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1817
ARTES
་ཀ
SCIENTIA VERITAS
7
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apalı pek sakin, jangan jangan alat paista
THE LIFE AND OPINIONS
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR CHARLES METCALFE MACGREGOR
Disce puer virtutem ex me verumque laborem
Fortunam ex aliis."

HOMOR
MAGDALA
THE LIFE AND OPINIONS
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR CHARLES METCALFE MACGREGOR
K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA
EDITED BY
LADY MACGREGOR
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MDCCCLXXXVIII
All Rights reserved
-
DS
479.1
M15
A3
v. 2
1.37
13-165982
CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
CHAPTER I.
CENTRAL ASIA, 1875-1877.
Exploration and adventure in Khorassan, Armenia, and Baluch-
istan-On furlough-Afghan territory forbidden-The Per-
sian Gulf-An unknown route-Ruins of Persepolis-The
arid plains of Yezd-Strange fatality at Tabbas-Faulty in-
formation-Marauding Turkomans-An alaman-Afghan re-
ception-An insulting rebuff-Mashad-The Foreign Secre-
tary - Disappointing reply-A Persian garrison-Visit to
Sarakhs― Towards Merv - The Russian prisoner — Ayub
Khan-Along the Atrak-Across the Caspian-Lord Salis-
bury's encouragement-Renewed explorations-Armenia—
The theatre of war-Baluchistan-A bandit chief-Zirreh-
A desert area-Want of water-Arrival in India-Death of
Captain Lockwood-The Russo-Turkish war-Quartermaster-
General's department, .
Appendix A.-Memorandum on Armenia. Appendix B.
The 'Statesman' on the expedition to Baghdad,
PAGE
CHAPTER II.
THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR-THE KHAIBAR TO GANDAMAK,
1878-1879.
Origin of the war-Sher Ali's grievances-Lord Lytton's Envoy
-Precarious relations with Russia-Plans and projects-The
1
43
vi
CONTENTS.
crossing of the Indus-Routes into Afghanistan-Road to
Quetta-Persia and Herat-No Afghan can be true-Pro-
posal to go to Herat-Checkmating the advance of Russia-
Getting rid of the Barakzais-The Indian troops at Malta-
Frontier administration-The Berlin Congress-Sir Neville
Chamberlain's Mission-Repulse of Cavagnari-Forcing the
Khaibar—Ali Masjid-Road commandant-Bazar Valley ex-
pedition-Guerilla warfare-Reconnaissance of the Bokhar
Pass-Transport organisation-Inspection of the Kuram line
-Safed Sang-Treaty of Gandamak — The retirement-
Afridi black-mail,
Bu
Appendix.-Advantages of the Lakarai Pass-Project for
the advance on Kabal, .
CHAPTER III.
M
ALI KHEL TO KABAL, 1879.
Terrible news-How matters stood-Simla to Ali Khel-In
Kuram Valley-Anarchy in Afghanistan-Pushing on ar-
rangements-Want of carriage—A directing hand needed—
The advance-Karatiga-The Hazar-Darakht-Shutargardan
Pass-Khushi-The Amir comes in-Safed Sang camp-
Battle of Charasia-General Baker and Major White-Bini
Hisar-The provost-marshal-Siah-Sang-Kabal entered—
Sherpur abandoned by the Afghans-Nek Mahamad and the
Amir-Scene of the massacre-Ride through the city-Com-
mission of inquiry-Examination of prisoners-Explosions
in the Bala Hisar-Sentences of death-The military com-
mission-Executions-Project against Herat,.
CHAPTER IV.
KABAL AND SHERPUR, 1879-1880.
Camp Siah-Sang-Move into Sherpur-Reconnoitring towards
the Khaibar-The Amir's case-Report of the commission-
The mustaufi examined-Proof of Yakub Khan's complicity
-The ink freezes-Through Maidan-Deportation of the
Amir-Threatening signs-Arrangements for a fight-The
51
90
98
CONTENTS.
British hated-An awful day-Loss and recovery of the guns
-Sherpur invested-Hot work-Major Green's march-The
signal-fire-A gloomy look-out-Daud Shah-Three Victoria
Crosses-Message from the Queen-Jalalabad-Affair with
the Mohmands-The Pari Dara defile-Inspecting defences
-Mounted infantry-Sending off wounded-Occupation of
Kabal-Equipment committee,
CHAPTER V.
ABDUL RAHMAN, 1880.
Who is to rule Afghanistan ?—Approach of Kandahar column-—
A darbar - Abdul Rahman's prospects - Battle of Ahmed
Khel-Sir Donald Stewart's victory-Fight at Shalez-Ar-
rival of the force from Kandahar-A large army-Lord Ripon's
advent-Babar's tomb-Ayub or Yakub?-The mustaufi's
intrigues-Rides near Kabal-An Afghan garden-party-
Mission to Abdul Rahman-Yakub's deposition discussed-
The Afghan question-Roberts's fortitude-The situation-
Ancient coins-Division of Afghanistan proposed—A dil-
emma-Gordon's resignation-More gatherings-Annexation
-Supplies-The Pai Minar-Retirement of the British con-
templated Preparations for departure Recognition of
Abdul Rahman as Amir,
—
CHAPTER VI.
K
KA
KABAL TO KANDAHAR, 1880.
The Maiwand disaster-Loss of honour-Drawing up the pro-
gramme―The Kabal-Kandahar force-A vacant brigade-
Appointed Brigadier-General-Off to Kandahar-The famous
march-A regular pace-Long distances-The Khan Agha-
An A 1 staff-Fortress of Ghazni-Field of Ahmed Khel-
Civil by order-Sortie of Deh Khwaja-Kalat-i-Ghilzai—
Roberts is ready-Battle of Kandahar-A brilliant success
-At Kandahar-Homeward bound-March to Quetta-Fare-
well to General Roberts,
vii
143
186
230
viii
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VII.
THE MARI EXPEDITION, 1880.
Re-establishment of military posts on the Sibi-Quetta line-
Brigadier-General MacGregor's force-Crossing the Sarakhula
-Through the Chapar Rift-Deserted villages-A punitive
expedition to the Mari country-Terms offered to the chiefs
-Skirmish at Spin Tangi-A plundered station-The rear-
guard fired on-Restitution of grain-Reconnaissances-
Alarm-fires-The formidable Sembhar Pass-The Bombay
Cavalry attacked Friendly Lunis - The Kolu valley-
Mehrulla Khan's fort-Remarkable cliff-Submission of the
Maris-The Bihisto hills-Return to India,
CHAPTER VIII.
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA, 1880-1885.
•
Appointed Quartermaster-General-Knight Commander of the
Bath-At Osborne and Windsor-Services of the Guides-
The department-Interchange of information-Presidency
distinctions-Ayub Khan's advance and defeat-Intelligence
Branch-On furlough-Bombay and Aden-War Office in
London-The Clan MacGregor—'The Defence of India'—A
fool's Paradise-What are we doing?-Ignorance of Russia's
movements-Feeling in Persia-Publication of the book—
Government disapproval-Explanations-Results of telling
the truth-Central Asian question-International Boundary
Commission-Conference at Rawal Pindi-The Panjdeh out-
rage-War preparations-In Peshin-The Khojak and Bolan
-Loss of rank-Command of Panjab Frontier Force,
CHAPTER IX.
LAST SERVICES, 1885-1887.
Camp of exercise at Delhi-Inspection of frontier posts-Re-
newed illness-Letters to wife-Invalided home-Farewell
address to Panjab Frontier Force—Arrival in England-For-
titude during illness-Cairo-The last scene-Glengyle,
265
292
380
1
CONTENTS.
POSTSCRIPT.
Meeting at Simla-Duke of Connaught's speech-Sir Frederick
Roberts's sketch of Sir Charles's career Lord Dufferin's
eulogy,.
INDEX,
•
APPENDIX.
Catalogue of Publications and Memoirs by Major-General Sir
C. M. MacGregor, 1859-1886, .
RECORD OF MAJOR-GENERAL MACGREGOR'S SERVICES,
•
ix
395
407
418
421
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE SECOND VOLUME.
THE TAKING OF MAGDALA,
:
Frontispiece
From an Original Drawing. By permission of the
Royal Artillery Institution.
MAPS.
CENTRAL ASIA-Calcutta to the Indus. To illustrate
Travels, Explorations, and Opinions of Sir Charles
MacGregor,.
To face page
AFGHANISTAN AND NORTH-WEST FRONTIER-To illus-
trate Campaigns of 1878-79-80,
1
To face page 51
:
SIR CHARLES MACGREGOR.
BAS
MAJOR-GENERAL
CHAPTER I.
ALAMAN
CENTRAL ASIA.
EXPLORATION AND ADVENTURE IN KHORASSAN, ARMENIA, AND BALU-
CHISTAN-ON FURLOUGH AFGHAN TERRITORY FORBIDDEN-
THE PERSIAN GULF-AN UNKNOWN ROUTE-RUINS OF PERSEPO-
LIS-THE ARID PLAINS OF YEZD-STRANGE FATALITY AT TAB-
MARAUDING TURKOMANS
AN
M
1875-1877.
"It vexes mc- -for I would fain
Have paid their insult back again.
I paid it well in after days."
FAULTY INFORMATION
AN INSULTING REBUFF
MASHAD-THE FOREIGN SECRETARY-DISAPPOINTING REPLY-
A PERSIAN GARRISON-VISIT TO SARAKHS-TOWARDS MERV-
THE RUSSIAN PRISONER-AYUB KHAN ALONG THE ATRAK-
ACROSS THE CASPIAN-LORD SALISBURY'S ENCOURAGEMENT
RENEWED EXPLORATIONS-ARMENIA-THE THEATRE OF WAR-
BALUCHISTAN-A BANDIT CHIEF-ZIRREH-A DESERT AREA-
WANT OF WATER ARRIVAL IN INDIA
DEATH OF CAPTAIN
VOL. II.
A
M
MAG
AFGHAN RECEPTION
M
(
---
S M
C
baby bandag
2
ON FURLOUGH.
LOCKWOOD
GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.
THE RUSSO - TURKISH WAR
[1875.
QUARTERMASTER-
APPENDIX A. -MEMORANDUM ON ARMENIA. APPENDIX B.-
'STATESMAN' ON THE EXPEDITION TO BAGHDAD.
-THE
Catatan
IN 1875 Colonel MacGregor thought of going on
furlough to Europe, not however merely for relaxa-
tion and frivolous amusement, but more for change
of work after incessant duty; and with this object
in view he wrote to the Foreign Secretary, Mr C. U.
Aitchison, asking for something stirring to do: "I
have luckily had hard work up to this; but now it is
nearly over, and I cannot stand the prospect of com-
parative idleness in a cantonment, in the hot weather.
I mean to go and travel somewhere; but as I have
no object in doing so, beyond change of scene and
occupation for my thoughts, if you have anything
you want doing I may as well offer myself. I do
not care for any pay, nor, indeed, for anything much
beyond having some object in life for a time, and I
would gladly undertake any duty, however danger-
ous or onerous it might be. I was thinking of going
to Persia, and then to Russia, but have not settled
any route." The Calcutta Foreign Office, with its
usual cautiousness and nervous dread of responsibility,
rejected Colonel MacGregor's offer for any informa-
tion; but General F. Roberts, then Quartermaster-
General in India, warmly entered into his brother
officer's schemes. "What we want," he wrote, "are
routes. Any number of these will be most valuable ;
and you will assist the Department greatly if you

45
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1876
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1876
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BALUCHAS TAN
Ghazni
ROUTES OF COLONEL C. M. MACGREGOR THROUGH PERSIA, KHORASSAN, ARMENIA AND BALUCHISTAN,
1875 1877.
Kandahar
Chimkand
Pashkand
KOJAK PASS
KALAT
SEA
65
Quetta
BALKASH
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KABAL T
LAKE
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75
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AROGH
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PASS
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PASS
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Rushalgarh
Multan
Bahawalpur
RAJPUTANA
50
OHYDRABAD
Bhuj
45
40
S. Pasfleld Oliver, Capt
30
1875.]
will send me every route you can get hold of. I
have got sanction for two additional officers, to be
attached to our office for six months, to collate in-
formation; and I intend to set them to work at
routes beyond our border, so as to have a Central
Asia Route-book. Any help towards the comple-
tion of this I shall be most thankful for. No one
knows better than you do the points on which infor-
mation is required."
At first Colonel MacGregor projected a ride to
Herat, and thence, via Mashad, to Astrabad; but
unfortunately it was then considered unsafe for a
British officer to ride across Afghanistan.
K
On reaching Bombay, therefore, he decided to
proceed vid Bushire to Teheran, and thence across
the Caspian and Russia to England.
CHANGE OF PLANS.
со
He started from Bombay to Karachi by himself,
in but poor spirits. "No one to talk to, no one to
get cranky with-all by myself; none but my own
sad thoughts to keep me company. For did I not
know that the eye that used to look lighter on my
coming, will never welcome me more? On the other
side of this interminable waste of water there is only
the grave of my happiness. In truth, I felt as if the
very sap had been taken out of my future, that once
was full of high ambition and bright hopes."
Landing at Bushire, MacGregor rode to Shiraz ;
but meeting here with Colonel Ross, the British
Resident, a conversation about Persian geography
unsettled all previous plans; and on hearing there
[1875.
was a route from Shiraz to Yezd, which had never
been traversed by any Englishman, MacGregor de-
termined to make a reconnaissance in this direction.
4
NOT A DAY WASTED.
Accordingly,¹ having engaged a muleteer to ac-
company him wherever he wished, in order that he
might be free to follow his own bent, Colonel Mac-
Gregor left Shiraz on the 24th April, pitching his
tent among the ruins of Persepolis on the following
day. By the 6th May, Yezd was reached, and here
the traveller halted a couple of days. Practically,
he had found that to travel in Persia meant to roam
over bare burnt-up plains, and rough, brown, arid
hills, with nothing to see at the beginning of the
day's stage, or in the middle of it, or at the end.
However, he determined to wander on, with no set-
tled plan, and so proceed towards Tabbas, employ-
ing himself in plotting the route, and adding to and
correcting his Persian Gazetteer. All his
spare time
was spent in inquring about various routes, commu-
nications, the country, and its people; for even on
furlough Colonel MacGregor never wasted a day.
He found he could not do profitably more than
twenty-five miles' marching each day, in order pro-
perly to record all the available information along
1 Narrative of a Journey through the Province of Khorassan, and
on the North-West Frontier of Afghanistan, in 1875. By Colonel C.
M. MacGregor, Bengal Staff Corps. In two volumes, with illustra-
tions. London, Allen & Co.: 1879. The proper names given by
Colonel W. W. Knollys, who saw Colonel MacGregor's work through
the press, have in the present book been adapted to the orthography
of the Royal Geographical Society's map of 1881.
·
}
1875.]
the road. A march of seventy miles across the desert
of Kavir, where no water was obtainable, brought
him to Tabbas, where, on the 24th May, a most un-
fortunate fatality occurred, which might have led to
disastrous consequences. A messenger, one Hoosen
Ali, after an interview with Colonel MacGregor, ac-
cidentally fell from a window, and was killed on the
spot. In that country, if a man is killed, his nearest
male relation can demand the death of his murderer;
and as Colonel MacGregor's two discarded servants
had spread evil reports of their former master, the
situation was not without disagreeable complications.
Fortunately the nearest male relation was not dis-
satisfied; the funeral expenses were paid, and a
present made to the widow by the Colonel, who was
not sorry to get off so cheaply.
At sixty-five miles from Tabbas, Bushruyeh was
reached—a locality hitherto never visited by an
Englishman. To show how faulty our information
was of this country, General Chesney described it,
from report, as a town in an oasis in the great salt
desert of Persia, said to contain 30,000 souls. "In
the first place," writes Colonel MacGregor, "it is not
in the great salt desert of Persia at all, nor anywhere
near it; next, it has not now, and never could have
had, anything like 30,000 inhabitants. Bushruyeh is
simply a large village of some 800 houses, situated
in the middle of a wide plain, surrounded by a larger
amount of cultivation than any place I have seen
since Shiraz." This instance is but an example of
FAULTY INFORMATION.
5
[1875.
one out of hundreds, where Colonel MacGregor was
able to correct the wholly inaccurate topography as
laid down in previous maps of Central Asian routes.
By the 8th June, Colonel MacGregor arrived in
Birjand, an important centre, although but poorly
fortified, as roads lead from it to Herat, Sabzawar,
Farah, Lash Juwain, and Sistan.
6
RUSSIAN SPIES.
Here were to be seen Turkoman prisoners, in chains,
awaiting their ransom, being worth from £9 to £13
apiece. The Amir, Alam Khan, of this district was
a trusted officer of the Persian Government, having
commanded a detached force against Sabzawar and
Lash Juwain, when Herat was captured in 1857.
Under him was a force of 11 guns, 1000 cavalry, and
2000 infantry.
Colonel MacGregor now made a discovery which
interested him excessively. He found that a few
years before four or five Russian officers had been
at Tabbas, ostensibly on a scientific mission, which
necessitated their taking copious notes regarding
the routes, the food-supply, and transport resources
of the district, and as he went on, he found they
had been to Bushruyeh and Tun. From this they
had gone by Bajistan and Gunabad, a well-culti-
vated district between Bajistan and Kauf, to Ghain ;
but as this was a roundabout way, Colonel Mac-
Gregor proceeded by Kakhk and Ghain, where he
came again on the track of the Russians, who, he
found, had also visited Birjand, where they had
remained fifteen days. At Birjand it appeared the
1875.]
Russians had divided, some going on to Sistan,
others to Herat. The question for Colonel Mac-
Gregor now became, by what route he should pro-
ceed. First, it was a great deal too hot to go to
Sistan in June; next, if he went back straight to
Mashad, he should be going over the same road
twice; but by going to Herat he would traverse a
country totally unknown to the British. He could
obtain information of the routes leading from this
part of Persia to Herat, Sabzawar, Anardara, and
Farah, and of the west frontier of Afghanistan ;
and lastly, he would perhaps be able to run the
Russians to earth. On the other hand, he was
aware that it was necessary to get permission to
travel in Afghanistan; but as that was then im-
possible, he considered the knowledge to be gained
worth the risk, and he had no reason to expect
anything but the most favourable reception. He
therefore determined to take the responsibility of
going on, and took the road to Herat.1
June 11.-At Baj, seven miles outside Birjand,
was the residence of Sirdar Behbood Khan (Aliko-
zai), grandson of the famous Yar Mahamad of
Herat. This chief told Colonel MacGregor that he
had a party in Herat, and that some day he intended
to teach the usurping Barakzais a lesson.
The route now lay across plains frequented by
marauding bands, and the order of march was
7
AN UNKNOWN ROUTE.
1 Letter to Mr C. U. Aitchison, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary, Simla,
from Mashad, 5th July 1875.
8
:
[1875.
arranged with a view to the possibility of meeting
some of these border ruffians.
AN ALAMAN.
"As we were coming up to the tower of Gulwarda,
I noticed rather a commotion among the garrison of
the post, which consisted of two decrepit old gentle-
men, and on arriving found there was reason for it ;
for on going to the top of the hill, and looking
in the direction pointed, I saw a party of horse
marching swiftly across the front in compact order.
This was an alaman, or raiding party of Turkomans.
They seemed to number about one hundred men,
and luckily did not seem to have any intentions in
our direction, for they passed without once looking
our way.
""
"Near Yezdan¹ were noticed the Turkoman towers
with which the whole plain is dotted, and on getting
closer we saw at first people scattered about through
the fields. Presently a matchlock was fired from
the high tower of the fort, and then there was a
skedaddle marvellous to behold; and almost before
we had time to look out, not a man was to be seen
below-all had clambered up into the nearest tower.
Seeing this, I thought it prudent to stop the party
till we had assured them that we were friends, so I
¹ Mr Merk, political officer attached to the Afghan Boundary Com-
mission in December 1885, writes: "Near Yezdan, at Burj-i-Gul-
warda, I again heard of Sir Charles MacGregor. This time he was
described as a Russian who endeavoured to reach Herat, and got as
far as Pahrah, where he was arrested and taken to Mashad, and thence
into captivity in Russia!"—See Northern Afghanistan, by Major C.
E. Yate, p. 148.
9
1875.]
rode on with only Ali Akbar to the fort. After
some doubt, the party inside became reassured, and
presently the gate was opened, and about twenty
heavily armed men came out, like prudent soldiers,
cautiously, with one eye on us and the other on the
gate. They were headed by a fine young man,
Rustem, who said we must excuse them; they
lived far away from any one, in a desert where no
man was a friend till he had proved himself so.
Nevertheless, they would not let us into the fort,
but made us bivouac outside."
IN AFGHAN TERRITORY.
After leaving Yezdan ten miles to the rear, on the
18th June Colonel MacGregor crossed the frontier
into Afghanistan, and entered the valley of the Hari-
rud. Fifty miles of Afghan territory were traversed
without meeting a soul except a caravan bound from
Herat to Birjand; but on reaching Pahrah, two or
three facts indicated that the traveller had left
Persia. "When my servants were pitching the
tent, there was the usual crowd enjoying the novel
spectacle of a Feringhi; but whereas I had marched
over 1000 miles in Persia, and had never once been
offered the slightest assistance by any of the crowd,
here several men came
came forward, and assisted in
driving in pegs, &c."
Here Colonel MacGregor despatched a letter to
the Mustaufi of Herat, advising him of his approach,
and intention to visit Herat; but on starting the
next morning towards the city, a messenger from
the Mustaufi stopped his advance until further in-
10
[1875.
structions were received from the Afghan governor.
Nevertheless, the next day Colonel MacGregor went
on to a small village called Kargan, within five
miles of Herat, where he awaited in a cool garden
the invitation from the Mustaufi.
REPULSED.
·
Instead of a courteous invitation, however, an
official, Shah Mahamad, and another officer, Mahamad
Alam, with a ragged escort of sowars, were sent to
convey Colonel MacGregor back across the frontier.
The Afghans, who evidently believed Colonel Mac-
Gregor to be a Russian spy, as Mr Merk afterwards
heard, treated Colonel MacGregor with some inci-
vility until he reached Ghorian, the frontier town,
where Mahamad Sarwar (Ghilzai), the governor,
showed him proper attention.
From Ghorian the discomfited traveller was es-
corted along the left bank of the Hari-rud to Sang-i-
Dakhtar, where the river was crossed, and then on to
Kusan, a position of considerable importance, as
being the first village in the valley of the Hari-rud
which would be reached by forces coming from the
west, and the point on which the roads from Turbat,
Mashad, and Sarakhs join. Here was a delightful
garden, where the wearied colonel was able to lie on
his back in the airiest of costumes, devouring bunch
after bunch of the most delicious grapes.
1
An uneventful journey along the road from Kusan
to Kehriz,2 which bore an unenviable reputation,
brought the party out of Afghanistan into Persia;
2 See post, chap. ii. p. 60.
1 Turbat-i-Shaikh Jami.
1875.]
but the escort under Mahamad Alam insisted on
taking their quasi prisoner safe to the Persian vil-
lage celebrated for its melons. It may here be men-
tioned that after his return to England, Colonel
MacGregor was informed that his proceeding into
Afghanistan near Herat, and his communicating
with the Mustaufi of that city, were highly disap-
proved of by the Indian Government; but after ex-
planation, his conduct was not disapproved of by
Lord Salisbury in Downing Street, as will appear
afterwards.
11
TURKOMAN HORSES.
t
G
Next day Colonel MacGregor reached Mashad-i-
Reza, and later traversed the district of Bakharz,
getting to the fort and village of Hamitabad on
the 27th June. After an incidental rencontre with
some Turkomans, who made off after an interchange
of a few shots, the village of Faraimun was gained
(June 29), where the chief, Nusrola Khan, showed
great hospitality, and here acquaintance was made
with the breed of the Tekke Turkoman horses.
"They are, in my opinion, one of the few things in
that fearful imposture, Central Asia, that come up
to their reputation, and are far and away the best
oriental horses, after Arabs, that I have seen.
"In some respects they are superior; indeed, in
stature and bone they approach the English horse.
For chargers, light weights, or ladies' horses in
India, they would be most suitable."
Here also was met the first specimen of a Turko-
man chief, who impressed his visitor very favourably.
12
[1875.
On the 1st of July Colonel MacGregor marched
into Mashad, where he was entertained by Abbass
Khan, who appears to have remembered particular
years by the arrival of particular Englishmen. Thus
1872 was assigned to Captain Marsh, 1873 was
named after Colonel Baker, 1874 after Captain
Napier, and doubtless 1875 would in future be
handed down as Sal-i-Colonel MacGregor. Mashad
is the residence of the Wali, or Governor-General,
of Khorassan, and here Colonel MacGregor had the
opportunity of inspecting some eight or nine regi-
ments of the Persian army.
DISAPPOINTED.
One of the first things Colonel MacGregor did on
arrival at Mashad was to telegraph to Mr Aitchison,
the Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government, for
permission to visit Herat with permit from the Amir,
Sher Ali. He also expressed his intention of visit-
ing Merv, from which place he projected a recon-
naissance along the right bank of the Oxus to
Kolab, over ground quite new to the European
world then, and on to Bamiam vid the Hazarajat,
back to Herat. But the anticipated, adventurous
journey was not to be. Lord Northbrook, the
Viceroy of India, telegraphed to the Minister at
Teheran, who at once sent to inform Colonel Mac-
Gregor that he was prohibited from travelling in
Afghanistan or Turkistan or going beyond the
boundary of Persia. At this very time Russian
officers were thoroughly exploring the very tracts of
country which Colonel MacGregor proposed to visit,
13
1875.]
and yet the Government of India were so blind to
their own interests as to discourage the acquirement
of information by one of their best qualified officers.
There is no doubt that, had Colonel MacGregor
been encouraged and supported in his endeavour
to enter Herat, British influence and prestige
would have been reawakened in that city; and
possibly Ayub Khan would have found it impos-
sible later to assemble an expedition there against
Kandahar.
"The results of this trip, I am vain enough to
believe, would have been that the English Govern-
ment would have been in possession of every route
from Turkistan to the Oxus, from the Oxus to
Afghanistan, and between Kabal and Herat—of the
resources of all the States passed through, and of the
feeling of the chiefs towards us,-in fact, of the in-
formation which my knowledge of the amount we
possessed told me was what was most required to
enable our Government to arrive at a clear idea of
what ought to be done when called on to provide
measures for the defence of our Indian empire."
Hearing that the Persian garrison of Sarakhs was
about to be relieved, Colonel MacGregor determined
to accompany the relief, and see as much of the
country in that direction as he could. The tract of
country he proposed visiting afforded considerable
interest, as no Englishman had hitherto traversed
this particular route. A start was made on the
18th July, and Colonel MacGregor was not a little
A CONFUSED COLUMN.
14
SARAKHS.
[1875.
amused at witnessing the utter confusion of the
whole order of march. Cavalry were mixed up in-
extricably with camels carrying baggage; the in-
fantry were mostly riding on donkeys, whilst the
advance - guard riding in front had their wives
mounted behind them. Even the guns were sur-
rounded by such a throng of donkeys, horses, and
camels as would have made their services utterly
inoperative in case of an attack. However, there
was more discipline among the gunners, whose
physique is splendid, and the way in which they
got their 9-pounders over difficult ground extorted
the admiration of the Bengal Staff officer. The
superiority of the artillery over the rest of the
Persian army is supposed to be due to the remnant
of the good effects instilled into that branch by the
gallant Christie in the days of 1810. Abbass Khan's
small army, which, if it had been properly handled,
was really a very compact little form of a battalion
of infantry, three guns, and 500 horse, was quite
lost in a chaotic throng of camels, ponies, and mules,
so that its fighting powers were completely annulled.
It took eight days' marching to get to Sarakhs, the
frontier post at the north-east extremity of Persia.
"With regard to its strategical importance, I think
a glance at the map will show that, in the compli-
cations which must arise ere the Russo-Indian ques-
tion can be deemed settled, its future is likely to be
a stirring one. Placed at the junction of roads from
Herat and Mashad by the Hari - rud and Ab-i-
-
1875.]
Mashad valleys respectively, and at the best en-
trance to the province of Khorassan from the north,
it cannot fail to exercise a very serious influence on
the momentous issue of the above question. This
must happen whether it falls into the hands of the
friends of England or into those of her foes.
Whether Russia uses Sarakhs as a base for offensive
measures against Herat, or England as a defensive
outpost to defeat any such operations, that position
will be heard of again. And if my feeble voice can
effect a warning ere it is too late, let it be here
raised in these words: If England does not use
Sarakhs for defence, Russia will use it for offence!
I think, however, the actual site now occupied is,
from a tactical point of view, too far forward, and I
should myself be inclined to draw it back as far as
Daulatabad, near which on the right bank of the
river are some heights which might soon be rendered
a very strong position for a fort, while arrangements
might be made for storing water in the river-bed
below to any extent."
On the 28th July, Colonel MacGregor got Abbass
Khan to give him 200 horsemen, with whom he
rode out across the Hari-rud a dozen miles or so
towards the endless desert in the direction of Merv.
"Deserts," he writes, "have the same effect on me
as unknown mountain-ranges-I always want to look
beyond!
Whilst at Sarakhs, Colonel MacGregor learned that
the Tekke Turkomans had a Russian prisoner, whom
""
15
TOWARDS MERV.
:
16
[1875.
they were keeping till a ransom of £2000 was paid
for him. The amount required was beyond the
power of Colonel MacGregor to offer, but feeling
sympathy for the unfortunate wretch, said to be a
gunner, he sent him a note and a little money by
some Tekkes who were leaving Sarakhs for Merv.
The note and money reached Ivanoff, the prisoner
in question, but the answer fell into the hands of
the Governor of Khorassan, who forwarded it to
Teheran. Here it caused at once a diplomatic
problem, and Colonel MacGregor was called upon
by the British Government for explanations. No
wonder is it that Colonel MacGregor condemned
the mercenary and selfish spirit which dictates the
policy of Great Britain, in Persia at least :-
"I have now seen a good deal of these Persians,
and my opinion, formed after very many talks with
all classes, is, that while they fear the Russians, and
know themselves to be powerless, they like us per-
sonally, and would gladly, as far as in them lies,
do anything for us if they dared. But, they say,
what are we to do? The English do not seem to
care, and the Russians are very powerful."
fact, it has been industriously spread all over Khor-
assan that the Russians are much more to be feared
on the land than we are even on the sea; and
although they know they must distrust the Rus-
sians, yet they cannot turn to us." 1
"In
Aug. 1.-Leaving with the relieved guard of that
1 Letter to Mr Aitchison.
THE RUSSIAN PRISONER.
1875.]
station, Colonel MacGregor re-entered Mashad on
the 1st August. Whilst residing at Mashad, a very
decided attempt was made by interested parties to
get the British officer to visit Ayub Khan, the
rebellious son of Sher Ali, the Amir of Afghanistan,
and own brother to the gallant Yakub who was kept
by his father in prison at Kabal. Under other cir-
cumstances, Colonel MacGregor would gladly have
gone to see this exiled prince, but he thought that
an interview with him might cause some political
embarrassment, and perhaps another complication, so
he declined the honour. However, he met Ayub
himself in the streets, and exchanged salutes, and
Ayub seemed half inclined to call on the Colonel to
stop and talk; but, not meeting with any encourage-
ment, he desisted from making further advances.
How little did either foresee that five years subse-
quently they should meet as enemies on the field of
battle outside of Kandahar!
AYUB KHAN.
17
Ayub, it appears, was well treated at Mashad,
having quarters and a pension of 4000 tomams per
annum. The fact is that the Persians have always had
a hankering after Herat, and were consequently ever
ready to receive kindly any fugitive chief from that
country, in hopes of making use of him at a future
time as a stalking-horse for their own purposes.
Thus they had Shah Nawaz Khan, a son of Sultan
Jan, at Teheran, and a grandson of Yar Mahamad at
Birjand, either of whom they were prepared to play
off against the Amir of Afghanistan when times
VOL. II.
B
18
[1875.
should be propitious. At this time Colonel Mac-
Gregor impressed on the Foreign Secretary at Simla
the importance of preserving a friendly alliance with
Persia. He wrote: "There is this to be said in
favour of trying the effect of supporting Persia,—as
long as the Russians can be kept to their present
boundaries, the danger with which we are menaced
by their proximity may be prevented; but directly
they come to get possession of such vital points as
Merv and Sarakhs, the disease may be said to have
begun, and will have to be cured. Now, if Russia
could calculate on the assistance of Persia in men,
supplies, and information, no one can doubt that
there need be no hesitation on their parts, in not
only taking those places when the proper time
comes, but also in advancing on Herat; and as
Persia by herself is helpless, there is no reason-
able ground for supposing she can refuse any
assistance that is asked for. But if, on the other
hand, Persia, assured of our aid, was unfriendly,
Russia could not
not move a step towards either
Merv or Sarakhs as long as there was a Power
on the flank of her communications unfriendly and
unsubdued."
MASHAD.
Aug. 7.—A week was spent in Mashad, and then
the indefatigable traveller rode on to examine the
small khanate of Daragez, the chief town of which,
Mahamadabad, he entered after a rough journey of
some eight days. Daragez is a tract in the Atak
hills, some 1200 feet above the sea, with plenty of
1875.]
water and good grazing for the fine breed of horses
which is here reared.
ALONG THE ATRAK.
19
Aug. 18.-The Khan of Daragez was not too
pressing in his hospitality, so Colonel MacGregor
started again on the 18th to Kochan, where the
Mir Hoosen Khan proved a most desirable host,
and consequently a most pleasant visit was enjoyed
by the traveller. The town, however, had recently
suffered from earthquakes, so that the majority of
the people lived in tents.
c
After staying here two days, the Colonel left for
Shirwan on the 22d, following the road down the
right bank of the Atrak river. The next day a
march of thirty-seven miles brought the explorer to
Bujnurd, lower down but some distance south of the
Atrak. At Bujnurd, situated in one of the prettiest
valleys in Persia, Colonel MacGregor was met in
the kindest manner possible by the Elkhani. "I Ι
have seen some more intelligent men in Persia, but
have met no one whose kindness has left a more
grateful recollection on me than has that of Yar
Michund Khan." Before leaving Bujnurd, where
Colonel MacGregor stayed four days, the Elkhani
presented his visitor with a carpet and a fine piece
of chain-mail armour, and rode out some three or
four miles on his journey westward. On the 29th
Jajarm was reached, after a march of thirty miles.
over a level plain of hideous aspect, without a
particle of vegetation, and for two miles over a
regular bit of sand desert. Almost the whole plain
20
[1875.
near Jajarm, which boasts of considerable cultivation
dependent on karezes (artificial irrigation), is covered
by Turkoman towers, showing what a dangerous
spot this was.¹
1
Colonel MacGregor arrived at Shahrud, a walled
town, but weakly defended, on 2d September; and
here a Russian spy appeared to take an impertinent
curiosity in the British officer's movements.
On the 4th September Colonel MacGregor got
away from Shahrud, and proceeded north vid Tash,
over the Shalwar Kuh pass (at 9000 feet elevation),
across the lofty range of the Hazar Jarih mountains, a
confused mass of jungle-clad hills, and along a break-
neck path through dense forest for miles to Astrabad,
in the plain bordering on the Caspian Sea below.
On the 10th the Colonel reached the shores of the
Caspian at Bundur Gez, and took steamer past
Ashurada and Mashad-i-Sar to Enzelleh, the port
of Resht. From Resht Teheran was reached by road
on the 29th. Here Captain the Hon. G. Napier,
who had been travelling over much the same ground
as Colonel MacGregor, made that officer's acquaint-
ance, and the two proceeded together by chuppur
stages on miserable hired steeds to Tabriz. Leaving
Napier at Tabriz, MacGregor rode on to the Russian
frontier (23d October), and thence, by troika, drove
ACROSS THE CASPIAN.
D
1 In the reproduction of Colonel MacGregor's sketch of "Jajarm
from the East" (Journey through Khorassan,' vol. ii. p. 105), these
towers by mistake have been, strangely enough, altered into solitary
trees, thus altogether transforming the characteristic of the land-
scape.
،،
""
THE MERV QUESTION.
1875.]
The
to Nukohvan, the first Russian cantonment.
journey vid Erivan and Tiflis across the Caucasus is
not described by Colonel MacGregor in his volumes.
He merely records that he took rail from Vladi-
kavkas to Rostof, and by way of Kharkof, Cracow,
and Vienna, reached England on the 15th November.
Colonel MacGregor had
had now reached home.
"Alas! not such a home as I had often dreamed
of going to, where each pleasure would have been
enhanced and reflected in the bright eyes of her
who has gone from me, but still a home where I
should see our child, and begin with her a new
life. This little daughter, Viva, was now three.
years and a half old, and her father had brought
home with him some silk embroidery all the way
from Ghain, to make cushion-covers for her.
""
During his journey from Sarakhs, Colonel Mac-
Gregor wrote a paper on the "Merv Question," in
which he discusses the anticipated conquest of Merv
by the Russians, which has since become an accom-
plished fact.
This paper was subsequently pub-
lished as an appendix to the author's work on
Khorassan four years later; and the course of
events which happened during that interval amply
justifies the prescient warnings given in the docu-
ment. Colonel MacGregor pointed out that if the
Russians were in possession of Merv they could
move up troops and stores for any further offensive
advance in absolute secrecy. He pointed out how
easily Herat is accessible from Merv-the distance
21
22
'
THE KEY OF INDIA.”
[1875.
being only 260 miles, and the route practicable for
infantry, cavalry, and even guns. He proceeded to
urge that Herat was well termed the "key of India,"
because it was the best point at which an invader
from the west could concentrate and prepare for the
invasion of that country - because its strategical
position commanded all the important approaches
to India-because its fortifications were strong, and
capable of being improved by modern appliances-
and because its climate was admirable; and the
possessor of Herat would ever command a widely
extended prestige throughout Central Asia. Taking
it for granted that, unless England interfered, Russia
would successfully carry out her designs against
Merv, Colonel MacGregor next considered the result
of such an advance. He had only to bid his readers
look back on the history of Russian progress in
Central Asia to forecast the next move on the chess-
board-which, undoubtedly, must be the taking of
Herat. Once in possession of that city, they would
fortify it so that we should be unable to retake it
with 50,000 men. They could then secure the
direct line of communication with the Caspian, along
the Atrak, and Northern Khorassan would be ab-
sorbed by the Muscovite.
Colonel MacGregor advised the conciliation of
Turkey, the strengthening of Persia, and above all,
the necessity of making Afghanistan unassailable.
He would have British officers despatched to put the
defences of Bala-Murghab, Kusan, and Herat in or-
•
1876.]
1
der; next, the acquisition of sites at Mohumrah and
Ormuz from the Persians for the formation of depots;
and thirdly, officers sent to discipline and instruct
the Persian troops. Such measures, it was urged,
need not commit England to war with Russia; but
should Russia resent such measures, then, undoubt-
edly, it would be necessary to act decisively by the
military occupation of Herat. Colonel MacGregor,
however, recorded his dissent from any plan which
went further than a purely military occupation of
Herat, as he considered that interference in the
political management of a single Afghan district
would only lead to a recurrence of the disasters of
1842. Herat in English possession, the Russians
would not care to retain Merv.
AT THE GEOGRAPHICAL.
23
On the 31st December Colonel MacGregor was
made a Companion of the Order of the Star of India,
a not undeserved decoration.
Captain the Honourable G. Napier, son of the
Commander-in-Chief in India, who had been sent to
Persia to examine into the circumstances of a raid
which had taken place on the frontier, sent to the
Foreign Office an elaborate Report upon the Persian
territory between the Hari-rud and the Caspian.
His route corresponded closely with the latter portion
of Colonel MacGregor's journey from Sarakhs; and
when Sir Frederic Goldsmid read portions of
Napier's report at a meeting of the Geographical
1 The island of Bahrein has since (1888) been acquired by the pro-
mulgation of a British Protectorate.
ļ
[1876.
Society on the 24th January, Colonel MacGregor
was requested to attend and give some particulars
of his reconnaissance in those regions adjacent to the
Turkoman frontier. Accordingly, Colonel MacGre-
gor complied with the request, and gave a brief
account of his travels-in which he confirmed and
illustrated Captain Napier's observations satisfac-
torily. The ensuing discussion was turned on the
ancient bed of the river Oxus, and the origin and
power of ancient Parthia, by Sir Henry Rawlinson.
24
EXPLANATION.
Shortly afterwards, in reply to some disparaging
remarks which had appeared in the newspapers, Col-
onel MacGregor addressed the following explanation
to the press :
"I was proceeding home through
Persia, when the perhaps not altogether inexcusable
wish occurred to me to try and add some information
to our knowledge of that country; and I was the
more induced to take this step because I knew, better
than most men, that of a very important part of
Central Asia we are curiously ignorant. The object
I set before myself was to complete our information
regarding, first, the routes leading into Persia from
the south; secondly, the routes leading from Persia
into Afghanistan; thirdly, the routes leading into
Afghanistan from the Oxus; fourthly, to see with
my own eyes the valley of Herat, the fortifications
of Herat, and the other important fortresses of the
frontier. I fully accomplished the first and second
of these objects, I failed in the third, and partially
succeeded in the fourth. The reason of my thus
25
1876.]
"IN HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE."
partial success was owing entirely to the action of
our own Government; and of course, as a loyal
servant of her Majesty, I accept that decision with-
out comment and without cavil.
"Being thus disappointed in my object, and ad-
hering strictly to both the letter and spirit of my
orders, I still determined to see as much of Persia as
was possible; and was thus enabled to add still more
to our information.
With reference to the sneer contained in the
paragraph, of my having asked for accommodation
suitable to my rank, it implies that I made too much
of my rank. But the fact is, that I asked the mus-
taufi for no more than I had asked and received at
every Persian town or village I had stopped at-a
place to lay my head in. It is true I informed him
at the same time who I was; but this—though I am
extremely proud of serving in her Majesty's military
forces-was merely from the wish not to conceal
anything. I was asked by the mustaufi's first
messenger, who was very civil, who I was? Not
being a tinker, or a tailor, or a private gentleman,
I could but answer, 'A lieutenant-colonel in her
Majesty's service.'
،،
Then as to my not waiting for a reply: this is
inaccurate again. The first reply I received was
from an officer of the mustaufi's; and as he gave me
to understand I would not be received, I took ad-
vantage of the cool of the morning to ride from
Pahrah, the frontier village of Afghanistan, in the
26
INFORMATION OBTAINED.
[1876.
direction of Herat, and I stopped for several hours
in a garden on the road and waited for the reply.
"That reply being a refusal to receive me, because
I was a British officer, I got on my horse and rode
down the valley, and was escorted by Afghan horse-
men to the Persian frontier post at Kehriz, and not
to Teheran, as the paper rather ludicrously supposes.
"Next, I did not report the matter to Mr Thom-
son, nor did I ask his permission to visit Herat, be-
cause, in the first place, I had nothing to do with
that gentleman; and in the second, I knew quite
well he could not give the permission.
When I was at Sarakhs, on the Merv frontier,
I discovered there was a Russian prisoner there, and
I had every reason to believe there he will remain
till the Russians find it convenient to release him
by force of arms.
"The last paragraph comments on a simple bit of
chaff in a private letter as if it was said in sober
earnest. I laughingly remarked that if I was cap-
tured by Turkomans, I hoped Mrs Aitchison and
other mutual lady friends would get up a fancy
bazaar for my relief.
"I confess that from causes quite beyond my con-
trol my journey has not realised quite all I hoped of
it; but however that may be, I have learnt enough
to give me a very fair general idea of how affairs
stand, and also to know that the day may come
when the information I was debarred from procuring
will be worth far more than its weight in gold; and
1876.]
even if I had learnt nothing and seen nothing, the
feeling that I have risked danger, undergone con-
siderable hardship, and spent a large sum of money
out of my own pocket in an endeavour to benefit my
country, is worth something to a soldier who only
serves for the 'name of the thing."
NOT DISCOURAGED.
27
ލ
When returning through Persia after his attempt
to reach Herat, and after receiving the discouraging
prohibition from the Indian Government to cross
the Turkoman frontier, one resolve was uppermost
in Colonel MacGregor's mind-viz., that nothing
would ever induce him to travel in those countries
again. The fact was, that having undertaken his
private journey in the interests of the State, and
the Government having jealously interfered with his
movements when on furlough, all the salt, as he ex-
pressed it, had been taken out of the trip, and hence-
forth the dreary wastes and long stages seemed in-
terminable, and he always repeated to himself that
never, never would he undertake again such a
thankless task. If there was one thing on which
he was fixed, it was that Central Asia should see his
face no more.
In this frame of mind he continued
throughout the winter of 1875-76, during which no
more irritating subject could be broached in his
presence than frontier work in Asia; but in the
spring of 1876¹ the spirit of the true traveller re-
.
1 Lord Lytton succeeded Lord Northbrook as Viceroy, and in-
augurated a forward policy in India in April, a circumstance which
LORD SALISBURY'S ENCOURAGEMENT.
[1876.
vived, and by the summer-time Colonel MacGregor
was making renewed preparations for filling up
certain blank spaces on the map, which he felt
looked reproachfully at him.
-
Lord Salisbury, then her Majesty's Secretary for
India in Lord Beaconsfield's Administration, had
been particularly considerate towards Colonel Mac-
Gregor in the expression of sympathy with his un-
successful attempt to reach Herat; and during an
interview at the India Office, the Deputy Quarter-
master-General informed the Marquis that he was
ready to go anywhere and do anything which the
Secretary for India might wish him to undertake.
Colonel MacGregor particularly suggested Mekran
as a useful field for exploration. Lord Salisbury
said that any information about this country could
not fail to be interesting, and he promised to con-
sider whether he would allow him to travel in those
regions. On a subsequent occasion Lord Salisbury
informed the Colonel that he had obtained the assent
of the Council of India to his returning to duty vid
Baluchistan, with the view of procuring detailed
geographical information of the districts through
which he should pass. His friend Captain Lock-
wood was also permitted to accompany him.
28
contributed not a little towards the restoration of Colonel Mac-
Gregor's ardour for exploration.
1 "INDIA OFFICE, LONDON, 14th Sept. 1876.
"MY LORD,—I have to acquaint you that, having authorised Lieu-
tenant-Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., of the Bengal Staff Corps,
1876.]
All preliminaries being settled, Colonel Mac-
Gregor and Captain Lockwood took train from Char-
ing Cross, Eastward bound, on the 25th Septem-
ber 1876. There being no hurry, they travelled
leisurely through Paris, Vienna, and Pesth; then,
steaming down the Danube to Rustchuk, there took
rail to Varna, and thence by steamer to Constanti-
nople and Trebizond.
TO ERZROUM AND KARS.
29
From Trebizond the officers rode to Erzroum, where
they carefully inspected the fortifications, and pro-
ceeding to Kars, they examined the defences of that
historical fortress minutely.1
This fortress, it will be remembered, subsequently
fell into the hands of the Russians, who gallantly
took it by storm on the 15th of November 1877.
The journey through the highlands of Armenia to
the Tigris was performed during snowstorms and
and Captain R. B. Lockwood, of the Panjab Frontier Force, who are
at present in this country, to proceed to India by way of the Kharan
river and Baluchistan, I have decided that, in addition to travelling
expenses, those officers shall receive the full Indian pay and allow-
ances of their appointments during the period which will be occupied
by their journey, reckoning from the date of their leaving England,
and that such period shall count as service for pension.-I have, &c.
"SALISBURY.
.. To his Excellency the
Right Hon. The GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA."
-See "Wanderings in Baluchistan, by Major-General Sir C. M.
MacGregor, Quartermaster-General in India." One volume, p. 315.
Allen & Co., London: 1882.
1 Kars was a formidable fortress, consisting of a solid stonework
citadel, with a series of detached masonry forts and earthworks mount-
ing some 300 guns.-See the Campaign in Armenia, by Lieutenant
F. V. Greene, United States Engineers.
30
[1876.
wintry weather, after which the raft-voyage down
the Tigris seemed luxurious travelling.
On the 25th November the travellers reached
Baghdad, and proceeded vid Basrah and Bushire to
the station of the Indo-European Telegraph Com-
pany at Jask-a barren, uninviting spot on the
coast of Mekran.
ARMENIA.
W
Colonel MacGregor thus had an opportunity of
seeing a part of the world which was soon to be the
theatre of stirring scenes. He sent an exhaustive
report¹ to Lord Salisbury concerning the capabilities
of those strong positions, Erzroum and Kars, which
were already fully armed and equipped with Krupp
guns, whilst great efforts were then being made to
provision both of these fortified towns adequately,
and reinforcements were being hurried up to increase
their garrisons.
Troops were met on the road down to the Tigris
from Erzroum at almost every stage en route to
Erzroum or Kars; for by this time the Turks were
thoroughly convinced of the certainty and immi-
nence of the coming war, and feeling that it was to
come sooner or later, they were looking forward to
its commencement to put an end to their harassing
anxiety. Kars was found to be, as far as the plan
of its fortification went, in much the same state as
when it was taken in 1855 and handed back by the
Russians after the Crimean war; but all the bat-
teries had been immensely strengthened and more
1 See Appendix A, p. 43.
1877.]
BALUCHISTAN.
31
G
powerfully armed.
The forts had been lately in-
spected and reported on by Blum Pasha, a Prussian
officer of considerable reputation in the Turkish ser-
vice, and the defences put in order by Hoosein
Pasha, who had been educated at Woolwich. The
Turkish garrison was composed also of troops far
superior to any that could have been brought into
the field in 1854-55; but still there was much
rottenness observable in their administration, and
above all, there was a lack of educated officers.
Before leaving Jask, Colonel MacGregor drew
up a suggestive Memorandum for the India Office,
which was highly approved of by Lord Salis-
bury and forwarded to Calcutta, where fifty copies
were printed for confidential distribution. It was
entitled "Memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel
C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., Assistant-Quartermaster-
General, on Armenia as a Theatre of War, 15th
December 1876."1
The explorers arrived at Gwadar on the 1st Jan-
uary 1877, and were there assisted in procuring
camels and guides by Major Mockler, who accom-
panied them from Jask for that purpose. The first
objective point to be attained was Panjgur, to which
place there were two routes which had not been
visited before by Europeans. Major Lovett had
St
1 This paper was subsequently reprinted as an appendix to 'The
Defence of India,' a work published by General Sir C. MacGregor in
1884 (see post, p. 43). It had already been published by "The
Statesman,' in January 1880, and had thereby lost its confidential
character.
[1877.
pointed out the first of these routes-viz., that from
the mouth of the Dasht river-as a suitable line
for an advance of troops into the interior; and Cap-
tain Lockwood undertook to reconnoitre this road,
whilst Colonel MacGregor made an exploration of
the second communication via the village of Pasni.
A start was effected on the 3d of January, Lock-
wood turning west round the head of the bay, and
MacGregor along the sea-shore to the east. At the
fifth mile Colonel MacGregor came to one of the
mud-volcanoes which are peculiar to this locality.
It is named the Darrya Cham, and consists of a
crater of dried mud with a basin of liquid mud in
its centre, which every now and then bubbled up
with a faint sound. At certain periods the mud is
said to rise up and overflow the sides of the crater
when affected by the high tides of the neighbouring
sea. After travelling some fifty miles from Gwadar,
the Colonel had only passed ten hovels, for there
was not a sign of any village anywhere between the
sea and the hills.
32
MUD-VOLCANOES.
The state of affairs in the Panjgur valley made it
necessary for the travellers to approach it from their
different roads with a certain amount of caution.
Colonel MacGregor marched by the road which is
the regular caravan-route through Shahbaz, where
he heard that Azad Khan, a notorious bandit chief,
had sent a message to the killadar of the fort there
that unless he made his salaam, he would come and
attack him. Consequently he made a long detour
33
1877.]
to the west in order to keep clear of Azad's warriors,
and turned towards Isa, the residence of the Khan's
naib (lieutenant). The Colonel selected Thal as the
most fitting place for his stay in Panjgur, where he
could keep aloof from the feudal dispute between
Mir Gazian, the present, and Mir Isa, the former
ruler of Panjgur. Azad Khan made several attempts
to open communication with Colonel MacGregor
whilst that officer was awaiting Captain Lockwood
to rejoin him in Panjgur, which he did on the 25th
January.
Of the tract between the Helmand, Sistan, and
the mountains of Panjgur and Sarhad, the infor-
mation existing was nil. At this time on the
map there was a blank only broken by two names
one ZIRREH, in large letters, the other Pir-i-
Kaisar, in small. Pottinger and Christie had skirted
this district (which extends 200 miles north and
south, and the same distance east and west) on
the north and south, Goldsmid's party had passed
west of it, and St John looked at it from Jalk; but
no one had hitherto examined this country, and now
Colonel MacGregor and Lockwood proposed to ex-
plore the resources of this uninviting area of desert.
From cross-examination of a Baluchi guide, Nur
Mahammad, the travellers gleaned that it was four or
five marches to a place called Tankh-i-Zorati, where
the river Mashkel goes through the hills into the un-
known land beyond; hence a road went to a district
called Naru (the first heard of this hitherto un-
VOL. II.
с
ZIRREH.
shpall
34
[1877.
known locality), and another to Pir-i-Kaisar, so it
was determined to push on to the pass where the
Mashkel found its way through the hills.
The 29th of January found the small party fairly
started on their way with provision for fifty days.
The defile called Tankh-i-Zorati was reached on the
4th of February, and was found to be an intricate
road winding with the turnings of the river, which
it crosses and recrosses several times; and when
the river is low the way is easy, but with a flooded
"The
river the pass would be impracticable.
heights on both sides are very steep and rugged,
and are composed of sandstone rock, the strata of
which are upheaved straight on end. The defile is,
of course, eminently defensible. In fact, it is of
that nature that it would be described by a non-
military traveller as a place where a few men could
stay thousands. But the fact is, like most defiles
through rugged hills, while it would present an al-
most unforcible obstacle to a front attack, yet it is
very open to be turned both as a whole and in de-
tail; so that, unless defended by an intelligent
enemy, it would not detain well-commanded troops
a single day." The explorers were now north of the
range which bounds the desert on the south, and they
were puzzled where the river, called "Budu," by
Pottinger, could have its course. It was tolerably
evident that the Budu and the Mashkel were one
and the same river. The bed of the river Mashkel
was followed for some days along the stream which
EXTREME TEMPERATURES.
35
1877.]
but partially filled it, and as they proceeded north,
found only pools here and there, but plenty of tam-
arisk for camel-forage. The weather meantime at
night was so cold that all the water in the skin-bags
was frozen, although the temperature in the daytime
was high.
THE HELMAND.
G
A halt was made at a place called Shandak on the
14th and 15th, until another guide to Zirreh made
his appearance on the 16th, on which day all extra
hands and animals being sent to Lal-Khan-Chah to
wait for instructions, the expedition, reduced to as
small a size as possible, pushed on into Zirreh. By
the 20th all the water-supply had been finished,
and the camels began giving in one by one; and on
the 22d, when no water had been obtained for forty-
eight hours, seven of the camels were missing, and
the guide disappeared, presumedly in search of the
camels. However, pushing on, the undismayed ex-
plorers reached the shela or old waterway of the
Helmand at Shah Godar,¹ near the ruins of Gumbaz-
i-Shah Maksud. The lost camels and guide turned
up late on the following day, and having reached
the projected objective of the reconnaissance, the
track of the small caravan was directed towards the
1 Mr Merk, a political officer attached to the Afghan Boundary
Commission, when at Sarshela in December 1885, was told by some
Persians deputed to meet him by the Amir of Ghain, "That eight
years ago a big Feringhi had visited Shah Godar, a point some fifty
miles south of Sarshela, and had built a pillar there. Possibly they
meant,” he writes, "Sir Charles MacGregor, who visited these parts
about that time."-See Northern Afghanistan, by Major C. E. Yate,
p. 146.
•
36
[1877.
Sind frontier, or, as Colonel MacGregor termed it,
homewards. During these three weeks in the desert
the food of the travellers consisted principally of
dried dates; and in the evening, at the end of a
long dreary march, their greatest treat was a cup of
cocoa, a luxury, however, used most sparingly, for
they were only able to carry two or three tins with
them.
KELAT.
On the 4th of March it was settled that Lockwood
should go by the most direct and practicable route
he could find from Lal-Khan-Chah vid Nushki.
From this last post he was to proceed vid Mastung
to Bibi-Naru in the Bolan Pass, and thence to Jacob-
abad as far as possible. The greater part of the
Baluchi retinue was sent back to Panjgur. Colonel
MacGregor traversed Brahui Land by another route,
which led through the Pisi defile in the Tazinan
range. On each side of this pass, which is a mile in
length and only about thirty yards wide, the cliffs
rise perpendicularly for about 100 feet. "No doubt
to a front attack in the old approved manner of
taking the bull by the horns, this defile would be
very strong; and this is the way non-military travel-
lers generally look at these places. I am, however,
surprised to see that Colonel Neil Campbell, who
reported on the route in 1840, seems to consider it
very strong, saying an enemy by merely throwing a
It
few stones might render it impracticable.
did not strike me as the place to detain a decent
general a couple of days."
AZAD KHAN'S ALLEGIANCE.
37
1877.]
On the 23d March Colonel MacGregor arrived
safely in Major Sandeman's camp at Gandava, in
Kelat territory, and without delay pushed on to Jac-
obabad (Sind) by the 26th, whence he telegraphed
news of the safe termination of his expedition to the
Military Secretary. Captain Lockwood came down
to Bolan Pass, and reached Jacobabad the following
day, and the Viceroy telegraphed his congratulations
on the happy result of the journey.¹ Colonel Mac-
Gregor, on resuming duty with the Quartermaster-
General's Department, was able to construct a valu-
able map from the observations taken during his
reconnaissance in Baluchistan. This was lithographed
at the Surveyor-General's Office in Calcutta in June
1877 on a scale of sixteen miles to one inch.
Colonel MacGregor was able to throw considerable
light on the much-vexed question of the boundaries
of Afghanistan, and conclusively showed that the
territory where Azad Khan held sway could not be
considered tributary to Sher Ali.
1 Telegram, March 28, from the Military Secretary to Colonel
MacGregor, Jacobabad :-
"Viceroy (Lord Lytton) is very glad to hear of your arrival, and
congratulates you and Captain Lockwood on safe termination of
your adventurous journey. Political Superintendent Jacobabad was
instructed to remit to Kelat 4000 rupees for your use. Please com-
municate with Colonel Nuttall. If the money you require be addi-
tional to that sum, Viceroy will authorise a further advance. His
Excellency thinks you had better frame your report, and bring it up
to Simla for consideration. He thanks you for all your interesting
letters and reports, addressed to Burne.
"Colonel BURNE,
Secretary to Military Department,
Government for India."
38
[1877.
"The mere fact," he wrote, "of Azad Khan
having declared himself at various times during his
checkered career a subject of the Afghans, cannot
entitle them to claim his allegiance any more than
if one of our Indian tributaries were to do so, and
therefore, if he is not really a subject of the Afghans
or the Persians, he must be that of the Khan of
Kelat. Even if there was a shadow of right in
favour of an Afghan claim, it must give way before
the fatal inexpediency of permitting such an arrange-
ment. In my opinion there are but two courses.
open, either Azad Khan must acknowledge the Khan
of Kelat unreservedly, and give up the Afghan alle-
giance completely, or he should be brought to his
senses without delay."
THE DIARY.
Captain Lockwood was unfortunately taken ill at
Multan a few days afterwards, the disease being
brought on by the exposure and bad food during
the journey through the deserts of Baluchistan. He
lingered some months at Mari, but eventually suc-
cumbed to dropsy and Bright's disease.1
From March 1877 to October 1881, a period of
four years and a half, the diary of Colonel Charles
MacGregor's travels with Captain Lockwood was
laid aside.
"This journal," the author says,
46
was written from
1 "Captain Lockwood, who was MacGregor's companion during this
expedition, died soon afterwards from the hardships they underwent;
and I have often thought it was during this time of extreme privation
that MacGregor sowed the seeds of the disease which ultimately car-
ried him off."-Speech of Sir Frederick Roberts at Simla, June 3, 1888.
1877.]
،
MS. OF ZIRREH.'
day to day, and copied out of my note-book by a
baboo. He has made endless mistakes, and these I
have corrected with red ink: but even with these
corrections the book is quite in the rough. I have
had no time to polish it up." It was not until after
the close of the Afghan Campaign 1878-81 that Sir
Charles wrote to Captain W. E. Gill, R.E., of the
Intelligence Branch, War Office (the well-known offi-
cer who was shortly afterwards murdered together
with Professor Palmer, in Egypt, 1882), asking if
he knew any one who would undertake the revision
of his manuscript ZIRREH,' as he then called it.
"What I want is," he wrote, "that it should be care-
fully gone over, and any palpable errors in English
or spelling corrected; and sentences may, where
necessary, be turned into better English, so long as
the sense and meaning of my words is strictly pre-
served." In reply, Captain Gill advised the general
to name a friend to deal with the publishers, men-
tioning at the same time the names of several men
who would be likely to carry out his wishes. Major
H. B. Hanna was then asked to act as reviser, on the
understanding that he was not to be at liberty to
show it to any one at the India Office. "I do not
want to make a penny by the book," said General
Sir Charles MacGregor, "nor will I pay a penny
for its publication."
39
<
As Major Hanna's duties did not allow him leisure
to revise the manuscript, this work was undertaken by
Mr A. V. Wollaston, of the India Office. The diary
40
[1877.
was finally published, in 1882, by Messrs Allen of
Waterloo Place. "Lord Salisbury," wrote Mr Wol-
laston, "has expunged the whole of the chapter nar-
rating your dealings with him, merely leaving a few
lines to say that you undertook the journey at his
request, with the view of exploring a region the geo-
graphy of which was comparatively unknown."
When Colonel MacGregor wrote his memorandum
of the 15th December 1876, the Russo-Turkish war
was yet in embryo. However, hostilities commenced
in April 1877, and the Russians, as Colonel Mac-
Gregor had foreseen, invested Kars, with results
which concurred entirely with the Colonel's predic-
tions. Under this changed aspect of affairs, Colonel
MacGregor prepared another memorandum (dated
May 8th) for the Indian and Home Governments,
in which the question as to the aid which could be
rendered to Turkey from India was considered in
the new light which actual events had thrown on it.
This document has only been published "confiden-
tially;" but although it was reprinted in the famous
work, 'The Defence of India, 1884,' as that volume
was also branded "confidential," this valuable paper
can only be alluded to here. It is sufficient to men-
tion that it goes far to confirm the reputation of the
prescience and political acumen of the late general
in a remarkable degree.1
AID TO TURKEY FROM INDIA.
1 The despatch of a British Indian force to the Mediterranean within
twelve months of the appearance of Colonel MacGregor's second mem-
orandum is good evidence that the suggestion of an advance from the
Mediterranean was not lost upon the authorities.
1877.]
OFFICIAL MEMORANDA.
41
Throughout the year 1877, Colonel¹ MacGregor
worked hard in the Quartermaster-General's Depart-
ment, and numerous are the memoranda, notes, re-
ports, and papers which attest the untiring zeal with
which he interested himself in working out the pro-
per way of dealing with the various questions of
importance submitted to him by his Chief, Sir Fred-
erick Roberts, who, it should be remembered, was at
this period only a major regimentally, although he
had brevet rank as a colonel, and local rank of major-
general whilst Quartermaster - General in India.
Among some of the most valuable papers written by
Colonel MacGregor during this period are those on
Herat; Committee Report on Intelligence; on Care
of Arms by Native Troops; Operations in Jawaki
Land, and Punishment of the Jawaki Tribe; on
Clandestine Prostitution; on the Schemes of Defence
and Fortified Posts; places of Refuge for Europeans
in case of an Outbreak among the Natives, &c.
In April 1876, Lord Lytton had succeeded Lord
Northbrook as Viceroy, and as he came out with
special injunctions from Lord Salisbury to press the
residence of a British Envoy with the Court of Sher
Ali at Kabal, it was not long before negotiations
were entered into for carrying out the policy of Lord
Beaconsfield. The outposts of Russia in Central
Asia were now almost immediately upon the frontier
of Afghanistan, and during 1877 frequent confer-
1
1 Lieut.-Colonel MacGregor was promoted Brevet Colonel on 18th
June 1877.
:
42
[1877.
ences with the agents of Sher Ali were held, but
with highly unsatisfactory results.
Meanwhile Colonel MacGregor did not cease to
press upon the Indian Government the necessity of
putting Herat in a state of defence by sending British
officers to strengthen the fortifications of that city,
and to organise the Herati and Kabal regiments in
garrison there. He fully foresaw the course of
events, and duly prepared schemes for the invasion
of Afghanistan when the time for action should come.
CENTRAL ASIAN ROUTES.
"TO THE QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA,
Army Headquarters Camp.
"SIMLA, December 7, 1877.
SIR, I have the pleasure to-day to forward to
your address a map to illustrate my travels in Persia
in 1875. In doing so, I beg to point out that the
whole of the red line represents my actual route, and
is the result of a survey made by me while in that
country; the rest is put in from native information.
In addition, I have already embodied in Part IV.,
Routes in Asia, 112 routes, most of them quite new,
and nearly all collected by me during my travels.
These travels were accomplished by me during fur-
lough, and most of the time taken-viz., from 26th
March 1875, date of leaving Bombay, to 15th No-
vember 1875, date of reaching London-was devot-
ed by me to increasing our knowledge of Persia for
the benefit of the Government at an expense of not
under £600. The fact, therefore, is, that I am en-
66
1877.]
abled to present Government with a survey of 1870
miles of country in Persia, together with the descrip-
tions of 112 routes, without costing them one penny.
This being the case, may I request the favour of
your soliciting his Excellency the Commander-in-
Chief to recommend to Government that such portion
of the time between 26th March and 15th Novem-
ber 1875 as may be deemed fair may be allowed to
count to me as service towards pension? In any
case I should have taken a month to reach England,
so that from 26th April 1875 to date of my reaching
London is the time actually spent by me in obtain-
ing the information above specified."
ARMENIA.
43
APPENDIX A. TO CHAPTER I.
COLONEL MACGREGOR'S FIRST MEMORANDUM ON ARMENIA
AS A THEATRE OF WAR, 15TH DECEMBER 1876.”
<<
--
G
A BRIEF notice of this Memorandum cannot fail to be in-
teresting, more especially if a comparison is made between
the estimates of the forces and the conclusions drawn by
Colonel MacGregor before the war with the actual numbers.
and results of the real war itself.
A campaign in Armenia naturally inferred an invasion of
that country by Russia. The success or failure of this in-
vasion would depend-first, on the number of troops Russia
could bring into the field in this quarter; second, whether
Turkey would be supported, or not, by England. As Russia
would be forced to keep up large forces for the protection
[1876.
of her Polish, Galician, and other frontiers, besides in-
creasing her forces in Central Asia, in addition to the large
army required for the invasion of Bulgaria, it was evident
that no very overwhelming force could be available for the
invasion of Asiatic Turkey.
44
A CORRECT FORECAST.
The force available for such a purpose was calculated not
to exceed 170,000 men. (The actual force with which
Russians began operations in Armenia, on the 24th April
1877, was about 55,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 210
field-guns of all kinds, besides a siege-train in the Caucasus
of 336 guns, of which half only was mobilised at first-in
all, not more than 100,000 men.)
If Persia became the ally of Russia, there would be in
addition 50,000 rabble, unofficered, unfed, and untrust-
worthy.
Sameh Pasha, the Governor-General of Erzroum, showed
Colonel MacGregor returns putting the Turkish forces at
200,000 men; but their returns were so evidently untrust-
worthy that the Colonel puts down 70,000 as the number
of disciplined troops in the pashalic.¹ (The Turkish forces
in Armenia at the outbreak of the war under command of
Mouktar Pasha numbered in all 70,000 men and 108 field-
guns.)
Pag
The garrison of Kars would consume not under 25,000
men, and with such a garrison, it could hope to stand a
siege throughout the summer, and the enemy could neither
besiege nor blockade that place with a less force than
50,000 men.2 Loris Melikoff's column established itself
10 miles from Kars on the 24th April, and established
siege-batteries (60 guns and mortars) by the end of
May, when the bombardment commenced; but by the be-
1 "I think that, turning out every available man, and calling out all the
Redifs, the utmost strength of what I may call for the moment Turkish
discipline troops in this pashalic would be 70,000 men."
2 Batoum, 20,000; Ardahan, 7500; Kars, 25,600; Erzroum, 8250; at
other points 9000-total, 70,250.-The Campaign in Armenia, by Lieu-
tenant Greene, U.S. Engineers.
45
1876.]
ginning of July the offensive campaign of the Russians
in Armenia had come to a halt for lack of sufficient
troops.
The garrison of Kars was 16,000 infantry, 30 field-guns,
1000 cavalry, and over 300 siege-guns-in all, with artillery,
22,000 men.
BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS.
Loris Melikoff's army in September was 35,000 infantry,
with 5000 or more Cossacks-total, 40,000.
'
If indeed the Russians attacked Kars with an over-
whelming force, and were prepared to sacrifice 20,000 for
its capture, it might fall sooner."
In all, 41 battalions, or 30,000 infantry, with 53 squadrons
and 144 guns, field and position, constituted the army of
investment of Kars under General Lazareff in October.
Forty-eight guns arrived on the 4th November. The
Turkish force was 22,500 men at this time. Kars fell on
the 18th November.
"There is little doubt that in this case the Russians would
have the best chance of success, though it is by no means
certain that they would be victorious in the long-run."
Now comes the gist of the suggestion: "How would it.
be if a corps d'armée of British troops 30,000 strong landed
at Trebizond, if 60,000 mixed British and Indian troops
advanced from Baghdad, and if the fighting powers of the
Turks were more than doubled by the presence of British
officers at their head?"
Colonel MacGregor then proceeds to discuss at some
length the routes by which the British columns could move
from Trebizond, and next the line of operations of a force
advancing from India either to assist the Turks or to co-
operate with the force sent from Europe. The details are
interesting enough, but too lengthy to find a place in this
sketch.
Some years later this Memorandum was published at
length in the colums of the 'Statesman,' to which paper it
had been intrusted "confidentially" by some one whose con-
46
[1880.
fidence was evidently misplaced; and in Appendix B.
will be found the comments on the confidential document,
and the remarks of Sir Charles MacGregor on the apparent
breach of confidence.
THE EXPEDITION TO BAGHDAD.
((
APPENDIX B. TO CHAPTER I.
THE EXPEDITION TO BAGHDAD-COLONEL MACGREGOR'S
MEMORANDUM.1
We have stated in our earlier issues that an insane Minis-
terial project was on foot in 1876-77 for invading Armenia
via Baghdad. Lord Lytton declared the statement to be a
pure fabrication of the 'Statesman.' We shall therefore
now inform our readers, since the truth of our statement
has been publicly challenged, on what grounds we made
them. We have before us a 'Memorandum by Lieutenant-
Colonel MacGregor, C.S.I., Assistant-Quartermaster-Gen-
eral, on Armenia as a Theatre of War, December 15, 1876.'
The reader will observe the date of the Memorandum. It
was just before the Constantinople Conference, when Lord
Beaconsfield was steadfastly contemplating the failure of
the conference, and the subsequent outbreak of the war,
in alliance with Turkey, to defend its integrity and inde-
pendence' against Russian invasion. Colonel MacGregor,
an Indian officer of some consideration as a strategist, was
about that time, it seems, returning from England to India;
and he was plainly deputed by the English Ministry to re-
turn by way of Armenia, to undertake the task of planning
an Armenian campaign for the guidance of the Ministry.
Colonel MacGregor did return to India vid Armenia; and
1 The 'Statesman,' January 17, 1880, pp. 236-238.
1880.
LET THOSE BELIEVE WHO CAN.
47
he took a very painstaking survey of the country that was
expected to become the theatre of war, and made an esti-
mate of the probable forces that could be brought into the
field by Russia and Turkey respectively; and this he em-
bodied in a Memorandum, which bears absolute evidence
of having been written to order, and submitted to superior
authorities. We shall now, as we have no doubt, be asked
to believe that Colonel MacGregor undertook and executed
this laborious task of his own option and for his own amuse-
ment, and that it was never under serious consideration by
any one but himself. Let those believe who can. It will
of course be convenient to repudiate the mad scheme now;
and after the extraordinary statement of Lord Salisbury in
reply to Lord Grey and to Lord Derby, it would not of course
surprise us if that nobleman were to disown for himself
and his colleagues all responsibility for Colonel MacGregor's
Memorandum. The best answer we can, by anticipation,
make to such a repudiation, will be to publish the Memor-
andum, and let it speak for itself. Our readers will find it
below, and we leave it to their unprejudiced judgment to
say whether it bears intrinsic marks of having been written
under instruction for submission to the authorities, or of
being from first to last a freak of Colonel MacGregor's
alone. The latter hypothesis is plainly absurd on the face
of it had Colonel MacGregor been only a less dashing
Captain Burnaby, scouring Armenia out of curiosity, love
of adventure, or the gratification of a strategical turn of
mind—had he made his survey of the country, and planned
the campaign without instruction from English Ministers
that they were prepared to entertain the idea of such a
campaign-he would neither have been at the pains to
study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the
country, nor would he have detailed his scheme in the
style he has adopted. The style is distinctly the official
style, and that of a man who is performing an official
duty, who writes not as a military adventurer, with a wild
-
▸
48
[1880.
scheme of his own which he would fain recommend to the
Government, but as an officer of the Government acting
with the cognisance and approval of his superiors; and al-
together untroubled by a doubt as to the acceptability of
his services, he plunges at once in medias res, without giv-
ing an explanation of the circumstances which led him to
visit Armenia, and to take upon himself the task of making
strategical arrangements for a war. The superior authority
under which he was acting is assumed in every line, and
the serious consideration of his proposals, which he submits
with deference, is assumed throughout as a matter of course.
We do not know that his scheme was approved in all its
details, or that such a campaign as he sketches was ever
actually determined on. But that it was under 'serious
consideration,' and that it, or something resembling it,
would have been adopted, could Lord Beaconsfield have
had his way, and been allowed to enter upon a war with
Russia, no one can entertain a doubt.
CONFIDENTIALLY.
(
"We may say, in closing our remarks for the present,
that the 'Memorandum' was given to us confidentially,'
and that so long as there was the least likelihood of war,
and of the scheme being put into practice, we felt bound,
perhaps wrongly, to keep the matter secret. Had we been
under no such obligation we should have at once exposed
the insane project, believing that in so doing we were serv-
ing the interest of our country. But so long as war was
possible, and the publication of the scheme might have em-
barrassed the Government in its Eastern diplomacy, we felt
ourselves in honour bound to respect the confidence reposed
in us.
Now that the Eastern question has been settled for
the present, and the transactions connected with it have be-
come matters of history, and the country is called upon to
sit in judgment on the policy of the Government during the
last two years, every document that can shed light on their
policy and their intentions ought to be published; and we
have no hesitation in publishing Colonel MacGregor's
1880.]
OF MY OWN OPTION.
49
Memorandum, that it may be brought to the knowledge of
Parliament in the coming session. We did not feel justified
in producing it till the Berlin Treaty had closed the present
chapter of the history of the Eastern question."
"TO THE EDITOR OF THE STATESMAN.'
((
<
"KABAL, 20th February 1880.
SIR, I have just read your article entitled 'The Expe-
dition to Baghdad-Colonel MacGregor's Memorandum' (of
17th January), in which you are good enough to assume
that because, taking advantage of my journey through Ar-
menia in 1876, I chose to submit A Memorandum on Ar-
menia as a Theatre of War,' therefore a campaign in that
country against Russia was actually contemplated by her
Majesty's Ministers. With your views or your belief I
have nothing to do, but you will perhaps do me the favour
to give the same publicity to this letter as you have to
the article in question.
<
"My statement then is, that I was not ordered to proceed
through Armenia, I was not ordered to prepare any such
Memorandum, and I did undertake what you are pleased
to call this laborious task' of my own option, and for my
own amusement. I am not in the secrets of her Majesty's
Ministers, and therefore I do not know what they may have
intended to do in the event of a war with Russia; but the
above is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth of the matter,' as far as I am concerned.
((
There is one other point to which I may perhaps call
your attention-viz., that my memorandum is entitled, 'On
Armenia as a Theatre of War,' and it does not therefore
necessarily recommend the plan of operations sketched.
What it does attempt is to show that if aid were wanted
from India for a campaign in Armenia, how the Baghdad
route to that province could best be utilised for it. As a
matter of fact, I did not recommend its adoption.
"You proclaim your inability to believe that unless I had
been commissioned to write this Memorandum, I would
VOL. II.
D
50
[1880.
'neither have been at the pains to study, in all its difficult
details, the topography of the country,' therefore you will, of
course, be utterly unable to believe the following statement,
which, nevertheless, I have no hesitation in making-viz.,
it has been my invariable custom, whenever travelling in
countries which may become a theatre of war, in which
our army may be engaged, always to be 'at the pains to
study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the
country' I am visiting. I have submitted many such
memoranda-scores of other officers have done so; and I
hope both they and I will continue to do so whenever we
have a chance.
WHENEVER WE HAVE THE CHANCE.
"C. M. MACGREGOR, Ast.-Qr.-Mr.-General,
Chief of the Staff, Kabal Field Force."
51
THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR-THE KHAIBAR TO
THE
A
CHAPTER II.
KHAIBAR
ORIGIN OF THE WAR-SHER ALI'S GRIEVANCES-
-LORD LYTTON'S
ENVOY-PRECARIOUS
PRECARIOUS RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA - PLANS AND
PROJECTS THE CROSSING OF THE INDUS- ROUTES INTO
AFGHANISTAN- ROAD TO QUETTA PERSIA AND HERAT- NO
AFGHAN CAN BE TRUE-PROPOSAL TO GO TO HERAT-CHECK-
MATING THE ADVANCE OF RUSSIA GETTING RID OF THE
BARAKZAIS THE INDIAN TROOPS AT MALTA FRONTIER
ADMINISTRATION THE BERLIN CONGRESS SIR NEVILLE
CHAMBERLAIN'S MISSION- -REPULSE OF CAVAGNARI
ALI MASJID-ROAD
FORCING
COMMANDANT BAZAR
GANDAMAK.
"No cymbal clashed, no clarion rang,
Still were the pipe and drum;
Save heavy tread and armour's clang,
The sullen march was dumb."
—
1878-1879.
padded
-
VALLEY EXPEDITION·
GUERILLA WARFARE-RECONNAISSANCE
OF THE BOKHAR PASS-TRANSPORT ORGANISATION-INSPECTION
OF THE KURAM LINE-SAFED SANG-TREATY OF GANDAMAK-
THE RETIREMENT—AFRIDI BLACK-MAIL.
APPENDIX.—ADVANTAGES OF THE LAKARAI PASS-PROJECT FOR
THE ADVANCE ON KABAL.
SHER ALI, the Amir of Afghanistan, had long nursed
several grievances against the British-in fact, ever
[1876.
since he had first reported his accession to power in
1863, on the death of his father, the famous Dost
Mahamad Khan. After having fought his way to
the throne, in 1864, when he proposed to enter into
a new treaty of friendship and defensive alliance
with the Indian Government, he was told by Sir
John Lawrence that the old treaty of 1855, still in
force, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the
situation; and Sir Henry Rawlinson asserts that the
successive slights which the ruler of Kabal received
at our hands gave rise to those deep feelings of
mistrust which ever afterwards marked Sher Ali's
intercourse with India.1
52
AFGHANISTAN.
Nevertheless the Amir had no scruple in con-
tinuing to receive large subsidies in money and
arms from the English Government, although he
was constantly encouraging the border tribes to
make raids across the Indian frontier and otherwise
annoy his powerful neighbours.
After interviews with Lord Lytton at Simla in
October 1876, the British agent, Nawab Ata Ma-
hamad Khan, proceeded to Kabal with letters from
the Viceroy to the Amir (at whose Court Russian
intrigues had formed a party carrying great weight),
requesting that chief to enter into negotiations for
a new treaty, and inviting him to be present at
the forthcoming Imperial darbar at Delhi. The
Going
¹ Sher Ali resented an attempt made by the British Government to
mediate between himself and his son Yakub Khan, whom he had im-
prisoned, and he had been greatly dissatisfied with the award of the
Commission of Arbitration on the Perso-Afghan boundary in Sistan.

34
32
30
Safed Kuh Whitel Mis
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1877
Schluge
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Mount
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KOJAK, PASS
67
PISHIN
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KALAT-I-GHILZAL
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(2) PU
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SUK DAHAR PAS
Yarghali Juni
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1880
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Haida hel
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Haft Asia
Shashgao
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Harnai
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ODADUR
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1880
HO B
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69
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M
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1879
Bet Bakstu
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*******
………………………………………………………………❗❗O÷
P
Mangrola
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akka
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Fashal
VALLEY
alpur
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R
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1878
ODERA ISMAIL KHAN
Kohat
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ODERA GHAZI KHAN
STATE
20
PESHAWAR
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high Bury
sa Khel
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30
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40
MULTAN
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50
Hoti
Nowshera
PUNJA
Scale
OBAHWALPUR
NORTH WEST FRONTIER, PART OF AFGHANISTAN, PISHIN, AND THE MARI COUNTRY.
Showing Routes of Major-General Sir Charles Mac Gregor 1878-79-80-85.
Attock
Ambela
Sa
Saon R.
Campbellpur
An
Range
Shahpur
ab
Jhang
RAWALO
PINDI
Rav
• Mojgarh
y
100 MILES
R
Sept 1888. S. Pasfield Oliver, Capt?
32
30
28
1877.]
suspicious Amir, however, delayed his answer by
several pretexts, and all prospect of the meeting
between Lord Lytton and Sher Ali at Delhi was
abandoned, whilst the contemplated treaty also fell
through.
WAR EXPECTED.
53
Meantime Russia was mobilising her troops on
the Bulgarian, Armenian, and Turkistan frontiers, so
that it was highly necessary for the Indian Govern-
ment to take timely precautions in anticipation of
possible hostilities.
The unmistakable manifestations of the Amir's
scarcely concealed ill-will towards India, taken in
conjunction with the precarious relations between
Great Britain and Russia, made it necessary, there-
fore, for Lord Lytton to consult Sir Frederick Haines,
the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject.
(C
-
In November, whilst Colonel MacGregor was in
Armenia, Sir Frederick Haines submitted a rough
sketch of feasible operations which should be under-
taken by the Indian army in the event of a war
breaking out between Russia and Great Britain;
and, among other measures, the Commander-in-Chief
recommended the despatch, with the least possible
delay, of some selected British officers to drill and as-
sist the Amir's troops at Herat, Kandahar, Balkh, &c.
The Amir, on hearing of this proposal, remarked,
Before the English look elsewhere, they had better
attend to their own home."
In January 1877 war was confidently expected
with Russia both at London and Calcutta, and the
54
i
THE INDUS.
[1877.
Commander-in-Chief's staff were engaged in planning
operations for a Central Asian campaign. It was
resolved that, to meet Russia, the Kandahar and
Herat line was the one for offensive object, if only
Afghanistan was allied to us.
Shortly after, General Llamakin's famous pro-
clamation was issued, and in April war was declared
against Turkey by the Emperor of Russia. Colonel
MacGregor had now returned from Central Asia,
and all his thoughts were concentrated on the
expected fight with the White Czar's troops on the
Turkistan frontier. His Memoranda on the aid to be
afforded to Turkey by India in Armenia have already
been alluded to. The one of May was not without
its effect on the military councils of the Indian author-
ities; and shortly after, 1st June, Colonel MacGregor
wrote another brief paper for the Commander - in-
Chief, in which his opinions are plainly stated.
DOW
As early as October 1876, Lord Lytton had given
orders for the construction of a bridge of boats
across the Indus at Khushalgarh, forty miles south
of Attock, and now, in May 1877, Colonel Mac-
Gregor wrote:-
..
"I think that some very much more efficient
arrangements should be made for crossing the Indus
at Attock. In the event of operations having to be
undertaken through the Khaibar, the strain on the
bridge would be enormous. Another bridge, or two
even, should then be run up, and an English officer
with proper staff placed specially in charge. To
1877.]
enable us to do this, sufficient boats or pontoons
should be sent there. Enough are by no means pro-
curable at a moment's notice.
PREPARATORY.
55
"The Pindi-Kohat road should be improved, and
care taken that the bridge should be really kept
efficient. I do not consider this road of anything
like so much importance as the Attock line. The
practicability and suitability of the Kuram route has
been much exaggerated. The distance from Rawal
Pindi (which must always be our base in any opera-
tions in North Afghanistan) to Kabal by Kohat and
the Kuram is 391 miles, by Peshawar and the
Khaibar it is only 292 miles. The road by the first
is unmetalled the whole way, while 196 of the
second, to Hari-Sing-ka-Burj,¹ is metalled. Both
routes have to cross the same river. The Kuram
route goes over one pass 13,500 feet high, and from
the Paiwar to Kabal, nearly 140 miles, or thirteen
marches, the country passed is always over 6000
feet. On the other road, the last forty-four miles
only are above 5000 feet, and the highest point
passed is 8173 feet. The fact is that the snow, if
nothing else, would make the Kuram route quite
impracticable from December to March, whereas the
Khaibar route has been traversed many times by
our troops. All this I think proves that, if Kabal
is to be attacked, the Khaibar is the proper road to
take, and consequently the Pindi-Kohat road is not
so important as the Pindi-Peshawar.
1 Six miles from Peshawar.
56
**
[1877.
"The next road to the south is that which con-
nects Dera Ishmail Khan with the railway at Chicha-
watni.¹ I think the improvements indicated on this
line by the Commander-in-Chief should be made;
because in the event of the Amir, secure in the pro-
tection afforded by the high snow - passes on the
Kuram route, attempting to operate in the direction
of Kandahar during the winter, the road from Dera
Ishmail Khan to Ghazni affords the only route by
which we could threaten his communications and
check such intentions. From Chichawatni to Ghazni
is 450 miles, and from Jhilam to the same point is
440 miles when the different nature of the road is
considered, I should have no hesitation in recom-
mending the first, because the Kuram is not practica-
ble throughout the year, and the Ghwalari 2 route is,
and is, moreover, well suited, from facilities of forage
and water, for camel-carriage, which could also prob-
ably be got to a large extent from the Povindahs.
"The next route is from Multan to Dera Ghazi
Khan and onwards. In the present aspect of affairs
this route becomes of principal importance, and I
think that it would be advisable to lay down a light
railway on that part of it from Sher Shah to the
left bank of the Indus. Beyond, to the mouth of
the Khojak Pass, the road should be improved; but
the most crying want of all is the improvement of
the road through the Mari hills. This at present
ALTERNATIVE ROUTES.
1 On the river Ravi, in Montgomery District.
2 I.e., vid the Gomal Pass.
1877.]
cannot be said to be practicable for artillery, yet
there seems no reason why it should not be made
so; and if the improvement was continued through
the Bolan, as it easily may be, we should be in a
tenfold better position for getting at Kandahar than
we are at present.
"I think, at the same time, the roads from the
nearest points on the Indus Valley Railway to
Kashmor, Roghan, and Rajanpur should be im-
proved, and bridges of boats established over the
river at the points of crossing. This would give us
many alternative routes by which to push up sup-
plies to the front, a matter of much importance
when such enormous numbers of camels have to
graze on the scanty herbage which even the best
of the routes affords.
ESSENTIAL POINTS.
57
G
"In conclusion, I consider the most essential
points are: (1) The provision of better crossing ar-
rangements at Attock; (2) the rendering the road
to Quetta practicable for guns.
Both are equally
important.
"C. M. MACGREGOR."
In June Colonel MacGregor sent in the following
paper :
66
In the Memorandum I wrote for you some time
ago, I laid great stress on the necessity which existed
for our making Herat quite secure; but it has since
struck me that perhaps I did not make sufficient of
a danger which that place was likely ere long to be
58
[1877.
placed in, and as you were kind enough to ask my
opinion before, perhaps you will not mind my offer-
ing it again.
"The danger I allude to is from the Persians.
The possession of Herat is so much the dream of
every Persian, that he considers it a personal matter;
so, even if Russian intrigue is not added to spur the
Persians on to attempt its capture once more, there
would still be great danger of their seizing such an
excellent opportunity as would be afforded if the
Afghans came to be engaged in a war with us.
"No doubt if Herat was threatened by the Per-
sians, it would have the effect of inducing the Amir
to strive to stave off war with us. He probably
shares the national feeling for the possession of
Herat, which is not less strong among the Afghans
than the Persians, and cannot be indifferent to the
chance of its loss.
PERSIA AND HERAT.
"But I should doubt the value of any reconciliation
with us made under such circumstances, and the
stability of any arrangement made in insincerity, and
as the lesser of evils, by the Amir could not last.
Meanwhile our difficulty in regard to Herat
would not have decreased, as the Persians would
only bide their time; and when our relations with
Kabal again became strained, as they certainly soon
would, they would be ready once more to pounce
down on Herat.
((
"In my opinion the present is the time to play
out the Afghan game; still, though any attempt to
1877.]
put it off will do no lasting good, a little delay may
serve our purpose. Too precipitate action now may
ruin all-in fact it may force us eventually to retake
Herat at frightful loss of life and treasure, or to
acquiesce in a blow to our prestige, the effects of
which would be greater than another Kabal disaster.
"The question is, What danger is Herat in, and
what can we do to prevent what is now only a
danger from becoming a disagreeable reality?
66
According to our latest information, the Afghans
have about 18,000 men and 60 guns in Herat; and it
is certain that, if they would be true to each other,
they have in this force the power of keeping the Per-
sians out of Herat for months. But that is just the
point-no Afghan can be true; and there can be no
doubt that both Persians and Russians have a party
in Herat who might treacherously deliver the place
into the hands of the former, to be used for the pur-
poses of the latter.
66
NO AFGHAN TRUE.
59
Now, once Herat is gone, a month under the
Russian engineers, who, I conceive, will certainly
accompany any Persian force, will render it so
strong that our retaking it at all must at least be
doubtful.
CC
Now the Persians, I fancy, know pretty well
that any attempt to move on Herat is a casus belli
with us, and therefore they will not move until our
hands are pretty full with an Afghan war, which
they are of course now on the look-out for.
"We may, it is true, move up to Quetta without
60
[1877.
declaring war, but then Quetta is 515 miles from
Herat; and they may in the same way move to
Kehriz,¹ which is only 85 miles from Herat. It is
therefore clear we could not hope to be at Herat
till long after the siege had been commenced by the
Persians.
SEND AN OFFICER
"What we want, therefore, is time. But we must
utilise that time in a way the Persians can get no
inkling of.
66
But what can be done to utilise it? It is very
hard to say.
The difficulties are enormous; yet
something should be tried, must be tried. It will
never do to sit with folded hands and twiddle the
thumbs of resignation.
"If we move a regiment from Quetta, depend
upon it it would be known at Teheran in a few days;
and as there is a telegraph to Mashad, the Persians
could be at Herat before we were at Kandahar.
Therefore, what we must do must be a secret. We
cannot move a regiment secretly, but we can move
an officer. The only plan I can see is to send an
officer (or more) in the direction of Herat, to push
on, to feel his way, to see what can be done, to dare
all that may be dared; to give him all the support
he wants in the way of money, and a carte blanche
to do what he considers best to secure Herat, hold-
ing out, at all events, till succour can arrive.
“Of course I know that for an Englishman to
ba
1 Kehriz, on the Persian frontier, where Colonel MacGregor had been
escorted by the Afghans in 1875. See ante, vol. ii. chap. i. p. 10.
61
1877.]
VIA LASH-JUWAIN.
present himself in most parts of Afghanistan now is
to sign his own death-warrant, and for him to go
through Persia to the Herat border is to secure his
being turned back or detained. But it seems to me
it might be possible for an enterprising man to go
through Baluchistan to the Helmand, and thence
work his way, perhaps by Lash-Juwain or Khakhk,
and somehow throw himself into Herat. Now,
though no doubt the Persians and Russians have a
party in Herat, there is also a royal or Amir's party,
and an English party, besides, of course, a heap of
scoundrels ready to come over to any party.
"If, therefore, such an officer once got into Herat,
and if he could keep his presence unknown for a few
days, I do not quite see why he should not succeed
in getting up a party of his own.
I do not suppose
there is an ounce of faith in Herat, at least none
proof against the jingle of rupees; and an officer
might be able to arrange that the Persians did not
get in quite as soon as they expected.
6
"I do not attempt to sketch any plan-to do so
would be folly. Such a man would do all that
daring, combined with intelligence, would suggest.¹
If he failed, he might be struck off as 'expended.'
His failing would not hamper Government in any
way, and they could carry on their operations with-
out reference to his, except in so far that every effort
should be made to keep Persians from advancing as
¹ It is needless to say that Colonel MacGregor proposed himself to
make this attempt.
62
[1877.
long as possible. But if he succeeded, Herat might
be saved at comparatively small cost, and a check
might thus be given to Persian aggression and Rus-
sian intrigue for a long time.
CHECKMATING RUSSIAN ADVANCE.
"The remedy is doubtless a dangerous one, but
the disease is too acute to admit of our hesitating to
apply any cure which may give even a chance of re-
tarding such a blow to our prestige as the fall of
Herat would be."
On the 4th June, Major-General Roberts, Quarter-
master-General in India, forwarded a remarkable
scheme, which had been drawn up in his office by
direction of the Commander-in-Chief, in which were
considered the measures which should be adopted in
India, in the event of England joining Turkey in the
war against Russia. The expedition via the Tigris,
recommended by Colonel MacGregor in December
and May, was not that adopted by General Roberts ;
and now Colonel MacGregor concurred with General
Roberts in the idea that the whole strength of India
should be devoted "to checkmating the advances of
Russia on the north of Persia, the north-west fron-
tier of Afghanistan, and in Central Asia." Af-
ghanistan, therefore, was the point to which all the
thoughts and energies of the Indian authorities had
to be directed. General Roberts's scheme projected
the occupation of Herat by the Kandahar line; and
Sir Frederick Haines backed up this opinion on the
25th June, pointing out that by such an advance on
Herat the signal advantage of acting on the offensive
1877.].
would be gained, while such a move would cover the
Indian frontier from direct invasion.
RUSSIAN SUCCESS.
63
In case Afghanistan had to be taken possession of,
it would be necessary, the Commander-in-Chief stat-
ed, "to get rid of every Barakzai chief, whereby the
country would be relieved from the greatest curse
which hung upon it."
This idea of getting rid of the Barakzais (to
which clan Sher Ali belonged) was subsequently
put forward by Sir Henry Rawlinson in an article
in the Nineteenth Century' (December 1878), and
doubtless found its way to Kabal in due course.
6
The progress of the Russian arms in Turkey and
Armenia was watched with intense anxiety in Cal-
cutta and Simla, as may well be imagined. Then
came the advance of the Muscovite army on Con-
stantinople, the passage of the Dardanelles by Ad-
miral Hornby, and the Treaty of San Stefano. The
despatch of the Indian contingent from Bombay to
Malta, the Congress of Berlin, and the occupation of
Cyprus by the Anglo-Indian troops, followed in due
course, and the critical period involving a possible
war with Russia was tided over, as far as a direct
conflict was involved. But Russia saw the way of
attacking India indirectly, by gaining over to her
side the Amir of Afghanistan, whose scarcely veiled
grudge against England could not be misunderstood,
and a Russian mission was sent to cement an under-
standing with Sher Ali by a treaty of friendship, a
direct challenge to the Indian Government.
ލ
A
64
[1878.
Meanwhile Colonel MacGregor, in addition to the
heavy duties entailed on him by the extra pressure
put upon his department in the preparation of the
schemes for defence and offence, and the ordinary
routine works of the office, found time to work up
papers on other subjects; and on one important
matter, in which he took a deep interest, he made
use of his intimate knowledge of the North-West
frontier to mature a plan for the reform of its
administration,¹ to which subject he had paid great
attention ever since he had been employed in his
'Gazetteer' work across the Indus several years
before.
RUSSIAN MISSION AT KABAL.
On the very day on which the Berlin Congress
held its first sitting, the approach of General Stolie-
toff to Kabal on a mission from General von Kauf-
mann was announced to the Amir; but the Envoy
himself did not arrive until after the conclusion of
the Berlin Treaty had been communicated to him on
arriving in Kabal in August. Previously numerous
schemes for the invasion of India through Afghani-
stan, notably those by Generals Milutin and Duhamel,
had been published in Russia, and the manifest in-
tention of Von Kaufmann was to discredit England
at the Court of the Amir.
-
A Russian general with his staff and Cossack
escort having been formally received by Sher Ali in
state, with a salute of thirty-six guns and other
1 See ante, Appendix to chap. viii., vol. i. p. 360.
1.
1878.]
honours, it was manifestly time for Lord Lytton to
discuss the propriety of deputing a British envoy to
the capital of Afghanistan. Both the Viceroy and
his Council foresaw the Amir might easily incite the
independent Afridis to obstruct a British mission,
and it was therefore deemed expedient to despatch
a native envoy in the first instance to herald the
advent of the British envoy. Accordingly, Sir
Neville Chamberlain, G.C.B., was appointed Envoy
Extraordinary, with Major Cavagnari as his special
assistant, and instructions were given him to pro-
ceed to Kabal on the part of the Governor-
General of India, and carry out the wishes of the
Indian Government in clearing up any misunder-
standing that might be found to exist in the mind
of the Amir, Sher Ali.
SIR NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.
65
At the same time Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan,
the native Envoy, was despatched from Peshawar on
the 30th August, in advance, to notify Sir Neville
Chamberlain's proposed visit; but this native officer
was delayed, and only allowed to make short
marches, so that he did not arrive at Kabal until
the 10th September.
Finally, Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission pro-
ceeded to Jamrud, and encamped there on the 21st
September, whilst Major Cavagnari was deputed to
ride on to Ali Masjid with a small escort, to demand
permission for the advance of the mission through
the Khaibar. How Faiz Mahamad Khan was de-
puted by the Mir Akhor, the Amir's representative
VOL. II.
E
66
[1878.
at Ali Masjid, to forbid the approach of the mission,
and how an ostentatious exhibition of hostility was
made by the garrison of the fort under the personal
orders of the Mir Akhor, are now matters of history.
The Nawab was instantly recalled from Kabal, and
war was virtually declared.
However, before any British troops crossed the
frontier, an ultimatum was despatched to Kabal, de-
manding an apology and an expression of willing-
ness to receive a British Resident at the Court of
Kabal. The acceptance of these conditions was
limited to the 20th November; after which date, if
no answer was received, the British would treat the
Amir as the declared enemy of the British Gov-
ernment.
AN ULTIMATUM.
Meantime columns had been formed at Thal, in
the Kohat district, under General F. Roberts, ready
to enter the Kuram valley-and at Hasan Abdal,
under General Sir Samuel Browne, to occupy the
Khaibar; whilst three divisions were assembled,
under Lieutenant-General D. M. Stewart, to ad-
vance by way of the Bolan and Quetta, first on
Kandahar, and thence on the real objective, HERAT.
The move towards Kabal was only meant as a
feint on the right, and the real attack was the push-
ing forward of the left. General Biddulph took
command of the troops at Quetta, forming the
advanced-guard of the division for Herat.
Among the projects submitted to Sir Frederick
Haines for the various plans of operations at the
1878.]
THE KHAIBAR PASS.
67
commencement of the campaign, the following
scheme for the capture of Ali Masjid was put for-
ward by Colonel MacGregor, who was now Deputy
Quartermaster-General :-
"Oct. 22.-Project for the Forcing of the Khaibar
Pass.-The situation at present appears to be that
the Amir has reinforced the detachments in the
Khaibar by the greater part of the troops at his im-
mediate disposal. . . . Nine regiments of infantry,
three cavalry, and three batteries are now in the
Khaibar; while three regiments infantry, two cavalry,
and one battery are at Ali Boghan, near Jalalabad.
Supposing that in addition to this force the
Amir's general can command the services of some
10,000 levies, armed with jazails, we should have
to face about 7500 infantry, 2500 cavalry, 10,000
levies, and perhaps 30 guns.
66
"Before going further it is necessary to call atten-
tion to one point. I hold the operation before us is
not so much the mere forcing of the Khaibar as the
destruction of the Amir's troops. The Amir, doubt-
less proud of the army which he has got together,
urged on by the adventurous, inflated by the import-
ance which the Russians have appeared to place on
his alliance, and brooding as all Afghans do, over
the stories of our Kabal reverses, has at last brought
himself to consider that the result of a struggle with
us may at least be doubtful. There can be no doubt
that this is the case; no doubt, any impartial stu-
dent of the Afghan war must see that the Kabal dis-
Ka
68
[1878.
aster was an exceptional event, due to quite excep-
tional circumstances. He must be convinced that
on every occasion where our troops were commanded
with the most ordinary skill the Afghans invariably
gave way. But no Afghan will ever see this, nor
yet will he see the superiority of our troops, our
arms, and our organisation, to what it was in '38.
Further, it must not be forgotten that the story
of the Kabal disasters, coupled with the care with
which, for forty years, we have avoided all cause of
quarrel with the Afghans, had its effect not only on
our soldiery but on the population of India.
"All this, I think, points to the necessity of our
striking a crushing blow with as little delay as pos-
sible, after hostilities break out. If the Amir had
remained passively at Kabal, I think it would have
been better to have advanced on Kandahar. But we
must deal with events as they stand. The Amir, in
sending strong reinforcements to the Khaibar, has
challenged us to attack him, and I submit we must
take up that challenge.
"In this view I think the assembly of a consider-
able force of Afghans about Ali Masjid is a positive
advantage. It is a step we should encourage by
every means in our power, because it gives us an
opportunity of dealing the Afghans an early, a crush-
ing, and a fatal blow, and transferring to ourselves
in one day all the prestige which arises from taking
the initiative.
Supposing the policy of this step is accepted, it
..
ALI MASJID.
s
66
""
1878.]
only remains to be considered how it can be carried
into effect with the least possible delay. Considering
that we shall, according to the latest information in
this office, have some 20,000 men and 30 guns to dis-
pose of, I am of opinion that it would not be advisable
to advance with less than 8000 infantry, of which
some 2000 would be a reserve. True, Pollock's force
only consisted of about 5000 infantry, 1500 cavalry,
and 18 guns (a number he considered very efficient);
but then he had, according to the highest estimate, not
more than 40,000 men against him, and these were
without doubt armed in a manner altogether inferior
to that in which, thanks to us, the Amir's troops are
now, and they had no guns. Moreover, I do not
think it is altogether a question whether it might not
be possible to force the Khaibar with fewer men. It
must always be remembered that the political effects
of check in this first trial of arms between us and
the Amir would be enormous. Therefore, seeing
that we must not fail, I have no hesitation in putting
the force at the figure above given.
"Exclusive of the garrison of the Peshawar valley,
which would consist of 230 artillery, 12 guns, 400
native cavalry, 700 British infantry, 1000 native
infantry, there is now already available at Peshawar
a force consisting of 460 artillery, 24 guns, 1000
native cavalry, 2100 British infantry, 2500 native
infantry, and 200 Sappers, making a total of 5680
men and 24 guns.
..
At Rawal Pindi there are now 300 British
WE MUST NOT FAIL.'
69
70
[1878.
cavalry, 400 native cavalry, 700 British infantry,
and 1000 native infantry: these could easily be in
Peshawar by the 1st prox., raising the disposable
force to 2800 British infantry, 3500 native.
"In addition to these, the 51st (700), 6th Native
Infantry (500), and 45th Native Infantry, could be
put down at Jhilam in two days, and if carriage was
ready, they could, by going double marches, reach
Peshawar (168 miles) in ten days, or say fourteen
days from to-day (22d October). This reinforcement
would bring the force up to what would be advisable
by the date (4th November) indicated in the Govern-
ment letter.
PROJECTED OPERATION.
"The remaining troops detailed for Hasan Abdal ¹
could move up and take the place of those who had
gone on from Pindi. If Government consider it
necessary to deal the blow even sooner, I would sug-
gest that the Pindi troops be ordered to proceed by
forced marches to Peshawar, and a brigade of the
Kuram force to Peshawar; operations might then
commence by the 1st.
66
'I think it would be very advisable if the general
officer who is to command the operation, together
with an experienced officer of the Quartermaster-
General's Department, went at once to Peshawar, to
collect information, and to render it so complete that
not a goat's path could escape his knowledge. This
I regard as very important,-first, because our exist-
1 Hasan Abdal, half-way between Rawal Pindi and the Indus, where
the reserve division under General Maude was being formed.
71
1878.]
J
ing information of the Khaibar is very incomplete; 1
secondly, the whole success of the operation will de-
pend on our having perfect knowledge of this defile.
Meanwhile, the troops should be brought up, thor-
oughly equipped for a month, for 4000 men would
be sufficient for the present.
The nature of the
operation should consist of a turning operation, which,
while the enemy is fully engaged in front, will com-
pletely sever his communication, and leave him no
alternative but disorganised flight or fighting, with
his face to the rear, with the disadvantage of ground.
"In order that the above operation may be suc-
cessful, it will be, as I have said, above all things
necessary that the Amir should be induced to send
as many of his own troops (in distinction to local
levies) down for the defence of the Khaibar as
possible, and therefore any measure that would in-
duce him to draw off his forces from the Khaibar,
to reinforce other parts of his territory, should be
avoided. As the advance of a column by the
Kuram route to threaten Kabal would certainly
have this effect, I am of opinion that it should be
postponed until the forcing of the Khaibar is ac-
complished. To my mind there seems no necessity
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.
•
1 Colonel MacGregor had been for years urging on the authorities
the necessity of obtaining correct information of the defiles and passes
beyond the borders of British territory, but, as is before shown (see
ante, vol. i. pp. 331, 332, et passim), without success, and his own in-
dividual efforts had been ever obstructed by the "politicals." Conse-
quently, when Sir Samuel Browne advanced into the Khaibar, that
general had to rely, almost solely, on the meagre information afforded
by Hough's narrative of 1841.
G
72
[1878.
for any haste in the advance of the Kuram column,
both for the above reason and because there would
certainly be plenty of time left after the forcing of
the Khaibar to take possession of the Kuram valley
before any advance on Kabal could take place.
"The primary object seems to me to be the read-
ing the Amir's troops and generals a terrific lesson,
and the taking up such a position as would effectu-
ally afford the Khaibaris that protection from the
Amir's troops that I understand Sir Neville Cham-
berlain promised to them. We must, in fact, raise
our prestige and redeem our promise before any-
thing else is attempted.
"I am inclined to think that the most effective
way of accomplishing our object would be something
as follows. Let the troops from the other side of
the Indus, as they arrive, be encamped on the
healthy high ground about Badabhir¹ or there-
abouts till wanted.
NO NECESSITY FOR HASTE.
-
"Similarly, either the Peshawar movable column
should remain in their lines or move to some healthy
spot about Hari Singh Burj towards Kafir Dheyri,
the camp being pitched in full sight of the Khaibar.
Let two or three days be spent in open reconnais-
sances by cavalry and infantry of the mouths of
the Khaibar, of the Rhotas, and Badpukht hills.
Meanwhile it should be allowed to leak out that
we meant to go straight at the main entrance
and batter down the defences with turning columns
1 A small post seven miles south of Peshawar.
1878.]
up the Goondur, and perhaps also up the Rhotas
hill.
A TURNING MOVEMENT.
73
"This done, I should advance the whole force to
the mouth of the Khaibar, and bring on a noisy but
not serious action of artillery and musketry, and
then I should return to camp, and send off openly
expresses to bring up more troops from Kohat and
from Badabhir, on the plea that the defences were
stronger than was expected, and it was necessary to
wait for reinforcements from those places.
"The ostensible instructions which would go to
these forces would be to march with all speed and
join the main force at Jamrud; but the real instruc-
tions should be sent in cipher, to the effect that the
two columns would concentrate at Bara with a
brigade from Hari Singh, and move towards the
Soorgurh ridge, and then advancing along it, get
into the Loargai glen behind or north of Ali
Masjid.
"Leaving a detachment at some suitable spot to
protect their rear, the column would then take all
the defences of the Khaibar in rear.
"After this I should doubt there being very much
opposition, and if the Khaibaris have meanwhile
been skilfully handled, they ought to complete the
destruction of the Amir's forces in the Khaibar.
،،
Having cleared the pass to Ali Masjid, the re-
serve force would move up, and passing through the
turning columns, advance at once on the Landi
Khana Kotal, which could probably be secured by
[1878.
a simple turning operation, whence the force would
advance and take up a position on the Khurd
Khaibar ridge beyond Daka, agreeably to the orders
of Government."
74
A CLAIM TO GO FORWARD.
"To his Excellency, General Sir F. P. HAINES, G.C.B.,
Commander-in-Chief.
“ARMY HEADQUARTERS, LAHORE,
October 23, 1878.
"MY DEAR SIR FREDERICK,-I wrote a memoran-
dum about the attack on the Khaibar, and thought
you would have seen it this morning, but you were
too busy.
"I hope you will be able to see it to-morrow, be-
cause there is one point in it, I think, of great im-
portance-namely, that the general officer to com-
mand should at once proceed to Peshawar, and that
he should have with him an officer of the Quarter-
master - General's Department of experience and
knowledge of the country.
"I submit with deference that the staff told off is
something wanting in this respect, and I hope you
will believe that in making this suggestion I was not
actuated by personal motives. I honestly thought
so and think so, without reference to myself.
Therefore I venture, should your Excellency
agree with me that a little more experience is ad-
visable in the staff, to submit my claims to be sent
to assist General
66
"I have worked so long at the compilation of in-
formation about Afghanistan, that it has become a
dream with me to be employed some day there.
1878.]
"As apparently Government do not intend going
further than Daka, the operation would not be a
long one, and I could come back to Lahore before
the end of next month.
THE INVASION.
75
..
Hoping your Excellency will excuse my writ-
ing to you direct, and if you can help me I trust
you will."
.
The three columns of the first line were ready to
cross the frontier after midnight on the 20th of
November, at Jamrud, Thal, and Huramzai respec-
tively-and on that date, at a Cabinet Council, the
order for advance was sanctioned; and the Com-
mander-in-Chief telegraphed at sunset to Generals
Stewart, Roberts, and Sir Samuel Browne to put
the troops in motion at 12 P.M.-and at that hour
the Second Afghan War began.
By daylight on the 21st, Biddulph's advanced-
guard was in Peshin territory; Roberts's advanced
cavalry pushed on to Ahmed-i-shama, in Kuram
district; and Sir Samuel Browne's force turned the
enemy's position at Ali Masjid. The fort of Ali
Masjid was captured on the 22d-the Mir Akhor
and the greater part of the garrison escaping by the
Chora valley and Sir Samuel Browne's camp was
pitched at Daka by the end of the month. General
Stewart was at Dadar, and his division was pouring
steadily to the front through the Bolan Pass.
The Paiwar Kotal was turned by way of the
Spingawai Kotal during the night of the 1st Decem-
ber, and the heights were occupied by General
-
76
[1878.
Roberts on the 2d, thereby virtually securing pos-
session of the whole of Kuram.
ROAD COMMANDANT.
By December, the Herat division having occupied
the Khojak and Gwajha passes, was ready to ad-
vance on Kandahar, and Sir Samuel Browne had
established himself securely in Jalalabad. The Amir
Sher Ali had fled from Kabal to Turkistan; and
Yakub Khan, restored to liberty, was in power at
Kabal-thus changing the situation materially. In
these preliminary operations Colonel MacGregor took
no active part; but he was not the less active in the
head-work required at Lahore with the Commander-
in-Chief, and, meantime, pertinaciously pressed his
claims to be employed in the front. At last his
requests were acceded to, and he was despatched,
early in December, on special duty to the Khaibar
line of communications to see to the general state
of affairs, without, at first, any specific instructions.
He found the two divisions of Sir Samuel Browne
and Major-General Maude on the same route, yet
quite independent of each other, and in commis-
sariat and transport arrangements perfectly dis-
tinct.1 Colonel MacGregor thus became the only
connecting link between the two divisions, and as
"officer superintending communications," advised
1 "Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.S.I., C.I.E., served at first in charge
of the communications of the 1st and 2d Divisions from Peshawar to
Jalalabad. His Excellency must be aware of the services of that
officer and how successful they were."-Extract of Report on the Ser-
vices of Officers of the 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force, by
Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., V.C., com-
manding.
~.
1
1879.]
the two generals of division on all matters relat-
ing to such intercommunication. His first survey
enabled him to detect the deficiency of all sys-
tem regarding the transport and maintenance of
supplies along the line covered by the two divisions,
and extending from the base at Peshawar to Jalala-
bad. By the 20th December he had got a senior
commissariat officer appointed to introduce one sys-
tem throughout, and placed Major Dyson-Laurie to
act in conjunction with him. This uniformity of
system, however, seems to have been unacceptable
to the commissariat authorities, and was not there-
fore carried out in its entirety.
77
IN THE BAZAR VALLEY.
Get
Major Cavagnari having recommended the tem-
porary occupation of the Bazar valley, the Govern-
ment instructed Lieutenant-General Maude to conduct
an expedition through this district, and to visit the
villages of the recusant Zakha Khels. Accordingly,
two columns were ordered, from the 2d Division
troops at Ali Masjid and Jamrud, to co-operate with
a third column furnished by the 1st Division at
Basawal, and concentrate in the valley. The Jamrud
force, in all 1200 men, marched on the 24th January,
halting for the night below Shudumna tower; and
next day General Maude's force proceeded to Bara-
kus without opposition.
On the 25th, Brigadier-General Appleyard's column
of 1200 men left Ali Masjid, and marched on Kar-
amma, where the towers belonging to the local tribe
were blown up.
On the same date, the troops of the 1st Division
w
78
[1879.
left Basawal under Brigadier-General Tytler, march-
ing on Chunar, where this force was augmented by
45th Sikhs and 27th Panjab Native Infantry-the
united column now numbering 1200 of all ranks.
On the 26th, Colonel Armstrong, after destroying
Chunar, attacked and destroyed the village of Kasabai,
joining Appleyard's column, which proceeded to de-
stroy the Sitsobi villages-the inhabitants of which
had, very naturally, taken to the hills and refused to
come in. Meanwhile Appleyard's column effected a
communication with General Maude's force at Burj,
where the village towers were blown up, and con-
tinued the march towards Bazar. Colonel MacGregor
accompanied General Maude on this expedition as
chief of the staff.
GUERILLA WARFARE.
M
The hill-tribes were now roused, and attacked
Maude's rear-guard, near the Obcha Tangai, wound-
ing two of Major Battye's Ghurkhas. During the
night there was considerable firing at the pickets all
round the camp-one of the 25th Foot being killed
and two wounded.
On the 27th, four companies of infantry, with
some sappers, seized the Sitsobi Pass, to enable the
column to pass, and were met by an escort of 400 men
from Maude's headquarters, under Colonel C. M. Mac-
Gregor. The same day the three columns concentrated
in the Bazar valley, and the camp was placed in a
strong position on the plain. There was no doubt of
the hostility of the Zakha Khels, as the force was
fired upon night and day; moreover, the villagers had
deserted their houses and fired them themselves.
1879.]
None of the tribes showed themselves in the day-
time to any bodies of the troops; but the hillmen
kept prowling about the heights and ravines, and
fired on small parties whenever they got a chance-
so that this sort of guerilla warfare was not a little
harassing to the troops.
Jan. 28.— General Maude determined next to
reconnoitre the Bokhar Pass towards Bara. As the
country was unknown, and resistance was expected,
he took 1000 men and a couple of guns with him;
and on the troops reaching Halwai, two miles from
camp, fire was opened on them from the hills. From
this point every vantage-ground was contested by
the Zakha Khels up to the pass. General Maude
did not attempt to force the pass, but retired his
troops to camp, being fired upon in rear till past
Halwai. Lieutenant Holmes of the 45th Sikhs was
wounded, one Ghurkha and one dhoolie-bearer killed,
and two other casualties made up the loss sustained
by the British.
The next day the towers of Halwai were blown
up, but the Zakha Khels came out in swarms; the
whole country seemed alive with them, and the
British casualties were four.
RECONNAISSANCE OF BOKHAR PASS.
79
On the 30th the Kuki, the Aka, Kambar, and
Malikdin Khels, Sipah Afridis, as well as Shinwaris,
Urakzais, and Saagar Khels, were assembled on the
Bara hills prepared to resist any further advance of
General Maude, who telegraphed to army headquar-
ters that a further advance would assuredly bring on
a regular Afridi war. Meantime Sir Samuel Browne
80
[1879
at Jalalabad was momentarily expecting an attack,
and telegraphed for the Basawal column to return.
Colonel C. M. MacGregor accompanied this column
under General Tytler back to Daka and Jalalabad,
where he reassumed his special duties connected with
the organisation of the transport of the Khaibar
route to the front.
TRANSPORT ORGANISATION.
The Afridis, on seeing the British depart from
Bazar, ceased harassing the retiring troops, and gave
no further trouble in this quarter.
At the end of February the Commander-in-Chief,
Sir F. P. Haines, with headquarters staff, arrived on
a tour of inspection at Jalalabad; and whilst there
he received letters from Yakub Khan announcing
the death of his father-or rather, as he put it, that
his "worthy and exalted father had obeyed the call
of the summoner, and throwing off the dress of
existence, hastened to the region of divine mercy."
The Commander-in-Chief returned to Peshawar on
the 7th March, Colonel MacGregor accompanying
him; and on the 20th March Colonel MacGregor
went with Sir F. Haines to inspect the troops under
General Roberts stationed in Kuram, going to the
top of the Paiwar Pass, where the 72d Highlanders
were complimented by the Commander-in-Chief on
their achievements. At the end of March the Com-
mander-in-Chief left for Simla, and Colonel Mac-
Gregor returned to duty on the line of communica-
tion through the Khaibar.
Colonel MacGregor was appointed Adjutant and
1879.]
THE KHAIBAR LINE.
81
Quartermaster-General of the 1st Division Peshawar
Field Force, on its advance early in April, as Chief
of the Staff to Sir Samuel Browne. A reconnais-
sance had been made from Jalalabad towards Gan-
damak which heralded the move to the front, an
operation, however, that was terribly retarded from
want of transport. Thus, for carriage of camp and
fifteen days' supplies, there were only 2800 camels
and 1500 mules effective, giving a deficiency of
6000 camels and 2000 mules actually required for
baggage of the division.
Colonel MacGregor's former experience, as Director
of Transport on a large scale during the famine
operations of 1874 in Tirhut, now stood him in
good stead. He set to work strenuously, after
reporting the breakdown of the commissariat in
camels as
very serious."
He at once, however,
made arrangements for progressing the move for-
ward, and by the 7th April the post and telegraph
offices were transferred to Fatehabad.
66
Colonel MacGregor had now thoroughly organised
the security of the line of communications through
the Khaibar, by carefully selected encampments and
fortified posts along the entire route between Jam-
rud and Jalalabad, each of which was capable of
being reinforced or reduced at short notice whenever
it might be found necessary, as it was impossible to
put any trust in the disaffected tribes along the road.
Meantime the Viceroy had decided to depute
Major Cavagnari as envoy to Kabal, to communicate
VOL. II.
F
[1879.
unreservedly with the new Amir, Yakub Khan; and
at last a move was made to Gandamak.
Colonel MacGregor to General Roberts at Ali
Khel, Kuram [original in cipher]
66
Gandamak, April 13.—I write a line to let you
know we are here that is to say, the following:
I-C Royal Horse Artillery, 13/9 Royal Artillery,
Hazara Mountain Battery, 10th Hussars, Guides
Cavalry, 17th Foot, Rifle Brigade, 4th Ghurkhas,
27th Panjab Infantry, 300 Guides Infantry, Sir
Samuel, and Cavagnari. We are encamped about
two miles short of the village of Gandamak, and we
move on to a new position in front to-morrow. I
telegraphed and told you about the mission. The
man (Bakhtiar Khan) went some days ago, and
must be at Kabal by this time, so that in three or
four days more we ought to hear what will come of
it. If they say the mission is to go on, there will
be another delay of a month; but if not, we must
move as soon as we can. But the transport of this
division is in a very bad state, and it is really impos-
sible to say when we shall be in a position to move
forward, certainly not before the 1st May.
،،
Colley¹ is to be here to-morrow. The bearer of
this is going by the short cut to you—that is, he
will not go to Hisarak, but by a short cut to the top
of the Lakarai Pass. He says he will be with you
on the morning of the 15th, as to-day is nearly over
82
AT GANDAMAK.
1 Military Secretary to Lord Lytton; afterwards Sir George Col-
ley. He was killed at Majuba Hill in February 1881.
1879.]
83
(4 P.M.) Do you think the Lakarai Pass¹ would be
a good route for you to adopt, and come down and
join us at Tezin? I have said nothing to any one,
but it seems to me it might be a good move, as it
would completely outmanoeuvre them, if they thought
you were coming by Khushi. A telegram came
here to say considerable reinforcements had arrived
at Khushi, so perhaps they mean to defend that line.
As far as we can make out, there are no preparations
for defence of the passes. It is said that the Amir
has moved a force to Butkhak. I don't think they
can hold the passes: we can manœuvre them off the
whole road. I sincerely hope
I sincerely hope for our sakes Yakub
will not treat."
A CIPHER CRYPTOGRAM.
The following communication, sent by General
Roberts at Fort Kuram, across the Safed Kuh moun-
tain-range, to Colonel MacGregor at Gandamak, may
be interesting as an example of cipher correspond-
ence used during this campaign, and therefore a
curiosity in its way :-
KURAM, 17th April 1879.
MY DEAR MACGREGOR.-Your letter, dated 13th, reached Ali Khel
at noon yesterday, and this [Fort Kuram] about 11 P.M. Sir Sam's
note is dated 14th, so perhaps you made a mistake in the day of the
month. A messenger of mine—
Original.
XUY CTIE DPMHC YZ EUT TCTSTZEU,
said that Cavagnari's BPZ XPv
TWATLETK there that KPO, and
that the general opinion was OD
XK accept the BFVVFYZ and PGQTT
to YHQ ETQBV.
Interpretation.
who left Kabul on the eleventh,
said that Cavagnari's man was
expected there that day, and that
the general opinion was Y[akub]
K[han] w[oul]d accept the Mis-
sion, and agree to our terms.
1 See Appendix-Advantages of the Lakarai Pass.
84
AT SAFED SANG.
I shall be ready EY BYST any
day PIETQ EUT EXTZEFTEU; a BYYZ
will be PKSPZEPGTYHV, but I
trust there will not be great de-
lay, or LPBTCV may KFVPAATPQ.
They have KFTK in ZHBMTQV late-
ly; however, nearly all are being
QTVETK ZYX and ITK well.
I thought of the CPDPQPF QYHET,
but decided it would be better to
GY MO EUT VUHEQGHQKPZ, which
we know is IFE IYQ LPBTCV, and
by entering LPMHC at a KFIITQTZE
AYFZE, we shall probably have
less KFIJFLHCEO FZ LYCCTLEFZG
VHAACFTV and IYQPGT. I have
made a road TFGUE miles beyond
PCFDUTC IFE IYQ XUTTCTK GHZV,
and in a few days it will be com-
pleted to IYHQETTZ BFCTV, or with-
in TFGUE BFCTV of the EYA of the
VUHEQGHQKPZ. This will assist
materially. No YAAYVFEFYZ the
PIGUPZV can bring can VEYA us,
and I hope to be PE KYMHZKF, if
ZYE DHVUF, before YHQ KTAPQEHQT
Wood-
thorpe will be on BPEHZGF on the
EXTZEFTEU if not VEYAATK MO
IQYB PCFDUTC FY DZYXZ.
[1879.
I shall be ready to move any
day after the twentieth; a move
will be advantageous, but I trust
there will not be great delay,
or camels may disappear. They
have died in numbers lately;
however, nearly all are being
rested now and fed well.
KURAM, 1.30 P.M.,
Thursday, 17th April 1879.
I thought of the Lakarai route,
but decided it would be better to
go by the Shutargardan, which
we know is fit for camels, and
by entering Kabul at a different
point, we shall probably have
less difficulty in collecting sup-
plies and forage. I have made
a road eight miles beyond Ali
Khel fit for wheeled guns, and
in a few days it will be completed
to fourteen miles, or within eight
miles of the top of the Shutar-
gardan. This will assist mate-
rially.
rially. No opposition the Af-
ghans can bring can stop us, and
I hope to be at Dobundi, if not
Kushi, before our departure from
Ali Khel is known. Woodthorpe
will be on Matungi on the twen-
tieth if not stopped by snow.
VZYX.
My fullest salaam to Sir Sam, and thank him for his note.-Yours
sincerely,
FRED. ROBERTS.
On the 14th April Sir Samuel Browne's head-
quarters and column reached Safed Sang, which it
was found safer to occupy than Gandamak. On the
following day Colonel MacGregor again pressed the
question of transport on the Quartermaster-General
1879.]
at Simla.
"We want," he telegraphed, "at least
1000 more camels, come from where they may.
They can readily be provided from 2d Division,
which should be ordered accordingly. I consider
the whole working of the Commissariat Department,
whether as regards supply or transport, to be most
unsatisfactory, as after four months' breathing-time
they are not ready." Accordingly a number of
camels and mules were transferred from General
Maude's division up to the front, in view of an
advance being ordered on Kabal.
On the 24th April, Bakhtiar Khan, the agent sent
on by Cavagnari, brought back letters from the Amir
dated 20th April, proposing that he, Yakub Khan,
should visit the British camp. This proposal was
accepted by the Viceroy, and preparations were
made for the reception of the Amir, much to the
disappointment of Colonel MacGregor, who longed
for an advance on Kabal. The Amir made his
appearance at Safed Sang on the 8th May, and the
negotiations commenced which were terminated by
the famous Treaty of Gandamak. "Cavagnari,"
writes Colonel Dyson-Laurie, "obtained the Treaty
of Gandamak in a great measure owing to Colonel
MacGregor establishing the fact that Sir Samuel
Browne could advance upon Kabal-an advance
which the transport difficulties were held to prevent,
and it was only the energy of Colonel MacGregor
which prevailed in bringing this about, and enabled
Cavagnari to impress this mobility of the division
85
THE TREATY OF GANDAMAK.
86
[1879.
upon Yakub Khan." This treaty was signed on
receipt of the sanction of the Government, on the
26th May, without ceremony, and ratified by Lord
Lytton on the 30th, the ratification being handed to
the Amir by Sir Samuel Browne in full darbar on
the 6th June. Everything was now ready for the
withdrawal of the force of 2600 men from Safed
Sang; but as cholera existed on the route, and the
summer season had commenced, great precautions
were necessary to ensure the health of the troops on
their return to India.1 The sun's rays, combined
with that fell disease cholera, were far more ter-
rible enemies to encounter than any amount of
THE RETIREMENT.
1 "A march at this time of year in Afghanistan," writes Surgeon-
General Ker-Innes, "involved exposure to a temperature ranging
from 110° to 115° Fahr. in the shade; and in spite of every precaution,
the suffering of the troops was, as might have been expected, great.
Had it not been for the prevalence of cholera, the troops
would, however, have performed the march with comparatively few
casualties. On reaching Jamrud and Hari-Singh-ka-Burj, and especi
ally as they made their final marches, their distress was very apparent.
Their clothes were stiff and dirty from the profuse perspiration and
dust. Their countenances betokened great nervous exhaustion, com-
bined with a wild expression difficult to describe. The eyes injected
and even sunken; a burning skin, black with the effects of sun and
dirt; dry tongue, a weak voice, and a thirst which no amount of fluids
seemed to relieve. Many of these men staggered rather than marched
into their tents, and threw themselves down, utterly incapable of fur-
ther exertion until refreshed by sleep and food. This was very marked
in the 51st Light Infantry. Nor did the officers appear in any better
plight. The principal medical officer, 2d Division, remarks on the
arrival of the 17th Foot at Landi Kotal, on the 14th June, that every
officer and soldier in the regiment was more or less ill on arrival, and
likely to be fit for little duty for the following three or four days.
The medical officers were worked terribly in the cholera hospitals,
and suffered in proportion. There were 200 deaths from cholera, of
which 75 were Europeans, during this withdrawal.”
·
1879.]
Afghans and Afridis; more especially as a tedious.
march to the rear entails vast fatigue without the
excitement of an advance to the front. The most
difficult operation by far of this campaign was the
withdrawal of the 1st Division, and the details of
this were carefully worked out by the Chief of the
Staff, Colonel MacGregor, whose practical common-
sense and unwearied energy carried away all ob-
stacles, and baffled the most tiresome difficulties.
The whole of the retirement was effected success-
fully, thanks to the arrangements of the Chief of the
Staff and the Quartermaster-General's departmental
officers, and almost without molestation. The Amir's
subjects were quiet all along the route by which the
British troops passed. Within the then newly ar-
ranged scientific British frontier, however, such is
the irony of fate, an attack was made on the baggage
of the 9th Lancers by the Afridis (now so-called
British subjects), when two of the cart-drivers were
killed and some of the officers' baggage stolen.
On the 21st June, Sir Samuel Browne was able to
report to Sir Frederick Haines that the Peshawar
Valley Field Force was broken up; and he himself,
accompanied by Colonel MacGregor, left for Mian
Mir on the same date.
EVACUATION OF KANDAHAR.
87
G
By the treaty, Kuram was retained by the British,
but Southern Afghanistan was restored to the Amir.
The evacuation of Kandahar, therefore, commenced,
and to all appearances the Second Afghan War had
terminated successfully.
88
[1879.
In July, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, as resident
Envoy to Kabal, crossed the Shutargardan Pass with
his escort of Guides, and met the Afghan escort sent
to conduct him to the Court of Yakub Khan, where
the mission arrived and was received in state on the
25th July. The Amir's demeanour and the spirit
of the people seemed friendly, and peace appeared
to be assured.
AFRIDI BLACK-MAIL.
The Government of India had some difficulty in
coming to terms with the Afridi tribes now placed
under their authority, and, true to his principles,
Colonel MacGregor objected to paying these robbers
the black-mail demanded by them. He thus wrote
to Colonel Charles C. Johnson, officiating Quarter-
master-General in India :-
SIMLA, 12th August 1879.
"MY DEAR JOHNSON,-I have read these papers:
they only show that no satisfactory arrangements
have as yet been come to, and that they hope to
arrive at some such later on.
،،
"For the present the garrison can remain as it
is, and afterwards I will reduce it to four native
infantry battalions. With these we could hold the
whole pass, Afridis or no Afridis.
،،
I don't approve of political arrangements with
these gentlemen-they never stand. For 88,000
rupees we could have a good corps of 600 strong;
that, put in proper positions along the pass, would
hold it easily in spite of Afridis, and the only safe
way of settling the business is to do this-take up
܇ܢ
1879.]
proper positions right through the pass, and hold
them. The Afridis are very averse to bullets coming
their way, and they would soon acquiesce in our
holding, as they could not help themselves. This
way of doing it would not only succeed, but will
gain their respect more than if you spent ten times
88,000 rupees in political arrangements. The pay
of the political officer will come to something con-
siderable, plus his establishment, and a good brigade
in the Khaibar would do all that was necessary
without any such."
THE LOGIC OF BULLETS.
89
K
For his services in connection with the campaign
of 1878-79, which terminated in the conclusion of
the treaty at Gandamak, Colonel MacGregor was
rewarded by being gazetted a Companion of the
Order of the Bath, on the 25th July 1879.
On his thirty-ninth birthday, therefore, he was
C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., a brevet colonel with five
medals, and Deputy Quartermaster-General at Army
Headquarters, with a record second to no other
officer of his standing (twenty-three years' service)
in the Indian Army.
90
THE ADVANCE ON KABAL.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II.
[1878.
ADVANTAGES OF THE LAKARAI PASS 1-PROJECT FOR THE
ADVANCE ON KABAL.
"CAMP SAFED SANG,
April 14, 1878.
"AT present the two columns destined for Kabal are situ-
ated at Safed Sang and Ali Khel respectively, about thirty
miles apart as the crow flies, but with a difficult range of
mountains between them. These points may therefore be
considered as their advanced bases, from which the final
operations for the reduction of Kabal will be undertaken,
and it will be well at once to consider what should be the
future plan of operations.
"There are, however, one or two things in connection
with both forces which must primarily be considered. The
first is, that owing to the great scarcity of transport, it will
be necessary to cut down the scale of baggage to some con-
siderable extent, and thus, owing to the men being deprived
of much of what was before considered necessary to their
comfort if not efficiency, it will be necessary to weed the
strength of the force, considerably reducing it, probably not
less than one-fifth.
"This being the case, it is evident that a plan which
might have been justifiable under the circumstances of
our having sufficient forces at our disposal to enable them
to act independently, becomes no longer tenable.
"The plan which till now has been proposed, and on
which my former letter was based, was that the two forces,
operating by totally separate lines, would be unable to com-
municate with each other until they joined under the very
walls of Kabal.
"But under the circumstances noted above, it is sub-
¹ See the Second Afghan War, vol. ii. pp. 174, 194, 195.
1878.]
mitted that such an operation would be dangerous in the
extreme, as it would expose our forces to the risk of being
attacked in detail.
PROPOSED JUNCTION.
91
"It has therefore become necessary to abandon the idea
of these two divisions operating by entirely separate lines,
without communication with each other, and adopt some
other plan more in accordance with the actual circum-
stances of the moment.
"Luckily the existence of the Lakarai road over the Safed
Kuh range furnishes us with the means of changing our
plan and adopting one that will be more suited to the
means now at our disposal.
"There seems little doubt that this road is practicable at
the present moment for laden animals, and therefore it will
afford us a means of effecting a junction with the Kuram
force, not only immediately after the advance is given, but
under conditions that will make it impossible for the enemy
to prevent it.
"It is therefore advisable that the 1st Division should be
permitted to get into position at or near Surkhab with as
little delay as possible, from which place it will threaten
Jagdalak, so as to draw off the enemy from the direction
of Lakarai as far as may be. At the same time the Kuram
column should proceed in advance of Ali Khel, in order to
threaten the Shutargardan. The exact point to which this
advance should be limited would of course be decided by
General Roberts; but it seems necessary that it should if
possible be far enough in advance to induce the belief that
no idea of using the Lakarai road was entertained, yet not
so far as to entangle the column in the defile of Hazar
Darakht. On the day ordered for the advance, the posi-
tion of the two divisions would be as follows: 1st Division
at Surkhpul, one brigade threatening Jagdalak Pass, and
one brigade ready to cover Roberts's advances. Kuram
column, say at Rokian,¹ with a detachment pushed on to-
1
Rokian, three and a half miles from Ali Khel.
92
TURNING THE ENEMY.
i
[1878.
wards Hazar Darakht. The advance part of this column
would be composed of troops who would be left on the
Kuram route, and the rear of the troops who would
advance.
66
،،
"Then, on the order for an advance, the troops in the front
of the Kuram column would stand fast, and the rear would
come up and turn off quietly to the Lakarai road, their left
rear being covered on one side by the advanced detach-
ment, and their right front by the 1st Division on the other.
'Till some trustworthy men who have been sent to re-
port on the Lakarai road return, it will be impossible to
determine the exact point of the two columns of junction.
It may be that it will be necessary for them to come down
to Hisarak; but it seems not unlikely that a road will be
found which turns off the Lakarai on to the Karkacha
route, which will be practicable for mules, by which a
column of infantry and mountain-guns could be sent to
Tezin, the heavier portion of this column coming on to join
the 1st Division.
Directly the Kuram column is on the top of the Lakarai
ridge, it is pretty certain it will be able to communicate
with the 1st Division, and from this moment it may be said
that the two columns have effected their junction, as they
will then be able to work in unison.
"As soon as this has been effected, therefore, it will be
possible to arrange with almost absolute certainty that the
Kuram column will be at Tezin at the same moment that
the 1st Division is at Bala Hisar Ziarat by the Royal road,
or in the Tezin valley by either the Lakarai or Iro Manzil
roads.¹ The defence of the enemy between the points
Hisarak - Tezin and Surkhab - Ziarat must necessarily be
feeble, as he will know that whichever way he fronts an-
other column is coming in his rear, and as any force at-
tempting to hold the Tezin valley will be between two fires,
it may be taken for granted that it also will be abandoned.
¹ See Part III. 'The Second Afghan War,' p. 162.
1878.]
"This may be deemed to complete the first stage of the
operation; the Kuram column in position at Tezin, the 1st
Division at the Ziarat holding hands, the passes in rear clear
of the enemy, our line of retreat secure, and the Lataband, the
Chinari, Pul-i-Chashma, and Haft Kotal roads threatened.
"If there is any resistance at all, it may be presumed, to
put it at its worst, that the enemy will hold the passes of
the range between Tezin and Khurd Kabal, as also the
Khurd-Kabal defile; but we shall by this time certainly be
in a position to know which of the passes is held in greatest
strength, and which had therefore better be attacked-
whichever we attack successfully, the enemy will have to
abandon the others.
CONTEMPLATED RESISTANCE.
93
"Therefore, what we shall have to do is to force by a
turning operation the evacuation of the Pul-i-Chashma, the
best route, and then bring our heavier baggage up by it to
Khurd Kabal.
"It will depend on circumstances which cannot well be
foreseen at this time, whether it will be advisable to send a
column by the Lataband road in order to get in rear of the
Khurd Kabal. It is probable this may have to be done;
but whether or no, the defence of the Khurd-Kabal defile is
an undertaking which may be considered beyond the tactical
skill and power of the enemy. We already know of two
paths which turn it- viz., the Gospand Dara and the
Chinari road; and it seems very improbable we should
have much difficulty in forcing the enemy to evacuate it.
"This brings us to the third period of the operations, which
would comprise the advance from Butkhak (both columns
concentrated) and the reduction of the Bala Hisar. It
seems improbable that the enemy will make any stand in
the open country; but if he did, it is probable that the
severe defeat he would almost certainly receive, would do
much to indispose him to attempt the defence of the Bala
Hisar.
"But as, of course, we must be prepared for such a defence,
94
[1878.
it is necessary now to consider the best method of reducing
that fort. The force would advance in mass from Butkhak
and take up a position west of Bagrami, noted in the map
as that occupied by Headquarters Camp in September 1839.
"From Bagrami, as operations against Kabal will be seri-
ously affected by the inundations to the west and south of
the former place on the left bank of the Logar river, it will
be necessary to turn off all water directed on to this tract
into the Logar river bed, and it seems probable that the
best point at which to do this would be at a point about
two and a half miles south of the camp near Kala Wali
Mahamad, where an easterly spur of the Takht-i-Shah ridge
promises a suitable place. This work will of course have
to be guarded, and therefore an intrenched position would
here be erected, or suitable detachment placed for its pro-
tection.
OPERATIONS AGAINST KABAL.
"Half-way between the camp as above and Kabal is the
position of Siah - Sang, on the heights of that name, and
almost south of it on the main road are two detached
mounds, which are about 1800 yards from the gate of the
Bala Hisar, and which affords a good position directly
covering our line of communications. The heights of Siah-
Sang appear to be only about half a mile across in the
direction of Hindu Khoja, and extend from the former vil-
lage to about 1100 yards from the Bala Hisar near Shah
Shahidan. A battery on these heights will therefore be
within easy range of the face GH of the fort, will fairly
enfilade the north face 'DH, partially enfilade the south face
FG, and range easily through the whole of the occupied
portion of the fort, and give a fair view of the interior of
the citadel and the works on the higher ground beyond.
No lèss range than 1800 yards can be obtained from the
mounds, but from them the whole north face DH can be
taken obliquely in reverse, and in other respects the posi-
tion is almost as good as Siah-Sang. In combination these
two positions for batteries would be almost perfect.
THE APPROACHES OF THE BALA HISAR. 95
"The eastern side of the Bala Hisar is boldly salient and
easily enveloped without much exposure of the right flank
of attack to the city, or of the left to the hills. Operations.
from this side conducted against it would moreover leave
the city perfectly safe from even stray fire, while the bat-
tery at Shah Shahidan can shell the whole city, should such
measure become desirable.
1878.]
The right attack at Siah-Sang could no doubt be amply
secured by works against any counter-attack, and a post or
two to the east of it would connect it with the Headquar-
ters Camp. The left attack on the mounds appears to be a
commanding position with uninterrupted view over the cul-
tivation to the west and south, and works extending half a
mile along these mounds would perfectly ensure their safety.
G
"The two attacks and the Headquarters Camp would en-
close a cultivated valley about a mile square, the advantage
of which for horses and cattle would be very great.
"As regards the defences of the Bala Hisar, a glance at
the sections shows that they are weakest at this very east
side, not only in themselves, but in the obstacles of ditch
and mound, and the walls can be seen to their fort.
"With regard to the actual mode of attack which will
have to be adopted, this can only be definitely settled on
the spot, when more recent and trustworthy information
regarding the state of the defences are at our disposal, and
therefore it is impossible now to say whether it will be most
advisable to escalade, blow in the gate, sap up to the walls
and mine for a breach, or batter with artillery in the same
view—at all events, it may fairly be hoped that ten days
will suffice to place us in the Bala Hisar.
"In regard to the manner in which it is proposed to pro-
vide supplies for the two columns noted above, our calcu-
lations must be based on the following data: first, each
column will bring with it twenty days' supplies; second,
all baggage having been cut down to the very lowest, every
available animal will be utilised to bring up more supplies,
Gay
96
[1878.
and with this view depots will be formed at Surkhpul, Jag-
dalak, Tezin, and Khurd Kabal, or as many of these places
as can be safely arranged for, and as there are troops to
guard. In regard to supplies from the Kabal valley, it is
not easy to estimate what amount may be expected; but as
in case of necessity the country can be requisitioned and
prompt payment given, it may be hoped that some will be
forthcoming.
FUEL AND FORAGE.
"If, however, the worst comes to the worst, and it is
necessary for the force to be detained any length of time
at Kabal, it will always be possible after the capture of the
Bala Hisar to utilise a portion of it to bring up supplies
from the depots, the farthest and principal of which will
be at Safed Sang.
"In regard to fuel, the country between Surkhpul and
Butkhak not producing this article in any quantity, arrange-
ments are being made which will do away as far as possible
with the necessity for cooking-e.g., the British troops will
be provided with cooked Australian beef and biscuits, and
the natives with a preparation of ghee, atta, and sugar.
"The forage question is also no doubt a difficult one; but
seeing that the tract of country has been traversed before,
by armies of greater and less strength than ours, there is no
reason to doubt the ability of this force to do so likewise,
especially as our animals start fresh. And it must also be
remembered that the accounts of the routes to Kabal are
taken from the reports of officers who accompanied either
Sir John Keane's force in 1839, or Sir George Pollock in
going or returning, and that these forces traversed the coun-
try at the very worst time of the year for forage-Septem-
ber and October; whereas at this period, the country, as far
as can be seen, does produce a considerable supply of grass.
It now only remains to note that, whereas by the adop-
tion of the plan of operation of advancing the two columns
in totally separate lines, the south column will be absolutely
en l'air, cut off from its own communications, and totally
(C
1879.]
97
devoid of any possibility of receiving any assistance from
the north column, and the point of junction of the two
columns will be actually in possession of an enemy strongly
posted, with interior lines and his own line of retreat quite
safe, by adopting a plan of operation such as is sketched
above, the advantages are all on our side, and consequently,
whether we are opposed or not, we shall have carried out
the operation on correct scientific principles, a fact which is
likely to have a much better political effect on our enemies,
hidden and apparent, than a hasty disjointed advance could
possibly have.
"C. M. MACGREGOR."
VOL. II.
A SCIENTIFIC OPERATION.
G
66
Sp
98
CHAPTER III.
ALI KHEL TO KABAL.
" 'Tis the summons of heroes for conquest or death,
When the banners are blazing on mountain and heath."
TERRIBLE NEWS-HOW MATTERS STOOD-SIMLA TO ALI KHEL- -IN
ANARCHY IN AFGHANISTAN PUSHING ON
A DIRECTING HAND
KURAM VALLEY
ARRANGEMENTS
NEEDED—THE ADVANCE-KARATIGA—THE HAZAR-DARAKHT
SHUTARGARDAN PASS-KHUSHI-THE AMIR COMES IN-SAFED
SANG CAMP BATTLE OF CHARASIA GENERAL BAKER AND
MAJOR WHITE-BINI
BINI HISAR-THE PROVOST - MARSHAL-SIAH-
SANG KABAL ENTERED SHERPUR ABANDONED BY THE AF-
GHANS-NEK MAHAMAD AND THE AMIR-SCENE OF THE MAS-
SACRE-RIDE THROUGH THE CITY COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
EXPLOSIONS IN THE BALA
HISAR-SENTENCES OF DEATH-THE MILITARY COMMISSION-
EXECUTIONS-PROJECT AGAINST HERAT.
-EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS
G
1879.
g
WANT OF CARRIAGE
C
'Lahore, Sept. 7.-The most terrible news has
come from Kabal.¹ The Herat regiments broke out
1 The massacre of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his escort took place on
the 3d September, and the news first reached Captain Conolly at Ali
Khel late at night on the 4th. The Viceroy summoned a Council on
the 5th, when General Massy, then commanding the Kuram column,
1879.]
and attacked the Residency; the escort fought, but
were eventually overcome. The Residency was burnt,
and the whole Mission was massacred.
"In consequence of this Roberts is ordered off.
He sent for me, and put me down for a brigade;
and I recommended him to get Baker¹ for the
other; Lockhart2 for Assistant-Quartermaster-Gene-
ral; Durand, Political Secretary; Mignon, Com-
missary-General; or Hawkes 5 and Luckhardt."
TERRIBLE NEWS.
8
"He got Baker a brigade, and Durand; but the
Chief" or Lumsden, or both, put a spoke into my
wheel. The Chief said Roberts could take me as
anything else; so I am to go as Chief of the Staff.
"Got everything ready, and started [from Simla]
at 8 A.M. Met Murray,9 72d, on road, and Malony,
who appears to belong to 3d Sikhs. The road very
bad. Got to Kalka in eight hours, and got a snack
of something, and then on to Umballa and Lahore.
"Rawal Pindi, Sept. 8.-Arrived at Lahore 7.30
A.M., and found Murray there. Very nice as usual;
anxious to go, but he cannot.
He told me that the
was at once ordered to occupy the Shutargardan Pass. This occupa-
tion was carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Currie on the 11th
September.
¹ Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B.
2 Now Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B.
99
3 H. Mortimer Durand, Esq., Political Officer.
4 M. J. J. Mignon, Bombay Staff Corps.
6 Lieutenant H. M. P. Hawkes, Bombay Staff Corps.
6 Major W. Luckhardt, Bombay Staff Corps.
7 Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, G.C.B.
8 Adjutant-General, Major-General P. S. Lumsden, C.B., C.S.
9 Captain R. H. Murray, 72d Highlanders.
100
[1879.
Viceroy had not given Samuel Browne¹ a divi-
sion.
HOW MATTERS STOOD.
66
MacPherson 2 is going to have a brigade. He
comes up with me. Porter also has arrived. Shall
try and get him as deputy surgeon; he is much the
best man.
"Got to Jhilam at 4.45, and off at 5.30 again
onwards.
"Peshawar, Sept. 9.-Arrived at Pindi at 4.30
A.M. Found no gharie. Baboo says only horses for
two gharies a-day; so I telegraphed to Simla to
complain of this, and to Roberts, to say how matters
stood.
"Wrote to Lyall as follows:-
66 6
I wanted to see you before I left; but it was
such a skurry to get my things ready, that I found
after all I had no time. The late events make it
very necessary for us to make up our minds what we
shall do. I believe there will be some who will say
we ought never to have sent a Resident to Kabal;
and if we did so, we had every reason to expect
something very like what has just happened. I am
not one of these. I think, under all the circum-
stances of the time, we did exactly what was best;
and though events have turned out most unfortu-
nately, they do not offer to my mind any reason
whatever for turning back. The policy which said
we must have a Resident at Kabal and the complete
1 Major-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B.
2 Colonel (afterwards Sir Herbert) T. MacPherson, C.B., V.C.
Ma
1879.]
control of Afghan foreign affairs was a right one, and
late events do not make it less so.
NO WAVERING NOW.
101
66 6
"Therefore, under the present juncture of affairs,
the thing to do is to say to the Afghans: "You
shall give in. You have killed Cavagnari and his
100 men; but we are sending another representative
with 10,000 men, and he shall stay there, whether
you like it or not. We wish one thing from you,
and that is friendship; but whether we get this or
not, we will have your obedience. You may chafe
as much as you please, but we will be your masters;
and you will find that the only escape from our
heavy hand will be by your entire submission."
66 6
Depend upon it, there should be no turning
back. We have got into a conflict with a race of
tigers, and it is only by treating them with a rod of
iron they will ever give in. What is wanted now is
firmness in the path you have begun. It is the right
one; and though it has cost the life of about the
finest fellow in India, what is one life to the great
object you have before you?
.
“´And remember there is no other way out of the
business; any wavering now, any looking backward,
will be fatal. They have killed Cavagnari, then
send Snooks; if they kill him, send Jones; if they
see we are firm and consistent-if they see that their
cowardly treachery and fanatical bloodthirstiness
only makes us draw the yoke tighter they will give
in sooner or later, because they are curs at bottom.
"I have never looked to political employ, but if
102
[1879.
I can be of service I offer myself. I am quite game
to take the place Cavagnari's death has left vacant,
and to carry out what I believe the right and only
policy to the death.
NO FEAR OF RESULT.
"The pay to me is no object. I am just as game
to take up the berth on my present pay, and I should
not fear not succeeding in the long-run. I hope you
will excuse my writing thus to you; I am sure you
want no prompting to make you persevere in the
right path, but I feel so strongly on the necessity for
firmness at this juncture that I cannot be silent.
With Roberts and the splendid regiments at his dis-
posal, there need be no fear of the result of any con-
flict; but it is after we have (as we shall) vindicated
our superiority that we shall have need of our great-
est firmness, and this must take the form of putting
another man in Cavagnari's place with a sufficient
guard to hold his own. For such a service you would
get thousands of volunteers, and one of them would
be my humble self.'
Got up
"Heathcote 1 came in.
came in. He is honest, energetic,
and is to command from Ali Khel on.
at 6.30, and had a levée. Henderson came with
Tara Sinh, who put in a proposal by which I cal-
culated he would have made Rs. 70,000 in a month.
Heathcote got off after me. About one I awoke
and heard the voice of a European in my gharie.
Thinking this odd, I listened, and fancied it was
¹ Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Heathcote, Bombay Staff Corps, Director
of Transport.
1879.]
TO THE FRONT.
103
Heathcote; so called out, and it was. His gharie
had run into a bullock-train cart and lost a wheel.
Came on to Attock, and then stayed.
"Matanni, Sept. 10.-Got into Peshawar, after a
deliciously cool night, about 9 A.M. Went into the
dak bungalow and had breakfast, and bought tent,
table, chair, and pony for Durand. Then went over
and saw Sanford; do not know what to make of
him. He is clever. I think I will take him up.
Heathcote arrived; went over to mess of the 17th
for lunch. Got off about 4.30. Found dûk bun-
galow full.
Burlton, a gentlemanly Commissariat
officer; Lewis, good head and linguist.
66
Kohat, Sept. 11.-Got off at 5 A.M. Rode to
Aimal. Presently Johnson came in, a frontier civil-
ian. Then rode on through pass. It is very easy,
both with reference to road and holding. Found
5th Panjab Cavalry horses laid for me at Sharaka.
Rode on, last half quite alone; looked out for a line
where a railway could be made, but a tunnel of a
mile would be required, and it is not worth it. Got
in here at 10.30 to dak bungalow; no room. Burl-
ton here as well, clever; also Faught, doctor 92d,
very powerful; also Padre Adams, a really good
chap, I should say; and Morison, 14th, a good man,
and two uninteresting doctors. Just as I had turned
in, Ross, 1st Sikhs, came to say he was sorry he did
not know I was here; why did I not come to mess?
Good, hard-headed Scotchy Ross!'
Meanwhile a small combined force, consisting of
B
[1879.
the 5th Ghurkhas, the 23d Pioneers, and Captain
Swinley's mountain - battery, under Lieutenant-
Colonel Currie, left Karatiga at 2.30 A.M. on the
11th, and reached the crest of the Shutargardan
Pass by 6.30 A.M. without opposition. An intrench-
ment was at once commenced under Lieutenant
Nugent, R.E., which was completed by the night
of the 12th. Heliographic communication with Ali
Khel was established, and the laying down of the
field-telegraph commenced.
By the 12th September some 6000 men had been
concentrated at and near Ali Khel when Sir Frederick
Roberts arrived.
The Amir had written, saying that he hoped for
an opportunity of showing his sincere friendship for
the British Government and for recovering his good
name before the world.
104
THE FIRST STEP.
66
Thal, Sept. 12.-Got off by 2.30.
Got off by 2.30. Walked to
Sher Kote; when it got light, then galloped. Road
good to Ibrahimzai, then heavy to Mohsum Talao,
owing to heavy rain last night. Saw Faught at
bungalow. Got very well to the stage from Sarozai,
when I got a demon of a horse, whose paces were so
excruciating I walked most of the way. Very hot;
felt like sunstroky, so, as I did not want to risk any-
thing, went into Gandiawar serai and bathed my
head, and got a drink; felt better, and went on.
Got to Thal about one, passing Chapman, 1st Ben-
gal Cavalry; hailed me, so went in, put up with
him instead of Plowden, where I meant to.
Got a
IN KURAM VALLEY.
105
1879.]
telegram from Roberts telling me to arrange for
reducing posts, Plowden to take all other side Thal;
did so.
Saw Plowden; nice fellow, but
political. He dined at mess and praised up Cav-
agnari, who was no doubt very fine.
a
"Fort Kuram, Sept. 13.-Got off by six. Passed
Sapri Manduri, Alizai, Shinak, Balesh-Khel. Country
easy, but, owing to undulations from hills coming
down in longitudinal billows, not easy to make road.
Got to Balesh-Khel about eleven, saw all 21st; did
not know who they were except Gowan; stayed till
4.30, then off; road better. Changed horses at Wali
Mahamad Killa, and got in about 6.30. Dined with
the 14th and met Colonel Ross, whom I like; good
sterling man.
••
Ali Khel, Sept. 14.-Went round lines of 14th
and picked out three nags, and rode off. Took one,
and said would telegraph about others.
"Got a change at Shilozan, the new cantonment,
on a bare stony plain with nothing to recommend
it. Rode on to Paiwar, over beastly undulations of
stone like fingers, to Turai. Got a villanous brute
in exchange. Rode up the Kotal: bad road-no im-
provement since I was here in March. After break-
fast with General D. Massy, Pretyman¹ came up,
so rode with him. We walked nearly whole way.
Country fine, forest and rocks. Saw the Matangi
hill, which we used to look to from Gandamak to
open signalling. Got a good idea of country; seems
1 Captain G. T. Pretyman, R.A., aide-de-camp to General Roberts.
:
106
GHULAM HASAN'S ARRIVAL.
[1879.
very enclosed and confined. Got in about six.
General Roberts very cordial; he is very sanguine
about the advance, thinks they will fight: it will be
a great thing for us if they do.
"The Nawab, Sir Ghulam Hasan Khan, K.C.S.I.,
arrived; he had left Kandahar and got within six-
teen miles of Kabal, when, hearing the news, turned
off. He says Yakub will bolt, and should be hung.
Major Hastings is coming up as political. What
these men are for I do not know: most unnecessary.
The road to this is all down a valley, and is pretty
good. Hills well covered with forest, and much
terraced cultivation and plenty water; people
Jajis.
"Ali Khel, Sept. 15.-Slept well. Saw Ghulam
Hasan, who says he thinks the Amir knew of it:
there was estrangement between Cavagnari and him.
Ala-ud-din, brother of Padshah, chief of Ghilzais,
came in, also the Hisarak Jajis, who have held out.
Have arranged with Roberts that I shall write a
memorandum of news for general information every
day. After he has seen it, it will be published: this
will save me trouble. Also talked about organising
an Intelligence Department, in which he agreed.
We hope to advance on 28th or so. This may be
a big business! Hyat Khan (assistant political
officer to Hastings) has arrived. Roberts seems to
have great faith in him. I do not know him, but
will soon take his measure.
"Sept. 16.-To-day Roberts had a meeting of the
1879.]
POLITICAL INTERVIEWS.
107
scoundrels round; I only went to it at the end, and
found him completely surrounded by them, with no
arms. I remonstrated with him, and he said he
would not do it again. I also told Hyat that he
should be ashamed of himself for allowing such a
thing. Have not got different departments in hand
yet, but soon I will have it. I also mean to attend.
at all the political interviews, both to get a thorough
knowledge of the whole thing, and make myself as
fully instructed in this line as in every other. Had
a long talk with Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Perkins,
(commanding R.E.), about the attack on Kotal, and
mean to get it settled. Ala-ud-din came to terms;
he agrees to keep his people quiet to within two
marches of Kabal, and to provide all supplies and
transport he can this for a pay of 2000 rupees per
mensem, and a present of 3000 rupees. I think all
this black-mail paying is very wrong in principle,
but our force is so small that it requires all such
help. I do hope this will turn out well.
66
Sept. 17.-Another long telegram came from
the Landi Kotal, giving an account of the massacre
by a man who had escaped. I give this in my daily
memorandum of news. I told Roberts to-day I would
like to be present when any hogs came to see him,
as I wanted to hear all that was going on, and he
said he would always call me. The local carriage
is not coming in now; this may be owing to the
Eed.¹ By the way, there was one thing struck me;
1 The Eed, fast of Ramzan.
108
[1879.
a young man was told he might go away to his
home for the Eed, and he said he would rather not
go, and when pressed still adhered. Does this mean
that he himself is friendly, but knows of some devilry
up among his people, and does not wish to take part
in it? This is what I argue, and shall tell Roberts
to-morrow. After dinner Roberts called me into his
tent, and said some letters had come from the Amir.
The tone was friendly and helpless, that of a man
overcome by misfortune. He forwarded letters from
Jafir in Turkistan, which said there was a bad spirit
amongst the troops, and that a nephew of the Em-
peror had been round by Shahr Sabz, Kolab, and
Charjui looking at the country.
"Another letter from Ayub, saying that on Thurs-
day a mutiny had taken place among the Kabali
troops at Herat, and that they had killed Fakir
Ahmed, who dying had said, 'Give my respects to
the Amir, and say that I am thankful I died true to
him.' The story is very much the same as that of
the outbreak at Kabal, and shows there is no ap-
proach to a government in Kabal or Afghanistan
anywhere. A letter came to the general to say that
some more men had been saved, and some of them
through the instrumentality of Ibrahim, my old
friend. I will get the general to let me address
him, as he may be useful to me. Did this, and he
agreed. Roberts asked me to go down to Kuram to
stir the people up there. I agreed at once, although
I did not want to go one bit.
THE AMIR HELPLESS.
-
1879.]
MOVING ALONG THE LINE.
109
"Fort Kuram, Sept. 18.-Got ready and off by
eight; rode to Paiwar a brute of the 12th that went
like a ballet-dancer, but got better. The country is
decidedly pretty, and the bit by Zargum Khel is
beautiful, and must be more so when Sikaram Peak 1
is covered with snow. Got into the Paiwar Kotal
by 10.30, sent for Colonel Gordon, and found out
what waggons were working; also from Shafto, Com-
missary of Ordnance, what amount remained to bring
up. Rode on at eleven on an old screw to Turi.
Saw Kitchener, Transport, and arranged he was to
work the kahars. Shall write to Massy2 to have an
officer up there to do ditto. On to Hahib Kal'a;
road not so good as it ought to be; indeed all the
roads in Kuram are worse than they should be.
Saw Green, 12th Bengal Cavalry, who explained
that the 12th were prepared to go without a single
animal from Government. Rode on; got in at two;
went straight to Burlton; got from him balance on
hand now; balance and amount to be sent up-
average amount carried by local carriage.
Booth, Transport; got a return from him; find a
great many sick; told him I would inspect to-
morrow. Then to Christie, who said all local car-
riage was working, and no coolies would come for-
ward.
Went to the mess of the 14th Bengal
Lancers, and got them to make me honorary mem-
Also,
-
1 Sikaram, the dominating peak of the Safed Kuh range, 15,500
feet.
2 Brigadier-General Dunham Massy, commanding Cavalry Brigade.
110
[1879.
ber; they are nice. Their colonel, Ross, is silent as
the grave, but sterling.
-
Fort Kuram, Sept. 19.-I got a telegram order-
ing 3d Sikhs to march, so order them to march day
after to-morrow in two days; they will get there in
quite time enough. In the morning went, and in-
spected all the bullocks and mules; gave very strict
orders to Booth to send on all that were at all able to
take a load. We cannot afford to lose even the ser-
vices of a broken-down bullock. Got more telegrams
from Roberts about the artillery waggons; have,
however, arranged that all that can possibly go on
shall do so; this will clear all out by the 21st.
Went over to Colonel Money, 3d Sikhs, and told
him to give me an indent for carriage on the new
scale, as I mean to bag all over for Commissariat.
3d Sikhs is a very fine regiment; over 500 Sikhs
and only 30 Pathans; I think they should go on.
The papers say Yakub has played us false, and has
roused the Mohmands. They will get a precious
good licking if Jenkins comes across them.
"Fort Kuram, Sept. 20.-Subahdar Sada Meer, a
Laghman of the 3d Sikhs, came to see me-a parti-
cularly fine specimen. The burden of the Afghan's
song was, that all Afghans were brutes, and treach-
erous to the core. These people never seem to think
that this abuse is applicable to themselves, yet I
fancy he would be as bad as any, this man who
talked so glibly about the faithlessness of Afghans.
Got Money to send me indents for carriage on the
..
PUSHING ON ARRANGEMENTS.
1879.]
6
new scale, which leaves about ninety of his camels
free. Shall send treasure on it with 3d Sikhs to-
morrow. Roberts telegraphs for all the kahars¹ to
be sent on. Gave the order. I think it would be
better to bide a wee,' but I never refuse an order
if it is in any way possible to carry it out.
Got a
long letter from Lyall, in which he says he relies on
me to strengthen our policy. He simply notes my
offer to take Cavagnari's place; but perhaps he may
see it after all. Morty 2 came up with Combe and
Carew and Stewart, who brought in the 5th Panjab
Cavalry. Morty is looking all right. I recom-
mended him to go on to-morrow and join."
Letter to Lyall :—-
“Fort Kuram.-I am so glad to hear that it is
quite determined to go through with the Afghan
policy, which I believe to be the only one.
Not
that I doubted it for an instant, but it is gratifying
to hear it. I certainly will do all I can to get
Roberts to adopt the strong and straightforward
course, which is the best in dealing with these
people. 1. I went up to Ali Khel, but soon found
there was need of some directing hand behind before
we could go forward. The Transport, Commissariat,
Ordnance, and Medical Departments were all working
at cross purposes, and not with sufficient life-so I
have come back here to stir them all up; and now,
A POLICY DECIDED ON.
111
+
1 A kahar is a stretcher-bearer or carrier of sick.
2 H. Mortimer Durand, political officer (brother-in-law to Colonel
MacGregor).
112
[1879.
in
except two unimportant items, which will be up
three days, I have got all that is wanted to the
front. The Transport, as usual, is our greatest diffi-
culty, as there is very little of it, and what there is
has been almost starved by the Commissariat; but
it is coming up, and we must just make the best of
it. There is no doubt that ever since the tribes
round this valley heard of the massacre, they have
become in a very excited state, and there are rumours
of an attack being made somewhere about Balesh
Khel, where the line is open to the Alisherzais, Ma-
sozais, and other baisaks.¹ Still, I doubt their efforts
being very potent, and if our troops keep a good
look-out, it will only be a flash in the pan. Why
on earth they sent the 20th, an Afridi regiment, up
here, I do not know. Beyond the Paiwar they
seem quiet. The Jajis have all come in to Roberts,
and one hears little of those Zakha Khels of these
parts, the Mangals. Ala-ud-din, brother of Pad-
shah, head of the Ghilzais, also came in and expressed
his determination to keep his people quiet, and to
do what he could to help us with camels and sup-
plies, of course in consideration of a douceur. I
have just heard that 300 Ghilzai camels have come
into Ali Khel, so I hope the difficulty of having to
fight our way to the valley of the Logar may be thus
got over. Roberts is going to send Baker on to
Khushi as soon as he can get up transport to move
TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES.
(
1 Baisaks, or bodies of men, about 200 each, attached to a baisak or
standard.
1879.]
him, which may be by Wednesday. This will have
a good effect, as it will show these people we are
really coming; and as the Khushi men said they
would do what they could for us if we came, they
may get us supplies, and perhaps some transport.
The road, too, over the Shutargardan is being im-
proved by Baker, who promises well. Once in the
Logar valley, it will be pretty plain sailing to Kabal.
There all depends on the resistance which we shall
meet. I scarcely think it will be very desperate;
but still, as we have no heavy guns, it might be
pretty smart before we get in. The Afghans have,
however, the usual military abhorrence of having
their rear cut off strongly developed, and I think we
shall be able to take up a position which will make
them make tracks. Once in Kabal, we shall still
have difficulties. It is impossible yet to say what
the Amir will do; but what we must do is clear-
take up an unassailable position, and 'bide' there till
spring, going out and thrashing any gathering which
may dare to come too close. If all goes well, we
may get some supplies from the Shutargardan before
the snow comes, and we must requisition the country
for more, and then trust to the Khaibar column to
give us what more we want, and keep open our
communication with India. In regard to our deal-
ings with these people, I have great faith that if we
really show them we will put down all rebellion with
a strong hand, and at the same time are just and
conciliatory to them, we shall in time tame them as
,
VOL. II.
PLAIN SAILING TO KABAL.
H
113
Th
[1879.
us.
much as Yusafzai or Bannu is tamed. There is no
patriotism amongst them, and their substitute, fanat-
icism, will not bear them up long. Afghanistan
can never again be what it was to us; it must be-
come subject, and no sort of encroachment can be
allowed from the north and west. But I must say
that I think some effort should simultaneously be
made to regain our influence in Persia, because, if it
be possible to drive Russian influence out from that
country, we need not care so much about Afghan-
istan. And the first thing to be done, as in all such
cases, is to get a really strong able man to represent
Durand has gone to join, looking very well."
Kuram, Sept. 21.—I have had a day of worry.
Roberts has suddenly conceived a desire to push on,
and telegraphs to me a programme of movements,
forgetting or ignoring that there is absolutely no
carriage. However, I never make differences, so I
said it shall be done, though I do not know at pres-
ent how it is to be done. I got the 14th to agree
to go without any carriage, and the 9th Lancers
with only twenty instead of about eighty. G-3 and
11th want a great deal, and I do not see how they
can get off; so I wrote to Burlton to the effect that
we must use local carriage for them unless other
Government carriage comes in. There is an awful
gul mal about the artillery. All the ammunition has
not gone, and Roberts wants all the artillery to go,
and I have to get back the waggons before Tuesday
morning. I have sent express to tell C-4 what to
114
1
(C
WANT OF CARRIAGE.
1879.]
do. Then the 11th Guards are not yet relieved, so
I sent an order to send them up by double marches,
so as to get them off. I daresay all will come right:
it generally does, when one does not fuss too much.
I do not see what more can be done, so I am going
to sleep.
،،
Kuram, Sept. 22.—No carriage having arrived,
cannot march the 11th Native Infantry, G-3 Bat-
tery, or 9th Lancers to-morrow.
..
K
Kuram, Sept. 23.-No carriage in. Got the
14th off (Bengal Lancers), and sent the 9th Lancers
carriage. Roberts says now he will put off his ad-
vance for two days. However, he wrote he was
sure no one could have done more than I had, which
is so far satisfactory, and is only the truth; one
cannot move regiments without something to move
them with.
ALL WILL COME RIGHT.
66
115
Kuram, Sept. 24.-Got off 9th and 5th Panjab
Cavalry wing. Some transport has come in, about
90 camels and 230 good mules, not enough for both
G-3 and 11th; so I shall send G-3, other wing 5th
Panjab Cavalry, and Ordnance stores under charge
of latter."
((
Sept. 25-26.-Kuram to Ali Khel.
'Sept. 27.-Roberts went off.
،،
Ali Khel, Sept. 28.-Last night Gordon¹ got a
telegram saying they were going to attack the Pai-
war Kotal, so he immediately wired to Roberts to
1 Brigadier-General T. E. Gordon, left as commandant of Kuram
force.
116
(6
PRECAUTIONS NIL.
Roberts said 'No.'
stop the 67th.
Townsend was wounded, and now we
dead-I hope not.
Karatiga, Sept. 29.-We were supposed to
march at three, but, as might have been expected,
we did not get off till six. The march was a
lamentable instance of the carelessness and happy-
go-lucky style in which we do things. There was
a small advance-guard, a few men with the guns,
others scattered about, and the rest in rear; no at-
tempt was made to keep the baggage and troops
within a reasonable space, and the consequence was
the whole line of march was sprawling along three
times as long as it need. Then many unnecessary
and long halts were made up to Drai Kala, up to
which it was safe, the baggage was at least kept
behind. Up through the Hazar-Darakht defile all
precautions were thrown to the winds, and every-
thing was allowed to go on as it pleased. Every
one was complaining there were no orders, and
there seemed to be no head. MacPherson had his
breakfast comfortably and got in himself at four,
without a sign of an enemy.
Karatiga. At six a report came that the rear-
guard was attacked, and when I went to bed at nine
it was not in. Then the march was much too long,
considering the state of the baggage-animals: it
should not have been more than ten miles, it was
eighteen, and many animals marched double marches
from Pindi and Peshawar, and only got in late last
66
[1879.
Poor old
hear he is
{
1879.]
night, were loaded at three, and did not get their
loads off till nine, fifteen hours; the consequence
was that fifty camels were lost, and many mules,
and the inevitable result will be considerable dis-
organisation of the train. The road is pretty fair,
though stony up the bed of the ravine the whole
way. The country is strong, but not so much so as
I expected, and I do not think they would ever be
able really to stop the road: it would require
much better arrangements than they could ever
make. The G-3 Battery could not go on, and to-
morrow they say we are to go to Khushi. To-night
we are in an awful position in a hollow completely
commanded, but I suppose our luck will carry us
through. Passed Townsend¹ on the road: he is
not seriously wounded-a bullet has lodged in his
jaw; nothing dangerous, though perhaps painful.
،،
DISORDER.
117
-
Khushi, Sept. 30.-Spent a very decent night
-rather cold, but not too much so. Started at
eight; road to Surkhi Kotal easy, but stony. Up
not very difficult, but a severe tug for horses; on
reaching top all trees cease, and the country is in-
expressibly blank and barren, but the climate was
lovely; the road to the 'Shutar' is quite easy; the
troops are on the summit in a good position. Got
my horse shod by the mountain-battery under Mor-
gan. Got MacPherson to give me a guard to go to
Khushi, and got off at once. The road down is
1 Deputy Surgeon - General S. C. Townsend, principal medical
officer.
118
[1879.
very steep and bad, though the guns got down all
right; rest of the way is very stony down the bed of
the stream to Akhun Khel, where is a very strong
little position enclosed between two darbands, as
in Persia. Arrived at 3.30 at Dobandi, a small
village with cultivation stretching along the bank
of the river for a mile it is inhabited by Babar
Ghilzais. By the way, these are very fine men,
but are the most uncouth and animal-looking of any
I have seen. Mercy is a word not known to them.
From Dobandi the road turns half right to the Shin-
kai Kotal, which I reached at 4.15. The ascent is
easy and practicable for guns. The road then goes
over a stony waste, just like Persia, for some six or
seven miles to Camp Khushi, which seems a flour-
ishing village, situated down the bed of the Shutar-
gardan stream. There is much cultivation and
trees, and a picturesque little fort. Got in about
six. When I arrived the general received me with
great empressement. Said he was so glad I had been
at Ali Khel.
THE SHUTARGARDAN.
66
·
Camp Khushi, Oct. 1.-Slept last night in a
tent with Major-General J. Hills, V.C., C.B.¹ He
was detailing his woes from having been promoted
to major-general too soon. He now has to go home.
Got general to put in an order about Sergeant
MacDonald,2 who behaved very well. General
called me over while he gave orders about a pro-
1 Now Lieutenant-General Sir J. Hills-Johnes, V.C., K.C.B.
2 Colour-Sergeant Hector MacDonald, 92d Highlanders.
1879.]
1
clamation he proposes to issue to the people of
Kabal, saying that no one was to be hurt if they
came in; and in the afternoon he was exercised as
to what he would do to Kabal. In the evening we
went over to the Amir, where I saw the mustaufi ¹
and Daud Shah,2 who recognised me. They seemed
anxious to stop us; but I am glad to say Roberts
would not give in, but said he would send the pro-
clamation mentioned above, at which they seemed
satisfied, saying, 'Bisyar khub, bisyar munasib.'
To-morrow the whole force goes to Zargunshahr,
where, by my advice, all will concentrate. Roberts
would have split his force into three; though they
might have held their own, it would have been
adding to the danger needlessly, and is quite against
Cocker. Got my ribbons sewn on to-day, and find,
even by overlapping, I have no room for more, so
what I shall do when I get the second Afghan medal
I do not know.
PROCLAMATION ISSUED.
..
119
Camp Zargunshahr, Oct. 2.—Got up and worked
about carriage. That dog Padshah said he would
bring in 300, and only brought nineteen. Just as
we were starting, some people said they thought
they heard guns, so Padshah Khan's son was sent
off to find out what it was. With great difficulty
got Baker's lot off, and despaired almost (for I never
really despair, which I take to be a very unmanly
sentiment) of getting MacPherson's brigade off, but
1 The mustauft, or minister of finance, Habibulla Khan.
2 Daud Shah, late Commander-in-Chief, Afghan army.
120
[1879.
somehow, at the last moment, it was managed. We
started at eleven, and rode over undulating stony
plain for seven or eight miles to this. This is truly
the land of sags and sangs. The Amir rode with us
with perhaps 100 rag-tag, Daud Shah, the mustaufi,
Wazir Shah, and Mahamad Yahiya. Amir had a fine
Turkoman horse he had at Gandamak with him,
and some of his people rode others. Daud Shah
rode a very powerful bay, which he said came from
Kataghan.¹ Talked to mustaufi and Daud Shah,
who were pleasant. It somehow went against my
grain to be talking to men who may have had some-
thing to do with poor Cavagnari's murder; and be-
sides, I do not think it is right or looks well to have
these dogs riding with us, as, if anything happened,
it would be very awkward to have them all round
us, so I warned Roberts, and he said he would be
careful. Have got a bad cold, and am feverish, so
felt the sun very hot, and as I have only a 'single
fly' bell- tent, the heat was not much mitigated.
Wrote out the order of march, putting every one
in their place, and ordering proper precautions for
covering front, flank, and rear, and for taking up
pickets on arrival. Afterwards the Wali Mahamad
came to see the general, and had a private inter-
view with him. His people said openly the Amir
could have helped the mission. Roberts means, if
he can find anything against the Amir, to quod
him. We are in very great difficulty about carriage.
1 In the Kunduz province of Afghan-Turkistan, south of the Oxus.
THE AMIR AND FOLLOWERS.
1879.]
Every night there is the same bother; we do not
know where the carriage for to-morrow is to come
from, and have only the Ghilzai promises to trust
to-a broken reed indeed. News has come that the
ridge above the 'Shutar' was occupied by considerable
numbers of Machalgah, Gardez, and Zurmat Ghilzais.
Money went out and attacked them, and drove them
over the hill, killing thirty and wounding some more,¹
with a loss on our side of only Griffiths, 3d Sikhs,
and a sergeant of 67th wounded slightly. Got the
general to send the news off to the Amir, and tele-
graphed back to Money, The general congratulates
you heartily; husband your ammunition and sup-
plies, and go in at the brutes. General Gordon has
been ordered to send for 100 rounds ammunition
more, and more supplies.' A report came in that
there were some guns and a regiment in a fort some
four miles to the right, so I went and asked Hast-
ings to find out about it; he reports it is nothing
at all. Found M-- had put out no pickets at
all by day, and had very inadequately protected
himself from surprise by night, so sent him an order
to do so at once. When will British officers cease
from carrying on war in this careless fashion?
દુઃ
Camp Safed Sang, Zahidabad, Oct. 3.-Still
feeling bad with a cold, but had to get up and run
about as usual. Had my usual scratch breakfast,
badly cooked.
It is a good thing I am very
MILITARY PRECAUTIONS.
C
121
1 See p. 56, Part III., MacGregor's Second Afghan War-Money's
Defence of the Shutargardan Kotal.
[1879.
strong, or I should have been snuffed out long ago,
with all the hardships I have had. Met my old
friend Ibrahim Khan, who came in on a letter I
wrote to him. He is looking old, and has dyed
his hair. He was very glad to see me. I think I
shall find him useful in getting me things. Then
he can get me a lot of things I shall want, and
which I fancy Kabal can produce, such as teapot,
cups and saucers, Turkoman cloth, carpets, ponies,
&c. I told him to give me a list of all our well-
wishers, and all who were directly or indirectly en-
gaged in the massacre.
I have told Roberts that
the crime is unparalleled in the annals of history,
and the punishment should be likewise. So if we
find that the Amir and his people are implicated, we
must seize them by a coup d'état, and then hang
them from the gate of Cavagnari's residence. He said
he will tell me all who were against us, even if his
own father was amongst them. We are getting lists
from several other independent men-all separately,
as it ought to be a very long one. Baker has been
kept behind to guard all our supplies, and to-morrow
we send back all our camels, &c., to fetch them up.
"Halted at Safed Sang, Zahidabad, Oct. 4.—
The equivalent of 1200 camels went back to-day to
bring up everything from Zargunshahr. As it is
fourteen miles there and fourteen miles back, we
shall not see them, I said, till six or seven; and, as a
matter of fact, the head was not in till eight, and
the tail will not be in before twelve or one.
After a
122
PUNISHMENT EXEMPLARY.
›
SHORT OF CAMELS.
123
1879.]
1
deal of worry, got Colonel Heathcote ¹ to tell me the
number of animals he had, and what he wanted, by
which I find we are some 600 camels short of what
we want. Wright, too, gave me a deal of bother
before I could get out of him what was wanted in
the way of transport for six days' supplies. Ibra-
him Khan came over, and we had a long talk. He
said Cavagnari never tried to make friends with any
one, but isolated himself, and gave himself
up to
partridge-shooting, so he never heard anything that
was going on. He said he could only raise a body
of Kizilbash horse. I will speak to Roberts about
this. Sent Combe back to see what had become of
the convoy. He came back at eight, and said he
had been to the rear, and had seen Baker some six
miles back. Shortly after, Murray, 72d, came up,
breathless, to say heavy firing had been heard by the
bridge [across the Logar]. I came out, told him
quietly to turn out two companies 72d; then told
general, and went to turn out Ghurkhas also. Told
Knowles to have wing 67th ready; then to Pratt to
have 5th Panjab Infantry ready. Then I suggested
the village being surrounded at daybreak, and told
Massy, who ordered the 14th [Bengal Lancers] to
surround the village. Then came back and arranged
that Knowles should go with wing 67th, 5th Panjab
Infantry, and mountain-battery, with Hastings and
some of Padshah's men, and if they did not come
out and give up their arms, we would make them.
1 Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Heathcote, chief Transport officer.
124
[1879.
Ordered Knowles not to engage till he had sent back
word as to the result of the summons, when we can
settle what to do. I hope it will all be settled
quietly. Our men shot one man with a red coat,
who was brought in; and a man of the Amir's suite,
coming into camp, had his horse shot by a sentry.
"Camp Charasia, Oct. 5.-According to Roberts,
we should have been in Kabal to-day; but owing to
delay, caused by want of transport, we shall not be
there before Tuesday. Got up at 6.15, and saw that
every one had moved off as ordered. The 14th, at
four, surrounded the village; then the 5th Panjab
Infantry and 67th, with mountain-battery, moved
up and waited. The result was that two men were
killed and five captured, of whom Roberts ordered
three to be shot. We marched at eleven, and only
went about seven miles; then came to an open plain
with the village of Charasia at the far end, thickly
wooded. It was very hot, and Roberts in the after-
noon must needs go down to the village to look at a
fort to leave our supplies in.
"Bini Hisar, Oct. 6.-I told him yesterday we
ought to occupy a very strong conical hill above the
[Sang-i-Nawishta] pass, but he said, No; and so we
sent out patrols, who, almost immediately after clear-
ing the village, found the heights all occupied. So
Baker¹ was sent with the 72d, 200 [Lieutenant-
Colonel Clarke], Ghurkhas [Major Fitzhugh], 23d
Pioneers [Lieutenant-Colonel Currie], four mountain-
1 Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, 18th Foot.
CHARASIA.
1879.]
GENERAL BAKER'S SUCCESS.
guns [Captain Swinley], and some 200 5th Panjab
Infantry [Major Pratt], and another party of 200
Highlanders, 100 23d, two squadrons 5th Panjab
Cavalry [Major Hammond], and three guns, G-3
[Major Parry], went also. Baker seemed cool, con-
fident, and quiet, and laid his plan for turning the
enemy's right quite off his own bat, telling off the
party under White¹ to play with their front, and
push on as soon as the enemy began to feel his flank
attack. This he carried out steadily, and at last
turned them out of all their positions with a loss
of three officers wounded, and some eighteen men
killed and seventy wounded. White went at a
party on a very strong position on a hill which
flanked their left of the pass. He met with a des-
perate resistance, but took it at last, and lost three
killed and wounded; then finding them going, he
pressed on, and at last got into the pass, seized the
conical hill, and took twelve guns. So that alto-
gether it has turned out most successfully; but to
Baker and White belong principally the honour of
the day.
Camp Bini Hisar, Oct. 7.—I must now put
down every single thing as it happens. This
I did not do to-day, therefore I must put down
what I remember. Got up at 3.45 A.M., some devil
having blown off fifteen minutes too soon.
Very
cold. Blew the advance without seeing whether
everything was ready or not, consequently found
1 Major J. White, 92d Highlanders.
125
66
126
[1879.
no one in their places, and the general waiting;
thought he would have been in a rage, but he was
not. Then we got off, and went to left or west of
village through gardens to the foot of the hill, when
we turned to the right, and skirting the hills, came
out on plain, where Parry opened his guns. Saw
the hills the 92d got up to pass. Found White
there. Roberts said, 'I congratulate you. I was
sure the 92d would do well.' Then he went up to
some men and said no one could have done better.
Then we went on, and in half a mile came up with
Baker. He seems to have managed his work very
well, and to have inspired confidence in his troops.
Find we have captured eighteen guns, have lost
eighteen killed and seventy wounded-total, eighty-
eight. So we have had, as fights go in India, a
smart little affair. Got into camp about nine; got
a bit of fowl to eat-all I had all day. Then we
went to top of hill, where 23d have a picket;
from this there is a capital view of the Bala Hisar
and the whole country round. The walls are very
much dilapidated, and are, I fancy, in the same
state as they were in 1839. It is evident the way
to get into it is to seize the point marked K on the
map, put up a couple of mountain-guns and a few
good infantry shots, and then, enfilading the two
approaches on the south, storm it; then all the rest
would be at our mercy. Some men came in to say
the Bala Hisar was empty, and they wanted us to
come in; but I told Roberts this wish was suspicious
THE GALLANT 92D.
1879.]
in itself, and he had better send and see if it really
was empty. Then there is the story that the place
is mined, and, curious to say, just as I was calling
his attention to this, a big explosion actually did
take place, which may be a warning. A party of
the 67th came in, and as they are not to go back
to-night, they will have a cold night of it; but it
serves them right, as they should at least have
brought their greatcoats with them. Got all the
pickets placed out. About ten some shots were
fired to our right. Ibrahim Khan promises to be of
use to me. Our men gutted a village to-night,
against orders, so the provost-marshal flogged no
less than 150 of them.
WORK FOR PROVOST-MARSHAL.
127
66
Camp Bini Hisar, Oct. 8.-I not only forgot
to write my journal as things happened, but I have
for six days forgot to keep copies of the orders I
have sent out, which, considering that many of
them were most important, is quite inexcusable.
I thought we were going to have a quiet day, but
no sooner did I get up than it began. First a report
said the enemy had deserted their cantonment at
Sherpur, and had retreated to Deh Mazang on the
other side of Kabal, so I proposed that the cavalry
should be sent to cut them off from going further
on the Bamian road. So Massy started with 725
cavalry. He went over Siah-Sang to Sherpur, found
it quite deserted, with seventy-eight guns in it.
Then he went on, and got over the Baraki Pass to
the west of Deh Mazang. Then a report came that
"
128
[1879.
they were going to attack the Chandaol,¹ so I told
Roberts to send Baker with 92d, 23d, two mountain-
guns, and two Gatlings to co-operate with Massy.
All this was done, and Baker got over the ridge and
found they were intrenching themselves on the
Asmai heights. He made nothing of them, and
at sunset sent in to say he was going to attack, a
foolish thing to do when night was coming on. By
the way, we sent up a wing 67th and two companies
Ghurkhas and two more mountain-guns to him; and
at three the rest, 67th and 28th, with four horse-
artillery guns, go to him. I do hope they will take
it, else we shall be in a hat. We have nearly
eaten all our provisions, and if we were to get
worsted, not only would the whole country be up,
but we should get no supplies. I hope Roberts's
luck will carry him through; but we are playing a
risky game, and if a disaster takes place? What
then? It is all very well as long as things go
smoothly. There was an alarm last night. About
two, shots were fired, and every one solemnly turned
out as if a division of Russians were on us; the
guard also marched solemnly up. Roberts told me
he was going tamasha banaoing (?), and wanted me
to stay in camp. I did not encourage the idea, and
I think, perhaps, we will not try it on again.
"Oct. 9.-MacPherson started at one, and Gough
at five, with the rest of the cavalry, to hunt up the
Turkistan road.
1 The Chandaol Bazaar, the Hindu and Kizilbash quarter of Kabal.
A RISKY GAME.
1879.]
SIAH-SANG.
129
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 9.-Roberts went off about
four. I did not stir, but lay till eight, then got up.
About 8.30 he sent back to say they had all bolted,
and Baker was in their camp and had taken twelve
more guns. So he came back about nine. In his
usual impulsive manner he said we would all go to
Siah-Sang. I said, 'Yes; if it can be done.' He
said, 'I hope so; we shall see.' The end was that
we started about 10.30, and rode straight down the
road to the Bala Hisar; but beyond a few people
who blessed us, met nothing. We had only a few
sowars, and rode on to Siah-Sang, which is a fine
position. Here we camp. Roberts is very hot on
catching Abdul Karim, who is said to be in a village
under the hills to the east; but all our men are
knocked up, so I advised waiting till to-morrow.
Ordered ten poshtins for my servants, and Ibrahim
brought me a Russian teapot and some grapes.
Perkins reported that Sherpur was being looted, so
we are going to see for ourselves to-morrow. We
must somehow prevent their carrying off the wood.
66
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 10.-Got up at 6.30;
found Roberts did not mean to go till ten, so went
back to bed and did not get up again till eight. At
ten we went over to Sherpur, not more than two
miles; found it of course quite empty. A long
straggling wall, with bastions, meant to extend all
round the Bimaru hill, but only finished on two sides.
It has an immense amount of accommodation, very
good rooms with broad verandahs. There are sub-
VOL. II.
I
•
[1879.
stantial gateways at intervals, and the Bimaru hill
is meant for the citadel. It is altogether too am-
bitious a place, and would take 20,000 men to hold
it. There are two or three water-ducts running
through it, a good deal of cultivation inside, and
some wells. Ibrahim came to see me,
Ibrahim came to see me, and I gave
130
SUSPICIONS AROUSED.
him a list of what I wanted; he also said he would
give some supplies. I told him to send in anything
he had at once. All the Hindus in the place came
in and salaamed, and then all the Kizilbashes. I hear
they offered Cavagnari a house in their quarters, and
would have protected him for a month at least. I
do not know what he can have been thinking of.
They say he never tried to make any friends, and
held aloof from every one. He has paid bitterly for
his neglect. Roberts has written a proclamation.
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 11.- Morty is very
much concerned about the Amir, and says he is
being treated badly, and condemned without a hear-
ing. I think there is quite enough proof to make
us suspect him, and if we suspect him, we should
quod him.
First, there is no doubt he gave Cav-
agnari no assistance whatever, and never tried to.
He
gave him a house where there was no possibility
of a fight being made, and he could have shut the
gate of the Bala Hisar when they went for their
arms, as it must have taken at least an hour for
them to do so. Then he has given us no assistance
either in supplies, transport, or news, the latter
especially. On the 6th and 8th he must have
66
Z
1879.]
known exactly where the enemy were, but he never
told us; and the fact of Nek Mahamad¹ coming
into our camp, and his never telling us, is also much
against him. Then there seems little reason to
doubt that he has done all he can to stir up the
tribes against us; altogether, we have quite enough
to make it necessary we should have him under
restraint. At twelve we went down to the Bala
Hisar and rode through it. I had a wing of 72d
down, and took two companies in with us, and left
one on the gateway and one outside. We rode
mostly all through it, and then went to Cavagnari's
house, which is a poor place, and a regular rat-trap,
closely surrounded by houses, and completely looked
into by the upper hill. Hamilton's and Jenkyns's
bodies were buried, but Cavagnari's and Kelly's do
not seem to have been found, and are supposed to
be buried under the ruins. We must dig them out.
The place was thickly marked with bullet-marks,
and these had quite evidently been fired from both
sides, showing how hopeless the defence of such a
place must have been. We saw the place where
Hamilton charged out, and three times took the gun,
firing at them, and the place where he and Jenkyns
were killed. Then we came home, and to listen to
Morty Durand talking about treating these fiends
with justice of the High Court kind was sickening.
Wrote out programme for to-morrow, when we are
SCENE OF THE MASSACRE.
1
131
¹ Nek Mahamad, the Commander-in-Chief of the rebels, had visited
the Amir in the British camp the night before the battle of Charasia.
132
[1879.
to make our entry into the Bala Hisar, never to go
out of it again I hope. The troops are to line the
road, and a salute is to be fired and the flag hoisted ;
then we are to go into the Diwan-i-Am, and the Amir
and all his people are to be quodded. At least that
is what Roberts first determined on; but I am afraid
Morty and Hastings have got at him, and he is
shaken in his intentions, and I do not know what
he will do. Went to him and warned him that our
supplies were running very low, and it would be a
risky business if we did not get them in; so he had
Wright and Cook up, and made it quite plain. The
first is to feed the troops every day; the second, to
store five months' supplies.
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 12.-We all went into
Bala Hisar. I arranged everything. Ghurkhas came
down on the upper Bala Hisar, one company 67th
on gate, all troops lined road from camp. This was
quite straight and very broad, with trees, and the
sight was very impressive. One company 67th and
band went ahead, latter playing like mad. Got to
the Diwan-i-Am; found door locked-had to wait.
Went inside; nothing was ready, and Zakaria was
not there, so we had to wait for him. All this is
very bad, and reflects on those who should have had
everything arranged. Then Roberts read out the
proclamation, which the kazi translated very indif-
ferently. In fact the whole thing was undignified,
and, a cat appearing, it was nearly ending in a
screaming farce, as Roberts cannot endure that
66
THE PROCLAMATION READ.
1879.]
species of animal. However, the 67th cheered him,
and then he left me to quod Zakaria, Yahiya, the
mustaufi, and the wazir. I told off separate rooms
for them, and put double sentries on them, and
showed Colonel Knowles (67th) the whole place, and
left them in his charge. In the evening Roberts
told me he wished me to be president of a commis-
sion 1 to try these devils, a task which I do not like
at all. Then he told me he thought of exploring in
the Bamian direction; and as the 85th, 3d Sikhs, and
44th are coming, I may get command of this brigade,
and of the party to Bamian: this will be only fair.
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 13.-We rode all through
the city. Its appearance does not disappoint me;
it is just what I expected-mean, filthy, like an
Afghan's heart. The people were neither respectful
nor disrespectful, and seemed to show they did not
care a d n one way or the other. Afterwards
I went with Nuzuff Ali Khan, a maundering old
idiot, chief of some Arabs who have a prescriptive
right to be in Bala Hisar, to see about a room to
hold the commission, and settled on a room of the
Amir's, and told them to get it all ready. Then
went and saw all the prisoners, who looked very
sorry for themselves. It is a strange turn in for-
tune that I should have the mustaufi in my hands.
now.2 Then came home. Reported that the 14th
(6
COURT OF INQUIRY.
133
1 Colonel C. M. MacGregor, president; Dr Bellew, Mahamad Hyat
Khan, members.
2 See ante, vol. ii., chap. i., p. 9. The mustaufi of Herat had arrested
Colonel MacGregor in 1875.
134
EXAMINATION.
[1879.
could not get the guns in, so ordered Gordon to
send an officer (Royal Horse Artillery) and detach-
ment with a guard of fifty men to bring them in on
twenty-four elephants. Also ordered two squadrons
12th Bengal Cavalry to reconnoitre the Charikar
road for any signs of the Turkistan regiments who
are said to be coming. Just as I was going to bed,
Knowles sent me a letter found in a coat going to
the mustaufi, so had it copied, and told them to put
it back and give it to him, and look very sharp for
any answer that might be sent. We may get hold
of something. I shall write letters to all of them
and see if we cannot draw them. To-morrow I
shall take the deposition of Daud Shah, get body of
Bakhtiar exhumed and examined, and also dig for
Cavagnari and Kelly; then we will have a military
funeral over them. Also get the general to send a
purwana to all regiments who have not been in any
way engaged against us, to say we did not wish to
be enemies of theirs.
CC
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 14.-Took up the work
of the commission, wrote out a list of the men to be
examined, of all persuasions. Examined one Diwan
Hira Nand, who gave very little information, and
that only to show that there was a bad feeling be-
tween Amir and Cavagnari, which the latter pro-
fessed to ignore and think light of. In the afternoon
Ibrahim sent me word that Nek Mahamad was in
the city, so asked Hills to try and catch him. He
did not do so; but he did not search the house at
1879.] ONLY THE GUILTY SHALL SUFFER.
all. Ordered the kotwal,¹ Mahamad Aslam, into
quod, on account of a statement that he had stirred
up the people to go out and fight us at Charasia ;
we will find out more about it to-morrow. Had
meant to have examined Amir to-morrow, but
Roberts said we had better not a while, as it might
look as if he was a prisoner, which he is. Green 2
came back. He went as far as Kala Haji, and went
to the different villages en route, and they expressed
themselves quite ready to give up the grain due
from them. Heard that Mir Fakir was at Deh
Bala, near Shakardara, and owing to some quarrel,
was surrounded; so shall offer a reward of, say, 1000
rupees for him.
He was brigadier - general, and
fought against us. I do not think that men who
merely fought against us without having been con-
cerned in Cavagnari's business should be killed.
Any way, I will not sentence such men to death.
A telegram from the Queen was published, very
eulogistic.
(6
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 15.-Examined Yahiya
Khan, but, though I threatened him a good deal, I
could get nothing out of him; he absolutely refused
to incriminate himself one bit. Also examined an
old merchant named Dada Sher, and another old
driveller called Saiad Jan, but got very little out of
them. To-morrow shall examine the kotwal and
wazir, next day the mustaufi and Zakaria. I do
135
¹ Chief magistrate of Kabal.
2 Major Green, 12th Bengal Cavalry.
:
136
[1879.
not like this,... but I will not find them guilty unless
I am convinced of their guilt. The Foreign Office
said the punishment should be short, sharp, and
repressive. It cannot be short, unless we catch
men whose guilt is patent. With all others we
must inquire thoroughly. I do not believe it ever
does good to kill men indiscriminately, and I will
not lend myself to it.
""
Camp Siah-Sang, Oct. 16.-Examined the
kotwal¹ to-day, and was just finishing him when a
great explosion occurred. Went out, and saw it was
in the direction of the Bala Hisar, which was envel-
oped in a cloud of smoke; shut up the court and
went to see. Got as far as the Diwan-i-Am, and
found that the 67th were clearing out, and the
Ghurkhas running down the hill. Told the colonel
to get his ammunition out and take all the men out,
put a guard on both gates, and turn every one out.
All this took an hour or two. Then went down and
moved the troops and every one half a mile away,
drove every one away from the gate, and then went
out into the open myself. At four precisely I was
looking to see if the fire was decreasing, and we
(Spratt and I) came to the conclusion it was, when
first a sort of lateral explosion took place, followed
instantly by another tremendous one. In the direc-
tion I was to the south-only a few stones came
and some bullets, and I thought all was over. Sent
Spratt to find out how many Ghurkhas were missing,
¹ Mahamad Aslam Khan, the kotwal or chief police magistrate of Kabal.
66
!
THE EXPLOSIONS.
1879.]
and went back to gate; heard that some six men
had been killed by the last explosion, so left Spratt
and went to the general; got him to order 67th
and Ghurkhas into camp. The casualties to-day are
Shafto and twenty-one Ghurkhas missing, one 67th,
two 5th Panjab Cavalry killed, and some Afghans
and followers, and about six wounded.
66
'Some men-Bourke amongst them-volunteered
to go in and see if they could save any one in
the Bala Hisar, but I did not see the good, so
I vetoed any such idea. It is one thing to try to
save a man when you believe it may be done, an-
other to go into an unknown danger to look for men
who may all be dead. It struck me to-day that it
would be much better to destroy the Bala Hisar
altogether, and move all intact into Sherpur. I
would not object to this, as it would not split the
force up into two. I told the general, and he had
thought of it also, so we are going to speak to Baker
about it to-morrow. This is a misfortune, but is not
without alloy, as it might have been worse; so I
think it will be better to blow up the big magazine
to-morrow, and then quit the place, take all the
timber and anything worth having, and destroy it by
degrees. Even if we ever leave this again, these
devils will never have the energy to rebuild it.
"Heard that Money had had another tremendous
fight at the Shutargardan, and had beaten enemy
off with a loss of two killed and twelve wounded.
He killed forty of the enemy, who were found on
137
PROPOSAL TO DESTROY BALA HISAR.
[1879.
the ground, and some 150 more are supposed to be
killed and wounded.
138
SHERPUR TO BE OCCUPIED.
66
Siah-Sang, Oct. 17.-Got orders out for the
occupation of the Sherpur cantonment and the de-
struction of the Bala Hisar. I do not object to
occupying Sherpur as long as the whole force goes
there, but I did to our holding both, for we are not
strong enough for it. A letter came in from Money
to say all communications with Ali Khel were stopped,
and he expected to be attacked on the 16th (yester-
day). Gough went off with the 5th Panjab Cavalry,
5th Panjab Infantry, and four mountain-guns, and
sent in at nine from Charasia, to say he was all right,
but could not get communication with the Shutar-
gardan. Examined the brother of Yahiya, Mahamad
Sarwar―got nothing out of him; also Mirza Mahamad
Zakaria, Captain Nabi, and a funny old scoundrel,
called Baz, who made the proclamation. There is no
doubt it was made, and that Nek Mahamad was the
instigator; but there is no direct evidence to prove
the kotwal ordered it to be made, and therefore there
is not enough to hang him, though I daresay that
will be done. Roberts says that he hears the Ghilzais
mean to oppose Charles Gough, and that we must go
out and help him in. I do not think these devils
mean to let us be quiet in the winter; but their
power is a good deal broken, and we have got most
of their arms and ammunition, and nearly all their
guns. I go to-morrow with the general to see
where our quarters are to be, and having fixed
1879.]
on my rooms, I shall get glass doors out of the
Amir's house, and have a fireplace made. I have
already told Ibrahim to lay in supplies of food
for me.
SENTENCE OF DEATH.
139
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 18.-Went with the general
down to look for quarters; settled on taking those
in the south-east gate. Roberts evidently wants his
down below; so I shall have my choice of those up
above. Shall get a plan, and tell them off to-morrow.
Examined the mustaufi to-day, and got the man who
dragged Cavagnari's body through the streets, though
he says he did not drag but carried it, and gave it
over to Mirza Mahamad. Owen told me to-day that
in the city they had taken him for Cavagnari, and
said they thought he had escaped. He is something
like him. I never thought of it before.
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 19.- Did not do much to-day.
Wrote a summary of the kotwal's and chaukidar of
Mundai's cases, and gave it to Massy's commission,¹
which condemned them to death, with three others,
and they are all to be hung to-morrow. Had a talk
to-day with Ahmad Ali Jan, son of Mahamad Ali
Khan, who was Sher Ali's favourite son. He has a
good manner, and might turn out well, though I can-
not fancy any Afghan turning out well at all.
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 20.2-Took Wali Mahamad's
C
1 Military Commission.-Brigadier-General Massy, president; Ma-
jor Moriarty, Bombay Staff Corps; Captain Guiness, 72d Highlanders,
members.
2 No. 1125, dated 20th October, from Major-General Roberts to
Chief of Staff, par. 44: "I further desire to bring to notice the services
140
THE COMMISSION.
[1879.
evidence. All directed to show what a well-wisher
he was of ours, and how much the contrary the Amir
was!
66
Siah-Sang, Oct. 21.—I take the following from
the notes of the proceedings of the commission: (1)
Prisoner, Sultan Aziz. — Mahamad Hyat states :
"The city people are unwilling to come forward
openly; but I have ascertained beyond doubt that
this man was the moving spirit on the night of the
5th to get people to go out and fight us.
He was
also present himself at the fight with a standard.'
Accused simply denies his guilt. The commission
sentence him to be hanged. The commission is
composed of Massy, a captain of 72d, and Moriarty.
Eleven men have been hung (including two ordered
to-day) up to date. I therefore intend to see that
no prisoner goes to the commission without a clear
statement of the nature of the evidence, and with-
out a chance of bringing witnesses in his favour.
..
Siah-Sang, Oct. 22.-Saved five men's lives to-
day-that is to say, if I had not inquired into their
cases, they would have been hanged. They did not
seem a bit grateful, and made no remark. One old
man, Jahangir, was reproved by his son for not
thanking me, and he turned and muttered something,
whether a curse or a blessing I do not know. Then
he passed his hand over his beard, as if to say, ' May
of the following officers: Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E.,
Chief of the Staff. This officer's soldierly qualities are so well known
that I need not say I have throughout derived the greatest assistance
from his energy, ability, and experience."
1879.]
my beard be cut off if I do not do what I say!' One
of the accused was Abu Bakar, a merchant, against
whom there was a regular got-up case, the principal
witness being his deadly enemy. Old Nakhshband
seemed very grateful to me for getting him off, and
said, 'May God spare your child!' a wish I heartily
agree with him in. Supplies are coming in better
now, but we are still far off from having enough yet.
I hope we shall get enough to enable us to carry on
till we can get things up from the Khaibar. There
seems to be a strange want of life in that force; they
are still only at Jalalabad. They might easily have
been here."
DEPOSITIONS AND EVIDENCE.
141
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 24.-Engaged half the day in
taking down trifling cases. Let two fellows free,
and then got Daud Shah up; his evidence is not
worth much. I cannot get at any sign that the at-
tack on Cavagnari was premeditated. I am inclined
to think it was not; but perhaps it may come out
later on.
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 25, 26, and 27.-Nothing but
depositions! I must try and get Roberts to give me
a brigade; then I shall have very little to do, and be
in a better position to do it. I am going to suggest
my being sent to Herat : it would be a grand thing
if I succeeded in taking it and holding it all the
winter. I think I could, but he will not let me.
"Siah-Sang, Oct. 28 and 29.-Broached my views
about Herat, but he would not see it; and when I
said I might go, he said, 'Oh no! we could not spare
k
142
[1879.
you.' My idea is, that instead of sitting here doing
nothing, we should try and secure Herat this winter;
and the way I would do it would be by taking 100
cavalry, 100 infantry, and two mountain-guns as my
body-guard, raising as many Kizilbashes as I could
get here say 1000-adding to these the Hazara
horse of late Amir, and then going and raising the
whole Hazara country, sweeping on like a wave,
and making a rush for Herat. It would be somewhat
risky; but I think I could do it. What I want Ro-
berts to let me do would be to go on a sort of mis-
sion to the Hazara chiefs, with a view of seeing the
country, and I would then sound them, and if I found
them game, I would try a rush on Herat; it would
be a grand game.
(6
TRY A RUSH ON HERAT.
Siah-Sang, Oct. 30 and 31.-More depositions,
the usual sort of thing. To-day we got on the track
of a letter of the Amir, which will, I hope, lead to
something. Roberts went down to Yahiya Khan's
house. I am going to talk to him to-morrow about
the money taken being prize. If it does not belong
to the Amir, it certainly should be prize, and I shall
try all I know to get it made so.
"" 1
1 Upwards of 8 lakhs of rupees, and a quantity of jewellery and
gold coin tillas and Russian 5-rouble pieces, in all amounting to 9
lakhs, were found, which were fairly recognisable as prize-money for
the troops; but the whole treasure was subsequently refunded to the
Afghan Government.
143
CHAPTER IV.
KABAL AND SHERPUR.
1879-1880.
"When the drum beat at dead of night,
Commanding fires of death to light."
CAMP SIAH-SANG-MOVE INTO SHERPUR-RECONNOITRING TOWARDS
THE KHAIBAR-THE AMIR'S CASE-REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
THE MUSTAUFI EXAMINED-PROOF OF YAKUB KHAN'S COM-
PLICITY
FREEZES-THROUGH MAIDAN DEPORTA-
THE INK
THREATENING SIGNS ARRANGEMENTS
THE
BRITISH HATED
AN AWFUL DAY
TION OF THE AMIR
FOR A FIGHT
LOSS AND RECOVERY OF THE GUNS SHERPUR
SHERPUR INVESTED
HOT WORK-MAJOR GREEN'S MARCH-THE SIGNAL-FIRE-A
GLOOMY LOOK-OUT—DAUD SHAH-THREE VICTORIA CROSSES-
MESSAGE FROM THE
THE QUEEN-
QUEEN-JALALABAD-AFFAIR WITH THE
MOHMANDS-THE PARI DARA DEFILE-INSPECTING DEFENCES-
MOUNTED INFANTRY-SENDING OFF WOUNDED-OCCUPATION OF
KABAL-EQUIPMENT COMMITTEE.
p
p
ON the 1st November the camp at Siah-Sang was
broken up, and the main body of the 1st Division
moved into the cantonments of Sherpur, which had
been prepared for winter quarters.
، ،
Sherpur Cantonment, Nov. 1.—Got up at half-
past eight. As I was dressing, Ahmad Ali put in
•
144
[1879.
his head and said, 'Good morning.' I looked blankly
at him, and he bolted. Sent orderlies for my things
left behind on the hill, then went to see my quar-
ters, which have not progressed one bit. Wonder,
if Roberts gets command of the two divisions, if
MacPherson will get one; then I might get his
brigade, and I should have less toil and more credit.
One of the fellows we had up to-day was Mahamad
Hasan, a fearful liar, and a man who killed two of
his brothers with his own hand. The general evi-
dently suspects the Amir to be implicated in a plot,
but I have no evidence to that effect as yet; he was
doubtless most culpably apathetic when the attack
was going on, but no more. By the way, I must
get a list of what they call the Yakubzai. In this
country you cannot absolutely believe a single soul,
they are all either friends or enemies, and they will
not say anything against this relationship.
،،
Butkhak, Nov. 2.-Up at 6.30, start off at
seven, and ride with the general to Butkhak,¹ eight
and a half miles. The road is nearly level all the
way, but stony; the Logar a deep, swift, but nar-
row river, crossed by a masonry bridge. Then the
road goes over country which is swamped, when the
Logar is in flood, for three miles; then becomes
stony, ascending. MacPherson had his camp pitched
in a somewhat straggling order on right bank of the
Khurd Kabal stream. Madad and Saadat, the chief
RECONNOITRING.
1 Butkhak, a new post established by General Roberts, garrisoned
and connected by telegraph with Kabal.
1879.]
men of the Ghilzais of this part, came in.
We had
an indifferent breakfast, and then marched at eleven
for the Lataband Kotal. For six miles the road. goes
over open stony country to the Surkhai Kotal, which
is easy, then over little kotals for ten miles to a ridge
called Amir Khan. There are three passes over this.
I thought the one to the left was the best, easiest
gradient, but longest. The middle is very bad, and
could hardly be made; the right, or south, is very
steep, but soil easier. We went over the middle,
and had to lead our horses over it. Then we went
up the bed of a river for Lataband-at first through
a very nasty defile; then we came on a very large
camp of Kuchis; then on by a very easy slope, up a
ridge, to the top-about five miles. We trotted up
the whole way, which was rather cruel to the animals
—indeed my pony was very nearly killed, and so
were several others. We got back about six; went
and dined with Broome.
THE CHINARI ROAD.
(6
145
Sherpur, Nov. 3.-Roberts first meant to go
through the Khurd Kabal defile and then come
back, but, at the last moment, Daud Shah said
something about the Chinari road, so he decided to
try that, and we started at nine.
After about six miles, we went south and up the
Chinari valley, then entered a very nasty, narrow
defile, with no road at all, and tremendous cliffs
overhead. This for six miles, then the hills opened
out, and we turned south-east and went for four
miles, when we came on to the Khurd Kabal road.
VOL. II.
K
146
[1879.
Then we changed our direction over very open, easy
ground, for eight miles, to the Khurd Kabal stream,
at about four miles passed the Haft Kotal road to
Tezin. Going down the river-bed for one mile, we
entered a narrow defile with precipitous cliffs, road
in the water. This for two miles, then we left it
and turned over bank of river for three miles to
camp, which we reached at four o'clock, having
gone not under thirty-two miles. We only waited
to change horses, and then rode in to Sherpur.
"Sherpur, Nov. 4.-Got up about eight. I have
strained my back-sinews somehow-I suppose from
a constant strain in keeping up a trot with the
general's infernal mare. At eleven we went out to
meet the 3d Sikhs, which we did opposite the Bala
Hisar, when Roberts made them a speech. The 9th
Lancers passed us, looking well, but undermounted;
the 5th Panjab Cavalry very good and serviceable;
Morgan's battery also very serviceable; the 3d Sikhs
is magnificent, also the 5th Panjab Infantry. Sorry
not to see old MacQueen at their head; he is so ill
he will have to go back. Then back to listen to
more lies. To-morrow we examine the Amir.
SERVICEABLE TROOPS.
(C
Sherpur, Nov. 5.-Had one Nur Ali up, to try
and find out where the rest of the Amir's money
was, but did not succeed. Got the Amir's seals;
went to take Amir's deposition; he did not let any-
thing out, and complained of having been made a
prisoner and being badly treated. There is no use
going on with this evidence-one gets nothing out
1879.]
of it; and so I am going to read it all over and see
what other questions we should put to these people,
and then we must shut up and draw up our report.
The upshot will be, there is no proof of the thing
having been planned, though there are some grounds.
for suspicion that it was.
There is no manner of
doubt that the Amir was most apathetic, and did
nothing; and there are very strong grounds for sus-
pecting that he was not quite free from conniving at
the resistance offered to us at Charasia. On the
whole, he must never be again Amir, and had better
be deported to India; and the same must be done
to the wazir, mustaufi, Yahiya, Zakaria, and all
that breed. The people are the very greatest set of
brutes I ever heard of, and it is evident that they
hate us
every one of them. I do not think Wali
Mahamad's lot are one little bit better. Moriarty
gave me a gold coin which nobody ever saw before,
and which is believed to be very valuable.
CC
Add
THE AMIR'S CASE.
Sherpur, Nov. 6.-Engaged all day in writing
up my report on the case; I hope I shall make a
good thing of it. Went to the general to get him
to promise Nek Mahamad and Mahamad Karim
their lives if they told us the truth about all this
business. Gave him information as to the Amir's
property, and a lot belonging to Khushdill and
others.
66
147
Sherpur, Nov. 7.-Sent out a party of fifty
14th Bengal Lancers, under Mitford, to search the
village of Chihaltan for property belonging to Khush-
148
[1879.
dill, &c. Cross-examined Daud Shah, but he lied
awfully.
"Nov. 8. Mitford's party not come back at
REPORT-WRITING.
8.30."
"Nov. 11.-Finished the first part of my report,
and began the second; hope to finish it in two to
three days more. Bellew says he thinks it is won-
derfully clear, and if I can get Roberts to think
so I shall do. I will get him to telegraph the
mutlab [gist].
"Nov. 12. - Writing report -finished second
G
part.
"Nov. 13.-Writing report-finished third part.
A letter came from Adjutant-General about the
business of the 8th, and we are to go to-morrow to
look at the ground. MacPherson is coming in to-
morrow.
"Sherpur, Nov. 14.-A letter having come from
Adjutant-General, calling in question the letting the
enemy escape on the 8th October, we rode out round
the Asmai hill, past Kala Aoshar, to look at the
ground.
showed us the ground where he
was drawn up, and where he went for the night.
At sunset he appears to have withdrawn his whole
force into two villages, and not have come out till
half an hour before daybreak-that is to say, for
nine hours he left the enemy alone, with the Char-
asia road quite open, and the Argandeh road par-
tially guarded. Between him and Baker there must
have been three miles of country, with trees through
Gwen
1879.]
which they could have got away. He should have
sent parties to reconnoitre the hill in the Deh Afghan
direction, and having got round by Kala Aoshar he
should have left a party on the Sherpur side, estab-
lished a signalling party on the Koh Aliabad, and
kept himself as close as he possibly could. He
should have communicated with Baker, and at night
there should have been one line of vedettes all night
all round the hill. He would by this have been at
once informed of any attempt of the enemy to break
through; and though this would not have prevented
them getting into the city, he would certainly have
prevented their breaking into the open. I think if
they had found themselves surrounded they would
have gone into the city, but that is no excuse for
not surrounding them, and inasmuch as he
did not do so he is to blame.
AN EVIDENT BLUNDER.
149
"It appears that Wali Mahamad will not go to
Balkh; I wonder if the general would let me go. I
might kick Ghulam Haidar out, and then, getting
the Uzbegs on my side, might go round and have
a shy at Herat by myself. I do not think Roberts
would let me go, however. I find seventy-six men
have been hung.
"Nov. 15.-Still at report. General went to But-
khak. Had the mustaufi up-he said he was sorry
he was a prisoner, as he thought he could be useful
to us.
"Nov. 16.-Finished that d-d report. Roberts
telegraphed that it was very able and exhaustive,
[1879.
and completely made out the Amir's guilt. Hope
to have a little peace now.
"Nov. 17.-The report is being copied all day by
about some six or seven different men, and will
probably be ready by to-morrow, and get off by
the post.
Roberts has written
a very compli-
mentary letter about me, which I shall get copied
to-morrow. It is not so bad; I have been men-
tioned very well in despatches, and then this-all in
two months.
150
THE REPORT.
-
"Nov. 18.-My report was sent off with following
letter by Roberts, dated 18th November :-
"I have the honour to submit, for the informa-
tion and orders of his Excellency the Viceroy and
Governor-General in Council, the report of the com-
missioners appointed by me to inquire into the
causes and circumstance of the late outbreak at
Kabal. Immediately after my arrival here, I de-
termined to intrust to a carefully constituted com-
mission the duty of collecting all possible evidence
regarding the late outbreak and the attack on the
British Residency. It was at first intended that
the commission should be charged with the trial of
all persons accused of participation in the attack or
of any connected offences; but I found that this
would involve undue labour and delay, and eventu-
ally the commissioners were relieved of all judicial
work.
K
M
"In nominating the members of the commission,
I was most careful to select such officers only as
151
1879.]
YAKUB KHAN'S COMPLICITY.
were specially fitted for the very important and
difficult task before them. To the office of president
I appointed Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I.,
C.I.E., Chief of the Staff. Colonel MacGregor's
character and ability are well known to his Excel-
lency in Council, and his close study of Afghan
politics and acquaintance with Persian were added
qualifications for the post. The other members
selected were Surgeon-Major Bellew, C.B., and Ma-
hamad Hyat Khan, C.B. Dr Bellew I chose on
account of his linguistic attainment and extensive
knowledge of the people, and Mahamad Hyat as
being a Mohammedan, and therefore more able to
enter thoroughly into the feelings and prejudices of
the Afghans than any European could hope to do.
The commissioners have now brought their work to
an end, and the enclosed report shows the extent
and result of their inquiries. It is, in my opinion,
a very able summing up of the information elicited,
and reflects the greatest credit on Colonel MacGregor
and his colleagues. The scantiness of direct evi-
dence made their task one of extreme difficulty, but
they have nevertheless succeeded, to an extent which
I did not anticipate, in throwing light on the causes
of the outbreak, and upon the conduct of the Amir
and those about him both before and after the
massacre of the Embassy. The guilt of Yakub
Khan is now established almost beyond question,
and I believe it only requires his removal from
Afghanistan to produce such direct and certain
152
[1879.
evidence as will leave no room for future doubt
either as to his own complicity or as to that of his
father-in-law or ministers.
PROOF OF GUILT FORTHCOMING.
"Once the people are satisfied of the fact that
Yakub Khan and his ministers will never again be
in a position to take revenge on those who may
have offended them, it will not be long before the
conclusive proof of their guilt is forthcoming. For
the present men's tongues are tied for fear of
the consequences, and so long as Yakub Khan re-
mains in Kabal, this state of things will continue.
I have, however, received the orders of his Excel-
lency in Council to arrange for the ex-Amir's
journey to India, and his departure will, I feel con-
fident, enable me to clear up without delay any
mystery which still hangs over the outbreak. I
trust his Excellency in Council will concur in the
opinion that great credit is due to Colonel MacGregor
and his colleagues for the patient and comprehensive
inquiry, and for the skill with which the informa-
tion elicited has been brought to bear on the main
points at issue. The inquiry involved close and
continuous labour for some weeks, and its result
will, I hope, be satisfactory to Government.""
"Nov. 20.-Rode out about nine with Roberts to
meet Collett and Badcock. Got as far as the Kotal
on the Butkhak road. Our party consisted of
Sherston, Chamberlain, and Carew.
"Nov. 21.-Old Nakhshband came and spoke to
me about himself. I said I would do what I could
-
1879.]
for him. He was very grateful. Then spoke to the
general about Mahamad Saiad and Paghman. I
hope I shall be able to keep him in. The general
said he was going out, as he thought there would be
a fight. I hope there will be, and I shall be able to
get a chance of doing something; it would be a
great thing. Wrote to Viva,¹ and told her about
the ink freezing. Ibrahim Khan says that the
Kizilbashes look on me as their friend. I will
get up a strong Kizilbash party in the country
before I am done with it, and these, with a regi-
ment or two of Hazaras, will enable me to keep
the country quiet.
THROUGH MAIDAN DISTRICT.
153
..
Argandeh, Nov. 22. Rode out at twelve.
We walked the whole way for sixteen miles. It
is a pretty ride through cultivation, and we did
not get in till 5.30 to Argandeh. Dined with the
general.
66
Camp Maidan, Ghazni Road, Nov. 23.—Very
cold at night. Got up about eight, started at ten.
After breakfast, ascent very easy and gradual to
Kotal and Takht, then descent; same to Maidan,
where we found Baker en route. Spoke to general
about the transport, and I telegraphed to ask Low if
he would take it. Baker very anxious to go at some
scoundrels who are collecting near, but the general
directed him to collect supplies. When this is done.
there will be less objection to his going; he might
then go round by Shekhabad and by the Tangi
1 Sir Charles's daughter, Geneviève, then aged eight years.
[1879.
،،
Warkak to Logar, then in. After lunch, went to
top of hill to west; saw up valley a bit and had a
very good view of valley itself, which has a very
large number of villages and is profusely cultivated.
Camp Maidan, Nov. 24.-Got up about seven,
and started on a wild-goose chase to a village in
Nirikh valley, where it was said there was a re-
fractory Malik called Bahadur Khan. Of course he
had flown, so we burnt his villages and came back.
The country passed over, as well as Maidan, was
wonderfully fertile and populated.
"Sherpur, Nov. 25.-Up at six, and after break-
fast started back and rode into Kabal, twenty-three
miles, arriving about two.
154
EXASPERATION.
Nov. 26.-A report came in from Baker that he
expected to be attacked. Warned the 5th Ghurkhas
and 5th Panjab Cavalry to be ready to go to his
aid.
"Nov. 27.-Up at 8.30. Went and arranged about
Low coming to direct transport. No news in from
Baker yet, so suppose night passed over quietly. The
5th Panjab Cavalry and 5th Ghurkhas allowed to
send their animals out to graze.
"Nov. 28.-Baker says he went out with 300
Highlanders, 200 3d Ghurkhas, and found the enemy
on the heights above Bini Badam; but he turned
their flank and they bolted, and he burnt their vil-
lage. I do not think this burning of villages is a
good plan it exasperates them and does not funk
them. To me it is specially repugnant, as it reminds
wed
1879.]
me of the days when they used to do the same with
the Highlanders.
THE AMIR DEPORTED.
155
"Sherpur, Nov. 29.-Wrote the orders for the
Amir's departure and journey from here to Pesha-
war. They take great care of him. The general,
who last night was talking about putting me in
here, now says we cannot stay; but he is in favour
of breaking up the Afghanistan State into four, and
returning to our frontier, holding Kandahar and a
cantonment at Gandamak. He is quite ready to
agree, if the Government wishes, to the Persians
having Herat. Got a note from Moriarty to say he
had heard the Kohistanis were collecting in large
numbers, and meant to attack us. I suppose we are
in for a winter of worry. I hope not.
"Sherpur, Nov. 30.-A busy day, what with re-
ports of Kohistanis coming down, and getting the
Amir off. Have arranged everything, and he starts
at 6 A.M. with escort of one troop 9th Lancers, one
squadron 5th Panjab Cavalry, two guns horse-artil-
lery, under Major Hammond. Sent out four patrols
on the four roads to Kohistan; they saw nothing.
Shall send them out again to-morrow. Rode round
position. Set Perkins to work to make shelter-
trenches and gun-pits, and told general officer of day
and field-officer to look out after their flanks. I hope
it will all go right about the Amir: it would be a
nice go if he escaped.
(6
Sherpur, Dec. 1.-Up at five. Went to Amir's
camp, bustled them about, and got him off about six.
156
[1879.
Went in just before with the general: he was very
civil. He asked if I was going, and when I said,
'No,' he said, 'Een che taor dosti ast.' He asked
that Yahiya Khan should come with him, also Abdul
Ghias; but this could not be, so we let Abdul Kayun
go. He seemed to be quite happy and contented at
going. Then got home. Sent a party off to Yahiya
Khan's house to take possession of it, with 150 camels.
I believe they found an immense deal of property.
About 1.30 we went out to meet Sir M. Kennedy.1
Went out about six miles, then met them all walk-
ing, the explanation of which was that Sir M.
Kennedy had had a fall and hurt himself. Met
Lockhart, Hogg, Hanna, and others, all looking well.
Did not get back till 4.30. Dust awful.
"Dec. 2.-Had very little to do all day. Morton
came in, and I explained to him what his work
would be. After breakfast Roberts told me that
Lockhart 2 had been appointed Assistant-Quarter-
master-General, which I am very glad of."
"Dec. 5.-We all rode out to Charasia to fight our
battle over again. Had a very pleasant ride. Lot
of fellows there.
"Dec. 6.-Arranging about our four political
prisoners going to-morrow with one squadron under
Green. Went to sale and bought an enamelled plate,
a very curious china plate with Arabic inscriptions, a
china bowl, and a carpet with a new pattern; ugly—
RIDE TO CHARASIA.
1 Sir Michael Kennedy, Director-General of Transport.
2 Major Lockhart, now Colonel Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B.
1879.]
too much yellow. Then tried my new horse. Think
he will do very well for me, being up to weight. The
general has put off his trip on the 9th, owing to
threatened disturbances which are brewing up all
round Kohistan, Maidan, and Logar; and men are
said to have gone down the road to stir up the
tribes. The Chief does not like this, and he is look-
ing careworn. He has told off a force to take Mir
Bachha's fort, Baba Kushkar, which is about twenty
miles off. MacPherson is to go in command. A
telegram has come from Viceroy, pressing on him
for an answer as to what course should be adopted.
Now he says he thinks the Treaty of Gandamak
should be maintained, and the Kuram route upheld.
Got all the orders off.
THREATENING SIGNS.
(6
157
Dec. 7.-Up at 5.30. Went and got the prison-
ers off.
Old Yahiya was very amusingly querulous.
He was grumbling, 'Oh dear! oh dear! it is so
cold! Oh bachha! where are my socks? Tell
Yasuf I leave him in the Lord's hands. How can I
go without my riding-trousers!' &c. They got off all
right, however. Then we arranged how to thrash
these devils. MacPherson goes with the brigade
towards Argandeh to try and draw them on, and
Baker goes round by Chihal-Dukhtaran and tries to
get in their rear. If they can manage this well, it
will be a good business. I also suggested getting up
the Guides, and propose putting them at the bridge,
north of Butkhak, so as to try and keep the gentle-
men at Baba Kushkar together till we can get the
,
-
[1879.
Maidan troops round to them. Our trip downwards
is, of course, put off till matters are settled up here,
but then we shall go on.
"Dec. 8.-We had a parade of all the troops in
garrison on the ground near Wazirabad. The ground
was excellent, and the troops were drawn up in two
lines, the infantry in front, cavalry and artillery in
rear; the day was lovely, and altogether it was a
pretty sight. The general looks very well on his
Arab; he rides well. All the Sardars and people
were there, and I fancy did not like the look of the
troops much. After parade I wrote out Mac-
Pherson's instructions for him, and had a talk with
Baker about what he should do. I hope they will
make a good business of it. Also ordered Jenkins
to come to bridge, west of Butkhak; but soon after we
found that Baba Kushkar was a great deal more to
the west than it is marked on the maps, and so I
counter-ordered the Guides, and told them to march
in here instead.
158
THOROUGHLY HATED.
"To-morrow Baker goes out, and we shall not
have too many troops in camp, so we must prevent
any more moving out. This gateway is very much
unprotected, so I had the guard increased to twelve
men, and put out two sentries. We are thoroughly
hated, and not enough feared, and they show the
absolute necessity of our holding on here till they
get accustomed to us. If we go now, we shall not
have improved our position with the people one bit;
rather the contrary. We have been too cruel, yet
1879.]
we have not made them quite acknowledge our
supremacy; and they have not yet had time to ap-
preciate our justice. The only serious difficulty I see
in occupying this place is in the fact that it would
be very unpopular with the native army.
Dec. 9.-Not up till eight, then went down to
general, found he was going out to MacPherson's
camp, but, as I wanted to clear my table, did not
go. Got some three fellows out of quod-one, Taj
Mahamad, son of Zakaria, his mother being a sister
of Ibrahim's, was a singularly handsome man.
Nothing much happened all day; in the evening
MacPherson reported the enemy were going towards
Kohistan, so arranged that MacPherson should try
to cut them off by the Khirskhana Kotal,' while
Baker went on with his movement. If this is well
managed, it will be a very pretty business, and we
ought to make a good bag, and then turn our minds.
to the Kohistanis. Wrote orders to above effect,
and gave to Sherston and Smith to carry out. At
eleven a note from Baker to effect that report said
some 4000 Ghilzais were a little beyond Zargun-
shahar, but he rightly does not think much of that.
I think it will be a real good business.
"Dec. 10.-Heard that MacPherson and Baker
had moved off as ordered. About ten got a
heliogram to say MacPherson had got hold of
the Surkh Kotal. About twelve went off to Gor-
66
IN THE FIELD AGAIN.
159
C
1 Khirskhana Kotal is a pass leading to Koh Daman, six and a half
miles north-west of Kabal.
160
›
AN AWFUL DAY.
1
[1879.
don's camp at Kala-i-Aoshar; got there about 12.30;
found Gordon had gone; went and found he had got
his cavalry out all right, and had two guns about
two miles ahead. Told him to go on with all his
guns and cavalry, and see if he could get a chance
to help MacPherson, leaving men to watch the dif-
ferent roads. At two general came up, sent a letter
to Baker to say what was going on, and rode on
towards Paghman with a few cavalry. Got to hill
overlooking valley about 4.15, then came back,
general going his usual jog-trot; got in at 6.30.
A letter from MacPherson says the Kohistanis, 5000
or 6000, had come at him, and he had licked them,
taking six standards; our loss only seven wounded,
so it has been a good business. Sent a note to Mac-
Pherson by one of Ibrahim Khan's men. To-morrow
we go out at ten.
"Dec. 11.-An awful day. According to pro-
gramme, MacPherson was to go along by foot of
hills to Argandeh and meet Baker in Maidan, and
Massy was to join him. We started about ten to
see the fun. We got out at eleven to Kala-i-Aoshar,
and had got beyond when we heard firing towards
Kala-i-Kazi, and presently we got a note from Massy
to say enemy were in large numbers, and he was
trying to hold them in check. When we got up, we
found enemy, 10,000 strong, advancing north on
Massy, who was retiring. The general told them to
retire into open, and charge them. The 9th Lancers
did make a sort of charge, but not a good one, then
1879.]
retired. Then one gun¹ and limber got stuck, and
had to be left spiked; then retired again to a village.
9th Lancers were quite out of hand, would not face
them, and went back, and three guns had to be left
in village. All this time I was with general, and
shots were coming in. He told me to go and
rally 9th Lancers. I went, got a squadron together,
and told them to get out to enemy's right flank and
charge, but they would not; then they began bolt-
ing; I went after them, shouted and swore at them,
but to no purpose.
Then I went back to village,
found guns left and everybody gone, and enemy
close up, so I turned and went back towards Kala-i-
Aoshar. Then told Deane to go and stop all cavalry
he could. He stopped some fifty, and we formed
up. Enemy came on to within 1000 yards, then
turned east towards city, so I took this party and
went to join MacPherson, whom we could see hotly
engaged. After I had got about a mile, came on
MacPherson's baggage; got hold of all infantry I
could-about sixty of 67th Ghurkhas-and throwing
them out in skirmishing order, advanced to where I
had seen the guns left. Found three guns; got them
out and sent to rear, then advanced again, and got
the fourth; took it off. Thus the honour of retaking
all four belongs to me alone. I hope MacPherson
will make a good thing of it to-morrow, and this will
break up all these devils, else we shall have them
dancing about us all the winter.
1 Of Major Smijth-Windham's battery.
VOL. II.
RECOVERY OF THE GUNS.
L
161
[1879.
“Dec. 12.-Up at seven, had a beastly breakfast,
and went up to top of house and remained there
nearly all day watching for Money's attack.
It was
delayed from one cause and another, and did not
begin till 12.30. We could see nothing of him, but
saw enemy in great strength on top of a frightfully
steep position. The result was that about 4.30
Money signalled he could not get on, so the attack
failed. That is the second defeat in two days; one
more and we shall have to shut ourselves up all the
winter."
162
SHERPUR INVESTED.
!
A portion of the diary is here missing. On the
13th, Generals Baker and MacPherson operated in
conjunction against the Afghans' position on the
Takht-i-Shah, which was taken after severe fighting
by the 92d Highlanders. In all, four officers, fifty-
five men, and fifty-two horses were killed and
wounded. On the 14th, the Afghans assembled on
the Asmai heights were again attacked and driven
off; but the Afghans regained the heights, and the
British were forced to withdraw with the loss of two
guns. The whole British force was now concen-
trated in Sherpur. Killed and wounded on 14th,
five officers, seven native officers, 125 men. On the
15th, the garrison of Butkhak was recalled to Sher-
pur, and Sherpur placed in a state of defence. The
enemy was comparatively quiet, looting the city, &c.
On the 17th, the Afghans made demonstration on
the Asmai heights, and on the 18th the Afghans
advanced in force against Sherpur.
-
-
1879.]
HOT WORK.
163
"Dec. 18.-Sent orders by Combe and Smith to
give orders to all to have their breakfast early, as
they say they are going to attack at 6.30. At
eight sent 100 5th Panjab Infantry out to occupy
5th Panjab Cavalry village. MacPherson and
Williams came at 6.30 for orders about making a
counter-attack. 8.35, went to Luke to get wire put
up at MacPherson's gate and inside of Commis-
sariat. Told general about Corporal Sellar's¹ be-
haviour, and also about Hammond of Guides. Told
Hyat Khan to find out if any of the enemy had
gone to attack Gough, and sent party 5th Panjab
Cavalry to find out. Sent orders for four and a
half squadrons, under Williams, to go out on the
east and same on the west, under Ross, at 11.10.
At 11.30 enemy moving in small numbers from
Asmai; 11.45, troops ordered out, as enemy coming
down into gardens below Deh Afghan; 12.30, two
guns field-artillery shelled enemy on lower slopes
of Asmai hill; 12.10, 8-inch howitzer at south-west
corner shelled Deh Afghan, two shots; 12.40, told
Williams to go out south-east corner and wait;
1.30, turn out 67th to sweep along south face and
clear enemy, where possible, but do not get them
under fire-72d will support; look out for our men
in 5th Panjab Cavalry garden. Two, not to let
1 Lance-Corporal George Sellar, 72d Highlanders, rushed forward
in advance of every one and engaged in a desperate conflict the lead-
ing Afghans on the Asmai heights on the 14th December. He re-
ceived afterwards the Victoria Cross.
164
[1879.
Green retire, but support him; 2.30, to look for
67th; found they had slipped along under wall.
Told Brownlow he had better do what 67th were
ordered; but he pointed out, if he did so, he would
be raked. I agreed with him, and went back to
general, who sent orders for him to stand fast till
further orders. Carey went at three. Sent orders
at four for troops to turn in. This sort of thing
cannot go on we must bivouac troops on ground,
and only turn out when attack is imminent. The
troops would not last long at this rate. After 6.30,
letter came for Collett to say enemy were collecting
in village to cast, so ordered wing 92d to be ready.
Then a letter came from Gough to say he had not
moved from Jagdalak-why, he does not say he
ought to have started before; but he cannot be here
now before the 22d, at earliest. It began to drizzle
about seven, has all the appearance of being a very
nasty night for the troops. The enemy made no
real attempt to attack, but got into gardens and
cover as nearly as they could and took pot-shots.
They say they mean to attack to-morrow-a regular
good attack—but I doubt its being a serious one. I
do not like this; I wish we had gone into Bala Hisar,
as I wished. We should then never have lost com-
mand of the city, and this would never have come
to such a head. About ten, Brownlow came over
about his section of defence. I told him I thought
that he might turn part of his men in. Then Per-
kins came over to get an order for sappers to go out
HARASSING WORK.
.
▸
66
:
T
1879.]
A QUIET DAY.
and knock down walls all round; a thing I had sug-
gested should be done at the very first. At 10.30,
Roberts came over and proposed we should go all
round the pickets. Though I did not like the idea of
paddling through snow, we went; and after three
hours' walking through snow, and almost losing our
way, we got back very wet and cold, and at last I
got some sleep, not before past three though.
"Dec. 19.-Ordered Baker with 400 67th, 400
3d Sikhs, and two of Swinley's guns, to go and burn
Kala Akhor to east. They did this, and had some
sniping with enemy, but they burnt the village.
Got communication with Lataband and sent helio-
grams saying Gough must come. Montanaro, moun-
tain-battery, and two men 9th Lancers, wounded,
latter inside enclosure, so sent order for every one
to keep under shelter of walls. There were six of
67th, and six of 3d Sikhs wounded to-day.
165
"Dec. 20.-Had a quiet day; enemy had evident-
ly not the pluck really to attack us. Heard that
the transport animals sent off last night got through
to Lataband all right, so Roberts is going to send
sixty more to-night. Arranged for five heavy guns
to open on Kala Sharif at nine to-morrow. A lot of
tom-toming and shouting going on till about twelve.
Dec. 21.-The guns opened as ordered and fired
ten rounds, but they did little or no damage. About
twelve, Roberts went off to the ridge to prospect, as
they said the enemy were going to attack us. The
troops were got under arms by telegraph at about
166
[1879.
1.30. The enemy never really did more than threaten
us, and at four we let them turn in. I sent word
that two guns were going to try and turn enemy
out of gardens to the west, whereupon a lot of in-
fantry turned out, and H- tried to get up an
engagement on his own hook. Talking to Roberts,
we have arranged a way of attacking when Gough
comes. Got a heliogram to say he would leave
Jagdalak to-day, and be here on 24th, so he is at
least a week later than he need have been. Tele-
graphed to Hudson to come to Butkhak to-morrow,
and arranged for Green¹ to go out during the night,
and try to join him he will have to run the gant-
let of fire from a lot of villages, but I daresay he
will get out all right. If Gough gets in on 24th, we
ought to polish the devils off on 25th. We shall
have about 4500 infantry, 500 artillery, and 1200
cavalry to move out with, and I hope we shall
succeed.
:
MAJOR GREEN'S MARCH.
"Dec. 22.-Nothing doing to-day; troops did not
even fall in. Enemy working round from east to
north, apparently to surround us, as some also were
working round from west to north. Had a couple
of talks with the general about what was to be done
when Gough comes in. He is very hot on going to
Siah-Sang, and I am against it, as we could not keep
1 Major Green and 12th Bengal Cavalry started at 3 A.M. 22d, and
after an eventful march and crossing the Logar with difficulty, and
under the continual fire from the enemy, reached General Gough's
column at Lataband.
1879.]
up communication with it. However, after second
talk, he has more than half given up his idea of
seizing Kala Mahamad Sharif, and we are to go and
see if a better line cannot be found from the north-
east angle straight to Siah-Sang. Reported that the
enemy are going to attack us to-morrow morning,
and that the signal is to be a fire lit on the Asmai
hill. Telegraphed round to every one to say so.
Was woke up no less than fourteen times during
the night."
"When we were shut up in Sherpur," writes a very
distinguished officer, "the defence of the headquarter
gateway had been given to a certain senior officer,
who, between ourselves, was a bit nervous. When
his defences were prepared he went to Colonel Mac-
Gregor and said, 'Now I have done the best I can;
but what shall I do if the enemy force their way
into the gate in overwhelming numbers, as I have
no reserve to fall back on .?' 'Turn 'em out!'
gruffly remarked the chief of the staff. Yes, of
course,' said --; but if they are too strong for
us?' TURN THEM OUT!' roared MacGregor; that's
what you're there for!' and no other answer would
he give him, as of course it was the first thing
he would have done himself in a similar case. It
was thoroughly characteristic of the man."
.
THE SIGNAL-FIRE.
-
167
C
"Dec. 23.-Punctually as the fire was lit on
Asmai, the attack began. At first there was a feint
on the west, and then a most determined attack from
about 10,000 men on the east side, where the guides
7
168
AFGHANS PUT TO FLIGHT.
[1879.
were.
The firing was heavy, and it went on with-
out intermission till eleven. They threatened also
the south side; not at all on north. They were
beaten back with great loss, and the enemy fled
disastrously, some 5000 making for Kohistan, and
the rest towards the Siah-Sang. The cavalry were
then sent out, and made a long sweep round to the
north and east, and cut up a few. Baker moved out
with wing 3d Sikhs and two companies 92d, and two
guns to shell a village, but did no good, and came
back after destroying some villages. Six companies
of 67th also went out,, and cleared enemy out of
Rikabashi Fort, and burnt some villages in that
direction. Juma, subahdar of 5th Panjab Infantry,
also turned them out of Kala Mahamad Sharif, and
it would have been held, only Brownlow came to
general and got him to countermand it. We had
signals from Gough at Butkhak, who has arrived
this side. Sent off to tell him to start at 6 A.M. and
seize east end of Siah-Sang, and open communica-
tion with us. Had a long talk with general, and he
is going to send Baker out with 67th, 3d Sikhs,
Guides, and Pioneers, to cover Gough getting in
here. If we can only manage to clear them out of
the city and Bala Hisar, it will be grand. The
Queen has already telegraphed her thanks. Roberts's
idea is to storm the Bala Hisar either to-morrow or
next day with C. Gough's troops. I think this is
very risky, as the Bala Hisar is very strong indeed
to an assault: the walls are too high to escalade, and
1879.]
so the only way in is by the gate, which may be
strongly retrenched inside; and if these fellows are
determined, they may, being so numerous, beat us
off, then we shall be in a worse hat than before. Al-
together the look-out is somewhat gloomy. Juma
was ordered again to go at five, and get the fort
of Mahamad Sharif, and then 200 of the 72d to
join. Sent fifteen letters to Gough.
"Dec. 24.-Got up, and the general sent to say
MacPherson was to go with the force to see Gough
in. I sent off. Then Nakhshband came in and
said they had all bolted; and so it proved. Gough
came in all right, but his rear-guard was not in till
four. It snowed all day, and the ground was very
slippery. Massy went out with the 9th Lancers and
5th Panjab Cavalry by Bini Hisar road, and Gough
with the 14th Lancers and Guides; they found no
one,
and had an awful day of it, cavalry being no
use whatever. MacPherson went into the Bala Hisar;
found no one, and all the ammunition gone. A tele-
gram came for Roberts from the Queen, and also one
from Viceroy, expressing thorough confidence in him.
This is a great thing for him, having this support.
"Dec. 25.-Six inches of snow. Nothing much
doing; no enemy. Dundas and Nugent buried.
General talks of sending a force to burn Baba
Kushkar.
169
A GLOOMY LOOK-OUT.
"Dec. 26.-Nothing much doing. Arranged about
sending a force under Baker to Kohistan. A coffee
wala reported that he had heard it said that Daud
170
[1879.
..
Shah had corresponded with the enemy, and in the
evening Heathcote came and said another man had
told him the same. Bellew is inquiring into the mat-
ter; it looks fishy at present. Sent him another man.
Dec. 27.-Baker's brigade went off at nine,
Lockhart with it, looking very ill. Roberts went
out with him, but as I did not know of it, did not
go. Arranged for 150 yaboos to go back for our
banghy parcels. Most of the reports have come in
except MacPherson's. Dick Cunyngham is recom-
mended for the Victoria Cross; he behaved well.
POLITICAL PRISONERS.
"Dec. 28.-Captain Tucker, political officer, who
had accompanied General Gough's brigade from Gan-
damak, left Sherpur with a squadron of 12th Bengal
Cavalry, and reached Lataband on the 29th, report-
ing the country quiet, and communication with the
Khaibar line restored.
"Dec. 29.-Nothing much doing. Roberts pro-
posed going out to scene of cavalry disaster, so I
went. I should have thought the less he saw of this
the better. A party of cavalry and infantry under
Ross also out. We humbugged about on the snow,
and went through the city coming back. Ross got
[the bodies of] Forbes, Hardy, a lancer, and five Jats.
There are rumours of another jihad at Naorak.
"Dec. 30.-Arranged for getting the rest of the
political prisoners off, Daud Shah amongst them.
"Dec. 31.-General wrote that he wanted me to
try Daud Shah. I asked him what evidence he had,
and he told me to go to Durand and ask him. Du-
1880.]
rand produced the depositions of three men, which
went towards proving he had been in communication
with the enemy. There are rumours that we are to be
attacked again, and I must speak to him to-morrow
about getting the defences put in better order. How
all this will end I do not know; there is no doubt a
very strong feeling of hostility against us, which all
this indiscriminate hanging and burning villages in-
tensifies. In fact we have not got a single friend
in the country. He is sending Ross out with a
squadron of his regiment, 4th Ghurkhas, and some
sappers to burn the village of Baghwana.
C
go
"Jan. 1.-Gave orders for the 14th and 12th to
down to Gandamak. I wrote a despatch giving
the true account of my retaking the guns.
Our
losses have been over 350 killed and wounded, and
the Ministry is sure to make capital out of it.
"Jan. 2.-The Highlanders made a hideous row
on New-Year's night for two hours. They came
and drew the general. Heard a capital story. A
Scotch sergeant was asked who was first up the hill,
said, 'Weel, I was so beesy slaughtering o' thae
deels that I could not weel see who was first.' To-
day all Gough's brigade went into the Bala Hisar.
Told general about Sergeant MacDonald of the 72d,
who behaved very well on the 12th and 13th. Hope
to get him a commission. There will be three V.C.'s
for this business-Hammond, Vousden, and, I am
glad to say, Dick Cunyngham, 92d.
"Jan. 3.-Did a good spell of work.
THREE V.C.'S.
171
Got off
172
[1880.
twenty letters and telegrams. In the evening Ro-
berts sent to say he wanted me to go to Jalalabad.
I will try and work up the Laghman business sharp.
Perhaps another bit of luck for me.
A MILD CIRCULAR.
"Jan. 4.-Went over to Roberts to talk about
going to Jalalabad. He put me off till three, and
then said I was to go, and he gave me some notes.
I do not see what good my going will do. Telegram
from Queen thanking the general for his glorious vic-
tory, and one from Viceroy also complimentary. I
think his sending me shows he has confidence in me.
I think I shall go on to Peshawar, and report on the
whole line. Have telegraphed to Kennedy to recom-
mend him as Director of Transport to the 1st Divi-
sion also recommend Bromhead for 2d Division.
6
"Jan. 5.-Read a mild circular from the military
department about the situation which says,- We
have 7500 effectives, and 2500 can easily hold
Sherpur, so that we have a division of 5000 men for
offensive operations.' This is all humbug. We had
not 5000 effectives, and this place requires at least
7500 men really to hold it, which makes all the dif-
ference. I do not want to stay long, and shall try
to be back in ten days. I am going on a wild-goose
chase, and, moreover, it is Gough's work, not mine.
"Jan. 6.-Left Sherpur about 10.30,¹ and rode
1 On 6th January 1000 spare transport animals at Kabal were sent
to India (and to work on Khaibar line) with a convoy of sick and
wounded. Colonel MacGregor accompanied this convoy to meet
General Bright and confer with him on the disposition of the troops
from Jamrud to Lataband.
1880.]
mot.
out to Butkhak. Found Cotton of the 9th, and Wil-
Told latter to go into infantry fort. He did
not seem to like it, but I persisted. Told them to
knock down all walls on the top of the roofs; also
ordered the banquette to be completed all round.
Had tiffin, and then went on, and found the road
quite quiet to Lataband. Here 3d Sikhs and 24th
Panjab Infantry. Saw Norman and Money.
66
Jan. 7.-Got my things off at seven, but did not
go myself till ten. The road over the Kotal Mulla
Umar is much improved, and I got over without
much difficulty. I think it would be a better place
to have the post over the pass. The road up to
top of Lataband is very easy, and I should doubt
snow lying much on it, as it is quite exposed to the
sun. The road down is, on the whole, easy, but re-
quires clearing of stones. There is one bad bit, so I
telegraphed to general to let the sappers remain and
make it under Blair. Got down to Seh Baba about
12.30. Found my traps had not arrived, so pottered
about and waited, and had lunch with Armstrong.
The position of Seh Baba is not a good one, but I
do not see how it can be helped. At three, as no
signs of my traps, determined to go on. The road
goes up and down, but is quite easy
and open. Got
in about dark to Jagdalak. Acton put me up, and
I dined with 51st detachment. They gave me a
dhoolie and lots of hospital blankets.
"Jan. 8.-Met Douglas, whom I had not seen
since Bareilly. At eleven, went on with party of
DOWN THE LINE.
173
G
[1880.
1
my old regiment; road very easy, the whole way to
Pezwan. The Jagdalak Kotal is a bad position."
From 8th to 11th January lost.
"Jan. 11.-Sent a long telegram about the Lagh-
man business, and asked if I was to return; no
answer came. A telegram came from Quartermaster-
General about disposition, which I will answer with
Bright to-morrow.
"Jan. 12.-Still at Jalalabad, settling business
with Bright.
"Jan. 13.-Got off about eleven, with Dutton
and Low. Rode to Rozabad. Chose a site for a
new post under a hill to the left of road, about one
and a half mile on, then on to Gandamak with Low.
Arrived about five; dined with the 10th. During
dinner got a telegram from general to say I was to
go to Landi Kotal and see about the Mohmands.
66
Jan. 14.-Started at 8.30, and got on to Jalala-
bad at twelve. Found that 5000 Mohmands had
crossed river, so went on to Barikab. Wanted to
have gone on to Landi Kotal, where I should have
got about eight, and been in time to go with Doran.
"Jan. 15.-Rode to Basawal, and had breakfast
with 17th, then on to Daka. Found firing had
commenced, so went into fort, and sent off a tele-
gram; then went and joined Boisragon. Found
Stewart first, then Boisragon; found he had already
sent his infantry at the Gara hill, a very steep, diffi-
cult hill, which it ought to have been impossible for
19th January, Colonel MacGregor arrived at Jalalabad.
174
JALALABAD.
Suk
1880.7
them to take. Was of opinion that he had no busi-
ness to have pushed his attack; however, by two he
had taken it. Then he went over the hill with the
support, and got out of communication with Young.
For a couple of hours did not know where he was,
and talked of going back. However, some one
called out that they saw our troops down the bank
of the river; so went down. Then, about 4.30,
heard Doran's guns begin; but it was too late, the
enemy had gone; so having seen they were in com-
munication with each other, left and went back.
"Jan. 16.-Meant to have gone down to Kam
Daka, but did not. Sent telegrams to Roberts.
About four Stewart came back, and said they were
all asleep; so determined to go next day.
"Jan. 17.-Went to Kam Daka. Found Bois-
ragon had begun crossing, and Doran nowhere.
Sent him a note, and he came back. Dissuaded
him from going to Polosi,¹ for reasons given in my
telegram to general, which, I hope, will be deemed
satisfactory. Then came back.
"Jan. 18.- Battye left.
Nice boy; shall do
something for him. Rode to Basawal; met the sick
convoy coming down. Saw Bellew, Clarke, Fergus-
son, &c.; then went on to Carabinier's mess.
KAM DAKA.
175
"Jan. 19.-Before I was up Bellew came and
said good-bye. So went out and talked to him,
then went to look at two men killed last night by
1
¹ Polosi, a village on left bank of Kabal river, fifteen miles below
Fort Daka, where the Mohmands had assembled.
176
[1880.
our patrols while cutting the wire; one was a very
fine lad. Then walked down with Fergusson to his
dhoolie. Poor fellow, he has had a very nasty wound;
one eye taken out and nose smashed. Then home
to breakfast. Went off about 10.30, and rode
quietly. Came on two engineers, Lindley and Dar-
ling. Got on; put my bed down in corner of tent.
"Jan. 20.-Had to wait a devil of a time for
breakfast, but got off at 11.4, and rode into Jalala-
bad in three hours. Lunched with Bright, read
telegrams, and thought over answer to Roberts.
Dined with Bright. The 10th, 12th, 14th go to
Peshawar. I will try and get the 12th sent back
to India.
A WOUNDED OFFICER.
"Jan. 21.-Wrote a long telegram to Roberts,
and a letter also, saying I thought that the whole of
Bright's Division should be ready to move to Kabal.
I believe I am right; but he will not like it, so I
wrote to Johnson also to give him my views. The
home papers evidently think we are in a hat, and
call us the glorious 5000. Telegraphed in evening,
and told him the Laghman expedition could move
on 27th. I hope general will not order me to go
with Bright to Laghman. I think it is very likely.
(Wrote to Viva.) There is another row coming on.
I only hope I will get through it as safely as I did
the last.
"Gandamak, Jan. 22.-Telegraphed to Quarter-
master-General to send up 1-8 R.A. Do not suppose
he will. Rode to Gandamak. Very cold ride from
1880.]
Fort Battye.
Got in at five. My baggage only
one and a half mile behind. A very good Hazara
muleteer. Shall try and get him as private servant.
"Pezwan, Jan. 23.1-Started about 10.30, and
had an easy ride to Pezwan. On way looked at a
position at Surkhab, which I think is better than
Pezwan. Got in about 1.30. Met Spragge and a
lot of the old fellows. Got off again, and rode to
Jagdalak Kotal, which seems a very bad position.
Shall report it. Found Nugent there. Then to
Jagdalak Fort. Got in before dark.
Armstrong
THE PARI DARA PASS.
177
.
put me up.
Found Gore Langton arrived.
Jagdalak Fort, Jan. 24.-Went to Seh Baba,
through the Pari Dara Pass. It is very grand and
narrow, but not a bit strong, as the heights above
it can be easily crowned, and it can be turned. At
Sang Toda met Burlton coming down. From here a
fine view of the hills of Tagao and Hindu Kush.
On to Barikhab, where met Blair. We went and had
a look at a place for a post; found it quite unsuited;
then on to Seh Baba. Put up with Blair, and dined
with the Sappers.
"Lataband, Jan. 25. After breakfast started
for Lataband. Blair came to top of first kotal, and
1 "Of Colonel C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., who has held
the important post of Deputy Adjutant-General and Deputy Quarter-
master-General, I cannot speak too highly. I have already referred
to the prominent part which he bore in the recovery of our guns on
the 11th December, and I take the opportunity of recording the admira-
ble manner in which he has discharged the responsible duties attached
to his office."-General Roberts's despatch, dated 23d January.
VOL. II.
M
178
[1880.
we found the road good enough, with a little easing
here and there at a bend, and clearing of stones,
wanted. Perkins got Roberts to send Blair an order
to make it 4 in 100, which would make it twenty-
six miles long, and with no encamping-place between.
The road is quite practicable all the way until you
come to Perkins's road, where it is not so, owing to
the sharpness of the turns. Got into Lataband for
lunch. Slept in 24th office-tent, on the ground, on
a bhusa mattress.
LATABAND.
66
Lataband, Jan. 26.-Sat kicking my heels till
Roberts came, which he did at 11.15, having ridden
out very smartly in three and a quarter hours. He
looked about him a bit, and spoke to Norman, and
we got off at one, and rode into Butkhak. Here we
looked at both forts, and then on, getting in well
before dark.
"Sherpur, Jan. 27.-Am very glad to get back.
Wrote all my letters. Nothing doing. General told
me he would recommend me for rank of brigadier-
general. Morty has to go away on appointment as
under-secretary. He will be a loss."
"Sherpur, Jan. 29.-Went to general to talk
about defence schemes, and he rather shut me up.
He does not realise the necessity for a large force
even now; and when that devil, Mahamad Jan,
comes again, as he will, we may be shut up again,
and the fear is lest some rash undertaking may give
him a chance. I am beginning to think the rising
this time will be worse.
1880.]
INSPECTING DEFENCES.
179
"Sherpur, Jan. 30.-Heard that Griffin is com-
ing up as chief political. I must write to Lyall in
answer to his letter about the executions.
"Jan. 31.-Went with general round the defences.
They are very much stronger than they were before;
then to Siah-Sang and Bala Hisar, up to top of Sher
Darwaza. Brab 1 walked up from bottom in forty-
three minutes. I shall go and see what time I take
to walk it in, and shall take a witness.
[Extract. "Colonel C. M. MacGregor, a particularly
energetic, intelligent, and gallant officer. Of great
war experience, and eminently well-fitted for his pre-
sent high post on the Staff, or for an independent
command in the field."-General Roberts's Confiden-
tial Report of Jan. 31st.]
"Feb. 1-9.-The Queen's speech came. Very vague,
but, on the whole, it does not look like going back.”
"Feb. 13.-Explained to Roberts the true nature
of the case about the river-road, which Bright is
always telegraphing about. He wants to begin by
the southern road, and then go on by the river. I
say, take one or the other; however, this is all fully
explained in my telegram. Spoke to Roberts about
getting a clear programme of what is going to be
done out of Government; but he said it did not mat-
ter, as whatever they settled would be sure to be up-
set. I think we are now in for marching about more
or less all the summer; one thing will be, that it
will always be pretty cool in the shade. It will be
1 Lieutenant J. P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major of Cavalry.
""
180
SENDING AWAY WOUNDED.
[1880.
slow, but we shall see a lot of country. I would
rather be out of it, only, of course, it will never do
for me to go before it is all over.
Went and
lunched with Baker, to talk over starting some
mounted infantry. He agrees that it is quite feas-
ible, and I think it will be a great thing, as I do not
much believe in cavalry. They are all very well
against a running enemy, who would not fight, but
against an enemy who will stand up to them they
get as good as they give. I think White¹ would be
the man to give it to, with young Hughes and one
or two others.
،،
Feb. 14.-Heard Tytler died at Thal. This
leaves a brigade vacant.
C6
Feb. 15.-Wrote to general, and asked him to
back me up for a brigade. He wrote back that Jen-
kins would get the brigade, as I was in a very much
higher position, and had better stick to it, and he
would get me rank of brigadier-general.
"Feb. 16.-Went to see the first batch of wounded
go. Roberts walked round. . . . I should have been
glad if he had made them a little speech, and said he
was sorry to lose them, and hoped they would get all
right soon, &c. In the afternoon we went down to
see some men of 72d and 5th Panjab Infantry equip-
ped as mounted infantry. We generally agreed that
the 72d turn-out was the best, and I am to write out
instructions to-morrow for every one.
"Feb. 17.-Nothing much doing. Hyat came
1 Major White, 92d Highlanders.
1880.]
and had a talk. Griffin is bringing up five British
and four native officers with him. Hyat does not
like the idea of his coming. I suppose Griffin knows
too much about him. General is doing all he can to
get the Ghazni people in, and has sent the mustaufi
to Wardak on some such mission. He is also anxious
to get Abdul Rahman in. He is playing rather a
risky game, and, I think, perhaps is going in for a
grand political coup, to enable the Government to
extricate itself from its entanglement.
66
Feb. 18.-The general received the Adjutant-
General's letter regarding
,,
"Feb. 24.-Engaged all day about transport
questions. Also got ready a draft order about
mounted infantry, which we will send down to the
Chief in a day or two. I mentioned my wanting
to get a brigade. I would like awfully to get one.
From this to 14th March did not write any
journal. Nothing doing but what is shown in the
letter-books."
(6
MISSION TO WARDAK.
181
'
"Sunday, March 14.-Went to see Battye in
Upper Bala Hisar. Capital quarters: high, breezy,
Met Molloy and Sim there. Rode the
fine view.
mare.
"March 15.-Went to inspect 3d Bengal Cavalry.
In good order. Very weak; only 200 on parade.
In afternoon, went with Lockhart to Siah-Sang to
choose site for 24th and 45th camp.
"March 16.-Went with Roberts to Asmai. Good
tug up. Was rather beaten.
Was rather beaten. Perkins has made a
182
[1880.
hideous mess of the whole thing. The fort does not
command the critical point, and the road up is com-
manded the whole way by the city. I warned
Roberts of this. Sent out two strong pickets—one
to Takht-i-Shah, one to Paiminar. Also sent Smith
up to make panorama from the top; he brought part
of it. It will be good.
(6
March 17.-At 1.30, went to top of Takht
Shah. Rode to the ziarat of Khoja Khidari, round
the east face of Bala Hisar, after passing which the
road goes through a very large graveyard, but with-
out any monument of mark. From the ziarat I
walked up, taking exact fifty minutes; but as I
walked slowly, I did not lose my breath, nor was
I half so pumped as on going up Asmai. The posi-
tion of Takht-i-Shah is one of enormous natural
strength, and with very little trouble could have
been made impregnable. In fact, with their numbers
it ought to have been impregnable; but the fact is
they did not fight at all. It was the same at Asmai,
and also, I think, at Charasia. Money was sent
at it with too few men.'
"March 20.-Roberts showed me a telegram up-
setting all the new organisation. I suppose Vice-
roy has done this on telegram from Roberts. I
worked him up to send telegrams to Johnson, pro-
testing against being interfered with. In the even-
ing we rode up to Siah-Sang to see 24th and 45th,
both good regiments, and old friends of mine.
"March 21.-Nothing doing as usual. Rode
ENVIRONS OF KABAL.
""
1
1880.]
could be made
along Bimaru ridge to see if a post
by which we could keep hold of it. Found it could
be made; but it would be risky keeping posts out
there, unless you had a movable column of at least
a brigade. Then on to Siah - Sang: found there
was ample room to encamp a division. Then had
a talk with Armstrong.
MAHAMAD JAN MOVING.
183
"March 22.-Nothing done. Rode out to Pai-
minar Kotal across the swamp, about four miles.
There is a fine view into the next valley, which is
a large plain eight miles across, and quite level and
cultivable, but very little cultivated. There is
another similar low ridge beyond, and then another
plain. All these drain north.
"March 23.-News come to say that Mahamad
Jan was going to proceed from Gumaran to Tezin,
and attack the posts on road. The Gandamak
movable column was ordered up, a wing 28th, and
two guns out to Lataband. I do hope they will
not attack, as that will keep this going. Roberts
went out with Griffin to Chardeh: I did not go.
They are kicking up a great row about the hangings.
I see a notice of Grant Duff having asked a ques-
tion in the House of Commons about my paper on
Armenia.1
"March 24.-Griffin called.
Must go and call
on him to-morrow. Rode mare; she tried to buck
at starting. Gave her a
Gave her a good gallop down to the
lake.
1 See ante, p. 40.
184
GRAND PARADE.
[1880.
"March 25.-Committee on equipment-Arm-
strong, Lockhart, White, Craster, Bushman, Swinley,
MacKenzie, Combe. Told them to go and make
out lists of equipment, and when ready let me have
it. Bright proposed sending expedition against
Hisarak.
W
"March 26.-Telegram from Bright to say that
excitement was settling down, owing to report
of Mahamad Jan's defeat.
defeat. Dined with Griffin.
General Baker, Lyall, Tweedie, Brownlow, and all
the following there. Tomorrow we go out to
Charasia.
"March 27.-Rode out with general to beyond
Charasia; infernally hot. Rode back quietly
with Brownlow. As we were trotting, the whole
bit came out of the mare's mouth, but luckily she
stopped.
"March 28.-I have altogether neglected my
account of the campaign. My tent has arrived.
Also got a box of cartridges, which has been on the
road since September.
"March 29.-Grand parade. Not very good.
9th Lancers looked smart; Guides Cavalry service-
able; 92d grand; 23d Pioneers, 72d, 67th, 9th,
and 4th Ghurkhas good; cavalry and Horse Artil-
lery gallop past very bad. Gough clubbed his
brigade. General sent for Hensman,¹ and showed
him Harrison's new article on the hangings."
"March 31.-Sent off my horses. Rode with
1 'Pioneer' correspondent.
1880.]
general to Siah-Sang. Did nothing, so came home.
Dined at home.'
PARTITION OF AFGHANISTAN.
185
P
At this juncture of affairs the British Government
were anxious to find without delay some native
authority to whom they could restore Northern
Afghanistan, without risk of anarchy taking place,
on the evacuation of Kabal during the ensuing au-
tumn; but there seemed little prospect of finding in
the country any man strong enough for this purpose.
Mr Lepel Griffin's instructions were at this time to
divide Afghanistan as follows: to hand over Herat
to Persia, and to separate Western and Southern
Afghanistan from Northern and Eastern Afghanistan.
The Government proposed to hand over Northern
and Eastern Afghanistan-i.e., Turkistan and Kabal
cum Jalalabad-to any strong ruler that could be
found; and Mr Lepel Griffin's attention was now
directed towards Abdul Rahman, who had recently
defeated the Mir Shahzada Hasan, his rival, in
Badakshan, and thereby acquired prestige in the
country.
.
186
(C
CHAPTER V.
ABDUL RAHMA N.
1880.
They waited but a leader, and they found
One to their cause inseparably bound."
WHO IS ΤΟ RULE AFGHANISTAN ?
APPROACH OF KANDAHAR
COLUMN-A DARBAR-ABDUL RAHMAN'S PROSPECTS-BATTLE OF
AHMED KHEL SIR
SIR DONALD STEWART'S VICTORY—FIGHT AT
SHALEZ ARRIVAL OF THE FORCE FROM KANDAHAR-A LARGE
ARMY-LORD RIPON'S ADVENT—BABAR'S TOMB
YAKUB ?—THE MUSTAUFT'S INTRIGUES
P
- AYUB OR
RIDES NEAR KABAL
AN AFGHAN GARDEN-PARTY-MISSION TO ABDUL RAHMAN-
YAKUB'S DEPOSITION DISCUSSED THE AFGHAN QUESTION
ROBERTS'S FORTITUDE THE SITUATION ANCIENT COINS-DIVI-
SION OF AFGHANISTAN PROPOSED-A A DILEMMA GORDON'S
RESIGNATION-MORE GATHERINGS-ANNEXATION-SUPPLIES
Add
Making
plakp
THE PAI MINAR-RETIREMENT OF THE BRITISH CONTEMPLATED
PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE RECOGNITION OF ABDUL
RAHMAN AS AMIR.
"April 1.-Rode out to Lataband with Roberts.
Of course he went galloping over the stones. I hope
I have not screwed my big horse.
Griffin, Baker,
Rode very hard.
and a whole lot came out with us.
Did not see an enemy. Many tents about, showing
1880.]
the tribes are coming back early. Found the heights
Found the 30th with
crowned. Got in about 4.30.
a good band.
66
ABDUL RAHMAN.
187
66
April 2.—Up at 5.30. Selected a horse which
turned out the worst of the lot,-an awful brute,
who would not walk a step. Had some breakfast,
and off at 6.30. Rode over Lataband road; steepish,
but good. Got into Seh Baba about 8.45. Then
we went round the works, which are quite strong
enough against these devils; then had some breakfast
with 22d. Got off about eleven. Bridges lent me
a pony, which I rode up to the caves,' then got on
the one Lyall rode. Got back to Lataband at one.
Found the 30th drawn up-a very smart, clean, good-
looking regiment; then had more breakfast with
28th. Off at two on big waler. Roberts, as usual,
galloping over stones regardless of road. Thought
my horse going queer. However, got on at four.
Changed to mare. Got to Logar Bridge. Changed
to pony, put bit on him, and he went much better.
He is very good. Got on about 5.30.
66
'April 3.—Old Nakhshband came and said no one
could govern Kabal unless assisted by us, not even
Dost Mahamad. He said Abdul Rahman was trust-
worthy; also, that if we tried to go out of this with-
out hammering these fellows, we should be followed
up the whole way.
April 4.-General went to show me a site for
transport, which was where I always meant them
1 Caves at Barikhab.
188
[1880.
to be; then he said good-bye to Morgan's bat-
tery; then home.
<<
SIR DONALD STEWART.
April 5.-The mustaufi came in. He has not
brought back any terms, and Mahamad Jan's lot say
they will fight if we do not do what they want us
to. Went up with Lockhart, Kennedy, and Kinloch
to select sites; found that there was lots of room.
Told Low to move his transport as much up the hill
as possible. Saw the cavalry-ground; it was good,
not very dry, but if the fields are cut it will do.
"April 6-Had committee on equipment settled
pretty well-the British part. We had Bushman,
Craster, White, and Combe, who will do very well
for secretary-all good men. Sent a long telegram
to Sir Donald Stewart by order of Quartermaster-
General. I should not wonder if this shows that Sir
Donald is going to be put in command.
"April 7.-Went at four to see Perkins's Engineer
park. Sixty animals, already very well trained, only
the saddles are not sufficiently stuffed. It is very
complete. A very useful body of men might be
raised of such men, one man to each mule, and to
work also. Altogether it was very good. Then to
see some ground for the cavalry camp, which Gough
wanted; found it a great deal too much exposed,
so general did not agree to it.
<<
April 8.—I said yesterday that surely a doctor
would say the site was objectionable on health
grounds, and sure enough a letter came to-day to
that effect. Showed it to Roberts, and was de-
1880.]
lighted to hear him say, 'Tell him to go and be
d——————d.'
66
189
APPROACH OF KANDAHAR COLUMN.
April 9.-Went to look at 17th Bengal Cavalry.
Very bad in every way; very hot. Fearful lot of
midges. In afternoon went to Bala Hisar. Tele-
gram came from Sir Donald Stewart to say he
wanted a force to be at Shekhabad on 20th. We
arranged for Gough's brigade, with Guides and
Pioneers. One squadron 9th, two squadrons 3d
Bengal Cavalry to march on the 12th to 15th. If
things are quiet, we will go with this force, and
get to Shekhabad on the 20th, move on 21st and
22d, and meet Stewart on that day."
66
April 11.-Got photos of Cavagnari, Hamilton,
and Jenkyns; very good. Agreed to go and be
photographed on my horse by Bourke; hope he will
make a good one. In the Quartermaster-General's
group
I have come out scowling. I wrote to Greaves,
asking that if Stewart was to command the whole
force, I might be transferred as his Chief of the Staff.
My new horse came; he is a fine horse, but has a
bad head, and is poor in condition. I hope he is
quiet, and does not buck-jump.
"April 12.-Went out to see the screw-guns; one
of them stuck from dust, which is just what I said
they would. Arranged for force under Ross to go
out,2 and Guides to stay.
1 Major Graham's battery of 7-pounder mountain-guns, which are
in two pieces, and screwed together by the trunnion-ring.
2 A force sent out to meet Sir Donald Stewart's column en route
from Kandahar.
190
[1880.
"April 13.-Went with Jenkins and Smith to
Asmai. X — remained on a hill under cover more
than a mile from the fight, and he is therefore
primarily responsible for the loss of the guns, and
not poor Clarke, who died of a broken heart. The
conical hill is not a very good position, still they
should have held on to it longer. Then went up
Asmai, a very steep nasty hill to take, and no doubt
assaulted at the wrong point. Jenkins went at it,
not enveloping and turning them. They should
have gone at it from Deh Afghan side. It was a
bad business altogether. On the top met P
who glared at us and said, 'Have you come to take
stock?' The Asmai fort is the most ridiculous un-
necessary piece of work I ever saw, walls five feet
thick. It would be ridiculous, if it were not la-
mentable. At four went to a darbar, where were
all the scoundrels who have been fighting against
us. Roberts made a short speech, which the kazi
translated well; then Griffin came on, like a tenor,
and read out a speech in Persian, and mispronounced
every word. I do not suppose they understood a
single word. I have not seen the speech in English;
it was not bad, and the Persian was good, but all
spoilt by Griffin's absurd manner and vile
pronun-
ciation.
.
A DARBAR.
"
My
"April 14.-Went with White and Smith to see
scene of the fight on the 13th December; told Smith
what pictures I wanted. Came back and went in to
MAHAMAD JAN'S PARTY.
1880.]
see 3d Panjab Cavalry; it is an Al regiment all round,
beautifully mounted. Then went on to the 3d Ben-
gal Cavalry, and got Mackenzie to make me a dodge
for my chain bridle. He also showed me a mess-tin
he had had made for native cavalry, a very good
plan, with iron top for a taron, and a copper bottom,
and a very dodgy handle, making a spoon also. I
do not see why native troops should not have these
things as well as British. Rode round with Jimmy
Hills to see all the block-houses; came to the con-
clusion you ought not to have less than 600 men on
Bimaru, and not less than four and a half regiments
for Sherpur, Asmai, and Siah-Sang. Have got to
like Hills much; he is a very sensible man, and I
have a high opinion of him.
opinion of him. We laughed about
Griffin's speech; it was a most ludicrous oration,
and our enemies must have laughed. Asked old
Nakhshband, and he said he approved of it. It is
evident, I think, that Mahamad Jan's party is break-
ing up, and that all are looking to Abdul Rahman.
I expect he will come with a good following, and we
shall have more fighting. I would rather we did
not; but if I was sure of getting off, or only getting
a slight wound, I would not mind, as every shot
that is fired makes me more sure of my promotion.
By the way, I have a bet of a dinner with Dutton I
am not made a K.C.B.
191
46
Sherpur, April 15.-Did not go to the parade
of 9th Lancers, as I wanted to work my table off.
[1880.
Got through everything. Telegram from Bright
said that Palmer of Commissariat had been killed,¹
and Captains Hamilton, R.A., and Nugent (51st
Foot) wounded, in a reconnaissance to the Awazan-
gani gorge.
Went over to Griffin; he was very
civil. Took my new horse out; do not like him;
he is ugly but good; has a bad cold. After dinner
Roberts sent for me. He had heard they were going
to fight in Maidan, and wanted Ross to leave his
heavy baggage behind; however, he determined not,
and we are to ride out to Ross's camp to-morrow
and settle then. I think it all looks as if they were
going to fight again. I only hope it will be over
soon, and we shall get away. I am most heartily
sick of this, but I would like to get a brigade before
I went. I think if there is more fighting I shall get
it, but not unless. Read Colonel Grodekoff's journey
through Afghanistan; he seems to be a determined
man, and to know how to treat those hogs of Afghans.
It is being translated in the 'Pioneer.' Hope we shall
get some more guns off to-morrow.
"Kala Kazi, April 16.-Telegram from Bright
to say he had returned to Pezwan, and was followed
the whole way-not a good business. Got my traps.
ready, but did not get off till two, and Roberts
would not start till nearly four. Then we rode out
by Aoshar, and a devil of a long way round to Deh
Bon, when we got on to the Ghazni road. Passed
192
COLONEL GRODEKOFF'S WORK.
I
1 Expedition to Hisarak valley under General Bright, 11th to 14th
April, from Pezwan.
1880.]
place where we first came up, and where I sent the
order to charge; it was right across the Ghazni
road. Got in about six or after.
We are to go
back to-morrow. Hills is going on to Ghazni; I
wish I was. Griffin is very civil to me. Perhaps
he could help me to go to Herat, then I might get
on to Merv.
66
April 17.-Returned to Sherpur. Roberts sent
Sherston to say he was going out on Monday."
"April 19.-Went over to see Griffin; told him
about Mazulla Khan having property in Charasia.
He immediately wrote to Wali Mahamad to send him
a list of all property in Kabal belonging to Mazulla,
and he says he thinks it will get to Mazulla's ears,
and he will come in; this is sharp. Griffin also said
he did not see why a native should not go to Hazara.
I must try and get him to send one, then we might
go on and take Herat. I shall try to work it.
LEPEL GRIFFIN.
66
193
1
April 20.-Ross sent in a letter to say that he
had sent out reconnaissances in every direction-one
of which, under Dutton, had been fired on-and that
he was going to halt to get in supplies. He ought
to have done that on the 19th by simply requisition-
ing the inhabitants.
66
April 21.-Roberts is all right again; he says
Lord Lytton has been asked by the Queen to stay
on till this is all over, so that Roberts is all right.
"April 22.-Went to see Griffin, who showed me
a copy of a letter from Abdul Rahman in reply to a
1 Mazulla Khan, chief of Ghilzais, in Hisarak.
VOL. II.
N
194
BATTLE AT AHMAD KHEL.
[1880.
question as to his intentions; it is very diplomati-
cally worded, and says¹ that he thinks Afghanistan
cannot fight either of such empires as Russia or
England, and therefore they had both better leave
her alone. He then talked about going with 500
cavalry to meet Abdul Rahman at Charikar-a mad
idea, which I do not imagine he really means. A
report has come that Stewart has had a desperate
fight near Karabagh, in which both sides went in,
sword in hand, and we were beaten I hope it is
!
not truc, else we shall have it hot soon. Also
rumours about fighting with Ross at Top. The
next few days will tell us what will happen.
"April 23.-News has come that Stewart had a
good fight near Nani, where 15,000 of the enemy
were in position. He went at them, and 3000
Ghazis came down sword in hand; they were utterly
routed, and lost 200. We lost 17 killed and 124
wounded, amongst them Young, 19th, and Corbett,
Royal Horse Artillery. This is a very good busi-
ness, so Roberts ordered a salute to be fired. To-day
1 Dated 15th April 1880: "Now therefore that you seek to learn
my hopes and wishes, they are these: That as long as your empire
and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribesmen of Afghan-
istan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States
should find us true and faithful; and that we should rest at peace
between them. For my tribesmen are unable to struggle with
empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your
friendship that, sympathising with and assisting the people of Afghan-
istan, you will place them under the protection of the two Powers.
This would redound to the credit of both, and give peace to Afghan-
istan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my wish. For
the rest, it is yours to decide."
4.
1880.]
Roberts told me Stewart was coming here to take
command, and he supposed I would go to him. I
expressed surprise; he said that he was sorry we
were not going to see it out together.
66
April 24.—A letter from Stewart describing his
action on 19th.¹ Says some of the regiments did
not behave well, but the 2d Sikhs and cavalry did.
Young is cut to pieces almost, Corbett badly wounded.
He must have had 59th, 15th, and 25th with him;
however, they licked them well, and nothing was
heard of any gathering near. He marches to meet
Ross to-day.
FIGHT AT SHALEZ.
CC
195
April 25.-About eight got a telegram from
Jenkins at Saiadabad, in which he says he is being
attacked. General sent out wing 92d, Guides, four
horse-artillery guns under MacPherson, and the most
of the movable column under Gough. Jenkins held
his ground till MacPherson came up, and then they
attacked and drove them back, killing over 100.
Our loss, four killed, thirty-four wounded, and
about twenty-five horses, no officers. [This affair
was the second action at Charasia.]2
"Stewart had another fight,3 six miles south-east
1 On the 19th April General Stewart's division, marching from
Kandahar towards Kabal, encountered an Afghan force of 1000 horse
and 13,000 foot at Ahmad Khel, twenty-three miles south of Ghazni.
Stewart's troops numbered 3000 rifles, 350 lances, 700 sabres, and
22 guns.
2 The principal standard of the enemy was captured by the 2d
Ghurkhas.
3 Affair at Shalez and Arzu-British casualties, two rank and file
killed, eight wounded.
196
[1880.
Ghazni, on 23d April, against 6000 Ghilzais. Licked
them-slight loss; enemy 400. Leaves Ghazni on
25th, leaving no one in it at all-a most extraordi-
nary proceeding.
"Ross sent out 100 Sappers, two companies
Ghurkhas, to make roads; they were surrounded
by 1000 of enemy from Langar under Abdul Gha-
fur,¹ and he had to send reinforcements, as usual
with us. Roberts sending out detachments, and only
one brigade left here; luckily all ended well.
'April 26.-Went to the hospital in Bala Hisar :
got a ducking. Report that they are going to attack
Butkhak or Lataband; telegraphed to warn them.
General has ordered 200 men out to former: no
use.
MORE FIGHTING.
،،
April 27.-Reports say enemy lost heavily in
fight; good thing for Jenkins.
66
April 28.-News that Ross had had a big fight,
and had beaten them with loss of 1200: this is
good; it will all add to the importance of the war.
I can perhaps get made Chief of the Staff to Stewart.
Roberts went out to Butkhak; I did not go.
"April 29.-Letter from Ross to say he had a
little fight under Rowcroft-only a small affair.
Griffin, however, says that they had another fight
on Monday. He also says that Mir Bachha 2 will be
in to-night. It is great rot having these fellows in
like this: they all want thrashing first.
1 Abdul Ghafur, Akhunzada, of Langar.
2 Mir Bachha, a Kohistani of Koh Daman.
1880.
،،
6
April 30.-In the afternoon Roberts sent me,
by Kennedy, an article in Englishman,' saying that
I 'deserved no credit for recovering the guns.' I
think the best thing I can do is to take no notice
of it. Lockhart's information is to the effect that
Mahamad Jan is turning his attention to cutting off
supplies for Ross. This is no doubt the game they
should play, and if they did this persistently, they
would trouble us very much.
66
ARRIVAL OF KANDAHAR FORCE.
197
May 1.-Rode out to village Ghulam Haidar;
jolly ride, valley lovely; found camp in splendid.
position. Found Sir Donald Stewart in a garden,
where a tent had been pitched. Major E. F. Chap-
man, Royal Artillery, Deputy Quartermaster-General
to General Stewart's division; Major Euan Smith,
political officer. When we left, told Stewart I was
to go to him; he said he knew not. As Chappy had
been so long with him, he would rather have him,
though he would be glad to have me, and was sure
we should get on well; but he had heard I was
looking out for a command, and that Barter was
going, a splendid brigade, and I might get that.
I said I would think about it, and he said, 'Yes; we
shall have plenty of time to talk about that.' At
four we left; nice cool ride back.
Rode my new
horse; he went very well. Hills is to be recom-
mended for Stewart's division.
66
May 2. Put Stewart in orders.
May 3.-Griffin has sent a mission to Abdul
Rahman. Afzal and Ibrahim have gone. I think
66
198
[1880.
this is wrong, but perhaps he has stringent orders,
which force him to patch up a peace somehow.
66
May 4.-Asked Stewart if he had any orders
about me; said No, but had not had orders to
settle about Staff. An answer has come about him
and Griffin, to say they want him to stay, and he is
to have chief military and political control; but
they want him to leave Griffin pretty free, and only
when anything Griffin wants to do is against his
opinion, is he to interfere. Stewart is apparently
willing to stay under these circumstances, but I do
not know whether Griffin will. We call Stewart's
orders General Order'; he commands not far off
40,000 men now, and I am Chief of the Staff to the
biggest army since the Mutiny.
،،
A LARGE ARMY.
May 5.-In the afternoon we went up to Asmai,
which Perkins has turned into an impregnable post;
but the works are a great deal too costly and solid.
Shall talk to Stewart about this. We hear that Lord
Ripon is coming out at once; he has chosen the very
hottest time of the year.
66
May 6.-Stewart had a levée. It went off well
enough, though the 9th and 67th were all late.
White has been appointed Military Secretary to the
new Viceroy, and goes off at once to join. Stewart
has stopped all works, and I think he is quite
right. Now we must cut down the medical, en-
gineer, and transport staff. Telegraphed to-day to
ask Bright whether he could send back the 8th
Hussars and a battery of artillery. I think we
G
1880.]
could dispense with some native cavalry; I shall
suggest this.
66
199
RAID AT JALALABAD.
May 7.-Telegram to-day says that Gordon
Pasha is to be Private Secretary. Good selections
Gordon and White! Shows Lord Ripon is looking
out for the best men. Stewart seems particularly
shrewd, and is very above-board. He says I am
to send the daily telegrams to the Quartermaster-
General. Stewart is what I call a masterful man-
a real commander.
66
May 8.-Roberts went off with Baker's force to
Charasia [into the Logar district and Maidan, with
the object of relieving the Commissariat at Sherpur,
and of opening up roads to allow traffic and supplies
to pass freely]. A telegram come to say that 1000
cattle and 180 sheep have been raided from Jalala-
bad. Some one will, I trust, catch it for this. We
went with Stewart to Bala Hisar to see some build-
ings. He went over the hospital. He was very
pleasant, sensible, and amusing. I only hope I shall
get on with him. It rained coming back. Sir Donald
does not care for galloping.
May 9.-I rode out to Charasia with Sir Donald.
Started at 6, and rode quietly; enjoyed the ride im-
mensely through green fields with trees,-every sign
of plenty and comfort among the people. Roberts
met us at the Sang-i-Nawishta. We had breakfast
with him, pottered about, and then rode back by
Indaki. The view of the Chardeh valley from top
of the Indaki Kotal is lovely; road very good.
66
200
[1880.
Passed through Indaki; large prosperous village.
Road bad here for guns; would have to go by river-
bed. Then on, road excellent. Passed village Aghil-
Shams, and came to Babar's tomb. Enter garden
by gate ruined, then found whole garden terraced.
A road on each side sloped down centre of each
terrace. There had been a waterfall, which had come
down in a duct of marble. At head is a mosque of
marble, and the tomb is above an elaborately carved
stone of marble. The view from this is also very
fine. Both sides of road are lined with lovely yel-
low roses, and some very delicate pink-and-white
ones. Then on by right bank of river to Chandaol;
then crossed by the Pul-i-Khishti and by Asmai, and
home by made road. Found no dak in; pitched into
postmaster. Hutchinson came up, not a bit changed;
said he would be very glad to be my assistant.
Near Indaki Kotal passed a tract covered with very
beautiful yellow-tufted flowers, name unknown; ask
Collett. Had a long talk with Stewart out and
home. Great fellow to talk; think I shall get on
with him well.
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND SCOTCH.
66
May 10.-Had a lot of work; got through it
most satisfactorily. Sir Donald is a capital man of
business. He is very straightforward and Scotch.
These are always more reliable than other men,
whereas some nationalities are always untrust-
worthy.
•
May 11.-Took Stewart some papers, and got
through them satisfactorily. Went over list of staff
1880.]
ABDUL OR AYUB?
officers, and determined on extensive reductions of
staff and regiments - two brigadier-generals and
staff and two cavalry regiments. We have too much
cavalry on the line; there are 7 regiments above
the passes, which is nonsense.
May 12.-Griffin showed me letters from Lyall,
Lytton, and an official, about what was to be done
with Abdul Rahman. The gist of the instructions is
that he is to be treated well, but that no discussion
or condition is to be entered into. It remains to
be seen what will come of it. He may come, or he
may not.
If he does, and agrees, the other party
will break out; if he does not, we must kick him
out of the country. If he will not do, they talk of
Ayub; but he is more of an imbecile, if possible,
than Yakub.
66
201
66
May 13.-Went out for a ride with Kinloch.
Dined at Stewart's. I find I agree with him. For
instance, he said that if we had four corps d'armée
there would be no use for a chief-which is exactly
what I said, and they all hooted at me. I am sure
I was right, and that the military department, as
at present constituted, should be done away with.
My ideas are generally ahead of my fellows.
"May 14.-Bright has been telegraphing about
Mulla Fakir and Mulla Khalil stirring up the people.
Like Stewart more I see of him; he knows his work
very well."
(6
.
May 16.-Political, Euan Smith, went to-day.
I rode out with him; he seems a good, honest, steady
Con
}
202
[1880.
fellow. At one we rode out to a picnic at Babar's
tomb, given by Ross.
THE MUSTAUFI CAUGHT OUT.
"May 17.-Griffin sent me a paper to read, the
gist of which was that he proposed that Abdul Rah-
man should be put up, and, failing him, Ayub. Both
these are very bad selections, but there are no other.
Hashim is openly hostile, and the Wali is too weak;
but the fact is, what I have always said, that there
is no solution of the question except taking the state
over. I am glad to see Griffin goes against Kuram,
and is in favour of Jalalabad; he is quite right. He
proposes to give up Hariab valley, and take some
land round Pesh Bolak; but we should not go back
further than Jalalabad on any account whatever. It
might pay to set up the Wali here and support him;
otherwise, we must take the whole country.
J
May 18.-Had a jolly ride out through the vil-
lages and fields to the north up to the Wazirabad
lake, and another short ride in the evening. A
telegram from Johnson asks if it was understood that
the movement was to be simultaneous. This shows
we may go back soon, and as I suppose Stewart will
not stay, I certainly shall not. Some people seem
to think there will be rewards given on Queen's
birthday.
.
66
66
'May 19.-The event of the day is that the
Mustaufi, Habibulla Khan, has been found out.
Griffin got some of his letters to Mahamad Jan, and
now it is determined to send him down. If they
had only done what I told them long ago, this would
1880.]
not have happened. Made all the arrangements, and
he goes off to-morrow morning. Then Griffin told
me that Hashim Khan was going to bolt; so that
bubble has burst. It looks, indeed, as if we were
really meant to stay here. I do not much believe
in Abdul Rahman. Had a nice ride this morning
out to the village of Khoja Rawash and back; found
a capital road the whole way. These rides through
the lanes are delightful. Liddell told me a story
that a man had meant to warn him about the Bala
Hisar; will inquire to-morrow about it. There
may be powder in it still, and they may be trying
to blow it up.
INDECISION.
203
،،
May 20.-The Mustaufi went off at daybreak,
and got to Lataband at 3 P.M. A report last night
that Hashim was going to bolt turned out to be
false, or else he thought better of it. Went out for
a ride, and in the way met a man with a lot of
muskets on a pony, so I made him come with me.
He said he was Wali Mahamad's man. I told
general, Griffin, and Dutton the story about Liddell's
warning, and let Dutton suggest his looking for any
mining operations. General had a long talk with
Hashim, who said we had no friends, and that all
who had tried to be friendly were ruined. This is
quite true, and is owing to the imbecile indecision
of the Government. I saw from the first that there
were only two things to do, either to go away
directly we had destroyed the Bala Hisar, or give out
at once we meant to stay for ever. The first would
204
[1880.
have had a most excellent effect, and the second was
the best thing to do. But all the good which ac-
crued from our first rapid advance was lost by this
indecisive way of doing business.
May 21.-Had a nice ride out on the Wazirabad
'Chaman' in the morning, and a very slow one in
the evening in the direction of Khoja Rawash. Sir
Donald does not like galloping, so we walked nearly
the whole way; nothing much doing. Took up to
him the schedule for reduction of staff, and sent off
a telegram to Adjutant - General on the subject.
Two brigadier - generals are to be reduced, two
quartermaster-generals, and twelve Engineer officers,
besides some others. News came in that Gib had
had a fight near Mazina, and had beaten the enemy.
Porteous, R.A., wounded, and Noyes, 14th. They
expect to hear from Abdul Rahman to-morrow; I
hope it will be satisfactory.
..
May 22.-A telegram says, 'Gladstone hopes
speedy settlement Afghan affairs.' I hope to good-
ness we are not to stay here long.
'May 23.-Sir Donald told me Abdul Rahman had
not answered, but they had heard from our mission.
The answer is not very hopeful: it looks as if he was
going to have nothing to say to us; and he is quite
right, as it will do him no good whatever. If they
do not get him to come in, I shall try to get sent.
،،
May 24.-The news from Abdul Rahman is not
so satisfactory, and any chance of a settlement gets
further off, although Lord Ripon has orders to evac-
66
66
DISTANT HOPES OF SETTLEMENT.
1880.]
..
uate as soon as
as
a strong ruler can be found.
Mahamad Ishak, Abdul Rahman's nephew, has
written to stir up the people against us. I must
say I do not believe in any settlement short of tak-
ing the whole country, and I have always said so.
Went in the afternoon to hear 67th band; very good
one; very good regiment and colonel. It is perhaps
the best regiment here. What an infernal bore stay-
ing here is! I do so want to get away and get home.
'May 25.-Had capital rides. Griffin sent me a
letter of Abdul Rahman's to read. He does not
want to come in till he knows exactly what we
want, and I do not believe any one can tell him,
because no one knows.
66
RIDES NEAR KABAL.
May 26.-Rode out by Bala Hisar to Bini Hisar,
and then back. In going round the bay I went
smart, as I did not know the country, and might
have been fired at. I must have ridden ten miles.
In the evening rode round by Khoja Rawash (north-
east of Kabal) about eight miles. Sir Donald says
the Viceroy thinks we shall get away by July, and
as all the troops cannot stay, I do not think the
chief will; and then, of course, I shall not, and I
may get home in August after all. I must ask about
going on a mission to Kunduz.¹ I am not sure how
this will do, still, it might be worth trying.
May 27.-Rode out by Deh-i-Afghanan and Deh-
،،
205
dj
1 Kunduz one of the principal khanates of Afghan-Turkistan,
south of the Amu Daria. The chief town is about 190 miles north of
Kabal.
•
206
[1880.
i-Mazang, round the Asmai and Aliabad hills, and
back, I suppose about eight or ten miles. In the
evening went round by Wazirabad, then to the lake,
and back by Khoja Rawash, and in at the 92d
gate. Ordered Arbuthnot's column [at Jagdalak]
to march on Chiprihar,
on Chiprihar, to attack Mulla Fakir,
and then go on to Laghman by Darunta, and two
regiments to go from here to Jagdalak. Hutchinson
arrived. I do not know what there is for him to do,
but he will be able to help me about regulations.
Roberts got Morton to write to me to ask if I could
tell him anything about an order of Maude's last
year in Bazar, saying 'no prisoners were to be taken.'
I said I knew of no such order. I suppose he alludes
to an order that any one found with arms within a
mile of the Khaibar road was to be shot. By the
way, John Morice says that Hyat Khan has been
saying that 170 men were hung, and that 70 of
them were for fighting against us. By the way,
Hashim Khan has asked us all to a breakfast on the
29th, and I advised the general not to go without a
proper guard; so I have ordered 100 men of the
9th, and I will get him to take the Lancers also.
Got the general's leave to go out and see Roberts at
his camp to-morrow. Shall get old Nakhshband to
come up with me, and put him on to find out what
is up with Hashim.
with Hashim. I should not be one bit sur-
prised if they meant some infernal treachery; it
would be just like them. I hope, however, that see-
ing the guard of honour will put them off.
A NECESSARY GUARD.
1880.]
66
AN AFGHAN GARDEN-PARTY.
May 28.----Rode out by Nanachi, by the direct
road to Kala Ghulam Haidar. Country very pretty,
with splendid crops, and many people carrying pro-
duce on donkeys; altogether, an air of great plenty
and peace pervades the whole scene. None of the
men are armed, and all were polite. I doubt very
much if the people hate us, and if they were not so
worked upon by their mullas, would not perhaps be
at all disinclined to receive us. If I was made Amir
of this country, I would make friends with the
mullas, as they are the people who have the influ-
ence, and not the sardars; and when I had got them
in hand, I would begin to break their influence by
showing them up. Found Roberts looking very
well, and not careworn like he used to be here.
Every one looking better for the trip. Kennedy has
won the Derby lottery, over 5000 rupees. On ar-
rival I found a note from Griffin, that there was no
chance of anything happening, as his own people
were all about. The place for Hashim's breakfast is
changed to the Wazir's garden; but I have ordered
50 men to accompany the general. I think it is a
mistake going without a proper guard, and I have
told Sir Donald so."
207
66
May 29.-Queen's birthday parade. Afterwards.
we went to breakfast with Hashim at the Wazir
Bagh, which we were told was near Babar's tomb,
but was more than a mile off through intricate lanes.
There was one of the delightful garden-houses at the
end, with half-a-dozen magnificent plane-trees, and
208
[1880.
any amount
a stream of water down the centre. There was also a
fine double shamiana' pitched over the front of the
building, and under it were tables with
of sweets. Presently they brought in food. The
kabobs were quite good; also a kind of sausage, some
excellent lamb, and pilaos, not too greasy.
curds were good; only sherbet and tea to drink.
Afterwards they played backgammon and chess.
Ibrahim played very well. We left about one, and
The
had a hot ride home.
ABDUL RAHMAN AGAIN.
'
66
May 30.-Must have caught a chill last night,
as I have got the most infernal lumbago to-day; can
hardly move, and not at all without pain.
"May 31.-Lumbago still bad. Did nothing but
equipment committee.
"June 1.-Getting better, but cannot ride. Com-
mittee still sitting.
"June 2.-The mission sent to Abdul Rahman
returned; say they were well treated, and Abdul
Rahman would come in soon. I hope he will not,
as it will have a very bad effect to put him in, as
every one will say that it was the Russians put him
in.
Had a talk with the Nawab, who says the best
thing to do would be to bring Yakub back. I wonder
if it would; shall tell Stewart this.
"June 3.-Roberts told me he had sent to say
he wanted to leave Kabal, and nothing would in-
duce him to stay. He then tried to persuade me to
take MacPherson's brigade, but I would not see it,
and said I would think of it.'
""
to
1880.]
YAKUB'S DEPORTATION.
Mr Lyall¹
¹ left Kabal 2d April 1880. Letter to
A. C. Lyall, Esq., Kabal, June 1880:-
"You say, 'If Roberts and you and Baker had
not been in such an unnecessary hurry to deport the
wretched Yakub, these difficulties would have been
avoided.' Now, I will take you up on this point.
You mean to say that if Yakub had not been de-
ported, our subsequent political difficulties would
not have happened. In the first place, you seem to
forget the date on which he was deported-viz., 1st
of December—and that the row which broke out on
the 11th of December was brewing before he left.
If Yakub had remained here, you think there would
have been no row. I do not agree with you.
The
row did not take place because Yakub was deported,
but, first, because they thought we were going to
take the country; and, secondly, because they saw
how weak we were. Yakub's being here would not
have prevented it, but, on the contrary, would have
added to our difficulties; for he would either have
joined the enemy openly, and thus given the rising
the weight of his name, or we should have had to
quod him and his myrmidons to prevent their com-
municating with the enemy, and this would have
added greatly to the duties on our already hard-
worked troops. I do not regret Yakub having been
deported, but I do regret that Daud Shah and the Mus-
taufi were not sent away long before, for they both
1 Now Sir Alfred Lyall, K.C.B.
VOL. II.
209
O
[1880.
increased our difficulties by intriguing against us. I
forget what the phrase was which seems to have
aroused your ire, but I suppose I said your politicals
had made a mess of it. I did not mean you, or
Hastings, or Bellew, but the Foreign Office. The
cause of all the trouble was because no orders or
hint even was given to Roberts as to what was
wanted. Although a month had elapsed from the
date of the news of Cavagnari's massacre reaching
Simla to the date of our reaching Kabal, the Foreign
Office had no plan ready, and Roberts was quite in
the dark as to what was wanted or not wanted. I
suppose the real reason was because the Govern-
ment at home could not make up their minds. The
first chance we had of settling this business satis-
factorily was when we first came. If Roberts had
been told to inflict adequate punishment and come
away, we should have been back in India by No-
vember, and our name would stand far higher to-day
than it ever can now. The second chance was
when Roberts was trying to get in the Musa Jan
faction; and if he had been let alone he would have
succeeded, and would have put up Musa Jan, with
Hashim as Regent or Prime Minister. Then di-
rectly Stewart joined us, we could have gone back
and been all in quarters by end of May; but this
was knocked on the head by Griffin's arrival, and
his immediately taking up Abdul Rahman. Since
Griffin came there has been an upset of all Roberts's
arrangements, but certainly no improvement, and
210
THE AFGHAN QUESTION.
1880.]
the end will now be that we shall secure the estab-
lishment of Russian influence at Kabal, which is
what the war was undertaken to prevent. The fact
is that there never were more than two possible
satisfactory settlements: one was to have left the
country in October after having exacted retribution,
the other was to practically annex the country; but
I cannot see how Roberts can in justice be blamed
because neither of these were carried out. A general
can no more retire from an enemy's country than
he can annex it without orders, and it was the
business of the Foreign Office to see that he had the
necessary orders. Perhaps the Indian Government
may put it on to the Home Government: with this
I have nothing to do; all that concerns me is to
show that Roberts should not be held responsible
for the deadlock in the present situation. Perhaps,
though the proposed solution with Abdul Rahman
does not commend itself to my judgment, it may
turn out all right, but the future seems made up a
good deal of ifs and ands.
"I said in October the only really permanent
solution was to annex the country, and I am ten
times more of that opinion now. Nothing that will
be done now will be permanent; however, as we
have gone so far with Abdul Rahman, we may as
well finish it. As you say, whoever we put up
will have to prove himself the best man, and then
perhaps a strong Amir may emerge. It will then
be your duty to make him friendly."
PROPOSED SOLUTION.
211
ROBERTS'S ADVANCE.
[1880.
To A. C. Lyall, Esq., C.B., Secretary to the Gov-
ernment of India, Foreign Department
212
"KABAL, June 1880.
"You ask me to say what I think of the Kabal
executions, the affair, &c., and I must do so
very shortly; but I think it will be more just to all
if I give you a short review of the whole campaign.
The first point to be criticised is the advance.
Roberts was asked to undertake this, and he did so
without a moment's hesitation. I do not think
people in England have yet realised what this ad-
vance was, and I am sure they have never done it
justice; it was simply the most daring and brilliant
feat of arms that has been performed by any British
general since the Peninsular war. Before Roberts
went to Kabal with 6000 men, I believe you would
hardly have got a man in India to undertake to do
it under 20,000; and owing to the state of the
transport, he was never able to have more than this
6000 in his fighting line. I do not know another
man in the British army who would have done it;
certainly would not. And the daring energy
and persistence with which Roberts pushed his ad-
vance far more deserved a peerage than anything
that has earned it of late; and we are all
very dis-
gusted that all this time has been allowed to pass
without any reward beyond empty thanks having
been given to our general for his brilliant feat.
"Roberts has been blamed for splitting up all his
troops and leaving Sherpur undefended. It is all
:
1880.]
very fine to throw stones, but it was almost impos-
sible to get reliable information; and I certainly
think he acted for the best. Moreover, it is all very
well to talk of Musa Jan's strategy, but the fact is,
that if had not brought on the action of the
11th, the 12th would probably have seen the enemy
all bolting. On the 11th the enemy were not more
than 10,000; and if had let them alone they
would have been attacked by MacPherson not more
than two hours after, and driven back on Baker.
Musa Jan¹ had no more idea of attacking Sherpur
than London. He had failed to join the Kohistanis,
and he was in a hat. MacPherson coming from the
north, and Baker from the south, he could do nothing
but bolt to south-east, and on the 12th both Baker
and MacPherson would have been on him again;
but all this was marred by
I may mention
that we are just in the same position regarding in-
formation now that we were in December, only now
we have lots of troops, and we probably should do
very much the same thing now as we did then-
i.e., prevent a junction between the Kohistanis and
southerners with our right, and smash up the latter
with our left. I know that a good many men, on
hearing of the rising all round, would have shut
themselves up in Sherpur at once, and called for
reinforcements. Roberts did not do this; but, not
a bit disheartened, he hit out all round, and only
HITTING OUT ALL ROUND.
213
1 Musa Jan, eldest son of Yakub Khan, was proclaimed Amir by
the Wardak general Mahamad Jan.
214
[1880.
after five days' fighting went into Sherpur, and then
only telegraphed for one brigade to enable him to
retake the offensive again; and this brigade would
only have given 8000 men against 60,000. The
greatest general is he who makes the fewest mis-
takes. No general was ever free from mistakes, but
I think that the fortitude and constancy and pluck
shown by Roberts in those dark days in December
show that he is the right grit clean through.
"With regard to the Kabal executions, Roberts
has given a complete reply to the cry, and has shown
that every man was fairly tried. It is really too
disgusting that he has been attacked in this way,
after having performed such deeds as he did.
"Then as to the political management of the
business, it is all nonsense to say that Roberts is to
blame. Whatever he did was done under orders
from Simla; and when he was in a fair way of
settling it, by putting up the strong party in the
country, the Foreign Office sent up Griffin, who
immediately committed himself to Abdul Rahman;
and now we are in as pretty a hat as you can con-
ceive, and much further off a settlement than we
were in March. Abdul Rahman, no doubt, is willing
to come to our terms; but he has no party here, and
if he is put up, he will probably be kicked out in a
week after we leave, then where shall we be? We
have earned the undying hatred of the Sher Ali fac-
tion already; and if they give in, as they will without
our help, they will be new plaster materials for us to
THE SITUATION.
G
RESTORATION OF YAKUB ?
work on.
Abdul Rahman will be in our camp, or
flying back to Tashkend, and we shall not have a
single man in the country who is not our enemy;
but all this might have been avoided if they had
left Roberts alone."
1880.
215
.
"June 4.-Told Stewart my idea about Abdul
Rahman, that I was glad he was not coming in, as
it would only be said he was put in by the Russians.
He wrote to Lyall to say that the Abdul Rahman
idea had fallen through, and there was no one else
to put up, and that the best thing we could do was
to go.
I told him I would have a big darbar, and
say to all the assembled chiefs-We took up Abdul
Rahman because we thought he was the strongest
man, but that has fallen through, and now who do
you want? They would say, Yakub. I would say,
There is the doubt that he ordered the massacre of
Cavagnari. They would say, No, he did not. I
would say, We will restore him on conditions that
his sons are sent as hostages.
1
“June 5.—When I went to see general, Ibrahim
Khan was with him, so went to Roberts. He
showed me a paper he had written, in which he
made out that Kuram was a better route militarily
than Khaibar. Khaibar is far away the best road,
though, of course, if you have troops on one line up
to Peiwar, and on the other only to Peshawar, you
could get to Kabal sooner; and then above Ganda-
mak there are just as good places as the Peiwar, and
you could as easily get troops from there, in fact
|
216
WANTED, AN AMIR.
[1880.
easier. A man brought me four coins, for which he
wanted 50 rupees each. I sent them to Talbot, who
is our numismatist, and he says they are-1st, a
very small coin of Demetrius, King of Bactria and
Kabal, B.C. 200, worth about 2 rupees, probably get
it for 1 rupee; 2d, coin of Athens, probably date
about B.C. 500 to 400, extremely common in Europe,
worth about 5 rupees in London. Here they fancy
they are of immense value. 3d and 4th, coins of one
of the Antiochi, kings of Syria, 300 B.c. to 100 B.C.;
probable date of coin, B.C. 300; inscription worth at
home, if well preserved, 10 rupees-poorly preserved,
5 rupees. Then there were ten coins which belong
to a late Hindu dynasty, probably A.D. 600 or 700,
very common, and not very interesting, consequently
are worth but little more than their value in gold-
i.e., about 5 to 7 rupees. I shall offer the man about
5 rupees for each of the first, and also for second.
Went to see Griffin. He told me the Abdul Rahman
business had fallen through, and said he would show
me a paper to-morrow which he has written about
it. He wants to put up some one else. I say what
I have always said, that there is no use putting up
any one, the only way to settle this country is to
take it ourselves; but as Government will not do
that, the thing to do is to assemble the chiefs and
tell them frankly that we are going, and they must
settle amongst themselves who to put up, or whether
to put any one up at all. They may pay revenue to
no one if they like, and may all be their own masters.
*
1880.]
If they would give me a carte blanche, I would soon
conquer the whole country for them. I would begin
gradually by annexing Jalalabad, and then get a lot
of volunteers from India and Europe, and ask Gov-
ernment to give me two lakhs a-month, and I would
go on to conquer Turkistan and Herat; then get
them to give me back Kandahar, develop the trade,
and be a real king in fact."
"June 7.-On committee again. Settled about
followers. Cut it down to one man per horse, with
great opposition from Mackenzie. Letter come re-
commending Kilgour, 5th Fusiliers, for Victoria
Cross. Think he ought to get it. We stuck about
cooking-pots, so referred it to a regimental com-
mittee, and also about number of kahars. These
two I think we shall be able to cut down immensely,
at least half. There appears to be a scare on in the
Khaibar, but I should doubt its being very much.
June 8.-Had a long talk with Nakhshband
about affairs he is very much against Abdul
Rahman, and thinks the only thing to do is to
divide the country-give one bit to Wali, another
to Hashim, and a third to Ibrahim, who, by the way,
he has a better opinion of. Went to Stewart to speak
against Abdul Rahman, and I think he agrees, and
was inclined to my view, that our only chance now
was Yakub. I am of this opinion also. Then went
to Griffin; there were a lot of fellows in the room-
Christie, Hastings, &c. I asked him if it was true
that there was a gathering in Kohistan, and he said
(6
DIVIDING AFGHANISTAN.
217
J
CAPTA
[1880.
'Yes.' I shall begin an Intelligence Department of
my own now. Then he read me a letter of Abdul
Rahman to the Maidan Maliks, in which he told them
to be ready after twenty-five days; also one from
Mahamad Jan, in which he said he was bringing all
the people from the south, and would come by way
of Maidan, while Abdul Rahman came from Kohis-
tan to attack us. Griffin told me that it was evident
that there was going to be a rising all along the line,
and that there was something in the Tira¹ business;
but I do not think there is much fear, if people only
look out what they are doing. Altogether, it looks
as if we were not quite out of this business yet, and
I am sure, if it will only get me promotion, I should
not care. I told Griffin my ideas about Yakub, and
then he showed me his memorandum, sent with his
letter [No. 16, S.P.C., dated 5th June], in which
he puts before them all the pros and cons of Abdul
Rahman, and insists on our declaring for some one at
once, and putting up some one before we leave. It
certainly is about the worst hat we ever got into,
and it is owing a good deal to Roberts's way of doing
business, as well as to the Government not knowing
what they wanted.
"June 9.-The committee is getting on, and is
nearly finished-a few days more will do it. Stewart
was a good man, but there is no doubt he was surprised
at Ahmad Khel. Then he is not active, and though
men have confidence in him, he does not go amongst
1 Tira, the country of the Orakzai (Afridis).
218
A DILEMMA.
T
219
1880.]
GORDON'S RESIGNATION.
them nor court their liking. If I was in command,
I would go amongst the men, and get known to
them, and would create enthusiasm amongst them.
I think they would believe in me. In to-night's
paper it says Gordon resigned the Private Secretary-
ship, and he has written a most extraordinary letter
to the paper, giving his reasons, evidently from some
religious craze.
It is a wonderful world, and
nothing should be expected but the unexpected.
Went out for a ride with Hutchinson; met Stewart,
and took him along with us. We all agreed Kabal
might be made the best station in Asia. It has
everything to recommend it-lovely climate, beauti-
ful scenery, splendid rides and drives, boating, skat-
ing, military shooting, good food-only man is vile.'
"June 10.-Went out for a ride round by Bala
Hisar, then few papers with general and committee.
We did Line gear, and did it satisfactorily. Then
at four to races; saw two, one in which Adams and
Thruston rode very well. My name appears in orders
as Honorary Aide-de-Camp to Viceroy, which I am
very sorry of.
,
G
June 11.-Had a talk with Roberts about the
situation. Stewart thinks we shall be attacked
going out, I hope not. Roberts agrees that it
would be the best thing now to send for Yakub,
and that we ought to leave this by 15th July. He
has some thoughts of going by Kuram himself."
“June 13.—Last day of committee; have now to
write the report.
220
[1880.
June 14.-The general evidently expects a row;
and I had a talk with him about the necessity of
not splitting his force up too much. He ordered
Hills to come to Charasia, but we could not helio-
graph on account of the sun being obscured. Began
report of committee; hope to get through it in a
few days."
June 17.—Heard there was a large gathering to
the south. I hope they will come; and if I could
only get a chance of the Victoria Cross I would do,
then I could go with credit. Told the general that
I thought it was risky sending Gough out all by
himself. Old Nakhshband came to me, and told
me not to let them go too near, or the whole coun-
try would rise. I told the general. Must send
some one out to select a site for a camp for Hills
""
66
66
66
MORE GATHERINGS.
to-morrow.
June 20.-Got a report that a reconnoitring
party from Gough's camp had been fired on. If they
get into a mess I shall not be sorry, as it is against
my advice their going out. General told me that
Hills would have to go back again, or we shall get
no supplies."
Charasia, June 24.-Rode out with Lockhart
to Hill's camp, and saw all the fellows there—Mac-
lean, Kennedy, &c. Dined at mess.
Dined at mess. Slept in Euan
Smith's tent. His Persian servant very attentive.
"June 25.-Started back at eight; hot ride;
arrived at 9.10.
"June 26.-Got up at four, at five started with
66
-
!
1880.]
Roberts and party, and rode to Karez-i-Mir; road
good, but stony over the Kotal; about ten miles.
Went and had some fruit with Gough, and started
again at eight; rode through very enclosed country
-trees, walls, ditches, for four miles. Country very
beautiful, then open alongside a very deep difficult
ravine to pass above Kara Dushman. Walked to
this, then got a change, and galloped all way to near
Pai Minar; walked over that shocking bad road,
then galloped to gorge, and in by 11.30. Did not
feel heat much; had tub and breakfast; about three
began to feel seedy.
66
Sunday, June 27.-Slept on roof very well till
7.30, then woke, feeling seedy; effects of sun on my
liver. Had long talk with general about the situa-
tion. We are in a regular hat. It is a great blunder
having anything to say to Abdul Rahman, who is
playing us false. His answer has come: he accepts
the Amirship, and says he understands we mean to
give him back all the country Dost Mahamad had,
and he sent a circular to all the tribes to this effect.
This put Hashim and Abdulla in a funk, and they
have bolted. Our only other card now (as this must
exclude Abdul Rahman) is Yakub; this too would be
a blunder, but a lesser one than Abdul Rahman. It
is all as I said; there is no settlement possible short
of annexation, or at least military occupation, and
this it must come to.
ANNEXATION.
221
"June 28.-Walked to top of Shahr Darwaza by
the zigzag road to the north and west. We took
[1880.
forty-five minutes to ride out to the foot, and forty-
five minutes to get up to level of Shahr Darwaza.¹
I went up slowly and steadily, and did not lose my
wind, though it was rather a grind; luckily, how-
ever, we got more than half-way up in the shade,
then we walked down in half an hour and rode
home, getting in about ten minutes to eight. Ridge-
way was in with the general about supplies. I
listened and said nothing, but at end said I thought
he ought to get up some from below, but he said it
would be all right when the crops were cut. I doubt
it, and if we had 60,000 devils dancing it is devilish
few supplies we shall get. I must speak again about
this to-morrow.
222
SUPPLIES.
"June 29.--Shall finish committee report to-mor-
row, and then get commanding officers to give me their
opinions, and then I will send it round to members
and rewrite it. I hope it will be thought a good
report. Sir Donald very amusing: he has a fund of
stories and a good memory; but I am inclined to
think he had no difficulties at Kandahar, and his
battle of Ahmad Khel was a surprise, and he was
only saved by the troops; there was no generalship
shown."
..
July 2.-My bat has come. I must get up and
play tennis, this will keep me in health. Went out
for a ride, went across country, tried to jump a ridi-
Ad
1 Shahr Darwaza is the name of the southern heights of the gorge
through which the Kabal river runs to the northern side of the city of
Kabal, formed by a spur from the Takht-i-Shah.
1880.]
A VISIT TO THE MINAR.
223
culously small ditch, and my horse came down and
fell on my leg; thought I was hurt at first, but was
not. Then on, and came down again at another; did
not hurt myself again. He is a brute, and cannot
jump a bit; will sell him. Mahamad Afzul came in
from Turkistan, gave a favourable account of Abdul
Rahman. I am sure this game will not do. Ayub
or even Yakub would be better. Line cut between
Butkhak and Lataband; wonder if they are attacked.
I must press going to Chakri¹ on the general again.
Went for a walk with Hutchinson along Bimaru
ridge, and down by Collet's; he showed me sixteen
fine mules, which he wants to keep for the regimental
equipment. Arranged yesterday for a trip to the
Minar. The 2d Ghurkhas are to go, and part of the
67th. I should not be surprised if we found some
chaps on the top, and we may have some sniping.
Told Stewart I thought we should go down in paral-
lel columns, one by our road, and the other by the
higher and southern road; this really will be a good
plan, and we will go by the southern. It will not
be very hot, and we shall get down, I hope, pretty
comfortably to the Khaibar and Peshawar. We can
get on to Landi Kotal, and then into Peshawar next
day. Must have a talk with Griffin to-morrow, to
see when we can go. I mean to press that we go
without any delay, and we might get away by 1st
August, and be at Simla by 6th September, just a
1 Chakri, the village of Sadu and Dadu (vide ante, p. 144), two
notorious freebooters who gave great trouble.
.
224
..
EXTENSIVE VIEW.
[1880.
year after we left, and hurrah, then, for England,
home, and beauty!"
66
July 6.—Up at four, off at five. Rode to foot
of Minar Pass. The road goes by Bini Hisar, and
then turns to the left, past the Amir's garden to
Shewaki, where there is a somewhat rickety bridge,
then through fields to where the 2d Ghurkha camp
was pitched. On the way Roberts told me that he
had recommended Stewart to write Lord Ripon, and
propose to go directly we came to terms with Abdul
Rahman, which he thinks will be in about a fort-
night or three weeks, so we ought to be out of this
by the 1st August. I am very glad of this. I
walked up to the Minar about two miles, very steep,
and the sun being in my eyes the whole way, I felt
it very much; however, I never stopped once the
whole way. The road is very bad, but is practicable
for mules. The Minar is ninety-eight feet high and
twenty-one feet in diameter at base. It is clearly
Buddhist, from the way of building with layers of
slate or flat thin stones; it is quite plain to near the
top, where there is some ornamentation. After
twenty minutes' rest walked to the top of the pass,
which is about three-quarters of a mile further; from
there there is a good view of the Khurd Kabal and
Chakri valleys, with the Haft Kotal and Karkachar¹
in the distance. The country is very open and easy.
There is a fine view of the Hindu Kush, which has
hardly any snow on it except on two peaks; one of
1 Karkachar, a spur of the Safed Koh.
1880.]
these, a conical one, must be 20,000 feet, but the
rest of the range not more than 15,000 feet. Of
course no breakfast appeared, those delightfully
useful aides-de-camp having made a mess of it.
What a useless breed it is! I hardly know an aide-
de-camp that is any use at all; they ought all to be
disestablished. Rode home with Heathcote, Perkins,
and Dutton; overtook the general walking his horse.
Things are brewing up for a big row in Europe, and
Gladstone is bullying the Turks; it will end in an
alliance between Russia, Turkey, and Persia and the
Afghans against India, and we shall get a licking.
""
¢¢
July 10.-Had a talk with Griffin about going
down; he agreed that the sooner we went after
Abdul Rahman was put up the better, but talked
about the 1st September. I must speak to the gen-
eral about this—it will not do; supplies will not last
either here or on the Khaibar, and we must go by
1st August at latest. I want to go very much.
Had a talk with general about going down, and
recommended him to go by the 1st, and to form a
camp for the sick at Marki Khel, and send them
from here at once-also about getting all the ord-
nance down at once; but he talked about the 10th.
(6
RETIREMENT TALKED OF.
225
"July 11.-Tried again to induce the general to
agree to go by the 1st, but he persisted in the 10th ;
however, at last he said, 'If you can show me we
can go by the 1st, I have no objection.' Must go to
Roberts and try and persuade him to go by the 1st.
"July 12.-Had a long talk with general about
VOL. II.
P
226
[1880.
the situation. The thing is in as good a mess as can
be imagined, and now Abdul Rahman does not seem
to like coming. I told the general I would send
him an ultimatum to say that if he did not settle in
two days we would make other arrangements. He
said they had sent men to him, who were to see him.
and come back at once and report, and then if not
satisfactory, we would write him a letter saying he
must settle at once. We have played long enough
with this fellow. He will not remain in a week
after we go; the other party is much stronger, and
wants, even now, to go at him. General says Griffin
has written a memorandum objecting to all the de-
fences being destroyed. I hope he will not give in
about it.
PREPARATIONS FOR DEPARTURE.
•
July 13.-Had committee on transport.
Did
not do much, as Low was not there; but we settled
two points, and put it off to twelve to-morrow."
"July 15.-General told me that Abdul Rahman
had come to Tutam Dara, and his messengers would
probably be back in a few days, two or three; then,
if their report was not satisfactory, he would write a
letter, and if he got no fitting reply, he would make
other arrangements. Also he told me Griffin had
been remonstrating against the premature retire-
ment, and as he did not convince Stewart, he had
been trying to work the press, having given a state-
ment to Vaughan and Hensman, and Stewart is very
angry. He has also had a difference of opinion with
Griffin about blowing up the forts, so altogether they
1880.]
do not hit it off. Stewart said that if Lord Lytton
had stayed, he was going to have recalled Griffin.
66
July 16.—At five we rode out to MacPherson's
camp; they say it has been very hot. The 9th
Lancers, in their small tents, look very well and
compact. Ibrahim's people, at my request, wrote a
petition to the general about the property they
would have to leave behind. I will ask him to-
morrow what he means to do with it, as I want to
get him some compensation. I think we have treated
these people very shabbily, and it is little to our
credit."
(6
ABDUL RAHMAN RECOGNISED.
July 20.-Had a long talk with Jenkins, Roberts,
and Stewart about what Government should do for
the native cavalry. I said first, give them proper
batta; secondly, take 7 rupees, and give them 20
rupees a-month; thirdly, give them extra compen-
sation for horses. Stewart adopted all these, and
is writing a letter."
July 22.—At five there was a darbar to recog-
nise Abdul Rahman. Griffin said we were going to
give back all the country according to treaty of
Gandamak, which of course includes Kandahar.
Then Stewart said a few words, but very well, and
Smith put it into very good Persian; then we all
went away. None of the sardars looked pleased,
and I should not wonder if we had some trouble.
Must worry out the transport idea to-morrow.
Have been thinking of jotting down experiences of
the campaign, only I should abuse some one or other
66
227
I
228
[1880.
-and that would make enemies for me, and do me
no good whatever.
July 23.-General wrote and told me to order
to go and see Griffin. It appears that yester-
day had some squabble with either Karim
Khan, the envoy of Abdul Rahman, or his servant,
and had hit him. He apologised and paid a fine,
and so all was over. Had a talk with Badcock
about transport, and settled we would recommend a
certain staff and leave it to Government to say who
it was to be under. Must write some more about
medical comforts, and necessity for better rations
for the men.
С،
66
July 24.-Played tennis. Had another com-
mittee. Chapman was not so inclined to dissent;
think we shall manage it at last, but there is not
much time. Went for a ride with general, then left
him, as I had to be home to go to Guides by eight.
They were talking of Roberts, whom they seemed to
stick up for on the whole."
July 26.-Stewart said there was something in
the paper about me. That brute
called me
a grim-visaged Mephistopheles—which may be very
truthful, but I do not like it all the same. Had
a wretched dusty ride. General heard from Com-
mander-in-Chief; got the relief, and he said that
he must go home to see his boy, who was coming
out in the spring. So I suppose I must give up
all hope of getting home for a year at least."
At this time Sir Donald Stewart had been em-
MEPHISTOPHELES.
ઃઃ
1880.
SETTLEMENT OF ABDUL RAHMAN.
229
powered by the Government to complete the politi-
cal arrangements with Abdul Rahman, for that
chief's occupation of Kabal. He was to furnish
the new Amir with ten lakhs of rupees to enable
him to establish his authority in the country, and
to hand over the capital to his Government. The
retirement of the British forces from Northern
Afghanistan was then to be carried out as soon as
practicable in the autumn, the dispositions being
left to Sir Donald Stewart's discretion.
.
In fact, the position of affairs, as described by
Mr Lepel Griffin, certainly now appeared more
favourable. The firm and decided tone in which
the Sardar had been addressed, the precision and
definiteness of the conditions which had been laid
down as necessary for his acceptance, had had the
anticipated effect.
Abdul Rahman had seen that the British Govern-
ment had been fully informed of the game he had
been playing, that trickery and treachery would
not be tolerated, and that, if he intended coming
to a settlement with the Indian Government at all,
he must be prepared to accept the terms offered to
him rather than dictate his own.
C
230
،،
CHAPTER VI.
qka m
KABAL TO KANDAHAR.
1880.
"They call to the dirk, the claymore, and the targe,
To the march and the muster, the line and the charge."
THE MAIWAND DISASTER LOSS OF HONOUR·
-DRAWING UP THE
PROGRAMME-THE KABAL-KANDAHAR FORCE-A VACANT BRI-
GADE-APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL-OFF TO KANDAHAR-
THE FAMOUS MARCH-A REGULAR PACE-LONG DISTANCES
THE KHAN AGHA-AN A 1 STAFF FORTRESS
·FORTRESS OF GHAZNI·
FIELD OF AHMAD KHEL-
CIVIL BY ORDER -SORTIE OF DEH
KHWAJA-KALAT-I-GHILZAI-ROBERTS IS READY-BATTLE OF
KANDAHAR A BRILLIANT SUCCESS-AT KANDAHAR-HOME-
WARD BOUND-MARCH TO QUETTA FAREWELL TO GENERAL
ROBERTS.
Add
-
July 28.-The general told me a telegram had
come from the Foreign Office to say Burrows' bri-
gade had been attacked by Ayub, and disastrously
defeated and dispersed, many officers killed, and the
men bolting all over the country-no more. St John
and the Wali had returned. What effect this will
have on the country it is impossible to say; it will
1880.]
raise the whole country there at least, and possibly
here it will buck up the Sher Ali faction, and all
who have joined Abdul Rahman will now leave him.
I came back and at once set to work to think what
I had better do. I have been thinking whether it
would be a good thing to offer to go and join at
Kandahar, and see what could be done. I might
get in, and instil a little life into them, and raise
the Hazaras in Ayub's rear, and at all events get
him to retreat.
WORSE FOR OUR HONOUR.
231
66
July 29.-No more news. Found Roberts in
with Stewart; he had arranged all about the 1st
Division going. I said I thought no troops should
go from Kabal, and to send any would be a strat-
egical and political blunder. It is an infernal nui-
sance. The whole thing may have to be done all
over again, unless they can localise the war. I have
not sent my telegram about going myself, and half
think I will not. Have promised to go and show
some fellows the scene of the cavalry action.
CC
July 30.—Telegram came saying that a number
of officers had escaped, some killed and wounded ;
not so many as I thought, and none I know. E-B,
R.H.A.,¹ lost two guns. It is not so bad in the
way of losses as I thought, but worse for our honour,
as they ought all to have been killed. Ayub had
thirty-five guns. I wonder if there were any Russian
officers there. If Ayub now goes on to Kandahar, it
may be a good thing; but if he goes up to Ghazni,
1 Major G. F. Blackwood's battery of Horse Artillery.
232
[1880.
we shall have to attack him. Told Stewart my
opinion that it would be less a strategical than a
political blunder to send troops from here; every
effort should be made to localise the war. He agreed
with me, and said he had telegraphed to that effect.
A telegram from Johnson¹ also said that the 4th
Cavalry, 3d and 4th Native Infantry, were on the
way up; so there ought soon to be enough, and our
force could not get there till it was too late. I hope
they will not send them, as it would be a fatal error
to do so.
66
July 31.—Got through a power of work; made
the programme of withdrawal. In afternoon Roberts
came in and had a talk. I think he came with an
object, but he did not disclose it. I wrote a letter,
asking him to take me with a brigade, but did not
send it. Stewart and he went off to camp; they
say Abdul Rahman will not come to our camp.
Aug. 1.-Waited to see if there would be a
darbar; but about four heard there was to be none,
so determined not to go till the morning. If there
is nothing, I can ride back again. Telegram from
'Foreign' says Burrows brought in a portion of his
force, so I fancy it is not so bad; but it may be
worse in another way. Ayub may come up towards
Ghazni, and that may necessitate our going to lick
him. In that case I shall hold out that not less
than 7500 infantry shall go; shall telegraph to
MAKING THE PROGRAMME.
66
1 Colonel (now Sir C.) C. Johnson, Deputy Quartermaster-General
in India.
1880.]
Greaves about it. Wrote to Roberts asking for a
brigade; I wonder what he will answer. There
seems a good deal of excitement among Abdul Rah-
man's troops, and I should not be surprised if there
was a row out there, then they would see what non-
Will
sense it was sending these small forces out.
they never learn?
(C
KABAL-KANDAHAR FORCE.
233
Aug. 2.-Made out a programme for force¹ to
march to Ghazni. 1st Brigade-92d, 2d Ghurkhas,
23d Pioneers, 24th Panjab Native Infantry; 2d
Brigade-72d Highlanders, 5th Ghurkhas, 2d Sikhs,
and 3d Sikhs; 3d Brigade-60th Rifles, 15th
Sikhs, 4th Ghurkhas, 25th Panjab Native Infan-
try; Cavalry-9th Lancers, Central India Horse,
3d Panjab Cavalry, 3d Bengal Cavalry; Artillery
-6-8 screw-guns, 11-9 and No. 2 Mountain Bat-
teries, A-B and G-3, R.A. Roberts said, 'No field
artillery,' and he cut off A-B, R.H.A., and G-3, R.A.,
but I got him to agree to the rest, so he took
it in to Stewart; and when I was in the room
in the afternoon, Stewart did not like it at all, and
talked of retiring on the day Roberts left. I do
not think he should retire, but go in to Logar, and
take up a position about Amir Kila, so as to watch
Logar and Wardak for about eight days, and then
retire over the Shutargardan, or open communica-
padd
1 This force was detailed for special service under Lieutenant-
General Sir F. Roberts, and styled the "Kabal-Kandahar Force."
1st Brigade under MacPherson, 2d under Baker, 3d under General
Barter, who was afterwards replaced by Brigadier-General MacGregor.
234
[1880.
tion with it, and stay at Khushi. Then Bright on
the same day should retire all his troops on Ganda-
mak, and so to India as he pleased. Roberts would
then go on, and if he licked Ayub near Ghazni,
would retire by the Gomal, or, if he went to Kanda-
har, by the Bolan or Thal-Chotali or Zhob. But I
do not think there should be any force sent, unless it
was absolutely necessary; that is, unless Ayub came
up all 'cockahoop,' and then he must be licked. T
rather hope there will be no necessity to send a
force, and we shall get back in peace; but, if one
goes, I must go with it. Roberts said he would try
to get me as Brigadier-General, 3d Brigade; and as
I would like to be in one good fight, that would do
very well. Stewart does not like this: he is looking
careworn. There is no darbar to-day. I rode out,
but only got a couple of miles over the Pai Minar
when I met them all coming back. This is a ter-
rible fiasco. As old Nakhshband says, if Abdul won't
trust us so far, how can we trust him? and if he
pleads fear of his troops now, what will he do here-
after? It is a very miserable solution to the whole
thing. There seems every chance of our having a
devil of a flare-up before we go. It would not be
half a bad thing if we gave both Abdul Rahman and
Ayub a good thrashing before we go, but we must
go at once. I do not see how we are to feed our
force if we go. We cannot carry large supplies with
us, and as the whole country will be hostile, it will be
very
difficult to get enough. Roberts is very daring,
A MISERABLE SOLUTION.
1880.]
and will risk anything to get kudos out of this. I
am afraid I could not get more than what I shall
get now.
"Aug. 3.-Went in to Stewart early; found him
poring over Roberts's memorandum, which he did
not seem to like. Asked me my opinion. I said
'I agreed with Roberts entirely.' Then sent off
orders about Central India Horse-11-9 to Bright,
and 11-11 and A-B, to Hills, also for 6-11 to go
down with 12-9. Asked Roberts about the 3d Bri-
gade; he seemed to be anxious to have me.
66
Aug. 4.—Wrote to Stewart last night, and asked
him to put me into Barter's brigade. He first said
it was not vacant; but if it was, he would recom-
mend me, and later on he did so; now it rests with
Chief. The details of the Kandahar business came
to-day; very bad business. Ayub advanced in good
order, in line, with reserves; cavalry on right and
left, and artillery at intervals. They fired from
seven to one; then infantry and cavalry advanced,
and the Bombay regiments bolted on to the 66th, and
there was a skedaddle-1250 lost, 2 guns, and 700
Sniders, 400 Martini.¹ All the 66th must have been
cut up—in fact, a regular bad business, as bad as
anything that has ever happened to our arms, and
worse than anything in my time in India. This
makes them more and more anxious to go; so I sup-
pose there is no putting it off. I am not so confident,
THE VACANT BRIGADE.
235
1 Killed—20 officers, 914 men; wounded and missing-9 officers,
166 men. Lost 7 guns and howitzers.
[1880.
and should not be so sure we may not do something
rash, and rush at them without waiting to see how
they were posted; but there is no doubt we shall
have a picked force, with picked leaders, and per-
haps we shall pull through. I must impress on
Roberts the necessity for great caution and good in-
telligence. I do hope we shall make a good thing of
it, as it will be the making of me. I should like to
get one or two not very bad wounds, which would
necessitate my going home. I think it is a great
shame they have not brought out some honours before
this. We all lose by it, and it shows a great want
of appreciation of the way to manage soldiers, who
should get frequent fillips during a campaign, espe-
cially a long one.
66
Aug. 5.-To-day Barter's papers came in. It all
rests with the Chief now, and Greaves,1 because if he
will help me, it will be all right. Oh that I may get
it [the vacant brigade]! I feel sure I shall succeed,
as I will anywhere on my own resources. This staff
work does not suit me; it cramps and cabins one's
energies, and leaves me no initiation. It has played
the devil with me, and if I can only escape I shall do ;
so if we go to Kandahar, and on to Herat, I might
possibly end by getting a V.C. after all. Have felt so
worried and uncertain all along all day, could not set-
tle to anything. Oh! if I can only go, and if with the
3d Brigade I can have a devil's own fight, I shall do.
236
APPOINTED BRIGADIER-GENERAL.
J
1 Major-General Sir George Greaves, Adjutant-General in India
since October 1879.
1880.]
66
A FINE BRIGADE.
Aug. 6.—A note from Roberts came to congrat-
ulate me, so it is all right.¹ Put Lockhart in orders
to succeed me, and engaged all day in clearing off
and getting off the committee reports. Every one
congratulates me. Cunyngham said he thought
every one in the army would be glad. The brigade
is a splendid one; the 60th are very fit and keen, 4th
Ghurkhas the best in the service, 15th Sikhs magnifi-
cent, and 25th very good. I ought to do something.
Perkins came in and said he thought our going and
leaving the force here was the maddest thing out. I
shall write to Stewart, so as to be on the safe side,
and propose that he (Stewart) should go into camp,
and move up towards Logar, so as to threaten it and
Wardak.
237
66
Aug. 7.-Up at five, off at six with Roberts.
First we went into Low's, then to Jimmy Hills's
camp, under Siah-Sang, and then to my brigade to
see the transport. Found all the mules, striped, and
a very fine lot, all hired. The 4th Ghurkhas, who
have yabus, are not half so fit. Saw the command-
ing officers of each regiment. The 15th Sikhs look
a splendid regiment, at least as far as physique of the
men go, and I hope they will turn out well. Then
home. Every one congratulating me, and I think
all are glad. I think I am liked as well as looked
1 "Under instructions from Army Headquarters, Colonel C. M. Mac-
Gregor, C.B., C.S.I., was appointed, on 6th August, to the command
of the 3d Brigade of the Kabal-Kandahar force, in place of Brigadier-
General Barter, invalided."
238
[1880.
up to, and all believe me a good soldier; I am sure
I hope I shall prove so. I am not yet forty, and am
a brigadier-general. I doubt if many men have got
the rank so young as I am. My contemporaries are
mostly junior; and now if we only get a chance of
a fight, and I do not make a mess of it, I shall have
a name second to none in the Indian army.
"Aug. 8.-[First day's march-Sherpur to Bini
Hisar, six miles.] Up at 5.30 A.M. Brigade
formed up.
Rode to head of column, and, sound-
ing the advance, marched off at 6.30 in columns
of fours from right. We went due east over the
Chaman, for a mile or two, and then struck a road
from Butkhak to Bini Hisar, and got into camp
without going through the village at all. Rode on
to head of column, and then stood to see all pass.
Much of the baggage was badly loaded, so I issued
an order on the subject, and wrote some orders for
the line of march, which I shall show Roberts. Told
him I had issued orders about each regiment turning
out as strong as possible. In the evening Sir Donald
came out and said 'Good-bye' to every one. The
men all turned out and cheered him; the soldiers
believe in him. To-day I bought a kilta (load) of
grapes, and sent them to the Rifles; shall do so to
all my regiments. I must go amongst the men, and
talk to them, so that they will get to know me. Be-
fore we get to Kandahar they will swear by me. I
know how to get at soldiers' hearts!
66
Aug. 9.-[Second day's march-Bini Hisar to
OFF TO KANDAHAR.
1880.]
Zaidabad, fourteen miles.] Up at three. Off at
4.30. Went and stood at the bridge to see every-
thing off. Stayed till nearly six, and saw 2d Reserve
Ammunition and Field Hospital, and left strict orders
about the rest; but owing to the narrowness of the
road, they were very much delayed, and they did not
all get off till eight. Beyond the Kotal of White's
Hill halted for nearly an hour to let the baggage
close up, and so we went on, I halting whenever
necessary, and the consequence was we got on well.
When we came into the open, I formed open column
of companies, and made the men march at open order,
with loose files. This makes it easier and cooler for the
men and they get less dust. Issued a lot of orders,
copies of which I must get and keep, as they will be
useful both to me and others. The 1st Brigade, I hear,
did not get off till 10.30, and did not get in here till
fully 6.30, so they were out all day. Very bad
arrange-
ment, the animals standing loaded for hours together.
To-morrow we march behind the 1st Brigade; but I
must try and find another road, and try and get in
nearly as quick as them, otherwise we shall not get
in till awfully late. Wrote to general, and sug-
gested I should find a new road from the beginning;
but he would not agree, so I must do what I can to
get another road after crossing the river. I am not
very confident in our disposition, and am afraid that
we are splitting our force up too much. They say
we shall have to fight at Ghazni against the guns
that Stewart left behind!
ORDER OF MARCH.
&
239
240
[1880.
"Aug. 10.-[Third day's march-Zaidabad to Zar-
gunshahar, thirteen miles.] Up at three, off at four.
This is a mistake. The animals got loaded in the
dark, and are consequently loaded badly, and practi-
cally at four you cannot see an inch, so you do not
really get off till 4.30. We got jammed with
MacPherson's brigade, and could not get on. If I
had taken my own road, I would have been in here
at least an hour before. After passing the river,
where the water was only up to a man's knees, we
got to a nasty water-cut, with a narrow bridge, and
after that it was all over an open stony plain. I
march in open order as usual.
order as usual. Gave out orders
one about not loading till a bugle sounded, another
about sending animals out for forage immediately on
arrival, and a third about marching animals on as
broad a front as possible. In the evening went
round the hospitals to see the men who fell out; found
some fever and a curious morning vomiting. Went
and inspected all the transport animals, and gave
orders that the men were not to carry their great-
coats. Sent for the quartermaster-sergeant of Rifles,
who always goes with the camp colourmen; told him
to march at the head of the column 100 paces a-
minute, and keep it steadily; this will save the men
immensely. I like all my commanding officers, and
I hope in time the brigade will like me; I want a
good fight.
66
A REGULAR PACE.
Aug. 11.-[Fourth day's march-Zargunshahar
to Patkao Roghani, sixteen and a half miles.] Up
1880.]
at three, off at four. March to Patkao Roghani,
over undulating, bare, stony, then open plain for
some eleven miles, then water. Halted to water
column, baggage all well up. On for three miles,
baggage still up; then on for four more, when we
got into an intricate country, with water-cuts and
cultivation. Passed Jabir Kala; very hot; the men
much done up, as also the baggage-animals. This is
a great mistake, knocking up animals. Got in very
hot. Found no room for my tent, and my baggage
delayed because MacPherson crossed it. In the
evening went round and placed all the pickets, and
visited the baggage-animals of 25th and 4th Ghurkhas.
My regiments march very strong. I hope there will
be no row to-night. Report says there is no gather-
ing nearer than Ghazni, so we shall get through the
Tangi-Wardak¹ all right. At Ghazni we shall pro-
bably have a fight. Phayre has been ordered not to
go forward till he is quite strong, so we may get
there before him; this will be good for us, as it will
add to the prestige which already hangs over us.
HOT WEATHER.
66
241
Aug. 12.—[Fifth day's march-Patkao to Amir
Kala, eleven miles.] Up at four, off at five. March
through centre of Logar. Road very good, but very
narrow, with small stone bridges over very nu-
merous water-cuts, and a very difficult country to
fight over. However, I do not suppose these fellows
would ever fight in it; and if they did, I should out-
1 Tangi-Wardak, a defile leading from the Logar valley into the
Wardak country between Shekhabad and Amir Kala.
VOL. II.
242
[1880.
flank them, and so turn them out. Did not get in
till 11.30, not more than eight miles in six and a
half hours. Several very strong forts scattered
about. A most awful hash, as usual, about our
baggage, by which that of the 2d Brigade crossed
ours, and kept it back. Roberts sent the 2d Brigade
and cavalry over the Zamburak Pass. The troops
got over, though it was very difficult (7000 feet
elevation), but the baggage of the 2d Brigade did
not, and so they are to-night without any food, and
the force is divided into three parts. I am camped
in a regular punch-bowl, surrounded by hills, which
command the camp in every direction. I have 200
men on picket, and 200 more ready, but I do not
like it, and hope the night will pass quietly. I have
to go through the Tangi-Wardak to-morrow, but have
been given no information as to whether there is any
enemy, so I shall have to act as if there was.
Roberts wants me to go to Haidar Khel, but I think
it is too far.
ACROSS THE TANGI-WARDAK.
66
Aug. 13.-[Sixth day's march-Amir Kala to
Haidar Khel, twelve miles.] Up at three, off at
4.30. Road good enough through the Tangi-War-
dak, but very narrow, with large number of water-
cuts, the valley gradually narrowing to about half a
mile, with great deal of cultivation and numerous
strong little forts. I put the whole of the Ghurkhas
on rear-guard, and divided the baggage into three,
and sent a regiment with each, so as to give them
sufficient protection. I halted at Doaba for two
1880.]
hours, then rode on to where the roads from the
Tangi and the Zamburak Pass meet, when, having
sent the column on, I went under some trees on the
bank of the Shiniz and had breakfast. Here I met
the Khan Agha,¹ the most powerful chief of Herat,
and head of the Jamshidis; had a long talk with
him. He was very anxious for us to go to Herat,
saying it was ours-' Zar Khand!'
Got into camp
about two, not very hot. My last regiment not in
till 5.15, but the 1st Brigade were not in till seven.
To-morrow we have a long march. The Shiniz 2
valley is narrow, with bleak but easy hills on each
side. They say there are no more difficulties of
road. Went in the evening to see Ross and Morton.
Aug. 14.-[Seventh day's march—Haidar Khel
to Shasgao, sixteen miles.] Up at three, off at
four. Blew the 'load' at 3.40, and the head of the
column began to move at 4.20. We got on all right
till five, when we came in to the tail of Baker's
baggage, and old Ross sent me an order to halt; and
though I asked to be allowed to find a road for
myself, he would not let me, but made me halt one
and a half hours, and then said I might go. So I
went. Turning off the road to the left, I found that
66
THE KHAN AGHA.
6
243
1 See Yate's Afghan Boundary Commission,' p. 229. After Ayub's
defeat, Khan Agha (Jamshidi) intrigued among the tribes of the
Chahar Aimak against the Herati chief. While thus occupied, he
was seized by Faiz Mahamad Khan and Mahamad Sadik Khan, chiefs
of the Tulak and Tagas Ishlan sections of the Taimani tribe, taken to
Herat, and handed over to Ayub, who put him to death.
2 The upper waters of the Logar river are called the Shiniz.
244
AN A 1 STAFF.
[1880.
we could get along all right, and so we did; but the
halt in the cool of the morning was fatal, and
though I got in at 1.30, sixty-eight men fell out.
The country is an open bleak valley about five
miles broad, with a fair amount of cultivation and
water. The Shiniz runs through it, and villages are
met every five miles. The hills on east and west
are bare and rocky, but there are evidently passes
through them at intervals. To-morrow my brigade
is on rear-guard, and I am not going to move till
ten or so; then I shall send off my baggage, keep all
but the 25th, and go over the pass in order. To-
morrow we get to Ghazni. I am lucky getting a
brigade at my age, but I should have done better
five years ago, as I was more active. It is very easy
work commanding a brigade. It is quite cool at
night, and I had to put on my choga at dinner and
shut up my tent. I have got an A 1 staff.
Aug. 15.-[Eighth day- Shasgao to Ghazni,
fifteen miles.] As I was on rear-guard, I did not
sound the rouse till 7.45; the baggage of the
other brigades, however, got off by 7.30, so that
I might have started then. However, got all the
animals a good feed, and let the men have their
breakfast, and we went off very calmly, and marched
at a steady pace of three miles an hour. The last
four miles were very hot. The Sher Dahan Pass
(9000 feet) is a pass only in name, the ascent and
descent being very gradual. It is also not defen-
sible, as the hills on either side are so easy that it
66
1880.]
could be turned in any direction. Owing to the
gradual slopes of the hills, I should also doubt
whether it would ever be stopped in the winter. The
road goes to the east of a spur, at the end of which
is Ghazni. This is a poor place, and is commanded;
but still, if defended, might give a lot of trouble.
There are two very curious minars here, of which no
one seems to know the origin, and Mahmud's tomb.
Did not go; as I had had such a grilling, I did not
feel inclined; besides, I have got a cold, and am
feverish. Got in at three, men quite fit. Reported
to general, and he was very civil, and gave me some
grapes. Hear he is going to march to beyond Ahmad
Khel to-morrow, and that a gathering is to be got up
to follow us up. Hope not.
GHAZNI.
((
245
Aug. 16.-[Ninth day-Ghazni to Yarghati,
twenty miles.] Marched at 4.30. Much delayed
by narrow roads and water-cuts; however, had a
good look at Ghazni, which seems to me to be
capable of being made an extremely strong place.
And it is very strong even now against anything but
very heavy artillery, as, though commanded from
the Balal hill, the command could easily be defil-
aded. I think if there is water, it could hold out
for ever against these fellows; and if it had been
determinedly held, we should have had very great
difficulty in getting in. Sir Donald Stewart said
you could ride your horse into it; unless he could
jump forty or fifty feet high, you certainly could not.
The place is extremely picturesque and beautiful,
246
[1880.
and there are a large number of fruit-gardens around.
The march then went out on to a desolate plain,
which continued mostly to Nani. At Chihal Bacha
Gum, five miles, however, there were some fine
plane-trees, a shrine, and water-a very desirable
hot-weather residence for a fakir. On the road met
some men from Dera Ishmail. They were traders,
and came by the Gomal Pass, and said there was a
road by Sirufza, by which Bannu could be reached in
four days.
At Nani we had to turn off the
road, and unload and feed our animals by simply
cutting down what fields we wanted. This is the
only way to make war. No doubt it puts the people
against you, but I doubt if you would have much
more trouble in the long-run, as by our way of pay-
ing they despise us. Put up my tent, and so got
shade, and had breakfast; then on six miles to
Yarghati. Passed over field of Ahmad Khel; very
large number of graves; good fight, but Stewart was
surprised. Not very hot, cool wind blowing; dust
on arrival in camp awful. Was brigadier-general
of day, but found I had nothing particular to do.
To-morrow I march first.
PASSING AHMAD KHEL.
،،
Aug. 17.-[Tenth day-Yarghati to Chardeh,
thirteen miles.] Up at three, off at 4.30. Marched
to Chardeh. Road very good all way, through a
desolate-looking but well watered and cultivated
district. My brigade was leading. Morton came
and told me to form mass of columns. The cavalry
baggage got in right amongst ours; tried to find the
1880.]
officer, and would have put him under arrest, but
did not. It was very hot, and I felt it more, as I
have a nasty feverish cough. My dodge for shade is
a very good one, and consists only of the bathroom
and one pole; it gives shade for about six people.
Letters came from Tanner, commanding, and Yate,
political, at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, dated 12th, to say they
were all right, and were not beleaguered; but Smith
tells me they are: I think he is a bit of an alarmist.
I am on rear-guard to-morrow, and shall form my
regiments in columns in echelon, so as to be ready to
flank the baggage or form square in any direction.
PICKETS.
247
"Aug. 18.-[Eleventh day-Chardeh to Karez-i-
Oba, sixteen and a half miles.] I was on rear-
guard, so did not start till 6.30. For six miles
through well-cultivated but uninteresting country,
then over a desert flat; good soil, but no water.
The water you do come to is simply splendid; there
is much more of it than in Persia. I did not get in
till 4.30, but owing to a cool breeze it was not very
hot. Suggested arrangements about followers being
inspected and carried, also about marching in three
brigades, and the general adopted both suggestions.
Baker came and talked about the pickets, and we all
agreed that it would be better to leave brigadiers
alone to look after their own camps. Am feeling
much better, cold gone. I posted my own pickets,
and must do so always. In the evening talked to
some men of the Ghurkhas and 25th about possi-
bility of a fight: they seem in good heart.
248
[1880.
“Aug. 19.—[Twelfth day-Karez-i-Oba to Muk-
kur, fourteen miles.] To-day marched to Mukkur.
General agreed to try my dodge of marching in three
parallel columns. I started at 4.30, but found the
other two had gone some time before, and in my
attempt to catch them up, my baggage straggled so
much I was obliged to halt for nearly an hour, and
also to make frequent halts afterwards. Our road
was over an open plain covered with sand and
camel-thorn, and much cut up by water-courses.
We got to a river at eleven, and as that ass
never told me of it, we were delayed in making a
crossing, and so the rear-guard, which might have
been in by twelve, did not arrive till two. How-
ever, my baggage was all in, but Baker's was stretch-
ing over some eight miles of country. People civil,
they say apologetically, 'by order.' The division of
Mukkur is very fertile; plenty cultivated villages,
and water; good climate. Once belonged to Haz-
aras, who have been kicked out by Afghans. Many
Povindah encampments.
Aug. 20.-[Thirteenth day-Mukkur to Panjak
(Kalà-i-Juma), twenty-one miles.] Marched at same
hour. They told us we were going to do twelve
miles, and they went on twenty-one miles; and the
only water was filthy, so the men were much done
up. The baggage of the other brigades, as usual, all
over the place; so instead of an orderly advance, it
looked like the disorganised retreat of a beaten army.
Did not get in till 2.30, my rear-guard at 7.15; men
(C
CIVIL BY ORDER.
1
249
1880.]
beat. All this to try and cut into Kandahar before
Phayre. The general may be exposing his force to
be defeated in detail, and Phayre too; whereas, if
both got there together, the result must be success.
Now it only may be, possibly will be, but it is not
certain, and any risks are unnecessary. What I would
do would be to leave the garrison in Kalat-i-Ghilzai
with all my langra lula, and halt there a day to pull
every one together; then go to Kandahar in five six-
teen-mile marches, and one short one in. This is the
right thing to do.
66
SORTIE OF DEH KHWAJA.
'Aug. 21.-[Fourteenth day-Panjak to Kajai,
thirteen miles.] Marched at four to a place called
Kajai, thirteen miles along the road, which was
very good, bar a few ravines. Any amount of water;
so we got in very comfortably at 11.20. Very hot
all day. A heliogram from Kalat-i-Ghilzai says the
Kandahar garrison made a sortie, and Brooke is killed,
eight officers wounded, and 200 men killed and
wounded; no date or reason for making it. I trust
Roberts will wait for Phayre, and get in at the same
time. I must get a chance of telling him so.
I was
the first who pointed this out, and Ross and Baker
certainly agree with me.
،،
Aug. 22.—[Fifteenth day-Kajai to Baba Kazai,
seventeen and a half miles.] Rouse at one, off at 2.30.
Fine moonlight night. Had to get past the 2d
Brigade; great delay in getting off, so that by 3.30
we had done very little then, however, we slipped
along. I walked till about 4.30. Country low, undu-
: :
250
[1880.
lating hills, with Tarnak river, seldom visible, in deep
ravines on the left. It has a deal of Indian corn on
both banks. Road intersected by nasty deep ravines.
1st Brigade could not get on; off road. Frightful
confusion amongst baggage-always must be, under
this régime, which is supremely happy-go-lucky.
General issued an order for extra issue of rum and
meat; very good of him, but there is none to give !
News that Kandahar sent sortie to take village of
Deh Khwaja; got in, but had to go back, losing
quarter of their number. Wood, March (7th Fusil-
iers), Brooke, Gordon, killed; Shewell, Malcolmson,
&c., wounded. Wretched business. Roberts told me
they were going to halt at Kalat-i-Ghilzai, and I be-
lieve we are going regular marches after that.
66
Aug. 23.—[Sixteenth day-Baba Kazai to Kalat-
i-Ghilzai, sixteen and a half miles.] Rouse at one, off
at 2.30. Did very well till it got light; then Mac-
Pherson, who was leading, began to dawdle, so we did
not get in till eleven. Last part very hot; road very
good, with ravines; river close on left, with large
amount of cultivation. Close in, met Gordon of
Sind Horse; he did not ask me to breakfast. Rob-
erts, as usual, came to see us pass, and told me the
60th were not to be put on rear-guard again. I
am afraid we shall have some very nasty fighting
in walled villages, in which we shall lose a lot of
men. Very hot; did nothing-slept all day. Halt
to-morrow. Shall go and see the fort, which looks a
very strong place. A wing of Baluchis has been sent
KALAT-I-GHILZAI.
W
1880.]
66
on to Jaldak, so the country must be pretty quiet.
I shall try and get away immediately after Kandahar
Aug. 24.-[Seventeenth day-halt.] No march.
Had a delicious sleep till six. Lovely night,
beautifully cool. Then at seven rode up to fort;
went all over it. There is an immense deal more
room in it than one supposes, and if the buildings
were only arranged in order, with the stores and
animals below, and men's quarters above, there
would really be an immense deal of room in it. It
is very strong indeed, as near impregnable as any
place I ever saw. Bomb-proof quarters for the men
could easily be made, and there is a very copious
perennial stream right in the middle. I should like
to have the making of it. There is enough ground
and water within range of the guns to grow all the
supplies of every sort that would be necessary for
the garrison. Fuel is a difficulty, but forests of
willows could easily be grown down by the river-
side. Went to general, and was glad to find that
now he has given up the idea of double marches,
and has written to open communication with Phayre.
I think it very likely that Ayub will bolt now: I
shall not be sorry.
Aug. 25. [Eighteenth day-Kalat-i-Ghilzai to
Jaldak, fifteen miles.] Marched at 2.30 along the
right bank of the Tarnak. Road very good all the
way, though with a few nasty nalas, which are,
however, practicable for artillery. We stepped out,
and did not halt, so at eight we were in sight of
66
ALONG THE TARNAK.
251
--
252
[1880.
camp. Very cool and nice up to then. Got in at
9.15. General, as usual, met us, said we were to
have no more long marches. Found my little tent
pitched it is a capital arrangement, as I can carry
it on the breakfast-pony, and it gives enough shade
for four men to have breakfast, and for two to lie
down. I also always carry a towel, as it is very
refreshing to get a wash. Was brigadier-general of
the day, and went round on my pony. Must be
more particular next time I go round. Put in an
order about men saluting, as they are very slack in
this brigade. Orders say we are to go seventeen
miles to-morrow to Tirandaz, so the talk about a
short march is all bosh. We shall have a devil of a
fight. I only hope I shall get out of it with nothing
worse than a wound.
66
A PROSPECT OF FIGHTING.
'Aug. 26.-[Nineteenth day-Jaldak to Tiran-
daz, sixteen miles.] Marched at three, my brigade
in rear.
We got along very slowly, owing to the
way the 1st Brigade dawdled. The cavalry baggage,
as usual, lapped round, and surrounded us. I
stopped it, but it was no use, and by the time we
got in, it was all round us again. Nothing worse
can be conceived. Wrote and reported it. I found
my camp pitched in a most extraordinary fashion,
in three blocks facing different ways; reported it.
When we got in, heard Ayub had raised the siege
and gone to the Argandab, whence he can either go
by Khakrez to Herat or up to Ghazni. General sent
for us all, and the result is the cavalry go on to
1880.]
Rabat to-morrow, while we go half-way. I said I
thought we ought to stop here till we heard more
of what was going on, as we should only have to re-
trace our steps, if Ayub was coming up the Argandab.
Now we see the folly of giving up Kalat-i-Ghilzai, as
Ayub must get into the Tarnak at that place; and if
he gets there before us, we may have to besiege it.
"Aug. 27.-[Twentieth day-Tirandaz to Pomazai,
fifteen miles.] Marched at 2.30. We were the 2d
Brigade, and got off early, and went well all the way.
Road good, and no stoppages, so got in by 8.10,
while it was quite cool. Had my tent all pitched
by ten, fortunately, for it was very hot indeed all
day. Roberts has got a go of fever, and is laid up.
I hope he will pick up, or we shall be left to the
tender mercies of
and that will be awful.
Roberts is at all events go-ahead and decided.
Heliogram from Kandahar says that Ayub is in-
trenching himself at the Baba Wali and Murcha
Kotals; but this may only be a blind, as we also hear
he is making ready to be off. I think we should
now go from Rabat into the Argandab, and come
down on his rear: this will make him bolt, and we
can follow him up till he gets clear of Zamindawar,
and we shall pick up any guns he has to leave
behind, and that will be quite enough for us, and I
hope they will then let us go back to India as fast
as we can. I hope I shall get through all right, and
get to Simla and Calcutta.
"Aug. 28.-[Twenty-first day-Pomazai to Ra-
NEWS OF AYUB.
253
"
254
[1880.
bat, nineteen miles.] Marched at 2.30. Being the
leading regiment, got on first-rate till eight, when
Ross sent us an order to go round by the canal,
which increased the distance by some three miles,
and we did not get in till about 10.30. It was very
hot indeed, and the men were much done up. Hot
all day; did nothing but slept a couple of hours.
I was brigadier-general of the day. Went round
about the pickets, and then to see general. He talks
of making a march all night, and assaulting Baba
Wali at daybreak. I think this is too much for one
day, and am, besides, of opinion we should cut in to
the Argandab, and come down on his rear, while
Phayre attacked in front. Roberts is ready, but he
may put off till Phayre's arrival. I want the
Argandab scheme, as I think, if it is adopted, we
shall gain all our objects without fighting. Mac-
Pherson is all for attacking in front. I would send
the cavalry round to the Herat road. News says
they are determined to fight. Every one says the
mismanagement at Kandahar has been quite ter-
rible. I think
should be tried by
court-martial. Phayre is to be at Mandi Hisar on
the 2d, five days hence. We can afford to wait
till then, though it would have been better if we
had not come here in such a hurry, and it would
not have had the appearance of indecision. I wish
1
and
it was all over.
ROBERTS IS READY.
1 Major-General Phayre, commanding 2d Division, Southern Af
ghanistan Field Force, advancing from Quetta.
1880.]
AWFUL IMBECILITY.
.
255
Aug. 29.-[Twenty-second day-halted.] Had
a long sleep, and lie down all day. Very hot, 101°;
not so bad as yesterday, though. I suppose Kan-
dahar will not be worse. Gaselee¹ gave me a memo-
randum about a road from this to the Argandab,
and I sent it on with a letter to Roberts pointing
out that the proper way was to go to the Argandab,
and then down on Ayub's rear; but he sent no
answer, and when I went to see him this evening, he
said he was too seedy to read it even. We march
to Mohmand to-morrow, and to cantonments, Kan-
dahar, the next day; so I suppose we are going
to attack in front, a great mistake. And there
will be great loss of life if they fight, which per-
haps they will not. My brigade will have to lead.
There seems to have been the most awful imbecil-
ity at Kandahar, and and should be re-
called. Phayre is not expected before the 10th, so
we shall not wait for him. I shall go and recon-
noitre the pass directly we get in.
(C
Aug. 30.-[Twenty-third day-Rabat to Moh-
mand, seven and a half miles.] Marched at 3.30.
The 2d Brigade got off the road, going a great deal
more to the right, and so we, who went right, had to
wait for them. The road went over a level plain of
good soil cut up with water-courses from the Logar.
We were much delayed on the road, and did not get
in till 8.30. Very hot again to-day. Went to see the
general, who is much better. Was glad to hear he
1 Captain A. Gaselee, Bengal Staff Corps, D.A.Q.M.G.
G
256
[1880.
had no idea of going straight to the Baba Wali Pass,
which is strongly intrenched, and is very difficult;
but he means to go round. Primrose recommended
him to send his cavalry to the north-west, and to
scatter his infantry ! ! To-morrow MacPherson's
brigade takes possession of the Karez hill. I do
not suppose there will be much, if any, opposition.
Then we go round by the south end of the ridge,
perhaps not next day, but the day after, when
Roberts gets all right. I wish it was all over, but
the general said he did not wish to lose lives. I
am glad of this; but these fellows mean fighting,
and are said to have 30,000 men, and there is some
one who knows what he is about with them.
THEY MEAN FIGHTING.
(C
Aug. 31.-[Twenty-fourth day-Mohmand to
Kandahar, thirteen miles. Total, 301 miles from
Kabal.] Marched at 2.30 over a dead level plain,
and got to Shikarpur gate at 8.30.
Here was a
scene of the most indescribable confusion, as all the
baggage had cut in and surrounded the troops.
The men got some food, and the natives had to
buy what they wanted. At 10.30 we got off, and
got to the Karez hill. No opposition, put out my
pickets, and had a much too extensive line given
me. A very hot, disagreeable day. Presently an
order came for me to supply a regiment for a recon-
naissance which was to go out. They went out
1
1
4
1 A reconnaissance en force under General Gough found Ayub's
troops intrenched at Pir Paimal. The enemy followed Gough's recon-
naissance back to Old Kandahar, where MacGregor's brigade had to
turn out under arms to repel the attack and cover retirement of Gough.
1880.]
and were attacked, and retired on my position, con-
sequently brought an attack down on it, which went
on for three hours, some of the time pretty hot.
However, we never gave them a chance; they went
on sniping all night. Very demoralising being at-
tacked by an unseen enemy. We lost only ten men,
though (one killed, nine wounded).
"Kandahar, Sept. 1.-At six went to the gen-
eral, and he explained his plan of attack. There
were a whole heap of officers there-the Kandahar
heroes,
and Co.-looking very cheap.
He proposed sending cavalry to left to draw enemy
out, and then attacking Paimal with 1st and
2d Brigades; but the enemy were too soon, and so
cavalry did not get out till 10.30. Then brigades
went and drove them back, till it ended in a very
complete rout by 12.30. It has been a brilliant
success, and we have got all Ayub's guns. Poor
Maclaine¹ was found murdered-his throat cut. I
looked at him; he seemed an unusually fine fellow..
There were a lot of tents, some of them ours. Then
we came home, getting in by 4.30. Poor Brownlow,
72d, killed, also Frome and Straton.2 Our losses
about 200, enemy about 200 killed. The 92d and
72d Highlanders did it all, and drove them before
them like sheep; a very brilliant feat, and one to
take the shine out of the Bombay fellows. Their
BATTLE OF KANDAHAR.
257
2
¹ Lieutenant Hector Maclaine, of Major Blackwood's battery R.H.A.,
had been taken at Maiwand, and was a prisoner in Ayub's camp.
2 Captain Straton, 22d Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling.
VOL. II.
R
258
[1880.
regiments are very puny and wretched, and not fit
to fight the Afghans.
THIRTY-FOUR GUNS TAKEN.
((
Sept. 2. Slept till seven. Nothing doing all
day; very hot and beastly. If this sort of thing goes
on long, I shall get ill-congestion of liver. Heat
immediately knocks me up. Went in the evening
to Brownlow's funeral. The stench of the dead bodies
was awful; lost my way coming back.
"Kandahar, Sept. 3.-Did not get up till eight.
Went over to see the quarters told off for my
brigade very unhealthy-looking; then went to the
general's quarters. He is looking very ill. Got
back very hot. Did not feel the heat much. In
evening went with Baker to the citadel, and called
on the 7th and 66th; saw a lot of fellows-do not
know who they all were. I should say it was very
hot and unhealthy in the citadel; wonder they do
not order them out. We have taken thirty-four
guns, and lost some 250 men; seventy-five out of
92d alone. Seven officers wounded and three killed
I go
I
-with Shewell and Maclaine, five. The general
likes me, I think, as he often comes to see me.
into quarters to-morrow, as we have got a house.
do hope we are not going to stay here long. Phayre
comes in to-morrow, and the 15th Hussars.
"Kandahar, Sept. 4.-Moved after breakfast
into quarters; found them very hot and stuffy all
day. In evening went to hospital. Had only one
wounded man to show, while the other brigades had
many.
1880.
INSIDE KANDAHAR.
((
259
Sept. 5.-I went for a ride all round canton-
ments: the stench was awful everywhere. I feel as
if one must get ill stopping here. Not so hot to-day.
Went in evening to citadel to Edwardes's quarters;
very stuffy.
،،
'Sept. 6.-Did nothing all day. Went to city by
Herat gate. Good streets meeting at the Charsu ¹
might be made something of. Saw Ahmad Shah's
tomb; dome beautifully proportioned, brick; few
inferior tiles inside; architecture good, spoilt by
tawdry ornaments. Passed the captured guns.
Went to a sale, bid for a knife, then back in
evening. Phayre has come in; 2 saw Wyllie and
Somerset, his aides - de - camp. Had talk with
Roberts, who is determined to get our division back
sharp; glad of it. Am sick of this place.
66
Sept. 7.-Rode down to call on Primrose with
Baker; found him going out, so went to Shewell's
sale and got an easy-chair; then back, and saw
Phayre, who is just as hale and hearty as ever, al-
though over sixty. Got a letter from Dunsford con-
gratulating me on being made K.C.B. I hope it
will come true. A man (Douglas) of the 15th
Hussars came to breakfast, and said they were
starving, because not allowed to forage; wrote and
1 At the point of intersection of the main streets is a large dome
called the Charsu.
C
2 General Phayre's force, the 2d Division, Southern Afghanistan
Field Force, arrived at Karez-i-Zarak, about twelve miles south of
Kandahar, on the 5th. The headquarters staff rode into Kandahar
the following day.
260
[1880.
told general, and he replied that he was going
to Gulistan Karez, and we were to go with him;
very glad. Engaged all rest of day in giving orders
for our march down; 1 every one very glad indeed.
"Mandi Hisar, Sept. 8.-Marched at 4.45,
arrived at nine. Road good all way over plain,
mostly cultivable. Passed two or three villages.
The Central India Horse is with me. Not very hot.
Got breakfast and tent up by 10.30. General did
not arrive till 6.30; showed me telegrams from
Viceroy, Chief, Duke, Hartington, and Queen, con-
gratulating him on splendid victory and great
march. He surely ought to be a peer after this.
"Abdul Rahman Camp, Sept. 9.-Marched at
1.30. Got on very well, though it was very dark,
as we had a guide. Got to the Arghesan about five,
and in at 8.30. Road very good all way-water at
several places; country dead level. Heathcote,
Colonel 19th, met me; he seems an intelligent man.
The regiment is smart. We had an awful day
from dust, which went on till after dark; then it
rained, and became delightfully cool. I went to see
Roberts, who is very cheery again, and seemed all
right. If no more rain comes, we march at 1.30. I
do not want to stop. General says we may go on
CONGRATULATIONS.
1 The 3d Brigade, under MacGregor, was ordered to be ready to
march the following day (8th), with Lieutenant-General Roberts,
towards Peshin.
This Brigade, being composed of regiments which had formed part
of the original advance on Kandahar, was therefore the first to be
brought back.
1880.]
to Quetta, which is cool, at all events, then we can
get down by degrees.
"Abdul Rahman Camp, Sept. 10.-Poured all
night, so we halted. The day was most deliciously
cool. 15th and 23d came in, so now I have six
regiments under my command. I suppose I shall
only keep it till we get to Quetta. Telegraphed to
Commander-in-Chief to see if there was no chance
of my getting three months' leave. I do not think
he will give it me, but it is worth trying. A snake
was found to-day at the head of my bed, just where
I put my hand to get matches, &c., so I have taken
to sleeping in a dhoolie.
"Started at three. Lost the way; however,
afterwards we got on very well, and were in by
eight. Very cool march, excellent road, no water,
over desolate country. Passed Takhtipul, where
there was a fight in first campaign.
"Camp Dabrai, Sept. 11.-Started at 3.30. Road
good all the way; coldish at first. Got in by eight.
This place, Dabrai, is a desolate spot on a bare plain
of good soil, covered with southernwood, and with
the Khwaja Amran mountains looming large in the
distance it is the first regular range we have seen
for some time. Euan Smith asked me how the
command at Kandahar would suit me, and general
showed me a telegram from Viceroy asking his
ON THE WAY DOWN.
261
1 On the 4th January 1879, the advance-guard of the Quetta Field
Force, under Brigadier-General Palliser, engaged the Afghan cavalry,
1200 strong, and put them to flight with an estimated loss of a hundred
killed and wounded.
262
[1880.
opinion about retention of Kandahar. I got him to
write a telegram strongly recommending it, then he
asked me how it would suit me. This has put it
into my head, and I must get up to Simla, and
work it. Roberts has been made a G.C.B., and got
the Madras command."
TREMENDOUSLY BUCKED UP.
"Dabrai to Gatai, Sept. 13.-Marched at 4.45 to
Gatai; day was just breaking. The road all over
fine plain, good soil, and cultivable, if there was
only water. At four miles passed between low hills.
We went on to Mula Amir on account of water, four
miles. Got in by eight. Very cold at starting.
Did nothing all day, as usual; there is nothing to
do as brigadier-general. Went to see Brackenbury,
who is down with dysentery; nice cheery chap and
zealous. A telegram gives the Queen's speech, in
which she bucks us all up tremendously. General
has asked for a special medal and six months' batta.
I think we shall not get the first, but a clasp, and
perhaps we may get three months.
66
Chaman, Sept. 14.-Marched at two, over a
dead plain, with gentle ascent at end to Chaman, a
place at foot of Khojak Pass. Found nothing up.
Had breakfast with Crawford, Artillery. Roberts
told me he was going to send two of my regi-
ments to Shorawak : I protested, as I must get
up to Simla. Met Westmacott, road commandant ;
seems good man, intelligent and gentlemanly. I
hope the Shorawak trip will be knocked on the
head.
1880.]
BAD GUIDES.
263
"Kala Abdulla, Sept. 15.-Marched at 4.30 to
Kala Abdulla. For two miles up bed of stream,
pretty easy gradient; then by a zigzag road over
Khojak. Not a very good road, too steep for carts,
and too sharp turns, two miles up. The position on
the top is a very bad one, commanded, and water
long way off. The filth and want of ordinary
sanitary arrangements very conspicuous. Road
down the same, then down the bed of stream.
Great many trees, lots of fuel on hills. Kala Ab-
dulla on desolate plain. Ordered to
Ghurkhas and 15th Sikhs by another road.
Shorawak scheme knocked on the head.
came over to say good-bye.
send 4th
Got the
Roberts
"Segi, Sept. 16.-Marched at 2.30.
Bad guides,
who took us wrong at 'first; however, road all over
level. Got in at nine. Passed four or five villages.
Soil salt, but would be good with water. Wrote to
general to thank him for his letter of yesterday, and
asked him to write to Lord Ripon; hope he will.
Markey came and told me a man had cholera; after-
wards he said he was getting over it. I do hope
there will be no cholera, as that would perhaps keep
me here indefinitely, and I want so much to go to
Simla.
“Dinar Karez, Sept. 17.-Marched at 4.45 over
dead plain to Dinar Karez. In at eight. Half-way
crossed the Lora, which has a good deal of water for
this country, which could well be utilised, if raised
by Persian wells or pumps, as the soil is excellent,
264
[1880.
but there are no people. Glad to say the cholera
was a false alarm. Arrived here. No forage, so sent
on the Central India Horse to next camp.
Mehtarzai, Sept. 18.-Marched at three. As-
cent for six miles over the Ghazarband Pass, then
descent. Good natural road, nothing done to it.
Easy march; had lots of forage for animals. Quetta
valley, open bare plain, good soil, might be made
anything of. Found some beer, and bought a dozen.
Hope we shall get orders to go here.
"Quetta, Sept. 19.—Marched at five, got in by 8.30.
Fine plain, with plenty of water. Quetta not bad
place, with good soil and water-supply; has the
making of a fine station. Captain Curzon Wyllie,
political, came to see me; seems nice fellow. Got
telegram to say we are to go through Mari country;
do not like it. In afternoon, Lieutenant-Colonel
M'Calmont and Lord St Vincent, 7th Hussars, came
to see me; say wanted to go, said no objections, but
shall tell them I will have them work. Came out
from England to Quetta in twenty-eight days, good
going. Hope we shall have a good fight, and get
out of it well; it will do me good."
66
HOPE FOR A GOOD FIGHT.
265
I
CHAPTER VII.
THE MARI EXPEDITION.
1880.
Where twined the path in shadow hid,
Round many a rocky pyramid,
Round many an insulated mass,
The native bulwarks of the pass."
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY POSTS ON THE SIBI-QUETTA LINE-
BRIGADIER-GENERAL MACGREGOR'S FORCE-CROSSING THE SARA-
KHULA THROUGH THE CHAPAR RIFT
DESERTED VILLAGES
-A PUNITIVE EXPEDITION TO THE MARI COUNTRY TERMS
OFFERED TO THE CHIEFS-SKIRMISH AT SPIN TANGI-A PLUN-
DERED STATION-THE REAR-GUARD FIRED ON-RESTITUTION OF
GRAIN-RECONNAISSANCES-ALARM
HILLS RETURN TO INDIA.
-
1
p
FIRES-THE FORMIDABLE
LUNIS THE KOLU VALLEY
SEMBHAR PASS-THE BOMBAY CAVALRY ATTACKED-FRIENDLY
MEHRULLA KHAN'S FORT—RE-
MARKABLE CLIFF—SUBMISSION OF THE MARIS—THE BIHISTO
BRIGADIER-GENERAL MACGREGOR, with the 25th
Panjab Native Infantry and four guns of 11-9
Mountain Battery, marched from Quetta on the
24th September towards Kach, with the object of
opening the road from that place towards Sibi, and
of re-establishing the military posts thereon, all of
[1880.
which had been withdrawn by General Phayre last
month to reinforce his division for the advance to
relieve Kandahar. Having accomplished this, he
was instructed to collect a force at Kach, consisting
of the 2d 60th Rifles, 4th and 5th Ghurkhas, 3d and
4th Sikhs, and 11-9 Royal Artillery, for a punitive
expedition into the Mari country. The following
extracts are from Brigadier-General MacGregor's
official report, and private notes.
66
Quetta to Gundak, Sept. 24 (distance, fourteen
miles; altitude, 6500 feet).-The march to-day was
to Gundak by General Phayre's road, which leads
first over the plain north-east, and then enters the
hills, through which it follows the course of the
Sarakhula¹ stream to the halting-place. There is
but one small village in the valley north-east of the
Gundak camping-ground, and provisions are not
obtainable, with the exception of a few sheep and
goats; but there are sufficient trees and bushes to
furnish fuel. The Takatu mountain (11,000 feet in
height) runs along, due west, from which signalling
can be carried on with most of the posts in this part
of the country.
266
ACROSS THE SARAKHULA.
"Gundak to Kach, Sept. 25 (distance, sixteen
miles; altitude, 6100 feet). The road from here
gradually ascends to the Sarakhula Pass (6800 feet),
and is in fair order; but from that point the rain has
damaged it. It follows the bed of the stream through
1 The Sarakhula or Saraghurg (sara, rough; khula, mouth, gorge, or
debouchure of a torrent, ravine). Gundak means a pointed hill.
1880.]
narrow gorges, and in some places was nearly im-
passable for baggage-animals. It then emerges on
to a small open valley, where the camping-ground,
called Saran Tangi, has been fixed. General Phayre's
road here enters a very narrow gorge between two
hills, which was found to be in such a rough state
that it was decided to proceed by the old road lead-
ing over the hill to the left. A vile road. Found a
nice state of affairs. Do not like this business at all.
Have got to establish posts, and have no carriage to
do it with. Do not know how I shall succeed; wish
I was out of it. It is a
shame sending me off
in this happy-go-lucky way.
"The column started at 5-45, and reached Kach
at 11.30; but the rear-guard did not arrive until
7 P.M.
DISAGREEABLE BUSINESS.
267
"Kach, Sept. 26.-In consequence of the non-
arrival here of the Ghurkhas and 15th Sikhs, the
column is halted here to-day. Men have been sent
on to repair the road, and to render the passage
through the Chapar Rift fit for the baggage-animals.
Dr Duke and Captains Brackenbury and Gill accom-
pany this party. Orders were sent last night to
Colonel Rowcroft at Kawas to come here.
"The village of Kach has recently been destroyed,
in consequence of an attack made by 2000 ghazis at
daybreak of the 16th August, on the garrison, under
Colonel Pierce; and the nearest villages are eleven
miles up the valley, but they can furnish hardly any
supplies. The post established by us consists of a
268
[1880.
small square mud fort built close to the bank of the
Mangi river, and is commanded by a hill about 200
feet high, and within 200 yards, which, however, is
occupied by a picket, as is also another ridge on the
other opposite bank of the stream.
66
Kach, Sept. 27.—The 4th Ghurkhas, 15th Sikhs,
two guns 11-9th Royal Artillery, and one company
2d 60th Rifles, marched in from Wam, arriving at
11.10 A.M. Colonel Rowcroft reports the road ex-
ceedingly bad.
"The party sent from Quetta to repair the tele-
graph-wire arrived this evening, and communication
opened with Quetta and other places.
(6
POST ON THE MANGI.
Kach to Dargi, Sept. 28 (distance, seventeen
miles).—The 4th Ghurkhas, 15th Sikhs, 25th Native
Infantry, a company of the 2d 60th, and 11-9th
Royal Artillery marched from Kach at 4.30 A.M., led
by a hundred sabres Central India Horse. The road
crossed the river immediately below the fort, and
then zigzags up and down the further side of a low
hill, and takes the bed of the river, and leads through
a gorge and down the valley, which widens out to
about a mile, until the fort of Mangi is reached.
"The fort at Mangi or North Chapar is merely an
irregular-shaped enclosure, with walls three feet in
height, of unburnt brick, about 300 yards from the
river and 600 yards from the entrance of the Chapar
Rift. A detachment of one hundred men has just
taken up the post, and orders have been issued to im-
prove it by building the walls to seven feet, with loop-
1880.]
holes, and making a covered way to the river, protected
by a sangar on the opposite hill. Loose dynamite
was found lying about, left there by the natives when
they plundered the place. Orders have been given
to Colonel Pierce to send a British officer to store it,
and to see to the defences.
LOOSE DYNAMITE.
269
..
The rift is only about twenty feet wide for some
few hundred yards at its entrance, and then gradu-
ally widens out between the precipices. The total
length of this passage through the Chapar mountain
is nearly two miles, and most of the pathway is ex-
posed to fire from the cliffs above. Great difficulty
was experienced by the transport officer and rear-
guard in getting the baggage-animals through the
rift, especially after dusk, and the latter did not
reach camp till after midnight.
66
Dargi to Nidar, one of the Kosht villages, Sept.
29 (distance, nine miles).—It having been reported
that the people near Harnai were selling grain, &c.,
which they had plundered from us recently, I sent
Dr Duke, political officer, with the hundred sabres
Central India Horse, to march towards Harnai with
the object of stopping the further removal and sale of
the grain. The 15th Sikhs marched at 5 A.M., with
orders to halt at Sharigh as a support to the cavalry.
The remainder of the troops marched at 6 A.M., and
halted on some high ground just above the village of
Nidar.
"Nidar to Sharigh, Sept. 30 (distance, ten miles ;
altitude, 3650 feet).—Marched at 5.45, and reached
270
[1880.
Sharigh at 9.30. The road
The road goes through low hills,
and leads on to an open plain covered with crops of
rice, and well watered. The brigade encamped with-
in a few hundred yards of the buildings which had
been erected by the railway people last year, most
of which have been unroofed and looted by the
natives. Sharigh consists of three villages close
together, and was found to be deserted. The in-
habitants having very recently and hurriedly left
them, most of the plunder from the railway build-
ings was found in them, as well as a considerable
quantity of grain and fuel. Two companies 24th
Bombay Native Infantry have been established here.
HIDDEN PLUNDER.
--
-
"Sharigh to Nasak, Oct. 1 (distance, nine miles;
altitude, 2600 feet).-Marched at 5.30. The road
goes over a tolerably level country, and then dips
down into a large nala, with a stream running
through it, which opens into a narrow valley. The
railway-house at Nasak is unroofed and empty, and
the small village deserted, as are also the only vil-
lages within reach. The foraging parties found very
little in the villages, but recovered a small quantity
of grain in Government bags, hidden in the jungle,
which is mostly stunted palm, and in which the
men found a number of wild pigs and partridges.
"Nasak to Harnai. Oct. 2 (distance, eight miles;
altitude, 2600 feet). The road from here passes
over a low ridge through which a railway cutting
is being made, and then through low hills until
Harnai camp-ground is reached, close to the fort
1880.]
271
and railway buildings, which consist of two blocks.
of quarters, a commissariat enclosure, and a set of
go-downs. The fort is well situated in a bend of
the river, with a covered way down to some springs.
of excellent water, walls loopholed, and with small
demi - bastions at two opposite corners. On the
arrival of the Central India Horse on the 30th, two
reconnoitring parties went toward the hills, and
found that the natives were carrying off a consider-
able quantity of grain. The sowars were fired on
when they attempted to seize the cattle upon which
the sacks were loaded. The surrounding villages
have been found to contain most of the property and
grain, &c., removed by them on our departure, and
is now being brought in by them. The camp has
been pitched on the left bank of the Pan stream.
The Foreign Secretary approved terms submitted.1
TERMS OFFERED TO MARIS.
1 "Our proposals as follow: Agent Governor-General will proceed at
once to Sibi, and there summon Mari chiefs to meet him. He will
offer following terms :—-
"1. Restitution of treasure and bullocks plundered from railway
convoys.
"2. Twenty thousand rupees fine to compensate private losses.
"3. Blood-money, according to tribal custom, for those slain.
"4. Troops to march through Mari country by Kahan to Harrand.
"5. Surrender of leaders in late raid. (Roberts and I are somewhat
doubtful about this fifth clause, knowing extreme repugnance
of hill tribes to deliver up any of their people. We leave this
to you to decide.)
"6. Approved hostages to be given for future good conduct of the clan.
"General MacGregor's force will at once occupy Quat-Mandai, one
march from railway line, and await result of negotiations."
(6
Reply from the Foreign Secretary: Terms proposed by you are
approved with exception of fifth clause, regarding surrender of
leaders. This should be omitted."
272
[1880.
B
"Harnai, Oct. 3.-The 25th Panjab Native In-
fantry and 15th Sikhs were sent on to Spin Kach
this morning, with orders to halt there and put the
path over the Spin Tangi in good order. The bat-
tery, Ghurkhas, and a company of the 2d 60th, re-
mained at Harnai. I, accompanied by Dr Duke and
Shepherd, visited the villages and the country in the
vicinity of the camp towards Spin Kach. The
valley appears to be most fertile in that direction,
and well furnished with trees.
MARCH TO SPIN KACH.
"Harnai to Spin Kach, Oct. 4 (distance, seven-
teen miles; altitude, 1200 feet).-Marched with the
squadron, Central India Horse, to Spin Kach. The
road gradually descends 1400 feet; leads along the
foot of the low hills, then over the plateau; dips
to the river-bed, and takes to the plateau again,
after which descends again to the river, and fol-
lows the right bank until the camp of Spin Kach
is reached, on a ridge between the streams Babian
and Kuriak.
"The pathway over the hill at Spin Tangi was re-
ported ready for the baggage-animals to get over; it
is a zigzag rising, and rather steep in places. The
Tangi itself is a deep pool of water, which completely
fills up the space between the rocky cut through the
hill. The railway people have hitherto kept up
communication with Spin Kach by means of a boat
and rafts, but these have apparently been washed
away, as quantities of débris have accumulated
among the rocks.
:
1880.]
"Spin Kach to Spin Tangi,¹ Oct. 5 (distance, three
and a half miles; altitude, 1500 feet).—The troops
left the camp at 4.30, and reached the Spin Tangi,
two and a half miles, at daylight, about 5.15. The
15th Sikhs and Central India Horse passed over at
once and halted on the high bank. The baggage-
animals were then sent up in batches by the brigade
transport officer, and were handed on by sepoys of
the 25th Panjab Native Infantry. The quarter-
masters superintended the transit of the baggage,
which, commencing to ascend the path at 5.15, had
passed completely over by 12.55. Finding that it
would be rather late for the troops to continue the
march, I decided to encamp at Spin Tangi, which
post consists of a fair fort and a bungalow about 200
yards from it; but all these buildings have been un-
roofed and are quite empty, most of the property
belonging to the late occupants having been found
to-day in the village of Mian Kach.
REPULSE OF ENEMY.
273
'At about 7 A.M. a number of men were observed
on the ridge above the Ganeji gap, and on the ap-
proach of some sepoys whom I sent up to crown the
heights, at once opened fire upon the 15th and Cen-
tral India Horse, at about 900 yards' range, as well
as upon the baggage-animals in the ravine, waiting
to ascend the pathway. The firing lasted about
twenty minutes, and then the enemy retired, having
caused the following casualties: two sowars (Cen-
tral India Horse), two sepoys (15th Sikhs), two
1 Spin Tangi, more properly the Ganeji Rift or Gap.
VOL. II.
S
274
[1880.
kahars, and two transport animals wounded. The
enemy's casualties are not known.
..
Spin Kach to Kuchali, Oct. 6 (distance, twelve
miles; altitude, 1100 feet).-Marched at 4.30 A.M.
At the fourth mile the fort and post of Dalojal is
reached; it had been plundered and hardly anything
left. The road then passes through very narrow
valleys until it reaches Zindag-i-Ab, where the val-
ley opens. The bed of the Gundakin stream is passed
immediately beyond this post. Four miles further
on Kuchali is reached. The troops arrived at about
ten o'clock, and as the heat was great, and a large
store of bhusa was found, the camp was pitched.
The remains of property of all sorts was found lying
all about the place. The railway engine was stand-
ing on the line-injured considerably-with a few
burnt carriages attached to it. Of the three bunga-
lows, only one had been much damaged. Large
quantities of railway stores were found partly dam-
aged in the fort, which is a low loopholed wall of
sunburnt bricks on the plateau.
Kuchali to Kalat-i-Kila, Oct. 7 (distance, twelve
miles; altitude, 600 feet).—Left Kuchali at 4.30
A.M., and reached Kalat-i-Kila at 11 A.M. The road
crosses the Nari river, and then winds through
narrow valleys to Gundakin Daf. It then goes down
the valley of Bhadra, crosses the river, and passes
between the cliffs forming the Babar Kach Tangi;
winds through a narrow valley, crossing the river
frequently, until Kalat-i-Kila is reached, which con-
66
WRECKED RAILWAY PLANT.
Gam
275
1880.]
sists of a bungalow, surrounded by a loopholed wall,
and situated on the plain clear of the hills. Most of
the way, from Kuchali to Gundakin Daf, and from
Babar Kach to Kalat-i-Kila, is commanded by steep,
rocky, and very high hills, many places being quite
inaccessible, with perpendicular cliffs, which, if held
by an enemy, would prove very troublesome and
difficult to turn. The large village of Bhadra is seen
in the middle of the valley surrounded by crops.
The people were much excited at our approach, and
were seen driving off their cattle, &c., but eventually
the chief malik came out to salaam with a lot of
followers, all of whom were caused to accompany the
force. Nevertheless, our rear-guard was fired on
when quitting the camp-ground, and a sepoy, 25th
Panjab Native Infantry, and a transport-driver
wounded, also a pony killed; and the same men
followed up the company for some two or three miles,
without, however, doing any more damage. The
range they opened fire at was probably 1400 or 1500
yards, so it is very likely they had one of the stolen
Martini carbines left by the railway people.
"Kalat-i-Kila to Sibi, Oct. 8 (distance, seventeen
miles; altitude, 480 feet).-Marched at 4.30 over
the open valley, and then over a low ridge, after
which the river is crossed and the valley becomes
narrow, with high cliffs on the right, similar to yes-
terday's march. The river-bed is followed the whole
way by the road and railway, and eventually emerges
into the plain at Nari mouth, ten miles from Kalat-
REAR-GUARD FIRED UPON.
276
FUNERAL OF LIEUT.-COLONEL COLLINS. [1880.
i-Kila. The remainder of the road is perfectly level,
and runs along the railway, which is open to this
post, although the telegraph is not. On arrival, 15th
Sikhs and 25th Native Infantry encamped near the
railway station in readiness to go off to India. The
5th Ghurkhas, 2d 60th Rifles, and 2d Sikhs were en-
camped on the maidan, having arrived yesterday;
and the 3d Panjab Cavalry is encamped at Nari
-
bank.
"Sibi, Oct. 9.-Halted. The 15th Sikhs started
for India by rail at 7.45 P.M., leaving eighty-two
kahars behind to supply any requirements in the
corps of my newly formed force. The funeral of the
late Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, 2d 60th Rifles, took
place in the Sibi cemetery near camp.
"Sibi, Oct. 10.-Halted. Divine service held in
2d 60th camp at 6.30 A.M. 3d Sikhs marched into
camp at 9 A.M. All regiments engaged in complet-
ing requirements in ammunition, shoes, blankets,
carriage, &c.
"Sibi to Kalat-i-Kila, Oct. 11 (distance, seven-
teen miles; altitude, 763 feet).-The 2d 60th Rifles,
2d Sikhs, and 5th Ghurkhas marched from Sibi at
4.30 A.M., under command of Colonel Fitzhugh, 5th
Ghurkhas. The 2d Sikhs were left at Nari mouth,
and the other two corps, continuing the march, en-
camped three miles short of Kalat-i-Kila on a bend
of the river.
Kalat-i-Kila to Babar Kach, Oct. 12 (distance,
seven miles; altitude, 963 feet).-The 2d 60th Rifles
66
1880.]
and 5th Ghurkhas continued their march this morn-
ing, and arrived at the camp-ground at the entrance
of the Babar Kach Tangi. We marched from Sibi
with the 3d Panjab Cavalry and 3d Sikhs to the
camp-ground near Kalat-i-Kila, and the 2d Sikhs
escorted the grain convoy to Kalat-i-Kila itself.
The camping-ground the force is assembling on is a
very large plateau covered with long grass and some
bushes, about ten feet above the level of the river,
which runs close to it.
277
PLUNDER AT BHADRA.
-
"Babar Kach, Oct. 13.-Marched with the 3d
Sikhs and 3d Panjab Cavalry into Babar Kach
camp at 8.30 A.M. Lieutenant Jennings reports
that the village of Bhadra contains a quantity of
grain, and that the people have been ordered to de-
posit in the camp all that they took from the post
of Gundakin Daf.
"Babar Kach to Qwat, Oct. 14 (distance, ten
miles; altitude, 1093 feet).-The 3d Panjab Cav-
alry moved off at 5.30 A.M. up the valley to recon-
noitre; followed half an hour later by the 2d 60th,
2d Sikhs, 3d Sikhs, and 4th Ghurkhas. The village
and fort of Qwat was reached at about nine, and
found to have been rather hurriedly deserted, as
guns and shields and a good deal of property were
discovered in the houses. The infantry encamped
on either side of the fort, and the cavalry went on
as far as Mandai, returning a couple of hours later.
—
"Qwat, Oct. 15. I sent a party of Sikhs
to Mandai this morning to bring in all Govern-
278
[1880.
ment property, and destroy everything not worth
carrying away. Nothing of any value was dis-
covered, with the exception of nine Government
carts, which were brought on. A small cavalry
reconnaissance went up the valley about three
miles, and found that the road is nearly impass-
able. The 5th Ghurkhas marched in from Babar
Kach with the remainder of the grain which was
left there, and some that was taken out of Bhadra
village.
A RECONNAISSANCE.
"Qwat, Oct. 16.-Each regiment was sent out for
a couple of hours to-day, taking all its transport
animals, for the purpose of cutting and bringing in
the juar crop, which has been collected in front of
the fort.
"I made a reconnaissance to the entrance of the
valley out of which the Harnai river flows. No
enemy appeared, and, as far as could be seen, the
way seemed by no means difficult, although very
stony.
66
Qwat to Dalojal, Oct. 17 (distance, fifteen
miles; altitude, 1693 feet). The whole of the
force-with the exception of the 2d Sikhs, one
squadron 3d Panjab Cavalry, and two guns 11-9
Royal Artillery, which are left at Qwat as a gar-
rison for the present-marched at 5.30 A.M. this
morning, and reached Dalojal at 1 P.M.
The path-
way follows the bed of the Harnai river the whole
distance, at first through a fairly open valley, and
later between high cliffs, which, however, are very
1880.]
easily crowned, the men being quite able to keep up
with the column below.
SIGNAL-FIRES.
279
66
Dalojal to Spin Kach, Oct. 18 (distance, six
miles; altitude, 1843 feet).-The column moved off
at 5.30. Two companies 4th Ghurkhas were sent on
half an hour in advance, and crowned the heights
on either side of the gap, but saw no enemy. The
troops commenced passing over at seven; and at ten
o'clock, seeing that the baggage could not be got
over until very late in the day, I decided on en-
camping at Spin Kach, where the Bombay troops,
to form the Thal garrison (consisting of 348 men
15th Native Infantry, 132 sabres 2d Bombay Cav-
alry, and two guns Jacobabad Mountain Battery),
had already arrived.
(C
Spin Kach to Kuriak, Oct. 19 (distance, eight
miles; altitude, 2443 feet).—I made a reconnais-
sance up the valley leading towards Thal from Spin
Tangi at 11 A.M., in order to look for a camping-
ground three or four miles on that road; but the
only place where water was found, two and a half
miles from Spin Kach, the quantity was not suf-
ficient for the force. No enemy was seen.
In con-
sequence of the baggage not having yet crossed over
Spin Tangi this morning until 7 A.M., we did not
march until 8 A.M. The road leads up the Kuriak
stream, and passes over the plateau to the camping-
ground. A few men were seen during the march
on the high mountain south of the road, who lighted
signal-fires, but disappeared as soon as half a com-
ka
-
280
[1880.
pany
of Ghurkhas was sent up after them. The rear-
guard arrived in camp to-day at 6 P.M.
"Kuriak to Kanti, Oct. 20 (distance, eleven miles;
altitude, 3343 feet).-The troops marched in two
separate columns. One high mountain runs parallel
on the right, about a mile off, the whole distance,
and the path winds through low hills from Kuriak
camp-ground over a kotal, about 600 feet high, and
then down to a plain. On this occasion all the
transport animals have been watered at the camp-
ing-ground near the road, and the camp of the
whole force pitched along the edge of the deep
ravine.
PUSHING ON FOR WATER.
..
Kanti to the Well, Oct. 21 (distance, nineteen
miles; altitude, 3243 feet).-Marched at 5.30 A.M.
Crossed the Sembhar valley, and again entered the
hills, passing over a low kotal (4043 feet), and down
to the halting-place. The only water is found in
two small pools under a cliff a little further on,
through a narrow gorge, through which the road
passes. There is a sufficient quantity for a large
force, but for the men only, and is slightly salt in
flavour. Under these circumstances, I decided to
push on to the next water, at the entrance of the
further end of the pass, particularly as the road
was reported to be a made one, and very passable
for mule-carriage. Leading from this halting-place
there are two rather steep kotals, and at the fifteenth
mile the road became almost impassable in a small
narrow gorge, and for the next three miles is little
1880.]
better than a narrow rocky ravine, in which the
road is almost sure to be washed away by a good
fall of rain. The last mile is outside the pass over
the open to the well, and owing to waiting con-
stantly for the baggage, and even the ammunition,
to close up, the leading troops did not reach the
camping - ground until 5.20 P.M. Fortunately it
was a bright moonlight night, and the bulk of the
baggage arrived before morning; but the rear-guard
of 3d Sikhs and 2d 60th did not clear out of the pass
until 11.30 A.M. on the 22d. The absence of water
and want of food have much knocked up the trans-
port animals, and ninety-two have been left dead and
abandoned. This pass may be said to extend over
nearly ten miles, and would be a most formidable
one to get through if held by even a not very
numerous enemy. I sent the cavalry to Biland,
where water for the horses was obtained from a
tank, the well-water being almost undrinkable on
account of its salt flavour.
A FORMIDABLE PASS.
281
"The Well to Thal, Oct. 22 (distance, seven
miles; altitude, 3243 feet).-Some companies from
the 2d 60th Rifles, 3d Sikhs, and 15th Bombay
Native Infantry were sent into the pass at 8.30
A.M. to relieve and assist the rear-guard, and, with
the remainder of the troops with the baggage, field-
hospital, &c., we marched to Thal and encamped.
There is a good supply of water, the karez water
being brought close to the station, and the river
water can be turned on when required. Nothing
Gint
[1880.
was left in the buildings, and even the wooden
part of the roofs was in most cases removed, but
the villagers to whom the stores were given to
take charge of, are returning nearly everything.
The fort is square, with a round tower at each
corner. A commissariat go-down is built in the
centre, with a large well, and the barracks for
the garrison are built outside the fort.
282
(C
Thal, Oct. 23.-Halt. In order to fill up with
provisions and rest the animals, I halted to-day.
Heard in the evening that the 2d Bombay Cavalry
when coming through the Sembhar Pass had been
fired on, so ordered the 3d Panjab Cavalry, squadron
2d Bombay Cavalry, and 4th Ghurkhas to proceed to
its assistance at 4.30 P.M.; the detachment had, how-
ever, nearly cleared the pass by 5.30 P.M. The officer
in command reported having seen the bodies of seven
followers who had been killed along the road, and
that a good many men had collected on the hills
over the Sembhar watering-place and fired on the
rear-guard, and that one sowar was wounded. A
number of Lunis came to-day and professed friendly
intentions, requesting at the same time permission
to go and fight the Maris with us. The thermom-
eter goes down to 37° during the night, but the days
are still hot between 11 and 3 P.M. in a tent.
HOSTILITY OF MARIS.
66
Thal, Oct. 24.-All supplies not having been
received, the troops again halted to-day, but during
the afternoon nearly everything required was brought
in. The detachment 2d Bombay Cavalry marched
1880.]
in from the Sembhar Pass, where it had halted
during the night. I sent Lieutenant Brackenbury
with the 5th Ghurkhas to bridge the river which
crosses the road towards Chotiali.
66
A RUINED VILLAGE.
283
Thal to Chotiali, Oct. 25 (distance, ten miles;
altitude, 3243 feet).-Started at 6.30 over a flat
plain to the river, where it was found unnecessary
to build a bridge as a good ford was discovered.
The road thence runs along at the foot of the low
hills up to which the jungle-trees and grass come.
The camping-ground is beneath the village of Choti-
ali, which is little more than a ruin now, with about
a dozen inhabitants-the result of an attack made
on it about five years ago by 1500 Maris, who killed
every one they could catch, and destroyed the place.
"Chotiali to Paniali, Oct. 26 (distance, fourteen
miles; altitude, 3243 feet).-Marched at 6 A.M.
over low spurs of the hills, then over the level plain,
which is covered with excellent grass and a few trees,
until, at the tenth mile, the jungle gets thicker and
the bed of a river without water is crossed. The
halt was made at the fourteenth mile, and camp
pitched on the left bank of the river-bed, in which
were found several pools of water.
66
Paniali to Bahanwala, Oct. 27 (distance, four-
teen miles).-Marched at 6 A.M. over a level plain
covered with good grass and a good number of tam-
arisk and other trees, and about three miles wide.
At the tenth mile the path enters the hills and turns
up the bed of the Bahan river. It is tolerably easy
-
284
[1880.
going until just previous to emerging from between
the two hills, where the road is liable to floods.
Water was found in pools along the bed of the
river. The camping-ground is covered with grass
and trees, and is just large enough to encamp six
regiments.
ROAD-MAKING.
"Bahanwala to Baladakha, Oct. 28 (distance,
eleven miles). The 3d Panjab Cavalry and half a
battalion 3d Sikhs marched at 6.30 A.M. this morn-
ing with the object of reconnoitring the country in
advance of Baladakha, including the kotal leading
into the Kolu valley. With the rest of the troops
we followed an hour later. The path leads through
a valley and over low undulating hills. A brigade
can easily be encamped on the ground of Baladakha,
where our camp was pitched. The cavalry returned
at 4 P.M., and reported that the kotal is almost im-
passable for animals.
-
"Baladakha to Nikra, Oct. 29 (distance, nine
miles). The 3d Sikhs and 5th Ghurkhas started at
3 A.M., the former to take possession of the heights,
while the latter made a road over the hills; and the
cavalry went on at 4.30 A.M. to be in readiness to
pass over into the Kolu valley as soon as possible.
The remainder of the troops remained encamped
where they were until their turn arrived to move
over.
"After four hours' hard work in removing large
stones, building walls, and filling in holes, the
cavalry passed over, followed shortly after by their
1880.]
baggage, the field-hospital, and reserve ammunition;
and each corps, as it arrived, was signalled by
heliograph from camp, and took up the pickets on
the hills, allowing the others to move on. The
ascent to the second kotal from the upper valley is
about 500 feet, and the descent thence to the Kolu
valley about 1200 feet. There is no water to be
found in this upper valley or near either kotal.
The rear-guard reached camp at 10.30 P.M., bringing
in everything by the aid of large bonfires lighted all
along the pathway.
66
Nikra to Karam Khan Kila, Oct. 30 (distance,
ten miles). The troops marched at 8 A.M. up the
flat valley of Kolu, which is nearly five miles broad
all along. The village of Oriani is passed; the
Malikzai villages are to be seen, and Jelal Khan is
then reached. All the male population, of about a
hundred, turned out to pay their respects. All
these villages are much the same size, about fifty
houses enclosed in a high wall of thirty feet, with a
few round towers. The camp was pitched imme-
diately beyond a new fort, built by Karam Khan,
which was deserted some days ago in consequence of
the expected arrival of this force. In the evening a
man named Alu, a Bijarani, came into camp with a
report that Mehrulla and a lot of Mari headmen had
got together at Bazar Kach, and didn't quite know
what to do, and that they were anxious to find out
what Government wished. He went off again with a
message to them, that they had better come in at
INDECISION OF MARIS.
285
286
[1880.
once if they really meant to do so, and hear the
conditions to be imposed.
"Karam Khan Kila to Bhor, Oct. 31 (distance,
thirteen miles). Marched through a gap called
Dowla Wanga, and down the steep side of a range of
hills for about half a mile; then, between precipices
on either side, into the Bhor valley, which just here
is not more than a quarter of a mile wide. The
camp was pitched a mile from the mouth of the
gorge above mentioned, and near several pools of
water. The hill on the north side, as far as the eye
can reach from this camp, is a perpendicular rock
from the summit to about fifty feet down (whence
the earth slopes away for 200 feet more), from which
the Maris could annoy the camp very much with
perfect impunity for some hours until outflanked
via the pass; but there is a pathway, in a re-enter-
ing angle, by which one man at a time can manage
to get to the top, if not opposed.
"Bhor to Kui, Nov. 1 (distance, thirteen and a
half miles).-Marched at 7 A.M. Our path followed
the valley up a rather steep ascent to a kotal. Fur-
ther on there is a sudden descent of 200 feet to a
lower valley, and then a very steep rocky path is
found, which descends to the large valley of Kui.
The camp was pitched three miles further on. The
remarkable cliff referred to yesterday is on the right
all the way, and is quite as high and inaccessible,
only one break occurring about four miles from the
camp of yesterday, and advantage has been taken of
A STUPENDOUS CLIFF.
M
G
1880.]
it by the natives to make a path over it into the
Kolu valley, which is named the Lanial Pass. This
tremendous natural barrier is nearly thirty miles in
length, extending almost in a straight line from
Sadik, in the Bhor valley, to a high conical hill,
called Kunal, close to Mahmand. The Mari chief,
Mehrulla, arrived in our camp at 1.30 and had an
interview with me. I explained the terms to him,
and, at 5.30, he and his following were escorted out
of camp.
"Kui to Manjra, Nov. 2 (distance, eleven miles).
-Marched over the plain through a gap, and across
a level country to this camp-ground, which is a
long flat piece of ground along the bank of the
river.
MARI CHIEFS COME IN.
287
،،
Manjra to Mahmand, Nov. 3 (distance, four
miles).-Moved the column over a low saddle and
down to Mahmand, and encamped a mile west of the
fort. The advance-guard of cavalry found the fort
quite deserted yesterday, and some of the houses
partially destroyed by fire, but apparently not very
recently. The footmarks of sheep, cattle, children,
were found all about the place quite fresh. Mehrulla
Khan, Karam Khan, and a few other headmen are
now in camp, and will accompany the force to
Kahan, as a guarantee for the fulfilment of the terms
which Government has imposed, and which they say
they agree to.
"Mahmand to Khaniki Nov. 4 (distance, eight
miles).-Marched along the Manjra river east and
288
[1880.
south through a gorge, and out on to the plain beyond,
called Khaniki, where the camp was pitched.
"Khaniki to Ghur Daf, Nov. 5 (distance, thirteen
miles).—The march from Khaniki led us up the
valley and then across low hills and up nalas for
the next six miles. Further on we entered the
rocky river-bed, until we reached this camp-ground.
"Ghur Daf to Kahan, Nov. 6 (distance, thirteen
miles). - Marched over a spur of the Dojannak
mountain and along the bed of the Kahan river.
This gorge is about 300 yards wide, the cliffs about
150 feet high, and quite inaccessible everywhere,
with the exception of one or two places, and even
those are very difficult. Troops caught when well
into this place would have rather a bad time of it,
unless the high land had been crowned. On emerg-
ing from this ravine the Khan valley could be seen
stretching away eastward. There are a good many
fields of standing juar (maize), and the vicinity of
the fort is all under cultivation and covered with
tamarisk - trees. The camp was pitched one mile
west of the village, on the left bank. Mehrulla and
Karam Khan met the head of the column a few
miles out, and tendered their entire submission to
Government, at the same time handing over 50,000
rupees, in coin and jewellery, &c., as an earnest of
their honest intentions.
SUBMISSION OF TRIBES.
(6
Kahan, Nov. 7.-Halted to give the animals a
rest, which they much needed. A few 12-pounder
howitzer-shells in good preservation were found on
1880.]
a tomb some little distance from Kahan yesterday;
but no signs of the two guns said to be in possession
of the Maris have been discovered as yet. The
whole village of Kahan is contained within four mud
walls about eighteen feet high, with a round tower
at each corner, and an odd one here and there along
the walls, which are 250 paces in length each face.
I permitted no one to enter the place, as a compli-
ment to Mehrulla Khan for his behaviour in regard
to the Government claims against his tribe.
"Kahan to Sajji Kach, Nov. 8 (distance, nineteen
miles). Marched at 5.30 A.M. between some low
hills, where, in a ravine called Kaka-Ku, there is a
good pool of water with a very small stream above
it. From here the route led down the valley, occa-
sionally passing over low hills, to the Pathr river.
The camp-ground is close to some pools of excellent
water in the bed of the river.
Sajji Kach to Ketchi-ki-Kot, Nov. 9 (distance, six
miles; altitude, 8600 feet).—Marched down the val-
ley, which is nearly level the entire distance. The
camp was pitched just north of the fort, built on the
edge of a ravine. Lieutenant Mardall, 3d Panjab
Cavalry, who died last night of typhoid fever, was
this afternoon buried close to two small tamarisk-
trees north of the fort, the band and firing-party
being furnished by the 60th Rifles, and the service
read by Major Mainwaring, 4th Ghurkhas.
“Ketchi - ki - Kot to Chatt, Nov. 10 (distance,
twelve miles; altitude, 2240 feet).-Marched, at
VOL. II.
..
VILLAGE OF KAHAN.
289
T
290
[1880.
5.30, through low hills. The whole way is ex-
cellent throughout. At the tenth mile a kotal
named the Burzen Pass is reached, and then the
path descends to this plain, where the camp-ground
is good.
"Chatt to Kalchas, Nov. 11 (distance, eighteen
miles).-Marched along the foot of the Khupp range
through tamarisk-shrubs and long grass until, at the
eighteenth mile, the Kalchas nala was crossed, where
the camp was pitched.
"Kalchas to Bet Baksha, Nov. 12 (distance, seven
miles).-Marched over and between low hills the
whole way to the camp-ground at Bet Baksha, which
is roomy and on the right bank of the Chachar river.
"Bet Baksha to Toba, Nov. 13 (distance, thirteen
miles).—Marched along the northern slope of the
Bihisto hills, over a tolerably open valley, and
along the river-bed; then again over an open
country for a mile, and along the stream again
until the camp-ground was reached at Toba.
"Toba to Drigri, Nov. 14 (distance, fifteen
miles).—Marched from Toba over a small kotal
and into the valleys beyond, and, for the next
five and a half miles, through a succession of nar-
row defiles and gorges. A quarter of a mile further
on, the road branches off north. Here the 3d Panjab
Cavalry and 3d Sikhs separated from the force and
went their own route to Dera Ghazi Khan vid Har-
rand, and the remainder of the troops marched to
the post at Drigri, on the British frontier."
DEPARTURE OF PANJABIS.
Wh
+
1880.]
The expedition was now finished. At Drigri
orders were issued to the effect that the Mari
Field Force was broken up, and Brigadier-General
MacGregor took his departure on the 15th for Ra-
janpur vid Fatehpur, leaving the command of the
troops to Colonel Rowcroft.
END OF EXPEDITION.
291
292
APPOINTED
THE BATH
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA.
6
،،
QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL KNIGHT COMMANDER OF
AT OSBORNE AND WINDSOR—SERVICES OF THE
GUIDES-- THE DEPARTMENT INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION
-PRESIDENCY DISTINCTIONS AYUB KHAN'S ADVANCE AND
FURLOUGH-BOMBAY
p
CHAPTER VIII.
d
1880-1885.
Cogite concilium et pacem laudate sedentes :
Illi armis in regna ruant.”
DEFEAT
AND ADEN-WAR OFFICE IN LONDON-THE CLAN MACGREGOR
THE DEFENCE OF INDIA A FOOL'S PARADISE-WHAT ARE WE
DOING? IGNORANCE OF RUSSIA'S MOVEMENTS FEELING IN
PERSIA
BOOK GOVERNMENT DISAP-
PUBLICATION OF THE
PROVAL-EXPLANATIONS-RESULTS OF TELLING THE TRUTH-
CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION-INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY COMMIS-
SION-CONFERENCE AT RAWAL PINDI-THE PANJDEH OUTRAGE
-WAR PREPARATIONS-IN PESHIN-THE KHOJAK AND BOLAN
-LOSS OF RANK-COMMAND OF PANJAB FRONTIER FORCE.
Magdale
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
M
ON
M
-
No sooner had the Mari expedition re-entered India
than its gallant commander was appointed (19th No-
vember) to the much-coveted post of Quartermaster-
General in India, and Colonel MacGregor at once
1881.]
proceeded to the army headquarters to take over the
active duties of that office. He was also gazetted
(10th December) to the local rank of Major-General,
a position and station seldom attained by an officer
of similar age and service in the Indian army, for he
was not more than forty years of age, and could
reckon twenty-four years' military service.¹
After entering upon the work of his department,
to the Intelligence Branch of which he devoted special
attention, the strain upon Major-General MacGregor's
constitution, produced by the continuous hard work,
physical and mental, during the trying campaigns in
Afghanistan and on the frontier, had by this time
told seriously on his health, and by timely advice
he sought the much-needed rest and relaxation for
brain and body in a few months' leave of absence
to England.
RECEPTION BY THE QUEEN.
293
Jan. 17.-Soon after his arrival in London,
General MacGregor was invited to Osborne, where
he was received by the Queen with much kindness
and consideration. He very often afterwards re-
ferred to the gratification he experienced on this
occasion, when her Majesty presented him with some
books containing his name with her autograph in-
scription. At this time Major-General MacGregor,
who was already a Companion, was raised, on the 1st
March, to the rank of Knight Commander of the
Order of the Bath, of which most honourable Order
1 Lord Wolseley became a substantive Major-General at thirty-five
years of age after only sixteen years' service.
294
[1881.
he received the insignia and the accolade of knight-
hood from the hands of her Majesty at Windsor in
the same month.
GENEROUS TO A FAULT.
Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor soon after-
wards sailed for India, where, from the dates of his
letters, it appears he was hard at work at the Quar-
termaster-General's office in Simla early in April.
In addition to the ordinary routine of his official
duties, Sir Charles lost no time in setting to work to
thoroughly reorganise those multifarious sections of
internal army economy, such as distribution, trans-
port, supply, and communication, &c., which with
their thousand and one intricate subdivisions came
within the scope of his department.
One especial trait in MacGregor's character was
his love of strict justice and fairness. It has been
said of him by those who knew him best, that he
was generous to a fault, even to his own personal
risk and disadvantage.
How just and fair he was under most adverse cir-
cumstances, which would have deterred most men,
has already been alluded to;¹ for instance in China,
where, it will be remembered, he risked the charge of
insubordination rather than see a sowar of Fane's
Horse suffer flogging undeservedly. Indeed it was
to the expression of his opinion on this occasion that
he owed the loss of what had ever been the dearest
wish of his heart-viz., the Victoria Cross.
Having thus himself suffered so keenly from rank
1 See vol. i. chapter iv. p. 159.
295
1881.]
injustice, he never lost any opportunity of bringing
forward to proper notice the services of his brother
officers.
REGARD FOR FRONTIER CORPS.
As an irregular cavalry officer he had a warm
sympathy, and a true feeling of camaraderie, for
the various frontier corps; and one of his first letters
after reaching Simla as Quartermaster-General may
be quoted here, to show how zealously he backed up
the recognition of any gallant and meritorious
services.1
"To Major-General GREAVES.
"SIMLA, 12th April 1881.
“I enclose a letter from Colonel Campbell of the
Guides. I simply do not understand the services of
the Guides being so completely ignored.
A regi-
ment that could produce such men as those who died
in the Residency at Kabal, I think deserves that
some recognition should be made; but after that,
throughout the whole second campaign, the Guides
were ever foremost. They led the Khaibar column
right up to Jagdalak, and when called on, marched
straight into Kabal. They were at the capture of the
W
1 When president of the commission of inquiry to investigate the
circumstances attending the attack on the Residency at Kabal, Sir
Charles MacGregor had brought prominently to notice the conduct of
the escort of the Queen's Own Guides. He wrote in his report:
"They" (the commission) "believe that the annals of no army and
no regiment can show a brighter record of devoted bravery than has
been achieved by this small band of Guides. By their deeds they
have conferred undying honour, not only on the regiment to which
they belong, but on the whole British army."-See ante, chap. iv.
p. 150.
296
[1881.
Takht-i-Shah on the 13th [Dec. 1879], and of the
Asmai hill on the 14th, and held the most exposed
part of the Sherpur cantonment. Everywhere their
conduct was magnificent, and Sir F. Roberts repeat-
edly acknowledged their services. Campbell com-
manded the infantry at the attack on Asmai and
at Sherpur, and at the second fight at Charasia.
Stewart commanded the cavalry throughout; and
in the very brilliant charge on the 13th December,
Hammond always distinguished himself, but espe-
cially on the 14th, when the steady way the Guides
came down the hill, if anything, surpassed the splen-
did way they had assaulted it. I heard Jenkins
himself say that Hammond was worth a company to
him, and Campbell and Battye also behaved very
well. I know scarcely any who more thoroughly
earned the C.B. than Campbell and Stewart, and
they were, besides, officers of very distinguished ser-
vice before the Afghan war was heard of. I spoke
to Sir Donald about them this morning, and I hope
he will include them.
C. M. M."
THE GUIDES.
"To Sir DONALD STEWART,
Commander-in-Chief.
"SIMLA, 27th April 1881.
"Do you approve of our keeping troops at
Chaman? The position is bad militarily, though,
I believe, healthy; and it seems that if we hold the
top of the Khojak, there can be no use in holding
Chaman also. I have been thinking of this, and
thought I would bring it to your notice."
1881.]
"To Colonel G. CHESNEY, Military Department.
HATED PRESIDENCY DISTINCTIONS.
297
"SIMLA, May 25.
"I return Girdlestone's letter and enclosure with
thanks. I have always been crying out against the
system, which is very prevalent in India, of one
department of Government not knowing what the
other is doing; and the fact of a military report of
Nipal having been written as far back as 1872, and
not yet communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, is
a very good instance.
"Nipal is a country where military operations are
very possible, yet, as far as I know, none of the many
reports which must have been written by Residents
during the last seventy years, have found their way
to us. Now, we are trying to extract information
from the Foreign Office, and I hope ere long we shall
be able to get a report on Nipal ready."
"His Excellency Lieutenant-General Hon. A. E. HARDINGE, C.B.,
Commander-in-Chief, Bombay Army.
"SIMLA, June 2.
-
"I hate all Presidency distinctions, and shall al-
ways be ready to do what I can for good men either
from Bombay or Madras; but it is only in the Intel-
ligence Branch that I have a chance. I hope they
will introduce some, at least, of the recommendations
of the Commission of which I was a member; but
there is always the fear of their accepting anything
for economy without giving enough consideration to
efficiency.
298
[1881.
"I was glad to see General Hume's order about
the Bombay troops. I expect they were more sinned
against than sinning. The best troops in the world
will get defeated if under a bad general, and I must
say that I think one of the most crying wants of our
army is to provide for the selection of the best men
for generals. With a good general everything pos-
sible is done, and done well; but no money, no
amount of blood, will save operations conducted by a
bad one.
I believe we have as many good men as
our neighbours."
IMPORTANCE OF SARAKHS.
"To Captain W. J. GILL, R.E.,
Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards.
www
"SIMLA, July 23.
"I am very sorry you were not able to accomplish
all you intended, but the journey you did make may
be useful some day.
"The Russians are, as you say, getting on fa-
mously for their own interests, but how about ours?
I pointed out the importance of Sarakhs some years
ago, and I believe that we shall find that they will
be there ere long; then they have a straight run in
to Herat.
"We have made an awful mess of it politically.
I suppose a week will settle who is to be master of
Kandahar, and all accounts seem to say that Ayub
has the best chance. The last news is that the
Amir's outposts in front of Giriskh have been
driven in."
1881.]
AYUB BEATEN.
"Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS,
G.C.B., V.C., &c., Madras.
SIMLA, Sept. 26.
(6
We were very much shocked to hear of poor
Kennedy's death in so sudden a manner, and I am
sure you will feel it much.
"The news has just come that the Amir has
beaten Ayub, who has bolted to Herat. The Gov-
ernment people are delighted. I wonder what they
will do now? They ought to get Abdul Rahman to
go on and kick him out of Herat, as that is the
critical point now. I got your long letter. I al-
ways say that they had better have left you alone
at Kabal. Abdul Rahman may of course turn up
trumps, but I still think it was mere gambling to trust
to him. We have got a long report on Burma ready,
and I am just sending an officer to go and fill up
blanks in our information, and when he has finished,
I will send you a copy. When you get to Madras,
I shall write to you about helping us in the Intel-
ligence work, with the assistance of one of your
Quartermaster-Generals.'
""
299
(6
"To Lieutenant-General the Hon. A. E. HARDINGE, C.B., Bombay.
"CALCUTTA, Dec. 29.
"It is very uphill work trying to get our army
into good working order for service. There is no
finality about anything. We are very fond of having
commissions to report on every or any thing, but
their recommendations are seldom if ever accepted;
and if a commission of the best officers in the army
300
[1882.
recommended anything, all would be upset on the
dictum of a
We are trying now to get the
Transport into working order, but are always afraid
a fit of economy will upset the whole thing.
"I hope in time to get the Intelligence Branch
into good order; but we are much underhanded,
and Government treats us as if we were trying to
do something wrong in wishing to get information
of possible theatres of war, and there is all sorts of
obstructions from different Government departments
not interested in the scheme."
BURMESE AFFAIRS STRAINED.
"Colonel J. BROWNE, R.E., C.B.
"CALCUTTA, Jan. 28.
"If we had held on to Kandahar, the railway
would have been finished to Peshin by this. Now it
will never be touched until a great emergency arises
again. Affairs in Burma are what they call
strained, but nothing short of Theebaw coming down
and smacking Bernard's cheek will make us go to
war; and even then I am not sure that the Sec-
retary Foreign Department would not be instructed
to direct Bernard to offer the other cheek also."
“E. BERNARD, Esq., C.B., C.S.I., Rangun.
“Jan. 31.
"I will send you Roberts's letter in a few days.
We have been working at Burma for some time
past, and Major MacNeill has been sent there to
complete our information. I shall be obliged if you
301
1882.]
will help him in getting information about resources
in transport and supplies in British Burma.
HOME ON FURLOUGH.
"I think we could roll Theebaw up in about three
weeks from leaving Rangun."
The Quartermaster-General obtained a year's fur-
lough from the 14th April, when he proceeded by
the mail-steamer Rome to England. On his journey
he took the opportunity of inspecting the fortifi-
cations at Bombay and Aden, and whilst at sea
the following letter was written to Sir Donald
Stewart :-
"April 19.-I went round all the fortifications at
Bombay with the engineer in charge and Blood,' and
I was very much disappointed in the amount of pro-
tection afforded by them.
66
Batteries have been made at Mahalakshmi, Mala-
bar, Colaba, and Oyster Rock: there are two others,
but they need not be considered, being quite useless.
The two first batteries, provided their guns were effec-
tive against armour up to ranges which would make
the guns of an enemy ineffective against Bombay, are
well placed. I cannot now say whether this is the
case, having no table showing range, penetration,
&c., of modern guns; but I am under the impression
that the guns in position in those batteries are not
powerful enough, and therefore it seems that a ship
with armour could anchor out of their effective range
(against ironclads) and shell Bombay.
1 Major Bindon Blood, R.E.
302
[1882.
"The Colaba Battery is quite useless, being so
placed that its guns could not reach any point which
an enemy's ship could approach, because the shoal
round Colaba Point extends so far out that an
enemy's ship could not, if she wanted, come within
the effective range of this battery.
"We now come to the Oyster Rock Battery. By
itself this battery is of no use, because an enemy's
ship keeps in deep water, out of range, till she is
right past it, and then takes up a position from which
she could shell Bombay town and arsenal at her
leisure without any of the batteries in the harbour
being able to reach her. It therefore comes to this,
that the defence of Bombay rests on the two moni-
tors [Abyssinia and Magdala]; but, considering
there are no gunners for them nearer than Ports-
mouth, this seems rather a precarious sort of de-
fence. Of course they could put garrison gunners
into them, but imagine how many times the guns
would hit under such circumstances. I can hardly
imagine anything more ludicrous than to see a par-
boiled, sea-sick garrison gunner, who has never laid a
gun at sea in his life, trying to lay it on an enemy's
cruiser moving at the rate of twelve knots.
"It is not for me to do more than point this out,
although I must say it does seem to me most extra-
ordinary that such things should be allowed. To me
it seems there is absolutely no excuse; for when lakhs
are being spent upon offices, &c., it should certainly
be possible to provide money for fortifications.
BOMBAY DEFENCES.
-
(
1882.]
"In 1875¹ I wrote strongly against the folly of
leaving the arsenals at Bombay and Madras unpro-
tected, but that was seven years ago, and nothing
has come of it. I think just the same now. The
Bombay arsenal should be moved at once, partly to
Poona and partly to Asirgarh; 2 indeed, the ground
would fetch a price that would cover the cost of a
new arsenal.
FORTIFICATIONS AT ADEN.
303
"I am going round the Aden defences with
Colonel Goodfellow,³ R.E., and the engineer in
charge."
66
April 28.-I went all over the Aden defences.
These may be said to consist of the two batter-
ies of Marbut and Tarshein, which sweep the entrance
of the harbour, and are well enough placed; but on
looking at the chart, you will find that any ship draw-
ing twenty-seven feet and under can get past these bat-
teries, under Little Aden, entirely out of range, and
once these batteries were turned, there is, of course,
nothing to prevent such a ship from shelling the
buildings at Steamer Point at her leisure.
"There were two most ridiculous facts which oc-
curred, and which I must tell you of. First, after
some difficulty the several gates of the Ras Marbut
fort were opened, and we got in. I then went round
1 When on Ordnance Special Commission.-See vol. i. chap. viii.
p. 358.
2 Asirgarh, a strong fortress in Nimar District, Central Provinces,
near Chandni, on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway.
3 Colonel C. A. Goodfellow, R.E., V.C.
304
[1882.
to each gun, till, standing in the embrasure of one
of them, I noticed the ditch had been filled up, and
that I could walk out, or any one walk in (?), at
pleasure. Then-would you believe it?-this fort,
which must have cost a great deal of money, is
built so that its guns do not command the water for
a considerable distance from the shore. True, seeing
this, they have erected a four-gun battery immedi-
ately in front of the fort, which does command the
water; but surely the man who made the fort should
be hung, if only in effigy. I then went all over the
old fortifications, which were erected to keep out the
Arabs. Of these I need only remark that they con-
stitute a permanent compliment to the supposed
fighting qualities of the Arabs. The whole of the
range from Jebel Shamshan 1 to the sea has been
scarped, every pinnacle is crowned with rifle-towers,
and every bit of ground bigger than a teapoy has a
battery of guns on it. Then these are connected
with a massive double wall of masonry, whilst out-
side the whole isthmus is blocked by massive ram-
parts with bastions. It would be interesting to know
what the cost of these was, and I hope Sanford will
try and find out. It must have been enormous, and
I am quite sure that a sixth of the sum would have
made Aden quite secure. On the cantonment side
the only protection from big guns is a battery on
Sirah Island of two 12-ton guns. I don't think
COSTLY FOLLIES.
-
1 Jebel Shamshan, the highest peak on the peninsula of Aden,
1776 feet.
1882.]
this is enough, as now there is nothing to prevent
a ship getting round the promontory to the south of
Sirah, and then, being completely out of sight, shell-
ing the crater at her leisure.
BRITISH WAR OFFICE.
305
-
(6
'I heard at Aden that a Colonel Crossman is com-
ing to do wonders. What I think is wanted, is a
battery on the promontory near Sirah; to put the
Marbut and Tarshein batteries at Steamer Point into
proper order; and by some means to close the Little
Aden channel, so as to compel ships to pass within
range of these batteries. I should hardly think this
was very difficult, as there seems to be a good deal
of stone lying idle in this part of Arabia."
U
Cậ
On his arrival in London, Sir Charles placed the
whole of his collection of voluminous notes and per-
sonal papers referring to the campaigns of Afghanis-
tan in the hands of an artillery officer, who compiled,
under the direction of the general, a succinct account
of the Second Afghan War, which he proposed hav-
ing published, when completed, in England.
Meantime the indefatigable general lost no time.
in examining the working of the Intelligence Branch
of the British War Office, at this time located in
Adair House pro tem. (in the old building now con-
verted into the Junior Carlton Club), under the direc-
tion of Colonel Cameron, V.C., the present chief of
the Military College, Sandhurst.
He thus writes to Colonel Sanford, Deputy Quar-
termaster-General, Simla :-
VOL. II.
MAD.
306
ON A RUSSIAN MODEL.
[1882.
“LONDON, June 22.
"From what I have seen of the Intelligence here,
I do not think that, considering the short time we
have been started, and the smallness of our establish-
ment, we have any sort of reason to be ashamed of
what we have done.
"The Intelligence Branch here certainly does a great
deal of work; but a large amount of it is not, in my
opinion, purely Intelligence work. In fact, the In-
telligence Branch here is a sort of an attempt at being
a great general staff on the Russian model. I must
say
I don't think this is right, and we certainly could
not undertake such work as they do unless we were
trebled in numbers.
.،
I think, if each year as much is done as we did
last, that five years will see us in possession of very
complete information of all the countries which come
into our répertoire.
"We are weak in mapping establishment and
clerks, but that is a matter of money."
Same to same.
"DALMALLY, October 4.
"The Military Department does not seem to be
able to get out of the obstruction vein which was so
prevalent under, and their treatment of the
Intelligence Branch is disgraceful. They cannot see
that if they would treat us generously now, we could
get all the information compiled at once, and then
it would not require a large establishment to keep it
307
1882.]
going. The home Intelligence Branch is treated
properly, but here they seem to have realised the
necessity for it. In India they seem to be going on
-'s idea, that we got on very well before Intel-
ligence Branches were heard of. There is one plan
by which I think I can help, if you will talk to
Lockhart about it, and then go to the Chief. Here
in England one can get any number of literary men
to undertake jobs, and if the Chief will sanction it,
I will get a good deal of the necessary preliminary
work done here. I will advance the cost out of my
own funds, and take my chance of getting it back
from Government.
"In London there are greater facilities for doing
this. When I go back (to town), I am going to at-
tend the Intelligence Branch regularly till I have
thoroughly mastered all their system, and know ex-
actly what information they have got which affects
us, and then I will write about it.
"I am very glad you have got some mules for the
Sappers. We must be thankful for what we can get,
but go on 'pegging away' at Government till we get
things right for service. We are ahead of them at
home in the transport scheme; but even this may die
of inanition if Government are not kept constantly
jogged about it. They have been making great
capital here about so many men having taken their
discharge. It was perhaps unfortunate that it hap-
pened just when it did; not that it mattered very
much all the same, but if we are never to do any-
PEGGING AWAY.
308
HIGHLAND TOUR.
[1882.
thing because we may have a war, it will be revers-
ing old Moltke's ideas. He does everything he can
to keep his army efficient for the same reason that
& Co. would do nothing.
"I don't mind betting that in the long-run the
Military Department scamping our offices will be
more expensive than if they had given us what we
wanted.
"I hope the difficulties about the men who trav-
elled for us are settled by this time. There should
be no difficulty about the leave part of it. It was
done in my case twice. Once my leave in Persia
was allowed to count as service, and when I went to
Baluchistan I was held to have been on duty."
During the summer, Sir Charles took his little
daughter Viva, now ten years old, on a tour through
the most beautiful parts of England, and amused
himself with sketching, painting, and photographing
lovely bits of scenery which took his fancy, and
places and objects of historical interest.
With the autumn, this pleasant journey was con-
tinued into Scotland, and there Sir Charles had the
opportunity, so long wished for, of visiting those por-
tions of the Highlands which had constituted the
famous MacGregor country in olden days—the shores,
mountains, and glens of Loch Katrine and Loch
Lomond.
The general was deeply impressed by the associa-
tions connected with the romantic prospects now
;
1883.]
beheld for the first time. All the instincts of his
race were aroused, and his ardent temperament was
fully kindled by this visit to the scenes of his an-
cestors' exploits and sufferings, so that on his return
to London, he set energetically to work towards the
re-establishment of his Clan's reputation and unity,
and with his characteristic enthusiasm, though not
without some considerable trouble, he at last suc-
ceeded in awakening the dormant kindred spirit
among his fellow-tribesmen.
CLAN GREGOR.
309
Accordingly a meeting of the Clan Gregor was
held in the George Hotel at Glasgow on the 6th
January 1883, and another meeting and dinner took
place on the 26th, which were well attended by
members of the Clan.
"QUEEN'S HOTEL, MANCHESTER,
27th Jan. 1883.
"There was a very large and most enthusiastic
meeting at Glasgow yesterday. After a good deal
of talk, all of which evinced on the parts both of the
speakers and of the audience the deepest interest in
the Clan, it was determined to appoint a committee
to consider and report,―(1) whether it would not be
possible to come to a satisfactory understanding with
the old Clan Gregor Society, and instil into it new
life; (2) what should be done in the event of its not
being possible to do so. This, you see, is just the
conclusion we came to at Edinburgh, and I may
say also in London; and therefore I hope that the
310
RESUSCITATION.
[1883.
Edinburgh and Glasgow sections of the Clan, as
being the largest, will be enabled to work together
not only harmoniously, which all must see to be of
great importance, but also with some enthusiasm.
My experience of this world is that nothing can be,
or has ever been, done without enthusiasm either in
a body or in some individual. I am glad even to
have got so far in the object I have in view, which is
simply to fuse us all together into one brotherhood.
There are some who look on a Highland clan as a
small hereditary monarchy; but I am sure a study
of the numerous works on the subject will convince
any one that the constitution was far more that of a
republic. One man was elected chief, and was given
a larger share of the lands of the clan than others,
in order to enable him to support the dignity of the
position, and this really was his only title to be
better off than others. I therefore hold that all
of the name are, according to ancient traditions,
brothers, and I would try to make them all brothers
in reality, so that each may help the other, when-
ever it is in his power, for the sake of the old name.
All my proposals such as the writing of a history,
the keeping up of a roll, the foundation of a museum,
&c., &c.—are directed towards this end alone; be-
cause my experience tells me that enthusiasm, even
when kindled, requires fuel to keep it up.
"I have already helped many of the name be-
cause of it, and if I knew more of them, I daresay
I shall be able to do more in the future ;-so I say,
1883.]
in the words of the boating song, let us pull, pull
together,' and we shall, I am sure, make something
of this movement so happily started. I purpose to
write a pamphlet and distribute it; in this I will
embody fully all the views I hold on the subject,
and it will, at least, show what one of the name
hopes.
C. M. MACGREGOR." 1
CHARITABLE PROJECTS.
311
In addition to the above proposed institutions,
General MacGregor projected a school for boys and
girls of the Clan, and an asylum for poor disabled
MacGregors. Both of these he thought should be in
Glenorchy, where he hoped a bit of land could be
bought, and where the locality was very healthy and
accessible by rail.
"UNITED SERVICE CLUB, January 1883.
"I am collecting materials for a really complete
history of the Clan Gregor, which I
propose either
to compile myself, or get compiled by some com-
petent person. I do not disguise to myself that this
will be a difficult task, as, owing to the barbarous
and cowardly persecutions to which the Clan was
subjected, the members of it are now very much
scattered, and I am afraid many of their records are
lost. Still, having had considerable experience in
collecting information of a similar nature, I have
found it nothing less than extraordinary how, when
once begun, much easier the task turns out than has
1 Letter to John MacGregor, Esq., 10 Dundas Street, Edinburgh.
[1883.
been expected. Facts long forgotten are remem-
bered, and searchings amongst old papers reveal
more facts and clues to others. I am therefore not
inclined to despair, and hope, with the assistance
of members of the Clan, to gradually get together
enough information to make a beginning. It is in
this view I address you, to ask if you can help me
with any papers which may be in your possession,
any traditions or anecdotes you may remember, or
any references to works and papers in which infor-
mation may be found, or to people who may be able
to help.
312
PROPOSED HISTORY.
66
Any genealogies of the Clan, copies of epitaphs
on tombstones, old letters, agreements, &c., &c.,
would certainly be most useful.
"Hoping you will be able to help, and assuring
you that if, in addition to any information you can
afford, you could help me with suggestions as to
carrying out my idea, I shall be most grateful.
"C. M. MACGREGOR.” 1
This letter was circulated through the MacGregors,
1 Rough idea for a History of the Clan Gregor. (1) Sketch of the
descent, manners, and customs of Highlanders generally; (2) ancient
history of the Clan Gregor; (3) history from commencement of per-
secutions to withdrawal of proscription of name; (4) biographical
sketches of the more distinguished members of the Clan; (5) descrip-
tion of the country formerly known as MacGregor country, with
traditions and anecdotes; (6) genealogies and epitaphs; (7) extracts
of notices of the Clan in other works; (8) documents relating to the
Clan; (9) a roll of the Clan Gregor in 1883. A map; any portraits
that can be got, &c.
▸
1883.]
and meeting with a favourable response, was followed
up by a private circular :-
66
FEELING OF CLANSHIP.
313
.
CLANSMEN, While travelling about lately I
have met many MacGregors, and from conversation
with them, have been induced to form the opinion
that there is a strong feeling of clanship prevailing
among those bearing our name. It seems to me,
therefore, that it would be advisable, and, I trust,
also practicable, to take measures to revive and sus-
tain this honourable spirit; and as I hope there are
many of the name who will be found to agree with
me, I write to you to propose that a meeting should
be held of as many of the leading members of the
Clan as may be willing and able to be present, to
consider what measures are practicable for the re-
suscitation and fostering of Clan feeling amongst
us, and for the establishment of a system of mutual
aid and support from each and all of us to the
other.
66
Proposals for consideration :-
"(a) That there should be an annual gathering of
the Clan at some convenient place.
"(b) A roll of the Clan should be made and kept
up.
"(c) A comprehensive history of the Clan should
be written.
66
(d) A Clan Gregor Society should be started, for
the benefit of all who may be in want of
aid."
[1883.
1
The amalgamation of the Clan Gregor Society was
carried out during the following year, and Sir
Charles was President of this institution until his
death.
314
MARRIAGE.
On the 6th February 1883 Sir Charles married
Miss Jardine, and a fortnight after the wedding, he
and his bride started for India, travelling through
Europe, and visiting the principal cities of France,
the Riviera, and Italy, on their way to Venice, where
they were joined by Sir Charles's little daughter,
Viva, so often mentioned in the diaries of his travels
in Asia.
After spending a week in Egypt (during which
interval the general critically went over the scene of
action at Kassassin, and examined the lines of Tel-
el-Kebir, out of which Lord Wolseley had driven
Arabi and his Egyptians five months previously),
Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor and his daughter
went on to Bombay, and reached Simla in April,
when the duties of the Quartermaster-General's office
were resumed at army headquarters.
Meantime the Intelligence Branch was an especially
cherished section of Sir Charles's department. From
the first he had initiated, from his own resources,
an Intelligence office wherever he had served, and
now, by his example and energy, he rapidly suc-
ceeded in animating his colleagues and junior officers
1 See letter from George MacGregor, Esq., 30 Roslea Drive, Dennis-
toun, Glasgow, 6th November 1884.
1883.]
with something like enthusiasm (without which he
always said nothing could succeed) and ardour for
adventurous and far-searching work. Here again
the zeal of the general, at every step, encountered
dogged obstruction, and certain members of the
Indian Council and Civil and Political depart-
ments did all they could to stifle the new-born
spirit of inquiry and the activity of this scientific
branch of the service instituted by Sir Charles Mac-
Gregor.
The prevalent laisser aller system of the much-
praised masterly inactivity politicals had long found
favour at Calcutta and Simla, and Sir Charles came
to the conclusion that the only way in which it was
possible to awaken the apathetic officials to a sense of
the unpreparedness of India against external danger,
would be for him to work out in detail the actual
state of India from a military point of view, the
numbers, resources, and armament of the country as
they existed, and compare with these the stupendous
power wielded by Russia in Asia.
He therefore set to work with characteristic,
thorough-going devotion, and carefully prepared,
with minute details, in conjunction with the advice
of the best military minds and heads in the Indian
service, a plain statement of the danger in which
India then stood.
OFFICIAL APATHY.
315
،
Some of his letters concerning his study of The
Defence of India' and the improvement of the Intel-
ligence Branch may be here quoted, as they exhibit
[1883.
some glimpses of the development and progress of
his scheme.
316
SUGGESTIVE PROBLEM.
"To Major the Hon. G. C. NAPIER, C.I.E.
"June 5.
Many thanks for your paper, which I have read
with much interest. With reference to your remarks
at the end, I should be much obliged if you would
write a paper showing how soon the Russians could
put a force of 20,000 men down at Herat. Work
it out as though you had to put that number of men
there, and show where you would get the troops from ;
where they would embark; how long they would
take to get to the east coast; how long to disem-
bark; what route they would take, (1) supposing
Persia was openly on their side-(2) if she was
passive (3) if she was hostile; what supplies
would they require; what baggage; what trans-
port-they would have to take at least two heavy
batteries with them; what would be the best means.
which could be devised for ensuring that we should
receive very early and reliable information of what
Russia was doing.
"Entre nous, I am preparing a paper on the
reverse of this question-viz., how soon could we
put a force into Herat of 20,000 men with heavy
artillery. I think I would undertake, if Government
put their backs into it, to put such a force into
Herat in
days."
66
-
1883.]
“To Lieutenant-Colonel Sir R. SANDEMAN, K.C.S.I.,
Agent Governor-General, Quetta.
A STRATEGICAL EXERCISE.
317
"SIMLA, June 15.
"I am making out, as an exercise, some calcula-
tions as to the arrangements necessary to put a force
en route to Kandahar in the shortest possible time.
Of course the question of supplies enters largely into
these; and to enable me to be sure that no supplies
that are procurable locally be carried up needlessly,
I should be much obliged if you let me know ap-
proximately what quantities of supplies you could
put down within fourteen days at each or either of
the following places-viz., Quetta, Gulistan, &c., &c.
Of course it may not be possible to give any
accurate estimates, owing to your not being able
to make inquiries; but your great local knowledge
and experience may enable you to give some that
might be very valuable to us. Of course you will
understand that I am not making these calculations
on account of any probable move, but only to be
ready, as such a move is not impossible."
Writing from Simla on the 20th June to Sir
Frederick Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief of the
Madras army:-
"SIMLA, June 20.
"We shall be glad to get your programme, as then
we can make out our annual tour. I rather want
Sir Donald to make a good long march, and have
as little to do with Calcutta as possible. If I was
!
318
[1883.
him, it would see me not. Nobody up here cares
two d's about Russia. If we were paid for it, we
could not play their game better. I am sure it is
a hideous blunder letting them get to Herat. The
effect on India will be enormous, and I am sure
we could prevent it. I think an officer should be
sent as soon as possible with ten lakhs of rupees
to put the defences in order, and to gain influence
and prestige for us. Of course Abdul Rahman
would not like it, but he would sooner have a
British officer there than Ayub, which will be
the case if he does not look out; besides, we
could buy his consent for a lakh. Simultaneously
the railway should be pushed on to the other side
of the Khojak Pass. I would send a division down
and give the work out on contract to regiments, who
would do it in six months. Then another lakh or
so would induce Abdul Rahman to ask for it on
to Kandahar.
DEPARTMENTAL NAGGING.
"I am having two papers got ready; one to show
how soon we could put 10,000 men in Herat-another,
how soon the Russians could do the same.
We are
about equal now, and we could beat them, but every
day tells against us.
Yes, I remember writ-
ing to you about the Intelligence Branch, and was
delighted but not surprised to see how thoroughly
you entered into the spirit of it. I don't know
who it is, but there is some one in the Military
Department who is very hostile to our Intelligence
Branch. They are always nagging us; but we
1883.]
have given way enough, and we mean fighting
next time."
A FOOL'S PARADISE.
"To his Excellency, General Sir D. STEWART,
Commander-in-Chief in India.
319
"July 5.
.
"I wrote to the Foreign Office some days ago to
ask if they had good information as to what was
being done to extend the Atak railway. They re-
plied that it had been completed up to Kizil Arvat,
and did not know whether anything was being done
to extend it.
"Now Ridgeway sends me the enclosed, which
says that steps are to be taken at once to extend
it. All this should make us alive to two facts:
1. That we have no proper means of getting infor-
mation of Russian movements Trans-Caspian; 2.
That we are taking no steps to push on our own
railway.
"I think we are living in a fool's paradise, and
are trying to make ourselves think that we can put
off the evil day when complications with Russia will
arise by doing nothing-by burying our heads in
the sand, in fact. The steps we should take at
once are, in my opinion, to send an officer to the
Caucasus to report on what is going on there—i.e.,
on the distribution of troops, the facilities for mov-
ing reinforcements by rail, and for embarkation and
disembarkation on the east coast of the Caspian.
Another officer should go to Astrabad, and go about
?
[1883.
as much as he could along the east coast, and make
good arrangements for getting early information of
what is going on; whilst a third officer should be
sent to the Daragaz frontier. I know we have
Stewart at Khaf,¹ and at all events he is doing no
harm; but we want more officers than him.
(6
320
THE PROPER ANSWER.
Secondly, Our answer to the Trans-Caspian
railway should be to make eight miles of our
Harnai line to every one they make, and therefore
I think efforts should be made to put a strong force
on to the line this cold weather-I mean more than
we are sending. I write this in case you should
feel inclined to take the question up to Council,
and see if something cannot be done."
"To General Sir FREDERICK ROBERTS, Bart., G.C.B., V.C., &c.,
Commander-in-Chief, Madras.
"SIMLA, August 13.
My paper is a very long one. It will not be
published, but printed and circulated, and you may
be sure you will have one of the first copies. So
much vague jaw is expended on what the Russians
can and cannot do, that I begin by showing exactly
what they can do. Then, and not till then, I hold
we are in a position to see exactly what the danger
is, and then only can we take steps to provide against
it. These steps divide themselves into-(a) measures
necessary to maintain our hold on India inviolate;
(b) diplomatic measures to be taken-i.e., in way
1 Khaf, on the Persian frontier, west of Herat.
..
1883.]
A D- -D BIG QUESTION.
of alliances, &c., against Russia; (c) military opera-
tions, both offensive and defensive.
321
"With reference to the first, I want to show what
measures are necessary to prevent any chance of a
rebellion in our rear, and I take this province by
province.
"If you had time to give me your ideas with
reference to Madras and Burma, I should be awfully
obliged, and would duly acknowledge or not mention
your name, as you pleased. What I want to know
is (1) the most important points to be held in
Madras, and the garrisons; (2) what movable
columns would be necessary to keep all going; (3)
what troops would be available for service outside
the Presidency.
"I am making all the use I can of volunteers,
Europeans and Eurasians generally.
"It is a dd big question, notwithstanding
and suchlike, and I should be glad to think
only two or three were gathered together to think it
out; but no one seems to care a 'twopenny dam.'1
It will not come in their day, but I think it will
come in yours and mine, and I can't help seeing
its magnitude and our carelessness.
"If I can manage it, I will get some copies of the
first proofs, and send to you and a few others who
are interested in and capable of understanding the
1 See Colonel Yule's Anglo-Indian Glossary. Dam originally an
actual copper coin. "I don't care a dam"-i.e., in other words, "I
don't care a brass farthing.”
VOL. II.
X
[1883.
question; but I don't know more than six men who
come under that category."
322
WHAT WE SHOULD DO.
"To his Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS.
"SIMLA, August 23.
"I have finished the Russian part of the ques-
tion, and have proved, to my own satisfaction at
least
"1. They have many more men available than
would suffice for the invasion of India.
"2. They could put forces into Herat, Kabal, and
Chitral in sixty days after starting. How many
days this would be after our hearing of it depends
altogether on our Intelligence arrangements, which
at present are as bad as they can be.
"3. If once in possession of these places, they
could reinforce them to a sufficient number and in
sufficient time to make it impracticable for us to
turn them out. What would be the state of affairs
under these circumstances, think, you? I think if
we allow them to get so far, it is only a question
of time when they will be in a position to invade
India.
"I am now taking up the other side-viz., what
should we do? First, I must see what number and
disposition of troops are necessary to make India
safe. Till we know this we cannot know how many
we shall have available for exterior operations. I
am afraid we shall be fearfully short of men, but we
shall see. One thing I am sure of, no plan of the
1883.]
defence of India can be worth much as long as this
sort of legislation goes on."
A TIMELY FORECAST.
323
"To his Excellency General Sir D. STEWART, &c.
SIMLA, September 28.
"You know there have been reports for some time
of the massing of Russian troops in the Trans-
Caspian district. Now we
we hear that General
Komaroff is to take 10,000 or 15,000 men to Merv.
What are they going to Merv for? We have heard
that the Merv Tekkes have given in to the Russians,
and I believe this is true. What then can be the
good of their going to Merv? My idea is they are
not going to Merv. They are making the going to
Merv a pretext to enable them to collect troops
about Sarakhs, with some other objective in view.
That objective, I hold, is Herat, and I fully expect
that our dream will very shortly be broken by some
rather startling news.
66
“I don't know what you think, but I am decidedly
of opinion that if they get possession of Herat, the
consequences will sooner or later be disastrous to us.
They will complete the railway 1 to that place in
five, ten, or twenty years; and when this is done, Mr
Ross, or Major Stewart, or half-a-dozen others, will
show you, to an hour, how soon 10,000 or 200,000
men can be put into that place. Then the invasion
1 The railway from Uzanada, on the Caspian, to Kizil Arvat, Merv,
Chaharjui, and Samarkand, was opened for traffic on May 27, 1888,
less than five years after the above was written.
•
324
RUSSIA'S NEXT MOVE.
[1883.
of India will become quite a feasible project, because
no one can know better than you that we have not
the men to meet 100,000 Russians.
"But even supposing that we could hope that
they would stop at Herat, the result of their getting
there must be ruinous to us, because, inasmuch as
the invasion of India is a feasible project to Russia,
if Herat is in her possession, we shall then be forced
to increase our army to an extent which will drive
the financial member into the grave.
"There are many things which can be done to
stop the Russian advance. I think that one of the
first is to stop their being able to make a rush on
Herat and take it by a coup de main, and I consider
it is our duty to take immediate steps to this end.
"If you go with me so far-viz., that we should
stop them getting to Herat-I will show you how I
think we can do this. But remember I honestly
believe we have not a day to waste."
"To his Excellency General Sir D. STEWART, &c.
"October 1.
"You so far agree with me that you say that
Russia is preparing for her next move-(1) by
getting the Kalat Atak;¹ (2) by arranging with the
Mervis; (3) by getting a footing at Sarakhs.
"But what is the next move after she has accom-
1 The Daman-i-Kuh or Atak district includes the country be-
tween Kizil Arvat, Askabad, and Sarakhs, along which General
Annenkoff's railway is now laid.
1883.]
plished this? It is undoubtedly Herat. Meanwhile
we do absolutely nothing. We see her throwing
forward her parallels, and do not turn a spadeful to
prevent her.
"I don't say she is going to invade India at once,
but I see that the steps she is now taking all tend
to place India at some future day in great danger.
These steps are clearly,-1. To take up such posi-
tions that she can make an easy and sudden advance
to positions of vast strategical importance at a time
when we are otherwise engaged and when we cannot
prevent her. In fact, she will absorb
In fact, she will absorb up Sarakhs
and up to the Oxus. 2. Her next move will be
Herat, Kabal, Chitral. You say, 'I know that any
move across the Afghan frontier would mean war
with England.' I do not know it-I wish to good-
ness I did. I wish even Russia knew it.
But even
if she did know it, when she is prepared for war
with us, I don't suppose she will give us much
warning; and once she has got to the positions I
have named, the first we shall hear of her advancing
to the second line will be that they are in her hands.
For I hold, and I do not think any one can disprove
it, that if we let her absorb up to Sarakhs and do
nothing at all, we shall not, when the second phase
of her operations comes to be carried out, be in a
position to prevent her going to Herat. 3. Having
got hold of these places, she can rest on her oars just
as long as suits her convenience. She will have
won the two first tricks; and while she is making
FUTURE DESIGNS.
325
[1883.
railways up to Farah, improving the navigation of
the Oxus, and making a gun-road to Kabal, she can
employ her spare moments in raising sedition along
our whole border. Now, what I want our Govern-
ment to do is to copy the Russians, to look ahead a
bit—to do, as you say, all that can be done without
declaring war against Russia. One of the first steps
is to have the north and west boundaries of Afghan-
istan laid down, and there is not a day to be lost:
now, there can be no counter-Russian claims to any
part of it, but this may not be the case a few months
hence. Having laid down the boundary, the next
thing is to inform Russia solemnly that if she crosses
that border it will be war with us. I don't believe
at present she believes this, anyhow we have never
yet told her so in plain words.
"But of course this will be of no use unless we
take steps to make Herat safe. At present there can
be no doubt in the mind of any one who knows the
country that Russia could put a force into Herat
without our being able to prevent her; and if she
gets to Sarakhs, she will be all the more able to do
Herat is in such a state of anarchy politically,
and in such a weak state defensibly, that she must
fall to a sudden assault. We must prevent this.
We must arrange to have Herat put into such a
state of defence that she would not fall to a coup de
So.
main.
326
MAKE HERAT SAFE.
C
"Therefore I hold we should do two things at
once, (1) lay down the Afghan boundary on the
1883.]
north and west; (2) arrange for the safety of
Herat, and I should like to have a quiet talk with
you as to the best means of doing these things. I
can see the difficulties in the way of our accomplish-
ing them satisfactorily; but if we agree that they
should be done, I am by no means disposed to de-
spair of their accomplishment. I have said I wish
Government to act with forethought; I will add, I
wish them to act with every caution. I honestly
believe, to descend to the ridiculous, this is a case
like Eno's fruit-salt, a stone may stop the tiny rill,
but not a mountain the raging torrent."
PROBABLE LINE OF ATTACK.
327
"To his Excellency Sir DONALD STEWART, &c., &c.
SIMLA, October 19.
"We have heard before that the troops on the
Atak had been reinforced, and also that large num-
bers were collecting in Turkistan, and this seems to
confirm these reports.
"I have pointed out that the probable lines of
advance of the Russians will be (1) Krasnovodsk,
Askabad, Sarakhs, Herat; (2) Samarkand, Kilif,
Balkh, Kabal; (3) Khokand, Marghilan, by Kolab,
Faizabad, on Chitral, or by Terek Diwan Kul and the
Baroghil,¹ on the same place. We have heard that
15,000 to 20,000 are collecting at Askabad. This
says there are 25,000 at Turkistan and 15,000 are
going to Khokand, all of which places are on the
lines named above.
¹ These passes are practicable for wheeled artillery.
1
328
.
WHAT ARE WE DOING?
[1884.
"What does this mean? If they are going to
attack Merv, they do not want any troops at
Khokand; if they are going to attack Bokhara,
they don't want any at Askabad; but if they are
not going to attack either, but are only getting into
position for operations in Afghanistan, then these
movements are exactly the ones which would be
necessary. (I enclose a skeleton map to illustrate
what I say.) Meanwhile, what are we doing?"
Soon after this last letter was written, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Sir Donald Stewart, made a tour
of inspection through Central India, which lasted
through the remainder of October and during Novem-
ber. At this period Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor
accompanied the Chief, marching and camping with
the Headquarters Staff, their furthest point reached
being Jabalpur.
The beginning of the winter was spent by the
Quartermaster-General and his family at Calcutta,¹
where Lord Ripon's Court was then held, until Jan-
uary 1884, when Sir Charles had to attend Sir Don-
ald Stewart at the great camp of exercise formed near
Bangalore under his old friend Sir Frederick Roberts,
then commanding the Madras army.
From Bangalore Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor
accompanied the Commander-in-Chief to Madras,
¹ On 22d December 1883 a good-service pension of £100 per annum
was conferred by her Majesty's Government on Sir Charles MacGregor,
as a reward for distinguished and meritorious service.
•
:
1884.]
from which place they proceeded in turn to Secun-
derabad, Seringapatam, and Mysore, returning to
Bombay by way of Haidarabad, where they were
present at the gorgeous ceremonies with which the
investiture of the Nizam with administrative powers
by the Governor-General was celebrated.
From Bombay Sir Charles and his wife visited
Poona and many places of interest, and finally ar-
rived at Simla before the hot weather commenced.
Here the headquarters remained for the hot season,
during which time Sir Charles MacGregor, active as
ever, made several excursions into the mountains.
He often remarked, at this time, that he was not
fitted for a settled life, and ought always to be
wandering. Simla, with its social gaieties, dinners,
balls, and parties, was always distasteful to General
MacGregor; and although he was exceedingly hos-
pitable, and liked entertaining his own friends in hist
own house, he did not care to go out into society.
At home he was always bright, cheerful, and happy,
seeming to throw off all the cares and anxieties of
office directly he entered his own door; and he used.
to spend most of his leisure time, such as it was, in
painting or singing and playing at lawn-tennis.
Still Sir Charles was hard at work in putting to-
gether and working out in detail the minutiae of
facts, figures, and statistics, the examination of plans
and maps and papers, anything and everything
which in the slightest degree could assist in his plan
for the defence of India. This one thought ab-
DISTASTEFUL GAIETIES.
329
·
330
[1884.
sorbed his whole attention apart from his regular
and prompt fulfilment of his official duties, as the
following extracts prove.
With reference to a letter from Captain de Laessoe,
Foreign Department, on the concentration of Rus-
sian troops in Central Asia, the General writes:-
A VITAL SUBJECT.
"To his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.
February 25.
"I wish you would read this case through. It
shows what a lamentable state our Intelligence is
in. The Foreign Office ask us for information!
What information have we got? What means of
getting information are allowed us? We can't send
a sepoy five miles from Bannu without asking the
Foreign Secretary, Panjab Government, and the
Viceroy !!! Surely the time has come for some
systematic plan for gaining reliable information on
such a vital subject to be devised. I think an in-
formal committee, composed of Durand, self, and
Chesney, would do this, and that if your Excel-
lency would aid us, we could make some practical
proposal."
66
Writing to Durand on the same subject he re-
marks:
"I think myself we should have a regular system
of securing accurate, early, and regular military in-
formation of Russian doings. I think if Chesney,
you, and I were to get together and have a talk,
we could propose something. What do you say?
1884.]
I have got several men in my eye who would be
available for the purpose.
""
UNPREPAREDNESS.
331
In a memorandum written later (April 7), he says:
"At present we seem to be dependent for our
information on Russian movements in Central Asia
on :
"(1) News-writers stationed at Kandahar, Herat,
Merv, Bujnurd, Daragaz, Shiraz, Mashad,
Ispahan, and Askabad.
૮ :
(2) Such information as Afzul Khan sends us
from Kabal.
66
CC
(3) Bazar gup from Peshawar and Peshin.
66
(4) Translations from Russian newspapers (which
are, however, generally out of date).
ઃઃ
(5) Stray reports from the Berlin and St Peters-
burg Embassies.
"(6) Reports from Colonel Stewart (at Khaf), &c.
This is, I think, very unsatisfactory. No news-
writer who is known to the local authorities can
possibly write anything of value, as it may be taken
for a fact that their letters are read before despatch.
Then, of course, Russian papers are quite different
from our own. Our papers record every scrap of
information they can get hold of, often with very
little thought as to whether it is advisable it should
be published or not. Russian papers, on the con-
trary, never publish anything the authorities do not
wish to be known-i.e., nothing that can be of
much use to us.
"In order to show how unsatisfactory our infor-
mation is, I need not go back further than one
<<
332
[1884.
month, when the news burst upon us that the Rus-
sians had occupied Merv.
"But there is another more singular instance of
our ignorance. In June last, and since, rumours
have been flying about that the Russian garrisons
in Turkistan and Trans - Caspia have been lately
increased; and the Foreign Office note (dated 17th
January 1884) sums up by supposing that there
is now an excess of 60,000 men available for any
emergency, and concentrated principally in the
direction of Bokhara and Sarakhs.' This simply
means that the Russians are supposed to have suf
ficient men available (after providing necessary gar-
risons for Turkistan and Trans-Caspia) to enable
them to advance on Herat and Kabal.
OUR IGNORANCE.
،
"To this moment we are in doubt whether this
concentration has really taken place or not, and it
is evident that our councils must be paralysed as
long as this state of affairs continues.
"I therefore take it for granted that this state of
ignorance is allowed to be unsatisfactory, and pro-
ceed to consider how it can best be remedied.
"The first point for consideration is, What do we
want to know about Russian movements, &c. ? and
second, How can we best gain the necessary infor-
mation ?
66
Now, what we want to know I take to be this.
We should know at once what is the actual distri-
bution and strength of the Russian army, and espe-
cially that part of it in Turkistan and Trans-Caspia ;
1884.]
and we should have early, accurate, and regular in-
formation of all movements of Russian troops from
the Caucasus and Russia towards Turkistan and
Trans-Caspia.
In order to make sure of get-
ting this information, it will be necessary to”
Here follows a long scheme of the steps to be taken,
which cannot be published.]¹
"It should be borne in mind," he adds, "that there
are two maxims in getting good information. It
should come from as many different, independent
sources as possible, and it must be well paid for.
No rule can be laid down as to what amounts
should be paid to our secret agents; that must de-
pend entirely on the value and accuracy of the in-
formation tendered, and the celerity and secrecy
with which it is received."
VALUE OF INFORMATION.
333
،،
In a later memorandum :-
April 23.-A really accurate idea of the real
state of feeling at Teheran regarding England and
Russia would be most valuable. We assume that
the Persian Government are so completely under
the thumb of the Russians that they cannot be ex-
pected to go against them at all. Is this true? If
true, who among the leading men at Teheran are
especially Russophilist? and is there none who
leans towards England? If no hope can be enter-
tained of gaining over any of the leading men at
Teheran, it would be a good thing if
Of
¹ The identical course suggested in this scheme has since been taken
up and acted upon by Government.
[1884.
course we may take it for granted that Ayub Khan
means to try and get back Herat, and perhaps
eventually oust Abdul Rahman. Nothing is impos-
sible in Afghanistan. He means to do this by hook
or by crook, which being interpreted means, either
with our aid or that of the Russians, or without
either. But it would be very valuable if we knew
more of his real hopes and fears, in order that we
may know better how to utilise him for our own
ends, if he is worth it. I saw Ayub¹ once, but he
was too young to enable me to form any opinion
of him. The same information would be valuable
about the leading men with him, such as Loll Naib,
Hafizalla, Hashim, and the Surtip. How do they
hope to get back to Herat? Who do they propose
to work through? &c., &c. Everything we can get
as to the disposition and intentions of all this party
will be very valuable."
334
ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE.
"To H. M. DURAND, Esq., C.S., Foreign Department.
(6
SIMLA, March 24.
"Will you
be at your office to-morrow? If so, at
what hour? I want to see you. The Russians are
going it, and unless we take the bull by the horns at
once, we shall be in a hat that neither the diplomacy
of the Foreign Office nor the blood of many soldiers
will get us out of.
"I have just seen a paper by Condie Stephens on
the topography of the Hari-rud. There is an air of
1 Vide ante, p. 17; 'Khorassan,' vol. ii. p. 38.
4.
1884.]
COMPLETION OF ESSAY.
truthfulness and common-sense about all his reports
that makes one think he should certainly be sent
with any commission; and the tricks he points
out in the Russian maps show the necessity for a
properly constructed survey party. I have not yet
received the proofs of my paper. Ridgeway told me
they would be sent off on Saturday, 15th.'
"His Excellency Lieutenant-General Sir F. ROBERTS,
G.C.B., V.C., &c., Madras.
335
"SIMLA, April 5.
"I believe your Governor [i.e., the Right Hon.
Mountstuart E. Grant Duff] has a very complete
knowledge of foreign politics, and I should be very
much obliged to you if you would take an opportu-
nity of asking him quietly what he thinks of the
chances of our being able to make an alliance with
Germany, Austria, Turkey, against Russia. I am
inclined to think such a coalition would be feasible,
but of course I am rather abroad when I come to
talk about European politics. I daresay he will be
against the idea, but I should like to know his
reasons.
“I have finished three parts of my paper, and two
are in the press, and the third is ready. The fourth
and fifth I hope to get ready this week, and sixth
and appendices in another fortnight. I have now
come to a final arrangement about the parts.
"I. What can Russia do ?1 II. Internal Defence
1 Ultimately the headings were as follows:-
Chapter I., pp. 1-50-“Can Russia invade India?”
3
336
[1884.
of India; III. Diplomatic Measures necessary; IV.
How are we to provide sufficient Troops to defeat
Russian Operations? V. Strategical Disposition of
our Troops; VI. What Improvements in Communi-
cation are necessary ?
"Part V. will be considered under four heads: (1)
If the Russians remain in their present positions till
we are ready; (2) If they take up positions at Herat,
at or near Kabal, at or near Chitral, before we are
ready; (3) If from these positions they advance to-
wards India; (4) If we are driven out of Kandahar
and advanced positions, and have to fight on our
frontier.
દ
THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.
"I can't say what the appendices will be exactly,
but I hope they will include (1) Notes on the de-
fence of our seaports; (2) Note on the defence of
the obligatory points in India; (3) Details of routes,
Chapter II., pp. 51-104-"Internal Defences of India."
Chapter III., pp. 105-144-" Diplomatic Measures necessary.
Chapter IV., pp. 145-182-" How are we to provide a sufficient
Force to meet Russian Operations?"
Chapter V., pp. 183-210—“Offensive- Defensive Military Opera-
tions from India."
Chapter VI., pp. 211-228-" Communications."
In addition, Chapter VII., pp. 229-232 —“Offensive - Defensive
Operations from other points than India."
The headings in Chapter V. were— (1) Provided Russia remains in
her present positions till we are ready to undertake operations to cover
Afghanistan; (2) Supposing she takes up positions at Herat, at or near
Kabal, and at or near Chitral, before we are ready; (3) If, having
gained these positions, she advances towards India; (4) Admitting
that we have been so supine as to take no adequate steps to meet her,
and we are driven out of the Kandahar-Kabal line and have to fight
on a line from Jalalabad to Quetta; (5) Allowing that we have been
defeated on this line and driven back to our present frontier.
1884.]
&c.; (4) On the sphere of operations of our movable
columns in India; (5) Reports on the defence of Af-
ghanistan; (6) Latest information about the Haza-
rajat and Kafiristan, &c., &c.; (7) Organisation of the
lines of communication of the forces noted in Part V.
A DIFFICULT GAME.
337
"But I will not wait for the appendices to get
the report out and send round copies. I should like
to know to whom you think I should send them.
Who did you send yours to? I cannot say how
many pages this will run to. I calculate the three
first parts will come to about 200.
"The game we have to play is very difficult, but
all the more honour to us if we win. There are
signs that our miserable Governnent is somewhat
roused. The Boundary Commision will certainly
come off. Who do you think they will send ?"
“To Colonel G. T. CHESNEY, C.S.I., R.E.
"SIMLA, May 21.
'I am glad you think I have succeeded in arous-
ing conviction as to the reality of the danger we are
in. I shall be glad to come over and see you when-
ever you name a day, and talk it over.
The great
point I want to raise is, Is the danger real? If we
are agreed about this, we can very soon settle what
should be done. Of course I give my ideas of what
this should be, but I am not so wedded to my ideas
that I would not work heart and soul for whatever
was thought best for the general cause.
"I am going on with the paper, and am going to
VOL. II.
Y
[1884.
work out all the necessary details. I have not sent
it to Lord Ripon yet, indeed I have only sent it to
a few experts to get at their opinions. When I get
them I will bring it all out, and send it to every one
I can think of. Perhaps you could help me in this.
I am averse to publishing our nakedness."
338
MARKS ON A MAP.
At last The Defence of India' was printed and
issued just as it was settled that the demarcation of
the Russo-Afghan Boundary should be fixed by an
international Commission.
"To Lieutenant J. M. GRIERSON, R.A., Staff College.
"SIMLA, June 19.
1
"About the Boundary Commission. I fancy
they will prefer to send any one but me. They
talk of Temple, Griffin, and St John, and I fancy
they are very likely style of men to go; but if they
would send me to hold Herat, I would not care who
drew red and green marks on a map.
I hope you
will send me Hamley's paper.2 Mine is finished, and
1 On the 21st July Sir C. MacGregor writes to Lieutenant-Colonel
Kinloch, 4th Battalion King's Royal Rifles: "You will have heard ere
this that they are going to send Sir P. Lumsden, so I suppose he will
select his own men, and I shall have nothing to do with it.”
2 "Russia's Approaches to India," a paper read at the Royal United
Service Institution, on May 16, 1884, by Lieutenant - General Sir
Edward Hamley, Royal Artillery, who adds in a note to the printed
report: “And here I may mention that, since this paper was printed,
I have seen evidence that most of the views here set forth are shared
by an Indian officer, whose name would be at once admitted as of
almost decisive influence in the question "--alluding to the advance
sheets of 'The Defence of India,' by Sir Charles MacGregor.
1884.]
is now being printed. I am proud to think that it
has given the whole Council fits!"
GIVING COUNCIL FITS.
"To Colonel W. S. TREVOR, V.C., R. E.,
Secretary to Government, P.W.D.
339
"July 17.
66
I see that
I see that you assume
I have read your paper.
that
If
will have eight to ten years to prepare.
you
there was any certainty of this, I should agree with
you, but the exact contrary is the case, for the
Russians are in a position now to take Herat.
"They may perhaps be afraid to do so at once;
but if we do nothing, they will always be in a
position to do so before we can prevent them.
Therefore the time we shall have to prepare rests
with them, not with us. Whenever they are ready,
they will begin without giving us any warning.
"I am quite sure that your plan of having a
Resident with no British troops to back him, and
intrusting the defence of Herat to Hazaras, will
never do. No Resident could stay in Afghanistan
anywhere without a force at his back. I see all the
difficulties of our going to Herat as clearly as any
one, but I am convinced there is no other way of
making that place safe, and therefore the sooner we
face it the better."
"To Colonel J. W MACQUEEN, C.B.,
Secretary to Government, Panjab.
"July 18.
"About Herat of course the whole question turns,
whether it is a sufficiently important position to fight
340
[1884.
for, and whether we are not bound to fight for it. I
hold it is most important, and that we must fight for
it. If so, the only way to secure its safety is to go
there ourselves; no reliance whatever can be placed
on any Afghan rag-tag to hold it for us. I see all
the difficulties as well as any one, but no one has
yet answered my question-What measure short of
our going there will make it safe? I can understand
a fellow saying he does not want an omelet at all,
but not those who say they would like an omelet,
but who try to get it without breaking eggs. Will
you let me see your paper?"
HOW INDISCREET!
"To Captain J. C. F. GORDON, C.B.
SIMLA, July 24.
"I have nothing to do with the Boundary Com-
mission. A great luminary here, who lately distin-
guished himself by the introduction of a bill for the
transfer of power to the Babus, has been still drop-
ping pearls of wisdom. If he saw your letter (the
spirit of which I commend much) he would say,—
'How very indiscreet! it might provoke the Rus-
sians.' So now, if you cough too loudly up here, we
say, 'How very indiscreet! it might provoke the
Russians.' Never mind, my boy! I always say
the politicals are the soldiers' best friends, and they
are now preparing for us as pretty a kettle of fish as
the most ardent could desire, and you and all of us
will get our chance yet.
""
66
1884.1
CAN THEY BURKE IT?
"To Major-General Sir G. R. GREAVES, K.C. M.G., C.B., &c.¹
"SIMLA, Aug. 20.
"I want to have a talk with you about the situa-
tion generally. I have had my say in my book.
The fate of such productions is, we all know, 'Yes,
it's very true; but let's have a peg!' Now I do not
want this to be the case in this case. There is
doubtless a good deal that a real radical reformer
would like to upset in our system of organisation out
here; but I think the question for us is, How can we
get ready for contingencies in the shortest possible
time, with the least dislocation of present arrange-
ments, and despite all that the 'rest-and-be-thankful'
school can do?
341
"Though there are points which might be im-
proved in our Staff and departments, I think we
could get through a campaign all right very much
as we are.
"One great want is men. The first point is, How
many do we want?-and the second is, How can we
get them? I have tried to answer this in my
Chapter IV., but I may be wrong; and if we could
get the Chief to settle the first point, we might work
out the second, and then get him to let us submit the
whole scheme officially to the Military Department.
Coming thus from the Chief, they could not burke it.
In order to get the Chief to settle the first point, I
think we might submit a memorandum officially to
him. Tell me what you say to all this."
1 Adjutant-General in India.
.
342
A SUPPRESSED WORK.
'THE DEFENCE OF INDIA.' › 1
[1884.
This notable book, completed, as we have seen, in
June, was printed and ready for issue in September,
from the Government Central Branch Press at Sim-
la, but only a limited number of this confidential
publication was actually distributed to certain prom-
inent officials, experts, and recognised publicists,
interested in Central Asian affairs; for scarcely had
the earlier copies been glanced through at the
Foreign Department in Calcutta, than, by order
of the Supreme Government, the further distribu-
tion of the volume was hastily stopped, and the
remainder of the now suppressed work rigorously
impounded.
1884.
-
The Quartermaster-General had previously exer-
cised the greatest possible caution to ensure the ex-
clusive and confidential character of his book, by
personal superintendence of the printing process, by
seeing the type distributed after use, and by taking
each sheet when pulled from the press into his own
custody. He also took the greatest pains that those
copies sent out only reached persons whose reputa-
tion was assumed to guarantee the safety of the in-
formation contained within.
G
In a prefatory note the author explains the cir-
K
¹ [Confidential.] The Defence of India: A Strategical Study. By
Major-General Sir C. M. MacGregor, K. C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Quarter-
master-General in India. Simla : Government Central Branch Press,
1884.]
cumstances which led up to the preparation and pro-
duction of the book, and he further requests each
reader of his "Strategical Study" to send him criti-
cal remarks, whether in favour of or against the
views therein set forth; his only object being, as he
states, to get the right thing done, whatever that
may be.
343
RUSSIAN MENACE.
Patron
wing
There can be no breach of confidence now in giving
a brief sketch of the contents of this highly valuable
book, the reasons which alone rendered it improper
for general circulation being fully explained in the
preface, which may be quoted at length:-
"Preface. The following pages have been writ-
ten under the strong belief that a great danger is
impending over our Indian empire, and therefore
that it behoves all Englishmen to try to realise
exactly what that danger is, and what measures
should be undertaken to meet it. It may be taken
for certain that the ranks of those who believe that
there is no danger to India from Russian encroach-
ments in Asia have been very much diminished by
the late uncalled-for and deceitful advance of that
Power to Merv, and that therefore any warning is
now but little required. However this may be, I
hope what I have to say will at last open the eyes
of all Englishmen, and decide those who may yet be
wavering that the danger is now real.
I have pro-
posed certain measures to meet the Russian menace.
I believe all are sound and all are feasible; but as
long as my readers agree with me that the danger is
344
[1884.
real and must be met adequately, I have no wish to
split hairs as to what is best to be done. Once
those in power in England and India are roused to
a just appreciation of the situation, I shall have no
fear of the result. Therefore I earnestly appeal to
each one who reads my paper to do all that lies in
his power to aid in the great work which it recom-
mends; for that work is no less than the preserva-
tion of our Indian empire. It may be asked why I
have not addressed myself to the general public of
England and India by means of the press. My
answer is, Because I believe doing so would do more
harm than good, inasmuch as though I believe if I
did so it would raise a strong popular feeling on the
subject, still there is much of what I have said that
should not be known to the Russian Government,
who, with all their finesse, are not so well informed
on many points as they would wish to be and are
trying to be. I therefore, instead of addressing
myself to the general public of England, appeal to
those whom I believe to have the power to aid; and
I ask each one who reads this paper, while keeping
it strictly confidential, to do what he can to assist
in getting done what is necessary and advisable."
Leaving out, therefore, all facts, details, suggestions,
and figures which (from their minute accuracy) can
be considered confidential, or in the remotest degree
detrimental to the interests of the Government and
the service, the following meagre notice of the sub-
jects of each separate chapter will serve to indicate
AN EARNEST APPEAL.
1
1884.]
PLAN OF ATTACK.
345
sufficiently the argument of General MacGregor's
exhaustive disquisition.
Chap. I. Can Russia invade India?—In his first
chapter Sir Charles considers the possibility of Russia,
from her present position in Asia, invading India now
(1884) or at any future time. He shows that, the
Caucasus being subdued, Turkey cannot cope single-
handed with Russia; whilst Persia, the Turkomans,
Khiva, Bohkara, and the Khanates are all subordinate
to the Muscovite Emperor. Next he shows the enor-
mous fighting strength of Russia, the proportionate
force which must be retained for her frontier defence,
and the sufficiency of the remainder available for an
invasion of India. Then, as to the feasibility of this
operation, it is pointed out how easily the obvious
vantage-points can be seized without hindrance.
Sir Charles suggests that the Russians would prob-
ably advance five columns of attack,-viz., an Atak
column, via Sarakhs, on Herat; an Oxus column, via
Chaharjui, on Bamian; a Jam column, via Balkh, on
Kabal; a Marghilan column, via Kolab, on Chitral ;
and a Pamir column, via Terek Diwan, on Kashmir.
The author calculates that, on the sixtieth day
after the Russian forces have been put in motion
from their respective bases, they could reach their
secondary bases, and that Russia would have a very
fair chance of arriving at her objectives before
England could take any practical steps to prevent
her.
The Russian plan, it is suggested, would be-"To
346
[1884.
hold on to Herat at all hazards, reinforcing it to any
extent necessary from the Caspian; to hold on to
Kabal, thence threatening India long enough to draw
the English into entangling themselves in a campaign
in North Afghanistan in the winter; to play the same
game with the Chitral column, by threatening to
advance on Peshawar, and to use the Pamir column
to keep up a constant irritation on the Kashmir
frontier; to embroil the English in every way with
the Afghans, and so exhaust her, that she would be
glad to seek a modus vivendi ; then to offer to evacuate
Chitral and Kabal and withdraw the Pamir column,
for acquiescence in a new Russian frontier, drawn
from the crest of Terek Diwan Pass, south by the
watershed of the Pamir, to the Hindu Kush, then by
the crest of that range to the Koh-i-Baba, and then
to include the whole of the country of the Hazaras,
and the province of Herat to the Farah-Rud." This
new frontier would be all that Russia need aim at in
the first campaign. Then she could afford to wait
until a favourable opportunity arose for the real
invasion of India, having, in addition to the posses-
sion of the big battalions, the prestige, the Ikbal, of
an Asiatic conqueror.
Chap. II. Internal Defences of India.—Sir Charles
now turns to what Great Britain should do in view
of such an invasion, and bases his scheme on certain
principles-the maintenance of a firm hold on all
places of strategical importance, and on the com-
munications; the provision of places of refuge, and
THE IKBAL.
-
1884.]
movable columns; the practice of great economy,
and the necessity of the garrisons being mainly
British.
ORGANISED RESISTANCE.
347
The author discusses in detail the defence organ-
isation of each Presidency, the proposed distribution
and the utilisation of volunteers and armoured trains.
He makes a special point of the necessity of enrolling
the Eurasians, Portuguese, half-castes, and native
Christians, alien races, and others whose lot must be
cast in with the British. But what then? The con-
clusion arrived at is, that Russia can put, say, 95,000
regular troops, within eighty to one hundred days
after the summons, into positions from which she can
undertake the invasion of India; whilst Britain, by
prodigious efforts, could only place in line xyz,000
men on the frontier to encounter the invasion, with-
out proper reserves.
Chap. III. Diplomatic Measures necessary.—The
great object is for Britain to utilise her breathing-
time and meet Russia elsewhere than in India.
European alliances are indispensable, and Russian
trade must be crippled if invasion is threatened.
The north and west boundary of Afghanistan must
be demarcated, a commission being at once sent to
Herat for the purpose, and that city should be occu-
pied and fortified without delay. Endeavours should
be made to gain over Persia, or at least to neutralise
her giving assistance to Russia. An immediate alli-
ance with China, &c.
Chap. IV. How are we to provide a sufficient Force
348
[1884.
to meet Russian Operations?-In this chapter Sir
Charles considers to what extent our military forces
in India must be increased to enable us to meet the
advance of 95,000 Russians, excluding all irregular
levies, into Afghanistan.
He takes for granted, that at least xyz,000 men
are required, and proceeds to estimate their compo-
sition and distribution. He then shows how many
units of each branch are required for this army, and
calculates how may units we are short.
He points
out the resources in men which we have in India
which only require organisation, and recommends
the steps to be taken.
"Procrastination and temporising may defer the
storm for a brief season; but every hour that is
spent in mere procrastination, without taking advan-
tage of the lull to face our difficulties, will only
cause it to acquire accumulative force.
The
only thing now left for us to do is to grasp our nettle,
and to take up such a strong position in defence of
our Indian frontier as will make Russia see the hope-
lessness of attacking us. Nothing short of this
will do."
GRASP THE NETTLE.
Chap. V. Offensive - Defensive Military Opera-
tions from India.-Provided Russia remains in her
present position, the only way to make Herat secure
is for Britain to occupy it. Supposing Russia has
been allowed to gain possession of Herat, she will
have gained the outworks of India. What should
Britain do? She would have to fortify Kandahar
1884.]
strongly. Sir Charles then works out all the steps
of the operations by Russia, against Kandahar and
Kabal, and the dispositions of British troops needed to
check them. The successive advances of Russia and
the final actual invasion of India are then treated of,
and the corresponding lines of defence to be occupied
are thoroughly discussed. "If we take up the game
at once, a field army of xyz,000 men and a home
army of about yzx,000 men would suffice. If we
lose Herat, we shall require a field army of zxy,000
men, and the home army will have to be increased
by at least one-fourth. If we lose Kandahar and
Kabal, our field army would have to be increased to
xxx,000, and the home army by another fourth. If
we have to fight on the Indus, we should require a
field army of xyx,000 men; and to hold India quiet,
we should want probably not less than yxx,000 men
-that is to say, in the last stage, zzz,000 men
would be necessary.
NO SACRIFICE TOO GREAT.
349
"It
It may be said, and this is the only other argu-
ment worth considering, that we could not raise such
a number of men, and if we could, the game would
not be worth the candle. Such a statement I most
entirely refuse to admit. I fearlessly assert that
England can raise enough men, and can pay them ;
and for the rest, I am one of those who think that
no sacrifice is too great to face when national honour
is in danger."
Chap. VI. Communications.-General MacGregor
states that he has entered into all the details with
350
[1884.
the only spirit which leads to success in war, and that
is, determination to win. In Chapter VI. he discusses
the state of British communications and those of the
Russians, and in reference to the first quotes the
memorandum on the development of the Indian rail-
way system prepared by Major Stewart, Assistant-
Quartermaster-General, and advocates certain im-
provements as absolutely necessary to secure India
from disastrous defeat.1
EUROPEAN COALITION.
Chap. VII. Offensive - Defensive Measures from
other points than India.-" Russia, like France, is a
purely aggressive Power. Her great wish is to get
to the open sea. Those who stand in her way are
Austria, England, and Turkey.
In order
to carry out her designs, Russia must attack Turkey;
in order to paralyse England she must threaten India ;
and to annul Austria, she must threaten her with a
Slav rebellion. The peace of the world can probably
be secured by the coalition of Germany, Austria,
Turkey, and England; but if war did break out,
Russia and France would be overmatched. Should
Germany keep out of the alliance, a successful issue
would not be certain."
..
Epilogue. In the foregoing pages I have tried
to point out, as shortly as the vastness of the subject
will allow, what I, and probably, at this time, the
majority of Englishmen who have any knowledge
of the subject, believe to be a great danger hanging
over our Indian empire, and consequently-for the
¹ These measures are in many instances being carried out.
1884.]
My
6
two are inseparable-the honour of England.
aim has been to state what I believe to be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.'
''
'If there should be any, at this stage of Russian
aggression, who still refuse to believe, and who would
still resort to the favourite device of the masterly
inactionists,' of calling every one who raised a note
of warning Russophobists, I can expect no better
fate at their hands. I suppose they will say I
have exaggerated the danger, and have proposed
measures so grandiose that no Ministry would ever
contemplate putting them in hand.
"As to my having exaggerated the danger, it is
very easy to make such an accusation; but I protest
against its being made, unless it is backed up by
some arguments which will really cut away the
ground from under my feet. The whole question
really lies in a nut-shell. Has Russia the wish and
the means to attack us in India, and is such an
undertaking a feasible operation of war? As to
the wish, I think the whole history of her advance
eastwards for the last hundred years sufficiently
proves this, at least to those who are open to
conviction. I have not troubled my readers with
any sketch of this advance, as there is no necessity
to repeat what can be found in a hundred different
books, articles, and letters. As to the means, I have
shown in the first chapter what these are, and in
the same chapter I have sketched without bias what
would be the course of any further unopposed ad-
NO EXAGGERATION.
351
6
352
[1884.
vance by Russian troops; while in the Appendix
will be found the grounds on which I base the
belief that an advance on India is a feasible op-
eration of war. By these proofs (or others more
trustworthy) alone can my statement be refuted.
Mere assertion and hiding one's head in the sand
is not proof, and I sincerely hope the English people
will demand from those who, even at this eleventh
hour, pooh-pooh all action, nothing less than a clear
and detailed refutation of my arguments.
"From those who, even now, do not believe, I
only ask further, honest and searching investigation
of the subject. To them I say, 'Not only I, but
the great majority of those who have made the
subject their study, believe there is great danger.
You perhaps do not; but unless you think us all
absolute fools and knaves, let the fact that we do,
induce you to make a more thorough and more
earnest study of it than you have yet done. If
the result of your labour is to confirm your belief,
let us, in the name of patriotism, hear your views
backed up by unanswerable arguments.
If you
can prove that I am wrong, I shall be the first
to acknowledge my error, and to welcome your
reassuring conclusions; but, in heaven's name, let
us have nothing but real proofs.'
As to the measures I propose being on too grand
a scale for the acquiescence of an English Ministry,
I can only say that, if I am right as to the danger,
it will not be in the power of any English Ministry
ONLY INVESTIGATE.
1884.]
-
to refuse to carry out, if not the exact measures I
propose, other measures at least as great and ex-
pensive. If Russia does advance further, she will
have to be met with adequate measures, and with
adequate force. An English Ministry may try to
put off the evil day by timid procrastination and
by tinkering; but, fortified by the experience of
the past, and the prescience which a study of war
in general, and this question in particular gives,
I prophesy they will fail, and just inasmuch as
they neglect to face the danger adequately, so far
need they bring further danger and disaster on their
country. I allow that I have proposed a very ex-
tensive programme. I have done so because the
peril is very great, and I am convinced that nothing
short of it will meet the case; at the same time,
I am not so foolish as to be wedded to each detail
-
of my plan of action. All I ask is, that enough
should be done, and done in time.
"With these few words by way of epilogue, I
close; but, in doing so, I make one last appeal to
all Englishmen who have followed me so far, to do
all that in them lies to rouse the English nation to
a just appreciation of the crisis which is coming on
us. If this can be done, there need be no further
fear or doubt.
AROUSE THE NATION.
353
"There is, I think, only one point to which I have
not alluded—namely, the possibility of our coming
to some agreement with Russia. Is such a thing
possible? If so, I am sure most Englishmen would
VOL. II.
Ꮓ
354
[1884.
hail its conclusion with gladness. Of course, if her
Majesty's Government opened communications with
the Imperial Government to the effect that, desirous
of continuing friendly relations, they wished to see
if there was no modus vivendi between the two
Powers, the Russian Government would reply that
to remain on good terms with the British was and
always had been the main aim of their existence,
and they would be ready to promise anything to
secure that friendship.
(C
THE SOLE GUARANTEE.
But Russian promises are, I am afraid, at this
moment not a marketable commodity. What we
want is to be let alone. A mere promise from
Russia to sin no more is incontestably not worth
the breath expended in uttering it: we must have
some guarantee that we should be let alone.
“The only guarantee that would be of the smallest
use to us would be the absolute withdrawal of the
Russians from the east coast of the Caspian below
the Yaman Airakti Bay. If the Russians would
do this, we might consider how far we could meet
their wishes.
"Russia's most absorbing wish I understand to
be a port in the Mediterranean; but it is impossible
to think how she can get this without the concur-
rence of Turkey, and as that Power cannot agree
without losing territory, I don't see how it can be
accomplished.
"Myself, I don't see what advantage to the com-
merce of Russia the possession of a port in the
1884.]
DIPLOMATIC EVASIONS.
355
Mediterranean would be. I don't see even how
the Russian trade would be benefited by her pos-
session of Constantinople, unless she got all the
country intervening between Odessa and that place
in addition.
"The fact really is, that Russia does not want a
port for purely commercial purposes, but for ag-
gressive purposes. During peace, her vessels have
the freest access to the Mediterranean, but during
war, Russia can be confined to the Black Sea. If
she had Constantinople and the Dardanelles, or some
other port on the Mediterranean, she could gradually
assemble a fleet there that might be very useful to
her, because it could act on the sea-communication
between India and England, and threaten the Suez
Canal.
So that if she got a port on the Mediterranean,
we should gain nothing thereby. If she is in a posi-
tion to put pressure on us now, she would be in a
better position to do so then, and most assuredly
she would use it. She may give up the line of the
Atak to gain a port in the Mediterranean; but, de-
pend upon it that the idea that she would be so
grateful to us for helping her to it that she would
never again worry us on the Indian frontier, is
altogether a delusion.
"I therefore regret to say I can see no way of
coming to a satisfactory understanding with Russia
by diplomatic means. It is certain that we do not
want war, and will not provoke it; but it is also
356
[1884.
certain that we must fight her if she takes one step
more towards India; and I solemnly assert my belief
that there can never be a real settlement of the
Russo-Indian question till Russia is driven out of
the Caucasus and Turkistan.1
PURELY PRIVATE.
66
C. M. MACGREGOR, Major-General,
Quartermaster-General in India."
"To Colonel A. S. CAMERON, V.C., A.Q.M.G.
Intelligence Branch, Horse Guards, London.
September 4.
"I got a telegram last night from Cameron,'
London-Six copies, "Defence of India," please.'
As you are the only Cameron I know, I write to
tell you that I have sent six copies to H. S. King
& Co., 45 Pall Mall, with instructions that if you
apply personally for them they are to be given to
you and a receipt taken. While thus complying
with your request, I wish you, please, to under-
stand that I do not give them to you in your of
ficial capacity as head of the Intelligence Branch,
War Office.
(6
(
Ho
"The publication is a purely private one, and I
do not wish that it shall be regarded in any way as
official. You are at liberty to show it to any officer,
or member of Parliament, or member of the Govern-
ment, as long as, while doing so, you inform them
of the private and confidential nature of the publi-
1 See article in 'Quarterly Review' for January 1887-" Constanti-
nople, Russia, and India"--which bears out the same conclusion.
1884.]
cation. Please apply for them the instant you get
the letter, so that they may not have time to look at
them, and see that the package has not been opened
until
you see it."
THE CALL TO ARMS.
357
.
General MacGregor's tocsin resounded loud with no
uncertain tone, and its sounds reverberated widely,
spreading, as the author of The Defence of India
intended, a general feeling of alarm at their inse-
curity, now forced on their attention, among the
authorities at Calcutta, and almost a scare in the
Indian Council and Downing Street.
Like Miltiades before Marathon, the general de-
precated above all things procrastination. "Never
since the foundation of the empire," he said, "has
India been placed in so imminent a peril." How
her defence might be accomplished he explained.
The sentiments of the Government and of the India
Office were divided. "Depend upon it," he wrote,
"if we delay, all may be lost; but if we take im-
mediate measures, we may obtain the victory. Con-
sider the alternative, the decision rests with you."
"
By October a certain number of copies of The
Defence of India' had been distributed to a limited
and select circle of military authorities, members of
Government, heads of departments, and a few pub-
licists, by Sir Charles MacGregor, with the express
purpose of eliciting additional information and criti-
cism. He wrote: "I shall be very pleased to re-
ceive from any gentleman who may read this 'Study,'
358
[1884.
any remarks he may have to offer in favour of or
against the views I have set forth. In fact, as my
only object is to get the right thing done, whatever
that may be, I earnestly invite such remarks, and
promise to give them every consideration in a second
edition of this work."1 Besides, Sir Charles wrote
to each recipient as follows: This publication is a
purely private one, and I do not wish that it shall
be regarded in any way as official. You are at
liberty to show it to any officer, or member of Par-
liament, or member of Government, as long as,
while doing so, you inform them of the private and
confidential nature of the publication."
In spite of the precautions taken by Sir Charles,
owing to the unfortunate indiscretion of certain
parties in London, several articles and paragraphs,
alluding to and quoting from 'The Defence of
India' appeared in some of the papers; notably
in the pages of the 'St James's Gazette.' 2 Now the
'St James's Gazette' was an anti-Government organ,
and the Cabinet of Mr Gladstone would appear
to have looked upon The Defence of India' as a
.
THE SECRET REVEALED.
1 Numerous replies were received, which, it is to be hoped, will
some day be appended to a second edition of the work.
2 "After the receipt of the first copies had been acknowledged from
England, I got a letter from a friend urging me to let the question be
publicly discussed in the press. I answered, refusing point-blank to
let my book be used for the purpose, but said that I saw no objection
to his showing it to a few of the editors, provided he first of all got an
assurance, on honour, that the book was not to be alluded to or quoted
from in any way."-Letter to Sir Donald Stewart, Commander-in-
Chief in India.
1884.]
work endangering the Liberal party; for the Earl of
Kimberley telegraphed out to Lord Ripon to know
whether he (the Governor-General) or the Com-
mander-in-Chief (Sir Donald Stewart) had taken,
or intended to take, any steps to mark disapproval
of the circulation of General MacGregor's book in
a manner which practically amounted to publication
of a discussion of matters of a delicate and confiden-
tial nature by the Quartermaster-General.¹
Sir Charles was called upon for an explanation
through the Commander-in-Chief, and stated the
steps he had taken to preserve the confidential
character of the work, and that no one, reading his
prefatory note, could be led to suppose that it was
written in his public and official capacity as Quarter-
master-General. Besides, he had submitted, some
months previously, a preliminary issue of his book
for the consideration of his Excellency the Viceroy
and the principal members of the Supreme Gov-
ernment before the regular copies had been sent
out to others, and he had not received the slight-
est hint that the circulation would be considered
objectionable.
OFFICAL DISAPPROVAL.
359
He wrote to Sir Donald Stewart: "It was in no
petty search for notoriety I wrote the book and cir-
1 On learning the substance of the Secretary of State's telegram, Sir
Charles telegraphed to Captain A—— D—— in London, to recall any
of his books which might have passed into the hands of editors. Only
one editor was recalcitrant, but by 26th November A D-
was able to wire that all the copies were out of the hands of the
editors.
360.
[1884.
culated it. I saw then, I see now,-a danger
hanging over our Indian empire, and I considered
it my duty to point it out clearly and fearlessly.
I did so.
I endeavoured to tell the whole truth
on the subject, and I submitted it for the honest
consideration of all. I meant to have performed
a public service, and now find I have committed
an official mistake, for which I beg to express my
deep regret."
.
-
He had, indeed, performed a public service, and
the unpalatable truths laid bare by Sir Charles's un-
flinching exposé of the situation were shortly to be
brought home to the Indian official mind.
As it turned out, it is understood that Lord Ripon
would have taken no serious notice of the work, al-
though he officially expressed in Council his regret
at the circulation which had been given to it-i.e.,
the notice taken of it in the English press-had not
the matter been taken up by the Government of Mr
Gladstone at home, and had not the Secretary of
State (Lord Kimberley) pressed upon the Governor-
General the necessity of taking steps to suppress the
book and its author if possible.
The incident terminated with the only result pos-
sible, that Sir Charles MacGregor's explanations
were accepted, perhaps not with the best grace,
and he was told in official language to sin no
more.
UNPALATABLE TRUTHS.
Perfectly aware of his own integrity and honesty
of purpose, the single-minded Quartermaster-Gen-
JUSTIFICATION.
361
1884.]
C
eral pursued the even tenor of his way with un-
shaken purpose. His great idea was to prepare, as
far as in him lay, for whatever crisis should arrive,
and the events he had foreseen were not long in
making their advent apparent even to the most
blinded of Government officials. Before Sir Charles
vacated his appointment, his precautions and advice
were fully justified.
The Indian Government professed to undervalue
the warnings of Sir Charles MacGregor; but none
the less, they were tremendously impressed by the
irrefutable arguments so well pushed home in 'The
Defence of India.' The effect was unmistakably
shown in the Indian Budget of 1885; and lately we
have been reminded of the change effected, although
the promoter of this increase has not received that
acknowledgment of his share in the movement which
he so well deserves.
"At that time," said Lord Randolph Churchill (13th
March 1888) in the debate on our Indian frontier
policy,1 "we were brought as near to war with Rus-
sia as we could be without actually being at war.
The Prime Minister [Lord Salisbury] demanded an
enormous vote of credit, and the Indian Government
incurred immense expenditure in order to send up
large bodies of troops to the frontier. The frontier
was defenceless. There were no railways and hardly
1 Mr Slagg moved "That in the opinion of this House the unwise
frontier policy of the Government of India is producing grave finan-
cial difficulties in that country," &c.
1
362
[1884.
any roads and bridges to enable our troops to move
about with ease or without very heavy loss and ex-
pense. Such was the state of the frontier at that
time. We knew that the Russians were perfecting
their arrangements in Central Asia, with the view of
bringing up large bodies of troops to Afghanistan,
and the Indian Government decided that for the or-
dinary security of India it was absolutely necessary
to undertake a more complete defence of the frontier.
When our frontier was brought very near indeed to
the frontier of so great a Power as Russia, was it
unwise or foolish to take steps to enable us to defend
our frontier? Is there any nation in the world
which in the circumstances would not have adopted
a precisely similar policy?
"When I was at the Indian Office large estimates
were submitted to it for two branches of frontier de-
fence. One branch related to road communication
and bridges, and the other to the construction of
great fortified works. Both were submitted to and
approved by the House of Commons; . but I
believe that by far the main amount of the expendi-
ture has been confined to the construction of rail-
ways, roads, and bridges across the rivers in that
part of the world."
LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL.
-
Sir R. Temple on the same occasion "quite be-
lieved that it had been imperatively necessary for
the Government of India to increase their army by
30,000 men, including 10,000 British troops, because
it was essential to show before the people of India,
1884.]
and before the world, that they had two army-corps
mobilised on the North-Western frontier."
SIR EDWARD HAMLEY.
363
General Sir E. Hamley re-echoed with emphasis
Sir Charles MacGregor's forecast of Russian invasion.
He said: "The chances were that if she, Russia,
should find occasion to threaten our frontier, she
would begin by the invasion of Afghanistan, and
when she had possessed herself of the three corner
cities of Herat, Kabal, and Kandahar, she would, in
the space between these, proceed to create an advance
base of operations by filling it with immense supplies
of men and matériel for a campaign against India.
This was the programme that our Indian officers had
to face, and he would for a moment place the House
in their position. Half-way down the upper part of
the Indus was a great mass of mountainous country,
having a great depth of passes 200 or 300 miles in
length, and thus it formed a natural rampart; and
so long as we watched the issue on the banks of the
Indus, we might be satisfied that the invader would
only attempt an entrance at its own peril. But
half-way down, this natural rampart ceased, and the
lower part of the Indus, down to Karachi, had for its
right bank a great plain stretching away up to Kan-
dahar, presenting no serious obstacles to the march of
an army. If we were to await Russia behind the
Indus, we should certainly, in the event he had been
imagining, find her coming down the plain; and
should she succeed in planting herself there, she
would be able to operate with enormous advantage.
J
[1884.
But besides that, our Indian officers were of opinion
that nothing could be more dangerous than to sus-
tain even the slightest reverse upon the frontiers of
India. He had another authority to the same effect,
and that was General Skobeleff, who said, 'Every-
body who has concerned himself with the question
of a Russian invasion of India would declare that it
is only necessary to penetrate a single point of the
Indian frontier to bring about a general rising.
Even the presence of an insignificant force on the
frontier of India might lead to a general rising
throughout the country, and the collapse of the
British empire.' Not only was Skobeleff a great
fighting soldier, he was a scientific soldier who well
knew the politics of war, and Indian officers believed
General Skobeleff.”
364
EVE OF VINDICATION.
6
The author of The Defence of India,' however,
needed no apologist, resting assured that his warn-
ings, however disregarded at the time, must event-
ually be listened to. His duty had been accom-
plished with perfect disregard of all consequences
which might injure his personal interests, even at
the risk of losing his appointment, rank, and posi-
tion; whilst his premonition was, meantime, on the
eve of full vindication.
When the cool weather set in at the end of 1884,
Major-General MacGregor took his wife on a pleasure
trip of sight-seeing through the state of Rajputana;
and they also visited in succession the principal cities
of the North-West Provinces, including the holy city
1885.]
of Benares, Patna, the old headquarters of Sir Charles
during the Tirhut famine of 1874, the barracks at
Dinapur where the outbreak of 1857 took place, the
Residency at Lucknow, the Well of Cawnpore, the
mosques and monuments of Shah Jehan at Agra,
besides Ajmere and Udaipur.
During their progress Sir Charles felt the greatest
pleasure in pointing out to his wife all the interest-
ing monuments of the historical sites visited. Of all
the monumental buildings in India, Sir Charles's
deepest admiration was lavished on the famous Taj
Mahal at Agra, which indeed he looked upon as the
most perfect piece of architecture of its kind in the
world. He revisited with unwonted interest the
several scenes of the tragedies enacted during the
Mutiny, and the various fields of action in which
he had been personally engaged during that event-
ful period of his youth. Finally, their journey was
brought to an end at Calcutta, where Lord Ripon
was just about to resign the administration.
Lord Dufferin, the newly appointed Viceroy, now
took up the reins of government at Calcutta, and
the most serious business awaited his consideration
in relation to the Central Asian question, in which
Sir Charles MacGregor was so well qualified to
advise with authority.
At this time the British Commissioners for the
delimitation of the Russo-Afghan boundary had
established themselves on the banks of the Murghab
river, on the borders of north-western Afghanistan,
LORD DUFFERIN.
365
366
ABDUL RAHMAN'S VISIT.
[1885.
under their chief, Sir Peter Lumsden (who had for-
merly been Quartermaster-General in India); whilst
to their annoyance, and to the chagrin of the Indian
Council, they found that General Zelenoy, who by
rights should have been on the spot to meet them,
had absented himself, and his Cossacks had already
pushed far forward the camp of their advanced out-
posts to Pul-i-Khatun, a site still regarded as within
the debatable ground claimed for Afghanistan by
Abdul Rahman; so that no inconsiderable amount
of apprehension was experienced in the Foreign
secretariat of the Supreme Government.
In view of these anticipated complications, it is
not wonderful that one of the first acts of Lord Duf-
ferin, as Viceroy, was to despatch to the Amir of
Afghanistan a cordial invitation to a friendly inter-
view on Indian territory, which was unreservedly
accepted by Abdul Rahman, and the arrangements
for the meeting were very happily carried into effect
without delay.
At this time, unfortunately, whilst playing at
lawn-tennis in the Fort gardens, at Calcutta, Sir
Charles MacGregor had the ill-luck to break a tendon
of his right leg, thereby rendering that limb almost
wholly useless for some time.
Whilst still suffering from the effects of his acci-
dent, the general had to attend the camp at Rawal
Pindi, where the Amir was received by Lord Duf-
ferin on the 31st March.
There was a grand gathering on this important
1885.]
occasion, and the Duke and Duchess of Connaught,
Lady Dufferin, and many other ladies, including
Lady MacGregor, were present at the State cere-
monies, which included a banquet to the Amir and a
review of the division by the Viceroy, accompanied
by the Kabal chieftain and their respective suites.
A ceremonious darbar was held on the 8th April,
and negotiations were satisfactorily carried on be-
tween the Amir and the Governor-General.
HERAT TO BE DEFENDED.
367
At this meeting it was arranged that the defence
of Herat should be left entirely to the Afghans them-
selves, but that the Indian Government would sup-
ply engineer officers, under whose direction the forti-
fications of that strategical point should be placed in
a state of efficient defence against a coup de main;
whilst the British would also supply an armament of
modern ordnance and ammunition wherewith to en-
able the Afghans if attacked to hold their own, at all
events long enough to allow a relief force from Kan-
dahar or the Helmand to come to their assistance.
Bab
Disabled as he was, with his wounded leg (the
injury occurred on the place of a former wound)
tightly strapped up in plaster of Paris, and only able
to move painfully by the aid of crutches, Sir Charles
contrived to take his full share in the important dis-
cussions carried on during this conference at Rawal
Pindi, carrying on all the time the work of his de-
partment without intermission; whilst the Duke of
Connaught and other Staff officers came, not unfre-
quently, to sit with him, in his tent, and to take
368
[1885.
his advice and counsel on all occasions about the
innumerable details inseparable from the public
service.
}
THE COUNTER-STROKE.
Meantime the complication of the Russo-Afghan
dispute had become serious. The contemplated visit
of the ruler of Afghanistan to the Panjab had been
viewed throughout Asia as a pledge of amity and
alliance with Great Britain, and was therefore
looked upon with extreme disfavour at St Peters-
burg.
The Russians, to effect a counter-stroke, had ac-
cordingly planned a coup, which they lost no time
in carrying out effectively; and on the very day
before the Amir reached Rawal Pindi (31st March),
the small Afghan force posted in Panjdeh, their
station on the Khusk, had been attacked and
driven out of their position, several miles towards
Herat, by the Russian troops of General Komaroff,
and the British commissioners had been forced to
leave their camp at Bala Murghab, which was burnt
and plundered.
The telegraphic news of this unprecedented act
of hostility, which only reached London and Rawal
Pindi on the 9th April, caused intense excitement
throughout Europe and India, and lent additional
interest to the investiture of the Amir with the
Grand Cross of the Star of India by the Viceroy
on the 11th of the month.
At army headquarters messages were instantly
despatched to the various military centres in Bengal
1885.]
369
and Bombay, warning the Commanders-in-Chief and
the Staff departments of the imminence of the
crisis; and Sir Charles's hands were full of work,
his bodily pain put altogether aside by the con-
stant brain-work called into action by the emer-
gency.
FOREWARNED.
Nevertheless, there was no need for excitement or
hurry, at least in the Quartermaster-General's De-
partment. So perfectly had Sir Charles MacGregor
foreseen the approach of such a crisis, so minutely
had he prepared beforehand all the details, neces-
sitated by a sudden mobilisation of two divisions
for an advance beyond the Khojak, the occupation
of Kandahar, and the defence of the line of the
Helmand or a march on Herat, that the various
commanders and executive heads of departments
had been duly schooled in all the precautionary
measures for some considerable time previously. All
preliminary calculations of ways and means, move-
ments, transport and supply, had been laid down in
anticipation of an immediate and sudden move, so
that the strategical combination of columns at the
front could be effected without a moment's delay
whenever the command to march should be signalled
from Whitehall.
Everything pointed to war. Within a fortnight
after the fight at Ak Tépé Sir Peter Lumsden was
recalled. Mr Gladstone brought up in the House a
vote for eleven millions, which was passed before the
end of the month; and a "Queen's Message" called
2 A
VOL. II.
370
[1885.
Mean-
out the reserves of the United Kingdom.
time, after the departure of the Amir from India,
Sir Charles and Lady MacGregor went to Simla,
where, although still very lame, the Quartermaster-
General worked assiduously in hastening the final
arrangements for a Central Asian campaign.
How wistfully he looked forward to obtaining a
command during the forthcoming war can only be
imagined by those who knew his ardent and enthusi-
astic temperament. But it was not to be. On the
2d May Lord Granville gave an intimation of a
peaceful settlement of the Afghan boundary dispute,
and from her would-be heroic attitude Great Britain
suddenly descended to the practical but painfully in-
glorious submission of her quarrel to the arbitration
of the King of Denmark (an arbitration, by the
way, which was never decided). The surrender of
Panjdeh was supposed to be fully compensated for
by the recognition of the Zulfikar Pass as Afghan
territory, and the work of delimitation of the boun-
dary was proceeded with.
DELIMITATION.
As soon as the war scare had subsided, Sir Charles
MacGregor went in June on a trip for a month's
exploration in the interior passes of the adjacent
mountains, and he was never happy until he had
ascended the highest practicable peaks in the dis-
trict, for the purpose of obtaining the most extensive
panoramas of the surrounding country. His pastime
was subservient to reconnaissance for the purposes
of military information, and he never looked across
1885.]
a valley without noting its capabilities for a position,
or surveyed a fruitful plain without estimating the
amount of supplies and forage which was obtainable
from such a resource. In fact, during his utmost
relaxation from service his brain and mind were ever
on military duty.
In the following August the Quartermaster-Gen-
eral was despatched by Lord Dufferin to Peshin to
report on sites for sanatoria and on the frontier de-
fences beyond Quetta.
FRONTIER DEFENCES.
371
This duty, which occupied some six weeks of the
hottest weather in the trying climate of that rugged
country, was finished in September, when Sir
Charles returned to Simla thoroughly ill from
fatigue and exposure to the climatic effects, which
were at length beginning to tell on his hitherto iron
constitution.
During this journey the changes of temperature
were so frequent and unequal, from the great differ-
ences of altitude experienced in ascending and de-
scending heights and valleys, that not seldom in one
day's march the thermometer would show 57° Fahr.
in the traveller's tent at one time, and within a few
hours might record 102° in the shade. No wonder
that constant hard bodily work under such condi-
tions tried severely the health of the general, who,
writing to his wife, says, "I have got a bad cold
from a chill, and quite lost my voice.
"I was in the saddle ten hours yesterday and seven
to-day, and the sun is terribly hot. I have a split-
372
[1885.
ting headache, and feel as if I were going to have
fever." A few days later he writes: "I have been
so very seedy that I thought it best to get in here
[Peshin] to a house and keep quiet. I seem to have
a complication of evils; but the worst is that I can't
sleep, and as soon as I doze off I awake with a start
and a sort of nightmare."
From this attack Sir Charles never recovered, and
although he bravely fought against it and refused to
believe himself really ill, it was in truth the begin-
ning of the end.
ON THE KHOJAK.
"I had an awful night last night; I felt suffocated,
and could hardly breathe, and had no sleep at all.
I did not go out this morning with them, as I didn't
really feel up to climbing hills. I hope the attack
will pass over. I don't know what it is, and there
is no doctor; but perhaps it is nothing serious, and
I don't want you to be alarmed."
With regard to the practical results of Sir Charles's
visit to the frontier, he writes: "The air on the top
of the Khojak Pass was delicious. This would form
a very good site for a sanatorium, and the tribes
round are absolutely quiet. The occupation of the
Khojak would be a great advantage, as it would
cause the roads to it, and especially the crossings
over the rivers in Peshin, to be improved, and it
would familiarise our troops to the route."
From Gulistan Karez the general writes: "We
got up at three, and were at the top of the pass
[Khojak] by 4.30, and walked along the top of the
J
1885.]
373
range till ten, up and down the whole way; then we
had had enough of it, so we halted for breakfast.
Afterwards we determined to descend, and got down
into the bed of a ravine, and walked on for four
miles in a most blazing sun, till we came to some
water and trees. Then I threw myself down, and
said, 'I don't care for any one; and I will not
move another step to-day;' so we anchored. We
had been six hours walking in the most frightful hot
sun, and over no road at all; however, I wanted to
see the nature of the range, and was quite satisfied.
It got dark at seven, so we went to bed. I had only
my greatcoat and plaid, but I found a fragrant shrub,
and made them cut me a heap of it, and it made a
very nice bed, just like heather. My pillow con-
sisted of my big hat, the saddle-bags over that, then
my back-pad and a towel-very comfortable. This
morning we walked for about six miles down the
ravine, and then met our horses and rode in here,
ten miles, over a hot plain. Then I had a tub and
breakfast, and now I am in quite a benevolent frame
of mind. They say this is the finest place in Sande-
man's dominions. It certainly has a fine stream of
water, and a row of willows; but the glare in these
parts is so strong, that I wear my dark glasses all
day, even when trying to get a little sleep."
Of the Bolan Pass Sir Charles writes: "I was as-
tonished by the easiness of the Bolan road. I cannot
conceive how any one could prefer the Harnai when
they decided to make the railway, while this line
THE BOLAN.
C
374
[1885.
is so very easy. Lord Dufferin asked me to say
whether I thought a railway could be made, and I
have no hesitation in saying that it can be made, and
very easily too. While they have been throwing
millions away on the Harnai line, this line could have
been finished ages ago."
MERIT DEPRECATED.
The five years of duty during which he had held
the appointment of Quartermaster-General were now
nearly expired, and Sir Charles occupied himself
through October in packing up his effects and break-
ing up his establishment at Simla, as Lady Mac-
Gregor proceeded this month to England with his
young daughter.
On relinquishing his appointment, Sir Charles
applied for permission to retain his rank as major-
general, to which rank, if not strictly entitled by
right, yet by precedent and extraordinary service he
had fully earned the right to hold permanently. His
meritorious and distinguished conduct in the field
should have secured this reward; but there is, un-
fortunately, no room to doubt that the gallant career
of General MacGregor had excited a certain amount
of jealousy among one or two influential persons
at headquarters. Moreover, one who held a very
high executive position, and who could have so
used his influence as to permit Sir Charles retaining
the well-deserved recognition and confirmation of
the substantive rank of major-general, which he had
already borne so long during five years of good and
unrequited service, refused to support his applica-
-
What
375
1885.]
ILL-REQUITED SERVICES.
tion.
From the letter containing Sir Charles Mac-
Gregor's application to the Adjutant-General in India
for this privilege, the following extracts may be
quoted. It is dated 15th February 1886.
"2. I am induced to make this application by the
fact that several officers [viz., Major-Generals Dor-
mer, Buller, Stewart, and Brackenbury] have already
been promoted to that rank in accordance with
clauses 12 and 13 of the Royal Warrant (of 10th
November 1881), and that three of these officers were
junior to me as colonel; and there seems every prob-
ability of other officers still more junior to me being
ere long also promoted over my head.
"3. It is not for me to compare my services with
those of the above officers. His Excellency is so
intimately acquainted with my services (under both
of the above-quoted clauses) that I am satisfied I
could have no fairer exponent of them than him.
It is still less for me to expatiate on the rewards.
which my services have brought me as compared
with those of others, who in the same campaign did
not hold higher positions than I did, and who have
not held higher or more responsible positions since
but I hope I may be permitted to draw attention to
the fact that my services during the last twenty years
have not brought me a single day's acceleration of
promotion.
"4. I was promoted to lieutenant-colonel for ser-
vices performed in the Bhutan campaign of 1864-
65-66, and the only step of rank I have received
376
[1885.
since, came to me by length of service. And further,
my services of two years in the field, in Afghanistan,
have not even gained me any better appointment
than I should have gained if I had never quitted
Simla at all.¹ In fact, I am now drawing less pay
and holding inferior rank to what I did five years
ago; and several officers who were then my juniors
are now entitled to rank before me.
WANT OF CONSIDERATION.
"5. His Excellency knows, and the Government of
India know, that I have never spared myself through-
out my whole service; and as they were pleased to
confer on me two steps of rank for services performed
as a subaltern during my first nine years of service,
I ask not for the same, but for some of the same
consideration for services performed during my last
twenty years of service in positions of great respon-
sibility and great difficulty.
"6. In the ordinary course of events (if I last so
long), I must get my promotion to major-general in
a year or so, and therefore it does not seem very
much to strive for it perhaps six months sooner.
"7. Yet to me it is a great thing. No man can
say that I have ever shown a clutching after higher
emoluments or the empty swagger of title. What
I have striven for is higher opportunities for useful-
ness to the Government, and what I do feel acutely
P
1 "For Afghanistan I got no step in rank; and in the matter of ap-
pointments, I have been no better off. If I had never been to Afghan-
istan at all, I should have been Quartermaster-General all the same-
in fact, I have good reason to believe I might have actually got it one
year sooner."
1885.]
is, that in a few months I may have to acknowledge
that my services for twenty years-services which
have been as unstinted as they have been highly
acknowledged—should not have brought me a single
step in rank.
ACUTE FEELING.
377
"8. I know that no promotions have yet been
made in the Indian army under the clauses under
which I seek it; but I cannot believe that, while the
advantages of these clauses are freely extended to
officers of the Imperial List, those of the Indian List
are to be excluded from them altogether, and there-
fore I submit this application."
"There is little but the name of the thing left to
strive for," writes Sir Charles in a note which accom-
panied the foregoing letter, "still this is something
to me. If I got it one day before as an acknow-
ledgment, I should be much pleased. I do feel
most acutely the fact that even twenty years' work,
which I put against twenty years' service of any
other man in India, has done nothing for me.
Of course, even if Sir Frederick sends this [his
application] on, he may not succeed, yet I hope he
will. The fact recorded on paper that the man best
qualified to judge did recommend me for special pro-
motion will be very much to me, not perhaps while
I am in the service, but when my clans-people come
to read and inquire what I have done with my time."
It was indeed a very bitter reflection for a sensi-
tive, high-minded officer to make to himself after
having served so well and faithfully, sparing neither
-
-
D
378
[1885.
health nor strength in the interests of India, that,
he, Charles MacGregor, losing rank, position, com-
mand, power, and pay as a major-general, by no
fault of his own, but rather by jealousy excited by
his unusual merit, should revert-in fact, be reduced
-to a station actually lower and inferior in pay
and
rank to what he had been at the end of the Afghan
campaign. In a letter written just after his appli-
cation had met with an ungracious denial, Colonel
Sir Charles MacGregor writes: "The more I think
of it, the more pained and annoyed I feel at the way
I have been treated."
DISAPPOINTMENT.
The unlooked - for ingratitude of his superior
officers was a rankling source of deep grief rather
than of indignation to the colonel, who, always
keenly alive to any injustice, felt that occasion had
been found to slight and humiliate him.
Suffering as he was from impaired health brought
on by his late tour in Peshin, the shabby behaviour
of the authorities in this matter contributed materi-
ally towards depressing his hitherto elastic spirits;
for undoubtedly a more severe blow could hardly fall
upon a gallant gentleman, whose soul had always
been bound up in his professional career as a soldier.
However, even to Colonel (now no longer General)
MacGregor a command of some sort could not well
be refused, although he was passed over for the com-
mand of a division (being superseded by a colonel of
artillery ¹ junior to him).
1
1 Colonel D. MacFarlan, R.A.
1885.]
PANJAB FRONTIER FORCE.
379
Instead of resigning and throwing up the service
in disgust, as many a man in his position might
have done, and as one or two doubtless wished he
might do, he resolutely determined to serve on, dog-
gedly concluding to force his way to the highest
post obtainable in the Indian army; and with this
view he decided to accept the command of the Pan-
jab Frontier Force when it was offered to him, and
after seeing Lady MacGregor and his daughter off to
England from Bombay, he proceeded to Abbottabad
to take up his duties on the North-West Frontier.
380
CHAPTER IX.
LAST SERVICES.
1885-1887.
"The soldier with his mark of war,
The medals on his breast,
Star of the brave that decks him now,
When his sword is laid to rest;
And the iron sheath is worn away,
That was tenantless on the battle day."
SCENE-GLENGYLE.
CAMP OF EXERCISE AT DELHI-INSPECTION OF FRONTIER POSTS-
RENEWED
FAREWELL ADDRESS TO PANJAB FRONTIER FORCE
HOME
ARRIVAL
IN ENGLAND—FORTITUDE DURING ILLNESS-CAIRO-THE LAST
ILLNESS-LETTERS
ΤΟ
WIFE-INVALIDED
Make a
IN December Sir Charles was ordered to the Camp
of Exercise at Delhi, where he commanded a division
under Sir Frederick Roberts. He had the satisfac-
tion of forming and commanding a brigade of High-
land and Scottish regiments during these manoeuvres.
Although at this time General MacGregor was in
reality suffering, and in ill health, he manfully in-
sisted on carrying through all his duties. He found
it difficult to sleep at night, and finally, whilst in
in!
381
1886.]
this delicate state, got wet through, having to remain
several hours in drenching rain at the review on Pro-
clamation Day. A severe chill was the result of this
exposure, which brought on a renewed attack of
fever, and eventually resulted in his fatal illness.
Yet Sir Charles recovered, for a time, sufficiently
to undertake the inspection of all the posts in his
command, going over the familiar ground which he
had formerly traversed so often in his younger days,
and which he had described so accurately with such
painstaking in his 'Gazetteer of the Frontier.'
Kohat, 7th March 1886.-"I left Bannu on the
2d, and had a capital field-day of the whole garrison
about four miles out. Then we rode for twelve miles
and drove another twelve, till we got to a place
called Bahadur Khel. Did you, on the 2d, feel
nervous and conscious of danger? I didn't, but you
ought, because I slept all night with twelve barrels
of gunpowder in a room below, with two fires within
ten feet of it!! This is true: an infernal store-
keeper being in the house, had the audacity to
do this. It takes a good deal really to rouse the
MacGregor, but I guess that practical experiments
in 'Guy Fawkesing' just about does it, and you
should have seen me go for that man!! Next
day we rode twenty-two miles, and on the 4th
we drove fourteen and rode seventeen miles, and had
a field-parade at the end. Yesterday I had an in-
spection of the 3d Sikhs, and to-day is Sunday.
They say Chesney is coming out as military mem-
FAMILIAR GROUND.
382
[1886.
ber. I am very glad, as he is a man of great breadth
of mind, and we want these. I do wish you were
here. I am a solitary sort of individual with domes-
tic tendencies, which, if carefully fostered, might
lead to my perfect subjection! Note this!"
He wrote on the 13th March 1886: "These nights
are really awful. I dread every time the sun goes
down, as, although I am nearly always worn out, I
know I have got to lie long hours in bed, hoping for
a wink of sleep, and longing for the dawn. My
head aches so, I don't know what to do. My brain
goes on for ever working, working. I try not to
think, and I think a thousand times more, and then
the brain gets so excited there is no sleep. I believe
if you could watch my brain at night, you would
find it moving like water on the boil. Last night
I only slept three hours, and the night before, and
before that, and now I am tired to death. I light
the candle a dozen times in the night, and feel often
inclined to cry out, 'O day, day, do come shall
I never see light again?' and with all this I look so
well they congratulate me."
At this time (March) there was every reason to
suppose that the Government would send an expedi-
tion against the Buners, who had on several occa-
sions lately raided over the British frontier. Whilst
it was still undecided whether or not this expedi-
tion should be despatched under command of the
brigadier-general commanding the Frontier Force,
the anxiety of mind suffered by Sir Charles as to his
NEARLY WORN OUT.
1886.]
capability of carrying it through on account of his
enfeebled health may be gathered from some of his
letters at the time.
FATAL DISEASE.
383
He writes: "I do wish this Buner business was
settled. I mean to apply for leave the instant I
decently can; but I cannot do this till it is settled
there is to be no expedition. I do hope there is to
be no expedition, as there is no doubt I am not in a
fit condition to go, and I am afraid I shall break
down in it. The doctor says if I do not go to this
Buner expedition, and get rest and good treatment
for six months at home, I may be as well as ever;
but I must go through with the expedition, if it
comes off. I have opposed it all along as unjust
and unnecessary and inadvisable, and if I did not go,
they would say I did not care to go, and had op-
posed it for that reason, so I must; and if I come to
grief in the middle of it, and have to take leave,
people must see that it is my health that gives way.
I hope after the rest in the summer and autumn I
shall be all right and ready for any number of expe-
ditions.
I have just been examined by a
number of doctors, and they agree that what is the
matter with me is irregular action of the heart and
disease of the kidneys. They wish me to go home
at once, and they positively prohibit my going on
service at all, as they think it would bring on an
acute attack and very probably kill me outright.
This is fearfully unfortunate, not only because it
must end fatally sooner or later, but, coming just as
384
AN ANXIOUS DILEMMA.
[1886.
they are going to have a campaign in which I was
to command, it is almost impossible for me to refuse
to go now. My name has gone to Government, and
as I have all along opposed the expedition as unjust
and unnecessary, now they will say I am shirking.
If I don't go, I am ruined in reputation; if I do go,
I shall probably die in the middle of it. The latter
would be the best for me; but, my darling, what is
the best for you ?-to have a husband with a dam-
aged reputation (I know the world will not let me
off), or to lose me, and be able to say,—' He knew
he was going to his death, but he would go!'
Good-bye, my darling. I little thought this letter
would end so; but if there is war, I must go. If
death is to come, I would rather it was with my
claymore in my hand. I can face anything, but not
disgrace! Say good-bye to Viva for me. Don't tell
her, it will do no good. I had half a mind not to
tell you,
but I could not show such want of trust in
you or your nerve, and you and your nursing (if I
can only get home) might be the means of pulling
me through. Remember, I have apparently been
nearer death than this. Good-bye."
The Government, after all, decided not to send the
expedition, so Sir Charles was free to ask for leave to
England. Just before leaving Abbottabad for Bom-
bay he wrote: "I have felt the pain at my heart so
bad since I came up here, that after consulting my
doctor I have arranged to be put on the sick-list
during the rest of my time here. I shall leave here
1886.]
on the 7th, and Bombay on the 16th, so I ought to
be in London about the first week in May.
.
385
VIVA.
66
My own wife, I don't want you to be alarmed ;
but I think it is wrong to hide from you what a seri-
ous view the doctors take of my case.
It appears
the chill I got in Peshin, aggravated by that on the
review day, gave me this disease; and it may develop
into Bright's disease, from which there is no escape.
This is the very worst view; but the best is, that they
may all be wrong, and therefore I am coming home
at once. Don't you fret. If I get worse on the voy-
age, I promise I will telegraph for you; but otherwise
you will know it is all right. I hope for the best,
but still things may go wrong, and you will come to
me if I ask. Better not bring Viva. I will make
out a will-a few words. I will leave every single
thing I have in this world, including Viva, to you,
with no restrictions. There is no one I trust more;
there never has been any one. You will do for her
(Viva) what you think best; and promise me, what-
ever she does, you will never desert her. You have
been a mother to her; continue so to the end, for
my sake.
I don't repine,-if it is to come,
who can stop it? I hope every one will allow that
I have died with a clean sheet, and that no one can
throw stones at my honour. I only want a stone
(plain and rugged as the hills of the Clan) to say,
'Here lies C. MacGregor, of
the old stock of the
Clan Gregor, who did his best for the old name.'
But all this is lugubrious and sentimental. I am
2 B
VOL. II.
•
Galle
[1886.
not well, and feel very weak. Tell Viva I will write
to her. Ever your own Mac."
A little later he writes: "I really am very seedy,
and am beginning to feel quite weak and out of sorts
generally. My heart and breathing are all wrong,
and I have aches in all my joints. This may be the
beginning of the end. I feel as if I had ague all
over, and have no appetite. It is very lonely here.
I am in the house all by myself, and have no one to
talk to. How I do wish you were here to cheer
me up! This is a nice ending to all my ambition
and hard work, just as I was getting up the last few
rungs of the ladder. Of course if I am never to be
put to hard work again I shall retire. I should like
to have gone on till I was Commander-in-Chief.
Now nobody will ever hear of me. Ah, well! what
does it matter, after all?"
Sir Charles MacGregor was too unwell to issue
a farewell order to his troops at the time he left
them, but during his illness he penned the following
address, which was forwarded to India six months
afterwards, on the expiration of his sick leave of
absence. It should be remembered that when he
wrote it he was in bed and almost too weak to
hold the pen :—
"In relinquishing the command of the Panjab
Frontier Force, Sir Charles MacGregor is desirous of
saying a few words in farewell. He hopes this fare-
well will be but temporary, for no prouder moment
can occur for him than that which should place him
386
BEGINNING OF THE END.
•
1886.]
again in command even of a portion of a force which
has raised in him feelings of the highest admiration.
During his late tour Sir Charles MacGregor
regrets that he was so ill that he found himself un-
able to attempt more than to commence the carry-
ing out those aspirations for their good as soldiers
that he so strongly held and holds still. But the
leading idea of these hopes was to endeavour to instil
into every one, from sepoy to commandant, the in-
controvertible fact that peace is the time to prepare
for war, and that all should, by constant practice in
such measures as come within their competence, un-
ceasingly endeavour to improve themselves.
"Sir Charles MacGregor believes the Panjab Force
is as ready for war as any body of soldiers serving
her Majesty the Queen-Empress; but inasmuch as
no body or regiment can ever be quite perfect, it
behoves commandants always to strive for a still
higher state of perfection.
"In conclusion, Sir Charles MacGregor wishes
each comrade of the force a regretful farewell; and
he assures them that, although the time of his com-
mand was but short, the many kindnesses he has
received from its officers, and the thoroughly soldier-
ly spirit and efficient bearing he has observed in all,
will never fade from his memory."
At last Sir Charles took his final leave of India, and
sailed from Bombay on the 16th April, arriving at
Venice on the 2d May, where he was met by his
wife. By this time he was greatly altered by his
(C
387
FAREWELL ORDER.
[1886.
illness, and he was only able to reach England by
slow stages.
388
ENGLAND.
On reaching London, Sir Charles went to stay
with his wife's parents, and immediately sent for
the cleverest doctors to come and give their advice
and opinions on the state of his health. From the
first, they gave little or no hope of his ultimate
recovery. He had left India too late. After six-
teen weeks of great suffering, during which time
he lay between life and death, and bore all the
discomforts of severe illness with the greatest for-
titude and heroism, he had so far sufficiently re-
covered as to be able to pay a short visit to relatives,
and then go to Eastbourne for change of air. This,
however, only increased the illness, and he returned
to London to be again confined to his room for nine
long weeks. The monotony of this life was almost
unbearable to Sir Charles, and he tried to occupy
his time by drawing and taking lessons in painting ;
but as the winter approached, and fogs appeared, he
seemed to lose all heart, and became so depressed
that the doctors agreed to his often-expressed wish
go abroad in search of warmth and sunshine.
On the 16th of December, Sir Charles and his
wife left London en route for Egypt, and travelled
overland in short stages by Paris, Marseilles, the
Riviera, and Brindisi. They arrived at Alexandria
on the 28th of December, and at Cairo on the last
day of the year. The long journey had been most
trying to the invalid, and the symptoms of disease
to
1887.]
were much increased by the fatigues of the voyage.
After about a week, strength returned, and with it
Sir Charles appeared to regain all his old spirits.
He enjoyed sitting out in the sunshine on the
balcony at Shepheard's, meeting many of his old
friends and comrades, watching the ever-varying
crowd below, making many amusing sketches and
caricatures. Sir Charles had no doubt he was
making progress, and talked frequently and hope-
fully of his return to India, and of his appoint-
ment to the Lahore Division, which Sir Frederick
Roberts had promised to him. He had also been
very anxious for a long time about the rank of
major-general; but although he was entitled to
that rank on the 22d of January, the gazette did
not arrive in Egypt till too late. The following let-
ter betrays the preoccupation of his mind on this
subject:-
(6
CAIRO.
389
Cairo, 29th January. — My dear Mrs
of
-We
e were so glad to get your letter, and to hear
you and the general. Your letter was certainly
a little gloomy, but there is no lane without a turn-
ing, and I think no misery without some compensa-
tion. I am sure, in the memory of much pain and
weariness during those many dreary hours at the
Langham, there will always remain the thought of
your kindness and the general's to me. But sickness
is like service, and brings out the qualities that are
often otherwise hidden; and with reference to you
two, I have a feeling of shame that I knew you so
[1887.
long in India, yet never knew of the wealth of
kindness there was in you. I see your son has
got the medal of the Humane Society, and well he
deserves it. I promise to keep my cold grey eye
on that young man, and give him a lift when
I can.
390
STRUGGLE FOR LIFE.
"We have been here a month now, and I am get-
ting better. I feel ever so much better; though the
dropsy is going slowly, still it is going. I believe
they are going to make a hole in my liver. If they
do, they think I shall get well, and as I am pretty
strong, I hope it will come all right, and that I shall
once more come out victorious from the struggle with
the demon who has been afflicting me so long. I am
looking forward very anxiously to my promotion to
major-general, which Stewart said I should get on
the 4th of March.1
"I do enjoy basking in the sun here. With kind-
est remembrances and much gratitude. Yours
sincerely."
His gratitude to those who had nursed him during
his long illness was almost to deep for words, and
he acknowledged all the little acts of kindness of
his friends tenderly and gratefully. One of the
last letters he wrote was to the doctor who had
attended him so long and with such devotion before
leaving England.
1 Colonel Sir C. MacGregor, K.C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E. Bengal, major-
general (since deceased), dated 22d January; gazetted 18th February
1887. See Army List for March 1887.
1887.]
BRAVE TO THE LAST.
391
"Cairo, January 31.-. . . I am in good spirits,
and believe it will come all right, though there is
some danger; but after having defeated the demons
who have worried me for a year, I am not going to
be beaten at last. I have almost made
I have almost made up my mind
not to attempt to go back to India till October.
General Roberts has been very kind, and promises to
keep open a berth for me, and it would be foolish to
go back before I am really recovered, and able to
rise from the ashes of the past year with increased
splendour! Do tell me what I owe you in coin.
I know well enough what I owe you for your care,
trouble, and unvarying kindness-that I can never
repay. I don't pray much, and never in the regular
periodical manner dear to church-goers; still I do
sometimes silently breathe a prayer or two, and I
am sure I have no dearer desire than that you may
receive some day your reward for your kindness to
me. Our paths are so different that I don't suppose
I shall ever be much in the way of being able to do
much for you; but if ever you think I can do any-
thing for you or any one belonging to you, I will not
fail you. Sincerely yours."
On the 2d of February, the doctors decided to
perform an operation, as they imagined there were
signs of abscess of the liver. Sir Charles bore the
painful operation with his customary bravery, lying
on his sofa, and refusing anything to deaden the
pain. After a few hours, a violent inflammation
ensued, and the patient suffered intensely till the
392
MILITARY HONOURS.
[1887.
morning of the 5th, when all pain ceased. During
all this time he had no idea of his danger, and his
wife thought it better that he should not be informed.
of it.
On the morning of the 5th of February, Sir
Charles expressed a wish to go and lie on the sofa
in his sitting-room. Being assisted there, he lay
down, and talked to his wife about his little
daughter, and plans for the summer. After a
time, a regiment passed by with the band play-
ing, when, seeing his wife much affected, he took
her hand, and said, "Don't fret, my child. I'm
ever so much better, and shall soon be all right."
Then he went to sleep, and in sleep his spirit passed
away calmly and peacefully.
Full military honours were shown by the garrison
of Cairo to the remains of Sir Charles MacGregor by
order of Sir Frederick Stephenson, then commanding
the troops in Egypt; and Colonel Ardagh, R.E.,
made arrangements for the conveyance of the body
of the deceased officer to England.
During the most critical periods in his last illness
Sir Charles had frequently expressed his earnest
desire to rest at the last among his ancestors in the
graveyard of Glengyle. The solitary grandeur of
this Highland burial-place, on the shores of Loch
Katrine, in the midst of the MacGregor country, had
left a lasting impression on the mind of the general
when he had visited the home of his Clan with his
little daughter, five years previously; and since that
1887.]
time he had always wished that his body should lie
buried side by side with his kith and kin of the old
name, which he had ever done his utmost to uphold.
In accordance, therefore, with these wishes of her
late husband, Lady MacGregor, on the arrival of the
remains at Liverpool, a month after his death, had
the body conveyed to Aberfoyle, near the Trossachs,
where, on the morning of Friday, 11th March, a small
number of the family assembled to accompany the
funeral to the burying-ground.
Throughout the long journey up the glen, past
Loch Ard, to Stronachlachar, the snowflakes fell in-
cessantly, so that when the coffin was placed in the
boat, awaiting it on Loch Katrine, the wreaths of
flowers which were placed on it formed a vivid
contrast to the wintry landscape around.
GLENGYLE.
393
Whilst crossing the lake the snow ceased, but it
took an hour for the small procession of boats to
reach the opposite shore at Glengyle, where the
coffin was lifted on to a country cart and carried
with some difficulty through the drifted snow to
the ancient site.
The only coronach which accompanied the march
of the mourners was the sound of the waving pine-
tops, not unlike shadowy echoes of the "Cha till mi
tuilich," the funeral strains of the MacGregor bag-
pipes in days of yore.
The burial service having been read at Glengyle
House, the coffin was carried thence on men's shoul-
ders to the grave in the long-disused but sacred en-
Con
A
394
[1887.
closure, where the dust of the brave soldier was
buried under the white-curtained heights of Moel
Mor, whose hoary crests appeared almost to express
their regretful commiseration.
(C
GONE TO HIS ANCESTORS.
Fleet foot on the corrie,
Sage counsel in cumber,
Red hand in the foray,
How sound is thy slumber!
Like the dew on the mountain,
Like the foam on the river,
Like the bubble on the fountain,
Thou art gone, and for ever!”
395
POSTSCRIPT.
MEETING AT SIMLA-DUKE OF CONNAUGHT'S SPEECH-SIR FRED-
ERICK ROBERTS'S SKETCH OF SIR CHARLES'S CAREER
DUFFERIN'S EULOGY.
LORD
G
THE news of Sir Charles MacGregor's death caused
general regret throughout military and official circles
in India, and Sir Frederick Roberts, the Commander-
in-Chief, assembled at an early date a meeting to
consider how the Indian army could best perpetuate
the name and fame of such a gallant soldier.
At a meeting, held at Simla on the 18th May, to
take steps to raise a memorial to the late major-
general, when the Commander-in-Chief, the Lieu-
tenant-Governor of the Panjab, Generals Chesney,
Elles, and Chapman, and many other officers were
present, it was agreed that the memorial should take
the form of gold and silver medals as prizes for re-
connaissance at Sandhurst, a memorial tablet in St
Paul's Cathedral, and a portrait of the General in the
United Service Institute at Simla.
CA
At a subsequent meeting, held at Poona by the
Commander-in-Chief of Bombay, H.R. H. the Duke
396
[1887.
of Connaught, in advocating the support of the pro-
posals made at Simla, said :-
،،
Should any of you be unacquainted with
the services of that distinguished officer, I may men-
tion that he served throughout the Mutiny, when he
was three times wounded, and also served in the
China War in 1860, when he was twice wounded.
In the Bhutan expedition he was again twice
wounded. He also served throughout two cam-
paigns in the Afghan War, of 1878 and 1880, in-
cluding the march from Kabal to Kandahar. The
late Sir Charles, I forgot to say, served also in the
Abyssinian expedition in 1868. After the Afghan
War he was appointed Quartermaster-General of the
Indian army, and was subsequently given command
of the Panjab Frontier Force. Great as were this
officer's military services, it is especially with regard
to his explorations and his writings that he has
earned the gratitude of Englishmen in India. It is
chiefly owing to him that we have now a good
knowledge of the state of affairs beyond the frontier.
He also wrote extensively on the military policy of
India, his works being probably more important than
any that have been published on the subject. He
was most anxious that his knowledge and experience
of the tribes beyond the frontier, and the policy to
be pursued in Central Asia, should serve to open the
eyes of Englishmen as to what was passing there. We
owe him a great debt of gratitude for the energy,
zeal, and, if I may say so, the courage with which
DISTINGUISHED SERVICES.
1888.]
he openly spoke, showing the risks we were running
on our frontiers, and pointing out how we should
secure ourselves against any danger there by posting
ourselves in a strong position, and completing our
communications with the frontiers.
I think you
will agree with me, when I say that we owe him
a great debt of gratitude for the way, and cannot
but admire the manner, in which he brought home
facts which he knew better than anybody else,
showing how we might be exposed to serious dan-
ger from one of the most powerful empires in the
world were we not strongly posted on the frontier.
It was he who brought home, not only to this
country but to England, the necessity of being
strongly posted on the frontier, and of being well
informed of what was passing beyond, and how
essential it was that our communications should
be completed.
"I think that the Government of India will be the
first to own that their hands have been strengthened
universally by the arguments used by Sir Charles
MacGregor in his powerful book [The Defence of
India'], which have helped them to carry out what
has been done on our positions, enabling them to
push on incessantly the railways and other means of
communication now existing."
On the 3d July 1888, the ceremony of unveiling
the portrait of Sir Charles took place in the rooms
of the United Service Institute at the Town Hall,
Simla; on which occasion the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin,
A POWERFUL BOOK.
397
[1888,
and the Commander-in-Chief, spoke feelingly of their
departed friend and comrade.
"I did not hesitate," said Sir Frederick Roberts,
"to accept the invitation of the committee to unveil
the portrait of the late Sir Charles MacGregor, for
I thought there could not be many at present in
India who had known him so long or so well as my-
self, and certainly no one could have had a greater
regard and respect for him. As mere boys, we were
together during the Mutiny; and from that time
until 1879, in Afghanistan, when we were placed in
that intimate relation which the Commander of an
army and the Chief of the Staff bear to each other,
we were thrown more or less into each other's soci-
ety, so that I had many opportunities of studying
my friend's character, both as a soldier and as a
private individual.
398
AS MERE BOYS.
"My earliest recollection of MacGregor was in
camp near Fatehgarh, in January 1858. He was
then attached to the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, which
regiment he had joined at Delhi two days before the
assault, and with which he had already seen some
hard service. He particularly brought himself to
notice by his courage at Narnul and Patiali: in both.
these actions he had personal combats with the ene-
my, and in the former he was mainly instrumental
in capturing a gun. I had occasion to visit a picket
of the regiment, which happened to be commanded
by my brother, who, on introducing me to his sub-
altern, said: 'I have a strange companion here.
399
1888.]
HIS SOLDIERLY QUALITIES.
He seldom speaks except when fighting is going
on; then he brightens up and becomes quite agree-
able.'
"At that time MacGregor was extremely reserved,
and had more than the usual shyness of a boy straight
from school; but under the excitement of battle his
true nature asserted itself, and neither reserve nor
shyness could even in those early days prevent his
soldierly qualities from showing themselves. A few
months after this MacGregor was appointed to the
command of a squadron of Hodson's Horse. He
remained with this regiment for about eighteen
months, during which time he was continually in
the field; he was twice severely wounded, and had
two horses killed under him.
"In February 1860, MacGregor was transferred to
Fane's Horse, the present 19th Bengal Lancers, then
being raised for service in China. With him went
170 men of his old regiment, who volunteered to
accompany him.
him. He distinguished himself greatly
in China, especially during the advance on Pekin,
when a battery of artillery, which he was escorting,
was attacked by a large body of Tartar Horse. Mac-
Gregor, who had only thirty men with him, gallantly
led them against and drove off the enemy. His
small party suffered heavily, and he himself received
two severe wounds. On his return to India he re-
joined Hodson's Horse, and was made second in
command. His next service was in Bhutan, in
1864-65-66, first as brigade-major, then as deputy
400
[1888.
assistant - quartermaster - general.
Here he made
himself remarkable, as indeed he had on former
occasions, by the boldness of his reconnaissances, and
was again twice severely wounded. The effects of
his many wounds (he had received six in less than
nine years), and the constant hard work and expo-
sure he had undergone, necessitated his proceeding
to England on medical certificate. He left India in
February 1867, but before the end of the year he
threw up his leave and joined the army in Abyssinia
under Sir Robert Napier, where he did good work in
the Quartermaster-General's department.
BOLDNESS IN RECONNAISSANCE.
"In 1874, when all Bengal was moved by the
prospect of a famine, which threatened to carry off
thousands, if not millions of its inhabitants, it was
determined to organise relief-works in various parts
of the province. The main difficulty was the feed-
ing the vast number of people employed on these
works, and establishing granaries within reach of
those who were unable to labour themselves, or even
to go to any distance from their own homes in search
of food. There were no railways in those days, ex-
cept the main East Indian line, and the majority of
the roads were very indifferent. The arrangements
made to meet this terrible calamity were worthy of a
great Government, and it was fortunate that a man
of MacGregor's capacity was found to superintend
the transport arrangements. He was appointed
'Director of Transport;' and we may judge of the
admirable manner in which he performed his arduous
Ch
1888.]
task by the report of Sir Richard Temple, the Special
Famine Commissioner.
A DARING RIDE.
401
C
"In 1875 MacGregor was able to gratify a long-
cherished desire to travel through Persia, towards the
northern confines of Afghanistan. In this adventur-
ous journey he succeeded in reaching Sarakhs, and
to within a few miles of Herat. It was a daring ride,
resulting in the collection of valuable information.
"To MacGregor himself the journey was a dis-
appointment. One of the principal objects of his
ambition was to obtain information of the countries
bordering on our Eastern empire, and as he always
did anything he undertook in the most thorough
manner, he could not understand any one being less
enthusiastic than himself about a matter which he
believed to be of the highest importance. On this
particular occasion he imagined, rightly or wrongly,
that an unnecessary limit had been placed on his
wanderings, and that his efforts were not appreci-
ated; and he resolved (to use his own words) that
nothing would ever induce him to travel in those
countries again.' But such good work as Mac-
Gregor had done was not likely to be long over-
looked; and the encouragement he received shortly
after his return to England from the present Pre-
mier (Lord Salisbury), then Secretary of State for
India, caused him to volunteer to return to India.
via Persia and Baluchistan. His offer was accept-
ed, and in September 1876 he left London with a
view to procure geographical information of the
VOL. II.
2 C
J
402
[1888.
approaches to India from Eastern Persia. The re-
sult of this journey was another interesting book.
Captain Lockwood, who was MacGregor's companion
during this expedition, died soon afterwards from
the hardships they underwent; and I have often
thought it was during this time of extreme priva-
tion that MacGregor sowed the seeds of the disease
which ultimately carried him off.
GRAND RECORD OF SERVICE.
"All this time MacGregor's reputation was steadily
increasing. His grand record of service, his inde-
fatigable industry, and his determination to bring
to a successful issue any kind of work intrusted to
him, had made him a marked man; and when the
Second Afghan War broke out he was selected for
special duty on the Khaibar line. At the com-
mencement of the second phase of the war, he was,
at my particular request, appointed Chief of the
Staff to the Kabal Field Force, and it is impossible
for me to say how much I owed to him. His ex-
perience of war and his many military instincts
peculiarly fitted him for such a responsible position,
and it was fortunate for me that I had so tried a
soldier with me at a time of such difficulty and
danger. When Sir Donald Stewart arrived at
Kabal and took supreme command, MacGregor
joined him as Chief of the Staff. Admirable as Mac-
Gregor was as a staff officer, he sighed for a com-
mand; and when a force was ordered to proceed
from Kabal to Kandahar, he begged to be allowed
to resign his appointment, and he was given a
1
1888.]
brigade in that force. After Kandahar he brought
his brigade back to India by the Mari-Bugti coun-
try, a most difficult march, which afforded him the
opportunity he so much desired of showing his skill
as a commander.
،
C
"At the close of the campaign MacGregor was
appointed Quartermaster-General in India. It was
during his tenure of this important office that he
compiled his valuable History of the Second
Afghan War,' and brought the whole of his energy
and great talents to the consideration of that very
interesting problem The Defence of India.' Like
the 'Gazetteer of the North-West Frontier,' which
MacGregor had compiled some years before, this
work showed his mastership of detail, his indomit-
able perseverance, and his careful study of his sub-
ject, which his experience of Central Asia and his
knowledge of India generally enabled him to treat
as no other officer could, I believe, have treated it.
It was during the time MacGregor was Quarter-
master-General that the Intelligence Branch made
such strides. It had been established by his pre-
decessors, but it was chiefly to him that we are
indebted for the admirable system of intelligence
which now obtains in the Quartermaster-General's
department.
"When his time as Quartermaster-General was up,
MacGregor was appointed to the command of the
Panjab Frontier Force-a post which he hoped
might have given him opportunities of further dis-
GREAT TALENT AND ENERGY.
403
C
404
[1888.
tinction as a commander. But at this stage, when
it seemed as if he were about to reap the reward of
years of labour and unwearied devotion to duty,
inexorable fate, which so often frustrates human
endeavour, intervened. Hardly had he assumed
command when he showed symptoms of the disease
which prematurely cut short his promising career.
Almost broken-hearted at having to give up his
command even for a time, he took leave to England,
where he made the most determined fight against
his fatal complaint-a fight which astonished even
those who knew him best, but which could only
serve to postpone the end. In the hope that change
might do him good, and with, I believe, the feeling
that it would be so far on his way to India, and to
the work which engrossed his every thought, he left
England for Egypt towards the end of 1886. He
wrote three or four letters to me from Cairo (the
last of which I received some days after the news of
his death reached India), all full of hope for the
future. There was to be no future on earth for him!
He passed away on the 5th February 1887, at the
early age of forty-six years and six months. Had he
only been permitted to die in battle at the head of
his troops, he would have wished for nothing better.
It was in the hope he might be spared for such a
glorious death that he made his great struggle for
life. It was not for life's sake, but that he might
some day lay it down on the shrine of a soldier's
duty. Alas that his wish was not fulfilled!
"To attempt more than a mere sketch of Sir
DEVOTION TO DUTY.
405
1888.]
Charles MacGregor's life and labours for the public
service would be out of place here; moreover, the
attempt would be superfluous, for the actions of our
friend are recounted and his character is shown in
the pages of contemporary history written by himself.
Those who had the privilege of knowing Sir Charles
MacGregor in private life can bear testimony to his
upright honest character. A somewhat hasty tem-
per and brusque manner concealed from the outside
world a most kind, most affectionate heart.
He was
a true friend, and many a brother officer has had
occasion to thank MacGregor for generous assistance
in time of need. His great soldierly qualities are
known to us all, and we are assembled here to-day
to commemorate them; and lest they should be for-
gotten when we, his friends, have left the country,
this portrait of him is presented to the United Ser-
vice Institution of India, of which he was one of the
founders, and in which he took so deep an interest.
It now only remains for me to obtain the permission
of his Excellency the Viceroy, for the portrait to be
unveiled."
GENEROSITY.
The Union-jack which veiled the picture, hung in
a wooden alcove at the end of the room, having been
drawn aside. The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, said:
"We are assembled to do honour to the memory of a
brave and noble soldier, and I am glad to have this
opportunity, as head of the Government of India, to
testify, by my presence, to the high estimation in
which we held Sir Charles MacGregor. He was also
my personal friend; and on that account too, it is
406
[1888.
most grateful to my feelings to be here. Not among
the many distinguished captains I have known could
I mention one who came nearer, in martial bearing,
love of his profession, devotion to duty and know-
ledge of the art of war, to the ideal of a powerful,
chivalrous warrior. Shortly before his death I had
the satisfaction of conferring on him the command
of the Panjab Frontier Force; and as we gaze on
this admirable likeness, I can safely ask, Where
could you find a better type of a gallant Lord
Warden of the Marches'? Though he died of sick-
ness in Egypt, he had as undoubtedly sacrificed his
health and life to the service of his country as did
any of those of his brave countrymen who have
fallen on the field. This tribute of respect we are
paying to his memory is indeed but a poor consola-
tion for his loss. But while, on the one hand, there
is one to whom the knowledge of what we are doing
in her husband's honour will be specially grateful,
on the other, the simple and unostentatious cere-
mony will witness the desire, innate in the hearts
of Englishmen, to express, however imperfectly, the
appreciation of a great soldier's merits, and the de-
sire to recognise devotion to duty wherever found."
SACRIFICE OF HEALTH AND LIFE.
،
It may be added that the proposed monument to
Sir Charles MacGregor will in the course of a few
months be placed in St Paul's Cathedral, as the
Memorial Committee expect to be able to have it
completed and erected before next June.
APPENDIX.
CATALOGUE
OF
PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS
BY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. M. MACGREGOR.
1859-1886.
DATE.
1861
1859 Letters on Irregular Cavalry
1861
1862
1864
to
1865
1865
1860 On the Transport of Horses by
Sea
1866
CATALOGUE
1866
1866
PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS.
SUBJECT.
OF
On Irregular Cavalry
Letters from Bhotan.
Mountain Warfare
•
On raising Irregular Cavalry Letter to Osborn.
for Service in China
Our Native Cavalry
REMARKS.
In 'Delhi Gazette'.
Reprinted .
Letter through Ad-
jutant-General to
the Commander-
in-Chief, Sir Hugh
Rose. Reprinted
in Memoranda on
various Military
Subjects
...
On Collecting Information on
the North-East Frontier
Do.
do.
Notes on Defence of North- Reprinted
East Frontier
·
11
Letter to Quarter-
master-General
11
SIGNED.
"Glenstrae,"
Lieut.C.M.
MacGregor
To Bengal Harkaru. | Brigade - Ma-
jor, Dooar
Field Force
…….
C. M. Mac-
Gregor
By
"Ghor-
chara"
Chas. Mac-
Gregor,
Lieut.
Lieut. C. M.
MacGregor,
D. Assis.
Q.M.G.,
Eastern
Frontier
District
•
⠀⠀
...
410
DATE.
1866
1866
1867
1867
1866 The Experiences of the Bhutan
Campaign of 1864-65-66
1867 On Transport of Supplies in
Abyssinia
SUBJECT.
1867
1867
MILITARY REPORT OF BHUTAN
1868
APPENDIX.
Narrative of Military Opera-
tions in Western Dooars
1868
1867 On Army Organisation (I.)
1867
1868
On the Equipment of Officers
on Service
1867 Supersession of Distinguished
Service Majors by Staff Corps
Men
On the Carriage of Sick and
Wounded
On the Reorganisation of the
Army
•
1867 On Army Organisation (II.) Note
1867 Army Administration.
1867
On Army Organisation (III.).
1867 On Army Uniform
1867
On Army Pay
1867 On Promotion in the English
Army
On Indian Army Staff
On the Amalgamation of the
Staff
•
On the Organisation of the
Transport Department
·
On the Field Equipment of
Troops (I.)
1868 Design for a Canteen.
On the Storing of Supplies in
Abyssinia
1868 Design for a Mule Trunk
Printed at Calcutta,
pp. 74 (1873)
Note
Reprinted in Memor-
anda on Various
Military Subjects
Memorandum.
||
11
||
11
"1
"
[1
!!
REMARKS.
11
11
...
...
...
...
***
Ga
...
•
SIGNED.
D.A.Q.M.G.,
Bhutan F.F.
...
C.M.M.
D.A.Q.M.G.,
Abyssinia
...
...
...
...
...
⠀⠀⠀⠀
...
•••
...
...
...
:
***
...
4.
...
Assis. Q.M.
G., Army
Há. Qrs.
...
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS.
DATE.
1868
1868
1870 CENTRAL ASIA (Part I.)—North-
West Frontier
1871
1871
1871 CENTRAL ASIA (Part II.)--Af-
ghanistan
1871
SUBJECT.
"On
Plan for Rescuing our Prisoners | Reprinted as
from Theodore
the Release of the
Abyssinian Prison-
""
On the Use of Mitrailleurs (I.)
1870 On the Sham Plain Question Memorandum (see
(I.)
1873.)
On the Field Equipment of
Troops (II.)
1871
Scheme for Association for Pub-
lishing Military Works
1871
1871 Remarks on Major Cary's Lec-
ture
1872
Scheme for Introduction of
Military Libraries
On Merv.
1871 Design for a Frontier Tower
1871 Design for Sketching and Sur-
veying Board
1871 Design for a Chair for carry-
ing Wounded among Moun-
tains
1871 Design for a Hammock or
Stretcher for Wounded
among Mountains
On Crossing the Baluchistan
Desert
1872 About Frontier Management
Do.
do.
1872 About Military Instruction
•
ers.
1872 On Reduction feasible on Sind
Frontier
REMARKS.
| (See 1872.)
'Gazetteer,'
dential, Vols. i.,
ii., iii., iv., v. (657
Pp.) Calcutta
Note
..
:
...
Gazetteer,' Confi- A.Q.M.G.
dential, Vol. i. (800
PP.) Calcutta
...
...
...
...
…….
Confi- A.Q.M.G.
Letter to Sir William
Merewether
Letter to Colonel
Maclean
Letter to Army and
Navy Gazette'
SIGNED.
...
Letters to Colonel
Baillie
Memorandum
··
...
⠀⠀
...
...
:
...
...
...
:
...
...
:
:
...
⠀⠀
...
411
•.•
...
412
DATE.
1872 For Secretary Military Inst.
1872
On Military Institution.
1872
1872 On the Invasion of Afridi Land
1872 On Political Appointments
1872
1872
1872
1872
1872 Scheme for Management of the
N.W. Tribes
1872
SUBJECT.
APPENDIX.
1872
1872
1872
•
1872 Review of the Operations at
Ambela in 1863
•
1872
On the Punishment of the Moh-
mands
Comparison of the Sind and
Panjab Frontier Systems
On the Rajanpur Frontier .
On the Management of the Memorandum
N.W. Tribes
On the Punishment of the
Jaduns
1872
On the Invasion of Buner
1872 On the Invasion of the Bozdar
Country
·
On the East part of the Afridi
Border
On the Dera Ghazi Khan
Frontier
Operations on the Mahaban
Mountains
On the Punishment of the
Khetrans
1872 On the Occupation of the La-
gari Barkhan
1872 On Sir Charles Napier's Cam-
paign against the Bugtis
On the Defence of the Dera
Ghazi Border
1872 On Mitrailleur Batteries (II.)
1872
On the Attack of the Kohat
Pass Afridis
Memorandum
Letters to General
Thesiger
Memorandum
Letter to 'Civil and
Military Gazette'
Memorandum
Note
"I
"
11
||
11
11
11
REMARKS.
11
11
||
11
11
(a)
(0)
(a)
...
SIGNED.
:
···
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
•
•••
:
…….
...
...
...
...
A
⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀
...
...
...
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS. 413

DATE.
SUBJECT.
1872 On the Kohat Pass Question Note (b)
Letter
1872 Asking for Command of a Ben-
gal Cavalry Regiment
1872 On the Hadianis
1873
•
CENTRAL ASIA (Part III.)—
Persia
1873 The
1873 Opinions on the Retention of Précis
Peshawar
The Sham Plain Question | Note
(II.)
1873 Military Institution
•
1873 On the Defence of the Khai-
bar
1873 The Yarkand Mission
1873 Journey through Persia.
1873 Sir Charles M.'s Prospects in
the Department
1874 Sir Jan Bahadur's Complaint.
1874 Famine Operations
1874 Camp of Exercise.
•
•
Note
1874 System of Supply of War
Matériel
1874 Offer to explore Khorassan and
Herat
1875 From Mashad
REMARKS.
1874 On Nipal.
Notes
1874 Application for post of Deputy Letter
Quartermaster-General
1874 On Personal Prospects
...
Letters to Colonel
Stansfeld;
...
Letter to Mr Aitch-
eson
Letter to the 'Times'
Letter to General
Roberts
Memorandum
Report of Transport
Depart.
Letter to Colonel
Earle
Letter to Sir H.
Tombs
Scheme.
Letter to Mr Aitch-
eson
11
On Furlough Travel-
ling in Persia and
Khorassan
SIGNED.
...
...
...
A.Q.M.G.
...
...
...
...
:
...
...
Director
Transport,
Behar
...
:
...
...
•••
Member Spe-
cial Ord-
nance Com-
mission
...
::
of
...
414
DATE.
1876
1876
SUBJECT.
APPENDIX.

On Colonel MacGregor's Pros-
pects
On the Karun Route.
1876 Speech at Royal Geographical
Society
1876
Do.
do.
1876 Native Indian Army (I.)
1876 | Along the Frontier and about
it
1876 Appointment of Sir Hope Grant
as Commander-in-Chief
1876 Russian Prisoner at Merv
1876
Portion of MSS. of Journal in
Khorassan
1876 Intelligence Department Com-
mittee
1876 Operations on the Naga Hills
1876 Selection of Sites in the Murree
Hills
1876 Appointment of Colonel Lums-
den as Adjutant-General
1876 Questions for House of Com-
mons
1876 On Native Indian Army (II.)
1876 On the Boundaries of Baluch-
istan
1877 The Aid which could be ren-
dered to Turkey from India
1877 On Herat
1877
Committee on Intelligence.
Memorandum
Lord Salisbury
REMARKS.
Letter to Mr Mac-
kenzie
Letter to the 'Times'
Note
••
...
Letter to the 'Times'
Letter
#1
Letter
Extracts rejected
from proposed
book, subsequently
printed and pub-
lished in 1879
Note on
Memorandum
...
Report
for
::
re-
1876 ON ARMENIA AS A THEATRE Memorandum,
OF WAR
printed as Appen-
dix (C) at end of
'Defence of India'
(1884)
...
Do., Appendix (D)
...
SIGNED.
1st Assist.
Q. M. G.,
Army Hd.
Qrs.
...
24th Jan.
28th Feb.
***
...
...
⠀⠀
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
⠀⠀⠀
...
...
...
:
...
...
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS.
DATE.
1877 On foregoing Report .
1877
do.
1877
1877
1877
Do.
Do.
SUBJECT.
Do.
1877
1877 On Matrimony.
1877
1877
1877
1877
1877
do.
do.
▸
1877 Committee on Intelligence.
1877 Scheme for a chummee in Lon-
don
•
On Defence of North-West
Frontier
1877 Operations in Jawaki Land,
30th August 1877
1877
On Title for New Route Books
1877
On Clandestine Prostitution
1877 Schemes of Defence submitted
with Rohilkand District, No.
272, and 13th February 1877
On care of Arms of Native
Troops
On the Punishment of the
Jawaki Tribe
From Erzrum
Map of Persian Travels.
Russo-Turkish War in Armenia
Do.
do.
1877 Design for Utilising Water-
proof Sheets as Tents
1878 The Original Kabal Scale
1878 CENTRAL ASIA (Sec. IV.)-
Routes in Persia and Balu-
chistan
Letter to Mr Thornton
Letter to Colonel
Thuillier
REMARKS.
Letter to Colonel
Colley
Letter to Colonel
Roberts
Letter
Letter to Major Cory
Note for Report
1877 On Captain Butler's (9th Regi- Notes. Reprinted
ment) Travels
Memorandum
Letter
Note
#
…….
Memorandum on
Memorandum
Telegram
Letter forwarding
Notes on
Letters to Crook-
shank
...
...
SIGNED.
...
...
...
:
...
:
:
...
:
...
...
...
:
...
**
:
...
•
415
...
No. of Routes 376, 1st Assist.-
pp. 620
Qr.-Mr.-
General,
Army
Head Qrs.
416
DATE.
1878 Operations at Jhansi on 4th-
6th February 1878
1878 Military Situation in 1878.
1878 Intelligence Branch, Q.M.G.D.
1878
1878 On the Crossing the Indus, and
Invasion of Kabal
1878 On Field Service Tent
1878 On Exploring near Mashad
1878
SUBJECT.
1878
APPENDIX.
1878 On Appointments to Intelli-
gence Branch
1878
On Reorganisation of Transport
in 1st Division
1878
On the Attack of Kabal.
1878 On the Formation of a Gormal
Column
On Reorganisation of North-
West Frontier
On the Military Situation, end
of 1878
1880
On the Situation on General
Roberts leaving Ali Khel
1878 On the Attack on the Khaibar
1878
Colonel MacGregor's Accounts
on Journey
1880
·
1878 Terms offered to the Maris
1878 Testimonial to Ghulam Nakhs-
band
1878 Plan of Camp of 3d Brigade
1879
'NARRATIVE OF A JOURNEY
THROUGH THE PROVINCE OF
KHORASSAN'
REMARKS.
Memorandum
11
and
Letter to Johnson.
Reprinted
Memorandum
Letter to Captain
Napier
Memorandum
"I
||
11
||
...
...
Letters to Johnson
Letter to Adjutant-
General
...
:
··
2 vols. 8vo. Pub-
lished by Allen &
Co., London
On Sending Troops from Kabal Memorandum.
to Kandahar
General Roberts's Actions at Letters to Lyall
Kabal
Kabal executions
Letters to Greaves
SIGNED.
...
:
...
...
···
...
...
...
⠀⠀⠀
...
...
...
...
…….
:..
⠀⠀⠀
...
...
...
...
Corrected for
the press
by Col. W.
W. Knollys
Chief of the
Staff
……
…….
CATALOGUE OF PUBLICATIONS AND MEMOIRS. 417
DATE.
1880 Management of Harnai Fron-
tier
1880 About the Memorandum on
Armenia
SUBJECT.
1880 Mari Operations
1880 On Selection of a Commander-
in-Chief
1880 Speech at the
1880 General M- -'s Case
M
1880
The Kabal Massacre .
1880
Committee on Offices
1882 WANDERINGS IN BALUCHISTAN
1884 Papers relating to the Opera-
tions of the Mari Field Force
THE DEFENCE OF INDIA
1884
1884 THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR
1885
do.
1886
do.
Do.
Do.
•
VOL. II.
REMARKS
...
Letter to
""
man
Despatches
•
"States-
Memorandum
Report of
Report
1 vol. Published by
W. H. Allen & Co.,
London. Corrected
for the press by
A. N. Wollaston,
Esq., C.I.E.
...
1 vol. Simla. Sup-
pressed by Govern-
ment
Signed.
Qr.-Master-
General in
India
Brigadier
General
Command-
ing Mari
Field Force
..
...
:
...
2 D
...
1884 Memoranda on various Military 1 vol. Simla. In- C. M. M.
cludes various fore-
going papers
Subjects
Vols. i. ii.
Vols. iii. iv.
Vols. v. vi. Index.
Simla
•
…….
Strictly Con-
fidential
Strictly Con-
fidential.
Hitherto
suppressed
by Govern-
ment
N.B.-The rough MS. draft of the above Catalogue, as far as 1880, in Sir
Charles MacGregor's handwriting, was found among his papers, evidently in-
complete, and probably intended as a guide for binding together his miscellaneous
memoranda for future reference. The list, therefore, does not include his in-
numerable official and semi-official writings during his period of office as Quarter-
master-General in India.
RECORD
Ensign,.
Lieutenant,
Captain,
Brevet-Major,
Major,
MAJOR-GENERAL MACGREGOR'S SERVICES.
OF
DATES OF COMMISSIONS.
Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel,
Lieutenant-Colonel,.
Brevet-Colonel,
Local Major-General,
Major-General,
•
·
•
•
20th October 1856.
17th November 1857.
20th October 1868.
21st October 1868.
20th October 1876.
10th November 1869.
26th October 1882.
18th June 1877.
19th November 1880.
22d January 1887.
APPOINTMENTS.
Regimental duty, 57th Native In-
fantry.
Regimental duty, 1st European Ben-
gal Fusiliers.
Regimental duty, Hodson's Horse,
Regimental duty, Fane's Horse,
Cavalry.
Regimental duty, 1st Sikh Irregular 17th November 1860 to
30th January 1861.
31st January 1861 to
26th April 1861.
Recruit Depot, Barrackpur,
Second in Command, 2d Regiment 27th April 1861 to 19th
Hodson's Horse.
January 1864.
5th January 1857 to
24th September 1857.
25th September 1857 to
16th September 1858.
17th September 1858 to
8th February 1860.
9th February 1860 to
16th November 1860.
20th January 1864 to
1st June 1864.
Second Squadron Officer, 10th Ben-
gal Lancers.
Second Squadron Officer, 13th Ben- 2d June 1864 to 27th
gal Lancers.
Brigade-Major, Bhutan Field Force,
September 1864.
28th September 1864 to
15th May 1865.
RECORD OF SERVICES.
Officiating Deputy-Assistant Quarter-
master-General, Eastern Frontier
District.
Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-Gen-
eral, Abyssinian Field Force.
Assistant Quartermaster-General,
Officiating Deputy - Quartermaster-
General.
Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-
General, 1st Division, Peshawar
Valley Field Force.
Officiating Deputy - Quartermaster-
General.
Director of Transport during Famine October to December
Relief Operations, Behar.
1874.
First Assistant Quartermaster-General,
6th March 1875 to 23d
July 1880.
25th February 1878 to
21st April 1879.
22d April 1879 to 25th
June 1879.
Deputy-Adjutant and Quartermaster-
General, 1st Division, Kabal Field
Force.
419
Brigadier-General Commanding 3d
Infantry Brigade, Kabal-Kandahar
Field Force.
Brigadier-General Commanding Mari
Field Force.
Deputy-Quartermaster-General,
16th May 1865 to 23d
January 1867.
6th December 1867 to
5th July 1868.
6th July 1868 to 5th
March 1875.
SIMLA, 16th July 1888.
26th June 1879 to 14th
September 1879.
Chief of the Staff, Northern Afghan- 2d May 1880 to 5th
istan Field Force.
August 1880.
6th August 1880 to 3d
October 1880.
15th September 1879 to
1st May 1880.
4th October to 16th
November 1880.
24th July 1880 to 18th
November 1880.
Quartermaster-General in India,
General Officer Commanding Panjab 28th November 1885.
Frontier Force.
19th November 1880 to
27th November 1885.
On 31st December 1875 Colonel MacGregor was gazetted to
be Companion of the Star of India, on 1st January 1878 to be
Companion of the Indian Empire, and on 17th January 1881
to be Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath.
MARK S. BELL, COLONEL, V.C., R.E.,
Office of Quartermaster-General in India,
Intelligence Branch.
Abbas Khan, ii. 12, 14.
Abbot's Mission to Khiva, i. 116.
Abbottabad, ii. 379.
INDEX.
Abdul Ghafur, ii. 196.
Abdul Karim, ii. 129.
Abdul Rahman, camp at, ii. 261.
Abdul Rahman, Sardar, ii. 181, 185,
186 et seq.-letter from, 194, 211 et
seq., 221, 223 et seq., 318, 334, 366
et seq.
recognition of as Amir, ii. 227.
Abdulla Khan, ii. 221.
Aberfoyle, ii. 393.
Ab-i-Mashad, river, ii. 14.
Abors, border tribe, i. 218.
Abu Bakar, ii. 141.
Abyssinia, expedition to, i. 254 et seq.
Negus of, i. 256, 299.
"
prisoners in, i. 257-release of,
project for, 308.
Act of Parliament denouncing Mac-
Gregors, i. 3-annulled, 4.
of Privy Council, name of Mac-
Gregor abolished by, i. 3-annulled,
4.
Acton, Lieutenant-Colonel C., ii. 173.
Adair House, ii. 305.
Aden, fortifications at, ii. 303, 305.
Adigerat, i. 265 et seq.
Adjutant of 2d Irregular Cavalry, i.
169.
Afghan game, the, ii. 58.
Turkistan, ii. 205.
Afghanistan, adventure in, ii. 10.
;
Boundary Commission for north-
ern, ii. 8, 326.
>
campaign in, ii. 51—begins, 66.
Gazetteer of, i. 325.
partition of, ii. 155, 185, 217.
Afridis, ii. 65 blackmail paid to,
88-objected to by Colonel Mac-
Gregor, 89.
Afridis, regiment of, ii. 112.
tribes, ii. 65, 79.
Agra, i. 8-relief of, 57; ii. 365.
Agra Bank, the, i. 8, 71, 83, 85, 249.
Aham princes, the, i. 215.
Ahmad Khel, battle of, ii. 195, 218--
field of, 246.
Ahmad Shah's tomb, ii. 259.
Ahmed-i-shama, ii. 75.
Aimal, ii. 103.
Aitchison, Mr (Sir C. U.), Foreign
Secretary, i. 333; ii. 2, 12.
——, Mrs, ii. 26.
Ajmere, ii. 365.
Ak Tépé, ii. 369.
Akbar Khan, i. 117.
Akhor, the Mir, ii. 66, 75.
Akhun of Swat, the, i. 201.
Alaman, an, or raiding party of Turko-
mans, ii. 8.
Alambagh, the, before Lucknow, i. 71.
Ala-ud-din Khan, ii. 106.
Ali Akbar Khan, ii. 9.
Ali Boghan, ii. 67.
Ali Khel, ii. 83, 105.
Ali Masjid, fort of, ii. 65 et seq.-cap-
ture of, 75.
Aligarh, mutiny at, i. 34.
Alikozai, tribe, ii. 7.
Alisherzais, ii. 112.
Allaster MacGregor, slain at Glenfruin,
i. 3.
Alpine, Clan, the regiment of, i. 6.
Ambela campaign, the, i. 194. See
Umballa.
Ambiok, i. 224.
American war, Captain John Mac-
Gregor serves in the, i. 7.
422
Amir, Alam Khan, ii. 6.
Amir, the, of Kabal: Sher Ali, ii. 65,
80-Yakub Khan, 80, 119, 130,
151 et seq.
Amir Kala, ii. 241.
Amir Khan, the ridge of, ii. 145.
Amu Daria, the river, ii. 205.
Anardara, ii. 7.
Anderson, Lieutenant and Quarter-
master of Fane's Horse, i. 112, 131
death of, 158, 160, 161.
INDEX.
Lieutenant, Royal Artillery,
killed by explosion, i. 227.
Annenkoff, General, railway of, ii. 324.
Annesley Bay, i. 258, 259.
Annexation of the Bengal Dwars, i. 221.
Antalo, i. 266 et seq.
Anting Gate of Pekin, surrender of
the, i. 160.
Appleyard, Brigadier-General, ii. 77.
Arabi, ii. 314.
Arbitration on Perso-Afghan boundary,
ii. 52.
Ard Loch, i. 393.
Ardagh, Colonel J. C., Royal Engineers,
ii. 392.
Argandab river, the, ii. 252, 253.
Argandeh, ii. 153.
Arghesan river, the, ii. 260.
Argyleshire, ancient home of the Mac-
Gregors, i. 2.
Argyll, Earl of, persecution of the
MacGregors by the, i. 2, 4.
Armenia, campaign in, ii. 40, 41 et
seq.-journey through, 29.
memorandum on Theatre of War
in, ii. 31, 41 et seq., 183.
, question in House of Commons
on, ii. 183.
Armstrong, Colonel, 45th Sikhs, ii.
177, 183.
Armstrong guns at Sinho, i. 133, 145.
Army signalling course, i. 344.
Arogee, battle of, i. 291.
Arzu, action at, and Shalez, ii. 195.
Ashurada, ii. 20.
Asigarh, fortress of, i. 303.
Askabad, ii. 327.
Asmai hill, ii. 128-fight on, 162.
Assam, conquest of, i. 215.
Astrabad, ii. 20, 319.
18, 324, 327, 345, 355.
Atholo, Earl of, i. 4.
Atrak river, the, ii. 19, 22.
Attock, ii. 54.
Ayub Khan, ii. 13, 17, 223, 230 ct
seq., 299, 318, 334.
Azad Khan, the bandit chief of Balu-
chistan, ii. 32, 37.
Aythorp, Major, his account of Edward
MacGregor's death, i. 67.
Baba Kazai, ii. 249.
Baba Kushkar, ii. 157.
Baba Wali Pass, the, ii. 256.
Babar Kach, ii. 277.
Babar's tomb, near Kabal, ii. 200, 207.
Baghdad, ii. 30-expedition to, 45.
Baghwana, village of, burnt, ii. 171-
guns abandoned and recaptured at,
161.
Bagrami, ii. 94.
Bahadur Khel, ii. 381.
Bahanwala, ii. 283.
Bahraich, i. 99.
Bahram Ghat, fight at, i. 95, 104, 120.
Bahrampur, mutiny at, i. 16 et seq.
Bahrein, island of, under British pro-
tection, ii. 23.
Baigrie, Major, i. 258.
Baisak, ii. 112.
Baj, ii. 7.
Bajistan, ii. 6.
Baker, Major, i. 97-Brigadier-General,
ii. 99, 124, 125.
Bakharz, ii. 11.
Atak, the district and railway of the, ii. Bara, action at, i. 120; ii. 79.
Baraki Pass, ii. 127.
Barakzai, Afghan clan, ii. 7-getting
rid of the, 63.
Bakhtiar Khan, sent to Kabal, ii, 32—
search for body of, 134.
Bala, in Bhutan, i. 234, 238.
Balaclava, i. 174.
Baladakha, ii. 284.
Bala Hisar, ii. 94 et seq., 130 et seq.
Bala Murghab, ii. 22, 368.
Bala Rao Khan, i. 108.
Balesh Khel, ii. 105, 112.
Balkh, ii. 53, 149, 327.
Balmaha, the, i. 2.
Balquhidder, MacGregor of, i. 7.
Balrampur jungle, i. 107.
Baluchis, i. 337; ii. 33.
Baluchistan, ii. 28 et seq.
Bamian, ii. 12.
Bamuri Ghat, i. 95.
Banda Serai, i. 92.
Bandah, i. 342.
Bandit chief, Azad Khan, ii. 32, 37.
Banks, Major, killed at Lucknow, i. 52.
Bannu, i. 342; ii. 114, 381.
Bareilly, fight with rebels from, i. 65.
stationed at, i. 171.
Barikab, ii. 177.
.
Baroghil Pass, the, ii. 327.
Baron Gros, French Envoy to China, i.
122.
Barrackpur, mutiny at, i. 16 et seq.
Barry's battery, Royal Artillery, in
China, i. 133.
INDEX.
Barter, Brigadier-General, ii. 235, 236.
Barwell, murder of Lieutenant, and
wife, at Hissar, i. 43, 44.
Basawal, ii. 77 et seq.
Basrah, ii. 30.
Bath, Órder of the, Companion of, ii.
89-Knight Commander of, 293.
Battles of, Arogee, i. 291-Bahram
Ghat, i. 104-Bala, i. 234—Bara, i.
120-Baxa, i. 234-Bazar Valley, ii.
77-Chamurchi, i. 219 et seq.-Cha-
rasia (a), ii. 124-Charasia (b), ii.
195-Daryabad, i. 93 et seg.-Daling-
kot, i. 228-Ganjairi, i. 60-Gogra
river, passage of the, i. 101-Jarwa
Ghat, i. 106-Kabal, i. 161—Kam-
dakot, i. 120-Kandahar, ii. 7—
Lucknow, i. 77—Machhligaon, i. 101,
120-Magdala, i. 284-Maharajganj,
i. 107, 120-Mainpuri, i. 66, 120-
Narnul, i. 58, 65, 120-Nawabganj,
i. 89-Pachgaon, i. 120-Patiali, i.
62-Pekin, i. 161-Sinho, i. 141.
Battye, Captain F. D., of the Guides,
ii. 175, 181.
seq.
Battye, Fort, ii. 177.
Baxa, Fort, in Bhutan, i. 234.
Bayley, Mr (Sir Stuart), Commissioner
of Patna, i. 351 et seq.
Venerable Archdeacon, i. 320.
Beaconsfield, Lord, ii. 28, 48.
Begum, the, i. 81, 87, 108.
Behar, North, famine in, i. 349 et seq.
Belago Pass, the, i. 270.
Belhir, camp at, i. 81.
Bell, Colonel Mark S., Royal Engineers,
V.C., Intelligence Branch, Quarter-
master-General, ii. 419.
Bellew, Dr, ii. 133, 151, 170, 175.
Benares, i. 14; ii. 365.
Bengal army, mutiny of, i. 16.
Bengal Cavalry, i. 19, 46, 165.
"
Fusiliers, 1st European, i. 51 ct
famine in Northern, i. 349 et seq.
Lieutenant Governor of, Sir
Richard Temple, i. 349.
Beni Madhu, the rebel, i. 99.
Berlin, Congress of, in 1878, ii. 63, 64.
Bernard, Mr, Commissioner in Burma,
ii. 300.
Beshilo river, the, i. 272.
-
423
Bethune, Lieutenant, Royal Artillery,
i. 107.
Bhadra, ii. 275.
Bhartpur, Major MacGregor wounded
at, i. 7.
Bhinga camp, i. 104.
Bhor, ii. 286.
Bhutan, campaigns in, i. 200 et seq., 213
et seq.-reconnaissance in, 242 et seq.
-, report on, i. 252.
Bibi Naru, ii. 36.
Biddulph, Sir M. A., Royal Artillery,
i. 103; ii. 66.
Bigni Dwars, the, i. 218.
Bimaru Ridge, the, ii. 129, 183.
Bini Badam, ii. 154.
Bini Hisar, ii. 125, 238.
Birch, Colonel, killed at Sitapur, i. 52,
72.
Birjand, ii. 6.
Bishen Singh, i. 234.
Black-mail paid to Afridis, ii. 88—to
Ghilzai tribes, 107.
Blackwood, G. F., Major, Royal Horse
Artillery, killed at Maiwand, ii. 231.
Blair, Major, Royal Engineers, ii. 173,
177.
Blanc, Dr, i. 256, 296.
Blank spaces on map of Asia, reproach
given by, ii. 28.
Blood, Major Bindon, Royal Engineers,
ii. 301.
Blum Pasha, ii. 31.
Blunt's battery, i. 68.
Bognor, i. 15.
Boisragon, Colonel, ii. 174.
Bokhar Pass, the, ii. 79.
Bolan Pass, the, ii. 36, 66, 373.
Bombay army, the, i. 202, 257, 258;
ii. 257-Commander-in-Chief of, 297,
299.
defences of, ii. 301-port of, 3.
'Saturday Review,' i. 175, 176.
Bond, Lieutenant, 57th Native Infan-
try, i. 22.
Booth, Major, Transport officer, ii. 109.
Boundary, Afghan, Commission, ii. 326,
335, 337 et seq.
Perso-Afghan, ii. 52.
Bourbolon, M. de, French Envoy in
China, i. 122.
Bourchier's battery, i. 68.
Bourke, Major the Hon. J. J., i. 96.
Bowlby, Mr, 'Times' correspondent,
account of Sinho by, i. 140.
killed by Chinese, i. 158.
Boyle, the late F. C., Prefect at Marl-
borough, i. 12.
424
INDEX.
Brabazon, brigade-major of cavalry,
ii. 179.
"
Captain, Royal Artillery, killed
by Sang-ko-lin-sin, i. 157, 160.
Brackenbury, Captain, ii. 267.
Lieutenant-General H., Royal
Artillery, Director of Military Intel-
ligence, ii. 375.
Brahui Land, ii. 36.
Brett, Colonel, i. 113, 114.
Brevet rank of major, i. 319.
Bribery in 10th Bengal Cavalry, i. Calcutta, first arrival at, i. 13-quar-
177 et seq.
tered at, 165; ii. 365.
Cambridge, Duke of, i. 199.
Cameron, Colonel A. S., V.C., Intelli-
gence Branch, London, Command-
ant of Royal Military College, Sand-
hurst, ii. 305, 356.
Bridges, Major F., ii. 187.
Brigade, the 3d, Kabal-Kandahar Force,
ii. 237.
Brigade-Major Bhutan Field Force, i.
213, 214.
Bright, Major-General R. O., C.B., ii.
176, 184.
Bromhead, Sir B. P., Lieutenant-Col-
onel, Transport officer, ii. 172.
Brooke, Brigadier-General H. F., ii. 249.
Brougham, Doctor, European Fusiliers,
i. 74, 113.
Browne, Colonel, Royal Engineers, ii.
300.
Sir Samuel, Lieutenant-Gen-
eral, i. 173; ii. 66, 81, 84, 100.
Brownlow, Lieutenant-Colonel F., 72d
Highlanders, ii. 164, 184-killed at
Kandahar, 257.
Bruce, the Hon. Mr, British Envoy to
Pekin, i. 121, 135.
Buchanan, Thomas, Esq., i. 3.
Budget, Indian, the, ii. 361.
Bukhtiar Khan, rebel chief at Delhi,
i. 52.
Bulgarian frontier, ii. 53.
Buller, Major-General Sir R. H., V.C.,
ii. 375.
Bullet-wounds received at Bala, i. 238
-Dalingkot, 226- Maharaganj, i.
108-Sinho, 145 et seq.
Bundur Gez, ii. 20.
Bushman, Lieutenant - Colonel, 9th
Lancers, ii. 184.
Bushruych, ii. 5, 6 et seq.
Butkhak, ii. 83, 93 et seq., 144.
Butler, T., Lieutenant, V. C. gained
by, i. 75, 89, 95.
Byrampur, i. 92.
Byron, Colonel, at Marlborough, i. 12.
Buners, ii. 382 et seq.
Bunerwals, i. 194.
Bunkasia, camp of, i. 101.
Burial-ground at Glengyle, ii. 392.
Burj, towers of, blown up, ii. 78.
Burj-i-Gulwarda, ii. 8.
Burlton, Major N. R., ii. 103, 109.
Burne, Colonel Sir O. T., i. 187-sec-
retary Military Department, ii. 37.
Burrows, Brigadier-General G. R. S.,
ii. 232, 255.
Burzen Pass, the, ii. 290.
Bushire, ii. 3, 30.
Cairo, ii. 388 ct seq.
Caithness, i. 7, 136.
Lieutenant, Royal Artillery,
wounded in Bhutan, i. 234.
2
-, Consul, in Abyssinia, i, 256.
Campbell, Captain, i. 230.
Neil, Colonel, ii. 36.
>
Sir Colin, General, i. 66, 68, 70,
84, 85.
Sir George, Lieutenant-Governor
of Bengal, i. 349.
Campbells, the, i. 2.
Canning, Lord, i. 22-proclamation of
amnesty by, 100.
Carabineers, charge of the, i. 61.
Carew, Pole-, Lieutenant-Colonel R.,
Coldstream Guards, ii. 152.
Carnac, Rivett-, Mr, Bengal Civil Ser-
vice, i. 319, 323.
Lieutenant, of Fane's Horse
(Colonel, 11th Hussars), i. 131.
Carnegie, Captain, i. 20.
Carr, Captain, i. 341.
Cartridges, the famous greased, i. 16.
Caspian Sea, the, ii. 20.
Catalogue of Publications and Mem-
oirs, ii. 407.
Cattley, adjutant of Fane's Horse, i. 131.
Caucasus, ii. 20, 345, 356.
Caulfield, Major, i. 110.
Cavagnari, Major, ii. 65 et seq., 77, 81,
85-Sir Louis, 88-murder of, 98
et seq., 123, 130, 139, 141.
Cavalry, 10th Bengal (Hodson's
Horse), i. 169, 182-Brigade-Major
of, 194- Assistant Quartermaster-
General of, 259.
charge of, at Daryabad, i. 93—
at Sinho, 144.
history of, in India, projected, i.
167, 175, 178.
disaster near Kabal, ii. 160, 161.
Cavalry, internal economy and min-
utiæ of, i. 172; ii. 227.
Irregular,
studies of, ib. et seq.
Caves at Barikab, ii. 187.
Cawnpore, in camp at, i. 69.
essay on, i. 171-
>
massacre at, i. 49; ii. 365.
Central Asia, ii. i.
INDEX.
Route-book of, ii. 3.
2
Chahar Aimak, tribe of the, ii. 243.
Chaharjui, ii. 345.
Chain-armour, i. 103.
Chakri, ii. 223.
Chaman, ii. 262-the, 238.
Chamba, i. 321.
Chamberlain, Lieutenant-Colonel Ne-
ville, ii. 152.
Sir Neville, Lieutenant-General,
i. 34, 98, 198; ii. 65.
Chamurchi, fort in Bhutan, i. 219 et
seq., 233, 237.
Chandaol, the, bazaar at Kabal, ii. 128,
200.
306, 327; ii. 197, 395.
Chappiah, burning of, i. 117.
Charasia, battle of, ii. 124, 125; se-
cond battle of, 195.
Chardeh, ii. 183.
Chardeh, near Ghazni, ii. 246.
Charles II., i. 4.
Charles XII. of Sweden, i. 8.
Charsu, the, at Kandahar, ii. 259.
Chatt, ii. 289.
Chinese intrenched camps, i. 138, 141.
Chiprihar, ii. 206.
Chirang, reconnaissance from Datma
to, i. 242 et seq.
Chitral, ii. 327, 345.
Chittakot, i. 218.
Chefoo, i. 134, 136.
Cherra Poonjee, i. 240.
Chesney, Colonel G. T., Military De-
partment, ii. 5, 297, 327, 381-
Lieutenant-General, 395.
425
Cholera, epidemic of, i. 128; ii. 86.
Chora Valley, the, ii. 75.
Chotiali, ii. 283.
Chang-kia-wang looted, i. 158.
Chapar Rift, the, ii. 268, 269.
Chapman, Major-General E. F., Royal
306ry, Quartermaster-General, i. Clyde, Lord, i. 101.
Chowkidar of Mundai, the execution
of, ii. 139.
Christie and Pottinger, ii. 33.
Christie, Captain, ii. 109, 217.
Chunar, destruction of, ii. 78.
Chuppur, riding by post in Persia,
ii. 20.
Churchill, Lord Randolph, ii. 361.
Ciar Mohr, i. 3.
Cipher cryptogram, ii. 83, 84.
Clan MacGregor, ii. 309 et seq.
Clarendon, Lord, i. 257.
Clarke, Lieutenant Colonel, ii. 124,
175, 190.
-
Collett, Major H., ii. 164, 200.
Colley, Colonel Sir George, ii. 82.
Collings, Brigadier-General, i. 259.
Charge of cavalry at Daryabad, i. 93- Colonel, promoted to brevet rank of,
ii. 42.
at Sinho, 144.
Charikar, ii. 194.
Charles I., i. 4.
Class troops, i. 202 et seq.
Clayton, Colonel V., Royal Engineers,
i. 12.
See Sir Colin
Campbell.
Cockburn, Captain, Royal Artillery, i.
235.
Colquhouns at Glenfruin, i. 3.
Combat, single, with mutineers, i. 64,
74, 76, 79, 80.
Combe, Captain B. A., 10th Hussars,
ii. 184.
Commissariat, Bengal and Royal, i.
129.
on Khaibar line, the working of
the, ii. 85.
in Afghanistan, ii. 81, 85, 111 ct
seq.
Commission of Inquiry, ii. 133 et seq.
of Extermination of the Mac-
Gregors, i. 2.
Chichawatni, ii. 56.
Chief of the Staff to Sir Samuel Browne,
ii. 81-to Sir Frederick Roberts, 99
-to Sir Donald Stewart, 198.
Chihal Bacha Gum, place of pilgrim-
age near Ghazni, ii. 246.
Chihal-Duktaran, ii. 157.
Chihaltan, ii. 147.
China, war in, i. 121.
Chinai Pass, the, i. 341.
Chinari Pass and road, the, ii. 93, Confidential memorandum, ii. 31, 43
145.
et seq.
Special Ordnance, i. 359.
Committee on Equipment, ii. 188, 219.
on Transport, ii. 226.
Communications on Khaibar
line,
superintendent of, ii. 76, 81.
Companion of the Order of the Bath,
ii. 89.
(
426
Congress of Berlin, ii. 63.
Dayrell, Lieutenant, i. 110.
-
Connaught, Duke of, speech by, ii. De Brett, Lieutenant, 57th Native In-
fantry, i. 22 et seq.
De Luc, the Abbé, execution of, by
Chinese, i. 160.
INDEX.
396.
Connelly, Mr, the sculptor, i. 8.
Constantinople, ii. 29-conference at,
46-Russian advance against, 62,
355.
Convoy, march of a large, i. 82.
Corbett, Captain R., Royal Horse Ar-
tillery, wounded badly at Ahmed
Khel, ii. 195.
Cossack escort at Kabal, ii. 64.
Cotton, Captain, J. W. M., ii. 173.
the Right Rev. Dr, Bishop of Cal-
cutta, i. 12.
Council of India, ii. 28, 339.
of war at Firozpur, i. 22.
Cracow, ii. 21.
Craster, Major W. R., Royal Artillery,
ii. 184.
Crossman, Colonel, Royal Engineers,
ii. 305.
Cunyngham, Dick, Captain, V.C., ii.
171, 237.
Currie, Colonel, ii. 104, 124.
Cyprus, occupation of, ii. 63.
Dabrai, ii. 261.
Dadar, ii. 75.
Daragez, the district of, ii. 18.
Daraka, i. 342.
Deane, Captain, Military Department,
ii. 161.
Death of Sir Charles MacGregor, ii.
392.
'Defence of India,' ii. 315 et seq., 338,
342 et seq.
Defile of Hazar Darakht, ii. 92, 116.
Deh Khwaja, sortie to take, ii. 249.
Deh Mazang, ii. 127.
Delafosse, Lieutenant, escape of, from
Cawnpore, i. 50.
Dardanelles, the, ii. 355.
Dargi, ii. 268.
Darjeeling, i. 222 et seq., 249 et seq.
Darling, Lieutenant C. H., Royal En-
gineers, ii. 176.
Darrya Cham, mud-volcanoes of, ii. 32.
Darsamand, i. 342.
Daryabad, charge at, i. 93 et seq.
Dasht river, the, ii. 32.
Datia, principality of, i. 181.
Datma to Chirang, reconnaissance
from, i. 242 et seq.
Delhi, assault of, i. 50-camp outside,
58 'Gazette,' 106, 115, 174-
meeting at, ii. 53-camp of ex-
ercise at, 380.
Denmark, King of, arbitration by, ii.
370.
Dharmsala, i. 320.
Dhubri, i. 240.
Dilkusha, capture of the, at Lucknow,
i. 72.
Dafadar, a swell, i. 97.
Daka, ii. 74, 75, 174, 175.
Dillon, Lieutenant-General Sir M.,
Military Secretary, i. 323.
Dalhousie, i. 321.
Dalingkot, i. 224 et seq.
Dalojal, ii. 278.
Dinapur, i. 14; ii. 365.
Dinar Karez, ii. 263.
Daly, Colonel Sir Henry, i. 94, 97, Disbandment of the native troops, i.
103, 105.
18, 29 et seq.
Damsang, i. 222.
Danube, the, ii. 29.
Dera Ghazi Khan, i. 330, 338; ii.
56.
Dera Ishmail Khan, i. 341; ii. 56.
Derby, Lord, ii. 47.
Diwangiri, Bhutan, i. 217 et seq.
Diwan-i-Am, ii. 132.
Dobandi, ii. 118.
K
Doran, Brigadier-General, ii. 175.
Dormer, Major-General Hon. J. C., ii.
375.
Dost Mahamad Khan, i. 117, 193; ii.
52.
Douglas, Captain C. F. J., 15th Hus-
sars, ii. 259.
Dowla Wanga Pass, the, ii. 286.
Draban, i. 341.
Dragoon Guards, the 7th, i. 188.
Drai Kala, ii. 116.
Drake, Lieutenant, of Fane's Horse,
i. 131.
Daud Shah, Commander-in-Chief of
the Afghan army, ii. 119, 120, 141.
Daulat Khana, the, i. 79.
Daur, a, or raid, i. 117.
Dawall, Colonel, 57th Native Infantry, Duhamel, General, ii. 64.
i. 26.
Duke, Dr, ii. 267.
Drigri, i. 337; ii. 290.
Duff, Right Honourable Mountstuart
Grant, ii. 335.
Dufferin, Lord, ii. 365, 371, 374, 405.
INDEX.
Duke of Cambridge, i. 199; ii. 260.
Dundas, J., Captain, Royal Engineers,
V.C., death of, ii. 169.
Dunn, Colonel, V.C., death of, i. 265.
Dunsford, Brigadier-General, i. 213 et
seq.
Durand, Captain A., i. 229.
H. Mortimer (Foreign Secretary),
ii. 99, 131, 170, 330.
>
Sir Henry, General, i. 194, 319,
320, 341.
Miss, i. 316, 319.
Dutton, Captain the Honourable C.,
ii. 174, 191.
Dynamite at Chapar Rift, ii. 269.
Dyson-Laurie, Major, ii. 76—Colonel,
85.
Earle, Colonel W., i. 344.
Eden, the Hon. Ashley, Envoy to
Bhutan, i. 213, 216.
Edward MacGregor, i. 13—death of,
52 et seq.
Edwardes, Colonel, i. 34.
Eed, the fast of Ramzan, or, ii. 107.
Egypt, ii. 314.
Elgin, Lord, i. 121, 135, 191, 192.
Elkhani of Bujnurd, the, ii. 19.
Elles, Major-General W. K., Adjutant-
General in India, ii. 391.
Ellice, Colonel, i. 195.
Embassy to China, i. 121.
Ensign, commissioned, i. 13.
Envoy, British, to Abyssinia, i. 256—
to Bhutan, 213-to China, 121-to
Kabal, ii. 65, 81.
French, Baron Gros, i. 121.
Enzelleh, ii. 20.
Erivan, ii. 21.
Erzroum, ii. 29, 30.
Executions at Kabal, ii. 212, 214.
Expedition to Abyssinia, i. 255-Bhu-
tan, 213-China, 122-Mari country,
ii. 264.
Experiences of the Afghan campaign,
ii. 227.
of the Bhutan campaign, i. 215,
242.
Explosion at Firozpur, i. 25.
at Bala Hisar, Kabal, ii. 136, 137.
Faiz Mahamad Khan, ii. 65 et seq.,
243.
Falla hill, the, i. 281.
Fane, Walter, Captain, commanding
Fane's Horse, i. 123, 130, 159.
Fane's Horse, i. 123 et seq.
Farah, ii. 6 et seq.
427
Farah-Rud, the, ii. 346.
Faraimun, ii. 11.
Faridabad, i. 191.
Fatehabad, ii. 81.
Fatehgarh, i. 66; ii. 398.
Fatteh Khan, i. 117.
Fergusson, Lieutenant, wounded, ii.
176.
Firozpur, i. 16 et seq.
Fitzgerald,
Fitzgerald, Major, Bengal Commis-
sariat, i. 129.
Fitzhugh, Major, ii. 124.
Flad, Mr, i. 257, 296.
Forbes, Lieutenant O. E. S., 14th Ben-
gal Lancers, body of, recovered, ii.
170.
Forsyth, Sir Douglas, i. 322, 323.
Fortifications of Aden, ii. 303—of Bom-
bay, 301.
Franks, Colonel, i. 70.
Fraser, the Hon. James, Adjutant, i.
99, 102.
Frome, Captain, 72d Highlanders,
killed at Kandahar, ii. 257.
Frontier Force, Panjab, ii. 379, 406.
North-West, Gazetteer of, i.
343.
Fusiliers, 1st Bengal European, i. 57,
74.
Fyzabad, i. 70, 98 et seq., 123.
Gandamak, ii. 81, 82, 84, 85, 155, 176,
183.
Gandava, ii. 37.
Gandiawar, ii. 104.
Gandri, i. 335.
Ganeji Gap, ii. 273.
Ganges, the river, i. 53, 352.
Gangetic Doab, the, i. 57.
Ganjairi, action of, i. 61, 120.
Garbett, Colonel, Royal Artillery, i. 21.
Garstin, Major, i. 224.
Gaselee, Captain A., Deputy-Assistant
Quartermaster-General, ii. 255.
Gatai, ii. 262.
Gauhati, i. 217.
Gauntlets, use of steel, deprecated, i.
103.
Gazetteer of Afghanistan, i, 329-of
Central Asia, 317 et seq.-of North-
West Frontier, 320, 343-of Persia,
327; ii. 4.
Geographical Society, ii. 23, 24.
Gerrard, Brigadier-General, killed, i.
59.
Ghain, ii. 6, 35.
Ghazarband Pass, the, ii. 264. ·
Ghazis, attack by, ii. 267.
I
428
Ghazni, ii. 55, 181, 193, 245.
Ghilzais, fight with, at Shutargardan,
ii. 121-at Shalez, 195.
€
Ghorchara,' letters by, i. 174, 187.
Ghorcharas of Runjit Sinh, i. 113.
Ghorian, ii. 10.
Ghulam Hasan Khan, the Nawab, ii.
65.
Ghur Daf, ii. 288.
Ghurkhas, ii. 247.
Gill, Captain, ii. 267.
Captain W. E., Royal Engineers,
ii. 39, 298.
INDEX.
Gladstone, Mr, ii. 225, 358.
Glanders, African, i. 262.
Glenalmond College, i. 8.
Glenfruin, i. 3.
Glengyle, i. 3, 5; ii. 392 et seq.
Goalpara, i. 215.
Gogra, passage of the, i. 53, 101, 120.
Goldsmid, Sir Frederick, ii. 23.
Golundazes, i. 61.
Gomal Pass, the, ii. 56, 246.
Gonda Camp, i. 107, 119, 169.
Gondar, i. 256.
Gorakpur frontier, i. 113.
Goranari, i. 334.
Captain J. C. F., ii. 340.
Chinese, ii. 199, 219.
Colonel B., Royal Horse Artil-
lery, ii. 160.
Gore Langton, ii. 177.
Gorge of the Kahan, ii. 288.
Gospand Dara, the pass, ii. 93.
Gough, Charles, Brigadier-General, ii.
165 et scq.
, Hugh, Brigadier-General, i. 97;
ii. 122.
Lord, i. 195.
"
Graliam's, Major, Royal Artillery, bat-
tery of jointed guns, ii. 189.
Grant, Colquhoun, of the Bays, i.
109.
>
Sir Hope, i. 81, 109, 122, 131.
Grant Duff, M.P., ii. 183.
Greathed, Brigadier-General, i. 57.
Major, Bengal Engineers, wound-
ed, i. 138.
Greaves, Sir G. B., General, ii. 236,
295, 341.
Green, Major, 12th Bengal Cavalry, ii.
109, 156-night march of, 166.
Greene, Lieutenant,
Lieutenant, United States
Engineers, ii. 27.
Gregor, the Clan, Society, ii. 309.
Grey, Lord, ii. 47.
Grierson, Lieutenant J. M., Royal Ar-
tillery, ii. 338.
Gordon, Brigadier-General, i. 120; ii. Gwaliar, i. 181.
109.
Griffin, Captain, Royal Artillery, killed
by explosion, i. 227.
Sir Lepel, ii. 179, 181, 183, 193,
338.
Grodekoff, Colonel, his journey in
Afghanistan, ii. 192.
Gros, Baron, French Envoy in China,
i. 122.
Guerilla warfare, ii. 79.
Guides Cavalry, i. 199-escort of, at
Kabal, ii. 260-services of, 295.
Gujrat, i. 194.
Gulistan Karez, ii. 260, 372.
Gulwarda, tower of, ii. 8 ct seq.
Gumaran, ii. 183.
Gumati Pass, the, i. 342.
Gumbaz-i-Shah, Maksud, ii. 35.
Gumti river, i. 79, 84, 89.
Gundak, ii. 266.
Gundakin Daf, ii. 277.
Gunga Sinh, in 105.
Guns, recovery of, near Kabal, ii. 161.
Gwadar, ii. 31.
Gwajha Pass, the, ii. 76.
Gwalari route, the, ii. 56.
Habibulla Khan, ii. 119.
Haidar Khel, ii. 242.
Haines, Sir Frederick P., Commander-
in-Chief in India, ii. 52, 62, 66, 80,
87.
Halwai, skirmish at, ii. 79.
Hamilton, Lieutenant, of the Guides,
killed at Kabal, ii. 131.
---, Captain C. H., Royal Artillery,
wounded, ii. 192.
Hamitabad, ii. 11.
Hamley, Sir E., General, ii. 338, 363.
Hammond, Major, 5th Panjab Cavalry,
ii. 125, 155-obtains the V.C., 171.
Hand-to-hand fights, i. 64, 74, 76, 79,
80, 120, 147.
Hangings, the, at Kabal, ii. 184, 212,
214.
Hanna, Major, H. B., i. 201; ii. 39,
156.
Hapur stud, near Meerut, i. 125.
Harand, i. 337; ii. 271.
Hardinge, Honourable A. E., Lieuten-
ant-General, Commander-in-Chief at
Bombay, ii. 297.
Hardy, Lieutenant E., Royal Horse
Artillery, ii. 170.
Harinarapur, i. 92.
Hari-rud, the, ii. 9.
INDEX.
Hari-Sing-ka-Burj, ii. 55, 72, 73.
Harman, Sir George, Major-General,
Military Secretary, i. 12.
Harnai, ii. 270 et seq., 373.
Harrison (editor), ii. 134.
Hartington, Lord, ii. 260.
Hasan Abdal, i. 197; ii. 66, 70.
Hashim Khan, ii. 203, 207, 221.
Hastings, Major, Political Officer, ii. Huramzai, ii. 75.
106, 217.
Haughton, Colonel, i. 224.
Havelock, Sir Henry, death of, i. 68,
83.
Havelock-Allen, Sir Henry, i. 97.
Hawkes, Lieutenant, ii. 99.
Hay, Lord John, Captain R.N., i.
155.
Hazara country, ii. 12, 142, 231, 337.
Hazar Darakht defile, ii. 91, 116.
Hearsey, General, i. 16.
Heathcote, Colonel, 19th, ii. 260.
Lieutenant-Colonel Mark, Road
Commandant, ii. 102 et seq., 123.
Heliographic communication, ii. 104.
Helmand, the river, ii. 33, 35—water-
way or shela of the, 35.
Hensman, Mr, ii. 184, 226.
Herat, ii. 6-accessible from Merv, 21
-defence of, 59 et seq.-projected
move against, 66, 141, 142, 193, 327,
336, 338, 345 et seq.
Herbert, Lord, speech of, in Parliament,
i. 163.
Hills-Johnes, Sir J., Lieutenant-Gen-
eral, ii. 118, 191, 193.
Hindu Kush, ii. 177, 346.
Hisarak, ii. 82, 192.
Hissar, escape of Mrs Robertson from,
i. 44.
Hodson, Lieutenant, i. 18, 86, 97.
Hodson's Horse (10th Bengal Cav-
alry), i. 61, 93, 169, 182.
Holdich, Brigadier-General, i. 117.
Holmes, Lieutenant, wounded, ii. 79.
Hong Kong, i. 131.
Hoosein Pasha, ii. 31.
Hoosen Ali, death of, ii. 5.
Hope, Admiral Sir James, at the
Peiho, i. 122-at Tientsin, 150.
Hope Johnstone, i. 128.
Hornby, Admiral, passage of the Dar-
danelles by, ii. 63.
Horsemanship, skill in, i. 178, 179,
183.
Horses, oriental, ii. 11.
-, purchase of, for Fane's regiment,
i. 125.
transport of, i. 128, 154.
Ho-si-wu, i. 157.
Hospital-ship, the Sir William Peel,
i. 150.
429
Hoti-Mardan, i. 197.
Hozier, Captain H. M., Military Secre-
tary in Abyssinia, i. 259.
Hughes, Major, i. 93, 119.
Hume, Major, i. 93-Colonel, 98.
Husainabad at Lucknow, i. 74.
Huxham, Captain, i. 224.
Hyat Khan, Assistant Political Officer,
ii. 106, 133, 181.
Ibrahim, Khan, ii. 122, 123, 215.
Ikbal, the, ii. 346.
Imperial darbar at Delhi, ii. 52.
Incendiary fires, i. 17.
Inchbald, Mr, i. 12.
Indaki, ii. 199.
'India, Defence of,' ii. 315 et seq., 342.
Office, ii. 39.
"
Star of, Order conferred, ii. 89.
'Indian Army Review,' the, i. 201.
Empire, Order of the, ii. 89.
Staff Corps, service in, i. 170.
Indo-European Telegraph Company, ii.
30.
Indus river, the, i. 345; ii. 349, 363.
Innes, Brigadier-General, i. 21 et seq.,
74.
Intelligence, i. 113, 114, 126; ii. 106,
305 et seq.
Intelligence Branch, War Office, ii.
305 ct seq.
Inverarderan, MacGregor of, i. 5.
Irregular Cavalry, letters on, i. 106,
115, 171-report on, 202.
Ishak, Mahamad, Abdul Rahman's
nephew, ii. 205.
Islangi, King Theodore's camp at, i.
272.
Ivanoff, the Russian prisoner at Merv,
ii. 16.
Jacob, General, i. 322, 332, 336.
Jacobabad, i. 333; ii. 37.
Jafir, ii. 108.
Jagdalak Kotal, ii. 174.
Jaipur, i. 218.
Jajarm, towers outside, ii. 20.
Jajis, ii. 106.
Jalalabad, ii. 77, 81, 172 et seq.
Jalandhar, i. 193, 199.
Jaldak, ii. 251.
Jaldhaka river, i. 218.
Jalk, ii. 33.
Jalpaiguri, i. 218 et seq.
430
Jam, a column vid, ii. 345.
Jampur, i. 331.
Jamrud, ii. 65 et seq., 75, 81.
Jamshidi, ii. 243.
Jardine, Miss, ii. 314.
Jarwa Ghat, action at, i. 106, 119, 120.
Jask, ii. 30.
Jawaki Land, operations in, ii. 41.
Jazails, ii. 67.
Jebel Shamshan, ii. 304.
Jenkins, Colonel of Guides Cavalry, ii.
158, 195.
Jenkyns, death of Lieutenant, at Ka-
bal, ii. 131.
Jhansi, i. 181.
Jhilam, i. 34, 195; ii. 55.
Jihad (sacred war) at Naorak, ii. 170.
Johnson, Colonel Sir C. C., ii. 88, 232.
Jones, Admiral, in China, i. 122, 155.
Jones, Colonel, 61st Foot, i. 21.
Jung Bahadur, i. 70, 118.
INDEX.
Kabal, ii. 64, 65, 67, 71, 82, 83, 85, 88
-project for advance on, 90-mas-
sacre at, 98, 100, 108-march from
Kabal to Kandahar, 233 et seq.
Kabali troops, mutiny of, at Herat, ii.
108.
Kateg
Kach, ii. 265 et seq.
Kafiristan, ii. 337.
Kahan, ii. 271-gorge of the, 288.
Kahars (bearers), ii. 109, 111.
Kaisar Bagh, the, at Lucknow, i. 74.
Kakhk, ii. 6.
Kala Abdulla, ii. 263.
Kala Aoshar, ii. 149 et seq.
Kala-i-Kazi, ii. 160, 192.
Kalat-i-Ghilzai, ii. 247, 250.
Kalat-i-Kila, ii. 274.
Kalchas, ii. 290.
Kali Nadi, the, i. 65.
Kamdakot, action at, i. 120.
Kanauj, i. 58.
Kandahar, ii. 17, 53, 66, 87, 155, 233
et seq., 256, 257, 348, 349, 369.
Kanti, ii. 280.
Kars, ii. 29.
Karsiang, i. 222.
Kasabai, destruction of, ii. 78.
Kasganj, i. 62, 66.
Kashgar, i. 323.
Kashmar, i. 332; ii. 57.
Kashmir, ii. 345.
Kassa, prince of Tigre, i. 262.
Kassassin, lines of, ii. 314.
Kataghan, ii. 120.
Katrine, Loch, i. 5; ii. 392, 393.
Kauf, ii. 6.
Kaufmann, General von, ii. 64.
Kavir, desert of, ii. 5.
Kaye, Sir John, History of Indian
Mutiny by, i. 15 et seq.
Keane, Sir John, force of, ii. 96.
Kehriz, ii. 10, 60.
Kelat, ii. 37.
Kennedy, Captain B. G., Assistant
Quartermaster-General, ii. 188.
Sir Michael, ii. 156.
Ker-Innes, Surgeon-General, ii. 86.
Kotchi-ki-Kot, ii. 289.
Khaibar, the line of the, ii. 54, 66;
project for forcing, 67 et seq.
Khairigarh jungles, the, i. 115.
Khakee uniform, i. 112.
Khan Agha, ii. 243.
Khanate of Kelat, ii. 38.
Khaniki, ii. 287.
Kharan river, in Baluchistan, ii. 29.
Kharkof, ii. 21.
Khirskhana Kotal, ii. 159.
Khoja, Rawash, ii. 204, 205.
Khojak Pass, the, ii. 56, 76, 262, 369,
372.
Khokand, ii. 327.
Khorassan, ii. 4, 12, 16, 21.
Khurd Kabal Pass, the, ii. 74, 96, 144,
145.
Khushalgarh, bridge of boats at, ii. 54.
Khushdill Khan, ii. 147, 148.
Khushi, ii. 83 et seq.
Khusk, the river, ii. 368.
Kilgour, Lieutenant H., 5th Fusiliers,
ii. 217.
Kilif, ii. 327.
Kara Dushman, ii. 221.
Karachi, ii. 3, 363.
Karatiga, ii. 116.
Kinloch, Lieutenant-Colonel A., 60th
Rifles, ii. 338.
Karauli, Rajah of, i. 190.
Karez hill, ii. 256.
Karez-i-Oba, ii. 247.
Kargan, ii. 10.
Kitchener, Captain, ii. 109.
Kizil, Arvat, ii. 323.
Kizilbash, ii. 128, 130, 142.
Karim Khan, ii. 228.
Knollys, Lieutenant-Colonel W., i. 318.
Karkachar, spur of the Safed Koh, ii. Knowles, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B.,
224.
67th Foot, ii. 123.
Kochan, ii. 19.
Koh Aliabad, ii. 149.
Kimberley, Lord, ii. 359.
Kingchow, i. 136.
Koh Daman, ii. 159.
Kohat, i. 342; ii. 55, 66, 103, 381.
Kohistan, ii. 155, 169.
Kohistanis, ii. 213.
Kolab, ii. 12, 327, 345.
Kolu Valley, ii. 284.
Komaroff, General, ii. 323, 368.
Kosht, villages of, ii. 269.
Kotwal, the, of Kabal, ii. 135, 138.
Krasnovodsk, ii. 327.
Krupp guns at Kars, ii. 31.
Kuch Behar, i. 218.
Kuchali, ii. 274.
Kuchis, ii. 145.
Kui, ii. 287.
INDEX.
Kunduz, ii. 120, 205.
Kuram, Force, ii. 75, 76-fort, 83,
105, 109—route, 54-valley, 66.
Kuriak, ii. 279.
Kusan, ii. 10.
Laessoe, Captain de, ii. 330.
Laghman, ii. 172.
Lahore, i. 22; ii. 74, 75.
Lakarai Pass, ii. 83 et seq., 90 et scq.
Lal Khan Chah, ii. 36.
Landi Khana Kotal, ii. 73, 86.
Langar, ii. 196.
Langton, Lieutenant Gore, 72d High-
landers, ii. 177.
Lataband, Pass of, ii. 145, 187.
Lawrence, Sir Henry, i. 20, 72.
Lord, i. 91, 316; ii. 52.
Lectures at Soldiers' Institute, i. 175,
Kweiliang, Chinese Commissioner, i. MacDonald, Major, i. 21.
150.
177.
Lepchas, tribe of, in Bhutan, i. 229.
Lesseps, M., i. 278.
Liddell, Lieutenant A. F., Royal Artil-
lery, aide-de-camp, ii. 203.
Lindley, Lieutenant W. D., Royal
Engineers, ii. 176.
Liptrap, Colonel, i. 21.
Llamakin, General, ii. 54.
Loargai Glen, ii. 73.
Loch, Mr, i. 150--capture of, at Pekin,
157.
Logar river and valley, ii. 94, 144.
Lora, the river, ii. 263.
Loughnan, Lieutenant, i. 224.
Low, Lieutenant-Colonel, 13th Bengal
Lancers, Director of Transport, ii.
174.
Luard, Lieutenant, of Fane's Horse, i.
131.
Lochs Katrine and Lomond, i. 5, 393.
Lockhart, Colonel Sir W. S. A., i. 327;
ii. 99, 156, 181, 197, 237.
Lockwood, Captain, i. 343; ii. 28 ct
seq.-death of, 38.
Luckhardt, Major, ii. 99.
Lucknow, i. 20, 68 et seq., 74 et seq.,
170.
Lumsden, Sir Peter, Major-General,
Chief of the Staff, i. 323; ii. 99,
366, 369.
431
Lyall, Sir Alfred, ii. 100, 111, 179.
Lytton, Lord, ii. 27, 41, 46, 52, 53,
227.
M'Calmont, Lieutenant-Colonel, 7th
Hussars, ii. 264.
2
171.
'Lalla Rookh,' i. 197.
Lalpur, i. 102.
Edward, death of, i. 67 et seq.
Miss, i. 253-Mrs, 7-Major-Gen-
eral, ib.—Major Robert Guthrie, ib.
Sir Malcolm, i. 113.
Machhligaon, action of, i. 101, 120.
Lance, as a weapon, the, i. 183.
Laucers, 9th, attacked by Afridis, ii. Machi Balwan, the palace at Lucknow,
87.
i. 72, 74.
Mackenzie, Colonel Murray P. A., i.
51, 83.
Sergeant Hector, V. C., ii. 118,
MacDowell, i. 97.
MacGregor, Charles Metcalfe, birth of,
i. 8.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. D., 3d
Bengal Cavalry, ii. 184.
Mr, at Calcutta, i. 326.
Mackeson, Fort, i. 343.
Maclaine, Lieutenant Hector, Royal
Horse Artillery, killed by Ayub
Khan, ii. 257.
Maclean, Lieutenant, Fane's Horse, i.
131.
„
MacNeill, Major, ii. 300.
MacPherson, Major-General Sir Her-
bert, ii. 100, 144, 157 et seq., 256.
Macqueen, Colonel J. W., ii. 146, 339.
Magazine at Firozpur exploded, i. 25.
Magdala, i. 257, 261, 272, 284, 298.
Mahamad, Alam, ii. 10.
Aslam, ii. 135.
Hasan, ii. 144.
Jan, ii. 178, 213.
Karim, ii. 147.
Sadik Khan, ii. 243.
Sharif, fort of, ii. 169.
Yahiya Khan, ii. 120.
432
Mahamadabad, ii. 18.
Mayo, Lord, i. 319.
Maharaganj, fight at, i. 107-wounded Mazulla Khan, ii. 193.
Mecham, Major, i. 97.
Mechs, border tribe, i. 218.
Mainaguri, i. 222.
Medical Department in Afghanistan,
ii. 111.
Mainpuri, action at, i. 66, 120.
Mainwaring, Major, 4th Ghurkhas, ii. Mediterranean, Russia in the, ii. 354
289.
Maiwand, disaster at, ii. 230, 235.
Malik, Bahadur Khan, of Nirikh,
ii.
154.
Maliks of Maidan, gathering of, ii.
218.
at, 120.
Maidan, ii. 153.
INDEX.
Malta, Indian contingent at, ii. 63.
Manas river, in Bhutan, i. 218.
Mandi Hisar, ii. 260.
Manikiala, top of, i. 196.
Manjra, ii. 287.
Mansfield, Sir William (Lord Sand-
hurst), i. 317.
March from Kabal to Kandahar, ii.
233.
Mardall, Lieutenant, 3d Panjab Native
Infantry, ii. 289.
Marghilan Pass, the, ii. 327, 345.
Mari expedition, i. 331; ii. 55, 265.
Markey, Dr, ii. 263.
Marki Khel, ii. 225.
Marlborough College, i. 8 et seq.
Marsden, Major, i. 32.
Marsh, Captain, ii. 12.
Martin, Mr A., at Marlborough, i. 10.
Martineau, Bengal Commissariat, i.
129.
Martinière, the, at Lucknow, i. 85.
Mashad, ii. 3, 10, 12.
Mashad-i-Reza, ii. 11.
Mashad-i-Sar, ii. 20.
et seq.
Meerut, i. 14.
Mehrula Khan, submission of, ii. 285
et seq.
Mehtarzai, ii. 264.
Mekran, ii. 30.
Melikoff, General Loris, ii. 44.
Memorandum on Armenia, ii. 31.
Menilek, King of Shoa, i. 262.
Merewether, Brigadier-General, i. 257,
259.
Merk, Mr, political officer, Boundary
Commission, ii. 8, 35.
Merv, ii. 18, 21, 193, 323.
Mian Mir, i. 34; ii. 87.
Michel, Sir John, Major-General, i.
133, 155, 162.
Matkoza, i. 342.
Matow, i. 155.
Maude, Brigadier-General, V.C., ii. 76
et seq., 206.
Mayne, Major, 30th Panjab Native
Infantry, i. 224, 229.
Mignon, Major, ii. 99.
Military Department, obstruction in,
ii. 306, 308.
Millett, Lieutenant, killed at Tazagong,
i. 234.
Milutin, General, ii. 64.
Minar, the, near Kabal, ii. 224.
Minutia of cavalry duties, i. 186, 188.
Mir Akhor, the, ii. 65, 75.
Mir Bachha, ii. 157, 196.
Mir Fakir, ii. 135.
Mir Gazian, ii. 33.
Mir Hoosen Khan, ii. 19.
Mir Jafir, ii. 108.
Mashkel river (or Budu river), ii. 33, Mir Shakzada Hasan, ii. 185.
Mirza Mahamad, ii. 138, 139.
34.
Masozais, ii. 112.
Massacre of envoy and escort at Kabal,
ii. 98 ct seq.
Massowah, i. 257 et seq.
Massy, Brigadier-General Dunham, ii.
99, 105, 109, 139, 140, 160.
Mastung, ii. 36.
Matangi hill, signalling from, ii. 84, Mohmand, one stage from Kandahar,
105.
ii. 256.
Mohmands, the, ii. 174.
Mitchell, Colonel, 19th Native Infan-
try, i. 18.
Mobilisation of British force in India,
ii. 369.
of Russian troops, ii. 53.
Mockler, Major, ii. 31.
Moel Mor, ii. 394.
Matanni, ii. 103.
Mathilda Atheling, the transport, i. Mohumrah, ii. 23.
163.
Moira, the Lord, battalion, or 57th
Native Infantry, i. 21.
Molloy, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii. 110,
162.
Mongol horsemen, i. 153.
Montanaro, Lieutenant C. A., Royal
Artillery, mortally wounded, ii. 165.
Montauban, General de, Commander-
in-Chief of the French army, i. 122,
132.
Montrose, Marquis of, i. 4.
Morgan's battery, ii. 117, 146.
Moriarty, Major, ii. 139, 147.
Morton, Captain G. de C., Brigade-
Major, ii. 156, 206.
Mountain warfare, paper on, i. 200,
243.
Nakhsband Khan, ii. 141.
Nanachi, ii. 207.
Nana Sahib, i. 49, 99, 108, 111.
Nani, ii. 246.
INDEX.
Mounted infantry, ii. 180.
Mowbray - Thomson, escape of, from Nur Mahamad, ii. 33.
Cawnpore, i. 50.
Mud-volcanoes, ii. 32.
Mukkur, ii. 248.
Nurpur, i. 321.
Nushki, ii. 36.
Nusnola Khan, ii. 11.
Mullas, ii. 207-Mulla Fakir, 201- Nuttall, Colonel, ii. 37.
Mulla Khalil, ib.
Nuzuff Ali Khan, ii. 133.
Multan, i. 330; ii. 56.
Munzinger, Swiss Consul, i. 262.
Murad Buksh, killed, i. 117.
Musa Jan, ii. 213.
Mustaufi of Herat, ii. 9, 133.
of Kabal, ii. 119, 133, 202.
Mutineers blown from guns, i. 40.
Mutiny of Bengal army, i. 15 et seq.
, suppression of, i. 56 et seq.
Naorak, jihad at, ii. 170.
Napier, Captain Hon. G., ii. 12-report
of, on Persia, 24.
Lord (of Magdala), i. 131, 133,
141 et seq., 258 et seq.
Sir Charles, i. 98.
Napoleon III., the Emperor, i. 122.
Narnul, battle of, i. 58, 59, 65, 120,
304.
Naval Brigade, i. 136.
Nawab Ata Mahamad Khan, ii. 52.
Nawab Ghulam Hasan Khan, ii. 65,
106, 209.
Nawabganj, battle at, i. 120-camp at,
71.
Nawaz Khan, ii. 17.
Nek Mahamad, ii. 131, 147.
Nicholson, Colonel, i. 34.
Major, Engineers, at Lucknow,
J
i. 75.
Nikra, ii. 284.
Nirikh Valley, ii. 154.
Norman, Colonel, i. 199; ii. 178.
VOL. II.
Normann, Mr de, captured by Chinese,
i. 157.
Northbrook, Lord, Viceroy of India, i.
347, 349; ii. 12.
North-east frontier, i. 241.
North-west frontier, i. 343.
Nugent, Captain J. V., 51st Foot,
wounded, ii. 192.
Lieutenant, Royal Engineers, ii.
104-killed, 169.
Nukhohvan, ii. 21.
Occupation of Herat advocated, ii. 23.
Odessa, ii. 355.
433
Odin Bay, i. 135.
Officers for irregular cavalry, i. 208,
209.
Naru, ii. 33.
Nasak, ii. 270.
Native cavalry, officers for, i. 208, Padshah Khan, chief of Ghilzais, ii.
209.
106, 119.
Olpherts, Colonel, V.C., i. 196.
Operation, painful, for abscess of liver,
ii. 391.
Orakzai, country of the, ii. 218.
Orders, C.B., ii. 89-K.C.B., 293—
C.I.E., 89-C.S.I., 23.
Ordnance Department in Afghanistan,
ii. 111.
, Special Commission on, i. 358.
Ormuz, acquisition of, ii. 23.
Osborne Palace, ii. 293.
Oudh, insurrection in, i. 34, 37, 43, 54,
103, 120.
Outram, Sir James, i. 68, 75, 84, 98.
Oxus river, Sir Henry Rawlinson on
the, ii. 24, 345.
Pachgaon, i. 120.
Pachgawa, i. 116.
Paghman, ii. 153.
Pah-li-chao Bridge, near Pekin, i. 160.
Pahrah, ii. 8.
Pai Minar, ii. 182.
Paimal, ii. 257.
Paiwar, ii. 54, 75, 80, 105, 109, 115.
Palliser, Brigadier-General, i. 97, 174
et seq.; ii. 261.
Palmer, Lieutenant E., Commissariat,
ii. 192.
Professor, ii. 39.
Pamir, the, ii. 345.
Pamphlet on Native Cavalry, i. 181.
Paniali, ii. 283.
2 E
434
Panjab, i. 34-Frontier Force, command
of, ii. 379-farewell order to, 386.
Panjak, ii. 248.
Panjdeh, ii. 368.
Panjur Valley, ii. 31, 33.
Pari Dara Pass, ii. 177.
Paris, ii. 29.
Parkes, Sir Harry, i. 150, 155 et seq.
Parry, Major, Royal Artillery, ii. 125.
Partabpur, i. 95, 96.
Parthia, ancient, ii. 24.
Pasakha, i. 219.
Pasni, ii. 32.
INDEX.
Patiali, fight at, i. 62.
Patkao, Roghani, ii. 240.
Patna, Commissioner of, i. 351-town
of, ii. 365.
Pattle, Brigadier, King's Dragoon
Guards, i. 133, 152.
Pecheli, Gulf of, i. 134.
Pehtang, landing at, i. 137.
Peiho river, the, i. 122, 137, 149.
Pekin, i. 156 et seq.
Penny, General, i. 57.
Perkins, Lieutenant - Colonel, Royal
Engineers, i. 223 et seq.; ii. 107,
155.
Persia and Herat, ii. 56 et seq.
Persian Gazetteer, i. 325; ii. 4.
territory, report on, ii. 23.
troops, ii. 14, 23.
war, conclusion of, i. 16.
Perso-Afghan Boundary, ii. 52.
Peshawar, ii. 55, 66, 69, 87.
Peshin, ii. 75, 371, 372.
Pesth, ii. 29.
Pezwan, ii. 177.
Phayre, Major-General, i. 258; ii. 254.
Phillips, 8th Hussars, i. 174.
Phipps, Trooper, murdered by Chinese,
i. 160.
Pierce, Colonel, ii. 267.
Pig-sticking, i. 107, 181.
Pindi Kohat road, ii. 55.
Piri-i-Kaisar, ii. 33.
Pisi, defile of, ii. 36.
Plater, Rev. Mr, i. 8.
Plowden, Mr C., political officer, i.
342; ii. 104, 105.
Pole Carew, Captain,
Coldstream
Guards, aide-de-camp, ii. 152.
Political interference in Afghanistan
deprecated, ii. 23.
Pollock, Sir George, force of, ii. 69, 96.
Polosi, ii. 175.
Pomazai, ii. 253.
Poona, ii. 395.
Portnellan, i. 3.
•
Pottinger and Christie in Baluchistan,
ii. 33.
Povindas, burial-place of, i. 341.
Pratt, Major, 5th Panjab Native In-
fantry, ii. 125.
Pretyman, Captain, Royal Artillery,
aide-de-camp, ii. 105.
Prideaux, Lieutenant, i. 256, 294 et seq.
Primrose, Major-General, ii. 255, 256,
259.
Prize-money at Kabal, ii. 142.
Probyn, Sir D. M., V.C., i. 100, 129, 143.
Probyn's Horse, i. 129.
Promotions, Lieutenant, i. 70-Cap-
tain, 317-Major, 319-Lieutenant-
Colonel, 321-Colonel, ii. 89, 418-
Major-General, local, 293-substan-
tive, 390, 418.
Pugh, the Rev. H. B., i. 10.
Pul (a bridge), Pul-i-Chasma, ii. 93.
Pul-i-Khatun, ii. 366.
Pul-i-Khishti, ii. 200.
Quartermaster - General, appointment
as, ii. 292.
Quartermaster-General's Department,
i. 217.
Quat Mandai, ii. 271, 277.
Queen, her Majesty the, ii. 293-mes-
sage from, i. 308-telegram from, ii.
169, 260-speech in Parliament by, i.
123-letter from, to King Theodore,
i. 256 et seq.
Quetta, ii. 56, 66, 261, 264 et seq., 371.
Rabat, ii. 253 et seq.
Rajanpur, ii. 57.
Rajputana, ii. 364.
Rangun, i. 18; ii. 300.
Raniganj, camp at, i. 127.
Rapti river, i. 103, 109.
Rassam, Mr, i. 256 et seq., 294 et seq.
Ravi river, ii. 56.
Rawal Pindi, i. 196 et seq., 366 et seq.
Rawlinson, Sir Henry, ii. 52.
Reconnaissance in Oudh, i. 92; from
Datma to Chirang, 243; of Baluch-
istan, ii. 37; of Magdala, i. 286.
Recovery of Windham's guns by Colonel
MacGregor, ii. 161.
Redmund, Major, wounded, i. 23.
Reduction of staff, ii. 204.
Refuge towers in Persia, ii. 8, 20.
Reid, Brigadier-General, i. 34.
Release of Abyssinian prisoners, project
for, i. 308.
Relief of scarcity in Bengal, i. 349 et seq.
Remarkable cliff, ii. 286.
Reorganisation of north-west frontier,
i. 360 et seq.
Report on Bhutan, military, i. 252.
on Kabal massacres, ii. 149, 150.
Resht, ii. 20.
Residency at Lucknow, the, i. 72, 74,
Richardson, Colonel, i. 245 et seq.
Ridgeway, Sir J. W., ii. 335.
Rifle Brigade officers, i. 71.
Ripon, Lord, ii. 198, 263, 328, 338,
359, 360, 365.
Road Commandant on Khaibar line, ii.
76.
INDEX.
78.
Revolt of the sepoys, i. 13.
Reward for distinguished and meritori- St Vincent, Lord, ii. 264.
ous service, ii. 328.
Sajji Kach, ii. 289.
Rewari, i. 57.
Rob Roy, lineal descent from, i. 6.
Roberts, General Sir Frederick S., i.
347; ii. 2, 66, 99, 106, 214, 299,
317 et seq., 391.
Robertson, Mrs, escape of, from Hissar,
i. 43.
Rohilkand, i. 65.
Rohtak, District of, i. 57.
Rojhan, i. 332; ii. 57.
Rokian, ii. 91.
Roorkee, i. 191.
Rose, Sir Hugh (Lord Strathnairn), i.
167.
Russia's approaches to India, ii. 338.
Russo-Afghan boundary, ii. 338.
dispute, ii. 368.
K
435
Safed Sang (near Zahidabad), ii. 121
et seq.
seq.
Russo-Persian boundary, ii. 52.
Russo-Turkish war, ii. 40, 53.
Rustchuk, ii. 29.
Rustem, ii. 9.
Sahawar, i. 66,
Saiddabad, ii. 195.
'St James's Gazette,' the, ii. 358.
St John, Colonel, at Maiwand, ii. 230,
338.
Sabzawar, ii. 6 et seq.
Saddles, i. 174, 185, 211.
Safed Kuh range, ii. 91 et seq.
Safed Sang, ii. 84 et seq.
Ross, Brigadier-General C. C. G., ii.
189, 192.
Colonel, at Bushire, ii. 3.
Lieutenant-Colonel, 14th Bengal
Cavalry, ii. 103, 110, 189, 192.
Rostof, ii. 21.
Screw guns, jointed or, ii. 189.
Rotas, ruined fort at, i. 196.
Rowcroft, Lieutenant-Colonel F. F., Seaton, Sir Thomas, Brigadier-General,
4th Ghurkhas, ii. 196, 291.
Rozabad, ii. 174.
i. 98.
Second Afghan War, the, ii. 66, 87, 98.
Russian spy, Colonel MacGregor treat- Second in command of Hodson's Horse,
ed as a, ii. 10.
i. 169—supersession of, 197, 198.
Segi, ii. 263.
met with, ii. 20.
Seh Baba, ii. 173.
St Paul's Cathedral, ii. 391, 406.
Salisbury, Lord, ii. 11, 28, 40, 361.
Samarkand, ii. 327.
Samson, Mount, i. 136.
San Stefano, Treaty of, ii. 63.
Sandeman, Sir Robert, Colonel, i. 331
et seq.; ii. 37, 317.
Sandhurst, Lord (General Mansfield),
i. 317.
Sandhurst, Royal Military College at,
medals for reconnaissance prizes, ii.
395.
Sanford, Colonel G. E. L. S., Royal
Engineers, ii. 305, 306.
Sang Toda, ii. 177.
Sangi-Dakhtar, ii. 10.
Sang-i-Nawishta Pass, the, ii. 124.
Sang-ko-lin-sin, Chinese Commander
in-Chief, i. 158.
Sarakhs, ii. 13, 14, 15, 327, 345.
Sarakhula, the pass of, ii. 266.
Sardars, ii. 207.
Sarel, Colonel, 17th Lancers, i. 97, 197.
Sarhad, mountainous tract, ii. 33.
Sarozai, ii. 104.
Russo-Indian question, ii. 14, 335 et Sellar, Corporal, ii. 163.
Sembhar Pass, the, ii. 280.
Senafé, i. 259, 265.
Seringapatam, i. 7.
Sarshela, ii. 35.
Saunders, Captain, 41st Native Infan-
try, i. 68, 69.
Sekrora, camp at, i. 101.
Selassie, i. 280 et seq.
Seventh Dragoon Guards, i. 188 et seq.
Shafts, Captain, Commissary of Ord-
nance, ii. 100, 137.
Shah Godar, ii. 35.
Jehan, monuments of, ii. 365.
Shahbaz, ii. 32.
Shahrud, ii. 20.
436
Shalez, skirmish at, ii. 195.
Shalwar Kuh, ii. 20.
Sham Plain, the, i. 334.
Shandak, ii. 35.
Shantung, i. 134.
Sharigh, ii. 269.
Shasgao, ii. 243.
Shaw, Adjutant of 57th Native Infan-
try, i. 21-Mrs Shaw, rescue of, 46.
Shekabad, ii. 153, 189.
P
Sortie of Deh Khwaja, ii. 249.
South Afghanistan, ii. 87.
Sowars, combat with, i, 47.
Sowerby, Rev. J., i. 8.
Shela of the Helmand, ii. 35.
Sher Ali, ii. 12 et seq., 52 et seq., 62, Spear as a weapon, the, i. 183.
76.
Spin Tangi, ii. 273.
Spingawai Kotal, ii. 75.
Spragge, ii. 177.
Spry, Dr, i. 230.
.
INDEX.
Dahan, ii. 244.
Darwaza, ii. 179.
Kote, ii. 104.
Shah, i. 196; ii. 56.
Sherpur, ii. 127, 129 et seq., 143 et seq.
Sherston, Lieutenant, Rifle Brigade,
ii. 152, 159.
Shikarpur gate of Kandahar, ii. 256.
Shilozan, cantonment at, ii. 105.
Shinak, the, ii. 105.
Shiniz, the river and valley, ii. 243.
Shinkai Kotal, ii. 118.
Shiraz, ii. 3.
Showers, Brigadier-General, i. 57.
Shudumna tower, ii. 77.
Shutargardan Pass, the, ii. 91, 113,
117, 137.
Siah-Sang, ii. 94 et seq., 127, 129 et
seq., 143.
Sialkot, i. 20.
Sibi, ii. 265 et seq.,
275.
Sidli Dwars, the, i. 218.
Sikandra Bagh, the, i. 74.
Rao, i. 190.
Sikaram Peak, ii. 109.
Sikhs against Tartars, i. 144.
Sikkim, i. 219.
Simla, i. 185, 200; ii. 294 et seq., 370,
395.
Assistant Quartermaster-General, ii.
159.
Smith, Major Euan, ii. 197, 220.
Smyth-Windham, Major, Royal Artil-
lery, loss of guns by, ii. 161.
Somerset, Lieutenant, aide-de-camp,
ii. 259.
Sind frontier, i. 332; ii. 36.
Sinho, battle of, i. 141 et seq., wounds
at, 145.
Stanton, Captain, Royal Engineers, i.
351.
Star of India, Order of the, ii. 23.
'Statesman,' the, newspaper, ii. 31, 46
et seq.
Staveley, General Sir Charles, i. 133,
150, 258 et seq.
Steel gauntlets, i. 103.
Stephens, Condie, on the Hari-rud, ii.
334.
Stephenson, General Sir Frederick, ii.
392.
Stern, Mr, at Magdala, i. 296.
Stewart, Colonel C. E., ii. 320, 323,
350.
Sir Donald, Commander - in -
Chief in India, ii. 66, 188, 189, 195,
197, 229, 319 et seq., 359.
Stirling, Major-General W., Royal Ar-
tillery, his guns saved at Sinho, i.
144 et seq.
Stolietoff, General, ii. 64.
Strathnairn, Lord, i. 171, 319.
Straton, Captain, 22d Foot, killed at
Kandahar, ii. 257.
Stronachlachar, ii. 393.
Sultan Aziz, ii. 140.
Jan, ii. 17.
Superintendent of Communications,
Khaibar line, ii. 76.
Sipcha, i. 229.
Sir William Peel, hospital - ship, i. Supersession of seconds in command,
i. 198 et seq.
150.
Sirufza, ii. 246.
Sistan, ii. 52.
Sitsobi, villages destroyed, ii. 78.
Surkh Kotal, ii. 159.
Sixty-eighth Native Infantry, ex- Surkhab, ii. 91 et seq.
change into, i. 201.
Surkhpul, ii. 91.
Skobeleff, General, ii. 364.
Slagg, M.P., Mr, ii. 361.
Smalley, Lieutenant, killed at Sitapur,
i. 72.
Smith, Lieutenant Manners, Deputy-
Suppression of "The Defence of India,'
ii. 360.
Sutton, Brigadier-General, i. 133, 138.
Swat, Akhun of, i. 201.
Swatis, i. 194.
Swinley, Major G., Royal Artillery, ii.
104, 125, 184.
•
.
Sword, as a weapon, the, i. 209-a
Wilkinson, 171, 181-his brother's,
69.
Sword-cuts, wounds from, at Bahram
Ghat, i. 92-at Sinho, i. 145.
Sylhet, i. 239.
Tabbas, ii. 4, 5 et seq.
Tabriz, ii. 20.
Tagao, ii. 177.
Taj Mahal, the, ii. 365.
Mahamad, ii. 159.
Takhtipul, ii. 261.
INDEX.
182.
Taku Forts, the, i. 122, 149.
Talanta, plateau of, i. 257, 272.
Talienwan Bay, i. 133.
Tangi Wardak, ii. 153, 154, 241.
Tangkow, i. 141.
Tank, i. 341.
Tankh-i-Zorati, ii. 33.
Tarnak, river and valley, march along
the, ii. 251.
Tartar Cavalry, charge of, i. 145, 152.
Tash, ii. 20.
Tashkend, ii. 215.
Taylor, Reynell, Colonel, i. 87.
Tazagong, i. 234.
Tazinan, range of, ii. 36.
Teheran, ii. 3, 20.
Tej Sinh, i. 67.
Tekke-Turkomans, ii. 11.
Temple, Sir Richard, Lieutenant-Gov-
ernor of Bengal, i. 338, 349 et seq.,
362.
Takht-i-Shah, ridge of the, ii. 94, 162, Trebizond, ii. 29.
Tenth Bengal Cavalry, or Hodson's
Horse, i. 169, 182.
Terek Diwan Kul, the, ii. 327, 345.
Tezin, ii. 83 et seq., 183.
Thal in Baluchistan, ii. 33 (281, Peshin).
Thal (Kuram), ii. 66, 75, 104.
Thanah (police station), i. 219.
Theatre of war in Armenia, ii. 31, 46
et seq.
Theebaw, King of Burmah, ii. 300.
Thesiger, Colonel (Lord Chelmsford),
Tigris, river, ii. 30.
Tira, ii. 218.
Tirandaz, ii. 252.
i. 295.
Thibet, i. 219.
Thomas, Mr J. S., Bursar of Marlbor-
ough College, i. 10.
Thomson, Captain, of Invalids, i. 201.
of Commissariat Department, es-
cape of Captain, i. 157.
Thruston, Lieutenant, ii. 219.
Tientsin, i. 121, 150.
Tiflis, ii. 21.
Tigre, Kassa, ruler of, i. 266, 307.
Tirhut, famine in, i. 349 et seq.
Tista, river, i. 223.
Toba, ii. 290.
Tombs, Colonel Sir Henry, Royal Artil-
lery, V.C., i. 191.
Tongsu, i. 245.
Tongsu Penlow, the, i. 216, 243 et
scq.
Towers of refuge, ii. 8, 19, 20.
Transport Department, ii. 76, 111.
Trevor, Colonel W. S., V.C., Royal
Engineers, ii. 339.
Trotter, Major, i. 327.
Troup, Brigadier-General, i. 100.
Tulsipur, i. 102 et seq.
Tulwar, i. 103.
Tun, ii. 6.
437
Tungchow, i. 156 et seq.
Turai, ii. 105.
Turi, ii. 109.
Turkish garrisons, ii. 30, 31.
Turkistan, ii. 327.
boundaries, ii. 53.
Turkoman prisoners, ii. 6.
rencontre with, ii. 11.
Tutam Dara, ii. 226.
"
Tweedie, Lieutenant-Colonel, ii. 184.
Tytler, Brigadier - General, i. 237 ct
scq.; ii. 78.
Udaipur, ii. 365.
Ultimatum to Pekin, i. 135-to Theo-
dore, 261; to Sher Ali, ii. 66.
Umballa, i. 19, 20, 192. Ambela, i.
194, 317, 318.
Unas in Oudh, i. 70.
United Service Institution of India, i.
329; ii. 395-portrait of Sir Charles
in, 397, 405.
Urquhart, Lieutenant, Royal Engi-
neers, killed at Diwangiri, i. 235.
Uzanada, on the Caspian, ii. 323.
Van Cortlandt, General, i. 33.
Vaughan, Mr, ii. 226.
Vernon, Fred., i. 9.
Viceroys of India: Canning, i. 22-
Dufferin, ii. 365-Elgin, i. 121
Lawrence, i. 91-Lytton, ii. 27-
Mayo, i. 319-Northbrook, i. 347.
Victoria Bay, i. 135.
Victoria Cross, i. 75, 92, 93, 94, 105;
ii. 163, 170.
Vidor, i. 339.
Gadg
438
Viva MacGregor (Geneviève Muriel),
ii. 153, 176, 308, 314, 385.
Volcanoes, mud, ii. 32.
Von Kaufmann, General, ii. 64.
Vousden, Captain W. J., V.C., ii..
171.
Vyse, Lieutenant (Carabineers), killed,
i. 62.
Wade, Mr, in China, i. 156.
Wagsham Gobize, the, i. 262.
Walcott, Lieutenant, 57th Native In-
fantry, i. 23.
Wali Mahamad, ii. 139, 147.
Walidad, the rebel chief, i. 60.
Walker, Lieutenant-Colonel, escape of,
in China, i. 158.
Wallis, Dr, i. 146.
INDEX.
Walpole, Brigadier-General, i. 72.
Walter, Lieutenant, Royal Artillery,
P
Wheeler, General Sir Hugh, i. 49.
White, Major, ii. 125, 180, 184.
killed by explosion, i. 227.
War, the Afghan, ii. 66, 75.
Wardak, ii. 181, 213.
Warde, Lieutenant, i. 102.
Wardlaw, Lieutenant, killed at Kas- Yezd, ii. 4.
ganj, i. 61, 62.
Watch-towers in Sind, i. 333.
Waterhouse, Captain, i. 326.
Watson, General Archibald, i. 7.
Lieutenant, V.C., i. 100.
Wazir Bagh, the, ii. 207.
Shah, ii. 120.
Wazirabad, ii. 158.
Wazirganj, action at, i. 101, 120.
Waziris, raids of, i. 322.
Wethered, Dr, i. 102.
Wilkinson, sword by, i. 171, 181.
Williams, Lieutenant Colonel,
Panjab Cavalry, ii. 163.
-
Willoughby, Lieutenant, at Delhi, i.
34.
Wilson, Sir Archdale, i. 56.
Wollaston, Mr A. V., C.B., 'Baluch-
istan,' edited by, ii. 39.
Wolseley, Viscount, i. 133, 139.
Womberat hills, the, i. 271.
Wood, Sir Charles, i. 201.
Sir Evelyn, i. 12.
Wordsworth, Bishop, i. 8.
Wyllie, Captain Curzon, political offi-
cer, ii. 264.
Yahiya Khan, ii. 120, 133, 135, 156.
Yakub Khan, the Amir, ii. 17, 52, 80,
151, 152, 155, 209.
Yakubzai, ii. 144.
Yaman Airakti Bay, ii. 354.
Yar Mahamad, i. 117; ii. 17.
Michund Khan, ii. 19.
Yarghati, ii. 246.
Yate, Major, ii. 8, 35.
Yellow House at Lucknow, capture of
the, i. 75, 77, 78.
5th
Yezdan, towers at, ii. 8.
Yuen-ming-yuen, Summer Palace of,
Wilkins, Colonel, Royal Engineers, i. Zelenoy, General, ii. 366.
258.
i. 160 et seq.
Yungtsin, i. 161.
Yusafzai, ii. 114.
Zahidabad, ii. 121, 239.
Zakaria Khan, ii. 132 et scq.
Zakha Khels, ii. 77, 112.
Zamburak Pass, ii. 242.
Zamindawar, ii. 253.
Zargum Khel, ii. 109.
Zargunshahar, ii. 119, 159, 240.
Ziarat (a graveyard), ii. 92 et seq., 182.
Zirreh, depression of, ii. 33, 35.
Zulfikar Pass, the, ii. 370.
Zulla, i. 259, 264 et seq.
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