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CAN WE BELIEVE IN MIRACLES?
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LONDON
GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS,
1
ST. JOHN'S SQUARE.
CAN WE BELIEVE
IN
MIRACLES?
BY
GEORGE WARINGTON,
CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE;
AUTHOR OF "THE WEEK OF CREATION," ETC., Etc.
Fourth Thousand.
LONDON:
CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE COMMITTEE OF THE
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE;
SOLD AT THE DEPOSITORIES:
77, GREAT QUEEN STREET, LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS;
4, ROYAL EXCHANGE; 48, PICCADILLY;
AND BY ALL BOOKSELLERS.
}
THE Christian Evidence Committee of the
S. P. C. K., while giving its general approval
to this work of the Christian Evidence Series,
does not hold itself responsible for every state-
ment or every line of argument.
The responsibility of each writer extends to
his own work only.
1
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
INTRODUCTION
pp. 3-26
The religion of the Bible is essentially a historical
religion; so that to reject its history is to destroy the
religion.
The history of the Bible is essentially a miraculous
history; so that faith in its history, and faith in miracles
are inseparable. And this:-
•
(1) Because the miracles are so mixed up with the
history, that whatever theory is adopted to account
for the record of the former, must apply equally
to the latter; which would destroy the whole
volume's claim to historical accuracy.
(2) Because the most esssential facts in the reli-
gious history of the Bible are themselves miracles.
This inseparability is allowed and made use of
by sceptical objectors.
The question to be discussed is thus vital to the very
existence of the religion.
Miracles, however, are not the only evidence on
behalf of the religion and history of the Bible.
There are, besides, evidences external-literary-
277276
vi
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
and theological. All which must be put aside if
miracles be rejected.
Thus there are difficulties on both sides, which
must be weighed against each other, before deciding
the question of belief:-a fact full of the most
important bearings upon many detailed points, beside
the main topic.
In the present work, however, only the difficulties on
one side are to be discussed, viz. those against miracles.
The inquiry is hence strictly preliminary.
CHAPTER I.
WHAT ARE MIRACLES? .
pp. 27-39
The discussion concerns Scripture miracles only ;-
hence the Scriptural definition of a miracle is the right
one to take.
Miracles are denoted in Scripture by three terms—
'marvel'—' mighty work'-'sign.'
sign.' The precise
meaning of each;-they are not synonymous, or
exclusive, but complementary ;-the full view of a
miracle combines all three.
Objectors mostly confine themselves to one aspect
of miracles only;-may often be refuted by a mere
reference to the other omitted aspects. Hence, an
apparently formidable objection, under one head,
may turn out to be altogether irrelevant when
miracles are viewed as a whole. Illustration, in
exemplification of this, drawn from the 'Mont Cenis'
tunnel.
!
Proof that the three terms do not in Scripture
denote different kinds of miracles, but different
aspects.
Final definition of a miracle.
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
vii
.
CHAPTER II.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
pp. 40-76
Miracles are 'marvels' because they are extraordinary
phenomena contrary to prior human experience. Is then
every such phenomenon unworthy of credence?
The fact of miracles having been thought credible
for so long and by so many, is a strong argument to
the contrary; not, however, pressed here.
How do we get experience ?-It comes gradually by
observation; every addition to it being something dif
ferent from what prior experience has told us of. To
reject all phenomena different from prior experience
would thus be to destroy experience altogether. The
case remains essentially the same whatever the amount
either of the experience diverged from, or of the diver-
gence itself.
,
•
But miracles are said not merely to be different from
past experience, but contrary to it. What does 'con-
trary' here mean? Not experience, in regard to the
alleged marvels, which contradicts their marvellous cha-
racter, but experience concerning other related phenomena
which warrants an expectation contrary to the occurrence
of a miracle. Illustrations of this from Scripture.
Does such contrariety then involve incredibility ?
Instances of non-miraculous marvels in proof of the
contrary ;— eclipses-arctic climate-ice-and other
natural phenomena;-diving apparatus-cure of cataract
-spheroidal state-diamagnetism-and other pheno-
mena of art and science. Examination of these instances
to show their sufficient parallelism to miracles for the
purpose of the argument, so long as both are regarded
exclusively as phenomena. Conclusion to be drawn as to
the worth of the objection.
viii
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
Application of this argument to Hume's dilemma
concerning miracles and testimony. The dilemma
shown to lead to absurd conclusions in parallel
cases; hence either intrinsically unsound, or irrele-
vant. Its intrinsic faults are not sufficient to account
for the conclusions it leads to. Examination of the
way in which men really judge of the credibility of
of things contrary to their experience :-a reference
to causation or circumstance leads them to see or
suspect that their experience is not really relevant;
when Hume's dilemma drops out of sight altogether.
Illustrations of this.
Application of the
solution thus given to the case of miracles. Miracles
claim to be connected with agency and circumstances,
whose influence man's prior experience is quite
unable to determine. Until, therefore, this claim is
decided, (and that in the negative,) Hume's dilemma
does not apply.
C
General result of the chapter:-the credibility of
miracles as marvels,' depends upon their credibility as
'mighty works,' and as 'signs.'
CHAPTER III.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MIGHTY WORKS pp. 77-165
The causation of miracles a point of great intrinsic
importance, apart from the result of the last chapter.
The Bible view of their causation :-not more properly
God's works than every other event in Nature and provi-
dence; spoken of habitually in similar terms. Their
speciality lies not in their relation to God, but to Nature,
and to man ;—are events out of Nature's ordinary course,
and such as manifest God's working more strikingly.
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
ix
Two classes of objections to be met:-
(1) Deistical. Miracles cannot have come from
the same Author as Nature.
(2) Atheistical. Miracles require the assumption
of an Intelligent First Cause, which Nature
does not.
General statement of the first of these objections in its
primary and simplest form. "Nature is uniform, and
rigidly subject to law;-miracles are violations of that
uniformity and law ;-therefore miracles are incredible."
What precisely is meant by this uniformity?
not one merely of recurring phenomena, -nor even
of the sequence of phenomena upon one another,
though this is included,—but a uniformity of causa-
tion, the elements which go to make up phenomena
having always one and the same properties, and
obeying one and the same laws.
This doctrine of science here frankly accepted
as true. Certain preliminary cautions, however, are
necessary:-(i) we very likely do not know all the
matter and force which constitute the world of
Nature;-(ii) nor, certainly, all the properties and
laws of this matter and force;—(iii) nor, conse-
quently, any thing like all the phenomena which may
occur in Nature. Effect of these cautions upon the
course of scientific inquiry;—our ignorance of Nature
must always be borne in mind when deciding on the
credibility of new phenomena. What kind of
phenomena then really are, in a scientific view,
incredible ?-those only, where some known law or
property, which ought to have had an influence in a
phenomenon, can be shown to have had either no, or
some other, influence. Mere inadequacy of known
laws to explain phenomena, or apparent but explica-
ble contrariety, never allowed by scientific men
X
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
as an objection. Illustrations of this:-ozone—
red phosphorus-the abnormal expansion of water
-&c.
Application of this scientific method to miracles.
Some are too like well-known Natural phenomena
to need discussing. Detailed examination of others
—those which seem to violate gravitation (the pas-
sage of the Jordan, &c.);—those which seem to
violate astronomical laws, (the sun and moon stand-
ing, the return of the sun's shadow);-those which
seem to violate laws of heat (the three youths,
Gideon's fleece, &c.) ;-those which seem to involve
creation or transformation of matter, (feeding the
five thousand, &c.) ;-those wrought on man, (heal-
ing, resurrection, &c.).
General result of
this examination :-miracles are events, for the most
part, wholly inexplicable by Natural laws; but it
cannot be affirmed of any of them with certainty
that they involve a violation of those laws. They
require a similar assumption to explain them with
the instances of scientific phenomena mentioned
above; and stand therefore (so far) upon the same
footing of credibility.
The above argument assumes (i) that the out-
ward acts accompanying miracles were not their
sole cause; and (ii) that the unknown elements
in their causation were (proximately) Natural
forces. Reasons for these assumptions. Objections
urged against the second :-(a) Natural causes are
insufficient; (b) by this means the distinction
between miracles and non-miracles is destroyed.
The answers to these may be best obtained by
proceeding to—
The second phase of the Deistical objection:--" The
reign of law in Nature includes not only the constitution
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
xi
of phenomena internally, but their determination exter-
nally. Even if miracles violate no law in their immediate
causation, they are such events as law by itself would
never have brought about. In this sense therefore
miracles do violate law."
The fact that Nature alone is inadequate to produce
miracles is freely conceded. (Bearing of this upon
objection of lack of distinction between miracles and
non-miracles). How does this affect their credibility?
Illustration of a locomotive drawing a train,—an
event in Nature, and ruled rigidly by law, yet
which Nature alone would not have brought about.
Precise relations of Natural causes and of mind in
the production of the locomotive-what mind did
not do, and what it did-essential limitations of
mind's action—yet how much mind does. Allow
mind, therefore, and there may well be events in
Nature, such as Nature by itself would never have
produced.
Objections to this argument:-verbal-ma-
terialistic-necessitarian.
The assumption of a (superhuman) directive mind
to account for the occurrence of miracles is not made
merely for the sake of the argument, but is an
essential part of the Scriptural claim. All therefore
turns upon whether the account of the causation of
miracles in Scripture is admitted. How far this
account has been tested so far. (Bearing of the
results upon the alleged insufficiency of Natural
causes). What yet remains to be discussed :—two
fundamental positions, (i) that there is a God,
(ii) that He chose to use His power to work miracles.
The second of these belongs to Chap. iv.; the first
leads us to-
The Atheistic type of objection. Exact form in which
xii
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
this presents itself now-a-days,-not "there is no God."
but "
we do not know that there is, and have no right to
assume one. Nature does not require such an assump-
tion;
but miracles do; therefore miracles and Nature
are inconsistent.”
Insufficiency of this position to prove the incredi-
bility of miracles. Illustration of supposed Roman
encampment. Nothing but the assertion that
Nature is inconsistent with the existence of God
can prove miracles to be really at variance with
Nature.
But the objection, though thus, for its proper end,
invalid, is intrinsically most important; since, if
admitted, it throws the whole burden of proof for
God's existence upon miracles; whereas Scripture
assumes this as granted before miracles are appealed
to at all.
In what sense Natural phenomena may be said
to be sufficiently accounted for by matter force
and law,—only as isolated phenomena, not as a
whole. Viewing Nature as a whole, matter force
and law fail to account (i) for their own existence,
(ii) for their being in action, instead of at rest,
(iii) for their results tending to promote the wel-
fare of man, &c.
(i) There is no Natural creative power discoverable
in Nature; creation, therefore, must have come
from some other quarter. Reasons why this ar-
gument cannot be pressed.
(ii) All material action implies a cause, so that the
mind is not satisfied until some reason for its occur-
rence is found. On this instinctive conviction,
that there must be a cause for every action, all
science depends. Yet all that science can do is to
refer us back to other actions, which, in like man-
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
xiii
ner, require causes to account for them, and which
cannot, therefore, explain the whole series. Laws
do not touch the matter; for these are simply our
expressions of the uniform manner in which
action takes place, not in any sense causes of
action.
With this is associated a physical difficulty-
the degradation of force. Natural phenomena
require not only certain quantities of force, but
that force at certain intensities. In nearly every
phenomenon some part of the force used is lowered
in intensity, so that the total force after the phe-
nomenon is no longer able to accomplish all that it
could before. Hence it follows-(a) that Nature
is not a self-sustaining system which can go on re-
producing itself for ever;-(b) that the tendency
of Nature as a whole is steadily to passivity and
equilibrium ;—(c) that there must have been ori-
ginally in Nature vast stores of force, such as
Nature cannot produce, or there could have been
no such action going on as we now see.
These considerations leave but two alternatives
open-either the initial cause was mental, or
Natural law has not always reigned. The latter
may be rejected as destructive to all science. The
former then alone remains. Further examination
of its necessity. Connexion of this line of
thought with the universal notions of God diffused
throughout all nations. Transition from God as
the Prime-mover to God as the Creator.
(iii) The argument from design too well known to
need more than just mentioning. What, pre-
cisely, it adds to the previous positions,-some
knowledge of God's character.
Result of these three points :-Nature cannot be
xiv
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
accounted for without God; miracles, therefore, have
not to prove His existence. Further, to account for
the course of Nature we need to assume that God
acted in just such a way (as the Prime-mover of
phenomena) as we need to assume He acted if we
would account for miracles. Initial phenomena of
Nature are in their causation indistinguishable from
miracles. Nature and miracles, then, are in the
strictest harmony, both being explicable only on one
assumption, and that one the very same in both
cases.
General summary of this chapter; in itself, and in its
bearing on the one before:-miracles are credible as
'marvels' and as 'mighty works,' if it is credible that God
chose to work them.
CHAPTER IV.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS
pp. 166-227
This title the most prominent in Scripture, because it
implies the ends for which miracles were wrought. This
also the most important view of miracles controver-
sially, since the credibility of miracles being wrought by
God must depend upon the ends to be attained by them.
'Sign' implies a purpose outside the thing itself. This
very necessary to bear in mind, lest the intrinsic value
of miracles should overcloud their higher and more proper
end—their significance. Reasons why their significance
must always be of superior import to all other ends they
served.
What is it that miracles signify ?-Invariably some
truth about God and His relation to man. Hence their
credibility as signs depends on-
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
XV
(i) the credibility of God purposing to make known
such truths.
(ii) the credibility of His using miracles for this end.
The first of these questions is one of great difficulty
from the lack of any sufficient independent knowledge of
God's character and purposes. What course must be
pursued under these circumstances.
Inferences may be drawn (a) from evidence of
design in Nature; (b) from man's moral convictions,
instincts, and longings; (c) from man being able, to
some extent, to discern and know his Maker. None
of these afford sufficient ground for saying that God
would probably vouchsafe a revelation; but they all
combine to show that His doing so would be rather
more credible than not.
The second question admits of an easier answer. All
revelation is in its very essence miraculous; hence, with-
out miracles, no revelation could be given. The credi-
bility of the one involves the credibility of the other.
Objection :-"It is inconsistent with God's cha-
racter, as manifested in Nature, that He should work
miracles, or in any way interfere with the course He
had once foreseeen and planned out as the best."
cur.
Answer :-The fact that infractions of Nature's
uniformity do not occur whenever we think we want
them, only shows that we have no right to expect
them in other cases, not that they can never oc-
Though the undeviating course of Na-
ture strikingly exhibits God's foreknowledge and im-
mutability, it by no means follows that infractions of
that course are therefore inconsistent with those attri-
butes. Such infractions may have been as much fore-
seen and planned as the other events.
Events
belonging to Nature's ordinary course might have
fulfilled all the intrinsic ends of miracles; but they
h
xvi
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
1
could never have had their significance. Scrip-
ture claims for miracles, in many ways, that they
were part of a long foreseen, deliberate plan.
Though miracles may not exhibit some attributes of
God so clearly as Nature does, they exhibit others
more clearly, and especially His condescension to
man's weakness in giving them at all.
This general vindication of miracles' credibility as signs
is not enough. Beside this, the special credibility of
Scripture miracles must be considered.
Miracles of revelation (i. e. 'mental miracles) are
indispensable to revelation; but many of those in
Scripture are not such, or such only in part. Of
these we cannot plead necessity; it must suffice to
show that they were advantageous and congruous.
Physical miracles promoted revelation-(i) as
heralds and credentials of God's messengers; (ii) as
embodiments and illustrations of His message.
Application of these two principles to the solution
of difficulties urged concerning certain Scripture
miracles. Some are said to be trivial-those con-
nected with Elisha, Christ's turning water into wine,
&c. Some are said to be grotesque-Balaam's ass,
Jonah and the fish. Some are said to be vindictive
-Elijah's calling down fire, Christ's cursing the fig-
tree, &c.
General conclusion to be drawn from this
examination. Some minor considerations in favour
of the credibility of miracles as signs.
Is all the ground of sceptical subjection done away ?—–
on the contrary, we have only now arrived at the real rout
of the matter. The argument has shown that the credi-
bility of miracles as 'marvels' and 'mighty works' rests
on their credibility as 'signs', and this on their congruity
to the Scripture scheme of revelation. The credibility of
the latter is the fundamental point still left open to attack.
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
xvii
Why this point is not discussed here:-the
position of the argument now is exactly the converse
of what it was at starting; then miracles were
alleged as difficulties in the way of believing the
religion, now they are shown only to become diffi-
culties when the religion is first disbelieved. All
that was proposed to be done has thus been accom-
plished-miracles are shown not to be difficulties in
the way of faith.
Further results from this:-(i) all attacks on the
Bible and its religion through miracles are nothing
more than reasoning in a circle ;-(ii) the real source
of sceptical feeling about miracles lies in prior doubts
about God's agency and the religion generally.
Objection:—“If the religion must first be admitted
as credible, before miracles can be believed, what use
are they? And is not urging them as evidences of
the religion a case also of reasoning in a circle ?”
Answer:-(i) Miracles are not to be believed because
they are credible, but because they actually occurred.
All that the proof of their credibility does is to clear
the way of objections, so that the proper evidence
may have its due weight. The relation of miracles
to the religion is only a negative criterion of their
truth; the positive criteria are altogether inde-
pendent. Hence there is no reasoning in a circle
here.
(ii) It is not required that the religion be credited,
but only regarded as credible, i. e. such an one as
may possibly be true, and which appropriate evi-
dence may therefore establish. Again, a negative
criterion only. It is the work of miracles to lead
men up from this admission of possible truth, to
actual belief.
Ultimate view of the function of miracles :-as
B
xviii
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENT.
'marvels,' they arouse attention by their extraordinary
character; as 'mighty works' they awaken a presump-
tion of supernatural agency; as 'signs' they point to
God as their author, and His revelation of Himself as
their ends. Who will receive their message ?—those
only who see no fatal objection to the revelation being
true, and who are desirous of the instruction and benefits
it brings. All others will reject them, or remain in-
different.
Indirect way in which miracles may lead those
who discredit the revelation to ultimate faith;
denying miracles as 'signs' they must further cither
deny them to be 'mighty works,' or deny them to
be 'marvels.' The second is the alternative always
taken now-a-days. This brings the sceptic face to
face with the difficulties which attend such a denial
(those, namely, referred to in the Introduction);
which may lead him to give up his own difficulties
as of lesser weight.
Miracles bring the question of belief or disbelief to a
sharp and definite issue, being the focus of all evidence
and of all revelation. Hence called by Moses the 'tempta-
tions' or testings of God. A similar function belongs
to them still.
Objection to this :-"This is not the sort of evi-
dence God ought to have given." Vindication of
its propriety and justice; how small the minimum
of faith is which is required, and each item of it
derivable from evidence common to all men.
Final answer to the question "Can we believe in
miracles ?"
The question "Ought we to believe ?" remains open,
to be settled on other grounds.
INTRODUCTION.
THE religion of the Bible, whether in its earlier
phase of Judaism, or in its later phase of Chris-
tianity, is essentially a religion based on histo-
rical facts. Each step in its progress is not
only inseparably connected with such facts, but
actually consists in them. The call of Abraham,
the Exodus, the conquest of Canaan, the esta-
blishment of the Monarchy, were not mere his-
torical reminiscences of the Jews, as the Norman
Conquest or the Reformation are among our-
selves, but they were the very foundation-stones
of their faith. If it could be shown that the
accounts handed down to us of the Norman
Conquest, or the Reformation, were utterly un-
trustworthy, so much so as to make it a matter
of serious doubt whether any events of the kind
really happened at all,-then we should indeed
}
B 2
4
INTRODUCTION.
have lost the clue by which to account for
much that we are familiar with and enjoy at
the present day; but of practical consequences
arising from such an alteration in our view of
the past, there would be few indeed. Not so,
however, with the Jew and his history. The
Jew believed himself to be one of God's spe-
cially chosen people, to be living under a Di-
vinely-given law, to be dwelling in a Divinely-
appointed land, to be destined to yet greater
glories and privileges under a Divine King, of
David's seed, yet to come. And each one of
these distinctive points of faith rested directly
upon facts in bygone history, and derived from
these their whole validity and strength. If it
could be shown that the histories of Abraham,
Moses, Joshua, and David were untrustworthy,
and the facts hitherto believed concerning them
uncertain or untrue, then the faith of the Jew
was without rational foundation. He must
either give up all that was distinctive in his
religion; or if he retained it, it must be merely
as a pleasant fancy of his own imagination.
Still more so is this the case with Christianity.
The birth of Jesus, His ministry, His death,
His resurrection, His ascension, His gift of the
Spirit, are the very sum and substance of the
Christian religion. Every thing that is distinc-
INTRODUCTION.
5
20
tive in Christianity is embodied in these histo-
rical facts, and stands or falls with them. If
it can be shown that the accounts we have of
these alleged events are legendary or mythical,
and the events themselves consequently doubt-
ful or fictitious, then Christianity as a distinct
religion is destitute of any rational basis. How
completely Christianity is thus bound up in the
history of the Gospels and Acts may be seen
by a glance at the oldest and most wide-spread
of all Christian formularies, the Apostles' Creed.
Strike out from that Creed every clause that
clearly depends for its validity upon the his-
tories of the New Testament, and what is there
left? Nothing but the opening words about
God as Father and Creator, and at most a frag-
ment or two of the closing section, of which all
the distinctive foundation has been swept away
by the omission of the rest. In a word, it
would not be a Christian creed at all, but one of
bare Theism, to call which Christianity is simply
an abuse of terms. Some there are, no doubt,
who talk of such meagre beliefs, combined with
high morality, as the essence of Christianity.
But with what right? Theism and morality,
however essential to Christianity, are common
in greater or less degree to many other sys-
tems also; while all that is distinctive in
6
INTRODUCTION.
Christian Theism and morality comes from the
relation in which these elements stand to the
historical facts of its Founder's life and work.
To call these common elements, then, the
essence of Christianity,-ignoring all that, whe-
ther by ennobling them, or still more by its
own proper significance and worth, distin-
guishes Christianity from other religions,-is
not only to sin against the unanimous witness
of the Christian Church throughout all ages
(which must surely be admitted as decisive),
but is intrinsically unfair.
Taking, then, this as the basis of our posi-
tion, that the religion of the Bible, from first.
to last, is a religion directly resting upon and
bound up in historical facts, so that without a
belief in those facts it is impossible really to
believe in or hold the religion,—the next step
in the argument is clear. The history of the
Bible is essentially a miraculous history. A
belief in miracles is, therefore, inseparable from
either Jewish or Christian faith. This insepara-
bility appears in two ways. First: the miracles
recorded in Scripture are too intimately mixed
up with its history generally to allow of their
being rejected without most seriously damaging
the worth and credibility of the records as
a whole. Second: many of the most funda-
INTRODUCTION.
7
mental facts of Bible faith not only involve,
but are themselves miracles, so that to reject
miracles is to reject the very basis and essence
of Scriptural religion. A few words will suffice
to illustrate and enforce these two positions.
1st. If the miraculous events recorded in the
Pentateuch, say, or the Gospels, are to be re-
garded as untrue, then how did they come to
form part of these narratives? Three supposi-
tions are possible. It may be (i) that they
are legends, the exaggerated and distorted
traditions of bygone events, which acquired a
miraculous colouring by long transmission from
mouth to mouth. Or (ii) they may be myths,
the more or less deliberate inventions of imagi-
native men desirous of clothing their ideas
with the semblance of reality. Or (iii) they
may be the deliberate falsehoods of men in-
tending to deceive. This last alternative is
one seldom taken by the objector to miracles
now-a-days; but the other two, variously com-
bined and modified to suit each particular
critic's taste, are largely prevalent. What,
then, do these involve? The legendary theory
assumes as its very essence that the narrator
is far removed from the events he describes,
and obtains his information through a circuitous
chain of unveracious witnesses, whose amplifi-
8
INTRODUCTION.
A
cations and distortions he has no independent
means of correcting. The testimony of such a
one to any fact so obtained is clearly all but
worthless. A residuum of truth there doubt-
less is in nearly every legend; but how is it to
be discriminated and verified? Nor is the case
better on the mythical theory. For here, not
only must the narrator be distant from the
events described, but he must be one who cares
little or nothing for the real truth in regard to
those events, since he does not hesitate to use
fictions concerning them as vehicles for his
ideas. The truth of the history is in his eyes
a thing of so little practical moment, that he
regards it as of no consequence how he misre-
presents it.
These two elements,-distance in the nar-
rator, accompanied with untrustworthy infor-
mation, which he cannot sift; and a disregard
or even contempt for the actual facts (if known)
as of no practical importance,-constitute, either
separately or together, the essence of every
theory which has been started to account for
the miraculous history of the Bible without
admitting real miracles. Either element is
utterly fatal to veracious history. The retailer
of legends and the creator of myths are each
alike incompatible with the true historian. We
INTRODUCTION.
9
do, indeed, find legends and real history con-
joined in many, especially of the ancient his-
torians. But conjoined in what way? Inva-
riably the legends in the earlier part of the
narrative, where the writer had only meagre
and traditional information to go upon; and
the history in the later part, where the writer
was either contemporary, or had access to
contemporary records; the legendary element
steadily decreasing as the narrative approaches
the writer's own days. If, then, it could be
shown that the miracles of the Bible were found
only in the accounts of early times, and disap-
peared from the story more and more as we
came to contemporary witnesses, there would
be some colour for the opinion that miracles
are the offspring of tradition. But this is not
the case.
In the Old Testament, miracles are
distributed over nearly every part of the his-
tory, and are as plentiful in the days of the
kings, when the most destructive of critics
admit the existence of contemporaneous writers,
as in those of Moses or the judges, and more
plentiful than in the still earlier days of the
patriarchs. In the Gospels there are simply
no miracles recorded as wrought by Christ
during the first thirty years of His life, the
most tempting field by far for legend, and
10
INTRODUCTION.
especially myth, as is strikingly shown in the
later apocryphal gospels; but all are concen-
trated into the three or four years of His public
ministry, when contemporaneous testimony,
adverse as well as favourable, was necessarily
abundant. So once more in the other writings
of the New Testament; while, with the ex-
ception of the great fundamental miracles of
the Incarnation, Resurrection, Ascension, and
Giving of the Spirit, there are exceedingly few
references to the miraculous works of Christ;
there are frequent and pointed references to
miracles connected with the Apostles, or oc◄
curring in the Church in their days; and this
as much in those writings which are admitted
by all to be contemporaneous (as the epistles
of Paul to the Romans, Corinthians, and Gala-
tians, whose genuineness no critic has yet
dared to contravene 2), as in those which ra-
tionalists are accustomed to assign to a later
P
1 In the apocryphal gospels there are over fifty miracles
ascribed to Christ which are not mentioned in the four cano-
nical ones. Of these one only belongs to His public ministry,
and about fifty to His early childhood. In the canonical
Gospels there are none in His childhood, but some thirty or
forty in His public ministry, excluding the numerous general
statements about healing.
2 Rom. xv. 18, 19; 1 Cor. xii. 4-11, 28-30, xv. 8;
2 Cor. xii. 1–5, 12; Gal. i. 11, 12, 15, 16, iii. 5.
INTRODUCTION.
II
period. These facts make the legendary or
mythical origin of the Scripture miracles very
difficult to believe in. To dwell on this is not,
however, our object here. The point insisted
on is (1), that if miracles are to be rejected,
some such hypothesis to account for their ex-
istence in the Scripture records is inevitable;
and (2), that miracles are so distributed
throughout Scripture, that whatever hypo-
thesis is adopted in regard to them must be
extended to the entire history. No historical
book in the New Testament, and but few in
the Old, are without their miracles; nor has
the keenest critical dissection of these books
into fragments-by-divers-authors been able to
discern in them a primitive non-miraculous
story of any extent or importance. The mira-
culous element runs through them all, and is
so inextricably interwoven with the more ordi-
nary events which they narrate, that its rejec-
tion leads inevitably to the rejection of these
also, so far as they depend for their acceptance
upon the testimony of the books. Those events
in Jewish or Christian history which are wit-
nessed to by profane authorities will, of course,
remain in any case, but all else becomes utterly
uncertain, if not positively untrue; a heap of
admitted fable, legend, or imposture, intermixed
12
INTRODUCTION.
with matter most reasonably suspected to be
of the same character; in which whatever grains
of truth there are must be discriminated by
intrinsic probability merely, and the exercise
of critical acumen. That such histories, so
composed, afford no basis whatever for a histo-
rical religion is self-evident. Even if the events
on which the religion is founded are not them-
selves miraculous, yet they stand on no better
or more trustworthy basis than do the miracles
commingled with them, which are hence-
forth to be regarded as legends, myths, or
downright falsehoods; that is, they have no
rational basis whatever.
But, 2nd, the case is, in truth, worse still;
for the fundamental facts both of Judaism and
Christianity are not merely associated with
miracles, but themselves are miracles. That
Abraham left his native country, and sojourned
in Canaan; that after long oppression in Egypt
the Israelites came out under Moses, journeyed
through the wilderness, and conquered their
land; these were facts of no value to the Jews
religiously, except as essentially involving
miracles. It was the fact that Abraham went
out at God's command, received God's pro-
mises, entered into covenant with Him; that
the Exodus was brought about by special
INTRODUCTION.
13
Divine interference, the land obtained by
special Divine assistance;-this it was that
made these facts the corner-stones of Jewish
faith. Each fact was, more or less, a miracle;
and by virtue of its being so, and not otherwise,
was it of worth religiously. So in a still higher
degree is it with Christianity. That in the
days of Tiberius Cæsar a teacher appeared in
Judæa, called Jesus of Nazareth, who went
about preaching to the people, and helping the
sick and suffering so far as His powers allowed,
and who at last was executed as a felon in
Jerusalem;—of what value were such facts as
these, as the foundation of a religion? It was
because this Jesus of Nazareth was not an
ordinary man, but by His miraculous birth
was at once both Son of Man and Son of
God; because He proved Himself by super-
human works to be the promised Messiah;
because He not only died, but rose again the
third day; and having risen was taken up into
glory in heaven, whence He poured out upon
His waiting Church the gift of the Spirit;-it
was because of these miraculous facts concern-
ing Jesus Christ that His name became the
distinguishing mark, His life and person the
one foundation, of the noblest and most in-
3 1 Cor. iii. 9-11; 1 Pet. ii. 4—7.
14
INTRODUCTION.
fluential religion (even its enemies being judges)
that the world has ever seen. Take away mira-
cles from Christianity, and you take away its
very essence; for it is miracles, and nothing
but miracles, which makes Christianity a dis-
tinct and powerful religion. "If Christ be
not risen," wrote Paul to the Corinthians,
"then is our preaching vain, and your faith is
also vain; ye are yet in your sins." And if
this is true with regard to one fundamental
miracle only, how much more when to this we
add all the other miracles besides, and consider
what would be the result if they also were
rejected?
This inseparable connexion of miracles with
the history and faith of the Bible, is one fully
recognized and made use of by its antagonists.
Does a rationalist critic wish to invalidate the
genuineness or authenticity of any book or
narrative of Scripture? It suffices to point
out that it contains some account or mention
of miracles; clearly, then, it cannot be con-
temporary or trustworthy, for miracles cannot,
under any circumstances, be believed to have
occurred. Is it desired to attack the strong-
holds of Christian dogma? It is enough to
remark that they involve miracles; and mira-
cles are incredible; plainly, then, the dogmas
INTRODUCTION.
15
fremsend
must be rejected by all rational men.
This is,
in brief, the main gist of the sceptical objec-
tions against both Book and Faith. Whatever
other arguments there are, are mostly subor-
dinate and auxiliary, and unable in themselves
to bear the weight of the conclusions sought
to be established. And this main line of
sceptical argument is, we have seen, just and
logical. The rejection of miracles as intrinsi-
cally incredible does involve all that the ex-
tremest opponents of the Bible allege. The
entire authority of the Book, its history and its
faith, rests upon and is bound up with the
occurrence of miracles. Reject these, and the
whole superstructure falls to the ground.
This, then, is the issue depending on the
question, "Can we believe in Miracles?" It
is no mere question of accepting or rejecting
certain stories of bygone days of no practical
moment to ourselves; it is no question even
of a particular part of Bible religion, or of a
particular branch of its evidences; but it is
a question vital to the very existence of the
religion. And this being so, the believer
clearly has a right to demand that the disproof
of miracles which objectors bring forward
should be cogent, unanswerable and complete.
But further, that history, and that faith, which
16
INTRODUCTION.
must be surrendered if miracles be disproved,
are very far from resting upon miracles only for
their proof. There is abundant evidence for the
veracity and authenticity of the sacred books,
arising from other and most varied sources, and
steadily increasing in strength and consistency
as the means of testing their accuracy is ex-
tended, now in one direction and now in
another. It matters not whether it be the
discovery of ancient historical monuments in
Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, &c., or whether it be
the more minute and critical investigation of
such monuments and records as have been
long known; whether it be the exploration of
countries which the Bible speaks of, a better
acquaintance with their Natural history, or en-
larged information regarding the manners and
customs of their inhabitants past and present;
in every case the result is the same,—extension
of the power to test the accuracy of Scripture
issues in an extension of its evidences. Diffi-
culties disappear, or are not unfrequently re-
solved into powerful proofs of authenticity.
Daniel's alleged blunder about Belshazzar, and
Luke's about Cyrenius' first taxing, turn out
when we really know the facts of the case to
be no blunders at all, but simply evidences that
Daniel and Luke were much better acquainted
INTRODUCTION.
17
with the history of the times they wrote of than
those profane authorities with whom they had
been disparagingly compared. Different parts
of this confirmatory evidence of course affect
different portions of the Biblical history.
Acquaintance with the minute geography,
natural history, &c., of Palestine, for instance,
is of little or no worth as a sign of veracity in
Old Testament books, because whenever these
may have been written their writers would
equally be familiar with such things, being
natives of the country. In the New Testament,
on the contrary, such acquaintance is worth a
good deal, since only in the earliest ages of the
Church's history was it at all probable that the
writers of her historical books would be men
thus familiar with Palestine. Minute acquain-
tance with the country in this case affords a
strong presumption in favour of early date.
On the other hand, precise accuracy in his-
torical matters is of more importance as
evidence in the earlier writings than in the
later, because in these latter there were greater
facilities for a distant author obtaining correct
information than in the former. And so with
other cases.
But external evidence of this kind is very
far from being all the proof for the Bibles'
с
18
INTRODUCTION.
authenticity. There is, besides, the internal
evidence afforded by literary criticism, unde-
signed coincidences, and the nature of the sub-
ject-matter generally. Some of these lines of
argument, and especially literary criticism, and
that comparison of one part of Scripture with
another which discloses undesigned coinci-
dences, have been, no doubt, largely used by
the opponents of Scripture as weapons of
attack. But whatever success such may have
had for a time has depended mainly upon the
effective support afforded them by the denial
of miracles. With the position laid down as a
foundation, that a narrative must be either
legendary or mythical in some of its main
features, every literary characteristic assumes
a new appearance, being viewed through a dis-
torting medium, and with an inexorable bias
in favour of one kind of inferences only. It is
easy, too, on such a theory to represent accounts
as diverse traditions of the same event, involving
contradictions, which in reality refer to wholly
different events; and so to multiply discrep-
ances, which are afterwards alleged as proofs of
late date and unauthentic narration. Wherever
hostile critics have tried to assail Scripture
by these paths without denying miracles, they
have failed most completely; the utter assump-
INTRODUCTION.
19
tion of their dogmatic criteria of dates and
accuracy being in itself a sufficient refutation
of their arguments. On the other hand,
wherever the methods of internal evidence
have been fully carried out by able and unpre-
iudiced critics, the result has invariably been
the elucidation of a most valuable mass of cor-
roborative proof. And here again the tendency
of further research is to increase the amount
and worth of the evidence thus obtainable.
Further still, there is the evidence, which
comes directly home to the religion of the Bible,
and does not merely touch the authenticity and
genuineness of its several books. There is the
long chain of prophecy, linking on the succes-
sive stages of the religion to one another, and
binding all indissolubly to the person and work
of Christ. There is the scarcely less wonder-
ful history of the growth and triumph of the
Christian Church in the face of the mightiest
and most varied opposition. There is the pro-
found theology, gradually developing from
epoch to epoch, yet harmonious and consistent
throughout. There is the sublime and un-
equalled picture of the character of Jesus, ac-
knowledged even by unbelievers to be unrivalled
as a portrait of the ideal perfect man. There
is the influential power of the religion on the
C 2
20
INTRODUCTION.
personal life and nature of its recipients, both
past and present. All these are facts which
must be accounted for. The Bible accounts
for them simply and easily by the one principle
of miracle. Supernatural forces, superhuman
agencies have been at work in this religion
from the beginning until now, and therefore
facts are as they are. The explanation is
admittedly sufficient. But the denier of mira-
cle has no such single and natural explanation
at hand. Now he resorts to one principle, now
to another, now to several working together;
but in vain, the facts are too high, too unhuman,
for any selection or combination of common
principles possibly to account for them. Till
at last, despairing of any other escape from the
difficulty, the sceptic resorts once more to his
old plea―at all events, by denying the Bible
explanation of these facts you keep clear of
miracles, and these involve even greater diffi-
culties than those thus incurred.
Whether this be so, or not, is beside our
present purpose to inquire. It would indeed
be premature to do so before the question of
the difficulties of miracles had been fully dis-
cussed. But the point to be observed is, that
the existence of these different branches of
evidence occasions an important set of difficul-
INTRODUCTION.
21
ties on the other side also. Assuming for a
moment that the difficulties in the way of a
belief in miracles are as great as many allege,
yet if they do not amount to miracles being
impossible, it by no means follows that we must
therefore reject them. It would be necessary
to weigh against the difficulties of miracles, the
accumulated difficulties that beset their re-
jection; those namely, which are involved in
regarding nearly the entire Bible as unhis-
torical, and the whole of its religion as false.
And only if the former difficulties were found
to be greater and more weighty than the latter,
would the rejection of miracles be a legitimate
logical conclusion. Should the preponderance
of difficulty appear to be the other way, then
however hard it might be to believe in miracles,
we should be constrained to do so, because to
disbelieve them would involve a harder alter-
native yet.
It is scarcely possible to lay too much stress
upon this fact of there being difficulties on both
sides. We are told that the progress of in-
telligence, and especially of science, renders a
faith in miracles more and more difficult as
time advances. Possibly so. It is, however,
at least equally certain that this same progress,
in other directions, by multiplying evidences of
22
INTRODUCTION.
the veracity of Scripture, is as steadily in-
creasing the difficulties of rejecting them. We
are told, by another class of objectors, that
although those living near the time might
believe in miracles, on account of the strength
of the personal testimony in their favour, yet
that time and distance have so weakened the
force of this evidence that to us they cannot
but appear dubious. Let it be so. This same
time has, however, also developed a new kind
of evidence—the witness of history, the tes-
timony of the results of miracles, in the growth
and triumphs of the Christian Church. Granted,
then, that we have less evidence for the fact of
miracles having happened than had the believers
of the first century, we have much more
evidence for the effects that sprang from them,
and the effects imply the cause. So, once more,
with the theories to which sceptics are obliged
to have recourse in order to account for the
existence of miraculous stories in the Bible.
The casier the hypothesis is made for the
purpose in view, the harder it is to reconcile it
with the stubborn facts on the other side. In
explaining, for instance, the origin of the four
Gospels, so full of miracles from beginning to
end, the rationalist is obliged to assume (1)
that they were not written by those whose
INTRODUCTION.
23
#
names they bear, but by other unknown
authors; (2) that these authors were not con-
temporaries, but men who obtained their in-
formation through a circuitous course; and,
(3) that during this transmission the original
facts (whatever they were) were exaggerated,
distorted, idealized, or otherwise changed and
added to, according to the particular type of
legendary or mythical theory adopted. The
farther removed the assumed writers were from
the events described, the longer the chain of
tradition through which their information came,
the easier it is to account for the growth of
legend or myth. But each of these assump-
tions is fraught with difficulties which also
increase in weight precisely as this interval
between the events and their narration is
extended. The greater the interval, the harder
it is to understand how such forgeries and
fables could have been successfully imposed
upon the ever-extending Church, so as to obtain
that wide-spread and universal reception which
no one can deny that the Gospels had long
before the close of the 2nd century; the harder
it is to account for the innumerable marks of
genuineness and authenticity which charac-
terize them, and which are still further en-
hanced by their many links of mutual relation-
July
24
INTRODUCTION.
ship in the midst of the most unmistakable
signs of independence; the harder it is to
assign any adequate cause for that earliest part.
of the Church's history, which according to
these theories preceded the belief in Christian'
miracles, or while that belief was being de-
veloped from the meagre substratum of fact
which rationalism regards as underlying the
Gospel narrative; precisely the part of Church
history which it is hardest to explain on purely
naturalistic principles. Thus, whichever way
we turn, the importance of remembering that
there are two sides to this question of difficul-
ties, which must be considered and weighed
one against the other before any decision can
be arrived at, is very apparent.
It might seem from this, that the discussion
of the question, "Can we believe in Miracles ?"
would involve an examination of the whole
range of Bible evidences. But this is not the
case. Our question is not "must we believe,"
but "
can we believe?" In other words, it is
only the difficulties on one side that are about
to be discussed. For which very reason it
seemed to be of especial importance that the
existence and importance of the difficulties on
the other side should be clearly set forth before
commencing the investigation; since other-
INTRODUCTION.
25
wise it might be thought that on the answer to
this question depended the whole claim of
Christianity to our belief, and so a false
colouring be given to our inquiry. If, indeed,
there should appear to be reason to answer the
question in the negative; if it should be proved
that miracles are impossible, and therefore that
we cannot under any circumstances believe in
them, then truly the whole claim of Christianity
would be thereby set aside. But no other
answer save this would settle the matter. If
it should appear that miracles are just credible,
under certain very peculiar circumstances; or
if it should appear that they are something
more than credible, perhaps probable, in certain
cases; the claim of Christianity could in neither
instance be decided by the answer to this ques-
tion alone. We should still need to ascertain
(1) whether these circumstances were in fact
present; and (2) what other evidence there is
for or against that religion; before we could
decide whether it ought to be accepted or not.
The present inquiry, then, is strictly pre-
liminary. It proposes simply to ascertain what
value there is in the current objections to
miracles, and what position miracles conse-
quently occupy in regard to the claims of the
Bible generally. Are they obstacles to faith
26
INTRODUCTION.
as commonly alleged, or are they not? And
if obstacles, then of what kind; insuperable, or
partial; destructive of all other evidence, or
capable of being overcome by stronger evidence
on the other side? This, and nothing more, is
the question here proposed to be discussed.
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
27
•
CHAPTER I.
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
Ir is not proposed to discuss miracles in
general or in the abstract, but exclusively
Scripture miracles. And this for two reasons:
1st. In regard to these only is there any issue
of sufficient practical and universal importance
to make it worth while to investigate minutely
their credibility. If there were no miracles in
the Bible the question
66 can we believe in
them?" would be one merely of curious
philosophic or archæological research, not, as it
is, one of general and profound interest. 2nd. By
thus defining the range of the discussion it
gains very much in clearness and reality. We
are not concerned with scientific abstractions, or
unknown and perhaps supposititious cases, but
with things exceedingly familiar to us from
childhood; by our acquaintance with which we
can at any point of the discussion pass easily
to concrete examples and illustrations, and
thus both test and realize the value of any
28
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
argument, objection, or explanation that may
come before us.
And because we have thus to do only with
Scripture miracles, it is manifestly but fair
that we take our definition of miracles also from
Scripture, instead of from any opinion or fancy
of our own. The object of the discussion is
to test the truth of the statements which the
Bible makes in regard to miracles.
Let us,
then, first of all ascertain what the Bible does
state, what it calls a miracle, and wherein it
teaches that the worth and importance of a
miracle consists.
There are three terms used consistently
throughout Scripture to denote miracles; terms
not synonymous but complementary, each one
regarding miracles from a different stand-point,
and with regard to a different element in their
constitution, so that the full idea of a miracle
is only obtained by combining the three terms
together. These three terms are "marvel"
(JEID, NE, Tépas) "mighty work" (dúvaµıs¹),
and "sign," (ix, onμeîov).²
:
2
1 This idea is expressed in Hebrew by the periphrases
mighty hand," "outstretched arm," or some expression of
that kind.
2 In the Old Testament there is also a fourth term, пpp,
"temptation," the force of which as applied to miracles will
come under notice at the close of Chap. IV.
WHAT ARE MIRACLES ?
29
By❝marvel" miracles are described as un-
usual, extraordinary, wonderful occurrences;
the outward aspect which they would present to
the observer even at a cursory glance; in which
marvellous character, accordingly, lay their
power to attract attention and arouse inquiry.
By "mighty work," on the other hand,
miracles are described in their inner aspect,
with respect to the agency by which they are
brought about. The extraordinary occurrences
are asserted to have a special cause, which cause
is characteristically "power;" that is, in Bibli-
cal language, Divine action.
By "sign," lastly, miracles are described with
regard to their purpose; the end in view, for the
sake of which they are wrought; which end is
something beyond and higher than themselves;
that is, something moral.
: In a word, "marvel" denotes a miracle
viewed as a phenomenon in human experience;
"mighty work" as an effect of special Divine
action; "sign" as an instrument for the attain-
ment of moral ends.
It is of the utmost importance for the just
consideration and fair discussion of this question
of miracles that these three aspects under which
they may be viewed,—these three elements of
their constitution,-should not be dissevered.
30
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
.
The instant we leave one or other out of
account, and regard miracles exclusively from
this narrowed stand-point, we are no longer
discussing Scripture miracles at all, but muti-
lated fragments of these, such as the Bible
does not ask us to believe in. When, for exam-
ple, an objector chooses to speak of miracles
merely as "marvels," that is, as external
phenomena, tacitly ignoring the agency by
which the Bible represents them as having
been wrought, and the ends which they were
designed to accomplish; and when, thus re-
garding them, he urges their extreme impro-
bability, and appeals to our common sense
whether if we heard of such things happening
now-a-days we should not unhesitatingly dis-
believe them, even if supported by strong
testimony; we may safely, if we please, admit
the force of his reasoning, without in the
slightest degree invalidating our faith in mira-
cles. For, we might retort, the Bible does
not ask us to believe in mere marvels, but in
marvels wrought by an adequate cause and for
a sufficient end, and it is these added elements
that make the marvels credible. Add these to
the supposed case happening now-a-days, and
we shall be as ready to believe it as we were
before to disbelieve it. So, again, with those
*
WHAT ARE MIRACLES ?
31
objectors who concentrate their attention upon
the second term in the Scriptural definition,
and regard miracles merely as "mighty works,"
ignoring the element of "sign." These often
argue that the uniformity of Nature excludes
the very possibility of a miracle, for even
granting that God is able (i.e. has the power
if He so willed) to bring about such occur-
rences, yet He certainly would not, for He is
unchangeable and consistent, and the uni-
formity of Nature exactly represents this charac-
teristic of His being; any deviation from which
uniformity would imply, therefore, a deviation
from His own nature, which is impossible.
Suppose it is so, the believer in miracles might
reply; still you have left out of account the
fact that miracles are "signs" also, that they
belong to the moral order of the universe as
well as to the physical, and that it is in their
relation to this moral order (higher by far than
the physical) that the reason and purpose of
their occurrence lies; with which moral order
it is, therefore, that they must be compared, if
we would rightly judge of their consistency
with God's character.
<
The objections and replies here sketched out
will come under consideration in detail farther
on, when also the intrinsic validity of the
32
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
sceptical arguments, as well as their relevancy
to the end proposed to be attained by them,
will be discussed. They are alluded to here.
merely as illustrations of the importance of
adhering firmly to the full Scriptural definition
of miracles, instead of accepting as sufficient
the one-sided notions commonly put forth and
argued on by objectors. It is enough, we have
seen, merely to supply the missing element in
such partial statements, and some of the most
formidable objections sink at once, without
further trouble, into nothingness. They may
be valid objections to the belief in things more
or less resembling, in one or other aspect, the
miracles of the Bible; but inasmuch as these
latter claim to be more than the objections
take account of, they are of no validity against
these, since the addition of the lacking points
shows the objections to be, in regard to these,
altogether irrelevant.
When, therefore, we consider (as we are about
to do) the various objections which have been
raised against miracles, under these three heads
of "marvels," "mighty works," and "signs,"
it is clear that no objection under one only can
be admitted as final until its relation to the
other two has been carefully weighed; except,
indeed, it be of such a character as to prove
WHAT ARE MIRACLES ?
33
miracles to be impossible. If it can be shown
that "marvels," such as Scripture tells of, are
phenomena altogether incredible under any
circumstances; or if it can be shown that
"mighty works," such as it relates, are effects
which simply cannot in any case have been
produced; then, indeed, it avails nothing to
proceed to the further head of "signs." But
if the objection falls ever so little short of this,
—if it establishes ever so high improbability
merely, then it is quite possible that the
transition to the following heads may remove
this improbability altogether, or even turn the
balance the other way. Take a case from
non-miraculous history by way of illustration.
Suppose any one to hear for the first time
of the opening of the tunnel under Mont
Cenis, and to hear of it only as a phenomenon,
the agency and purpose of its construction
being left out of account,-what would he say
to it? That a hollow cavity of small but uni-
form dimensions, and over seven miles in length,
should have been formed at the base of a lofty
range of mountains, proceeding in a straight
line right through it from side to side,-this
surely is most improbable. And if, further, he
should be informed that the cavity began to be
formed at both ends at once; that there had
D
i
34
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
J
been, in fact, two of these cavities, quite inde-
pendent of each other, starting from opposite
sides, which at the end of fifteen years of
growth had exactly met, and opened into one
another in the middle; he would instantly
pronounce the whole story a hoax. The hol-
lowing of narrow cavities in mountains is cer-
tainly a well-known Natural phenomenon ; but
such a cavity as this is so utterly antagonistic
to all that is known of Nature, that one really
cannot believe in it. But now let our supposed
sceptic have his attention turned to the new
point of agency. This cavity through the Alps
is something more than a Natural phenomenon,
it is the work of man. Now how stands the
case? All the difficulties hitherto perceived
are at an end. The work is an arduous one
truly, yet one well within the powers of the
agent. But new difficulties speedily arise ;-
why should men have taken the trouble to
excavate this subterranean passage? It must
have cost an enormous sum of money, immense
labour, great skill; and that not of one man
merely, but of many combined together, of two
nations even. From what observation teaches
us about human nature, it is certain that men
will not thus combine and labour except
for ends very dear or profitable to them-
ܝ
WHAT ARE MIRACLES ?
35
selves. Agriculture, manufacture, commerce
—these are the occupations which men exert
themselves in, and spend their money and skill
upon, not boring holes through mountains.
It is inconsistent with human nature to suppose
such a thing to have been done; and therefore,
possible as it is (with the agency alleged) for a
work like this to have been accomplished, it
must notwithstanding be pronounced incredible,
since we cannot believe the agent to have ever
occupied himself in any thing of the kind. The
improbability in this case is, perhaps, some-
what less than in the former one, when the
tunnel was regarded merely as a phenomenon;
still it is very considerable, and quite suffi-
cient to render any but the most direct
and trustworthy evidence extremely doubt-
ful. But now, lastly, if the sceptic be still
further informed as to the object for which this
passage was cut,—that it is a railway-tunnel
and if the necessity and the advantages of such
a tunnel just in this place be fully pointed out,
!
so that he regards its opening no longer merely
in itself, or even as a work of man, but in all
its circumstances and relations, as a work de-
signed and exactly adapted to accomplish a
particular end, which end is one quite con-
sistent with what he knows the agent would be
-
D 2
36
WHAT ARE 1RACLES ?
likely to seek after and work for ;-how stands
the case then? Now all difficulties of credence
are gone. It is no harder to believe that there
is such a tunnel opened under Mont Cenis, than
it is to believe the ordinary events of every-day
life. Just such a series of successive steps
must we pass through in dealing with miracles.
We cannot rest with regarding them merely
as phenomena, nor even as effects of Divine
action; they must be viewed also in relation to
the ends said to be designed and accomplished
through their instrumentality, before any valid
answer can be given to the inquiry, "Can we
believe in them?" There may, as in the illus-
tration just discussed, be great and well-nigh
insuperable difficulties in the way of belief at
each of the preliminary stages, and yet when
the matter is viewed as a whole they may turn
out to be really more probable than not.
One thing only now remains to be done before
proceeding to the details of our inquiry; and
that is to show that the three terms "marvel,"
"mighty work," and "sign," do in Scripture
represent different aspects or elements of a
miracle, as is asserted, and not different kinds
or orders of miracles. In the first place it is
to be noted that never in the New Testament,
and but very rarely in the Old, do we meet with
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
37
"marvel" alone, as the designation of a miracle.
It is always associated with one of the others,
most commonly with "sign." Thus in Exod.
vii. 3, Deut. vi. 22, xxix. 3, Psalm lxxviii. 43,
cv. 27, the miracles of the Exodus are described
as "signs" and "marvels," the two terms being
in the last two passages disposed as equivalents
in the parallel members of the Hebrew verse,
and clearly, therefore, relate to the same events.
But, further, these same miracles are in Exod.
x. 1, 2, Josh. xxiv. 17, called "signs" only,
and in Psalm lxxviii. 11, 12, "marvels " only;
an additional proof of the common reference of
the two terms. "Signs" and "mighty works"
(or rather one of the Hebrew equivalents to
this latter term) are coupled together in
Deut. xi. 2, 3; while all three terms are found,
still in allusion to these same miracles, in
Deut. iv. 34, vii. 19, xxvi. 8. These instances
from the accounts of the Exodus sufficiently
illustrate the identity of reference of the terms
in the usage of the Old Testament. Passing
now to the New, it is to be observed that the
only term ever used for an individual miracle
is "sign" (John ii. 11, iv. 54, Acts iv. 16). Of
general terms denoting the whole series of
Gospel miracles, we find in the first three
Evangelists habitually "mighty works" (Matt.
38
WHAT ARE MIRACLES ?
1
<<
(C
xi. 21, 23, xiii. 58, xiv. 2, Mark vi. 5, 14,
ix. 39, Luke x. 13); in the fourth as habitually
signs" (John ii. 23, iii. 2, vi. 2, 26, ix. 16,
x. 41; xi. 47, xii. 37), or in one instance" signs
and marvels" (John iv. 48); which, as there is
no difference in the kind of miracles the several
Evangelists record, may be taken as a conclu-
sive proof of the identity of "signs" with
mighty works." In Acts ii. 22, the miracles
of Christ are denoted by all three terms taken
together. So, again, with the miracles of the
Apostolic Church. In Acts xix. 11, 1 Cor. xii.
10, 28, Gal. iii. 5, they are called "mighty
works;" in Mark xvi. 17, 20, Acts viii. 6,
“signs;" in Acts viii. 13, "signs and mighty
works;" in Acts ii. 43, v. 12, vi. 8, xiv. 3, xv. 12,
Rom. xv. 19, "signs and marvels;" while in
2 Cor. xii. 12, Heb. ii. 4, again all three
terms are used. Nothing can be clearer than
that all this diversity arises simply from the
different aspects under which the same events
might be viewed, or in some cases perhaps
merely from the natural interchange of words
every where recognized as equivalent. Of any
distinction in reference, so that one term would
denote one set of events, and another term a
different set, there is not the slightest trace.
We adhere, then, to the definition set forth
WHAT ARE MIRACLES?
39
1
at starting, that a miracle is a marvellous
phenomenon, brought about by special Divine
agency, for the attainment of moral ends,
which three aspects or elements are denoted by
the three Scripture terms, "marvel,” “mighty
work," and "sign;" and all of which aspects
and elements of miracles must be borne in
mind and fully considered before the question
of their credibility can be finally decided on.
40
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
CHAPTER II.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
{
THE marvellous character of miracles depends
upon their being phenomena of an unusual and
extraordinary kind, different from and con-
trary to what experience would have led one
to expect. The question now before us is,
How far, and in what way, this character of
miracles affects their credibility?
Is there any law of the human mind which
forbids belief in the marvellous? Must every
fact worthy of credence be one in accordance
with, or at all events not in discordance with
past experience? Would it be a sound canon,
either of practical or scientific faith, to say that
nothing should be believed which was incon-
sistent with what we already knew, either
directly from personal observation, or indi-
rectly from the observations of others with
which we were acquainted? This is the issue
upon which the answer to our question about
the credibility of miracles as "marvels" depends.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
41
There is no doubt whatever that miracles are
phenomena contrary to experience. It is part
of their essence that they are so. For not only
is this implied in the term "marvel," but
Scripture over and over again explicitly asserts
for its miracles that they differed from all pre-
viously known phenomena, and claims regard
for them on this very account.
"Such as
neither thy fathers nor thy fathers' fathers
have known,”—this is the description given
by Moses of the miracles attending the Exodus.
(Exod. ix. 18, 24, x. 6, 14, xi. 6; Deut. iv. 32,
34, viii. 3.) "Works that none other man did,”
-this is Christ's description of His own mira-
cles (John xv. 24). When, therefore, the
opponents of miracles make it a reason for
rejecting them, that miracles are contrary to
experience, they are merely repeating what
Scripture has already said concerning them.
How then can this be a valid reason for their
rejection? It can be so only if it be laid down
as a general principle, that nothing which is
contrary to a man's prior experience ought to
be believed by him. Then, of course, it logi-
cally follows that miracles, being avowedly
contrary to experience, are incredible. But
nothing short of such a general principle is
sufficient to establish this conclusion.
ļ
42
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
?
Under "man's prior experience” we include,
it will be observed, his acquaintance with the
experience of others (so far as he has reason to
think this worthy of credit), as well as his own
personal observation. The principle to be
tested cannot be said, therefore, to be unfairly
limited or narrowed, since we include under
"experience," all that any man can possibly
have at his disposal, wherewith to judge the
credibility of any new phenomena which demand
his belief.
It might seem enough to settle this question
to point to the fact that, in all ages and through-
out all countries, men have been found ready to
believe in miracles, though fully admitting them
to be phenomena contrary to experience. It
might even be asserted with great probability,
that those who have thus believed, or at all
events professed to believe, in miracles, have
formed an absolute majority of the human race.
While no one could deny that among these
believers there were at least as many names
of the greatest eminence in every department
of human excellence,-art, literature, states-
manship, philosophy, science, -as could possi-
bly be mentioned on the other side. How,
we might ask, could this have been so, if there
were a law of the human mind inexorably for-
-
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
43
bidding belief in any thing contrary to ex-
perience? Such an argument, however, valid
as it is, might seem too much like endeavouring
to swamp objections by an appeal to authority;
which is very far from our purpose. It has,
moreover, the disadvantage of meeting an
objection which regards miracles under one
aspect only, by an answer which has to do
with them as a whole. We waive it, there-
fore, and proceed to examine the principle at
issue in an entirely different manner.
Whence comes this experience which is to
be the standard of our faith? It is not the
creation of an instant, but the slowly developed
product of the whole life. Nor is this develop-
ment the mere unfolding of knowledge from
within, potentially present all along. So far
as the knowledge of phenomena is concerned,
all are agreed that this comes to us from with-
out, by observation, and cannot proceed from
within. The very term "experience," indeed,
has come to mean in technical metaphysical
language, that knowledge of phenomena which
we obtain by observation. Experience, then,
is a thing constantly being added to, for it is
by additions that it grows. And each increase
of experience is plainly the addition of some
new item of knowledge different from that
44
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
which was known before; for if it be not dif-
ferent, then there is no real increase of ex-
perience. Repetition of the same observation
can only strengthen and confirm our knowledge
of that particular phenomenon, not increase our
knowledge of phenomena generally. Expe-
rience thus depends for its very existence upon
the observation of phenomena different from
any previously observed, and upon the cre-
dence which the mind gives to these. If, then,
it were laid down as a principle that no pheno-
menon ought to be believed in, which differed
from those we had already experience of, the
result would be the annihilation of the very
standard appealed to. We should have no
experience left wherewith to try the new fact.
Such a conclusion is too manifestly absurd and
self-contradictory to be admitted by any one for
an instant. We may, therefore, regard it as
conceded, that the mere difference of a pheno-
menon from those known to prior experience is
no ground whatever for rejecting it as incre-
dible.
Nor is the case altered whatever be the
amount of experience from which the new
phenomenon diverges; or whatever be the
amount of its divergence, and consequent
strangeness. Many of the discoveries of science
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
45
are phenomena which it may be safely affirmed
had never up to the time of their discovery
been observed or known by a single human
being. The experience from which they dif
fered was a strictly universal one. Yet would
any one venture to urge this absolute novelty
and uniqueness of the phenomenon as a reason
why it should not be believed? A rule of this
kind would plainly be fatal to the whole of
science. Not even, then, universal experience
ignorant of a phenomenon, is to be admitted
as a valid ground for discrediting a single
experience in its favour. Nor can the amount
of the divergence do this. A large number of
the experiences of every one are, when they
first come, as utterly different from any thing
before known, as any miracle; and are the
natural occasion of a corresponding wonder-
ment. The experiences of children present
abundant examples of these absolutely strange
and astonishing phenomena; while in later
life nearly every explorer and investigator,
whether of countries or of science, meets with
such more or less frequently in his researches.
Whoever, in fact, enters any field of knowledge
previously (by him) untrod, will, almost as a
matter of course, came across phenomena so
entirely different from any thing he has known
46
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
1
before, that the thought, how curious! how
strange! how surprising! how wonderful! will
be often in his mind, if not upon his lips. But
what then? Should he on account of this
strangeness, this divergence of his present
experience from his previous ones, reject the
new phenomenon as incredible? Or should
those who by indirect means share his expe-
rience reject it, because they have never seen
or heard of such things before? Again, it is
clear that upon such a principle there would be
an end to all discovery, all progress and diffu-
sion of knowledge whatever. The observer
of a very strange or very new phenomenon
ought, indeed, naturally to be more careful in
verifying the reality of the phenomenon, than
if it were one long and well known. The in-
direct sharers in his experience would be only
right in requiring somewhat stronger evidence
of his probity and ability, to protect them-
selves from the risk of imposture or mistake.
But to refuse credence on the mere ground of
the phenomenon being so very different from
any thing hitherto known, would be simply
absurd. The concession of this point also may
be safely assumed.
-
One case only remains to be discussed, which
however contains the kernel of the whole
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
47
matter. Miracles, it is contended, and with
justice, are not phenomena merely different
from experience, but contrary to it; and hence
their incredibility.
-
The first thing to determine, then, is what
precisely we mean by "contrary to experience."
It clearly cannot mean that we have experience
of each particular phenomenon asserted to be
miraculous, which experience entitles us to
pronounce it not miraculous. No one, for ex-
ample, asserts that we have direct evidence in
regard to each individual miracle recorded in
the Book of Exodus, which warrants us in
affirming that the events there described as
strange and marvellous were not strange and
marvellous, but only ordinary. No witness is
alleged who saw the so-called miracles of Christ,
and testifies of them that they were not the
marvels which the New Testament describes
them to have been, but only common-place
events. The most that has ever been done in
this direction is to bring forward certain writers
who speak of the times, or more rarely the
persons, in question, and who omit all mention
of the miracles. But this is not contrary
experience, but only absence of evidence,-an
element in the question of a wholly different
character, whose discussion here would be
48 MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
altogether out of place. It is to be observed,
further, that even if there were such contra-
dictory experience (for this, if existent, would
be its proper title), it would not effect the
purpose in view. For particular experience
against individual miracles could manifestly
affect those only which it immediately con-
cerned, and would leave the credibility of other
miracles, and of miracles in general, quite un-
touched. Moreover, there would not be in
this case a universal experience against miracles,
as is alleged to be the case in the argument
under consideration; but only the particular
experience of these individual adverse witnesses,
whose testimony would have to be balanced
against the equally particular testimony of the
witnesses on the other side. Since then the
argument against miracles, as being contrary
to experience, is brought forward as one con-
clusive against all miracles indifferently, and
as claiming on its behalf the universal experi-
ence of mankind; it is plain that, on its own
showing, it cannot be this sort of contrariety
which it has in view, but some other; for this
sort fails completely to answer to the character-
istics claimed for it. Experience contrary to
miracles does not mean, then, experience in
regard to the particular events alleged to be
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
49
miraculous, but experience in regard to some
other events.
But how, it must be asked, can such ex-
perience about other things, other phenomena,
be properly denoted "contrary experience?"
It is so called because it is experience which
causes the miracle to appear less probable than
its contrary. For example, it is related in
Scripture that on more than one occasion the
water of the river Jordan was stayed in part of
its course, so that a dry passage was made
right across its bed. Now rivers are things
with which mankind have had much to do, and
of which they have hence much experience.
And this experience, so far as we know it, all
goes in favour of rivers flowing steadily on,
and not (with the exception of the cases
mentioned in Scripture) in favour of their at
times standing still and leaving a dry passage
across. Judged, therefore, by the probabilities
of experience, the contrary of the Scripture
event is more likely to have occurred than the
event itself. Or, again, the Bible narrates
several instances of blind men having their
sight restored by a mere touch, accompanied
sometimes by anointing with clay, or washing.
But blindness is a thing of which, again, man-
kind has had large experience; and this ex-
E
50
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
-
perience, so far as we know it, all goes (saving
these Biblical exceptions) against blindness
being thus removed. Judged, therefore, by
experience the alleged miracles are decidedly
less probable than their contraries. This, pre-
cisely, is what is meant by "contrary experi-
ence." It is experience in regard to similar
phenomena to that under dispute; and ex-
perience of such a kind as to render the occur-
rence of that phenomenon less probable than
the occurrence of its contrary. That miracles
are in this sense "contrary to experience,"
and are, therefore, as phenomena, decidedly
improbable, is, we have seen, part of the claim
of Scripture on their behalf. The point to be
discussed here is, what measure and kind of
improbability it is which this contrariety to
experience brings with it. Above all, is it
such as to make a phenomenon thus contrary
incredible?
To settle this question we must inquire, as
before, how the rule of rejecting all such
phenomena would hold in other cases; in cases,
that is, in which a phenomenon is contrary to
prior experience, yet without involving any
thing miraculous. We commence with some
illustrations in respect to phenomena of
Nature.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
51
It is quite possible that there may be
persons now living on the earth who have
never seen or heard of an eclipse. Let
such, then, hear for the first time of the
occurrence of one. They are told that certain
persons, it may be in a far-off country, have
seen the moon, when shining at its full,
gradually become obscured in the clearest sky,
without cloud or other apparent cause; that
they have seen it reduced from a full round orb
to the thinnest crescent, and then this at last
disappear too, leaving nothing where the moon
had been, but a circle of dull murky red; that
they have seen the crescent reappear and grow
before their eyes till it returned once more to
the full bright moon again; and all this in the
space of a few hours, on a single night. Or,
again, they are told that at midday in the
broadest sunshine, and a cloudless heaven,
darkness has been seen to creep on, at first
stealthily and then with rapid strides, yet
without fog or mist or cloud, till the sun itself
has been turned into blackness, and there has
been night in the midst of day. What would
those who knew nothing of eclipses say to such
stories? It is not a case where they have no
experience to appeal to. They have experience,
and that ample, in regard both to sun and
:
E 2
52
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
moon. They have watched them and been
familiar with them from childhood; others
around them have done the same; the combined
experience of all is at their disposal. And the
result of this experience is directly opposed to
the phenomena now alleged. They know that
the moon does not become obscured in the way
asserted; that when it turns into a crescent,
disappears, and reappears, growing again to
its original size, this is not the work of a few
hours, but of a whole month; and that in these
changes it does not turn red. They know that
day and night succeed each other in regular
order, and that night does not occur in the
middle of the day, nor any approach to it ex-
cept through clouds, or fogs, or something of
that sort. In a word, these phenomena are
utterly "contrary" to their experience.
Again: there are, beyond doubt, a large num-
ber of persons inhabiting the world who have
no knowledge whatever of the peculiarities of
climate in the Arctic regions. Suppose then
such to be informed by travellers, or books, that
there was in those parts a day sometimes that
lasted a month or more, during which it was
never dark; and, again, a night as long, during
which the sun was never seen; while in one
place there was, in fact, but one day and one
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
53
night, of six months each, which together made
up the whole year;—what would they reply?
Days and nights, their limits and their varia-
tions, are phenomena familiar to all, and of
which they have accordingly large experience.
And what says this experience? It is distinctly
and, so far as they know it, universally, against
the phenomena alleged, and in favour of its
contrary.
The story of the Eastern prince who had
never seen or heard of frozen water, till one
day a traveller told him that in his country
men were accustomed to walk about and even
ride on the water, which was hard and bore
their weight like the solid earth-is well known
and very apposite. Here, again, there was a
large experience to appeal to. Water and its
properties were quite familiar to the prince
and his people, and they knew well that men
could not walk or ride on water without imme-
diately sinking into it; that water never did
become solid or hard; that in fact their whole
experience was directly "contrary" to the
phenomena alleged.
Illustrations of this kind might easily be
multiplied. Such phenomena as comets, the
Aurora Borealis, mock suns, the monsoon winds,
waterspouts, earthquakes, volcanoes, flying-fish,
54
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
&c., &c., might be dwelt upon in the same way
as those just noticed. And in each case it
would be easy to show that there were many
people who had no experience of these things,
but who had experience of other things similar
to these, or otherwise intimately related; which
experience was directly "contrary" to the
phenomena in question; and this in precisely
the same sense as it is said (and with truth)
that experience is contrary to miracles.
Infrequent or local Natural phenomena are
by no means, however, the only things which
come under this head of phenomena contrary
to experience. Examples may be drawn as
easily from the appliances of art and the dis-
coveries of science.
No men have more experience of the length
of time during which a human being can remain
under water without suffocation than the pearl-
fishers of the east. It is certain that at the
time when the diving-bell and its various con-
trivances first came into use, it must have been
unknown to these eastern fishermen. If, then,
some one had come and told them that in
another country a man had been known to dive
under the water, remain there for hours moving
about at the bottom, and at the end come up
to the top unhurt, and not even exhausted,
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
55
what would be their answer? Surely they
would appeal at once to their experience as
being wholly inconsistent with such a pheno-
menon. They, and their companions, and their
ancestors, in fact every one whose testimony
they had ever in any way come across, all
agreed that such a thing was utterly "contrary"
to their experience; in fact, they would say,
impossible.
""
The steam-engine, railways, telegraphs, bal-
loons, gunpowder, and many more similar
inventions, might all be treated in the same
way; for all present us with phenomena strik-
ingly contrary to the whole previous experience
of mankind.
My
It would be easy, again, to instance ex-
amples from the progress of medical and
especially surgical art. We might take such
a case as the successful cure of cataract on
the eye.
The disease was one well known,
but which had hitherto resisted all attempts at
cure. The entire experience of the medical
profession, and we may safely add, if need be,
of the whole human race, was that cataract was
incurable. But at last it was asserted that
cataract had in a particular case been cured;
a phenomenon, however, "contrary
contrary" to all
experience. Ought it to have been believed?
56
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
But, lastly, let us come to physical science,
and see how this rule about phenomena con-
trary to experience applies there. We select
a couple of illustrations from among many
which suggest themselves. Every one knows
that the effect of intense heat upon substances
is generally to make them melt, or boil, or
burn, certainly not to make them freeze. It is
utterly contrary to all experience that a liquid
should, upon being poured into a vessel very
much hotter than itself, be forthwith found to
have become frozen. Yet the following is a
phenomenon described in modern scientific
books:-A metal crucible is taken and raised
to a bright red heat, into this is put a particular
mixture which speedily causes brilliant flames
to appear at the top of the crucible; liquid
quicksilver is then poured in, and in a few
seconds it is removed from the centre of the
crucible (which all the while has been main-
tained at its intense heat by a spirit-lamp),
through the flame, a solid frozen mass! Now
quicksilver freezes at a temperature very much
lower than water, as much lower (nearly) as
the temperature of ice is lower than scalding
water. Yet it is asserted, and the present
writer can bear witness to having seen the
phenomenon with his own eyes,—that quick-
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
57
silver can actually be brought from the ordinary
temperature down to its freezing point in a red
hot crucible surmounted by flames, and that,
too, within a fraction of an inch of positive
contact with its sides. Surely a phenomenon
more absolutely "contrary" to experience, it
is hard to conceive.
The appeal here is to ordinary every-day
experience. Let us choose for our closing
example one where it is strictly scientific ex-
perience which is sinned against. It was
stated in scientific books up to 1845, and
generally believed throughout the scientific
world, that the action of magnets was confined
to a very few substances, and was always an
action of the same kind with that exerted on
iron. These statements and belief were based
on a long and wide scientific experience of
magnets and their properties, the result of
careful experiment. But at this date Faraday
asserted that he had observed new and oppo-
site phenomena,-phenomena which went to
show that magnets affected all substances
without exception, and the majority in a totally
different fashion from iron. Such phenomena,
then, were directly "contrary" to prior scien-
tific experience. Ought they to have been
believed?
58
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
1
¡
It will be observed that in all these instances
(which might easily be multiplied twenty-fold)
any reference to the causes of the phenomena
spoken of has been carefully avoided. They
have been regarded exclusively in their out-
ward aspect as strange and wonderful pheno-
mena. And this for two reasons:-1st, because
the whole question of causation as affecting
credibility is to come before us in the next
chapter, and would therefore be out of place
here; 2nd, and chiefly, because it is as pheno-
mena only, excluding all reference to causation,
that miracles are regarded by the objection
under discussion; and, therefore, fairness de-
mands that any other phenomena placed in
comparison with them should be regarded in
the same exclusive light. To compare the
credibility of miracles, omitting all considera-
tion of their cause, with the credibility of other
occurrences viewed in connexion with their
causes, would be manifestly unjust. And that
this is the way in which the objection regards
miracles is clear, for it appeals to "universal
experience" as being contrary to miracles.
But of the causes of phenomena, whether
natural or artificial, the vast body of mankind
are certainly, and have always been, profoundly
ignorant. They do not know how or why
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
59
•
things are as they are, but only that they are
SO. In other words they know them only as
phenomena. If then it is a "universal expe-
rience" which is appealed to as contrary to
miracles, plainly "miracles" here are regarded
only as phenomena. Now we desire to test the
worth of this appeal by extending it to other
cases. In simple fairness to the objection,
therefore, we are bound in considering these
to deal in like manner with phenomena only,
leaving the bearing of causation upon the
argument to be discussed at a later stage.
Taking these parallel occurrences, then,
merely as phenomena, we ask, Does their con-
trariety to experience render them incredible?
Ought those persons whose experience they
contravened, on that account to have rejected
them as unworthy of credence? We take first
of all the case of those who observed these
phenomena personally. Ought the man who
first saw an eclipse, or who first visited the
Arctic regions, or who for the first time in his
life saw frozen water,―ought these to have
refused to believe the testimony of their
senses, because the phenomena before them
were opposed to everything they had seen or
known before? If so, then a very large pro-
portion both of science and of knowledge
60
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
generally must be at once set aside as based
on mere illusions: phenomena which men say
indeed they saw, but which they ought cer-
tainly, even if they did see, to have unhesitat-
ingly rejected as incredible.
It needs no
argument to refute such a conclusion; its
absurdity is patent on the face of it. And
with the conclusion the principle on which it
rests must of course be abandoned likewise.
It is clear that contrariety to prior experience,
however large and intelligent that experience
may be, is not a sufficient ground for an observer
to refuse credence to a new phenomenon.
We pass, then, to the other and commoner
case of those who depend for their knowledge
upon the observation of others, and in general
upon that observation as recorded in books.
The number of those who, in any of the in-
stances cited above, could have a first-hand
acquaintance with that particular marvel, must
always have been very small compared with
those who knew of it only by hearsay. How
ought these latter to have received the testimony
borne to its occurrence? Ought they to have
rejected it as incredible? If so, then it fol-
lows that no one ought to believe such pheno-
mena, except they behold them with their own
eyes. Is this a principle which any one would
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
61
dare to endorse in regard to science, say, or
the knowledge of foreign lands? Again, the
conclusion arrived at is too patently absurd to
be worth discussing. And again the under-
lying principle goes with it. It is admitted
that in these cases contrary experience, even
when universal, is not a sufficient ground for
rejecting testimony to new phenomena as in-
credible.
But some will say, the experience in these
alleged parallel instances is not universal.
The phenomena in question have been observed
repeatedly, have been checked and verified,
and so have become actually part of our expe-
rience, instead of being contrary to it. True;
but then the question is not, are they credible
to us now? but, were they credible to those
who first came in contact with them? To
them they must necessarily have appeared
contrary to universal experience; for what is
universal experience to any one, but the whole
experience with which each is, directly or
indirectly, acquainted? To gather together
into one the entire experience of the whole
human race on any point, be it miracles or any
thing else, has never been, and can never be
done. · The utmost that any one can actually
appeal to is the experience possessed by
62
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
himself; which, if it be large and consistent,
he assumes to be that of the whole world also,
and hence calls "universal." This is what the
sceptic appeals to as opposed to miracles, and this
precisely it is which we have seen to be equally
opposed to a large number of phenomena in
Nature and art, in the case of those freshly coming
in contact with them. In many of the instances
named, the experience opposed to the pheno-
mena was to the full as large and consistent, and
therefore as much entitled to be styled "uni-
versal,” as that which is opposed to miracles.
In none of them was there any thing in past
experience which could suggest a thought of
its insufficiency. The attempted distinction be-
tween such phenomena and miracles in regard
to the universality of the experience opposed
to them, breaks down utterly.
Nor can any distinction be drawn in regard
to the measure of contrariety involved in the
two cases. The instances cited are phenomena
to the full as contrary to experience as mira-
cles are. It would be easy to parallel most of
them with phenomena alleged to be miraculous.
We might compare eclipses with the sun and
moon standing still; the Arctic nights with the
plague of darkness in Egypt; the solidity of
water with Christ's walking on the sea of
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
63
Galilee; the diver's long continuance beneath
the surface with the preservation of Jonah in
the fish; the cure of cataract with the cure of
blindness; the freezing of quicksilver in a red-
hot crucible with the safety of the three youths
in the burning fiery furnace. The parallelism
(each case being regarded exclusively as a
phenomenon¹) is in many cases remarkably close.
The miracles named are fair specimens of those
which Scripture relates, and comprise some of
the most stupendous and improbable. Suppose,
then, that these miracles were severally related
along with the parallel non-miraculous pheno-
mena to persons previously unacquainted with
either, but who had experience relevant to
each, what would be the reception they respec-
tively obtained? Can any one say that the
miracle would seem one whit more" contrary
to experience" than the non-miracle? Would
not both stand to the hearers on precisely the
same footing, equally opposed to all prior
1 This is carefully to be borne in mind throughout the
argument. No parallelism or similarity whatever is pleaded
for here, but that which belongs to the things in question
solely as phenomena. Nor is it asserted, or wished to be im-
plied, that the credibility of miracles as a whole is the same
as, or rests on the same footing as, the credibility of these
non-miracles, but only their credibility under the one aspect
of "marvels."
***
64
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
1
knowledge, equally improbable, equally (if you
please) incredible?
The case being thus, that there is no
distinction which can be maintained between
miracles and many other marvellous pheno-
mena (so long as both are regarded merely as
phenomena), either in respect to the univer-
sality or the contrariety of the prior experience
to which they are, on first hearing, opposed;
it is clear that whatever rule there is which is
to determine the credibility of such phenomena,
must apply in the same manner and with equal
force to both alike. But we have seen that in
regard to non-miraculous marvels the principle
of rejecting what is contrary to experience is
utterly untenable, and leads to absurd conclu-
sions. Equally untenable, then, and equally
absurd is it on this ground to pronounce mira-
cles incredible. They are in this respect no
whit more unworthy of credence than hosts of
phenomena which the most utter disbeliever in
miracles believes in firmly. If miracles are to
be proved incredible, it must be on other
grounds than this.
This, however, is very far from all which our
argument contains or implies, It is especially
valuable as settling once for all the validity of
Hume's celebrated dilemma touching miracles
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
65
and testimony. All credence, argues Hume,
rests, or ought to rest, on the balance of pro-
bability being in favour of the thing believed
in. Miracles have in their favour a certain
amount of testimony, on which their claim
to be believed rests. But they have against
them the contrary experience of mankind.
Their credibility, then, rests upon the balance
of these two probabilities—the probability of
the testimony for them, the probability of
past experience against them. Whichever pro-
bility is the stronger decides the case.
Now,
says Hume, from the very nature of the case,
the probability must always be stronger in the
case of the latter than the former. For on
what does the probability of testimony being
true depend? It depends upon experience.
We have generally found testimony to be true,
and therefore are ready to regard it as true in
fresh cases. But in this experience we have
also known many cases in which testimony was
not true, which of course diminishes somewhat
from the probability of its truth in the future.
The experience which is opposed to miracles,
on the other hand, is a uniform, unchequered
experience. The probability arising from it,
then, against the miracle, must always be a
stronger probability than that on behalf of the
F
66 MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
testimony, for the miracle. In other words, it
is always more probable that testimony should
be false, than a miracle true. Miracles, then,
resting as they do upon testimony, can never
be believed. The balance of probability is
invariably against them.
A more telling and plausible argument has
seldom been constructed. But if it is true in
the case of miracles, it will of course be equally
true of any other phenomena which like mira-
cles are contrary to experience. We have seen
that there are many such among the discoveries
and inventions of modern science. It is clear
also that the knowledge which a large number
of persons have of these is based solely on
testimony, and chiefly the testimony of books
and newspapers. How stands the case then?
In opposition to belief stands their prior ex-
perience, uniform and unbroken. In favour
of belief is the testimony just mentioned. But
what are the probabilities in regard to this
testimony? Ordinary experience of books and
newspapers is certainly not in favour of their
undeviating accuracy and truth. They have
been known at times to bear false witness
instead of true. Clearly then the probability
in favour of these scientific statements must
always be less than the probability against
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
67
them.
And faith being determined by the
balance of probabilities, it follows at once (on
Hume's principles) that belief in such scientific
statements is out of the question. They are
and, with such conflicting evidence, must
always be incredible. Of course this conclusion
is absurd. These scientific statements are
believed, and ought to be believed, on the
testimony in question. Hume's argument, then,
must manifestly be at fault somewhere; either
intrinsically, or in its relation to the conclusion
based upon it. Let us examine it more
closely.
One slight flaw there certainly is in it in-
trinsically, namely, that it omits to notice that
by far the greater part of the experience which
any one appeals to as opposed to an alleged
marvel, is derived from the testimony of others,
and hence is weakened by the chance of this
testimony being false, in precisely the same
manner as the evidence in favour of the marvel
is. So that, in fact, instead of the balance of
probabilities being decidedly against the marvel,
it is very nearly even. This correction, how-
ever, can at most only change the case from
one of incredulity to one of hopeless doubt;
since if the probabilities for and against are
thus evenly balanced, we can never be sure
F 2.
68
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
which side we ought to adopt. The intrinsic
defect in the reasoning is not the cause, then,
of the practical difficulty before us. It must
lie in the relation of the argument as a whole
to the conclusion built upon it.
When any one hears of a scientific marvel,
does he merely compare it with the experience
he has at hand, estimate the prima facie pro-
babilities in favour of each, and on their balance
base his final opinion? Most surely not. This
is, at best, but the first stage of the process.
He inquires further concerning this strange
phenomenon (for as such only we have sup-
posed it to be at first presented to his notice),
-under what circumstances is it said to have
occurred?-by what agency is it said to have
been brought about?—and so forth. And his
object in making these inquires is to ascertain
whether that experience of his, which is con-
trary to the phenomenon, has really any right
to be heard in the matter at all. For if there
be in this phenomenon any important circum-
stance, or any agency, of the influence of which
he knows nothing, then he simply has no
experience whatever on the point to which to
appeal. But his "contrary experience" being
thus found to be irrelevant, the whole of the
previous balance of probabilities is at an end.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
69
There is the weight of testimony in favour of
the phenomenon just as before, and against it
there is simply nothing, except perhaps the pre-
judice of ignorance. It does not follow, indeed,
that he at once accepts the statement made to
him as true. He may require to be satisfied
that the alleged circumstances, or agency, which
are said to account for the strangeness of the
phenomenon, did really exist, and would have
the effect asserted. And failing this, he may
in the end still reject it as incredible. But the
very fact of his proceeding to these points
shows that he is no longer regarding the ques-
tion after the superficial manner of Hume's
argument, but giving up this, is prepared to
decide the matter on its own merits.
Take an example or two by way of illustra-
tion. The pearl-fishers, whom we suppose to
have been informed concerning a European
diver, and who found his exploits so entirely
contrary to their own experience,—what would
they, if reasonable men, proceed to inquire?
Their first question would naturally be, how
was it managed? Oh, they would be told, he
was provided with a long pipe reaching to the top
of the water, through which air was supplied to
him. Now of the possibility or adequacy of such
a contrivance the pearl-fishers might very likely
70
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
doubt still; but one thing would be quite
clear to them-this was a case to which their
experience, however large, did not apply. The
instant the pipe to the top was mentioned,
whether they believed it or not, that instant
the phenomenon was taken out of the range of
their experience altogether. They were not
asked to believe in a diver such as one of them
doing such and such things, but in a diver
doing them who was equipped in a particular
way of which they knew nothing. Whatever
other objection there might be to belief in
the statement made to them, that of contrary
experience at all events had ceased to exist,
and so far as it was concerned there was no
reason whatever why they should not believe.
Or again, take the case of the eastern prince
and his ignorance of frost. When told that
water was sometimes hard and solid, he would
naturally ask, how was it so ?-and when?
He would be answered, When the weather was
extremely cold, so cold that people were obliged
to wrap themselves up and have large fires in
their houses in order to keep even moderately
Now of the existence of such cold he
might very likely doubt; but one thing would
be plain-having no acquaintance with such
weather, he did not in the least know what
warm.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
71
effect it would have upon water.
In a word,
he had really no experience to appeal to. He
might object to the cause alleged, he might
doubt its efficacy, but his objection to the
phenomenon as contrary to past experience was
no longer tenable.
This, then, is the solution of the paradox in
which Hume's principle seemed to involve us,
the paradox, namely, of a sound argument
leading to absurd conclusions. The principle
is true, but it is not the whole truth. So long
as any alleged event is regarded only as a
phenomenon, the argument applies perfectly.
Any phenomenon thus opposed to uniform
prior experience has, so long as it is thus
regarded, the balance of probability either
against it or precisely even, and must always
be at best, therefore, extremely doubtful. But
we have no right thus to limit, nor do we in
fact thus limit, our view to the phenomenal
aspect of an event. We proceed to the circum-
stances, the agency, the cause, of the pheno-
And the instant we are satisfied that
there is something connected with it, of whose
influence we are ignorant, then we at once give
up altogether Hume's principle, not because it
is in itself unsound, but because it is here
inapplicable. The experience to which we
menon.
72
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
•
appealed as contrary, turns out to be really
irrelevant, for it is contrary only in appearance;
contrary, that is, only so long as the event is
regarded exclusively in its phenomenal aspect.
Nay, more; we do not even wait to have this
irrelevancy of our experience proved; it is
enough that it be shown to be open to dispute,
and the field of argument is changed at once.
The question is no longer between experience
and testimony (which assumes that experience
has a right to be heard), but it is this,-Has our
experience a right to be heard?—or is there, as
is alleged, some circumstance connected with
the phenomenon which renders it altogether
irrelevant? To appeal to experience as decisive,
while this fundamental point of its right to
be even heard is undecided, is simple folly.
Wherever, then, a phenomenon is alleged,
contrary to experience, concerning which it is
also alleged that there is connected with it
some circumstance or agency which places it
out of the range of that experience, there the
argument from experience must be for a
time suspended, until this deeper question has
been first resolved. Should it appear that the
allegation is unfounded, and the experience is
really relevant, then Hume's argument recurs
in all its force. But if it be well founded, then
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
73
:
that argument must not only be suspended for
a time, but given up altogether. Testimony will
then be allowed full sway, without objection or
hindrance. To put the matter in the shortest
form the effect of this extension of view is to
take the event out of the class of things
"contrary to experience," to which it belongs
phenomenally, and put it into the class of
things merely "different from experience," to
which it is found really to belong. How this
latter class should be dealt with was considered
above (pp. 43—46). They demand keener ob-
servation, and more exact and able testimony,
than phenomena familiar to all, but there is
absolutely nothing against their credibility.
.
Now this is precisely the case with re-
gard to miracles. Viewing them merely in
their outward aspect as "marvels," they are
avowedly contrary to experience. And if,
consequently, our view of them were limited
to this, they must in accordance with Hume's
argument be pronounced at best hopelessly
doubtful. They could never command cre-
dence. But it is alleged concerning them
further, that they are phenomena brought about.
by agency, and related to circumstances, es-
sentially different from any thing which or-
dinary experience is cognizant of. Nor is this
74
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
alleged of them merely by advocates anxious
to parry the force of an opponent's attack. It
is the uniform claim on their behalf by those
Scriptures which alone record them. No one
in Scripture, or any where else, is asked to
believe in a mere "marvel," but in a marvel
wrought by God's special agency and for
special moral ends. As such, then, every one
is bound in fairness to regard them, at all
events until these further allegations on their
behalf have been shown to be unfounded in
fact. Then, and not till then, has any one a
right to pronounce upon the credibility of
miracles, regarding them exclusively as mar-
vels. No man can appeal to a knowledge of
such occurrences as miracles (as a whole)
claim to be, which might enable him to judge
whether they were likely or not. He simply
knows nothing about them. And ignorance
on the part of the recipient is not usually
regarded as a sufficient or satisfactory ground
for rejecting testimony. This being so, then,
the mere allegation on the part of Scripture
of these distinguishing circumstances necessi-
tates the suspension for the time of all appeal
to prior experience. We are bound in the
first place to examine the validity of these
further claims, and only should they be proved
-
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
75
to be baseless may we recur to the argument
from experience. Should the contrary be
proved or but rendered probable, that argu-
ment drops out of account entirely, not
because it is itself unsound, but because it is
here irrelevant. We say this is necessary,
and we are bound to do it; that is, we are
bound to act thus if we are arguing as fair and
reasonable men, not swayed by prejudice to
adopt a procedure here which any where else
would be condemned as stupid and ridiculous,
but desirous of getting at the truth in the best
and surest way that reason dictates, and to this
end employing those methods, and acting upon
those principles, in regard to miracles, which
we should employ and act upon if investigating
the truth of any thing else.
To sum up the result of the present chapter
in a few words:—we have found that miracles,
being (phenomenally regarded) "marvels,” are
as such contrary to prior experience, and hence
either positively improbable, or at best ex-
tremely doubtful, whatever testimony there
may be in their favour. But we have also
found that precisely the same might be said
with equal justice of a vast number of non-
miraculous phenomena in Nature and art,
which yet every intelligent person regards as
•
76
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MARVELS.
worthy of ready and implicit credence. And
the explanation of this appeared to be that
though as phenomena these things were con-
trary to experience, they were not so really,
because involving some circumstance of which
that experience had no cognizance. Turning
then to miracles, it appeared that the same
explanation is essentially involved in the claim
of Scripture on their behalf; it being asserted
that both in agency and in purpose they are
altogether out of the range of common ex-
perience; which claim if substantiated would
make an appeal to such experience quite irrele-
vant. Pending, therefore, the consideration of
this further claim (i.e. the remainder of the
Biblical definition of miracles), no conclusion
whatever can be drawn as to their credibility.
!
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MIGHTY WORKS. 77
CHAPTER III.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS MIGHTY WORKS.
Ir would be a great mistake to regard the
question of agency, on which we are now about
to enter, as one merely subsidiary to that con-
sidered in the last chapter, and introduced
here merely to settle the issue there left unre-
solved,-whether miracles are credible as phe-
nomena. On the contrary, its main importance
is an altogether intrinsic one. The belief that
miracles were brought about by special Divine
agency is a most essential independent element
in the authority that Scripture claims for them,
without which their credence as phenomena
would be worthless. It is, moreover, in this
department of the subject that objections have
been especially rife in modern times. Although,
therefore, our present inquiry cannot but have
a direct and important bearing upon the ques-.
tion considered in the preceding chapter, yet
as it has also other and still more important
independent bearings upon the subject as a
78
MIRACLES REGARDED
•
A
whole, it will be better to make an entirely
fresh start and discuss the question of agency
on its own merits.
What does Scripture mean when it asserts
miracles to be "mighty works" of God?
Certainly not that miracles are the only works
of God, nor even that they are more properly
His works than the ordinary phenomena of
Nature. Such an idea is utterly foreign to the
language and the thought of Scripture. Ac-
cording to the Bible every thing that happens
in Nature is as truly brought about by Divine
agency as any miracle. Material forces are,
indeed, recognized freely and fully; but they
are regarded as instruments fashioned, em-
powered, and directed, by the immediate action
of Deity. Natural laws are alluded to frequently,
and even strongly insisted on '; but it is as
manifestations of the unchangeable will and
ceaseless activity of the Lawgiver. So, again,
with providence. Every event in the history
of His people, and the progress ‘of His revela-
tion, is spoken of as wrought by God, as much
when it is non-miraculous as when miraculous.
Nor can it even be said that the Divine agency
is more insisted on in the case of miracles than
1 E. g. Ps. cxlviii. 5, 6; civ. 5-8. Jer. xxxi. 35, 36; xxxiii.
20, 21. 25, 26. Eccles. i. 4–9.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
79
in the case of ordinary occurrences. For
example:- the first existence of the sun, as a
luminary, is described as resulting from a Divine
fiat (Gen. i. 14-18), which involved a miracle.
The sun's daily rising and shining, which in-
volves no miracle, is no less spoken of as God's
work (Matt. v. 45). Compare this with the
account of the sun standing still, or the shadow
going back on the dial (Josh. x. 12—14; 2
Kings xx. 11), both notable miracles, and it
cannot be said that God's agency is one whit
more insisted on in the latter than in the former.
Or again: it is said that man's soul owed its
origin to God "breathing into his nostrils the
breath of life" (Gen. ii. 7); that is, it was the
work of God's Spirit: clearly a miracle of
creation. But in Ps. civ. 30, the renewal of
animal life generally, including of course man
with the rest, is said to be brought about by
God "sending forth His Spirit:" as clearly
the non-miraculous process of generation con-
stantly going on. While in Matt. i. 18, the
birth of Christ, that miracle of miracles, is
ascribed to precisely the same agency, and in
scarcely stronger terms. Thus, whichever we
take, original creation, ordinary phenomena of
daily occurrence, or rare and special miracles,
in all alike the same language is employed,
80
MIRACLES REGARDED
the same doctrine enforced. All are God's
works; nor is there the shadow of a pretence
for saying that one is more truly and properly
His work than the other.
This fact is of great importance to keep
clearly in mind in considering the question of
the agency by which miracles were wrought.
It has been too much the custom to assume, as
if it were a matter of course, that miracles, if
real events, are such as stand in a vitally
different relation to God from what other
things do. Now for this assumption Scripture,
our sole authority on the subject, gives no
warrant whatever. It is possible that the case
may be as is assumed; but if it is so, this must
be established on independent grounds, by
showing that only thus can a miracle be con-
ceived possible. While, failing such indepen-
dent proof, the probabilities are all the other
way; since the language of Scripture, so far
from supporting the assumption, rather dis-
countenances it by placing miracles and non-
miracles, as regards their relation to God, on
precisely the same level. Until, therefore,
some distinct and powerful reasons appear to
the contrary, we shall, in accordance with
Scripture, regard miracles as standing in
an exactly similar relation to Divine agency
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
81
LAP
with the ordinary occurrences of Nature and
providence.
But it will be said, If there be no difference
in the agency by which miracles were brought
about, then wherein do they differ from these
ordinary occurrences? The answer is plain:
they differ, not in their relation to God, but in
their relation to Nature, and to man. They
are not the common works of God, but His
special, extraordinary works. And they are
works which to man speak more plainly of the
Worker, and manifest His agency more strik-
ingly, than those they are accustomed to in the
ordinary course of events. Here, of course, is
the origin of the assumption just repudiated.
Because miracles bring God's agency more
powerfully home to our minds, therefore it has
been hastily concluded that His agency is more
concerned in them. But that this conclusion
is wholly unwarranted may be easily shown.
One might as well say that a spoken address
is more truly the work of the speaker, and
involves his agency more properly, than a book
does, because in the former case we feel that
agency more forcibly and plainly than in
the latter. If we have been accustomed to
read any one's writings habitually, especially if
they are impersonal in style, and are read
G
the
仔
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MIRACLES REGARDED
+
!
merely for the sake of the information they
contain, (e. g. the articles in a newspaper), we
are apt to have but a dim impression of his
personality; in fact almost to forget that there
is a writer at all. But we hear the same man
speak, and at once the living agency is vividly
forced upon our mind; it is impossible not to
think of the author as well as the words.
Yet would any one venture to infer that
because this latter was a different and more
striking manifestation of his agency than the
former, therefore it was his utterance in a
higher and more proper sense? As little
have we a right to infer that because miracles
are different and more striking manifestations
of God's working, therefore they are more
properly His works than the ordinary occur-
rences of Nature or of providence.
Thus much for the doctrine of Scripture in
regard to the cause of miracles; the bearing of
which upon their credibility we have now to
examine.
All the objections which come under this
head take their stand upon the difference of
miracles from the ordinary course of Nature.
One class of objectors argue that it is incon-
sistent with what we know of Nature to ascribe
miracles to the same agency with it; and there
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
83
being no other agency to which they can be
ascribed, that they are therefore incredible.
Another class argue that they are incredible,
because they require us to assume the existence
of an agency which Nature does not, and for the
assumption of which there is no warrant. The
first of these lines of argument admits, or at all
events does not deny, the relation of Nature to
God; but it denies that both miracles and
Nature can come from Him. The second re-
jects, or to say the least of it ignores, the exis-
tence of any thing beyond Nature, and refuses
credence to miracles because they assume
such existence. Accordingly, we may call the
one the Deistical objection, the other the Atheis-
tical; not thereby implying that every one who
uses either is necessarily a Deist or an Atheist,
but merely that these are the two forms of infi-
delity with which the arguments most exactly
harmonize. They may be most conveniently
discussed in the order in which we have named
them.
The course of Nature is marked essentially
by uniformity, such as may be best described
by saying that it is under the absolute dominion
of unchanging laws; miracles are events con-
trary to this uniformity, inconsistent with these
laws; therefore they are incredible ;-this is,
i
G 2
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MIRACLES REGARDED
-
in brief, the main objection which presents itself
under our first head. It is an objection made
most commonly in the name of physical science,
since it is to science that we chiefly owe that
knowledge of the universal reign of law which
is appealed to. The general uniformity of
Nature is indeed sufficiently patent to all, with-
out science. But it is a uniformity marked
with many exceptions, which weaken not a
little its value as an argument.
There are
many things in Nature which seem to the un-
instructed observer to be independent of its
regular course, and inexplicable by any of the
empirical laws with which he is acquainted.
Such phenomena have been thought accord-
ingly to approximate more or less to miracles,
and their existence and recognition have doubt-
less had something to do with the easy credence
which miracles of all kinds obtained in bygone
ages. Now a large number of these apparent
exceptions have been shown by science to be
no exceptions at all, but to be as truly part of
the uniform course of Nature as the commonest
occurrences are. While in regard to those yet
unexplained, there is seen to be a strong pre-
sumption in favour of their also being subject
to law. In the fuller light of science, then,
it is urged, miracles stand out far more strik-
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
85
}
1
ingly than of old, as the only exceptions to the
universal rule which characterizes the whole
known world. And this it is which makes
them, to the man of science, incredible.
.
In considering this objection let us, in the
first place, determine precisely what is meant by
"uniformity of Nature," and by "Natural laws."
It is clear from the very claim of science to
have established this uniformity more fully than
empirical observation had done, that it is not
uniformity of phenomena that is intended; for
this uniformity common observation is quite
as competent to perceive as science. The un-
failing recurrence of day and night, or of
seasons, for example, which are remarkable in-
stances of phenomenal uniformity,-these are
not the sort of things that are intended. Al-
terations in this kind of uniformity would pre-
sent no difficulty to the man of science. In fact,
such alterations are believed to have taken
place in the past, and are expected in the
future; in each case, however, strictly in accord-
ance with Natural laws. The uniform recurrence
of the same phenomena is not, then, what is here
intended. A phenomenon may occur but once
in the whole history of the world, and yet be as
truly part of the uniform course of Nature as if
it occurred every day for thousands of years.
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MIRACLES REGARDED
Is it, then, the sequence of phenomena one
upon another, so that whenever one pheno-
menon occurs another uniformly follows it,—is
this what is intended? This certainly is in-
volved in the idea of uniformity and law, but it
expresses only part of that idea, and by no
means the most fundamental part. Uniform
sequence of phenomena is rather a consequence
of Natural law than an expression of the law
itself. For if this were all, then our knowledge
of the reign of law would be limited indeed;
far too limited to warrant that assumption of
universality which is commonly made on its
behalf. Phenomena are not, for the most part,
simple, but complex. And owing to this, al-
though in a rough kind of way we speak of the
same phenomena occurring many times over,
yet viewed scientifically this is extremely rare.
There is almost always some circumstance, some
element in each phenomenon, which is different
in some slight degree from what it was in every
other similar phenomenon we are acquainted
with. Hence, a sequence of the same conse-
quent phenomenon upon the same antecedent
is strictly speaking a thing we can but very
seldom observe, certainly not nearly often
enough to warrant an extensive generalization
in regard to other cases. Moreover, even if
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
87
this were allowable, it would be of small avail
practically. For if any new case occurred in
which there was even the smallest possible
divergence in circumstance from those hitherto
known, it would be impossible to say whether
the sequence of phenomena was in accordance
with the uniformity of Nature or not; these par-
ticular phenomena having, in fact, never come
under observation before. Those who believed
in the uniformity of Nature would doubtless
assume that the principle was true in these new
cases as well as in the old ones; but it would
be an assumption destitute of proof, and impos-
sible to check until (most improbable occur-
rence) precisely the same pair of phenomena.
should happen to occur together again. Nor
would there be more reason to make this as--
sumption in one case than in another, the pro-
portion of undoubted phenomena requiring
such assumption to those in which it could be
tested and proved being so overwhelming..
Certainly such a principle of uniformity would
oppose not the slightest obstacle to a belief in
miracles; since nothing would be easier than
to show that in every miracle the antecedent
phenomenon was different, in some respect or
other, from any phenomenon with which we
were acquainted, and then who should dare to
I
M
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MIRACLES REGARDED
say that the consequent did not follow it in
strict accordance with Natural law?
The se-
quence of the same phenomena, one upon an-
other, cannot then be what is really intended
by the uniformity of the course of Nature. It
includes this, no doubt, but this is not its full
and proper expression.
Science is not content with observing phe-
nomena either singly or in connexion. It
seeks besides to analyze them into their con-
stituents, and discover how and why it is that
they are what they are, and are related to each
other as they are. To use the forcible words
of Professor Tyndall,-" The scientific mind
can find no repose in the mere registration of
sequences in Nature. The further question in-
trudes itself with resistless might,—Whence
comes this sequence? What is it that binds
the consequent with the antecedent in Nature?
The truly scientific intellect never can attain
rest until it reaches the forces by which the
observed succession is produced'." Here then
it is, in the forces underlying and occasioning
phenomena, that we are to look for the realm
of Nature's uniformity and Nature's laws.
Every phenomenon is the result of the action
1 Fortnightly Review. Art. on Miracles and Special Pro-
vidences. June, 1867. Vol. I., New Series, p. 657.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
89
?
•
of certain forces upon certain matter, and this
action it is which is conceived by science to be
rigidly and inexorably uniform. It may be
viewed, of course, in two aspects, as an action
on the matter, or as an action of the force 2.
In the first case the uniformity is expressed by
saying that matter has certain "properties;"
in the second by saying that forces have cer-
tain "laws." The varieties of force known to
us in Nature being far fewer than the varieties
of matter, it follows naturally that the “laws”
of the former present the uniformity in a more
striking aspect than the "properties" of the
latter, and hence they are commonly alone re-
ferred to as exemplifying it. But, in fact, it
is equally displayed in both; and which mode
of expression we use in any case is merely a
matter of convenience. Were phenomena gene-
rally the result of the action of one species of
force upon one species of matter, science would
have easy work. But this is not the case.
Both matter and force are observed in Nature
acting together in an exceedingly complicated
2 In strict scientific language both these expressions would
give way to the single one of matter acting upon matter;
forces being regarded not as separate entities, but merely as
modes of material action. The terms used above scem, how-
ever, more adapted for a popular argument like that here
intended.
}
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MIRACLES REGARDED
fashion. Many kinds of matter are, as a rule,
subjected at once to the action of many co-
working forces; the varying proportion of the
former, and the varying intensity, relative and
absolute, of the latter, giving rise to endless
variety in the phenomena exhibited. Inex-
orable uniformity of phenomena, as such, is
hence the very last thing that science would
expect. What it asserts is, that the way in
which phenomena are brought about is uni-
form; that every phenomenon is the direct and
necessary result of the properties of the matter,
and the laws of the forces, concerned in its
production. These properties and laws never
alter, are never in abeyance ; nor is there any
thing but these properties and laws which
make phenomena what they are. However
much phenomena may vary, then, they are
still inexorably subject to law; and in their
origin, however little in their appearance, are
essential and undeviating parts of the uniform
course of Nature.
This is the doctrine of science in regard to
the reign of law; a doctrine, it will be seen,
which, while it accounts for whatever there is
of apparent uniformity in Nature, either in
respect to the recurrence or the sequence of
phenomena, claims also to account equally for
►
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
91
1
Nature's variety; in fact, to be the principle
according to which all Nature is constituted
from beginning to end. To inquire into the
validity of this doctrine is beside our present
purpose. We accept it heartily and unhesitat-
ingly as true. Those who doubt it must be
referred to scientific works for some idea of the
evidence on which it rests. What concerns us
here is simply its application to the case of
miracles. Before proceeding to this, however,
it will be well to lay down certain preliminary
cautions, lest the doctrine of science just ex-
pounded should be thought to involve more
than it really does. These cautions have to do,
not with the doctrine itself, but with our
knowledge of its details; and they are such as
the man of science would, of all men, acknow-
ledge to be very necessary to be borne in
mind.
-
Firstly, then, we have no warrant for sup-
posing that we are acquainted with all the
different kinds of matter and force actually or
possibly concerned in Natural phenomena.
With respect to forces, the existence of an
altogether unknown one is no doubt scientifi-
ically improbable, but no one would venture to
say that it is impossible. While with respect to
matter, every year, one might almost say every
Ga
92
MIRACLES REGARDED
day, is adding fresh varieties, hitherto un-
known, to the already gigantic list.
Secondly, we have, if any thing, still less
reason to suppose that we are acquainted with
all the properties and laws of the matter and
forces we do know. Here again discoveries
are constantly being made in respect to both,
which tell us in the plainest language that we
must not regard our knowledge as at all com-
mensurate with the facts possible to be known.
Thirdly, in part in consequence of these two
limitations of our knowledge, and still more in
consequence of the infinite variety of possible
combinations of matter and force, with but
comparatively few of which we have any ac-
quaintance, it would be in the highest degree
unreasonable to suppose that we know any
thing like all the phenomena which the matter
and forces of Nature are capable of giving
rise to.
These three cautions in regard to the extent
of our knowledge show very clearly how far
the admitted uniformity of Nature can be law-
fully used as the criterion of the credibility of
any alleged phenomenon. That the phenomenon
is one altogether diverse from any which science
has ever examined, is no objection; for there
must be myriads of such phenomena actual and
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
93
possible within the range of Nature. That the
known properties and laws of matter and force
are insufficient to account for its occurrence, is
no fatal objection; for there are doubtless pro-
perties and laws in existence of which we as
yet know nothing. That it seems to require
the supposition of some unknown matter, or
even some hitherto unrecognized force, is not
a decisive objection; for the existence of such
is very far from impossible. In these two latter
cases there would be, indeed, a certain measure
of improbability about the alleged phenomenon,
which testimony would have to overcome: an
improbability, however, which will be shown
directly to be one not at all inconsistent with
scientific faith. But if this be so, what pheno-
mena, it will be said, does the reign of law in
Nature warrant us in rejecting? One kind
only, it must be answered, namely, such as
inexorably involve a contradiction of those pro-
perties and laws which are known, and which
must, if the phenomena occurred, have had
part in their causation. In other words only
when it can be proved that in an alleged case
the forces and matter necessarily engaged must
have had an action contrary to that which their
properties and laws are known to require, or
(which comes to the same thing) in which they
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MIRACLES REGARDED
must have had no action at all;-only in such
a case can we say that Natural law is violated.
It will be desirable, before proceeding any
further, to illustrate the position thus laid
down with a few confirmatory examples.
There were few substances whose properties
were better known to chemists before the year
1840 than phosphorus and oxygen. Nothing in
science was more certain than that phosphorus
was an extremely inflammable substance, re-
quiring but a comparatively low temperature
to cause it to burst into flame when exposed to
the air. Nothing was more certain than that
oxygen had the power of combining directly
at ordinary temperature with some substances,
as, for example, potassium, and had not the
power of so combining with others, as for
example, silver. It would have been hard to
have named two instances of matter better
known, or properties more thoroughly esta-
blished. It was part of the uniformity of
Nature discovered by science, that phosphorus
and oxygen had these properties. Now in
1840 it was asserted that oxygen had been
observed which did combine directly with
silver, and that under precisely the same con-
ditions of temperature, &c., in which oxygen
hitherto had never been known to combine
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
95
with it. And, again, in 1844 it was asserted
that phosphorus had been observed which was
not even easily, let alone extremely, inflam-
mable; which, in fact, required a very con-
siderable temperature to cause it to burst
into flame. Here, then, were facts asserted
altogether contrary to what had hitherto been
regarded as the uniform law of Nature in re-
spect to these two elements. How were such
assertions received in the scientific world?
Were they rejected as incredible, because op-
posed to what had hitherto been deemed the
laws of Nature? Not at all. Very many of
those who heard of these facts when first
announced accepted them unhesitatingly on
the single testimony of the original observers.
Others may have doubted them at first, but
gave credence upon further testimony being
produced, or upon themselves becoming ob-
servers of the facts. Part of this arose, no
doubt, from the fact that in each case there
was, along with the description of the new
phenomena, some account also of the way in
which they had been brought about. And
this being different from any thing hitherto
tried, at once placed the phenomena out of the
range of past experience, upon the principle
laid down at the close of the last chapter
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MIRACLES REGARDED
(pp. 71-73). But this did not in any way
touch the difficulty in regard to Natural law.
It was not merely that such and such experi-
ments had formerly been tried, and such and
such observations made, with respect to the be-
haviour of phosphorus and oxygen; but it was
held that these experiments and observations
warranted a certain inference in regard to the
essential unvarying properties of those sub-
stances, which might be used unhesitatingly
to check and explain any new phenomena
which presented themselves. And this belief
had up to that moment been amply confirmed
by every experiment and observation, whether
like or unlike to those originally made. The
mere fact of the phenomena now asserted dif-
fering in some of their circumstantials from
those hitherto experienced, did not, therefore,
touch the difficulty about the apparent infrac-
tion of Natural law. Nor did the nature of the
circumstantial difference do this. There was
nothing in the way in which these phenomena
were brought about which explained why phos-
phorus and oxygen had here opposite proper-
ties to those hitherto believed to be theirs.
This difficulty remains to the present day. We
know how these novel properties may be at
any time brought under notice, but why they
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
97
differ from the properties which the same sub-
stances (and there is no question but that they
are the very same) ordinarily exhibit,—that re-
mains an unsolved problem. There have been
many theories on the subject, but there is as
yet no certain knowledge. What follows then?
Is our belief in the essential unvarying charac-
ter of the properties of phosphorus and oxygen
to be given up? Not in the least; this remains
as firm as ever. But we conclude that there
is some difference in the forces acting along
with these material elements in the ordinary
phenomena, and in the new ones, which causes
their apparent properties to vary in this way,
the item contributed by the matter itself being
in each case precisely and necessarily the same.
We believe this to be so, though knowing
nothing of the nature of the difference as-
sumed, simply because we cannot suppose the
same matter to have really different or varying
properties, i. e. we cannot suppose the consti-
tuents of Natural phenomena to be otherwise
than rigidly uniform in their action and in-
fluence one upon another. All apparent oppo-
sitions to this principle must be resolved into
different groupings of the constituents, not into
differences in the action of the constituents
themselves.
-
H
98
MIRACLES REGARDED
1
In the instances just discussed, we have been
dealing mainly with the properties of matter,
as exemplifying Nature's uniformity. Now take
an example in regard to the laws controlling
Natural forces:
Few forces are better known, and have been
more largely studied than heat; and no law of
heat is more thoroughly established than that
of its expansive influence, i.e. that whenever
the amount of heat acting upon the particles
of any body is increased, the heat tends to push
those particles farther from one another than
they were before. From which the practical
inference at once follows, that whenever we
raise the temperature of a body it will, if all
other circumstances remain the same, increase
in size. Both principle and practical inference
have been abundantly tested, and as abundantly
verified. But there is one notable exception
-water. Take water at the temperature of
32° Fah. (i.e. precisely at the point when it
is either just melted, or just ready to freeze),
and measure its bulk exactly. Now warm
it, so as to raise the temperature to 33°.
According to the law of heat just described
this should cause an increase in bulk. But
no; the water has contracted. We raise it to
34,
there is still further contraction; and so
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
99
3
on till we reach a little above 39°, when the
water is found to be actuallyth smaller in
bulk than it was at 32°. The instant we pass
this point the phenomenon is reversed, and
further additions of heat produce expansion,
just as they would with any other substance.
There is no known liquid except water ³, which
presents this phenomenon of contraction by
heat; nor does water present it at any tempera-
ture higher than 40°. It certainly does not
arise from any thing peculiar in the circum-
stances under which the experiment is tried;
for we may vary the circumstances as we please,
and place any other substance we please side
by side with the water in conducting the ex-
periment, and the exceptional character of the
latter's behaviour remains precisely the same.
There is no force known to be at work along
with the heat to which the peculiarity can be
ascribed. The phenomenon is simply inexpli-
cable. What, then, do we conclude? That
the law of heat in question is not a rigid,
inexorable law; but whereas in other cases its
tendency is to cause expansion, in this case it
tends precisely the opposite way? This is
impossible; for then what would become of
-
3 The alloy known as fusible metal, and also sulphur, pre-
sent somewhat similar phenomena among solids.
H 2
Uor M
100
MIRACLES REGARDED
¡
Shall we
the uniformity of Natural law?
then suppose that the matter of water has
peculiar properties, which cause it to be acted
upon by heat differently to all other matter?
This also cannot well be; for water at all other
temperatures is acted on by heat precisely as
other matter is; whereas if its matter were
differently related to heat, this difference ought
to appear equally at all temperatures. One only
alternative remains. We must assume that
there is some force, antagonistic to expansion,
present in water at 32°, which comes increas-
ingly into action as the temperature rises, and
overpowers the influence which the heat
naturally has upon the water; but which force
is exhausted when the temperature reaches 40°;
after which the heat and the water have it all
Muu
their own way. Such an assumption is, no
doubt, intrinsically most improbable; but it is
the only way in which science can regard the
phenomenon, because on any other assumption
Nature's uniformity must be sacrificed: a
thing not improbable merely, but (on a
scientific view) impossible.
The examples just given have been chosen
purposely from departments of science among
the most remarkable for the completeness and
precision with which the phenomena they treat
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
101
of can be explained by Natural laws. Yet
even here cases occur where these Natural laws
appear to be contravened, and that in the
most decided manner. It is hard to conceive
a case which to an ordinary observer would
seem more distinctly contradictions of Natural
law than those just considered. Yet how are
they regarded by men of science? No one
rejects them as incredible, because of this ap-
parent contradiction; that would be stupid.
No one, on their account, renounces his belief
in the uniformity of Nature, or regards that
uniformity as one whit less rigid and inexor-
able than he did before; that would be un-
scientific. How, then, is the difficulty solved?
It is solved by a confession of our ignorance.
The matter and forces which we know were
concerned in the phenomena, we believe to
have acted in strict accordance with the pro-
perties and laws exhibited by them elsewhere;
but inasmuch as these are insufficient to ac-
count for the phenomena, and would in fact, if
the only elements concerned in its production,
have led to phenomena essentially different,
therefore we assume the existence along with
these of other forces, or of forces acting ac-
cording to other laws, as yet unknown to us,
sufficient in character and power to make the
102
MIRACLES REGARDED
:
phenomena what they are. And we make this
assumption simply because, but for it, we should
have either to give up our belief in Nature's
uniformity, or reject the phenomena as incre-
dible; both of which alternatives involve far
greater improbabilities than does the admission
of our ignorance.
It may be laid down, then, as an axiom of
scientific method, that whenever a phenomenon
is observed, or reported as observed by trust-
worthy witnesses, which appears to contravene
known Natural laws, the proper course is-not
to reject the phenomenon as therefore incredible,
still less to give up the idea of an absolute
reign of law, but to believe that it is our
knowledge of Nature which is at fault, and to
assume the existence of further laws, or proper-
ties, or matter, or forces, such as will account
for the phenomenon. Science of course does
not rest here, but proceeds at once to verify
the assumption by seeking to ascertain what
this unknown element in the phenomenon is,
which it has thus been necessary to assume
the existence of. Very often the endeavour
has proved successful, and the discovery of the
missing item of causation has amply vindicated
its temporary assumption. In other cases no
such success has as yet attended the efforts of
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
103
F
science; the assumption still remains such, and
may remain so to the end of time. But no one
thinks that this, any more than its original sup-
position, presents any difficulty to the scientific
mind.
Cases like those above cited are far from
rare. There is, however, another still com-
moner class which must receive a passing
notice, those, namely, which, though not in-
volving any apparent contradiction with
Natural law, yet are altogether inexplicable
by it; cases, that is, in which we know that
most or all of the essential elements involved
-are ones whose laws we are as yet utterly un-
acquainted with. To cite examples here is
needless. Not isolated phenomena merely,
but whole departments of science must plead
guilty to being in this predicament. The ex-
tent of admitted ignorance in regard to Natural
causation is at least equal to the extent of
knowledge. Whenever, then, our knowledge
of Natural law is appealed to as a test whereby
4 No doubt the progress of science is continually diminish-
ing this ignorance; but it is also, by extending our acquaint-
ance with phenomena, at the same time increasing our ap-
preciation of the vast extent of the ignorance yet remaining; so
that it may be doubted whether the proportion of recognized
ignorance to knowledge is at all less, or likely in the future to
be less, than it has been in past days.
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MIRACLES REGARDED
*
to judge of the credibility of any phenomenon,
our ignorance of Natural law must also be
borne in mind. Nor is it allowable on the
ground of the former to reject any thing which
a reference to the latter would show to be
credible.
This is the principle upon which scientific
men invariably proceed in judging of the
ordinary phenomena of Nature and Art. And
this principle it is, and no other, by which we
claim that miracles also should be judged. Let
them be tried by the standard of Natural law
by all means; but in applying that standard
let it not be merely our knowledge of law
which is appealed to, but let this appeal be
ever balanced by the recollection of our igno-
rance. If a miracle can be shown to be a
phenomenon so hopelessly opposed to the uni-
formity of Nature, that no assumption similar
to those instanced above could reconcile its
occurrence with that uniformity, then let this
irreconcilability be allowed its full weight as
an objection to belief. But if such an assump-
tion would effect the required reconciliation in
the case of a miracle, as we have seen it does
in the case of other phenomena, then let the
same measure of credence (so far, that is, as
this question of causation is concerned) be
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
105
In
extended to both. We do not say, observe,
let both be at once implicitly believed.
each case there is the value of the testimony
to be considered, and weighed against the im-
probability of the assumption of ignorance
required for belief. In the case of miracles
there are several other matters beyond this,
which would have to be considered before the
general question of credibility could be decided
All that is here contended for is, that no
objection shall be allowed against miracles in
respect of any apparent infraction of Natural
law, which would be disallowed by scientific
men in the case of ordinary phenomena. Or
to put the matter in the shortest possible form,
let not that be deemed a violation of law in a
miracle, which would not be so deemed in a
non-miracle.
on.
The question, then, stands thus :-Is there
any property or law discovered by science
which is absolutely inconsistent with the oc-
currence of the miracles recorded in Scripture?
And the means by which this is to be ascer-
tained is by inquiring whether the matter and
forces of Nature known to be engaged in any
miracle could or could not have had their
Natural influence in that miracle. If they
could, then whatever assumption of other
106
MIRACLES REGARDED
forces or laws we have to make in order fully
to account for them, still it cannot be said that
Natural law was violated. But if they could
not, then natural law was violated; and the
miracle is really open to the objection brought
against it. Let us look at some of the most
remarkable miracles in detail, with a view
to answer this question.
Take first those which had to do with ex-
ternal Nature. Many of these,-as the Deluge,
the raining of fire upon Sodom, the swallow-
ing up of Dathan and Abiram, the falling of
the walls of Jericho, the fire from heaven which
consumed Elijah's sacrifice, the sudden cessa-
tion of the storm on the lake of Gennesareth,
the earthquakes which on more than one occa-
sion liberated the Apostles from prison, and
others like these,―resemble known occurrences
of Nature far too closely for any one to cite
them as instances of violations of law. We
pass, then, to others which are of a more extra-
ordinary character.
There are certain miracles which have been
said to involve a violation of the law of gravi-
tation, e.g. the passage of the Red Sea, and of
the Jordan; the swimming of the iron axe-
head that had sunk in the water; Christ's walk-
ing on the sea, and His ascension. But is it
J
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
107
so? Take any one of these instances, say the
passage of the Jordan by the Israelites, and
see what would follow if we suppose that gra-
vitation was suspended. Why, had this been
so, instead of the waters being merely stayed
on their course, and piling themselves up until
Israel had passed over, waters and Israelites
together must, by the centrifugal influence of
the earth's rotation, have been hurled headlong
into space. So far, then, from the miracle
requiring us to suppose gravitation to have
been suspended for its occurrence, it requires
us to suppose gravitation to have been in full
force precisely as usual; for how else should
Israel have been able to walk across? That the
miracle requires the co-operation of some other
force beside gravitation is clear. But the con-
junction of a second force involves neither
violation or suspension of the first, but only a
modification of the result which the first alone
would have produced. Natural law here is
indeed (so far as we know it) insufficient to
explain the miracle; but there is not the slightest
reason for supposing it to have been violated.
As well might we argue that because we can-
not as yet completely explain the causes of the
ascent of sap in trees (a phenomenon equally
opposed to gravitation pure and simple), there-
C
108
MIRACLES REGARDED
fore we ought to regard the law of gravitation
as violated there also.
It is clear that a similar line of reasoning
with that pursued in the case of the passage
of the Jordan will in like manner remove all
ground of objection to the other miracles named.
In nearly all some other force beside gravita-
tion must be assumed, in none is there any
reason to regard gravitation as violated. They
need not, therefore, be discussed one by one.
There are, next, certain miracles which are
thought to violate the laws regulating the
motion of the heavenly bodies, viz., the stand-
ing still of the sun and moon, and the return
of the shadow on the sun-dial of Ahaz. Much
has been said as to the utter dislocation of the
whole solar system which these miracles, and
especially the former, would involve. And if
they were brought about, as has been assumed,
by the violation or suspension of fundamental
laws, no doubt this would be the case. But if
so, these results must have extended likewise
to the earth; in fact, have been more marked
there than any where else.
where else. Now the narrative
of Scripture distinctly disallows the occurrence,
along with the celestial phenomena named, of
the terrible dislocation supposed by objectors
to be involved in them. If, therefore, the
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
109
Scripture record of the miracles is to be heard
in the matter (and beyond that we have sim-
ply no knowledge of them), they were not such
miracles as these objectors suppose, i.e. they
did not involve that violation of the laws of the
solar system imagined, but were brought about
in some other way. In other words, it is im-
plied that the world generally went on just as
usual, and therefore that Natural forces and
laws were in action just as usual; only that
here in Palestine some further modifying force
was at work also, causing these phenomena to
appear there, and there only ³. To ascertain
how this could be, it will be necessary to look
at both miracles somewhat in detail.
5
-
What was it that Joshua desired when he
commanded the sun and moon to stand still?
It has been commonly assumed that he wanted
a continuance of light. But to this there
are several very serious objections. 1st. If so,
why did he couple the moon with the sun?
In daytime the light of the moon is inappre-
ciable, and for Joshua's purpose therefore quite
5 That the miracle of the shadow returning was confined
to Palestine appears from 2 Chron. xxxii. 31, where it is
said that the embassy from Babylon came to inquire con-
cerning "the wonder that was done in the land," thus im-
plying that they had not observed it at Babylon, but knew of
it by report only.
•
110
MIRACLES REGARDED
useless. Yet both in his command, and in the
notice of its fulfilment, sun and moon are put
upon an equal footing, as if the standing of
both was essential to his purpose.
On one
supposition only is this explicable, viz., that
what Joshua desired was not light, but darkness,
in which case both sunlight and moonlight
would have been alike prejudicial. 2nd. The
other particulars of the battle accord better
with this idea of darkness, than with the pre-
valent one of light. It is said that during the
battle there was a terrific hailstorm, so severe
that more Canaanites were struck dead by the
hailstones than fell by the sword. Such a
storm presupposes a heaven covered with the
thickest and blackest of clouds, such as would
effectually obscure the light both of sun and
moon. Now this hailstorm preceded the com-
mand of Joshua, and would seem to have been
the occasion of it, from the way in which the
two are linked together. It was thus after a
period of intense darkness, bringing rout and
slaughter upon the enemy, that Joshua spoke.
And under such circumstances, which was he
most likely to desire-light, or prolonged dark-
ness?
3rd. The duration assigned to the
-
6 It may be objected that on this view there is no explana-
tion of Joshua's naming certain places where the sun and
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
111
.
miracle fits in better with this idea than with
the common one. It is said to have lasted
"about a whole day." Now the battle began
either at dawn, or probably rather before; for
it is said that Joshua "" came upon them sud-
denly," having gone up from Gilgal "all night."
First came the slaughter of the unexpected
attack, then the storm, then the command to
the sun and moon, which issued in their stand-
ing-still “about a whole day"; i. e. all the
day except that short space before the storm
began. On the ordinary view the phrase is
very ambiguous; for does it mean that the day
was twice as long as usual, or that twelve hours
of light elapsed from the time of the command,
or what? It is impossible to decide from such
an expression; whereas on this other view all
is clear and straightforward. 4th. The ex-
pressions used concerning the sun and moon
harmonize as well, and some of them much
better, with this view than with the common
one. There are three words used in the
moon were to stand. The answer is very simple. At the
time of speaking both sun and moon must have been, at least
for a moment, visible over the places named. Joshua, seeing
them glancing out from the clouds, and perceiving the dis-
advantage which would ensue from their shining, bids them
be still, and naturally in so doing addresses them as in the
places where he sees them, "Sun in Gibeon" (thus the words
run in the original), "be still," &c.
112
MIRACLES REGARDED
(6
original, (1) 7 (A. V. "stand still ") is literally
"be silent," an expression much better suited
to denote darkness than light, and which,
wherever it is used in Scripture in the sense of
"stand," always implies passive standing, not
active continuance. (2) Ty (A. V. "stayed ")
is either "stood," "stood up," or "continued"
i.e. "stood as before." Its meaning here is
hence somewhat ambiguous, since it might
mean either “continued shining," or con-
tinued obscured," just according to which state
of things had been prevailing up to that time.
It is to be observed that this is the word used
in Hab. iii. 11, to describe the sun and moon
being obscured during a tremendous thunder-
storm, a passage which many think refers to
this miracle, yet which all are agreed, notwith-
standing, describes a darkening of the sun
and moon, not a continuance of their light.
Whether there be a reference to Joshua's
miracle or not, this much at all events is clear,
—the word in question is one perfectly appro-
priate to describe a darkening of the heavenly
bodies such as is here supposed. (3) S
""
i (A. V. "hasted not to go down") is
properly "hasted not to go," the word "go
being one with a very wide range of application,
and which would as naturally mean
66
come
در
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
113
<<
or "go on," as go down." Its precise sense
must in every case be decided by the context,
which we have seen here favours the second
meaning rather than the last.
On every
ground, therefore, it would appear that the
miracle was not, as usually supposed, a mira-
cle of prolonged light, but of prolonged dark-
ness. Such a darkness plainly involves no
dislocation of the solar system, nor any viola-
tion of Natural laws; for the cause hinted at,
the storm-clouds, is both sufficient and reason-
able, and involves no infraction of uniformity.
Next as to the return of the shadow on Ahaz'
sun-dial. It is said that the shadow went back
'ten degrees," or more properly "ten steps;"
for the sun-dial intended seems to have con-
sisted of a flight of steps so arranged that when
the day dawned a shadow fell on all the flight,
but as the sun mounted higher step after step
was illumined, so that the time could be told
from the number of steps on which the shadow
still fell. What is implied in the miracle is
that the shadow, having left the lower steps,
came back over ten of them in a way it would
not naturally have done at that time of day;
thus indicating that, so far as the dial was con-
cerned, the apparent vertical motion of the
sun's light was temporarily reversed. Does
I
114
MIRACLES REGARDED
this necessarily involve an equivalent reversal
of the earth's motion on its axis? Not at all
there are at least two other ways in which such
a phenomenon might have been brought about.
1st, it might have been occasioned by the
upheaval of one end of the dial, or the sinking
of the other, increasing for a time the angle of
its slope; which would instantly cause the sha-
dow to recede. Considering the frequency of
earthquakes in Syria such an explanation can-
not be regarded as involving any thing impro-
bable. But, 2nd, it might possibly also have
been occasioned by a solar eclipse, supposing
such an eclipse to have occurred shortly before
noon, and the portion of the limb obscured to
have been the upper part. For in such a case,
the apparent upward motion of the sun being
extremely small, the cutting off of the light
from the upper part of the limb would be equi-
valent to a slight lowering of the sun's position
in the heavens as measured by one of these
eastern dials. Every thing of course here turns
upon whether an eclipse exactly of this kind
actually occurred at the time specified. Nor is
such a coincidence altogether without evidence
in its favour; for an eclipse of the kind required
has been calculated by astronomers to have
occurred at a date which agrees precisely with
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
115
that which some chronologers take to be the
date of Hezekiah's illness. The calculation of
a solar eclipse at so distant a period is,
however, beset with too many difficulties, and
the chronology of this part of Jewish history
too much controverted, to allow of our insisting
on this as even a probable explanation. One
thing, however, is clear,—there is no necessity
for supposing any law of Nature to have been
violated or set aside for the occurrence of this
miracle of the shadow; and this is all that we
are here concerned with.
We pass on, then, in the next place to some
miracles which seem to violate the laws of
heat, viz., the non-consumption of the burning-
bush, the lighting and non-lighting of dew on
two successive nights on Gideon's fleece, and the
preservation of the three Hebrew youths in the
fiery furnace. Two of these, the first and the
last, may be dismissed with a word. Science
has shown in the most striking way, as already
pointed out (pp. 56,57), that intense heat may co-
exist even with intense cold, and that with the
heated and cold substances almost in contact,
without any violation of Natural law, nay, as a
direct consequent of law. That these pheno-
mena of science are precisely parallel, and
explain the miracles in question, we by no
I 2
116
MIRACLES REGARDED
means assert. But they show clearly that
such apparent non-action of fire is possible,
without any Natural law being interfered with;
which is all we have here to consider. The
case of Gideon's fleece presents as little diffi-
culty. True, if there were nothing concerned
in the miracle but the properties of wool and
soil, and the laws of the condensation of dew,
such opposite results could not have occurred.
But how easily would the introduction of some
other element alter the phenomena. It needs
but that from some unusual cause the tempera-
ture of the wool should one night be maintained
just above the dew-point, and in like manner
on the other night the temperature of the
ground; and all is clear. Will any one venture
to say that to do this would necessitate a
violation of Natural law? The phenomena
might easily be imitated by arrangements well
within the power of science; and does science
work by violations of law?
The last group of miracles, wrought mainly
on external Nature, are those which seem
to involve a creation, or at all events a
sudden transformation, of matter. Such are the
turning of Moses' rod into a serpent, of the Nile-
water into blood, and of dust into lice; the
giving of water from the rocks, and of manna,
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
117
in the wilderness; the healing of the bitter
waters by Moses, and again of the same and
also of the poisonous pottage by Elisha; the
multiplication of meal and oil by Elijah, of
bread and oil by Elisha, and on a still grander
scale of bread and fish by Christ; and the
turning of water into wine. All these mira-
cles involve a difficulty of the same kind,
though varied in form. It is, hence, unneces-
sary to discuss more than one in detail. We
take as our example the miracle of fceding
the 5000.
That the bread and fish with which this
multitude was fed were similar to ordinary
bread and fish, is clearly implied in the narra-
tive. There is, hence, no violation of law so
far. The matter of which each was composed,
and the forces and laws by which each was
bound together, and which gave to each its
nourishing power, all these were the same in
the food miraculously produced as in that which
was Naturally supplied. The violation of law,
if any, must lie in the way in which the pro-
duction was brought about. Now whence the
matter came of which the fresh bread and fish
was constituted, we know not. But assuming
that it came (as for all the essentials of bread
and fish it well might) from the moist air of
118
MIRACLES REGARDED
-
the neighbourhood, is there any thing here in-
consistent with Natural law? On the contrary,
it is certain that from air and moisture all the
most essential constituents of bread and fish
are ultimately derived in the natural course of
events. But it will be said, the manner and
means of production is vitally different. True;
but different in what way? Can we point to
any force concerned in the production of this
miraculous food, which was acting (if the mira-
cle be true) in opposition to its Natural laws?
On the contrary, we simply do not know what
forces were at work; and to talk of any of their
laws being violated is hence impossible. The
difference is simply this:-We know of but one
way in which such substances as those com-
posing bread can be built up from the simpler
constituents of the air and moisture, and that
is the agency of a living plant. A similar
agency, with that of animal life superadded, is
the only known way in which the substance of
a fish can be produced. It is certain that the
bread and fish in the miracle were not thus
produced. But what then? Are we justified
in asserting that the way we know of is the
only way in which bread and fish could be pro-
duced? Certainly not; and this for two rea-
sons. First: the production by living agency
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
119
is a process which science has so far failed to
unravel. We do not even know what forces
there are in the plant and animal which effect
the changes in question, still less do we know
the amount and kind of influence which each
contributes, or the laws under which it acts.
What part that mysterious influence called
vital force plays in the production; whether
indeed it is essential, or whether all may not
be due to that collocation of ordinary forces
which act (apparently) under its guidance ;-on
all these points science can as yet give us no
information. Since then, we cannot even affirm
that living agency is an essential ingredient in
the mode of production we do know, but
only that it is a constant one; still less can we
dare to assert that without it no production
after any other mode could take place. Second:
it is certain that several substances, which for a
long time it was supposed could only be pro-
duced by the intervention of living agency,
have been of late produced in other and inde-
pendent ways. That others will or may be so
produced, is highly probable. And though the
methods so far employed are often cumbrous
and round-about, still the conclusion to be
drawn is none the less clear, viz. that vital
agency is not an indispensable condition. To
י
120
MIRACLES REGARDED
call the miracles of the loaves and fishes a
violation of the laws of Nature, because it
asserts the production of certain kinds of
organic matter without the intervention of that
living agency which we every where see asso-
ciated with them, is, in the face of these facts,
altogether unwarrantable. It is a phenomenon
unaccountable by Natural laws certainly, but
involving no necessary inconsistency with them.
In few of the other miracles of this group is
the difficulty as great as in that just discussed;
in many it is far less; known Natural causes
being available for their explanation to a much
greater extent. Thus the development of lice
from dust, the turning of the Nile-water into
blood (a metaphorical way, probably, of ex-
pressing the water's becoming red and loath-
some), and the springing of water from the
rock, all have analogies in Nature, which pre-
clude any idea of violation of law. And so of
others, in different ways.
man.
We come, then, to the second great group
of miracles;-those which were wrought upon
These are partly physical, partly men-
tal. Of the latter class (including revelation
in all its various forms, and some others, as the
casting out of demons, &c.), it is unnecessary
here to speak; for mental laws are confessedly
Thi
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
121
beyond the province of physical science, with
whose objections only we are at present con-
cerned. The former sort, physical miracles on
man, are among the most numerous and impor-
tant recorded in Scripture, comprising all
miracles of healing, of sudden disease, of
renewed life, and of penal death, besides a few
cases of miraculous birth, and of life preserved
under extraordinary circumstances.
In regard to the major part of these one
observation will suffice. Disease and healing,
life and death, are phenomena with which we
are necessarily most familiar. But of the laws
which govern them, either singly or in their
relation to one another, we are for the most
part profoundly ignorant. Whether any par-
ticular case that comes under notice conforms
to Natural law or not, we are for the most part
quite unable to judge. We believe that it does
so, not on account of any proper knowledge on
the point, but on account of our general belief
that all phenomena are so conformed. When,
then, we come to a miracle of this class we are
really in the same position. We have no know-
ledge of how precisely it was brought about
(i.e. by what combination of forces, acting
under what laws), but only that it was brought
about. And believing that all phenomena are
122
MIRACLES REGARDED
rigidly controlled by law, we assume that here
also law was in full force; an assumption surely
as allowable in this case as elsewhere, our
ignorance being scarcely, if at all, more pro-
found. No doubt the one set of phenomena
are common, the other rare; but that this is
no reason against making such an assumption
has been amply shown before.
Even in the extreme case of all, that of re-
surrection, it cannot be said that Natural law
is violated. It is not very long ago since a
paper was read before the Royal Society, and
printed in their Proceedings, containing the
accounts of a series of experiments directed to
this very end-to see whether it was possible
to resuscitate life in a dead body. The experi-
ments were reported as, so far, failures; but
the mere fact of their being undertaken, and
still more of the account of them being received
and published by such a Society, is sufficient
proof that such resuscitation is not deemed in
the scientific world to involve any necessary
violation of Natural law.
One case only remains where the assertion
of law being violated has some show of plausi-
bility; that, namely, of the preservation of
Jonah in the fish's belly for three days. Surely,
7 Proc. Royal Soc. 1865, vol. xiv. p. 358.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
123
·
it may be said, it is a law of human life that
respiration is essential to continued existence;
and how could respiration possibly have gone
on in the stomach of a fish? True; but then
what warrant have we for saying that it did?
The whole of what Scripture tells us on the
point is (1), that Jonah was swallowed up alive,
(2), that he was cast out alive, and (3), that he
was aware of what went on during the interval.
It is our inference merely that he was alive (in
a bodily sense) during this interval. The lan-
guage of Scripture, which every where speaks
of personality as belonging to the soul, not to
the body, in no way requires such bodily life;
while there is much, both in the prayer of
Jonah, and in the New Testament references to
the miracle, which points to bodily death as
having in fact intervened. Thus regarded, the
miracle becomes one, among many others, of re-
surrection, and all peculiar difficulty is at an end.
How, then, stands the case as regards mira-
cles? We saw that the only instance in which
we should be justified in asserting Nature's
laws to have been violated was where some
force or matter known to be at work could be
shown to have acted contrary to the laws and
properties universally valid for it elsewhere.
s Jonah ii. 2, 6. Matt. xii. 39, 40.
124
MIRACLES REGARDED
Have we found such an instance among the
miracles recorded in Scripture? There were
abundant instances where Natural law, so far as
we know it, altogether failed to account for
the phenomena; indeed this was, as might have
been expected, the rule with miracles. But
there was no instance in which it could be
asserted that any force or matter known to be
at work had an action certainly contrary to
Natural law. All that was required to harmonize
miracles with law was the assumption that the
elements we know to have been at work were
not all those which were at work; an assumption
which is simply another way of confessing our
ignorance, and at the same time refusal on ac-
count of ignorance to give up our scientific faith
in the uniformity of Nature. Such assumptions
we saw to be both common and considerable,
even in the best known departments of science,
and to be regarded by men of science as
involving less improbability than the rejection
of even moderate testimony. In claiming to
make such assumptions in regard to miracles
we are asking no more than is granted readily,
and as a matter of course, in regard to myriads
of phenomena which science is conversant
with, and about whose credibility there is no
question. To reject miracles on this account,
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
125
when other things to which the objection
equally applies are unhesitatingly accepted as
presenting no difficulty, is an unfairness which
surely needs but to be mentioned to be repu-
diated by every one. So far, then, as the laws
of Nature are concerned there appears to be no
reason whatever to discredit miracles.
It has been taken for granted throughout this
argument, (1) that the external actions preced-
ing miracles (e. g. the lifting of Moses' rod, or
the touch of Christ's hand) are not at all events
the sole cause of the miracles' occurrence; and
(2) that the further causes which were con-
cerned in their occurrence were (proximately)
Natural forces similar, if not indeed the very
same, with those concerned in ordinary pheno-
mena.
On the first of these points it is unnecessary to
dwell. As well might one assume that the turn-
ing of the handle of a telegraph-machine was the
whole cause of the message travelling along the
wires, or that the alteration of a railway-signal
was the whole cause of the train stopping and
moving on, as suppose the outward acts ac-
companying miracles to have been the whole
causes of their occurrence. In no instance can
such outward acts be regarded as any thing
more than permissive or directive causes which
126
MIRACLES REGARDED
called the really efficient causes into action;
while in many cases they were mere signals to
call attention to what was to follow, and con-
nect the miracle with its moral purpose.
The second point is more open to dispute;
since to dogmatize on the nature of that, of
which we confessedly know nothing, may well
seem unwarrantable. Clearly, however, the
assumption made above is the most natural
that can be made, and that which harmonizes
best both with analogy, with the circumstances
of the case, and with the language of Scrip-
ture. We know, as a fact, that in every pheno-
menon which science has yet analyzed completely
into its constituents, the whole effect has been
produced through the instrumentality of Natural
causes. We believe that the same is true of all
other Natural phenomena, and this belief science
is perpetually confirming and verifying by new
discoveries. Miracles, then, being phenomena
in Nature (albeit not part of Nature's ordinary
course), may most naturally be regarded in the
same way. If it is God's pleasure to order
Nature's common occurrences through the in-
strumentality of secondary causes, surely it is
most reasonable to suppose that He would use
the same causes to bring about uncommon occur-
rences in the same field. Again, it is certain
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
127
that the state of things immediately preceding
and immediately succeeding every miracle was
a state in which Natural causes were exercising
their usual influence. The character of nearly
every miracle requires us to suppose further,
that some at least of these causes were at work
during its occurrence, as well as before and
after. To suppose, then, that all that was done
was to introduce some additional causes of the
same nature, is on this ground also the simplest
supposition that can be made; for we are thus
assuming that what we do not know in the
causation of miracles was of the same nature
as what we do know. Lastly, as remarked at
starting (pp. 78-82), this view seems most in
accordance with Scripture language, which
speaks of God's relation to miracles in terms
practically identical with that in which His
relation to Nature generally is spoken of.
The objections to this way of regarding
miracles are twofold-1st, it is said that these
Natural causes are insufficient, and that we
must therefore bring in some other proximate
cause not belonging to Nature; 2nd, it is said
that except we do this we destroy the sharp
line of distinction between miracles and non-
miracles, reducing both to the same level. As
to the first objection, the fact that it is based
128
MIRACLES REGARDED
entirely upon ignorance, and that we have
nothing but ignorance to go upon in replying
to it, puts an end to all possibility of directly
meeting it. It must suffice for the present to
remark, that if our inability to explain fully
the occurrence of miracles from Natural causes
is a valid ground for assuming the intervention
of a non-Natural cause, then the same principle
ought in fairness to be applied equally to all
those numerous ordinary phenomena which we
are in like manner unable fully to explain; the
effect of which would be to destroy the dis-
tinction between miracles and non-miracles far
more effectually than the view here taken can
possibly do.
We turn now to the second and more weighty
difficulty. It may best be met by bringing for-
ward the next stage or phase of the Deistical
objection; for the basis of this latter is pre-
cisely the existence of such a distinction between
miracles and non-miracles as the former desi-
derates, but which the preceding argument is
thought by both to ignore. We may conceive
the disbeliever in miracles arguing thus:--
True, it has been shown that you cannot lay
your finger upon any particular item in the
causation of a miracle, and say, Here is a spe-
cific property of the matter involved, or here
·
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
129
P
a specific law of one of the forces at work, which
the miracle violates. True, also, that you can-
not fairly reject a miracle merely because its
occurrence from Natural causes cannot be fully
explained. But the view here taken of the
reign of law, is not all that we understand by
Nature's uniformity; and it is against the part
omitted that miracles militate. When we speak
of Nature's uniformity we mean—not only that
every single event in Nature is brought about
exclusively by Natural causes acting in rigid
conformity to law, but-that no events are
brought about other than the results of pre-
ceding events would, in accordance with law, of
necessity occasion. It is not merely the consti-
tution of phenomena internally, but the deter-
mination of phenomena externally, which we
regard as governed by law; and this external law
it is, of what phenomena shall find place in
Nature, which miracles violate. Granted, that
they violate no law within the sphere of their
own causation; granted even, that combinations
of Natural causes are possible by which they
might have been brought about; still in Nature,
so long as law ruled, no such combinations would
ever have occurred, and therefore the existence of
such combinations implies that law has not ruled,
or in other words, thati aw has been violated.
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MIRACLES REGARDED
The fact here asserted, that Nature alone
would never have brought about the combina-
tion of causes adequate to produce a miracle,
may be freely conceded. Whether science is as
yet quite in a position to make the assertion
might perhaps be doubted; but about this we
need not trouble ourselves. The question before
us is, does this fact of miracles being phenomena
occurring in Nature, yet no part of Nature's
proper course, warrant the conclusion that
miracles violate law, and are consequently in-
credible? The fact itself, that miracles are
phenomena such as Nature alone would never
have produced, plainly does away entirely with
the objection noticed above, as to the lack of
distinction between miracles and non-miracles,
this distinction being taken as the common
ground of the present argument. With that
objection, therefore, it is unnecessary to deal
further. We turn to the question to which
the adoption of this common ground gives
rise.
.
If the principle laid down in the above objec-
tion is true, it must of course apply generally,
as well as to the particular case of miracles.
It must be affirmed, that is, as a universal pro-
position, that every phenomenon occurring in
Nature, other than Nature left to itself would
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
131
occasion, is a violation of law, and hence in-
credible. Is this so? Take the case of a
locomotive drawing a railway train. There is
no question that the locomotive is a phenomenon
in Nature, and every motion of its every part
may be traced proximately to Natural causes,
which in their action conform precisely with
Natural law. So far it resembles perfectly
what we call Natural phenomena. But is it a
phenomenon which Nature left to itself would
ever have brought about? Most surely not; it
requires besides Nature the action of mind.
If we trace back the origin of the locomotive,
step by step, we find a great number of Natural
causes concerned in its production, to which
Natural causes the whole of the production
without any exception can be ascribed, until
we reach at last in a variety of ways the agency
of man. We examine that agency, and find that
in part it also is resolvable into Natural causes
acting according to Natural law. Man acts by
his muscles, which are directed by his nerves.
The former of these have been shown, the latter
probably will be shown, to be in the strictest sense
Natural agents. But here our analysis stops,
at the threshold of the great mystery-mind's
action on matter and material forces. This
passes the domain of physical science; and this
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132
MIRACLES REGARDED
it is which, in conjunction with Natural causes,
has brought about the phenomenon of the loco-
motive. It is important to observe exactly how
it has done this. In none of its multifarious
actions tending to this end has mind created
a single atom of matter or iota of force. What-
ever of either has entered into the various stages
of the production has been drawn entirely from
Nature. Further: in using this matter and
force mind has imposed no new law, suspended
or modified no old one; whatever has been
done, has been done in the strictest accordance
with the universal law of Nature. What then
has mind done which Nature alone could not
do? It has done this one thing only—given
a particular direction to one of Nature's forces
(that namely, whatever it is, which is engaged
in nervous action), which reacting on matter
in conjunction with other forces, acting no
otherwise than as Nature leads them to, caused
all those phenomena which issued in the loco-
motive drawing the railway-train. The action
of mind on Nature is thus exceedingly limited;
1st, by the fact that it can only act through the
body, and hence that only so far as the Natural
powers of the body go can it act at all; 2nd,
by the fact that it can only act directly on one
of the forces of the body, and hence that only
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
133
so far as the other forces are controlled by this
can it affect them; 3rd, by the fact that in
regard to this one it can do nothing but direct
its action in one or other of a few determinate
lines, without the slightest power to call it forth
if lacking, or send it on any other errand than
that which the nature of the nervous system
allows. Yet, though thus limited in its power
and mode of action, what wondrous modifica-
tions of Nature has mind wrought! Looking
at the world generally, and especially at those
parts of it which we call civilized, is it too much to
say that a very large proportion of the pheno-
mena which we see are the products in part of
mind?—that is, are such as, but for mind,
Nature alone would not have brought about?
To ask whether these things are incredible
would be absurd. It is clear, that granting
the existence of mind, there both may be and
are myriads of phenomena occurring in Nature,
which Nature alone could never have produced;
and this without the slightest violation of
Natural law. But if so, then all that is required
to make miracles (in this respect) credible is the
assumption that they too are phenomena in
which mind has been concerned, with a similar
directive modifying influence.
Before proceeding to the new stage of the
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MIRACLES REGARDED
|
inquiry in which we are thus landed, it is
necessary to deal briefly with some objections
to the preceding argument. The first of these
is purely verbal, and turns upon the use of the
word Nature. Our argument has distinguished
between phenomena brought about by Nature
only, and by Nature directed within certain
limits by man's mind. Now it may be said: Is
not man's mind properly a part of Nature;
and ought not therefore his works and acts to
be called Natural, as much as those in which
he has no part? No doubt in one sense man's
mind is a part of Nature, nor would the above
argument be in the least degree affected were
its language altered to suit this view. The
distinction between mind, and the ordinary
forces concerned in phenomena, is a real one
however it is expressed; and upon that the
whole argument turns. We should simply
have to substitute "physical" or "material"
for "Natural," and the result arrived at would
be precisely the same. Natural, however,
seems the most appropriate term, 1st, because
of the common distinction between "natural”
and "artificial," which separates sharply be-
tween works produced by human agency and
others, restricting "natural" to the latter;
and 2nd, because the current scientific use of
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
135
the word Nature does certainly exclude mind
from its contents.
The second objection is vital to the whole
question, since it denies that any distinction
whatever can be drawn between mind and the
physical forces of Nature.
According to this
view (that of the materialists) man has properly
no mind at all; but what we call the mind is
simply the brain, or nervous system generally,
which acts and is acted upon by material forces
in the same way as any other material object
might be; the peculiar phenomena it produces
being solely due to the peculiarity of its struc-
ture and organization, and the relation of these
to the forces acting on it. Of course on such a
view the argument just drawn out breaks down
utterly; but so, also, does the whole inquiry of
which that argument is part. If man is nothing
more than a complex and delicate machine, a
mere automaton, to discuss whether he can be-
lieve in miracles is absurd. Scripture speaks of
man as having a soul, and it is for his soul's
sake that it describes miracles as having been
wrought. If, then, he has no soul, the question
is settled at once; of course there were no
miracles. We do not ask or expect, therefore,
any one who holds this materialistic view, of
man being a mere machine, to believe in mira-
136
MIRACLES REGARDED
cles. Nor is it proposed to enter at all into a
discussion of the view itself, since this would
lead us altogether away from the proper subject
in hand. The distinctness of the mind from the
material order of things is an ultimate fact in
each man's personal knowledge of himself. If
any one has it not, or having it refuses to ac-
knowledge its authority, the most that can be
done is to appeal to the consensus of human
belief against such an one, or proceed by an
ad hominem argument to show that if he rejects
this he ought, if consistent, no less to reject
the existence of matter and material force,-in
fact to believe in nothing. But this would
lead us into metaphysics.
Putting the materialist on one side, therefore,
as one to whom the whole question is necessarily
a nonentity, without relevance or meaning, we
deal for the future only with those who believe
that they have a mind and are not mere material
machines. Some of these, however, deny that
the mind is free to act; a denial which some
regard as equally inconsistent with the argu-
ment under consideration, and which therefore
may be regarded as a third objection. A very
few words will suffice to show that it is an
objection only in appearance. The popular
necessitarian view of the present day, which
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
137
puts the difficulty in its most plausible and ex-
tremest form, is this:-The actions of the mind
upon the nervous system are the direct and
necessary consequence of previous actions of
the nervous system (by way of sensation, &c.)
upon the mind; each complex action upon the
mind leading as inexorably to one certain action
of the mind, as if mind were but a part of the
chain of Natural causes. This may seem to be
a doctrine very similar to that of the materi-
alists just noticed. But in truth it is very
different; for it admits fully that mind is not
a material cause, and that effects flow from its
intervention which would not have happened
from the mere collocation of forces acting
upon it; whereas the materialist's view regards
so-called mind as the mere aggregate of these
Natural causes, producing no effect but such as
their material character directly occasioned.
All that the necessitarian does, in fact, is to add
another limitation of the mind's action to those
above laid down (pp. 132, 133),—the limitation
namely, that it can only act when excited from
without, and in exact accordance with the
nature of the excitement. But that the effects
which mind produces when excited differ from
those which would have been produced had
Natural causes been the only things at work-
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138
MIRACLES REGARDED
this is freely admitted; and this is the point
on which our argument turns. Although,
therefore, the denial of free-will may lessen
somewhat the apparent analogy between human
acts and miracles, yet as it does not touch the
essential point under discussion we may safely
dismiss the objection without expressing any
opinion on its intrinsic merits or demerits.
The case stands thus, then :-There are in
Nature myriads of phenomena which, though in
strict accordance with Natural law, and ener-
gized entirely by Natural causes, yet would
never have occurred had these Natural causes
been the only agents at work. Whatever ob-
jection is raised to miracles on this latter
ground applies with equal force to these occur-
rences also. But in the case of these it is
allowed no weight at all, because the control-
ling action of mind is recognized as fully suf-
ficient to account for the divergence from
Nature's proper order. Admit, then, the ac-
tion of mind in the case of miracles, and the
objection to them is in like manner altogether
at an end. They are, on this assumption, as
unexceptionable phenomena as the works of
man on the assumption of his mental activity.
Of course it is not human mind which we re-
quire to assume to make miracles credible.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
139
They are not only supernatural, but super-
human. The mind which directed their occur-
rence was GOD.
We have called this an assumption requisite
for the credibility of miracles, because it is in
this aspect that the course of our inquiry has
brought it before us. To regard it, however,
merely as an assumption necessitated by the
exigencies of argument would be most mislead-
ing. It is, we saw at starting, an essential and
most important part of the claim of Scripture
on behalf of miracles, that they were wrought
by the special intervention of God. We are
not asked to believe in them in any other light.
The position we have arrived at really, there-
fore, comes to this :-If the account which
Scripture gives of the causation of miracles is
true, then in respect to causation miracles are
perfectly credible. There is no objection to be
urged against them, which does not apply with
equal force to numbers of phenomena credited
unhesitatingly by the most sceptical. This
account of Scripture has been tested now in
two ways. It describes miracles as coming
from the same ultimate Author as Nature
does, and as standing to Him in a similar
relation. To see if this is so, miracles have
been compared in detail with Nature, and
140
MIRACLES REGARDED
it has been found that both in respect to the
laws governing them, and the causes (pro-
bably) producing them, they are quite in
harmony with Nature; the opinions to the con-
trary entertained by some having been shown
to be untenable. That miracles should have
proceeded from the same Author as other Natu-
ral phenomena is a proposition, then, which
involves no difficulty. But though in harmony
with Nature, miracles cannot be accounted for
by Nature only; they require besides the as-
sumption of a directing power exerted by a
superhuman mind. Now this is precisely the
remaining element in the Scriptural claim,-
that miracles owed their occurrence to the
special intervention of God. In this respect,
also, then, there is harmony. Do but grant
the agency alleged in Scripture, and the occur-
rence of miracles is perfectly credible.
And here we may just take up again for a
moment the only objection to our argument left
undiscussed above, the supposed insufficiency
of Natural causes to bring about miracles. We
know how wonderful, and how diverse from
Nature's order, are the phenomena which man's
intervention is capable of producing. We have
seen how limited is the sphere, and mode of
acting, of the directive influence by which man
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
141
does this. But with God there can be no such
limitations. Every where, at every time, His
control is capable of acting, and that on every
force of Nature, without check or hindrance.
If man, then, can do so much, and Natural
causes become in his hands sufficient to ac-
complish things so unlike what Nature ordi-
narily presents us with, how much more can
God do by such directive influence, and how
much more sufficient must Natural causes be
in His hands, to accomplish things still more
marvellous and above Nature's usual course.
Concede only that there is a God, and that He
chose to use the power over Nature which as
God He must possess, and the causation of
miracles is as credible as that of the commonest
events of our every-day life.
But will this be conceded? It involves two
assertions, to each of which objections have
been made. There are some who refuse to
concede that there is a God. There are still
more who refuse to concede that He chose to
use His power on behalf of miracles. With
the latter of these positions we have at present
nothing to do. It concerns the purpose and
motive of miracles, not their possibility as
effects of a given cause. Its discussion be-
longs, therefore, to the next chapter. Not so
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MIRACLES REGARDED
the former. This cuts at the root of the whole
question of causation, and is the extremest
form of disbelief to which miracles can possi-
bly be subject. Leaving, then, the Deistical
line of objection for the present, we turn to
this, the Atheistical.
The exact form in which it generally presents
itself now-a-days is to be carefully noted.
There are but few who go so far as positively
to deny that there is a God, or who attempt
to produce evidence for such a denial. The
majority of those, whom for convenience we
class together as Atheists, content themselves.
with denying that we know there is a God, and
with showing (as they think) that the evidence
commonly relied on to prove that there is one,
is insufficient. This distinction is of great im-
portance, for although the latter position is the
one actually taken up by the larger number, it
is the former which is really required to give
validity to the argument against miracles.
The basis of the reasoning is of course Nature.
It is said that Nature is so constituted that its
phenomena do not require us to believe in a
God; the reign of law is quite sufficient to
account for all that we see, without God. On
the other hand, miracles do require us to believe
in God, for they cannot be accounted for on
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
143
any other supposition. Nature and miracles,
therefore, are inconsistent.
Now this is a manifest fallacy. For what
this argument needs as its basis is not that
Nature does not require us to believe in God,
but that Nature requires us not to believe,
which is a very different thing. To say that
Natural law is sufficient to account for Natural
phenomena without God, is simply to say that
there is another alternative beside that of God's
being, which adequately explains them. But
the existence of such an alternative is no proof
that God is not; it only shows that, if this be
so, we cannot determine the question of His
existence from Nature alone.
Take a simple illustration by way of parallel.
On the slope of some hill a long straight
mound is observed forming a kind of terrace.
It is thought by some to be the work of man
part it may be of a Roman encampment. But
to this it is objected by others that a landslip,
or some such Natural cause, would fully ac-
count for the mound without calling in human
agency at all.
While the matter is in this
doubtful case, the discovery is announced of
some antiquity connected with the mound
which, if genuine, would prove it to be of
Roman origin. If, now, the advocates of its
144
MIRACLES REGARDED
Natural origin were to argue that because the
mound did not require human agency, but the
alleged antiquity did, therefore the two were
inconsistent; and the mound being well known
and certain, while the antiquity was only re-
ported of, therefore the latter ought to be dis-
credited as a forgery;-what would be thought
of such an argument? Would it not be laughed
at as absurd? Yet is it nothing but a fair in-
stance of exactly similar reasoning with that
relied on by many to prove that miracles are
incredible". The natural mode of reasoning
would surely be to argue from the clear to the
doubtful, and say that because the antiquity
discovered was Roman, therefore the mound
was so also. And so, by parity of reasoning,
that because miracles unquestionably required
Divine agency, therefore Nature also is to be
9 Of course the illustration is not perfect. In the case
supposed, human agency was an admitted fact on both sides,
the only dispute being as to its presence or absence in regard
to a particular phenomenon. Whereas in the case of Nature
and miracles the dispute is whether there is such a thing as
Divine agency at all. But, on the other hand, it is to be ob-
served that in the case of the illustration, it was also an ad-
mitted fact that Natural causes were sufficient to account for
the phenomenon without intelligent agency, which is not an
admitted fact in regard to Nature. The parallel, therefore,
though incomplete, is as fair to one side as to the other, the
two points of difference sufficiently balancing one another.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
145
ascribed to the same cause. The only answer
to this would be that Nature cannot be so
ascribed. In other words, that Natural pheno-
mena are such as to render it positively in-
credible that there is a God. But this position
is precisely that which disbelievers do not dare
to take up.
Here, then, so far as the question of bare
credibility is concerned, we might safely leave
the argument; the position taken up by un-
believers being one which cannot prove mira-
cles incredible, and the only position which
could do so being one which they do not take
up. But the sceptical premises, though they
do not warrant this extreme conclusion, yet do
warrant (if true) another conclusion of no little
importance, namely, that the whole burden of
proof that there is a God must rest upon mira-
cles; since clearly, if Nature can be accounted
for without God, His existence must not be
assumed as already conceded in arguing for the
credibility of miracles. Now Scripture in de-
scribing miracles does assume this as already
conceded; assumes, that is, that Nature's rela-
tion to God is an admitted fact before the
miracle takes place, and hence that by that re-
lation the miracle may be explained. Of mira-
cles designed to prove God's existence to those
I
146
MIRACLES REGARDED
who did not already allow it, we find none in
Scripture. Whether, therefore, this allegation
be correct, that Nature can be sufficiently ac-
counted for without God, is a matter of
very considerable importance, as determining
whether we have a right to assume God's
relation to Nature as an explanation of mira-
cles, or whether it is necessary to prove this
relation from miracles themselves'.
We have seen that all Natural phenomena
are resolved by science into the mutual action
of various kinds of matter and force in accord-
ance with fixed law. In many cases the belief
1 In thus stating the alternative it may seem as if the moral
grounds for believing in God's existence (viz., those founded
on our sense of dependence, of responsibility, of absolute right
and wrong, &c.,) were overlooked. They are not adduced, be-
cause, attentively considered, such moral grounds appear to be
incompetent to touch the point at issue. However strong
our convictions might be of the existence of a supreme Moral
Ruler, this would not afford any necessary presumption that
He was also Ruler of Nature, except the existence of the latter
was probable on independent grounds, in which case the
harmony observed between the two systems would be a fair
reason for concluding the Moral Governor and the Ruler of
Nature to be one. But if there were no independent grounds
for supposing a Ruler of Nature to exist, the mere belief in
a Moral Governor would not afford sufficient warrant for sup-
posing one, as there exists no necessary counexion between
the two ideas. The existence of a Ruler of Nature must be
established therefore, either from miracles (including, of
course, revelation), or from Nature's own evidence.
.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
147
that this is so is, founded upon analogy, the
precise constituents of the phenomena being
unknown. But wherever these are known, there
it invariably appears that these three elements
-matter, force, and law-are sufficient to
account for the phenomena. To conclude from
this that all Nature is to be accounted for in the
same way, seems buta reasonable inference. And
so long as we regard detached phenomena the
inference is just. But when we come to Nature
as a whole, then it is clear that matter, force, and
law, do not and cannot account for all. In the
first place they cannot account for their own exis-
tence. In the second place they cannot account
for the fact of their being actively at work, not
merely passive or in equilibrium. In the third
place they cannot account for the adaptation
of their results to certain ends, and especially
to the welfare of man and other living beings.
There are other things beside these, belonging
to particular sciences, which are also unac-
counted for, but of which we need not speak.
It will be enough briefly to point out the bear-
ing of the three general points enumerated,
which are true equally of all science.
Firstly then, matter, force, and law, do not
account for their own existence.
self-evident to need comment.
This is too
None of the
L 2
148
MIRACLES REGARDED
phenomena observable in Nature have, or, as
far as we can see, ever can have, a creative
power. They consist entirely of combinations,
decompositions, transformations, but never
of creation or annihilation. If, therefore, the
existence of matter, force, and law, is to be ac-
counted for, it must be by the assumption of
some other influence outside them, and capable
of doing things altogether beyond their power.
In this way Nature would point to a Creator.
The argument, however, so long as it stands
alone, cannot be pressed; for it is by no means
clear that the existence of matter, force, and
law, is a point which the human mind feels
ought to be accounted for. That their existence
is not necessary (i.e. that their non-existence
would not be deemed incredible), is manifest,
but on the other hand neither does their eter-
nity present any difficulty to the mind. In
fact, if we weigh one against the other the two
alternatives-to believe these things to have
existed always, and to believe them to have
come into existence at some definite time-
most minds will probably (so long as the idea
of God is kept out of view) find the former
easier than the latter. It is not until we have
got the idea of God that the difficulties of
Nature's eternity come strongly forward, and
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
149
we are led to the belief in creation. But if so,
then it is clear that we cannot in this way get
at the idea of God.
But, secondly, the existence of matter, force,
and law, does not account for their being in
action, rather than passive or in equilibrium;
and this is a point which the human mind
feels must be accounted for, before it can
be satisfied. When we see a thing at rest
(except that rest implies previous motion),
we do not feel impelled to ask, how came it
to be au rest?—that it should be so seems
quite natural, and needs no explanation. But
when we see a thing move, we are at once
impelled to ask (if we do not already know),
why does it move? what makes it move ?
Motion, or to put it in a wider form action,
is a thing which demands explanation. There
is an effect; there must, therefore, be a
cause. Whereas passive rest, i.e. either mere
existence, or equilibrium, does not, as we
have seen, thus necessarily demand to be
accounted for. This being, then, a law of
the human mind,-that wherever it discerns
action, there it feels that there is something to
be accounted for,-we ask, how far does science
satisfy this feeling? The recognition of this
feeling, and desire to satisfy it, are the very
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MIRACLES REGARDED
mainsprings of science; but how far is the
desire accomplished? Phenomena are analyzed
into particular combinations of matter and
force controlled by law, and these are rightly
said to be the causes of the phenomena. But
then they were causes already in action before
the phenomena took place; for, if not, they
would have had no power to produce such
effects. It was just because they were acting
that they were causes. But being things in
action they also in like manner need to be
accounted for. How came they to be in
action? Thus we are led back to another set
of causes, which also being things in action
require causes for themselves. And so on, step
by step; till at last we are fain to stop, not
because the difficulty is removed, but simply
because the links of causation have passed out
of our sight. It matters not how many these
links are, the real thing we are seeking for is
as far off at the end as it was at the beginning.
• Each link, no doubt, accounts thoroughly for all
that succeed it, but inasmuch as it stands in
precisely the same position of needing to be
2«The validity of all the Inductive Methods depends on
the assumption that every event, or the beginning of every
phenomenon, must have some cause." J. S. Mill, System of
Logic, Bk. III. ch. xxi. § 1. 7th ed., 1868.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
151
accounted for that the others did, the difficulty
is not lessened in the least.
But, it will be said: Do not Natural laws
solve this difficulty?—is it not these which
determine matter and force to action? Such an
idea can only come from an utter confusion of
mind as to what Natural laws are. They are,
in brief, nothing more than our expressions for
the uniform manner in which matter and force
act, and, as we believe, must act. But laws
of the manner of acting are altogether different
from, and in no way imply, laws causing to act.
Because it is a law that heat of certain
intensity will melt ice, it by no means follows
that ice will ever actually be melted, for that
this should happen requires further that the
heat and the ice should be brought in con-
tact. When this happens, we say the law
determines that the ice must be melted; but
how the ice and the heat came to be thus
together, that the law does not determine in
the least. Given any initial phenomenon,
where matter and force are in action, and
Natural law may be truly said to determine
not only its immediate result, but also all
the successive phenomena which arise from it;
but the initial phenomenon itself it cannot
account for. If it be said that this initial
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MIRACLES REGARDED
phenomenon is the result of preceding pheno-
mena, and so of law; this is simply pushing
the commencement of the chain farther back,
and saying that this was not the initial pheno-
menon, but some other. No doubt it is possible
by perpetually repeating this process of push-
ing back, and thus making the initial point in
the chain vague and indefinite, to so weary and
confuse the mind, or so occupy it with an
enormous number of intermediate links, as to
cause it to forget the object of its search, or
even imagine that it had attained it. But a
moment's thought will convince any one that
in so doing we have but hidden the difficulty,
not solved it; no, nor even approximated ever
so slightly to its solution.
.
Nor is this a mere metaphysical difficulty,
arising from the necessary laws of human
thought; it appears also in a purely physical
shape, in the doctrine of the degradation of
force. For the production of any Natural
phenomenon it is required not only that a
certain quantity of the suitable force or forces
be present, but that they be present in a
certain intensity. If from any cause the in-
tensity is lowered, the effect will no longer
ensue, however largely the quantity of the
forces may be increased. To take a single
•
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
153
"
·
rough example by way of illustration. We
have a furnace capable of melting cast-iron,
and we know that a certain amount of fuel
burnt in that furnace will enable us to melt a
certain quantity of iron, say 100 lbs. Suppose
now that we use this same quantity of fuel in
raising a large volume of water to the boiling
point; the apparatus being so arranged that
none of the heat shall be wasted or carried off
in steam, but all shall remain in the water.
In this volume of boiling water, then, we have
contained that quantity of heat which is suffi-
cient to melt 100 lbs. of iron. Yet it is clear
to every one, that to melt the iron by the heat
thus contained in the water is impossible.
There is enough heat there to do it we know;
but the heat is not sufficiently intense, in con-
sequence of its having been first employed to
boil the water. Nor can the heat be ever
again recovered from the boiling water in its
intenser form.
Now just such a change in the capacity of
forces to produce effects, as that here wrought
in the heat of the furnace by applying it to
boil water, is wrought in Natural forces gene-
rally, in well nigh every phenomenon that
occurs. There is no diminution of the quan-
tity of the forces; this remains constant. But
154
MIRACLES REGARDED
at the end of the phenomenon, some part at
least of the forces engaged will be found to
have become lowered in intensity; so that the
total force in existence after the phenomenon,
is no longer able to accomplish all that was in
its power before. Its capacity to produce
effects has become limited.
The converse of this, an increase in the
intensity of Natural forces, is very exceptional,
and is probably always accompanied with a
more than proportional degradation; a small
quantity of force becoming intensified at the
expense of a large quantity degraded. At all
events the occasional exceptions are quite unable
to affect the general tendency to degradation.
Now from this law of degradation, three
important results follow:-(1) It is clear that
Nature is not a system that can possibly, as a
whole, maintain itself. Its cycles may be
perpetually recurring, but the power that
moves each new course is not that which
worked in the old one, but new power drawn
from a higher level, and unable, after once
being used, to accomplish the same work over
again. (2) The ultimate tendency of Nature
is towards a state of passive rest and equili-
brium. Whenever two or more forces balance
one another, so as to be in equilibrium, such
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
155
equilibrium can only be disturbed by the in-
troduction of a new force of greater intensity.
Since, then, the whole forces of Nature are
ever being lowered in intensity, it follows that
their power to disturb equilibrium is steadily
diminishing; in other words, that an ever larger
and larger proportion of the Natural forces in
existence is daily becoming locked up in cir-
cumstances, from which there is no Natural
agency in the universe capable of liberating
⚫ them. The end of such a state of things can
only be absolute passivity. (3) There has
been, and to some extent still is, in Nature a
store of force of a degree of intensity far
greater than that which ever attaches to force
as it issues from Natural phenomena, and which
cannot therefore be accounted for as the result
of Nature, but must have sprung originally
from some other source. One of these store-
houses of force is the sun, or rather those
phenomena (whatever they are) which make
the sun the source of light and heat it is. The
enormous quantity of fresh force of high in-
tensity which we are daily receiving from the
sun, is what blinds as to the rapidity with
which force becomes degraded in our hands,
much in the same way as the daily receipt of
£1000 from his banker, might naturally blind
156
MIRACLES REGARDED
a spendthrift to the rapidity with which his
fortune was melting away, since he always had
plenty to spend, and however much he spent,
it made no apparent difference for the morrow.
None the less certain, however, would it be
that such a state of things could not go on
always; the end must be bankruptcy; and
the fact that he could go on so long arose only
from some one else having, before his days,
accumulated a fortune on his behalf. Just as
surely does the degradation of force in Nature
imply that Nature cannot go on in activity for
ever, but must end (left alone) in passive,
death-like rest; while that it is active now can
only be from some agency outside of and other
than Nature, which at the beginning conferred
on Nature that power to act which it would
never have possessed of itself.
Here, then, are vital points in Nature, which
the mind demands to have accounted for; but
which Nature by itself, no matter how scienti-
fically regarded, is hopelessly incompetent to
give even a clue to. But two alternatives
are open. We must either believe this missing
cause to be not material, but mental, or we must
give up the universality of Natural law, and
suppose that formerly action was able to arise
from rest in a way in which it does not arise,
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
157
The
and, according to law, cannot arise, now.
latter supposition would be destructive of all
science; for who could tell how often such in-
fractions of law had taken or would take place?
If once, long ago, why not frequently? This,
therefore, need not be further noticed. But it
may be said: Why conclude that the original
cause was mental, rather than any other kind
of power? For two reasons-1st, because all
matter, force, and law in Nature being ex-
cluded, there is simply no kind of power
but mental, which we can assume; and, 2nd,
because the phenomena of the human mind
afford (according to the ordinary view) an
exact parallel to the missing cause. It is
the characteristic function of the human mind,
by its directive influence, to evoke action where
otherwise there would be rest. If, then, there
is this power of mind known to exist and to
have precisely the function which, only to a
greater degree, the cause of Nature's action
must have, is it not the only reasonable con-
clusion that can be drawn, that mind is the
cause we are in search of? Of course, on the
3 The human mind, therefore, will be one of those excep-
tional cases of intensifying action alluded to above. It does
this, however, most probably at the expense of a much larger
quantity of force degraded; and so without any real balance
of gain.
158
MIRACLES REGARDED
materialist's view, what we call mind being
nothing but an aggregate of matter and force,
this analogy of human agency has no exis-
tence. On the necessitarian view it is weak-
ened, since although the phenomena of human
action still suggest that mind could have such
an initial influence, yet as man's mind never
has it, being always led to act by a previous
action of Nature upon itself, the analogy is much
less perfect and striking. Neither of these
views, however, touch in the least the main point
of the argument, namely, that the phenomena of
Nature inexorably demand for their explana-
tion the existence of some power beyond Nature
by which they were, at least once, set in action;
which power must be of a different order to
matter, force, or law. All that the analogy of
human influence is wanted for, is to make the
identification of this unknown power with an
intelligent but superhuman mind, clearer and
easier. Whether the analogy be perfect or im-
perfect makes comparatively little difference.
It is in this way beyond a doubt that the
contemplation of Nature has in all ages led man
to believe in the existence of God. He may have
localized the supernatural power which caused
the action of Nature, in Natural objects them-
selves, and so have believed in many Gods.
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
159
Or, perceiving the dependence of phenomena
one upon another, he may have selected some
one principal source of action, as the sun, and
supposed all supernatural power to reside in
that. Or he may have formed the grand con-
ception of One Great Spirit independent of all
things, yet pervading all, and acting upon all.
In either case his faith in the supernatural
equally bears witness to the necessity felt
by the human mind to believe in something
beyond Nature in order to account for Nature's
action. Not indeed that men commonly, or
perhaps ever, reasoned out the inference in the
detailed fashion in which it has been presented
above. The step from action to living agent
was much too natural and easy, for them to
stop and weigh the possibility of some other
explanation. Mind, and mind only, was in-
tuitively felt to be the one source to which
Natural phenomena must be ultimately ascribed.
But what was natural and intuitive in common
thought, has been shown to be in a scientific
view inexorable and demonstrative. However
dimly perceived, the reasoning of men generally
has been founded upon a deep principle of
necessity, and the essential conclusion come to
is only placed upon a firmer basis the more
keenly it is weighed and analyzed.
160
MIRACLES REGARDED
The transition from this belief in God as
the cause of Natural phenomena, to the belief
in Him as Creator, is simple and almost inevi-
table. The idea of an eternally existing uni-
verse utterly passive, waiting for the Divine
impetus which should set it in action, is plainly
a much harder and more improbable one than
that of a universe called into existence and set
in action at one and the same time. Hence,
from God as the cause of action arose naturally
the notion of God as the cause of existence¹.
4 The way in which this argument of causation is usually
expressed-"Every thing must have a cause, therefore there
is a First Cause "—is singularly unfortunate. The retort is
obvious. CC
Then, on this principle, God also must have a
cause," and so on ad infinitum. The argument in the text
is not exposed to this retort :-1st, Because it makes causation
the necessary inference from action, but not from existence.
2nd, Because it limits the inference to material action. The
grounds for both these positions lie, of course, in the personal
consciousness of the writer as to what are the necessary
laws of human thought in regard to causation; which must
be verified by the personal consciousness of each reader, there
being no universal court to which appeal is possible. To the
writer it seems perfectly clear that neither existence nor
mental influence are apprehended by the mind as things
requiring to be accounted for, in the same way that material
action is. They are not felt to be effects, but may be ultimate
facts. With regard to mental influence we do indeed think
of motive as necessarily or commonly preceding action, but
then by motive we do not as a rule mean external influence,
but internal aim or purpose, which, whether it is so or not, we
certainly regard as possibly self-evolved by the mind itself.
AS MIGHTY WORKS
161
On the third point in which science fails to
account for Nature, it is unnecessary to say
much. The argument from design is too well
known and has been too ably handled in other
works (as especially in the Duke of Argyle's
"Reign of Law,") to need either stating or en-
larging on here. It may suffice to point out
what is its special function; what, that is, it
adds to the results already obtained. The
second point insisted on landed us in the
belief that all the action of Nature must be
traced ultimately to the influence of super-
human mind, which mind we call God. And
the connexion of this with the first point was
seen to lead naturally to the belief that God is
also the Author of Nature's existence. Our
third point tells us that in thus causing Nature
to be and to act, God had at least partly in
view the welfare and happiness of living crea-
tures, and especially of man; thus at once en-
larging our conception of God's character and
attributes, and also affording us some slight
glimpse into His motives in causing Nature to
be what it is.
-
On these three points we take our stand.
The statement that Nature can be sufficiently
accounted for without God, that Natural pheno-
mena do not require us to assume His existence,
M
162
MIRACLES REGARDED
•
is proved to be false. For, on the contrary, it
appears that except we assume the existence
and influence of God we cannot account for
Nature at all. It is not, therefore, left to mira-
cles to prove that God is, but this may justly
be taken for granted as a means of explaining
them. And, be it observed, the main point
proved by the above inquiry is precisely the
very point which we needed to have proved in
order to explain them. For miracles to be
credible, we saw that it was necessary to
assume the existence of a superhuman mind
capable of directing the matter and forces of
Nature, so that other combinations should
occur, and other phenomena result, than those
which matter, foree, and law would, if left to
themselves, bring about. But we have now.
seen further, that for Natural phenomena to
occur, we are also compelled to assume the
existence of exactly such a mind, capable of
acting in exactly such a way. Natural pheno-
mena and miracles thus require precisely the
same assumption to account for their occur-
rence; the one difference being that Natural
phenomena are traceable to God's directive
influence through many intermediate links of
preceding phenomena, while miracles are trace-
able through at most but very few,—a difference
AS MIGHTY WORKS.
163
?
(6
not of kind, but of degree, since in this respect
every initial phenomenon of Nature was exactly
like a miracle. But for the difference in
purpose, indeed, we might justly reckon (as is
often done) every such initial phenomenon as a
miracle. In respect to external appearance and
to internal causation there is absolutely no
distinction. The argument before us really,
therefore, goes beyond what was proposed to
be proved by it. For it shows that not only
are miracles, viewed as mighty works,"
credible; but that "mighty works," indistin-
guishable from miracles, have actually occurred;
and that from these every phenomenon we see
around us has had its rise. If, then, the dis-
believer in " 'mighty works" would be con-
sistent, and would deal out the same measure
of faith to whatever possesses the same charac-
teristics, he must reject initial phenomena of
Nature as much as miracles; or rather, since
to do this would be to suppose that the long
sequence of subsequent phenomena have been
without cause altogether (which to a scientific
mind at all events must seem impossible), he
must reject all phenomena whatsoever, for
each one involves, far back in time, a miracle.
To sum up again in any detail the results of
the inquiry into the causation of miracles now
▸
M 2
164
MIRACLES REGARDED
completed, is quite unnecessary. We have seen
(1) that there is no necessary discordance be-
tween miracles and Nature, but that both may
well have proceeded from the same Author
acting after the same fashion; (2) that the
special intervention to which Scripture ascribes
miracles is quite sufficient to account for their
divergence from Nature's ordinary course; (3)
that the assumption of such an Author, capable
of so intervening, is one which Nature itself
compels us to make if we would satisfactorily
account for even the commonest phenomena.
In all these respects there is not the slightest
ground for pronouncing miracles incredible.
And this conclusion sets at rest also the ob-
jections urged against miracles as marvellous
phenomena. For the mode of causation of
miracles being one (proximately) different from
that of the ordinary events we have experience
of (the former being directly, the latter only
indirectly, connected with special Divine inter-
vention), miracles are at once placed out of the
range of common experience, and cannot, there-
fore, be rejected on account of any divergence
or contrariety in regard to it.
Both as phenomena and as effects, as
"marvels " and as "mighty works," miracles
are to be concluded as certainly credible, if one
AS MIGHTY WORKS
165
point only be granted—namely, that God chose
to exert for their occurrence that power over
Nature which He exerted in the initiation of
Natural phenomena generally. The discussion
of this final question we now proceed to.
166
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
•
!
CHAPTER IV.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
WHEN considering the different names given
to miracles in Scripture, we saw (pp. 36—38)
that the most frequent and characteristic one
was "sign." And the reason for this appeared
to be that by this name miracles were denoted
when viewed in connexion with their purpose,
which is plainly the most essential and weighty
point in regard to them. The value of mira-
cles lay in their fitness to accomplish certain
ends. Their relation to those ends therefore,
far more than their manner of causation, or
phenomenal character, constitutes their proper
essence, to which all else is subordinate. The
course of the preceding argument has shown
further that upon this question of purpose the
whole credibility of miracles depends. They
are credible as phenomena, they are credible
as effects, if it is credible that God chose to
work them; which of course depends entirely
upon the purpose which such intervention
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
167
would serve. Thus on either view, that of
Scripture, or that of critical inquiry, the
discussion of the purpose and significance of
miracles is of pre-eminent importance.
In the first place, it is advisable to fix clearly
what kind of purpose it is which Scripture
ascribes to miracles. This is implied, in part,
in the word "sign." A sign necessarily points
to something beyond itself, for the sake of
which it is given. There may, of course, be an
intrinsic value in the sign as well, but its chief
value as sign must always lie in the thing
signified. Miracles then, being signs, have
their chief value in something beyond them-
selves to which they point. When we inquire
why any miracle or set of miracles was wrought,
we are not to look so much to the miracles them-
selves for the answer, as to something outside of
them which they signified.
This is extremely
important to bear in mind. A very large num-
ber of Scripture miracles have an intrinsic
value of their own, and in dwelling on this we
are very apt to overlook the element of signi-
ficance. When, for instance, we read of the
plagues of Egypt, we are apt to regard them
merely as so many judgments wrought to
punish the obstinacy of Pharaoh, and to effect
the deliverance of Israel, because this was
168
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
their intrinsic character and value.
But Scrip-
ture speaks of them also in another light, viz.,
as signs of the relation in which God who
wrought them stood towards Egypt on the one
hand, and Israel on the other; and makes this,
rather than their intrinsic character and material
effects, the prominent point in regard to them.
So, again, in considering the miracles of healing
in the Gospels, we are apt to view them simply
as acts of mercy done for the benefit of the
sufferers. But beside this, Scripture speaks of
them as testimonies to the person and mission
of Him who wrought them, and makes this
rather than their intrinsic value the point to be
insisted on. In estimating the credibility of
miracles we of course look to both these points,
their intrinsic value and their ulterior signi-
fication, since both involve an element of
purpose; but we look far more to the latter
than the former, and this for three reasons:
(1) Because it is on the significance of miracles
that Scripture ever lays the greatest stress.
(2) Because while intrinsic value attaches only
to some miracles, and to these in very various
degrees, significance belongs to all, and to all
equally. (3) Because while the natural effects
of miracles were mostly transitory and local,
their significance is far-reaching and eternal.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
169
The value of a record of miracles to us lies
almost wholly in their significance.
If now, it be asked further, what it is which
miracles signify, there can be no doubt as to
the answer.
They point invariably to some
truth about God and His relation towards men.
The revealing or enforcing of such truths is the
true purpose of miracles. Whatever else they
did was subordinate, and one might almost say
accidental. To inquire whether miracles re-
garded as signs are credible, is hence the same
thing as to ask, (1) whether it is credible that
God should purpose to reveal or enforce truths
concerning Himself; and (2) whether, if so,
miracles are means so adapted to this purpose
as to make their employment for that end
credible.
The discussion of the first of these questions
involves a great and well-nigh insuperable
difficulty, the lack of any sufficient standard
by which to judge of it. When dealing with
the phenomenal character of miracles the
standard of appeal was ordinary human experi-
ence; when dealing with their causation the
standard was Nature: in both cases things well
known and easily examined. But in this new
question, as to the credibility of God purposing
to reveal certain truths, the standard is one
170
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
The most
almost wholly out of our reach. For the real
test of this credibility must be an appeal to
God's character and general designs in regard
to man. But, putting aside the informa-
tion given by miracles, what do we know
of God's character and designs? Extremely
little, and that little very dimly. To expect,
therefore, precise conclusions here, like those
arrived at in some of the earlier portions of
our inquiry, is out of the question.
we can hope to attain to is an approximate
result, that such revelation would not be, so
far as we can see, an unreasonable thing; or
something of that sort. Some there are, indeed,
who would substitute imagination for know-
ledge, and argue unhesitatingly from their con-
ceptions of God to the credibility of such and
such things being His acts. Others would
boldly presume that where we know nothing
there is nothing to be known, and hence that
whatever we cannot assert with confidence that
God would have done, that we may conclude
He did not do. But inasmuch as no conclu-
sions based upon such modes of arguing can
possibly be of the slightest value, we pass them
by, to get what meagre hints we can out of the
modicum of real knowledge which is at our
disposal.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
171
It has been already pointed out (p. 146, note),
that our knowledge of God independently of
revelation is of two kinds, Natural and Moral.
The only respect in which the former of these
bears upon the point under discussion is in the
item of design as exhibited in Nature, in so far
as that design has to do with the welfare of man.
If it be true that the arrangements of Nature
exhibit a special benevolent interest on the
part of Nature's Ruler in regard to man,
then it may certainly be inferred that if there
were any thing else beneficial to man, it would
not be (so far) out of harmony with that
Ruler's character to confer it. A similar in-
ference might, of course, be drawn with equal
justice in regard to all living beings. And in
neither case is the argument sufficient to
establish any definite presumption in favour of
special intervention. The most that it can do
is this: that if special intervention is alleged,
and its credibility turns upon the disposition of
Nature's Ruler towards living beings, then the
evidence of design shows that such favourable
intervention would not be discordant with His
disposition so far as design reveals it.
The evidence afforded by our Moral know-
ledge of God is of a different order, and goes
perhaps somewhat beyond this. However the
172
1
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
Maou
.
notions have been come by, whether by spon-
taneous generation within the mind, or through
experience of the moral order of the world,
there can be no doubt that men as a rule have
always had, apart from revelation, certain moral
notions, which have led up to a conception
more or less vague of a Moral Ruler. The
most important of these notions are those of
right and wrong, of responsibility, and of sin;
the last of these being derived from the other
two. Man feels that there is somewhere a
rule of right and wrong, which is beyond his
control or the control of any man, and which
he sees reflected within in the judgments of his
conscience, and without in the moral govern-
ment of the world. IIe feels further that this
rule carries with it a sense of obligation on his
part, that he should conform his actions to it; as
if the rule were imposed upon him by some supe-
rior power to whom he was accountable. Hence,
if he does not obey the rule, as he very soon
perceives that he does not, he is filled with a
mingled feeling of dissatisfaction, uneasiness,
and fear, which we call the sense of sin. The
interpretation which man has invariably put
upon these moral notions is, that there is a God,
either one or many, whose will in regard to
man is the rule of right and wrong, to whom
-
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
173
man is accountable, and who will reward or
punish according to man's deserts. That these
facts are so, is borne witness to by the universal
prevalence of religious notions and religious
services every where. It is easy to call such
things superstition and priestcraft; but if they
are such, they are none the less phenomena
which need to be accounted for. Whence came
superstition? What gave priestcraft its power?
Strike out the notion of God as having no
place in man's necessary conceptions, and how
shall the origin or dominance of this supersti-
tion be explained? Deny the universal sense
of sin, and where is the fulcrum which gave
priestcraft its tremendous power? It is, of
course, open to any one to deny that these
moral notions have any foundation in fact.
They may be characterized as delusions of the
imagination; though how in this case their
prevalence, or indeed origin, is to be accounted
for, it is hard to see. But however this may
be, it is at least plain that they are facts
in human nature, and facts which, along
with the facts of Nature before alluded to
(pp. 158, 159), have led mankind throughout all
time to some notion or other of God. Prefer-
ring, then, to suppose, as intrinsically most
reasonable, that these moral notions have a real
174
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
foundation, and are not baseless fancies, we
have to inquire how they bear upon the
credibility of revelation.
There is a Divine rule for man's conduct;
this rule he is bound to obey; and upon his
obedience depends to a certain extent his weal
or woe. Clearly then it is of importance to
man, 1st, to know exactly what that rule is;
2nd, to know what the issue of his obedience or
disobedience is; and 3rd, to know whether if
he have disobeyed, there is any means of avoid-
ing (1) the evil consequences of this disobe-
dience, and (2) the recurrence of the like
disobedience for the future. In a word, man
should know as much as possible of the moral
relations subsisting between God and himself.
Now part of this knowledge he has already in
these moral notions just reviewed, but not
enough to satisfy him either in respect to clear-
ness or extent. The desire to know more, and
more clearly, is manifested in the eagerness
with which men in all ages have been ready to
listen to and believe any one who came to them
professing to give them more knowledge on
these points; provided, of course, the new in-
formation offered them did not offend against
their prejudice too deeply. That a fuller know-
ledge of God's moral relations to men is a felt
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
175
Th
want of human nature, may be taken for granted
then. Now to argue from this want to its
supply, and say that because man thinks he
needs such knowledge, therefore God must
have given it, would be most unwarrantable.
Our ignorance of the plan of the universe, of
man's place in it, and of God's feeling towards
him (revelation being put on one side), is too
profound to allow of any such inference being
justly drawn. But while we dare not infer the
supply from the want, still less venture to
determine on à priori grounds (as some do)
the time, manner, and extent of this desiderated
revelation; this much we certainly are war-
ranted in inferring, that such a revelation,
conducing, as it seems to us it would, very
largely to man's highest interest, would not
be incredible. Nay, rather, that so far as
our knowledge enables us to judge, the weight
of probability is decidedly on the other side. It
would seem to us more credible that such a
revelation should be made than the contrary.
The extreme scantiness of our knowledge for-
bids indeed absolutely the inference that it was
made, but none the less does the balance of
credibility lie distinctly on that side rather than
the other.
Lastly, apart from these special views of
176
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
God, the mere fact that He is man's Maker
and Ruler, and that man is able to discern Him,
be it ever so dimly, as such, is enough to make
a subsequent revelation not incredible. God has
made man, and bestowed upon him intelligence;
that intelligence leads him to some scanty
knowledge of God, enough to stimulate his
desire for more, but not nearly enough to satisfy.
Now this result of his intelligence must surely
have been known to God, if indeed it was not
expressly designed and intended. Can it then
be deemed incredible that God should inter-
vene to satisfy this intelligent craving of His
own creating? Nay, is it not rather, so far
as our means of judging of the matter go,
more credible that He should, than that He
should not? Again, the basis we have for
reasoning is far too narrow and precarious to
allow of our inferring any thing certainly; but
what basis we have lends support distinctly to
the credibility of a revelation being vouchsafed,
rather than the contrary.
These three points, the existence of benefi-
cent design in Nature as implying God's good-
will towards man; the need of fuller acquaint-
ance with God's relations to man, on account
of man's sense of responsibility and sin; and
the inevitable desire for more knowledge of
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
1.77
his Maker, arising from his being created intel-
ligent; these are, it is believed, the chief
available standards to which appeal can be
made to determine the antecedent probability
of special revelation; to determine, that is,
whether it is credible that God should purpose
to reveal to man truths concerning Himself.
From each quarter a similar answer is obtained,
varying only in force and clearness ;-there is
no reason why this should be deemed incre-
dible; but there is some slight reason why it
should be deemed more credible than not.
The arguments commonly urged on the other
side, such as the difficulty or impossibility of
the Infinite holding communication with the
finite, &c., &c., will be found all to resolve
themselves into one or other of the two cases
alluded to at starting (p. 170), viz., where the
standard appealed to is either our imaginary
conception of what God is, or our ignorance
taken as if equivalent to knowledge. A de-
tailed discussion of them is hence unnecessary.
We turn, then, to the second question in-
volved in our inquiry ;-whether, it being
credible that God should purpose to reveal to
man truths concerning Himself, miracles are
means so adapted to this purpose as to make
their employment credible? The extreme
N
178
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
meagreness of the materials available for deter-
mining the former question, must make us all
the more careful in considering this, where the
matter lies more within our reach.
It is clear that all special revelation is a
departure from the normal order of the uni-
verse. It is not part of the law of mind that
God should make known to it new truths.
Rather, it is contrary to mental uniformity that
this should happen; as much so, as it is con-
trary to Natural uniformity that physical mira-
cles should happen. Accordingly we call
revelation a mental miracle. But if all revela-
tion is thus in its very essence miraculous, the
whole question might seem to be settled with-
out further discussion. Miracles are not only
means adapted to reveal truths, but they are
positively the only means available¹. Revela-
tion is itself a miracle, and so without miracles
-
1 This may seem to some like limiting God's power. But
it is not so. It is not said that God could not have caused
certain truths to be known without miracles. No doubt He
could, by placing their knowledge within man's power in the
ordinary course of Nature. But He has not done so; they are
not thus knowable. Hence to make them known requires
a departure from the ordinary course of Nature, that is, a
miracle; and this, not because God could not have ordered it
otherwise, but because God thus willed that it should be. If
miracles, therefore, are the only possible means of revelation,
it is only because such was God's will.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
179
there can be no revelation. If then revelation
be credible, miracles also must be credible. If
there is no objection, but rather the contrary,
to believing that God purposed the former;
there can be no objection, but rather the con-
trary, to believing that He purposed the latter.
Here, however, we are met by a flat denial
that God ever could choose to work a miracle.
It is inconsistent, it is said, with His character
and perfections. Of course this is tantamount
to a denial that God would ever vouchsafe a
revelation; and might therefore seem to belong
more properly to the preceding head. Since,
however, the form in which the objection meets
us is not a denial of God's willingness to make
certain truths known, but a denial of His will-
ingness to use certain means (which however
necessarily involves the other), it is somewhat
more convenient to consider it at this stage of
our inquiry than earlier.
1
The objection may thus be expressed : -The
only means we have of judging of God's
character and manner of working are the
manifestations of these observable in Nature.
Now the universal and essential characteristic
of Nature is that it is uniform, and that this
uniformity is absolute and rigid. There are
many cases continually occurring in which it
N 2
180
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
may seem to us that it would be most bene-
ficial if this uniformity were just for a moment
suspended or modified. We have wants that
need to be satisfied, desires that crave earnestly
for their object, and both wants and desires
seem to us legitimate and important, quite as
much so as any of those alleged in regard to
revelation. But in the way of these desires
stands Nature's uniformity. What we deside-
rate can be ours only by a deviation from the
normal order of Nature. Now in every such
case, experience teaches us that Nature does
not vary one iota on our behalf. Instead of its
uniformity bending to us, it is ever we, our
wants and desires, that have to bend to it, nay,
perhaps be utterly crushed by it.
But no
matter; Nature swerves not. And we believe
that this is so because Nature comes from God,
and adequately reflects God's character. God
is all-knowing, all-wise; and He alone is so.
God, then, in fashioning Nature has foreseen
and provided for every contingency that may
occur, and no one else is competent to judge
the wisdom or necessity of what He has or-
dered. Whatever it may seem to us, Nature
as it is is the right thing, the best thing. And
God never changes; from eternity to eternity
His will remains one and the same, unaltered
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
181
and unalterable. Nature, therefore, as it is, will
and must go on, working itself out according
to the plan originally designed for it by its
Author. To suppose a miracle to occur, sup-
poses one of two things,—either that the plan
originally designed was found in working to be
insufficient, and had to be modified accordingly;
or that God had changed His purpose, and
therefore deviated from His former plan. The
first of these suppositions makes God not all-
knowing, the second makes Him not immu-
table. But Nature teaches us that God is both
these; and Nature as reflecting God's charac-
ter is well known, and its testimony certain.
With this Divine character, so reflected and
borne witness to, miracles conflict. Miracles,
then, are incredible because they require us to
suppose God to be other than Nature repre-
sents Him to be. We cannot believe that He
whose character we read in Nature as all-wise
and unchanging could ever degrade and stul-
tify Himself by choosing to work a miracle.
This is, in brief, the objection which we have
now to consider, and is the same with that
reserved for the present chapter at the close of
the last (p. 165). It is to some extent an old
acquaintance arrayed in a new dress, to some
extent it is really new. The uniformity of
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MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
Nature, on which this objection mainly turns,
has come before us already in two forms, as a
matter of phenomenal experience, and as the
result of Natural law. We now trace it up to
its original,-the unchanging and omniscient
will of God. In so far, therefore, the objection
is old. But this new aspect brings with it new
difficulties altogether absent from the former
ones; and in so far it demands a new and in-
dependent treatment.
One important truth which the objection lays.
stress on is, that our conceptions of what would
be desirable are no criteria of what God will
actually do. We are apt to think that an
alteration in Nature's uniformity would be
advantageous in many cases. Such altera-
tion, however, does not take place, because
God's mind in regard to them is not as our
mind. This precisely confirms what was said.
above about the unwarrantableness of inferring
revelation from our need or desire for it. Then
we argued from à priori considerations; here
experience comes in and supports the same
opinion. The most that any such wants or
desires on our part entitle us to do, is to regard
any act fulfilling them as somewhat more
credible than it would otherwise have been:
an effect which inevitably follows from the
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
183
existence of the want. The only point here to
which it is necessary to demur, is the tacit
assumption that, because in our experience no
deviation from the uniform course of Nature
ever has taken place for the satisfaction of our
wants, therefore no such deviation ever can
take place. The true inference is, manifestly,
that we have no right to expect it; which is a
very different thing from the impossibility of its
occurrence. But the whole of this question of
experience has been so fully argued above in
Chap. II., that there is no need to go into it
again here.
The other great pair of truths which the
objection bases itself on, are the omniscient
wisdom and immutability of God as reflected
in the uniformity of Nature. There is no
truth of Natural theology, after that of God's
existence, that surpasses these in importance.
Nor can we conceive any more striking and
beautiful imaging of these truths than that
afforded by Nature, especially as discerned
by the scientific eye. The fallacy of the ob-
jection lies in the assumption that any other
mode of action, than this of undeviating uni-
formity, would be inconsistent with the attri-
butes of omniscience and immutability. That
this assumption is altogether unfounded may
184
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
be easily shown. Suppose that God foresaw
that at certain points in the world's history
crises would arise which might be most wisely
dealt with (in order to carry out His ends)
in a special way, and therefore determined
that when they arose He would deviate from
His normal manner of working;-would this
involve any inconsistency with His omnis-
cience or immutability? Surely not the
very least. His unusual action would be as
much foreseen, as much predetermined, as
much a part of the one unalterable plan, as
His usual. True, it would not carry the im-
press of these attributes on its face; it would
not reflect them (as we say), in the same way
that the latter does; but it would not be at all
inconsistent with them. If, then, such devia-
tions from Nature come before us, all we can
say is that from these exceptional occurrences
we could not have inferred that God was
omniscient and immutable. But neither could
we have inferred that He was not. We should
simply have known nothing at all about these
attributes, one way or the other.
But it will be said: Had God foreseen the
occurrence of such crises He would have pro-
vided for them by means of Nature's uniformity.
So perhaps we think; but what then? Is our
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
185
conception of what God was likely to do, to be
made the criterion of what He did do, so that
we should say "He must have done this," or
"He could not have done that?" It is a part
of this very objection that such inferences from
our ideas of what is fit, to what God will do,
are altogether unwarrantable. On this ground
only, then, we might dismiss the rejoinder as
utterly futile. But further, there is good reason
for rejecting it also on its own merits. Cer-
tainly, if we look only to the intrinsic charac-
ter and value of miracles it would seem as if
they might well have been superseded by some
original modification of the course of Nature.
For example: that instead of men being healed
miraculously, it should have been so ordered
that they should not have needed healing. But
we saw that this intrinsic value of miracles
was but a part, and that a very small and un-
important part, of the ends they were designed
to serve. Their main purpose was to point to
some truth concerning God outside themselves.
But this is precisely what the ordinary pheno-
mena of Nature would not have accomplished.
Had they, therefore, been superseded by such,
their proper significance would have been wholly
lost. On every ground, therefore, this alleged
non-accordance of miracles with God's fore-
-
186
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
sight must be set aside as invalid. They may
quite as well have been parts of a clearly fore-
seen and predetermined plan. And, be it
observed, it is thus that Scripture requires
us to regard them. We are not asked to be-
lieve in miracles which were after-thoughts,
but in such as were foreknown and decided on
before Nature's uniformity so much as began
to be. This appears, partly by the direct
statements of the sacred writers, who speak,
for example, frequently of the cardinal events
of Christ's life as having been fore-ordained
before the foundation of the world; partly by
one particular kind of miracles, prophecies, one
of the functions of which was to declare before-
hand how God would hereafter intervene to
carry out His purposes. The events thus de-
scribed as foreknown, or predicted as about to
happen, were many of them actual miracles,
while others were events so intimately bound up
with miracles that the foreknowledge of the one
implies the foreknowledge of the other. If,
for example, Christ's death and exaltation
were parts of the original Divine plan (as it is
repeatedly asserted they were), then apart
from all special references to His Resurrection,
we at once infer that this also was part, since
the contingencies which led to it were all of
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS. 187
-
them among the things foreseen. Now whether
this Scriptural view of miracles be accepted or
not, or whatever difficulties there may be in-
volved in it (difficulties which would require
far too long a digression to be discussed here),
this much is clear, that the assumption that
miracles were after-thoughts, being one (1) un-
necessary in itself, (2) inconsistent with the
proper significance of miracles, and (3) strongly
repudiated by Scripture, is one that can be
allowed no weight whatever as an objection to
their credibility. However strongly Nature's
uniformity may witness to God's foresight and
immutability, Scripture witnesses to it no less
clearly, and that as much in regard to mira-
cles as in regard to any other events.
But at least, it will be replied, a deviation
from Nature's uniformity must appear less
worthy of God than its strict observance; for
it is admitted that two of His greatest attri-
butes, which Nature exhibits in the clearest
light, are not thus manifestly displayed in
miracles. These, therefore, cannot but seem
less Divine, less noble, and surely must be in
so far less probable. No doubt this is to
some extent true, so long as these two attri-
butes of omniscience and immutability are the
only ones regarded; though even here mira-
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MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
cles of prophecy may be claimed as an impor-
tant exception, where foresight and unchanging
will are even more strikingly displayed than
in Nature. But these are not the only aspects
of God's character and relations to man which
miracles are designed to reveal. What if, to
make known other truths, God stooped from
the elevation of eternal uniformity, and deigned
to manifest Himself after a more human man-
ner, acting more as man would act;—is this
incredible, when the design of the whole was
man's instruction and welfare? Is it incre-
dible that one addressing foreigners should
speak in their language rather than his own?
And so, when God would make Himself known
to men, is it incredible that He should adopt
that method which would most easily be un-
derstood by them? (For that mankind has
ever regarded miracles as more apparent and
certain manifestations of God's action than
ordinary Nature, will scarcely be disputed.)
Nay, rather, is not this very condescension to
man's weakness, itself one of the most glorious
Divine attributes which miracles display?
Taken, therefore, in connexion with their
proper ends it cannot be said that miracles are
in any respect less worthy of God, or less
consistent with His greatness, than that
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
189
}
reign of unbending law which marks external
Nature.
The general conclusion thus arrived at, of the
at all events possible harmony of miracles with
what we know from other sources of God's
character, destroys the last stronghold of
sweeping unbelieving objection. We saw at
the close of the last chapter that there was no
tenable ground for objection on account of
their relation to our experience as phenomena,
or on account of their relation to God as un-
usual effects of His directive will, if it was
credible that His will should have been exerted
to produce them. This question we have now
discussed; and we have seen that so far as we
know what God's character and will is, there is
nothing either in the end to be attained by
miracles, or in miracles themselves as means to
that end, which is in the least inconsistent or
incongruous. We have not indeed any suffi-
cient ground for presuming that miracles
would actually be used; our basis of reasoning
is far too weak and narrow for that. But we
have even less ground for saying that they
are improbable. The matter is an entirely
open one, to be decided by the special reasons
for believing or disbelieving in each particular
case.
-
190
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
Here, then, it might seem as if our inquiry
closed, the discussion of such special reasons
being beside the purpose of the present work.
And if all that had been proposed were to decide.
upon the credibility of miracles in general, i. c.
whether any miracles could under any circum-
stances be believed, this would be the case.
But the subject in hand is not miracles in
general, but distinctively Scripture miracles.
Accordingly, both under the head of "marvels,”
and still more of "mighty works," we have
considered not only whether miracles in the
abstract were credible, but whether those re-
corded in Scripture were so. In like manner
here it seems necessary to turn to these special
cases, and inquire whether some "signs" being
credible, these particular ones are so.
It may
be that in them there is an incongruity with
God's character and will which should lead us
to reject them. In which case it would avail
little to have proved that such incongruity was
not of the essence of a miracle. Just, there-
fore, as in the case of the violation of law it was
necessary to examine the miracles of Scripture
in some detail, in order to see whether the
principle laid down applied to them; so here,
having decided that miracles need not, as
miracles, be inconsistent with God's cha-
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
191
racter and will, it is necessary to ascertain
whether Scripture miracles come under this
category..
We have said that some miracles are inevitable
to revelation, every act of revelation being itself
a miracle. But not all Scripture miracles are
of this kind. Many are rather accompaniments
of revelation; signs pointing to it, rather than
direct embodiments or vehicles of truths. Others
have a double character, being partly the one
and partly the other. Now it may be objected
that these latter kinds, which are not mere acts
of revelation, were unnecessary and therefore
incongruous. In employing miracles God
would surely employ no more than would
suffice for His purpose; and His purpose being
the revelation of certain truths, acts of reveal-
ing would be all that was really required. In
other words, the objection would assert that
mental miracles are the only credible ones ;
but that all physical ones must be rejected.
Now, as to the question of such and such mira-
cles being necessary,-this is a point which we
have no means whatever of determining. The
most we can do in any case is to ascertain
whether the occurrence of any miracle, as con-
trasted with its non-occurrence, was distinctly
advantageous; i. e. whether it tended to pro-
192
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
mote the general purpose in connexion with
which it was wrought. If it did, then it was
clearly, in regard to that purpose, credible.
Wherever, then, it appears that a particular
miracle or set of miracles was advantageous to
revelation, so that we may be sure that revela-
tion would not have fared so well without it as
with it, there it was clearly congruous, and as
a consequence credible, though we are in no
position to assert that it was necessary.
Were the physical miracles of Scripture,
then, such as distinctly tended to promote the
cause of revelation, so that revelation was more
effective with them than it would have been
without them? They were so in two ways:
1. They served as heralds and credentials to
those to whom revelations were made, and whose
office it was to communicate these revelations to
others. It was in connexion with such per-
sons, or very often through their visible in-
strumentality, that well-nigh every miracle
recorded in Scripture was wrought. One special
benefit of the miracles was, hence, to call atten-
tion to these messengers of God, and lead men
to give heed to their words; as was the case
with very many of the miracles recorded in
the Acts as wrought by Paul when on his
missionary journeys. Or still oftener their
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
193
(6
function was to establish the connexion of the
messenger with the Sender, so that his message
should be received as not his own but God's.
The former purpose of miracles is aptly illus-
trated by John iv. 45. "The Galileans re-
ceived Him, because they had seen all things
(i. e. all the signs, see ii. 22), which He
did in Jerusalem." The latter no less aptly
by John iii. 2, the words of Nicodemus,
Rabbi, we know that Thou hast come from
God as a teacher; for no one can do these
signs which Thou doest, except God be with
him." Now these advantages would not have
existed had physical miracles been absent.
Those who received revelations might no doubt
have conveyed them to others just as easily
without the accompaniment of visible miracles
as with it. But how difficult would it have
been in many cases for them to obtain a hear-
ing; how still more difficult to convince those
who would hear, that the message delivered was
any thing more than the individual opinion of
the speaker. Whereas the working of signs
proved that there was some power associated
with him, which claimed a higher reverence.
To argue from this that such accompanying
physical miracles were necessary for the accre-
diting of God's messengers, would be most
#
0
194
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
unwarrantable. We have no means of judging
à priori what God's plans in regard to revela-
tion were, and whether therefore the assistance
which such signs would afford was likely to be
given or withheld. All that is asserted is that
such signs harmonize with a scheme of revela-
tion and tend to promote it: and, therefore, if
revelation be credible these also are credible.
.
66
2. The other great function of physical
miracles was to embody in a visible and impres-
sive form some part of the teaching which they
accompanied. They were, in fact, what have
been well called "acted parables;" only with
this great advantage over spoken parables, that
they not only vividly illustrated the matter in
hand, but also gave a notable pledge of its
reality. They that are whole need not a
physician, but they that are sick," was an apt
proverbial parable illustrating Christ's princi-
ple in dealing with sinners,-receiving gladly
those who were despised and outcast, just be-
cause they most needed help.
His cleansing
the outcast lepers, whom every one else
avoided, was no less an illustration of this, with
the added point that it showed His power to
give the help that was needed. The physician
of the body was in each case the "sign" of
the physician of the soul; but when that sign
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
195
was exhibited in a miracle it afforded at the
same time a pledge of His efficiency. So, again,
when Paul would make clear certain truths
about our resurrection, he uses the parabolic
illustration of seed buried in the ground and
springing up again with a new body. But
when he would insist on the reality of our
resurrection, he turns at once to a miracle,-
“Christ died and rose again." It needs no
argument to show that this function of mira-
cles was distinctly advantageous to the cause
of revelation, fulfilling an office which nothing
else, so far as we can see, could have fulfilled
so well. Again, therefore, while entirely dis-
claiming any desire to assert such miracles to
be necessary accompaniments of revelation, we
conclude that they are harmonious and con-
gruous accompaniments, and as such credible.
Under one or other of these two heads all
physical miracles in Scripture may be classed.
They are either "signs" pointing to and ac-
crediting God's messenger, or they are "signs"
pointing to and enforcing His message. In
very many cases they are both of these at once.
The worth of these considerations as to the
congruity of miracles to a scheme of revelation,
may be best tested by applying them in detail
to some of the objections which have been
0 2
196
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
>
brought against Scripture miracles on this
score.
It has been objected to several miracles in
Scripture that they are trivial in their character,
and the occasions on which they were wrought;
and are thus unworthy of being accompani-
ments of revelation. This objection is espe-
cially urged against the cycle of miracles
connected with Elisha, as his making the iron
axe-head swim, his healing the waters of
Jericho, multiplying the widow's oil to pay her
debt, healing the poisonous mess of pottage, &c.
It is also urged against some of the miracles of
Christ, as especially His turning the water into
wine at the marriage-feast, with a few others.
Now, in all these instances, the triviality of the
miracles depends upon their being viewed ex-
clusively in their intrinsic character, leaving
out of account altogether their significance.
Elisha's miracles were not mere acts of helpful
kindness to those among whom he dwelt.
They were, besides, so many marks of the
reality of his prophetic mission, and marks
precisely of that character which would most
come home to those who were to receive his
teaching. They were miracles wrought amongst
those sons of the prophets" who were to be
the salt of the nation's religious life. How
-
66
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
197
1
necessary was it that their instructor and chief
should be felt by them to be one who had his
commission from on high; how advisable that
the signs of this commission should not only
be manifest and undeniable, but of such a
character as would make them feel that God
was cognizant of and interested in their simple
life and daily cares, and that so their religion
also was to be a matter of every-day life-of
the field, the house, the table,—as well as of
formal worship and outward observances. Thus
regarded, in connexion with the circumstances
under which they were wrought, and the signi-
ficance which they must hence have had, these
miracles of Elisha are seen to be perfectly con-
gruous and quite worthy of the revelation they
accompanied. Much that has been said on
these signs applies equally to such New Testa-
ment miracles as the turning water into wine.
Regard this as having no end but the supply of
wine for a festal gathering, and it may seem
trivial. But regard it as significant of the
unascetic, joy-giving character of Christ's
mission, and its near relation to common life
and men's every-day affairs, and all triviality
is at an end. Add on to this the profound
teaching embodied in the miracle itself,-the
transformation of the common and mean into
198
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
the precious and noble, the substitution of in-
ward life-giving for outward cleansing, of the
Christian banquet for Jewish purification,—and
it becomes one of the most glorious recorded
in the whole Gospel history.
Some miracles, again, are objected to on ac-
count of their alleged grotesqueness.
We
may take as the principal instances commonly
adduced, the speaking of Balaam's ass, and the
preservation of Jonah in the fish. To both of
these the same explanation must be given,-
examine carefully the circumstances of the
case, and the end which the miracle served;
and its congruity and fitness will appear so
manifestly, that all idea of grotesqueness will
drop out of sight.
It is clear that the main purpose of the
former miracle must have been some truth
which it was to teach the prophet himself.
The circumstances of its occurrence place
the idea of accrediting, or of general sig-
nificance to others, out of the question. What
truth, then, was it calculated to teach? To
arrive at this we must look somewhat farther
back than the miraculous occurrence itself.
The ass spoke because unjustly smitten; but
how came it to be unjustly smitten? Because
Balaam had failed to see what the ass did see
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
199
-the angel of God standing in the way, and
opposing their progress. But why did Balaam
fail to see this? No doubt because his thoughts
were intent upon the errand he was bound for,
the gain and honour he hoped to obtain; gain
and honour to be obtained by the misuse of
his special prophetic organ-speech on God's
behalf. Here, then, lies the contrast:-Balaam
intent on gain to be gotten by misused speech,
sees not the angel opposing, and would go
on in spite of him. The ass, with clearer eye,
sees the angel, and refuses. Balaam smites.
the ass, and God, through the ass's mouth,
rebukes him. Surely there is a deep congruity
in this miracle. The lesson which Balaam
needed to be taught was that speech, being
God's gift, must be used only in subjection to
God's will, and not as he was disposed to use
it. This lesson was taught by God suddenly
conferring powers of speech on the ass who
did subject himself to God, for the rebuke of
Balaam who did not. Could any thing more
forcibly impress the prophet with the utter
madness of the course he was entering upon?
If he refused to convey God's messages, was
God bound down to him only as a messenger?
Might He not choose others, ay, even brute
beasts, as worthier organs whereby to speak?
200
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
Might not, again, the same power which gave
the power of speech to a submissive ass, re-
move it altogether from the rebellious prophet?
The intense reiteration, in the subsequent pro-
phecies, of the thought, "I cannot go beyond the
word that God putteth in my mouth" (Num.
xxii. 38, xxiii. 8, 12, 20, 26, xxiv. 13), shows
how deeply the lesson entered into the pro-
phet's heart. No doubt the same truth might
have been revealed to him in other ways, so
that we cannot say that the miracle of the
ass's speaking was necessary: but it was cer-
tainly congruous, and in its original setting
not in the least grotesque.
The second instance to be considered shows
very strikingly the way in which the signifi-
cance of miracles removes apparent difficulties.
in the way of their credibility. Taken intrin-
sically no incident could well seem more in-
congruous than the deliverance of Jonah by
the agency of the great fish. Why, if the
miracle were simply to secure his safe return,
should not some piece of drift wood have floated
by, to which he might have clung, and which
might equally, and without miracle, have
brought him safe to land? The answer to
this lies wholly in the significance of the mira-
cle. The fish swallowing Jonah was not pro-
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
201
perly the means of his deliverance; rather it
made his deliverance more utterly hopeless than
before. That he should be cast out into the
sea, in the midst of a storm, was all but cer-
tain death; but that being cast out, he should
immediately be swallowed by a shark (for this
is probably the fish intended') would make
his destruction inevitable. It is probable that
he actually did die, and that the miracle lay
chiefly in his resuscitation (see p. 122). Why
then was it wrought? Jonah's mission was to
Nineveh, to declare to that city God's impend-
ing wrath. The purpose of the miracle lay in
its connexion with that mission.. Taking all
the notices of Scripture into account, we can-
not doubt that the strange story of the pro-
phet's wonderful deliverance was either part
of his preaching, or was known already to his
listeners. In the first place, then, such a
miracle connected with the prophet could not
but draw attention to his message, and accredit
its authority. But, further, the miracle em-
bodied in itself the main truth which his mes-
sage was to convey, and testified in the most
striking manner to its reality. Jonah had dis-
obeyed God, and cast off His service; and for
G
2 See Pusey's Minor Prophets; Introduction to Jonah, pp.
257,258.
202
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
this offence wrath had come down upon him
suddenly and to the uttermost, with not a
chance of escape any where. The people of
Nineveh had disobeyed and cast off God far
more grievously than the prophet, and for this
they too were threatened with utter destruc-
tion;-what hope was there of escape? The
God who threatened was One who had shown
Himself prompt and fearful in His judgments.
They might well tremble at such a message.
Yet surely there was also a gleam of hope.
Jonah swallowed down by the fish, had yet on
repentance come forth alive, alive from the
very jaws of the grave. Might not, then, re-
pentance on their part lead in like manner to
God's forgiveness and their deliverance? This
was Jonah's message,-judgment, swift and
utter, for their sins; yet mingled with this, as
implied by the very fact of warning being sent
beforehand, a hope of mercy if they repented.
This, too, was what Jonah's own history pointed
to, whereby it was a "sign" to the men of Nine-
vah; and in pointing testified powerfully to the
reality of the things pointed to. Taken, then, in
its true connexion and significance the miracle
is seen to be full of meaning, and most congruous
to the circumstances under which it was wrought.
We cannot call such a "sign" grotesque.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
203
•
Objection has been taken to some miracles
on account of their supposed vindictiveness,
i.e. as exhibiting mere personal wrath, rather
than any thing connected with revelation.
Elijah's calling down fire upon the companies
of fifty sent to take him, and Christ's cursing
the fruitless fig-tree, may be taken as examples.
In regard to most of these the answer is very
plain: they were significant of God's wrath
against sinners, and especially against those
who opposed His revelation, and sought to
hinder or hurt His servants; the congruity of
which significance to Scripture revelation gene-
rally is too self-evident to need insisting on.
One instance seems, however, to require a some-
what more detailed notice, that, namely, of
Christ's cursing the fig-tree. The significance
of this does not lie so manifestly on the surface,
and hence the apparent ground for objec-
tion. Yet is its significance not far to seek;
it is simply an "acted parable." The com-
parison of nations and individuals to trees
runs throughout the whole of Scripture, and
nearly always with reference to their bearing
fruit. That a barren tree was doomed to
destruction was a common parabolic proverb.
Christ had Himself used the image of a fig-
tree in this sense not long before (Luke
204
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
xiii. 6-9). Thus far, therefore, all is clear.
The whole difficulty lies in the fact that this
fig-tree was cursed for barrenness at a time
when figs were not reasonably to be expected.
But then as little were leaves to be expected;
for with the fig-tree leaves accompany or follow
the fruit, so that when the time of leaves is,
then also is the time of figs. Now this tree
had leaves, and perceiving these Christ came
to it to see if "under these circumstances"
(not "haply" as in the A.V.), He should find
figs. The tree, as it were, professed to be
fruitful by having leaves; yet in fact it was
barren; and, because it was thus, so to speak,
inconsistent and hypocritical, therefore it was
cursed. And just here lay the point of the
parable. The city of Jerusalem and nation
of the Jews were not only barren trees
in God's sight, but had now aggravated
their sin by a hypocritical profession of fruit-
fulness. Had they not but yesterday made
a great show by the welcome they gave to
Christ at His entry? Yet when He drew
nearer and looked for the fruit which such show
ought to have betokened, He found nothing.
All the more surely and speedily, then, should
the withering wrath of God come down upon
them, as now upon their type the leafy figless
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
205
tree. Thus regarded, the miracle is seen to be
no petty act of personal disappointment and
spite, but a clear and most impressive parable,
exactly appropriate to the occasion on which
it was wrought, and most congruous to the
whole scheme of revelation.
The various instances of alleged incongruity
above discussed may be taken as sufficient
samples of the objections urged against Scrip-
ture miracles on this head, and how much such
objections are worth. We have seen that
though here and there the significance of a
miracle is not obvious at first sight, yet that
it requires only a more thorough observation
of the whole circumstances of the case, and
the whole testimony of Scripture in regard to
it, and forthwith the significance appears clear
as daylight, and all question of incongruity is
at an end. This fact, that every miracle in
Scripture can be shown to be significant and
congruous in so simple a manner, by the ap-
plication of two such natural principles as
those of accrediting and illustration, will seem
to many a valuable independent evidence of
their truth. And when to this we add the long
range of time and variety of circumstances,
under which these miracles are said to have been
wrought, the number and diversity of writers
206
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
who have recorded them; and yet that through-
out all the utmost harmony prevails; that just
where in the history accrediting or illustration
seemed most wanted, there miracles are seen
most to abound, and invariably just of that
kind which appear most precisely suited to the
necessities of the occasion;-when we add all
this, the evidence will seem to many stronger
still. Doubtless there is much to be said on
this head which the disbeliever in miracles
would find it hard to give a satisfactory ex-
planation of. To accumulate evidence for
miracles, however, is not our object, but to
examine the worth of the objections raised
against them. This aspect of the subject, there-
fore, we pass over.
But have we reached the end of sceptical
objection? We have tracked it back from
the first crude off-hand difficulty of experience,
through the keen exactitude of scientific criti-
cism, to the speculative doubts of theologians,
and the petty cavils of rationalists; and nowhere
throughout the whole inquiry have we detected
any solid ground on which the assertion of
incredibility could be based. Is, then, the
whole ground of objection closed? On the
contrary, it is not too much to say that only
now are we really getting to the root of the
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
207
matter, and reaching that which is the original
of well-nigh all objections to miracles. Each
conclusion arrived at during the course of
our inquiry has rested on an assumption to
be verified farther on. Our final conclusion is
of the same character, and in like manner rests
on an assumption. This assumption it is which
furnishes the one remaining ground for scep-
tical objection.
We have said that Scripture miracles are
congruous to the Scripture scheme of revela-
tion, and that being congruous, it is therefore
credible that God wrought them; and if it
is credible that He wrought them, then they
are also credible, both as effects surpassing the
power of undirected Natural causes to bring
about, and as phenomena contrary to prior
human experience. Now here all depends upon
one point, namely, that the Scripture scheme
of revelation is itself credible; in other words,
that the teaching concerning God and His re-
lations to man, which miracles are represented
as bearing witness to, is such teaching as we
can believe to be true. If not, then clearly
the congruity of miracles to the revelation.
of that teaching is no proof of the credibility
of God working them; and so the whole chain
of argument, link by link, breaks down, and
1
208
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
every difficulty that has been met and put aside
springs up again with renewed life and vigour,
as formidable as ever. This being so, it would
seem as if we must now proceed to discuss in
detail the intrinsic credibility of Scripture
revelation, as that upon which all the rest
depends. For the purpose of the present
argument, however, such an inquiry would be
altogether out of place. It may seem para-
doxical to say so, after the admission just
made; but a little consideration will show that
the paradox is one merely in appearance.
The point from which we started was, that
miracles, being essentially connected with the
religion of the Bible, were objected to either
as impossibilities, or at all events, as difficul-
ties in the way of receiving that religion; and
accordingly that it was through an assault on
miracles that the religion was generally at-
tacked. The point at which we have arrived
is, that miracles are both credible and con-
gruous, without the slightest difficulty attach-
ing to them, if the revelation with which they
are connected is credible. That is to say, the
position of the argument at its close is pre-
cisely the converse of what it was at the begin-
ning. Then the religion was attacked through
miracles; now it appears that miracles can only
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
209
be attacked through the religion. Then it
was the incredibility of miracles that was to
drag down and swamp the religion; now it is
the incredibility of the religion that must first
of all be called in to confer incredibility on the
miracles. But, this being so, it is plain that
miracles are not in themselves difficulties in the
way of faith; but become such only when the
religion is doubted or disbelieved. Now it
was precisely the intrinsic difficulties of miracles
that it was proposed to discuss, and estimate
the worth of. When, therefore, it appears that
there are no such difficulties, but that what
difficulties there are come wholly from another
quarter, the work proposed to be done is mani-
festly accomplished. To proceed now to discuss
the intrinsic credibility of the religion of the
Bible, would be to leave miracles altogether, and
enter upon an entirely new subject. It is enough
to have shown that if objection is to come, it
must be from the religion against the miracles,
not from the miracles against the religion.
3 Of course this refers only to miracles viewed as Scripture
presents them, i.e. as indissolubly connected with religion. If
miracles be viewed in an independent aspect, there are no
doubt abundant difficulties. But this is exactly the aspect in
which we have no right to view them. The discussion of
other miracles, which may fairly be so viewed, would be foreign
to the present treatise, and is therefore passed over.
P
210
MIRACLES. REGARDED AS SIGNS.
But this is not all. The position at which
we have arrived points to two further conclu-
sions of great importance.
First, it shows that all the sceptical assaults
on the Bible and its religion made through
attacks on miracles are nothing but reasoning
in a circle. There is no objection raised against
miracles which does not rest ultimately upon
an objection against the religion, and derive
from this its whole validity. One objector
attacks miracles as inconsistent with the
character of God. We reply that if he will
but take a wider view of that character, as
depicted in the revelation with which miracles
are connected, he will see that no such incon-
sistency exists. What is his answer? Why,
that this view of God's character to which we
refer is one which he holds to be untrue. And
this objection to the revelation it is, which
gives the whole force and basis to his objec-
tion against miracles. Another attacks mira-
cles as inconsistent with Natural law. We
reply that the reign of law in no way excludes
the directive influence of an intelligent will
in modifying the results which matter, force,
and law would of themselves bring about.
Miracles claim to be events arising from such
directive influence on the part of the highest
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
211
intelligence in the universe. Regard miracles
as so occasioned, and all inconsistency with
Natural law ceases to exist. What is the
objector's reply? He refuses thus to regard
them; i.e. he refuses to allow that it is even
possible for miracles to have been thus occa-
sioned. We press him for a reason; why does
he refuse this? Here the answer may vary.
Some will say that they do not believe in God
at all; some that they do not believe He is such
an one as would interfere in this way; some
that the cause assigned for His interference is
one in their opinion unworthy of Him. Every
one of which answers is a direct objection to
the revelation miracles attest; yet upon which
objections the whole validity of the objection
to miracles ultimately rests. Strike out the
sceptic's reasons for disbelieving God's agency
in miracles, and his difficulties about their
causation are seen to be utterly baseless. In
the same way it would be easy to show how
the objection against miracles, as phenomena
contrary to experience, depends upon a re-
jection of the special agency and circumstances
with which Scripture connects them. And so
with every other diverse form of sceptical
objection; inquire into it but a little; trace it
back to its real basis; and in each case the
1
P 2
212
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
same result will ensue-it will be found to rest
in the end upon some disbelief in the reve-
lation. Now, if there are reasons for dis-
believing the Divinity of the religion of the
Bible, such as should discredit the miracles
alleged to have been connected with it, by all
means let these be brought forward. But let
not the difficulties which, if these reasons
were valid, would attach to miracles, be urged
as if they formed a new reason for discrediting
the religion; since they are really nothing but
results of the old reasons, and have no inde-
pendent value. Still less let the real reasons
be kept out of sight, and these mere inferences
from them be paraded as if they were objec-
tions standing on their own merits. It is not
said, be it observed, that this is done inten-
tionally. Long familiarity with the stand-
point of disbelief, and with the difficulties
which miracles present when viewed from
thence, has doubtless in many cases so con-
fused the sense of the true relation which
these bear to each other, that cause is mistaken
for effect, and consequence for reason. The
sceptic may hence honestly think his arguments
against miracles independent and unbiassed.
But, as we have seen, it needs but to probe the
matter somewhat more deeply, and each one is
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
213
found to rest upon just such items of disbelief
(if not indeed more far-reaching ones) as the
objections against miracles are urged to esta-
blish; and thus the whole reasoning is shown
to be nothing better than reasoning in a circle,
the point to be proved being in fact assumed
in the premises.
But, secondly, we see here also where it is
that the sceptical feeling in regard to miracles
really springs from. Difficulties as to miracles
are not the first stages of disbelief, probably in
any case; but are preceded by doubts or diffi-
culties of quite another kind. This is so even in
the extreme case of those who, without positively
discrediting miracles, yet feel them to be things
hard to believe. It may seem to such that
their difficulty arises solely from some incon-
sistency of miracles with experience or with
Nature. But let them look a little deeper, and
they will soon perceive that the real root of the
difficulty is not there, but that it consists in a
lack of faith in God as the Author of the reli-
gion and the Worker of the miracles. God's
action is not realized, and of course the results
of that action appear difficult. There is the
germ of the scepticism as to the religion under-
neath, out of sight; and therefore miracles
appear hard of credence.
In others the germ
214
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
is more developed; it is not merely that God's
action is not realized, but it is positively
doubted of, and of course miracles at once
appear equally dubious. Or if God's action be
actually denied, then miracles are incredible.
Nor is it merely doubts as to God's agency
which thus give rise to scepticism as to mira-
cles, though this is doubtless the commonest
case. It may be some difficulty as to the
purpose of miracles, or the truths which they
profess to bear witness to, which constitutes the
ultimate cause of disbelief. The doubt may
be intellectual, or moral; it may concern the
fact of revelation, or the matter of it; the doc-
trines taught, or the precepts laid down. But
in every case it is the parent of the doubt re-
specting miracles, not the offspring. The reli-
gion of the Bible is not doubted or disbelieved
on account of miracles, but miracles are doubted
or disbelieved because of some prior doubt or
disbelief as to the religion.
But it will be said, how, if this be the case,
can miracles be evidences of the truth of the
religion? If no one can believe miracles who
does not previously regard the religion as
credible, are they not useless ?-for why should
not the religion be accepted on its own merits
without them? Nay, is not this an instance
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
215
of that very reasoning in a circle which has
just been condemned on the other side? Do
you not in fact assume the truth of the religion
in the first instance, and then, viewing mira-
cles from this standpoint, prove them to be
credible; which credibility is afterwards urged
as evidence for the truth of the religion, really
assumed at starting? The solution of this
difficulty consists in two facts of cardinal im-
portance, which will serve to complete the view
of the value and functions of miracles to which
the preceding argument has been gradually
working up.
1st. We are not asked to believe in miracles
merely because they are credible, but because
they actually occurred. Their credibility, as here
regarded, is nothing more than a necessary
condition of their belief, not in any sense its
cause. The Christian, for example, does not
believe in the resurrection of Jesus Christ,
because this is a phenomenon which he has no
experience capable of contravening, or because
it is an effect which he regards Divine agency
as quite sufficient to account for, or even
because it is an event most congruous to a
scheme of revelation in his eyes well worthy of
God to have given, an event calculated both to
accredit the messenger and enforce and illus-
216
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
***
trate the message, but he believes it because
there is such and such evidence that it actually
took place. This is the real reason for his
faith; all the rest are merely considerations to
confirm this positive evidence, by removing
difficulties and refuting possible objections;
preliminary conditions requisite to faith, but
not its real cause. And so with all other
miracles. All that the establishment of their
credibility does is to clear the way for the
reception of the proper evidence in regard to
them; to remove the difficulties which would
otherwise have prevented testimony from being
heard. If they do not stand the preliminary
test of credibility; then, as we simply cannot
believe them, testimony is of no use. But if
they do stand the test, and are credible, then
we may believe them; there is no reason why
we should not; and in fact we ought to do so if
the direct evidence in their favour is sufficient.
Though, therefore, we cannot believe miracles to
have occurred unless we regard the religion with
which they are connected as credible, yet we
are not asked to believe miracles because the
religion is credible, but because there is such
and such evidence for their actual occurrence,
the credibility of the religion merely setting
aside any objections that might be raised to
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
217
the reception of this evidence. In a word, the
relation of miracles to a credible religion is a
purely negative criterion of their truth. The
positive grounds of belief come from another
quarter, altogether independent of this. And
hence it is no reasoning in a circle to say that
a recognition of such credibility must precede
the recognition of miracles as true.
2nd. For the establishment of this preliminary
credibility of miracles it is not required that
the religion should be credited, but only be
regarded as credible, i. e. of such a character
as may possibly be true. If the opposite were
the case, and we must believe the religion
before we could believe the miracles, then
although there would be no reasoning in a
circle, yet miracles would seem so compara-
tively useless as to shake their credibility not
a little.
But nothing of the kind is required.
All we need to admit is that the religion is one
which might conceivably have come from God,
and therefore one which appropriate testimony
might establish to be true;-again a purely
negative criterion, equivalent to saying that
we see no fatal objection to its Divinity 4. To
4 It is to be observed that this is the sense in which the
word “credible" is used throughout the whole of the present
work. Nowhere is it used to denote what actually is, or
necessarily ought to be, believed; but every where that to
218
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
pass from this mere admission of possible truth
to the belief that the religion really is true, is
an enormous step, to accomplish which is the
design of miracles.
How is it that they do this? They accom-
pany revelation, sometimes slightly preceding
it, sometimes following it, oftenest going side.
by side with it. Thus accompanying it, their
first office is by their extraordinary character
to call attention to it; which we may call their
function as 66
""
marvels.'
But the observer or hearer is not only startled
by their strangeness, but is led to wonder how
such things come about. The natural thought
in most men's minds is that of some super-
natural agency, the ordinary course of Nature
being plainly insufficient to account for them.
Or if this thought does not spontaneously
occur, it is speedily supplied by the messenger
whom the miracles accompany; and then the
miracles confirm the thought. To suggest or
confirm this idea of supernatural agency, we
may call their function as "mighty works."
But now what supernatural agency? They
T
which no sufficient objection exists why it should not be
believed. Just as "incredible" signifies "impossible to
believe," so "credible" signifies "possible to believe," and
nothing more.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
219
claim to be works of God, wrought in attesta-
tion of a revelation of Himself to men. If
this be admitted, then their great and final
office is fulfilled also-their function as "signs."
But upon what will this admission depend?
It will depend (other things being equal) upon
the willingness or unwillingness of those who
observe or hear about the miracles to believe
that such a revelation could come from God. If
men find the revelation opposed to their pre-
conceived notions, as postulating the existence
of a God, which they do not believe; or as
postulating the existence of human souls, which
they do not believe; or as asserting certain
attributes of God, or relations of Him to men,
which they do not believe (i. e. in each case do
not believe to be possible); then they reject the
significance of the miracles, and their evidence
is unavailing. Or, again, if men find the re-
velation distasteful to them, as requiring them
to admit things about themselves which they
are loath to admit; or as requiring them to
adopt a mode of life which they dislike adopt-
ing; then also they are likely to reject the
miracles. Or, lastly, if men feel no desire for
any of that knowledge which the revelation
brings, no want of any thing which the revela-
tion offers; then, too, they will probably, from
220
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
3
sheer indifference, reject the miracles; at all
events, their evidence will be utterly without
effect. In all these cases miracles can prove
nothing. On the other hand if there are no
such intellectual or moral objections to the
revelation; and if there is the desire for know-
ledge and the felt want of help; then the
significance of miracles will be accepted, and
they will be received as evidence that the re-
velation is indeed from God. We say "other
things being equal," for of course if the evidence
of the fact of occurrence be weak or defective,
those most prepared and willing to receive the
revelation may
doubt or disbelieve it as much
as the most unwilling and incredulous.
It would seem, then, that the evidential value
miracles is ultimately to prove to those who
are prepared to receive the revelation, that the
revelation is worthy of reception; and to leave
those who object to it as incredible uncon-
vinced in their incredulity. And so far as
the direct evidence of miracles is concerned,
this is all that they can do. Indirectly, how-
ever, they may do more. He who denies the
significance of miracles cannot stop there. He
must besides deny either their supernatural
character or their occurrence; he must either
say that they are facts within the ordinary
fdg
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
221
course of Nature, i. e. deny them as "mighty
works;" or he must say that no such facts
occurred at all, i. e. deny them as "marvels."
Now on the first alternative he is at once
brought into collision with physical science,
which refuses to allow that Scripture mira-
cles could have occurred as part of the or-
dinary course of Nature. This accordingly
is a position which few sceptics, certainly no
enlightened ones, choose to adopt. They prefer
the other one, that no such facts ever occurred
at all; that is, that the accounts of them are
either simple falsehoods, or myths embodying
certain ideas, or legendary and exaggerated
stories of other facts which did occur. In
either case the sceptic is brought face to face
with the varied mass of evidence which con-
centrates its testimony on their actual occur-
rence (see pp. 16—20). All this evidence must
be gainsaid and overthrown if the occurrence of
Scripture miracles is denied. Now it may well
be that the consideration of the difficulties
thus involved in disbelief may lead a man to .
weigh again the difficulties on his side which´
led to disbelief. He may perceive that the
former are really greater than the latter; that
it is easier to regard his pre-conceptions as
wrong, his antipathies as mistaken, his indif-
-
222
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
ference as ignorant, than to regard such an
accumulated weight of testimony as false. And
so he may be led, as many doubtless have
been led, to renounce his objections to the
revelation, to accept the significance of mira-
cles, and to believe that both miracles and
revelation are from God. But this is clearly
not the work of miracles as such; they have not
convinced him, and from the nature of the case
never could. They have only led him indirectly
to re-examine the grounds of his former unbe-
lief, and to find them insufficient. Then, and not
till then, do miracles come into play directly,
the obstacles to their action being now removed.
The position of miracles towards the religion
of the Bible is, then, on the whole briefly this:
-They are the focus to which all the various
lines of evidence external and internal converge
on the one hand, and from which all the truths
of revelation spread out on the other. What-
ever testimony there is on behalf of the religion
to be obtained from any quarter is in effect a
testimony to miracles. Whatever that religion
has to teach us, which we knew not before,
comes to us through miracles. They are the
meeting-place of the human and Natural, and
the Divine; the link between heaven and earth.
And they are such a link as brings the question
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
223.
of belief to a clear and precise issue, making
every man who looks them full in the face
decide definitely whether he will accept the
religion or not. To those who are open to
receive such a religion, and desire what it offers,
miracles establish its truth beyond dispute.
To those who are prejudiced against it, or in-
different, they do but call up in stronger force,
because in clearer form, the objections which
make them disbelieve or doubt it. Some of
these, being made to see what their objections
really are, and how weighty a conclusion they
are called upon to bear, may thus be led to
perceive their futility and renounce them.
Others are only confirmed in them more
strongly. In each case, directly or indirectly,
miracles are the turning-point of faith. They
are, as Moses aptly calls them, the great
"temptations" or "testings" of God.
All Israel had the same miraculous evidence
set before them, the same wondrous acts, the
the same proofs of a strong arm working on
their behalf, the same signs. But how dif-
ferent was the effect on them 5. In some
these signs wrought faith in God and obedience
to His servant; in others they did but serve
to bring out into greater prominence their
5 Comp. 1 Cor. x. 1-5.
224
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
66
see
disbelief and rebellion. What is said espe-
cially of the healing of the waters of Marah
and the manna (Exod. xv. 25, 26; xvi. 4),
was true of all the miracles (as well as the
privations) of the Exodus, they were to
try" the people, to "prove" them, to "
what was in their hearts" (Deut. iv. 34, vii.
19, viii. 2-4. 16, xxix. 2, 3). And as it was
in Moses' days, so it was in Christ's; the
"signs" which led some to faith, did but
aggravate the unbelief and sin of others (John
ii. 11, 23, iii. 2, x. 25, xi. 47, 48, xii. 37, xv.
24). And so it doubtless will be with mira-
cles, and their effects on men's minds, to the
end of time.
There are some who will cavil at such evi-
dences as these, and say that if God gave a
revelation at all it ought to be such as would
commend itself to every man alike, and leave
no room for doubt. But even supposing that
we had a right (which we have not) thus to
infer God's actions from our conceptions of
what was fit for Him to do; the question
might still be asked,-how could this have
been? So diverse are men that on almost every
subject, with whatever evidence you like to
bring, some will be found who will not be
convinced. Certainly such diversity exists in
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
225
1
all matters connected with religion, be that
religion what it may. Except, therefore, God
were to go so far as to compel men to believe,
there could be (so far as we can see) no evidence
given which should ensure the faith of all. But
such compulsion would be to reduce men to the
level of mere machines, without intelligence or
will. Not such as these would God have for
His servants, but those who entered His
service from free, rational choice. Therefore
the evidence which He gave was such as allowed,
nay courted, such rational choice; sufficient to
convince any one willing to be convinced, in-
sufficient to compel the unwilling; enough,
wherever germs of religious faith existed, to
strengthen and develope it and make it reason-
able, not enough to evoke it afresh where
previous voluntary action had crushed it out
of being. The minimum of faith required thus
beforehand is very small,-only to believe that
God is, and that man needs to know Him and
be helped by Him. Both are points which
Nature and man's own mind are fully capable
of informing him upon without the slightest
aid from revelation. Is it unreasonable that
man should be required first to learn the
common lessons which his own conscience and
reason can teach him, ere any special revelation
Q
226
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
is vouchsafed to him? Is it unjust that the
eyes should be required to be opened before
God pours in the light, or the ears made atten-
tive before He begins to speak? Must He
force open men's eyes against their will, or
pull their fingers from their ears when they
have stopped them of their own accord?
"Whosoever hath, to him shall be given," is
the principle of the whole world's order, and
it is the principle of miracles.
This, then, is the final answer to our question,
"Can we believe in miracles?"
We can believe in them, if there be in us the
bare rudiments of religious faith, such as
Nature and our own selves instruct us in; if
we have learnt the alphabet of religion, and are
willing to learn more.
Then the message
is plain to us, for it is written in characters
that we already know, and whose import we
cannot fail to perceive.
We cannot believe in them, if the witness
of Nature and ourselves has been neglected
or set aside, or if having it we proudly refuse
to admit that it is only the alphabet, and the
real message is yet to come. Then all is enig-
matical, full of difficulties and stumbling-
blocks. But the difficulties are altogether of
our own making.
MIRACLES REGARDED AS SIGNS.
227
Whether, if the former answer be ours, we
proceed farther, and say that we ought to
believe in miracles, depends upon the balance
of testimony in regard to the particular miracles
in question; a department of the subject with
which the present argument is not concerned.
Its object has been simply to examine what are
the à priori difficulties in the way of belief, and
what they are worth. And if in respect to
these it has convinced any that they are not of
the insuperable character often asserted, or if
it has merely led them to see where it is that
these difficulties really come from, and so in-
duced a more careful weighing of their validity,
its object will have been fully accomplished.
THE END.
APR 15 1915
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