D
375.3
C38
THE
1921

BERLIN CONGRESS
AND THE
ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.
ļ BY
EDWARD CAZALET.
WITH MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BERLIN CONGRESS TREATY
AND THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION,
LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 55, CHARING CROSS, S.W.
1878.
Price One Shilling.
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}


THE
BERLIN CONGRESS
AND THE
ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.
BY
EDWARD CAZALET, 1922.
WITH MAP ILLUSTRATING THE BERLIN CONGRESS TREATY
AND THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION.
LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 55, CHARING CROSS, S.W.
1878.
PREFACE.
WHEN, in November last year, I published an
Address which I had delivered on the Eastern
Question to the Working Men's Club at Plaxtol,
I ventured to suggest, in a short preface, that
the last part of the pamphlet might possibly be of
more importance than the other parts, "because
it points to a definite line of action for England
in the present political crisis." The policy which
I sought to urge was, that without throwing
obstacles in the way of the emancipation of the
Christian population of European Turkey, England
should counterpoise Russian policy mainly by
assuming the Protectorate of Syria, and carrying
out the scheme-approved by a select Committee
of the House of Commons, in 1872 of the
Euphrates Valley Railway.
England has assumed the Protectorate not only
of Syria, but of the whole of Turkey in Asia; and
that one of the principal reasons which led our
Government to adopt this policy was the im-
B 2
(4)
portance of the Euphrates route to this country, is
shown by their choice of Cyprus as a military
depôt.
In the present Address, which was also delivered
to the Working Men's Club at Plaxtol, I have
sought to show that no other policy than that
which the Government has inaugurated would
have met the exigences of our legitimate interests;
and that, in protecting these in the East, we also
protect the interests of the civilized world.
E. C.
FAIRLAWN, TONBRIDGE,
August 13, 1878.
THE BERLIN CONGRESS
AND
THE ANGLO-TURKISH CONVENTION:
AN ADDRESS DELIVERED TO THE WORKING MEN'S CLUB
AT PLAXTOL.
It is scarcely a year since I delivered to you an
address* on the Eastern Question. During a few
short months what momentous changes have taken
place! At that time Plevna had not fallen; the
Russian armies had been driven back in Asia
Minor nearly to the Russian frontier, and the issue
of the campaign seemed to many people doubtful.
Now, all has changed. In Europe, the Russian
armies have fought their way victoriously to the
walls of Constantinople. In Asia, Kars, over-
powered in a night attack, has capitulated for
the third time in half a century to its persistent
assailants. The Treaty of San Stefano has been
thrust upon the plenipotentiaries of the Sultan at
the point of the bayonet; and a European Con-
gress has once more brought its decisions to bear
upon the solution of the Eastern Question.
My chief object to-day is to endeavour to show
*The Eastern Question: an Address to Working Men.' London:
Edward Stanford, 55, Charing Cross, S.W.
( 6 )
you in what way the Treaty of San Stefano was
opposed to European and British interests; in what
essential points its decisions have been reversed or
modified by the Berlin Congress, and, incidentally,
what was the real nature of the Anglo-Russian
Agreement. Further, I shall do my best to ex-
plain what, according to my view, is the true
meaning and bearing of the Anglo-Turkish Con-
vention. On some of these questions, and the
important issues which they involve, public opinion
is not yet fully formed, and I feel sure that your
forbearance will be extended to me whilst I en-
deavour to fulfil the difficult task which, at the
request of some of my friends, I have undertaken.
It would be occupying your time in vain were I
to go into the details of the San Stefano Treaty.
That instrument has been superseded by the de-
cisions of the Berlin Congress, and it only possesses
an interest for us now in so far as we are able to
gather from its provisions, what were the main
objects of those in Russia who were responsible for
the invasion of Turkey. The map which I have
here, shows the extensive alterations of European
Turkey which it proposed. The territory belong-
ing to Montenegro was more than doubled. Servia
acquired an accession which increased her territory
by more than one-fourth. Russia, in addition to
her acquisitions in Asia Minor, received the Dob-
rudja, in order that, ceding it in turn to Roumania,
she might take from that principality the territory
( 7 )
of Bessarabia. The main feature of the treaty, how-
ever, lay in the creation of a new Slav State, extend-
ing on the Danube from Widdin to Silistria, and
with a stretch of coast on the Black Sea including
the important ports of Varna and Burgas. On the
south its frontier extended to the Bay of Salonika,
and on the west as far as the river Black Drina and
the Kara Dagh mountains. The great Slav State
which it was thus proposed to erect in the heart of
Turkey, comprised nearly one-half of the Ottoman
dominions in Europe. It consisted of upwards of
fifty thousand geographical square miles, and con-
tained a population of upwards of four millions. Its
political effect would have been not only to raise an
almost insuperable barrier to the aspirations of
Greece, but, by its interposition between Constan-
tinople and the western possessions of Turkey, to
prepare the way for the complete dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire.
In Asia, Russia acquired Ardahan, Kars, Batoum,
and Bajazid. This territory, as well as that of
the Dobrudja (which included the mouths of the
Danube), was taken by Russia as part indemnity
for her expenses in the war. She estimated these
territorial gains at 1100 millions of roubles, or
about 150,000,000l. sterling. By the acquisition
of Bajazid, Russia obtained the command of the
Persian transit trade with Europe through Erze-
roum and Trebizond. Once settled at Bajazid,
she could at any moment obstruct this traffic,
( 8 )
while her position here as well as at Kars and
Batoum would enable her to dominate over the
whole of Asiatic Turkey, including Syria and the
Euphrates Valley. An additional stipulation
granted her a war indemnity of 310 millions of
roubles, thereby giving Russia a claim to interfere
in the financial arrangements of Turkey for an
indefinite period. In fact, every preparation was
made for the annihilation of Ottoman rule in
Europe, and the complete domination of Russia in
the Asiatic possessions of the Sultan. Not unjustly
did Lord Salisbury remark in his Circular of
April 1st, that this Russo-Turkish Treaty, regarded
as a whole, must be declared to be incompatible
not only with British interests, but with the general
interests of Europe.
By these changes, European, and especially Aus-
trian, interests would have been affected in Europe,
but British interests were mainly jeopardized in
Asia. Let me endeavour to elucidate Austria's
position as regards these proposed changes. Un-
questionably Austria-Hungary might have obtained
Bosnia and Herzegovina at the hand of Russia,
as a condition of allowing the latter to work her
will in European Turkey. Similarly if England
had taken possession of Egypt, Russia would
have sanctioned the proceeding on condition of
being allowed to work her will in Asiatic Turkey.
But Austria avoided the snare, just as England
wisely renounced the acquisition of Egypt. It
(9)
must be borne in mind that the population of
Austria-Hungary is made up of Germans, Hunga-
rians, and Slavonians in nearly equal proportions.
An accession, therefore, of Slavish States, accepted
as a compromise with Russia, would necessarily give
umbrage to the other nationalities of the Austrian
Empire. On the other hand, the erection, on the
south side of the Danube, of a powerful Slavish
State supported by Russia would have the twofold
effect: first, by enveloping Roumania, of bringing
that principality, along with the navigation of the
Danube, entirely under Russian influence; and,
secondly, in the case of Austria holding aloof, of
absorbing all the other Slav States in its vicinity.
Servia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina must in the
course of time have formed with the new Bulgaria
a great Slav State which could not fail to exercise
a disturbing influence on the Slav population of
Austria-Hungary. The tendency would have
been for the Slav element of the Austrian Em-
pire to fall under the influence of their brethren
on the south of the Danube. This would have
placed the Government of Vienna more or less at
the mercy of that of St. Petersburg, and might
have led to a complete disruption of the Austrian
Empire.
The interests of Austria, however, were also the
interests of Europe; and, whilst she could count
upon European support at a Congress, without a
Congress it was not possible for her to take any
B 3
( 10 )
decided action. Austria was therefore the first to
propose a Congress.
But while Austrian interests were identical with
those of Europe, British interests in Asia could lay
claim to no such support. Turkey in Asia includes
Syria and Palestine, which lie directly in the path
between England and her Indian possessions. It
is one of the results of the late war that this ter-
ritory must eventually fall under the domination
either of Russia or England; and unless England
had taken active steps to prevent it, Russian
influence would have become supreme. These are
considerations which do not enlist the sympathies
of the other nations of Europe. An European
Congress might give an authoritative decision on
questions involving the general welfare of Europe,
but it could not interfere authoritatively in a
question in which Russia and England were alone
concerned. This brings us to the Anglo-Russian
Agreement signed by Lord Salisbury and Count
Schouvaloff. Austria had proposed a Congress,
and her proposal was subsequently, by common
consent, taken up by Germany. Prince Bismarck,
though cordially supporting the wishes of Austria,
and anxious to bring about peace in the interests
of Russia, already exhausted by her exertions in
the late war, found himself at once confronted with
the difficulty that Europe could not interfere ad-
vantageously between England and Russia. Of
what avail could a Congress be, if, in connection
( 11 )
with the Treaty of San Stefano, there were points
on which Russia refused to yield and the British
Government was prepared to go to war? Prince
Bismarck, therefore, suggested to Russia that she
should treat directly with England, and come to a
preliminary understanding on all those special
points which exclusively affected Russian and
British interests. Hence the Anglo-Russian Agree-
ment. That Agreement treats, of nearly all the
subjects raised by the Treaty of San Stefano; but
the main article-which has been the subject of so
much criticism-is the eleventh.
In it, England undertakes not to go to war with
Russia, either on account of the retrocession of
Bessarabia, or the cession of Batoum and Kars;
and in the same article is also foreshadowed the
special protection which our Government contem-
plated extending over Asiatic Turkey. To appre-
ciate England's position it is necessary to bear in
mind that with regard to Bessarabia, its retroces-
sion to Russia had been agreed to by Germany
and Austria before the commencement of the war;
and that no Power in Europe would for a moment
entertain the idea of going to war in order to
retain Bessarabia for Roumania, or to restore
Batoum and Kars to Turkey. Under these cir-
cumstances only two courses were open to our
Government. It might refuse to sanction the
Russian demands, and, in that case, as Prince
Bismarck declared, the Congress would not meet,
B 4
( 12 )
A
and on England would have devolved the respon-
sible and arduous task of enforcing her views
single-handed. The alternative was to submit to
these Russian exactions, and, if possible, to devise
a policy which would deprive them of their preju-
dicial effects. On this footing Congress might
meet, and an European war be avoided. Our
Government chose the latter course, and I believe
that all who prefer peace to war must admit that
in doing so they chose rightly. This Anglo-
Russian Agreement, instead of being the under-
hand, objectionable instrument which it was pro-
nounced to be at the time by so many of our
countrymen, and by several of the leading journals
of Europe, was simply a necessity of the situation.
It was suggested by Prince Bismarck, and, as
subsequent events showed, entirely approved by
Austria, while the French and Italian Governments
did not find in its provisions any cause whatever
of grievance. These difficulties once removed, the
Congress met. England had come to terms with
Russia respecting Asia Minor and the East. It
remained for Europe, in Congress assembled, to
pronounce upon the different modifications of the
Treaty of Paris necessitated by the altered position
of affairs in European Turkey, where, after cen-
turies of oppression, the Christian population had,
by a lavish expenditure of Russian blood and
Russian treasure, been emancipated from the
Ottoman yoke.
13 )
And here, let me notice an argument on which
much stress has been laid by a certain section of the
English Press. It is argued that because the agri-
cultural population of Bulgaria was found in many
parts of the country to be in a more prosperous
condition than the peasantry of Russia, therefore
it was a work of supererogation to interfere between
the Bulgarians and their rulers. It may have been
unwise on the part of Russia to undertake it, but
the work was none the less a necessary work. It
is not the ignorant, the careless, the drunken
peasant, the man who has nothing to lose, who
cares what the government of his country may
be. It is the honest, the industrious, the pains-
taking workman, who has accumulated a certain
amount of property; who, it may be, possesses a
small farm which his ancestors have cultivated for
generations; who has a family who look to him
for support, and whom it is his pride to protect—
it is this man who chafes bitterly under the in-
fliction of an alien and arbitrary yoke. And in
proportion as the man is just and honest and
industrious, is oppression felt to be galling. This
truth was at once recognized by the Plenipoten-
tiaries. Not only did it appear impossible to the
eminent men assembled at Berlin, to re-impose
Turkish dominion over the races which had been
emancipated by Russia, but their earnest desire, as
shown by the result, was to free the country as
quickly as possible not only from Turkish, but also
( 14 )
from Russian control. To have done otherwise
would have been to substitute one oppression for
another scarcely less bearable.
The desire of the Congress to favour as far as
possible the emancipation of the nationalities from
either Russian or Turkish rule, is apparent when
we come to look at its decisions. It is true that
there were reasons which made it impossible that
there should be no exceptions in the application
of this principle. The retrocession of a portion of
Bessarabia has been sanctioned by the Congress;
but it must be remembered that, previous to the
Crimean war, this territory had been in the posses-
sion of Russia for forty-three years; and, so far as
I am aware, there is no reason to believe that the
population objects to the transfer. Russia also
obtains Eastern Armenia, including Batoum and
Kars; but of this arrangement it may be said,
that the government of the Porte has for centuries
been so detestable in that country that any change
of rulers cannot conceivably be for the worse.
With these exceptions, all the populations of
Turkey must benefit by the changes made by the
Congress. Roumania and Servia have been freed
from Turkish rule, and their boundaries enlarged.
Montenegro has obtained additional arable land,
and a port. To Bulgaria, north of the Balkans,
has been accorded self-government. South of the
Balkans, the province of Eastern Roumelia has
been formed with a civil government independent
( 15 )
of the Porte. The aspirations of Greece, although
it has been found impossible to satisfy them, have
at least received substantial recognition. Herze-
govina and Bosnia have received security for
better government in being placed under Austrian
administration. In addition to these changes, the
withdrawal of the Russian troops from European
Turkey is to take effect in nine months instead of
two years.
But it is not in these changes, though they are
considerable, that the essence of the distinction
between the treaty of San Stefano and the de-
cisions of the Berlin Congress lies. That consists
not in territorial modifications, but in the substitu-
tion of Austrian for Russian influence in the
Balkan peninsula. Thus, it is Austria that is
entrusted with the removal of the obstacles in the
way of navigation on the Danube; it is Austria
that undertakes the construction of the railways
connecting Europe with Turkey; and, above all,
it is Austria that is invited by Europe to enter the
Turkish Empire, and indefinitely occupy Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The fact that Austria has accepted the invita-
tion of Europe to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina,
is of the utmost importance. In doing so she
provides the barrier "necessary," in the words of
M. Tisza, the President of her Hungarian Council
of State, "to arrest the steady development of
Panslavism." She takes up, on the invitation of
( 16 )
X
C
Europe, what the Journal des Débats,' one of the
most influential organs of public opinion in
France, terms "a military position which will
render Austria strong enough to oppose any
further extension of Russia on the side of Turkey."
Thus, it is not as a participator in the spoils of
Russian aggression that Austria enters upon the
possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She enters
with the intention avowed by herself, and recog-
nized by Europe, of securing a position from
which, if need be, she may successfully defend the
Balkan peninsula against its hereditary invader.
I need scarcely repeat to you what I have dwelt
upon on a former occasion, namely, that the main-
tenance of Turkish rule over Christian peoples in
Europe is, to my mind, not a desirable line of
policy to support; and I venture to think that,
notwithstanding the safeguards with which it has
been surrounded, it cannot be of long duration.
But the Plenipotentiaries assembled at Berlin,
with every means of obtaining the best information
on the subject, have evidently considered it a
necessity of the situation; and, granting this, I
cannot see what better arrangements could be
suggested. To sum up this part of my subject,
the Treaty of San Stefano aimed at the disintegra-
tion of Turkey in Europe, and the substitution of
Russian for Turkish domination in that country.
The Berlin Congress chose rather the maintenance
( 17 )
of Turkey as an European Power under an
Austrian protectorate.
And now let us turn to Turkey in Asia. Here
a problem of much greater interest for our nation
presents itself. This vast region, which we have
taken under our protectorate, comprises over
600,000 square miles, and is inhabited by a popu-
lation of about 16,000,000. It consists of countries
which were once the most productive and populous
in the world, and which still possess the elements
out of which prosperity may be developed. Its
soil is, for the most part, extremely fertile; its
climate is adapted to almost any kind of produce;
it possesses an extensive sea-coast, and its position
as the connecting link between Europe, Asia, and
Africa, is unique. As might be expected, this
region has been the scene of some of the most
memorable episodes in the history of the human
Centuries before the Christian era, the
peninsula of Asia Minor was the great field of
Greek colonization; and such cities as Smyrna,
Ephesus, Miletus, Phocæa, and Halicarnassus bore
testimony to the enterprise of the greatest colonists
of the ancient world. South-east of this peninsula
lie the regions watered by the Euphrates and
Tigris, which are associated with the glories of
the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian Empires;
and when Alexander the Great conquered Persia,
it was his design to have made Babylon the
race.
( 18 )
metropolis of universal empire. Of this great city,
"the beauty of the Chaldees' excellency," whose
walls encircled an area of 100 square miles-
an area five times greater than that of modern
London-only shapeless mounds of ruins remain;
and its great rival Nineveh, in repairing whose
palaces Sennacherib employed 360,000 men, has
also, in the language of the prophet, "become a
desolation." South of Asia Minor, and separating
it from Egypt, lie Syria and Palestine, a land
which was promised to Abraham's seed, and which
to this day is the dwelling-place of Hagar's off-
spring. To crown all these reminiscences, no
country has for us memories so sacred as that
which witnessed the birth, the ministry, and the
passion of our Saviour. Such are some of the
great memories connected with the territory which
England has undertaken to protect. And now
let us consider calmly what is the nature of the
Convention which, to effect this object, we have
made with Turkey.
The Convention is made conditionally on the
retention of Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan, or any
of them, by Russia; but Russia has annexed them
all, and is not likely to surrender them. We may
dismiss this part of the subject without further
observation. We undertake, then, to defend
against further aggression on the part of Russia-
not, be it observed, against a rising of the inhabi-
tants of the country, or against any other Power-
( 19 )
all the possessions of Turkey in Asia. In con-
sideration for the protectorate, the Sultan makes a
promise to England, distinct from any other
Power, to introduce reforms into the government
of the country; and, to enable her to execute
this engagement, he assigns to England the island
of Cyprus, to be occupied and administered by
her.
The objections raised to this Convention are the
following:-
First: The responsibilities we have undertaken
are not necessary for the protection of our in-
terests.
Secondly: They are binding upon us whether
the Sultan adheres to his engagements or not; or,
if, after having undertaken them, we renounce
them, we should become involved in still greater
difficulties and dangers.
Thirdly: We sacrifice our insular position, and
become a Continental Power in Europe.
Fourthly: We give our assumed enemy, Russia,
the opportunity of attacking us at a disadvantage,
whilst we alienate from ourselves the sympathies
of France and Italy.
Fifthly: The island of Cyprus is not a valuable
acquisition for us, nor is it necessary for the pro-
tection of our interests.
Sixthly: This Convention is not recognized by
Europe, and it is in opposition to principles which
we have advocated.
( 20 )
Seventhly: We have incurred alarming and
unjustifiable financial responsibilities.
There is. doubtless another objection raised to
the policy of the Government, or rather to the
way in which the Government has carried it out,
namely, that they have acted in a manner which
undermines the constitution of the country, and
have unduly strained the prerogative rights of the
Crown. This is a serious charge, but it does not
come within the scope of this address. One may
say, however, without discussing the important
issue raised, that unquestionably it would have
been preferable if the negotiations connected with
this treaty could have been carried on without
recourse to secret diplomacy. This agency is so
liable to abuse that it has come to be viewed with
great dislike and suspicion by all liberal politicians.
But the country, at any rate, does not believe that
the constitution has been in danger. There can
be no doubt that, if once the people of England
came to the conclusion that the constitution was in
danger, no administrative capacity, no personal
ability, no recognition of past services, could save
the Government from defeat and ignominy.
To return, then, to the critical objections raised
to the Treaty. All these objections, you will
observe, are based upon the assumption, either that
England has no paramount interests in Asia
Minor or Syria which it is worth her while to
maintain at the expense of largely increased
(21)
}
responsibilities, or that her interests might have
been protected in some other and better way.
To refute these objections, it will be sufficient_tq
show that such interests do exist, and that we
could not, under existing circumstances, protect
them in any other way. What, then, are the
interests involved?
First Syria lies on our highroad to India. By
taking this region under our protectorate, we have
it in our power to establish a right of way through
it to our Great Dependency.
The Euphrates
Valley Railway, by forming a connecting link
between Europe and Asia, will, like the Suez
Canal, be a permanent gain for our empire, and
for the world, independent of whatever changes
may befall hereafter.
Secondly: As soon as the Euphrates Valley
Railway is completed, this route will bring us
three or four days nearer India; and when you
consider our vast and yearly increasing interests
there, can it seem otherwise than important that
our postal communication with that country should
be expedited, and the government in Calcutta
brought so much nearer to the government in
London?
Thirdly With Syria under our protection, the
whole of this new and shorter route to India will
be under our control from one end to the other;
and, considering the important communications
which pass daily between the two countries, such
( 22 )
a result is worth some pecuniary sacrifice on our
part.
Fourthly: Cyprus will form a valuable depôt
for our troops, and a half-way station for them on
their way to India.
But the question still remains: Could not
these advantages have been secured for England
without this protectorate? Every one who has
watched attentively the current of affairs in the
East, is aware that at one moment after the Treaty
of San Stefano was signed in March last, the
danger became imminent lest, instead of a pro-
tectorate over Turkey in Asia by England, an
offensive and defensive alliance between Russia
and Turkey should be formed. Russia urged it;
several of the Turkish ministers, as well as men of
influence at Constantinople, advocated it; the
Turkish people, overwhelmed by the losses they
had sustained and despairing of assistance from
England, almost desired it; and if it did not take
place, this was solely due to the prompt action of
the English Government in boldly substituting
English protection for Russian domination.
Let us for a moment reflect what an offensive
and defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey
would have meant. The whole coast-line of the
Black Sea, including the Dardanelles, would have
fallen under Russian control, and the Black Sea
would have become a Russian lake; an empire
verging on bankruptcy, yet possessing nearly a
(23
( 23 )
million of soldiers, would have placed its heel on
the bleeding remains of the Ottoman empire, and
Russian policy would have become dominant at
Constantinople and in the East; throughout this
region, the influence of an empire in which the
degrading passport system and prohibitive tariffs
prevail, would have been supreme; England must
have looked on passively whilst a Russian garrison
occupied Aleppo, and Russian rule was established
at Jerusalem; no railway connecting the Mediter-
ranean with the Persian Gulf could have been
carried out, because Russia needs none; if our
communication with India by the Suez Canal
remained open, still every Englishman would have
felt that it could at any moment be threatened by
the Czar; and, instead of a bright era dawning,
a deep gloom would again have settled down over
the East. And what country except England,
let me ask, could have saved the world from such
a disaster? Would France have done it, who,
before entering the Congress, stipulated that no
subjects which did not form part of the Treaty of
San Stefano should be discussed? France, indeed,
specially excluded Syria from discussion, thus
rendering it impossible for our Government to
submit our Anglo-Turkish Convention to the ap-
proval of Congress. Would Germany have lifted a
finger for such an object? Why, Prince Bismarck
declared that, as far as the interests of Germany
were concerned, the whole Eastern Question was
( 24 )
not worth the boots of a Pomeranian soldier! Is it
likely that Italy would have lent a helping hand
in protecting European interests in the East, when
the main object of a certain noisy and not unin-
fluential body of her citizens seems to have been
to acquire an accession of territory at the ex-
pense of Austria, without offering her the smallest
compensation? And Austria, what of her? Is it
not a well-known fact that, though backed by
Europe, without the Anglo-Turkish Convention she
could not and would not have even ventured to
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina? This Anglo-
Turkish Agreement, so far from being an unneces-
sary Convention, is an indispensable complement
of the changes sanctioned by the Berlin Congress.
It is the keystone of the arch, without which that
work must forthwith have tumbled to pieces.
And now let me say a few words with regard to
the responsibilities which we have incurred. These
are a source of great disquietude to many of our
countrymen, and must be of particular interest to
every Englishman at the present moment. The
territory over which Ottoman rule is to be main-
tained may be divided into three sections. First,
there is European Turkey, where three-fourths of
the population are non-Mahomedan. This country
is now under European protection, and no respon-
sibility extends to it on our part beyond what
other European Powers have incurred. Then there
(25)
is Asia Minor; and, lastly, there is Syria and
Palestine, all of which are under the special pro-
tectorate of Great Britain. Now, with regard to
Asia Minor, as distinct from Syria and Palestine,
the point which I am especially anxious to lay
stress upon is this-that the population of this vast
country, numbering from 13 to 14 millions, is for
the most part (probably to the extent of four-fifths)
Mahomedan. Thus, whilst in European Turkey,
where the bulk of the population is non-Mahomedan,
it may be necessary in the cause of humanity for
Christian Powers to interfere for the protection of
Christians against Ottoman misgovernment, this
rule cannot possibly apply to the same extent to
the relations between Ottoman rulers and their
Ottoman subjects. It is true, no doubt, that along
the coasts of Asia Minor there are considerable
Greek settlements, and it will be necessary for us
to do our utmost to secure for them, what the
Turkish Government has undertaken to grant,
equality before the law, as well as security for life
and property. But such responsibilities need not
cause us alarm. The Ottoman subjects of the
Porte know well, that for upwards of a century,
England has ruled over 40 millions of their co-
religionists in Asia, who have had no cause to
regret our control. They must be aware that in
Asia Minor we have no special interests, and that
if England is ready to extend her protectorate over
( 26 )
that country, it is because, whilst it has condemned
Ottoman rule, the English nation sympathizes with
the Ottoman people. It is the hope and trust of
Englishmen that their influence may be exerted for
the benefit of that people; and if we should not
succeed in our philanthropic endeavours, there is
no reason why this protectorate over Asia Minor
should not be abandoned. We should then have
to devise, with or without the assistance of Europe,
some other form of government for that country.
But when we come to Syria and Palestine, our
position is quite different. Here not only our
interests become paramount, but the population is
essentially hostile to Ottoman rule. In Syria and
Palestine, there is a population of 2 or 3 millions,
a large proportion of which are Arabs, who, though
Mahomedans by religion, do not now, and never
have, recognized the Ottoman rule. The people of
this country are indeed sadly in want of protection.
Since their conquest in 1517, by Selim I., the
country under Ottoman rule has steadily declined
in power, wealth and population; and those who
are not now in open rebellion against the Turk
have sunk into the condition of slaves.
I may
say, without fear of contradiction, that it is to the
British nation, and to our nation only, that the
Arab as well as the Jewish population of Syria
look for sympathy and protection.
Unquestionably the regeneration of such a
(27)
country will involve some pecuniary sacrifices on
the part of England, but if the nation felt satisfied
that its finances were in hands which would
manage them judiciously and economically, it
would not grudge the means necessary to complete
the great enterprise it has undertaken. It is in
this direction that we see on the horizon the little
dark cloud which casts a shadow on the otherwise
bright prospect before us.
One of our first requisites is an impregnable
depôt for our troops and stores. Such a depôt we
have secured in Cyprus. This island is within a
few hours' sail of the coast of Asia Minor. It
commands the Bay of Iskanderoon and the port of
Seleucia, one of which must be the western terminus
of the Euphrates Valley Railway. Its soil is fertile,
and its climate not unhealthy. It will be necessary
to create a considerable military depôt on the island,
and to form a good harbour. Further, it will be
indispensable that the Government should grant
an Imperial guarantee in some shape or other on
the capital required to construct the Euphrates
Valley Railway. By this the Government would
incur a liability of 300,000l., perhaps of 400,0007.
a year; but it would not likely be involved in
any permanent outlay. It has been stated on con-
siderable authority that the railway will never
prove a paying concern; but that is not the opinion
of our consuls in the East who reported to Govern-
( 28 )
ment on this question; nor does it agree with the
views of a careful observer, Mr. Geary, the editor
of the ‘Indian Times.' Having recently travelled
through much of the country through which the
railway would pass, Mr. Geary writes to the editor
of the Times' as follows:-" Between Alexan-
dretta and Aleppo the trade is so great that
10,000 camels are employed on it. If a railway
were constructed, it would be difficult to assign
limits to the development of the trade of this
region." He adds, "A railway from the Medi-
terranean to the valleys of the Euphrates and
Tigris would tap provinces of wonderful fertility
and boundless extent." As one of the examples
which Mr. Geary furnishes of the fertility of the
regions through which the Euphrates and Tigris
flow, I may mention the date plantations, which he
describes as stretching league after league along
the river, both north and south of Bussorah.
These plantations are from four to six miles in
breadth, and grain is cultivated between the trees.
Although, owing to the great foreign demand for
dates, the price of them has risen 400 per cent. at
Bussorah within the last six years, at Hillah, im-
mense quantities of grain and dates rot unused
every year because there is no cheap and con-
venient carriage for the produce. Bussorah was
once a flourishing city of 300,000 inhabitants,
although it is now a very small place. Since the
( 29 )
opening of the Suez Canal it has begun to revive,
and our informant states that last spring as many
as eleven European steamers were anchored in a
line in the river opposite its grain stores. If such
has been the effect on Bussorah of opening a canal
about three thousand miles distant, there is nothing
unreasonable in supposing that a railway connect-
ing it and the other towns of this fertile region with
the Mediterranean on the one side and the Persian
Gulf on the other, will develope a very large
traffic.
But, be this as it may, without a connecting
link between our resources in India and the
Mediterranean, a protectorate over Asia Minor
and Syria would be a senseless undertaking. The
cost of the Suez Canal was not less than 15 millions
sterling; the Euphrates Railway will probably not
cost more than half that sum. England need not
recoil from such a liability.
There is one other point which I must not
pass over. It is, that England through this pro-
tectorate has become a Continental Power, and
that in future England's difficulty will be Russia's
opportunity. The real answer to this is, that the
choice-lay, as I have endeavoured to show, between
an English protectorate and Russian domination
over these countries; and no British Government
could hesitate which to choose. Besides, Russia
has not been injured or humbled either by the
( 30 )
decisions of the Congress, or by our Anglo-Turkish
Convention. On the contrary, she has secured to
herself considerable material advantages. The
danger for her is that these advantages may have
the effect of delaying the work of reform so much
needed within her own borders. History teaches
us that reforms are not the usual results of success-
ful wars, but rather the compensating conse-
quences of defeat and failure. Let us hope,
however, that the lessons which Russia must have
learned during this war, and the sacrifices which
her people will still be called upon to make, will
tend to bring about a more liberal form of
government in that Empire. When liberal
measures shall have conferred greater freedom
upon her people, and the advantages of education
are fully recognised by her government; when
Free Trade shall have swept away protective
traffic, and a Free Press shall have become an
honoured institution, then the influence of that
great country will make itself legitimately felt
over the Slav populations beyond its borders,
without the necessity of recourse to arms, and
our contact with Russia need inspire us with no
alarm. It is difficult, indeed, to see in what way
the interests of the two countries would then be
opposed. At any rate there is no longer any need
for Russian interference in Turkey; and if, as
there seems little cause to fear, Russia should again
( 31 )
advance her legions across her newly acquired
frontier in Asia Minor in hope of further con-
quests, the great battle of constitutional freedom
will have to be fought out in Syria, and England
could not choose a better battle-field. She will be
supported by a population she has undertaken
to protect against their hereditary enemy, and
with all her resources from the east and from the
west open to her, she may calmly await the result.
It is the peculiar merit of this Protectorate that
it is based on truly liberal principles. We have
asked no special privileges from Turkey to enable
us to govern that country for our private advantage.
Even the revenues and Crown lands of Cyprus
have been secured to the Turkish Government.
The justification of the Anglo-Turkish Convention
lies in this, that we have sought to protect our
Imperial interests by no selfish means, but by frankly
assuming responsibilities which are identified not
only with the well-being of the nations we desire
to protect, but with the welfare of the world. In
this there is no ground for boastful exultation.
The task before us will tax the energies, the re-
sources, and the patience of our country; but we
are sustained by the conviction that the policy we
have inaugurated is not one of selfish aggrandize-
ment or lust of conquest. It is antagonistic to no
legitimate interests, and it has been accomplished
by peaceful means. In endeavouring to regenerate
( 32 )
a memorable region, and to develope trade and
prosperity throughout the East, we ask all nations
to come to our help, and bear their part. If we fail,
all nations must suffer along with us; if we succeed,
England will have done much to promote the well-
being of Europe, and the progress of the world.