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COM
ES
THE
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS
OF
HINDU PHILOSOPHY
STATED AND DISCUSSED.
A Prize Essay.
BY THE
REV. JOSEPH, MULLENS,
DISSIONARY OF THE LONDON MISSIONARY SOCIETY,
AUTHOR OF "MISSIONS IN SOUTH INDIA, "
AND RESULTS OF MISSIONARY LABOUR IN INDIA.'
f
LONDON:
SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.
M.DCCC.LX.
The right of Translation is reserved.
ΤΟ
MY MISSIONARY BRETHREN IN INDIA,
OF ALL BRANCHES OF
THE CHURCH OF CHRIST,
This Essay,
WRITTEN
WITH
SPECIAL
REFERENCE
TO SOME OF
OUR COMMON DIFFICULTIES,
IS
RESPECTFULLY
INSCRIBED.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
INTRODUCTION:
The general character of Hindu Philosophy; its antiquity;
difficulties in the way of a successful study of its doc-
trines: studeut-life in India
1
PART FIRST.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE SYSTEMS OF HINDU
PHILOSOPHY.
The Vedic Age
15
The three chief systems
39
45
50
.
50
.
51
CHAP. I.—THE SANKEYA.
Introduction: Its origin; divisions; age and authorities
§ 1. Its object
$ 2. Principles of investigation
§ 3. The twenty-five principles
§ 4. The object of soul and the means of accomplishing it
§ 5. The denial of the existence of God.
§ 6. Sources of knowledge
$ 7. Existence and attributes of soul
$ 8. Comparison of the attributes of the several principles
Outline of the YOGA system :
55
59
59
62
64
67
viii
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CRAP. II.-THE NYAYA,
74
76
77
77
.
78
82
83
84
Introduction: its origin, divisions, and authorities
§ 1. Object of the system
§ 2. Instruments for gaining right notions
§ 3. Causality
§ 4. Objects of knowledge
§ 5. Soul .
§ 6. Body.
§ 7. Organs of sensation
§ 8. Mind: objects of sense
§ 9. Understanding, &c. .
§ 10. Activity: fault, &c.
§ 11. Physical objects of knowledge as taught by the Vai-
seshika
$ 12. The nine substances: earth, water, &c.
§ 13. The twenty-four qualities: colour, &c.
§ 14. The last four categories: action, community, distinction,
aggregation, and negation .
85
86
87
88
88
93
99
CHAP. III.- TAE VEDANTA,
Introduction: Author of the system, its origin, and authorities. 102
§ 1. Definition of Vedantism, its scope, &c.
116
§ 2. Of the Supreme Brahma
122
§ 3. The universe and its elements
129
§ 4. Of man
183
§ 5. The state of man and the results to which it leads
140
$ 6. The mode of deliverance and its final rewards
146
CONTENTS.
ix
PAGE
CHAP. IV.-COMPARISON OF THE TARDE SYSTEMS.
This comparison has regard to their origin; general character;
religious end; principles of inquiry ; causation ; notion of
substance ; its eternity ; its qualities ; soul; classes of
beings; the various bodies ; operations of mind; the term
“mind ;” defects and misery of this world's state ; in-
fluence of the Supreme and of Nature
158
PART SECOND.
THE CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS OF THESE SYSTEMS.
175
177
180
181
184
195
Introduction: Variety of the objects studied by ancient philo-
sophers
The minor errors in science authoritatively taught
The chief errors
§ 1. Denial of a God.-Sankhya .
§ 2. Pantheism in matter. Vedánta
§ 3. Pantheism as to the human soul.--Vedanta
§ 4. Matter eternal in mass.--Sankhya.
§ 5. Matter eternal as atoms.--Vaiseshika
§ 6. Soul is eternal.-Sánkhya and Nyaya
§ 7. Transmigration.--All the systems
§ 8. The grounds of transmigration: Fatalism .
§ 9. Virtue and vice
§ 10. The chief end of man
198
204
209
213
224
230
233
X
CONTENTS.
PAGE,
PART THIRD.
DISCUSSION OF THESE ERRORS.
236
.239.
247
.
261
Introduction: Usefulness and necessity of discussing them
Scheme of the following dialogues
Dialogue I. Principles of inquiry
II. Is there a God?
III. Pantheism, as to matter and spirit
IV. The eternity of matter
V. The eternity of souls
VI. The transmigration of souls
VII. Innate dispositions. Fatalism
282
09
305
331
348
396
PART FOURTH. .
AN OUTLINE OF SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH.
PREFACE.
This work was first suggested by the following pro-
posal :-
“ A prize of 3001. is offered for the best Statement
and Refutation, in English, of the Fundamental Errors
(opposed to Christian Theism) of the Vedánta, Nyáya,
and Sankhya Philosophies, as set forth in the standard
native authorities, in the Sanskrit language, treating of
those systems; together with a demonstration (sup-
ported by such arguments, and conveyed in such a
form and manner as may be most likely to prove con-
vincing to learned Hindus imbued with those errors)
of the following fundamental principles of Christian
Theism, viz. :-
“ First.—Of the real, and not merely apparent or illu-
sory distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from
matter; and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all
other spirits, and of matter, by God, in opposition to
the Vedanta.
“ Second.-Of the non-eternity of separate souls, and
their creation by God, in opposition to the Nyáya and
Sankhya.
66 Third. Of the creation of matter, in opposition to
xii
PREFACE.
the tenet of its eternity in the shape of atoms (as main-
tained in the Nyáya and Vaiseshika Schools), or in the
shape of Prakriti (as maintained by the Sánkhya).
66 Fourth.—Of the moral character and moral govern-
ment of God; and of the reality and perpetuity of the
difference between moral good and evil; with reference
to such dogmas of the above systems as are opposed to
those doctrines.
“ The refutation of the above-mentioned Hindu errors
should (as it seems to the proposer) proceed upon a
double basis, viz. :—First, the disproof of the grounds
on which the native authors claim divine authority for
the founders of the several philosophical schools ; and
for the Vedas, in so far as those schools profess to
be founded thereon. Secondly, a demonstration of the
contrariety of these doctrines to reason, or to the best
conclusions to which reason leads.
“ The erroneous systems in question embody the best
solutions which Hindu philosophers have been able to
frame of the mysteries of human existence. When,
therefore, these theories are controverted, the diffi-
culties which they were considered to neutralize, will
again occur to the Hindu's mind, as demanding solution.
Thus: their theory of the eternity of souls, and of the
present state being one of retribution for good or bad
deeds done in former stages of existence, obviates, in
their idea, the charge of partiality to which they con-
ceive the Supreme Being would, on the other hypo-
PREFACE.
xiii
thesis, be obnoxious, on account of the unequal distri-
bution of his gifts in the present life. Hence the
objections (founded on the above or other difficulties)
which Hindu writers or reasoners raise to the non-eter-
nity and creation of souls, and other doctrines of Chris-
tian Theism, must be encountered as they arise.
“ With the view of doing the fullest justice to the
subject, and ensuring most effectually the end proposed,
viz., the conviction of the acute adherents of the errors
in question, whose belief is founded on the reasonings
as well as the authority of their own writers, the Essay
must bear constant reference to the specific grounds on
which the native authors base their doctrines, and to
the arguments and illustrations by which they defend
them. All important statements should be supported
by references to the native authors.
“As native authors make use of frequent illustrations,
either to set their tenets in a clear light, or to defend
them, it might be useful that the same practice, in so
far as it answers the former purpose, should be em-
ployed by their opponents, to illustrate their own views.
" The treatise should be so constructed as to show
the English reader, in detail, what those grounds, argu-
ments, and illustrations are, by which the Indian authors
support their systems.
“In spirit, the treatise should be most kind and con-
ciliatory, recognizing cheerfully every merit and every
true principle which may be justly ascribed to the native
xiv
PREFACE.
authors, and encountering their errors with the utmost
gentleness which may be compatible with a clear indi-
cation of their pernicious tendency.
“ The subject is limited as above defined, because the
points which have been indicated above, form the pecu-
liar difficulties of the Hindu controversy; and are the
points with which those missionaries who may be dis-
tinguished by no remarkable metaphysical acumen,
and devoid of any accurate acquaintance with the
Indian philosophies, (though they may know the main
features of that which is popularly current,) are least
capable of dealing successfully. When such difficulties
have been cleared away, the remainder of the argument,
comprising the positive proofs of our holy religion,
and the answers to objections which are not peculiar
to Indian thinkers, or connected with their distinctive
tenets, does not call for the same acuteness, or depth of
Indian learning, on the part of the Christian advocate.”
The task assigned in this proposal is of a high cha-
racter, and very hard to execute. It is difficult for one
brought up in England to get away from our own
well-proved systems of philosophy and science, and
stand upon an entirely new platform, with a complete
set of systems, based upon new notions, in many
respects consistent with each other, and hanging toge-
ther with great tenacity. For a full understanding of
these systems, one ought to get at the exact meaning
of every term employed, and give to each not the
PREFACE.
XY
breadth of meaning which many bear in European
science, but a force no greater than the original teacher
attached to it. To do all this thoroughly, to meet
these Hindu philosophers on their own ground, to think
only as they thought, and see the world with their
eyes; one must almost forget all the principles we have
been learning from childhood, one must almost become
un-English, un-Baconian, and un-Christian. In order
to meet their errors, one has to evolve from their sys-
tems principles on which they agree with us, and
thence, without employing the authority of the Chris-
tian system, to bring forth a system of truth. To have
failed in accomplishing so difficult a task can be thought
nothing strange: though the attempt has been made.
A half share of the Prize above offered was awarded
to this work: the other half being given to the Essay
recently published by Dr. Ballantyne of Benares,-
Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy.”
66
ORTHOGRAPHY OF SANSKRIT WORDS.
In the following pages Sanskrit words, technical
terms, and the like, have been written in English
letters, according to the system of Sir W. Jones, as
modified by Trevelyan. The vowels bear the Italian
pronunciation; and the inherent vowel a is pronounced
like the u in the English word but.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
Introduction
HINDU philosophy, though known to only a small class
of European scholars, deserves, on several grounds, the
most attentive study. Tracing back its origin to the
earliest ages of civilization, preserved during a long
series of centuries, and taught by numerous admirers
even in the present day, it presents to us the singular
spectacle of the old world standing side by side with
the new, and exhibits speculators like Empedocles and
Democritus continuing their ill-based inquiries, while
surrounded on every hand by the inductive philosophy
of recent years. The curious notions it has defended,
the singular compactness of the forms it has assumed,
the length of time it has endured, increase its claims to
attention. The classical scholar, as he learns its dif-
ferent views of the origin of the universe, the cases
of the soul, the wanderings of transmigration, the pri-
mary elements, or the relation of inferior divinities to
B
2
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the Supreme, finds himself transported to the schools of
Greece and Alexandria, and cannot fail to observe how
far the philosophies of the East run parallel with those
of classic lands, and in how many points the mode of
inquiry adopted, and the results attained, by the former
systems are identical with those belonging to the latter.
But apart from the mere interest attaching to its specu-
lations, and the light they throw on the progress of the
human mind, there are circumstances connected with
them which render some portions of Hindu philosophy
matters of vital importance. Several of its most pro-
minent doctrines lie at the very root of the religious
faith now current among the Hindus; and these, in the
discussions aroused by Christian missionaries, are de-
fended by their advocates with all the earnestness which
reverence for ancient authority and the deductions of
reason can place at their command. It must 'then be
manifestly desirable to know what these doctrines are,
what is the evidence adduced in their favour, and what
are the arguments by which they are defended.
To the various branches of this philosophy the most
celebrated names in the Hindu world have largely con-
tributed. Including the later sections of the Vedas
themselves, a large proportion of their ancient litera-
ture is conversant about that philosophy, either in its
more speculative or more religious aspects. The poets
of India are comparatively few; the authors of history
are still less numerous; even the writers of the Vedic
hymns are almost unknown, except in name; but the
philosophers of India are numerous and renowned.
X
INTRODUCTION.
3
/
Amongst all the sages of the land, none bear a more
honoured name than VEDA VYÁSA, or KOPILA, or
GAUTAM.
The subjects embraced within its boundaries are of
the most extensive kind. They include all those fun-
damental inquiries into the nature of the universe, the
origin of matter, the nature and history of the soul, the
origin of virtue, and the chief end of man, which have
engaged the attention of the wisest from the dawn of
civilization to the present hour. They are, however, all
regarded from a particular point of view, and are all
placed upon a religious basis. Philosophy, cosmogony,
and religion, the laws of logical method, the structure
of plants, and the number of the vital airs, all find a
place within these systems; and all these varied objects
of inquiry are represented as having a religious cha-
racter, as connected with religious aims, and as leading
to religious rewards. Nothing can more clearly show
the erroneous notions which have prevailed among the
Hindus from the earliest ages respecting the nature and
sphere of true religion, than the fact that its highest
rewards are promised to those who attain to a correct
knowledge of these different systems of learning.
Formerly the systems of Hindu philosophy were
little known beyond their native soil. In European
“ Histories of philosophy" slight references were made
to them: the notices of their doctrines were brief, par-
tial, and frequently erroneous; and an English reader
could obtain from such second-hand sources but very
imperfect information as to what they really taught
B 2
4
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
This is not the case, however, in the present day.
Numerous works, published by able scholars, are now
available to those who wish to inquire what the sys-
tems teach; and the merest outline of their doctrines
and general plan will show at once how worthy they
are of careful study. Many of their conclusions, espe-
cially on questions of physical science, will raise a
smile in those who have been taught the well-proved
deductions of modern philosophy. But smiles are not
all that they deserve. The systems were formed when
the human race was in its boyhood; and they exhibit
the Hindu mind, even in that early age, as active in
the extreme. Some of their results are very striking.
Though the Hindus were isolated amongst the nations of
the world, high generalization was carried on, and
broad principles of inquiry were adopted. The Sánkhya
and Nyáya systems, for instance, even at that remote
period, distinctly advocated the very uncommon doc-
trine of a perfect separation between human souls and
the Divine. The Nyáya system possesses elements and
advocates theories of which Aristotle might be proud.
Could we but catch all the finer shades of meaning
which the teachers of these systems attached to the
nomenclature they employed, and could we limit the
technical uses of terms simply to those ideas which they
were accustomed to convey, we might be able to under-
stand the systems better than we now do, and perhaps
might find as large an amount of truth beneath their
surface as some enthusiastic scholars would lead us to
believe exists within them. All technical language,
INTRODUCTION.
5
especially that which relates to the branches of mental
science, is difficult, and requires to be accurately de-
fined. How much more difficult is that of the Hindu
systems, which purposely concentrated their doctrines
in the most narrow compass, and employed a language
which, till the days of Sir W. Jones, scarcely one
European had ever studied. The spirit of the Hindu
students was anything but childish; the aim they kept
in view was the highest which men of their knowledge
could possibly adopt; and the course of discipline pre-
scribed to them was both painful and long continued.
To ridicule those systems, or to contemn them on ac-
count of their absurdities, is to expect from the world's
boyhood the experience of ripened age; to expect from
the men who were groping in the gloom of unaided
reason the finished conclusions which have been reached
by the philosophic world in ages enlightened by the
homely lessons and majestic doctrines of the revealed
Book of God. One may rather find interest in the fact,
which these systems fully confirm, that apart from a
special revelation from heaven, the mind of man meets
with insuperable difficulties in the constitution of the
universe; that it moves within a narrow sphere of spe-
culation, shut up to one or another class of errors; and
that, left without Divine teaching, it roves like Noah's
dove, not finding solid land whereon it may rest in con-
fidence, and whence it may take a higher and farther
flight to regions which are still unknown.
A further obstacle to the study of this philosophy is
found in the form in which it has been presented.
6
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Since better materials have become available for an ex-
amination of what Hindu philosophy really is, its study
has appeared, even to willing scholars, peculiarly dry
and repulsive. It must be confessed, that to master the
great dogmas of the system, to observe their differences,
and familiarly compare them with each other, is a task
of no ordinary magnitude. The difficulty lies chiefly in
two things. On the one hand, so far as present inquiries
have extended, we have gathered scarcely any materials
for securing a history of the notions which the systems
develop, or personal notices of the individuals by whom
they were advocated. Singularly complete in them-
selves, it is difficult to determine with exactness in what
age they arose; which system was first in time; what
was the order of progress in the development of each,
or in the doctrines which are common to them all. On
all these points, so useful in rendering such systems
clear, we are only beginning to acquire information.
The books survive, with their bare abstractions, a few
names of learned adherents and commentators are
added, a few isolated facts connect the philosophical with
the political world, and the rest remains to the internal
evidence of the systems themselves. Future researches
may at least partially remove this difficulty.
On the other hand, the manner in which the systems
are drawn out, and their notions expressed, is peculiarly
uninviting. The chief books of authority are written in
a very curt and oracular style, having been constructed
with the special purpose of hinting the largest amount
of instruction in the fewest possible words; and, as if
INTRODUCTION.
7
this were not enough, the systems are all constructed in
the synthetical form. The reader pursues, therefore,
the course of study without any idea of the doctrines he
will arrive at, or the turn which the inquiry will
take. Though, like the philosophy of Greece, the sys-
tems of India are conversant much more about the
structure of the mind than the phenomena of matter,
yet the modes in which the two are presented differ
most widely. The former is wonderfully individualized
to us; we identify the philosophers as individuals like
ourselves, moving in the society of their fellows; subject
to human passions, engaged in public pursuits, and in-
volved in the many vicissitudes of human life. Some
of them are historical personages: they discuss common
affairs; and from them take occasion to develop some
recondite truth, that throws light on the structure and
government of the world. Hindu philosophy, on the
contrary, presents us with none of these pleasant ac-
cessories to abstract study. It gives us nothing like the
dialogues of Plato, or the more familiar recollections
which Xenophon recorded of his great master. It
gives us only the dry abstractions, tells the names of its
sages, and leaves us to find all the interest of the study
in the theme itself.
The SUTRAS, which constitute the earliest works in
which the various systems were drawn out on a settled
plan, are short treatises in the Sanskrit language, of
very compact form. So complete are they, and so con-
cisely expressed, that it seems evident that the sub-
ject they treat of must have been thoroughly examined
8
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
and discussed previous to their time, and all their
branches and divisions properly developed.
These
Sutras have been the great standards of instruction in
later times, and have formed the basis both of commen-
taries in which their tenets are expounded, and of other
treatises in which native scholars have arranged their
doctrines, according to their own judgment, with new
illustrations and perhaps greater breadth of plan. Their
brief aphorisms and concise style were intended to
assist the memory, although they necessarily render
the meaning obscure. Containing important truth ex-
pressed, or rather implied, in the fewest possible words,
they received from the first the exposition of the living
teacher, who clearly elucidated the meaning of each
expression and exhibited its connection both with the
context and the general course of the argument. Such
is apparently the origin of the commentaries of various
kinds with which the Sutras have been ever accom-
panied. The original author was most probably the
first commentator, and stamped each aphorism and
each word with the full meaning which he intended it
to bear. The best commentaries have been written
down, and again commented on by others. Thus have
the systems been handed down from age to age and
from one generation of students to another; and thus it
is, that without new light from more correct systems,
the same dogmas have been advocated in the schools of
Hindu learning, with the same arguments and almost in
the same terms, as were employed hundreds of years
ago.
INTRODUCTION.
9
It will not be inappropriate to add here a few
words concerning the general mode of student-life in
India. The manner in which students were gathered
in ancient Greece, and instructed in one or more
branches of learning by individuals of note, resembles,
to some extent, that in which Hindu students have
been brought up during several hundred years. Con-
sidering the differences in the religious notions of the
people, and in those ordinary habits which have de-
pended much on differences of climate, the similarity
appears very striking. India has no splendid colleges,
like those of the European universities; no ancient
corporate bodies, sustained by ample landed endow-
ments, from which the expenses of students and the
salaries of professors are annually provided. Yet its
schools and seats of learning are numerous; the num-
ber of brahmins who are able to expound its ancient
books of philosophy, is large; its courses of study are.
as extensive as the students can desire; and, like the
universities of Europe, its learned men confer degrees
of honour upon their successful scholars. At the pre-
sent day, if a brahmin, fond of such pursuits, with a
reputation for scholarship acquired during his own
studies, and with a title of honour conferred by his
teacher, wishes himself to become the teacher of others,
he will open a tola or college, and invite students to
attend his lectures. If he have a wealthy patron, he
will assemble them in one of the halls of his patron's
house; and lecture there upon his chosen theme. If
he prefer it, he may secure a respectable house, in
10
HNDU PHILOSOPHY.
some well-known seat of learning, as Nuddea, and
erect accommodations for his scholars within its pre-
mises. Unlike the disciples of the Sophists, the
scholars pay no fees for their education: on the con-
trary, the teacher will furnish them with food, lodging,
and instruction gratuitously: and they will provide
whatever else is needed, as their clothes, books, paper,
ink, and oil, out of their own resources : their expendi-
ture, however, on these accounts, frequently amounts
to only eight or ten rupees a year. The income of the
teacher is acquired in a manner quite different from
that of our European professors. Learned brahmins
are always much respected by Hindu men of wealth :
and numerous are the occasions on which it is cus-
tomary to give them presents. At the time of festivals,
weddings, and feasts for the dead, they are invited to
the houses of the wealthy, are feasted, treated with
honour, and on their departure receive gifts of value.
These presents vary with the branch of science in
which they excel, with their reputation for learning,
the public esteem in which they are held, the number
of their scholars, and the fame of their school. The pre-
sents include dresses, gold and silver vessels, ornaments
of numerous kinds, food, and also money. A man of
learning often takes one or more of his scholars to such
assemblies, both to enhance his own reputation, and to
accustom them to respectable society: and the students
also obtain a share of the presents. From gifts of this
kind the larger number both of teachers and students
in the Hindu schools of learning are supported, their
INTRODUCTION.
11
food procured, and their house accommodation provided.
Tolas, or native colleges, of this kind, are scattered all
over the province of Bengal; and one or more may be
found in all the great villages. The zillah of Burdwan,
for example, though not particularly celebrated for
learning, contained, a few years ago, 190 Sanskrit
schools and 1,350 students. Some places are more
celebrated as seats of learning than others. In North
India, for instance, Nuddea, Santipur, Tirhoot, and
above all Benares, contain a large number of “colleges :"
in South India, they are chiefly found in the provinces
of Tanjore and Madura.
These schools are divided into three classes : those
wherein general literature is studied; the schools of
law; and those of philosophy. In the first the subject
matter of study embraces grammar, lexicology, poetical
works, and rhetoric. In the law schools, the Dáya
Bhága, Mitakshara, and especially the Institutes of
Raghunandan, are the principal books of authority :
though the latter is studied with an especial view to
a knowledge of the ritual ceremonies of the Hindu
religion. The students who enter these law schools
almost always pass through the classes of literature
first: the students of philosophy, also, generally spend
years in the same preliminary pursuits, before they
enter on a full consideration of the great philosophical
systems. The study of these systems ranks the highest
of all in general estimation : and those who thoroughly
master the best works are comparatively few in number.
They are men who must have spent many years in
12
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
study of one kind or another before they could attain
such knowledge. The systems are not held in like
estimation everywhere. In South India the Vedanta
is frequently studied; in Bengal the Nyáya seems most
popular; in Upper India, though the Nyáya is very
popular, the Sánkhya and Vedant find numerous
adherents, the Vedant holding the highest place of all.
In Benares followers of all these systems may be found,
including the most accomplished of the learned men in
Hindustan
In the present day there are influences at work which
will probably diminish the study of the ancient systems
very considerably. In the great cities and towns of
India, and chiefly in Lower Bengal, there has sprung
up an intense desire to learn English, both for the
pleasure which it gives and for the valuable appoint-
ments to which a knowledge of that language leads.
This desire is drawing away the minds of the young
brahmins from that Sanskrit learning, which in former
days was their great path to wealth and honour; and
on which they spent half their years. The Káystha, or
writer caste, a most intelligent race, forbidden to study
Sanskrit, have eagerly embraced the new opportunity
offered for their advancement, and are competing with
the brahmins for the fruits of real learning. The
village Sanskrit schools are being deserted for English
institutions : the brahmins, who taught in the former,
can acquire better incomes by entering the latter. The
demand for a sound vernacular education, now made by
all true friends of the native population, will operate in
INTRODUCTION.
13
the same direction. Intelligent teachers are required
as pundits, and as the remuneration is good, it will pay
far better to prepare for such labour than to carry on,
for years together, those studies to which the class once
gave so much heed. At the same time, the spread of
better knowledge, and more correct notions, prevents
the brahmins from being so much honoured, and
receiving so many gifts at weddings and festivals as
they once enjoyed. They must therefore exchange
their study for a life of toil. Under these varied
influences, which will be the means of spreading sound
education and the practical results of true philosophy
over the country at large, the older systems will pro-
bably, ere long, disappear from their high platform of
authority, and be regarded only as ancient curiosities,
which few will care to preserve.
PLAN OF THE WORK.
In view of the special aim of this work, viz., to expose the religious
errors of Hindu philosophy, it will be well, at the outset, to give a
general outline of the chief systems, that the place held in them by
the religious errors may be fully understood ; next, to state clearly
and fully the errors themselves, with the texts in which they are
asserted, the arguments by which they are defended, and the illus-
trations by which they are made plain: and then to set forth the
grounds upon which, even on their own showing, these dogmas must
be objected to, as great and dangerous errors. The essay thus
naturally divides itself into three parts :-
PART FIRST : The Systems of Hindu Philosophy surveyed.
PART SECOND: The Religious Errors of these Systems stated.
PART THIRD: These Errors discussed and exposed.
PART I.
General View of the Systems.
THE VEDIC AGE.
RIGHTLY to appreciate the notions current amongst a
people, it is necessary to learn in some degree the
customs of their daily life; to consider, not only the
deep religious emotions which stirred the depths of their
nature, but the amusements of their idle hours; to see
them at home, to hear their bazar talk, to know the
objects by which they are daily surrounded; in a word,
to realize those circumstances, objects, customs, which
mould the thoughts, the habits of each generation, and
gradually determine the current and the course in which
their human life shall run. It will be well, therefore,
at this point, briefly to consider that state of society
in which Hindu philosophy first began to germinate,
in which it was gradually reduced to a settled system,
and by which those systems were determined and illus-
trated. To do this thoroughly would require a large
volume. Puránic religion, notions, legends, and cus-
toms are passing before our eyes, and have been
16
(PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
discussed and exposed again and again. Some of the
most tenacious of these notions have been defended
among the ancient philosophies of the land; but these
again everywhere rest upon the primary rock of Vedic
religion and Vedic life. The last controversy with the
Hindu system must deal with these ; and the man
who shall specially provide the material for showing
in a complete, satisfactory and convincing form, that
Vedic life, Vedic sages, and Vedic authority were erring
and human, instead of divine, will confer upon the
agencies of Christianity in India a boon of incalculable
worth. A far more summary view of these subjects
will suffice for our present purpose.
The Aryan race, from which the modern Hindus
have sprung, had long since quitted the valleys of
Media and Bactria, found their way across the snowy
passes of the Hindu Koosh, and settled along the
margin of the Punjab rivers and of the plains which
they inclose. Successive emigrations increased their
numbers, and enlarged their territory. They found on
their arrival a native population, of Tartar origin,
occupying the soil. They were of another lineage and
spoke a different tongue: while the Aryans belonged
to the great shepherd race which gave the Pelasgians
to Greece and Italy, and the Teutonic tribes to Northern
Europe. Their progress was so disputed, and the
tribes of Dasyus which they drove back were so perti-
nacious in their resistance—they yielded so slowly to
their conquerors, and so frequently plundered them-
that long after the tribes had been swept away, their
PART 1]
17
THE VEDIC AGE.
name was employed as the common term to describe
a prowling.robber.
When the Aryans first appear to history in the
pages of the oldest Veda, we see them a sturdy race,
active, intelligent, and warlike, of simple. habits; living,
to a large extent, upon their flocks and herds; yet
dwelling in small towns and villages, and cultivating
with cereals and fruits the fields and gardens which
they have wrested from the earliest holders of the soil.
They continue to increase their numbers and their
territory; and to push southward and eastward across
the plains of Sirhind to the head waters of the Ganges
and Jumna, which they were destined to render so
famous in future days. Their settlements are evidently
greatly scattered; the land and the people are broken
up into sections, to a great degree independent of each
other, and often involved in quarrels. In some parts
arid plains spread out for miles ; in others, thickets and
tangled jungle cover the country, in which live the wild
elephant, the tiger, the bear, the wolf, and many kinds
of deer.
With diligent hand they cultivate their fields and
gardens, watering them from the stores gathered in
tanks and ponds, covered with the horned singhara and
the blue lotus. Their wealth consists principally in
cattle, goats, horses, and sheep; and everything which
can tend to secure the retention or the increase of
these blessings is an object of intense desire. Their
petty wars and contests, whether with their kindred,
or with the aborigines, occupy a large share in
0
18
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
their anxieties. Their rivalries are numerous, their
contests frequent, and their victories, as in other
lands, are celebrated in the most spirited and joyous
songs. They are living a natural active life, divided by
the ordinary distinctions of society, and absorbed in
the ordinary employments which shall defend their
settlements and supply their wants. They possess
many striking features of character, and are peculiarly
distinguished by family attachments and ties. To them
home is a sacred place, and the hearth the centre round
which their affections most strongly twine. Affected by
so many pressing wants, all the aspects of nature, on
which they are dependent, impress them in the pro-
foundest degree. The three seasons of the year, the
cold bracing winter, with its sky of brilliant blue, the
hot season, with its blinding glare and its terrific dust
storms, and the rainy months, when the refreshing
showers clothe the parched earth in carpets of richest
green, are objects of vital interest.
Their religion naturally bears the character of their
daily life. It has few objects of worship, and the rites
that are paid to them are few and simple. The “ One
Great Creator,” almighty, all-sufficient, has nearly
passed from their view ; mere remnants of tradition, in
their most ancient songs, are all that speak his praise.
Their deities have a direct relation to the circum-
stances in which they dwell. AGNI, the god of light
and fire; INDRA, the god of the firmament; VARUNA,
the god of order ; Ustas, the dawn, " the daughter of
the sky,” “whom age cannot touch ;" the Maruts, the
PART I.]
19
THE VEDIC AGE.
66
whirlwinds, the attendants of Indra; the Ashwins, the
sons of the Sun, and a few others, thirty-three in all,
are the deities whom they reverence.
To them light and fire in all their forms, applications,
and uses, were objects of intense interest. Whether on
the household hearth, on the sacrificial altar, in the bril-
liant day, or the terrific blazing of the kindled forests,
they saw their mighty genial god AGNI," the ever young”
Agni of the golden eye and golden hand.” His praises
therefore are frequent, the epithets applied to him are
endless, and petitions for earthly objects of desire are
unceasingly renewed. To INDRA, likewise, who rules the
firmament, and bestows the blessings dependent upon
rain and sunshine, they turn with longing eye. To
him, the warrior god, they appeal for victory over
enemies and the huge spoils that follow a successful
raid. In the burning months of the hot season, when
they see the arid plains cracking with the fierce heat,
the trees losing their brilliant green, the herbage
parched before their eyes, and all their cattle failing
for thirst, they turn to him. It is Vritra, his enemy and
theirs, that withholds the refreshing showers for which
all eyes long And when at length along the western
horizon the vapours thicken, and the desired storm
bursts in grandeur-when they see the blinding dust
whirling in lofty columns on its mighty march, and the
swift scud flies low along the ground—when they see
the blue flashes which pierce the clouds, and hear the
crashing peals of the awful thunder, it is Indra and his
Maruts that are fighting the celestial battle on their
C2
20
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
behalf. And when the driving rain pours from the heavy
clouds, and the earth drinking it in, all nature renews
its life, fresh verdure clothes the fields, and the birds
carol their joyous songs, it is to the mighty Indra, the
Conqueror, that their thanks are paid, and from him
that fresh blessings are humbly craved. The worship
paid is exceedingly simple, and is offered especially,
though not exclusively, on the family altar. In order
due, the rites are paid; thrice in the day, the sacred
log is laid upon the fire; each father of a house pours
upon its blaze the offerings of butter, repeats the prayers
or sings the sacred song. They speak to the gods on
most familiar terms, as to a petted child; pat them on
the back with praises, and because of their gifts express
a strong hope that the gods and they will be friends
again. They cry aloud at times for mercy, and plead
human infirmity as the cause of their errors.
not our own doing, O Varuna ! it was necessity, an in-
toxicating draught, passion, dice, thoughtlessness; even
sleep brings unrighteousness."
In those early days offerings of the soma-juice to
Indra were very frequent, and the soma-yága was cele-
brated in public by the village community in general.
The plant was gathered specially at the appointed hours,
its juice expressed, prepared and fermented ; part was
poured upon the fire for the god, and the rest drunk by
the worshippers. It is evident, however, that the exhilara-
tion produced was by no means regarded with the feelings
with which modern Hindu society looks on drunken-
ness. The soma was taken in their worship and offered
66 It was
PART I.]
21
THE VEDIC AGE.
to their god; and the excitement of mind and nervous
elevation it produced were evidently regarded as a
divine afflatus deepening their religious feelings, inten-
sifying their fervour, and bringing them into closer
communion with their deity.
their deity. They attributed the
same elevation to Indra himself, prayed him to drink
deeper draughts, that his strength might increase; and
little understood the moral character of their offering;
when they praised him for securing his victory over
Vritra by the noble [Dutch] courage with which the
soma had inspired him. This was one of the earliest
forms of rites, like the Dionysiac ceremonies, or the
ceremonies by which the Marabout, the dancing Der-
vish, and the Shaker have endeavoured to attain artificial
excitement in their outward worship: an excitement
mistaken for that fervour of religious principle which
ought to spring only from the heart within.
Expressing themselves thus naturally, holding a close
communion with their various gods, and offering new
prayers and praises as circumstances dictated, the
hymns in which their litany was embodied gradually
increased, and at length, apparently about a thousand
years before Christ, seem to have been collected from
among the scattered settlements in which they were
honoured, and brought together in the form in which
they now appear in the RIG VEDA. Writing was en-
tirely unknown; they were transmitted from generation
to generation entirely by memory, though special care
was taken to transmit them with great correctness.
There was no exclusive priesthood, as in later days, or
22
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
at least only the germs of that exclusiveness had been
avowed and were beginning to appear. Kshatriyas
could offer worship, or receive fees; and even one
sprung from the Dasyu race was permitted to con-
tribute hymns to the worship of the Vedic gods.
Hundreds of years passed on.
On every side the
Aryan nation, with their Sanskrit speech, increased in
number, extended their authority, and enlarged their
territory. Their civilization rose to a higher level;
their notions were enlarged, their habits were developed.
Powerful kingdoms were established; and when their
systems of philosophy appear, the nation at large, and
the learned classes in particular, had reached perhaps
the highest point of civilization and of mental vigour
which they were ever permitted to attain. When Alex-
ander entered the Punjab, all Upper India was in their
hands. The vast plain of the Ganges to the hills of
Rajmahal, the valley of the Soane, the rich lands of
Oude and of Tirhoot; from the jungle slopes of the
Siwalik hills, with the deadly Terai at their feet, to
where the basaltic masses of the Vindhya range o’erhang.
the loamy plains watered by the swiftly-flowing Ner-
budda; from the open fertile provinces on the Ganges
to the hilly valleys and recesses of Guzerat and Rajpu-
tana, Arya VARTHA, " the land of the Aryas," included
them all. The Hindu kingdoms were numerous, and
probably only a few were powerful. Kanouj, Benares,
’Awadh (Oude), Avanti, Indraprastha, Vesali, Sra-
vasti, were the centres of independent principalities.
The powerful kingdom of Magadh, or Behar, had its
PART I.]
23
THE VEDIC AGE.
capital at Rajagriha, and subsequently at Pataliputra.
Central India contained many such independent states.
The kingdoms in the Ganges plain, in Oude, and
Magadh seem to have been most completely Hinku,
and most subject to brahmin influence, custom, and law.
In Central India there existed much more freedom, and
other influences held considerable sway. Great changes
had passed over the country. As the Aryan race ad-
vanced in numbers and in territory, it seems clear that
they by no means exterminated the original inhabitants :
but when the latter submitted, permitted them to occupy
their villages and cultivate their fields: they were glad,
doubtless, to avail themselves of their services as la-
bourers. Though they lost their languages, and adopted
the language of their conquerors, many traces of such
original inhabitants exist throughout the provinces down
to the present day. Besides these, subdued and in a mea-
sure mingled with their conquerors, a border of native
tribes everywhere fringed the Hindu kingdoms, living
independent and free upon the hills, in the dense forests
and the pathless tracts; protected by swamps, or by hill
fastnesses, that their enemies could with difficulty ap-
proach. Small in stature, dark in features, living
hardly, of rude manners, limited in knowledge, fond of
drink, afraid of demons, seeking protection in charms
and spells, bound together in clans, they have remained
to this day, ill-treated by successive conquerors, but
really tamed by none; prepared to plunder all, when-
ever fit occasion should arrive.
Great changes had passed over Hindu society at
24
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
large. The brahmins, ambitious of retaining the priest-
hood exclusively in their hands, and of ruling all classes
through their superstitious fears, had carried their efforts
for that purpose successfully through; had maintained
fierce contests with the Kshatriyas, and in the eastern
portion of the Aryan land had all but exterminated
them. They stood, therefore, at length at the head of
Hindu society, and their authority was maintained with
a firm hand. The caste system had been fully de-
veloped, and in it all ranks of society now found their
place. A large body of Sudras had been formed,
partly, we presume, from the intermixture of the
Aryan with the native races, and partly from the de-
graded families of the purer castes.
In the west,
crippled though not exterminated, the Kshatriyas held
the states of Central India, filling the high plateau
watered by the Chumbul and the Betwa; mingled
largely with the native races, the Bhils and Mairs,
from whom they had wrested the many fortresses that
crown the isolated hills, amongst which, eminent above
all, stood the noble mountain of Abu, with the “Jewel
Lake"
upon its lofty brow. Even here, however, while
retaining more fully an independent rule, for religious
ordinances and the due performance of public festivals,
they were compelled to look to the brahmins, with
whom they had contended.
Occupied and cultivated, the country appeared pro-
bably the same as it does now. In the villages and
along the high roads were seen the wide-spread banyan,
with its pillared walks, the home of the monkey, the
PART 1.]
25
THE VEDIC AGE.
bat, and the “flying-fox;” the peepul, with its green,
glossy, and pointed leaves; the caotchuc; the umbra-
geous tamarind and the bitter neem; the soft, pointed,
feathery clusters of the bamboo; the mango, with its
abundant wood; the clumsy jack-tree, with its ugly,
lumpy, and far-scented fruit; the cotton-tree, with its
silky fibres, the wonder of the Greeks; the tall, straight
palmyra and date trees; tlie betel palm, with its slender
trunk and feathery crown; and near the sea, the cocoa-
nut, with its rich store of fruit. In the gardens, both
rich and poor loved to look on the thick foliage of the
asoka, with its heads of orange, crimson, and scarlet
flowers; upon the sacred kusa grass; the purple, and
orange, and red hibiscus. They loved to scent the
fragrant lemon-grass, the bokul, with its white, sweet
flowers, and the gondhoráj, “the king of scents.” A
profusion of vegetables and fruits filled their gardens
and the public markets: the trailing cucumbers, gourds,
and melons lay thick upon the cottage roof: the plan-
tain, the custard-apple, the betel-creeper, and all classes
of peppers and spices, beans and pease, yielded their
stores for the comfort of all classes. These gardens
were watered from the numerous wells with which the
land was filled, or from the tanks, covered with water-
lilies and bordered with green turf and shady trees :
dense jungle ran along the mountain bottoms and
sprang from the feverish swamps; while, over all,
stood the mighty range of Himavat, clad with dense
forests of the feathery pine, and crowned with the ever-
glistening fields of stainless snow: a mighty range,
26
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
beheld from afar with speechless awe, and believed in
after ages to be the abode of the mighty Siva, who
through his streaming hair is fabled to have poured the
goddess Gunga, that, bursting through the rocky bar-
riers below, she might carry life, health, holiness, and
immortality to their millions of votaries in the burning
plains.
The villages were few and far between, built of mud
huts, or cottages of bamboo and mat, surrounded by
mud walls for self-defence, and governed by the little
fraternity which has maintained the municipal element
down to the present day. The towns held the most
civilized portion of the community: some were large
and comparatively wealthy, containing houses of brick
and stone. No temples were to be found in them :
their noblest buildings were the palaces of kings and of
the chiefs that surrounded them. While in the country
a skilful agriculture produced abundant crops of wheat
and barley and rice, in the towns the various arts and
trades were in a flourishing condition: and from their
operation the brahmin teacher drew many an illustra-
tion of the principles he taught. The smith could pro-
duce iron and steel of the finest temper, and work them
into swords and arms of the best kind. The weaver
provided, of cotton and silk, dresses, both coarse and
fine, with plain or figured patterns, and of various
colours. Precious stones and pearls were set by the
jeweller in earrings, bracelets, and other ornaments for
women; in caps, and arms, and tiaras for warriors and
kings. Pottery of all kinds; vessels of brass and bell-
PART 1.]
27
THE VEDIC AGE.
metal; embroidery of gold and silver thread, were all
l'eadily produced and highly prized. The wealthy rode
in cars drawn by bullocks; the umbrella was borne
only over the heads of kings; and the fine yák-tails of
Tibet were carried before them in their honour. All
warriors, high and low, sought to excel in archery:
they rcdle in chariots, on horses, or on elephants : they
defended themselves with bull-hide shields or fought
with inlaid swords. Camels and elephants carried their
camp equipage and supplies.
The amusements of the people were found in listen-
ing to the legends of their race; in gambling, for which
houses were specially provided; in ram-fighting and
cock-fighting; in exhibiting feats of strength; in riding,
driving, and shooting with bows of strange strength at
a peculiar mark.
The Hindu women in this earlier period of their his-
tory evidently enjoyed far greater freedom than was
given them in later times. They could walk and ride
abroad, were openly present at public festivals and
shows, at the great marriages, and at great trials of
skill and of strength, in which their own hand was the
victor's prize. The oldest legends of the people, which
are worked up as episodes in the Mahabhárat, and other
authorities, relate the most interesting and attractive
stories of their excellence; and show both men and
women at times exhibiting an earnestness of principle,
an amount of self-sacrifice that would not be expected
in modern days. "The faithful, unwearied search of
Damayanti for her ruined husband; the bright in-
28
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
telligence of Maitreyi, and her desire to know all that
can be taught of the soul's future: the purity and faith-
fulness of Sita; the filial reverence and self-renuncia-
tion of Nachiketa; the high self-respect of Sunahsepha ;
the intense fondness of all classes for family and home,
exhibit the Hindu character on a higher platform, and
as able to attain a higher excellence than in modern
and degenerate days. Signs of that excellence exist
still. In spite of the degradation of ages, in spite of
the lying, deception, and cringing subservience pro-
duced by centuries of oppression, the Hindus have
some noble traits of character remaining still. Morally
ruined, often left the victims of passion which their
religion supplies no principles to control, in cooler hours
they are courteous, gentle, kindly, hospitable; and dis-
play an active intelligence, and a desire for knowledge,
which gratify all who are willing to instruct them. As
compared with Mahomedans, they have always been a
favourite race with missionaries; and few can doubt
that, under the sanctifying influence of the gospel, they
will become one of the noblest races in all the eastern
world.
It is perfectly clear from these ancient legends, that
in the long series of years of which we now speak, the
claims of brahminism, though steadily pressed, were by
no means speedily settled; and the institutions and
manners of the people were by no means confined
within the limits which brahminical law subsequently
set around them.
The Kshatriya Visvamitra long
resisted with success the exclusive claims of the brah-
PART 1.]
29
THE VEDIC AGE. .
min order, and was at length admitted amongst them.
King Janaka offered a similar resistance. A most
striking illustration of the difference between earlier
and later customs is seen in the fact that the Princess
Draupadi was the wife of the five Pandu brothers, the
chief of whom were Arjuna and Judhishthira; and that
Vyása, their grandfather, married his brother's widows.
In the different families and clans the household cere-
monies and customs differed considerably from one
another; and so sacred was ancient custom allowed to
be, that even Vedic rule was not strong enough to set
it aside. Families differed from each other in the braids
of their hair, the shaving of their heads, the colour of
their priestly dress, or in the materials employed in
worship; and, as in Bengal to the present day, great
families adopted different gods as the favourite objects of
their reverence.
While retaining, however, very largely the ancient
Vedic gods and ancient modes of worship, the whole
nation developed to a much larger degree than at first
that love for metaphysical speculation and for a life of
contemplation for which they have become celebrated.
Their religious system assumed a broader shape and
occupied a wider field. Their ritual, confined almost
exclusively to the elements provided by antiquity, was
thoroughly settled, and its different portions classified
and arranged. Their household ceremonies, adminis-
tered by parents and priests for their children and
scholars; the solemn sacrifices; the duties which every
householder had to discharge, or every student had
30
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
carefully to observe, were clearly and succinctly de-
tailed. The four classes of priests required by Vedic
service had their distinct duties assigned, and rules
were adopted to assist them in the punctilious discharge
of even the most minute service. The adhváryus, aided
by the ritual prescribed in the YAJUR VEDA, prepared
the place of ceremony, provided the materials, led up
the animal, sacrificed it, and performed all the harder
labour, muttering as they proceeded the usual invoca-
tions. The udgátris, directed by the Sám VEDA, sang
the sacred hymns. The Hotri, acquainted with the
whole, as taught in the RIG VEDA, recited at the ap-
pointed times, in loud, clear tones, the holy texts,
invocations, and prayers.
While the brahmin super-
intended the whole, watched that mistakes were cor-
rected, and saw that the entire rites were performed
in due order. On all these topics explanations arose,
minute directions were given; and as time went on, and
the original import of particular ceremonies and sacri-
fices became lost, other explanations, even of the most
puerile kind, were suggested, confirmed, and adopted.
For instance, the great sacrifices, the Aswamedha and
the Purushamedha, in which no doubt at first, in the
early history of the race, horses and men were literally
sacrificed, entirely changed their character; substitutes
were provided for the victims, and the original custom
and meaning entirely passed away. These explana-
tions and minute directions became the nucleus of the
BRAHMANAS of the Vedas, which contain many of them
to the present day.
PART I.]
31
THE VEDIC AGE.
In this age, also, the first attempts were made to
philosophize about the world at large. The laws of
thinking, the laws of causation, were but dimly under-
stood : thought wandered free and unrestrained; and it
can be no matter of wonder that inquiries should be
incomplete, facts ill-examined, explanations crude and
puerile, and conclusions utterly unsound. Still the
process was original; it was entirely unguided by the
thinkers of other lands; it had to develop not only its
object-matter, but the rules by which its own methods
should be conducted; and it is, therefore, in the highest
degree interesting as an exhibition of the modes in
which the unaided reason of man carries on its in-
quiries, of the objects of contemplation which it chooses,
and of the results at which it is able to arrive.
One of the strangest facts connected with this matter
is, that the whole of these discussions were carried on,
and those long and extraordinary treatises formed,
without the aid of writing. Slowly weighed, prepared
and thought out in the author's own mind, they were
taught with infinite pains to students; by them learned
by heart, together with the running commentary which
expounded them; and were subsequently taught to
others. The extent to which memory was taxed and
developed was infinitely greater than anything ex-
hibited in these latter days, when books may be weighed
by tons and paper measured by the mile.
The earlier settlements of the Aryan race were scat-
tered and much separated from each other; and even
in their most flourishing days, the want of good roads,
32
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART I.
the frequent occurrence of jungle tracts, of aridpiains
and undrained swamps, must have greatly hindered
their mutual intercourse. But wherever they went,
however far they spread, they carried with them the
hymns of their fathers and the religious rites trans-
mitted to them from ancient days. All were preserved
by memory alone, and all the ceremonies and customs
in which they had been trained were regarded with the
highest veneration. While their faith and their life
were fresh and natural, new hymns were composed and
adopted in the various clans, or separate families, spread
over the country. The ancient songs also were pre-
served with the greatest care; and at length the whole
were gathered, as we have seen, about a thousand years
B. c. into the collection known as the Sanhita of the
RIG VEDA. Within three or four hundred years more
the ritual collections of the other Vedas, and the expla-
nations and speculations of their Brahmanas were also
produced. All were transmitted from generation to
generation. The fact that they were so dependent
upon
the memories of men who were continually dying
away, led them to make extraordinary efforts to master
the minutest detail, to learn each passage with the
greatest exactness, that they might be taught without
to the generations that should follow them.
Many years, varying from twelve to forty-eight, were
spent by individuals in learning these works by heart;
and it is not improbable that the care employed for this
purpose by the brahmin families, the large amount of
learned lore to be transmitted, the necessity of having
error
PART I.]
33
THE VEDIC AGE.
a class devoted solely to its acquisition, and the conse-
quent high authority 'they obtained, contributed to
secure the fulfilment of those high aims which their
ambition had formed, to be religiously the masters of
their entire race. Besides, amongst the Hindus of
those remote ages, an amazing reverence existed for
literary compositions. They thought nothing of mere
conventional rules; they fancied there was something
divine in these communications; and they reverenced
not merely the sentiments or the authority of the com-
posers, but regarded with profoundest awe each syllable,
each letter ; and the very tones and emphasis with
which each should be pronounced. The mispronoun-
cing of a single accent might mar the power of a
prayer!
In spite, however, of all their care, the circumstances
in which they were placed naturally produced in the
course of time various differences in the text of their
hymns and the proceedings of their ceremonies. Diffe-
rent localities naturally acquired different "editions” or
“ recensions” (sákhá) of the Veda: the families and in-
dividuals that followed a particular sakha, or “ branch,"
were called a charana: and among the various charanas
there existed, in most places, parishads, or coteries of
well-qualified individuals, who were regarded as 'refe-
rees on all disputed questions of the reading of words,
syllables, or sentences of the sacred text. As the com-
positions of various kinds increased, and the population
spread, these sakhas and charanas increased also. There
were charanas that varied in their reading not only of
D
34
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the Rig Veda Sanhita, the oldest of all, but of every
Sanhita, of every Brahmana, and of the different com-
positions of which the collections were composed. And
in spite of all precaution, through the deaths of in-
dividuals, the decay and extinction of different families,
nothing would seem to be more clear than that, in some
cases, hymns, rites, customs, and treatises, that were once
well known, became obsolete, and eventually were en-
tirely lost. So that the Vedas and other ancient works,
including the oldest legends, are but a portion, though
a considerable one, of the literary compositions which
the fertility of the Hindu intellect and imagination put
forth in ages when they received not the slightest aid
from that art of writing which, in modern days, is
deemed of essential importance to the existence of
civilization itself.
Such were the people, such the land, such the atten-
dant circumstances from which these ancient systems
of philosophy sprang. Such was the history of their
thinking; such the hard training, the painful toil with
which their knowledge, their science were slowly
gathered. Whatever be the character of their attain-
ments, the results are entirely their own. Their scholars
enjoyed few of those helps for attaining truth which so
largely abound in modern days. They had none of the
practical common sense education which surrounds a
Protestant Saxon child from his cradle : they breathed
all their life long a different atmosphere. They were
not aided by the accumulated wisdom, experience, and
conclusions of earlier civilizations. They knew no
PART 1.]
35
THE VEDIC AGE.
country but the Aryan land, and the broad border of
rude native tribes, which cut them off from other
por-
tions of the globe. The material of their thinking,
the rules of inquiry, they had to provide for them-
selves. They could start only from that platform of
primeval civilization, with its remnants of Biblical
tradition, which their fathers had brought with them
from the Chaldæan plains. Their systems, therefore,
are native and original ; and so far are objects of pecu-
liar interest. It is not strange that their first attempts
at philosophy should be loose, free, and unsatisfactory :
that they should often fail to hit the mark at which they
aimed; that the research should be partial, the reason-
ing inconclusive ; and that to the eyes of a wiser age,
both the processes and the results should appear puerile
and ridiculous. The schoolmen of the middle ages,
with all their great advantages, their masculine vigour,
and their sometimes grand results, were not free from a
like charge. And the failure was less unnatural, in an
age when the teachers and thinkers were brahmins,
who had pressed with unceasing vigour their claims to
the exclusive priesthood, had fought with success the
most desperate contests on behalf of their order, and
now stood triumphant, the spiritual lords of the Hindu
Teaching with high and undisputed authority,
they dealt out with careless hand a great deal of what
the world calls rubbish; for true philosophy flourishes
only when sifted by honest opposition.
The time for sifting at length arrived. About six
hundred years before the Christian era a new class of
race.
D 2
36
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
speculations in philosophy, and new theories respecting
the shortest mode of “liberating the soul,” began to
find currency. Existing notions were freely examined :
greater system, therefore, became the order of the day.
An artificial system of expressing the largest amount of
knowledge in the fewest possible words was invented,
and seems to have been received with enthusiasm. The
brief aphorisms so formed were termed SUTRAS. They
were constructed on peculiar principles, to which a key
was furnished; they rather hinted at knowledge than
expressed it; and, from the first, required the explana-
tory commentary which should declare all they were
intended to convey. With a view to aid the priests in
their severe toil of learning by heart all the formulæ
necessary for their official duties, the directions con-
veyed in the Brahmanas of the Vedas were reduced to
a system termed Kalpa Sutras ; and so easy did the
cess become, that many were induced to neglect the
Brahmanas, and study the Sutras alone.
The objects of philosophy were treated in the same
way. The thinking became more clear ; the principles
of inquiry more defined; reasons, arguments, and illus-
trations were brought forward in defence of the tenets
advocated; controversies became numerous and sharp;
and apparently, within a period of two or three hundred
years, the great systems which have come down to us
were sifted, arranged, and settled. The order in which
they were started is not distinctly known; and to ascer-
tain it is not a matter of vital consequence.
Most
probably the system now termed the SÁNKHYA was the
did the pro-
PART I.]
37
THE VEDIC AGE.
first that left the beaten track of the old Brahmanas;
and by its novel theories, so contrary to the current
brahmin notions, became the occasion of stimulating to .
new inquiries, and rendering the arguments respecting
them more satisfactory and sound. While exceedingly
free in its speculations, and on many important points
differing from ordinary Vedic doctrine, it partly saved
its position by not directly questioning the authority of
the Vedas, or of the brahmin priesthood. As a matter
of doctrine and argument, the Vedánta system seems to
have been formed in direct reply to it. The other sys-
tems were likewise propounded ; and at one time the Sán-
khya, Yoga and Vaiseshika were denounced as heretical.
Brahminism, however, was very lenient where mere
speculation was concerned. It was only a denial of its
authority that roused all its ire and called forth its most
active opposition. This spirit was conspicuously exhi-
bited in the case of Buddhism; which, as it grew in
strength, directly attacked it in its most vital seats.
When that system was first formed, the strength and
the pretensions of brahmin exclusiveness had reached
their culminating point.
That class had driven the
Kshatriyas and all others from the priesthood. They
excluded all knowledge of sacred books from the lowest
castes; even those who sought to acquire that know-
ledge with a view to their elevation in another world
had to spend years in painful toil, in weary studies, and
in self-mortifications of the most bitter kind. Prac-
tically, the lower castes were shut out from all such
aspirations; and the spirit in which the priests desired
38
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
to deal with them is well exhibited in those cruel
“ Laws of Manu,” which were already partly current
among the Taittiriya clans for whom they were com-
piled. Buddhism was the natural, popular reaction
from this grinding tyranny. Its founder, SAKYA SINGH,
a Kshatriya prince, had studied deeply brahminical lore:
and at length prepared a system of his own, which, to
much of Kopila's Sánkhya doctrine, added a simpler
theory of relief from the ills of transmigration than
the Vedic system taught. On the courses of trans-
migration, past as well as future, he dwelt very fully :
and laid it down that all classes, without those years of
weary study, could carry on the works of virtue, which
should infallibly end in final annihilation. Apparently
pitying, with a large-hearted benevolence, the ignorance
of the lower orders, he encouraged them to attend his
teaching; preached his discourses in plain language,
with repetitions and explanations that made his doctrine
more clear and more impressive: and sought in every
way to render his instructions not the privilege of a
lordly few, but the heritage and the purifier of the most
despised. Indirectly, therefore, he attacked the Vedas,
the brahmin priesthood, and ancient brahmin learning,
in their very heart; by showing that if his system were
adopted, the whole of them might be neglected without
harm. Controversies of course arose, the brahmins
tenaciously defended their views. But large numbers
enrolled themselves as his disciples: the system spread,
including brahmins as well as others within its pale: its
followers became exceedingly numerous; and when at
PART 1.]
39
THE VEDIC AGE.
length, under the great Asoka, it became a political
power, it not only brought about the one great crisis in
the history of brahminism, but at one time even threat-
ened its extinction. After severe contests the tide of
opposition was rolled back ; brahminism, once more
triumphant, was considerably popularized, and the
Puranic system was rapidly developed. Henceforth
in Hindustan, all knowledge, all philosophy were con-
fined to the brahmin caste. But little was the author
of Buddhism aware that he was founding an awful
system of religion; which when completed and carried
into other lands by his successors, should subjugate the
minds of half the human race for many, many centuries;
an awful system of fatal error, which while denying the
existence of the Supreme God, should lead its disciples
to take as their model, and the support of all their
future hopes, an utterly ANNIHILATED MAN.
NAMES AND CHARACTER OF THE HINDU SYSTEMS.
The various schools of Hindu philosophy which were
formed under the circumstances we have now described
are distinguished from each other by names expressive
of their origin or of the opinions which they advocate.
As we have seen, the doctrines of some are taken from
the Vedas, or are at least consistent with the tenor of
brahmin teaching, and the maintenance of brahminical
authority. The speculations of others directly and in-
directly tend to destroy that authority. The former
are declared to be orthodox; the latter, heretical. The
40
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
system of the Buddhists, and that of the Jains which
sprang from it, are the most ancient of the heretical
schools, and have been most largely followed: but
others have arisen and contended with brahminism in
later days. The schools which are reckoned peculiarly
orthodox are six in number, and are well known by the
names of the SÁNKHYA and YOGA; the Nykya and
VAISESHIKA; the PURBBA and UTTARA MIMÁNSÁ. These
systems, termed DARSANAS, always occupy a conspi-
cuous place in any enumeration of the sacred shastres :
and inspiration is claimed for their respective authors,
who enjoy the highest reputation as men of learning.
Jaymini and Veda Vyása, the authors of the two
Mimansas, are reputed to have taken an important
share in the compilation and arrangement of the Vedas.
The six systems are not totally different from each
other. Owing to the great similarity in doctrine
and purpose existing between some of them, and the
contrast which therein they present to others, the sys-
tems form themselves into three groups or pairs; and
their followers into three great schools. The VenÁNTA
and PÚRBBA MIMÁNSá constitute one pair, as correlative
to each other and working to the same end. The
Púrbba Mimánsá expounds the “earlier ” portion of the
Vedas, and describes the ritual ceremonies and acts of
devotion by which religious merit may be acquired.
The Uttara Mimánsá or Vedánta, expounding the
“ later” books, the Upanishads, develops the higher
mode of meditation on the nature and attributes of the
Supreme Brahma, by which absorption into his essence
PART 1.]
41
THE ORTHODOX SYSTEMS.
can be more speedily and effectually attained. The
SÁNKHYA in its structure and tenets differs widely
from the VEDÁNT: but is closely followed by the Yóga of
PÁTANJALI. The Nysya and VAISESHIKA are also alike
in doctrine; the former being occupied chiefly with the
principles of investigation; the latter with the physical
inquiries which form the main purpose of its treatises.
All the systems deal with those familiar topics which
lie near to the surface of human life and human reflec-
tion. They all discuss the constitution of man; the
point in existence from which he starts; the aim of his
mundane life; the course he runs; and the sphere
awaiting him in another world. They examine his
relation to the Supreme and to the system of nature;
the structure of his frame; the universe in which he
dwells; the elements of which it is composed; the
beings with which it is peopled; the regions into which
it is divided; the heavens above, the worlds of dread
and punishment below.
The three pairs of systems, however, deal with these
problems differently; and are strongly contrasted with
each other in their fundamental positions, as well as in
the modes by which they account for the origin of all
things. The Nyára, giving special heed to the cause
of our sensations and the pursuits to which they lead,
looks outward to the world, whose varied objects pro-
duce those sensations, and stir the thoughts of the soul
within: and observing in the human organism five
channels of information respecting external objects in
the five senses, adopts unquestioned the theory of the
42
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. (PART I.
five elements, and develops all its consequences. Apart
from its excellent principles of investigation, it is a
more natural system than the others : it embraces a
wider range of topics; classifies them more correctly;
enters more deeply into their constitution; and arrives
at sounder conclusions respecting them than either
or both those systems have done. In its doctrine con-
cerning God, the substratum of matter, and the opera-
tions of the human soul, it comes much nearer to
modern philosophy than they. The SÁNKHYA, arrested
by our emotions, which are of three kinds, and which
continually disturb the soul's “ quiet,” searches for that
which “ enslaves" the soul, naturally free, and passing
by the active agency of a Supreme Lord, educes every-
thing from the union of an eternal matter and eternal
souls acting by themselves. The VEDÁNTA, passing
below the surface of both external appearances and
internal emotions, looks at the question of Being, asks
What is, What is real; and, leaving everything that is
mediate and apparent, decides that there is but one
Existence and one Substance in the universe, the Supreme
Brahma. This explanation of their fundamental prin-
ciples will render it easy to understand the details, now
to be presented, in which each of the systems has been
worked out. Having surveyed them separately, and
instituted a comparison between them, we shall be
better prepared to judge of their peculiar characteristics;
and to enter more deeply into their view of those all-
important religious questions of which they principally
treat.
PART 1.]
43
THE ORTHODOX SYSTEMS.
It may be thought that the systems are in several
essential points so completely opposed to each other,
that they may well be left to that mutual destruction
which such contradictions should involve. But the
vitality of Hindu errors is not so easily destroyed.
These errors have fought against each other for two
thousand years, and live still. Stern consistency in the
search after truth rarely belongs to any but the dis-
ciples of Bacon; to those who have been trained under
the common-sense philosophy which governs countries
where the Bible gives health to the intellect as well
as to the heart. In the present day, these systems are
by no means regarded as irreconcileable antagonists.
However great their differences may have been thought
in former ages, however fierce may have been their
many discussions, however earnest their rivalries, their
modern followers have long since adopted the com-
fortable conviction that the differences are reconcileable,
and have arranged the various glosses and interpre-
tations by which that reconciliation is secured. A mere
reference, therefore, to the discrepancies between their
systems is insufficient to silence the advocates by whom
they are defended. In respect to their religious position,
likewise, these native scholars are all at one.
orthodox brahmins, who, whatever be their systems,
honour the Vedas above all other books, pay complete
respect to the current Hinduism of the day, perform
the daily ceremonies, and observe the usual caste rules.
Even the great doctrine of Kopila, which gave to his sys-
tem the name of the Nireswara Sánkhya, "the Sankhya
All are
44
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
without a God,” can be held by his followers without
any suspicion that such speculations injure their reli-
gious standing; for they now argue that he does not
deny the existence of a God, he merely asserts that,
in the arguments he is discussing, that existence is not
proved. The followers of all the systems fully recog-
nize the divine origin and authority of the Vedas; and
they are, therefore, thoroughly at war only with those
who, like the Buddhists and Jains, dispute that autho-
rity. Their philosophical creed is matter of opinion:
their daily life is ruled by the Puránic Hinduism
around them. Their systems may furnish material for
study in quiet hours, or for the pleasant discussions
which whet the appetite at a funeral-feast. But they
have little to do with them as men; and guide them
but little in the details of ordinary life. Making, how-
ever, full allowance for these things, it is clear that
certain fundamental doctrines of the systems do differ
essentially from one another; and if truth be sought
as the result of sound and earnest inquiry, it is foolish
to give up the advantage secured by the fair exhibition
of such discrepancies. Any accommodation in such
cases is impossible; and its adoption must tell both
against the systems and against the spirit of inquiry by
which their followers are guided.
45
CHAPTER 1.
THE SANKHYA.
THE Hindu system termed Sankhya was apparently
the earliest formed among those which introduced the
really philosophic age. Its author is said to have been
the great sage, KOPILA: but though his learning and
acumen must have been great, and his name is still
highly honoured, very little is known of him except his
name and his opinions. Legends declare that he was
a son of Brahmá; an incarnation of Vishnu, or of Agni,
whose name, like his own, denotes “ fire;" he is num-
bered among the seven great rishis, or saints, and many
marvels are ascribed to him. He was evidently a clear
and independent thinker. Though a brahmin, and
taught probably the vague theories current before his
time, he struck out a path for himself; and no longer
following the puerile comments and loose unsatisfactory
philosophies of the Aranyakas and Brahmanas, he
formed a compact system of his own, intended to
explain the world around us in a broader fashion, and
with greater consistency than any one had previously
attempted. While largely using Vedic notions and
materials, he quitted Vedic theories; and in important
particulars reaches conclusions the very opposite of
what the Vedas teach. It is probably both from the
spirit and method adopted in his inquiries, that his
46
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
system is named Sankhya. This term is derived from
the Sanskrit word sankhya, which denotes “number,
also “judgment,” “discrimination.” The doctrines of
the system are pre-eminently sought and defended by
“Reason," in opposition to mere authority, of which
the Brahmins at that period were very fond. “They
exercise judgment,” says the Bharat," and are therefore
termed Sankhyas."
The question of its position among the other systems
is by no means settled, and is very difficult to deter-
mine. It has been argued that the Vedánt is later than
the Sánkhya because it acknowledges its tenets and
endeavours to refute them. M. Cousin, in reply, points
to the fact that all the systems quote each other, imply
each other, and argue with each other; the authorities
having been re-touched and interpolated in later times;
until it would seem that they all sprang into existence
on the same day. M. Cousin endeavours to find a
test of age in the nature of the doctrine. He argues
that the system which discusses only a particular point,
is later than one which treats of truth in general; and
that a system, which is more free in its principles of
inquiry, and pushes them to a higher range of truth, is
later than one which cleaves to authority, and merely
repeats opinions already formed. On these grounds he
places the Sánkhya at a later period than the Vecánt.
The argument will apply to the Sánkhya as against
the Upanishads, but not to the other systems : and it
has been argued, that the Sánkhya was prior in time;
it took the Upanishads and erroneously represented
CHAP. I.]
47
THE SANKHYA.
prove that
their texts as concurring in the doctrines of its own
system; the Vedanta was called forth to show what
the true system of the Upanishads was, and
the views of the Sánkhya were misrepresentations.
The latter opinion seems to be the more popular among
European scholars.
The Sánkhya system contains two grand divisions,
which differ on the vital question of the existence of a
God. One is termed the Seswara Sánkhya, the Sánkhya
cum Deo ; ,the other is named Niréswara Sánkhya, the
Sánkhya sine Deo. The latter is Kopila's system: the
former is the Yoga of Patanjali. On general doctrines
the two coincide. The oldest authority of the system is
the work entitled Sankhya Pravachan Sútras. It is
attributed to Kopila, and is evidently a work of great
value; all its positions are well discussed, and an ample
store of material is provided for the student of the phi-
losophy. This work, as usual, has been commented
on and annotated in the Kopil-Bhásya, or Sánkhya
Pravachan Bhásya, written by Vigyána-Bhikshu. The
most valuable authority of all is the SÁNKHYA-KÁRIKÁ,
a collection of memorial verses by Iswar-Krishna, in
which the system is embodied. This most admirable
work is based upon the Sutras of Kopila; it takes up
all their doctrines, arranges them in perfect order, re-
produces their arguments and illustrations, avoids con-
troversy, and gives a clear, complete, and logical view of
the system and of the mutual bearing of its several
parts. The work is very brief, and contains only
seventy-two slokas. Its great value has caused other
48
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
works to go out of use, including even the original
Sutras on which it is itself based. It has been com-
mented on by learned scholars, especially by. Gaurapád,
who has written the oldest and best commentary.
Both these works on the Sánkhya philosophy are
now available to students who know but little of
the Sanskrit language. Of the two, the more valuable,
from its completeness, is the translation of the SÁNKHYA
KÁRIKA, by Professor H. H. Wilson. This book is a
quarto volume, most handsomely printed; it contains the
Sanskrit text of the Karika, and of the Bhasya of Gau-
rapád; a complete translation of both, and a comment
by Professor Wilson himself, containing numerous elu-
cidatory extracts from other native authorities that
throw light on the subject. Every student of the
system should reckon the complete study of this work
a duty of the first importance. Colebrooke's Essay on
the Sánkhya describes the system most completely, from
the Kárika, with additions from other authorities. Dr.
Ballantyne has lately published a translation of Book I.
of Kopila's Sutras, with the commentary; and thus made
another valuable contribution to the list of original
works. After the completion of these Sutras, which
are most admirably arranged, and go fully into the
subject, there will be little to desire, on the side of
Kopila's division of the Sankhya system. Dr. Ballan-
tyne has also translated Books I. and II. of the Yóga of
Pátanjali, with a brief commentary.
These books
bring out clearly the great questions upon which their
author and Kopila differ.
CHAP. I.]
49
THE SANKHYA.
Kopila's philosophy was entirely new. The Upani-
shads had been gradually developing in a clearer form
the pantheist doctrine that the Supreme Brahma was
not only the author of the universe, but that he is the
universe, including human souls. Kopila taught that
in that universe there are two primary agencies, Nature
or matter (Prakriti) and Souls; but there is no Su-
preme. Souls have existed in multitudes from eternity;
by their side stands this Prakriti. For eternal ages the
two remained separate : at length they became united,
and the universe in all its forms was developed from
their union. The products of that union are twenty-
three in number; so that twenty-five principles explain
everything; of which soul and nature are the chief.
He proceeds to explain how by the union first is pro-
duced the individual man in his germ and his full de-
velopment; and then how the world and universe
around are aggregated. The great evil of human
existence is this union between soul and nature; it
causes all the pains of life; and the endless transmigra-
tions which the soul makes from one gross body to
another. The soul which knows the Sánkhya system
can secure the separation, and transmigration will at
To all this the Yóga system adds, that
besides the two primal agencies, there exists a Su-
preme Lord, and that intense devotion to him will
secure the same desired end. - A brief outline of the
systems will show how these doctrines are laid down
and defended. The SÁNKHYA KARIKA embraces eight
distinct topics.
once cease.
E
50
(PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
§ 1. The object of the Sánkhya, as well as of the other
branches of Hindu philosophy, is the removal of human
pain by the final and complete liberation of the indi-
vidual soul. This pain is of three kinds; it proceeds
from one's self, either by bodily disease or anxiety of
mind; from some fellow. creature; or from the acci-
dents of divine providence. Temporal means merely
alleviate these pains in the present life, and they fre-
quently return. Even the revealed mode of religious
worship, which has final liberation in view, which en-
joins sacrifices and prayers, is ineffectual. For it is
impure, because it requires the sacrifice of animals; it is
defective, since even the gods, who have attained its
highest rewards, perish at the appointed period; and it
is excessive, because the happiness of one being is
secured at the expense of the good of others. These
means are all insufficient.
True wisdom alone gives
a permanent deliverance, and secures an absolute termi-
nation to all the ills of human existence. This wisdom
consists in a true discrimination between the principles
and elements of the material world and the sensitive
and cognitive principle in man, the immaterial soul. To
secure this discrimination, and to show how it
may
be
attained, is the distinctive aim of the Sánkhya.
§ 2. Principles of investigation. In order to obtain
wisdom, three kinds of evidence are admissible, viz.,
perception, inference, and affirmation. [Analogy, added
by Gautum, is included in inference; and the Tradition
of Jaimini belongs to affirmation.] Intuition is the
only other legitimate source of knowledge, but it is con-
CHAP. I.]
51
THE SANKHYA.
fined to superior beings. The perception of the senses
is allowed as the first kind of evidence. Inference is of
three kinds : (1.) Inference of an effect from seeing its
cause in operation. “It will rain, because clouds are
gathering.” (2.) Inference of a cause from observation
of its effects. “ There is fire on that hill, for I see
smoke.” (3.) Inference from a relation different from
both. The colour of a flower is inferred from percep-
tion of its scent. The saltness of the sea is inferred
from that of some of its waters. This is the inferring
the existence of some correlatives, from the known
existence of others. Tradition or affirmation denotes
the authority of the Vedas, whose texts are reckoned
inspired by Brahmá : also the recollections of those who
remember events in their former births. More gene-
rally it includes all oral communication, especially if it
comes from those who are celebrated teachers. From
all these sources, then the direct perceptions of sense,
the indirect inferences of reasoning, and the dicta of
inspired or celebrated authority--this wisdom, which is
to liberate the soul from pain, may be derived. The
last is held by the Sánkhya very much in subordination
to the second, and comparatively little weight was at
first allowed to the Vedas, in a system which, in several
important points, flatly contradicts them.
§ 3. The twenty-five principles.-The Sánkhya system
next considers the various categories or objects of know-
ledge to which the soul must apply itself, and in respect
to which true wisdom is to be acquired. These prin-
ciples are twenty-five in number. They are stated in
E 2
52
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the order of their origin, and are all regarded in rela-
tion to causality.
The first and chief is Nature (Prakriti), the plastic
origin of all things. It is termed pradhán, or chief,
from being the universal material cause, the prime
cause of all things. It denotes not ordinary matter,
which is reckoned gross; but the eternal matter,
whence the latter has sprung. It is without beginning,
without parts, inferrible from its effects : itself unpro-
duced, but productive of other things. We shall con-
sider this principle at greater length hereafter.
The second principle is Intelligence (mahat or buddhi).
It is the first product of nature: increate, prolific, itself
productive of others.
The third is Self-consciousness (ahangkár); its peculiar
function is the recognition of the soul, the self, in its
various states. In perception it declares that objects of
It is the product of intelligence, and
produces principles which follow.
The next five principles (4-8) are the five subtle
particles, or atoms of things (tanmátra). These are
imperceptible to the gross senses of human beings, but
may be cognized by superior intelligences. Conscious-
ness is their origin, and from them spring the gross
elements.
Eleven organs (9-19), (indriya), follow next in order,
the organs of sense and action: of which ten are
external and one is internal. The organs of sense are
five: the eye, nose, tongue, ear, and skin. The organs
of action are also five: voice, hands, feet, the termina-
sense concern me.
CHAP. I.]
THE SANKHYA.
53
tion of the intestines, and the organ of reproduction.
The mind (manas), which denotes (as in the Nyáya) the
sphere of living and present consciousness, serves both
for sense and action. These eleven organs, with
intelligence and self-consciousness, constitute thirteen
instruments of knowledge. They are likened to three
warders and ten gates in the human constitution. An
external sense perceives: the internal one examines :
self-consciousness applies itself to the recognition of
its state; intellect resolves : an organ of action exe-
cutes.
Five elements (20-24) are produced from the five
subtile particles. (1.) Ether has the property of
audibleness, being the instrument of sound. (2.) Air
has two properties; it is audible and can be touched.
(3.) Fire has three, audibility, tangibility, and colour.
(4.) Water has four, adding to the three last-mentioned
the quality of taste. (5.) Earth has five, having that of
odour in addition.
The last principle (25) is soul (purush, puman,
átman). Like nature, it is not produced, but is eternal.
But, unlike nature, it produces nothing from itself. It
is multitudinous, individual, sensitive, eternal, imma-
terial. The Yóga ascribes these qualities also to God,
the ISWAR, who is the ruler of all.
In relation to causality, these principles are thus
described in the Káriká, sutra iii. - Nature, root all,
is no product. Seven principles (buddhi, ahangkar, and
the five subtile elements) are products and productive.
The sixteen following are products only. Soul is
54
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[ [PART 1.
errors.
neither a product nor productive." These are the
principles about which the system is conversant.
A few words must here be added in respect to the
three principles which lie at the root of Kopila's
system. His views seem most strangely to confound
the products of matter and mind; and it is difficult for
those who have been taught from the cradle to think of
intelligence and consciousness as purely mental states,
to understand how he can have fallen into such serious
But the explanation is near at hand. It must
first be clearly understood that by Prakriti, his primal
agency, Kopila does not mean ordinary matter. In his
view it is an extremely refined essence, an undefinable
something, different from soul, and yet capable of
bringing forth the very universe. To this essence and
primary agency soul is united. What happens ?
Tracing back the soul's most active life, in the daytime
as contrasted with night, in manhood as contrasted
with infancy, Kopila seems to have hit upon the idea
that until it is united with body in some form, the soul's
powers lie in a dormant state. Those powers are not
exerted until adequate occasion calls them forth. He
then teaches that when soul is first united to rudi-
mentary matter, intelligence, the first dawning of
mental life and power, begins to appear. But mis-
taking occasion for cause, he calls this intelligence the
product of “nature," instead of the product of soul,
occasioned by the union between the two. As intelli-
gence continues to act, there springs up within the
sphere of its activity the thought of self. Farther on
CHAP, I.]
55
THE SANKHYA.
within the sphere of self-consciousness are produced the
germs or subtle particles (notions) of the five elements :
notions of the organs of which the body is constructed;
and farther on, as Berkeley thought, the notions of an
outer universe. It is not improbable that, from some
conviction like Berkeley's that every man had his
own universe in his own mind, Kopila, by tracing the
process of intelligence and thought back to its first
steps, arrived at the doctrine expressed in these first
principles.
§ 4. The object of soul and the means of accomplishing
it. This most important branch of the system is next
discussed; and herein one of its radical deficiencies is
exhibited. Soul, it is declared, existing alone with
primeval nature, but itself unable to produce anything
whatsoever, is united to nature in order to contemplate
it and be abstracted from it. Neither can accomplish
the end by itself; both therefore join together, just
as the lame and the blind join together for mutual
guidance and locomotion in a journey. How the union
begins, and when it begins, are circumstances not at
all satisfactorily explained. By that union creation is
effected, and all the objects in the universe are deve-
loped. This creation, as we have already mentioned,
has respect to two things; first, to the residence of the
soul, and secondly, to the sphere in which its existence
is to be passed.
(a.) As to the soul's residence. It obtains for itself a
subtile body, composed of seventeen principles, of the
finest rudiments. They include intellect, self-conscious-
:56
(PART 1
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
ness, and mind (2, 3, and 19), with the other organs
and instruments, conjoined with particles of five sorts,
all in the most elementary and refined form. This body,
which the Vedas declare to be of the size of a thumb, is
called the Linga Sarír or Sukhma Sartr. It is the first
creation; it is primeval, produced at the very earliest
development of principles from the original prakriti. It
is unconfined, too subtile for restraint, swift as the wind,
and cannot enjoy till it has a grosser body. This sub-
tile body is the abode of the soul so long as it does not
obtain absorption; and it travels with the soul in all its
migrations. The grosser bodies through which they
migrate are composed of the fine elements. They are
perishable, while the subtile body endures. It is doubt-
ful whether Kopila speaks of a third body between
these two; some of his commentators consider that he
does, others that he does not.
(6.) The sphere in which the soul resides is also pro-
duced with a view to subserve its purpose of contem-
plating nature and being freed from it. The corporeal
creation, different from man, includes eight orders of
superior beings, and five of inferior ones. These thir-
teen classes, with man, are distributed in three worlds:
The eight orders of superior beings include the gods,
demigods, demons, and evil spirits well known in Hindu
mythology, Brahmá, Prajapatis, Indras, Pitris, Gan-
dharvas, and the like. The inferior orders comprise
quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, fishes, and insects, with all
vegetable and inorganic substances. The three worlds
are these. Above are the abodes of the superior beings,
CHAP. I.]
57
THE SANKHYA..
in which virtue and happiness prevail. Below are the
abodes of darkness, in which dulness and gloom abound.
The human world of misery lies between, in which
foulness, activity, and passion prevail. Through the
three the soul wanders, suffering or enjoying till it is
liberated. Much of this doctrine is taken directly from
the Upanishads.
(c.) An intellectual creation, interior to the soul, is also
justly recognized, as well as its own body and the
universe, the external abodes which it occupies. This
is called pratyay-sarga or bháb-sarga. It consists of
the affections of the intellect, its sentiments and facul-
ties. Described as to their effects upon the soul's ob-
ject, these affections are divided into four classes, and
are fifty in number. Of these, five obstruct the soul.
They are error, conceit, passion, hatred, and fear.
Twenty-eight disable it in its progress, owing to defects
in the organs of the body. Nine content the soul, five
internally and four externally. Eight species tend to
perfect it by preventing the evils both in it and around
it. Five of these are external means, and include
reasoning, oral instruction, study, amicable intercourse,
and purity. These are minor parts of the system, and
show how ingeniously all things are introduced into
the account of the condition and engagements of the
soul.
(d.) Connected essentially with this creation are the
three great qualities (guna) which occupy so large a
space in Hindu philosophy, and by which the ancient
sages endeavoured to account for the admixture of good
58
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
and evil in the world. The description of them and of
their tendencies does not differ from that presented by
the Vedánt. They tend upwards or downwards, or
retain the soul in the middle sphere of passion and
activity, encouraging its course towards greater purity
and ultimate success in its pursuit of absorption, or
drawing it lower and lower into wickedness, gloom,
and despair. These qualities enter into the very com-
position of nature, from the first development of created
objects, and co-operate together by a union of oppo-
sites; as a lamp is composed of oil, wick, and flame.
They are compared to the rope which prevents a horse
from running off. Taking up one meaning of the word
guna, viz. a cord, the commentator, in language more
striking than polite, says, “ These “qualities' are the
cords which bind the purush-pasu, the brute-like soul.”
(e.) The intellect has eight kinds of disposition: four
good, four evil. The four good are virtue or merit,
knowledge, disposition, and power. The four evil are
their opposites, vice, ignorance, passion, and weakness.
These dispositions abide in the intellect, and according
to their influence will be the history of the soul. These
are connected again as intellectual and corporeal, in
which they are respectively cause and effect. Virtue,
knowledge, and the like, are efficient causes of the
bodily conditions. The corporeal include the different
periods of life, viz., embryo, infancy, youth, and old
age. According to the admixture of these dispositions
will be the end with which the soul meets. Thus, for
instance, the soul which possesses dispassion without
CHAP. I.]
59
THE SANKHYA.
knowledge, obtains only absorption into nature (prakriti
laya). It obtains a resolution of its constitution into
the eight primary elements. It does not get real libe-
ration, and the soul migrates afresh. Devotion to God
is declared by the Yóga to be the best means of obtain-
ing beatitude through absorbed contemplation. The
devotee will repeat the divine syllable Om, and meditate
upon its meaning. Thereby he will propitiate the deity
and receive liberation as his reward. This is the doc-
trine taught by the Yóga; and much care is spent in
showing the scholar how the process may be rendered
complete, and the reward perfectly secure.
$ 5. Hitherto nothing has been discussed beyond the
elements of the creation, from which the categories of
the science are derived. Nothing has been taught con-
cerning the existence and attributes of God. This im-
portant topic will be treated in the Second Part of this
essay. It will suffice here briefly to state, that in the
Sankhya of Kopila, that existence is altogether denied;
though he allows a kind of inferior divinity with limited
powers, produced, like other elements of the universe,
on the first development of nature. Patanjali, on the
other hand, in the Yóga system, fully acknowledges the
existence of an Omniscient and Eternal God, whose
name is GLORY (OM).
§ 6. The manner in which the principles or cate-
gories of the Sánkhya may be discovered is another of
the subjects of which it treats. « Sensible objects are
known by perception : things beyond the sphere of
sense are learned by inference; a truth which cannot
1
60
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
be learned from perception or inference may be com-
municated by revelation. Nature, owing to its subtilty,
cannot be perceived, but is inferred from its effects.
Intellect and the other derived principles are effects;
something must be their cause, and that is set down as
Nature.” This introduces the subject of causation, on
which the Sánkhya teaches a peculiar theory. The
Sutras of Kopila speak very distinctly respecting it.
In aphorism 79, he lays down the great doctrine
of antiquity: “A thing is not made from nothing."
(Návastuno uastu siddhih.) (81.) “The product of some-
thing is something, and of nothing, nothing." (115.)
“A nonentity cannot be developed into an entity;
like a man's horn, it is an impossibility.” Effects,
therefore, are educts, not products or creations of new
things. Oil is in sesamum before it is pressed ; milk,
in the udder before it is drawn; and rice, in the husk
before it is shelled. (116.) “ There must be a material
from which the new product comes." (117.) “Else
might anything occur anywhere at any time," without
It will be seen hereafter that, although this
principle may be made to bear such an interpretation
as to include the Christian notion of sufficiency of
power for creation existing in an Almighty God, by
Hindu philosophers it was interpreted as teaching that
for every material effect there must exist a material
cause. That God," who is a Spirit,” should in any way
produce a material universe was by them regarded as
an utter impossibility. The very principle stated above
(Sutra 79) would be brought against the doctrine.
a reason.
CHAP. I.]
61
THE SANKHYA.
Sutra 79, therefore, equals in its force Sutra 116. The
Greek principle, το γιγνομένον έκ μη όντων γινέσθαι
ảdúvatov, seems to have been applied in the same way.
Again (6), he says (118), “ A thing possible is made
from that which is competent to produce it.” Causes,
whether material or efficient, must be adequate to the
object they produce. Cloth, not pottery, is made from
yarn.
Milk, not water, is taken to make curds. A
potter does not weave cloth, but makes jars and vessels
from his clay and wheel.
(c.) A more important principle laid down is (119):
“ The product is nothing else than the cause itself.”
A piece of cloth does not differ essentially from the
yarn
of which it was woven: as an ox does differ from
a horse. Barley, not rice, is grown from barley-corns.
(120.) “ Production is only manifestation" of what pre-
viously was. As the whiteness of white cloth is mani-
fested on the removal of dirt, so, by the operation of
the potter, the pot is manifested; so oil is manifested
from sesamum by pressure: a statue, from stone by
the operations of the sculptor; and rice, from the
husk, by threshing. (121.) “ Destruction,” he adds, " is
only the resolution of a destroyed thing into its causes.
[Násah Kárana layah.] The wise may sometimes trace
out the resurrection of an object after such destruction.
Thread becomes earth: earth is changed into a cotton-
tree; the cotton-tree gives cotton; thence thread is
again woven. So is it with all entities.
(d.) Concerning the ultimate cause, the following
principle is laid down :
“ There is a general cause
62
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
which is undistinguishable ;” and many arguments are
adduced to support it. Thus, it is said, specific objects
are finite; they are multitudinous, not universal : there
must, therefore, be an all-pervading cause.
- Homo
geneousness denotes cause.” A lump of clay is implied
by an earthen jar; a gold crown implies the bullion
from which it was shapen; and a rigidly abstemious
novice implies that his parents are brahmins ! The
great argument is, the issuing of effects from causes
and the re-union of the universe with its original cause.
The tortoise puts forth his legs and draws them in
again: so at the general destruction of all things, the
five elements, of which the three worlds are composed,
are re-absorbed in the inverse order of that in which
they were developed ; returning, step by step, to their
first cause.
It is singular that, with so much that is
true in this theory of causality, Kopila should have
steadily adhered to his dogma that lifeless, inert matter
was that primary cause; and that, in spite of all this
reasoning, the existence of a GoD could not be proved.
§ 7. The existence of soul, and its attributes, form
another prime topic in the Sankhya system. (a.) The
first argument is this : “ The assemblage of sensible
objects is for another's use." A bed is for a sleeper ; a
chair, for a sitter : the person who uses these things
must be a sensitive being, of a nature opposite to theirs.
So the universe is full of sensible objects, that are en-
dowed with the three qualities, and are inanimate. The
converse of them must exist, and must discriminate
them from itself: the being which does so is Soul.
CHAP. I.]
!
THE SANKHYA.
63
(6.) Another argument is: “ There must be superinten-
dence” in the three worlds; as there is a charioteer
to a car: the superintendent of matter is the soul.
(c.) “ There must also be one to enjoy;" a spectator
of the universe, who can derive pleasure from its con-
templation. (d.) “ There is a tendency to abstraction;"
both the wise and unwise desire a termination of their
wanderings, their incertitudes of pleasure and pain.
The only being that can feel this desire, or make efforts
to realize its object, is soul. Soul, therefore, on these
several grounds, must be reckoned a separate and dis-
tinct entity or class of entities in the universe, whose
history alone can explain why that universe exists as it
now is and has been.
About its existence, however, there is little dispute.
The question is rather about its attributes. Kopil in
his discussion of it first declares, that soul is some-
thing different from body; and adds, that as light does
not pertain to the unintelligent, it must be the essence
of the soul. The great doctrine of the Sankhya, how-
ever, is that soul is multitudinous. The Vedanta
teaches that all souls are emanations from Brahm, and
there is but one soul, the great soul, in the universe.
All the great systems of philosophy in ancient days
held something of this view. But Kopil clearly lays
down the doctrine that the souls of all beings are sepa-
rate, individual, co-ordinate, perhaps, in their nature,
but independent of one another. There is not one soul
pervading all bodies, which are placed on it "
cious gems upon a string” (Vedant). (a.) “ Birth,
as pre-
64
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART I.
death, and the different stages of life are allotted indi-
vidually.” If one soul animated all bodies, one being
born, all would be born; one dying, one being blind
or deaf, one seeing, hearing, or speaking, all would die,
be blind, or see, or speak. Birth is not a modification
of the soul : that is unalterable. Death is the abandon-
ment of its organs by the soul, not its own extinction.
(6.) “ Occupations are not at one time the same univer-
sally.” If one soul animated all beings, all would be
stirred by one impulse. Whereas, some follow virtue;
some, vice; some restrain passion, some indulge it;
some live in error, others seek “wisdom.” (c.) Quali-
ties also affect differently. Some are happy; some are
miserable. “ The gods are happy; men unhappy: the
lower animals, dull.” In discussing these points Kopil
argues against the Vedánt theory distinctly; and en-
deavours to adduce Vedic evidence for his own doctrine;
of course, unsuccessfully. “The soul,” he adds, “is
altogether free: it is a witness, while united to body.
It is really indifferent to pain and pleasure ; its nature
is constant freedom."
§ 8. The last topic of the Sánkhya is a comparison of
the attributes of the several principles. In this the two
great principles, the material and the immaterial, the
discrete and undiscrete, the perceptible and impercep-
tible, are contrasted with each other. a. A “ discrete”
principle, one of the products of “nature,” is causable.
Hence it is un-eternal: it is also inconstant; at one
time it appears, at another, not. It is unpervading,
does not enter into all, and is confined to its local
CHAP. I.]
65
THE SANKHYA.
!
sphere: it is also mutable, and changes from one to
another. Again, the “discrete” products are multitu-
dinous; there are as many minds, intellects, self-con-
sciousnesses, and so on, as there are souls in bodies.
They are supported, resting each on its cause; they are
involvable, merging into one another; conjunct, con-
sisting of parts, as sound, taste, &c.; and they are
governed, being dependent upon another's will.
b. The “undiscrete” principle is the opposite of all
these, and exhibits none of these relations of dependence
and inferiority. Both the discrete and undiscrete pos-
sess the “ three qualities.” The latter, Nature, ' has
them of its own right; the former derive them from
the latter, whence they are themselves drawn: just as
black yarn makes black cloth. They are undiscrimi-
nating or indiscriminate. Nature is not distinct from
itself, nor are the “ qualities” separate from it: indeed
Nature is their aggregate. They are objects of appre-
hension to every soul external to the other, but subjects
of that one.
They are also common; they are irra-
tional and unsentient, just as insensible clay produces
an insensible pot. They are prolific, inasmuch as they
produce. Nature produces intellect: intellect, self-
consciousness, and so on.
Soul has no “qualities :" it is discriminative; it is
no object of enjoyment; it is several or peculiar; it is
sensitive; it is unprolific, and produces nothing. In
these respects it differs from the other principles.
From the contrast between it and them, it follows that
soul is not an agent, but “witness, bystander, spectator,
F
66
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
solitary and passive." It is only through its union
with insensible body, that the latter seems sensible;
though its qualities be active, it is the soul that appears
as the agent. For its great work of seeking deliver-
ance, Nature, though inanimate, prepares the soul,
just as it is the function of milk, an unintelligent
substance, to nourish the calf.” Nature in its dealings
with soul is finally likened to a female dancer; she
exhibits herself to soul as an audience; and is re-
proached with shamelessness for so frequently exposing
herself to the spectator's gaze.
When she has been
seen and understood, she desists, having sufficiently
shown herself. He desists, because he has seen her;
there is no further use for the world; yet the connec-
tion between the two still subsists. In all this discus-
sion, the fact that mind in the world is the great source
of power, and the efficient agent in causation, is totally
forgotten. The chemical action of substances upon one
another is also wholly lost sight of. The connection
between soul and nature, the mode in which it origi-
nates, and the reasons for which it occurs, are exceed-
ingly weak points in the Sankhya system.
The following is the conclusion of the whole. By
attainment of spiritual knowledge, through the study of
the twenty-five principles, from the conviction that the
whole universe is ideally produced from self-conscious-
ness, and has no real existence apart from it; from the
acknowledgment also that Nature, the root of all, is
siinply the congeries of the three qualities,” the
eternal matter of which they are the component parts,
CHAP. I.]
THE SANKHYA.
67
the conclusion, incontrovertible upon such reasonings, is
reached and proclaimed—“ NEITHER I AM, NOR IS AUGHT
MINE, NOR DO I EXIST!” Possessed of this self-know-
ledge, soul contemplates, at ease, nature thereby de-
barred from prolific change, and precluded therefore
from every other form and effect of intellect, but that
special saving knowledge. Yet soul remains awhile
invested with body (unless a man dies immediately
after the attainment of such knowledge), just as a
potter's wheel continues whirling after the pot has been
fashioned, by force of the impulse previously given to
it. When a separation of the informed soul from its
corporeal frame takes place, and nature in respect to it
ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accom-
plished. " Thus this abstruse knowledge, adapted to
the liberation of the soul, wherein the origin, duration,
and termination of beings are considered, has been
thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint. The
compassionately taught it to Asuri, who communicated
it to Panchasikhyá, and by him it was promulgated to
mankind.”
The sage
The Yóga of Patanjali adopts the scientific views of
the Sankhya, as a whole, but runs a course of its own
in relation to that distinctive end which all the systems
aim at, the freedom of the soul from the burdens of
transmigration. The first two books, published by
Dr. Ballantyne, are treated in the following way. The
first book contains fifty-one Sutras, in which is de
veloped, very systematically, the doctrine of the author
F 2
68
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
as to the special mode of securing such deliverance.
This doctrine is far more religious in its tone and spirit
than the purely scientific method taught by the Sán-
khya; it adopts, in fact, very much the Vedántic theory
on the subject, and turns to its own account the asceti-
cism so prevalent when the system was taught. Start-
ing with a quotation from the Katha Upanishad, in
which Nachiketa is declared to have attained the
Supreme Soul by observing the rules of the Yóga,
communicated to him by Yama, Patanjali avows that
the teaching of those rules, and of the method which
they contain, is the aim of his instructions. The evil,
with which men have to contend, lies, according to his
views, in the various phenomena which are produced in
the mind, whether in its waking or sleeping hours, by
the perceptions of sense, the deductions of reasons, and
the dogmas of authority; by incorrect notions; by fancy;
by the dreams of sleep and the recollections of former
items of knowledge called up in memory. In other
words, to get rid of the process of thinking, on which
the soul seems to be employed from birth till death, at
all hours, compelled thereto by the objects which affect
it both within and without, is the summum bonum to be
secured. This great end is to be gained by concen-
trating the mind. “Concentration (yóga) is the hinder-
ing of the modifications of the thinking principle
(Sutr. 2): if successful, the soul will be like a spectator
without a spectacle, earnestly engaged in thinking of
nothing! For this purpose, exercise and dispassion are
necessary : efforts must be made to exclude thought,
CHAP. I.]
69
THE SANKHYA.
stedfastly and perseveringly; and all desire after terres-
trial or celestial objects of every kind must be subdued.
The meditation engaged in is of two kinds—that in
which there is distinct recognition, and that in which
such recognition is lost. The former is the fixing of
the mind upon one selected object, and concentrating
all thought upon that alone; the latter, which is of a
higher character, is without an object, and is confined
to the act of thinking alone. This meditation is pre-
ceded by faith, perseverance, intentness, and a thorough
knowledge of the object pondered. All the aspirants
after absorption are not alike : they are divided into
nine classes, according to the impetuosity with which
the object is pursued; the mild, the mediate, and the
transcendent, constituting three chief divisions : all are
exhorted to strive for the transcendent method, and
warm impetuosity is recommended in carrying it out,
that they may be the sooner successful.
The sage points out distinctly that to this severe
course of self-restraint there are many obstacles.
“ Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, regard
for objects of sense, erroneous perceptions, failure to
attain any stage of abstraction, and instability” in the
state when attained, all cause distraction of mind, and
hinder the progress of the ascetic. Besides those hin-
drances arising from a diseased body or an undisci-
plined mind, external circumstances bring their obsta-
cles. “ Grief, distress, trembling, and sighing are
accompaniments of those distractions." But there are
remedies by which these difficulties can be met. In
70
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
order to concentrate attention, and abstract it from
other objects, “let ONE truth be dwelt upon.” The
mind also may be pacified by the “ exercise of bene-
volence, tenderness, complacency to the virtuous, and
indifference to the wicked.” These methods are ex-
ternal to the Yóga, and are useful in preventing un-
steadiness of thought. Another expedient, a favourite
one in Hindu asceticism, is that of " forcibly expelling
and restraining the breath;" a process similar to some
recommended in mesmerism. He may further fix his
attention by taking up some object of sense, and ex-
clusively regarding that; or, he may reflect on the
inner light of the heart; or, he may call to mind the
example of one who was devoid of passion; or, have
recourse to the dreams he has experienced. In other
words, a Yógi, to steady his mind, may, according to his
own taste, take up any object of thought that he prefers
and ponder it well, until all else is excluded from his
perceptions and his consciousness.
So far, Patanjali confines his instructions to the mode
hy which the concentration of attention may be secured.
He does not touch upon the place or the external
circumstances by which these contemplations may be
aided, the shady grove and the running stream, such
as are described in the Upanishads and the Gita; nor
does he enumerate the various methods (sannyás) by
which ascetics have been accustomed to subdue their
senses, and compel the passions to lie still within them.
He closes with a statement of the fruits of such con-
templation. The mind of the ascetic will master all
CHAP. I.]
71
THE SANKHYA.
objects, from the minutest atom to the great ether: he
will gradually lose all distinctive perception of the
qualities” of objects; he will attain spiritual clear-
ness; his knowledge will be perfectly free from error;
every object of thought will finally disappear; and his
mind will be like the pure rock-crystal, which seems
tinged with the red of the hibiscus behind it, but is
really unspotted, and will become perfectly free from
contamination, by the phenomena and modifications with
which it has been ever occupied.
In the SECOND Book, the subject of concentration is
continued; the various " afflictions” that have to be
met are pointed out; the mode of meeting them is dis-
cussed, and the various fruits of concentration, which
result in perfect meditation and the complete subjection
of all sense, are enumerated. In the remainder of his
treatise, Pátanjali describes the range of transcendental
powers to which this asceticism leads, powers which
were universally attributed by the superstitious to those
meditating denizens of the forests. In addition to know-
ledge of various kinds, knowledge of his former states
of existence, of invisible objects, of the future both of
himself and others, the Yogi will acquire invisibility of
form, perfect strength, freedom from hunger and thirst,
the power of entering other bodies, living and dead,
of hearing sounds even in other worlds, of transforming
himself into any of the elements, of penetrating any-
where, and even of changing the course of nature.
All this resembles the talk of the clairvoyant carried
to the extreme, and indicates the extent to which,
72
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
in fact, mesmerism and clairvoyance were practised
in certain ways, and brought to bear upon religious and
philosophical attainments in ancient India.
Pátanjali was not, however, a mere mystic. While
receiving as a whole the Sánkhya system of Kopila, he
opposes in strong and clear terms one of the greatest
of Kopila's errors, the rejection of a God. In book i.
sutra 23, he refers to the religious mode of attaining
contemplation taught by the Vedanta, and says that the
ascetic may attain this state of abstract meditation" by
profound devotedness towards the LORD.” The commen-
tator adds, that by this devotedness is meant a peculiar
serving of him, “ by giving up all desire for the enjoy-
ment of objects of sense, and by making over all
actions to Him as the pre-eminent guide." It is at this
point that Pátanjali introduces his view of the existence
and attributes of God, which will be quoted in a future
chapter.
M. Cousin, in his History of Philosophy, has pointed
out with great truth the strong resemblance which
exists between the YOGA Shastra and the BHAGAVAT
GITA. The system of the latter is, in fact, an eclectic
system, which combines the scientific principles of the
Sánkhya, with the asceticism of the Yóga and the
Pantheism of the Vedanta. The spirit of religious
contemplation inculcated, the exclusion of all external
objects, the thinking away the various notions of the
mind itself, are the same in both the latter, but have
different aims. In the Yóga, the contemplation is to be
practised in order to produce perfect abstraction from
CHAP. I.]
73
THE SANKHYA.
all thought: in the Gita, it is intended only to secure
a more complete concentration of the mind upon
Krishna or Brahma, the Spirit Supreme. There can be
little doubt that the Gita was written long after the
other systems had been formed, and that the form which
the poem has assumed is a dramatic device of the
author to give his system currency. We shall refer to
the poem again.
74
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER II.
THE NYAYA.
THE Nyáya system is divided into two parts, which
agree to a considerable extent with each other, yet
differ on certain points ; each supplying most valuable
elements for supplementing the other, and for securing
one great system combined from both. The Nyára,
properly so called, considers specially, though not ex-
clusively, the true mode of inquiring after truth; it is,
therefore, occupied to a great extent with logical ques-
tions, and has surveyed the whole field of argument
far more exactly and completely than any other of the
Hindu systems. In doing so, it has pointed out the
true constituents of a sound argument, and the variety
of fallacies, accidental and dishonestly intended, which
lead to wrong conclusions. For these discussions it
is greatly valued and extensively studied by the fol-
lowers of all the systems down to the present day.
The VAISESHIKA, on the other hand, takes up for its
consideration, chiefly physical inquiries, and surveys,
classifies and endeavours to account for the various
objects existing in the universe, more extensively and
more exactly than others have done. In doing so, it
asserts that all substances have an atomic origin, and
that the atoms are eternal. These atoms, however,
CHAP. II.]
75
THE NYAYA.
have not been discovered by any chemical analysis, but
are purely hypothetical. They are, in size, the sixth
part of the smallest visible object, the mote in a sun-
beam. Both systems advocate the existence of a
Supreme Soul, excelling all other souls in being almighty
and all-wise. Souls of a lower rank, whether of gods
or men, are not parts of him, but are eternal. The
great evil of human existence is found in the restless
activity of the soul, which leads to its endless trans-
migrations. The cure offered is a thorough knowledge
of the principles of the system, by which a perfect
quietism will be produced.
The Nyáya system is attributed to GAUTUMA; and is
described in a collection of Sutras written by him. They
are divided into five books; the first of which sketches
out the subject matter of the whole. The Vaiseshika
is also recorded in Sutras, by its author Kanada, and
contains ten lectures. Each of these original works has
been commented on again and again, and their doctrines
have been arranged in original treatises by other writers.
The English reader will find the fullest account of the
system in both divisions in Colebrooke's celebrated
essay.
Dr. Ballantyne has published the first two books of the
Nyára SUTRAS of Gautum; the first lecture of the
VAISESHIKA ; and a compact little treatise, the TARKA
SANGRANA, with elucidatory commentaries. The Brásná
PARICHHEDA, a favourite work among native scholars,
which gives a clear outline of the whole system, has
also been recently translated into English by Dr. Roer
for the Asiatic Society of Bengal, under the title of
76
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART 1.
Categories of the Nyáya Philosophy. All these authorities
are of the greatest value.
$ 1. GAUTUM sets out, like the founders of the other
systems, with the inquiry, What is the way to attain
perfect beatitude (nisreyasa): and then asserts that that
deliverance is only to be secured by a knowledge of the
truth. This knowledge embraces many topics, but is
directed chiefly to the true condition of the soul as
separate from body: he who obtains this knowledge,
which it is the object of the system to communicate,
will be delivered from the evils and pains by which he is
now beset. KANÁDA, in his first Sutra, lays down the same
dogma: emancipation is to be secured by abstinence
from all kinds of works; and that abstinence is to be
attained by the study of his system and the acquirement
of its several objects of knowledge. The steps to be
followed in the process are enumerated by Gautum with
great clearness. The pains to which the human soul has
been subjected by its connection with matter are owing
to and suffered in its frequent births. These births
arise from the soul's constant activity, which requires
rewards for its meritorious actions. This activity has
sprung from the fault of dislike, or desire, or stupidity,
which inevitably leads to it. Their origin, again, is
traced to false notions (mithyá-gyan) of what men are
and may be. Now the Nyáy by its sound instructions
will communicate right notions, instead of wrong ones,
concerning the soul and the universe. These will
destroy the fault (dosha) of desire and dislike: with
that will pass away the activity (pravritti) which so
CHAP. II.]
77
THE NYAYA.
erroneously looked for the fruit of its actions: new births
(janman) and migrations will henceforth cease; and the
original pain (du’kha) be entirely removed. The removal
of that pain, and the restoration of the soul to its ori-
ginal condition of perfect rest, is the beatitude (apa-
varga) promised. Absolute quiet, therefore, is the
summum bonum at which the system aims.
$ 2. Gautum next describes the instruments (pramán)
by which these right notions are to be acquired. He
mentions four: perception (pratyaksha); inference (anu-
mána); comparison (upamána); and testimony (sabda').
Dr. Ballantyne translates them: (1) the deliverance of
sense, the knowledge acquired by a contact of the senso-
rium with its object: (2) the recognition of a sign; this
“ inference” is of three kinds; à priori inference; à
posteriori; and from analogy: (3) the recognition of
likeness, that by which similarity is detected between
different objects: (4) worthy precepts or authority.
By means of these instrumentalities correct knowledge
may
be obtained of things as they really are.
§ 3. Causality occupies an important place, especially
in the Sutras of Kanáda, and may be most appropriately
mentioned here. A cause (kárana) is declared to be
that which is efficacious in the production of something
which otherwise could not be. By its existence or non-
existence, the existence or non-existence of that some-
thing, the effect (kárya), is rendered necessary. Hence
it follows, that if there be no cause, there is no effect :
if there be no effect, there is no cause. Again : the
quality of the effect depends upon the cause. - If there
78
(PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
be no thread, there is no cloth: if there be no conjunc-
tion of the two halves of a jar, there is no jar: if there
be no virtue, there is no happiness.”
Three kinds of causes are enumerated: (1.) The inti-
mate or substantial cause (samaváyi), by which an aggre-
gation is produced. Two atoms make a bi-atomic com-
pound: threads make up cloth; two halves make a jar.
(2.) Non-intimate or non-substantial cause (asamaváyi);
this is connected with the direct cause: thus the con-
junction of two atoms is the proximate cause of the
resulting bi-atomic compound: the putting together of
thread is the proximate cause of the resulting cloth.
(3.) The instrumental cause (nimitta) is that by which
the conjunction is produced: as the loom of the weaver:
the wheel and stick of the potter. Kanáda says: The
cause which refers to substance is intimate cause: and
action is a non-intimate cause. Of these the first is
usually termed the material cause; the second, the effi-
cient; the third, the instrumental cause. Beside these,
God, the Omniscience of God, desire, endeavour, time,
space, virtue and vice are reckoned general causes. The
rest are special causes.
§ 4. With these instruments and on these principles,
the various objects of knowledge (prameya) are to be
examined. But as the bare mention of these objects
does not secure a correct knowledge of them, the Sage
takes up the subject of doubt (sansaya) as one inter-
mediate between hearing and believing: and proceeds
to argue it in the most systematic and logical manner.
In order to get out of doubt, the scholar must have a
CHAP. II.]
79
THE NYAYA.
motive ( prayojana) for inquiring further. Possessed of
such an incentive to inquiry, he will endeavour to enter
new regions of truth. But he must start from that
which is known, from some established facts or tenets,
which are well received and acknowledged. If known
among the unlearned, they are called familiar facts.
Other facts are scientific, known among the schools of
philosophy. Of these, some are dogmas of all the
schools; others are peculiar to an individual school :
some are hypothetical, and some are implied as inevit-
able corollaries requiring no special proof. All of them
furnish data, on which, as a foundation, further inquiry
may be based, and new conclusions be established.
Passing from these data, Gautum proceeds to describe
the mode of demonstrating a new conclusion. He teaches
that every demonstration contains five members: the
proposition (pratigyá), which states what is about to be
established: the reason (hetu), by means of which its
establishment is secured: the example (udáharana or
nidarsana), which furnishes some familiar case of the fact:
the application (upanaya) of the example to the case to
be established : and the conclusion (nigaman), in which
the original case is declared to be proved. These five
elements are members of the Nyáya syllogism. It will
be seen at once that they are reducible without difficulty
to the three propositions of the modern syllogism, and
that the mode of demonstration taught by Gautum is
that now adopted as the true one. The proposition and
conclusion are of course identical (as he himself says) :
the same truth being first stated as hypothetical, and at
80
(PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
last as proved. The reason again is only a statement of
the proof employed for the second time in the applica-
tion. The five elements are thus reduced to the example
(or major premiss): the application (or minor premiss):
and the conclusion. This is the form in which Jaymini's
syllogism is presented in the Mimansa. Thus:
Proposition :
The hill is fiery :
Reason:
For it smokes:
Example:
What smokes is fiery :
Application :
The hill is smoking :
Conclusion:
The hill is fiery.
.
Dr. Ballantyne very justly points out * that this syl-
logism, though not the strictly logical one, is yet most
valuable regarded from a rhetorical point of view.
The proposition is laid down and the reason assigned.
Presuming a doubt in the mind of the hearer, the case
is then argued logically ; and the final conclusion comes
out the same as the original proposition. Were the
scholar to confine his attention to that which is required
to convince himself, the last three propositions would
be sufficient. When he passes onward to the effort of
convincing others who may doubt his first assertion, the
rhetorical process stated by the Nyáya will probably
be adopted.
Should an argument not be clearly apprehended, the
arer is directed to look at it from an opposite point of
view; to take a simple case, and show the absurdity
involved in a denial of one of the premises. Thus, sup-
* Tarka-Sangraha, pp. 45-47.
CHAP. II.]
81
THE NYAYA.
pose a person admits that there is smoke in the hill,
after allowing that where there is smoke there must be
fire, and yet denies the conclusion that the hill is fiery,
he is confuted by the proposition that if there were no
fire there could be no smoke. This process is called
Tarka ; it is equivalent to the reductio ad absurdum ;
proving a point indirectly by showing the absurdity of
its contradictory, the only possible way of proving a
negative. The result of these processes, in which evi-
dence is offered, and reasons are given both for the
proposition and against it, is the certain ascertainment
of a truth (nirnay).
So far Gautum has provided for hearing both sides
fairly; but even then there may be many who do not
accept the conclusion as true. He therefore takes up
the subject of controversy, and describes the various
classes of disputants which controversy calls up. Three
classes are more or less honest; those who enter into
candid discussion in order to arrive at truth, then un-
known; the wranglers, who aim only to get victory as
material for self-gratulation; and the caviller, who only
finds fault with the arguments of others, without
settling anything himself. Five classes beyond these
furnish only apparent reasons, which are really fallacies,
and thus deceive both themselves and others. Others,
again, employ arguments dishonestly, solely with the
intent of deceiving and thwarting their opponents.
Some employ objections, miserably futile, that can
mislead no one.
The lowest rank of reasoners con-
tains only the absolute blockheads, who, though they
G
82
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
(PART I.
doggedly oppose the truth, are too stupid to under-
stand it.
§ 5. Having cleared the way for inquiry, by defining
the instruments of knowledge, and exhibiting in all its
phases the mode of discussion both with friends and foes,
as well as the different classes to whom it is applied, the
Nyáya takes up in order the various objects of knowledge
(prameya) which are to be proved and known. These
are twelve in number: “ Soul, body, sense, sense-object,
knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit,
pain and beatitude," are the subjects fitted to supply
right notions," and thus secure the entire removal
of all human pain.
(a.) Of these, soul (átman) is stated justly as first in
importance. The soul is reckoned as the site of know-
ledge or sentiment. It is distinct from the body and
from the senses. It is different for each individual and
co-existent person. It is perceived by the mental organ,
i.l., its phenomena are learned within the sphere of
consciousness. Its existence is proved by its peculiar
attributes, intellect, self-consciousness, and the like.
This existence is implied by six special signs, viz., de-
sire (ichchha), aversion (dwesha), volition (prayatna),
pleasure (sukha), pain (du’kha), and knowledge (gyána).
They are only qualities or characteristics of the soul,
and therefore imply a distinct substratum which under-
lies them. They are, again, not universal attributes,
which belong to space, time, and mind, but particular
attributes apprehended by one organ exclusively. Souls,
again, are multitudinous. In these views Gautum
CHAP. II.]
83
THE NYAYA.
concurs in the doctrine of the Sánkhya of the separate-
ness and independence of numerous souls in the uni-
verse: but differs from the Sánkhya, and is more
correct, in holding that the universe is not merely a
development of the soul's notions, but possesses a real
substratum of an entirely different kind.
Gautum advocates, like the other great sages, the
eternity of souls, and also declares them infinite; they
are eternal in consequence of being infinite. The mind
(manas) has an atomic origin, its capacity of retaining .
knowledge being very limited; but the “mind” also is
eternal and multitudinous. Souls are of two kinds, the
animal soul (jívátmá), and the supreme soul (param
átmá). The peculiar qualities and functions of the
latter will be specially described hereafter.
$ 6. (6.) The second object of proof is body (sartra).
Body is an ultimate compound; it is composed of parts,
and has been developed from atoms. Associated with
the soul it enjoys fruit. It is distinguished as being the
site of muscular action, of the organs of sensation, and
of the sentiments or feelings of pleasure and pain ex-
perienced by the soul.
In its constitution it is earthly,
and has the qualities which belong to earth; it is not
composed in part of the other elements, they being
heterogeneous, which the body is not.
Besides human bodies, Gautum enumerates other
bodies distributed through this and other worlds. Like
the Upanishads, he describes them as aqueous, igneous,
and aërial. Earthly bodies are generated and ungene-
rated. The former include the viviparous or uterine:
G 2
84
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the oviparous; the insects engendered in filth and hot
moisture: and the plants which germinate from the
soil. The third class include worms, maggots, and
the like, to which the Vedas and all the Schools ascribe
a spontaneous origin.
§ 7. (c.) The third object are the organs of sensation
(indriya). “The organs of sense originating from the
elements are smell, taste, sight, touch, and hearing.”
“ The elements are earth, water, light (tejas), air, and
ether." These organs belong to the body; they are
not modifications of “Consciousness," as the Sánkhya
teaches, but material organs, derived from the elements
respectively. The Bauddhas say that the pupil of the
eye is the organ of sight, and the outer ear the organ
of hearing. But the Nyáya controverts this opinion,
declaring that a ray of light proceeding From the pupil
towards the object viewed is the visual organ; and that
ether, contained in the cavity of the ear, communicating
by intermediate ether with the object heard, is the organ
of hearing. As a torch is not seen at mid-day, so.
that ray is not usually visible: but in the dark it is
visible, as in the eye of a cat! The organs possess
qualities derived from their origin.
The organ of
vision is lucid: that of hearing is ethereal: that of
taste, aqueous, possessing saliva: that of feeling, aërial;
that of smell, earthy. The site of the visual organ is
the pupil of the eye: that of the auditory organ, the
orifice of the ear: and so on. The objects apprehended
by the senses are qualities of the elements or their pro-
ducts, and they are cognized by the organ cognate with
CHAP. II.]
85
THE NYAYA.
them. Thus odour, which is earthy, is apprehended by
the nose; and colour, which is from light, by the eye.
These organs are proved to exist by their uses, as that
of a knife is proved by an act of cutting. Besides the
five external organs, an internal organ, the manas, or
mind, is also allowed. The five organs of action, in the
other philosophies, are not reckoned so here.
This sixth and internal organ, the mind (manas),
equivalent in modern philosophy to the sphere of con-
sciousness or internal perception, is the instrument
which apprehends pain, pleasure, and the internal sen-
sations: it apprehends external objects by its union
with the five external senses. Its existence is proved
by the fact that our sensations occur only one at a
time. If apparently several sensations arise in the
soul, it is only from their rapidity; just as a lighted
torch, when swung round quickly, seems a ring of
fire. It is in itself single: each soul has only one.
It is limited, not infinite : otherwise it might be united
with everything at once, and all sensations and notions
be cotemporaneous. Still it is eternal, and conjoined
with soul as with body, but has a separate existence
from it. Kanáda reckons both Mind and Soul among
the substances, and ascribes to them qualities such as
substances possess.
§ 8. (d.) The fourth object of knowledge in Gautum's
list are the objects of sense (artha). These objects are
the qualities of earth, water, light, air, and ether, viz.
odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound. This
branch of the Nyaya is the one which Kanád has so
86
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
fully developed in the Vaiseshika system, and has de-
scribed in his six categories: it is sufficient to note that
they are included, though briefly, in Gautum's scheme
of knowledge: we reserve a special mention of them
till his categories are concluded.
$ 9. (e.) The fifth of Gautum's twelve objects is
understanding (buddhi). Understanding, apprehen-
sion, and knowledge have all the same meaning.". It is
that which makes matter known. It is twofold: appre-
hension and memory. Apprehension is of two kinds :
right and wrong. Right notion is incontrovertible, being
derived from demonstration, and from the various in-
struments by which knowledge is produced. It arises,
therefore, from perception; as when a jar is properly
seen by healthy organs: from inference; as when fire
is inferred from smoke : from comparison or analogy ;
as when a gayál is known from its likeness to a cow:
and from tradition or Revelation; as when it is known
on the testimony of the Vedas, that heaven may be
attained by sacrifice. Wrong notions are not derived
from proof, but from false perceptions; from doubt,
from contradictory premises, and from errors of various
:
kinds.
Remembrance (smriti), the other faculty of the un-
derstanding, has also reference both to truth and error:
it may recall things correctly from within the mind; or
may recall them incorrectly in confusion and disorder.
In waking hours both right and wrong recollections
arise: in sleep, only wrong ones.
The sixth of the objects of proof is the Mind: it
CHAP. II.]
87
THE NYAYA.
as
occurs in two places in Gautum's arrangement; first,
as one of the Senses, the sixth or inner sense; and here
a distinct object of knowledge by itself. It has
already been treated under the former head.
§ 10. The remaining six of the twelve objects will
not require more than a passing notice, having already
been referred to at the outset of the subject. The
seventh, activity (pravitti), is that spirit which originates
in man the utterances of the voice, the notions of the
understanding, and the gestures of the body: all in-
tended to secure rewards of virtue and the like, and
keeping up the condition of illusion in which men live.
The eighth, fault (dosha), is that erroneous desire in
men which produces the activity just mentioned. It
appears in three forms, of affection, aversion and in-
fatuation, or extreme delusion. The ninth is transmi-
gration, the condition of the soul after death (pretya-
bháva), during which it wanders from one body to
another, as the result of its infatuations. The tenth,
retribution or fruit (phala), is the consequence of the
faults just mentioned, which in their turn spring from
activity. It is realized in connection with the mind,
body, and senses. The eleventh is pain (du’kha), which
includes pleasure also as its opposite; it denotes the con-
dition in which men live, and from which these systems
of philosophy are intended to deliver them. The last is
the beatitude (apavarga), promised to the followers of the
system. It denotes deliverance from all the “pain,"
and the absolute prevention of all evil in the future.
This liberation differs from the temporary alleviations
88
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
of pain and of excitement that are experienced by men,
in being absolute and final. This liberation is attained
by the soul that has become acquainted with right notions
(tatwa), by means of the instruction here offered. Such
a soul freed from the passions which agitate mortal life
will cease to desire, will cease to be active. Its previous
acts being annulled, its previous body passes away; no
new body is assigned to it; there is no connection with
previous evils, since there is no longer cause for them.
Thus pain entirely ceases, and perfect rest is secured.
§ 11. While Gautum in the Nyáya Sutras, deals
chiefly with the logical mode of a sound inquiry after
right objects of knowledge, Kanáda in the Sutras of
the VAISESHIKA, takes up the physical as well as mental
branches of human knowledge, and enters upon them
at once at the outset of his system. “Emancipation (he
asserts) is to be attained through the knowledge of truth,
which specially relates to the agreement and disagree-
ments of the six categories (padártha). These cate-
gories or objects of knowledge are substance, quality, .
action, genus, difference, and intimate relation. The
Bháshá Parichheda starts with a similar statement,
adding, however, with many authorities, a seventh
category, non-existence, or negation.
§ 12. SUBSTANCE (dravya) is the sole substratum ; it
possesses qualities and actions—(Sutra 15.) It should
be observed here that Hindu Philosophy possesses no
term exactly equivalent to the English word “matter,"
and comprising the class of objects which that word
expresses. The Hindus never generalized so far as to
CHAP. II.]
89
THE NYAYA.
as such.
reduce all objects to the two classes of matter and
mind; or to distinguish the primary qualities of matter
The Nyáya, however, teaches that all the
objects of knowledge which possess " qualities ” must
have a substratum in which those qualities inhere; and
that such “substances” are nine in number; the five
elements, time and space,"mind” and soul. Before
discussing the individual substances, Kanáda compares
substances, qualities, and actions together, and shows in
what respects they have similar modes of action or
properties, and in what points they differ. He says,
substances and qualities each produce their like; but
an action does not produce another action. Neither
cause nor effect destroys substance; but they do destroy
qualities. Substance is the cause of substances, quali-
ties, and actions. In a jar there may be the jar itself,
its colour, and its motion when floating down the
Ganges. A quality also may indirectly produce all
three, either from being in the mediate cause of a pro-
duct (as colour in the threads of a cloth)--or as coming
out only in the product itself. Action does not produce
substance: it is the cause of conjunction, disjunction
and momentum: and so on.
(a.) Earth (prithivi) occupies the first place among
the substances. Like all other substances, it possesses
substantiality and qualities. In particular it possesses
form, action, and velocity. It has feel, colour, gravity,
odour, and taste. Odour is its distinguishing quality :
it is also the site of the various colours. It has
three kinds of feel: hot, cold, and temperate. It is
90
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
(PART 1.
eternal as atoms: non-eternal in respect to its parts.
All objects are compounds of it, from the smallest, con-
sisting of two atoms, to the largest, the universe, "the
egg of Brahmá."
Its aggregates are of three kinds,
organisms, organs, and inorganic objects. The organized
bodies are of four kinds, viviparous, &c. The inor-
ganic are stones and the like : the organ originating
from earth is that of smell.
(6.) Water (ap) has fourteen qualities : touch ; num-
ber, quantity, individuality; conjunction, disjunction ;
priority, posteriority; velocity, gravity; fluidity, colour,
savour and viscidity. Odour does not belong to it,
except accidentally. Its colour is said to be white: its
taste and feel are sweet and cold. As atoms, it is
eternal: its aggregates and various forms are transient.
Its organisms are not born; they are beings abiding in
the realm of Varuna. Its inorganic objects are the sea,
rivers, snow, rain and the like.
The organ is the
tongue: wherein saliva is produced.
(c.) Light (tejas) and heat are the same. Light has
eleven qualities: the first eight ascribed to water,
together with colour, fluidity, and viscidity: but pos-
sesses neither smell, taste, nor gravity. Its distinguish-
ing quality is heat; it has white colour: its fluidity
is not innate, but accidental. Eternity and non-eternity
are attributed to it as to the earth and water. Its
organ is the eye: the visual ray, which is the organ of
sight, is lucid. Organic lucid bodies are lightning, fire
and gold. Sometimes it is both seen and felt, as with
fire; sometimes only one; sometimes, neither. There
CHAP. II.]
91
THE NYAYA.
are earthy light, celestial light, alvine light, and mineral
light.
(d.) Air (váyu) has the same qualities as light, ex-
cepting colour and fluidity. It has no colour: it is
sensible to touch. Its temperature is its distinctive
quality: it is neither cold nor hot: its motion is
crooked: the feel in the air is natural to it, and from
this its existence is inferred. As atoms, it is eternal :
its aggregates are transient. Its organisms are aërial
bodies : its objects are all substances intermediate
between the vital air and the great element. Besides
the air upon the earth's surface, the breath and the vital
airs, i. e., the vital functions, are reckoned separately.
(e.) Ether (ákása) has for its distinguishing quality,
sound. Its organ is the ear. It has many titles : it is
infinite, eternal, and one. It appears white by its con-
nection with some lucid orb. The blue colour of the
sky is not derived from it, but from the southern peak
of Mount Sumeru, which is all sapphire. Others say
that that colour is in the eye itself, and makes the sky
seem blue, as jaundice makes all things yellow. The
existence of the ether is inferred in this way. Sound is
learned by the ear. It cannot be a quality of earth,
water, light, or air: nor can it be a quality of time,
It must have some other substratum :
this is ether. The organ of hearing is ethereal: it con-
sists of a portion of ether, confined in the cavity of the
ear: endued with the particular virtue. That virtue is
wanting in the deaf.
(f.) Time (kála) has the qualities of number, quantity,
space, or mind.
92
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
[PART I.
severalty, conjunction and disjunction. It has also the
attributes of ubiquity and infinity. It is inferred from
priority, sequence, and the like: from quickness and
slowness in motion: from the contrast between young
and old. It is called past, present, and future. It has
many names, moment, hour, day, year. 66 Time is
thought to be the producer of all that is produced ; and
the substrate of all worlds:" that is, that they can only
exist in time, and under the conditions of its progress.
Upon it as a basis, the notions of priority and sequence
rest.
(g.) Space (dig) is one and eternal, ubiquitous and
infinite. It is the substrate of the notions of here and
there, proximity and distance. It is known by many
names, as east and west, high and low. Its qualities
are those of time.
(h, ¿.) The soul is ubiquitous and infinite; it has the
qualities of number, quantity, and the like, which are
possessed by space and time. Its existence is shown
from the fact that there is an agent who controls the
senses, as a knife cuts: without it the senses would be
useless, for they are instruments of an unseen ruler.
The mind and the soul have been already examined in
the system of Gautum, and need no further remark.
It is important to notice the frequent references made
in connection with the earlier substances to the distinc-
tion between their atoms and aggregates. It is here
arises one of the most important doctrines of the Vaise-
shika philosophy, recognized also by the Nyay, the doc-
trine of the eternity of matter in the form of ATOMS, and
CHAP. II.]
93
THE NYAYA.
also the similar atomic and eternal origin of souls. This
theory will be examined at length in a future chapter.
§ 13. QUALITY (guna) forms the second category in
Kanáda’s list. It is closely connected with substance,
but cannot produce either substance or quality. It is
inherent in substance, cannot produce conjunction or
disjunction (as action does), and has no qualities in
itself. The qualities are reckoned twenty-four in num-
ber; though Kanáda only mentions the names of seven-
teen. The commentator supplies the remainder, and
says they are implied by the great sage though not
specified. They are as follows: colour, savour, odour,
and feel or tangibility; number, magnitude, individu-
ality; conjunction and disjunction; distance and proxi-
mity; thought; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion,
and effort. The seven added are gravity, fluidity, visci-
dity, momentum, virtue and vice, and sound. In
modern science they would fall into two great classes ;
the qualities of matter, and the immaterial qualities of
the soul. The former are sixteen, the latter eight.
In the Bhásha Parichheda they are generally com-
pared before their distinctive characteristics are pointed
out; they are classified as general and special; as ap-
prehended by one or more senses; as produced or
effected by particular actions.
(1.) “ Colour (rúpa) is perceived by the eye; it mani-
fests substances, qualities, and classes: it is the cause of
the perceptions of the eye." It exists as essential in
three substances, earth, water, and light. In light it is
the principal quality; there it is white and resplendent.
94
[PART. I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
In water it is white, but not lustrous. In earth it is
variable. In the primary atoms of light and water it is
perpetual; in products it is not so. In earth it can be
changed, as when a jar is burned red by fire. Seven
colours are enumerated. White, yellow, green, red,
black, orange, and variegated. Of these there are
many varieties. Six simple colours occur in the pri-
mary atoms: all seven are found in the double atoms.
(2.) Savour (rasa) is apprehended by the tongue: it is
of various kinds, as sweet, bitter, pungent, astringent,
acid, and saline. It exists in earth and water; it is the
distinctive quality of the latter. It is perpetual in the
atoms of water; not so in the accidental aqueous pro-
ducts; it is variable in the earth.
(3.) Odour (gandha) is perceived by the nose, and is
of only two kinds, good and bad. It is the special
quality of earth, and of earth alone; in water it is acci-
dentally produced by earthy particles (just as the crys-
tal appears red when a red flower is placed behind it).
In air it is the same, and is produced from the particles
of flowers carried about by the wind. Flowers do not
waste away; but camphor and like substances do.
(4.) Feel or tangibility (sparsa), by which is meant
temperature, is apprehended by the skin. It exists in
four substances, earth, water, light, and air; it is the
proper quality of air. It is threefold, hot, cold, and
temperate. In water it is cold; in light and heat it is
hot; in earth and air it is temperate. In respect to
earthy substances it is also hard and soft, and the like.
It is eternal in the atoms of air; in atoms and double
CHAP. II.]
95
THE NYAYA.
It is a
atoms it is latent; but is perceptible in large pro-
ducts.
(5.) By number (sankhya) objects are recognized as
one, two, three, and so on ad infinitum. It is deduced
from comparison, as by comparing things together and
in groups, we say they are one, two, and so on.
universal quality, and like others is either essential or
accidental. In eternal substances unity is eternal; it
is transient in products, and may be destroyed. Num-
ber is of two sorts, unity and multitude; or else of
three kinds, monads, duads, and multitude. All num-
bers from two upwards are produced by comprehending
intellect: and they are collectively apprehended in their
dependence upon more than one object.
(6.) Dimension (parimána) is the cause of the per-
ception and use of measure. It is universal and com-
mon to all substances. It is fourfold; and is divided
into great and small, long and short. It is eternal in
eternal substances; large, as in the ether: it is also
eternal in the smallest things, as atoms and the mind.
Between these extremes of size are all the uneternal or
transient magnitudes. Transient and finite quantities
are produced from number, measure, and the aggrega-
tion of units into heaps. In two and more atoms it
arises from number; in a jar and similarly extended
things it is from measure: the conjunction of loose
things, as pieces of cotton, makes heaps.
(7.) Individuality or separateness (prithaktwa) is also
common to all substances. It is of two sorts: (a) of
one, or a single pair; or (b) it is manifold, as of a triad.
96
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART 1.
It is the cause of the knowledge of separate things. It
is eternal in eternal things: and transient in transient
things.
(8, 9.) Conjunction (sanyoga) is transient connection:
it is also a universal quality. There are three kinds of
it:-(1.) The first is simple, and results from the action
of one out of two agents, as a falcon sitting on a
rock;" the action being only on the part of the bird.
(2.) The second kind is when the action is mutual, as
the fighting of two rams. (3.) The third is mediate;
as when the contact of a finger with a tree produces
indirectly a conjunction between one's body generally
and that tree. Again, conjunction is produced in two
ways, by violent motion or by soft motion : the former
is the cause of sound. Disjunction (vibhaga) is the
reverse of the last; and is preceded by it: it is also a
universal quality. It has the same three divisions: being
simple, mutual, and mediate as before. The last is, of
two kinds; being produced either by the disjunction of
the cause, or by that of both cause and non-cause. The
former is illustrated by the destruction of that half of
a jar which is only immediately connected with a tree
by the other half. The commentator illustrates the
other by saying that where the hand is disconnected
from a tree (the cause), the body (the non-cause) is
also separated; and a belief arises that the tree is also
separated from the body.
(10, 11.) Priority and posteriority (paratwa, apa-
ratwa) are correlative qualities, belonging to place and
time. As belonging to place, they are called proximity
CHAP. II.]
97
THE NYAYA.
and distance: as attached to time, they are termed
youth and antiquity. The one concerns bodies which
have circumscribed quantity; the other relates to
generated substances that have had beginning. The
knowledge of these qualities is obtained by comparison ;
as by the perception of greater or less distance between
places, as Muttra and Allahabad: or of the periods
which have elapsed between the revolutions of the sun.
(12.) Weight (gurutwa) is that which produces fall-
ing: it abides in earth and water. Gold has it (though
derived from fire) because of the particles of earth which
have become mixed with light. It is imperceptible to
the senses; but is inferred from the falling of bodies,
when opposing causes, like adhesion, are removed. Its
opposite and negative is lightness. It is eternal in eter-
nal substances; but in transient products is transient.
(13.) Fluidity (dravatwa) is the cause of trickling.
It is of two kinds, innate and derived from a cause: it
is innate in water, but in earth and light is accidental,
being produced from the action of heat, as in butter
and other substances. It is perceptible by two senses,
sight and touch. It really exists in hail and ice; but
is obstructed by some unseen quality which makes the
water solid. In the eternal atoms of water it is of
course eternal.
(14.) Viscidity (sneha) is the cause of agglutination. It
abides in water. Oil has it in abundance, derived from
watery particles, and from this combustion is favoured.
(15.) Sound (sabda) is a quality which abides in the
ether : it is apprehended by hearing owing to the ether
H
98
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
which abides in the organ, the ear.
There are two
kinds of sound, musical, as of a drum; articulate, as in
the pronunciation of ka, kha. Articulate sounds are
produced by the contact of the tongue with the palate.
It is propagated by undulation (according to some):
wave after wave coming from a centre; only the last
wave is heard. It originates in conjunction, disjunc-
tion, or from sound itself. The drumstick beating
the drum is an example of the first: the rustling of
leaves, of the second : these are instrumental causes:
ether is always the material cause. The Mimansa has
discussed and advocated at great length the eternity
of sound. The Nyáya, however, rejects the doctrine.
The next eight qualities are perceived by the mental
organ. (16, 17, 18.)—Understanding, Pleasure, and Pain,
have already been discussed in the arrangement by Gau-
tum, being reckoned among his objects of knowledge.
(19, 20.) Desire and Aversion (ichchha, dwesha).
Desire is the wish of pleasure and of the absence of
pain. It is threefold: (1.) That which has for its
object the last end, the summum bonum. (2.) That
whose object is the means for obtaining something
else, the instrument of accomplishing another object;
(3.) The desire for action. Passion is extreme desire.
Aversion is the opposite of desire, and denotes disgust.
It produces cessation from activity.
(21.) Volition (prayatna) is a determination to produce
gratification. Its occasion is desire ; its reason is per-
ception. Hence it has three kinds : (1.) Active effort.
(2.) Cessation from activity (owing to aversion), and
CHAP. II.]
99
THE NYAYA.
(3) the natural efforts of the animal functions. The
last are beyond the perceptions of the senses.
(22, 23.) Virtue and Vice (dharma, adharma), “merit
and demerit,” are the causes of pleasure and pain. The
former arises from doing what is enjoined; the latter
from doing what is forbidden. They both abide in
living creatures. By works of merit, bathing in the
Ganges, sacrifices, and the like, heaven is obtained.
Demerit or vice is the cause of hell : it may be de-
stroyed by expiations.
(24.) Faculty (sanskár) is the last quality. It has
three kinds: (1.) Velocity, which is a cause of action; it
abides only in material bodies. (2.) Elasticity is by
some considered to belong only to terrene objects; by
others it is attributed to the first four elements. It is
imperceptible to the senses, and is sometimes the cause
of vibratory motion. (3.) Memory (bhávaná): it is the
cause of recollection, and is regulated and aided by
association, as by the sight of objects. It is only found
in sentient, beings. This concludes the consideration of
quality, the second of Kanáda’s categories.
§ 14. The third category is ACTION (karma). It consists
in motion; it abides only in substances; it is the cause
of conjunction and disjunction; it has no qualities, and
is transient. We have already mentioned that five
kinds of it are enumerated.
The fourth category is GENUS (sámánya). By this is
understood the condition of similar things. It causes us
to perceive conformity. It is eternal, single, concerns
many things, and abides in substances, qualities, and
H2
100
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
actions.
It has two degrees : (1.) Existence is the
highest, and regards numerous objects; (2.) Abstrac-
tion of the individual is the lower. There is a third,
intermediate. These greatly resemble genus, species,
and individual. In another view, they are only two,
genus (játi) and species (upádhi). The next category
is DIFFERENCE (visesha). It causes us to perceive ex-
clusion; it abides in eternal substances,--mind, soul,
time, place, ether, and atoms, all of which are origi-
nally and eternally different in some respects from one
another. The last is INTIMATE RELATION, or co-inherence,
already stated. It is illustrated in the relation between
a web and the threads of which it is formed; between
a body and the parts of which it is made up.
§ 15. A seventh category is usually added to these,
that of NON-EXISTENCE, or negation (abháva). It is of
four kinds. Mutual non-existence, or difference, is the
reciprocal negation of identity, essence, or respective
peculiarity.“ A jar is not a web of cloth.” Antecedent
non-existence is a present negation of what will be a
negation in the material cause previous to the effect.
In yarn, for instance, until the cloth is fabricated, there
is antecedent negation of the cloth to be worn.
is not produced until its previous non-existence is put
an end to by its formation from clay. It is without
beginning and end. Emergent non-existence is destruc-
tion; it is negation in the cause after the effect is pro-
duced. In a broken jar, the negation of the jar is the
heap of pieces which remain. This has beginning, but
no end. Absolute non-existence is negation through
A jar
CHAP. II.]
101
THE NYAYA.
all “the three times;" as fire in a lakea thing that
can never be.
Those who have sufficient patience to wade through
the details of the Nyáya system must acknowledge that,
in spite of its dryly formal character, the system is one
which exhibits a great advance in the analysis by the
human intellect of the objects of thought presented for
its consideration. It is not, like the system yet to be
examined, vitiated by errors which destroy its whole
value from beginning to end. In spite of its imperfect
analysis and generalization, it has found a great deal of
solid truth. In its method of inquiry, and in the laws
which it prescribes to the instruments of investigation, it
reached the truth which modern science employs in our
more enlightened days. Even its physical science, un-
aided by chemical analysis, by mathematical exactness
and broad astronomical knowledge, exhibits a very exten-
sive examination and patient research into the elements
and objects of the universe. One cannot, therefore, but
hope that the effort now being made in the Benares
College, to render its method the means of presenting
the pundit world with a view of the correct results of
modern science, may prove successful, and may lead
native scholars from the errors of their religious books
to seek for the religion as well as the science of those
from whom such correctness has proceeded. The fear,
however, is natural, that with the Hindu narrowness of
mind, which can receive at once as true opposite and
contradictory dogmas, the partial acknowledgment of
the truth of their shastres will lead them pertinaciously
to reverence the whole.
102
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
CHAPTER III.
THE VEDÁNTA.
The Vedantic system appears before the European
scholar in three stages of development. The germs of
its philosophy, and even its principal doctrines, are con-
tained in the Bráhmanas of the Vedas; but they are
not there arranged in due order, nor are they taught
with that completeness and elaboration which are em-
ployed in works of later date. It is from this circum-
stance that the system derives its name ; its special
design being to exhibit the “end” and scope of the Vedas
in a duly classified form. The completed system is first
seen in the Sutras of Veda Vyása; wherein its peculiar
aim, the reasons which have necessitated its appearance,
the doctrines it teaches, and the results to which its
study leads, are all laid down in proper order. Subse-
quently to this great authority and its cotemporaries,
the philosophy is recorded in the great commentaries
which eminent scholars have written upon the original
authorities, as well as in works composed with a view
to exhibit its truths in a succinct and comprehensive
form. In all its stages, the system is substantially the
same; and, therefore, the student will find little diffi-
culty in ascertaining what its dogmas are. In all the
works which expound it, the topics discussed, the doc-
trines laid down, and the illustrations employed, are to
CHAP. III.]
103
THE VEDANTA.
a great extent identical. The last stage of the system
differs from the earlier two only in showing a more
complete deduction of all the consequences to which
its principles lead. Just as the schoolmen of the middle
ages cared not to discuss the truth or falsehood of the
principles of the Aristotelian philosophy, but taking
those principles for granted, sought only to exhibit them
in a clearer light, and to develope them to their utmost
extent; so the commentators on the Vedanta, adopting
without question the original truths presented for their
acceptance by the earliest authority, endeavour to
describe it more clearly, explain it, paraphrase it, find
reasons for it, and draw out the ultimate conclusions,
which that truth essentially involves. Varieties in the
interpretation of the original works, led to varieties of
opinion on some points, and to the founding of different
schools of philosophers who adopted them. In the
main, however, the grand doctrines have been taught
from the same great authority, through a long suc-
cession of ages down to the present day.
The unanimous voice of Hindu antiquity ascribes to
the great sage Bádáráyan, otherwise called VEDÁ-VYÁSA,
the origin of the Vedantic system. Little is known con-
cerning his personal history, and that little is of a very
doubtful and legendary character. The manner of his
birth is thus described in one of the works attributed to
him, the Mahábhárat. His father, PARÁSARA MUNI,
struck with the beauty of a fisherman's daughter on the
banks of the Yamuná; conveyed her to an island in the
river which he produced for her residence; and there a
104
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
son was born to them. From his birth-place and his dark
complexion, he was called Krishna-Dwaipáyana, “the
dark islander." From the time of his birth he became,
like Yájnawalkya and other great scholars, an ascetic in
the woods. All his time was spent in the practice of re-
ligious austerities, and in meditation on religious subjects.
With the affairs of common life he busied himself but
little: only occasionally appearing at some celebrated
sacrifice; or visiting his relations to advise them in their
quarrels. He quitted his retirement, however, on one
occasion for a special object, which illustrates the difference
between ancient and modern Hindu society. Through
the blessing of Parásara, his mother, Satyabati, had
become the wife of Sántanu, the king of Hastinápur, and
had borne him two sons. Both died without children; the
younger leaving two widows, who were sisters. Anxious
to save the royal race of Kúrú from extinction, his
mother resolved to recall Vyása from his meditations;
and besought him to raise up issue from his brother's
widows. He complied with her request: from Ambá
was born Dhritarashtra; from Ambalika, Pandu. From
the former sprang a hundred sons: from the latter came
Yudhishthir, Bhim, and Arjun. Thus the three great
heroes of the Mahabharat were Vyása's own grandsons.
By the force of his meditations, Vyása attained
astounding wisdom, and prepared within his mind an
immense array of Hindu learning. As he was reflecting
on the proper person to aid him in writing it downi,
Brahmá appeared and advised Ganesa to be sent for.
The god of wisdom, therefore, became his secretary;
CHAP. III.]
105
THE VEDANTA.
and amongst the works which he dictated, forth came
the Mahábhárat. Such is the legend which the poem
itself contains. Scholars doubt whether the Mahab-
hárat be the work of Vyása; and the mention of Ganesa
in this very passage is itself suggestive of the gravest
doubts on the point. The greatest work ascribed to
him, and ascribed to him universally, is the compilation
and arrangement of the Vedas: from whence he derives
his celebrated name of VEDÁ VYÁSA, “arranger of the
Vedas.” These various works, the collection of the
Vedic hymns, the formation of the Vedánta system,
and the composition of the Mahábhárat, are separated
from each other by hundreds of years. They cannot
all claim him as their author; and it is exceedingly
doubtful if he ever lived at all.
The book of Sutras, he is said to have compiled, is
reckoned the most direct and important authority on
the Vedánta system. It is called by the various names
of Brahma Sutras, Saririk Satras, and Uttara Mi-
mánsá. It is complete in itself, delivers the system in
a clear, compact form, and, like the Sutras of other
systems, is divided into sections, which may be readily
committed to memory. Like them, also, it requires the
elucidation of a commentary.
In addition to this excellent compendium, the Ve-
dánta has an advantage over the other systems in being
able to appeal for its authority to another class of
works, more ancient than the Sutras, and forming a
portion of the Vedas. It was mentioned in the sketch
presented of the Vedic age, that as the philosophic spirit
106
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
grew among the brahmins, various treatises were com-
posed by the learned among them, embodying their
speculations, not only as to the meaning of ancient
Vedic rites, but respecting the constitution of their own
nature and of the universe around them. These trea-
tises had relation to all kinds of subjects; they expressed
the notions of their authors freely; they were guesses
at truth rather than the results of well-weighed
thought; they spread over a long period; and when,
at length, such as survived were gathered as works of
authority into the Brahmanas of the Vedas, it was only
to be expected that they would contain a strange med-
ley of opinions, would express different views upon the
same subject, and not unfrequently contradict each
other. So various are their opinions that all orthodox
systems are able to appeal to them in confirmation of
their views, and are glad to do so because of the weight
attached to the Vedas of which they form a part. The
philosophical chapters and tracts are called Upanishads,
and, though belonging to different parts of the Bráh-
manas, have been selected from them, so as to occupy a
kind of independent position. More than a hundred
of them are known, and the greater part are numbered
among the treatises of the Atharbba Veda. The
authors of the most ancient and authoritative are not
known; they are all Sruti, i.e. inspired, and are
believed to be communications from the great Brahma
himself. One special set of the Brahmanas are termed
Áranyakas, because they were to be read in the forests
by those ascetics and devotees who quietly withdrew
CHAP. III.]
107
THE VEDANTA.
from household life to meditate in retirement upon the
Supreme. These works were composed later than the
Bráhmanas in general: they contain a great number of
Upanishads, and, in after days, were declared by their
brahmin commentators to be “ the essence of the
Veda.”
Eleven of these Upanishads are considered by the
brahmin world to expound Vedantic doctrines, and
their authority is appealed to as of the highest kind.
We may well doubt whether their original authors, who
lived before the Vedantic system was formed, really
intended them to bear simply and solely the Vedantic
interpretation which is now put upon them; but they
have undergone the same fate as all the early Aryan
legends and literature, in being thoroughly brah-
minized. By the English scholar they may be re-
garded in two lights. On the one hand, he cannot
fail to regard these treatises with great interest, as the
earliest forms of philosophic investigation produced
among a great people thinking for themselves; and he
will readily make allowances for their various imper-
fections. When, however, he comes into controversy
with brahmin priests, because they assert that these
tracts contain the veritable utterances of Brahma, he
even op
the books contain, to prove their human origin.
The eleven Upanishads of the Vedantic school are the
following: the Aitareyá, Brihad Aranyaka, and Vája-
saneyi: the Taittiriyá, the Chhandogya, and Talavakár:
the Mundaka, Katha, Prasna, and Mándukya; and
108
(PART. I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
lastly, the Swetáswatara. The AITAREYÁ Upanishad
is taken from the Bráhmanas of the Rig Veda, and
forms four chapters in Book 2 of the Aitareya
Ára-
nyaka. It has been translated by Colebrooke in his
Essay on the Vedas, and contains a curious description
of the process of creation. The BRIHAD ÁRANYAKA is
a very voluminous Upanishad, the last book of the
Satapatha Bráhmana; the Bráhmana of the Vájasaneyi
school, which under the teaching of Yajnawalkya,
formed the White Yajur Veda. The Upanishad con-
tains an immense amount of interesting matter, in-
cluding several dialogues between Yajnawalkya and his
rivals and scholars. The CHHANDOGYA is a very im-
portant and extensive Upanishad of the Sáma Veda,
full of theological disquisitions and dialogues. Several
of the others named are exceedingly brief. They are
all, however, so valuable that it will not be inappro-
priate to describe the character and contents of two or
three of the most popular.
The Taittiriya Upanishad is found among the Bráh-
manas of the Black Yajur Veda, and stands high in
the estimation of Vedantic scholars. It is clear in its
doctrine, but shows the system in quite an early stage.
It is divided into three chapters: the first of which
describes the preparation a student must undergo,
before the system is communicated to him: the second
conveys the doctrines themselves: and the third shows
how the knowledge sought is only to be acquired by
degrees, by those who patiently study all its parts, as it
was by Bhrigu, the son of Varuná.
CHAP. III.]
109
THE VEDANTA.
The Mundaka Upanishad professes to be a discourse,
containing a series of instructions delivered by Angiras
to Sounaka in answer to his inquiry: “Tell me, oh
illustrious sage, what is that science, by the knowledge
of which this universe is understood." The treatise is
divided into three chapters, each of which has two
sections. It is entirely didactic, and describes with
varied illustrations the nature and attributes of the
supreme; the connection between the universe and
him; the way by which men may acquire a knowledge
of him; the fruits of that knowledge, and so on.
The Katha Upanishad is divided into six sections
(valli). It describes a dialogue between Yama and
Nachiketá, the son of Vájasravasa. Nachiketá had
been devoted by his father to Yama, and arrived at the
house of that deity during his absence. On his return,
the servants informed him that a brahmin had been
waiting for him for three days, and begged him speedily
to offer the usual attentions in order to prevent harm.
He hastened to do so, and promised Nachiketá three
favours. Nachiketa asked first, tranquillity for his
father's mind : secondly, an account of the sacred fire
by which men ascend to heaven: and thirdly, a full
explanation of the nature and attributes of the abso-
lute and supreme Brahm. Yama consents to grant all
the requests: though the last is given with great reluc-
tance. The description of the fire is contained in the
first section : that of the supreme occupies the other
five. From the frequent ellipses in its language, the
Upanishad is rather difficult to understand.
110
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
The Swetáswatara Upanishad consists of a number of
oracular sayings concerning the Supreme, the Universe,
and Brahm, delivered by Swetáswatara to his disciples.
They are divided into six sections, but are strung toge-
ther without any logical order, the same topic occurring
again and again at different intervals. This Upanishad
is of very late date: it was prepared long after the rise
of the great systems; and is interesting as exhibiting an
early attempt to fuse the Sánkhya and Vedánta into one
system; and show that all their apparent contradictions
may be explained away.
A similar attempt, perhaps of the same age, is found
in the celebrated and highly honoured poem, the
BHAGAVAT GÍTA. This beautiful production is treated
by the Vedantists as one of their authorities, and is
explained in accordance with their views. But it is by
no means an exclusively Vedantist work. It is divided
into three principal sections, each containing six lectures.
The first of these dwells on the ascetic practices of the
Yoga; describes them and their fruits; but also points
out that every one who faithfully fulfils the duties of
his own caste in his own sphere will receive the highest
reward. To enforce this brahminical doctrine was one
of the great aims which the poem had in view. The
second section goes over the principles of the Vedanta,
teaching pantheism in the plainest way; and the last
accepts the scientific and general doctrines of the
Sánkhya. A single system is woven out of the doc-
trines of all. While intended to teach a theological
system, the poem is cast into a dramatic form, and so
CHAP. III.]
111
THE VEDANTA.
far may be compared with the Book of Job. It pro-
fesses to describe a conversation which took place
between Krishna and Arjuna immediately before the
battle of Kurukhetra. Arjuna was in the deepest grief
at the slaughter which had already taken place, and
was about to be renewed, inasmuch as all the great
warriors on both sides, and numbers of their depen-
dents, were relations fighting against each other. In
order to remove his grief and nerve his arm for battle,
Krishna argues with him, that from the nature of
things it was useless to mourn or to rejoice: that he
was bound as a Kshatriya to fulfil the duties of his
position, without regard to consequences: and enters
into a theological discussion in order to defend so strong
a conclusion. Krishna declares himself the author of
the doctrines, and in proof of his authority exhibits him-
self to Arjuna in his divine form. The estimation in
which this dialogue is held amongst not only native
scholars, but the people generally, is of the highest
kind. The beauty of its language; the regularity of its
structure; its noble descriptions of the Supreme; and the
clearness of its explanations give it literary excellence
of a high order. It is a work of merit to hear its
exposition ; much more so to learn it in the original
Sanskrit tongue.
The works of authority which follow next in order,
and which exhibit the system in its latest stages, are the
various Commentaries which have been written upon
the inspired works, and compendiums of the doctrine
compiled by celebrated scholars. These commentaries
112
(PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
are very numerous, as the Vedant has been a favourite
system for many centuries. The greatest of all the
commentators is SANKAR ACHÁRYA. This learned
Hindu bears among his philosophical countrymen a
name and reputation for scholarship scarcely inferior
to that of Veda Vyása himself. He is perhaps the most
illustrious disciple the Vedantic system ever produced.
In an age when other philosophies were popular, he
travelled so extensively, fought so hard, and obtained
so many victories by his lectures, discussions, and
writings, as to secure for the Vedánta ever after the
foremost place in the schools of Hindu philosophy.
Various data show that he lived between 650 and 740
A.D., and that his life was protracted to a great age.
He travelled all over India, and amongst other places,
visited Cashmere during the reign of Lálitadya, where
he joined in a learned discussion, and obtained the vic-
tory. He is better known in Southern India than in
the northern provinces. There he appeared as the
great restorer of the Siva-ite worship. To the impulse
given to that worship by his advocacy and example are
attributed the building of the great temples at Madura,
Chillumbrum, and Tanjore, with their mighty goprams;
and also the bitter persecution which destroyed the
Jains, subjecting them to cruel tortures, which the
Madura temple has preserved in pictures down to the
present day. The great works of Sankar Acharjya are
his Commentaries on the Upanishads, on the Saririk
Sutras, and on the Bhagavat Gíta.
One of the latest, most popular, and most important
CHAP. III.]
113
THE VEDANTA.
authorities of the system is the VEDÁNTA SÁR. This
little work, which expounds the views of the later
Vedantists, gives a most compact and systematic out-
line of the chief doctrines of the Vedant with argu-
ments in their favour. It contains comparatively few
of the more descriptive portions of the science which
will be found in other authorities, and dwells chiefly on
those points which describe the method of learning it,
the reasons for its formation, and the difficulties which
its disciples meet.
The Vedanta Sár starts with a brief statement that
four things are to be considered in the study of the
system: the student, the object, the authority, the
means by which the end is attained. To the student
and his process of learning we shall refer again. It
will be necessary here merely to consider the theory
given by this little work, of the Vedantic system. In
spite of appearances there is in the universe but one
real existence (vastu): the being who is existence,
knowledge, and joy, the Supreme Brahm. The various
objects of the universe, especially the individual finite
souls, are unreal (avastu). The unreal has been based
upon the real by an improper process of “imputation;"
just as there is sometimes imputed to a rope the unreal
notion that it is a snake. This is caused by ignorance
(agyána). The definition given of this ignorance brings
out a most interesting feature of the later Vedánt.
Ignorance is a kind of thing different both from
existence and non-existence, in the shape of an entity,
consisting of the three qualities,' the opponent of know-
T
114
(PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
ledge." In modern language it is understood to mean
the phenomenal as distinguished from the substance
which underlies it, as we have seen all “nature is
recognized as the aggregate of the three “ qualities,
which include all that renders it cognizable by sense.
By this ignorance has the universe been produced.
Portions of the supreme soul have been individualized :
there are separate souls (prágya) in which has arisen
the notion of self and the like. - There is no distinc-
tion between the sụpreme ruler and the individual in-
telligences .; as there is none between the sky
which covers the forest and the trees, and the sky
which is reflected by the ocean and by many waters."
This ignorance in separate souls has two powers, a
covering power and a producing power. By obstruct-
ing the mind of the observer (as a small cloud obscures
the sun), the covering power hides the infinite soul and
makes it appear limited. The producing power gives
rise to notions of happiness, misery, possession, and
dominion: and as it educes an unreal snake from a
real rope, so in the soul it produces the expanses of
the universe, and projects them as phantasms before
the mind's eye. Nevertheless the soul which is covered
by it is ONE SOUL. It is by abstraction (apabád) that
the supreme is to be discerned as the only reality. By
its means all the great objects in the universe will be
seen to resolve themselves into him. The student,
purified by religious ceremonies, detaching his thoughts
from outward objects, and giving intensest attention to
his teacher's instruction, meditates on the great sen-
CIIAP. III.]
THE VEDANTA.
115
tence “That art thou,” “ thou art the one sole being."
He gets to perceive that all duality is illusion, that all
the varied objects in the universe are all Brahma; that
he is himself Brahma. “I am he." Passing beyond
this judgment, which still shadows forth duality, he
ceases to assert even that as a separate thought. Sub-
ject, object, and the relation between them disappear;
his “wisdom” is perfect; nothing is left but the ONE,
who is existence, knowledge, bliss.
It should be added that the explanation adopted by
the later Vedant appears in the mythology of the Hindus
in a very debased form. The ignorance which "pro-
duces” the “egg of Brahmá” is termed pra-kriti.
As production is the result of energy, this pra-kriti
must be the energy (sakti) of the Supreme. Popularized
for the vulgar, this sakti becomes a goddess, Máyá, the
wife of Brahma, the Creator in the Hindu triad.
THE VEDÁNTA SYSTEM.
It is impossible in this brief sketch to give more than
a meagre outline of the general Vedant doctrine. The
varieties of opinion held by different schools, and the
differences in the truths maintained at the various
stages of its progress, must all be omitted. The student
who would understand the whole thoroughly, must
apply to the original authorities and examine them
himself. In carefully analyzing them, he will soon
detect the truth which one teaches and not another ;
and note the shades of meaning which the same lan-
guage seems to bear in different works. He will observe
I 2
116
(PART I
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
how the tone of the Gita differs greatly from that of the
Sutras : how the Upanishads seem to contain the system
distributed among them: how one Upanishad, for in-
stance, the Katha, is much more pure in its doctrine
than others : or how another, like the Swetáswatara,
endeavours to effect a compromise between the Sánkhya
and Vedánt, and on eclectic principles, suggest a sys-
tem which shall embrace the concurring elements of
both. All such refinements of Vedantic inquiry we
must here pass by. The general principles of the sys-
tem are few and simple; they necessarily involve the
minor details by which they are accompanied: are stated
in the earliest authorities, and described in terms not a
whit clearer in the very last. It is these general princi-
ples which we shall endeavour to lay before the reader.
§ 1. DEFINITION OF VEDÁNTISM: scope of the sys-
tem; its ultimate basis : conditions and mode of study-
ing it.
“ The name VEDÁNTA," says the Vedanta Sár,
applies to the arguments of the Upanishads, also to the
Saririk Sutras, and other shastres auxiliary thereto.”
It is also defined as the system by which may be ob-
tained the knowledge of Brahma. That knowledge is
the chief end of man'; the knowledge by which he
will be delivered from all evils, especially the great evil
of repeated birth. “They who, by their nature and
firm faith in a teacher, attain to the knowledge of
Brahma, are by that knowledge removed from a multi-
tude of evils; as being begotten, born, growing old,
CHAP. III.]
117
THE VEDANTA.
affected with diseases, and the like; or it brings them
to the supreme Brahma, or removes and destroys the
ignorance which is the cause of worldliness in them :
on this account the science is called Upanishad.” The
aim of the system is to show the unity between the
sentient souls of individual men and Brahma, the great
soul in its pure state. Every treatise therefore endea-
vours to describe truly the nature, existence, attributes
and works of the Supreme: in order that men, by a
proper study of these important subjects, may compre-
hend the identity which exists between themselves and
him; and may thereby attain that superior happiness
which springs from such knowledge alone.
The sources of such knowledge are distinctly defined.
The schools of Hindu philosophy generally recognize
three ways of obtaining knowledge; the perceptions of
the senses; the deductions of reason; and tradition or
revelation. By the Vedantic authorities six methods are
enumerated; and the logical system adopted is that of
Jaymini. The principal authority however is the autho-
rity of the VEDA; of truth derived originally from the
Deity himself and handed down from one generation of
teachers to another. Hence it is named pramán, ágama,
He, then, who would acquire the science,
must apply to the authoritative shastres; and lest he
should err in seeking to know their meaning, he must
study under the great masters and teachers, who have
themselves attained it, and who have received that tra-
ditional explanation which has been handed down from
the earliest time. In the Upanishads we have many
or sruti.
118
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
1
examples of such teachers communicating divine know-
ledge to their numerous students. In the Chhandogya,
Gautam teaches Satyakáma, and he teaches Upakósál.
Yájnawalkya taught the White Yajur and its two Upa-
nishads. Angiras taught the Mundaka to the son of
Sunaka. Still the series of teachers is acknowledged
to be human, however great the names or celebrated
the erudition of those whom it includes. But the doc-
trine claims to be regarded as superhuman, and to be
derived in several ways from BrahmA himself. The
Mundaka Upanishad declares “ Brahmá, the Lord of
the Universe, came into existence before all the gods.
He revealed the doctrine of Brahma, the most excellent
of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharbba. Atharbba
communicated it to Angirá : he revealed it to Satyabáha,
of the race of Bharadwaj: he made it known to An-
girás.” He taught it in the Mundaka to Saunaka. In
the Chhandogya it is said : “ This doctrine Brahma
spake to Prajápati: Prajápati to Menu: Menu to created
men." In the Katha, Yama himself instructs Nachiketá.
The Sun instructs Yájnyawalkya: “the Sun is Brahma:
this is a certain truth.' He, the all-resplendent, who
formerly created Brahma and placed the Vedas in him,
is the displayer of divine knowledge.” (Swet.)
The classes to whom the knowledge of Brahm is to be
communicated are also pointed out. The dry and ab-
struse character of the study prevents its application to
men of various ranks in society: and a lower branch of
the system, containing only ritual ceremonies, worship
and prayers, is open for the unintelligent and those
CHAP. III.]
119
THE VEDANTA.
1
engaged in the pursuits of ordinary life. Beyond
this, even in the early days of the Upanishads, learning
was reserved for the “twice born,” especially for the
brahmins, whose authority in Bhárat, though not com-
plete, was very extensive. In the Sutras (i. 3. 34-38)
it is plainly declared, that “the purification of the Upa-
nayana (the investiture of the sacred thread)...is the
ground of instruction: none but brahmins, Kshatryas
and Vaisyas have authority to study the Vedas.” Even
amongst the privileged classes, all will not attain it:
deficiency of natural ability, or a blinded mind, like that
of Virochan, king of the Asurs, may entirely prevent its
attainment.
The manner in which the study is to be prosecuted,
and the ceremonial preparation that should precede its
commencement, occupy considerable attention. The
study being of the highest kind, can only be undertaken
in the most serious way. Sankar Acharjya has fully
described the adhikári, the person “ qualified” to under-
take it. The Vedanta Sár describes the same. He
must first find out the sense of the Vedas, as books of
language, by the study, according to rule, of the Vedán-
gas.. He must either in his present birth or a pre-
vious one, renounce all the objects of desire, such as
sacrifices which obtain heaven, and works which are
forbidden, as brahmin murder and the like. By the
performance of the Sandhyá bandhana and other ap-
pointed ceremonies; by offering expiations ; and en-
gaging in acts of internal worship, he must purify his
mind froin errors and fix it upon Brahm. He has then
120
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
to perform “ the four means” (sádhan chatúshtay).
(1.) He must distinguish between the real and unreal
thing: i.e., he must regard everything unreal except
Brahm. (2.) He must free himself from all desire of
enjoying the fruits of merit, whether in this life or a
future one. (3.) He must exclude from his mind and
from sense everything which does not refer to Brahma.
He must endure cold and heat, pleasure and pain, with-
out recognizing a difference between them. (4.) He
must have an intense desire after liberation from self,
and absorption into Brahm. These exercises duly com-
pleted, he will be qualified to learn more. With earnest-
ness of soul, let him now hasten to a teacher, with
offerings in his hand, and becoming his disciple, beg
him to impart that knowledge which is the highest that
can be attained.
Of a complete victory over the ordi-
nary love of wealth, Nachiketa, as mentioned in the
Kaiha, furnishes an illustrious example. “O Yama,
said he, the age of this universe is short: wherefore let.
these equipages remain thine; be thine the dance and
.. Confer on me, then, the favour of a
solution of my doubts respecting the nature of God."
Nárad again shows how the most extensive knowledge
of the letter of the shastres, without a perception of their
hidden spiritual meaning, does not convey to its pos-
sessor the knowledge of the Supreme. “I have learned,
he says, the Rik, the Yajur and Sáma Veda, the Atharba,
the Itihása and Puráns : grammar and the like: yet
do I only know the text, and have no knowledge of
the soul (Chhand).” Frequent meditation, abstraction
the song:
CHAP. III.]
121
THE VEDANTA.
66
of the thoughts from all external objects continued for
a long time, must be employed during the whole process
of instruction and after its completion, in order to
secure a complete conviction of the great truth which
the science teaches. Amongst other things, a long and
most devout contemplation of the sacred syllable Om, in
each of its three letters and their meaning; as well as
the combined meaning of the whole, occupies a pro-
minent place in these pursuits : and it is only men who
are prepared to undergo these toils, both tedious and
painful, that can hope to attain the great reward to
which they infallibly lead. Curbing the senses and
appetites, and breathing gently through the nostrils, while
meditating, the scholar should concentrate his thoughts.
On a clean, smooth spot, free from pebbles, from gravel
or from scorching sand : where the mind is tranquillized
by pleasant sounds, by running water and grateful
shade, with nought to offend his eye, let him apply
himself to his task.” (Swet.)
With such a process, how can it be wondered at
that, after all, few ever attain the knowledge offered :
and even they who do attain it, have been destined to
their reward by the Supreme. “ He who regulates
both knowledge and ignorance is God.” (Swet.)
makes him to do good deeds, whom he wishes to bring
out of this world: and him he makes to do evil deeds,
whom he wishes to bring into the world again, in a
future birth.” (Kaushitaki Up.) Thus aided by divine
choice; thus prepared by ritual services, by self-
subjugation, and by the desire of obtaining the know,
- He
122
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
(PART 1.
ledge of the Supreme: and thus provided with a com-
petent teacher, the student must place himself at his
master's feet, to receive with undoubting faith what-
ever that master may choose to teach: ready, if need be,
like Indra (Chhand, vii.), to wait patiently a hundred
years before that wisdom be imparted, but determined
to get it in the end.
§ 2.-OF THE SUPREME BRAHMA.
The Upanishads being treatises which have for their
end the teaching of the knowledge of Brahm, are of
course crowded with passages descriptive of his exis-
tence, attributes and deeds. Some of them contain
sublime conceptions, expressed in the highest forms of
poetical language, and illustrated by striking metaphors.
Other parts are puerile; and the constant repetition
of the same descriptions, confined to a narrow range
of topics, wearies the reader without instructing him.
All the authorities dwell profusely on the same subject,
and in the same manner. The Bhagavat Gita, in its
tenth and eleventh lectures, contains some noble pas-
sages on the majesty and splendour of the Supreme.
· The existence of Brahma is a point which the Vedan-
tic authorities take not the slightest trouble to prove:
even although the Sankhya had already made its here-
tical assertion that no evidence can be offered of such
existence. All are employed rather in enumerating his
attributes ; which are numerous, and described both in
negative and positive terms. 6 Brahma is eternal,
omniscient, pervader of all things, ever satisfied in
CIIAP. 111.]
123
THE VEDANTA.
one.
- He
nature, ever pure, intelligent and free; wisdom and
delight. “ That being is the true, unchanging, eternal
Like ether he penetrates all things: he is free
from all change, ever satisfied, without limbs, in nature
light itself. He, in whom right and wrong, with their
effects, and the three times, have no place, he is with-
out body, and is freedom itself.”
66 That Supreme
Lord pervades all things, and is independent and one :
there is no one like him, no one superior to him ; the
whole world obeys his will. He is the internal spirit
of everything that is: he, by means of an impure delu-
sion in names and forms, makes himself, the ONE GOD,
multiform.” “He is without hearing, touch, form, taste,
or smell. He is without beginning or end, mighty and
supreme." "He is Om. This Om is Brahma.”
is Supreme among the Gods: the Great God: the
Supreme debta of the debtas; the Lord of lords,
supreme over all."
6 Brahma is supreme: supreme
and all excellent: and pervading the body of each,
dwells deep in all existences. He alone encompasses
and regulates the universe.” 66 To him there is none
high nor low, nor great nor small.” “ He is the
inighty Lord, perfect, the inciter to all good. Without
hands or feet he runs and handles : without eyes he
sees: without ears he hears. He knows all, but they
know him not. He is without decay, ancient, uni-
versal spirit, all-pervading. He is without birth, eter-
nal." “ He is without tribe or race: without eyes or
ears; without hands or feet
the producer
of everything that is."
124
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
With respect to his essential nature, Brahma is
declared to be Supreme Intelligence. “On account of
the eternal essence of intellect in Brahma (as light is
the essence of the sun), no regard can be allowed to
other supports of intelligence.” Again, this intelligence
is not only compared to light, as in the passage just
quoted, but is said to be light. Though Brahm is
in his very nature intellect, yet the word light describes
him, as it does the cause of the illumination of the
whole world.” (Sankara.) “ As a mass of salt is, not
internally, not externally, but entirely, a mass of savour,
so that spirit is, not internally, not externally, but entirely,
a mass of intelligence.” His size is thus described : “He is
less than the least atom: he is greater than the greatest.”
According to some views of the Hindu mythology,
Brahma is not always invested with these attributes.
In the intervals between the Great Ages, or Kalpas, he
is said to be altogether nirgúna, “without qualities,” and
to recline upon the leaves of the banyan-tree in a state.
of profound repose (batpatrasáyt). The Sutras declare
that the latter is the true description of him; not the
former, nor the two together. It is only in relation
to the creation that these “ qualities” of various kinds
are attributed to him. Really, “he is unaffected by
the modifications of the world: as the clear crystal,
seemingly coloured by the red blossom of the hibiscus,
is not the less really pellucid.”
lucid.” “He changes not: all
change is expressly denied him by the texts in the
Vedas.”
The Universe, on the Vedant theory, as we shall
1
CHAP. III.]
125
THE VEDANTA.
presently see, is not a real universe, it is only an ap-
parent one. Yet the relation of Brahma to that unreal
world, is fully and frequently mentioned in the Ve-
dantic authorities. He is declared to be its creator.
" When there was neither day nor night, He was,
who is without darkness and is pure goodness alone.”
But when the time arrived he made all. 66 One God
produced the heavens and the earth.” “He is the
almighty creator of the world and the all-wise author
of the Shastres." - His will alone is a sufficient cause
of the universe: and he has made it for sport.” The
Sutras say, that he first conceived the desire to create,
and employed special words in the process.
« From
Vedic words, the universe beginning with the gods, has
sprung." Uttering the word vhúr he created the
earth.” The Aitareya Upanishad (ii. 4.) enters fully
into the subject of the creation, and describes the forma-
tion of the great objects of the universe with minute
detail; especially the structure of man.
The passage is
too long to quote here.* The Brihad Aranyaka also
describes the formation of the animated creation, and
the mode in which the male and female of each kind
were produced.
Brahma is the sustainer also of the creation which he
has produced The Upanishads give numerous illus-
trations. “ All things in the world proceeded from the
Supreme, and in him they move. Through fear of him
fire flames: through fear of him the sun shines; through
fear of him Indra, Váyu and Death keep in motion.”
* Colebrooke's Essay on the Vedas gives it in full,
126
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
“If God leave the system of man which he pervades,
then what of it can remain ! Not through their vital
powers do mortals remain alive: they live through him,
by whom those powers are themselves sustained." In a
dialogue between Yájnyawalkya and his wife Gargi,
the former declares that the ether, on which the heavens
and earth rest, is woven and sewn upon the supreme
Brahm. Brahma is also the destroyer of this creation.
“ The one destroyer, the being without a second, who
dwells in every one and who regulates these worlds by
his regulating power, after creating all worlds and sus-
taining them, destroys them in the end.” So say other
passages.
The time of destruction is defined as arising
periodically at the end of the various Kalpas which
mark out the progress of time: when Brahma, according
to the necessity of his nature, absorbs all his works into
himself, to produce them again when another appointed
period shall arrive. This is a matter rather discussed in
the Puráns than in the Vedant, except in general terms.
The connection between the Supreme and his created
works is declared by all the authorities to be even more
intimate than that which has been now described.
Hitherto we have seen him as the efficient and ultimate
cause of the universe; and of the myriads of objects
which it contains. But the greater number of pas-
sages which speak on the subject show the relation
between him and them to be more direct and simple,
declaring him to be their internal ruler, their substantial,
or as we usually express it, their material cause: that
is, in other words, the very substance of which they are
CHAP. III.]
127
THE VEDANTA.
composed. This is the prime doctrine of the Vedant
system: whose influence has moulded all the other
por-
tions of the science, and has produced all the difficulty
which students and scholars have found in explaining
both its dogmas and the necessity which produced them.
It is also the prime error of the system, immensely im-
portant in itself, and also producing other errors which
naturally cluster round it as its legitimate companions.
We shall therefore defer a more particular statement of
the doctrine, of the arguments by which it is defended,
and the illustrations by which it is elucidated, to a
future chapter, and merely state briefly for the present
the evidence of its existence in the system.
There are three classes of passages contained in the
various Vedantic authorities, which teach the perfect
identity between Brahma and the universe; that is, the
doctrine of Pantheism : numerous expressions and pas-
sages most strongly imply it: it is openly and forcibly
asserted in distinct terms; and numerous illustrations
are employed to explain it. (1.) The Upanishads, the
Sutras and Gita, frequently speak of Brahma as per-
vading the universe, and apply to him numerous epi-
thets expressive of that idea. And in order to put the
fact in a clearer light, the assertion is made, not only
concerning the universe in general, but also its indivi-
The term sarvabhútantarátená, “ the
internal spirit of all things,” frequently occurs in the
Mundaka and Katha Upanishads.
(2.) The doctrine is directly taught in passages like
the following : “ Brahma is the substance of the uni-
duated parts.
128
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
verse : for so the propositions in the Vedas) and their
illustrations require” (Sutras i. 4. 23). Nothing
exists but he" (iii. 2. 29). “I am the sacrifice: I am
the worship: I am the drug; I am the incantation :
I am the fire; I am the incense” (Gita, ix.). “Fire is
that original cause: the sun is that; so is air: so is the
moon: such is that pure Brahmå : and those waters;
and Prajápati
.
It is he who is in the womb :
he who is born: and he who will be produced.”
(3.) The illustrations employed also teach it. The
universe is compared to sparks proceeding from him,
the fire: to the spider's web, which is of the same
animal substance with the creature which spins it: and
the like. Many of these figures are drawn out at great
length, and are beautifully expressed.
By far the most copious details of this dogma are
taught in the earliest authorities, the Upanishads: and
from thence they have been reproduced in the Sutras,
the Gita and their commentaries. Nothing then ap-
pears more clear than that it was cotemporaneous with
the earliest philosophy which sprang up among the
Hindus, and was considered to furnish a proper ex-
planation of the essence of their religion so far as it had
been then developed. Of its great age and immense
influence at the present time, no proof can be more
plain than that every Hindu knows it, that every
Hindu occasionally appeals to it; and makes it the
ground of all his stolid submission to the fate which
seems to rule his existence from the cradle to the
funeral pyre.
CHAP. III.]
129
THE VEDANTA.
§ 3.—THE UNIVERSE AND ITS ELEMENTS.
In the preceding section, it has been shown that the
universe has for its substance and material the Supreme
Brahma himself: that it was created from his desire,
and called forth by special words. In this section may
be noticed the divisions into which it is separated ; its
primary elements ; and the various classes of beings by
which it is occupied.
According to many authorities, the universe is divided
into three worlds (Tri-lóka) viz. heaven, earth, and
hades. By others a division into only two is sanc-
tioned, of which one includes the earth. In this division
the worlds are classified as the upper and lower. In
the upper worlds are included, first, Bhúr-lok, the
earth : then, Bhuvar-lok, the residence of the Munis,
the region between the earth and sun : Swar-lok is the
heaven of Indra: next comes Maha-lok, the abode of
Bhrigu and other saints : Jana-lolc, the residence of the
sons of Brahma: Tapa-lok, the residence of the “ Vai-
rágis :" and lastly, Satya-lok or Brahma-lok, the dwell-
ing-place of Brahma himself. The lower worlds are
beneath the earth: they are also seven in number, are
placed one beneath the other, and constitute the resi-
dence of various evil beings. Their names are Atala,
Vitala, Sutala, Rasátala, Talátal, Mahátal, and Pátil.
These reappear also in Puranic theology. In various
texts, other regions are spoken of which must be con-
sidered subdivisions of those now enumerated. Thus
in ascending to the heaven of Indra, the soul of the
devout worshipper passes first to the realm of fire :
K
130
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
thence to the regents of the day : thence to the abode of
the gods; thence, through the region of air, to the
moon; thence to the realm of lightning. Above this is
the realm of Varuná: and finally, follows the region of
Indra. In the Upanishads but few references are made
to this subject; yet the same classification seems to
have prevailed in their day. Allusions are made to the
seven retributive worlds of happiness :" and Brahma
Loka is several times named : as also Pitri Lóka.
The original elements of the universe are always in
Hindu philosophy set down as five: the Upanishads
having started the doctrine, and no chemist among
them attempting to set it aside as untrue. “ From him
have sprung ether, air, light (or fire), water, and the
all-containing earth.” The order in which they were
created is not the same in all the passages which
enumerate them; sometimes one element precedes and
sometimes another : the confusion passed onwards into
the Sutras and commentaries, and though they en-
deavour to settle the fact, they agree in arguing that
in the Vedas, the order was considered immaterial.
These five elements have been compounded one with
another, in various proportions, arbitrarily fixed by
the philosophers; and from these combinations have
sprung the myriads of varieties which the actual
objects of the world exhibit. The Swetáswatara
Upanishad says: “He, by his power, at the time of
creation, combined element with element, in the propor-
tion of one, two, four, and eight.” The Sutras say that
ether and air are from Brahma: and that fire, water,
CHAP. III.]
131
THE VEDANTA.
own.
and earth proceed mediately from him; but that they
are evolved successively from one another: fire is from
air, air is from ether. They are evolved in this way,
by his will, not from any chemical properties of their
At the destruction of all things they merge into
one another in the reverse order, and are all reabsorbed'
into his essence. The Vedanta Sár gives a later view
of the question ; developed still farther and on a diffe-
rent principle. “ The gross elements are composed of
the subtle ones according to the combination of five
(panchikritam). This combination of five is—to divide
each of the five elements into two parts: then equally
to divide each of the five former of the ten parts into
four parts: to separate these four of the one half from
their own parts, and to join them with the parts of the
other elements, &c." From the five elements so com-
pounded were produced all the great Lokas or worlds.
The various classes into which organized bodies are
distributed are not spoken of frequently. In the Aita-
reyá they are enumerated under four heads : (1) the
oviparous; (2) those born in the womb; (3) those
springing spontaneously from hot moisture (the minute
insects); and (4) those springing from plants. The
same classification is made in the latest authority, the
Vedánta Sár; physical science having made little pro-
gress since the days of the Upanishads. They are
enumerated among the other objects contained in the
universe, which the illusive power of ignorance has
produced from the Brahmándo—“ the egg of Brahma."
It is important to notice among other objects of crea-
K 2
132
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
>
tion, the creation and existence of various DEITIES. In
the Vedas and Upanishads Indra, Váyu, Agni, Varuna,
and Mitra appear in the most conspicuous places. The
Nirukta, however (the passage has no Vedic autho-
rity), declares that the deities are only three; namely,
Agni, Váyu, and Indra; of whom collectively Prajá-
pati is Lord : “In fact, however, there is only deity,
the great soul.” In other passages, however, inferior
deities are mentioned, the Vasus, Rudras, and Adityas,
the gods of the Vedic age. These gods are not purely
imaginary beings. They are “produced;" they “ boast;
they "worship;" they “doubt” about religious ques-
tions. They were worshipped with sacrifices and offer-
ings; and the Upanishads teach that such worship is
beneficial to the devotee. In the Chhandogya Upa-
nishad (ch. v.) a number of sages go to Aswapati to
inquire about Brahma.
He asks them individually
whom they worship. One worships Indra; another,
the Sun; another, Heaven, “as the soul;" another,
Váyu; another, ether, and so on.
acknowledges to each the benefits of his worship;
though in the end he points them all to the higher
worship of Brahma by contemplation. Not only in
the Gita, where numerous passages speak of it, but in
the Vájsaneyi Upanishad, the benefits of this lower kind
of religion are distinctly asserted as true. In the Ve-
dánta Sár, the worship of the usual deities, included in
other ceremonies of the brahmins, is noted as a part of
the preparation essential to the man who would become
qualified to study the system. The Gita speaks most
The kingly sage
CHAP. III.]
THE VEDANTA.
133
fully both of the existence of the deities, and of the
fruits of their worship: and that worship is frequently
declared to be beneficial. “ Remember the gods: they
will grant you the enjoyment of your wishes.”
66 Those
who worship the gods, go unto them.”
$ 4.-Or Man.
Man is but one among the numerous classes of
created things : but from the importance of his position,
in fact, as well of that which he occupies in the Vedantic
system, a separate section of this chapter must be de-
voted to an examination of his origin. He is regarded
by the Vedánt as made up of two elements, the indivi-
dual soul, and the vehicle constructed for its use. We
will consider the latter first.
The vehicle or abode of the individual soul is said to
consist of two bodies, one more refined, the other more
gross in its constitution. The former, called the sukh-
ma sarira, or subtle body, is the internal vehicle. The
latter, called the sthul sarira, or gross body, is made up
of the limbs and organs visible to us. The body in
general is styled in the Upanishads, the “city of
Brahma," and is frequently said to have nine gates, in
allusion to the various openings into its interior. But
its structure is very little described in those treatises.
The five senses, the five vital airs, and the five organs
of action had all been recognized even in their day:
but for the particular details of the body's structure we
must turn to the Sutras, and to the Vedanta Sár, in
which they are fully described. The inner, or subtle
134
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
body, is said by the latter authority, to contain seven-
teen organs: the five organs of intelligence, the five
vital airs, the five organs of action, understanding, and
reason. The five organs of intelligence are the five
senses: the eye, the ear, the tongue, touch, and smell.
They are derived from parts of the first quality (the
Satwa guna) of the five original elements respectively.
The understanding and the reason are both enumerated
among the “organs” of the soul's vehicle, and it is
difficult to conceive the exact shade of meaning in
respect to our constitution which they are intended to
bear. The former is said to be that action of the mind
which asserts: the latter, that action by which it weighs
arguments. Thinking and consciousness are two actions
included in them. Understanding and reason both
spring from the united first qualities of the ether and
other elements. The subtle body again is made up of
three cases, included one within the other, and made up
of the seventeen organs mentioned. The “understand-
ing," joined with the five organs of intelligence, is
called the “intelligent case” of the soul (vigyánmaya
kosh). It possesses the consciousness of power, enjoy-
ment, pleasure and pain, and constitutes the sentient
soul. The “reason” joined with the five organs of
action is the mental case (manamaya kosh). These
organs of action are, the hand, the foot, speech, evacua-
tion, and generation. They spring from parts of the
five elements, of the second quality (the Raja guna).
The five vital airs joined with the organs of action form
with them the vital case of the soul (pránmay kosh).
CHAP. III.]
135
THE VEDANTA.
They include the vital functions of respiration, inspira-
tion, circulation, the guttural air, and the “equalizing
air” of digestion. Of these cases, the intelligent case,
having the faculty of knowledge, is the originator :
the mental case, having the faculty of desire, is the
causal: and the vital case, having the faculty of action,
is the performer of works.
It is difficult to determine the exact application of
each portion of this singular theory of our constitution.
Though descriptive properly of the body, it contains
much that is purely mental. Professing to account for
our physical structure, it really includes a great deal
that is immaterial. The description of the three cases
of the soul, and of their separate functions, seems to
refer to certain facts in the phenomena of human
actions of this kind. We resolve mentally to lift the
hand; an act of volition follows, which influences the
nervous system, particularly the nerves of motion : the
muscular action of lifting the hand concludes the series.
It would appear that phenomena of the first kind are
attributed to the intelligent case of the soul: those of
the second, to the mental case: and the muscular
actions to the vital case. It is scarcely to be wondered
at, that while the connection between the soul and the
body is so intimate and so close, philosophers of an age
so early should fail to discriminate thoroughly the
purely mental from the purely physical elements em-
ployed in the proceedings of human life. The Sutras
differ somewhat from the Vedanta Sár in their account.
They enumerate only eleven organs in the body: the
136
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART I.
five organs of sense or intelligence; the five organs of
action; and the “inner sense.
The mode in which the body is sustained is curiously
stated in the Sutras. The Supreme Ruler, as consti-
tuting the material of the universe, has transformed
himself into all the objects of which it is composed; he
has transformed himself into various combinations and
shapes, deemed terrene, aqueous or igneous, according
as one or other element predominates: it is by him
therefore, in the form of these edible substances, that the
body is nourished and matured. The process of diges-
tion and assimilation is thus described. When nourish-
ment enters the body it undergoes a threefold distribu-
tion according to its fineness or coarseness. Corn and
other terrene food become flesh: but the coarser por-
tions are rejected; the finer nourish the mental organ.
Water is converted into blood : the coarser particles are
rejected as urine: the finer support the breath. Oil
and other combustible substances become marrow: the
coarser parts enter into bone; the finer supply the
faculty of speech.
When the body is dissolved at death, a process takes
place, the reverse of the development, which has been
now described. The speech of a dying man, followen
by the ten exterior faculties, is absorbed into the mind.
The mind (or consciousness) retires into the breath,
with all the other vital functions. The breath, attended
by them, is withdrawn into the living soul, as the
attendants of a king assemble round him when he
departs on a journey. The living soul, attended with
CHAP. III.]
-137
THE VEDANTA.
all its faculties, retires within a rudimental body com-
posed of light. This rudimental frame remains in all
its transmigrations, and during all its period of separate
existence, till the dissolution of all things, when it
merges into the Supreme. Here again we seem to
have merely a description of the ordinary course of
death : in which first a patient becomes speechless; then
his limbs begin to grow cold, and his sensations dull.
He then becomes unconscious; but still breathes. The
breath ceases, and then life departs. It is important
to notice that “these vital acts do not take effect of
themselves : they are directed and influenced by a
divinity who presides over them: the living spirit is,
however, only conscious of the enjoyment, and not of
the presiding power.”
During life, the body is considered ever to occupy
one or other of three states : those of waking, dreaming,
and profound sleep. That of coma or fainting has been
reckoned as a fourth; and the state of death added as
fifth. Sankar Acharya thus describes them :-“When
awake a living man, owing to the illusions of máyú,
perceives an inherent distinction between the objects of
sense: in dreams the mind retires into itself, and from
its own imaginings creates new worlds: in profound
sleep both these illusions are wanting, and the mind
reverts to its true union with the Supreme.” “When
a man sleeps, speech goes into the mind; the eye into
the mind; the intellect into the mind; the ear into the
mind; when he wakes, from the mind they again re-
turn." “ In profound sleep the soul retires to the
138
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART I.
bosom of the Supreme by the way of the pericardial
arteries, and obtains its own form”-(Sutr. iii. 2, 1-10.)
Similar views of sleep and dreams are propounded in
the Upanishads.
The origin and nature of the human Soul form a
prominent topic in the Vedánt, and few things can be
more clear than the view which its authorities take of
the subject. In § 2. it was shown that all matter is
only Brahma, and that he is the substance and material
of which the universe is composed. We shall naturally
expect, therefore, when we inquire into the nature of
the individual souls of men, that we shall be referred
also to the Supreme. And thus we find it. While the
Nyáyá and Sankhya find an original matter for the
physical universe, and original “souls” for its human
minds, the Vedánt ascribes their origin at once to the
Supreme, and declares them to consist of individuated
portions of his essential substance. The soul is said to
be a spark of the Supreme soul, shining by its own
light. It resides in a cavern of the heart as a diminu-
tive “ether" in the centre of a small water-lily. Its
size is said to be that of a thumb, a mere expression, we
presume, to denote its smallness. Eternal in its nature,
it never grows old; and whatever be its history, it at
last is reabsorbed into the divine essence from which it
was originally withdrawn. This doctrine, as containing
one of the fundamental and most pernicious errors of
the Vedánt system, will be stated separately in a future
chapter.
We must not omit to notice, that in spite of the
CHAP. III139
11..
THE VEDANTA.
]
community of origin thus attributed to all human souls,
and of their perfect consubstantiality with the Supreme,
the Vedant from its earliest stages recognizes amongst
them the important division of CASTES. The Mánava
Shastre, a work of authority on the science, contains
the fullest statement of its numerous details : of the
origin and uses of the division; the classes into which
men are distributed; and the peculiar duties incumbent
on each caste. The Gita, though it says comparatively
little, attributes clearly the origin of the system to the
Supreme himself. - The institution of the four castes
was created by me, according to the distribution of the
natural qualities and actions ”—(ch. iv.) The parti-
cular duties of each are specified in Lect. xviii., and
it is declared that the natural duty of a sudra is servi-
tude. The Upanishads speak of it but little; and seem
to point to different stages in the development of the
caste system : but the allusions are unmistakeable, and
the theory is maintained to the present hour. Ir
hymn of the Yajur Veda, of very early date, occurs
the following passage: “Into how many portions did
they divide this person whom they immolated ?
His mouth became a priest; his arm was made a
soldier ; his thigh was transformed into a husbandman;
from his feet sprang the servile man.” According to
the Brihad Aranyaka the process was a gradual one.
“ The brahmins alone existed in the beginning.” But,
“all being one, he did not enjoy it; he therefore largely
created the Kshetriyas of excellent nature.” Next he
created the Vaisyas: but as there was a want of slaves,
a
140
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
6 he therefore made the order of Sudras." Of these
four races, thus distinct from their very formation, the
conditions are very different: the first three are widely
separated from the last. 66 Those who do well in this
world attain to excellent races hereafter, according to
their works, whether it be the race of brahmins, Kshetri-
yas, or Vaisyas” (Chhand. v. 6). The mixed castes,
so numerous in the present age, and some of them so
honourable, are seldom referred to in the Upanishads.
The Chandula and Paulkasa are mentioned : of which
the former is one of the lowest castes in modern times.
These few extracts show that the division into four
castes is reckoned a divine institution, and to owe its
origin to the very circumstances of the creation itself.
$ 5.-THE STATE OF MAN.
However noble the origin of man, however intimate
the connection between him and the Supreme, he is
acknowledged on all hands to be ignorant of his true
character. He knows nothing of his real nature, of
the reason of his existence, and of his future destiny.
He therefore yields himself to the dictates of passion ;
finds his enjoyment in the fleeting pleasures of sense;
and is too happy to inquire into the sufferings which
will be the result of his worldliness.
1. The first thing, then, that is taught concerning the
condition of man is, that he is in a state of the greatest
ignorance. Of this ignorance, however, he is not the
original cause. When Brahma evolved from himself
the various objects of which the universe is apparently
CHAP. III.]
141
THE VEDANTA.
а.
composed, he placed them all under the influence of
an illusion (máya) which prevented their knowing what
was their real character. The illusion is specially
developed in man, who looks on himself as quite dis-
tinct from the Supreme. The Upanishads upon this
subject are decided and clear. “Living in the midst
of ignorance, and believing themselves to be wise, fools
frequently are led astray through crooked paths, like
blind man led by a blind man.” They are also very
decided in ascribing the origin of this ignorance (as the
Vedanta theory consistently requires) to the Supreme
Creator. “Knowledge and ignorance are both hidden
in him who is the imperishable Brahm. He who
governs both ignorance and knowledge is God” (Swet).
“He makes him to do good deeds, whom he wishes to
bring out of this world; and him he makes to do evil
deeds, whom he wishes to bring again into the world.”
(Kaushitaki). “He is the cause both of our bondage
in the world, and of our liberation from it.” This
alleged fact, the ignorance which all men possess of
their true relation to the Supreme, is the first necessary
conclusion from the fundamental tenet of the Vedant
system: the identity between the universe and its
maker. It is therefore dwelt upon strongly by the
later authorities, who felt that, if this ignorance of man
cannot be established, that first tenet will at once be
overthrown by an appeal to human consciousness, to
human reason, and especially to their sense of right
and wrong. Recognizing it as such, the notion of this
ignorance, produced by an illusion (or máyú) from the
142
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Supreme, is strongly defended by those authorities, and
illustrated more largely than any other topic of their
philosophy. Mr. Colebrooke considers that the doctrine
of máyá is an excrescence of the system, added on in
later times. But it seems only a fair deduction from
the principles of an earlier age. If man be identical
with Brahm, he certainly is ignorant of the fact.
Indeed his own consciousness of independence, his moral
affections, his sense of responsibility, the duality of
nature taught by every thought and every act of life,
deny the fact and prove the contrary. The only mode
of getting rid of this great difficulty is to deny the
validity of an appeal to consciousness, by an assertion
that its view of things is distorted and false : that it is
under the influence of illusion, gives false evidence con-
cerning the nature and existence of things around us,
and therefore leads men thoroughly astray. This is
máyk. Without it, the original pantheistic dogma may
soon be overturned: by its aid, the court of appeal
has its character destroyed, and is pronounced un-
worthy of confidence. Either pantheism is false, or
man's consciousness is a delusion. The Vedant accepts
the latter alternative.
The explanation of this illusion, as drawn out in the
Vedúnta Sár and in the Bhagavat Gita is very subtle:
and is made to turn upon one of the most mystic
dogmas of ancient Hindu philosophy (xiv. 92). Every
portion of the universe has been invested by the Supreme
with one or more of the THREE GUNAS or qualities.
These so enter into their very essence and constitution
CHAP. III.]
143
THE VEDANTA.
In living
as to necessitate from them certain conclusions which
must infallibly be developed. The first of these quali-
ties is goodness (satwa). It is alleviating, enlightening,
leading to happiness: virtue predominates in it. It is
prevalent in fire, whence the flame ascends, and sparks
fly upward. When present in man, as it is in those of
a superior order, it is the cause of virtue. The second
and middle quality is foulness, passion, or activity (raja
or teja guna). It is active, urgent, variable, attended
with evil and misery. Present in the air, it causes
wind to move along the ground. In living beings it is
the cause of vice. The third quality is darkness (tamah).
It is heavy and obstructive; attended with sorrow, dul-
ness, and illusion. Because it predominates in earth
and water, they have a tendency to fall.
beings it causes ignorance, sloth, and gloom. The Gita
enlarges on the influence and natural results of these
qualities, and shows the different forms in which they
appear, especially in human conduct and the states of
human happiness or misery. Following the Sánkhya
philosophy, the Gita declares that these qualities belong
to the very essence of nature, and employs the very
same term, Prakriti, the root-matter of the universe, to
denote the substance from which they come forth.
These qualities affect men in everything according to
their natural tendencies: and according as they possess
the higher or the lower, will they contrive to rise or to
fall, to improve in virtue and in an approach to the
great object of their birth; or to wander farther and
farther from Brahm at each successive stage of their
144
[PART 1:
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
existence, to be absorbed once more into his essence,
only when the mighty universe' returns to him at the
final destruction of all things. Thus it is that in their
desires, propensities, temper, mode of worship, objects
of worship, actions, aims, and enjoyments, men are and
can be only what the quality they have been endowed
with permits them to be.
It is in consequence of the great prevalence of the
Raja and Tama Gunas that men lie in such intense
ignorance of what they are. Though Brahma is every-
thing, and everything is Brahma, men draw “distinc-
tions” between themselves and him, and between him
and the universe in general. This ignorance, which
vitiates all their opinions, leads them continually into
the error of “improper attribution” (adhyárópa), that
is, of falsely ascribing to things and persons qualities
which they do not possess.“ Just as a man may, from
gloom or distance, attribute to a piece of rope the qua-
lity of being a snake, so has the individual soul, under
the influence of the glooms of ignorance, created for
itself an outward world. From this cause it has erro-
neously considered that the gross body in which it
resides, with all its various organs—the place which
supports that body, the ether and other worlds-in fact,
the whole egg of Brahmá,' are REAL things (vastu),
instead of unreal (avastu), and have their origin in
the gross elements. From the same cause it believes
that these elements, with their three qualities, are sepa-
rate existences, instead of being identical with the
“ fourth Brahma,' the uninherent Soul, who is their
CHAP. III.]
145
THE VEDÁNTA..
support.” The Supreme, in all these errors, still con-
trols and governs it. "Blind in the darkness of igno-
rance, the soul is guided in its actions and fruition,
in its attainment of knowledge and consequent libera-
tion and bliss, by the Supreme Ruler of the Universe,
who causes it to act conformably with its previous re-
solves; now, according to former purposes; as then,
consonantly to its yet earlier predispositions, accruing
from preceding forms with no retrospective limit, for
the world had no beginning. The Supreme Ruler
makes individuals to act relatively to their virtuous
or vicious propensities. As the same fertilizing rain-
cloud causes various seeds to sprout multifariously,
producing diversity of plants according to their kinds."
(Sutras.)
The most important and practical result of this state
is, that until the soul gets free from its delusions, it is
compelled to undergo a series of transmigrations, ever
reaping the rewards of its acts, either in punishment or
in pleasure; and then returning to another body to
undergo the same round. In time all its pollutions
may be purified, if the tendency of its “qualities" be
upward; and it may be reunited once more to its ori-
ginal essence, and absorbed in the glorious fulness of
the Creator of all. This doctrine of transmigration is
taught not by the Vedant only, but by all the schools
of Hindu philosophy: it lies at the root of all their
speculations, is the basis of all their purposes and aims :
it: deserves therefore special attention, and will be dis-
cussed in a future chapter.
L
146
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
$ 6.-HUMAN DELIVERANCE AND ITS FINAL REWARDS.
Transmigration from one body into another, during
a succession of ages, is represented as a great misfor-
tune. The Vedánt therefore lays before its followers
the system revealed by the Vedas, according to which,
the misfortune may be obviated, the series of changes
reduced in number, and the individuality of the soul
destroyed by its absorption into the Supreme. This
system contains a course of instruction that shall en-
lighten the mind and purify it from all the errors and
illusions by which its misfortunes are caused. The
student will be shown what he is, that he may be de-
livered from the erroneous conviction that he is some-
thing entirely different. All persons however, even
among the favoured brahmins, will not be able to
undergo the same arduous course of study. The
science, therefore, has been divided into two branches.
1. The inferior doctrine is no other than that of the
Purbba Mimánsúi, viz., that liberation may ultimately
be attained by religious merit; by the fruit of sacrifices,
and other ceremonies of the Hindu ritual.
All the
authorities refer to them and acknowledge them as a
distinct though preparatory part of the Vedanta system.
“ All this effort and knowledge of which we have
spoken, rightly observed, aid the man who desires libe-
ration and is free from worldly longings, in purifying
his nature: ... all the works enjoined in the Vedas
and other shastres, are efficacious only in the acquire-
ment of salvation by the southern road.” In the Katha
CHAP. III.]
147
THE VEDÁNTA.
Upanishad, Yama describes the mode of worship by the
Nachiketic fire. In the Mundaka, ritual ceremonies are
in some texts praised as elevating the soul, and pre-
paring it for enjoyment in the next world: though in
others they are declared worthless and deceptive as
compared with the higher mode of securing the same
end. The Gita is most profuse in its praise of this lower
mode of obtaining celestial bliss, and the benefits of
idol worship are affirmed in the strongest terms. In
point of fact, however, the performance of such cere-
monies and the effort to secure high rewards in the next
world, are external to the Vedant as a system. All
rigid Hindus in their daily worship are engaged in per-
forming them, whether Vedantists or not. The texts
serve to show that while the system as such points out
the shortest and most efficacious mode of securing libe-
ration, it allows that all those inferior ceremonies tend
to increase and promote a religious spirit, and therefore
to lead a man towards the high end which all religious
worship is calculated to secure.
Another mode of deliverance, of the same inferior
kind, is taught almost exclusively by the Bhagavat
Gita. It is the mode of FAITH which is again and again
declared to be supremely efficacious.
forms his actions for me, intent on me, devoted to me,
free from interest and from enmity towards any being,
comes to me.” (ch. xi.)
2. The superior mode of obtaining liberation from the
ignorance in which men have been born is that which
the Vedánta system is specially intended to teach. We
66 He who per-
L 2
148
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
have already seen that as 'ignorance' of Brahma is the
disease, so wisdom' in relation to Brahma (Brah-
magyán) constitutes the cure, a cure which may be
made perfect and eternal. By this wisdom' is meant
the true and complete understanding of what Brahma
is, and of man's relation to him. The soul has been .
accustomed to consider itself independent, a separate
being, a voluntary agent; living in a body prepared for
its own use from material substances; and residing upon
a world in the midst of a universe, external to itself
and formed also from matter. These views have
sprung from the habit of improperly attributing to
these varied objects qualities which they do not possess.
The Vedánt assumes as its special task the removal of
this ignorance by a faithful exhibition of the real cha-
racter of the universe and its elements. It teaches
that all is Brahma; that the scholar is himself Brahma;
that his body is but a form of Brahma; that the
universe is Brahma, and does not exist apart from
Brahma; that his passions, pleasures, and pains are all
unreal; his relations in life unreal; and that there is
but one REAL thing in the universe—“ the immortal,
fearless Brahma.” All this doctrine is communicated
to the scholar by his learned teacher; but a process is
required, which the student must most steadily pursue,
before he can receive it thoroughly and make it his own.
It is not the mere communication of the doctrine, or
general assent to it, which makes a man a real Vedantist,
but the weaving of it into his very nature, so that he
embraces it in his inmost soul.
CHAP. III.]
149
THE VEDÁNTA.
v
The process to be adopted, in order to secure so
great a result, a result so opposed to the usual con-
victions of his daily life, is that of deep and continuous
MEDITATION on the character of the Supreme. “MEDI-
TATION is the root of the knowledge of the SPIRIT.”
(Swet.) “ They who know the Vedant and observe its
meaning well, who exercise devout contemplation, and
who are pure, at last in Brahma-loka are altogether libe-
rated and cease to die." This meditation or mental
contemplation is called by different names, and is carried
on under various circumstances. The position of the
devotee, the place of his retirement, and other exterior
conditions of the student, are all pointed out, that he
may be aided in every step to direct his thoughts, and
secure the desired end. In the Upanishads, little is
said of them: though one passage already quoted from
the Swet, shows the process systematized. The different
modes and degrees of religious meditation are also
named and distinguished. The general application of
the mind to all the details and degrees of contemplation;
the retirement, the bodily mortifications, the subju-
gation of the passions, the direction of the mind to any
individual truth, are all noticed. In the Bhagavat Gita,
numerous descriptions of the “ wise man" (gyúni), who
applies himself to this devotion, occur : and the supe-
riority of his worship and study to those of the sacri-
ficer and seeker of merit are frequently dwelt upon.
- The sacrifice of spiritual knowledge is better than a
material sacrifice.” “ The Yogi places his couch firmly
on a spot that is undefiled. Then seated on his couch,
150
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
fixing his heart on the one object: restraining his thoughts,
senses, and actions, he should practise devotion for the
purification of his soul. Holding his body, head, and neck
all even and immoveable, and firmly seated, his eyes fixed
upon the tip of his nose, not looking in different direc-
tions, let him meditate intent on me.” (vi. p. 45.) The
Vedánta Sár contains the most complete and systema-
tized view of all the processes attendant on the Vedanta
study. They are called especially “the four means,"
and include both what is needful to the study, when
attending on the teacher, and what is efficient for its
absorption into the mind, when privately meditating
upon his precepts. They are as follow : (1.) Hearing:
that is, fixing in the mind the opinion of the Vedant
concerning Brahma; by regarding the commencement
and end of the passages which speak of him ; by con-
stant practice and repetition ; by excluding other argu-
ments than those advanced; by regarding the fruit of
knowledge; by praising the subject explained; and by
demonstration of it. (2.) Attention to Brahma by the
demonstrations offered concerning him. (3.) Contem-
plation of him in the way taught. (4.) Meditation, espe-
cially meditation which regards no difference between
him who knows the object of knowledge, and the
knowledge itself. This process includes refraining
from injury, from lying, from stealing, and from dis-
obedience to the teacher: it includes also sitting in a
particular posture, as in the form of a lotus, and sup-
pression of the breath. It excludes listlessness, absence
of mind, passion and propensity to pleasure. When
CHAP. III.]
151
THE VEDÁNTA.
We can
these are really attended to, the student becomes im-
moveable in mind, “like a lamp protected from the
wind.” The effect of such processes on his mental con-
stitution must be practically to pervert in an extreme
degree the natural judgment, instead of developing its
powers and widening its range of view.
scarcely wonder then that the sense of duality, which
is one of the prominent fundamental facts of the mind,
should be so blunted, and the whole mind so distorted,
as to permit a student to adopt the conviction that he
and all things are Brahm.
It must not be forgotten that amongst the distinct
objects of special and careful meditation, the sacred
syllable Om occupies a distinguished place. The stu-
dent must devoutly repeat it again and again, and fix
his mind in the intensest degree upon its several mean-
ings. The Mandukya Upanishad declares these to be
four in number. The A included in it denotes Brahma,
in the form of Vaishwanar, the human soul in its
waking state. The u refers to him as Taijasa, in the
state of dreaming: the m represents him as Prájna
in the state of deep sleep: the combined syllable OM,
2. e. Aum, denotes him at once as the Supreme, invisible,
blissful, without a second. The Sutras attribute to the
syllable three elements of meaning, and declare the effi-
cacy of its repetition to depend upon the sense in which
it is viewed by the devotee. He who meditates on all
three, like a serpent which casts its skin, ascends at once
to Brahma. “ After sharpening thy arrow by devotion,
fix it to that great weapon, the bow found in the Upa-
152
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
1
nishad, and after drawing it and carefully aiming at thy
mark, pierce him, oh beloved, who is the imperishable.
It is said that OM is the bow, the soul is the arrow, and
Brahma is the mark,
As an arrow pene-
trates its mark, so do thou penetrate him.” (Mund. ii.
2, 3, 4.)
It only remains to describe the various EFFECTS of
these processes, and our outline of the system will be
complete. The fourth book of the Sutras is specially
occupied with this topic, and clearly defines the separate
degrees of reward which devotees will obtain. The
Upanishads also describe them. We find that all who
give their mind to the study of the Vedant, with the
desire to obtain its fruit of absorption, enjoy reward :
nor are those precluded who have adopted only the in-
ferior path of ceremonies and works of merit. Three
degrees of this reward are specified : bestowed accord-
ing to the amount of merit or knowledge acquired by
the worshipper.
(a.) The lowest degree is that assigned to the fol-
l'lowers of the inferior method. They go after death to
the heaven of Indra, where they remain till their merit
is expended, when they are born into the world again.
(Gita, ix. p. 65.)
(6.) The second degree is obtained by those who have
by meditation, sacrifice, and worship, served Brahma
greatly, but have not attained perfect wisdom or the
highest rank in excellence. Their souls are conveyed
at death across the regions of the universe to the heaven
of Prajápati. They are endowed with very great power,
CHAP. III.]
153
THE VEDÁNTA.
a power analogous to that of Brahms, but which serves
for enjoyment only and not for action. They can sum-
mon the pitris at pleasure, and exercise other super-
human faculties. (Chhand. viii. 2.) Whatever they wish
for, whatever they desire, they at once obtain. They
are independent and can assume many bodies or one,
as a lamp can nourish more than one wick.”
Both these classes have to pass through life again :
though the number of migrations differs with the degree
of knowledge and merit obtained. The lowest will be
born again speedily: the highest may not leave the
heaven of Brahmá till another Kalpa returns. The
course of their journey; the steps by which they rise;
the regions they cross; the place they reside in; the
course of their return, and the mode in which their
human birth is again accomplished, are all clearly yet
concisely stated in a valuable passage in that section of
the Chhand. Upanishad, which is called Panchágnibidyá.
One special consolation is reserved for them all, what-
ever be their grade. It is that though they may enjoy
and expend the fruits of their merits, the good influence
of those merits will still remain, and thus from birth to
birth they will rise higher in the scale of holiness, until
they attain the final reward. " As the arrow which is
launched stops not until it finishes its course; and as
the potter's wheel stays not till the speed imparted to it
has passed away," so the good works which have begun
to take effect are not annulled. The son succeeds to
the good works of his father, and their good fruit is
continued until absorption is secured.
154
[PART 1.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
(c.) The highest degree of reward is secured by those
who obtain by their meditations a perfect knowledge of
the Supreme. They reach the goal of “wisdom” and
they enjoy the summum bonum of all human effort.
Three things have to be noticed concerning the Brahma-
gyáni. (1.) His condition during life. He becomes
entitled to absorption the moment he obtains “wisdom,"
but he may still remain in the body for several years :
he is called during that time "jivanamukta," “freed in
life.” His condition while he continues on earth is fully
described in the last passage of the Vedanta Sár: and it
is asserted that though he appears, like an ordinary
man, to exercise his senses, to suffer hunger, thirst, and
pain; to be a subject of grief and of error; to perform
deeds which result from his former desires and to enjoy
their fruits; still he is not really so affected. He is
like one who seeing does not see; and hearing, does.
not hear. (2.) A second thing to be noticed in refe-
rence to him, is his relation to good and evil. Par-
taking of the nature and worthy to be reabsorbed into
the essence of Brahma, it naturally follows that good
and evil are to him only what they are to the Supreme,
viz., nonentities. He can sin no more : the penalty of
the greatest crimes is blotted out: and even the merit
of good works is despised and valueless. « The knot
of the heart is divided : all doubts are dissolved; and
his works both good and evil vanish, when that Suprenie
one is seen. “He can do neither good nor evil.”
does not become greater by good deeds; nor less by
evil ones.” (Kaushit.) Two celebrated passages state
1
66 He
CHAP. III.]
155
THE VEDÁNTA.
this dogma in the strongest terms; and one of them
employs expressions and puts it in a light which, except
on Vedantic principles, must be regarded with horror.
“ As water wets not the leaves of the water-lily, so sin
touches not him who knows this: as the combings of a
comb, when cast into the fire, are consumed, so are sins
consumed.” (Chh. iv. 14.) “He who steals gold; who
drinks spirits; who ascends his guru's bed; and who
slays a brahman; all four fall into hell: and the fifth is
he who has communion with them. But he who knows
this doctrine, though he have communion with them, is
not contaminated by sin, is holy, is pure, and is fit for the
pure worlds.” (v. 10.) (3.) His state after death. On
leaving the body, the Brahmagyáni proceeds imme-
diately to a reunion with the Supreme, in whom he is
entirely absorbed. The independent existence which
he had received, under the influence of máyá, is de-
stroyed: he has recognized his true nature, and relation
to Brahma: the máyá is dissipated, and he returns to
his original essence once more. The
passages and texts
in which this consummation is promised to the true
and successful devotee are endless. Some of them
are more complete, and decided; others are
others are more
general. A few have become celebrated from the
clear and undeniable manner in which the doctrine is
laid down. No more transmigration remains to such.
“ The man who knows him obtains liberation (moksha)
and dies no more.” “He who knows the Supreme is
free from all bonds, from all miseries, and is free from
birth and death." Their souls are absorbed into the
156
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART 1:
essence of Brahma. “They who know him as present
in all things, and are acquainted with the science of
Brahma (Brahmabidyd), are ABSORBED (lina) into
Brahma, and are freed from transmigration.” (Swet.
i. 7.) “The soul having retired to its proper place, the
heart, the summit of that organ sparkles and illuminates
the passage (the Susanna nári) by which it will pass
away,” to the crown of the head, and the suture (vidriti)
in the plates of the skull. Here the solar rays meet
it, night or day, summer or winter. By these rays it
reaches the sun. Being entirely in a rudimental form,
and destitute of faculties and organs, it is like a blind
man; and is conducted across the different regions of
the universe by their presiding divinities, to the highest
heaven, the residence of the Supreme Brahma. “The
soul of him who gets liberation, goes to the Supreme
light, and is identical with him; as pure water, ab-
sorbed in a limpid lake, is exactly in everything con-
formed to it." The identity becomes complete and
final. “That soul, having arrived at the Supreme light,
POSSESSES HIS FORM.” (Chh. viii. 12.)
" (Chh. viii. 12.) “As rivers flowing
go into the sea, and lose their name and form, so the
wise, freed from name and form, gain him who is Su-
preme, perfect and splendid. He who knows that
Supreme Brahma, BECOMES even Brahma.” (Mund. üi.
2, 8, 9.) “No egress from the body or migration
can fall to him, who knows Brahma and BECOMES
BRAHMA.” Such is the final reward of all the austeri-
ties and contemplations of the Vedanta--annihilation of
self: identity with Brahm.
L
CHAP. III.]
157
THE VEDÁNTA.
L
Such is a brief outline of the ancient and still re-
ceived Vedantic system, according to its well-known
authorities, the Upanishads, the Súririk Sutras, and
Bhagavat Gita. Utterly wrong as are its fundamental
assertions and the doctrinal system based upon them, no
one will deny to it the merit of consistency, or that the
final conclusions follow by fair logical sequence from the
point whence the start is made. It holds that there is
but one Being in the universe, the Supreme Creator;
that all forms and products of matter are but emana-
tions from him, are but forms of him; that man also is
both in body and soul a product or form of the sole
entity; that whatever therefore implies or seems to
prove him an independent being is the offspring of
illusion and ignorance; that every object in the uni-
verse is endowed with that ignorance, and with the
“ qualities” in which it is exhibited ; that these “ quali-
ties” were placed there by Brahma when he evolved the
universe from himself; that on man, the effect of the
illusion is to fill him with doubt, to lead him into
“error ;” that by peculiar processes, divinely revealed,
these doubts and errors may be removed; that he will
then recognize his true nature and origin; and that as a
result, he will lose the individuality which seems a
prime element in his being; and return by absorption
into the essence and being of the Creator whence he
sprang. The chief of these dogmas will be specially
examined hereafter.
158
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER IV.
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
A CURSORY glance at these great systems of Hindu
philosophy will show that while they differ on most im-
portant points, they have numerous elements in common;
and that while they advocate great and dangerous errors,
their limited observation has yet discovered some truths
which to the present day are universally acknowledged.
Two of them especially exhibit the Hindu mind in a
very active condition: well appreciating the advantages
of clear arrangement, and able to employ sound logical
principles in scientific discussion. Doubtless the pre-
sence of followers of rival schools at the same seats of
learning, and the numerous controversies to which their
meetings gave rise, exerted a powerful influence upon
the development of their theories, and in the correction
of their earlier errors.
It is evident that the systems
were rivals, and that hard battles have been fought at
times for victory by their different adherents, followed
by varied success. The Sánkhya seems at one time to
have been popular. But in the seventh century of the
Christian era the Vedant, under the able advocacy of
Sankara Acharjya, is said to have overpowered other
systems. The Nyáya, from its internal worth as a sys-
tem of reasoning, has always been a favourite subject
CHAP. IV.]
159
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
of study, even with those who did not adopt its philo-
sophical views.
1. The first thing observable in respect to these sys-
tems is that to a considerable extent they are based ироп
the Upanishads. The notions current among the learned,
which became embodied in those detached tracts, have
greatly influenced all subsequent inquiries, and many
have been received without question among the tenets
of later systems. The doctrine of transmigration, with
the causes by which it is necessitated; the various
classes of character among the good and evil, with the
destinies assigned to them in consequence, are evidently
traceable to that source. The divisions of the universe;
the regions above; the regions below; the classification
of all organic and inorganic structures; the five ele-
ments to which their origin was attributed; the descrip-
tion of the human body; its five senses, five organs of
action, and the five vital “airs; ” the separation between
soul, as a distinct entity, and the other objects of crea-
tion; the system of meditation, the submission to
authority, which were to be adopted by all inquirers
after knowledge; and the relation between human
beings and the practice of morality, are all derived
from those ancient works. Many of their notions,
espressions, and illustrations are current among native
scholars to the present day. The Vedanta in its teach-
ing lies of course nearest to them, being professedly
their mere expounder : but the Nyáya and the Sán-
khya both bear marks of that origin, or at least of the
great influence which the Upanishads exerted among
160
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
all the learned in the days when the systems were
founded.
2. Of the three systems, the Vedanta, in its general
character, bears the most religious tone : the others are
more scientific. The science of the Vedánta is com-
paratively incomplete; it forms an inferior part of the
system, and merely repeats what was already univer-
sally believed. The Sánkhya is distinguished by its.
admirable arrangement, and by the clear, logical deve-
lopment of the various truths and theories which it ad-
vocates. They are made to spring necessarily from the
points at which the system starts, and are shown to
follow fairly from the principles there laid down. But
even in arrangement the Nyáya is not inferior to the
Sankhya; while its researches are all pushed deeper
into the world of phenomena, and it draws forth con-
clusions about physics, and about the philosophy of
soul, far beyond what its rivals had been able to secure.
Its range of topics is much wider, its classification more
complete, its principles of inquiry more sound. It has
already been noticed that the text-books of both systems,
barely as they state their object-matter, are most sys-
tematically arranged.
3. All the systems profess the same religious end.
All assume the fact of man's continued transmigration,
and explain its causes in a similar manner. The vari-
ous migrations arise from the follies and sins of men,
which have sprung from their errors; and each system
proposes to define clearly what the error is, to show
how it may be avoided; to secure for its followers com-
CHAP. IV.]
161
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
plete immunity for the future; and thus to bestow upon
them true beatitude. They differ, it is true, both in the
account of the error, its causes and its cure: but a
similar current of thought runs through them all in
relation to it: and all agree that transmigration is its
most dreaded fruit and consequence.
4. In their principles of inquiry, and in describing the
sources of true knowledge, they somewhat differ. The
Nyáya directs its students to four sources of information:
perception, inference, analogy, and verbal communica-
tion (i.e. inspired authority). Of course, analogy may be
readily regarded as an indirect mode of inference, and be
classed with it, leaving the sources of knowledge three:
perception of the senses, inferences of reason, and autho-
rity. In this form they are accepted and employed by
the Sánkhya and Yóga. The Vaiseshika again admits
only the first two. The Vedanta recognizes six sources
of knowledge: these three, and three others reducible to
them. While, however, reason and argument are ex-
tensively employed in the Sutras and all the commen-
taries, special stress is laid upon the texts of the
Vedas.
In the application of these principles to the objects of
knowledge, the Nyáya, as we have seen, far excels all
the rest: its logical system being more complete, and
more correctly drawn out than theirs. The difficulties
in the way of an inquirer, the various classes of fal-
lacies, the sources of wrong notions, the sound method
of deducing right ones, all find a fair place in its
scheme: which has exhibited the art of reasoning and
M
162
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the system of syllogisms in a wonderfully clear and
correct manner.
5. The treatment of causation is an important topic
in connection with these systems. The Vedánta says
little about it: the subject of inferior causes being with-
out interest to a system which holds that the qualities of
bodies act not from an imparted. power, but by the
direct agency of the Supreme. The Nyáya and
Sánkhya have examined the matter well; and both
classify causes into instrumental and material. Both
also lay down the law that “ from nothing, nothing
comes :" i.e. material effects must spring from some
material cause; and “causes must be adequate to pro-
duce effects.” Kopila, however, seems to go farther in
asserting the identity between a cause and its effect;
holding that effects are only the same as their causes.
The Nyáya again allows the fact so often shown in
modern chemistry, that the operation of two causes
may result in a third kind of product, different in form
and qualities from both, though actually produced by
their mutual action.
6. In their notion of substance, the systems decidedly
differ. The Vedanta clearly asserts the common origin
of all objects, material and mental, in the nature and
essence of the Supreme Brahm. In spite of phenomena,
of appearances which may seem altogether to oppose
the theory, it teaches pantheism in the fullest manner,
by asserting it in relation not only to things in general,
but to various objects individually. Whatever, then, be
the essence of the Supreme, and whatever be its inhe-
CHAP. IV.]
163
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
same.
rent qualities, the world and all its products, the universe
and its regions, must all have been fundamentally the
The Sánkhya, as we have seen, attributes an
ideal existence to the universe so far as its forms and
developments are concerned : declaring that the “ five
subtle particles," the germs of the whole, spring from
Consciousness. At the same time it advocates the eter-
nal existence of primeval “ nature” and of souls. The
Nyáya comes nearer to modern philosophy, in tracing all
things to “substances,” which are the unknown sube
strata of known qualities and actions. These substances
have not been produced by God or in thought alone,
but are real independent existences. Even here, how-
ever, the generalization of the system does not go deep
enough to divide the “substrata” into matter and soul,
with space as the sphere of existence, and time as the
succession of moments during which it exists.
have already noticed that “matter” as such was un-
known in the systems.
7. All the systems give to this substance an eternal
origin. The Vedánta does so implicitly, in identifying
it with Brahm, the sole entity, and therefore an entity
uncaused and eternal. The Sánkhya also asserts it of
that primal “nature” whence all material forms have
been derived. The Nyáya makes it not a product of
creative power, but cognate in its origin with the
Supreme Soul, and merely moulded by him into its
numerous forms.
The substance when first educed or
wrought is by all declared to have been of the finest
texture. It is finer than the five original elements,
We
M 2
164
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
they being derived from it. The prakriti of the Sánkhya
has none of those properties by which visible matter is
known. The atoms of the Nyáya also are like ma-
thematical points, without parts or magnitude. They
are imperceptible by sense, and are learned only from
their effects. By the aggregation of atoms, by the de-
velopment of nature, from the essence of Brahma,
the five gross elements are first formed: and from
them all material products in the universe are com-
pounded.
8. Only the Nyáya has gone with any depth or cor-
rectness into the question of the qualities of substance.
Without at all reaching the modern view of the primary
qualities of matter, it has yet discovered some of them,
adopted several of the secondary qualities, and made a
decided distinction between the properties of matter and
the attributes of the soul. Thus colour, savour, odour,
dimension, weight, conjunction and disjunction, with
others, are referred to material substances. Under-
standing, volition or effort, merit and demerit, desire
and aversion, pleasure and pain, are ascribed to soul.
This great advance upon other Hindu systems is the
work of Kanáda.
It has also gone into the singular question, How are
the qualities of a substance connected with that sub-
stance?-a futile attempt; for even though one single
cause be established, the question returns, How is that
cause connected with both the substance and the quality,
so as to unite the two? The difficulty is removed only
a step back, and is insuperable. The Nyáya, however,
CHAP. IV.]
165
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
0
has invented a relation between them, called Intimate
relation. This intimate relation is something real, and
is included neither in substances, qualities, nor actions.
Again, all substances are united actually with the
general notion of substance. This union is not merely
the offspring of human reason, but a union real and in-
dependent of human thought. The general notion, too,
is an entity. It is singular that the Vaiseshika should
have hit upon the doctrine held by the Realists of
Europe, which for so many centuries divided the
scientific world of the schoolmen with its rival, the
doctrine of the Nominalists. Finally, the Nyáyists
held that the special qualities of substance are effects,
and do not belong to the essence of the substance.
9. In regard to Soul, the Vedanta teaches the same
pantheist doctrine as it holds respecting matter. The
soul is an entity, separated from other objects of the
universe, but in its origin identical with the original
of matter, the essence of the Supreme. The Sánkhya
also gives it a separate existence, and attributes a sepa-
rate soul to each individual animated thing. This soul
has an eternal origin, and will never cease to be. Very
little is ascribed to it by the Sánkhya. It does not join
with nature of its own accord. Nature does everything:
forms a creation for its use, a vehicle for its residence:
and a system of knowledge for its liberation. The
Nyáya, like the Sánkhya, makes souls eternal and mul-
titudinous; but ascribes much more action and thought
to the soul when united to " mind," and clothed with a
body. In all the systems souls are divided into classes.
166
[PART r.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Some are higher in rank, others lower. Hence have
originated the Gods, the Gandharvas, the Yakshas
and other beings, as well as men: beings whose ex-
istence is quite unproved, but is probably received on
the testimony of the Upanishads, which all good
Hindus were bound to believe.
10. It is important to notice the place ascribed to
the SUPREME. By the Nyáya, ISWARA or God is
reckoned as of the same class as other souls, there being
a general as well as individual souls. Soul has a real
substratum, in which abide its knowledge, and the
various qualities attributed to souls. Soul has existence
and causality. Its qualities are happiness, unhappiness,
intellect, volition, &c. It has the attributes of ubiquity
and infinity as general qualities : it has also special
qualities, that is, it is limited in space and of momentary
duration. Souls are thus divided into two classes, the
Supreme Soul, and animal souls.* The Supreme Sonl is
God: He is one only. He is omniscient. The “mind”
is the organ in which takes place the perception of plea-
sure, pain, and the like. It is in the form of an atom
and eternal. Number, quantity, severalty, conjunction,
disjunction (qualities of all substance), with intellect,
desire, and volition, are sited in God; but He has none
of the other qualities of soul-merit, demerit, and happi-
ness—as these imply imperfection. Of the place which
God occupies in creation, little is said by the Nyáya
authorities. But considering the attributes ascribed to
him, the material provided, and the work ascribed to
* Tarka Sangraha, p. 15.
CHAP. IV.]
167
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
Brahmá by the shastres generally, it is not difficult to
infer what their opinion must be. Before the universe
began to exist in its present form, there existed the
eternal atoms of the nine substances, which include the
“mind," soul, time, space, and ether. The atoms were
solitary and unconnected, without mutual action: souls
were unconscious and perfectly passive. The work of
the Supreme was, to unite the atomic “minds” to souls,
thereby rendering them conscious; and to unite the
atoms of other substances, and develop them into the
material universe. He thus became the Great Artisan
of the universe. Colebrooke says: “He is demon-
strated as the maker of all things.” In one respect the
ISWARA of the Nyáya occupies a position similar to that
of the Supreme in Christian philosophy: but in the
source of creation, in his personal moral attributes, in
the magnificent ends and purposes of the creation, he is
utterly different and inferior.
By the Vedanta, again, Brahma is reckoned every-
thing; he is knowledge, he is bliss : all distinction be-
tween him and the universe is delusion. Duality is
denied entirely. Yet to the emanations of himself he
has imparted that ignorance, which leads them to con-
sider themselves independent beings. The Sánkhya of
Kopila denies the existence of God: “Nature" alone
having, on her union with soul, spontaneously de-
veloped her refined original substance into the universe
Brahma and the Gods are only the highest order of
created beings. The Yóga of Pátanjali, however, advo-
cates the existence of a God, in whom knowledge
168
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
reaches its extreme limit. Knowledge exists : know-
ledge must find its perfect limit in some being : that
being is God.* Omniscience therefore is an essential
attribute. As LORD he upholds all things by his mere
will, power being also natural to him. In opposition to
Kopil's argument against the existence of God, derived
from the consideration that such a being must be af-
fected by “troubles,” &c., Pátanjali states † that the
Lord is a particular spirit, different from all other
spirits, and is untouched by troubles, such as ignorance;
by actions that involve merit or demerit; by the fruits
of action, such as birth and death ; and by the ten-
dencies which impel other souls on their particular
courses of existence. This Lord is pre-eminent above
all others. He is without beginning, not being limited
by time. He is thus superior to Brahma and all other
created beings that have had beginning, and is their
preceptor and guide.
While thus advocating pre-
eminence in existence, power, and wisdom to the Lord,
Pátanjali says nothing about his connection with the
creation; and if he adopt the views of the Sankhya, no
connection at all is needed, NATURE developing itself.
In such a case He would have existed apart from the cre-
ation, and watched its development as an unconcerned
spectator. Yet it is by profound meditation upon Him
that the scholar of the Yóga may soonest attain com-
plete deliverance from his mundane existence and toil.
* So Dr. Mosheim in Cudworth: “Whence did we get our notion
-of perfection? There must be an Archetype of it: that Archetype is
God."
† Yoga Sutras, part i. pp. 29-32.
CHAP. IV.]
169
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
11. Souls are placed for residence in the bodies of
animated beings. All the systems teach that the soul has
at least two bodies: the exterior is the gross body, visible
and tangible; which is born, lives, suffers disease, and
dies. The interior is a subtile body: small in size, but
of great power. To this the soul is joined on its first
union with matter, and from it it never parts, till its
own emancipation or the dissolution of all worlds takes
place. The subtile body never decays. To the body are
ascribed five senses, five organs of action and “the mind."
The Upanishads and Vedanta speak also of the five vital
“airs,” the vital functions of breathing, circulation, and
digestion. They also add three " cases” to the soul :
making out a compound constitution for the soul as
invested with body. Over the rudiment of soul is the
“intellectual case;" above that, the “mental case;
then the “ vital case," external to the rest.
12. Of the operations of mind little analysis has been
made, except by the Nyáya. That system has enu-
merated several with considerable accuracy. Two
perations especially are attributed to intellect, appre-
hension and memory.
Under apprehension are in-
cluded perception and inference. In connection with
these we find also the beginning of a reference to the
laws of association by which remembered facts are re-
called into consciousness. It is in discussing inference
that the Nyáya educes the laws of sound reasoning.
The Sánkhya does not go so far: though it allows both
the perceptions of sense and the deductions of reason.
In respect to the mode in which perceptions are ac-
170
PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
quired both systems hold curious theories. The Nyáya
considers that objects are beheld by means of rays of
light which proceed to them from the eye. The Sán-
khya or Yóga* holds that in perception the “mind”
moulds itself to the shape of the object perceived : just
as water, pouring from a reservoir, takes the shape of
the vessels into which it runs. In the case of wrong
notions, the shape is taken incorrectly or partially.
We have already noticed the Sánkhya description of
the first rise of intelligence and consciousness, and ob-
served how it attributes the production of intelligence
to primeval “nature;" not to soul on its junction with
nature. When the occasion arises, one or the other
must produce it: and as Kopila wished to show that
nature was the great agent, he attributed the result to
that cause.
13. The peculiar meaning attached by all the systems
to the term “mind” (manas) must be specially ob- .
served. It is quite distinct from soul. Both the Nyáya
and Sankhya ascribe to it a distinct origin; in the former
it has an atomic origin. According to the Nyáya, it is
this “mind” which perceives by means of the senses.
Judging from its acts and operations, it is evident that
we must understand by the term, that portion of the
mind which is the sphere of all our conscious acts. The
soul is of immense capacity, receiving and retaining
immense stores of knowledge. This knowledge is within
the soul, out of consciousness: and may be recalled
and employed for use. All things again are perceived
* Yoga Sutras, p. 8.
CHAP. IV.]
171
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS.
originally in consciousness. This sphere of consciousness,
then, in which alone the mind knows what it is doing,
is what is denoted by the term “mind” or manas. The
ancients were of course struck by the fact that with all
its immense knowledge and power of thought, the soul
at any one time knows very little. This sphere of con-
sciousness they seem to have regarded, not as a kind
of portico to the soul, but as a special instrument for
its use, a special faculty of internal perception.
14. The moral feelings are entirely omitted from all
the systems. None of them enter into our notions of jus-
tice, compassion, veracity, love, and gratitude. They say
nothing of the domestic affections, nor of anger and
jealousy, the defensive affections by which our interests
are protected. Conscience is never referred to as a ruling
moral power, probably from the reason, that good and
evil are ascribed to the Supreme rather than to the fault
and folly of men. Nor are the various classes of moral
duties among men, as members of society, or of a family,
or as men in general, discussed. All feeling and desire
are by the various systems reckoned imperfections.
15. The system of caste is decidedly taught in the
Upanishads, the Brahma Sutras, and the Gita: it is im-
plied by all the systems, and referred to in their com-
mentaries. It is said to have originated with the Creator
himself: and each caste is exhorted submissively to per-
form the duties which He has assigned to it.
It must not be forgotten that deities of an inferior
kind, from Brahma downward, are recognized by all
the systems, even by the Sánkhya: but they are chiefly
172
[PART I.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
referred to in the Vedantic authorities, and can plead
Vedic authority for their existence, influence, and power.
16. All the systems agree in assigning to man in
the world a condition of defect and misery. Man is the
victim of desires he cannot accomplish, of efforts by
which he gains nothing, and of illusions by which he is
led astray. All agree that transmigration, which we
have mentioned above, is the result of these illusions,
and in many cases is the means of securing purification
and progress in the path of improvement. The systems
differ as to the character of the greater errors.
The
Sánkhya and Nyáya consider it to be error respecting
the nature and relations of soul and matter: the Vedanta,
error respecting the identity of the soul and universe
with Brahma. All are confused as to the real nature
of sin: making it rather an intellectual fault, than a
moral one, and, naturally, defining right and wrong
actions by the notions and practices prevalent in Hindu
society, and in connection with the Hindu religion.
Sacrifices and idolatrous worship are reckoned among
the minor works by which the soul is raised from its
illusions, gloom and misery.
Finally here, the source of these errors and of the evil
dispositions by which they are produced is traced up by
the Sánkhya and Vedánt to the Supreme or to Nature;
and the germ of all the evil is said to have originated and
to have been imparted to individual souls and minds, at
the time when they were produced or developed. This is
the way in which almost all Eastern philosophy accounts
for the origin of evil: exhibited though it be in various
CHAP. IV.]
173
COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS. .
forms, physical and moral. In the same way all the
material of the universe is by both systems said to be
endowed, if not composed of, elements which cause it to
rise or fall, to lead to happiness, to passion, or to brutal
misery, according to the prevalence of these elements in
their numerous varied proportions.
17. With these views, all the systems agree in de-
claring it to be the chief end of man, that is, of the birth
with which souls are most frequently endowed, to seek
freedom from his errors and delusions; thereby to avoid
transmigrations, and to secure perfect immunity from
them, by obtaining liberation. In the Sánkhya and
Nyáya, this liberation is merely the separation of soul
from matter, which has occasioned its varied troubles.
In the case of the Vedant, it means utter annihilation of
independent existence by absorption into the Supreme
Brahma.
Such are the general views of the great systems of
Hindu philosophy on the chief subjects connected with
the universe, its elements and its aims. Such are their
theories concerning the origin of man, the causes of his
misery, and the course he must adopt to secure eman-
cipation. Such too are their views of the worlds to
which he is going, and of the lot which awaits him
there. In comparing them together, we have merely
indicated the views of each in very few words, leaving
the reader to complete the comparison by examining each
point in the chapters already laid before him, descrip-
tive of each system in detail. The comparison shows
how much similarity there exists between the systems
174
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART I.
in the facts received; how much they allow in common;
and how they differ rather in the ultimate reasons of
things, than in the intermediate details. While the
Vedánta makes all Brahma; the Sánkhya, Nature with-
out God; and the Nyáya gives us an omnipotent God,
with souls and atoms as his original materials; the
systems formed comprise very much the same elements
and take the same Hindu shape. It would have been
interesting here to trace out the great similarity be-
tween many of the tenets of Greek philosophy and
those of the Hindu systems: and to show also the rela-
tion which these systems bear to the theories of the
universe which have been formed in modern Europe;
but we must hasten on to the principal object of this
essay, a statement of their chief errors, and a discus-
sion respecting them.
PART II.
The Chief Religious Errors of these Systems.
From the earliest dawn of philosophy to the present
time the inquiries of philosophers have been naturally
directed to the circumstances of the sphere in which
they live. The world on which we stand, the sky
above our heads, the animal and vegetable products
which so much contribute to our preservation and our
enjoyment, in respect to their classes, their uses, and
their origin, have furnished abundant materials for the
consideration of the most thoughtful mind. Had the
method of inquiry been as broad as the principles of
inquiry were sometimes sound, the truth of these things
would have been reached at a much earlier period in
the world's history than it was in fact discovered: but
theories, hypotheses, and speculations, too often drew
off the attention of philosophers from the true sphere
of science, the knowledge of existing facts, and led
them away into the regions of imagination, while their
contradictory conclusions served only to bring their
176
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. [PART II.
systems generally into contempt with the vulgar. In
numberless cases did they turn aside to study the
nature of matter, the constitution of the universe, the
primary elements of things; and forming but narrow
and hasty generalizations, deduced conclusions which
experience has falsified. Both in Greece and India the
same classes of objects have been examined, and in
numerous instances similar results have been attained :
the same continue to occupy the attention of modern
science; and as the boundaries of human knowledge
have been more clearly defined, it has become evident
that while we may hope to attain a complete knowledge
of the phenomena of the universe, there are points con-
nected with its substance which we never can know;
and topics of research into which the mind can never
hope to enter. We have already seen that the Hindu
philosophy in its results has in some cases attained to
truth, which experience has subsequently confirmed:
while in other, most important, instances, it has gone
into manifest error. The errors however are not all
of one kind or character. Some are more vital than
others; some are positively trivial. It must be noticed
however that they are not introduced incidentally, as
expressive of the notions of their day; but are all
taught with AUTHORITY; and that such as are advocated
in the Upanishads, appear to the Hindu mind invested
with the solemn and unanswerable authority of the
ancient and venerable Vedas themselves. All the sys-
tems are declared to be true; all profess to lead their
students to that great object of human life, the attain-
PART 11.]
MINOR ERRORS.
177
ment of final beatitude. Though some of these errors
therefore are trivial, others important; though some are
in their nature scientific, and others are purely religious,
they all derive strength from the authority ascribed
their standard text-books: and therefore may all be
referred to in controversy with the Hindus, as furnish-
ing important illustrations of the emptiness of their
claim to be considered the productions and instructions
of inspired men. If the Vedas teach directly that all
material products have sprung from the five elements,
which are no elements at all, can those Vedas be the
inspired word of Him who created all things ? A few
of the minor errors may be enumerated and at once
dismissed.
MINOR ERRORS.
1. The Divisions of the Universe.—The Vedant autho-
rities distinctly advocate the existence of fourteen worlds,
seven upper, and seven lower worlds. The
upper
in-
clude the dwellings of Brahmá ; of Bhrigu and other
Munis; of the sons of Brahmá; of the Pitris; of Indra;
and of the Supreme himself. Amongst the subdivisions,
the sun is declared to lie much nearer to the earth than
the moon: while the region of lightning is placed be-
yond both. The same theory is taught by the Chhan-
dogya and Mundaka Upanishads. Lightning comes
from a place more distant than the moon: the moon
lies farther from the earth than the sun.
Rain comes
from the moon: and after falling and being evaporated,
returns to the moon again. The moon at the conjunc-
N
178
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
as
tion disappears within the sun, and from him is pro-
duced again.
2. The five elements.-Chemical analysis was
thoroughly unknown to the Hindus as it was to the
Greeks: and considering the importance of the most
prominent objects in the universe, they (like the Greeks)
attributed the origin of all substances to five primary
elements ; earth, air, light or heat, water, and ether :
ether being added, to account for the origin of sound.
This is the doctrine of the Upanishads,* and has been
received without suspicion by all the schools of philo-
soplıy. The Sankhya teaches that the five gross ele-
ments are derived from five more subtle elements of the
same kind: and the Nyáya refers four out of the same
eleinents to their original atomic forms. In respect to
the qualities of these elements, it may be observed that
fluidity is ascribed to earth : and the organ which cog-
nizes it is not touch but smell. Water is declared to
have colour, taste, and viscidity: although the purest
water has neither colour, taste, nor smell. Light is
reckoned only of a white colour: its fluidity is not in-
nate, but derived from some unknown cause. Gold is
one of its products. In the perception of objects rays
go from the eye, not towards it. Ether is the cause of
sound; a portion of it abides in the ear itself, without
which no sound would be perceptible.
3. In regard to the constitution of man several sin-
gular theories are taught. One contained in the Katha
* Aitureyú Upanishad : Dr. Roer's, p. 33. Colebrooke on the Vedas,
· P. 29.
PART II.]
179
MINOR ERRORS.
Upanishad is that respecting the susamná artery. “A
hundred and one arteries issue from the heart, and the
chief among them proceeds through the brain.” This
is the artery by which the soul passes from the heart
at death, to the joint in the skull, whence it leaves the
body and travels to the upper worlds.
The theory of sleep and dreaming contains the strange
notion that in deep sleep the soul of man becomes for a
time reunited to Brahma. “ When a sleeper sees no
dreams; speech goes into the mind : the eye also, with
all its forms, and the ear with all its sounds: when he
wakes, they return again, as sparks come forth from
blazing fire.” This is the doctrine of the Chhandogya
and of the Brahma Sutras.
The theory of digestion advocated in the Sutras is
equally curious.
" When nourishment is received into
the corporeal frame it undergoes a threefold distribution
according to its fineness or coarseness. Corn and other
terrene food become flesh: their finer portions nourish
the mental organ. Water is converted into blood, the
coarser particles are rejected; the finer support the
breath. Oil and butter become marrow: their finer
portions supply the faculty of speech : their coarser
parts become bone."
Other errors might be pointed out: but these will
suffice to show in how many ways, and in connection
with how many topics, objections may be brought
against the sufficiency, excellence and inspiration of
the Upanishads and other authorities of these systems
as teachers of religious truth.
N 2
180
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
We now proceed to consider the more important re-
ligious errors of these systems. Some appear, perhaps,
to be more scientific than religious in their character:
but it will ultimately be found that every one has a
thoroughly religious bearing. We shall state them in
the following order :-
1. The Sánkhya denial of the existence of God.
2. God is identical with matter. Vedánta.
3. God is identical with the human soul. Vedánta.
4. Matter is eternal in man. Sankhya.
5. Matter is eternal as atoms. Nyáya and Vaise-
shika.
6. Soul is eternal. Nyáya and Sankhya: Vedant
also.
7. The doctrine of transmigration. All the systems,
8. The doctrine of fate: that the dispositions of men
are decreed. Vedánta and Sankhya.
9. The nature of virtue and vice.
10. The chief end of man.
In giving a clear account of these great errors, it will
be well to exhibit, as fully as possible, the evidence of
their existence, with the arguments and illustrations by
which they are defended; to quote the ost important
texts, and exhibit the doctrines in the very words in
which they have been long taught.
PART II.]
181
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
§ 1.—THE SÁNKHYA DENIAL OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
The important dogma of the Sánkhya philosophy
that there is no God, self-existent from eternity, is
found most clearly stated in the Sutras of Kopila. It
is laid down not as a separate and distinct dogma arising
independently out of the scheme of the philosophy, but
is introduced indirectly whilst the sage is treating of
another subject. After discussing the means by which
liberation may be secured, and showing that the Vedic
scripture concurs in the doctrine which he has just
deduced from reason ;-viz., that liberation is obtained
not by ritual observances, but by discriminating soul
from nature (the great doctrine of the system); Kopila
proceeds to examine the means of proof. (Sutr. 88.)
After defining perception as that discernment which,
being in conjunction with the thing perceived, portrays
the form thereof, he meets various objections. Among
them appears the following :-“Your definition does
not extend to the perceptions of God, Iswara ;” because
as these are from everlasting, they cannot result from
conjunction with objects subsequently created. He
answers the objection by the bold statement:
Sutra 93. Iswarásiddhoh. “ The existence of Iswara
is a thing unproved."
In this Sutra, he does not directly deny such an ex-
istence. He might have urged that the perceptions of
Iswara are fond the sphere of human explanation :
or questioned whether Iswara had perceptions at all,
instead of intuitions; or argued that though they are
182
[PART 11.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
not included in the definition, they may still be similar
in kind: but instead of proffering any such reply, he
rather questions the existence of such a person at all,
and begins by saying that his existence has not been
proved.* But he does not leave the matter here. An
objector will naturally say that the Vedas prove that
existence, and assert it with divine authority. He then
offers in reply the following dilemma, and expounds
it:- :-
Sutra 94. “ Of free and bound, He cannot be either,
and therefore cannot exist."
He can neither be free from trouble † (such as mundane
creatures suffer), nor bound through troubles.
For:
Sutra 95. “Either way he would be inefficient.”
If he were free from such troubles, he would have no
desires which could instigate him to create : desires
being reckoned a class of those troubles. If he were
bound, he would be under illusion. In either case he
would be ineffective: he could not create. The present
universe could not therefore have sprung from him, and
there is no proof of his existence.
The objector then urges against this reasoning the
question: If there be no God, what is the meaning of
the texts in the Vedas which speak of the Lord or God?
He answers :
* The modern system of Secularism professes to occupy just this
position of Kopila’s. It does not dogmatically assert that there is no
God, and then advance arguments to prove the negative; but it takes
up the sceptical position of doubting the sufficiency of that evidence
which is offered in proof of His existence.
† See Yoga Sutras, part i. p. 29. Sutra 24.
PART II.] CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
183
Sutra 96. “ Muktátmanah prasansá, upásá siddhasya
bá."
These texts are either “ glorifications of the liberated
soul, or are homages of the recognized deities." He
allows the three great deities a secondary immortality,
since soul is eternal. In respect to this attribute, it
is glorified under the title of Lord.
His own explanation of the work of first producing
the present forms of things from the original matter and
from original soul is the following:
Sutra 97. “Soul governs nature, not from a resolu-
tion to create, but from its proximity; as the load-
stone acts on iron."
There is a kind of chemical affinity between them.
Just as the loadstone acts on iron, when lying near it,
so when soul is brought into proximity to nature, nature
becomes mahat, or intelligence. In this way alone can
we talk of its “creating.” One of the Puránas says
the same thing in the same words. Soul therefore,
though apparently an agent, is really not an agent. It
has no will to be such: it exerts its power only through
attraction. A last objection is then offered: If there
be no eternal Lord, will not the Vedas cease to be of
any authority? He replies :
Sutra 99. “ The declaration of the texts of the Vedas
by Brahmá, is sufficient authority; since he knows
the truth."
The Sánkhya Kárika gives another argument based
on their theory of causation. It is contained in the
commentary on the 61st sutra, and is as follows: "How
184
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
can beings endowed with qualities' proceed from
Iswara, who is devoid of qualities ? In nature it is seen
that like produces like. From white threads is pro-
duced white cloth: from black threads, black cloth.
The various objects contained in the three worlds are
endowed with qualities, the three gúnas, in various pro-
portions.” How can they have sprung from Iswara,
who does not possess them? On the other hand, Nature
does possess these qualities, and from nature have the
three worlds, endowed with these qualities, been de-
rived. Iswara therefore is rejected.
The explanation which Kopila gives of the mode
and cause of creation will be described in the next
chapter, in the dialogue on the subject.
§ 2.-" THE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS BRAHMA."— Vedúnta.
In describing the Vedantic system, it was observed
that the texts which exhibit the relation of Brahma to
the universe are very numerous, and that to an unpre-
judiced mind their doctrine on the subject must appear
perfectly clear. Brahma is in several passages declared
to be the creator and sustainer of the universe: upon
whom 66
are woven and sewn the heavens, the earth
and the transparent region between them.” But the
connection between them is far closer than this. All
the authorities from the Upanishads to the Vedanta
Sar exhibit him as the substantial, as well as the effi-
cient cause of all things; in other words they teach
that their base and substance are identical with his own.
PART II.] CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
185
This doctrine appears in three classes of passages : first,
those which very strongly imply it; secondly, those
which directly assert it; and thirdly, those which illus-
trate it by numerous examples and defend it in answer
to objections.
1. Numerous texts imply that Brahma is the sub-
stance of all things, by asserting that he pervades them:
and in order to avoid all doubt, they assert the fact not
only concerning the universe in general, but in respect
to its individual parts, both great and small. The
epithets most commonly used are sarvvagatam, sarvva-
byápi, bibhúmá, and antarátmá : i. e. “ moving in all ;'
"
“ all-pervading,” “ internal,” “internal spirit.” In the
Mundaka and Katha, he is several times described as
sarvvabhútantarátmá, "the internal spirit of all that is.”
“ This spirit is everywhere. He is in the heavens; he
is in the wind: he is Agni; he is in the earth; he is
the soma-juice; he is in the pitcher of the sacrifice;
he is in men; he is in the gods; he is in the ether; he
is the productions of water; he is the productions of
earth; he is Om; he is the productions of mountains
(the rivers); he is unchangeable and vast.” (Katha,
v. 2.) “ He is the ear of the ear; the mind of the
mind; the speech of speech; the life of life; the
eye of the eye." (Tal. 2.) “ As the spokes of a
carriage wheel are to its nave; and as the arteries
are to the heart; so are all the operations of mind to
him who dwells within.
He dwells in all space.
He pervades the mind, and rules over life and body; he
is in the body close to the heart.” (Mund.) “ This
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[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
divine being is on all sides. He was in beings of
former times. He is in beings now in the womb. He
was in beings that have been produced. He is in
things that are being produced. He dwells in every
living thing: he has all things for his face.
The perfect one with a thousand heads, a thousand eyes,
and a thousand feet, pervades the earth and the illimit-
able universe.” (Swet. ii. 16, iii. 14.) “On me is
the universe suspended, like pearls upon a string.”
(Gita, vii.)
2. A more important class of passages state the doc-
trine in direct terms. The most celebrated text is in
the Chhandogya Upanishad, and is as follows: “ All the
universe is Brahma; from him it springs; into him it
is dissolved; in him it breathes : so meditate thou with
a calm mind.” (iii. 14.) Others are of the same cha-
racter; and exhibit the doctrine in its application to the
particular objects of the universe. - This divinity is
fire; he is the sun; he is the wind; he is the moon.
This divinity is the brilliant (stars): he is Brahma; he
is water; he is the Lord of all creatures. Thou art,
woman; thou art man; thou art the youth ; thou art
the maiden; thou art the old man with his staff; thou
art all things born; thou hast the universe for thy
face. The bee with dark plumage art thou: the green
bird with ruby eye; the cloud, the womb of the light-
ning; the seasons; the sea. Thou art the universe
and all things produced in it.” (Swet. iv. 2, 3, 4.)
When Bhrigu, the offspring of Varuna, approached his
father, saying: “ Venerable father, make known to me
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187
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
Brahma ;" Varunk in reply enumerated several objects,
and instructed him to meditate upon each one: giving
for his guidance the following principle applicable to
them all. “That whence all beings are produced ; that
by which, when born, they live; that towards which
they tend; and that into which they pass; do thou
seek for: that is BRAHMA." He meditated accord-
ingly in devout contemplation; and having thought pro-
foundly, recognized food or body to be Brahm. Again
he discovered breath, intellect, and felicity to be
Brahm. Such is the science taught by Varuná. (Taitt.)
Another important extract from the oldest authorities,
the Upanishads, is the following from the Aitareya :
- This soul is Brahma : he is Indra ; he is Prajápati;
these gods are he; and so are the five primary ele-
ments :
whatever lives, or walks, or flies,
or what is immoveable ; ALL THAT is the eye of intel-
ligence
Intelligence is Brahma, the great
one."
All the Vedantic authorities concur in these views,
and contain numerous statements, expressed in noble
language, to enforce the doctrine. It will be sufficient
to select only one or two from each. The Sutras say
(i. 4. 23): “Brahma is also the substance (prakriti) of
the universe ; for so the propositions in the Vedas, and
their illustrations, require. The reference to his desire*
to create, leads to the same conclusion." “Nothing
exists, except him; although different texts of the Vedas
seem to imply the contrary” (iii. 2. 29). The Bhagavat
* Mentioned, at length, in the Brihad Aranyaka.
>>
188
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Gita contains many verses of the same kind. “Brahma
is the offering : Brahma is the sacrificial butter :
Brahma is the fire of the altar; by Brahma is the
sacrifice performed” (iv.)
- There is nothing, says
Krishna, greater than I. I am savour in the water :
light in the sun and moon: Om in the Vedás: sound in
the ether: sweet smell in the earth: I am brightness
in the flame: in all beings I am life” (vii.) Amongst
other things, the Vedánta Sár speaks thus : “ There is
no difference between the Supreme Ruler and indi-
vidual intelligences: as there is none between a forest
and the trees; and between water as one thing, and
water as many waters."
The various passages which teach the absorption into
Brahma of either the human soul or the elements of
the universe are based upon the same doctrine of iden-
tity in the nature of the two. “ In him this world is
absorbed : from him it issues; in creatures he is twined
and woven with various forms of existence."
“ Recog-
nizing heaven, earth, and sky to be him: knowing the
worlds, discovering space and the solar orb to be the
same: he views that being; he BECOMES that being;
and is identified with him, on completing the broad web.
of the solemn sacrifice.” (Yajur Veda.)
To these might be added a long extract from the
Brihad Aranyaka, in which the process of creation is
described fully, and in particular terms. It is there
shown that he himself became each separate class of
beings; and that for the purpose of increasing their
numbers, he divided himself into male and female.
PART II.]
189
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
Thus did he create from himself “every living pair
whatsoever, down to the ants !"
3. The third class of passages which teach this pan-
theistic doctrine, contain illustrations by which the
method of production is exhibited. In other cases, the
doctrine is taught dogmatically and on authority. These
illustrations show the arguments and reasonings by
which it is defended against those who impugn it. For
greater distinctness the illustrations are numbered.
(1. 2. 3.) The process of creation and destruction is
compared to the work of the spider; to vegetation; and
the economy of the human body. "(1) As the spider
spins and gathers back its thread; (2) as plants sprout
on the earth; (3) and as hairs grow on a living person ;
so is this universe produced from the imperishable
Brahma." (Mund. i. 7.)
(4.) A similar example is shown in the silkworm.
“ Like the silkworm, the one God has, from his own
nature, encased himself in the universe with
many
threads, sprung from primeval ‘nature.'” (Swet. vi. 10.)
(5.) The sparks of fire show the same.
thousand sparks are emitted from blazing fire; so,
beloved, all kinds of beings proceed from that Supreme,
and to him again they return.
(6.) He is again compared to the banyan-tree. “This
universe is like an eternal banyan-tree, whose root is
on high and whose branches are below. He is Brahma."
(Katha, vi. 1.)
4. The doctrine is further exhibited, especially in the
Sutras and in Sankara Acharjyá's commentary, by the
66 As a
190
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
a.
attempts to answer the objections brought against it.
The Sutras themselves notice the Sankhya doctrine of
the “ plastic nature,” from which everything has been
formed; and endeavour to disprove it by showing that
the Deity himself is the Substantial cause, and that no
other material is required. Sankar also discusses other
objections.
“ How can this universe (it is asked), which is
manifold, void of life, impure and irrational, proceed
from him who is one, living, pure, and rational ?" He
answers: “ The lifeless world can proceed from Brahma,
just as lifeless hair can spring from a living man.”
b. “But in the universe we find him who enjoys and
him who is enjoyed: how can he be both ?” Answer
(Illustration 7): “Such are the changes of the sea.
Foam, waves, billows, bubbles, are not different from
the sea which is in its native waters. Still a difference
is perceived in them by turns, and an activity which
agrees with their mutual union. Nor, though they are
identical with the sea, do they obtain the condition of
each other: nor does the difference follow from the
nature of the sea, if they do not obtain these conditions
by turns. In the same way, he who enjoys and he
who is enjoyed do not by turns gain each other's
conditions, nor are they different from the Supreme
Brahma."
c. Again he says: “There is no difference between
the universe and Brahma. The effect is not different
from its cause.
He is the soul : the soul is he.
(Illust. 8.) The same earth produces diamonds, rock-
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191
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
crystal, and vermillion. (9.) The same sun produces
many kinds of plants. (10.) The same nourishment
is converted into hair, nails, and so on. (11.) As milk
is changed into curds, and water to ice, so is Brahma
variously transformed without external aids. (1.) So
the spider spins its web from its own substance: (12)
spirits assume various shapes : (13) cranes propagate
without males: (14) the lotus grows from swamp to
swamp without organs of locomotion."
Now all these illustrations, whether given to teach
or to defend the doctrine, point to a single fact, that
the creation is of the same substance and material as
its divine author. They show not merely that the
universe has an author, and that he is Brahma, but that
the nature of the one is identical with that of the other;
and that the sole difference is one of form. This is
Pantheism.
It is a fair deduction from the doctrine to ask, whether
by this creation, the amount of substance in Brahma is
diminished : it appears to be taken from him and, it is
said, will return and be absorbed into him again. How
much of Brahma's substance then is contained in the
whole creation: a part only; or the whole? The usual
authorities seem to have avoided this subject; but the
Vedas acknowledge the justice of the question, and
one or two of the later texts furnish an answer.
“ All creatures are ONE-TOURTI of him: three-fourths
are immortal in the divine abode.” This one-fourth is
again broken up into four: and each of these into four
again: (just as a rupee is broken up into sixpences;
192
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
each sixpence into four separate annas; and each anna
into four pice.) The different portions are specified in
the Chhandogya Upanishad, and it is declared that
Brahma is divided into sixteen minor parts. In the
Yajur Veda occurs the following passage, in which the
whole doctrine is briefly stated; and with it, therefore,
this account of it may be concluded : “ The embodied
spirit which hath' a thousand heads, a thousand eyes,
a thousand feet, stands in the human breast, while he
totally pervades the earth. That being is this universe,
and all that has been or will be.
The ele-
pents of the universe are one portion of him, and three-
fourths of him are immortality in beaven.” (Yajúr
Veda. As. Res. vii. 251.)
In the western world it is acknowledged that most of
the ancient philosophers, both Greek and Roman, held
in some measure to the notion that the universe had
sprung from Jupiter : the general indefinite notion re-
ceiving particular applications by different teachers, in
different schools. Amongst all their writings, the Orphic
hymns seem to come nearest in the doctrines they lay
down to the theory just developed from the texts of the
Upanishads. These hymns assert, like the Upanishads,
a clear identity between Zeus, the Supreme Ruler, and
the universe at large. They employ, singularly enough,
in some cases the same expressions as the Upanishads;
and illustrate the doctrine by applying it in the same
way to the details of the creation and the objects of
which it is composed. The following passages will
show this : “ Together with the universe were made,
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193
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
within Zeus, the height of the ethereal heaven; the
breadth of the earth and sea; the great ocean, the pro-
found Tartarus; the rivers and fountains, and all other
things; all the happy immortal gods and goddesses
whatsoever hath been or shall be, was at once produced
in the womb of Zeus.” The resemblance of the follow-
ing passage to texts in the Gíta, and in the Mundaka,
and Aitareya will be self-evident: “ Zeus was the first,
and Zeus the last, the mighty thunderer: Zeus is the
head; Zeus, the centre: from Zeus have all things been
made. Zeus was a man; and Zeus, an immortal maid:
Zeus is the profundity of the earth and of the starry
sky: Zeus is the breath of all things : Zeus is the force
of the untameable fire: Zeus is the bed of the ocean :
Zeus is the sun and moon: Zeus is King: Zeus himself
is the originator of all things. There is one power,
and one God, and one mighty ruler of all.” Timotheus
represents the Orphic doctrine thus: “ All things were
made by God, and he himself is all things.”
66 There is
none other beside the mighty King,” say the hymns
again. “ Heaven is his head; the sun his eyes: the
regions of air his arms, shoulders and breast; the earth
and mountains his belly.” “God passes through and
pervades all things.” “In the mighty body of Zeus do
all things lie.” Virgil describes the same doctrine, in
the celebrated passage of the sixth Æneid; and the
system was revived in great force in the schools of
Alexandria by Ammonius and Plotinus under the name
of Neo-Platonism.
Pantheism may be believed and advocated under
o
194
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
many forms. There is the poetic pantheism, which
fires the imagination with highly-strained descriptions
of the divine origin of the universe and the soul. Akin
to this is the indefinite pantheism, which grandiloquently
worships heroes as divine, descants on the greatness of
the soul, the divine harmony of its powers, calls on it to
awake to its divine destiny, and display its godlike in-
ternal light. “Standing on the ground, my head bathed
with the blithe air, and uplifted into infinite 'space, all
mean egotism * vanishes; the currents of the universal
being circulate through me; I am part or particle of
God.” (Emerson.) There is again the philosophical
pantheism which in modern times has been developed in
various systems of metaphysics on the Continent of
Europe. These systems are by no means identical
with the Vedanta, nor do they render us much assist-
ance in comprehending all its different consequences.
Spinoza identifies God with the substratum of the uni-
verse; which is the only real, eternal self-existent
Being : possessing the attributes of extension and
thought; and developed in the two modes of body and
soul. Schelling makes God the sole subject in the
universe. Hegel goes farther, and not merely identi-
fies God with the universe; but makes him the law
and process of creation. God, nature, man, are three
forms of the development: only in man does the self-
developing entity attain consciousness. Cousin declares
that God is everything, and almost in the words of the
Vedánta Sár, denies any difference between the per-
* In Sanskrit, Ahangkára.
PART II.]
195
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
sonality of each part of the universe, and the general
personality of the whole: the individual waves of the
universe being essentially one and the same with Him,
the illimitable sea. All the modern systems, however,
are more or less hampered by the notions and termi-
nology of sound science and true religion : and nowhere
do we find pantheism so clear, so consistent, so com-
plete, and so fairly drawn out to all its legitimate con-
sequences, as in the VIDÁNTA, the earliest system of the
kind.
§ 3.—THE HUMAN SOUL IS BRAHMA.- Vedánta.
It is only a consistent part of the doctrine just stated,
that the human soul, if selected from the various objects
of creation in the world, should, like the rest, be de-
clared identical with the Supreme. The importance of
the dogma, however, is so great, and it may be so fully
examined on independent grounds that it will be found
useful to make a separate statement of the passages in
which it is taught.
One of the most striking modes in which it has been
laid down is in the following illustration in the Brihad
Aranyaka. Yájnyawalkya, discussing with a number of
pundits to whom he proves himself superior, utters these
striking words: “Man is indeed like to a lofty tree: his
hairs are the leaves : and his skin the bark. From his
skin flows blood, like juice from the bark: it issues from
his wounded person as juice from a stricken tree. His
flesh is the inner bark, and the membrane, near the
02
196
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
bones, is the white substance of the wood.
If,
then, a felled tree spring anew from the root, from what
root does mortal man grow again, when hewn down
by death?” He points out that that Roor is Brahma.
“ The soul,” say the Brahma Sutras, “is a portion of
the Supreme Ruler, as a spark is of fire. The relation
between them is not that of master and servant, ruler
and subject, but that of whole and part.” (ii. 3, 43.)
"The distinction between the living soul and the Su-.
preme Ruler arises from illusion, not from the thing
itself.” In the Aitareyá, a description is given of the
mode in which Brahma entered the human body, in
order to make it his abode. After showing why he
could not have entered by any of the natural openings
of the body, it is said that he entered by the join in the
plates of the skull, descended the susomna artery, and
took up his abode in the heart to which it leads. There
he ever remains; his size, suitable to his dwelling, being
only that of a man's thumb. “ The perfect one, of the
size of a thumb only, abides in the centre of the soul!"
Owing to this high honour conferred upon the body, it
is regarded not as a mere receptacle for a common soul.
It is styled “the city of Brahma” (Brahmapúr): and
its various openings are compared to city-gates. “In
the city of Brahma abides a small water-lily, and in the
centre of the flower is a diminutive ether. As great as
is the external ether; so great is the ether in the midst
of the heart: both are placed there: the sky and the
earth both: . . . all that belongs to him and all that is
not his, everything is placed in it.”
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CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
It will naturally follow, that having such an origin,
the soul must partake of the divine attributes of the
Being, of whom it is a portion. “That soul (says the
Chhandogya) is without faults; without old age: with-
out death; without sorrow; without hunger and thirst;
true in its desires, true in its will.” (viii.) - This soul
of mine in my heart existed before the earth, before the
atmosphere, before the sky, before the worlds.” It is of
course indestructible. “ It is not born, neither does it
die: it has not proceeded from any: nor has it been
changed into any : nor does it perish when the body
dies.” (Mund.) Of the same character is the celebrated
passage in the Bhagavat Gîta ;
" It is not born; it
never dies. It has had no beginning; beginning it will
never have. Unborn, changeless, eternal, it is not to
be slain when its mortal frame is killed. The sword
cannot cleave it. Fire burns it not. Water cannot
wet it: the wind drieth it not away.
For it is indi-
visible, inconsumable, incapable of moisture, and is not
to be dried away. It is constant, capable of going any-
where, immovable, eternal; it is invisible, inconceiv-
able, unalterable.” (ii.)
Little is stated in these extracts beyond the fact of the
identity between the human soul and the divine; and of
its possessing some attributes to which only a divine
being can lay claim. No proofs, and almost no illus-
trations are offered, and consistently enough, all acknow-
ledgment of the existence of duties from man to God,
or from man to his fellows, is entirely omitted.
Pythagoras appears to have held a doctrine very
198
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
similar to that of the Upanishads. Plato also taught
that human souls are emanations from God through the
soul of the world. The stoics held that both body and
soul were portions of the one existence: and Aristotle
seems to have believed something not very different.
Indeed the belief of a divine origin in one mode or other
for human souls seems to have been in Greek philosophy
almost universal.
$ 4.-ORIGINAL MATTER IS ETERNAL IN Mass.—Sánkhya.
The Sánkhya sets out with the assertion that all reali-
ties are included within its TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES. Of
these, soul stands quite apart from the rest, and plays
an independent part. The remaining twenty-four are
reducible to one. Among these twenty-four, sixteen
include the gross elements from which all the various
objects in the three worlds are formed; which are
cognized by the senses of men, and constitute the instru-
ments employed and acted on in their daily experience.
They include the five senses, the five organs of action,
and the manas of man, which are also objects of our
direct personal knowledge. The existence, then, of
these sixteen principles cannot be disputed. The Sánkhya
next asserts that the existence of the gross elements
must be derived from elements of a similar character,
but of a finer description ; for everything which is gross
is formed of something less gross—that is, of something
more subtile. Hence are acquired by inference the
five subtile elements, preceding and producing the five
PART 11.]
199
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
elements which the senses perceive. Such elements,
again, and organs, can only be produced from self-
consciousness; for if that self-consciousness did not
cognize them, how could they be known to exist at all.
Another principle, therefore, is discovered, the producer
of those elements. But self-consciousness cannot stand
alone : it requires a basis, and its basis is intellect.
The assurance felt in self is a function of self-conscious-
ness; but the function of the effect must result from
a function of the cause. Hence intellect is discovered.
But intellect has for its affections, pleasure, pain, and
dulness; and these must be produced from something
which, in itself and from its own constitution, possesses
these qualities. That something Kopila accepts as the
final cause and basis of all that has preceded, and he
terms it PRAKRITI or NATURE. Immediately the cause
of intellect, it is mediately the cause of all products.
Kopila adds that his theory is confirmed by the Vedas ;
which declare that the world arises from nature; and
that it is superior to the atomic theory, because limited
things, like atoms, cannot be the cause of all things:
and he therefore assumes one grand cause.
Soul also, he declares, is uncaused, being neither
producer nor product: both soul and nature, therefore,
are before everything else, and are therefore eternal :
for both are uncaused. Have both then been engaged
in producing ? No. For soul is never modified: while
nature has the capacity of modification, and hence gives
rise to all visible forms of matter in the three worlds.
It is their sole cause. (Sutras, 62–67.)
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[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
The description of nature and its various qualities
occupies considerable space in the Káriká and its com-
mentaries ; but the doctrine may be exhibited in a
small compass. The name Pra-kriti, usually termed
NATURE, denotes “ that which precedes a thing made.”
It is therefore doubly applied : first, and chiefly, to the
Múl-prakriti, the root-matter, which was not created,
and from which other things have mediately sprung;
secondarily, to the material causes of a lower kind,
from which other things are derived. The effects which
follow those causes are termed vi-kriti. Hence intellect
is the vi-kriti of Nature, and the pra-kriti of self-con-
sciousness; the latter is the vikriti of intellect and the
prakriti of the five subtile elements. These elements
are the vikriti of self-consciousness and the prakriti
of the gross elements. The gross elements are merely
the vikriti of the subtile ones. Hence the truth of the
verse that of the twenty-five principles sixteen are only
products (vikriti); seven are both producers and pro-
ducts (prakriti and vikriti). Soul is neither, and nature
is producer alone. From its relation to things univer-
sally, it is also termed pradhána, the chief. Amongst
all things that exist, it occupies the highest place.
The qualities of nature are readily observable when
it is contrasted with its effects. These effects, separated
from their causes, and having an independent existence,
are all products; their present form is but temporary;
they are unpervading, their special inherent properties
being not universally visible, but divided in separate
objects; they are moveable, and change from one body
PART 11.]
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CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
to another; they are multitudinous, being repeated in
various objects and persons; they are supported, resting
on their cause; they are mergent, and become lost in
their original elements ; they are combined, and are
governed by the influence of nature which compels
them to produce certain effects and not others. In
contrast with these things, nature possesses properties
of an opposite kind. It has no cause; it has no end;
it pervades all things; it is immutable; it is single; it
is self-sustained; it is the subject, not the predicate; it is
one whole; it is supreme. While they are visible and
tangible, nature is imperceptible, owing to its subtlety;
but though perception cannot reach it, it is inferred
from its effects. *
The constitution of this primeval cause has also been
described as well as its qualities.
“ Nature," says
Kopila (Sutr. 62), “ is the state of equipoise of good-
ness, passion, and darkness,” the three qualities. Nature
is the triad of qualities, distinct from the products to
which they give rise. These qualities, however, are
not “ qualities,” in the sense of “ properties” of matter;
for they themselves possess such qualities; they have
the qualities of conjunction, disjunction, lightness, force,
and might. “They form "cords' (gúna) by which,"
says the commentator, “the brute-beast (púrusha-pasu),
the soul, is bound.” They are things and substances
of which nature is constituted: just as the trees are the
constituent elements of which a forest is made. The
forest is not different from the trees of which it is
* Kárika, x. xi. vi. pp. 40–48.
202
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
made : so nature is not different from the three quali-
ties, but is the aggregate of them. While in equipoise,
they constitute the original cause of all. As seen in
the various individual objects of the three worlds, they
vary in their proportions; sometimes one predomi-
nating, sometimes another. In the gods, the quality of
goodness predominates : passion in men, in animals,
darkness. It undergoes modification entirely through
its own energy, and for a special reason, in connection
with soul. In this respect, it is like the plastic
nature of the Greek philosophers. The Pythagoreans,
Platonists, and Aristotle, all advocated a primeval
matter, having neither parts nor form, yet the one
universal, incorporeal substance from which all others
were derived. It must be allowed that this composition
of the one original cause is a very weak point in the
Sánkhya system.
The Sánkhya in discovering this principle, traces
back all existing things to it as their origin: in declar-
ing it to be uncaused, the system of course implies it to
be eternal: for otherwise, at any period when it began,
the law of causation would have been broken through,
and the things which now are would have sprung from
nothing. The dogma, however, is directly laid down
by Kopila in the Sutras. Having traced all things to
intellect, and intellect to Prakriti, or Nature, he now
asserts that nature is eternal.
Sutra 68. Múle mulábhávát, amulam múlam.
“ From the want of a root in a root, the root (of all)
PART II.]
203
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
he says:
is rootless." Here the system stops. That root, from
whence spring other things, is rootless. Anticipating
the objection: “Why do you stay there: why not
trace the origin of nature to another cause; and that to
a farther one
Sutra 69. - Even if there be a succession of causes,
there is a halt at some one point; and so it is
merely a name" (given to the final cause).
Whatever be its name, some one thing must at last be
reached which is eternal : that at which we stop is the
Primal-agency, pra-kriti, which, in order to prevent a
regressus ad infinitum, is declared to be the root of all.
Such is the course of Kopilá’s argument for the eternity
of matter.
In view of other objections he takes up the subject
again at a later period. He first teaches that the ex-
istence of nature is learned from beholding her pro-
ducts: and it then being objected, Why trace all to
this Prakriti, and not to atoms,-he replies:
Sutra 114. “Any other cause contradicts the three-
fold aspect of things.”
In other words, all things exhibit the influence of the
three great qualities : and the source from whence they
sprang must possess them too. Pleasure and pain are
not properties of atoms: the atomic theory, therefore,
fails to explain them.
204
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
$ 5.-ORIGINAL MATTER IS ETERNAL AS ATOMS.--
Nyáya.
The eternity of matter is plainly and directly asserted
by the Nyáya and Vaiseshika systems : which divide all
substances into two classes, eternal, and non-eternal
respectively. All objects and products are traced back
to nine substances ;* time, space, soul and mind: ether,
air, earth, fire and water. All the non-eternal sub-
stances included within these are declared to be com-
pounds, and are divided into various classes, objects,
organisms and organs, which are the direct objects of
our perception, whose existence is therefore beyond
doubt, and which we must fully explain. Of the nine
substances, the soul is immaterial, one and eternal.
Time and space are also eternal: they have the pro-
perties of ubiquity and infinity. Space is declared to
be one and eternal. Mind, the sphere of consciousness,
is a thing quite separate from soul. Apart from these,
the remaining substances are five in number, ether, air,
earth, light and water. Of these the ether is described
in terms which all but identify it with space. It fills
space, and must therefore differ from it only in density.
It might have been attributed to an atomic origin, most
consistently with the general theory of the system, but
has not been so: on the contrary, it is declared one, and
undivided. It would appear that the authors of the
Nyáya had attained a more correct knowledge than
* The term is used in Hindu Philosophy, like substantia among the
schoolmen, the unknown substratum of known properties.
PART 11.]
205
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
others of what the ether was, had noticed the weakness
of the arguments by which its existence is proved, and
only did not omit it altogether from their system,
because of its Vedic origin and the fact that it was
received by all other philosophies. Were it omitted
altogether, its place would scarcely be noticed.*
The remaining four substances are distinctly de-
scribed in detail. (Bhasha Parichh. 28-43. Tarka
Sangraha, 10–16.) The properties of each; the organic
bodies compounded from each; their different classes;
and the organ of the human body by which they are
apprehended ; are all systematically, though briefly
stated: and in each case it is declared, that the sub-
stance is twofold, eternal and non-eternal: non-eternal
in its various parts and compounds : eternal in the
atoms to which its objects are ultimately traced. For
instance, respecting earth it is said: “Earth is the [ma-
terial] cause of odours, and is the site of various
colours. It has three kinds of feel: hot, cold and
temperate. It is twofold: eternal and non-eternal:
eternal as considered in its atoms; non-eternal, as
being composed of parts. The latter is threefold, or-
ganism, organ, and object (inorganic matter). Organic
substances are [classed as] viviparous (mammalia), ovi-
parous, engendered in filth, and vegetative. Its organ
is the sense of smell. Its (inorganic) objects are all
compound substances from the smallest, made of two
atoms, to the largest, “the egg of Brahma,” the world.
(35–38.) The same formula is repeated in reference to
* Bhúsha Parichheda, 26, 27.
206
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the qualities and compounds of the other substances.
All aqueous compounds, snow, hail, and rivers; all.
compounds of light, fires and gold; are all said to have
an atomic origin: and their atoms to be eternal.
The definition of an atom is thus given by KANÁDA,
in his Sutras:
Sadakáranabannityam
Ato biparitádandah.
An atom is “something existing, without a cause,
without beginning and end. It is contrary to what has
a measure."
This is explained and applied by the commentator in
the following way: dealing first with the formation of
compounds, and afterwards showing why atoms, con-
fessedly invisible, are believed in at all. The non-eternal
compounds are those which consist of two, three, or
more atoms. Are these atoms visible either separately
or in conjunction ? An objector says: “ Each may be
invisible, yet their totality may be visible; as from a
certain distance the hairs of the head together are
visible, although none of them individually is visible.”
He replies: “ We maintain that each hair is perceived,
because it is more clearly perceived when brought
nearer. You cannot say that from a totality of in-
visible atoms a totality of visible atoms is produced :
visible things are not produced from invisible things.
If one atom is no object of the senses, a totality of atoms
is also beyond their perception.” The objector then
suggests that, from the invisible compound of two atoms,
the production of a (visible) compound of three atoms
PART II.]
207
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
is impossible (the difference being but a single invisible
atom).” He replies: “ This cannot be said: we do not
assert that the visibility or invisibility of a thing arises
from its own nature, but from its necessary causes,
greatness, form, and the like. A compound of three
atoms is visible on account of its greatness, while a
compound of two is not.”
The earthy substances, as a jar, are composed of
parts, each part being a compound of at least two
atoms; and they are non-eternal, for they have had
beginning in their form, and can be destroyed. There
is no difference, except one of degree, between Mount
Meru and a mustard seed, both being compounds of
parts after parts. There is necessarily a retrogression
from compounds to more simple elements. We must,
in this division of parts, come somewhere to an end.
The point where the end is obtained is eternal; other-
wise, that point must have sprung from nothing; and
we must admit the production of an effect from some-
thing which is not its material cause. The continual
progress from one great thing to another still greater
finds its end in the assumption of a sky and other
infinite substances: so must there be ultimately a ces-
sation of the reverse process, the regression from a
small thing to one still smaller. Hence the necessity
of atoms. A compound of three atoms is not the end;
for that has parts, on account of its size : we must go
back to ONE ATOM.
This argument, he adds, does not prove the necessity
of a continuation of parts after parts; because thereby
208
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the regressus ad infinitum (as in the same line of argu-
ment in the Sankhya) would become necessary.
According to Mr. Colebrooke, the argument of
Kanáda is as follows. The mote in a sunbeam is the
smallest perceptible quantity.
It is a substance-an
effect; and is therefore made from something less than
itself. This something is also an effect, and is a sub-
stance. It is composed of something smaller, and that
smaller thing is an atom. It is simple, else the series
would be endless. If so, everything great and small
would contain an infinity of particles; and all would,
therefore, be alike. The first compound consists of two
atomàs. One cannot form a compound, and there is no
argument to prove more than two. The next consists
of three double-atoms. If only two were conjoined,
magnitude would not result; since that can consist only
from the number or size of the particles. It cannot
be size, since they are atoms : it must be number.
There is no argument for four, because three such
double-atoms are sufficient. The atom, then, is equal
to one-sixth of the mote of a sunbeam. Two earthy
atoms, brought together by some cause (the will of
God, time, and the like), make one double-atom. Three
double-atoms equal one tertiary atom. Four tertiary
atoms make one quaternary; and so on. Thus it is by
aggregation that the gross earth is produced. In like
manner, from aqueous atoms come forth, by aggrega-
tion, all watery substances, organs, and organisms. So,
also, from the atoms of light and air, the compounds
classed among them. Pressure and velocity produce a
PART 11.]
209
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
union of the integrant elements. Disjunction separates
them; and as by aggregation substances are formed, so
by disjunction they are broken up, and return inversely
to the original atoms. The qualities of the original
atoms attend them in the compound substances, and it
is from them that the compounds derive the qualities
which they possess.
The atomic theory of the Nyáya resembles much the
theory of Empedocles, who from ultimate atoms first
formed the four elements, and from them constructed
the sun, moon, stars and earth in general. Under
various phases it had many advocates among the ancient
Greeks, as Democritus and Leucippus; but with them
and others it became the ground of an atheistical phi-
losophy, very different from that which the Nyáya has
advocated in connection with a God, whose agency
moulded these atoms into their numerous compound
forms.
$ 6.—THE SOUL IS ETERNAL.—Sánkhya and Nyáya.
All the systems of Hindu philosophy speak of the
soul as something different from the body. Even the
Vedanta, which teaches that, in common with all other
objects in the universe, it is derived from Brahma,
mentions it as a distinct thing, bearing a peculiar
burden, and undergoing the labours of a peculiar history
in order to get free. The Sánkhya and Nyaya are
equally explicit, and each place it amongst the original
and eternal substances which their systems allow. The
P
210
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Sánkhya makes it cognate with the uncaused Prakriti;
and the Nyaya enumerates it among the nine substances
that have had no beginning.
(a.) The existence of soul as something distinct from
nature or matter, is discussed by both systems, and both
prefer arguments to illustrate it.
1. The Sánkhya lays down as its chief argument:
that an assemblage of things is for another's use
(Sutr. 67): as a house is for a tenant; a couch for a
person to lie on; a seat, to sit upon. Now Nature,
Intellect and Self-consciousness, are a combination,
developing subtile elements, and thence producing
worlds and a body: all are intended for the mundane
experiences and the eventual liberation of something
different from themselves. That something, for whose
use they are thus intended, and which is different
froin them all, is Purusha or Soul. Here the Sản-
khya employs the argument from design.
2. Again soul is distinct from body and from nature,
for it does not possess the three qualities, by which they
are marked in all their forms. (Sutra 142.)
3. Besides, it superintends nature. (143.)
4. It is also the enjoyer of everything. (144.)
5. It is only for soul that all this system which is to
secure liberation is intended. It cannot be for nature:
for soul then it must be.
The Nyáya in illustrating the same subject adduces
additional arguments, which are considerably more to
the point than some of Kopila's.
1. It is the soul which governs body. For an organ
PART 11.]
211
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
must have an agent as its master. (Bhasha Parichh.
Sutra 47.) Now body itself is not the agent. For
consciousness, which an agent possesses, is not in the
body. This is known from the fact that consciousness
disappears at death : also that in old age the body can-
not (from being frequently changed) remember (as a
man does) things which occurred in childhood. Again
the “ mind” is not the agent: for it is an atom: and no
perception could take place in it, if knowledge and the
like were placed within it: its power being limited to
the immediate object of thought.
2. The soul is again distinguished by its peculiar
qualities. (Sutra 49.) It enjoys happiness and suffers
misery: they are not in the body : else would one body
experience the fruit of works which were done in
another (in a former birth).
3. It is known also from its activity, and from the
exertions it makes in respect to knowledge and desire:
just as a charioteer is implied by a carriage in motion.
4. It is the site of intellect; and of perception and
remembrance, which intellect includes.
(6.) In respect to the nature of soul, the Sánkhya
(Sutra 146) states: “Since light does not pertain to the
unintelligent, it must pertain to the essence of soul:
which while self-manifesting, manifests also whatever
else is perceptible.” The Sánkhya adds in respect to its
attributes, that the soul is without qualities, otherwise it
could not be liberated. “There cannot be liberation
where there is alteration: and alteration must take
place where there are qualities and susceptibilities.
P 2
212
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Hence intelligence is considered, not one of its qualities
or products, but is set down as an effect of nature. The
soul is ever free: it is a witness by means of its senses
and is inactive with respect to pleasure and pain. This
theory is very unsatisfactory; being greatly hampereçl
by the notion of “ Qualities” peculiar to Hindus. The
Nyáya says little about the qualities of soul: but it
teaches more than either of the other systems about its
operations. Intellect is one of its qualities : in this are in-
cluded apprehension and remembrance. Apprehension
again includes, perception of the senses and inferences
of the judgment. It has also merit and demerit: desire and
aversion: volition and imagination: pleasure and pain.
(c.) It is important to notice that both the Nyáya
and Sankhya advocate the important doctrine of the
multitudinousness of souls; thereby separating them en-
tirely from the Deity and from the Vedánt doctrine of
their unity with him. The Sánkhya advocates it on this
ground. At the same moment, a variety of accidents
is happening to different persons: birth to some: death
to others: and that without affecting all. It is absurd
then, argues Kopil, to think that souls can be one: and
that these contradictory affections can be happening at
the same time to a monad. He therefore teaches that
souls are multitudinous : each person of those living
contemporaneously in the world having a different soul.
(Sutra 150.) "From the several allotments of birth
and death, a multiplicity of souls is to be inferred.”
He tries also to show that this is the doctrine of the
Vedas, but of course fails.
PART 11.] CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
213
(d.) Both systems finally assert that the soul is
eternal. The Nyáya attributes to soul the qualities
of ubiquity and infinity: and from its being infinite
deduces the fact that it is eternal. The Sankhya
reckons it equally with nature, an undiscrete principle,
invisible: and ascribes to it the attributes of being
uncaused, all-pervading, self-supporting, and the like.
Only these two principles really exist : and it is for the
purpose of securing liberation for soul that nature un-
dergoes all the modifications to which it is now subject.
$ 7.-THE TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
The doctrine of the transmigration of souls is not
merely taught directly and indirectly by these systems
of Hindu philosophy: it is the very basis upon which
they all rest. Its evils are at once assumed to be real ;
they are acknowledged without question ; the necessity
of getting free is allowed; means are pointed out for
securing that liberation; each systein propounds its
own plan, and promises all faithful followers that spe-
cial blessing as the result of their studies; the systems
are constructed so as to meet it; and all scholars and
disciples are exhorted to employ with vigour the means
of liberation placed at their command. The systems
are not, however, all alike in their treatment of the
subject. The Vedánta often mentions it, implies it
throughout, and repeatedly assures its followers that
those who embrace its doctrine in the highest form,
will at death escape all transmigration, by absorption
214
HINDU PHILOSOPHY, [PART II.
into the Supreme. The Nyáya does little more than
allude to it, and state its own purpose to free men from
the evil. The Sánkhya, however, enters much more
into detail, and provides materials for a complete dis-
cussion of the interesting question.
(a.) The fact of transmigration none dispute: it is
unanimously allowed, though the mode in which it
becomes an essential element in man's lot is differently
explained. The Veđánta furnishes numberless texts in
all its authorities. “Man is like a blade of corn: he
rots away: but like the corn sprouts forth again.”
(Katha.) “ He who is without knowledge, who is
of fickle mind, and ever impure, obtains not the
Supreme glory, but goes again into the world.” “ If
before death, the soul obtains a knowledge of Brahma,
it is freed from worldly bonds; but if not, it assumes a
body again in these created worlds.” (Katha.) “ As a
man casts off his old garments and puts on new ones,
so the soul, having quitted its old mortal frame, enters
into another which is new.” (Gita.) “By knowing the
truth," says Gautum,“ in regard to the sixteen objects
of knowledge, beatitude (nisreyasa) is attained. This
beatitude is secured by the successive annihilation of
men's false notions, evil desires, and the births to which
they give rise.” (Sutr. 1 and 2.) “ Transmigration,"
he says, “is the being born again and again :" the same
soul entering into different bodies. (Sutr. 19.)
Sutra 22.- Tadatyantabimokshopavargah.
“ Complete deliverance from that is emancipation.”
The first sixty Sutras in Kopilá's First Book are occu-
PART II.]
215
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
pied with developing the fact of these migrations of the
soul; of the bondage in which it is held, and the causes
which have produced it. Then taking up other causes
which are falsely alleged as true ones, he refutes them
and sets them aside. (Sutra 1.)
Atha tribidhadukhátyantanibrittiratyantapurushártha.
“ Well! the complete cessation of pain which is of
three kinds is the complete end of man.” He then
shows that this cessation is not to be secured by visible
means, because the evil comes back. Nor can it be
done by the repeated use of ordinary means; for they
are not always attainable, nor are they perfect in their
kind. Besides the Vedas speak of liberation, not as a
trifling matter, but as one of the highest importance.
Is this bondage essential or is it accidental ? It is
accidental. If it were essential, there would be no fit-
ness in enjoining means for liberation. It is not essen-
tial as heat is to fire. What is then the real cause ?
Kopila supposes and refutes several in succession. Time
does not cause bondage: for it is eternal: and would in-
volve every soul, even the emancipated. Neither does
it arise from place, for the same reason. Nor do the
circumstances of our condition produce it, for they be-
long to the body, and the soul remains solitary. Nor
do the works performed by any one cause bondage, for
they belong to the mind, not the soul. Neither does
nature cause it; for though bondage is occasioned by
the conjunction between soul and nature, that conjunc-
tion must first take place. Neither is the bondage pro-
duced by that conjunction (just as a black jar becomes
216
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
red by heating): for the colour remains when the heat
is gone, and so would the bondage remain, after nature
had separated from soul. The bondage is occasioned
by it: but it is really only verbal: it is only reflected
in the soul; as the red colour of the hibiscus is re-
flected in pure crystal: and ceases to colour the crystal
when the flower is removed.
(6.) In entering upon the details of transmigration
the Kárika states clearly (pp. 48, 49) two important
principles, which the theory implies, and which are
essential to its completeness. First: that it is the same
individual soul which undergoes many changes of body,
and enters one body after another in the course of its
history.
Ekah purusho jayate náparah.
“ ONE soul, and not another is born” (in a regene-
rated body).
“ There may be various unions of one
soul, according to difference of receptacle: as the ether
may be confined in a variety of vessels.”
Secondly: The Soul itself is not subject to birth or
death. These arise from its connection with body, and
are felt in body: “Life is the combination of soul with
the pains incident to body, not any modification of the
soul itself. Death is the abandonment of those bodies,
not the destruction of soul.” The soul is unchanged,
through all its migrations into various forms, until its
final liberation. It is the disguise which is changed, not
the agent who wears it. (Kar. pp. 69, 70.)
(c.) The Sánkhya thus explains the way in which
soul and nature, the two original and independent prin-
PART II.]
217
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
ciples, come to be joined and act together. Nature is
devoid of sensibility and reflection : it can neither enjoy
nor observe: its existence, therefore, would be without
an object, unless there were some one who could do
both. That other is soul. For the purpose, therefore,
both of contemplation and enjoyment, soul is united to
nature. But then, pain is inseparable from nature:
and soul becomes cognizant of that pain in all its
numerous varieties, by its continued union with nature.
After a time, therefore, it wishes to be freed from the
union: from nature only it can be freed. In this way
they are both employed. The union here resulting is
curiously compared to the association of a lame man
and a blind one, for the accomplishment of a journey.
The lame man can see, while the blind one cannot see,
but can walk. The blind man, therefore, carries the
lame : and the lame guides the blind. The soul sees,
but cannot act: the body acts but cannot see, feel, or
enjoy. Each, therefore, requires the other. When
final liberation is secured, they both separate; just as
the two associates, the lame and blind, part from each
other when their journey is completed. This is the
argument. There is of course a fallacy in it: for nature
is after all without feeling or enjoyment: in this respect
it is like pure matter, an instrument of something
superior: even though on the Sánkhya theory, it in-
cludes intellect and self-consciousness. The advantage
is all on one side. In the illustration it is on both sides :
and is arranged by two intelligent agents. For the
purpose of this contemplation and enjoyment, nature
218
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
must be developed in products: a world is formed: for
it is only in such circumstances that the enjoyment can
take place. Thus soul is involved with nature. Thus
it gets into all its pains and gloom. Through this ser-
vice, however, soul can get to understand nature : to
discriminate between itself and nature: then it can
detach itself from nature, and reacquire its original soli-
tude, independence and repose.
(d.) While for this end nature develops the world in
general, it also provides a special vehicle for the soul's
use, by means of which it becomes connected with
nature at large : and from which it is never separated
during its entire wanderings. This vehicle in which the
soul takes up its residence, is called the subtile body, or
rudimental body (sukhma sarira, or linga sarira). The
subtile body is small in size, no bigger than a thumb,
and to men's eyes is invisible. It is composed of intel-
lect, self-consciousness, the five elements, mind, and the
organs of sense and action. If self-consciousness be
reckoned in intellect, the body appears composed of
seventeen elements. This body in the case of each in-
dividual soul is formed at the time of the creation.
Brahma * seems to have been the first for whom it was
made. This body is very strong: and is therefore per-
manent: it lasts till the period of universal dissolution:
* It may be well to notice distinctly the difference between Brahma
and Brahmá. Brahma (pronounced Brum-hå) is the One Supreme,
the Iswara, from whom the Hindu triad-Brahmá (pronounced
Brum-há), Vishnu and Siva–have sprung. Singularly enough,
in South India, Isuren does not denote the Supreme, but is Siva
alone.
PART II.]
219
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
or at least never changes till knowledge causes its wan-
derings to cease. It is also unconfined: it does not mix
with animals, men or gods: it can go through rocks
without obstruction. It is also invested with peculiar
dispositions and tendencies. Of its final history, the
commentator says: “Subtile body is that which at the
period of universal dissolution, possessed of intelligence
and other subtile principles, merges into the chief one
(pradhán or nature): and exempted from further revo-
lution, remains extant here until creation is renewed,
being bound in the bondage of the stolidity of nature,
and thereby incompetent to the acts of migrating and
the like. At the season of re-creation it again re-
volves.” (p. 128.)
This subtile body does not enjoy or suffer. Hence a
connection with generated body, the gross body, is
necessary. But gross body cannot last long: and as
dispositions” with which the subtile body is in-
vested by Intellect, rènder it susceptible of reward or
punishment, more bodies are necessary. Here it is the
necessity of new bodies is seen, and the modus operandi
of transmigration is rendered complete. The subtile
body "migrates” (sansarati) from one to another, and
the worldly system through which it travels is entitled
“migration” or sansára. The migrations are compared
to the different disguises and dresses assumed by an
actor, which he puts on for the amusement of others.
By means of these gross bodies, the subtile body ex-
hibits before the soul. The Vedant uses also the simile
of old and new dresses.
1
the 66
220
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
In this view of the Sánkhya respecting the residence
of the soul in a subtile body, which provides it a per-
manent home during its separate history, all the sys-
tems of philosophy agree. In fact its existence is essen-
tial to the theory of transmigration, as the Greeks also
felt. All concur in describing it as an exceedingly fine
and subtile rudiment, which passes through gross bodies
in a long series ; and through them experiences the
worldly history of which living beings are conscious.
The Vedánt especially notes the two bodies, and their
structure, and shows how the dispositions of the soul lead
to its lot in gross bodies of a higher and lower kind.
The Upanishads are more explicit about the history of
individual migrations than any of the later authorities.
There is a passage (referred to in the chapter on the
Vedánt) in the Chhandogya Upanishad, in that section
of Chapter V. called the Panchágnibidyć, which details
with great minuteness the history of those who die
without obtaining complete emancipation and beatitude,
The passage is as follows: “ They who in villages per-
form works of merit and benevolence go to smoke: from
smoke to night: from night to the time of the moon's
waning: from that to the six months of the year when
the sun goes southward: from the months they obtain
the world of the pitris: from the world of the pitris, the
ether: from the ether, the moon. He is the Soma
King : that is the food of the gods, and they feed on it.
After they have lived there a suitable time, they return
by the same road as that they came by: they go to the
ether: from ether to the wind : the wind becomes
PART 11.]
221
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
smoke: the smoke, cloud : the cloud pours down rain :
hence they become a grain of rice or barley, or plants
or trees : hence their progress is more difficult: from
that nourishment they pass into men; thence into an
animal embryo. They who here do works of merit
obtain a womb in high rank: as that of a brahmin,
Kshatriya or Vaisya mother.” Of the course of punish-
ment endured by the souls that descend into the seven
hells, but little is said : it is added that on their return
they enter the womb of a dog or a boar; of beasts, deer,
birds, reptiles, and even immoveable substances.
The doctrine of metempsychosis appears to have been
universal in ancient philosophy among those who ac-
cepted the immateriality of the soul. A few exceptions,
like Leucippus and Democritus, seem to have taught
that it was destroyed at death. But the ancient Egyp-
tians, the Pythagoreans, Platonists, and others, all held
its migration among various bodies : with intervals of
happiness and misery between the different births,
passed in the unseen world, according to their merits
and demerits in the present one. Empedocles even
pretended that he knew he had been at different times
a boy, a girl, a plant, and a fish. Pythagoras also
asserted that he had previously existed as Ethalides,
the son of Mercury, Euphorbus, and others. Dr. Cud-
worth and his commentator Mosheim find a difficulty
in the Egyptians believing both that the souls of men
ascended to the councils of the gods and descended into
the bodies of impure animals. But there is no difficulty
in applying the two statements to different classes. The
222
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Hindu philosophers have taught precisely the same doc-
trine: noting that it is the virtuous that ascend, the
wicked who are thus degraded. Buddha in his teach-
ing dwelt very largely on the doctrine, and allowed his
imagination to run riot respecting it in the most extra-
ordinary manner. He would trace back the history of
previous Buddhas; and would speak without hesitation
of what had happened in previous births to himself and
others, for a long series of ages. Respecting his theory
of transmigration, the Ceylonese Buddhist authorities
teach a doctrine that differs very decidedly from that of
Kopila. Kopila says, “One soul is born not another."
The Ceylon books however teach as Buddha's doctrine,
that the merit of a good man at his death causes the
birth of another soul that is the representative and equi-
valent of the soul by which that merit was acquired :
the man himself disappears.
The doctrine also in Europe, as in India, was accom-
panied by the other, that the soul resides in a subtile or
refined vehicle which furnishes it with a species of
dress that it always wears. Dr. Cudworth has shown
that people, poets and philosophers, all held the notion.
He has examined it at great length, and given numerous
extracts. The philosophers termed it öxnua “vehicle."
“ The ancient assertors of the soul's immortality did not
suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped,
stark naked, from all body: but that the generality of
souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy
body accompanying them, though in different degrees
of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As
PART 11.]
223
CEIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
also that they conceived this spirituous body, or at
least something of it, to hang about the soul also here
in this life
as its interior vestment, which also
then sticks to it when that other earthly and gross part
of the body is put off as an outer garment.” He shows
also that this body was preserved to the soul, in order
that it might experience in the next world the pleasures
or pains which fall to its lot: and by them become
purified from its evils and vices. The purifications of
the soul directly by self-subjugation, and the restraint
of the passions were taught in connection with the doc-
trine by the Greek philosophers. Dr. Cudworth's an-
notator says: “ The whole of the Platonists were agreed
that the soul always possesses a certain celestial body,
and that it is invested with such a body when it
descends into this concrete body, which it again takes
away on its departure from it.” (Vol. iii. p. 260, note,
1845.) Cudworth also shows that some philosophers,
especially among the Chaldeans, taught that the soul
had a third body or tunicle investing it, a luciform
body, of higher rank than either of the former (p. 266).
While the Sánkhya teaches that the subtile body always
remains, some Pythagoreans and Platonists seem to
have held that this body is changed for a better one, as
the soul rises higher in virtue. The parallel between
the belief of the eastern and western worlds is exceed-
ingly interesting.
224
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
$ 8.—THE GROUNDS OF TRANSMIGRATION : FATALISM.
The doctine of transmigration, we have already seen,
finds its basis and its explanation in another doctrine,
universally accepted among the Hindus, both philoso-
phers and unlearned. It is that there exists in this
world an immense amount of misery, of wrong of
various kinds. There exists in the heart an incessant
desire that can never be gratified: wrong notions and
“faults” that lead it astray; desire for the fruits of
works; activities which nothing can subdue ; and
courses of action from which merit and demerit neces-
sarily spring. Masses of men are foolish, sunk in
passion, enslaved to passion; are miserable and spend
their lives in gloom. All this is acknowledged as fact:
all is traced up to a virtue and vice of some kind or
other. Present evils in those now living are traced
back to the lives and history of the same beings living
at a nearer or more remote period of the world: they
having enjoyed the immediate fruit of their actions
in the unseen world; and having now returned to enjoy
other more remote fruits and enter upon actions which,
according to their nature, will carry them higher or
lower, in virtue and happiness, than the position which
they held before. This line of argument will trace the
grounds of transmigration and of the present tendencies
of men a few steps back: and that is sufficient for
common minds. The philosophers, however, have justly
perceived that the argument begins again there as
fresh as ever, and must go back more and more till an
PART II.]
225
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
ultimate explanation be reached. These explanations
are given confidently by two of the three schools, whose
tenets we are examining; and the conclusion they have
adopted has become a dogma held universally by the
Orientals at large.
The Nyáya (as we have seen) attributes the present
pains of men to "wrong notions” which they have
formed, of themselves and of the system in which they
live. These wrong notions lead them to the fault of
desire or stupidity; from this springs an “ activity,"
which looks for the reward of their merits (always
mentioned as an evil). In consequence of this men
have birth again and again, with all the pains and evils
attendant upon mortal life. Here it will be seen that
the original difficulty is avoided. The system does not
state whence the 66
were originally
derived. They are connected with the nature of soul
and its relation to the universe: but their source and
origin are not determined.
The Sankhya, on the other hand, tells us the whole
story. It attributes all the pain, the causeless, unsatis-
fied desire, the gloom, and misery of human life,
to the connection of soul with nature. Soul has been
joined to nature to contemplate and enjoy it: but nu-
merous pains have been necessarily developed from their
connection. All the results now seen, and all the special
evils suffered by individuals, are the natural offspring
of the tendencies of things, of the “DISPOSITIONS ” with
which they have been endowed.
These dispositions
originated with the creation, that is, with the first struc-
wrong notions
Q
226
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. ,
ture of the subtile bodies from nature: it was then that
particular tendencies were communicated to each indi-
vidual of the multitudinous souls existing; according to
those dispositions has been the subsequent history of
each soul, and will continue to be. All the conduct,
the misery or happiness of individuals has resulted
naturally and from necessity from those dispositions.
This is of course fatalism: but it is fatalism in the
present instance without an overruling power: a God
being denied to the Sánkhya system; excepting Brahmá
and other inferior deities, who are themselves subject to
the necessity which compels all other creatures. The
text for this important doctrine is as follows.
“ Subtile body," says Sloka 40 of the Kárika, “mi-
grates, invested with dispositions." These dispositions
are various : some are superhuman, belonging only to
saints and sages. In character they are of two kinds as
affecting men, viz., intellectual and corporeal: the two
are connected as cause and effect, the intellectual being
always attended by a corresponding corporeal condition.
Of the intellectual conditions or dispositions, there are
eight kinds: four good and their four contraries: they are
virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power; and the contraries,
vice, ignorance, passion, weakness. They all abide in in-
tellect, the first product of nature: that being the instru-
ment to which they belong. (Sutra 44.) By virtue,
both religious and moral merit are intended. The effects
of these dispositions correspond to their internal charac-
ter. By virtue, there is ascent to the regions above :
the regions of Brahmá, Indra, the Gandharvas and the
PART II.]
227
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
like, eight in all. By vice, descent into the regions
below, the seven hells. By knowledge, i.e. a disposi-
tion communicated to those who have studied, do study,
or will study, the Sánkhya system successfully, comes
deliverance; the entire separation of soul and nature,
and a return to their primal condition. By ignorance
again is produced bondage. This bondage denotes three
different classes of errors respecting soul and nature, the
prevalence of which precludes the hope of final emanci-
pation. These are, (1.) Prákritika, the error of the ma-
terialists, who assert soul in nature and identify them as
one. (2.) Vaikritika, the error of other materialists, who
confound soul with products of nature: such as the ele-
ments, the senses, and so on. (3.) Dákshina, the error
of those who, ignorant of soul, engage in moral and
religious rites. These errors confine the soul to its
subtile body for different periods. The second class, for
instance, who confound soul with sense, are confined to
it for ten manwantaras, a period equal to 3,084,480,000
years (p. 145). By dispassion, a third kind of excel-
lence, an inferior kind of reward, is produced. The
subtile body becomes absorbed into nature: the soul is im-
mediately invested with another subtile body; and enters
on a new period of migration till KNOWLEDGE is attained.
By passion, the soul becomes subject to a repeated round
of migrations, through bodies of various kinds, beasts,
birds, and reptiles. By power arises unimpediment: by
weakness, obstruction, to the course of the soul's improve-
ment and elevation. These eight dispositions and their
effects are thus clearly tabulated by Dr. Wilson :
Q 2
228
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
CAUSE.
EFFECT.
1. Virtue 1. Elevation in the scale of being.
2. Vice. 2. Degradation in that scale.
3. Knowledge. 3. Liberation.
4. Ignorance 4. Bondage in error,
5. Dispassion . 5. Dissolution of the then existing subtile body.
6. Passion 6. Migration.
7. Power 7. Unimpediments.
8. Weakness 8. Obstruction,
1
This whole system is carried on for the purposes of
soul: and is enforced by the authority of Nature: who
here in the place of God) exercises a kingly supremacy.
While special causes, the instrumental means of virtue
and vice, affect individual souls, and take them upward
or downward towards a higher or more degraded con-
dition, it is by Nature, acting independently, that the
general scheme is supervised and regulated. It is by
Nature that the subtile body is “invested with these
dispositions," and undergoes its varied and chequered
history. The classification of the different characters
-- and dispositions among men is well arranged: the
essence of the whole is that these characters are the
result of their dispositions, apart from any exercise of
their own will: and that primarily Nature invested
the soul with them, when her creation was first deve-
loped. Fatalism is thus traced up to its highest source.
The VEDÁNTA doctrine on the same subject does not
practically differ from that of the Sankhya. Teaching
fundamentally as the basis of all its system that human
souls are portions of Brahma, it also lays down in con-
nection with this doctrine, that men are full of gloom,
doubt, desire, and misery from their ignorance of it.
PART II.]
229
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
All nature we have seen is influenced by the three
gunas or “ qualities ;” and it is from their many admix-
tures in various proportions that all the varieties of
human character and of human condition arise. These
qualities invest all prakriti, according to the Gíta, and
thus it follows that “there is nothing in heaven or
earth, or amongst the hosts of heaven, which is free
from their influence.” Who then is the source of the
illusions in which men are involved, and of the qualities
of the material of all things from which they arise ?
The Vedánt, consistently with its Pantheism, ascribes
all to the Supreme. “Blind in the darkness of igno-
rance, the soul is guided in its actions and its fruition,
in its attainment of knowledge and consequent liberation
and bliss, by the Supreme Ruler of the universe, who
causes it to act conformably with its previous resolves :
now, according to former purposes; as then, according
to its yet earlier predispositions; which accrued from
preceding forms with no retrospective limit; for the
world had no beginning. The Supreme Ruler makes
individuals to act according to their virtuous or vicious
propensities. As the same fertilizing rain-cloud causes
various seeds to sprout multifariously, producing diver-
sity of plants according to their kinds.” Colebrooke
says (Vedánta, pp. 188-9): “The Supreme Being is
designated in the Vedas, as the cause of virtue and vice,
as of everything else.” The sixteenth lecture of the Gíta,
“ Of Divine and Evil Destiny" (Prakriti-bhed), repeats
the same theory with a variety of details. Nor are the
Upanishads silent on a topic so momentous: if any.
230
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
thing, they are more explicit than the other authorities,
overleaping intermediate causes and influences, and
throwing the origin of all the good and evil directly
back upon the Supreme. “ He whó governs both
knowledge and ignorance is God.” “ He is the cause
both of our bondage in the world, and of our liberation
from it.” Still more strongly are both the instrumental
and efficient causes both of good and evil ascribed in
repulsive terms to his direct agency, by the Kaushitaki
Upanishad, as quoted in the Brahma Sutras : “For he
makes him to do good deeds, whom he wishes to bring
out of this world: and him he makes to do evil deeds
whom he wishes to bring again into the world," by
other transmigrations.
Amongst Vedic doctrines, next to that of Pantheism,
few have spread more extensively or had a more potent
influence for evil than that of the divine fatalism now
under discussion. It has descended deep among the
common people, has existed among them for centuries,
influences their conduct in all their troubles, produces
apathy in seasons when personal effort is demanded to
avert calamity; leads them to ward off from themselves
the sense of guilt arising from wrong committed, and to
advocate in all its bare deformity the blasphemous
dogma that God is the Author of Sin.
§ 9.—THE NATURE OF VIRTUE AND VICE.
Moral questions, it has already been noticed, are but
little discussed in the systems of philosophy: the moral
law as a rule from without, the conscience as a monitor
PART 11.] CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
231
within man, are quite passed over. We find desire and
aversion enumerated among the qualities of mind, and
volition tog: but the laws to which the will should
be subjected have not been developed, and no system of
ethics, even such as Aristotle's, has been advanced and
defended. The nature of virtue and vice has then
rather to be deduced indirectly from the works now
examined, since they have not been directly treated.
In spite of all erroneous theories respecting the basis
of virtue, it is evident that the voice of nature within
man has not been entirely silenced among these brah-
minical men of learning, and that many actions, which
from the nature of things must be evil, are reckoned
so even by them. In the Gita, for instance, purity of
heart, self-restraint, mildness, patience, chastity, are
reckoned among the virtues; while pride, presumption,
hypocrisy, and anger, are reckoned among the vices.
“ There are three passages to hell: lust, anger, and
avarice: wherefore, a man should avoid them.” It is
only to be expected, however, that right and wrong
should be understood to a large extent in connection
with Hindu habits, and should derive their complexion
greatly from the customs of the country, running very
far back into antiquity. Thus bodily penance, mortifi-
cation, and study, are reckoned virtues. Ignorance is
counted among the vices. The fulfilment of their special
duties by the people of the different castes is right and
meritorious: the neglect of them is the opposite. The
Hindu Yogi, stoical in relation to heat and cold, poverty
and wealth, is highly esteemed: the man of pleasure
232
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the man immersed in business, are regarded as slaves
to illusion. The man who kills a brahmin is the greatest
of criminals: the man who defiles the bed of his
guru,
is scarcely less guilty; but the way in which these
actions are spoken of, seems to imply that it is the dis-
tinguishing features of the murder and the defilement
which make them criminal, not the general quality of
those actions.
The chief point to be noticed here is the origin to
which both virtue and vice are ascribed. In the very
passages of the Gita above quoted, it is distinctly said
that the good and the evil destiny are from Brahma,
the Krishna of the poem.
The last section gave
abundance of evidence that this is the real doctrine held
by the schools. Whatever be the qualities of actions,
whether they be correctly classed among the virtues
and vices or not, one thing is certain, the original
tendencies from whence both spring are given by the
Supreme, and their fruits must inevitably be worked
out, without reference to human will. If both courses
of conduct come from Him, any real moral distinction
in character must be denied to them. They must be
viewed rather as chemical powers in nature, leading
necessarily to certain ultimate consequences. Thus are
they represented by the Vedánt in their influence upon
the jivanmukta, the man who has attained the knowledge
of Brahma, but is not yet dead. “ He can do neither
good nor evil.” " As water wets not the leaves of the
water-lily, so sin touches not him who knows this."
“He who steals gold; who drinks spirits; who ascends
PART 11.] CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
233
his guru's bed, and who slays a brahmin, these four fall
into hell, and the fifth is he who has communion with
these: but he who knows this doctrine, though he have_
communion with them, is not contaminated by sin; is
holy, is pure, and is fit for the pure worlds." (Chh.*)
$ 10.—THE CHIEF END OF MAN.
This important topic is closely allied with the two
points recently examined. Each system starts with it:
and all their followers are as familiar with both the
notion and the expression itself (purushártha) as those
brought up in Christian households. The primary evil
by which men in this life are enslaved, and which is
declared to be the most burdensome of all, is the
liability to transmigration: the chief end, therefore,
which the students of all these systems are exhorted to
adopt, is their deliverance from its bonds, and from all
the evils directly and indirectly connected with it.
LIBERATION is thus the beginning, middle, and end of
each and all these philosophies, from the Upanishads
downwards. LIBERATION from these wanderings is the
summum bonum of them all: in that consists BEATI-
“Complete deliverance from pain is beatitude.”
The Upanishads repeat the dogma every few sentences,
and weary the reader with the endless modes in which
they recur to it.
* " And I will hallow him to the ends of Heaven,
That though he plunge his soul in sin like a sword
In water, it shall no wise cling to him."
Festus, p. 4.
TUDE.
234
(PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
But each system puts, as we have seen, its own inter-
pretation on the final reason, and each system offers
itself as the only competent means for securing it.
Each starts with this profession; and each expounds its
peculiar view of the evil from which liberation is to
be sought; as well as of the benefits which a study of
its precepts will secure. Thus, the Vedanta declares
the evil to be ignorance, on the part of the soul, of its
identity with Brahma, and urges its followers to strive
to attain a firm belief in that identity. By the Vedant
system will they learn to know him as he is, and
liberation be thereby secured. Hence Sankara Acharjya,
in commenting on the first of the Brahma Sutras, says:
Brahmábagatirhi purushártha: “ The knowledge of
Brahma is the chief end of man.” Hence, also, the
profuse professions of the benefits of the system, absorp-
tion into Brahma. “He who knows that Supreme
Brahma, becomes even Brahma. (Mund.) Sa yoha bai
tat paramam brahma veda, brahmaiba' bhavati.
The Nyáya Sutras thus announce their remedy
for the same evils, and as loudly promise the desired
cure :
“ Proof: the object of right notion, doubt, motive,
&c.; from knowing the truth in regard to these
(sixteen things) there is the attainment of (nisreyasa)
the summum bonum.” (Sutra 1.)
Pain, birth, activity, fault, wrong notions; since on
the successive annihilation of these by turns, there
is the annihilation of the one preceding it; on the
PART II.]
235
CHIEF RELIGIOUS ERRORS.
annihilation of the last, there is attained Beatitude
(apavarga).”
The Vaiseshika's scheme is as follows:
Emancipation is to be attained through the know-
ledge of truth, produced by a particular kind of duty;
which knowledge specially relates to the agreements
and disagreements of the six categories : viz., substance,
quality, action, community, disjunction, and concretion.
In other words, it is to be attained by those who acquire
that knowledge which the Vaiseshika system teaches.
Thereby, as by the Nyáya, they will understand the
real nature and mutual relations of soul and matter;
about which they are now profoundly ignorant.
The Sánkhya of Kopila states the difficulty in the
first Sutra already quoted, and shows that escape from
it is the great end for which men obtain a human birth.
“ The complete riddance of pain, which is of three
kinds, is the complete end of man." As the pain arises
from connection with nature, so a right comprehension
of nature will separate the soul from it, and liberation
and beatitude be enjoyed. The Sánkhya teaches how
this may be done; the study of the system, therefore,
will secure that desirable end.
236
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
PART III.
Discussion of the Chief Errors.
IT
may appear to some, that any attempt to refute these
errors, and to discuss the subtile reasoning by which they
are upheld, is only labour in vain, and that, as with
similar errors in ancient Europe, the best course is to
let them die out, or be replaced by the growth of a
sounder and more complete philosophy. If, however,
any dealings are to be maintained with the class of men
among whom they prevail in India, it is impossible to
leave those errors alone. They are sustained and taught
by the most learned priests of the Hindu community;
they exert a powerful influence on the whole system of
worship, and many of the most important dogmas are
current among the lowest and most ignorant of the
people, from one end of the land to the other. All
Hindus have heard, and have received the doctrines,
that God is the author of sin; that God is everything,
and that everything is God; that sin consists in violating
the rules of caste, and the like; and that other births
in the future are reserved for all men. The errors then
PART III.]
237
DISCUSSION OF CHIEF ERRORS.
must be met: by popular arguments for the vulgar, in
which appeals to common sense and to conscience will
hold a conspicuous place; and by arguments for the
learned, placed on a basis similar to that from whence
they themselves start. The latter task, the work of
this essay, is by no means an easy one. On the one
hand, little help is to be obtained from English philo-
sophical works; they discuss errors that have arisen in
Europe, taking them up under the peculiar phase which
they have exhibited there, and either omit altogether,
or dismiss with the epithet of absurd, some of the
dogmas tenaciously held to this hour by millions of our
Hindu fellow subjects. On the other hand, the Hindu
mind is moulded in a peculiar form. In arguing with
Hindus, whether learned or rude, we deal with men,
not brought up from their youth, like the English and
Americans, under the philosophy of common sense, and
hence possessing a reason, trained by experience on sound
principles to judge fitly and simply of facts before them:
but we deal with men of perverted principles, of judg-
ments warped by absurd dogmas, men who have received
the Vedas as true, and are perfectly willing to forswear
the evidence of their own senses, wherever the Vedas
contradict them ; men who know little of the physical
world, who have read little even of the world within
them, and have received concerning things in general
the theories which they have been taught. In Indian
philosophy, therefore, we leave the sphere and age of
Baconian inquiry, and are transported back to the age
and schools of the philosophers of Greece. The Pla-
238
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
tonists and Epicureans, the Atomists and Stoics, are
living and studying before our eyes. We behold the
same select circle of students, the same system of verbal
instruction, the same deference to authority. The same
antique principles, the same deficiency of physical re-
search exist amongst them, as amongst the sages of
ancient Greece. The groves of Academus, and the
many schools of young philosophers, still exist at
Nuddea and Benares. Gorgias still displays his subtle
rhetoric in paradox and sophistry, Platos and Aristotles
still lecture to their disciples on the origin of the
universe, the summum bonum, and the future of the
soul. The defenders of pantheism still sit in conclave,
discussing the illusions of Máyá and the real nature of
existing entities; and when they have proved to their
satisfaction that everything is BRAHMA, they break up
their lecture, and proceeding to the Ganges, spend two
hours, sitting on its muddy bank, repeating mantras,
reciting prayers, throwing in flowers, sprinkling the ap-
pointed water, and bathing in proper rule, in honour of
those very gods, whose separate existence as real beings
they had just before disproved! Such examples of con-
tradiction between belief and practice are witnessed
every day. Thousands upon thousands of men believe
that both sides of a contradictory argument are true.
In thousands upon thousands the divorce between prin-
ciple and practice is all but complete. Discussion, there-
fore, has great difficulties before it; but we need not
on that account deem it utterly useless. There are
many sound principles to be found in the Hindu sys-
PART III.]
239
DISCUSSION OF CHIEF ERRORS.
tems, of which the chief, the law of cause and effect, is
more generally acknowledged, perhaps, than any other :
these may be well employed as the basis of a courteous
discussion of the errors which they teach: especially
when the deductions of those systems are shown to be
inconsistent with the very principles which they them-
selyes allow. This process has been attempted in the
following series of dialogues. It will at once' appear
that they are constructed principally for native readers.
SCHEME OF THE FOLLOWING DIALOGUES.
Several years ago there lived in the city of Kaşı, that
is, Benares, an English gentleman, connected with the
Indian Government. He was one of the few, who take a
real and hearty interest in the welfare of the people of
Hindustán; and during the time he resided in the
country, he aimed to promote that welfare. Sometimes
he sought it in the administration of justice, in the
punishment of the criminal, and the protection of the
weak against the strong: at others by devising measures
for enlightening the ignorant and promoting true learn-
ing and true morality among all classes. Amongst
various studies, he had diligently applied himself to the
languages of North India, and from time to time em-
ployed his leisure in reading the shastres of the Hindus,
including their best authorities in science and philo-
sophy. After serving the Government in various offices
for many years, he went to live in Kási.
He soon
240
[PART UI.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
began to visit the various schools of learning with
which that famous city abounds, and became acquainted
with a large number of its celebrated pundits. Treating
them with respect, and taking an interest in their pur-
suits, they learned to regard him as a friend, and readily
conversed with him respecting the objects of their study.
Numerous were the discussions which he held with them,
and numerous the arguments which he advanced, to con-
vince them of the true character of their great systems,
and to induce them to study also for themselves the great
book of the Christian religion, the Bible. This he reve-
renced as the true light for man's darkness; and often
did he utter on their behalf the fervent prayer that the
glorious God of heaven, who had sent that Divine Book,
would Himself explain its meaning, change their cor-
rupted nature, and teach them to love Him as their
own Redeemer. Some of these discussions are now
recorded in the following pages for the instruction of
all who are interested in such pursuits : with the hope
that they may obtain true light from Him, who is the
source of all real wisdom.
One morning the judge walked down to the bank of
the river at an early hour. The sun had just risen and
was gilding with glory the thousand minarets and tem-
ple towers which stand out so prominently above the
city. Passing through the narrow streets, amidst a
mingled crowd of traders, bathers, pilgrims, and bulls
of Siva, he reached one of the great ghauts, built of
stone, and forming a noble flight of steps from the top
of the high bank down into the honoured stream. Here
PART III.]
241
DISCUSSION OF CHIEF ERRORS,
a most striking picture was presented to his view.
Along the river, for nearly five miles, the ghauts were
crowded by people of all ranks and all castes, who had
come to offer gifts at the various shrines, or to perform
their customary ablutions in what they consider the
holiest spot on earth. In some parts were seen groups
from the neighbouring suburbs: in others the poorer
people of the city: at others the more respectable classes
of the community, the merchants and traders. A few
ghauts were appropriated exclusively to Mahomedans,
and others were occupied solely by the brahmins who
resided in their immediate neighbourhood. Everywhere
were to be seen crowds of fakeers, sannyasis, bairagis,
and gosáins, vociferating the names of their gods and
asking money: with the “Gunga-pútras,” instructing
pilgrims in the due performance of Hindu ceremonies.
Some of the crowd were bathing; others were being
shaved on little stages raised above the stream ; others
were engaged in various ceremonies in the shrines near
the water's edge; others were reciting their prayers,
though looking at the same time on the scenes trans-
acting around them ; so that the prayers became min-
gled with conversation, jokes, laughter, and even abuse.
Some were pouring out water to the Sun: others were
observed applying the water in due order to their
various limbs, muttering a prayer or mantra as each
successively was touched.
Standing on one side, he observed his friend GÚRÚDÁS,
a well-known pundit, and having joined him, and pre-
sented the usual salutations, he proceeded to converse
R
242
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
with him upon the singular scene before them.
56 Thou
seest," he observed, “ ( pundit, how the people of this
city are given to idolatry; and what a multitude of
worshippers has come forth this morning to pay their
honours to the Sun, the Gunga, to Mahadeo, and a
thousand other divinities. Is it right, О friend, that
the learned men of this city should take a share in the
follies of idolatry? Do they really approve of these
various ceremonies in which they daily take a párt?"
Gurudás. They do not approve of these things, O
friend, as the best things: they understand these cere-
monies to be of a comparatively low kind; they are
classed among works of merit, which men ought not to
desire, and are only fit for the vulgar. The wise only
perform them for the sake of example, as says the Gita
(iii. 20. 25): “Whatever the most excellent practise,
other men practise likewise. Whatever example they
set, the world follows.
As the ignorant act,
who are devoted to works, so let the wise man act,
without any devotion thereto, seeking to benefit man-
kind." They of course believe that these ceremonies
are efficacious in purifying and elevating the mind.
Do not the shástres themselves say so? Thus speaks
the Sruti : “By ritual observances is gained one kind
of fruit: and by the worship of the deities another.”
Again: “ They who here do works of merit obtain a
womb in high rank, as that of a Brahmin, Kshtriya,
or Vaisya mother.” But the wise do not trust to these
works; they rather despise them, consider them unde-
sirable, and turn to other and more sure methods of
PART 111.] DISCUSSION OF CHIEF ERRORS.
243
deliverance. They apply their minds to the sciences,
to one or more of the Darsanas, and by the study of
them, endeavour to attain the purushártha.
Englishman. We have sometimes spoken of these
systems of learning; but I have often wished to discuss
them thoroughly with you and others. For I cannot
help doubting about their efficacy in securing the purush-
ártha for which men should live. The question in-
volved in such discussions is of the highest importance.
It is connected with the happiness of the soul for ever.
I cannot but mourn when I see so many lakhs of people
wandering in ignorance and error; and find that error
encouraged by those who profess to know better. I feel
obliged to doubt therefore about the systems which they
hold: and the more I study them, the stronger these
doubts appear. In doubting however about their truth,
I do not despise these systems. I allow them to be
very ancient; in many respects very ingenious; and to
be the work of men who possessed great ability. But
it appears to me that the strong trust reposed in them
is misplaced; and that the consequences are most fear-
ful.. What evil can be greater than for a man to be
deceived all his life, and to find at last that his precious
time has been wasted, and his “ day of salvation” been
spent in vain? It becomes us, 0 pundit, to inquire
seriously about these things, and to endeavour from all
quarters to obtain true wisdom. Were the pundits of
Benares to study other systems and to read other books
of religion than their own, they would find abundant
reason for changing many of their present opinions.
R 2
244
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
some
Gurudás. But why should they study other systems ?
Their own systems require so much time: they are the
older systems: they were given by inspired men and
Rishis: and surely they are superior.
Eng. Our fathers may have been wise in
things; but they did not possess all knowledge. Their
descendants have made discoveries which are quite
The knowledge they did possess forms only a
foundation for us to build upon. The Hindus of former
days asserted that the world was flat, and was sur-
rounded by the seven seas of milk, and treacle, and the
like. No one denied it. But Bháskar at length proved
that the earth was a globe, and all who have examined
the evidence of that doctrine, and receive it in prefer-
ence to the mere authority of antiquity, accept it as
the true one. Travellers have gone over all the world,
but nowhere have the seas of milk and butter been
discovered. Besides the doctrines of the Hindu sys-
tems are not new nor confined exclusively to them.
Other people have taught doctrines very similar, which
have been long known to the scholars of Europe. In
former days there lived to the west of Persia a wise
people, called Greeks; some of whom subsequently con-
quered Persia and Cabul, and have been known in
Hindustan as the Yavanas.* Among them many
schools of learning were established ; and many of
their great pundits taught opinions which are to this
day advocated in Kási and in the tolas of Nuddea.
Some of them advocated the origin of all things from
new.
* The term “ Yavana,” however, now is applied to Musalmáns.
PART III.]
245
DISCUSSION OF CHIEF ERRORS.
atoms (like the Nyáya): one ancient pundit, named
Pythagoras, taught openly the transmigration of souls:
another, the eternity of the world; others, the eternity
of matter. Others, like the Vedantists, taught that all
is God and God is all: and one wise teacher, a prodigy
of learning, named Aristotle, expounded a system of
reasoning like that of the Nyáya. Now none of these
learned men call their doctrines inspired. None say,
like the Vedantists, that those opinions of theirs came
from the mouth of God.
Gurudás. That may be true; but does a simi-
larity between our doctrines and the opinions of those
sages deprive the Hindu systems of their authority ?
They assert over and over again that they have come
from a divine source; the names of their authors are
widely known as those of the greatest sages and Rishis,
who knew the truth. Hence it is that we prefer them
to the systems of this age and of other lands; for they
are certain.
Eng. How can we reckon them to be certain, when
they mutually differ? The three great systems, the
Sánkhya, Vedanta, and Nyáya, do agree on some sub-
jects, but they disagree on many others. Even the
chief points of these three systems not only differ, but
they are positively contradictory of one another. What
can we, O pundit, under such circumstances, do? We
cannot believe all ? Every one knows that of two con-
tradictories one must be false. A fish must either be
in the water or out of the water. Either it does rain or
it does not. If it does not rain, then it is incorrect to
246
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
true.
say that it does rain : and if a fish is out of the
water, it is wrong to say that it is in it. It cannot both
rain and not rain at the same time in the same place.
Now the Sánkhya teaches that there is not an Eternal
and Supreme Lord: the Nyáya, that there is such a
Lord, existing from everlasting, the Supreme Soul.
Now, which of these two is correct: both cannot be
One must be positively untrue. If so, how can
we say that all are certain ? The Vedanta again de-
clares all matter and spirit to be identical with Brahma:
the Nyáya, that they are distinct from Him and from
each other. Where is the certainty here? Of the two
theories, so mutually contradictory, one must be in-
correct. Yet both say they are true.
It seems to me, O pundit, that the differences be-
tween the opinions of men on these important subjects,
at least show them to be exceedingly difficult. They
ought therefore to be studied by thinking men. They
ought also to be studied calmly and with patience.
Men ought carefully to examine the reasons of every-
thing: they ought to doubt their own wisdom, listen to
others, and not dogmatize. In this way we shall all
learn something: and the contributions of all will tend
to exhibit pure truth. How needful it is that men of
different countries should learn from each other, and
should not be self-sufficient. True knowledge is the
food of the soul : it adds to man's dignity; it increases
his happiness; it increases his usefulness. The man
who possesses much knowledge can go and teach the
ignorant: and alas ! how few wise men there are in
PART III.]
247
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
the world, able and willing to do so. However, as the
sun is now rising high and the air becomes warm, let
us adjourn to a more convenient spot, and, if you please,
continue our discussion.
Gurudás invited his friend to his house which stood
in the immediate neighbourhood. It was pleasantly
situated on the bank of the river, and enjoyed both
a large prospect and the cool breeze blowing from the
water. They accordingly left the ghaut, and proceeded
thither. Having ascended to the third story, they sat
down in the verandah which overlooked the broad river.
Several pundits gathered around them, and the Judge
having courteously saluted them, they prepared to
listen to the discussion which was at once renewed.
Bialogue First.
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY-CAUSATION,
PRELIMINARY NOTE.
IN commencing an inquiry into Hindu Philosophy, it is
essentially necessary that both parties should start from
common ground. Happily such ground can be easily
discovered, in those simple principles of common-sense
inquiry which God has planted in every intellect. These
principles are not numerous, and at the same time they
are so simple, that the most untutored mind will at once
acknowledge their truth. The Baconian method of in-
248
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
quiry, which exhibits them in full force, was not a new
thing in the world. The principles themselves are as
old as mankind: Bacon and others tauglit the necessity
of applying them more rigidly, more justly and on a
wider scale than philosophers had been accustomed to
do. Even right principles applied in a contracted sphere
may appear to lead to results which contradict almost
universal experience. It is only a wide analysis and
generalization which will attain universal truth. The
object of this Dialogue is merely to show, that in sound.
inquiry, regard must be had both to the spirit and the
method of inquiry. Men must possess faculties for in-
quiry; must coriduct the inquiry honestly, intelligently,
searchingly: and a proper method must be adopted as well
as a right intention. Three rules are provided for phi-
losophy: a, Every fact must be an ultimate or simple
one: b, The whole facts of a case must be taken: c, No
foreign facts must be interpolated. It was by making
only partial examination and by introducing extraneous
elements that almost all ancient philosophy went astray.
If these rules are completely observed, sound science
MUST come out of the inquiry: if they are not observed,
such science is impossible. The views of the native
systems respecting causation give us great help in car-
rying through this method. They allow three rules
which answer in some respects to the three just stated.
1. Every effect must have some cause.
2. That cause
must be adequate. 3. No cause must be sought un-
suitable to the effect. If their own rules are rigidly
applied, with other principles which they well under-
PART III.]
249
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
stand, the disciples of these systems can be led on to see
that many parts of their system are indefensible. It
will be found however extremely difficult to wean them
from making those erroneous applications of the rules
to which they have been accustomed.
Englishman. We were just speaking of some of the
mutual contradictions in most important matters, of the
Hindu systems of philosophy. These systems were
taught by great men and learned men: yet they advo-
cate dogmas which are entirely opposed to each other.
I am aware that you have devised schemes for recon-
ciling them; still some great differences do exist, as
your own controversies respecting them show. Are we
then to believe that it is impossible to discover truth; are
we to doubt about everything; is there certainty in
nothing ?
Gurudas. Not so. We all allow that sound know-
ledge can be attained by men, and hence prepare courses
of study by which it may be attained. Man is able to
get knowledge by his various senses, his eyes, his ears ;
and by the exercise of his reason. By these he can
examine all the knowledge presented for his acceptance,
and having tested the evidence for and against it, can
decide on what is and what is not.
Eng. There are indeed means and instruments given
to man for this very purpose, and there are principles of
inquiry contained within his constitution by which his
researches ought to be regulated. But before we look
at these, let us consider the circumstances which often
250
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
hinder their proper application. A traveller going from
Kási to Brindávan has a straight road before him. But
if fogs and deep darkness, or false guides meet him, he
will lose the road, although he may be in perfect health,
possess a willing mind and be able to walk many miles
a day. So the fogs of prejudice, of ignorance, of pas-
sion, of self-interest cloud the mind. Some men find
the results of inquiry opposed to their dearest interests,
to the notions which they have indulged for years, and
therefore will not accept them. Others are led astray
by false teachers, who are themselves deceived. Others
again are indolent, and will not take the labour required
for the discovery of truth; others again are of limited
capacity, and cannot comprehend what is taught. The
Sánkhya allows this, and reckons three classes of scho-
lars, the dull, the mediocre and the best : of whom only
the best attain completely the knowledge to which all
applied.
Gurudás. Many are the causes which will hinder
sound inquiry. Of these the Nyáya has spoken much.
It shows that the spirit in which it is conducted must be
honest as well as wise. Thus the Nyáya Sutras say
(p. 37): “Those who are desirous to know the truth
are the persons who are competent for discussion.”
Eng. Quite true. Let us take as an illustration the
process adopted in a court of justice. In examining
into a case of murder, there are required honest wit-
nesses, competent to give evidence of what they have
seen; complete evidence of all the facts; and an honest
judge, to weigh them all. Ignorance in the witnesses, or
+
PART III.]
251
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
falsehood; and partiality in the judge will lead only to
false conclusions, as the courts of different countries often
show. So in examining philosophy, we must examine
honestly and completely all the sources of knowledge
open to us, and then will our conclusions be sound. If
we reject any, either through carelessness or unwill-
ingness, those conclusions must be erroneous. Re.
membering this important fact, let me ask you, O pun-
dit, what are the sources of knowledge commonly allowed
in the Hindu systems ?
Gurudás. Our authorities, O friend, on this point
somewhat differ; but may be considered substantially
alike. Thus the Sánkhya enumerates three: Percep-
tion, Inference, and Testimony. The Nyáya adds to
these Comparison: and the Mimánsa, Conjecture: but it
is generally considered that the first three include the
others: the authority of Revelation being embraced by
Testimony. The Vedánta allows six sources of know-
ledge, which are also reducible to the three first named.
Eng. It seems to me, O pundit, that this arrange-
ment is clear and correct; if we add to it the intuitions
with which the intellect of man begins its work. All
the philosophers of Europe agree with those of the East
in looking to these as the ordinary sources of the know-
ledge we acquire. And indeed it is not difficult to
assent to their opinion. Beyond his own intuitions man
either learns knowledge which he is able of himself to
attain; or which by himself he could not obtain. If he
attains the latter at all, the information must be con-
veyed to him in common matters by his fellow men;
252
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
and in extraordinary cases by some higher authority, as
God, to whom it is familiar.
In ordinary matters this
is called Testimony. All knowledge coming from a
supernatural origin, and relating to super-human mat-
ters, men call Revelation. When a man turns to things
which lie within the range of his own powers, he ob-
serves them by means of his senses, and pronounces
decisions upon them by his Reason. How wonderfully,
O pundit, has man been endowed with instruments of
knowledge. Reason is the master, and the five senses,
like five slaves, together with the manas, convey to
him information about the world without or the mind
within, which the master analyzes and weighs and com-
pares, and which often he combines into new and beautiful
forms of truth. The eye tells him of the thousand objects
it sees: the ear relates all that it hears; and the touch tells
him how things are shaped and feel. All these items of
knowledge the reason analyzes, and putting them to-
gether in new combinations infers great conclusions and
wonderful principles, unknown to all except the intelli-
gent beings in the three worlds. Thus it is we see clearly
how the perception of his senses, the inferences of reason,
the testimony of his fellows, and the supernatural revela
tions of God, furnish him with the materials of which his
knowledge is composed.
But the same facts, 0 pundit, show also the sphere
to which his attention should be confined. The senses
of men can examine the earth in which they dwell and
the heavens which are visible; but how can they pene-
trate into the upper or lower worlds, which are in-
9
PART III.]
253
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
visible ? Even if we infer their existence, how can we
learn their condition ? If God should condescend to
inform us of them, then we can learn so much as he
pleases to reveal, and no more. We can find out no-
thing by ourselves. Is it not then foolish, O friend,
to speculate about bhúts and prets (goblins), and pre-
tend to describe the habitations of superior beings,
which no mortal eye has seen ? Ought we not to
confine our researches to the sphere to which our
senses are confined? Therein we have the wonderful
earth, and all that it contains: and long, long will it
be before we exhaust the facts which it reveals concern-
ing its constitution and structure; its physical history;
the great divisions into which it is mapped out; its
vegetable, mineral, and animal products: and above
all, the history and constitution of men; the history of
their societies and the laws which govern them; toge-
ther with the study of the right means by which all
nations may live in peace and unity, helping each other,
and doing all they can to secure each other's endless
happiness. These are objects of inquiry open to every
right-hearted philosopher; and are worthy of the powers
with which the great Creator has endowed him.
There is another great object of philosophical pur-
suit, 0 pundit, closely connected with that which I
have described. Men not only ask continually, What
has happened; but also, Why it has happened: and
spend a large amount both of time and effort in seeking
for the reasons of things which they do not know.
This naturally leads us to consider the LAWS OF CAUSA-
254
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
TION, because they are the rules by which such exami-
nations are conducted. May I ask you kindly to say
what are the opinions of Hindu philosophers generally
upon the subject ?
Gurudás. All our philosophers are not entirely
agreed as to the fact of causation. The honoured Vá-
chespati* enumerates four kinds of opinions: (1) some
say that that which is, may proceed from that which
is not. (2) Others say that that which now is, is only
the revolution of an existing thing. (3) Others again
say that that which is not may be produced from that
which is. (4) The ancients assert that that which is
comes from that which is. The majority of Hindu
philosophers accept the last principle. The Vedantists
do not regard the subject as important; owing to their
Pantheistic theory, which declares the existence of only
one Being in the three worlds. The Nyáya and Sán-.
khya, however, classify the different kinds of causes, and
announce the rules on which they act.
Eng. It is singular that any men, like some Baud-
dhas, can even seem to deny the existence of causation;
or, what is the same, can lay down as a principle that
a thing which now is can have come from that which is
not.f All men see causes in operation around them
every day: even common people, who are ignorant,
confess that some things produce others; that move-
ments lead to changes of place; and that actions pro-
* Sánkhya Káriká, p. 30.
† The statement may denote a thing can come from something not
homogeneous.
PART III.] :
255.
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
duce results. All men know that to get milk, one must
milk the cow; that to make cloth we must weave yarn;
and that to make pots we must employ a wheel and
mud. All languages are filled with terms expressive of
causality; with such terms as cause, effect, produce, pro-
duction, do, generate, and create. To speak, to write, to
run, to strike, to cut, all denote actions performed by
an agent with the express purpose of producing certain
results, which experience shows to follow from such
actions. Thus the common words of every-day life
show that we live under the complete control of this
principle. You said just now that the Nyáya and Sán-
khya classify the different kinds of causes: will you
kindly state them?
Gurudás. The Nyáya teaches that there are both
special and general causes: meaning by general causes
the active agents by whom effects are occasioned. The
special causes include the instrumental (as the weaver's
loom), the intimate cause (the threads of a cloth), and
the non-intimate, the conjunction of the intimate causes.
The latter notion is peculiar to the Nyáya, and arises
from its doctrine of intimate relations. The Sánkhya
again refers especially to three causes: the active or
efficient cause; the instrumental; and the material
cause: as the potter, the wheel, and the mud are three
causes of a jar. If we take away the non-intimate
cause of the Nyáya, the three latter causes are identical
with the former, and differ only in name. All effects
have immediately these three causes.
duced by the bullock, the beam and mortar, and the
Thus oil is pro-
256
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
sesamum seeds.
A statue requires the sculptor, the
iron chisels and hammer, and the solid stone. Milk is
pressed from the cow's udder, by the hand of the gwálá.
Cloth is woven, by the weaver, working his loom, with
numerous threads.
Eng. This description is clear, and the opinions of the
two great schools are the same as those of philosophers
in Europe. Other classes of causes, especially of a more
remote kind, might be mentioned, but these are the
chief.
Will you now kindly mention the principles
upon which causes are sought for, and applied ?
Gurudás. The first great principle is, that every effect
must have some cause. This has been stated in two or
three different forms. Thus Kanáda plainly says: “If
there is no cause, there is no effect; if there is no effect,
there is no cause.” The great Kopila states (Sutra 79)*
“a thing is not made from nothing." “ The product of
something is something, and of nothing, nothing." (81.)
Again he declares, "a nonentity cannot be developed
into an entity;" as a man's horn; it is an impossibility.
“ There must be a material from which the new product
comes." He also points out the reason of this. If
entities could be produced from nonentities, or pro-
ducts without materials, there would be no certainty
ܪ
* Sutra 79, taken literally, expresses the law of causation here
advocated, and such a meaning may fairly be drawn from the terms
which it employs. It is a fact, however, that all the Hindu and
Greek philosophers have made a special application of the rule,
which is not necessarily true; viz., that “a material thing is not
made from a non-material thing." Here we may allow the former
application of the words: the latter will be specially disallowed in a
future dialogue.
PART III.]
257
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
in anything; anything might occur anywhere at any
time.
Eng. This is certainly an admirable principle and
clearly stated. Among the wise Greeks whom I men-
tioned to you, the same doctrine was taught in almost
the same words, and their principle has been universally
recognized as true. Men know of no existence being
produced, nor even of change produced, even in the
commonest things, without a cause. If we want some-
thing, we must get it from something: and out of a
nonentity, nothing can be produced. In all your sys-
tems, however, an erroneous application has been made
of this principle, which will be discussed hereafter.
Gurudás. Another great rule of causality is thus ex-
pressed by Kopila : “A thing possible is made from
that which is competent to produce it.” (118.) And
this rule also is expressed and illustrated in different
ways.
66 Fit materials must be selected.” A man who
wishes for curds, takes milk, not water, for the purpose.
Everything is not possible from everything else.”
Gold is not produced from silver, nor from the fruits of
trees. Cloth is not produced from the mud of the
potter. “ What is capable, does that to which it is
competent.” The potter, the wheel, the mud and water
are capable of producing a jar: from these the jar is
produced. The potter cannot make bracelets, or cloth,
or brass vessels; and no one goes to him for them. Milk
does not come from stone, nor does rice grow on the
stalks of sugar-cane.
Hence again, “Like produces
like.” Rice comes from rice, barley from barley, milk
66
02
258
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. .
from cows, jars from clay, and cloth from threads. This
is the rule.
Eng. This law is also of the highest importance, and
ought to be observed in all our examinations of the
world and what it contains. Effects must be attributed
to adequate causes. Causes set in motion must produce
corresponding effects. The two must suit each other.
The causes of effects must be adequate in time, and
adequate in power. If a cannon-ball is fired now, I
attribute its flight not to the effort of a little boy who
tried to throw it yesterday. I must find a powerful
cause which produced that rapid motion now, and drove
it that immense distance. The melting of the immense
snows of the great Himalaya, can produce nothing less
than the mighty Ganges as it flows in the month of
Srávan in its full stream. A great city like this is
built by none less than the intellect, and wealth, and
hands of man: and so it is, in my opinion,* that the
production of the universe we can attribute to no cause
less than that of the omnipotent and eternal God.
Gurudás. There are other principles of causation
laid down both by the Sánkhya and Vaiseshika. The
Sankhya for instance, lays it down, that a product is
nothing else than the cause in another form : that pro-
duction is therefore only manifestation, and that de-
struction is only the resolution of a product into its
* Of course, Kopila does not make this application of the law, or
allow it: but it is a perfectly just application. One of the objects
here kept in view is to show Hindus how much truth is involved in
their own principles of philosophy, which they themselves have not
deduced.
PART III.]
259
PRINCIPLES OF INQUIRY.
causes. The Nyáya again describes a number of super-
fluous causes, and warns the student against recognizing
them.
Eng. In tracing back effects to causes, it is not easy
to say exactly what those causes were, owing to the
want of a correct knowledge of the secret nature of
things. We therefore meet with difficulties. However,
the general laws of causation are quite clear, and there
can be no mistake, either about the laws themselves, or
their use. It is plain that every effect must have a
cause; that out of nothing, nothing can spring; and
that effects can be produced only by adequate causes,
even supposing those causes actually unknown. We
need only add, that too many causes ought not to be
sought for an effect, nor causes too great for its pro-
duction. We require to know the true cause, the whole
cause, and nothing beyond the cause of the product
examined.
Gurudás. The principle just named was laid down
of old; when sufficient proofs for a thing are found,“no
addition to them is to be sought; because of the cum-
brousness” of such a proceeding. (Sánk. Sutras, p. 96, b.)
Eng. These then are the few, but important princi-
ples upon which all our inquiries into philosophy are to
be based. By the aid of our perceptions, guided and
examined by Reason, we can study the facts of all this
universe laid before us, and endeavour to understand
its constitution and history. If we look to its many
changes, we have two great laws of causality to guide
us, and so long as we keep within them, we cannot go
S 2
260
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
wrong. If too the Omnipotent God reveals to us any
supernatural intelligence concerning the worlds invi-
sible, or the ages yet future, or his designs unknown,
we are able also to receive it, and can make that know-
ledge our own. I shall be very happy now by the aid
of these principles to accompany you into a careful
examination of the great systems of Hindu learning.
I have looked over their authorities, studied the doc-
trines they teach, and weighed the arguments by which
they defend them. I find many good things there; the
very principles of inquiry we are speaking of are cor-
rectly stated, and if the great teachers, the founders
and scholars, of these systems had never broken through
their own rules, they would have arrived at a greater
number of correct conclusions than they have found.
I think that while they
also advocate some things which are most erroneous :
errors indeed of great magnitude: and if you are will-
ing, I shall be most happy to discuss these doctrines with
you; and having done so, to state what I think to be
the chief outlines of the truth which men can learn from
the sources of information opened for our use.
To this proposal Gurudás and the assembled pundits
readily agreed, expressing the hope that much pleasure
might be derived from such a discussion. They wished
to hear what fault their English friend could find with
their various shastres : but felt little curiosity as to the
ultimate effect it might have upon themselves. Their
English friend accordingly having fixed to meet them ano-
ther day, then left them and returned to his own home.
PART III.]
261
IS THERE A GOD?
Dialogue Second.
IS THERE A GOD ?
PRELIMINARY NOTE.
In treating this important subject, two things have to
be done. First, to examine Kopila's own reasoning in
defence of his views; and secondly, to bring forward
a few cogent arguments in proof of the being of a God.
In examining Kopila's reasoning an endeavour has been
made to state it fairly and completely: and to show
that it may be most justly turned against himself. He
has himself employed the argument from design; and
made use of some very happy illustrations, in the course
of his discussion, which, however, he does not fully
apply. His own illustrations prove that the Framer of
the Universe was an Intelligent Being. While Pátan-
jali, the head of the Yóga school, shows that his single
argument against the existence of God will not apply to
such a Being
There are three branches of the argument of Natural
Theology usually employed by English writers to prove
the existence of God. First: the argument from exist-
ence and causation. Second: the argument from mind.
And thirdly: the argument from design exhibited both
in mind and matter.
· In selecting a few reasonings on the subject, the
second of these branches has been omitted; because
from the peculiar views held by the Nyáya and Sán-
262
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
khya respecting the eternity of souls, any argument
from their existence in favour of a CREATOR would
necessarily lead us away from the main question into
topics which must be hereafter treated separately. The
discussion must therefore mainly depend on the other
two branches, and can be made cogent and convincing
enough by their means alone. Only a few specimens
of design have been considered necessary. The most
happy as well as most complete treatment of the entire
argument, in a form suited for English readers, that I
have seen, will be found in the recent work of the Rev.
Dr. Buchanan of Edinburgh-Faith in God and Modern
Atheism compared. Vol. i. § 1 and 2.
Some days after, at the invitation of their English
friend, several pundits who followed the Sánkhya doc-
trine, met together at the house of the pundit Gurudás,
who had himself made a complete study of that philo-
sophy. Having taken his seat among them he thus
addressed the assembly: I have recently been reading
the Sutras written by Kopila respecting the existence of
an ISWARA, as well as the Slokas of the Sánkhya
Kárika upon the same subject. These books contain
much that is good, and advocate many admirable prin-
ciples, which the wisest men of this age allow: but in
respect to our present subject, the reasoning appears to
me decidedly defective; and if you please I should like
to talk it over with you. I observe first that Kopila
does not treat the subject specially, as for instance the
PART III.]
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IS THERE A GOD ?
Yoga does; but only speaks of it incidentally, and in
quite an indirect manner. Now it seems to me that this
was not giving to it the importance which it naturally
claims. If such a Being exist, then in every way the
truth concerning that God must be of importance to
every man: God is the Ruler of his life, to him he looks
for all things : Kopila, therefore, could scarcely have
had an adequate conception of the greatness of the doc-
trine, and of the Being to whom it refers, when he
treated the matter so briefly and so indirectly as he does.
I see that, when speaking of perception, and examining
whether his definition applies to such a being as Iswara,
he boldly declares that in his opinion the existence of
God is not proved.
Gurudás. True, sir, he does assert this; but he also
gives arguments against that existence. The chief argu-
ment he propounds in the form of a dilemma; thus:
“Of free and bound, he cannot be either, and therefore
he cannot exist: either way he would be inefficient."
(Sutra 94, 95.)
Kopila's meaning as explained by Patanjali, is; If
God were “free" from all the ignorance, error, conceit,
desire, and the like, which come on the 6 soul” when
connected with nature, he would be indifferent: he
would not wish to create. If he were “ bound” by
those desires and troubles, through being united to
nature and fettered by it, then he could not create.
Either way he would be ineffective to produce anything.
There can be no such being.
Eng. This argument of Kopil's seems to me to be
264
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
quite insufficient, and that for two reasons. a. He as-
sumes that a being, bound by desires and other troubles,
incident to mundane existence, troubles such as men
and the gods experience, cannot effect anything. But
this is untrue. The potter, the weaver, the farmer,
though numbered among men, who are “bound” by
desires, troubles and activity, do engage continually in
new labours, and produce new things, in many new
forms. Desire does not prevent action in inferior beings,
who work according to their inferior capacity: Why
should it prevent him ? Even then if God were bound
by desires, what should hinder him from forming matter
into new combinations so far as his great power ex-
tends; just as the potter makes new vessels accord-
ing to the inferior skill which he possesses ? The sage
actually allows this, and thus contradicts and over-
turns one horn of his own dilemma. Thus in the Káriká
(Sutra 58), it is written : “ As people engage in acts to
relieve desires, so does the undiscrete engage in acts to
liberate the soul.” Supposing then that Iswara were
like other souls, united to nature, bound by mundane
troubles, why should he be unable to engage in acts for
the liberation of souls? I offer this only as a minor
ohjection to Kopil's reasoning, though I think it quite a
sound one. But the argument is insufficient for another
b. Kopila here argues that Iswara must either
be “bound," or be " free,” whether originally or by
liberation. He assumes, therefore, that all intelligent
beings from the highest to the lowest must be either the
one or the other. But Iswara, as commonly received,
reason.
PART III.]
265
IS THERE A GOD ?
is neither. He is not subject to the laws or the condi-
tions of mundane existence like other beings. He is their
author and therefore in a condition above theirs. Kopila
himself allows that Iswara is not endued with the three
gunas, from which all delusions are said to arise: and
therefore he is not bound by the troubles to which they
are subject. He has never become free by liberation. He
is, however, always free: God is not like other souls :
and Kopil must prove that he is like them before his ar-
gument be accepted. This dilemma, therefore, is quite
unsound: the sage elsewhere answers his own argu-
ments. I would ask you, has Kopila's reasoning satisfied
all the disciples of the Sánkhya school ?
Gurudás. No. The Yóga of Patanjali, which is
reckoned a branch of the Sankhya school, and is
termed the Seswara Sánkhya, differs entirely from
Kopila on this subject.
Eng. Would you kindly tell us what Patanjali says
when he discusses it?
Gurudus. Having referred to one method of attaining
abstract meditation by profound devotedness towards
Iswara, the Lord, the sage in the next Sutra describes
Iswara thus: “God is a particular spirit (Purusha),
untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts." He
thus declares Him to be of the nature of souls, but
calls him a “particular” spirit, unlike the other multi-
tudinous souls with which the universe in its several
regions abounds. Alluding to the statement of Kopil,
that Iswar must be " bound” or “free," after declaring
him to be unlike all other souls, he describes him as
266
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
“ untouched * by the troubles, works, fruits, and deserts”,
which a connection with nature has brought upon
them. He adds that He is possessed of power, able
to uphold all things by His mere will.f He is also
omniscient; because knowledge finds only in Him that
extreme limit and perfection which it must find some-
where. Possessing this Supreme Wisdom, He has been
the teacher even of the earliest beings, the gods, having
existed long before them, and being, in fact, from ever-
lasting. This is Patanjali's reply to Kopila.
Eng. His reply we cannot but deem excellent and
sound. With good reason does he assert that the God
above us is in a condition very different to ours. Ac-
cepting Patanjali's reasoning, we may regard the argu-
ment of Kopila as quite insufficient to establish the
important dogma which he advocated, that there is no
Iswar: and to get rid of that which all men believe,
that there is such a God, their Preserver and King.
The Yogists, therefore, have done well. Nor are they
the only Hindu philosophers who have maintained this
truth. The Nyáyists also defend it, and describe the
existence and attributes of God in clearer terms than
even the Yoga.They hold that God is not mere know-
ledge, but He is a substance of which perfect knowledge,
intellect and volition are attributes. He is altogether
different from nature and different from spirits. It was
He who formed the universe by developing its original
* Yoga Sutras, pp. 29–32.
4. This statement is from his commentator.
# Bhúsha Parichheda, pp. 17–20.
PART III.]
267
IS THERE A GOD?
atoms, and uniting “mind” to its many souls. In
pressing upon you, therefore, the unsatisfactory nature
of the argument of Kopila, I am not introducing reasons
formed by strangers, who follow a foreign philosophy.
I bring forward objections which have been felt by a
branch of his own system, and by the wise teachers
of other systems that are equally old and renowned
with his. Nothing can be clearer than that Patanjali
felt the objection to that argument which I have ex-
pressed; and that Kopila, in making Iswara the subject
of troubles and illusion, assumed the very point to be
proved. I have shown, too, that Kopila has contra-
dicted himself in arguing that an intelligent being,
though under illusion, is unable to effectuate anything.
But there are other objections to his argument which
may be drawn even from his own system. He is quite
inconsistent in three things : first, in his reference to
the Vedas; secondly, in not applying to this subject
the same reasoning as that which he employs to prove
the existence of soul; and thirdly, in arguing that all
things originate from an unintelligent source.
First: he is inconsistent in rejecting the existence of
God, while he acknowledges the authority of the Vedas
and of Brahmá. Has he not asserted the authority
of the Vedas ?
Gurudás. Certainly. In the 150th Sutra, he says:
Scripture is of higher authority than intuitions.”
Eng. Has he not also allowed the authority of
Brahmá ?
Gurudás. Yes. An objector to his doctrine asks: If
268
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
there be no Eternal Lord, will not the Vedas cease to
be of any authority? He replies (Sutra 99): “ The
declaration of the texts of the Vedas by Brahma is
sufficient authority, since he knows the truth.”
Eng. That is the passage I refer to. Kopila allows
that Brahmá knows the truth, and yet contradicts the
very thing which Brahmá declares. In the Upanishads,
especially in the Mundaka, which is said to contain the
doctrine he taught to his son, Atharbba, Brahmá is
represented as everywhere teaching the doctrine of the
Supreme Brahma ; affirming his existence again and
again, and also enumerating his attributes. If Kopila
received his authority and that of the Vedas, why does
he reject the existence of the Supreme altogether, of
whom they speak so much ?
Secondly: he is inconsistent in not applying to this
subject the same argument which he elsewhere employs
for a similar one. Will you kindly say how he proves
the existence of unseen soul?
Gurudás. In Sutra 67, he argues that the combination
of the principles of nature is for the sake of another.
A couch, a bed, and the like, are made not for their
own use, but for the use of another. All their various
parts conduce to the effect they are intended to produce,
and they have evidently been made for a purpose.
Now there must be a being for whom they are made;
and that Being is Soul.
Eng. Well; may not the same argument be applied
* It is extremely interesting to find in the Sánkhya such an early
application of the doctrine of "final causes."
PART 10..]
269
IS THERE A GOD ?
to show the existence of a Superior Being who is above
souls ? Each body is indeed fitted to be the residence
of a soul: the organs and senses are all intended to
convey to it information from the outer world, and most
admirably serve their purpose. The world, too, is
fitted up for the same end. Its vast seas, its great
mountains, its broad fertile plains, its flowing rivers, its
mines of gold, silver, and iron, its endless forests, are
all fitted to serve the purposes of man, to sustain his
life, to add to his comforts, to increase his wealth, to
employ his thoughts, and in a thousand ways advance
his happiness both of body and of mind. Intelligence
and happiness do arise in his soul, and all the souls
of men enjoy these numerous sources of pleasure and
convenience. But for whom are all souls made, with
all these stores of happiness? When they are happy,
who is the sharer of that happiness? Who is the chief
enjoyer, not only of this world, but of other worlds ?
Whose glory is shown in all these things: whom do
they all praise : to whom do men look as the giver of
all good? They all acknowledge God. All nations
look up to him as the Great Soul: all people adore a
Being whom they consider the giver of this good; as
the maker of themselves; as the Being whom they
ought to please. The glory of God is promoted by it
all : and therefore he made it all: he made the unin-
telligent for the use of the intelligent: and he made
the intelligent for his own honour. He delights in their
happiness, the happiness for which he has made such
abundant provision. The jeweller makes ornaments for
270
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. [PART III.
the child to wear: and the father of the boy rejoices
in the delight which the wearing of them produces.
The Great God rejoices in the happiness of his intel-
ligent creatures, for which He himself has provided.
In this way it seems to me, that Kopila ought to have
proved the existence and greatness of God, in the same
way as that by which he argues the existence of soul.
Thirdly: I have said that Kopila contradicts himself
in rejecting a God, and attributing the origin of all
things to unintelligent nature, while his own argument
shows that the real agent must be intelligent.
Gurudás. How, O friend, can this be? He distinctly
declares that all things, except soul, come from nature,
the aggregate of the Three Gunas.
Eng. By the illustrations he employs. Will you
kindly quote those which are mentioned at the end of
the Kárika ?
Gurudás. They are these. (Sloka 58.) “ As people
engage in acts to relieve desires, so does undiscrete
nature engage in acts to liberate the soul.” Again, “ As
a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectators,
desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having
manifested herself to soul.” - Generous nature accom-
plishes the wish of ungrateful soul.”
Eng. Exactly, those are the illustrations I mean.
Now, what has the author of the Káriká said here?
Nature engages in acts to relieve the desires of soul,
just as people commonly do. The potter having formed
the desire of making a jar, engages in efforts to produce
it; the jeweller, having desired to form a bracelet, en-
PART III.]
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IS THERE A GOD?
deavours to make one; the weaver wishes to make a
beautiful sári, and applies his skill to its production.
Nature, having finished her work, desists from it; as a
dancing girl, having danced and completed the cha-
racter she has been acting, desists from the efforts she
has made. Again, nature is generous to soul-shows
kindness to soul, though unòrateful; just as a benevo-
lent man endeavours to relieve the distress of the
poor.
All these illustrations apply to intelligent persons. The
potter, weaver, and jeweller, are intelligent, and act
according to reasons, in what they do. The dancing
girl is intelligent; she knows when her work is com-
pleted, and therefore desists. The benefactor of the
poor is intelligent; he understands their wants, knows
how to relieve them; and continues his kindness,
although some prove ungrateful. The argument, there-
fore, requires that, in the same manner, the agent who
has acted to relieve the desires of the soul, who has
desisted when the work was done, and has exercised
benevolence to ungrateful soul, should be reckoned an
intelligent agent. Only by intelligence could the work
be accomplished; only intelligence can learn when it is ·
completed ; and only intelligence can understand what
benevolence is. Kopila, however, makes his agent un-
intelligent nature ! In this he is inconsistent. After
employing these excellent illustrations, he deduces a
conclusion which the illustrations do not allow. An
intelligent agent is what they prove; an intelligent
agent is accepted by all nations: to an intelligent agent
no valid objection can be made. Such an agent is
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
God, who is. Supreme Intelligence as well as Almighty
Power. Have none of the followers of the other schools
distinctly noted this position of Kopila's ?
Vedántist. It has been specially referred to by Veda
Vyása in the Brahma Sutras. Without saying any.
thing about Kopila's inconsistencies, he takes up the
doctrine that the origin of all things is unintelligent
nature. In the Sutras (B. i., ch. ii., Sut. 5), he argues
that the first cause must be an intelligent one, and that
in the Vedas he is always spoken of as such. The
Nyáyists also argue in the same way.
Gurudás. It should be said, however, that in practice
there are few learned men who reject the doctrine of a
Supreme Iswara; and the difficulty we have been dis-
cussing has long since been satisfactorily explained. It
is understood that the great Kopila here does not intend
to teach that there is no Iswara, but that he merely
asserts against an objector that his existence has not
been sufficiently proved.
Eng. I am quite aware, O pundit, that few learned
scholars in Upper India are really atheists, though
they study the Sánkhya system; and that, as orthodox
Hindus, you all believe in the Supreme Brahma. But
the explanation given can scarcely be called satisfac-
tory. Kopila not only asserts, for the sake of argument,
that the doctrine is unproved, but he treats it as un-
proved : he treats the existence of Iswara as entirely
unnecessary, and, in his scheme of creation, does en-
tirely without such a being. In ancient days, his con-
temporaries and successors regarded his views as
PART III.]
273
IS THERE A GOD ?
unsound. They called this system nireswara; they held
long controversies with his disciples. The Yogists and
Vedantists argued specially against him; and when
schools like those of the Swetaswatara Upanishad and
Bhagavat Gita were formed, while they adopted his
philosophy in some cases, they distinctly recognized a
Supreme. Besides, the Buddhists, whom you all reckon
unorthodox, because of Kopila's doctrine, which they
received, rejected not only an Iswara, but Brahma and
the authority of the Vedas. All this shows that his
errors were regarded as important; it tells against his
authority as a teacher, and proves that he is not to be
regarded as a safe guide.
Leaving the arguments of Kopila, let us examine this
great subject for ourselves. Some men have rejected
the existence of a God in Europe as well as in India.
But the proofs of that existence are numerous, and, in
my opinion, most satisfactory. Let us briefly review
one or two of them. (a.) Let us take first the argument
from causation, the principles of which we noticed a few
days ago.
Will you kindly state those principles ?
Gurudás. We noticed that every effect must have a
cause, and that an adequate cause.
On these points
nearly all philosophers are agreed.
Eng. Will you kindly state also the classes of causes
engaged in producing effects ?
Gurudás. We noticed three, generally employed
among men: the material cause, the instrumental, and
the efficient cause. Sometimes, however, no instrument
is employed. But two causes are always needed; the
T
274
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
agent, who is the efficient cause, and the material from
which the effect is produced.
Eng. Well then look at the world in which we live :
its surface is formed into mountains and valleys, rivers
and seas: it is clothed with forests : it is inhabited by
beasts, birds and men. All these things are effects :
they have sprung from causes which have preceded
them. Trees have sprung from the trees of former
ages: animals have been produced from others now
dead. We can trace back existing effects to their
causes : those causes have sprung from previous causes :
and so we go farther and farther back to some begin-
ning. Do not all your systems allow this process to be
a sound one ?
Gurudás. Certainly they do. And all the systems
trace up the present forms of existence in the world to
the five elements; which are considered to be the primi-
tive material of all.
Nyáyist. There is, however, this difference. The
Vaiseshika traces all things to ether, soul and the
original atoms of the other four elements and of
“mind :" the Vedánta also recognizes these five ele-
ments: but the Sankhya adopts finer forms even of
those elements; then reduces them back to one origin,
Nature.
Eng. That is the point to which I wish our attention
to be turned. Supposing that we reduce all the material
causes of the world to two, the union of which will
produce another effect, from which again other effects
may be multiplied: the question properly arises, how
PART III275
: :
] IS THERE A GOD ?
are those two material causes to be brought into
union ?
Nyáyist. Of course by an agent, who will be the
efficient cause.
Without the efficient cause the two
material causes can never join. Allowing the wheel
and the clay, how can the pot be produced without the
potter?
Eng. Just so. Whatever be the system of philosophy
we each adopt, it seems clear that all must allow the ne-
cessity of an effective agent who shall be the prime mover
in the creation of this world. Without such an agent,
possessed of power to do, and of intelligence which
knows what to do, how can two unintelligent materials
come together to produce an effect? In order to unite
to produce an effect, they must be moved near to one
another. But they have no power to move themselves.
If they move, their motion must come from nothing,
which cannot be: out of nothing, something cannot
arise. An agent, however, can originate motion; can
originate action; and can be governed by motives.
An agent, therefore, was absolutely necessary to pro-
duce the first effects of matter in the great universe.
Such an agent is God: able to do what was needful;
and wise to understand its results. It seems to me,
therefore, that the Laws of Causation, which all men
believe, prove beyond doubt the existence of God, who
is the FIRST CAUSE. We shall see further the truth of
this if we consider the contrivance Kopila has adopted
for bringing his causes together. What, О pundit, does
he consider to be the original causes ?
T 2
276
(FART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
Gurudás. He reduces all products to two, Soul and
Pradhán, “nature," which are from eternity.
Eng. Does soul then become the Creator, and employ
pradhán for its purposes?
Gurudás. No. Soul is inactive: free from desire.
But the sage teaches that for the purpose of giving
pleasure to soul, nature joined herself to soul.
Eng. How could that be; how could the unintelli-
gent act in this way?
Gurudás. He explains it in the following illustration:
“ Soul governs nature not from a resolution to act, but
from its proximity: as the loadstone acts on iron."
When soul came near to nature, the latter (as by the
power of attraction) became Mahat, and its system of
development began. Again, in the Karika it is said:
“ As grass and water become milk and nourish
the calf, and as the secretion stops when the calf is
grown, so nature acts spontaneously for the liberation
of soul.”
Eng. But these illustrations are childish; and can-
not account for all the grand effects which are visible
in the universe. The first one also directly sins against
the Law of Causation. 6 Soul attracted nature when
they were brought near to each other:" we therefore
ask: Who brought them near? Were they eternally
near: then according to the illustration nature must
have been attracted from eternity; and its creation
been produced eternally: an impossibility: for there
was a beginning at a distinct time. This must have
been effected by the moving power of some agent; and
PART III.]
277
IS THERE A GOD ?
thus again we see Kopila's argument leading us to an
intelligent agent possessed of knowledge and power.
The other illustration implies that nature is already
organized, like the udder of a cow, and is organized for
à suitable end: whereas the very argument itself is
based on the idea that nature is then unformed and only
begins to act for the liberation of soul. Both the illus-
trations however are trifling, and are utterly insufficient
to account for the origin and plan of this stupendous
universe. Are we not right, 0 pundit, in rejecting
such an explanation, which at most is analogy, but
contains no proof? And are we not right in consider-
ing that the Laws of Causation imperatively call upon
us to believe in an Intelligent First Cause, who first
put together and set in motion the various material
causes at work in the world? Without him, how could
those causes have begun to work? Kopila has given
his account of their original impulse, but nothing can be
more unsatisfactory.
(6.) Let us next take up the argument from design.
The necessities of causation show that in creation there
must have existed an efficient intelligent cause to put
material causes at work: much more is this shown by
the argument from design. Let me now describe it
to you.
The universe in which we dwell is full of contrivances
of all kinds, great and small. Men continually apply
to them the resources of their minds: and animals also
exhibit in thein their skill. The nest of a bird, the
hole of a field-rat, the nest of a wasp, are all made, and
278
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
made for use: they are not natural, do not grow like
vegetation, but are artificial, and are just adapted for
the use which they are intended to serve. The contri-
vances produced amongst men are seen most frequently
in the work of the artisans. The houses we live in;
tables ; desks; brass pots; mud pottery; the hookah;
paper and ink; books; carriages; boats; are all works
of art, and are intended for certain specific uses.
Now, are these things the mere work of unsentient
matter? No. Every one knows they are the product
of intelligence applied to matter; and that only by
intelligence can they be contrived. We see again that
the amount of contrivance varies with the amount of
intelligence, and of the resources which that intelli-
gence can command. A man whose contrivances and
products are unusually skilful and useful is called
very
clever; while another whose works are clumsy is called
stupid. We have all heard of the celebrated engravers
at Delhi, who cut such beautiful Persian inscriptions
upon precious stones, and can cordially join in the
praise which their skill receives. These are common
facts, but they teach us great principles, upon which we
always act in ordinary life, and which we ought not
lightly to set aside in more important matters. Con-
trivances spring from intelligence. Their skilfulness
varies with the amount of intelligence displayed.
The universe is filled with an immense multitude of
objects, exhibiting these signs of contrivance. The in-
organic masses possess various qualities (I use the term
in the Vaiseshika sense), which admirably fit them for
ונג
PART III.]
279
IS THERE A GOD?
man.
the use of men: coal burns; mud is made into pots and
jars; water washes; metal melts with heat. The or-
ganic again are distinguished by a wonderful structure
designed to promote their growth and their multipli-
cation: and are also wonderfully adapted for the use of
Thus trees grow through the supply of sap in
their myriads of vessels: the bud and the flower pre-
pare the way for fruit.
The horse, the cow, the
elephant, and the camel by their strength and activity
are fitted for the various labours to which men assign
them. , What do we then fairly deduce from these
facts ? We see that they must have been made by
some intelligent Being. Could unintelligent nature,
merely drawn as by a loadstone, or influenced like the
udder of a cow in secreting milk, have made all these
things? It is impossible. Why has every man five
fingers on each hand? Why has every man two eyes
placed in his head and not in his feet: why has he two
ears at the sides of his head and not on the top: why do
fruit trees always bear the same fruit after their kind:
why do mango trees give only mangoes : and plantains,
plantains: why, if rice is sown, does rice spring up:
why, when black threads are woven, does black cloth
result: why is there order, regularity, and exactness in
the world: why does the sun rise in the east day after
day, giving light and warmth: why does the moon
show her bright face at night: why, in a word, is the
world full of order, full of beauty, full of contrivances
for the wealth, the support, and the comfort of men ?
It is because it was made by a Being possessed of
intelligence and wisdom.
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
We see also in the extent of these contrivances and
works the greatness of this intelligent Agent. The
views which the Nyáya, Vaiseshika, and Yóga have
taken up concerning the Creator of the universe, while
true to a certain extent, seem to me to be defective, in
not giving an idea of him sufficiently glorious and
great. Will you kindly give us, 0 pundit, the opinion
which Patanjali has expressed upon this subject?
Gurudás. He declares that Iswara is possessed of
power; for so his name implies: and that in him the
germ of the Omniscient becomes infinite: knowledge in
him reaches its utmost limit: but he gives no parti-
culars concerning his agency in creation.
Eng. But if we do descend to particulars, and
examine the extent to which design and skill are dis-
played by him in the universe, we shall obtain the
most exalted notions of his nature, power, wisdom, and
goodness. We see the proofs everywhere. There is
not a single object in nature that does not exhibit
them: while presented upon the most stupendous scale
in the sky above, they appear in the most minute forms
of animal and vegetable life in this world. An enume-
ration of individual cases would add nothing new to the
argument. They would merely increase the number
and breadth of the instances in which the attributes of
the Creator are exhibited.
We are compelled to believe in the existence and
agency of a First Great Cause, an efficient cause, by
whom the material causes of the universe were first set
in motion. We are compelled, by the system of design
in the universe, to believe that this Great Cause is pos-
PART III.]
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IS THERE A GOD ?
sessed of the highest possible intelligence, power, and
goodness. Such a Being is He, whom we call God:
and whom we ought to honour as the most exalted and
glorious of Beings. As the first Being, the cause of
other beings, he is himself uncaused. He must there-
fore possess within himself the power of existence: he
MUST exist; he cannot but exist; nothing can destroy
his existence. He is therefore pre-eminently self-de-
pendent. The immense extent of the universe; the
vast resources it contains; the greatness of the bodies
of which it is composed; the might, the speed, the
tremendous effects of the natural agents which it con-
tains : all exhibit the immensity of his power.
The
nature, variety, and multitude of the contrivances exhi-
bited throughout the universe, illustrate his boundless
wisdom: and their wonderful effects in securing the
comfort, the health, and the welfare of all living crea-
tures, of securing their safety and ministering to their
enjoyment, show forth his goodness. Such is the Being
whom the great universe presents to men as its creator,
its daily preserver, its daily benefactor, its tender father.
By the side of proofs like these, how insufficient do the
arguments of Kopila, of the Bauddhas, and the Jains
appear, when they wish us to believe that all things
came by chance and sprang from nothing! Let us
reject such a faith: let us hear the voice of Reason,
and accept the conviction that He is, and that He is the
rewarder of them that seek Him. With these words
the dialogue on this subject closed.
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Dialogue Third.
PANTHEISM.
PRELIMINARY NOTE.
The subject of this dialogue is one which has but little
engaged the attention of modern Christian writers in
Europe. Very little has been written against it in
English even in India. As a specimen of the mode in
which discussions intended for England fail to help us
in India, attention may be called to the following argu-
ments against Pantheism, occurring in a popular essay
on Infidelity :-((1.) If true, creation is not a free act,
but a necessity: it is therefore fatalistic. (2.) Pan-
theism inevitably destroys all moral distinctions. (3.) It
shuts out prayer. (4.) It destroys the immortality of
the soul.” To all this a Vedantist would reply that the
writer understood Pantheism to a certain extent, and
had stated some of its consequences: but that there are
other consequences, even of a stronger kind, which he
had quite overlooked. So far, however, from being
shocked by these consequences, and hence rejecting the
system as unsound, the Vedantist would accept the
whole as true, and as perfectly legitimate elements in
the system, which thus proves itself so consistent! To
people trained amid the influences of European society,
the statement of such consequences may perhaps be left
to imply the falsity of any system which teaches them.
But with the Vedantist the argument against his system
PART II.]
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PANTEEISM.
at that point is not even begun: it must take up those
consequences, and show why they are wrong, and why
they pull down the system with them. We are left,
therefore, to go much deeper into the very first princi-
ples of common sense and common morality; the very
foundations of both must be reached before we attain
that firm ground on which the thorough-going Pan-
theist finds he cannot set his foot. Few processes of
reasoning are more difficult than this. Happy is he
who can carry it through successfully.
The next subject which engaged the attention of the
English judge and his friends, was the important doc-
trine of the Vedánta respecting the nature of God and
of the universe. The discussion was conducted chiefly
with Vedantic pundits, although Gurudás was well
acquainted with the tenet and the objections made to
it by Hindu philosophers. Their friend opened it by
asking one of the pundits who were the first teachers of
the Vedantic doctrine.
Vedántin. The Vedanta system was formed by Veda
Vyása; but he is said to have compiled the Brahma
Sutras from the Upanishads of the Vedas. These
Upanishads were communicated by most celebrated
sages of former days: as Angirás, who taught the Mun-
daka, Swetaswatara, Yájnavalkya, and others. They
expounded the doctrine to their disciples; and from
them it has descended to the present time.
Englishman. The most important part of the system
seems to me, the doctrine concerning Brahma: we
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
have already examined the proofs that there is a God
Supreme, ruling over all. Let us now consider the
question, whether God is everything and everything is
God: and first let us hear, 0 pundit! how the doc-
trine is stated by the authorities.
Vedantin. It is said in the Sruti, “ All the universe
is Brahm.” This statement is repeated again and again
through all the Vedánt Upanishads in many forms.
Many illustrations also are given of the way in which
the universe sprang from him. As the threads from
the spider, plants from the earth, hair from animals,
sparks from fire, silk from the silkworm, and trees from
the ground, so the universe sprang from the imperish-
able Brahm.
Eng. But is this asserted of the whole? Is nothing
excepted from the general doctrine ?
Vedántin. Nothing is excepted. On the contrary, in
many passages, individual objects of various classes are
pointed out as exhibitions of him. Thus: “He is fire;
he is the sun and moon; he is wind; he is water.
Thou art woman; thou art man; thou art the youth
and the maiden; thou art all things born: birds of
various plumage; the seasons; the sea, art thou. Thou
hast the universe for thy face.” Many a similar pas-
sage is found in the Katha Upanishad and other autho-
rities.
Eng. Is it plainly declared that the soul of man also
is a product of Brahm's? Are there more passages
than
the one you just quoted ?
Vedántin. Vyása distinctly states: The soul is a por
PART 111.]
285
PANTHEISM.
tion of the Supreme Ruler, as a spark is of fire: the
relation between them is that of whole and part. It is
said in the Upanishads, that on the formation of the
body, Brahma penetrated into it and took up his dwell-
ing in the heart, on the water-lily that is placed there.
Hence the body is called the city of Brahma, with its
nine gates.
Eng. But if the universe is formed from Brahma
and returns to him again, how much of the whole of
his substance is reckoned as contained in these various
objects ?
Vedántin. The Yajur Veda declares that one-fourth
is so employed.
Eng. Are any special arguments advanced in favour
of this doctrine, or does it rest upon the authority of
the Upanishads and other shastres alone ?
Vedantin. No special arguments are used: but Sankar
Acharjya, in commenting on the Brahma Sutras, con-
siders several objections against the doctrine, and thus
confirms its truth. Otherwise it is taught on the direct
authority of the Vedas.
Eng. Very good. Such is the doctrine and the evi-
dence in its favour. One thing, however, strikes us at
the outset; the followers of the Nyáya, who are most
numerous, as well as those of the Sankhya philosophy,
entirely reject the doctrine : though they do not at any
length argue against it: this they do, though Vedic
authority carries weight with all Hindus. Looking at
the doctrine, however, on its own merits, it seems to me
quite erroneous. Its very nature and effects are so
286
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
contrary to reason, that it cannot be sustained by sound
argument: I will endeavour to state clearly several
proofs against it.
First. The great God of the universe ought to be
reckoned a glorious being: but the Vedánt makes him
appear very contemptible. You say, God is everything:
all animals; whatever the universe contains. He is,
therefore, the sun, the moon, the stars; he is mountains ;
he is rivers; he is the sea. He is trees and plants: he
is the flowers, fruits and vegetables. He is all men.
He is not only brahmins and Vaisyas; he is the lowest
caste, the Chandál, the Hári, the Dóm. He is the man
of wisdom; but he is also the thief, the liar, the lowest,
the most degraded of men or women. Can we believe
that? He is all animals: * not only the elephant, the
tiger, the horse; but he is the ravening wolf: he is the
buffalo, the deer: he is the lizard, the scorpion, the
crocodile, the centipede: he is the crow that eats every-
thing, the kite and the hawk : he is the very ants. Does
this give us a proper idea of God? If again Brahm is
everything, then he is the food we eat, the water we
drink; we write with him, we walk on him; we touch
him wherever we go. Does not this present him in a
very insulting and contemptible light? Can any one
really believe that the lizards and flies and centipedes,
our food, our water, our air, are all God? It cannot be.
If again Brahm is everything, it is hew ho does every-
thing, whether performed by animated or inanimate
things. Can we believe that it is God who is eating,
* This is the argument of Origen against Pantheism.
PART III.]
287
PANTHEISM.
drinking, sleeping? Is it God who follows all the sen-
sual habits, and performs the sensual acts, which daily
disgust even men? It is most revolting to the mind
even to speak of such things : but if the Vedánt theory
be true, Brahma, and none but Brahma, does all this
and infinitely more. The honour, therefore, which we
pay to God, and which the Upanishads so often assert
concerning Brahma, prevents us from considering that
he himself actually holds such a degrading position or
performs such degrading acts.
2. I find a second argument against it in this: it con-
founds entirely matter and soul. Though they differ
entirely in properties, it ascribes to them a common sub-
stance; and that is the substance of the divine nature.
It puts all things, as to their origin and nature, on one
level. The intelligent and the unintelligent are alike;
they are Brahm. The potter and his vessels are the
same; the brazier is of the same substance and occupies
no higher rank than his brass pots: the blacksmith is
not better than his frying-pans, anvil and hammer: the
weaver is of the same origin as his loom and thread:
the hunter and his gun; the boatman and his boat;
the builder and his stone, are all alike. Brahma is alike
the substance and material of which all are composed.
Is this true? Are all things in this world on-such a
level ? Are there no things superior in their nature, as
well as their uses, to others ? Are there no things com-
mon; while others are superior? We know that there
are: and especially do we acknowledge that the souls
of men, by their reasoning powers and their ability to
288
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. (PART III.
acquire knowledge, are greatly superior to the earth on
which we tread.
But this theory does more than level them: it actually
confounds the substance of things; and thereby sins
against the law, that like produces like. I mean this.
God, as we have seen, must be a Being full of intelligence,
possessed of the highest power in himself, and of the
highest wisdom. Now intelligence, wisdom, and self-act-
ing power, are attributes of soul. Such attributes he has
given also to the soul of man. We shall see hereafter,
how correctly both the Sánkhya and Nyáya discrimi-
nate between soul and matter on these very grounds.
The substance therefore, of God (so to speak) must be
a substance of which intelligence is an attribute. He
is a spirit, the Great Soul. Now matter, as we call it,
is quite different. Soul thinks, loves, is angry, rejoices,
hopes, sins, does good. Matter cannot do one of these
operations: it can only be known as long or short, hard
or soft, possessed of shape, incompressible, and the like.
The two substances differ entirely in their phenomena,
their capabilities, their uses: and men are compelled,
therefore, to believe that they possess substances of
entirely different kinds. They feel compelled to believe
that iron, which is a hard metal, is a thing entirely dif-
ferent in its very nature from the thinking soul of the
blacksmith who shapes it. But the Vedánt teaches us
they are the same; and it teaches not that there is no
soul, but that all is soul, all has emanated from the
Supreme Soul. It teaches us that the iron and the smith's
soul have the same substratum, although they differ
PART III.]
289
PANTHEISM.
1
entirely in their properties and acts. Now we cannot
believe that. If like produces like, then the substance
of the all-wise, all-powerful God, which must be a
spiritual substance, is not the substance of iron, wood,
and water, which have a material substratum. The
Vedant dogma, therefore, must be erroneous. Take
now a third argument : you allow, 0 pundits ! that
there are many defects in matter, do you not? You
allow that the actions of animals are in many respects
degrading, and that the conduct of men is distinguished
by faults and sins of various kinds.
Vedantin. Certainly. All the authorities show that
the whole universe is enveloped by the three gunas ;
and that, according to the nature of the guna in each
part, and the amount of it, will be the peculiar cha-
racter which it exhibits. There is nothing in the
universe free from the influence of the three gunas,
except the Supreme in his own nature.
Eng. Well. But if the universe is Brahm, then all
these gunas influence him, and the different forms which
a portion of his substance has assumed. Not only does
the Satya Guna influence him, but the Raja Guna, with
all its varieties of passion, and the Tama Guna, with its
numerous degrees of vileness (according to your doc-
trine), rule him, and exhibit their fruits in him. You
have yourselves pointed in strong terms to the corrup-
tion and decay of the world around us, as well as to
the follies and vices of men. Can such things occur to
emanations and forms of the incorruptible God? The
Vedantic world itself has endeavoured to avoid this
U
290
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
consequence of their doctrine, by applying the theory of
the three qualities to those forms. Still it must be from
Brahma that they are derived: the Sánkhya tells us
that they belong to Prakriti; but the Vedanta can find
no other origin for them than him, from whom all
things spring. If men are forms of God, then in their
thefts, adulteries, and murders, it is Brahma who steals,
Brahma who murders, Brahma who is the adulterer.
He is guilty of covetousness, anger, lying, ingratitude to
parents, and impurity of heart. Every fault we find with
men or with each other, all the disorder of human
societies, all the destruction produced by wickedness of
all kinds, we throw entirely and without exception upon
him. Is not this a fair deduction ?
Vedantin. Yes, it is fair; even the Shastres attribute
these evils to him: the Sutras and Gita say so dis-
tinctly. The words of Vyása are: “ The Supreme
Being is designated in the Vedas as the cause of virtue
and vice, as of everything else.” (Colebr. Ved. p. 231.)
He must be, therefore, the author of their results, of
the sorrow, trouble, and misery which follow vice, as
well as of the joy which springs from virtue.
Eng. But who can believe that this is right? Who
can charge upon the great Benefactor and Father of
men all the misery which the world contains ?
There is a fourth argument, cognate with the last one,
which we may next consider. I asked just now, How
can all the defects, decay, and wickedness of the uni-
verse spring from the pure, wise, and happy God? Now
I ask, If the universe be an emanation from Brahm, and
PART III.]
291
PANTHEISM.
If then, you
all its various objects be so many forms of him, why do
they not possess his excellences ? His substance is the
same throughout. If he can be divided into parts, then
every part is endowed with all the divine excellences
which belong to his nature: every part must have these
excellences, for it is essentially divine.
and I, and all men, and animals, and things, are forms
emanating from his divine substance, how is it that the
one-fourth of Brahma contained in the universe does not
exhibit those excellences at all? Everything here is just
the opposite. It ought to be incorruptible : it is full of
decay. It ought to be happy, it is full of misery. It
ought to possess divine power, it is all weakness. It
ought to be wise, the densest ignorance and degradation
rule over all. How, then, can this universe be God?
Nyayist. This same argument is offered by the fol-
lowers of the Nyáya. “ True knowledge, that is, the
Supreme Brahma, is not found in individual souls,
because they are clearly distinguished from it by know-
ledge and ignorance, happiness and unhappiness, and
similar qualities; and in consequence, the difference
between them and Iswara is established. Otherwise
servitude and liberation were names without meaning.
(Bhásh. Parichh. comment. p. 21.)
Eng. Let me present to you, O pundits ! a fifth
argument, which more directly relates to the souls of
Is not Brahma declared to be “ without a
second ?”
Vedantist. He is so declared in many passages. “He
is one, and without a second." The meaning of these
97
men.
U 2
292
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART III.
statements is thus given by Veda Vyása :* “ Nothing
exists but he, though different texts of the Vedas seem
to imply the contrary.”
Eng. If nothing exists but he, the universe con-
tains but one substance. Whence then, 0 pundits ! is
the sense of duality derived ? With one intelligent
substance, and no more, there can be no duality.t Yet
the soul of man possesses the sense of duality and acts
upon it at every moment of our waking existence.
Thus speaks Kopila on this point (Sutra, 42):-
“Not thought alone exists, because there is the in-
tuition of the external.” Every thought of the human
* Sutras, iii. 2. 29.
† The wonderful doctrine of the Trinity relieves Christianity alto-
gether of several of those difficulties which the acute Hindu sages
detected as necessarily attaching to any doctrine-that God is abso-
lutely one and without a second. It would seem to follow that if God be
absolutely and solely one, if his knowledge be always perfect, and his
nature unchangeable, his ideas would everlastingly be the same ; one
notion or one state only would be experienced; that state would be
without contrasts, and would seem to be equivalent to insensibility.
The Sánkhya philosophers felt this when they say: “ The cause of the
world cannot be a God who is fixed in one monotonous state; because
there is neither the possibility of action or of knowledge in such
a Being.”-(Dr. Ballantyne's Vedanta Sutras, p. 16.) We cannot
wonder, then, at the Hindu doctrine of Brahma sleeping alternately
with waking. The cause of any awakening under such circumstance
they have not explained: they can only, with M. Cousin, assume the
thing to be proved, and say that he wakes from a necessity of his own
nature, and begins to create, because his " distinguishing character is
an absolute creative force, which cannot but pass into activity.” Con-
sistently they ought to hold that awakening is impossible; but the
fact of a creation upsets the doctrine. The Bible clears all this away.
With perfect unity of essence, knowledge, and purpose in the Divine
nature, there is plurality: a plurality which becomes the source of eter-
nal activity, eternal bliss; which can contemplate for ages a mighty
purpose, and realize it only when the fulness of time is come.
PART III.]
293
PANTHEISM.
soul, every notion of which we are conscious, and every
act which we perform, implies to us that we differ
both from other persons and other things. Myriads of
objects exist around us, which we call by different
names, and employ for different purposes : every
thought and every affirmation concerning them implies
a mental affirmation that they are different from us,
and from each other. We also have different states
of mind, at different periods, in relation to different
objects. We act for various reasons : possessed of
limited knowledge, we examine the consequences of
actions; and, determine, therefore, what course to
pursue. Here is duality at every step: a conviction
of differences between beings, differences between
things, differences between rights, differences between
opinions and states of mind. This duality is felt by all
men, in all places, and has been so felt during all ages.
What do men mean by “mine," "yours," if there is
no duality ? Under the theory that everything is
Brahm, and there is no duality, such a universal con-
viction of duality, and such universal acting upon it,
would be impossible.
Closely allied to this argument, О pundits! is another.
I have spoken of the conviction of duality in the soul,
which the soul is every moment asserting: let us now
consider the actual differences between things. These
actual differences entirely refute the pantheistic doc-
trine which the Vedánta advocates. That doctrine
says there is no real difference, no real duality: those
which we observe are only apparent. I think, however,
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
it can be shown that these differences are real, and
therefore overturn the doctrine. These differences are
shown in two ways:-(a.) In the universe there is a
multitude of contrarieties in respect to condition. Some
beings are happy, others are miserable; some are rich,
others are very poor; some rule, others serve. Some,
again, are virtuous; others are loaded with crime;
others are partly good and partly evil. All grades of
character lie between. How can this be, if all be
equally parts of Brahm, one and indivisible?
They
should be all perfectly alike. In the same way, how
can rights exist, if all be Brahm? One individual has
not different rights over the same thing. Yet such
rights exist in the world, and are protected by law.
Your land is yours; my house is mine: but if all be
Brahm, my right is your right; yours is identical with
mine. Or, rather, all right ceases; for the property
we hold is on a level with ourselves. Will men listen
to such a doctrine ? They acknowledge duality; and
they defend it by force, by laws, by police and punish-
ments. Will they believe that there are no such things
as rights, and that “mine” and “yours are mere
names ?
Again. (6.) Not only do these conditions differ, but
some are directly the contradictory of others.
Your
Shastres declare how the gods even quarrelled with
each other; how, at the feast of Daksha, Mahadeo
fought with other gods, and, amongst other deeds, de-
prived Surjya of his teeth. So do men quarrel; so do
rebels disobey their king's commands; so do foreign
PART III.]
295
PANTHEISM.
enemies make war. Some men punish, others are
punished ; some reward, others receive the rewards;
some love, others hate. These are perfectly contradic-
tory of each other. But, according to the Vedanta,
God does all this to himself. He sins against himself;
he takes himself prisoner, tries himself in court, con-
demns himself to prison, and punishes himself by fasten-
ing himself in gaol. The existence of these contrarieties
is a complete answer to the doctrine that all is Brahm,
and that there is no duality.
Vedantin. But there is a special answer, O friend !
furnished to this argument by Sankar Acharjya. An
objector tells him, as you have done, that in the world
there exists the enjoyer and the enjoyed; and asks,
How can Brahma be both ? Sankar replies: “Such are
the changes of the sea. Foam, waves, bubbles, are not
different from the sea itself, though a difference is per-
ceived in them by turns. Nor do these changes obtain
each other's condition. So the enjoyer and enjoyed do
not obtain the condition of each other; they remain
separate."
Eng. This argument of Sankar does not, ( pundit!
meet the difficulty. As to the illustration, it must first
be noticed that the foam, waves, billows, and bubbles
of the sea are only different forins of the same sub-
stance, viz. salt water. They differ in appearance, but
they are water still, and possess all the essential pro-
perties of water. They are produced from the water
certain causes, as the winds, and subside into water
again. They do not differ in character and qualities
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from one another, as the other objects of the universe
do. The same sea cannot be both land and water at
once: it cannot be foam and mountains, billows and trees,
bubbles and grass, at one and the same time. But that
is what the Vedanta asserts of Brahm. Part of his
substance quarrels with another part; part is vicious,
part is virtuous; part is matter, part is soul; though
the essence of all ought really to be identical. The
difference is not merely one of form, it is a difference
between characters, which are not only distinct but
contradictory
I might add a seventh argument here, showing
especially the inconsistency of the Vedas, and of the
disciples of the Vedánt, in teaching the worship of dif-
ferent gods and the observance of distinctions in caste.
If Brahm be one great being, without a second, there
cannot be separate gods at all. One limb of a living
being is not a separate animal or a separate life by
itself; it cannot have a separate consciousness of its
own, and especially it cannot exercise by itself the
rights of the complete being from which it is taken.
There can, therefore, on the pantheist theory, be no
Mahadeva, no Indra, no Ráma, and no Káli: not one
of them can possibly possess the right of acting as a
separate god. How inconsistent it is, then, 0 pundits !
to honour them as such, and to allow the common
people to honour them as real living beings, when, after
all, they are nonentities ! How inconsistent, moreover,
it is for the Upanishads and the Gita to recommend
the worship of these gods to the common people as
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PANTHEISM.
beneficial, when, on the Vedantic argument alone,
these deities must at once cease to be gods and to exer-
cise influence as such.* Besides, if it be true that all
is Brahm, the worshippers are Brahm as well as the
deities; and what service, what reverence do they owe
to them? Again, if all be Brahm, how can the dis-
tinctions of caste be maintained ?- for all men have
one origin, and all possess the substance of Brahm.
Why should you, then, reckon some high and some
low, some as pure and others impure? The consistent
Vedantist ought to give up both the worship of the
gods and the observance of caste, but the disciples of
the system do neither.
Vedúntin. But the Shastres approve of both: the
Vedas
say
that both gods and castes were ordained by
Brahm: and encourage the worship of the former, as
well as commend the observance of the latter.
Eng. But if, 0 pundit, the Veda teaches doctrines
which are opposed to one another, where lies the fault.
Is it in us, who find it out; or in the book which
so teaches ? The Vedas do teach such things ; and this
doctrine, which we are discussing, compels a wise man
to condemn them as teachers of religious error.
* Augustin, in his discussion with the Manichees, brings forward
another argument against pantheism, which, however, is of no use to
us. He says, if all beings are parts of God, and a course of study is
good for men, in order that they may obtain “wisdom” and absorp-
tion, consistently the gods ought to undergo the same labours and by
the same plan!
The Vedantists allow that the argument is sound, and show that
the gods have so acted. The Chhandogya Upanishad (viii. 11.) declares
tbat Indra was a student under Prajápati for a hundred years before
he attained “ true knowledge !"
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Vedántist. We have heard, O friend, all your argu-
ments against this great doctrine, and can acknowledge
that in appearance they do condemn it. No doubt there
seems to be in the soul of man a consciousness of
duality: a perception of good and evil. There seem to
be in the world contrariety of condition, opposite con-
ditions and opposite courses of good and evil. Even
the Shastres speak of different classes of beings, and
describe them as acting independently. But all this is
consistent with the theory. Apparently, men and things
do differ from Brahma; but the Shastres prove that
they do not differ in reality. There is an illusion
(Márá) in men's consciousness, a Máyá enveloping the
universe, which makes these appearances; and it is from
the influence of this Máyá that so many errors have
been propagated instead of the true doctrine of the
Vedanta All the Vedantic authorities refer to the
ignorance and delusion in which man is bound : and it
is the object of the system to free him entirely from
their influence.
Eng. I am quite aware, O pundit, of this explana-
tion; and have perceived also that it is given more
especially by the later schools of the system. It is
certainly clear to my mind that if man's mind is not
filled by delusions, like those of a dreamer, it is im-
possible, for many reasons, to believe that the universe
is God: and that we are all parts of the Supreme.
Either pantheism is false, or the consciousness and
reason of man are bound by illusion. You accept the
latter alternative. You maintain that the doctrine is
PART III.]
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PANTHEISM.
true: and that the reason why men believe it false is
because they really are deceived by their illusions of
soul. Let us now examine this point: it has most
suitably been reserved to the last.
Taking, then, this doctrine of Máyá, as expounded by
the Gíta and the Vedanta Sár, we are taught that all
which men are accustomed to look upon as real, all
things of which they seem daily to be conscious, are
unreal. They appear to differ from one another in
name, and form, and properties; but they do not really
differ. They have only been drawn, if drawn at all,
from one substance. The illusion which makes them
appear real to us has deceived us; and as we are parts
of God, the illusion has enveloped the Supreme himself.
“ The illusive power of ignorance produces the universe
from the egg of Brahma." The glorious sun which en-
lightens the world by day, the moon which lessens its
darkness by night, are unreal. The stupendous sea,
the glory of our world, has no existence: the moun-
tains, rivers, forests, and fields are illusory appearances.
No beasts really roam the boundless wilds, no birds
really warble their sweet songs. The mighty cities of
men, that include the abodes of the wealthy, the huts
of the poor, the bazars for trade, the courts of justice,
the shops of artisans, are all illusive too. The very
world has no existence. These things appear to exist in
the eye, the ear, and the touch of him who imagines
them; but they do not really exist. Reality is un-
known. The different conditions of men, the different
bonds by which they are associated, are unreal. The
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PHILOSOPHY.
relationships of father and son, husband and wife, ruler
and subject, master and servant, are a deception. Men
are not really companions, fellow-subjects, or friends :
the duties which spring from these relationships are not
really obligatory; pleasure and pain do not truly exist;
real virtue and vice are unknown; the rules of law, the
instructions of wisdom, the pleasures of piety, are only
imaginary: all that is wise, good, and holy has no abso-
lute foundation. The world with all its substances, its
variety of beings, its principles of pleasure, morality,
and religion, is all a LIE. There is nothing true in our
whole life, or in the history and continued existence
of all the nations of the world. Everything is false :
and the deceiver is the Supreme Brahm: who is thus
engaged for innumerable years in deceiving himself !
What an awful conclusion to come to !
Who can
believe that this doctrine gives a fair and true account
of the real system of the universe ? Who can believe
that he himself is a lie; his life, a lie; the world, a lie!
The judgment with which we have been en-
dowed, which reasons on such sound principles, works
on sound system, examines so wisely and builds up such
wonderful masses of knowledge, is made and constructed
too well to let us for a moment imagine that the Creator
intended, in forming us and all men in the world, only
to lead us astray. We are formed to establish cer-
tainty. Can the God who so formed us have planned
everything to delude?
To this explanation respecting Máyá, we reply (a)
that the doctrine greatly insults God. It is said that he
No one.
PART III.]
301
PANTHEISM.
assumes these forms, and produces these distinctions for
illusive sport.
He has made intelligent beings from
himself, and made them so as to appear independent,
only to please himself. He has enveloped them in a
Máyá, which leads them into error, and which has
governed millions of men for ages, yet he has done this
to please himself: their errors, wanderings, doubts, and
troubles give him pleasure. All the acts that are done,
he does : yet it appears that it is not he that does them.
Whether these acts be acts of devotion, or of wickedness,
of impurity, cruelty, and blasphemy, or of benevolence
and mercy, he does them all; yet he deceives men into
believing that there is a difference between them, while
really and truly there is not. Is not all this blasphemy
against God?
(6.) If men are Brahm, and possess the nature of
Brahm, it is impossible that they could have been de-
ceived in this way. Men of confined knowledge are
deceived in consequence of their imperfect acquaintance
with things around them. But Brahma knows every-
thing. Brahma too is really one and indivisible. How
then can different portions of him be so deceived as to
forget their own origin, their very nature, and the
knowledge in which, so to speak, they shared. They
could not forget. Neither is it possible in any way
for
God to deceive himself.
(c.) Again, if men be bound in the illusions of Máyá,
it is impossible that they could ever have been taught
that they were so. Here I may say: If my mind is
deceived by Máya, how am I, while still in Máyá, to
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
know it. The knowledge that I am in Máyá, is itself.
Máyá. All things around and within me are full of
deception. That very piece of knowledge is part of the
errors by which I am involved. How am I to distin-
guish between what is error and what is truth? The
knowledge of the illusion is itself illusion; the power
which recognizes the confusion, is itself confused. We
can understand this by reference to a class of people,
who are really under illusion, viz. the insane. We
know that the insane lie under various delusions. Some
call themselves kings, some reckon themselves wealthy
men with numerous attendants: and so on. By calling
them insane, we mean that their reason is perverted,
and cannot judge of things like the reason of other men.
We cannot therefore accept their conclusions. Can any
insane man, whose reason is thoroughly deluded, be
made to understand that he is insane; and can any such
be brought deliberately to say, “I am in all respects
insane?" He cannot understand the difference between
insanity and sanity: how then can he pronounce him-
self insane? To speak thus, requires a large amount of
sagacity and reason. He therefore who can, delibe-
rately and with understanding, come to the conclusion,
“I am insane," shows by that act that he is not insane
at all. In the same way, if all men are deluded by
Máyá, it is impossible that in their delusion they should
be able to understand that they are so. It is impossible
that they could sit down, as we are doing, and discuss
the various arguments to prove that they are. Such
conduct implies that their power of judging is free from
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303
PANTHEISM.
Máyá, and is thereby enabled to contrast Máyá with
certainty and with truth. It proves that amidst universal
illusion their own judgment is a thing fixed and free
from doubt. If we can see the uncertainty of all things,
and pronounce that everything is illusion, we must in
respect to that judgment be ourselves certain.
(d.) Still more clear also is it, that men involved in
Máyá could never undertake a long course of study to
get themselves out of their illusions. How, in such a
case, is the true knowledge of Brahma to be communi-
cated to those whose every thought and every judgment
is led astray by error? No one can expect the insane
to do any such thing, and the attempt is never made
by insane persons themselves. Yet those deluded by
Máyá are invited to undergo a long course of severe
Vedantic study, in order to cure them of illusions and
set their judgment of the universe right. This only
proves that in respect to its followers, the Vedánt does
not apply its own doctrine.
Vedantin. The meaning which you have attached to
some of the Vedantic authorities does not, however,
express the views of all. The system taught in the
Vedanta Sár does not hold that all material substances
and all souls are in all respects identical with the
Supreme; but teaches that so far as we know these
things we know only their appearances or phenomena :
and that the only real and existing substance which
underlies them is the Supreme: without him they can-
not be.
Eng. I am quite aware of this doctrine of the recent
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Vedant schools : and can easily believe that thinking
men must give up the gross pantheism against which I
have been speaking. Even that doctrine, however, is
by no means a sound one: and the system of the Ve-
dánta Sár, which contains the explanation of Maya or
Illusion is open to several of the objections I have
raised. But I have referred to the doctrines taught in
the oldest and most honoured authorities of the system.
The refined doctrine taught by the Vedanta Sár is
very different from that of the Sutras, the Upanishads,
and the Gita, where the identity between the Supreme
and all objects in the universe is asserted in plainest
terms, objections are answered, the system is rendered
complete, and its great consequence, the making God
the author of sin, is set forth in clear and direct terms.
Philosophers may refine such a doctrine: but the com-
mon people of Hindustan have made the grossest use
of it. It has blinded them to the real nature of sin;
and made them fatalists in the hour of calamity. And
were not men often better than their creed, did they
not listen to the conscience within them, the evil effects
of this mighty error among the Hindus might be much
greater than they now are.
PART III.]
305
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
Dialogue Fourth.
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
PRELIMINARY NOTE.
In the next two dialogues we have the most difficult
subjects of all to treat of. I have no hope whatever
that the discussion will be considered satisfactory. The
more deeply the subject of creation is studied, the more
clearly does it appear to my own mind that bare reason-
ing upon the phenomena of the universe is insufficient
to settle the question: and that any course of argument,
which is drawn out on principles that Greek and Hindu
philosophers will allow, must of necessity be incomplete
and inconclusive. To show this, let us briefly examine
the capabilities of the argument and consider how far it
is possible for proof to go.
Supposing the entire creation to be a pyramid, in-
duction and analysis inquiring into its origin, and
tracing its progress, according to the strictest applica-
tion of the Laws of Causation, bring us, without ques-
tion, to its apex. There we find seated an Intelligent
Being, who is the First Cause, endowed with power
and wisdom, sufficient to have developed that universe
from the earliest causes in the series. Since two causes
are required to produce one new effect, we are certain that
at the commencement of that series there must have
been at least two material atoms to begin with. The
Framer of the Universe must be an Intelligent Being,
Y
306
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
seeing how greatly thought, design and foresight have
been exhibited in the universe. He must have existed
before the work of development began; He must there-
fore have been uncaused; that is, 'He must have been
self-existent: and judging from what He has done, His
power, wisdom, skill and goodness must be of the most
surpassing kind.
Can we go higher in this process, and seek for some-
thing earlier
Were those two original atoms pro-
duced from one by the Supreme Intelligence? Were
they produced from no material at all in some way that
only His superior wisdom knows? Does He now occupy
by His presence any part of that space which lies
beyond the limits of the universe, and which the
very
weakness of our intellect compels us to believe to be
unbounded on every side? Are His power and skill,
which are proved to be immensely great, even greater
than what is proved, and in reality perfect and unli-
mited ? Has He power to create matter? Has He power
to create souls ? Did He at first exist alone in the vast
ether? And did He at some special time or times cause
matter and soul to begin their existence; and people
one portion of space with substances and living crea-
tures ?
It seems to me that creation itself does not give a
complete reply to these questions. We, who are a part
of creation, produced after it began, can never learn
from nature itself, when, how, and from whom it first
began to be. Vast as we see the universe to be, it is
still limited: vast as are the designs, the power, the
PART III.]
307
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
wisdom displayed in its structure, they too are limited.
We know that they must be great enough to produce
what now exists and has existed: they may be some-
what greater : but we can by no means prove them all
to be unlimited. All around us is finite: the infinite is
unproved. Probable it may be: the Architect of the
Universe may possess perfect attributes; but the limited
universe does not prove them perfect.
Dr. Buchanan, in his excellent lectures, suggests that,
as the mind of man has the power to pass from con-
cretes to generals, from particulars to universals, and
does so in a thousand things connected with the facts
and phenomena around us, so we can pass from the
limited universe to the perfect God. I feel hesitation
however in accepting on such a subject the testimony
of Christian writers, who have already got the notion
from another source. I fear that, like those who saw
Columbus make the egg stand firm on its broken end,
they argue from reason, in favour of a doctrine which
reason would not have discovered for itself. It is a
striking fact, that while the ancients did rise in thou-
sands of cases from particulars to generals in common
things; and while they used the terms “ Almighty
Power” and “Omniscient,” no Hindu or Greek phi-
losopher ever rose to the idea of a creation properly so
called. They never got to a higher stage than that of
placing God in relation to the universe where the
potter stands in reference to his vessels. That eternal
matter, either in mass or atoms, is conceivable, we
learn from the fact that hundreds of the learned and
X 2
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PART IIT.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
acute both in Greece and India have believed in it:
and they accepted that explanation in reference to the
universe, without imagining the far nobler theory laid
down in the Word of God. So much for the capabili-
ties of the argument. Let us consider the best mode of
treating the discussion.
a. The Hindu systems assert the eternity of matter :
is it fair to throw upon us the burden of disproving
it ? Have we not the right of insisting that they shall
prove what they assert? Otherwise we are called upon
to prove a negative: and to prove it by simply pointing
to the defects of matter, or its uses, or the obvious pur-
pose of its constitution. Even if we can show that
there is a Power sufficient to create it, we do not prove
that it was so created. It may possibly have been eternal
after all.
b. On the other hand, it is clear that they do not
directly prove that matter is eternal. All they can say
is that matter in its present form can be and must be
traced back to the fewest primal causes. Then, because
they do not know whence those causes came, they boldly
declare their material is eternal. That however is
merely a theory to explain a fact. Undoubtedly some
explanation is necessary: the primal causes must come
from somewhere: but it by no means follows that
theirs is the right one: and in point of fact it is impos-
sible to prove that it is the right one. Another expla-
nation, another theory may be suggested. The Supreme
Intelligence, whose eternal existence is certain, and whose
power and skill are proved to be immensely great, may
PART 111.]
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THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
If we
possibly possess sufficient power to provide these ma-
terials by creation, in some way above the comprehen-
sion of our minds. To assert in answer to this sugges-
tion, that a material cause for such primal agencies is
necessary, is to assume the very point to be proved.
We may not understand either the nature or process of
creation; it is impossible that we should do so. Yet he
may really create these original substances. Nay more,
we must allow it to be perfectly possible for such a
Being to produce many other kinds of substrata besides
mind and matter ; and many other qualities of which we
are totally ignorant. Had we seventy-two senses in-
stead of five, we should probably find out hundreds of
properties in the substratum of matter, which hitherto
we have never conceived. All this is possible.
can suggest an origin of matter as sufficient as that of
its eternity, our theory has as much right to be accepted
as theirs.
c. In this difficulty I think it perfectly fair to avail
ourselves of the admissions made by the systems, that
God is omnipotent and knows all things. However
they got the idea (and I think it is not difficult to show
that it is a remnant of patriarchal teaching, the full force
of which is not perhaps understood), there it is: and
we have a right to use it and show what it involves.
Perfect power on the part of God is quite sufficient to
account for the origin both of matter and of human
souls.
d. With these views, it appears to me that the
strongest argument against the eternity of matter is
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
found in the fact that it has been made for a grand
purpose; that every property and attribute it possesses
has been interwoven into the system of the universe;
and that it is subordinated and controlled entirely by
him who rules that universe. Believing him omnipotent,
it is far more reasonable to suppose that he produced
it for himself, than that he found it accidentally pos-
sessing the very properties which he required.
e. It is wearisome to plod one's way through these
courses of argument, when one single word of authority
carries us straight to the truth. “In the beginning
God created the heavens and the earth.” But all shows
us the truth of the assertion that we really learn the
fact not from the works of God but from his word.
Through TAITH we understand that the worlds were
framed by the word of God, so that things which are
seen were not made of things which do appear.”
66
Having shown that it is impossible on numerous
grounds for men of wisdom to regard the universe as
identical in substance with the Supreme God, the judge,
on his next visit to his pundit friends, took up another
theory advocated among them as to the origin of matter.
This was the theory advocated by the Sánkhya and
Nyáya, in two separate forms, that matter is eternal. In
discussing this subject, he addressed himself to his friend
Gurudás, and to some Vaiseshika pundits, who had
come to meet him for that object. On opening the dis-
cussion, he proceeded to say :-
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THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
Eng. We have seen by numerous proofs that all
intelligent men must acknowledge the existence of an
Eternal God, supreme in wisdom, almighty in power,
and full of goodness, a Being of intelligence, who has
had supreme control in the formation and preservation
of the universe. We now turn to that universe itself,
and ask, what is its origin? whence did it come? We
have seen that we cannot regard it as a form of Brahma
himself, for it is material while he is spiritual. There
were different theories advocated in Europe respect-
ing these questions among ancient philosophers: some
thought that the world itself was eternal; others, merely
that its material had existed from eternity.
Gurudás. No Hindu pundit says that the world is
eternal. On the contrary, every system among us, in-
cluding the Vedant, traces the present constitution of
the three worlds to original elements : it is these ele-
ments that are regarded as eternal.
Eng. Very true, O friend. I am aware that the
opinion is not a Hindu one: and I merely mentioned
it, in order to show that other philosophers besides those
of Hindustan have speculated on the subject. The opi-
nion again is easily disproved. All the causes now at
work in the world are but the effects of previous
causes: and those causes again spring from causes
preceding them. Active causes produce changes : how
then, with these causes ever in operation from age to
age, can the world which now is, have existed as it is,
unchanged from everlasting? It is a contradiction in
terms to say so. Besides, the great sciences of chemistry
312
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
and geology prove beyond all doubt that the most nume-
rous and important changes have taken place upon the.
surface of the earth. Seas once stood over what is now
dry land: mountains have given place to valleys, and
valleys to mountains. Mountains have been worn down
by the washing of water, as the Himalaya are being
worn now: and their particles have gone to form fertile
plains far distant from them, like the rich plain of the
Ganges. Thus a long succession of ages gives the earth
a different appearance from that which it once bore.
These sciences show that the earth in its present form
had a beginning: they teach what was the lowest stratum
of its surface, as the eye now sees the uppermost, and
they show how these successive strata were formed and
deposited in the course of many ages. But we need not
trouble ourselves with this theory. Let us turn at once
to the theories of the Sánkhya and Nyáya systems. The
Vaiseshika traces all substances to atoms, and declares
these atoms to be from everlasting : while the Sánkhya
traces all things up to a final nature to which the same
eternal origin is ascribed. Will you, O friend, kindly
state the Sankhya doctrine upon the subject?
Gurudás. The Sankhya traces all present existences
to twenty-five principles. Sixteen of these are again
traced to the five elements : these again to five subtle
elements. The five subtle elements are traced to self-
consciousness: this to intellect: and intellect is traced
to nature. Soul is represented as a separate existence
never modified.
Eng. Nature, then, you reckon as the last of all, and
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313
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
therefore the first producer. But why is production
attributed to Nature and not to Soul?
Gurudás. Kopila, O friend, gives the reason of this.
He teaches that all the products in the universe are
distinguished by the effects of the three gunas: all the
thoughts of men, as well as the objects around us. Now
these three gunas are not in the soul, they are in nature :
hence, many of these things called intellectual, and
deemed to belong to the soul, have really sprung from
nature. He says (Sutra 114): “ Anything else than
nature involves a contradiction to the threefold aspect
of the products."
Eng. But this does not get rid of the difficulty. To
avoid the alligator behind, Kopila leaps into the mouth of
the tiger in front: but he does not thereby save his life.
To avoid the difficulty about the gunas, he confounds
material with spiritual products. But let me ask, on
what ground does he declare nature to be from eternity?
Gurudus. He shows by his reasoning that na re is
the first producer. Soul is inactive: nature therefore
produces. Now, unless something spring from nothing,
nature cannot have been produced from anything before
it. It is uncaused, and therefore eternal. On this the
sage argues :
“ Múle mulábhávát amúlam múlam."
“ Froin the want of a root in a root, the root (of all) is
rootless."
As the root is the commencement of a tree and has no
root to itself: so the uncaused producer of all things has
no beginning and is therefore eternal.
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Eng. But, О pundit, while the principle is a good one,
it will not in this case prove the eternity of matter: for
as I have already shown you,* we must believe that the
Primal Agent in the production of the universe is an
intelligent agent; that He is God. So say Vyása,
Patanjali and Kanáda. It would appear, therefore,
that Kopila gives no special argument in favour of the
eternity of matter : as distinct from that which shows
the original intelligent producer of the universe. But
Kanáda and the Nyáyists have done so, have they not?
Vaiseshik. Yes, O friend: they accept the great doc-
trine of a God; but they also believe that in forming
the universe, he had the eternal atoms of various ele-
ments to commence with: and that without them the
universe could not have been formed at all.
Eng. How many kinds of atoms, 0 pundit, do you
consider uncaused ?
Vaiseshik. We reckon nine substances, of which only
five are in their eternal form atomic: viz., “mind,"
earth, water, light, and air. The other four substances
are soul, ether, time, and space, each having qualities
and actions. All the substances are eternal. Time
and space have the qualities of infinity and ubiquity:
and ether fills all space.
Eng. Apart from the question of the eternity of these
substances, the classification of them seems in itself
deficient. Of soul and mind I need not now speak : as
we shall discuss them separately hereafter. But I can-
not but ask, How is it that TIME and SPACC are num-
* See Dialogue on the Being of a God.
PART III.]
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Let us
bered among substances? I am aware of Kanáda's reason
for making them so; viz. from his very definition of
substance: but this is insufficient. They are not things
at all. They are merely the conditions upon which
existence is possible. If a being exists he inust exist
somewhere: and if he continue to exist, the continuance
supposes time. They are thus conditions and attributes
of existence. We see the universe around us.
imagine it not to exist: take away this world and all its
inhabitants; the moon, the stars, the sun: leave only
God; still the space exists: all the place which these
beings and these substances occupied is empty, but the
place itself exists still. The space does not depend
on my idea of it: or on my knowledge of it: or on
the knowledge of any one else. It existed before I
was born: before men at all were made. It existed
before the universe was formed. The space within
which our planets and comets move existed before they
were placed there : it was then empty: now it is partly
occupied. So it is with time. We mean by time suc-
cession of existence: its continuance during successive
moments. The world exists, and has existed for years :
before its production space also existed: and continued
to exist. Space must have existed from eternity, and
continued to exist in time, whether occupied or unoc-
cupied. These things, however, we can see are not
things. The Creator, the First Cause, has always
existed : and continued to exist. He must have existed
somewhere. He who exists nowhere and for no period
of time is a nonentity. That somewhere is space: that
316
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
period is time: space may be, as far as we know, infi-
nite in extent: as time is endless in the succession of its
moments. But they are quite independent of a creation,
a universe: and are merely the conditions under which
anything exists at all. To reckon them among sub-
stances must then be regarded as a mistake. The
Nyáyists and others have made a mistake too in count-
ing ether* among the substances. From the qualities
ascribed to it, it appears to differ from space only in
density, for it is coextensive with space: but there is
no proof whatever of its existence : and we need not
believe in it till such proof is given.
Regarding the atoms of the four substances, viz.
water, light, earth, and air, it is easy to show that these
substances cannot be reduced to ultimate atoms of the
same kind as themselves : for they are themselves com-
pounds, and their simple constituent elements are well
known. So far, therefore, the teaching of the system
must be regarded as erroneous: no such atoms exist.
But I am aware that Kanáda did not teach the doctrine
from an actual examination of these substances, and
from an actual sight of their atoms : he only considered
by reason that they must have such ultimate atoms,
especially as the Vedas referred to such. Neither did
he actually inspect the combinations of atoms, for he
himself teaches that they are invisible, and are only
* Ether was invented in the days of the Upanishads merely to
account for the origin of sound: an object being required for hear-
ing, just as light and so on are objects of the other four senses.
The Greeks were not hampered by this theory: and therefore believed
only in the four substances.
PART III.]
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THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
discovered from their aggregation in compounds. The
assertions he has made concerning their size and their
combination are mere assertions, of which there is no
proof. All statements concerning such things ought to
be the result of direct examination and experiment.
Modern chemists have made many such researches, and
it is from the results of their examination that the
doctrine of four elements is rejected. They do not
reject the doctrine of atoms in general. That may be
true, or it may not: they know nothing for certain.
They have merely shown at present that all material
substances may be traced to fifty-nine originals: and
they hope to prove that these are reducible to a smaller
number. Be this as it may, what is the reason given,
O pundit, for regarding atoms as ETERNAL ?
Vaiseshik. Kanáda declares that every atom is eternal,
without beginning and end (nityam), and also without a
measure. He says too that atoms are uncaused, putting
the case thus: There is necessarily a regressus from
compounds to simples: and in this process we come
somewhere to an end. The point finally obtained is
eternal. Otherwise at the last step we must admit the
production of an effect from something which is not its
material cause. This argument both shows the exist-
ence of atoms, and that they are eternal, because they
are the uncaused commencements of visible material
products. The argument is illustrated by the case of
the potter. A potter requires mud for the production
of his pottery: and also his wheel: if there be no mud,
there will be no pots. So when the Supreme Soul
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
formed the universe, how could he have done so with-
out material to begin with ?
Eng. It seems to me then, 0 pundit, that the argu-
ment offered for the eternity of atoms resembles closely
the argument offered for the eternity of nature by the
Sánkhyas. It is said by each that products can be all
traced back and back, and that the point at which a
stoppage is made is eternal. Both the systems do the
same thing for different purposes. The Sankhya does
it to find the First Cause in unintelligent nature: the
Vaiseshika, in order to find out the primeval elements
of the material world. But it appears to me that the
argument cannot stop where it does. You come to
eternal matter, in order to avoid the regressus ad infi-
nitum. But that regressus must be made. All things
physical are effects, produced from causes: those causes
are the effects of previous causes: these we trace back
and back, and still back: and so long as we confine
ourselves to such causes, there is no STOPPING. The
reasoner must go on. Hence the difficulty pointed out
in the case of the Sánkhya: “When did Prakriti begin
to act?" It is impossible to find an answer.
The
infinite regressus must be made, until we reach some
adequate cause from which matter or atoms could have
been produced. The mind compels us to make it; yet
in point of fact such regressus is absolutely impossible.
How then can the eternity of matter, whether as Pra-
kriti or as atoms, be proved by such an argument, either
by the followers of the Sánkhya or of the Nyáya? The
argument has no base to stand upon. Besides, since
PART III.]
319
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
you feel the difficulty of accounting for the origin of
matter, and fall back upon an impossible regressus of
causes to explain it, may I ask you, would you not feel
the difficulty disappear, if we could discover some other
sufficient cause from which it could be originated ?
Gurudás. Certainly, O friend, it would vanish away;
and we might then give up all other attempts to explain
the origin of matter. But such a cause must be an
adequate cause : as Kopila says, “A thing possible is
made from that which is competent to produce it.”
(Sutra 118.) Where shall we find such a competent
producer? We accept the eternity of Prakriti, because
we do not see how it can be anything else but eternal.
Eng. I think we find that competent producer in the
Great God by whom the universe is ruled. And, in
addition to establishing such a cause, which would
render the doctrine of the eternity of matter unneces-
sary,
I think we find substantial reasons in the very
constitution of matter itself for considering that it could
not have been eternal. My arguments, then, divide
themselves into two classes, derived from the character
of matter, and from the character of God. First, let
us look at the character of matter. You will allow,
O pundit, that whatever is uncaused, must be self-
existent: and being self-existent, so far as we can judge,
will be independent.
Gurudás. Certainly, O friend, we allow these notions.
For they have been advanced several times during our
discussions. It is because we reach an ultimate mate-
rial, which is uncaused, that we say it is eternal. That
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
which is eternal must exist by itself: the power of
existence is not derived, it must therefore belong essen-
tially to that substance, whether it be soul or nature:
this is what we mean by self-existent.* Again, if a
potter makes a jar, and a weaver some cloth, those
articles belong to them, for they have produced them.
The right of ownership belongs to all who produce
such things by their own efforts and skill. Beings and
substances which are self-existent have that right in
themselves. The Bhásha Parichheda says, “ Dependence
is the attribute of everything save eternal substances.”
Eng. So it seems to me, judging from the circum-
stances of the world around us. But look at the posi-
tion of matter in the universe. Everywhere it is
passive and subject to the control of intelligent beings.
Animals employ it. Man uses it in a thousand forms.
But chiefly must we notice that it is everywhere under
the control of God. There is no single portion of it,
in any place, which seems free from His sway.
.
What-
ever portion of matter we examine, we find that,
whether organized or inorganic, it has been moulded
by wisdom and skill. All is adapted for use. So far
as we can see, the entire universe constitutes one vast
system, governed by one Soul. The heavens are con-
structed on a plan. They are under the influence of
fixed laws, and all the bodies in the sky obey those laws
with perfect exactness. The earth has also been con-
structed on a plan, and takes its proper place in the
great system. Its surface has been formed gradually
* Swayambhúta: Swayamjivi.
PART III.]
321
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
and with great skill for the use of men. The animal
world in every part is constructed throughout upon
fixed plans, and with a view to evident and wise
designs. Thus has been devised the body of man
with all its organs, its senses, and elements. Thus
we see matter rendered subservient, primarily to the
happiness and comfort of animated beings, and ulti-
mately to the designs of the Supreme God, who has
laid his hand on every particle of it and moulded it
entirely to his purposes.
We do not find a single
particle of matter which has not its appointed place in
this vast system.
Vaiseshik. But the followers of Kanáda fully allow
that all the present forms of matter have been produced
by God; and that He, by His wisdom and power,
moulded the three worlds into their present shape.
Eng. Very true: but the argument is not yet com-
plete. We will go deeper into the question. Mere
control of matter, and mere system in its arrangement,
will not prove that it did not at one time exist inde-
pendently by itself. Let us move a step further.
Whence is it that the great system of the universe
derives its character ? Whence is it that all the dif-
ferent parts accomplish the various designs which they
subserve: and how is it that these parts are applicable
to so many thousand uses? We say that these things
arise from the properties and qualities which the sub-
stance of matter possesses; and if we go back and back
from the properties and uses of all the compounds of
the universe, and trace them to the simplest elements
Y
322
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
with which we are acquainted, what do we find ?
Chemists assure us that all these wonderful properties
of which I speak are found in those simplest elements,
and that all the uses to which the many kinds of matter
are put are directly traceable to those qualities. All
the qualities of matter (so far as we have examined)
are brought out in these uses; and if the properties
had been different, the uses of all the parts, and the
construction of the entire system, must also have been
different to what they now are. Considering, then,
that every particle of matter finds its own place in the
great system of the universe, and that the design, and
structure, and laws of the whole are directly dependent
upon the very constitution of the original elementary
forms of matter, is it not natural to believe that, instead
of matter being independent and eternal, it was actually
produced by the Architect of the universe for the
pur-
poses to which it is now completely applied, and that
HE endowed it with the many properties upon which
those purposes depend ?
Vaiseshik. He might have found matter originally
existing, and possessing these properties. His work
would then be limited to wisely adapting those pro-
perties to the system which he wished to construct, or
adapting His system to them.
Eng. I allow that that supposition may be made. It
is, however, only a supposition, and may on that ground
be compared with my supposition as to the origin both
of the elements and the system of which they form an
essential part. But, considering that the properties of
PART III.]
323
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
matter are a part of its constitution, and will attend it
wherever it is found, your hypothesis really leaves.
very
little for the Constructor of the universe to do.
If material of a certain kind were already pro-
vided, his plans would be compelled to take a certain
shape, owing to the qualities of that material. My own
hypothesis seems the more probable, because it puts
away all such difficulties ; it gives to the Great Ruler
of the universe the honour of the whole-of the plan,
the designs, the material itself, the development, the
wonderful working of all the elements and qualities
seen in every part; in a word, of the perfect unity
seen through the entire universe. Therefore, it seems
to me the most natural to believe that He whose exist-
ence, whose intelligence, whose eternity are undoubted,
both contrived the universe and provided the material
of which it is composed. This hypothesis seems to me
to be more simple, more complete, more consistent, and
more comprehensive than either of those which your
three schools respectively offer. One can at least com-
prehend it, but who can accept a regressus of causes
in an infinite series, which is absolutely impossible?
Vaiseshik. But, О learned friend ! if you thus get
rid of some difficulties, there remains a greater difficulty
still in the theory which you advocate. How could God
“provide” a universe without a material ? How can a
potter make a jar without mud ?-a weaver, cloth with-
out yarn ?-a jeweller, bracelets without gold or silver ?
Eng. I acknowledge, 0 pundit, that the difficulty is
shifted from the material to the framer. If God were
Y 2
324
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
like a potter or a jeweller, He could not make a uni-
verse without something to make it of. If He had
only the imperfect knowledge and the limited skill of a
human being, He could not make a world. But we
should be careful how, in this subject, we compare God
with men. Men are not infinite; they are limited in
power, limited in wisdom. They begin from perfect
ignorance, and gradually, by experience, they attain
some measure of skill and knowledge. According to
that measure do they effect things in the world, and
beyond it they cannot go. Hence a potter becomes
skilled in pottery, the builder in building, and the
pundit in the pursuits of science. It is this limit upon
their power which in all these things compels them to
seek material for any work they effect. They can com-
bine, they can change the forms of matter, but they
cannot create.
But this is not the case with God. To Him I ascribe
a higher power than that of a mere architect. I say
He CREATED matter from nothing. We have already
seen, by strong arguments, that He must exist, and
must exist from eternity. We have seen how both
causation and design in the universe compel us to bem
lieve that He, the prime cause of all things, must be
eternal, and must be intelligent. We have seen, also,
from the vast multitude of instances in which design is
displayed, and from the greatness of that design in some
particular cases, how unspeakably grand His intelli-
gence and wisdom must be. We see that wisdom, also,
in His perfect knowledge of the nature and qualities of
PART 111.]
325
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
all His materials, and in their adaptation. We look
again at the amount of power now exerted in the world
---the power of natural agents, earthquakes, storms,
gunpowder, steam, and air; we see the gigantic results
of such power in the formation of mountain chains, the
elevation and depression of continents, in the control of
the illimitable sea; we see the vast amount of motion
existing in the universe, begun by the mightiest Power;
we see everything in the universe governed, preserved,
controlled by the hand of God; and what is the con-
clusion to which we come? That He, who has done
all this—who has done it with perfect wisdom, with
perfect benevolence for the good of His creatures, and
who has done it for numerous ages--must be a God of
Almighty Power, who is able to do whatsoever he will.
Instead, therefore, of comparing God, who is perfect
in wisdom and almighty in power, with an ignorant
and weak man like the potter, I look up to Him with
wonder and adoration, and find no difficulty in believing
that He who devoted them to such uses, and applied so
much power in their motions and effects, once produced
the original elements from which they all sprang, en-
dowed them with their inherent properties, and CREATED
those elements in a way known only to Himself.
base this belief on the doctrine that God is ALMIGHTY.
Is not that, О pundits, your own doctrine likewise ?
Gurudás. That is the doctrine generally received by
scholars. And there are several texts which lay it
down. Thus in the Brahma Sutras * (i. 1, 1-4), Vyása
* Dr. Ballantyne, p. 5, para. d; p. 7, paras. g and f.
326
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
declares that He is the cause of the world, and is there-
fore omniscient and omnipotent. In Sutra, ii. 1-30, he
is distinctly called Almighty; and the Vedas declare
him to be so.. Pátanjali specially declares him to be
Omniscient.
Eng. The doctrine is plainly a reasonable doctrine.
What, then, is the meaning of it? How far can it be
applied ? By the term “ Almighty” we clearly mean
that God possesses all possible power; that He is able
to do everything which power can possibly effect.
There are some things which no amount of power can
do. No power can make two real contradictories both
true. No power can put two distinct things in exactly
the same place at the same time. But these are not the
things now under discussion. How much can power
produce? We all understand the formation of things
from materials. The greater the materials, the greater
must be the power.
But, beyond this, if God be
ALMIGHTY, and possess all possible power, unlimited
power, why should we doubt that He can produce his
materials by creation, as well as form them into the
shapes and systems which he designs ?
The same argument may be put in another form.
We have seen that all the present forms of matter are
traceable to earlier forms. This world had a beginning.
All the great sciences show this. The science called
Geology distinctly shows that it had a beginning, and
points out the stages through which it has passed. The
laws now in operation are the products of a wise mind
and must have been set in motion at some definite time.
PART III.]
327
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
All motion implies a beginning. All causation implies
a beginning. The world and the universe clearly then
at some time began. Their present form is derived
from the form which was first given. But consider the
vast amount of wisdom and power exhibited in the de-
velopment of these primary forms; look at the mighty
results now apparent: the immense power required to
sustain, rule, and keep in order the great systems in the
animal, vegetable, and mineral worlds. Now since we
allow God to be ALMIGHTY, is it difficult to imagine that
He, who has so developed the original forms into the
present wonderful universe, at first GAVE EXISTENCE to
these original elements ? I find no difficulty in at-
tributing their creation to such a Being, after seeing the
greatness of the effects which He has produced, the
causes He has set in motion, the operations He has
carried on, and the designs he has accomplished.
Gurudás. I can see, O friend, the force of the argu-
ment you advance: but at the same time, how can we
imagine the universe produced without a material ?
Eng. It is doubtless, 0 pundit, very difficult to
imagine it: indeed it is certain that no one of us can
really understand it. All our experience is connected
with changes in the forms of matter, and it is within the
power of man to produce these changes. But in all this
there is no originating of a new material element. We
are bound to what already exists; present matter we
combine into new forms, compound in new proportions,
and realize corresponding results. But let us never
forget that God is far above us. We are but ignorant
328
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
and weak beings as compared with him : and if we do
not understand all He does, let us not therefore think
that He has done nothing. It cannot be expected that
we understand Him. We cannot understand very much
even of his works. Although we are surrounded by
material things all our life, no one of us can tell what the
SUBSTRATUM of matter is. We see it, feel it, discern its
properties, analyze it, compound it, yet no one knows
what the base and substratum is: and no amount of
effort and experiment has yet enabled man to find it
out. How then can we comprehend the creation of a
thing whose very “substance” is hidden from our eyes ?
On this subject let me state to you, what is declared in
the Christian Bible, the Book which we regard as our
authority in religion ; and which for numerous reasons
we believe to be really a revelation from God to man.
On this subject the Bible speaks as follows: “In the
beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”
“ The worlds were framed by the word of God, so
that things which are seen were not made of things
which do appear." “By him were all things cre-
ated, that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible
and invisible; all things were created by him and for
him: and he is before all things, and by him all things
consist.” These and numerous other passages state
most distinctly that God is the creator of all things:
and that they are not formed from eternal elements.
As a Christian I receive this on authority, as God's
own word: but reason also confirms the doctrine. The
theory I have advocated at least explains the case suf-
PART III.]
329
THE ETERNITY OF MATTER.
ficiently: and is far more consistent and complete than
your views of the eternity of matter. That eternity you
entirely fail to prove. Both the Sánkhya and Nyáy
give for it no other argument than a presumed neces-
sity arising out of an impossible regressus of infinite
causes : a supposition quite uncalled for, if we can find
a sufficient origin and commencement of causation. I
think
my theory provides such an origin. After showing
that matter is in every way worked into the system of
the universe, and that its inherent properties make the
universe what it is, the theory announces that the
Framer of the universe himself created this material, and
caused the system of causes to begin operation. He was
competent to be the originator of these materials: because
He is Almighty. The explanation is thus complete.
Vedántist. But surely, O learned friend, the theory
which you advocate confirms the Vedántic doctrine,
that all things are from God, and that his substance is
the only substance existing in the universe.
Eng. No, O pundit, we cannot receive such a doctrine.
The two cannot be identical. God, a spirit, and the
matter of the universe possess essential qualities, which
are perfectly distinct from each other. The one there-
fore cannot have been formed directly out of the other.
To
say
that God created matter is a very different thing
from saying that God is matter.
Nyayist. But does not the theory break through that
law which declares that something cannot come from
nothing ? If the new substance is not God, whence then
does it come?
330
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Eng. Not so, O pundit; in this doctrine we do not
set aside this excellent rule of causation, which all wise
men receive. In saying that “something cannot come
from nothing " we need not imply that matter can be
produced only from matter, as you all do: it is sufficient
if we mean that a thing cannot be produced by itself; a
thing cannot be produced without some adequate cause:
its producer must possess qualities as good at least -as its
own. No imperfect being can produce a new thing.
With this interpretation the rule is quite sound: and I
make no false application of it. In advocating the crea-
tion of matter by God, we do not violate these laws.
We do not say that matter, which was not, can exist
while it is not. We do not say that this something was
made from nothing. We say that the Omnipotence of
God, which can do everything, can produce a new
thing: a thing which did not exist before. We may
not understand how it is done. Indeed we are incom-
petent to do so.
We are ourselves portions of the very
universe which has been created. But in attributing
the creation of matter to the Almighty and Glorious
God, we attribute it to a real cause; to an adequate
cause; to a cause whose wonderful skill and power have
been for ages displayed in sustaining matter, developing
its forms, carrying out the laws by which those forms
are governed, and especially making all things tend to
secure the happiness of all the living creatures that in-
habit the world. It seems to me that this argument is
adequate to the conclusion derived from it: while cer-
tainly the arguments which defend the eternity of mat-
PART III.]
331
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
ter are insufficient. On this account I cannot but allow
a full assent to the simple and sublime declaration of the
Bible, the first sentence on its holy page:
“In the beginning GOD CREATED the heavens and the
earth."
Dialogue Fifth.
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
PRELIMINARY NOTE.
ONLY a few words need be added after the introduc-
tion prefixed to Dialogue Fourth. In treating the
present topic it is fair to keep continually in mind that
the Eternity of Souls, as of matter, is not proved by the
Hindu Schools; yet the burden of proof ought to be laid
upon them. It is at the utmost an hypothesis invented
to explain a fact. They find them existing: they
do not see where they came from : therefore they must
have existed from eternity. We cannot prove a nega-
tive: except by establishing its contradictory. We may
therefore endeavour to show reasons for believing that
souls are of late origin. I have mentioned four reasons
of this kind. Soul does not possess the attributes of a
self-existent intelligence: its knowledge is not the ac-
cumulated store of ages : but is all acquired in this its
present life: it remembers nothing of another existence:
even its sins are learned by experience. I have then ad-
332
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
vanced a direct argument in favour of its being created,
similar to the chief argument in the last Dialogue, viz.,
that it seems adapted for a special purpose, in connec-
tion with the system of the pniverse; its character, func-
tions, capabilities are all interwoven with the universe;
it is most natural therefore to believe that it was ori-
ginally constructed for that purpose. The Omnipotence
of God furnishes a sufficient explanation of its origin.
On a subsequent day, the same parties met again at
the house of the pundit Gurudás, to examine another of
the great doctrines of the Nyáy ảnd Sánkhya systems,
viz., the ETERNITY OF Souls. The judge in opening the
discussion thus addressed them:
Englishman. We have recently, O friends, been in-
quiring into the origin of the universe, into its different
agencies, and the causes of its numerous products and
forms. We have asked, who created all this? and have
considered whether the Supreme God formed it by
moulding matter already existing, or created the origi-
nal materials, which he subsequently developed. We
have now one agent left: we have still one particular
form or kind of existence to inquire into, namely the
HUMAN SOUL: and again we observe that each of your
systems has a distinct theory respecting it. Although
the Nyáya and Sankhya differ in their reasons, both
agree in advocating the eternity of souls, and implicitly
deny that they were ever created. The Vedánta, as.
we have seen, teaches that the soul is a portion of the
Supreme Brahm, and therefore makes it coeval and
PART III.]
333
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
cognate with him. We have seen, however, that this
doctrine has powerful arguments arrayed against it.
To-day, let us carefully review the theory advocated
by the Sánkhya and Nyáya.
At the outset, I would state that several things, in
the general doctrine of the soul, defended by these two
systems, deserve commendation, especially in the Nyáya.
Difficult as the subject is, it is yet beyond doubt that
they have discovered some most important truths con-
cerning the nature and operations of the soul.
It is
a singular fact, that amongst these systems, not one
makes the soul material. The Vedánta certainly
makes both spirit and matter to spring from one sub-
stance, and so far its proceedings resemble those of
material philosophies; but as in its theory all springs
from Brahm, the system becomes one of spiritualism.
The Sánkhya again has almost become a material sys-
tem : since it only advocates the existence of soul for
one or two reasons, and yet makes very little use of the
soul throughout its various dogmas: even intellectual
operations, and the “mind,” are declared to spring from
Nature. But the Nyáya has acted far differently, and
has made the nearest approach to a correct mental
philosophy amongst all the systems of learning in Hin-
dustán. Will you kindly state, 0 pundit, the reasons
for which the Sánkhya advocates the SEPARATE EXIS-
TENCE of souls.
Gurudás. The great sage Kopila, in the first book, de-
clares in Sutra 140, that soul is something different from
body, and then assigns five reasons for the opinion.
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[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
1. The combinations and contrivances in the three
worlds are for the use of some one; just as a house, a
seat, a bed, are for the use of a living person. That
some one is soul.
2. In soul there is the reverse of the three qualities,
which distinguish all material forms. Prakriti is
formed from their aggregation in equipoise; but soul
has them not.
3. Soul superintends Nature.
4. Soul is the enjoyer (bhoktri) of all that nature has
formed.
5. It is for soul that liberation is wanted. Nature
possesses three .qualities. Connection with nature has
given the soul pain. Liberation is needed, and hence
all the processes which nature carries on. If soul did
not exist separately they would be aimless.
Eng. These reasons are very poor. Some of them are
sound, but others are not so ; while important reasons
are omitted. The strongest reason of all, derived from
the separate character of the operations of soul, the
Sánkhya could not give; seeing that it has confounded
those operations with the productions of Prakriti. The
second reason respecting the qualities is not identical
with this, for that reason is intended to refer to the
faults and defects which are exhibited in the products
of the gunas. Will you, O Nyáyist pundit, also state
the arguments of the Vaiseshika and Nyáya.
Nyáyist. The reasons given by the Nyáya for the
separate existence of souls are five.
1. Soul governs the body: for an organ must have
PART III.]
335
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
an.agent as its master. The body is not its own agent,
for consciousness is not in the body; it disappears at
death, and the body also, from being often changed, has
no recollection in old age of the things which a man did
in childhood. The “mind” also is not the agent; its
knowledge is limited, and if all perceptions were laid
up there, new perceptions would be impossible.
2. Soul is known by its distinguishing qualities.
These qualities prove it to be a substance, one of the
nine original substances. Amongst them are happiness,
and unhappiness. These are not in the body: else one
body would not experience, as it now does by the trans-
migration of the soul, the fruit of the works done in a
former body.
3. Soul is known from its activity. From the regular
motion of a carriage is learned the presence and activity
of the charioteer. So from the exertions of the soul to
obtain knowledge and fulfil desire, its agency is also
known.
4. Soul alone can be the site of intellect, perception,
remembrance, and other qualities which are seen to
exist, and of operations which are performed.
5. A fifth argument may be stated from Sutra 29.
“ The soul and the elements have special and contrary
qualities; what is the property of one is the opposite of
the others." Here the perfect contrast between the
qualities and actions of soul and of the elements, is
plainly asserted. Kanáda thus combines these proofs :
“The vital airs, which go upwards and downwards,
the closing and opening of the eyes, life, the actions of
336
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the mind,' and the modifications of the other senses;
happiness and unhappiness, desire and aversion, and
endeavour, or will, are proofs of the soul.” (Bhásh.
Par. p. 25.) These are the five arguments.
Eng. And they are excellent arguments; although
the defence of the second, by a reference to transmi-
gration, was unnecessary. It is indeed by the peculiar
operations of the soul, the exercise of its perception, its
memory, its reasoning faculty: the display of its feel-
ings, its anger, joy, and pain; the products of its will in
actions and purposes : and the happiness and misery
which it draws from virtue and vice; that the soul is
distinguished from the body. Its operations are quite
different from the qualities of matter; it rules the body
and its many organs as a master rules a house, and often
it is found most active, as in dreams, while the body
soundly sleeps. What are the operations attributed to
soul by the Nyáya?
Nyáyist. In the Bhasha Parichheda the operations are
thus classified. The immaterial qualities are demerit
and merit; happiness and unhappiness; desire and
aversion; intellect and memory; and the like. In-
tellect includes apprehension and remembrance. Under
apprehension are included: perception by the senses
and by internal consciousness (“ mind”); inferences of
reason ; comparison and verbal knowledge.
Eng. These are indeed a chief portion of the ope-
rations of the soul, and may be conspicuously observed
in the daily life of every human being. There are
others, however, which have not been referred to. It
PART III.]
337
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
is interesting to notice that the Nyáyists have remarked
the same things as have been noted in the philosophies
of Europe. We need not, however, dwell, upon these
things: it is to the eternity of souls I wish to draw
your attention. Will you kindly state, O friend, the
argument for the multitudinousness of souls adduced by
the Sánkhya.
Gurudás. The argument of Kopila is; that there is
a great variety in the accidents and events occurring to
different persons at the same time. Some are being
born, others are dying. Some are enjoying pleasure;
others are in pain. Some are happy; others are
wretched; some are following virtue, others are drowned
in vice. These states of condition and character are not
only different but opposed. It is therefore impossible
to believe that all individuals possess, as the Vedant
asserts, but one soul. One soul cannot be at the same
instant in these contradictory states. To this the Nyáya
also agrees.
Eng. The argument is identical with one which I
adduced against the Vedantic doctrine, and seems to me
unanswerable. Thus we find that all souls are really
separate from matter; and that the soul of each in-
dividual is independent of the souls of others. This
doctrine is most important: but few ancient schools of
science arrived at it. The Nyáya and Sankhya have
the honour of advocating it, earlier in the world than
any others, except the Christian Bible. Now let us
take up the argument for the eternity of souls.
Gurudás. The Sánkhya, O friend, traces all products
2
338
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
that possess the three gunas up to nature. Nature,
again, acts for some one else, by whom nature is
governed: that being is soul. Now souls and nature
exist side by side; when they join together through
“ proximity,” they become the first causes of things.
The Karika says: “Soul is united to nature in order
to contemplate it, and be abstracted from it. By
that union creation is effected. This creation is the
development of intellect’ and other principles.” These
principles are themselves uncaused. We know no cause
that could have produced them. Hence both are from
eternity. The argument is the same for both. Soul
is undiscrete, uncaused, self-supporting. Each soul
therefore that exists is from eternity.
Eng. And what is the reason assigned by the Nyáya ?
Nyáyist. It is taught that time, ether, soul, and space
have the qualities of infinity and ubiquity. *
- Mind"
also is eternal : it is innumerable, because one remains
with each soul: it is in the form of an atom. These all
exist: no producer is assigned as their origin : their
eternity is inferred from their being uncaused. It is
said also, “eternal unity is ascribed to eternal sub-
stances :" it has no beginning; as the text says: “it is
not born.'
Eng. It seems to me that these arguments are un-
worthy of the great doctrine which they are employed
to prove; and that their proof is quite insufficient,
* In the Nyáya system, the ascribing of the quality of eternity to
both “mind” and “soul,” and making them two separate “sub-
stances” when their powers show them to be but one, is a special
error.
PART III.]
339
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
The Sánkhya argument naturally follows from the
peculiar dogmas of the system. The agencies in the
world must have a cause, a master; and hence a super-
intendent, an enjoyer is felt to be necessary, a soul
uncaused and eternal. If the premises were sound,
this conclusion would follow; if there existed only
matter and souls in the universe, and no origin can
be found for them, those souls must be eternal.
But let us look at the character, constitution, and ex-
perience of these souls, and endeavour to ascertain what
they indicate as to the length of time that they have
endured.
a. In their nature we find no such elements as belong
to a substance that is everlasting. An eternal, intelli-
gent being, having the power of life in itself, must be
independent and free: it must be great and noble. But
the soul shows none of these characters. It is depen-
dent upon its body for even a connection with the
world at large: without its senses the soul can acquire
no knowledge of external things. When the eye is
asleep or injured, the soul cannot see.
When the ear
is asleep or diseased, it cannot hear. Instead of being
great, it is in its knowledge, its pursuits, its enjoyments,
a follower of trifles. What signs, then, does it show of
an independent origin ?
b. Look at its ignorance. The soul is continually
getting knowledge during a man's life. Even the poorest
man adds to his knowledge of persons and things day
by day. He sees new faces, visits new places, and does
new things. Much more do the very intelligent, the
z 2
340
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
[PART III.
learned, acquire by their studies additions to all that
they had learned before. In this way men obtain a
large stock of experience, if they live to become old.
But every man when he is born is perfectly ignorant.
Every man has to begin afresh, like all his prede-
cessors. Every pundit here had to begin his course of
learning with A, B, C. From such a beginning do we
all toil slowly on, step by step; making painful efforts
to add to our knowledge, and attain to that informa-
tion which yet lies beyond our reach. - And so much
is there to be learned, that no man ever yet learned
everything: no man ever yet acquired all the science,
of all the countries in the world, which other men had
separately attained. What do these facts prove? They
show the imperfection of the soul. Though intelligence
is its nature, its knowledge begins in this life: and God
to aid it has supplied it with the necessary subordinate
agents for acquiring knowledge. These things seem to
show that the soul begins to be, when a man is born:
and that the soul has a beginning as well as the body.
Instead of being eternal, its intelligence and its activity
begin with a man's birth; and every atom of know-
ledge it acquires it acquires between birth and death.
c. Look at its memory. If the soul is from eternity,
it has lived through countless years. Even on your own
theory, since the time when it was united to “mind,"
its intelligence must have been displayed during the
years which have passed since that union took place.
It must have acquired knowledge, all these years, of the
various scenes through which it has passed, of the
PART III.]
341
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
persons it has seen, and the events which have happened.
Now all such knowledge, acquired during human life, it
lays up in memory. From memory it recalls that know-
ledge when it is needed. The memory retains it down
to the time of death. Old men recall the faces of those
whom they saw in the days of youth: they retain the
knowledge of languages which they then spoke and have
forgotten for many years. The body is frequently
changed during a long life (as the Nyáya allows); but
the memory remains the same: this shows that the
memory belongs purely to the soul and not to the body
at all. If then the soul has lived before this, has lived
from eternity, and has seen and heard countless things
before its present life and history, where is the remem-
brance of it all? Not a particle of such knowledge
exists. All the knowledge which a man has in his
waking hours relates to his experience in this world.
All that rises up in his dreams can be traced, so far as
its material is concerned, to the same experience; but
where, whether in dreams or in waking hours, does he
ever recall the memory of past experience in any life or
period previous to his present existence in the world ?
If any such knowledge had ever existed, there ought to
be a remembrance of it in every individual who has a
soul. But not one has it. The inference then is surely
fair, that the soul never experienced such a life at all:
and that (as its ignorance implies) it began to act as an
intelligent agent upon its birth into the present life.
Gurudás. But this argument, О friend, goes to show
that there is not even a transmigration of souls, as well
342
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
as that souls are not eternal. You surely do not ques-
tion that doctrine which has been received by all Hindu
pundits of all schools from the commencement of time?
Eng. The argument certainly does bear upon that
celebrated doctrine, O pundit, and I must say, that I do
doubt altogether about the truth of it: although it is so
ancient, and has received the sanction of so many of the
Hindu learned. But I do not wish to say anything
more about it just now: as I propose to make it the
subject of our next discussion.
d. Another argument against the eternity of souls
arises from their sinfulness, weakness, and defects.
Every human being knows that there is in his own
soul a large amount of thoughts and wishes which even
the Hindu shastres declare to be sinful: and that the
soul leads him to do many of those acts which the
shastres say ought not to be done. Some men are sunk
in these evils, are quite slaves to their passions, and
scarcely ever do any good thing at all. Now all the
progress in evil, which leads to these mournful results,
is made during the life of every human being. When
he is born he is not thus depraved. When a little boy,
he does not commit the same vile deeds which we after-
wards see in the grown-up man.
He feels ashamed of
them, his mind rebukes him for even thinking of them.
Evil is learned and practised by degrees, just as the
knowledge of the intellect is acquired. Boys are not so
clever nor so bold in sin, as men: and older men are
greater adepts at wickedness than young men.
This
shows that even with its sins and defects, the soul runs
PART III.]
343
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
its course in the present life: that it has not brought ex-
perience and knowledge of evil from a former existence.
Thus the growth of the soul's sinfulness in this world
brings new evidence of the notion, that the soul has had
no existence before this present life.
Gurudás. But whence, O friend, does the tendency to
evil spring, if the soul knew nothing of it in a former
life? Does not its readiness to commit sin prove that it
did know it before ?
Eng. I expected this question, 0 pundit: but it re-
quires full consideration, and we will talk of it again at
some future time. A great deal must be said respecting
it, and I trust I shall be able to explain the tendency to
evil without referring it, as you do, to a former life, and
to the soul's migrations.
These four considerations, applied to the soul, without
any thought about the mode of its appearance in the
world, seem to me to show that its present existence is its
first existence: that it has not existed before its present
birth : and certainly is not from eternity. We see none
of the dignity, the power, the purity, that should belong
to an eternal being. We find that it is very ignorant:
and all its knowledge is acquired during its earthly
Its wonderful memory brings no information
from any previous state; while if soul were eternal we
should expect such tidings to appear both in our waking
moments and our nightly dreams. All souls too are
imperfect, and gain experience in evil during their
pre-
sent life. All these facts show us the soul only in a
single life: we never go beyond it: and left to consider
career,
344
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
S.
these things alone, no man would ever have imagined
that his soul had existed from eternity.
Remembering these things, I would now lay before
you a special reason for thinking that souls were pro-
duced by the Great Ruler of the Universe, and that He
caused them to commence an existence. You will
remember how I argued for the creation of matter from
the fact of its constitution and qualities fitting it exactly
for the purposes which it serves and the position which
each part occupies in the vast system of the universe.
I think the same reason applies with not less force to
the origin of souls. I speak now only of human souls,
because of their existence we are certain. Men occupy
a most important place in this system. Even your
systems admit that the “ creation” is made for souls to
control, to use and to enjoy. Now the Framer of the
Universe has first of all provided for each man a most
wonderful instrument for connecting the soul with the
material system. The body of man, with its wonderful
senses, organs, limbs and joints is this instrument. It
is perfectly suited to be the residence of the soul, and
to serve the purposes which soul has to accomplish. .
Still more is the soul itself so constructed as to be ex-
actly fitted to occupy the place which men take up in
the world, both in relation to their Creator and to each
other. Its intellect, affections and will are all formed
on the most wonderful principles : its sense of right and
wrong; its reasoning powers, its knowledge of God, all
are required and are all suitably employed in the right
occupation of that place.
PART III.]
345
THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
Men live in societies holding certain relations to each
other as men, as fellow citizens, as parents and chil-
dren, as relatives, as neighbours; there are certain laws
which rule these relations, and the souls of all men are
so constituted that these laws and duties can be easily
understood, appreciated and observed. Not one faculty,
not one element in the soul's constitution is useless or
superfluous. The world was evidently made for the
use of men, that they might live on it, be fed by it, and
find comfort in it: men were made to live together in
societies; to help each other and to serve God. Our
constitution teaches us all this. Now shall we be-
lieve that God, in framing the universe in this manner,
accidentally found souls endowed with the qualities and
faculties required : or that in constructing the universe
with a grand design, and creating its material with the
qualities exactly required, He did the same with its souls;
produced them also, and endowed them with exactly
the faculties and powers which they would require, to
fulfil all the purposes which He had in view in making
them? I think the latter supposition by far the most
natural. - The supreme fitness of souls for the position
which men occupy must be observed by all; and I
think that such a fitness shows they were intentionally
endowed with the powers which secure it.
I would point out also here, that while this argument
in relation to matter is strong by itself: and in relation
to mind is strong by itself also: they both become
stronger when examined together. The system appears
all the more vast, the more complete, the more wonder-
346
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
ful, when we consider souls and matter acting together,
and together accomplishing the great purpose of the
universe. For they are both fitted, not merely each
for its separate work, but to work in harmony together:
the unity observable in each one, is observable also in
their mutual action; and tends to bring home an irre-
sistible conviction that both were constructed and pro-
duced for these grand purposes by the great God from
whom the design of the system sprang.
The history of the world seems to me powerfully to
confirm this. An examination of its rocks shows how
each separate layer, as well as the mighty whole, had
its beginning at a certain time. It shows that each
separate class of animals, fishes, reptiles, birds, and
beasts, was produced or created at a certain special
time: that they did not spring from each other, and
were not made at the same time; but that they began
to exist at a special period; * that the scale of creation
gradually rose with these successive classes of crea-
tures, as the world became more and more fit for the
dwelling of men; and it shows distinctly that human
beings also began to exist only six thousand years ago.
Everything serves to show that the system was thus
developed, and creatures added under the most entire
control of the Great God: and I cannot therefore help
believing that He himself made everything just as it
was wanted. Remembering that human souls in all
their knowledge, memory, and even sins show that they
have had but one life in the world ; and that they are
* Hugh Miller's Testimony of the Rocks.
PART III.
347
] THE ETERNITY OF SOULS.
so wonderfully adapted for their proper place, I argue
that they received a distinct beginning from the hand
of God.
Gurudás. But still we may ask, where do these souls
come from?
Eng. As in the case of matter, we cannot understand
the process by which they are produced: we are our-
selves numbered among the objects that have been
created. It is sufficient to find a cause competent to
produce them, and to assign them a fit place in the great
scheme of the universe. Such a cause we find in the
perfect wisdom and almighty power of the Supreme
God. To attribute their production to Him quite
satisfies all the facts of the case. It explains the origin
of souls; it explains the condition in which they enter
the world; and accounts fully for all absence of the re-
membrance of previous existence in other spheres of life.
A competent power is referred to as the cause of these
souls: spirit is regarded as creating souls and intelli-
gence. What more is required ?
Gurudás. Still, O friend, the migration of souls is not
accounted for on this theory: and it is difficult to ex-
plain the conditions existing in human life except upon
the belief that such migration exists.
Eng. I feel with you, friend, that the two doctrines
cannot stand together : I feel and acknowledge, that if
the soul is only introduced into human society for the
first time on each human birth, that the migration is
set aside. That subject we will discuss at our next
meeting. At present I would only add, that if this
348
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
transmigration of souls were not believed, all Hindus
would have no difficulty in accepting the proofs I have
now presented against the eternity of souls. It would
at once be seen, that the arguments which confine the
existence of the human soul to this life, and make its
history begin with the birth of each individual, have
great weight in themselves and quite explain all the
facts which that history, so far as we know it, presents.
I feel therefore that we cannot longer delay the full
examination of a doctrine so powerful in its influence
and so generally believed.
Dialogue Sixth.
THE TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
On the day appointed for discussing the doctrine of
TRANSMIGRATION, a large number of Hindu . pundits
assembled at the house of the pundit Gurudás. The
importance of the subject was felt to be very great,
because the doctrine occupies such a conspicuous posi-
tion in all the schools of learning, and is so largely
treated of, especially in the Sankhya and Vedánta.
The judge also was not unimpressed with the task he
had undertaken, and determined, as far as he was able,
to secure a complete examination of the whole subject.
After the usual salutations, he took his seat, and a few
preliminary remarks having been made by one and
another, he opened the discussion as follows:-
PART 111.]
349
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
Englishman. In our last conversation, I objected alto-
gether to the doctrine, advocated by the Nyáya and
Sankhya, of the eternity of souls, and stated several
reasons on which the objection is founded. . I endea-
voured also to show that all the facts with which we
are directly acquainted exhibit to us the soul of each
individual entering this world in perfect ignorance, but
fitted with various senses and faculties intended to aid it
in the acquisition of knowledge: and that nothing in its
condition proves it to have existed anywhere before such
entrance ainong the human race. To this argument it
was objected that their TRANSMIGRATION shows that souls
do pre-exist, and have existed for thousands of ages:
and that, in your estimation, the fact of their transmi-
gration has many arguments and reasons in its favour.
I propose, therefore, that our present discussion be
devoted to this doctrine alone, and that we endeavour
to examine it thoroughly. First, I would ask, O Gu-
rudás, is this doctrine accepted by all the schools of
Hindu learning ?
Gurudás. It is taught, О friend, and upheld by them
all. The necessity of transmigration is, in fact, the
great evil which all profess to remove: thus it forms,
in one sense, the foundation of our philosophy. Our
earliest authorities, the Upanishads, teach it in very
distinct terms, and refer to it again and again; adding
that an attainment of the knowledge of Brahma will
deliver man from its evils. The Sutras of Veda-
Vyása assert the same: the Bhagavat Gita repeats it
again and again. The first Sutras in the works of
350
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Gautam and Kopila, in the Yoga and Vaiseshika, the
opening Slokas of the Sánkhya Káriká, assert it as the
necessitating cause of their several philosophies: while
the Káriká and the Sutras of Kopila give much in-
struction concerning the mode in which it is carried
out, the reasons which have produced it, and the objects
which it is intended to accomplish. The Puranas teach
the doctrine also, and the Mánava Dharma Sástra.' All
the pundits, all the brahmins, and all castes believe it
to be true.
Eng. Clearly have you stated, O friend, the extent
to which the doctrine is believed: in order that we
may make no mistake, will you kindly state what the
doctrine is?
Gurudás. It may be stated thus. All human beings
have souls. These souls now born into the world have
not begun to exist for the first time. They existed
before, and they have come from worlds in which they
were suffering pain or enjoying reward. This pain and
reward are the result of actions committed in a pre-
vious birth. Into that birth they entered from a
previous one; and into that again from one earlier
still. And thus we reckon them to have had existence
in this world, alternated with an existence in the worlds
of punishment and reward: the latter being regulated
by the character they had in the former. This alterna-
tion has taken place an infinite number of times, and is
to be traced back to the very beginning of the present
constitution of the universe, if not to an earlier time.
Eng. Does this theory apply merely to human souls ?
PART III.]
351
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
Gurudás. No, O friend; it applies to others: it is
difficult indeed to speak of human souls: for those
which have animated a human body may subsequently
pass into an animal or a tree. All objects may be
animated by these souls: the commentator on the
Káriká describes them as animating “ animals, deer,
birds, reptiles, vegetables, and minerals.” The Chhan-
dogya Upanishad similarly speaks of souls entering
“ vile wombs; as those of a dog, a boar, or a Chan-
dála.” The multitude of souls is infinite, and they may
inhabit all kinds of forms, from the highest to the
lowest. The theory even applies to the gods: thus it
is said in the Káriká : “Many thousand Indras have
attained not merely heaven, but the sovereignty of
heaven: and yet have passed away, overcome by
time."
Eng. During this long course of ages, and under
this multitude of varying circumstances, does the soul
always remain the same?
Gurudás. Certainly it does. The doctrine of course
implies that it does; but the great Kopila, to avoid all'
doubt, has stated two principles concerning it in very
plain terms. Thus he says: “One soul is born and
not another.” (Eka purusho jáyate náparah.) “There
may be various unions of one soul, according to differ-
ence of receptacle." Next he asserts that the soul
itself is not subject to birth or death: these arise from
its connection with the body. “Life is the combination
of soul with the pains incident to body: not any modifi-
cation of soul."
>>
352
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Eng. Will you also state, 0 pundit, under what cir-
cumstances the soul thus migrates ?
Gurudás. On its first connection with matter, there is
formed for the use of the soul, a subtil body. This
body is small and of an exceedingly refined nature. It
envelops the soul, and is its constant habitation. This
is the doctrine taught clearly both by the Vedanta and
Sánkhya. The subtil body however is unable to per-
ceive or to enjoy the gross world: in order therefore that
soul may be connected with the gross world, the subtil
body enters gross bodies of various kinds. As a rule the
subtil body never changes: it remains constant to the soul
during all its migrations; but the gross bodies are changed
at each successive birth. The Sankhya enumerates the
qualities of subtil body thus: It is primeval, it is perma-
nent, it is confined, and does not mix with animals, men,
or gods : it can go through rocks and solid substances.
It migrates through the three worlds; as an ant, the
body of Siva.
Eng. According to what law are these migrations
determined ?
Gurudás. They are determined by the rule of virtue.
Those souls which grow in virtue and attain higher
degres of religious merit, rise to a higher kind of body
and a higher rank of existence. Those who sink deeper
into irreligion and folly, get lower births on successive
occasions. 66 Virtue and vice are the efficient causes of
the bodily conditions."
Eng. What then is the particular reason assigned for
these migrations?
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Gurudus. Soul when joined to nature becomes sub-
ject to pain, although it was connected with nature in
order to contemplate and enjoy it. These continued
migrations are deemed a necessary consequence of the
tendencies and dispositions by which souls became
affected on their union with matter: they may be em-
ployed as opportunities for breaking that union, and
when soul and matter separate, they will entirely cease.
Eng. But your systems claim the merit of securing
that liberation speedily.
Gurudás. Yes, each of the Hindu systems of learning
professes to provide a short road to liberation and beati-
tude. I have just described the common lot of the
majority of men, to whom this learning is unknown.
Both the Sánkhya and Vedant, in all their authorities,
advocate this view of the case. Both state that by
studying their doctrines men may get speedily free from
the “doubts” and “activity” into which they have
fallen: otherwise their migrations may not cease till the
present Kalpa comes to an end.
- Eng. You have well stated, O friend, the various
branches of the theory of transmigration, and the sub-
ordinate principles connected with the chief and essen-
tial doctrine. Will you now kindly state what is the
authority for the doctrine ? How are we to know that
it is true?
Gurudás. All the systems of course teach this doc-
trine on the authority of their teachers, such as Kopila,
Gautum, and Veda-Vyása. Of these, the oldest and
most revered authorities are the VIDAS, which, in the
A A
354
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Upanishads, distinctly assert that transmigration is true.
But various arguments also are drawn from reason to
illustrate and confirm it.
Eng. You say that the Vedas teach it. Do they
teach that human souls ever go into the bodies of
animals or the structure of minerals and trees?
Gurudás. Yes; in the passage I recently quoted from
the Chhandogya, the wombs of a dog and a boar are
specially named. On the whole question, the Vedas
are the earliest authorities, and are regarded of course
with the greatest respect.
Eng. Let us, however, now put away for a time the
Vedic authority, and the great authority of your ancient
sages. Let us look at this doctrine, as it stands, by
itself; and let us examine it, with the grounds on which
it is advocated, by the aid of reason only. Is it con-
sidered that any parts of this doctrine are observed by
direct perception?
Gurudás. No. It is not seen or felt by any one, that
he pre-existed, that he has passed through different
lives, in different places, and that he has visited the
lower worlds, or the upper heavens. Reason tells us
there must have been previous existence, and the autho-
rity of the mouth of Brahmá confirms it.
Eng. Very good. There is no direct perception in
any one of this previous course or of its processes as it
was going on. Do all the systems give the same
reason for it?
Gurudás. No. There are many arguments assigned.
There are popular arguments which pundits commonly
PART III.1
355
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
employ, and there are special reasons connected with
the different views of the systems.
Eng. Let us then take up these arguments, and
examine all that can be said for such a doctrine. Let
us remember that, apart from transmigration, we have
shown that there is no reason for believing either matter
or soul to be eternal: on the contrary, there are many
reasons to show that both have been created by the
almighty power of the one Great God who exists with-
out doubt from everlasting. Let us then enter on these
arguments. Will you kindly state, 0 pundit, the first.
Gurudás. First, then, we consider—that only by this
doctrine of transmigration can we satisfactorily account
for the present mixture of good and evil among intelli-
gent beings: and for their different degrees of happiness
and misery. Men do differ greatly in the happiness
they enjoy, and in the ranks which they occupy. Why
is this, if they have all received birth for the first time?
If, as you advocate, there is one God, Almighty, who
now produces new souls, and sends them into the world
for the first time, is he not partial and unjust in distri-
buting his favour; in placing some high, some low;
and in giving to some great prosperity, and to others
misery? This argument is stated in the Brahma Sutras
by Vyása himself. Injustice and unkindness ought
not to be attributed to Brahma, because some (the
inferior gods) are happy, others (animals) are miserable,
and others (men) are both. For every one has his lot
according to his merit in a former stage of the universe.”
(Colebr. p. 179, Vedánt.) Unless we admit the truth
66
À A 2
356
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
of those former stages of existence, such injustice and
unkindness may be ascribed to him. “ The rain-cloud
distributes its rain equally; but the plants vary accord-
ing to the seed whence they spring.” (Ibid.)
Eng. The fact which you have described, O friend,
constitutes a difficulty, and has troubled many minds. .
But you offer only one mode of explaining it. Are there
no other explanations ? Are there no better expla-
nations? Are there no explanations freed from the diffi-
culties which attend the one you give ? Does even
yours truly and completely explain it? We may ask all
these questions. For it does not follow that because
you give one reason for a fact that reason must be sound,
or that no other can be given. I shall endeavour to
show that other explanations can be given, and that your
theory of transmigration, while it endeavours to avoid
an imaginary evil, runs into a real one.
(a.) First, let me ask-Are the inequalities of condition
among men so great as men think them? It is true that
some do exist; but greatness is not always attended by
happiness, nor is poverty necessarily connected with
misery. Sometimes they are not real, but imaginary,
and people make numerous mistakes respecting them.
The poor man, who deals honestly with his neighbours,
and who is kind-hearted, often enjoys much happiness
of mind; while his rich zemindar, possessing abundance
of wealth, is afraid of robberies, is plundered by flat-
terers, cheated by his servants, wretched in his own
vices, sick in his luxuries, and is rendered exceedingly
miserable. . The different conditions of life are not
PART III.]
357
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
necessarily connected with certain conditions of joy and
sorrow. Wealth, power, and fame, do not always give
pleasure. Neither does sickness always make men sad.
How often have we seen that great kings, like the
emperors of Delhi, have been surrounded by great
dangers; and, like the Emperor Humáyan, have some-
times enjoyed unbounded power, at others have been
nearly starved. Happiness is the great thing men
desire; where, then, is God unjust, in setting one thing
against another; when he makes the poor peasant con-
tented, and leaves the rich king miserable: for, after
all, this very happiness is the fruit of a man's own
doing? This brings me to a second argument.
(6.) The varying conditions of happiness and misery
(which are the chief and the most important) can be
explained in a different way. They may all be traced
to two sources. (1.) Personal happiness and misery
are to a great extent the result of personal conduct.
The industrious man, by his very industry, secures
wealth and prosperity. The idle man, by his idleness,
is compelled to live in poverty. The careless rich
man, who received from his dead father lands, and
houses, and money, spends them on luxury, on women,
on flatterers, and comes to poverty. The imprudent
man continually falls into mistakes and losses; the
wise man successfully preserves himself amid dangers.
These things are seen in thousands of instances. The
happiness and misery which result from them are not
traced by men to another and previous life. They are
rightly ascribed to men's own dealings, to their own
358
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
character, and to their own conduct. No one reflects
on the justice of God, because the drunkard falls sick
and poor; no one reflects on the justice of God, when
the son of a poor man honestly labours and becomes by
diligence an honoured and wealthy man. No brahmin
reflects on the justice of God, when such a prosperous
man invites him to his house, and pays him large fees,
and offers large gifts that he may celebrate some great
puja with pomp and show.
(2.) Again: this happiness and misery spring to a
very great extent from our connection with others.
Men are connected together closely in this world, and
must be so. Parents and children, relatives and friends,
fellow citizens and neighbours, are necessarily con-
nected much together, and have a great influence upon
each other's happiness. A wicked son gives his parents
great sorrow: a profligate father renders his children
sickly and weak. A murderer brings disgrace upon all
his family, however innocent they may be. Men are
so involved together that all human independence is
destroyed. No man stands alone. He is daily in-
fluencing others by his words and acts : and others are
daily influencing him. If he does good, all will be
benefited. If he does evil, all will suffer. Every one
knows how much discomfort is produced in a large
village by one quarrelsome man. A boy, playing with
fire, perhaps sets fire to his father's house. A high
wind is blowing; the whole bazar is burned down :
much property is destroyed : a few lives are lost. Why
do so many people suffer? Not from any fault of their
PART III.]
359
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
own. Not from any partiality on the part of God. But
because they lived near to each other : because their
houses were within the influence of the same fire and
the same wind. The misery and suffering have nothing
to do with a past life: they are produced by the care-
lessness of one individual : and no injustice can for a
moment be charged on God.
These two facts go very far towards explaining the
differing conditions of happiness and misery in which
human beings are placed. They depend far more on
ourselves than on any previous life; and they are
largely affected by the conduct of others. If all men
were holy, honest and temperate in themselves, and
were all honest, prudent, just and holy in their dealings
with each other, there would be comparatively little
misery in the world. All classes, from the poorest to
the richest, would be happy. Where would be the
argument for transmigration then? We should get rid
of it by removing, not any imagined injustice on the
part of God, but merely the evils which men inflict
upon themselves and on each other. Many instances,
in fact, of happiness, produced in this way, may even
now be found.
Gurudás. But, supposing men to be thus upright to
each other, that does not get rid of the inequalities of
their condition.
Eng. True, O friend, it does not do so. But I have
argued that it is only in respect to their happiness that
men have any apparent ground for charging injustice on
God. That is what all men continually seek; whether
360
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
by wealth, or pleasure, or fame, or power, they wish to
fill their minds with happiness. Now, if God fills all
minds with happiness, whether they be the minds of
kings or fishermen, of men or women, need he do any-
thing more? Can any one find fault? Why are men
not happy, then? I have shown you that it is their
own fault. As to the inequalities of condition, I now
advance a third argument. (c.) These inequalities are
the appointment of God: they must exist; they are in-
tended for the good of society. So far from being a
cause of fault-finding in respect to God, we must ad-
mire them and accept them as beneficial.
Men live together in very large societies; they have
a great variety of wants; they carry on a multitude of
employments. Now, can all men be equal ? All the
Shastres say that they cannot. All men cannot be
brahmins; else how would those brahmins eat?-how
would they be clothed ?--where could they all live ?
The Gita says that the caste of Sudras is made to serve
the other castes, and that in serving them they fulfil
their special duty. You yourselves, then, allow the in-
equality of castes to be an ordinance of the Supreme;
this ordinance the authorities declare to be coeval with
the creation, and to be quite independent of merit and
demerit. I do not believe that caste, with all its minute
rules, is of divine origin ; but I argue that, in the very
nature of things, some inequalities must exist. Thus,
there must be male and female in the human race; the
two sexes must exist side by side; and of these that of
the father will be the stronger, requiring him to dis-
PART III.] TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS. 361
charge duties abroad; while that of the mother will
require her specially to act at home. There must be
inequality again between parents and children. The
parents must be the older, and more experienced: they
will therefore rule; while the children must be younger,
and will learn from their parents. There must, again,
be
amongst men a common submission to the law of
the land ; and some must administer that law as rulers,
while all obey as subjects. All the various employ-
ments which are necessary to the comfort of men will
be divided amongst them. Some of these are easier ;
others, more difficult. Some will give more profit ;
others, much less. These different employments, being
necessary, will at once produce different classes. Some
of them require more intellect; others, greater bodily
strength. On these considerations, we see why it is
that the Supreme God has distributed mental capaci-
ties so variously among men, and why he has endowed
men with such different measures of plıysical strength.
Hence we see also how and why it has been appointed,
that there should be such differences between the dif-
ferent nations of the world. Some live in mountains;
others, on the great fertile plains. Some live in colder
climates; others, amid tropical heats. All these things
influence and maintain these physical differences. All
these varieties of pursuit and varieties of condition tend
to promote the comfort and welfare of human society.
All men are necessary to all others. None can live
independently ; none can get through life without the
aid of thousands of others. The poor are necessary to
362
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
the rich ; the labourer is necessary to the landholder ;
the merchant only prospers by trading with a commu-
nity; and the community is benefited by the skill of
the merchant. These things benefit men by uniting
them; all classes help each other; none can live with-
out the others. God intended that men should depend
on each other and live like brothers. Equality of con-
dition would make every man work only for himself,
even for common things; it would make all indepen-
dent; it would produce disunion ; it would separate all
the inhabitants of the world; it would lead to their
destruction; and thus the very end for which men are
formed would be completely frustrated. Thus, instead
of regarding the inequalities of their condition as an
evil, for which we must apologize, it seems to me that
wise men must regard them as a means of promoting the
happiness and the prosperity of all nations.
aware that there is great misery connected with the
lower classes in society; but the misery arises from the
injustice, oppression, and robbery to which the poor are
often subjected. If all men were just, and honest, and
holy, all such oppression would be removed. The rich
would pay the poor their wages rightly, and would
befriend them. The poor would work diligently and
faithfully for the rich; and the inequalities of condition
would then be scarcely felt at all.
Gurudás. But when, O friend, will such a state of
society come about in this world, with all its máyá, its
follies, and false activity ?
Eng. The time will come, O friend. The religion,
I am
PART III.]
363
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
which I believe, has produced it in some places : and
will do it at length everywhere. It is the special fruit
of this religion, that it teaches all men to do to others as
they would that others should do to them. This is the
law given by that Supreme Creator whose existence
and agency I endeavoured to prove: and who formed
human society in the condition we have just considered.
(d.) A fourth answer to the theory of transmigration,
as based upon the differences of happiness and of con-
dition, I find in the fact : that while God appoints these
inequalities of condition, he does not do so from mere
caprice, but he does it with the view of trying men in
various situations, and of testing the qualities of their
character. It is not from injustice that he appears to
favour one more than another. He gives to all the .
opportunity of happiness by making that happiness de-
pendent upon the discharge of duty. Every man who
faithfully performs that duty will be happy so far as he
himself can promote his happiness. But duties are not
the same to all. The man who is rich has higher duties
The man of learning has more to ac-
count for than the ignorant man. The king has heavier
duties to discharge than the poor people whom he rules.
All men who have power of any kind have to account
for that power.
All men are stewards of God. Just as
the Great Mahájan places money in the hands of his
servants, that therewith they may trade, and rewards
them according to their fidelity: so the Great God
places wealth, or learning, or power, or fame, in the
hands of men, that they may thereby do good to their
than the poor.
364
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
fellow creatures. Those who have much will have to
account for much. Those who have little will be re-
sponsible for little. One day he will settle the accounts
of all, and then he will reward every man according
to his works. Are the rich then to be envied; or shall
we wish to change places with the powerful? Rather
may the poor and the ignorant be glad that they have
not to bear the same responsibilities as the rich. Living
as we do in a sinful world, and surrounded as we are
by various temptations to evil, we are very liable to do
wrong, to forget our responsibilities, and use in an evil
way the gifts of God for which we must give account.
May we not then say : Happy are they who have to
account for little? Again then we find that in this view
of men's probation we need not go back to a previous
life to find it explained. The differing responsibilities
of men explain their differences of condition and en-
dowments, just as the differing situations of judges and
magistrates explain the difference of duty expected from
them.
In this way it seems to me that a reference solely to
our present life explains all the difficulty which this
variety of condition and happiness produces respecting
the justice of God, and entirely obviates all appeal to
some life previously enjoyed.
You invent the hypothesis of transmigration in order
to account for these inequalities of condition: I show
you that they can be satisfactorily explained without
such an hypothesis. That supposition therefore be-
comes superfluous : and may be rejected on that ground
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alone : quite apart from any special difficulties which
the hypothesis itself involves.
Gurudás. We acknowledge, O friend, that you have
skilfully met the proposition that I advanced in favour
of transmigration, but there is one fact in this inequality
that you have quite overlooked: and I therefore pro-
pose it as a second argument to prove the necessity for a
previous life: viz. Some men are born lepers, blind, deaf
and dumb, lame, idiots and diseased.* No explanation of
this sad fact is so simple as that which ascribes these
calamities to sins of which they were guilty in their pre-
vious birth. Other inequalities may perhaps be ac-
counted for by the circumstances of this life : but how
can these be so dealt with ?
Eng. I acknowledge, O friend, that this is the real
difficulty, among the inequalities which you so strongly
dwell upon : but I have thought it over and do not doubt
of explaining it too. The cases you refer to are com-
paratively few, yet we may in many instances trace them
to causes connected with men's present life. Men who
are born with these defects cannot have them from any
* I have not seen this argument stated in such plain terms in any of
the authorities: it was presented to me by pundits at Nuddea, and
considerable stress was laid upon it. It is only one special form of the
more general argument which has been first discussed, and which is
advanced by Vyása himself. It is the argument implied in the
question put to our Lord (John ix.), “Who did sin; this man in a
previous birth) or his parents, that he was born blind ?" It is an
argument well known among the common people, and frequently
referred to by them. A friend of mine was told by a lame native that
he must have kicked a brahmin in a former birth. To the man him-
self such an explanation of his misfortune seemed natural and satis-
factory !
366
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
fault of their own, that is clear. They cannot be charged
with folly, like the spendthrift who wastes his ancestral
property, and be told that they suffer the consequences.
But I have shown you how closely individuals are con-
nected together in this world; and how much harm is
done to innocent beings by the evil conduct of those with
whom they are connected. I think these cases are an
illustration of that fact.
a. Many cases of this kind are the result of here
ditary diseases.
Thus, where persons marry, who are
too near of kin, it frequently happens that their children
are born with numerous and painful defects: and if the
same thing is repeated again and again by people and
communities, who are much separated from others, who
marry in and in, these defects are greatly multiplied.
There are places well known in Europe in which idiocy
abounds that has arisen from this very cause. Leprosy
again is reckoned one of the remote forms of the diseases
which spring from impure connections among men.
The same kind of reason is true of deaf and dumb
children. Medical men find little difficulty in tracing all
peculiarities of bodily health to nearer or more remote
causes of constitutional disease. The actual cause may
be concealed: but the nature of it is not thus unknown:
Experience has shown where to look for such causes.
b. But even allowing the uncertainty of these actual
causes, I answer again, that all diseases of the body,
and all the sufferings of human life in general, are the
consequences of sin. Sin has come into the world, has
confused everything, has corrupted everything. What
PART III.]
367
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
wonder, then, that its fruits should be extensively felt
and should appear in strange and unexpected forms.
What wonder, that connected as we all are, some men
should be the victims of disease, and suffer when they
are not personally in fault. Had not sin prevailed in
the world and produced so many evils, these things
would never have occurred.
C. A third consideration bearing upon these few cases
is, that we can explain this application of the con-
sequences of sin to these individuals, as the act of
sovereign power on the part of God. He rules over all.
We all acknowledge that He does appoint to men their
lot in the world : and we can believe this without say-
ing that He controls every act and incites to every act,
whether good or evil. Only God can appoint the place
where a man is born, the time of his birth, the day of
his death. These things are absolutely beyond human
control. In them He shows his sovereign prerogative.
But he does not act arbitrarily. There are reasons at
work even in cases like these, which can produce
benefits to men, although they see only evil. Thus in
such cases (1)-God shows his great displeasure at sin.
Men do not like the natural consequences of sin; but
He will develop them, to show how evil its effects are;
to show how guiltless persons are involved in them;
and how widely spread these remote effects really are.
Thus he adds to the warnings which he addresses to
sinners, and by the acts of His Providence impresses
those warnings more deeply on men's minds. Again
(2) He intends to excite gratitude in all those who
368
HINDU PHILOSOPHY, (PART III.
have not been visited by evils so great. They see the
consequences of sin, they know themselves to be sinners,
and then wonder why He did not visit them with such
effects of it. That He has not done so should excite
gratitude in their minds to Him for His special favour.
Besides (3), He makes these sufferings a part of the
probation of those afflicted by them. He tries all men:
some by duty, some by sorrows.
For the purposes of
such trial, it is necessary that men be placed in circum-
stances opposite to their character and worth. Thus
good men suffer adversity: bad men are rendered pros-
perous. In this way the virtue of the good man shines
the brighter for his sufferings : while the vice of the
wicked is made more manifest by his abuse of good for-
A mother's love is more tried in the sickness of
a child than by its health. If we would test gold well,
we should put it in the fire.
d. Another fact explanatory of such cases is—that by
them the Supreme God is teaching us to sympathize
with the afflictions of our fellow-creatures. I cannot
at all agree to the caste rules adopted among the
Hindus, by which people of different castes are rendered
incapable of giving food and water to those of other
caste than their own; of helping them in sickness and
in accidents: and thus showing to them the kindness
really due from all who possess the same nature. I
wish to see all men united, mutual friends, mutual
helps, and always ready to promote each other's wel-
fare. On this principle the Supreme God has con-
structed human society; for this he has established
tune.
PART III.]
369
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
different ranks among men; and it is for this also that
he permits the sicknesses, and the accidents which pro-
duce human suffering. It is that therein men “may be
kind one to another:" “may rejoice with them that
rejoice, and weep with them that weep.
"
Gurudás. But, О friend, there is one thing frequently
referred to in these several arguments, which you have
still left unexplained. You have spoken much of the
effects of sins and faults of various kinds, and shown
how widely their miserable effects are spread. You
have not, however, explained why God permitted sin at
all, that sin to which you trace the misery..
Eng. True, 0 pundit, I have not distinctly indicated
an explanation of that difficulty. I think we can find
a most satisfactory one, in the great purposes of His
moral government: but this is not the place to dwell
on it. I am endeavouring to show that the inequalities
of rank, health, and happiness are not merely produced
capriciously by God, but are greatly dependent upon
the very sins which men have themselves committed.
And in reference to those who suffer from leprosy and
other sad defects, the explanations I have offered seem
to me suitable and proper. They do not require to be
transferred to some previous life, in which, without any
proof, these persons are said to have existed. At all
events let me add, even if such considerations do not
clear
up
the whole difficulty ; let us remember that we
are very imperfect in our knowledge of things; and
that though we understand many things in the world,
there are many common things which we do not under-
BB
370
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. [PART III.
stand: especially things connected with the work of
God, either in the material world or in human society.
His operations are the hardest to understand : for is He
not far wiser and higher than we? I will say only
another word, and that is, allowing the difficulty in the
case of the few we have spoken of, will their cases,
so rare in number, prove transmigration to be true of
all men in all ages of the world ? Supposing they do
prove their own case, they cannot do more: and it will
be quite unfair to apply the principle to those, by whom
it is not needed. This is my reply concerning them.
Gurudás. You have given an elaborate reply to the
arguments advanced, and which are generally deemed
conclusive by us; and it is very difficult to refute your
positions, especially as you draw proofs of them from
subjects about which we have thought but little. But I
cannot but think we have a strong ground for the doc-
trine in the fact that it provides so well for DISTRIBUTING
REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS to the VIRTUOUS and the
WICKED. Indeed, without it, how can those rewards be dis-
tributed? This is the great argument used on its behalf.
Eng. I am quite aware, O pundit, that this is a com-
mon argument, and that with transmigration, the notion
of retribution is always connected. But I would ask,
first, Is no other scheme possible ? Can the Supreme
God, whose wisdom and power are so great, devise only
this one scheme for getting rid of human imperfections,
and rewarding men according to their works? This
çannot be. Your own systems of philosophy prove that
other means of avoiding the punishment have been in-
PART III.]
371
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
vented. Besides, this system of retribution is one that
is never adopted anywhere else. You advocate that
human souls are thus rewarded or punished by repeated
alternations of residence in the earth and in the other
worlds. You subject men to an intermittent fever; to
seasons of happiness in Vaykantha or Pitriloka, when
they are virtuous, followed by a birth among the evils
of the world again. Why may not God settle their
retribution once for all: and appoint the good to a
permanent happiness and the evil to permanent misery?
There are more reasons for such a course than for
the one which you advocate. (1) Governments in
this world always punish in this way. They give a
definite punishment: a certain fixed amount which
must be gone through. Sometimes a man is im- !
prisoned for a month; sometimes for a year: in very
bad cases, like those of the Thugs or Phansigars, they
imprison them for life: or perhaps they put them to
death. They never give a man changing periods of
pleasure and pain, making each period to depend upon
the last. Why may not the all-wise God act in the
same way? (2) In the same fixed way we deal with
everything: and we make the present qualities of things
decide on their future use. Thus good, sound pots are
sent into the bazar for sale: damaged ones are put aside.
Well-woven cloth is offered in the markets. Good corn
is preserved in golas for future food; sound trees are
reserved as beams for houses: and rotten wood is sold
for fuel. Good and bad things have their future lot
decided by their present worth. You reckon the other
B B 2
372
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
way, and think that the present life of men is a fruit of
past conduct. Why may not the Great God deal with
men in the way in which we deal with material things,
and with offenders against society? Why may He not
try men's characters now: and having done so, give the
wicked a place of punishment, and take the righteous to
live with him eternally in heaven? To me this seems
a far more reasonable plan than your theory of trans-
migration.
The great element in your argument is, that the sys-
tem of transmigration is a system of justice. I have
thought this over, and intend to speak of it when I
come to the arguments which I have to offer against the
doctrine: I will only say now that so far from exhibiting
justice, it seems to be most unjust throughout, and
therefore cannot be received. I will endeavour to prove
this hereafter. At present I am only listening to your
arguments in favour of the doctrine: and endeavouring
to show that they are unsound. Will you kindly advance
any others that you have adopted ?
Gurudás. I will present you, O friend, with one more.
You are aware that we all believe that no new produc-
tion takes place in the world. Every one of our sys-
tems of learning regards the matter of the universe
and all souls, under whatever form, as being eternal :
hitherto we have thought there could be no doubt on the
subject. But you have argued with us on these subjects,
and have shown that much can be said on the other side.
Now, if transmigration be untrue, and every human
being has but one birth, then new souls must continually
PART III.]
373
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
be produced as new births take place. The matter of
new bodies is of course older matter under new forms:
that we can all understand. But we have been accus-
tomed to think that no addition is made to the three
worlds, and that what exists now, has existed always.
Eng. Why should not God create new spirits, if He
thinks fit? He is able to do it. He may easily form
the purpose of such a creation, and desire to fill this
world with inhabitants; and, having tried them here,
to remove them to other worlds for which they prove
themselves fit. He knows all that is best for his crea-
tures : and will do what is best. We are really ignorant
of his purposes until He reveals them ; and to say He
does not create new souls, or that He will not, is very
presumptuous on our part. It implies such a know-
ledge of His doings, as we by no means possess. We
have only to look to facts, to see whether He does create
them or not: leaving the reason and mode of such a
thing entirely to Him.
But why may not new souls be created? What diffi-
culty is there in such a supposition? Matter is not newly
created every day (so far as we know), but we see it
endlessly combined and moulded into new forms. The
forms are new : the combinations are new: the concep-
tions are new. The potter makes his pots not out of
the old broken materials of former pottery, but he takes
new earth, and shapes that earth as it never was before.
Pundits continually form new conceptions in their mind
and write new books. Poets make new poems. Artists
paint new pictures. In fact all men are continually
374
[PART II.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
forming new purposes ; inventing new ideas, and adapt-
ing themselves to new circumstances. Every day by
means of muscular power they produce new motion: in
this case, the force and the motion are absolutely new.
Where then is the difficulty of the Supreme God
creating new souls and new intelligent beings to people
his mighty universe ? Is he not giving us new things
daily? His sun sends out new beams of light. His
rain, and sun, and earth give us new trees, vegetables,
and fruit. Every year new crops of corn cover the
ground, intended for the food of man and beast. All
these gifts are new: and are all bestowed by him. If
we consider these facts, and contemplate his power and
wisdom, I do not see any difficulty in our receiving
what seems to be a fact also; viz., that on each human
birth, a new soul is introduced into the world. I
say
that seems to be the fact: we have no sound reason for
believing it to be a soul come from some former birth in
a previous age, and why should we not receive the fact
as it appears ?
If we look to the history of the world, I think we
find that a new creation has actually taken place again
and again at different periods. By careful examination
we can trace back every tribe of living creatures to its
origin: we see in all cases that each had its beginning at a
certain era. There was a time when it was not; at a cer-
tain period it began to be. Numerous classes of animals,
birds and reptiles have existed on the earth and become
extinct. None of these sprang
any others. Each
separate class was a separate creation : these creations
from
PART III.]
375
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
.
were effected at many different periods, distant from
each other. The souls of men, with all their pecu-
liarities, appear for the first time only about six thou-
sand years ago. If God has thus actually made a new
creation repeatedly at successive eras, where is the diffi-
culty of believing that he does now create a new soul
each time a child is born into the world ? I see no
difficulty in believing he does so, although the exact
period of its creation may be unknown to us.
Gurudás. This argument of mine is the last of the
reasons commonly urged amongst both pundits and
common people in favour of the migration of souls.
You are aware, however, O friend, that our systems of
learning have other arguments, connected with their
doctrine of the eternity of souls, which each propounds
in its own way.
Eng. I am aware of it, О friend; especially of the
argument given by the Sánkhya in its doctrine of the
Dispositions : and by the Gita,* in its notion of Divine
destiny. But these doctrines are so important, that I
propose to make a separate discussion respecting them.
They are closely connected with the dogma of the eter-
nity of souls, and are intended to show why it is souls
and their history vary in their qualities and destiny, by
attributing the primary cause of all to the conditions of
their actual creation; that cause both necessitating
transmigration and determining its character in each
individual case.
I doubt the whole doctrine: and have
many reasons to offer against it, derived both from the
* Bhag. Gíta, “ Divine and infernal fate.” Sec. xvi., Prakritibheda.
376
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
1
character of God and the actions of men. These doc-
trines, however, do not compel us to believe in transmi-
gration. They rather serve to account for it. Perhaps
it is more correct to say that they are derived from
transmigration, than that they lead to it.
You have now offered, 0 pundit, four arguments for
our examination, by which it is generally believed that
the migration of souls is proved. You have based it
upon
the varieties of happiness and misery in the world, and
the inequalities of human conditions ; upon the fact
that some men are lepers and the like; upon its excel-
lence as a scheme of just retribution; and upon the
objection to the creation of new souls. I have endea-
voured to show that all these reasons are futile: that
their difficulties can really be explained by a reference
to the present life of men, including their probation and
preparations for a state in the future: and that, in
order to secure a satisfactory explanation, we do not
require the theory of transmigration at all. When all
the arguments for a principle are set aside, it of course
falls to the ground. Such ought to be the case with
this doctrine; and from the deficiency of reason on its
side, the scholars and common people of Hindustan,
like those of Europe, ought to cease to believe it. But
I am aware that it is taught by all the Shastres; and
first of all by the Vedas. Reason, however, has nothing
in its favour: on the contrary, I propose now to show
that reason brings forward the most powerful arguments
against it.
PART III.]
377
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
PART SECOND.-DIRECT ARGUMENTS AGAINST
TRANSMIGRATION.
Eng. Having offered my opinion with respect to the
arguments in favour of this doctrine, and shown you that
the hypothesis of transmigration is unnecessary, I pro-
pose now, 0 pundit, to point out the various arguments
against it, which render it in itself objectionable.
First. The doctrine of transmigration confuses the
various classes of beings existing in the world.
We
were told distinctly that both the Upanishads and the
Sánkhya Karika assert that in the course of punish-
ment, the worst of mankind go into the forms of dogs
and boars, deer, trees, and even rocks. In other words,
that animals, vegetables, trees, and even the rocks of
the world, are inhabited by the souls of intelligent
human beings. Now this is entirely opposed to all we
know of the universe. We all see that perfectly dis-
tinct classes of things and beings exist in the world.
Hindus, as well as European men of science, divide
them into organic and inorganic; the viviparous and
oviparous; fishes, birds, insects. Some are animate,
some are inanimate. More than this, we see that all
the organic beings reproduce their own kind exactly.
An hibiscus (yabá) produces an hibiscus: a bilwa-tree,
a bilwa-tree. Mangoes produce, not oranges, but
mangoes. Horses produce horses : from elephants,
only elephants spring. Kites again produce kites :
hargilas lay eggs from which young hargilas come forth.
In all these cases, the different genera do not mix:
)
378
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
whether they be oviparous or mammalia, they adhere to
this rule. If an exception occur, as in the production
of a mule, the exception stops with the individual: it
is not continued into a new species of a cross breed.
The exception doubly confirms the rule itself. Now
we know again that in multiplying their kind, all the
special characters of the class continually reappear.
The wisdom of the elephant, the fierceness of the wolf,
the patience of the ass, the rapacity of the kite, con-
tinue in each kind from generation to generation. They
retain the same properties of body, the same amount
and the same signs of intelligence. Now man is distin-
guished from them all by his soul: by his memory; by
his reason; by his power of speech; by his use of lan-
guage; by his power to attain and to employ abstract
ideas. Men produce such men : from age to age, the
human race continue to be men. But transmigration
tells us to confuse all this beautiful order, which the
Creator has established in the world.
But this is not all. A consideration of the pecu-
liarities which distinguish human beings from other
classes of living creatures, an examination of that which
makes them human beings, will show that such a con-
fusion of classes as your theory contains could not
exist: at all events, it could not exist without displaying
itself. Let me ask what are the qualities of soul ?
Nyayist. The fourteen qualities of soul, are intellect,
pleasure and pain, desire, aversion, volition, and so on.
The soul also rules the senses and the body.
Eng. What do you include in intellect?
PART III.]
379
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
Nyayist. We reckon in it two things : apprehension
and recollection: under apprehension are ranged per-
ception, inference, comparison, and verbal knowledge:
under these also are various subdivisions.
Eng. Well. Without discussing minute details, we
can all see how intellect, recollection, inference, per-
ception, and the like, belong to soul: and how the
soul obtains a knowledge of its own proceedings, its
internal perceptions, and the like. Now it seems to
me that all such faculties distinguish the human soul
from all other souls or beings said to possess souls.
I go beyond this, to points that your systems do not
notice. I look at the whole constitution of the soul's
nature, its feelings and desires, as well as its intellect;
at its knowledge of good and evil, its conscience;
at the power which it possesses to know God, the
Ruler; to worship him, and fear him; at its power
to feel its duties to others, the duties which men owe
as parents to children, children to parents, and the like:
and I say that in all these things a human being
differs entirely from the animals, birds, and reptiles
of the world. His body again is exactly suited to
his soul: its five senses assist him to get knowledge;
its organs help him in motion and action: and all its
powers are exactly fitted in every way to help him in
the various works, duties, employments, &c., which he
must carry on.
On the other hand, the bodies of
animals are exactly suited to their position, habits, and
characters : different tribes and classes each having a
body suited to itself. According to your theory, these
380
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
animals, and even trees and rocks, possess the same kind
of soul as a human being, a soul united to a perceiving
mind,” and having intellect, reason, and recollection,
amongst its powers. Yet of all this we scarcely see
the slightest sign. No one would ever imagine, from
examining animals and men together, that they were all
animated by the same kind of souls.
And you cannot say here that the difference consists
in the different kinds of " mind” they possess : for all
chief qualities are qualities of the soul : the “ mind” is
only the instrument by which the soul perceives its
internal work; and is aware of its own activity. The
animals do not show that they possess any of those
qualities except in the slightest degree. In all these
qualities men and they differ most strongly. More
than this, it is not a mere difference of body that
makes the difference between the two classes of beings.
The body is only the dwelling of the soul, and though
it does somewhat modify the soul's actions, according
to the state in which it happens to be, we nowhere find
that the mere body makes an entire change in the con-
stitution of the “ being," so that he can no longer act,
exercise his chief powers, and be the same as he was
before. All these things show that the soul of man is
something peculiar by itself, possessing special qualities
which distinguish it from other classes of beings; hav-
ing a home of its own, duties of its own, responsibilities
of its own.
Animals seem entirely different in their
qualities, capabilities and place in the world. How can
we then believe that the one class ever becomes the
PART III.]
381
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
other? Your theory asserts that they do: but you give
no proof and no instance: there is no sign that they
ever do so, or that they can become so. Everything
points the other way. May we not then on strong
grounds object to a theory exhibiting such important
defects?
2. My second argument is that HUMAN RECOLLECTION
is entirely opposed to this migration of souls. We
know that the human soul by means of its faculties
acquires knowledge by perception, stores that know-
ledge in memory, recalls it when required for use, and
applies its judgment to an examination of the knowledge
so acquired. The memory, we all know, is a very
great faculty. It lays up carefully in store the know-
ledge which has passed through the mind; and if we
look attentively at the interesting cases in which its
phenomena have been developed, we can scarcely resist
the conviction that it never loses an atom of the infor-
mation which it has once acquired. Under ordinary
circumstances a man attends to and keeps before him
those objects which are prominently brought up by the
demands of daily life. His previous knowledge is not,
however, lost. It may be hidden or thrown out of
view: but it is all laid up in the memory, and any
effort of recollection or a peculiar suggestion may recall
on a sudden any item of it which had been long for-
gotten. Thus it is that, though the body of man
changes every seven years, the soul retains till old age
what it acquired in youth. Thus it is that the old man
recalls the history of a long lifetime and enumerates
382
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
the varied incidents which have happened during that
period.
Such is the ordinary history of our waking and con-
scious life. But there are two kinds of extraordinary
facts, which exhibit the contents of the soul far more
fully (though not so systematically) as the common
process of recollection. These extraordinary facts are
dreams and delirium. Dreams are not under the con-
trol of the reason. The soul produces them at random
(merely following the laws of suggestion): and in so
doing mixes up times, places, persons and things which
never in our experience stood side by side in fact. The
contents of the mind are thrown up in great confusion.
Delirium goes much farther, and tosses up the contents
of the soul in a very much greater degree, and in far
greater disorder. At such times the most concealed
thoughts, the most secret items of knowledge have been
unexpectedly revealed. In hundreds of cases the most
secret crimes have been brought to light among the
wicked: and the most secret thoughts and elements of
knowledge among those who had nothing to conceal.
Thus it is that in severe fevers, the unconscious
patient has often been heard to utter the language
which he spake in youth, but in his conscious hours
had forgotten for more than twenty years. Under such
circumstances uneducated servants have been known to
repeat passages from Greek and Roman books which
their learned masters had perhaps on a single occasion
been reading in their presence. Though the impression
made at the time of hearing could only have been
PART III.]
383
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
slight, yet the memory retained it, and retained it for
many years; and all of a sudden in this delirium the
whole wonderfully reappears. Now amidst all these
revelations of the most secret, most hidden, long-for-
gotten objects of the soul's knowledge, we observe one
most striking fact. All the items of knowledge thus
thrown up from the innermost recesses of the mind to
its surface, have related to the one single life of which
these individuals have been conscious. The forgotten
languages were those which it is known that they had
learned in earlier life: the forgotten words were those
which they had heard (it may be only once) many years
before: the forgotten events were such as had actually
happened to them. No single thing has ever been
revealed from the inner soul of any one which could not
be explained in this way.
Upon these facts and phenomena connected with the
soul's MEMORY, I build this argument. Considering the
amazing power which the soul has to lay up within
itself the events of its history; and considering the
numerous cases in which, without control from the
reason, the most secret and forgotten events have been
thrown out again, on extraordinary occasions,-if these
souls had ever experienced a former life in the world,
such as you say, much more if they had experienced
many,--then it seems to me that in some cases, if not
in all, numberless facts would and must have been
revealed respecting that previous experience: and thus
we should have obtained certain information respecting
their transmigrations. But not a single case of the
384
HINDU PHILOSOPHY, [PART III.
kind has ever been known. All knowledge revealed in
this way has invariably been knowledge acquired in
their one single life. On this ground alone, I feel per-
fectly justified in rejecting the doctrine of the transmi-
gration of souls.
Let us examine here the illustrations of migration
given by your authorities.
a. A traveller who journeys through Hindustan, and
goes from city to city, of course remembers his home,
his parents, his neighbours, and all that happened to
him among them. He remembers, too, what he sees in
each new city, what kinds of people he meets with, and
what he says and does. All this is quite natural, and
occurs every day. Now the Vedantists tell us that the
body is the city of Brahma : if the soul really enters
“ cities" in the course of many ages, why does it
not carry with it the remembrance of what has hap-
pened during its residence in each? Or if we cannot
recall such events voluntarily, why do such never come
into the mind in dreams or in times of delirium? The
fact that such a thing never happens, proves incontes-
tably that there is no recollection in the soul of such
events: and therefore that they have never occurred.*
6. Let me take another illustration from the Sán-
khya. We are told in the Kárika, that the subtil body
assumes different gross bodies for the contemplation of
soul, just as an actor assumes different disguises for the
* A familiar argument, very convincing to the common people, is
derived from the illustration of a speaking parrot, removed from one
cage to another, yet retaining his knowledge of names and his power
to express them.
new
PART III.]
385
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
4
amusement of a crowd. The people see the changes of
dress; they compare them; they trace the same man in
them all, and enjoy the contrast produced by the change.
Now why cannot the soul in the same way remember all
the disguises which, on your supposition, the subtil body
has assumed ? It cannot remember one. Can we believe
then that it ever put them on? C. A third illustration
is given by Veda Vyása, when he says: “As a man
casts off his old garments and puts on new ones, so the
soul, having quitted its mortal frame, enters into another
which is new." Now a man when he changes his dress
carries with him all that makes him a man; he does not
lose his memory of what he is or has. Nor should the
soul lose its recollection of such things, when it forsakes
one body to enter another. Thus once more the illus-
tration given disproves transmigration. Again we ask:
why does not the soul remember its former births? It
does not, because they never took place. Had they
taken place, the soul must have remembered them. We
thus see that the illustrations employed by the great
sages to prove the doctrine actually serve to disprove
it. If bodies are “ cities of Brahma," the traveller,
soul, ought to remember them, as it journeys, age by
age, through them.
If the soul is spectator of the
disguises assumed by subtil body, it will of course
remember and compare those disguises. If soul merely
puts on new bodies, as a man puts on new garments,
like that man, it will not lose a remembrance of all its
past history. Memory, which is so powerful in soul, is
entirely deficient in all that relates to toher lives than
Сс
386
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
our present one. The inference then is, that such lives
we never had.
Gurudás. Your argument, О friend, respecting me-
mory would be a sound one, if the soul remained
perfectly the same
.
But you have forgotten that at
each death the soul is divested of mind, understanding,
and consciousness. This is the view held both by the
Vedánt and Sankhya. Only the rudiment is left.
Eng. I am aware, O friend, that such is the theory
of soul held by Hindu pundits; but I did not refer to
it, because I deem it quite incorrect. How could such
a fact be known except by memory: and yet that
memory you want to get rid of. But your own theo-
ries (even if incorrect) supply a better answer. Sup-
posing these faculties necessary to a perfect soul, when
embodied in the form of a man, and supposing that at
death and during its stay in the other world, it is
deprived of them, yet on its birth into the world again,
it is again invested with them, and becomes once more
the perfect human soul. Is it the same soul? Kopila
distinctly declares it is.
The Nyáya also says:
“ Eternal unity is attributed to eternal substances : of
which soul is one." Its powers then will be in perfect
action: its memory will be complete and sound; and in
the new birth it will be quite able to do and to reveal
all that my argument pleaded for. I think this con-
clusion follows from your own theories.
actually shows us one instance in which recollection
of the circumstances of a former birth is seen in opera-
* Kúriká, pp. 48, 49. Bháshá Parichh. p. 59.
The Nyáy
PART III.]
387
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
tion. “Why does a child begin to take milk from its
mother?" - The commencement of the action takes
place by the recollection of the causes of the desires
experienced in a former birth.” *
He acknowledges that
it ought to recollect other things, but fate prevents !
But I should not argue thus on my own principles. I
have shown you that I think the theory which sepa-
rates “mind” from soul is incorrect: and that the soul
exhibits a unity of constitution so complete that if any
part or faculty is taken away it ceases to be soul any
longer. Just as the living body has its five senses and
many organs, and ceases to be a complete body where
they are all absent; so soul is possessed of faculties
belonging to its very nature: and ceases to be soul, if
they are lost.
What is soul, for example, without per-
ception, without reason, without memory, without con-
sciousness? It is not the same being : it can learn
nothing, it can do nothing. It will cease to be soul.
It seems to me that it is not possible for a soul to lose
its memory and yet remain the same soul, as Kopila
says it is. Such is evidently the opinion of the Nyáy.t
And if it cannot lose its memory, then it will be sure to
remember all its past history. The argument I used
respecting it, I therefore adhere to still.
3. Let me now propose to you a THIRD argument
* Bhúshá Parichh., p. 18, Commentary.
† Also Bh. Parichh., p. 18, Commentary. “If consciousness be-
longed to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things
perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and de-
crease by acquiring and losing its particles." Recollection here is
purely an attribute of soul: and that soul (see above) is always ONE.
C C 2
388
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. [PART III.
against transmigration, which, while quite different from
the others, is of itself extremely forcible. It is this:
transmigration is a system of great injustice.
Gurudás. Injustice! It is advocated amongst us,
because we think it is the only mode of defending the
justice of the Supreme.
Eng. Yes, I think it injustice. You will remember
that I spoke of this before, and I will now state the
argument which I then referred to. If soul existed pre-
viously, and does not remember the least event of its
history (a fact about which we all agree), then some-
thing must have happened to it, which has removed
that remembrance. Allowing that such a change in its
constitution is possible, some compulsory change must
have occurred, which cuts off its connection with all the
previous events of its history. The pleasures which it
enjoyed in that former life; the pains from which it
suffered; the friends with whom it held intercourse,
are all forgotten. All the events which happened to it;
all the good, and all the evil which it did, are entirely
forgotten. It knows nothing of its former virtues : it
knows nothing of former faults. The knowledge of them
is lost for ever. If a man were to be told of all these
things, he would not recognize them as events, or faults,
or virtues connected with himself; he would listen to
them as to the actions and virtues of another person.
He would not feel himself worthy to be honoured for the
good; nor to be punished for the evil. Now is such a
man the same being that he was ? No: though the rudi-
ment of soul be the same, he is to all intents a NEW MAN.
PART III.]
389
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
But you say transmigration is necessary as furnishing
a time of retribution. Now the Supreme God in distri-
buting rewards or punishments distributes them with a
view to encourage virtue and to discourage vice. He
wishes both to punish and to reform a guilty soul. But if
a man who has committed faults in a previous birth, is to
suffer for them here, how can he feel the benefit of such
a punishment, when he is so changed in soul, as not to
be the same being that he was ? The punishment there-
fore of his faults falls upon another being altogether (i.e.
himself in an entirely changed state). He cannot re-
member what he did or why he is punished. He will
say of course that he is totally another man. So will a
good man say if he be rewarded for virtue: of that
virtue he can know nothing. By the destruction of
memory, he too has become another being. Here then
the theory involves the great injustice of the Supreme
rewarding one man for the virtues of another, and of
punishing one man for the faults of another. Can we
speak thus of the Great God whom we ought to honour?
You stated at the outset that the theory was framed in
order to avoid what seemed the injustice of an unequal
distribution of happiness and misery. But by the loss
of memory, the theory formed to provide against an
apparent injustice, involves a real one !-Let me now
present you with a FOURTH argument against it. What
is the great end of this migration of souls ?
Gurudás. The end is explained differently by our
systems, but all agree that by its means the soul works
out in the course of ages the full fruit of those tendencies
390
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
66
and innate dispositions, with which it was originally
endowed. The evil work out a course of evil; the good
travel to higher and higher positions, and at length
attain “ deliverance,” even if it be delayed to a future
Kalpa or " great period.”
Eng. This theory is a theory of fatalism. Is there
nothing by which the soul is able to rid itself of its
troubled condition and by effort rise to a higher rank
than that which it now occupies ?
Gurudás. Special causes, the instrumental means of
virtue and vice affect individual souls, or take them
upwards or downwards towards a higher or more de-
graded condition. Our various systems of knowledge
are all contrived with the purpose of delivering souls
more speedily from this condition and ensuring libera-
tion at once.
Eng. But if you are consistent, the formation of those
systems and the study of them by individuals, with the
adoption of any other of the special causes you have
mentioned, should all be considered as merely the natural
development of those “innate dispositions” of which the
systems teach. Apart however from them, I turn to the
great fact observed by many learned and thoughtful
men, and already pointed to by me in this discussion,
that our life in this world on many grounds must be
considered a life of discipline and trial preparatory to
another state of existence, “the worlds of reward." In
reference to this fact, I find another argument against
transmigration, that it introduces souls repeatedly into
the world of sin, in which it is impossible, that without
PART III.] TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
391
special help (of which your theories know nothing) they
should improve and grow better. Many who believe in
transmigration have considered that one of its objects is
the progressive improvement of the soul.
This is one
of the ideas lately received by many Hindus in Calcutta:
an artificial result of the mixture of English and Hindu
ideas. I do not see how such improvement can be
secured: especially if every soul on being born again
into the world, has no remembrance of its previous
faults. All punishment for crime ought to inflict suf-
fering on the offender, and ought, from fear of its repeti-
tion, to deter both him and others, from the commission
of such a fault again. Look at the way in which the
Phánsigárs (or Thugs) are treated at Jubbulpore. There
they are confined because of their crimes and made to
work: but with a special view to their reformation, they
are taught also the nature and wickedness of their crime,
in order that such as regain liberty may never return to
their former practices. But for this end memory is again
required. If a man has no memory, how will he be able
to confess, “I did that deed: I committed that crime”?
How will he know that it is a crime at all : and that he
is undergoing punishment, deserved by him for such
deeds ? All association between the crime and its conse-
quent suffering is cut off.
The two things stand sepa-
rate. How then will the moral character of the criminal
be improved? The system of transmigration then viewed
as a retribution for evil cannot in the nature of things
accomplish the improvement of human souls and their
complete reformation. Let me ask you, 0 pundit; you
2
392
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
was the
think it has been going on for thousands of years: do
you consider that the Hindus are improving and be-
coming better age after age?
Gurudás. Alas! O friend, your question is a painful
one. Do not the Shastres say that the first
age
age of truth: and that passing through the Treta and
Dwápár, we have entered into the Kali Yuga ? Do not
all allow that this is the age of ignorance, of folly, of sin ?
And do we not all look forward to the time, when all
men shall cease to fear and honour brahmins and shall
form but one single caste? Are not the shastres less
studied than they used to be? Are not brahmins turning
away from our systems of learning in order to acquire
the English language, with a view to profitable employ-
ment under the Company's Ráj? Alas, O friend, we
cannot say that the Hindus are improving or that the
Kali Yuga is becoming more pure.
Eng. Even on your own theory, 0 pundit, how can
it become so ? We have just seen how, by the de-
ficiency of memory, the effect of punishment must be
frustrated, and fear of doing evil cease to have in-
fluence. Let me add another fact that will cause the
same failure;-viz., the circumstances under which the
punishment is carried on. The Government of India,
we have seen, in trying to improve the Phảnsigárs, has
placed them in a separate habitation, removed them
from the society in which they lived, and deprived
them of the opportunity of crime. It also gives them
good advice and wise instruction: and teaches them to
work in the production of useful things. But according
PART III.]
393
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS.
to the theory of transmigration, the Supreme in punish-
ing impure souls, sends them back to the very world
where they became impure, with their tendencies and
dispositions unaltered ; places them in the very midst of
the associates with whom they carried on crimes in
former days, and does this without a word of good
instruction or one fact of warning from their previous
history. Can this be wise? Can it possibly be a
successful plan? Can any one be improved by being
placed amidst his old temptations, surrounded by scenes
of sin, and subjected again to the influence of the six
passions in a gross body, as before ? Can any man
with an impure nature be drawn from his impurity
by being made to inhabit the body of a cow, a dog, or a
boar? No. The souls of men will become like the
filthy birds and beasts they are compelled to inhabit,
and cannot possibly enter from thence the path of true
wisdom. Such a scheme must fail : and only increased
ignorance, debasement, and sin be the result. Men
well know that they cannot make their sons tem-
perate by putting them in a spirit shop: nor their
daughters chaste by associating them with dancing-
women. Why should they think that the Supreme
God will act in a different manner?
I have thus endeavoured, 0 pundits, to state clearly
a few arguments which seem to me to render the theory
of the migration of souls impossible. I showed first
that, as believed in India, it confuses all the distinctions
of classes among created objects in this world. It
teaches that soul, possessing essential powers for which
394
[PART IIT.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
a human body is required, can be united to animals,
rocks, and trees. It is utterly inconsistent with the
condition and operations of our memory. It charges
upon the Supreme the great injustice of punishing one
person for another's faults. It is rendered futile, as a
means of improvement, by destroying all recollection
of the crimes that are punished. And its end must be
defeated, owing to the circumstances by which it sur-
rounds the guilty one who is to be improved. Where
is the use of a system, which has so few reasons in its
favour, and so many strong arguments against it? The
more it is examined by a calm, unprejudiced mind, the
more defective, the more useless, and the more unlikely
will it appear to be. Even you yourselves allow that it
has failed hitherto. Have you hope that it will succeed
better in the future?
I leave argument here, and conclude this long dis-
cussion by asking you, Does this theory give you any
hope in the prospect of death? Death is the lot of all :
and at the time appointed by God, every one must quit
this world. Does this plan make you happy? If you
have done well now, may you not fail in some future
birth; and thereby be compelled to undergo one or
more degrading births : and descend lower and lower in
the condition of your existence? You do not see any
rising: you see all society in Hindustan going back-
ward. Can you hope to fare better?
Gurudás. Your words, O friend, are sad words: your
reasons are strongly urged. What better belief is there
for us?
:
PART III.] TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS. 395
Eng. The system, which I believe, teaches that there
is but one birth for men : that they live in this world
but once: that they are accountable to God for what
they do: and that they will be rewarded according to
their works. It teaches that in the future world, there
is a heaven for the righteous and a hell for the wicked ;
in which they will reside for ever: and which they will
leave no more. It tells us, as we all feel, that men are
very sinful: are quite unfit to dwell in heaven. But
through an all-sufficient atonement, offered by a true
Incarnation, it offers pardon for all past sins: and it
tells man, that while he cannot purify himself, God will
give him a new nature, a purified soul: and will give
him strength and favour, whereby he may live pure and
forsake sin. That change and that purification of heart
are the true “regeneration;" the true birth, is the new
birth not of a second body, but of a purified soul.
Here is a LIBERATION complete and worthy: a true
deliverance from the pains of life and the sins from
which they spring. Let us pray God to give us this
divine change of nature. It is what we want.
With-
out it we never can be reformed: we never can get to
heaven. But if we possess it, we shall enter, when
we die, the heaven of God, and leave it no more for
ever.
396
PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Dialogue Seventh.
INNATE DISPOSITIONS-FATALISM.
PRELIMINARY NOTE.
SEVERAL of the arguments used in this dialogue are of
a popular kind: appealing to the natural feelings of the
mind more than to the deliberate judgments of men
who rule everything by processes of thinking. I em-
ploy these arguments now, because I have found them
effectual in experience, convincing men, where more
abstruse argumentation failed.
The next discussion in this assembly of Hindu pundits
turned upon a subject closely akin to the last one, the
migration of souls ; and embraced that point which
proves the ultimate resting-place both of the Hindu
systems, and the common Hindu belief. Their English
friend thus opened it for consideration.
Eng. In our last discussion, 0 pundits, there was one
argument against the migration of souls, which I might
have brought forward, but preferred not to employ in
this assembly. It is a special argument against trans-
migration as received by the common people. We see
a great amount of evil in this world of many kinds.
How has it come here? whence did it spring? We are
told: “It came from the previous lives of those now in
the world." But whence did it come into those lives?
PART III.]
397
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
It is answered: “From earlier lives.” And into those ?
“ From lives earlier still.” This process, it is evident,
is quite incomplete. It traces evil a few steps back, and
removes the difficulty of its origin from our sight, only
to throw it upon others who lived long before us. But
the difficulty remains still. When you have repeated
the removal several times, and gone back into distant
ages, the question still arises: Where did that evil
spring from ? The origin of that distant evil is as diffi-
cult to account for as that of the evil which we see in
our own day. The only consistent course for a philo-
sopher to adopt is to go back and back, and never to
stop till he arrives at the primal origin of things, and
examines whether it is traceable there. The Sánkhya
and Vedánt do so: and furnish their ultimate expla-
nation of the existence of evil by boldly making it an
element in the original creation of the matter of the
universe. Will you kindly tell us, O Gurudás, the
view of the Sankhya on this subject ?
Gurudás. Kopila asserts that intellect, the first pro-
duct of Nature, exhibits as its affections, goodness, pas-
sion, and foulness (the Satwa, Raja, and Tama gunas):
that from which intellect springs must then possess these
things in its constitution. He therefore defines Nature
the state of equipoise of goodness, passion, and dark-
These are not “qualities” (in the ordinary sense),
but are the actual material engaged in the service of SOUL :
just as a cord " is used to bind an animal. There is
a triad of these “ qualities;" and neither less nor more.
Hence spring the varieties of products in the universe.
+
as
ness.
398
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Eng. By this statement then, Kopila teaches that all
the varieties of pain and pleasure, virtue and vice in
the three worlds, are derived originally from the crea-
tion. He teaches that all the mixtures of character, not
only in the hearts of men, but in the animal, vegetable,
and mineral worlds, result from impulses which are to
be traced back to the very origin of things. He finds
good and evil in the objects among which we dwell,
and that which partakes of the quality of both: and he
reckons that the original materials of the world con-
tained these things, or rather, he even teaches that they
are made up of these things; and therefore their pro-
ducts in every combination contain more or less of
three material or natural substances. We have already
noticed the singular theory which traces all things to
one substance (Prakriti), which is after all a compound
of three other contrary substances in equipoise; and have
argued against the notion that such substances are
eternal. Let us look at the theory now as it bears upon
the origin and existence of evil, and ask whether it
properly accounts for what we daily see and experience.
The good, the evil, and the mixture of both, are worked
into the very constitution of things : just as we see the
colours of the sun's rays reflected in all sorts of com-
binations on the surfaces of material things. If we
reckon three primary colours, blue, red, and yellow ;
and say that all the colours of every shade to which their
mixtures can possibly give rise, are traceable to these,
whatever be the position, the locality, and the circum-
stances of such colours, we should make an argument
PART III.]
399
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
perfectly similar to that of the Sánkhya. Undoubtedly
in the physical world, we see such rules being carried
out. The very law of causation implies them in connec-
tion with material objects. Mangoe-trees spring from
mangoe-trees, and nothing but the branch, or seed, or
root of a mangoe-tree can produce such a tree again.
Elephants produce exclusively their own kind. Kites
produce the eggs of kites; and from these eggs only
kites are hatched. The hilsa fish produces spawn, from
which only hilsa are produced. Whether they be beasts
or birds, fish or insects, each kind produces only young
of its own species. There is no confusion: one kind
does not give birth to another indiscriminately; there
is perfect regularity kept up, and even in the produc-
tion of living creatures, the law which we see ruling in
material products also holds good, that like produces
like. If we trace back each kind of living creature
now in the world, we have every right to expect that
ve shall go on, until we come to a pair (or more)
created by God. You will remember that I have argued
for a real creation of each separate species of living
creatures. It seems to me perfectly just to conclude that
to each separate species, the Supreme Creator gave what
the Sánkhya terms a “disposition,” an innate tendency
to produce only their own kind: so that it is with them a
law; they cannot help it; they cannot get free from it.
So long as the proper process of reproduction is employed,
the result is sure to be a product exactly resembling in
its essential elements the producer from which it sprang.
In the same way the same distinguishing qualities are
we
400
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
preserved to the different classes even' of inorganic
minerals. The same processes carried on by similar
agents, under the same conditions, lead to similar
results. We all see this: we look for it, we count upon
it, and lay our measures accordingly.
Gurudás. All this, O friend, we can indeed see and
entirely agree to; and this is but a fair development of
the doctrine of Kopila concerning the three gunas,
which make up the original element of all things,
Prakriti. Hence it is that the S. Karika lays down
very fully the doctrine of innate dispositions. By this it
shows that while the dispositions communicated to men
and other creatures are of various kinds, corporeal and
intellectual, essential and incidental, leading upwards or
urging downwards, and productive of all the num-
berless varieties of character, lot and history of created
beings in this and other worlds, yet they are all derived
from the different amounts and proportions of the three
gunas, with which each individual is formed.
Eng. I am quite aware of this fact, О friend, and of
the Karikas in which the statement is made ; and allow
that this doctrine is precisely similar to that of the
gunas you first mentioned. But I have not finished
my argument concerning it. While acknowledging its
just application to the physical properties of all portions
of matter, and also to the reproduction by each class
of living creatures, from the ants upwards, exclu-
sively of its pecies, I ask, is this the analogy by which
you explain the defects and sins of men? Do you
account for the virtues and the vices of men by the
PART III.]
401
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
same rule which accounts for the production of heat
in fire, and the hatching of parrots from their parents'
eggs. Allowing the physical application of the rule,
and allowing that there must have been such an "innate
disposition" imparted to them, I object altogether to
apply the theory to the virtues and vices of men. The
cases in my view are thoroughly different, and the same
explanation cannot serve for both. The origin of the
Gunas and of Prakriti I need not again object to.
Kopila gives us a system of designs, and of dispositions,
originated without a producer; and acting under regular
laws, established without any 'lawgiver: and this alone,
apart from other arguments, might justly be urged as
false to the whole scheme. However, let us rather look
at the doctrine itself.
Vedantist. Besides, O learned friend, granting that
the Sánkhya fails from their rejection of an Iswara, to
secure a foundation for the doctrine, the Vedanta cannot
be charged with a similar defect. The Vedánta allows
the existence of Brahma, yet teaches the same doctrine.
In the Bhagavat Gita, the same theory of the three
Gunas is laid down: and all dispositions, all characters,
all courses of conduct, are said to flow naturally and
necessarily from them. It is added that there is nothing
in the three worlds freed from the influence of the
Gunas. The consequence is that men, amongst other
beings, are born with different tendencies: some have
“ divine destiny:" some are subject to “infernal destiny;"
according as they possess more or less of the Satwa,
Raja, and Tama Gunas.
D D
402
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
To the same purpose, Veda-Vyása in his Brahma
Sutras (ii. 3. 41, 42) speaks in the clearest terms: “Blind
in the darkness of ignorance, the soul is guided in all
its actions and fruition, . by the Supreme Ruler . .
who causes it to act according to its previous resolves :
now, according to former purposes, as then, in a manner
consonant to its yet earlier predispositions, accruing
from forms without limit." And he adds: “The
Supreme Ruler makes the individuals act relatively to
their virtuous or vicious propensities."
Eng. Does he not give an illustration of this very
important doctrine ?
Vedantist. Yes; he says that the Supreme Ruler
makes individuals to act thus, just as the same fer-
tilizing rain-cloud causes various seeds to sprout multi-
fariously, producing diversity of plants according to
their kinds."
Eng. Exactly so. He makes them act by the same
rule as that according to which vegetables, animals, and
birds are produced. Virtue and vice come forth from
a man's heart, as sweetness comes from the sugar-cane,
and acidity from the tamarind.
Vedantist. Nor does Vyása alone mention this. The
Upanishads teach the same doctrine. While the
Sánkhya places Prakriti above all to enforce this law
of innate dispositions, the Upanishads ascribe the law
to Brahma himself. “He who regulates both knowledge
and ignorance is God.”
Eng. Even such things do the Vedas teach; and yet,
O pundits, you can regard them as divine books! The
PART III.]
403
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
Let us
Vedánta, then, joins the Sánkhya in teaching this doc-
trine. Both teach that all the dispositions of men, their
ordinary actions, their longings, their enjoyments, their
virtuous conduct, their vicious practices, are all the
necessary development of their nature, and of the pro-
portion of the Gunas which they individually contain:
it is said also that all this is done through the controlling
power of Brahma.
We need not again refer to the Pantheistic dogma
that we have already discussed, and show how this
doctrine in the Vedánt is the natural offspring of that:
nor will I meet the Vedant and Sankhya separately by
showing that each bases its doctrine on an error, which
we have already examined and set aside.
examine this doctrine by itself, a doctrine which so
many
millions of Hindus believe: and which is so fre-
quently spoken of among them. 1. I ask then. FIRST:
If men are compelled to act in all things as trees and
animals “act” in bringing forth their natural products,
how is it that men are conscious of freedom, and that
they are seen in numberless instances to exercise choice ?
If words mean anything, then compulsion, which rules
in everything, is the very opposite of free choice. A
tree is a tree, and produces leaves, branches, fruit, and
seed, because that is the law of its nature. It cannot
help it. A monkey, except in trifling things, where
its instincts allow choice, is just an animal, and performs
all the functions of its monkey-life, because such is it
compelled to be by the law of its being. But men are
not living under such a law. In respect to their animal
DD 2
404
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
[PART III.
nature, they do follow certain laws to which their
nature is subject: but in respect to their actions and
their purposes, the products of their intelligence, they
exercise choice every hour of their waking life.
Vedantist. Why then do they ever declare themselves
subject to fate?
Eng. In countries where this doctrine is part of their
religion, men constantly use such an expression. In
Hindustan and in Persia it is very common; for both
Hindus and Musalmans believe it. But on what occa-
sions do they talk of fate? In great events, which are
beyond a man's control; in accidents in which he is in-
volved by others; in misfortunes which he has not ex-
pected, or which he much regrets but cannot hinder;
men are found to console themselves by such professions
of belief. Sometimes, though not often, they utter the
same on occasions of unexpected success.
sion also is often used wrongly, where events can be
plainly traced, as the fruits of a man's own prudence or
of his folly. But if fate were true, it ought to be felt
always: men ought to make no exertions to avoid coming
evil: they ought to care nothing about anything that
happens. Like the Yogi, they should sit still, exercise
no choice about anything, and do nothing all their lives.
But it is not true : and although some do profess it, we
find the voice of their real nature speaking against it,
and see them doing a thousand things without any refe-
rence at all to this doctrine; we see them acting as if
they had never heard of it. Let us look at the history
of one man through one day: and we shall see that his
The expres-
PART III.]
405
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
whole life is a life of choice, and of effort to produce
certain desired results, by measures which experience
teaches him will lead to them. On rising in the morn-
ing, he takes his clothes, procures flowers and vessels,
and goes away to the river to worship and to bathe. He
has chosen to do this; for he approves of it, and knows
how to accomplish the end. Were he desirous of seeing
a sick mother in a distant village, he would not choose
it: he would omit such a work that morning, and at
daylight, would (from choice) set off for the distant
village in order to see her. In the one case he would
choose to go to the river : in the other he would not.
After bathing, he walks home again, dresses, and takes
his food. He uses his hands in order to feed himself:
he lifts the food and the cup to his mouth: he is not act-
ing under compulsion, and in such things never thinks
that it is his fate to lift his hands or eat and drink. He
walks away to the bazar: he there engages in business :
he employs not only his hands, but all the skill and
wisdom and prudence of his mind. He wishes to be
rich: he therefore uses all his skill to buy cheap, to sell
dear, and to sell fast. Perhaps he deals honestly; per-
haps he overreaches: but he chooses to act so: for he
has an end to accomplish, and these are the means by
which it will be secured. Clever men, by means of
their skill, obtain large profits : unskilful men subject
themselves to losses. Observing this, he tries to avoid
the mistakes of the one and follow the prudence of the
other. Such is his practice during all the hours of
business. When evening comes and business closes, he
:
406
[PART III
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Here we
returns home; again takes food, and then voluntarily
retires to rest. Throughout the day, we see nothing in
his doings, of the compulsion which we allow to exist in
making a tree what it is; we see him master of his own
actions; he is independent; he does things and refrains
from other actions because he chooses so to do. He
gives reasons for what he does; and in his actions ful-
fils certain objects, such as pleasure, gain or fame hold
out to him.
All men act in this way. They act for reasons :
they are swayed by motives; they keep in view certain
objects: and they adopt certain measures.
see ample proofs of freedom: but none of compulsion.
We see freedom of thought and reason; and freedom of
will. Look at the case of disease. Men are liable to
sickness, sometimes from known causes, sometimes from
causes unknown. They know that medicines are very
useful to promote a cure: and a class of physicians
therefore is found in all civilized communities who
administer these medicines, to the satisfaction and for
the welfare of society. If men were subject to a com-
pulsory fate, they would not take care of their patients,
or trouble themselves about the removal of diseases.
They could say: This is God's doing: I am not free:
this is the effect of the Tama Guna; he will do what he
likes: and there they would leave the matter. But
very
few are so unwise. Almost all do call the doctor
and use the means of cure which experience suggests as
useful. Here again is freedom of choice and action
clearly manifested.
PART III.]
407
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
The use
2. Taking the fact of this freedom as the first argu-
ment against the theory of conipulsory dispositions, let
me present to you a SECOND argument in the fact that
motives are the causes whence human actions spring.
Now, motives can be acted on only when there is a
freedom of choice. We mean by them the variety
of reasons which influence the mind. Physical causes
affect the production of objects in nature. In the soul
of man changes of state are produced by what we term
motives and reasons. Reasons are suited to the judg-
ment; motives are suitable to men's will.
of these terms in all languages-reasons, will, choice,
purpose, unwilling, and the like-all point to the fact
that men are able to do or not do, according as they
incline. In most cases, the courses of action which
men pursue have both advantages and disadvantages
attending them. Men examine both, and choose be-
tween them. The man who is fond of drinking thinks,
on the one hand, of the pleasure which that vice gives ;
on the other, of the disgrace to which it leads; and
according to the weight which he allows, either to the
one reason or the other, will be his final history. Now,
what motives has a tree to act upon ? It follows the
laws of its being, which are indeed innate. And in its
growth the human body follows the same; but the under-
standing, the affections, furnish reasons to the soul;
and the will chooses between them, and then acts. Do
you not, 0 pundits, on this ground lay before your
disciples the advantages of following your respective
systems of learning; and do you not argue with each
408
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
other to prove that your own systems are correct and
those of others erroneous ?
3. A third reason—a strong reason—against the doc-
trine of compulsion is that, according to the choice
which is made between motives, men administer to
each other praise or blame; declare they have acted
rightly or wrongly, and that they are virtuous or fol-
lowers of vice. What is the meaning of these terms ?
They are entirely inapplicable to a tree, to a fish, to a
horse, or to a tiger. The tree follows the law of its
being; the tiger does harm, in the destruction even of
human life; but herein he follows the “innate disposi-
tions” with which his nature has been invested. No
one, therefore, thinks him deserving of blame and of
punishment. If, now, it is true that men are placed
under the same law of compulsory " dispositions,” how
is it that terms expressive of blame and praise are
applied to them? They are not more applicable than
they are to a tiger, a parrot, or a tree. We constantly
apply them, however. We apply them to children,
even from infancy, and they appreciate the force of the
arguments which we present to them from this source.
We apply them to grown-up men.
We embody them
in public laws, and appoint magistrates, ameens, and
judges, to see those laws enforced. Why do we not
seize tigers and have them publicly punished? Why
do we not collect the búlbúls and Syámá birds, and
publicly thank them for their sweet songs. We know
that they all act from innate dispositions, without
choice; we know that men have a freedom of choice,
PART III.]
409
- INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
and that no innate disposition compels them to do
things which they cannot help. We make them,
therefore, accountable; the animals we leave alone.
In your authorities you continually speak of merit,
demerit, reward, punishment, and the like: these terms
always imply choice, freedom of purpose, and freedom
of action. You use them in speaking of the system
established in the universe, and of men's dealings with
God. They are quite inconsistent with your doctrine
of innate dispositions; but they agree entirely with
men's general feeling and experience. In this case, I
think your natural feelings have led you rightly where
consistent adherence to your theories would lead you
wrong.
Vedántist. It is hard, O friend, to deny that there
does seem a great difference between the actions of
men and the proceedings of animals and the like. But
still it may be said that this system under which they
so act is appointed to them, and they are compelled so
to live.
Eng. But, 0 pundit, if their so acting is called com-
pulsion, then what is freedom? So long as men have
the power to choose courses of action for themselves,
we cannot help considering them free. God has truly
established in the world the system under which they
live; but, as I showed you before, His system is in-
tended to try men's character, and for this purpose
freedom of choice between motives is essential. The
compulsion of those innate dispositions is a very dif-
ferent thing. The system as such may be a fixed one:
410
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
manner,
individual action is left independent. I might add that,
if there be a real compulsion, why is it not uniform?
It ought to be in a wise system, and is uniform in the
animal and vegetable world. In the conduct of men
the same circumstances ought to produce the same re-
sults. A man, in circumstances similar to those by
which he was once surrounded, ought to act in a similar
But this is frequently not the case; on the
contrary, men often act a second time differently to
what they did at first. And they do this from choice,
as the result of experience, from knowing what results
followed. On the theory of freedom, we can fully
explain the difference: on that of dispositions it cannot
be explained ?
Vedantist. If God choose to act so, what can we say
against it?
Eng. But we cannot charge such conduct on him.
We can easily see how men differ in wisdom and
prudence, and we give them these names according to
their qualities. If a man say: I will swim across the
Ganges in the month of Asára, who will call him
prudent? If he do it and get drowned, will men blame
his folly or impute the fault to God?
Vedantist. They will generally impute it to him; but
they ought really to do so to God. Even the shastres
teach us this : as says the Sruti : “He makes him to do
good deeds, whom he wishes to take out of the world:
and him he makes to do evil deeds, whom he wishes to
introduce into the world again.”
Eng. I allow, O pundit, that this is the consistent
PART III.]
411
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
result of your doctrine. According to your mode of
arguing, it is clear that all evil and all defect of every
kind in the three worlds is traceable up to God. He is
the Author of all actions, all tendencies, all characters.
He is therefore the sole Author of Virtue and He is the
AUTHOR OF SIN. It is natural that we should arrive at
this result of your arguments: and I now desire to
express my belief, that the fact of your teaching this
openly is the strongest argument against your doctrine.
God is the author of all sin! What a blasphemous
doctrine to teach! Yet, alas! there are millions of
Hindus who believe him to be so. The Vedas them-
selyes teach it: and what shall they say against the
Vedas ? I wish therefore to examine this assertion,
and by showing sound reasons against it, add new
arguments against the doctrine from which it con-
sistently springs. Let me present to you one or two
plain reasons such as the most illiterate can understand.
(1.) The Yoga allows that God possesses infinite
wisdom, and that all wisdom finds its source in him.
Gurudus. Certainly that is the doctrine which the
Yóga teaches.
Eng. What would you say to a man, who, after
spending much money building a splendid house, fur-
nishing it with everything his family can desire, and at
length bringing them to enjoy it, should deliberately set
the whole on fire ?
- Gurudás. We have never heard of such a man: if
such ever existed he must have been mad: no man in
his senses could commit such folly.
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[PART III.
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Eng. Very good: but do you not ascribe the same
folly to the Supreme God, in asserting that having
created this universe with all its wonderful contri-
vances ; having created men, superior to trees and to
dull animals, and given them intelligence, and the
choice of right and wrong, he then compels them to
sin, and thus leads them, through sorrows in this life,
to punishment in hell? Is this course of folly possible
on the part of the all-wise God ?
(2.) God's holiness, again, would prevent such a
course. Have we not seen in the Upanishads pas-
sages which declare him spotless and free from all
impurity.
Vedúntist. Certainly: there are numerous Srutis to
that effect: in the Puráns also.
Eng. But if God loves holiness, and is holy, and
therefore dislikes sin : if, as we read in the Gita, he so
far disapproves of murder, theft, lies, and adultery as to
command men not to do them, how can he possibly
incite men to do such evil deeds ? Would any one of
you, 0 pundits, incite a man to murder your parents,
destroy your children, and plunder the property of your
relatives?
Vedúntist. No one surely would do that: such
wickedness we must abhor.
Eng. If we, who are imperfect, abhor such deeds,
how then can we attribute them to the pure and holy
God: how can we attribute them to him not once, nor
ten times; but attribute all the evil that is or has been
or ever will be? God hates evil, and how can he
PART III.]
413
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
possibly himself commit it, and be the author of all
men's wickedness?
(3.) God rewards men according to their merits and
demerits. And he is to be reckoned just.
Vedantist. Certainly. All authorities say so: and
that is the rule by which we say migrations are deter-
mined.
Eng. Are not the virtuous really made happy: are
not the degraded and vicious made to live degraded
lives in this world, and then rendered miserable in the
next world in hell ?
Vedantist. Yes, that is the doctrine we believe.
Eng. But if God be the author of all good dispo-
sitions, and also of all evil ones, how can he be reckoned
just in treating these two classes so differently? The
virtuous are good from no excellence of their own;
but from his controlling influence. From the same
cause the wicked are not wicked of themselves: they
cannot help it : they are obliged to be so. Where is
the justice of God in thus punishing men for doing
what he obliges them to do? He does punish them
indeed; because their evil acts are the offspring of
their own voluntary sin. That is justice which we
all approve.
(4.) Let me ask one other question: Is not God
full of benevolence ?
Vedantist. Yes, he is “mangal swarup," goodness
personified: for he feeds men and beasts, and provides
for the wants of all.
Eng. Well, then, I ask, what is the cause of all the
414
(PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
misery in this world ? In our last discussion I showed
that it all arises from the evil conduct of men towards
God, towards themselves, and towards each other. SIN
is the cause of all sorrow, and all misery. Were a
man secretly to put poison in your food, and your life
were destroyed amidst the greatest pain and torture,
would you reckon him benevolent, or count him as
your enemy?
Vedantist. As my enemy surely: if he did it pur-
posely.
Eng. But Sin is the poison of the world: and he
who has introduced sin has been the occasion and
commencement of all the misery that is suffered. How
can we ascribe such misery to God, the ever benevolent
and good ? That he is kind and good, he proves by
all the care he takes of us: by the rains of heaven,
the corn harvests, the fruit, he gives : by the constant
change of day and night: by giving us medicines to
check disease, and wisdom to apply them.
Thus we see that this doctrine that God is the author
of all virtue and of all sin, opposes entirely his greatest
attributes. If we believe the Vedas, we must allow
that he is an unwise, unholy, unjust, and unmerciful
God. Which of us is prepared to accept this neces-
sary conclusion from that theory?
Vedantist. Still it seems strange, if he had nothing
to do with it. We allow that he made all things: He
gave our minds, souls, bodies, and limbs : it is with
them sin is committed : how then can he be free from
all connection with it?
PART III.]
415
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
Eng. God has certainly given us our limbs and
organs: our five senses, our understanding and speech.
But why has he given them? Surely that we may
do good with them: and if we use them otherwise,
the fault lies not with him but with ourselves. If, O
brahmin, you have given to your servant to-day a rupee
to make purchases for your family, and he go and waste
it, or spend it in drinking or in folly, who is to be
blamed, you who gave the money, or he who misspends
it? He surely is guilty, and he deserves punishment.
Vedantist. Certainly he is guilty.
Eng. But supposing he pleads that that rupee which
led to the folly and theft, was given by you, and that
you
therefore were the cause, what would you say?
Vedantist. I should tell him that it was given for
my purpose, and not his own, and because he is my
servant.
Eng. Thus will God reason with us, his servants,
respecting sin. All our organs, and all this world, he
has given that we may serve him. If then we sin and
turn all these gifts to evil uses, he is not chargeable
with guilt: it is we who sin. Therefore, it is he
who punishes.
Vedantist. But we would ask, O friend, If sin is so
evil; if God hates it, and will surely punish, why did
he allow it to enter the world at all: why was not
all made perfectly free from sin ?
Eng. Do we not say, 0 pundit, that the state of man
is the highest, and is much superior to that of stones,
trees, and animals? If God compel men to remain
416
[PART III.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
It was
sinless, whether by “ innate dispositions,” or otherwise,
then there is no virtue in refraining from evil. There
is then no more virtue in a man than in a tree. Real
virtue arises from the willing obedience of a soul that
can do wrong but prefers to do right. Such is the
obedience which God wishes to see in men.
for this reason that he gave them their intelligence,
their freedom, their power to choose. Thus their good-
ness is tried and tested. Those who, in the presence
of evil, prefer to practise what is holy, and to do what
pleases God, are shown to be willingly virtuous, and
therefore God rewards them. The wicked, in the pre-
sence of what is good, prefer to sin; and therefore
God punishes them as beings really evil.
Gurudás. There is reason, O friend, in your words;
still you have not yet touched the difficulty which the
Sánkhya and Vedánt theories seek to explain. There
is evil in the world: and it can be traced to yet earlier
evil : how did the first evil arise ? Was the world
made evil at first ?
Eng. This subject, О friend, has always perplexed
the minds of men : and must do so: because the ulti-
mate reason for permitting evil lies deep in the mind
of God. You have offered your explanation : let me
give you that which is contained in the Christian Bible.
That Book states that God made this world perfectly
pure. Every part of the creation was good. There
was no defect.
Then he placed in it, in a garden,
a pair of human beings. He made them perfectly holy:
he made thein free. Then he gave them this com-
FART III.]
417
INNATE DISPOSITIONS.
mand: “Do not eat of the fruit of one particular tree
in this garden : all the rest is yours:
» and he left
them. This command was given in order to try their
obedience, and see whether they were above all things
anxious to please him. They were free to obey or
disobey. They disobeyed. From that time sin has
been in the world. Men are surrounded by sin, see
sin, and practise sin. Yet do they bear marks of their
pure origin. Sometimes they long to do good, to
oppose what is evil. Then they fall into temptation:
and they commit the sins which they profess to dis-
like. Thus it is man is in general a mixture of good
and evil : and that both are seen in his conduct, lan-
guage, and thoughts. While you explain it unsatis-
factorily by a reference to the Gunas, This is the
explanation of the origin of sin in this world, given
by the Christian Bible, which, for many reasons, we
honour as the WORD OF GOD. That word has been
God
given to warn us against the effects of evil; to show
us how sin is pardoned, and the soul freed from its
guilt and power. Its whole purpose is to fight against
sin: and ultimately the grace of God will restore all
things unto himself.
Е Е
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[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
PART IV.
An Outline of Truth.
In the preceding Dialogues, the chief errors taught in
the great systems of Hindu Philosophy have been dis-
cussed: the arguments and authorities upon which they
are based have been stated; and the various considera-
tions which reason urges against their validity, have
been expounded. So closely are the various dogmas
connected together; they are so intimately bound up
with the very structure and end of these systems; that
if the reasonings against them be sound, the systems as
such must fall to pieces. Many of their topics are
wisely chosen ; and many of their individual principles
are sound; but as systems they must be reconstructed,
if they are to stand. The Nyáya alone can safely
retain any considerable portion of its original plan. The
Sankhya, though ably constructed and singularly con-
sistent, proves utterly deficient both in its beginning
and its end. The Vedanta disappears in like manner;
its very root being the gigantic error of pure Pantheism.
Aware that he had appeared chiefly in the invidious
position of a critic; that he had hitherto been ex-
amining the dogmas of others; had endeavoured to
destroy the credit of the systems which his pundit
friends highly valued ; and though he had advocated
PART IV.]
419
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
several important principles of truth, had not yet pre-
sented them as a system, the English judge prepared,
as was just, a brief outline of the system of truth
usually received by educated Christians in modern
times; that his friends might know how European
scholars not only destroy fallacies, but build up truth
in their stead. Imitating to a small extent their own
forms of text-books, he compiled this brief outline in
the form of SUTRAS ; and having requested the pundits
to write them down, he dictated and expounded the
Sútras in their hearing on several succeeding days.
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
Victory to the Supreme God.
May the Glorious God, by whom have been created
the three worlds, grant unto us the light of His wisdom;
that our souls, being freed from the glooms of passion,
may contemplate His works and His honoured words
with attention; that we may comprehend the lessons of
instruction which they teach, and accomplish those
holy works, which these lessons, acting as motives,
ought to produce in our souls.
BOOK FIRST.
SUTRA 1. To please God is the chief end of man: in
so doing he will escape all pain; and will attain ever-
lasting happiness.
At the outset four questions will be asked: What is the
object proposed for consideration : What is the occasion
E E 2
420
[Part 1v.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
which calls it forth : What is the purpose for which atten-
tion to it is invited : and, Who are the parties to whom it is
addressed ? We have stated the object; the attainment of
the purushártha or chief end of man. We now proceed to
the remaining questions,
2. Concerning this chief end, and the method of its
attainment, many wrong notions are prevalent in the
minds of different learned persons, as well as among
the vulgar. All these must be laid aside, and it is
essential to the fulfilment of the end, that we acquire
right notions of both.
3. Because permanent happiness can be secured, only
by the fulfilment of duty in pleasing God; and because
in such happiness alone can the object of man's crea-
tion be accomplished, therefore all persons ought to seek
sound instruction respecting the chief end, and give to
it the most careful attention of reflecting minds.
Most men desire immediate pleasure; which is of many
kinds. They find it in the enjoyment of wealth ; in the in-
dulgence of evil passions; in the praises of their fellow-men;
in the exercise of power; in the gratulations of self-righteous-
ness; and the like. Our instruction is addressed to the
reflecting, who know that all such pleasures are transient:
and should therefore desire a happiness which is lasting.
4. This chief end is proclaimed, not to the learned
only, but to all men. Through the infinite mercy of
God, the means of securing it are provided for all classes,
and can be understood and employed even by the poor.
While therefore it is good for the wise, like the corn
and the fruits of the earth, it is beneficial also to the
unlearned; and they are invited to secure its accomplish-
ment by their most earnest endeavours.
PART IV.]
421
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
Having answered these four questions, we next consider
the instruments of knowledge, by which right notions can be
obtained.
5. The instruments by which right notions of the
chief end and of its means may be secured are, the
perceptions of sense; the inferences of reason; and the
revealed book of God.
Each of these we consider in turn in three Sútras.
6. By the perceptions of sense, we acquire a right
knowledge of the various objects which our five senses
recognize.
By means of our senses, which are five in number, we
come to know the multitudinous objects which are in the
world; our fellow-men, animals, trees and the like. We see
and hear from others what God is doing in the universe; we
also receive the knowledge which is laid up in books.
7. By inferences of reason, which are of three kinds,
and which are based upon its innate notions and intui-
tions, we deduce from the things we have perceived,
the general principles and laws by which they are
governed.
a. Inferences of reason are of three kinds. (1.) A priori:
when we infer effect from cause: as when from the sight of
clouds we infer rain. (2.) A posteriori : when from effects
we infer cause : as when from a seat we.infer a carpenter.
(3.) Analogical: tracing the resemblance of relations : as
wlien from seeing the mango blossoms in my own garden, I
infer that there are blossoms on the mango-trees of others.
6. By examining, in this way, the facts and objects which
our senses present, we infer general facts or laws: as the
rising and setting of the sun; the causes of tides; the value
of rain; and the like. We also observe design in the struc-
ture and arrangement of the universe, and hence infer the
wisdom and goodness of Him who created it.
422
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
8. By Revelation we acquire knowledge of things
which lie beyond the ordinary observation of men: and
which our reason could never discover : such as things
which only God knows; or which have been done
beyond the sphere of our senses ; in heaven, hell and
other worlds.
These are the instruments of knowledge: we now proceed
to examine the various objects made koown by their
means.
9. God, human souls, sense-objects, understanding,
the mind, holy and evil deeds, evil passions, mundane
life, retribution, the purification of the soul from sin,
and the future world: these and similar objects are
brought to the knowledge of men by these instruments.
These objects are divided into two classes. Some, espe-
cially numerous classes of sense-objects, are only partially
connected with the chief end of man: and a knowledge
of them is not necessary to his fulfilment of that end.
Others are necessary to its attainment; and it is with
them our inquiry is concerned. We shall mention the
former for such as find a pleasure in studying them.
The sources of our knowledge of these numerous objects
will now be pointed out.
10. Knowledge connected with the chief end of man
may be learned from two sources : from the works
which God has made; and from the special book which
he has caused to be written.
Each of these sources is now described.
11. By the works of God we mean, all things which
exist in the universe; especially the earth and its con-
PART IV.]
423
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
!
tents, and the heavenly bodies. Such works teach
many lessons concerning the wisdom, power and good-
ness of God. The relations of society also teach our
duties to God and to each other : and exhibit the prin-
ciples of his government, and the like.
12. The special knowledge which God has caused to
be written concerning himself, concerning the chief end
of man, and the mode of its attainment, is contained
in a book called the Bible. This book confirms what
we infer from reason, concerning the works of God and
a future world, and adds to those inferences a great
deal of divine knowledge, which reason and perception
could not attain by themselves.
The revelation of God (called by Hindu scholars, tradition)
is not contained in the Vedas, the Darsanas, the Puranas, and
other Shastres. We judge this from their many deficiencies;
from their numerous important errors; and from their mutual
contradictions. Books liable to such charges cannot by a
wise man be regarded as books which teach sound and un-
deniable truth.
13. The Bible is a book, which contains many sepa-
rate treatises: these were written at different periods,
during successive ages, by holy men who were taught
by the Spirit of God what to write. These numerous
books are collected in two divisions, called* the First and
Second Parts. In them is recorded a great amount of
religious instruction, which men could not have disco-
vered by their unassisted efforts, and which is essential
to them in explaining and enforcing the chief end for
which they have been created.
* i. e, in various Indian versions.
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[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
Some of these instructions could not have been discovered
by men: such as the complete account of the character of
God; the origin of the universe; the nature and description
of the future world. All are useful. Thus Part I. of the
Bible tells about the creation ; the creation of the first
human pair; the begivning of sin; the gradual increase of
sin and its evil effects; the separation of one nation to be the
special disciples of God; the holy law which declares our
duty to God and duty to men ; various hymns and prayers
suitable for the worship of God; moral instructions concern-
ing mundane life and holy conduct; the lives of good and evil
men; and prophecies concerning the future. The Second
Part describes the life of the divine incarnation of mercy,
Jesus Christ: his holy instructions, bis acts of kindness, his
sufferings, his death ; his resurrection from the grave ; his
atonement for sin; and the means of pardoning the wicked.
It contains also the lives of his disciples; the account of the
first spreading of his religion ; the moral instructions given
to his followers by which they must regulate their conduct;
the account of heaven, and hell ; of the great day of judg-
ment; and similar subjects.
How this book, written by men, is yet known to be the
Book of God is next declared.
14. That the Bible is the special book of God is
shown by two classes of proofs, called the internal and
the external evidences. Each of these is described in
two Sutras.
-15. By# the internal proofs we mean, the internal
character and contents of the book. The doctrine dis-
plays the highest wisdom; the moral instruction incul-
cates the purest holiness; the moral duty enjoined
requires the kindest spirit of benevolence; and the
effects of all exhibit nothing but justice, love, peace and
happiness. No error can be found in its descriptions of
God, its doctrine concerning the duties of men; or in
those prophecies which have been fulfilled. Although
written at different times by different men, the purpose
PART IV.]
425
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
of the Book, its doctrine, its morality, its effects agree
with each other in every part.
16. By the external proofs we mean other circum-
stances which, apart from the contents of the book
and the nature of its teaching, show them to be of
divine origin. Thus its teachers and writers performed
works of wonder which only God can properly do.
They also displayed in their prophecies (many of which
have been fulfilled) a deep knowledge of future events
which only the All-wise God can of himself possess.
Since as men they could not of themselves exercise
either this divine power or divine knowledge, it is evi-
dent that (as they themselves declared) God must have
communicated it to them, in order that people might
believe in their authority.
The object for which God condescended to publish this
special book of divine wisdom is now to be considered. God
has done much for the happiness of men by the regular course
of his providence. It is not to be supposed that he will
lightly or for a trifling reason interfere with that providence
by sending special messengers or giving special laws. Why
he did so is now to be stated, in one Sutra,
17. Since among men numerous errors prevail con-
cerning the chief end and its attainment; concerning
the character of God, the evil of sin, and the existence
of another world: since also men, rendered blind and
foolish by the practice of evil deeds, are liable to forget
God, to forget the retributive worlds of punishment,
and are therefore in danger of everlasting destruction ;
therefore God, in his boundless compassion, gave this
Book of Wisdom, that thereby he might communicate
426
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
to men right notions in the place of their errors, and
might warn them to flee from eternal wrath ; both by
the fear of certain punishment, and the hope of pardon
to a true penitent.
We have now completed the first division of these
Sutras, which speak of the object to be accomplished,
the instruments and sources of knowledge, and the
purpose for which such knowledge is required. We
now proceed to consider the various objects of know-
ledge rightly made known in these several ways. First
we speak of God.
BOOK SECOND.
SUTRA 18. There is but ONE GOD. He is the first
Great Being: a spirit; eternal; self-existent; infinite
in wisdom, in power, in holiness, in justice, in goodness,
in mercy, truth and joy.
The great attributes of the character of the glorious God
are frequently described in the Bible in the most exalted
language: and the numerous texts should be studied by the
reflecting with humility and awe. In regard to his nature
we lay down one Sutra.
19. The Bible teaches that in the Godhead there is
a Trinity of “persons ;” the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Ghost.
How the Godhead subsists ever must be a mystery which
the limited soul of man cannot possibly comprehend : we
can only receive with faith and humility such knowledge
respecting it as God himself is pleased to reveal. We next
speak of his works.
20. He created all things which exist; he did noi
produce them from himself; or merely make them from
PART IV.]
427
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
some eternal matter which he shaped and fashioned into
new forms; but he gave existence to the substances
themselves in some way known only to himself. Having
created them, he continues to preserve them by the
work of his superintending providence, according to
the laws which he has established.
21. The matter thus created and thus preserved, the
Great God has distributed through the universe in the
form of globes: known as the earth, the sun, moon, and
stars. Of these, the fixed stars are most distant: the
planets, including the earth, revolve round the sun;
the moon revolves round the earth.
We nowhere find, either in nature or the Bible, anything
concerning regions like the realm of Indra, of Prajápati,
the Gandharvas, and the like.
22. The various created objects in the universe are
divided into two classes, the animate and the inanimate.
The inanimate are subdivided into vegetable and
mineral. The animate, into intelligent and unintelli-
gent. The unintelligent include beasts, birds, fishes,
reptiles, and insects. All these classes of objects exhibit
the wonders of God's wisdom, power, and goodness.
The knowledge of them constitutes the different
branches of human learning: which may be examined
and studied by the intelligent, and will produce great
pleasure in their minds. It is not, however, essentially
necessary for the fulfilment of the chief end.
For the sake of the intelligent, who may wish to know
more about these things, a few particulars are added :-
1. All these objects possess the quality of existence. Con-
nected with the modes of existence, namely, number, size,
428
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
and motion, there arise several sciences, such as Arithmetic,
Geometry, Algebra, and the Calculus.
2. All these objects (excepting the intelligent) are com-
posed of matter in numerous forms. Matter is either im-
ponderable or ponderable. Imponderable matter gives rise
to the sciences of Heat, Electricity, and Optics. Ponderable
matter, viewed in relation to its essential properties, gives
rise to the sciences of Mechanics and the like. If we con-
sider solids we get Statics, when they are at rest : and
Dynamics, when put in motion. If fluids, we get Hydro-
statics : and if the subject of sounds, Acoustics.
1
3. Matter, again, in mass, according to its distribution,
gives rise to other sciences. Astronomy shows the mutual
relations of all the heavenly bodies, and the movements of
the planets, &c. In regard to the earth, our dwelling-place,
numerous branches of learning are required. Geography
shows how its surface is laid out; and tells of the various
appearances of the mountains, seas, rivers, islands, cities,
forests, and the like.
Geology describes the structure of the body of the earth,
and the mode in which the different elements of its upper
part have overlaid each other. Mineralogy shows the various
materials of which the upper part has been formed : and
Chemistry analyses all these elements, in order to discover
their essential properties, and trace out the actual number
of primary materials. This science has not established the
doctrine of the five elements, but has proved that most of
them are compounds. These things belong to inorganic
natter.
4. The organized matter is divided into vegetable and
animal. The vegetable kingdom is described by Botany, in
reference to the various classes of trees and plants; and by
Vegetable Physiology, in relation to the manner of their
structure and organization. The animal kingdom is similar.
The habits of animals, birds, and the like, are described in
Natural History. Their different classes and kinds in Zoology:
the functions of their different organs in Animal Physiology:
and their organization by Anatomy.
These are the various sciences connected with the physical
matter created and distributed in the universe. Of the
intelligent we shall speak hereafter.
PART IV.]
429
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
23. Amongst the created objects of the universe, in-
telligent beings are the chief. So far as known, they
are divided into two classes, angels and men.
There is no proof of the existence of any beings like
the gods spoken of in the shastres. There is no proof of the
existence anywhere of Indra, Agní, Varuná, and the
Máruts: of Brahmá, Vishnu, and Mahadeo: of Krishna,
Surjya, Ganesha, and Kartik: of Lakshmí, Durgá, Káli,
and Saraswati: of Sitola and Kálu Ráy. The character
of these gods, the wicked deeds ascribed to many of thein
in the shastres, and their numerous deficiencies in respect
to divine attributes, prove that no such gods exist. It is
also said in the Bible, there is but one God: and that ido-
latry is evil.
24. The angels are intelligent beings of high rank,
who were created to be servants and messengers of
God in different parts of the universe. They reside
near him in heaven, where he especially manifests his
presence: but are his messengers everywhere. They
are numerous, powerful, and holy. They are specially
engaged in promoting the welfare of men. There are
also bad angels, who were once holy in heaven, but
were in consequence of sin cast out from it. They
employ themselves in endeavouring to accomplish the
injury and destruction of men.
25. Men were also created by God. They have
been formed of body and soul. He created at first
but one pair, and from them have sprung by ordinary
birth all the human beings that have lived in the
world. The body of men is not developed from con-
sciousness, nor formed of three cases, but consists of
organized matter, like that of the different classes of
animals.
430
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
a. The sciences of Anatomy and Human Physiology ex-
plain the structure and the functions of the different organs
of the body. They do not show two different bodies (as the
Sthúl and Linga Sarira); nor do they exhibit the Susamna
artery, as taught in the Upanishads.
6. Again, a comparison of the different races of men con-
firms the doctrine of the Bible and the inferences of history,
that all races have the same origin.
26. The soul of man is not a part of God: nor is it
eternal in its origin. Souls are multitudinous. Each
individual possesses a soul independent of all other
souls; the time when these souls is created is not
known, though it is probably produced when each child
is born into the world.
27. The soul of man was made 66 in the likeness of
God.” That is; man was created with intelligence,
affections, a will, and a conscience. He was made
perfectly holy: able to understand the designs of his
Creator, and to please him by obeying his commands.
(a.) There are many branches of knowledge connected with
the intelligence of men. The instruments of the soul are
explained in Language, Grammar, and Rhetoric. The opera-
tions of the soul are described in Psychology or Mental
Philosophy; which tells of perception, recollection, imagina-
tion : reason with its intuitions: the feelings, and the will.
The laws which govern reason are expounded by Logic.
The laws which govern the will are developed in Moral
Philosophy. These laws are divided into several branches :
Religion shows the laws of duty towards God : Morality, of
duty towards men in general : Political Morality, of men to
each other as fellow-citizens, and so on. Men viewed in re-
lation to experience, are described in History: They are
the subjects also of Laws in reference especially to their
social relations and political connections.
(6.) The moral powers are the chief faculties of the soul.
By their means, the soul judges of right and wrong; per-
ceives the duties which arise from all our relations with
PART IV.]
431
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
others ; and incites us to perform them completely. From
them spring our notions of justice, love, benevolence, for-
bearance, and the like.
28. All human beings are formed in like manner.
Though they differ in the amount both of mental and
bodily strength, in the degrees of ability, and in the
depth of their feelings, they all agree in being formed
with minds and bodies of the same kind. Born also
from the same first parents, it is evident that they con-
stitute but ONE CASTE or race (játi), the caste of MAN;
and that all are brethren.
(a.) Besides the chief differences above mentioned in their
capacities, they differ also in colour, in manners, in dress, in
habits. But many of these things are merely the result of
special differences in their circumstances, as of heat and
cold, and modes of living, especially when continued for many
generations.
(6.) The Hindu notion of a creation of four castes by
Brahma is nowhere proved to be a correct one. Many reasons
can be brought against it. If Kshatriyas, for instance, in
former times, like Visvamitra, could become bralimins, where
is the separate creation of the castes ?
29. God created men, and placed them in this world,
that they might rule in it; might exert all their facul-
ties; might understand his doings; might praise him
for his character and works; might enjoy the beauties
of their dwelling-place; and be happy.
30. Besides this, he wished also, that being able to
understand good and evil, and being left free to do it,
they might undergo trial, in order to show whether
their good or evil conduct sprang from their own will.
Hence arose the chief end, of which we have spoken,
that all men should please God.
How the trial was to be borne will be next explained.
432
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
31. With a view to this trial of their moral nature,
God placed man in circumstances, from which spring
certain relations. These moral relations involve moral
obligations: and each position has its own peculiar
duty. The chief relations are those of man to God as
his Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, and Proprietor: and
of man to his fellow-men, as father, son, mother, neigh-
bour, fellow-citizen, and the like.
Good and evil therefore can never be the same thing. As
long as the same relations exist under the same circum-
stances, the same duties must arise.
32. Thus the duties of man are of two kinds : his
duties to God, and his duties to his fellow-men: the
former are called religion; the latter, morality. Both
classes are summarily described in the Two GREAT
COMMANDMENTS, “ Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
with all thy heart,” and “ Thou shalt love thy neigh-
bour as thyself."
33. An important statement of these duties is con-
tained also in the TEN COMMANDMENTS. Several duties of
man to God are stated in four commandments: (a.) Men
are to serve and honour as God the one true God alone.
No other god of any kind whatsoever can be wor-
shipped. (6.) They are to worship only in the heart,
with love and faith: no image is to be made, and no
image is to be honoured. (c.) God's holy name is
always to be reverenced; his holy service maintained,
and all profanity in words and actions be put away.
(d.) God has appointed a holy day, or Sabbath, in the
week, in which men must rest from labour, and occupy.
PART IV.
IV.] AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
433
themselves in his service or in seeking the good of
their own souls.
34. Several most important duties of man to man are
described in six commandments. They contain and en-
force-(a.) The duties of parents to children; children
to parents and the like, which arise from blood relation-
ships; and from our relations to the government of the
country. (6.) Respect for life and the safety of others.
(c.) Respect for the purity of others and the maintenance
of their own, by the complete control of the passions.
(d.) A perfect regard for the property and rights of others,
shown in honesty and in upright dealings in trade.
(e.) The observance of strict truth in all their words and
actions; and (f.) the control of the thoughts, by suppress-
ing all unlawful desire after those things which others
possess, since from covetous desires spring the begin-
nings of evil. All the moral duties of men are explained
and enforced again and again in many parts of the Bible.
35. He who observes these rules, and performs all
the duties which spring from his relations to God and
man, will accomplish the END of his existence : he will
please God: his trial will prove the faithfulness of his
love and obedience; and, therefore, he will receive the
reward of everlasting happiness.
36. He who does not observe these rules; nor per-
form these duties; who disobeys the command of God
and the obligations which his relations impose; he will
not please God. He commits sin: his trial proves that
his love is defective, and, instead of being rewarded,
he will be punished.
FF
434
(PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
37. From these things it is evident that SIN is the
breaking of those obligations which God has made to
arise from our relations in life, and has declared in his
word that it is man's duty to observe. It is the break-
ing of the Law of God, expressed both in his works
and in his revelation.
It is therefore plain that sin does not consist in breaking
caste; in touching a dead body; in neglecting idol-worship;
in not performing a sráddha for the dead. These are not
sins. But ingratitude, idolatry, theft, lying, adultery,
malice, revenge, murder, covetousness, and the like
these
are sins. It is evident, also, that God is not the author of
sin ; but sin is produced when the covetous desires of
seek for that which the law of God forbids.
38. The beginnings of sin did not arise from the
internal constitution of man; but it occurred when the
first moral being first broke the command of God. In
this world it began when the first woman, being tempted
and deceived by a bad angel named Satan, coveted
something which God had forbidden, and disobeyed his
command. The first man repeated the act: and both
became sinners.
The account of this is written in the Bible,
The effects of sin will now be declared in two Sutras.
39. The first effect of disobeying the commands of
God is, that in consequence men are liable to punish-
ment: while living they are unhappy through the dis
satisfaction, reproaches, and despair produced by their
conscience: and at death they are carried to that hell
where the punishment of sinners has been appointed by
God.
PART IV.] AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
435
40. The second effect of sin is that it corrupts the
nature and practice of all who commit ít: and incites
them to repeat the evil they have once done. This
corrupted and depraved nature is the real cause of all
the darkness (tamah) and the evil tendencies that exist
in the world. It is the natural fruit of sin, and has not
been produced either by the direct agency of God, or
by the dispositions with which man was originally
endowed.
BOOK THIRD.
و
Having explained the real nature and origin of the
sins and defects under which man is labouring, and
in consequence of which the accomplishment of his chief
end might naturally be destroyed, we proceed to con-
sider the special means, which the merciful God has
appointed for preventing such a calamity. These are
declared in the following Book :-
SUTRA 41. All men without a single exception have
broken God's commands; have become liable to punish-
ment in this world and in hell; have lost their present
happiness and the hope of future bliss; it would there-
fore only be the natural fruit of sin, if every one were
destroyed, because not one has accomplished the end
for which he was created : not one has pleased
God.
42. The wonderful mercy of God has prevented this
awful calamity: and has provided a TRUC DELIVERANCE.
This blessing is not merely a deliverance from wrong
notions concerning soul and nature; but from evil prac-
FF 2
436
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY.
tices, and their just punishment; from a corrupt nature
and a love of sin.
The mode of this deliverance will next be explained.
43. The deliverance of a sinner cannot be accom-
plished without a suitable atonement to the law he has
broken, and the Lawgiver whom he has disobeyed.
This atonement must be offered by one who is not a
sinner: and must be equal in value to the crime com-
mitted.
a. All injuries to the law of men or of God must be atoned
for either by punishment or ranson: as thefts, debts, and
the like.
6. If the ransom be equal to the crime, the full debt must
be paid off by some one else. Thus the blood of buffaloes
and goats can never be a fit ransom for the sins of man: nor
bathing in the Ganges, nor offering myriads of cowries. Nor
can good works be atonements, for men's works are the
works of sinners.
44. Men cannot find such atonements: for they are
themselves sinners: and the life of even a pure and
sinless man can only ransom the life of one man.
45. To provide a fit ransom, the SON OF GOD, JESUS
CHRIST, became incarnate. He took the form of a man,
bore the responsibilities of a man; and being sinless
and divind; He died in the place of sinners, bore their
punishment, and opened a way for their forgiveness.
Here an account of his birth, actions, instructions, and life
ought to be justly considered. The full particulars are
recorded in his own Book, in the four “Lives” written by
his disciples.
46. God has now appointed that all, who wish to
please Him and accomplish their chief end, shall come
PART IV.]
437
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
to Him and pray for pardon and for deliverance from
their punishment in the name of Jesus Christ, the
Atonement. He is thus appointed to be the Mediator
through whom men come to God. None are excluded
from this offer of his mercy. All classes, poor and
rich, learned and unlearned, are invited to accept it.
Their acceptance of his atonement, instead of their own
efforts, is FAITH.
We now describe the results of this atonement. They are
of two kinds, answering to the two effects of sin.
47. The first effect of faith in the atonement of Christ
is that God, for His sake, forgives all the sins of the
repenting sinner: he is therefore FREED from the punish-
ment in hell which he deserved for his sins.
48. The second effect is that by Divine grace, he is
purified from his evil desires. The Spirit of God will
give a new nature by removing his corrupt propensi-
ties, and giving him a love for holiness. Thus are both
the effects of sin removed.
49. Being thus pardoned and purified, a man must
henceforth live very holy, striving daily to please God,
by loving Him supremely, by subduing all desire after
sin, and by obeying His commandments.
God has also appointed means for this: these will now be
described.
50. Believers must diligently use the FOUR MEANS
which are appointed for this purpose. (a.) They must.
study the instructions, warnings, and encouragements
which are written in the Book of God. (6.) They must
438
[PART IV.
HINDU PHILOSOPHY,
continually keep watch against the temptations to which
they are subject; and be careful not to sin. (c.) They
must daily pray for the assistance which God has pro-
mised to give them in obeying Him. (d.) They must
keep the Sabbath-day of worship, observe communion
with their fellow-believers, keep the ordinance of the
Lord's Supper; and listen to the instructions of religious
teachers.
Each of these means may be more fully described.
51. The extent of this work of holiness is, that it must
be carried on so long as the believer lives. During all
his life he is on trial, and his chief end can only be ac-
complished by the testing of his love and obedience.
52. Probation ends with death : all men will die, at
various times appointed by God, who gave them life:
but they will only die once. There will be no trans-
migration : having left this world, they will enter it no
more, but will live in the other world for ever.
53. Their probation being completed, all men will be
judged by God, as to whether they have fulfilled the
chief end or not. At a time appointed, all men that
have ever lived will be gathered together on one great
day of judgment: their bodies will be raised again from
the dead and reunited to them: and on that day their
condition for ever will be fixed.
54. Those who have pleased God by accepting his
mercy in Christ will be taken to heaven. There they
will receive the reward of everlasting happiness. They
will not be absorbed into God, nor will they be sepa-
PART IV.]
439
AN OUTLINE OF TRUTH.
remove,
rated from matter. They will dwell with God for ever,
in perfect happiness, exercising their various powers in
the highest condition, contemplating the works of God,
and the character of God; and always striving to please
and obey Him. From this condition they will never
.
55. Those who have not fulfilled their chief end, will
each receive a punishment due to his sins in hell.
There he will be confined, and there will he live for
ever, in misery and despair unutterable.
56. This is the chief end of man, and this the way of
attaining it. This is the effect of fulfilling it: and this
the sad result of leaving it unaccomplished. May the
grace of God help us to gain the former happy lot: and
DELIVER us from the misery of the latter.
THE END.
AUTHORITIES.
ANCIENT SANSKRIT LITERATURE: an Introduction to the Literature
of the Vedas, by Professor Max Müller. London, 1859.
ESSAYS ON THE RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDUS, by
H. T. Colebrooke, Esq. A new edition, in one Volume. Williams
and Norgate, London. 1858.
THE SÁNKHYA KARIKÁ, translated by Mr. Colebrooke; with the
Commentary of Gaurapáda, by Prof. H. H. Wilson. Oxford, 1837.
INTRODUCTION TO THE RIG VEDÁ SANHITÁ, by Prof. Wilson.
THE SUTRAS of Kopila, Part I.; of the Yoga, Parts I. and II.: the
NYÁYA SUTRAS, two parts : the VAISESHIKA, Part I. ; and the
BRAHMA SUTRAS of Veda Vyása, Part I.; translated by Dr.
Ballantyne; Benares.
THE BHAGAVAT GITÁ; translated, with Notes and an Introduction,
by J. Cockburn Thomson, Esq. Hertford, 1855.
THE KATHA, MUNDAKA, Isa, Kena, Taittiriya, Aitareya, Swetas-
watara, Prasna and Mandukya Upanishads: translated by Dr.
Roer, Bibliotheca Indica, Nos. 41 and 50. Calcutta, 1852-3.
THE BHASHA PARICHAEDA: Categories of the Nyáya Philosophy;
translated by Dr. Roer. Bib. Ind., Nos. 32 and 35.
THE TARKA SANGRAHA; Lectures on the Nyáya: translated by
Dr. Ballantyne; Benares. 1852. .
THE VEDÁNTA SARá; by Dr. Roer: Calcutta, 1845.
SANKARA; Sive de Theologumenis Vedanticorum; by Prof. Fr. H.
Windischmann: Bonn, 1833.
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who wish to travel as he did, on foot, and with
the least possible expenso. They may also place
thorough reliance on all ho says, his good sense
never allowing his enthusiasm to duzzle him and
delude his followers. It is a useful and trust-
worthy book."-Athenceum.
"The book is nmusing; the author saw much
that was new. There is frank graphic writing,
and much pleasant thinking, in his volume, which
is elegantly produced, and liberally illustrated
with tinted views and woodcuts."--Rcaminer.
"Through Norway with a Knapsnck'is & work
of intrinsio interest, very instructive and amus-
ing. Mr. Williains is a model pedestrian traveller,'
anrl his book is the best guid: we know of for
thoso who intend to explore Norway on foot."
Spectator.
"A vory instructive book on Norway, and the
manners Anisl custoins of its indiabitants." -
Literary Gazette.
"Every chaptor of it will be read with interest."
Morning Post.
SMITH, ELDER AND CO.
5
Voyages and Travels-continued. .
Voyage to Japan,
Kamtschatka, Siberia, Tartary, and the Coast of China, in H.M.S.
Barracouta.
By J. M. Tronson, R.N.
Svo, with Charts and Views. 18s. cloth.
"The able and intelligent officer, whose work is
hetore us, supplies the first authentic information
on the present state of Japan and the neighbour-
ing settlernents. .. An extremely interesting
book."-Athenæum.
"The book possesses all the qualities of a book
of travels, with the prominent advantage of break-
ing comparatively, and in some instances alto-
yether, new ground."-Illustrated London News.
"Br. Tronson writes well, and imparts a great
deal of new and useful information. The clear
and beautiful charts and sketches, accompanying
the volume, are of great value."--Globe.
It coutains a great deal that all the world
ought now to know.” Morning Herald.
We cordially recommend it."- British Quar-
terly Revieto.
To Cuba and Back.
By R. H. Dana,
Author of “ Two Years before the Mast," &c.
Post 8vo. Price 7s. cloth.
"Mr. Daua's book is so bright and luscious, so "Mr. Dana does not spare his faculty of descrip-
pictorial and cheerful, so essentially pleasant aud tion. The pictures he gives of the Cuban metro-
refreshing, that even
the rule of a Spanish capi- polis itself, with its tropical luxuries and laziness;
tan.general appears tolerable where the subjects its dirty and daiuty ways of existence, the Spanish
itre so courteous, and the strangers so gracernlly grandiosity of its national manner, and the pet-
petted. Mr. Daua las a pen to paint such pic- tiness of its national character, are pleasantly
tures well. His voyage and residence occupied and forcibly drawn. A consting' voynge to Ma-
scarcely a month, yet he has written a volume truizas, and a railrond journey, brought him
110t only fascinating from its warmth and glitter | into closer contact with the essential charac-
as a narrative, but also intelligent, instructive, teristics of the country and its history."-Satur-
and of obvious integrity."-Athenwun.
day Revie10.
Life and Liberty in America. .
By Dr. C. Mackay.
Second Edition, 2 vols. post 8vo, with Ten Tinted Illustrations,
price 21s.
'A bright, fresh, and hopeful book, worthy of
1.lic author, whose songs are oftenest heard on
the Atlantic. Dr. Mackay writes as healthily as
Sie sings; describing, Life' as ho silw it, and
Liberty as he studied it, in the North and in
the South,'-Athenceum.
" We recommend these volumes to pernsal, as
the result of careful and diligent observation,
assisted by personal ussociation, well calculated
to facilitate the attainment of truth."- Leader.
Dr. Mackay's
volumes are eminently readable
and amusiug."-Press.
Life in Tuscany.
By Mabel Sharman Crawford.
With Two Views, post 8vo. Price 10s. 6d. cloth.
"There are many traces of quiet, genial humour,
Brilliant and harmless as summer lightning,
which agreeably relieve the more serious portions
of the work. Miss Crawford's reflections are n8
sound and practical as her percoptions are lively
and acute, and she has succeeded in contributing
a really valuable addition to that otherwise re-
dundant department of literature."--Press.
"The peasant life in Tuscany has, perhans, not
been so well photographed before."-Athenaeum.
6 -
WORKS PUBLISHED BY
Voyages and Travels-continued.
Narrative of the Mission
From the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855.
With Notices of the Country, Government, and People.
By Captain Henry Yule, Bengal Engineers. .
Imperial 8vo, with Twenty-four Plates (Twelve coloured), Fifty
Woodcuts, and Four Maps. Elegantly bound in cloth, with
gilt edges. Price 21. 12s. 6d.
"A stately yolume in gorgeous golden covers.
“Captain Yule, in the preparation of the splendid
volume before us, has availed himsell of the labours
of those who preceded him. To all who are desiruus
of possessing the best and fullest account that
has ever heen given to the public, of a great, and
hitherto little known region of the globe, the
interesting, conscientious, and well-written work
of Captain Yule will have a deep interest, while
to the political economist, geographer, and mor-
chant, it will be indispensable."--Examiner'.
Such a book is in our times a rarity. Large,
massive, and beautiful in itself, it is illustrated
by & sprinkling of elegant woodcuts, and by a
series of admirable tinted lithographs.
We have read it with curiosity and gratiication,
is a fresh, full, and luminous report upon tho
condition of one of the most interesting divisions
of Asia beyond the Ganges."- Athenceum.
Hong Kong to Manilla.
By Henry T. Ellis, R.N.
Post 8vo, with Fourteen Illustrations. Price 12s. cloth.
The narrative fulils the object of the anthor',
which is to present a lively succount of what he
saw, heard, and did during a holiday run to a
rarely visited place."-Spectator'.
" Mr. Ellis has given to the public a most valı-
able and interesting work upon a race and country
little known to English readers."-Illustrated
News of the World.
Antiquities of Kertch,
And Researches in the Cimmerian Bosphorus. ·
By Duncan McPherson, M.D.,
Of the Madras Army, F.R.G.S., M. A. I.
Imperial 4to, with Fourteen Plates and numerous Illustrations,
including Eight Coloured Fac-Similes of Reliques of Antique
Art. Price Two Guineas.
“It is a volume which deserves the careful
attention of every student of classical antiqnil.
No one cau fail to be plensed with a work wliicie
has so much to attract the eyo and to gratify the
love of beauty and elegance in design.
The book is got up with great care and taste,
and forms one of the handsomest works that have
recently issued from the English Press.'
Saturday Review.
Captivity of Russian Princesses in the
Caucasus.
Translated from the Russian by H. S. Edwards.
With an authentic Portrait of Shamil, a Plan of his House, and a Map.
Post 8vo. Price 10s. 6d. cloth.
A book than which there are few novels more I we liave read; it contains the best popular notice
interesting. It is a romance of the Caucasus. of the social polity of Shamil and the manners of
The account of life in the house of Shamil is null his people."--Leader.
and very entertaining; and of Shamil himself we "ilho narrative is well worth reading.".
see much."--Examiner.
Atheneum,
The story is certainly one of the most ourious
SMITH, ELDER AND CO.
7
Biography.
The Autobiography of Leigh Hunt.
Revised by Himself, with additional Chapters by his Eldest Son.
One vol., post 8vo, with a Portrait engraved on Steel from an Original
Drawing. Price 7s. 6d. cloth.
“It is perhaps the first charin of an autobio- biography of Leigh Hunt' possesses in an un.
graphy that it should make us like the writer; usual degree."-Saturday Review,
and certainly this is a c!um which the Auto-
4 .
Life of Schleiermacher,
As unfolded in his Autobiography and Letters.
Translated from the German by Frederica Rowan.
Two vols., post 8vo, with Portrait. Price One Guinea, cloth.
Shelley Memorials.
.
Edited by Lady Shelley.
In one vol., post 8vo.
Second Edition.
'We welcome the present biography. It pre-
sents Shelley to us as he was understood by those
who knew him best."-athencewin.
"Lady Shelley touches with a reveront auct
loving hand, tho incidents of the poet's career;
and the gentleness, ardou, and truthfulness of
his uature reappear in her unpretending pages.
Wo gladly welcome this interesting
volume" - Daily News.
“The present biography presents Shelley to us,
as he was understood by those who knev liim
best."--Leader.
Price 7s. 6. cloth.
"The beauty of style and feeling, with which
this work abounds, will make it acceptable to
inany."-Suturday Review,
Lady Shelley's work is a real acquisition to
the biographical literature of the day; it will be
read with profound interest for its perspicuous and
trutlıful delinention of somo hitherto neglected
braits in one of the most extraordinary charac-
ters that ever lived."-Illustrated News of the
Worlll.
* We hoartily recommend it to our readers."
Critic.
The Life of Charlotte Brontë
(CURRER BELL).
Author of " Jane Eyre," "Shirley," " Villette," &c.
By Mrs. Gaskell.
Author of "North and South," &c.
Fourth Edition, revised, one vol., with a Portrait of Miss Brontë
and a View of Haworth Parsonage. Price 7s. 6d. ; morocco
elegant, 14s.
“All the secrets of the literary workmanship of disregard every temptation which intellect throws
the authoress of 'Jane Eyre are unfolded in the in the way of women-how generously and nobly
course of this extraordinary narrative."--Times. a human being can live under the pressure of
" Mrs. Gaskell's account of Charlotte Bronte accumulated misfortune--the l'ecord is at hand in
and her family is one of the profoundest tragedies The Life of Charlotte Brontë.'"- Saturday
Review.
“Mrs. Gaskell has produced one of the best Mrs, Gaskell has dono her work well. for
biographios of a woman by a woman which we narrative is simple, direct, intelligible, unaffected.
can recall to mind."-Atheniceum,
No one else could have paid so tonder and discern-
"If any one wishes to see how a woman ing a tribute to the meinory of Charlotte Bronte.'
possessed of the highest intellectual power can -Fraser's Magazine.
8
WORKS PUBLISHED BY
?
Biography—continued. .
Life of Lord Metcalfe.
By John William Kaye.
New Edition, in Two vols., post 8vo, with Portrait. Price 12s. cloth.
"A work which occupies the highest rank
among biographies of the great mer of modern
times."'-Observer.
" The new edition contains new matter or the
utmost value and interest."-Critic,
"One of the most valuable biographies of the
present day. This revised cdition has soveral
fresh passages of high interest, now first inserted
from among Lord Netcalfe's papers, in which bis
clear prescience of the dangers that threatened
our Indian empire is remarkably shown." - Eco-
nonnist.
"This editionis revised with core and judgment.
Mr. Kaye has judiciously set forth Lord Metcalfo's
views of the insecurity of our Indiau empire."
-Globe.
"A much improved edition of one of the most
interesting, political, biographies in English
literature."-National Review.
Life of Sir John Malcolm, G.C.B.
By John William Kaye.
Two vols. Svo, with Portrait. Price 36s. cloth.
" The biography is replete with interest and larity which it was the good fortune or Sir John
information, deserving to be perused by the stu- Alalcolm to enjoy."--Edinburgh Review, .
dent of Indian history, and sure to recommend "Mr. Kaye's biography is at once a contribution
itself to the general rerler."-Athenreum.
to tlie history of our policy and dominion in the
"One of the most interesting of the recent East, and it worthy memorial of one of those wiso
biographies of our great Indian statesmen." — and Inrge-hearted men whose energy and prin-
National Review.
ciple have made England great."-British Quar-
"This book deserves to participate in the popu- terly Review,
The Life of J. Deacon Hume.
By the Rev. Charles Badham.
Post 8vo. Price 9s. cloth.
"A masterly piece of biographical narrative. | in our literature, peculiarly full of heauties, and
To minute and conscientious industry in search- peculiarly free from faults,-Atlus.
ing out facts, Mr. Bidham conjoins the atirnc- It is well that the world's attention should be
tions of a graceful style and a sincere liking for called to such a man, and that the particulars of
the task he has in hand. He has produced one of his character and career sliould be preserved in a
the most useful and judicious biographies extant biography."--Spectator.
The Life of Mahomet
And History of Islam to the Era of the Hegira.
By William Muir, Esq., Bengal Civil Service.
Volumes 1 and 2. Svo. Price 32 s. cloth.
"The most perfect life of Mahomet in the
English language, or perhaps in any other.
The work is at once learned and interesting, and
it cannot fail to be eagerly perused by all persons
having any preteusions to historical knowledgo."
-Observer.
The Autobiography of Lutfullah,
A Mohamedan Gentleman; with an Account of his Visit to England.
Edited by E. B. Eastwick, Esq.
Third Edition, small post 8vo. Price 5s. cloth.
“This is the freshest and most original work ! "Read fifty volumes of travel, and a thousand
that it has been our good forture to inect with for imitations of the Oriental novel, and you will not
long. It bears every trace of being almost genuine got the flavour of Eastern life and thought, or the
account of the feelings and doings of the author. zest of its romance, so perfectly as in Lutfullah's
Lutfullah is by no menns an ordinary specimen of book."-Leadcr.
liig race."-Economist.
SMITH, ELDER AND CO.
9
Ant.
WORKS OF MR. RUSKIN.
The Elements of Perspective.
With 80 Diagrams, crown 8vo.
Price 3s. 6d. cloth.
Mr. Ruskin, seeing the want of a clear and obtain a clue to many important laws of pictorial
accurato code on the subject, has set himself to effect less than of outline"-Daily News.
the task of arranging aud explaining the neces- “This book, provided by Mr. Ruskin for the use
sary rulos in a form as nearly approaching the of schools, bears its recommendation on the title-
ideal of a popular treatise as can be managed page. The rules are arranged in a short mathe-
consistently with the object of practical com- matical form, which will be intelligible to stii-
pleteness. No better way of blending the two dents reasonably advanced in general knowledge."
purposes could, we believe, have been found than -Leadcre.
the way Mr. Ruskin ingeniously discovered and " The student will find in this little book all that
has ably worked out. A careful perusal of the is necessary to lay the foundation of a thorough
work will enable the intelligent student not only scientific knowledge of perspective."--Illustratech
to solve perspective problems of a complexity News of the World.
gronter than the ordinary rules will reach, but to "To the practical student it is likely to prove a
most valuable manual,'-Literary Gazette.
The Elements of Drawing.
Sixth Thousand, crown 8vo, with Illustrations drawn by the Author.
Price 7s. 6d. cloth.
“The rules are clearly and fully laid down; and
the earlier exercises always conducive to the end
by simple and unembarrassing means. The whole
volume is full of liveliness." --Spectator.
We close this book with a feeling that, thouglı
nothing supersedes a master, yet that no stndent
of art should launch forth without his work as a
compass.”- Athencum.
“It will be found not only an invaluable acqni-
sition to the student, butagrocable andinstructive
reading for any one who wishes to refine his per-
ceptions of natural scenery, and of its worthiest
artistic representations." Economist.
Original as this treatiso is, it cannot fail to be
at onco instructive and suggestivo."--Literary
Gazette.
"Tho most useful and practical book on the
subject which has ever come under our uotice,"
Press,
Modern Painters.
.
Vol. I., 6th Edition. Price 18s. cloth. Imperial 8vo.
Vol. II., 4th Edition. Price 10s. 6d, cloth.
Vol. III. OF MANY THINGS, with Eighteen Illustrations drawn by the
Author, and engraved on Steel. Price 385. cloth.
Vol: IV. ON MOUNTAIN BEAUTY. Imperial 8vo, with Thirty-five Illus-
trations engraved on Steel, and 116 Woodcuts, drawn by the
Author. Price 21. 10s. cloth.
"A generous and impassioned review of the art, and the most potent influence by the pen, of
works of living painters. A hearty and earnest young artists, whom this country can boast." -
work,full of deep thought, and developing greatand National Review.
striking truths in art.- British Quarterly Review. This work is eminently suggestive, full of niet
Mr. Ruskin's work will send the painter more thoughts, of brilliant descriptions of scenery,
tlau over to the study of nature; will train mon and eloquent moral application of them."-New
who have always been delighted spectators of Quarterly Review.
nature, to be also attentive osservers. Our critics “Mr. Ruskin has deservedly won for himself a
will learn to admire, and inero admirers will learn place in the first rank of modern writers upon
How to criticise : thus a public will be educated." the theory of tho fine arts."--Eclectic Review,
Blackwood's Magazine.
"The fourth voluine of Mr. Ruskiu's olaborate
"Every one who cares about nature, or poetry, work treats chiefly of mountain scenery, and
or the story of human development-every one discusses at length the principles involved in the
who has a tinge of literature or philosophy, will pleasure we derive from mountains and their
find something that is for him in these võlumes." pictorini representation. The singular beauty of
-Westminster Review.
his style, the hearty sympathy with all forms of
“Mr. Ruskin is in possession of a clear and naturnl loveliness, the profusion oť his illustra-
penetrating mind; he is undeniably praction) in tions form irresistible attractions."--Daily News.
his fundamental'ideas; full of the deepest “Considered as an illustrated volume, the fourth
reverence for all that appears to him beautiful is the most remarkable which Mr. Ruskin has yet
and holy. His style is, as usual, clear, bold, racy. issued. The plates and woodcuts are profuse, and
Mr. Ruskin is one of tho first writers of the include numerous drawings of mountain form by
day":- Economist.
the author, which prove Mr. Ruskin to be essen-
All, it is to be hoped, will road the book for tially an artist. He is an unique man, both
themselves. They will find it well worth a carelui among artists and writers."-Spectator.
perusal."-Saturday Review.
Such a writer is a national possession. Ho
“Mr. Ruskin is the most eloquent and thought- adds to our store of knowledge and onjoyment."
awakoning writer on nature in its rolation with -Leader,
10
WORKS PUBLISHED BY
Ayt-continued.
WORKS OF MR. RUSKIN-continued.
The Two Paths :
Being Lectures on Art, and its relation to Manufactures and
Decoration.
One vol., crown 8vo, with Two Steel Engravings. Price 7s. 6d. cloth.
" The meaning of the title of this book is, that
there are two courses open to the artist, one of
which will lead him to all that is noble in art, and
will incidentally exalt his moral nature; vnilo
the other will deteriorate his work and help to
throw obstacles in the way of his individual
morality. ... They all contain many useful
distinctions, acute remarks, and valuable sugges-
tions, and are everywhere lit up with that glow of
fervid eloquence which has so materially contri-
buted to the anthor's reputation."-Press.
The Two Paths. contains much eloquent de-
scription, places in a clear light some forgotten or
neyfected truths, and, like all Mr. Ruskin's books,
is eminently suggestive."--Literary Gazette.
“ This book is well calculated to encourage the
humblest worker, and stiinuate bim to artistic
eitort."-Leader.
The Stones of Venice.
Complete in Three Volunes, Imperial Svo, with Fifty-three Plates and
numerous Woodcuts, drawn by the Author. Price 51. 15s. 6d. cloth.
EACH VOLUME MAY BE HAD SEPARATELY,
Vol. I. THE FOUNDATIONS, with 21 Plates. Price 21. 2s. 2nd Edition.
Vol. II. THE SEA STORIES, with 20 Plates. Price 21. 2s.
Vol. III. THE FALL, with 12 Plates. Price 1l. Ils. 6d.
"The 'Stones of Venice' is the production of ani "This book is one which, perhaps, no other man
earnest, religious, progressive, and informed mind. could have written, and one for which the world
The author of this essay on architecture has con- ought to be and will be thankful. It is in the
deused it into & poetic appreh-usion, the fruit of highest degree eloquent, acute, stiinuating to
awe of God, and delight in nature; a knowledge, thought, and fertile iu suggestion. It will, we
love, and just estimate of art; a holding fast to are convinced, elevate taste and intellect, raise
inct and ropudiation of hearsay; an historic the tone of moral feeling, kindle benevolence
breadth, and a fearless challenge of existing social towards men, and increase the love and rear of
problemas, whose union we know uot where to find God."Times.
paralleled.”--Spectator.
The Seven Lamps of Architecture.
Second Edition, with Fourteen Plates drawn by the Author. Imp. 8vo.
Price 11. 1s. cloth.
“By The Seven Lamps of Architecture,' we the moralist, the divine, will find in it ample store
understand Jr. Ruskin to mean the Seven funda- of instructive matter, us well as the artist. The
mental and cardinal laws, the observance of and author of this work belongs to a class of thinkers
obedience to which are indispensable to the archi- of whom we have too few amongst us.'
tect, who would deserve the name. The politician, Dxaminer.
Lectures on Architecture and Painting. .
With Fourteen Cuts, drawn by the Author. Second Edition, crown 8vo.
Price 8s. 6d. cloth.
"Mr. Ruskin's lectures-eloquent, graphic, and “We conceive it to be impossible that any intel-
impassioned-exposing and ridiculing some of the ligent persons could listen to the lectures, how.
vices of our present system of building, and ever they might differ from thejndgments asserted
exciting his hearers by strong motives of duty and and from the general propositions laid down,
pleasure to attend to architecture - are very without an elevating influence and an aroused
successful.”- Economist.
enthusiasın."-Spectator,
The Political Economy of Art.
Price 2s. 64. cloth.
A most ahle, eloquent, and well-timed work. ! recommend this little volume, like all his other
We hailit with satisfaction, thinking it calculated works, to the perusnl of our readers."-Economist
to do much practical good, and wocordially recom- * This book, daring, as it is, glances keenly at
mend it to our readers." Witness.
principlos, of which some are among the articles
"We never quit Mr. Ruskin without being the of ancieut codes, while others are evolving slowly
better for what he has told us, and therefore we to the light."-Leader',
SMITH, ELDER A:ND CO.
11
Religious.
Expositions of St. Paul's Epistles to
the Corinthians.
By the late Rev. Fred. W. Robertson.
One thick Volume, post 8vo. Price 10s. 6d. cloth.
"These lectures were the last discourses that
Dr. Robertson ever delivered from his pulpit.
High as is the standard of thoughtfulness and
originality which we expect in everything that
comes from the pen of this preacher, these pages
are not unworthy of that high standard. This
single volume in itself woud establish a reputa-
tion for its writer.'
Sermons :
By the late Rev. Fred. W. Robertson, A.M.,
Incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton.
ST SERIES.-Seventh Edition, post Svo. Price 9s. cloth.
SECOND SERIES.-Seventh Edition. Price Is. cloth.
THIRD SERIES.-Fifth Edition, post Svo, with Portrait. Price 9s.
cloth.
“There are many persons, and their number "These sermons are full of thought and beauty.
increases every year, to whom Robertson's writ- There is not i sermon in the series that does not
ings are the most stable, exhaustless, and satis- furnish evidence of originality without extrava-
factory form of religious teaching which the gance, of discrimination without tediousness, and
nineteenth century has given the most wise, of piety without cant or conventionalism.
suggestive, and practical."-Saturday Review. British Quarterly,
There must be a great and true heart, where “We recommend the whole of the volumes to the
there is a great and true preacher. And in that, perusal of our readers. They will find in them
heyond everything else, "lay the secret of Mr. tiliought of a rare and beautifuu description, an
Robertson's influonce. We feel that it brother earnestness of mind steadfast in the search of
man is speaking to us as brother men; that we are truth, and a charity pure and all-embracing."
listening, not to the measured words of a calm, Economist.
cool thinker, but to the passionate deep-toned “They are very remarkable compositions. The
voice of an earnest humali sou."-Edinburgh thoughts are often very striking, and entirely out
Christian Magazine.
of the track of ordinary scrmonising."--Giardian.
Quakerism, Past and Present:
Being an Inquiry into the Causes of its Decline.
By John S. Rowntree.
Post Svo. Price 5s. cloth.
*** This Essay gained the First Prize of One Hundred Guineas
offered for the best Essay on the subject.
The Peculium :
An Essay on the Causes of the Decline of the Society of Friends.
By Thomas Hancock.
Post Svo. Price 5s. cloth.
*** This Essay gained the Second Prize of Fifty Guineas, which was
afterwards increased to One Hundred.
12
WORKS PUBLISHED BY
Miscellaneous.
On the Strength of Nations.
By Andrew Bisset, M.A.
Post 8vo. Price 9s. cloth.
" We can safely recommend the perusnl of this subject in a way that will be equally acceptable
work to all who have not maturely considered the to the scholar and the true economist." -M0772-
subject. It will set them thinking in the right | ing Star.
direction." -Daily News.
We commend most heartily Mr. Bissot's able
"Frequent concurrence with him, and genoral volume."--Examiner.
sympathy with his views, even where we do not "A work exhibiting considerahle research;
accept his principles, dispose us to recommend many of the author's views will be found currect,
Mr. Bisset's book for perusal."-Spectator.
and valuable at the present moment."-Literary
"Mr. Bisset has dealt with this important | Gazette.
Social Innovators and their Schemes.
By William Lucas Sargant.
Post 8vo. Price 10s. 6d. cloth.
Mr. Sargant has written a very useful sketch., this merit that constitutes the special valuc of
His book is impartial, pleasantly written, and Mr. Sarcant's book. His views are sensible and
excelleutly arranged."-Suturday Review.
sound, they are brought forward clearly and dis-
It has the merit of going deep into the suhject passionately, with quiet vigour and telling illus-
watter at one of its most vital points; und it is trition.”-Press.
Lectures and Addresses.
By the late Rev. Fred. W. Robertson.
Post 8vo. Price 7s. 6d. cloth.
“ These lectures and addresses are marked by !
the same qualities that made the author's ser-
inons so justly and so widely popular. They
manifest the same earnest, liberal spirit, the
trdent love oltruin, the lucid eloquence, the wido
sympathy, and singleness of purpose."-Lit. Gaz.
“They throw some new light on the constitui-
tion of Robertson's mind, and on the direction in
which it was unfolding itself.”—Saturday Review.
“In these addresses we are gladdened by rare
liberalily of view and range of sympathy boldly
expressed."-Daily Telegraph.
The Education of the Human Race.
Now first Translated from the German of Lessing.
Fcap. Svo, antique cloth. Price 4s.
“An agreeable and flowing translation of one
of Lessing's finest Essays." -National Review.
“The Essay makes quite a gem in its English
form."-Westminster Review.
"This invaluable tract."-Critic.
"A little book on a great subject, and one whichi,
in its day, exerted no slight influence upou Euro-
pean thougut."-Inquirer.
William Burke the Author of Junius.
By Jelinger C. Symons.
Square. Price 3s. 6d. cloth.
"A week's rellection, and a second reading of
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has come under our notice."-Saturday Review.
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Gunnery, not only to the professional student, power of observation."-Express.
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24
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The Vital Statistics On the Treatment of the
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in India.
By John Conolly, M.D.
By Joseph Ewart, M.D.
Demy 8vo. Price 14s. cloth.
Bengal Medical Service.
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treatise to all who are interested in the subject.'
essence and import of an immense mass of de-
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FICTION.
Confidences.
By the Author of " Rita.”
Cousin Stella;
Or, Conflict.
By the Author of " Violet Bank.'
Three volumes.
"This new novel, by the author of 'Rita,' dis-
plays the same combination of ease and power in
“An excellent novel, written with great care; the delineation of character, the same life-like
the interest is well sustained to the end, and the dialogue, and tho same faculty of constructing an
characiers are all life-like. It is an extremely interesting story.”-Spectator.
well-written and well-conceived story, with quiet
power and precision of touch, with freshness of “Decidedly both good and interesting. The
interost and
great merit." -Atheneum.
hook has a fresh and plensant air about it: it is
"Cousin Stella' has the merit, now becoming
written in an excellent tone, and there are touches
rarer and rarer, of a comparative novelty in its
of pathos here and there which we must rank
subject; the interest of which will secure for this
with a higher style of composition than that
novel á fair share of popularity." - Saturday
usually attained in works of this class."-Nero
Review.
Quarterly Review.
SMITH, ELDER AND CO.
25
FICTION-continued.
Trust for Trust.
Lost and Won.
By A. J. Barrowcliffe,
By Georgiana M. Craik,
Author of " Amberhill."
Author of “ Riverston.”
Three volumes.
Ope volume. Second Edition.
"Nothing superior to this novel has appeareil
"It is seldom we find, even in this great age of
during the present season."-Leader.
novel writing, so much that is pleasant and so
"Miss Oraik's new story is a good one and in
little to object to as in. Trust for Trust.' It con-
point of ability above the average of ladies' novels.”
tains much original thought and fresh humour.' - Daily News.
-Leader.
The language is good, the narrative spirited,
"The story is admirably doveloped. Theinterest
the characters are fairly delineated, and the
never flags, the incidents are natural withont
dialoguo has considerable dramatic forco.”-
being conimonplace, and the men and woman talk
and act like human beings.”—Press.
Saturday Review.
“This is an improvement on Miss Oraik's first
work. The story is more compact and more
interesting."-Atheneum.
Ellen Raymond ;
Or, Ups and Downs.
An Old Debt.
By Mrs. Vidal,
By Florence Dawson.
Autbor of " Tales for the Bush," &c.
Two volumes.
Three volumes.
"A powerfully writton novel; one of the best
"The charactors are good, tho stylc pure, cor-
which has recently proceeded from a femalo
hand.
The dialogue is vigorous and
rect, brisk, and easy."-Press.
spirited."-'Morning Post.
"Mr8. Vidal displays resource, imagination,
aud power in no common degree.
*** There is
"There is an energy and vitality about this
work which distinguish it from the common
moro power and strength put forth in Rilen
Raymond' than perhaps in any lady's book of
head of novels. Its terso vigoni' sometimes recals
Miss Bronte, but in some respects Miss Florence
this generation."-Saturday Revicro.
“This novel will find a great many admirers."
Dawson is decidedly superior to the author of
Jane Eyre,'"-Saturday Review.
-Leader,
“This novel is written with great care and
painstaking it evinces considerable powers of
reflection. The style is good, and the author
THE
nossesses the power of depicting emotion."
Athenceum.
A very good seasonable novel."-Leader.
Dennes of Daundelyonn.
By Mrs. Charles J. Proby.
My Lady.
Three volumes.
“This is a novel of more than average merit.
A Tale of Modern Life.
There is considerable knowledge of character,
Two volumes.
power of description, and quiet zocial satire, ex-
hibited in its pages."-Press.
"My Lady' is a fine specimen of an English
"The Dennes of Drundeiyonn' is a very read- matron, exhibiting that union of strength and
able book, and will be immensely popular,
gentleness, of common sense and romance, or
It has many beauties which deservedly recom- energy and grace, which nearly approaches our
mend it to the novel render."-Critic.
ideal of womanhood."-Press.
"My Lady' evincos charming feeling and deli-
cacy or touch. It is a novel that will be read with
The Two Homes. interest."-Athenarum.
The story is told throughont with grent
strength or feeling, is well written, and has a
By the Author of “The Heir of plot which is by no means" common-place.”~-
Ditaminer.
Vallis."
" There is some force and a good deal of fresh-
Three volumes.
ness in 'My Lady.' The characters are distinctly
drawn, and often wear an appearance of indi-
"There is a great deal that is vory good in this viduality, or almost personality. The execution
hook-a great deal of good fooling and excellent is fresh and powerful."-Spectator.
design.
There are some good pictures of "It is not in every novel we can light upon a
Madeira, and or life and society there, and there style 30 vigorously graceful-upon an intelligence
ere evidences of much painstaling and talent."-- so refined without littleness, so tendorly truthful,
Athenaeum.
which has sensibility rather than poetry; but
"The Two Homes' is a very clever novel. which is also most subtly and searchingly power-
Madeira furnishes Mr. Matliews with a fertile ful."-Dublin University Magazine,
theme for his descriptive powers. The dialogue
is good: the characters all speak and act con-
sistently with their natures." -Leader.
Gaston Bligh.
The Moors and the Fens.
By L. S. Lavenu,
Author of " Erlesmere."
By F. G. Trafford.
Two volumes.
Three volumes.
"The story is told with great power; the whole
“This novel stands out much in the same way book sparkles with espritį, and the characters
that'Jane Eyre' did.
The characters are talk like gentlemen and ladies. It is very enjoy.
drawn by a mind which can realize fictitious able rending."-Prese.
characters with minute intensity."--Saturday Gaston Bligh' is good story, admirably
Review,
told, full of stirring incident, sustaining to the
“It is seldom that a first fiction is entitled to olose the interest of a very ingenious plot, and
such applause as is The Moors and the lens, abounding in clever sketches of character. It
and we shall look anxiously for the writer's next sparkles with wit, and will reward porusal."
essay."-Critic.
Critic,
26
WORKS PUBLISHED BY
.
- The
The Cruellest Wrong of
01",
3
FICTION-continued.
Sylvan Holt's Daughter. The Three Chances.
By Holme Lee,
By the Author of
Fair
Author of “Kathie Brande," &c.
Carew."
Second Edition. 3 vols.
Three volumes.
"The well-established reputation of Holme Some of the characters and romantic situr.
Lee, as a novel writer, will receive an additional tions are strongly marked and peculiarly original.
'
It is the gront merit of the nuthoress that
Daughter." It is charming tale 07 country lire the personages of her tale are human and rent."
and character."-Globe.
Leuder,
There is much that is attractive in 'Sylvan
This novel is of a more solid texture than
Holt's Daughter,' much that is graceful and re- most of its contemporaries. It is full of good
fined, much that is fresh, henlthy, and natural." sense, good thought, and good writing."--Statesa
Press.
inan.
“The conception of the story has a good deal of
originality, and the characters avoid common-
place types, without being unnatural or irnprobn-
ble. The heroine herself is charming. It is a
novel in which there is much to interest and
please."-New Quarterly Reviei.
All.
“A novel that is well worth reading, and which
possesses the cardinal virtue of being extremely By the Author of'" Margaret ;
“A really sound, good book, highly finished,
true to nature, vigorous, passionate, honest, and
Prejudice at Home."
sincere."-Dublin University Magazine.
One volume.
The author has a pathetic vein, and there is a
The Professor.
tender sweetness in the tone of her narration."-
Leader.
“It has the Orst requisite of a work meant to
By Currer Bell.
amuso: it is amusing.'-Globe.
Two volumes.
"We think the author's friends have shown
Kathie Brande.
sound judgment in publishing the 'Professor,
now that she is gone.
It shows the first A Fireside History of a Quiet Life.
germs of conception, which afterwards expanded
and ripened into the great creations of hier imagi-
By Holme Lee.
nation. At the same time lier advisers wero
equally right when they counselled her not to
Two volumes.
publish it in her lifetime.
But it abounds “Kathie Brande' is not merely a very interest-
in merits."-Suturday Review.
ing novel-it is a very wholesome one, for it
"Anything which throwy light upon the growth teaches virtuchy example."--Critic.
and composition of such a mind cannot be other- "Throughout Kathie Brando' there is much
wire than interesting. In the Professor' we may sweetness, and considerable powerof description.'
discover the germs of many trains of thinking, -Saturday Review.
which afterwards came to be enlarged and “Kathio Brande' is intended to illustrate the
illustrated in subsequent and more perfect paramonuit excellence of duty as a moving prin
works.”—Critic.
ciple. It is full of beauties." -Daily News.
“There is much new insight in it, much ex-
tremely characteristic genins, and one charaoter,
moreover, of fresher, lighter, and more airy
grace."-Economist.
A Chronicle.
Below the Surface.
Three volumes.
Three volumes.
“The story is told with a graphic and graceful
pen, and the chronicler has produced a romance
The book is unquestionably clever and enter- not only or great value in a historical point of
taining. The writer develops from first to last view, but possessing many claims upon the atten.
his double view of human lile, as coloured by the
tion of the scholar, the antiquary, and the general
manners of our age.
'It is a talo superior render."-Post.
to ordinary novels, in its practical application to "An Elizabethan masquerade. Shakespeare,
the phases of actual life."-Athenaeum.
the Queen, Essex, Raleigh, and a hundred nobles,
There is a great deal of cleverness in this story; ladies and knights of the land, appear on the
a much greater knowledge of country life and stage. The author has imbued himself with the
character in its various aspects and conditions spirit of the times."- Leader.
than is possessed by nine-tenths of the novelists
who undertake to describe it."-Spectator.
"This is a book which possesses the rare merit
Riverston.
of being exactly what it claims to be a story of
English country life; and, moreover, å very well
told story."-Daily News.
"A more pleasant story we have not rend for
Three volumes.
many a day.'- British Quarterly.
'Miss Craik is a very lively writer: she has wit,
and she has sense, and she has made in the
beautiful young governess, with her strong will,
sancy independence, and promptness of repartee,
an interesting picture."-Press.
Or, Mutation.
“Miss Crnik writes well; she can paint cha-
Three volumes.
racter, passions, mainers, with considerable
effect; her dialogue flows easily and oxpressively.'
"A more beautiful creation than Eva it would
-Daily News,
ho difficult to imagine. The novel is undoubtedly
The author shows grcat command or language,
full of interest."--Morning Post.
a force and clearness or expression not ofton met
with,
There is power, patlios, and originality in con-
We offer a welcome to Miss Oraik,
and we shall look with interest for her next
ccption and catastrophe."-Leuder.
work."-Atheneum.
The Noble Traytour :
By Georgiana M. Craik.
Eva Desmond;
SMITH, ELDER AND CO.
27
Friends of Bohemia;
FICTION-continued.
Perversion ;
Farina:
Or, the Causes and Consequences of
A Legend of Cologne.
Infidelity.
By George Meredith.
By the late Rev. W. J. Conybeare.
One volume.
Three volumes.
"A masque of ravishers in steel, of robber
knights; of water-women, more ravishing than
This story, has a touching interest, which lovely. It has also a brave and tender deliverer,
lingers with the reader after he has closed the
book."-Athenceum.
and a heroine proper for a romance of Cologne.
Those who love a real, lively, audacious piece of
' It is long, very long, since we have read a
narrative of more power than this."-
British
extravagance, by way of a change, will enjoy
Tarina."-Atheneum,
Quarterly Review.
"This is a good and a noble book," - New
Quarterly.
Maud Skillicorne's
Or, Phases of London Life.
Penance.
By E. M. Whitty,
By Mary C. Jackson,
Author of “The Governing Classes."
Two volumes.
Author of “The Story of myWardship.” “Mr. Whitty is a genuine satirist, employing
Two volumes.
satire l'or a genuine purpose. You laugh with him
"The style is natural, and displays considerable
very much; but the laughter is fruity and ripe in
dramatic power."--Critic.
thought. His style is serious, and his cast of
"It is a well concocted tale, and will be very
mind severe. The author has a merriment akin
prlatable to novel readers."-Morning Post,
to that of Jaques and that of Timon."-Atheneum.
The Roua Pass.
The Eve of St. Mark.
A Romance of Venice.
By Erick Mackenzie.
Three volumes.
By Thomas Doubleday.
“It is seldom that we have to notice so good a
Two volumes.
novel as the 'Ron Pass.' The story is weil con- "The Eve of St. Mark'is not only well written,
trived and well told ; the incidents are natural and but aroitly constructed, and interesting. Its
varied ; several of the characters are skilfully tone is perhaps too gorgeous; its movement is too
drawn, and that of the heroine is fresh, powerful, much that of a masquerade ; but a mystery is
and original. The Highland scenory, in which created, and a very loveable heroine is pour-
the plot is laid, is described with truth and feeling trayed, »-Atheneum.
-with a command of language which leaves a
vivid impression."-Saturday Reviewo.
“The peculiar charm of the novel is its skilful Stories and Sketches.
painting of the Highlands, and of life among the
Highlanders. Quick observation and a true sense
of the poetry in nature and human life, the
By James Payn.
author lins."-Examiner.
Post 8vo. Price 2s. 6d, cloth.
"Mr. Payn is gay, spirited, observant, and shows
no little knowledge of inen and books." -Leader.
'A volume of pleasant reading. Some of the
papers have true Attic salt in them."--Literary
Sea:
Gazette.
A Love Story.
By M. Betham-Edwards.
Undine.
Two volumes.
From the German of « De La
"A tale of English domestic life. The writing is
very good, graceful, and unaffected; it pleases
Motte Fouqué."
without startling: In the dialogue, people do not
harangue, but talk, and talk naturally. *-Critic.
Price 1s. 6d.
The White House by the
ras
19
Extremes.
The Rectory of Valehead.
By Miss E. W. Atkinson,
By the Rev. R. W. Evans.
Author of “Memoirs of the Queens of
Tcap, cloth. Price 3s..
Prussia."
Two volumes.
"A nervous and vigorous style, an elaborate
Social Evils.
delineation of character under many varieties,
spirited and well-sustnined dialogue, and a care- By the Rev. C. B. Tayler.
fully-constructed plot; if these have any charms
cor our readers, they will not forget the swiftly In Parts, each complete. Is.cach, cloth.
Morning Post.
I.-THE MDOHANIO.
"Extremes' is a novel written with a sober II.-THE LADY AND THD LADY'S MAID.
purpose, and wound up with a moral. The III.-THL PASTOR UT DRONTELLS.
purpose is to exemplify some of the errors arising V.--THE COUNTRY TOWN.
from mistaken zent in religious matters, and the VI.-LIVE AND LET LIVE; OR, THE MAN-
cvil consequences that flow from those errors.”-
CINSTER WRAVIRS.
Spectator.
VII.--THE LEASIDE FARM.
28
WORKS PUBLISHED BY
Cheap Scries of Popular Works.
Lífe of Charlotte Brontë
(Currer Bell),
Author of “Jane Eyre,' &c.
By Mrs. Gaskell.
Price 2 s. 6d.
"We regard this record as a monument of
courage and endurance, of suffering and triumph,
All the secrets of the literary workinan-
shin or the
authoress of Jane Eyre are unfolded
in the course of this extraordinary narrative.'
Times,
“Mrs. Gaskell has done lier work well. Her
narrative is simple, direct, intelligible, unaffected.
She dwells on her friend's character with womanly
tact, thorough understanding, and delicate sis-
terly tenderness. Mady parts of the book cannot
be real without deep, even paini'ul emotion; still
it is a life always womanly." -Fraser's 11 ugazine.
Jane Eyre.
By Currer Bell.
Price 2s. 6d. cloth.
"Jano Eyre' is a remarkable production.
Freshness and originality, truth and passion,
singular felicity in the description of natural
scenery and in the analyzation of human thought,
enable this tale to stand boldly out from the mass,
and to assume its own place in the bright field of
romantic literaturo."-Times.
"'Jane Eyre'is a book of decided powor. The
thonghts are true, sound, and original; and the
style is resolute, straightforward, and to the
purpose. The object and moral or 'the work are
excellent."--Examiner.
Shirley
By Currer Bell.
Price 2s. 6d. cloth.
“'Shirley' is the anatomy of the feinale heart.
It is a book which indicates exquisite feeling, and
very great power of mind in the writer. The
women are all divine."-Daily News.
"Shirley'is very clever. It cond not be other-
wise. The faculty of graphic description, strong
inagination, fervid and masculine diction, ana-
Jytic skill, all are visible.
Gems of rare
thought and glorious passion shine here and
there." - Times.
Lectures on the English
Humourists
Of the Eighteenth Century.
By W. M. Thackeray, ,
Author of “ Vanity Fair,” “Esmond,"
“ The Virginians,” &c.
Price 2s. 6d, cloth.
"What fino things these lectures contain; what
eloquent and subtle sayings; what wise and
earnest writing; how delightful are their turns
of humour'; with what a touching effcct in the
graver passages the genuine feeling of the man
comes out, and how vividly the thoughts are
painted, as it were, in graphic and characteristic
words."-Examiner.
“This is to us by far the most acceptable of Mr.
Thackeray's writings. His grnphic style, his
philosophical spirit, his analytical powers, liis
large heartedness, his shrewdness, and his gentle-
ness, have all room to exhibit themselves.'
Economist.
Villette.
By Currer Bell.
Price 2s. 6d. cloth.
Villotte' is a most remarkable work-a pro-
duction altogether sui generis, Tulness and
vigour of thought mark almost every sentence,
and there is a sort of easy power pervading the
whole narrative such as we have rarely met."-
Edinburgh Review,
The talo is one of the affections, and remark-
able as a picture of manners. A burning heart
glows throughout it, and one brilliantly distinct
character keeps it alive."-athenaun.
British India.
By Harriet Martineau.
Price 2s. 6d. cloth.
“Lucid, glowing, and instructire essays.".
Economist.
A good_compendium of a grent subject.".
National Reviere,
"As a handbook to the history of India it is
the best that has yet appeared." - Morning
Flelald.
Political Economy of Art.
By John Ruskin, M.4.
Price 2s. 6d. cloth.
"A most able, eloquent, and well-timed work.
We hail it with satisfaction, thinking it calculated
to do much practical good, and we cordially recom-
mend it to our readers."-Witness.
“Mr. Kuskin's chief purpose is to treat the
artist's power, and the ait itself, as items of the
world's wealth, and to show how these may be
best evolved, produced, accumulated, and dis-
tributed."-Athenaeuin:
The Town.
By Leigh Hunt
With Forty-five Engravings.
Price 2s. 6d. cloth.
"We will allow no higher enjoyment for a
rational Englishman than to stroll leisurely
through this marvellous town, arm in arin with
Mr. Leigh Hunt. The charm of Mr. Hunt's hook
is, that he gives us tbe outpourings of a mind
enriched with the most agreeable knowledge:
there is not one page which does not glow with
interest. It is a series of pictures from the life,
representing scenes in which every inhabitant or
the metropolis has an interest."--Times,
Italian Campaigns of
General Bonaparte.
By George Hooper'
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