100
26
B
1419
G82
A32
179
DOKE
ARTES
1817
SCIENTIA
VERITAS
LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
PLURIBUS UNUM
TUEBOR
I-QUÆRIS PENINSULAM AMⱭNANT
CIRCUMSPICE
:
1
PHILOSOPHICAL
AND
LITERARY
ESSAYS.
÷
>
PHILOSOPHICAL
AND
LITERARY
ESSAY S.
BY
DR GREGORY, OF EDINBURGH.
VOL. II.
འབ༽དང་ཐང་ཁག་ལ་
Nam Sophia ars illa eft, quæ fallere fuaviter horas
Admonet, atque orci non timuiffe minas.
PSEUDON: apud PITCAIRN.
EDINBURGH:
SOLD BY T. CADELL, LONDON,
AND W. CREECH, EDINBURGH.
MDCCXCII.
1
}
1
་
eeeeeee
Lowell City Library.
WITHDRAWN
Class.....
Number
Sexepepepepepeeeeeeeeee
}
1
57578
k
SECT. VIII.
Further inftances of the truth of the three
Canons, in Mechanical Philofophy, and in
Chemiſtry: and of ſtriking analogy to them
in Vegetation, and in Senfation, and Belief;
in which occurrences or operations, though
there be a different relation between the
event obferved and the principle of Change,
and in fome of them a different principle of
Change from what there is in cafes of Caufe
and Effect in inanimate matter; yet there
is either no optional or difcretionary power,
or but very little of it, in the ſubject, with
respect to the Change that takes place.
A¹
LL the general inferences expreffed by
All the general inferta ces by
the preceding formule X = A, X+Y
=A+B, X— Y = A — B, XY
A B, are found experimentally true
as matters of fact in numberless inftances
of cauſe and effect in phyfics. We know
not of any exception to them in phyſical
ſcience; and have therefore every reaſon
which the nature of the thing admits of
B b
to
194
ESSA Y.
to believe, that they are univerfally true
with reſpect to phyſical caufes and effects.
Hence we muſt infer, that the principles
from which they are deduced as neceffary
confequences, to wit, the incapacity of
body to change its own condition, and
the conftant conjunction of caufe and ef-
fect, are juſt principles or laws of Nature.
This point it may be of fome confe-
quence to illuſtrate more fully: for it is
of much importance in an attempt to in-
veftigate the nature of the relation of
cauſe and effect in phyfics; though it is
by no means effential to the immediate
object which I have in view in this fec-
tion. For at prefent my object is not to
prove, that ſuch is the nature of body,
and that ſuch is the relation of caufe and
effect, but that fuch is not the relation of
motive and action; in order that I may
be enabled to reafon by neceffary confe-
quences to fome further conclufions re-
ſpecting this latter relation, and the na-
ture of mind, or of living perfons, when
it is fhewn, that the conjunction of mo-
tive and action is but occafional and fe-
parable.
And
SECT. VIII.
195
And I fhall endeavour further to illu-
ftrate the fame principle, and its obvious
neceffary inferences, by the nearly corre-
ſponding refult of fimilar combinations of
the principles of change in certain ope-
rations of mind, which are either wholly
or partly involuntary, fuch as fenfation
and belief.
For this purpoſe, I fhall give fome inftan-
ces of the truth of the neceffary inferences
already ſtated, and confequently of the truth
of the two principles affumed, in three
different branches of phyſical ſcience, me-
chanical philofophy, chemiſtry, and phy-
fiology; each of which is in fome mea-
fure regulated by certain laws peculiar to
itſelf, while all feem to be fubject to thoſe
two more general laws.
Perhaps it will be thought needlefs, or
little better than begging the queſtion, to
offer inftances of the truth of conclufions
deduced from the principle of the inacti-
vity of body, and that of the conftant
conjunction of caule and effect, from the
phænomena of mechanical philofophy, as
every perfon in the leaft acquainted with
B be
this
196
ÉS SAY.
this branch of fcience knows, that in it
there is not even a ſuſpicion, among men
of competent judgement and knowledge,
of any exception to either of thofe two
principles. And I believe fuch a fuppofi-
tion would at once be pronounced, not
merely falſe, but abfurd, even by the vul-
gar.
Nevertheleſs, as mechanical philofophy
affords many of the beſt underſtood and
moſt diſtinct and obvious examples of the
truth of the inferences and of the prin-
ciples in queftion, I fhall juſt mention,
but without offering any commentary in
proof of them, which I am fure would be
needlefs, that the well-known phænomena
of the motions of the comets and planets,
and the irregularities of theſe motions from
the mutual influence of the moving bo-
dies on one another, and the tides from
the tendency of the ocean to the fun and
moon, and the inclination of a pendulum
towards a mountain, and the curvilinear
paths of bodies projected obliquely near
the furface of the earth, and the retarda-
tion, and at laſt the ceafing, of the mo-
tion
SECT. VIII.
197
tion of a body projected directly upwards,
and the acceleration of the motion of a
heavy body, when falling unrefifted, or
little refifted, and the retardation or cea-
fing of motion from the refiftence of the
air, or from friction of any kind, plainly
fhew, that no difference of the kind, or
of the direction of the cauſes applied,
and that no difproportion of the quantity
of theſe cauſes, ever feparates, even in the
ſmalleſt degree, or for a fingle moment, a
caufe from its effect. Nor do any of thefe
phænomena afford the ſmalleſt proof or
prefumption, that a body can ever begin,
or vary, or prevent, or ftop, its own motion.
Chemiſtry affords innumerable inftances
of the truth of the fame general inferen-
ces, and confequently of the principles;
and we uniformly rely upon them in che-
miſtry, as well as in mechanics. It would
be needlefs to enumerate inftances of the
effects of heat ſingly applied in producing
expanfion, fufion, or evaporation; of a-
cids and alkalis on the blue vegetable tinc-
tures, of various menftrua on ſubſtances
which diffolve in them; of the concurrent
effects
•198
ESSA Y.
effects of heat and menftrua in producing
folution in many cafes; of heat and cold,
of acids and alkalis, oppofing one ano-
ther, and preventing or undoing each o-
ther's effects, either wholly or partly, ac-
cording to their ſeveral proportions in dif-
ferent cafes. But it may be worth while
to point out, that the fame general prin-
ciples afford to men of real philofophic ge-
nius, and extenfive chemical knowledge,
the means of explaining fome of the moſt
important phænomena in natural fcience;
just as NEWTON's first happy corollary
from the laws of motion, enabled him to
make fuch wonderful progrefs in the theo-
ry of aftronomy, and in other branches of
mechanical philoſophy.
It has been fhewn by an ingenious che-
mift*, that the complete folution and per-
manent fufpenfion of water in air, de-
pends partly on the effect of the air on the
water, partly on the effect of heat; and
* Dr HUTTON of Edinburgh, in an Effay read
before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1784.
that
SECT.
199
VIII.
that the effect of heat in this way is great-
er than in proportion to the increaſe of
temperature as meaſured by the thermo-
meter. Hence he very juftly infers, that
when two portions of air of different de-
grees of heat, and both of them faturated
with water, are mixed together, the whole
quantity of water cannot be retained in a
ſtate of ſolution; and that part of it muſt
immediately precipitate. This is found
experimentally true as a matter of fact,
and is the bafis of a fatisfactory theory of
the formation of rain and fnow, &c. and,
in general, of the condenſation of vapour
in the atmoſphere.
*
The fame author, in his obfervations
and reafonings concerning the forma-
tion of the various ftrata which compofe
a great part of the ſurface of this globe,
and concerning the effects of heat on thoſe
ftrata, very properly pointed out, that we
muſt not fuppofe the effects of heat on the
ſubſtances which compofe fuch ftrata to
* Read before the R. S. E. in 1785.
have
200
ESSAY.
have been preciſely the fame, along with the
vaft preffure which must have been applied
at the fame time in the bowels of the earth,
and without the admiffion of air, that
they would have been, if air had been
freely admitted, and little or no preffure
had been applied. Such remarks and rea-
fonings I conceive to be highly judicious
and important, and ſtrictly philofophical;
not merely on the faith of the analogy of
many familiar inftances of folution with
or without heat, and of fufion or calcina-
tion, or refufcitation, according to the o-
ther circumſtances or caufes applied along
with heat; but likewiſe as refults to be
expected a priori, as being neceffary con-
fequences of the acknowledged inactivity
of matter, and the fuppofed conftant con-
junction of cauſe and effect. We cannot
indeed, for reafons which it is unneceſſary
here to confider, in every cafe foretell what
particular effect will be the confequence
of a certain combination of cauſes. In
fome cafes, however, we can do this; as
in mechanical philofophy. But in all fuch
cafes of the combination of caufes, we çan
foretell, that the effect will be different
from
SECT.
201
VIII.
from that of either of the caufes applied
fingly. And the fame may be faid with
reſpect to the effects of the exact concur-
rence or the direct oppofition of different
caufes.
The phyfiology of vegetables affords
fome familiar and unquestionable inftan-
ces of the fame general and important
truths. But before mentioning any of thefe,
it is proper to premife, that, independ-
ently of any influence or operation of what
we commonly call Mind, there is, in every
cafe where either animal or vegetable life is
concerned, a different relation between the
cauſe and the effect, and feemingly de-
pending upon the concurrence or influ-
ence of fome further principle of change
in the ſubject, than what ſubſiſts in inani-
mate matter, or in the caufes and effects
that are the objects of mechanical and che-
mical philofophy. And where-ever the
action or operation of mind is concerned,
the difference of the relations in queſtion
becomes ſtill greater; but ftill there is
much analogy between them; and I be-
lieve
Сс
202
ESSA Y.
lieve the terms Caufe and Effect are almoſt
indifcriminately applied to both.
Thus, light, and heat, and air, and wa-
ter, and earth, and perhaps many other
principles, blended with thefe, or unknown
to us, are regarded as caufes of vegeta-
tion; not indeed purely and completely,
but in concurrence with the principle of
vegetable life, without which, in a feed or
in a plant, vegetation will neither begin
nor continue, though all the other caufes
fhould concur in the utmoſt perfection.
Even when this principle of life is preſent,
the other caufes taken fingly are not con-
ftantly conjoined with effect in point of
vegetation. Any one of them may be ap-
plied in vain; nay more than one of
them; as light, air, and earth without
heat, or all of, thefe without moiſture.
Yet, where the circumftances are fuch
that vegetation does go on, the effect of
any of the external caufes in contributing
to the general refult, is fufficiently ob-
vious. The different growth of the fame
kind of plant, in a very poor and in a
richly manured foil, in a very dry or in a
wet,
SECT.
203
VIII.
wet, in a hot or in a cold feafon, is well
known to every peafant The confequen-
ces of with-holding light, or a due fup-
ply of air, from a growing plant, have
been afcertained by experiments. From
want of light, the plant lofes, or never
acquires, its proper colour, fmell, and taſte;
and from want of either light or air, it be-
comes feeble and fickly; unlike the flower
Quem mulcent aure, firmat fol, educat imber.
In one well-known inftance, the leaves of a
plant which are fibrous when they grow
under water, become broad when they are
expoſed to the air.
We have innumerable correfponding in-
ſtances in ſenſation. I acknowledge fen-
fation to be an act of the mind, and in
part even a voluntary act, in fo far at leaſt
as it depends on attention, which to a cer-
tain degree is voluntary. But then it muſt
be obferved, that fenfation is, in part at
leaft, an involuntary act: we can neither
have it when we pleaſe, nor avoid having
it when the proper caufes of it are applied.
And it muſt be admitted, that even in
fenfation there is a certain chain of caufes
Cc 2
and
204
ESSA Y.
and effects; that the change of ſtate oc-
curring in an organ of ſenſe, in confe-
quence of an impreffion made on it, to
which change, in ordinary and favourable
circumſtances, our fenfations very exactly
correfpond, may fairly be regarded as the
effect of a certain caufe, or combination of
cauſes, applied. Therefore, while I ac-
knowledge the important difference, I
hope I may fairly make uſe of theſe ſtrong
circumſtances of analogy, between ſenſa-
tion and effect in inanimate matter: the
incapacity of feeling (I uſe here the term
in its moſt general acceptation) at plea-
fure, correfponds to inertia; the infepa-
rable connection, in ordinary cafes, be-
tween the impreffions made on the organs
of ſenſe and the fenfations arifing from
them, correfponds ftill more nearly to the
conftant conjunction of cauſe and effect
in inanimate matter. And from theſe cir-
cumſtances of analogy, notwithſtanding
the differences, refult the fame general in-
ferences as in pure phyfics, reſpecting the
fingle application, the exact concurrence,
the direct oppofition, and the combination
of impreffions or caufes, of fenfations
1
or
SECT.
205
VIII.
or effects. We ſhall here confider only the
laft of them, the cafe of combination of
impreffions, as being the moſt curious and
fatisfactory of them all.
It is well known, that in numberlefs in-
ſtances, where various impreffions, natu-
rally producing fenfations of the fame
kind, are made on an organ of ſenſe, ei-
ther exactly at once, or in very quick fuc-
ceffion, ſo that the former fhall not have
ceaſed when the latter have begun, inſtead
of the fimultaneous or fucceffive feparate
fenfations, correfponding to every ſingle
impreffion, we experience a fenfation dif-
ferent from what we fhould have had
from any one of the fame impreffions, if
it had been made fingly on the organ of
fenſe.
Thus, the taſte of moſt kinds of food,
and of liquors, which we commonly uſe,
is the refult of the combination of two
or more impreffions, different from one
another, and each of them of fuch a na-
ture, that if it had been made fingly, we
fhould have experienced a fenfation very
different
206
ESSA Y.
}
different from what refults from the com-
bination of them. The fame may be faid
with refpect to fmells; or with reſpect to
founds, as in mufic.
But we have the most complete and
beautiful illuftration of the principles in
queſtion, from the fenfe of fight, and in
the cafe of colours; where the difference
between the ſentation confequent upon
any one of the impreffions when made
fingly, and that refulting from a combi-
nation of different impreffions, is peculiar-
ly ftriking. The mixture, either by fi-
multaneous combination, or by very quick
fucceffion, of impreffions on the fame
points of the retine, which fingly would
have produced in us the perception of
blue and of yellow, gives us the perception
neither of blue nor of yellow, but of
green. It may be obſerved too, that this
refult takes place even when thoſe different
impreffions are made fingly, one on the
right eye, the other on the left eye, pro-
vided they be made at the fame time, and
on correfponding points of the two retine;
for inftance, on the centre of each: for
in
SECT. VIII.
207
in this cafe both colours are feen in the
fame direction or viſible place. And the
fhade or kind of green, or its approxima-
tion to blue or to yellow, correfponds to
the proportion of the two impreffions.
which would have been attended, if made
fingly, or on points of the retina that did
not correſpond, with the diftinct and ſe-
parate perception of theſe two colours.
The fame may be faid of the combination
of all other colours in various proportions
with one another; or of the mixture of
white, or of black, (which laſt we regard
only as the oppofite of all colour, or the
privation of colour), with different co-
lours, which they always render lighter
or darker. And it is well known, that
the combination of fuch impreffions as
fingly would have given us the percep-
tion of all the rainbow colours, in cer-
tain proportions, gives us the percep-
tion of none of them, but of pure white.
It may
be proper here to mention,
though it is plainly a circumſtance that
can require neither proof nor commenta-
ry, that where the effects refulting from
feveral
208
ESSA Y.
feveral different caufes applied at once
are fo incongruous in their nature or
kind, that they cannot be combined ſo as
to form what is called a Tertium quid, ſtill
the conjunction of cauſe and effect ap-
pears to be conftant; for each caufe is
followed ſeparately by its proper effect.
Thus, when a red-hot ball is projected
obliquely to the horizon from a canon, by
the combination of the projectile force,
and of gravity, and of the reſiſtance of
the air, it defcribes a certain irregular
curve. The refult in this cafe is an effect
different from what would have taken
place from any one or two of thofe cauſes
without the reft. The ball at the fame
time becomes gradually cooler, and hard-
er, and denſer, and lefs luminous, by the
diffufion or diffipation of its heat. Thefe
effects do not admit of combination with
the others, fo as to modify the path of
the ball; but yet they are as conftantly
conjoined with their refpective cauſes, as
the others are with theirs; and the con-
trary opinion, if not abfurd, would at
leaft be very fooliſh.
In
SECT.
209
VIII.
+
In like manner, where fenfation is con-
cerned, if the fenfations, refulting from
the different impreffions made on our or-
gans of fenfe, be of fuch different kinds
as not to admit of any compofition or mu-
tual modification, each takes place fingly;
and we can, at leaſt in moſt cafes, attend
to any one of them by itſelf, or perhaps
to ſeveral of them together. But this laſt
circumſtance is a matter of diſpute among
philofophers. Thus, when a perfon
grafps a ball of iron in his hand, and at
the fame time looks at it, he perceives, by
means of different impreffions, either at
once, or in any order in which he may
chufe to attend to them, that it is extend-
ed, figured, coloured, folid, hard, heavy,
hot or cold, rough or ſmooth: whence it
appears plainly, that theſe ſeveral tenfa-
tions, in fo far at leaſt as they are effects,
and not actions of ours depending on our
attention, and confequently to a certain.
degree on our will, are conftantly conjoin-
ed with their refpective caufes.
We have another good inftance of ana-
logy to the refult of the compofition, op-
pofition,
D d
1
210
ESSA Y.
pofition, and combination of phyfical
caufes, in the cafe of that ſtate or act of
the mind which we call Belief. This ftate
of the mind correfponds to, or, as we
commonly exprefs it, is determined or re-
gulated by, evidence of various kinds.
Like fenfation, it is almoft or perfectly an
involuntary act of the mind. We can
neither believe nor difbelieve as we pleaſe,
but according to the evidence which we
have. The utmoft we can do by any vo-
luntary effort towards regulating our be-
lief is to liſten or attend, or avoid and re-
fuſe to liften or attend, to the evidence in
any particular cafe; but when we do at-
tend, our belief follows of courſe accor-
ding to the evidence,
Evidence, however, is not, ftrictly ſpeak-
ing, conftantly conjoined with belief, as
phyſical caufes feem to be with their ef
fects for different kinds of evidence are
competent to different fubjects of belief,
and have no weight or influence in pro-
ducing belief on other fubjects, or in op-
pofition to other kinds of evidence.
Thus,
SECT. VIII.
211
Thus, the intuitive evidence of an a-
xiom, and the diftinct conclufive evidence
of demonſtration, produce firm and per-
fect belief, not to be fhaken, nor confirm-
ed, nor any way modified, by the evi-
dence of experiment, or of induction, or
of ſenſation, or of teftimony. As little can
demonftration be offered as evidence, in
oppofition to experiment, or fenfation, or
confcioufnefs, with refpect to any matter
of fact.
Moreover, the belief or conviction which
we have of the truth of an axiom, or of a
theorem demonftrated, admits of no de-
grees; nor can it be confirmed by any o-
ther axioms or demonftrations.
We have no reafon to think, that there
ever can be any oppofition of intuitive
evidence; that is, any contradictory a-
xioms. As little can there be contradicto-
ry demonftrations by juft inferences from
genuine axioms. But if there were fuch
an apparent oppofition of intuitive or of
demonſtrative evidence, in coníequence of
the undetected fallacy of certain princi-
D d 2
ples
212
ESSAY.
ples rafhly admitted, or of the reafoning
employed, we have reafon from analogy
to think, that the feemingly equal and
oppofing evidences would completely de-
ftroy each other's influence, that no be-
lief on either fide could take place, and that
we ſhould inevitably remain in uncertain-
ty and doubt.
Such is the cafe with reſpect to oppo-
fing demonſtrations from principles arbi-
trarily affumed or eſtabliſhed; as, for ex-
ample, exprefs laws, which either directly,
or in their remote confequences, may be
inconfiftent; or fpecial compact among
individuals, which, according to parti-
cular circumſtances, may lead by the moſt
irrefragable reaſoning to inconfiftent con--
clufions.
The well-known ancient ſtory of the
double dilemma, or dilemma retorted, is
a good inftance of this result. Euathlus
promifed Protagoras a reward when he
had taught him the art of pleading; and
it was to be paid the firſt day that he
gained any caute in the court. After a
confiderable
SECT.
213
VIII.
confiderable time, Protagoras goes to law
this dilemma:
66
with Euathlus, for the reward; and uſes
Either the cauſe will go
on my fide or on yours: if it goes on my
fide, you muſt pay me according to the
fentence of the judge; if it goes on your
fide, you muſt pay me according to your
bargain: therefore, whether the caufe
goes for me, or againſt me, you muft pay
me the reward " But Euathlus retorted
the dilemma, thus: "Either I fhall gain
the cauſe or lofe it: if I gain it, then no-
thing will be due according to the fen-
tence of the judge; but if I lofe the
caufe, nothing will be due to you accor-
ding to my bargain: therefore, whether
I gain or lofe the caufe, I will not pay
you; for nothing will be due to you."
I think it is faid, that the court, unable
to decide in favour of either party, order-
ed them both to appear in court again an
hundred years afterwards, to receive judge-
ment. This may be regarded as virtually
a decifion on one fide; and, in point of
equity, it may be thought on the wrong
one; but it was at leaſt an acknowledge-
ment
214
ESSAY.
ment of the impoffibility, which every per-
fon muſt perceive, of giving judgement
in favour of either party, according to the
exprefs terms of their compact, and the
neceffary inferences from them; or belie-
ving that the one party had a better right
to exact than the other had to with-hold
the ftipulated reward.
We have reafon to think, that in phyfics
accurate experiment and ftrict induction
will never afford oppofing or inconfiftent
evidence. But as our experiments are
often inaccurate, and our induction rafh
and imperfect, fuch an apparent oppofi-
tion frequently takes place, and doubt, in-
ſtead of belief, is the refult, at leaſt with
thoſe who attend equally and impartially
to the evidence on both fides of a que-
ftion. This is the cafe at prefent with
many candid and intelligent chemiſts with
reſpect to the exiſtence of fomething call-
ed Phlogiſton, and with reſpect to the com-
pofition or decompofition of water, of me-
tals, of different kinds of air, and of in-
flammable fubftances, in various proceffes.
With
SECT.
215
VIII.
With respect to belief founded on the
evidence of our fenfes; it is a matter of
much nicety, and little to the purpoſe of
this argument, to diſtinguiſh accurately be-
tween direct ſenſation, or perception, and
the quick, but fometimes erroneous, in-
ferences with refpect to the objects around
us, which we are accuſtomed to draw
from our fenfations. But taking the two
together, as we generally do in common
life, it muſt be evident, that we often
have fimple, fometimes concurring, ſome-
times oppofing evidence from them; and
this fometimes clear and ftrong, fome-
times obfcure and feeble. Correfponding
to thefe varieties of the evidence, we
experience varieties in the refult with re-
ſpect to belief, from the perfuafion of the
flighteſt probability, to the moſt irrefra-
gable conviction, or inextricable doubt:
As, for example, in the common occur-
rence of judging of the genus or fpecies,
or even recognifing the individual by
means of our fenfes. As in the caſe of
Ifaac when he was blind, and Jacob, in-
ftructed and difguifed by his mother,
came to obtain his bleffing: "The voice
66 is
216
ESSA Y.
"is Jacob's voice; but the hands are the
"hands of Efau." In moft cafes of be-
lief from fenfation, any apparent oppofi-
tion of the evidence is foon removed, by
repeated and careful examination of the
objects and the fenfations; but in many
cafes of belief from what is called cir-
cumftantial evidence, or even from direct
teſtimony, we have not that reſource; and
accordingly experience irreſiſtibly the va-
rious degrees and ſtates of probability,
conviction, or doubt, according to the na-
ture, the amount, the concurrence, the
combination, or the oppofition, of the evi-
dence before us.
Thus, one or two circumſtances, per-
haps trivial in themfelves, will make us
think a certain point, for example the
guilt of an accuſed perſon, probable in a
certain degree. More concurring circum-
ftances will render that point more and
more probable, till at laſt we cannot doubt
of it, even though we have no direct evi-
dence, either by fenfation or teftimony.
And according to thofe circumſtances we
experience the belief of various particu-
lars
•
SECT. VIII.
217
lars relating to the principal point in que-
ſtion; but if any circumftances, in oppo-
fition to thofe firft obferved and attended
to, are difcovered, then we fall into doubt,
and can no longer believe.
This kind of oppofition of evidence hap-
pens often where belief is to be regulated
merely by human teftimony, and where
ſome advantage is to be gained by one or
both parties by falfehood and perjury.
Cuftomhouſe-officers have obferved, that
fmugglers have an uncommon latitude of
conſcience in this refpect; and ſmugglers
are very apt to return the compliment.
Certain it is, at leaſt, that in fome trials
relating to ſmuggling, ten, twenty, or
more witneſſes, on one fide, have fworn
in direct oppofition to an equal number of
witneffes on the other, with reſpect to a
plain matter of fact, ſuch as a ſhip being
in a certain place, or within a certain di-
ftance of the fhore, at a particular time;
the truth of which fact they muſt all have
known perfectly. Jurymen are aſtoniſhed,
and even experienced lawyers and judges
are fometimes confounded, with ſuch con-
tradictory
E e
218
ESSAY.
tradictory teftimonies; nor can any of
them believe in fuch a cafe, till fome-
thing be brought to light that fhews on
which fide the perjury is; then the belief
on the other fide follows of courſe; for the
teſtimony of perjured men is no evidence,
nor ground of belief.
Teſtimonies concerning the fame fub-
ject, not inconfiftent, though different,
admit of combination; the reſult of which
is a combination of belief, or modified be-
lief, with reſpect to that fubject. Thus,
if fome mariners of good character, on
their return from a voyage, fhould declare
that at a certain time they had ſeen, in la-
titude 30° north, a veffel, which, from
particular circumftances, they judged to
be a certain fhip, thoſe intereſted in that
ſhip (if they knew of nothing to the con-
trary) would experience from their tefti-
mony fome belief; they would at leaſt
think it probable that their fhip was in
the latitude ſpecified at the time mention-
ed; and might reaſonably be ſuppoſed to
regulate their conduct with reſpect to their
ſhip according to that perfuafion. If an-
other
SECT.
219
VIII.
other fet of mariners, of good credit, be-
longing to another fhip, fhould come and
declare, that about that time, and nearly
in that latitude, they had feen that very
ſhip, and converfed with the people on
board, and found them all ſafe and well,
this would confirm the belief produced by
the former teſtimony, and convert the per-
fuafion of probability into conviction. But
if another ſet of mariners, as numerous
and of as good credit as the two former
fets, ſhould come and declare, that they
had feen that fhip, at the time mention-
ed, in latitude 30° fouth, the crew fickly,
and the veſſel leaky and difmaſted, thoſe
intereſted in the veſſel would be left in
doubt and anxiety, from the oppofition of
the evidence. But if the last fet of wit-
neſſes had teſtified only, that they ſaw the
ſhip in queſtion at the time mentioned, in
longitude 30° weft, but without knowing
the latitude, and had learnt from the crew
that they had met with a ſtorm, but eſca-
ped unhurt, as there would be no oppofi-
tion of evidence, but only a combination of
and as the evidence would be in every
reſpect competent and equal, the belief of
thoſe
E e 2
220
E S SA Y.
thofe concerned would in every refpect cor-.
refpond to it.
Theſe various inftances of belief I have
confidered with a degree of minuteneſs
that may appear unneceffary; but it is of
confequence to examine fuch caſes accu-
rately, in order to perceive more clearly
the difference between the refult in them
and that in correfponding cafes of motives
and voluntary actions. The perfect cor-
reſpondence of them, where the evidence
is of the fame kind and authority, to the
formula ſtated in the beginning of this fec-
tion, and the dependence of the refult on
the want of any optional or difcretionary
power in a perfon, with refpect to belief,
can neither require nor admit of proof.
SECT.
SECT. IX.
Inference from the doctrine of the Conftant
Conjunction of Motive and Action, which
is demonftrated as a neceſſary confequence of
it, and yet is notoriously falfe in point of
fact.
A
NY man of tolerable ingenuity, or
even induſtry, who will take the
trouble to fearch for inftances of the ana-
logy and reſemblance between the rela-
tion of cauſe and effect and that of mo-
tive and action, will eafily find many
thouſands of cafes, which may be con-
ſtrued into inſtances of the affumed prin-
ciples with refpect to the latter relation,
and regarded as good illuftrations of the
neceffary inferences which have been
drawn from thofe principles. But every
man of obfervation and candour muft
know and acknowledge, that there are
thouſands
}
ESSA Y.
222
thouſands of familiar inftances in direct
contradiction to thoſe inferences and prin-
ciples, any one of which is fufficient to
prove them falfe for as the inferences
are all ſtrictly neceffary, if the princi-
ples from which they are deduced be juſt,
they must be univerfally true; and an
exception to them is a refutation of one
or other, or both, of the principles affu-
med.
And it is chiefly on this account that
the principle of inertia of mind, and that
of the conftant conjunction of motive and
action, are expreffed feparately in this ar-
gument: for though the former is fully
implied in the latter, this is not mutual;
the inertia of mind may be conceived,
even though the relation of motive and
action should be, not a conftant, but an
occafional and feparable conjunction.
I fhall confider, fucceffively, inftances
of all the three cafes of the combination,
oppoſition, and concurrence of phyfical
cauſes, and of motives, reſpectively, in or-
der to fhew the difference between the
feemingly
SECT. IX.
223
feemingly conftant conjunction of caufe
and effect in phyfics, and the manifeftly
occafional and feparable conjunction of
motive and action.
See Diagram I.
If any cauſe be applied to a body, in con-
fequence of which it would move with a
certain velocity in the direction A B, and
no other cauſe be applied, which might
either accelerate or retard its motion, or
alter the direction of it, it will defcribe
the line A B in a certain time. But if an-
other cauſe be at the ſame time applied to
the body, in confequence of which, if ap-
plied fingly, it would have moved in the
direction A C, with fuch a velocity as to
deſcribe A C in the fame time that it
would deſcribe A B in confequence of the
other caufe; then, as Sir ISAAC NEWTON
has proved, it will, nay it muft, move in
the direction A D, and defcribe the whole
diagonal A D, in the fame time that it
would have defcribed either A B or A C
ſeparately, if only one of the cauſes of
motion had been applied.
But
224
ESSA Y.
But will the fame refult take place in the
cafe of a fimilar combination of motives
prompting to different actions?
If a porter is offered a guinea for every
mile that he will carry a letter in the di-
rection AB, and no other caufe or motive,
either phyfical or moral, occur, he will
probably go on in that direction, till ei-
ther the motive ceafe, by his defire of
wealth being fully gratified, or elſe fome
new motive, or fome phyfical caufe occur,
to ſtop, or retard, or alter his courfe; fuch
as fatigue, or hunger, or thirſt, or ſome
river, or fea, or mountain, which he can-
not pafs.
If the fame porter were at another time
offered either a guinea or half a guinea for
every mile that he ſhould carry the letter
in the direction A C, and no other caufe
or motive were applied, he would go in
the direction A C, with juft the fame li-
mitations and exceptions as in the former
cafe.
And the evident facts, or general reſult,
to
SECT.
225
IX.
to be expected in both theſe cafes, will be
admitted as true by thofe who deny, as
well as by thofe who affert, the philofo-
phical doctrine of Neceffity; and eſpecially
that of the conſtant conjunction of motive
and action. For it has never been faid,
nor can it without the moſt glaring folly
ever be faid, that there is no relation be-
tween motives and actions, or that there
is no analogy or reſemblance between this
relation and that of cauſe and effect in
phyfics, or that motives are never con-
joined with their proper actions: it is
only the nature of the former relation,
and the degree or extent of the refem-
blance between it and the latter, and the
preciſe point of the conftancy of the con-
junction of motive and action, that are
the fubjects of difpute between philofo-
phers and the vulgar. It might even ap-
pear probable, from a fuperficial view of
fuch inftances of the relation of motive
and action, that the conjunction between
them was conftant, like that between cauſe
and effect in phyfics. I mean, that this
might appear probable to men who either
had not the ufual natural conſciouſneſs of
felf-governing power and independent ac-
Ff
tivity
226
ESSA Y.
tivity in themſelves, or who, having fuch
conſciouſneſs, ſhould think fit to difregard
it as a fooliſh vulgar prejudice. But let
thoſe two motives, prompting to different
actions, be applied at once, and the error
and the folly of fuch an opinion will foon
appear.
Let our porter be offered a guinea a
mile for carrying the letter in the direc-
tion A B; and at the fame time let him
be offered half a guinea a mile for carry-
ing it in the direction AC; and let him be
afſured, that if he earn the guineas, he
cannot earn the half-guineas, and that if
he earn the half-guineas, he cannot earn
the guineas.
Will he go in the direction A B, or in
the direction A C, or in the direction
AD, or in any other direction, or will he
remain at reſt at the point A?
I fay, that if the doctrine of the inertia
of mind, and the conftant conjunction of
motive and action, be true, he will go in
the diagonal A D; and that it is folly for
him to make a pretence of thinking, and
ridiculous
SECT.
227
IX.
for
ridiculous to make any words about it;
go he must in that precife direction, as
fure as ever a projectile moved in a curve;
and pretty nearly for the fame reafons.
And this he must do, though he cannot
earn, and knows that he cannot earn, one
farthing by doing fo: for the circum-
ſtance of earning, or not earning, any
thing by his work, relates merely to the
vulgar notion of motive," that for the
fake of which," and has nothing to do
with the philofophical notion of motive,
which either confifts in, or at leaft com-
prehends, the ſpecific principle of con-
ſtant conjunction. Now, my purpoſe is
to fhew, that thofe two notions are in-
confiftent: for though this appears to me
felf-evident, and has been generally ac-
knowledged by mankind, at leaſt by the
vulgar; yet as philofophers of fuch emi-
nence as Mr HUME and Dr PRIESTLY
have not ſeen it, nor thought of it, it
muſt be owned, that it requires a rigorous
proof. And further I fay, that if the
porter do not go in that direction, the
doctrine in queſtion muſt be falfe.
F f 2
I
228
ESSA Y.
I do not fay, that he will defcribe the
whole diagonal A D in the fame time that
he would have deſcribed either A B or
AC feparately; for other motives or cau-
fes will occur to prevent his going with
more than a certain velocity: For in-
ftance, the pain or fatigue of too violent
exertions, or the phyfical impediments of
want of fufficient ſtrength or agility.
It muſt be obſerved, therefore, that my
argument extends only to the direction,
not to the velocity of the porter's motion,
in fuch a cafe of the combination of mo-
tives that are conftantly conjoined with
their refpective actions, and are applied
to a perſon who is incapable either of re-
fifting motives, or of acting without
them.
It may reaſonably be expected of every
perſon who ſeriouſly believes the doctrine
of Neceffity, and the conftant conjunction
of motive and action, as afferted by Mr
HUME, and who likewife underſtands and
believes the compofition of motion, as e-
ſtabliſhed by Sir ISAAC NEWTON, that
he
SECT. IX.
229
he ſhould admit at once my conclufion
concerning the motion of the porter in
the circumſtances fpecified, without re-
quiring any further argument in proof of
it than what is comprehended in the al-
gebraical canons already ftated. Never-
theleſs, as there is reafon to think that the
doctrine of Neceffity has been often main-
tained by men who knew nothing of
NEWTON'S Principia; and as the conclu-
fion in queſtion is fomewhat repugnant to
common opinion, it may be neceſſary to
ſtate the proof of it more fully.
It is, in the first place, felf-evident, that
the porter, in the circumſtances ſpecified,
muft either remain at reft at the point A,
or move from it.
If he remain at reft at the point A, it is
plain there must be two motives com-
pletely feparated from their proper ac-
tions; which is contrary to the principle
of conſtant conjunction. The fuppofition
of his remaining at reft may therefore be
fet afide at once, without further exami-
nation,
The
230
ESSA Y.
The porter then muſt move from the
point A; and if he move, he muſt move
in fome direction or another.
If he move in the direction A B, from
his defire to earn a number of guineas,
which we ſhould think very natural and
very prudent for him to do, a very power-
ful motive, to wit the defire of earning a
number of half-guineas, prompting him
to go in the direction AC, is completely fe-
parated from its proper action; which is
contrary to the principle.
If he go in the direction A C, from his
deſire to earn the half-guineas, then a ſtill
more powerful motive, to wit, the defire
of earning the guineas, is completely fe-
parated from its proper action; which is
contrary to the principle.
If he go in any direction, fuch as A E
or A F, intermediate between AB, or A C,
and A D, either the motive prompting him
to go in the direction A B, or that prompt-
ing him to go in the direction A C, muſt
be in part feparated from their proper
actions;
SECT. IX.
235
actions; which is contrary to the prin-
ciple.
If he go in any other direction, fuch as
A G, or A H, or A I, there muſt be two
motives feparated from their proper ac-
tions, and an action without a motive,
and in oppofition to two motives; which
is doubly or triply contrary to the prin-
ciple.
The porter, then, according to the prin-
ciple, has nothing for it but to go peace-
ably, and without murmuring, in the
diagonal A D: for in this cafe both mo-
tives are conjoined with their actions, as
far as is confiftent with their mutual in-
terference and modification: the refult
partakes of both, and is different from
what either action would have been fingly,
as from the application of one of the mo-
tives by itſelf. And the difference be-
tween the refult from the combination of
the two motives, and that which would
have taken place if only one of them had
been applied, will be exactly equal to the
full
232
ESSA Y.
full (fuppofed) effect of the other motive;
to wit, BDA C, or CDA B.
All theſe conclufions refpecting the ne-
ceffity of moving in the diagonal A D,
would be admitted at once, as being both
demonftrably and experimentally true,
with refpect to a body which was free to
move, and under the influence of corre-
ſponding forces, or phyſical cauſes of mo-
tion, applied in a fimilar manner. If it
remained at reft at the point A, it would
be admitted, that two cauſes were com-
pletely feparated from their effects; if it
moved in the direction AB or AC, it
would be admitted, that one caufe was
fo; if it deſcribed A E or A F, it would
be admitted, that one caufe was in part
ſeparated from its effect; and if the body
defcribed AG, A I, or A H, it would be
admitted, that two caufes were com-
pletely feparated from their effects; and
that there was an event (commonly confi-
dered as an effect) without a cauſe.
It is proper likewiſe to point out, that,
according to the principle, the porter, in
the
SECT. IX.
233
the cafe ſtated, must go chearfully and
willingly, not with a heavy heart and by
conſtraint, in the diagonal A D: for mo-
tives of the kind ſpecified are not ſuppo-
fed to conſtrain a perfon, or to compel
his will, but gently, though irreſiſtibly,
to influence and determine it. If in fuch
a cafe the porter fhould be willing to go
only in the direction A B, or only in the
direction A C, one or other of the motives
applied would be completely feparated
from its effect on his will; as obviouſly as
both would be fo, if he ſhould be found
willing to remain at reft at the point A.
On the fame principles, too, it is de-
monftrable, that if our porter were affu-
red of a good round fum, if he would go,
in any ſtraight line that he pleaſed, to a
certain point, and were at the fame time
affured of a guinea a mile for going in
any right line that he pleaſed, which did
not lead, either directly to or directly from
the point ſpecified, he must defcribe fome
curve line, as being under the influence
of a projectile or tangential force, and of
a centripetal force at the fame time. Vis
centripeta
G g
234
ESSA Y.
•
centripeta eft quâ corpora verfus punctum ali-
quod tanquam ad centrum, undique trahun-
tur, impelluntur, vel utcunque tendunt. Now,
it might furely be faid, with fufficient
propriety in common language, that the
porter, in the caſe ſtated, is attracted, or
impelled; and NEWTON himſelf would
have admitted, that at leaſt he ſomehow
tended towards the point or centre ;
while, at the fame time, he fomehow tend-
ed to go away from it, though not di-
rectly.
It would require much more mathema-
tics than ever I was poffeffed of, to inve-
ftigate preciſely what fort of curve he
would deſcribe in any given caſe of a cer-
tain proportion of the tangential and cen-
tripetal motive; and I willingly leave that
curious inquiry to thoſe who like it, and
who think themſelves qualified to profe-
cute it with fuccefs. I fhall only ſay, that
every thing which they fhall demonftrate
mathematically from the principles affu-
med will be juft as true as the principles
themſelves are; and yet will be moſt noto-
riouſly
SECT. IX.
235
riouſly and ridiculouſly falſe in point of
fact.
Perhaps, therefore, it will be thought
fuperfluous to propofe any experiment on
fuch a point, as no man in his fenfes can
be fuppofed to doubt what the refult of it
will be; and as it may even be doubted
whether the moſt confident affertors of Mr
HUME's doctrine will riſk a fingle guinea
on fuch an experiment. Nevertheleſs I
humbly conceive, that all thoſe who have
profeſſed their belief of Mr HUME's doc-
trine,' muſt be eager to put it to fuch a
teft as I have fuggefted; as being confi-
dent that the refult of it will be favour-
able to their fyftem: For all thoſe who
fully underſtood, and unfeignedly belie-
ved, the principles afferted by him, muſt
alfo believe the neceffary confequences of
them, that are not impoffible, till they
have experience of their falfity, whenever
fuch confequences are pointed out to
them, even though they themſelves had
not thought of them. This is no new
cafe in ſcience; it happens every day to
thoſe who are learning geometry and me-
chanical
Gg 2
236
ESSA Y.
chanical philofophy. But we never hear
of fuch perfons refufing to admit the in-
ferences, though new and perhaps furpri-
fing to them, which are fhewn to be ne-
ceſſary conſequences of principles former-
ly acknowledged. Now, for metaphyfi-
cians, who, after due confideration, have
admitted Mr HUME's doctrine of Neceffi-
ty, and been proud to affert it as their un-
alterable creed, to give it up without
even putting it to the teſt of experiment,
or waiting till it be demonſtrated to be ab-
furd and impoffible; or for ſuch men to
diſtruſt the reſult of its neceſſary conſe-
quences, even though undoubtedly pof-
fible, on the bare mention of them, and
only becauſe they are contrary to vulgar
opinions and prejudices, and what is call-
ed Common fenfe, for which Mr HUME and
his followers have always expreffed the
greateſt contempt; is to acknowledge, that
they had never in their hearts believed
their own favourite fyftem; that they
knew more of human nature than they
choſe to avow; and, in particular, that
they underſtood the relation of motive and
action
SECT. IX.
237
action to be totally different from what
they pretended to believe.
Now, all theſe fuppofitions are fo inju-
rious to the perſons to whom they relate,
that it may well be thought illiberal bare-
ly to ftate them, though only for the fake
of argument; and to affert fuch things of
any ſet of men, or even of any individual,
would unquestionably be very unreafon-
able and uncivil, and perhaps not per-
fectly fafe; for it is well known that fome
philofophers are very choleric. I conceive,
therefore, that thofe philofophers who
have profeſſed their belief in Mr HUME'S
doctrine of Conftant conjunction must put
my inference from it to the teft of experi-
ment, before they can with any credit or
confiſtency acknowledge it to be falſe, and
give up the principle from which it is de-
rived; unleſs, indeed, they can confute
the reaſoning by which that inference was
deduced, and fhew, that a motive is con-
joined with its action, even when no action
whatever proceeds from it, and when a
perfon does preciſely what he would have
done
238
ESSAY.
{
done if no fuch motive had been applied
to him.
It may be worth while, however, to
point out, as a further illuftration both of
the reſemblance and of the difference be-
tween the relation of cauſe and effect and
that of motive and action, that, in cer-
tain circumſtances, a compofition of mo-
tion, the action of a perfon, will take
place from a combination of motives,
very analogous to what takes place in a
body from a combination of forces: fo
that a perſon ſo oddly conftituted by na-
ture as not to have the ufual faculties of
mankind, or fo unhappily perverted by
falfe ſcience, as to difregard the fuggeftions
of his faculties, might be tempted to be-
lieve, that the two relations were in every
reſpect the fame, and that in both the con-
junction was conſtant.
Let us fuppofe a porter to be fo far in-
ftructed in geography, as to underſtand
the terms commonly employed in that
fcience: Let him be aſſured of a certain
fum for every minute, or every fecond, of
latitude
SÈ C T. IX.
239
latitude that he fhall go to the ſouth of the
point where he ftands: Let him at the
fame time be affured of a proportional
fum (according to the length of the de-
grees of longitude, at any given latitude)
for every minute, or every fecond, of longi-
tude that he fhall go to the weft of the
fame point: and let him be allowed to
confider a little what would be beft for him
to do.
If he were a fhrewd fellow, he would
foon diſcover, that by ſteering his courſe
fouth-west, he would be paid, both for
his fouthing and his wefting. And if he
chanced to know any thing of a right
angled triangle, he would perhaps find
means to calculate, that by going fouth-
weft, that is, going in the diagonal of a
fuppofed ſquare, he would earn as much
by going feventeen miles, as he could
have earned by going twenty-four miles
either weft or fouth, or as he could have
earned by going twelve miles fouth and
twelve miles weft. And I think it fhould
be admitted as the probable or certain re-
fult of fuch a combination of motives,
that
240
ESSA Y
that every perfon of competent under-
ſtanding and knowledge, placed in the
circumſtances ftated, would go in the di-
rection fouth-weft. It is obvious, that if
a perfon does fo, both motives applied are
conjoined with their proper actions; and
that the action performed is a tertium quid,
reſulting from the combination of them
both, and different from the fimple effect
of either of them applied fingly, by the full
effect of the other. And it is equally ob-
vious, that if the perfon were to remain at
reft, both motives would be ſeparated
from their proper actions; and that if he
were to go only weft, or only fouth, that
one of the motives would be ſeparated
from its action. The keeneſt affertor of
the doctrine of Neceffity and conftant con-
junction, could fcarce defire, or indeed
contrive, an illuftration more favourable
to his fyftem. And if no cafes but fuch
as this had ever been experienced or ob-
ferved, it may be prefumed, that all man-
kind would have been naturally of the
fame opinion with Mr HUME concerning
the relation of motive and action. But
whenever fuch a fimple diftinct circum-
ſtance
•
SECT.
241
IX.
ftance, as that of conftant conjunction, is
ſpecified as fubfifting between them, it may
be tried experimentally in innumerable ca-
fes, and will foon be found not to take
place.
It muſt be obvious to every perſon, that
though in both theſe caſes that I have ſta-
ted, motion in the diagonal is equally the
neceſſary conſequence of the principles of
inertia and of conftant conjunction; yet in
the former cafe, motion in that direction
is not, while in the latter it is, in the well
underſtood relation of an action to the
motives of it. And it must be equally e-
vident, that in the former cafe we ſhould
all of us expect, from our common notion
of the relation of motive and action, and
from our knowledge of mankind, and of
their conduct in fimilar cafes, that a per-
fon would not go in the diagonal of the pa-
rallelogram, but in the direction of one or
other of its fides; and I have no doubt but
it will be found, that he will do fo. But
this is to feparate completely one motive
from its action. Now, this is all that I
aim at proving at prefent. The inertia of
H h
mind,
242
ESSAY.
mind, and the abfolute and irreſiſtible force
of motives, and any other relation, poffible
or impoffible, between motives and ac-
tions, excepting only that one of conftant
conjunction, may ftill be held; and any
other doctrine of Neceffity, except Mr
HUME's, may ftill be maintained, confift-
ently with what has yet been proved.
SECT.
SECT. X.
Mathematical demonftration, that the doctrine
of the Conftant Conjunction of Motive and
Action is abfurd, as being inconfiftent with
itself.
Many expedients will no doubt be
contrived to evade the inferences
which have been offered as neceffary con-
fequences of Mr HUME's doctrine; as the
trial by experiment, if it is ever thought
of at all, muſt, for very obvious reafons,
be the laſt refource. I have not been able
to think or hear of any fuch expedients
which appear to me of any confequence;
and have every reafon to believe that there
can be none. But there is one of them fo
commonly employed on all occafions, fo
ftrongly infifted on as fufficient to folve all
difficulties with reſpect to the doctrine of
Neceffity, and fo important in its confe-
Hh 2
quences,
244
ESSAY.
quences, which are very different from
thoſe commonly thought of, that I con-
ceive it deferves peculiar attention.
Every perſon is ready to fay, that all
motives which do not exactly concur, and
yet prompt to actions that cannot take
place feparately, muſt be confidered as di-
rectly oppoſing one another.
This fuppofition is, in the firſt place,
inconſiſtent with the univerſal analogy of
phyſical cauſes; and, if admitted in phy-
fics, would imply an endleſs maſs of the
moft notorious and ridiculous falfities and
abfurdities.
In the fecond place, It is inconſiſtent
with many of the beſt known facts with
reſpect to human actions: for in theſe we
can often obferve the blended reſult or in-
fluence of different, but not oppofite, mo-
tives.
But fuppofing for once, that it were
true, or rather confidering the cafe of mo-
tives really oppofing one another, let us
examine
SECT. X.
245
examine the import and trace the conſe-
quences of the doctrine of the conſtant,
conjunction of motive and action; for in
this cafe it appears to be inconſiſtent with
itſelf, and therefore abfurd, even in the
ſtrictest mathematical fenfe of this term;
while, in the cafe of the combination of
motives, it was only inconfiftent with
plain matter of fact, and with the vulgar
notion of motive; and therefore (ftrictly
fpeaking) only falfe.
If motives of equal ftrength directly
oppofe one another, it is held, that no
action can take place, as they mutually
counteract each other; but it is thought,
that if motives of unequal ſtrength di-
rectly oppofe one another, the ſtronger
will not only prevail, but have its full
effect, as if it were not oppofed at all.
Thus, a porter affured of a guinea a
mile for going due eaſt, and of as much
for going due weit, as faſt as he could, if
his face chanced to be due north or fouth,
it is conceived, muſt remain at reſt till
fome new motive occur to determine his
choice,
246
ESSAY.
choice, and direct his courfe. But it is
conceived, that if he were affured of a gui-
nea a mile for going eaft, and only of half
a guinea a mile for going weft, he would
go eaſt at the rate required of him, and
earn the guineas, notwithſtanding the con-
ftant conjunction of motive and action;
juſt as he would have done if no fuch op-
pofite motive as the offer of the half-gui-
neas had been applied.
Now, if theſe very plaufible propofitions
were expreſſed in mathematical form, they
would run thus:
X=A= =Y= B,
X_Y=0=0,
X—1=X=A;
which is abfurd.
In common algebra, it is juft X = Y,
X-Y Y
= 0,
abfurd.
y
X-1 = X; which is
Or if it were thought worth while to
employ a diagram to illuftrate fo plain a
propofition,
SECT. X.
247
propofition, in order to make the abfur-
dity viſible, it might be done thus:
A
B
C
D
Let AC and CD reprefent the equal
force of the oppofite motives, and let B C
be a part of A C; it is afferted, that if A C
be deducted from CD, the remainder will
be nothing; but that if BC be deducted´
from CD, the remainder will be CD;
which is abfurd.
In plain Engliſh, it amounts to this,
that when ten are deducted from ten, there
can remain nothing; but that when four,
or five, or fix, are deducted from ten,
there will remain ten; which is abfurd.
There have been many inftances of one
error in an account or calculation, balan-
cing, and thereby concealing another; but,
fo far as I know, this is the only inftance
in ſcience, and a very curious one it is, of
a notorious falfity in the principle affumed
being in a great meaſure corrected and con-
cealed
248
ESSA Y.
cealed by a palpable abfurdity in the rea-
foning employed. And I doubt greatly
whether this could have happened, unleſs
they who reaſoned from fuch a principle
had been fecretly guided in their reaſon-
ings, or at leaſt in their conceptions and
in their belief, by fome other principle,
which they did not chufe to acknowledge.
SECT.
SECT. XI.
Illuftrations of the abfurdities and inconfiften-
cies which are neceffary confequences of the
doctrine of the Conftant Conjunction of Mo-
tive and Action.
AS
S the arguments offered in the prece-
ding fection, to fhew the abfurdity of
the doctrine of the conftant conjunction of
motive and action, and its inconfiſtence
with itſelf, though abundantly fimple, are
fomewhat abftrufe; and as there cannot
fail to be, among men of fenfe and men
of ſcience, a very great diſtruſt of all
fuch general mathematical reafonings on
the point at preſent in queſtion; it will be
proper to illuftrate, by particular inftan-
ces, the abfurdities and inconfiftencies
which in the laft fection have been expreff-
ed only in abſtract general terms.
I A
With
250
ESSAY.
With respect to the firſt point mention-
ed, namely, the unreaſonableneſs of ſup-
pofing all motives that do not perfectly
concur to oppofe one another directly,
which is the first expedient commonly
thought of to evade the argument from
the compofition of motion, it may be very
eafily illuftrated.
We know that in phyfics the two cafes
of oppofition and combination of cauſes
are widely different, and have very dif-
ferent refults. We ſhould be apt to think
a man infane, or at least not fit to be rea-
foned with, who fhould affert, that a cur-
rent at right angles to the courſe of a ſhip
had no other effect but to retard her pro-
grefs, juſt as an adverfe current would
do, and did not in the leaſt put her out of
her courfe. Nor fhould we have a much
more favourable opinion of the under-
ſtanding of one who fhould affert, that the
weight of a projectile, for inſtance a ca-
non-ball, fhot obliquely to the horizon,
had no other effect than merely to retard,
and at laſt to ftop, the motion of the pro-
jectile; or that the mixture of blue with
yellow
SECT.
251
XI.
yellow had no other effect than the mix-
ture of black or white with it would have
had; or that the addition of fugar to le-
mon-juice neutralized the acid of it, as
effectually as the addition of an alkali
would have done. Such, however, is pre-
cifely the nature of the fuppofition with re-
ſpect to motives, which is ftated in the be-
ginning of the laſt ſection.
Moreover, in many inftances of motive
and action, we can fee plainly the blend-
ed reſult of combined motives; as in the
ſtory of Appius Claudius and Virginia, or
indeed in any cafe, where, from fear or
prudence, a perfon takes an indirect me-
thod to gain his chief and ultimate object;
as when a thief ſteals, who dares not rob
or when a rogue cheats, who will not riſk
his neck by ſtealing; or when a general
employs ftratagem, rather than open force,
as thinking the latter, though fure to be
effectual, might coft him too dear. And
let it be remembered, that it is not faid
that motive and action are never conjoined,
but only that they are not conftantly con-
joined; nor that a blended refult of com-
bined
I i 2
252
ESSA Y.
bined motives never takes place, but only
that it does not always take place.
With reſpect to the fecond point ſtated
in the laſt ſection, namely, the abfurdity
of fuppofing the ſtronger of two really op-
pofite motives, not only to prevail, but
to have its full effect as if unoppoſed, not-
withſtanding the conftant conjunction of
motive and action, and the acknowledged
mutual counteraction of oppofite mo-
tives of equal ftrength; it is, if poſ-
fible, ftill clearer, and more eafily illu-
ftrated.
How fhould we all be aftoniſhed, if a
man of fuppofed good fenfe, and fome
knowledge, fhould ſtart up and affert, that a
mixture of equal parts of black and of white
paint produced a grey paint; but that if
the black or the white preponderated ever
fo little, the mixture would prove a per-
fectly black, or a perfectly white paint.
Or what fhould we think of a philofo-
pher, who fhould gravely maintain, that
an adverſe current did not in the leaſt re-
tard
SECT.
253
XI.
tard the motion of a fhip, unless it was
equal to the velocity which the derived
from the wind; and that in this cafe the
ſhip remained ſtationary; but that, when-
ever the current became fo ſtrong as to
give the ſhip a greater velocity in one di-
rection than the wind gave her in the op-
pofite, then the fhip went down the cur-
rent, just as faft as if there had been no
wind at all. Men who fhould maintain
fuch opinions, if their converſation and
conduct on other points correſponded to
this fpecimen, would undoubtedly be pro-
nounced fit for bedlam.
Yet a philofopher, who had adopted Mr
HUME's doctrine of Neceffity, and of the
conftant conjunction of motive and ac-
tion, would not bluſh to ſay to his pupils,
if they chanced to meet a fot reeling home
from his club, "This fellow must have a
"moft immoderate love of ftrong liquor
"and drunken company. You fee here
what a life he conftantly leads; yet he
"has a ſtrong fenfe of religion, a juft notion
"of virtue and moral conduct, a defire
"C
to preſerve a good character, nay a de-
" fire
254
ESSA Y.
"fire of fame, like other men; he wishes
(c
66
66
<<
to enjoy good health, to profper in his
"bufinefs, and to make a fortune; he has
wife and children, whom he loves,
"and whom he wishes to provide for; he
"is not ignorant of his duty to his friends,
"to his
o his country, and to all mankind :
"Yet, in defiance of all theſe motives, he
abandons himſelf to drinking. Now,
"this can proceed only from the extraor-
dinary violence of the motive that
prompts him to it. For there can be
no action without a fufficient motive,
nor any motive without its proper ac-
tion: The conjunction of motive and
"action, like that of caufe and effect in
phyfics, is conſtant." And this idle
talk would be thought fenfe, nay, very
ingenious reaſoning, and profound philo-
fophy.
66
"C
66
Let us fuppofe, now, the drunk man to
have heard what the philofopher faid, and
being fufficiently able to ſpeak, though not
very able to ſtand, to fet about anſwering
him, to the following purpoſe: "I know
"nothing about your metaphyfics, and
"" your
SECT.
255
XI.
IC
your motives and actions; but I know
66 very well how to make punch; and that,
"I can tell you, is no fmall piece of know-
66
ledge; for every thing depends on the
"nice proportion of the ingredients. If
"there be but one drop too much rum
"in it, it will be as ftrong as rum, and
" without any taſte either of fugar or le-
mon-juice; and if there be but one
"
66
drop too much water in it, it will be
"much worſe, for it will be mere water,
"without either ftrength or tafte; and if
"there be one grain too much fugar, or
"one drop too much lemon-juice, it will be
as fweet as fugar, or as four as lemon-
juice; which would never do. And I
am philofopher enough to know, as
"well as you do, that this is the confe-
quence of the conftant conjunction of
66 cauſe and effect."
66
(6
66
My drunk man would be thought to
ſpeak nonſenſe; and, to ſay the truth, not
altogether without reafon. Yet his non-
fenſe would be wonderfully like the phi-
lofopher's fenſe; and I believe it would
have puzzled SOCRATES himſelf to fay
·
which
256
ESSAY.
which of them was the more abfurd; as
both of them contain as direct and pal-
pable a contradiction as it is poffible to ex-
preis in language.
We ſhould doubtleſs think it no eaſy
matter to add to the inconfiftency juft now
ſtated; yet even this has been done, and,
what is more, must be done, by every per-
fon who afferts Mr HUME's doctrine of
Neceffity, and yet admits that juſtice may
be tempered with mercy; for inſtance,
that a thief, juftly condemned to be hang-
ed, may be pardoned on condition of ba-
niſhment; that paffion may be moderated
and reſtrained within certain bounds, by
prudence; that one paffion may be check-
ed in its indulgence, though not quite e-
radicated or overcome by another; for in-
ſtance, anger by fear; or that a debauchee,
who diftrufts, or perhaps does not reliſh,
the maxim of a fhort life and a merry one,
may wifely determine to be a little lefs
wicked than he would like to be, that he
may be the longer wicked. For in all fuch
caſes, the weaker motive trenches upon
the ſtronger, and of courfe the action or
fuppofed
SECT.
257
XI.
fuppofed effect proceeding from the latter
is lefs than it would have been if unop-
poſed; while in innumerable other cafes
the reverfe takes place. Indeed the flight-
eft attention to human conduct fhews fo
clearly that the relation of motive and
action is not a conftant, but an occafional
and feparable conjunction; and that mo-
tives and actions are feparated much oft-
ener than they are conjoined; that it is
furpriſing the author of the Hiſtory of
England fhould even for an hour have
continued in the opinion at prefent in que-
ftion.
Had I the pen of ARBUTHNOT or
SWIFT, I ſhould write a little hiſtory of
the life and opinions of a true Neceffarian,
whoſe thoughts and actions accorded with
his profeffion, and were infeparably con-
nected with the cauſes or motives that
were applied to him. For fuch a hiſtory
would be the beſt refutation of the prin-
ciple that has been aſſerted.
However unequal to ſuch a taſk, I ſhall
venture to give a fhort fpecimen of what
K k
manner
258
ESSA Y.
manner of man a practical Neceffarian must
be.
His religious fentiments I pafs over in
filence; for the religion of a Neceſſarian is
to me utterly incomprehenfible.
For the fame reafon, too, I fay nothing
of his fpeculative principles of morality:
Not that I would by any means infinuate,
that he would have no religion and no
virtue, but only that his religion and vir-
tue would be fo ridiculouſly inconfiftent
with thoſe of other men, that it would be
folly for other men to attempt to judge of
them: For he would affume as unde-
niable axioms in religion and morals, what
other men would confider as palpable ab-
furdities: For inſtance, that a man might
justly be hanged in this world, and damn-
ed in the next, for doing what he could
not help doing.
His practical morality, or general cha-
racter and conduct, it would be eafy to
give an account of, and even to demon-
ftrate mathematically, if required. But
it
S E C T. XI
259
it would be very little to his credit; for
every vicious tendency he might have
would trench moft grievously on his vir-
tues, if he had any; and every tempta-
tion to evil would make him worſe than he
was before. He would not, and indeed he
could not, emulate the juftum et tenacem pro-
pofiti virum of HORACE; nor could he ever
prove the
Felix ille animi quem non de tramite recto,
Impia facrilega flexit contagio turbe.
He never could be perfectly virtuous in
thought and deed, but when he had no
temptation, or no opportunity, to be vi-
cious. He would be brave, or, more
ftrictly speaking, he would not be afraid,
only where he knew not of any danger;
he would be patient only when he had
nothing to fuffer; he would be juſt only
when he could get nothing by diſhoneſty;
he would be temperate and chafte only
where he had no opportunity to gratify
his appetites, or had no appetites to gra-
tify.
Kk 2
In
26a
ESSA Y.
In ſcience he would be a prodigious
fceptic, and of courfe would fancy him-
felf a mighty philofopher; and perhaps
find means to perfuade other people to
think fo too; as has often happened al-
ready.
In politics he would be a Trimmer, and
one of a very peculiar kind. If he got a
feat in the Houſe of Commons, he would
be fadly perplexed, and perhaps find it
impoffible, to chufe a fide, if he had no
other principles but pure public ſpirit to
direct him. A puzzling debate about the
good of the nation would be as fatal to
him as it was to Sir Francis Wrong head.
But having much defire of popularity, and
fome little wifh for wealth and power, and
no proſpect of any good thing from the
minifter, he would of courfe join the op-
pofition, whoever was in or out, and would
ſpeak loud and long, and vote uniformly
with them. But whenever the miniſter
diſcovered his blind fide, (which could not
long remain a fecret), he would imme-
diately put an end to his ſpeeches, and his
oppofition, without the fmalleft expence
to
SECT. XI.
261
to government, or retarding, even for an
hour, the payment of the national debt,
The mere offer of a good place or penſion,
on condition that he ſhould ſpeak and vote
with the miniſtry, though it could not
bring him over to them, would effectual-
ly undo him as a patriot. It would, in
the first place, mar his oppofition- fpeech
completely.
This indeed is no new
cafe; fomething of the fame kind once
happened to DEMOSTHENES, after recei-
ving a handſome preſent from PHILIP.
He ſpoke againſt PHILIP, it is true; but
he had lost his voice, and the Athenian
people could not hear him. His witty
countrymen foon difcovered, that he had
got the 'Apyupayx", or filver-fore-throat; a
diſeaſe not defcribed by HIPPOCRATES or
GALEN, but faid to be endemic, and well
underſtood in all popular affemblies; and
all the world knows that it is quite impof-
fible either to prevent or to cure it.- -But
to return to our Neceffarian in the Houſe
of Commons. Being under the influence
at once of his patriot-principles, and of
the great offer made him by the miniſter,
it is plain, that he would either not ſpeak
at
262
ESSAY.
But
at all, or not fpeak fo as to be heard or
underſtood, or not ſpeak to the purpoſe on
either fide. If the queſtion was put, he
neither would, nor indeed could he, fay ei-
ther Aye or No; for that would be to fepa-
rate a motive from its action; and there-
fore he would of neceffity either be filent,
or utter fome found different from either
Aye or No: For example, a combination
of the two, if fuch a thing were poffible,
or very probably ſome exclamation expref-
five of embarraſſment and diſtreſs.
if the Houfe divided, his cafe would be at
once ridiculous and deplorable. He might
be expected, firſt of all, to endeavour to
place himſelf in the door-cafe; inclining,
perhaps, more to the Houſe, or more to
the lobby, according to circumſtances.
But this not being allowed, he would try
to ſneak off, or to conceal himſelf in ſome
corner or fome garret; nay, he might
jump out at the window, or lay violent
hands on himſelf; in fhort, he might do
any thing that he pleaſed, or that he could
think of, except ftaying in the houſe, or
going into the lobby; for he would know
that that would be to vote either with the
Ayes
SECT.
263
XI.
Ayes or with the Noes, as the tellers would
find him on one fide or the other, in ſpite
of all his remonftrances. Now, for him to
vote on either fide, would be to ſeparate
completely the oppofite motive from its
proper action.
In the common affairs of life, he would
be wavering and irrefolute, feldom form-
ing, and never executing, any ſteady or
uniform purpoſe; and fond of feeble coun-
cils, and of imperfect and inadequate mea-
fures, on all occafions.
He would be very often in love; but
would never marry; for however much he
might love his gentle miſtreſs, yet, like
Tom Thumb, at the thoughts of marriage
he would grow pale.
He would often fet out on a journey,
and feldom arrive at the end of one. And
he would often be found hopping through
the world with one boot on and the other
off, like Prince Prettyman, in the Rehear-
fal, who, by the by, is the only practical
Neceffarian that ever I faw.
If
1
204
ESSAY.
If he escaped the lath of the law for
fome of his pranks, which I can by no
means anſwer for, he would foon be exa-
mined by virtue of a commiffion of lu-
nacy; and would inftantly be pronounced
non compos mentis; a phrafe never more
properly applied than to fuch a Being,
who, though not mad in other reſpects,
had loft or renounced the power of govern-
ing himſelf.
Abfurd and fooliſh as theſe affertions
muſt appear, I beg it may be obſerved,
that they are all neceffary inferences from
the doctrine of the inertia of mind, and of
the conſtant conjunction of motive and
action; and if this doctrine be true, they
muſt all be truths, and fuch truths as no
power in heaven or earth can alter. They
ſtand on the ſame footing with the necef-
fary truths in geometry and in mechanical
philofophy.
Geometers do not pretend to prove the
exiſtence of cones, fpheres, and cylinders;
but they have demonftrated, that if it
fhould pleaſe God to create a cone, a
fphere,
3
SECT.
265
XI.
ſphere, and a cylinder, of the fame height
and the fame diameter, they must be to
one another in the proportions 1, 2, 3.
Sir ISAAC NEWTON never fet about
proving the exiſtence of matter, and the
reality of motion; and I dare fay was
much too wife a man ever to have at-
tempted to reaſon with men who required
any proof of theſe things. But, taking
them, and the fimple laws of motion as
afcertained by experiment and induction,
for granted, he has demonftrated what
the refult must be in innumerable cafes.
I by no means affert, or undertake to
prove, the exiſtence of mankind, the inertia
of mind, and the conftant conjunction of
motive and action; and I think too high-
ly of divine wisdom and goodneſs, to be-
lieve, or even to fuppofe, that God fhould
ever make fuch a fooliſh, helpleſs, wretch-
ed Being, as the Neceffarian man; the
notion of which appears to me altogether
unworthy of the human underſtanding,
confidering the means of better informa→
tion which we poffefs; but I affert with
L 1
con-
266
ESSA Y.
confidence, that if fome malevolent Dæ-
mon fhould contrive to make fuch a Be-
ing, or if fome philofopher, crazed with
falfe fcience, fhould refolve to act con-
formably to the principles in queſtion, and
perfevere in doing to, his conduct must be
what I have ſpecified; for the contrary
fuppofition involves a direct contradic-
tion.
Or if the fame principles be extended
(as hath ſometimes been done) to the mo-
tives and actions of the Supreme Being,
to whom we afcribe juftice and mercy as
motives of his actions, then, whenever
juſtice prompted to puniſh, and mercy to
fpare, God himſelf could neither be juft
nor merciful. And let it be obferved, that
the folly and impiety of fuch an inference
lies entirely in the principles affumed, and
by no means in the reatoning employed,
which is as innocent and fimple, and juſt,
and the conclufion, therefore, (if the prin
ciples be true), as unquestionable, as that
if three be deducted from five, there can
remain but two.
SECT.
',
SECT. XII.
Obfervations on the cafe of the increaſe or con-
currence of Phyfical Caufes and of Motives
respectively.-The refult with respect to
Phyfical Caufes confiftent with the prin-
ciple of Conftant Conjunction.-The refult
with reſpect to Motives only fometimes con-
fiftent with that principle, and often re-
pugnant to it, but always confiftent with
the vulgar notion of Motive.-Obfervations
on the parallel cafe of the increaſe or con-
currence of the external, partial, exciting
Caufes in Phyfiology.
IN
the preceding fections, I have confi-
dered the two cafes of the combination
and the direct oppofition of motives and of
phyſical cauſes, refpectively; and have il-
luftrated very fully the various inferences
drawn as neceffary confequences from the
principle of conftant conjunction of cauſe
L12
and
P
268
ESSAY.
and effect, motive and action. Thoſe in-
ferences appear to be very generally, if
not univerfally, true with refpect to caufes
and effects; but in many cafes falſe, and
in others abfurd, with refpect to motives.
and actions. Though this be amply fuf-
ficient to prove, that the relation of mo-
tive and action is not a conftant, but an
occafional and feparable conjunction; yet
with a view to fhow more clearly the dif-
ference between the two relations, and to
affift in the inveſtigation of the nature of
the relation of cauſe and effect in phyfics,
it may be uſeful to confider the third caſe
of the application of cauſes and motives,
reſpectively, namely, the increaſe, addi-
tion, or exact concurrence of them. This
cafe is juſt as inftructive as the others;
and in it the difference between the refult
according to the vulgar notion of motive,
"that for the fake of which," and the
refult according to the notion of phy-
fical caufe, including the circumftance of
conſtant conjunction with its effect, is as
real, and as great, as in the other two
cafes, though perhaps it is not quite fo
obvious; in confequence of which, on a
fuper-
SECT. XII.
269
fuperficial view, the analogy between the
two relations in queftion appears more
perfect in this than in the other two cafes;
but this error is foon corrected, when we
attend ſtrictly ad inftantias particulares, ea-
rumque feries et ordines.
As fair and obvious inftances of the in-
creaſe, addition, or exact concurrence, of
phyfical caufes, either of the fame or of
different kinds, but all having the fame
kind of effect, we may take the following:
-Heat applied in various degrees, from
the flighteſt that we can perceive or mea-
fure, to the greateſt that we can produce,
or have any opportunity of obſerving;
correſponding to which degrees of in-
creaſe or addition, and conſtantly con-
joined with them in the fame kind of ſub-
ftance, provided no other caufe interfere,
we obferve expanfion of the folid fubftance
in various degrees, then fufion of it, then
expanſion of the fluid fubftance in various
degrees, then evaporation of it, then more
and more expanfion of the vapour:-Or
with reſpect to motion, a ſhip in ſtill wa-
ter, and with a gentle breeze, advancing
with
!
270
ESSA Y.
with a certain velocity, when ſhe has but
one fmall fail fpread to the wind; and
quicker and quicker, as fhe fets more and
more fail; and ſtill quicker when the wind
becomes greater; and ftill quicker when
the turn of the tide produces a favourable
current :-Or a cannon-ball being project-
ed with a certain velocity from the mouth
of a gun loaded with one ounce of gun-
powder, but with a much greater velocity
when the charge is a pound, and with a ftill
greater when the charge is twelve pounds
of powder :-Or with refpect to gravita-
tion, when a body near the furface of the
earth falls towards it with a certain inci-
pient velocity; but with a greater velocity
towards a greater mafs of matter, as, for
example, Jupiter, or the fun, if placed at
the fame diſtance from the ſurface of ei-
ther of them :-Or when a body at the
furface of the earth falls fifteen or fixteen
feet in the firſt fecond, which, at the mean
diſtance of the moon, falls but the three
thouſand fix hundredth part of fixteen feet
in the firſt ſecond, fo as to fall only fix-
teen feet in the firft minute, by the con-
ſtant accumulation of its own motion.
This
SECT.
271
XII.
This laft inftance I mention as ferving to
keep in mind, that in cafes of phyſical
cauſe and effect, the principle of change
is, ſtrictly ſpeaking, not the thing uſually
termed the Caufe, but a certain relation
between it and the ſubject in which the
change occurs. Now, a relation between
two things may depend, not merely on the
things themſelves, nor on their reſpective
qualities, but either wholly or partly on
fome other relation between the things.
Thus, we know that gravitation, or the
tendency of every particle of matter to
every other, varies according to the di-
ftance of the bodies, or maffes of mat-
ter; and decreaſes as the ſquare of the di-
ſtance increaſes. But the diſtance between
two bodies is plainly no quality of either
of them, but a relation between them.
Correſponding to theſe caſes of phyfical
cauſe and effect, and on a fuperficial view
fo perfectly analogous to them, as ſcarce
to exhibit any difference, are the follow-
ing common cafes of motive and action.
-A porter will for a fhilling (that is to
fay, his defire of earning the fhilling be-
ing
272
ESSA Y.
{
ing his motive) carry a letter a mile. For
a guinea he will carry it one and twenty
miles, which he would not do for one
fhilling, nor even for two. For an hun-
dred pounds, he will engage to do as
much of that kind of work as he can in a
twelvemonth.--A labourer will work a
whole day, but not a week, for a fhilling.
He will work a whole week for ſeven fhil-
lings; and perhaps a whole year for twen-
ty pounds.-A weaver will make a certain
quantity of cloth for a certain fum, and
more and more, very exactly, in propor-
tion to any larger fums that may be offer-
ed him.-Thefe are all inftances of mo-
tive and action bearing fuch a cloſe and
ſtriking relation to proper quantity, that
there can be no cavil about them. There
would be many more actions from mo-
tives of various kinds, equally analogous
to the cafes of phyfical caufe and effect,
were it not that oppofing motives often oc-
cur, which check many actions that other-
wife would be in proportion to their re-
ſpective motives. Thus, we are often re-
ftrained from doing many exceffive or ex-
travagant actions, from extraordinary mo-
tives
SECT.
273
XII.
1
tives of benevolence, of felfiſhneſs, of ma-
lice, or paffion of any kind, by confide-
rations of juſtice, of prudence, or of hu-
manity.
It is neceffary, therefore, in point of
candour, when we would point out the
difference between the refult of the in-
creafe or concurrence of motives and that
of phyfical cauſes, with refpect to the
principle of conſtant conjunction, to con-
fider only fuch actions as are either not at
all reſtrained in their degree by the in-
fluence of oppofite motives, or not more
reſtrained in the inftances wherein they do
not occur, than in thoſe in which they do
occur, in a degree accurately proportionate
to their reſpective motives.
Such caſes we may eaſily make for our-
felves, in any porter, labourer, or weaver.
For example, let a porter be offered, in-
ftead of a fhilling, a guinea, or an hun-
dred guineas, for carrying a letter an hun-
dred yards. I conceive that he will do
the work, and pocket the money, with
great fatisfaction; but without infifting
M m
on
274
ESSA Y.
on going twenty miles, or on working a
whole year, for his generous employer,
and thereby fhewing the conftant con-
junction of motive and action.
It would be needlefs, and indeed un-
pardonable, to have recourfe to diagrams,
or to algebraical formule, or even to arith-
metical calculation, in order to fhew the
difference between the refult of the in-
creaſe or concurrence of phyfical caufes,
and that of a fimilar increafe or concur-
rence of motives; and the inconſiſtency of
the refult in many examples of the latter
kind with the principle of conſtant con-
junction; and the repugnancy of it to
the notion of quantity, which amounts
to abfurdity, even in the ftricteft fenfe
of this term. The illuftrations of the
ſhip, and of the cannon-ball, muſt be ſuf-
ficient for my preſent purpoſe. To fup-
pofe a fhip to advance fometimes no faſt-
er on increaſing her fail, or on the wind
increafing, or on her getting into a fa-
vourable current, than fhe did in ſtill wa-
ter, with a ſmall fail, and with a gentle
breeze; and to fuppofe a cannon-ball fome-
times
SECT.
275
XII.
times to move no faſter from the mouth of
a cannon with the force of one or of twelve
pounds of gun-powder, than it would
have done with the force of one ounce of
the fame kind of powder, would be a moſt
extravagant and foolifh error; nor do I
believe there is in the whole British fleet a
fingle cabin-boy or powder-monkey who
would fall into fuch a miſtake. If any
perfon, from uncommon deficiency of
underſtanding or attention, fhould fall in-
to fo ſtrange an error, it would be eaſy to
fet him right; but if a perfon ſhould aſ-
fert, that ſuch a refult, and fuch occa-
fional varieties in the refult, in thoſe cafes,
might take place, notwithſtanding the
conſtant conjunction of cauſe and effect,
he would be maintaining an abſurdity,
and, though not a direct contradiction in
terms, at leaſt a propofition immediately
refolveable into fuch a contradiction; and
if he ſpoke bona fide, he would be infane,
and confequently unfit to be reaſoned with,
Such precifely would be the fituation of
one, who ſhould
affert the correſponding
M m 2
Ma
propo-
276
ESSA Y.
propofition, with refpect to the cafes of mo-
tive and action.
It muſt, I think, be obvious to every
perfon of competent underſtanding, and
knowledge of human nature, that the dif-
ferent refult from the increafe or concur-
rence of motives prompting to the fame
kind of action, on different occafions, is
to be expected and foreſeen; that on fome
occafions the motive is to have its full ef-
fect, or to be completely conjoined with
its proper action, and on others not; and
that, in both theſe cafes, the action per-
formed, whether proportioned to the mo-
tive that prompts to it, according to the
principle of conftant conjunction, or quite
difproportioned to it, and in repugnance
to that principle, equally ftands in the fa-
miliar and well-understood relation of a
voluntary action to its motive, or "that
"for the fake of which."
Hence we may infer with certainty,
that thoſe who expect and foreſee that va→
riety in the refult, on different occafions,
with refpect to motives and actions, but
not
SECT.
277
XII.
not with reſpect to phyfical caufes and ef-
fects, could not have believed the two re-
lations to be the fame, nor even the prin-
ciple of conſtant conjunction to make a
part of the former relation, as it does of
the latter; and that all of them muſt have
had, not only the conception, but the be-
lief, of the relation of "that for the fake of
"which," and no other, as fubfifting be-
tween motives and actions.
Though not immediately connected
with the purpoſe of this Effay, yet as
highly fubfervient to the more remote and
general object of my inveſtigation, the na-
ture of the relation of cauſe and effect in
phyfics, and of the various principles of
change to which the phenomena that we
obferve ought to be referred, I think it
may be worth while here to point out both
the reſemblance and the difference be-
tween the refult from the increaſe or
concur-
278
ESSAY.
concurrence, as well of phyfical caufes
as of motives, refpectively, and the refult
in the correſponding cafes in the phyfiolo-
gy both of animals and vegetables.
In the phyfiology of theſe, as well as in
the voluntary actions of intelligent Beings,
we obſerve a mixture or union of cauſes
or principles of change. There are cer-
tain external circumſtances, to which the
changes in vegetables, and many of thoſe
in animals, bear fuch an evident relation,
and one fo like to that of caufe and effect
in lifeless bodies, that the former have al-
ways been regarded as the cauſes of the
latter. It appears, however, on giving
due attention to the changes obferved,
and to all the circumftances connect-
ed with them, that the relation between
the changes and the external circumſtan-
ces is not the fame with that of caufe
and effect in lifelefs bodies; that the
external circumftances are not the fole
caufes or principles of the changes obfer-
ved, but only partial and acceffory cauſes
of them, though perhaps indiſpenſably re-
quifite
SECT. XII.
279
quifite for them; and that there is in the
fubject another principle of change, the
concurrence of which is no lefs requifite for
the production of thofe changes than the
application of the external caufes. To this
we give the name of the Vital Principle, or
Principle of Life; meaning thereby only to
expreſs a fact, and give a name to fome-
thing which we have frequent occaſion to
ſpeak about, but without intending to ex-
preſs any opinion, or to infinuate any hy-
pothefis, concerning the nature of it; which
is hitherto unknown, but well deferves to
be inveſtigated.
Common language affords no appro-
priated word or phraſe, correſponding to
motive or final cauſe, which we uſe in ſpeak-
ing of voluntary actions, to denote the
partial external caufes, whofe concurrence
with the internal vital principle is requi-
fite for the production of phyfiological
changes. Medical language, however, af-
fords a phraſe, hitherto employed chiefly
or ſolely in ſpeaking of the correſponding
partial and acceffory cauſes of diſeaſes,
namely, occafional or exciting cause, the
meaning
1
280
ESSA Y.
meaning of which, I think, may, without
much impropriety, be extended from pa-
thology to phyfiology; as the generic na-
ture of the notion to be expreffed by it in
both fubjects muſt be obvious; and the
fpecific meaning of it, in different cafes,
muſt be fufficiently explained by the in-
ftances to which it may at different times
be applied. And ſuch an eaſy and natu-
ral extenfion of the meaning of a well-
underſtood phraſe is more agreeable, and
lefs embarraffing, than the introduction
of a perfectly new word or phraſe; eſpe-
cially when employed to denote what
was before in fome meafure known,
though perhaps not much attended to,
and expreffed by a familiar, but ambi-
guous phraſe.
For, however imperfect their language
has been on this point, the actions of man-
kind, on many of the commoneft as well
as moſt important occafions, as in agri-
culture, in medicine, in the breeding of
animals, fhew plainly, that they not only
perceived a difference, but had even fome
notion of the nature of the difference, be-
tween
SECT. XII.
281
tween the partial exciting cauſes of phy-
fiological changes and the full phyfical
cauſes of the changes obferved in lifeleſs
bodies. That ſome of them, in their rea-
fonings on phyfiology and pathology, have
overlooked that difference, and of courſe
have fallen into error, and fometimes into
nonſenſe, in their fpeculations, cannot be
denied. Phyficians, in particular, have
often done fo. But this proceeded from
their reaſoning haftily and careleſsly, by
means of ambiguous words, without due
attention to the differences of the things
about which they reafoned, or even to
the differences of their own natural no-
tions, occafionally expreffed by the fame
phraſe.
All this may be eaſily illuftrated by
many familiar and unequivocal examples.
Thus, though the principle of life be pre-
fent in full perfection, as in a fresh egg,
or a ripe acorn, unleſs the proper external
circumſtances, or exciting cauſes, concur,
no change will proceed from it. For ex-
ample, if a certain degree of heat be not
applied, the egg and the acorn will re-
N n
main
282
ESSA Y.
main in the fame ftate (at leaſt without
any life or growth) for many years.
If the principle of life be a wanting,
for example, if the egg be addle, and the
acorn unripe or rotten, whatever heat be
applied, and however favourable the other
exciting cauſes, ſuch as moiſture, and earth,
and light, and air, may be, no chicken and
no tree will ever be produced.
But when both the vital principle is
preſent and perfect, and the exciting cau-
fes concur, then the phyfiological changes
or effects take place, as certainly, and with
as little appearance of any kind of op
tional or felf-governing power in the ſub-
ject, as the fimple effects in lifeless bodies
from the application of phyfical caufes.
But even in thefe circumſtances, the phy-
fiological changes, though they may be
increaſed and accelerated to a certain de-
gree by an increaſe of the exciting cau-
fes, and diminiſhed by a diminution of
thefe; yet are by no means accurately pro-
portioned to them, according to the prin-
ciple
SECT. XII.
283
ciple of conſtant conjunction, or as pure
phyfical effects are to their cauſes.
Thus, a freſh hen's egg, in ordinary
circumſtances of air, reft, &c. if heat be
uniformly applied to it, to the degree of
about 100 of Fahrenheit's fcale, will be
hatched in about three weeks. If a lower
degree of heat be applied to it, or if the
application even of that proper degree be
often and long interrupted, the egg will
be longer of being hatched; as happens to
the eggs firſt laid of any brood, which are
hatched much about the fame time with
thoſe laſt laid, though theſe were perhaps
a fortnight later of being laid than the
firft. Poffibly a certain very moderate in-
creaſe of heat, beyond even what is com-
monly applied, may accelerate a little the
hatching of the egg; but if a much great-
er degree of heat, for example, 200° or 300°,
were applied to the egg, all other circum-
ftances being the fame, inſtead of being
hatched in three days, it would be roaſted
in three minutes.
If a freſh and ripe acorn were planted
Nn 2
in
284
ESSA Y.
1
in Windfor foreft, with the degree of
heat, of moiſture, of air, &c. which it
would meet with there, it would foon ve-
getate, and in two hundred years would
grow to be a sturdy oak. The fame
acorn, in the poorer foil, and chilling cli-
mate of Scotland, would grow more flow-
ly and imperfectly; and in the dreary re-
gions of Iceland or Greenland, it would
not grow at all. In France or Italy, with
the aid of their more genial climate, it
would grow more quickly even than in
England. In the torrid zone, at leaſt in a
fituation where the heat is very great, as
near the level of the fea, it would either
not grow at all, or it would be feeble and
fickly; it would never arrive at maturity,
nor continue its fpecies; and even the in-
dividual plant would foon periſh. If a
very great degree of heat and moiſture
were applied, as in a ſtove or oven, to try
how much its growth might be haſtened
or increaſed, it would not vegetate in the
leaſt, and might be thoroughly boiled or
ftewed in an hour.
In the animal body, great changes may
be produced by exciting cauſes in concur-
rence
SECT.
285
XII.
rence with the vital principle. I fhall fay
nothing of diſeaſes, as I do not intend this
Effay as a medical treatiſe; but ſhall con-
fider fome of the falutary changes which,
by fuch a combination of caufes, may be
produced in our bodies.
It is generally believed, and I hope it
is in ſome meaſure true, that by the uſe of
certain drugs ftrength may be given, or
at leaſt reſtored, to the human body; for
example, by Peruvian bark, and by the
calx of iron. A perſon may grow ſtrong-
er, by taking a drachm of the former, and
ten grains of the latter, every day; and
perhaps ftill ftronger, by taking two, or
four, or ten times that quantity, of each
of thoſe medicines, daily. But if he ſhould
take it into his head to fwallow a pound
of each of thofe drugs every day, in hopes
of obtaining a proportional increaſe of their
beneficial effect, he would add as little to
his ſtrength as to his ſtature; and probably
would injure his health, and impair his
ſtrength very greatly.
Whatever may be thought of the effica-
су
286
ESSA Y.
cy of fuch drugs, it is certain at leaſt,
that, by a certain quantity of food and of
exerciſe, other circumſtances being fuch
as we commonly find them, a man will
juſt be kept alive, and will be very weak;
by more food, and more exerciſe, he will
grow gradually ftronger; by the natural
quantity of both, he will have the natural
degree of ſtrength. By a kind of over-
feeding or cramming, the 'Arayxopayıα of
the ancient Athlets, correfponding to the
high feeding of horfes for many purpoſes,
with proportional exerciſe, he will acquire
preternatural and athletic ſtrength, per-
haps dangerous in its tendency, and in-
conſiſtent with health. But if he carries
either the feeding, or the exerciſe, or both,
beyond a certain degree, inſtead of grow-
ing ſtronger, he will become every day
weaker; he will foon be worn out, or may
even faint, or die, from his violent exer-
tions.- The fame may be faid with re-
ſpect to the beneficial, exhilarating,
ftrengthening, vivifying effects of wine,
or fometimes even of brandy, when taken
in moderate quantity; and the pernicious,
enfeebling, ftupifying, and fometimes fa-
tal
SECT.
287
XII.
tal effects of them, when taken in too great
quantity.
In like manner, when the phyfiological
effect of an occafional or exciting caufe
tends to impair or to deftroy life, to a cer-
tain degree there may be a proportion be-
tween them, like to that of phyfical caufe
and effect in lifeless bodies; as in many
morbid cauſes, and the diſeaſes proceed-
ing from them. But the total extinction
of life admits not of degrees; nor can it,
therefore, be proportioned to the increaſe
or concurrence of external occaſional cau-
fes, as pure phyfical effects in lifeless bo-
dies, or even in living bodies, may be to
their full phyfical cauſes.
A man may be as effectually killed by
one musket-ball, or even by one blow on
the head or on the ftomach, though per-
haps no vifible injury is done to his frame
by fuch a blow, as he could be by a thou-
fand muſket-balls piercing every part of
his body, or as he could be if he were
blown from the mouth of a cannon. In
theſe laſt cafes, the phyfiological effects
are
288
ESSA Y.
are not proportioned to their occafional
cauſes; nor can they be fo; but the fimple
mechanical effects of the fame things, to
wit, the number and velocity of the balls,
and the quantity of the powder in the
cannon, are proportioned to them as their
full phyfical caufes.
In like manner, though a very mode-
rate degree of heat will as completely ex-
tinguiſh life as the heat of a great furnace
could do, ſo that no greater effect on life
can proceed from the heat of the furnace
than from the more moderate heat; yet
the pure chemical effects of the greater
heat, expanfion, inflammation, evapora-
tion, calcination, fufion, vitrification, &c.
are produced, and are proportioned to the
heat as their full phyfical cauſe.
Even where the principle of life has no
fhare in the production of the phænome-
na, but where thefe depend partly on the
internal conſtitution of a lifeless body, or
the relation of its constituent parts to one
another, partly on the concurrence of an
external occafional cauſe, the changes that
take
SECT.
289
XII.
take place in the fubject, though in fome
meaſure proportioned to the occafional
cauſe, are by no means completely fo; nor
is that cauſe conftantly conjoined with that
kind of effect.
Thus, the fermentation of muft, or of
wort, and the putrefaction of flesh, de-
pend on fuch a combination of principles
of change. Befides the conftitution of the
fubject with reſpect to mixture, and moi-
fture, &c. the concurrence of heat is re-
quifite to fermentation of every kind. In
the temperature of 20°, it will not go on
at all; in that of 40°, it will go on, but
very ſlowly; in a temperature from 50° to
60, it will go on moderately, and proper-
ly for the uſeful purpoſes of making wine
or ale; in a temperature from 80° to 100°,
it will go on violently, and much too faft
for thoſe uſeful purpoſes. But in a heat
of 200°, or in the greater heat of Papin's
digeftor, or of a furnace, it will not go on
faſter, and probably not at all; but the
fimple effects of heat, that is, the changes
reſulting from the relation between heat
and the ſubſtances to which it is applied,
will
{
Оо
298
ESSA Y.
will take place, and will correfpond to the
degree of heat.
Now, let us compare together theſe va-
rious reſults, in the correfponding cafes of
the concurrence, or increafe, of full phyfical
caufes applied to lifeless bodies; of partial
concurrent caufes applied to fuch bodies;
of external, occafional, exciting caufes, ap-
plied to living bodies; and of motives ap-
plied to living intelligent perfons.
The full phyfical caufes are conftantly
conjoined with their reſpective effects;
which accordingly correfpond to them,
not only in kind, but in degree or quan-
tity.
The partial, exciting, concurrent cauſes,
whether applied to lifelefs bodies, or to li-
ving animals and vegetables, are not con-
ſtantly conjoined with thoſe changes that
are referred to them; nor, confequently,
do thofe changes always correfpond to
them in degree or quantity, nor even in
kind.
Motives
SECT. XII.
29t
Motives are not conftantly conjoined
with their reſpective actions; nor, confe-
quently, do theſe correfpond to them in
degree or quantity, even where they do fo
in kind.
ΤΟ
But the actions always correfpond to
the vulgar notion of motive, "that for
the fake of which." The porter, the la-
bourer, the weaver, in the examples gi-
ven, do juſt what is requifite to obtain their
object, To's 'evexa nas to 'ayabor, and no more.
They ſeem to give, or allow, as much in-
fluence or effect to the motives applied,
in any caſe, as may fecure that object, and
to prevent their further well-known effects,
which in other cafes they would allow to
take place.
Now, this implies fomething more than
intelligence in the perfon; for intelligence
in the ſubject to whom the motive is pro-
poſed is implied in the very notion of mo-
tive. That fact of the action always cor-
reſponding to the motive in point of in-
telligence, and attainment of the object
propoſed, but yet not always being pro-
002
portioned
292
ÈS SA Y.
portioned to it, or correfponding to it in
point of quantity, is equally inconfiftent
with the principle of conftant conjunction,
and with the fuppofition of mere chance,
or the want of any power in the Being
who acts, to allow or to prevent the full
effect of the motive. It implies the pof-
feffion and exercife of fuch a power.
A maſs of ice expofed to heat, a fhip
under fail, a cannon-ball when fhot from
a cannon, wort in Papin's digeftor, an egg
placed in a common oven, an acorn plant-
ed in very moift earth in the torrid zone,
a man who has juſt drank a quantity of
brandy, a fellow who is offered a fum of
money, on condition that he drink a cer-
tain quantity of brandy, and who is wil-
ling to earn the money on that condition,
though other wife not difpofed to drink
brandy, which, though a fhameful, is a
real cafe, and not a very uncommon one;
are all fubjects fufceptible of change, and
all have certain caufes, or principles of
change, applied to them.
The fix first of them are equally defti-
tute
SECT.
293
XII.
tute of intelligence and of felf-governing
power.
The three firſt of them, being expofed
to the full phyfical cauſes of certain chan-
ges, undergo thofe changes; which are
proportioned in degree to the increaſe or
concurrence of their reſpective cauſes.
The fourth, fifth, and fixth of them,
are under the influence of certain prin-
ciples of change, which are the full phy-
fical cauſes of certain changes, and only
the partial, concurrent, exciting caufes of
others the former fet of changes takes
place conſtantly, and always in propor-
tion to their cauſes; the latter fet of changes
either does not take place at all, or at leaſt
the changes are not proportioned to the
partial exciting caufes applied; nor is the
peculiar moderate effect of a ſmall degree
of theſe obtained, when a greater degree of
them is applied; the more violent and pu-
rer phyſical effects of which take place uni-
formly.
In the two laft fubjects, to which we
fuppofe
294
ESSA Y.
fuppofe principles of change to be applied,
there is equally intelligence; but in the
laft of them only there is any felf govern-
ing power, with refpect to the change, or
any power of feparating, even in part, the
principle of change from the change cor-
reſponding to it, fo as to obtain or per-
mit the moderate effect or influence of it,
without the greater effect, proportioned to
the degree of it, and which fometimes
would take place.
The man who drinks brandy, notwith-
ſtanding his intelligence, and his defire to
obtain only the good effects of it, will ex-
perience phyfiological changes or effects
correſponding to that exciting cauſe, and
in a great meaſure proportioned to the de-
gree of it;
of it; and accordingly theſe effe As,
from one degree of it, will be uniformly
flight, and from a greater degree of it, will
be uniformly violent.
But the action of the fellow who drinks
brandy merely in confideration of a motive
propoſed to him, which action is confi-
dered as the effect of that motive, and in-
deed
SECT.
295
XII.
deed correfponds to it perfectly in one
way, is by no means proportioned to the
degree of the motive propoſed, but only
to what it is requifite to accompliſh. And
if this can be accompliſhed by drinking
one glaſs of brandy, the fellow (whom we
ſuppoſe not to be fuch a fool as wilfully to
endanger his health or life without know-
ing why) will drink no more of it; tho',
if he could not otherwife have accompliſh-
ed his purpoſe, he would perhaps have
endangered his health or life by drinking
a much larger quantity; that is, by doing
an action in a great meaſure, or as far as
he was able, proportioned to the degree
of the motive applied.
SECT.
SECT. XIII.
Obfervations on fome circumftances that have
contributed to conceal from the view of
men of Science the abfurdities and inconfift-
encies which are neceffarily implied in the
doctrine of the conftant conjunction of Mo-
tive and Action.
IT
is incredible, that falfities and abfur-
dities, fo grofs and palpable as thoſe
which are demonftrably implied in the
doctrine of Neceffity, as modified and af-
ferted by Mr HUME, fhould even for an
hour have eſcaped the notice of men of
fenſe and men of fcience, if there were
not fome circumſtance to conceal them
from their view, or to withdraw their at-
tention from them. A fingle leaf, it has
often been obferved, may conceal an ob-
ject, as effectually as a mountain could do.
Such,
+
SECT.
297
XIII.
Such, I believe, has been the cafe in the
preſent inſtance.
Philofophers have always been more in-
tent on obferving the points of analogy and
reſemblance, (which are very numerous
and very obvious), than on obferving the
points of difference between the relation of
motive and action and that of caufe and
effect in phyfics: Which is the very reverſe
of what they ſhould have done.
This difpofition in men of ſcience, and
indeed in all mankind, and the dangerous
tendency of it, and the neceffity of guard-
ing againſt it, are well pointed out by BA-
CON, in the following aphorifms of the
Novum Organum.
Intellectus humanus ex proprietate fua fa-
cile fupponit majorem ordinem et æqualitatem
in rebus quam invenit: et cum multa fint in
natura, monodica, et plena imparitatis, tamen
affingit parallela, et correspondentia, et rela-
tiva, que non funt. 1. 45.
Intellectus humanus in iis que femel placue-
runt, (aut quia recepta funt et credita, au! quia
delectant),
P P
298
+
ESSA Y.
delectant), alia etiam omnia trahit ad fuffra
gationem, et confenfum cum illis : et licet ma-
jor fit inftantiarum vis et copia, quæ occurrunt
in contrarium; tamen eas aut non obfervat, aut
contemnit, aut diftinguendo fummovet et rejicit,
non fine magno et perniciofo prejudicio, quo
prioribus illis fyllepfibus authoritas maneat in-
violata. At longe fubtilius ferpit hoc ma-
lum in philofophiis et fcientiis; in quibus quod
femel placuit, reliqua, licet multo firmiora et
potiora, inficit et in ordinem redigit. Quinetiam
licet abfuerit ea, quam diximus, delectatio et
vanitas, is tamen humano intellectui error eft
proprius et perpetuus, ut magis moveatur et
excitetur affirmativis quam negativis; cum rite
et ordine aquum fe utrique præbere debeat;
quin contra, in omni axiomate vero conftituen
do, major eft vis inftantiæ negative. 1. 46.
Maximum et velut radicale difcrimen inge-
niorum quoad philofophiam et fcientias illud eft;
quod alia ingenia fint fortiora et aptiora ad no-
tandas rerum differentias; alia ad notandas re-
rum fimilitudines. Ingenia enim conftantia et
acuta, figere contemplationes, et morari, et hæ-
rere in omni subtilitate differentiarum poffunt :
Ingenia autem fublimia, et difcurfiva, etiam
tenuiffimas et catholicas rerum fimilitudines et
agnofcunt
SECT. XIII.
299
agnofcunt et componunt. Utrumque autem in-
genium facile labitur in exceffum, prenfando
aut gradus rerum aut umbras. 1. 55.
Such being human nature, it ought not
perhaps to be thought furpriſing, that fo
many philofophers have been fond of
dwelling on the refemblance between the
relation of motive and action and that of
cauſe and effect in phyfics; and have been
equally diſpoſed to overlook the difference
between them. The unlucky metaphor of
the balance, and the analogy between the
turn of a balance when loaded with une-
qual weights in the oppofite fcales and the
determinations of mankind between differ-
ent motives, occurred to them; it pleaſed
their fancy, engroffed their attention, and
has even come to be regarded by many as
an important philofophical axiom, which
it is folly to call in queftion. It may well
be doubted, whether the doctrine of Necef-
fity would ever have been maintained, had
it not been for this analogy; and, but for
it, we may be fure that the doctrine of
Neceffity could not long have kept its
ground. For whenever we lofe fight of
P p 2
the
300
ESSA Y,
the mere turn of the balance, and confider
more accurately all the obvious circum-
ſtances of phyfical caufes and effects, nay,
even of the motion of a balance itſelf, we
perceive at once, that the doctrine of Ne-
ceffity is not more contrary to common
ſenſe, than it is to the eſtabliſhed laws of
the relation of cauſe and effect in phyfics.
The analogy of the balance must no
doubt be obvious and ftriking; for it has
occurred, and has pleaſed almoſt univer-
fally. But the difference between the turn
of a balance and the determination of our
will, however difficult it may be to ex-
prefs this difference in words in an unex-
ceptionable manner, muſt be equally ob-
vious to the apprehenfion even of the vul-
gar; as appears from their invincible re-
pugnance to the doctrine of Neceffity,which
feems, at firſt fight at leaſt, a fair infer-
ence from the analogy of the turn of the
balance: Or if a few people ſhould be un-
reaſonable enough to diſregard that gene-
ral repugnance, and to deny the inference
from it, ftill it must be felf-evident, that
the difference between the turn of a ba-
lance
SECT. XIII.
301
lance and the effects of phyſical caufes is
infinite. For the mere turn of a balance,
though undoubtedly the effect of the great-
er weight, is not the whole effect, nor does
it even bear any proportion to the whole
effect, of that weight; which effect, in this
argument, we affume as a principle, and
indeed know experimentally, to be con-
ftantly conjoined with that weight. And
if a balance were made, as furely may be
conceived, without any refiftance to its turn-
ing, by diminiſhing friction, and making
the centre of gravity of the whole machine
coincide (phyfically) with the centre of
motion, it would turn completely, from
the horizontal to the vertical direction, with
any the ſmalleſt addition or difference of
weight at either end of the beam; and
of courſe would be unfit for the com-
mon uſeful purpoſes of a balance, though
it would afford a better illuftration even
than the common balance in favour of
the doctrine of Neceffity. Yet in reafon-
ing upon this favourite analogy, the ſmall
circumſtance of the mere turn of the com-
mon balance, (without regard even to the
degree or quantity of the turn), has alone
been
302
ESSA Y.
"
been kept in view; while the whole effect
of the weights in both fcales feems never
to have been thought of, even by thoſe
who admitted the conftant conjunction of
caufe and effect, and who afferted the fame
with respect to motive and action.
It would no doubt be very fooliſh to fet
about proving, and perhaps will be thought
needleſs to attempt to illuftrate, this point,
of the difference between the mere turn of
a balance and the full effect of the weights
in both fcales, as no perfon of tolerable
capacity can fail to underſtand it at once,
if he will attend to it even for a moment.
But it is worth while to point out, that
if a perfon fhould be found of ſuch flen-
der capacity as to be incapable of under-
ſtanding it, or of fuch a perverfe difpofi-
tion as to be unwilling to acknowledge it,
his cafe is by no means defperate: for
though he is doubtless infinitely beyond
the reach of argument or reafon, the point
in queftion may be made very plain to
him, without any thought or reaſoning at
all. Such a perion may be fuppofed to
have
SECT. XIII.
303
have all his bodily organs entire, and the
full ufe of his five external fenfes: truſt-
ing to thefe, I fhould humbly propofe,
that, by way of beginning his ftudies in
phyfics, and acquiring fome knowledge of
the relation of caufe and effect, he place
himſelf under the defcending ſcale of a
common balance, when loaded with a
thousand pound weight in one ſcale, and a
thouſand and ten pound in the other; and
that the oppofite weight be taken out of the
fcale by about ten pound at a time.
I am
confident, that by the time five hundred
pound of it is taken out, he will feel dif-
tinctly, whether he can understand, or will
acknowledge, or not, the difference be-
tween the turn of a balance and the full
effect of a weight. And if he has any ge-
nius for analogy, he will eafily extend the
notion which he acquires in that way, to
every other inſtance of cauſe and effect in
phyfics, and of courſe to every inſtance of
motive and action, if he either believes
theſe two relations to be the fame, or con-
ceives that they both involve the circum-
ſtance of conftant conjunction.
SECT.
C
SECT. XIV.
Obfervations on an ancient paradox, with re-
Spect to the notion of Motive, founded on
the analogy between Agent and Motive, and
the ambiguity of common language.—Ana-
logy between it and the modern philofophi-
cal doctrine of Neceſſity.
TH
HE philofophical doctrine of the
Neceffity of human actions, which
is a modern paradox, founded on the ana-
logy between the relation of motive and
that of phyfical cauſe, and rendered plau-
fible, and difficult of detection, by the me-
taphorical and ambiguous phraſes often
employed in ſpeaking of thoſe two rela-
tions, may be in fome meaſure illuftrated
by a ſimilar inftance of an ancient para-
dox, with reſpect to the nature of motives,
founded on the analogy between the rela-
tion of motive and that of agent, and ren-
dered
SECT.
305
XIV.
dered plaufible, or at leaſt tenable, by the
ambiguity of many common phrafes,
which literally exprefs the notion and the
relation of agency, but are often uſed me-
taphorically in fpeaking of motives and
the relation of theſe to actions. At firſt
view, we ſhould think it impoffible that
ſuch a confufion of thought could ever
be made, or fuch an extravagant paradox
ever be afferted, either by the moſt careleſs
or by the moſt uncandid reafoner. It ap-
pears, however, from a very curious epi-
ftle of SENECA, that there were philofo-
phers in ancient times, who maintained,
that the virtues (which are confeffedly
motives or principles of action) were li-
ving creatures, and literally moved or im-
pelled men to act in a certain way. SE-
NECA ſtates the arguments in behalf of
this ſtrange opinion very fully, and then
reaſons againſt it at great length, half in
jeft, half in earneſt. As this abfurdity
may have its uſe, and as it is very little
known, I fhall give a fhort fpecimen of
the arguments on both fides of it.
"Animum conftat animal effe: cum ipfe
efficiat
306
ESSAY.
efficiat ut fimus animalia, et cum ab illo ani-
malia nomen hoc traxerint. Virtus autem ni-
hil aliud eft, quam animus quodammodo fe
habens: ergo
animal eft. Deinde, virtus agit
aliquid agi autem nihil fine impetu poteft :
fi impetum habet, qui nulli eft nifi animali,
animal eft. Si animal eft, inquit, virtus, ha-
bet ipfam virtutem. Quidni? habet feipfam.
Quomodo fapiens omnia per virtutem gerit,
fic virtus per fe. Ergo, inquit, et omnes
artes animalia funt, et omnia que cogita-
mus, quæque mente complectimur.
Ego in alia effe me fententia profeffus fum.
Non enim tantum virtutes animalia erunt, fi
hoc recipitur; fed oppofita quoque illis vitia
et affectus, tanquam ira, timor, luctus, fufpi-
cio. Ultra res ifta procedet, omnes fenten-
tiæ, omnes cogitationes animalia erunt: quod
nullo modo recipiendum eft. Non enim quic-
quid ab homine fit, homo eft. Juftitia quid eft?
inquit. Animus quodammodo fe habens. Itaque
fi animus animal eft, et juftitia. Minime, hac
enim habitus animi eft et quædam vis. Idem
animus in varias figuras convertitur, et non
toties animal aliud eft, quoties aliud facit:
nec illud quod fit ab animo, animal eft. Si
juftitia
SECT.
307
XIV.
juftitia animal eft, fi fortitudo, fi cæteræ vir-
tutes: utrum definunt animalia effe fubinde,
ac rurfus incipiunt, an femper funt?" &'c.
&'C.
SENECA, Epift. 113. paffim.
There can be no occafion to enter into
the merits of this ftrange controverſy. I
prefume, if any perfon in the prefent age
were to affert the opinion which SENECA
combats fo acutely, he would inſtantly be
pronounced infane; and probably there
would not be a much more favourable o-
pinion entertained of the judgement of
one who ſhould fet about arguing againſt
it. Yet let it be obſerved, that it is a fpe-
culation or ſyſtem that correfponds per-
fectly to the modern doctrine of the Ne-
ceffity of human actions; both in princi-
ple, which confifts in the confounding the
notions of two different natural relations ;
and in the ſtyle of reafoning, which con-
fifts in drawing inferences from the words
and phrafes commonly employed in a me-
taphorical fenfe in fpeaking of motives
and actions, juft as if they were literal ex-
preffions of thought. It is unneceffary
Qq 2
to
308
ESSAY.
to make any compariſon between the two
doctrines in point of rationality: fome,
no doubt, will think the difference very
great, others very little. But whichever
of them be the more plaufible, I have no
fcruple to ſay, that the ancient ſyſtem is
by far the more tenable. Indeed (all re-
gard to common ſenſe, and even to con-
ſciouſneſs, being put out of the queſtion,
as in candour it ought to be) I fee no
means of confuting a philofopher, who
fhall chufe to deny having any ſelf-go-
verning power with refpect to his own ac-
tions, and to affert, at the fame time, that
they are abfolutely, and as to him irre-
fiſtibly, determined and produced by cer-
tain motives or principles of action, which
are animals, and act upon him only occa-
fionally, or when they pleaſe. I am fure
fuch a doctrine is proof againſt mathema-
tical demonftration, or, more properly
fpeaking, is beyond the reach of it. Ma-
thematical demonſtration, I apprehend, is
only applicable to this fubject on the fup-
pofition, that the living perfon, or mind,
is as inert with refpect to the production
of any change in itſelf, as inanimate mat-
ter
SECT. XIV.
309
ter is; and that the motives producing
change in it are alſo things inanimate,
which, whether conftantly conjoined with
their reſpective actions, or occaſionally ſe-
parated from them, have no power of their
own, either of not acting, or of acting ac-
cording to their difcretion. I own I ſhould
ſuſpect, that thoſe philofophers whom SE-
NECA undertakes to confute, and takes the
liberty to laugh at, had given up their
fortrefs, or rather abandoned it, becauſe
no body thought it worth while to attack
them in it; for it is one of that kind, which
a fucceffion of refolute difputants might
eafily maintain againſt all mankind, even
to the day of judgement.
SECT.
SECT. XV.
General illuftration and confirmation of the
reaſonings in the nine preceding fections,
from Sir ISAAC NEWTON's reafonings in
his Principia.-Commentary on his argu-
ment in proof of his first corollary from the
three laws of Motion.-That corollary and
argument refolvable into the principles of
Inertia of the fſubject, and conflant con-
junction of Caufe and Effect, or into the
latter principle fingly, as it implies the for-
mer.-Impoffibility of affigning a reaſon,
confiftent with the principles, for the dif
ferent refult, in the cafe of lifeless bodies,
and in that of living perfons.-Abfurdity
of fuch an attempt.-Either the inferences
must be admitted, or the latter principle
must be given up, with respect to Motives
and Actions.
I B
Believe the moſt fatisfactory and moſt
ufeful method of illuftrating and eſta-
blifhing the kind of mathematical reafon-
ing
SECT. XV.
311
ing that has been employed to refute the
doctrine of the Neceffity of human actions
as modified by Mr HUME, and maintain-
ed to confiſt in the conftant conjunction of
motive and action, at leaſt with men who
are accuſtomed to ſcientific reaſoning, will
be, to analyſe NEWTON's first corollary
from the three laws of motion, with his
argument in proof of it. For it will ap-
pear at once, that his argument turns en-
tirely on the conftant conjunction of caufe
and effect, and on the inability of the bo-
dy to move itſelf. This laft circumſtance,
which is comprehended in what NEWTON
calls the inertia of body, is indeed fuffi-
ciently implied in the former, though this
is not mutual; and the correſponding
principle is equally implied with reſpect
to mind, or living perfons, in the doctrine
of the conftant conjunction of motives and
actions, as was formerly mentioned; and,
at any rate, it is exprefsly afferted in eve-
doctrine of the Neceffity of human ac-
tions as proceeding from motives, like phy-
fical effects from their cauſes, and, is an
effential part of every fuch doctrine, and
feems to be the very point in difpute be-
ry
tween
i
312
ESSA Y.
re
tween philofophers and the vulgar on
this fubject.
NEWTON'S firft corollary from the
three laws of motion is as follows: Cor-
pus viribus conjunctis diagonalem parallelo-
grammi eodem tempore defcribere, quo latera
Separatis.
This corollary evidently confifts of two
parts or points, and confequently might
have been expreffed in two ſeparate pro-
pofitions.
The firſt point is, That the body muft
move in the diagonal of the parallelogram
fuppofed.
The ſecond point is, That it muſt de-
fcribe the whole diagonal in the fame time
that it would have defcribed either of the
two contiguous fides of the parallelogram
feparately.
The fecond point I put out of the que-
ftion here; becauſe, for reafons formerly
mentioned, it is not indifferent to a per-
*
fon
SECT.
313
XV.
fon to go, as it is for a body moving un-
refifted, or uniformly refifted, to move
with any velocity. But if this were the
cafe with a perſon, there can be no doubt
that the whole of NEWTON's corollary
would, on the principle of conftant con-
junction, apply to a living perfon under the
influence of combined motives, as well as
to a dead body under the influence of fi-
milarly combined forces, or phyſical caufes
of motion.
It is therefore the first point only of the
corollary that I have occafion to confider
at prefent. NEWTON's argument in proof
of his whole corollary is as follows: Si
corpus dato tempore, vi folá M in loco A im-
preſſå, ferretur uniformi cum motu ab A ad
B; et vi folá N in eodem loco impreſſt, fer-
retur ab A ad C: compleatur parallelogram-
mum A B DC, et vi utrâque feretur corpus
illud eodem tempore in diagonali ab A ad D.
Nam quoniam vis N agit fecundum lineam
AC ipfi B D parallelam, hæc vis per legem
fecundam nihil mutabit velocitatem accedendi
ad lineam illam B D, a vi altera genitam.
Accedet igitur corpus eodem tempore ad lineam
B D,
Rr
314
ESSA Y.
que
BD, five vis N imprimatur, five non; at-
ideo in fine illius temporis reperietur ali-
cubi in linea illa B D. Eodem argumento in
fine temporis ejufdem reperietur alicubi in li-
nea CD, et idcirco in utriufque linea con-
curfu D reperiri neceffe eft. Perget autem
motu rectilineo ab A ad D per legem pri-
mam.
This important argument is one of the
plaineft and fimpleft that can be concei-
ved, and fuch as I am perfuaded a child
of feven years of age would eaſily under-
ftand. It is in fubftance merely this
That while the body, in confequence of
one cauſe, is moving, or tending to move,
in the direction of one of the contiguous
fides of the parallelogram, in confequence
of the other cauſe, it is tending to move
in the direction of the other contiguous
fide of it. It ſeems tacitly to be taken for
granted by NEWTON, that the body must
be in fome place, and that it cannot be
in two places, nor be moving in two dif-
ferent lines, at once; which it may be
prefumed no perfon will difpute; and
therefore, that at any moment of the time
J
舭
​in
SECT. XV.
315
in which it is moving, it muſt be found
in fome point of a line lying in the inter-
mediate direction between the two in each
of which it tends to move the precife
line of this motion being determined by
thoſe of the other two, which would have
taken place if the refpective cauſes of them
had been applied fingly.
The merit of the reafoning employed
by NEWTON, in proof of his corollary,
must depend on the thoughts expreffed by
his words employed in enunciating it, and
not upon the words themſelves; elfe the
corollary, though true in Latin, might be
falſe in Greek or in Engliſh; which is ab-
furd.
Let us then confider accurately the im-
port of his words, and obferve which of
the many circumstances expreffed by
them are effential to the force of his ar-
gument in proof of the compofition of mo-
tion.
1. Corpus, a Body; a Being, extended,
figured, folid, divifible, moveable, unin-
telligent,
Rr 2
316
ESSA Y.
telligent, inert, that is, incapable either
of changing its own ftate, or of prevent-
ing it from changing, in confequence of
any cauſe applied.
Take away, or, what is the fame thing
for our preſent purpofe, put out of confi-
deration, extenfion, figure, folidity, and
divifibility; fuppofe the body a mere
atom, or an indiviſible moveable point:
NEWTON'S argument remains unſhaken.
Suppofe the atom, or the extended, fi-
gured, folid body, to have intelligence:
or, if this be thought an abfurd or extra-
vagant fuppofition, fuppofe a very intelli-
gent man, with all his ſenſes about him,
but perfectly paralytic, or bound hand
and foot,. fo as to be unable to give him-
felf the ſmalleſt motion, or to prevent
himſelf from moving, by laying hold of
any thing, to be placed in the fame cir-
cumſtances with the body in NEWTON'S
firſt corollary: NEWTON's argument ſtill
applies in full force to fuch a Being; and
whenever the experiment is tried, or any
one equivalent to it, as in the caſe of a
perfon
SECT. XV.
317
perfon in a ſwinging chair or bed, the
refult is strictly agreeable to the corol-
lary.
But let us next fuppofe the Being in
queſtion, whether extended, figured, fo-
lid, and divifible, or only a fhapeleſs a-
tom, whether intelligent or fenfeleſs, to
be capable of moving of itſelf.
NEWTON's argument does not apply at
all to fuch a Being: for, inſtead of going
in the direction of the diagonal, it may go
in the very oppofite, or in twenty differ-
ent directions fucceffively. It may go
backwards and forwards; it may move
in a circle, or deſcribe a ſpiral or a regu-
lar polygon; and this notwithſtanding the
two forces applied.
It may be proper here to remark, that
motion, the effect of one caufe, is always,
and, as we have reafon to think, neceffa-
rily, rectilinear, progreffive, and uniform
in its velocity but motion, the action of
one agent, may be either progreffive or
retrograde, or each alternately; it may
be
318
ESSA Y.
be uniform, or accelerated, or retarded,
or all fucceffively; it may be either recti-
linear, or curvilinear, or each in their
turns. The acceleration of the motion of
a falling body, the ofcillatory motions of
pendulums, and many other fuch inftan-
ces, which at first view might appear
contradictions to the alledged uniformity
of motion, the effect of one caufe, will not
be found fo when duly examined.
2. Vires, Forces, or caufes of motion.
In NEWTON's reafonings, commonly no-
thing more is meant by forces than mere-
ly certain tendencies to move; and this
he is at much pains to inculcate, even in
his definitions. But the term is often
ufed to denote the fuppofed cauſes of fuch
tendencies to move; as in the preſent ar-
gument; which produces no embarraff-
ment, nor even ambiguity, as the cauſe
and its effect, the tendency, are conceived
to be conſtantly conjoined. If this were
not uniformly conceived to be the cafe,
the uſe of ſuch a term, that is really am-
biguous, would produce the greateſt con-
fufion, and would completely mar his
whole
1
SE C T. XV.
319
whole reafonings. The nature of thefe
cauſes NEWTON did not fpecify, and in
the Principia he frequently warns us, that
he did not know it: nor indeed was it of
any confequence to him, in his mode of
reaſoning, of what nature the caufes of
motion were, provided only they were
conftantly conjoined with their effects.
That this circumftance was always im-
plied in NEWTON's conception of them,
and that it is effentially neceffary to his
argument in proof of his firft corollary, is
very evident. Suppofe, in the cafe put in
that corollary, that one of the forces fhould
be feparated from its effect, then the bo-
dy, inftead of moving in the diagonal,
must move in the direction of one or other
of the two contiguous fides of the paral-
lelogram. Suppoſe both the forces to be
feparated from their effects, the body, in-
ftead of defcribing the diagonal, must re-
main at reſt at the point where it was ori-
ginally placed.
Even the claufe in NEWTON's argu-
ment, Nam quoniam vis N agit fecundum li-
neam A C ipfi B D parallelam, hæc vis
per
legem
320
ESSA Y.
legem fecundam nihil mutabit velocitatem ac-
cedendi ad lineam illam BD a vi alterd
ge-
nitam, is implied in the notion of the con-
ſtant conjunction of caufe and effect, is
refolveable into it, and is in truth little
elfe than a particular mode of expreffing
it, adapted to the cafe in queftion.
Without inquiring minutely into the
extenfive and various meanings of the
verb agit, and confequently the ambiguity
of it in certain cafes, we may fafely ſay,
that, as here employed by NEWTON, it
means merely is the caufe of motion; and
that the ſenſe of the paffage would be ex-
actly expreffed in the following words:
Quoniam vis N eft caufa motus fecundum
A C, hæc vis non erit caufa ullius mutationis
velocitatis accedendi ad B D. For muto, as
being an active verb, as well as ago, ac-
cording to its full literal meaning, involves
and expreſſes a notion of fomething dif-
ferent from merely being a phyſical cauſe
of change, and fomething different from
what NEWTON was reafoning about, or
feems to have had in view in this
ment.
argu-
な
​Such
SECT. XV.
321
Such being the meaning of the clauſe
at prefent under confideration, it may ea-
fily be ſhewn, that it is fully implied in
the notion of the conftant conjunction of
cauſe and effect; or, in other words, it
may be demonſtrated from this principle.
For, according to the hypothefis, or cafe
put in the corollary, no caufes are applied
to the body, but M and N. Uniform
motion, with a certain velocity in the di-
rection A B, is the full effect of M when
applied fingly; and uniform motion, with
a certain velocity in the direction A C, is
the full effect of N when applied fingly.
If, then, when both M and N are applied
together, the velocity of the motion of the
body, either in the direction A B, or in
the direction A C, is either encreaſed or
diminiſhed, this change, which we confi-
der as an effect, muft either take place
without a caufe, or it muſt proceed either
from M or N, the only two caufes that
are applied. If it be faid to take place
without a cauſe, it is a fpecific inftance of
the feparation of caufe and effect, as much
as the application of a caufe which ſhould
Sf
not
322
ESSA Y.
not be followed by its proper effect would
be. If it be faid to be the effect of M, or
of N, it must be either over and above
their ufual full effect when each of them
is applied fingly; or it muſt be either
wholly or partly, inſtead of their uſual
full effect. If it be over and above the
ufual full effect of them refpectively, then
they are not conftantly conjoined with
their effects, having a greater effect at one
time than at another; and the amount of
the difference between the effect of either of
them, when applied fingly, and when ap-
plied in combination with the other, is the
quantity of effect from which at one or other
of thoſe times it was feparated. For the
fake of concifeneſs and diftinctneſs, this
may be expreffed in algebraical form, as
follows:
X = A,
Y = B,
XY = AB,
according to the affumed principle of con-
tant conjunction:
But
SECT.
323
XV.
1
But if it be ſuppoſed to be
X √ Y=A+CB,
or if it be fuppofed to be
X^ Y = A ^ B — D,
then C or D are the quantities of effect ſe-
parated at one time or another from the
caufes X and Y.
If it be faid, that this new effect is
not additional, or over and above the
ufual full effect of either caufe fingly ap-
plied, but either wholly or partly, in-
ſtead of that uſual effect, ſtill it would be
an inſtance of the feparation, either total
or partial, of a caufe from its effect; for
even if the quantity of the new effect were
the fame with that of the old, the quality
or kind of it would be different.
while the body advances towards B D
with the fame velocity as if N were not ap-
plied, and towards CD, with the fame
velocity as if M were not applied; and
accordingly at the end of the given time
S f 2
But
is
324
ESSA Y.
is found, at the point D, the difference
from the effect of M correfponds exactly,
both in quantity and quality, to the full
effect of N; as the difference from the ef-
fect of N applied fingly does to the full
effect of M; ſo that both caufes are fully
conjoined, both in refpect of quantity and
quality with their refpective effects.
The cafe of "the direct concurrence or
direct oppofition of forces or cauſes of
motion is more familiar to us than the
combination of them, or at leaft is more
readily and clearly apprehended on account
of its perfect analogy with the fimple ope-
ration of addition and fubtraction in arith-
metic or in algebra. It may therefore be
uſed to illuftrate the preceding argument.
with refpect to the combination of forces,
as the fame general principle applies to
them all.
If a force or caufe of motion X produ-
ced a velocity as A, and another force Y
produced a velocity as B, on the principle
of conſtant conjunction, the concurrence
of X and Y muft produce a velocity as
A+ B,
SECT.
225
XV.
A+B, and the oppofition of them would
give a velocity as AB. To fuppofe
X + Y to produce a velocity as A + B
—C, or as A+ 2 B, or to fuppofe X-Y
to produce a velocity as 2 A + B, or as
A + B + C, would at once be acknow-
ledged to be an extravagancy, or little bet-
ter than an abſurdity; and, on examina-
tion, it would be ſeen, that on thoſe fup-
pofitions there muſt be ſometimes an effect
without a cauſe, or elfe caufes feparated
from their full uſual effects.
If the principle of conftant conjunction
be conceived to make a part of the relation
of cauſe and effect, they are complete ab-
furdities, as hath been already fhewn.
And fo univerfal and irreſiſtible is that
notion of the relation in queſtion, that if
thofe fuppofitions were expreffed in arith-
metical numbers, and explained by any
familiar illuſtration, fuch as failing, ei-
ther againſt or with a current, any ordi-
nary man would be ftruck with the abfur-
dity of them. A common feaman, I pre-
fume, would fee at once the abſurdity of
them in all the three cafes of concurrence,
oppofition,
326
ESSA Y.
1
oppofition, or combination.—Let it be
remembered, however, that theſe reafon-
ings are given merely as neceffary infer-
ences from the principle of conſtant con-
junction of caufe and effect, not as any
proof of the neceffity of that conftant con-
junction, nor even of the truth of it, as a
mere matter of fact; though no doubt
they indirectly tend to prove the truth of
it, as they themſelves are found true as
matters of fact. The nature of the rela-
tion, in other refpects, is a rational fub-
ject for further inveſtigation.
Call one of the forces, to which NEW-
TON's argument relates, Gravity, and the
other Magnetifm or Electricity; or one of
them Hunger, and the other Thirft; or
one of them Anger, and the other Fear;
or one of them the defire of earning 100
guineas, and the other the defire of earn-
ing 50 guineas; or, what is much better
for the purpoſe of precife reaſoning, call
one of them M, and the other N, as NEW-
TON does in his argument in proof of
the firſt corollary; ftill, if their conjunc-
tion with their effects be conftant, NEW-
TON'S
SECT. XV.
327
TON's argument applies to them complete-
ly.
It has often been obferved, and I be-
lieve is now univerfally acknowledged,
that NEWTON's argument in proof of that
important corollary, is no demonftration.
Indeed he himſelf does not give it formal-
ly as a demonftration, though it is very
plain, that he relied on it as being effen-
tially a perfect one. In both theſe re-
ſpects, I apprehend, he was clearly in the
right. The argument is deficient in the
form; but it has completely the effence of
a demonſtration. It is deficient in this
refpect, that the conclufion is not clearly
refolved into all the fimpler principles that
are affumed in the reafoning, whether
theſe be ſelf-evident neceffary truths, or
axioms, or only ultimate phyfical facts or
laws of Nature. Of the former kind are
the neceffity of a body's being in fome
place, and the impoffibility of its being
in two places, or moving in two different
lines, at once: of the latter kind are the
conſtant conjunction of caufe and effect,
and the inability of the body to move it-
felf.
328
ESSAY.
ſelf. But this indeed is virtually implied
in the firſt law of motion; and both the
conftant conjunction of caufe and effect,
and the inability of a body to move itſelf,
are implied in the common notions of
cauſe and of body. Yet NEWTON's ar-
gument is effentially good demonſtration;
for all theſe fimple truths, whether necef-
fary or contingent, are univerfally implied
in the notions of mankind concerning
thoſe things about which he reafons; and
they would be expreffed in good defini-
tions of thoſe notions, or explanations of
the terms, which he, like other men, em-
ploys to denote them. This feems to have.
been very uniformly felt and underſtood
by men of ſcience, who have almoſt uni-
verfally acquiefced in NEWTON's argu-
ment. None indeed could call in queſtion
the truth of the conclufion as a matter of
fact; for there is neither obfcurity, nor
difficulty, nor contradiction, in the expe-
riments that confirm it; but a few have
inclined to refuſe their affent to the corol-
lary as a point demonſtrated, or a neceffary
truth; but thefe, I believe, have been
men who, from the force of old prejudi-
ces,
SECT.
329
XV.
ces, could not, or would not underſtand
it. As every demonftration muſt ulti-
mately reft on fome first principles; as no
more principles fhould be affumed for any
demonſtration than what are effentially
and abfolutely neceffary for it; as it is al-
ways pleafing, and indeed for other rea-
fons defirable, to refolve a demonftration
into as few principles as poffible; and as
nothing more is wanting to complete the
demonſtration of NEWTON's Corollary, but
merely to ſpecify thofe circumſtances which
are tacitly affumed by him, and are im-
plied in his argument; I hope 1 fhall not
be accuſed of arrogance when I fay, that I
conceive this little commentary to be a de-
monſtration of his firft corollary, and
of the neceffary compofition of motion,
from a combination of forces, neither di-
rectly concurring, nor yet directly oppo-
fing one another: and the fame principles
apply to all other cafes of motion from
the various applications of any cauſes or
forces, whether concurring or oppofing.
In fhort, grant him but the inertia of
body, and the conſtant conjunction of cauſe
and
Tt
330
ESSA Y.
and effect, the neceffity of a body's being
in fome place, and the evident impoſſibi-
lity of its being in two places, or moving
in two different lines, at once; which are
all of them axioms of phyfics, or laws of
human thought, with reſpect to body,
fpace, motion, caufe, and effect, as much
as the axioms of geometry are laws of hu-
man thought with refpect to quantity;
and NEWTON'S corollary with reſpect to
the compofition of motion is plain de-
monſtration: take away any one of theſe
things, or diſprove any one of theſe ſup-
poſed phyſical axioms, and the Principia of
NEWTON do not deferve the name of rea-
foning.
*
The two laſt of theſe things are uni-
verfally admitted with refpect to living
perfons, as well as with refpect to inani-
mate bodies: nor can they, without the
moſt palpable abfurdity, be denied. The
two first of them are alfo maintained with
reſpect to living perfons, as well as to in-
animate bodies, in the philoſophical doc-
trine of the neceffity of human actions,
as it has been modified and afferted by
Mr
SECT.
331
XV.
Mr HUME: and the fame confequences
must neceffarily follow from them.
This difquifition, therefore, I give as
complete demonſtration, not merely of the
falfity, but of the abfurdity, of the doc-
trine of the conftant conjunction of mo-
tive and action, and of the neceffity of hu-
man actions as refulting from this rela-
tion between them and the motives of
them, and of the perfect refemblance or
identity of the relation of motive and ac-
tion with that of cauſe and effect in phy-
fics.
If any perfon will not acquiefce in my
demonſtration, and give up Mr HUME'S
doctrine, he has his choice of two things
which he may do. He must either admit
as truths all my conclufions from that
doctrine, and ten thouſand others, equal-
ly falfe, and more ridiculous, that may be
drawn from it; or he must fhew ſome error
in the reaſoning employed, which in truth
is not mine, but Sir ISAAC NEWTON'S.
I only analyſe it, and make a new applica-
tion of it. He must likewife find means
T t 3
to
332
ESSA Y.
to difprove, or at least must be prepared
to deny, and argue againft, many of the
beſt known and molt important facts in
phyfics.
For it is neceffary to point out, that no-
thing can ever be done towards evading
or explaining away thofe falfe and ridicu-
lous conclufions that have been drawn
from the doctrine of the conftant con-
junction of motive and action, by af-
figning a reaſon, confiftent with the prin-
ciple, for the ftriking difference of the re-
fult of it in the cafe of living perſons, and
in that of inanimate bodies.
I have no doubt but that, by the help
of ambiguous words, and groundleſs, or
perhaps unintelligible hypothefes, argu-
ments, or talk at leaſt, may be muſtered
up, even on the plaineſt ſubject, which
it will be impoffible either to underſtand or
to anſwer. But to feek for fuch a reaſon
in the preſent cafe, is an abfurdity; for,
from the nature of things, there can be
none fuch and it is folly to liſten to any
thing that can be faid in favour of ſuch
:
an
SECT. XV.
333
an opinion. This point, which is of
fome confequence, it would be tedious to
explain in general terms; but this kind of
explanation of it is not needed, as it may
be fufficiently proved and illuſtrated by
one or two inſtances.
If a mathematician fhould affert, that
he had conſtructed a plain triangle of ſuch
curious proportions, that one fide of it
was longer than the other two put toge-
ther, and that the three angles of it were
greater than two right angles; and ſhould
undertake to affign a reaſon for theſe dif-
ferences between his triangle and all others,
and even offer to demonſtrate theſe ſtrange
properties of his triangle: What would
men of ſenſe and men of fcience think of
him?
Or if a chemiſt ſhould tell us, that he
had diſcovered a new foffil, or contrived a
new compofition of metals, of fuch won-
derful properties, that though it was per-
fectly inert, and very ponderous, yet a
ball of it, when projected obliquely to the
horizon, went in a ſtraight line, and with
an
1
334
ESSA Y.
an uniform velocity, till the whole force
of projection was fpent; and that then it
fell to the ground, with a retarded, or
with an uniform velocity; and fhould
undertake to affign a reafon for thefe fin-
gular properties in his new metal: What
fhould we think of fuch a chemiſt?
It is plain, that both the mathematician
and the chemift must be mad, and that
they would be undertaking abfurdities:
and it would be abfurd to liften to them,
unlefs from curiofity to know what fpecies
of infanity poffeffed them, or with the
charitable intention of miniftering to their
relief. For if the human faculties may
be truſted in any cafe, we may be fure,
that Omnipotence itſelf does not extend to
fuch undertakings as theirs. And if the
moft ingenious of men will nevertheleſs
make fuch attempts, by all their ingenui-
ty and all their labours, they can do no
more than demonſtrate their own infanity.
The triangle may be any thing that a
triangle can be; equilateral, ifofceles, or
fcalene; right angled, acute angled, or
obtufe
SECT.
335
XV.
obtufe angled; of any fize, of any propor-
tion, or lying in any plane; ftill, if it is a
plane figure, bounded by three right lines,
any one of theſe lines must be leſs than
the other two taken together, and the three
angles of it must be equal to two right
angles.
The metal may be any thing that a body
can be; nay more, it may be every thing
that mind can be, except that one thing
which is excluded by the fundamental
principle of the doctrine of Neceffity: the
ball made of it may be folid or hollow,
hard or foft, rough or ſmooth, big or little,
hot or cold, black or white, or party-co-
loured, and of any ſhape; it may be ſup-
poſed to have all the piety of David, and
all the wiſdom of Solomon; all the virtues
of Socrates, or all the vices of Nero; all
the poetical genius of Homer, or all the
philofophical knowledge of Newton: ftill,
if it is inert, and heavy, and projected
obliquely to the horizon, and if the con-
junction of cauſe and effect be conſtant, it
muſt deſcribe a curve, and fall with an ac-
celerated velocity.
Now,
336
ESSA Y.
:
Now, according to Mr HUME's doctrine
of the Neceffity of human actions, and the
conftant conjunction of motives and actions,
a living perfon in relation to motives and
actions is precifely in the fituation of an
inanimate body in relation to projection
and gravity, or to any other phyſical cau-
fes and if that doctrine be juft, the fame
general refult, to wit, the conftant com-
pofition of actions (for inftance, of volun-
tary movement confidered as an action)
from the combination of motives, as being
a ftrictly neceffary inference from thoſe
principles, without the ſmalleſt regard to
any other properties in the ſubject or per-
fon, or to any other circumſtances what-
ever, muft univerfally take place, like the
compofition of motion from the combina-
tion of forces in phyfics; all idle talk to
the contrary notwithſtanding.
:
?
SECT.
SECT. XVI.
Second part of the Dilemma ftated.-The in-
ertia of Mind.—Irreſiſtible influence of Mo-
tives which are not conftantly conjoined
with their respective Actions or Effects,
but occafionally ſeparated from them.—Re-
pugnance of this occafional feparation or
conjunction to the affumed principle, That
every Event or Change is an Effect imply-
ing a Caufe. -Impoffibility of its proceeding
from any Caufe conftantly conjoined with
its Effect-Neceffity of its either coming
to paſs without any Caufe, and purely by
chance, or elfe being produced by an Agent
having optional or difcretionary power to
Separate or to conjoin Motives and Actions.
-Suppofition of its coming to pass with-
out any Cauſe ſtated, and confidered on the
principle of the doctrine of Chances.-Ne-
ceffary inferences from it, that are falſe,
and repugnant to the univerfal notion of the
relation of Motive and Action.
As
S it is an unquestioned axiom of
logic, That a propofition directly
contradictory to one that is falfe, muſt be
U u
true;
338
ESSAY.
true; and as it appears from the prece-
ding obfervations and reafonings, that the
doctrine of the conftant conjunction of mo-
tive and action is not merely falfe, but
abſurd; it muſt be admitted, that what-
ever the relation in queſtion may be in o-
ther refpects, it is only an occafional and
Separable connection. And this conclufion,
I believe, is perfectly confiftent with the
general and natural conviction, or what
is called the common fenfe, of mankind.
Still, however, it may be afferted, and
probably it will be afferted by thoſe who
are keen partifans of the doctrine of phi-
lofophical neceffity, that though the con-
nection of motive and action is but occa-
fional and feparable, the volitions and ac-
tions of men are abfolutely determined and
produced by motives, as phyfical effects
in inanimate matter are by their cauſes;
and that men have no independent power
of refiſting motives, or of acting, except
merely as impelled by them.
Such we may reaſonably fuppofe to have
been the perfuafion of philofophers who
main-
SECT.
339
XVI.
maintained the doctrine of Neceffity be--
fore the time of Mr HUME; who, fo far
as I know, was the firft that clearly and
explicitly maintained the doctrine of the
conſtant conjunction of motive and action,
and made this principle the foundation of
the neceffity of human actions. It is very
plain, at leaſt, that Mr HUME regarded
himſelf as the author of that doctrine, and
that he confidered it as an important dif-
covery in ſcience.
This doctrine, which, in contradiftinc-
tion to Mr HUME's, may be called the old
or common doctrine of Neceffity, is as re-
pugnant to general belief, or common
fenſe, as Mr HUME's is; and, what is
more to the preſent purpoſe, like his doc-
trine of Neceffity, it may be demonſtrated
mathematically to be falfe and abfurd.
For though thefe two doctrines are very
different in one reſpect, yet, upon the
whole, they are very near akin; and as
they both involve the fame falſe principle,
to wit, the inertia of mind, the fame mode
of reaſoning, with only a few very flight
alterations, may be applied to both, and
U u 2
will
340
ESSA Y.
will be fufficient to prove, that the com-
mon doctrine of Neceffity, as well as Mr
HUME's, muſt be falfe, becauſe its necef-
fary confequences are inconfiftent with
plain matter of fact; and that it muſt be
abſurd, becauſe it is inconfiftent with it-
felf
It appears to me, I confefs, that this old
or common doctrine cannot be maintain-
ed with near fo much plaufibility as Mr
HUME's doctrine of Neceffity; that it is
liable to many peculiar objections, as well
as to most or all of thofe to which his is
liable; and therefore, that though it might
be refuted by itfelf, without regard to his,
yet the refutation of it is effectually invol-
ved in that of Mr HUME's. And this was
one reafon for confidering fo minutely the
principle of conſtant conjunction, and il-
luftrating the confequences of it at ſo great
length.
The doctrine now to be confidered, and
purſued to fome of its neceflary confe-
quences, is, "That men cannot act, ex-
cept as impelled by motives, nor avoid
"acting
SECT.
341
XVI.
66
acting as they are impelled by motives;
which motives are not conftantly conjoin-
"ed with the actions to which they
prompt."
(6
This doctrine it may be proper to con-
fider, firſt, in its moft fimple form, and
without any of thoſe modifications and
additions which the ingenuity of philo-
fophers has contrived to obviate or pal-
liate fome of its most striking defects,
and which modifications are now gene-
rally conceived to make an eſſential part
of it.
One of the moſt obvious difficulties that
occurs with reſpect to this doctrine, is the
ftriking inconfiftence of it with what feems
to be affumed as the fundamental principle
of every doctrine of Neceffity, to wit, that
every event or occurrence, even the volun-
tary action of a living creature, is to be
regarded as an effect implying a caufe;
that is, ſtanding in the very fame relation
to fomething elſe, that any phyſical effect
ſtands in to its caufe; for inftance, motion
to
342
ES SA Y.
to impulſe'; or expanſion, or fufion, or e-
vaporation, to heat.
The conjunction of two things which
were feparated, or the feparation of two
things which were conjoined, at other
times, is plainly a kind of Event: as, for
example, drunkenneſs, from the drinking of
pure ſpring water; or motion in the parti-
cles of lead, or of wood, from the approach
of a magnet; or a ſtone fometimes ceafing
to gravitate or tend to the earth; or a ſnow-
ball fometimes not melting as ufual in a
fire and fuch an event, according to the
fundamental principle affumed, muſt be
an Effect, implying a Caufe. But then this
cauſe muſt either be conftant in its influ-
ence, or not conftant. If it is conftant,
the occafional feparation and conjunction
ftated in the hypothefis in queſtion is im-
poffible. If it is not conftant in its in-
fluence, then according to the fundamental
principle affumed, there must be a cauſe
for its fometimes having effect, and fome-
times not having effect; and fo on, ad in-
finitum.
But
S ECT. XVI.
343
But it is furely unneceffary to enlarge
on this point; as it muſt be ſelf-evident
to every perſon who confiders it even for
a moment, that if the conjunction of mo-
tive and action be only occafional, it can-
not depend on a cauſe whoſe effect is uni-
form and conftant; and therefore, that
motives and actions muft either be fome-
times conjoined, and ſometimes feparated,
without any influence of a caufe, or any
operation of a voluntary agent, or Being
who poffeffes fome kind of optional or dif-
cretionary power; that is, purely and
ftrictly by chance; or elfe that there muſt
be an optional or difcretionary power lod-
ged fomewhere, of conjoining or fepara-
ting them. Such a power common fenſe
tells us, that we ourſelves poffefs; and it
may fairly be prefumed, that if it had
been confiftent with the fpeculations of
the affertors of the doctrine of Neceflity to
allow the poffibility of it any where, they
would have taken it to themſelves, at leaſt
as willingly as they would have allowed it
to any other Beings.
Since, then, the fuppofition of the in-
fluence
344
ESSA Y.
fluence of a caufe whofe effect is conftant
and uniform, is inconfiftent with the hy-
pothefis of the occafional conjunction of
motive and action; and the fuppofition of
an optional or difcretionary power of
fometimes conjoining and fometimes fepa-
rating them, is inconfiftent with the fun-
damental principle of Neceffity; there re-
mains no other fuppofition, but that mo-
tives and actions are occafionally conjoin-
ed or ſeparated merely by chance, without
either a cauſe, or the interference of a vo-
luntary free agent.
This laft fuppofition, which is alſo pal-
pably inconſiſtent with the affumed fun-
damental principle of the doctrine of Ne-
ceffity, to wit, that every event is an effect
implying a cauſe, will to many appear too
extravagant and fooliſh to merit any dif-
cuffion; yet perhaps it may not be amiſs
just to point out one plain inference from
it, contraſted with the correſponding in-
ference from the doctrine of conſtant con-
junction. On the latter fuppofition, it is
demonftrably impoffible for men to play
at chefs: -on the former fuppofition, it is
demon-
J
SECT.
345
XVI.
demonftrable, that chefs muſt be a game
of chance, more purely even than hazard
is. And the fame may be faid with reſpect
to the whole game of human life, which
in many reſpects reſembles very much a
game at chefs.
On most other fubjects, perhaps on eve-
ry other but the very one at preſent under
confideration, fo ftriking a repugnance of
any doctrine to plain matter of fact, would
be regarded as fufficient proof of its fal-
fity; and fuch an inconſiſtency of any
doctrine with itſelf, or of one part of it
with another, would be regarded as evi-
dence of its abfurdity: nor does there ap-
pear any good reaſon why the caſe ſhould
be different with refpect to this fubject.
But as the doctrine of Neceffity has long
been allowed to have a peculiar privilege
of withſtanding all uſual kinds of philofo-
phical evidence, it may be uſeful to pro-
fecute the inquiry ftill farther, to fome
more particular confequences, which may
be brought to the teft, either of ftrict ma-
thematical demonftration, or of fome more
fimple, open, unequivocal experiments,
X x
than
346
ESSA Y.
than either a game at chefs, or the general
conduct of human life.
Admitting, then, that men cannot act
except merely as impelled by motives; and
that motives are but fometimes conjoined
with their reſpective actions, and fome-
times feparated from them; and fetting
afide all inquiries concerning the manner
in which this comes to paſs; it might ſtill
be a very rational and pertinent queſtion
to afk, How often are they conjoined, and
how often are they feparated? or, What
proportion does the frequency of the con-
junction bear to that of the feparation of
motive and action?
pre-
This queſtion perhaps it will be found
difficult to anfwer with great accuracy;
but luckily this is not required for the
fent purpoſe. Confidering that there are
generally two or three, and often twenty
or thirty, different motives to chufe a-
mong, only one of which can be conjoin-
ed with its proper action; it might not be
unreaſonable to fuppofe, that the fepara-
tion happens at leaſt three or four times
as
SECT.
347
XVI.
as often as the conjunction. But, for the
fake of eaſy calculation, we may affume as
the proportion of the frequency of the
conjunction and the feparation of motive
and action, that of equality, and ſuppoſe
them conjoined juſt as often as they are ſe-
parated.
Then it follows neceffarily, that if 100
needy porters were offered 100 guineas
each, on condition that they ſhould carry
as many letters but 100 yards, only about
fifty of them would be moved to do the
work required, and the reſt would remain
idle, or waiting for their chance of their
ordinary employment. Nay, if 100,000
men had wanted food for three days, and
were on the point of starving, (and fuch
fituations are not imaginary, for they have
occurred often in the courfe of warfare);
and if plenty of good food were ſet before
them, and they themſelves were left at
full liberty, only about 50,000 of them
would eat, and the remainder, not from
any motive, but for want of an effec-
tual one, that is, one conjoined with its
action, would not eat, but would die of
hunger,
X x 2
348
ESSA Y.
hunger, with plenty of food within their
reach.
If the fuppofition of the feparation of
motive and action being as frequent as
the conjunction of them fhall be deemed
unreaſonable, let us fuppofe the feparation
of them to happen but once in a million
of times. Then to be fure, if the experi-
ment fuggeſted were fairly tried on a mil-
lion of needy porters, or on a mill on of
hungry foldiers, only about one of each
million would remain inactive, while all
the rest would earn their money, and eat
their meat. But it will probably be thought
by many, that even that one of each mil-
lion would be one more than would be
found to act, or rather to remain inactive,
in ſo abfurd a manner. However, that
we may not be thought too fcrupulous on
fuch an occafio, we may allow the con-
clufion in queftion to país as a truth.
But then it will furely be allowable, and
even proper, to vary a little the circum-
ſtances of the experiment, that we inay
have an opportunity of examining the re-
fult
[
SE C T. XVI.
349
i
fult of it in cafes which will occur more
frequently than once in a million of
times; and confequently of feeing whe-
ther the neceffary confequences of the doc-
trine in queſtion be confiftent with plain
matter of fact.
Let any number of men, for inftance a
million, be fuppofed placed at the point
A, (fee Diagram II.), and let it be fuppo-
fed, that to each of them there are applied
at once two different motives, fuch as
hunger and thirst, anger and fear, plea-
fure or profit, one of thete motives prompt-
ing them to go to the point B, the other
prompting to go to the point C, at a cer-
tain rate; and let the men be fuppofed
afſured that they cannot attain both the
objects which in fuch circumitances they
muſt have in view, by taking them fuc-
ceffively:
What muſt become of them? or how
will they act, confiftently with the hypo-
thefis?
As the conjunction of motive and ac-
tion
350
ESSA Y.
tion is ſuppoſed to be broken once in a
million of times, and as two millions of
motives are fuppofed to be applied to one
million of men, it may reaſonably be ex-
pected, that two of them fhall feel the in-
fluence of only one of the two motives ap-
plied to them, and accordingly go direct-
ly either to B or to C, at the rate required.
But then if both motives fhould chance to
be ſeparated from their proper actions, in
the fame perfons, at the fame time, which,
for aught that appears, is poffible, even
theſe two men must remain inactive at the
point A. But perhaps this poffibility will
be thought too improbable to deferve at-
tention.
Let us then confider the cafe of the odd
999,998 men, whom we placed at the
point A, under the influence of two dif-
ferent motives, which we may call A B
and AC; for there can be no doubt that it
does deferve attention.
As theſe men are unable to act except
as impelled by motives, and as the mo-
tives impelling them are ex hypothefi infe-
parably
SECT.
351
XVI.
¥
parably connected with their proper ac-
tions, the fuppofed number of cafes of
disjunction in a million of inſtances being
already deducted, their fituation is very
nearly that of the body in the firſt corol-
lary from the three laws of motion; and
if there be truth in the Principia of NEW-
TON, they must begin to move in the dia-
gonal A D, and continue to move in that
direction till they arrive at the point E.
Then they will be under the influence of
directly oppofite motives, E B and E C,
one of them fufficient to induce them
to go at a certain rate to B, the other
fufficient to induce them to go at the
fame rate to C. If thefe are equal, they
must remain at reft at that point, if they
fhould die for it, till fome other mo-
tive occur to put them in action, as the
afs fhould have done between two bundles
of hay. If the oppofite motives are un-
equal in force, the men, ex hypothefi, muft
yield to the ſtronger, and go accordingly,
either towards B or towards C. But it may
be doubted, whether they will ever get
quite to B or to C; and it cannot be
doubted, that they cannot go from E to B,
or
352
ESSA Y.
or to C, at the fame rate that they would
do if they felt the influence of only one of
the motives applied for if they did, the
other motive would be completely fepara-
ted from its proper action more frequent-
ly than is conſiſtent with the hypothefis at
prefent in queſtion; for the proper deduc-
tion of one inſtance in a million has alrea-
dy been made; and of courſe they will
not attain that object, the defire of gain-
ing which was their motive for going to
B or to C, for inſtance, the money promi-
fed them; becauſe they do not comply with
the condition on which it was offered them,
namely, going at a certain rate to one or
other of thoſe points.
Any proportion of frequency between
the conjunction and the feparation of mo-
tive and action may be affumed at plea-
fure, and ſtill the fame notorious and ri-
diculous falfities, (which it would be need-
lefs and abfurd to put to the teft of experi-
ment), only in different proportions of
frequency to one another, will be necef-
fary confequences of the fuppofed inertia
of
SECT. XVI.
353
of mind, and irreſiſtible influence of mo-
tives.
Theſe conclufions I give as matters of
mathematical certainty, but not of ma-
thematical preciſion. They all depend on
the doctrine of Chances; and therefore
all that is demonftrable with refpect to
them, or in fuch fimple cafes as I have put,
is felf-evident, is, that it is an equal chance,
on the hypothefis affumed, that the reſult
will be what I have fpecified. Thus, for
inſtance, in the firſt cafe put, of the equal
frequency of the conjunction and of the
ſeparation of motive and action, it cannot
be proved, that 50,000 out of 100,000 ve-
ry hungry men will die of hunger, though
they have plenty of food at their com-
mand; but it is demonftrable, or rather
ſelf-evident, that, on the hypotheſis affu-
med, it is an equal chance that fuch a
number will do fo. No perfon of candour,
I dare fay, will regard this acknowledged
and neceffary imperfection in the doctrine
of Chances as any imperfection in my ar-
gument. But if any ſhould be fo unrea-
fonably captious, I fhall admit frankly,
Y Y
that,
354
ESSA Y.
that, inſtead of 50,000, there may be but
49,500, or but 40,000, or but 20,000, out
of the 100,000, that will remain fo fooliſh-
ly inactive; and they in return muſt ad-
mit, that it is alfo poffible, and juſt as
probable, that 50,500, or that 60,000, or
that 80,000, out of the 100,000, may re-
main inactive, and die accordingly.
This, therefore, I conceive to be mathe-
matical demonftration of the falfity of the
common doctrine of Neceflity, as hitherto
Stated.
i
SECT.
SECT.
XVII.
The common doctrine of Neceffity stated, with
the modification, that the strongest Motive
alone is conjoined with its proper Action,
and that all the weaker and oppofing Mo-
tives are feparated from theirs.-Various
circumstances of falfity and abjurdity in this
doctrine, which are to be demonftrated.-
Preliminary Questions stated. What is
meant by the force or strength of fuch Mo-
tives? - What is the teft or measure of
their strength?
T will perhaps be thought very need-
Iew to have taken the double to
IT
lefs to have taken the trouble to give
fuch a demonftration of the falfity of a
doctrine that never was maintained; for
it will occur at once to every perion who
ever heard of the controverfy, that the
doctrine of Neceffity, as generally affert-
ed, has always comprehended another cir-
cumſtance,
Y y 2
356
ESSAY.
cumſtance, not ſtated in the preceding ar-
gument, to wit, that the ftrongeſt motive
always prevailed, and had its full effect,
while the weaker motives were overpower-
ed, and had no effect at all; that is, were
completely feparated from their proper ac-
tions.
The common doctrine of Neceffity, with
this peculiar modification, has been, That
the ſtrongeſt motive alone is conjoined
with its action, while all the weaker op-
pofing motives are ſeparated from theirs.
And even this fuppofition may eaſily be
ſhewn to be falſe and abfurd, by tracing
its neceffary confequences.
But it was proper, in the firſt place, to
confider the more fimple fuppofition, in or-
der to fhew, that it was untenable, and
that fuch a modification of it was indif-
penfably neceffary, and not a mere arbi-
trary and ornamental addition: for the
fame reaſon that in mathematical demon-
ftrations, ad abfurdum, we ftate and refute
every poffible fuppofition inconſiſtent with
the one which we mean to eſtabliſh, tho'
thefe
SECT.
357
XVII.
thefe may be fuch as no perfon ever thought
of maintaining.
The doctrine of Neceffity, even with
this modification, that motives have dif-
ferent degrees of ftrength or force, and
that the ſtrongeſt are conftantly conjoined
with their actions, while the oppofing
weaker motives are always feparated
from
*
* This, I believe, is more than any of the affert-
ors of the doctrine of Neceffity will chufe to main-
tain, or even to admit: for it is plain, that, in many
caſes at leaſt, the oppofing weaker motives have ef-
fect, as appears by their diminishing or modifying
the effect of the ftronger and prevailing motive; for
inſtance, in the caſe of juſtice tempered with mercy,
paffion moderated by prudence, and many others.
But I know not how otherwife to exprefs the gene-
ral hypothefis of the Neceffarians, without involving
again the doctrine of Chances, of which furely enough
has been faid already. The defect in this cafe, and
the impoffibility of giving, in general terms, an accu-
rate expreffion of the hypothefis in queſtion, I appre-
hend, proceeds not from any fault or any error of
mine, but is the neceffary refult of the imperfection
of the doctrine itfelf, which is repugnant, not only
to vulgar belief, but to many obvious facts, which
philofophers themſelves must admit. Such facts
have,
358
ESSAY.
from theirs, may be fhewn to labour un-
der feveral very grievous defects, as bad at
least as thofe of the other fuppofitions which
have already been confidered. It may be
fhewn,
I. That it is inconfiftent with plain mat-
ter of fact.
2. That it is inconfiftent with itſelf.
3. That there is no fuch force or ftrength
in motives as is repreſented in the doctrine
of Neceffity, even ſetting aſide the princi-
ple of conftant conjunction.
4. That, from the nature of things,
there can be no fuch force in motives.
5. That many, perhaps moſt, of thoſe
who have afferted the doctrine in que-
ftion with the greateft confidence, have
have, in general, been difregarded by philofophers,
or explained away; while thofe only were attended
to, and inſiſted on, which favoured, or might be
conftrued to favour, their darling fyftem.
never
SECT.
359
XVII.
never in their hearts believed that there
was fuch a force or ſtrength in motives.
Nor is there any great difficulty in pro-
ving theſe points, however ftrange fome
of them may appear; but there is the ut-
moſt difficulty in inveſtigating two other
preliminary points, which are of much
confequence in this inquiry. The firſt of
theſe preliminary points is, What is meant
by the strength or force of motives that
are not conftantly conjoined with their re-
ſpective actions? The fecond is like to
the firſt, and very intimately connected
with it, namely, What is the teſt or mea-
fure of the comparative force of ſuch mo-
tives?
Theſe two points I fhall confider, as
much as poffible, feparately, to prevent
confufion; for each of them will require
a minute and pretty long difcuffion.
SECT
1
SE C T. XVIII,
a
Remarks and Queries concerning the notion of
the abfolute Strength or Force of Motives
that are not conftantly conjoined with their
respective Actions.
T has already been fhewn, that motives
IT
are not conſtantly conjoined with their
proper actions, as phyfical cauſes ſeem to
be with their refpective effects. But, ne-
vertheleſs, it is held, that motives have
ftill fome peculiar property, or at leaſt
fome eſtabliſhed relation to their proper
actions, which may be termed their abſo-
lute force or ſtrength; which is very ana-
logous to the eſtabliſhed relation between
phyfical cauſes and their effects, com-
monly termed the force or influence of
fuch caufes; and which completely ex-
cludes any independent activity or felf-.
governing power in the perfon or agent.
It
SE C T. XVIII.
361
It is plain, then, that the conftant con-
junction of a motive with its action, and
the ftrength of a motive, are two different
things; and I apprehend it would be very
defirable, and of the moſt effential im-
portance in this inquiry, to know preciſely,
either by means of ftrict logical definition,
if fuch can be given, or elſe by means of
clear and explicit illuſtration, per inftantias
fingulares earumque feries et ordines, what
is meant by the ſtrength of a motive when
feparated from its proper action, or as we
expreſs it in common language, which
a perſon refifts, or according to which he
does not act.
In order to explain more accurately than
can well be done by common and general
words, the nature and importance of the
defideratum which I here point out, and of
the queſtion which I propofe, I ſhall ſup-
pofe, that there are applied to a perſon,
at the fame time, two particular oppofite
motives; that is, motives prompting to
different actions; which actions, either in
their own nature, or by fpecial compact,
are abfolutely inconfiftent, fo that both of
Z z
them
362
ESSA Y.
ger
them cannot take place feparately, nor can
they be combined into a fort of tertium
quid. Such oppofitions of motives, and
inconfiftencies of actions, are by no means
imaginary; they happen often between
duty and intereft, pleaſure and profit, an-
and fear, or between different kinds
of intereſt and of pleaſure. For the fake
of diſtinct reaſoning about any two fuch
appofite motives, we fhall call one of them
X and the other Y. We fhall fuppofe,
that X is fully conjoined with its proper
action; and that Y is completely fepara-
ted from the action to which it prompt-
ed; the conduct of the perfon acting be-
ing preciſely, both in kind and in degree,
what it would have been, if Y had not
been applied, and if X alone had been ap-
plied to him. In every fuch cafe, X is
faid to be the ftronger, Y the weaker mo-
tive. This implies furely, that there is in
Y a certain portion of ftrength; and, at
any rate, this must be admitted, elfe no
increaſe or multiple of Y, nor any addi-
tion of ftrength to it, could ever make it
equal to X, or greater than X. But it is
not even pretended that this is the cafe:
on
SECT.
363
XVIII.
on the contrary, it is always underſtood,
and acknowledged by thofe who fpeak of
the force of motives, that the addition or
concurrence of two or more weaker mo-
tives may amount to a greater fum of
force than one other motive; though this
motive be much ſtronger than any one of
the others taken fingly. Many a man, it
muſt be acknowledged, will take a great
deal of trouble, or commit a vile piece of
roguery, for 100 or for 1000 guineas, who
would not have done the fame for one, or
even for ten.
It would no doubt be a great help to
our reaſonings on fuch fubjects, and per-
haps would at once put an end to all diſ-
putes about them, if any circumſtance a-
bout the motive X, different from what
takes place in Y, in confequence of which,
a perfon unable to act, except as impelled
by motives, is influenced by it, and not
by the oppofite motive, could be ſpecified
or defined, without involving the very
point in difpute; that is, making the whole
ſyſtem an everlaſting petitio principii. For
any thing that appears, nothing more
Z z 2
would
1
364
ESSA Y.
2
would be wanting to make Y the stronger,
and X the weaker motive, but that the
perfon fhould act as prompted by Y, dif-
regarding the influence of X. It would be
a great fatisfaction to know what hinders
a perfon from acting in that manner; or
even to be affured, that he is hindered, or
is unable to act in that manner, from what-
ever circumſtances his incapacity may pro-
ceed.
I muſt here repeat what is faid (SECT. IV.
p. 133.) concerning the neceffity of guard-
ing againſt a very fooliſh controverfy which
might naturally occur with refpect to the
application of the term Motive. We are
not inquiring, whether thofe things ufual-
ly called motives, or principles of action,
fuch as appetites, paffions, defires, aver-
fions, judgements of duty, expediency,
&c. are to be called motives at all times
when they take place, or only when action
proceeds from them; but what is the na-
ture of the relation between them and ac-
tions, and what is meant by their force
or ftrength. If any perfon fhould affert,
that the defire of wealth, the fear of death,
the
SECT.
365
XVIII.
the cravings of violent hunger, or the ex-
tremity of torture, were not motives in
thoſe cafes in which the perfons to whom
they were applied refifted them, and, not-
withſtanding them, perfevered unfhaken
in their duty, he might indeed evade the
argunient concerning the conſtant con-
junction of motive and action, and the
que-
ftion concerning the abfolute force of mo-
tives; but the fame argument with re-
ſpect to the conftant conjunction, or the
occafional feparation, of thoſe things and
their reſpective actions; and the fame
queſtion with refpect to the force or
ftrength of thoſe things, as relative to ac-
tion, and yet feparated from it, would a-
wait him.
It must not be thought that this is a
diſpute about a word: it is an important
queſtion about a thing denoted by a word.
The words force or strength, as applied to
motives by thofe who deny independent
activity to perfons, fhall be allowed, un-
queſtioned, to fignify any conceivable qua-
lity or condition of a motive, or any re-
lation, poffible or impoffible, between mo-
tive
366
ESSAY.
tive and action, which thoſe who uſe it
can ſpecify, and which does not involve
the very point in difpute, to wit, the vo-
lition and action of the perſon, and the
relation between thefe and the motive ac-
cording to which they take place. For if
this be included in the definition of the
ftrength of a motive, to be fure, any mo-
tive with it is ftronger than any motive
without it. But then, to fay that a per-
fon acted in a certain way, becauſe the
motive prompting to do fo was the ſtrong-
eft of thoſe applied, would be merely an
identical propofition, equivalent to ſaying,
that he acted according to the motive ac-
cording to which he did act.
The phraſe ftrength or force of motives,
in the common popular acceptation of it,
is abundantly well understood, and is fa-
miliar to us all. But in this fenfe, far
from excluding the independent activity
of mind, or being inconfiftent with the
liberty of human actions, it always implies
and refers to theſe things; as in the cafe
of ſtrong temptation from evident inte-
reſt or pleaſure, of great and acknow-
ledged
SECT.
367
XVIII.
ledged duty, nay, even of irreſiſtible com-
pulfion.
It is not difputed, nor can it reafonably
be diſputed, that the vulgar always be-
lieve, that, in ordinary cafes, a perfon
who is only tempted may refift the temp-
tation; that a perfon who merely ought to
do a certain action, may yet not do it; and
that a perfon abfolutely compelled to do
any thing, cannot help doing it; but that
if the force or degree of the motives ap-
plied to him had been much leſs, he would
not have been compelled, and might have
avoided doing it. But philofophers en-
deavour to fhew, that all theſe vulgar per-
fuafions are erroneous, and to account for
all the facts or phænomena, without al-
lowing any independent activity to the
perfon, on the fuppofition, that in all
thoſe caſes the relation of motive and ac-
tion is either very nearly or preciſely the
fame with that of caufe and effect in phy-
fics; and that there is in every motive that
is followed by its proper action, fome qua-
lity, or at leaſt fome relation to the per-
fon, which may be termed its force, which
is
368
ESSA Y.
is greater or ſtronger than the correſpond-
ing quality in the oppofing motive, and
by which the volition and action of the
perſon is abfolutely and irreſiſtibly deter-
mined, though not conſtrained.
It may be worth while to confider a
little the cafe of compulfion, as it will
fhew very plainly the imperfection of the
philofophical notion of the force of mo-
tives.
There are few motives ftronger, or more
univerfal, than the love of life, or fear
of death, and the abhorrence of pain.
Few motives either are more nearly equal,
reſpectively, in different individuals.
Hence they are almoſt univerſally em-
ployed as means of compulfion. It muſt,
however, be acknowledged, that they are
not equally powerful in their influence in
all different men. They are conceived,
and I believe very properly, to be ſtrong-
eſt, and eſpecially the fear of death is
thought to be fo, in thoſe perfons who
have little vigour of mind, (no matter at
preſent for the propriety of the phraſe, it
is
SECT.
369
XVIII.
is fufficiently explained by the common
application of it). But, difregarding this
difference, which no doubt is confiderable,
we ſhall ſuppoſe the fear of death to have
no greater influence in the moſt cowardly
than in the braveſt, in thoſe who have
leaſt, than in thoſe who have moſt vigour
of mind; and fhall regard the ordinary
force of this motive as a kind of ſtandard,
by which the force of others may be mea-
fured. This fuppofition, though inac-
curate, is the moſt unfavourable that can
be made with refpect to the argument
which at preſent I have in view.
The abhorrence of pain of any given in-
tenfity, muſt be fuppofed very nearly the
fame in all mankind; and it muſt be fup-
pofed, that the abhorrence of any pain
muſt be very nearly in proportion to the
intenſity and the continuance of it. With
reſpect to this motive, therefore, we have
a diſtinct notion of the force or ſtrength of
it, (at leaſt according to the vulgar con-
ception of the force of a motive), confider-
ed by itſelf, and without involving the
action to which it prompts. Moreover,
3 A
from
370
ESSA Y.
from various circumſtances, we are en-
abled, in many cafes at leaſt, to judge of
the intenſity of the pain, as well as of the
continuance of it, and of courſe of the
abhorrence of the perfon to it, or the force
of this motive; not indeed with mathe-
matical accuracy, but with tolerable pre-
cifion.
Now, theſe two motives, the fear of
death, and the abhorrence of prefent pain,
have often been fet in oppofition. By an
abfurdity equally fhocking to reafon and to
humanity, and which, it is to be hoped,
will foon come to an end in every civiliſed
country, the torture has often been ap-
plied to obtain from criminals a confeſſion
of their guilt, which could not otherwiſe
be proved, and for which, as foon as pro-
ved by their own confeffion, they were to
fuffer death. In fome countries, a crimi-
nal, even though convicted on the cleareſt
evidence, muſt not be put to death till he
confeffes his crime, and acknowledges the
juſtice of his fentence. In all theſe cafes,
the fear of death and the abhorrence of
pain are motives directly oppofed; and,
according
SECT.
371
XVIII.
according to the philofophical doctrine of
Neceffity, and peculiar notion of the force
of motives, the reſult muſt be as follows:
Either the fear of death, which is fuppo-
fed to be of uniform ftrength, or very
near it, muſt be found univerfally ſtrong-
er, or it muſt be univerfally weaker, than
any kind of torture commonly employed;
or there muſt be a certain degree of torture
uniformly fufficient and requifite to get
the better of the fear of death in all ordi-
nary perfons. The two firſt of theſe con-
clufions we may fafely diſregard, and con-
fider only the laſt of them, which perhaps
will appear plaufible or certain. But it has
been found in fact, that there is a vaſt
difference among men with reſpect to what
they can or will bear in the way of torture.
Of two men, whom we may, and indeed
muſt, ſuppoſe equally unwilling to be hang-
ed, one perhaps yields very quickly to the
flighteſt tortures that are commonly uſed,
the other refifts for a long time the moſt
violent that can be invented. Nor can this
difference be with any plaufibility attri-
buted to the different degrees of ſtrength
of the oppofite motives in the different per-
3 A 2
fons
372
ESSA Y.
fons. For this is not only a gratuitous
fuppofition, and therefore unphiloſophi-
cal; but, moreover, it involves certain fup-
pofitions that are in the higheſt degree im-
probable, if not quite inadmiffible. It
implies, either that one of the perfons is
much leſs unwilling to be hanged than
the other, which is fcarce credible, and
very difficult or impoffible to prove; or
elfe, that a flight degree of torture, and
for a fhort time, is a ftronger motive than
a violent degree of the fame kind of tor-
ture for a long time; which appears little
lefs than abfurd. To fay that a certain
degree and continuance of torture is a
ftronger motive with the perſon who yields
to it, than with him who refifts it, is only
begging the queſtion once more; even
fuppofing ſuch a ſentence to be intelligible,
which it certainly is not, till it be ſpecified
what is meant by the ſtrength or force of
a motive, which is neither conftantly con-
joined with its proper action, nor yet re-
fers to or implies the independent activity
of a perfon.
Theſe remarks, however, are given only
as
SECT. XVIII.
373
as an illuftration of the obfcurity, ambi-
guity, and imperfection, of the philofo-
phical notion of the ſtrength of motives;
not as a proof of the falfity of the opinion
concerning it. For hypothefes and con-
clufions as groundleſs, and as extravagant,
as theſe are, have been maintained or ad-
mitted on the ſame ſubject; and fo per-
haps will theſe be. At any rate, the in-
quiry into the exact import of a notion
ought to precede the attempt to explode it,
or to refute opinions that involve it, or
that relate to it.
SECT.
SECT.
XIX.
Remarks on the difficulty or impoffibility of
finding a proper teft of the abſolute force
of Motives that are not conftantly conjoined
with their respective Actions.-The phrafe
ſtrongeſt Motive is fynonymous with the
phrafe Motive according to which a per-
fon acts; and is therefore nugatory in this
inveſtigation.
TH
HE other great difficulty and im-
perfection of the philofophical doc-
trine concerning the ſtrength of motives,
is, the want of a proper teſt or meaſure
of it.
The fuppofition, that the ſtrongeſt al-
ways
is that which prevails, is not merely
a conftant petitio principii, but it is an i-
dentical propofition, till fuch time as fome
condition or quality of motives be ſpeci-
fied,
SECT.
375
XIX.
fied, or at leaſt fome definite relation of
them to their respective actions, which
may be termed their force, independently
of their apparently having effect, or being
conjoined with their actions; fuch as, the
conſtant conjunction of cauſe and effect in
phyfics, (which, on ſtrict obſervation, is
found to take place even in thoſe cafes
where, on a fuperficial view, it is not to
be perceived); the occafional exertion of
the muſcular ſtrength of men or other
animals; the eſtabliſhed relation between
evidence of various kinds and belief or
conviction, either in the common affairs
of life, or in different branches of fcience;
or, what is furely nearest to the ſtrength
of motives in the philofophical ſenſe of
the term, (if there be fuch a thing), the
ftrength of motives, according to the vul-
gar notion of it; duty, intereft, pleaſure,
or various degrees of them, concerning
which mankind are very generally agreed,
and which may eafily be ſpecified without
any regard to their having effect or not.
For we may know preciſely, in many ca-
fes, how a perfon ought to act, either in
point of duty or intereft, and be certain,
that
376
ESSA Y.
that one motive was, in this point of view,
ftronger than the oppofing one: we may
know in many cafes, too, how a perfon
*would like to act, which is another kind
of ſtrength of a motive; but in neither
of theſe caſes can we be equally fure, that
he will act either as he ought to do, or as
he would like moft to do. And this un-
certainty, and the difference of the refult
in different cafes, we conceive to depend
on fomething in the perfon himſelf, not
on any quality in the motives, nor yet on
any relation between them and the voli-
tions and actions of the perſon.
According to this vulgar notion of the
force of motives, it is plain, that no mo-
tives can be commenfurable, or even ap-
pretiable with reſpect to one another, but
fuch as are preciſely of the fame kind;
duty with duty, intereft with intereſt,
pleaſure with pleaſure, torture with tor-
ture, terror with terror. But the univer-
fal and promifcuous commenſurableneſs
of all motives, bearing relation to the fame
action, is implied in the philofophical no-
tion of the force of motives.
It
SECT.
377
XIX.
It muſt furely be very evident, that, on
the fuppofition that the connection of
motive and action is but occafional and fe-
parable, and yet that men can act only as
they are impelled by motives, we can ne-
ver have any reafon to believe, from any
perfon's conduct, that the motives prompt-
ing to thoſe actions which he performed
were ſtronger than the oppofing motives;
for the ſtrongeſt motives might chance to
be ſeparated from their proper actions,
while the weakest were conjoined with
theirs; just as if the effect of a heavy body
in turning a balance was only occafional,
a cubic inch might fometimes outweigh a
cubic foot of folid lead; though the latter
be more than 1700 times as heavy as the
former for whenever the weight of it
chanced to be ſeparated from the uſual ef-
fect on the balance, it would be as if it
were not.
If a juggler could contrive a balance of
fo peculiar a kind, that, though to all ap-
pearance perfectly juft, and at leaſt as in-
capable as any other balance (of moving
or turning itſelf, when a cubic inch of
3 B
lead
378
ESSA Y.
}
lead was put into one of the fcales, and a
cubic foot of lead into the other, fome-
times the inch, fometimes the foot, ſhould
preponderate; What fhould we think of
him and his balance? He would no
doubt gain credit for his ingenuity, and
probably make a fortune by his contri-
vance but it may well be doubted, whe-
ther, in the four quarters of the world, a
fingle individual could be found, who
would believe that the various turns of
the balance depended merely on the dif-
ferent weights of the pieces of lead put in-
to the fcales. The vulgar, according to
cuftom, and as they have recently done
with reſpect to the figure that plays at
chefs, would at once fet about accounting
for what they faw, by fuppofing, either
that the artiſt himfelf had ſome ſecret
means of directing the movements of his
balance, or elfe that fome other li-
ving Being, though perhaps invifible to
them, inclined the balance ſometimes the
one way, fometimes the other: few, if
any, would venture to maintain, that the
different turns of the balance depended ei-
ther on the occafional and feparable con-
nection
SECT.
1
XIX.
379
nection of caufe and effect, or on the cir-
cumftance of the different pieces of lead
having different degrees of weight at dif-
ferent times. Indeed this laft hypothefis
feems to furpaſs, not only the belief, but
even the underſtanding of mankind. Nor
would the cafe be different, if fuch a jug-
gler were to exhibit a number of ba-
lances fo oddly conftructed, that though
they all feemed perfectly juft, yet what
preponderated in one did not preponde-
rate in the others; and this in an endleſs
variety of combinations. Moſt men would
be ſtartled at the hypothefis, that the things
weighed in them were really of different
weight when put into the different balances;
and that the balances themfelves were fo
conftituted, as fometimes to be more af-
fected by one kind of weight than by an-
other. Yet an hypothefis very nearly or
exactly the fame, and requiring at leaft an
equal ſtretch of faith and underſtanding
with the one juft now ftated, muſt be held
by thofe who, without admitting any in-
dependent activity in the perfons, and
merely on the fuppofition of different de-
grees of force in the motives applied, and
3 B 2
the
380
ESSA Y.
the various conditions of the perfons to
whom they are applied, undertake to ac-
count for the different conduct of differ-
ent individuals, in circumftances where
the motives applied to them muſt be un-
derſtood to be of equal force reſpectively
in them all. The ambiguity of the phraſe,
force of Motives, which has one meaning,
and that a very rational one, as employed
by the vulgar, and a very different, very
obſcure, and ill underſtood one, as ufed
by philofophers, feems to have contribu-
ted to conceal the impropriety, and even
the real import, of fuch an hypotheſis.
On confidering, again and again, this
and the preceding ſection, I have always
found in them fomething peculiarly unfa-
tisfactory and diſagreeable; which I pre-
fume will be at leaſt as ftriking to any
perfon who may have the curiofity to
read them, as it does to the author of
them. Yet, on the moſt careful examina-
tion,
SECT.
381
XIX.
tion, I cannot find any error, either in the
obfervations, or in the reafonings contain-
ed in them; and I believe the peculiarity
of them, and the feeming defect in them,
proceeds from this circumſtance, that they
are an unſucceſsful attempt to find out the
nature and the proper teft of the abfolute
force of motives that confeffedly are not
conſtantly conjoined with their reſpective
actions, as phyfical caufes feem to be with
their effects.
But it muſt be obferved, that my want
of fuccefs in this attempt is no fault of
mine, nor any defect in my obfervations
and reaſonings: it proceeds from the na-
ture of the ſubject of inveftigation. My
undertaking was not to explain the nature
of the abfolute force of motives feparable
from their effects, nor to give a fatisfacto-
ry teſt of the force of ſuch motives; but
to inquire ftrictly, whether or not there
was ſuch a force in them; whether or not
any proper teſt could be given of it; and
to find out, if poffible, what could be
meant by fuch a phrafe as the abſolute
force of motives feparable from their pro-
per
382
ÉS SA Y.
per actions, and not implying or referring
to independent activity, or felf-governing
or felf-determining power in the agent or
perfon. I did not undertake to make ſenſe
of that doctrine, but only to find out, whe-
ther fenfe could be made of it or not. The
refult of my inquiry, which I own has
been conducted rigorously, but I truſt
candidly, has been unfavourable to the
doctrine in queftion. The notion of the
abfolute force of motives feparable from
their effects, and not referring to the ſelf-
determining power of a perfon, appears to
be one of thoſe which are very properly
termed by BACON falfe, confufe, et temerè
a rebus abftracte, on which account, nihil
in iis que fuperftruuntur eft firmitudinis. I-
taque fpes eſt una in inductione verd. In plain
English, That notion is nonfenfe; and the
doctrine founded on it is not a jot better;
and therefore the fubject must be carefully
examined anew by accurate obfervation
and experiment, and ſtrict inferences from
thefe: Which is juft what I am endea-
vouring to do. But it would have been to.
no purpoſe to ſay this of it, though true,
without carefully examining it: it would
even
SECT. XIX.
383
even have been illiberal and unphilofophi-
cal to have faid fo before this examina-
tion; and it may be thought not very
civil to fay fo after all. But in a philofo-
phical inquiry, it is neceffary above all
things to be fully underſtood.
SECT.
SECT.
XX.
Suppofition of the abfolute Force of Motives
not conftantly conjoined with their refpec-
tive Actions, with the modification that
the strongest Motive alone is conjoined with
its proper Action, while the oppofing weak-
er Motive is always feparated from its Ac-
tion, and that the prevailing Motive is al-
ways the strongest, in fo far as it is in-
telligible, ftated accurately, confidered
mathematically.-Neceffary inferences from
it, that are abfurd and impoffible.
ROM what has been faid in the two
FROM
preceding fections, it muſt be evi-
dent, that the notion of the abſolute force
of motives not conftantly conjoined with
their reſpective actions is at beſt very
vague, confuſed, and imperfect; and that
even fuppofing that notion to be rational,
it muſt be very difficult, if indeed it be
poffible,
SECT. XX.
385
poſſible, to find an accurate teſt or mea-
fure of the fuppofed force or ſtrength of
fuch motives. But leaving fuch inveſti-
gations to the care of thofe who are inte-
reſted in finding out or making a diſtinct
meaning, and a fair unequivocal teft, for
the force of motives; difregarding what-
ever is obfcure or unintelligible in the
force of motives, according to the philo-
ſophical ſyſtem concerning it; and con-
fining our attention folely to thoſe cir-
cumſtances of it which are explicit and
intelligible, it will be eafy to fhew, that
no fuch force of motives does or can ex-
ift, or has generally been believed to exiſt,
even by philofophers themſelves.
It may appear a piece of fingular prefump
tion, to undertake to reaſon about a thing
fo imperfectly underſtood as that at preſent
in queſtion. But the prefumption and dif-
ficulty in this cafe are not fo great as may
at firſt be thought; and the reafonings
may be fufficiently diſtinct and concluſive,
if thoſe circumſtances alone are confidered
and reafoned about, which may
be accu-
за
rately
386
ESSA Y.
rately expreſſed, and which are clearly un-
derſtood.
The chief of theſe are,
1. That the abfolute ftrength or force
of motives may be meaſured or eſtimated,
with a certain degree of preciſion, by the
actions proceeding from them.
2. That the comparative ſtrength of
motives may be meaſured, with a certain
degree of precifion, by the relation of dif-
ferent, and eſpecially of oppofing motives
to one another; and that univerfally the
motive according to which a perfon acts,
or which is faid to prevail, is ſtronger than
the oppofing motive, according to which
he does not act, or which in common lan-
guage he is faid to reſiſt.
3. That there exiſt among different mo-
tives, with refpect to strength, the rela-
tions of equal, greater, and lefs.
4. That different motives may either
concur with one another, or oppofe one
another.
5. That
SECT. XX.
387
5. That when they concur, the ſtrength
of them is added together.
6. That when equal motives directly
oppoſe one another, the ſtrength of thoſe
on one fide completely counteracts and de-
ftroys that of thofe on the other fide; and
that the one force may be conceived to be
deducted from the other, leaving of courſe
no remainder.
7.
That when motives of unequal
ſtrength oppoſe one another, the ſtrong-
eſt always prevails, and is followed by its
proper action, which is always in kind,
and generally * in degree too, what it would
have been if no oppoſing motive had been
applied.
8. That a motive applied fingly, or a
number of concurring motives applied at
once, and unoppofed, will inevitably be
followed by their proper actions, where
there is no phyfical impediment to thefe;
which laſt circumſtance must be under-
* Vide p. 357. Note.
3 Ca
flood
388
ESSA Y.
ſtood to be the conſtantly implied condi-
tion in
every cafe.
The 6th and 7th of theſe ſpecified cir-
cumſtances are equally and indifpenfably
neceffary, as parts of the doctrine in que-
ſtion. But as they are abfolutely incon-
fiftent with one another, no relation be-
tween motives and actions, and no kind
of ſtrength or force of motives, which im-
plies them both, can from the nature of
things ever exiſt.
This inconfiftence of the two circum-
ſtances, and the confequent impoffibility
of that fyftem which involves them both
being true, will appear very clearly from
confidering the cafe of equal and oppofite
motives, with the fuppofed neceffary re-
fult in all fuch cafes, and the expedients
commonly employed to account for a dif-
ferent refult univerfally taking place in
fact.
It is held, that in fuch a caſe no action
can be performed. The correſponding
conclufion with refpect to caufes and ef-
fects
SECT.
389
XX.
fects in phyfics is always found true as a
matter of fact.
is faid to hold
And the fame conclufion
equally true with refpect
But
to motive and action: but of this there
may
be fome doubt, as few or no inftan-
ces can be produced in fupport of it. It
has never yet been found on trial, that an
afs placed between two equal and fimilar
bundles of hay, died of hunger in that fi-
tuation for want of a motive to determine
him to the one or the other bundle.
this conftant failure of the experiment,
which it may be remarked is not obfer-
ved, but foreſeen, is accounted for by Jup-
pofing, either that the bundles will not be
exactly equal and fimilar, and equally di-
ſtant, or elſe that the afs, though a crea-
ture of no very quick difcernment or live-
ly imagination, may yet have penetration
or fancy enough to perceive or imagine
ſome reaſon for preferring the one to the
other bundle. As we have no means of
converfing with affes, fo as to learn their
thoughts on the point in difpute with fuf-
ficient accuracy, it may be expedient to
acquiefce in this account of the matter.
Though it muſt be obſerved, that it is try-
ing the truth of a ſuppoſed fact by its a-
greement
ས
390
ESSA Y.
greement with an hypothefis, inſtead of
trying the truth of the hypotheſis by its
agreement with matter of fact; which is
altogether inconfiftent with good reafon-
ing, and fuch an impropriety as never
would be admitted, nor even thought of,
in any branch of phyfics.
Conceiving that men had a better chance
of knowing fomething of their own
thoughts, than of thoſe of any quadruped,
I have endeavoured to attend accurately to
my own thoughts in fimilar cafes: yet,
after the moſt careful attention to them, I
cannot find that I have any difficulty in
chufing one of two chances which I know
to be perfectly equal; or in chufing one
card out of a pack, where I am fure there
can be no reaſon for preferring one to an-
other. But I have been affured, with
much ſeriouſneſs, by good metaphyſicians,
that even in theſe caſes I had always a mo-
tive for my preference, though I would
not own it; and that if I had no other
motive for my choice, the greater facility
of pronouncing one word than another,
would be fufficient to determine me to fay
the one rather than the other. Of this I
am
SECT. XX.
391
am not in the leaft confcious, but rather,
as I think, of the reverfe: however, as it
was in vain to reafon with men who knew
my own thoughts better than I did my-
felf, I was obliged to give up the point.-
But there are ſome other points, relating
to the fame fubject, which I cannot and
will not give up.
Let a porter be offered 100 guineas, if
he will carry a letter ten miles due eaſt,
and at the fame time let him be offered an
equal fum, if he will carry the letter the
fame diſtance due weft; and let him be
affured, that he cannot earn both the fums
that are offered: Will he ftand ftill, as
the aſs ſhould have done, between two
bundles of hay? or will be chufe between
going east and going weft, and earn 100
guineas accordingly, as he cannot hope to
earn 200 ?
It will be admitted, I prefume, that he
will not ſtand ſtill, but carry the letter ei-
ther one way or the other. But this, accor-
ding to the hypothefis, he cannot do, with-
out fome motive or ground of preference,
real
392
ESSA Y.
real or imaginary. Whenever ſuch a thing
is found or fuppofed, the oppofite mo-
tives are no longer equal; and as ſoon as
they become unequal, the ſtrongeſt will
prevail, according to the hypothefis, and
will have its full effect, as if unoppofed..
Now, let us confider accurately this
kind of reafoning, and exprefs it in ma-
thematical form, for the fake of fimplicity
and preciſion, and that we may the more
eaſily trace the neceffary confequences of
the hypothefis.
The force or ſtrength of the two origi-
nal great motives which are equal and op-
pofite, we ſhall call X and Y,
The ſtrength of the minute additional
motive diſcovered or fancied by the porter
on one fide, we fhall call Z.
Z, we know, ſcarce bears a fenfible pro-
portion to X or Y; but for the fake of ea-
fy calculation, we fhall fuppofe either X
or Y taken fingly to be equal to 100 Z.
From
SECT. XX.
393
From theſe principles, and the hypo-
thefis of the abfolute force of motives
which are not conftantly conjoined with
their reſpective actions, we have, by ne-
ceffary confequences, the following fimple.
equations.
X = = Y,
Y = 100 Z,
X =.100 Z,
X-Y=0,
X+Z~Y=X+Z*,
Y. = 0,
X = 0,
100 Z = 0,
Q. E. D.
Though it be very unuſual, and in ge-
néral very needlefs, to offer any commen-
tary on fuch a fimple piece of mathema-
tical reaſoning as the preceding equations,
*This equation may appear abfurd, after the pre-
ceding four. In common algebra, or in phyſical
reaſonings about cauſes and effects, or even in meta-
physical reasonings about motives and actions, on the
principle of the conftant conjunction of motive and
action, and the perfect identity of this relation with
that of caufe and effect in phyfics, it must have been
X+Z―Y=Z. For X is ftated at firſt as equal
to Y. But fuch is the doctrine of Neceflity at pre-
fent under confideration.
3 D
yet,
394
ESSA Y.
yet, as there is fomething uncommon,
both in the fubject and in the conclufion,
in the preſent cafe, it may be worth while
to confider with peculiar care every step of
the reaſoning employed.
The three first equations exprefs with
fufficient accuracy the comparative force or
ſtrength of the different motives applied
in the caſe put, according to the doctrine
of Neceffity, with thofe needful modifica-
tions which we are now confidering.
The fourth equation expreffes accurately
the neceffary reſult of the oppofition of e-
qual motives, according to the doctrine of
Neceffity.
The fifth equation expreffes accurate-
ly (perhaps fome may think too rigorouf-
ly, but of this afterwards) the neceffary
refult of the oppofition of unequal mo-
tives, according to the doctrine of Necef-
fity, with the modification already ſpeci-
fied, and allowed to be indifpenfably re-
quifite to it, namely, That the ſtrongeſt
motives alone have effect, and that they
!
have
SECT.
395
XX.
have their full effect, juſt as if they were
unoppoſed.
The fixth equation is a fimple, and ma-
nifeftly neceffary inference from the fifth.
The feventh and eighth equations are
manifeftly neceffary inferences from the
fixth, the firſt, and the third; for if Y be
equal to nothing, and X and 100 Z be fe-
verally equal to Y, they muſt alſo be e-
qual to nothing.
In plain Engliſh, there is not, nor can
there be in motives, fuch a kind of force
or ſtrength.
It will perhaps be thought, that the
doctrine of Neceffity has been ſtated too
rigorously, in the preceding equations, and
eſpecially in the fifth of them. It may be
faid, that the minute additional motive
Z, though fufficient to turn the fcale when
it was exactly balanced before, was too in-
confiderable to have any effect by itſelf, or
even to add to the effect of the ſtrong mo-
tive X; and that accordingly the force of
3 D 2
X+Z
396
ESSAY.
X+Z-Y would be juſt the fame with
that of X by itſelf. If the doctrine of Ne-
ceffity were juft, I apprehend it could not
be ſtated, nor conclufions be deduced from
it too rigorously, any more than from the
commonly received principles of mechani-
cal philofophy, or of
pure geometry. But
not to run any risk of being thought too
fcrupulous or rigid on ſuch a point, I ſhall
admit, that the additional minute motive
Z, when added to X, makes no greater
fum of force, and would produce no great-
er effect in point of action, than X by it-
felf, and unoppofed. But then I muſt
beg leave to ftate even this hypothefis in
mathematical form, for the fake of pre-
ciſion and diſtinct reaſoning. We fhould
then have the following fimple equations.
X=Y,
Y = 100 Z,
X = 100 Z,
X - Y = 0, (as before),
X+Z−Y= X,
Y = 2,
Z = 100 Z.
Which is abfurd.
The
SECT. XX.
397
The four first of thefe equations are
juft the fame with the four firſt on the
former more rigorous fuppofition and
ſtate.
The fifth equation is an accurate ex-
preffion of the refult, on the fuppofition
that the minute additional motive which
turns the balance does not add any thing
to the force of the greater motive, with
which it concurs, but only allows it to
have its full and proper effect as if unop-
pofed.
The fixth equation is a manifeſtly ne-
ceffary inference from the fifth. And let
it be remembered always, that the weaker,
and confequently overpowered motive,
though completely feparated from its pro-
per action, does not, even according to
the doctrine of Neceffity, ceaſe to have
force or ſtrength; as appears by two or
more motives which concur, being ſtrong-
er than one oppofing them, though weak-
er than it when taken fingly. Thus, in
the preſent cafe, it would be admitted,
that Y + would be a greater fum of
ftrength
IO
398
ESSA Y.
Y
IO
ftrength than X+Z; though taken by
itſelf would have much lefs force than
X+Z, or even than X by itſelf.
The feventh equation is a plain and ne-
ceffary inference from the fixth and the fe-
cond For if Z be equal to Y, and 100 Z
be alfo equal to Y, Z and 100 Z muſt alſo
be equal to one another.
Such, without exaggeration or mifre-
preſentation of any kind, is the abſurdity
which ambiguous words, and loofe rea-
foning, and vague and groundleſs hypo-
thefes, multiplied without end, whenever
there was thought to be occafion for them,
have hid from the view of many philofo-
phers diftinguished for the acutenefs of
their underſtanding, and the extent of their
knowledge.
I am aware of the
aware of the ridicule that
may attend the attempt feriouſly to flate
and to refute fuch abfurd opinions;
but if this attempt be ridiculous, what
fhall we fay of the conduct of thoſe whofe
pretended ſcience has made it neceffary;
who
SECT.
399
XX.
who have been proud to maintain as an
important piece of knowledge, that very
doctrine, which, when ftripped of all am-
biguity, and made intelligible, appears too
abfurd even to deſerve a refutation ?
1
安
​SECT.
1
"
SECT.
CT
T.
XXI.
A
!
Reaſons for wiſhing to try experimentally, as
a mere matter of fact, the conclufion de-
monftrated in the preceding Section.-Im-
portant ule that may be made of fuch an ex-
periment.—Difficulty of finding a proper
cafe for the fubject of experiment, inde-
pendent of all hypothefes, and all appeals
to conſciouſneſs.—Such a cafe pointed out by
the aid of Mathematical reafoning.—The
refult, according to the doctrine of Neceffity,
however modified, is inconfiftent with plain
matter of fact, with the common notion of
Motive, and with the belief and expecta-
tion of those who affert the doctrine of Ne-
ceffity; yet is poſſible in itſelf, and the cor-
reſponding inference with respect to phyficat
caufes and effects is univerfally true, and
is always expected to prove ſo.—Inference
from this.
}
A
S there cannot fail to be among men
of ſcience a very great diſlike, and
perhaps fome diftruft, of fuch general ab-
ftract
SE C T. XXI.
401
ftract reaſonings as thofe contained in the
preceding fection, with reſpect to the ſub-
ject of this Effay; I conceive it may be
worth while to confider it in a different
point of view; and, fetting afide all re-
gard to the impoffibility, which has been
demonſtrated, of there being in motives.
ſuch a kind of ſtrength or force as is re-
quired and implied in the doctrine of Ne-
ceffity, with the needful modifications,
that the relation of motive and action is
but an occafional and feparable conjunc-
tion, and that the ſtrongeſt motive is al-
ways conjoined with its proper action,
while the oppofing weaker motive is ſepa-
rated from the action to which it prompts,
to inquire into the truth of fome neceffary
inferences from this doctrine, confidered
merely as matters of fact; admitting, what
perhaps never was admitted before, and
certainly ought not to be admitted again
in any argument, that to be poſſible which
has been fhewn to be abfurd.
Though I am aware of the cenfure and
ridicule that may attend the attempt to
reafon on any ſubject beyond an abfurdity,
3 E
which
402
ESSAY.
which is univerfally and juftly regarded
as an ultimate teft in all fcientific invefti-
gations, I have a particular reaſon, be-
fides the general one, of wiſhing to fhow,
that the doctrine which I combat is expe-
rimentally falfe in point of fact, as well as
abfurd, for endeavouring to do ſo on the
preſent occafion. I wish to fhew, what I
am confident is the cafe, and with due
pains may be ſhewn, that thoſe who have
moſt zealously maintained the doctrine of
Neceffity, and afferted in the ſtrongeſt
terms their own molt firm belief in it,
and their hearty contempt for the opi-
nions and underſtanding of fuch as were
of a different perfuafion concerning it,
were only confounded in point of words,
but never deceived in point of thought,
by their own reaſonings; that they al-
ways retained the fame notion of the re-
lation of motive and action, and of the
independent activity, or felf-governing
power, or liberty, of mankind, which other
men have; and that they never ſeriouſly
in their hearts believed their own doc-
trine.
Strange
SECT.
403
XXI.
Strange and impracticable as this at-
tempt to demonftrate mens moſt intimate
thoughts, in ſpite of themfelves, may at
firſt fight appear; yet I think it muſt be
admitted at once
once by every competent
judge, that is, by every man of fcience
and candour, that it is fairly accompliſhed,
when I demonſtrate certain neceſſary in-
ferences from the doctrine of Neceffity,
which are poffible, and even eafy; which
are ſtrictly agreeable to what takes place
in all inſtances of caufe and effect in phy-
fics; between which relation and that of
motive and action, thoſe who maintain
the doctrine in queſtion affert the analogy
to be perfect; which are of fuch a na-
ture, that when expreffed cautiouſly, and
in general terms, they would be admitted
as truths too obvious and generally ac-
knowledged, either to admit of doubt, or
to require any proof or illuftration by ex-
periment; and yet are fuch as, when ſta-
ted particularly, and without ambiguity,
no affertor of that doctrine will admit as
true, nor even as probable, nor even as
doubtful, and as requiring to be put to the
teft of experiment.
3 E 2
The
404
E S SA Y.
The fairneſs and the certainty of this
fingular teft of the moſt ſecret thoughts of
men, will, I truft, be eſtabliſhed by the
following confiderations.
It is univerfally admitted, as well by
thoſe who deny as by thoſe who maintain
the doctrine of Neceffity, that belief or
conviction is purely an involuntary act, ope-
ration, or ſtate, of the human mind; and
that it is abſolutely and irreſiſtibly produced
and determined by various kinds of proof
or evidence, each of which has its own
peculiar province. Thus, confciouſneſs,
perception, memory, teftimony, intuition,
(I mean the faculty by which we know
the truth of geometrical and other ax-
ioms), reafoning, induction, demonftra-
tion, feverally command, with unrefifted
fway, the belief of all men of found in-
tellects, with refpect to their proper fub-
jects.
Of theſe different grounds of belief,
none is conceived to be ſtronger than ſtrict
reafoning, whether in the form of com-
plete and regular fyllogifms, or in the
more
SECT. XXI.
405
་
more concife form of mathematical de-
monſtration, founded on principles which
are well underſtood, and unfeignedly be-
lieved. It is well known, that though it
be always needlefs, yet it is always pof-
fible, and indeed eafy, to refolve a mathe-
matical demonſtration into a chain of re-
gular fyllogifms: but this is hardly ever
done, becauſe fuch a chain of fyllogifms
muſt be three times as long as the demon-
ſtration, and not more clear nor convin-
cing. An author already quoted, whoſe
moderation and candour will not be called
in queſtion, has not ſcrupled to give it as
his opinion, that a man who could admit
the major and the minor propofitions of a
juft fyllogifm, and yet deny the conclu-
fion of it, would be a greater monſter
than a man with two heads. The fame
may be faid, with equal truth, of one
who fhould admit the axioms of geome-
try, and all the ſteps of a demonſtration,
and yet deny the conclufion of it. For
my own part, I do not believe there ever
exiſted fuch a monfter; and fure I am,
that no man of fcience will ever pretend
that he has the misfortune to be fuch a
one.
406
ESSA Y.
one.
If any perſon were fo unhappily
conftituted, he must be for ever inca-
pable of reaſoning, and unfit to be reaſon-
ed with.
But it must be admitted likewife, that
whenever the conclufion demonſtrated is
abfurd and impoffible, as, for inſtance,
that two things equal fingly to one and
the fame thing are not equal to one ano-
ther, or that a part is equal to the whole;
or like the two conclufions demonftrated
in the laſt ſection as neceffary inferences
from the doctrine at prefent in queſtion,
that a force may be equal to another, and
much greater than a third, and yet all
three of them be equal to nothing; and
that a force may be an hundred times as
great as itſelf; then it cannot be believed,
and the principles from which it was de-
duced muſt be given up. It is therefore
only when the conclufion demonftrated is
poffible, as well as confiftent with the
principles maintained, that it is to be ad-
mitted; as, for instance, that a juft ba-
lance will turn on putting into one of the
fcales a certain weight, with which it
had
SECT.
407
XXI.
1
had formerly turned; or that a man of
good ſenſe will act as prompted by a cer-
tain motive, when it is either altogether
unoppofed, or oppofed only by a motive
or combination of motives weaker than it-
felf.
It can ſcarce be neceffary to add, that
when any error can be pointed out in a
fuppofed demonftration, no further regard
is due to the conclufion of it. But it may
be proper to mention, that a ſhort and
fimple piece of mathematical reaſoning
cannot, without the greateſt injuſtice, and
a degree of abfurdity, be pronounced er-
roneous, nor even diftrufted, till fome par-
ticular error is pointed out in it; and when
this is done, there can be no further dif
pute about it.
What ſhould we think of a man, who,
on getting to the end of the 47th propo-
fition of EUCLID, fhould inſtantly take
the alarm at the conclufion of it, and,
without pointing out any error, either in
the axioms or the chain of reaſoning, that
led to that conclufion, declare roundly,
that
408
ESSA Y.
1
2
that he did not, and could not, believe
that the fquare of the hypothenufe is e-
qual to the fum of the fquares of the o-
ther two fides of a right angled plain tri-
angle?
Or what ſhould we think of a man who,
after admitting the laws of motion as fta-
ted by NEWTON, fhould deny at once the
firſt corollary from them, and deny the
poffibility of the formation of a curvili-
near orbit from the combination of a pro-
jectile and a centripetal force, and the ac-
celeration of the motion of a heavy body
falling unreſiſted, and the retardation of it
when rifing from a projectile force; and
who should declare, that he thought it un-
neceſſary even to put fuch concluſions to
the teſt of experiment, as being notoriouſly
and ridiculouſly falſe?
FOM
We ſhould ſcarce be intitled to fay, that
fuch perſons were mad; for there have
been no inſtances obferved, fo far as I
know, of fuch a madneſs. In the higheſt
degree of madneſs, to be fure, all the uſual
connections of thought are broken, and
the
SECT.
409
XXI.
in
the lunatic is incapable of thinking ſteadi-
ly on any fubject even for a moment
cafes of perfect ftupidity or idiocy, the
very faculty of thinking feems to be fuf-
pended or loft: and in both thefe cafes
the power of reaſoning is of courſe at an
end. But in the ordinary ſtate even of
madneſs, the lunatic reaſons with juſt-
neſs, and fometimes with admirable acute-
nefs, though from very erroneous prin-
ciples; which I confider as a good phyfi-
cal proof, that certain relations among
our thoughts are almoſt or altogether in-
defeaſible.
Now, what is the moſt candid or fa-
vourable judgement that we can form of
the conduct of one, who, in point of rea-
foning, acts more irrationally than an or-
dinary lunatic, by refufing to admit as
true, or even as probable, an inference
which is unquestionably poffible, and
ſtrictly deduced from principles which he
afferts? The moft obvious and natural
fuppofition furely would be, that he was
either incapable of reafoning, or elſe, that
he did not believe the principles which he
3 F
afferted.
410
ESSA Y.
afferted. And the moſt favourable opi-
nion that I can form of fuch a perſon is,
that he did not underſtand the principles
which he afferted, and that he had fome
other principles which ferved to direct his
judgement, tho' perhaps he had paid little
attention to them. Indeed, unleſs fome-
thing of this kind interfered, it is as plain-
ly impoffible for a perfon who is acting
bona fide to refuſe his affent to inferences
juſtly deduced from principles which he
acknowledged, as it is for a pendulum
to begin, or to vary, or to stop its own
motion.
Though every conclufion which is a
strictly neceffary inference from a falſe
principle muſt likewiſe be falſe, and tho'
there are many conclufions from the doc-
trine of Neceffity, which may eaſily be
tried experimentally; yet it is a matter of
great nicety to ſelect unexceptionable ſub-
jects of experiment for the purpoſe of pro-
ving, that the doctrine in queſtion is in-
confiftent with plain matter of fact, and
repugnant even to the fecret conviction
of thoſe who moft confidently affert it in
words,
SECT.
411
XXI.
words, and who feem to have been moft
fucceſsful in the fingular attempt to de-
ceive themſelves with refpect to their own
thoughts.
The circumftances from which this
nicety and embarraſſment proceed cannot
fail to be underſtood from what has alrea-
dy been faid in the courſe of this Eſſay,
concerning the reſemblance or analogy be-
tween the relation of caufe and effect in
phyfics and that of motive and action, and
between the relation of motive and action
according to the fyftem of Neceffity, and
this relation according to the popular per-
fuafion of liberty; concerning the facility
of framing hypothefes to explain away
the most obvious facts, to the fatisfaction
of thoſe who know fo little of fcientific
reaſoning as to liften to fuch hypotheſes;
and concerning the unfatisfactory and
fruitleſs reſult of all appeals to conſciouſ-
nefs with reſpect to what a perſon thinks
or feels, whenever this comes to be a mat-
ter of difpute.
The cafes of the various applications of
motives,
3 F 2
412
ESSA Y.
motives, which we ſhould moſt naturally
think of trying experimentally, with a
view to afcertain whether the doctrine of
Neceffity, with the needful modifications
already mentioned, be juſt or erroneous,
are chiefly the following.
1. A motive applied by itſelf.
2. Two or more motives which concur
or prompt to the fame action applied at
once.
3. Two or more motives of unequal
force directly oppofing one another; that
is to fay, prompting to different actions,
which, either by nature, or by fpecial
compact when the motives are applied,
are abfolutely inconfiftent; fo that the
perfon may chufe or determine which of
them he will do, but can do but one of
them.
4. Two or more motives of preciſely
equal force directly oppofing one ano-
ther.
5. All
SE •
413
C T. XXI.
5. All motives whatever completely
withdrawn.
A moment's reflection will be fufficient
to fatisfy any perfon, that all theſe cafes
may be tried experimentally times with-
out number, as in fact most of them are
tried every day, without tending in the
leaſt to aſcertain the point in difpute.
Thus, with refpect to the three firſt of
them, if the perfon acts according to the
fingle motive applied, or according to the
concurrent motives, or according to the
ſtrongeſt of the oppofing motives, which
it is to be expected he will do, no infer-
ence of any importance towards deciding
the controverfy either way can be drawn
from his conduct. For the viſible mani-
feſt reſult, which a fpectator may obferve
and judge of, is just what was to be ex-
pected, either on the fuppofition of Necef-
fity, or on that of Liberty: I mean, on
the popular notion of Liberty as concei-
ved by mankind; not on that notion of
Liberty which has been imputed to them
by thoſe who affert the doctrine of Necef-
fity;
414
ESSAY.
fity; which notion is widely different
from theirs, and plainly amounts to a de-
nial of there being any fuch relation be-
tween motive and action, that we can ever
reafon from the one to the other.
And with reſpect to the fame cafes, if
the perfon does not act as prompted by
the fingle motive applied, nor as prompt-
ed by the concurrent motives, nor as
prompted by the ſtrongeſt of oppofing mo-
tives; as well as with refpect to the fourth
and fifth cafes, if the perfon acts notwith-
ſtanding the equal force of the oppofing
motives, or acts without any known or
obvious motive; it is eafy to contrive hy-
potheſes which ſhall reconcile the facts ob-
ferved with the fyftem of Neceffity, to
which at firſt view they feem very unfa-
vourable. The dulleft metaphyſician can
fuppofe, that the perfon acting in ſuch a
manner had ſome fecret motive for doing
fo, which either by itſelf, or along with
the other acknowledged and apparent mo-
tives, was fufficient to turn the balance
and determine his will.
Nay,
SECT. XXI.
415
Nay, ftrange as it muſt appear to one
who is unacquainted with this controver-
fy, fuch a mode of reafoning has been
brought to the form of a regular fyftem;
and it has been gravely maintained, that
when a perſon acts in oppofition to a mo-
tive fingly applied, or in oppofition to
concurrent motives, or according to a
weaker motive in oppofition to a ſtrong-
er, the fantaſtical defire of fhewing li-
berty is the motive of his action.
HUME'S Effays, vol. 2. Note F. on p. 100.
Mr
I do not find, however, that Mr HUME
has ever inquired into the nature of this
fantaſtical deſire of fhewing liberty; nor
pointed out who is the author, or what is
the fource of it; nor inveſtigated what re-
lation it ſtands in to the perfon acting;
or whether it is in any degree dependent
on him, or to what degree it is fo. It
would, however, be very fooliſh to argue
againſt fuch a ſyſtem: it plainly conſiſts
of words, not of things; and words beget
words, as BACON juitly obferves.
But the most difagreeable circumſtance
that
416
ESSAY
that attends the bringing of fuch conclu-
fions as the preceding from the doctrine of
Neceffity to the teſt of experiment is, that
fuch an attempt almoft inevitably involves
and requires fome kind of appeal to con-
ſciouſnefs. As the queſtion is not, Whe-
ther there be a relation between motive
and action? but, What is the nature of
that relation? we can ſcarce avoid paying
fome regard to what we feel or think in
every cafe where we act, in whatever re-
lation our action may ſtand to the motives
of it; and fuch thoughts of ours muſt
mingle themſelves with our reaſonings;
and in one reſpect they certainly ought to
do fo; not indeed with a view to the
ftrict decifion of the queftion, but with
a view to give us real folid knowledge of
the relation of motive and action.
But whatever knowledge fuch a con-
duct may give an accurate and impartial
obferver, it tends rather to perplex than to
decide the controverfy, and to make it ap-
pear difficult in fact, when it was only fo
in words.
When,
SECT.
417
XXI.
When, after the moſt careful and im-
partial attention to my own thoughts, I
give the faireſt and moſt accurate account
of them, in certain circumftances, that I
can, I am but on equal terms with any
other perfon, who, with equal profeffions
of impartiality and care, gives a directly
contradictory account of his thoughts in
fimilar circumſtances. Nay, if he chofe
to avail himself of the ambiguity of com-
mon language, or even employed it bona
fide but careleſsly, he would have the ad-
vantage of me in point of plauſibility.
But, fetting afide this confideration, I do
not ſee what claim to regard or credit one
of us could have more than the other.
An impartial perfon might fuppofe, that
we were differently conſtituted: he might
ſuppoſe, that one or that both of us were
by nature or habit incapable of attending
to our own thoughts with fufficient accu-
racy; or that one or both of us were too
keenly engaged in controverfy to be ca-
pable of attending to our own thoughts
with fufficient impartiality: nay, a ſpec-
tator of an uncharitable difpofition might
be apt to fufpect, that one or other of us
3 G
was
}
418
ESSAY.
was prevaricating moft vilely in the ac-
count which he gave of his own thoughts.
Perhaps we might even find it difficult to
avoid expreffing, or at leaſt conceiving,
fome fuch unfavourable opinion of one
another. It is plain at leaſt, that the moſt
confident and pofitive affertions which we
could utter in contradiction to one ano-
ther, could never amount to any proof,
either of the judgement or of the candour
and veracity of either of us, nor ever tend
to decide the controverfy in the judge-
ment of any impartial perſon of good un-
derſtanding. Nor can there ever be a
doubt, that it is incumbent on every per-
fon who undertakes to reafon on fuch a
fubject, to avoid with the utmoſt care every
cafe or fubject of experiment which may
give occaſion to ſuch unphiloſophical con-
tradictions, and fuch illiberal fufpicions.
I truft it will be evident, that this can
be done only by ſelecting as the ſubject
of experiment a cafe wherein the refult
according to the popular, and what ap-
pears to me the juft, notion of the relation
of motive and action, does not coincide
with
SECT.
419
XXI.
with what muſt be the refult according
to the doctrine of Neceffity, or what ac-
tually is the reſult in correfponding cafes
of the relation of cauſe and effect in phy-
fics; and by taking care that the circum-
ftances of the experiment be fuch, that
every ſpectator may judge with certainty
of the refult, without there being occafion
to make any appeal to the thoughts or con-
ſciouſneſs, that is, to the judgement, can-
dour, and veracity, of the perfon on whom
the experiment is made.
It would likewiſe be very defirable that
the circumſtances of the experiment were
made fuch as to exclude the poffibility of
framing new hypotheſes, to account for and
explain away the refult, to whichever of
the fides it may appear unfavourable. This,
however, I believe, it is in vain to look
for the power of conjecture and imagi-
nation in fuch cafes is very great; and
that of vague and ambiguous words knows
no bounds. Any perſon who may chuſe
to exerciſe his ingenuity in arguing againſt
an obvious fact, or in trying to explain it
away, will eaſily contrive hypotheſes for his.
3 G 2
purpoſe;
420
ESSA Y.
}
purpoſe; and if theſe are expreffed in
vague and ambiguous terms, it muſt be a
work of time and labour at beſt, or per-
haps impoffible, either to underſtand or to
refute them.
With refpect to the two firft points re-
quired in the fubject of experiment, that
it be one wherein the refult is not the fame
according to the doctrine of Neceffity, and
according to the popular notion of the re-
lation of motive and action with inde-
pendent activity or liberty in the agent;
and that it neither require nor admit of
any appeal to the conſciouſneſs of the per-
fon; which are the most important cir-
cumſtances; they may eaſily be accom-
pliſhed with the help of mathematical rea-
foning but without this affiftance, and
by reaſoning only in vague and ambi-
guous terms, I doubt much whether it
would be poffible ever to attain that pre-
cifion which is ablolutely neceffary in de-
ducing from the principles maintained,
without regard to any other means of
knowledge, fuch inferen.es as may be
brought
SECT.
421
XXI.
brought to the teſt of
cal experiment.
open and unequivo-
As to the other point, the contriving of
hypotheſes to explain away an evident ex-
periment or matter of fact, or to account
for its being diametrically oppofite to what
it ſhould have been according to the doc-
trine maintained, though this cannot be
prevented, it may be fo guarded againſt,
that fuch hypothefes can never produce any
difficulty or embarraſſment.
For this purpoſe, I think the two fol-
lowing confiderations may be fufficient.
In the first place, let it be remembered,
that a new hypothefis, contrived to account
for the falfity of a neceffary inference of
an old one, and to explain away an ob-
vious matter of fact, in order to avoid gi-
ving up a favourite opinion, is in the
highest degree unphilofophical, and in
ftrict propriety of fcientific reaſoning, is
not intitled to any regard or attention. In
the ſecond place, let it be conſidered by
thoſe even who wiſh to fhew every poſſible
indulgence to fuch hypothefes, that they
may
422
ESSA Y.
may eaſily be brought to the teft of
expe-
riment. For the conclufion which it is
propoſed to try experimentally muſt be a
ſtrictly neceſſary inference from the prin-
ciples of the abſolute irreſiſtible force of
motives, (though thefe may be feparated
from their reſpective actions, in fuch a
manner that only the ſtrongeſt of two op-
pofing motives fhall be followed by its
proper action), and of the incapacity of a
perfon to act without a motive, as well as
of the impoffibility of a body refifting or
preventing the change or effect corre-
ſponding to any caufe applied to it, or
ever changing without a caufe; and this
without any regard to any of the other
real or fuppofed attributes, either of mind
or body; of living perfons or of inani-
mate matter. Confequently the conclu-
fion muft either be true, both with reſpect
to the relation of motive and action and
that of cauſe and effect in phyfics; or it
muſt be falſe with refpect to both theſe
relations, if thoſe two principles take place
in both; juſt as all the properties of a
plane triangle are equally true of equila-
teral, ifofceles, or fcalene triangles; or as
in
SECT. XXI.
423
in an equilateral, as well as in an ifo-
fceles triangle, the two angles at the
bafe are equal to one another. And if
any perſon thinks he can affign a reaſon,
confiftent with the principles juft now ſpe-
cified, for the conclufion not being true in
the caſe of motive and action, we may
know at once, by the eaſieſt and ſimpleſt
teſt that can be conceived, whether the
reafon propoſed be juſt and ſolid, or a
mere jargon of ambiguous words, fuch as
have long abounded on this fubject; and
this too without arguing about it even for
a moment. We need only try whether it
applies to the correſponding cafe of the
relation of cauſe and effect in phyfics. If
it does not, and if the conclufion be found
true in the latter relation, and falfe in the
former, there must be a difference between
them, with reſpect to thoſe very prin-
ciples from which the concluſion in que-
ſtion was deduced as a ſtrictly neceffary in-
ference.
A cafe or inftance of the application of
a motive, having all the conditions requi-
fite for my preſent purpoſe, may, I think,
be
424
ESSA Y.
be fairly and demonftrably got at in the
following manner.
Let two great equal oppofite motives be
applied to a perfon at the fame time. In
fuch a cafe, according to the doctrine of
Neceffity, the perſon muſt remain inactive,
having nothing to determine him, and
being unable to determine himſelf to act
according to one of the equal motives,
rather than according to the other. This
conclufion, however, is not verified by ex-
periment; the direct contrary almoſt uni-
verfally taking place. But this is eafily
accounted for, and reconciled to the doc-
trine of Neceffity, by fuppofing that the
perfon either diſcovered, or at leaſt fan-
cied, fome additional motive on one fide
or the other. Though this is a mere gra-
tuitous hypothefis, contrived to explain a-
way an obvious fact, and therefore un-
worthy of any regard; yet, for reafons
already mentioned, it ſhall be allowed to
paſs unqueſtioned. Nay, in order to make
the argument as fimple and unequivocal
as poffible, we fhall confider the cafe of a
real additional motive, though a ſmall one,
being applied on one fide. And for the
fake
SECT.
425
XXI.
fake of eafy commenfurableneſs, we fhall
fuppofe this ſmall additional motive to be
of the fame kind with the great original
oppofite motives; for instance, the offer of
money. But in this cafe it is plain, that
the oppofite motives are no longer equal;
and, according to the doctrine of Neceffity,
that one with which the ſmall additional
motive concurs must prevail. Now, it is an
axiom of geometry, hitherto unqueſtioned,
That if from unequals equals be deduct-
ed, the remainders must be unequal; and
it may be added, that the difference be-
tween the remainders must be as great as
that between the whole quantities had
been. Let then the equal motives, that
is, the great original oppofing motives, be
withdrawn at once from both ſides, as foon
as the perfon has felt the influence of the
minute additional motive, and made his
choice accordingly and let all the cir-
cumſtances of the cafe, and above all the
doctrine of Neceffity, be duly explained to
him he must immediately perceive, that
the motive which determined his choice
remains entire, unoppofed, and confe-
quently in full force; and he must accor-
3 H
dingly
426
ESSA Y.
dingly do the action required as certainly
for that ſmall motive as he would have
done it for the correſponding great motive
applied by itſelf, or for the fmall and great
one together. For all motives being, as
to him, irreſiſtible, any motive applied,
and unoppoſed, must be followed by that
volition, choice, determination, and action,
to which it prompts.
This cafe, and the mode of reafoning
employed in arguing it, may be fully il
luftrated by the uſe of a very fimple dia-
gram, and by means of algebraical and
even arithmetical notation; as, for exam-
ple, in the following manner.
Z 2
X =100
Y = 100
Let X and Y reprefent the forces of two
equal oppofite motives applied at once to
the fame perfon. Each of theſe forces we
fhall fuppofe equal to 100. According to
the doctrine of Neceffity, however modi-
fied, the perfon in fuch a fituation cannot
act according to either motive applied, and
cannot act without a motive; and there-
fore, if no other motive is applied to him,
must
SECT.
427
XXI.
must remain inactive. But the contrary re-
fult is always ob/erved on trial, nay, is al-
ways forefeen before any trial is made.
This is accounted for, according to the
doctrine of Neceffity, by Juppoſing that
fome additional motive, however flight, is
always found or fancied on one fide or the
other. Let this ſuppoſition be admitted,
and let Z repreſent the force of this fmall
additional motive; which we muſt con-
ceive to be much lefs than X or Y, and
for the fake of eafy calculation, we fhall
ftate as only equal to 2; and fhall admit
that it concurs with X, in oppofition to
Y. Then, no doubt, according to the
doctrine of Neceffity, as now modified,
X+Z being equal to 102, muſt be more
than Y, which is but 100, and according-
ly must prevail, and have their full effect,
as if Y were not applied. But then it fol-
lows neceffarily, that if the two great op-
pofing motives of equal force be with-
drawn at the fame time, there must remain
the additional motive Z = 2 on one fide,
and unoppofed, (for aught that yet ap-
pears); which therefore must have its full
effect, and be followed by the action to
3 H 2
which
428
ESSA Y.
which it prompts, as certainly as X would
be if it were applied fingly. But this ve-
ry plain and ſtrictly neceffary inference,
though evidently poffible, and perfectly
analogous to what is known to take place
univerfally with refpect to caufes and ef-
fects in lifeless bodies, I prefume will not
be admitted as in the ſmalleſt degree pro-
bable, or as even worthy to be tried expe-
rimentally; and a new fuppofition will im-
mediately be contrived to account for that
neceffary inference from the doctrine not
being true as a matter of fact, and for thoſe
who profefs their belief in the doctrine not
even expecting it to prove true.
It will be ſuppoſed, (and not altogether
without reafon), that the motives men-
tioned, the forces of which are denoted
reſpectively by X, Y, and Z, are not the
only motives applied to the perſon; that
he must be conceived to be at the fame
time under the influence of fome other
motives, of a peculiar kind, and differing
from the others in this reſpect, that they
are not motives to action, but motives,
reafons, or inducements, to remain inac-
tive;
SECT. XXI.
429
tive; as, for instance, lazinefs, averfion to la-
bour of any kind, the pleaſures of idleneſs,
the advantage that may be expected by re-
maining inactive, or at leaſt by not acting
either according to X or according to Y,
&c. Such motives or confiderations may
well be fuppoſed to have great influence
with a perfon. They cannot indeed be
fuppofed to concur with either X or Y in
prompting to any action; but they may
oppoſe either or both of them: they will
always oppoſe that one which is likely to
prevail; as, for example, X; when Z con-
curs with it; and in fuch a cafe will con-
cur with Y to that precife effect, and no
more.
This fuppofition well deferves attention;
for it is in one reſpect juft; there are fuch
motives, or principles of choice or deter-
mination, which may have influence; that
is, according to which a perfon may rea-
fonably be conceived to regulate his con-
duct. But even thefe motives have no
abfolute force as caufes of choice, voli-
tion, or determination in the perfon, in-
dependent of his felf-governing power.
And
430
ESSA Y.
And the fuppofition of their influence by no
means takes away the objection to the doc-
trine of Neceffity founded on the palpable
falfity of the laſt neceffary inference from
it, but only removes it one very ſhort
ſtep; and at the fame time gives us an
opportunity, by means of ftrict mathe-
matical reaſoning, to fhew more clearly
than has yet been done, that the notion of
the fuppofed abfolute force of motives, is
completely nugatory.
According to this laft fuppofition, the
former expreffion and diagram were in-
complete; and an important addition muſt
be made to them, to exprefs the fuppofed
force of theſe peculiar motives for remain-
ing inactive; which always oppoſe ac-
tion, and concur with any other motive
that does fo. The force of any fingle mo-
tive of that kind, or of any number of
fuch motives concurring, may be repre-
fented by V=m; and the diagram, when
completed according to this fuppofition,
will be as follows.
Z=2
SECT. XXI.
431
Z=2
X = 100
Y
= 100
V = m
The proportion of V to X, Y, and Z, we
cannot know, and therefore I ftate it as
equal to m; but we know that V muft ei-
ther be equal to Z, or greater than Z, or
leſs than Z.
If V be equal to Z, then as X is equal
to Y, X+ Z must be equal to Y + V.
According to the arithmetical illuſtration
given, each fum would be 102; and the
force of the motives on each ſide being
thus equal, according to the doctrine in
queſtion, the perfon must remain inactive,
just as he must have done if only X and Y
had been applied, or as he muſt have done
if no motives at all had been applied to
him.
If V be greater than Z, (for example, if
it be fuppofed equal to 3, while Z is but
2), X+Z=102 must be leſs than Y +
V 103, and never can prevail over them,
any more than Z could do over Y; and
therefore
432
ESSAY.
therefore the perfon muſt ſtill remain in-
active.
If V be less than Z, (for example, equal
to I while Z is equal to 2), then, no
doubt, X + Z = 102 must be greater
than Y+V=101, and must prevail over
theſe, and the perfon must act according-
ly but then let both X and Y be taken
away, that is to fay, the equals from the
unequals, and the remainders muſt ſtill be
unequal, and the perfon, according to the
doctrine of Neceffity, however modified,
must act as he is prompted by Z, juft as
completely as if V were not applied, or as
he must do if X+Z (unoppofed), or X
(fingly), were applied to him. But, ac-
cording to the interpretation of every part
of the experiment, V must be leſs than Z;-
for X and Y are equal, and X + Z was
found to be greater than Y + V.
Therefore, if the doctrine of Neceffity,
however modified, be juft; that is, if
there be in motives any abfolute force or
ftrength in determining the will or choice.
of a perfon, or any fuch relation between
them
SECT. XXI.
433
them and the volitions and actions of
mankind, that volition and action come to
paſs in confequence of them, independ-
ently of any ſelf-governing power in the
agent, or any capacity in him of refiſting
them; juft as changes in lifelefs bodies
come to pass on the application of their
reſpective cauſes, independently of any
felf-governing power in the fubject; a
perfon must infallibly do, for any the moſt
trivial motive, which added to any great
one that was balanced by an equal oppofite
motive, was fufficient to turn the balance,
and determine the will, preciſely what
he must have done for that great motive,
either applied by itſelf, or applied along
with an equal oppofite motive, and that
concurrent trivial motive.
Thofe who have been accuſtomed to af-
fert their belief in the doctrine of Neceffi-
ty, may confider here, before they proceed
to particular inftances, whether this im-
portant general inference coincides with
their notion of the relation of motive and
action, of the abfolute and irrefiftible force.
of motives like that of phyfical cauſes, and
with
3 I
434
ESSA Y.
with their experience of the general cha-
racter and conduct of mankind. They
will not furely, nor can they confiftently
with the character of men of ſenſe, and
men of ſcience, and men of veracity, re-
fuſe their affent to fo plain and obvious a
conclufion, without first pointing out fome
error in the very fhort chain of fimple ma-
thematical reaſoning, by which it is dedu-
ced neceſſarily from their own fundamental
principle.
Nay, if there were occafion to reaſon on
fuch a fubject with men incapable of un-
derſtanding any kind of mathematical rea-
foning, or having an infuperable diflike
and diſtruſt of fuch an application of ma-
thematics, the conclufion which I propoſe
to try experimentally might be explained
and proved to them by phyfical illuftra-
tion, with a degree of evidence and clear-
nefs little inferior to that of mathemati-
cal demonſtration; and yet of ſuch a kind
that men of no more knowledge or un-
derſtanding than we may reaſonably ex-
pect to meet with in common porters,
should fully and eaſily apprehend it, and
fee
SECT.
435
XXI.
ſee the force of it, as neceffarily following
from the principles afferted.
For this purpoſe, I fhould require no
other inſtrument but our old, though very
unworthy reprefentative, the common ba-
lance.
Let us fuppofe any number of porters
to be defired to attend carefully to the na-
ture, and ſtructure, and various motions,
of a balance; to try it as often as they
pleaſed, and in every way that they could
think of; and let us fuppofe, that, after
due attention on their part, and many
careful trials of the balance, fuch queſtions
as the following fhould be put to them ſe-
verally.
1. Whether they believe that the balance
can turn of itſelf, with nothing in either
fcale?
2. Whether they belive it can prevent
itſelf from turning, or in any way fail to
turn, when a certain weight is put into
312
one
436
ESSAY.
one of the ſcales, and nothing into the o-
ther?
3. Whether they believe it can turn ei-
ther way, with juſt one pound, or juſt one
hundred pounds, in each ſcale?
4. Whether they believe it will remain
even, with an hundred pounds in one
fcale, and an hundred and one pounds in
the other?
5. Whether they believe it will turn to
that fide where the greater weight was
put?
6. Whether they believe it will turn to
the ſame fide, if an hundred pounds were
taken out of each fcale, and one pound only
left in that ſcale in which it had originally
been put ?
It cannot be neceffary to fay, that ex-
periments fuch as thefe have been tried
with balances times without number; that
the refult of every one of them is inva-
riable; and that it is univerfally known,
and
SECT.
4-37
XXI.
and foreſeen before the trial. I will ven-
ture to ſay, that if any porter were fe-
riouſly to anſwer in the affirmative to any
of the three firſt queſtions, or in the ne-
gative to any of the three laſt queſtions, he
would inſtantly be pronounced infane, as
well by his own rude and ignorant bre-
thren, as by the moſt intelligent and en-
lightened of mankind.
Next, let us fuppofe a company of mer-
chants, all of them men of ſenſe, and of
liberal education, and of extenſive know-
ledge, and of fair character in all their
dealings, to be provided with a balance to
all appearance of a very different con-
ſtruction, and made of very different ma-
terials from thofe which we are accuftom-
ed to ufe; that ordinary people fufpect it
not to be a fair one, and alledge that in
it fometimes the greater, fometimes the
fmaller weight preponderated; that when
equal weights were put into the oppofite
fcales, one of them always preponderated
over the other; that they pofitively charge
the merchants with having fome fecret
way of turning the balance as they plea-
fed,
438
ESSA Y.
fed, or having fome perfon, though un-
feen, to do it for them; and at laſt refuſe
to deal with them, in the way of buying
or felling, by fuch a balance, unleſs they
will allow it to be fairly examined.
We ſhall ſuppoſe the merchants to treat
all fuch opinions and fufpicions with con-
tempt and indignation; to laugh at the
opinion, that any balance, or any thing
whatever, could turn itſelf, as a palpable.
abfurdity, equivalent to faying that there
might be an effect without a caufe; and
to ſpeak of the fufpicions of their honeſty
as the vile fuggeftions of ignorance, envy,
and malevolence; but yet, in order to fa-
tisfy the world, to fhew, by a thouſand
inftances, that in their balance the hea-
vieſt ſcale always went down, and that the
fufpected balance was even fo nice, and
of fo peculiar a conftruction, (friction in
it being almoſt annihilated, and the centre
of gravity of the whole machine, even
when loaded, coinciding with the centre
of motion), that it would turn complete-
ly from the horizontal to the vertical di-
rection, with the fmalleft difference of
weight;
SECT.
439
XXI.
weight; as for inftance, with a fingle
ounce, or with a fingle grain, when there
were 1000 lbs in each ſcale.
Their cuſtomers we fhall fuppofe not
yet to be quite fatisfied, and, with the
conſent and approbation of all the mer-
chants, to try the experiment of put-
ting 1000 lbs, carefully weighed, into
each ſcale it is found, that one ſcale not
only preponderates, but goes down as faſt,
and as far, as it would have done if there
had been nothing in the oppofite ſcale.
The vulgar are aſtoniſhed, but the mer-
chants are not in the leaft difconcerted.
They immediately examine the defcending
fcale, (without ever looking at the other),
and fhew, that there is in it, or about it,
a ſmall quantity of duft, which they rec-
kon may weigh a grain or more; and they
had already warned their cuſtomers, that
the balance was fo nice as to turn com-
pletely with a fingle grain, or even leſs.
The ſpectators immediately propoſe to af-
certain this point, and along with it the
juftneſs of the balance, by taking out the
1000 lbs from each fcale, and attend-
לן
ing
440
ESSA Y.
ing to the refult. But the merchants will
not liſten to fuch a propofal: they fay it
is abfurd and foolish; and that it is treat-
ing them like children to appeal to fuch
an experiment; and, laftly, we fhall fup-
pofe, that, notwithſtanding all their re-
monftrances, the experiment propoſed by
their cuſtomers is tried; and that, on ta-
king out the 1000 pounds from each fcale,
the balance immediately becomes and re-
mains perfectly even.
What fhould we think of fuch a balance,
and of fuch merchants?
in
For my own part, I have not the ſmall-
eft fcruple to give it as my opinion, that
if ever fuch a cafe occurred, all mankind
who were fit to judge of it would agree
their fentiments on the two following
points: First, That the pretended balance
was not a balance; that the turn of it was
not produced or determined merely by the
weights put into the fcales, but that there
was in the machine, or at leaſt fomehow
connected with it, fome other principle
from which the turn of it proceeded, ei-
ther
SECT.
441
XXI.
ther wholly or partly: Secondly, That
the merchants them felves knew this per-
fectly well, and were acting mala fide in
all that they faid or did about their ba-
lance.
Philofophers who have maintained the
doctrine of Neceffity as confifting in the
total want of any ſelf-governing power in
perfons, and the irrefittible influence of
motives; and who have afferted the per-
fect analogy between the relation of mo-
tive and action, and that of caufe and ef-
fect in phyfics; and who have inſiſted on
the illuftration of their doctrine, from the
compariſon of the balance as affording
the fulleſt proof of their fyftem, and the
beſt explanation of their meaning, as Dr
PRIESTLY has done in the ſtrongeſt
terms ; muſt confider maturely what
they are doing before they venture to de-
ny the conclufion at prefent in queſtion,
unleſs they can point out an error in the
reaſoning by which it is deduced from
*
*Vol. 1. p. 11. 12.; vol. 2. p. 24. 25.
3 K
their
442
ESSAY.
{
their own principles, and at the fame time
explain how it comes to pafs that a con-
clufion neceffarily deduced from certain
principles fhould be always falfe in fome
cafes, and always true in others, the
principles remaining the fame in all:
both which things I conceive to be im-
poffible.
To deny the conclufion, (p. 432.-3.)
without fhewing an error in the fhort and
fimple reaſoning that leads to it, would be
equivalent to a renunciation of all pre-
tenfions to the uſe of reafon, at leaſt in
fcientific inveſtigations. To doubt of the
truth of the refult as a matter of fact
when tried with the balance, would
be fuch wonderful ignorance of a well-
known fact, as could not be believed of
any fet of men, but efpecially of men well
acquainted with the nature of the ba-
lance. To admit the conclufion with re-
fpect to the balance, and yet deny it with
reſpect to the voluntary actions of perſons,
ſtill afferting the fame principles, to wit,
the inertia of the ſubject, and the irreſiſtible
influence of motives as well as of caufes,
would
SECT. XXI.
443
would be ſtill worfe: it would bring into
queſtion their veracity as well as their un-
derſtanding.
I apprehend, therefore, that thoſe alone
can expect credit for their fincerity in the
belief which they have profeffed of the doc-
trine of Neceffity, who admit my conclu-
fion, and agree to try it experimentally.
After all, my conclufion is no more than
what, if it had been expreffed in general
terms, without their knowing in what cafes
it might be tried, or by what means the
comparative force of the oppofite motives
was to be aſcertained before the laſt trial
of them, every orthodox Neceffarian would
have admitted; as in fact many of them
have done. None of them furely would
ever think of difputing that a perfon would
or must act according to the ſtrongeſt of
oppofite motives; and that fuch motives
would commonly have their full effect as
if unoppofed.
Nay, if particular cafes were ſtated, of
fuch a nature that no appeal could be
3 K 2
madę
444
ESSA Y.
made to open experiment with refpect to
the refult in them, and every person would
be left to judge for himtelt what the re-
fult would have been, I have ftrong rea-
fons (from analogy) to believe, that my
conclufion would be admitted by every
affertor of the doctrine of Neceffity.
I fhall ftate, firft, one of the ſimpleſt
cafes of this kind; in which the alterna-
tive is merely that of acting in a particu-
lar manner, or not acting in that manner,
that is, remaining inactive. It is the cafe
expreffed mathematically by Z —V, (dia-
gram, p. 431.): it correfponds in general
phyfics to the cafe of a body under the in-
fluence of a force or caufe of motion,
which is at the fan e time oppoſed by fric-
tion; and with refpect to the balance, if
it be chofen as the fubject of illuftration,
the corresponding cafe will be a weight
put into one fcale, and nothing left in the
other. I prefume there can be no doubt,
that if the force applied be lets than the
refiftance, or only equal to it, the body,
or the balance, will remain at reft; but
that, if the force be greater than the refift-
ance,
SECT.
445
XXI.
ance, the body will move, or the balance
will turn, according to the force or the
weight applied.
Innumerable examples of the corre-
fponding cafe of the application of motives
may eaſily be found: I take the two first
which occur, as they are both of fuch a
kind that the truth of the conclufion can-
not be tried experimentally; fo that every
perfon is left to judge what it would be,
from his own preconceived notion of the
relation of motive and action, and of the
abfolute force or influence of motives.-
Cæfar had to chooſe whether he thould or
fhould not pafs the Rubicon; that is, begin
or not begin a bloody and calamitous civil
war: Cato had to chooſe whether he fhould
kill himſelf or not. We know what each
of them did; we conceive that they had
powerful motives for not doing fo, but
ftill more powerful motives for doing what
they did. It is conceivable, that the op-
police motives in them refpectively might
have been equal, or that the contrary mo-
tives might have been the ftroager; and
in either cafe it will be admitted, on the
principle
446
ESSA Y.
principle of the doctrine of Neceffity, that
Cefar would not have paffed the Rubicon,
and that Cato would not have killed him-
felf: but the motives on one fide prepon-
derating, they could not avoid chooſing as
they did. Now, let us fuppofe the mo-
tives to inaction in both cafes to have been
completely withdrawn, and at the fame
time an equal portion in point of force or
influence to have been withdrawn from the
motives to action, and of courſe the original
difference on this fide, or any force of mo-
tive, however minute, to have been left un-
oppoſed; muſt we conceive, that Cæjar and
Cato would have acted as they did for ſuch
a fmall motive, juſt as a balance will turn,
or a body will move, in the correſponding
circumſtances?
Next, I fhall confider a different, but e-
qually fimple caſe, of the oppoſition of
motives prompting to inconfiftent actions,
but where there can be no motive, or at
leaſt none of any fenfible influence, for re-
maining inactive. This cafe is expreffed
by the diagram, p. 426. or by the alge-
braical formula X + Z-Y; and corre-
fponds
竜
​SECT.
447
XXI.
fponds to the fituation of a body in free
ſpace, but under the influence of two op-
pofite forces or caufes of motion, and to
the ſtate of the balance, (as nearly as the
ftructure of that inftrument with reſpect
to friction, and to the place of its centre.
of gravity, will permit), when weights are
put into both fcales. Let us fuppofe a
truly honeſt freeholder to be folicited by
two candidates for his vote, which he can
give for only one of them; let us fuppofe
that he wiſhes equally well to them both,
and believes them equally deferving of the
honour and the truft of which they are
ambitious. If thefe confiderations or mo-
tives are preciſely of equal force, it will
no doubt be admitted, that he can vote
for neither of them. Let us next fuppofe,
that he has the additional motive of gra-
titude in favour of one of the candidates,
as having formerly received favours from
him. It will be admitted, I prefume, that
this additional motive muſt turn the ba-
lance, and make him vote for his bene-
factor. Next, let us fuppofe, that he has
no other motive whatever for voting for
either of the candidates, but merely his
gratitude
448
ESSA Y.
As
gratitude to one of them, neither of them
being men of any peculiar merit.
there is no motive for refusing to vote,
but a frong one against fuch conduct,
which would difoblige two men; and as
there is a motive for voting for one of
them, and none for voting for the other,
I prefume it will be admitted, that he
must vote or act according to that mo-
tive.
Now, if this be human nature, it muſt
be equally the cafe in honeft and in kna-
vifh voters; and I think it may be tried
experimentally in the following manner.
Let two perfons folicit at the fame time,
but each for himſelf ſeparately, the vote of
fome worthy burgeſs of ſome rotten bo-
rough, which vote can be given for only
one of them: Let the folicitations be pro-
perly made by the offer of an equal bribe
from each candidate.
The worthy burgefs, as he cannot vote
for both of them, muft either refufe his
vote to both, or promiſe it to one of them.
If he refuſes it to both, let one of them
offer
SECT.
449
XXI.
offer him a very fmall additional bribe.
He must then promiſe his vote to the can-
didate who does fo. But whenever he has
made his choice, and given his promiſe,
whether from the confideration of an ad-
ditional bribe, or of fome other motive,
not diſcoverable, on one fide, then let the
equal bribes or motives on both fides be
withdrawn. There will then remain the
additional motive (the influence or effica-
cy of which is already afcertained) for gi-
ving his vote to one of the candidates, ei-
ther abfolutely unoppoſed, or oppoſed only
by fome inconceivable reaſon for not vo-
ting at all; which confideration, by the
previous ſteps of the experiment, is alrea-
dy afcertained to be leſs in force or influ-
ence than the motive which is now left for
voting on one fide. Will he vote accor-
dingly, or not? If he does, it is plain
that a practical and economical uſe, of
great importance in all free governments,
may be made of this principle of human
nature, which I claim the fole merit of dif
covering.
Laftly, I fhall confider the cafe where
3 L
the
459
ESSAY.
the motives for not acting in either of the
ways required are very great, almoſt or
perfectly equal to either of the great mo-
tives which oppofe one another, and infi-
nitely greater than the minute additional
motive which is found to turn the ba-
lance. This is in truth a very common
cafe; it occurs in every example of a fale
by auction, where there are two bidders
for the thing to be fold. It correſponds
to the cafe of a body under the influence
of two very great oppofite forces, one of
which is but very little greater than the
other, and where there is alfo much refift-
ance, from friction or other fources, to
the motion of the body in the direction of
either of the forces. And it correſponds to
the caſe of a balance having much fric-
tion, the centre of gravity very low, and
great weights very nearly equal in both
fcales.
If a man be offered L. 50 for a horfe, or
L. 50,000 for an eſtate, which he is willing
to fell for an adequate price, but not ab-
folutely obliged to fell at any price that he
can get; and if he is convinced that the
prices
SECT.
451
XXI.
prices offered for his horfe and for his eftate,
reſpectively, are fully adequate, it is to
be fuppofed he will conclude the bargain.
But if he have the fame offer from two
different perfons, it muſt be conceived,
that he could not fell his horfe or his e-
ftate to either of them, for want of a mo-
tive to determine his choice. But then let
a fingle guinea more be offered on either
fide, and the balance will be no longer
even, and his choice must be determined
on that fide. Then let the great equal of-
fers on each fide be withdrawn at once,
and only the offer of the guinea on one
fide be left, that it may appear whether it
will turn the balance or not, in fpite of
the value the man may be fuppoſed to fet
on his property; juft as a balance will turn
with any mall weight put in either ſcale,
with which it had turned when both ſcales
were greatly loaded; or as a great weight
may be dragged on the ground by any
force that was fufficient to drag it in that
direction, along with a much greater,
which was oppoſed by one equal to itſelf.
All theſe cafes I have confidered with a
3 L 2
degree
452
ESSA Y.
degree of minuteneſs which will probably
appear tedious and unneceffary: the ob-
ject of it is to ſhow, in the ſtrongeſt pof-
fible light, the difference between the no-
tion as well as the reality of being done for
the fake of a motive, and barely coming to
paſs in confequence of a phyfical caufe; and
to point out the extravagant and ridicu-
lous abfurdity, or at leaft incongruity
with the univerfal notion of mankind, whe-
ther philofophers or vulgar men, that re-
fults, even before any experiment can be
made, from fuppofing the voluntary de-
terminations and actions of men to come
to paſs on the application of motives, as
phyfical effects do on the application of
their caufes, without any felf-governing
power in perfons, any more than in life-
lefs bodies, or any means of preventing
the influence of the motives, any more
than of the phyfical caufes applied. I do
not, however, make any appeal to con-
ſciouſneſs on this point: Iftate the ne-
ceffary confequences of the fuppofition of
fuch influence of motives; and leave to
thoſe who may think it neceffary the la-
bour
‍
SECT.
453
XXI.
bour of trying thoſe inferences experimen-
tally.
It may be proper to mention that theſe
inferences are equally neceffary on the
fuppofition of the conftant conjunction as
on that of the occafional and feparable
conjunction of motive and action: they
are deduced from the fuppofition of the
abfolute irreſiſtible force or influence of
motives.
It muſt be obſerved, too, that as they
do not in any degree depend on the fup-
poſed immediateneſs or remoteneſs either
of the conſtant conjunction or of the ir-
refiſtible influence of motives, they can-
not be ſet aſide by any fuppofition con-
cerning the number or the nature of the
intermediate ſteps between the firſt appli-
cation of them and the ultimate vifible re-
fult in action. Juft as in the cafe of the
balance, or of any lifeless body, there may
be any fuppofeable number of links or
fteps between the caufe and the effect;
ftill, however, if the conjunction at every
ſtep be conſtant, that of the firſt with
the
454
ESSAY.
the laſt muſt be fo too: if the influence at
every ſtep be irrefiftible, that of the firſt
on the laſt muſt be ſo too *. To men-
tion the various circumftances of appre-
henfion, judgement, will, effort, thought
of every kind, which are peculiar to per-
fons, and which may be conceived to ac-
count for the difference in the cafe of per-
fons and in that of lifeless bodies, requires,
in the first place, fome appeals to con-
fcioufnefs; and, in the fecond place, im-
plies the uſe of many vague and ambi-
guous terms; and, laftly, it is in fact,
though not in words, an acknowledge-
ment that the conjunction of motive and
action is not conftant, but occafionally fe-
parable; and a ſpecification of the fteps of
the proceſs, or ſeries of events, where the
conjunction in queftion is broken, where
the influence of motives is found not ta
be irrefiftible, and where the aid of an-
other principle of change is required.
Suppoſing that all theſe inferences which
I have drawn from the principle of the
* Vide p. 84. 85. 86. 232.233.
inertia
SECT. XXI.
455
inertia of mind as well as of body, and
the irreſiſtible influence of motives, as well
as of phyfical cauſes, firſt on the fuppofi-
tion of the conſtant conjunction, fecondly on
the fuppofition of the occafional and fepa-
rable conjunction of caufe and effect, and of
motive and action, are ftrictly neceffary
confequences of that principle; it muſt, I
think, be admitted, that they have all the
other qualities and conditions which are
fpecified, Sect. IV. p. 128. and 129. to
which I here beg leave to refer, as it is
needleſs to repeat what is there ſtated fo
particularly; and I truft they will be
thought by every attentive and candid
reafoner to justify and eſtabliſh the pro-
pofitions afferted p. 125. 126. 127. and
130. 131. 132. concerning the import of
the notion of motive, or "that for the fake
"of which," and the univerfality of that
notion among philofophers as well as the
vulgar, and its being indefeafible even in
thofe who profeffed to have no belief and
fcarce a notion of that principle of change,
the felf-governing power of perfons, which
appears to be always implied in the notion
of motive.
If
456
ESSA Y.
If any perfon can fhew that my fuppo-
fed neceffary inferences from that prin-
ciple are really not fo, I fhall frankly give
up my argument, and acknowledge his fu-
periority in reafoning; though I own I
cannot alter my opinion as to the ultimate
point at iffue, which appears to me a ſelf-
evident truth, which nothing but vague
analogical reaſoning, and the careleſs uſe
of ambiguous terms, could ever have
brought into queſtion.
If, contrary to my expectation, any af-
fertors of the doctrine of Neceffity fhall
admit my ſeemingly neceffary inferences
from their own principle, as appearing to
them true, or at leaſt highly probable,
with reſpect to living perfons as well as
with reſpect to lifeless bodies; and if it
fhall appear, that their actual conduct in
fimilar circumftances has correfponded to
fuch admiffion, and to my inferences, I
fhall with much pleaſure acknowledge
their candour and fincerity in their rea-
fonings, and their profeffions of belief,
and ſhall be glad to fee the truth of their
principle,
SECT.
457
XXI.
!
principle, and of my inferences from it,
fairly afcertained by experiment.
But if any of them, without pointing
out any fuch error in my reafonings as
may ſhew that my inferences are not ne-
ceffary confequences from the principle
afferted, fhall deny thofe inferences, and
ftill hold faſt the principle, I must confider
them as ſo ſtrangely deficient in the facul-
ty of reaſoning, as to be incapable of any
ſcientific inveſtigation; and if they ad-
mit the inferences with reſpect to life-
lefs bodies, which implies that they un-
derſtand them, and fee the force of the
reafonings which lead to them, and yet
deny them with refpect to living perfons,
ftill afferting with refpect to both that
fimple principle from which alone, with-
out regard to any other circumſtance or
property either of mind or body, thofe in-
ferences are drawn, then I must confider
them as fo deficient in candour and fince-
rity as to be unfit to be reaſoned with.
3 M
SECT.
SE C T. XXII.
Summary of the Dilemma.-Ultimate conclu-
fion of the argument with respect to the
general nature of the difference between
the relation of Motive and Action and that
of Caufe and Effect in Phyfics.-Reaſons
for not attempting in this Effay the inve-
figation of the particulars relating to the
Self-governing Power in Perfons.-Im-
poffibility of doing it without appealing to
Confciousness and Common Senfe.
'HE relation of motive and action has
THE
now been confidered on two direct-
ly contrary fuppofitions, one or other of
which must be true. It must be either a
conftant conjunction, as that of caufe and
effect in phyfics feems to be, or it muſt
be an occaſional and feparable conjunc-
tion.
Each
SECT.
459
XXII.
Each of theſe fuppofitions has been con-
fidered along with the fundamental prin-
ciple of the doctrine of Neceffity, name-
ly, that the influence of motives is irre-
fiſtible, like that of phyfical cauſes; and
that there is no ſelf-governing power in
living perfons, any more than in lifelefs
bodies.
Both thoſe fuppofitions with reſpect to
the relation of motive and action, taken
along with that principle, imply various
neceffary confequences, fome of which are
falfe, and others abfurd.
Therefore that principle must be falfe.
But the direct contrary of what is falſe
must be true.
The direct contrary of that principle is,
that the influence of motives is not irre-
fiſtible; and that there is in living per-
fons a certain ſelf-governing power: and
this muſt be true. Which was to be de-
monſtrated.
3 M 2
IG
460
ESSAY
i
It will be obſerved, that in the prece-
ding argument care has been taken to con-
fider only the original motives, or firſt
principles of action, applied to a perfon
in any cafe, and the ultimate viſible re-
fult or overt act proceeding from them
without regard to any intervening circum-
ftances, fuch as the procefs of thought,
which we know to be interpofed between
the motive applied and the overt act
confequent upon it. Various fteps in the
intervening procefs of thought may be
diftinctly conceived and fpecified, fuch as
apprehenfion, defire, judgement, choice,
preference, will, effort, and poffibly many
others, for which it is not eafy to find
unexceptionable, that is, unambiguous
It would be natural and reafon-
able to inquire in which of thele ileps, or
in how many of them, the exertion of the
felf governing power is required. Nor
would there be any difficulty in anſwering
names.
fuch
SECT.
461
XXII.
fuch queſtions, if appeals to conſciouſneſs
and to common fenfe were admiffible;
which here they are not, both as being
fruitlefs, and as being inconfiftent with
the plan of this Effay. Befides, many of
the terms expreffing thofe operations of
thought are ſo vague and ambiguous, as
almoſt certainly to perplex and fruſtrate
any reaſonings in which they are employ-
ed. Nor is it neceffary for the purpoſe of
this Effay to enter into fuch difcuffions.
It appears by the unequivocal reſult, the
overt act, that the exertion of the felf-
governing power is interpofed between the
motive applied and the action following
upon it, and referred to it.
Nay, if any perfon fhould choofe, as
fome philofophers feem inclined to do, in
defiance of the common and the proper
ufage of language, to employ the term
Motive to denote, not merely the principle
of action, ſuch as appetite, paffion, de-
fire, &c. ufually called the motive, but
all the circunftances preceding the overt
act, it would make no difference with re-
ſpect to my conclufion: for it would ap-
pear,
462
ESSA Y.
pear, that in that maſs or ſeries of things
and thoughts, confounded together under
one name, there were both the principle
of action, commonly called the Motive,
and the exertion of the felf-governing
power fubfequent to it, and preceding and
effentially neceffary to fuch overt actions
as men uſually perform. For though the
power of words be very great, in confound-
ing our reafonings and fruftrating our re-
fearches, it has no influence at all on the
things about which we reafon; nor does it
even prevent us from perceiving their pro-
perties and their relations, if, without re-
gard to the words which we employ, we
attend ſtrictly to the things themſelves.
Though I will not, any perfon who
chooſes, and who has fufficient confidence
in his own power of reflection on his
thoughts, and in his own candour on this
fubject, may eafily apply my dilemma,
and my mathematical reafoning, to any
ſtep of the procefs of thought which in-
tervenes between the motives applied and
the overt act produced; for example, to
the judgement, choice, or will of the per-
fon
SE C T.
463
XXII.
fon acting; and he will foon find, that in
the very notion of fome of them there is
implied the ſeparability, and the very fre-
quent feparation, of fome of the motives or
fuppofed caufes from their fuppofed effects;
and in others of them, a very different re-
lation from that of irrefiftible influence of
the ſuppoſed caufes, or the fuppofed effect
fimply coming to pafs on the application
of the motives. And, inſtead of the ana-
logy of the motion of a lifeless body,
which correfponds or contrafts fo well
with the voluntary movement of a perſon,
he may take, for the firſt part of the Di-
lemma, the perception of colour; which
perception is a mere modification of
thought, as much as judgement, will, or
choice; but which being involuntary,
comes to pafs irrefiftibly, on the applica-
tion of its exciting cauſe or cauſes: and for
the ſecond part of the Dilemma, he will
have at hand the familiar analogy of the
balance. And if he reaſons ſtrictly, and
obſerves attentively, he will perceive the
difference between the turn of a balance
from the weights put into the fcales, and
the choice, judgement, or will of a per-
fon,
464
ESSA Y
fon, from motives applied to him, as well
as that between the fame turn of a balance
and the overt act of a perfon.
The felf-governing power of perfons,
the reality of which I conceive to be de-
monſtrated on phyfical and mathematical
principles in this Effay, appears to me a
curious and important principle in human
nature, and one that well deferves parti-
cular inveſtigation. Though many phi-
lofophers have thought fit to deny the ex-
iftence of it, yet it has not altogether
eſcaped the attention either of philofo-
phers or of the vulgar: it is well known
in common language by the name of
FORCE OF MIND; a phrafe which I find
is uſed in the very fame fenfe by mankind
in general, and by the affertors of the
doctrine of Neceffity; as appears by the
inftances to which they apply it, and by
their never falling into crofs purpoſes or
miſunderſtanding in their converſation
when they uſe it. Many juft and intereſt-
ing obfervations concerning it may eaſily
be collected, by accurate obfervation of the
characters and conduct of men, and from
the
SE C T. XXII.
465
the writings of poets, hiftorians, and phi-
lofophers. Such obfervations, properly
arranged, will lead us gradually to a more
diſtinct and accurate knowledge of its na-
ture. We may become acquainted with
its varieties and its modifications, and
with fome of the cauſes of thefe; we may
find what ſhare it has in all the operations
of thought, fomewhat even in fenfation,
more in judgement, in memory, in ima-
gination, in reafoning, in the common
conduct of life, in virtue, and in vice.
We may find it to be one of the moſt va-
luable poffeffions that man enjoys, and
one that by his own management he may
improve, or debafe, or almoſt lofe. We
may find the knowledge of this power fub-
fervient to the inveſtigation of the nature
of other principles of change, which it is
the object of philoſophy to aſcertain. But
as this inveſtigation cannot be conducted
on phyfical and mathematical principles,
I muſt not enter on it here; but it may be
the ſubject of another Effay.
3 N
AP-
APPENDIX:
CONTAINING
Objections made to the preceding Eſſay, and
Anfwers to them.
VERBA GIGNUNT VERBA.
Bacon.
"I
Communicated this Effay to a friend
that I knew had early imbibed the
principles of the Neceffitarians, requeſting
him to give me his opinion of it. He
fent me the following remarks, numbered
at my defire, and gave me leave to do as I
pleaſed with them. But he requeſted that
3 N 2
I
468
APPENDIX.
I fhould not publifh his name; becauſe he
did not think either the obfervations or
himſelf of fuch confequence as that there
could be any propriety in announcing their
author.
13
1. I believe the doctrine of the Neceffi-
tarians is, That human actions, or the acts
of the will which prompt them, depend
as much as any other events on caufes;
and that theſe cauſes are to be found in
the nature of the mind, and in thoſe per-
ceptions, fentiments, and opinions, which
arife in it.
2. The phyfical conftitution of the
mind, on which its exiftence, and the per-
formance of its operations, depend, muft
naturally be fuppofed to contain the pro-
per phyfical caufe or caufes of the acts of
the will, as well as of every other mental
operation: For I think we cannot conceive
a change to take place in any fubitance,
without fuppofing that there is a phyfical
caute for it in the nature of the fubftance.
But this conftitution we have no faculties
for examining. The perceptible opera-
tions
APPENDIX.
469
tions of the mind, however, or the pro-
ceffes of thought which attend on voli-
tion, may be confidered as exciting caufes
of the acts of the will. If there is any
thing contingent in theſe proceffes of
thought, or if the acts of the will are not
conſtantly conjoined with them, it is evi-
dent, that however conftantly conjoined
the acts of the will be with their proper
phyfical caufe, if that phyſical caufe is
only attended with its effect when ftimu-
lated by fomething contingent, the doc-
trine of the Neceffitarians must be erro-
neous. If, 'on the other hand, proceffes
or trains of thought are conftantly con-
joined with the acts of the will, and there
is nothing contingent in thofe trains of
thought, it appears to me, that the doc-
trine of the Neceffitarians must be well
founded; as, in that cafe, the relation of
conſtant conjunction must take place be-
tween the acts of the will and trains of
thought which invariably precede them.
3. It has been hitherto thought by the
Neceffitarians, that every volition is very
obviouſly the refult of a train of thought;
+
and
470
APPENDIX.
The
and that the relation of conftant con-
junction is very perceptible in-fuch trains
of thought, at leaft as far as it is necef-
fary to trace back the ſteps of them. I
underſtand the object of the Effay is, to
fhow, in the following manner, that ab-
furdities refult from this hypothefis.
doctrine of the Neceffitarians is fuppofed
to be, That every apprehenfion and defire
of attainable good, or, in the language of
the Eſſay, every motive, is attended with
an influence on the will, commenfurate to
the intenſity of fuch defire; and then, by
having recourfe to the known laws of
phyfics, it is proved, that instead of the
human actions which do happen, others
the moſt abfurd and extravagant would
neceffarily refult from the oppofite and
combined effects of certain of fuch mo-
tives.
4. But if it can be fhown, that, ac-
cording to the doctrine of the Neceffita-
rians, the will is not, and need not be, ex-
pofed to fuch combinations or oppofitions
of influences, it ſeems to me to follow, that
the
APPENDIX.
475
the argument in the Effay fails in its foun-
dation.
5. The Neceffitarians maintain, That
the will is invariably determined by the
judgement of the underſtanding, or the
laft ſtep in the train of thought previous
to volition; and that this judgement is in-
voluntary; and that no apprehenfion and
defire of attainable good has any influence
on the will, till the underſtanding decides
on its preference, or on the expediency of
attempting the purfuit of it. It is there-
fore a miſtake to have fuppofed, that, ac-
cording to the Neceffitarians, every appre-
henſion and defire of attainable good had
a determinate influence on the will. I be-
lieve there is no Neceffitarian that would
require any demonſtration or argument
to be convinced, that ſuch ſentiments oc-
cur every day without producing any effect
whatever on the will; and that according-
ly there is no conftant conjunction between
them and human actions.
6. Again, I believe it will not admit of
diſpute, that the decifions of the under-
ftanding
472
APPENDIX.
1
ftanding are involuntary. It ſeems to
be admitted in the Effay, that belief,
which is a judgement of the truth or
falfehood of a propofition, or of an event,
is involuntary; and I can fee no reaſon
for doubting, that an opinion of what is
preferable, or otherwife, is equally invo-
luntary. The former kind of judgements
is indeed more uniform and ſteady than
the latter, which varies according to the
ſtate of a perfon's health, or other cir-
cumſtances; but there is no reaſon for e-
fteeming them to be lefs involuntary than
the former.
7.
Neither will it admit of diſpute, that
a judgement will never be pronounced by
a perſon in health, in favour of two pur-
fuits at one and the fame time, that are in-
compatible, or admit only of combina-
tions which are inconfiftent with each fe-
verally.
8. Unleſs, therefore, the Neceffitarians
are under the neceffity of admitting, that
the involuntary judgement of the under-
ſtanding is contingent, or proceeds upon
a
}
APPENDIX.
473
a train of thought, fome ſtep of which is
contingent, the Effay feems to fail in its
object; fince, according to the Neceffita-
rians, the act of the will depends on an o-
peration of the underſtanding, which is
itſelf involuntary, and excludes all thofe
abfurd combinations of influence alluded
to in N° 3.
9. The queſtion, therefore, turns on the
nature of the operations of the under-
ſtanding. If the Neceffitarians must yield,
that every apprehenfion and defire of at-
tainable good muſt have an influence on
the underſtanding, in a manner perfectly
fimilar to that of forces in phyfics, in or-
der to be intitled to maintain, that its
operations proceed by immutable laws;
and that the relation of constant con-
junction takes place among them, the ſub-
ſtance of the argument in the Eſſay would,
I think, ftill remain folid, notwithſtand-
ing what has been remarked. It
It appears,
however, to me very clear, that the laws
of the operations of the underſtanding are
immutable; that the relation of conftant
conjunction is univerfally acknowledged
30
by
474
APPENDIX.
by mankind to take place among theſe ope-
rations; and that the influence of our de-
fires for attainable good on the decifions.
of the underſtanding, refpecting the pur-
fuit of them, though as certain and,
ſtrictly ſpeaking, uniform as that of forces
in phyſics, is ſubject to extremely different
laws.
10. I imagine all men will acknowledge
that a perſon will form exactly the fame
judgement to-day, for inftance, that he
did a twelvemonth ago, if he is circum-
ſtanced in preciſely the fame fituation, viz.
having perceptions, appetites, expectations,
and difcernment, perfectly fimilar to thoſe
which he then poffeffed; and it does not
appear to me poffible that this perſuaſion
can be otherwife accounted for than from
a belief, founded in conſciouſneſs, of the
immutability of the laws of the operations.
of the underſtanding, and of one of thoſe
laws being a conftant conjunction in the
fteps of the trains of thought which pre-
cede the judgements of the underſtand-
ing fo that we are fure that fimilar ef-
fects will always refult from fimilar cauſes
in
APPENDIX.
475
in the mind, as well as elſewhere; or, if a
different mode of expreffion is preferred,
that fimilar events will enfue in the mind
from ſimilar preceding circumſtances. We
cannot, as I believe an able writer has ob-
ferved, trace back the rout of the die in
the dice-box, and the train of caufes and
effects by which a particular face of it
comes at laſt to caft up; but we have
no doubt of the conftant conjunction of
the whole from the firft impulfe it re-
ceives, till it fettles on the table; and I
think we have as little doubt of the fame
relation pervading the trains of thought
that iffue in judgements of the under-
ſtanding; though thefe trains are too
fleeting and various, and the memory too
imperfect a faculty, to admit often of our
tracing them back with accuracy.
11. The total want of analogy between
the influence of our appetites upon the
judgement and of forces in phyfics, ap-
pears alfo to me to be fo ftriking, that it is
fcarcely requifite to make any remarks up-
on it. The defire of earning a guinea by
going a mile weftward, can no more com-
3 0 2
bine
476
APPENDIX.
bine with a defire to gain half a guinea
by travelling a mile fouthward, in form-
ing a judgement, that it would be eligible
to travel a mile in the diagonal fouth-weſt-
ward, than phyfical forces applied to make
a ball move with different directions, fouth
and north, could combine of themſelves
to make it move to one of theſe points.
The intelligence of the mind renders the
combination impoffible. At the fame time,
no man can fay but that he is as certain
that the porter, if there is no other appe-
tite in the caſe, will decide
upon the
pre-
ference of travelling the mile weftward for
the guinea, as that a ball impelled by e-
qual forces fouthward and weftward will
move fouth-weftward. If it is aſked,
What becomes of the effects of the appe-
tite for the half-guinea? I anfwer, That it
has had all the effects that by the immu-
table laws of the underſtanding it was fit-
ted to have. It was felt, obferved, its in-
feriority to a defire, the gratification of
which was incompatible with it perceived,
that gratification judged preferable to it
accordingly; and it then probably ceaſed
to exift, and was forgotten. It is not eve-
1
ry
APPENDIX.
477
ry train of thought that is conftantly con-
joined with volition, though volition be
conftantly conjoined with a previous train
of thought; nor is it requifite that every
train of thought that might terminate in
volition must be prevented from doing ſo
by a fpontaneous exertion of a fuppofed
felf-governing power: for, independently
of theſe judgements, which I have faid
involuntarily put a period to them, or at
leaft to our attention to them, we know
that any one of a thouſand external cir-
cumſtances may occur, and, either con-
trary or agreeable to our inclination, mo-
nopolife our attention fo completely as at
once to put an end to any of thoſe trains
of thought that formerly engaged us, and
might have terminated in action. After
turning the ſubject every way in my mind,
I cannot difcover the finalleft ufe for a
fuppofition, that a felf-governing power
was neceffary to enable the underſtanding,
poffeffed as it is of intelligence for percei-
ving the incompatability of two purſuits,
to judge the one eligible, without abfurd-
ly combining it with the other. The fuf-
ficiency of the underſtanding for this ope-
ration,
478
APPENDIX.
ration, ſeems to be the natural reſult of its
intelligence, which differences that faculty
fo infinitely from every thing that is ex-
poſed to the influence of phyfical force;
and furely it is not meant in the Effay to
prove, that intelligence cannot be fubject
to the relation of conſtant conjunction.
12. It is faid in the Effay, "That the
"action not always being proportioned to
"the motive, or correfponding to it in
point of quantity, is equally inconfiſt-
66
"6
ent with the principle of conſtant con-
junction, and with the fuppofition of
mere chance, or the want of power in
"the being who acts to allow or to pre-
vent the full effect of the motive." This
appears to me to be a miſtake. Even in
phyfics, an effect may be conftantly con-
joined with a circumftance, which is in
one fenfe its caufe, without being the mea-
fure of it. The explofion of a mine of
gunpowder cannot meaſure the quantity of
fire that kindled it. The malignity of the
fmall pox is no meaſure of the quantity or
quality of the contagious matter employed
to give the diſeaſe. The contraction of a
muſcle
APPENDIX.
479
muſcle is no meaſure of the ſtimulus ap-
plied to produce it. Human actions do
not admit of degrees that bear proportions
to the degrees of our appetites. I need
not make any remarks on the latter part of
the paffage. I think the involuntary opi-
nion of the underſtanding always has its
full effect on the will.
13. I could have wifhed that the Effay
had contained fomething more detailed
with respect to that felf-governing power
the exiſtence of which it is the object of it
to eſtabliſh. The terms option and difcre-
tion, which are attributed to this power
when acting, as is fuppofed it often does,
without motives, or in oppofition to mo-
tives, or in oppofition to fome, and in fa-
vour of others, and the character afcribed
to it, of being vanquished by appetites or
feelings of a certain intensity, leave the
reader very much at a lofs what to under-
ſtand by it, and how to difcriminate its
functions from thofe of the underſtand-
ing. One fhould be apt to think, from
fome of theſe terms, that it was a faculty
which decided according to reafon and ar-
gument;
480
APPENDIX.
gument; and from the laft circumftance,
its yielding to feelings of certain intenfity,
that combinations of theſe feelings would,
according to the doctrine of the Effay, fre-
quently, or at leaſt fometimes, lay men
under the neceffity of performing actions.
as abfurd as thofe which are fuppofed to
be the refult of the doctrine of the Neceffi-
tarians.
14. I have r
I have no occafion in theſe remarks
to concern myſelf with the fact, which
poffibly may prove to be important, and
which I think the Effay eſtabliſhes, that
the relation between caufe and effect is
different from that between motive and
action. It is fufficient for my argument,
if a relation fubfifts between what is in-
voluntary in the train of thought in the
mind and the acts of the will, as conftant
and certain as that of cauſe and effect.
15. I alſo acknowledge, that ever fince
I firſt ſtudied pneumatology, I have been
perfuaded, that we truly poffefs a notion
of power derived from the confcioufnefs
of our mental efforts; at the fame time I
muft
APPENDIX.
48I
muſt think, that theſe efforts, or the fa-
culty that makes them, are in general un-
der the direction of the underſtanding,
which again is under the neceffity of exa-
mining what is fuggefted for its confide-
ration, and of forming an opinion as to
what purfuits appear at the moment moſt
conducive to our happinefs.
16. I fhall only further obferve, that
though I may have been unfuccefsful in
pointing out any defect in the argument
in the Effay, my remaining unconvinced
by it is fome ground of fufpicion againſt
it, fince I can difcover nothing in my fi-
tuation or fentiments that ſhould lead me
to fufpect I had imbibed any invincible
prejudice against it; and if it is folid, I
fhould think, that, notwithstanding any
degree of prejudice, it ought to produce
infallibly the fame degree and facility of
conviction that refults from a theorem in
geometry. I confefs alfo, it feems to me
very clear, that if the acts of the will are
not determined by the judgements of the
understanding, but by a felf-governing
power, which may act, and, if I recollect
3 P
right,
482
APPENDIX.
4
right, is fuppofed to often act without
motives, and in oppofition to all motives,
the human race, inſtead of being moral
agents, would fometimes at leaſt be more
diforderly than any madmen; their man-
ners could be regulated with any degree
of certainty by no laws; the preſcience of
God Almighty could not trace their ac-
tions; and even his omnipotence, unleſs
he altered their nature, could do nothing
more for them than make a vaſt bedlam to
contain them. I do not affert, that theſe
confequences, even though proved to be
juſt, can impeach the validity of a demon-
ſtration; but, on the other hand, I muſt
think, that the apprehenfion of fuch con-
fequences is fufficient to justify a ſuſpi-
cion, that there lurks fome inaccuracy in
it."
Obfervations
Obfervations on the preceding Remarks.
IN
the preceding remarks, there are ma-
ny things hard to be understood; fome
things that may be underſtood ſeveral dif-
ferent ways; fome that I cannot under-
ſtand any way; very few, if any, that I
can think ſtrictly fair, or pertinent to my
mode of reaſoning; and certainly none
which I can regard as valid objections to
my argument, and fuppofed demonſtra-
tion.
It may appear, therefore, a ftrange de-
viation from what I have repeatedly men-
tioned, in the courfe of my Effay, as my
refolution with refpect to any fuch objec-
tions that may be made to it, to pay any
regard or give any anſwer to them.
My reafons for this deviation are,
Firſt, That I think myfelf under fuch
peculiar obligations to the author of the
3 P 2
remarks,
484
APPENDIX.
remarks, for the trouble he has taken in
revifing my Effay, and for his permiffion
to publifh his remarks, that I confider it
as my indifpenfable duty to pay every pof-
fible attention and regard to them. And
as I cannot fay with truth, that I think
them juft or valid, I have no other way to
fhew my fenfe of them, but by giving
thoſe anſwers to them which I think they
fairly and eafily admit of.
Secondly, I know that though they ap-
pear to me of no weight, yet they have
appeared juſt and important, not only to
the author of them, but to two other per-
fons, of whole talents, and of whofe
knowledge in various branches of fci-
ence, efpecially in Mathematics and in
Phyfics, I have the highest opinion: it is
poffible that the remarks may appear e-
qually valid to other people, and that an-
fwers to them may therefore be necef-
fary.
Thirdly, As they are almoft all of a
particular kind, confifting chiefly of vague,
obfcure, metaphorical, and ambiguous ex-
preffions;
APPENDIX.
485
preffions; as there are in fome of them
very needlefs and unwarrantable innova-
tions or perverfions of common language,
which tend obviously to perplex our rea-
fonings, but can in no degree alter or af-
fect the nature of the things and relations
about which we reafon; and as there
feems to be in all of them a peculiar ftu-
dy to avoid thofe ftrict reafonings by ne-
cellary conſequences, which alone I have
employed, and that complete decifion of
all queſtions of fact, which I have recom-
mended, by open unequivocal experiment,
without any appeal to confcioufnefs, or
to preconceived opinions and common
prejudices; I think they afford me a good
opportunity of fhewing what kind of an-
fwers may be given, and ougat to be gi-
ven, to ſuch objections.
It will be obſerved by every attentive
reader, that the paragraphs only, not the
remarks or objections contained in them,
have been numbered by the author of the
remarks; that feveral different remarks
may be found in one number or para-
graph; and that the fame kind of objec-
tion
486
APPENDIX.
}
tion pervades ſeveral different paragraphs.
To this inaccuracy of arrangement in fta-
ting the remarks and objections to my ar-
gument, the arrangement of my obferva-
tions on them, and of my anſwers to them,
muſt in ſome meaſure correfpond.
N° I.
AFTER what I have ſtated fo ftrongly,
and illuſtrated ſo fully, in my Eſſay, con-
cerning the ambiguity of the term Caufe,
as having, both in common language, and
in the writing of philofophers, various
meanings, fome of them more general and
comprehenfive, others of them more par-
ticular and limited, I could not have ex-
pected that any perſon would have given,
with a view to ftrict reafoning, fuch a
vague account of the doctrine of the Ne-
ceffitarians as is given in the paragraph
N° 1.
That paragraph contains nothing pecu-
liar to the doctrine of Neceffity, nor any
thing but what mankind in general, and
the
APPENDIX.
487
the affertors of the liberty of human ac-
tions in particular, myſelf included, will
moſt readily admit.
As a mere account of the doctrine of
Neceffity, it is wonderfully imperfect: for,
according to that doctrine, not only there
are Cauſes for all human actions, which
Cauſes are to be found in the nature of
the mind, and in the fentiments, &c.
which arife in it; but, moreover, the re-
lation between the voluntary actions of
men and the Cauſes of them, is either pre-
ciſely, or very nearly, the fame with that
between the changes which occur in life-
lefs bodies and the caufes of theſe chan-
ges; and, in particular, the relation be-
tween thoſe ſentiments, &c. commonly
called Motives, and the voluntary actions
of men, is fuch as to exclude the poflibi-
lity of any felf-governing power in men
with respect to their own actions, juſt as
much as any felf-governing power in life-
leſs bodies, with reſpect to the changes of
which they are fufceptible, is made im-
poffible by their nature, and by the irre-
fiftible influence of the causes of the chan-
ges
488
APPENDIX.
!
і
ges which occur in them. Mr HUME and
Dr PRIESTLY, and I believe all the moſt
recent affertors of the doctrine of Necef-
fity, have even fpecified the peculiar cir-
cumſtance or relation of conftant conjunction
as fubfifting equally between motive and
action, and between phyfical caufe and
effect, and equally and abfolutely exclu-
ding the poffibility of liberty or felf-go-
verning power in living men and in life-
lefs bodies.--Such was the doctrine of
Neceffity, either on the fuppofition of the
conftant conjunction, or on that of the
occafional and feparable conjunction of
motive and action, (one or other of which
fuppofitions must be true), and by no
means the vague doctrine expreffed in
N° 1. (which may be either true or falfe,
according to the meaning given to the
term Cauje), that I undertook to examine,
and to refute by an argument ad abfur-
dum.
N° 1. confidered as an introduction to
a ſeries of remarks on my Effay, and of
objections to it, and of arguments in fa-
vour of the doctrine of Neceffity, is won-
derfully
APPENDIX.
489
derfully uncandid: for it implies, that the
affertors of the liberty of human actions,
and that I in particular, have either de-
nied that our actions depend, as other e-
vents do, on caufes; or at leaſt that we
have afferted, that the caufes on which
they depend are not to be found in the na-
ture of the mind, and in thofe fentiments,
&c. which arife in it. Now, the truth is,
that we all admit and maintain, that the
voluntary actions of men, as much as the
ebbing and flowing of the fea, depend on
cauſes, that is, on principles of change; and
that theſe caufes are to be found in the
nature of the mind or living perfon, and in
the fentiments, &c. that arife in the mind;
which fentiments, as bearing relation to
voluntary actions, are called Motives. The
very plan and object of my Effay has been
to fhew, by accurate obfervation and ſtrict
reafoning, that our voluntary actions do
not depend entirely on fuch fentiments or
motives, as the tides do on their phyfical
cauſes; but that they depend, partly on
fuch fentiments, partly on fomething elſe in
the nature of the mind itſelf, the nature
of which fomething else in the mind I have
3 &
ſpecified;
490
APPENDIX.
fpecified; and have fhewn, that nothing
analogous to it appears to belong to life-
lefs bodies, or to have any fhare in рго-
ducing thofe changes which occur in them,
conftantly and irrefiftibly, on the applica-
tion of the phyfical caufes of fuch changes.
Before 1 difmifs N° 1. I muft obferve,
that there is a great impropriety in the
expreffion, "human actions, or the acts
of the will which prompt them." Thefe
metaphorical and ambiguous expreffions
ought carefully to be avoided in all rea-
fonings concerning the human mind:
they perplex and darken the plaineſt and
cleareft thoughts; they encreaſe the diffi-
culty of a work difficult at any rate; and
have on many occafions fruftrated the re-
fearches of the moft acute and enlightened
philofophers.
In the prefent inflance, human actions
are reprefented as different from the acts
of the will: the latter are reprefented as
acting on the former, prompting them; this
implies the feparate exiftence of thofe ac-
tions and acts, and a kind of agency of the
acts
APPENDIX.
491
acts upon the actions. This, again, im-
plies a kind of life in thoſe acts. The will,
too, ſeems to be confidered as a Being fe-
parate from the man, and capable of ha-
ving acts of its own; that is, as capable of
acting.
I am fure none of theſe extravagancies
were intended by the author of the re-
mark: but his words, taken literally, con-
vey them all; and there is no occafion to
ufe fuch words. Let it always be re-
membered, that in thefe difcuffions we
have only one being, one agent, to con-
fider; that is, the mind, or living per-
fon. Such terms as Will, Judgement, Me-
mory, Imagination, Senfation, are very
ambiguous, and of very dangerous ufe.
They never exprefs feparate Beings ca-
pable of acting, or having acts of their
own. They exprefs our notions of certain
faculties of the mind, or its powers of act-
ing in certain ways; and confequently,
by an cafy tranſition, and almoft inevitable
and imperceptible metaphor, they denote
the feveral claffes of acts of the mind that
are referred to thofe heads or faculties re-
3 Q 2
fpectively.
492
APPENDIX.
ſpectively. Often, by a further metaphor,
they are employed to denote fingle inftan-
ces of acts, or exertions of faculties: As
for example, will for willing, or volition;
judgement for an act of judging, &c.
An act of the will can mean nothing
but an act of willing, or the voluntary act
of a perfon. Such an act may be very
complicated all overt acts certainly are
fo, depending on the conformation and
condition of our bodily organs:
it is
highly probable, that all acts of the mind
are (for the fame reafon) more or lefs com-
plicated. The willing is a circumftance.
and part of many complicated acts, both
overt and fecret, and may no doubt take
place without the reſt of ſuch acts; as in
the inſtance of a palfied perfon, willing to
move his hand, willing to ſpeak, willing
to remember, but unable to do any of
them. To ſpeak of an act of the will
prompting an action, is either a violent me-
taphor, like faying that the wifdom of So-
lomon ſuggeſted to him his famous judge-
inent between the two mothers, or that
the eloquence of Cicero dictated to him his
orations,
APPENDIX.
493
erations, or that the philofophical genius
and mathematical knowledge of Newton
fhewed him the compofition of light and
the general gravitation of matter; or elſe
it is an hypothefis too extravagant and ab-
furd to deferve a moment's confideration.
--The application of what is here faid
will appear in the obfervations to be made
on fome of the other remarks.
N 2.
THIS paragraph is wonderfully obfcure.
It is, I prefume, needlefs to inquire mi-
nutely, how many, or what ſtrange things,
may be meant by the odd phrafe, the phy-
fical conftitution of the mind on which its ex-
iftence, &c. depend, as the author himſelf
acknowledges, we have no faculties for ex-
amining it.
The phrafe proper phyfical caufe, as ufed
by him to denote fomething fuppofed to be
contained in the phyfical conflitution of the
mind, requires more particular confidera-
tion.
494
APPENDIX.
tion. The term Caufe, in its moft exten-
five fignification, means any principle of
change; of which there are many differ-
ent kinds. Phyfical is a Greek word, of
the fame meaning with natural. Phyfical
cauſe, therefore, may be fuppofed to mean
any natural principle of change. Now, we
are not inquiring after any principles of
change, but fuch as are perfectly natu-
ral: For example, an agent, fuch as a li-
ving perfon, according to the common
notions of mankind, is as truly and na-
turally a principle of change with re-
ſpect to his own voluntary actions, as
impulfe is with reſpect to motion, or heat
with reſpect to fufion; or as motives are
with refpect to actions, or evidence with
reſpect to belief. But thefe are four dif-
ferent kinds of caufes, and of relations
of event. In this fenfe of the term Phy-
fical caufe, to fay, that the phyfical confti-
tution of the mind contains it, is as great an
impropriety, as it would be to fay, that
the phyfical conftitution of a man con-
tained the father of his children, and
that the phyſical conftitution of a wo-
man contained the mother of hers. The
mind,
APPENDIX.
495
I
mind, or living perfon, does not contain,
but is, that kind of caufe; juſt as a man
and his wife do not contain, but are, the
father and mother of their children.
always avoid ufing the term Cauſe in that
fenſe; becauſe, though fanctioned by
fome philofophers, it is repugnant to
common ufe; juft as it would be to fay,
that parents were the cauſes of their chil-
dren. In common language, we fay,
that men fpeak, and walk, and eat, and
drink, and are fully as well underſtood
as if we were to fay, that they were, or
that they, or that their phyſical conſtitu-
tions, contained the proper phyſical caufes
of ſpeaking and walking, of eating and
drinking.
If by proper phyfical cauſe he means
that kind of caufe which impulſe is to
motion, heat to fufion, &c. which ex-
cludes the poflibility of any felf-governing
power in the fubject, whether living per-
fon or litelets body, he ought, in the firſt
place, to have explained very fully, why he
affumed as a felt-evident principle a doc-
trine
496
APPENDIX.
1
trine ſo ſtrange, and fo repugnant to com-
mon opinion, as that it is contained in the
phyfical conftitution of the mind, or in the
nature of every fubftance in which a change
takes place.
We regard the ftroke of a billiard-club
on a ball, as the phyfical cauſe of the
ball's confequent change from reft to mo-
tion; and we regard the explofion of gun-
powder in a loaded cannon, (which ex-
ploſion is only a peculiar modification of
impulſe), as the phyfical cauſe of the change
of ſtate in the ball from reft to motion. But
we do not regard the ftroke of a wooden
club, or the explofion of gunpowder, as
contained in the phyfical conftitution of
the billiard, or of the cannon ball, refpec-
tively.
In like manner, we confider the fun and
moon as the phyſical caufes of the tides ;
but by no means as contained in the phy-
fical conſtitution of the fea: on the con-
trary, we believe the moon to be two hun-
dred and forty thousand miles, and the
fun
APPENDIX.
497
fun to be at leaft an hundred millions of
miles, diſtant from the fea. We regard a
certain degree of heat as the phyſical cauſe
of the melting of ice, and a certain great-
er heat as the phyfical cauſe of the boiling
of water; but by no means as contained
in the phyfical conftitution of ice or of
water. We regard heat and light, and
air and moiſture, not as the full phyfical
cauíes, but as partial and acceffory cauſes,
of the growth of plants; yet not as con-
tained in the phyſical conſtitution of them.
We regard, however, the vital principle
of a plant, the concurrence of which with
the other caufes already mentioned is ne-
ceffary for its growth, as contained in, or
making a part of, the phyfical conftitu-
tion of it. So, in the human body, we
regard contagion as the caufe of the pro-
duction, mercury as that of the cure, of a
very common difeafe; but we do not re-
gard either the contagion or the remedy
as contained in the phyfical conftitution
of our bodies; any more than a dofe of
arſenic, or a ſtab with a dagger, which
may be the caufes (immediate or remote)
of diſeaſes and of death. But we confider
3 R
the
498
APPENDIX.
*
the vital principle, without which there
could neither be the venereal difeafe from
contagion, nor the cure of it from mercury,
as a part of the conſtitution of the body.
Even many of our moſt common men-
tal operations or changes manifeftly de-
pend in a great meaſure on caufes (prin-
ciples of change) that cannot without ab-
furdity be faid to be contained in the phy-
fical conftitution of the mind. Thus, be-
lief depends on evidence, fo perfectly as
to exclude the poffibility of any felf-go-
verning power with refpect to it. Yet
though the belief of twelve fenfible jury-
men, or of a great popular affembly, will
depend completely on the teftimony of two
or three good witneffes, it would be ab-
furd to fay, that their teftimony was con-
tained in the phyſical conftitution of the
minds of thoſe who heard and who belie-
ved it. And in fenfation, though much
no doubt depends on the phyfical confti-
tution of the bodily organs, and much on
the ftate of the mind, it is plain, that
much depends on external cauſes, ſuch as
the impulfe of light on the retina, the vi-
brations
APPENDIX.
499
brations of the air conveyed to the organ
of hearing, the volatile odorous particles
applied to the noftrils, &c. which cer-
tainly are not contained in the phyfical
conſtitution, either of the human body or
of the human mind.-- -Suppofing, laftly,
as the moſt intelligible and favourable
conftruction that can be given to the
phrafe in queftion, that the author of the
remark meant no more by it than to fay,
that he could not conceive any change to
take place in mind or body without a phy-
fical caufe for fuch change; we muſt firſt
inquire what he means by the term con-
ceive, and it will immediately appear
what regard is due, and what anfwer
fhould be given, to the remark. If he has
uſed that word in its moſt ſtrict and pro-
per fignification, as fynonymous with un-
derstanding, apprehending, or having a no-
tion of; which I fhould prefume were his
meaning by it, if he fhould fay, that he
could not conceive the joys of heaven, or
that a man who never faw could not con-
ceive the difference between red and blue;
and if he has attended to his own thoughts
with fufficient candour and patience;
3 R 2
there
>
500
APPENDIX.
there muſt be a very great peculiarity and
a fundamental defect in his faculties: for
ordinary men conceive eafily what he can-
not conceive at all; and they believe that
there are many different relations of event,
and feveral other kinds of caufes, befides
phyfical caufes ftrictly fo called, and ma-
ny events that do not depend on phyfical
but on other caufes. Such a defect in
his faculties must completely diſqualify
him from judging of this fubject, or un-
derſtanding what other men underſtand
about it. And it would have been pru-
dent for him not to have meddled with
it. If he has ufed the term conceive as fy-
nonymous with believe, as is very com-
monly done, then the very myſterious
fentence, the firft of N° 2. is little lefs
than a begging of the queſtion. It is at
leaſt a plain declaration, that his opinion
with respect to it is fixed beyond the reach
of argument, or evidence of any kind.
kind. If
he really cannot believe or conceive what
is to be proved, he must let it alone,
and leave it to the confideration of or-
dinary men, who can conceive all com-
mon notions; that is, who underſtand,
or
APPENDIX.
501
or at leaſt who can learn, common lan-
guage; and who not only can, but muft
believe according to evidence. My Effay
is addreffed to fuch perfons only as can.
conceive or apprehend all thoſe things or
notions about which I reafon; and who
will believe That to be true, the direct con-
trary of which is proved to be falfe, as
implying, by neceffary confequences,
fome things which are evidently abfurd,
and others which are experimentally
falfe.
As to the third fentence of N° 2. I muſt
obferve, that volition and act of the will
(which in it ſeem to be diſtinguiſhed) are
perfectly fynonymous terms; and that the
perceptible operations of the mind, or the pro-
ceffes of thought which attend on (I preſume
the author means rather which precede)
volition, (or act of the will), may be confi-
dered as exciting cauſes of ſuch act of the
will or volition, or not, juft according to
the fenfe in which he employs the phrafe
exciting caufe, that is, according to the no-
tion or relation which he means to exprefs
by it.
Some
{
502
APPENDI X.
Some thoughts which precede or at-
tend our voluntary actions, fuch as ap-
petites, paffions, defires, and fome judge-
ments, or, in general, what are called
Motives, are univerfally acknowledged as
a kind of principles of action, that is, of
change; and as they are only partial and
acceffory, not the fole caufes of the ac-
tions referred to them, they may be called
exciting causes of thofe actions, by an ex-
tenfion of the meaning of the phrafe ex-
citing caufe. But fuch an innovation in
language is, in the first place, needlefs,
becauſe the familiar terms motive and final
cauſe expreſs the fame meaning, or the no-
tion of the fame relation, perfectly well.
It is, in the ſecond place, improper, be-
cauſe the phrafe exciting caufe has a very
different meaning, both as employed in
medical language, and as I have uſed it in
this Effay. To employ the fame phrafe to
denote different meanings, is the fureft
way to fruftrate our reafonings, by ma-
king us confound in our thoughts the dif
ferent things about which we reafon.
Other thoughts, fuch as fenfation, per-
ception,
APPENDIX.
503
ception, apprehenfion, memory, fome
judgements, nay fome paffions, (for ex-
ample grief), which precede or attend
many of our voluntary ations, have ne-
ver been confidered as caufes of fuch ac-
tions, any more than the morning dawn
is confidered as the caufe of the rifing of
the fun; nor ought they to be regarded
as any kind of caufes of our actions.
And ſome proceffes of thought, even vio-
lent appetites, paffions, and defires, are
often fo far from being caules of many
voluntary actions which they precede or
attend, that fuch actions are commonly
and juſtly thought to be done in fpite of
them; that is, in oppofition to them.
Thus, when a rake takes phyfic, which
he loaths, for his ills, and marries a rich
old woman, whom he abhors, to repair
his fhattered fortunes, we conceive, that
his loathing of the phyfic, and his abhor-
rence of the wife, though they precede
and attend the volitions and actions of
fwallowing the drugs, and marrying the
wife, are not the motives of them.
motives for theſe two actions refpectively
The
are
504
APPENDIX.
are conceived to be the defire of recover-
ing health, and the defire of acquiring
wealth. But the loathing and the abhor-
ring are by no means fentiments indiffer-
ent or unrelated to the actions in queftion,
as numberleſs other proceffes of thought
preceding or attending them might be;
fuch as the perfon's fentiments in religion
or in politics; for example, his being
High or Low Church, Whig or Tory.
They are motives for not acting in the
way ſuppoſed; but they are motives fepa-
rated from their proper actions.
The author of the remark under confi-
deration may, at his own difcretion, ap-
ply the phraſe exciting cause, with refpect
to the volitions of fwallowing and of mar-
rying, in the cafes put, either to all the
proceffes of thought that are fpecified,
Whig and Tory, loathing and abhorring,
defire of health and defire of wealth, as
they all attend or precede the actions, or
only to theſe two laft. It would be fooliſh
to diſpute with him about a word; but it
muſt be remembered, that all thote three
kinds of fentiments ftand in relations to
the
APPENDIX.
505
the actions alluded to, very different from
one another, and very different from the
relation of occafional caufes to difeafes,
or from that of the partial and acceffory
caufes of vegetation to the growth of
plants. And all thefe differences of rela-
tion muſt be aſcertained, not by arbitrary
definitions, nor by the arbitrary impofi-
tion of names, but by careful obfervation
and experiment, and ſtrict induction from
thefe; and for the fake of precision and
diftin&tnefs in reafoning, they ought to be
expreffed by different words or phrafes.
As to the two laft fentences of N° 2. I
muft obferve, that there feems to be in
them a ftudied peculiarity, and intended
obfcurity, in the way of ftating and con-
trafting the two fuppofitions. Many cir-
cumſtances contribute to this obfcurity,
Neither the term Motive, nor any equiva-
lent word or phrafe, is employed in fta-
ting the queſtion. This omiffion cannot
have been by chance; and it is a very
ftrange omiffion, to fay no worfe of it, in
ſtating objections to an argument about
the relation of motive and action; which
argument
3 S
506
APPENDIX.
argument confifts of neceffary confequen-
ces from two different fuppofitions with
refpect to that relation. It fhews a ſtrong
defire to evade that argument, and to a-
void examining, and either refuting òr
admitting, thofe neceffary confequences.
The expreffions, proceffes, or trains of
thought, are by far too general and vague;
nor can I know with certainty what is
meant by them; and I think it probable
that they are intended to denote many
things, or kinds of thoughts, which may
precede or attend voluntary actions, with-
out being the motives of them. Now,
with fuch thoughts I have nothing to do
in this argument,
The word contingent occurs repeatedly in
thoſe two ſentences; and much ftrefs feems
to be laid on the notion expreffed by it.
It ought therefore to have been accurately
explained; for it may be underſtood in
different meanings. If by contingent be
meant coming to pass without a cause of any
kind, fuch a notion is here quite out of
the queftion: neither I nor any perfon
that I know of can believe that ever to be
the
APPENDIX.
507
the cafe. But if by contingent be meant
coming to pass without a phyfical caufe, (in
the fenfe fully and repeatedly explained
and illuſtrated already), we hold, that
there are numberlefs contingent events,
in the familiar occurrences in animal and
vegetable life, and in all proceffes of
thought, or operations of mind. In par-
ticular, we hold, that all our voluntary
actions, whether fecret, like chufing and
refolving, or overt, like walking and eat-
ing, are, in this ſenſe of the term, con-
tingent. We know of nothing that ſtands
in the relation of phyfical caufe to them.
We know of no other caufes or princi-
ples of change for them, but the perfons
or agents, and the motives: it is, I think,
felf-evident, that neither the agents nor
the motives are the phyfical cauſes of the
actions referred to them; nor has it ever
been faid that the agents were fo; but it
has been maintained that the motives
were fo, on the principle of their being
conſtantly conjoined with their reſpective
actions; which phyfical caufes feem to be
with their refpective effects. Now, this
can be aſcertained only by examining the
relation
3 S 2
508
APPENDIX.
relation of motive, and comparing it with
that of phyſical caufe. But the author of
the remark thinks fit to drop the confide-
ration of motive, and its relation to ac-
tion, and to treat of things which may be
very different, and which must be fuppo-
fed fomehow different, as he gives them
other names.
"However conftantly conjoined the acts
of the will be with their proper phyſical
caufe."-I cannot guefs, nor have I as yet.
been lucky enough to meet with any per-
fon who can guefs, what is here meant
by proper phyſical caufe. The very que-
ftion at iffue is, "Is the motive of an ac-
tion its phyfical caufe;" which involves
the more general queſtion, "Are there
phyfical caufes of voluntary actions?"
Both theſe queſtions muſt be anſwered in
the negative, after ftrictly examining and
comparing voluntary actions with phyfi-
cal effects, and the relation of motive with
that of phyfical caufe, eſpecially with re-
fpect to the point of conſtant conjunc-
tion.
The
APPENDIX.
509
The word however comes forward here
in a very queſtionable ſhape. Does the au-
thor of the remark mean to ſtate the prin-
ciple of conftant conjunction, as an effential
part of the firſt or of the fecond fuppofition,
or to omit it in both, or to avoid doing ei-
ther the one or the other, and fo to evade
the decifion of the queſtion, by eſcaping
from both the horns of the dilemma ?
This laft is abfolutely inadmiffible. In
ſtrict and candid reaſoning, a perſon muſt
take his choice of one or other of the two
fuppofitions offered in fuch a dilemma; juſt
as in geometry he must admit, that the line
A is either equal to the line B, or not equal
to it; and if it be not equal to it, that it
muſt be either greater or leſs than it. From
what follows, however, there can be no
doubt, that this unphilofophical and im-
practicable efcape from the dilemma wast
intended." If that phyfical caufe is only
attended with its effect when stimulated by
Something contingent." Phyfical caufe fhall
be allowed to fignify any thing that the
author pleaſes; and the ſtrong metaphor,
Stimulated by, (which, taken literally, im-
plies a kind of lite and agency, both in
the
510
APPENDIX.
the caufe ftimulated, and in the fomething
ftimulating it), fhall be understood to
mean only the occafional co-exiſtence and
co-operation (whatever be the mode of it)
of fomething elfe. Then it is plain, that
according to the ftate of the cafe given by
the author of the remark, in the firft fup-
pofition, what he calls the phyfical caufe
of the act of the will, is reprefented both
as conftantly conjoined, and at the fame time
as not conftantly conjoined with its proper
act; conjoined with it only when flimu-
lated, not conjoined with it when not fti-
mulated, by fomething contingent. No-
thing but the obfcurity of the expreffions
which he hath employed, and his ftu-
dioufly avoiding thofe plain and precife
terms which I have ufed, could have pre-
vented him from feeing that he has here
fallen into fomething rather worfe than a
contradiction in terms; an incongruity of
thought, of the fame kind with that which
in common language is called a Bull. What
fhould we think of a mathematician who
fhould fay, that the fquare of the longeſt
fide of a triangle is conftantly equal to the
fum of the fquares of the other two fides
but that, however conftant this
relation
of it;
APPENDIX.
SII
Level
N
relation might be, it took place only in
the contingent cafe of the triangle being
right angled?
Or what fhould we fay of a chemiſt who
fhould maintain, that water was the men-
ftruum, or proper phyfical caufe of the fo-
lution of filver and of mercury; and that
it was conftantly conjoined with that ef
fect on thoſe bodies when put into it;
but that this phyfical cauſe, borcever con-
ftantly conjoined with its effect, was at-
tended with its effect only when ftimula-
ted by a certain quantity of nitrous acid,
and a certain degree of heat?
Or what fhould we think of a phyfician
who fhould affert, that a few grains of
cryſtals of tartar are the proper phyfical
caufe of fevere vomiting, and are con-
ftantly followed by it; but that, however-
conftant this may be, it happens only when
the cryſtals of tartar are flimulated by a
certain quantity of antimony?
Whatever be thought of the chemift,
the phyſician, and the mathematician, in
thefe
512
APPENDIX.
theſe fuppofed cafes, must be thought of
the metaphyſician who conceives, that the
acts of the will are conftantly conjoined
with their proper phyſical caute; but that,
however conftantly they are conjoined with
it, this phyfical caufe is only attended with
its effect when ftimulated by fomething
contingent.
me.
I have conſidered this point the more
minutely, becauſe the incongruity of
thought which every attentive reader muſt
find fo glaring, feems to be imputed to
The expreffion conveying it appears
in the ftating of my fide of the queſtion;
but I difclaim it. It will appear clearly,
both from the explanation, and from the
uniform uſe and application of the terms
conjunction, feparation, conftant, occafional,
&c. as applied to motives and actions,
cauſes and effects, and from the many in-
ſtances given of their conjunction and of
their feparation, in my Effay, that I could
not have fallen into fuch an incongruity of
thought as that under confideration.
As my own way of ftating my own fide
of
APPENDIX.
513
of the argument, or thofe propofitions
which I mean to prove, is at leaſt clear
and precife, and peculiarly adapted to the
mode of reaſoning which I employ, it was
needlefs to give, in the remarks, my fenti-
ments in any other words but my own.
But if other words, without neceffity, were
to be employed inftead of my own, they
ought to have been fuch as to do juftice to
my argument, by expreffing my meaning
with equal clearnefs and preciſion, and
without addition, diminution, or altera-
tion. As the cafe ftands, I may fay of
my friend's way of reprefenting my mean-
ing, nearly what MARTIAL fays of a per-
fon's way of reading or repeating his
verſes :
Quem recitas, meus eft, O Fidentine, li-
bellus :
Sed male cum recitas, incipit effe tuus.
3 T
N° 3,
514
APPENDIX.
N° 3.
As there feems to be almoſt always (per-
haps even in fleep) fome fucceffion or train
of thoughts going on, over which a per-
fon has but a partial and limited volun-
tary power; and as a metaphyfician may-
chufe to call any volition that occurs in
fuch a train the refult of the thoughts
which preceded it, whether any of them
ftood in the relation of motive to it or
not; and as fuch trains of thought can-
not be made the fubject of open obfer-
vation and experiment, but may eaſily
be made the fubject of endlefs cavil and
verbal altercation, I muft difregard alike,
as no way related to my mode of rea-
foning, the first fentence of this, and the
laft of the preceding paragraph. But the
claufe,
"As
As far as it is necessary to trace
back the fteps of them," deferves fome at-
tention. It is not neceflary to trace the
ſteps of them at all, if the object be on-
ly to aſcertain the relation of motive
and action with refpect to their conftant
or their occafional and feparable con-
junction for this will appear by obſer-
ving,
APPENDIX.
515
ving, whether actions are always done, or
only fometimes, on the application of
their reſpective motives; which is a mat-
ter of fimple obfervation and experiment,
and, as has already been fully explained,
may be eaſily known without any regard
to the number or to the nature of the ſteps
of the train of thought intervening be-
tween the motive and the overt act.
If the object be to aſcertain that rela-
tion metaphyfically, (if I may be allowed
the expreffion), by mere confcioufnefs and
attention to our own thoughts, which I
think a very bad plan, becauſe it is very
difficult, and fubject to endleſs cavil; then
it is neceffary to trace every step of the
train of thought back as far as the motive,
and forward as far as the action, elfe the
relation between thefe, as to the conftancy
or feparability of their conjunction, can
never be difcovered.
But if the object be only to evade the
decifion of the queftion concerning the re-
lation of motive and action by neceffary
confequences and open experiment; then,
3 T2
to
516
APPENDIX.
to be fure, it is neceffary to avoid tracing
the ſteps of the train of thought, either
back to the motive, or forward to the ac-
tion and it is expedient to ſpeak of it
in the moſt ambiguous and indefinite
terms; and to put it, and to leave it, as
much in the dark, and as much out of the
reach of experiment, as poffible.
66
The doctrine of the Neceffitarians is
SUPPOSED to be." Why ſuppoſed? Have
I miſrepreſented it any way, either from
miſtake and ignorance, or from defign?
Have I not given it in the very words of
MR HUME ? Have not his doctrine and
his phrafeology been adopted by DR
PRIESTLY? Is not my mode of reaſon-
ing perfectly independent of them, and of
their phrafeology, and of their doctrine?
Is not the propofition which I undertake
to demonstrate ftated clearly and precife-
y? and is it not directly contrary to the
doârine of Neceffity? If my dilemma be
complete, my notion of conftant conjunc-
tion precife, my axioms arifing from it
* Pag. 171.
just;
APPENDIX.
517
juft; and if my inferences with reſpect to
the reſult in the various cafes put be ſtrict-
ly neceffary confequences of the principle
affumed, (the direct contrary of what I
mean to demonftrate); and if theſe in-
ferences be falſe or abfurd; is not my de-
monſtration perfect? and would it not be
fo, though neither MR HUME, nor DR
PRIESTLY, nor any other philofopher,
had ever ſtated or taught any doctrine of
Neceffity, nay, though my opinion had
been quite new to mankind, and the con-
trary opinion as natural and as univerfal
among them, as the belief of the flatneſs
and ſtability of the earth, and of the daily
motion of the fun and ftars around it?
If fo, I can have no occafion to confider
any one of the numberlefs opinions or fy-
ftems that may be called doctrines of Ne-
ceflity. For they muft either involve, or
not involve, the propofition contradictory
to mine in page 171: if they do involve
it, they are refuted by my argument, un-
lefs fome error in it can be pointed out:
if they do not involve the propofition con-
tradictory to mine, requiefcant in pace: I
do not wiſh to diſturb them, nor to quar-
rel
-F
518
APPENDIX.
rel with them about their names, and it
is plain that my argument can never reach
them.
"That every apprehenfion and de-
fire of attainable good, or, in the language
of the Effay, every motive."-If the appre-
henfion and defire of attainable good, or, more
concifely, defire, (tor defire implies appre-
henfion, and the notion of good in the
obje& defired), had been given as fyno-
nymous with motive, or explanatory of it,
or as a definition of it, I fhould have ac-
quiefced in it as a fair, though, for rea-
fons formerly mentioned, a very needlefs
definition of motive, and one that, for rea-
fons abundantly obvious, might be fubject
to many cavils.
But here I find infinuated a diftinction,
and perhaps an important difference, be-
tween motive and defire of attainable good.
Why, in the language of the Effay? This
is an infinuation that the language of the
Effay, at leaſt in fo far as relates to the
ufe of the term Motive, is different from
common
APPENDIX.
519
}
common and from philofophical language.
If it be fo, it is very bad indeed; nay
more, the Effay itfelf, inftead of being, as
the author intended, a fpecimen of pa-
tient candid difquifition, and good rea-
foning, amounting to a rigorous demon-
ftration of the point in queftion, muſt be
one of the vileft quibbles that ever was
obtruded on the world, either with re-
fpect to this or to any other fubject; and
the author of it must have defervedly for-
feited all credit, both in point of under-
ftanding and of candour.
An objection to the Effay fo important
ought to have been expreffed fully and
clearly, not conveyed by a feemingly ca-
fual hint or infinuation; and a cenfure on
the author of it, at once fo fevere and fo
groundlefs, ought not to have been ex-
preffed or conveyed in any way.
That I have not miftaken the meaning
of the hint in queftion, nor done any in-
juftice to the author of the remark in theſe
obfervations on it, will appear from com-
paring this hint, and the expreffion juch
motives,
520
APPENDIX.
motives, in the end of N° 3. with the ge-
neral tenor of the fubfequent remarks,
and particularly with the two laft fenten-
ces of N° 5. In the former of theſe, it is
faid to be "a miſtake to have fuppofed,
that, according to the Neceffitarians, eve-
ry apprehenfion and defire of attainable
good had a determinate influence on the
will." Let it be remembered, that I rea-
fon about the conftancy or inconftancy
of the conjunction of motive and volun-
tary actions, not about the influence of de-
fires on the will; and that it is abfolutely
impoffible that I fhould have fallen into
any miſtake with respect to a point on
which I had neither expreffed nor formed
any opinion. Such defires either are or
are not motives: if they are, I am perfect-
ly right as to the doctrine of the Neceffi-
tarians; if they are not, I at leaſt am not
miſtaken with reſpect to it, as I have ne-
ver ſaid nor thought, that, according to
their doctrine, any things elfe but mo-
tives were conftantly conjoined with ac-
tions. In the latter of thofe fentences,
(N° 5.), it is faid, that "no Neceffitarian re-
quires any argument to be convinced, that
there
APPENDIX.
521
there is no conſtant conjunction between
them (defires of attainable good) and hu-
man actions."
Here there is an explicit acknowledge-
ment, that fuch defires are not conſtantly
conjoined with actions; and tho' nothing
is faid with reſpect to the conftant conjunc-
tion of motive and action, about which I
reafon; yet it is certainly implied, that
they are conſtantly conjoined; and there-
fore that a motive is fomething different
from a defire of attainable good.
In the remarks, as they are printed,
there is no diftinct enunciation of what
the author of them means by motives;
nor, confequently, is it clear what kind
and degree of perverfion of language he
means to impute to me with reſpect to the
ufe which I make of that term. But in
the remarks, as I firſt received them from
the author of them, this was fully ex-
plained by a few fentences, which made
the latter part of Nº 14.; the ſubſtance of
which was,
"That by the term Motive,
in the language of the Neceffitarians, he
3 U
under-
522
APPENDIX.
underſtood only thoſe gratifications which
have obtained a judgement afcertaining
their fuperior merits, upon the whole, to
others in competition with them.-That
this import of the term ſeemed agreeable to
Dr Johnſon's interpretation of it, "That
which determines the choice,"-" That
which incites to action." As he obfer-
ved, however, that in the Effay it ſeemed
employed to denote any apprehenfion and
defire of attainable good, whether its fu-
periority to others, in competition with it,
had been ascertained or not, he avoided
making uſe of it in his remarks."
Allowing the ſtrongly metaphorical ex-
preffions in theſe fentences to paſs without
difcuffion, let us confider only the general
import of this remark, as fhewn by the
application of it to particular inftances.
It amounts plainly to this, That thoſe de-
fires, &c. alone, are motives, according to
which a perſon thinks fit, judges proper,
determines, refolves, or chufes to act; or
according to which he does act, when not
hindered by phyfical impediments: For
example, that in the cafe put, p. 226. the
porter's
APPEND I X.
523
porter's defire to earn a certain number of
guineas is a motive; but that his defire
of earning an equal number of half-
guineas is no motive. In like manner,
when a gay rake marries a difagreeable
rich old woman, his defire to get pof-
feffion of her fortune is a motive; but
his diſlike to her perfon is no motive.
And when a ſturdy rogue endures the
torture, rather than confeſs, and be hang-
ed, his diflike to hanging is a motive, his
abhorrence of pain is none: but when a
rogue of a feebler frame yields to the tor-
ture, or to the fear of it, and confeffes,
though he knows he muſt be hanged if he
does fo, his abhorrence or his fear of
pain is a motive, his averfion to hanging
is none. And when a mifer delivers his
purfe to a highwayman who civilly puts
a piſtol to his breaſt, he has a motive for
giving away his money, but none for
keeping it.
It will appear from the whole tenor of
my reaſoning, as well as from feveral par-
ticular obfervations in my Effay, for ex-
ample in p. 133. and 461. to 464. that
3 U 2
I
524
APPENDIX.
I was not unprepared for this kind of ob-
jection; that it was eafy for me to an-
fwer it; and impoffible for me to think it
of any weight, or to regard it as any
thing elſe but a wilful perverfion of lan-
guage.
I was, however, mortified to meet with
it in theſe remarks; not for my own fake,
but my friend's: for I was peculiarly
pledged to publiſh his remarks, with my
anfwers to them, if I did not think his
objections valid. I could not anſwer this
objection, without vindicating myſelf
from the imputation of quibbling; nor
do this, without retorting, and fixing
that charge on him. For it is plain, that
either he or I muſt be quibbling on this
point, in a manner almoſt unparalleled.
In hopes of faving myfelf the trouble
and vexation of fuch a long difcuffion a-
bout words, which can avail nothing as
to the decision of the philofophical que-
ſtion, I explained very fully my notion of
it to a brother Neceffitarian of the author
of the remarks, referred him to the paf-
fages
APPENDIX.
525
fages in my Effay in which theſe verbal
objections were anticipated and difcuffed,
and prevailed on him to reprefent to the
author of them what I thought of them,
as unphiloſophical in themſelves, and in
one point of view injurious to me, and
requiring an anſwer which implied a re-
torting of the charge of perverting lan-
guage, or quibbling, which they conveyed
by fuch ſtrong implication; and in my
name to beg the author to reconſider them
maturely.
He did fo accordingly; and after ſome
time returned them to me, with the latter
part of N° 14. erafed, (but not made ille-
gible), and the following marginal note
fubjoined to it; "I think the paſſage may
be ſpared; and therefore I prefer dele-
ting to illuftrating it."
66
66
* As the paffage (N° 14.) was eraſed a-
vowedly as being fuperfluous, and on that
account; as it was not retracted as erro-
neous, nor acknowledged to be unjust with
*MS. Penes me.
refpect
526
APPENDIX.
reſpect to me; as the fame meaning is
conveyed by irreſiſtible implication in o-
ther paffages of the remarks which are al-
lowed to be printed, and as indeed it
plainly pervades the whole reafoning in
the remarks; I find myſelf ſtill under the
unpleaſant neceffity of difcuffing it fully;
not that I think it a point of the ſmalleſt
confequence in fcience, or even in the
queftion of liberty and neceffity, as I hope
foon to fhew; but becauſe I am fenfible I
am not intitled to be attended to in any
reafoning, till I have fhewn that I have
neither made, nor attempted to make,
any fuch innovation or perverfion in com-
mon language, as is imputed to me. In
juſtice to the author of the remarks, I
have taken his own explanation of his own
hints.
The term Motive is plainly relative; the
notion of it implies or involves fome other
notions, fuch as defire, object, agent, ac-
tion, and many others. In this refpect it
reſembles many other familiar notions of
things fomewhat of the fame clafs or ca-
tegory with itſelf; as for example, agent,
}
(in
APPENDIX.
527
(in its moſt general meaning), or writer,
poet, painter, dancer, in particular; in-
ſtrument, in general, or ſpade, axe, ruler,
compaffes, teleſcope, in particular; phy-
fical cauſe in mechanical philofophy and
chemiſtry, fuch as impulfe or heat; exci-
ting phyfiological cauſe of the phenomena
in animal and vegetable life, fuch as heat,
air, and water; evidence in general, or
teſtimony in particular, with refpect to
belief. All theſe things imply, as cor-
relatives, fome other things, events, chan-
ges, effects, actions, &c.; that is, they
can never be conceived, or thought of,
any more than motive can, without con-
ceiving or thinking of fomething elfe.
But this implied relation may be confi-
dered in two very different points of view,
and, ftrictly speaking, is of two kinds,
the one remote and general, the other
immediate and particular; the former
conftant, and effential to the notions in
queftion, the latter only occafional and
accidental, and by no means effential to
or implied in thofe notions refpectively.
Thus we may regard an agent, inftru-
ment, caufe, or motive, feverally, either
as
"
528
APPENDIX.
as bearing a conftant implied remote and
general relation to their reſpective kinds of
correlatives, or as bearing an occafional
more immediate relation to particular in-
dividual inftances of their refpective corre-
latives. And in good language, ſuch as
is uſed in converfation by well educated
perfons, and in writing by the moſt e-
fteemed authors, the relative terms in que-
ftion are employed equally (though not
indifcriminately) both in the general and
in the particular meaning that I have
mentioned; which it may be expedient
now to illuftrate by particular examples.
In good broad Engliſh, we call a fpade
a Spade; meaning thereby an inftrument
adapted for digging the ground, and very
often uſed for that purpoſe. But we call
it equally a fpade, whether it be actually
and immediately employed in that way by
any perfon, or not. It may be new, and
never once uſed: it may have been uſed,
and long laid afide: the perſon who has
got poffeffion of it may have no thoughts
of ever ufing it; he may be confidering
whether he ſhall uſe it or not; he may be
refolving
APPENDIX.
529
refolving to uſe it; he may have refolved
to lay it down; he may be uſing it not as
a ſpade, but as a ſtaff, or as a lever, or as
an oar, or as a weapon of offence or of de-
fence. Still, however, in all theſe cafes,
we call it an inftrument, in contemplation
of a certain relation it bears to fuch ac-
tions generally as may be done with it;
and we call it a fpade, in contemplation
of the fame kind of relation that it bears
to the action of digging the ground parti-
cularly, though remotely.
Take away
the notion of ſuch relations, and it could
not be thought either a ſpade, or an in-
ſtrument of any kind: it would be a body
of a certain fize and fhape, and other pro-
perties; it would be an aggregate of wood
and iron, &c.
In like manner, we think and fpeak of
a man as an agent, perhaps, as one of moft
extraordinary activity, even though at
that particular moment he may be doing
little or nothing, nay, though he be a-
fleep.
So we conceive MILTON to have been a
3 X
great
530
- APPENDIX.
great Engliſh poet, not only in thoſe hours
when he was compofing the moft fublime
and beautiful paffages of Paradife Loft,
but when he was writing profe Latin let-
ters for Oliver Cromwell: and we conceive
both MILTON and ADDISON to have been
excellent writers in different ways, even at
thofe hours when they were writing no-
thing, but were engaged in the common
duties or buſineſs of life.
We conceive and ſpeak of heat and air,
and light and water, as the acceffory cau-
fes of vegetation, on account of the gene-
ral remote relation which all and each of
them bear to the growth of plants, tho'
we underſtand that any one or more of
them may be applied to a plant, with-
out producing any growth in it; nay,
though all of them may be applied to a
plant that has loft the vital principle,
without having any fuch effect on it.
We ſpeak of human teftimony as a kind
of evidence, or ground of belief, without
regard to the contingent fact of belief in
any particular inftance correfponding to
it.
APPENDIX.
531
cy
it. In cafe of the oppofition or inconfiften-
of equally good teftimonies, no belief,
but doubt, would be the refult: and in
cafe of the moſt unimpeached teftimony,
in oppofition to direct ſenſation and per-
ception, or even to diſtinct memory, be-
lief would take place, contrary to the te-
ftimony. Still, however, in regard of
the general and remote relation of teſti-
mony to belief, it is called Evidence.
We often have occafion to ſpeak of phy-
fical cauſes, ſuch as impulfe, gravitation,
heat, menftrua, &c. confidering only their
remote or general relation to their refpec-
tive effects, fuch as motion, fufion, folu-
tion, &c. without regard to their being
applied at any particular time to any par-
ticular body in whom fuch effect can take
place. But we conceive, that whenever
they are applied to bodies between which
and them the relation in queſtion fubfifts,
their effects will conftantly take place. This
is precifely what is meant by the relation
of conftant conjunction about which I
have reaſoned; and which feems to fubfift
between phyfical caufes and effects; but
3 X 2
certainly
532
APPENDI X.
1
મે
certainly does not fubfift between motives
(commonly fo called) and the voluntary
actions of men.
The fame obfervations and reafonings,
which it cannot furely be neceffary to il-
luſtrate more fully, are ftrictly applicable
to the term Motive: and that, in fact,
this term is commonly employed in this
general fenfe, will appear fufficiently from
the following examples.
66
"And truly it appears to me, that the
"whole fpecies are hurried on by the fame
defires, and engaged in the fame pur-
fuits, according to the different ſtages
66 and divifions of life. Youth is devoted
"to luft, middle age to ambition, old age
66
45
to avarice. Theſe are the three general
"MOTIVES or PRINCIPLES OF ACTION,
both in good and bad men; though it
"muſt be acknowledged, that they change
&6 their names,
names, and refine their natures,
according to the temper of the perfon
"whom they direct and animate. For with
"the good, luft becomes virtuous love,
ર ambition
66
APPENDIX.
533
T
"ambition true honour, and avarice the
"C
care of poſterity."
ADDISON, Tatler, N° 120.
In this paſſage it may be obſerved, that
the term Motive is applied in its moſt
common, that is, its abfolute or general
meaning; that certain defires are expreſsly
called motives, or principles of action, with-
out the ſmalleſt infinuation of a motive
being any thing different from a deſire, or
of a defire becoming a motive in certain
circumſtances only: For example, not till
the understanding decides on its preference,
or on the expediency of attempting the purfuit
of it; and that, in the metaphorical lan-
guage employed, the defires are repreſent-
ed as hurrying men on, directing them,
animating them; and men are reprefent-
ed as devoted to them. All fuch expref-
fions, whether literal and abftract, or me-
taphorical and pictureſque, mean juſt the
fame thing, viz. that fuch defires are the
principles of action, or motives, about
which, and about whofe relation to actions,
we have occafion to reafon,
J
The
534
APPENDIX.
+
The definition of motive given by DR
JOHNSON, in his Dictionary, though fuf-
ficiently good for all ordinary purpoſes, is
uffelefs, nay bad, in fcience, as being both
ftrongly metaphorical and hypothetical.
But the inftances of the ufe of the term,
which he has felected from good authors,
are unexceptionable; and I ſhould defire no
better inſtances in proof of what I have,
ftated as the proper meaning of Motive.
They are as follows.
I.
"Hereof we have no commandment,
either in nature or fcripture, which doth
exact them at our hands; yet thofe mo-
tives there are in both, which draw moſt
effectually our minds unto them."
HOOKER.
Here we have plainly the abfolute fenfe
of the term Motives, implying only their
more remote and general relation to ac-
tions: not a word faid of the things allu-
ded to being motives only when and after
"the underſtanding decides on their pre-
ference," &c. On the contrary, as the
motives alluded to are faid to be both in
nature
APPENDIX.
535
nature and in fcripture, it is irreſiſtibly
implied that they are motives before the
underſtanding decides on their preference,
nay, whether it ever does fo or not; juſt
as the things alluded to in the firſt clauſe
of the fentence are commandments, whether
a perfon or a perfon's underſtanding de-
cides on their preference, or on the expe-
diency of obeying them, or not.
It would be a palpable abfurdity to fay,
that there are both in nature and in fcrip-
ture fome things, on the preference of
which, and on the expediency of at-
tempting the purfuit of them, the un-
derſtanding of every perfon who has at-
tended or is to attend to nature, or who
has read or is to read the fcripture, has
decided.
66
2. Why in that rawneſs left
you wife
and children, thofe precious motives, thofe
ſtrong knots of love, without leave taking.”
SHAKESPEARE.
Part of what Malcolm fays to Macduff; and
a kind of reproach to him for not providing
for
536
APPENDIX,
<<
for the fafety of his family. The uncouth
word rawness means unprepared or unpro-
vided ſtate. The expreffion is in another
reſpect elliptical: in ftrict and full philo-
fophical language, the wife and children
could not be called motives: they are pro-
perly the objects of certain affections,
which affections are the motives. Suppo-
fing his wife and children to have been.
hateful or indifferent to Macduff, they
could not have been called by Malcolm
precious motives," in the fenfe here con-
veyed. But as Macduff is repreſented as a
good man, and paffionately fond of his
wife and children, the ellipfis is eafily fup-
plied, and the meaning of the paffage is
in a moment fully underſtood. But it is
plain, that the term Motives is applied to
things or confiderations which could not
altogether have efcaped the attention of
the agent, but on the preference of which
neither he nor his underſtanding had de-
cided. They were motives according to
which he did not act; that is, motives fe-
parated from their proper actions.
دیا
"What can be a ftronger motive to
(6
a
APPENDIX.
537
a firm truſt on our Maker, than the gi-
ving us his Son to fuffer for us?"
ADDISON.
This is plainly the abſolute ſenſe of mo-
tive, from its remote and general relation
to the action in queſtion, and predicated
of a thing, whether the underſtanding de-
cides on its preference or not. The fame
may be faid with refpect to the following
inftance, the laft given by DR JOHNSON;
4. "The motive for continuing in the
fame ſtate, is only the prefent fatisfaction
in it; the motive to change is always fome
uneafinefs.”—LOCKE.
If any philofophers, in their reaſonings
about motives and actions, had chofen to
ufe the term Motive in a peculiar meaning
of their own, different from, and much
more limited than, the common meaning
of it, (which would have been very need-
lefs, and not very wife, as it could be no
addition to our knowledge), they ought to
have begun by explaining precifely, and
illuftrating fully, the fenfe in which they
3 Y
ufed
ง
538
APPENDIX.
ufed the term; elfe their conduct might
juftly have been reckoned uncandid, as
well as their reafoning bad or frivolous.
And if MR HUME and his followers had
fairly announced, that in all their reafon-
ings about the conftant conjunction of
motives and actions, they meant by mo-
tives thoſe defires only on the preference
of which the underſtanding had decided,
it would inftantly have been difcovered,
that their doctrines bore no relation to the
fcientific queſtion at iffue; and that thofe
great philofophers had a mind only to
make themſelves merry (according to the
cuftom of metaphyficians) at the expence
of the ignorant vulgar, who could not fail
to ftare at fuch marvellous novelties; juft
as they would ſtare if a philoſopher ſhould
tell them, that a certain quadruped, on
which he occafionally rode, was not a
horfe, but only a beaft, while he was feed-
ing in a meadow, or ſtanding in a ſtable,
nay, even though fairly bridled and fad-
dled; but that as foon as the philofopher
beſtrode the beaft, and clapped fpurs to
him, then he became bona fide a horſe, as
appeared by his movement; or if the phi-
lofopher
APPENDIX.
539
lofopher fhould gravely affure them, that
a portion of the flesh of an ox, even tho'
properly boiled or roafted, and ferved up
to table, was not beef, but only meat;
but that as foon as any perfon applied his
knife and fork to it, and began to eat of
it, then, and not before, it became truly
beef,
But I am very far from thinking, that-
either MR HUME OF DR PRIESTLY had
in view any ſuch frivolous perverſion of
language. It appears to me very plainly,
from the whole tenor of their reafonings
on this fubject, that by motives they meant
juſt what I and other people who fpeak
Engliſh mean by the fame term; that
they conceived the judgement of a per-
fon (or, in the language of the author of
the remark, the decifion of the under-
ftanding) with refpect to action, as much
as his will, choice, or determination, to
be the effect of the motive or defire to which
they are referred; and that being mifled
by the analogy of phyfical caufes, and con-
fequently attentive to thoſe inſtances only
that favoured their fyftem, and regardleſs
3 Y 2
of
540
APPENDIX.
1
1
of thoſe that were inconfiftent with it, they
had rafhly and erroneously afferted, that
fuch defires or motives were conſtantly
followed by or conjoined with their re-
fpective actions, like phyfical caufes with
their effects. And that this was only a
rafh and erroneous affertion of thoſe phi-
lofophers, not their real thought or be-
lief, I judge from having found it ſo in
thoſe who had adopted their fyftem, all of
whom, the author of the remark inclu-
ded, as foon as the proper cafes were fug-
gefted to them, have perceived intuitive-
ly, without having occafion to try any ex-
periments, that fuch motives were not al-
ways followed by, or conftantly connect-
ed with, their respective actions.
he acknowledges fully in the laft fentence
of N° 5.; but with a reference to the
preceding infinuation, that fuch things
were not what philofophers meant by mo-
tives.
This
As MR HUME, and thofe who have fol-
lowed him in his mode of reafoning con-
cerning the conftant conjunction of mo-
tive and action, have attended almoft fole-
ly
+
APPENDIX.
541
ly to thofe cafes in which actions were
done correſponding to the motives applied,
it cannot be expected, that any of the in-
ſtances which they give in proof or illu-
ſtration of their ſyſtem ſhould be exam-
ples, like the one quoted by DR JOHNSON
from SHAKESPEARE, of the application of
the term Motive to defires not followed by
their correfponding actions. If any fuch
inftances had occurred to MR HUME, the
doctrine of Conftant conjunction would
probably never have been heard of: and
if any fuch had occurred to DR PRIEST-
LY, it can ſcarce be doubted, that inſtead
of adopting MR HUME's fyftem, he would
have fallen into the fame train of thought,
and of demonſtrative reaſoning, that I
have employed to refute that fyftem. But
there are many inftances in the writings
of both thoſe authors on this ſubject, in
which the term Motive is employed, or
the notion of it alluded to, in that ab-
folute and moſt general acceptation which
I have explained, implying only its remote
and general relation to action: For ex-
ample,
" The
542
APPENDIX.
6
66
""
"The fame motives always produce the
"fame actions; the fame events follow
" from the fame caufes. Ambition, ava-
rice, felf-love, vanity, friendfhip, ge-
nerofity, public fpirit; theſe paſſions,
"mixed in various degrees, and diſtribu-
"ted through fociety, have been from the
"beginning of the world, and ſtill are,
"the fource of all the actions and enter-
"prifes which have ever been obferved a-
<< mong mankind."
expecs, that
"The pooreft artificer
"when he carries his goods to market,
"and offers them at a reaſonable price,
"he fhall find purchafers; and fhall be
"able, by the money he acquires, to en-
gage others to fupply him with thoſe
"commodities which are requifite for his
"fubfiftence."
66
*
A prifoner, who has neither money
"nor intereft," &c. as already quoted,
pag.65.
"We confider not, that the fantaſti-
t
cal
APPEND I X.
543
"cal defire of fhewing liberty, is here
"the motive of our actions."
HUME, paffim.
Not a word is here faid of fuch defires,
paffions, &c. being no motives of them-
felves, and only becoming motives or
fources of actions, when the underſtand-
ing decides on their preference, &c.: on
the contrary, we find them exprefsly call-
ed Motives, without any peculiar explana-
tion of the term; nay, the common ellip-
fis is ufed; the object of defire, fuch as
goods and money, being ftated as the mo-
tive.
The following examples I felect from
DR PRIESTLY.
<<
CC
That men do in fact act accor-
ding to their affections and defires, i. e.
"in one word, according to motives."
"It makes no difference to fay, that
"the motive does not immediately produce
"the action. It is enough if it neceffa-
"rily produce the immediate caufe of the
"action,
544
APPENDIX.
rr action, or the cauſe of the immediate
"caufe, &c.: For example, if the *
<6
mo-
tive excite the defire, the defire deter-
"mine the will, and the will produce the
"action. For, contrive as many mediums
"of this kind as you pleafe, it will ftill
"follow, that the action is ultimately ac-
cording to the motive, flows from it, or
depends upon it; and therefore, in pro-
per philofophical language, the motive
ought to be called the proper caufe of
"the action. It is as much fo as any
thing in nature is the cauſe of any thing
"elfe." Vol. 1. p. 54. 55.
""
66
""
"Moreover, we fee evidently, not only
"that men are determined to act by cer-
"tain motives, but that the vigour of
"their actions correfponds alfo to what
may be called the intensity of their mo-
* The ftriking peculiarity of this expreffion, in
oppofition to his own definition of motive given in
the preceding page, arifes from DR PRIESTLY ha-
ving here inadvertently uſed the term Motive for the
object of the defire, for example goods or money.
His meaning is clear, though his expreffion be vague.
and improper.
❝tives.
APPENDIX.
545
66
t
tives. If a mafter be actuated fimply
by his anger, he will beat his fervant
more violently, and continue the cor-
"rection longer, in proportion to the de-
66
66
gree of his anger, or the apprehended
"caufe of his difpleafure; and kindneſs
operates exactly in the fame manner,
a ftronger affection prompting to great-
and more kind offices, than a weak-
t.
66
66
''
66
(6
er,
er.
"Alfo oppofite motives, as caufes of
"love and hatred, are known to ba-
"lance one another, exactly like weights
"in oppofite ſcales. According to all ap-
pearance, nothing can act more inva-
riably, or mechanically. Is it poffible,
then, that a philofopher, obferving
"thefe conftant and uniform appearan-
ces, fhould not conclude, that the pro-
per caufe of a man's actions are the
"motives by which he is influenced?
Strengthen the motive, and the action
is more vigorous; diminiſh it, and its
vigour is abated; change the motive,
and the action is changed; entirely
66
66
66
66
(C
(6
" withdraw it, and the action ceaſes; in-
3 Z
"troduce
546
APPENDIX.
66
"C
66
troduce an oppofite motive of equal
weight, and all action is fufpended,
juſt as a limb is kept motionleſs by the
equal action of antagoniſt muſcles. As
"far as we can judge, motives and ac-
❝tions do, in all poffible cafes, ftrictly
66
66
correfpond to each other." Pag. 30. 31.
In this fuppofed cafe, of the equal and
oppoſite motives exactly balancing each
other, and all action being fufpended, it
is plain, that by motives must be meant
things, fuch as paffions, defires, &c. on the
preference of any of which the under-
ſtanding has not decided, and, what is
more, cannot decide. That decifion, or
judgement, (which in fact is juſt what in
common language we call choice, deter-
mination, will, &c. as I fhall foon have
occation to fhew), is reprefented by all
Neceffitarians as quite involuntary, and
completely determined by the motives (de-
fires) that are applied.
But furely any commentary on theſe
paffages must be needlefs. And it must be
equally needlefs for me to declare, that in
all
APPENDIX.
547
all my reaſonings on this fubject, I have
always employed the term Motive, bona
fide, in what I conceived to be its proper
fenfe, and that in which it was uſed by
MR HUME, DR PRIESTLY, and other
philofophers who have held the doctrine
of Neceffity; that my Effay has been care-
fully peruſed by thirty other perfons, all
of them well qualified to judge of it in
every reſpect, and many of them very un-
willing to acquiefce in my reafonings, and
very defirous to find an error in them,
none of whom difcovered or fufpected any
fuch innovation or perverfion of language
on my part, as the author of the remarks
imputes to me; that many of theſe per-
fons, on my communicating to them the
remarks under confideration, agreed with
me in thinking, that the author of the re-
mark in queſtion, and not I, was attempt-
ing an innovation in language with re-
fpect to the meaning of the term Motive,
and that this innovation was equally un-
neceffary and unavailing; that I had often
converfed and argued, on thefe fubjects,
with the author of the remark, both viva
voce and in writing, in the firm belief,
3 Z 2
that
548
APPENDIX.
that we both of us meant the fame thing
by that term, and certainly without ever
obferving that either he or I fell into any
thing like crofs-purpoſes in our reaſon-
ings about motives, which I think must
have happened if we had annexed differ-
ent meanings to that word; that I never
heard from him of any difference about
the meaning of it, till fome time after he
had perufed, and made feveral other ob-
jections to, thofe fections of my Effay
in which I demonftrate, that the things
uſually called motives are not conftantly
conjoined with their refpective actions.
I therefore cannot help thinking, that the
objection and infinuation in queſtion is
merely an expedient to avoid admitting
my inference; that it is uncandid with re-
ſpect to me, and altogether unavailing with
refpect to the queſtion at iſſue, or even
with refpect to my peculiar mode of rea-
foning.
I cannot better fhew how uncandid and
unavailing it is, than by ftating a pa-
rallel cafe, of the adopting an erroneous
notion and opinion, and employing
a
mere
APPENDIX.
549
mere verbal expedient, to avoid giving it
up even when fhewn to be wrong.
A certain Prince of Orange, a man of
good fenfe, and much knowledge of the
world, took notice of two prevailing vul-
gar errors: That peaceable men imagined
that a foldier was always fighting; and,
That a young girl imagined that a lover
was always, En etat.
This wife Prince, who, I prefume, had
been in his day both a foldier and a lover,
knew better, and was well qualified to re-
fute fuch erroneous opinions. It cannot
even be fuppofed, that with any man or
any woman of good fenfe and candour,
he would find any difficulty in exploding
the errors in question; but if he had en-
tered the lifts with a metaphyfical Bur-
gomafter of Amfterdam, or, for his fins,
had fallen into the hands of fome little
Metaphyſician in petticoats, (Quale porten-
tum neque militaris Daunia in latis alit efen-
letis, nec Juba tellus generat, leonum arida
nutrix), I fufpect he would have been fore
put to it to have fet them right, if they
had
550
APPENDIX.
rors.
had unluckily fallen into the common er-
The Burgomaſter had only to fay,
that the man who was not always fight-
ing was no foldier for him; and the girl
had only to declare, that the man who
was not always En etat was no Lover for
her; and the wife Prince would certainly
have had the worst of the argument, and
muſt foon have declined fo unequal and fo
unavailing a conteſt.
Such I conceive to be the nature and
force of the objection infinuated againſt
my argument; which I fhould never have
thought of anſwering, but for the rea-
fon already mentioned, namely, that two
perfons, of whofe talents and knowledge
I have the higheſt opinion, have expreffed
their approbation of it. It appears to me
fomewhat ftrange, however, that neither of
them thought of fuch an objection to my
phrafeology and my mode of reafoning,
tho' both of them were well acquainted with
my Effay for many months, nay for years,
before thoſe remarks were written, and
had often converfed with me about it, and
even favoured me with various remarks
upon
APPENDIX.
551
upon it in writing, which I have preſer-
ved; and though fuch a perverſion of lan-
guage, and fuch frivolous and uncandid
reaſoning as are imputed to me by the
infinuation in queſtion, if real, muſt have
been ſtrikingly obvious to them at firſt
fight.
It only now remains for me to point
out, that fuch uncandid and frivolous
reaſoning was not only unintended, but
quite unneceffary on my part; for my
mode of reaſoning will apply equally well
to aſcertain the relation between defire and
judgement, (in the language of the author
of the remark), as between motive and
action, (in common language), and to fhow,
that what he calls judgement, or the under-
ftanding deciding on the preference of any de-
fire of attainable good, is a voluntary act of
the mind; and not like belief, or judge-
ment with respect to the truth or falfehood
of a propofition, which appears plainly to
be involuntary.
The terms Judgement, or decifion of the
understanding on the preference of a defire,
as
552
APPENDIX.
as employed by him on this fubject, are
phrafes perfectly fynonymous with chu-
fing, preferring, refolving, &c.: fo that, ad-
mitting his phrafeology with reſpect to
motive, and its conſtant conjunction with
action, his doctrine amounts to this only,
that men always chufe according to the
motive according to which they chufe,
which is an identical propofition that no
perfon can difpute; nor will any perfon
difpute, that a man, when not hindered
by phyfical impediments, will at accor-
ding to the motive according to which he
chufes. But the great philofophical que-
ftion at iffue is of a very different nature
from thefe frivolous and almoft identical
propofitions; it involves and effentially
confifts in the inquiry, what is the rela-
tion between the voluntary actions of men,
and thofe defires to which they are ulti-
mately referred as the caufes or princi-
ples of change from which they proceed?
what is the relation between the perfon
himfelf, or agent, and his voluntary ac-
tions? in particular, is he merely the fub-
ject in which thofe actions take place,
like effects in lifeless bodies, purely in
confe-
$
APPENDIX.
553
confequence of the caufes applied, or is he
in part, and, if fo, to what extent, and in
what manner, is he, the author, caufe,
or principle of change, to which his ac-
tions fhould be referred, as well as to the
defires, which are by all acknowledged as
principles of change or of action.
The effential part of this inquiry may
be aſcertained without meddling with the
various intermediate fteps, or links, of the
proceſs of thought, or feries of events, be-
tween the defire and the ultimate overt
act: and I thought, and do ſtill think it
better, to avoid the inquiry into thoſe
parts of the procefs which cannot be made
the fubject of open unequivocal experi-
ment, and which require any appeal to
confcioufnefs; for this is little better than
an appeal to the candour, to the natural
capacity or talents, and to the acquired
habits of attention and reflection, and of
intenſe and ſteady thought without the
ufe of words, (which are ambiguous and
deceitful), of every individual with whom
we may have occafion to reafon; but theſe
accompliſhments, even in a moderate de-
4 A
gree,
!
$54
APPENDIX.
degree, are very rare, and perhaps have
never yet been poffeffed in abfolute per-
fection by any perfon.
But if any perſon fhall chufe to rely on
his own qualifications in thofe refpects,
he may eaſily apply my dilemma and my
mathematical reafoning to the point in
queftion, the relation between defire and
judgement of preference; the combination
of which two things conftitutes a motive,
according to the phrafeology of the au-
thor of the remarks: and he will find it
to be fuch as neceffarily to imply the ex-
iftence and occafional exertion of the ſelf-
governing power of the perfon, in order
that the judgements of preference may be
what we find them. Indeed for this pur-
pofe nothing more is required but a very
flight change of expreffion (defire for mo-
tive, judgement for action) in SECT. VI.;
for the first part of the dilemma, and in
SECT. XVI. XX. and XXI. for the ſecond
part of it and if he fhould be likely to
bewilder himſelf by the uſe of ſuch hy-
pothetical expreffions and nugatory pro-
pofitions as thofe concerning the abfolute
force,
APPENDIX.
555
force, ftrength, or influence of defires in
producing judgements, he will find, mu-
tatis mutandis, in SECT. XVIII. and xIx, a
full elucidation of thofe things.
The initial letters of the Alphabet will
expreſs the judgements (fuppofed to be
known by conſciouſneſs) juſt as precifely
as they would exprefs the overt actions
of a perfon, that certainly might be
known by obfervation, The final letters
of it will exprefs the feveral defires that
may be excited in a perfon, juft as well as
they did the motives about which I rea-
foned.
}
The relation between the defires X, Y,
Z, and the judgements of preference or
expediency A, B, C, reſpectively, that is,
correſponding each to each, A to X, B to
Y, C to Z, must be either a conftant conjunc-
tion, (which fully implies the want of any
felf-governing power in the perſon or ſub-
ject with reſpect to fuch judgements), or
it muſt be not a conftant, but an occafion-
al and feparable conjunction.
4 A 2
If
556
APPENDIX.
If the first part of the dilemma be cho-
fen, the fix canons or axioms refulting
from the notion of conftant conjunction,
and ſtated in p. 172, and fully illuſtrated
in the pages that follow it, muſt, in the
firſt place, be either admitted or denied,
before it be poffible to reaſon on the ſub-
ject for all reafoning muft ultimately
reft on first principles, or acknowledged
truths and theſe canons are the firſt
principles or axioms in this kind of rea-
foning. Any reafoner who chufes to de-
ny them, fhould do it openly and expli-
citly; and when he has done fo, I pre-
fume he will find but few perfons difpofed
to reafon with him and moſt affuredly I
fhould not be one of the few.
:
If he admit them, we may rationally
proceed to inquire what the reſult muſt be
in point of judgement of preference, in
various particular inftances, fuch as often
occur in real life, or may be produced by
tudy and contrivance, and which may be
diftinctly conceived and expreffed; it be-
ing underſtood, that if our reafoning were
to be ſtated fully, in the regular form of
fyllogifm,
APPENDIX.
557
fyllogifm, one of thoſe axioms fhould be
the major propofition, general and affir-
mative; the inftance given, the minor,
particular and affirmative; and that the
conclufion may be left to the decifion of
thoſe who underſtand the rules of logic,
or indeed of any perfons who poffefs the
ufual intellectual faculties of mankind.
To prevent (if it be poffible to prevent)
any
idle verbal difputes about the rea-
lity of thoſe defires, the relation of which
to judgements of preference we mean
to afcertain, I beg it may be under-
ftood, that we fuppofe the ftate, condi-
tion, or difpofition of the perfon or fub-
ject, both as to mind and body, to be
fuch, that every defire, about which we
have occafion to reafon, may and fhall
truly and bona fide take place in him,
whether fuch defire be excited fingly, or
along with one or more other defires; and
this without regard to the degree or in-
tenſity of any one or all of them: that
therefore all cafes of madnefs, delirium,
drunkenneſs, fever, ftupor, or other diſeaſe,
and all fuppofitions of fuch intenfe appe-
tites
558
APPENDIX.
tites or paffions, like ravenous hunger, or
furious anger, as may make a perſon in-
fenfible to or incapable of any other de-
fire, are exprefsly fet afide and that we
confider only men in their ordinary ſtate,
in full poffeffion of their various facul-
ties, fufceptible of, and actually expe-
riencing, every defire that we have occa-
fion to ftate: For example, a porter wait-
ing for his chance of his ordinary employ-
ment, and truly defirous to earn any and
every fhilling that may be offered him; a
fimple traveller really defirous to preſerve
both his money and his life; a rogue very
defirous to escape from the toiture, and
very defirous to avoid being hanged; a
rake very defirous to re-eſtabliſh his health
and his fortune, but at the fame time bona
fide defirous to avoid fwallowing nauſeous
drugs, and having a difagreeable old wo-
man for his wife.
The diftinct conception, and the ac-
knowledgement of the poffibility, of fuch
cafes, from the oppofition of different de-
fires, motives, or principles of action, are
effentially neceffary to my mode of reaſon-
ing
APPENDIX.
559
1
ing on this fubject, juft as the admiffion
of the poffibility of drawing a ftraight line
from any one point to any other, or of
deſcribing a circle at any diſtance round
any centre, is to the reaſonings of geome-
ters and I fhould certainly have ftated
them formally as Poftulata, if I could have
fuppofed, that any intelligent or candid
perfon would have heſitated to admit them,
whenever, in the courfe of my reafonings,
there might be occafion to refer to them.
It is not yet too late to mention, that I do
confider them as undeniable Poftulata: I
mean fuch as cannot be refuſed without a
degree of abfurdity and want of candour,
as glaring and as extravagant as it would
be to refuſe the common Poftulata of geo-
metry. And I find now it is neceffary to
mention this explicitly, left, by fome new
diſtinctions, or new meanings to
to old
words, which I regard as no better than
a kind of metaphyfical legerdemain, the
defires, the things about which I wiſh to
reafon, without caring by what name they
may be called, fhould be conjured away
from me, just as motives have been in the
remarks under confideration, and I ſhould
get
560
APPENDIX.
get in their ftead fome other word; a vox
et præterea nihil. Of this indeed I find
fome very alarming fymptoms in N° 11.
page 476. line 17. et feq.; of which more
fully afterwards.
Theſe things being premiſed, and my
Poftulata being fuppofed to be granted, I
prefume it will be admitted immediately,
that the relation between defires and judge-
ments of preference or of expediency, (N°5.
line q.), which judgements, (according to
the phraſeology of the author of the re-
marks), in conjunction with defires, con-
fſtitute motives that are conftantly conjoin-
ed with their correfponding actions, is
not a conftant but an occafional and fe-
parable conjunction. For though the re-
fult in the fimple cafes of only one defire
being excited at once, might be foreſeen
a priori, and would be found on trial to
correfpond to the fimple formulæ X = A,
&c. the judgement always correſponding
to the only defire that took place in the
perſon who is to judge and to act; and
though it might be fuppojed in all cafes of
the direct concurrence of two or more de-
fires,
APPENDIX.
561
fires, and would be found in many of them,
that the refult, in point of judgement,
would correfpond to the canon X + Y
=A+B; yet it would both be foreſeen
a priori, and found on trial, that in num-
berleſs inſtances of the fimultaneous ap-
plication of two or more defires, either in
combination or in direct oppofition, the re-
fult would not correſpond to the canons
X √ Y=AB, and X — Y=A—B;
for the judgement would be perfectly ac-
cording to one of the defires, and not in
the leaſt according to the other of them.
If any perſon ſhould heſitate to admit this,
let him confider, that it may eaſily be de-
cided by open unequivocal experiment.
For as the judgement according to the de-
fire is a motive, and as a motive is conſtant-
ly conjoined with its proper action, the
action muft correfpond to, and be con-
ftantly conjoined with, every defire accor-
ding to which judgement took place. The
experiment propofed in page 226.
page 226. may be
tried by any perfon who is not confident
that he can foreſee the reſult of it, and
who does not perceive, that in the ordina-
ry conduct of life defires are not conſtantly
4 B
conjoined
}
562
APPENDIX.
conjoined with judgements, fo as to become
motives.
Though the author of the remarks may
not have forefeen the important confe-
quences of this feparability of defires and
judgements, I prefume he will acknowledge
it at once; and perhaps had perceived it
at the time he uſed the expreffions, " till
the underſtanding decides on its prefer-
ence, or on the expediency of attempting
the purſuit of it," (N° 5.); for theſe ex-
preffions feem to imply the poffibility and
the frequency of the underſtanding not de-
ciding on the preference or the expediency
of fome defires, as well as deciding on
the preference or expediency of others:
the latter is the feparation, the former is
the conjunction of defire and judgement,
about which we are now reafoning.
Suppofing, then, the feparability of de-
fire and judgement to be eſtabliſhed, either
as intuitively evident, or as afcertained
by experiment, it muſt be evident, that,
in this refpect at leaſt, what the author of
the remarks calls judging, or the under-
ſtanding
APPENDIX.
563
1
ſtanding deciding on the preference of a
defire, &c. agrees perfectly with what in
common language is called choofing. Choice
is an operation or modification of thought,
according to one thing, and not according
to fome other, or preferring one and not
another. Even in the fimpleft poffible
caſe of voluntary action, I mean that
where only one defire, and one kind of ac-
tion, are to be thought of, there is al-
ways the alternative of acting or not act-
ing, determining or not determining, ac-
cording to the only defire applied. Now,
this is a kind of choice; in the language
of the author of the remarks, it is a deci-
fion on the expediency of attempting the
purſuit of a defire.
As it appears, then, that the relation
between defire and judgement is not a con-
ftant, but an occafional and feparable
conjunction; we muft next inquire, whe-
ther they are occafionally conjoined, or
feparated by mere chance, that is, ftrictly
fpeaking, without any cauſe at all; or by
fome caufe (fuch as we conceive a living
perfon or agent to be) having power to
4 B 2
conjoin
564
APPENDIX.
*
$
conjoin or feparate them at his own dif-
cretion; that is, to judge or not to judge,
according to any defire applied. For it
is felf-evident, (as already mentioned,
p. 342.), that fuch an occafional conjunc-
tion and feparation cannot proceed from
any cauſe that is conſtantly conjoined with
its effect.
If the fuppofition of mere chance be
chofen, (which is abfurd in itſelf, as well
as inconfiftent with the fundamental
principle of the doctrine of Neceffity), we
may then inquire what proportion in point
of frequency the conjunction bears to the
feparation of defire and judgement: we
may affume any proportion of frequency
between them, and, on the principles of
the doctrine of Chances, we fhall imme-
diately have, by neceffary confequences,
many extravagant and ridiculous inferen-
ces, too repugnant to the univerfal notions
of mankind on theſe ſubjects to allow us
even for a moment to doubt of their be-
ing falfe, or to make it neceffary to try
them experimentally: but let it be re-
membered, that this, if required, may
eafily
APPENDIX.
565
eafily be done; for the judgement ſuper-
vening on defire is a motive conftantly con-
joined with its correſponding action; and
this action is an object of direct perception
and obſervation.
Laſtly, If mere chance ſhall be given up,
and recourſe ſhall be had to the fuppofi-
tion of fome peculiar quality of defires,
or fome peculiar relation between them
and judgements, in confequence of which
judgements came to paſs, in common cafes,
according to fome defires, and contrary to
others; and when this quality or relation
was equal in two or more oppofite or in-
confiftent defires, no judgement of prefer-
ence could take place according to any of
them; then it will appear by the argu-
ments page 360. to 400, that there nei-
ther is, nor can be in defires, fuch a qua-
lity, or fuch a relation between them and
judgements. And if any perfon fhould not
underſtand, or fhould not like that mode
of reafoning, he may have recourſe to the
reaſoning employed page 424. to arrive at
a conclufion, which he may try experi-
mentally, if he fhall think it neceflary fo
to
566
APPENDIX.
to do. The ultimate conclufion muſt
be, that thofe judgements which fuperve-
ning on defires conſtitute motives con-
ftantly conjoined with actions, do not
come to pafs in confequence of
any ab-
ſolute irreſiſtible force or quality or rela-
tion of defires, but depend on, and necef-
farily imply in the perfon judging, fome
felf-governing power with refpect to fuch
judgements.—Now, this is the other ef-
fential characteristic of choofing, in contra-
diſtinction to what is commonly (and
therefore properly) called judging; or of
a voluntary as diftinguiſhed from an in-
voluntary action.
The practice of employing the term
judging inſtead of choofing, is very impro-
per, becauſe it makes the expreffion of our
thoughts ambiguous, and conſequently
our reaſonings obſcure and bad. It is by
no means peculiar to the author of the
marks; it has been adopted by many wri-
ters; it is common even in ordinary con-
verfation to ſay, that a perfon thought fit
or judged proper to act in a certain man-
ner, when we mean to exprefs, not his
involuntary
APPENDI X.
567
involuntary judgement, but his voluntary
act or choice. It is a well underſtood
piece of civility, to fuppofe a perfon's
choice and actual conduct to be the refult
of his judgement, rather than of his un-
reaſonable paffions or caprice. In many
cafes the choice and actual conduct corre-
fpond to the involuntary judgement; but
in many caſes they are in direct oppofition
to it.
From want of due attention to theſe
things, the maxim, Voluntas fequitur ulti-
mum judicium, came to be admitted as a
kind of axiom; and it was long held as
the fundamental principle of the doctrine
of Neceffity. I am well informed, that
MR LOCKE, in the first edition of his
Effay, had adopted that erroneous prin-
ciple but foon difcovering the error of
it, he very candidly renounced it in the
fecond edition. As I have not been able to
procure a fight of either of thoſe editions
of his Effay, I cannot quote the precife
paffages. DR SAMUEL CLARKE, too,
fhewed that the maxim in queſtion was
fallacious and nugatory, forafmuch as
what
568
APPENDIX.
1
what had been called the laft judgement
of the underſtanding was really the choice
or voluntary determination of the perfon.
I preſume the author of the remarks had
not been aware of theſe things, elſe he
would not have betaken himſelf to this ar-
gument of the Neceffitarians; which has in
a manner been given up for half a centu-
ry, in favour of the doctrine of conſtant
conjunction.
In N° 6. and the following paragraphs,
he endeavours to avail himself of the
maxim, That the decifions of the under-
ftanding (which is a very needlefs, and
therefore improper metaphor for judge-
ments) are involuntary.
Before this important maxim can rea-
fonably be either admitted or denied, it
is néceffary to know exactly, how many
and what fort of operations of thought
are to be comprehended under the terms
decifions of the understanding, or judgements :
for theſe phraſes, at the difcretion of the
perfon uſing them, may be employed to
denote very different things or thoughts;
fome
APPENDIX.
569
fome of which may be voluntary, and o-
thers not. I conceive even that fome latitude
in this refpect is allowed in common lan-
guage; and a great deal certainly has been
taken by metaphyfical writers. However,
I can have no doubt, that, in ftrict philo-
fophical language, the term judgement, or
the metaphorical phrafe decifion of the un-
derstanding, fhould be uſed to denote cer-
tain thoughts only, fuch as opinions of
right and wrong, expedient or inexpedient,
good or bad, true or falfe, which are com-
monly reckoned involuntary; and which
in reality are almoft, but not perfectly fo.
They cannot be perfectly involuntary, for
this plain reaſon, that even for theſe kinds
of judgements attention is requifite, and
attention is voluntary; not indeed per-
fectly, but in a great meaſure. To judge
well and fairly on any point, a perfon
ought to attend equally and impartially to
all the confiderations and circumstances.
relating to it which are known to him,
whether they tend to make him judge one
way or another. But if he has already
taken a fide, or wishes to judge one way
rather than another, he may attend, and
1
4 C
if
570
APPENDIX.
if he be not very much on his guard, he
naturally and probably will attend, chief-
ly or folely to the confiderations in favour
of that judgement to which he already in-
clines; ſo that his final judgement will be
partly voluntary: "For none want rea-
fons to confirm their will." POPE.
For example, in belief, or the judge-
ment of what is true or falfe, when a per-
fon is impartial, and equally attentive to
every article of the grounds of belief, the
refult is quite involuntary, whether it be
belief on one fide or on the other, or only
doubt, from the oppofition of different ar-
ticles of evidence. Hence we have a-
xioms, demonſtrations, and rules of logic,
which reaſonable and candid men never
preſume to controvert. But even in be-
lief, as, for example, in judging of this con-
troverſy about the doctrine of Neceffity,
and of my mode of reaſoning about it, a
perfon, according to the fide which he al-
ready favours, may either attend fully to
every ſtep of my reaſoning, and yield to
the influence of it, as being a feries of
ftrictly neceffary confequences; or he
may
APPENDIX.
571
J
may attend very little to my argument,
and be eager to lay hold of every example,
and to employ every expreffion, that can
favour the oppofite opinion; whether it be
an objection to my argument, or whether
it bear any relation to it or not: and, in
conſequence of this voluntary withdraw-
ing of his attention from my argument,
and giving of it to the ambiguous phraſes
and vague analogies on the oppofite fide,
he may not feel the force or influence of it,
though it were as complete a demonftra-
tion as I think it.
But if it be meant to exprefs by judge-
ment or decifion what is cominonly and
properly called choofing, the maxim in que-
ftion cannot be admitted: it is inconfiſt-
ent with the very notion of choice. And
more preciſely, and in a way better fuited
to my mode of reafoning, by neceffary
confequences, and open experiment, I ſay,
that if they are ufed to denote any thing
that involves choice, or is conftantly con-
joined with or followed by it, the maxim
cannot be admitted. For though choice
and overt action often correfpond to invo-'
4 C 2
luntary
572
APPENDIX.
luntary judgement, yet they are often in
direct oppofition to judgement, or the
involuntary decifion of the underſtanding.
As for example, in the cafe of Medea, fo
happily ſtated by OVID, that his lines are
become proverbial, as expreffing clearly a
very common ftate of mind, and mode of
actual conduct:
Sed trahit invitam nova vis; aliudque cupido,
Mens aliud fuadet. Video meliora, proboque:
Deteriora fequor.
Here we have choice and action againſt
involuntary judgement. The firſt line ex-
preffes, in ſtrong metaphorical language,
the defires: the fecond line expreffes
clearly the involuntary operation of
thought, or decifion of the underſtand-
ing: Deteriora fequor expreſs the ultimate
choice and actual conduct according to
the defires, and againſt the decifion of the
underſtanding. To call the deteriora fe-
quor judgement, as well as the video me-
liora, proboque, in a ſtrict philofophical in-
veſtigation, the object of which is to af-
certain the differences among certain ope-
rations
APPENDIX.
573
rations of mind, would be highly improper;
and to fuppofe it involuntary, becauſe it
was expreſſed (no matter whether purpoſe-
ly or accidentally) by a term (judgement)
ufually and properly employed to denote
an involuntary operation of mind, would
be abfurd. The name given to it can no
more affect its nature, than giving one
individual the proper name of another
can make them two one; or than ex-
tending the generic names of Bird and
Fish to denote both thofe kinds of ani-
mals, can make birds fifhes, or fiſhes
birds.
If I were to employ the term Will or
Choice, (or any other commonly uſed to de-
note the voluntary operations of thought),
to expreſs judgement, belief, or any other
involuntary operation of thought, I dare
fay, neither the author of the remarks,
nor any other perfon, would think it any
proof of judgement or belief being vo-
luntary. The cafe I here put will perhaps.
be thought extravagant; but it is a real
one, and may be found in a book which
is ſtill regarded as good authority in point.
of
574
APPENDIX.
of Engliſh, and was once thought of
great
authority in fome other refpects: For
•
(C
"the good that I would, I do not; but the
"evil which I would not, that I do,"
ROM. vii. 19. -Here would expreffes
judgement, or the involuntary act of the
mind, and correfponds perfectly to mens
aliud fuadet, and video meliora, proboque;
while would not expreffes will or choice,
the voluntary operation of thought, and
correſponds to aliudque libido fuadet, and
deteriora fequor.
ST PAUL furely never
meant to ſay, that he chofe, reſolved, and
attempted to do the good, but could not
accompliſh it, as a man in a palfy might
endeavour in vain to walk; nor that he
did the evil in fpite of his choice and at-
tempts not to do it, as in certain difeafes
any attempt at the moſt proper motion
with the hand will fail, and either the
moſt ridiculous gefticulations, or the moſt
painful convulfions, will take place in its
ftead. We conceive that he meant, that,
notwithſtanding his judgement of what
was good and evil," the fin that dwelled
"in him" made him chooſe and do the evil,
and not the good.-As ST PAUL was not
only
APPENDIX.
575
only a great Apoſtle, but alſo a great me-
taphyfician, and had moreover a ſtrong
bias towards the fyftem of Neceffity, tho'
on principles fomewhat different from
thofe that I have been confidering, I truſt
his authority on this point will have
great weight with all orthodox Neceffita-
rians.
N° 6.
The involuntary nature of the decifions
of the underſtanding, or judgements, can
be admitted only with the explanations
and exceptions already mentioned; which
exclude choice or determination from the
claſs of judgements, or even from being
conftantly conjoined with, or always cor-
refponding to, preceding or co-existing
judgements. As to the author of the re-
mark feeing no reafon to doubt, that an
opinion of what is preferable, or other-
wife, is equally involuntary as a judge-
ment of what is true or falfe, it muſt be
his own fault, in not giving due attention
to the many great and obvious differences
between them; fome of which have gene-
rally
576
APPENDIX.
rally been acknowledged as felf-evident,
and as fuch I have mentioned them in
this Effay, pag. 12. 13.; and others, in
SECT. VIII. pag. 209. 220. I have illuftra-
ted very fully; and I think it unneceffary
to repeat here what is there faid. The
term Preferable, as employed in Nº 6. is
ſtrikingly ambiguous; and the opinion
expreffed in the laft fentence of it, con-
cerning the variations which are faid to
occur in a perfon's (involuntary) judge-
ments of what is preferable or otherwiſe,
according to the ſtate of his health, or o-
ther circumſtances, appears to me altoge-
ther erroneous; but I forbear to enter on
the diſcuſſion of theſe points, as not being
effential to my argument.
Nº
3. pag. 470. 1. 13.-" And then, by
having recourſe to the known laws of phy-
fics, it is proved," &c.-By no means: I
never dreamed of having recourſe to the
known laws of phyfics for
fuch pur-
pofe: I know well that it would be in
vain to do ſo, and fooliſh to attempt it.
To have argued, that becaufe lifeless bo-
dies had certain properties, and certain re-
any
lations
APPENDIX.
577
lations to the caufes of the changes of
which they are fufceptible, living perfons
muſt have the fame properties, and the
fame relations to the motives of their ac-
tions; and that, becaufe a certain refult
took place in certain cafes in phyfics, a
fimilar reſult in the actions of men muft
take place in fimilar cafes of the applica-
tion of motives, (which I prefume is the
meaning of the phraſe, having recourfe to
the known laws of phyfics), would have
been abfurd. It would juſt have been
falling into the fame error that the affert-
ors of the doctrine of Neceffity have fallen
into. But my plan, and
my plan, and my actual con-
duct, have been very different. I have
had recourfe to no laws of phyfics, nor to
any laws whatever, but the laws of hu-
man thought with refpect to the percep-
tion of certain neceffary confequences,
bearing that kind of relation to the no-
tions of event, caufe, conftant conjunc-
tion, or occafional conjunction of thefe,
inertia of the ſubject, and abſolute irre-
fiftible force or influence of caufes, that
the theorems of geometry bear to the no-
tion of quantity. Thofe neceffary confe-
4 D
quences
578
APPENDIX,
quences are found experimentally true in
numberless inftances in phyfics, but falfe,
and even ridiculous, in numberlefs fimilar
inſtances of the application of motives.
Whence I infer, that the principles of iner-
tia in the fubject, conftant conjunction of
cauſe with event, and abfolute irreſiſtible
influence of caufes, from which they are all
ftrictly deduced. must be falfe with reſpect
to living perfons, and the motives of their
actions, but may be true, and probably are
true, with reſpect to lifeless bodies and
phyfical cauſes and effects. To give a dif-
ferent account of the object or of the man-
ner of my reaſoning in this Effay, is to
mifreprefent it.
I am not perfectly fure, but I prefume,
that the author of the remark alludes to
the compofition of motion, as a law of
phyfics to which I had recourſe. If ſo,
he is quite miſtaken. In the firſt place,
It is not called nor thought a law of phy-
fics, any more than the fifth propofition
of EUCLID is called or thought an axiom
of geometry. It is given by NEWTON as
a corollary, a kind of theorem, refult-
ing
APPENDIX.
579
ing from certain principles, more gene-
ral and more fimple, which are called
Laws of Nature. In the fecond place,
So far am I from having recourſe to
it as
an ultimate principle or law of
phyfics, that I have offered a demon-
ſtration of it, different from NEWTON'S,
and, as I think, more complete than
his, as it fpecifies all the laws of phy-
fics, and of human thought, on which
the truth of that theorem as a matter of
fact, and our belief of it as a neceſſary
truth, demonftrable from certain princi-
ples, ultimately depend. The application
of the term Law in this fenfe is no doubt
in fome meaſure arbitrary; it is a meta-
phorical expreffion, employed to denote
fome very general fimple facts with re-
ſpect to the properties and relations of bo-
dies; which can no more obey laws, in
the literal fenſe of this word, than they
can underſtand them, or rife in rebellion
against them. But fome regard is due
even to the eſtabliſhed metaphorical fenfe
of the term; and I dare fay the author of
the remark himfelf would be fenfible of
the impropriety of fpeaking of the cur-
4 D 2
vilinear
580
APPENDIX.
vilinear path of a projectile, or of a pla-
net, or of the formation of a rainbow,
as laws of phyfics: yet they are juſt as
much fo as the compofition of motion.
N° 9.
"If the Neceffitarians must yield,
that every apprehenfion and defire of at-
tainable good muſt have an influence on
the underſtanding, in a manner perfectly fi-
milar to that of forces in phyfics, in order
to be intitled to maintain, that its opera-
tions proceed by immutable laws, and
that the relation of conftant conjunction takes
place among them, the ſubſtance of the ar-
gument in the Effay would, I think, ftill
remain folid, notwithſtanding what has
been remarked."
64
Allowing the affected ufe of the phraſe,
apprehenfion and defire of attainable
good," (inftead of motive), and the im-
proper and ambiguous uſe of the word
underſtanding," (instead of the agent,
or perfon to whom the motives are ap-
plied), to pass without difcuffion, I muſt
obſerve,
APPENDIX.
581
obferve, that there is plainly infinua-
ted, for it is not directly afferted, in
this remark, a very erroneous and unfa-
vourable, or, in one word, a moſt un-
juſt account of my argument and my
conclufions in this Effay. Any perſon
reading N° 9. and knowing nothing
more of my argument than what he
could gather from that remark, regarded
as an objection to it, would furely think
that I had been reaſoning about the ope-
rations of the underſtanding; whereas I
was reaſoning only about motives and vo-
luntary actions, which are as different
from operations of the underſtanding as
feeing is from hearing, or underſtanding
from fmelling. Such a perfon would alfo
conceive, that I had been afferting the
mutability of the laws of the operations
of the underſtanding; which is an abfur-
dity that I never dreamed of, and of
which not one word is faid in the whole
of my Effay. Even allowing the term
Understanding to exprefs, not what it com-
monly does, but choice and voluntary
action, (which is a licence juft as needlefs,
and as unavailing, as it would be to em-
ploy the term Smelling in the fame mean-
ing),
582
APPENDIX.
ing), ftill it will be found, that I never
call in queftion the immutability of the
laws of choice and voluntary action. I
only endeavour to afcertain what thoſe
laws (or general facts) are; particularly
whether the agent, or perfon choofing, is
merely the Subject in which the choice
comes to paſs, or the Author of the choice,
and whether the relation between motive
and voluntary action be a conftant con-
junction or not. Whatever thofe laws
might be found in theſe and many other
refpects, I could have no doubt of their
being the fame in all ages and countries,
and immutable, at leaſt by any human
power; whatever they might be as de-
pending on the will and power of the Su-
preme Being, who has made man what he
is. Such a reader would fuppofe, too,
that I had confounded the notion and
queftion concerning the immutability of
the laws of the underſtanding, with thoſe
of the conſtant conjunction among the o-
perations of the underſtanding, which I
had never done; and that I had denied
the conftant conjunction of the operations
of the underſtanding, which, far from ei-
ther
i
APPENDIX.
583
ther afferting or denying, I had not even
confidered nor mentioned.
But, above all, fuch a reader of this
remark (N° 9.) would understand, that I
had maintained, and moft particularly in-
fifted on the point, that " every appre-
henfion and defire of attainable good
(that is, every motive) had an influence
on the underſtanding, (that is, on the per-
fon who underſtands, judges, choofes,
and acts), in a manner perfectly fimilar to
that of forces in phyfics; and that this
principle, of the perfect fimilarity of the
influence of defires, and that of forces in
phyfics, was effential to my argument.
This infinuation is too plain to be mif-
understood, and too important to be over-
looked; and from the manner in which it
is expreffed, and from the uſe that is
made of it, for it is the baſis of all the
reaſonings about the underſtanding and
will that appear in the remarks, it ſeems
not to be accidental, but intended. But
nothing can be conceived more groundleſs
in itſelf, or more unjuft with refpect to
me. From the way I ftate the queſtion,
and
584
APPENDIX.
and bring it to the form of dilemma,
from the way in which my axioms or ca-
nons are expreffed, from the whole tenor
of my reaſoning, and from the numerous
illuſtrations that have been given of it, it
muſt appear, that my reaſoning and my
conclufions are quite independent of all
fpeculations with respect to perfect fimi-
larity, and to numberleſs ſuppoſeable or real
differences of manner in the influence of
motives and of forces. Nay more, all this
has been ſtrongly and repeatedly men-
tioned in the courfe of my Effay, (as for
example in pag. 84. 85. 86. 232. 233. 332.
336. 453 454.), with a view to prevent
fuch mistakes as thoſe at preſent under con-
fideration: but this I find is impoffible.
If my argument had depended, according
to the infinuation N° 9. on the aſſumed
principle of perfect fimilarity of manner, it
would not have deferved the name of rea-
foning; for ſuch a principle could never
be admitted, as it is intuitively falfe and
extravagant.
If fuch miſrepreſentations of my mode
of reaſoning had occurred in a deſultory
viva
APPENDIX.
585
viva voce argument, they might have
been regarded as mere mistakes, from
hafte, and imperfect expreffion, and im-
perfect underſtanding of the argument,
by one or both of us: though it muſt be
obferved, that mistakes always on one
fide, and always unfavourable to the per-
fon miſtaken, are very fufpicious, and, to
fay the truth, barely credible. But in de-
liberate reaſoning in writing, or in print,
as in the prefent cafe, where every part
of the argument is expreffed accurately,
and illuſtrated fully, and remains even for
months under the infpection of the perſon
who means to object to it, and who has it
in his power to take the very words of any
obfervation, or opinion, or argument, or
principle, which he means to controvert,
(as the author of theſe remarks has very
properly and candidly done in N° 12.),
there can be no miſtakes; and any unjuſt
and unfavourable account of the reafon-
ing, given with a view to found objec-
tions to it, muſt be regarded as wilful
mifreprefentation; which is equally un-
candid and unavailing. It is, however,
fo common in controverfies, even among
4 E
philo-
586
APPENDIX.
philofophers, that it is generally expreff-
ed, and reprobated, by the well-known
and appropriated metaphor, of fetting up
a man of ſtraw, in order to have the plea-
fure of knocking him down. Such mif-
takes in viva voce difputation, especially if
afferted confidently, and in a boisterous
overbearing manner, may procure to the
party employing them the tranfient ap-
pearance of victory in the argument, by
confounding and putting to filence his op-
ponent, who, if he has any fenfe at all,
will not perfiſt in reaſoning with one that
cannot or will not underſtand what he
fays. But in deliberate written difcuf-
fion, addreffed not to one man, or one
company, but to men of fcience in gene-
ral, in which the object is not victory,
but the inveſtigation of truth, and the ad-
vancement of fcience, they cannot ferve
even that little purpofe, nor indeed any
purpoſe that I can conceive. This I men-
tion purely for the fake of fcience, and
not for the fake of thoſe who may chooſe,
and who are heartily welcome, to amuſe
themſelves in that way; nor yet for my
own fake, as I am fure I fhall eafily be
believed, and fhall not even be thought
particular
APPENDIX.
587
1
particular in my tafte, when I declare, that
in all cafes, literal or metaphorical, in
which I may have occafion to be knocked
down, I ſhould chooſe to undergo that ce-
remony by proxy, as in the preſent cafe,
rather than in perfon.
With respect to that extravagant and
needlefs petitio principii, "That defires muſt
have an influence on the underſtanding,
in a manner perfectly fimilar to that of for-
ces in phyfics," which, in N° 9. is fo un-
accountably reprefented as neceffary to my
argument, and fo by implication is im-
puted to me; I beg it may be obſerved,
that, far from having affumed any thing
fo unreaſonable and unneceffary, and fo
evidently falſe, I have affumed no petitio
principii whatever. The nature and form
of my argument, which is indirect, or ad
abfurdum, and a dilemma, made all af-
fumptions of that kind perfectly needlefs.
This is mentioned exprefsly, page 79.
line 10. et feqq.; but it has not been at-
tended to by the author of the remarks.
Thoſe who wiſh to judge of my reaſoning,
will find no petitio principii in it with re-
ſpect
4 E 2
588
APPENDIX.
ſpect to the manner of the influence of mo-
tives and of causes. They will not find
themſelves called upon to admit any thing
till it be fhewn, either intuitively or by a
fhort ſeries of neceffary confequences, that
it must be true, forafmuch as the direct
contrary of it is falſe or abfurd.
Thus they may deny, and all Neceffi-
tarians certainly will deny, my propofi-
tion page 171; but to deny it is to affert
the direct contrary of it; for fuch affer-
tion and denial are correlative notions,
and convertible expreffions. That con-
trary is the principle from which I reafon
ad abfurdum.
They may next take their choice of the
two fuppofitions, that of conftant con-
junction and that of feparable conjunc-
tion, as the relation between cauſe and ef-
fect, motive and action, refpectively; it
being previouſly fettled, both by verbal
explanation, and by particular inftances.
and illuftrations, that by conjunction is
meant the coming to pafs of effect, and
the doing of overt action, correfponding
to
APPENDIX.
589
to the cauſes or to the motives applied;
that by conftant is meant this always being
the cafe; by Jeparable, this only fometimes
being the cafe.
If they chooſe the fuppofition of con-
ſtant conjunction, they ſhould next confi-
der the axioms reſulting from it; and they
muft either admit them as expreffed by X
and Y, A and B, without regard to fimi-
larity or difference, or any circumftance of
manner, and indifferently with reſpect to
caufes and effects, motives and actions, or
they must deny them. If they chooſe to
deny them, they can proceed no farther
in reafoning with me; but will have the
pleaſure of maintaining a direct contradic-
tion in terms, to wit, that effect comes to
pafs correfponding to a caufe, and that
action is done correfponding to a motive
applied, when no effect, and no action
correfponding to fuch caufe or motive,
take place.
This the author of the remarks, who
wiſhes to maintain the principle, or rather
to retain the expreffion, of conſtant con-
junction,
590
APPENDIX.
junction, feems to have been aware of;
and he has employed a very fingular ex-
pedient to avoid afferting fuch palpable
contradictions, N° 11. p. 476, 1. 17. et
feqq. "If it is afked, What becomes of
the appetite for the half-guineas? I an-
fwer, That it has had all the effects that,
by the immutable laws of the underſtand-
ing, it was fitted to have."
This vague
and ambiguous expreffion is a mere eva-
fion, and an attempt to confound our rea-
fonings on the fubject, by employing the
fame phrafe to denote two things, not
merely different, but diametrically oppo-
fite, and things of fuch importance, that
the whole reaſoning in the dilemma ulti-
mately depends on our conceiving them
clearly, and always expreffing them dif
tinctly. "All the effects it was fitted to
have," may mean no effect at all, or ef
fecs totally different in kind, as well as
in degree, from what it would have had
at another time, or at that very time, if no
other motive had been applied, nay, even
though many other motives had been ap-
plied, provided only the perfon had choſen
and acted according to it. Let us con-
fider,
APPENDIX.
591
66
fider, then, what theſe effects are which
it is faid are all it is fitted to have. "It
was felt." The feeling of an appetite, de-
fire, or motive, is the fame with the ex-
iſtence of it a defire that is not felt, is
as arrant nonfenfe as a pain that is not
felt; and to reprefent the feeling of a de-
fire as the effect of it, is as nugatory as to
call feeling an effect of pain. Obferved"
only another word as nugatory as felt,
when employed to denote a fuppofed ef-
fect of a defire. "Its inferiority to a de-
fire, the gratification of which was in-
compatible with it, perceived :" A new
metaphor uſed to fignify the not willing,
or chooſing, or deciding, or judging, ac-
cording to the defire; and precifely what
in this inveſtigation is reckoned the no ef
fect or influence of a motive, and, in my
phrafeology, is the feparation of motive
from its correſponding judgement, choice,
or will; which, however, I avoid reafon-
ing about, as I prefer the ultimate overt
act for the fubject of obfervation and expc-
riment. If the author of the remarks has
any good reafon for wifhing to call the feel-
66
ing and obferving a defire, and perceiving
1
213
592
APPENDIX.
its inferiority to another incompatible with
it" all the effect it is fitted to have, he
fhould be gratified in his wifh, though it
muſt appear an odd one: but then care
muſt be taken not to exprefs any thing
elfe by the fame phrafe; particularly ne-
ver to employ it to denote the perceiving
the Superiority of any defire, and judging,
willing, and acting according to it, and
never to miſtake theſe things for the effects
of fuch defire, and all the effects it was
fitted to have; but, on the contrary, al-
ways to regard thefe things, which are the
oppofites of the others, as no effects of
fuch defires as they correfpond to; and,
in my phrafeology, to call them inftances
of the feparation of motive and action.
And then my mode of reafoning, mutatis
mutandis, that is, intercharging or rever-
fing the meanings of a few phrafes to
which I have no particular attachment,
will ſtill remain valid. The dilemma de-
pends not upon the phraſes, conftant or
feparable conjunction, having or not ha-
ving effect, or all the effects any thing
was fitted to have, but on the notions of
ert, whether effect or action, always or
only
1
APPENDIX.
593
only fometimes coming to pafs, according to
every cauſe or motive applied.
Theſe two notions are effentially dif-
ferent, and neceffarily imply very different
confequences; which may be traced a
priori by ftrict reafoning, and inay be tried
experimentally. For the purpofe of fuch
reafoning, it is requifite that the two no-
tions be uniformly expreffed by different
terms, or fymbols, vifible or audible:
but it is of no moment what theſe terms
or ſymbols are, provided only they be well
explained and illuftrated, and each of
them be always ufed in but one meaning.
With fuch explanation and care, the let-
ters P and Q, or the words Beef and Pud-
ding, or any two new words that the moſt
whimſical philofopher could contrive,
would completely anfwer every purpoſe of
good reafoning; without fuch explanation
and care, no words nor phrafes that could
be contrived would enable us, or indeed
allow us, if we made ufe of them, to rea-
fon ftrictly and diftinctly about the two
notions, and their relpective neceffary con-
fequences.
4 F
It
594
ΑΡΡΕΝ DIX.
It is unreasonable in the highest degree,
to call "perceiving the inferiority of a
motive, and judging another preferable
to it," fuch motive having effect, and all
the effects it was fitted to have; becaufe
it is contrary to the eſtabliſhed ufage of
language, and to the analogy, always to
be acknowledged, between the relation of
motive and action and that of cauſe and
effect in phyfics; and alſo becauſe it tends
to prevent us from diftinguiſhing, as we
fhould do, that kind of effect of motives
from the other kind of effe of them, ana-
logous to the effect of phyfical caufes,
and fhewn by voluntary action being done
according to them. But allowing. them
both to be called effects of motives, it muſt
be allowed that they are of very different
kinds; and that they might be, and for
the purpoſe of distinct reaſoning ought to
be, expreffed by different Specific or trivial
names: For example, let one of them be
called fuperior, and the other inferior effect.
This being explained, we may reafon a-
bout them as ſtrictly as before, and will
foon arrive at the fame ultimate conclu-
fion.
The
APPENDIX.
595
The first difference we fhall diſcover be-
tween the relation of motive and action
and that of cauſe and effect in phyfics,
will be, that in the latter the effect ſeems to
be always of one kind only, to wit, fupe-
rior; while in the former it is certainly
fometimes fuperior, fometimes (indeed
much oftener) inferior.
Next, we muſt inquire how this comes
to pafs, whether it is by a felf-governing
power in the agent, in confequence of
which, though he cannot hinder every
motive applied to him from having all
the effect it was fitted to have, he can, at
his own difcretion, make that effect infe-
rior or fuperior? or is it by mere chance
that the effect, conftantly conjoined with
the motive, is fometimes of the one fome-
times of the other kind? Or does this
depend on any abfolute force, or influence,
or quality, of the motives, or on any rela-
tion of them to one another, and to the
perfon?
The obfervations and reafonings in the
fixteenth and following fections, (which,
4 F 2
with
596
APPENDIX.
1
with only a trifling change of terms, are
ftill perfectly applicable to theſe queſtions
and fuppofitions), will fhew, that the oc-
cafional variety in the effect of motives is
not a mere matter of chance, and does not
depend on any abfolute force of them, but
implies the existence and very frequent
exerciſe of ſuch a felf-governing power in
the agent.
The ultimate conclufion will be, that
the liberty of human actions, and the dif-
ference between the relations of caufe and
motive, effentially confift in this, that
there is in a living perfon, and not in a
lifeless body, a power of making the effect
of any cauſe applied, fuperior or inferior;
which, though different in found, is the
fame in fenfe with making fuch cauſe have
effect or not have effect.
But to return to the confideration of all
the effects of a motive or defire according
to which a perfon does not act, p. 476.
1. 25.
that gratification (i. e. of another
defire) judged preferable to it according-
ly." This (due allowance being made for
the
APPENDIX.
597
the peculiar phrafeology of the author of
the remark) is juft what we ufually call
the effect of fuch other motive, and the
want of effect of that one whoſe effect, on
the fuppofition of conftant conjunction,
we were inquiring after.
To this enumeration of the effects of a
defire, which we ſhould be apt to think
had none at all, is fubjoined a very im-
portant, but inadmiſſible hypothefis, in-
tended, I prefume, to prevent any further
inquiries about the defire and its effects;
"and it then probably ceafed to exift,
and was forgotten." This is in the high-
eft degree improbable, indeed fcarce cre-
dible, even in the cafe ftated, choofing to
earn a guinea rather than half a guinea.
To me it appears much more probable,
that the porter, though he would prefer
the guinea, would ftill feel a good appe-
tite for the half-guinea, and that he would
remember it as long as he lived.
But even if we could fuppofe, that the
porter fhould in a moment ccafe to hun-
ger after the half-guinea, and completely
forget
598
APPENDIX.
forget every circumſtance about it, it will
be difficult or impoffible to apply the fame
arbitrary hypothefis to every cafe of X-
Y, where the refult is A, inſtead of A-
B. When a perfon endures the toothach
for a long time, rather than ſubmit to the
operation which would give him relief,
does the pain really ceafe to exift? Does
the patient ceaſe to feel it? Does he bona
fide forget it? Can he, with a fafe con-
ſcience, declare, that he has no abhorrence
or diffike of it, and no defire to be freed
from it? If theſe things are ſo, they
will be joyful tidings to many people,
who muſt impatiently wifh for the con-
firmation of them: they will likewife af-
ford fome good corollaries, extremely com-
fortable to thoſe who are afflicted with the
ftone.
With respect to the ufe which I have
made of the phrafe conftant conjunction in
my argument, it has been uniformly the
fame, both when it was applied to motives.
and actions, and when it was applied to
phyfical cauſes and effects; namely, to de-
note the ultimate vifible effect in the one
relation,
APPENDIX.
599
relation, and the ultimate overt action in
the other, always correfponding to, or be-
ing according to, any and every cauſe or
motive applied. This uniformity of the
meaning of it is effential to my mode of
reaſoning; and, at any rate, I ſhould have
thought the uſing any fuch phraſe in two
or more different meanings in the fame
treatiſe, abfolutely inconfiftent with every
kind of good reafoning. The only mean-
ing in which I have uſed it, is that in
which (for reafons fully ftated already,
p. 28. 29. 30. 142.-146) I conceive MR
HUME, the introducer of it, and DR
PRIESTLY, one of the lateſt and greateſt
writers on the controverfy about liberty
and neceffity, to have always uſed it; and
certainly my meaning of it correfponds
perfectly with all the inftances and illu-
ftrations of their fyftem which thofe au-
thors have given, feveral of which have
been already quoted in this Appendix,
(p. 542. to 546.)
It was not only unneceffary for my
mode of reaſoning, but abfolutely incon-
fiftent with it, to lay any ftreis upon, or
even
600
APPENDIX.
even to take into confideration, the cir-
cumſtances of manner of the conftant con-
junction, about which I reafoned. My
plan was, to reafon by neceffary conſe-
quences from the principle to be refuted,
to conclufions that might be tried by open
experiment, without making any appeal
to conſciouſneſs, or leaving any room for
doubt or conjecture. But this could be
accompliſhed only by attending to the ul-
timate refult in viſible effect or overt ac-
tion, about which there could be no dif-
pute; while, with reſpect to the manner in
which that refult came to pafs, there might
be everlaſting altercation,
Let the manner of the conjunction of cauſe
and effect in phyfics be fuppofed as dif-
ferent as poffible from the manner of the
conjunction of motive and action, only let
the conjunction in both relations be con-
ftant, and the whole of my reaſoning from
the dilemma and axioms to the laft infer-
ence must remain unfhaken, and all my
conclufions will be found fuch as may be
tried experimentally: For example, let the
manner of the conjunction of cauſe and
effect
APPENDIX.
601
effect in phyfics be fuch that there is but
one ſtep between them, and that one a
mere change of ſtate in body, and in no
degree intellectual: let the manner of the
conjunction of motive and action be fuch,
that there fhall be always ten thouſand
ſteps between them, every one of which
is purely intellectual, or a proceſs of
thought, not connected with any change
of ſtate in body; and let theſe ſteps be
called Underſtanding, Intelligence, Apprehen-
Sion, Judgement, Will, &c. &c.; and let
every one of them be a fit fubject for end-
lefs difpute, requiring always appeals to
conſciouſneſs; ftill, if the conjunction of
motive and action be conftant, the action
correfponding to the motive muſt take
place, as invariably on the application of
it, as if there had been but one ſtep be-
tween them for its not taking place in
any cafe, would be an unequivocal in-
ftance of the conjunction between them
not being conftant, but feparable, and in
that cafe being actually feparated.
Were we even to fuppofe, that by the
interpofition and co-operation of fome
4 G
other
602
APPENDIX,
other kind of caufe, (as, for example, an
Agent or living Perfon), the whole chain
or feries between the motive applied and
the ultimate overt action performed, fhould
be varied on different occafions, being
fometimes a train which (to avoid all idle
diſputes about words) we fhall exprefs by
G, H, I, K; at other times a different
train, which we fhall call P, Q, R, S; ſtill
it muſt be evident, that, whichever of
thefe be the interpofed train, if the firſt
and laſt ſteps of it (X and A, Y and B,
&c. reſpectively) be conftantly conjoined,
the refult from the fimultaneous applica-
tion of X and Y muſt be what I have ſpe-
cified in the axioms; for the want of ei-
ther A or B in the ultimate refult would
be ipfo facto proof of a feparation having
taken place, contrary to the principle of
conſtant conjunction.
The author of the remarks muſt furely
have attended but very little to my in-
ftances and illuftrations, and must have
had but a very imperfect and erroneous
notion of my plan, and of my principles
of reafoning, when he hazarded the affer-
tion
APPEND Í X.
603
tion in the beginning of N° 9. that "the
queftion, therefore, turns on the nature.
of the operations of the underſtanding."
This is perfectly groundleſs: they may
be whatever he pleaſes to call them, with-
out in the leaſt affecting my argument,
which I have purpoſely taken care to make
quite independent of them.
As little was he aware of the nature
and force of my reafoning, when he em-
ployed, in anſwer to it, ſuch vague, hy-
pothetical, and metaphorical expreffions
as the following, "That the will is not,
and need not be expofed to fuch combi-
nations or oppofitions of influences," N°4.
"That a judgement will never be pro-
nounced by a perſon in favour of two pur-
fuits, at one and the fame time, that are
incompatible," N° 7.-" Since the act of
the will depends on an operation of the
underſtanding, which is ittelf involuntary,
and excludes all thofe abfurd combinations.
of influence alluded to," N° 8.-" The
intelligence of the mind renders the combi-
nation impoffible," N° 11. 1. 16.-" The
fufficiency of the understanding for this o-
peration (judging one purfuit eligible,
4 G 2
without
604
ΑΡΡΕΝ DIX.
without abfurdly combining it with ano-
ther) feems to be the natural refult of its
intelligence, which differences that faculty
fo infinitely from every thing that is expo-
poſed to the influence of external force,"
N° 12.—“ If the acts of the will are not
determined by the judgements of the under-
Standing, but by a felf-governing power,
which may
act without motives," &c.
N° 16.
It muſt be obvious to every perfon,
that the needlefs ufe of thefe expreffions
tends greatly to perplex and to fruſtrate
our reaſonings, by withdrawing our at-
tention from the real acts and operations
of the only agent we have to reaſon about,
I mean the person to whom the motives
are fuppofed to be applied; and by ma-
king us attend to the fancied acts of many
imaginary agents, fuch as will, judgement,
underſtanding, power, &c. This is mere
metaphor, and a kind of poetry; it is
giving to airy nothings a local habita-
tion and a name." They are as truly ima-
ginary beings as the Sylphs and Gnomes,
who make ſo great a figure in the Rape of
the Lock; where indeed they are in their
proper
APPENDIX.
605
proper place: Not that I think metaphors
can be, or ought to be, confined to poetry
alone;
the poverty of language makes
them neceffary, both in common dif-
courſe, and in fome meaſure perhaps in
ſcientific inveſtigation. And even if a lan-
guage could be contrived, both for the
purpoſes of common life and of fcience,
as precife and literal as the language of
EUCLID, I believe few people would ufe
it it would be exceedingly dull; for no-
thing contributes fo much as the occafional
uſe of metaphors to adorn, to enliven, and
to enforce the expreffion of our thoughts.
But whatever ufe we may make of them,
we ſhould at leaſt remember, that they are
but fictions; and that to attempt to a-
vail ourſelves of them, as if they were li-
teral expreffions of philofophical truths,
is as unreaſonable as it would be to tranf-
fer the machinery of the Rape of the Lock
to the intercourfe of real life. Every body
is pleafed with the difpofition that Ariel
makes of his flimfy legions, and ap-
proves of the employment of the fifty
chofen Sylphs, who are ftationed to
guard the petticoat of Belinda. But in
the
606
APPENDIX.
the actual intercourfe of belles and beaux,
the former have no fuch airy guards to
defend them: if due care be taken of
the petticoats, the belles, not the Sylphs,
have the praiſe and merit; if any finiſter
accident befal them, the belles alone muft
bear the blame. To attribute agency, and
praiſe or blame, to their or to any per-
fon's underſtanding, or will, &c. &c. for
their conduct in any cafe, is almoſt as far
removed from literal philofophical truth,
as it would be to attribute fuch agency
and praiſe or blame to the Sylphs and
Gnomes.
The only inſtance I can at preſent re-
collect of this kind of attempt having
been openly and avowedly made in a ſe-
rious difcuffion, is that in the hiſtory of
John Bull, when he was endeavouring to
fettle accounts with his friend Nic. Frog.
John found always in Nic.'s accounts two
fwinging articles to Major Ab. and Major
Will. which he could not underſtand.
"John Bull. But who the devil are
thoſe two Majors that confume all my mo-
ney?
APPENDIX.
607
ney? I find they always run away with
the balance in all accounts.
"Nic. Frog. Two very honeft gentle-
men, I affure you, that have done me
ſome ſervice. To tell you plainly, Major
Ab. denotes thy greater ability, and Major
Will, thy greater willingness, to carry on
this law-fuit. It was but reaſonable that
thou ſhouldſt pay both for thy power and
thy pofitiveness.
<<
John Bull. I believe I ſhall have thoſe
two honeſt Majors diſcount on my fide in
a little time."
I would by no means infinuate, that ei-
ther the author of the remarks, or any o-
ther metaphyſicians, have borrowed their
Dramatis perfonæ, Will, Underſtanding,
Power, &c. from worthy Nic. Frog; but
it is plain, not merely from the fimilarity
of their names, but from the ſtriking fa-
mily-likeness among them, that their
perfonages and his are very near akin;
though perhaps they never met before:
and I am happy in this opportunity of in-
troducing
608
APPENDIX.
troducing them to each other's acquaint-
ance.
If I, a Phyſician, in reaſoning on theſe
fubjects, had endeavoured to avail myſelf
of the different organs of the human body,
the inftruments of all our actions or opera-
tions, both intellectual and corporeal, and
had attributed agency of various kinds,
not to the person having the organs, but
to the brain, and nerves, and tongue, and
ftomach, and mufcles, and hands, and
feet, as the author of the remarks, a Pneu-
matologiſt as it appears, has done with
reſpect to the abſtract notions of the dif-
ferent faculties of the human mind, fuch
as, Understanding, Will, &c. he would
certainly have thought my conduct unrea-
fonable and uncandid: As, for example,
if I had maintained, that it was not the
perfon, but his brains, that kept his fto-
mach from being loaded with improper
food, his feet from walking over a preci-
pice, his hands from picking and ſtealing,
his tongue from lying and flandering,
when motives or temptations, and oppor-
tunities for fuch actions, occurred; every
body
APPENDI X.
609
body, I think, muft regard fuch a mode
of reafoning as mere evafion and arrant
trifling; yet it would be a kind of meta-
phor very near akin to the one under con-
fideration, and juft as much to the pur-
poſe. We are not reafoning about the
conduct of men without brains, nor about
men without underſtanding; but about
men who have both, and who could nei-
ther judge nor act as they do without
both; though neither their brains nor
their underſtanding can act for them.
And we are inquiring, whether they, even
with the help of brains and of under-
ftanding, can act as we fee them do, un-
lefs motives were ſeparable from their cor-
refponding actions, and they had the
power, that is, were able, to feparate them
occafionally.
But, difregarding the full literal mean-
ing of the metaphors employed, we may
confider what must be fuppofed the philofo-
phical meaning of fuch expreffions; as,
for example, in the end of N° 8. and be-
ginning of N° 9.
4 H
Influence
610
APPENDIX.
Influence is ambiguous it may mean
either a perfon's feeling the defire or mo-
tive fuppofed, that is, having them ap-
plied, according to the poſtulatum; or the
effect of ſuch motive, in choice and overt
act. If it mean the former, it cannot be
excluded by the understanding, or by
any of its operations. It is implied in the
very
notion of motive or defire. If it mean
the latter, then to exclude the combina-
tion of influence (whether abfurd or not)
in any cafe, is to feparate one or more of
the motives applied from its proper action
or fuppofed effect.-No action being per-
formed according to a certain motive,-
fuch motive having no effect,-the influ-
ence of it being excluded,-the combina-
tion of its influence with that of one or
more other motives being rendered im-
poffible,—and its being feparated from its
proper action,—are phrafes perfectly fyno-
nymous and convertible, as will appear
from the cafes (inftantias particulares ea-
rumque feries et ordines) of which they
may be predicated indifcriminately. It
is indifferent for the purpoſes of good
reafoning,
APPENDIX.
611
سمجھ
reafoning, and eſpecially of my kind of
reaſoning, which of them be employed.
Even if we ſhould agree to fpeak in
metaphor, without neceffity, on this fub-
ject of strict reafoning, we fhould foon
find, that on many occafions the fuppofi-
tion of the underſtanding excluding, or
rendering impoffible, the influence of cer-
tain motives, is improper in this refpect,
that the excluſion or feparation which takes
place is often not according to the judge-
ment or decision of the underſtanding,
but directly in oppofition to it. In the
caſe of a porter earning a guinea by go-
ing one way, and difregarding half a gui-
nea which he might have got by going a
different way, both the action and the ex-
clufion of influence are according to the
underſtanding; but in the cafe of Medea,
and all like it, both the action and the ex-
clufion are againſt the underſtanding. It
would be nearer the truth, though till a
very inaccurate mode of fpeaking, to fay,
that in fuch cafes the will excluded, or
rendered impoffible, the influence of cer-
tain motives on the perfon, or his un-
4 H 2
derſtanding,
612
APPENDIX.
derſtanding, &c. than to attribute fuch
exclufion to the act of the underſtand-
ing.
The author of the remarks muft cer-
tainly have forgotten the important dif-
ference between what is ftrictly speaking
impoffible, and what is only repugnant to
vulgar prejudices or common fenfe, when
he called fuch a refult as that of going in
the diagonal, and not in either of the
fides of the parallelogram, in the cafe of
the porter, (p. 226. referred to in Nº 11.),
impoffible. No underſtanding or intelli-
gence of the mind can render it impof-
fible; like the being in two places, or the
moving in two different lines at once.
The vulgar might with ſome reaſon call
it abfurd and ridiculous, as being con-
trary to their notion of the relation of
motive and action. But the author of the
remarks, and all other Neceffitarians, far
from having any reaſon to think it impof-
fible, are not even intitled to call it abfurd
and ridiculous; for it correfponds perfectly
to their notion, though not to the vulgar
notion,
APPENDIX.
613
notion, of the nature and influence of mo-
tives: Nay more, it is a refult preciſely of
the fame kind with that from two equal
and oppofite motives applied to the fame
perſon at once, and well illuftrated by the
ſuppoſed conduct of the hungry aſs be-
tween two bundles of hay; which all or-
thodox Neceffitarians hold as faft as any
article of their creed. Both remaining in-
active or at reft, when under the influence
of two equal and oppofite motives, and mo-
ving in the diagonal in the caſe of the porter
as ſtated by me, are fo extravagantly incon-
fiftent with the vulgar, proper, notion of
the relation of motive and action, as to be
ridiculous: both of them are perfectly
confiftent with the notion of the abfolute
irreſiſtible force of motives; both of them
are neceffarily implied in, or deducible
from, the notion of conftant conjunction;
both of them are perfectly analogous to
what is well known experimentally to take
place in lifeless bodies under the influence
of equal, oppofite, or of combined caufes
of motion; both of them, I am well con-
vinced, will be found falfe on trial; yet
thofe very philofophers who (like DR
PRIESTLY
614
APPENDIX.
PRIESTLY in the paffage already quoted,
P. 545. and 546.) affert the one of them
as a familiar and well-known matter of
fact, and even as a felf-evident neceffary
truth, take great umbrage at the other,
and reckon it a kind of infult to their un-
derſtanding; and call it impoffible; nay,
give it fome very hard words, ſuch as ab-
furd and ridiculous, &c.; which I, as
the diſcoverer of it, cannot fail to take
very much amifs. What, then, is the
difference between the two cafes, in con-
fequence of which thoſe philofophers fo
boldly affert the one, and fo obftinately
deny the other, without even the ceremo-
ny of a trial? I folemnly declare, that I
can conceive no reafon but one, namely,
that the latter may in a moment be deci-
ded by open unequivocal experiment, in
fuch a manner as to exclude all hypo-
thefes, and all appeals to confcioufneſs
with reſpect to the reaſon of its failure;
while the former is of fuch a nature, that,
though in the firſt inſtance it may be
brought to the teſt of experiment, yet it
will admit of an arbitrary hypothefis, in-
volving an appeal to conſciouſneſs, to ac-
count
APPENDIX.
615
1
count for the refult of the experiment
being contrary to the doctrine afferted;
which is always foreſeen and expected a
priori.
r
With respect to the laft fentence of
N°
9. I need only obferve, that as I am
not difputing about words, but things, I
care not whether the influence of motives
be called ftrictly speaking uniform," or
not; but their "uniform influence," if it
is to be called fuch, appears plainly to be
a very different kind of "uniform influ-
ence" from that of phyfical caufes, when
applied to lifeless bodies. And as to the
former being fubject to very different
laws" from the latter, it is a very allow-
able metaphorical expreffion, denoting in
general what I have been maintaining and
demonftrating particularly in my Eſſay.
Laws, in fuch inveſtigations as thefe,
mean ultimate general facts: fome of
thefe laws, or facts, which are different
in the two relations of caufe and motive,
I have afcertained; efpecially the occa-
fional feparation of the latter from its ac-
tion, its conftant reference to another
1
concurrent
616
APPENDIX.
1
concurrent principle of change, which I
have called a felf-governing power in the
agent or ſubject, and the want of any
fuch concurrent principle of change in
the lifeleſs fubject of mere phyfical
changes.
N° 10.
This remark may feem to deferve pecu-
liar attention, as it infinuates a kind of
appeal to obfervation and experiment,
with refpect to the uniformity of a per-
fon's judgement (which, in the language
of the author of thefe remarks, means
choice, or voluntary determination, followed
by and fhewn by overt action) in the fame
circumftances.
Suppofing, for the fake of argument,
what I cannot admit in point of fact,
that mens judgements and overt actions
would be found always the fame in the
fame circumſtances, no juft inference of
neceffury confequence with refpect to the
queftion at iffue could be drawn from it.
The
APPENDIX.
617
The perfon may have acted, in affairs of
importance, according to motives of du-
ty, or of intereſt, or of pleaſure, either
applied fingly, or in all varieties of combi-
nation and oppofition; and on trifling oc-
cafions, he may have acted without much
attention or exercife of the felf-governing
power, from inftinct, or from habit, or
from the first thought that occurred to
him in that involuntary train which is al-
ways, or almoſt always, going on. I fee
no reaſon to expect, in general, that a per-
fon's conduct in the fame circumftances.
ſhould be different at different times, To
fuppofe or expect, that a perfon having a
felf-governing power fhould do his duty,
or confult his intereft, or follow his plea-
fures, at one time, and at another time,
in the fame circumftances, fhould difre-
gard duty, intereft, pleaſure, &c. is to
confound the notion of felf-governing
power with the improper and fantaſtical
uſe of it, and with the want of any uni-
form relation between motives and ac-
tions; which is uncandid, as well as un-
reaſonable, as is fully ftated in SECT. I.
P. 4. 5. 6. This, however, the author of
4 I
the
618
APPENDIX.
the remarks has not attended to, as ap-
pears by the fecond fentence of N° 16.
My mode of reaſoning is independent of
the reſult of fuch obfervations and expe-
riments as we are now confidering; for it
fhews, that the actions of men could not
be in ordinary cafes what we really find
them, whether more or lefs uniform,
without the concurrence of a principle of
change different from what appears to have
any ſhare in the changes or effects obfer-
ved in lifeless bodies.
The reference to the fuppofed uniformity
of mens judgements and actions in cir-
cumſtances Suppofed the fame, is in ano
ther reſpect fallacious and nugatory: for
let the refult of any obfervation or expe-
riment be what it will, or what it can be,
I mean in favour of the uniformity al-
ledged, or againſt it, ſtill room is left for
hypotheſes to explain it away; and theſe
hypotheſes are endlefs, as well as ufe-
lefs; for they require appeals to con-
ſciouſneſs.
If the refult be the fame at the fubfe-
quent
APPENDIX.
619
quent trials as at the first, it will be held
as clear proof of the doctrine afferted; if
it be different, it will be immediately
fuppofed and afferted, that the circum-
ftances, though feemingly the fame, were
really different; that fome new motive,
perhaps not diſcoverable by the obſervers,
the conductors of the experiments, had oc-
curred, and produced the variety in the
refult. According to MR HUME, "the
fantaſtical defire of fhewing liberty" muſt
be reckoned the new motive in fuch a
cafe. This arbitrary hypothefis is juſt as
unreafonable as the converfe of it would
be; I mean, as it would be to affume the
fuppofition of the interference of a new
motive, though unknown to us, in thoſe
cafes where the refult, on repeated trials,
was the fame as on the first; and thence
to argue, that there muſt be a ſelf-go-
verning power in the perfon to prevent
the effects or influence of certain motives,
(that is, to feparate them from their pro-
per actions), fo as to make the refult, in
action, the fame, while the circumftances,
in point of motives, were very different.
The two cafes, of different actions in the
4 I 2
fame
620
APPENDIX.
But
fame circumſtances, and of the fame ac-
tions in different circumftances, are ftrict-
ly correlative; both fuppofitions are e-
qually eafily made, and both are nu-
gatory, as requiring appeals to confci-
oufnefs, and confequently being fubject
to arbitrary affertion and denial.
were it not for this laft circumſtance, that
is, could they both be aſcertained beyond
doubt or difpute, they would afford the
means of fettling demonftrably the ulti-
mate philofophical queftion at iffue ;
which the mere uniformity of refult in
action, from circumſtances really the fame
in point of motive, could never do.
It is at leaſt a conceivable cafe, that a
perfon having a ſubſtantial motive for
acting in the way he had done before,
may feel a defire (fantaſtical or rational)
to fhew his liberty, and may think this
can be beſt fhewn, or fhewn only, by
acting differently from what he had done
before. The philofophical queſtion, then,
comes to be, not, Whether he will act or
not act as he did before? but, How will
he
APPENDIX.
621
he be able to act according to the old or
according to the new motive? What is
the nature of the influence of motives?
What are the general laws or facts with
reſpect to it? What is the relation, not
merely of the motive according to which
he acts, but of both the motives, and of
every motive that he feels, to his volun-
tary determination and action? Is it a
conftant conjunction? Is it a feparable
one? Is the feparation by chance, or by
a certain law? Is there any abfolute force
or influence of motive, fo as to exclude
felf-governing power?—In thort, the
whole reaſoning of my Eſſay applies ſtrict-
ly to the hypothefis arifing out of the al-
ledged uniformity, and real or apparent
difference of actions in the fame circum-
ſtances, and the very certain fameneſs of
actions in different circumstances. But I
think it better to avoid fuch hypothetical
and difputable motives as that fuppofed
fantaſtical defire of fhewing liberty, and
take fuch as may eaſily be applied, and
may be certainly known, fuch as the
offer of money to a porter, on condi-
tion
622
APPENDIX.
507
tion of his doing any ordinary piece of
work.
N° 10. line 22. "We cannot trace back
the route of the die in a dice-box," &c.
Why the route of a die in a dice-box, ra-
ther than that of a ray of light in a glaſs
prifm, or in a teleſcope, or of a projectile
through the air, or of a fhip failing in a
current? Is it that fome philofophers love
darkneſs rather than light, becauſe it fa-
vours their fyftem more? I fufpect fo
very ſtrongly; for I cannot think any wri-
ter, whether able or not, would ever have
had recourſe to fo complicated a caſe, and
one fo much out of our fight, and out of
our knowledge, and out of our power, as
the motion of a die in a dice-box, if his
object had been only the inveſtigation of
truth, and a fair illuftration of what takes
place between the application of motives
and the voluntary overt actions of man-
kind.
But though it is impoffible either to
forefee or to trace back, in any one inftance,
the exact route of a die in a dice-box; yet
it
APPENDIX.
623
it is eaſy to analyfe and to ſpecify the va-
rious cauſes of its route, and its final ſet-
tling on the table, fo as to fhew, that
there is an infinite difference between the
motion and fettling of a die and the vo-
luntary actions of men, and eſpecially
to fhew, that there is no evidence, not
even the flighteſt prefumption, of there
being any felf-governing power in the
die, as there feems to be in a living per-
fon. For though the fhaking a die in a
box, and throwing it on a table, be fair-
ly referable to one Agent, and may be
thought a very fimple as well as eafy ac-
tion; yet when we confider phyfically the
motion and fubfequent fettling of the die
as effects referable to caufes, we find that
they are by no means fimple. Many dif-
ferent phyfical caufes, and even different
kinds of fuch causes, contribute to the va-
rious motions of the die; fuch as, impulfe
from the bottom or from the fides of the
box, and from the table, modified too by
the elafticity of all of them, in various de-
grees; gravitation, or the weight of the
die, always the fame, and having always
equal effect, whether the die be at reit or
in
624
APPENDIX,
in motion, and whether the direction of
its motion be upwards or downwards, per-
pendicular, parallel, or oblique to the ho-
rizon; refiſtance from the air, and from
the bottom and fides of the box, and from
the table, (though indeed theſe refiftances
are only impulſes, conſidered in a different
point of view). Then the direction of the
impulfe, with respect to the centre of gra-
vity of the die, muſt be confidered: if it
be in a line paffing through the centre of
gravity of the die, the motion of the die
will be fimply progreffive; but if the im-
pulſe be not in fuch a line, there will take
place in the die both a rotatory motion
round its centre of gravity, and a pro-
greffive one in the direction of the im-
pulfe.
It is unneceffary here to confider more
minutely, either the number, the nature,
or the proportions, of the various phyfical
caufes of the motion of the die, as accu-
racy on that point is neither our prefent
object, nor perhaps in itſelf attainable.
On throwing a die in the common way,
from a dice-box on a table, which may
be
APPENDIX.
625
be done in a ſecond of time, or lefs, all
thoſe phyſical cauſes are applied to it, ei-
ther fimultaneoufly or in fucceffion, and
either in concurrence, oppofition, or combina-
tion, (+,−, ^): but the particular cir-
cumſtances of the application of them, as
to quantity, time, proportion, and other
relations, are unknown to us, and out of
our power; and therefore, with refpect
to us, are as if they were not; but it
cannot be believed, that any perfon of
competent knowledge and judgement
ſhould ever fuppofe, that any one of thofe
caufes is feparated from its effect. If any
perfon were to entertain fuch an extrava-
gant opinion, he might (if he were can-
did in his profeffions and reafonings) be
eafily convinced of his error, by trying
feparately that ſtep of the proceſs in which
he ſuppoſed ſuch a ſeparation to take place.
We know, in general, with refpect to
the route of the die, that from being at
reft it will be in motion, variouſly modi-
fied in kind, in direction, and in velocity,
and at laſt will be at reft again.
from the Shape of the die, it is phyfically
4 K
But
impoffible
626
APPENDIX.
impoffible that it ſhould reſt in any other
but one of fix pofitions; that is, if it be
thrown on a hard table; for if it were
thrown on a very ſoft ſurface, or on loofe
fand, it might reft on one of the twelve
lines or of the eight points that bound it,
and in an endleſs variety of directions. If
the die is fair, (not loaded), there is no
cauſe, and no power in itſelf, to make one
of its fix furfaces turn up, rather than an-
other; but one of them must turn up: it
is an equal chance which of them, and
five to one againſt any one fide that can
be ſpecified. The particular feries of caufes,
either fimultaneous or fucceffive, concur-
ring, oppofing, or combined, that termi-
nate in the ultimate effect, which alone we
fee, being unknown to us and out of our
power, the ultimate effect may fairly, and
without danger of error, be regarded by
ús, with a view to conjecture, or betting,
or calculation, as a mere matter of chance;
that is, as coming to pafs without any
caufe at all. The doctrine of chances is
ftrictly applicable to it, and the conclu-
fions deduced from that principle are found
experimentally true with refpect to a die,
of
APPENDIX.
627
or any number of dice: but they are
falfe and ridiculous, and repugnant to the
natural, univerfal, and indefeaſible no-
tion of motive, when applied to the vo-
luntary actions of men; as hath been fully
ſhewn already, in SECT. XVI: the con-
cluſion is obvious, and need not be here
repeated.
NII.
"The total want of analogy between the
influence of our appetites upon the judge-
ment and of forces in phyfics, appears,"
&c.
This is a ſtrange affertion; and a mif-
take. The analogy between the relation
of motive and action and that of caufe
and effect in phyfics, (comprehending ap-
petites under the genus Motive, forces un-
der the genus Caufe), is great, and obvi-
ous, and generally acknowledged, and not
to be denied without extravagance; and
it has been fully fhewn and illuſtrated in
my Effay. It used to be thought fo per-
4 K 2
fect
628
APPENDIX.
fect as almost to amount to identity: this
was the doctrine of all modern Neceffita-
rians, eſpecially of MR HUME and DR
PRIESTLY; and the very object of my
Effay was to fhew, that the two relations.
were not the fame, to ſpecify wherein the
analogy between them failed, (namely,
with respect to the conftancy or feparabi-
lity of the conjunction), and to draw cer-
tain conclufions from the differences af-
certained between them. The doctrine
of the total want of analogy between them
was quite unexpected, and is ſtill incom-
prehenfible to me. But fuppofing it right,
that is, fuppofing the two relations in que-
ſtion to be ſo completely different and un-
like, that not only they are not the fame,
but that they do not even reſemble one
another, in any, the ſmalleſt, particular,
this cannot reafonably preclude the in-
quiry into the principal differences be-
tween them; nor can it in the leaſt inva-
lidate any conclufions neceſſarily reſulting
from the differences obferved. The
want of combination in the refult, from
the application of different motives, in
many cafes, as already fully explained, is
complete
APPENDIX.
629
complete proof of a feparation of one of
them from its proper effect or action;
and, in truth, the phrafe in queſtion is
little elſe than another expreffion for the
fame notion, fo effential to my reafon-
ings, and to all reafonings, on this fub-
ject.
cr
66
The ſufficiency of the underſtanding
for this operation," &c. (p. 477. line 26.)
Admitting the fufficiency of the under-
ſtanding for perceiving and judging to
be the natural refult of its intelligence,"
though I think the expreffion a perfectly
unmeaning pleonafm, and allowing the
metaphors employed in the remark to paſs
unqueftioned, I muft obferve, that fuch a
phrafe as "influence of phyfical force,"
and all the words and phraſes that can be
contrived, will make no difference as to
my argument, which is independent of
words, and turns on the felf-evident and
the demonſtrable neceffary confequences
of a certain relation, and on the truth
or falfity of thefe neceffary confequences,
as matters of fact, in different cafes of the
application of motives and of phyfical
cauſes:
630
APPENDIX.
caufes it is perfectly equal to me, whe-
ther X and Y be phyfical or metaphyfical
forces, that is, caufes or motives, and
whether A and B be effects or actions: I
find out by the refult, whether the rela-
tion in queſtion be a conftant or an occa-
fional and feparable conjunction, and
whether there be in the ſubject, whether a
living perſon or a lifeleſs body, any capa-
city or faculty of feparating X from A,
or Y from B: fuch a faculty is juſt what
I call a felf-governing power.
I admit, that a perfon having under-
ſtanding without felf-governing power,
would, in numberleſs inſtances, as in the
caſe of my porter, "judge one purſuit e-
ligible, without abfurdly combining it
with the other;" juft as I firmly believe,
that many a perſon ill of the palſy would
judge it eligible to take up his bed and
walk. But a man in a palfy cannot do
what he thinks eligible; as little could a
man, whatever might be the degree or
kind of his underſtanding or intelligence,
prevent the combination, oppofition, and
concurrence, (however abfurd theſe might
often
APPENDIX.
631
often be), of the effects or influence of
different motives; unleſs, in the firſt place,
theſe were ſeparable from their actions;
and unleſs, in the fecond place, he had
the power of feparating them. To
this I alluded in p. 232. 233.: for though
my argument is independent of all confi-
derations with reſpect to the ſteps, ſuch
as judgement, choice, will, &c. &c. be-
tween the motive and the overt act, and
though I anxiouſly wished to avoid fuch
difcuffions, in hopes of avoiding all idle
verbal diſputes, and of having no appeals
to make but to open experiment; yet I
knew perfectly, that my argument, found-
ed on the notions, +, -,, would
apply equally well to every ſtep of the pro-
cefs; but that, whether it did or not,
or whether that was confidered or not, it
would apply completely to the firſt and the
laft; the motive and the action, the cauſe
and the effect.
If any Pneumatologift fhould not at
once perceive and underſtand the infinite
difference between judging it eligible to pre-
vent the effect (in abfurd or improper com-
bination
632
APPENDIX.
bination or otherwife) of any cauſe, and
the actually preventing fuch effect, that is,
ſeparating the one from the other, let him
fairly try a few fuch experiments as the
following: Let him walk out at his win-
dow, or try to walk over a deep and rapid
river on the furface of the water, or try
to leap over a broad and dirty ditch; or,
if theſe experiments be thought too dan-
gerous to life or limb, let him fwallow
half a drachm of ipecacuanha, or half a
drachm of jallap; or, if he diflike drugs,
let him drink, inſtead of tea, to his break-
faſt, a pint, or more if needed, of the
beſt French brandy; and let him candidly
mark the refult: -I take it for granted,
that his underſtanding would judge (or
enable him to judge) it eligible not to
yield to the law of gravitation, not to fall
to the ground with an accelerated veloci-
ty, not to fall into the ditch, not to fink
to the bottom of the river, not to be car-
ried down the ſtream of it, not to expe-
rience the unpleafant effects of the drugs,
and not to become drunk with the bran-
dy; yet I fcarce think even a Metaphyfi-
cian can be found, who will expect that
the
APPENDIX.
633
the judgement of his underſtanding will
avail aught in preventing thoſe effects; or
who will not fee that fuch preventing of
the effects is just what I have been rea-
foning about, and have been expreffing
by the phraſes feparating a caufe from its
effect, &c. and that to enable a man to
make fuch experiments with fafety, as
well as uniformity of the refult, it would
be neceſſary, not only that the cauſes al-
luded to fhould be feparable from their
effects, but alſo that he fhould have the
power of feparating them. Now, fuch fe-
parability of motives and actions, and fuch
power in the agents, appear in the ordina-
ry conduct of mankind, but not in the
phænomena of phyfics, where the fubject
is lifeless body.
N° 12.
This paragraph deferves particular at-
tention for though it appear only as a
remark or objection relating to a ſingle
fentence of my Effay, which fentence is
fairly quoted, yet it is really an indirect
4 L
and
634
APPENDIX.
and feeble attempt to deny one of my a-
xioms, X+YA+ B, or, as it might
be expreffed in many cafes, m X=m A.
I call the attempt feeble and indirect, be-
cauſe the axiom is not quoted and openly
denied, but only a particular cafe, refer-
able to that axiom, is mentioned, and
certain inſtances of phyfical phænomena
are ſpecified, which the author of the re-
mark thinks contradictory to what I have
tated as neceffarily true in that cafe, as
comprehended under the general axiom.
From this it appears, that he was not
fufficiently aware of the nature of an a-
xiom, or felf-evident neceffary truth; and
particularly, that he did not attend to the
relation between a neceffary and a contin-
gent truth, or what is fuppofed to be one;
and confequently that he hath not fully
underſtood the complete evidence and fu-
preme authority of demonſtrative reaſon-
ing, as diftinguished from inductive, and
from the evidence of perception and of te-
ftimony. But this certainly may be ex-
plained to him, or to any perfon: ſuch
an attempt I made in SECT. III. to which
I
APPENDIX.
635
I fhall now add a few remarks and illu-
ſtrations relating to the point at preſent
under confideration; which I own I did
not think of as even a poffible matter of
diſpute at the time when SECT. III. was
written.
any
Particular inſtances, in contradiction to
a fuppofed general or univerfal fact or law
of nature, muſt be admitted as exceptions
and limitations to that law: they may
even be found fo numerous, and fo gene-
ral, as to fet afide fuch a fuppofed law,
and to convince us, that our belief of it
was either wholly or partly erroneous.
The general notion, and the belief of
fuppofed principle or law of nature, be-
ing deduced from particular obfervations
by a certain procefs of thought or reafon-
ing which we call induction, can never
be of higher authority than the particu-
lar facts from which it is derived, or than
other facts equally well aſcertained. Nay,
as that very procefs of reafoning or in-
duction may be fuppofed imperfect or er-
roneous, the general inference from it may
le fallacious; and must be of rather lefs
4 L 2
authority
636
APPENDIX.
authority or evidence than the particular
facts on which it was founded.
But the cafe is widely different with re-
fpect to axioms, or felf-evident neceffary
truths. Theſe are equally independent of
all particular obfervations, and of all in-
duction from them. They can neither be
diſcovered, nor eftablished, nor fhaken,
nor confirmed, nor made more particular
and limited, nor made more general and
comprehenfive, by fuch means. They
contain in themſelves the evidence of their
own truth, which evidence is fimple, di-
rect, and fupreme. In order to our being
fully convinced that they are univerfally
and neceffarily true, nothing more is re-
quifite but that we underſtand them. As
there may often be fome difficulty in this
reſpect with regard to fuch abstract no-
tions as thoſe which alone can be proper
fubjects of thofe propofitions which we
call axioms, we may be affifted in appre-
hending and underſtanding them, and
confequently be enabled to perceive their
internal evidence, by proper illuftrations,
taken from real fubftances, correfponding
1
in
APPENDIX.
637
in one reſpect, or more than one, to the
notions on which the axioms are found-
ed.
Thus, in teaching geometry, it is al-
ways poffible, and fometimes may be ne-
ceffary, to illuftrate the axiom, "That
things equal to one thing are equal to one
another," by fhewing the learner various
examples of the meaning and of the truth
of it, in lines, furfaces, folids, circles,
triangles, &c. But it would be a great
miſtake, and a great fault in the teacher,
to repreſent thofe examples as proving the
axiom, or the truth and the univerfality
of it as depending on and limited by the
refult of the obfervations in particular in-
ftances, and the axiom as being made more
or leſs general, according to the number
and the extent of the particular obſerva-
tions that were made and confidered: for
this would imply, that the axiom might
not be true at all times, and in all cafes;
and that whenever cafes occurred where-
in the refult, on obfervation and trial, did
not correſpond to the axiom, theſe were
to
638
APPENDIX,
to be acknowledged as exceptions to it.
But this, if not, ſtrictly ſpeaking, abfurd,
is at leaſt repugnant to the notion of
axiom: for every perfon who knows what
an axiom is, would inftantly judge, that
there was fome defect or miſtake in the
fuppofed obfervation, not that there was
any error in the axiom, or any poffibility
of there being an exception to it. Thus,
for example, if a perfon, on the faith of
the axiom alluded to, fhould fuppofe that
all quart-bottles must be equal to one an-
other, and on comparing many fuch by
actual experiment, and finding that they
were not equal to one another, fhould aſ-
fert that the axiom was falſe, or at leaſt
ſubject to exceptions, and in particular
that it was not applicable to quart-bottles,
it would inftantly be diſcovered where his
error lay; namely, in fuppofing that all
the things commonly called quart-bottles
were feverally equal to one thing: and
it might reaſonably be ſuſpected, that he
did not know what an axiom was, that
he did not underſtand the nature and fu-
preme authority of neceffary truths, and
the
APPENDIX.
639
the advantages of reafoning by neceffary
confequences.
Now, to apply thefe remarks to the cafe
in queſtion, the objection to my argu-
ment founded on the fuppofed obferva-
tion of certain examples in contradiction
to one of my axioms, or to a cafe plainly
comprehended under it, I have only to
obferve, that, fenfible how abſtruſe, and
in one reſpect how new, the notion of
conſtant conjunction is, on which my a-
xioms depend, or in which they are im-
plied, I took care to explain and illu-
ſtrate both it and them, very fully, per-
haps tedioufly; but merely in order to
make them be understood, that their
own internal evidence might be percei-
ved; not as conceiving, that thoſe exam-
ples and illuſtrations could prove, or that
any others could refute or limit the a-
xioms.
The illuftrations were taken from cer-
tain phyfical caufes and their effects; and
as the refult in various examples corre-
fponded perfectly to the axioms, fome-
1
thing
640
APPENDIX.
thing more than the illuftration which I
wanted was obtained, and fomething
highly important; I mean a proof, not
indeed, ftrictly ſpeaking, conclufive, but
affording a probability approaching very
near to certainty, that the circumſtance of
conſtant conjunction was a part of the re-
lation of thoſe cauſes to their effects: juſt
as the refult, when quantities feverally
equal to one quantity are compared ex-
perimentally, by its correfpondence with
the firſt axiom of geometry, ſerves to
prove, not the axiom itſelf, but the juſt-
nefs of the notion of quantity, and its
applicability to real fubftances, and the
truth of the fuppofition of the relation of
equality fubfifting between each of thoſe
quantities feverally and one other quan-
tity.
According to my mode of reaſoning,
the correspondence of the refult in many
cafes of phyfical caufes and effects to my
axioms, whatever it may prove with re-
fpect to this relation, has no more pre-
tenfions to prove or confirm the axioms
implied in the notion of conftant con-
junction,
APPENDIX.
641
junction, than the inconfiftency of the refult,
in many cafes of motives and actions, with
my axioms, has to refute them. This in-
confiftency only proves, that the circum-
ſtance of conſtant conjunction is no part
of the relation of motive and action. This
was precifely the ufe that I made of it;
and it was all that I wanted for the firſt
part of my dilemma. I fhall at all times.
admit the fame inference as to the want
of conſtant conjunction between any
things called caufes and their effects, with
reſpect to which the refult in the ſeveral
cafes does not correfpond to my axioms.
The cafe is exactly parallel to that of
the quart-bottles, already ftated: Give
us any number of quart-bottles feverally
equal to one, and they must be equal to one
another; give us any number of fuch
bottles not equal to one another, and they
must not be ſeverally equal to one: The a-
xiom will ſtill remain unfhaken. So give
us cauſes conftantly conjoined with their
effects, and the refult from the application
of them must be what is expreffed in the
axioms; give us caufes the refult of whofe
application does not correfpond to the
4 M
axioms,
642
APPENDIX.
axioms, and they must not be conftantly
conjoined with their effects; give us a
number of inftances of the application of
cauſes, in all of which the refult corre-
fponds with the axioms, and we fhall ad-
mit, that, in all of them, the feveral caufes
are conjoined with their reſpective effects;
and we might infer by induction, with
fome probability, that this was the cafe
with refpect to all kinds of cauſes, until
we met with inftances to the contrary, in
the application of fome particular kinds of
them; and then fuch inftances would be
acknowledged as exceptions to the ſuppo-
fed general rule with refpect to cauſes;
as, for example, with reſpect to agents,
motives, evidence, the vital principle,
and the partial exciting cauſes in the phy-
fiology and pathology of animal and ve-
getable life.--But whatever be the rela-
tion between thefe caufes, or any others,
and their reſpective effects, as to conſtant
or occafional and feparable conjunction,
the axioms derived from this notion must
remain unfhaken, as neceſſary truths; and
must be found true, as matters of fact, in
the various applications of every kind of
caufe
APPENDIX.
643
cauſe that is conftantly conjoined with its
effect.
As to the three inftances ſtated in N°12.
as examples contradictory to my remark
in p. 291. 292. which is fairly quoted in
N° 12. and which I ftill think juſt in eve-
ry part, and the first part of which is
clearly implied in one of the axioms, as
the laſt is in the Doctrine of Chances, it
is nowife furpriſing, that in none of them
is the effect the meaſure of that "circum-
ftance which is in one fenfe its caufe:" For,
in the first place, in none of them is that
circumftance conſtantly conjoined with the
ultimate effect, as the author of the re-
mark has very rafhly afferted; and, in
the fecond place, in the two laft of them,
(which are of a very different kind from
the firft), other principles of change, or
cauſes, beſides that circumftance which is in
one fenfe the cause of the phænomenon men-
tioned, concur, and are indeed abfolutely
neceffary for the production of it. Even
with refpect to the firit of them, the ex-
ploſion of a mine of gunpowder, fome
other circumftances, befides the heat ap-
4 M 2
plied,
644
APPENDIX.
ង
plied, are neceffary for the production of
the effect; for example, air: if the pow-
der were thoroughly wet, by the mine be-
ing filled with water, it would not ex-
plode in the ufual manner on the applica-
tion of heat.
But, independently of this confidera-
tion of a different kind of caufe, befides
the heat, being requifite for the produc-
tion of the effect ufually referred to the
heat alone, which confideration may be
diſregarded at preſent, as that other cauſe,
as well as the heat, may be fuppofed e-
qually applied in all cafes, while the ul-
timate refult, though the fame in kind,
is widely different in degree in differ-
ent cafes, and by no means a meaſure of
either of the original external caufes ap-
plied, it muſt be obferved, that in "the
exploſion of a mine of gunpowder," there
is a great concurrence, and a very long fe-
ries of caufes and effects, of the fame kind
with that firſt applied. I call the feries
of caufes long, in confideration of the
great number of ſteps in it, however ſhort
it may be in point of time. By the inac-
curacy
!
APPENDIX.
645
curacy
of the expreffion employed by the
author of the remark, all that vaft con-
currence and that long ſeries of innume-.
rable little effects are reprefented as but
one great effect, referable to the heat ap-
plied as its caufe: and perhaps, from
want of due attention on his part, he
may have come to regard it in that im-
proper light; for I cannot fuppofe him
unacquainted with the generally known
facts relating to the compofition, the in-
flammation, and the deflagration of gun-
powder.
"A mine of gunpowder" is a concife,
but inaccurate expreffion, employed to de-
note the quantity of gunpowder lodged
in a mine. This quantity may be 100
barrels, that is, 10,000 lb. containing
feveral hundred millions of grains or par-
ticles, each of which has in itſelf a due
proportion of nitre, of fulphur, and of
charcoal. "The exploſion of a mine of
gunpowder," means the inflammation and
deflagration of every particle of the gun-
powder. This may be produced or begun
in one particle, or a few particles, by the
application
646
APPENDIX.
application of a certain degree of heat,
however ſmall the quantity of it may be,
which will kindle the fulphur or charcoal,
or perhaps melt the nitre and fulphur,
without kindling directly the latter and
the charcoal. By the chemical affinities
of the component parts of the gunpowder,
as foon as ſuch kindling and melting of
any the ſmalleſt particle takes place, a ra-
pid and violent decompofition of it, at-
tended with the extrication or generation
of much air, and very intenfe heat, is
produced: this is called the deflagration,
detonation, or explofion of the gunpow-
der. The heat thus produced has the
fame effect on the particles in contact, or
nearly fo, with the one firſt kindled on
the fame principle, this procefs will go
on fucceffively through all the particles
of the powder, but with fuch velocity,
that the whole quantity of it may ex-
plode in one or two feconds; and this,
which is the fum or amount of millions
of little effects, either fimultaneous or in
very rapid fucceffion, will appear as only
one great effect produced in a moment by
one fingle caufe, perhaps very fmall in
quantity,
APPENDIX.
647
quantity, and bearing no proportion, at
any time, to the ultimate effect; which is
alfo various at different times, according
to the quantity of the powder exploded;
that is, according to the number of little
effects of which it is the aggregate a-
mount. But, accurately confidered, the ul-
timate effect in this cafe is no more to be
regarded as the effect and meaſure of the
fuppofed cauſe, than the great fire of Lon-
don, which raged for many days, and
confumed a great part of the city, could
be reckoned the effect of the fmall quan-
tity of heat, perhaps a ſingle ſpark, which
began it. The difference between the two
cafes is merely as to the velocity of the ſe-
ries of effects produced: but whether this
ſeries occupy only a few feconds, or many
days, or many years;
whether the many
little effects coincide, or come fo near one
another, in time, as to form one great ag-
gregate, which is the caſe in the exploſion
of gunpowder, or the burning of a houſe;
or come fo flowly as to be feen only in
fucceffion, which is the cafe in the burn-
ing of flow-match; it is equally different
from
648
APPENDIX.
from the fimple immediate effect of a caufe
conſtantly conjoined with its effect, and
equally unfit to be a meaſure of fuch a
caufe.
If the author of the remark, or any o-
ther perſon, wiſh to find in the explofion
of gunpowder the conftant conjunction of
cauſe and effect, (in my ſtrict and uni-
form meaning of the phrafe), and an ef-
fect, confequently, which is a meaſure of
the cauſe applied, he muſt look for it in
the ſtep between the application of heat
and the kindling or melting of the ingre-
dients, and in the ſtep between this and
the detonation of the compound; and,
making due allowance for the peculiar
chemical principles of change, conſiſting
in the relations among different bodies,
fimple and compound, and among the
particles of the fame body, however fimple
it may be, which principles of change
feem to have a fhare, as well as heat, in
producing fuch effects as we are confider-
ing, he will find in theſe ſteps what he
wants. But he muft obferve, that the firft
of
APPENDIX.
649
of them depends, not on the quantity of
heat thrown into the whole mafs of pow-
der, but on the raifing the temperature of
fome part of it to a certain degree; we
fhall fuppofe (for I know not exactly the
fact) to 600°. A vaſt quantity of heat may
be thrown into gunpowder, enough, for
example, to raiſe the temperature of a
great mafs of it 2000 or 300°, if equally
diffuſed over it all, without kindling or
melting the fmalleft particle of it. While
a wonderfully finall quantity of heat, as,
for example, what is contained in a red-
hot fpark ftruck off with a flint from fleel,
will melt or kindle that little particle to
which it is applied; which particle will
then immediately explode. Nor will it be
thought by any chemiſt a paradox to ſay,
that the heat in fuch a fpark is as truly
confumed, or abſorbed, in heating, melt-
ing, or kindling the gunpowder, and con-
ſequently is as truly meaſured by the quan-
tity of its effect in thoſe ways, as if it had
been employed in making water boil or
ice melt. Yet the quantity of heat in ſuch
a red-hot ſpark of fteel may be fo very
ſmall, that, if it had been equally diffufed
4 N
through
650
APPENDIX.
through the whole mafs of gunpowder, it
would not have raifed its temperature the
thouſandth part of a degree. If a much
greater quantity of heat, as, for example,
that contained in many large maffes of
iron of a white heat, be applied to the
gunpowder, the immediate effect of it will
correſpond to the quantity of it, or be a
meaſure of it; that is, more of the powder
will be kindled or melted directly by it;
but as foon as this effect begins, the de-
flagration begins, and is rapidly propaga-
ted through the whole mafs; the explo-
fion of which will take place in ſomewhat
leſs time, and confequently with fome-
what more violence, than if it had been
produced by only one fmall ſpark. But
the difference of the two explofions, in
point of time, will probably not ex-
ceed a very ſmall fraction of a fecond;
and the difference between them, in
point of violence or force, will be pro-
portionably ſmall, fo as to bear no fen-
fible proportion to the whole force of
the exploſion in either cafe and confe-
quently both thoſe differences will eſcape
our
APPENDIX.
651
our obfervation, or be to us as if they
were not.
The other two inftances ftated in N° 12.
as contradictory to my remark, may be
difcuffed very ſhortly.
"The malignity of the fmall-pox is no
meaſure of the quantity or quality of the
contagious matter employed to give the
diſeaſe."
It certainly is not; nor can it be fo,
for three moſt excellent reafons: Firſt, Be-
cauſe any given quantity of the conta-
gious matter of any given quality is not
conftantly conjoined with any determined
degree or malignity of the difeafe, that is,
with any certain number or kind of pu-
ftules, and with any certain degree, or
number, or combination, of the febrile
and other ſymptoms; fecondly, Becauſe
at leaſt one other caufe, of a different kind
from the contagious matter, and admit-
ting of great varieties as to its own condi-
tion, muſt concur with it to produce the
diſeaſe, in any degree; and, thirdly, Be-
4 N 2
caufe
652
APPENDIX.
cauſe in moft cafes feveral other caufes do
in fact concur with the two primary cauſes,
and have a great influence in modifying
the diſeaſe,
The vital principle is as neceffary for
the production of the finall-pox, as the
application of the exciting caufe, conta-
gion; nay, a particular ſtate or condition
of the vital principle is requifite for the
production of the difeafe. The contagion,
if applied to an animal of a different fpe-
cies from man, as, for example, to a bird
or a fish, or to a man who had had it be-
fore, or to one who, from peculiarity of
conftitution, was incapable of having the
difeafe, or even to one who was not, at
the time when it was applied, properly
difpofed to take it, would no more pro-
duce the fmall-pox, than it would do if it
were applied to a ſtock or a ſtone.
Even when the proper condition of the
vital principle concurs with the conta-
gion, and the diſeaſe accordingly is pro-
duced, it is greatly modified, as to ma-
lignity, by fuch concurrent cauies as the
ftate
APPENDIX.
653
ſtate of the body with refpect to fulneſs
of blood, and tendency to inflamma-
tion, general or particular, and perhaps
to putrefaction, or at leaſt to debility;
and perhaps ſtill more by external cauſes
of a different kind, fuch as heat or cold,
bad air or good, proper or improper diet
and medicines. According to the various
management of thefe concurrent caufes,
many of which are very much in our
power, the ſmall-pox may be made either
fo mild as ſcarce to be known, or thought
a diſeaſe, or fo malignant as to be gene-
rally fatal.
"The contraction of a mufcle is no
meaſure of the ſtimulus applied to pro-
duce it.
99
Certainly not; for nearly the fame rea-
fons that make it impoffible that the ma-
lignity of the ſmall-pox ſhould be a mea-
fure of the contagion applied.
The ſtimulus that occafionally excites
contraction in a mufcle, is not conftantly
conjoined with any uniform degree or
force
654
APPENDIX.
>
force of contraction in it; nay, not even
with any contraction at all in the muſcle.
It is only a partial exciting phyfiological
caufe, which can have no effect without
the concurrence of the vital principle; and
as this principle admits of many different
modifications, the ultimate effect obfer-
ved from the application of a ſtimulus
may often be various in quantity, and
perhaps in quality too, when the ftimulus
is the fame; or may be the fame in both
reſpects, when the ſtimulus is very differ-
ent in both. A ſtimulus applied to a
muſcle perfectly dead, that is, completely
deprived of its vital principle, will pro-
duce no contraction in it: a weak ftimu-
lus applied to mufcles of great and pe-
culiar irritability, (which is a particular
modification of the vital principle), will
produce unuſually ſtrong, and perhaps ir
regular, contraction of fuch muſcles: a
ftrong ftimulus applied to muſcles that
are weak, or torpid, or paralytic, will pro-
duce weak contraction, or perhaps none
at all.
After thus confidering phyfically, and at
fo
APPENDIX.
655
fo great length, the three inftances given
as contradictory to my remark founded
on one of the axioms of conftant conjunc-
tion, in order to fhew that they are not
inconſiſtent with the common, and what
appears to me the juft, notion of the rela-
tion of fuch caufes and their effects, I
hope I may, without any danger of be-
ing thought either obfcure, or defirous to
evade the moſt rigorous and particular in-
veſtigation of the cafes ftated in N° 12.
give what I think the fair and complete
logical and mathematical anſwer to thoſe
cafes, and to all of the fame kind; which
is indeed a very ſhort one. If X be fome-
times conjoined with A, fometimes with
m A, ſometimes with, it is not con-
ftantly conjoined with any one of them;
nor confequently can any one of them be
a meaſure of it.
"Human actions do not admit of de-
grees," &c. Vide fis page 271. line 20. to
page 276. line 21.
"I think the involuntary opinion of the
underſtanding
८
656
APPENDIX.
underſtanding always has its full effect on
the will."
This very erroneous affertion, for it
can ſcarce be reckoned a real opinion, pro-
ceeds from confounding the two very dif-
ferent notions of will or choice, and opi-
nion or judgement, properly ſo called
which confufion again proceeds from u-
fing the terms, Understanding, Judgement,
Opinion, to exprefs the two different no-
tions in question. This appears clearly
in confidering fuch cafes as that of Me-
dea, page 572.; and has been fully dif-
cuffed already, page 551. line 8. to page 576.
line 17.
N° 13.
ર
"I could have wifhed," &c. Vide fis
page 465. line 20.
"The terms Option and Diſcretion, which
are attributed to this power when acting,"
&c.
I
APPENDIX.
657
I never meant to attribute option or dif
cretion to power; nor did I ever conceive
that power acted. Power and action, (in the
ſtrict and literal meaning of theſe terms),
as well as option and difcretion, are at-
tributes of mind alone. By optional or dif-
cretionary power, I meant power which
the mind, or living perfon, might or might
not exert on any occafion, according to
the option, difcretion, or choice of fuch
mind or living perfon. This kind of power
alone, I conceive to be properly and lite-
rally power: The power (as it is called) of
heat to melt ice, of water to diffolve falt,
of brandy to make men drunk, &c..is
plainly a very different kind of thing;
which I conceive to be called power by a
metaphorical ufe of this term.
The pur-
pofe of the epithets optional and diſcretio-
nary, ſo often applied to it, was to pre-
vent ambiguity, by fhewing plainly what
kind of power I meant. But I have no
attachment to the phrafe, which, though
perfectly intelligible, is evidently illogi-
cal; like the common phrafes, a wife
plan, a fooliſh project, a happy choice, a
miferable life, an eloquent ſpeech, &c. in
40
which
658
APPENDIX,
which that wifdom, or folly, or happi-
nefs, or miſery, is verbally predicated of
the plan, the choice, the life, &c. of a
perfon, which is meant, and, in ſtrict lo-
gical propriety, is predicable, only of the
perfon. The remarks on the notion
power (page 147. to 153.) were intend-
ed to prevent fuch objections as theſe in
N° 13.
of
"One ſhould be apt to think, from
fome of theſe terms, that it was a faculty
which decided according to reafon and ar-
gument.
""
That would be a miſtake of a very odd
kind; for it can no more decide than it
can eat, and drink, and walk, and ride;
and it can neither hear, nor fee, nor un-
derſtand reafon and argument. The fimple
word power, and the phrafe optional and
difcretionary power, exprefs merely the ab-
ftract notion of a perfon being able, at his
own option, to act or not to act; that is,
they exprefs that notion, fingly, without
regard to numberlefs other attributes of a
perſon; juſt as the word whiteneſs expreſſes
one
APPENDIX.
659
one thing, without regard to many other
things, predicable of fnow.
"And from the last circumftance, its
yielding to feelings of a certain intenſity,"
&c. page 480. from the top.
This remark deferves peculiar atten-
tion; for, to the best of my judgement,
it is the only one of the great number con-
tained in the fixteen paragraphs of objec-
tions to my Effay, that is ftrictly fair,
and pertinent to my mode of reafoning.
It plainly turns on things, as all reafon-
ings thould do, and not on words; and it
fhews, that the author of it understood
the nature and force of my argument.
But I cannot think it a valid objection to
the reafoning in my Effay; and I think it
may be fairly and completely anſwered in
the following manner.
First, I admit, that men do fometimes
perform very foolish actions in confe-
quence of the fimultaneous application of
two or more motives in oppofition, com-
bination, or concurrence; and i conceive
402
that
660
ΑΡΡΕΝ DIX.
that this may proceed in fome caſes from
the abfolute violence of the motives fo ap-
plied, which may diſorder both the intel-
lectual and the active powers of a perfon;
but more commonly from the relative
want of due force of mind, that is, from
weakneſs or deficiency of the felf-govern-
ing power, which is various in different
perfons, and in the fame perfon at differ-
ent times. Thus a child, from a defire to
fit on two ftools, will endeavour to fit on
them both at once: but the danger thence
refulting to the fitting part is fo great and
immediate, and the confequences of fuch
an attempt have fo often been experien-
ced, that the cafe is become proverbial.
And the childish conduct in this cafe, and
the vulgar proverb founded on it, afford
more real ufeful practical knowledge of
the human mind, and of the relation of
motive and action, than could be extract-
ed from many volumes written to prove
the neceflity of human actions. The child
learns that he has the power of choofing,
and that he ought to chooſe, in ſuch ca-
fes; and as he grows up, is reminded by
the proverb, that in many other cafes it
behoves
APPENDIX.
66 £
behoves him much to chooſe between dif-
ferent motives. Yet many people, either
from natural defects, or acquired habits
of indeciſion from want of proper exer-
tion of their faculties, have all their lives
been remarkably wavering and irrefolute,
unable or unwilling to chooſe or deter-
mine where they ought to have done it,
and where ordinary men would have done
it, at once. This character has attracted
the attention of men of obſervation and
wit it has been fuccefsfully exhibited on
the ftage; as in the French comedy of
L'Irrefolu. I have heard of a ſtateſman,
diſtinguiſhed for this peculiarity of cha-
racter, who moſt imprudently built him-
ſelf a handſome library, with two doors
to it a brother ftatefman, who knew his
infirmity, expreffed great concern at find-
ing him in fo perilous a fituation; appre-
hending he would never get out of his li-
brary, from not being able to determine
which door he fhould go out at.
But we muſt not expect in all cafes in
which there is a combination of incon-
fiftent motives, without the poffeffion or
the
662
APPENDIX.
the proper exertion of the felf-governing
power, that there will of neceſſity be an
abfurd or ridiculous combination in the
refult or overt action, of the fame kind
with that which I have fhewn to be the
neceffary confequence of the conftant con-
junction of motive and action; and which
I have illuftrated fo fully. For the rela-
tion of motive and action is in fact but
an occafional and Jeparable conjunction; and,
confiftently with this notion of the rela-
tion in queſtion, the influence of only one
of the motives applied may be perceptible
in the refult; or firft that of one, then
that of another, then that of a third of
them; and this not once only, but re-
peatedly, and as it were by turns. Hence
that peculiar modification of indecifion
and weakneſs of mind which is called
wavering, and is confiderably different
from mere hesitation, or want of chooſing
or determining. It is the frequently de-
termining, but often changing the deter-
mination; and choofing, and for fome
time acting, according to different motives.
in fucceffion, though they were all applied
at
1
APPENDIX.
663
at once. The bad confequences of this
wavering conduct on numberless occa-
fions, eſpecially in all very important ca-
fes, and in all cafes of great and urgent
danger, are as well known as thoſe of ab-
folute indecifion; and I believe in fact,
that they have been more frequently ob-
ferved. As theſe two kinds of weakneſs are
fo near akin, it is highly probable that
both may often have been combined in
the fame perſon, and may even have been
fhewn in the courfe of the fame tranfac-
tion, eſpecially if it were long or compli-
cated.- Both kinds of weaknefs are e-
qually inconfiftent with the character of
a great man; for example, of a great ge-
neral, or a great ftatefman; as many ar-
mies, and many nations, have learned by
fevere experience. Many perfons, by the
various accidents of birth and fortune,
have been placed in fituations, in which,
for want of proper ſteadineſs or vigour of
mind, they could not act either with ho-
nour to themſelves or advantage to thoſe
whoſe moſt important interefts depended
on their conduct.
JAMES,
664
APPENDIX.
JAMES, the Firſt of England, and Sixth
of Scotland, who was no way deficient in
fenfe, or knowledge, or wit, feems to have
been remarkably deficient in the no leſs
important talent of ſteadineſs or vigour of
mind. It is faid he knew well enough his
own defect; and that he was once told of
it in a very curious manner from the pulpit.
He had heard of a famous preacher, who,
according to the faſhion of the times, was
very witty in his fermons, and peculiarly
happy in his choice of texts. JAMES got
this perfon to preach before him; who,
with all ſuitable gravity, gave out his text
in the following words: James, First,
and Sixth the latter part of the verfe.
He that wavereth is like a wave of the
"fea, driven by the winds, and toffed."
"He is at me already," faid the King.
The text is genuine, and the application
of it juft and witty, even independently
of the pun, which feems fo well fuited to
the taſte of the times, and eſpecially of
JAMES and his Court. I know not whe-
ther the ſtory be true or invented; but,
at any rate, the ſtory, and the fimple text,
(6
afford
APPENDIX.
665
afford a good illuftration of what I am here
endeavouring to point out.
What I have here mentioned fo fully
with reſpect to the cafe of motives of only
ordinary force, in perfons in whom there
is a want of due vigour of mind, is e-
qually applicable to the cafe of motives of
fuch extraordinary violence, that ordinary
people cannot refift them; and may be
fufficient to fhew, that fuch a combination
of influence in the refult as is alluded to in
N° 13. will not neceffarily take place in
fuch circumſtances. For fuch motives be-
ing either permanently and completely or
for a time ſeparable from their reſpective
actions, the refult may correfpond entirely
to one or more of the motives, juft as if
there had been no others applied; or it
may correfpond to every one and all of
them fucceffively, or by turns. When I
mention this as what may be the refult in
thefe cafes, in contradiftinction to what
must be the refult on the fuppofition of
conftant conjunction, I mean only to ex-
clude the notion of its being in any mea-
fure voluntary, or depending on the felf-
4 P
governing
666
APPENDIX.
governing power of the perfon to whom
the motives are applied; which is exclu-
ded in the cafe ftated in N° 13.: but I
do not mean to fay, that it may come to
pafs ablolutely by chance, or without
any cauſe whatever; for fuch a fuppofi-
tion is abfurd. We are only to conceive,
that the varieties in the refult will depend
on caufes or circumftances in the applica-
tion of the different motives, and in the ſtate
of the perfon to whom they are applied,
eſpecially in the involuntary train of
thought, which may be unknown to us, or,
if known to us, will not be in our power.
In confequence of fuch circumftances, the
perfon's attention may be firſt and exclu-
fively given to one or two of the motives
applied, or firft to fome, and then to o-
thers of them; fo that the influence of
them, fuppofing them to have overcome
the force of mind, fhall not have neceffa-
rily nor conftantly, whatever may be the
cafe on fome occafions, that abfurd refult
which the author of the remarks alludes
to.
But it is needlefs to difcufs more mi-
nutely
APPENDIX.
667
nutely this point of the feparability of mo-
tive and action, as preventing, not the
poffibility, but the neceffity and univer-
fality, of fuch a refult; for there is a ftill
greater difference between the real juſt no-
tion of the relation of motive and action,
and that notion of it which I have confi-
dered fo fully, and fhewn to be erroneous;
in confequence of which fuch a refult as
the author of the remark alludes to, (for
example, motion in the diagonal cafe,
p. 226. and inftances, p. 260. 263.) can-
not be a neceffary confequence of any pof-
fible or ſuppoſeable application of mo-
tives.
The natural and juſt notion of motive
implies in ordinary cafes reference to the
felf-governing power of the agent; but in
all cafes, even thoſe of compulfion, it im-
plies the feparability of motive from its
proper action; and it always implies,
and chiefly confifts in, the notion of
"that for the fake of which;" which ef-
fectually excludes fuch refults as are at
preſent in queſtion from being neceſſary
4 P 2
confequences
668
APPENDIX.
confequences of the application of
tives.
any mo-
For the reafons ftated p. 465. 1. 20. I
avoided entering on any minute difcuffion
of the nature, extent, and limits of the
felf-governing power; nor can I here un-
dertake to exprefs, in a manner free from
cavil, the peculiar ftate, and all the cir-
cumſtances, of a perfon under compulfion,
from the application of motives of irreſiſt-
ible force. But I may venture to fay, that
a perfon in fuch circumflances is not con-
ceived to be deprived of his underſtanding,
or driven to madnefs: he is fuppofed to
underſtand what he is to do, and to know
whether he can or can not attain or ac-
compliſh, by any mode of acting," that
for the fake of which." I may ſay like-
wife, that what is ufually called and rec-
koned the irrefiftible force of a motive, is
but a relative notion: it is indeed doubly
relative, as bearing relation both to the
mind to which the motive is applied, and
to the other motives applied along with it,
but in oppofition to it.
I
APPENDIX.
669
1
I know of no kind or force of motives
that, ftrictly speaking, can be thought ab-
folute, and univerfally irreſiſtible: I know
of nothing that could have fubdued atro-
cem animum CATONIS. But we conceive,
that he was endowed with very extraordi-
nary force of mind; and an ordinary per-
fon, who fhould take it into his head that
he was equal in this refpect to Cato, would
be as much and as defervedly laughed at,
as if he ſhould fancy that his own limbs
were equal to the invicti membra Glyconis,
or as if he thought his own talents were
equal to thoſe of Homer or of Archimedes.
But the inferiority of ordinary men to
Cato, and others of heroic virtue, is not
folely, nor perhaps chiefly, in point of
underſtanding: the knowledge of what is
right, and the ability to do it in very try-
ing circumſtances, are quite different
things; the former of which is much
more common than the latter, and may
reaſonably be fuppofed in all who ap-
prove the conduct and admire the cha-
racter of Cato, though probably but few
of them could have done as he did, or
been, what they behold with admiration;
and
670
APPENDIX.
and this, not from folly, nor from igno-
rance, nor from vice; but merely from
weakneſs.
Though the differences among mankind
with refpect to natural or to acquired vigour
of mind, and confequently with respect to
the kind and the intenfity of motives
which they cannot refift, be very great;
yet there is generally underſtood to be a
fort of common ſtandard or average a-
mong them as to theſe things, juft as
there is with refpect to all other mental
endowments, or with refpect to various
bodily qualifications, fuch as ftature, and
muſcular ſtrength. All excufes or juftifi-
cations of a perfon's conduct on the ſcore
of conſtraint, compulfion, or ſtrong and
irreſiſtible temptation, and all our judge-
ments when we acquit or condemn in fuch
cafes, and all our fentiments of admira-
tion of thoſe who have difplayed on try-
ing occafions heroic virtue, and extraor-
dinary vigour of mind, and our contempt
of thoſe who on ordinary occafions have
acted meanly, though perhaps not crimi-
nally, and have thereby fhewn peculiar
weakneſs
APPENDIX.
671
}
weakneſs of mind, plainly bear relation
to that notion, however vague and inac-
curate it may be thought, of the common
degree of force of mind.
I doubt much whether any great accu-
racy in eſtimating the force of mind of
different individuals be attainable; and,
at any rate, I do not aim at it here. But
I prefume it will be a fufficient illuftration
of my meaning, and, in general, a pretty
juſt account of the matter, to ſay, that
we conceive that even ordinary men may,
if they pleaſe, refift the allurements of in-
tereſt or of pleaſure, of various kinds; or
what we call temptation: but that ordi-
nary men cannot refiſt ſuch motives as the
fear of death and violent pain. In other
words, we conceive, that the latter mo-
tives do overpower, but that the former
do not overpower the common degree of
force of mind.
It is certain, at leaſt, that the latter mo-
tives, and not the former, have in all ages
and countries been employed as almoſt
fure means of compulfion; that they have
generally
672
APPENDIX.
;
generally been found effectual; that we
confider a perſon as fomehow extraordi-
nary who has refifted them to the laft:
that we confider the application of them
as excufing actions in their own nature
improper, and, if they had been volun-
tary, highly criminal; that, on the o-
ther hand, mere temptation is not thought
an excuſe, nor confequently, in general,
pleaded as one, for fuch improper actions;
and that perfons yielding to temptation,
and doing wrong in confequence of it,
are reckoned not merely weak, but crimi-
nal. It was thought, as in truth it was,
a very extraordinary excufe for the pecu-
lation that he and his friends were char-
ged with, that a man of no common ta-
lents, and very uncommon vigour of
mind, made openly in the Britiſh ſenate,
"That there were fuch temptations in In-
dia as fleſh and blood could not refift."
There was certainly fomething bold at
leaft, if not honeft, in fuch an avowal;
but I am convinced no perfon of common
fenfe and common honefty could ever hear
or think of fuch an excufe without indig-
nation.
22
But
APPENDIX.
673
But leaving, for the preſent, the exami-
nation of fuch cafes of fuppoſed irreſiſt-
ible temptation, as doubtful at beft, we
may confider the motives generally ac-
knowledged as fufficient to overcome the
ordinary degree of force of mind; and it
will foon appear, that even their ſuppoſed
irreſiſtible influence is not uniform in the
fame perfon, nor conftantly conjoined
with its proper action; that it depends in
a great meaſure on the kind and degree of
the other motives applied along with it,
but in oppofition to it; that the influence.
of fuch motives may ferve to ſupport, and
concur with, the force of mind, which,
though overcome, is not to be regarded
as annihilated, even in cafes of compul-
fion.
The fear of death may be fuppofed, or
may have been found on trial, fufficient
to overcome an ordinary perfon, and make
him do what he was very unwilling to do,
and would not have done but for that
fear; as in the common cafe of a travel-
ler being robbed on the highway. This
must be acknowledged to be a fair in-
4 Q
ftance
674
APPENDIX.
1
+
ney
ftance of compulfion, and as fuch would
be a fufficient excufe for the traveller, if,
to fave his own life, he gave up the mo-
of another perfon entruſted to him,
and which he could not replace. If he
were to do this from mere temptation, that
is, for his own intereft or pleaſure, he would
be criminal; at leaſt he would be thought
fo on this fide of the Indus. But it would
not follow, that the fame perſon, either at
that or any other time, would neceffarily
yield to the fame motive, and to fave his
life do any other action required of him,
however mean or criminal it might be;
nor that he would, for the fame confide-
ration, ſuffer any evil that could be in-
flicted on him, as, for example, the extre-
mity of torture. In the caſe of torture
applied to obtain from a wretch the con-
feffion of a crime for which, as foon as
he confeffes it, he muſt fuffer death, we
have in direct oppofition two fuppofed ir-
reſiſtible motives, each of which, if it had
been applied without the other, would
probably have overcome the force of mind
of the perfon. But when both are applied
at once, the perfon completely refifts the
one,
APPENDIX.
675
one, and acts perfectly according to the
other. This feparability of even the most
powerful, and fuppofed irrefiftible, mo-
tives from their actions, prevents the ne-
ceffity of fuch abfurd combinations as thoſe
alluded to in N° 13. If any perſon think
this may be accounted for merely on the
ſuppoſition of abfolute force in the mo-
tives, without any force of mind in the
perfon, let him confider again the neceffa-
ry confequences of his fuppofition, as fta-
ted in the dilemma and the axioms, and
he will find his mistake.
Without fuch feparability of motive and
action, felf-governing power or force of
mind being excluded from having any
fhare in the actions of men, the abfurd
combinations of influence muſt take place;
but motive and action being feparable,
and the notion of "that for the fake of
which" being effential to the relation of
motive and action, we cannot expect a com-
bination of action that is not in that rela-
tion to all the motives from which it
ceeds, whatever be the force of the feve-
ral motives applied; not even though
4 & 2
fingly
pro-
676
APPENDIX.
fingly applied they would have been irre-
fiftible.
Thus, in the cafe p. 226. diagram 1. if
the porter, inſtead of being offered a gui-
nea for going in the line A B, were affu-
red, that he ſhould be hanged if he did not
go
in that line, I take it for granted he
would go accordingly and for a ſimilar
confideration fingly applied, he would go
in the line A C. But if both threats were
applied at once, he would not go in the
diagonal A D, any more than he would
have gone in the diagonal for the guineas
he might have got by going in the line
A B, and for the half-guineas he might
have got by going in the line A C; for
this plain and fatisfactory reafon, that he
could neither earn guineas nor half-gui-
nias, nor efcape hanging, in the different
cafes put, by fuch conduct: his action
would not be in the relation of "that for
the take of which" to the motives applied.
I call this reafon plain and fatisfactory in
the cafe at prefent under confideration,
becaule it is confiftent with, and directly
proceeds from, the principle (the juſt no-
tion
APPENDIX.
677
tion of the relation of motive and action)
from which I reaſon, and perfectly ac-
counts for the refult; which, though ne-
ver yet experienced, is uniformly and eafily
forefeen. The fame reafon is frivolous
and abfurd, when offered to account for
the refult not correſponding to the neceſſary
inference from the principle of conſtant
conjunction,
becauſe it is inconfiftent
with this principle, and cannot account for
the neceſſary inference from it being falſe,
if the principle itſelf be true; which there-
fore must be given up.It can ſcarce be
neceffary to mention, that if motives that
are ſuppoſed to overcome the force of
mind be applied to a perfon, fo that a
combined action refulting from both may
ſtand in the relation of "that for the fake
of which" to both, fuch a combined ac-
tion (which in this cafe will not be ab-
furd, but, on the contrary, very wife)
may reaſonably be expected to take place;
as, for example, in the cafe ftated p. 238.
239; if the fear of hanging, inſtead of
the defire of earning money, were the
porter's motive for going fouthward, and
alfo for going weftward, I have no doubt
but
678
APPENDIX.
but he would go in fome direction inter-
mediate between the two, as being the
only way by which he could efcape hang-
ing, or attain "that for the fake of which"
with refpect to both motives.
"C
t
N° 14.
"I have no occafion, in thefe remarks,
to concern myſelf with the fact, which
poffibly may prove to be important, and
"which I think the Effay eſtabliſhes, that
"the relation between caufe and effect is
"different from that between motive and
"action."
When the author of the remarks wrote
this ſentence, he muſt certainly have for-
gotten both the kind of the difference be-
tween the two relations in queſtion, and
the very particular manner in which it was
diſcovered and demonftrated. That differ-
ence, which he acknowledges that the Ef-
ſay eſtabliſhes, has been aſcertained by
tracing the ſtrictly neceffary confequences
of the fundamental principle of the doc-
trine
APPENDIX.
679
trine of Neceffity, namely, the perfect in-
ertia of the fubject, and the abfolute ir-
refiſtible force of the fuppofed cauſes ap-
plied to it thefe neceffary confequences
have been found true as matters of fact
with respect to phyfical caufes and effects
in lifeless bodies, but falfe, and abfurd,
and ridiculous, with respect to the motives
and actions of living perfons.—The ul-
timate neceſſary inference from this ap-
pears fo plain and obvious, that I could
never have fuppofed it a matter of doubt
or difpute; and its being made fo now ap-
pears to me a very ſtriking and a very in-
ſtructive phænomenon in the operations of
the human mind. But it is one that had
not eſcaped the obfervation of BACON;
and therefore refpondebit pro me Ariftoteles
MEUS.
Idola et notiones falſe, quæ intellectum bu-
manum jam occuparunt, atque in eo alte he-
rent, non folum mentes hominum ita obfident,
ut veritati aditus difficilis pateat; fed etiam
dato et conceffo aditu, illa rurfus in ipfa in-
ftauratione fcientiarum occurrent, et molefta
erunt;
680
APPENDIX.
erunt; nifi homines pramoniti, adverfus ea fe,
quantum fieri poteft, muniant.
Nov. ORG. I. 38.
As a good illuftration of this important
general obfervation, and as a real cafe,
very exactly parallel to that of the author
of the remarks, who acknowledges the
difference that I have eſtabliſhed in my
Effay, but does not acknowledge, nor
perhaps perceive, what is neceffarily im-
plied in it, 1 fhall mention a ſtory which
I remember to have heard more than twen-
ty years ago.
One of the men who had been round
the world with Commodore Byron, foon af-
ter his return to England, went to his na-
tive place, where he was confidered as a
very extraordinary perfonage, and was in-
vited to a club of his townfmen, who ex-
pected to be greatly edified by his conver-
fation. It was plain, that a man who had
been round the world muft know more of
it than any other body. But the circum-
navigator could give them but very little
information with refpect to what he had
feen
APPENDIX.
681
feen in his voyage; and feemed to have
very little to fay for himſelf, till fome of
the club began to question him about the
world being round: then he opened with
a tone of authority, "As to that, I'll tell
66
you what it is; they fay the world is
"round; but I have been all round it,
"and, by God, it is as flat as this table."
-Yet this honeft Tar was not forfworn;
but I think his best friends muſt admit,
that he was not very expert at drawing
inferences from premifes, or perceiving
neceffary conſequences; fince, after know-
ing, and feeing, and doing what was im-
poffible unleſs the world were round, he
could not diſcover that it was fo.
"It is fufficient for my argument, if a
"relation fubfifts between what is invo-
luntary in the train of thought in the
"mind, and the acts of the will, as con-
"ftant and certain as that of caufe and
"effect."
This is one of the remarks that I can-
not fully underſtand: it appears to me
both vague
and obfcure; nor can I fay
4 R
with
682
APPENDIX.
16
with certainty to what things and what
relation the author alludes: but I gueſs,
that by "
"what is involuntary" may be
meant judgement; and by acts of the
will," voluntary determinations, or choo-
fings, and overt actions. If fo, the an-
fwer to it has been given too fully alrea-
dy, (p. 551. to 575.), and muſt not be re-
peated here.
{
N° 15.
The first part of this paragraph is, I
believe, a juſt account of the origin of the
notion of power, not only in the author
of the remarks, but in all mankind. The
laſt part of it is another inſtance, like ma-
ny that have been already confidered, of
the confufion, and perplexity, and obfcu-
rity, and error, that are almoft inevitably
produced in fuch reafonings as this, by the
needlefs and carelefs ufe of metaphorical
expreffions. The power or faculty of
making efforts, is an attribute of a living
perfon; the making efforts is the exertion
of fuch a power or faculty, by the perfon:
the
APPENDIX.
683
the perfon has likewife underſtanding,
that is, he underſtands what he is about;
and the term Understanding expreffes mere-
ly the abſtract notion of this other attri-
bute; which can neither direct the efforts
made, nor the faculty that makes them;
nor can it examine any thing, nor form
any opinion, nor confequently can it be
under the neceffity of examining any thing,
or of forming any opinion: but the per-
Son may, if he pleaſes, examine a great
many things, though he is not under the
neceffity of doing fo; and if he do exa-
mine things fairly, his opinion or judge-
ment will be involuntary; and fo far is
he, and his efforts, and his faculty of ma-
king them, from being under the direc-
tion of his underſtanding, (even admit-
ting the metaphor), that it is rather his
underſtanding that is in a great meaſure
under his direction; for he can attend, or
not attend, as he choofes, to thoſe things
which he might underftand, and which,
if he did attend to them, and confequent-
ly did underſtand them, he would invo-
luntarily judge of one way, and not ano-
ther. When the perfon has attended, and
4 R 2
underſtood,
684
APPENDIX,
underſtood, and judged involuntarily, he
may make efforts, or act voluntarily, ei-
ther according to, or in oppofition to, his
involuntary judgement; as in the cafe of
Medea.—If things had been as they are
ſtated in the latter part of N° 15. I do
not think we could ever, from the con-
ſciouſneſs of fuch efforts, have acquired
the notion of power; any more than we
could from what happens with reſpect to
belief.
N° 16. Sentence Firſt.
Having already, in the courſe of my
Effay, expreffed very fully my opinion
with reſpect to the profeffion of belief of
the doctrine of Neceffity, eſpecially in
thoſe who affert it, and yet perceive intui-
tively the falfity of many neceffary confe-
quences that I have deduced from it, and
who deny thefe inferences, and hold faft
the principle, without fhewing any error
in my reaſoning, it is evidently impoffible
for me to make any exceptions in favour
of any individual. The cafe of the au-
thor
APPENDIX.
685
(C
re-
thor of the remarks, with refpect to
maining unconvinced," is not altogether fin-
gular: I have met with the fame in feve-
ral other perfons. It may eaſily be ac-
counted for they have no occafion to be
convinced of any error in their opinion, or
to alter their belief; which, from their
own actual conduct, as well as from what
they have always obferved, and feem al-
ways to have expected in other men, and
above all from their perceiving intuitively
what neceſſary confequences from the prin-
ciple of neceffity will be found experimen-
tally falſe, and what may be true, appears
clearly to have been the fame with that of
ordinary men who affert and believe the
liberty of human actions. Their fituation
is nearly the fame with what would be the
fituation of a ſet of philofophers, who ha-
ving met with the pretended demonftra-
tion, that Achilles, though fwift of foot,
could never overtake an old man, who
went but half as faſt, and was but a mile
before him; and who, being unable to
detect the fophifm, had acquiefced in it,
and profeffed to believe it; but faw at
once, when the cafe was fairly ſtated to
them
686
APPENDIX.
them in proper and accurate terms, that
when Achilles had gone two miles, he
would be juſt up with the old man; and
that when he had gone four miles, he
would be a mile before him. Surely theſe
philofophers would have no occafion to be
convinced, or to change their opinion.
There is, however, one peculiarity in
the fituation of the author of the remarks
which ought to be confidered; I mean,
his having fo much confidence in his own
objections as to allow them to be publiſh-
ed; which many other perfons," remain-
ing unconvinced," like him, would not
do with refpect to theirs. Even this pe-
culiarity may eaſily be accounted for: his
objections themfelves afford a full expla-
nation of it. They are expreffed in vague,
obfcure, ambiguous, and metaphorical
terms, to which he feems to have a pecu-
liar attachment, as he employs them vo-
luntarily, or at leaft without any apparent
neceffity. Such ambiguous and metapho-
rical expreffions confound and fruftrate the
beſt reaſoning, and make the worſt appear
as plauſible as the beſt: but as the uſe of
them
APPEND I X.
687
them is voluntary, it is beyond the pro-
vince of demonftration.
For the purpoſes of good reaſoning with
one another, it is abfolutely neceffary that
men ſhould employ words, or ſymbols,
that expreſs accurately and diftinctly the
feveral thoughts or notions which they
have occafion to compare together, and to
reaſon about. Nay, though it may ap-
pear a paradox, I believe it to be an im-
portant truth, that moſt men need accurate
and diſtinct words to enable them even to
think accurately on certain fubjects; for
most men are accustomed to think and to
reafon by themſelves, in fome meaſure,
by the help of words. If the words fo
employed be inadequate for their purpoſe,
by being vague, fo as to denote no thoughts
with fufficient diftinctnefs and precifion;
or ambiguous, fo that the fame word
fhall occafionally denote two or more dif-
ferent thoughts, the perfon ufing them
may be fo thoroughly confounded, as not
only not to be able to think accurately or
justly, but not even to be able to know
what
688
APPENDIX.
what he thinks, nor confequently to give
any intelligible account of it.
The learned and ingenious DR CAMP-
BELL, in his Philoſophy of Rhetoric, has
treated this point with his ufual acuteneſs
and good fenfe; and has clearly thewn,
that a perfon may not only read, but de-
liberately write nonfenfe, without know-
ing or fufpecting it. The fame author
has very happily illuftrated the relation
between language and thought, by com-
paring the former to the medium, fuch as
water, air, or glafs, through which the
latter is to be feen; and to an inftru-
ment, fuch as a mirror, by means of
which a perfon may fee even his own
thoughts. He remarks, that the ut-
moſt poffible perfection of fuch a me-
dium, or fuch an inttrument, is, that it
be fo clear that itſelf fhall not be percei-
ved at all, while every thing that fhould
be perceived through it ſhall be ſeen dif-
tinctly. He very juftly obferves, that the
terms, clearness, perfpicuity, obfcurity, fo
commonly applied to language, denote li-
terally the qualities of fuch a medium or
inftrument;
APPENDIX.
689
inſtrument; and that they are uſed meta-
phorically in their more common applica-
tion.
If the greateſt philofopher in the world
fhould obftinately perfift in always uſing
a cylindrical mirror, he could never ac-
quire a juft notion of his own features,
and, inſtead of his own face, would fee
always a very frightful and diftorted i-
mage and if he chofe to view all objects
only through green fpectacles, he could
never diſtinguiſh properly their feveral co-
lours, nor ever know the full and varied
beauty of the fair face of nature. If he
were to maintain, that what he faw of his
own face, and of other objects, was the
real conſtitution of them, and that the
common notions of them were falfe, his
conduct would juftly be reckoned uncan-
did, as well as extravagant. It would be
reaſonable and friendly to admoniſh him,
that he was uſing very prepofterous in-
ftruments, and to furnifh him with bet-
ter; but if he would not condefcend to
make uſe of thefe, he muſt be allowed to
pleaſe himself; for it would be too violent.
4 S
a
690
APPEND I X.
a meaſure to break a philofopher's mir-
ror, becauſe it was cylindrical; or to take
his fpectacles from
they were green.
admonition may be
off his noſe, becauſe
The fame reaſonable
given, and the fame
friendly offer may be made, to the philo-
ſopher who uſes, in his reaſonings, ambi-
guous and metaphorical expreffions, which
difcolour, and diſtort, and confound, eve-
ry thought which fhould be feen through
them but if he will not regard the ad-
monition, nor accept of the offer, he muſt
be left to himſelf.
66
،،
N° 16. Sentence Second.
I confefs alfo, it ſeems to be very
clear, that if the acts of the will are
not determined by the judgements of
"the underſtanding, but by a felf-go-
verning power, which may act, and, if
"I recollect right, is fuppofed to often
"act without motives, and in oppofition
46 to all motives, the human race, instead
"
'
* More metaphors: Tranfeant cum cateris.
"of
APPENDIX.
691
"of being moral agents, would fome-
"times at leaſt be more diforderly than
"C
"
66
any madinen; their manners could be
regulated with any degree of certainty
by no laws; the prefcience of God Al-
"mighty could not trace their actions;
"and even his omnipotence, unleſs he al-
tered their nature, could do nothing
66 more for them than make a vaſt bedlam
" to contain them."
Theſe things, which feem fo clear to
the author of the remarks, are incompa-
rably witty, and fufficiently wonderful: a
very rigorous critic would perhaps require
a little proof of ſome of them, as thinking
they were of that kind which POPE has
very happily termed,
"Demonftration thin, and Thefes thick,
"And Major, Minor, and Conclufion quick."
But as I am no Theologian, and am nei-
ther inclined nor qualified to reaſon a-
bout prefcience and predeſtination, I think
it more prudent, and I am fure it is much
more eafy, to let them all pais as ſtrictly
4 S 2
neceifary
692
APPENDIX.
{
neceffary confequences of the principle to
which they are referred; and to content
myfelf with fhewing what relation that
principle bears to the doctrine maintained
in my Effay. This relation is indeed a
very remarkable one.
The principle in queſtion is, That a ſelf-
governing power (which here certainly
means an agent, or perfon having felf-
governing power) may act, and is fuppofed
to often act, WITHOUT motives, and in op-
pofition to ALL motives. Now, it happens
that this principle, which is imputed to
me, is very widely different from what I
have maintained; fɔ widely different, in-
deed, that the greater part of it is juft
what I have formally and repeatedly dif
claimed in the ftrongeſt terms, as being
not merely erroneous, but fo notoriouſly
falfe and extravagant, that there would be
good reafon to call in queſtion the veraci-
ty, as well as the underſtanding, of any
perfon who fhould venture to affert it.
Videfis p. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 62. 63. 64.
From the very title of my Effay,-on
the
APPENDIX.
693
!
the difference between the relation of mo-
tive and action and that of cauſe and effect
in phyſics, it muſt be evident, that it could
never have been my intention to reaſon a-
bout actions without motives, but only
about actions for which there were ac-
knowledged or well-known motives; fo
that I might afcertain the difference be-
tween this relation and that with which
I undertook to compare it. From the plan
of my reaſoning,-on phyfical and mathe-
matical principles, without making any
appeal to conſcioufnefs, (to which plan, I
prefume, it will be admitted that I have
ſtrictly adhered), it muſt have been in-
poffible for me to have included in my ar-
gument any cafes or inftances, real or
ſuppoſed, of actions without motives; be-
caufe this circumftance, the want of a
motive for any action performed, could
be known only by confcioufnefs, and ne-
ver could be afcertained, either by open
experiment, or by mathematical reafon-
ing. From all the inftances that, in the
courſe of my argument, I have given of ac-
tions variouſly related to motives, it muſt
appear, that I never meant to treat of ac-
tions
694
APPENDIX.
tions performed without any motives; for
no fuch inſtance is given by me as part of
my reaſoning; but many of motives ap-
plied, to which there were no correfpond-
ing actions. From the manner in which I
have ſtated the propofition (p. 171.) which
I undertook to demonftrate, it muſt be e-
vident how far I meant to go; and that I
did not undertake to prove, that perſons
often acted without motives, and in oppo-
fition to all motives.
Any attentive reader and good reafon-
er, who fhall compare that propofition
(p. 171.) with the doctrine imputed to
me in the ſentence of N° 16. at preſent
under confideration, will be ſtruck with
the great change of meaning made in my
propofition, by fubftituting the word ALL
for the word ANY; which indeed is fo
great as to convert my propofition into
one which I not only never thought of
maintaining, but had formally difclaim-
ed. The difference of meaning between
the two adjectives in queſtion is, I pre-
fume, ſo obvious, that it muſt be well
and
APPENDIX.
695
and uniformly underſtood: if it were not,
the prefent cafe would be a good illuftra-
tion of it. And this difference is ren-
dered the more ftriking by fubftituting
the phrafe, is fuppofed to often act, for
my phrafe, of very different import, may
act.
The infinite difference between the pro-
pofition which I undertook to demon-
ſtrate and the affertion imputed to me
by the author of the remarks in N° 16.
will appear plainly from the mere ſpecifi-
cation of each of them by a fingle ex-
ample. Let any number of motives, ſuch
as duty, intereſt, pleaſure, honour, fear,
hunger, &c. be fuppofed to be applied at
the fame time to a perfon, in fuch a man-
ner that ſome of them fhall be in oppofi-
tion to one another, others in direct con-
currence or in combination with one ano-
ther; I hold, that the perſon, in ordinary
cafes, (that is, fetting afide compulfion),
may act according to any one of thoſe mo-
tives, or according to any two or more of
them in concurrence or in combination, and
of courſe contrary to any motive, either
fingle,
a
1
696
APPENDIX,
fingle, or concurring with or combined with
others, in oppofition to thofe according to
which the perfon acts. But in N° 16. I am
reprefented as maintaining, that perfons
often acted, without a motive, in oppofition
to all the motives fo applied. The im-
puted propofition is fo extravagantly falſe,
that it can deferve no confideration. My
own appears to me a plain and familiar
truth, of which we have experience every
day; at leaſt I know of no motive accor-
ding to which men have not fometimes
acted; nor of any that has not on fome oc-
cafions been applied without being fol-
lowed by correfponding action, in a man-
ner equally inconfiftent with the fuppofi-
tion of mere chance, and with that of ab-
folute irrefiftible influence or force in the
motives. But as it has been denied by
fome philofophers, I was at pains to exa-
mine it rigorously, and to fhew, by ſtrict
reaſoning, and by open experiment, if re-
quired, that fuch was the cafe.
I was perfectly aware of the uſual mif-
take, or miſrepreſentation, of the popular
notion of liberty; not merely by habitual
wranglers
APPENDIX.
697
wranglers in common converfation, but
by fome of the moſt diſtinguiſhed writers
on this fubject, ſuch as LEIBNITZ, HUME,
and PRIESTLY; and having occafion to
quote a paffage from MR HUME's Effay,
and to refer to one in DR PRIESTLY'S, in
which, by the ſtrongeſt infinuation, that
extravagant doctrine is unjustly imputed
to thoſe who affert the liberty of human
actions, I took that opportunity to dif
claim it in the ftrongeſt terms.
Even with reſpect to the notion and be-
lief that a perfon may act without a mo-
tive, which I had occafion to mention
more than once in the courfe of my Effay,
(p. 56. 57. 58. 59.; 388. 389. 390. 391.;
424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431.),
I was at pains to declare fully and expli-
citly, that I did not affert nor undertake
to prove it, but left it entire for future
confideration, if it fhould be thought to
deferve any. The difcuffion of it did not
appear to me effential to what I under-
took to prove with refpect to the relation
of motive and action, and the difference
between it and that of cauſe and effect in
phyfics:
4 T
698
APPENDI X.
phyfics: I faw no means of conducting
it without any appeal to conſciouſneſs,
and purely on phyſical and mathematical
principles, or ftrict reafoning by neceffary
confequences and open experiment; and
I therefore avoided it fo carefully in all my
reaſonings, that a candid and attentive
reader will find nothing in my argument
inconfiftent with the perfuafion, that a
perfon would inftantly fall aſleep, or die,
if there were no motives applied to him;
fo as to be effectually prevented from act-
ing without motives.
After all theſe precautions, continued
uniformly from the beginning to the end
of my Effay, I could not have ſuppoſed it
poffible that any perfon, from any imper-
fection of memory, could have fo far mif-
taken my meaning, as to imputė to me
the doctrine ftated in the fecond fentence
of N° 16.; nor could I have fuppofed it
poffible that any perfon who diſtruſted a
little the accuracy of his memory with re-
ſpect to that point, (which, from the hy-
pothetical claufe, “If I recollect right,"
appears plainly to have been the caſe with
the
APPENDIX.
699
the author of the remarks), fhould yet
have relied fo much on his memory, as to
impute to me the abfurd opinion which I
had diſclaimed, and to proceed to draw
inferences from it, without looking into
my Effay; the flighteſt inſpection of which
would have fet him right, and prevented
him from fo ftrangely attempting to put
me in the wrong: and if I had fuppoſed
theſe things poffible, and very likely to
happen, I could have done no more than
I did to prevent them.
The ſtrange inferences in N° 16. dedu-
ced from my ſuppoſed doctrine, feem in-
tended as an imitation and a fort of coun-
terpart of thoſe which I have given (p. 257.
et feqq.) as neceffary confequences of the
doctrine of the conftant conjunction of
motive and action, and which many men
of candour, and good fenfe, and good
tafte, may think too ludicrous for a ferious
philofophical inveſtigation. Without pre-
fuming abfolutely to juſtify thoſe ludi-
crous inferences, I fhall only mention as
fome excuſe for them, that they are given
in illuſtration of certain general inferen-
4 T 2
ces,
700
APPENDIX.
!
ces, previouſly demonftrated as neceffary
confequences of the principle of conftant
conjunction, from which I was reafoning
ad falfum et abfurdum. That principle had
been moft confidently afferted by a great
philofopher, whoſe very words I had quo-
ted; and, at any rate, though it never had
been afferted, it would have been fair and
rational to have ftated it, and to have rea-
foned from it by neceffary confequences,
as being one of the alternatives of an
undeniable dilemma. The notions on
which the reaſoning depended (XY
=AB, &c.) were fo new and fo abf-
trufe, that it was neceffary to illuftrate
them fully. The cafe of going in the dia-
gonal, or in one of the fides of a paralle-
'logram, though abundantly diftinct, and
in one reſpect complete and decifive, was
too remote from the general conduct of
human life to afford that clear and for-
cible illuſtration which was wanted: there-
fore inſtances were to be taken from the
occurrences in real life; and they appear
ludicrous. But this is no fault of mine,
but a well-known principle of human na-
ture, and I believe a very uſeful one. Any
thing
APPENDIX.
701
f
thing repugnant to a mathematical axiom
is calmly perceived to be abfurd and im-
poffible; but any thing ftrikingly repug-
nant to the familiar principles of human
nature, even though it be poffible, appears
to us not only abfurd, but ridiculous. It
is a matter of tafte, to like or diflike fuch
ludicrous illuftrations; but their being lu-
dicrous cannot weaken the force of them:
Ridentem dicere verum quid vetat? If in-
deed they had been given without the
previous demonſtration, they would have
been worle than the ravings of any ordi-
nary madman.
Theſe things I fufpect the author of the
remarks had not duly confidered, when
he fet about drawing inferences from an
extravagant principle, erroneously at leaſt,
if not unjustly imputed to me, who had
difclaimed it, and very different from the
common opinion of mankind.
I muft differ from him even with re-
ſpect to the very modeft opinion that he
expreffes in the lait fentence of N° 16. "I
do not affert that thefe (extravagant and
ludicrous)
702
APPENDIX.
ludicrous) confequences, even tho' proved
to be just, can impeach the validity of a
demonſtration." This, I think, is too mo-
deft. A demonftration ad abfurdum is juſt
as valid as one that is direct; and there-
fore, if by neceffary confequences a falſe
or abfurd inference can be deduced from
any principle, however demonftrated, that
principle, and its fuppofed demonſtration,
muft ipfo facto ftand impeached; and un-
lefs fome error can be difcovered, either
in the firſt demonſtration of it, or in the
deduction of neceffary confequences from
it, it must remain impeached to all eter-
nity. There is certainly no power in the
Britiſh legislature, nor even in the Na-
tional Affembly of France, fo far as I
have yet learned, that can put an end to
fuch an impeachment. To ſpeak without
metaphor, ſuch an oppofition of demon-
ſtrations, if it could take place, would
produce abfolute fcepticiſm with reſpect to
the point in queftion; and would even
tend to fhake our faith in demonſtration
in general: but of this I have no fear.
As to the preſent inftance, fuppofing
the
APPENDIX.
703
the ludicrous inferences in N° 16. to be
ftrictly neceffary confequences of the
principle, that men may act, and often
act, without motives, and in oppofition
to all motives, it would not in the leaft
affect my demonftration, forafmuch as I
never afferted ſuch a principle.
If the author of the remarks fhall con-
trive to deduce any fuch falſe or abſurd
conclufions from my doctrine, I fhall be
very glad to ſee them, and fhall pay due
attention to them. I need not tell him
now, for I told him more than a year and
a half ago, in a written fpecimen (and it
was not a fhort one) of the anſwers that
might be given to his objections, that it
was a matter of great nicety and difficulty
to draw neceffary inferences with reſpect
to the actions of men, from the principle
of their having felf-governing power. I
told him, that it appeared to me, that, on
the principle of Liberty, the neceffity of any
particular refult, in any cafe, was as com-
pletely excluded, as any liberty with re-
ſpect to the refult was on the principle.
of Neceffity. I underſtand perfectly, that
in
704
APPENDIX.
in certain circumftances, chiefly of the
motives applied, it will be more probable,
that men will act in one way than in an-
other; though we cannot meaſure the de-
gree of this probability, as we do in the
cafe of chances; in which indeed, as well
as in living perfons, on the principle of
Liberty, there can be no neceffity of the re-
fult in any particular inftance. But I can-
not guefs on what principle any perfon
fhould think it probable, that the actions
of men having felf-governing power,
fhould be either more rational or more ex-
travagant, more vicious or more virtuous,
than we ufually find them. It is the prin--
ciple of this probability, in oppofition to
the experience and wifdom of all ages and
nations, that I am curious to learn; tho',
to fay the truth, my expectations with re-
ſpect to it are not very high; nor are my
apprehenfions great with refpect to its im-
peaching the validity of my demonftration,
which is by no means a diſcovery in me-
taphyfics, but only the detection of a fo-
phifm, really incredible, but long and ar-
rogantly maintained, as a great diſcovery,
and an important truth.
(
!
}
}
}
Ι
Ift
Id
A
G
H
I
A
B.
E
C
F
D
E
B
D
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 03163 3053
A
686,760