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65 7, 9
.N. Tº
LIFE AND TIME S
OF
F. R A N C E S C O S F O R. Z. A
PRINTED BY will IAM BLAckwood AND sons, EDINBURGH.
LIFE AND TIME S
OF
F R A N C E S CO SFOR Z. A
D U K E O F M I L A N
WITH A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE
HISTORY OF ITALY
BY
WM, POLLARD URQUHART, ESQ.
W O L. II.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
ED IN BL R G H AND LONDON
MD CCC LII
:
:
ll - 2, 3- 3 &
3 3 os 7
CONTENTS OF WOL. II.
BOOK FIFTH.
FROM THE DEATH OF FILIPPO MARIA WISCONTI TILL THE ACCESSION OF
FRANCESCO SFORZA TO THE DUKEDOM OF MILAN, 1447-1450.
CHAPTER I.
Page
Position and plans of Francesco Sforza—Negotiations with the Parmese
—Receives intelligence of what is going on at Milan.—Views of the
different parties in that city.—Conduct of the Braccians—Establish-
ment of a republic.—Revolt of most of the cities of Lombardy from
the Milanese.—Lodi and Piacenza surrender to the Venetians.—
Sforza is engaged by the Milanese—Advances to Cremona—Lays
siege to San Columbano.—Pavia surrenders to him—Anger of the
Milanese—Their difficulties—Approach of a French army.—Sforza’s
advice to the Milanese—Message to the French commander—In-
vests Piacenza—Constructs a bridge across the Po—Takes a Vene-
tian spy, who afterwards supplies him with information—Defeats an
attempt of the Venetians to destroy the bridge of Cremona.-Affair
between the Milanese and French—Storming of Piacenza—Surren-
der of the citadel—Pillage of the inhabitants, . e • 3
CIH. A. PTER II.
Invasion of Tuscany by Alphonso—Forced to retire after two cam-
paigns.—Piacenza continues to be pillaged.—Position of the Vene-
tians,—Intrigues against Sforza at Milan—His successes in the field.
—Venetians attack the bridge of Cremona—Heroic conduct of
Bianca Maria.-Sforza holds a council of war—Is at first prevented
by the Milanese government from marching to Cremona, but after-
wards receives permission to act as he pleases.—Difficulties with the
Piccinini—Sforza's address to his generals at Casale.—Destruction
of the Venetian fleet.—Great avidity of the soldiers for plunder.—
Sforza raises the siege of Casale.—Orders of the Milanese govern-
ment.—Sforza invests Caravaggio.—Indecisive action with the Vene-
tians—Position of the two armies near Caravaggio—And views of
vi CONTENTS.
Page
the respective generals.--Council of war in the camp of the Vene-
tians—They decide on attacking Sforza—Are repulsed in great con-
fusion—Their own camp is taken—All their stores and accoutre-
ments, and a great number of prisoners, fall into the hands of the
enemy, tº * g g e * * g 39
CHAPTER, III.
Effects produced by the victory at Milan.—Council of war in the Mila-
nese camp.–Sforza marches against Brescia.—Double-dealings of
the Milanese.—Sforza remonstrates in vain—Passes over to the
Venetians.—Explanations and recriminations, . e tº 69
CHAPTER IV.
Sforza deserted by some of his officers—Is put in possession of Pia-
cenza—Joined by some friends from Milan—Takes castles in the
immediate neighbourhood of Milan.-Milanese sent to remonstrate
with him.—He protects their ambassadors from his soldiers.—
Sends a friend with them to Milan.—Violent speech of Giorgio
Lampugnano.—Charles Gonzaga the head of the republic.—Ab-
biate saved from pillage by Bianca Maria.--Sforza cuts off the water
from Milan.—Piccinino carries off cattle from Pavia.-A Florentine
ambassador remains in Sforza's camp. —Affairs of Parma.-Sforza is
joined by Piccinino.—Several Milanese nobles banished or executed.
—Mobocracy at Milan.—Affairs of Parma.-Parmese offer their city
to Lionel of Este.—Venetians arrange that it should be given to
Sforza, G e # g † te © tº 86
CHAPTER V.
Close blockade of Milan.—Negotiations of the Milanese with the duke
of Savoy.—Sforza lays siege to Monza—Is foiled by Piccinino's
treachery.—Venetians lay siege to Crema.—Proceedings of the
Savoyards.—Sforza remonstrates with the duke of Savoy’s father.—
War on the banks of the Sessia.-The two Piccinini pass over to the
Milanese.—They proceed to relieve Crema.-Melegnano surrenders
to them, but is retaken by Sforza-Route of the Savoyards.-Arrest
of William of Montferrat.—Siege and capture of Vigevano.—Sforza
defeats an attack made against him in the vicinity of Parma, . 113
CHAP TER VI.
Election of magistrates at Milan.—Negotiations between the Milanese
and Venetians.—Charles Gonzaga joins Sforza.-Negotiations for the
surrender of Lodi and Crema.-Interview of Venetian ambassadors
with Sforza.-Sforza's attempts to take Milan—Frustrated by Barto-
lomeo Collio and the Venetians.—Terms proposed by the Vene-
CONTENTS. vii
Page
tians.—Sforza deceives both Milanese and Venetians by consenting
to a truce.—Alexander Sforza compelled to sign a treaty at Venice,
by which Francesco does not consider himself bound, . © 144
CHAPTER VII.
Debates and measures of the Florentines.—Death of Francesco Picci-
mino.—Sforza makes terms with the duke of Savoy.—Further
acquisitions around Milan.—Skirmishes near Bivio—Defeat of Jacobo
Piccinino–Skirmishes around the lake of Como.—Defeat of a body
of Sfortian cavalry.—Unsuccessful attempt against Monza-Dis-
tresses and critical situation of Sforza's army.—Privations and suf-
ferings of the Milanese.—Tumults in the city—Wain attempt of the
government to appease them.—Mob take possession of the palace
and gates—Send to tendertheir submission to Sforza—His triumphal
entry.—Festivals attending his coronation, d & º 159
B O O K SIXTH.
FROM THE ACCESSION OF SFORZA To THE PEACE OF LODI, 1450-1454.
CEIAPTER I.
Rebuilding of the fortress at Milan.—William of Montferrat liberated—
Joins Sforza's enemies—Charles Gonzaga leaves Sforza's service.—
Plague at Milan.—Coalition formed by the Venetians against Sforza.
—Sforza is joined by the Florentines and the Marquis of Mantua.--
Visit of the Emperor Frederic III. to Italy—Who is crowned at
Rome, and refuses to acknowledge Sforza.—Recommencement of
hostilities.—Manoeuvres of both parties.—Sforza's challenge, and
reply of the Venetians.—Venetians retire without fighting.—Inde-
cisive campaign in Tuscany.—Arrangement of Sforza with Cosmo de'
Medici for continuing the war.—King of France promises to send
Réné of Anjou to their assistance.—Campaign in Lombardy and Tus-
cany.—Conspiracy of Porcari at Rome, . * g g 195
CHAPTER II.
Constantinople taken by the Turks—Its effects in Italy.—Wain efforts
of the pope to make peace.—Arrival of Réné of Anjou in Italy.—He
joins Sforza near Brescia.-Council of war.—Sforza's speech.-Dis-
pute between French and Italians at Ponteviso.-Retreat of Picci-
nino.—Bianca Maria visits her husband in the camp.–Sforza forced
by the severity of the weather to desist from active operations.—
Réné retires to France.—All parties tired of the war.—Extravagance
viii CONTENTS.
- Page
of their mutual demands.-Peace of Lodi.-Sforza compels the duke
of Savoy and the marquis of Montferrat to relinquish all the towns
that had belonged to Filippo Maria, te tº te * 222
B O O K. SEW E N TH.
FROM THE PEACE of LoDI To THE ACQUISITION OF GENOA By
FRANCESCO SFORZA, 1454-1464.
CHAPTER. I.
Alphonso signs the peace of Lodi.-Italian alliance.—Friendship of
Alphonso and Sforza.-Death of Pope Nicholas.-Jacobo Piccinino
attacks the Siennese—Is reduced to the greatest extremities in Tus-
cany—Enters Alphonso's service.—Violent tempests, and earth-
quakes.—Attack upon the Genoese by Alphonso. —Pietro Fregoso
makes over the city to the French.-John of Anjou arrives there.—
Preparations of Alphonso—His death.-Disputed succession to the
kingdom of Naples.—Sforza supports Ferdinand.—Death of Callix-
tus.-Election of Æneas Silvius under the title of Pius the Second.
—Piccinino invades the territories of the Church—Is forced to desist
in consequence of a timely admonition from Sforza.-Ferdinand
crowned by the pope.—Congress of Mantua.-Galeazzo Maria sent
to meet pope Pius at Florence—His reception there.—Proceedings
of the Congress, . & e ſe g e e 247
CHAPTER II.
Ferdinand's unpopularity with his own subjects—They make overtures
to John of Anjou.-Wain efforts of John to secure Sforza's assist-
ance,—Pietro Fregoso attacks Genoa-Fails.-Preparations of John
of Anjou against Naples.—Fregoso again attacks Genoa-Is killed.—
Departure of the duke of Anjou for Naples—His successes.—Ferdi-
nand appeals to the members of the Italian alliance.—Answer of the
Venetians.—Correspondence between Cosmo de' Medici and Sforza.
—Piccinino enters the service of the Angevins.—Complete defeat of
Ferdinand near the Sarno.—Heroism of queen Isabella.—Retreat of
Alexander Sforza after the battle of San Fabiano.—Ferdinand, hav-
ing received fresh supplies from Sforza, regains much of the ground
he had lost, tº e * > * º ſº © 269
C HAIPTER III.
Disturbances at Genoa-French driven into the citadel—Contentions
between the Adorni and Fregosi–Allayed by the mediation of the
CONTENTS. IX
Page
citizens.—Genoese receive assistance from Sforza.—Expedition sent
from France against Genoa under Réné of Anjou-Total destruction
of the French army by the Genoese.—Louis Fregoso made doge.—
Death of Charles IX.-Succession of Louis XI.-His reception of
Sforza’s ambassador.—War in the territory of Naples.—Ferdinand
is joined by Scanderbeg.—Illness of Sforza.-Efforts of the king of
France, and of Bianca Maria, to make him change his policy.—Re-
volt and subjugation of the Piacenzans,—Imprisonment and death
of Tiberto Brandolino.—Defeat of Piccinino near Troia.-Losses of
Sigismund Malatesta, e e © ſº ſe tº 289
CHAPTER IV.
Effects of the battle of Troia.-Sforza persuades many of the Neapolitan
barons to submit to Ferdinand.—Piccinino leaves the Angevin
party.—Ruin of Sigismund Malatesta.—Death of the prince of Ta-
rento.—Discontent of the Genoese.—Negotiations between Sforza
and the king of France.—Sforza's measures to take possession of
Genoa.--Surrender of the city and garrison to him.–Genoese send
ambassadors to put Sforza in possession of the city—Their recep-
tion—Speeches on the occasion.—Archbishop Paulo Tregoso turns
pirate, but his ships are taken by the Genoese.—John of Anjou
returns to France, 307
B O O K. EIGHT H.
CON CLUSION.
Position of Sforza.-State of affairs at Florence.—Proceedings of Lucas
Pitti...—Death and character of Cosmo de' Medici.—Pope Pius endea-
vours to assemble an expedition against the Turks at Ancona—His
disappointment, and death.--Tyranny of Ferdinand.—Piccinino goes
to Milan and is married to Drusiana—His reception there—Departs
for Naples—Is thrown into prison, and murdered.—Suspicions con-
cerning Sforza.-Opinions of historians.—Galeazzo takes the com-
mand of an expedition against the rebellious nobles of France—His
success.-Death of Francesco Sforza.-Conduct of Bianca Maria.--
Remarks on Sforza's character, . e e e o 327
B O O K FIFT H .
.*
FROM THE DEATH OF FILIPPO MARIA VISCONTI, TILL THE
ACCESSION OF FRANCESCO SFORZA TO THE DUKEDOM OF
MILAN, 1447-1450.
LIFE AND TIME S
OF
F R A N C E S () () S F () R Z A.
B O O K FIFT H.
FROM THE DEATH OF FILIPPO MARIA WISCONTI TILL THE ACCESSION
OF FRANCESCO SFORZA TO THE DUKEDOM OF MILAN, 1447-1450.
0 H A PTE R I.
POSITION AND PLANS OF FRANCESCO SFORZA—NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PAR-
MESE—RECEIVES INTELLIGENCE OF WHAT IS GOING ON AT MILAN.—VIEWS
OF THE DIFFERENT PARTIES IN THAT CITY..—CoMDUCT OF THE BRACCLANS—
ESTABLISHMENT OF A REPUBLIC.—REVOLT OF MOST OF THE CITIES OF LOM-
BARDY FROM THE MILANESE.-LODI AND PLACENZA SURRENDER TO THE
VENETIANS.—SFORZA IS ENGAGED BY THE MILANESE—ADVANCES TO CRE-
MONA—LAYS SIEGE TO SAN CoIUMBANo.—PAVIA SURRENDERS TO HIM—
ANGER OF THE MILANESE—THEIR DIFFICULTIES-APPROACH OF A FRENCH
ARMY. —SFORZA's ADVICE TO THE MILANESE—MESSAGE TO THE FRENCH
COMMANDER—INVESTS PIACENZA-CONSTRUCTS A BRIDGE ACROSS THE PO—
TAKES AVENETIAN SPY, who AFTERWARDS SUPPLIES HIM WITH INFORMATION
—DEFEATS AN ATTEMPT OF THE WENETIANS TO DESTROY THE BRIDGE OF
CREMONA.—AFFAIR BETWEEN THE MILANESE AND FRENCEI—STORMING OF
PIACENZA-SURRENDER OF THE CITADEL–PILLAGE OF THE INHABITANTS.
THE death of Philip, following so closely upon that of
Eugenius, seemed likely to be the beginning of a new
epoch in the history of Italy. During the twenty-two
4 POSITION AND Book V.
years that had elapsed since Sforza had taken the com-
mand of his father's troops, the peninsula had presented
a strange spectacle. Wars had been undertaken with-
out motive, pursued without vigour, abandoned without
any advantage being secured by peace. Alliances had
been a thousand times contracted, broken, renewed, and
again violated. Treachery had become the moral of the
day. Though the military art was no longer ennobled
by the desire of saving one's country, every day beheld
new captains elevated to independent positions, treating
with princes on terms of equality, and not unfrequently
ending their career on the scaffold.* This state of
things, to which the tortuous policy of Filippo Maria had
in part given rise, had assumed a more decided appear-
ance after the accession of Eugenius. It may be recol-
lected that one of the first acts of the latter was to
unite the republics of Florence and Venice in a coalition
against Philip, which had been continued in various
phases till the time of his death. But there was no
one now on the throne of the Wisconti, and the succes-
sor of Eugenius was a man of peace. Even had he been
otherwise inclined, the great object for which the former
pontiff had fought—the restoration to the church of the
territories of Ancona—had been accomplished. A new
scene was thus opened to one who proved himself the
most skilful of adventurers. And in forming a judgment
of the means by which he managed to place himself
on the throne of the Visconti, it must be recollected
that he lived in an age in which Machiavelli says that
* M. SISMONDI, vol. v. cap. 4.
CHAP. I. PLANS OF SFORZA. 5
in it men were more ashamed of losing in any manner,
than of gaining by deceit.
After his marriage with the daughter of Philip, the
tide of his affairs had begun to go out. Though it
might now appear to be about to take a turn, it was at
this instant at a very low ebb. He had lost all the
Neapolitan fiefs that had been left to him by his father.
He had just relinquished the city of Jesi, the only spot
that remained to him of the extensive territory which
he had once possessed in the March of Ancona. The
town of Cremona, which had been given to him with
his wife, was now surrounded by his enemies. Though
he was at the head of an army, he had no money; the
man who had promised to supply him was dead; and if
the Milanese were to take this opportunity of regaining
their liberty, they could hardly be expected to fulfil
the pecuniary engagements of their duke. The Vene-
tians were much exasperated at his recent conduct ;
and it seemed not unlikely that ere long they would be
in possession of all Lombardy. Though he had a
friend in Cosmo de' Medici, and though the Floren-
tines themselves were as well disposed towards him as
they could be to any of his trade, their alliance with
the Venetians would prevent them from openly assist-
ing him. Now that Philip was dead, he could expect
nothing more from his old enemy Alphonso. However,
in the words of Machiavelli, he determined to face his
fortune, and let his course be guided by accidents,
being well aware that many plans present themselves
to a man engaged in active operations, which are not
6 HALTS AT PARMA. BOOK W.
seen by him while he remains inert. He therefore
made up his mind to proceed to Lombardy, to try
there how men were disposed to receive him ; and he
set forth on this, which may be termed the second trial
of his fortunes, from Cotignola, the place whence, about
Seventy years ago, his father first started to embrace
the possession of arms. Though Bianca Maria was
much distressed at the loss of her parent, she accom-
panied him in all these movements.
On the fourth day of his march northward he halted
in the vicinity of Parma, which had long since fallen
under the rule of the Visconti, and in which city he
knew he had a considerable party. From this place he
sent to inform the Milanese of his approach, ordering
his messenger, at the same time, to try the disposi-
tions of the inhabitants of Piacenza, Lodi, and Pavia,
on the way. In the mean time he himself began to
sound the inclinations of the Parmese. While he was
thus engaged, four ambassadors came to him from
the city to inform him that the principal inhabitants
had agreed to establish a republic, and to entreat him
not to menace their liberties. To this he replied, that
the Parmese were among the most attached of his
friends, and that he would do nothing against them ;
but that he would be obliged to them if they would tell
him in what manner they meant to maintain their
independence, while all around them was raging with
war. He assured them that he was halting there
merely for the purpose of reposing his troops, and tha
he would take care that they should abstain from any
CHAP. I. STATE OF MILAN. 7
offence against either the properties or the persons of
the inhabitants.
In the mean time he received intelligence of the
state of affairs at Milan. In that city, as he well
knew, there was one party attached to his cause, and
another, consisting principally of the old friends of
Piccinino, and denominated “ Braccian,” was bitterly
opposed to him. Lionel of Este, and Charles of Or-
leans, the son of the late duke's sister, were talked of
as successors to the duchy; but neither of them appeared
to have many supporters in Milan. There were also
great numbers anxious for the restoration of a republic.
When it became evident that Philip's end was drawing
nigh, all parties fancied that they saw a fair oppor-
tunity for carrying out their views.” The republicans
used all their endeavours to bring the populace to their
side, and they were joined by many who, though they
would not have taken part in an insurrection against
Philip, or perhaps, indeed, against any Wisconti, were
anxious to secure themselves against such acts of tyranny
as had been practised by some of his predecessors.
Others were continually urging the enfeebled duke to
appoint a successor. The partisans of one side repre-
sented to him that Sforza was not qualified, either by
birth or his present position, to succeed to the splendid
heritage of the Visconti; that though he had undoubt-
edly talent, he had not at present either money or allies,
* “Postguam agro corpore fatigabatur, aderatoue finis et spes novae ;
pauci bona libertatis incassum disserere ; plures bellum pavescere, alii cu-
pere; pars multo maxima imminentis dominos variis rumoribus differe-
bant.”—TACITUS, Annals, book i. chap. 4.
8 RUMOURED SUCCESSORS. Book W.
and would be unable to maintain its independence
against the Venetians; that the king of Naples, being
of royal descent, abundantly possessed of all the sinews
of war, and the qualifications of a prince, was in every
way better fitted to be his successor than an upstart
adventurer. By the others it was urged that Alphonso
was a barbarian, and consequently unfit to rule over
Italians ; that Sforza's great talents and popular
manners would in themselves be a bulwark of strength,
and that he would have no difficulty in finding both
men and money for the defence of Milan. Philip, in-
constant to the last, could not make up his mind about
anything, and is said, with his dying breath, to have
expressed a wish that, after his departure from the
land of the living, everything should be involved in
confusion. The Braccian party, however, who, from
their hostility to Sforza, were all in favour of Alphonso,
were determined to take advantage of the presence of
a Neapolitan force, under the command of one Ray-
mond Boilius. They spread a report” that the duke
had in his last moments declared his preference for
Alphonso ; they managed to introduce his general,
along with a body of soldiers, into the citadel, and got
some of his partisans to shout out his name in the
streets. But this trick failed of the desired effect ; the
citizens would not join in the cry ; they—
* Some contemporary historians write as if they entertained no doubt
about the duke's having declared Alphonso his heir. Simoneta and Corio
allude to it as a rumour which they affect to disbelieve. Muratori mentions
it as a report that was believed at the time, and leaves his readers to
judge for themselves. M. Sismondi relates it as it is given in the text.
CHAP. I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A REPUBLIC. 9
“Like dumb statues or breathless stones,
Stared at each other, and looked deadly pale.” “
Fear and trepidation seemed everywhere. The shops
were all shut. For a time everybody was uncertain
what course to take. But it was not long before the
republican party showed themselves sufficiently strong
to assume the direction of affairs, and appointed a pro-
visional government consisting of twenty-four of the
best men of the city. Raymond and his associates,
finding themselves unsupported, and being assured that
Sforza was not to be chosen in place of their king, were
happy to be allowed to evacuate the citadel with a
small quantity of treasure and booty. After their
departure the inhabitants lost no time in levelling
with the ground a building whence any one might
threaten their liberties.
One of the first acts of the provisional government
was to send ambassadors to the Venetians, informing
them of their new constitution, seeking their friendship
and alliance, and entreating them to join them in per-
Suading the places that had been under the dominion of
Philip to remain subject to them. But the other cities of
Lombardy, many of which had ill brooked the destruc-
tion of their independence by the duke, preferred fol-
lowing their example to complying with their request.
A frantic desire of liberty seemed to spread like an
epidemic through all. Some of them placed in the
citadels those on whom they could most depend; others
insisted on seeing those buildings entirely demolished.
* Richard III., Act iii. scene 7.
10 STATE OF LOMBARDY. BOOK W.
The whole of Lombardy became a scene of tumult and
Sedition ; and, as is usual on such occasions, rebels,
exiles, and Vagabonds from all quarters endeavoured to
turn to their own account a movement made by those
who were desirous of improvement. In the words of
Simoneta, all respect for persons, or fear of the Almighty,
seemed to have departed. The inhabitants of Como,
Novara, and Alessandria, alone consented to obey the
Milanese ; those of Lodi joined the Venetians. In
the midst of this confusion, the two sons of Piccinino,
and Charles Gonzaga, the brother of the Signor of
Mantua, all of whom had been in the service of Philip,
brought their forces out of the city, hoping to get some-
thing for themselves in the scramble.
While these things were going on in Milan and the
other cities of Lombardy, Michael Attendolo and the
Venetian army remained in the country adjoining the
town of Cremona. Here they were able to maintain
themselves without difficulty, both on account of the
fertility of the country and the communication which
the Po allowed them to maintain with their metropolis.
They had not since the winter made any attempt on
the town itself; and it is not improbable that, in the
new fusion of parties, they abstained from doing so until
they saw in what relation they were likely to stand
with its owner. Nevertheless, as the place was one of
the principal of the fiefs of Milan, and was important, as
commanding both the passage and the navigation of the
Po, they for some time held themselves ready, should
circumstances require, to take immediate possession of it.
CHAP. I. MOVEMENTS OF THE WENETIANS. 11
At length, however, Michael Attendolo was induced to
relinquish these quarters, by the arrival of an embassy
from the Guelf party,” whom he had in the previous
year expected to put him in possession of Milan, and
who now informed him of the present state of the city,
and urged him to march forward and to seize it. On
the receipt of this intelligence, his first step was to
take possession of San Columbano, a fortress in a
commanding position between Lodi and Pavia. The
inhabitants of the former of these cities voluntarily sur-
rendered to him ; and not long afterwards the Guelf
party at Piacenza, who had for some time past disliked
the yoke of the Milanese, managed to gain the ascen-
dency, and made over the city to Thaddeus of Este, a
general in the service of the Venetians.
For some time the Milanese had hoped that their
independence might be secured by a peace which Pope
Nicholas had, ever since his accession, been attempting
to negotiate. But his endeavours had failed, and the
Venetians, encouraged, as we have seen, by the pro-
mised support of the Guelfs, and the accounts that
they had received of the disunion of the citizens, had
haughtily rejected their offers. They, however, were
now doomed to experience the truth of Machiavelli's
observation, about keeping citizens in disunion, in the
* Though the contentions of the Guelfs and Ghibellines, properly speak-
ing, had long ceased, I find the expression, “Guelf Party,” frequently used
by contemporary historians. Of course, it must be understood as denoting
the party opposed to the rule of the Wisconti, whose ancestors had been
among the chiefs of the Ghibellines.
+ MACHLAVELLI, Discorsi, lib. 3. cap. xxvii.
12 MILANESE ENGAGE SFORZA. Book W.
same manner as Visconti had done when he had hoped
to take advantage of the disorders at Florence. At
their approach the different factions at Milan, instead
of continuing to quarrel, agreed to retain the services
of the most successful general of the day. They had
hitherto, indeed, avoided employing mercenary captains;
for they well knew, and they were destined to expe-
rience, that the most skilful of these generals always
looked to raise themselves, and were not scrupulous
about doing so at the expense of their employers.
Many, too, had witnessed, and others had heard of, the
cruelties perpetrated by the condottieri, who had con-
stituted themselves the guardians of the children of
Gian Galeazzo Visconti. But they knew, on the other
hand, they could derive but little assistance from those
from whose talents they had nothing to dread. Sforza
belonged to the first of these two orders of captains,
and the two Piccinini were then included in the latter.
Having to make up their choice between the two, they
preferred to encounter the distant peril resulting from
the dangerous talents of the former, to the risk of
immediately losing their liberty through the incapa-
city of the latter. They therefore sent to Sforza,
requesting him to act for them in the same manner,
and on the same conditions, as he had promised their
late duke.
Sforza for some time might have entertained expec-
tations that his own party would gain the upper hand
at Milan, and that he might thus appear to have
acquired the ducal crown rather by the free choice of
CHAP. I. HE ADVANCES TO CREMON A. 13
the people, than in right of the somewhat doubtful title
of his wife, or the will of a fickle old man. It must
therefore have been a sore disappointment to him to
find that those whom he had expected to rule were
determined on governing themselves. But, at the pre-
sent moment, he had not the means of maintaining his
own rights; and he well knew that, when a man wishes
to get the rule of a city or state, he cannot forward his
designs better than by commanding an army in their
defence.* After receiving this message, his first step
was to advance to Cremona, where he might join his
own forces with those that had been left by the duke,
and afterwards act as appeared most expedient. When
he started from his position adjoining Parma, the inha-
bitants of that city refused to let him pass through,
but at the same time sent him ambassadors to declare
their willingness to remain the allies of the Milanese.
However much he might have coveted the possession
of the city, he was thus deprived of any pretext of
taking it by force; and as he was not yet in a situa-
tion to act without disguise for himself, he left them
unmolested, and, making a circuit of their walls, passed
on to Cremona. By his timely arrival there he secured
the allegiance of many who had appeared to be waver-
ing. He was first met by Orlando Palavicino, a man
whose fidelity had on several previous occasions ap-
peared more than doubtful, but who now received him
with every mark of friendship, and promised him his
assistance. The Piccinini too, who had been coqueting
* MACHIAVELLI, Principe, cap. xiv.
14 HIS TACTICS BOOK W.
with the various contending parties, seeing what they
could get for themselves, were seized with a most salu-
tary terror at his presence ; and though they had had
the foolhardiness to promise to take Crema and Cre-
mona for the Venetians, he hesitated not to take them
into his service. And the army of the latter, who,
since their victory at Casale, had committed depreda-
tions all through the country without the fear of oppo-
sition, now confined themselves almost entirely within
the precincts of their camp.
In all his preceding campaigns in Lombardy, Sforza
had been fighting the battles of others. He was, there-
fore, more anxious to obtain glory and spoil, the usual
fruit of a victory in those days, than to adhere to a
well-devised plan of operations, so as to secure the
object of his employers. In his wars in the March
of Ancona, he had generally to contend against great
superiority of numbers, and was obliged patiently to
watch the movements of his enemies to take advantage
of any oversight. This may account for the fact that
hitherto, at least, he was more deserving of praise for
his conduct on the field than for any great skill in the
plan of a campaign. But now, though he was nominally
commanding the armies of others, he considered himself
in some measure fighting for himself. We shall hence-
forward behold him exhibiting great skill in selecting the
plan of operations, and great steadiness in adhering to
one that he had once chosen ; never deviating therefrom
under the hopes of gaining an ephemeral advantage ;
never attacking, except for some definite purpose ; and
CHAP. I. AND PLANS. 15
never gaining a victory that he did not turn to the best
possible account.
The cities that commanded the bridges over the Po
and its tributaries, he justly considered as the most im-
portant positions in Lombardy. Their possession would
not only secure him against the approach of any enemy
from the south, but would, as before observed, cut off
one great channel of communication between the Vene-
tian army and their home. It was therefore of the
greatest importance to him to be master of the whole
line of the Po, for effecting which he was able to make
Cremona the basis of his operations. Before setting
about this, however, he advanced to the vicinity of
Lodi, to reconnoitre the position of his enemy, and
shortly afterwards laid siege to San Columbano, which
had so lately fallen into their hands. But here he
received intelligence of events that, to him at least,
were of the greatest consequence. The city of Pavia,
most important from its situation near the junction of
the Ticino and the Po, was nominally subject to, or
allied with, the Milanese ; but a considerable diversity
of opinion existed among the citizens as to who should
be their rulers: they still retained some of their ancient
jealousy of the latter, and there now seemed too much
reason to fear that, following the example of their
neighbours at Piacenza, they would revolt to the Vene-
tians. There were two persons who endeavoured to turn
the state of things to Sforza’s advantage : the first was
one Sceva Curtes, a man of much boldness and ability,
who had formerly been in his service in the March of
16 PAVIA REVOLTS BOOK W.
Ancona ; the other was Agnes Mayna, the mother of
Bianca Maria. The first was not long in furnishing his
former master with the intelligence of what was going
on, and endeavoured to plead his cause with the citi-
zens; while the latter began making offers to Bolog-
nino, the commander of the citadel. This person had
always been attached to the party of Braccio ; but as
they were now without a head, he seemed to have no
objection to make a friend to himself of the opposite
chief. He therefore promised to comply with the
requests of the lady, on the following conditions: first,
that he should be fairly adopted into the party of
Sforza, and be treated as if he had borne with him the
brunt of his fortunes; and, secondly, that he should
receive with the title of count the sovereignty of the
castle of San Angelo, the place where he had been born.
Sforza at first hesitated about taking immediate pos-
session of the city. On the one hand, he was fearful
of incurring the displeasure of the Milanese. On the
other hand, he recollected that there were several other
candidates for it ; that if he made any long delay in
closing with the offers that were now made to him, it
would probably fall into the hands of either the Vene-
tians or the duke of Savoy; and that in either case it
would be a sore thorn in the side of the future possessors
of Lombardy. The Milanese, having received informa-
tion of these offers, sent ambassadors to his camp,
reminding him of his engagements with them, and
representing to him that it should be his object to bring
under their rule all the cities and states that had been
CHAP. I. TO HIM. - I 7
subject to the duke. To this message, Francesco, who
was as well skilled in the arts of diplomacy as in those
of war, replied that for his part he would do all that
lay in his power; that, at the same time, he thought it
proper to inform them that the Pavians, divided among
themselves in most respects, were agreed only in one
thing—that they would not be subject to them, and that
they might very possibly choose a foreigner, or even an
enemy, for their ruler; that it surely was better for
them that Pavia should fall into his hands than into
those of one who might employ it to their injury; that,
besides being important in a military view from its
situation, it contained all the stores and camp equip-
ments that had belonged to Philip, and would afford
him no small assistance in his attempts to deliver them
from their enemies. These answers appeared far from
satisfactory to the ambassadors; but, such as they were,
they promised to report them to the Milanese. And
Sforza, having thus explained and defended his motives,
thought that the present opportunity was not to be lost;
and after the departure of the ambassadors, he received
in his camp a deputation of eight citizens from Pavia,
to treat about the surrender of the city.
In the mean time, his relation and opponent, Michael
Attendolo, was not ignorant of what was going on, and
hoped to divert him from his present enterprise by
bringing him to battle. But it was in vain that he
made many manoeuvres and counter-manoeuvres in his
presence: the possession of a city was now of much
greater importance to Sforza than the gaining a victory;
WOL. II. B
18 CITADEL SURRENDERS, Book V.
and though he seemed fully prepared for any attempt
of the enemy, he refused to be drawn from his position.
The deputation, after having remained with him one
day, returned to Pavia, accompanied by two of his
officers, who were received with great acclamations by
the citizens, and formally put into possession both of the
town and of the territory. But Bolognino, the com-
mandant, refused to deliver the citadel to any one ex-
cept to the count himself. It is not likely that the
latter would, under any circumstances, have allowed any
considerations of the interests of his employers to stand
in the way of his own fortunes; but as he had just con-
cluded a treaty with the garrison of St Columbano, in
which they promised to surrender if within eight days
they were not relieved, he was now able to repair to
Pavia without any detriment to them. His first act,
after his arrival thither, was to go in public to the
cathedral and to return thanks to the Almighty for his
fortune. He then repaired to the citadel, which was
given up to him by Bolognino; and having found there,
besides the military stores, a considerable treasure, he
rewarded the commandant with a handsome present
from the latter. On the following day he was formally
proclaimed sovereign of the town and the surrounding
territory, under the title of count. Like a good captain,
he lost no time in making the best military use of his
new acquisition. He first despatched soldiers to some
of the outlying fortresses in the neighbourhood of the
Milanese and of the territory of the duke of Savoy, and
then sent eight galleys down the river to intercept all
CHAP. I. DISPLEASURE OF THE MILANESE. 19
communication between the Venetian army and the
town of Piacenza. Having thus secured to himself the
possession of this most important place, and taken
measures for the future, he returned to his camp on the
third day after his departure.
The Milanese, though they must have been in some
degree prepared for this step on the part of their.
general, when they heard that he had actually taken it,
could not conceal their indignation. They even went
So far as to send messengers to his camp, saying that
they would make peace on any terms with their avowed
enemies, rather than have their armies managed by men
in whom they could place no reliance. As if to show
that they were in earnest, they despatched an ambassa-
dor to treat with the Venetians. But several events
soon occurred, which made them think better of the
resolutions adopted in a moment of passion. Their
anger had been in some degree appeased by receiving
possession of the castle of San Colombano from their
general. The Venetians refused to treat with them,
except on terms which they deemed it impossible to
accept. Their neighbours, as well as the descendants
of those who had been subjected by Galeazzo or Philip
Wisconti, began to take advantage of their present dis-
tress to make encroachments on their frontiers, or to
assert their independence. Lionel, the son of Nicholas
the marquis of Ferrara, got possession of two castles in
his neighbourhood, and began to threaten Parma. Two
of the minor barons in the neighbourhood of that town
had taken other strong places in the vicinity. The
20 FRENCH ARMY BOOK W.
Genoese had crossed their natural boundary of the
Apennines, and, having taken the fortresses on the
frontiers of Lombardy, were menacing Tortona and
Alessandria. The duke of Savoy also had sent troops
to occupy the latter place as well as Novara, and would
probably have taken Pavia if he had not been antici-
pated by Sforza. The inhabitants of several important
places, allured by his promise of exempting them from
all tribute, had revolted to him. The marquis of Mont-
ferrat began to take measures to recover his position as
an independent sovereign of Italy. They were also
pressed by a more formidable rival, who might, on a
future occasion, bring to bear against them the whole
power of France. The possession of the cities, which
had been given to the king of France in the preceding
year, whetted the appetite of that monarch for extending
his dominions in the country in which he had obtained
a footing; and he now claimed the duchy of Milan for
his nephew, Charles duke of Orleans, the son of Valen-
tina, the sister of Filippo Maria. And his general,
Rinaldo, began to assert his claims with the force which
he had some time before brought to Asti, originally
destined for the assistance of Philip.
This last-mentioned enemy appeared to the Milanese
the most formidable of all. The party that was still
termed Guelf in the cities of Lombardy retained a sort
of traditionary dislike to the supremacy of Milan. They
were all much attached to the French, from their con-
nection with the monarchs of Anjou, who had so long
been the leaders of their party, and they were suffi-
CHAP. I. IN LOMBARDY. 21
ciently strong to afford considerable aid to any of their
enemies. As in any country except Italy the illegiti-
macy of Bianca Maria would have been a fatal barrier
to her claims, those of Charles, according to the laws of
succession, which are usually respected north of the
Alps, would have been the most valid of all the aspi-
rants. The Milanese might, indeed, assert their rights
to self-government, and say that the Visconti had
reigned only with their consent ; but such reasoning
would have weighed but little with the monarch of a
country in which the rights of man had not as yet been
discussed; and though they might affect to despise the
French as barbarians, they feared that they were as
superior in fighting as they were inferior to them in
civilisation. Many of the places between Asti and
Alessandria, either from attachment or fear, had gone
over to them; and several, who dreaded the yoke of a
foreigner, sent to Sforza to beg for assistance. The
Milanese then accosted him in a very different tone from
that in which they addressed him some time before, and
requested him to advise them in their dilemma. To the
former he sent word not to be afraid of the French ; for
that, though they might appear more than men at the first
onset, yet, if they met them with a stout resistance, they
would find them more easily vanquished than women.”
* It is curious how often this remark has been made concerning the Gauls
as well as the French, who now live in the country they formerly occupied.
Caesar, Livy, and Tacitus, frequently advert to this characteristic in the
former ; and Machiavelli (Discorsi, lib. iii. c. 36) endeavours to explain why
it has always been observed in the latter, by ascribing it to great impetuo-
sity, and absence of all discipline. It need hardly be added that the latter
22 SFORZA TREATS WITH THEM. Book W.
The latter he recommended to send what forces they
could into the territory of Alessandria, to defend the
places that still remained faithful to them ; and added,
that he had no doubt but that many of those that had
revolted from them would return to their allegiance in
the winter. He himself sent ambassadors to Rinaldo
of Dresnay, the French general, requesting him to
abstain from making any attempt on the towns that
either belonged to him, or were in any manner under
his protection. He reminded him of the claims he had
on the king of France, from the circumstance of his
father and himself having been the principal supporters
of the kings of Anjou in their contests for the crown
of Naples, and of his having lost all his fiefs in that
kingdom from his attachment to their cause. And he
concluded by saying that if, nevertheless, Rinaldo, un-
mindful of all the services he had rendered to his mon-
arch, in any way molested him, he would bring the
whole of his forces to bear against him. These argu-
ments weighed with the French commander, who,
influenced either by his friendship for, or his fear of,
Sforza, made no attempt to annoy him.
In the mean time, the inhabitants of the town of
Tortona, seeing how all parties respected the possessions
of Sforza, sent to make offers of their sovereignty to
him. But as that place was at some distance from the
spot which was to be the scene of his operations, he did
not deem its possession of sufficient importance to risk
part, both the observation and explanation, is totally inapplicable to the
more modern French armies.
CHAP. I. |DESIRES TO 23
another breach with his employers. He therefore wisely
made a show of declining it ; but he sent thither a per-
son whom he knew to be most attached to himself to
receive it for the Milanese. He also requested Rin-
aldo to respect it as being one of the places protected
by him. And as the Milanese had, in accordance with
his advice, sent a force of two thousand men to watch
the movements of the French between Asti and Aless-
andria, he was now able to turn his undivided attention
to following up his operations on the river, the command
of which would be of such consequence to whomsoever
might be destined to be ruler of Lombardy.
He was already in possession of two most important
places in the vicinity of the king of rivers—namely,
Pavia and Cremona. But the occupation of Piacenza
by the Venetians not only entirely prevented any water-
communications being carried on between these two
places, and endangered those that might be attempted
by land, but, what was a most important circumstance
in these days when no body of men could be depended
upon, it gave his enemies every opportunity of carrying
on intrigues in each of these cities. It was obvious,
then, that its reduction was of the utmost consequence
to him, and he already had his army at no very great
distance from it in the vicinity of San Columbano.
The Milanese were of course more desirous that he
should relieve them of the presence of an enemy at
Lodi, and the Venetian commander seemed anxious to
engage his attention in that quarter to divert him from
Piacenza. But he pursued his plans with a steadiness
24 TAKE PIACENZA. BOOK W.
that contrasts strangely with his conduct in former
campaigns. On one occasion, indeed, he was wellnigh
foiled, either by the incapacity or the treachery of his
generals. Hints having been made to him of some
meditated treachery at Cremona, he deemed it advisable
to repair thither, leaving the Piccinini in the command
of his army. After his departure a report was spread
among his troops that the Venetian general, having
been informed of his absence, was about to attack them,
whereon the Piccinini, either through incapacity or
cowardice, retired in some disorder to Pizzighettone.
When intelligence of this was brought to him, he was
in no small degree annoyed ; not so much, perhaps, on
account of any actual damage that it was likely to cause,
as from the loss of the prestige of the invincibility of
his troops. This prestige, which was of such powerful
aid to him both in battle and in diplomacy, he deter-
mined to redeem. Accordingly, he lost no time in ral-
lying his army, and bringing them to the vicinity of the
enemy, who had all this time remained quietly encamped
near Lodi. Both armies were drawn up on opposite
hills, within a mile of one another. But though frequent
challenges passed on each side, neither would descend
to the intervening valley to allow the other to attack to
advantage ; and after sunset they both retired to their
quarters. Sforza now thought that he had done enough
for his honour ; and as it was already the beginning of
October, he well knew that, if he meant to take Pia-
cenza that year, he had no time to lose ; so he brought
his army there, and began the siege in right earnest.
CHAP. I. STRENGTH OF THAT CITY. 25
His desire to get possession of that city was in no
small degree enhanced by the great difficulties in his
way, the overcoming of which, he thought, would in no
small degree add to his already well-established reputa-
tion. The city is situated in a plain about half a mile
south of the Po. It was then divided into four Quarters,
in each of which there was a gate. The circuit of its
walls was not much less than that of Milan : they were
remarkable for their strength ; they were surrounded by
a deep ditch, and contained many towers at short dis-
tances from each other. It was garrisoned by a force
of two thousand horse, and the same number of foot.
It contained a great abundance of forage, provisions,
and military stores of every description. Among the
inhabitants were six thousand men of arms, almost all
determined enemies of Sforza ; and as they knew that
they had little mercy to expect from the Milanese, they
were all resolved to fight to the last. Their hopes were
considerably elated by the setting in of the autumn
rains, which would of course retard the operations of
the besiegers. Sforza found that the number of those
whom he could bring to attack the place was not
greater than that of its defendants—a circumstance
which, considering the great disadvantages at which
besiegers always fight, might seem to render his success
almost hopeless. But he was determined that before
the end of the year Piacenza should be his. His first
object, of course, was to prevent all communication
between the besieged and their allies, more especially
as he had heard that the Venetian general, who was as
26 SFORZA's ARRANGEMENTS. Book W.
well aware as himself of the importance of the place,
had meditated sending thither reinforcements. For
this purpose he made four divisions of his army, and
assigned to each the custody of one of the gates of the
city. He made level the surface of the intervening
country, so that nothing should prevent their immediate
junction, should it at any time seem necessary. In
making these arrangements he was careful to assign to
the treacherous Piccinini the command of the southern
gate of the city, the quarter from which he least ex-
pected an attack.
Michael Attendolo had four galleons on the Po, by
which he meant to have sent the promised reinforce-
ments. But this was now rendered impossible by the
strength of the blockading force. There remained but
two ways by which he could do anything for the be-
sieged, either by sending a fleet up the Po from Venice,
or by pressing the Milanese in a manner so vigorous as
to compel their general to relinquish his present design,
and to come to their relief. The advanced season of
the year would of course much retard any assistance
that could be rendered to them in the first mode; and
even if his fleet were in the river, the bridge of Cre-
mona presented an obstacle which would at least re-
quire time to surmount ; so he determined on vigorously
following up his operations in the vicinity of his enemy's
capital. He therefore again laid siege to San Colum-
bano, which he had already taken and lost in the course
of the year; and having established his headquarters
there, he scoured the whole of the country between the
CHAP. I. BUILDS A BRIDGE OVER THE PO. 27
cities of Pavia and Milan. He was not without hopes
that the former city would have revolted to him ; but
the inhabitants, influenced, it is said, more by the fear
than the love of their present ruler, remained faithful to
their engagements.
Sforza, however, was not so easily to be moved from
his position ; but, with a view of keeping the enemy in
check without raising the siege of the city, he began to
build a bridge over the Po, immediately above the head-
quarters of his army. The Milanese sent messengers
to him, urging him, in the strongest manner, to come to
their relief; but to all their solicitations he replied, he
could do nothing until he had completed the bridge—a
work which not only was necessary for the present, but
would also be of the greatest use to them in the subse-
Quent conduct of the war. He requested them to send
him money and materials, of which he knew they had
abundance at Lago Maggiore ; and promised that, if he
had all things at hand, he would be able to finish the
bridge in six days—a shorter space of time than it
would require to bring his troops to their assistance by
any other route. There was much truth in all this; but
free states seldom act with vigour and promptitude in
war; and the Milanese, having for a century and a half
been accustomed to obey others, had even less unity of
action than most republics. However much they might
have desired the possession of Piacenza, there were not a
few who dreaded to see it fall into the hands of Sforza.
They therefore sent to him to state that they knew
from experience that it was utterly impossible that the
28 CONTINUES THE SIEGE. Book W.
bridge could be completed within the time that he had
stated ; that he must come to their relief without farther
loss of time; and that they could not think of furnish-
ing him with assistance for the prosecution of a work
which he must immediately relinquish. But he well
knew the instability of the popular governments at
Milan; that they had nobody but him to whom they
could cry in their distress; and that if they saw no
chance of relief until he had finished his undertaking,
they must give in to his wishes. He therefore conti-
nued his operations, and sent a fresh embassy to his
employers to urge his former requests.
These measures produced the desired effect. He still
had many partisans at Milan, and experience taught the
others that there was nothing for it but to give in to him.
As soon as he had got all that he required, he prosecuted
his work with such assiduity that, contrary to the
general expectation, he had it finished within the time
he had mentioned. While he was thus engaged, he
artfully gave out that he intended, without loss of time,
to bring the whole of his forces against the Venetians,
leaving merely a few galleons on the river to prevent
reinforcements being sent to the beseiged. These reports
so completely deceived the Venetian general that, re-
calling his troops from their predatory incursions, he
concentrated them on the far side of the Lambro, and
ordered different bodies of infantry to cross the Po by
night to reinforce the garrison at Piacenza. In the
latter attempt, however, he was completely frustrated by
the vigilance of his adversaries. Thus had the very
CHAP. I. WENETIAN SPY 29
fear of Sforza’s name done for the Milanese all that
they had desired his presence to effect. The Venetian
army was expecting him with fear and trembling at
Lodi ; the Piacenzans were disappointed of assistance ;
and he himself was able to prosecute the siege with all
necessary vigour.
After the besiegers had made one or two ineffectual
attempts against the city walls, an event occurred in
their camp which considerably assisted their general in
his future operations. An uncouth-looking fellow,
dressed in rags, and to all appearance a simple-minded
countryman, was caught while endeavouring by stealth
to make his way across the wall of the city. When
brought before the commander-in-chief, he was con-
demned to the fate of all spies. But he, like the one
found by Ulysses and Diomede, was willing to purchase
his life on any conditions. Though he had not in his
family residence brass, gold, and highly wrought iron,
to give to his captors, he had it in his power to render
them the most effectual service. He acknowledged that
he was carrying letters from the Venetians to the com-
mandants of the garrison, and he proposed that he
should continue to be the bearer of these communica-
tions, and place them all at the disposal of the besiegers.
Those that he had about his person he immediately
delivered. After considerable difficulty in deciphering
them, (in which, among others, Simoneta, the biographer
of Sforza, was employed,) it was discovered therefrom
that the Venetian general encouraged the besieged to
hold out to the last, informing them that a fleet was
30 GIVES INFORMATION TO SFORZA. BOOK W.
shortly about to come to their assistance; and that, lest
they should be delayed in their ascent of the river by
the bridge of Cremona, he intended to make a sudden
descent upon it and destroy it. The general of the
Milanese and their allies, more humane than the Grecian
heroes, not only spared the spy's life when he got all this
information from him, but even rewarded his services
with money; and having promised to pay him here-
after, on the condition of his fulfilling his stipulations,
he resealed the letters in the best manner he could, and
allowed him to make his way with them into the
city. The spy soon returned therefrom, bearing the
answers of the besieged, in which they declared that
they were by no means hard pressed, and would have
no difficulty in holding out till the arrival of the fleet;
and further suggesting to Michael the expediency of
making another diversion in their favour, by attacking
Sepri, the only part of the Milanese territory that yet
remained undevastated. Sforza was so terribly afraid
of their complying with this last piece of advice that he
retained the letters in which allusion was made to it, but
sent the spy forward with the others. When he arrived
at the headquarters of the Venetians with the letters
from the Piacenzans, he was asked how he had made
his way through the enemy's camp. To this question he
replied that he had met there an officer of Sforza's who
had formerly been his master, and now passed him off
as his servant, and promised to do so on all future
occasions on the condition of receiving a reward from
the Venetians. They gave perfect credence to his tale,
CHAP. I. SKIRMISH NEAR CREMONA. 31
and intrusted him to bring two hundred florins of gold
to his supposed benefactor. And as the same man
continued to be employed in the same service, Sforza
had the most perfect knowledge of all that was going
on both in the city of the besieged and in the camp of
his enemies.
An opportunity soon occurred, in which he was able
to turn the information thus received to the most bene-
ficial account. One of Michael's letters apprised him
that he had just passed the Adda by the bridge at
Cassano, (which had been of signal service to him during
the whole of the campaign,) and was marching direct
to Cremona. As the garrison left in the town was not
sufficient to resist this force, he immediately despatched
thither a considerable body of cavalry and infantry under
two of his ablest officers, and he himself descended the
river in a galleon. He arrived at the post of danger just in
the nick of time. The Venetians were already seen by the
people in the citadel of Cremona to approach the bridge
with all the implements required for its destruction ;
but on their arrival there, they found a body of infantry,
sufficiently strong to guard its approach, placed in front
of it, and beheld themselves threatened by an attack of
cavalry in their flank and rear. A battle soon com-
menced in the plain between the city and the bridge, in
which the Venetian commander found all his attempts
to take possession of the latter ineffectual. After fight-
ing for some time, he beheld the lofty cockade of Sforza,
and recognised the sonorous tone of his kinsman's voice
issuing the commands to his men, whereon he retired in
32 AFFAIR WITH THE FRENCH. BOOK W.
some confusion upon Crema, marvelling much at the
wonderful tact and good fortune of the man who always
managed to be at the post of danger the very moment
he was wanted.
While these events were taking place on the Po,
others occurred in Piedmont, singularly illustrative both
of the intriguing spirit of the times, and of the tact of
the man whose history has been chosen to illustrate
them. It has been already stated that the Milanese
had, in accordance with his advice, sent two thousand
horse to keep in check the French army in the territory
of Alessandria. In the mean time, the French general,
Rinaldo of Dresnay, was engaged in the siege of Bosco,
a town a little to the south of Alessandria, and sent
to Sforza to beg that, as a token of his amity to his
countrymen, he would give him assistance. In his reply
to this request, he made no allusion either to his engage-
ments with the Milanese, or to the advice he had given
to them; but he endeavoured to represent to him the
folly of attempting to reduce such a strongly fortified
place with a comparatively small body of men, and urged
him to retreat upon Asti, lest Bosco should prove a
scene of as great disaster to the French as Alessandria
had formerly been to the Germans. Much about this
time the Milanese determined to relieve Bosco, and sent
orders to Sforza to send them part of his forces to assist
in their attack upon the man with whom he had just
been carrying on these negotiations. It need hardly
be said that he, intent as he was upon the reduction of
Piacenza, and anxious to maintain appearances with
CHAP. I. NEAR ALESSANDRIA. 33
Rinaldo, declined to do this. The Milanese troops
were, however, soon joined by a considerable body of
Volunteers from Alessandria and the neighbouring cities,
under an old man of the name of Gian Trotto, and they
were preparing to attack the camp of Rinaldo with
force. Before the action commenced, the Alessandrian
volunteers began crying out, “Carne, carne !” On
Rinaldo, who happened to be in the part of the French
army that was immediately contiguous to them, asking
what this word meant, he was given to understand that
it was a war-cry of the Italians, denoting blood and
murder. When this became known among his soldiers,
it was impossible to restrain them, and they immedi-
ately attacked and routed that part of the army oppo-
site to them. They followed the fugitives as far as Tor-
tona; and, to the great terror and surprise of the Italians,
who had not been accustomed to see much blood shed
in their wars, and who valued victories not as a means
of destroying their enemy's forces, but of enriching
themselves with booty and ransom, they gave no
quarter during the pursuit or afterwards. On the other
side of the army, however, the regular troops of the
|Milanese, under Bartolomeo Collio, were successful,
and they were unable to prevent the citizens of Ales-
sandria from avenging the slaughter of their country-
men by a cruel massacre of the prisoners. Rinaldo
himself was taken, but he escaped the fate of his less
fortunate soldiers. Collio's next step was to attack the
town of Tortona, because it was known to be well
affected towards, and supposed to be actually in posses-
WOL. II. C
34 STORMING OF BOOK W.
sion of Sforza. A strange epoch, in which one general,
certainly with the connivance, and possibly at the insti-
gation of his employers, made use of his soldiers to in-
jure the man who was actually at that time at the head
of their armies | The city, either because it was unpro-
vided with means of resistance, or because Sforza did
not wish actually to avow himself its owner, surrendered
at once. Its loss was unimportant, but it gave Sforza
an insight into the real disposition of the Milanese to-
wards him, and showed him how little he could expect
from them, if they were once freed from their enemies.
Francesco, while thus watching all that was passing
around him, continued the siege of Piacenza without in-
termission. By the middle of December a considerable
breach was effected in the walls by means of the artil-
lery, which appears then, for the first time in Italian
warfare, to have been effectually employed for that pur-
pose. He then determined upon storming it. On the
15th of the month he called a council of war, and re-
presented to his chief captains that, as the season was
far advanced, Piacenza must be taken on the following
day. His words were amply responded to. A uni-
versal enthusiasm spread through the army. Many
who had deserted, or who had been absent on pillaging
excursions, returned. Several of the country people
joined them. The appetites of all were whetted by the
expectation of the booty they were to get in the city.
The dispositions for the attack were most skilfully
made. A small fleet was sent, under the command of
Charles of Gonzaga, up the Trebbia, a river which
flows from the direction of Piacenza, and which was
CHAP. I. PIACENZA. 35
then so swollen that it afforded water for the vessels up
to the very city. The men were ordered to scale the
Walls, and make themselves masters of the turrets from
the masts of the vessels. Sforza directed another attack
to be made on the turrets adjoining the southern gate,
While he selected the troops on whom he had most
reliance for the assault on the breach, which he deter-
mined to command in person. The two first attacks
Were designed as feints, to divert the attention of the
defenders from the breach ; and though those to whom
they were intrusted performed their part as they were
ordered, and the soldiers fought with great bravery,
neither made any impression at first. But the third
attack, though resisted with the most desperate courage,
was completely successful. For a moment the comman-
dants of the place were astounded at the suddenness of
the assault, and scarcely knew from which quarter their
real danger proceeded ; but they soon organised both
the soldiers and the citizens for the defence of the
breach, and prepared to contest every inch of ground
with the aggressors. The latter, however, pushed on
till they found an unexpected obstacle in a new trench,
which had just been constructed around the walls. As
soon as Sforza perceived this, he ordered each soldier to
take with him a faggot for the purpose of filling it up;
but this so much retarded their movements that they
were unable to face the javelins and balls of the be-
sieged. Fortunately for them there still remained a
palisade, which had been constructed for the defence of
the men employed in digging it, and which was strong
enough to admit of their passing over. But here again
36 CAPTURE OF THE CITY. Book V.
they were repulsed by the missiles which were showered
upon them from behind the fragment of the wall; and
it is not probable that they would ever have arrived at
the breach, if Sforza had not adopted the bold, and then
entirely novel, proceeding of ordering his men to lie
down, and discharging his cannon over their heads at
the wall which afforded shelter to the defenders.” The
wall fell with a terrible crash upon those who were posted
behind it. Most of those who escaped destruction were
confounded ; and the few whose nerves were unshaken
were unable to resist the soldiers, who now marched in
an unbroken line across the bridge. For a short time,
indeed, the tide of the victors was arrested by Sforza
having his horse killed under him ; but on his appear-
ing remounted and unhurt, their energy was restored.
When, however, they had passed the breach, a formid-
able difficulty seemed still to await them. There was
in the city a considerable body of cavalry, against whom,
as they could not enter it in any sort of order, it would
be impossible to make a stand. On beholding this they
halted by the walls, and cried out for horses as lustily
as King Richard. But this danger soon disappeared.
Thaddeus of Este, despairing of ultimately saving the
city, retreated with a small body of soldiers to the
citadel. The walls were scaled from the river; the city
* A similar measure was adopted by Sir Thomas Graham on the taking
of San Sebastian in 1813. The shot of the besiegers then passed two feet
over the heads of the assailants, without doing them the slightest injury.
Of the shot discharged on the occasion referred to in the text, Sforza's
secretary says, “Supra armatorum militum cervices evolans multorum
cristas corraserat.” The danger which seemed to threaten the soldiers at
each period was, of course, in inverse proportion to the degree of perfection
attained in the science of gunnery.
CHAP. I. PILLAGE OF THE INHABITANTS. 37
gates were opened, and Sforza galloped in at the head
of a considerable body of horse. Shortly afterwards
the garrison Surrendered, and the citizens were aban-
doned to the mercy of the victors.
On no one occasion was Sforza more unmindful of
the advice of his father, to treat the vanquished with
mercy. All accounts agree as to the extent of the
injuries inflicted on the unfortunate citizens. Even
Sforza’s secretary and biographer, who in general is
partial to his character, allows that he made no attempt
to save them from the cupidity or the revenge of the
soldiers. It would be difficult, he says, to give any idea
of the nature and extent of the devastation that took
place on the following night ; to describe how the sol-
diers quarrelled and fought among themselves for the
booty; to say what murders were committed among
the many thousand friends and foes who were in the
city. The victors, as well as the vanquished, were
murdered and robbed. Churches and houses alike
were ransacked ; virgins and matrons were violated
indiscriminately. The annalist of Italy makes use of
the words, “that the people who committed these ini-
quities appeared more like Turks than Christians”—a
strong expression, when we consider the dread which, in
his time, the former inspired throughout Christendom.
After a time, though it does not exactly appear when,"
Sforza expressed some wish to protect the property of
the churches and monasteries, and the persons of the
nuns.” Thus, however much his reputation as a general
* Muratori seems to doubt either the fact of Sforza’s having issued an
order to this effect, or his sincerity in wishing it to be obeyed. He cites
38 REFLECTIONS. Book V.
gained by the siege, his character as a man, weighed
even by the standard of that age, was considerably
damaged by the use that he made of his victory.
Of the pillage that followed the capture of Piacenza,
M. Sismondi remarks, that it showed in an odious light
the then system of war, on the humanity of which the
Italians of that day so much prided themselves, inas-
much as the peaceful inhabitants were liable to the
most frightful sufferings, while the mercenary soldier
could scarcely be said to be exposed to any hazard.
But in a siege,” which occurred in the memory of many
men now living, in which success was attained by an
extraordinary expedient, similar to that employed at
Piacenza, by soldiers who have been less sparing of
their lives than almost any recorded in history, who
have stood to be mowed down like grass, or advanced
with fixed bayonets to the mouth of the cannon, the
capture of the city was followed by excesses of a not less
heinous nature than those committed by the Italian sol-
diers on the occasion commemorated. The comparison
of the two events may, in the words made use of by Mr
Alison with reference to the more recent one, suggest
the mournful doubt, whether all mankind are not at
bottom the same, in point of tendency to crime, when
exposed to the influence of the same temptations; and
whether many evils do not lie beneath the boasted
glories of modern civilisation.
three historians, who relate the unrestrained commission of the crimes which
it was designed to prevent.
* Siege of San Sebastian, 1813.
(; HAPTER II,
INVASION OF TUSCANY BY ALPHONSo—ForcED TO RETIRE AFTER Two CAM-
PAIGNS.—PIACENZA CONTINUES TO BE PILLAGED.—POSITION OF THE WENE-
TIANS.–INTRIGUES AGAINST SEORZA AT MILAN–HIS SUCCESSES IN THE
FIELD.—WENETIANS ATTACK THE BRIDGE OF CREMONA—HEROIC CONDUCT
OF BIANCA MARIA.—SFORZA HOLDS A councIL of WAR—IS AT FIRST
PREVENTED BY THE MILANESE GOVERNMENT FROM MARCHING TO CREMONA,
BUT AFTERWARDS RECEIVES PERMISSION TO ACT AS HE PLEASES.—DIFFI-
CULTIES WITH THE PICCININI.-SFORZA'S ADDRESS TO HIS GENERALS AT
CASALE.—DESTRUCTION OF THE WENETIAN FLEET.-GREAT AVIDITY OF
THE SOLDIERS FOR PLUNDER.—SFORZA RAISES THE SIEGE OF CASALE.—
ORDERS OF THE MILANESE GOVERNMENT.-SFORZA INVESTs CARAVAGGIO.—
INDECISIVE ACTION WITH THE WENETIANS.—POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES
NEAR CARAVAGGIo–AND VIEWS OF THE RESPECTIVE GENERALS.–COUNCIL
OF WAR IN THE CAMP OF THE WENETIANS.—THEY DECIDE ON ATTACKING
SFORZA–ARE REPULSED IN GREAT CONFUSION – THEIR own CAMP Is
TAKEN.—ALL THEIR STORES AND ACCOUTREMENTS, AND A GREAT NUMBER
OF PRISONERS, FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY. -
IT was fortunate for Sforza that, while the events just
narrated were taking place, his old enemy, Alphonso,
had sufficient on hand to detain him elsewhere. He had
never been friendly with the Florentines; he had long
desired an opportunity to carry out the project of sub-
jecting them, entertained by Ladislaus at the end of
the last century; and he determined to take advantage
of the present time, when the Venetians and Milanese
had too much to do to interfere in his projects. It was
not difficult for him to find an excuse to justify his
conduct. The Florentines were the allies of the Vene-
tians, with whom his ally, the duke of Milan, had been
40 ALPHONSO WINTERS IN SIENNA. Book W.
at war; and though the latter was now dead, he affected
to consider his treaties with him binding. Under pre-
tence of fulfilling his engagements, he marched into
Tuscany. His first step was to take the fortress of
Cennina, whence he proceeded to lay waste the terri-
tory of Sienna. The Florentines, though surprised,
were by no means confounded by the suddenness of the
attack. They created a council of ten for the manage-
ment of the war: they provided themselves with an
army, and retook Cennina. The king of Naples having
lost this place, and finding that its inhabitants and those
of all the surrounding places remained faithful to his
enemies, invaded the territory of Volterra. Thence he
passed into the neighbourhood of Pisa, several of the
strongholds of which were allowed by the leading men
of the state to fall into his hands. He then made an
attempt to reduce Campighlio, but relinquished the siege
just about the time that Sforza succeeded in taking
Piacenza. After having left what he considered a
sufficient force in all the places that had fallen into his
hands, he retired to winter quarters in the vicinity of
Sienna.
Meanwhile the Florentines engaged the services of
two additional captains, Frederick, the lord of Urbino,
and Sforza's son-in-law, Sigismund Malatesta. By com-
pelling them to carry on their operations in the winter,
they retook several of the places they had lost. The
king of Naples resumed his operations in spring. After
the hostile armies had manoeuvred in the presence of
one another, not far from Campighlio, Alphonso directed
CHAP. II. BESIEGES PIOMBINO. 41
his steps to Piombino. As that town is situated on the
sea at the extremity of a promontory, it was evident
that, if once master of it, he could have supplies sent
thither from Aragon or Naples, and make it the basis
of his future operations against Tuscany. With this
view he invested it strongly by land and by sea. The
Florentines attempted to send four gallies to its relief
from Leghorn, which were unfortunately captured by a
superior fleet of the enemy’s. But the inhabitants were
resolved to hold out to the last, and Alphonso saw the
necessity of collecting the whole of his force to reduce
it. He was followed thither by the army of the
Florentines, who determined to watch his operations,
and to seek an opportunity of forcing him, if possible,
to raise the siege. Thus had both parties sufficient on
hands to prevent their appearing for another year at
least in Lombardy.
This campaign died, as it were, a natural death. It
was not long before the insalubrity of the marshy shores
of Tuscany, always developed by the heats of the sum-
mer and autumn,” and the difficulty of procuring sup-
plies, produced their due effects upon the health and
* The fever generated by the malaria in this part of Italy, is alluded to
by Dante in the following lines:–
“Qual dolor fora, se degli spedali
Di Valdichiana tra l’ Luglio e'l Settembre
E di Maremma e di Sardigna i mali
Fossero in una fossa tutti insembre.”f
# “ As were the torments, if each lazar-house
Of Valdichiana in the sultry time
"Twixt July and September, with the isle
Sardinia, and Maremma's pestilent fen,
Had heaped their maladies all in one foss together.”—Inf. xxix. 45,
42 RETIRES. Book V.
spirits of both armies. The Florentines were the first
to retire from their position; but having done this, they
cheered their troops by leading them to the capture of
many places that still remained in the hands of the
enemy. Alphonso sent to Florence to make propo-
sitions of peace, and offered to leave Tuscany on the
condition of receiving fifty thousand florins of gold, and
the town of Piombino. But these offers were, through
the instrumentality of Neri Capponi, rejected with indig-
nation. Upon this the king, finding that the malaria
fever had already carried off ten thousand of his soldiers,
and had rendered many others almost unfit for service,
retired to his own dominions, vowing vengeance against
the citizens who had refused either to surrender or to
pay for their liberty.
In Lombardy, Piacenza continued to be pillaged for
forty days. The Po afforded such a facility for carry-
ing off the booty on rafts, that the citizens were stripped
not only of their treasure and ornaments, but even of
the commonest articles of furniture. Many of them
were sold as slaves; and a body of two thousand
infantry, who had marched thither before they were
aware of the catastrophe, shared the same fate. Never
after that time did the city regain its former position
in Italy. The victors frequently fought among them-
selves about the booty, and their general had no small
difficulty in preventing his army sustaining a severer
loss from these internal quarrels than it had from the
valour of the defenders. At last he restored order by
appointing the captive commandant, Thaddeus of Este,
CHAP. II. POSITION OF THE WENETIANS. 43
a judge to whom all such matters of dispute were to
be referred. He afterwards treated him with com-
mendable generosity in restoring him to liberty.
Meantime the Venetian army took up its winter quar-
ters in the country north of the Po, between the Oglio,
the Mincio, and the Adige. An armament, which had
been destined for the relief of Piacenza, had arrived at
Casale. Thus the whole of the territory around Cre-
mona was occupied by Sforza’s enemies. His own
troops were cantoned to the south of the Po, and he
had not the inclination, even if he had the power, to
resume operations before the return of the season.
But he took the precaution of fortifying the bridge
of Cremona, by the erection of a battery and other
means. His subjects thus continued to receive their
supplies from the side of the river without any moles-
tation.
The Milanese celebrated the capture of Piacenza by
a triumphal procession, which lasted for three days.
The place, indeed, was so important, its fortifications
so strong, the mode of taking it had been so novel, and
the subsequent sufferings of its inhabitants had been so
great, that the event caused no small sensation through-
out the peninsula. While none could fail to admire
the talents, many were envious of the success, and fear-
ful of the ambition, of the man who had taken it. After
the first exultation was over, feelings of the nature of
those last mentioned became predominant among the
Milanese. They beheld the man who had once openly
aspired to be their ruler, in possession of the city of
44 JEALOUSY OF THE MILANESE. BOOK W.
Pavia, which had, in the days of yore, been their rival;
so that, even if he did not at present wish to menace
their independence, he might at any time become a
formidable neighbour. They now saw that he had
succeeded in taking a city which, before its capture, was
not deemed much inferior, either in population or in the
strength of its fortifications, to their own ; and they
could not but contrast his success in that quarter with
the little progress he had made in clearing the country
about the Adda of their enemies. These feelings
were artfully inflamed by the Piccinini and others, who
never ceased to represent to them that, in supplying
him with the means of carrying on the war, they were
but nourishing a serpent who would one day destroy
them. Being duly impressed with a sense of these
dangers, they sent, on three different occasions, to treat
with the Venetians. But in none of these were they
able to come at once to any satisfactory conclusion ;
and, pending the negotiations, Sforza's agents were
actively employed in stirring up the passions of the
anti-Venetian party at Milan. So well did they do
their work, that, when it was proposed in the city that
each of the belligerent states should be allowed to retain
the places of which they were then in possession, some
of the leading men shouted out “War !” and the popu-
lace seized the person of the principal abettor of these
pacific negotiations, and forced him to join in the cry.
Thus were they compelled to continue their existing en-
gagements with Sforza. But the Braccian party were suf-
ficiently strong to cripple him in all his operations; and
CHAP. II. SFORZA's SUCCESSEs. 45
though the government was submissive enough to him
in their hour of need, they constantly sought to deprive
him of the fruit of his victories. Sometimes, indeed,
they did not hesitate to treat with the enemy while he
was actually engaged with them. But they were dealing
with one who was perfectly acquainted with all their
arts of intrigue, and who, as we shall see, anticipated
them by committing what would, at other times, have
been deemed an inexcusable act of treachery, just at the
time that they were meditating one of a similar nature.
The Milanese, in compliance with often-repeated
requests of their general, equipped a considerable fleet
for the defence of Cremona, and sent him reinforcements
to prosecute his operations by land. Thus, though he
was deserted by Charles of Gonzaga and others, who
alleged that the term of their service had expired, he
was able, by the beginning of May, to take the field
with a force not inferior to that of the preceding year.
In order to remove one cause of suspicion, his first step
was to make an attempt to dislodge the enemy from
their position on the Adda. His success there was all
that could have been desired : he took several of the
castles; the inhabitants of many of the towns, having
before their eyes the fate of the unfortunate Piacenzans,
surrendered to him at once ; and, after a sharp contest
of ten days, he made himself master of the bridge at
Cassano. Of all the important places the Venetians
had taken in this territory, Lodi and Caravaggio alone
remained in their hands; and it is probable that these
towns would soon have surrendered to the man whom
46 AFFAIR NEAR CREMON A. BOOK W.
it was thought almost vain to resist, had he continued
in that quarter. But the enemies who had tried in
vain, in the preceding year, to take him from the siege
of Piacenza by a diversion on the Adda, found no diffi-
culty in taking him from the Adda by threatening his
possessions on the Po. The Venetian fleet, under the
command of Andreas Quirinus, advanced from Casale,
where it had been stationed during the winter, and
made a most formidable attack on the bridge of Cre-
mona. They fastened several of the galleons to stakes
in the water beneath, and posted a considerable body
of infantry in a species of island or sand-bank that had
been formed in the river. After they had cleared the
bridge by their artillery, they attempted to scale it.
Some of the men actually mounted thereon, and hoisted
the standard of St Mark ; and it seemed probable that,
ere long, they would succeed either in taking possession
of, or at least in destroying it, and capturing the galleons
of the Milanese, which were lying there unmanned.
The heroic conduct of Bianca Maria alone saved her
husband from this great disaster. As soon as she heard
of what was taking place, she repaired without delay
to the post of danger, and sent orders to two of her
husband's best generals, who were stationed at Pizzighet-
tone, to come to the rescue. The guard on the bridge,
animated by her presence, and, as it is said, even guided
by her directions,” managed to maintain it till their
arrival; after which, they soon drove the enemy from
the sand-bank whence so much damage was inflicted,
* SIMONETA, lib. ii.
CHAP. II. SFORZA's PLANs. 47
and directed their own batteries with such effect against
the fleet of the Venetians, that they were compelled to
retire with loss. But the Venetians, though foiled in
their attempt, continued to annoy the citizens by their
incursions, and to keep the garrison in no small anxiety
about the safety of the bridge.
Information of these events was duly conveyed to
Sforza. If left to himself, he would immediately have
repaired thither with the whole of his forces; but having
already had experience how unstable was the favour of
the Milanese, he was desirous, in his present position,
to do nothing that could give his enemies cause to com-
plain. With the view of appearing to act in compliance
with the wishes of others, whom he hoped to bring over
to his views by his eloquence, he immediately called a
council of war. He there endeavoured to impress his
generals with a due sense of the injury that would be
inflicted on them if this bridge were once to fall into
the hands of the enemy : he said that its loss would
open to the Venetians the command of the Po as far as
the Ticino ; he reminded them of the inconveniences
that Philip had formerly suffered from a similar event;
he entreated them for once to lay aside all jealousy,
and to put their confidence in him, and follow his ad-
vice, which was, that they should go with their whole
force to Cremona, whence, having manned the galleons
that were there lying empty, they should make a vigor-
ous attack, both by land and by water, on the enemy
above Casale. He added that, if he were once free from
all apprehension in that quarter, he would be able to
48 OPPOSITION OF THE PICCININI. BOOK W.
prosecute his campaign on the Adda and on the Oglio
with the greatest vigour; but that, otherwise, he might
possibly waste much time without effecting anything.
Against these plausible arguments nothing could be
said ; even the Piccinini at first pretended to give in to
them. But that which they did not dare to say in the
camp, they got others to say for them at Milan. Their
friends in the city cautioned the government not to be
deceived by the fine words and perfidious intentions of
their general. They insinuated that he was only anxious
to secure his own town of Cremona, and to march thence
to Brescia, which had been promised to him ; and said
that, if they were wise, they would not allow him to
leave his present position till he had put them in posses-
sion of Lodi. Orders to this effect were sent to the
camp. It was in vain that he sent remonstrances to
Milan. The Braccian party, though not powerful enough
to procure his dismissal, were still able to thwart him in
many of his plans, and the government were firm in
adhering to their former demands. Wexatious as they
were, he at first thought it prudent to obey. Never-
theless, as he received continual accounts of the danger
with which the city and bridge of Cremona were threat-
ened, he sent thither two of his ablest captains with a
small body of men to assist in keeping the enemy in
check.
The Milanese were, like the majority of mankind,
very self-willed in the time of prosperity—very humble
to those who could help them in the hour of adversity.
Whenever their general found himself thwarted by them
CHAP. II. POWERS INTRUSTED TO SFORZA. 49
in his plans, he had merely to let them feel their need
of him to make them give in to him as he wished. For
this reason it may be supposed, that, while he was detained
contrary to his wishes on the Adda, he was not anxious
to render them any signal service. Though he was
obeying their commands to the letter, the Venetian
general managed to cross the Oglio and to take Moza-
nica. This partial success rather startled the Milanese,
and the count took advantage of the sensation caused
thereby, to send a friend to them to ask for unlimited
powers in the conduct of the war. However suspicious
they might still have been of his ultimate intentions,
they thought it politic to accede to his request. On the
receipt of this permission, he prepared to bring all his
forces to attack the Venetian fleet near Cremona, and
was ready to start on the third day after he had fixed
on his plan of operations. The only danger he appre-
hended was from the treachery of the Piccinini; but as
he did not think it prudent to come to an open rupture
with them, he contented himself with placing in their
camp and about their persons spies, who were to report
their proceedings to him. A three days' march brought
him to the vicinity of the place where the enemy had
been ; but on his arrival, he found they had retreated
down the river to Casale Maggiore—the scene of the
victory which had but two years before showed the first
gleam of hope to him in the midst of his adversity.
This movement of the Venetians was a sore disap-
pointment to Sforza, as the current immediately below
Cremona would have enabled him to attack them to
WOL. II. D
Ö0 HE TAKES PONTIONI. BOOK W.
great advantage, whereas in their present position they
were protected both by an island and an angle of the
river. He had nevertheless made up his mind to attack,
and to do so with all his might. But he was still thwarted
at every step by the Piccinini. Though they dared not
lift up their voices against him in council, they pre-
tended that, as they had not money for their forces, and
could not procure them the necessary supplies, they were
unable to proceed any farther. But he well knew that
the avarice of these men was even greater than their
envy of him, so he induced them to remain with him by
promising them the spoil of the town of Pontioni, which
it would be necessary for him to take. The unfortunate
inhabitants, having heard of his intentions, and warned
by the fate of the Piacenzans, sent to beg that he would
receive them as friends and allies ; but it was in vain.
The keeping together of his army required that their
property should be sacrificed; and he, though by nature
neither cruel nor revengeful, was not the man to allow
his principle to stand in the way of his ambition. He
therefore sent them word that the time for a compro-
mise was now past ; that if they had wished to escape
the fate of the conquered, they ought to have surrendered
to him long ago; and that now they could do nothing
better than defend themselves to the best of their
ability. The city was taken almost without any show
of resistance. The property of the unfortunate inhabi-
tants was given without compunction to the soldiers,
but their persons were protected. The quantity of
cattle and grain that fell into the hands of the Piccinini
CHAP. II. REPAIRS TO CASALE. 51
was so great that it ought to have removed all just
cause of discontent. But as soon as they had got all that
they could of the rewards of war, they began again to
seek for excuses for avoiding its labours. Among other
things, they complained that they had not obtained
their full share of the spoil, and that they would still
find it difficult to maintain their troops. But Sforza
represented to them that they could get abundant sup-
plies by means of the river; and that in the event of any
success on his part, they would be still further enriched
with booty. Overcome in some measure by his powers
of persuasion, which Simoneta says were quite irresis-
tible, and still more by their appetite for plunder, they
consented to remain with him. And having thus
managed to keep things together, for a time at least, he
proceeded to act on the offensive.
His first step was to march to Casale with the whole
of his army. The city was strongly fortified on the
three sides which are accessible by land, and was
guarded on the water by the Venetian fleet, under the
command of Andreas Quirinus. Sforza lost no time
in constructing batteries just where the walls adjoined
the river, with which he managed to do much damage
both to the fortifications and to the ships. The
Milanese fleet, also, which was commanded by Blasius
Asaretus, who in the year 1435 had taken Alphonso
prisoner in the battle of Penzio, and which was manned
by a force that had been sent from Parma for the
purpose, had come from Pavia to the present scene of
action. The Milanese admiral did not think himself
52 PANIC IN HIS CAMP. BOOK W.
strong enough to attack his enemies in their present
position, but he stationed himself in a spot whence he
might follow them to advantage, should the batteries of
Sforza compel them to relinquish it.
In the mean time, it was ascertained that Michael
Attendolo had taken up his quarters with the whole
of the Venetian army, within eight miles of Casale.
Many of the officers of Sforza thought that they would
be no match for the combined forces of Michael and
of the garrison and fighting men of Casale ; and his
secret enemies, the Piccinini, took advantage of the
apprehensions to spread panic and disaffection in the
camp. To such an extent did they succeed that
many said at once, that, if he did move soon, they
would go home rather than fall into the hands of the
Venetians. Against these machinations Sforza had
nothing to oppose except his eloquence ; but, trusting to
it, he called together his officers, and represented to
them that he surely could not be thought so destitute
of skill and prudence as to ask them to remain in their
present position if they were really in the danger that
was represented, seeing that his fame, his family, and
his fortunes would be ruined by such an act of folly ;
that there was nobody present who would lose more by
it than himself; that they surely could not think him
such a fool as to involve himself in such certain de-
struction ; that though he was far from wishing to
undervalue the force or the bravery of the enemy, their
own position could not be said to be one of danger;
that they were strong enough to withstand a combined
CHAP. II. WENETIAN FLEET BURNED 53
attack from the city and the country ; but that, as the
enemy, by so doing, would leave their fleet defenceless,
he did not think that they would attempt it ; that for
his part he considered victory certain, and if they forced
him to forego it, they would inflict a most irreparable
injury, not only on themselves, but also on the cause of
the Milanese ; and that, if they would but remain with
him two days longer, they would then see that he was
not addressing them in this tone of confidence without
I'éâSOI).
The officers, yielding to the force of these arguments,
consented to await the result ; and it was not long
before it convinced them of the sagacity of their general.
The Venetian admiral still remained in front of the city,
expecting aid from Michael Attendolo ; but he was
suffering more and more from the batteries that had
been erected on land : the vessels themselves were
almost all shattered; the men, deprived of all protection,
were falling in great numbers ; and it was evident that
his position would soon be intolerable. Of this both
Sforza and Blasius were aware ; and the latter, at the
instigation of his commander-in-chief, attacked the
Venetian fleet one afternoon, and captured and carried
off several of their galleons before evening. Quirinus
saw that, if the battle were renewed on the following
day, everything, both men and ships, must fall into the
hands of the enemy. He endeavoured by means of
signals to make the Venetian general aware of his dis-
tress; but receiving no response from him, he evacuated
the fleet by night; and, setting fire to some of the ships,
54 AND PILLAGED. BOOK W.
let them float down among the others, that all might
be consumed before the enemy could get them.
A curious scene afterwards ensued, illustrative of the
human appetite for plunder. The inhabitants of the
city were the first to perceive what had taken place,
and they soon made their way among the deserted
ships of their allies, to lay hands on what they could
find. It was not long before the Milanese fleet was
deserted by its crews, all of whom appeared among the
smouldering ruins of their adversaries' vessels, seeking
what they could get. Sforza endeavoured to prevent
the soldiers joining in the scramble. He had them all
drawn up in lines, and forbade them to go out of the
intrenchments of the camp, under penalty of death.
But all attempts to preserve order were in vain. Exag-
gerated reports of the booty that was to be had else-
where, spread among them ; and it was not long before
the camp was almost completely deserted.* The dis-
order became so great that, if Michael had chanced to
make an attack on them that day, nothing could have
saved them. Sforza himself was much afraid of this,
more particularly as he thought that the sight of the
flames and the smoke in the distance might cause him
to advance to see what was going on. With a view of
bringing back his soldiers, he spread about a report that
the enemy was actually coming down upon them with the
* The effective force of the English army was in like manner considerably
weakened after the battle of Vittoria. The number of stragglers who had
left the ranks for plunder was so great that, on the following day, the Duke
of Wellington complained that they lost more by the victory than the
enemy had by their defeat.
CHAP. II. WENETIAN LOSS. 55
whole of his force, and that, if they did not return to
defend the camp, they would lose all that they had got.
At the same time he sent others, who were as well aware
as himself of the extent of their danger, to remove
farther temptation, by continuing to set fire to the
ships. It was not till the greater part of them were
consumed that order was restored to the camp.
The Venetians on that day lost thirty-two galleys,
a great number of transports laden with provisions,
besides baggage, military stores, and equipments, to a
prodigious extent. They wented their indignation on
Andreas Quirinus, by condemning him to a three years'
imprisonment in the dungeons. And Sforza, having
thus destroyed the force by which his own town of
Cremona was threatened, so far complied with the
wishes of his generals as to raise the siege of Casale,
and to retire thence in the direction of the former
town. All this time Michael looked on, but did not
dare to attack his apparently invincible kinsman.
As had happened on more important occasions,
“rumour, speaking truth from the first,” had preceded
the authenticated intelligence of this victory at Milan.*
The confirmation of the good news by the ambassadors
* See a note on this subject in ALISON's History of Europe, seventh edition,
chap. xcv. “It is curious how often the rumour of a great and decisive
victory prevails at a great distance in an inconceivably short space of time
after its actual occurrence.” Livy says that, when the news of the defeat of
Asdrubal at the Metaurus was brought to Rome, the rapidity with which it
arrived destroyed the credit of the messenger, seeing that it related to events
which were said to have taken place at a considerable distance only two days
before. In the London Cowrier of 20th June 1815, a rumour was mentioned
of Napoleon having been defeated in a great battle near Brussels, on Sunday
evening, in which he lost all his heavy artillery. When we recollect that
56 MILANESE ORDER SFORZA BOOK W.
of Sforza produced a mingled sensation of joy at the
destruction of their enemies, and envy of the rising
fortune of the great captain. Influenced as before by
the latter passion, the chief council immediately as-
sembled together, and abrogated the unlimited powers
which, not many weeks before, they had intrusted to
him. They ordered him to repair without loss of time
to Caravaggio, and to use all his endeavours to reduce
it. They naturally thought that, if they could once dis-
lodge the enemy thence, Lodi would be given up to
them almost without a struggle ; and they made no
secret of their intentions of reopening their negotiations
with the Venetians as soon as they regained these two
important places. Sforza's design had been to attack
Brescia, both because the place had been promised to
him, and because he well knew that, if his employers
were freed from the presence of an enemy in the regions
of the Adda, he himself would not be allowed to remain
long in the most desirable position of commander of
their armies. There might also have been much truth
in his own allegations, that, by drawing the enemy into
the territory of Brescia, in which he hoped to be able
to attack him to advantage, he was taking a surer, and
probably a more expeditious, mode of putting the
the French artillery was not taken till sunset on the 18th, the rapidity of
this intelligence seems almost incredible. And on the day on which the
Greeks conquered the Persians, both at Plataea and at Mycale, it is said that
the result of the former battle, which took place early in the morning, was
known at Mycale, on the coast of Asia Minor, as the latter was about to
commence in the afternoon. But though there is no doubt of the Greek
generals having announced a victory, I cannot but think that it was an in-
vention of theirs to encourage their men.
CHAP. II. TO CARAVAGGIO. 57
Milanese in the possession of the places that they so
much coveted, than by commencing the tedious and
doubtful undertaking of a siege; and it is probable that
he himself would have had no objection to have seen
the Venetians dislodged from these cities after he had
attained the objects he had immediately in view. But
it was in vain that he represented many of these things
to the ambassadors, and, at the same time, upbraided
them with the inconsistency and short-sightedness of
their employers. Being in the camp, he was not able
to bring the power of his eloquence to bear upon the
council at Milan, with whose wishes he was obliged to
comply. The ambassadors also encouraged both the
soldiers and the officers to go to Caravaggio, by pro-
mising them a most abundant supply, not only of pro-
visions, but also of everything that would assist them in
the prosecution of their enterprise.
Sforza, though constrained to act against his will, dis-
played great promptitude and talent in carrying out
the wishes of the ruling powers at Milan. Five days'
march brought him beneath the walls of Caravaggio,
which, though they were more than one mile in circum-
ference, he surrounded with his army. He then forti-
fied his camp, so as to render it almost impregnable.
Three days after his arrival, he was informed that
Michael Attendolo, with the whole army of the Vene-
tians, was about to take up an intrenched position
within four miles of him. The circumstance of an
enemy being so near him, engaged in a work in
which it is impossible to preserve military order,
58 INDECISIVE BOOK W.
seemed to Sforza to present an opportunity of at-
tacking which was not to be lost. He immediately
brought thither the main body of his army ; and
though he was met by a fair show of opposition, he
would probably have gained most important advantages
if he had not been deceived by a report that a large
body of the enemy had taken a circuit to the right,
with a view of making a flank attack on his camp, while
he himself was engaged in front with the majority of
his troops. Though he thought it almost incredible
that a general of the experience of his kinsman would
have weakened his line by extending it in this manner,”
he was well aware that the movement, if not checked in
time, was fraught with peril to himself. He therefore
repaired without delay to the spot whence the alarm
had proceeded, intrusting the command of the battle to
the two Piccinini. The elder of them evinced no desire
to betray the confidence that was reposed in him ; but
not so the younger. Though Sforza was at this instant
acting against his own wishes, in obedience to the orders
of the government, and had no object of his own to secure
by a victory, the younger Piccinino evidently showed
that he was more afraid of conquering than of being
conquered. At the time that both armies were wholly
engaged, he made a signal to his own troops to retreat,
and remained quite unmoved either by the remon-
strances of his brother or the regrets of his own officers.
* A movement similar to that which Michael was reported to have made
caused the defeat of the Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz, and of the
French army at Salamanca.
CHAP. II. ENGAGEMENT. 59
The victory expected by Sforza might thus have been
turned into a defeat, had not he himself ascertained the
falsity of the reports that had been brought to him, and
made a speedy reappearance on the scene of action.
He fortunately arrived in time to arrest the disaster;
but the heat of the Sun had become so intolerable that
it was impossible to renew the attack. The accounts
that he received of the state of the enemy showed him
how great a victory he had lost. It was ascertained
from the prisoners and deserters that their camp had
been in complete disorder; that all ranks were panic-
stricken, and placed their only hopes of safety in flight;
and that they were endeavouring to remove all that
they could save to the other side of the Oglio. Though
he had no doubt as to who had caused this disappoint-
ment, he nevertheless affected to continue on good terms
with the traitor, being probably of opinion that he would
do him less injury when present in his camp than he
might when at a distance in Milan. Michael, in noways
daunted by the danger of attempting to fortify a camp
within four miles of a formidable adversary, retained his
position ; and Sforza, having the enemy so near him,
deemed it advisable to increase the strength of his for-
tifications, before proceeding to take the city by storm.
For some time the rival armies remained in the pre-
sence of each other, neither daring to hazard a general
attack. Both commanders, however, deemed it advis-
able to render their positions as secure as possible ;
and in process of time both camps became so strongly
fortified that they assumed the appearance of two cities
60 POSITION OF BOOK W.
within a short distance of each other. Those who were
within one camp used to bring their batteries and
missiles to bear upon any of the enemy who ventured
out of the other, and frequent skirmishes took place in
the intervening space. In one of these the younger
Piccinino received a wound, sufficient to afford him an
excuse for absenting himself from the camp; in another,
the Venetians suffered so severely that the republic was
obliged in no small degree to tax its resources to repair
the disasters, having to send to Dalmatia for bowmen,
and to Germany for sharpshooters and cavalry. Each
general, however, had his own motives for delay.
Michael, being well aware both of the envy with which
Sforza was regarded by the Piccinini and others, and
of the uncertain state of the relation between him and
the Milanese, hoped that some dissension might occur
in the camp or in the council, which would compel him
to desist from his enterprise. On the other hand,
Sforza, although a considerable breach had already been
effected in the walls, did not attempt to storm the city
in the presence of a powerful enemy, fearing that, even
should he succeed, his soldiers would be so intent upon
pillage as to leave his camp without defence. At one
time the expectations of his adversary seemed likely to
be realised. The Milanese had already become very
remiss in their supply of money and provisions to their
general, and there were many who endeavoured to as-
cribe to him selfish and treacherous motives. It was
generally insinuated that he might easily take the city
any day that he liked, but that it suited his own designs
CHAP. II. BOTH ARMIES. 61
better that the enemy should remain in the vicinity of
Milan; and that, at all events, he wished for nothing so
much as to make the Milanese exhaust their resources,
so that they might hereafter fall an easy prey to his
ambition. He, however, took little notice of these
accusations; and, when remonstrated with for not pro-
ceeding faster with his work, he offered to resign the
command to any successor they might think fit to
appoint. It need hardly be said that they were too
wise to take him at his word.
At last, on the thirty-fifth day after the commence-
ment of the siege, a considerable breach had been made
in the walls, and the camp was so well fortified that,
in the opinion of most, a very few men would suffice to
defend it against any attack that could be made on it.
In the mean time, a certain Venetian officer, by name
Tiberto Brandolino, managed, by the following device,
to get into the Milanese camp, and to spy out, as he
thought, its most vulnerable points. Having for some
time hovered about a wood which lay on its confines,
he fell in with a party of foragers, and having suspended
two large clusters of grapes to the extremities of a stick
which he put on his shoulders, he passed himself off as
one of them, and made his way even to Sforza's own
tent, and to the walls of the city. From the hasty
view that he was able to take of the intrenchments, he
came to the opinion that they might be attacked from
the side of the wood whence he himself had entered
them, as they were on that quarter defended only by a
marsh, which he thought might easily be rendered
62 SFORZA's DIFFICULTIES. BOOK W.
passable for troops. On his return to the camp he
reported accordingly, and strongly recommended them
to make a vigorous attack in a quarter whence their
enemies did not appear to apprehend any danger.
Unfortunately for those to whom he gave the advice, a
deep trench had been dug across the greater part of
the marsh ; but as the sides of it were level, it had
escaped his observation.
All this time Sforza was in a great state of uncer-
tainty as to what course he should take. The breach in
the walls might be deemed easily practicable according
to all the ordinary rules of war; and at one time he
meditated a plan of storming the city with one division
of his army, and promising the other their full share of
the spoil if they would remain steadily at their posts
in the intrenchments, to resist any attack of the ene-
mies; but as his recent experience at Casale had taught
him how little he could depend upon them when booty
was to be had, he dreaded lest the taking of the city
should cause the destruction of his army. On the other
hand, he well knew that his enemies would persuade
the ignorant multitude to ascribe his delay to any
motives rather than those of patriotism. Fortune, how-
ever, seemed about to declare in his favour ; the com-
mandant of Caravaggio wished to save the citizens from
the fate of the Piacenzans; and when he saw that the
city could no longer be defended against any assault,
and that the Venetian army was doing nothing to
relieve him, he sent to make offers of surrender.
Information of this having been duly conveyed to
CHAP. II. WENETIAN COUNCIL OF WAR. 63
the Venetian camp, a council of war was held, in which
each captain was requested to give his opinion in writ-
ing, that it might be forwarded to the government at
home. The commander-in-chief, Michael Attendolo,
suggested that they should leave Caravaggio to its fate,
retire to Martinengo, and thence make a rapid descent
upon the enemy's army while they were intent upon
booty, as he well knew they would be, after the capture of
the city. Others were of opinion that the want of con-
fidence between the Milanese and Sforza was so great,
and that the dissensions in the camp had reached such
an extent, that the army could not be kept together
much longer, and that it would most certainly disperse,
if they could by any means have the siege prolonged
another month. Many thought that by falling back
upon and threatening Cremona they might divert
Sforza from his enterprise ; but the plan that had been
suggested by Tiberto Brandolino, who had, as he fan-
cied, spied out the nakedness of the enemy's camp, was
most acceptable to the majority, and it was referred,
along with the others, to the senate at Venice.
To people at a distance from the scene of operations,
nothing seems so easy as to carry out a plan which is
represented to them as certain to be successful: their
absence does not prevent them from apprehending its
advantages, but generally renders them unwilling or
unable to understand the countervailing obstacles. The
Venetian government viewed the last of the above-men-
tioned schemes in this light. Its success would be the
most complete of any : they could not see any reason
64 THEY ATTACK SFORZA. BOOK W.
why it should not be carried into practice, and they
ordered it to be adopted forthwith. A general who
acted contrary to the orders of the Venetian govern-
ment had not unfrequently to answer with his head for
the consequences; and Michael Attendolo, though he
did not approve of the plan, was obliged to obey.
While Sforza, together with his secretary Simoneta,
was engaged in arranging with the commandant the
terms of the capitulation, intelligence was brought to
him that the enemy were moving towards Mozanega,
which lay on the same side of the camp as the wood
and the marsh by which they intended to make their
attack. It was at first suggested to him that, as they
saw they could not save the city, they were about to
shift their quarters; but he immediately repaired in
person to see what they were about. As soon as he
had arrived at the extremity of the camp, which looked
in that direction, he found that the enemy had already
emerged from the wood, and that many of the stragglers
and detached bodies of his own soldiers were being driven
in in some confusion to the camp. These, however, he
rallied at the trench, which, as has been noticed already,
had escaped the observation of the spy who planned the
attack; and having ordered all the officers and soldiers
who were in that part of his camp to the defence, he
hoped to be able to maintain it till the arrival of rein-
forcements should give him the superiority.
A severe, and even bloody combat, for these times,
took place in the trench. The assailants well knew that
a repulse would be tantamount to a defeat ; while the
CHAP. II. ARE REPULSED. 65
defenders were aware that, if the trench were taken
before their fellow-soldiers could be marshalled in fight-
ing array, everything they possessed would fall into the
hands of the enemy. Jokes and repartees are said to
have passed between the officers on both sides—the one
anticipating an easy victory, and the others telling
them that they would soon return in a very different
plight from that in which they advanced.” At last,
Alexander Sforza arrived with a body of four thousand
cavalry and infantry ; and after having driven back the
enemy from that part of the trench that was immedi-
ately opposed to him, he passed over it, and attacked
the others on their flank and rear. This movement
obliged them to fall back, and their confusion was in
no small degree aggravated by the wood in their rear.
Sforza observing their state, cried out at once, “The
day is ours!” and ordered the whole body of his troops
to cross the trench and follow up their advantage.
The retreat of the Venetians soon degenerated into a
route. A great part of their army, including several
officers who had dismounted under the hopes of being
able to escape through the wood and the marsh, were
taken before they could reach their own camp. In the
midst of the pursuit, Sforza's sonorous voice was heard
ordering them to give quarter whenever it was possible.
The consequent necessity of leaving a large body behind,
to guard the great number of prisoners that had fallen
into his hands, had considerably diminished his forces
before he arrived at the enemy's encampment. When
* SIMONETA, lib. xiii. CorIo, part v.
WOL. II. E
66 THEIR CAMP IS TAKEN. BOOK W.
there, he met Francesco Piccinino and his men, who had
hitherto taken no part in the action. The former be-
gan making some excuses for the absence of his troops,
when the victorious general (without the least appear-
ance of anger) assured him that there was no need for
apology; that everything, up to the present moment, had
gone as well as possible, and that he had come just in
the nick of time to assist him in passing the intrench-
ment. This, however, he declined doing, saying that
enough had already been accomplished for one day.
Sforza, however, whose mode of fighting was now very
different from what it had been after the battle of
Tenna,” replied that a victory was a mere barren
honour if it was not turned to account ; and then began
the attack, allowing the latter to retire unheeded. But
after they had proceeded some little distance, he made
them believe that his men were already within the
trenches enriching themselves with spoil. This bait
was too strong for Piccinino and his soldiers: they
returned to follow in the wake of the victor ; and the
enemy, believing themselves overwhelmed by numbers,
ceased to resist.
Nothing could have been more complete than the
victory. The Milanese, in the words of their historian
Corio, took the camp, with all the possessions of the
enemy, and made a great number of prisoners. Michael
Attendolo and Louis Gonzaga continued to fight to the
last ; but they, too, were obliged to seek safety in flight.
Others preferred letting themselves, along with the
* See the observations on that subject, ante, vol. i. p. 306.
CHAP. II. EXTENT OF THEIR LOSS. 67
standards committed to their care, fall into the hands
of the enemy, to encountering the displeasure of the
Venetians after such a disaster. The victors, of course,
remained pillaging till the evening. Among other
things, they took six pieces of heavy and thirty pieces
of light artillery, several cars, and a great quantity of
grain, gold, silver, and costly armour of all sorts. Every
Soldier, from the highest to the lowest, obtained an
unprecedented share of spoil, enough, it was said, to
make his fortune. The number of prisoners was three
thousand foot and ten thousand five hundred cavalry.*
Many of the horses died in consequence of the fatigue
they had undergone in such a protracted action, under
a burning autumn sun. Most of the men, after having
been stripped of everything they possessed, were set at
liberty. Though the majority of the officers were re-
tained as prisoners of war, Sforza, in return for favours
that he had formerly received, granted some few of them
their liberty. Among them was a certain Venetian
commissary, who had at various times tried to do
Sforza what injury he could by spreading false reports,
and dwelling on his illegitimacy. In his present situa-
tion, the memory of his former misdeeds caused him to
tremble, and, when brought into the presence of the
victor, like other low-minded men, who are full of inso-
lence in prosperity, but ready to lick the dust in adver-
* I have here followed the numbers given by Muratori in his Annals of
Italy. Corio and Simoneta estimate the number of cavalry at twelve thou-
sand five hundred. The account of Machiavelli, who says that out of twelve
thousand cavalry little more than one thousand escaped, nearly agrees with
that given in the text.
68 SURRENDER OF CARAWAGGIO. BOOK W.
sity, he threw himself on his knees, and implored his
captor's forgiveness. Sforza was never wantonly cruel,
and, in the present state of his fortunes, he could well
afford to despise the man who was then at his feet. So
he told him to be of good cheer, and contented himself
with mildly expostulating with him on account of his
conduct, and cautioning him to be more circumspect for
the future.
The day after the battle the triumph of the victors
was completed by the surrender of Caravaggio.
CHAPTER III.
EFFECTS PRODUCED BY THE VICTORY AT MILAN.—COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE
MILANESE CAMP.—SFORZA MARCHES AGAINST BRESCIA.—DouBLE-DEALINGS
OF THE MILANESE.-SFORZA REMONSTRATES IN VAIN–PASSES OVER TO
THE WENETIANS.–EXPLANATIONS AND RECRIMINATIONS.
As the victory of Caravaggio was perhaps the most
complete that had been gained in Italy for a whole
century, the news of it caused no small sensation at
Milan. It came the more acceptable, as a contrary
report had been spread by Charles Gonzaga, who, after
having been wounded in the suddenness of the first
encounter, had retired thither. A great display was
made on the entrance of the most notable captains into
the city, and a species of triumphal procession, some-
what resembling those of ancient Rome, was got up.
The people could not fail to admire the abilities of a
general who had gained a great victory, when placed
in circumstances in which others could scarcely have
avoided a defeat. All were loud in his praises, except
the Piccinini, who secretly insinuated that, if they had
not come up at a most critical moment, the battle could
not have been won. But Sforza treated all the calum-
nies of his maligners with contemptuous indifference;
and as everybody knew that they had not made their
70 COUNCIL OF WAR. BOOK W.
appearance on the field of battle till the fate of the day
was decided, he might well afford to do so.
It was not long, however, before all feelings of exul-
tation were, as after the capture of Piacenza and the
victory at Casale, followed by envy and fear at the
rising greatness of the general. As he was no longer
intrusted with supreme power in the conduct of the
War, the government sent ambassadors to him, who,
after a due consultation with the officers, were to give
him directions about his subsequent operations. On
the third day after the capture of the city, a council of
war was held in the camp. The ruling powers, as well
as the majority of the people at Milan, were desirous
to see Lodi and Bergamo freed from their enemies.
They naturally thought that this could be easily accom-
plished in the absence of any opposing force ; and
among them the only point in debate was, which of
these two places they ought first to attack. It is pro-
bable, indeed, that many of them, who had begun to
despair of seeing the dominions of the new republic
extend over the cities and territories that had been
subject to the two last of the Visconti, would have been
content by the acquisition of these two places, which
would have enabled them to establish a free state of
about the same extent as that which had been at the
head of the Lombard league in the days of Frederic I.;
and that, having done this, they might not be sorry to
dispense with the services of such a dangerous man as
Sforza. But he, on the other hand, was more anxious
to take Brescia, which had been promised to him, than
CHAP. III. OPINIONS OF SFORZA. 71
to put his employers in such a state of independence ;
and he was able to show many reasons why his plan
was more likely to be effective in carrying out even the
immediate wishes of the Milanese, than those which
were suggested by their ambassadors. So, while others
were divided in their opinion as to whether they ought
to march first to Lodi or to Bergamo, or make a simul-
taneous attack on both places, he tried to bring them
over to his wishes by the following arguments:–That,
since they had gained a great victory, they ought to
proceed in such a manner as to escape the imputation
that had been frequently thrown out against them, of
not knowing how to use their advantage ; that they
could not do so more effectually than by carrying the
war to the other side of the Oglio ; that by this step
they would increase not only the moral impression that
had already been produced, but even the actual advan-
tages that were to be reaped from their victory; that
their forces would derive their supplies from an enemy's
territory; that the remains of the opposite army would
not have the courage to rally if they were vigorously
pursued in that direction ; that the garrisons in most of
the strongholds would be so taken by surprise that they
would surrender at once ; that they might then bring
their whole forces to bear against the town of Brescia;
that, if the people of Bergamo and Lodi beheld them-
selves cut off from all hopes of assistance, in conse-
quence of the fall of that place, they would of their own
accord surrender ; but that if, instead of following his
advice, they fell back upon Bergamo or Lodi, and
72 HE PROCEEDS TO BRESCIA. BOOK W.
wasted their time in the siege of these cities, the Vene-
tians, possessed as they were of almost boundless re-
sources, both in money and other things, would soon
bring against them another army, strong as that which
they had beaten, and that thus they would scarcely be
in a better condition than they had been before.
The persuasive powers of Sforza were always omni-
potent in the camp. The officers and soldiers, whom he
had so often led to victory and plunder, were all in his
favour. He was backed in his opinion by two or three
independent condottieri, and only opposed by Piccinino,
who was piqued at the idea of seeing him in possession
of another city. But the opposition of the latter was
overruled by the rest of the assembly, and it was finally
determined that Sforza should proceed with the main
body of his army to Brescia, and that Ventimiglia, a
nobleman of some importance in the kingdom of Naples,
who had lately adopted the profession of arms, and was
now in the service of the Milanese, should betake him-
self with a small force to Lodi. The judgment of the
council was further confirmed by the arrival of several
messengers from the different towns in the territory he
was about to invade, all of whom said that they were
ready to surrender to him, and that they wondered
much that he was not among them already. The delay,
of course, had been involuntary on his part ; and when
he had obtained leave to follow out his own plans, he
was not slow in making up for lost time. One day's
march brought him from Caravaggio, within the con-
fines of the Brescian territory. In four days more, he
CHAP. III. OPPOSITION OF PICCININO 73
took, almost without opposition, all the strongholds
therein; and then he encamped within two miles of the
town of Brescia, with the intention of immediately
commencing its siege.
Piccinino, finding that in the camp he could not pre-
Vail against the great rival of his family, obtained leave
to go to Milan, under pretence of attending to some
necessary business. There he endeavoured to stir up
the republican party, by representing to them how much
they would have to fear from Sforza, if they allowed
him to add Brescia to his other possessions. Many
concurred with him in this opinion ; but they feared the
people, who worshipped Sforza with all the homage that
is generally rendered to a conqueror; and, warned by
the experience of the past, they did not dare openly to
take measures against him ; but they tried to injure
him in every under-hand manner that their malice could
suggest. They sent messengers to the Venetians, to
inform them that they would find a large party at Milan
willing to listen to propositions of peace ; and they
obtained leave for Piccinino to withdraw his forces
from the army of Sforza, to prosecute the war in the
territory of Lodi.
Sforza Soon became aware of these proceedings.
Arasmus, the person who was formerly mentioned as
having been seized by the mob for making propositions
of peace, sent a letter to an officer in Sforza’s army, ex-
horting him to arrange with the other captains, to divide
the forces in such a manner that their general should
not be able to bring together troops sufficient for the
74 DISCOWERED BY SFORZA. BOOK W.
capture of Brescia. This letter having been dropped by
accident, and brought to Sforza, served to remove from
his mind all doubts, if any had formerly existed, as to
what the Piccinini had been doing at Milan. He, never-
theless, persevered, hoping that he might take the city
before his enemies could effect all the mischief they were
plotting. He had already invested it on the two sides
on which it was bounded by a plain, and had placed
guards near the opposite gates, and at different stations
in the mountains, to prevent any supplies being sent to
it. The garrison, which consisted of one thousand
horse and five hundred foot, taken from the army that.
had been defeated at Caravaggio, scarcely dared to
attack him except under the cover of night ; and as
their spirits were considerably broken after their recent
reverse, it did not seem probable that they would make
a protracted resistance against one who was deemed in-
vincible. Everything, indeed, appeared to promise him
a speedy success, when his hopes were much damped by
the discovery of a treachery which was almost unparal-
leled in the history of nations. While he was endea-
vouring, by all the means in his power, to take a city
which was the most important that had fallen into the
hands of the enemy, and which had been the first cause of
the hostilities with which Lombardy had been desolated
for nearly a quarter of a century, and while he was
not without hopes that the inhabitants would of their
own accord surrender, he ascertained, beyond all possi-
bility of doubt, that the state whose army he was com-
manding was encouraging the besieged to hold out, by
CHAP. III. ORDERS OF THE MILANESE. 75
informing them that they had already proposed terms
to the Venetians, which they hoped would lead to a
speedy cessation of hostilities; that, even if these
failed, they would order Sforza to go elsewhere with his
army; and that, under any circumstances, he would soon
be obliged to retire to his winter cantonments. A short
time afterwards, he himself received orders not to waste
any more time at Brescia, but to make himself master
of the cities on the Mincio, and to proceed thence to
Verona. The bearer of these mandates added that,
if they were not obeyed at once, supplies should be
withheld.
On the receipt of these orders, Sforza at first made a
temperate reply. He reminded their bearer of the
arrangements that had been made after the battle of
Caravaggio, from which he distinctly understood that he
was to retain, if not the whole of the forces he had at
that time, at least those that were now with him for his
present enterprise ; that its difficulties were not such as
they had represented ; that, from the arrangements he
had made, it was easy to see that, if the city did not ere
long surrender, it might be taken by storm ; that, with
regard to the plan which they proposed, it would be con-
trary to all rules of military science to advance while
their enemies held such a city as Brescia in their rear;
that the force which was there would, after he had gone,
at once regain possession of all the strongholds and towns
in the neighbourhood which had already surrendered to
him; that all their communications would in this manner
be intercepted ; that as to the cities on the Mincio,
76 PASSES FROM THE MILANESE BOOK W.
they could not be taken so easily as they seemed to
think; that many of them belonged to the marquis of
Mantua; and that, if he did not assist them and furnish
them with supplies, their position would be untenable.
Though these arguments were just, Sforza well knew
that they would avail nothing with men whose leading
motive was jealousy of him. He saw too well that the
time had come when he could no longer act under the
Milanese, with either honour or advantage to himself.
Their behaviour to him throughout the whole of the war,
and more especially upon the present occasion, afforded
him sufficiently specious excuses to justify, both to him-
self and to others, any step that he might deem it
advisable to take. He therefore made up his mind, as
soon as he beheld a favourable occasion, to break from
his present employers, and publicly to assert his pre-
tensions to be Duke of Milan ; and it was not long be-
fore the much-wished-for opportunity presented itself.
The government of Venice, however they might have
been vexed, were by no means driven to despair by the
result of the battle at Caravaggio. Though unable to
bring together another army against their enemy, they
made every preparation for retarding his progress.
They put garrisons into all the cities and strongholds;
and having learned from the previous wars how im-
portant it was to have the command of the lake of
Garda, they equipped four galleys at Peschiera. And,
as some suspected Michael Attendolo of collusion with
his kinsman, and all agreed that he was incapable of
opposing him, they appointed one Marcellus to the
CHAP. III. TO THE WENETIANS. 77
command of what forces they were able to collect. But
they placed their chief reliance both in the assistance
and the friendly mediation of the Florentines. They
well knew the friendship of Cosmo de' Medici and
Sforza ; and the frequent overtures of the Milanese, as
well as the private information which they continued to
receive, had made them fully aware of the want of con-
fidence between the latter and his employers. In ac-
cordance with their expectations, as Alphonso had at
that time just raised the siege of Piombino, their re-
publican allies sent a force of two thousand horse and
one thousand foot to their assistance. At the same
time, both republics made overtures of reconciliation
and alliance to Sforza, by means of Angelo Simoneta,
the uncle of the historian of that name. These over-
tures were seconded by Bianca Maria, who was also
incessantly urging her husband to claim from the Mi-
lanese the succession that she believed to belong to her.
In this state of his feelings and his circumstances, he
did not hesitate to accept the terms now offered to him.
By these terms, it was agreed upon that the Venetians
were to assist him to make himself master of Milan, and
allow him thirteen thousand florins per month for the
support of his troops till he should succeed in so doing;
but that he was to be content with the possession of
those cities and territories that had belonged to Philip
at the time of his death, and was to restore to them all
those places of which he had since deprived them.
During the progress of these negotiations, but few of
Sforza's officers had any notion of his real intentions.
78 EXPLAINS HIS CONDUCT BOOK W.
But when everything had been arranged, he called them
together, for the purpose of declaring and justifying to
them the part that he was now about to take. He
begged them to call to mind the desperate position of
the Milanese at the time of Philip's death ; that they
were deprived of almost everything they had formerly
possessed ; their so-called allies were all in revolt; their
capital was surrounded by enemies' armies, and that, if
he had not come to their succour, they must have been
completely subjugated; that his first step was to secure
them, by negotiation, the friendship of the Parmese ;
that he then took for them the citadel of San Colum-
bano; that he then took Piacenza, with no inconsiderable
sacrifice of his soldiers, and, as was evident from the
fate of his horse having been killed under him, at no
small danger to himself;” that immediately after that
the Milanese began intriguing against him ; that he,
nevertheless, brought his army into the neighbourhood
of the Adda, and prevented the country from being pil-
laged by the Venetians; that by remaining there, as
directed, he exposed his own possessions at Cremona to
no inconsiderable danger ; that he afterwards com-
pletely destroyed their fleet at Casale ; that when, in
obedience to their commands, he laid siege to Cara-
vaggio, his power was so weakened by their intrigues
that he might on many occasions have fallen an easy
prey to the enemy ; that he, nevertheless, continued to
* At any other time it would excite surprise to hear a general claiming
any merit for having exposed himself in the manner alluded to; but it must
be recollected that this speech was made when such battles as that of
Anghiari were of no uncommon occurrence.
CHAP. III. To HIs OFFICERs. 79
maintain the army principally at his own expense ; that
he ended by putting them in possession of the city, and
enriching their soldiers with a quantity of booty almost
unequalled in Italian warfare ; that, in spite of all he
had done for them, they grudged him his promised re-
ward of the city of Brescia; that when he repaired
thither, their first act was to weaken his army by order-
ing the Piccinini to bring their forces against Lodi ;
that when, notwithstanding this, they saw every propa-
bility of his taking the city, they endeavoured to pre-
vent his attaining one of the stipulated rewards, by
trying to make peace with the Venetians, and encourag-
ing the citizens to hold out against him to the last.
Thus a prudent regard for his own safety, for the pos-
sessions of his wife, and for the fortunes of his children,
rendered the step he had taken quite unavoidable. He
concluded by exhorting them all to remain with him, if
they wished for rewards worthy of the labour they had
undergone, and of the success they had attained.
The above arguments were so plausible in themselves,
and had been so ably stated by the speaker, that none
had aught to say against them in the council. Many,
indeed, as their subsequent conduct proved, must have
suspected his motives, and were inimical to him at
heart ; but he was personally popular with the great
body of the army, most of whom, it is probable, were
allured by the recollection of former, and the pros-
pect of future plunder, and troubled themselves but
little about the righteousness of his cause.
The news of Sforza's desertion caused a consterna-
80 ANGER OF THE MILANESE. BOOK W.
tion at Milan, equal in intensity to the joy which had
been produced by his success at Caravaggio. The great
men, it was said, were grieved ; the people indulged in
reproaches ; the women and children poured forth
lamentations. The government themselves, indignant
at being overreached in dishonesty, sent ambassadors
to remonstrate with him. Some of them admitted,
indeed, that he had cause for complaint, but entreated
him not to set down the misdeeds of a few citizens
as the acts of the republic ; while others, though it
must have been as unbecoming in them to make any
taunts on this score, as it would have been in Clodius
to censure the libertines, or in Catiline to accuse the
Cethegi, without reserve reproached him with the
grossest treachery and deceit. The speech made by
the latter is curious, both as making a pretence of
injured innocence on their part, and as setting forth his
conduct in exactly a contrary light to that which he
had endeavoured to represent it to his army. The fol-
lowing are the words of it as given by Machiavelli :*—
“Whenever a person wishes to obtain anything from
another, he generally tries him with entreaties, with
promises of rewards, or with threats, in order that he
may be moved by pity, by hopes of advantage, or by fear,
to do that which he desires. But in dealing with men
who are cruel and awaricious, and who think themselves
powerful, it is but lost labour to attempt to soften them
with prayers, to bring them over by hopes of advan-
tage, or to frighten them with threats. We, however,
* 1st, lib. vi.
CHAP. III. SPEECH OF 81
having (too lately it may be) acquired experience of
your cruelty, your ambition, and your pride, are come,
not indeed to ask any favour from you, but to remind
you of the benefits you have received from the people of
Milan, and to show you with what ingratitude you are
treating them, that in the midst of our misfortunes we
may have the melancholy pleasure of loading you with
reproaches. You, indeed, may well recollect in what a
state you were at the time of Philip's death ; you were
involved in hostilities with the king of Naples, and the
pope; you had forsaken the Florentines and the Vene-
tians ; and as they were justly indignant at your con-
duct, and had no longer any need of you, you had
almost become their enemy. You were exhausted by
the war which you had waged with the church, you had
but few soldiers, you were without allies or money, and
could not have any hope of being able to retain either
your states or your former reputation. These circum-
stances alone would have caused you to fall, but for our
simplicity—for we alone gave you protection, being
moved thereto by respect to the memory of the late duke;
and we believed that you would show some friendship to
his successors, and being willing to confer on you some
favours in addition to those that you had received
from him, we promised you Verona or Brescia besides
your other fiefs: your attachment to us ought, there-
fore, to be firm and indissoluble. What more could we
give you, or promise you ? What more could you
have, or even wish for ? Thus you have received from
us unlooked-for kindness, and we have received from
WOL. II. F
82 THE MILANESE BOOK W.
you unlooked-for injury. Indeed, even before this you
showed the iniquity of your intentions ; for as soon as
you were made commander-in-chief of our armies, you
acted contrary to all justice in accepting the sovereignty
of Pavia—a deed which should have forewarned us of
the result we might have expected from your friend-
ship. Alas !—for those who desire all, a part is not
sufficient. You promised us, indeed, that we should
have the benefit of every acquisition that you might
make, as you well knew that anything you gave us you
could in an instant take from us. This you did after
the victory of Caravaggio, which, though obtained by
our blood and money, has been the cause of our ruin.
Unhappy indeed are the states which have to defend
their liberty against those that wish to oppress them ;
but much more unhappy are those which have to defend
themselves with faithless and mercenary arms like yours.
May posterity take warning from our case more than
we have done from that of Thebes and Philip of Mace-
don, who, after he had obtained a victory over their
enemies, changed from being their captain to be their
enemy, and finally became their ruler. We, however,
cannot be accused of any fault, except that of having
placed much confidence in one in whom we ought to
have placed but little ; for the whole of your past life,
and your boundless spirit, not content with any de-
gree of dignity, or any possession, ought to have put
us on our guard, and we ought not to have placed
any reliance in one who had betrayed the signor of
Lucca, deceived the Florentines and Venetians, thought
CHAP. III. AMBASSADORS. 83
little of our duke, showed no respect to the king of
Naples, and, worst of all, inflicted many injuries on
God and the church. And we ought never to have
thought that Francesco Sforza would have shown more
respect to the people of Milan than he did to so many
Sovereigns; and that, after having so often violated his
engagements with others, he would keep them with us.
But this, though it may show our imprudence, cannot
either palliate your treachery or clear you from the
infamous character which our just complaints will be the
means of procuring you throughout the world; nor will
it save you from the sting of your own conscience when
those arms, which we prepared to attack and to frighten
others, are brought to wound and to injure ourselves;
for you yourself will think that you deserve the punish-
ment of parricides. And even if you are entirely blinded
by ambition, yet the whole world, who are the witnesses
of your iniquity, will make you open your eyes. God
too will make you open them, if perjury, breach of pro-
mise, and betrayal are displeasing to Him, and if, judg-
ing from the way in which He has hitherto always ruled
by His unseen goodness, He does not wish for ever to be
the friend of the wicked. Do not now flatter yourself
with the hopes of a certain victory, for, in the first
place, you will be prevented by the just displeasure of
the Almighty ; and, in the next place, we all prefer
death to the loss of liberty. Even if we cannot defend
our liberty, we should surrender to any one rather than
to you ; and if, for our sins, we should ever come into
your power, be well assured that your reign, which will
84 SFORZA's ANSWER. BOOK W.
have been begun with fraud and infamy, will end either
in your person, or in that of your sons, with blame and
loss.”
When men have made up their minds how to act,
they are seldom induced to change their course by
reproaches or taunts; and it will easily be credited that
Sforza was unmoved by aught that the ambassadors
could say. Whatever might have been his feelings, he
did not either in word or in gesture betray the slightest
symptom of irritation, and very quietly replied, that he
was happy to be able to give them the satisfaction of
venting their anger in words so destitute of sense; that
he would answer the charges that were brought against
him, if they were in the presence of any one who could
be an impartial judge of their differences; that he him-
self was quite conscious that he had in no way injured
the Milanese, but merely taken precautions against
being injured by them ; that they had no reason to feel
aggrieved at his having taken a step that they them-
selves had already endeavoured to take ; and that if he
had not acted as he had done, he would, ere long, have
had reason to upbraid them with reproaches of the
same nature as those that they were now casting against
him. He concluded by appealing to the same God
upon whom they had called to avenge them of their
adversaries, and expressed a wish that He would so
order events that the result of the war might show
which of the two parties had most justice on his side,
and was acting most in consonance with His will.
Shortly after this the ambassadors returned to Milan,
CHAP. III. REFLECTIONS. 85
and Sforza set about the measures that were most
advisable in his new situation.
Such were the chief circumstances of a transaction
which has been represented by the enemies of Sforza as
a most unparalleled piece of treachery on his part. He
himself endeavoured to make out, as has been shown,
that, considering the behaviour of others, he could not
have acted in a different manner; and it must be
allowed that he was not more deserving of blame either
than those whom he betrayed, or those into whose
service he entered. The former were frequently in-
triguing against him during the time that he was in the
command of their army, and they could not have been
surprised at his having done unto them as they had
sought to do unto him ; the latter were entertaining
Sforza's enemies with the semblance of listening to their
negotiations, at the time that they were endeavouring
to deprive them of their general. But although the
practice of the times, and the behaviour of other parties,
will in a great measure palliate this act, it is impossible
not to concur in the opinion of M. Sismondi, “that
Sforza’s conduct throughout was so skilful, and directed
so uniformly towards the same end, that it is difficult
to believe that he had not foreseen and premeditated
everything, from the time that he engaged in the ser-
vice of the Milanese.” .
CHAPTER IV.
SFORZA DESERTED BY SOME OF HIS OFFICERS – Is PUT IN POSSESSION OF
PIACENZA-JOINED BY SOME FRIENDS FROM MILAN–TAKES CASTLES IN THE
IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF MILAN.—MILANESE SEND TO REMONSTRATE
wiTH HIM. — HE PROTECTS THEIR AMBASSADORS FROM HIS sold IERs. –
SENDS A FRIEND WITH THEM TO MILAN. — VIOLENT SPEECH OF GIORGIO
LAMPUGNANO. — CHARLES GONZAGA THE HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC.—
ABBIATE SAVED FROM PILLAGE BY BIANCA MARIA.—SFORZA CUTS OFF THE
WATER FROM MILAN. — PICCININO CARRIES OFF CATTLE FROM PAVIA.—
A FLORENTINE AMBASSADOR REMAINS IN SFORZA's CAMP.-AFFAIRs of
PARMA.—SFORZA IS JOINED BY PICCININo.—SEVERAL MILANESE NoblEs
BANISHED OR EXECUTED.—MOBOCRACY AT MILAN. — AFFAIRS OF PARMA.
—PARMESE OFFER THEIR CITY TO LIONEL of ESTE. — WENETIANS AR-
RANGE THAT IT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SFORZA.
THE extremities to which the Milanese had been reduced
before they retained Sforza showed that, unassisted, they
were no match for the Venetians. The man by whose
aid alone they had maintained themselves was now about
to pass over to the enemy. If, before hiring him, they
had trembled for their fate, it might now be thought
that nothing could save them. There was, however, one
important difference between their present and their past
circumstances. On a former occasion, if the Venetians
had taken their city, they would have added it to their
own empire ; now, they had promised it to their new
ally. Judging of the policy of their republican neigh-
bours by their own, they thought that they would not
be particularly anxious to continue the war for the sake
BOOK W. SFORZA's PREPARATIONS. 87
of their condottiere, after they had got all they wanted
for themselves. They therefore determined to use all
the arts of diplomacy and intrigue, to maintain them-
selves for the present. The result will show how well
they played their game ; for though they did not ulti-
mately succeed, it required all the talents, the perse-
verance, and the generalship of Sforza to beat them.
It was not long before an event happened that made
many people think that Sforza's success was not likely
to be so rapid as had at first been anticipated. Picci-
nino succeeded in regaining possession of Lodi ; Charles
Gonzaga, with a force of about one thousand two hun-
dred horse, and five hundred foot, deserted him by
night ; and many feared lest the other captains and
soldiers who had been engaged by the Milanese should
follow their example. These events made such an
impression in the camp, that it required all his address
to prevent his soldiers from losing that self-confidence
which is one of the principal requisites for military suc-
cess. He himself, nothing daunted, shortly began to take
the measures which his altered circumstances required.
He lost no time in restoring to the Venetians, both their
captives that still remained in his hands, and the cities
that he had taken in the territory of Brescia. As the
former bridge across the Adda had been broken down,
he constructed a new one, and passed over it into the
territory of Lodi, giving out that he appeared there as
an ally, not as an enemy. He had spies to report to him
the actions and sayings of the Milanese generals that
still remained in his camp ; a fleet was equipped at
88 ACCESSION BOOK W.
Pavia, which served both to guard the passage of the Po
and to supply his army with abundance of provisions.
The legate of the Milanese, who at first said that he
could not leave his army until he received orders from
home, was politely dismissed, and requested to assure the
Milanese, that, if they would at once receive him as their
duke, they had nothing to fear; but that, if they per-
severed in their foolish attempt to govern themselves,
he could not answer for the consequences. He also sent
to the Parmese, exhorting them to quit the Milanese,
and to put themselves under his protection ; and at
the same time admonished them, if they did not wish
to do this, to abstain from rendering any assistance
to his enemies. After this, he endeavoured to sound
the dispositions of the inhabitants of Piacenza. For
money, he applied as usual to Cosmo de' Medici, to
Lionel of Este, as also to Jacobo Fregoso, the lead-
ing man at Genoa, who had in the preceding year
married his natural daughter; finally, he requested the
legates of the Venetians to return home, and endeavour
to procure him an augmentation of forces according to
their previous arrangements.
In the mean time Jacobo Piccinino moved towards
Piacenza, where he hoped to reconcile the contending
factions to the rule of the Milanese, and to place his
army in cantonments for the winter. The inhabitants,
however, whether it was that they disliked the yoke of
their present rulers, or that they foresaw the success
and dreaded the displeasure of Sforza, refused to admit
him. On hearing of this, the latter, heedless of the
CHAP. IV. OF FORCES. 89
admonitions of his friends, who feared lest some should
try to avenge themselves on him for the losses they had
sustained in the preceding year, went thither himself to
receive their allegiance. On his arrival, he found that
the citizens, so far from making any attempt against
him, welcomed him with acclamations, and submitted to
him at once. With their permission, he placed a gar-
rison of six hundred horse in the citadel, under the
command of Salernitano and Thomas Theobaldus, from
Bologna. He then took up a position between Pavia
and Milan; so that, while the rear of his army was
guarded by the former of these cities, he appeared to
threaten the latter.
While he was in this position, the three brothers of
the family of San Severino, notable captains of their
time, came to him from Milan, bringing with them a
force of about eight hundred horse, and acknowledged him
as their duke. Soon afterwards he engaged the services
of William, brother of the marquis of Montferrat, and
of Vermio, a condottiere of some note—the former of
whom joined him under the hopes of some future day
getting the city of Alessandria, and the latter for the
sake of preserving the towns that he held in the vici-
nity of Piacenza. Vermio also obtained a promise from
him that his eldest son by his first wife should, in the
course of time, be married to his only daughter. Even
at that time it was deemed advisable to seek the alliance
of one who bade fair to be one of the most powerful
sovereigns in Italy.
The approach of winter did not cause Sforza to cease
90 TAKES FORTRESSES BOOK W.
from active operations. But in order to protect his
soldiers from the rains that usually set in about that
season of the year, he generally managed to find shelter
for them in the cottages and farm-houses, with which
that highly-cultivated region abounded. Indeed, though
his ambition was at all times great, it seems at this time
to have been particularly whetted by the great beauty
and fertility of the territory for which he was then con-
tending, for he is reported then to have said, that
though he had been in every part of Italy from the Straits
of Messina to the Alps, both in war and in peace, he
had seen no part of it to be compared to that which lay
between Pavia, Lodi, and Milan. Thus the gift of
beauty made Italy suffer, as well by stirring up the
passions of her own sons as by exciting the cupidity of
barbarians.
Having posted his troops in the manner described,
he managed to occupy so considerable a portion of the
territory of Milan as to prevent the unfortunate inha-
bitants of the city from deriving their customary sup-
plies from the country. The three neighbouring towns
of Rosato, Sachiarella, and Binasco, soon came into
his hands. Some little show of resistance was made
to him before the citadel of the last-named place sur-
rendered ; but here, like Napoleon at Ulm, he overbore
all opposition, as well by the terror of his name as by
the adroitness with which he was able to turn it to
account. The citadel itself was on a lofty eminence
with its walls in excellent order, and surrounded by a
trench which was filled with water ; it had been well
CHAP. IV. NEAR MILAN. 9 |
garrisoned and well provisioned by the Milanese, and
seemed capable of offering a protracted resistance. The
light troops of Sforza, being the first to approach it,
were considerably annoyed by the discharge of missiles
therefrom. But when the commandant saw the great
forces of his enemy in the surrounding country, he lost
all heart, and ordered his men to desist from offering
them any active resistance. Sforza, taking advantage
of this respite, approached the edge of the trench, and
shouted out, “O commandant l if this citadel is not
this instant delivered up to me, I will forthwith substi-
tute cannon for these light arms; and, secure as you now
think yourself, you will soon find it battered about your
ears. And you shall soon be as much below as you
are now above us; and those that are with you shall be
sent headlong into the trench beneath.” The terrified
commandant entreated that he might be allowed to save
his reputation, by postponing his answer till the fol-
lowing day, before which time he might receive direc-
tions from Milan. But Sforza knew well how to take
advantage both of his present position and of the con-
sternation of his adversary, and he immediately replied,
“What do I care about time, or the wishes of the
Milanese ? If you do not at this moment surrender,
nothing short of an extraordinary interposition of the
Almighty shall save you from my hands.” “ These
words produced the desired effect, and he was forthwith
put in possession of the citadel.
For some time the Milanese had continued to hope
* SIMONETA, lib. xv.
92 MILANESE REMONSTRANCES. Book W.
that, whatever might have been the intentions of Sforza,
he would not have had the power to proceed to extre-
mities against them. They well knew that he had not
the means to carry on a war at his own expense ; they
did not think that the Venetians would supply him with
money or troops to follow up any enterprise of his own;
and they expected that the majority of the soldiers with
which they had furnished him would desert him, as soon
as he entered their territory. But his present position,
master as he was of almost everything except their city,
and threatening every day to cut off their supplies,
showed them that their danger was greater than had
been anticipated. They therefore sent again to remon-
strate with him, in rather humbler terms than before :
they affected to take it much to heart that the person
whom they had looked up to as their protector should
have become their persecutor, and they declared that
they would do anything for him except surrender their
liberty. In conclusion, they entreated him at least not
to continue to employ against them their own troops.
In answer to these representations, he said that the
city of Milan belonged to him by right of inheritance,
and that he was merely seeking his own ; that he was
not the enemy of the great body of the people, but
merely of a domineering faction that sought to deprive
him of his rights ; that, as a proof of this, he appealed
to the manner in which he had respected the property
as well as the persons of the people, whenever they had
come into his power; that, as for the Milanese troops in
his army, they had his permission now, as heretofore,
CHAP. IV. DEBATES AT MILAN. 93
to act just as they liked. On the departure of the
ambassadors, he had some little trouble to preserve
discipline among his troops, a considerable number of
whom set upon them at no very great distance from his
camp, and stripped them of all they possessed. For-
tunately for his reputation, he received intelligence of
this act of violence in sufficient time to have all their
property restored to the injured parties, and to have
several of the malefactors hanged in their presence. He
was about to proceed in the same manner with all who
had been concerned in the robbery, when the ambas-
sadors entreated that their lives should be spared.
Sforza well knew that his party at Milan would be
considerably strengthened, both by the commanding posi-
tion which he held at that instant, and by the manner
in which he had abstained from wantonly injuring the
people. He also judged that a favourable impression
would be caused by the kind treatment and protection
which their ambassadors had received at his hands. For
this reason he sent with them to the city a friend of his
own, who found a considerable number, both of the
nobles and the common people, well disposed to receive
him, and he was not without hopes that they might all be
prevailed upon to do so. He was allowed to plead the
cause of his master in the hall of the dukes, before the
assembly of the people. But whatever expectations he
had previously entertained were frustrated by the influ-
ence of one Georgio Lampugnano, who had accom-
panied the ambassadors to Sforza's camp, and shown
himself throughout to be one of his bitterest enemies.
94 FEELINGS AGAINST SEORZA. BOOK W.
He made a most violent speech to the people, in which
he called both Sforza himself and Bianca Maria by the
most opprobrious names, and asked them if they thought
that such people were fit to be rulers of their ancient
city. He concluded by saying that their would-be
duke had many Sons, brothers, and connections, each of
whom they would find an intolerable tyrant; that under
them neither the persons nor the properties of their
citizens, nor the honour of their matrons or maids, would
be safe ; that they would have to rebuild at no small
cost of money and labour the citadel, which they had
so lately levelled with the ground; and that they might
ere long behold their wives and children working as
slaves in re-erecting this instrument of oppression.
The passions of the ignorant, and, it may be, the
fears of many sober-minded people, were stirred up
by this harangue. Many false stories were circulated
against Sforza, and many of his most questionable acts,
and of the deeds of severity which, at different times,
he had thought himself necessitated to commit, were
exaggerated so as to blast his reputation. And there
were many people who had seen with their own eyes,
or who had heard from their fathers of, the cruelties
that had been perpetrated by their rulers of old, and
to whom the dangers that were set forth in such strong
language by Lampugnano must have appeared in no way
overdrawn. The result of the whole was, that Sforza’s
name, for a time, became a sort of byword of unpopu-
larity, and all classes declared their determination to
oppose him to the very last drop of their blood. In
CHAP. IV. SIEGE OF ABBIATE. 95
their present critical position, they intrusted the chief
conduct of their proceedings to Charles Gonzaga ; they
ordered Francesco Piccinino to return with all his force
to the city ; and they placed garrisons, under the most
trustworthy of their captains, in Como, Monza, Novara,
and several other towns which still remained faithful to
them. They also sent to the king of France, and to
the dukes of Burgundy and Savoy, to beg for aid ; and
they left no means untried to render the name of Sforza
as unpopular, both in Italy and out of it, as they had
already made it within the walls of their city.
Sforza, seeing that matters had come to this extre-
mity, resolved to give the Milanese and their allies some
experience of the evils of war. His first step was to
lay siege to the town of Abbiate ; and having, in three
days, effected a considerable breach in the walls, he
summoned the inhabitants to surrender. On their
refusal to do so, he swore that, as soon as it fell into
his hands, he would abandon it, without any mercy, to
be pillaged by his soldiers. There is very little doubt
but that it would have shared the fate of Piacenza, if
it had not been saved by the intercession of Bianca
Maria. It so happened that, previous to her marriage,
she had passed the greater part of her time there along
with her mother—she had many friends among its in-
habitants, and was much attached to the people in
general. Fortunately for them, intelligence of their
impending fate was soon brought to her at Pavia, and
she used all her influence with her husband to save
them. As he seldom refused anything to a wife to
96 IT SURRENDERS. BOOK W.
whom he was so much indebted, he consented, for her
sake, to pardon them. Having promised this, he sent
a second summons to them to surrender. But the
inhabitants, either through ignorance of the manner
in which a city could be taken by storm, or at the insti-
gation of the garrison, who were anxious to gain time
for the Milanese, again sent a refusal. The news of this
spread like fire among the camp ; the soldiers desired
nothing so much as that their general should be irri-
tated by the obstinacy of the citizens, and abandon
them to their fate. A great body of them having
rushed forward to the breach, crying out, “Booty
booty 1 ° and begun to effect an entrance into the city,
it required the utmost exertions of Sforza and one of
his officers to restrain them. When order had been in
some measure restored, the former, thinking that the
inhabitants must now have become convinced of the
futility of all further resistance, approached the breach to
arrange about the terms of the capitulation. But here
again they seemed determined to tempt fate; for one
of their number, probably thinking that he would
do a good deed if he put Sforza out of the world,
hurled a javelin at him, which, however, an attendant
managed to ward off by the handle of his spear. Sforza
merely remarked that his time had not yet come, and
moved on, neither daunted nor irritated. On his ar-
riving at the place where he had expected the leading
citizens to treat with him, and finding nobody, he said
that he took their behaviour on this occasion much
more to heart than the attack that had been made on
CHAP. IV. MILANESE SUPPLIES CUT OFF. 97
him ; for that it really seemed as if they were trying
to make a fool of him, and to bring destruction upon
themselves: nevertheless, for his wife's sake he would
spare them if he could ; but that he very much feared
that he could not restrain his soldiers any longer. The
dread of this last event brought the citizens to their
senses, and they surrendered before daybreak on the
following morning. The commander of the garrison,
well knowing that the fortress could not stand the
enemy's cannon, soon after followed their example.
The possession of this city enabled Sforza to turn the
water from the canal which led from the Ticino to the
city of Milan. By this act he prevented the inhabitants
deriving their usual supplies from the adjacent country.
He was, however, disappointed in his expectations of
starving them into an immediate surrender. His ene-
mies had managed to inspire all classes with so great a
dread of his rule, that they determined to submit to
any privation rather than receive him as their ruler.
Their present distress caused them to exhibit an ex-
ample of firmness and patriotism ; the nobles and the
wealthier citizens produced whatever stores they might
by chance have had in their own houses, and sold them
at a moderate price ; the government allowed the people
to procure stones for grinding the corn from the walls,
the public buildings, and the largest of the houses;
and all disaffection and dissatisfaction was easily sup-
pressed.
Though he failed in producing at once the desired
result, Sforza continued his plan of operations. About
WOL. II. G
98 FURTHER CONQUESTS BOOK W.
the same time, he received from Venice a reinforcement
of two thousand infantry, under the command of Mar-
cellus. With these he took several more towns and
strong places, almost without any opposition. Nearly
all the cities in the vicinity of the lake of Como, with
the exception of the town of Como itself, surrendered
to him. Piccinino, who was now commanding for the
Milanese, though he did not dare openly to oppose
him, attempted to make a diversion in favour of his
employers. For this purpose he left Milan, with a
considerable body of men, very early in the morning,
entered the territory of Pavia before sunrise, and
carried off a considerable quantity of cattle from a
place within one mile of the town itself, where the
inhabitants of the surrounding country had placed
them. He then attacked Chiarella, a strongly forti-
fied place between Pavia and Milan. It was not long,
however, before the commandant of the garrison at
Binasco, which, it may be recollected, had been taken
not very long previously by Sforza, received intelligence
of what was going on, and marched forth to the rescue.
Piccinino, on seeing him approach, retired to the monas-
tery of Caravalle.
Not long afterwards, an ambassador from Florence
arrived in Sforza's camp. He begged to assure him of
the best wishes of Cosmo de' Medici, and the chief men
of the republic; but stated that, as their resources had
been exhausted by the war with Alphonso, they were
unable to supply him with money. He promised, how-
ever, in token of their friendship and support, to remain
CHAP. IV. OF SFORZA. 99
in his camp until he had succeeded in making himself
master of Lombardy. Though Sforza would, of course,
have preferred money to good wishes, there is no doubt
but that the open and avowed support of a man like
Cosmo de' Medici must have strengthened his cause in
the eyes of Italy, and may, in the same measure, have
contributed to his ultimate success.
Being now in possession of nearly all the towns in
the vicinity of Milan, he proceeded to carry on his
operations beyond the Ticino. He first turned his at-
tention to the important city of Novara, which had been
taken by the duke of Savoy in the unsettled state of
the affairs of Milan. He ordered boats to be brought
from Pavia to construct a bridge across the Ticino.
Having invested the city on all sides, he summoned the
inhabitants to surrender, accompanying his summons
with the usual threat of abandoning them to the pillage
of the soldiers, should he take it after their refusal. As
the fortifications were in a bad state of repair, and as
there was no force at hand to relieve them should they
hold out, they had nothing left but to obey. Their
example was soon followed by the inhabitants of the
other towns ; Romagnano, the only one where any re-
sistance was experienced, was after its capture given up
to the victors. The booty found therein, along with the
ransom paid for the prisoners, is said to have been as good
as several months' pay. While he was in this neighbour-
hood, the city of Tortona, which, it may be recollected,
had been taken possession of by him nominally for the
Milanese, but in reality for himself, and had been finally
100 NEGOTIATIONS WITH PARMESE. BOOK W.
taken for the former by Bartolomeo Collio, was divided
into two factions—the one which called itself Guelf,
being in favour of the Milanese republic ; the other,
bearing the opposite appellation of Ghibelline, support-
ing the man who aspired to be its duke. The latter
party, taking advantage of his vicinity, sent to him to
say that, if aided by a sufficient force, they felt sure that
they would be able to put him in immediate pos-
session of the city ; and on the appearance of five
hundred of his cavalry, they performed their promise.
He then took the city of Alessandria, and assigned it
to the marquis of Montferrat, much against the wish of
the inhabitants, who all preferred to be subjected to
him.
Intelligence was then brought to him that a certain
friend of his had agreed with the garrison of Parma to
surrender to him on the first favourable opportunity;
he therefore sent his brother Alexander to settle
matters. The latter arranged that a considerable part
of the garrison at Piacenza, along with a detachment
from Brescia, should form a junction with a few others
of his adherents who were in the Parmese territory, and
forthwith march upon the city. Unfortunately, how-
ever, for the success of this plan, one of the command-
ant's letters to the Venetians had fallen into the hands
of the Milanese, and made them aware of his intentions;
and they, indignant at the discovery of his treachery,
sent orders for the whole of the garrison to be put to
the sword. The execution of this bloody, though cer-
tainly not unmerited act of vengeance, was only pre-
CHAP. IV. GONZAGA's INTRIGUES. 101
vented by their having received timely intimation of
the discovery of their plot, and making their escape to
Some strongholds in the neighbourhood. As Alexander
still continued to threaten the city with a considerable
force, the Milanese sent Jacobo Piccinino to oppose him.
Whatever prejudices might have been excited against
Sforza at Milan, his continued success made no small
impression upon the minds of the people. Many of
them looked on in fear and trembling, uncertain which
way to turn themselves. Charles Gonzaga, to whom, as
has been stated, the Milanese had intrusted the chief
command of their affairs, feeling that he could not much
longer make head against him, bethought himself how
he might best turn this state of affairs to his own ad-
vantage. For this purpose he devised a plan of seizing
the city of Milan himself—not, indeed, under any expec-
tations of continuing to retain it, but under the hopes
of exchanging it with Sforza for Cremona, or some im-
portant places in the vicinity of his ancestral possessions.
He had already written to his friends at home to come
to him in his present quarters, intimating to several of
them that he had sundry good things in store for them.
He was making arrangements for seizing the Signoria
on a certain day, scouring the streets with his cavalry,
and procuring parties of his adherents to shout out
“Long live duke Charles l’ It was not long, however,
before some, who became suspicious of his proceed-
ings, used every means in their power to persuade the
citizens to maintain their liberty; besides which, there
were others who, however they might have wished for
102 TARTIES AT MILAN. BOOK W.
a republic, began to weary of a contest in which success
appeared at least to be doubtful; and the majority of
them thought that, if they must submit to somebody, it
would be better to be ruled by Sforza than by Charles
Gonzaga. Among the latter was Georgio Lampugnano,
who had on a previous occasion so effectually excited
the minds of the citizens against Francesco. They also
thought, that, if they must sooner or later have Sforza,
they might make better arrangements for a constitu-
tional government now than at a future time, after they
had been conquered by him ; and as Charles Gonzaga
had never ceased to persecute them from the time that
he had found himself thwarted by them, they were
anxious under any terms to get rid of him. They there-
fore intimated to the former, that, if he appeared in
the vicinity of the city, something might turn up to his
advantage. They also ordered their general, Venti-
miglia, to form a junction with him, along with his
forces. As he was always attached to Sforza before
he had quitted his army at a time that he supposed he
was acting in concert with him, he was only too glad
to execute their orders. He was received with the
greatest friendship by his former commander-in-chief.
As it seemed now probable that Sforza would sooner
or later be at the head of affairs at Milan, he was joined
by many of those characters who, like the rats that
always desert a foundering vessel, invariably leave the
falling for the rising party. Several of those who had
from time immemorial been his opponents in war, and
were still called Braccians, after the founder of their
CHAP. IV. PICCININO JOINS SFORZA. 103
school of arms, flocked to his standard. One of them
brought with him a body of two hundred horse that had
belonged to Francesco Piccinino. It was not long ere
this general also followed the example that had been
set by many of his party. He happened at this time
to be not very far from Landriano, the place whither
Sforza had gone under the expectation of being at once
made duke of Milan. Being in great want of money,
men, and everything required to maintain his position,
and beholding himself deserted by his friends and his
troops, he made up his mind to join himself with the
man whose fortunes now seemed to be more than ever
on the ascendant. But, at the same time, deeming it
advisable to keep two strings to his bow, just as he was
about to betake himself to the camp of Sforza, he sent
word to the opposite party at Milan that he hoped to
rejoin them in the commencement of the spring. Many
of Sforza’s friends endeavoured to dissuade him from
having anything more to do with such a faithless ally,
saying that he really could not foresee to what amount
of personal danger he might be exposed by admitting
him within his camp. He, of course, knew him too well
to place any reliance in him. Nevertheless, as his career
had now come to a point in which any appearance even
of increased strength would be of use to him, and as
nothing could prevent his getting immediate possession
of Parma, if his brother Jacobo were to withdraw his
forces, he determined to make what use of the two
brothers he could for the time. He also tried to attach
Piccinino in some degree to himself by promising to him
104 MUTUAL EXPLAN ATIONS. BOOK W.
his daughter Drusiana, whom the death of Fregoso at
Genoa had left at liberty to make a fresh engagement.
This alliance would make the fortune of any adventurer,
should her father succeed to the duchy of Milan ; and
events then showed that great things might be expected
even by marrying a natural daughter. But from this
arrangement he could not expect more than a tempo-
rary adherence to his cause: as he himself had already
lost much by the continued enmity both of his father-
in-law and son-in-law, he was too well acquainted with
the habits of his countrymen not to be aware that family
connection never stood in the way of self-interest.
The arrival of Piccinino in the camp of his new
master was followed by such explanations of past mis-
understandings, and protestations of mutual friendship,
as never take place between parties who really trust
one another. The former declared that he had not
been induced to join him through any pressure of cir-
cumstances, but that he had done so entirely from pre-
ference ; that whatever he had promised he would
faithfully perform ; that he would do his duty in
whatever station he might be placed, and never shrink
from any danger by which the fortunes of his friend
might be advanced. Sforza, in reply, assured him that
he had not the slightest mistrust of him whatever; that
he hoped that both his brother and himself would
regard him as their best friend ; that, for his part, he
looked upon them both as his sons; that there never
had been any enmity, but merely a glorious rivalry, be-
tween their late father and himself. When the inter-
CHAP. IV. ADWICE GIVEN TO SFORZA. 105
view was over, many people suggested to Sforza that he
had now an excellent opportunity of quietly getting rid
of a man who had at all times been either a treacher-
ous friend or a dangerous enemy. They added that
they had ascertained, beyond all doubt, that he had
made arrangements for joining the opposite party at
Milan the instant he should see a favourable oppor-
tunity of doing so ; that they had been informed that,
before he had joined them, his soldiers had come to
him and said, that, if he did not speedily do something
for them, they would either desert him or send him a
prisoner to the enemy ; and that he had merely come
to him as the only harbour of safety in the sea of his
difficulties. Though all this was well known to him,
he made a most magnanimous reply, which, as a good
name was at that time of peculiar importance to him,
may be supposed to have expressed his actual senti-
ments. He said that he preferred the risk of being
killed himself to being guilty of the blood of one who
had put himself under his protection ; that he would
behave in such a way to him that, if there was
to be any quarrel between them, the fault should
not be with him ; that, even if he had just cause
for killing him, the world at large would ascribe his
conduct to motives of policy or revenge. On that
very same day Piccinino returned to the place whence
he had come, and despatched a letter to the king of
Naples, saying that, although he was now serving under
his enemy's banner, he hoped he would still consider
him as his friend, and that of the republican party at
106 EXECUTION AND BANISHMENT BOOK W.
Milan ; that dire necessity alone had compelled him to
act as he had done, and that he would rejoin his old
allies on the very first opportunity. To send this letter
in Safety, he was obliged to apply to Sforza for a convoy
through the cities that acknowledged his jurisdiction.
While Piccinino was treating with each of the rival
parties, Sforza himself appears to have been carrying
on a double negotiation with the Milanese. He had
one correspondence with the chiefs of the old Ghibelline
party, many of whom had been at first opposed to his
pretensions, but were now willing to arrange terms on
which they might receive him as their duke ; another
with Charles Gonzaga, who hoped to get something for
himself by withdrawing his opposition. Matters, how-
ever, did not proceed as favourably for him as he might
at one time have expected ; the terms proposed by the
former appeared to him so stringent that he haughtily
rejected them ; and the latter, finding that he himself
was gaining nothing, made use of an artifice to get rid
of some of the leading men among his opponents.
Letters written in cipher, and said to have been inter-
cepted, were brought before the public, and interpreted ;
and it seemed as if the writers of them had been
making proposals to Sforza which were highly dis-
pleasing to the majority of the citizens. Whether
these letters were genuine or not does not appear ; but,
such as they were, they were sufficient to raise a
storm of indignation against those to whom they were
ascribed. The leaders of the opposite party did not
dare openly to put them to death ; but pretending to
CHAP. IV. OF SEVERAL MILANESE. 107
be very anxious for their safety, they advised them
to escape by night out of the city, for the purpose of
placing themselves under the protection of the emperor;
and told them that they would give them an escort to
Como, where they would find a supply of all things
necessary for their journey. The people in question
naturally hesitated to commit themselves to their ene-
mies; but on receiving repeated assurances from Gon-
zaga that nothing hostile was intended, they set out as
was desired. Instead of bringing them to Como, as
they promised, their guards brought them, during the
hours of darkness, to Monza, where they were cast into
prison. Georgio Lampugnano, the chief man among
them, was beheaded ; another of them was brought to
Milan and examined upon torture. In his agonies he
accused several citizens of note, of whom some were
executed, and others made a timely escape. The pro-
perty of all who fled was confiscated ; several others
who were suspected were ordered to depart, and many,
thinking Milan no safe place, voluntarily followed their
example. Among the latter were the ringleaders of
those who, when it had been proposed to make peace
with the Venetians, had instigated the people to shout
out “War, war !”
In this manner did Charles Gonzaga manage to clear
Milan of a considerable proportion of its noble citizens.
The government then fell into the hands of a party com-
posed of the most audacious demagogues and the lowest
order of citizens, who soon made their fellow-coun-
trymen experience some of the worst evils of democracy.
108 REIGN OF TERROR AT MILAN. BOOK W.
They obliged those who were supposed to be attached
to the exiled Ghibelline party to bear the whole weight
of the taxation. One of their first acts was to publish
an edict denouncing capital punishment against any one
who should mention Sforza’s name, except in terms of
disparagement. They made some additional declara-
tions about maintaining their liberty to the last, and
added, that if by any chance they should be unable to
do so, they would surrender to the devil or the Turkish
Sultan sooner than to Sforza. So complete was the
reign of terror which they established, for the time,
that many of the citizens, who desired nothing more
than to be allowed to follow their avocations, were
afraid to express any opinion whatever in public.”
Though Sforza was in hopes that he might gain the
crowning object of his ambition by negotiation, he still
continued to follow up his military operations. Fight-
ing, as he now was, on his own account, he seldom
allowed his troops much repose during the winter. His
brother Alexander still remained in the vicinity of
Parma, where he was opposed by Jacobo Piccinino.
In the month of January 1449, the extreme cold had
forced him to station his troops in cantonments in the
neighbourhood of Filino, and Piccinino and the Parmese,
taking advantage of this circumstance, had formed a
plan for surprising them. At the same time Alexander
himself was devising, along with Pietro Maria, the citi-
* The proscription of Sforza's name by the ruling party at Milan may
recall Tacitus' description of a reign of terror under the imperial government
of Rome:–“ Memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdissemus si tam in
nostrá potestate esset oblivisci quam tacere.”—Agric, 2.
CHAP. IV. BATTLE NEAR PARMA. 109
Zen who had promised to admit him within the city, a
joint attack upon the Parmese. They were, however,
anticipated by their enemies: their troops were driven
in towards the city of Filino, and a smart battle took
place beneath its walls. After it had been carried on
for some time with various success, Piccinino's division
was driven back with considerable loss by Alexander
Sforza ; and the former, immediately after his defeat,
received intelligence of the treaty that had been made
between Francesco Sforza and his brother. On this he
at once abandoned the Parmese to their fate. They,
however, though deserted at a most critical moment,
did not lose heart : they retired in the most perfect
order to the city, and prepared to defend it to the last.
Alexander was in no condition to follow them, but he
opened a fresh negotiation with some of the inhabitants
to take Parma itself by surprise. The party that were
favourably disposed towards him had managed to get
possession of one of the gates, which they promised to
open to his army. Their treachery, however, was dis-
covered in time, and the infuriated citizens made a vio-
lent attack on the gate that was held by the traitors,
under the hopes of getting possession of it before the
enemy should make his appearance. The defenders of
the gate knew that they could expect but little mercy
from their betrayed countrymen, should they fall into
their hands; and in order the more effectually to secure
themselves from their violence, they let fall the port-
cullis. But this device, which for a time protected
them from their fellow-citizens, served in the end to
110 NEGOTIATIONS OF |BOOK W.
save the latter from their enemies. On the appear-
ance of Alexander's army at the gate, it was found
impossible to lift the portcullis higher than would give
sufficient space for a man to crawl under. A few of
the light-armed cavalry, nothing daunted, threw them-
selves off their horses, and made their way into the city;
but as their example was not followed, they were left
to sustain a desperate conflict in the interior. Those
that were not killed on the spot, afterwards expired of
their wounds. The citizens, after having made a most
successful sally, and driven back their enemy with con-
siderable loss, attacked and set fire to a tower which
was still occupied by the traitors. When they had
compelled them to surrender, they wented their ire on
them by putting them to various tortures and sundry
kinds of death. One among them, who was known to
be much attached to Sforza, and generally suspected of
having been the chief instigator of their treachery, was
hung from a window in the public hall, where his body
was left for some time, to serve as a warning to others.
Shortly after this, Alexander Sforza was joined by
Bartolomeo Collio, with a body of two thousand horse
and five hundred foot. It soon became evident, even
to the most sanguine of the Parmese, that they could
not long sustain a conflict against the augmented forces
of their enemies, more especially as within the last few
months they had twice learned by experience, that in a
city which, for nearly four centuries, had been divided
into parties, it was impossible to depend upon the
fidelity of all. They were still, however, as much
CHAP. IV. THE PARMESE. 111
averse to being governed by Sforza as they had been
when they closed their gates to him immediately after
the death of Filippo Maria; and as they had formerly
belonged to the family of Este, and retained no dis-
agreeable recollections of their rule, they determined, after
due consultation, to make an offer of their city to the
present representative of that family. That prince
happened then to be at Venice, and the offer of the
Parmese was conveyed to him through his brother
Borsio, the signor of Reggio. Being too prudent
to do anything without the consent of his powerful
neighbours, he at once referred the matter to their
Senate, stating his claims, and adding, that, if they
did not wish him to have the city, the inhabitants
would sooner see it added to the republic of St
Mark than fall into the hands of Sforza. When he
had stated his case, he was ordered to withdraw ;
and on being brought back to hear their determination,
the doge Foscari addressed him in the following words:
“There is none of our customs of longer date, or more
rigidly observed by us, than that of strict adherence to
our word. It is incumbent upon us to perform the
whole of the covenant we made with Francesco Sforza
concerning the cities, the towns, and the territories of
the old duchy of Milan : therefore we neither want
Parma ourselves, nor will we allow you to take it. If
you wish to please us in this matter, you will use what-
ever influence you have with the citizens to persuade
them to surrender to Sforza.” When these words of
the doge were made known to the Parmese, they saw
112 THEY SURRENDER TO SFORZA. |BOOK W.
that there was no course left for them but to make the
best arrangement they could with Alexander. As
Alexander was not taking the city for himself, and as
he was anxious to go to Pesaro on business of his own,
he at once acceded to their propositions ; and after
having told them that these must be ratified by his
brother, he went on his way. When the terms were
brought to Francesco for his approval, he found many
things in them which he did not like, and which, had
they been in the first instance submitted to him, he
would have refused. Nevertheless, for the sake of his
reputation, he acceded to them all, and even promised
in no way to molest one or two of the citizens who, in
the words of his biographer, were the most hostile to
him of the many enemies he had in Italy. After this,
the Parmese admitted his soldiers within their walls and
into the citadel, which they had refused to do before.
GHAPTER W.
CLOSE BLOCKADE OF MILAN.—NEGOTIATIONS OF THE MILANESE WITH THE
DUKE OF SAVOY.-SFORZA LAYS SIEGE TO MonzA—Is FOILED BY PIC-
CININO's TREACHERY.—WENETIANS LAY SIEGE TO CREMA.—PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SAVOYARDS.—SFORZA REMONSTRATES WITH THE DUKE OF SAVOY’s
FATHER.—WAR ON THE BANKS OF THE SESSIA.—THE TWO PICCININI PASS
OVER TO THE MILANESE—THEY PROCEED TO RELIEVE.CREMA.—MELEG-
NANO SURRENDERS TO THEM, BUT IS RETAKEN BY SFORZA.—ROUTE OF THE
SAVOYARDS.—ARREST OF WILLIAM OF MONTFERRAT.—SIEGE AND CAPTURE
OF VIGEVANO.—SFORZA DEFEATS AN ATTACK MADE AGAINST HIM IN THE
VICINITY OF PARMA.
WHILE the events above narrated were going on, Sforza
was engaged in closely blockading the city of Milan.
As it was still winter, he did not bivouac his troops in
the open country, but stationed them in the villages and
fortresses around. His forces, augmented as they had
been by those of Piccinino and Ventimiglia, were suf-
ficient, when thus placed, to occupy every side of the
city; the canals which formed a communication with the
Ticino were strictly guarded, and all the gates of the
city, except one, were blockaded. Even at this one,
egress and ingress were almost prevented by a force of
six hundred cavalry, stationed at no very great distance
on this road. By these means the Milanese were
reduced to such straits that many thought they could
not hold out much longer. .
In this crisis, Charles Gonzaga deemed it advisable
WOL. II. H
114 INTRIGUES OF CHARLES GONZAGA. BOOK W.
to make a friend of his opponent, that when he him-
self failed he might do something for him. For this
reason he gave him to understand that a large party
in the city were growing heartily weary of the rule
of the demagogues ; that he would not be at all Sur-
prised at their opening the gates any day; that he
would therefore advise him frequently to show himself
in the vicinity, and to be on the alert to take advantage
of anything of the sort that might occur. Above all, he
recommended him to be outside the eastern gate of the
city on the 1st of March, the day on which the elections
for the new magistrates were to take place, and on
which the popular feeling would be almost sure to
display itself. Though Sforza frequently appeared
near the city, he gained nothing by So doing, and on
more than one occasion he had reason to suspect
treachery on the part of his informant. But such con-
duct was too common in those days to have excited
either indignation or surprise. Though he was again
disappointed in his expectations of being admitted
within the city, he continued to take possession of every
village, monastery, castle, and stronghold of every de-
scription in the neighbourhood, so that the Milanese
possessed nothing outside their walls. On one occa-
sion, when they made a sally to relieve the monastery
of Castellatio, they were driven back with considerable
loss.
The ascendancy of the democratic party in the city
was in nowise shaken either by the inconveniences
which the prolonged blockade entailed upon the inha-
CHAP. W. PROMISES OF THE SAVOYARDS. 115
bitants, or by the continued success of their enemy.
Events soon occurred which tended for a time to con-
firm it. The late duke's second wife, a daughter of the
duke of Savoy, whom, as has been related, he had
married in his early struggles against fortune, continued
to reside at Milan ; she had endeared herself to all
classes by her bounties, and was respected for the pro-
priety of her conduct—a virtue, perhaps, less common in
those days than now. It is not improbable that she
viewed with great jealousy the pretensions of a man
who aspired to succeed to her husband in right of his
natural daughter. Either for this reason, or it may be
at the instigation of some of her family, who might
have hoped to turn the war of the Milanese to their
own account, she proposed to the leading citizens that
they should send to the duke of Savoy for assistance.
It need hardly be said that they lent a ready ear to
her suggestions. As her father, who had been anti-
pope in the days of the schism, had abdicated, the ducal
throne was then occupied by her brother. He promised
immediate compliance with their requests, and gave out,
in a vaunting manner, that he would bring fifty thou-
sand men against their enemies. To all who knew
anything about the resources of that prince, it was evi-
dent that these numbers must have been a mere empty
boast, and they may have been inclined to have placed
but little reliance on a promise that was expressed in
such exaggerated terms. But as many of the government
of Milan had been taken from the ignorant multitude,
the answer pleased them well, and it served both to
116 MONZA BESIEGED BY SFORZA. BOOK V.
confirm their authority, and to re-establish the droop-
ing spirits of the citizens. Sforza, who of course had
information of all that was going on, tried in vain to
show them that, mighty as these promises sounded,
their performance was impossible : they continued more
averse to him than ever, and assured him that, come
what might, they would be ruled by anybody sooner
than him. To all their contumelies he calmly replied
that he was merely contending for his inalienable right,
and that he was determined to have it ; that hitherto
he had used all his successes with the greatest modera-
tion, and that nothing would grieve him more than to
proceed to extremities; but that, if they persevered in
their present insensate policy, he knew not what he
might find it necessary to do. Though he never actu-
ally said that he would storm the city and pillage the
inhabitants, it is obvious that he alluded to it through-
out the whole of his discourse. And though the govern-
ment continued unmoved, they took the utmost precau-
tions that neither his speech nor the threats that were
conveyed in it should be known to the multitude.
Sforza still hoped to reduce the city without attempt-
ing to storm it. Monza was almost the only place in
the neighbourhood that remained in the hands of his
enemies, and he observed that, in spite of all he could
do, frequent communications were passing between
it and both Vercelli and Milan. It seemed to him as
if the taking of it would almost cut them off from their
last resource. Though he himself remained in the
vicinity of the city which was the grand object of his
CHAP. V. RELIEVED BY CHARLES GONZAGA. 117
ambition, he sent thither a considerable force under the
command of some of his best generals, including Venti-
miglia and Piccinino. But here he was doomed to lose
more than he ever had done before by the treachery of
the latter. Piccinino was ordered to lead his forces to
the eastern side of the town ; but instead of bringing
them directly under the walls, so as to prevent all pos-
sibility of ingress or egress, he took up a position at a
small village at about the distance of a mile. It was not
long before a considerable breach was effected in the
walls, and to all appearance the city must have fallen
at once. The inhabitants sent to inform the Milanese
that, if they were not immediately relieved, they must
surrender the following day. The Milanese despatched
thither a considerable body of troops under Charles
Gonzaga, who managed to make his way to it by night,
and effected his entrance on the side which Piccinino
had been ordered to guard. Gonzaga, shrinking from a
conflict with Sforza’s army, and fearful of his vengeance
should he fall into his hands, proposed that they should
remain in the city and await the attack of their enemies;
adding that, when they were driven back by so much
larger a force than they expected, they would doubtless
raise the siege in despair. But the citizens, eager to
free themselves from the enemy, were not guided
by this advice ; they sallied forth before daybreak;
and ere the besiegers were aware of their approach,
they set fire to their tents, and inflicted no small loss
upon them otherwise. Ventimiglia, however, and the
other generals of Sforza, though taken unawares, did
118 SFORZA's LOSSES. BOOK W.
not lose heart; they rallied their men, and even drove
the enemy back to the ramparts. For some time they
maintained a conflict there with the greatest bravery,
under the expectation that Piccinino, who had been
duly apprised of what had happened, would have come
to their assistance; but no small confusion was caused
among the troops by the burning tents in the rear;
and the space between the fire on the one side, and
the enemy on the other, was so small that they were
unable to form in a regular line of battle. Finding that
Piccinino was again playing the traitor, they retired
in no small confusion to Canturio, without even being
able to bring off any of their artillery. All their tents
were consumed by the flames; their baggage, with the
implements made use of in the siege, fell into the hands
of the enemy. In addition to this damage, Sforza sus-
tained no small loss in the death of Dulcius, one of the
best and most trustworthy of his captains, who was
wounded by a bullet in the knee, and a few days after-
wards expired of spasm.
The Milanese were beyond measure elated at the
turn which their fortune seemed to have taken. They
appear, indeed, to have thought that their enemy would
have been obliged to retire from the field till he could,
in some measure, repair his loss. Acting on this sup- .
position, they sent forth a body of men to retake the
monastery of Castellatio. But Sforza had already
experienced too many vicissitudes, and had too much
confidence in his own resources, to be so easily cast
down ; and he ordered his troops to blockade the
CHAP. W. WENETIAN ARMY. I 19
city more closely than heretofore. On finding them-
selves still pressed by their enemies, the force that had
set forth to relieve Castellatio retired with great preci-
pitancy. Piccinino too, though he had inflicted much
injury on Sforza, did not think that the time had yet
come for openly breaking with him ; he therefore en-
deavoured in the best manner he could to explain his
conduct, and promised, upon receiving some more artil-
lery, to continue the siege of Monza. Sforza, though
it is needless to say he was not deceived, thought that
he might still strengthen his cause by appearing to keep
on good terms with him, and promised to have sent to
him four more pieces of artillery from Cremona.
About this time a Venetian army, under Sigismund
Malatesta, made its appearance on the Adda, and re-
took several of the cities which they had lost in the
preceding year. Crema alone, of all the places in that
neighbourhood, continued to hold out against them.
The Venetians, as the Milanese had done previously,
had been anxiously soliciting Sforza to attend to their
interests in preference to his own ; they now sent to
request him that he would repair the loss he had in-
flicted on them at Caravaggio, by furnishing them with
men and implements for the siege of Crema. In com-
pliance with their entreaties, he sent them six hundred
cavalry, and a number of artisans to make implements.
But events soon happened which caused him to turn
his attention to a different quarter.
The duke of Savoy, though he failed to fulfil the
magnificent expectations which he held out to the
120 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SAVOYARDS. BOOK W.
Milanese, gladly availed himself of the opportunity that
was offered to him of extending his dominions under
the pretext of succouring his allies. For this purpose
he collected together six thousand men in Vercelli,
under the command of an officer named Compecius.
One of his first measures was an attempt to surprise
the important city of Novara, which was only twelve
miles from their headquarters. He sent thither a force
of a thousand men, who managed, under cover of night,
to scale the walls, and actually effected an entrance into
the citadel. They had already occupied about half of
the building when the guards awoke, and the whole
garrison arose with a mingled shout of terror and sur-
prise. The Savoyards were now as terrified as they
had hitherto been audacious. Though the number of
the defenders did not exceed two hundred, they fancied
that the whole city had risen upon them ; their terror
was aggravated by the circumstance of their not ex-
pecting quarter, which they themselves had never been
accustomed to give, and they thought only of Seeking
safety in flight. The commandant of the citadel, taking
every advantage of their panic, succeeded with his small
body of troops in capturing a considerable number of
them before they could effect their escape. After this
the Savoyards confined themselves to laying waste the
country and taking the castles and villages. This they
did with a cruelty which contrasted strangely with the
practice of the Italians. Not content with destroying
and pillaging whatever came in their way, they murdered
men, women, and children alike. Such was the terror
CHAP. V. SFORZA's REMONSTRANCES. 121
that their name inspired among a population who were
so little accustomed to the sight of blood, that even
before their approach the inhabitants of many places
sent to say that they were willing to submit to them.
Sforza, on seeing himself attacked in this quarter,
sent to remonstrate with Amadeus, the father of the
reigning duke. He said that he ascribed this attack
entirely to him, and that Surely his endeavours to
establish his rights against a certain party at Milan
ought not to have provoked his interference. He also
reminded him that, if from any particular circumstances
he had felt himself bound to assist this party, it would
have been Christian like and honourable to have begun
by making a formal declaration of war. He trusted,
therefore, that he would at once have restored to him all
the places in the Novarese that had been taken by the
soldiers of his son ; at the same time, if he was deter-
mined to continue his injustice and aggression, he wished
him to recollect that he was in alliance with the power-
ful republics of Florence and Venice, who were bound
to assist him. To this Amadeus made a reply rather
unbecoming one who had for some time set up to be the
head of a mild, unambitious, and peace-making religion.
He said that, as he had resigned all his temporal pos-
sessions to his son, and was entirely given to his spiri-
tual avocations, he could not interfere; but that he for
one could not see why his son should give back a single
thing that he had taken, or why he should in any way
alter his policy; and that those who wished to live on
good terms with the Savoyards should recollect that
122 BARTOLOMEO COLLIO BOOK W.
from time immemorial it had been their custom not
only never to renounce their claim to anything they
had ever possessed, but even to continue to encroach
more and more upon the possessions of their neighbours.
The count, in no small degree irritated by the response
of the late anti-pope, determined to repel with all his
force this unprovoked aggression of his son. His first
plan was to send an expedition against them under the
command of Jacobo Piccinino. That general had of his
own accord offered to undertake its command, on the
condition that he was not to be associated with his
brother. But the latter, on hearing of the arrange-
ments that were in progress, and thinking that such
a favourable opportunity of injuring Sforza by his
treachery was not to be passed over, sent word to him
that if his brother went he must go thither also. Much
as Sforza mistrusted him, he did not wish to give him
cause of complaint, or to proclaim his want of confidence
to the public. But that he might not all at once
endanger his forces, by allowing a traitor to command
them in the face of a formidable enemy, he ordered
Jacobo to cross the Po, and to join his brother in the
Milanese. At the same time, he, in order to rivet the
fidelity of the former, formally betrothed to him his
daughter Drusiana, in earnest of his previous engage-
ment, but deferred the celebration of the wedding till
such time as he should get possession of Milan ; and,
that he might effectually guard against the treachery of
the brothers, he intrusted the chief command of the war
against the Savoyards to Bartolomeo Collio.
CHAP. V. SENT AGAINST THE SAVOYARDS. 123
That general, as has already been mentioned, was in
the command of the Venetian forces that had been sent
to assist Sforza ; hence he could merely use them in
fulfilling the stipulations of his employers, and could
not be expected to engage in any of the count's pri-
vate wars or ulterior designs. As these stipulations
were that they should assist him in acquiring possession
of all the territories that had belonged to Philip at the
time of his death, they were of course bound to repel any
hostile force that might attempt to subjugate any part
of these territories; but they were not obliged to carry
on the war beyond their boundaries. As in the present
instance the Venetians had no object in extending their
own conquests to the west of the Milanese, and of course
did not wish to see the power of Sforza, should he ever
gain possession of Milan, unduly increased, they could
hardly be expected to go beyond the terms of their
agreement; and as Bartolomeo had already shown his
jealousy of Sforza by attacking Tortona, it was not
likely that he would exceed the wishes of his employers
for the sake of doing him a favour. Hence Bartolo-
meo's war with the Savoyards was entirely defensive : he
did his best to retake the strong places on the east of
the Sessia that had submitted to them, and attacked
them whenever they attempted to cross it ; but he
declined doing anything beyond it. In all the opera-
tions that he did attempt, he was completely successful:
in a short time all the strong places, with only one ex-
ception, Submitted to him ; and on one occasion he de-
feated a considerable body of the enemy that had crossed
124 SFORZA's SUSPICIONS BOOK W.
the river, and made a prisoner of their general. And
though he himself refused to follow up his success by
invading the territory of the duke of Savoy, he had un-
der his command a considerable body of Sforza's own
troops, who, having no such scruples, frequently made
predatory excursions in the country beyond the river,
in which they were often joined by numbers of the
soldiers of the Venetians. Thus in a short time Sforza
was quite freed from the incursions of his new enemies;
but he was still obliged to reserve a considerable body
of men near the Sessia, to keep them in check.
About this time his operations were further crippled
by the treachery of his old enemies, the Piccinini.
From the information that he had received from several
quarters, he knew that they were meditating imme-
diate desertion ; and though he had never had any
doubt as to their ultimate intentions, he had still enter-
tained hopes that they might have remained nominally
in his service until something should turn up in his
favour at Milan, or at least until he should be able to
make peace with the Savoyards, and be rejoined by the
forces of Bartolomeo Collio. As he plainly foresaw that
their open defection, in the present crisis of his affairs,
would considerably injure his ultimate chances of suc-
cess, he was in no small strait how to act with regard
to them. His most expeditious, and possibly his safest
course, would have been to put an end to them both, or
at least to throw them into captivity, for then they
could never again injure him, either by foul means or by
fair; and as they had so often committed acts deserv-
CHAP. W. OF THE PICCININI. 125
ing death, he could not be restrained by any scruples of
conscience from doing so. But, at the same time, he
felt that, aspiring as he did to hold a place among the
sovereigns of the Peninsula, a good name was worth
more to him than a considerable body of troops, and
that he would probably suffer more by the loss of it
than by any act of the treacherous, though not very
talented, brothers. Though in his own mind he had
not the slightest doubt either of their former misdoings
or their present perfidious intentions, he was not in pos-
session of any written documents or proofs, wherewith
he might justify himself to others; and in the absence of
these, he well knew that any act of severity would afford
material for slander to his enemies, and might arouse
even the misgivings of his friends. After some delibe-
ration he made up his mind to behave towards them as
if he neither knew nor suspected anything; and being
anxious to resume the siege of Monza, which only a short
time before he had been compelled to relinquish through
their treachery, he assigned to them the same post
which they had formerly held on the east of the city.
He was even about to proceed to their camp to give
them their orders in person, but was restrained from
doing so by the remonstrances of his friends. But the
brothers ere long came to him to hear his pleasure—
“ making fair show,
And hiding with false faces what their false hearts did know.” "
They then obtained his permission to remain where
they were one day longer, promising immediately after-
* Macbeth, Act i. scene 1.
126 THEY DESERT HIM. BOOK W.
wards to repair to the place that had been allotted to
them. When the appointed day came, they marched
with all their troops into the city of Monza. The inha-
bitants had been prepared to receive them, and on their
arrival they endeavoured to persuade them to make a
sally on the besiegers. They refrained, however, from
doing so, when they saw that their commander William,
marquis of Montferrat, was in a position to defend
himself till such time as he could receive succours from
Sforza. Shortly after this, William, not having suffi-
cient force remaining to prosecute the siege, departed,
though without any molestation from the garrison ; and
the Piccinini marched with their forces, consisting of
three thousand cavalry and one thousand infantry, to
Milan, where they were received with a species of
triumph.
Intelligence of these events was brought to Sforza
while he was engaged in the performance of mass.
Though they must, in no small degree, have deranged
both his plans and his prospects, he did not betray the
slightest agitation of any sort, but calmly remained
where he was till the conclusion of the ceremony. He
then gave orders for his wife to retire to Pavia, and
summoned his generals to a council of war. They were
almost all of opinion that, weakened as they now were
by the defection of the Piccinini, and the necessity of
detaching a part of their forces to keep the Savoyards
in check, it would be no longer safe for them to extend
through the Milanese, but that they ought to concen-
trate them in one position, in order to be able effec-
CHAP. V. MELEGNANO TAKEN BY THE MILANESE. 127
tually to resist any attack of the enemy. But however
prudent this advice might have been, Sforza, fearful lest
his acting in this manner should be ascribed to either
weakness or fear, positively refused to adopt it. And
seeing that his men were in no small degree downcast
by recent events, he endeavoured to revive their spirits
by the all-powerful charm of his eloquence: he told
them that, however the accomplishment of their wishes
might be deferred, it was still as certain as ever; that
the Piccinini were but incompetent generals, and that
the Milanese would soon find out that they would have
been better without them ; that, for his own part, he
would sooner have them openly opposed to him than
working against him by their intrigues, while they
pretended to be his friends; and that, for the present,
all they had to do was to take care never to be taken
by surprise.
The hopes of the Milanese were in no small degree
elated by the arrival of the Piccinini; and their leaders
were now loud in their boastings that they would, in a
few days, clear their territory of the enemy. They
made several sallies, under the expectation of doing so.
But seeing that they made no impression, and that the
enemy continued, as before, to occupy the whole of the
country around, they changed the plan of their opera-
tions, and sent an expedition to the relief of Crema,
under the command of the Piccinini and Gonzaga. Its
success at first must have surpassed even their most
sanguine expectations. While they were on their
way thither, the town of Melegnano, which had been
128 RETAKEN BY SFORZA. BOOK W.
intrusted by Sforza to the care of the Piccinini, and had
been left by him in an almost defenceless state, fell into
their hands. Sigismund Malatesta, the commander of
the Venetian forces at Crema, having heard of the change
in the prospects of Sforza, retired on their approach ;
and shortly afterwards, the town of Melzo, with the
greater part of the implements that had been destined for
the siege of Monza, fell into the hands of the Milanese.
These events were sufficient to convince Sforza that,
if he meant to preserve his footing in and around the
Milanese, he must be up and acting. He first marched
to Melegnano, a place which is described by his bio-
grapher as being the most important for the carrying
on war, and inflicting every possible injury on the
Milanese. He took the place itself, without experien-
cing almost any resistance, and managed to save the
inhabitants from the cupidity and lusts of his soldiers.
The enemy's forces, of course, made their escape into
the citadel; and though its mason-work was remark-
ably strong, and though it was surrounded by a deep
trench which was then filled with water, he prosecuted
the siege of it so successfully that, after six days, the
garrison promised to surrender if, within three days,
they were not relieved. Before the expiration of that
time, however, the Milanese generals approached with
an army, consisting, it is said by all historians, of thirty
thousand men. But of this large force ten thousand
only were regular troops; the remainder were volunteers,
who, out of a passionate desire to maintain their pre-
sent constitution, had joined their ranks—a fact which,
CHAP. W. PICCININO’s MESSAGE TO SFORZA. 129
when we consider the reluctance of the Italian citizens
at that age to serve as soldiers, shows how unpopular
Sforza must have been with a certain class at Milan.
And though, of course, they were undisciplined, and
could not do much in close fighting, most of them
were armed with guns, which, as yet, had not been
used in Italian warfare, and which, though it was
probable they could not send a ball either with much
precision, or with sufficient force to injure men clad
in heavy armour, might, from their very novelty, cause
no small annoyance and terror.
Against these numbers, Francesco Sforza, having
collected his troops from Pavia and other places, was
able to oppose a body of thirteen thousand disciplined
soldiers, well accustomed to victory. Piccinino was per-
fectly aware that his multitude of recruits could not
stand long before them, and that, if he did not carry the
day at once by the mere appearance of numbers, they
might probably be driven back, and cause no small con-
fusion among his regular troops. He therefore thought
it better to endeavour to persuade Sforza to raise the
siege than to risk an engagement. With this view he
sent him word that, though he was now opposed to him
in war, he had never ceased to regard him with friend-
ship and respect; that he really should be loth to see
his whole army destroyed or routed, but that, as he then
was in command of sixty thousand men, and as he would
be joined in the course of the engagement by William
of Montferrat, this result would be inevitable if he were
to attack him on the following day; that he therefore
WOL. II. I
130 SFORZA's REPLY. BOOK W.
entreated him, for his own sake, to raise the siege, and
to retire during the night.
The receipt of this message filled Sforza with joy :
he well knew that nothing would give Piccinino greater
pleasure than to be able to annihilate him, and that, if
he were really in a condition to do so, he would be the
last man to give him timely warning to enable him to
make his escape; and he felt convinced that his present
step was taken because he felt doubtful of the result
of an engagement. He sent word in reply, that he
was much obliged to him for his information, but that
he himself knew perfectly the character and the inten-
tions of every man in his camp ; that he was exceed-
ingly rejoiced to hear of the great number of his soldiers,
as he would have so many more prisoners, and so much
more booty; and that he would even save him any fur-
ther trouble by beginning the attack himself.
During the night he had all his workmen employed
in levelling the inequalities of the ground between his
own position and that of the enemy—a measure which,
as his own force consisted entirely of well-disciplined
troops, and his enemy's strength lay in no small degree in
skirmishers and sharpshooters, was of the very greatest
importance. But before commencing the attack, he
found that the substance of the message which had been
sent to him had been artfully spread among the soldiers,
and that they were in no small degree terrified at the
report both of the numbers and of the new weapons of
their adversaries. Sforza did his best to convince them
of the exaggerations that had been made use of with
CHAP. W. PICCININO RETIRES. I31
respect to the former, and of the inefficient nature of
the latter. He made the most admirable preparations
for the approaching battle. He well knew that the
enemy's greatest advantage lay in the mere appearance
of numbers; that a large part of the multitude opposed
to him were undisciplined volunteers, who would not
stand before his men in a close fight ; and that if
these were once to give way, his own soldiers would
regain heart, and the crowd of fugitives could not fail
to embarrass the regular troops upon whom they would
be driven back. To accomplish this result, he put two
hundred of his very best cavalry under the command of
William of Montferrat, whom he ordered to lead the
attack : he gave them particular directions to continue
Sabering and riding down the enemy, but on no account
to halt to make prisoners, threatening the penalty of
death to any one who should do so.
No plan more likely to spread havoc among the
ranks of his opponents could have been adopted ;
and when we consider the great prestige of his name,
and the incapacity of the opposite generals, it is
almost certain that, if his enemies had awaited him,
it would have been crowned with success. But they
on finding that, so far from being terrified into raising
the siege, he was actually about to attack them, did not
dare to await him, and retired to Milan, giving out that
the citadel had capitulated before their arrival. On
their part the garrison, seeing that the relieving force
had entirely disappeared, surrendered according to
their engagement.
132 SFORZA's GREAT TALENTS. BOOK W.
If Sforza's talents stood him in good turn in this
emergency, the display which he then made of them
inspired some of his contemporaries with an admiration
which was in the long run prejudicial to him. While he
was going through the camp, giving orders and making
arrangements, he was accompanied by Marcellus, the
Venetian general, who had continued to abide with
him since his alliance with his countrymen. The
latter afterwards declared that, highly as he had always
thought of the abilities of the great captain, he had until
that day no idea of his skill in military matters, his ad-
mirable tact in managing the tempers of the soldiers,
his quickness in council, his readiness in action, or the
great admiration with which his troops regarded him,
and the implicit obedience which they paid to his orders.
He then expressed his conviction of the danger that
would accrue to his countrymen if they were to allow
such a man to be Duke of Milan ; that if he were once
well established as such, he would never rest easy till he
had enlarged his boundaries at the expense of his neigh-
bours; but that if, on the other hand, they were to
allow the Milanese to remain subject to their present
rulers, they must at no distant period come under their
domination. These impressions, which he lost no time
in communicating to the Senate at Venice, soon after-
wards produced their effect.
The regaining of Melegnano left Sforza at liberty to
continue his operations in the Milanese. He still
cherished the hopes of entailing such privations on the
citizens as would make them discontented with their
CHAP. V. BATTLE WITH THE SAVOYARDS. 133
present government, and cause a rising in his favour. To
do this more effectually, he ordered a number of reapers
and mowers to Sally forth from Pavia and Novara, and
to cut down and carry off whatever they could find upon
the land.
Another piece of good fortune occurred, sufficient in
no small degree to restore the hopes of Sforza’s parti-
sans. Skirmishes still continued to take place between
the Savoyards and the Venetian and Sfortian troops on
the banks of the Sessia, but without any very decided
success, till one day a considerable body of each met,
more by accident than otherwise, near Borgo Maniero.
Though the Sfortians and Venetians were considerably
inferior in numbers, nevertheless, as they looked upon
the Savoyards as barbarians, they determined for the
honour of their common country not to decline the
encounter. The Savoyards, observing the comparative
smallness of the attacking force, and beholding a wood
of considerable extent in their rear, began to suspect,
as the Gauls* did when they entered Rome, and as
Machiavellif advises all people to do when they observe
an enemy placing themselves in a notoriously disadvan-
tageous position, that some ambush was laid for them.
They therefore thought it prudent to adopt measures
to save themselves from what they thought an imminent
danger of being overwhelmed by superior numbers; so,
alighting from their horses, they formed a circular pali-
sade of stakes sufficient to retard the advance of the
* LIVY, lib. v. cap. 38.
t MACHIAVELLI, Discorsi, lib. iii. cap. 48.
134 DEFEAT OF THE SAWOYARDS. BOOK W.
enemy's cavalry; and from behind this they inflicted
great damage on them with their arrows. The Italians
were driven back in some confusion, and the Savoyards,
seeing that no fresh forces appeared, left their palisade
to follow them, and became scattered in the pursuit.
Bartolomeo Collio, having received intelligence of
what had happened, and seeing a considerable body of
the enemy in the vicinity of his own headquarters in
pursuit of the fugitive Sfortians, called a council to deli-
berate what should be done. But at the same time,
Salernitanus, who had always been a steady adherent of
Sforza's, said that, as the honour of their common coun-
try was at stake, this was a time for action, not for deli-
beration, and put himself at the head of a thousand
horse, with which he galloped forward. As the Savoy-
ards were scattered and disordered, they immediately
recoiled before the charge of a compact body of men ;
the example of Salernitanus was soon followed by Bar-
tolomeo and the other Italian generals, who, now that
their national feelings were roused, little heeded the exact
terms of any treaty. The Savoyards, having brought up
all their forces to repel the combined attack that was
now being made upon them, rallied within the circular
palisade, where a protracted, and, what was rare in those
days, a sanguinary combat ensued. But though they
fought with bravery, they were unable to stand before the
superior skill of the Italians; and after a great number
had fallen on the spot, they broke from their ranks, and
fled in confusion. The victors followed them till the
close of the day, and having taken nearly all the chief
CHAP. W. REVOLT OF WIG EVANO. 135
captains of the enemy, they sent them prisoners to
Sforza, who, having received their parole that they
would not bear arms against him during the remainder
of the war, gave them their liberty. So highly elated
was he at the result of this battle, which completely
subdued the new enemy whom the intrigues of Philip's
widow had raised up, that he said it much more
than compensated for the loss he had sustained in
the desertion of the Piccinini. But the blood that
was shed thereat filled the Italians, who were accus-
tomed to a very different species of warfare, with
horror, and, as M. Sismondi remarks, may have paved
the way for their easy submission to the French in the
following century.
Though the attack of the Savoyards had failed, they
had, nevertheless, done signal service to the Milanese by
effecting a diversion in their favour. The great object
of the latter, as has already been remarked, was to gain
time: they knew that Sforza had not means of his own to
continue a protracted contest, and they hoped that the
Venetians would soon get tired of waging war merely
for him. Hence every fresh enemy that even threat-
ened him, and every city of his that made even the
semblance of a revolt, benefited their cause ; the tem-
porary desertion or disaffection of every captain, how-
ever incompetent—every doubt they could cast upon the
fidelity of any one in his camp—was of use to them.
It was not long before they were favoured by two
events of this nature. The inhabitants of Vigevano,
the most important city in the territory between the
136 ARREST OF WILLIAM OF MONTFERRAT. Book W.
Ticino and the Sessia, having driven out their comman-
dant, hoisted the colours of the Milanese republic.
Sforza also had received several hints that William of
Montferrat meditated leaving him, for the purpose of
securing Alessandria and Bosco for himself. As the loss
of Vigevano might entail upon him that of the whole
of the country between these two rivers, he determined,
loth as he was to absent himself from the immediate
vicinity of Milan, to repair in person to retake the city;
and he managed, by a polite artifice, to defeat the
intentions of Montferrat. While he was with his troops
endeavouring to construct a bridge over the Ticino, in
the immediate vicinity of Pavia, he invited him to come
to that city to visit his wife ; and after he had been in
this manner lured into the citadel, he was given to
understand, in the civilest manner possible, that he
must remain there for the present. At the same time,
his captor took care that all his property should be
respected, and his dominions should be preserved for
him. After having finished, not without some little
delay, the bridge over the Ticino, Sforza repaired to
Vigevano, determined to prosecute the siege with the
utmost celerity, that he might return as soon as possible
to the place where he deemed his presence was of the
greatest importance.
The details of this siege are interesting, as exhibiting
both the military science of the Italians, and the deter-
mination with which, when their feelings were thoroughly
roused, they could still fight for their liberties. Time
was equally important to both parties—to Sforza, as
CHAP. V. SIEGE OF WIGEWAN O. 137
every day's absence from the Milanese diminished his
chance ; to the besieged, as they hoped that the repub-
lic would send a force to relieve them, or at least to
effect a diversion in their favour. Encouraged by the
Milanese soldiers in their garrison, and by hearing that
Piccinino had been sent to Sepri, they disputed every
inch of ground to the last. Though their powder was
soon exhausted, they defended themselves bravely with
swords, javelins, and all the other weapons which had been
formerlyin use. When their walls began to crumble before
the artillery of the enemy, they erected behind them a
great mound of earth, which they protected by sacks of
wool from the cannon-balls.
Sforza was much vexed by the loss of time thus
caused, and determined to do what he could to take the
city by a coup-de-main. He had, at the commence-
ment of the siege, constructed wooden towers in differ-
ent places, from which his soldiers were able to inflict
considerable annoyance on the enemy whenever they
appeared on their walls. He now divided his army into
eight bodies, with which he purposed to attack the city
successively, thinking that neither the numbers nor the
courage of the besieged would be able to withstand the
continued onset of fresh troops. He promised one
hundred pieces of gold to the first who should make
good his ground within the city, fifty to the second,
and twenty-five to the third. The chief command was
intrusted to one Donatus, a Milanese officer who had
earned great reputation at the siege of Piacenza. The
appetites of all were in no small degree whetted by
138 ASSAULT OF THE BESIEGER.S. BOOK W.
the recollection of the spoil which had been obtained in
that city.
Against these dispositions the inhabitants, who felt
that, after their protracted resistance, they could expect
but little mercy, prepared to defend themselves with all
the resolution of despair. Early in the morning they
crowded the churches, and prayed most fervently to be
delivered from the impending calamity; and whether it
was that they really believed in their efficiency, or that
they thought that the sight of all that was deemed most
sacred might inspire spirit into their defenders, and
some superstitious awe into their aggressors,” they car-
ried forth the pictures of holy personages and the
relics of the saints. At first the men continued to
fight sword in hand with the assailants, while the
women stood beneath to supply them with weapons
and missiles; but the latter, in the course of the day,
clothed themselves with the uniforms, and put them-
selves in the places, of those that fell. Those that
remained on the walls showered down hot water, burn-
ing pitch, stones and beams, on the devoted heads
of the assailants. Seven of the divisions of the besieg-
ing army had already been repulsed, when their general
ordered them to desist from the assault, and to annoy
their enemy with missiles from the wooden towers. By
* More likely for the latter reason than the former. It is probable that
the condottieri of the day entertained the opinion which Schiller (Fiesco,
act v. scene 14) put into the mouth of Lomellino in the following century—
“Seitdem das Pulver erfunden ist kampiren die Engel nicht mehr"—
(“Angels have left off fighting since the invention of powder.”) But the
soldiers, however little they might have obeyed the religion of the gospel,
were probably not free from superstition.
CHAP. V. REPULSED. 139
this measure the numbers of the defenders were so much
thinned that they were unable to repel the next attack;
several of the assailants soon made good their position
on the walls; the citizens were told that the enemy
was among them, when they were saved by an accident
from the dreaded fate. One of Sforza's men, a com-
mander of a division, while standing on the wall,
received a blow on his head, which precipitated him
upon those who were at that moment actually engaged
in the ascent. The foremost men of the advancing
column were thus hurled down upon their comrades
beneath, and caused no small panic and confusion in
their ranks. The defenders seized the opportunity ;
and, though only a few minutes before they had given
up fighting in despair, and were each thinking how they
might make the best terms for themselves, they now
began to shower down upon them the weapons which
they had used with so much effect in the morning.
Sforza deemed it useless to continue the attack, and
recalled his soldiers, determined to renew it early on
the following day.
The Vigevans, though they had defended themselves
bravely during the day, saw too plainly that they
could not hold out any longer, and that their only
chance of Saving their property lay in a capitulation.
Accordingly, before sunset, they sent to propose terms
to Sforza. There was nothing that he would have
liked better than to have punished them for their
treachery, and to have kept up the somewhat drooping
spirits of his army by the plunder of the city; but he
140 WIGEWANO SURRENIDERS. BOOK W.
felt that, even if he were to make himself master of it
on the following day, it might be some time before he
could bring together his troops, who would remain there
in search of plunder, around Milan ; and as every
movement was of importance to him, he consented, after
some little deliberation, to accept their offer. The only
condition which he added was, that they should rebuild
the citadel, which they had destroyed after the death of
Filippo Maria, and give up to him the leading men who
had prompted them to rebel. These he confined in the
castle of Pavia. During the night he had some little
trouble in preventing his soldiers from breaking into
the city in search of booty; but as he had great autho-
rity with his army, and as the citizens had been warned
to be on their guard, there was no mischief done.
During the progress of the siege, Charles Gonzaga
and the Piccinini retook several places of minor import-
ance, and laid waste the territory of the Pavians. But
Sforza, feeling assured that, if he retook Vigevano, he
could easily repair whatever mischief might in the
mean time be effected, was not diverted from his purpose
either by the loss of the former or the cries of the lat-
ter for assistance. Offers were also made to Venti-
miglia, who, it may be recollected, had on a former
occasion gladly embraced an opportunity of leaving the
service of the Milanese for that of his present employer,
and who, perhaps, was the most attached to him of any
of his generals. Ventimiglia was so incensed at the
proposal that was now made to him, that he sent the
bearers of it to Sforza, who did not hesitate to hang
CHAP. W. PICCININO’s POSSESSIONS TAKEN. 141
them ; and the count himself, after having left a thou-
sand horse in Novara, lest the Savoyards should again
show themselves in his dominions, returned to the ter-
ritory of Milan.
As Sforza had been unable to bring the Piccinini to
a general action since their last desertion of him, he
resolved to punish their treachery by taking the places
that belonged to them between Piacenza and Parma.
He hoped by this measure also to make a demonstration
to all the powers of Italy, as well as to the Milanese, of
the real efficiency of his forces. Accordingly he ordered
some of the officers on whom he could most depend to
cross the Po with a body of men sufficient for the pur-
pose. They soon took all the towns and strong places
that had belonged to the treacherous brothers, experi-
encing very little resistance from any except Firenzuola,
which required a forty days' siege to reduce. Of the
forces that were taken prisoners in these towns only the
officers were retained, while the soldiers were given
their liberty on the condition that they would not again
bear arms against Sforza.
In the mean time Nicolo Guerriero, an enemy of
Sforza’s, had been entreating the king of Naples to send
a force to take Parma ; and that monarch, ever mindful
of what the great captain and his father had done
against him, sent thither two divisions, one of a thousand
horse and five hundred foot, under the command of
Astorre, and another of five hundred, under that of
Raimondo Amichino. Alexander Sforza undertook the
defence of this territory for his brother. He easily per-
142 WAR IN THE PARMESE. BOOK W.
Suaded the former of these generals to desist from his
enterprise, and to disband his forces, on the receipt of a
thousand pieces of gold from Francesco. He then
repaired to Colornio, a town belonging to Nicolo Guer-
riero, who had brought this new enemy into the field.
At his approach Nicolo fled for safety to Mantua.
Raimondo Amichino having, to the no small indigna-
tion of the Sforzas, been allowed a free passage through
the territories of the marquis of Este, who at that time
professed to be in alliance with the Venetians, made
an attempt to relieve Colornio ; he was, however,
completely defeated, and that town soon afterwards
fell into the hands of Alexander. Thus the man who
had attempted to make this new diversion against
Sforza paid the penalty of his interference by the loss
of his city, and the war in the Parmese terminated
without further incident.
Sforza himself retook, without any difficulty, the
places that, while he had been engaged in the siege of
Vigevano, had fallen into the hands of his enemies.
Most of them, indeed, returned to him without any
resistance ; Castellione, the only one that held out
against him, was after its capture abandoned to the
soldiers. He then continued as before to blockade the
city, and to lay waste the territory of Milan. His
position was now, perhaps, as good as it had been at any
time since the beginning of the war : he was in posses-
sion of almost all the strongholds in the neighbourhood ;
he had completely defeated every attempt that had
been made by the new enemies who had been incited
CHAP. W. SFORZA's POSITION. 143
against him, and had let every one see that he had been
able to maintain his position in spite of the desertion
of the Piccinini. He was assured that he had still a
powerful party in the city, although they were for a
time silenced by the violence of their opponents. In
this position he calmly awaited the approaching elec-
tions, hoping that he might weary his enemies into
submission, but determined, should his present policy
fail, to adopt more violent measures.
CHAPTER WI.
ELECTION OF MAGISTRATES AT MILAN.—NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE MILANESE
AND VENETIANS.—CHARLES GONZAGA JOINS SFORZA.—NEGOTIATIONS FOR
THE SURRENDER OF LODI AND CREMA.-INTERVIEW OF WENETIAN AMBAS-
SADORS WITH SFORZA.—SFORZA's ATTEMPTS TO TAKE MILAN–FRUSTRATED
BY BARTOLOMEO COLLIO AND THE WENETIANS.—TERMS PROPOSED BY THE
WENETIANS.—SFORZA DECEIVES BOTH MILANESE AND VENETIANS BY CON-
SENTING TO A TRUCE.-ALEXANDER SFORZA COMPELLED TO SIGN A TREATY
AT VENICE, BY WHICH FRANCESCO DOES NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF Bound.
ON the 1st of July 1449 new magistrates were elected
at Milan. Those who had held the highest offices
during the preceding months had rendered themselves
extremely unpopular, both by the arrogance which
they then displayed, and by the sufferings which their
policy had entailed upon the people ; and in the words
of the historian of Milan, they were detested by all
who wished to live well, or who had any pretence to
nobility.” On the expiration of their magistracy they
were cast into prison, and were succeeded by men of
more aristocratic tendencies, and supposed not to be
unfavourably disposed towards Sforza. But though his
bitterest enemies had been incarcerated, his name was
still under a ban ; and such was the ascendency of the
mob at Milan that, till it was known how they were
inclined to receive him, no one dared make any propo-
sitions concerning him.
* CoRIO, part vi.
BOOK W. MILANESE SEND TO WIENETIANS. 145
In accordance with the supposed wishes of the
populace, the new magistrates commissioned a certain
Henry Panigarola, one of their own countrymen, of the
Guelf party, who happened at that time to be at
Venice on business, to go before the Senate and repre-
sent to them that, as they had at all times been such
ardent supporters of liberty, instead of aiding an aspir-
ing usurper in subjugating their nascent republic, they
ought, on the contrary, to assist them in maintaining
their independence against him. He laid the views
and pleaded the cause of his countrymen with great
effect before the Senate, who referred the matter to a
committee consisting of the doge and four of the prin-
cipal citizens. At the same time, Marcellus, the Vene-
tian ambassador in Sforza's camp, continued to give
them the same advice as before ; and he now further
said, that he was convinced that all their efforts to
place Sforza in Milan would be utterly useless. The
committee finally decided that Panigarola should be
entreated to remain in the city for the present.
Mean time Sforza, either unconscious or unmindful
of these negotiations, continued his former plan of
operations. He occasionally diversified them by taking
a fortified place which had either remained in the hands
of, or had recently revolted to, the enemy ; but more,
perhaps, for the sake of making a demonstration of his
power, or of giving occupation to his troops, than for
any positive advantage. In one of those undertakings
he was much grieved at the loss of one of the most de-
voted and confidential of his adherents, by name Manno
WOL. II. K
146 CHANGE OF MAGISTRATES AT MILAN. Book W.
Bariles, who, in attempting to pass the Lambro on
horseback, was drowned, much in the same manner as
his father had been in passing the Pescara. To show
his respect for the deceased, he had his body conveyed
to Pavia, where his funeral was conducted with the
greatest pomp, and attended by the principal officers of
his army. Shortly after this, the town of Pizzighettone,
most important from its position on the Adda, revolted
to him ; and though he was embarrassed in consequence
of a scarcity of provisions, and the breaking out of a
fever in his camp which carried off some of his ablest
officers, he was able to take the fortress of Cassano,
which commanded the bridge over that river. About
the same time Sigismund resumed his operations
against Crema, whence the Piccinini had forced him to
retire in the preceding year. Charles Gonzaga was
proceeding to the relief of this town, when events
occurred at Milan which caused a fresh disposition of
parties.
In the beginning of September the magistrates who
had been elected in July were deposed, and were suc-
ceeded by those who, at their accession, had been cast
into prison. The violence of the extreme democratic
party now became greater than ever, and they directed
their fury against the two ex-magistrates, who were
obliged to fly for their lives. One of them succeeded
in reaching Sforza's camp ; but the other, being un-
able on account of a lameness to escape from his pur-
suers, was brutally murdered. Overtures were again
sent to the Venetians, and the former edicts which
CHAP. VI. CHARLES GONZAGA JOINS SFORZA. 147
forbad men to speak respectfully of either Sforza or his
wife were renewed.
At this time Charles Gonzaga was at Lodi on his
way to Crema. He had always been exceedingly jealous
of the ascendency of the Piccinini, and doubtful of the
ultimate chances of success of the Milanese, and he now
affected excessive wrath at the murder of the ex-magis-
trate. Influenced either by his righteous indignation,
or, more probably, as is hinted by the annalist of Italy,
by motives of self-interest, he opened negotiations with
Sforza ; and he now proposed to put him in possession
of Lodi, and to procure the surrender of Crema either
to him or the Venetians. He, however, strongly recom-
mended him to take it for himself, alleging that, if
the Venetians once got it, they would probably make a
separate peace for themselves with the Milanese. In
return for this, he requested him, if ever he got posses-
sion of Milan, to give him a part of Cremona, and to
allow him henceforward to rank among the foremost of
his generals. Sforza replied that, as Cremona was the
property of his wife, he could not dispose of it, but he
agreed to give him Tortona in lieu of it ; at the same
time he said that he would have the greatest pleasure
in complying with the latter part of his demand, and
promised him a considerable stipend for his own services
and the maintenance of his troops. Though Gonzaga
had much set his heart on Cremona, so near to his
native city of Mantua, he at once accepted the terms
that were offered to him, and he forthwith arranged
with the inhabitants of Lodi, who appeared to have
148 MESSAGE FROM THE BOOK W.
been much disgusted with the ruling faction at Milan,
that after his departure they should admit Sforza’s
troops within the walls.
In the mean time the representations of Panigarola,
and the letters of Marcellus, produced their due effect
at Venice. The senate came to a resolution no longer
to continue the war with the Milanese, or the payment
of the stipend to Sforza. They sent messengers to
inform the latter of their determination, and at the
same time gave them directions not to depart from his
camp until they had brought him round to their wishes.
And the messengers had scarcely set out on their errand,
when the arrival from Marcellus of information con-
cerning the arrangements that had been made with
Gonzaga about Lodi and Crema, caused the Senate to
send an express after them, ordering them not to be
too abrupt in their negotiations, but to dally with him
till they should get possession of Crema.
When Sforza heard of the Venetian messengers'
approach, he suspected the object of their visit, and,
fearful lest it should transpire and cause fear and dis-
affection among his troops, he proposed to meet them at
Ripalta, a town on the other side of the Adda. As he
was about to proceed thither, several of his friends re-
monstrated with him on the imprudence of intrusting
his person to those who, it was supposed, were about to
become his enemies ; but though he must have clearly
foreseen his approaching rupture with the Venetians,
he was anxious to keep up the appearance of cordiality
to the very last moment: he therefore turned a deaf
CHAP. VI. WENETIANS TO SFORZA. 149
ear to their warnings, and proceeded with an air of
confidence which might have been either real or assumed.
On his meeting the messengers he accosted them with
the usual compliments, and asked to know their pleasure.
They at once told him that as the war was lasting
much longer than had been anticipated, and as there did
not seem to be any immediate prospect of his attaining
his wishes, they had come to propose some accommo-
dation between him and the Milanese ; that as they
knew his great abilities and his integrity, they would
leave all arrangements to his discretion, and, as he
had recently obtained new and almost unlooked-for
success, the present seemed a most opportune moment
for terminating the war with honour and advantage.
He replied to them in the flattering tone usual with
those who see through, but wish to feign ignorance of,
the falsity of their friends. He said that he knew that
the Senate of Venice had in all its transactions shown
itself superior to the other governments of Italy in
integrity, justice, and faith ; that for that reason he
did not believe the hints which had been made to him
of their being about, contrary to their most solemn
engagements, to discard him, and to make peace with
the Milanese ; and that if such things were spoken of
at Venice, he felt well assured that they came only
from a few unprincipled citizens, and were Scouted
at by the majority. On one point he was anxious
to inform them correctly : his prospects of success
were very different from what they seemed to think,
for he was now in possession of Cassano, and in
I 50 LODI AND CREMA Book W.
a very few days would have Lodi, and the only other
towns which commanded the passes of the Adda,
namely, Trezio and Bivio, would soon surrender ; that
after this it would be utterly impossible that the
Milanese, cut off as they would be from all their com-
munications with the other states of Italy, and already
weakened by their internal dissensions, could hold out.
After the semblance of a negotiation, both parties
went their way—Francesco to his army, the ambas-
sadors to Bergamo, there to await the further deci-
sions of their senate. The former then received a
deputation from the Cremese, who declared that their
countrymen dreaded nothing so much as being sub-
jected to the Venetians, and entreated him to take
their city for himself. Though the possession of Crema,
lying as it did between Lodi and Cremona, would have
been a matter of great importance to him, as consoli-
dating the territory that he already possessed, never-
theless, as his availing himself of this offer would have
hastened the approaching rupture between the Vene-
tians and himself, and would have both justified them,
and damaged him in the eyes of all Italy, and as
he looked to do more by procrastination and by pre-
serving his reputation than by force of arms, he thought
proper to refuse it. He therefore replied that, much
as it grieved him to decline the offer of a people who
were so well disposed towards him, he had already pro-
mised their city to the Venetians, and would undergo
any disappointment sooner than violate one jot or tittle
of an engagement that he had solemnly made. On the
CHAP. VI. SURRENDER TO SFORZA. I 51
following day he went to Lodi accompanied by a con-
siderable body of infantry, and was forthwith admitted
within its walls. He then summoned the garrison in
the fortress to surrender, saying that, if they did not
do so forthwith, he would proceed to storm them with
the whole of his available force ; and as they merely
wanted an excuse to justify their conduct to the
Milanese, they obeyed without any delay. In this
citadel Sforza found Arasmo Triulcio, who had always
taken such an active part against him at Milan. The
unfortunate captive endeavoured to stammer forth ex-
cuses for his conduct, but Sforza, though he was above
taking vengeance upon him, sent him a prisoner to
Pavia, the place where he confined all those who had
the inclination and the power to injure him. Not long
afterwards Crema surrendered to the Venetians, and
Sforza repaired with the whole of his army to Vico
Lambrato, within two miles of the eastern gate of
Milan.
As the conquest of Crema must have deprived the
Venetians of all reasonable grounds of dissatisfaction,
he was not without hope that their apparent alliance
with him would last till he could accomplish his wishes.
Several reasons made him think that a period when he
might do this was at hand : the Milanese were already
suffering from scarcity ; they were so divided among
themselves, that it did not seem likely they could
long hold together ; Charles Gonzaga had already
brought him a considerable accession of force, and his
effective strength was daily augmented by a number of
152 SFORZA ATTEMPTS BOOK W.
deserters. But, as he was aware that the Venetians
were only watching for an opportunity of dissolving
their alliance with him, he felt that he had no time
to lose, and he proceeded to take measures of a more
decidedly offensive nature than hitherto, rather, per-
haps, under the hope that he might thereby terrify the
Milanese into submission, than with the intention of
actually taking the city by storm. And there is no
doubt but that he would have succeeded, if he had not
been foiled, as of yore, by the treachery of his captains.
Bartolomeo Collio, who commanded the Venetian sol-
diers in his army, had on many occasions shown himself
jealous of his rise ; he was now fully aware both of the
intentions of his government and of the sentiments of
Marcellus; he felt well assured that any lukewarmness
on his part would not bring upon him their displeasure;
and he determined that he, at least, should have no hand
in making his brother condottiere duke of Milan.
All Sforza's measures on this occasion were selected
with prudence, and undertaken with energy. His first
attempt was to take the suburb that lay beneath the
eastern gate of the city. This was defended by a trench
of considerable magnitude, which, as it was now the
month of December, he thought might be filled so as to
afford a passage for his cavalry, and be crossed by his
infantry between sunset and sunrise. To do this as
rapidly, and with as little noise as possible, he selected
the spot in which each division of his army was to cross
at a certain hour of the night. When the appointed
time came, Bartolomeo and the Venetians were not in
CHAP. VI. TO TAKE MILAN. 153
their places, and the former, on being sent to by Sforza,
said that he could not come till he had all his forces
together. In this manner he managed to retard the
commencement of the enterprise till the appearance of
daylight. Sforza, though he knew that his chances of
success were now much diminished, determined to pro-
ceed. But his soldiers had not advanced far ere the
Milanese became aware of his designs, and sent forth
from behind the suburbs a well-directed shower of
javelins, arrows, and bullets. So great, indeed, was the
quantity of firearms, both artillery and hand-guns, used
on the occasion, that the place was for some time enve-
loped in a thick cloud of smoke, and the assailants'
troops were unable to discern their way. After two
hours' hard fighting, Sforza retired. In this skirmish
several men were wounded, and others were taken ; but
the Piccinini, who dreaded nothing so much as that the
Milanese should hear Sforza well spoken of, refused to
keep their prisoners of war within the city.
Sforza himself, though sorely vexed at the conduct
of Collio, did not yet give up all hopes of success.
It was not long before he agreed with a certain captain
of cavalry, for a thousand pieces of gold, to put him in
possession of the eastern suburb. But now Marcellus
and Collio saw that, if they did not wish to behold Sforza
in immediate possession of Milan, they must openly
declare their intentions; they therefore made no scruple
in informing him that the preliminaries of peace had
already been settled at Venice, and that none of their
soldiers should either enter the town, or in any way
154 SECOND MESSAGE FROM Book W.
injure the property of the Milanese. On the very day
on which it had been arranged that he should take the
suburbs, the Venetian ambassador arrived in his camp,
confirming the unwelcome intelligence ; and after some
preliminary dissertations, to the same effect as those he
had made before the taking of Crema, he proposed to
him the following terms:—That he was now to desist
from making war against the Milanese, and to leave
them in the undisturbed possession of all the country
between the Po, the Adda, and the Ticino, with the
exception of the city and territory of Pavia; that he
was to keep for himself all the other cities which he
had taken in Lombardy, and which had belonged to his
father-in-law at the time of his death; that the city of
Lodi, which was situated on the Adda, was to be given
up to the Milanese. Twenty days only were to be
given to him to consider the proffered conditions. In
order to incline him to accept them, the ambassador
said, contrary to the truth, that the senate had con-
cluded an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the
pope, the king of Naples, the republic of Florence, and
the duke of Savoy; and that all these powers would
unite with them in maintaining the independence of
Milan.
Though Sforza had for some time past been aware of
the intentions of the Venetians, nevertheless the receipt
of this message, just when he thought his greatness was
ripening, overwhelmed him with disappointment. He
made a reply of considerable length to the ambassador,
in which, after having endeavoured to depict the con-
CHAP. VI. THE WENETIANS TO SFORZA. I 55
duct of the Venetian republic in somewhat the same
colours as his own behaviour had, on a former occasion,
been drawn by the Milanese, he informed them that
they were mistaken in several of the facts to which they
had referred in justification of their proceedings; for
that he had now brought matters to such a crisis
that he must very soon get possession of the city of
Milan ; that, though the mob were opposed to him, the
majority of the nobles were in his favour; and that he
had at hand supplies of food sufficient to maintain an
army much more numerous than his own for any length
of time. He acknowledged that he was in want of
money, but he knew that his soldiers were so attached
to him that they would remain with him though their
pay was in arrears; that, so far from his being a burden
to the Venetians, he would repay to them anything they
would now advance him, and he would never ask them
for the balance of the stipend that they owed him. He
concluded by requesting the ambassador to return to
Venice, and bring the matter once more before the
senate for their reconsideration. This, however, he
refused to do, saying that it was not the manner of
the senate to rescind any resolutions which, like the
present, had been duly sanctioned by a committee.
Seeing that he could prevail nothing with the ambas-
sador, he asked for one day to consider their proposi-
tions. There is no doubt but that, from the very first,
he himself had made up his mind as to what part he
would take ; but he dreaded lest the Milanese should
sally forth upon his army, while they were weakened
156 WENETIANS MAKE PEACE BOOK W.
and disordered by the desertion of the Venetians, in
which case he thought that the latter, ever eager to
obtain a share in the spoils of war, might join his
enemies. He therefore availed himself of the respite
that was allowed him to retire to Culturano. Mean
time his own soldiers, who had expected ere long to
share in the honours and rewards that awaited him,
were beyond measure incensed with the Venetians,
and were with the greatest difficulty prevented from
making an attack upon those that still remained in or
near their camp. Whenever their officers or ambassa-
dors made their appearance, they were assailed with
hisses and opprobrious epithets, and some of them were
even stripped of their armour and robbed. But Sforza,
determined that the Venetians should have no cause of
complaint against him, did his best to bring the offen-
ders to justice, and insisted that all their property
should be restored to the officers. And when their
envoy, Marcellus, who had remained with him during
the whole period of their alliance, was taking his
departure, he accompanied him to the distance of five
miles from the camp, in order that he might more
effectually protect both his person and his property.
After the departure of these ambassadors, Sforza
received information that the Venetians were concen-
trating a considerable force behind the Adda. This,
of course, convinced him that they were sincere in
their intention of joining the Milanese, should he
continue the war. This he was resolved to do; but as
he was no match, unaided, for their combined armies,
CHAP. VI. WITH THE MILANESE. 157
he scrupled not for a time to conceal his intentions, by
means of double-dealing of the same sort as that which
they had adopted towards him. He therefore granted
a truce of twenty days to the Milanese; and he sent his
brother Alexander once more to make a semblance of
treating with the Venetians, though he secretly forbade
him to be a party to any arrangements which should
exclude him from Milan. At the same time he
despatched another message to Cosmo de' Medici and
the Florentines, begging them to assist him.
As this armistice was granted at the sowing time, he
was secretly in hopes that the Milanese would use as
seed a considerable quantity of the grain that they had
laid up in their city—an act which would serve him
even more effectually than the continuation of the
blockade. Nor was he mistaken. When the Venetian
ambassadors first made their appearance in Milan, the
unfortunate inhabitants thought their troubles were at
an end, and made token of their joy by the lighting of
bonfires, the sounding of bells, and the discharging of
cannons. And when the enemy had retired to Cultu-
rano, and had granted them a truce for twenty days,
they thought that these acts must have been done in
anticipation of a general peace, for they little dreamed
that he would have the audacity to oppose himself single-
handed against them and the Venetians. So, instead
of availing themselves of this respite to bring more pro-
visions into the city, they brought their grain out of it
into the country, hoping that they would once more be
allowed to reap their harvests in peace. Nor did they
I 58 SFORZA PERSEVERES. Book V.
continue to keep their fortifications in order as before.
The Venetians also were so far deceived as to discon-
tinue the concentration of their forces behind the Adda.
All this time he himself was engaged in negotiations
with the Milanese governor at Trezo, which commanded
a pass over the Adda, and from him he exacted a promise
not to let the Venetians cross to join the Milanese. The
only other pass which was not commanded by his troops
was at Bivio, which he thought he could easily defend.
Unmoved by the remonstrances of Alexander, the
Venetian senate obstinately declined to abate one jot or
tittle of their demands. The former, to gain time, asked
leave to send again to consult his brother. But the
Senate—in contradiction, it would seem, to all the laws of
nations—replied that, if he would not sign the treaty as it
was now presented to him, he should not be allowed to
depart in safety from Venice. He forthwith signed the
treaty, after which he left the city by night to convey
to his brother Francesco the unwelcome intelligence.
On hearing what had passed, Francesco was in no
Small degree vexed, but as his ambassador had exceeded
his authority, he did not think himself bound by his act.
However, to satisfy his conscience, or to justify himself
in the eyes of the other Italians, he called together and
consulted an assembly of those who were most skilled in
international and pontifical law, and received their per-
mission to act as he pleased. He then declared his
intention of prosecuting the war with the Milanese,
and resisting the Venetians, should they make any
attempt to co-operate with his enemies.
(HAPTER WII.
DEBATES AND MEASURES OF THE FLORENTINES.—DEATH OF FRANCESCO PIC-
CININO.—SFORZA MAKES TERMS WITH THE DUKE OF SAVOY.—FURTHER
ACQUISITIONS AROUND MILAN. —SKIRMISHES NEAR BIVIo —DEFEAT OF
JACOBO PICCININO—SKIRMISHES AROUND THE LAKE OF COMO. — DEFEAT
OF A BODY OF SFORTIAN CAVALRY. — UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT AGAINST
MONZA.—DISTRESSES AND CRITICAL SITUATION OF SFORZA's ARMY.-PRI-
VATIONS AND SUFFERINGS OF THE MILANESE.-TUMULTS IN THE CITY-
WAIN ATTEMPT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO APPEASE THEM.—MoB TAKE POS-
SESSION OF THE PALACE AND GATES.–SEND TO TENDER THEIR SUBMISSION
TO SFORZA— HIS TRIUMPHAL ENTRY. —FESTIVALS ATTENDING HIS CORONA-
TION.
THOUGH Sforza's ambition and courage were generally
known, his present resolution caused some surprise even
among his friends. The Florentines, on hearing thereof,
were for some time divided as to what part they should
take ; and though they did not come to a decision till
the issue of the war was otherwise settled, their delibe-
rations are not a little remarkable, as illustrating the
opinions that were then entertained regarding Sforza.
His friend, Cosmo de' Medici, who had been in constant
communication with him, and is supposed to have
assisted him out of his private fortune, now thought
that the time was come when he might persuade the
republic to do something for him also. But Neri di
Gino Capponi, who had signalised himself by several
victories, and obtained a considerable influence among
the Florentines, opposed him in this; partly, it may
I 60 NERI CAPPONI's AND BOOK W.
be from a real love of liberty, and some traditional hos-
tility to the dukes, whose ambition his predecessors had
for half a century kept in check ; and in great measure
also out of jealousy of his rival, Cosmo de' Medici, who
was already too powerful for him, and would become
still more so if his talented friend were to become ruler
of Milan. He therefore endeavoured to persuade his
countrymen that it would be much better for their
welfare that Sforza should agree to the conditions pro-
posed, than that he should continue the war. In the
first place, he felt convinced that he was so disliked by
the Milanese, that, sooner than surrender to him, they
would put themselves under the rule of the Venetians
—an event which would be detrimental to all parties.
In the next place, supposing that he were to get pos-
Session of Milan, would not so great a state, when ruled
by so great a soldier, be dangerous to the balance of
power %—and as the latter had been bad enough as a
count, would he not be utterly intolerable as duke of
Milan 2 For every reason, it was better, as well for the
Florentine republic as for Italy in general, that Lom-
bardy should be divided into two states, which could
never unite to do injury to others, and each of which,
taken by itself, would be too small to be formidable.
These considerations, he said, convinced him that it
would be more for their advantage to maintain their
former alliance with the Venetians, than to send assist-
ance to the count.*
On the other hand, it was maintained by Cosmo de'
* MACHIAVELLI, Ist. lib. vi.
CHAP. VII. COSMO DE MEDICI's OPINIONS. 161
Medici, that it was utterly impossible the Milanese
should preserve their independence, seeing “ that their
former constitution, their manner of living, and the
continuance of parties of long standing, had altogether
incapacitated them for self-government; and that, if
Sforza could not succeed in making himself their duke,
they must fall under the dominion of the Venetians.
In such a case, he thought, nobody would be fool enough
to hesitate whether he would sooner have for a neigh-
bour a powerful friend, or a still more powerful enemy.
Finally, there was no reason to suppose that the Mi-
lanese would of their own accord put themselves under
the Venetians, merely because the count continued the
war ; for as he had a number of adherents in the city,
while they, on the contrary, had none, when they found
they must be ruled by somebody, their choice would
undoubtedly fall upon him.”
The citizens were for some time uncertain as to
whose counsel they would follow ; at last they came to
the determination to send ambassadors to his camp,
with directions to see how he was getting on, and be
guided accordingly. If they found him confident of suc-
cess, they were to make a treaty with him immediately ;
if not, they were to postpone any direct settlement for
the present. But before their arrival he had, without
their assistance, obtained the great object of his wishes.
On the expiration of the twenty days' truce, Sforza,
after he had made it publicly known that he was not
bound by the acts of his ambassadors, took measures both
* MACHIAVELLI, Ist. lib. vi.
WOL. II. L
162 DEATH OF FRANCESCO PICCININO. BOOK W.
for continuing the blockade of Milan, and for preventing
the Venetians passing the Adda. As winter had already
set in, he allowed his troops to remain in cantonments;
but he stationed one division of them near Milan, So as
to prevent any provisions being brought into the city,
and the remainder near Bivio on the Adda, ready to
take the field at a moment's notice. In the mean
time death freed him from an enemy who, though he
was not formidable from his talents, had nevertheless
done him much mischief. On the 16th of October,
Francesco Piccinino, seeing that his troops continued to
desert from him to the man who had been the constant
rival of his family, and who was still the idol of the
Italian soldiers, died of dropsy brought on by chagrin.
He was succeeded in the chief command of the Milanese
army by his brother Jacobo, who had certainly shown
himself less destitute of talent, and less addicted to
treachery. On his appointment to this post of honour,
he received from the citizens the title of the “Thunder-
bolt of War.”
Sforza continued to take measures well adapted to
his new position. He forthwith concluded a treaty
with the duke of Savoy, to whom he gave several places
which he had taken in the territory of Alessandria
and Novara. The cession of any of his conquests must
have been galling to a man of his ambition ; but on
this occasion he thought it well to follow the pro-
verb which says that a wise man should know to give
up something at a proper time; and that when he has
several enemies, it is expedient to make peace with one,
CHAP. VII. SFORZA's MEASURES. 163
a truce with another, and a fight with all his might
against the third.* About the same time he allowed
the Venetian ambassador a free pass through his army
when on his way to Milan ; and on being remonstrated
with for doing so, he replied that his enemies must
defend themselves by fighting, and not by negotiation.
But, doubtless, he had good reasons for his conduct.
In the first place, as the stability of his position at
Milan, should he ever succeed in getting possession of
it, must depend much upon the good-will of his neigh-
bours, he wished to avoid giving any unnecessary offence :
and, in the next place, as he had reason to believe that
the Milanese were already reduced to the extremity of
famine, he wished the Venetians to be acquainted
with their actual condition. Not long after this, the
commandant of the fortress at Trezo, on the far side of
the Adda, surrendered to him, and also delivered to
him as captive Innocenzo Cotta, one of the Milanese
commissioners, who had gone thither from the Venetian
army to reconnoitre the pass. Lucius Cotta, the bro-
ther of the captive, happened at this time to be the
commandant at San Columbano, a place which, as it
was several times during the war taken and retaken,
must have been of considerable importance, and Sforza
sent word to him that, if he did not give him possession
of that fortress, he would hang his brother outside the
walls. Lucius's love for his brother was stronger than
his patriotism, and the castle was duly given up. Thus
the possession of the principal places in the Milanese,
* MACHIAVELLI, 1st. lib. vi.
164 SFORZA's TROOPS BOOK W.
with the exception of Monza—of the passes of the
Adda, with the exception of Bivio, which might easily
be defended, and of the principal towns on the Po
and the Ticino—gave Sforza every facility for keep-
ing asunder his enemies, starving the inhabitants of
Milan, and procuring supplies from all quarters for his
own army.
The new commander of the Milanese forces had soon
an opportunity of measuring himself with the greatest
captain of the day. It has already been stated that
the latter had a considerable force in cantonments
near Bivio, ready to take the field the instant the
enemy should attempt to cross the river. The road
from that place to Milan lay between two mountains, on
each of which he had a small force stationed, sufficient at
any time, as he thought, to keep the enemy in check, till
he should be able to arrive with reinforcements. Infor-
mation being brought to him late one evening that the
Venetians were actually passing the river, he resolved
to collect his forces, and repair thither without delay ;
and though the winter was now far advanced, and the
Italian soldiers were little accustomed to face the
inclemency of the seasons, yet, for his sake, they did
not hesitate to encounter the hardships of a winter
campaign in the immediate vicinity of the Alps. Dur-
ing the night-march to Bivio, he was rather alarmed on
beholding the number of fires on the mountains which
guarded the road to Milan, but he continued to hope
that they had been lighted by the troops that had been
stationed there by him. On his arrival there, however,
CHAP. VII. SURPRISED NEAR BIWIO. 165
he found, to his great surprise and mortification, that his
guards had been surprised and expelled thence by the
Venetians, and that these mountains, by means of
which he had hoped to prevent their junction with the
Milanese, were in possession of his enemies. He also
heard that Sigismund was about to pass the river with
all his forces on the following day, with the intention
of forming a junction with Piccinino.
Sforza saw that, should Sigismund's plan succeed, all
his chances would be annihilated ; and one with less re-
sources, or less confidence in himself, would have aban-
doned his enterprise in despair, and endeavoured to
make what terms he could for himself. But, desperate
as his situation now appeared to be, he did not give in,
for he well knew that, if he could only retard the junc-
tion of his enemies, the people of Milan must ere long
be starved to death or surrender. His first step was
to make a vigorous effort to drive the enemy from the
mountains, and so repair the mischief that had already
been done. Though he failed in doing this, he was able
to confine them to the highest and most inaccessible
positions, so that they could in no way co-operate with
their fellow-soldiers, should they attempt to pass the
river. For a few days both armies remained in this
situation. Skirmishes continued to take place, to the
great annoyance of the troops, who suffered much
from the cold, and whom nothing but the prospect
of instantaneous success on the one side, and the
dread of losing everything on the other, could have
induced to take the field. At last information was
166 PICCININO DEFEATED. BOOK W.
received that Piccinino was advancing with a consider-
able army from Monza. As there were several routes
by which he might ascend the mountains, and form a
junction with the forces thereon, Sforza saw that his
only chance was to meet him at a distance from the
remainder of his enemies; so, after a council of war, in
which it was debated whether they should divide the
army or not, he marched against him with the whole
of his force. He did not, however, set out till after
dark, and he artfully placed his sentries and their fires
in such a manner that the enemy had no notion of
his departure. Pushing on with celerity, he managed
before daybreak to attack Piccinino, whose troops,
confounded as they were by the suddenness of the
onset, the dangers of which were as usual magni-
fied by the darkness, made but a feeble resistance.
The victors got possession of all their baggage and
equipments, and pursued their foe to the very walls
of Monza. They then retraced their steps to Bivio,
where, in spite of the fatigues of the preceding
night, they arrived at the close of the day. Thus
within twenty-four hours had Sforza's troops marched
over a distance of twenty-five miles, and gained a
most important victory—such was the rapidity of his
movements, and such was their readiness to undergo
fatigue for a commander who had so often led them
to victory.
As soon as Sigismund, the general of the Venetians,
beheld that his enemies were not in their former posi-
tion, he ascribed their departure to fear, and passed the
CHAP. VII. WENETIANS RETIRE. 167
Adda with the whole of his army. Before advancing
farther, he thought it advisable to make himself master
of one or two strongholds in the vicinity of the moun-
tains that were still held by the troops of his father-
in-law. These, however, resisted his utmost efforts
during the whole of the day, and in the evening he
was confounded by the intelligence that Piccinino's
army had been routed and dispersed, and that the
enemy, whom he believed to be retiring before him,
were coming, full of exultation after their victory, to their
former position. Not daring to await the issue of a
battle, he retired with the main body of his army
behind the Adda, while those that originally occupied
the mountains remained. Thus Sforza had completely
succeeded in keeping asunder, for a time at least, the
armies of his opponents. But the circumstance of the
mountains being still held by the Venetians gave him
much uneasiness, both because it rendered it necessary
for him to keep a considerable body of troops to guard
the pass of the river, and because they did much
damage to the adjoining territory, most of which was
the property of the Milanese nobles who had supported
him. At last he managed to cut off their supplies by
taking a small fort which commanded their communi-
cation with the river. On this, about a thousand of
those who were stationed on the mountains surren-
dered unconditionally to him, and he, ever true to his
policy of endeavouring to get himself a good name, set
them free, and presented the servants of their captain
with a ducat each. The remainder, amounting to
168 SKIRMISHES NEAR BOOK W.
about three thousand, escaped by night over a bridge
near Oliginato, which had only recently been con-
structed, and which they now broke down to protect
their retreat. Having thus undisputed possession of
these mountains, he constructed fortifications on them,
from which a small body of men might completely
guard the passage of the Adda.
The famine was now sore at Milan. The unfortunate
people continued to send to Sigismund, entreating him to
come to their relief; but he, baffled by the superior skill
of his adversary, could do nothing. At last Bartolomeo
Collio proposed to turn Sforza's position by a manoeuvre
somewhat similar to that by which Sforza had him-
self, ten years before, surprised Nicolo Piccinino on the
banks of Lake Garda, and offered to conduct the army
to a place adjoining the lake of Como, whither the inha-
bitants of the city of Como would send a fleet to trans-
port them to the other side. Though it was now the
middle of January, they hesitated not to expose the
troops to the hardships of a campaign in the Alps. This
bold movement was skilfully directed by the Venetian
generals, and opposed with equal skill by Sforza. The
great object of the latter was to prevent his enemies
taking up any position on the lake whence they could
embark, and in his endeavours to do this he was fre-
quently engaged with them on the mountains between
Bellagio and Bellona. In one of these skirmishes, a re-
markable anecdote is told of him, which shows the almost
magical effect of his presence both on his friends and his
foes. He had happened for some days to be absent
CHAP. VII. LAKE COMO. 169
from his army, and the enemy profited by the occasion
to make an attack on his troops. The Sfortians were
somewhat taken by surprise, and several of their castles
were on the point of falling into the hands of the
enemy. At this moment he himself, having had no
knowledge of what had taken place, returned, and,
beholding the critical position of affairs, he threw him-
self into the midst of the combat, and cried out with a
loud voice, “Here am I l’’ The effect of these few words,
pronounced in his well-known tone, was almost incre-
dible. If we are to believe the accounts given to us by
his secretary, Simoneta, and Corio, the Milanese histo-
rian, who wrote in the time of his son, the foremost
ranks of the enemy threw down their arms and made
obeisance, and many of them pressed forwards, eager to
kiss the hand of the man whom they revered as the
greatest ornament and honour to their profession. Be
this as it may, it is certain that their rapid retreat, and the
immediate rally of his own men, soon restored the battle.
And there is very little doubt but that he would have
prevented the Venetians embarking on the lake, if all
his calculations had not been deranged by the unex-
pected revolt of some of the towns on the coast, and
some of the owners of the fortresses whom he had looked
on as his staunchest adherents. Profiting by this cir-
cumstance, the Venetian commander managed to embark
his forces on the lake, and to bring them over to the
mountains of Briganza. *
Another circumstance occurred about this time which
* SIMONETA, lib. 20. CoRIO, part vi.
170 PICCININO’s PARTIAL SUCCESS. Book V.
raised the drooping hopes of the Milanese. Sforza was
informed that seven regiments of Piccinino's cavalry
were anxious to join him on the first opportunity, and
that they would most certainly do so, if he would send
a body of his own horse to meet them on a certain day,
when they were to be on their way to Como. He,
nothing doubting, sent a large force to the appointed
place, under the command of Salernitanus and Venti-
miglia. Piccinino's cavalry duly appeared; but, either
by accident or design, their commanding officer, who had
expressed his wish to join Sforza, was not with them.
When a commissioner went forward to summon them
to fulfil their engagement, they said they knew not
what he meant, and seized his person. The Sfortian
cavalry, seeing what had happened, without awaiting
the orders of their generals, galloped forward to attack
those whom they had expected to join them. In their
first encounter they were completely successful. But,
unfortunately, they continued to follow their foe till they
became entangled with the main body of Piccinino's
army; and when they were disordered in the pursuit,
and laden with spoil, they were in their turn attacked
and defeated. The advantage gained in this casual
encounter was represented by Piccinino and his friends
as a complete victory gained in a general action, and was
celebrated as such at Milan by illuminations and trium-
phal processions. And Piccinino, with a view of turning
the impression so caused to the best possible advantage,
had it signified to the inhabitants of the towns and the
garrisons of the castles that he had completely routed
CHAP. VII. SFORZA's CRITICAL SITUATION. 171
the enemy, and that their best course would be at once
to surrender to him.
But the count was not the man to be daunted by
such a slight disaster. All the places in the Milanese
remained faithful to him ; even the owners of the for-
tresses in the mountainous territory of Briganza, as they
were chiefly Ghibellines, and opposed to the democratic
party at Milan, were unmoved by the presence of the
Venetian army. He himself lost no time in concen-
trating his forces in the plains adjoining the moun-
tains, so as to attack the latter, should they attempt to
proceed to Milan. But his situation was every day
becoming more critical. He was placed between two
hostile armies, each of which was equal, if not superior,
to his in numbers. There was a great want of forage
for his horses, and the men had been living on grapes,
turnips, and chestnuts—poor fare for Italian soldiers
engaged in a winter campaign at the foot of the Alps.
Even of this diet it was reported, on the 28th of Janu-
ary 1450, that they had but a three days' supply.
Under these circumstances, Sforza determined to
make another attempt against Monza, by the capture of
which he hoped more effectually to cut off the supplies
of the Milanese, and to interpose between the armies
of his enemies. The conduct of this enterprise was
intrusted to one Marliano, an officer of Charles Gon-
Zaga's. He sent forward some of his captains to sound
the disposition of the garrison, and to reconnoitre the
defences of the town. The former were reported to be
faithful to the Milanese, but it was said that the latter
172 SFORZA HOLDS BOOK W.
might easily be taken by night from the side of the
Lambro. An expedition set out on the evening of the
31st January, for the purpose of effecting an entrance
into the town in the manner proposed ; but by one of
those so-called accidents, which seem to be brought
about by the contrivance of false friends, and in
which, in this case, there is much reason to suspect
Charles Gonzaga, who must have seen the difficulties
of Sforza's situation, they lost their way in the dark.
When morning appeared, they found themselves seven
miles from the city, which it had been their object to
surprise during the night. After the failure and conse-
quent discovery of this design, it was not deemed
prudent to repeat it.
The contest between Sforza and the Milanese now
seemed to depend on whether his troops or the citizens
could endure hunger the longest. As murmurs had
begun to be rife among the former, he deemed it
prudent to call a council of war, more, perhaps, for the
sake of soothing his officers by his eloquence than of
profiting by their advice. All the generals who attended
it were unanimous in their sentiments. They repre-
sented to him in the most forcible manner the dangers
of their present situation, placed, as they were, between
two hostile armies, and straitened for provisions, and
strongly recommended him to fall back upon Lodi and
Pavia: by so doing, they said, he would confirm the
allegiance of the inhabitants of these two places, who
might otherwise be induced by the present uncertain
aspect of their fortunes to waver. If he were well
CHAP. VII. A COUNCIL OF WAR. 173
established there, he would get supplies for his own
army; and as there was but little provision left in
the country they proposed to evacuate, he might starve
the Milanese as effectually as at present. Even if the
Venetian army were to advance to form a junction with
Piccinino, they would soon be compelled by want of
food to retire, so that, if he were to follow their plan,
he could not fail to bring the Milanese to terms which
would be alike advantageous and honourable. But this
advice, however prudent, did not suit him; and in reply
to it he said, that it would be a pity to be disheartened
by their present difficulties, when Milan was all but in
their hands; that their retiring from their position would
be ascribed to cowardice. He therefore strongly recom-
mended them to remain where they were till Sigis-
mund should advance towards Milan, when he promised
them he would retire to the cities they had mentioned,
if he did not see an opportunity of attacking them
to advantage. He allowed that the Venetian army
exceeded his in numbers ; but for this, he said,
they fully made up for in valour, and reminded them
how often he had defeated Sigismund, Piccinino, and
Collio. He concluded by telling them that he had
made arrangements for getting supplies from Pavia,
Lodi, and the other cities on the rivers.
Though all were heartily tired of this winter cam-
paign, yet as nobody could do anything against the
eloquence and the influence of their chief, they were
compelled to give in to him ; nevertheless he found it
necessary to keep up their spirit by Some show of active
174 SUFFERINGS OF BOOK W.
operations. For this purpose he frequently drew them
out in battle array near Monza, as if expecting an
engagement. In the mean time he omitted no means
which could conduce to his ultimate success. He
repeated his injunctions to the officers and soldiers to
be doubly careful that no provisions should be brought
into Milan ; and having heard that his subjects at Lodi
and Pavia had been tempted by their high price to send
them supplies, he forbade them doing so under penalty
of death. He requested all his friends in these places
to send him from their private stores what was requisite
for his own army; and where his friendly entreaties were
not complied with, he did not hesitate to avail himself
of force. With a view of providing against any sudden
attack of the Venetians, he had his own positions forti-
fied in the most complete manner; and arrangements
were made, by which, should anything occur, the dif-
ferent divisions of his army were to communicate by
signal. Sigismund, so far from showing any disposition
to attack him, seemed more desirous of securing the
communications in his rear than of advancing to the
assistance of the Milanese.
If we may judge by the conduct of the men of little
faith, which is always a pretty sure index of the expec-
tations of a party, suffering and privation had made
both sides equally despondent. Jacobo Piccinino offered,
on the condition of receiving Piacenza, with all the
castles in the vicinity that had belonged to his father,
to pass over to Sforza ; while Ventimiglia, who had
hitherto shown considerable attachment to the latter,
CHAP. VII. BOTH SIDES. 175
promised to give up the town of Canturio, in which he
was then stationed, and to join the enemy. The former,
however, moved either by remorse, or by the dread of
putting himself in the power of the man he had so
often betrayed, changed his mind; and when his friend
Luchino, through whose agency the arrangements had
been made, brought him letters from Sforza, he de-
nounced him as a traitor, and had him hanged.* Ven-
timiglia was also prevented by the Sagacity of his com-
mander-in-chief from carrying his designs into execu-
tion. When the latter first received intimation of them,
he was loth to believe it, but, after further intimation,
went himself to Canturio with sufficient force to pre-
vent it falling into the hands of the enemy. On his
arrival there he had him brought into his presence, and
frankly told him what he had heard. Ventimiglia
attempted in vain to exculpate himself. Sforza found
additional proofs of his intentions, and sent him to be
incarcerated at Pavia.
The blockade of Milan had now continued for more
than one year, with the exception of the short truce of
twenty days, which had been rather detrimental to the
inhabitants than otherwise. But their patient endu-
rance, and the vicissitudes to which Sforza was exposed,
* I am bound to say that the meditated treachery of Piccinino rests
entirely on the authority of Sforza’s secretary, Simoneta, and of his copyist,
Corio. M. Sismondi, in relating the transaction, refers to no authority
except the former of these, and Muratori makes no mention of it in his
annals of Italy. The fact of Piccinino having hung Luchino for bringing
him letters from Sforza would probably not have been related, if it had not
been notorious ; but the first part of the story involving Piccinino may
have been invented, or given on insufficient authority, by the panegyrist of
his enemy.
176 FAMINE AT MILAN. Book V.
had induced many even of those who most admired his
talents to doubt of his ultimate success. Now,
however, the fruits of his well - laid plans began to
manifest themselves. The famine in the city was
becoming too severe even for those who said that they
would sooner die than submit. The poor, who had
always been very numerous at Milan, and who, it is
probable, at this time formed no small portion of the
government party, were compelled to live on asses,
horses, dogs, cats, rats, mice, and many other things so
abhorrent to the nature of man, that, in the words of
the annalist of Italy, they often gulped down the very
death they sought to avoid. Indeed, their use of the
above-mentioned animals had become so common that
they were publicly sold in the principal square in the
city, and the people frequently quarrelled among them-
selves in their anxiety to get them. Roots and vege-
tables were eagerly sought after, and devoured undressed.
None, except the most wealthy, ever tasted wine. *
Many of the aged and diseased expired in the streets.
The lamentations of the wretched, the groans of the
dying, and the howls of the despairing, were heard in all
quarters. Many made their way out of the city, think-
ing it better to fall into the hands of men than to face
such a calamity. Several betook themselves to the
castles and threw themselves on the charity of the com-
mandants, who were seldom so hard-hearted as to
* At present, this may seem no great sign of privation, but it was doubt-
less severely felt in a country where light wine was the general beverage of
the people, and was probably deemed necessary to counteract the insalu-
brious effects of the water that was mixed with the Alpine snows.
CHAP. VII. REFLECTIONS. 177
refuse them admission or relief. But Sforza forbad any
species of relief to be administered to them, and gave
orders that, whenever it was possible, they should be
driven back to the city. As all those who had found a
temporary asylum in the neighbouring towns and castles
were expelled, the whole country was soon filled with
famishing wretches of all ages and sexes; many, who
thought that, in the country, they might possibly lay
their hands on vegetables or weeds, threw themselves
into any place where they hoped to escape the observa-
tion of those who were ordered to drive them back into
the city ; neither matrons nor maids hesitated to make
any sacrifice to preserve their lives.
To all remonstrances that were made to him, Sforza
replied that he was merely acting according to the rules
of war, and that the prevalent misery was to be ascribed
not to him, but to the obstinacy of the Milanese. His
then opponents, and subsequent calumniators, did not
hesitate to avail themselves of the circumstance to injure
his reputation and to blacken his memory. But in
reviewing his conduct after a lapse of four centuries, it
must be admitted that, though the effects of his measures
came more immediately under his observation than
often happens in such cases, the most humane com-
manders of the present age have not hesitated, when
occasion required, to inflict the same amount of misery
on the undeserving inhabitants. The sufferings of the
Genoese in 1797, and of the Maltese in 1799, were
probably equal to those of the Milanese in 1450; yet
no one has laid them to the charge of either Lord
WOL. II. M
178 VENETIANS UNABLE TO BOOK W.
Keith or Lord Nelson. Perhaps, indeed, Sforza's con-
duct may have been in more strict accordance with the
rules of justice than that of either of the English
admirals, as it is probable that those he beheld suffering
from famine had taken no inconsiderable part in exclud-
ing him from what he conceived to be his rights. The
reflection that these commanders were only executing
the orders of others, while he was carrying on the war
on his own account, will only serve to transfer whatever
blame may be attached to these transactions from their
shoulders to those of the authors of the late wars. The
repetition of such acts, indeed, may seem to call for an
alteration in the rules of war, or may serve to convince
mankind of its folly and iniquity; but surely it is unjust
to blame an Italian condottiere of the fifteenth century,
for conduct which has been followed by Englishmen
whom we have honoured with titles, and whom history
has dignified as heroes.
The Milanese authorities ceased not to solicit Sigis-
mund to attack the enemy who caused such misery.
But as he had been so unrelenting in his hostility to
his father-in-law, and had, by the recent murder of his
daughter, Polixena, both aggravated his displeasure
and committed a crime which would justify any punish-
ment, he dreaded nothing so much as falling into his
hands; and he did not think his superiority in numbers
sufficient to compensate for the greater skill and prestige
of his opponent. For these reasons he declined to
attack him, and told the Milanese messengers that the
citizens had only to hold out a very short time till want
CHAP. VII. RELIEVE THE MILANESE. 179
of supplies should compel their enemy to relinquish the
blockade. The Venetians themselves were secretly in
hopes that, in the extremity of despair, the populace
would make the city over to them. However, as it was
necessary to pretend to be doing something, Sigismund
ordered a considerable quantity of provisions to be
brought from Bergamos and the country around to the
Adda, which he promised to forward to Milan. But
Sforza thwarted all his designs: by withdrawing the
garrisons from the fortresses, he brought together a
sufficient force to show a bold front to any enemy who
should appear, and to blockade the city more closely
than ever. For he well knew that the crisis of his fate
was now come, and that, if he could in any way maintain
his ground against his enemy, he would soon be in pos-
session of Milan ; if not, he would soon be compelled,
whether he now held the fortresses or not, to evacuate
the country.
Within the city of Milan the famine began to pro-
duce its usual train of consequences. The citizens no
longer gave vent to their grief in mere passive lamenta-
tions; tumults arose in various places, and the authority
of the men in power began to wax weak. The magi-
strates, well aware of the state of feeling of the popu-
lace, took the greatest precautions that they should
hold no assemblage, while they themselves met in the
church of Santa Maria to devise means of appeasing
them for the present, and providing for the future.
As regards the latter, they could see no hope but in
making over the city to the Venetians. But the sub-
180 TUMULTS IN MILAN. BOOK W.
ject of their consultation soon got wind, and two of the
most independent of the citizens, by name Pietro Cotta
and Cristofero Pagnano, went about sounding the wishes
of the populace. By degrees a great crowd assembled
outside the walls of the church. The government sent
one of the most eloquent of their colleagues to persuade
them to disperse ; but, so far from prevailing with them,
he had some difficulty in escaping out of their hands.
They then tried to do by force what he had failed in
accomplishing by eloquence, and sent another of their
adherents in command of a body of cavalry, and carry-
ing with him a number of halters, to let them see what
they were to expect in case of disobedience. But a
rebellion caused by hunger was not to be put down so
easily; the appearance of the halters irritated instead
of frightening the populace; and the troops that had
been sent against them were driven back in confusion.
They then began to sound the bells, and make other
notes of preparation against an enemy. In the course
of the night they made an attack on the palace, which
was then occupied by the magistrates. After a repulse,
in which Pietro Cotta, whose name has already been
mentioned, was taken and thrown into prison, they
again came together, and managed to gain admittance
by a side entrance into that part of it which was inha-
bited by the widow of Filippo Maria. The guards, on
seeing this, fled in dismay. The principal entrance was
soon opened, so as to admit the body of the people.
Leonardo Veniero, the Venetian ambassador, attempted
to stay their course ; and having made use of high-
CHAP. VII. DELIBERATIONS OF THE PEOPLE. 181
Sounding language, mingled with threats, he was seized
by the leaders of the populace, and torn to pieces.
The magistrates were then happy to be able to make
their escape ; and the populace, after they had got pos-
session of the palace, set to to make themselves masters
of the gates, at one of which alone they experienced
resistance. Having thus completely revolutionised the
city, they agreed to meet the following day in the
church of Santa Maria, to consult about what was to
be done.
Great was the concourse of people that came there
at the appointed time. All professed their attachment
to the republic ; but experience had convinced them
that they could not maintain their independence. They
had then only to make a choice of rulers; and as they
all agreed that they would not put themselves under
the Venetians, they discussed the respective merits of the
pope, the king of Naples, the duke of Savoy, and the
king of France. Francesco Sforza was in the minds of
all ; but for some time no one dared to mention a name
which had latterly become a byword of unpopularity.
But among the people assembled in the church was one
Gaspar Vicemercato, a man who was at all times dis-
tinguished for his courage, and who had been among the
leaders of the insurrection of the preceding day; and
having himself served under Sforza, he had probably
learned that he was not so bad as he had been painted.
On the present occasion, he displayed his wonted hardi-
hood, by being the first to propose that they should call
in the man whom they had been taught to hate like the
182 THEY AGREE TO SUBMIT TO SFORZA. BOOK W.
devil or the sultan. He backed his proposition by
several very forcible arguments. In the first place, he
represented to them that, torn as they were by faction,
crippled for want of money, and almost expiring from
famine, they must give up all attempts to preserve their
liberty. Secondly, with respect to the princes whose
merits they had discussed, the pontiff and the kings of
Naples and France were all too far off to do anything
for them in their present emergency; and the duke of
Savoy was not strong enough to protect them. They
must therefore make choice between Sforza and the
Venetians. In such a case, they surely could not have
any hesitation to call in the son-in-law and adopted
child of their late duke, a man whom he knew to be so
humane and merciful that he would be more likely
to deport himself as the father than as the tyrant of
the city.
This advice seemed based on sound reasoning, and
possessed the additional recommendation of pointing
out to many a hungry man the only method by which
his necessities could be relieved before night. It was
incredible with what alacrity it was adopted. All
shouted out the name of the man whom, one day before,
they had been taught to regard as their bitterest enemy;
and it was forthwith decreed that Gaspar Vicemercato
should proceed to inform him of the wishes of the
people, and to request him to come to the city without
any delay.
During the whole of the preceding day, Francesco
Sforza was well aware of all that was going on in the
CHAP. VII. SFORZA CONSULTS HIS OFFICERS. I 83
city. As before, he kept his men under arms, ready
either to proceed to Milan, or to repel an attack of the
Venetians. On the day following that on which the
citizens had agreed to submit to him, he called a council
of war, trusting as usual to his eloquence to make the
measures which he had predetermined appear to be
adopted in compliance with the advice of his officers.
He then asked them to give their opinion, whether it
would be better to attack the army of Sigismund, who
would most likely be in some measure disheartened by
the news of the recent occurrences, or to march to Milan,
where their presence would not be without weight in
the deliberations of the citizens. The majority of the
captains were naturally more desirous of the booty that
was always acquired after a victory, than of gaining any
advantage, however great, for their general. At present,
elated as they were by the recent turn which affairs
had taken, and confident in their leader, they had little
doubt of the result of a general engagement ; whereas,
if their presence should cause the Milanese to give in,
their general would of course protect the properties of
those whom he wished to make dutiful subjects. They,
therefore, eagerly demanded to be led against the Vene-
tians. But the considerations that in former times
would have prompted Sforza to the same course did
not now influence him ; he felt that the die of his
fortunes was now being cast at Milan ; compared with
its issue, the glory and the spoils of a victory were
nothing. He managed to represent the posture of
affairs to them in a manner so artful that they all gave
184 HE PROCEEDS TO MILAN. BOOK W.
in to his opinion. It is probable that in this he was
backed by a large number of exiled Milanese nobles,
who looked to his success as the means of restoring
them to their home and their position ; and who, having
sought security in the vicinity of his camp, might have
been asked to assist in the deliberations of his officers.
It is certain, at all events, that he was attended by a
considerable number of this class the instant he set out
for Milan.
He had not proceeded far when he was met by
Gaspar Vicemercato, who formally announced to him
the resolution of his countrymen. He was followed by
a great concourse of citizens, who were anxious to
curry favour with their new ruler, or to beg bread from
the troops. Their number is said to have been so great
that the fields adjoining the road for ten miles were
swarming with men. The avidity with which they
Snapped at and swallowed whatever was given to them
by the soldiers, showed how great had been their suffer-
ings. In the conflict of their adulation, and their real
joy, they cried out in the Latin language as they had
heard it in church, “This is the day which the Lord
made, and let us rejoice in it.”
When he arrived at the Porta Nuova, by which, as
it adjoined the quarter in which the insurrection in his
favour had begun, it was arranged that he should enter,
he found the gateway stopped by a species of barri-
cade. An attempt was then made by some of the
citizens to prescribe conditions to him. He, however,
very coolly said, “If I had foreseen this, I should
CHAP. VII. HIS ENTRANCE AND RECEPTION. 185
have managed matters in a very different way.” The
significance of this hint was not lost ; the republicans
were in no condition to resist ; and even if they had
been, there were many who were more anxious for a
good meal than for a constitution, and would not brook
any delay. Gaspar also reminded them of the message
which they had authorised him to deliver. The gateway
was then cleared, and the new duke was admitted with-
out further obstruction.
Perhaps history does not furnish us with any more
remarkable instance of the fickleness of the lower orders,
than the reception that was now given to Sforza. But
a short time before this, the Milanese mob, having the
upper hand in the city, forbad any one to mention his
name except in opprobrious terms ; now were heard
the shouts of this very same people in honour of Duke
Sforza. In the words of his secretary, who doubtless
witnessed the scene, “men pressed upon one another,
anxious to seize his hand, or in any way to touch him.
So great was the throng, that for some little way his
horse appeared to be carried on the shoulders of the
citizens. All this time the dignity of his appearance
was almost more than human; his countenance was both
composed and cheerful, his words were seasoned with
wonderful suavity. There was not less reverence than
amity in their mode of receiving him, and he in his
turn deported himself with a facility of manner and
graciousness that was perfectly astonishing.”.” As he
* SIMONETA, lib. 21. A somewhat similar description is given by Mr
Alison of the reception of the Allied sovereigns in Paris, in 1814: “The
186 HIS CONDUCT TOWARDS BOOK W.
was always peculiarly observant of all religious ordi-
nances, and on this occasion was more than ever anxious
to conciliate the good-will of the clergy, his first step
was to go to the church of the Holy Virgin to return
thanks for his fortune. This he was obliged to do on
horseback, as the surrounding crowd was so great that
he was unable to alight. He then proceeded to the
house of one of his friends in the forum, where, after a
slight refreshment, he began to take measures for setting
his duchy in order.
His proceedings on this occasion were distinguished
by his usual sagacity. Having placed a sufficient
number of soldiers in the towers adjoining the gates,
and in the Senate house, he then ordered the citizens
to lay down their arms; assuring them that they
should be kindly treated, and that their properties
should be protected. Provisions of all sorts were
ordered to be brought into the city without any toll
or tribute; both the Cremonese and the Pavians, whose
situation gave them a great command of the produce of
the surrounding country, were requested to lose no time
in making good the deficiencies that had been caused by
the blockade : three days after the capitulation of the
city, no traces of famine remained. After all these
matters had been arranged, he appointed Charles Gon-
zaga deputy governor of the city, and on the very day
people kissed their boots, their sabres, and the trappings of their horses;
and many young women, of graceful exterior and polished manners, entreated
the gentlemen to take them up before them on their horses, that they might
obtain a nearer sight of their deliverers. Alexander's manner was so
gracious, his figure so noble, his answers so felicitous, his pronunciation of
the French so pure, as to excite universal admiration.”
CHAP. VII. THE MILANESE. 187
on which he had entered it he took his departure to
Wimercato, in the vicinity of the headquarters of his
army.
On his arrival there he learned that the Venetians,
along with Piccinino, had retreated across the Adda, in
spite of a futile attempt of one of his own generals to
intercept them. Having thus fairly gained the upper
hand in the field, he allowed his soldiers, exhausted by
the hardships of a winter campaign, to go into canton-
ments. He then sent ambassadors to the potentates of
the peninsula and to the neighbouring states of Europe,
requesting them to acknowledge him as duke. . In the
mean time he took up his own headquarters at Monza,
a place sufficiently near Milan to allow him to super-
intend the arrangement of affairs. Men of the utmost
capacity and probity were selected to fill the chief
offices of state. Two of the leading democrats, who,
while their own party had the upper hand, had indulged
in every species of violence and insult against the
others, and who now trembled for their lives, were cast
into prison ; a few others were banished to Pavia or
elsewhere, but the majority lost nothing by their change
of rulers. Many both of those who had been his
friends, and of those who wished to be so for the future,
came to visit him at Monza ; and there was scarcely a
day on which he did not receive assurances of allegi-
ance, or addresses of congratulation, not unfrequently
drawn up in an adulatory strain. And when matters
appeared to him to be sufficiently settled, he fixed the
10th April, the Feast of the Annunciation of the Holy
188 HIS CORONATION BOOK W.
Virgin, as the day on which, accompanied by his wife
and his child, he was to make his second entry into
Milan.
Sforza's formal instalment in the dignity which he
valued so highly, and for which he had so ably contended,
was celebrated with a pomp well worthy of the occasion.
From his present quarters he passed by a cross-road to
the vicinity of the Ticinese gate, where he was joined
by Bianca Maria and Galeazzo, who had shortly before
attained his seventh year. They were followed by
Alexander Sforza, with a great number of the captains
who had fought under him, all of them mounted and
equipped in the most magnificent manner. On the
other side the leading citizens had come from Milan to
meet them, bringing with them a triumphal car with
a canopy over the seat, covered with white muslin
and embroidered with gold, in which they wished their
new duke to enter their city. But this he, out of policy
or modesty, refused to do, saying that such dignities
were fitted only for kings. Escorted by the nobles,
and followed by his captains, he proceeded on horse-
back to the church of the Holy Virgin. Before passing
the vestibule he was clothed with the white muslin
garment worn by former dukes. He then entered the
church along with his wife, where he was formally
invested with the ducal dignity, in a speech composed
for the occasion. After deputations of citizens, chosen
from each quarter, had sworn allegiance to him, he
was presented with the keys of the gates, along with the
sceptre, crown, Sword, and other insignia of his office.
CHAP. VII. AS DUKE. 189
When this ceremony was over, he made his eldest
son count of Pavia, the title which he himself had held
after he married the heiress of Wisconti. Vicemercato,
who had been the foremost in aiding his accession
to his new honour, and the first to announce to him
fortune, was raised to the dignity of count, and not
long afterwards presented with the town of Valentia.
A festival of five days was proclaimed, in which the
new duke entertained the chief men of the city in a
manner becoming his station. The time which was
not occupied in these entertainments was passed in
dances, plays of various descriptions, and tourna-
ments. These last were held with the greatest spirit :
rewards were given to those who acquitted themselves
the best, and all seemed anxious to appear to the greatest
advantage in the presence of the first general of the
age. At the conclusion of the festivities, he created a
new order of knighthood, with which he decorated one
hundred and fifty of those whom he thought had most
befriended him throughout. Thus the name of Fran-
cesco Sforza, from having been a by-word of reproach,
became the most popular in the state.
He had at this time the additional gratification of
being acknowledged by all the potentates of Italy, with
the exception of the Venetians and the king of Naples.
The Florentine ambassadors had already proceeded as
far as Reggio, with directions to be guided by circum-
stances, when they received intelligence of the surrender
of Milan. Great was the joy of their countrymen when
this circumstance was reported to them; in place of the
190 IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY OTHER POWERS. Book V
Visconti, whom they had looked upon almost like here-
ditary enemies, they now beheld one who had shown
himself their most constant friend ; and in the present
circumstances of Italy, they were not sorry to see him in
a position to make head against the Venetians and the
king of Naples. The ambassadors were ordered to pro-
ceed from Reggio to offer their congratulations, and, it
need hardly be said, were received by the new duke
with every mark of honour. And though the Emperor,
Ferdinand III., had said that, after the death of the
last of the Visconti, the duchy should revert to the
Empire, and though the king of France claimed it for
his nephew the duke of Orleans, neither of them made
any attempt to enforce their pretensions by arms.
If the new duke of Milan, says M. Sismondi, could,
at this very moment, when he had obtained the prize
which had been the great object of his ambition, have
foreseen the future destiny of the family whom he had
raised to the throne, his joy would have been turned
into sorrow. In the words of a Milanese historian of
the sixteenth century, his crown was not destined to
descend to a sixth heir ; and the five successions through
which it did pass were accompanied with many tragic
events in his family. His son Galeazzo, as a punishment
for his crimes and his lust, was killed by his attend-
ants, in the presence of the people, in front of the altar,
and in the midst of the celebration of sacred rites ;
after which, the whole city was deluged with the blood
of the conspirators. Gian Galeazzo, who came after-
wards, was poisoned by Ludovico the Moor, and was
CHAP. VII. REFLECTIONS. 191
the victim of the crimes of his uncle. He, in his turn,
after having been made prisoner by the French, died
of grief during his captivity. The fate of one of his
children was like to his own ; and the other, after
having passed a long time in banishment and misery,
re-established his children on his shattered throne, and
afterwards saw the termination of both his family and
his kingdom.
Such was the value of the prize for which Sforza had
so long, so earnestly, it may be thought so unscrupu-
lously striven ; such, too, is the value of many things,
for the attainment of which mortals still rise up early,
go to bed late, and eat the bread of carefulness.
B O O K S IXTH,
FROM THE ACCESSION OF SFORZA TO THE PEACE OF LODI,
1450-1454.
B O O K S IX T H.
FROM THE ACCESSION OF SFORZA TO THE PEACE OF
LODI, 1450–1454.
C HAPTER I.
REBUILDING OF THE FORTRESS AT MILAN.—WILLIAM OF MONTFERRAT LIBE-
RATED–JoſNS SFORZA's ENEMIES-CHARLES GONZAGA LEAVES SFORZA's
SERVICE.-PLAGUE AT MILAN.—COALITION FORMED BY THE WENETIANs
AGAINST SEORZA.—SFORZA Is JOINED BY THE FLORENTINES AND THE MAR-
QUIS OF MANTUA.—VISIT OF THE EMPEROR FREDERIC III. To ITALY—WHO
IS CROWNED AT ROME, AND REFUSES TO ACKNOWLEDGE SFORZA.—RECOM-
MENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.—MANOEUVRES OF BOTH PARTIES.—SFORZA's
CHALLENGE, AND REPLY OF THE WENETIANS.—VENETIANS RETIRE WITH-
OUT FIGHTING.-INDECISIVE CAMPAIGN IN TUSCANY.-ARRANGEMENTS OF
SFORZA WITH COSMO DE MEDICI FOR CONTINUING THE WAR.—KING OF
FRANCE PROMISES TO SEND RENE OF ANJOU TO THEIR ASSISTANCE.-
CAMPAIGN IN LOMBARDY AND TUSCANY.-CONSPIRACY OF PORCARI AT
ROME.
MACHIAVELLI, in that celebrated work entitled The
Prince, says,” that the man who rises from being a
subject to be a sovereign, must have either great good
fortune or considerable talents, and that those who rise
in virtue of the latter, find less difficulty in maintaining
* Principe, cap. vi., vii.
196 SFORZA's SAGACITY. BOOK WI.
their position than those who have been aided by the
former. As an example of the truth of his assertion,
he refers to Francesco Sforza, who, he says, by lawful
means and great talent, became Duke of Milan, and kept
with little trouble that which he had acquired with great
difficulty. The whole of Sforza's subsequent history
will show that he possessed as much ability in govern-
ing as he had exhibited in diplomacy and war. And
many of the deeds which he found it necessary to do
in order to preserve his position, like those which he
did to reach it, will show the sagacity of the historian
whose remark has been quoted.
Neither the applause with which he had been received
when he first entered the city, nor the pomp of the
festivities which followed his coronation, lulled him into
a dangerous feeling of security. Though desirous of
winning the affections of his new subjects, he knew that
it was at least as requisite for him to be feared as to be
loved,” and that many of those who, when he had the
power of conferring on them any benefit, were the
loudest in their professions of devotion, would be the
first to revolt from him in the hour of need. But in
following out this policy he did not commit any act of
unnecessary severity. Fortunately, there were no more
direct heirs of the late duke whom it might be neces-
sary for him to put out of the way. And having, as
has already been mentioned, banished some of his most
active opponents, and thrown into prison one who had
committed many crimes in the name of liberty, he
* Principe, xvii.
CHAP. I. HE REBUILDS THE FORTRESS. 197
endeavoured to treat the other citizens as if they had
never been his enemies.
He lost no time in strengthening the fortifications of
the gates, and rebuilding the citadel which had been
demolished on the death of the last duke. But well
knowing that this fortress was generally regarded as a
badge of servitude, and that by its restoration he would
cause many to suspect that he meditated acts of tyranny,
and would make it evident to all how little he trusted
them, he wished that it should appear that he was doing
So at the instigation of the citizens themselves. For
this reason he persuaded his partisans—who, it is pro-
bable, were at this time tolerably numerous—to suggest
to the multitude how much the restoration and repair-
ing of their strongholds would conduce both to the
ornament and security of their city.”
Whatever might have been the general opinion as to
his real intentions, all saw that it would be useless to
oppose them ; many even made a virtue of necessity,
and pretended to be anxious for the restoration of the
obnoxious edifices. One only of the citizens, Giorgio
Piatto, an advocate of considerable celebrity, had the
courage to raise his voice in opposing the wishes of their
new ruler ; but not daring to speak anything against
* Machiavelli, when discussing the policy of disarming the citizens of a
conquered state, or building fortresses, says, “Quando tu gli disarmi tu in-
cominci ad offendirli et monstrare che tu habbi in loro diffidenza o per
viltà, o poca fede, e l'una e l'altra di queste opinioni concipe odio contro
di te.”—Principe, cap. 20. Sforza was evidently of the same opinion; but
though, nevertheless, he built the fortress, he did his best to prevent the
evil consequences referred to. Machiavelli, however, is of opinion that the
building of this fortress contributed in no small degree to the ruin of his
family. See Principe, cap. 20, and Discorsi, lib. ii. cap. 24.
198 LIBERATES WILLIAM OF MONTFERRAT. BOOK WI.
him personally, he most artfully avoided the imputation
of disloyalty by saying, that, if they could insure all
their dukes being like Francesco Sforza, they would have
nothing to fear, but they knew not by whom he might
be succeeded or supplanted; and that if this fortress
were ever in the hands of a tyrant or a foreigner, they
had no idea to what oppression they might be subjected.
He concluded by a sentimental appeal to the reigning
duke, to trust more to the hearts and the affections of
his subjects than to bulwarks of stone—a piece of advice
which, however beautiful it may sound, has seldom been
found practicable by those who have aspired to rule.
The eloquence of the advocate was no match for the
influence of the duke. At the expense of a thousand
ducats a new castle was built, which, according to the
historian of Milan, surpassed in strength and beauty
anything that had previously been erected on level
ground.”
Sforza, deeming himself now tolerably well established
in his new position, bethought himself of one whom, a
short time before, he had thought it necessary for his
safety to cast into prison. He not only released Wil-
liam of Montferrat from his confinement at Pavia, but
also put him in possession of Alessandria and the sur-
rounding towns, which he had coveted so much. He,
however, stipulated that he should pay him two thousand
ducats annually, in lieu of the custom-dues which he had
formerly received therefrom. This William promised
to do, and signed a treaty to that effect at Lodi. But
* CoRIO, part vi.
CHAP. I. CHARLES GONZAGA's CONDUCT. 199
he never forgave the indignity to which he had been
subjected. When he found himself safe at Alessandria,
he protested against the treaty, which, he said, he had
only signed under the influence of fear, and took the
earliest opportunity of joining the enemies of the new
duke. -
His example was, not long afterwards, followed by
Charles Gonzaga. Sforza had, according to his stipula-
tion, put him in possession of Tortona; he had also
formed the most intimate alliance with his brother,
Louis, the marquis of Mantua, and had even gone so
far as to promise that his son and heir, Galeazzo, should
marry Louis's daughter. But whether it was, as some
strongly suspect, that the getting rid of Charles was one
of those things which the hard necessity of the case and
his recent succession compelled him to do,” or whether,
as is said by Sforza's secretary and biographer, Simo-
neta, Charles had, out of jealousy of the favour shown
to his brother, begun to intrigue with the Venetians, it
is certain that, on the 7th of November, he cast him
into prison at Binasco. In a few days, however, being
moved by the intercession of Louis, he released him on
the condition of his giving up Tortona. Charles, on
finding himself at liberty, made his way by a circuitous
* Machiavelli says that a new prince must do many things for which they
can only plead the same excuse that Dido did for her severity, when the
captive Trojans were brought before her— -
“Res dura et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri et late fines custode tueri.”
In the same place he says that every new prince must be reputed cruel.
Few of that age, I think, would have been placed in Sforza's circumstances
without having done more to deserve the imputation.
200 PLAGUE AT MILAN. BOOK WI.
route to Venice, to be ready to join the enemies of the
new duke when required.
Sforza was now neither at peace nor at war with the
Venetians. Both parties alike feared one another.
The duke of Milan dreaded the great power and bound-
less resources of the republic of St Mark, while they
stood in awe of his military talents. Thus he was
enjoying a cessation from the toils of war—the first he
had known since his sixteenth year, when he made his
appearance in the battle in which his father defeated
Tartaglia, near Rome. But cares of a weightier nature
now pressed upon him. A terrible pestilence, the result
of the famine which had placed him on the ducal
throne, broke out at Milan ; and as this year had been
fixed by the pope for a jubilee at Rome, the number of
pilgrims who were passing through Lombardy, on their
way to the holy city, rendered impossible that isolation
by which the progress of disorders of this nature may
be stayed. Thus it soon spread to Lodi and the other
cities of the duchy, where the predisposing causes had
not existed, and was carried thence to Rome. So
severe was it at Milan, that two hundred occasionally
died of it in one day ; nor did it cease till it had car-
ried off thirty thousand, or, according to some, as many
as sixty thousand.* Piacenza is said to have been left
* Simoneta says thirty thousand; Muratori, sixty thousand : the smaller
number appears the more credible. Nevertheless, it should be recollected
that Muratori is generally tolerably accurate in his figures, and had no
object in exaggeration; whereas the secretary of Sforza might be tempted
to underrate the extent of the calamity, which, though he does not say so,
was no doubt produced by the famine during the blockade of the preceding
year.
CHAP. I. STATE OF ITALY. 201
almost without inhabitants. It continued, with more
or less severity, till the end of the following year.
The peninsula, though desolated by this plague, was
at least free from the horrors of war. Its potentates
had been wearied and exhausted by preceding struggles;
so that, though there could not be said to be a thorough
understanding among them, there was at least peace in
the land. This was in no small degree brought about
by the mediation of Pope Nicholas V. That excellent
pontiff was more given to learning and the fine arts
than to war; and whenever he took part in the drama
of Italian politics, he appeared in the character of a
peacemaker. By his intervention Alphonso came to a
definite peace with the Florentines, with whom, though
he had not invaded their territory since he had been
forced to raise the siege of Piombino, he had hitherto
been nominally at war; and with the assistance of the
marquis of Este, he persuaded the Venetians to-join
that monarch in signing a treaty with the Florentines
at Ferrara. By the jubilee which he held in this year,
he managed to replenish his coffers with money, which
he employed in relieving the poor, in repairing and
enlarging the churches, and in beautifying the city.
Early in October, Borso of Este quietly succeeded to
the marquisate of Ferrara, which had become vacant by
the death of his brother Lionel, a prince who appears
to have inherited all the good qualities of his father,
though the shortness of his reign has assigned him a
less prominent place in the history of Italy. The city
of Genoa alone was ill at ease. In the month of July
202 SYMPTOMS OF WAR. BOOK WI.
the inhabitants deposed the reigning doge, and, after
an ineffectual attempt to recall his predecessor, they
elected his nephew in his room. But their commotions
did not disturb the tranquillity of the neighbouring
States.
This state of things, however, was not of long dura-
tion. The Venetians continued to regard in no friendly
light the new duke of Milan ; and they endeavoured to
form a coalition against him of those who viewed him
with jealousy, fear, or dislike. They were soon joined by
the king of Naples, the duke of Savoy, and marquis of
Montferrat, all of whom were actuated by some one of
these motives, and who, though they dreaded his talents,
entertained hopes that he was not sufficiently firm on his
new throne to make head against their number. But
he, though he wished for time to set his new duchy
in order, and though he was fully aware of the almost
inexhaustible resources of the Venetians, did not lose
heart when he heard of their machinations. Misunder-
standings had already arisen between the Venetians
and the Florentines, and he found no difficulty in form-
ing a counter-alliance with the latter, together with the
Genoese and the marquis of Mantua. The above-men-
tioned misunderstandings were further fomented by a
decree of the Venetians and the king of Naples, banishing
from their dominions all the Florentines, with the excep-
tion of some few who were specially privileged to remain.
In this position of his affairs, Sforza was fortunate
in being able to secure the assistance of one of the
best condottieri of the times. Bartolomeo Collio, dis-
CHAP. I. COLLIO JOINS SFORZA. 203
gusted at the preference shown to others, determined
to leave the Venetians. Under pretence of his term
of service having expired, and the non-payment of
arrears, he asked their leave to retire. But they,
seeing that they could get nothing more by him, and
determined that the duke of Milan should not have
the benefit of his services, resolved to act with him
in somewhat the same manner as they had done with
Carmagnola, and ordered Jacobo Piccinino to seize
him and kill him. Piccinino managed to surprise and
make prisoners of his troops, which consisted of fifteen
hundred horse and four hundred foot, but he him-
self succeeded in making his escape to Mantua.
Thence he repaired to Milan, where he was received
by his old opponent with every demonstration of
friendship. Sforza, to make good Collio's losses, as-
signed him the command of two thousand horse and
five hundred foot, and promised him a larger stipend
than he had ventured to ask. Thus, before the end of
the year 1442, all parties were again ready for hostili-
ties, and were only awaiting the commencement of the
following spring to resume active operations.
In the course of the winter, the emperor Frederic III.
made an expedition into Italy, for the purpose of
receiving the imperial crown from the hands of the
pope. As the Italians had long since ceased to be
jealous of imperial influence, the greatest respect was
shown to him wherever he went ; even the Florentines,
those ancient guardians of Italian liberties, honoured
him with a magnificent reception. It was in vain,
204 FREDERIC III. CROWNED AT ROME. BOOK WI.
however, that Sforza, who was peculiarly anxious to
stand in the same relation with him as the Visconti
had done with his predecessors, continually entreated
him to come to Lombardy to receive the iron crown at
Monza, and even sent his heir, Galeazzo Maria, to meet
him at Ferrara. Either because he would not acknow-
ledge the present duke, or because he feared that the
plague was not extinct at Milan, he remained obdurate
against all his solicitations. The pope, though he had
the precaution to fill his fortresses with armed men,
received him with all the respect that was due to the
powers that be. When asked to crown him king of
Lombardy, he requested a few days to consider, and
afterwards, in spite of the remonstrances of the Mila-
nese ambassadors, he consented to do so, merely reserv-
ing the rights of the archbishop of Milan. About the
same time the emperor solemnised a marriage with a
daughter of the king of Portugal, who was also a niece
of Alphonso's. Three days afterwards, he, along with
his new wife, received the imperial crown from the
pope with all the customary ceremonies. Having made
a sojourn of a month with his wife's uncle, he set forth
on his return to his dominions.
On his way north he made a short halt at Ferrara.
He was there met by ambassadors from the duke of
Milan, and the governments of Florence and Venice,
all of whom were anxious to secure his good offices, and
was requested by them to arrange the differences which
were just about to lead to hostilities. Whether he really
tried to preserve the peace does not appear, but he cer-
CHAP, I. COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 205
tainly effected nothing. Borso of Este, the new mar-
quis of Ferrara, seems to have succeeded more than any
other prince of the time in gaining his good-will, having
been by him created duke of Modena and Reggio. On
the 10th of April the duke was installed in his new
dignity. The great concourse of people, and incessant
applause, both of the Ferrarese and the other subjects
of the house of Este, which greeted him on the occasion,
shows that he preserved all the popularity of his an-
cestors. On the 19th the emperor took his departure,
and after a short halt at Venice, where the republic
made wonderful efforts to receive him with due honour,
he proceeded to Germany. Thus, though he did not
take any open part in the war, nevertheless, by receiving
the crown of Lombardy at Rome, and by visiting the
king of Naples and the Venetians, while he declined to
do the same honour to Sforza, he gave the enemies of
the latter all the advantage of his name.
As he did not arrange a peace while at Ferrara, his
departure thence was the signal for the recommence-
ment of hostilities. On the very day on which he set
forth, the Venetians beat their drums in token of a
formal declaration of war. At the same time, the
marquis of Montferrat, aided by his brother William
and the duke of Savoy, made an attack on the Milanese
dominions from the west; and Alphonso despatched his
son Ferdinand with a force of eight thousand horse and
four thousand foot into Tuscany.
The details of the campaign between Sforza and the
Venetians, though they have been celebrated in a bom-
206 CAMPAIGN IN BOOK WI.
bastic strain by a Neapolitan writer,” are destitute of
interest. Each party passed into the territory of the
enemy, and remained there doing what mischief he
could. The Venetians crossed the Oglio with a force
of fifteen thousand horse and three thousand foot, took
several strongholds—among others, Soncino—and laid
waste the surrounding country. On the other hand,
Sforza advanced from Cremona into the territory of
Brescia, where he carried on operations of the same
nature. After he had been joined by the marquis of
Mantua, he took the important town of Ponte Vico.
The Venetians then began to construct a bridge over
the Adda, with a view of invading the Milanese. To
hinder their operations in this quarter, Sforza despatched
his brother Alexander, who was, however, surprised and
defeated by one of the Venetian generals; and after he
had lost nearly all his baggage, and eight hundred of
his men had been taken prisoners, he escaped with dif-
ficulty to Lodi. But as the duke had ordered all the
fruits of the earth and property of the inhabitants to
be conveyed to the strongholds, the Venetians, though
they overran the country almost to Milan, found nothing
therein, and so far from enriching themselves with booty,
they could scarcely maintain their soldiers. As Sforza's
position in the Brescian territory enabled him to inter-
cept the supplies that were sent to them from home,
they were soon obliged to retire ; and after various
manoeuvres and occasional skirmishes, they brought
* PorcFLLI. His account of the campaign is published, Rerum Italicarum
Scriptores, vol. XX.
CHAP. I. LOMBARDY. 207
all their forces behind the Oglio to free their dominions
from the presence of the enemy.*
Meanwhile, William of Montferrat, with four thousand
horse and two thousand foot, crossed the western fron-
tier of the Milanese, and, having been for some time
unopposed, began to threaten the city of Pavia. Sforza
then sent a small force against him under the command
of his brother Conrad, who gained a complete victory
near Alessandria. For some time after this, William did
not dare to reappear in the field, but, hearing of the
defeat of Alexander Sforza, he took courage, and began
carrying on intrigues with one Gian della Noce, a general
of the duke's, who he hoped would join him with a suf-
ficient force to enable him to resume active operations.
The discovery of these intrigues, and the execution of
Della Noce, obliged him again to keep quiet for a
SeaSOIl.
For some time the Venetian and the Milanese armies
continued manoeuvring in the territory of Brescia in the
presence of each other. Neither party, indeed, seemed
to court a general engagement. The Venetian captains
naturally dreaded the great military talents and almost
unprecedented success of their opponent, while he, as, in
the event of a disaster, he had not the means of reor-
ganising an army, was reluctant to risk anything. The
former availed themselves of this circumstance to increase
their own reputation and to damage that of the duke :
* The result of Sforza's tactics on this occasion shows that he was not
unreasonable in his recommendation of the plan which he proposed after the
battle of Caravaggio.
208 SFORZA's CHALLENGE BOOK WI.
they began taunting him and his officers with cowardice,
and they gave it out through Italy that, though they
constantly offered him battle, he declined it through fear.
Sforza was too jealous of his fame, on which he felt that
much of his fortune must rest, to allow these insinua-
tions to pass by unnoticed, and he issued counter-state-
ments, saying that the reluctance to fight was all on their
part. At last, when the autumn was rapidly drawing
to a close, both parties seemed to think that something
should be done to save their reputation. Accordingly,
the duke, after having satisfied himself that his numbers
were not inferior to those of the enemy, and made
choice of his ground, sent the Venetian generals a chal-
lenge, which, whatever might have been thought of it
at the time, cannot but seem ridiculous to every modern
reader. After having called God and man to witness
their injustice and his innocence at the commencement
of the contest, he made a most pathetic allusion to the
miseries which the continuance of the war was entailing
upon the whole of the peninsula, especially upon the
unfortunate Brescians, who, as he said, were literally
ground to atoms by the continual laying waste of their
fields and bombardment of their towns. He then said
that he really thought it was time that these evils should
cease, and that he saw no other way of putting an end
to them than their agreeing to meet in a certain spot
and fight it out among themselves, a proposal which he
did not think they would decline, after their having fre-
quently given out that they were continually courting
while he was avoiding an engagement, and having sent
CHAP. I. REPLY OF THE WENETIANS. 209
him a letter, saying that they would soon give him
reason to repent that he proceeded so far in their do-
minions. He therefore promised to meet them with
all his forces in the plain of Monte Chiaro, four hours
after sunrise, on any day that they would name; and,
as a token of the sincerity of his intentions, he sent them
a gauntlet stained with blood. “Thus,” he concluded,
“will the burning of houses, the smoking of towers, and
the violence offered to matrons and virgins, stop ; thus
will cease the slaughter of men and the other horrors of
war. It will be a fine thing, also, that such a multitude
of brave men should meet in an open place to make a
trial of their valour; and the result will show which of us,
in the judgment of the Almighty, is acting most justly.”
This challenge, which was of course meant as a mere
bravado to show off before the other powers of Italy,
was accepted and replied to in somewhat similar terms.
The Venetian generals, after all due protestations of
bravery, said, that though it was for the challenged to
name the place of meeting, they would nevertheless be
ready for him in the plain he had named on the follow-
ing Monday. As pledges of their faith, they sent him
two gauntlets, and the same number of javelins dipped
in blood. Thus, they said, as became the honour of the
Venetian senate and the extent of its empire, they
would persecute all tyrants, and continue to wage war
with one who had so often effected his conquests with
their arms, and made use of their money to get, first a
wife, and afterwards a sovereignty, for himself.
* SIMONETA, lib. 22.
WOL. II. O
210 WENETIANS Book VI.
The purport of this answer spread rapidly through the
Milanese camp, and the spirits of the soldiers, who had
seldom remained so long in the field with so little advan-
tage to themselves, were considerably elated thereby.
Sforza, most likely expecting that his adversaries really
meant to fight, made all the usual preparations for an
engagement. From the directions that he issued, it
would appear as if the only danger he dreaded was,
lest his soldiers, after the first advantage they gained,
should become disordered in their eagerness to enrich
themselves with booty. He threatened the punishment
of death to any one who left the ranks; he said that
whoever should take a horse of the enemy's, and bring
him within their lines, or even to a place whence they
should be unable to get him back, was to be the owner
of the horse ; in like manner, if any one should seize
one of the enemy by the crest of the helmet, or by the
neck, and in any way detain him till his fellow-soldiers
were unable to assist him, he was to have a right to the
captive. Also, every person was to have a right to
any one whom he had unhorsed, as well as to half the
horse, should the animal be taken by another.
On the appointed day the Sfortian soldiers advanced
in order to the plain of Monte Chiaro. A thick fog
and a drizzling rain prevented their seeing the disposi-
tions of the enemy. As they proceeded, a mighty shout,
as if coming from a multitude of men, was heard from
behind the brushwood, on the Venetian side of the
plain, but no one appeared in the field. At first the
duke of Milan suspected some ambush, to guard against
CHAP. I. RETIRE. 211
which he reserved a considerable body of men in the
rear for the defence of his camp. But as the time
passed away, and there were no signs of the enemy, he
sent some of his light troops forward to see what had
become of them ; and they soon brought him back word
that they were already at some little distance off in full
retreat. He afterwards ascertained that the shout
which he had heard in the morning had been raised by
men placed behind the brushwood, for the purpose of
impressing his soldiers with an idea of great numerical
superiority; after which the Venetian generals, finding
that the Milanese were not terrified thereby, had not
the courage to measure themselves with Sforza.” The
only one of the enemy found on the spot was the Nea-
* M. Sismondi says that the generals on both sides were equally desirous
of avoiding an encounter, and that their armies, after having remained some
time in one another's presence, retired to their respective quarters. It is
impossible to admit the truth of this assertion, as even Porcelli, who com-
posed his history for the sake of extolling Piccinino, allows that the duke of
Milan was ready to give battle, but that his favourite hero was unable to per-
suade his troops to come up to the encounter. As he met Sforza while he
was awaiting the enemy in the appointed place, his account of the transaction,
which I subjoin, may be interesting. Piccinino is denominated Scipio, and
Sforza is called Hannibal, throughout. “Scipio was expecting the arrival of
the enemy, when, relying on the permission that I had got from Hannibal,
I betook myself to him, that I might become acquainted with the disposition
he had made of his troops. Here I saw the famous commander, by whose
wisdom and military genius everything was being most diligently arranged.
When he saw me in the middle of the army, he addressed me in the politest
language possible, and expressed his confident expectation that I should
write and abundantly testify before all the princes of the world the things
that were now about to take place. The promise which I then gave I have
kept as a writer of the truth.” After mentioning the order in which the
different bodies of troops had been arranged, he goes on to say—“A Scout
came up to him and said, ‘The enemy is approaching.’ Hannibal looked
around all the plain like an eagle, and, on not seeing the enemy, said,
‘Where is he?' To which he answered, ‘They are not going to attack you in
front, but through the slanting paths of the woods and the marshes.’ Then
turning his eyes to me, he said, ‘I was aware that these fellows, whatever
212 CAMPAIGN IN - BOOK WI.
politan poet, Porcelli, who had accompanied the oppo-
site army throughout their campaign, and who now
asked leave to visit the great captain of the age. The
poet, in return for the courtesy with which he was re-
ceived by the duke, promised to give him a good name
in his book. Thus ended the day which was to have
decided which was the bravest of captains of Italy,
and which of the contending parties had most justice
on his side. Both armies then retired to their can-
tonments for the winter.
The campaign in Tuscany was as barren of incident
as that which has been described. Ferdinand, the son
of Alphonso, having entered that territory with twelve
thousand men, wasted most of the summer in taking a
few places of minor importance. Having afterwards
failed in an attempt against two small towns in the
they might say, would not really come; but let us go on as we have begun,
lest anything be said against us.” Hereupon I said, ‘You have before your
eyes at the mound Scipio, with whom you can fight; he, for some time past,
has been awaiting the enemy's forces, that he may begin the battle. Of this
I wish you to be assured, Hannibal, that there is nothing of which Scipio is
more desirous than this very day to make trial of the virtue of the generals
and the courage of the soldiers.’ Then, seeing that many illustrious men
were watching him, he said, ‘ I am aware how desirous Scipio is of battle,
and that he would most certainly fight, if the matter rested with him alone;
but this I tell you, that the armies of the Venetians will not come to fight
this day, and we do not wish to engage with merely a few.’” He then goes
on to describe the increasing violence of the storm, the retreat of the main
body of the Venetians, the desire of Piccinino to fight with the small body
that still remained with him, and his being obliged finally to quit the field,
in obedience to the wishes of others. On beholding this, Sforza proceeded
to say, “‘I am right—did I not say that the enemy would not come to this
mound?” “But,” said I, ‘Scipio came.’ ‘Believe me,’ said he, “Scipio alone
wished to fight; the others were lying hid in the woods and marshes. You
know that in this I am speaking truth. Wherefore, I beg and entreat you,
in virtue of your honour as an illustrious person, and your duty as a vera-
cious historian, that you describe this matter exactly as it happened, for I
know that all people and sovereigns will believe you.’”
CHAP. I. TUSCANY. 213
valley of Chianta, he laid siege to Castellina. This
place is described by Machiavelli” as being badly for-
tified by art, and still worse fortified by nature; but,
weak as it was, the army which besieged it was still
weaker, and after forty days it was obliged to depart.
“So formidable were those armies, and so dangerous
were those wars,” says Machiavelli in irony, “ that
those fortresses which in these days are abandoned as
being defenceless were then looked upon as impreg-
nable, and held to the last.” During all this time the
Florentine army, under Sforza's two kinsmen, Sigismund
Malatesta and Michael Attendolo, looked on, thinking
that they could not do better than let their enemy
waste his resources in a vain attempt to take places
which, even if they were to fall into his hands, would
profit him nothing. They had some little trouble in
protecting their coast from the incursions that were
made from the Neapolitan fleet, but ultimately they
were able to prevent their continuance. After being
obliged to raise the siege of Castellina, Ferdinand
retired to winter quarters in the territories of his father.
During the winter the duke of Milan received two
slight additions of strength. The Venetian general,
Tiberto Brandolino, the same who had planned an
attack on his camp at Caravaggio, passed over to his
service; and Collio, whom he had stationed in West Lom-
bardy to keep the marquis of Montferrat in check, was
supported by the French general Rinaldo. He then
retired to Cremona to spend the Christmas with his
* Ist. lib, vi.
214 SFORZA's ARRANGEMENTS WITH BOOK WI.
wife and family, in whose society he seems to have had
much pleasure, whenever he could spare time from the
labours of politics and war. After a few days' repose
he began to make preparations for the future.”
Skilful as Sforza undoubtedly was, both in politics
and in war, it is allowed on all hands that he had at this
time enough to do to make head against his enemies.
The pecuniary resources of Venice, compared with those
of any other state, may be said to have been inexhaus-
tible. Recent events had reduced those of Milan to
the very lowest ebb ; and it is probable that Sforza's
private fortune, which never had been large, had been
rather diminished than augmented by his accession to
the dignity of a duke. And he had now not only to
make head against the Venetians on the east, but also
to defend his western frontier against the duke of Savoy
and the marquis of Montferrat, and to defend his Par-
mese dominions against an attack made upon them by
two brothers of the family of Correggio.
In this emergency, Sforza had recourse to his old
friend Cosmo de' Medici. The wealthy Florentine
republic, of which he continued to be the chief ruler,
* I have not made mention in the text of a report given on the authority
of a contemporary historian, Neri Capponi, that the Venetians made two
attempts in the course of the year to assassinate Sforza. His account of the
matter is as follows: “It is to be remarked that, during the course of the
summer 1452, the duke was exposed to the following dangers. First of all,
the Venetians endeavoured to have him assassinated in the fortress of Cre-
mona, by — who was a prisoner there, and engaged to take from him
the fortress and the city. He discovered the plot and punished the guilty.
The Venetians promised ten thousand ducats to a certain person who pro-
mised to poison the duke, and gave him a certain drug which had been
brought from the Levant, and which, if put into the fire, would cause the
death of any one who was near, or even in the same room or chamber as
CHAP. I. THE FLORENTINES AND FRIENCH. 215
was at this time as much in want of troops to con-
tinue the war against the king of Naples, as the
duke of Milan was in want of money to pay his large
armies; the two friends agreed to administer to the
necessities of each other, the former by a subsidy of
eight thousand florins of gold, the latter by a body
of two thousand troops, under the command of his
brother Alexander. They also sent to demand help
from the king of France, promising him that, if he
would send Réné of Anjou to their assistance, they
would allow him one hundred and twenty thousand
florins for the maintenance of his army, and endeavour
to reinstate him in the kingdom of Naples as soon as
they could free themselves from the hostility of the
Venetians. This, they said, they would soon be able
to do, if he would comply with their request. It
was finally arranged that Réné should enter the penin-
sula with a force of two thousand five hundred men.
While these negotiations were going on, the Vene-
tians showed themselves determined to leave their
adversaries no breathing-time. Regardless of the cold,
they made an expedition into the dominions of the
the fire, as also of any one who touched it, or was daubed by it. The drug
was given to him, the circumstance was revealed to him, an experiment of
it was made, and, on its alleged qualities being discovered to be true, he
rewarded the person who was engaged to do the deed, and kept the drug in
his own possession.” I do not believe that the story is mentioned by any
other historian of that time. If it had been well founded, Simoneta, who
would gladly have mentioned any circumstance which would have justified
his master's hostility to the Venetians, would hardly have passed it over ;
nor would it have escaped the notice of one who was so well acquainted
with all the mischief of the times as Machiavelli; Muratori, the compiler
of the ponderous volumes containing all that has been written on Italian
history, takes no notice of it in his annals.
216 CAMPAIGN NEAR BOOK WI.
marquis of Mantua during the month of January. The
campaign, however, was as uninteresting in its details,
and as undecisive in its results, as that of the preced-
ing year. Sforza's means were so crippled that it
was some time before he could take the field with an
efficient force, and without him the marquis was unable
to make head against his enemies. Hence, in the
beginning of the year several of his fortresses fell
into their hands. In the capture of one of these,
(Manerbe,) which took place on the 15th April, the
Venetian commander-in-chief, Gentile da Leonissa, was
mortally wounded. The chief command of the Vene-
tian armies then devolved on Jacobo Piccinino, whose
partial successes in the preceding year had procured
him the name of being the next best general in Italy
to Francesco Sforza. But his conquests were now
stayed by the appearance of the latter with a force
vastly inferior to his own. Being attacked by him on
the 17th of May, while engaged in the siege of Ponte-
vica, a town between the Brescian and Mantuan terri-
tories, he retired the instant he recognised him among
the opposite ranks.
The duke of Milan then marched against the Brescian
fortresses. But his forces were not sufficient to effect
their reduction ; and the marquis of Mantua, whom he
frequently solicited to come to his assistance, was not
only more anxious to recover the places he had lost at
the beginning of the year, but he had now enough to do
to defend his remaining possessions against his brother.
For Charles, who had never ceased to covet his patri-
CHAP. I. BRESCIA AND MANTUA. 217
mony, had invaded his dominions from the side of
Verona with a Venetian army of three thousand horse
and five hundred foot, and at first carried all before
him. After a short time, Tiberto Brandolino, who,
as has already been mentioned, entered the service
of Sforza during the preceding winter, came to the
assistance of Louis. The latter, thus reinforced, lost
no time in attacking his enemy. On the 15th of
June a battle took place between the two brothers in a
plain between the cities of Mantua and Goito ; and
after a protracted resistance of five hours, Charles
was obliged to give way, leaving in the hands of the
victors one thousand horse and several captains of
divisions.
Louis did not fail to turn this victory to account; he
retook several of his fortresses, and was proceeding to
lay siege to Gedo, when Piccinino joined his forces with
the remains of Charles's army, and prepared to attack
him. But the news of Louis Gonzaga's victory near
Goito had already made Sforza determine to evacuate
the Brescian territory, and co-operate with his allies in
the vicinity of Mantua. In pursuance of this plan, he
had already advanced as far as Gottolenzo, when intel-
ligence was brought to him that Piccinino was proceed-
ing with forced marches upon Gedo. Sforza was well
aware that the forces of the marquis were not sufficient
to resist a combined attack of the garrison at Gedo
and the army of Piccinino, and that his friends would
most undoubtedly be defeated, if he was not there to
compensate by his presence for their inferiority in
218 ITS INDECISIVE NATURE. BOOK WI.
numbers. For this purpose he himself galloped off in
the direction of that city, accompanied by a body of
light cavalry, giving directions to his generals to bring
the army after him with as little delay as possible.
When he arrived at the scene of action, he found that
his allies were already beginning to give way before the
superior forces of his opponents. But he was destined
on this occasion to afford another example of the
wisdom of Machiavelli's observation, of how much the
presence of a victorious general avails in deciding the
fate of a battle. The news that Sforza himself was on
the field, and that they would shortly be joined by the
whole of his forces, spread like wildfire among the ranks
of his allies, and passed from them to those of his
opponent: the former were raised from the slough of
despondency—the latter, from having expected a certain
victory, began to tremble for the issue of the battle ;
and Piccinino, having so frequently had terrible expe-
rience of his inferiority to his antagonist, withdrew his
forces from the engagement. As his line of retreat lay
across a marsh, where his superiority in infantry could
not fail to tell, Sforza did not deem it prudent to follow
him with his wearied troops. But Piccinino, though he
was thus protected, continued his retreat during the
night, leaving Gedo to its fate.
Thus, by the middle of summer, Sforza and Louis
Gonzaga had pretty nearly regained the ground they
had lost at the early part of the spring. After this,
occasional skirmishes, and sometimes even bloody en-
counters, took place, but neither party was able to effect
CHAP. I. CAMPAIGN IN TUSC ANY. 219
anything of importance: Piccinino was afraid to come
to a regular engagement with his great opponent; and
Sforza, not thinking himself sufficiently strong to attempt
offensive operations, resolved to await the succour that
had been promised him from France.
Nor was this year's campaign in Tuscany productive
of any more decisive results. Alexander Sforza and
Sigismund Malatesta retook some minor fortresses, but
were prevented, by jealousy on the point of precedency,
from co-operating to effect anything of importance. Fer-
dinand, who still commanded the Neapolitan forces, did
not dare to risk a general engagement, but took up a
position in the mountains near Siena, whence, by ravag-
ing the Florentine territory almost up to the walls of
the city, he caused no small degree of panic among the
inhabitants. His father made an attempt to gain a
footing in Tuscany by means of one Gherardo Gam-
bacorti, the signor of a castle in the Val di Bagno, a
place which is situated in the mountains between the
source of the Tiber and the Arno. By promising him
a fief of equal value in the kingdom of Naples, Alphonso
persuaded him to make over to him his dominions, which
he looked upon almost as the key of the valley of the
Arno. He was, however, prevented from carrying his
project into execution by the loyalty of the inhabitants,
who rose in masses and expelled the Neapolitan soldiers
—an act by which they not improbably preserved the
independence of Florence. -
The pope, though he did not take any part in these
wars, was not without his trouble at home. There was
220 PORCARI's BOOK WI.
at this time at Rome one Stefano Porcari, a man of no
inconsiderable attainments, and of acknowledged ability
and virtue. Like many other such persons, he was
ambitious of signalising himself by some great deed ;
and for this purpose he resolved to make an attempt
to rescue his country from the dominion of the priests,
an undertaking in which his knowledge of their evil
practices, and of the detestation in which they were held
by the nobles and the people, made him hope for success.
Like Rienzi in the preceding century, he indulged in
many dreamy anticipations of being the second founder
of Rome, and began to think that the beautiful verses
of Petrarch,
“Sovra il monte Tarpeio canzon vedrai
Un Cavalier che l’Italia onora
Pensoso più d'altrui che dise stesso,”
were written in prophetic anticipation of himself.
These thoughts had so completely engrossed Porcari
that he was not able to contain himself; his words,
his actions, and his mode of living, let everybody see
what was passing in his mind. When his fame
reached the ears of Nicolas, he had him banished to
Bologna, and gave directions to the governor of that
city to have an eye on him. But Porcari, nothing
daunted, continued his intercourse with some kindred
spirits at Rome, whom he managed to visit, making
his journeys with such celerity that the governor of
Bologna was not aware of his absence. At last it was
arranged that all these lovers of liberty were to sup
together at a certain house in Rome, where Stefano
CHAP. I. CONSPIRACY AT ROME. 22 1
Porcari was to join them. The supper was laid out,
the would-be Saviour of his country arrived in garments
embroidered with gold, wearing a necklace and other
ornaments which were thought to become his assumed
character; speeches were made full of patriotic senti-
ments, and a plan was laid for seizing the palace of
the pope, and calling on the people to resume their
liberty. But their assembly was suddenly broken up
by the arrival of the pope's soldiers; the patriots were
all seized and brought to prison ; and ten of the leading
men among them, including Stefano Porcari himself,
were hung outside the castle of St Angelo. Several of
the people, supposed to have been privy to the plot,
were afterwards put to death, with perhaps less trial
than justice might seem to have required. Thus
ended a conspiracy, concerning the promoters of which
Machiavelli justly says that, “if their intentions were
good, their judgment was bad ; for though the concep-
tion of such enterprises may be attended with some
little prestige of glory, the carrying them into operation
is certain to be accompanied by evil.”
* Ist. lib, vi,
CHAPTER II.
CoNSTANTINOPLE TAKEN BY THE TURKs—ITS EFFECTS IN ITALY.—WAIN
EFFORTS OF THE POPE TO MAKE PEACE.-ARRIVAL OF RENE OF ANJOU
IN ITALY.—HE JOINS SFORZA NEAR BRESCLA.—CouncIL OF WAR.—
SFORZA's SPEECH.-DISPUTE BETWEEN FRENCH AND ITALIANS AT PONTE-
VISO.-RETREAT OF PICCININo.—BIANCA MARIA VISITs HER HUSBAND IN
THE CAMP.—SFORZA FORCED BY THE SEVERITY OF THE WEATHER TO DE-
SIST FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS.—RENE RETIRES TO FRANCE.--ALL PAR-
TIES TIRED OF THE WAR.—EXTRAVAGANCE OF THEIR MUTUAL DEMANDs.
—PEACE OF LODI.-SFORZA COMPELS THE DUKE OF SAVOY AND THE MAR-
QUIS OF MONTFERRAT TO RELINQUISH ALL THE TOWNS THAT HAD BELONGED
TO FILIPPO MARIA.
THE belligerent powers were in the position described
already, and the pope had safely quelled the sedition in
his city, when they as well as he were astounded by
the intelligence of an event, which seemed likely at no
distant day to menace the common independence of
the former, and the very existence of the religion
of which the latter was the head. All Italy heard
with dismay that the capital of the Eastern Empire
had been taken by the Turks; that the Emperor Con-
stantine, with forty thousand Christians, had been slain ;
that the churches had been profaned, and that the most
abominable excesses had been committed by the unbe-
lieving barbarians. The establishment of the religion
of Mohammed in the largest city in the known world,
seemed in itself no inconsiderable blow to Christianity,
BOOK WI. TAKING OF CONSTANTINOPLE. 223
while the material interests of the Italians appeared
likely to suffer by the loss of the Genoese colony
of Pera, and the interruption of the Venetian commerce
in the Levant. The peninsula of Greece seemed but a
feeble barrier between their own shores and the barba-
rians. Men now began to think that it was no small
reproach to the sovereigns of the peninsula, and of
Christendom, that they had been so long striving among
themselves, when they should have united against the
common enemy. The pope wrote letters to this effect
to the different rulers of Europe, and sent to Naples, to
Milan, to Florence, and to Venice, requesting the respec-
tive governments to despatch ambassadors to Rome to
negotiate a peace, and threatening excommunication to
all who would not comply.
The different potentates had no objection that their
delegates should go to Rome to talk of peace, but each
was too much under the influence of self-interest to
abate one jot or tittle of his own pretensions for the
good of the community. As usual, they were not with-
out the most specious excuses to justify their conduct.
When the pope's message was delivered to Sforza, he
replied to the legate that he was not waging war of
his own accord, but was obliged to do it in self-
defence against the Venetians; that his enemies were
now attempting neither more nor less than to make the
whole of Lombardy a province of their republic ; that
if it had not been for him, they would long since not
only have done this, but have subjugated the whole of
Italy, not even excepting the States of the Church. If,
224 PACIFIC EFFORTS OF THE POPE. BOOK WI.
therefore, the pontiff really wished for peace, let him
send to the Venetians, who were the constant disturbers
of tranquillity and breakers of treaties, and not to
him, who only wished to be allowed to live quietly in
his own dominions. If the places which they had taken
were restored, and if Alphonso, who without a just
cause or pretext had invaded the Florentine dominions,
were to lay down his arms, he, for one, would be happy
to forget all past differences, and to unite in a common
confederation against the Turks.
When these things were known in the camp of the
Venetians, a cessation of hostilities for four days was
agreed on, to allow the wishes of the pope to be laid
before the senate. But even this truce, brief as it was,
was broken as soon as it suited one of the contending
parties to do so. A considerable body of Sforza’s
troops had gone on a foraging excursion ; the enemy,
observing that they were unarmed, and at a long dis-
tance from their fellow-soldiers, Sallied forth against
them, and carried them off, along with their horses and
their beasts of burden. The pope's ambassador remon-
strated with them seriously on this breach of faith, and
threatened them with excommunication if they did not
restore all that they had taken. But they cared as
little for the anathema of the pope as they had done
for their own most solemn engagements; and Nicholas'
ambassador, finding that all his pacific efforts were ex-
erted to no purpose, returned to his master.
Sforza was with his army, awaiting the arrival of
Réné, when Piccinino made another attempt against
CHAP. II. CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES. 225
him, which did but little honour to his integrity. It
had been agreed between these two generals that the
inhabitants of some of their towns should be allowed
to go out into their fields without fear of annoyance
from their enemy. The people of Castellio, trusting
to this convention, were out in the country during the
harvest-time, when they were suddenly attacked by a
large body of Venetian troops, who, after having taken
much booty and many prisoners, proceeded to lay siege
to the city. The town itself was almost in a defence-
less state, and the citizens, who had probably served
too many masters to be particularly attached to any,
were on the point of surrendering. The place was,
however, saved to the duke of Milan by the intrepidity
of one of his officers, by name Donatus. As soon as
he heard what had happened, he made his way into the
city, disguised in the uniform of the Venetians, and did
his best to persuade the inhabitants to hold out till
assistance should arrive. They, however, seemed little
inclined to listen to him, and even threatened him with
violence should he do anything to bring upon them the
horrors of a siege. On this he made his escape into
the citadel, whence he managed, by means of signals,
to make his situation known to Sagramoro, another of
Sforza's generals, who happened to be at hand. The
circumstance of the wife and children of the latter being
at Castellio made him doubly anxious to come to the
rescue ; and he managed on that very night to attack
the camp of the besiegers, while they all lay in that
false security which the certain expectation of victory
WOL. II. P
226 RENE ARRIVES IN ITALY. BOOK WI.
too often engenders. A fight followed in the dark,
during which Venetian occasionally slew Venetian, and
Sfortian slew Sfortian. It was not long, however,
before victory, as it usually does on such occasions,
declared itself in favour of the assailant ; the Venetians
all fled, or were taken prisoners, and Castellio was pre-
served to its former possessors. The captive officers,
when remonstrated with on their treachery, defended
themselves by the paltry quibble that they had made
a truce with the inhabitants, and not with the walls of
the city; and that, though they wished to take the lat-
ter, they meditated no injury to the former.
Agreeably to his engagement, Réné of Anjou had
collected in Provence a force of two thousand four
hundred men, with whom he had set out to the assist-
ance of his allies. He was, however, for some time
prevented from forming a junction with them by the
duke of Savoy and the marquis of Montferrat, both of
whom had, at the instigation of the Venetians, refused to
allow his army to cross the Alps by the mountain-passes
which they commanded. This, however, the Dauphin
Louis, who was connected with the house of Savoy,
and who seemed to cherish a sort of instinctive hatred
towards the Venetians, undertook to arrange, and, by
a combination of entreaties and threats, he induced
the marquis and the duke to withdraw their opposition.
Meanwhile Réné himself, impatient of the delay, had
sailed with a small body of troops from Marseilles to
Ventimiglia, a town some distance north of Genoa.
Proceeding thence by Asti to Montferrat, he settled all
CHAP. II. JOINS SFORZA. 227
the differences between the marquis of that place and
Sforza, and thus enabled the latter to bring four thou-
sand men from the vicinity of Alessandria to his own
headquarters near Brescia. Shortly after this the duke
of Anjou was joined by his own troops, consisting of
two thousand four hundred men, whom the duke of
Savoy had allowed to cross over the Alps. Thus, by
his friendly negotiation and his reinforcements, he in-
creased the effective strength of his allies by six thou-
sand four hundred soldiers.
Before proceeding to the headquarters of the war,
Réné paid a visit to Bianca Maria at Milan. On his
arrival there, he was so sumptuously entertained by her
that neither he nor his soldiers—who, as the annalist of
Italy remarks, appeared as fond of pleasures of all sorts,
amusements, and feasting, as did their countrymen three
centuries later—were in any hurry to leave it. It was
in vain that Sforza sent to remind them that the season
for taking vengeance on their enemies was passing
away; they were unable to tear themselves from the
delights of Milan, and they always found some excuse
to stop on. At length, after a delay of fifteen days,
Réné took his departure for Lodi, and proceeded thence
to Pizzighettone, where Sforza sent a considerable detach-
ment of troops, to receive him with the honours becom-
ing a friend and a sovereign. After this, he lost no time
in joining the duke of Milan in the Brescian territory,
where he made a formal proclamation of war against
the Venetians. As the arrival of Collio about the same
time, with the force that had been employed against the
228 COUNCIL OF WAR. BOOK WI.
marquis of Montferrat, put them in a position to act
on the offensive, it was deemed advisable to call a
council of war to arrange their future plan of operation.
The speeches delivered by the two principal persons
at this council—namely, the duke of Milan and the
marquis of Mantua—are amusing, as illustrating the
manner in which each endeavoured to convince others,
as they possibly also might have persuaded themselves,
that the measures which they most desired for the pro-
tection and enlargement of their own dominions were
also most conducive to the general good. The marquis
proposed that they should begin their operations by
laying siege to Asola, a town on the confines of the
territories of Brescia and Mantua, the capture of which,
he had no doubt, would be followed by the surrender
of all the places in the latter. Having done this, he
thought they ought to pass on to the vicinity of Verona,
where they would find all the inhabitants only watching
their opportunity to throw off a yoke which they de-
tested, and afterwards to make themselves masters of
all towns between the last-named city and Vicenza,
where they would find excellent winter quarters, and
where he would undertake to provide them with abun-
dant supplies. After these propositions had been
variously discussed by Collio, Tiberto, and the other
generals present, the duke of Milan delivered his opinion
as follows. “If,” said he, “it were now the beginning
of summer, I should certainly approve of the suggestions
of my friends; the advanced season, however, requires
that we should act far otherwise. Before the setting
CHAP. II. SFORZA's PROPOSALS. 229
in of the winter, Cremona must be recovered, and all
possibility of the enemy's crossing the Adda must be
prevented. For it would be perfectly ridiculous in us
to take up our winter quarters in the Veronese at a
time that the enemy might be encamped around the
walls of Milan. In addition to this, we must recollect
that our allies, the French, cannot stand the cold as we
can,” and must, at no distant time, be lodged in com-
fortable winter quarters. For this reason alone, even
if there were no other, we must set about the operations
which are nearest at hand. And I promise my friend,
Louis Gonzaga, that, as soon as we shall have cleared
the Cremonese, secured the passes of the Adda, and
settled the French for the winter, I will bring my forces
to co-operate with his in the manner he has proposed.”
The duke of Milan, as usual, carried the day.
t was about the middle of October, just three
months and a half after the repulse of the Vene-
tians at Gedo, that the Milanese and Mantuan army,
strengthened in the manner already described, resumed
active operations. Their career was one of almost un-
interrupted success. Sforza had, however, no small
difficulty in managing Réné's soldiers, who were chiefly
natives of Picardy, and accustomed to a totally different
species of warfare from that which had been practised
by the civilised Italians. In their general conduct,
* To many this assertion of Sforza's may seem strange, as the majority of
Réné's forces were natives of Picardy, the most northern province of France.
It has, however, been ascertained by experience, that the inhabitants of
northern climates do not stand severe cold better than those of the south.
In the campaign of 1812, the Russians suffered from the cold fully as much
as the French, whenever they were equally exposed.
230 CAPTURE AND DESTRUCTION BOOK WI.
they fully sustained their character of being more than
men in the first onset, but more easily beaten than women,
if firmly resisted. The first time they met the enemy,
they had assigned to them a post of no very great im-
portance, and received particular directions about their
mode of fighting and plan of attack. But they had
no idea of any discipline or obedience to commands:
raising a loud shout, they rushed on without any sem-
blance of order; but, fortunately for their allies, their
rashness did not in any way affect the result of the
battle. On a subsequent occasion, at the siege of
Pontevico, they, as well as the Italians, incurred no
small danger by rushing forward before a practicable
breach had been effected, and by exposing themselves
uncovered to the shower of stones that were thrown on
them from within. Afterwards, when it was determined
to storm the city, they solicited the commander-in-
chief to be allowed to have all the danger and the
glory to themselves; but, being repulsed on the first
onset, nothing would persuade them to renew it. And
when the place had been taken by the valour of their
allies, they showed that they, indeed, deserved the name
of barbarians. On finding that those who had first
entered the city had also secured the best share of the
booty for themselves, they vented their disappointment
by putting to the sword not only the Venetian soldiers,
but even the unoffending inhabitants, and spared neither
age nor sex in their fury.*
* Muratori, who records the atrocities of the French soldiers on this
occasion, says that in his time, (the middle of the eighteenth century,) they
CHAP. II. OF PONTEWICO. 231
The unfortunate citizens of Pontevico, who had little
expected, and therefore made no preparation against,
such unheard-of cruelties, implored the protection of
those of their captors who were their countrymen. A
pretty sharp contest arose between Sforza's French
and Italian soldiers: the latter were determined to
save the citizens, the former would not be balked of
their prey ; and it was not long before each party
began to make use of their arms. The French, who
could not long stand before the united force of the
Italian soldiers and inhabitants, were obliged to fly,
to escape the fate which they proposed to inflict upon
others, and it required the utmost address of Sforza
to prevent the whole body of his Transalpine allies
from being sacrificed to the vengeance of his country-
men. The fury of the citizens, in the end, proved
their ruin. Having in the first burst of their wrath set
fire to some house, to which their would-be butchers had
fled for safety, they were unable to prevent the flames
from spreading, and Sforza, perceiving what had hap-
pened, and thinking that he might have some difficulty
in preventing the place revolting to the Venetians,
ordered his soldiers to allow the devouring element to
take its course, and told the inhabitants to quit the
city.
If the French auxiliaries of Réné were of little use
were very different in that respect. They appear, however, to have acquired
the same character whenever they appeared south of the Alps, during the
fifteenth century. It has already been mentioned that, in the year 1447,
they roused the vengeance of the Alessandrians by giving no quarter to the
fugitives; and Muratori gives them no better character in describing their
actions in Italy in 1461 and 1495.
232 PICCININO RETIRES. BOOK WI.
to Sforza in regular operations, they did him good
service by the terror which they spread through the
region around. The circumstances attending the cap-
ture and destruction of Pontevico were, as usual,
exaggerated by report ; and in the words of a contem-
porary writer, * “in all the towns subject to the Vene-
tians, people were continually fancying that the French
were at hand, and that their mothers, wives, sisters, and
children, were about to be butchered before their eyes.”
Wherever he went, the towns seemed to contend with one
another as to which should be the first to proffer their
submission. The Venetian garrisons were seized on by
the citizens, sometimes permitted to depart out of the
town, and sometimes, even within sight of the army of
Piccinino, sent as prisoners to the duke of Milan. So
rapidly did these events take place, that within the eighth
day after the fall of Pontevico nearly all the places in
the Cremonese and Brescian territory were in the hands
of the victors. The army of Piccinino in despair
retired to Brescia; even then, though they were not
pursued by an enemy, their retreat partook of the
nature of a rout ; each soldier seemed anxious that his
person and his property should as soon as possible be
protected by the walls of the city, and their march was
in no small degree retarded by the confusion which such
haste invariably begets. Finding on their arrival there
that the inhabitants, being afraid to admit such a dis-
orderly multitude within their walls, had shut their
gates against them, they took up the most secure
* SIMONETA, lib. xxiv.
CHAP. II. BIANCA MARIA VISITS HER HUSBAND. 233
position they could find between the city and the
mountains.
Sforza, though annoyed at not being able to bring
Piccinino to a general action, was now at least able to
continue his operations without any fear of interruption.
In a very short time all the plain between the Oglio and
the Adda, with the exception of the cities of Bergamos,
Crema, and one or two places of minor importance,
surrendered to him. At two of them only (Roado and
Orci) did he experience any resistance. In taking the
first, he adopted the then rather novel expedient of
firing, from his cannon, stones, which fell upon the
heads of the unfortunate inhabitants—a practice which,
though it has since been frequently adopted, is certainly
unjustifiable on principle, and seems, as much as the
system of starving a whole city or nation, to call for an
alteration in the rules of war.” The capture of the
last mentioned of these places caused him no small
anxiety, and detained him a considerable time, during
which, however, he was solaced by a visit from Bianca
Maria. That lady's desire of seeing her husband was
so great that the terrors of a winter campaign could
not keep her from him ; and after she had arrived in
his camp, she preserved, amidst no small privations and
hardships, as much serenity of mind as if she had been
enjoying the luxuries of her capital. For the winter had
already set in with unusual rigour, and the necessary
hardships of the season were in no small degree aggra-
wated by a tempest of such severity, that it tore up
* See ante, vol. ii. p. 178.
234 SFORZA RETIRES TO MANTUA. BOOK WI.
several trees by the roots, and overthrew the tents of
the soldiers, including those of the duke of Milan.
After the surrender of this place, Réné and his soldiers
retired to winter quarters at Piacenza.
If Sforza could have continued the campaign in the
manner that he himself wished, he would have pro-
ceeded to lay siege to Bergamos and Crema. He had
already made some dispositions to do so, when the
marquis of Mantua reminded him of the engagements
he had made about marching into his territory after he
had taken certain places on the Oglio and Adda; and,
being swayed either by honour or policy, he gave in
to his wishes. Having placed garrisons in the cap-
tured towns—which, as he had lately been rejoined by
his brother Alexander from Tuscany, he was able to
do without much diminishing his effective force—and
having sent Bianca Maria to Cremona, he proceeded
along with his ally to Asola, the place to which the lat-
ter had proposed to lay siege immediately after they had
been joined by the French. But the inclemency of
the weather prevented their making any impression on
that city. After a few days’ exposure to no ordinary
hardships, the duke and the marquis were glad to turn
from the toils of war to the society of their wives,
Bianca Maria and Barbara, who had come from their
respective quarters to make acquaintance with each
other in the camps of their husbands. They then
agreed to retire to Mantua for the Christmas.
They had not been there three days when they
were alarmed by the news that Réné was about to
CHAP. II. RENE RETIRES TO FRANCE. 235
retire, with the whole of his forces, to France. As his
so doing would most likely prevent the completion of
their successes, Sforza hastened to him, to endeavour to
dissuade him from his intentions. The duke of Milan's
eloquence was so powerful that Réné was unable to
reply to it at the time, and requested to be allowed
one day to consider. He then sent one Gian Coxa to
tell Sforza that, much as it grieved him to do anything
disagreeable to him, he was now come to an age at
which he was fitter for the society of his family than
for the camp ; that he must therefore retire ; but he
promised to send his son John, who had assumed the
title of duke of Calabria, to take his place. The sol-
diers, too, had been perhaps more exposed to the incle-
mency of the weather than they had expected ; they
were in no small degree piqued at the superiority of
the Italians, and had ceased to feel friendly towards
them since their quarrel at Pontevico. The Florentines
were supposed not to be displeased at this step on the
part of the duke of Anjou ; they had already regained all
that in the preceding year had been taken from them
by Ferdinand ; and though the duke of Milan was their
friend and ally, they had no wish to see him undisputed
master of Lombardy. Réné, after he had declared
his intentions to Sforza, proceeded without delay to
Asti, whence he crossed the Alps to Provence, with-
out experiencing any opposition from the duke of
Savoy.
The movements of Réné had wrought a change in
the spirit of the contending parties, which the fear of
236 SIEGE OF ASOLA. BOOK WI.
their infidel enemy had been unable to effect. Expe-
rience had shown Sforza that without his assistance he
could effect nothing decisive against the Venetians, and
they had suffered too severely at the end of the year
not to avail themselves of a favourable moment for
treating. Sforza, however, was anxious not to appear
wanting in his engagements to the marquis of Mantua,
and for this purpose he lost no time in rejoining his
army, and making preparations for resuming the siege
of Asola. But the soldiers, who from the first had
murmured at being led thither in winter, said they
could not continue to expose themselves to the extraor-
dinary hardships of the season. An attack which he,
unmindful of these circumstances, had planned against
the city, was prevented by a heavy fall of snow. On
this, Louis Gonzaga told Sforza that he was now satis-
fied that he had done all that he could for him ; that,
much as he desired possession of Asola, everything
was now against him, and it would be folly to proceed.
Sforza, on his part, said that the failure of the enter-
prise grieved him as much as if it had been undertaken
entirely on his own account. He called God and man
to witness that it had not miscarried through any want
of zeal or exertion on his part ; and though they were
now obliged to abandon it, they need not despair of
ultimately succeeding. After the two friends had re-
mained some time together in private consultation, the
troops were allowed to retire to cantonments: those
of the duke took up their quarters at Cremona, Pia-
cenza, and Parma ; those of the marquis around his
CHAP. II. NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. 237
own city of Mantua. Piccinino placed his army in
winter quarters on the eastern side of the Lake of
Garda and the Adige.
The belligerent powers gladly availed themselves of
this respite to send ambassadors to Rome to arrange
the terms of a peace, of which they had all become so
desirous. As spring advanced, neither party showed
any desire of recommencing the campaign. Sforza,
indeed, took some precautions about Securing the passes
of the Adda, and the Mantuans and Venetians occa-
sionally made pillaging incursions into each other's ter-
ritories, but nothing in the shape of regular warfare was
attempted.
The demands made by the ambassadors of each of
the contending parties were so extravagant, that at first
they seemed likely to preclude all hopes of an arrange-
ment. The king of Naples required that the Floren-
tines should indemnify him for the expenses of the war
—a thing which they said he must do for them. The
Venetians demanded that the count of Pavia—for they
still refused to call Sforza by any other title—should
not only restore all the places he had taken, but also
give up Cremona ; while his ambassadors insisted that
he should have Bergamos, Brescia, and Crema, in addi-
tion to the territory he had possessed at the beginning
of the war. To reconcile all their claims must have
appeared difficult to anybody, and Sforza's secretary
suspects that the pope was not in earnest in wishing
for peace, thinking that he got better off while the dif-
ferent powers were venting their wrath upon one another,
238 TERMS PROPOSED BY THE WENETIANS. Book VI.
than he might if they were to agree among themselves
and to turn upon him. Nothing, however, is easier than
to reconcile combatants who are alike exhausted by
fighting ; and that which the pope was unwilling or
unable to effect at Rome was done by the mediation
of an Augustine monk, by name Fra Simonetta da
Camerino, in Lombardy.
The Venetians, seeing that the negotiations at Rome
were likely to end in nothing, sent the above-named
person to the duke of Milan, offering to give up all
claim upon Cremona, if he would do so likewise with
respect to Bergamo, Brescia, and Crema. The duke
consented to give up the two first named of these
cities, but still stipulated for the last. The Venetians
were too desirous of peace to continue to haggle about
one city, and too fearful of augmenting the power of
their formidable rival not to make one effort to prevent
its falling into his hands. For this reason they expressed
their willingness to give it up, and said that, if he would
send thither Bartolomeo Collio, they would surrender
it to him. As they had for some time past been carry-
ing on secret negotiations with this general, and had just
arranged with him to leave the service of his former
master for theirs, they were in hopes that, after he had
got possession of Crema in Sforza's name, he would
keep it for himself. Collio, however, boldly threw
off all disguise; and on hearing of the state of the
negotiations, he went at once to Venice, and advised
them not only to keep Crema, but also to insist on
much more favourable terms than they had at first pro-
CHAP. II. PEACE OF LODI. 239
posed. The loss of the services of Collio, and the
report that Sigismund Malatesta, who had hitherto
fought for the Florentines, was about to follow his
example, together with a pretty clear intimation from
the latter that they could not continue to fight any
longer, induced Sforza to come to terms at once. For
this purpose he met the monk Fra Simonetta, accom-
panied by one Paolo Barbo, who was authorised to sign
a treaty on the part of the Venetians.
On the 9th of April the duke of Milan and the
Venetian commissary met at Lodi, and took upon them-
selves to make the following terms for the rest of the
Italian states. The former was to relinquish all the
conquests he had made in the territory of Bergamos and
Brescia, but was to be allowed to retain the tract of
land commonly called the Gheradda. A free amnesty
was to be granted to the inhabitants of all the cities
that had revolted to him. All the places that the
brothers Correggio had taken in the territory of Parma
were to be restored to him, and those that they as well
as the Venetians had acquired in the territory of Mantua,
were to be given back to Louis Gonzaga. The latter was,
in his turn, to reinstate his brother Charles in his lawful
patrimony. There was also a secret article in the treaty,
by which Sforza was allowed to recover, by persuasion
or by force, the places formerly belonging to Philip that
were now held by the duke of Savoy, the marquis of
Montferrat, and his brother William. Alphonso was
to evacuate the Florentine dominions, on condition of
being allowed to retain the castle of Castiglione in
240 AGREED TO BY THE MARQUIS OF BOOK WI.
Brescia.” All the potentates of the peninsula were to
be called upon to subscribe to the terms that had been
agreed on by the two leading powers of Lombardy.
The marquis of Mantua and the brothers Correggio
were, of course, constrained to abide by the settlement
that had been made by their more powerful neighbours.
Alphonso, however, had no idea that other people
should make arrangements for him, and for a time he
continued obstinately to reject them. But on hearing
that the pope and the republic of Florence gave the
treaty their most candid support, he thought it prudent
to offer it no practical opposition ; and though he did
not actually sign it for some months afterwards, he
recalled his forces from the Florentine dominions.
It now remained for Sforza to recover those places
on his western frontier that had belonged to his father-
in-law. To the marquis of Montferrat, who had come to
terms with him in the preceding year, at a time that he
was compassed by many enemies, it must have appeared
hard to be asked to make further concessions; but he
knew full well that powerful states, after they get all
they want by war, leave their weaker allies ; so, after
having in vain solicited Réné, who had arranged the
treaty of the preceding year, to intercede in his favour,
he gave up all that was required from him. Nor had
Sforza much more trouble in arranging matters with the
duke of Savoy. In three days his generals, Tiberto,
* Neither Simoneta, Corio, Machiavelli, or Muratori, make any mention
of this clause. M. Sismondi, however, relates it on the authority of Neri
Capponi, who was doubtless well acquainted with all those parts of the
treaty that related to his country.
CHAP. II. MONTFERRAT, THE DUKE OF SAVOY, 241
Brandolino, and Roberto Sanseverino, took nearly all
the castles on the east of the Sessia. The duke of
Savoy, confounded by the suddenness of the attack and
the rapidity of the success, sent ambassadors to Milan
to complain of the injustice of requiring from him more
than was arranged by the treaty he had made with
Sforza, when he was fighting for the possession of Milan,
and to say that, if he would abide by those terms,
nothing would give him greater pleasure than to form
the closest alliance with him. To cement their friend-
ship, he proposed that his daughter should be betrothed
to Galeazzo Maria. The duke of Milan, however,
replied, that as he had broken the treaty alluded to by
joining the Venetians against him, he must abide by
the consequences; and that if all the places that had
belonged to his father-in-law were not surrendered to
him within eight days, he would deprive him of every-
thing he possessed to the south of the Alps. Louis
afterwards made many propositions for a compromise ;
but finding his antagonist quite inexorable, and being
fully aware that, single-handed, he was no match for
him, he gave in to the full extent of his demands. The
duke of Milan then said that he would be happy to
form an alliance with him ; but as he had already pro-
mised that his eldest son should marry the daughter of
the marquis of Mantua, he could only give his second
son Philip to his daughter. Though this connection
was then agreed upon, its preliminaries were never
signed, and it appears afterwards to have been given up
by the consent of both parties.
VOL. II. Q
242 AND THE DUKE OF MODEN A. Book VI.
The duke of Milan, being determined to avail himself
of the present opportunity to consolidate the dominions
of his father-in-law, sent to Borso, duke of Reggio and
Modena, summoning him to surrender two places on
the Parmese frontier. Borso's territories were not so
large that he could well spare any part of them, and he
had on many occasions shown himself jealous of Sforza ;
but as open resistance was useless, he replied that he
never could believe that Sforza could prefer the posses-
sion of two petty towns to keeping on good terms with
him. He also sent to the other potentates of Italy to
implore their protection. On finding that they would do
nothing for him, he said that he was willing to give up
anything that the duke of Milan required ; but begged,
as a favour to himself, that he might be allowed to
retain the least important of the two places he had
demanded ; and Sforza, though he had a long list of
alleged grievances to complain of, said that he was
willing to grant him any favour to secure his good-
will.
Thus ended the first war in which Francesco Sforza
had been engaged since his accession to the duchy of
Milan. Few, indeed, of the belligerent parties gained
anything by it—certainly none of them had acquired
any accession of territory that might not have been
purchased for a much less sum than had been spent in
the maintenance of their armies. But Sforza's position
was in no small degree strengthened by the other powers
treating with him as duke of Milan ; and though his
dominions might not be much enlarged by the clause in
CHAP. II. ADVANTAGES GAINED BY SFORZA. 243
the treaty which assigned to him all that belonged to
his father-in-law at the time of his decease, it was of
great importance to him that its words acknowledged
him to be the legal successor of the Visconti. There
is little doubt but that he must have been fully aware
of this at the time that he showed himself compara-
tively indifferent about territorial acquisitions.
B O O K S E W E N T H.
FROM THE PEACE OF LODI TO THE ACQUISITION OF GENOA
BY FRANCESCO SFORZA, 1454–1464.
B O O K S E W E N T H.
FROM THE PEACE OF LODI TO THE ACQUISITION OF GENOA
BY FRANCESCO SFORZA, 1454–1464.
C H A PTE R I,
ALPHONso SIGNS THE PEACE OF LODI.-ITALIAN ALLIANCE,-FRIENDSHIP OF
ALPHONSO AND SFORZA.—DEATH OF POPE NICHOLAS.—JACOBO PICCININO
ATTACKS THE SIENNESE—IS REDUCED TO THE GREATEST EXTREMITIES IN
TUSCANY–ENTERS ALPHONSO's SERVICE.-WIOLENT TEMPESTS, AND EARTH-
QUAKE.—ATTACK UPoN THE GENOESE BY ALPHONSO.—PIETRO FREGOSO
MAKES over THE CITY To THE FRENCH. — JoHN OF ANJOU ARRIVES
THERE.-PREPARATIONs of ALPHONSo—HIS DEATH.-DISPUTED SUCCES-
SION TO THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES.—SFORZA SUPPORTS FERDINAND.—
DEATH OF CALLIXTUS.—ELECTION OF AFNEAS SILVIUS UNDER THE TITLE
OF PIUS THE SECOND. — PICCININO INVADES THE TERRITORIES OF THE
CHURCH — Is FORCED TO DESIST IN CONSEQUENCE OF A TIMELY ADMONI-
TION FROM SFORZA.—FERDINAND CROWNED BY THE POPE.—CONGRESS OF
MANTUA.— GALEAZZO MARIA SENT TO MEET POPE PIUS AT FLORENCE—
HIS RECEPTION THERE.—PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS.
DURING three years of tranquillity that followed the
peace of Lodi, Sforza acquired as much glory as he had
done in times of war. The part which he had taken
in arranging the negotiations to which all the powers
of Italy consented, affords ample proof of the estimation
in which he was held, and caused him from that time
248 ITALIAN ALLIANCE. BOOK WII.
to be looked up to as the pacificator and the arbiter of
the peninsula. At the request of the pope and the
Venetians, he sent ambassadors to Naples to endeavour
to procure the formal adherence of Alphonso to the
treaty. As that monarch had refused his assent to it,
more out of pique at not having been previously con-
sulted than from any positive objection to its conditions,
it required merely time and tact to bring him over.
By the persuasion of Sforza, he duly signed it on the
29th of January 1455; and at the same time he entered
into an alliance for twenty-five years with the Floren-
tines, the Venetians, and the duke of Milan, of which
the principal object was to protect Italy against the
Turks, and which was for some time afterwards the
main-spring of Italian policy, and generally designated
the Italian Alliance. But in becoming a party thereto,
he reserved for himself the right of attacking the Ge-
noese and Sigismund Malatesta — a condition which
contained the seeds of the next Italian war.
From this time forward the king of Naples adopted
towards the duke of Milan a line of conduct totally
different from that which he had formerly pursued. As
he had first become acquainted with him as the son of
a powerful supporter of the Angevin party at Naples,
and had afterwards regarded him as a clever adven-
turer, who might become a dangerous neighbour, if he
were securely established either in or near his domi-
nions, he had done his best to expel him from his fiefs
in the kingdom of Naples, and to prevent him establish-
ing a principality in the province of Ancona. And as
CHAP. I. FRIENDSHIP OF SFORZA AND ALPHONSO. 249
he, like many others, had coveted the inheritance of the
Wisconti, he could not be expected to be friendly to the
pretensions of any rival, least of all to those of an inti-
mate friend of Cosmo de' Medici, and constant ally of
the Florentines. But now that he was well established
as duke of Milan, and had been acknowledged as such
by the principal powers of the peninsula, their relative
situations seemed totally changed. Their dominions were
too far apart to leave many points in dispute between
them ; and should any member of the house of Anjou
try to enforce his claims to the kingdom of Naples, the
duke of Milan would be the most powerful enemy or
ally that either party could have. In short, Alphonso
was now weighed by all the reasons which he had urged
with so much effect upon Philip after the battle of
Ponza ; and these reasons were rendered doubly cogent
by the talents and the influence of the person who now
stood in Philip's place. The circumstance of John,
the son of Réné, who had assumed the title of duke of
Calabria, being now at Florence, showed him that no
opportunity of making useful alliances was to be lost.
For this reason he availed himself of every occasion of
speaking of Sforza in terms of the highest approbation,
and took care that the altered tone of his conversation
should be made known as well to his ambassadors as
to others who were likely to report it to himself. The
duke of Milan, thinking that nothing would so much
strengthen him in his new position as an intimate alli-
ance with the most powerful and the highest in rank
of the sovereigns of Italy, and recollecting that the
250 DEATH OF BOOK WII.
claims of the duke of Orleans to his dominions gave
them a common interest in keeping the French out of
Italy, showed every disposition to meet the overtures
that were made to him from this quarter. To remove
all causes of suspicion, he signified his willingness to
forego his claims to the fiefs that had been held by
himself and his father in the kingdom of Naples. Thus
ere long did these two men, who had been for so many
years opposed to one another, express their willing-
ness to form the most intimate alliance. After the
manner of princes, they deemed it necessary to cement,
by matrimonial connections, the union which had been
formed by a community of interests. Accordingly,
Sforza betrothed his daughter Hippolyta to the king's
grandson Alphonso, and the king promised his grand-
daughter, Isabella Leonora, to Sforza Maria, the third
son of the duke of Milan.
Whether Pope Nicholas had been sincere or not in
attempting to effect the pacification of Italy in the
preceding year, he appears to have done his best to
procure Alphonso's acquiescence to the treaty that had
been settled by others at Lodi. He did not, however,
long survive the attainment of the object which he pro-
fessed to have so earnestly desired. For some time
past he had been suffering from gout in the hands and
feet, and towards the beginning of the present year his
maladies began to assume a more formidable appear-
ance. Feeling his end approach, he is said to have
expressed, in the following words, a sentiment which
doubtless has been felt by most good men who have
CHAP. I. POPE NICHOLAS. 251
been called from a life of study to take a prominent
part in the affairs of the world. “Never,” said he,
“do I see anybody cross the threshold of my door in
whose word I can confide. I am so confounded by the
tricks of those who surround me, that, if I did not fear
the opinion of the world, I would give up the popedom,
and once more become plain Thomas of Sarzano. *
While I was in that condition, I had more happy mo-
ments in a single day than I have now in a whole year.”
He departed this life on the 24th of March 1455,
leaving behind him a great reputation for acquirements
in learning and taste in the fine arts, as also for the
more Christian virtues of charity and disinterestedness.
Nor had his liberal pursuits and amiable qualities of
mind rendered him in any way unfit for governing with
fortitude and prudence. He was succeeded by Alphonso
Borgia, bishop of Valenciennes, under the title of Cal-
lixtus the Third.
Whatever benefits the peace might have brought to
the sovereigns and the people of Italy, it was ruin to
the men whose “country was war, and whose home was
their armour.” At the head of this class now was
Jacobo Piccinino. After the peace of Lodi, he had
remained in command of the Venetian armies, at a
salary of one hundred thousand ducats, till the end of
the year; but at the expiration of his term of service,
* M. Sismondi, in his zeal for everything done in the name of liberty,
thinks that these words might have been occasioned by remorse at the crime
of having put down, with a high hand, the conspiracy of Stefano Porcari.
Had he taken the same part in public life as Machiavelli, whose opinions
concerning that attempt have already been quoted, it is probable that he
would have viewed it in the same light.
252 PICCININO ATTACKS THE SIENNESE ; Book VII.
his employers, grudging the above sum in the time of
peace, and disgusted with the disorderly behaviour of
his soldiers, who were equally troublesome to friend and
to foe, declined to re-engage him. Though full credit
cannot be given to the exaggerated account of his
deeds written by Porcelli—who, it may be recollected,
visited Sforza's camp after the challenges that had
passed between the two rival generals near Gedo—his
partial successes in the late war had shown that he
was not destitute of talent; and since Sforza had become
a sovereign, he was looked upon as the first of the hire-
ling condottieri of Italy. But he now began to act a
part little better than that of a captain of the bands of
the marauders who, during the preceding century, had
infested the peninsula. In the words of Muratori, he
lived at the expense of all who were not his subjects,
and gained the affections of his soldiers by allowing them
to commit with impunity robberies and crimes of all
sorts. After he had been dismissed by the Venetians,
he collected together a force of three thousand horse
and one thousand foot, to resume the trade which had
been begun by Guarnieri. At first he seemed likely to
threaten Bologna, a place to which he might have laid
some claim in right of his father, but he was prevented
by the presence of the Milanese troops from making any
attempt thereon. He then proceeded to the mountain-
ous districts of Tuscany, and began laying waste the
territory of the Siennese. As Alphonso owed this
people a grudge on account of the resistance they had
offered him in his preceding campaigns, and as the
CHAP. I. IS BLOCKADED AT CASTIGLIONE ; 253
poet Porcelli had managed to predispose him in a
wonderful manner in favour of his hero, he is supposed
by many to have secretly instigated Piccinino to this
attempt.
Thus attacked, the Siennese sent to beg the pro-
tection of the powers of Italy. The pope sent Wen-
timiglia, (Sforza's former general) and the duke of
Milan sent his brother Conrad and Robert Sanseve-
rino, with sufficient forces to defend them. Piccinino
made a sudden attack upon his enemies in the Val
d’Inferno before they were well united ; but after a
partial success, in which he made prisoner the pope's
general, Ventimiglia, he was checked by the rapid con-
centration of his adversary's forces, and finally obliged
to retire with loss. Unable to make head against all
those that were now brought against him, he retired to
Castiglione, where his supplies were cut off, and his
army was wasted by pestilence and famine. In this
extremity his forces must have either perished or sur-
rendered, had not Alphonso, in direct violation of his
former engagements, sent them a few ship-loads of
biscuit from Naples. But these supplies were too scanty
in themselves, and too irregular in their arrival, to afford
sufficient support to a large army, and Piccinino, in the
agony of distress, sent word to the Milanese ambassador
that he would be willing to abide by whatever condi-
tions his master prescribed. To this Sforza replied,
that he would make no treaty whatever except in con-
junction with the other allied powers of Italy. Al-
phonso then made another effort for his unfortunate
25.4 ENTERS ALPHONSO's SERVICE. BOOK WII.
friend, and proposed that he should be made generalis-
simo of the forces of the Italian league against the
Turks, at a salary of one hundred thousand ducats per
annum. But this proposal was at once negatived by
the influence of the duke of Milan, who scouted the
idea of a wretched bandit (as he now called his old
rival) being appointed to such a situation.
Piccinino remained in this situation till the following
year, probably finding the difficulties of supporting his
army in the mean time decrease in proportion to the
diminution of its numbers. After this, the Siennese
and the others, weary of keeping watch on him,
requested the mediation of Alphonso, who arranged
that he should quit their territory, and restore all the
places he had taken, on receiving twenty thousand florins
of gold. It is even said by a contemporary writer, that
the Siennese as well as the pope agreed to pension
him, on the condition of his not molesting them for
the future. He then entered the service of the king
of Naples, who allowed him to take up his quarters at
Chieti, and allotted him to the pay of one thousand
two hundred horse and six hundred foot.
After this affair of Piccinino's, the land had perfect
peace for a year. The pontiff, indeed, tried to get up a
crusade against the Turks, and might have done so, had
not the news of their having been defeated near Bel-
grade by the Hungarians quieted the apprehensions
they had formerly excited. But though the peninsula
was not disturbed by the wickedness of man, it seemed
to be the special object of the fury of the elements.
CHAP. I. TEMPEST IN TUSCANY. 255
The appearance of a comet during the months of June
and July made many think that some terrible cala-
mity was at hand. As if in accordance with their
expectations, the country shortly afterwards witnessed
a hurricane which, if the descriptions are not greatly
exaggerated, must have been one of the severest that
Europe has ever seen. A mass of black clouds, issu-
ing from the sea near Ancona, passed over the land
between that city and Pisa, at a distance of about ten
yards from the earth, and, when it came into contact
with the Apennines, burst forth into thunders, lightnings,
and whirlwinds of extraordinary severity. The thunder
was so loud, and the lightning was so terrible, that many
thought that the day of judgment had come. Neither
buildings, trees, or living creatures were spared. Frag-
ments of the roofs of private houses and churches were
found at the distance of a mile from the buildings
whence they had been taken ; the stems of trees which
had at first resisted the wind were broken across and
carried far from their roots ; even cars and mules, with
their drivers, are said to have been carried from one
place to another through the air.” It was most furious
in the country between Florence and Sienna, which in
the preceding year had suffered so much from Piccinino
and his marauders. Fortunately, its devastations were
confined principally to the rural districts; for if, says
Machiavelli, it had entered a town, where houses and
* “Trasporto uomini e carre colle bestie da un luogo all altro per aria.”
—MURATOR1, Annali d'Italia. “Un vetturale insieme col Suoi mali fu dis-
vosto dalla strada nelle vicini convalli trovato morto.”—MACHIAVELLI, Ist.
256 EARTHQUAKE AT NAPLES. BOOK WII.
human beings are crowded together, the amount of dis-
traction and misery which it must have caused would
have been almost beyond the power of man to conceive.
And at the end of the year an earthquake took place in
the south of Italy, which is said to have caused the death
of one hundred thousand people, and the destruction of
several churches, in the cities between Benevento and
Naples.* If this number be not exaggerated, the loss
of life must have been much greater than would have
been caused by many years of such wars as were carried
on in the fifteenth century. If, says the annalist of
Italy, it be not impious in man to judge of the ways of
the Almighty, it would almost seem as if the wrath of
God had been poured out upon the unoffending people
of Naples for the transgression of their king.
It is the opinion of some philosophers that war is
the natural state of man, and that, though nations are
frequently obliged to live in peace when their resources
are exhausted, they will generally find something to
quarrel about as soon as their means are recruited.
Whether this proposition be universally true or not, its
advocates might certainly appeal to the history of the
different states of Italy in support of it. The wars which
ended by placing Sforza on the throne at Milan were
succeeded, if not by a regular peace, at least by a two
years' cessation from hostilities. After this the different
powers of Italy, though they really had nothing to fight
about, as if by a sort of natural instinct were again in
* MURATOR1, Annali d' Italia.
CHAP. T. COMMOTIONS AT GENOA. 257
arms, which they seemed by an equally natural instinct
to lay aside as soon as they had got tired of them. Two
years and a half after the peace of Lodi they seemed to
have had sufficient repose to allow their bellicose Pro-
pensities again to break out. As regards Sforza him-
self, the wars that followed are remarkable as exhibit-
ing him at the head of the party opposed to that of
which he and his father had been the principal Sup-
porters, and putting him in possession of a city which
had once been the principal entrepôt of the commerce of
the Mediterranean, the Levant, and the Black Sea.
It has already been remarked that the clause of the
Italian alliance, by which Alphonso reserved to himself
the right of attacking Sigismund Malatesta and the
Genoese, contained in itself the seeds of future hostili-
ties. These seeds began to develop themselves about
the end of the year 1457. Genoa, since the expulsion
of the Milanese in 1436, had taken but little part in
the general politics of Italy, but had, in the mean time,
suffered much from the rivalries of two great parties, at
the head of which were the Adorni and the Fregosi.
The dissensions so caused had continued with various
success for twenty years, and they now afforded Al-
phonso, who regarded the Genoese with all the heredi-
tary dislike of his countrymen—which had been in no
small degree increased by the part they had taken at
the battle of Ponza—a specious excuse for interfering
in their affairs. Under pretence of expelling the reign-
ing doge, Pietro Fregoso, and of restoring the Adorni
—who, it was suspected, had promised to make the city
WOL. II. R
258 GENOA. ATTACKED BY ALPHONSO. Book VII.
over to him—he directed a simultaneous attack against
it by sea and by land; and being desirous, at the same
time, to take vengeance on Sigismund Malatesta for
having commanded the armies of the Florentines em-
ployed in defence of their country, he ordered Jacobo
|Piccinino and the duke of Urbino to invade their domi-
nions. This last expedition was not attended with any
results worthy of notice; but the attack upon Genoa
produced consequences of a more serious nature to his
family than it had entered his head to conceive.
The doge, Pietro Fregoso, despairing of being able
to keep the city against such a powerful assailant as
Alphonso, determined to make it over to some one who
would prevent it falling into the hands of his enemies,
and who might possibly confer on him some favour in
return. Accordingly, he transferred his own rights over
Genoa to the king of France. That monarch hesitated
not to accept his offer, and selected John, the son of
Réné of Anjou, as being tolerably conversant with the
ways of the Italians, to take possession of the city for
him. At the same time, it must doubtless have occurred
to him that the establishment of that prince in Italy
would afford him or his countrymen no small facility in
following up his claims on the kingdom of Naples.
John of Anjou, on his arrival at Genoa in the middle
of May, was immediately put in possession of the city
and the fortress, and received by all classes with the
greatest acclamations.
If the Genoese had hoped for peace under the im-
pression that Alphonso would not dare to enter the
CHAP. I. DEATH OF ALPHONSO. 259
lists against so formidable a monarch as the king of
France, they found themselves woefully mistaken. The
difficulty of accomplishing his design seems only to
have whetted his ambition, and imparted force to his
energy. Determined to make a vigorous effort to get
possession of the much-coveted city, he sent against it
an expedition of twenty ships laden with all sorts of
bellicose instruments, along with ten well-armed gal-
leys, and gave directions that twenty more should
follow them as soon as they could be got ready. At
the same time the Adorni and the other exiles were
collecting a considerable force, with which they were
preparing to attack it by land. The Genoese, being
animated by a hereditary dislike of the Aragonese,
prepared to resist to the last ; and John of Anjou, as
well as Pietro Fregoso, took the most skilful measures
for putting the city in a proper state of defence.
The blockade of Genoa had already commenced: the
besieged were expecting, and had got themselves ready
to resist, a combined assault by Sea and by land—a
terrible strife appeared to be at hand—when all parties
were surprised by the news of the sudden death of
Alphonso. That monarch expired on the 27th of June
1458, of a disease supposed to have been aggravated
by the anxiety of the moment. After having detailed
the part he played on the drama of Italian politics, it
would be useless to say anything in praise of his genius,
or in condemnation of his ambition. If the accounts
given of his private life and of the internal adminis-
tration of his kingdom be true, he is to be blamed for
260 CLAIMANTS FOR THE BOOK WII.
immoderate debauchery, and for grinding his subjects by
taxes and imposts of every description. His removal
from the world was the signal for the dispersion of all
the forces assembled at Genoa : the marines retired to
their respective homes at Naples or Barcelona; and the
land forces, which had been composed principally of
exiles, did not tarry after their departure. The two
heads of the family of the Adorni are said to have died
of vexation at seeing all their hopes blighted by the
untimely death of their ally. The Genoese, though
freed from the immediate danger of an assault, suffered
in no small degree from an epidemic, supposed to have
been caused by privation and excessive labour under-
gone in preparing for their defence.
Up to the present moment Sforza had remained a
passive though not an unobservant spectator of what
was going on so close to his own dominions. But now
matters had come to a state in which he could not
possibly remain inactive. Alphonso having left no legi-
timate children, his hereditary dominions passed by the
law of succession established therein to his brother, the
king of Navarre; but as he had acquired the kingdom
of Naples in no small degree by his own talents and
bravery, he had thought himself at liberty to bequeath
it to whom he pleased, and he persuaded the parlia-
ment of Naples to accept his natural son, Ferdinand, as
his successor. Though such successions were not un-
common in Italy, Ferdinand's illegitimacy afforded a
fair pretext to other parties to urge their claims, more
especially as he had not the talents nor the resources of
CHAP. I. CROWN OF NAPLES. 261
his father. The hopes of the Angevin party at Naples
had been in no small degree revived by the promises
which Sforza himself had made to Réné, when that
monarch crossed the Alps to his assistance ; and now
that Alphonso was dead, and that the heir of the house
of Anjou was established at Genoa, they thought them-
selves sufficiently strong to dispute the succession ;
besides which, the new pope was determined to assert
at least the claims which his predecessors had always
made to the kingdoms of Apulia and Calabria. He
even went so far as to send his envoys to the different
cities and great men in the kingdom, requesting them to
return to the allegiance of the Holy See, and threatening
them with ecclesiastical censures in the event of their
refusal; and well knowing that he could do nothing with-
out Sforza, he sent a special ambassador to him, request-
ing his assistance, and promising him, in return, not only
his paternal fiefs, which had been taken from him by
Alphonso, but even a considerable portion of the king-
dom of Naples. -
The son of the peasant of Cotignola had now risen
so high, that not only did the destiny of the fairest
provinces of the peninsula seem to hang on his decision,
but a way was opened to him by which he might make
a considerable addition to his dominions, and possibly
hope to unite in his own person the sovereignty of the
two finest states in Italy. Had he been twenty years
younger, or had he been so long in possession of the
duchy of Milan as to be relieved from all apprehension
about the undisputed succession of his son, it is possible
262 PART TAKEN BY SFORZA. BOOK WII.
that he would not have had the wisdom or the desire
to refuse the offers of Callixtus. But he had now come
to an age when most men are aware how much better
it is to make sure of what they have, than to run the
risk of losing everything in their insatiable desire for
more. He therefore turned a deaf ear to the solicita-
tions of the pope; and, for the reasons that had induced
him to form a strict alliance with Alphonso of Aragon,
he was now determined to give a most vigorous support
to his son. For this purpose he sent two of his most
intimate friends to the chief men and citizens of the
kingdom, with authority to make his intentions known
among them, adding that he was ready to risk his
dominions, and his very life, in support of him whose
part he had espoused. By this timely declaration he
so strengthened the timid, and confirmed the wavering,
that for a time all the former subjects of Alphonso
seemed ready to offer their allegiance to his son. Only
a few of the principal nobles, who had, perhaps, even
before affected a species of independence, openly de-
clared their preference for his rival.
At the time that the new duke of Milan was thus
endeavouring to secure the succession of Naples for his
friend, he took upon himself to administer a species of
rebuke to the pontiff for his interference. After up-
braiding him with the injustice of his attempt, and
requesting him not to meddle any further in the matter,
he warned him of the amount of danger and difficulty
in which he must involve himself should he persevere.
He reminded him that, even if Ferdinand were unsup-
CHAP. I. DEATH OF CALLIXTUS. 263
ported, he had no means of making head against such a
powerful monarch. Much less could he do so against
the united arms of all Italy, who, at the request of
his excellent predecessor, Nicholas V., had bound them-
Selves to maintain the existing order of things. If the
others were to fall short of their engagements, he him-
self would fight to the last in support of Ferdinand.
Even if he had never been a party to the league of
Italy, regard to his father, and the iniquity of the
attempt that was now made to set him aside, would
have induced him to do so. The refusal of Sforza to
co-operate in the ambitious designs of the pontiff is
said to have been the cause of the fever which not long
afterwards carried off the latter. -
Callixtus was succeeded by Eneas Silvius, under
the title of Pius the Second. He was a man of great
learning, eloquence, and ability; and, from having been
constantly employed in public life, had acquired no
small knowledge of mankind. The mention of a few
of the leading circumstances of his former career will
show his dexterity and tact. At the council of Basle,
he had so distinguished himself by his opposition to the
court of Rome that the anti-pope appointed him his
secretary. Having been sent by the Emperor on diplo-
matic business to the court of Rome, he managed to
reconcile himself with Eugenius, and received from him
the appointment that he had held under his opponents.
He was afterwards made bishop of Trieste by the same
pontiff. By his successor he was elevated to the See
of Sienna, the place of his education, and he received
264 SFORZA PROTECTS THE NEW Book VII.
the dignity of a cardinal's hat from Callixtus. He now
ended by occupying the seat of those whom he had
once declared to be heretical.
Whatever might have been Pius's wishes with regard
to the kingdom of Naples, he had not the means of
asserting the claims that had been made by his prede-
cessor. As Callixtus had devoted whatever he could lay
hands on to the aggrandisement of his nephews, the pon-
tifical treasury was quite empty at the accession of Pius.
Besides this, he now beheld himself in danger of losing
part of his dominions in consequence of the acts of his
predecessor. It has already been mentioned that
Jacobo Piccinino had been engaged by Alphonso and
had been sent by him shortly before his death against
Sigismund Malatesta. The claims which Callixtus
made to the succession of the son of Alphonso had
given him an excuse for attacking the dominions of the
Church, of which he continued to avail himself even
after Callixtus' death. In a very short time after his
accession, Pius beheld himself stripped of three of the
fairest cities of his patrimony, and was without the means
of resisting the further encroachments of his aggressor.
He was forced to cry out to the duke of Milan in his
distress.
Sforza now beheld himself, for the third time since
his accession, called upon to adjust the differences of his
contemporaries. Indeed, his authority and his influence
appear to have become so great that the simile with
which one of England's greatest statesmen “illustrated
* Mr Canning—Speech on the Portuguese intervention.
CHAP. I. POPE FROM PICCININO. 265
her position in 1825 might almost have been applied
to him. As king Æolus kept the winds in restraint, he
was able to restrain the jarring powers in Italy, to
moderate their animosity, and to soothe their anger.
On more than one occasion, if it had not been for his
interference, they would have spread havoc and desolation
around. With Piccinino, whom he affected to regard as
little better than a common brigand, he dealt in a very
summary manner. He sent him a message, in which he
began by suggesting to him that it would appear much
better in him to give up at once, and as it were of his
own accord, the cities that he had taken from the Holy
See, than to be compelled to do so, as he certainly
would be, in the event of his refusal. Let him bear in
mind that the Italian allies were all of one mind in
maintaining the integrity of the dominions of the Church,
and that he, for one, would take care that their wishes
on this head were carried out. Let him take warning
from what had occurred two years before, when he in-
vaded the territory of Sienna ; and let him now do as
he was told, lest a worse punishment should befall him.
As even Ferdinand, who of course would not do any-
thing displeasing to Sforza, showed Piccinino no coun-
tenance, he was forced to comply.
The duke of Milan requested Pius, in return for
the protection he had afforded him, formally to in-
vest Ferdinand with the kingdom of Naples. This he
promised to do, merely stipulating for the restoration of
Benevento and Terracina, which had been taken from
his predecessors. At the same time Pius arranged a
266 CONGRESS AT MANTUA. BOOK WII.
marriage between his own nephew, Antonio Piccolimini,
and Maria, the natural daughter of Ferdinand. When
these things had been arranged, the cardinal Ursino was
despatched to Naples to place the crown on the head
of the son of Alphonso. Thus had the son of the pea-
Sant of Cotignola managed to have all things settled
according to his wishes.
Though pope Pius was not without the ambition of
his order, on this occasion he certainly showed more
zeal for exciting Italy against the Turks than for ex-
tending his dominions. For this purpose he arranged
that a congress should be held in Mantua, which all the
leading powers of Christendom were invited to attend.
He left Rome on his way thither on the 22d of January
1459, and, after making long halts at Perugia and
Sienna, for which last place he had always shown the
most patriotic affection, he arrived at Florence on the
25th of April. He was met there by Galeazzo Maria
Sforza, then only fifteen years old, who had been sent
thither with a long train of soldiers and of the nobles
of the land, who were in many cases accompanied by
their families, to kiss the feet of his holiness in the name
of his father. The young man was received at Florence
with all the respect due to the son of an illustrious
prince ; in the words of the annalist of Italy, the citi-
Zens spared no expense in getting up amusements and
shows for his diversion, and made every profession of
regard and attachment for his family. On the 9th
of May, the pope, accompanied by the young prince,
took his departure from that city. After having been
CHAP. I. ATTENDED BY SFORZA. 267
received with all due honours on the road, he arrived in
Mantua about the end of the month, where he was met
by deputies from the principal states in the peninsula
and the Levant, as well as from the Emperor and the
king of France.
Though Sforza, by sending his son to accompany Pius
from Florence to Mantua, had given token of his friend-
ship and support, yet the pontiff thought it necessary
for the dignity of his congress that he should attend it
in person—a circumstance which bears no small testi-
mony to the eminence both of his position and his repu-
tation. In obedience to the summons of the head of
the Christian religion, the duke repaired promptly to
Mantua. It is incredible, says a contemporary, with
what honour he was received, as well by the holy pontiff
and the college of cardinals as by the marquis of
Mantua. When the assembled deputies were ready to
attend to him, one Francesco Philelpho, a most con-
summate orator and poet, delivered a most weighty and
eloquent speech in his name, in the presence of his holi-
ness, the cardinals, the clergy, and ambassadors, from
all the states, not only of Italy, but of Christendom.”
After having duly praised the proposition of the pope,
he promised that, as far as in him lay, he would assist
him against the Infidels. Hippolyta Sforza also, the
betrothed bride of the son of Ferdinand, is said to have
complimented the pope in a Latin oration that would
have done credit to the best scholar of the day.
Though the diet at Mantua had been opened with
* SIMONETA, lib. 26.
268 NOTHING DONE AT THE DIET. BOOK WII.
great pomp, and was numerously attended, and though
various resolutions were unanimously passed, and mag-
nificent promises were unhesitatingly made, it did not
produce any practical result. The real cause of this
appears to have been the peculiar circumstances of the
Venetians. Their own situation, and their extensive
colonies and commerce in the Levant, naturally made
them more than any others desirous of really repressing
the encroachments of the Turks; but for these very rea-
sons they would be the first object of their attack in
the event of a declaration of war, and they refused to
expose themselves to this danger till they saw that
others had assembled their forces, and were ready to
fight in good earnest. And when this was proposed to
them, all, as before, began to make excuses. Some,
indeed, had taken measures for increasing their armies
or strengthening their fleets; but these augmentations
were generally destined for objects nearer home, in which
they imagined themselves more immediately interested.
Thus, at the end of the year 1459, the diet separated
without having arranged anything for the defence of
Christendom ; and, in the mean time, events had
occurred which claimed the attention of the different
sovereigns of Italy.
CHAPTER II.
FERDINAND's UNPOPULARITY WITH HIS OWN SUBJECTS-THEY MAKE OVER-
TURES To JoHN of ANJOU.—WAIN EFFORTS OF JOHN TO SECURE SFORZA's
ASSISTANCE.-PIETRO FREGOSO ATTACKS GENOA—FAILS.—PREPARATIONS
OF JOHN of ANJoU AGAINST NAPLES.—FREGOSO AGAIN ATTACKS GENOA—
Is KILLED.—DEPARTURE OF THE DUKE OF ANJOU FOR NAPLES-HIS SUC-
CESSES.—FERDINAND APPEALS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE ITALIAN ALLIANCE.
—ANSWER OF THE WENETIANS.—CoRRESPONDENCE BETWEEN COSMO DE'
MEDICI AND SFORZA.—PICCININo ENTERS THE SERVICE OF THE ANGEVINS.
—COMPLETE DEFEAT OF FERDINAND NEAR THE SARNO.-HEROISM OF
QUEEN ISABELLA.—RETREAT OF ALEXANDER SFORZA AFTER THE BATTLE
of SAN FABIANo.—FERDINAND, HAVING RECEIVED FRESH suppliFS FROM
SFORZA, REGAINS MUCH OF THE GROUND HE HAD LOST.
FERDINAND, though placed on the throne of his father
by the support of Sforza, and crowned king of Naples
by the pope, had never been popular with his subjects.
Even the warmest partisans of the house of Aragon
would have preferred for their monarch Don Carlos,
the son of the king of Navarre, who, however, turned a
deaf ear to the overtures that were made to him. It
was not long before Ferdinand embroiled himself with
Antonio Orsini, prince of Tarento, one of the most
powerful barons of his kingdom. The cause of their
quarrel was soon settled, but the resentment of the
prince of Tarento continued, and he took care to
have it intimated to John of Anjou, the governor
of Genoa, and the titular duke of Calabria, that the
270 OWERTURES MADE TO SFORZA. Book VII.
time had come for his reasserting the claims of his
anceStorS.
John of Anjou had not been free from troubles since
his arrival at Genoa. He was frequently without
money to satisfy his partisans, and was occasionally
obliged to borrow from the duke of Milan; and the
duke, though he did not refuse to aid him in his diffi-
culty, and wished to keep up the appearance of being on
good terms with him, was supposed to wish the French
well out of Genoa. Moreover, the ex-doge, Pietro
Fregoso, who had made over the city to him, being
now discontented with his reward, was endeavouring to
get up a party against him. But the hints which he
had received from the rebellious Neapolitan barons cast
all these troubles into the shade. His first step was to
endeavour to gain, by the most liberal promises, the
assistance of Sforza. After reminding him of the friend-
ship which had subsisted between their families for two
generations, the assistance that his father Réné had
given to him only a few years previously, and the
engagements they had then made, he went on to pro-
mise him the sovereignty of fiefs and provinces, in the
event of his succeeding by his assistance. He then
proceeded to say that as both his father and himself
intended to live principally in France, they would be
only sovereigns in name, while he himself would be the
virtual ruler of the kingdom of Naples. He further
proposed that his daughter, Hippolyta, who had been
betrothed to a son of the present king of Naples, many
years younger than herself, should be given to him. If
CHAP. II. FERDINAND's MEASURES. 271
he would not actually support them, he hoped that he
would at least remain neutral, and endeavour to persuade
Pope Pius to do so likewise.
All John's arguments and promises were thrown away
upon Sforza. He briefly replied that he wished to live
on good terms with the son of the duke of Anjou,
as well as with his other neighbours, but that he was
bound to act up to the terms of the Italian alliance,
which guaranteed the throne of Naples to Alphonso
and his descendants; and that he, for one, would do
his best to oppose any attempt that was made to in-
fringe it. That as for the proposed marriage, it was
quite sufficient for him to say that he had promised
his daughter to the son of Ferdinand ; that at the time
of his making his engagements he was as well aware of
the difference between their ages as he was then ; that
he therefore could not deem that any reason why he
should break his word, and that he would sooner suffer
death than be guilty of such gross prevarication and
deceit.
In the mean time Ferdinand, having been duly
informed of the negotiations between his insurgent
subjects and the duke of Anjou, sought to retaliate on
the latter by raising him up enemies at Genoa. He
sent to counsel the ex-doge, Pietro Fregoso, who, as has
already been mentioned, had become dissatisfied with
John of Anjou, to make an effort to expel him from
Genoa. To enable him to do this, he furnished him with
money that he had managed to borrow in the cities of
the duchy of Milan, and with troops who had served
272 PRETENDED NEUTRALITY OF SFORZA. Book VII,
under Tiberto Brandolino, a general who had formerly
fought under, and was commonly thought to be much
attached to, Sforza. What part Sforza himself had in
advising or assisting Fregoso does not appear, but he
was generally supposed to have been uneasy at the
establishment at Genoa of the French, from whom alone
he dreaded any rival claims to his duchy; and the fact
that the money of his subjects, and the troops of his
captain, were employed in the expedition, seemed in
some degree to implicate him.*
Viewing the matter in this light, John of Anjou sent
to remonstrate with the duke for allowing these things
to take place, and to say that he must complain of
his conduct to the king of France, who, he had no
doubt, would speedily send a force sufficient to pro-
tect him. However much Sforza may have disliked
this allusion to the king, he was quite unmoved there-
by in his reply. He said that he was not bound by
engagements to any party except the members of the
Italian alliance, and that, as he was at peace with
all the world, the right of entry into his dominions
was open to everybody. He could not understand
why any one should blame him, if the king of Naples
had borrowed money from the bankers at Milan, or if
* M. Sismondi relates this occurrence as if there was no doubt of Sforza
having had a hand in it. Muratori also strongly suspects the same ; and in
confirmation of his opinion, refers to the 1storia Bresciana, by Christoforo da
Soldo, a contemporary writer. The words of the passage relative thereto
are—“The duke of Milan wished to drive the duke of Calabria from Genoa,
and sent Messer Tiberto, one of his own generals, with seven hundred
cavalry and infantry.” No other historian, that I am aware of, says that
either Sforza or Tiberto took any direct part in this expedition.
CHAP. II. FREGOSO ATTACKS GENOA. 273
Fregoso had raised troops in his dominions with Ferdi-
nand's money. John of Anjou might do just the same
if he wished. He cared not one jot for his threats of
complaining to the king of France, nor would he be
induced thereby in any way to alter his conduct. The
king, if the truth were told him, would see at once that
he had done nothing that was not fair and honourable.
The undertaking of Fregoso turned out a failure. On
setting out, he was joined by Antonio Filippo Fiesco,
a Genoese of high standing, who was peculiarly hostile
to the French. Having crossed the Apennines with-
out opposition, he encamped within two miles of the
city. He was disappointed, however, at finding that
the inhabitants made no demonstration in his favour ;
and as the duke of Anjou remained within the walls,
he could do nothing against him, except endeavour to
reduce the city by siege or blockade. At the same
time it was reported to him that the French general,
Rinaldo, was advancing upon him from Asti. An
accident afterwards caused the dispersion of part of his
army. Fiesco was killed in a dashing attempt to effect
an entrance into the city; and as he had great posses-
sions, and as his relations and friends were more anxious
to look after the goodly heritages that might be coming
to them than to reinstate the ex-doge in Genoa, they
very soon quited his camp. Fregoso, not deeming it
prudent to await an attack with his remaining forces,
retired and took Chiavari, Sestri, and one or two other
places of some importance on the coast. But after he
had been compelled to relinquish these by the Genoese
WOL. II. S
274 JoHN OF ANJOU's PREPARATIONS. Book VII.
fleet, he recrossed the Apennines into Lombardy. A
victory which the same fleet not long afterwards gained
at Noli, over one that had been sent against them by
Ferdinand, emboldened the Angevin party at Genoa to
take measures more decidedly offensive than before.
The support which Ferdinand had given to Fregoso
made the Genoese, who never liked either the Aragonese
or their monarchs, most bitterly hostile to him. After
the affair at Noli, John called together the leading
men of the city, laid before them his plans and preten-
sions to the crown of Naples, and requested their aid.
He reminded them that he had originally come from
France at their own entreaty, in order that he might
save them from the great misfortune of being enslaved by
Alphonso of Aragon. In return for this, he now asked
their assistance in regaining the kingdom that had
belonged to his family; but, ardently as he desired this,
he would take no step towards the accomplishment of
his wishes without their concurrence. Before they came
to a decision, however, they should recollect the dangers
with which they had been threatened both by Ferdi-
nand and his father, and with which he had no doubt
they would continue to be menaced as long as a mem-
ber of the house of Aragon remained on the throne of
Naples. Finally, let them reflect on the great advan-
tage it would be to them if the ports of Gaeta and
Naples, and the fertile provinces of Apulia and Calabria,
were under the same government as themselves.
It did not require much to persuade the Genoese, in
their present temper, to aid in an attempt to expel Fer-
CHAP. II, FREGOSO's SECOND ATTACK ON GENOA. 275
dinand from Italy. After no long consultation, they
promised the duke of Anjou their support; they resolved
to place at his disposal their fleet, consisting of ten gal-
leys and two transport-ships, and voted him a subsidy
of sixty thousand ducats. He was further strengthened
by a fleet of twelve galleys from his father, and by a
considerable sum of money from the king of France.
Thus supported, the duke of Calabria was about to
Sail for the coast of Naples, when news came that
Fregoso was making another expedition against him.
The latter, in fact, had crossed the Apennines, and
stationed himself at Provenza, within four miles of
Genoa. As before, John resolved not to give him
battle in the open country; but, trusting to the loyalty
of the inhabitants, he had the fortifications well guarded,
and remained within the city. Mean time, as had
already been determined, the fleet sailed for the Neapo-
litan coast with a numerous force. The subtraction of
such a number of men from the garrison emboldened
Fregoso to make an attack, and he succeeded in getting
over the walls by night, and opening one of the gates,
so as to admit the main body of his army. There
was, however, a second line of fortifications within the
city, which had been originally built as a protection
against the Saracens, and had been completed in the
time of Frederic I. Thither the French and their
adherents, as soon as they had recovered from the con-
sternation caused by finding an enemy within their
outer walls, retreated. At the same time, word was
brought to Fregoso that the Adorni, who were more
276 FREGOSO IS KILLED. BOOK WII.
influenced by their ancient dislike to him than by any
other feelings, were coming by sea to the support of the
French. On this he determined, before their arrival,
to make one desperate effort to gain possession of the
old city, in which he was in great hopes that he would
be joined by several of his countrymen. But as they,
contrary to his expectation, remained faithful to the
French, he was driven back after his first attack with
considerable loss. Not long after this, however, he rushed
in, followed by only three of his attendants, and regard-
less of the consequences, through a gate of the old city
which had been inadvertently left open. The gate was
immediately closed on him. For a time he overcame
all opposition, and galloped from one gate to another
seeking for the means of egress. But all exit from
the city had been cut off, and, as missiles continued
to be showered on him, both by the soldiers and from
the houses, he at last fell mortally wounded. He was
taken up by his enemies speechless, and in a few hours
afterwards departed this life.
His death was the signal for the retreat and disper-
sion of his army. From the circumstance of their
having been within the old city, several prisoners were
made, including Sigismund, the son of Tiberto Brando-
lino, and some of the leading citizens who had joined
Fregoso. A few of the latter paid the penalties of
traitors; but the majority of them were dismissed, on
the condition of their promising never again to bear
arms against the king of France. The son of Tiberto
was thrown into prison, as it seemed contrary to the
CHAP. II. JOHN's DEPARTURE FOR NAPLEs. 277
law of nations that he should have joined in a war
while his father was in the service of a sovereign who
still professed himself neutral. And there is no record
of the duke of Milan having made any remonstrance
whatever on the subject.
The defeat and death of Fregoso set John at liberty
to follow the armament that had already started to the
Neapolitan coast. On his way thither he touched at
Porto Pisano, where the Florentines, though bound by
treaty to the son of Alphonso, received him with every
demonstration of the friendship that had so long sub-
sisted between their republic and his family. “For,”
says M. Sismondi, “it was not with them as with the
duke of Milan—they were not able to keep all their
feelings in subjection to their policy, and they were
more influenced by the character of the individual com-
batants than by any considerations of arresting the
progress of the French arms in Italy.” After his arrival
at Gaeta, his success was so rapid as to attract the
serious attention of all the powers of the peninsula.
Though Ventimiglia (now marquis of Crotona, the same
whom Sforza, before the surrender of Milan, had cast
into prison at Pavia) had already been arrested by
Ferdinand for carrying on a correspondence with John
of Anjou, several of the leading nobles soon flocked to
the standard of the latter. Almost all Campania re-
volted to him. When he went into the Abruzzi, its
inhabitants did the same. Thence he passed into
Apulia, several of the principal cities of which submit-
ted to him almost without resistance. While in that
278 FERDINAND’s APPLICATION TO Book VII.
province he was joined by Hercules of Este, whom his
brother, the duke of Modena and Reggio, had sent to
his assistance.
After an ineffectual attempt to recover his lost ground,
Ferdinand sent to the parties who, four years before,
had signed the Italian alliance, requesting them, in
virtue of the arrangements entered into on that occa-
sion, to assist him in driving a foreign enemy from his
territories. His first appeals were made to the pope
and the duke of Milan, by whose influence he had been
placed in the kingdom bequeathed him by his father,
and who had several times, during the course of the
year, called the attention of the congress that still con-
tinued to sit at Mantua to the affairs of his kingdom.
In reply, they still expressed their determination to
stand by him ; but as they naturally wished a part at
least of the expense of supporting him to devolve upon
others, they ordered him to apply to the rich republics
of Venice and Florence.
These two states now viewed matters in a very different
light from what they had done at the time they signed
the Italian alliance. They were then exhausted by a
long war, and glad to come to terms with a powerful rival;
and the predecessor of Ferdinand, whatever might have
been his faults, had talents to make himself feared, and
address to acquire friends. But Ferdinand was neither
talented nor popular, while his rival was both ; and as
the tide of fortune had now turned against him, few
were willing to expose themselves to it merely for his
sake. The Venetians, therefore, at once declined Sup-
CHAP. II. THE WENETIANS AND FLORENTINES. 279
porting him, saying that, though they still adhered to
the stipulations of the Italian alliance, his father had
excluded his family from the benefit of it by the support
he had given Piccinino in his marauding expedition
against the Siennese. The Florentines, too, had their
own reasons for refusing to assist him. It has already
been mentioned, that John of Anjou had been received
by them with all the affection due to the represen-
tative of a family by whose assistance their ancestors
had been enabled to maintain their independence ;
the royal standard of the Lily was still endeared to
them by many associations, and both Ferdinand and
his father had given them much annoyance, and sought
to do them much evil. Thus, so far from acceding to
the demands of Ferdinand, they could not at first be
prevailed upon to remain neuter ; and, under the in-
fluence of their feelings, they voted a subsidy of eighty
thousand florins to the duke of Anjou.
The leading man in Florence, Cosmo de' Medici, had
lived long enough in the world, and was sufficiently
well versed in its ways, to know that, in managing the
affairs of states, men must not be ruled by their feelings.
He therefore thought it prudent to consult Francesco
Sforza, the most intimate of his friends, and the greatest
of living generals and politicians, before allowing his
countrymen to carry out the vote which they had so
unanimously passed. For this reason he sent an am-
bassador to him, to state the resolution to which they
had come, and to explain to him that the feelings of the
people of Florence, which were always friendly towards
280 COSMO's MESSAGE TO SFORZA. BOOK WII.
the French, had been raised to such a pitch of enthu-
siasm by the recent successes of John, that he did not
think they could possibly be induced to act otherwise.
He requested him, therefore, to weigh this circumstance
well before deciding which part he would take. On
the whole, he thought he could not do better than join
him in expelling the Catalan pest, as he termed Ferdi-
nand's party, from Italy. After alluding to the many
injuries which they had both of them in times past
received from Alphonso, and the connection of his father
with the Angevin party, he left no arguments untried
to convince him that his real interests would be best
promoted by their success. Let him but reflect on the
many fiefs that his father had held in the kingdom of
Naples — all of these, and probably several others,
would be his, if he would join them in placing John
on the throne. Desirable as these possessions would
be for any one, they were peculiarly so for him, who
had such a numerous offspring to provide for : in
short, they would enable him to establish a family
connection which would make him the most powerful
man in Italy. And let him not fear lest John should
be so much irritated by the part he had already taken
as to retract his offers: in fact, if he would but give
him permission, he would undertake to arrange all
differences between them; and he would manage
matters so, that John himself would be the first to
make overtures of reconciliation.*
When an astute politician like the duke of Milan has
* SIMONETA, lib. 26.
CHAP. II. SFORZA's REPLY. 281
once made up his mind how to act, he is seldom Swerved
from his determination by any representations of his
friends. After he had attentively listened to the pro-
posals of Cosmo's ambassador, and apparently given
them all due consideration, he dictated a letter to him
to the following purport. He was surprised and
grieved to hear that the Florentine people, forgetful
of the conditions to which a few years before they had
subscribed, had determined on assisting the opponent
of Ferdinand; but his astonishment and sorrow were
still greater when he was told that Cosmo de' Medici
and other wise men had done the same as the fickle
and easily-excited multitude. They at least ought to
have had the courage and the honesty to oppose the
violation of the most solemn engagements. To these
engagements, let others act as they might, he for one
was determined to adhere. He must once more remind
them that they were bound thereby not only not to
oppose, but even to assist, the son of Alphonso. He
therefore begged that Cosmo would exert his influence,
which he well knew was paramount, to induce them to
do so; or, if he could not carry this point, let him at
least persuade them to remain neuter. With respect
to their relations to the rival candidates, he of course
recollected the ancient friendship of his father and
himself with the house of Anjou, and the many
causes of complaint which they both had against
Alphonso ; but he had been taken off, he might say,
by the judgment of Providence, and the character and
the circumstances of his son were essentially different.
282 ITS EFFECTS. BOOK WII.
Alphonso, indeed, had boundless resources, and could
neither tolerate an equal nor keep faith with a friend.
So great was his pride, that wherever he went he
seemed almost to expect that the very buildings and
trees should do him homage. It was, of course, impos-
sible to enter into any agreement or form any alliance
with him. But Ferdinand had no dominions out of
Italy, and was without the power, even if he had the
inclination, to do them injury. Let them beware, how-
ever, how they allowed the French to obtain any fur-
ther footing in Italy. The great object of that nation
was territorial aggrandisement at the expense of their
neighbours: they were already in possession of Asti
and Genoa; if, in addition to these, they were esta-
blished in the kingdom of Naples, he for one would
tremble for the independence of the peninsula. Their
next object would be the conquest of Lombardy, after
which they would be the virtual rulers of the country
south of the Alps. He thought, however, he could
answer for Ferdinand always acting as their common
interests required ; and though his fortunes seemed
now at a low ebb, he had no doubt but that, with their
joint assistance, they would be easily re-established in
the following spring.”
Cosmo de' Medici and the other statesmen at Flo-
rence were influenced either by these arguments, or by
their desire of pleasing the duke of Milan. It does
not appear whether they ever tried to induce their
countrymen to do anything to support Ferdinand, but
* SIMoNETA, lib. 26.
CHAP. II. PICCININO JOINS JOHN. 283
they persuaded the assembly to abrogate the vote which
they had made of giving a subsidy to his opponent.
Nevertheless, the wishes of the Florentines for the suc-
cess of the Angevin party were so great, that many of
the citizens are supposed to have made large contribu-
tions out of their private fortunes for its support.
The circumstance of Sforza having been able to
change the policy of a great republic like Florence, is
no small proof of the degree of power and authority he
had attained. But what he was able to do with the great
men by whom its councils were directed, he could not
effect with one who was, for the time being, regarded as
little better than a common marauder. It has already
been mentioned that Piccinino had been obliged, sorely
against his will, to restore several cities that he had
taken in the Dominions of the Church. After this he
invaded the territories of Sigismund Malatesta, against
whom he had been previously despatched by Alphonso,
under the hopes of enriching himself at his expense.
These expectations, however, were frustrated by the
conclusion of a peace between Malatesta and Ferdi-
nand. Anger resulting from this disappointment, and
the hopes of getting something for himself by joining
the side that appeared to be winning, induced him to
leave the service of the latter for that of his opponent.
On hearing of his intentions, Sforza did his best to
prevent his carrying them into execution, and he was
able, by donations of money, to induce several of his
soldiers to remain with Ferdinand. To Piccinino he
also offered at once to give his daughter Drusiana in
284 FORCES SENT TO FERDIN AND. BOOK WII.
marriage, and promised that he himself would imme-
diately send him a present of money, and arrange with
the pope and the king of Naples to put him in posses-
sion of some goodly fiefs, if he would but remain faith-
ful to the latter. At first, indeed, he pretended to
lend a willing ear to these offers, and requested Sforza
to send a friend along with the money to Borso of
Este. But this appears to have been merely a trick to
gain time, for Borso detained the Milanese ambassador
disputing about the most trifling particulars, till the
intelligence arrived that Piccinino had gone over to
the enemy.
The duke of Milan, on finding that his attempts at
mediation were vain, requested the duke of Urbino and
his brother Alexander, the possessor of Pesaro, to pre-
vent Piccinino passing through their dominions into the
Neapolitan provinces. To assist them in so doing, he
sent his brother Borso with a force of two thousand
horse; but either because they were unable to oppose
him, or unwilling to make their own dominions the
scene of war, Piccinino was allowed to pass through
them unmolested. However, they lost no time in
marching after him, with the whole of their forces, into
the disputed territory of Naples; and at the same time
Pius, as some think at the instigation of Francesco
Sforza, sent two generals, Simoneta and Rinaldo
Ursini, with several squadrons of cavalry, to act under
the directions of Ferdinand.
The annalist of Italy makes mention of an attempt
that was made about this time by one of the insurgent
CHAP. II. BATTLE OF THE SARNO. 285
barons, the duke of Sessa, to terminate the contest by
the assassination of Ferdinand. He says that the lat-
ter, being desirous of effecting a reconciliation with
him, agreed to meet him in a certain place, where he
was set upon by the duke and two others, but that he
was so well skilled in the use of his sword as to be
able to keep them at bay till some of his own attend-
ants came to his assistance.* Be this as it may, Fer-
dinand took the field as soon as he had been joined by
the forces which had been sent by the pope; and such
was the impression of his superiority, that many of
the cities which in the preceding year had revolted
to his rival now returned to their former allegiance.
John himself did not dare to attack him, and retreated
to a strong position in the mountains near the Sarno,
a river that flows into the sea a little to the south
of Naples. As Ferdinand was sufficiently strong to
have blockaded his rival there, he might have starved
him into a surrender—a course which his leading gene-
rals strongly advised him to take. But either be-
cause his youthful ardour was so great, or because,
as is said by some, his soldiers refused to remain with
him unless their arrears of pay were immediately dis-
charged, he determined on attacking. His men, having
gained some advantages in the first outset, were allured
into the mountain passes, where his cavalry, which con-
stituted his chief strength, were unable to act, and
* Muratori does not give his authority for this anecdote. I have in vain
tried to find it in any of the historians of that period. M. Sismondi, who
had doubtless searched through them all, makes no mention of it whatever.
286 FERDIN AND'S DISTRESS. BOOK WII.
where they were set upon by the whole force of the
enemy's infantry, who had all the advantage of the
upper ground. The retreat of the assailants was cut off
by the river which flowed at the foot of the mountains.
The result was, that Ferdinand sustained a complete
defeat, the pope's general, Simoneta, was killed, nearly
all the baggage was taken, and the king himself arrived,
attended by only twenty horsemen, at Naples.
Ferdinand was now without either an army or money,
and it is probable that his cause would have been irre-
trievably lost, but for the devotion of his wife Isabella.
To procure him supplies, she did not hesitate to go
about Naples with a begging-box in her hand, soliciting
aid, by which means she managed to obtain for him a
sum of money sufficient to re-equip himself to a certain
extent. It is generally supposed that she was the
means of preventing the duke of Anjou following up his
victory by marching directly to Naples. Had he done
this, it is probable that the contest would then have
been once for all decided in his favour. But he, in
accordance with the advice given to him by the queen's
uncle, the prince of Tarento, stopped to make him-
self master of the other places of less importance in the
vicinity, before marching to the capital, “not knowing,”
as Machiavelli says, “that in kingdoms the extremities
are governed by the head, and not the head by the ex-
tremities.” And it was currently reported that the
prince had tendered this advice in consequence of the
intercession of his niece, who made her way into his
camp, disguised as a Franciscan friar, and, throwing
CHAP. II. BATTLE OF SAN FABIANO. 287
herself at his feet, entreated him, if he did not wish to
be the means of depriving her of the regal position to
which he had assisted to raise her, to prevent John from
consummating her husband's ruin.
Time was thus given to Ferdinand to make his dis-
tress known to the staunchest of his supporters, the
duke of Milan. The constancy of the latter was in no
way shaken by the misfortunes of his friend. After
slightly reproaching him for his rashness at the Sarno,
he rallied him on his prospects, and said that he, for
one, would support him to the last. As an earnest of
his good wishes, he sent him a sum of money and a
body of two thousand horse and one thousand foot,
under the command of his friend, Robert Sanseverino.
He also persuaded Pope Pius, whose friendship does not
appear to have stood the test of adversity as well as his
own, not to desert his cause.
In the mean time, matters did not proceed better
with Ferdinand in the other parts of his dominions.
The brothers Sforza, after various manoeuvring, made
an attack on an intrenched position which Piccinino
had taken up near San Fabiano, in the Abruzzi.
After a severe contest, which lasted till darkness sepa-
rated the combatants, the Sforzas found they had
suffered so severely that they retired during the night.
Piccinino then advanced into the dominions of the
pope, where he did such mischief as to cause panic
and disaffection within the walls of Rome. And it
again required all Sforza’s influence and address to pre-
vent Pius detaching himself from the alliance of Fer-
288 FERDINAND’s POSITION. BOOK WII.
dinand. He had sent word to Milan, that reasonable
regard, as well for his own safety as for that of the
holy church, would require him to do so, if he did not
receive sufficient reinforcements to protect him from
such annoyance. In reply, the duke sent him a banter-
ing message, complaining that he was causing him more
trouble by his timidity than the enemy had done by all
their victories. But at the same time Alexander
Sforza marched into the Territories of the Church, so
considerably reinforced that Piccinino retired before
him into the Abruzzi. The receipt of his friend's
message, and the timely arrival of the army of his
brother, confirmed the pontiff in his former allegiance.
Before the end of the year Ferdinand recovered
much of the territory which he had lost after the battle
of the Sarno. He retook Castellamare, and many other
places in the vicinity of Naples. Cosenza, the capital
of Calabria, was captured and barbarously plundered
by his troops. He also managed to effect a reconcilia-
tion with several of his barons who had either been
lukewarm in his cause, or given an actual support to his
adversaries. In settling these affairs he was much
benefited by the assistance of his wife, who, in addition
to the advantages of great personal charms and graceful
eloquence, derived considerable influence from her being
a native of that part of Italy—a circumstance of no
small import in exciting the people against the French.
Thus, in spite of the disasters of the Sarno and San
Fabiano, Ferdinand stood before the end of the year
almost on an equality with his adversary.
CHAPTER III,
DISTURBANCES AT GENOA—FRENCH DRIVEN INTO THE CITADEL.—CoNTENTIONs
BETWEEN THE ADORNI AND FREGOSI—ALLAYED BY THE MEDIATION OF THE
CITIZENS. — GENOESE RECEIVE ASSISTANCE FROM SFORZA. — ExPEDITION
SENT FROM FRANCE AGAINST GENOA, UNDER RENE of ANJoU—ToTAL
DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY BY THE GENOESE.—LOUIS FREGOSO
MADE DOGE.—DEATH OF CHARLES IX.-SUCCESSION OF LOUIS XI. —HIS
RECEPTION OF SFORZA's AMBASSADOR.—WAR IN THE TERRITORY OF NAPLES.
—FERDINAND IS JOINED BY SCANDERBEG.—ILLNESS OF SFORZA.—EFFORTs
of THE KING OF FRANCE, AND OF BIANCA MARIA, To MAKE HIM CHANGE
HIS POLICY. —REVOLT AND SUBJUGATION OF THE PIACENZANS.-IMPRISON-
MENT AND DEATH OF TIBERTO BRANDOLINo.—DEFEAT OF PICCININo NEAR
TROIA.—LOSSES OF SIGISMUND MALATESTA.
AFTER the influence and the constancy of Sforza had
placed Ferdinand in almost as good a position as he
had been before his losses in the field, events occurred
in Genoa which gave him a decided superiority. The
people of that city, like most who have acted in the
same manner, found that they had gained nothing by
a change of masters. Their treasury having been ex-
hausted by the expenses both of their own wars and
of the expeditions which they had equipped to assist
the duke of Anjou, it was found necessary to impose
new taxes to raise money for the ordinary expenses of
the state. The French mode of taxation, which exacted
nothing from the nobles and everything from the citi-
zens, was intolerable to a people who had been accus-
tomed to some species of self-government; the national
WOL. II. T
290 COMMENCEMENT OF THE DISTURBANCES. Book VII.
prejudices of the Italians of all parties were much
offended by an impolitic attempt to subject to these
new burdens a number of citizens who, for past service,
had been promised an immunity from all taxation ;
and it is probable that, in the words of Muratori, the
duke of Milan, who could not but be uneasy at behold-
ing a nest of Frenchmen in his immediate vicinity,
secretly blew a cherishing breeze upon these seditions.
For some time the people continued pleading, re-
monstrating, and murmuring to no purpose. At last,
on the 9th of March, they assembled in a tumultuous
manner to discuss their grievances with the magistrates
of their own order. On this occasion, many painted in
glowing colours the injustices and hardships to which
they were subject, but satisfactory remedies were pro-
posed by none. At last a young man, apparently of a
humble station in life, rose up and said, “This was not
the time for debating; by the sword alone could these
complaints be remedied;” and, having said this, he
rushed forward and called on them to take arms.”
But his words, though they were not forgotten, pro-
duced no effect at the moment; and it is the opinion
of contemporary historians that, if severe measures
of repression had been adopted at the time, the sedition
might even then have been quelled.
During the remainder of the day, and the whole of
the night, armed masses of people continued to assemble
* SIMONETA, lib. xxviii. Who can doubt but that this young man was an
agent of Sforza's One cannot but suspect, also, that the indecisive measures
of the French, which allowed the rebellion to come to a head, must have
been prompted by people in his confidence.
CHAP. III. FRENCEL FLY INTO THE CITADEL. 291
in different parts of the city. At first the French tried
to put them down by conciliatory promises; but it was
now too late for measures of this sort. Every moment
the tumults became more formidable. Paul Fregoso
and Prosper Adorno, the heads of the old rival factions,
whom a common hatred of the French had for a time
reconciled, entered the city by different gates, each at
the head of a considerable body of armed men from the
country, and the French fled for safety to the citadel.
But scarcely had the two old rivals driven their com-
mon enemy before them, when the spirit of discord
began once more to show itself: though their hatred
lay in the same direction, their interests were widely
different, and they now began to dispute among them-
selves which was to be governor. A large number of
the citizens, who might otherwise have been indifferent
by which of their countrymen they were ruled, feared
that, if Fregoso should obtain the upper hand, he would
avenge the death of his brother. This circumstance for
a time greatly increased the power of the Adorni; and
a prevalent rumour that they were about to join the
French in an attack upon their rivals, whether true or
not, caused Fregoso to withdraw from the city. But
people who seemed to have been sent thither on pur-
pose made it their business to reconcile the citizens of
the opposite parties, and they found no difficulty in
persuading them that these jealousies had been caused
entirely by the intrigues of the French and of their
adherents, who, in order that they might make an easy
prey of the Adorni, wished first to drive away all the
292 SFORZA SUPPORTS THE GENOESE. BOOK WII.
friends of the Fregosi. Thereupon was formed a pro-
visional government of eight citizens, who began by
ordering the head of the first-named party to depart
from Genoa. But, after a time, both Prosper Adorno
and Paul Fregoso were allowed to return ; the former
was elected doge without any opposition from his rival,
and all parties agreed to unite heart and hand to expel
the French from the citadel.
As the difficulty in raising money to defray the
ordinary expenses of government had been the original
cause of the discontent of the Genoese against the
French, it could not be expected that they could con-
tinue a contest against one of the most powerful
monarchs in Europe entirely out of their own resources.
Accordingly they sent to Sforza, with whose real wishes
they must have been tolerably well acquainted, to beg
for assistance ; and he was now able to interfere in
the contest with much less detriment either to his
honour or to his interest than on any former occasion.
In the first place, the attempt of the Angevins to drive
Ferdinand from the throne of his father had placed
him, as a member of the Italian alliance, in direct
hostility to them. In the next place he had been
carrying on negotiations, by means of the duke of
Savoy, with Louis the Dauphin of France, and he had
received an intimation from him, who, like many other
heirs-apparent, was in opposition to his father, that he
would not view in an unfriendly light any attempt that
might be made to drive his countrymen from Genoa.
Therefore, throwing off the disguise of neutrality which
CHAP. III. SIEGE OF THE INNER CITY. 293
he had so long affected, he sent a force of about a
thousand men, along with a considerable sum of money
and several pieces of artillery, to assist the citizens in
the siege of the inner city.
The capture of a place like the inner city, strongly
fortified by nature and by art, must under any circum-
stances have been a tedious operation ; and in the
present instance it was protracted for a considerable
length of time by the constantly reviving dissensions
between Adorno and Fregoso. Though they had the
greatest difficulty in preventing the French making
murderous sallies from their stronghold, and though
shells were continually discharged upon the city, which
frequently destroyed entire houses with their inmates,
the sense of their common danger did not make them,
for any time at least, restrain their animosity. It
required all the influence of Sforza to prevent the cause
of their countrymen being ruined by their dissensions,
and he at last, fearful of what might be the conse-
quences if these two rivals continued in the same camp,
persuaded Fregoso to come to him to Milan.
In this manner the siege was continued till the
beginning of July, when the Genoese received the
startling intelligence that they were about to be attacked
by the combined forces and fleets of the king of France
and the duke of Anjou. The terror excited by this
intelligence might possibly have proved fatal to them,
if it had not been for the firmness of Sforza and the
confidence reposed in him by all. Though he did not
send them any further assistance from his own troops,
294 ARRIVAL OF THE FRENCH. Book VII.
lest he should not have an army sufficient to repel
any attack that might be made against himself by the
forces that had just come from France, he engaged
one Marcus Pius, the signor of the neighbouring town
of Carpi, to march with a small body of horse to their
assistance ; and he in no small degree strengthened
their position by persuading Fregoso again to act in
obedience to Adorno. One of Fregoso's first deeds
was to seize and retain thirty of the richest citizens, for
the purpose of getting money from them. Some thought
that he was instigated to this act by his rival, who
wished to make him unpopular ; at all events, it could
only have produced that effect, for he failed in extort-
ing anything from his victims. It was finally arranged
that the command of the force which was to defend the
city against any attack that might be made on it by
land was to be intrusted to Fregoso, while that of the
besieging force in the interior remained, as before, with
Adorno.
Shortly after these preparations had been made, the
French troops, commanded by Réné in person, dis-
embarked at Voragine, and advanced, experiencing
scarcely any opposition, to within five miles of Genoa.
In the opinion of most contemporary writers, if they
had immediately proceeded to attack the city, both by
sea and by land, they would have met with but a feeble
resistance. But either because the troops needed
repose, or in deference to the wishes of the Genoese
nobles in the French camp—who, anxious to save their
native city from being sacked, still hoped that matters
CHAP. III. BATTLE NEAR GENOA. 295
might be arranged by accommodation—the opportunity
was allowed to go by, and time was given to the citi-
zens to rally their spirits and their forces. However,
after some skirmishes, in which it was ascertained that
the French were not invincible, Réné, on the 17th
July, ordered his whole army to march forward, and
to carry the heights by which the city of Genoa is
overlooked. He himself, being now too old to be of
much service in the field, remained at sea, immediately
beneath the hills where the action was to take place.
The foremost division of the Italians was driven back
at the first Onset, but it was soon rallied, and remained,
along with the main body of the army, firm on the
summit. The French, by the time they approached
them, were in no small degree exhausted by having had
to climb up a mountain under a burning Italian Sun
and the weight of their heavy armour; while the
Italians, who had not undergone anything like the
same amount of fatigue, had the advantage of fighting
under a climate to which they were accustomed, and
had their strength recruited by a constant supply of
refreshments from the city. Thus they were enabled
to offer a protracted resistance to their once much-
dreaded opponents.
The battle continued for some time without any
decided result, till three horsemen, known to be in the
service of Sforza, came in haste to the scene of action,
and gave out that a considerable force, which had been
despatched by their master, was already at hand. To
insure credit to their assertion, they directed the atten-
296 DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH. BOOK WII.
tion of the combatants to a large body of men whom
they had collected from the neighbouring towns, and
ordered to assemble together in the distance. The
actual appearance of the duke of Milan with the whole
of his troops could not have produced a more decided
result : the Genoese, raising a cheer in honour of Sforza,
renewed the attack with fresh vigour; while the French,
already exhausted by fatigue, taken aback by the ra-
pidity of the attack, and auguring evil tidings from
the cheer, immediately gave way. They were then
driven with great precipitancy down the mountain which
they had ascended so full of hope in the morning.
When, from his position in the ship beneath, Réné
beheld the fine army of six thousand men, whom he
had expected to enter Genoa in triumph, flying in con-
fusion to the shore, he immediately put out to sea,
hoping that, when they beheld their retreat cut off,
despair might make them rally. But the nature of
the ground rendered it impossible to restore order.
The Genoese continued the pursuit as far as the sea,
and no choice remained to the fugitives but to encoun-
ter the risk of the element, or to submit to their enemies.
The havoc was increased by the number of peasants
who, from desire of rapine or revenge, had joined the
pursuers. Some of the fugitives perished in an attempt
to swim to the ships in their heavy armour, and all the
others fell into the hands of the Genoese ; so that, of the
force which only a few days before had disembarked
at Voragine, scarcely one vestige was saved. As the
French, being at that time, as Muratori says, a beastly
CHAP. III. RENE RETIRES TO FRANCE. 297
nation, did not give any quarter to the Italians, the
latter now paid them in the same coin. Many of them,
nevertheless, were taken alive, and reserved to be ran-
somed. The number of the French slain has been
variously estimated at from two to four thousand—a
strange contrast to some of the almost bloodless battles
which have lately been described. Of the Genoese only
three or four were killed in the field.
The defeat of their common enemy revived the
dissensions between Adorno and Fregoso for the third
time since the commencement of the revolt. The
former, in virtue of the authority which had been de-
puted to him as doge, forbade the latter to enter the
city, and, after he had made his way in by stealth,
attempted to expel him by force. Thereupon arose a
fierce contention, in which Sforza's troops remained
neutral, and the result of which was, that Adorno
was obliged to give way and to depart from the city.
As Paul Fregoso was already an archbishop, it was
thought that the office of doge would be unfitting for
one of his sacred calling; so his cousin, Louis Fregoso,
was chosen to fill the place vacated by his adversary.
When order was thus restored among the Genoese,
Réné made a formal surrender of the inner city, and
retired without much loss of time to his own country.
Shortly after this the king of France died, as was sup-
posed of chagrin at the success of the Genoese revolution.
As Charles's son, now Louis XI., had expressed
himself averse to the retention of Genoa by his father,
the succession of the latter might be supposed by many
298 STATE OF THE WAR "BOOK WII.
to guarantee the Genoese in the enjoyment of their
liberty. But the views of that monarch, like those of
most heirs-apparent who have been opposed to their
fathers when living, immediately changed with his cir-
cumstances. To Sforza’s ambassador, who was sent to
Paris on his accession, he gave a reception not very
dissimilar to that which our Henry V., on a like
occasion, gave to the friends of his youth. On his
requesting him that, as king, he would ratify the treaties
that, as dauphin, he had made with the duke, he indig-
nantly upbraided him with his master's having caused
the destruction of his father's army at Genoa, and kept
his kinsman, the duke of Anjou, from the crown of
Naples. Nor was he much mollified by the reply of
the ambassador, that he believed that all these things
had been done not only with his consent, but to a great
extent at his instigation.
While these things were going on at Genoa, the war
continued in the kingdom of Naples without any
remarkable result. As soon as the weather permitted,
Piccinino took the field in the Abruzzi, and Sigismund
Malatesta began attacking the dominions of the pope.
The former was opposed by Alexander Sforza : the two
armies continued to manoeuvre and to skirmish in the
presence of each other ; and on one occasion, Donatus,
a Milanese officer of note, whose name has frequently
been mentioned, was surprised and taken prisoner ; but
Piccinino was finally obliged to retire before his anta-
gonist, leaving him in undisputed possession of that
territory. In the March of Ancona, Malatesta gained
CHAP. III. IN THE KINGDOM OF NAPLES. 299
some advantage over the pontifical troops, and was pro-
ceeding to join his forces with those of Piccinino, when
he was recalled by the intelligence that a fresh army of
the pope's had entered his dominions. But the most
remarkable feature in the campaign was the pope's
availing himself of the unsettled state of the kingdom
of Naples, to take several cities belonging to his ally
Perdinand. Having heard that the inhabitants of Ter-
racina—a town to which, it has already been mentioned,
he laid claim—were discontented with Ferdinand, he
ordered count Frederic of Urbino to take it in his name,
and afterwards authorised him to extend his conquests
over several cities in the neighbourhood. It was in vain
that Sforza and Ferdinand remonstrated with him—he
was determined to have some recompense for the perils
to which his alliance with the latter had so frequently
exposed his own dominions; and both the king and
the duke were too well aware of the importance of
having him on their side to take occasion to quarrel
with him. He excused himself by saying that he had
no hand in promoting the discontent of the inhabitants
of Terracina, but that, if he had not taken the city, it
would most certainly have gone over to the French, and
that surely it was better for their common cause that it
should belong to him than to their enemies. At the same
time, in order to soothe Ferdinand, he sent him a con-
siderable reinforcement under the command of his
nephew Antonio. But as he was inferior to none
of his order in their distinguishing quality of nepotism,
he invested his said nephew Antonio with the fiefs
300 SCANDERBEG JOINS FERDIN AND. Book VII.
he had conquered in the kingdom of Naples, and re-
quested Ferdinand to fulfil his promise of giving him
his natural daughter Maria for his wife. The monarch,
anxious to gratify the pope, not only did this, but also
created this same Antonio duke of Amalfi, and grand
justiciary of his kingdom.
Towards the end of the year, Ferdinand received no
inconsiderable accession of strength from a new ally
brought to him, as was thought, by the good offices of
the pope. George Castriot, celebrated in history under
the name of Scanderbeg, landed on the eastern coast
of Apulia with a force of eight hundred men, designed
for his assistance. This singular personage was the son
of a sovereign in Albania, who had been forced into
alliance with the Turks. When, on the death of his
father, he beheld the hereditary dominions of his family
appropriated by the Sultan, he formed the project of
regaining them ; and though he had been forced to pro-
fess the religion and to serve in the camp of the
Mussulmans, he continued to watch his opportunity.
After the defeat of the Turks near Sophia in 1442,
he passed over, and managed by a bold stratagem to do
signal service, to the victors. Having collected under
his banners all the Christians that were scattered
throughout Epirus, he succeeded ere long in freeing the
whole of the mountainous districts of that province and
of Albania from their barbarian invaders. From that
time he was noted as the most persevering as well as the
most successful of the champions of Christendom. He
became known to the Italians after the progress of the
CHAP. III. SFORZA's ILLNESS. 301
Turks had begun to give them uneasiness; and some of
the contributions which had been levied for the fitting
out expeditions, which were never sent, against the
Turks, were placed at his disposal. It now gave no
small disgust to many to behold the resources which
had been given to him, to be used against their common
enemy, turned against a prince whom they wished to
Succeed.
It was evident that, as matters now stood, John of
Anjou had but little chance of maintaining his position,
unless fortune should take some unexpected turn in his
favour. Some hope now began to dawn on him from a
new quarter. In the month of August of the present
year, Sforza was attacked by a dropsy, which many
thought would be incurable ; and it was evident that, if
he were carried off by death, or if his capacity were to
be weakened by disease, the main stay of his adversaries'
cause would be gone. But though his body was doubt-
less debilitated by illness, he showed that his constancy
was as unshaken and his judgment as discerning as
ever. He, as well as the Venetians and Florentines,
sent ambassadors to Paris to treat of various matters;
and the king, though gracious to all, received Sforza’s
with the most marked attention. It turned out that
Louis's great object was to induce him, as well as the
pope, to withdraw their support from Ferdinand. After
having used the arguments which had been so many
times resorted to in vain, he went on to say that, even if
his cousin, John of Anjou, were expelled from the penin-
sula of Italy, he would do his best to maintain him in
302 HIS RESOLUTION UNSHAKEN. BOOK WII.
Sicily. But Sforza's resolution was as unshaken as .
ever; and he declared in a positive manner, that
neither the prospect of advantage or loss to himself,
nor respect for the wishes of the king, should induce
him to relinquish the part he had taken. His family
and friends tried in vain to alter his resolution. Even
Bianca Maria, who in general had great influence over
him, and who thought that, in the event of her hus-
band's disease proving fatal, it would be better for her
son to be found on the same side with the king of France,
failed to effect anything; and when he became annoyed
by her frequent solicitations, he forbad the mention of
the subject in his presence.*
Sforza's unswerving constancy produced its due effect
on the pope. When Louis sent him a message to the
same effect as he had done to the duke of Milan, and
even threatened, in the case of his refusal, to summon a
general council to discuss the propriety of his former
conduct, he replied in public, that he was bound by
every obligation of justice and honour to continue
acting as he did. At the same time he secretly inti-
mated to Sforza that he would do exactly as he wished,
and it was thought by many that he was in hopes that
his death would soon leave him at liberty to act more
in accordance with his wishes. It required a little
decided language, and some actual threats from the
duke, to keep him true to his obligations.
The many-tongued strumpet, Fame, had spread such
exaggerated accounts of Sforza’s illness, that it was
* SIMONETA, lib. xxviii.
CHAP. III. REBELLION AT PIACENZA. 303
commonly believed in Italy, as well as in Europe, that
he was at the point of death, if, indeed, he had not
actually expired. And now many petty states which
had licked, however they might have loathed, his hand,
while in the plentitude of power, rose, like the meaner
animals, anxious to have a kick at the old lion in his
decrepitude ; while others, who had never been beholden
to him for aught, showed their constancy by standing
by him, as they believed, in the hour of death. The
owners of the soil around Piacenza rose up in a mass,
and made an onslaught on Sforza's magistrates while
they were actually engaged in the discharge of their
duties. The inhabitants of the town, who had remained
perfectly faithful since the terrible lesson they had re-
ceived fourteen years before, were uncertain what part
to take. Tiberto Brandolino, who, since Sforza’s acces-
sion to the duchy of Milan, had been among the most
honoured of his generals, now that he believed his
patron was about to depart from the land of the living,
did not hesitate to join his enemies. On the other
hand, the governor of the place, though at first obliged
to make a pretence of giving in to the insurgents, re-
mained faithful to his trust ; and having seized some of
the ringleaders, he retained possession of the city. The
Florentines sent ambassadors to Lombardy with orders
to assure the duke of their continued friendship, and to
stand by his family in the event of his death.
As soon as the duke heard what was going on at
Piacenza, he sent thither the same Donatus who has so
frequently been mentioned already as having done him
304 DEATH OF TIBERTO BRANDOLINO. Book VII.
good service. The insurgents were soon dispersed by
him, and their ringleader cast into prison, after a vain
attempt to escape to Genoa. Tiberto Brandolino, who
hoped that the part he had taken in the rebellion was
as yet unknown to his master, asked leave to go to the
scene of active operations in Naples; but as evidence
of his guilt transpired before he took his departure, he
was arrested, and confined at Piacenza. Some time after
his captivity he was found dead in his dungeon. It is
related by Sforza's secretary and biographer, and was
generally circulated among his friends, that Tiberto had
killed himself; but a report prevailed among the duke's
enemies that he had been murdered by assassins sent
thither by his order. A story so derogatory to Sforza
found ready acceptance with the rebellious but sub-
jugated Piacenzans ; and the vulgar, ever ready to
accommodate their superstitious imaginations to their
prejudices, gave out that, when Brandolino's remains
were carried from the prison to the grave, the devil was
seen in the shape of a great mastiff sitting on his bier,
snarling like Minos in the Inferno of Dante, and vowing
vengeance against his murderers.”
It is probable that Piccinino, if he could have followed
the bent of his inclinations, would not have remained
an inactive spectator of the revolt at Piacenza ; but he
was this time obliged to devote all his energies to the
conduct of the war in the southern provinces of Italy.
In spite of the formidable accession of strength which
had been received by his adversaries, he managed to
* Inf, v. 4.
CHAP. III. BATTLE OF TROIA. 305
make head against them ; and being joined by John of
Anjou in person, he even retook several cities in the
Abruzzi and Apulia which had fallen into their hands.
His partial success, indeed, appears to have given some
uneasiness to the duke of Milan, who complained much
of the inactivity of his brother Alexander, and of the
manner in which the resources which he had supplied
to him and Ferdinand had been squandered away. At
last, by dint of remonstrances and subsidies, they were
persuaded to take the field by the beginning of July.
Their first act was to march to the relief of Orsaria,
a fortress that was then besieged by Piccinino. After
some skirmishing on both sides, the besieging army was
obliged to fall back upon Troia, where they were closely
followed by their enemies. Here a general action took
place, which, as it was fought in the presence of both
the sovereigns, and as it was likely, in consequence of
the exhaustion of the resources of both parties, to be
decisive of the fate of the kingdom, was most obstinately
contested. At the end of the day the Angevins fled
in disorder, leaving their camp to be pillaged by their
enemies. Piccinino, when from the walls of Troia he
beheld the victors dispersed through his tents in quest
of booty, sallied forth upon them at the head of a
select body of men. But all his attempts to repair the
disaster were in vain. Though he managed to recover
several prisoners, and even to cause some panic among the
conquerors, it was not long before Ferdinand and Alex-
ander Sforza collected together a body of cavalry, with
which they drove him and his followers back to the city.
WOL, II. |U
306 DEFEAT OF SIGISMUND MALATESTA. Book VII.
Fortune seemed now to have taken a decided turn
in favour of Ferdinand. John of Anjou and Piccinino
retired the night of the battle, leaving Troia and the
whole of the surrounding country to the conquerors.
They still seem to have entertained some hopes of
bringing together the scattered supporters of their party,
so as to be able again to face the enemy. But they
soon learned that fortune had not dealt better with their
friends than with themselves. Some little time before,
Sigismund Malatesta had set forth at the head of a
considerable force, with the intention of forming a
junction with them in the Abruzzi; but he was soon
stopped by the startling intelligence that the pope, in
revenge for the many annoyances he had sustained from
him, had sent an invading force into his dominions
under the command of Frederic of Urbino. Sigismund,
in spite of all his efforts to defend himself, in a short
time beheld the fairest of his dominions overrun by the
enemy ; and having as yet heard nothing of the battle
of Troia, he betook himself by sea to the Abruzzi, to
implore the assistance of John of Anjou and Piccinino.
The allies then first became acquainted with the extent
of each other's disasters; and Sigismund, seeing no hope
of aid in any quarter, was obliged to return to do the
best for himself in what remained to him of his former
dominions.
CHAPTER IW.
EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF TROIA. —SFORZA PERSUADES MANY OF THE
NEAPOLITAN BARONS TO SUBMIT TO FERDINAND.—PICCININO LEAVES THE
ANGEVIN PARTY. — RUIN OF SIGISMUND MALATESTA. — DEATH OF THE
PRINCE OF TARENTO. — DISCONTENT OF THE GENOESE. —NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN SFORZA AND THE KING OF FRANCE. — SFORZA's MEASURES TO
TAKE POSSESSION OF GENOA.—SURRENDER OF THE CITY AND GARRISON TO
HIM.—GENOESE SEND AMBASSADORS TO PUT SEORZA IN POSSESSION OF THE
CITY — THEIR RECEPTION — SPEECHES ON THE OCCASION.—ARCHBISHOP
PAULO TREGOSO TURNS PIRATE, BUT HIS SHIPS ARE TAKEN BY THE
GENOESE,-JOHN OF ANJOU RETURNS TO FRANCE.
THE battle of Troia was decisive of the Neapolitan
war. Alexander and Ferdinand began, without delay,
to profit by their victory. The city of Troia itself did
not hold out long—the inhabitants soon sent word to
Alexander Sforza that they were willing to surrender
to him in the name of his brother, the duke of Milan ;
but that they would submit to any extremity before
putting themselves again under a sovereign of the house
of Aragon. To facilitate matters, Alexander consented
to take the city in the name of his brother, but at the
same time he gave Ferdinand to understand that it
should be given to his son as a part of Hippolyta's dowry.
Not long afterwards, Foggia, Ascoli, and other places in
the neighbourhood, submitted; and in order that the
soldiers might not be without their due share of the
fruits of the victory, some towns of minor importance
were sacked and made over to them.
308 SUBMISSION OF THE NEAPOLITAN BARONS. Book VII.
It was now that many of the rebellious barons, seeing
that the chief whom they had chosen had failed, began
to make friends to themselves of one whose protection
they were likely to need. Among the first of these was
Antonio Orsini, the prince of Tarento, who was for a
long time supposed to have furnished to the Angevin
party the sinews of war, but who was now easily per-
suaded to accept the offers made by Ferdinand. The
latter guaranteed him in the full possession of his fiefs,
and promised him the situation of captain-general of his
forces, on the condition of his joining him. But on no
one occasion, perhaps, was the general dislike and distrust
of Ferdinand, and the respect which was universally
entertained towards Sforza, made more manifest than
on this. Many of the chiefs of the Angevin party
intimated to the Milanese ambassadors their willingness
to submit to their duke, and earnestly begged that he
would not ask them to put themselves under the
dominion of the new monarch. Indeed, a less prudent
man, in Sforza’s situation, might have availed him-
self of these offers to add to his dominions the kingdom
of Naples. But he was wise enough to know that on
many occasions, according to the aphorism of Hesiod,
“the half was more than the whole;” and he now wisely
declined to endanger the security of the sovereignty he
had already acquired, by a vain attempt to grasp at
another, more especially as there now appeared to be
every probability of his being able to place there a king
3. -
* “’Nimruct º' to aoru ägg, TAéow jutorv travrás."
HESIOD, Epya kal fluep. v. 40.
CHAP. IV. BICCININO JOINS FERDIN AND. 309
who, for many reasons, would be obliged to act as he
wished. Nevertheless, it required all his address to
persuade those who would so willingly have been ruled by
him, to trust to the clemency or promises of Ferdinand.
In the kingdom of Naples, little now remained to
be done by fighting. Piccinino, indeed, brought his
forces to the assistance of some of the barons who
still held out in desperation; but he appeared more
anxious to enrich himself at their expense, than to
secure their independence. Under some pretext or
other he took the town of Celano, whence he carried
off an immense quantity of booty in the shape of gold,
silver, and precious stones, along with sufficient grain
and cattle to support his army for some time to
come. After this he in some degree redeemed his
reputation, by forcing Ferdinand to raise the siege of
a small fortress in the territory of Marino. But
finding himself, about the middle of August, confronted
by Alexander Sforza, at the head of a consider-
able army, he came to be of opinion that he could no
longer remain in the service of the Angevins with any
hope of advantage. Alexander, at the time that he
might possibly have been making preparations for an
engagement, received a message from his adversary,
requesting a pass for the sake of having some private
conversation with him. The result of this private con-
versation was, that Piccinino was to leave the duke of
Anjou, and take service under Ferdinand, in return for
which he was to be allowed to retain possession of
Sulmona, and other places he had occupied in the
310 MANFREDONIA PLUNDERED. BOOK WII.
Neapolitan territory, and receive a salary of ninety
thousand golden ducats from him and his allies. These
terms are said not to have been very acceptable to
Ferdinand; and, indeed, they might have been thought
by many rather too liberal to be offered to a vanquished
foe. But the king's allies were anxious to put a speedy
termination to a war of which the whole burden, and
no small part of the risk, devolved on themselves; and
they compelled him to acquiesce in a measure which
seemed to deprive the opposite party of their only hope
of salvation.
This arrangement of Piccinino's produced the desired
effects. City after city, and province after province,
submitted to Ferdinand. The city of Manfredonia
sustained a blockade of a few days, and had actually
sent to propose terms of capitulation, when a report
was spread that a vessel with the Angevin flag was
approaching. A shout in favour of the duke of Anjou’s
name was raised by the mob, on which many of the
more sober-minded of the citizens, who saw the futility
of any resistance, requested Ferdinand to send a body
of troops sufficient to oppose any force that might be
landed from this vessel. When the gates were opened
to admit them, the whole army rushed in and began the
work of pillage, nor were all the efforts of Ferdinand
able to save this city from their avidity.
From this time the leaders of the opposite party
seemed to have thought their case hopeless. The duke
of Sessa, who had been among the first to invite John
of Anjou to the kingdom, and among the staunchest of
CHAP. IV. RUIN OF MALATESTA. 311
his supporters, implored the pardon and sought the
alliance of Ferdinand. To obtain the former, he put
him in possession of several of his most important
fortresses, and cemented the latter by arranging a mar-
riage between his own son and the king's daughter.
And John of Anjou, finding no rest for the sole of his
foot in the kingdom he had once all but conquered,
retired to Ischia, there to await any succours that might
be sent to him by his father or the king of France.
Matters did not go better with the allies and well-
wishers of John. The king of France, as will presently
be explained, found that he had so much to do at home,
that he did not care to embarrass himself by interfering
in the affairs of the peninsula. The Venetians, who
had always secretly supported, though they had never
openly espoused his cause, were now engaged in a
disastrous war with the Turks and with the Emperor
of Germany; so from them he could expect nothing. In
the beginning of the year, Sigismund Malatesta had
made a vigorous effort to recover his lost ground, but
fortune did not favour him. Fano, one of his principal
towns, after a protracted resistance, surrendered to the
duke of Urbino, and he was soon left with nothing
except the town of Rimini itself, and a few fortresses
of minor importance. In his desperation he appealed
to the Venetians for succour, but they, for the reasons
already mentioned, could do nothing for him but inter-
cede in his behalf with the pontiff. Though they were
joined in this by the Florentines, it was with great
difficulty that Pius could be prevailed upon to leave him
312 DEATH OF ANTONIO ORSINI. BOOK WII.
in possession of the only small spot in his former
dominions that now remained to him, and he did so
only on the condition of its reverting to the Territories
of the Church after his death. This was the end of the
family of Malatesta, whose representatives have already
been mentioned as having been celebrated, about a cen-
tury and a half before, as combining the vices of a traitor
and a mastiff,” and who do not appear to have become
less cruel or treacherous in the course of generations.
Before the end of the year Ferdinand's good fortune
was crowned by his succeeding to the wealth and
dominions of a man who, if he lived, might have
been a thorn in his side. On the 15th of November
expired Antonio Orsini, the prince of Tarento. Though
he had arrived at an age when nature has generally
run its course, there were not wanting those who
insinuated that he had been strangled by order of the
king; and it is certain that Ferdinand was not scrupu-
lous in such matters. After his death was found a will,
suspected by many to have been forged, leaving Fer-
dinand heir to all his states and his treasures. These
treasures, as he had been given to hoarding in his old
age, were considerable, and were said to have amounted
to a million florins of gold. Thus did Ferdinand become
possessed of almost the only spot in his kingdom which
might have afforded to his enemies a basis for the
recommencement of their operations, and also of money
sufficient to maintain an army to secure him in the
possession of his dominions.
* DANTE, Inf, xxvii.-xliii.; xxviii.-lxxxi.
CHAP. IV. UNSETTLED STATE OF GENOA. 3.13
Since the beginning of the fifteenth century the
Genoese had shown themselves as restless, under any
form of government, as the Florentines had been one
century before. Being jealous of the elevation of, or
discontented with the protection afforded them by, their
native rulers, they had at different times put them-
selves under the Visconti, or the kings of France, and
when they found that they had gained nothing by
the change, they had recalled their former governors.
Even while they were ruled by their countrymen, the
spirit of party generally ran so high that it was seldom
that the same man could maintain for any time the
chief place in the republic. After they had called in
and driven out the French in the manner described,
and after the rival factions had fought for supremacy
almost beneath the cannon of the enemy, they sub-
mitted for a time to the government of the Fregosi.
In the space of two years they made trial of three
different members of the family, some of whom they
elevated and deposed more than once ; and they found
their tyranny or their incapacity alike unendurable. The
former caused all those who had the means of living
elsewhere to take their departure ; and in consequence
of the latter, several of the subject cities in the neigh-
bourhood refused any longer to acknowledge their
authority. Many of them made secret overtures to,
and some of their own accord actually hoisted the
standards of, the duke of Milan.
A man of Sforza's Sagacity could not be an inatten-
tive observer of the events that might put him in
314 AFFAIRS OF FRANCE. BOOK WII.
possession of a strip of country that was necessary for
the consolidation and the security of his own dominions.
But he was much too prudent to involve himself in
direct hostilities with the king of France ; for though
he had, in opposition to his wishes, stoutly maintained
the cause of Ferdinand in the kingdom of Naples, and
assisted in expelling the forces of his rival from Genoa,
the Italian alliance had afforded him a pretext for these
acts, which were very different from a direct attempt
to take for himself any portion of territory to which
that monarch laid claim. But while the above-men-
tioned events were taking place at Genoa, others had
occurred in France which made Louis prefer the friend-
ship of one of the most influential of his neighbours,
and the most politic prince of the day, to the nominal
possession of a few cities in a foreign country. During
the reign of his predecessor, the power of the feudal
aristocracy had grown to such a height as to threaten
the dismemberment of his kingdom, and it was now his
object to humiliate and to subject the barons, though he
had formerly supported them when they were opposed
to his father. Being skilled beyond the other princes
north of the Alps in what may be termed the science of
politics, he clearly perceived and appreciated the genius
of Sforza ; and he was determined that his enemies should
not have the benefit of his friendship or of his counsels.
The town of Savona, the only place still in his posses-
sion on the coast of Italy, so far from yielding him any
revenue, was actually taxing his resources for the main-
tenance of a garrison ; and he had too much on hand
CHAP. IV. ARRANGEMENTS OF LOUIS AND SFORZA. 31.5
to think of making any attempt to regain Genoa and
its other dependencies. He therefore determined to
purchase the friendship of Sforza, by making over to
him those claims and rights, which, though a source of
embarrassment to himself, would be invaluable to the
owner of Milan.
The king of France knew the value of public opinion
far too well to do anything which should lead others
to suppose that he was seeking to purchase the support
of an Italian prince by any sort of concession. But
he authorised his ambassador at the court of Rome
to drop to Sforza’s friends some hints of his altered
Sentiments with regard to his Italian possessions, and
to insinuate that, if the duke would make overtures of
friendship and alliance to the king, they might make
Some arrangement advantageous to both. These hints,
having been duly made, were not lost upon Sforza, and
the ambassadors that he sent thereupon to the court of
France found no difficulty in settling everything accord-
ing to his wishes. The king of France and his friend,
the duke of Milan, entered into a treaty, which, it was
agreed, was in no way to effect the engagements of the
latter with the Italian alliance. The former made over
to his new friend the possession of Savona, and all his
claims to the sovereignty of Genoa, and sent formal
intimation of this clause in the treaty to the Venetians
and the other potentates of Italy, threatening them with
his hostility in the event of their interference. Sforza
immediately sent a body of troops to Savona, under the
command of his brother Conrad Foliano, who entered
316 SFORZA SENDS AN EXPEDITION BOOK WII.
the citadel amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants.
At the same time a marriage was arranged between
Galeazzo Sforza and a princess of the house of France.
This gave such offence to the marquis of Mantua, one
of whose daughters had been betrothed to Galeazzo, that
he entered the service of the Venetians in disgust, and
became the chief captain of their forces.
To get possession of Genoa, Sforza had now only
to arrange matters with the present ruler and inhabi-
tants of the city. It seemed impossible, indeed, that
it could long continue in its present state. Many who
had fled from it in fear or disgust had established their
headquarters at Savona, whence they ceased not to
entreat the duke of Milan to put an end to their troubles
by giving to their country the benefit of his government.
It was generally supposed, too, that those who remained
at Genoa, though compelled by fear to submit to, were
far from being content with, their present rulers. Sforza,
thus finding that the rights he had derived from his
treaty with the king were backed by the wishes of the
people, endeavoured to persuade Fregoso, by promises
and by threats, to give up possession of the city to him.
But on the latter refusing to be thus ousted from his
possessions, he entered into a league with the head of
the opposite faction, and even with some of the coad-
jutors of the reigning doge, who, as they held fiefs in
his dominions, were obliged to act as he wished. It was
agreed they were to form a junction with the exiled
nobles, many of whom owned fortresses in the sur-
rounding mountains, and that, after receiving a reinforce-
CHAP. IV. AGAINST GENOA. 317
ment from Milan, they should march upon Genoa. It
was also settled that Sforza's faithful officer, Donatus,
was to come to their assistance with a part of the
garrison that had been left at Savona.
Paul Fregoso, beholding himself thus menaced on all
sides, determined to resist to the uttermost. Having
put the city in a state of defence, and left a consider-
able garrison in the castle, he departed with three
triremes, hoping to collect all his adherents in some
point on the coast, and to return with a large force.
In the mean time, the enemy advanced with but little
opposition, and they soon got possession of one of the
gates, which admitted them into the outer city. The
people, who at first remained neutral, now declared in
favour of the Milanese ; and being joined by a great
crowd of exiles and malcontents who returned with the
army, they did obeisance to Sforza's officers as the
representatives of their doge. Vigorous preparations
were then made to storm the citadel with all the artil-
lery that could be sent from Milan. Among those who
had been left in the citadel by the fugitive doge was
Bartolomea, his brother Peter's wife, and owner of some
cities in the neighbourhood. That lady, frightened at
the prospect of the cannon being directed against her,
sent privately to treat with the besiegers, but endea-
voured to protract the negotiations as much as possible,
hoping that time might be given to her brother-in-law
to collect his forces, and to come to their relief. But
the Milanese officers, determined to show her that, if
she meant to save her own possessions, no time was to
318 GENOESE DEPUTATION TO SFORZA. Book VII.
be lost, attacked and took possession of several of her
cities. On hearing of this, she did not delay any
longer, and agreed to make over to them the inner
town, on the condition of being allowed to retain her
own possessions, and of receiving fourteen thousand
florins of gold. The Milanese soldiers were admitted
by night, and the garrison of Fregoso, being taken by
surprise, offered no resistance.
Both Sforza and his friends were anxious that he
should appear to have got possession of Genoa, more
by the wishes of the great majority of the citizens than
by right of conquest. Accordingly, preparations were
made to invest him with his new dignity, in a manner
that might attract the notice of all Italy. Twenty-four
people, taken from different orders of the citizens, were
chosen to go as ambassadors to Milan, for the purpose
of doing honour to their new duke, and of arranging
with him the form of their government. Two hundred
more followed in their train. As soon as it was known
that they were approaching Milan, they were met by
the sons of Sforza and the chief men of the state, who
had been ordered to conduct them with all dignity into
the city. The first-born of the sons, Galeazzo Maria,
having taken the right hand of the one who appeared
to be entitled to precedence among the ambassadors,
proceeded by his side ; the other sons of the duke and
the Milanese nobles having done the same with the
remaining ambassadors, followed, in the order of their
ages and rank: they then entered in a procession of
two and two into the city, amidst martial music
CHAP. IV. THEIR RECEPTION AT MILAN. 319
and the shouts of the populace. The ambassadors
were brought to a palace that had been prepared
for their reception. Three days were spent in fes-
tivals of the most magnificent nature, and on the
fourth it was settled that they were to be received
by the duke.
When the appointed time had come, Sforza appeared
on an elevated platform in the chief hall in the Curia,
with Bianca Maria by his side, and the princes and
princesses, and the great officers of state, around and
behind him. On the platform was a throne, above
which were hangings of wonderful texture and many
colours. All were clad in their state apparel : the
appearance of the duke was rendered, if possible, more
imposing than usual, by the silver embroidery at the
bottom of his robe, and by a pearl of great price
which he wore on his head. Many of the other nobles
appeared on a less elevated platform, on each side of
which the fairest of the Milanese matrons and maids
added by their presence to the beauty of the scene.
Seats were provided for the ladies as well as for the
most dignified of the courtiers and nobility, and the
floor of the great hall was strewed with Oriental tapes-
try, flowers, and garlands. Free ingress was allowed
to the people, while bars were fixed across the hall in
such a manner as to prevent them trespassing on the
space allotted to the ambassadors. In due time the
ambassadors themselves appeared, attracting, it is re-
lated, the admiration of all, both by their apparel and
their gait. It might almost be fancied, without exag-
320 THEIR, ADDRESS. BOOK WII,
geration, says a contemporary historian,” that they
were the chief of the Roman Senate of yore, having
full powers delegated to them on some important occa-
sion. As they appeared before the duke, with bended
knees and heads uncovered, he, as well as the duchess,
took them in the most gracious manner by their hands,
and ordered them to arise. Leave having been given
them to speak, they stepped back a few paces from the
ducal throne ; after which one of them, by name Bap-
tista Goanna, a lawyer by profession, who seemed, both
in dignity and in age, to take precedence of the others,
addressed the son of the peasant of Cotignola as fol-
lows:–
“Most magnanimous and invincible of sovereigns,
the republic of Genoa, which, after years of suffering
from anarchy and discord, has been considering long
and anxiously how it can be ruled with immunity from
these evils, and with the greatest advantage to all, has
come to the resolution to seek out some prince who is
superior to all others in wisdom, justice, and honesty.
Experience, indeed, has shown us that a country can no
more be ruled by a multitude than a ship can be steered
by many pilots, or an army led by many generals. For
we, who are renowned from East to West for our vic-
tories, our colonies, and our commerce—we who have
conquered so many kings, princes, and free states, have
not been able to keep ourselves in subjection. We see
plainly that, if we do not alter our system, we shall not
cease to be torn by discord. As heaven, the common
* SIMONETA, lib. xxx.
CHAP. IV. TO SFORZA. 321
country of all the good, is ruled by one God, it is neces-
sary for us to be under one prince, who can rule and
manage everything by his wisdom and virtue. Casting
our eyes over all Italy, and thence over all Europe, we
see no one so worthy to fill this post as yourself. Con-
sider, we beseech you, the greatness of the offer that
we now make to you ; consider that, if you accept it,
you will have most ample opportunity of exhibiting
your talents and your virtue to all nations, and that so
you will acquire great and imperishable fame. Think
what a noble work it will be for you to heal the wounds
of our bleeding city, to extinguish the fire of faction, to
see that equal justice is rendered to all men. In return
for this, you will have the rule over the whole coast of
Liguria down to the territory of Pisa, along with the
noble island of Corsica. In addition, you will have in
the East the islands of Thasos, Lesbos, and Chios,
besides the town of Amacosto, the largest and richest
in the island of Cyprus, Amassa and Caffa on the coast
of the Black Sea, besides the region of Tana, as far as
the Don in Scythia. In all these great cities, the
foundations of which have been laid by the Genoese in
the most distant parts of the world, will your victorious
standards be unfurled, and your great name be celebrated.
To be brief, you are looked upon by all Christians as one
sent to them from heaven at the present time, and worthy
to be adored by them and by barbarians alike.”
After this very complimentary address, the standard,
the sceptre, and the great seal of the republic, along
with the keys of the city, were presented to him by
WOL. II. X
322 SFORZA's REPLY. Book VII.
Giovanni Sierra, another lawyer, who at the same time
made a speech, in which, however, the flattery must
have appeared too glaring to be acceptable. After
saying that it would require another Livy or another
Xenophon duly to commemorate all the great deeds
that he had done, for that they surpassed the powers
of all living historians, he added, that a still greater
deed remained for him to do—to restore peace to their
distracted city. The glory arising from military achieve-
ments, he said, must be shared in by others, while that
resulting from the task last mentioned would belong to
him alone. He concluded by describing the glory that
would accrue to him therefrom in three of those lines
of Virgil, written in praise of Augustus, in a style suffi-
ciently adulatory to justify the expression applied by
Tacitus to the prose writers of the period, “ donec
gliscente adulatione deterrerentur.””
When all the insignia of the state had been duly
delivered, Sforza, holding the sceptre of Genoa in his
own hand, having placed the standard in that of
Galeazzo, and given over the keys and seal to his two
next sons, made the following gracious reply :—
“Pleasing to us, O men of Genoa, was your arrival ;
most pleasing and most agreeable has been your speech.
We have always had an affectionate regard for your
interests, and wished for that which was most condu-
cive to your dignity and your tranquillity. Many
things, indeed, appear to us to make it advisable for all
parties that both Milan and Genoa should be under the
* Annal. lib. i. cap. 1.
CHAP. IV. FREGOSO TURNS PIRATE. 323
same governor. The long line of frontier between the
two states, and the commercial intercourse that is con-
stantly passing between them, renders it impossible
that prosperity or adversity can ever happen to one
without in some way affecting the other. Wherefore
we avail ourselves of your offer, not so much for the
sake of adding to our own empire, which the Almighty
has already made sufficiently extensive and powerful,
as for that of benefiting both you and our own sub-
jects. Of course, we are duly aware how much we are
increasing our own dignity and power by so doing, and
we are also sensible of the responsibility which thereby
we are entailing on ourselves; wherefore we shall strive
to perform, in the best manner possible, the duties that
you have committed to us. If we have any qualities
which fit us for undertaking these duties, to God be the
glory, whom we are also to thank for whatever fortune
we have enjoyed during our life.”
The speeches being ended, the Genoese ambassadors
took the oaths of perpetual allegiance to Sforza and
his descendants on behalf of themselves and their fellow-
citizens, and in due time the assembly dispersed.
The delegates, after their return to Genoa, found
that the archbishop, Paul Fregoso, who at one time
thought that the accepting the office of doge might be
incompatible with his sacred character, had turned
pirate. As he was unable to collect a sufficient force to
make a descent on the city, he avenged himself on his
countrymen by making attacks on their argosies, where-
ever they could be found trading on the waters of the
Mediterranean. His first attempt was against four of
324 JOHN RETURNS TO FRANCE. Book VII.
their vessels, just as they were about to enter the port
of Willafranca; but they gave him such a warm recep-
tion that he was induced to change his quarters, and
to hover around the coast of Sicily. It could hardly,
however, be expected that the Genoese, who had con-
quered mighty kingdoms, and extended their empire
into remote and formerly unexplored regions, would
long continue to put up with annoyances of this descrip-
tion. One of their first acts, after peace and tranquil-
lity had been restored to them under the government of
Sforza, was to send against the pirate archbishop four
vessels, under the command of Francesco Spinola.
These vessels fell in with his holiness near the island of
Corsica, where they took all his ships, after he himself, with
all his crews, had made their escape in small boats. After
this, Genoa had rest from its troubles for fourteen years.
About the same time, also, John of Anjou came to
the resolution of abandoning all further attempts to
make himself king of Naples. In the beginning of the
year 1464, his father Réné had sent him a fleet of ten
galleys from Marseilles, hoping that he might once
more be put in a state to take the field; but on hear-
ing of the death of Antonio Orsini, in whom, notwith-
standing his treaty with Ferdinand, he seems to have
placed some hopes, as also of Sforza's alliance with the
king of France, and of the revolution of Genoa, he
abandoned the enterprise in despair. In the sixth year
after he had departed from France with such high
expectations, he returned thither with all the anguish
of mind that is usually caused by blighted hopes and
the fruitless expenditure of energy and resources.
B O O K E I G HT H,
CON CLUSION.
B O O K E I G. H. T. H.
0 0N (; L USION.
POSITION OF SFORZA.—STATE OF AFFAIRS AT FLORENCE.-PROCEEDINGS OF
LUCAS PITTI.-DEATH AND CHARACTER OF COSMO DE MEDICI.-PoPE PIUs
ENDEAVOURS TO ASSEMBLE AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE TURES AT ANCONA
—HIS DISAPPOINTMENT, AND DEATH.-TYRANNY OF FERDINAND.—PICCI-
NINo GOES TO MILAN AND IS MARRIED TO DRUSIANA-HIS RECEPTION
THERE–DEPARTS FOR NAPLES-IS THROWN INTO PRISON, AND MURDERED.
—SUSPICIONS CONCERNING SFORZA.—OPINIONS OF HISTORIANS.—GALEAzzo
TAKES THE COMMAND OF AN EXPEDITION AGAINST THE REBELLIOUS NOBLES
of FRANCE—HIS SUCCESS.—DEATH OF FRANCESCO SFORZA.—ConDUCT of
BIANCA MARIA.—REMARKS ON SFORZA'S CHARACTER.
IT must be acknowledged that few military adven-
turers ever succeeded better than Francesco Sforza.
Forty years before the event just narrated, he had
inherited from his father the uncertain possession of
some isolated fiefs, and the confidence of a number of
mercenary soldiers. He was now lord of the most fer-
tile, if not of the fairest, of the lands of Italy. His
dominions comprised two cities, to which the names of
Grande and Superba had been given, and one of which
commanded the commerce of the seas between the
328 SFORZA's POSITION. BOOK WIII.
Pillars of Hercules and the mouth of the Don. His colo-
nial empire was inferior to that of the Venetians alone.
As he had succeeded in carrying out to his heart's
desire the stipulations of the Italian alliance, as the
chief man in the republic of Florence was the most
intimate of his friends, and as neither the pope nor
the king of Naples dared do anything against his wishes,
his influence may be said to have been paramount in
the peninsula. Moreover, his alliance was eagerly sought
after by one of the most powerful of the monarchs north
of the Alps.
After he had thus established his influence and added
to his dignity, he did not complete any enterprise of
importance in Italy. He talked at one time of sending
his son, Ludovico Sforza, in command of an expedition
against the Turks; and in the following year he de-
spatched his heir, Galeazzo Maria, along with some of
his best captains, and a considerable force, to assist the
king of France against his refractory barons. But he
never sent the former, and did not live to witness the
return of the latter. Little now remains for his bio-
grapher but to notice the simultaneous departure from
the great stage of human existence of many of those who
had played the most conspicuous parts in the drama
narrated.
- The first that was called away was the oldest and
staunchest of Sforza's friends, Cosmo de' Medici. During
the first twenty-one years after his return from exile,
the presence and popularity of Neri Capponi had ope-
rated as a salutary check upon himself and his friends;
CoNCLUSION. AFFAIRS OF FLORENCE. 329
it prevented him from abusing his power, and kept
them from quarrelling among themselves. At the death
of Neri Capponi, in the year 1455, Cosmo had arrived
at the age of sixty-seven, a time of life when men sel-
dom change their habits, by whatever means they may
have been formed. But as he began to wax old, his
friends were without either a rival or ruler to keep them
in order ; their evil passions broke forth unrestrained,
and the citizens, having become disgusted at their con-
duct, refused any longer to intrust the chief manage-
ment of their affairs to their committee of dictators,
which had been denominated Balia. For some time
great confusion and discontent continued to prevail
among all orders. Cosmo was in vain solicited to use
his influence to have another balia appointed, till at last
one of his former adherents, Lucas Pitti, filled the palace
with his armed retainers, and forced the people to in-
trust the government to a committee of his own crea-
tures. The balia so chosen made the most violent use
of their authority, and they hesitated not to torture, to
banish, or to kill, those whom they thought likely to be
troublesome opponents. Lucas Pitti himself took pre-
sents from all those who had anything to hope or to
fear, and with the funds so raised he began building
the palace which still bears his name. To facilitate its
erection, he constituted it an asylum for all those
who for any reason were afraid to show their faces in
Florence.
To Cosmo, who had always been careful not to make
any display in the city that he thought likely to attract
330 DEATH OF COSMO DE MEDICI. Book VIII.
the observation or excite the jealousy of others, not only
was Pitti's general mode of proceeding offensive, but
the building of the palace itself was peculiarly so. Dis-
gusted at the turn that affairs were taking, and begin-
ning to feel the infirmities of age, he retired to his
country seat at Careggi, and gradually withdrew him-
self from political life. In his latter days he is said to
have felt much regret that he had not succeeded in his
oft-tried conquest of Lucca, more especially as his
friend, Francesco Sforza, had often held forth promises
of aiding him in the same, should he ever attain the
sovereignty of Milan, but had afterwards, like Lucullus's
soldier in Horace,” determined to leave such enterprises
to those who had their fortune to make. The disap-
pointments and the infirmities of age were aggravated
by the death of his favourite son, which took place
about the end of the year 1463. He felt this blow the
more acutely, as it was to him that he principally
looked for maintaining the position of his family, the
other being unfitted through ill health for public busi-
ness. It is related that, on being carried through his
house a short time after his bereavement, he said with
a sigh, “This is too large a house for so small a family l’
alluding, probably, to the incapacity of his other son to
fill his position. He himself did not long survive the
shock, and he departed from this scene on August 13,
1464, in his seventy-seventh year.
Though Cosmo's last years were not the brightest of
his life, he had even then but little to complain of beyond
* Ep. ii. 2, 25–40.
Conclusion. PIUS's EFFORTS AGAINST THE TURKS. 331
the cares and disappointments which must be felt by
every party-leader whose existence is prolonged to old
age. His griefs, such as they were, cannot be said to have
in any way either diminished his glory among his surviv-
ing contemporaries, or tarnished his memory. There is,
perhaps, no other instance in history of a citizen having
attained so much power in a free state, and having after-
wards so little abused it. Almost all the potentates of
Christendom sent to condole with his son, and the
regrets of his countrymen were manifested by the num-
ber who attended his funeral. By a public decree,
the words “Padre della patria” were inscribed on his
tomb.
The next public character of the day that made his
exit was Pope Pius. After the retreat of the duke of
Anjou to Ischia, he was exceedingly anxious to get up
a vigorous crusade against the Turks, perhaps with a
view to wipe out the imputation that had been made
against him of misappropriating the resources that had
been intrusted to him for that purpose. The champions
of Christendom were summoned to meet him at Ancona;
and though many doubted the sincerity of his promises,
and all must have thought him unwarlike and infirm,
he declared his intention of embarking with them him-
self, and sharing in the perils of the expedition. The
call, however, was but feebly responded to; though the
Venetians had promised to send a fleet, and the dukes
of Milan and Burgundy had each engaged to furnish an
army, the head of the Christian religion found few at
the place of rendezvous but pilgrims and adventurers.
332 HIS DEATH, Book VIII.
Many of those who had gone there before him had
already departed, on beholding neither ships to trans-
port them nor captains to lead them against the enemy;
and the ardour of those that remained was soon damped
by finding that the pope had nothing but spiritual
rewards to give them. The countenance of the old
man, as he was borne to the city on a litter, betrayed
marks of grief and disappointment not to be mistaken;
and though he relaxed not in his endeavours to get the
promised forces brought together, the failure of his
expectations proved too heavy a blow for his already
shattered constitution. The Venetian fleet arrived on
the 14th of August, but disease and vexation had
already done their work with Pope Pius; and on the
succeeding night he expired, amidst the tears, it is said,
of his cardinals and attendants. His character has been
painted in the most flattering colours; but on a calm
review of his history, it must be acknowledged that, if
he had many excellent qualities, he was also tainted
with several of the faults incident to his order and age.
The praise to which he is well entitled for his sagacity,
must be tempered by the blame so justly due to his
nepotism.
Piccinino was not long suffered to survive the success
of Ferdinand and the aggrandisement of Sforza. What-
ever may have been his faults, the circumstances attend-
ing his death, forming, as they do, one of the dark
passages of the history of Italy, invest his end with a
melancholy interest. After the departure of John of
Anjou from Ischia, Ferdinand showed by his conduct
Conclusion. FERDINAND'S CONDUCT AT NAPLEs. 333
that it was not without reason that the insurgent barons
had feared his tyranny at the commencement, and mis-
trusted his sincerity at the termination of the rebellion.
The majority of them had, partly, as has already been
related, by the persuasions of Sforza, and partly from
the despair of doing better, submitted to him ; but no
Sooner had the king got them completely in his power
than he began to find divers excuses for breaking his
word. It has been mentioned that many suspected
that the death of the prince of Tarento had been
accelerated by foul play. After this event the duke of
Sessa, who was the next most powerful baron in the
kingdom, and who had been the next to give in his
adherence to Ferdinand, felt the vengeance of the con-
queror. The king, as he was one day enjoying the
recreation of the chase near the duke's castle, expressed
a desire to see his faithful subject, and to behold his son,
to whom his own daughter had already been betrothed.
The duke, who had previously been prepared by Alex-
ander Sforza for the interview, hesitated not to go forth
to meet his sovereign ; and when he had come into his
presence, he was seized, placed on a mule, and conducted
to a dungeon in Naples.
This, and other deeds of a like nature, showed Picci-
nino that the kingdom of Naples was no safe resting-
place for him. Perplexed and disturbed, he wrote to
Sforza to request his protection, and he received from
him the most assured promises of support, and an invi-
tation to come to Milan forthwith, to celebrate his nup-
tials with the long-promised Drusiana. Attempts to
334 PICCININO GOES TO MILAN. Book VIII.
dissuade him from taking this step were made by his
friends, who thought that Sforza, though endowed with
many great and good qualities, was, when his interest
clashed with his feelings, no better than his contempo-
raries. It was insinuated by some that he had been
privy to the murder of the duke of Sessa—an opinion
which, in some degree, gained ground from the circum-
stance of his brother Alexander having assisted to bring
about the interview between him and the king. And
it is certain that Piccinino's power at this time was
sufficient to excite apprehensions that he might one day
become a formidable adversary. He was in great repu-
tation for valour and military skill ; he commanded
some of the best troops in Italy, and he was in posses-
sion of several important fiefs in the kingdom of Naples.
He was allowed to retain the surnames of the houses of
Aragon and Visconti—a privilege which in no small
degree augmented his dignity in the eyes of the vulgar,
and might be of some advantage to him, should he
ever aspire to the rank of a sovereign. It is probable
that he himself was not without misgivings with respect
to the step that he had been invited to take; but he
mistrusted Sforza less than Ferdinand, and was assured
by the Bolognese and the Florentines that he had
nothing to fear.
When he entered Milan, the people seemed to vie
with the duke in honouring him. His presence caused
many to reflect on the times when his father had fought
for the last of the Visconti, with all the fond regret
that the memory of bygone events usually inspires—a
CONCLUSION. HIS RECEPTION THERE. 335
regret which, perhaps, might in this instance have been
heightened by comparing the parentage of their present
with that of their last duke ; it also recalled their
attempts, vain though they were, to establish their inde-
pendence, and drew forth the feelings, both of those
who were discontented or disappointed with their present
ruler, and of those who fancied that they perceived any
seeds of incapacity or violence in his successor. Even
those who were attached to Sforza—and there is no
reason to suppose that they were not numerous—were
anxious to show respect to a brave but unsuccessful
opponent. The consequence was, that his appearance
in the city drew forth a burst of enthusiasm, which may
possibly have astonished or alarmed the duke; and
many suppose that the shouts of “Bracciol” which were
everywhere heard in the crowd, made him reflect on
the danger that might accrue to his family from the
surviving representative of the party which had so
long been a formidable rival to his own. But, what-
ever his feelings might have been, he did not suffer
any symptom of jealousy to escape, and he received
Piccinino with all the cordiality that could have been
expected from the most generous and least suspicious
of mankind.
Shortly after Piccinino's arrival at Milan, he obtained
the hand of Drusiana; but the wedding was held in as
quiet a manner as possible, in consequence of the recent
death of Cosmo de' Medici. In the beginning of the
following year Ferdinand sent an ambassador to Milan,
for the purpose of bringing to Naples Hippolyta, the
336 PICCININo's DEATH. BOOK VIII.
destined bride of his son Alphonso. Shortly after-
wards, Piccinino, either by his own desire or at the
instigation of Sforza, or at the request of Ferdinand, (all
of which are stated in the different accounts,) left Milan
for Naples. Just before his departure, Sforza sent an
ambassador to Ferdinand to guarantee him security
and a reception due to his station, and ordered his con-
fidential secretary, Pietro Postula, to accompany him.
The king received him with every possible honour, and
entertained him in his court for twenty-seven days. In
the mean time his wife Drusiana was sent from Milan
to his town of Sulmona. He was preparing to leave
Naples on the twenty-eighth day after his arrival, when
the king requested him to come into the castle to see
his treasure; and when he had thus enticed him in
there, he detained him as a prisoner. It was said that
on the same day guards were stationed on all the roads
leading from Naples, to prevent his departure. A few
days after his incarceration he expired. It was gene-
rally given out at the time that he had broken his
neck by having fallen down while attempting to climb
up a window to get a view of what was going on
outside ; but it was shrewdly suspected that he had
been ‘strangled by the royal orders. At the same
time his territories were all seized, and his soldiers
stripped of their accoutrements and disbanded, by order
of the king. The unfortunate Drusiana returned to
Milan, where she not long afterwards brought a son
into the world.
Such were the principal circumstances, as agreed
CoNCLUSION. SUSPICIONS OF SFORZA. 337
upon by all historians, relating to the death of Picci-
nino. A strong suspicion prevailed, both at the time
and afterwards, that he had come to his untimely end
by the connivance of Sforza, if not at his instigation.
As many of the details from which a presumption can
be raised in favour of innocency or guilt are given dif-
ferently by different historians, it will be necessary, in
order that the reader may form an impartial judgment,
to lay the different versions of them before him.
The account that seems to leave the impression most
unfavourable to Sforza is that given by Christoforo
Soldo, a contemporary writer, the author of the History
of Brescia, which is as follows:—“When the time
fixed for the betrayal of the poor condottiere had come,
after he had ratified his agreement with the duke, he
said to him, ‘That it was time for him to go and ratify
it also with the king of Naples.’ This the duke con-
tinued to urge him to do, which he for some time
declined. ‘I beseech you, my good lord and master,’
said he, ‘send me not to Naples, for, if I do go there, I
shall never leave it alive.’ But the aforesaid duke conti-
nued to press him, saying, ‘Go, for I swear by my head
that nobody shall hurt you.' Thus the poor condot-
tiere took his departure, having been ordered for execu-
tion ; and while on the way, he left his wife at Cesena
with one of his sons, and brought the other with him
to Naples. It is worthy of remarking, that while he
was on his way thither, a son of Ferdinand's set out
with three hundred horse to bring Hippolyta to his
brother. In the mean time Piccinino arrived at Naples,
WOL. II. Y
338 OPINIONS OF BOOK WIII.
and was received by the king with all the honours with
which the Jews received our Saviour before they took
him and crucified him.” After mentioning the manner
in which he was seized, the writer goes on to say that
there was for some time great uncertainty and anxiety
through all Italy as to his fate, which was followed by
a burst of indignation when there could no longer be
any doubt of it. In the mean time the destined bride
“remained at harbour at Siena for two months and a
half, and then proceeded to her affianced husband.
Throughout the whole of Italy it was said that the
duke of Milan had sent Piccinino to execution, and
that the king of Naples had been his executioner.”
This account of Christoforo Soldo is confirmed in the
main, and his opinions are also participated in by Corio,
who was alive at the time, and wrote his history about
twenty years afterwards. He says that “Piccinino's
departure from Milan was entirely brought about by
the duke, who dreaded lest his great valour, military
skill, and popularity throughout Lombardy, Italy, and
even in the town of Milan, should operate prejudicially
to his children after his decease.” Corio does not in
general speak evil of Sforza, nor does he, indeed, relate
this transaction as if any great blame was due to him
for thus providing for the security of his family.
Machiavelli says that the honours that were paid to
Piccinino, on his entrance into Milan, hastened his ruin,
as they increased the desire of the duke to put an end
to him ; and he seems to think that the favours which
he continued to bestow on him were merely a mask to
CoNCLUSION. DIFFERENT HISTORIANS. 339
conceal his real intentions. And Muratori, an impar-
tial writer, who had doubtless well weighed all the evi-
dence, is inclined to decide against Sforza.
Notwithstanding the unfavourable opinion of so many
contemporary historians, it must be allowed that there
is great semblance of truth in the account given by
Simoneta, which will go far to exculpate Sforza. AC-
cording to that historian, Piccinino went to Naples
quite of his own wishes, and Sforza never either
urged him to do so, or attempted to dissuade him
from it. After Piccinino had been thrown into pri-
son, Ferdinand sent letters to Sforza, in which he
stated that, though he had been willing to pardon all
the past, and had loaded him with honours, he found
out that he was at that very instant holding commu-
nications with his enemies; so that a due regard,
as well for the safety of his own kingdom as for the
peace of the peninsula, compelled him to act as he did.
Sforza, on the receipt of this letter, expressed great
indignation, and said that he thought it hard that his
son-in-law should be arrested in the presence of his
ambassador on mere suspicion. He is also said to have
foreseen fully how his own character would suffer if
Piccinino came to a violent end. He therefore sent his
son Tristanus to Ferdinand, requesting him as a favour
to himself to pardon and liberate his son-in-law ; and
at the same time he gave directions that Hippolyta
should not proceed any farther on her way to Naples
till matters were settled. In the mean time, it was
formally notified that Piccinino had been killed by the
340 ARGUMENTS URGED IN BOOK WIII.
accident reported above, on which Sforza said that he
doubted not the fact of his death, but that he was
incredulous as to the manner in which it was reported
to have taken place. Tristanus, on his arrival at
Naples, demanded that the body of his brother-in-law
should be shown to him, in order that he might be con-
vinced as to the mode of his death. On its being pro-
duced for his satisfaction, it appeared so utterly decom-
posed, that he came to the opinion that he must have
died some time before he was reported to have met
with the accident. Sforza himself was reported to be
so indignant at the whole transaction that he debated
for some time whether he should not break his alliance
with Ferdinand, and the projected marriage of their
families; and it is certain that Hippolyta was obliged
to halt for two months at Siena. It was said that he
was strongly urged to this course by Bianca Maria;
but he finally came to the decision not to alter his
policy, or to drive a king from a throne where it had
taken so much trouble to place him, in consequence of
an act for which the practice of the times afforded too
many precedents.
Thus, in spite of what is said by Corio, Machiavelli,
and others, whose opinions are doubtless entitled to
deference, it must be acknowledged that there is much
in Simoneta's evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt of Sforza's guilt. His chief justification appears
to rest on the account given of his conduct after he had
been informed of Piccinino's arrest. M. Sismondi, who
cannot be suspected of any partiality towards the man
CoNCLUSION. WINDICATION OF SFORZA. 341
who crushed the attempts of the Milanese to re-esta-
blish their independence, justly remarks that, if he had
been really guilty, his secretary, who has undertaken
his defence, would have laid more stress on the conspi-
racy which Ferdinand pretended to have discovered ;
or that, at all events, he would have affected to have
believed the story of his having accidentally broken his
neck. Besides, that if he had been determined to get
rid of him, he would, in all probability, have availed
himself of a false witness or an assassin, while he was
sojourning at Milan with only one hundred of his
followers; that one can hardly suppose Francesco
Sforza guilty of such imprudence as to allow his intended
victim to escape to his fortresses and his soldiers; and
it is probable that he would not have incurred more
obloquy by despatching him at Milan, than that which
he fully foresaw Ferdinand's conduct would entail upon
him. So well aware, indeed, was he of the imputations
to which he would be subject, that he exclaimed that
not all the water of the Po could efface from his charac-
ter the stain that would be left upon it.
Simoneta's defence of Sforza is further confirmed by
a modern historian, who has lately brought to light
several interesting documents of the history of Milan.
On the whole, it must be allowed that there is much to
clear him from the suspicion, which seems to rest on no
better foundation than the evil practices of the times,
and the calumnies of his enemies. Those who may
hesitate to acquit him of all evil intent in allowing
Piccinino to go to Ferdinand, may perhaps concede that,
342 CHARACTER OF PICCININO. BOOK WIII.
whatever he may have expected others to do, he him-
self was in no way accessory to his murder. His
conduct after hearing of the imprisonment of his son-
in-law, though perhaps irreconcilable with actual parti-
cipation in the crimes of Ferdinand, may be thought to
betoken the indignation or the remorse really felt by
many men, after the secret object of their guilty wishes
has been attained.
The character and conduct of Jacobo Piccinino
cannot appear to advantage in a biography of Sforza.
He was frequently opposed to, and almost always
defeated by, that great man in the field; as neither his
nor his father's career was crowned by such success as
that of their rival, he occasionally did actions which
must have appeared ignominious or petty, when com-
pared with those of a sovereign who was able to guide
the policy of the peninsula. Yet, withal, he is entitled
to a greater reputation as a general, and certainly is
not more deserving of blame as a man, than the majo-
rity of his contemporaries. Though frequently worsted
by Sforza, he was often able to stay his progress; and
after the duke had ceased to go forth at the head of his
armies, he does not appear to have had his equal in the
field. Ample proof of this is afforded by the eagerness
with which his services were sought after, as well by
Alphonso as by those who fought for his successor,
and also by Sforza's own anxiety to secure them for
his friend. There is no doubt but that his military
skill would have placed John of Anjou on the throne,
if the opposite party had not been backed by the
CoNCLUSION. EXPEDITION TO FRANCE. 343
resources and the influence of Sforza. The more
questionable deeds of his early life were done in con-
junction with his elder brother, and possibly in defer-
ence to his authority ; and judging from his subsequent
popularity, he appears to have done nothing outrageous
to the moral feelings of his contemporaries. His tragic
and treacherous murder did much to cause the evil that
he did to die with him, and his good deeds to live after
him in the memory of men.
Francesco Sforza did not long survive the last great
general of the Braccian school. Since his accession to
the ducal throne, he had never ceased to entertain a
lurking suspicion that the French would some day be
formidable competitors either with himself or some
of his descendants. For this reason he was extremely
anxious to secure the good wishes of the present mo-
narch, and to inspire him with a due sense of the
extent of his resources and the valour of his troops. An
opportunity of doing both was now presented to him.
Louis was at this instant sore pressed by a contest with
the feudal lords, and Sforza, though unsolicited by him,
sent his son Galeazzo, along with six thousand men and
his best captains, to his assistance. The departure of
Galeazzo on his first campaign naturally excited great
interest in his parents; they both accompanied him out
of the city, and his mother proceeded to Vercelli,
where she obtained the duke of Savoy's permission for
her son to bring his army across the Alps. The expe-
dition produced all the effects that could possibly have
been desired; in a short time Galeazzo had so com-
344 SFORZA's ILLNESS BOOK WIII.
pletely overrun the provinces adjoining the Rhone as
to make the duke of Bourbon anxious to withdraw
from the confederate nobles, that he might return to look
after his dominions, after which Louis found no diffi-
culty in coming to terms with the others. And the
superiority of the Milanese soldiers in military tactics,
more especially in taking cities, which was the principal
work of the expedition, made such an impression on
the French that they were said to have been looked
upon as being almost more than ordinary mortals.
Galeazzo Sforza, flushed with the glory of his first cam-
paign, was on his way home with his army, when he
received the unexpected intelligence of the event which
made him duke of Milan.
The death of Francesco Sforza was in this wise.
The king of France had sent ambassadors to thank him
for the diversion he had made in his favour; and he
received them with all the honour that he could show to
a powerful monarch whose friendship he courted, and
with the affability that men generally display after their
projects have succeeded. All things, indeed, seemed to
have gone well with him; he was in undisputed posses-
sion of a great empire, and had settled the affairs of
Italy and France in the manner that he had desired.
For aught that appeared to the contrary, he might now
have anticipated many years' tranquil enjoyment of his
honours. But in the plenitude of his content he had
neglected his usual regimen of diet and medicine, which
he had observed since the first appearance of his disease.
On the 6th of March 1466, he experienced so sharp an
CoNCLUSION. AND DEATH. 345
attack that his physicians prescribed extraordinary
remedies. He does not appear to have been much
alarmed on that day, for neither his disease nor his
drugs prevented him indulging in a pleasure,” which
now, at least, would be thought rather unbecoming in a
man of sixty-five, who owed much of his good fortune
to his wife. Shortly after he retired, he was attacked
with such violent pains that his family and atten-
dants were summoned. It soon became evident to all
that his time was come; he lingered for upwards of
twenty-four hours, and expired in the course of the
following night.
Never, according to all accounts, did woman exhibit
more heroic conduct than was displayed by Bianca
Maria at the time of her husband's decease. She lost no
time in calling medical aid, and seeing that every possi-
ble remedy was tried. But when the downcast looks of
the physicians, and the failing voice and sinking pulse
of her husband, showed her that all hope was gone, she
bethought herself of every public measure that should
be taken on such a trying emergency. Her first step
was to despatch a messenger to Galeazzo, to inform him
of his father's state. Though profoundly afflicted, and
unable for a time to repress her emotions, she ordered
the senate to assemble in the middle of the night, and
particularly requested the attendance of those on whom
she could most depend for keeping the people in order.
* “La medicina essendo nell' operare, come uomo molto disordinato,
andô a lussuriare con una sua femina ch' egli teneva in quella propria
notte, e Subito gli vennero certi dolori grandissimi.” — CRISTOFORO DA
Soldo, Istoria Bresciana.
346 BIANCA MARIA’s BEHAVIOUR. Book VIII.
And though she bore such marks of grief that her coun-
tenance seemed almost like that of a dead person, and
though she had previously been unable to restrain her
emotion, and many of the senators were themselves too
full to give utterance to their thoughts, she had suffi-
cient command over herself to be able to address them
in a composed and dignified manner. When her hus-
band had finally given up the ghost, she sent messen-
gers to the principal states in Italy to notify the event,
and to request them to acknowledge her son as his
SUICCéSSOI’.
After she had taken every measure that seemed
necessary for the good of the public, she made no
attempt to restrain the violence of her grief. At differ-
ent times her shrieks might be heard through the whole
of the palace. She stood long and frequently by her
husband's remains, gazing on his countenance, and seem-
ing, as it were, to doubt the power of death. She
would not allow the body to be moved for two whole
days after the spirit had departed. On the third day,
when it was absolutely necessary that it should be taken
away, neither the fear of infection, nor the utmost
efforts of the attendants, could prevent her loading the
already decayed countenance with kisses. After she
had been torn from it with difficulty, she is reported
to have made a speech, in which she expressed, in
the most beautiful language, the feelings called forth on
such an occasion, and evinced the keenest regret that
she had ever suffered herself, even through the jealousy
that excessive fondness usually inspires, to quarrel with,
CoNCLUSION. SFORZA's FUNERAL. 347
or in any way give annoyance to, her husband. Turn-
ing round to her ladies in waiting, she said, “Ye that
are married, I entreat you, by the great God, be not
troublesome to your lords. For, if you yourselves could
but feel what I am now suffering in consequence, there
is not one of you who would not henceforward be the
most complacent of wives.”
The remains of the duke, decorated in all the robes
of state, were brought into the shrine of the public room,
where they were suffered to lie in state during the
remainder of the day. In his right hand was placed
the sceptre, and on his side was the sword which he had
worn in so many victories. Several of the citizens
flocked thither to see whether the countenance which,
in life, had been so commanding, had been much altered
by death. Every mark of respect usual on such occa-
sions was exhibited ; and from the absence of any
attempt at insurrection, we may infer that he had done
something to gain the affections, and to merit the
regrets, of his subjects.
It had been the good fortune of Francesco Sforza to
unite with his political and military talents great per-
sonal advantages. On many occasions, as has already
been related, his commanding appearance and his excel-
lent address did him good Service. In stature he was
about the middle height, and in activity, strength, and
capability of enduring fatigue, he scarcely had any
equals. In running and jumping he excelled all his
contemporaries, and is said to have been able to lift
and to throw heavy stones and iron weights with as
348 DESCRIPTION OF HIS BOOK WIII.
great facility as if they had been pieces of wood. He
was patient of hunger and thirst to an extraordinary
degree, and seemed scarcely to feel the blows and the
wounds that were inflicted upon him in battle. Though
able to do with very few hours of rest, he was never
kept off his sleep by over-fatigue or anxiety; and
though his repose was never broken by the clang of
arms, the neighing of horses, or the other ordinary
sounds of the camp, he was always the first roused by
any emergency. He ate but little, and, according to
his biographer, did not yield to the most delicate of
young ladies in the nice and sparing manner in which
he took his food. During his meals, he used constantly
to admit people to his presence, and to discuss with
them the most intricate questions of policy and war.
He was prodigal of money, for which he was frequently
reproved by his friend and benefactor, Cosmo de' Me-
dici, who, a merchant himself, could make little allow-
ances for the extravagance of a soldier of fortune. To
all such admonitions he used to reply, that he would
sooner die than be esteemed stingy ; that, as Providence
had given him a powerful sovereignty, he thought he
could not make better use of his resources than to re-
ward those by whose assistance he had succeeded; that
his children would have money enough if they were
honest men, and that, if they were not, they would be
better without any. In private life he was singularly
humane and benevolent, and if ever he thought he had
offended anybody in a moment of irritation, he endea-
voured to make up for it by subsequent courtesy. He
CoNCLUSION. PERSON AND HABITS, 349
was exceedingly kind to all who had been plunged into
distress by vicissitude of politics or fortune, and is said
to have frequently gone about in person to visit the
sick and the needy. It was, no doubt, principally by
these qualities that he attained that great popularity in
the army which even his enemies do not deny.
Of his general character it would be superfluous to
say much, after having detailed and discussed the prin-
cipal actions of his life. It will not, I think, be denied,
that he was endowed with all the great and most of the
good qualities that generally fall to the lot of mankind.
His abilities were singularly developed and displayed
by the various circumstances in which he was placed.
The tact by which he won his way to fame, before his
marriage with Bianca Maria; the perseverance with
which he struggled against adversity from that time till
the death of his father-in-law ; the great military skill
and political sagacity by which he succeeded, notwith-
standing false friends and dangerous enemies, in placing
himself on the throne of Milan ; the firmness by which
he secured himself, combined with the moderation which
he exhibited in his new position ; the policy by which,
after having made himself arbiter of Italy, he laid the
foundation of thirty years' peace and prosperity, show
a combination of active and reflective powers rarely to
be found in one person. Muratori, one of the deepest
read and most impartial of Italian historians, gives his
opinion in the following words,--" The more we reflect
on the actions of this unrivalled prince, the more readily
must we acknowledge, notwithstanding the opinion of
350 REFLECTIONS ON BOOK WIII.
some, that, for many centuries, Italy has not produced
so renowned a hero as Francesco Sforza, in whom there
was a rare combination of wonderful valour with un-
common political sagacity. In twenty-two battles which
he gave, he always ended by being conqueror, and he
was never conquered by any. His father, Sforza At-
tendolo, having risen from the lowest station of life,
began to build the fortune of the family; but his son,
Francesco, proceeding with gigantic steps, advanced it
in such a manner that he came to be at the head of the
most noble duchy of Milan, and the proud city of
Genoa, and to attain such a fame, that he certainly
deserves to be compared with the greatest captains of
antiquity, and reckoned among the most illustrious
people in the history of Italy.”
With respect to his moral qualities, it must be ac-
knowledged that his memory is tarnished as well by
undeniable acts of treachery and intrigue, as by the
suspicion of deeds that few men of the present age
dare do. In palliation of these, it must be recollected
that his lot was cast in an age when the arts recom-
mended in the Prince and the Discourses of Machiavelli
were by many thought to be essential to success in
public life, and that the main ground of the suspicions
against him is the evil practice of the times. At pre-
sent, a man who holds a prominent station is not gene-
rally deemed guilty of bloodshed in the absence of
strong evidence ; but in medieval Italy, a public man
was invariably supposed to have had some hand in a
murder conducive to his interests, if he could not prove
CoNCLUSION. HIS HISTORY. 351
himself innocent. Thus, the stronger the presumptive
evidence of his guilt, the greater will be the excuse afford-
ed by the ways of the age. We have the acknowledg-
ment of M. Sismondi, that among his contemporaries he
was reckoned most loyal, most generous, and most faith-
ful in friendship. If it be true that men's characters
may be known from those of their associates, his friend-
ship with some of the brightest ornaments of the fifteenth
century affords strong testimony in his favour. And
there is none of his misdeeds for which he might not
plead the excuse that is said to have been always in
the mouth of one of the greatest heroes of antiquity—
“If one must sometimes do wrong for the sake of a
sovereignty, it is most glorious to do wrong; but in
other things one should always act righteously.””
Thus of Francesco Sforza it may truly be said, that
his good deeds were his own, his evil ones were those
of the age in which he lived. As Italy contained as
many political organisations at that time as are now to
be found in all of Europe, the number of men engaged
in public life bore a much greater proportion to the rest
of mankind than it does at present. Hence the crimes
for which ambition was supposed to afford sufficient
excuse were then of more frequent occurrence, and pub-
lic opinion was more tolerant of them in Italy than it
would be now in other countries of the same extent and
population. It may be questioned whether this lax
* “ºutrep yap déukčiv Xpſ) rupdvvuòos Tepi
ká\\torov dàukčiv ráA\a 6' évoré8ew Xpedov.”
—EURIP. Phoenissae.
A distich said to have been constantly in the mouth of Julius Caesar.
352 - CONCLUSION. Book VIII.
state of public morality did not more than counter-
balance all the advantages of wealth, learning, and
refinement, which the early freedom of Italy and the
absence of centralisation called into existence. The
opening of a career of distinction to every man of ability
has always been reckoned one of the greatest advantages
of republican institutions and local self-government.
The life of the man who was said by the annalist of
Italy to be one of the greatest heroes of his country,
and allowed by his contemporaries to be just, humane,
and generous, affords too many examples of the deeds
which every one who would then tread the path of fame
was compelled to do. Can it be said that mankind
were either better or happier by the political organisa-
tions which afforded opportunities, and held forth in-
ducements, to enter on this career?
THE END.
PRINTRD BY WILLIAM BI.ACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH.

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