fuch capacities, and have as it were overtures of immortality
made him, if after all there is no fuch thing? Muſt his private acts and conceald
exerciſes of religion be all loft? Can a perfect Being have fo little regard to one,
who however inferior and nothing to Him, yet regards Him according to his
best abilities in the government of himſelf?
Are fuch meditations and reflexions as theſe well founded, or not? If they are,
it muſt be reaſonable to think, that God will fatisfy a reaſonable expectation.
There are other arguments for the immortality of the foul, two of which I will
leave with you, to be at your leiſure ponderd well. The one is, that, if the fouls of
men are mortal (extinguiſhd at death), the cafe of brutes is by much preferable to
that of men. The pleaſures of brutes, tho but fenfual, are more fincere, being
• Hic pietatis hongs ?
palled
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 211
palled or diminiſhd by no diverting confideration: they go wholly into them;
and when they have them not, they ſeem less to want them, not thinking of them.
Their ſufferings are attended with no reflexion, but are fuch as they are faid to
be p. 34. obf. 8. They are void of cares; are under no apprehenfion for families
and poſterity; never fatigue themſelves with vain inquiries, hunting after know-
ledge which muſt perifh with them; are not anxious about their future flate
nor can be diſappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at laſt ſome fudden
blow (or a few minutes of unforeseen pain) finiſhes them, having never ſo much
as known that they were mortal.
The other is, that the foul is a principle of life: that, which brings vitality to
the body. For how ſhould that, which has been proved to be a ſubſtance, and
at the fame time is alfo a principle of life, and as fuch (as being what it is) is
alive; I fay, how can that die ", unleſs it is annihilated?
Here I begin to be very fenfible how much I want a guide. But as the religion
of nature is my theme, I muſt at preſent content my ſelf with that light which
nature affords; my buſineſs being, as it ſeems, only to fhew, what a Heathen
philofopher, without any other help, and almoſt avrodidaer, may be fuppofed to
think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing elſe containd in this
Delineation, can be the leaft prejudice to any other true religion. Whatever is
immediately reveald from God, muft, as well as any thing elfe, be treated as be-
ing what it is: which cannot be, if it is not treated with the higheſt regard,
believed and obeyd. That therefore, which has been fo much infifted on by me,
and is as it were the burden of my fong, is fo far from undermining true reveald
religion, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this
oppor-
tunity to remark to you once for all. And fo returning to my philofopher, I can-
not imagin but that even he would have at leaſt ſome fuch general thoughts as
thefe, which make up almoft the remainder of this laſt ſection.
S. Iq9sa יצטערו בהיותם משערים שסופם למות כאדם וכו'
לא b
• Fera pericula, quae vident, fugiunt: cum effugere, fecura funt, &c. Sen.
‹ Sic mihi perfuafi, fic
fentio, cùm
femper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia fe ipfe moveat; ne¨
finem quidem habiturum effe motus, quia nunquam fe ipfe fit relicturus. Cic. That in Greg. Thaum.
is like this thought of Tully: Ἡ ψυχή, αυτοκίνητος ἔσα, ἐδέποτε ξ' είναι διαλείπει· ἀκολυθεῖ γδ τῷ ἀυς
τοκινήτῳ τὸ ἀεὶ κινητὸν ἔιναι· τὸ ἢ ἀεὶ κινητὸν ἅπαυτόν ἐτι, κλ. But that in S. Auflin comes fomething
nearer to my meaning: Eft animus vita quadam, unde omne quod animatum eſt vivit.
poteft animus mori. Nam fi carere poterit vita, non animus fed animatum aliquid et.
Non ergo™
IX. The
ť
212
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
IX. The foul, when it parts from this grofs body, will pass by fome law into
Some new feat, or ſtate, agreeable to the nature of it. Every ſpecies of beings
muft belong to fome region, or ftate. Becauſe nothing can be, but it muſt be
Some where, and ſome how: and there being different kinds of abodes and man-
ners of fubfifting in the univerfe, and the natures of the things, that are to
exiſt in them, being alfo different, there will be a greater congruity between
theſe ſeveral natures refpectively and fome particular places, or states, than there
is between them and others; and indeed fuch a one, that out of thoſe per-
haps they cannot ſubſiſt, or not naturally. To thoſe therefore muſt be their re-
fpective tendences: to thoſe they are adjudged by the courſe of nature, and con-
ftitution of things, or rather by the Author of them ".
While the foul is in the body, it has fome powers and opportunities of moving it
ſpontaneouſly, or otherwiſe than it would be moved by the meer laws of gra-
vitation and mechanifm. This is evident. But yet, notwithſtanding this, the
weight of that body, to which at preſent it is limited (among other cauſes) con-
ftrains it to act for a while upon this ftage. That general law, to which bodies.
are ſubjected, makes it fink in this fluid of air, ſo much lighter than itſelf;
keeps it down; and fo determines the feat of it, and of the foul in it, to be
upon the ſurface of this earth, where, or in whofe neighbourhood it was firſt
produced. But then, when the foul fhall be difengaged from the grofs matter,
which now inclofes and incumbers it, and either become naked fpirit, or be on-
ly veild in its own fine and obfequious vehicle, it muſt at the fame time be ei-
ther freed from the laws of bodies, and fall under fome other, which will carry
it to ſome proper manſion, or ſtate; or at leaſt by the old ones be capable of
mounting upwards, in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of e-
merging out of theſe regions into fome medium more fuitable, and (if the phi-
loſopher may ſay ſo) equilibrious. Thus much as to the general state of fouls
after death. But then,
The tranfmigration of fouls has been much talked of: but ea fententia,quoniam ridicula, &
mimo dignior quàm ſcholâ, ne refelli quidem feriò debet ; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id cre-
dat. So Lactantius. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucian of Homer's having been a
camel in Bactria, &e.
1 Χωρείν η ανάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. Hierocl. c Ex humili
atque depreſſo in eum emicabit locum, quifquis ille eft, qui folutas vinculis animas beato recipit fmu.
Sen. Ἡ τὸ θνητῆς προσπαθείας επιβολή, ε ή θ' ἀρετῶν, ὅσον πτερῶν τινων, ἔκφυσις πρὸς ἃ * καλῶν κα
θαρὸν τόπον, εις των θείαν ἐυζωίαν ἡμᾶς ἀνάξει. Hierocl. d Depofitâ farcina, levior volabit ad
cælum. S. Hier.
X. In
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 213
X. In this new ſtate, or place of abode, there may be different ftations befitting
the differences of particular fouls among themſelves, as they are more or less perfect
in their kind. We ſee even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities,
figures, impulfes, &c. fettle into fome order among themſelves, agreeable to
thefe differences. And fo by the fame univerfal rule in nature (viz. that diffe-
rences in things are attended with anſwerable relations and effects) fouls muſt
alfo take their fituation in ſome kind of order according to their differences.
a
XI. The great difference of human fouls, with respect to perfection and
imperfection, lies in their different degrees and habits of reaſonableneſs or unreaſon-
ableness b. That is to ſay, not only in men's different improvements, or neglects
and abuſe of their rational faculties; but alſo in the greater or lefs influence of
thefe upon their actions, and by conſequence in their different degrees of virtue,
or vice. For a man is accounted a reaſonable man, when he reaſons rightly, and
follows his reafon in which expreffion virtue muſt be included, being (as
p. 179, & al.) nothing but the practice of reafon and truth.
That men are reaſonable, or the contrary, in different degrees is plain. Some
reaſon well upon ſome ſubjects, but in reſpect of others, to which they have
not been accuſtomd, are dim and confuſed: or they are partial to their vices
and paffions, their old impreffions and parties; and fo their reaſon is not gene-
ral, nor has its due extent, or influence. Others, whoſe reaſon is uncultivated
and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into fuperftition
and abfurdities; mifled by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes
of ſpeaking, and grave non-fenfe. Many, if not the moſt, ſeem to have ſcarce
any notion of reaſon or virtue at all, but act fortuitoufly, or as they ſee other
folks act; moved either by bodily propenfions, or by example. Some few
there are, who endeavour to improve their underſtandings, to diſcover what is
agreeable to reaſon, and to fix their opinions; and conduct their lives accord-
ingly. And in all theſe ſeveral kinds there are various degrees of elevation in
knowledge and virtue, and of immerfion in vice and ignorance, and new diffe-
rences arifing endlefly. All this is vifible.
The Jews, who generally fay, that by the practice of religion the foul acquires perfection and
life eternal, lay ſuch a ſtreſs upon habits of piety, that R. Albo makes the effect of giving 1000 zuzin in
charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one zuz and repeating it 1000 times non
.עשיית פעל אחר בעצמו יקנה מדרגה יותר גדולה מעשיית הפעל ההוא פעם אחת כל b
עושה מצות הבורא יתברך ימצא שכל טוב---והגמול הנמשך אחר השכל האמיתי הוא השארת
.I. Lev .הנפש אחר כלות הגוף והדבקו בשכל הפועל והיותו קים לעל
E e
Now
214
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
Now the foul, reflecting, finds in itſelf two general faculties, one, by which it
underſtands, and judges, and reafons (all which I comprehend under the term ra-
tional faculties, or reafon); and another, by which it wills, or determins to act,
according to the judgments and conclufions made in the upper part of it. And
the more perfectly it performs theſe operations (i.e. the more truly it reaſons, and
the more readily it wills and executes the decifions of reafon), the more perfect
certainly it muſt be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect.
The accompliſhments therefore and perfections of human fouls, and the contra-
ry, muſt be in proportion to the forementiond differences.
XII. According to thefe differences then it is reaſonable to think the fouls of men will
find their ſtations in the future world. This is but a corollary from what goes before.
Obj. Why ſhould we think, that God cauſes things to be in ſuch a manner,
as that in the future ftate men fhall be placed and treated according to their
merit, and the progreſs they have made in reaſon and virtue, when we ſee the
cafe to be widely different in this? Anf. It must be rememberd, that this is
one of thoſe very reaſons on which the belief of the foul's immortality is found-
ed. Now, if it be reaſonable to believe there is a future ftate, becauſe things
are dealt unequally now, upon that very fcore it will be reaſonable to think, that
they are dealt equally b in that other ſtate.
Here bodily wants and affections, and fuch things as proceed from them, do inter-
mix with human affairs, and do confound merit with demerit, knowledge with igno-
rance and hence it comes to paſs many times, that bad men injoy much, and good
men fuffer, and both are, if there is no other ftate, in their wrong places. But, when
the corporeal caufes of miſplacing fhall be removed, fpirits (or fpirits and their care
#veμTina) may be fuppofed more regularly to take their due pofts and privileges:
πνευματικά)
the impudent and vitious will have no fuch opportunities of getting into circum-
ftances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find fuch
obftructions to keep them down in circumſtances unworthy of them. Be fure the
more advanced and pure any ftate is, the more properly will the inhabitants be rank-
ed, and the juſter and more natural will the fubordination of its members be.
Even here we commonly find men in that kind of bufinefs, for which they are
educated and prepared, men of the fame profeffions generally keeping together; the
virtuous and reaſonable defiring to be (tho they not always can be) with their like © ;
• Τόπες προσήκοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ. Plato.
deferts: equitably.
b With an equal or impartial regard to every man's
ς ᾿Αγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαῖτας ἴασιν Αυτόματοι ἀγαθόν. F. Plat.
I
and
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 215
and the vitious (as they ſcarcely cannot be) with theirs. And why ſhould we not
think, that an aſſociation and communion of fouls with thoſe of their own fize,
difpofition, and habits may be more univerfal and compleat, when thoſe things,
which in great meaſure hinder it here, fhall be no more? If we may think this,
certainly thoſe fields or ſtates, in which the virtuous and wife ſhall meet, muſt
be different from thoſe in which the foolish and wicked fhall herd together b.
The very difference of the company will itſelf create a vaſt difference in the
manner of their living.
a
XIII. The manſions, and conditions of the virtuous and reaſoning part muſt be
proportionably better than those of the foolish and vitious. The propofition can-
not be inverted, or the cafe be otherwife, if the conftitution of things de-
pends upon a reaſonable caufe: as I have endeavourd to fhew it does.
Cor. Hence it follows, that the practice of reafon (in its juſt extent) is the
great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happiness through
all our fubfequent duration. But moreover,
XIV. In the future ftate refpect will be had not only to men's reaſoning, and
virtues, or the contrary, but also to their injoyments and fufferings here . Becauſe
the forementiond inequalities of this world can by no means be redreſt, unleſs
men's injoyments and fufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices,
are compared and balanced. I fay, taken together: becauſe no reaſon can be
affignd, why a vitious man ſhould be recompenfed for the pains and miſchiefs
and troubles, which he brings upon himself by his vices, as the natural confequen-
ces of them; nor, on the other fide, why any deductions ſhould be made from
the future happineſs of a good man upon the ſcore of thoſe innocent injoyments,
which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and found
reaſoning.
Cor. Wicked men will not only be leſs happy than the wife and virtuous, but
be really unhappy in that ftate to come. For when all the happineſs, that anſwers
to thoſe degrees of virtue, which they had, and thoſe ſufferings, which they
underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedneſs; I ſay, when
• Οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς, or οἱ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι, in Plato's ftyle.
う
​b
Ο Τελευτήσαντας αυ
τὲς ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὁ ἃ κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπον ου δέξεται, ενθάδε ἢ τί αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τ' διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ
ε Εἰ πλέον τ' ἁμαρτημάτων κολάζεται [ὁ δίκαι@], προσθήκη
ἕξεσι, κακός κακοις συνόντες. Plato.
δικαιοσύνης αυτῷ λογίζεται. Chryf.
Ee z
A
that
216 The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
that is fubtracted, what remains upon the account will be fomething below no-
happineſs: which must be fome quantity of poſitive unhappineſs, or miſery.
Thus there will be rewards, and puniſhments hereafter: and men will be hap-
py, or unhappy, according to their behaviour, injoyments, and ſufferings in
this prefent life. But,
XV. If the immortality of the foul cannot be demonftrated, yet it is certain the
contrary cannot 2. To fay, when a houſe is ruinous and faln, that it once had
an inhabitant, and that he is eſcaped out of it, and lives in fome other place,
can involve no contradiction, or abfurdity b. And,
XVI. If the immortality of the foul fhould be confiderd only as a probability, or
even as a chance poffible, yet still a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contra-
ry. For if the foul be mortal, and all perception periſhes for ever at our death,
what in this caſe does a good man lofe by his virtue? Very rarely more than fome
acts of devotion, and inſtances of mortification, which too by cuſtom grow
habitual and eaſy, and it may be pleafant by being (or ſeeming at leaſt to be)
reaſonable. On the other hand, what does a vitious man gain? Only fuch in-
joyments, as a virtuous man leaves: and thoſe are fuch, as moft commonly
owe their being to a vitiated tafte; grow infipid in time; require more trouble
and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off diſagreeably;
• Sure thoſe arguments in Lucretius can convince no body. Nunc quoniam, quaffatis undique va-
fis, Diffluere humorem, & laticem difcedere cernis; Crede animam quoque diffundi, &c. And Præterea
gigni pariter cum corpore & unà Crefcere fentimus, pariterque fenefcere mentem, &c. Quare animum
quoque diffolvi fateare neceffe eft; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi. Nor thofe in
Pliny (N.H. 7. 55.): if there really are any at all. For to plead the antegenitale experimentum is
to beg the queſtion; which may be put thus, Whether we ſhall after death. be more conſcious of
our exiſtence, than we were before we were born. And if Dicaarchus's Lesbiaci were extant, I be-
lieve we fould find nothing fronger in them. The truth feems to be, Οὐ βέλεται ὁ κακὸς ἀθάνατον
εἶναι των αυτό ψυχήν: but he comforts himfelf with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον ἐδένεια ἑαυτῇ
5. Tò peù eivaı
b Nor that the
will prevent future fufferings. This is . To en voi xaraQuyn. Hieroel.
foul fill exifts ἔρημον καταλιπέσα ζωῆς τ' ἡμέτερον οικον. Pb. 7. Domus ab habitatare deferta dilabitur:
Μακρὸς ἢ δ' όρθιος διμος ἐπ' αυτὴν [ἀρετὴκλα
- corpus, relictum ab anima, defluit. La&t.
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον. ἐπὴν δ᾽ εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηαι, Ρηϊδίη δ' ήπειτα πέλει. Hef
Kai rò
3
· are
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 217
C
are followd many times by ſharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear; and
at beſt after a ſhort time end in nothing, as if they had never been. This is all.
But then if the foul prove to be immortal (as we have all the reaſon in the world
to think it will), what does the virtuous man gain? His preſent pleaſures (if not
fo many) are more fincere b and natural ; and the effect of his felf-denials and
ſubmiſſion to reaſon, in order to prepare himſelf for a future ſtate, is the happi-
nefs of that ſtate: which, without pretending to defcribe it, may be prefumed
to be immortal, becauſe the ſoul is fo; and to be purer and of a more exalted na-
ture (i. e. truer, and greater) than any of theſe low injoyments here, becauſe
that ſtate is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked
man lofe? That happineſs, which the virtuous gain as fuch; and he finks, be-
fide, into, fome degree of the unhappiness of that future ftate: of which one
may fay in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappineſs or fuf-
ferings of this world, as the happiness and joys of that are above thofe of this.
In a ſtate that is ſpiritual and clear every thing will be purer, and operate
more directly and ſtrongly, and (if the expreffion may be tolerated) with more
Spirit: there will be fewer obftructions to either happineſs or unhappineſs: the
foul will lie more open, and have more immediate and acute perceptions of ei-
ther fo that each of them in their kind will be more intenfe, the one nearer
to pure or mere happineſs, the other to the contrary d. But to enter further
into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an un-
dertaking for my philofopher.
I ſhall only add, that the reaſoning and virtuous man has at leaſt this advan-
tage over the fooliſh and profligate, that, tho his wiſdom and virtue cannot ¿l-
ways rectify that which is amifs in himſelf or his circumftances, they will find
means to alleviate his preffures and diſadvantages, and fupport him under all
the anomalies of life, with comforts of which the other knows nothing: par-
ticularly this, the injoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of
felicity hereafter, fincere and durable e.
• Calo prafertur Adonis..
5 Ὁ ἀρετῇ διαπρέπων ( ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτες καρπόται. Hierost,
: If the foul was mortal, yet the virtuous nan τω ἑαυτῷ τελειότητα απολαμβάνων, τὸ οικεῖον καρτε
μενος ἀγαθὸν, ἐυδάιμων ὄντως ἐςὶ ἢ μακάριος, σ' ηδε τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. Simpl.
d "Que vo
μόνον τῷ καλῷ περιεῖναι το σπυδαῖον τ' φάυλε, ἀλλὰ ἢ ἀυτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ νικῶν, δι᾿ ἣν μόνην δοκεῖ εἰς κακοῖν ὁ
φαυλος ὑπάγες. Hier. επί γδ δίκαιοι τ' αδίκων, εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλεονεκτᾶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἦν ἐλπίσι
જ
γε σπεδάίαις ὑπερέχεσιν. Ifocr.
XVII. £
218
The RELIGION of NATURE. Sect. IX.
XVII. He therefore, who would act according to truth, muſt, in the laſt place,
not only confider what he is, and how circumftantiated in this prefent ftate, and pro-
vide accordingly but, further, must confider himself also as one whofe existence pro-
ceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How I think this is to be done,
by this time I hope you fully apprehend.
For a conclufion of the whole matter; let our converſation in this world, fo
far as we are concernd, and able, be fuch as acknowledges every thing to be
what it is (what it is in itself, and what with regard to us, to other beings, to
cauſes, circumſtances, confequences): that is, let us by no act deny any thing to be
true, which is true: that is, let us act according to reaſon: and that is, let us
act according to the law of our nature. By honeftly endeavouring to do this we
ſhall expreſs our duty to Him, who is the Author of it, and of that law
and at the fame time profecute our own proper happineſs (the happineſs of ra-
tional beings): we ſhall do what tends to make us eafy here, and be qualifying
our felves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great
revolution, which, at the fartheft, cannot be very far off.
ર
b
;
And now, Sir, the trouble is almoft over for the prefent, not properly which
I give you, but which you have brought upon yourſelf, thefe being the
Thoughts, which you defired: unless I have any where miſreprefented myſelf
through inadvertence; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in
fome places fubjoind a few little ſtrictures principally of antiquity, after the
manner of annotations: fuch as, when I came to reviſe theſe ſheets, I could re-
collect upon the fudden ; having no common-place book to help me, nor
thought of any ſuch thing before that time. They may ſerve perhaps ſometimes
a little to explain the text; and ſometimes to add weight; but chiefly to di-
vert you, who know very well how to improve any the least hint out of the
Ancients, and I fear will want to be diverted. I have alſo printed a few copies
of this Sketch, not with any deſign to make it public, but merely to ſave the
trouble of tranſcribing; being minded, fince I have made it, to leave
it not only with you, but perhaps alfo with two or three other friends :
3
Τρόπο η Θεῖς θεραπείας ὗτος ὁσιώτατος [ἀσκεῖν ἀρετήν]. 70.
added in the ſecond impreffion,
b Some more were
© Nothing more was intended at firſt. See the advertiſe-
+
ment.
or
Truths belonging to a Private Man, &c. 219
or however, with my Family, as a private monument of one that meant well.
Tho, as to the difpofal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment
and manner of acceptance.
WILLIAM WOLLASTON.
S
מכ"א ות"ל.
A Compleat INDEX to the RELIGION of NATURE Delineated.
A.
Chance, what
CTIONS, morally no cauſe
good or evil,
Chaſtity, what
A
in what crea-
tures to be
found p. 7,8
their ſpring 173
are expreffive as
well as words
may be fignificant or infignifi-
cant
8--13
II
the fame, when indifferent,
may have contrary fignificati-
ons
12
ſome have an unalterable mean-
ing
ibid.
what conftitutes their depra-
vity
13
what makes them unnatural ib.
-- morally good or evil, which zo
good, not equal
fuppofe the agent fufcepti-
ble of happineſs or mifery
38
according to right reaſon, and
according to truth the fame so
- public not to be determin'd by
22
83
Evil, no independent principle of
83, 84
180
Children, whence like their pa-
89,90
rents
their duty to parents 163-165
Comets, their motions and pha
Common-fenfe, no proper judge
of actions
23
Compaffion, a natural principle
in man
139, 140
– moſt viſible in the best men ibid.
Conflagrations, whether any have
91--93
been univerfal
Confequences, when juſt 44
Covetoufneſs, its feveral kinds 138
may be virtuous
Crimes may be evanefcent
fo many acts of injuftice 141
of a lefs heinous nature repre-
fented
Criminals, their difference
Cruelty, what
it
71
whence it may proceed 71, 72
its formal ratio
F.
138
Acts more expreffive than
12, 13
help us to judge of good and
evil
23
Faculties remain in the body, tho
their inftruments are loft 185,
196, 198
Falsehoods expreffible by actions
Fame, what
Fate, what
II
117, 118
ibid.
Freedom, whether in man 63,64
Forbearance from action in the
power of man
ibid.
31
144
Fortitude, what
Frugality, what
34
139, 140, 141
- inconfiftent with truth and na-
ture
139, 140
private judgment | Ꭰ
Adultery, its heinous nature laid
open
141, 142
Affection, natural, its dictates to
be follow'd
165
Agent, its difference from inftru-
8
ment
Agents, neceffary have no "non ib.
Animals, the wifdom expreffed
D
Eath may enlarge the facul-
ties of the foul 199
Defence, mutual, one end of fo-
ciety
153
Deluges, whether any have been
univerfal
91--93
Defpotic power not founded in
paternal authority 162, 163
Dominion not given, or loft, by
perfonal excellencies, or de-
in their ftructure 82, 83
fects
130
the laws by which they are go- Doubtful cafes, how to proceed
vern'd
96, 97
in them
Aftronomy affords noble proofs Duration, what
31, 58, 59
75
of a deity
78-80 Duties of rational agents, what
Attraction, what
how lodged in matter
79
ibid.
B.
B.E
63
of parents to their children
159--163
of children to their parents
163--165
owing to remote relations 165
--167
E.
Eings, different orders there-
of
108
Brutes, their fufferings and death
not like to thoſe of men 34,35
cautions to be obferved in kil-
ling them for uſe
their difference from men 233, E Ducation of children incum-
C.
2II
64
182, 183
180
Future-ftate, the neceſſity thereof
113, 114
the expectation of it juft and
reaſonable
193-211
G.
Eneration of animals how
perform'd
G
Glory, what
89-91
116-119
the defire of it, when juſtifia-
ble
118
God, feeks not the unhappineſs
of his creatures
39
how he conceives of things
45, IOI
his exiſtence proved by the
chain of caufes
-his exiftence proved by the
faculties of the mind
neceffarily exiftent
produced every thing
Thewn to be infinite
65--68
87--93
68
ibid.
69
69, 70
70
70, 75
his manner of exiſtence incon-
ceivable
-exists in a perfect manner
is but one
fuports all other beings 72
is the Author of nature 72,73
not the immediate Author of
the acts of free agents 74
not ſpace, duration or matter
74--76
not the univerſe
75, 76
the cauſe of matter and moti-
76--79
the Author of the univerſe 79
---87
bent on their parents 160,
161
Endeavour, what it means 63
Enjoyments, when lawful 40
Error, its caufes
59---62
on
81
Evil, its degrees how to be rated
ibid.
22
Ff
C Aufes, when fatisfactorily
known
the fame with effects
God
INDE
X.
God is free from defects 93, 94
is incomprehenfible ibid.
operates in the government of
the world
94, 95
governs the world by his pro-
vidence
95--114
his foreknowledge reconcilea-
ble with human liberty 99---
103
the duty which men ſhould
have towards him 114-126
how to be conceived of by
ibid.
his attributes, how to be un-
derstood
ibid.
Good and evil, coincident with
pleaſure and pain
35
how imputable to intelligent
beings
63
Government, its origin 149, 150
Gravitation not alone fufficient to
produce the motions of the
heavenly bodies
Guilt, its degrees vary with the
importance of things 31
man
H.
79
HAppinefs, nearly allied to
truth
31
coincident with the true quan-
Man,
Identity, in men, what 127, 198
Inanimate beings capable of no
obligation
63
govern'd by certain laws 96
Individuation, a principle in man
127
Indolence, a happineſs infinitely
diminiſh'd
37
Injustice, a violation of truth 137,
138
Innate maxims no proper judges
of right and wrong, 23
Intelligent beings have immediate
objects of their underſtand-
ings
41
have general ideas 41
are under obligations in
proportion to their facul-
ties
63
Irregularities in nature, whence
• 84, 85
Irreligion, its principal cauſe 60,
61
form'd in
58, 59
137
Judgment, how to be
dubious cafes
Juſtice, what
how to be eſtimated
33 K
tity of pleaſure
36, 37
whether capable of
exifting
without pleaſure
37
ultimate, what
38
38
the duty of every intelligent
the practice of it right 141
K.
Indred, to find the degrees
of obligation between
them
167
the dictates of natural affe-
Єtion for them to be regarded
165---167
L.
AW of nature, what
being to, prot procurable but Lawo obtaining ha the uni-
ultimate,
by the practice of truth 38,
in
168
fenfible of defects
defirous of happineſs 169
muſt be ſubject to reaſon 169
---171
muſt provide for himſelf
171, 172
muſt hearken to his affecti-
ons
172--175
muft remember he is but
175, 176
man
muft examine himſelf and
repent
176
muft labor to improve his
faculties
176, 177
178
muſt be adviſed
muft lay afide his prejudi-
ces
179
muft live virtuouſly 179---
183
is compounded of foul and
body
184--186
fummary of his duty in life
218
Marriage, its foundation and
end's
154
its advantages 155, 156
the nature of the compact
111
its obligations how
ftrengthen'd
156, 157
157
how made a natural re-
lation
158
how best to be underta-
ken
ibid.
the contract to be religi-
ouſly obſerved
ibid.
159
the behaviour it requires
under affliction
whether it gives autho-
verfe
96, 97
rity to the man ibid.
of fociety, natural 128, 148
the foundation of all na-
muft confift with natural ju-
tural relations 166
148, 149
makes a ftrict union ibid.
muſt be obſerved
152 Mathematicians, their way of rea-
where they fail, thofe of
foning 44, 45
nature take place ibid. Matter, what
what to be done when they
74, 75
its manner of exiſtence 77
oppoſe the laws of nature
152, 153
Liberty, wherein it confifts 63,64
Life, human, its hiſtory 201--208
Love of our country, whence 151
-
78
not ſelf-exiftent 76,77
whether capable of think-
39
never deftructive of the nature
of the creature
39
ftice
wherein it confifts
40
coincident with truth
ibid.
the end of religion
ibid.
hard to judge of it in others
110--114
-every man's property
131
ought to be defended
132,
133
ing
how obtainable
Heavens, figns of providence
therein
104, 105
218
Men,
116--119
MAN
Honours, what
118, 119
ftifiable
Humanity, what
118
139
I.
IDeas,
known to the mind
LI III
Honour, how to be given to God
when the defire of them ju-
Human life, its hiftory 201--208
Deas, immediate, adequately
42
their immediate relations
known to the mind 42, 43
114
a focial creature
145
the best judge of himſelf 167
has fome things in common
with inferior creatures 168
is endow'd with various fa-
culties
ibid.
is confcious of liberty 183,
184
poffeffed of many inclinati-
ons and averfions 168
Mind, its operation in reaſoning
how it gradually increafes
its faculties
may be affected by fudden
influences
105-107
Monarchy, not founded in pater-
nal authority 162, 163
Monſters, whence 84,85
M.
AN not abfolutely free 107
his duty towards God
whether they have exifted
from eternity
186, 193
91--93
Mercy, what
129
the practice of it right
141
47
its progreſs in knowledge
54, 55
87
Moral
1NDE
X.
Moral good and evil, what 7, 8, 20.
coincident with right and
wrong
20, 22
22
the vulgar rules for di-
ftinguiſhing between
them faulty
Morality, its juft foundation 25
Motion, what, and how caufed
77, 78, 183, 184
Murder, its heinous nature
29,
N
Parents, their duties to their chil- Providence, what
dren
159, 160
their authority over their
160--163
children
their authority not do-
minion
162
123
Particles, their mental uſe
Paffions of the mind, expreffible
by gefture
8
95
whether there be a di-
vine providence 95--114
inftances thereof in the
world
96
particular, its exiſtence
proved
98--114
its phænomena accoun-
ibid.
ted for
inviſible minifters there-
141
time
Planets habitable
Pleaſure, what
no infirmities 174
Perception always produced in
32
80
of
107, 108
ted
Puniſhments to be differently fui-
34
32
N.
Ations to be confider'd as
153
Natural religion, its foundation
25, 26, 52
why fo called
40.
is the purſuit of happi-
neſs by the practice of
reafon and truth 52
86
various fignifications of
the word
87
how rightly follow'd 13
---23
that of man not purely
rational
23
the law of its Author 26
Neglects may be inconſiſtent with
Nature, what
O
truth
O.
16-m]8
Bjects, why not perceiv'd in
fleep
198
Obligations of a mixed kind 39
Occupancy, prime, gives right
134
Omiffions may be finful 16--18
P.
PAIN may infinitely exceed
pleaſure
36
when true and real 40
Pain and pleaſure, no criterions
of good and evil 24
proportionable to the
perceptions of the per-
fons
32
increaſed with the facul-
ty of perceiving them
32, 33
their cauſes relative 33
how to be eſtimated 33,
34
not to be judged of in
others by what we feel
ourfelves 34,. 112--114
the fame with good and
evil
35
may bear 'different pro-
portions to each other
ibid.
when equal they deſtroy
each other
38
may change their nature,
and run into each other
ibid.
when true and real 40.
only the true kind good
naturally annexed to
crimes
143
whether they can be eter-
24
nal
R.
Poffeffion, original, gives the
greatest right 134, 135
Power gives no dominion or right
Praife, what
200
130-133 R Ational, what denominates-a
--120
117, 118
how to be given to God 116
Prayer, a neglect of it a denial of
18, 121.
how to be offered up to
God
120--126
requifites to the folemn kind
122
the proper times and places
for it
ibid.
in what words to be put up
122~-124
the mental alfo verbal 122
to be made audible 123, 124
not to be made extempore
LI24
in what pofture to be offer'd
ibid.
public, of the nature of pri-
vate
125
true prayer always private
ibid.
its effects
125, 126
Principles of things, unfearchable
81
Probability, the ſubſtitute for cer-
tainty
55--62
rules for finding it 56-58
its highest degree 85
its force the refult of rea-
fon and obſervation 58
the only light when cer-
tainty leaves us
Property, upon what it depends
59
107
equal in a ſtate of nature
130
founded in nature and
truth
136
gives abfolute right of
difpofal
136, 137
not justly diftinguiſh'd
from ufufru&t
137
Propofitions once true remain fo
in all cafts
43
crcature fo
45
132
Reaction in matter
Reafon the judge of actions 23
differs from particular
knowledge
41, 42
a fix'd and general thing
4I
the faculty, what 45
relative to the being who
is poffeffed of it ibid.
how improveable 46
why it influences men fo
little
ibid.
defign'd as the governing
principle in man
its criterion
52
54
of greater authority than
fenfe
whether things are go-
vern'd by it 110--114
the great preparative for
death
215
whence different in dif-
ferent men
213
Reafoning, a method to improve
in it
46, 50--53
may be rightly exercifed
on falſe propofitions 46,
47
the requifites to ftri&
foning
47
49
to what lengths it may
reach
right reaſoning no chi-
ibid.
mæra
falſe reaſoning, whence
49, 50
Reflexion, its difference from per-
ception
32, 33
Relation, how weaken'd by remo-
val from the parents 166
Relations, determine the nature
of things, and are the
guide of our actions 18,
Ff2
19, 27, 28
Relations,
INDE X.
Relations, not inmediate, difco-
verable by fuch as are
intermediate
43
25, 69, 126
its foundation 7, 25, 126
-its fum and ſubſtance 126
Religion, what
Reprifals lawful
Repulfion in matter
131-133
79
Revelation, how to be treated 211
Rewards and punishments une-
qually diftributed by hu-
man laws
Soul, not a faculty
immaterial
191, 192 Truths, by what faculty invefti-
186--143
199
its feat, where 184, 192, 198
proved immortal 193--211
may think after death, tho'
not in found fleep
may have its faculties en-
larged after death 199,217
paffes into a new ftate after
death, agreeable to its na-
ture
34
their unequal diſtribution in
this life argues the being of
another 201--203, 215, 216
brought about by the laws
of nature
104
Right, natural, what
127, 128
ftrong in the firft occupier
134
Right and wrong, what
14, 20
how to be judged of 129
Rights, natural, how far a Man
may part with them 150
S.
212
will after death have a feat
affigned it ſuitable to its per-
fection
47
gated
difcoverable by reafon-
48, 49
ing
may rife from error 54,55
many qualifications re-
quifite to judge of them
61, 62
whether men can act
agreeably to them when'
diſcovered 62--64
U.
its difference, whence Unhappiness, coincident with
213-215
in dif-
ferent perfons
213, 214
its two principal faculties 214
its mortality not demonftra-
ble
216, 217
Sounds,either fignificant or noti
Space, what
74, 75
Spirit, proofs of its exiftence 90,91
Spirit, whether the notion of it be
clear to the mind
Stars, their phænomena
of nature,
of nature,
108
80
the true quantity
of pain
ultimate, what
Unmercifulness, what
36, 37
38
139
inconfiftent, with truth
and nature
ibid.
Ufage, proves poffeffion 10, 137
Ufurpation of property, injuſtice
V.
137
SEafons, how wifely contrivedState minionre gives equal do- Apors, the wisdom and good-
82
Secrecy no excufe for injuftice 143
Self, wherein it confifts 127
Self-defence, lawful 131, 132
Self-denial neceffary
175
Self-preſervation, a ſtrong princi-
ple in animals 132
Senfes
Senfation, how perform'd
Erogyn', its dictates to be followed
165
Succeffion may give right 135
Sun, demonftrates the grandeur
of the fyftem
80
T.
Senfes may give falſe repreſentati-Emperance, what 179, 180
ons of things
53, 54
55
when to be credited
Sentiments,expreffible bygefture 8
Sins, not excuſed by fecrecy 143
tendencies towards them cri-
minal
143, 144
their heinous nature manife-
fted
141-144
Society, the laws thereof
128
laws neceffary thercin
145, 147
its bafis
128, 129
reafons for it 145
its end 128, 129, 147, 148
fuppofes government
149, 150
fuppofcs rules agreed to
147
may be justly form'd 150
may be form'd by impli-
cit or explicit confent 151
duties required in it 152
192, 193
Soul, what
its dependent manner of cx-
iftence
89
its exiftence proved 184--186
not ex traduce
88--93
Things, to judge rightly of
them
formation
extremes
82
Vegetables, the wifdom expreffed
in their ftructure ibid.
the laws by which they
are regulated 96
Vice, the cauſe of unhappineſs
215, 216
its effects and confequences
216, 217
18--20 Virtue, whether feated between
indifferent, what 20
24, 25
Thinking, whether effential to the
foul
194, 195
why not obferved in
found fleep 195, 198
Thoughts,their fleeting nature 122
Time,prefented by moments 32,33
Titles, transferable by compact or
donation
Trade, the neceffity and lawful.
nefs thereof
135, 136
135
Truth, what
8
its different acceptations 48
never contradicted without
the practice of it recom-
mended
179--183
productive of happineſs
182, 203--203, 217
W.
WAR fhewn to be lawful
2
Writing, why best practifed in our
mother-tongue 123
12, 123
their uſe in thinking 122,
123
Words, what
im piety
14--16
how discoverable
its criterion
49, 50
52
World,
how convey'd to the mind of
another
53
the way of coming at it 5 1--62
difcoverable by reafon and
fenfe
55
Truths,all of them confiftent 16,19
lead to the diſcovery of
truths
43
lefs expreffive than facts
12
a furvey thereof and its
furniture
87
laws of nature obſerved
therein
76--98
Worſhip, how to be given to God
120---126.
publick, why neceffary
124, 125
न
FINIS.
H
Error cause of pr. los.
hage will pos
Good Wil
Manche
the lever
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