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THE


WAR IN EGYPT.
WHY ARE WE FIGHTING ?
AN EPITOME OF EVENTS,
+
CULMINATING IN THE
BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.
Compiled from Parliamentary Blue Books and other
authentic sources.
PRICE TWOPENCE.
London:
W. R. CREMER, 9, BUCKINGHAM STREET, STRAND,
18$2.
.
}
DT
107.4
W25
This Pamphlet was prepared for the Workmen's
Peace Association, but in order to give it wide and
immediate publicity it was first published in the
“ECHO" newspaper.
#4
THE WAR IN EGYPT:
AN EPITOME OF EVENTS,
CULMINATING IN THE
BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.
These words are written, not for the few who have closely studied the
Egyptian Question, but for the many who ask-Why are we fighting? We
propose to consider the present crisis from an Egyptian as well as an English
stand-point. Let the reader endeavour to look at the facts as though he had
been born on the banks of the Nile, and felt an ardent desire for the elevation
of his countrymen.
National discontent is almost always provoked by
national wrongs.
Let us, instead of joining in the outcry against Egypt,
consider rather the causes of the disturbance. We are convinced that the root
of the evil is that the interests of the population of Egypt have been entirely
subordinated to the interests of foreigners. It is necessary first of all to ask
HOW HAVE THE WESTERN POWERS TREATED EGYPT IN
THE PAST?
Both France and England earned Egyptian distrust in the earlier half of the
present century. The Directory of the first French Republic, in order to
strike at British rule in India, despatched a filibustering expedition to Egypt
under Napoleon Bonaparte, although the Sultan, who was Sovereign lord of
Egypt, was at peace with France at the time. The country was invaded and
its defenders slaughtered for no other reason than that France and England
had quarrelled. Among the Turkish soldiers who assisted the English in
driving the French troops out of the country was Mehemet Ali, the son of an
Albanian peasant, upon whom the Sultan afterwards bestowed the Govern-
ment of Egypt. Mehemet Ali was a born ruler of men, who took advantage
of the increasing weakness of the Turkish Empire to extend his authority and
assert his independence. A quarrel with a neighbouring Pasha gave him the
opportunity, about half a century ago, of extending his sway over Syria, with
such beneficial results that Miss Martineau says that Mehemet's son, Ibrahim,
who commanded the Egyptian forces, "was soon seen in every part of Syria,
building hospitals, repairing mosques, promoting agriculture, encouraging
manufactures, and everywhere securing with the whole force of his authority
me
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toleration and good treatment of the Christians." The Turks were com-
pelled to call in the Russians to prevent Mehemet Ali from pushing his con-
quest to Constantinople. After two years of hollow peace, war broke out
again between Mehemet Ali and a new Sultan, France encouraging the former
and England supporting the latter. Once more Syria became the theatre of
Egyptian conquest, but the English fleet blockaded the ports in the Levant,
bombarded Beyrout, and stormed Acre. In the end Mehemet Ali was
forced to abandon Syria and to satisfy himself with the Sultan's con-
cession that the Government of Egypt should be hereditary in his
family. Miss Martineau says that "to the day of his death he was wont
to taunt European travellers with the state of Syria, and ask them if they did
not wish it back in his hands; and it is quite true that under his rule the
roads were as safe for travellers as he had made his great highway of the
Nile; while in Syria there was nothing that could be called government; and
the roads were infested with marauders." Thus for a second time Egyptian
progress and the welfare of Eastern populations were sacrificed to the arbi-
trary political arrangements of a Western nation.
HOW DID EGYPTIAN INDEBTEDNESS GROW UP?
Had England not prevented Mehemet Ali from winning his independence
he would have rid his people of the payment of the annual tribute of £400,000
to the Sultan. In 1861 one of Mehemet Ali's successors obtained from the
Sultan a change in the succession and other advantages to himself, not to
his people, for an increase of £350,000 in the annual tribute; the money, of
course, only passing through the hands of the Sultan into those of Turkish
bondholders. Nine years later Ismail the ruler of Egypt, who had acquired
the title of Khedive obtained from his nominal master unlimited borrowing
powers of which he took full advantage. It was during the sixteen years'
rule of Ismail that nearly the whole of the debt of a hundred millions was
piled up.
A poor and patient people, less than six millions in number, de-
spotically governed were loaded with this vast liability in sixteen years. What
shall we say of the conduct of the financiers who knowingly thrust their costly
favours on this unhappy people?—the most heavily taxed in the world! Our
Indian fellow-subjects complain of the crushing weight of a taxation of 48.
per head, but 40s. a head was exacted from the Egyptians. The extravagance
of Ismail was only equalled by his cruel extortions, made under pain of
torture. On the testimony of Sir W. H. Gregory we are assured that the
Egyptian National Party "connect much of the financial embarrassment of
their country, with the pernicious encouragement by the French, of the insane
extravagance of the last Khedive in building and decorating his many tasteless
palaces at a ruinous expense, the greater part of which went into the pockets
of French fournisseurs and contractors." Mr. McCoan, M.P., who is well
acquainted with Egypt, declares that out of five loans of the nominal value
of £55,000,000 the Egyptian Treasury only received £35,000,000 in cash or
its equivalent.
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DID ISMAIL GET VALUE FOR HIS MONEY?
IT must not be supposed that Ismail squandered the many millions he
borrowed entirely upon himself, his wives, and courtiers. A great part of
the debt was run up in much the same manner as a bill-discounting Shylock
multiplies the liabilities of a spendthrift heir. Take, for example, the trans-
actions of the Suez Canal Company. The shares which Ismail sold to
England for four millions, cost him over five millions and a quarter, principal
and interest included. He granted the Company certain concessions for
nothing, and Napoleon III. made him pay the Company £3,360,000 for taking
them back again. He also granted the Company a concession for the Fresh
Water Canal, from Cairo to Ouady, and had to buy it back for £400,000
when the Company had not the means to finish the work. He bought back
the right of navigating and levying tolls on the Fresh Water Canal, the right
of fishing in the Suez Canal, and other concessions for £800,000, and all the
establishments the Company possessed on the Isthmus for £400,000 more,
agreeing to pay 10 per cent. interest on the money till it was actually found.
To raise the money, the Khedive had to cut off twenty-five years' coupons
from his shares, which represented a capital sum not of £1,200,000, but of
£1,600,000. Let the reader consider these facts, which are taken from the
Times and from the Annual Register of 1875, and reflect that these transactions
took place in a heavily taxed country, with a population of less than six
millions, and a revenue of barely nine millions. It is abundantly evident that,
for the benefit of European commerce and European capitalists, the people of
Egypt have been grossly plundered by means of a series of financial operations
which could lead to nothing but national bankruptcy.
HOW WERE ISMAIL'S DIFFICULTIES MET?
In 1875 Ismail was almost at his wit's end for money. Four years before,
when the Suez Canal was in difficulties, and Paris was in the throes of
revolution, Sir Daniel Lange had vainly suggested to Lord Granville the
purchase of the Canal outright. In 1875 the purchase of the shares held by
the Khedive was suggested to Mr. Disraeli, who seized the opportunity. The
world was startled by what a witty French journalist described as (( conquest
by Mortgage." At the expense of rather over four millions, England acquired
nearly half the shares in the Canal, whose dividends for the next twenty years
had been sold; Mr. Disraeli's friends, the Rothschilds, clearing nearly a
hundred thousand pounds by the transaction, exclusive of what they made by
speculating in Egyptian securities. By this purchase we largely increased
our responsibilities, and endangered the Canal itself. Ismail's difficulties
still pressed upon him, and at the close of the year he invited an English
financier to examine his accounts. Mr. Stephen Cave, who went over,
reported that most of the money Ismail had borrowed, had gone to help the
Suez Canal; in other words, that the interests of the Egyptian peasantry had
once more been subordinated to those of Western nations.
Thirty millions had indeed been spent on other public works, but Mr. Cave
was compelled to declare that Egypt suffered "from the ignorance, dishonesty,
waste, and extravagance of the East, such as have brought her ruler to the
verge of ruin, and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty
and inconsiderate endeavours to adopt the civilisation of the West." Mr..
Cave, however, reported that though the debt was then about 75 millions,
there was a reasonable prospect of the Egyptians being able to pay seven per
cent, interest thereon--seven per cent., when an English landlord thinks five
per cent, burdensome. At the price at which some of the loans were taken
up, the rate of interest was really between 11 and 12 per cent. The
arrangement made afterwards by Mr. Goschen, however, considerably reduced
these exorbitant claims, Mr. Cave recommended, as an essential condition
of success, that the English Government should send out a financial agent
"to take employment under the Khedive as the head of a central department,
which should have a general supervision of the incidence and the levying of the
taxes," a proposition to which Mr. Disraeli was favourable. Lord Derby,
however, disapproved of it; and Mr. Gladstone, with that foresight which
characterises him when untrammelled by office, warned the House of Commons
of the difficulties and the hopeless impotence in which such an official
would sooner or later be placed.
AT WHOSE RISK IS MONEY LENT TO GOVERNMENTS:
Capitalists lend money to foreign States on their own responsibility. If a
country like England were to accept the responsibility of collecting the debts
of its wealthy citizens, it would be almost incessantly engaged in war. Spain,
Greece, Turkey, Honduras, Costa Rica, the Confederate States of America,
and some of the Northern States also, have at different times become defaulters ;
but no one ever had the audacity to demand that they should be compelled to
fulfil their engagements. Egypt is the only country upon which strong and
continual pressure has been brought, in order to compel it to pay regularly the
interest upon its debt. Mr. Cave, and afterwards Mr. Goschen, who went
out to Egypt in the interests of the bondholders, recommended the appoint-
ment of an English and a French Controller of Egyptian Finances, to be
nominated by their respective Governments. The French Government, as
usual, only too susceptible to Bourse influences, was quite willing to take this
step. It is said, indeed, that one member of the French Government
interested in a great Financial Corporation which held large quantities of
Egyptian bonds, strongly urged this course; but Lord Derby, who was then
in office, cautiously declined the responsibility, Lord Salisbury, however,
was more compliant, and in 1879 assented to the plan. It will be seen here
after that the complications that have since arisen grew out of the Dual
Control, and that, apart from the Control, it is not at all likely that we should
have drifted into war. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind that the-
Control was first suggested by the representatives of the bondholders, and
that it was established in their interest.
༡
WHAT WAS THE DUAL CONTROL:
By the Decree issued in November, 1879, it was determined that the two
Controllers should have the rank of Ministers at the Council, and a seat and
a consultative voice therein; that they should be only removed with the
consent of their respective Governments; that they should not only be
regularly paid monthly from the Egyptian Exchequer, but that they should
have the right of naming their officials and fixing their salaries; that they
should have the most complete powers of investigation into all the public
services; that they should have the right of examining all documents, and of
claiming a weekly return of receipts and expenditure from the Egyptian
Ministry of Finance. The following year a Commission of Liquidation set
aside a certain proportion of the Revenue to pay the interest on the Debt,
and another to pay the charges incident to the government of the country.,
The Controllers-General afterwards gave place to two European Ministers,
and, subsequently, these gave place in turn to Controllers-General whose
position was somewhat modified. Into these refinements we need not enter;
suffice it that since 1879 the English and French Governments have exercised
a continuous and preponderating influence in the Government of Egypt.
HOW DID THE DUAL CONTROL WORK?
The peculiar position occupied by European Ministers or Controllers
generally has enabled them to sweep out the natives from the Civil Service
and to substitute for them a whole army of highly paid foreign officials,
leaving to the Egyptians themselves only the Army as a public career.
A
Parliamentary paper recently issued shows that there were no less than 1,3OG
European officials, with annual salaries amounting to £373,000, engaged in
collecting interest amounting to an annual sum of four millions and a half.
Is there any country in which the monopoly of its Civil Service by foreigners
would not be fiercely resented, more especially if the inhabitants knew that
these strangers, though paid by them, held office in the interest of their
creditors, and were practically irremovable? But this is not the only way
in which the spoiling of the Egyptians has been accomplished.
WHO ARE THE PRIVILEGED CLASSES IN EGYPT?
In any other independent country the rights and privileges of Natives are
superior to those of aliens; in Egypt it is exactly the reverse. What should
we say if there existed in England a body of aliens who were exempted from
taxation, and from the ordinary operation of the Courts of Justice, and
whose most powerful members had the privilege of conferring such advan-
tages upon others? If the reader believes that such a state of things is im-
possible in Egypt, let him read the following extract from a letter by Sir W.
H. Gregory, published on March 16th, 1882—“The stately palaces built by
Europeans, and by those who have obtained European nationality, in many
instances by very questionable means, are untaxed. The humble dwelling of
the Egyptian by the side of these mansions is taxed at the rate of twelve per
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cent, on the valuation.
.
Let a Maltese, or a Greek, or an Italian,
practise a trade or mount the box of a hackney carriage as a driver, he is
exempt from the tax on professions as being under European protection; but
an Egyptian, striving to earn his bread in the same way, is taxed in doing so.
With some slight preliminaries a Consul-General can convert an
Egyptian into an Englishman, or a Dane, or a Dutchman ad libitum ; and on
this conversion all his liability to his own country ceases, though he dwells in
it, and enjoys all its advantages." The introduction of European Judges
into the country, though a natural cause of irritation, is not objected to by
the Egyptian National Party; that which they object to is that hardly any of
these men are conversant with the language, and that, having to depend upon
interpreters, they are consequently incompetent. Yet another abuse has
grown out of the Dual Control; the Controllers have the power of granting
concessions, equivalent to the powers of our Parliament to pass Railway,
Water, and Gas Bills. Imagine the effect if such powers in England were
exercised, not by Parliament, but by the Ambassadors of France and Germany.
HAS THE CONTROL BENEFITED THE EGYPTIANS?
Lord Granville, in a recent despatch, affirms that it has; Colonel Gordon,
a high and impartial authority, well acquainted with the country, affirms that
it has not. Writing to the Times at the commencement of the present year,
Colonel Gordon says:-"It is reiterated over and over again that Egypt is
prosperous and contented. I do not think that it has altered at all, except in
improving its finances for the benefit of the Bondholders. The Army may
be paid regularly (?), but the lot of the fellaheen and inhabitants of the
Soudan is the same oppressed lot as before.
HAVE THE CONTROLLERS INTERFERED IN THE GOVERNMENT
OF EGYPT?
Under the circumstances of their position, they could hardly fail to do this
constantly. After the military demonstration in February, 1881, which re-
sulted in the appointment of a new Ministry, the Controllers interposed
objections to an increased demand of £50,000 for the Army; in November
they opposed a second proposition in the same direction, and the Budget was
partially framed upon their alternative suggestions. In January, the Chamber,
having been convoked, demanded the control of all the revenues not especially
assignable to the Public Debt; the Controllers objected that by such an
arrangement they would lose their control of the finances. Although mili-
tary operations in the Soudan and on the Abyssinian frontier furnished some
reason for an increase in the Army Estimates, we may admit that the Con-
trollers were to some extent anxious that the burdens of the Egyptians should
not be increased; but it is evident that their first thought was for the bond-
holders, in whose interest they held their offices. In April a number of
arrests were made of officers who were said to be implicated in a conspiracy
to murder Arabi Pasha. After a trial by court-martial forty officers were
1.
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condemned to banishment for life to the Soudan; but on May 9th the sen-
tences were commuted to simple exile from Egypt, "in accordance with the
advice given to the Khedive by the English and French Agents." A few
days later, in accordance with the advice of their Agents, the French and
English Governments resolved to send ironclads to Alexandria; a little later
yet it was reported that the Khedive had, in accordance with the advice of
the English and French Agents, restored his Ministry to office. A few days
afterwards the English and French Agents were instructed to take advantage
of the arrival of the ironclads to dismiss his Ministers, and to require the
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temporary withdrawal from Egypt of Arabi and other military leaders.
are not oblivious of the distinction between Controllers and Agents, and it
may be fairly conceded that the English and French Governments honestly
desired to offer the Khedive the best advice; but their interference in the
internal affairs of Egypt, (subsequently followed in the case of England by
the bombardment of Alexandria), grew out of that Dual Control, which was
established and maintained in the interests of the bondholders.
IS THERE A NATIONAL PARTY IN EGYPT?
The population of Egypt is so mixed that it would have been very difficult
to weld it into an homogeneous whole had not European injustice and
extortion come into operation; but the position of the Country, as a broad
highway of civilization has so permeated it with western influences that it
stands out as the one Mohammedan State which aspires to representative
institutions, and cultivates a broad tolerance of all creeds. The existence of
a National Party has been derided in some quarters, but the evidence of its
activity is overwhelming. As long ago as 1876, when Mr. Goschen's visit
to Egypt resulted in the banishment of Sadyk Pasha the Prime Minister to the
White Nile, there were signs of gathering discontent. According to the Annual
Register" reports came in from the country districts that a mischievous agitation
was being promoted among the village fellaheen, unheard of in Egypt. The
Viceroy (Khedive) was accused of betraying the interests of the country to
foreigners, as evidenced by his recent employment of Europeans in prominent,
posts in nearly all the administrations, and by his personal disposition to
accept Messrs. Goschen and Joubert's projects." This agitation, stifled for
a time, later on became far more formidable. At the beginning of this year
the Egyptian Correspondent of the Pall Mall Gazette, a ministerial journal,
wrote " No greater mistake can be made than to accept the assertion that
the (National) movement is confined to the towns of Cairo and Alexandria.
I have had occasion during the last eighteen months to visit many of the
villages, and I may say with absolute certainty that all the leading men, in
fact all the people who have influence, are warm supporters of the National
Party." The correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, too, declared that before
he went to Cairo he thought Arabi's influence was entirely confined to the
military; but, writing from Cairo he said, "I find his party is actually the
entire nation."
ΙΟ
WHAT IS THE PROGRAMME OF THE NATIONAL PARTY?
In December last, Arabi gave the Cairo correspondent of the Times an
exposition of its objects, which may be briefly summarised as follows. They
accept the over lordship of the Sultan, but object to his interference with
Egypt's administrative independence. They are ready to obey Tewfik the
present Khedive as long as he governs with a Council of Deputies, and does
not return to the despotic methods of his father. They acknowledge that
they owe freedom and justice to the action of England and France; accept
the foreign debt as a matter of honour, though it was not incurred for
Egypts' benefit; they even admit that the European financial contract is a
temporary necessity. At the same time they protest against the abuses that
have grown up under the control-the absorption of offices by strangers, the
extravagant salaries, and the exemption of Europeans from taxation, and from
obedience to the general law. They regard the army as for the present the
armed guardians of the interests of the people, but look forward to the
cessation of interference in political affairs by the troops as soon as the
authority of a representative Government is established. They disown any idea
of financial repudiation, or of hostility to Europeans engaged in industrial and
commercial pursuits; the end to which they work is comprised in the phrase
'Egypt for the Egyptians." We apprehend that Englishmen whose minds
are not warped by prejudice or personal interest will see much in this
programme with which they can sympathize, and nothing to which they
can fairly take exception.
IS THE NATIONAL PARTY HOSTILE TO EUROPEAN INDUSTRY.
The War party in England constantly insists that the Egyptian National
Party would destroy all that has been done by the efforts of European
Capitalists in developing Egyptian industry and agriculture. English Capitalists
have sunk 35 millions in Egyptian soil, apart from the Canal, and it is asked
whether we should allow their property to be confiscated. We reply that it
never was in danger from the National Party. The Cairo correspondent of the
Globe writing last December says:-" Arabi is not fanatical, and does not wish
every European to be bundled neck and crop out of the land on pain of being
massacred, as is generally supposed." In proof of this he cites a speech made
by Arabi—" Look at the Caisse Publique administered by five Commissioners
each with a salary of £3,000; £15,000 a year to administer a beggarly
revenue of a few millions, it is preposterous, and out of all proportion to
the resourses of the country. The foreigners come here and grow fat, and
their sons, brothers and cousins get fat places too, without the knowledge
requisite to qualify them for their posts. Dragomen and interpreters have to
be kept by the hundred, and all this Egypt must pay for, whilst half her
population are at starving point. Let the foreigners come and give fair work
for fair wages, and they shall be welcome, but let them not look upon our
country as a money bag into which they have only to plunge their hands to
grow rich." It is no answer to this to reply that Arabi's recent conduct has
I I
proved him to be a liar. There is evidence already to show that the story of the
massacre at Alexandria has been greatly exaggerated, but were it not so, it
must be remembered that the bombardment has wholly changed the conditions.
Weak but determined people when attacked by superior force frequently
resort to cruel methods of retaliation. There is no proof whatever that the
lives of Europeans were in danger until the Egyptians were driven to
extremities by the appearance of a fleet of European ironclads in their chief
harbour.
CAN ENGLISHMEN FAIRLY BLAME THE EGYPTIAN OFFICERS?
The national party has given the best proof of its honesty by its repeated
efforts to establish representative government. The adoption of representa--
tive institutions has always evoked English sympathy; even when Midhat
Pasha sought to checkmate the Constantinople Conference by a sham Turkish
Parliament, many Englishmen were misled by the specious device. Yet the
very same men scoff at the Egyptian Chamber of Notables. That body may
not be exactly representative of the Egyptian peasantry, who are perhaps toc
ignorant to form intelligent opinions; but the English House of Commons in
the days of the Stuarts was not a representation of the English peasantry whe
were also too ignorant to form intelligent opinions; yet the victories won by
Pym, Hampden and other representatives of the freeholders of England were
of priceless value to the whole nation. When Cherif Pasha met the Chamber
of Notables he proposed a constitution providing for an Assembly elected
every four years, meeting annually, with freedom of speech and vote and
immunity from arrest, and the right of expressing an opinion on the budget
apart from the tribute, the public debt, and international contracts. To
these proposals the Chamber returned counter-propositions, the most im-
portant of which was the right of discussing and voting the budget-a right
which the ancient champions of English freedom considered essential.
Gordon Pasha has affirmed that "it is against all reason to expect any
straightforward dealings in any Sultan, Khedive or Ameer; the only hope is
in the people they govern, and the raising of the people should be our object."
We believe that he is right, and that we may fully rely upon the good faith of
the representatives of the people of Egypt. Sir E. Malet himself wrote on
September 23, 1881, that the discontent of the officers "sprang from com-
parative, or rather, total neglect of necessary reforms in the army, while other
branches of the administration were being cared for."
BUT WERE NOT THE DISTURBANCES MERE MILITARY REVOLTS?
The military revolts were the only possible expression of the national
desire. It is true that the demonstration of the troops in February,
1879, was caused by Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson in making
reductions in the army, and placing a large number of officers on half pay
without discharging the arrears due to them, but it must be remembered that
as Europeans crowd the Civil Service, the only career open to natives in the
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public service is to be found in the army. Mr. Vivian's telegram to Lord
Salisbury, itself bears witness to the fact that behind the military revolt was
civil disaffection, for he says:-"An uneasy feeling of discontent no doubt
prevails among the natives, who are jealous of the large influx of highly-paid
European officials." European ministers had replaced the European control
of the finances as originally established; the result of the military demon-
stration of February, 1879, was the dismissal of the European ministers and
the convocation of the Chamber of Notables by Ismail, proceedings which
were so distasteful to the Western Powers that they procured Ismail's deposi-
tion from the Sultan. Let the reader note that the action of the soldiery
brought about the meeting of the rudimentary representative assembly. Tewfik
succeeded Ismail, and in September last, he had to face a military demon-
stration. What did the officers demand? That Cherif Pasha, who was in
favour of an Egyptian constitution, should be placed in office, and that the
Chamber of Notables should be convened. The National Party assert that
the political action of the army is only resorted to as a temporary necessity in
the national interest, and an attempt is made to show that this is untrue, by
pointing to the demands of the military leaders for increased army expenditure,
and to Arabi's disregard of the authority of the Chamber when it presumed
to differ from him. We are not concerned to defend the conduct of Arabi
and his colleagues. Let it be admitted that they formed an extreme wing of
Egyptian Nationalists. All the more necessary was it that England should
not play into their hands. Yet, what did we do? Lord Granville's dispatch
of November 4th, assures the Khedive of the desire of the English Govern-
ment to give the Egyptian people full control of their affairs; but in January,
Lord Granville refuses even to consider the claim of the Notables to have a
voice in the financial administration of the country, notwithstanding Sir
Edward Malet's statement, that if this concession was refused, the National
Party would be thrown into the arms of Arabi. Thus by protecting the
bondholders, England made Arabi for the moment master of the situation.
HOW CAME THE FLEET TO BE SENT?
As before stated, the claim of the Egyptian Chamber to vote the Budget
was objected to by Sir E. Malet as interfering with the Dual Control of
English and French officials over the finances, but soon after (February 6,
1882) Lord Granville expressed an opinion that a case for intervention had
not yet arisen, "since on the part of the Notables and the new Government
the intention is avowed to maintain international engagements." It was not
till May that the English and French representatives took up an attitude of
decided hostility to the Egyptian Government, when the Khedive commuted
the sentences passed on the officers who had conspired against Arabi “in
accordance with the advice given him by the English and French agents."
Three days after, the Prime Minister of France, M. de Freycinet, proposed
that England and France should send war vessels into Egyptian waters, and
in an evil hour Lord Granville consented, waiving in deference to France his
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preference for a European fleet. The demonstration was made in spite of the
protest of Turkey.
WAS THE FLEET SENT SIMPLY TO PROTECT EUROPEANS?
There was no proof before the arrival of the Fleet that Europeans were in
danger. On the contrary, we have Sir E. Malet's own testimony that its
arrival might place Europeans in jeopardy. On May 14th Sir E. Malet tele-
graphed to Earl Granville that "the political advantage of the arrival of
vessels at Alexandria would be so great as to outweigh in consideration the
dangers which might possibly accrue therefrom to Europeans in Cairo.”
Three months before (Feb. 1. 1882) Sir E. Malet had telegraphed to Earl
Granville that one of the Khedive's Ministers had told him that "armed
intervention on our part could neither be threatened nor effected without the
most serious damage to the European population, and a resistance which
would lead to prolonged bloodshed." Subsequent events have demonstrated
in the most lamentable manner that this warning was well-founded.
WHAT THEN WAS THE OBJECT OF THE NAVAL
DEMONSTRATION?
On Sir E. Malet's own showing it was the "political advantage" that he
had in view, and that political advantage was the removal of an administration
whose prolonged existence was supposed to threaten the interests of the bond-
holders. The English and French Governments shared the opinions of their
agents, for they at once sent instructions to them that they should "take
advantage of the favourable moment to call for the resignation of the Khedive's
Ministers." Even this step in advance was not sufficient for Sir E. Malet and.
his colleague. They telegraphed that it would be better to make “an official
demand" for the temporary exile of Arabi and his colleagues, and to this
course the consent of their respective Governments was given. Not to
protect Europeans but to compel Arabi to go into exile were the ironclads of
England and France sent into Egyptian waters.
DID THE FLEET PROTECT EUROPEANS ?
On the contrary, it drove Arabi to the wall. In September last Mr.
Cookson wrote to Earl Granville declaring that "others were associated with
Arabi who are more violent and ignorant, and who may push him to desperate
measures against his will." It was England and France in the end that did
most to drive him to desperate measures. The naval demonstration
rallied Egyptian patriotism to Arabi's support, and was quickly followed by
fresh military demonstrations in his favour at Cairo and Alexandria. On
June 11th, in the very sight of the Fleet, the mob at Alexandria made a des-
perate attack upon Europeans, sixty of whom were murdered, including half-
a-dozen Englishmen and as many Frenchmen.
WHY DID THE FLEET BOMBARD ALEXANDRIA ?
We have seen that the presence of the Fleet was the approximate cause of
Х
14
the Alexandria riots. In England the news of these riots was received with
an outburst of anger. The English Government was angrily reproached for
not ordering its Fleet to inflict summary and condign punishment on the city.
With commendable forbearance it resisted the demand for the moment, but
another cause for action soon arose. The men whose exile had been
demanded as a measure of self-defence ordered the completion of the forts of
Alexandria. Warning was given that these works should be discontinued.
It was denied in answer that the works were proceeding, but the electric light
showed that during the hours of night the defences were being strengthened,
and the temporary surrender of the forts was demanded. As the surrender
was refused, the bombardment followed. Although the French Fleet deemed
it compatible with national honour to steam away before decisive action was
taken, we may admit that the English Government would have been fiercely
denounced in certain quarters if it had permitted the continuance of works
which were likely to cause a great loss of life among their own sailors; but
when they plead that the bombardment was only a measure of self-defence,
they must admit the validity of the same plea on the part of Arabi, and they
ought to have foreseen that a hostile demonstration in Egyptian waters would
probably lead to a hostile demonstration on the other side.
BUT COULD THE GOVERNMENT FORSEE CONSEQUENCES ?
Yes. The most remarkable feature in the whole correspondence is Earl
Granville's clear foresight of the dangers before him. Writing to Lord
Lyons on January 30, 1882, he says:-" Her Majesty's Government have a
strong objection to the occupation by themselves of Egypt. It would create
opposition in Egypt and in Turkey; it would excite the suspicion and jealousy
of other European Powers, who would, Her Majesty's Government have
reason to believe, make counter-demonstrations on their own part, which
might possibly lead to very serious complications, and it would throw upon
them the responsibility of governing a country inhabited by Orientals under
very adverse circumstances. They believe that such an occupation would be
as distasteful to the French nation as the sole occupation of Egypt by the
French would be to this country." As to a joint occupation, Lord Granville
expressed the opinion that," although some obligations might be lessened,
others would be very seriously aggravated by such a course." Could a states-
man have made a more exact forecast than this? When statesmen place it
upon record that they have such a full apprehension of danger, they deprive
themselves of any excuse for placing their country in a position from which
it is extremely difficult to recede.
SUMMARY.
Our sole object has been to answer the all important question-Why are
we fighting? Otherwise we should proceed to summarise the terrible events
that followed the bombardment, and to show that they were simply its natural
consequences. The reader may be left to judge for himself of the wisdom of
15
a course which has isolated England from the sympathy of Europe, and has
placed her in a position of antagonism to the head of the Mohammedan faith.
It is quite within the range of probability that the events of the last few
months may not only threaten the continuance of British rule in India, but
involve us in a conflict with one or more of the Great Powers of Europe.
Already it is generally admitted that the present position of England is one
of almost unprecedented gravity. We have clearly demonstrated that the
Egyptians have suffered from wrongs so grievous that they are amply justified
in making a determined struggle for their redress; that there is a National
Party in Egypt, which has undertaken the task of National deliverance; that
the very opposition which we have raised has tended to make Arabi the chosen
representative of National aspirations; that the interference of England and
France has been mainly in the interest of the Egyptian bondholders; that the
naval demonstration was not caused by anxiety for the safety of Europeans,
but by the desire to force Arabi into exile; that the result of armed interven-
tion was massacre, anarchy, and the intervention of England. Was the
present war inevitable, and therefore justifiable? The verdict of Europe has
already been pronounced: we are confident that when Englishmen have
fully examined the question they too will answer-No.

[Persons desiring to become Members can obtain forms of which the following
is a copy.]
Workmen's Peaqq Association.
General Office:
9, BUCKINGHAM STREET, STRAND, LONDON, W.C.
Objects and Principles.
I. To advocate the settlement of all International Disputes by Arbitra
tion, and the establishment of a High Court of Nations for that purpose.
2. To place before our countrymen the danger, immorality, and
expense of standing armies.
3. To at all times urge upon our Parliamentary Representatives, that in
the interests of civilization and humanity, it is the duty of the Government
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Peace, by proposing a large, mutual, and simultaneous reduction of all armed
forces, with a view to their entire abolition.
If the undersigned, hereby declare my entire concurrence with the above
objects, and principles, and pledge myself to use every constitutional means
to reduce them to practice.
As witness my hand this.
day of
Signature
Residence-
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THOMAS BURT, M.P., President.
HOWARD EVANS, Chairman of the Council
B. BRITTEN, Treasurer:
W. R. CREMER, General Secretary.

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