THE
1. Berthous
PRINCIPAL TRUTHS
O F
NATURAL RELIGION
Defended and Illuftrated,
In NINE DISSERTATIONS:
Wherein the Objections of Lucretius, Buffon,
Maupertuis, Rouffeau, La Mettrie, and other
antient and modern Followers of Epicurus are
confidered, and their Doctrines refuted.
By H. S. REIMARUS.
LONDON,
Printed: And Sold by B. Law in Ave-Mary Lane.
MDCCLXVI.
PREFACE.
↓
T¹
HE defign of the following Dif-
fertations is to illuftrate the moſt
important Truths of Natural Religion,
and to defend them againſt the attacks
of ancient and modern Infidels. The
original work has met with univerfal
approbation in Germany and Holland;
and as we have too many among us who
are favourers of the abfurd doctrines of
Epicurus, recommended by all the
charms of Poetry by Lucretius, and
lately retailed by feveral artful and ad-
mired French Writers, I thought it
would not be amifs to put our ingenious
Author's fentiments in an Engliſh dreſs.
I have endeavoured to place M. Rei-
marus's arguments in the moſt confpi-
cuous point of view, and to convey his
ideas to the Engliſh reader in a plain,
eafy ftile; omitting fuch paffages as
might divert the attention from the
main argument, either by a minute
detail of particulars, or by notes and
long
PREF A CE.
1
long quotations; and am perfuaded
that nothing but redundancies have been
cut off, and that what the work lofes
in bulk, is made up in perfpicuity.
1
The reader will here meet with feve-
ral new arguments in favour of Religion,
and others placed in a new, and, in my
opinion, advantageous light; fo that,
I prefume, my endeavours to illuftrate
a fubject of the higheſt importance, by
adding this valuable work to other ex-
cellent treatiſes already extant in our
language, will be received with candour,
and read without prejudice.
f
R. WYNNE. .
THE
Gift
Tappan Preck Ce
4-9-1932
[1]
3
A
THE
PRINCIPAL TRUTHS
OF
;
NATURAL RELIGION
· Defended and Illuftrated.
DISSERTATION I.
SECTION
I.
.
Concerning the Beginning and Origin of Men
A
and Animals.
FIRM perfuafion of the exiſtence of a
God is the foundation of all Religion;
and the knowledge of this great truth,
as far as it is attainable by reaſon, may be termed
Natural Religion. Now, according to this Na-
tural Religion, God is the firſt ſelf-exiſtent,
neceffary, and eternal Being, the creator, fup-
porter, and governor of the world, and every
thing in it; who has adapted the human fpecies;
in particular, to the enjoyment of a more refined,
durable, and perfect felicity, even after this pre-
·
B
fent
2
NATURAL RELIGION
fent life: fuch a lively knowledge of God will
be an active principal in the human mind, and
productive of virtue and obedience; it will im-
part clear ideas of the connections and relations
of things, and infpire the foul with firmneſs,
ferenity, and acquiefcence.
On the other hand, thoſe who deny the ex-
iſtence of a God, and are deftitute of all Re-
ligion, eſtabliſh this as a fundamental maxim,
namely, "That the material world, and its na-.
"ture, is the primary, felf-exiftent, and eternal
CC
Being, and that out of and befides the world
"nothing exifts." A pofition which utterly
excludes all reaſon and defign, all wiſdom and
providence, from the affairs of this world, and
attributes every thing that happens here below
to the blind powers of chance or neceffity. By
this fuppofition the duration and happineſs of
man is limited to this fhort and fenfual life.
SECTION II.
However, all thoſe who deny the exiſtence
of a Deity, allow of a material world actually
exiſting without us; and thus the certainty which
we derive from the fenfes and manifeft experience,
remains uncontroverted. They likewife admit
of a ſelf-exiſting, neceffary, and eternal effence;
and confequently lay an immoveable foundation
of a truth on which found reaſon may raiſe a
fuperftructure.-To deny the actual exiſtence of
the corporeal world, would be in fact denying
that of our own bodies and their fenfations; and
not
Defended and Illuftrated.
3
A
not to ſuppoſe ſomething eternal, neceſſary, and
felf-exiftent, is to contradict the experience of
our own minds: for if there was not fomething
eternal, a time might be fuppofed when nothing
actually exiſted; and confequently all that now
exiſts muſt have fome enterance into being, yet
without any thing to impart that exiftence.-If
there was not fomething which neceffarily exifted,
every thing which now exifts might have, or not
have been, or have exifted in this or that man-
ner; confequently there was nothing intrinfically
in it to determine and cauſe its own exiſtence.-
If there was not fomething ſelf-exiftent, all things
that exiſt would have the foundation and cauſes of
their exiſtence, without themſelves, in fomething
foreign to them; confequently every thing would
be dependent, and yet the original cauſe of all
things dependent and exifting would no where
be found; which is manifeſtly abſurd and con-
trary to reaſon.
SECTION III.
So far then both parties are agreed, namely,
that there muſt be a ſelf-exiſting, neceffary, and
eternal Being: nor do our antagoniſts deny that
there can be but one fuch Being, as abfolutely
neceffary. Now from hence it evidently follows,
"That if there actually be any thing which has
"had a beginning, that Being muft have derived
"its origin from the felf-exiftent, neceffary, and
"eternal Being:" For otherwife, the fuppofing
fuch cauſes of things exifting, as had themſelves
B 2
an
4
NATURAL RELIGION
an origin and beginning of exiftence, leads on
to queſtions concerning the foundation and cauſe
of the exiſtence of all thofe dependent cauſes;
and theſe would at laft terminate in a mere
nothing, unleſs we finally acquiefce in one ſelf-
exifting, neceffary, and eternal Caufe.
Now this furniſheth us with an infallible
criterion, whereby we may know whether the
univerſe be ſuch a ſelf-exifting, neceffary, and
eternal Being: For,
<<
"That cannot be the firft felf-exiftent, ne-
ceffary, and eternal Being, which does
"not include in itſelf the original cauſe
"of all things which have been brought,
"into exiſtence."
Hence it follows, That if there be fomething
which has had a beginning, without owing its
first origin to the world or its nature, then the
world and its nature can by no means be the firft
ſelf-exiſtent, neceffary, and eternal Being; on
the contrary, the world itſelf muſt be dependent
and have received its exiftence, and confequently
muſt have had a beginning.
Now, in regard to the human and animal
fpecies, it may be clearly demonftrated, Firſt,
That they all had a beginning." Secondly,
"That they did not originally derive their ex-
"iſtence from the world or its nature." Hence
it follows, that we have in ourſelves and other
animals an infallible proof that neither the world
nor its nature is the firft, felf-exiftent, and eter-
nal Being, from which men and every thing
that exifts derive their origin.
SECTION
Defended and Illuftrated.
5
SECTION IV.
"That
As to the former pofition, namely,
"men and animals have all had a beginning of
"their exiſtence," I ſhall in this Differtation en-
deavour, with a fuccinct perfpicuity, to place it
beyond all doubt; and this I fhall do chiefly
with regard to the human fpecies, though what I
ſhall advance concerning them will hold equally
good as to other animals. To this end, let us
lay for a foundation an unquestionable, expe-
rimental truth, namely, That all thoſe men who
lived before us, and once did actually exiſt, are
now univerfally deceaſed, not one fingle perfon
excepted. Our anceſtors are all returned to duft;
not one of them has death fpared, fweeping
them away fucceffively; and even our eyes daily
fee the havock it continues to make among the
human fpecies. This is fo evident a truth, that
no metaphyſical fubtilty is of any avail againſt
it; for whatever can be predicated of all and
every individual of any fpecies, without ſo much
as a fingle exception, may properly be predicated
of all, or each of them taken ſeparately.
Now of all men who have lived before us, it
may be faid indifcriminately, without the ex-
ception of one individual, that they are defunct;
therefore, without the leaft equivocation or am-
biguity, I may include all, without exception,
under the fame predicament.
Let it not be fufpected that by the word all
I would here infinuate that the number of our
B 3
pre-
霄
​{
}
i
1
6
NATURAL RELIGION
predeceffors is finite: for I do not by the word
all in the leaſt determine whether the number of
them be finite or infinite. The extent of fuch
a number is to me unknown; nor is the in-
veftigation of it requifite in the cafe before us: it
is enough that I certainly and affuredly know
that we, who are now living, have but lately re-
ceived our exiſtence; that we are but of yefter-
day, as it were, and that all our forefathers are
fallen afleep, and have paffed to the regions
of death.
SECTION V.
Farther, fince all men who ever lived before
us (not one fingle individual excepted) have
arrived at the period of their lives, and died; fo
muſt they all (univerfally without exception)
have had a beginning of their existence. I am cer-
tain that no man of common fenfe will object to
this method of reaſoning; for who will prefume
to fuppofe one fingle man who has exifted from
eternity? or who will venture to affirm that what
has an end, might have been without a begin-
ning? But it is certain that all men who ever
lived before us are fince dead; and conſequently
all the men who have preceded us in Being
had a beginning of their life, and were pro-
duced by fome other Being. But if every man
who actually lived before us (not one excepted)
had a beginning of exiftence, and was formed
by fome other Being, there muft, exclufive of
all the men who have ever lived before us,
have been an efficient caufe, quite different from
the
Defended and Tiluflrated.
7
the human ſpecies, by which all men were form-
ed; for, without an efficient cauſe, we can have
no idea of the beginning or the exiſtence of any
thing and the efficient caufe is quite diftinct
from the things formed, and prior to them. Will
any one be ſo abfurd as to ſuppoſe a race of men
anterior to all and every one who ever lived, and
from whom all the following generations are de-
fcended? This would imply a manifeſt contra-
diction. For how can we conceive that all men,
and every individual man without exception, who
ever lived before us, had a beginning, if yet be-
fore them other men exifted? How can having
a beginning, or being formed, be predicated of
all men, if all are not comprehended in the
propofition? The inference therefore is plain,
that if, antecedently to all men who ever lived,
there has been an efficient cauſe by which they
have been all produced, it muſt be acknow-
ledged that there was a time when not one man
exifted. Hence it follows, that at leaſt two of
the human ſpecies were the firft from whom all
the generations of the children of men, fince
continued by the natural way of propagation,
derive their exiſtence; confequently the human
race, including all our predeceffors, had a be-
ginning, and therefore is not eternal. This con-
fequence does by no means reft on our having
by the word all underſtood only a finite num-
ber, but implies that to all and every one of the
human ſpecies ſomething belongs; the ſufficient
grounds and reafon of which are not predicable
B 4
of
DO
NATURAL RELIGION
Ca
nes of
futed.
}
tr. C :
of any one, but require a diſtinct efficient caufe
prior to all men who ever lived.
If this proof be thus evident and conclufive
with regard to the human fpecies, it is of no lefs
weight with regard to every animal and all
things having life, whether on our globe or in
other orbs in the univerſe. It is fufficient for
our purpoſe that they are mortal, and defcended
from progenitors who are now dead. Thus
every fpecies of animals, as well as men, once
had a beginning; and confequently there is not
to be found a fpecies of animals in any part of
the univerſe which is eternal, and does not owe
its exiſtence, and the beginning of it, to an
efficient cauſe different from, and prior to, that
whole fpecies.
4. Re:
SECTION VI.
It is a matter of wonder to me that fo
many
You need
het se philofophers, both ancient and modern, ſhould
labour to invalidate this plain demonftration,
namely, That the human fpecies had a begin-
ning, by ſuppoſing an infinite ſeries of men; for
this fuppofition is obfcure, perplexed, and falfe.
They firſt ſuppoſe the world to be eternal, and
then they maintain that the human fpecies is
coëval with the world. In confequence of this
opinion, there muſt have been on the earth an
infinite fucceffion of men without a beginning;
and they pretend that an infinite fucceffion of
births, antecedently to us, are as eaſily compre-
hended
*
9
Defended and Illuftrated.
t
Hended as an infinite progreffion of men pro-
pagated after us without end.
The fuppofition of the world's eternity for the
preſent I wave; but that of an infinite ſeries of
men I affirm to be erroneous and falfe, fince it
does not affign fufficient grounds and cauſes of
the things which have exiſtence. The fceptics
of old employed the fame artifice to draw their
adverfaries by tergiverſation into an unbounded
plain, of which they could neither fee nor de-
termine the limits. They referred every que-
ftion to an infinite fucceffion of cauſes; ſo that
no firſt cauſe might be found to terminate the
enquiry. But for thoſe who promiſe truth and
certainty, and to point out the origin and caufes
of things, to go about it by having recourſe to
infinitude, is a vain and frivolous attempt, as
will appear from the following confideration.
It is certain that we of the human fpecies,
who are now living, all had a beginning; if it
be aſked, from whence we derive that beginning,
the anſwer is very natural, From our fathers:
but had they alſo a beginning? Doubtleſs they
had, and that from our grandfathers; they again
deſcended from our great-grandfathers, and fo
on. Therefore, the foundation and caufe of our
origin is not fatisfactorily cleared up by the births
of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers for
if they had had no parents, they could not have
exiſted; we had not been, neither could our
defcendants be hereafter derived from us. But,
ſhould we trace back our origin to the thou-
fandth and hundred-thoufandth generation of our
pro-
IO NATURAL RELIGION
progenitors, would it clear up the myſtery and
folve the queſtion from whence we fet out? Not
at all; we have not gained an inch of ground;
the queſtion "Whence were they?" ftill con-
tinues the fame, and we may expect their final
anſwer in infinitude.
-
Thus the infinite fucceffion of cauſes is a
mere ſophiſm and juggle, fince it does not lead
us to an adequate primary caufe. Such reveries
may be compared to an infinite chain hanging
down from heaven: If no one fingle link can
fuftain itſelf in the air, unleſs it be connected
with that above it, it is a vain fuppofition to
imagine the links to be continued afterwards
ad infinitum; fince the whole chain is fuppofed
to hang upon nothing, and confequently muft
fall down to the ground *.
SECTION VII.
maliwattel Hence therefore it manifeftly appears, that an
infinite chain of dependent caufes does not affign
inferette of only
a fufficient foundation and cauſe of things exiſt-
magising; that it affords no illuftration, much leſs a
fatisfactory proof, of any thing, but is to be
claffed among vain and delufive chimeras. I
muſt however obſerve, that fome philofophers
are ftill apt to loſe themſelves in this intricate
434
maze.
In Algebra and Geometry we ufually fuppofe
an infinite progreffion of numbers, lines, and
* See W'ollafton's Religion of Nature delineated, Sect. V.
Prop. I.
mag-
3
f
Defended and Illuftrated.
II
magnitudes, as none of theſe can be imagined
fo great, but a greater ftill may be oppoſed to it.
This fort of infinitude alfo takes place in dimi-
nution; all the abftract ideas of numbers and
magnitudes being devifible ad infinitum. From
this negative and abftract idea of what may be
multiplied or diminiſhed ad infinitum, the ma-
thematician is at liberty to form fomething in-
finitely great, or infinitely fmall, in a pofitive
fenſe: nay, the infinitely great and fmall are by
them looked upon as unites, and multiplied or
divided infinite times: hence are produced in-
finite claffes of numbers, lines, &c. infinitely
great and infinitely fmall, among which one
infinite is always reckoned as nothing with
reſpect to another of a fuperior claſs *.
The inventors and patrons of this method of
calculating have very often given us to under-
* The mathematical ideas of infinite, with the uſe and abuſe
of them, have been treated of with much clearness and perfpi-
cuity by Baron Wolf in his Ontologia, Sect. 796 & feq. from
whence it appears, Firft, That the infinite of mathematicians
was intended purely for the more convenient calculation and
meaſurement of numbers and quantity, but ought not to be con-
fidered as any thing real or poffible; the fallacy confifts in this,
namely, That a negative idea is by mathematicians made pofi-
tive. Secondly, It appears that infinitely great or fmall is faid
to be ſo only comparatively, when one magnitude or quantity can-
not be meaſured or calculated by the other; as a mountain, which
in compariſon of an atom of duft blown from the fummit of it,
is infinitely great; but in calculating the eclipfe of the moon, or
the fhadow of the earth on the moon, is infinitely ſmall: On the
other hand, in meaſuring the diſtances and magnitudes of the
fixed ſtars, the whole earth is accounted as an indivifible point,
or as if the obſerver flood in the centre. See Wolfii Elementa
Analyfeos, P. II. Sect. 1. Chap. 1. Sect. 5.
ftand
$
+
NATURAL RELIGION
12
}
++
ſtand, that ſuch ideas of infinitely great and in-
finitely ſmall were contrived merely for the more
eafily finding out the true proportion; and as
fuch expedients are only uſed in the feveral
branches of the Mathematicks *, many philofo-
phers who are more converfant with the Mathe-
matics than logic, become fo accuſtomed to
theſe ideas, that by them they repreſent to them-
felves realities.
Hence fome eminent mathematicians are of
opinion, that the perfpicuity and certitude of the
ancient mathematical method of inftruction has
greatly fuffered by fuch dark and falfe ideas of
infinite; and that they tend to embarraſs the
* The celebrated Leibnitz in his Theodicée Difc. Prelim. Sec. 70,
has these words: Tout cela (nombre infini, ou infiniment petit)
ne font, que des fictions. Tout nombre eft fini et affignable,
toute ligne l'eft de même, et les infinis ou infiniment petits n'y
fignifient, que des grandeurs, qu'on peut prendre auffi grandes
ou auffi petites, que l'on voudra, pour montrer, qu'une erreur eſt
moindre que celle, qu'on a affignée, c'eſt à dire, qu'il n'y a au-
cune erreur: ou bien on entend par l'infiniment petit l'etat de
l'evanouiffement, ou du commencement d'une grandeur, conçus
à l'imitation des grandeurs dejà formées. To which may be
added what the fame author fays of this idea in the Acta Erudito-
rum 1712, P.167. To the fame purpoſe are the following axioms
in Wolfii Ontologia, Se&t. 797, "An infinite number, and an infi-
"nite magnitude, is an impoffibility. Sect. 779, Every number
"and every magnitude that is real and comprehenfible, is finite.
"Se&t. 801, One infinite cannot be greater or leſs than another
"infinite; for it is an impoffibility. Sect. 804, The infinite mag-
"nitudes of mathematicians are only imaginary, and no real
magnitudes. Sect. 805, The infinite of mathematicians is no
more than a technical term, fignifying fomething more than
can be comprehended in a number." Now this laft axiom
fhews, that by converting this imaginary infinite of mathema-
ticians into a reality, or a thing actually exiſting in nature, phi-
lofophy is become fubject to very grofs errors.
Co
mind
}
!
Defended and Îlluſtrated.
13
1
mind and lead it into errors. In confequence
of this, they have not been wanting in endea-
vours to ſhow that fuch ideas may be fpared
even in Geometry, and that every thing may be
fatisfactorily demonftrated in the old method *:
at leaſt it is certain that, except in the mathe-
matical ſciences, they are of no manner of uſe;
but on the contrary occafion many grofs errors,
and thoſe the more dangerous as they have the
appearance of certainty from the practice of
mathematicians, though they are falſe in them-
felves.
It will be fufficient for my purpoſe only to
animadvert on two pernicious errors of Spinofa
ariſing from ſuch ideas of infinitude. Firſt, it
is imagined "That infinite progreffion, and to
"be or to become infinite, is one and the fame
thing;" which is fundamentally wrong:
"
* This is the defign of the late Mr. Colin Mac Laurin, pro-
feffor of mathematics at Edinburgh, in his excellent Treatife of
Fluxions; in which, particularly in the introduction, he treats
of this point. It were to be wished that ſo good a defign was well
feconded and brought into vogue. Wolfius indeed vindicates the
intrinſically falſe ideas of infinite in the mathematics, as not detri-
mental, becauſe they are not productive of any palpable error,
and repreſents them infaribilating the diſcovery and demonftration
of truth. See his Ontologia, Sect. 814, Sect. S23, Sect. 824,
in notis. But on the other hand it is alleged, that ftill they are un-
neceffary, fince the demonftrations may be worked by truer ideas,
and with more precifion; and that they frequently render the ope-
ration much more prolix than the fynthetic method; that to lay
the foundation of a proof in falfe ideas, muft ever be attended with
uncertainty that even in the mathematics much circumfpection is
required to guard againft error; and lafly, that when thofe fci-
ences are applied to phyfics, many grofs and ridiculous errors
may be pointed out, into which fome celebrated mathematicians
have fallen by their infinitefimal calculation-.
:
other-
14.
NATURAL RELIGION
What
1
otherwiſe the inference is this, "What may
"proceed infinitely a parte poft, may alſo be
"extended ad infinitum, a parte ante, and
cc
confequently may have been without begin-
"ning;" which is a mere fophifm: but I fhall
farther enlarge on both theſe fuppofitions.
SECTION VIII.
aUnless we are difpofed to play with words,
of incuase is nothing can be or be termed infinite, but that
finite.
1
to which nothing of the fame kind can be far-
ther added; confequently, whatever admits of
addition or increaſe is finite or determinate: for
at that point, if I may be allowed the expreffion,
where a thing actually ceaſes, and where a poffi-
bility of its increaſe begins, that is the end or
utmoſt limit of that thing. Whether we apply
this maxim to numbers, lines, magnitudes,
power, ſpace, time, or any thing elſe, it will
be found to be true. Hence it follows, that
every one of theſe is ſo far finite and determinate
as any addition can be made to the number,
line, magnitude, power, time, or ſpace; which
evidently demonftrates that no number, nor any
thing that is numerable, is or ever can become
really infinite: for no number is or can be fup-
pofed fo great, that it cannot admit of increafe,
nay, that cannot be doubled. Now if this aug-
mentation can be carried on in an infinite pro-
greffion without end, it evidently proves that a
number, and every thing that is numerable and
may be augmented ad infinitum never ceafe to
be
Defended and Illuftrated.
15
*
be finite; and confequently, that to proceed ad
infinitum, and to be really infinite, are fo far
from being the fame thing, that they are quite
oppofites. That which can be augmented in-
finitely, muft, as fuch, ever come fhort of in-
finity; it remains, and ever will be capable of
increaſe, and confequently finite. That a num-
ber, a line, a magnitude, a ſpace, a time, or the
like, may increaſe and be augmented infinitely
I allow; but for this very reaſon there can be
no fuch thing as an infinite number, line or
magnitude, ſpace or time, in reality. Let
Let any
one multiply the feries and number of the de-
ceaſed among the human fpecies as long as he
pleaſes ad infinitum; yet will fuch feries and
number ever be found to be finite: for befides
thoſe who have already lived and are now dead,
others are fucceffively born and die in their
turn. Now as the feries or number of the dead
is actually augmented every day, it is therefore
not ſo great but that fomething of the like kind
may be added to it, and conſequently it cannot
be infinite. And this is the cafe with the future
feries of men who may come after us: though
the generations ſhould be prolonged ad infinitum
or to eternity; yet do they never ceafe to be
fufceptible of augmentation, and confequently
will be always finite and numerable.
SECTION IX.
The ſecond error ſpecified above, forms a new,
but an à parte poſt and not lefs falfe propofition
than
The abctions
sced-
infinitely has terr
• infinite be
twoo
16
NATURAL RELIGION
'
CC
# 1
than the preceding, namely, "Whatever can
proceed infinitely, may alſo be increaſed ad
infinitum a parte ante, and thus be held in-
"finite, and without beginning." I fhall for-
bear repeating what I have juſt proved, namely,
that to be capable of being increaſed ad in-
finitum, and to be infinite, are by no means the
fame, but indeed quite oppofite things; and that
the fucceffions of our progenitors are not there-
fore infinite and without beginning, notwith-
ftanding they may be increaſed in idea ad infinitum.
I farther affert that this continual increaſe can-
not be ſuppoſed to take place in the feries of our
anceſtors, as it does in that of our defcendants.
The difference is very evident: for the future
is but barely poffible, not real; and in things
poffible I may ever imagine more and more,
and carry on the feries at pleaſure without ever
coming to an end. But as real parts have a de-
termined number which caufes neither more nor
leſs, all that I imagine beyond that, have no real
exiſtence, but are only imaginary, or entes ra-
tionis; fo that as it would be an error to add our
poffible deſcendants as far as the thouſandth
ge-
neration to the ſeries of our real progenitors, it is
no leſs abfurd to increaſe at pleaſure the ſeries of
the former with thouſands or hundred thou-
fands of generations, and fo ad infinitum. Juſt
fo many of our predeceffors as have actually
exiſted, may be faid to have lived before us;
and not thouſands of generations more, which
as yet may poffibly exift. The number of them
being unknown to me, I call it x; it is not
there-
4
Defended and Illuftrated.
17
therefore yet x + 1000; it is a limited number
of real units, beginning from a firft unit and pro-
ceeding up to us. On feeing the public treaſure of
a ftate, it is readily fuppofed that it may be in-
creaſed ad infinitum; this is a bare poffibility.
But the fpecie which has been actually brought
into the treaſury in former times is not to be
increaſed at pleaſure; this would be only en-
riching the nation ad infinitum in idea.
The
national treaſure is the real determinate, though
unknown, quantity, of fpecie in that place, and
neither more nor lefs; and if that treaſure had
not had a beginning of its accumulation, it never
could be increaſed ad infinitum.
Now we will fuppofe the pieces of money
which have in reality been brought into the
treaſury, to be the perfons who already have really
died; and the pieces to be received for the time to
come ad infinitum, to be the future generations
of mankind; and the analogy between the real
cafe and the example will be evident and clear.
With regard to our anceſtors, we are not vainly
to multiply them ad infinitum, perpetually ima-
gining greater numbers of individuals than have
really exifted; this is feigning and ſuppoſing
without end. They who have lived before us
are determinate individuals, and each makes a
real part of the number and feries; and, with re-
ſpect to us, ftands in the definite relation of
grandfather, great grandfather, or remoter degrees
of confanguinity, to the 99th or 687th member,
and ſo on; therefore the whole number and the
C
whole
18 NATURAL RELIGION
whole feries, as far as they are real, are in all
reſpects limited and definite.
:
SECTION X.
It was, at firft, my defign to have reſted my
proof on this indifputable conclufion, logically
deduced from manifeft experience; totally omit-
ting the hiſtorical arguments in favour of it on
account of their multiplicity and extenfiveneſs. But
as a certain French Writer has lately laboured to
give a fanction from hiſtory to his opinion of
the eternity of the human fpecies *, I fhall, as
briefly as I can, endeavour to fhew, that true
hiſtory is fo far from contradicting the notion
of the human fpecies having a beginning, that
it confirms it by ſeveral circumftances.
✔
SECTION XI.
itive Hiſtory does by no means contradict the ſup-
firms the notion
pofition, that mankind had a beginning; for
а ведени
a legs all nations, of which we have any hiftorical
account, are agreed in this, namely, That their
Mo hurlian nake
*In a treatiſe entitled, Le monde, fon origine, et fon antiquité. à
Londres (according to the title-page) 1751, 8vo. In which the
anonymous writer, after borrowing a great deal from others, is
pleafed to copy from himſelf, repeating in the fecond part whole
pages of the firft; not omitting the very notes. Thus, Chap. I.
of Part II. had already made its appearance in Part I. from
p. 155 to 162. Again, from p. 15 to 19 ftands in P. I. p. 164-
167. Further, p. 21. is taken from P. I. p. 162, and p. 48-
52 from P. I. p. 168-171.
1
lineage
Defended and Illuftrated.
19
lineage had a commencement, however they
may differ as to the time, manner, and cauſe of
it. Moft nations give themſelves out to be indi-
gena, terrígena, aborigines, EyyEVELS or autox Dovas *
εγγενεις αυτοχ θονας
the import of all which is, that their primary
anceſtors were born in the country which their
deſcendants now inhabit, and derived their origin
from our general mother, the bofom of the earth.
This tradition, however, does not exclude the
interpofition of a divine artift, who formed them
of clay on the contrary, ignorance was pro-
bably the cauſe of this opinion, fince they did
not know that from time immemorial their an-
ceſtors had emigrated thither out of fome other
country; which induced them to believe, that
they were brought into Being, or produced, in
the reſpective regions which they afterwards in-
habited. In moſt of the ancient nations indeed
*Diodorus Siculus, Lib. I. Chap. IX. p. 12. Óv μorov EX-
Ον μονον
ληνες αλλά και πολλοι των βαρβάρων ἑαυτες αυτόχθονας λεγοντες. 66 Not
*only the Greeks, but many of the Barbarians fay, that
they fprung from the earth." What he fays concerning the
Egyptians the reader may fee in cap. 10, & feq. Concerning the
Indians in lib. II. cap. 38. p. 151, and Paufanias lib. VIII. cap.
29. p. 661. Concerning the Ethiopians, fee Diodorus lib. III.
cap. 2; and concerning the Scythians, lib. II. cap. 43. p. 155,
concerning the Athenians, fee Ifocrates in Panegyrico, p. 45. ed.
H. Steph. and in Panathenaico, p. 258, and Euripides, as cited
by Plutarch, de exilio, p. 604, Justin II. 6. Concerning the Ar-
cadians and Achivi, fee Paufanias Eliac. lib. V. cap. 6. p. 335.
Concerning the Cretans, lib. V. cap, 61. p. 381. Concerning the
Germans, ſee Tacitus de Mor. Germ. cap. 2 and 4; and laſtly, con-
cerning the Britains, fee Cæfar de bello Gall. lib. V. cap. 12.
for the Gauls Cæfar [de bello Gall. lib. VI. cap. 18] fays, Galli fe
omnes ab Dite patre prognatos predicant.
As
+ Vid. Pfanneri Syftema Theologiæ Gentilis purioris, cap. VII.
fect, z.
C 2
this
*
20
NATURAL RELIGION
į
this fiction aroſe from pride; for they would not
be thought to owe their origin to any foreigners,
or be called a colony, or defcendants from ano-
ther people. The fame pride and vanity gave
birth to the contefts among feveral nations about
their antiquity, divine extraction, and the first
invention of all the neceffary and polite arts*. The
Babylonians indeed, according to the venerable
account given of them by Mofes, were the moſt
ancient people, reckoning from the deluge; and
Dispute of live Bab it is fuppofed that Egypt was peopled by that
Sephew nation; yet this fuperiority was denied them by
Cinta
1
the Egyptians, who farther afferted, that not
only the firſt men but the very Gods were natives
of their country. Diodorus + farther tells us, that
they had fent colonies into Greece, Pontus, Ara-
bia, Judea and Syria, and even to Babylon;
and that they cauſed the Babylonians to be in-
ſtructed in aſtronomy §. It is alſo faid that to
them was owing the invention of every art, and
that the Greeks received all their Philoſophy and
Theology from the fame fource . This brings
Herodotus's veracity in queftion, when he makes
Diodorus Sic. lib. I. cap. 9, has thefe words, eg de, &c.
"Not only the Greeks, but Barbarians alſo diſputed among each
other which was the most ancient nation; each of them owned
no other origin than the earth; each was the first inventor of
neceſſary things; and each had, for ages before, performed exploits
worthy of commemoration."
† See Jacobus Perizonius in Originibus Babylonicis, cap. I.
Jeq. and in Originibus Egyptiacis, cap. I.
‡ Diodorus Sic. lib. I. cap. 10 and 12. Mela. I. 9.
§ Lib. I. cap. 28.
H Idem, lib. I. cap. 11, & feq. Item, cap. 22 and 69.
Pfam-
Defended and Illuftrated.
2I
The
}
cler of the
eyian, as to the
thi
usf Chin
atten
LAS
Pfammetichus, king of Egypt, yield the prece-
dence in point of antiquity, even to the Phry-
gians; becauſe two children, whom he had
cauſed to be brought up without hearing any
human ſpeech, had of themfelves cried out,
Bekos! Bekos! which, as he tells us, in the
Phrygian tongue fignifies bread *. The Scy-
The Scy-
thians, nevertheleſs, pretended to a more ancient
origin than the Egyptians; for they inhabited
higher land than the latter, which, after the
univerfal deluge, was quite dried, while Egypt
ftill lay under water; and Juſtin ſeems in this
particular to favour their pretenfions +. The tention
Ethiopians alfo were competitors for the honour
of being the first race of men, and looked on
the Egyptians only as an antient colony of
theirs. In fhort, every nation was for exalting
itſelf above all other people on account of their
antiquity, long train of anceſtors, divine ex-
traction, number of colonies, and valuable in-
ventions; and it was reckoned a diſgrace to be
called the defcendants of any foreign nation.
Since theſe were their motives, it appears that
their ſeveral claims were nothing but fictions
contrived by thoſe ſeveral nations from a vain
affectation of pre-eminence. The falfity of
their affertions is very glaring and palpable; for
the Egyptians pretend to a hiſtory of 23,000
Egyptian
years, the Babylonians of 470,000, and the ion.
Chineſe go beyond them both, tracing their Chines
*Herodotus, lib. II. fect. z.
+ Lib. II. cap. I.
'
Diodorus Sic. lib. III. cap. 2, 3•
hiſtory
C 3
22
NATURAL RELIGION
*
の​髪
​}
hiſtory back as far as nine millions of years.
Such grofs exaggerations have been fufficiently
expoſed by Cicero, Diodorus Siculus, and other
ancient writers *. Callifthenes, who attended
Alexander in his Afiatic wars, is faid by Porphyry
to have found in the Chaldean volumes no
aftronomical obſervations beyond 1903 years
prior to that æra; which anſwers pretty nearly
to the time of Nimrod. And Martinus
Martyni writes, that all the annals of China,
before Fo-by, were looked upon by the Chineſe
themſelves as fictions, and in many parts con-
taining ridiculous accounts ‡. It may be affirm-
ed of the hiftories of all nations in general, that
none of them which are entitled to any credit,
** Cicero, lib. I. De Divinat. lib. I. cap. 19, has theſe words,
Condemnemus hos (Babylonios) aut ftultitiæ aut vanitatis aut im-
prudentiæ qui CCCCLXX millia annorum, ut ipfi dicunt, monu-
mentis comprehenfa continent, et mentiri judicemus, nec fecu-
lorum reliquorum judicium quod de ipfis futurum fit pertimefcere.
vide eundem, lib. II. cap. 46. Diodorus Sic. lib. II. cap. 31.
fays, meçi de T8 TÂNƐ85 TWV ETWY, &c. i. e. « The vaft number of
years during which the Chaldeans pretend to have obferved
"the heavens, will not eafily be credited; for, from their firſt
"aftronomical obfervations, to the time of Alexander's en-
"trance into Afia, they compute a term of no lefs than 473000.
"years." Alfo of the Egyptians he fays, lib. I. cap. 26. Oì
ispɛic, &c. i. e. "The Egyptian priefts fay, that the interval
from the reign of the fun to Alexander's expedition into Afia,
CC was about 23,000 years; but this furpaffes all belief." Syn-
cellusin Cronico, p. 17, & eg, and 37 ed. Paris. 1652, in fol. gives
no better account of both nations, and of their hiſtorians Berofus
and Manetho.
+ Perizonius in Origin Babyl. cap. I. p. 6, & feq.
In Decade 1. Sinica Hiftoria, he has theſe words, Ante Fohium
quidem Imperatorem, conftituta annalium fuorum initia Sinæ ipfi
pro fufpectis habent, ut quæ falfa et ridicula quam plurima com-
plectantur.
go
Defended and Illuftrated
23
go
further back than the accounts given by Mofes
after the deluge: accordingly the hiſtories written
by the Greeks do not commence till the times of
Semiramis and Ninus; and the art of writing,
or rather of recording events, is fcarce of fo an-
cient a date *. Be this as it will, we have here
the unanimous confent of all nations, that they
did not look on themſelves as eternal, but
readily owned that they had a beginning: for
thoſe who deduced the primary origin of their
anceſtors from the earth, thereby acknowledged
that there was a time when none of their
pro-
genitors exifted. Even thoſe who derived their
pedigree from the Gods, or rather deified their
firſt fovereigns and benefactors, as the Egyp-
tians, Babylonians, Cretans, Pelafgians, &c. re-
preſented thoſe deities as born and produced,
that is, as mere men, though diſtinguiſhed by
their power or eminent virtues. The ancient
* Macrobius in Somnium Scipionis, lib. II. cap. 10, fays, Quis
facile mundum femper fuiffe confentiat? cum abhinc ultra duo
retro annorum millia de excellenti rerum geftarum memoria ne
Greca quidem exftet hiftoria. Nam fupra Ninum, a quo Semi-
ramis fecundum quofdam creditur procreata, nihil præclarum in
libros relatum eft. Diodorus Sic. lib. I. cap. 9. has the following
words, Aduvalov, &c. i. e. "It is impoffible that the invention of
letters fhould be of fo ancient a date as the age of the firft fove-
reigns; but even granting this, it appears that it is but lately
that the world has been bleffed with hiftorians." See likewiſe
Plato de Rep. lib. III.
+ It was only certain philofophers that, according to their
erroneous ſyſtems, would have the world and the human race to
be eternal, as Cenforinus le die natali. cap. 4. obſerves. Buddeus
however, in his Hiftoria Ecclef. Vet. Teft. Tom. I. p. 75, & feq.
clears moſt of the philofophers of this error, excepting only
Ocellus Lucanus and Ariftotle.
C 4
Perfians,
24 NATURAL RELIGION
Priven belof
to the cat
of man the world
Authentic bustom
never go bukid
hed the
bacé Quauuko
+
or
1
Perfians, and many other nations, afferted ex-
prefsly that the world and man were created by
God *. The Chineſe, notwithſtanding their
immenfe chronology, held that there was a firſt
man, by name PUONCUUM. Hence it ap-
pears, that there never was a people whoſe
pride and vanity arrived to fuch a pitch of
extravagance as to lay claim to eternity; and
that authentic hiftories never go farther back
than the time of Nimrod, or the Mofaic ac-
count.
count. Thus if we confider Mofes only as the
moſt early hiſtorian that is extant, we have all
the reaſon in the world to give credit to his
account of the origin, propagation, and difper-
fion of mankind. That he was not influenced
by vanity is evident, becauſe he affigns a more
ancient origin to all other nations then exifting,
than to his own: befides, feveral paffages in
the writings of Mofes fhew that he digefted
fome of his hiſtory from earlier accounts. The
names of the Patriarchs recorded by him agree
with the ancient names of nations and countries;
and in this particular even the Pagan hiſtorians
confirm the truth of the Mofaic writings, as the
celebrated Bochart has fufficiently fhewn in his
Geographia Sacra.
SECTION
XII.
It is not to be wondered at, that the later
Greek and Roman writers are filent about the
firft inhabitants of thofe countries that were dif
* Hyde de Reb. Vet. Perfar. p. 164.
† Mart. M. Sin. Hif. Decade I.
covered
Defended and Illustrated.
25
covered in their time; but ought to be imputed
to their ignorance, fince they are of too modern
a date to be acquainted with that particular.
However, what is faid concerning the firft peo-
pling of countries, ought not to be looked upon
as mere fictions, as if all countries had been always
inhabited. Now the anonymous French writer
mentioned above*, denies that from the hifto-
rical accounts of ancient migrations and colonies
it can be gathered, that the world was gradually
peopled from time to time: "For inftance,"
continues he," it is believed that the Egyptians
" and Phoenicians peopled Greece; that the
"Greeks and Lydians peopled Italy; that the
"Phoenicians and Celtæ peopled Spain, and fo
"on: let us therefore examine how far an-
"tiquity informs us concerning theſe colonies.
"I fhall from the ancient hiftorians make it
<c
appear, that all thofe countries whither thefe
"colonies were fent, had been actually peopled
"before the arrival of fuch colonies; and that
"the ancient colonies differed in nothing from
"thoſe which the Europeans, for fome time
<<
paſt, have been ſending to America: then I fhall
"proceed to demonftrate, that it is impoffible
<<
to go fo far back as thofe times when the
"world was firſt peopled, by the help of hiftory;
"and that confequently all that is advanced on
"this head, beyond a certain point, is mere
" fiction and groundleſs conjecture."
* Le monde, fon origine & antiquité. à Londres 1751, 8vo.
Part I. p. 218.
For
26
NATURAL RELIGION
1
1
For the truth of this he appeals to the tefti-
monies of Paufanias, Strabo, Dionyfius of Hali-
carnaffus, Varro, Pliny, Nepos, and Juſtin, but
fays not a word of Mofes. Now would a can-
did enquirer after the firſt inhabitants of various
countries, confine his reſearches to fuch modern
hiftorians as could not poffibly know any thing
of them? If after fuch a fucceffion of ages, and
fo many intervening migrations, expeditions, and
revolutions, they could gain fome knowledge
of the deſcent of a few nations or tribes by
oral tradition; yet they remained totally igno-
rant of the original inhabitants of thofe countries.
But wherefore does this writer omit Mofes, the
earlieſt hiftorian, who lived nearer to the re-
moteft antiquity and moft ancient accounts, in
that very country which was the nurſery that
fent colonies to many other parts of the world?
Is it confiftent with candor and impartial treat-
ing of a queſtion, that he ſhould totally paſs by
Mofes, as if fuch a perfon had never exifted,
as if he had not written any hiftory, or as if it
were a determined point that his teſtimony is of
no force, and not worthy even to be mentioned?
Is it rational to produce the filence of the
moderns as a proof that an event never happen-
ed, becauſe they do not give any account of it,
though it be recorded by the moft ancient *
hiſtorians?
*Bochart, in the preface to his Phaleg, comparing the Mofaic
accounts with the Pagan, fays, Neque enim aliud quidquam
fupereft, unde prifcarum gentium origines exfculpamus. Nam
Chaldæorum, Phoenicum et Ægyptiorum,monumenta pridem con-
fumpfit, ætas. Et Saiticus ille facerdos, Patenit nomine, de quo
Pro-
Defended and Illuftrated.
27
}
hiftorians? Should we, for once, allow that the
above-mentioned Greeks and Romans, in all the
accounts of colonies that occur in their writings,
ſuppoſed that thoſe countries in which they fet-
tled were already inhabited; that Pelos found
the Danaa; that by Danaus, Gelanor had been
driven out of Argos, and that he was a defcen-
dant from Inachus; that, prior to Cadmus, Beotia
had been inhabited by the Aonians, Temnicians,
Lelegians and Hyanthians, &c. yet all that this
proves is; that the Greeks could not give any
account of more remote times, and not that
their ignorance or filence is any proof that thoſe
countries had never been without inhabitants. Such
an inference is juft as logical as if we were to
conclude, on the other hand, from the ignorance
and filence of the Greek writers concerning the
people that inhabited Beotia before the Aonians,
Temnicians, &c. that it had never been inha-
bited before thoſe nations poffeffed it. This con-
clufion of the above-mentioned French writer
is even repugnant to the meaning and defign
of thoſe very hiftorians whom he cites: for though
they ſuppoſe the feveral countries inhabited, be-
fore colonies were fent thither; yet is there not
a word as if they imagined thoſe inhabitants to
Proclus poft Platonem in Timæo Græcos merito afferebat femper
effe pueros, nec unquam fenes, utpote veræ vetuftatis prorfus ignaros.
Proinde quoties de rebus vetuftis fermonem inftituunt, ad ridiculas
fabulas devolvuntur: atque alii fe ex quercubus aut lapidibus, alii
ex fungis, alii ex cicadis, alii ex formicis, aliiex draconis dentibus
fe fabulantur ortos. Quio porro gentium aliarum incunabula et pri-
mordia edoceri poffe fe putet ab iis, qui de propria origine talia
mentiuntur.
have
28
NATURAL RELIGION
have been the firft, and from everlaſting. If
ſome hiſtorians affirm, that in the beginning ſuch
and fuch people poffeffed this or that country,
or were its firft inhabitants (initio primi tenu-
erunt); fuch an expreffion is to be underſtood
with this limitation, viz. " the firft of whom
"we have any account." For though they fup-
pofed the earth to have been at first every where
uninhabited; yet it appears by their calling the
original inhabitants of countries, who were not
foreign coloniſts, Terrigena or earth-born, that
it was their opinion that there had been a time
when every country was entirely without inha-
bitants. Tacitus feems to fpeak doubtfully con-
cerning the Britons *: "Who the firſt inhabi-
"tants of Britain were, fays that hiſtorian, whe-
"ther natives or foreigners, is unknown, they
"being Barbarians; though from their appear-
' ance and cuftoms, I am inclined to think
them foreigners, or a mixture of Germans,
"Iberians, and Gauls." Thus he ſuppoſes two
ways by which countries were at firft peopled,
namely, either by natives or by foreigners; and both
thefe opinions pre-fuppofe a defart uninhabited
land. Accordingly, it was alfo the boaſt of the
Athenians, that of all the Greeks they alone
were natives, and did not owe their extraction
to foreigners; by which they fignified, that
before the arrival of thofe foreigners, all the
* Tacitus in vitâ Agricolæ, cap. 11.
+ See the paffages of Ifocrates, Euripides, and Juſtin, quated
above.
feveral
!
Defended and Illuftrated.
29
}
feveral parts of Greece, Attica excepted, were
uninhabited.
Though the later colonies, mentioned by the
most modern Greek and Roman hiftorians, do
not exclude the fuppofition of more ancient in-
habitants; yet by the additition of theſe emi-
grants, the countries where they fettled became
much more populous, unleſs, as it fometimes
happened, the colonifts extirpated or drove
away all the former inhabitants. It is very cer-
tain that Britain by the fucceffive expeditions
and fettlements of the Celtæ, Gauls, Iberians,
Romans, Anglo-Saxons, and Danes, muft
have confiderably increaſed with regard to the
number of its inhabitants; as I fhall preſently
more particularly fhew from the many woods
with which that ifland was anciently over-run,
and by irrefragable proofs drawn from ancient
monuments. Other countries were peopled in
the fame manner, and of this we have a recent
inftance in America, whofe defart waftes have
been peopled by European colonies; and pro-
bably theſe emigrations to that part of the globe
will be continued for many ages to come.
By
the modern colonies it manifeftly appears, though
this writer will not allow it, that the world from
time to time is become more populous; and this
amounts to an hiftorical proof that the earth was
once a folitary, uncultivated defart, and confe-
quently that its inhabitants had a beginning. But
the hiſtory of the infant ſtate of the world is not
to be expected from fuch late writers as the
Greeks
!
30
NATURAL RELIGION
>
1
Greeks and Romans; nor can it be fuppofed that
they ever made it the fubject of their enquiries.
SECTION XIII.
I proceed in the next place to adduce fome
geographical arguments, which confirm the opi-
nion that the human fpecies had a beginning;
and here I fhall confine myſelf to the moft.
known, the cleareft, and moſt evident proofs *.
Firſt, it is well known that the far greateſt part
of Europe was once over-run with vaft woods,
and but very thinly fown with cities, towns, and
villages. This is a plain proof, that in general
it was formerly much lefs populous than at
* Mr. Hume has lately, in his Political Difcourfes, with
great learning and judgment treated of the number of people in
ancient nations; and as he maintains that there is an increaſe of
people in modern times, he invalidates many of the teſtimonies
from ancient writers concerning the vaft multitudes of people
faid to have exifted in thofe times, and not without great ap-
pearance of reafon turns them to ridicule. The contrary is
afferted by Mr. Wallace in A Differtation on the Numbers of Man-
kind in ancient and modern Times, in which the fuperior Populouf-
nefs of Antiquity is maintained; with an Appendix, &c. and Some
Remarks on Mr. Hume's Political Difcourfes of the Populoufnefs of
ancient Nations. Edinburgh 1753, 8vo. This author handles the
fubject more at large, and abounds in excellent political remarks,
but does by no means deny the gradual increaſe of the human ſpe-
cies; all he endeavours to fhew is, that there has been a time
when the earth was more populous than it is at prefent, and he'
attributes the decreaſe of mankind to natural and moral hin-
drances that obstruct their increafe in later times. Poffibly a
compariſon of theſe two writers, each of whom is only intent on
peopling the world in his own way, may bring an enquirer
nearer to the truth: however, I do not fee that either of them
have confuted, or fo much as touched on, the general proofs which I
have adduced.
}
preſent,
1
>
Defended and Illuftrated.
31
preſent, when one city often contains as many
people as there are peaſants in a whole province.
Hence we may judge what an immenſe number
of people muſt be within the many cities, towns,
and villages, which are now to be ſeen in moſt
parts of Europe: Nay, the ancient woods will
not allow us to ſuppoſe, that there could have
lived near the number of inhabitants we find at
preſent in the country, which in many places
was a lonely defart; for fuch thick and ex-
tenfive woods and forefts, as are mentioned in
hiſtory, could not have grown up and ſpread in
that manner, had any number of inhabitants
lived among them, as they could furniſh necef-
faries but for few men; but as men increaſed,
it was neceffary that trees and wild beafts fhould
give place, and that the land fhould be culti-
vated by tillage. Now if the human fpecies
had been without a beginning, the earth muſt
from time immemorial have been as populous,
I may fay much more fo, than it is at preſent,
inſtead of being in a great meaſure lonely, rude,
and uncultivated, as it was, according to hiftory,
about two thouſand years ago
*
Let us now take a ſhort perambulation
through ancient Europe.
* It muſt be owned that many countries, which in very an-
cient times were well peopled, are now uncultivated and very
thin of inhabitants, as Judea, the northern coaſt of Africa, Afia
Minor, and many parts of Greece; but are we then to conclude
that the whole globe in general is lefs inhabited than anciently?
Mr. Reimerus fhews, by irrefragable proofs, that ſome countries,
and even the chief parts of Europe, are much better peopled
than anciently, and that the inhabitants of the earth have only
fhifted their fettlements.
Iberia,
1
32
NATURAL RELIGION
Iberia, or Spain, according to Varro, fwarmed
with inhabitants defcended from the Afiatic Ibe-
rians, Perfians, Phoenicians, and Celta, and in fuc-
ceeding times by the Pani, or Carthaginians *
which were all drawn thither by the fertility of the
foil, or the falubrity of the air; fo that as Strabo
fhews from Homer, it was accounted a kind of
paradife; but this is chiefly to be underſtood of
the maritime parts along the coaft of the Me-
diteranean, the inland parts all this while re-
maining uncultivated, and conſequently without
inhabitants. The Lufitanians, and thoſe who
bordered on the Tagus, inftead of attending to
agriculture, made it their principal buſineſs to
commit depredations upon their neighbours ; fo
that this country, though naturally fo fruitful,
lay wafte. The other inland Spaniards, and
thoſe inhabiting the parts that border on the
Pyrenean mountains, univerfally delighted in
war, and their manner of life was rough and
uncivilized, as the Romans frequently expe-
rienced. Strabo tells us that Pofidonius ridiculed
Polybius for afferting that Gracchus, while in
Celtiberia, made himſelf maſter of three hundred
towns, and fays, that, purely to magnify Grac-
chus's triumph, he has made towns of fingle
towers or forts erected only to fupprefs the in-
curfions of an enemy: he adds, that many
other hiftorians were no lefs culpable in giving
* This Pliny fays from Varro, Hift. Nat. lib. III. cap. 1.
+ Strabo Geogr. lib. III. tom. I. p. 223, from Homer's
Odyſſey, 8vo. p. 568.
I Strabo, lib. III. p. 231.
1
villages
!
33
Defended and Illuftrated.
villages the appellation of cities, when they
roundly affirm that Spain contained above a
thouſand cities and towns *.
Of the many
woods in the upper part of Spain, Strabo ſpeaks
a little before; and this is confirmed by Bochart
from other writers: Now it is well known
how greatly the number of inhabitants has in-
creaſed fince that æra, and afterwards again de-
creaſed, in Spain.
As to Gaul or France, though it was pretty
well peopled in Cafar's time; yet we find that
it was much more woody, and confequently
leſs cultivated than at prefent. Cæfar mentions
the Sylva Arduenna, or Foreſt of Ardennes, as
one of the largeſt in all Gaul, extending from
the Rhine in the country of the Treviri, (fituated
between the Rhine and the Maefe) to the Nervii,
that is to the Scheld, a diftance of more than five
hundred miles . Again he fays of the Menapii
and Morini, that the woods and fens whither
they had betaken themſelves, extended a great
way; and that for feveral days his army was
employed in hewing their way through the
woods, which they performed with incredible
diſpatch, but ineffectually, fince thoſe people
retreated farther up into the woods, and the bad
weather obliged him to give over his defign:
confequently, this wood must have reached from
the Rhine and the Maefe near Nimeguen (No-
* Strabo, lib. III. p. 247.
+ Strabo, p. 245. Bochart, geogr. 5. p. 694.
‡ Cæfar de B. G. lib. VI. cap. 29. V. 3.
Cæfar, lib. III. cap. 28.
D
viomagus
34 NATURAL RELIGION
1
•
viomagus Trevirorum) as far as Calais. The
general character which Strabo gives of the
Gauls agrees with this, namely, That they
applied themſelves more to war than agri-
culture *.
As for Switzerland, or rather Helvetia, the
nature of the country is out of the question,
Cafar having given us an exact account of the
number of its inhabitants in his time: for when
the Helvetii had refolved, together with their
wives and children, to quit their country and
feek a better fettlement in Gaul; Cafar, after
gaining a compleat victory over them, found
that by their own calculation the whole number
of the emigrants who had before occupied twelve
towns and about four hundred villages, amount-
ed to 263,000; and of theſe ſcarce 110,000 re-
turned home after the defeat: Now as the limits
of Helvetia at that time were very nearly the
fame as thoſe of Switzerland at prefent, what
an inconfiderable number is 263,000 compared
with that of its prefent inhabitants! and how
greatly have the fmall remainder which fur-
vived the flaughter of their countrymen increafed
fince that time†!
Cafar, in his firſt expedition to Britain, may
be ſuppoſed to have landed almoft oppofite
Calais; but on his advancing up the country,
* Strabo, lib. IV. p. 269.
+ Vide Cæfar de B. G. 1. 29. 5. 26. 2. The number of the
Felvetii, which Hume makes to be only 36,000, according to
Cæfar fhould be 368,000; in this number were included the
Tulingi, the Latobrigi, Rauraci, and Boii; the Helvetii alone
were computed at 263,000.
the
Defended and Illuftrated.
35
the enemies, who lurked in the woods during
the night, fuddenly fallied out upon his men *.
In his fecond expedition, when he penetrated
farther into the country, he was continually an-
noyed by parties of the enemy fallying out of
the woods, till he came to the Thames; where
he found Cafibelan, commander in chief of the
Britons, fortified among pathleſs woods, with
what men and cattle he could collect together.
Cæfar farther obferves, that a place environed
with trees which they had felled and furrounded
with a ditch, was by the Britons called a town;
and that they had no idea of any other ‡. Dio
Caffius alſo gives the like account of the Britons,
namely, that they lived in woods, fens, and moun-
tains, without any towns or walled places, or any
knowledge of agriculture; fubfifting by grazing,
hunting, and eating berries and roots. How
different muſt the aſpect of Britain have been at
that time from that it wears at prefent, where
no fuch extenfive woods, &c. are to be found,
eſpecially in the fouthern parts of the iſland!
And though it afterwards became gradually more
populous, by the defcent of the Romans, Anglo-
Saxons, and Danes; yet Sir Matthew Hale, a learn-
ed Engliſh writer, has proved from the original
account of all the cities, towns, and villages,
taken in the time of William the Conqueror §,
that the number of inhabitants, within 600 years
*Cefar, lib. IV. cap. 32.
+ Cæfar, lib. V. cap 15.
‡ Cæfar, lib. V. cap. 21.
|| Dio Caffius, p. 222. Heroidan, lib. III. cap. 14.
§ Doomíday Book.
D 2
from
}
36
NATURAL RELIGION
!
from that period down to his time, was increaf-
ed in above a twenty-fold proportion, though the
Engliſh nation in that interval fuffered more by
inteftine commotions and foreign invafions than
in any other. Hence it appears that a retroſpect
into the most ancient times of Britain fhews it
to have been a defart wafte, in comparifon of its
preſent proſperity and populouſneſs.
Ancient Germany was ftill more folitary and
uncultivated; for Cafar writes of the Germans,
that they accounted it matter of praiſe to ravage
every thing near them, and be furrounded on
all fides with defarts; and that, among that peo-
ple, to harrafs and deftroy their neighbours, fo
that none dared to fettle near them, argued
fuperior courage*; they defpifed agriculture,
and there was no fuch thing as property of land
among them, but the chiefs annually diftributed
to every tribe and houfhold as much land as
they thought fit; but the following year there
was a general removal, that they might not
conceive a fondness for any one place, and ap-
ply themſelves to agriculture, to the neglect of
the art of war. Cæfar tells us, that on his
paffing the Rhine, the Sicambri immediately
hid themſelves among the woods and thickets
and this account is confirmed by Tacitus: “It
"it well known, fays that hiftorian, that no
"German nation lives in towns; nay, they
"will not fo much as allow any confiderable
* Calar de B. G. lib. VI. cap. 23.
+ Ibid. cap. 29.
Cafar, lib. IV. cap. 18.
" number
Defended and Illuftrated,
37
"(
<c
"number of habitations to be built together,
"but every family lives feparate, juſt as they
are invited by a fpring, a fertile fpot of
ground, or a wood *."
In another place
he gives a very unpleafing defcription of that
country: "Who would fettle in Germany,
were it not his native country, where the
"foil is fo uncultivated and wild, the climate fo
unfavourable, and every thing wears ſo rough
"and dreary an afpect? Though the country dif-
"fers a little, as to the foil, in various places; yet
❝in general it is over-run with gloomy woods or
filthy marshes; it produces no fruit-trees; the
"inhabitants exchange their fields every year fuit-
<c
<c
ably to their number, yet land enough remains;
"their induſtry bearing no manner of proportion
"to the extent and fertility of their lands +.'
Cæfar fays farther of the Germans, and par-
ticularly of the Suevi or Suabians, that they
ſpent their whole time in hunting; and gives
a deſcription of a kind of wild ox, the elk,
and fome other animals peculiar to the Hercy-
nean Foreſt ; but at prefent thoſe creatures
are to be found only in the Pruffian dominions,
and even there but feldom. The Hercynean
Foreft, which Pliny | believes to be cöeval
with the world itſelf, according to Cafar's re-
lation, extended in his time from the Rhine,
and the country of the Helvetii, the Nametes,
and Rauraci, in a ftrait line to the Danube, and
* Tacitus de Mor. Ger. cap. 16.
+ Cæfar de B G. lib. VI. cap. 21.
| Plinius H. Nat. lib. XVI. cap. 2.
+ Idem, cap. 2.
D 3
the
38 NATURAL RELIGION
the borders of the Daci: the breadth of it was
nine days journey; but as to its length, all Ger-
many did not afford one perfon who could
boaft of having reached its extremity, even
after a journey of fixty days, or could get any
intelligence of the beginning of that immenfe
wood. The fame author alfo mentions another
foreſt by the name of Bacenis, running a vaſt
way up the country, and forming a natural bar-
rier between the Cherufci and the Suevi, and con-
fequently was a protection to both from their
reciprocal incurfions *. Cellarius rightly judges
that many other extenfive woods, as the Cefian,
Gabretian, Semanian, Marcianian, Lunian, &c.
joined to the Hercynean wood ; fo that all
Germany then made, as it were, one vaft
foreft, and that it was only fome fmall inter-
mediate ſpaces that were occupied by the in-
habitants, who fixed in no place, but every
year fhifted their habitation; that they never
lived in towns or villages, but in feparate and
diſperſed huts, fubfifting on game and the pro-
ducts of the woods, and, what was worst of all,
laying waſte all the adjacent country. We ſhall
allo fee in the fequel that all Germany did not
afford a ſingle fruit-tree, unleſs we reckon acorns
and maſt a ſpecies of fruit. Theſe are manifeſt
proofs of the ſmall number of inhabitants in
ancient Germany, in compariſon with the pre-
fent. Where are now the immenfe forefts,
the elks, and other wild beasts mentioned above?
* Plinius, H. N. lib. VI. cap. 10.
+ Vide Cellarii Not, Orb. Antiq. tom. I. lib. 2. cap. 5.
In-
វ
Defended and Illuſtrated.
39
Inſtead of trees and wild beafts, all places are
filled with men and cattle: point out a tract of
land, which has the leaft fertility, that lies un-
cultivated; furvey the country; is it not every
where richly interfperfed with meadows, fields,
feats, villages, towns, and cities? Hence it is that
fuch numbers of huſbandmen, labourers, artifi-
cers, and men of letters, derive a comfortable
fubfiftence; hence fo many gentlemen, barons,
counts, princes, electors, and kings, are enabled
to maintain their ſtate, ſome of whom keep up
a military force, and even numerous armies.
Thus, in order to make a juft compariſon be-
tween the ancient and prefent inhabitants of
Germany, we must first deduct from the pre-
fent number all thoſe who do not live by agri-
culture, that is, all who live in towns and cities;
and what a vaft number do theſe amount to!
In the next place, fince moſt of the ancient
foreſts are cleared away, and the land properly
cultivated, ſcarce one tenth part of the preſent
cultivated land can be allowed to ancient Ger-
many, and of courfe no greater proportion of
peaſants; and both thefe numbers together
muſt make a defalcation of fome millions.
Laſtly, it muſt be confidered that the prefent
age is infinitely better acquainted with improve-
ments than thoſe ancient times; that now mo-
raffes are drained, canals dug, land is converted
into meadows, fruit-trees and kitchen-gardens
are cultivated; we now breed bees, make ponds,
plant vines, and make our way into the very
bowels of the earth in fearch of gems, metals,
D 4
minerals
40
NATURAL RELIGION
>
!
minerals and ores; fo that at preſent one and the
ſame ſpot of ground maintains ten times more
inhabitants than it did formerly: Now if theſe juſt
abatements be made, what a ſmall number of in-
habitants muſt be affigned to ancient Germany!
Hence it appears that in Germany, Switzer-
land, Britain, the Netherlands, France, and
in every part of Europe, the human fpecies has
exceedingly multiplied without any ſupplies from
Afia, not to mention the great number of Eu-
ropeans that has been fent to the other parts of the
world. M. Sufmilch has alſo demonſtrated, by
inconteftable proofs, that according to the courſe
of nature mankind neceffarily muſt be gradually
increaſed *; and that if in any populous countries
the number of inhabitants has vifibly declined,
as in Greece, Egypt, and the coaft of Barbary, it is
by no means to be imputed to the barrennefs of
the human fpecies, but to a tyrannical govern-
ment, which as it generally drives the natives
from their own country, fo much more does it deter
foreigners from fettling in fuch unhappy ſtates +.
Thus
*It may be eafily demonftrated, that after the building of the
city of Rome, the inhabitants of Italy were greatly multiplied,
though the Romans were engaged in continual wars, maintained
very numerous armies in foreign countries, and fent out fo many
colonies into Europe, Afia, and Africa; but the hiſtory of that
famous ftate is fo well known that we need only appeal to
every ones memory.
+ M. Monte/quieu ſeems to have confidered only this depopulation
of a few countries, which formerly made a great figure, when
in his Perfian Letters, No 108, and in his Spirit of Laws,
B XXIII. Class 18, & feq. he pronounces in general that the
prefent number of people on the earth falls very fhort of what
it was in the time of Cæfar. Mr. Wallace, whom I mentioned
above, falls into the fame error when he appeals to the multi-
tudes
Defended and Illuftrated.
41
•
Thus the cafe is quite otherwife with men, than
the brute creation, in this refpect; other animals
are generally limited to certain climates, by their
aliment and the degree of heat which they can
bear; and the multiplication of each ſpecies is by
its nature, or the fcarcity of proper food, in-
Thus
tudes of people in ancient times in Egypt, Greece, Sicily, the
iflands of the Archipelago and Judea. It is certain that people
from all parts reforted to the most flouriſhing ſtates, and living
there in eafe and profperity, multiplied exceedingly.
great numbers flocked to Rome and the northern parts of Italy,
and likewife to the most inviting, conquefts of the Romans; not
to mention that all wealthy or victorious nations have from time to
time augmented their numbers by flaves from other countries,
either bought or carried away captives: but did we know to
what countries other nations, like the Jews, feverally difperfed
themſelves over the earth after they were expelled from their
native country, we fhould not, from the defolation of fome
particular regions, be apt to conclude that the whole number of
the human ſpecies was diminiſhed by thoſe revolutions. If the
ſtate of a whole kingdom is not to be determined from a town
or two which may have ſuffered from the peftilence or any other
accident, we have as little reaſon to conclude from the depopu-
lation of two or three countries, that the inhabitants of the whole
earth are diminiſhed. The multiplication of the human ſpecies
is grounded on natural cauſes, and extends all over the globe;
whereas the diminution of inhabitants in a few places is merely
accidental, and is doubly made up in other parts of the world.
Nothing can be more void of probability, and more contradictory
to all hiftorical truth, than to clafs Lufitania, Gaul, Helvetia,
Germania, and Britain, among the countries whoſe inhabitants
fince Cafar's time are decreaſed; whereas, from the above-
mentioned teftimonies, thofe countries appear one with another
to be at leaſt twenty times better peopled than they were when
Caefar wrote his Commentaries.
-
Though the increaſe of mankind has been greatly checked by
war, famine, peftilence, innundations, eathquakes, and votive
celibacy; yet for many ages paft, the human ſpecies appears to
have been increaſing, though but flowly; and indeed for want
of exact lifts of births and burials, nothing can be advanced
on this head with any certainty, though the author makes the
proportion as twenty to one between Cefar's time and the
prefent age.
clemency
42
NATURAL RELIGION
clemency of the weather, beafts of prey, or by
man kept within certain bounds: but the human
fpecies may be reconciled to every temperature
of climate, from Nova Zembla to the Equator;
can habituate themſelves to any kind of food
which any part of the earth affords, and fecure
themſelves from the inclement changes of the
weather they are generally able to propagate
their fpecies for forty or forty-five years, and the
female fex is prolific from fifteen to forty-five
years of age. Man can render defarts, fens,
woods, and mountains proper for his fubfiftence;
and can make uſe of, extirpate, or at leaſt drive
away, all hurtful beafts from his habitation;
and that all this has been done in former times
hiſtory abundantly teftifies. But the foreſts ſtill
remaining, eſpecially in the north-east parts of
Europe and Afia, and almoſt over all Africa and
America, farther fhew that the whole globe is
not yet ſo well peopled as it might be; befides,
many iflands and countries, which are naturally
very fertile and fit for habitation, continue to this
day without any inhabitants: on the contrary,
we learn from unquestionable authorities, that
the farther we fearch back into ancient times,
the more thinly was the earth peopled, and the
more it was over-run with woods, moraffes, and
defarts. This obfervation neceffarily leads us
to trace mankind to the fmalleft number poffi-
ble, namely, our general parents; and fhews,
that it is impoffible for the human race to have
always exifted without a beginning: for other-
wife, from time immemorial, there must have
been
Defended and Illuftrated.
43
been at leaſt as many individuals of the human
fpecies as there are at this time, and the earth
muſt have been as well cultivated and peopled
as we find it at preſent.
SECTION XIV.
The other hiftorical circumftance, which con-
firms the fuppofition that mankind derive their
origin from a ſmall number of anceſtors who
had a beginning, is the affinity of languages, or
rather the derivation of them all from one uni-
verfal mother-tongue. If feveral individuals who
were unacquainted with any language, were to
live ſcattered in different parts of the earth, and
each of them were to invent one for himſelf,
theſe languages, being made up of articulations
merely arbitrary, would bear no refemblance
with each other; on the contrary, men of the
fame lineage and extraction would naturally re-
tain the fame language and pronunciation: but
when fuch perfons feparate from each other, the
nature of their common tongue through length of
time and intercourfe with ftrangers would by
degrees be altered into different dialects, and at
length into quite different languages, ſo that ſuch
perfons would be no longer able to underſtand
one another: however, the chief radical words
would for a long time continue the fame, and
there would always remain fuch a conformity
between thofe languages, as would plainly fhew
that they were derived from the fame mother-
tongue. Now as this agrees with hiſtory and
expe-
m
nt days
the affinity
1
44
NATURAL RELIGION
t
experience; the derivation of the various lan-
guages from one mother is an evident proof that
the human ſpecies is defcended from one and
the fame lineage and people, provided that no
tyranizing conqueror has ever impofed a foreign
language on all mankind: but the hiftories of
all nations agree in this point, namely, that the
great monarchies are of a much later date than the
ancient principal tongues. Men at firſt main-
tained their natural freedom'; and it was only the
chief of every family in whom an arbitrary
power was lodged. When the defcendants of
a family multiplied and difperfed, they then paid
a deference to the opinion of thoſe who were
moſt eminent for wiſdom and valour among
them; yet this was rather voluntary than by
compulfion, or in conformity to any oath of
fubmiffion and allegiance. In proceſs of time
petty princes and kings arofe, and ftates and
communities were formed: as for the great
monarchies, it will be found in general that they
were originally divided into many diſtinct petty
fovereignties. Since therefore the earlieſt ages
afforded no ambitious conquerors of many coun-
tries, the ancient mother-tongues could not be
the refult of conqueft, nor could the affinity
between the languages be derived from that
fource; confequently both the one and the other
are to be folely attributed to the natural origin
and multiplication of one family.
At prefent indeed, the various dialects of man-
kind are almoſt innumerable; though the ancient
mother-tongues are but few: we fhall chiefly
confine
Defended and Illustrated.
45
confine ourſelves to thofe languages of which we
have ſome certain account. That the Hebrew
tongue has a near affinity with the Canaanitish
or Phoenician, the Punic, the Sýriac, the Arme-
nian, the Samaritan, the Chaldean and Arabic lan-
guages, cannot be denied; which evidently proves
that they all derive their origin from the fame
fource, and conſequently that thoſe ſeveral nations
were defcended from the fame ſtock, but were
gradually difperfed over the face of the earth.
If the other Afiatic tongues which are now loſt
were better known to us, there is all the reafon
in the world to think that the like affinity would
be found among them; and, as far as we can
judge from the remains of the Egyptian, Per-
fian, and Babylonian languages, they muſt have
approached very near to the mother-tongues;
but the other languages which are now in ufe in
the different parts of the world appear to be ſo
modern and intermixed, that they can ſcarce be
traced to their ancient origin. The Chineſe
tongue may be accounted an artificial language,
invented by the Mandarines; at leaſt, it is not
the ancient language of the country. Thus the
Egyptian prieſts had a facred or hieroglyphical
language, peculiar to themſelves *. In Europe
there are but three or four ancient mother-tongues
extant, namely, the Greek, Latin, Teutonic,
Vandalian †, and Sclavonic; among theſe, one
Vid. Jablonski Panth. Ægypt. P. III. fect. 17.
of
+ The author has not mentioned the Celtic tongue in this lift, which
is more ancient, and has a better title to an original language, than
either the Greek, Latin, Teutonic, or Sciavonic; and what is
more,
46
NATURAL RELIGION
of the principal is the Greek, which ſtill exhibits
to us viſible traces of the language of the Pho-
nicians, fome of whom, as it appears from history,
often fettled in Greece; the fouthern parts of Italy-
were peopled by the Greeks; and the Latin
tongue is chiefly indebted for its etymology to
the Eolic and Doric dialects. This has been
proved by the learned Gataker, by an example
taken from the beginning of Virgil's firft Eclogue;
which well deferves the notice of thoſe who are
acquainted with both languages, as they will
there find a more intimate and general analogy be-
tween them than they perhaps had imagined.
That the Germans alfo borrowed a multitude of
words from the Greeks, is undeniable; though I
am far from thinking that the Greek can be
properly called the mother-tongue from which
the Teutonic is derived.
There is a manifeft affinity between the Ger-
man, Low Dutch, Danish, English, Swedish,
Norwegian, and Icelandic languages; and the
Bohemian, Hungarian, Tranfylvanian, Poliſh,
Lithuanian, Ruffian, and Vandalian dialects
ſeem to be derived from the Sclavonic lan-
guage. Perhaps all theſe languages are originally
derived from the ancient Celtic or Scythian,
which prevailed over the far greater part of
Europe till the Roman yoke obtruded the Latin
upon feveral nations: it muſt alſo be remem-
more, it is ſtill a living language, being ſpoken in Wales, and
Bretagne in France, with a little variety of dialect. See Pezron's
Ant. de Nations.
* Vide Gataker de filo, N. T. cap. 1.
bered,
Defended and Illuftrated.
47
:
>
bered, that anciently the inhabitants of the Eu-
ropean coafts of the Mediteranean appear to
have had a great deal of the Phoenician in their
dialects; all hiftories agreeing that Europe was
firſt peopled by the extenfive commerce of the
Phoenicians, and the invaſions of the Scythians.
I heartily with M. Popowitfch, who, in his " Dif-
fertation on the Sea *," has fhewn a remarkable
fkill in the harmony and origin of the Weſtern
languages, may meet with a Mecanas to encou-
rage him in compofing an harmonic dictionary
of the Weſtern tongues; fuch a work would
throw a great light both on the hiftory of lan-
guages, and that of the human fpecies. We
fhould have ftill a clearer and more particular
knowledge of the extraction and affinity of the
human race, if the Thefaurus linguarum Afiæ et
Europa harmonicus, by Olaus Rudbeck, junior,
had been compleated; however, the flight
fpecimen of this Thefaurus, which Baron Wolf
has annexed to the fecond part of his Bibliotheca
Hebræa, fhews this opinion of the affinity of
languages and nations to be perfectly well
grounded.
SECTION XV.
The third hiftorical article, which I fhall ad-
duce to prove that the human fpecies had a
beginning, is the flow invention and improve-
ment of arts and fciences.
*This Differtation is entitled, Untersuchung vom meere, and
was publiſhed at Leipfig in 1750.
:
Man
J
48
NATURAL RELIGION
}
Man has not only a natural aptitude for arts
and ſciences, but is likewife powerfully incited
to them by his bodily wants, and his defire of
eaſe, conveniency, affluence and pleaſure of all
kinds. He is further prompted to inventions
and experiments by his admiration of things,
and the curiofity excited by it, as well as by
the fatisfaction and complacency he finds in
knowledge and the inveſtigation of truth. We
alſo learn from hiftory, that this has ever been
an active principle in man, viz. that every one,
according to his ability and circumſtances, has
endeavoured to find out fomething neceffary
and uſeful; and accordingly they who firft fuc-
ceeded in uſeful inventions, as Ceres, and Bac-
chus, were highly honoured, and even deified
by whole nations. Thus hiftory enables us in
theſe days to look back to thofe times, when
ſcarce the moſt neceffary inventions were difco-
vered; when the known arts were but few and
very imperfect; and when the firſt elements of
the ſciences were wrapped in fhades and obfcu-
rity for if we afcend four thouſand
years into
antiquity, we ſhall fee that man was extremely ig-
norant and imperfect before that æra. What is there
that has not been gradually developed in the fuc-
ceeding ages? What excellent improvements
have been made in all the arts and ſciences within
thefe three hundred years! and what noble difcove-
ries ſtill remain to be made by poſterity! Thus, if
from the moſt modern times we go back to the
earlieſt ages, it muſt be allowed that four thou-
fand
years ago, mankind was little better than in its
}
infant
Defended and Illustrated.
49
>
infant ftate and as it were just come into being;
and that from the ftate and advancement of
human knowledge within theſe four thouſand
years, the period may be traced very nearly
when the human fpecies was immerſed in total
ignorance, that is, when they were newly come
into the world. Whereas had they inhabited
the earth from eternity, it is quite incredible,
from the natural faculties of mankind animated
by neceffity and delight, that they would have
remained ignorant of the moft neceffary and
ufeful arts during an infinite feries of ages; on
the contrary, whatever human genius could have
invented for profit or pleaſure, muſt have been
found out long before the period mentioned
above. To this general proof, it will not be
improper to fubjoin the particular accounts to
be found in hiftory of the late tranfplanting of
fruit-trees into Europe. To particularize every
fpecies would be tedious and irkfome, let it
therefore fuffice to refer my reader to M. la
Mare's excellent treatife, de la Police, and the
obfervations on this head by a learned author
refiding at Geneva *. From thofe authorities
he will be convinced, that there is fcarce one
good fruit-tree which was originally a native of
Europe, but that all of them have, in thefe later
ages, been tranfplanted firft from Afia into Greece
and Africa, from thence to Italy, Gaul, and
Spain, and laſtly to Germany, the Netherlands
De la Mare Traité de la police, 1729, 4 Vol. in fol. vide lib.
V. Tit. XLII, Tom. IV. p. 530. The annotations are to be feen
in the Journal Helvetique, 1738, Sept. p. 181.
;
É
and
Fruit trees w
50
NATURAL RELIGION
and Britain. In the above mentioned treatife,
this is demonſtrated to be the cafe with regard
to the grape, olive, fig, lemon, orange, cherry,
peach, apricot, plumb, apple, quince, chefnut,
&c. Hence may we not juſtly ſuppoſe, that
the firſt inhabitants of Europe lived a kind of
Hari. Ha Hilmy ſavage life, fubfifting on herbs, roots, leaves,
acorns, and maft? and does not this fhow how
late the more ufeful inventions and refined arts,
and the moſt exquifite gratifications reached us?
Is it then to be imagined, that Europe has, from
eternity, been as well cultivated and as populous
as it is now, or that from all eternity no one
ſhould ever have ventured to tafte any of thoſe
palatable and delicious fruits of the Eaft, nor
fhould ever have had a thought of tranfplanting
them into his own country? Can it in general be
reaſonably fuppofed, that from all eternity, till
within theſe four thousand years, man fhould
have found out nothing for his conveniency and
welfare, and, fince that term, has abounded in
all manner of uſeful and elegant inventions.
i
SECTION XVI.
The ancient Philofophers feem to have very well
obſerved the force of the confequences, deduci-
ble from the very late and gradual invention of
arts and ſciences; and upon that account they
allowed, that mankind had a beginning *. But
* Vide Macrob. in fomnium Scipionis, lib. II. cap. 10. Lucret.
lib. V. ver. 326. Plato de republica, lib. III. p. 529.
the
AN
Defended and Illuftrated.
52
the Eternaliſts have endeavoured to overthrow
fuch undeniable proofs with ftrange evaſions, or
rather fictions of their own. Many of them ad-
vance, that the earth, together with the human
fpecies, has been ſeveral times deftroyed by fire;
others fuppofe that water was the inſtrument in
fome of theſe defolations: They farther pretend,
that the fire which had confumed the world pro-
duced it anew. Another hypothefis invented by
thoſe Philofophers fuppofes, that the water never
totally extirpated the whole race of mankind
by a deluge, but fpared a ſmall remainder by
whom the human race was renewed; and that
this ſmall remainder confifted only of poor
rude ſhepherds, who had gained the fummits
of mountains with their flocks and herds. But
they tell us, that the arts and fciences of the
former world were utterly unknown to the furvi-
vors. Hence they affirm, that though the world
and the human fpecies were eternal, the earth
may have been often reduced to a defart, the
arts and ſciences extinguished, mankind may
have been reſtored and multiplied, and arts and
fciences revived *. Who does not fee this to be
a mere fictitious fubterfuge, without either hiſ-
tory, experience, or reafon to fupport it? And
after all, it falls fhort of the mark. For, allowing
the whole globe to have undergone fuch cata-
ſtrophes, this is no proof that either the earth
Cicero Somn. Scipionis, cap. 7. Macrobius, lib. II. cap. 10.
Lucret. lib. V. 340, & feq. Plato in Timeo. But Aristotle in
Meteorologicorum, lib. I. cap. 14. Tom. I. talks much about
inundations.
E 2
or
52 NATURAL RELIGION
or mankind have exiſted from eternity; for ſuch
defolations ſtill make a numerable feries of ge-
nerations, and no number can be infinite. Ac-
cording to this their favourite fuppofition, theſe
defolations ſhould be periodical, and confequently
the number of them muſt be continually in-
creafing; but we have fhewed above that whatever
admits of increaſe is not infinite. The number
of the conflagrations, or deluges, muft alfo be
neceffarily less than the number of men and
their generations who had lived in the intervals;
but one infinite cannot, be lefs than another in-
finite *. Since therefore eternity is not to be
meaſured by any finite number, thefe hypo-
thefes do not fhew the real origin of mankind,
but only throw it back a long feries of ages.
But how weak and frivolous are theſe cavils!
What law of motion can countenance that
tenet of the Stoics, that at certain periods the earth
muſt take fire and be burned? And what phi-
lofophy teaches, that the fame deftroying fire
repairs its damages, and re-produces animals
and vegetables? As little agreeable to nature
is the fuppofed alternate deſtruction of the whole
earth by fire and water. Befides, all the deluges
mentioned by Pagan writers, as that of Ogyges,
Deucalion, &c. were confined only to a very
fmall part of the globe; on what then could
they found their boafted hypothefis?
Thefe obfolete fictions and evafions I fhould
not have thought worth mentioning, had not fome
*See what has been faid of infinite fucceffion, in Se&t. 6-9.
late
Defended and Illustrated.
53
late philofophers been at great pains to beftow
on them a new garb. They have the comets at
their command, either for deftroying or crea-
ting worlds. It is only caufing one of theſe vaft
celeſtial bombs to ſtrike againſt the fun, and off
Ay ignited fragments, by which afterwards the
planets, and among the reft our earth alſo, are
melted down. Then again, another fuch bomb
being directed againſt the earth, and breaking its
external cruft by the concuffion, there imme-
diately follows an univerfal deluge. This fuper-
induces a change in the axis and motion of the
globe; and, in the unequal furface caufed by this
eruption, we fee from whence hills and valleys
are derived. Others, though they do not affail
the whole ſyſtem and all mankind with fuch
dreadful engines, yet lay wafte a great part of
the globe; and, fweep away its inhabitants at
pleaſure with inundations, peftilence, famine,
and other epidemical calamities. As for the
arts and ſciences, they give them no quarter;
exterminating them from the face of the earth,
and fucceffively finking mankind into flavery,
ignorance, and a favage barbarity. This hy-
pothefis, of the comets and their fiery tails
threatning ruin and defolation, might poffibly
fill us with a fuperftitious fear, were not tle
motions of the celeftial bodies determined and
conducted by an all wife Superintendant: if it
were not fo, and thefe burning orbs moved with
a blind impetuofity through the vaſt expanſe,
they might by their collifions with the other
planets
E 3
54
NATURAL RELIGION
+
1
planets endanger the whole mundane ſyſtem.
But we who believe in a wife, gracious, and
powerful Providence, have a right to demand
from thefe pretended philofophers, clear philo-
fophical proofs, and fuch as are neceffarily
grounded in the general laws of motion, that
fuch things ever did, or ever will happen; other-
wife they must give us leave to continue in our
comfortable belief. Are they indeed, fo expert in
the motions of the comets, as to know their exac
courſes, their progreffions, and retrogreffions,
as we calculate the folar and lunar eclipfes ?
But in my opinion, they are very far from it
and if they have laid down a general rule for
obferving comets, they fhould have adapted it
to ſuch powers and laws of motion, as would
afcertain the excentrical orbits of thofe comets,
that are known, inftead of arnufing or terrifying
us with the courfe of thoſe which are to bring on
fuch periodical devaftations *. This I fay, that
fuch a theory neceffarily requires two oppofite
powers, one forwarding the approximation of
the comet to another celeftial body, particularly
to the fun; whilft the other labours to keep it at
a due diſtance, in order to cauſe it to revolve
The author feems here to have in his eye, not only M
Buffon, but likewife M. Whifton, who, in his Theory of the
Earth, endeavours to account for feveral phenomena and change:
in the earth by the help of a comet. The chief, though at the
fame time the moſt whimsical hypothefis, on which M Whiſtor
founds his argum ntations, occurs at the beginning of the fecond
book, p. 73, & feq. Burnet's Theory of the earth is more abfurd
and more contrary to Scripture and experience, than Whifton's.
round
Defended and Illuftrated.
55
round the other body. But in this caſe, there
muſt be a certain proportion and equilibrium
between two powers operating in oppoſite di-
rections; from which it may rather be con-
cluded, that a real collifion of two celeftial
bodies will probably never happen. There is
indeed no neceffity for combating this new way
of ftriking out and renewing planets by ſuch
collifions; for it will appear in the fequel,
that if all the planets were produced in that
manner, it gives no natural account of the
origin of the vegetable and animal kingdoms.
A
Should any of theſe gentlemen, in proof of
their hypothefis, adduce the Mofaic account of
an univerſal deluge, let me aſk them why they
will not alſo admit of Mofes's account of the
creation? or where, and in what place, Mofes gives
the leaſt intimation that the deluge was natural,
or occafioned by a comet? Or whether it is
not much more evident from the Mofaic hiftory,
that rivers (and without hills there could be no
rivers) were prior to that deluge; and confe-
quently that they were not firft formed at the
time of that deluge, by an accidental chaẩm or
fiffure in the upper cruft of the earth *. But if
any one will abide by the account of the deluge
as delivered by Mofes; and yet endeavour to
See his
*The author points out M. Buffon, and likewife M. Whißton
who is for attributing the univerfal deluge to a comet.
Theory of the earth, p. 181. and M. Buffon, in his Hiftoire Na-
turelle, Tom. I. where he tacks together fuch an enormous con-
ge:ies of fictions, that I muft refer them to the examination of a
reader whofe patience is more than common.
E 4
account
t
56
NATURAL RELIGION
account for it in a natural way *, I would fain
know how, in a natural manner, he will be able
to affemble in one particular place all the various
fpecies of animals difperfed in many diſtant coun-
tries? Or if men and beaſts had every where faved
themſelves, on the fummits of hills, which ſtood
above the water; then furely amidst fuch numbers
that ſurvived, arts and fciences would have been
preferved, and their defcendants could not be fo
rude and ignorant; neither would the earth
have been fo wild and uncultivated as it was
four thousand years ago.
Other calamities, as earthquakes, peftilence,
famine, &c. were never general; and confe-
quently the whole race of mankind could not
be again plunged in total ignorance, nor the
whole furface of the globe be turned into a de-
fart by fuch partial accidents. As to the pre-
valency of barbarous and uncivilized difpofitions,
it muſt be acknowledged, that when countries.
where arts and fciences once flourished, as Perfia,
Chaldea, Greece, and Italy, come to fall under
an oppreffive yoke, either ecclefiaftical or civil,
or are over-run by fwarms of favage nations; the
arts and ſciences may be very much checked by
ſuch a circumſtance, efpecially if fuch revolutions
happen in a state during their infancy, and
before they have made any confiderable pro-
greſs. But even in this cafe, when arts and
fciences are known only to very few indivi-.
* See Burnet's theory of the earth, wherein he pretends to
account for the deluge in a natural way.
duals,
Defended and Illuftrated.
57
น
2
!
duals, it is a fign that the arts, as well as the
. human fpecies were at that time in their in-
fant ftate; for if the human fpecies had ex-
ifted from eternity, the arts and ſciences would
have been improved to fuch a degree, and
have fpread themfelves fo far, that they could
not have been totally extirpated in every part
of the world *. As to former ages, we muft
allow
* Lord Bolingbroke, who, (in the third volume, page 206.
of the quarto edition), endeavours to demonftrate the origin of
mankind from tradition, under a very fpecious pretence, page 266,
rejects this proof taken from the gradual and late invention of
arts: he ſays, that there are still feveral nations who know no-
thing of the moft neceffary arts, as writing, building, making of
apparel, and from thence he draws this double inference, namely,
"that if thefe arts were never known to the people to whom they
are now unknown, it follows, that mankind may difpenfe
"with the want of them during many ages, and therefore might
"do it always; and that if theſe arts were ever known to thoſe
"people to whom they are now unknown, they may be totally
lolt, after having been once found out. Nay, they may have
"been found, loft, and found out anew, an infinite number of
"times, during an eternal duration."
But this argument contradicts both itfelf and the nature of man,
and at the fame time diſcovers a forced tranſition from particulars
to generals. If there had been any ancient people who could fo
eafily difpenfe with the want of clothes and houſes, the art of
making cloaths, and building dwellings could not have been fo
extremely neceffary to thofe people, as his Lordfhip would have
it; nay, they would not have been requifite, as productive of
any additional conveniency, or eafe to them. But can fuch a
ftate of indifference in this particular, be extended to the whole
race of mankind, and with regard to all arts, as if from infinite
ages down to the prefent time, the human fpecies could have
lived without clothes, or dwellings, and without inclination or
impulſe to find out any neceffary art, or conveniency? From
whence then is this inclination newly arifen in mankind, after
a courfe of infinite ages? But if clothing, building, and other
arts are abſolutely neceffury, every individual would naturally
have
58
NATURAL RELIGIỌN
$
}
allow that the arts, and particularly the fciences
made no great figure, in compariſon of their
prefent ftate; and that at one and the fame
time, they were generally confined to a civilized
nation or two. Now as this in itſelf affords
a proof that men could not in thoſe ages have
inhabited the earth for any long time, it would
not have been much to be wondered at, if by
the accidents of war, &c. men had gradually
loft every beneficial invention. However, the
arts and ſciences have only travelled from place
to place, firſt from the Eaft to Europe, and
from the latter again to the Arabians; from
whom they happily a fecond time vifited Eu-
rope.
And though the increaſe of fuperftition,
that moſt dangerous enemy to reaſon and genius,
threatened under colour of religion, to choak
all the remaining feeds of tafte and found
have turned his thoughts to the difcovery of them, or at leaſt
willingly have adopted thofe arts from his neighbours; and if
fome nations have not yet made any great progrefs in theſe arts,
this very circumftance denotes, that fuch a rude people cannot
be of any long ſtanding. For it is certain, that the more ancient any
nation grows, the more it increaſes in number of individuals; and
that by this increaſe, it is incited to exchange its inconveniencies
of a favage and barbarous ftate, for civil fociety, and a more
commodious manner of living in towns, cities, and communities,
for intercourfe and commerce with other nations, and for arts
and ſciences. This overthrows the ſecond objection, namely,
that the neceffary and beneficial arts and ſciences, after having
been once invented and propagated, may be frequently and
totally extinguifhed. The fame natural motives and difpofitions
which, with fo much difficulty, first introduced the arts and fciènces
among mankind, will alfo continually preferve and improve them 3
and no fortuitous obftruction can be fo great and general, as entirely
to alter the nature of the whole human race,
learning;
1.
Defended and Illuftrated.
3
59
រ
1
learning; yet in all ages, the arts and ſciences
have found ſhelter in fome part of the world,
and flouriſhed and produced excellent fruits. But
as fuch times of darkneſs and ignorance are now
happily over, and arts and fciences have taken
deep root in moft nations of Europe, it may be
pronounced impoffible, that ignorance and a fa-
vage barbarity ſhould ever again prevail amongſt
mankind, as they did four thousand years ago;
or that men ſhould utterly loſe all remembrance
of their former condition, and be unable to trace
the leaſt footſteps of their origin.
DISSER-
60 NATURAL RELIGION
}
$
DISSERTATION II.
Men and Animals do not derive their origin`either
from the World, or from Nature.
Th
SECTION I.
HE confequences drawn, in the former
Differtation, from the death of all our
anceſtors, from the hiftories of various nations,
and that of languages and arts, are fo natural
and convincing, that to hold the eternity of the
human ſpecies would be almoſt as abſurd, as
for every individual to fancy that he had al-
ways exifted in the world, and could remember
all his deceaſed anceſtors, and his own infancy
and gradual increaſe. In reality, there are very
few among thoſe who maintain the eternity of
the world and nature, who have the boldness
to affirm that the human fpecies has always
exifted. Moſt of them are obliged to allow
that mankind had a beginning, and was after-
wards propagated by regular generation. How-
ever, as they would fain raife their idols, the
World and Nature, to the higheft pitch of per-
fection, how will they be able to deduce the
first origin of the human race from the energy
and operations of the world, and to explain this
with any fatisfactory cleainefs? It is true, the
faculty of propagating their fpecies is natural to
man and all other animals; but what natural
power
Defended and Illuftrated.
61
power produced the firſt men and animals each
in their kind?
Here they have recourfe to fictions. They pre-
tend that the heat of the fun imparted life to
the flime or mud of the earth; but that the firſt
productions were all abortive and miſhapen, in-
capable of any long exiſtence or of propagating
their fpecies, till at length, after many mifcar-
riages, from a like fortuitous concourfe of fer-
menting ſubſtances, more regular animals of both
fexes were formed, and after that, human crea-
tures, who were capable of preferving their lives.
and propagating their ſpecies *.
It is not to be expected that thefe profound phi-
lofophers, in order to make us comprehend their
hypothefis concerning the origin of animals, will
explain the nature, modes, properties, and powers
of material ſubſtances, as water, the fun, and heat;
of the laws of motion, of the formation of
animal bodies, or the generation of them: had
they been acquainted with the laws of nature,
they never would have idolized it in fuch a
manner. They talk in the ftrain of poets, who
create, deſtroy, and re-create at pleaſure: Their
world is a fairy land, where every thing is of
fpontaneous growth, and exifts without any
adequate cauſe. According to them, this Earth,
the fertile mother of us all, only on being im-
* Every body knows, that this was the doctrine of Epicurus,
and Lucretius. See Lucret. V. 420. & feq. 781. 819. 835.
It is proper alfo to obferve, that M. de la Mattre in his Syſteme
d'Epicure, has, to his eternal difgrace, endeavoured to revive that
exploded fyftem.
pregnated
3
K
62
NATURAL RELIGION
pregnated by the heat of the fun, brought forth
a fucceffion of births; and Nature, their abftrufe
power, is fometimes an intelligent, benign, power-
ful creatrix, forming, difclofing, cherishing,
and maintaining the elements and feeds of all
things; at other times they exclaim againſt her
as a blind, envious, impotent, and unintelligent
power. A more clear and precife account of
this monftrous opinion, cannot well be laid
before the reader.
SECTION II.
Did we ſtill live in the dark times of ignorance
and fuperftition, we might perhaps imagine, that
we difcerned fome light in this hypotheſis; but I
know not how men, in this enlightened age,
can reconcile fuch chimerical fictions compound-
ed of a grofs ignorance of nature, and a mul-
tiplicity of contradictions and errors, to reaſon
and experience. The ancients themſelves, are
hardly to be excuſed for reaſoning ſo propoſte-
roufly, and, from falſe premiſes, maintaining that
their anceſtors were Terrigenæ, autoxloves, or
earth born *. They had indeed once feen, that
after the inundations of the Nile, the mud
which remained behind fwarmed with reptiles
and infects, as frogs, toads, lizards, &c. From
this they immediately concluded, that theſe ani-
mals were produced by the heat of the fun
and this fuppofition they as abfurdly entertained
* See Differtation I. Note*
;
of
Defended and Illuftrated.
63
of other animals of a larger fize, and even
of men; affirming, that at once the latter,
as well as the former, fome time or other had
derived their Being from a flimy foil co-operat-
ing with the heat of the fun.
However, we in theſe later ages are well
affured, that the proof on which thofe philofo-
phers grounded their opinion, is utterly falfe,
and that the inference drawn from it was too
precipitate. The most accurate and repeated
experiments and obfervations, made by the beft
naturalifts on all animals and infects that are
large enough to admit of a diftinct furvey of
them, clearly demonftrate, that no living ani-
mal or infect is fpontaneously produced from
any putrid or fermenting fubftances. Rotten
cheeſe is no more the mother of the mites
obferved in it, than the earth is of the men
that live upon its productions. It is the conftant
and unvariable order of nature, that all living
creatures, from the ſmalleſt infect to the largeſt
animal, are generated from others of the fame fpe-
cies; and it is certain, that moſt of them are pro-
duced by a conjunction of the parent-animals of
both fexes. Flies, gnats, fleas, butterflies, &c. co-
pulate, as well as animals of a larger fize, and are
careful to lay their eggs where their
where their young will
find a ready ſubſiſtence ; and neither cheeſe, flefh,
fruits, leaves, or any other ſubſtance, if kept
ſo cloſe that none of the fmall infects can de-
pofit their eggs or fpawn in them, will ever
produce the minuteft living creature: nay, we
know in general, that no plant or vegetable
grows
64
NATURAL RELIGION
grows otherwiſe, than from fuch feeds or buds
in which the embryo of each plant, according
to its fpecies, lies formed in miniature and
enveloped.
SECTION III.
This truth is fo fully demonftrated, that I
believe, no objection can be made againſt it
from the extreme minuteneſs of the animalcules
diſcerned by Hamm, Hartzoeker, Leeuwenhoek,
and others, in vinegar, pepper water, the
femen of animals, &c. and by Buffon and
Needham, in jellies or broth, and in vegeta-
bles, particularly in blighted wheat. Should
we allow the truth and certainty of all the ex-
periments, as reprefented in the works of thofe
authors; yet the conftant order of nature, in all
other animals which properly deferve that name,
ftands unfhaken; for, in thefe, we cannot be
impoſed on, or deceived. Their largenefs gives
the naked eye a clear and diftinct view of
the texture of their bodies, the organs of their
fenfes, their motion, generation, and manner
of their propagating their fpecies. It is the
fame, with vegetables, the production of which
from feeds, buds, and roots of their mother-
plants, has been plainly demonftrated by ex-
periments. Moreover, reafon, experience, and
analogy declare for us; we know that nature
is at all times confiftent with itſelf, and can
never act otherwife than it has once acted;
and conſequently, there never was a time when
theſe
Defended and Illuftrated.
65
thefe animals and plants were produced in ano-
ther manner, that is, by the fermentations of
a putrified fubftance.
Befides, though nature had been endued
with the power of producing the minute
and loweſt ſpecies of living creatures, which
ſeem to have little more than a vegetable
life, from flime, &c. without parent-animals,
as Needham fuppofes, by attractive and re-
pulfive powers; yet it does not in the leaſt
follow from thence, that the infinitely wife
affemblage of fo many thouſands of organi-
cal bodies could ever have been produced and
arranged by the blind power of a lumpiſh
clod: for we know, that the formation of the
more perfect ſpecies in the order of nature al-
ways previouſly fuppofes parent-animals with
organifed bodies.
Nature indeed may, without any pattern or
model, compofe falts, chryftals, ftones, and
metals: but no rational man will believe the
accurate impreffions of known land or fea-ani-
mals with all their parts and organs, which are
fometimes feen on ftones, to be nothing but a
Lufus Natura; and that the mere petrifying
power produced this imagery, without pattern
or model. Yet theſe only repreſent the outward
figure of fuch an organic body; how much lefs
is nature able to delineate of its own head, if I
may be allowed the expreffion, the internal
parts of this wonderful mechanifm, and to work
fo exquifitely without a pattern!
F
SEC-
'66
NATURAL RELIGION
1
SECTION IV.
·
+
But though no confequence can be drawn
from the production of the moft minute, and
lefs perfect animalcules difcovered by help of
microſcopes, to the larger and more perfect ani-
mals; I muſt beg leave to obſerve, that the
obfervations made by Buffon and Needham,
concerning thoſe little animals, are deficient as
to perfpicuity and accuracy; and that they do
not by any means account for the origin of thoſe
animalcules, in a folid, fatisfactory manner.
When we confider the obfervations of theſe
gentlemen as related by themſelves, we are not
fufficiently convinced, that the moving globules
they faw, were, really living animals. All
other obfervers repreſent the feminal animalcules
as tadpoles, with tails gradually terminating in a
point, and thofe in other juices and liquids gene-
rally as fo many little eels. But the gentle-
men above mentioned repreſent them quite
round or oval. All other accurate obfervers fee
thoſe corpufcles which they take to be animal-
cules, fwimming with bodies compleatly formed
at first: but what thefe gentlemen firft fee, con-
fifts of knotty filaments, which afterwards fepa
rate into a number of globules, or eggs, &c.
Other naturalifts fee the animalcules in freſh ſe-
mine mafculino, living only for the ſpace of two,
three, or four hours, and afterwards remaining
without the leaft fign of life or motion. On
the contrary, thefe gentlemen at firſt diſcern
nothing
Defended and illuftrated.
67
nothing in the femen; but fome hours after, the
matter beginning to ferment and putrify, they pre-
tend to fee animalcules, or organical parts of ani-
mals, and even affirm, that after twenty-four
hours, nay, three or four days, they have ſeen thofe
animalcules full of motion *. Now is it to be
thought, that they faw the fame objects as
other obſervers, or that their view was juft,
dinſtinct, and clear ?
I ſhall not here enlarge on the accurate Leder-
muller's objection to M. Buffon's experiments,
namely, that his microſcopes were none of the beſt;
the difference of their magnifying power, and of
thofe ufed by Ledermuller, being as one to eighty-fix.
M. Buffon's own delineation and deſcription muſt
undeniably evince, that he did not fee thofe minute
creatures clearly and diftinctly; all that he re-
preſents is nothing but fmall globules or eggs,
without any viſible head or tail, feet or other
limbs, much leſs mouth or eyes. And though Mr.
Needham viewed the fame objects as M. Buffon did
through the fame microfcope, yet they are not
agreed about the objects they faw; Mr. Need
ham afferting that they were compleat living
animalcules, and M. Buffon looking on them
only as organical parts of an animal; which is a
manifeft proof, that neither of them had a clear
and diſtinct view of what they faw, but that
each has fubftituted his own imaginary hypo-
thefis in the place of experience.
* See M. Buffon's Natural History, Vol. VI. part II. chap. 7
and 8. and Mr. Needham's new Microſcopical Obfervations, &c.
F 2
SEC-
1
68 NATURAL RELIGION
;
>
SECTION V.
As to the exiſtence of theſe animalcules, all
naturaliſts are not unanimous in admitting the
truth of it: fome, from their own obſervations,
do not allow that what is difcerned in femine
mafculino and other juices of fleſh and vege-
tables, are living animals *. Some objections
might alſo be offered againſt their tadpole-form,
their ſpontaneous motion, &c. The accounts
given us of this invifible world by many, are
in themſelves fufpicious; however, I ſhall wil-
* Of this opinion, for instance, are M. Wahlbom, and the
illuftrious Prefident Lineus in his Diff. de fponfalibus plautarum,
Se&t. 13. (Amanitat. Acad. Tom. I. page 79.) the latter having
with an admirable microſcope made by Lieburkuhn diſcovered,
that what Leeuwenhoek had miſtaken for animalcules, were nothing
but oily particles. M. Afch of Peterſburgh, in his differtation
de naturâ fpermatis obfervationibus microfcropicis indagatâ, publiſhed
at Gottingen in 1756, gives a detail of his obfervations made
with an Engliſh miſcrofcope, not only on the femen humanum, but
alfo that of dogs, cats, rabbits, cocks, and the milt of fiſhes,
and many other animal and vegetable juices; and fays, that he
could obferve nothing in any of them but globules, all of the
fame appearance, and without the leaft motion except what pro-
ceeded from the water mingled with the juices, or from the air,
the fun, or fome other adventitious cauſe. See Relationes Got-
tiengenfes, 1756. page 417.
+ I fhall here only quote one obfervation of M. Miles in the
Philof. Tranfact. Vol. XLI. Part II. p. 727. who, in the par-
ticles of blood perceived in the tail of a living tadpole, obferved
with a folar microſcope the fame tadpole-form, and the like ap-
parently ſpontaneous motions in all directions in the globules of
blood; yet he justly forbears concluding them to be living animal-
cules, chufing rather to attribute what he faw to the temperature
of the blood at that time, or to fome alteration in the veffels
containing it. May not the like fallacious figures and motions
thew themfelves alfo in other animal and vegetable juices?
lingly
Defended and Illuftrated.
69
lingly give more credit to thofe, who impartially
and circumftantially defcribe what every one has
clearly and diftinctly feen, ufing the beſt micro-
ſcopes, than to thoſe who barely affert, that they
could fee no fuch thing.
Now comes on our chief queftion, How theſe
animalcules, which are fo minute as to be vifible
only through microſcopes, are engendered? whe-
ther they are propagated by copulation of parent-
animals of both fexes, like the larger fpecies and
moſt infects, or whether like the polypus they mul-
tiply after the manner of plants; or whether, laftly,
without parents they receive life and figure from
the mechanical powers of nature operating on a
rude lifelefs fubftance, of which otherwife the
whole known compaſs of nature does not afford
one fingle, well authenticated inſtance.
The first manner of propagation prevails
throughout all nature, from the greateſt to the
ſmalleſt animal; the fecond feems only to take
place in nature's loweft ftep, for uniting the animal
and vegetable kingdoms, according to the na-
tural laws of gradation. However, there may
be an analogy in the method of propagation
in zophytes and vegetables; namely, that as
plants copulate by male and female bloffoms,
and impregnate and fructify each other, the
animal-plants may alſo propagate their ſpecies
in the like manner. But as it is certain and
demonftrable, that both ways of propagation
actually exift in nature, and as it were form
a connection between its productions; ſo do
they alſo eſtabliſh the certainty of Religion,
leading
F 3
4
70
NATURAL RELIGION
leading us, from the impoffibility of an infinite
progreffion, up to a first pair and a prolific
mother, the generative power of whom far fur-
paſſes the power of nature. And if the third
manner of propagation, without anceſtors or
parents, were poffible in nature; though it did
not contain in itſelf this proof of the truth of
religion, it does not contain any thing contrary
to it. For the fimple powers of nature, which
affembled a vifcid and glutinous ſubſtance in a
cutaneous cyſt or bag, and the fimple element
which, in this rude organization, were to be
brought to a ſtate of exiſtence, could no more
be the efficient cauſe of its exiſtence and acti-
vity, than of any of the other things in na-
But as there is no other inftance of this
manner of production, furely it is not to be
fo readily affented to.
ture.
But more circumfpection is requifite in theſe
experiments, than Buffon and Needham have be-
ftowed on them. I am credibly informed, that M.
Muſchenbroek, whoſe uncommon application and
experience in natural obfervations are above any
encomiums of mine, has for theſe two years paft
been employed in examining the experiments, and
inveſtigating the proofs of the two gentlemen
above-mentioned, but with quite different confe-
quences. He has taken the very fame fubftances
that they did from the vegetable and animal
kingdoms, and put them into glass vials; having
first poured boiling water on them, that if any
animalcules, or eggs or feed of animalcules,
were in the fubftances, they might be deſtroyed
by
•
!
Defended and Illuftrated.
71
by the heat. Afterwards he ſtopped the vials
with glaſs ſtoppers carefully luted, fo that no in-ved by
vifible animalcular feed ſhould penetrate through
it. A putrefaction of thoſe fubftances indeed fetus to originate
enfued; but the putrified ſubſtances being exa-
tring areatures-
mined through a microſcope on the eighth,
ninth, tenth, and twentieth day, at different
hours, nothing was found in the vials that had
the leaſt appearance of a living animal *. He
had alfo the precaution never to use, in a ſecond
experiment, any fubftance taken out of a glafs
which he had once opened; but always threw
it away.
It is hence evident, that thoſe two
gentlemen did not in their experiments uſe
proper care and attention, and that nature can-
not from a rude fubftance bring forth the
meaneſt animal; this is ftrongly confirmed by
obfervations made in the vegetable kingdom,
where nature, instead of producing the very
courſeſt plant, only diſcloſes and multiplies the
feeds of the ſeveral ſpecies.
This perfectly agrees with the experiment of Mr. Joblett,
who, on pouring hot water on the ſubſtance, and ſtopping the
glafs cloſely, diſcovered no animalcules in it; which led him to
infer, that thefe animalcules fprang from eggs laid on the plants.
by mother-animals of an imperceptible minuteneſs, or dropped
in the water, or perhaps had been floating in the air. On this
account, I am more backward to credit the obfervations of Dr.
Hill, who pretends, that he faw both the animalcules, and the
minute plants of the fpunge and mould, both in ſtopped and
open vials; and from thence concludes, that they were produced
without parent-animals or mother-plants.
SEC-
F 4
72
NATURAL RELIGION
1
1
SECTION VI.
1
Thus, at leaſt with regard to all animals which
have mechanical bodies, it is abfolutely falfe,
and demonftrated to be fo by experiments, that
ever an organized body or a living animal hath
owed its origin to the fermentation of a rude,
putrid ſubſtance; or that a power and energy
neceffary to fuch a production, is to be found
in the whole world, or its nature. If nature
were capable of this, and actually had performed
it, we ſhould ſtill here and there, eſpecially in
flime heated by a bright fun, meet with perfect or
imperfect, well formed or miſhapen, new and
unknown, or old and known animals; for na-
ture is always confiftent with itſelf, its powers,
method, tenour, and order are ever alike. It
is the fame earth without the leaft atom being
taken from it; it is the fame fun, with the fame
heat and revolutions as formerly, that ſhines upon
it: Thus, if nature had admitted of fuch a
production of animals, the like would ftill come
to paſs; ſo that we may fafely conclude, that if
nature does not at prefent any where effectuate
or admit of fuch a fpontaneous production, it
never did. Now can any country or place be
found, where any miſhapen figures of men,
elephants, camels, or Pegafus's, fphinxes, and
hippo-centaurs, or even of the fmaller animals
are produced from flime or mud? In this age no
body will be found of fo much effrontery or
ſtupidity, as to affirm that he has feen any fuch
thing,
Defended and Illuftrated.
73
thing, eſpecially as to the larger fort of the
animal fpecies; and confequently there was never
any fuch thing in nature.
What other fubterfuge therefore ſtill remains?
No other than this, which, to the amazement of
all rational men, a modern champion for fpon-
taneous generation has borrowed from the rude
ignorance of antiquity, and dreffed out with
fome new-fangled decorations; namely, that
nature, enfeebled by age, has at length ceaſed
to bring forth fuch productions *.
But is not
this a manifeft contradiction, that, after having
fet up the world, and nature, as the firſt ſelf-
exiftent, neceffary, and eternal Being, he ſhould
now repreſent them as fubject to change, decay,
and imperfection? The latter fuppofition quite
overthrows the former. What is ſubject to change
cannot be neceffary; whatever ceafes and decays
cannot be eternal, and, for the fame reafon,
cannot be felf-exiftent. Can the fucceffion of
youth and age be reconciled with eternity?
Befides, this evafion contradicts all experience;
no power of matter throughout all nature
having, from time immemorial, been known
to fuffer any decreafe, but every thing acts
and propagates in the fame manner, and with
the fame force and energy, as heretofore: nay,
if this were poffible, the world, admitting its
*Sec De la Mettrie's Syfteme d'Epicure, Sect. 10.
Lucretius, lib. II. ver. 1150.
Jamque adeo affecta eft ætas, effæraque tellus,
Vix animalia parva creat, quæ cuncta creavit
Sacla, deditque ferarum ingentia corpora party.
Fid, ibid. V. v. 824.
V,
eternity,
74
NATURAL RELIGION
1
eternity, would have been long fince reduced
to a wild chaos, or barren maſs.
SECTION VII.
But this opinion is pregnant with another
abfurdity, which I cannot pafs over in filence:
Not fatisfied with attributing, contrary to all
reaſon and experience, to nature and the in-
fancy of the world an imaginary plaſtic power
which is now barren and effete, they alfo
make its generative power to act blindly with-
out any fettled rule, and as it were only by fits. A
mere motive power, acting without life, un-
derſtanding, and intentions, and which, con-
fidered in its effential qualities, contains no
fatisfactory cauſe or reafon for the order and
fymetry obſerved in an organized animal body,
is pretended firſt, by a lawleſs fermentation,
to have produced millions of times uſeleſs and
miſhapen monſters; till at length, by a fortuitous
concurrence of circumftances, it once brought
forth an entire, found, well-conftituted ani-
mal; which accident, according to their opinion,
among the many uſeleſs productions brought
about by uncertain chance, is not impoffible,
and, in fo many thousand years, might actually
have once come to pafs *. That man, however,
must be utterly loft to all the noble diſtinctions
of a rational Being, who prefers ignorance, dif-
order, and irregularity, to an intelligent power;
* See Lucretius, lib. V. ver. 835, & feq.
and
Defended and Illuftrated.
75
and will rather deduce the regular fyftem of
the world from chance and confufion, than
from wiſdom and defign*. In this refpect, in-
deed, moſt of the ancients themſelves fhewed
more wiſdom; they admitted an intelligent
Being, which extended itfelf throughout all na-
ture, (Mentem per rerum naturam intentam).
Even thoſe who ſuppoſed, that the foul of the
world altered and formed its body into various
forms and figures, feem in every reſpect to be
more fupportable than our modern infidels.
But wherefore is the original caufe fuppofed to be
without life, fenfibility, or underſtanding, rule,
order, or defign? when it is allowed, that there
are living creatures endued with underſtanding,
with bodies of an admirable texture; and even
when all order and harmony in the whole world
hath proceeded from, and has, through fucceed-
ing ages down to the prefent, been maintained
by that fuppofed power or firſt cauſe.
SECTION VIII.
Several perfons of diftinguiſhed abilities have
exerted themſelves, to expofe in a philofophical
manner the abfurdity of afferting this fortui-
tous production of animals, and other larger
material bodies, from the wild concourfe of
atoms. The reſult of their arguments is nearly
this; namely, that the chance of a regular con-
junction poffible to mere accident, againſt the
* De la Mettrie Syfleme d'Epicure, Sect. 4. 18, 19. 24.
mul-
#
76.
NATURAL RELIGION
multitude of chances of irregular conjunctions,
is as the infinitely-ſmall part, (pars infiniteffima)
is to an infinitely-great number; which is to
be accounted as nothing. This argument is
fo far fatisfactory, as to fhow the abfurdity
of admitting blind chance, rather than wif
dom and defign, to have been the cauſe of
all the regularity and order we behold in the
world, though the former be infinitely lefs pof-
fible than the latter. It fully demonftrates
that we, who maintain that wiſdom and de-
fign are the caufe of this order and regu-
larity, are under the greateſt certainty that
our opinion is true, and the contrary, falſe.
Firſt, we ſuppoſe it to be known and ac-
knowledged by all, that the body of an animal
is compounded of millions of particles of a
different nature; a conftitution which infinitely
furpaffes all the invention, ſkill, underſtanding,
and wifdom of men, fhould they unite in a
defign of forming fuch a body. Now that
it is the higheft and the moft aftoniſhing ab-
furdity, to derive this harmony of ſuch a vaſt
multitude of various particles merely from blind
chance, may be illuftrated by Virgil's Æneid.
There is indeed little compariſon between the
letters in the Æneid, and the multitude of mate-
rial parts in an animal; and between the know-
ledge requifite to compofe fuch a poem, with
the wiſdom diſplayed in the formation of an
animal-body. However, first, let the latter
be ſuppoſed equal to the former, and we will
for a while grant, that by a lucky accident in
both
Defended and Illuftrated.
77
}
t
both cafes, among an infinite number of
fruitless conjunctions of letters and parts, at
laft a concurrence of them to the defired effect
were barely poffible; yet what would be thought
of him, who, being asked to what that cele-
brated poem of Virgil owes its origin, ſhould
attribute it to a fortuitous concourſe, rather than
to an intelligent choice of the letters? He, who
ſhould infiſt on ſuch an abſurdity, would doubt-
lefs be thought unfit for human converſation;
fince one fingle poffible chance, againſt an
infinite number of impoffible, cannot come
into account with a rational man, much leſs
be preferred to the other, which is the ma-
nifeſt and only neceffary cauſe.
SECTION IX.
But I think the conceffion is already too
great, in fuppofing the poffibility of a mere
fortuitous congruity between a great number
of parts. For if, by poffible, be meant what
can actually be brought about, a twofold pof-
fibility is required for any thing actually to
be effected; namely, an internal and external
poffibility. The internal poffibility (namely,
that there is nothing irreconcileable with the
exiſtence of a thing), is not alone fufficient
to cauſe the thing actually to exiſt; but an ex-
ternal poffibility muft likewife concur, imply-
ing the adequate caufe or reafon of fuch actual
exiſtence.
This
1
}
7
78 NATURAL RELIGION
41
This I fhall illuftrate by the example of
the Æneid. If in a printer's letter cafe there
were not only a fufficient number of letters,
but likewife of every letter in the alphabet
*a number equal to the times fuch letter oc-
curs in the Æneid; then, with refpect to the
letters, there is in an internal poffibility, that
this poem might be compleatly fet with them.
But to this muft likewife be added the ex-
ternal poffibility, namely, an intelligent com-
pofer, willing and able to perform the com-
pofition; belides many other circumftances,
he muft commit no mistakes in compofing,
and, if any ſhould happen, muft immediately
correct them.
But whenever, on the contrary, the internal
or the external poffibility, or both at the faine
time are wanting, the thing is not to be cal-
led poffible; but must be held impoffible, as
it cannot be brought into actual exiſtence.
Thus, (according to the inftance propoſed),
if ſome letters be totally wanting in the cafe,
or if of fome letters there be too few, or of
others too many; or if, inſtead of letters, the
cafe contained a great number of cyphers,
points, or aftronomical types, &c. then would
there be no internal poffibility of compofing
the Æneid with them. Or if all the requifite
letters were in the cafe, but a compofitor
was wanting, or was either unwilling, or in-
capable, then would there be wanting an ex-
ternal poffibility; for, that the letters fhould of
them-
Defended and Illuftrated.
79
themſelves come out of the cafe, and arrange
themſelves in the form, is not to be ſuppoſed.
Now this being applied to the cafe in hand,
two queſtions will arife; firſt, whether with
regard to the flime or mud, there be an in-
ternaly poffibility that an animal fhould be
produced from it; fecondly, whether in reſpect
to the folar heat, or the fortuitous fermentation
proceeding from it, there be an external pof-
fibility of a creature's being produced thereby
from the mud. Now I affirm, that there is
neither an external nor an internal poffibility,
that an amimal fhould, either by heat or fer-
mentation, be produced out of mud or any
putrified fubftance.
SECTION X.
As to the internal poffibility, all that belongs
to an animal, not only the material parts, but alſo
thoſe powers which are attributed to the foul
muſt be compriſed in the mud or flime. Thus
fleſh, bones, cartilages, tendons, ſkin, claws, hair,
feathers, blood, gall and other juices, which'
compoſe the ſeveral parts of an animal, muſt
anteriorly have been in the fubftance; other-
wife they could not have been produced from
it. Now mud, or any other terrene fubftance,
does not contain the parts of which an animal
body confifts, nor can be uſed for food or
aliment by the creatures pretended to be de-
rived from it.
SEC-
}
}
80*
NATURAL RELIGION
t
$
J
SECTION XI.
The external poffibility of fuch a production
is what nature ftill lefs affords. For if we farther
confider that the parts of an animal body, which
are fuppoſed to be lodged in the dirt or putrified
fubftance, muſt be fome too few and deficient,
and others redundant and too many; fome
mingled with parts quite heterogeneous, and
others in a total diforder; it is therefore indif-
putable, that no warmth or fermentation can
poffibly bring together the fcattered parts of the
animal body which are wanting in the mud, in
a determinate proportion, or remove the redun-
dant and heterogeneous parts, which are the moſt
coarfe and heavy, or difpofe the moſt proper
parts in their due order, place, pofition, and
connection; much leſs can it inſpire them with
life, fenfation, and other fublime faculties, and
the inſtinct requifite for their manner of living.
Nobody, I prefume, will be fo extravagant as
to object, that eggs are hatched by the heat of
the fun or an oven; fince the objection muſt pre-
viouſly fuppofe the egg to contain only arude lump
of unformed fubftance, and then the argument.
muft run thus: If mere warmth can produce
a bird, a ſnake, or a toad, from eggs, the heat
of the fun may alſo have formed the other ani-
mals from mud or putrid fubftances. But
this is quite foreign to the fubject in hand.
Every one knows that the white, jointly with the
yolk
Defended and Illuſtrated.
Br
}
egg
>
yolk and cicatricula of the *. contains every
thing belonging to the animal, and even the
food of the embryo; that there is nothing ſuper-
fluous and unferviceable in it, and that every
thing is already in fuch order and difpofition, as
is adapted to the ftructure of the body, even to
the accurate arrangement of the fmalleft parts
in a contracted fpace. Thus, as foon as a
moderate heat has kindled the fpark of life in
the punctum faliens, every thing is fet in motion.
The tender embryo expands itſelf, and gra
dually. acquires a folid form, the fluid part of
the egg having been imbibed as its food. But
if the egg has been fhaken, and its parts thrown
into diſorder, no warmth can ever produce from
it any living animal.
SECTION XII.
Moſt of the advocates for the eternity of
the world, in thefe times, acknowledge, that
the fortuitous concourfe of rude, or putrid fub-
ftances will not anſwer their ends †; fince it
is
* Vide Marcelli Malpighii opera, printed at London, 1686,
Tom. I. de ovo incubato, 1 om. II. de formatione pulli in ovo.
+ Can it be thought neceffary, in theſe enlightened times, to
offer any proofs that no animal bodies in the world, whether ſmall
or great, were ever produced by the cafual concourfe of atoms?
One would be inclined to anſwer in the negative, did not expe-
rience fhew, that there are fill men fo loft to reafon and fenfe
of fhame, as to argue in fuch a manner, as if thofe Chimeras
had fome real foundation. But they only the more expofe their
ignorance or their depravity by fuch hypothefes; for even the
atoms that compofe the fubftance, from the corruption of which
they fuppofe animals to be produced, are not eternal. They are
G
changeable
82
NATURAL RELIGION
is manifeftly contrary to all experience and reafon;
and in the room of it, they have fubſtituted
a more refined and artful contrivance, on which
I ſhall beſtow ſome ſhort animadverſions. Inſtead
of deriving the firſt animals from rude matter
by mere chance, they affert, that the feed or
eggs of all animals, in which the whole form
of the animal was included in miniature, have
from eternity been diffeminated all over the
world. Now according to this hypothefis, it
muſt have fallen out, that the feed, or egg
of every animal now exifting, once accidentally
lighted on its right place, where it found
warmth and food, and thus grew a living
animal.
But even this artifice will not avail them,
for the fuppofition that the feed, or egg, in
which the whole animal was formed in mi-
niature, and is fully fecured in a ſhell or rind,
exifted from eternity, is far from being granted
them. Are we better informed of the origin
of animals, by fuppofing them reduced to
an embryo ſtate? From whence are theſe feeds
changeable and paffible things, and the caufe of their exiſtence
muft neceffarily be without themſelves. If they were eternal,
how came they by motion? This certainly does not belong to
the effence of matter or atoms, fo that another Being is requifite
to impart motion to it. Thus by gradual deductions, we ſhall
arrive to a first mover. If then there is no finding any fatisfac-
tory reafon of the exiflence of matter and of motion, without
recurring to a firſt, neceffary, immurable Being, to what purpoſe
are all these fictions? Thefe canyot in the leaft difprove the ex-
istence of an eternal fupreme Being, of whom thee infidels are
fo extremely afraid, and would fain banish him out of the
univerſe. Theſe weapons are not fufficient for combatting the
moft precious and comfortable truths.
or
Defended and Illuftrated.
83
J
or eggs? Are they of themſelves neceffary,
and ſelf-exiftent? Or could not the world ſub-
fift without them? Muft not this ingenious ar-
rangement, this invelopment of minute em-
bryos, have fome powerful caufe adequate to
fuch operations, as well as the production of
the animals themfelves in their full growth?
And is there not more caufe to enquire how
the ftamina of theſe embryos came to be fo
curiouſly folded together in an egg, from
which they afterwards burft forth, and make
their appearance in a thouſand various ſhapes,
parts, and members, than we have to enquire
concerning full grown animals?
But fuppofing, that without farther exa-
mination, we admitted fuch feeds and eggs;
we are ftill at a lofs to conceive, how they
have been preferved from eternity to the
time of their birth without putrifying, or being
deſtroyed by fome accident? For they muft
have been compofed in the fame manner,
and confifted of as many parts as the ani-
mals themſelves when grown up; they must
have had within and without them the fame
cauſes of fermentation and putrefaction, as the
larger bodies.
And tho' they had exiſted from eternity, how
came the egg to be impregnated? This could
not be performed by heat alone; for even the
eggs of large fowls, unless they are impreg-
nated by the cock, are fo far from producing
a living animal, that they putrify the fooner
by the admiffion of heat. It is therefore fuf-
ficiently
G 2
1
84
NATURAL RELIGION
ficiently clear and demonftrable, that this hy
pothefis, notwithſtanding all its decorations,
does not avail; but on the contrary, ferves only
to render the opinion more contemptible and
odious.
SECTION XIII.
Now from what we have hitherto advanced,
I hope the reader is convinced, that the origin
of men and other animals from the earth can-
not be accounted for in a natural way; that
all the arguments urged by the ancients for
that end, arofe from grofs ignorance, and are.
directly contrary to all the moſt accurate ex-
periments and the principles of found reaſon-
ing; fo that they cannot, efpecially in this
learned age, be afferted with the leaft appear-
ance of truth, but proceed only from obftinacy
or an affectation of fingularity. If any of thefe
gentlemen are ſeriouſly inclined to fatisfy them-
felves concerning the origin of men and ani-
mals, they fhall find, that after feveral fruitless
evafions, they will at laſt be obliged to dethrone
their idol the World, or Nature, and to feek the
primary origin of living creatures in a more
exalted fource.
Thus it evidently appears from the premiſes,
that the earth has no title to be called the
general mother of us all. She is no more
than our nurfe, and the fun our fomenter.
After being formed and placed on this globe
by a more powerful hand, the earth furnishes
}
us
心
​!
85
Defended and Illuſtrated.
1
us with neceffary food, cloathing, and habita-
tion; and the fun imparts a proper heat to
us: but let it not be pretended, that the earth,
impregnated by the fun, conceived and brought
forth the firft men and animals, and that we
derive our origin from it.
it menti
AAG
It is farther evident, that in this firſt origin
of men and animals, we alfo difcover the end,
or rather the commencement of nature and
natural cauſes: for the only natural caufe oft
Parental pro.
the origin of men and animals is parental creation lak
procreation; there is no other adequate caule only,
to be found in the whole world. Now if
they are not defcended from anceſtors, by eter-
nal progreffion; fo neither can the natural power
of procreation be from eternity. Thus in what
time foever we place the exiſtence of the firft
pair of the human or animal fpecies, their
nature or natural energy ceafes to be the ef
ficient cauſe of men or animals, and even
receives its origin from a higher caufe. It fill
farther appears, that the very fame proof which
we have advanced concerning our earth and
nature, in this part of the univerfe, muft hold
good concerning all nature, and every part
of the creation, even all the vaft orbs that com-
pofe the amazing whole. For if, in the other
planets which move round our fun, or revolve
about other fixed ftars, there be living in-
habitants, as the ancients partly conje&ured,
and most modern philofophers have held highly
probable; it foilows from the above mentioned
reaſons, that there, as on our globe, every
fpecies
G 3
#
1
86
NATURAL RELIGION
fpecies muſt have had a beginning, and that
the primary origin of them is no more to be
attributed to their respective planet and its fun,
or to the nature of them, than our origin
to this earth. We may therefore make this
general conclufion; namely, that nothing in
the whole world, and throughout all nature,
having life in it, was originally produced by
the world of matter, or by material nature.
Now as that which could not impart ex-
iſtence to all things which have exiſted, can
by no means be the firtt Being, it follows,
that the whole material world, or nature, can-
not be the firft, felf-exiftent, neceffary and
eternal Being; but, like the living creatures
themſelves, muft owe its origin to another
cauſe, which is in reality the primary, felf-
exiftent Being. Thus, man has in himſelf,
and in other animals, an infallible criterion
by which he may diftinguish the World
and Nature, from the CREATOR of all
things.
I hall conclude with a brief recapitulation of
the connection of my argument; which is as
follows.
«
"If the fpecies of men and animals
have had a beginning, and yet do not
"originally proceed from the world, nor from
nature the world and nature are not the
“ firſt, ſelf-exiftent Being "
66
;
For that cannot be the firft, felf-exiftent
Being, which does not contain in itſelf the
original foundation and adequate cauſe of the
things
2
Defended and Illuftrated.
87.
>
things which have been brought into exiſtence.
(Differtation I. Sect. 3.)
"But the human race, and all the fpecies
"of animals, once had a beginning;"
As all who ever lived before us, without
one fingle exception, had a beginning; confe-
quently there must have been, antecedent to
all that have exifted, another cauſe, by which
the. first pair of each fpecies was produced;
(Sect. 4, 5.) and an infinite retrogreffive fe-
ries of anceſtors is irreconcileable with found
reaſoning; (Sect. 6-9.) all history likewife
bearing witneſs that mankind had a beginning.
(Sect. 10-16).
"And yet they are not originally ſprung
"from the world, or from its nature.'
"
For the heat of the fun does not produce
any animals from the
(Differtation II. Sect.
mud or rude matter;
1-6.) nor can blind
1—6.)
chance bring forth any body of an artificial
texture; (Sect. 7. 11.) but eternal feminal eggs
of every kind of animals are equally to be
exploded, (Sect. 12.)
"Therefore the world and its nature is by
"no means the firſt, felf-exiſtent Being; but,
"like the animals them felves, is produced by
a real, primary, felf-exiftent Being."
'
GEANTO
DISSER-
G 4
88 NATURAL RELIGION
DISSERTATION III.
Proving that the material world is, in itſelf
void of life, and confequently incapable of in-
trinfic perfection; from whence it follows,
that it is not felf-exiftent, eternal, and ne-
ceſſary; but must have derived its exiflence
from fome other Being.
WHAT
SECTION I.
HAT has hitherto been advanced con-
cerning the world, and its nature, from
the first origin of men and animals, is far-
ther confirmed from the contemplation of the
material world, and its nature, confidered in
itſelf. For if we diftinguish between the living
creatures and the material world, and if the
ſubſtances which compofe the latter and their
powers are allowed by our very adverfaries
to be without life, fenfation, or intelligence,
it is evident that the lifelefs material world,
and its nature, have no intrinfic and effential,
but only an extrintic, perfection. Hence I
infer, that it did not actually and neceffarily
exift of itfelt from eternity, but that it was
produced by fome other Being, and for the fake
of fome other Being, namely, for living creatures.
If this conclufion be confidered according
to our common and natural ideas, the truth
and juftneſs of it will immediately appear,
For
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
·89
}
For as every thing must have its effential
perfection, the greatest perfection muſt in-
difputably be found in a particular manner
in the ſelf-exiftent, neceffary, and eternal
Being. If this Being wanted that proper
internal perfection, it could neither fubfift
of itſelf, nor impart exiſtence to the things
that have been accidentally produced by it.
Now every rational perfon muſt allow, that
to be without life, fenfation, or intelli-
gence, and to act as fuch, is fo far from
poffeffing an internal perfection, that it im-
plies great imperfection. An inanimate ſub-
ftance, or blind nature, knows nothing of it-
felf, and can neither be fenfible of, nor enjoy
its own exiſtence; on the contrary, whether
it exifts or not, or whether it exifts in this
or that manner, is quite a matter of indiffe-
rence to it. How then can a Being be fup-
poſed to be eternal, which has not from eter-
nity rejoiced in its exiſtence, nor fhall to all
eternity be fenfible of it? How can it be ac-
counted a neceffary Being, fince it cannot ex-
ift for its own fake, and might have been of
another nature, or might have had different
qualifications? How can that be ſelf-exiſtent,
in which there is nothing that neceffarily
requires or determines its exiſtence? Thus it
is evident that it cannot exiſt of itſelf, nor
for itself; but if it does exift, it muſt have been
produced by, and for the fake of, fome other
Being. I thail farther evince the truth of
this conclufion, when I have illuftrated theſe
two
90 NATURAL RELIGION
two propofitions, namely, That I may juftly
confider the material world, in and with re-
gard to itſelf, abftractedly from the living ani-
mals it contains; and confequently may look
upon the material world as a fubftance void
of life.
SECTION II.
That the material world may, and ought
to be confidered in and with regard to itſelf,
abſtractedly from the living animals in it, ne-
ceffarily follows from the preceding demon-
ftrations; for though there are animate Beings
in the world, yet they have not always ex-
ifted, nor were they originally produced by
the world, or its power and energy.
The fubftance of the vaſt material bodies, their
figure, polition, order, motion, and alteration,
might exiſt and continue, without any animals
on them, or the fuppofition of any fuch Beings.
Why fhould not the earth, together with
Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury,
fubfift and perform their revolutions round
the fun, with the confequent fucceffions of
fummer and winter, day and night, rain and
drought, and produce flowers and fruits with-
out any living inhabitants, as well as they
do now, when they are fuppofed to abound
in them no lefs than our populous earth?
We have no hand in thofe great mutations.
The planets derive no greater motive powers
from our life; nor is their gravitation affected
by
Defended and Illuftrated.
91
by our death: and, on the contrary, our life
is not the neceffary refult of thofe powers and
mutations. We are no more an effential piece
or part of the material world, than the in- .
habitant is an effential part of a houſe;
why may we not then confider the world
abſtractedly from the animals in it, as well
as a houſe from its inhabitants?
SECTION II.
But fecondly, I confider all the great celeſtial
bodies in, and relatively to, themſelves, as void ·
of life, ſenſe, and intelligence; and this agrees
with the ſyſtem of our antagoniſts, which
will fave the trouble of admitting any more
proofs on this head.
I have indeed obferved above, that many
of the ancients fubftituted in the material
world an intelligence or rational foul, effen-
tially united to the world as its body, and
extended its energy to all nature; fo that it
was fuppofed to animate the world, and re-
gulate it with a determinate view. I have
alfo already fhewed, that our modern Pan-
theïfts might, by fuch an hypothefis, account
for all the mutations in the world in a much
more tolerable and rational manner, than by
their own reveries. Thus the fuppofition that
an all-pervading power animates the whole
body of the world, directing it with intelli-
gence and defign, does not thwart their own.
principles; fince they allow that material fub-
ftances
·
92 NATURAL RELIGION
1
ſtances, eſpecially organical bodies, have life,
fenfation and thought: but the end they aim
at feems contrary to all reafon and evidence,
namely, to explode all intelligence, reafon, defign,
and wisdom, whether in or out of the world;
and they take an irrational pleaſure in committing
every thing, and confequently themfelves, to
the fenfelefs powers of an inanimate ſubſtance,
to blind deſtiny, or fortuitous chance.
But as to the queftion, Whether all the
fubftances of the celestial bodies, exclufive of
animate Beings, are void of life and ſenſe?
I am aware that fome perfons, without any
ill intention, have, befides the fupreme Being,
adopted an univerfal foul of the world, and
looked on the vaft mundane bodies as fo many
animated, and perhaps intelligent, Beings.
But, for my part, I cannot diſcover the
leaft foundation for fuch an hypothefis. The
foul of the univerſe, which, next to the fupreme
Being, is fuppofed as a natural cauſe of the Phe-
nomina that appear in the world, explains
nothing; and, like other fimilar inventions, ſuch
as the natura plaftica, the principium bylarchicum,
or Idea formatrices, is an occult quality, that
is, an empty found, and a mere fubterfuge of
ignorance.
But it is well known, that the large
mundane bodies have nothing in common
with thoſe which we call animals; fince they
are not born, nor do they multiply their fpe-
cies they neither receive any aliments, nor
grow; they have no organs of the fenfes, nor
mem-
Defended and Hlustrated.
93
1
!
members to perform any voluntary motion:
for the ſtars and planets have no; appearance
of any ſpontaneous motion, which might be
expected from animated bodies; but, for fome
thouſands of years, every one of them inceffantly
goes on in the fame track and direction, and
performs its courfe in the fame order and
period, without any change or alteration, like
a piece of clock-work. Subterraneous fires rage
often within the bowels of the earth, and fre-
quently force their way through its ſurface, bring-
ing up with them ftupendous rocks, and even
whole iflands; but in all this there appears not
the leaft fign of pain, or any ſpontaneous motion.
Others chooſe rather to aſcribe life to every
particular ſubſtance, animating every plant, and
even the ſmalleft particle of matter. This hy-
pothefis has, at firſt fight, an air of grandeur
and dignity; fince life is thereby multiplied,
and all nature animated, fo as to appear the
more perfect. But as in our own body we
have a conſcioufnefs only of one Being, to
which life, fenfation, thought, and volition
belong, and as all the other parts of our
bodies have no inward and particular fenfa-
tion, or perception independent of that one
conſcious Being; with much leſs reafon can
life be attributed to plants and atoms. Ex-
perience does not diſcover to us the leaft traces
of it; and in the alteration made in thoſe
ſubſtances, even by fire itſelf, there appears a
manifeft infenfibility and indifference. But if
any one thinks proper to beftow the name
of
1
94
NATURAL RELIGION
of life on the mobility, or the power of being
moved, in matter or bodies, though they re-
main quite infenfible, we then differ only about
the meaning of the word life, and not about
the thing itſelf. Life, properly fo called, requires
fenfation at leaſt; however, though the fub-
ftance be void both of fenfation and life, yet
it may have its uſes.
Thus the pretended
perfection, which fome attribute to nature.
from the univerfal life beftowed on all its
minuteſt parts,
parts, is a Chimera juft as well
grounded, as if we were to defire a world all
of gold and precious ftones, as the moſt
perfect.
SECTION IV.
Thus, after furveying the whole material
world, relatively to itſelf, and abſtractedly
from the animals which inhabit it; there is
not the leaſt reafon to think, that it is any
thing elſe but an inanimate fubftance endued
with certain motive powers, by which, in this
connection and arrangement of parts, all the
changes occurring in the material world are
produced according to fixed rules. But who¨
does not fee that the upfhot of all this, is
no more than what is obferved in every well con-..
ftructed machine, as a clock, or a watch?
theſe alſo confift of a material fubftance di-
vided into feveral parts, determinately con-
nected with each other. The motive power,
i. e. the weight or fpring, produces according
to
*
}
ر
Defended and Illuftrated.
95
to the laws of motion, jointly with the reci-
procal connection of the parts, all the changes
obferved in the wheels, the index, and the
bell. Thus the material univerfe is nothing but
a vaſt machine, and the great celeftial bodies,
the funs and planets, are the parts and wheels
of this ftupendous machine. The nature of the
connection of its various parts, fhews the fitua-
tion of the planets with regard to their ref-
pective funs; and the alterations obferved in
thefe connected parts is effected by impreffing
on them motive powers, according to the fixed
laws of motion.
Of this large machine, the material inani-
mate world, I may fafely fay, that fince it
wants life, it is, 1. in general capable only of an
external, and not an internal perfection; con-
fequently, 2. much lefs can it be a felf-ex-
iftent, neceffary, and eternal Being; but 3. that
on the contrary, it muſt have been produced
by, and for, fome other Being, namely, for
the fake of the animate creation.
There is in nature a great difference of
powers, fome things being endued with fen-
fation and conſcioufnefs, and others having
neither; accordingly, all nature is divided into
animate and inanimate bodies. Both have
certain powers and operations: but the former
have a ſenſe of their exiftence, their confti-
tution, their aim, the workings and progrefs
of their powers; and a conſciouſneſs of the
different degrees of them: whereas, to fay all
this of inanimate bodies, would be contra-
dicting
{
96 NATURAL RELIGION
*
$
dicting the very nature of them. Now ex
perience teaches us, that there are agreeable
and diſagreeable fenfations, which conſtitute plea
fure or pain; and that to animate Beings,
from their very nature, it cannot be indifferent
whether they feel agreeable or difagreeable
fenfations, i. e. pleaſure or pain; but, on the con-
trary, every creature, according to his manner.
of living, endeavours to acquire thofe agreea-
ble fenfations of pleaſure which are within
its reach, or proper to its manner of life; that
is, every animal ſtrives to make himſelf happy
in his way. Hence it follows, that the enjoy-
ment of agreeable fenfations, or happineſs, is
the end which the nature of all animate beings
has in view, and earneſtly endeavour's after.
Thus the final caufe of the natural powers
of animate beings is in themſelves; and ac-
cordingly, this inward defign or tendency of
different animals to fome end determines what
powers, inclinations, capacities, and actions,'
what members and organs of the body, every
fpecies of living creatures muft effentially have;
and how each of them muſt be conftructed
and difpofed to correfpond with its final caufe,
that is, with its peculiar manner of life,. the
nature of its affections, and with its pleaſure
or happineſs; in a word, that it may have its
Natural Perfection. On the contrary, an inani-
mate thing, by its own nature, hath no con-
ſciouſneſs of its own exiftence, difpofition, ac-
tion, or effect. As, according to its nature, it
is capable neither of pleaſure nor pain; fo with
regard
<
Defended and Illuftrated.
97
1
regard to itself, to be, or not to be; to be of
this, or that texture; to have theſe or quite
oppofite powers; to undergo thefe, or quite dif-
ferent alterations, are matters of total indif
ference, to it. Thus there is nothing to be
perceived in a lifeleſs ſubſtance which ſhould
determine it rather actually to be, thań not to be;
to be of fuch a texture, rather than of another;
confequently in an inanimate thing, no internal
aim or defign can be fuppofed, wherewith every
quality and power fhould harmonize; but when
it has a certain mode of exiſtence, power, and
texture, which includes harmony with its final
cauſe and perfection; this must be applied to
external defign, which is foreign to itſelf, and
by which it was determined to fome end.
Such a phyſical perfection, which correſponds
or harmonizes with the internal aim of the
natural powers, and determines them to fome
end, I term Internal perfection: on the con-
trary, whenever the end to be attained by the
natural powers, with which every thing har-
monizes, is without the thing itself and fo-
reign to it, fuch a Being can only be faid to
have an External Perfection; for the idea of phy-
fical perfection depends entirely on the aim or
end any Being has in view.
Now all animate Beings have an internal
end attainable by their natural powers, which
they are continually endeavouring to arrive at;
and every thing that is in them correfponds.
and harmonizes with this end, and is de-
termined by it. Therefore the perfection of
H
living
1
98
NATURAL RELIGION
living creatures is an internal perfection; and
by virtue of their own natures, they en-
deavour to make themfelves perfect, and en-
joy their perfection in pleafing fenfations. As
many modes of living, and confequently as
many fpecies of pleaſures or happineſs, as can
be conceived; ſo many inward views or ends
are ſuppoſed in the Beings themſelves, which de-
termine what powers and difpofitions each of
them muſt be endued with, in order to cor
refpond with this inward defign, and confe
quently with its Internal Perfection. Now
as an infinite Intelligence muſt know all pof-
fible modes of exiſtence, and all poffible cor-
reſpondences with the inward view or defign
of every creature; fo muft the fame infinite
Intelligence be able to reprefent to itſelf all
the poffible internal perfections of all poffible
animate Beings, and to determine their feveral
parts, powers, &c. accordingly.
On the contrary, things inanimate, have, by
their own nature, no fenſe or conſciouſneſs of
their exiſtence, or conftitution; fo that it is
indifferent to their nature whether they exift
or not, whether they be of this or that tex-
ture; therefore the aim or end of their pur-
fuits, which determines every part of their
effence and conftitution to be of a certain
make, &c. cannot be in themſelves. Though
a phyfical congruity or perfection be attributed
to lifeleſs fubftances; yet the end or defign of it
muſt be without them; accordingly they are
capable only of an external perfection: as they
are
3
Defended and Illuftrated.
99
are by nature void of fenfation, it is only
for the fake of other things that they are
perfect, and not merely for themſelves.
To fet this in the cleareft light, it will be
neceffary previouſly to obviate a confufion,
which may be occafioned by mechanical per-
ceptions and the power of imagination. Ina-
nimate things have certain effential qualities,
as colours, fhape, fymmetry, proportion, mo=
tion, &c. which, harmonizing with our fenfa-
tions, give us pleaſure. Now from our fenfible
perceptions, we are wont to imagine that
every thing is out of us; and therefore we
afcribe to things without us, what is properly
only a fenfation within us. Thus we fay that
the air is warm, that fugar taftes ſweet, that
a flower has an agreeable ímell, that the found
of mufic is pleaſant; whereas the ſenſations of
the feeling, tafte, fmell, and hearing, are only
in ourſelves, whilft all that is in the inanimate
things without us, is only what occafions thoſe
fenfations, and harmonizes with them. Certain
colours and figures, order and proportion, by af-
fecting our organs, are known to correfpond
with our nature by the pleafing fenfation
they excite in us; which qualities are inhe-
rent in the things themselves. This cannot
be denied; the thing correfponding, however,
is not that with which it correfponds, nor the
intended view and end of fuch correfpondency.
Thus the thing correfponding has not the cor-
refpondence or harmony in itfelf, for that is
without it; and confequently it has only an
H 2
Ex-
*
ASAA
…
100
NATURAL RELIGION
P
External, and no Internal Perfection. One
colour is not in itſelf more perfect than ano-
ther; this depends on the eye, to which it
is adapted and correfponds. The fimilarity
of parts, with regard to the place, time, and
dimenfions, which prevails in the figure, order,
or proportion of an object, does not at all
conſtitute perfection; this appertains to other
things, to which every figure, order, and
proportion is adapted. Hence one and the
fame form, order, or proportion, may corre-
fpond with fome things, and ſo far have an
external perfection; but may be abfolutely
irreconcileable with others, and in that reſpect
be extremely imperfect.
Thus no phyfical internal correſpondence or
perfection is to be attributed to thoſe natures
which, in themſelves, are indifferent to all
modes of exiſtence. A flower, the figure
and colour of which pleaſes, whoſe ſmell
revives, whoſe parts, order, and proportion de-
light you, and whoſe ſubſtance yields fome va-
luable medicine; fuch a flower, correfponding
with your nature and fenfation, is, with regard
to you,, beautiful and perfect; but to the
flower itſelf, all theſe qualities, or the contrary,
are abfolutely indifferent. Mufical founds,
conveyed by the air to the ear, harmonize
with your ear, and, with regard to you, have
a certain perfection; but the air receives no
perfection by it, and the harmony, however
correfpondent with your ears, may be diſcordant
to the ears of other animals. The grandeur of
3
12
Defended and Illuftrated.
TOI
a palace, the difpofition and ſymmetry of the
ftories, windows, apartments, doors, pillars,
and decorations, have no relation to the ſtruc-
ture itſelf: It was built with all its conve-
niencies and elegancies for man, and for
man only; for to many other creatures,
as beavers, &c. the moſt fumptuous palace
would be an inconvenient dwelling. Thus
order, proportion, and every thing relative to
congruity, is not congruity or perfection itſelf;
and the qualities of things inanimate, which
correſpond with the nature of living creatures
and render them more perfect, have not, on
that account, any Internal and Phyfical Perfec-
tion, but only an External one.
Thus, on confidering that nothing of that
which, in a lifeleſs fubftance, a material world,
or machine, can harmonize and correfpond,
is in the inanimate fubftances themfelves, but
that it refides only in living creatures; if you
take away from the powers of its nature,
there remains no poffibility of any perfection
in the inanimate fubftances of the machine.
Suppoſe, for inſtance, fixed ſtars, planets, comets,
light, air, earth, plants, gold, filver, and
gems; fuppofe teleſcopes, microſcopes, qua-
drants, compaffes, violins, flutes, organs, clocks,
mills, pumps, or whatever you pleaſe; the
perfection of all theſe lifeleſs things confifts
entirely in the external benefit and pleaſures,
which animate Beings derive from each of
them. If I take away this benefit and plea-
fure, there remains nothing in the large or
fmall
H 3
102
NATURAL RELIGION
fmall bodies of this world, nor in artificial
machines or the human organs, with which any
1 of them can correfpond, or be adapted to.
The funs or fixed ftars are, indeed, the
fources of light and heat; but they are not
luminous and hot in, and for themfelves.
The planets have the viciffitudes of day and
night, fummer and winter; but to thofe orbs
themſelves, every difpofition is alike. The
vegetables and flowers exhibit to us an ele-
gant figure, difpofition, and proportion of
parts but this arrangement is quite indiffe-
rent as to themſelves, and does by no means
conftitute their Internal Perfection; fince they
themſelves enjoy thefe properties as little, as
they do their fragrancy, their exquifite tafte,
and other fecondary qualities. Thus alſo a
muſician does not play on the flute to enter-
tain himſelf, but the company; teleſcopes and
microſcopes do not render any object viſible
to themſelves, nor do the best clocks ſtrike
and ſhew the hour for their own fatisfaction :
it is only relatively to the ears, eyes, and un-
derſtanding of men, that they are perfect, and
with this external end or defign every thing
in them correfponds; there is nothing in them-
felves, to which their various parts can be
ſuppoſed to concur:
To advance one ftep farther: the perfection
which is attributed to the bodies of animals,
to their parts and texture, is not properly in
the body intrinsically and for itſelf, abftract-
edly from the foul: for, if we feparate the
foul
Defended and Illuftrated.
103
↑
foul and fenfation from the body, the eye
would not be affected by the light, nor the
ear by found, and the whole body would
be nothing more than a machine; for by
this means we ſhould take away the end of
all the exertions of thofe organs, and of their
form and arrangement: confequently, in the
nature of the body, as a body, there would
be nothing internally, with which the objects
of thoſe fenfes could correfpond; that is, ſuch
a machine would be totally void of any In-
ternal Phyfical Perfection. The perfection of
animate Beings confifts purely in this, namely,
that they are a kind of machines which every
way correſpond with the nature, or the pur-
fuits of every creature, according to its man-
ner of living. The fuppofition of a certain
clafs of fouls jointly, with a certain nature
and manner of living, determines how their
body, their eyes, ears, ftomach, &c. muft
be faſhioned, fo as to fuit with their manner
of living. Thus the eye of a fish owes all
its perfection to its being the eye of a crea-
ture that lives in the water; it would have no
perfection, confidered with regard to the eagle's
manner of living. This is alfo applicable to
the other members of animal bodies: their
perfection depends entirely on their various
modes of perception, and their manner of living.
The ftomach, inteftines, lungs, heart, nerves,
every thing is employed for the fervice of the
living creature, and, with regard to its par-
ticular manner of living, may be called perfect;
H 4
the
1
104 NATURAL RELIGION
the end or defign of their action is without the
parts themfelves; and, within themſelves, thefe
organs have only an External Perfection.
SECTION V.
This want of inward perfection, neceffarily
implies the want of life, in fubftances and ma-
chines; for a lifeless Being has no manner of
enjoyment of its exiſtence, either by fenfation,
conſciouſneſs, or imagination, nor by pleaſure
or happineſs. Thus, to a lifeless thing, its ex-
iſtence is no more than non-entity: it is quite
a matter of indifference to it, whether it
exifts or not, whether it be thus or otherwiſe;
fo that, as to its own nature and effence,
there is nothing which makes more for its
being, than for its not being; for its being in
this manner, rather than any other. Hence then
it is alfo evident that, in an inanimate thing,
nothing can be conceived with which every
thing that is in it fhould correfpond; or, in
other words, that it is not fufceptible of any
Internal Perfection. With regard to itſelf, it
would not be more imperfect if it entirely
ceafed from being at all, or if all its pro-
perties were ill conjoined.
•
The whole material world, as an inanimate
compofition, is not in itfelf more perfect than
a grain of fand, or a rudely compounded clod.
It has indeed every where a very great per-
fection; but the wonderful congruity of it is
not, nor can be, in the inanimate fubftance
itfelf.
Defended and Illuftrated.
105
itſelf. This we cannot better perceive, than
by taking away from the world all animate
Beings, leaving it to continue entire as to its
inward texture, and outward decorations; and
then will appear, what perfection it is poffeffed
of. Let the fun, moon, and ftars, regularly
riſe and ſet; let the grateful viciffitudes of
day and night, fpring, fummer, autumn and
winter, rain and fun-fhine, heat and cold,
winds and calms, fucceed each other: Let
vegetables, fruits, grain, flowers, and plants
flourish, and the trees grow more luxuriantly
than at prefent. But, in the immenſe machine,
there will be no eye to view and admire
theſe things, no mouth to taſte and enjoy the
fruits, no birds to fill the groves with melody,
no ear to be entertained by their harmonious
notes. From the elephant to the mouſe, from
the whale to the fmalleft fry, every thing in
nature, even to the moſt diſtant ſtars, will be
folitary, filent, dead; without ſenſation, under-
ſtanding or life, without enjoyment, pleaſure,
or happiness.
Where then is the inward perfection of
this infenfible material, and upon this fuppo-
fition, horrid and dreary, univerſe? Where is
that with which the fubftances, the divifions
into fo many vaft luminous and opaque ce-
leftial bodies, the regular courfe of the planets,
the viciffitude of day and night, of times and
feafons, the fertility of the earth, and like-
wife the diſorders and convulfions of the fame;
where is that, I fay, with which all theſe
correfpond
106 NATURAL RELIGION
{
correſpond and are adapted to? To what pur-
pofe is all this travail for fo many thouſand
years down to the prefent time, nay, from
eternity to eternity? To whom do the world
and nature belong? and for whom do the
celeftial bodies revolve, &c. with unwearied
Jabour?It was a matter of indifference to
the univerſe to be, or not to be; to be divided
into vaft orbs, or to be a mere chaos. It
was equal to the world, with regard to itſelf,
whether light was diftributed in every part,
or all things were buried in total darkness;
whether it had motion imparted to it, or every
thing remained at perpetual reſt in one and
the fame place; whether the planets moved
in ftated courfes, or wandered at random
through the ætherial expanfe; whether they
were decked with herbage, plants and trees,
or were only barren and defert rocks, re-
volving on their respective axes. The material
world, as an inanimate thing, would afford
nothing, to be benefited or injured; for the
whole univerfe, of itſelf, neither feels, knows
or enjoys, any thing of its exiſtence or con-
ftitution and were it poffible that for a mo-
ment it could be confcious of its exiftence,
it would readily own that it was quite a
matter of indifference, whether it had exifted
before, and how long; whether its exiſtence
was to continue, or what had happened, or
might happen, in it.
SEC-
Defended and Illuftrated.
107
SECTION VI.
It is therefore evident, that in the material
inanimate world in itſelf, relatively to its na-
ture and effence, there neither is, nor can be,
any thing which determines its exiſtence, more
than its non-existence. Moreover, with regard
to the world itſelf, no idea can be formed
of an internal perfection, or correſpondence of
every thing that is in. it with a general, in-
ternal aim or defign. But fince the end or
cauſe of its exiſtence, properties, and perfec-
tions is not in itſelf, it cannot be the firft and
ſelf-exiſtent Being; on the contrary it follows,
that the cauſe of its exiftence, properties, and
perfections, muft be fought for out of it,
namely, in the firſt, felf-exiſtent Being. Hence
it appears that the world was brought into
exiſtence, was created and produced, by a
ſelf-exiſtent Being, as the efficient cauſe.
This creation, or commencement of the
world, or is confirmed by its duration, the
continuance of its existence; which confifts
in a conſtant fucceffion of viciffitudes and con-`
tingencies. Now if a ſeries of viciffitudes con-
ftitutes what we call Time, then the existence
of the world cannot be conceived without the
idea of time; and its whole duration, or the
age of the world, is the fame as the whole
fucceffion of its incidents: one continues as
long as the other, and both will ceafe at the
fame time. Now, it is manifeft that freſh
con-
108 NATURAL RELIGION
contingencies, unknown before, continually ap-
pear in the world, and that year fucceeds
year, and age follows age; fo that there is
a continual addition made to the preceding
incidents. Now that, to which fomething can
be continually added, is by no means infinite;
and as it may be augmented ad infinitum,
for that reaton it can never be infinite, but
always continues finite. Therefore the vicif-
fitudes feen in the world and their fucceffion,
as likewife the time of their exiſtence, nei
ther are, nor can ever be infinite, but are ab-
folutely finite. Let us but imagine the time
of the world's exiftence to confift of fingle
years, or fingle ages, following each other;
and it will plainly appear that the time of
its exiſtence must be finite, becauſe every num-
ber can be augmented, and the years now
current can never be extended ad infinitum,
but make a limited number. Thus, with re-
gard to the limited number of the actual
years of the world, and all its actual incidents,
we can reprefent to ourſelves a time when
it was not atually in being; that is, it was
not from everlafting; it had a beginning of
its existence; and confequently was brought
into being, or created, by the firft, felf-ex-
iftent Effence.
SECTION VII.
Moft of the ancient philofopers imagined
the world to have exifted from eternity, if
not
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
109
not in its preſent conftitution, at least in its
elements or firſt principles. For they easily
comprehended that, from matter already ex-
ifting, fomething might be formed, then grow,
increaſe, and multiply; but that matter, or
a Being which abfolutely did not exift, could
have been produced from nothing, feemed to
them utterly inconceiveable, and abfurd.
But as fuch a doubt was founded only on
ignorance and want of penetration, it cannot
have any weight against clear and pofitive
ideas, or experimental knowledge. What is
more clear and diftinct, than the idea of
numbers, and of what may be numbered; and
that neither the one or the other can be fo
augmented as to become infinite? What is
more evident than that an inanimate world
has, in itſelf, no internal perfection, and con-
ſequently no cauſe why it actually exiſts?
In short, there would be no end of wrang-
ling, if manifeft proofs were to be confuted
only by faying, 'I cannot conceive how it is
poffible; therefore there is no fuch thing.'
<.
The formation of plants and animals as it
were in embryo in the feed, is no otherwife
comprehended than as we fee by the iffue,
that it is really fo; but how this comes to país,
no mortal has yet been able to explain by
any mechanic laws or powers. If this were
not fupported by daily experience, it would
be no lefs incomprehenfible to us, than the
primary production of a fubftance from non-
entity; are we therefore to deny both? All
the
110
NATURAL RELIGIÓN
}
13
B
1
the power which man is poffeffed of, is to
alter and change things which already exift
to his hands this he does by bodily ftrength
and mechanical inftruments, adding, joining,
or feparating the parts of matter; and yet
he fcarce knows how this is performed, that
is, how he moves his limbs, and how the
motion of one fubftance or body is commu-
nicated to another. As for many ftupendous
remains of antiquity, we are quite at a loſs to
conceive by what art
art or force fuch things
were effected; and
yet all
all agree that they
are the works of human hands. Thus, be-
caufe we are not able to create new things,
or to conceive how they were created, are
we to deny that there is a power which was
able to produce, or bring into being, things
which did not exift before? The human foul,
at leaſt, is capable of conceiving as poffible,
and as it were of creating in its underſtanding,
things which at prefent have no exiftence;
why then may there not be an Effence,
which, out of itſelf, gives real exiſtence to
things which are poffible, and of which we
can form ideas?
•
Let it not be objected, "That it is not
"mere ignorance how a creation from nothing
"fhould be poffible, but that the impoffibility
"or inconfiftency of it is manifeft." This
charge will hardly be made good by ſaying,
"from nothing, nothing is produced." Will
any one be fo abfurd as to maintain, that
Nothing was the fubftance of which every
thing
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
111
thing was formed; or that Nothing was the
cauſe which created all things? he thus makes
Nothing Something; and implies a contradic-
tion, by fuppofing that a non-entity produced
and framed the world, and that out of a fub-
ftance which was a mere nothing. But he
that conceives this ftate of non-entity, as
the limit or point from whence real exiſtence.
dates its commencement, is fo far from con-
tradicting himſelf, that his thoughts may be
ſaid to be perfectly juft. He does not make
Nothing to be Something, nor look upon it
as the matter or efficient caufe of things;
but, on the contrary, to be what it is (No-
thing, or abſence of real exiftence, only a
terminus à quo :) This is no lefs allowable than,
before a ſeries of numbers, or before the
unite with which the feries begins, to conceive
a cypher or zero.
Since therefore there is an Effence which
comprehends in itſelf the cauſe of all real
exiſtence; any thing, which was not before,
may be as eaſily brought into being by its will,
wifdom, and power as a man may, with-
out previouſly thinking on any number, begin
to reckon from an unite. But this Effence
muſt be a ſelf-exiftent Being, originally con-
taining in itſelf the caufes of the existence of
all that has been created; and confequently
he muſt have a power of bringing into ex-
iſtence the world, if it had a beginning, at
a time when there was no fuch thing in
being. But that the world had a commence-
ment
112
NATURAL RELIGION
1
ment is indifputable; fince its real exiſtence
confifts in a feries and number of incidents,
which cannot be infinite; confequently it muſt
have had a beginning.
SECTION VIII.
Some eminent perfons have oppoſed the
above-mentioned pofition, viz. that the world
had a beginning, and reafon thus: "It was
EC
<<
poffible to God, from all eternity, to create
a world; fince he himſelf is eternal, and
"had from all eternity the power and will
"of creation, and could not have firft ac-
"quired it in time." Thus, according to
them, it must not be fuppofed that God begun
the creation at any period of time, without
having exerciſed his creative power before:
they are of opinion that this would ftill leave
a vaft difference between the eternity of God,
who is without time or change, and dependent
on nothing without him; and the eternity of
the world, which, fay they, confifts in an infinite
time, and is continually dependent on the ſelf-
exiftent Being.
But theſe arguments are fallacious, and no-
thing but empty founds. Let us only put
thefe queftions to thofe who maintain this
opinion: What is it to create from eternity?
What idea have you of this? Is creating
the bringing into being a thing which did
exift before? This takes away the eternity
of
Defended and Illuftrated.
i13
1
of the thing created, and rather fuppofes a
beginning of its exiſtence. What is the mean-
ing of the expreffion from eternity? Do you
not thereby reprefent eternity as a progreffive
fucceffion of time, which commenced from a
certain point or term? And how does this
agree with the idea of eternity? How, then,
can a Being be faid to have created a thing
from eternity? For we may eafily conceive
a thing to be eternal if we ſuppoſe it to be
without fucceffion or change; but to fuppofe a
time of its actual exiſtence begun from eter-
nity, is fomething quite abfurd and unintel-
ligible. If you ſuppoſe time to be infinite,
does not this again lead you into the con-
tradiction, That fomething which may admit
of increaſe is infinite, and that a determinate
number of years, actually paffed, is indeter-
minate, and may be lengthened to infinitude?
$
In order to obviate the fpecious objection
raiſed from God's eternal Power and Will to
create the world, let us ftate the argument
as follows, that we may have a better inſight
into the truth or fallacy of thefe confequences.
But the whole conclufion deducible from it
is this, That if God's Power and Will to create
the world be eternal, then is the world alfo
eternal, or was created from eternity. Now
if the first propofition be true, fo is the
fecond. Here I plainly faw that, according to
this way of arguing, the infinitude of God's
attributes, and particularly his immutable du-
ration, were by the creation transferred to the
I
creature
2:14
NATURAL RELIGION
}
creature; juſt as if the attributes of the Crea-
tor could, and muſt have been communicated
to it, which is abfolutely falfe, and implies a
manifeft contradiction.
If the world be out of God, and the
work of his hands, then it must be diftinct
from him in its effence and properties; con-
ſequently it can no more be eternal than
it can be increate, or a God. The fupreme
Being himſelf cannot, by any means, transfer
his attributes to a creature. His underſtand-
ing is infinite but have the poffible things
that are out of him, infinite intelligence?
His will or inclination to good, to joy and
felicity, is without bounds; but can the things
which are out of him, and of a limited ex-
iſtence, thereby partake of his infinite per-
fection and felicity? His power is without
controul; but does that alfo render the ſtrength
of the things out of him immeafurable? Have
they not all their meaſure, weight, and num-
ber? The like may alſo be faid of God's
ſelf and neceffary exiſtence: it is not to be fup-
poſed that thofe attributes could have been
transferred by creation to any creature.
berty, with regard to fortuitous things, necef-
farily belongs to God; yet what he chooſes
does not thereby acquire a neceffary exiſtence.
Thus alfo, though the eternal and immutable
God had an eternal power, and an eternal
purpoſe, to create a world; yet eternity and
immutability are not by any means transferred
to the creature, in the accompliſhment of the
Li-
divine
?
Defended and Illuftrated. 115
#
divine Will. The things which God created, were
not eternal; but are mutable. Time begins
with the creation, and confifts in a fucceffion
of actual alterations of finite things; before,
and out of this, there is no time: and to fup-
poſe in the duration of God, which was prior
to the creation, a fucceffion of years and
ages, would be deftroying the real eternity of
the ſelf-exiſtent Being. Therefore afk not,
what God was doing before the creation;
or why the world was not created many thou-
fand years before the Mofaic æra. Thefe
queſtions are abfurd } nor can any idea be
formed of them.
SECTION IX.
Thus nothing can-obfcure this truth, namely,
that an inanimate, material world, which has
no Internal Perfection, does not contain in
itſelf the caufe or end of its exiftence and for-
mation; or, in other words, that it can in no
fenſe be ſelf-exiftent or eternal, but muft, at
fome, period of time, have received its exift-
ence together with its texture and perfection,
from fome real, felf-exiftent, and eternal Being.
This is evident from the continual fucceffion
of its incidents or changes, which, without
fuppofing a beginning, would be incompre-
henfible.
When any thing is produced by another
Being, and yet that for which every thing in
I 2
116
NATURAL RELIGION
1
·
甫
​it is of a determinate form, fize, &c. is out of
it; it is faid to have been produced for the
fake of fome other Being. Therefore it is
evident that the inanimate, material world
muſt have been produced for the fake of
fomething elſe, and not for its own. Now
if it be neceffary that there fhould be ſome-
thing without, or different from the mate-
rial world, for whofe fake it was produced,
and its whole conſtitution was determined ;
where are we to look for this Something, but
in the animal kingdom? For, to the inanimate,
nothing can be oppoſed but the animate Beings.
Thus it is the animate Beings only, that muſt in-
clude in themſelves the cauſes of all the de-
terminations or qualities obferved in the world:
for that it cannot be the ever-living God him-
felf for whofe fake the material world exifts,
or with whoſe nature it has a neceffary con-
nection, ſhall be made to appear in Differ-
tation IV. Section III.
It has already been fhewn that the mate-
rial world, confidered in itſelf, is no more
than a machine, and includes in itſelf at large,
what human machines exhibit in miniature';
namely, a connection of many parts in which
a motive power, according to fixed laws and
the nature of the connection, produces certain
alterations. It may farther be afferted that the
univerſe, though but one entire machine, is
compounded of millions of machines great and
fmall but how comes it to paſs, that we
could form no manner of idea what any of
thefe
Defended and Illuftrated.
117
thefe innumerable machines, their nature, fpe-
cies and intent were, if we did not know it
to be deſtined for the uſe of animate Beings?
How comes it that in all inanimate things
which form a machine, in all the forms,
conftitutions, and local motion, there is no-
thing contained which can determine their
particular frame, nature, and compofition,
much leſs the exiftence of them, and to which
of courſe, all the reft correfponds? For to
an inanimate thing, all forms, every texture
and motion, and even exiftence itfelf, is in-
different; it is not confcious of its exiftence
or particular texture. The benefit of the
living creatures can alone determine the con-
ftitution and ufe of an inanimate machine;
and confequently, That alone explains its nature.
and fpecies, and affigns the caufe why it is
there, and why every part is thus and not
otherwife. Thus the ufe which the machine
is to be of to the living, enters into the idea
and definition of its exiſtence. Without know-
ing the ufe of the machine, there is no know-
ing what kind of machine it is. If we fet
about defining a clock, a mill, a pump, &c.
we ſhall find it impoffible to form to ourfelves,
or convey to others, any idea of either of
thoſe machines, without fpecifying what ufe
they are of to animate Beings.
-
Suppoſe a Hottentot, who knows nothing
of the uſe of a watch, was fhewn the infide,
the fpring, chain, wheels, in fhort, all its
parts and the difpofition of them; nay, let
. I 3
him
118.
NATURAL RELIGION
him be inſtructed by a watch-maker, ſo that,
in time, he may be able to make a watch;
yet I affirm, that the Hottentot, if he is not
made acquainted with the uſe of a watch,
does not know what a watch is. He knows
it not effentially; he is ignorant of its defign
and entire conftruction. For if the uſe of it
had not been previouſly conceived in the mind
of the artift who made a watch, as fomething
feasible, fuch a machine would never have
been made, nor have been difpofed and con-
ftructed in fuch a manner.
1
It is with natural, juft as it is with arti-
ficial, machines; while we are ignorant of their
uſe and convenience with regard to the con-
nection of things, we muft own that our
knowledge of them is only external, and does
not extend to the effential part of them. Thus
the ancient anatomifts, being ignorant of the
action and uſe of the liver and spleen in the
human body, knew not what to make of
them. Even our modern anatomifts when,
in the diffection of the feveral fpecies of ani-
mals, they meet with any veffels whofe ufe
they cannot determine from the conformation
of them with others which are known, in-
genuouſly confefs that they know not what
thofe veffels are; whereas the eyes, ears, fto-
mach, bladder, &c. of animals are parts that
are known to us; fince we are acquainted
with their utility and beneficial operations, and
on that account are able to explain them.
Indeed
Defended and Illustrated:
119
Indeed, when we fee other things in na-
ture, of whofe exiftence we cannot diſcover
the utility, end, and defign, we are obliged.
to be fatisfied with their bare external ap-
pearances, and to diftinguish them by thoſe
only; but nobody will preſume to fay, that
he therefore knows them effentially. As for
other things, fuch as plants, trees, vegetables,
&c. we ſee the abfolute neceffity of their vef-
fels; yet, in fuch a manner, as to extend only
to inanimate nature, and the vegetable king-
dom. Yet no one will fay, that theſe ve-
getables exift for themſelves; or that he knows
them with regard to their connection with other
things in nature. Let the roots, ducts, and rind
or bark, ferve for the reception and circula-
tion of the alimentary juice; fome veffels to
involve the buds, leaves, and bloffoms; others
by diftending, to enlarge the fruit; and again
the fruit, for preferving the feed in order to
produce a new plant. Notwithſtanding all
this, we are ſtill within the compaſs of an
inanimate plant. We know the feed by this,
namely, that it brings forth fuch a plant;
that the plant yields fuch a feed; and that,
again, from this feed proceeds a fimilar plant,
and fo on in a perpetual viciflitude. What
inference can we draw from hence? Was the
plant, confidered with regard to itſelf, necef-
fary? Has it any enjoyment of its own ex-
iftence and texture? Or can it yield any be-
nefit to the other parts of the material world?
If we were as well acquainted with every
herb
I 4
120
NATURAL RELIGION
*
鼻
​herb and plant, as the farmer is with oats,
rye, wheat, barley, &c. and, as animals, know
all kinds of food, we fhould know fomething
more of the vegetable kingdom, with regard
to its connection with the other parts of na-
ture, than what our botanifts inform us con-
cerning their roots, leaves, ftamina, piftilla,
farina, &c. As Nature, in the animal king-
dom, defcends from us men through all pof-
fible ſpecies down to the very, meaneft in-
fect, supplying to each its food and necef-
faries; fo the vegetable kingdom correfponds
with it in all its gradations, fo that there is
no herb or plant which is not adapted to
the ſmell, tafte, aliment, and wants of
fome certain fpecies of animals; and fo far
they are, in general, to be looked upon as
inftruments produced for the well-being of
living creatures. Nay, the very univerfe, the
vaft machine of the world, must be viewed
in this light; and as it is inanimate, and has
not in itfelf any internal perfection, or final
cauſe of its exiſtence and determinate texture, it
must have been produced not only by ano-
ther Being, but alfo for the fake of fome
other Beings, that is, the animate; and muft
in all refpects have been deſtined for their
conveniency. And he that would learn to
know what fort of a thing the world is
must include, in its definition and effential
idea, this utility of it to animate Beings; this
being the cauſe of its prefent conftitution, and
comprehending in itſelf the laws of all nature and
mechanical
Defended and Illuftrated.
121
mechanical motion; otherwife he knows no
more of this vaft machine the world, than
a Hottentot does of a watch.
SECTION X.
That this conclufion concerning the world
is well grounded, may be manifeftly demon-
ftrated; and this without any extraordinary
fkill in aftronomy, or acquaintance with na-
tural philofophy, and much lefs with abſtract
metaphyfical fpeculations. We need only view
the world as it really is, and fhews itſelf to
our fenfes, and we fhall immediately ſee the
whole difpofition and ordinance of the vaft
ftructure of the univerfe; which includes in
itfélf an innumerable multitude of globes,
fome luminous, others opaque, performing their
ſtated courfes and motions in the immeafu-
rable expanfe of heaven. Now that this won-
derful difpofition of the vaſt univerſal ſyſtem
Correſponds in all its parts with the benefit of
animate Beings, may be eafily demonftrated.
The thin, fluid, and tranfparent ethereal mat-
ter is in itſelf proper for diffuſing light and
heat all over the univerfe; which, as they are
fo neceffary to living creatures, render the
whole world habitable, fertile, and pleaſant.
At the fame time, they exhibit, from an afto-
nishing diſtance, to thofe who are capable of
knowlege and reflection, a fketch of the im-
menfe fyftem confifting of an infinité variety
of
122
NATURAL RELIGION
'
On
of parts, which they are able to improve to
many noble purpofes and advantages.
the contrary, the inanimate orbs that compofe
the univerſe, do not ftand in any need of
light for themſelves to regulate their motions:
they can find their way in obfcurity and
darkneſs; nay, the light is to them dark and
invifible.
In this immeaſurable ætherial expanfe all
folid fubftances are diffeminated; not con-
fufedly heaped together, but divided into in-
numerable vaft bodies or globes. And as
globular bodies have, larger furfaces than any
other, they afford more room for the habi-
tation of living creatures, and are fit for the
feparate dwellings of feveral poffible fpecies of
animals, which could not all live together
on one globe, in the fame temperature of
air, the fame heat, and fubfift on the fame
food. But as things are now difpofed, all
have different habitations adapted to their va-
rious natures, and dwell at large in different
parts of the ftupendous univerfe. This ætherial
fluid, though it be fo rare and fubtle, is,
on one hand, as it were a barrier to confine
thofe vaft globes the fixed ftars within their
reſpective ſtations, and prevent them from
falling on one another; and, on the other
hand, they yield a free and uninterrupted
paffage to the planets, in their various revo-
lutions and circumrotations. Thefe number-
less globes are difpofed at ſuch proper diftances
as not to clash with each other, or alter
their
Defended and Illuftrated.
123
their unvaried courfe by any mutual impreffion,
or influence on one another. The end and defign
of all this admirable contrivance, is to render
the celestial bodies conftant and convenient
habitations for the various fpecies of animate
Beings. The reverſe of any of theſe wiſe dif-
pofitions would throw the whole fyftem into
confufion; which, though a matter of indif-
ference to the inanimate world, would utterly
deſtroy and exterminate all living creatures
that now dwell fecurely in their reſpective
habitations.
All the celestial bodies that compofe the
univerfe, as far as the most accurate obferva-
tions reach, are of a globular form; and not
of various figures, and thofe all irregular, as
might be expected from a fortuitous concourſe
of atoms. But now, from what we experience
on our own globe, we know that a ſpherical
body is on all fides habitable, on account of
its univerfal gravitation: and we may eaſily
conceive that any other figure, however re-
gular, would, if not entirely, yet in a great
meaſure, render theſe mundane bodies unin-
habitable; and confequently, that the globular
form is the beft adapted for rendering the
whole world habitable.
Of theſe orbs fome are luminous, and others
opaque. Among the former is our fun; the
fixed ftars are of the fame form, and are fup-
poſed to be fo many funs. And as fix pri-
mary planets, in themſelves opaque, revolve
round the fun, and ten fatellites round Sa-
turn,
}
3
}
124 NATURAL RELIGION
turn, Jupiter, and the earth; it is at prefent
the prevailing opinion among aftronomers, that
feveral planets revolve about every fixed ftar
in the heavens, as their refpective funs, to
which the latter impart both light and heat.
Indeed if we confider the general analogy
and difpofition of the feveral parts of the
univerfe, we ſhall have great reafon to em-
brace this opinion. Among all the fixed ſtars,
why ſhould our fun be the only one about
which all the opaque bodies in the univerſe
are fuppofed to be collected? Were it con-
tinual day with us, we fhould think the univerfe
very ſmall, and that it confifted only of the
fun, moon, and our earth; and, that we are
better acquainted with the extent of the
univerfe, and the multitude of its parts, and
can ſee the other planets revolving about our
fun and fome thouſands of ftars, we are be-
holden to the night and darkneſs. On the
other hand, though darkneſs, and the im-
menfe diſtance of the planets which move
round the fixed ftars, render them invifible
to us; yet fometimes certain luminous bodies,
which we call new ftars, make their appear-
ance near the fixed ftars, and at other times
are not feen, and after fome ſpace of time
entirely disappear, they can be no other than
opaque planets. This is a demonftration that
fuch planets move about the fixed ftars, as
their funs; To fay nothing of the comets,
which, after making their appearance, do not
for a great number of years come again
within
Defended and Illuftrated.
125
within our fight, and are nothing but opaque
celestial bodies, which have a particular and
very excentric courſe.
Thus all the fixed ftars in the univerſe are,
with great probability, fuppoſed to be funs
with a certain number of globes or planets
moving round each of them, and receiving
light and heat from their respective funs.
When we ſurvey the immenſe ſtructure of
the world, we behold with aſtoniſhment, amidſt
the vaſt multiplicity of its principal parts, an
uniform congruity in being habitable for ani-
mate Beings: for, that every planet is an ha-
bitable earth is, at prefent, little queftioned
by philofophers, and enquirers after truth.
But I know of no reaſon for making the
fun and fixed ftars fo many lakes of flaming
fulphur, or places of torment; I rather look
upon them
them as
as electrifing machines which
are capable of communicating light and heat
to other bodies, without burning or being in-
tenfely hot themſelves. For this, I think,
many phyſical obfervations furniſh us with
fufficient proofs. Thus, we may diſcover in
this difpofition of the world, the general con-
gruity of nature, in making the ſtars or funs,
as well as the planets, convenient habitations
for certain fpecies of living creatures; and that,
to the inhabitants of thofe funs, the planets
are not of lefs ufe and benefit, than the funs
are to the inhabitants of the planets.
SEC-
>
126 NATURAL RELIGION
1
+
SECTION XI.
Concerning our earth in particular, we know
that its rotation on its axis gives it day and
night; and that from its motion in its elip-
tical orbit, it derives the viciffitude of the fea-
fons, and the inequality of days and nights.
By the diurnal motion our hemifphere is not
left in perpetual darknefs and cold, while
the other enjoys continual light and warmth,
(by which means the whole globe would
have been uninhabitable ;) but on the con-
trary, it affords that viciffitude of light and
darkneſs which is fo beneficial to the whole
globe and its inhabitants. The annual mo-
tion, by occafioning the changes of weather,
the variety of ſeaſons, &c. fertilizes the earth,
and renders it every where habitable, even
in its extremes of heat and cold. That the
diurnal and annual motion, from which we
derive fo many advantages, are continued with
the fame velocity, and in the fame track,
for fo many thousand years without the leaft
ftop or deviation, greatly contributes to the
preſervation of all the fpecies of animals that
ever exifted on the earth.
The other appendages of the earth are in
like manner adapted to the welfare of the
living creatures that inhabit it. The moon
illuminates our nights, cauſes the tides to ebb
and flow, and regulates our time. The denfe
atmoſphere inclines the rays of light towards
the
Defended and Illuftrated.
127
1
the centre by refraction, and confequently in-
creaſes the warmth: the impreffion and gen-
tle motion of the air greatly contribute to
the fixedneſs of inanimate bodies, the growth
of vegetables, the health of animals, and af
ford a thouſand other advantages. The water,
that conſtitutes part of our globe, buoys up
and yields
yields nouriſhment to many thouſand
fpecies of animals. It also evaporates, and,
floating in ſmall particles in the air, forms
clouds; which are difperfed by the winds,
then fall down in dew or rain, fertilize the
foil, and yield drink to animals, to allay
their thirst. The hills imbibe the moift va-
pours of the air, and, firſt ſtraining them in
their bowels, deal them out in fprings, lakes,
brooks, rivers, and ftreams, watering the whole
ſurface of the earth, and facilitating intercourfe
and commerce between the inhabitants of
diftant countries.
How perfectly every thing elſe is adapted
to the convenient fubfiftence of animals, is
evident from hence, namely, that there is
ſcarce a ſpot either on the land or water,
which does not fwarm with many different
fpecies of living creatures. Concerning this
laft obfervation I fhall only add, that though
the taſte and manner of living of fo many,
and fuch a variety of animals, muft differ a
thouſand ways; yet eve. y fpecies has its
ticular fort of plants, leaves, fruit, roots, er
other food, which it relishes, and on which
it thrives, and thofe growing in a climate
par-
which
1
128
NATURAL RELIGION
L
:
which every fpecies can bear. Nay, there
are animals which feed only on one parti-
cular fort of herb or fruit, and would ftarve
rather than eat any other; and this herb is
found wherever fuch animals are feen. Thus
a thouſand different forts of food are provided
for, and adapted to, thouſands of different
palates, and nouriſh thouſands of fpecies of
animals.
SECTION XII.
Though we are but little acquainted with
the particular texture and compofition of the
other planets; yet we find that all which has
hitherto been diſcovered of them, is univerfally
adapted to the fubfiftence and accommodation
of animate Beings. As to our neighbouring
orb, the moon, though it is only a fecondary
planet, its furface when viewed through a
teleſcope appears like a map, in which the
brighter parts reprefent the land, and the
obfcure parts the water; befides, Aftronomers
think they have difcovered hills whofe fha-
dows ſeem to move on the luminous part of
the moons difk, and bright fpots or iflands
in its feas. It has its day and night, its fea-
fons and atmoſphere, and confequently muft.
be refreſhed with dew and rain; and our
earth enlightens its dark fide, like a large
moon.
The primary planets as Jupiter and Sa-
turn have alfo their moons, the former being
illuminated
{
Defended and Illuftrated.
120
?
illuminated with four, and the latter with
five fatellites and a broad luminous ring that
furrounds it; all which can be of no fervice
but to living creatures only, who by this
means receive fuch an affluence of light, as
compenfates for their immenfe diſtance from
the fun. Changeable ſpots have been obſerved
in Venus, Mars, and Jupiter, which we may
fuppofe to be mifts afcending upwards into
their atmosphere, and defcending again on
their furfaces in rain; and confequently thofe
planets confift of land and water, which iş
farther confirmed by the fixed fpots on their
furfaces. In Venus even hills are vifible
through a good teleſcope. By the rotation
of the fixed ſpots in thoſe planets we diſcover-
the period of time in which they revolve
round their axis; and confequently they have
their viciffitude of day and night. Saturn is
too remote from us, and Mercury is too
near the fun, for us to difcern any fpots in
their furface, by which we might determine
the periods of their diurnal revolutions: How-
ever, we may fafely conclude that, like the
other planets, they have their day and night;
fince they all perform their revolution round
the fun, and confequently have their years
and feaſons in their order.
Hence it appears that the fix primary, and
the ten fecondary planets, and all the celeſtial
orbs that compofe the univerſe, are fo many
habitations for animate Beings; on which, as
on our earth, the inhabitants enjoy, according
K
to
J
130 NATURAL RELIGION
to their manner of living, their light, warmth,
air, food, clothing, viciffitudes of day and night,
of fummer and winter, agreeable fenfations,
beautiful profpects, palatable efculents, harmony
and pleafing founds, mental pleaſures, exhi-
bitions of wiſdom and fkill, motives to mo-
rality and virtue, in a word, their delight and
happineſs.
SECTION XIIL
Thus it is fufficiently evident that every
thing in the material world, the various fub-
ſtances, their difpofition, figure, qualities, powers,
laws of motion, &c. all concur to the ac-
commodation and welfare of animate Beings.
Spinofa, on the contrary, who had quite dif
ferent opinions of the world, joins together
arbitrary ideas, and affigns arbitrary ſenſes to
words; by which means not only what he in-
tends to prove becomes obfcure, arbitrary and
undetermined; but is found contradictory to
experience, and what is known actually to
exift in the world.
His words are *, "A fubftance is that
"which is in itſelf, and is underſtood by
"itfelf; the idea of which ftands in no need
"of the idea of any other thing, in order
to make us conceive or comprehend it."
Farther: By the word GOD I underſtand
"that which is perfectly infinite, i. e. a fub-
((
* Spinoza in Op. Poſt, Ethic. Defin. III.
+ Idem Defn. VI.
ſtance
Defended and illustrated.
1
*ftance confifting of infinite qualities, each
of which expreffes an eternal infinite Being."
Hence he draws this conclufion: "Whatever
κό exifts, is in God, and nothing can exift, or
"be conceived to exift, out of God." This
is to fay in other words, The world is the
only fubftance which I (to fave appearances)
term God; and befides, or without the world,
nothing exiſts. Both thefe definitions are not
only obſcure, ambiguous, arbitrary, and con-
trary to the uſual acceptation of the words;
but falfe in themſelves, if they be understood
as they ought to be in order to draw fuch
a conclufion. For, in the first definition, to
exiſt, and be ſelf-exiftent; to be in itſelf, and
to be underſtood by itſelf, are taken for fy-
nonimous terms, and continually joined toge
ther. It is true, every fubftance exifts in it-
felf; but it does not follow from thence
that it is conceived by itſelf, and wants no
idea of any thing elſe to underſtand or com-
prehend that it exifts, that it is thus, and not
otherwiſe; that is, it does not follow from
the premiſes, that every fubftance exiſts by it-
felf. In the fecond definition, he arbitrarily
and falfely fuppofes, that to be infinite and
(with regard to number) to have infinite quas
lities (that is, all the properties of every thing
that exists, at the fame time and in itſelf)
is the fame thing; and likewife that all the
properties of whatever exifts are, in refpect of
their effence, eternal and neceffary. What
he would fain prove, he arbitrarily lays down
Ka
132
NATURAL RELIGION
as a foundation to build his reaſonings upon
a ftrange kind of philofophical argumenta-
tion, or rather a mean fubterfuge and pitiful
juggle !
Now, in order to examine whether Spinofa's
principle, that the world is the only ſubſtance
to be underſtood' be true, according to his
definition, namely, that it is comprehended by
itſelf, and that there is no need of any other
idea in order to acquire a clear knowledge
of the texture and compofition of the univerſe;
let us only obſerve whether, according to ex-
perience, that which Spinofa has advanced
concerning it, be actually and really in the
world. From hence it will appear evident,
beyond all doubt, that he has conftructed
in his imagination fuch a world as never
before exiſted any where elſe, and very different
from what it is in reality; and that, from
an arbitrary conjunction of ideas, he has at-
tributed to the world the reverfe of what it
is really poffeffed of.
The idea of a material univerſe, in itſelf inani-
mate, but fo framed as to afford habitations for
various fpecies of living creatures on all the
globes that are in it, is by manifeſt experience
Thewn to correfpond with truth and the reality
of things. And to this another idea is ab-
folutely neceffary in order to comprehend, on
the one hand, that living creatures exiſt in
the world, and on the other hand, that
the inanimate part of the univerſe is a com-
modious manfion for animate Beings. For, if
་
we
Defended and Illuftrated.
133
AP
we limit our ideas barely to the material
world without any thing elfe, the exiſtence
of animals in it can by no means be accounted
for; fince they must have had a beginning,
yet there is no power to be found in the
univerſe or nature from which they could
derive their origin. Thus the cauſe and defign
of its effence, qualities, difpofition, nature,
and harmony, is not to be found in the
world itſelf, as inanimate; and it is ftill more
abfurd to fuppofe that the living creatures
themſelves made a world adapted to their
reſpective wants, and imparted to it the ne-
ceffary powers for that end. Thus fince the
idea of another Being, befides the univerſe,
is neceffary for rightly comprehending that
the inanimate world is ftocked with living
creatures, and is adapted to the wants and con-
veniency of thoſe animals; we muſt conclude
that the world is by no means the felf-ex-
iſtent Being, or, in Spinofa's language, the
only fubftance, or God himſelf.
SECTION XIV.
Hence it appears that the fatal neceffity,
which Spinofa affigns to the world, its na-
ture, and its incidents, is a mere chimera.
For if it were true that the world was a
neceffary Being, its effence and texture muit
have been determined by its own Being,
which, as we have fhewn above, is falfe and
abfurd; confequently the prefent actual exif-
K 3
tence
Shit
}
134
NATURAL RELIGION
tence and texture of the univerfe are not ab
folutely neceffary. On the contrary, it was
brought into exiftence by another Being, who
alfo determined its texture and difpofition;
and the cauſe and defign of the world is out of
itſelf and its architect, that is, in animate Beings
for whoſe advantage it was created, and fur-
niſhed with properties adapted to the welfare
of living creatures. It is therefore evident,
that it was not formed by its architect through
a neceffity of its exifting, but expressly to
be a commodious habitation for animate
Beings; for, otherwife, it would not have
exifted, or would have been conftituted in
another manner, for another fpecies of animals.
I know not what fome of the ancients
and moderns mean by Neceffity: they feem
almoft to make of it a Being exifting for it-
felf, and different from all other things;
which, by its unlimited power, and an eternal,
fatal compulfion, orders things to be, and
makes their exiftence poffible only one par-
ticular way. According to thefe Fatalifts, it
is the neceffity, and not the poffibility of any
thing, or rather of all things, that is firft con-
ceived; and they hold nothing poffible, which
is not abfolutely neceffary. Such a Neceffity
fuppofed to be out of, and contrary to, the
being of things, is no leſs a chimera, à mere
found, than Chance, or the abstract idea of
Naturę. For all Neceflity which is not in-
cluded in the things themfelves, or in the
caufes of them, but is foreign to them and
contrary
Defended and Illuftrated.
135
contrary to their properties and exiſtence, is
an abſurdity, a mere cheat or juggle.
But nothing is more evident, than that an
indefinite Neceffity, when applied to the ma-
terial world, is fuppofed to be foreign and
even contrary to the being of things? To the
material inanimate world, with regard to its
being and properties, it is the fame thing,
whether it exifts or not; or whether it be
thus, or otherwife: confequently its exiſtence,
difpofition, and texture of its parts, are not de-
rived from itſelf. Therefore it is not abfo-
lutely neceffary; but, with regard to its ex-
iftence and properties, depends on fome exter-
nal efficient caufe which formed it, not for
its own fake, but for the accommodation of
living creatures. If we confider the univerſe
as a vaſt machine, it may be aſked, What de-
termines the figure of the parts, of a ma-
chine? Can each fubftance have but one par-
ticular form? Or has it of itſelf the form
proper for the conftitution of the machine?
The form and difpofition of the parts of the
univerſe are no more determined by the ſub-
ſtances themſelves, or by neceffity, than thoſe
of a clock or any mechanical inftrument.
SECTION XV.
Laftly, their idol Nature must be an affif-
tant to Neceflity, as every thing in the ma-
terial world, according to thele gentlemen,
comes to paſs in a natural way, and nothing
K 4
can
136 NATURAL RELIGION
:
まず
​1
can be in a natural way but what really is;
hence they infer, that every thing in the uni-
verſe is abfolutely neceffary. But every one
fees that no fuch conclufion can be drawn
from the premiſes; for, fuppofing it was granted
for once, that every thing in the world comes
to pass in a natural way, and that whatever
comes to pafs in a natural way cannot be
otherwife, it does not from thence follow that
there is an indefinite neceffity, but only a de-
finite mechanical neceffity. For, if we ſuppoſe
a certain machine with a definite conjunc-
tion of its parts and powers, and leave it to
itſelf, without making any external change in
it; then every thing in the machine comes
to paſs naturally, and with regard to the
powers, and the laws of them in the difpo-
fition of the parts, it is impoffible that any
thing elſe ſhould come to pafs in it, but what
actually does; however, what comes to país
in the machine is not abfolutely neceffary;
but depends on the artificer, and the conve
niency of mankind. Now I prefume that
I have fully demonftrated this to be the cafe
with regard to the whole inanimate world;
why then is the contrary, with fo much ob-
ftinacy, affirmed of Nature?
If we particularly confider nature in this
reſpect, it is neceffary previouſly to determine
the idea aunexed to the word Nature: for it
looks as if, under this veil, a myſterious Ifis
were ſtill concealed; that is, under a word of
an indefinite vague import, a mere Nothing
was
Defended and Illuftrated.
137
was made to pafs for Something, and an oc-
cult quality for a real cauſe.
Whoever would be thought to have clear
ideas, can, by the word Nature, underſtand
nothing but the effential
power of every real
fubftance. This definition agrees with the
opinion of the ancients, and the conceptions
of the vulgar and illiterate, as well as of the
learned, and the wifeft philofophers. Thus
the ſun, moon, ftars, minerals, plants, animals,
and every other fubftance in the world have their
diftinct nature, or an active power peculiar
to each of them, and different from others.
Experience and philofophy teach us, that the
power or nature of one thing oppoſes ano-
ther, and can withstand its efforts. The whole
world, in great and little, confifts entirely of
powers that act againſt each other: hence it
may be properly faid, that there are as many
different natures in the world, as real fub-
ftances; and that in reality, it is not one fingle
power which effects every thing in a natural
way.
However, all theſe claſhing powers in the
world, being by a wife connection brought
to a congruity, harmonize the whole univerſe,
and as it were maintain it in unifon; ac-
cordingly, the whole affemblage of all the par-
ticular powers which we obferve in the world
are, on account of this harmony, taken for
one, which is fimply called NATURE, or the
Univerfal Nature of Things. But this har-
mony of fo many powers, does not take away
the
138 NATURAL RELIGION
the effential difference of fo many millions
of fingle powers, any more than it would take
away the diftinction of fo many millions of men
or foldiers, by including them all in the appel-
lation of mankind or an army: for every
foldier in an army has his ftrength in him-
felf, though at a fignal from fome other per-
fon, he acts in concert with the whole col-
lective body.
Hence it evidently appears that the word
Nature is very much abufed, and reduced to
a mere found, when it is made to denote
I know not what fingle power of the world,
which effects all in all, and is diftinct from
all things; and yet is neither derived from the
foul of the univerſe, nor from God. What
is it then? Where does it refide? Muſt it
not thus vaniſh into a mere non-entity? Or is the
abſtract idea of Nature, arifing from a con-
templation of the particular nature of things,
transformed into a real Being? This is not
lefs abfurd, than if I was to fuppoſe a gene-
ral Human Nature diftinct from all the parti-
cular natures of men, as really exifting and
acting on all men. At this rate, this General
Nature might ſerve for a fabulous deity, as
Fides, Virtus, Honor, &c. were worshipped
among the Romans under the image of
Gods, though they were no more in reality
than general abftract ideas of mental qualities
in particular perfons. But it is in vain to
expect a clear explanation from thoſe men,
who thus ftrangely abufe the word Nature.
They
Defended and Illuftrated.
139
They themſelves know not what meaning to
affix to it; for it only ſerves them as an empty
found, which they ſubſtitute in the place of a
primary and fufficient caufe of all things.
SECTION XVI.
Now, whether we confider the powers of
the ſubſtances that compoſe the univerſe fingly,
or collectively, we can, for feveral reaſons,
afcribe no other than a definite or conditional
neceffity to the things themſelves; and con-
fequently to the nature of them: for,
First, Thefe powers of ſubſtances, being
their effential properties, are inanimate like the
fubftance itſelf. Now, as the inanimate fub-
ſtance itſelf does not neceffarily exift, but, on
the contrary, was produced by and for fome
other Being; its powers or nature muſt have
been produced in the fame manner, and at
the fame time with the fubftance to which
it belongs, for the fake of animate Beings.
How can an inanimate blind force, which has
no conſciouſneſs of its own operations, and
to which all the effects of its efforts are in-
different, produce any thing that is in itſelf
abfolutely neceffary? Why fhould that be
accounted the firft, eternal, felf-exiftent and
moſt perfect force, which has been eternally
unknown to itſelf, would continue a mere non-
entity, and contribute nothing to its own per
fection?
Secondly,
140 NATURAL RELIGION
Secondly, The powers of each particular large
or fmall body in the univerfe, depend on the
conftitution of the powers of thoſe parts which
are contiguous to it. Now, if this dependance
could be continued without end in one body
or ſubſtance in the univerfe, there would be
an external dependance of all nature; which
yet depended on nothing out of nature, and
was founded on a mere nothing. We may
therefore conclude, that there must be a fu-
perior power on which theſe powers are de-
pendent, and confequently, that they are not
neceffary in an abſolute ſenſe.
Thirdly, All the powers obſerved in the
univerſe are united in a congruity with each
other; but this congruity is by no
is by no means
inherent in the powers themſelves, and for
their own fake. For, if we confider them
ſeparately, not one of them includes in itfelf
the exiſtence of any other power; one knows
nothing of the other, nor to what end each
of them is adapted. But let us ſuppoſe them
all as already actually exifting, it does not
from thence follow, that there muſt be a kind
of harmony or congruity between them.
the contrary, even thefe powers might clafh
with one another, if every fubftance were
only otherwife placed, or if the order and
arrangement of all were different from what
it now is; and then this very nature of things
might deſtroy itſelf, and throw every thing
into a wild chaos. Therefore as Nature does
not derive this congruity from itſelf, it cannot
On
be
}
་་་
Defended and Illuftrated.
t4f
be abfolutely neceffary; and confequently, it
muſt have received this congruity from another
Being, without itſelf.
Fourthly, As in every machine the power.
belonging to each part of it depends on the
contiguous parts; fo the univerfal nature fup-
poſes a certain difpofition and order of its
parts; which must have been planned, and
have actually exifted, before one part would
as at prefent, act on another. Now as Na-
ture depends on fomething which must be
ſuppoſed to have exifted anterior to it, and
which, in itſelf, is not neceffary; it follows
that Nature cannot be abfolutely neceffary.
་
Fifthly, All the laws of the powers accord-
ing to which Nature acts, both with regard
to bodies and fouls, fuppofe a certain pre-
deſtination; no one of thoſe powers is of it-
felf abfolutely neceffary, nor can be demon-
ſtrated geometrically. Take either the laws
of an attractive, or repulfive power, or both;
or any other laws of motion which are con-
firmed by experience, and from which all
the phenomena of nature are derived; yet thefe
are not fuch eternal and intrinfically neceffary
truths, as that twice two is equal to four,
or that the three angles of a triangle are equal
to two right angles. Something, without or be-
fides the Laws of the natural powers, nay with-
out the fubtances themfelves, muft be con-
tinually fuppoled, in order to make us com-
prehend why thofe laws are thus, and not
otherwiſe
142
NATURAL RELIGION
otherwife conftituted*. Hence it
appears that
they admit only of an external congruity,
and an external perfection; and confequently
can be only calculated for the fake of animal
Beings, and are only conditionally neceffary.
The very laws by which fo many fouls of
a quite different nature from each other re-
gulate themſelves, are no otherwife neceffary,
then as they are defigned for a certain man-
ner of life, and a certain mode of happineſs.
On the fuppofition of a certain mode of life,
or happineſs, every law and property of the
nature of every creature, by which he acts
thus and not otherwife, were neceffary with
regard to them; but in themſelves, and abfo-
lutely, they are by no means neceffary.
Sixthly and Laſtly, The monſters which ſome-
times, though very feldom, are ſeen in the
world, befides various calamities, as floods,
earthquakes, hurricanes, famine, peftilence, &c.
fhew us, that all theſe things are naturally
poffible. Now, when theſe things fall out
entirely according to the laws impoſed on the
powers inherent in the feveral parts of the
world, it follows that there is a difpofition or
law poffible in nature, by which fuch cala-
mities are effected. Hence we may conclude,
that the prefent laws and difpofition of nature
are not impoſed by abfolute neceffity.
*See Leibnitz's Effais de Theodicée, Se&t. 345.
SEC-
T
143
Defended and Illuftrated.
\
20
SECTION XVII.
Experience, however, teaches us, that the
above-mentioned calamities happen but very
ſeldom, and muſt be purely unavoidable de-
viations from thofe rules which, otherwife, are
adapted to the welfare of living creatures.
All the powers of the material world, and
all the laws of motion, are, by undeniable
experience, known to be operative caufes of
the welfare of animate Beings. The whole
corporeal world, without knowing any thing
of the matter, without having any conſciouſ-
nefs of, or pleaſure in it, is continually at
work for our benefit; and were it endued
with the higheſt intelligence, it could not have
taken better meaſures to promote our well-
being.
The indefatigable induftry of fome modern
geometricians and natural philofophers cannot
be fufficiently commended; fince they have partly
diſcovered the laws which nature obferves in
the celeſtial and terreftrial bodies, and are in
a fair way of carrying their important enqui-
ries ftill farther. But every thing which has
been hitherto diſcovered, evidently fhews that
all thoſe laws are calculated for the advan-
tage of animate Beings. The laws difcovered
by Newton, Kepler, and Leibnitz, with regard
to the motions of the planets, are the very
fame to which we owe the viciffitude of
day and night, ſummer and winter, warmth and
fertility.
144 NATURAL RELIGION
{
fertility. From the law of gravitation the
earth retains its fixednefs, and is habitable on
all fides; and the laws of hydraulics caufe
the ftreams, lakes, and feas to overflow a
great part of the furface of the earth, and
renders it navigable. The elafticity of the
air is the means of the velocity of the pro-
greffion of light and found, of the vegetation
of plants, and the life of animals. The re-
fraction and reflection of the rays of light,
according to the laws of Optics, are of infinite
advantage to the fight. It were therefore
greatly to be wiſhed that any perfon, properly
qualified, would explain the feveral laws of
Nature difcovered in Geometry and Phyfics
with fuch precifion and perfpecuity, that every
one might clearly fee and comprehend the
numberless benefits accruing from them to
animate Beings, and the inconveniences that
would follow from a different conſtitution
of things. Such an uſeful fpeculation would
fill the vaft chafm which ftill remains in phi-
lofophy, and not only connect Geometry with
Phyfics, but Phyfics with Metaphyfics, the ef-
ficient caufes with the final cauſes; and would
derive the connection and harmony of things
from the inexhauftible Source of wiſdom and
perfection.
DISSER-
Defended and Illuftrated.
145
}
}
DISSERTATION IV.
Of God, and his defign in the creation, or final
cauſes.
IN
SECTION
I.
N our enquiries after the Firſt Cauſe, we
cannot reaſonably conclude it to be the
world or nature; fince they can neither have
originally produced living creatures, nor can
they be fuppofed to exift without having re-
courſe to an all-wife Architect, who has
formed this inanimate machine, for the fake
of animate Beings. Hence it is evident, that
the world or nature is not the primary, felf-
exiſtent, eternal, and neceffary Being. This
muſt have exiſted independent of the world,
and have produced the world for the fake
of the living creatures that are in it. This felf-
exiſtent, eternal, and neceffary Being, who hath
created the whole world and the inanimate
things that are in it, for the fake of animate
Beings, we ufually denominate Go D.
Now, if we would farther inveftigate the
properties or attributes of this Supreme Being,
on whom the whole univerfe and we ourſelves
with all the animal creation depend, we have
but two ways to proceed in our enquiries.
We may
first try what is to be known by
accurate reafonings drawn à pricri, or the firft
L
idea
146
NATURAL RELIGION
}
idea of God; and, fecondly we may also à
pofteriori view his perfections difplayed in his
works, as in a vifible mirrour of the power and
attributes of the invifible God. When theſe
two ways are purfued with fufficient clear-
nefs and perfpicuity, and harmonize with each
other; we may be thereby affured, that our
feeble reafon has not entertained any falfe con-
ceptions of fuch an immenſe Being, though they
muſt always be acknowledged to be very
inadequate; a great deal is concealed from
our narrow underſtanding, eſpecially when we
endeavour to comprehend things fo fublime,
and ſo very remote from fenfe. We know
not how, nor in what manner, this or that
is framed, or is poffible; but a doubt, arifing
only from ignorance and a want of com-
prehenfion, can have no weight againſt clear
and pofitive ideas. If this reafoning were al-
lowed, viz. I cannot conceive how fuch
a thing can be ; therefore it is not fo,' we
muft deny the moſt palpable things in nature,
as light, motion, propagation, and the like;
nay, even our own actions. And certainly
thoſe who impartially compare Divinity with
Natural Philofophy, will, in no point of the
former, meet with fo many things beyond
the reach of their understanding, as in the
<
latter.
C
SE C-
Defended and Illuftrated.
畜
​147
SECTION II.
1
God, confidered à priori, or according to
the firft idea, is a felf-exiftent, eternal, and the
only neceffary Being *: Therefore God muſt
be fuppoſed to be Immutable. For if any thing
could be fuppofed to be in God which was
not in him before, he could not be faid to
be abfolutely neceffary as to his exiftence;
but might, as to himſelf, be otherwiſe con-
ftituted, and exift ſometimes in this, and fome-
times in another ftate and condition. And
fuch different and fucceffive modes of exiſtence
would render him fubject to time, which would
deſtroy his eternity. A feries of years and ages,
however multiplied, will never produce an
eternity; how then could he be felf-exiftent,
that is, how fhould his entire exiſtence have
the abfolute cauſe of it in himſelf? His na-
ture is immutable; and therefore his exiftence
muſt be ſo too; confequently God is immu-
table, not ſubject to time or viciffitudes, con-
ftantly the fame, and always perfectly like
himſelf.
From this attribute it farther follows, that
in every thing relating to his nature, God is
Infinite and without bounds: For whatever
is confined within bounds admits of increaſe,
and an addition of fomething which does not
VI.
* See Differtation I. Section I, II.
† See Differtation I. Section VIII. and Differtation III. Section
L 2
exift
148 NATURAL RELIGION
exiſt in it at preſent. Our ſtrength, for in-
ftance, is bounded; fince fomething elſe, or
fomething more, might be performed by it
than we are at prefent able to do. Now,
when any thing poffible and above its pre-
fent real ftate is produced in a limited thing,
an alteration fucceeds in it. As this inverted
propofition is an acknowledged truth, namely,
whatever is limited is mutable, and what-
ever is mutable is limited;' fo, on the con-
trary, whatever is infinite is immutable, and
'whatever is immutable is infinite.' God is
infinite, fince all that is poffible in him exiſts'
collectively and at once. Hence I draw this
inference, that he is but One, or that there
cannot be more Gods than one; fince on fuch
a fuppofition they must be out of, and diftinct
from, each other. Now, for two or more
Gods to be diftinct from each other, the one
muſt have ſomething in him which the other
has not; the one would fometimes think, will,
and know what the other did not think, will,
or know. Thus, befides what one thought,
willed or knew, there would be fomething
more to think of, to reſolve, and execute. If
this were the cafe, how could it be faid that
the understanding, will, and power of two
Gods were infinite? Since they would be no
Gods. It is therefore an irrefragable, conclufion,
that whatever admits of many and different
fingle Beings, kinds, fexes, and degrees as pof-
fible, is finite and limited; fince, befides what
effentially belongs to each of them, others or more
of
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
149
of the kind, are poffible. On the contrary,
whatever is infinite is not only fingle and alone,
but perfectly ONE; fo that it is impoffible there
ſhould be more or other infinites.
SECTION III.
But, there are alfo finite and mutable things
befides God, which by his power are capable
of infinite perfection. Now, fince the world.
had a beginning and the ground or caufe of
every thing that appertains to it, and actually
exifts in it, arifes from the agency of God;
there muſt, in the Divine power, be fomething,
from which the exiftence and conftitution of
the world may be conceived.
Now, it is very evident that, in order to
bring a thing extraneous to himſelf into actual
exiſtence, a creative power is requifite; fuch a
power is therefore to be attributed to God, as,
at leaſt, equals its effect, or the magnitude of
the univerſe. But there being no contingent
thing generally poffible, which is not originally
derived from God, as the primary Being, there
muſt be in God a power that comprehends in
itſelf every thing poffible; and this we cal
Omnipotence. This alſo appears from God's
infinitude; for, if he was not omnipotent, there
would be ftill fomething out of his power
that were poffible, which however he could
not perform; and therefore he would be a li-
mited Being. But fince the world, which by
the omnipotence of God has been brought into
L 3
exiſtence
;
150
NATURAL RELIGION
7
1
exiſtence, neither is nor can be eternal; it
follows that it must have been produced by
God out of nothing. I have endeavoured to
fhew, in the foregoing Differtations, that this
idea implies nothing that is contradictory, and
confequently nothing impoffible. But certainly
the human fpecies has no power adequate
to it, and conſequently we cannot compre-
hend the manner how this is poffible; however,
we are not, from the deficiency of our ca-
pacities, to call in queſtion the thing itſelf *
3
That God has employed his power in the
creation of a world which was planned by
himſelf, we are not to afcribe to any internal
indefinite neceffity of his nature and Being:
for in that cafe, the world would be infepa-
rably joined with the Divine Being, and as
it were, would make one effence with him
fo that every thing which is, and comes to
paſs, in the world, would be and come to
paſs in God. In a word, the world would
be his body, and God the foul of the world.
But this cannot be; for the world is mutable,
and confequently God himſelf would alfo be-
come mutable, as the world would be an
effential part of him. Befides, the world, and
whatever is in it, has bounds; therefore the
Being of God would fo far become bounded
and finite. The duration of the world con-
fifts in time, and cannot be eternal; and there-
fore God would alfo be fubject to time, and
* See Differtation III. Section VI.
confequently
Defended and Illuftrated:
151
}
1
confequently could not be eternal. The world,
as to the far greater part of it, is material;
therefore God alſo would in this body have
a conſciouſneſs, i. e. would feel in an orga-
nical manner, and confequently would by no
means enjoy the moft perfect life, and the
moſt perfect felicity. The world contains in
itſelf various ſpecies of living creatures, which,
as finite Beings, are capable only of fenfual
delights; which are difturbed by pain and
difquietude, and frequently feek their aliment
from imperfection: therefore, if God lived in
the animate Beings of this world, he would,
by creating it, have rendered himſelf lefs
per-
fect and lefs happy. All which is contrary
to the attributes, and confequently to the ef
fence, of God; and therefore it is alfo con-
trary to his attributes and effence, that God
fhould have produced the world from any
internal neceffity of his own nature.
Hence it appears that the outward poffible
things, which according to his infinite wifdom
God propoſed to himſelf, muſt have been his
motive for exerting his creative power; and
that the contingency and multiplicity of poffible
things have left him a free choice, yet corre-
fponding with his neceffary properties.
Thus God has, by virtue of his own nature,
a delight, pleaſure, and complacency in his
own perfections; but at the fame time, by his
underſtanding, he reprefents to himſelf not only
his own Being, but all other poffible things
without him; with their different perfections.
L 4
Now,
2
152
NATURAL RELIGION
«
Now, men, from their own experience, know
that a fpirit can receive pleaſure from the
happineſs and perfection of other Beings, as
well as from his own; and therefore it may
be conceived, that this may have been a mo-
tive to the will of the Supreme Spirit, for
exerting his creative power.
Though we human creatures derive a plea-
fure from the perfection of other Beings, yet it
is always mixed with a defire after our own
ſuperior perfection, and felicity; and thus there
is a defect in the very foundation of it. But
this cannot be faid of God, whofe perfection
and happiness admit of no addition, fince he
is infinite. In this fenfe, therefore, God can-
not be ſuppoſed to have created the world for
its own fake. The material world, confidered
as inanimate, is not fufceptible of any internal
perfection, complacency or happineſs, and can-
not enjoy its own exiftence; but can only
fo far be termed perfect, as its exiſtence and
texture correfponds with the welfare of animate
Beings. Hence it is alfo evident that God
cannot have created the material world for
its own fake, but for that of animate Beings;
confequently living creatures of all kinds were
properly God's only motive for exerting his
creative power; fince they are capable of an
internal perfection, delight, and happineſs; and
God takes a complacency in giving exiſtence,
from his infinite plenitude to the living crea-
tures without him, and to communicate to
them all the perfection and happineſs which every
fpecies
?
Defended and Illuftrated.
153
fpecies is capable of, confiftent with the con-
nection and harmony of things in nature.
Now, that for which an intelligent Being
cauſes any thing to exift is called the end
or, defign he has in view. Thus God acts in
the world with defign, and this is directed
to the welfare of animate Beings but every
thing that is in the world, and contributes
to promote the end God has in view, is to
be reckoned among the means which are to
accompliſh his defign; and this is effected by
the being or nature of things.
An infinite underſtanding, being intimately
acquainted with the perfection of all poffible
things, knows how to bring his defign, and
the means to promote it, to the moſt perfect
congruity; and this is the greateſt Wiſdom.
A Will which takes a pleaſure in all the poffible
complacency and happiness of animate Beings,
will alſo be inclined to effect it; and this is
the greateſt Goodneſs. Therefore we cannot
think otherwife of the creation and the final
cauſes of it, than as an admirable difplay of
infinite Wiſdom and Goodnefs, and the work
of infinite Power.
SECTION IV.
As this way of attaining to the knowledge
of God has led us from the firft ideas of
his felf-exiſtence, neceffity, and eternity, to
his wife and gracious views in the creation
of the world; fo, on the other hand, by taking
a
•
154
NATURAL RELIGION
a furvey of the world, we are, by the final
cauſes vifible in it, brought back to that know-
ledge of the exiſtence, attributes, and opera-
tions of God.
From a furvey of the world, we have ſeen
that the living creatures in it had a beginning,
and that they, by no means, derived their origin
from the inanimate part of the world; but
that the latter cannot have in itſelf the cauſe
of its exiſtence and texture, i. e. inanimate
things cannot be ſelf-exiſtent, neceffary, or eter-
nal. We have farther proved, that the whole
world muſt have been produced by an actually
felf-exiftent, neceffary, and eternal architect, and
that the inanimate part was created for the
fake of the animate, that is, with a view re-
lative to living creatures and their welfare.
In this, God's Power, which has brought into
exiſtence the world with all that is in it, is
moſt eminently confpicuous; and next to
that his Goodness, which had the complacency
and felicity of living creatures for its object;
and then his Wifdom, which has chofen the
nature both of inanimate and animate Beings
as the moſt proper means to effect fuch a
benign intention. And theſe three attributes
of the Creator must be proportioned to the
effect; that is, they must be immeaſurable,
and, according to the mode of acting, infinite:
For whether we confider the univerſe and what
it contains with regard to its extent and variety,
or according to its harmony and perfection, it
furpafles, in every refpect, all the limits or
bounds
Defended and Illuftrated.
155
bounds that we can conceive. But as the
diftance is infinite between exiftence and non-
entity; fo the world, which did not exift be-
fore, and owes its exiſtence to the power of
the creator, fuppofes the attributes and per-
fections of God to be infinite. Such a creator
muſt not only be poffeffed of infinite power;
but, as he exerts it according to infinite good-
nefs and wiſdom, he muft alfo have the moſt
perfect underſtanding, and the moſt perfect
will, and confequently must be the Supreme
Spirit poffeffing fuch a life as becomes him,
with an internal perfection, complacency, and
felicity. Now as the world, by the harmony
of the efficient and final caufes, forms one
fingle Whole, and a fufficient caufe of the ex-
iſtence of the world is to be found in one
fingle Being, poffeffed of the moft perfect un-
derſtanding, the moſt perfect will, and infinite
power; it would be only lofing one's felf in a
labyrinth to imagine more creators than one.
Thus he is only one, and, agreeably to his
infinitude, there cannot be more Gods. He
is farther the neceffary, eternal, felf-exiſtent, and
primary Being, on which the real exiſtence
of all other things depends; and which we
call GOD.
•
SECTION V.
Both the ways that lead to this knowledge
reft on no other foundation, than what every
Atheist muft allow; namely, that there muft
on
- 156
NATURAL RELIGION
on the one hand, be fomething felf-exiftent,
neceffary, and eternal; and on the other hand,
that the world confifts of animate and inani-
mate things. Now each of theſe propofitions
leads us to the diſcovery of the fame pro-
perties or attributes of the Firſt Effence; which
is a farther confirmation of the truth we are
eſtabliſhing. But, in particular, they coincide
in the end or defign propofed,' as in a com-
mon centre: For if we begin à priori, i. e.
from the first ideas of a felf-exiftent, necef-
fary, and eternal Effence, we can have no
other conception of it, than as an animate
Being, that acts without itſelf fimply for the
fake of Beings endued with life; that is, with
a view to the welfare of living creatures. But
if we firſt ſurvey the world as confifting of
animate and inanimate things, neither having
the cauſe of their exiſtence within themſelves,
we perceive that inanimate things must have
been produced, not for their own fake, but
for that of animate Beings, and confequently
with a view to their well-being. And from
this correfpondence, the doctrine of final caufes
in nature is greatly corroborated; though it
already ftands on its own bafis, before the mind
afcends to the properties of the Primary Ef-
fence, being founded on the inanimate ſtate
of the corporeal world.
This general proof of final caufes, therefore,
does not arife from the external arrangement
of the univerfe, but from the internal con-
ftitution of the fubftances that are in it. It is
founded,
t
Defended and Illuftrated.
157
founded, not on a profound and extenfive
knowledge of nature, but on fomething that
is fimple and lies open to the eyes of every
one; not on any thing that is arbitrary or
equivocal, but on fomething that is effential.
Neither does this leave any fubterfuge to at-
tribute deſign or final caufes to chance or blind
neceffity; for even this very difpofition of the
fubftances in the univerfe, from which final
cauſes ariſe, at once annihilates both neceffity
and chance. I have thought it the more
neceffary to dwell fo long on this proof;
fince, after all that has hitherto been adduced
from the order and harmony of things, many
pretended philofophers are found who induf-
triouſly feize every opportunity for evafion,
and would fain afcribe all the benign and
magnificent order and difpofition of the world
to mere chance, and moft of them to a blind
neceffity. I am very far from defpifing the
proof drawn from the order and conformity
of things, or accounting it to be of no ſtrength
or validity; on the contrary, I eſteem it as
juſt and ſolid: but I think that hitherto it has
been produced to convince, rather becauſe it
is familiar to every one, than on account of
its fuperior evidence. It is certainly manifeft
to every man who does not affect an obftinate
fubtility, that the eye was made for ſeeing,
the ear for hearing, the mouth for eating, &c.
and that, in general, every particular difpofition
in the world, from the greateſt to the finalleft,
exhibits an evident wildom and defign; fo
that
158 NATURAL RELIGION
1
1
that he muſt be quite ignorant of nature, who
goes about to perfuade himſelf and others,
that fuch a correfpondence to the welfare of
animate Beings is derived from chance or
neceffity. But a more general and certain
proof may be adduced, that the corporeal in-
animate world must have been produced by
an intelligent architect, and that for the fake
of animate Beings, and confequently with de-
fign; which may be very eafily traced, in
this fuccinct manner.
1. The material world is in itſelf, and re-
latively to its own nature, an inanimate thing.
2. What is inanimate in itſelf, and rela-
tively to its own nature, cannot, according to
its nature, have any conſcioufneſs of its own
exiſtence and difpofition.
What in its own nature can have no
3.
conſciouſneſs of its own exiſtence and dif
poſition, can no more feel any pleaſure in its
own exiſtence than if it did not really exift;
and enjoys as little complacency from any par-
ticular difpofition, confidered in itſelf, as from
any other difpofition however oppoſite to the
preſent.
4. Whatever, according to its nature, feels
as little pleaſure in its own exiſtence as if it
did not really exift, and receives as little com-
placency from any particular difpofition con-
fidered in itſelf, as from any other difpofition
however oppoſite to the prefent; to fuch it
muft, according to its own nature, be quite
indifferent
}
}
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
159
1
indifferent whether it exifts or not, whether
its difpofition be thus or otherwife.
5. Of that which, according to its nature,
cannot but be indifferent, whether it really is
or is not, whether its difpofition be in this
or that manner, the exiſtence or difpofition can-
not be determined by its own nature, nor in
a manner conformable to the fame.
6. That, of which the exiſtence or difpofi-
tion cannot be determined either by its own
nature, or in a manner conformable to the
fame, muſt have its exiftence and difpofition
determined by another Being, as an Efficient
cauſe; and alſo according to the nature of
another thing, and confequently for the fake
of another Being, as a Final caufe.
7. That, of which the exiſtence and difpofi-
tion is determined by an efficient caufe, for
the fake of fomething elfe, muſt have been
produced with a view to the welfare of other
Beings, and be adapted to their nature.
8. Hence we may conclude that the ma-
terial world which, in itſelf and according to
its nature, is an inanimate thing, muſt have
been produced by an intelligent architect, with
a view to Beings different from inanimate
things, and confequently muft correſpond with
their nature.
9. Confequently all the harmony and cor-
reſpondence obferved between the material in-
animate world, and the nature of animate
Beings, muft arife from the end and defign
which the creator had in view.
SEC-
1
160 NATURAL RELIGIO N
1
SECTION VI.
As to thoſe pretended philofophers, who ab-
folutely deny any final caufes in nature, what
plaufible objection can they now produce againſt
them? Chance and natural neceffity, I have
already deprived them of, and fhall not here
enter upon repetitions. But can they alfo
make it appear that a material world, agreea-
bly to its own nature or being, cannot admit
of any difpofition for determinate views? I
ſhould have thought they might have known
better from the conftitution of mechanical
engines. The fubftance fuch machines con-
fifts of is taken from nature, and therefore is
in general of the fame nature with the ſub-
ftance of the material world. Now, if the fub-
ftance of the machine was no engine before,
and confequently was not neceffarily that thing
which it might be; yet it was capable of
being brought into fuch a form by a wife inten-
tion united with fkill to execute, for the uſe
of man, and without fuch a view or defign
it never would have been fuch a machine.
But is not the whole material world, in itſelf
a piece of mechanifm? Do not its parts move
by certain powers, according to ftated rules,
correfpondent with the univerfal connection,
and for the benefit of man and all living crea-
tures? Where then is the impoffibility that
defign fhould take place here? Or how does
it contradict the exiftence and difpofition of
the
!
Defended and Illuftrated.
161
the world. Surely theſe gentlemen cannot ſay
that ſuch deſign was implanted in nature with-
out any neceffity, reafon, or caufe, and that what
comes to pass naturally has no need of intel-
ligence and defign. On the contrary, I have
in general fhewn, that an inanimate fubftance,
with its exiſtence, difpofition, and blind na-
tural power, without an architect, and with-
out ſome view and defign formed by that
architect, is ſomething impoffible, and unintel-
ligible. What farther objections therefore can
they make?
But farther; they who are for excluding
all intelligence and all defign from nature, find
themſelves confuted by their own experience
and manner of thinking. For firſt, I preſume
that, in their fpeculations and inveſtigation of
nature, they find a mental complacency; for,
who could be fo irrational, as, after once ac-
counting nature worthy of his fpeculations,
not to be pleaſingly affected by it? Now though
a mechanical pleaſure may be excited in us
by a ſtimulus of the nerves, abftractedly from
the underſtanding, or the obfervation of intel-
ligence in corporeal things; yet no mental
pleaſure can arife from corporeal things, but
from the view of an intelligence fhewing itſelf
in them, from which our underſtanding receives
noble improvements. The eye is affected by
light, the ear by founds, the tongue by fa-
vours; but intelligence, and what proceeds from
it, is only for the understanding. Accordingly
the complacency which we receive from the
proportion,
M
i
162 NATURAL RELIGION
=
proportion, beauty, order and harmony of na-
ture, arifes from the intelligence, deſign, ſkill,
and wiſdom which we obſerve in natural ob-
jects. Without fuch an obfervation of under-
ftanding pervading all nature, no pleaſure would
accrue to us but what arifes from a mecha-
nical stimulus. Hence it appears that thoſe
who allow that the furvey of nature affords
a rational pleaſure, and yet pretend to fee no
traces of underſtanding and defign in nature,
contradict and confute themſelves. If this
were the cafe, why do theſe gentlemen,
reckon themſelves ingenious and learned, wife
and intelligent, and value themſelves for their
talents on account of their acquaintance with
nature? Indeed, there cannot be a greater im-
provement of the understanding than to ac-
quire a knowledge of the conſtruction of the
univerſe, the courfe of the planets, the laws of
motion, geometry, mechanics, hydroftatics, op-
tics, &c. efpecially when a man alſo knows
himſelf, that his underſtanding and will is to
be improved, and how his actions ought to
be directed in order to attain real happineſs.
But what is all this knowledge and fcience,
this fkill and fagacity? What is the perfection
of our underſtanding but a faint ketch of
that intelligence, that regularity, knowledge,
wildom, and defign which reign_throughout
all nature? There is in nature real architec-
ture, aftronomy, geometry, mechanics, hydro-
ftatics, optics and phyfics; therein are likewiſe
the actual laws of motion, of truth, of duty,
and
Defended and Illuftrated.
163
and happineſs; of which our ideas are but
fhadowy images. Now, can it be faid that there
is pleaſure and wiſdom in the imperfect imagery
of the things which really exiſt; and fhall the
architype be void of both? Let theſe pretended
réafoners anſwer me, Why they attribute to
themſelves underſtanding and wisdom; and yet
deny any fuch thing to their only teacher. I
leave it to thofe gentlemen who reject final
cauſes in the world, impartially to examine from
whence their delight in the perfection of things
arifes; and I dare appeal to their own judge-
ments, that deſign and final cauſes are the only
grounds on which they can build any con-
fequences. On feeing a plant furniſhed with
tendrils, they conclude it to be a vegetable that
muſt be ſupported by another; for if nature
were void of defign, they might as well be quite
uſeleſs, as of any ufe. On feeing a bird whoſe
toes are connected together by a membrane, they
immediately pronounce it to be an aquatic fowl;
but certainly for no other reaſon than the fuitable-
neſs of the means to the end propofed. In
general, they make no doubt of brutes having
life and fenfation; and yet how come they to
know this? They tell us, that they conclude
it to be fo from analogy; but this conclufion can
have no validity, unleſs the analogy be founded
on one and the fame univerfal defign; namely,
that fince the fenfative organs are made for fen-
fation, brutes alfo have fenfation, and confe-
quently a fenfitive foul. Many of theſe gentle-
men, I prefuine, are of opinion, that the planets
M 2
are
164
•
NATURAL RELIGION
are inhabited: but whence came fuch a thought
into their heads, unless it be from the end and
defign of what they had obſerved in the planets?
For our globe, confifting of dry land and water,
hills and valleys, and enjoying fun-fhine, day
and night, fummer and winter, for the fake of
its animate inhabitants ;-as the fame variety is
obſerved in the other planets, they conclude
that it must be defigned for the fake of ani-
mate Beings. If this be not the foundation of
their opinion, it has none at all; for it cannot
be faid, that the confequences of theſe pheno-
mena flow from efficient cauſes. And as the
confequences will hold only in respect to final
caufes, why then do they reject final cauſes,
when they themſelves daily have recourſe to
them in their reafonings? This fhews a great
ignorance of the rules, according to which they
themſelves reafon and think, and very strong
prejudices fupported by an obſcure and confuſed
repreſentation of things.
SECTION VII.
、
With regard to thofe, who, from other prin-
ciples, are thoroughly convinced of the exiſtence
of a God, but account the proofs drawn from
the order and harmony of things and final cauſes
as weak and unfatisfactory; I fhall refer them
to the celebrated Mr. Maupertuis, who has
lately thought fit fo to exalt his new proof of
the Being of a God from what he terms the
* See Effay de Cofmologie: ou l'on examine les preuves de l'existence
de Dieu, tirées des Marveilles de la Nature, à Berlin, 1746.
Law
Defended and Illuftrated.
165
Late of Oeconomy, or the leaft quantity of action
in nature, that he previously treats with con-
tempt, and feeks to invalidate, all other proofs
of it; and particularly thofe taken from the
order and harmony of things. The perfon
against whom he chiefly levels his objections is
the great Sir Ifaac Newton, who looked upon
this to be one of the moſt convincing proofs of
the exiſtence of a God, and had inftanced the
uniformity and order obferved in the concentric
motions of the planets, and the uniformity and
harmony in the ſtructure of animal bodies,
M. Maupertuis, in the firft place, fays, that
there is Scarce a probability that fuch a regular
motion has been produced by mere chance,
there being above a million of poffible irregular
motions; yet that there ftill remains fome proba-
bility, and therefore it cannot be faid that this
uniformity is the neceffary effect of a free choice.
He fays farther ‡, That Newton's conclufion
was entirely owing to his inability of affigning
the phyfical caufes of that uniformity; whereas
other philofophers have accounted for that uni-
formity of motion by an ætherial fluid in which
the planets move, and by which they are carried
in their orbits; ſo that neither a lucky chance,
nor a free choice, are neceffarily to be fuppofed
in it; and that it no more proves the exiftence
of
a Deity, than any other motion impreffed on
matter.
* See Maupertuis's Preface to his Works.
† Oeuvres de Alaupertuis, P.5.
‡ Ibid. p. 6.,
1
M 3
Againſt
166
NATURAL RELIGION
<c
<<
Againſt the uniformity and harmony obferved
in the ftructure of the bodies of animals, he'
objects * the infinite variety that is to be ſeen in
many creatures. "We need only draw a com-
"pariſon between an eagle and a fly, a deer
"and a fnail, a whale and an oyster, to form
a judgment of this pretended uniformity.
"Other philofophers, adds he, rather find a
proof of the exiſtence of God in the variety
"of forms; and I know not which of the two
"is beft founded." The correfpondence of the
different parts in the ftructure of the bodies of
animals to their neceffities, he is pleaſed to ac-
count a more folid proof; it being manifeſt
that their feet are, by intelligence and defign,
made for walking, their wings for flying, their
eyes for feeing, their mouth for eating, and other
parts for propagating their fpecies. He farther
allows, that it is in vain for the greateſt enemy
to the doctrine of providence to object, that the
ufe of thoſe parts was not originally defigned,
but is only the effect and confequence of the
ftructure of the parts of animals, which were
originally formed by mere chance. However,
he thinks, that it may be urged +, That chance
firſt produced an innumerable multitude of im-
perfect creatures, which neceffarily periſhed, not
having every part that was requifite to their fup-
port; and that none furvived but ſuch, whoſe
good fortune it was to be furniſhed with every
part that was neceffary to, and convenient for,
them.
\
* Ibid.
† Ibid,
‡
Ibid. p. 7.
"In
Defended and Illuftrated.
167
"In general, fays this author *, we are too
"little acquainted with the relation of parts to
"the whole, the bodies of animals and vege-
(c
tables are too complicated, and their fmaller
parts too minute, for us to know their uſe and
"defign, fo as to judge of the power and wif-
"dom that was requifite to form them. It
"would even be indecent, and unworthy of
"this moſt important truth, if, according to a
"prevailing humour, we were to draw our proofs
"from the minuteft and moft defpicable thingst
"in nature; like a certain Engliſh author †,
"who pretends to find his God in the folds of
"the rhinoceros's fkin. Let us, continues
Maupertuis, leave theſe 'trifles to thoſe who
are not fenfible how frivolous fuch argu-
<<
r
CC
ments are." According to him, the Supreme
Being is not to be fought in fuch minutia, nor
in thoſe parts of the world whofe relation to
others is but little known to us; but in the
great Phænomena, which are fo univerfal as to
admit of no exception, and fo fimple that they
may be thoroughly furveyed and examined
by us .
•
}
SECTION VIII.
M. Maupertuis's first objection againſt New-
ton's order of the planets feems chargeable with
* Ibid. p. 8.
+ Dr. Parfons. See Phil. Tranfa&t. No
Oeuvres de Maupertuis, p. 8.
]] Ibid. p. 11.
M 4
°470.
a kind
'
1
168
NATURAL RELIGION-
a kind of contradiction. For though he own.
it to be ſcarce probable that mere chance coule
produce their regular motion; yet he imme-
diately fubjoins, that there ſtill remains fome pro-
bability of it, and therefore it cannot be faic
that this uniformity is the neceffary effect o
choice * But, perhaps, he only meant tha
there ſtill remains a poffible chance†, and this
poffible chance, in order to give it the more
weight, he has dignified with the name of pro-
bability. But to fpeak properly, that is very fa.
from being probable which has only a bare
poffibility, and when to this one poffible chance
above a million of impoffible chances may be
oppoſed. But that even all poffibility of a com-
bination between a multiplicity of parts by means
of a fingle chance, is not at all probable, I have
proved above from. this fuppofition; namely,
that every chance or accident alfo works ac-
cording to certain laws, but fuch laws as are
irreconcileable with the law of order and regu-
larity. The fecond objection of M. Maupertuis
ſeems to have a little more weight: He tells us
that "Newton's conclufion in favour of a choice
«Ε
·
proceeded only from his ignorance of phyfical
"caufes; and that, perhaps, the planets per-
"form their revolutions in a vortex of an æthe-
* His words are, Il est vrai qu'il n'etoit guères probable, que
le hazard les eût fait mouvoir comme ils fe meuvent ; ily reftoit ce-
pendent quelque probabilité ; & dès lors on ne peut dire, que cette
uniformité fait l'effect neceffaire d'un choix.
ti. e. One fingle chance againft 1,419,856 that are impoffible
according to the calculation of M. Maupertuis. Which, however,
ís far from being accurate.
See Differ. II. Sect. 9.
"rial
Defended and Illuftrated.
169
"rial fluid, and therefore the uniformity of their
"motion does by no means prove the exiſtence
"of a God." I make no doubt, that Newton
knew as much, and a great deal more of natural
cauſes, than ever Deſcartes or others did, who
pretend that the planets are whirled round in a
vortex. Without laying any ſtreſs, at preſent,
on what Maupertuis himſelf has pronounced
concerning this vortex-fyftem, namely, that it
is a chimerical fiction; I fhall obferve that all
the natural caufes we can fuppofe have this in
common with the vortex-fyftem, viz. that they
refer us from one thing to another, ad infinitum,
unleſs we lay down for a foundation ſome other
cauſe, out of nature: fo that it may ſtill be
afked, Why the fluid fubftance in which the
planets float moves exactly in a vortex, and near
the outward extremity of it? Why, in this
vortex, which is fuppofed to carry round the
orbis magnus of the celeftial bodies, have the
planets preciſely this pofition which confines
them all within a determined zone? It is the
fame with all natural caufes, and caufes of
caufes. Not one of them is ſo conſtituted as to
ferve for a foundation to reft our enquiries upon;
not one of them can be maintained by a phi-
lofophical proof, like the properties of lines and
figures, as Maupertuis himſelf allows with re-
gard to his Law of Oeconomy *. This is what
Newton, Leibnitz, and all found philofophers
acknowledge; and from hence they conclude,
*See his Preface, cap. 2.
that
1
170
NATURAL RELIGION
1
that there muſt be a fuperior Being, exclufive of
the world, who, by a wife choice, has determined
that which, in the nature of things, is undeter-
mined.
SECTION IX.
-
As for Maupertuis's argument concerning the
different forms and conftitutions of animals, I
can by no means conceive the ftrength of it.
In animals, vegetables, and every part of nature,
as far as it is known to us, we fee a diverfity
running through all poffible gradations, without
any intervening void. But in all that variety
we perceive general conformity, order, and re-
gularity; of which it is an evident proof, that
every clafs upholds and multiplies its fpecies
fo that both this diverfity and conformity are
not only confiftent together, but the more con-
fpicuous this combination is, the more eminently
is difplayed to us this perfection of the world,
which can only be the work of a wife and intel-
ligent Being. For animate Beings do not exiſt
of themſelves; nor are of themſelves neceffary
and eternal; neither do they derive their origin
from the world or nature: and, on the other
hand, the inanimate world and inanimate nature,
relatively to their own Being, contain in them-
felves no cauſe or reafon by which their exiſtence
and determinate conſtitution could be determin-
ed above any other. It muft, therefore, have
been produced by a Firft Caufe, and by it have
been determined relatively to the nature of
fomething elſe, which is not inanimate. Now
this
1
1
Defended and Illuſtrated.
17I
龠
​}
this difpofition of the world, being equally
adapted to fo many thoufand' fpecies of living
creatures, manifefts a choice, a defign, and in-
finite wiſdom in the Firft Author of Nature.
The ſecond evafion againſt the conformity of
the parts in the bodies of animals, one would
think fuch a perſon as Maupertuis could hardly
have advanced in earneft; indeed, it is much
more worthy of La Mettrie: For how could
he admit the abfurdity of what Epicurus and
Lucretius object againſt this conformity in the
bodies of animals; namely, that the uſe of each
part was not the defign, but only the effect and
confequence of a formation, in itſelf cafual?
How, I fay, could he hold this opinion to be
abfurd, and yet borrow from thofe two miſtaken
philoſophers an hypotheſis of which, what he
had before pronounced as abfurd, is a direct
confequence? For had mere chance, after mil-
lions of mifcarriages, at length hit on one well
formed body; yet the ufe of every part could
not be defigned, but only a mere confequence
of a fortunate chance. Now, it being impoffible
that Maupertuis could be fo little acquainted
with the connection of ideas, as not to know
that he, in other words, eſtabliſhed the very
thing he had rejected; we cannot but think
that his intention was rather to fhew, that thoſe
who reject a Divine Providence cannot produce
any argument worth notice againſt the confor-
mation of parts in the ftructure of animate
bodies.
SEC-
172
NATURAL RELIGION
}
SECTION X.
When Maupertuis alleges the general igno-
rance of mankind with regard to the texture,
ufe, and difpofition of things, and confequently
of final cauſes, he ſeems both to extend our ig-
norance of theſe things much too far, and alfo
to conclude too much from it.
It is an exag-
geration to fay, that men cannot know any thing
at all of the difpofition of things, relatively to
the whole, and of their conformity to the uſe
and advantage of living creatures. Ariſtotle, long
fince, confidered the world as a great city found-
ed and governed by God *; and it is fufficiently
evident, that the luminous and opaque globes
which compoſe the univerſe were fo formed and
difpofed, as to be proper habitations for animate
Beings. No one is fo ignorant and void of ſenſe, as
not to be able to know and experience ſo much of
the difpofition of the folar fyftem, and the benefits
accruing from it to our earth, as muſt incite him
to praiſe the wife and gracious forefight of the
Creator. No rational man is fo ftupid as not to
be able to find out the uſe of the principal parts
of the bodies of men and animals; for inftance,
he muſt be fenfible that the eye is in a moft
admirable manner formed for feeing, the ear
for hearing, the hands for works of labour and
fkill: In a word, let this gentleman tell me,
whether Derham, Nieuwentyt, and other natu-
* Ariftotle De mundo, cap. 6. T. I.
ralifts
i
Defended and Illuftrated.
173
'
ralifts who accurately furveyed the world and
the various parts of which it confifts, with their
conftitution and difpofition for the benefit of
animate Beings, were entirely ignorant of theſe
things? or whether they eſtabliſhed any thing
for a truth, which is found to be falfe? and
whether this does not fufficiently lead us to ac-
knowledge the wiſdom, and beneficial deſigns
of the great Creator?
Indeed, the more we come to know of the
conftitution of things, the more we perceive
that there ftill remains an ampler, I may ſay
an infinite, field, which the narrow limits of our
underſtanding, in this ftate, will never be able
to meaſure. But are we to conclude from thence,
that we do not fee that which lies open to our
view? if ſo, we may as well fay that all en-
quiries into any fingle part of nature ought to
be dropped, fince we fhall every where meet
with immeaſureable space, and unfathomable
depths. But as no philofopher will have fo little
regard to truth and ſcience as to affert this,
Why are we totally to difregard theſe truths
concerning final cauſes, which are of ſo much
importance to our inward peace and tranquility,
inftead of fedulouſly applying ourselves to ac-
quire the higheſt degree of knowledge that we
poffibly can in theſe matters? Laftly, what be-
comes of morality and virtue, if we do not look
upon them as duties that concur with the wife
purpoſes and defigns of God? As to our igno-
rance of minute things, I know not how far
Maupertuis will extend this. Is it neceflary
that
1
>
A
t
મ
/
174
NATURAL RELIGION
that we ſhould fee into the combination of all.
the elements or ſmalleſt particles of matter, be-
fore we can have the leaft knowledge of the
wife difpofition of things? and, do we fee no-
thing at all, becauſe we are not ſo keen fighted
as the lynx? This would be granting too much,
and drawing too raſh a conclufion: Befides, I
am of opinion, that, by the help of microſcopes,
we ſee much farther into the more minute parts
of nature, than our ancestors. Hence it is that
we got over that erroneous fuppofition, that the
fmaller fpecies of infects, and the minuteſt par-
ticles of which animals and vegetables confift,
are produced from an irregular confluence of
all kinds of elements. On the contrary, by
means of thoſe glaffes, we plainly diſcern that a
mite in cheeſe, in all it's parts, fhews as much
fkill in its formation as an elephant, or even as
man himself; and that the eye of a gnat, the
feather on the wing of a butterfly, and the
farina of a flower, are as delicately wrought as
any of the larger parts of animals and plants.
At the fame time, reafon, in general, teaches
us, that there can be no perfection in any
thing, unleſs it arifes from the conformity of
its minuteft particles.
•
It is ufually objected againſt this reaſoning,
That we are very apt to deceive ourſelves when
we attribute this or that to the Divine purpoſe
or defign; fince the thoughts of the Supreme
Being are not only concealed from our narrow
underſtanding, as the fecret refolutions of a
king is from the meaneft of his ſubjects, but
alfo
Defended and Illuftrated.
175
alfo even the moſt probable things cannot be
pofitively pronounced to be for fuch an uſe and
conveniency, or for what particular end they
were made. But how fpeciouſly foever this
reaſoning may appear, yet it builds too much
on a falſe foundation. It is an error to ſay both
with respect to God's defigns and thoſe of a king,
that they continue impenetrable fecrets to the ge-
nerality; it is alſo falſe that we have no rules for
judging, with any certainty, of the deſigns of the
Supreme Being. For a fovereign, by laws, or-
dinances, heralds, and proclamations, makes
known to all and every one of his fubjects his
intentions, as far as is neceffary and uſeful to
the public. Can it be faid that there is no
diſcerning the tenour of his government, that
there is no perceiving that he endeavours to
make his fubjects wealthy and happy, and to
increaſe the power of his kingdom, without
being of his cabinet-council? May we not from
his military forces, and putting his towns and
ſtrong places in a ſtate of defence, fee that he is
intent on fecuring the country from foreign in-
vafions? Thus "God alfo has not left himſelf
"without witnefs." There are things in nature
which are, as it were, written in characters
which may be read by the moft fimple and illi-
terate, and that evidently difplay the intelli-
gence and difpofitions of the Creator, beyond
what politicians know of a monarch's private
view; fo that true philofophers may diſcover
many things in nature, which are a mystery to
the vulgar and unlearned.
But
'
176 NATURAL RELIGION
+
But fuppofing that, in particular cafes, our con-
jectures concerning the ufe of this or that thing
may carry us too far, and that confequently we,
may fall into an error*; yet, it does by no
means follow that we are utterly incapable of
difcovering final caufes, and that by every at-
tempt of that fort we only heap one error upon
another. The diſcovery of efficient caufes in
nature is no lefs fubject to the errors of human
underſtanding, than the diſcovery of final caufes;
and yet no one will precipitately infer from
thence, that the entire fyftem of phyfics fur-
paffes our understanding, and produces nothing
but error; and therefore fuch ftudies fhould be
totally neglected and defpifed. Shall a valuable
book be never opened or perufed, becauſe there
may be fome things in it which we cannot rea-
dily understand? or if in a few intricate paffages
we may miſtake the author's meaning, does it
from thence follow that we mifconftrue every
fentence? The principal defign, the general
title, and almoft the whole contents of the Book
of Nature, particularly thoſe chapters which moft.
concern us, are plain and open to our view. A
poffibility of erring, in particular cafes, only
* The general defign of the creation of the world for the fake
of animate Beings, both found reafon and experience place be-
yond all doubt: But when the queſtion turns on particular things,
viz. to what purpoſe this or that was fo formed, &c. it is poffible
we may be miſtaken; eſpecially, if from the bare fitneſs of a
thing to a certain ufe,. we conclude that to be its effential defign.
For one and the fame conftitution of a thing may be deſigned for
many ufes, and adapted to ſeveral ends; and confequently the
contrary of what we conjecture may be poffible.
teaches
Defended and Illuſtrated. 177
teaches us to be the more circumfpect, and more
attentively to obferve the rules of forming juft
conclufions.
SECTION XI.
It is farther objected, That to trace out the
wiſdom of the Supreme Being in fuch con-
temptible minutia, as infects, the folds of the
rhinoceros's fkin, and a hundred other fuch
trifles, is indecent and ridiculous. M. Mau-
!
pertuis, probably, would give us to underſtand,
that all former fpeculations in natural philofophy,
in compariſon of his Law of Oeconomy, were
but trifles; and therefore it behoved him,
among the examples he was to give, to point
out fome apparently mean and frivolous in-
ftances, otherwife he muſt be fenfible that
Derham, in his Phyfico and Aftro-theology,
with feveral other philofophers, have gradually
defcended from the greateſt to the fmalleft ob-
jects, from the whole ſyſtem to its moſt minute
parts; and have every where pointed out the
wiſdom and goodneſs of the Creator. But it did
not coïncide with his drift, to fpecify the more
general and ftriking examples in fuch enquiries.
But, it may be farther objected, Is it requifite
to be profound geometricians, aftronomers, and
naturalifts, before we can be convinced of the
exiſtence and wifdom of the Creator? In an-
fwer to which, I would afk, whether this new
diſcovered Law of Oeconomy is more convinc-
ing? and whether it is more generally affented
to, even by the learned? If not, why fhould
N
We
1
178
NATURAL RELIGION
1
we pafs over and neglect to trace the footsteps
of the Divine perfections, which are fo manifeft,
and ſtand open to every one's knowledge? Is it
not both uſeful and commendable to find out
the wife and gracious defigns of the Creator.
throughout all his works, where he is to be
diſcovered, both in fmall and great things?
But I would fain know, what meaſure or ſcale
we have for determining what is great and im-
portant, or what is mean and contemptible, in
nature. This cannot be merely the bulk or
weight of a thing, as if that alone was great
which we meaſure by fathoms, or weigh by
quintals; but if we ufe the meaſurement of
wiſdom, I do not know whether we fhall meet
with any thing deſpicable or trifling throughout
all nature; and fear that whoever affects to
deſpiſe any, the meanest natural production,
would only render himself defpicable, fince every
thing in nature is a diſplay of infinite wiſdom.
The moſt minute are too great and wonderful,
too inconceivable for our underſtanding; and
every thing that we fee about us is adapted to
the greateſt and moſt exalted end that can be
imagined, namely, to fill the world with life,
complacency, and happinefs; and the means,
whofe relation to that end is intelligible to us,
fo perfectly correfpond with it, that infinite
knowledge, united with the moſt benevolent
will, is diſplayed through all nature. Thus,
in fuch a wife order of things, there can be
nothing which is not wifely connected with the
great end the Creator had in view, namely, the
welfare
Defended and Illustrated.
179
welfare of animate Beings. The more perfect
God himself is, the lefs does it become him to
make even the ſmalleſt production in the whole
chain of nature, without a final caufe, in an
imperfect manner, or merely to pleaſe the eye.
He that reprefents nature as wifely ordered in
its moft fecret and minute parts, reprefents it
in the manner which reflects the greateft honour
on the Deity; and till we penetrate as far as we
are able into the inward texture of animals,
and into the nature, ufe, and operation of the
moft fimple parts, we can have no clear and
preciſe knowledge of the Divine Wiſdom in the
works of Nature. Nay, even the general laws
of motion ſhew the wiſdom of their author no
farther, than the utility of them in every par-
ticular cafe, and their conformity with the well-
being of every ſpecies of animals, are made to
appear. Maupertuis makes the following juft
obſervation on this head *: "All things in na-
ture are linked together: the univerfe is con-
"nected with the fpider's web no less than
"with that force which impells the planets, or
"attracts them, towards the fun." But to
what he adds I can, by no means, fubfcribe:
"Yet, continues he, it is not in the fpider's
"web that we are to ſeek for proofs of the wif-
"dom of its Creator." Strange! when, among
other things, it exhibits an amazing ſkill necef-
fary for the maintenance of that infect, which
it neither invented nor learned by practice or
* Oeuvres de Maupertuis, p. 25.
N 2
in-
3
'
80 NATURAL RELIGION
induſtry; but received it purely from its Creator
as an hereditary property, in lieu of reaſon.
Why ſhould this be thought unworthy of our
notice? Is it not poffible to be convinced of
this great truth, viz. that God has endued all
living creatures with means the beft adapted to
their well-being, without an accurate inveſtiga-
tion of the organs, nature, difpofitions and
powers, of every animal?
Neither can I fee why Maupertuis fhould
ridicule that Engliſh author mentioned above,
becauſe he curforily, and in a few words, ob-
ferves of the rhinoceros, That the ſkin of this
animal, which in other parts is very thick and
unpliable, is thin and fupple, and confifts of
feveral folds in thofe places where the joints
are; which he thinks an inftance of the Crea-
tor's wife contrivance and defign. Maupertuis,
however, endeavours to ridicule this inference
by another circumftance *. " What would be
faid of him, fays that author, who ſhould
preſume to deny a Providence, becauſe the
"fhell of the tortoife has neither folds nor
joints? and yet the inference is of no more
"C
weight than to prove a Providence by the
"texture of the rhinoceros's fkin." But does he
feriouſly believe, that any rational man will al-
low of the leaft fimilarity between this and the
other inference. He cenfures the English writer
as if he had only reafoned in this manner: An
animal has folds in its fkin; therefore there is a
* Qeuvres de Maupertuis, p. 7.
Pro-
* Defended and Illuftrated.
18.1
I
Providence. At this rate, fubjoins Maupertuis,
the contrary would follow from the reverſe,
namely, that as the tortoife has no folds in its
thell, there can be no Providence. But the dif-
ference lies here: The rhinoceros has fupple
folds in its ſkin over every joint, as neceffary to
the motion of the limbs; but the tortoife has
no fuch folds or joints in its fhell, becauſe they
are not requifite to the creature's motion. From
thence, as well as from a thouſand other in-
Rances, it may be inferred, that our beneficent
Creator has omitted nothing for the comfort
and preſervation of his creatures; and, at the
fame time, has made nothing in vain. Now
I refer to every one's judgement, Which of the
two philofophers is juftly chargeable with draw-
ing trifling and ridiculous conclufions.
SECTION XII.
}
But fays M. Maupertuis*, "What end will
"it anſwer, to allow all the proofs taken from
"the order and conformity in the parts of
"animals ; fince we are fuddenly furprized
"with ſome diſagreeable inference after all?
"The texture of a viper is admirable; but of
"what ufe is it, but for the prefervation of an
"animal whoſe bite is mortal? The gnat and
"the ant excite our wonder at the care of
“Providence over the eggs and young of thoſe
"infects; but all this ferves only to bring forth
the
* Oeuvres de Maupertuis, p. 8, & feq.
N 3
CC
an
182
NATURAL RELIGION
!
"an infect which is a nuiſance to man, and is
"devoured by the firft bird that happens to fpy
it, or furprized by a fpider. In general, fays
"he*, it appears to feveral perfons of great
"talents and fkill, that the fuitablenefs and
"order of things in the univerſe are not ſo pre-
r cifely and univerfally obferved, as not to create
"fome difficulty in conceiving, how the world
"can be the work of a Being infinitely wife.
"and powerful. Above half the furface of our
globe is covered by the fea; on the rest of its
"furface we find rugged rocks and precipices,
"frozen regions and burning fands, poiſonous
<<
"C
tr
<<
plants and venomous animals: and if we ob-
"ferve the morals of the inhabitants of this
"earth, we ſhall find that deceit, theft, murder,
" and all manner of vices abound, more than
"the virtues which conftitute the happineſs of
"fociety. Then, to what excruciating pains are
"the bodies of unhappy mortals fubject, as the
gout, the ftone, and other diftempers that
"render life infupportable! not to mention the
"folicitude and chagrin which prey on the
"human mind. Can fuch a world be faid, to
to diſplay the wiſdom and goodness of its
Creator? Were there nothing better than
"theſe things to be found in it, ſhould we
not, on the contrary, be rather tempted
" to think, that it might as well be the
work of evil fpirits, or of blind chance,
as of an Intelligence fo unexceptionably per-
C:
ec
'
2
* Ibid. p. 9. ·
+ Ibid. p. 11.
" fect?
Defended and Illuftrated. 183
fect? for the mere defign is not a ſufficient
proof of the wifdom and goodness of the
"Creator, unleſs the motive and external end
"be alfo good. An artift, who with great ſkill
"and ingenuity, ſhould conſtruct a machine
" which was rather detrimental than ſerviceable,
"would not be greatly praiſed or admired for
his abilities."
1
Hence it plainly appears, that Maupertuis, in
order to magnify his new Law of Oeconomy,
has fet every objection against the perfection of
the vifible creation, and the providence of the
Creator, and his wife and gracious defigns, in
the ſtrongeſt light. He affures us that, if
we acquiefce in his Law of Oeconomy, we
need only open our eyes and furvey the whole
univerfe; and then all the Phænomena, which
before, through our ignorance of the wifeſt
laws from whence they take their riſe, afforded
but an obſcure and confufed proof of the ex-
iftence of a God, will be improved to a demon-
ſtration; and what otherwife might have given
offence, will appear to be but a neceffary con-
fequence of the Law which he was going to
eſtabliſh. We ſhall by that means, as he pre-
tends, be able, without being offended, to fee
the production of monſters, and the commiffion
of crimes, and to fupport pain with patience
and refignation.
Thus by the Law of Oeconomy every diffi-
culty is at once cleared up, and every doubt
* Ibid.
+ Ibid. p. 25.
N 4
re-
184
NATURAL RELIGION
$
removed. But, may I afk M, Maupertuis, how
by his "leaſt quantity of action," every thing fo
eafily becomes a convincing proof of the ex-
iftence of a God, and of his wifdom and good-
nefs? Let us form this conclufion from it,
namely, If every thing in the world is effected
by the leaſt quantity of motion, it follows that
there must be a God, whofe wife choice has
made the very beft difpofition of things. Now,
if the leaft, or moft fimple, action be in itfelf
alone poffible, and therefore abfolutely neceffary,
what becomes of the inference, That it has been
eſtabliſhed by the wifdom and free choice of
God? Or if it be only fuppofed Neceffary in a
natural way, what figns does it exhibit to us,
that it was ordained by a free-agent.
objection Maupertuis firft makes to Newton;
and then he repeats it to himfelf:. But his folu
tion of it is as follows: *«o Though it be true
"that the laws of motion and reft indifpenfibly
"flow from the very nature of matter, it proves
"nevertheleſs the perfection of the Supreme
"Being; fince all things are fo regulated, that
❝a blind and neceflary mathematical principle
performs what the moft free and moſt wife
"intelligence has prefcribed." Strange proof
indeed! The natural neceffity of the leaft
quantity of motion manifefts a free choice in
the Supreme Being. How fo? Why, be-
cauſe it executes the plan formed by the moſt
wife and free intelligence. But is not this
}
EC
+
* Ibid. p. 13.
This
¿
fup-
Defended and Illuftrated.
185
fuppofing the very thing which is to be proved?
But if this is to be called a fatisfactory anſwer to
the above objection, why might it not likewife
folve the objection urged by Maupertuis againſt
Newton's order of the planets?
**
But, for once, let us grant that the law of the
very leaſt action proves the exiſtence of an intel-
ligent and free Spirit; yet, according to Mau-
pertuis himſelf, it does not properly diſplay his
wiſdom and goodneſs, unless the motive and
end of fuch action have fome good inherent in
them. How then can he reject and ridicule the
inveſtigation of final cauſes in nature, fince,
without pre-fuppofing fome good end or defign,
his own hypothefis affords no proof of the good-
nefs and wiſdom of God? for the motion of
bodies, whether it be great or little, confidered
in itſelf, includes no good defign; at moft, it is
but a mode applicable either to a good or evil
end. May not then the leaſt quantity of motion
be productive only of evil; or, at leaſt, of a
great deal of evil? How then is the wiſdom and
goodneſs of the Creator to be proved from the
Law of Oeconomy, or the leaſt action, con
fidered in itſelf, fince it does not appear that
fuch law is inftituted for any good end?. and
how ſhould this law furniſh us with an anſwer
to the objection raiſed againſt it, from the ma-
nifold evils that are to be ſeen in the world?
Are not monfters, venomous animals, poiſonous
plants, flander, pain and death, evils, becauſe
they are produced by the fmalleft motion? If
motion were the only thing to be confidered in
the
186
NATURAL RELIGION
the cafe before us, would not man ardently wiſh,
that a free and intelligent Being had been fome-
thing more fparing in producing evil, and a lit-
tle more liberal in the quantity of motion.
But farther, it is inconceivable that the evil
we find in the world ſhould be a neceffary con-
fequence of this law of the leaſt quantity of
motion. Can it be faid that hurricanes, earth-
quakes, innundations, wars, murders, confla-
grations, and all kinds of vices, are the effects
of the ſmalleſt quantity of motion? If no noxious
animals or herbs had ever been created, yet this
ſmalleſt quantity of motion might have been in
the world. On the contrary, this confequence
might have been rather drawn from fuch a law,
viz. That a great deal of good, and even all
living creatures, ought never to have exifted, in
order to prevent fo much motion, buſtle, and
noife, in the world, and that every thing might
be ſtill and lifelefs, and all nature wrapped in a
profound filence or fleep.
It were greatly to be wifhed, that Maupertuis
had explained to us more clearly, how his Law
of Oeconomy, on the one hand, can be necef-
farily productive of good, and confequently is
appointed by a wife Being; and on the other
hand, admits of the leaft poffible evil: for,
confidered in itſelf, it feems productive of nei-
ther good nor evil. If therefore no gracious
defign be pre-fuppofed, for the accompliſhment
of which the Law of Oeconomy is fuppofed to
be the means, it indicates no wiſdom, no choice
of excellence; nor is the evil we fee in the
world
Defended 'and Illuſtrated.
187
world reconcileable with it. This makes it ap-
pear the more unaccountable, that Maupertuis
fhould fo warmly attack the proofs taken from
final caufes, and the conformity of parts in na-
ture, when he himself ftands in no lefs need of
them than other philofophers. The worst of it is,
that Maupertuis endeavours to perplex, weaken,
and ridicule the arguments drawn from the good
that is to be found in the world, but enhances
and aggravates the evil; and, after leading us
into a labyrinth of intricate thoughts, diſappears
and leaves us in the dark.
SECTION XIII.
It appears from the very inftance adduced by
Maupertuis, that without pre-fuppofing a defign
and final cauſe, no right judgment can be formed
either of the perfection or imperfection of the
univerſe and its parts, nor of the whole conca-
tenation of things, any more than of the wiſdom
and goodneſs of the Creator. As I have already
fhewn this in general, it will evidently appear
that the external defign or end of the creation,
is as benevolent, grand, and magnificent as pof-
fible; and that the whole plan and difpofition of
the univerſe correfpond with the laws of nature;
fo that this, in general, fufficiently proclaims
the perfection of the world and of its great
Architect. But, previouſly to any direct anſwer
to the objections againſt paticular parts of the
univerfe, it will be neceffary to enlarge on the
particular ends God had in view, when he created
the
1
'
188 NATURAL RELIGION
the animal and human fpecies which exift on
our earth. It will then more manifeftly appear,
that the Creator hath imparted to them all as
much good, and as great a degree of perfection,
as was poffible in the concatenation of things,
confiftent with the exiſtence of each of them;
and that the want of greater perfection, or the
evil we fee in the world, was no part of God's
defign, but has unavoidable grounds of poffi-
bility, partly in the limited nature of a connect-
ed feries of things, and partly in the actual per-
miffion of it; which furniſhes new proofs of
the great Creator's wifdom and goodneſs,
I fhall not at preſent obviate any objections
raiſed againſt the wiſdom and goodneſs of the
Creator; it being fufficient for us, that the weak-
nefs and falfity of them already appears. For
how can we judge of a machine, and the per-
fection of the artist who made it, and, at the
fame time, look upon the connection of its
parts, and the defign of it, as fomething be-
neath our notice? To what purpoſe is it to
enter into an argument with a perfon who, out
of the ordinances of the wifeft of kings, picks
out here and there fomething to cenfure, as
weak or inconfiftent? and when he is afked;
Whether he has maturely confidered all the
other claufes, and the whole connection of them
all? anfwers, That fome of them he does not
underſtand, and others are trifling and frivolous,
and confequently unworthy of a wife monarch,
and even beneath his notice. Such a one I
would adviſe not to be fo precipitate, but to
allow
Defended and Illuftrated.
189
allow himſelf time and patience impartially to
confider the particular defign of fuch ordinances
for the ſupport of each ſtate, and every one of
them as it is adapted to fuch views; and if, after
all this, he fhould not perfectly comprehend the
grounds and reafons of every particular meaſure
of government, he ought not to impute to the
king what is the effect of his own ignorance,
Ought we not rather to treat the works of God
with the fame candour and equity, that Socrates
fhewed to the obfcure writings of Heraclitus? He
peruſed that author without expreffing the leaft
contempt for his writings; he applied himſelf
to dive into the true ſenſe of them: He was fo
far from endeavouring, by forced conftructions,
to draw contradictions out of difficult paffages,
that when he was afked, how he liked thoſe
writings? he anſwered, "What I can under-
"ſtand of them is admirable; and therefore I
prefume that what I do not underſtand is no
"lefs excellent *."
}
SECTION XIV.
مرة
Some naturaliſts will, by no means, have
final caufes intermixed with natural philofophy;
alledging, that theſe are ſo far from being of any
ufe in our enquiries into nature, that they fre-
quently lead us into errors. What Sir Francis
Bacon and Deſcartes have urged againſt this, is
* Diog. Laërt, II. 22. å µsr ournxa yervaia, ouai δε και ά
μη συνηκα.
1
2
well
!
190 NATURAL RELIGION
1
1
well known*; and many of the more modern
writers go ftill farther, not only excluding final
caufes from phyfics as ufelefs and delufory, but
ſcarce admitting them in metaphyfics; and,
from a ftrong prejudice, reject almoſt all proofs.
à priori as unneceffary reveries.
One writer is of opinion, that the per-
fection to which the defign of the Creator is
directed, and the fufficient reafon or caufe of
the end aimed at, are only entes rationis, formed
according to human imagination and arbitrary
relations, which we look upon as general; that,
confequently, to draw any conclufion from final.
caufes, is only to fubftitute the Effect instead of
the Cauſe.
-
A celebrated Epicurean of our times, who
had his own private reaſons for rejecting final
cauſes, or the leaft traces of the Divine Wiſdom
in Nature, not only fays of the principle that
affigns a fufficient caufe or reafon of things‡;
That it is a mere hypothefis contrived to promote
certain fyftems, and of no manner of uſe to-
wards the diſcovery of truth; but, on the con-
trary, throws down all the barriers of found
reafon. He adds, "The philoſophy of Leibnitz
leads to another principle ftill more uſeleſs
"than that of final caufes.; which is that of
"Contradiction." I do by no means charge
* See what has been alledged againſt this by Cudworth,
cap. v. fect. 1, of his Intellectual System, and Parker de Deo &.
Providentiâ, diff. III.
✦ Buffon in his General Natural Hiſtory, vol. I. art. 2.
M. de la Mettrie, in his Abregè de Syſtemes, lect. 3.
3
1
M.
Defended and Illustrated.
191
}
M. Buffon with the extravagancies of La Mettrie;
but I cannot fee that it is neceffary, for the fup-
port of his opinion, to uſe a language calcu-
lated only for atheifts? For he that will argue
God out of Nature, and fo diffuade mankind
from expreffing a due reverence for him, will
not ſtick at contradictions, nor trouble himſelf
about the fufficient Reaſon or final caufe in the
things themſelves, or in principles.
SECTION XV.
+
I have fhewn above that final caufes, or a
defign in the Being of material things, are well
founded; fince no inanimate thing can be fup-
poſed to exift, unleſs its nature, conftitution, and
exiſtence, were previouſly determined with re-
gard to animate Beings. But Buffon looks on
final cauſes, or a defign of perfection, as entia
rationis, invented merely according to human
views, arbitrary relations which we fuppofe to
be general, and a moral conformity with our
inclinations; by which the exiftence of things is
falfly repreſented. He is, however, pleaſed to
grant, that there is in things a relation and con-
formity with human views and inclinations; on
which account, he ſays, we aſcribe a certain de-
gree of perfection to things that exiſt. And
who can deny this? We are for gratifying our
eyes, our ears, and every fenfe; and do not only
endeavour to live in complacency and delight,
but we alſo have a ſtrong deſire to propagate our
fpecies. Now the whole difpofition and texture
of
192
NATURAL RELIGION
of our bodies, and particularly the organs of our
fenfes, correſpond with theſe inclinations. The
exiftence and quality of other external things,
and the laws by which they act upon our organs,
and, in fhort, all nature, anfwer to our propen-
fities. We endeavour to attain the knowledge
of thing and their cauſes, and take pleaſure in
ſurveying the beauty and order of them; and,
laftly, we find a complacency in our own
actions. The whole vifible world, the faculties
of our fouls, and the innate laws of them, cor-
reſpond with each other; and as the univerſe
includes in itſelf all knowledge and ſkill, all
beauty and order, fo are our mental faculties,
from the innate laws impoſed on them, adapted
to acquire a knowledge of that beauty and or-
der, and to take a delight and complacency
therein. -
Now the queftion is, Whether this relation
and conformity of things to our propenfities be
only an ens rationis, a mere moral conformity and
arbitrary relation, formed and made general by
us men, according to our own views? To which
I answer, That this would be a very ridiculous
fuppofition, and flies in the face of all truth
and experience. The things themſelves, like
the human ſpecies, and the relation they bear to
us, are effential; and their relation or conformity
to us is founded in Nature and their refpec-
tive Powers and Laws. Our thoughts, our
inclinations, and our wills, could never have
produced or altered them, nor have conftructed
a world according to our own minds: But we
are
t
Defended and Illuftrated.
193
*
་
are capable of forming an idea of theſe natural
relations of things to our propenfities, and of
taking a delight in them; and this idea is
grounded on truth, reprefenting the thing as it
really is. Now, this conformity of things with
our inclinations, that is, with our well-being,
is what I term the External Perfection of things.
Therefore this Perfection of things is nothing
that men can be fuppofed to have produced by,
or according to, their own fancy and views;
but
was firmly eſtabliſhed in the effence and nature
of things, previously to our having any end in
view: Or, if it be called Arbitrary, from our
general knowledge, and even experience, of it,
then 'the relation between caufes and their effects
muſt alſo be arbitrary, and accounted the inven-
tion of men; than which nothing can be more
abfurd. This artifice of Buffon I have detected
in feveral paffages, wherein he rejects any reaſon-
ing or experience which does not pleaſe him,
alledging, that it is merely arbitrary; and in this
his whole objection confifts. But this argument
ſhould be quite inverted; for he that reprefents
the relations of what was prior to our will, and
actually exifts without it and hath its reafon in
nature and its laws as arbitrary, fhews great arbi-
trarineſs in fuch a judgement; and, inſtead of the
truth of things, lays only his own prejudice for a
foundation. We ihal', in the fequel, have occa-
fion to animadvert on feveral inſtances of ſuch
behaviour. Take away
from Buffon his arbi-
trary principles and fuppofitions, and but little
will remain of his whole hypothefis.
Thus
194
NATURAL RELIGION
Thus we underftand, nay, we feel, that the
relation and conformity of things to our pro-
penfities and well-being, or, in other words, the
External Perfection of the world, is founded on
Nature itſelf, and is not the imaginary creature
of our will. Now, I would farther afk, From
whence this conformity with our welfare, or
the external perfection of the world, is derived?
If it be faid, that this queſtion is to no purpoſe,
then muſt the thing be already clearly con-
ceivable from the world, or from nature itſelf;
or, to uſe Leibnitz's words, then muft the world
and nature contain in themſelves a perfect and
fufficient cauſe of this conformity, and therefore
be abfolutely neceffary. But an External Per-
fection, and a conformity of one inanimate thing
to another, cannot be of abſolute neceffity, and
have the cauſe of it in itſelf: fince every thing
is indifferent to it; and neither its conftitution
nor its exiſtence is determined by its own nature,
but, in the fame manner as any inanimate ma-
chine has its conftruction and exiſtence from
fome artift, for the fake of animate Beings, of
with a view to their benefit. By thefe views, the
exiftence and conftitution of the world becomė
as conceivable as that of a machine; whereas, if
it be considered abftractedly and in itſelf, every
thing in the univerfe is quite inconceivable.
From hence Buffon may alſo fatisfy himſelf,
why all natural operations, as they tend to the
welfare of living creatures, muft rationally be
looked upon as final caufes; that is, as fo many
operations, which the Author of Nature had in
>
bis
Defended and Illuftrated.
195
2
his view as the univerſal end or deſign, for the
effectuating of which the univerſe was pitched
upon as the means; and confequently, why the
firſt cauſe or ground of the exiſtence and con-
ſtitution of every thing in nature, is to be fought
for in that end or defign. M. Buffon endeavours
to ridicule this argument by faying, "that others,
"who think by final caufes to anſwer the que-
"ftion, why fuch things are in being," (he
might farther have faid, why they are thus and
not otherwiſe)" are not aware that they mistake
"the effect for the cauſe." But by the term
Cauſe, which he has juſt named, he ſhould
mean the Final Caufe; and not play with words,
or tax us with miftaking Effects for efficient
Cauſes. But the word Final Cauſe, or end, no
body will apply to the effect in any other ſenſe
than objectively, as fuch an effect was the object,
of the Creator's views. What abſurdity then is
to be found in this? He cannot but know, what
the ſchoolmen have long fince, and very juſtly,
faid, that Ultimum in executione eft primum in in-
tentione. But how could this gentleman take
upon him to ſay, that "the relation of things to
us could have no influence on the origin of
"them?" On the contrary, if in an inanimate
thing no certain view, providing a correfpendent
relation, to the benefit of the living, be ſuppoſed,
no idea can be formed of its effence, nature, or
qualities. Until we know the effects and ad-
vantages of the liver, the fpleen, the pancreas,
and other veffels of the human body, we cannot
be faid properly to know thoſe veſſels. What-
Q 2
ever
}
196 NATURAL RELIGION
+
ever exifts in the world, with the utility of
which we are unacquainted, is to us, as it
were, a mathematical inſtrument or machine,
which we fee, but know nothing of,
SECTION XVI.
•
Thus far, therefore, the inveſtigation of final
caufes, or the defign of God in the creation, is
founded on reafon: But does it not alfo affift
us in acquiring a knowledge of nature? or is it
rather to be feparated from phyfics, as ufelefs or
detrimental.? In every thing extremes are to be
avoided, and too much or too little may be done,
Should any one argue thus: I fee the final
cauſes of things in general, and therefore I muſt
neceffarily know every particular end the Creator
had in view, and the means which ferve for the
accompliſhment of this or that particular end.
-This would be deceiving himfelf; juft as if
he imagined, that, from a knowledge of the ge-
neral laws of motion, he could readily find out
the particular laws, without any farther experi-
ments. For as, on the one hand, the general
view to the benefit of mankind does not let us
into the particular views, nor are all the poffible
fpecies of living creatures to be deduced from
fuch a general knowledge; fo, on the other
hand, cafual things may happen by various
means, and, to explain all the exhibitions of
God's defigns in the moſt fimple manner, or by
the wifeft means, far furpaffes our narrow un-
derstanding. Thus if, omitting all farther en-
quiries
Defended and Illustrated.
197
quiries into nature, we fhould, from our own
fcanty knowledge only, venture to guess what
things exift in the world, the texture of them,
the end of their formation, and the manner of
their acting; we ſhould, in moft particulars, err,
or at beft, it would be no more than conjecture.
On the other hand, it is going too far to
affirm, That from final caufes, even affifted by
natural hiſtory, no new truths are diſcoverable
in phyfics concerning the exiſtence of certain
things, the nature and effects of them. Who-
ever is verfed in experiments cannot but know,
that nature is approachable by many ways; and
he will eafily perceive what conclufions may be
drawn from the connection between a general
and particular propofition, fupported by experi-
ments. Now, as I have above pointed out the
rules, according to which inferences may be
drawn from the general end or defign of the
creation, to particulars; fo I fhall likewiſe en-
deavour to fhew the way, that may lead us to
the natural means which the Creator had in view
to accomplish thoſe ends, and the manner in
which thoſe means act. But this I fhall illuſtrate
by examples.
1. I have already adduced fome examples
to fhew, that the Argumentum Analogia, or
the inference drawn from the analogy of
things, has been uſed to a great advantage in
phyfics; though it is chiefly founded on the
relation of things, and the means conducive
to a general end, already known. From
whence had the ancients, as Anaximander, Phi-
оз
lolaus,
:
{
198 NATURAL RELIGION
lolaus, Ariftarchus of Samos, Plato, Nicetas of
Syracufe, and Copernicus among the moderns,
inferred, that the earth moved? This they cer-
tainly could neither prove from obfervations, nor
from the known laws of motion. They were
taught it purely from the abfurdity of the fup-
pofition, that the whole heavens moved round
our earth, when the fame effect might be pro-
duced by the rotation of one fingle orb on its
axis. How came the antients to think of anti-
podès? How came Columbus to conclude that
there was more dry land to the weftward, unleſs
it be from the confideration, that it was agree-
able to the defign of the Creator that the earth
ſhould be an habitation for animate Beings, and
be accommodated to the human ſpecies in par-
ticular?
2. The Law of Continuity, Lex Continuitutis,
diſcovered by Leibnitz, and fince adopted by
many ingenious philofophers, according to which
all things that exift in the world proceed in an
uninterrupted feries, without one void or chafm
throughout all nature; this law, I fay, is no more
than a law of wiſdom *, and ferves not only to
explode feveral phyfical errors, but helps us to
diſcover many unknown truths. Leibnitz, on a
certain occafion†, concludes from this Law of
Continuity, that there must be zoophytes or ani-
mal-plants in the world, and that by an accurate
* See Leibnitz, in a Letter printed by M. Koenig in his
Appel au Public, p. 44. Ariftotle feems likewife to have had
fome idea of this Concatenation in Nature. See his Works, tom.
II. p. 549.
+ Leibnitz, ibid. p. 46.
fearch,
·Defended and Illuftrated.
199
fearch, fuch beings might be found either on
the earth, or in the water: and the experience
of later times has confirmed the truth of his
inference from this law of wisdom; fuch zoo-
phytes having been actually found, as the poly-
pus obferved by M. Trembley, and corals and
madrepores, which in their manner of multi-
plying their ſpecies, and nouriſhing individuals,
are to be eſteemed real plants, and yet lead an
animal life. Therefore, with me, it is no doubt
that Leibnitz was perfectly right in ſaying, that
his principle, if duly followed, would lead to
the diſcovery of many other important truths.
When we enquire from whence Newton drew
his inference, that the axis of the earth and of
all the other planets muſt be fhorter than the
diameter of the Equator, or that the figure of the
earth more reſembles an orange than a lemon;
it is eaſy to perceive that he laid the foundation
of his conjecture in many other truths, previ-
ouſly known, but that the end the Supreme
Being had in view, and his choice of the beſt
means to complith it, greatly inforced the proof
of his hypothefis*. For in the revolution of
the earth round its axis, the parts about the
Equator are the moſt diftant from the axis of
motion, confequently have the greateſt centri-
fugal force. From thence it follows, that their
gravitation towards the centre of the earth is lefs
than the parts that are nearer the poles; and
that all the parts under or near the Equator are
* See Phil. Nat. Principia Math. Tom. III. P. I. Propof. xviii.
Theor. xvi.
04
much
200
NATURAL RELIGION
་
much lighter than thoſe about the poles. But
with fuch a difpofition the earth would not have
been poiſed in equilibrio, had not the levity of
the particles about the Equator been compen-
fated by the greater number of them, which
renders them equal in gravity to the heavier
parts near the poles. For, though the earth,
notwithſtanding this difference of gravity in its
parts, might have turned round without any
vacillation, and have been habitable; yet, in order
to this, it must have been one univerfal conti-
nent. But as the fuperfices of the earth is partly
covered with water, this fluid element by the
rotation of the globe would run from the heavier
parts, i. e. from the Poles, towards the lighter,
or the Equator; and there conglomerating, would
overflow all the æquatorial parts, fo that it would
become uninhabitable, and the reft of the earth
towards the poles, being deprived of the greateſt
part of its moisture, would be a dry barren de-
fert. If Sir Ifaac Newton had limited this con-
clufion only to our earth, it might be faid, that
he had grounded it on the experience we have,
that the earth is actually inhabited at the Equa-
tor. But as he extends it alſo to other planets,
he builds his reafoning on the general defign
the Creator had in view, and the choice of the
wifeft means to accompliſh it.
Maupertuis himſelf feems to have borrowed
his Law of Oeconomy, or of the fmalleft quan-
tity of motion, from this principle, namely, that
Nature works by the moft fimple and ſhorteſt
means, though he will not own the latter is
main-
Defended and Illuftrated.
201
1
maintained by him *. But whether he is right
in making the leaſt action or quantity of motion
to be every where the moſt fimple and fhorteft
means, is another queftion. General principles
cannot with certainty be applied to Nature,
but jointly with other known truths, and even
experiments.
SECTION XVII.
#
I could add many other examples from the
greateſt Geometricians and Naturalifts, whofe
diſcoveries of proofs are taken purely from final
cauſes, and the laws of wiſdom. However, fup-
poſing this advantage accruing from the doctrine
of final caufes was for once to be fet afide, I
fee no reaſon why, at leaſt, it may not be made
a part of Natural Philofophy? In order to un-
derſtand a thing thoroughly, the firſt cauſes of it
muſt be known t. Now, if efficient cauſes are
not intelligible in themſelves, but leave the que-
ſtion, why they operate, and what benefit will
accrue from their effects quite undecided; then
Natural Philoſophy itself refers us to a fublimer
fcience, which must be united with it. Can it
be ſaid that he ſufficiently knows the nature of
animals, who only knows that the ſpider ſpins a
web; that the ſtork is a bird of paffage; that
fea-fiſh ſwim againſt the ſtream; without know-
·ing the end of all this? Can he be faid to have
*See his Pref de l'Effay de Cofmologie.
+ See what Leibnitz fays of Defcartes in a Letter publiſhed
by M, Koenig in his Appel au Publique, p. 52.
1
7
1
!
:
}
}
202
NATURAL RELIGION
:
+47
a fufficient knowledge of the conftitution of ani
mal and vegetable bodies, who only knows their
parts and their texture, but is unacquainted with
the uſe and advantage of them? What would
be faid of an artiſt, who minutely knew the
conſtruction of certain inftruments or machines,
and could even very fkilfully make them, but
without underſtanding the end to which they are
fubfervient? Could he give himſelf or others
a fatisfactory anſwer, why he made every part
thus, and not otherwife? Would he be able to
bring his work to perfection, without a view to
fome end? Would he be ever able to enlarge
his plan, and improve his art? But the main
thing is, that we never can have a right know-
ledge of our own nature, without attending to
the end the Creator had in view when he
formed us; and we ſhould entirely miſtake our
way to happineſs, turn virtue into a chimera,
and be without any hope of a bleffed immor-
tality, unleſs we conftantly have an eye to the
defign of the Creator, in giving us fuch natural
faculties and powers.
All the fciences, like natural things, are
mutually linked together; and whoever attempts
to ſeparate them from one another, will know
very little of the grounds of any of them, and
will be totally ignorant of the harmony and con-
nection of the whole. I would fain know what
idea a man can form of the univerfe, or of
nature, without having an eye to the final caufe
of it? If we exclude the external end or defign
which has concentred all its parts, and even the
efficient
>
Defended and Illuftrated.
203
efficient cauſes, in a combination, there is no-
thing in the univerſe, and among its inhabitants,
but chance, diforder, and confufion: All the
conformity between one thing and another is
only from blind, inanimate, irrational cauſes,
which can neither explain the order, relation,
or difpofition of things, nor why they are of
this and no other texture.
But if we confider the world as an habitation
for all poffible ſpecies of living creatures, where-
in every thing is adapted to the uſe of animate
Beings, it is from thence alone that we can have
any reaſonable conception why the material uni-
verſe was brought into being, fince it has, in it-
felf, no enjoyment of its exiftence; why it is
divided into fuch a multitude of parts, all of
the fame globular figure; and why thofe globes
are placed in fuch an order, and at fuch a dif-
tance from each other, that one luminous globe
is always ſurrounded by others which are opaque.
It is from thence we judge, why the opaque re-
volve round the luminous globes, and have their
day and night, and the viciffitude of ſeaſons;
why they float in a fine æther, and are fur-
rounded with a denſe atmoſphere; why they
are furniſhed with plants, trees, and herbs in
fuch a rich variety; and laftly, why thefe, and
other general and particular rules of nature or
motion, have been inftituted. Now, as to the
whole animal kingdom, I apprehend that their
organs and powers were framed according to
the fenfitive foul of each fpecies of animals, and
the
រ
204
NATU
NATURAL RELIGION
the inclinations and faculties of the foul accord
ing to their peculiar manner of living; and,
moreover, that they all, taken together, contain
in themſelves all poffible modes of life, and
form one continued chain of nature, without
any chaẩm or the omiffion of any one link which
can be conceived as promotive of life, pleaſure,
and happineſs.
If Nature be not confidered with a view to
this end, and its conformity with it, there is an
end of all internal and external perfection of the
univerſe, of all the order and beauty of its parts,
and of all the ſkill and wiſdom of the Architect
who made it. The real complacency which the
foul finds in the glorious exhibition of an in-
finite Intelligence by which we are formed, and
his exuberant goodneſs, and paternal care for us
and all living creatures, would vaniſh: All that
natural hiſtory and phyfics could then teach us,
would be only the difference of form, and the
immediate cauſes of local motion; things from
which, confidered in themſelves, the human
mind derives neither benefit nor tranquility. All
laborious experiments and accurate obfervations
in order to attain to the knowledge of nature, ex-
cept what advantages might accrue from them to
artiſts and phyſicians, would become vain amuſe-
ments, a frivolous waſte of our precious time.
Should it not therefore be allowed, that the
advantage of natural knowledge may become
more general and noble, ſo as to improve both
the foul and body; to enable us to deduce from
it
Defended and Illuftrated. +
205
it various laws of wisdom and goodness; to
infpire us with love, confidence, and veneration,
towards the most perfect Being, on whom our
exiſtence and welfare depend; and laftly, to fix
our hopes on a better and more durable life,
after which, our beneficent Creator, by the very
works of Nature, teaches us to aſpire?
:
DISSER-
206 NATURAL RELIGION
1
}
DISSERTATION V.
Of God's particular views, or final causes, in
the animal kingdom.
It
L
SECTION I.
&
ATL
Tappears, from the preceding Differtations,
that God has created all things for the fake
of animate Beings, and that the latter were
brought into being on their own account, and
to enjoy their exiſtence. Let us therefore furvey
the animal kingdom, and more cloſely inſpect
into the particular execution of that glorious
defign, that we may have more lively ideas of
the infinite wisdom, benignity, and power of
the adorable Creator. This furvey will likewife
affiſt us in attaining a true knowledge of our-
felves, and acquaint us with that noble end for
which we are created, and to which our facul-
ties and powers are adapted.
That the certainty of the inferences I fhall
draw may appear the more evident, I fhall fet
down the feveral principles and pofitions from
which I deduce them feparately. Though the
whole conclufion flows from what has been de-
monftrated in the preceding Differtations; this,
however, by no means excludes thofe general
truths of Contrariety and Conformity, of Suffici-
ent Reaſon and Continuity of Beings, in Nature.
1
1. The
R
Defended and Illuftrated.
207
1. The inanimate fubftances in the world,
together with all their powers and effects, have
no Internal Perfection, and exift no more by
themſelves, than for themſelves; but every one
of them muſt have been created for the fake of
animate Beings, and, confequently, with a view
to their welfare.
2. The body of an animal has, in itſelf, no
cauſe or reafon of its exiftence, or contexture;
but is of ſuch a conftitution as is requifite for
the foul.
3.
The faculties of the foul, and their laws,
which are innate in animate Beings, are all
adapted to their refpective manner of living,
their Internal Perfection, complacency, and fe-
licity.
4. Hence it appears, that nothing in the
world exifts, or comes to pafs, without a view
or end to which it is directed.
5. Confequently, whatever exifts or comest
to pass in the world, exifts and comes to pafs
according to the defign of the Creator, and the
welfare of animate Beings.
6. Whatever includes in itſelf this external
end of the creation in general, and is conform-
able to the perfections of the Deity, may be
confidered as a final caufe, and was created by
God; on the other hand,
7. Whatever contributes to the benefit of
animate Beings, is defigned by the Creator.
8. The effence, qualities, and natures of
things, together with their laws, are the means
by which the ends propofed by God are jointly
carried into execution.
9. The
A
208
NATURAL RELIGION
1
9. The fitneſs of a thing for a certain uſe
warrants a conjecture, that this utility is the end
the Deity had in view; however, as one thing
may have various ufes, it affords no certainty of
its particular utility.
io. When any thing is adapted to certain
conveniencies of animate Beings, and is proved
to be fuch by trials in fimilar cafes, it yields a
probability, that fuch a thing concurs to the
fame end; and this probability increaſes ac-
cording to the frequency of fuch experiments,
and their conformity to each other.
11. But when the perfection and benefit of
animate Beings have their proper and neceffary
cauſe or reaſon in the quality of things, and the
contrary cannot be fuppofed in nature, then it
is certain that fuch a difpofition tends to that
end.
12. The operation of the faculties of the
foul, together with their laws and tendencies,
have a certain aim or end, which is infallible.
13. It is confiftent with the wisdom and
goodness of God, to chufe the fitteft means for
accompliſhing the beſt ends.
14. That which is manifeftly repugnant to
the quality and nature of things, and to the fittest
means towards effecting the beſt ends, is by no
means to be accounted a final cauſe, or the end
the Supreme Being had in view.
15. The greater the number of animate
Beings is, the more fit and fimple, amidſt ſuch
multiplicity, are the means for every mode of
living, and the welfare of every fpecies; and
5
the
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
209
the greater the figns of intelligence, ſkill, and
wife choice, which they exhibit to us, are, the
more manifeftly do we perceive in them the
defign or view, the wisdom and goodness, of the
Deity.
Of theſe principles, I fhall make frequent uſe
in the fequel; but at prefent fhall draw only
two inferences from them, in order to eſtabliſh
clearly the defign of the Creator, as the moft
magnificent and ſtriking diſplay of wifdom and
goodness.
Firſt, I fay, according to the fixth rule, if
the external end of the creation, which was the
welfare of animate Beings, includes in itſelf all
poffible living creatures which are, in any de-
gree, ſuſceptible of happineſs; and if it was
confiftent with the infinite wifdom, goodneſs,
and power of God to produce fuch Beings, it
follows that it was the real defign of God to
produce all poffible living creatures, of all fpe-
cies, and in all degrees of perfection; and con-
ſequently they actually exiſt in the world.
Secondly, I fhall, from the fifth rule, de-
monftrate that there is nothing in the univerſe,
eſpecially in the animal kingdom, which more
clearly exhibits the ends propofed by the Crea-
tor, and the wiſdom and goodneſs of thoſe ends
which he had in view, than the difpofitions,
powers, and fagacity of irrational creatures.
Y
MA
Р
SEC-
{
210
NATURAL RELIGION
1
SECTION II.
The univerfal and external end propoſed by
the Creator, namely, the well-being of living
creatures, induces us, in the first place, to con-
clude, that all poffible animate Beings, of every
fpecies and degree, are included in his plan; this
being conformable both to the infinite perfections
of God, and the external end he had in view.
The Supreme Being propofed to himſelf all
poffible kinds and degrees of Internal Perfection,
and of Life; he has a complacency in all the
poffible happineſs of living creatures; and his
power can realize whatever he defigns, and has
a delight in. Why ſhould he not therefore ex-
hibit in the creation his glorious perfections in
all their infinitude? What fhould limit his
wiſdom, goodness, or power; or obftruct his
creative views? It is as eafy for the Deity to re-
gulate and bring into being all poffible good, as
it is merely to think of it. All poffible living
creatures of every fpecies, and every degree of
happiness, equally correfpond with his defign,
and are equally dear to him. What reaſon,
therefore, can be affigned, why he ſhould not
have beſtowed life on all of them, and have
filled the whole univerfe with all poffible modes
and degrees of complacency and happineſs?
The Law of Continuity, or uninterrupted
feries, which is founded on the moſt perfect
wiſdom, likewife admits of no breach or irre-
gularity in the chain of poffibilities, which is
to
Defended and Illuftrated.
-211
to form one continued WHOLE. The poffible
degrees of perfection are ſo cloſely connected to
each other, that we cannot conceive any chaẩm;
nor can any one link be omitted inthe chain.
Now, the creation is to be looked on only as a
copy of fuch a Divine Plan. All the perfections
neceffary to make one entire abfolute WHOLE are
connected in the fame manner in their reality
as in their poffibility. To omit any degree of
perfection between the reft, would be acting.
without reaſon, and would alſo break the union;
or to ſelect any particular perfections from
among the whole, would be contradictory to
that wiſdom which fees the connection, and
would render the whole imperfect.
Now, if the univerſe be confidered, not only
with regard to ſpace and time, but alſo accord-
ing to the kinds and degrees of things, as com-
plete and permanent, it then appears in its true
perfection as a work worthy of an infinite Crea-
tor. For the degrees of perfection increaſe in
ſome meaſure with the variety of things, in a
mutual conformity; and a greater variety there
cannot be than that which comprehends all
poffible animate Beings.
SECTION III.
Experience fhews us, that on our earth,
nature gradually defcends from man to animal
plants, or zoophytes. There are brutes which
are, as it were, contiguous to the human fpecies,
and approach very near us in underſtanding and
organs
P 2
212 NATURAL RELIGION
*
#
organs of perception; on the other hand, there
are fome animals which can hardly be thought
to have life in them. Hence it appears, that
the moſt contemptible creatures that can exift
either on land or in the water on our globe,
are not omitted by the Creator. What a diver-
fity of amazing forms, organs, motion, inſtincts
or difpofitions, aliments, modes of life and pro-
pagation, is difplayed from the higheft and the
lowest degree of animals! Thus we have all the
reafon in the world to fuppofe, that all the vari-
ous fpecies of animals whofe exiftence was poffi-
ble, do actually exift. Hence the great difficulty
naturalifts find in dividing the animal kingdom
into genera and Species; fince, between thoſe
which have been diftinguiſhed from each other
by certain characteriſtics, and included within a
particular clafs, there are always intermediate
ipecies partaking of fomething in each of the two
claffes which come neareft to them. Thus the
junction or connection of the different fpecies
is formed, as colours imperceptibly loſe them-
felves in each other; fo that the exact limits of
each of them are not to be determined.* Ac-
cordingly, it is now generally acknowledged
that the Law of conftant Progreffion or Con-
tinuity is obferved in the animal kingdom *,
But, as on our earth there are animals which
are not to be found in Europe or Germany, to
whoſe exiſtence a different climate, degree of
1
* This is the opinion of Bradley, Roefel, Donati, Buffon,
Maupertuis, and many other judicious naturalifts.
1
warmth,
Defended and Illuftrated.
213
warmth, and element, &c. are neceffary; fo
there is no room to doubt of the exiſtence of
millions of other fpecies of animals, which for
their ſupport and existence require quite a dif-
ferent habitation from our earth, and are no
more able to live here, than we in the Moon,
Saturn, or Mercury. The kingdom of all pof-
fible fpecies is very far from being exhauſted by
the inhabitants of our globe.
The diverfity of form, and of every thing
that relates to the animal life, is almoſt infinite.
Muſt there not then be a poffibility of a greater
diverfity of difpofitions, capacities, faculties,
powers, intelligences, and modes of living, of
pleaſure and of happiness? For the other ha-
bitable orbs were not made in vain, or for their
own fake, any more than our earth, but purely
for the fake of animate Beings; fince the ce-
leſtial bodies have no confcioufnefs or enjoyment
of their own exiſtence.
If Great-Britain, or a much smaller ifland,
for inftance, one of the Maldivas, alone contained
all living creatures, and the reft, or much greater
part of the earth was ever to continue a folitary
deſert, and conſequently all the animals which
otherwiſe might live upon our earth, were not
brought into being; could fuch a difpofition be
reconciled with a Sufficient Reafon, and par-
ticularly with the fuppofed end which the Crea-
tor had in view? Now, in cofmography, we
muft confider the whole univerfe as a vaſt re-
gion, confifting of many iflands; and our earth,
confidered in this light, is certainly but a very
P 3
(mall
214 NATURAL RELIGION
!
fmall Maldiva iſland in the immenfe ocean that
furrounds it. What reafon then could we have
to fuppofe that this little ifland alone was fur-
nished with living creatures, and that all the
reft, or much greater part, was dead and ſenſe-
lefs? or that fo many convenient habitations, as
the ftars and planets are, fhould not be peopled
with animate Beings as well as our earth? What
reafon can be affigned that the inhabitants of the
earth alone ſhould be worthy of real exiſtence?
What could determine this difference between
the ſmalleſt part of the univerſe and all the reft?
Would not the univerſe, at this rate, in the far
greater part of it, be without a Sufficient Reafon
or caufe of its exiſtence?
But if, on the contrary, we fuppofe, that all
poffible animate Beings actually exiſt, and are
diftributed into different claffes, we fhall find
that every thing in the univerſe has, its Sufficient
Reafon or ground. That there are fo many
mundane orbs, and that theſe are ſo large and
fo diverfifyed, has its reafon or caufe; fince
all fpecies of living creatures cannot fubfift in
one and the fame. temperature of air, the fame
degree of heat, and fubfift on the fame food:
and therefore it became neceffary that there
fhould be fo many different habitations, as there
are poffible claffes of living creatures of one
general contexture in nature. That the lumi-
nous orbs are always accompanied with fome
opaque globes; that the latter move round the
former; that they have different length of days
and years; that they keep in a determined dif
tance
•
Defended and Illuftrated:
215
}
}
tance from each other, together with every
thing elſe obferved in the great plan of the uni-
verfe, has its Sufficient Reafon; fince all theſe
tend to the benefit of animate Beings, which
otherwife would have been created in vain. In
this hypothefis no limits, contrary to all reafon,
are fet to the Perfections of the Deity; no mere
volition, without a fufficient motive, is fuppofed
in the Creator. The world, as the work of
God, acquires a fixed and perpetual connection,
and is the mirrour and impreffion of his infinite
Underſtanding, by which every thing poffible is
prefent before him; of his infinite Knowledge,
by which he fees into the reality, the harmony,
and perfection of all poffible things; of his in-
finite Wiſdom, which propofes to itfelf all pof-
fible internal perfections, and the internal delight
of animate Beings, as the great end he has in
view, and has adapted the texture, conftitution,
arrangement, conformity and powers of all other
things to this end; of his infinite Goodneſs, in
conferring on every poffible fpecies of living
creatures that peculiar mode of life, of pleaſure
and happineſs, which every fpecies, in the con-
nection of things, was capable of; of his in-
finite Power, by which he has brought into
Being, and difpofed the effences and nature of
fo many things in the most complete regularity
and harmony, and continually fupports them
without any
diminution or confufion.
P 4
SEC-
216 NATURAL RELIGION
}
SECTION IV.
The ſecond thing I propofed to treat of at
prefent, is to fhew how nobly the Divine
Wiſdom and Providence is difplayed in the
various inftincts of irrational creatures, which
are alone fufficient to convince any one, that
Nature is directed by infinite Underſtanding, and
according to the moft benign views, for the
welfare of each particular fpecies of brutes.
Indeed, wherever we caft our eye, we may
diſcern the footſteps of the wifeft Providence ;
and even the external ſhape of animals, the
admirable ſtructure of the body, the uſe and
advantage of the parts, and their conformity
to the manner of life of each ſpecies, muſt lead
us to the knowledge of the great Creator. But
their actions, in which, with an innate fagacity
and skill, they practiſe a thouſand untaught arts
for the ſupport of themſelves, and the prefer-
vation of their fpecies, carry with them ſtill
more evident marks of a higher intelligence,
who has himſelf thought for irrational creatures;
and has implanted in their natures fo many in-
comparable inventions for their welfare, that
even from their first production, they are able to
practiſe them, though blindly, yet without ever
committing any mistake.
Thus, in all animals which do not partake
of reaſon, we perceive a certain natural impulſe,
inftinct, or ſkill, by which they perform, in a
mafterly manner, all that the moft perfect rea-
fon
+
Defended and Illuftrated.
217
$
fon could ſuggeſt to them for the welfare of
each ſpecies; and this by an innate and prompt
dexterity, without any deliberation, trial, or ex-
perience; without any inftruction, model, or pat-
tern. This natural impulſe is ſeen in the filk-
worm, the caterpillar, and many other infects,
which, in order to change their form, fpin for
themſelves a foft coque or bed in which they are
incloſed, or bury themſelves in the earth; in
the bees, with regard to the conftruction of their
cells, and laying up provifion againſt winter;
in birds, which build nefts in a manner adapted
for hatching their eggs, and are ſo fedulous in
hatching and feeding their young, &c. in fiſhes,
which to eject their ſpawn come from a great
diftance in the fea, and fwim up againſt the
current of freſh-water rivers. In general, there
are no kinds of irrational creatures, in which
the place of reafon is not fupplied by an innate
and peculiar art and fagacity neceffary to their
motion, ſubſiſtence, defence, and the propaga-
tion of their fpecies. Thus, in the animal
kingdom, we find the compleateſt ſchool of art
and induftry, conducted by fuch as are born
mafters; we there fee inventions proceeding
from the profoundeſt knowledge of nature and
the ſciences, and employed to the public benefit
of every fpecies. Their domeftic economy dif-
covers rules, methods, regulations, and laws in-
ſtituted according to the conftitution and cir-
cumſtances of every kind, and beneficial both
to individuals and the whole fpecies. Now, if
there can be no addrefs, knowledge, and fkill,
with-
218
NATURAL RELIGION
without intelligence or defign, all this can never
be attributed to the irrational creatures them-
felves. In them is difplayed an infinite Under-
ftanding, which is the fource of all poffible
ſcience and invention, and has contrived means
for implanting in the blind nature of every ani-
mal fuch a portion of thofe endowments as was
neceffary. In thefe inftances alfo appears an
unfathomable Wiſdom which hath, in the moſt
commodious manner, regulated, not only the
corporeal world with regard to the conftitution
of brutes, and every part of their bodies agree-
ably to the difpofition of their fouls, but alſo the
extent and laws of their faculties according to
the determined mode of life peculiar to every
fpecies of animals. Here is likewiſe diſplayed
an eternal Providence, which has by an innate
fagacity fo far limited the
powers of every fpe-
cies, that it is thereby maintained in the deter-
mined proportion. Theſe things likewife ex-
hibit to us an univerfal Goodneſs, which makes
the exiſtence of all poffible living creatures, and
all poffible complacency and happineſs, the gra-
cious end it had in view, and has carried it into ex-
ecution in thoſe which are of the more imperfect
kind, by the blind impulfes of nature, as the
moft fimple and fitteft means for accompliſhing
that end. This furvey of the animal kingdom
will adminifter much pleaſure and advantage to
the human mind: Inexhaustible in its diverfity,
and abounding in new proofs of infinite Wiſdom
and Goodneſs that fuperintend all Nature; it
teaches us to know God, the world, and our-
felves
Defended and Illuftrated.
211
felves better, and to employ fuch knowledge
towards the promoting of our happineſs.
Others may, for a time, imagine that they
know fomething of Nature, without having any
regard to the wife ends propoſed by the Creator
with regard to animate Beings, which they re-
ject as a chimera. But certainly, the iffue of
fuch knowledge will be nothing but error and
delufion; at leaft, it will not be at all conducive
to their inward tranquility or happineſs. More-
over, thoſe gentlemen who exerciſe their talents
in ridiculing * any diſcoveries of the Divine won-
ders in the animal kingdom, for the most part,
only betray the laſt ſhift of a defpairing atheiſm.
And though they may pretend to account for
the ſtructure of the material world in a mecha-
nical way; yet the inftinct, fagacity, and various
arts of brutes throws them into confufion and
aſtoniſhment. On this account, as it coïn-
cides with my defign, I prefume I ſhall be the
more readily excufed for entering on a concife
difcuffion of the principal points relating to the
inſtinct of brutes, which fo much abounds with
inſtruction; and yet has not hitherto been ſuffi-
ciently explained, according to the importance
of the ſubject.
SECTION V.
Though it may be fuppofed, a complete dif-
covery has not yet been made of all the fpecies
* La Mettrie l'Homme Pl. Ch. III. Buffon, Vol. II. L. II. p. 42.
+ Vid. La Metric Traité de l'ame, coap. XI. fect. 2 likewile
in his L'Homme Plante, towards the conclufion; and Maupertuis's
Venus Phyfique.
of
220 NATURAL RELIGION
;
of animals living on our earth; yet an exact
and indefatigable naturaliſt * reckons a hundred
and fifty fpecies of known quadrupeds, at the
fame time including all the fubdivifions of
claffes in one ſpecies; otherwife, there muſt be,
at leaft, a thouſand forts. He alſo enumerates
five hundred fpecies of birds, and as many of
fiſhes and if the teftaceous kind be included,
they amount to above three thoufand. The
feveral ſpecies of infects, according to the fame
author, exceed twenty thousand. Theſe, with
regard to individuals, are fome more, and fome
leſs numerous and prolific; and yet every ſpe
cies continues in a certain determinate propor-
tion to others; and ever fince the world has
exifted, no one fpecies has ever been driven
from the climate to which it is adapted, or
been extirpated by the prevailing fuperiority
of any other ſpecies; but they all retain their
proper number, difference, and perfection.
Thus the water, the air, the furface, and even
the bowels, of the earth; all places fwarm
with creatures that have life; and not one
fpot, that is convenient for their ſubſiſtence,
is found, which is not filled with its proper
fpecies of animals.
Not to mention, that the regularity of the
univerſe contributes to the life and fupport of
thefe various fpecies of animals, and that the
motory powers, throughout all nature, are in
action for this end; every one plainly fees that,
befides the preparative elements of earth, water,
Ray, in his "Wiſdom of God in the Works of the Creation."
air,
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
221
}
1
air, light, and heat, there muſt be a ſufficient
provifion of daily food for fo many millions of
mouths; and this muſt be ſuited to fuch a di-
verfity of taftes and modes of living, that either
their palates, &c. muſt be formed according to
the food, in order to render the aliment palatable
and wholſome, or the food according to the
taſte. Thus, it is not every fize and ſhape which
would fuit every animal; and, on this account,
what an amazing diſtance is there between a
whale and the ſmalleft hand-worm or mite!
We likewiſe ſee a ftupendous diverfity in the
external figure and formation of the organs of
life, of the fenfes, of motion, and propagation!
But every thing, as well in general as particular,
combines in every animal with its peculiar mode
of living. Give to one the fize, ſhape, and
organs of another fpecies, and it will not be
able to live in its ufual manner; but muſt periſh,
or at leaſt be a burthen to itſelf. Therefore,
whenever, even in certain organs of which they
all ſtand in need, a general fimilarity of form
be requifite; yet, in this very ſimilarity of form,
there is an infinite diverfity according to the na-
ture of every creature: For inftance, moft ani-
mals have eyes for vifion; but the eye of no
one fpecies is perfectly like that of another; nor
would the ftructure of the eye of one animal be
of any uſe to thoſe of another fpecies. The
like may be faid of the tegument of the body,
the noſe, mouth, ftomach, and other parts.
Thefe differences of the ftructure of the body
in the ſeveral ſpecies of animals, which furpafles
all
}
222
NATURAL RELIGION
all human fagacity and underſtanding; and this
fo accurate combination both of univerfal na-
ture, and of all and every particular part of
animal bodies, with the determinate modes of
living of every fpecies, powerfully and manifeftly
fhew, that to introduce all modes of life, of
delight and happinefs, as far as could comport
with our earth, was the Creator's defign; and
that, according to this moft benign end which
he had in view, he has, 'with infinite wiſdom
and power, executed his plan in the creation.
All theſe corporeal combinations in brutes would,
however, have been vain and ufelefs, had not
God alfo implanted in their fouls an innate
fagacity or inftinct, with certain contrivances and
arts, neceffary to their fupport and propagation.
The end which the Deity had in view in theſe,
together with his wifdom and goodneſs, is what
I now propofe to enlarge upon.
SECTION VI.
Mankind univerfally, in their own opinion at
leaſt, but not at all in reality, endeavour to pur-
fue their own good, though they often mif-
take the means conducible to that end. They
have, among feveral valuable arts and fciences,
which contribute to their neceffity and per-
fection, their conveniency and eafe, at the fame
time invented many frivolous, unneceffary,
and even pernicious arts; and a great part of
the world give themfelves no manner of con-
cern about learning any thing, or acquit them-
felves
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
223
•
felves but aukwardly even in the art which they
have choſen for their employment. On the con-
trary, brutes, which act by inſtinct, do nothing
in vain, nothing improperly or unfkilfully; they
always go the right way to work, and, inſtead
of practifing any frivolous or pernicious art,
every thing they do is indifpenfibly neceſſary to
the ſupport and well-being of themſelves or their
offspring; and every thing among them is per-
fect in its kind: Their contrivances or arts are
as various as the fpecies of animals; and yet
not a fingle animal, of any ſpecies, is ignorant
of, or averfe to, its occupation; and every in-
dividual, of every fpecies, is born an artiſt.
In order to give fome idea of the manifold
utility of inſtinct in brutes, I ſhall only mention
fome few of them. Every animal knows its
own element, and fpontaneously betakes itſelf
thither, even though it be brought forth in an
element that is foreign to it. Every creature
immediately knows how to move itſelf regularly
and alertly, according to the nature of its ele-
ment and the ſtructure of its body; and this
motion is performed a thouſand ways. Brutes
know, in general, all their organs and members,
with their feveral ufes, and the manner of ex-
erting them. They all, at firft fight, know the
food that agrees with them, and diftinguish it
from that which is noxious; and it has even been
obferved that fome animals, when fick or hurt,
immediately repair to an effectual remedy. If
their aliment be not immediately before their
eyes, they have faculties and inftruments for
coming
1
224 NATURAL RELIGION
Į
way
4
Coming at it; for hunting their prey, by ſwift-
neſs, or even for furprifing their enemy by a
thouſand ſtratagems. If their food requires fome
preparation, all animals, according to their feve-
ral ſpecies, go about it with great ſkill. If it is
to be laid up in ftore, they make granaries,
drawing and carrying in the food divers ways,
but all at the right feafon, before winter fets in;
they likewiſe preſerve it from receiving any da-
mage, and make uſe of it with an extraordinary
frugality. Others emigrate to foreign and far
diftant countries in queft of their food, and find
the thither without chart, map, or compaſs.
Others, who can live all the winter without
food, bury themſelves in the earth, where they
fleep for fix months; or for the fame purpoſe
plunge themſelves to the bottom of lakes, &c.
If to fome animals, befides food, a dwelling be
neceffary, this they can provide without learning
architecture; every one either digs, bores, builds,
fpins, or hews itſelf a convenient manfion on
one conftant uniform plan, which is impreffed
on its mind. When their ſkin or ſhell confines
them too much, their ingenuity, in diveſting
themſelves of their former garment, is amazing.
If, às fometimes is the cafe, there muſt be not
only a change of apparel, but of their whole
form, they previously withdraw from the light,
and out of reach of their enemies, and with won-
derful art and forefight bury or fufpend them-
felves in fome fecret place of ſafety, or ſpin for
themſelves a covering out of their own bowels:
And no lefs fkilful and dextrous are they in
opening
}
Defended and Illustrated.
225
opening their grave or prifon, and detaching
themſelves from it without the leaſt injury to
their delicate and new-formed members.
If ſome ſpecies of brutes have enemies, they
know with what weapons Nature has furniſhed
them, and attempt to defend themſelves with
them, even before thoſe weapons are become fit
for uſe; or by their celerity and cunning they
eſcape the enemy; fo that one fpecies of ani-
mals keeps the other in a due Equilibrium, and
none of them are deſtroyed, but fuch as are
ſuperfluous in that ſpecies.
If folitude be not convenient for fome fpecies
of animals, they herd together; they under-
ſtand one another by a kind of language; they
follow a king, a leader, or a queen; they build
in a common receptacle after one and the fame
plan. Whatever is neceffary to the common good,
they all join in collecting; they hatch and feed
their young indifcriminately; they defend them-
felves with united ſtrength, carry away the dead ;
and every member of the commonwealth pre-
ciſely regulates his conduct by wife and unalter-
able laws. When the time of coupling is come,
every one knows its fpecies, and the method of
propagating it, and underſtands the voice of its
mate. When a neft is to be prepared for their
offspring, they take care that it be done in a
proper time, and build it in a ſecure commodious
place; and in this article they exhibit an admi-
rable ſkill. They cheriſh and defend their young;
they likewife feed or fuckle, and wean them;
or, if the young are immediately able to fhift
Q
for
}
226 NATURAL RELIGION
}
for themſelves, they only depofit their eggs in a
place where the heat may hatch them; and the
brood, as foon as they are hatched, go in queft
of proper food. Their eggs they either lay
fcattered fingly, or in a heap, accordingly as the
young are adapted for fociety or otherwife; and
if in their ufual abode the young cannot con-
veniently be brought forth, they make long
journies or voyages in order to find a proper
place to eject their fpawn, or eggs, or to dif
charge themſelves of their fœtus.
SECTION VII.
That all theſe procedures are neceffary to
the ſupport of individuals and the whole fpe-
cies, ftands in need of no proof; but whoever
requires further conviction need only diſturb
the animals at their work, or make any al-
teration in it, and then he will fee that they
either periſh, become deformed and maimed, or
are not able to propagate their fpecies *. If any
one would undertake to invent a better diſpo-
fition for every animal, and fummon up all his
knowledge and capacity to affift him in this
noble plan, he would find all his labour loft,
and confequently would only expofe his igno-
rance, unſkilfulneſs, and prefumption.
Were theſe only fuch operations as neceffarily
arofe from the bare conſtruction of their body
and members, according to the reveries of a
* Sce M. Roefel's account of Night-Birds, Clafs II. N. I.,
Sect. 6. Beetles, Clafs I. Se&t. 6. Ibid. Clafs II. Sect. 6.
Descartes
Defended and Illustrated.
227
X
;
Defcartes or a materialiſt; yet, without fup-
pofing an artiſt, who perfectly knew the in-
ternal nature of things, and previouſly ſaw the
conformity of them; who had accurately mea-
fured their mutual relation, correfpondence, and
perfection, and whofe will it was to bring into
real exiſtence the different perfection of things
which were in his ideas, and who was poffeffed
of a thouſand inventions to accomplish this by
many ſecret ſprings; without fuppofing all this,
I fay, we never could comprehend fuch com-
plicated machines, nor the curious conſtructions,
and manifold ufes of them. A mere machine
which is fometimes at reft, fometimes moving,
creeping, flying, leaping, fwimming, and this by
no means at random, but in every part of the
world, and in every age, according to the dis
rection, ſwiftneſs and change of motion neceffary
to avoid evil, and acquire good; which eats
and drinks what is agreeable to its nature, and
as much and no more than it can digeft; which
at one time fpins, weaves, digs, builds, or col-
lects his ftore, at the feafon and in the manner
requifite to its fupport, according to the niceft
rules of art; at another time, couples, generates,
breeds, and produces other machines; fuch a
machine, I fay, were fuch a thing poffible,
could by no means have the grounds of its ex-
iftence and contexture in itſelf, but muft have
been produced for a determined end, by an in-
finite Artiſt, who had the whole univerfe, and
its various connections, prefent to his mind at
once.
"
1
Eut
1
228
NATURAL RELIGION
4
+
But this is not the cafe with animals; they
are far from being mere machines. A machine
can be only made for the fake of animate Be-
ings, and a mechanical body is defigned only
for a foul. In the fame manner, the mere body,
if brutes have not a foul, contains no fufficient
mechanical cauſe in itſelf for fuch a fucceffion of
´actions, without a previous or intermediate intent
of the foul determining thofe actions; there be-
ing in their bodies a thouſand different motions
in a thouſand different fucceffions, without any
neceffity that the one fhould follow the other.
Such a definite motion follows fo readily, at
fuch a time, in fuch a place, in a proper man-
ner, and contributing to the welfare of the crea-
this cannot but be an action of their foul
confequential to its fore-thought and defign.
ture
SECTION VIII.
A
Now, fuppofing that the body acts on the
foul of brutes by mechanical experiences; yet
this alone affords no fatisfactory explanation of
their inftinct. I grant, that like the human
fpecies, they are incited to action by mechanical
fenfations; and farther, that in certain cafes
their imagination and memory are put in action
by fuch a bodily impreffion. This corporeal
impulfe, however, can only direct them to pur-
fue pleaſure, or avoid pain; but this cannot
excite the foul to the modes of action, dexterity,
and ſkill in queftion, nor produce fuch actions
as are not founded on former experience.
Of
"
鼻
​1
•
Defended and Illuftrated.
229
Of the firft, we fee a proof in the filk-worm
which, on the approach of its metamorphofis,
fpins a coque, and involves itſelf in it. Now,
if it ſhould be ſaid that the ſubſtance, being
ripened into filk, cauſes a diſagreeable ſenſation
in the infect, which being, as it were, encum-
bered, feeks to diveft itſelf of it. I answer, that
this does not entirely agree with the actions
of the animal, fince it does not wind or writhe
itſelf as if it was in pain or uneafy; but it creeps
very flowly and cautiouſly to feek out a proper
place; and ſpins its coque in the form of a
cone, as it were from a determined defign or
plan. What incites the ſpider to fpin his web
in a circular pendent net round the radii which
are drawn from a centre? Can a mere fenfation
prompt birds to place or hang on a tree a neft
made of hair, and ſmall ſticks; or induce others
to build them with mud, clay and ftubble, and
affix them to a wall? What mechanical im-
pulſe makes the bees not only collect the honey
from the flowers for their food, but alfo take
away with it the farina of the flowers for
wax, and to fhove it from one leg to the other
till they lodge it in the hinder part of their
body, and then to form it in the hive into re-
gular hexagons as refervoirs for the honey;
not to mention a thouſand other fuch things *?
There muſt certainly be in their fouls a concep-
tion
* Certainly no part of Nature fhews greater appearances of a
Superior Direction than the Bees, which not only form their fex-
angular cells in the most regular and juft dimenfions, but go
about it as if they were well verfed in the fublime parts of
Q3
geometry
'
1
230
NATURAL RELIGION
tion or idea, as a model and plan of the work and
action of every individual, which muſt be coëval
with them. But farther, the endeavours of the
foul to imitate fuch a model muft, immediately
at their birth, be accompanied with all the per-
fection of dexterity to execute it; on the con-
trary, when men firſt come into the world, they
have very few or no ideas, and have no ſkill
or ability to put any plan in execution, but ac-
quire them by invention and exerciſe; whereas
the fouls of brutes are immediately, at the begin-
ning of their exiftence, created in that ftate,
to which ours attain only by repeated trials and
long practice.
SECTION IX.
But fecondly, I will venture to affert that the
mere organical fenfation, even joined to memory
and imagination, does not fatisfactorily account
for the inftinct of animals, fince what they en-
deavour to execute, or to acquire, does not de-
pend on prefent or paft experience; they are
bufied in the acquifition of a future good, with-
out any prefent or paſt experience of it. Thus,
neither the actions about which they are occu-
pied, their fkill and aptitude, nor even the good
refulting from it, have any affinity with the
fenfation of the prefent or mechanical repre-
geometry and fluxions. See M' Laurin in Philof. Tranſactions,
N° 471, and M. Koenig's Hift. de l'Acad. des Sciences, p. 40.
See alfo Reaumur and Maraldi in the Memoires de l'Academie,
P. 495.
A
fentations
Defended and Illuftrated.
231
ſentations of paft experience; nor does the in-
ftinct of animals fimply and folcly arife from the
impreffion which the body makes on the foul.
A ſpider is no, fooner out of the egg, than it
begins to fpin a web, which it had never feen,
or learned, or made before, and without the
leaſt experimental knowledge that there are flies
and gnats in the world for its aliment, and
which may be taken in that flight and delicate
tiffué. The like may be obferved of many
other inſtincts, as the laying up food for winter
in ſtore-houſes ready prepared; the hazardous
emigration of birds to remote countries; the
long voyages of fea-fiſh to diſcharge their ſpawn,
&c. All this, is a fpontaneous faculty of their
fouls, by which they perform an action of
which neither the plan, nor their skill in exe-
cuting, is connected with their preſent or paſt
experience; not to mention the impoffibility of
their knowing from experience the benefits ac-
cruing from thofe operations.
Hence it is alfo evident, that brutes daily.
perform what they have neither learned from
pattern, imitation, or inftruction, nor gradually
brought to perfection by many trials and long
practice. What model, for inftance, has the
young ſpider for the texture of its web? What
pattern lies before the filk-worm for ſpinning
its coque? yet, of themſelves, they perform
every thing exactly as their parent-animals did
before them. A bird, indeed, is hatched and
grows up in a neft; but was not prefent at the
conftruction of it, nor troubles itſelf about it,
Q4
all
232
NATURAL RELIGION
}
all its concern being for food and warmth,
Whenever it is able to uſe its wings and ſhift
for itſelf, it quits the neft; and fometimes, in-
deed, his very parents drive him out: however,
afterwards, when its time comes to pair with
its mate, it can build a neſt, exactly like that
in which it was hatched, as if it had frequently
obferved the conftruction of it, and had long
been employed in imitating the model fet before
it. What inftruction, what ſchool, what method
of teaching could enable animals, immediately,
without any previous trials, to conſtruct fuch
mafter-pieces of art? The filk-worm, and many
other creatures, which fpin and build the moſt
frequently, as fpiders, &c. make no gradual im-
provements, but the fame skill and delicacy are
feen in their firſt effay, as in all their ſucceeding
performances..
SECTION X.
Thus it appears that neither the bodies of
animals, their mechanical impreffion on their
fouls, nor their organical conceptions, the power
of fancy and memory, nor, in a word, their
outward experience, afford us any fatisfactory
cauſe of the inftinct or fagacity of brutes. It is
not impreffed on them from without, nor is it
improved in a mechanical manner; but thofe
wonderful faculties refide in fome inward, na-
tural quality of the foul: yet, even in that, we
fhall not be able to trace the primary and fuffi-
cient cauſe or reafon of ſuch prudent and skil-
ful
Defended and Illuftrated.
233
ful operations. Reaſon, confideration, reflection,
addreſs, invention, and every other requifite for
excelling in the human arts, cannot be aſcribed
to brutes; fo that their skill cannot be derived
from any of thoſe fources: For if we ſuppoſe
that brutes have found out, by their natural faga-
city, what is neceffary and beneficial to them, it
would indicate in them a much more perfect un-
derſtanding than in the human fpecies; the latter
having, for fo many thousand years, been la-
bouring with united ſtrength in the invention of
their arts, which have been but flowly brought
to the preſent degree of perfection; and yet we
cannot be faid to execute what is neceffary for
our ſtation in fo perfect a manner as every
animal, in its way, does immediately after its
birth. But where is the man who would pre-
fume of himſelf, without any inftruction or
pattern, to contrive and execute every thing that
he uſes or defires, and to bring it immediately
to its higheſt perfection? yet this is no more
than we fee daily performed by brutes. How
much fuperior therefore would the underſtand-
ing of brutes be to that of men, if they owed
their arts fimply to their own invention! but to
fay this, would be abfurd, and contradictory to
all our experience concerning irrational creatures.
To men, and I believe, to all living beings,
whofe reafon is limited, the invention of any
thing, without fome experience in the things
actually exiſting, is abfolutely impoffible; fince
this pre-fuppofes an understanding which is the
first fource of all poffible and real exiftence.
Thus
234
NATU
ATURAL RELIGION
}
Thus on examining all human arts and inven-
tions, we ſhall find that they are grounded on
fomething previouſly known; and on the con-
trary; from nothing, nothing can be conceived
or invented: Therefore reafon does not pro-
mote invention, previous to experience; but we
proceed from what we know to diſcover what
is unknown; that is, we diſcover it from what
our fenfes have firft informed us to be real and
feaſible.
Farther, whatever, in any Being, is founded
on its own experience, would, as in human in-
ventions, differ according to the capacity and
circumſtances of every individual. But the birds
build their nefts at this time, in the fame man-
ner as they did at the creation of the world;
and the laws and cuſtoms of the bee-hive in
Europe do not differ from thofe obferved by the
bees in Afia. Thus, among animals, there is
no improvement or decay of arts. The archi-
tecture of beavers has not been brought to any
greater perfection with the increaſing age of the
world; nor was it rude in its firft infancy. All
the faculties of all and every fpecies of animals,
have, from the firft exiftence of the world, and
time immemorial, been as perfect as was poflible
and neceffary for their well-being. The modern
brutes have no advantages over the more an-
cient; and, on the other hand, no ignorance,
floth, or falſe taſte, hath crept in among them.
Hence, all and every fpecies of them are, bý
their nature, adapted to what is neceffary to
:
their
才
​Defended and Illuftrated.
235
L
their ſupport and welfare, and are alfo limited
to certain immutable degrees of perfection.
Now, as the faculties of animals, by which
they difplay fuch ſkill and prudence for the
good of themſelves and their fpecies, are chiefly
to be afcribed to their fouls, and are not acquired
by any mechanical experience, model, inftruc-
tion, or practice; nor invented by reflection,
reaſon, and fagacity; it neceffarily follows, that
it is an effential innate property of the foul, by
which, on their entrance into life, without any
reflection or pains, they blindly, or with very
obfcure conceptions, act with unerring regu-
larity.
The human fpecies has few or no fuch in-
nate faculties, unleſs the fucking of children be
reckoned among them; yet by our acquired
skill in arts, we know that this could by no
means take place without confideration and a
determination of the foul. This acquired ſtate
of perfection of the human foul, in which it is
now accompanied with neceffary powers and
skill, is no more than that in which the fouls
of brutes are created at their primary exiſtence.
And this was abfolutely neceffary to the ſupport
of themſelves and of their fpecies; for if they
had been to learn their neceffary arts by ex-
periments, obſervations, inftruction, and practice,
or to have invented them by reflection, they
muſt inevitably have perished before they could
have attained to fuch a ftate by dint of their
own abilities: Befides, the life of many animals
is fo fhort as not to admit of much experience;
ご
​not
1
236
NATURAL RELIGION
J
not to ſay that the fcantineſs of their mental
powers would, without reafon, be utterly in-
capable, during the whole courfe of their life,
either of inventing or learning fuch arts and
faculties.
SECTION XI.
Whether, therefore, we confider the inſtinct,
skill, and parts of brutes, with regard to the laws
of the bodies, or of the fouls of animals; in both
cafes it is évident that they muſt be derived
from an infinite intelligence, as their primary
cauſe For if animals were nothing but ma-
chines, as Defcartes and other materialifts pre-
tend, yet the origin of their exiftence and qua-
lities could not be faid to be in themſelves;
on the contrary, they hold it from an artist who
has formed them for the fake of fome other
Being, or with a certain defign; and ſuch an
artist who, having the cleareſt knowledge of
the conformity of all things, has antecedently
fore-feen what actions every machine was to
perform at every time and in every place in the
world, for the fupport of its life, and prefervation
of its fpecies; but if brutes be confidered, as
living fouls, connected with a mechanical body
by an actual influence, it is manifeft that if
their arts and contrivances are not the effect of
experience, or of their own invention exclufive
of experience, then they must be derived from
an intelligence which has no occafion for ex-
perience or invention, but is the original ſource
of
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
237
of all poffibility, of all truth, of all knowledge,
of all skill, and of all perfection, who has
ſelected the moſt advantageous arts for the na-
ture and manner of living of every animal.
No leſs manifeft is it, that this infinite intellect
´employed all the defign, wiſdom, goodneſs, and
forefight, requifite for the fupport, welfare, and
happineſs of every animal, that, in the more
imperfect ſpecies of all poffible living creatures,
the want of the fublime faculty of reafon might
be no obstruction to their exiſtence and wel-
fare. Brutes, in this particular, are effentially
different from men, namely, that all which
they have in common with us, are organs of
fenfe, imagination, and memory, without any
fhare of reaſon, or the benefits emaning from it.
As they want reflection and fpeech, they can-
not, from their very obfcure conceptions of
things, form any abſtract ideas or general truths;
inveſtigate any arts, fciences or duties; nor com-
municate them to others. Had only the in-
ferior powers and faculties of the foul been be-
ftowed on them, they muft, by the want of all
experience, inftruction, and reflection, have pe-
rifhed at their birth. They would not have
known the uſe of their organs and limbs; they
would have been ignorant of their element;
they could not have been able to diſtinguiſh
their food, nor to feek, collect, prepare, and
lay it up in ſtore. They could not have wove
their teguments, nor changed them; they would
not have built dwellings, catched their prey,
defended themſelves from their enemies, and
I
pro-
23·8 NATURAL RELIGION
propagated their fpecies; they would have want
ed both ability and inclination to provide a con
venient receptacle for their brood, to fuckle
their young, and to feed and bring them up.
But from this calamitous impotence the gra-
cious Providence God has, by methods of
amazing wiſdom, freed the brutes; fince, if I
may be allowed the expreffion, He in his per-
fect wiſdom has thought and cared for them,
finding out what it behoved every ſpecies to do.
He has, in all animals, without any contrivance
or practice of their own, implanted an incom-
parable ſkill, as an hereditary property; fo that,
with their blind powers, they act with all the
prudence and ſkill that could have been im-
parted to them by any finite underſtanding.
Thus he, who does not difcover in the skill
and arts of irrational creatures a fuperior under-
ſtanding, defign, and wifdom, that not only
greatly furpaffes all the faculties of brutes, but
all human ingenuity and knowledge, muſt be
quite ignorant of the nature of animals; and
if he is not deftitute of underſtanding, he muft,
at leaſt, have ſubſtituted his paffions in the place
of his reaſon, if he does not attribute them
folely to the infinitely-wife and gracious Author
of Nature.
SECTION XII.
But M. Buffon, as he will not allow that.
Divinity ſhould have any thing to do with Na-
tural Hiſtory, pretends to know a more concife
and
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
239
and better method of accounting for the in-
ſtinct of brutes, and makes a jeſt of admiring
the wisdom and goodness of God in fuch things;
which, he ſays, are much eaſier to be difcovered
and illuſtrated by arguments *. It is but equi-
table that we fhould hear how he attempts to
eſtabliſh fuch an opinion.
He pretty nearly reſembles Deſcartes in his
method of explaining the difpofitions and actions
of animals by a mechanical rote; ſo that he fets
the foul entirely afide, and attributes all their
actions, &c. to certain vibrations of the organs,
and the inward texture of the brain.
He fays,
that on fuch a working and counter-working
of the brain and nerves, fuch a motion muſt
neceffarily enſue in the animal, which cor-
refponds with the nature of the creature, and
the external impreffion. Thus, he deprives ani-
mals not only of a foul, underſtanding and
will, reflection and reafoning, ingenuity and
invention; but alfo of ideas, imagination and
memory; as if he would account for every
thing only from the laws of motion in the
parts of the animal body. However, he foon
drops this mechanical hypothefis, and departs
from Deſcartes; affirming, that the bare vibra-
tions of the organs and the brain, without a
foul, is an effential perception, partly external,
and partly internal; and thus allows animals a
conſciouſneſs of their prefent ftate, dreams, ex-
perience, imitation, pleaſure and pain, inclina-
* See Buffon, vol. II. art. 2. in his Difcourfe of the Nature
of Animals.
tion
240 NATURAL RELIGION
tion and averfion. Indeed, he is of opinion,
that, even in the human fpecies, the foul is not
at all concerned in dreams, and the animat
functions. This fuppofition may, probably, ap-
pear to fome very arbitrary, and at the fame
time, fomething incongruous. It affords a large
field for remarks; but we fhall not here dwell
on it, as every one muft fee that an expla-
nation of the inftinct of brutes, founded on fuch
a principle, is neither truly mechanical, nor
mental, but muft halt between both.
?
His account of the waxen ftructures of the
bees, their œconomy, &c. is contrary to experi-
ence and the most accurate obfervations of thoſe
eminent naturalifts Swammerdam and Reau-
mur; and confequently, that part of his natural
hiſtory is a mere fiction, being quite irreconciles
able with every circumftance relating to thofe
animals, and known from experience. It is
manifeftly falſe that the inftinct of brutes is
originated in this manner; the aptitude and
skill of their fouls being innate to them, ex-
clufive of, and previous to, any experience or
patterns, as I have already fhewn. M. Buffon
feeks, in general, to clear himſelf of difficulties:
he not only deduces from fenfation a defire of
good, but even a difpofition to the moſt proper
conduct to obtain it. But theſe are quite dif-
ferent things; for it is one thing to have a
mechanical defire of good, and a mechanical
averfion to evil; and another thing to know
and readily make ufe of the best means for
obtaining the former, and averting the latter:
This,
เ
+
་་
Y
Defended and Illuftrated.
241
This, by no means, refides in a defire merely
mechanical.
;
Now, fuppofing, but not granting, that the
aptitudes and inftinct of animals were to be
accounted, for from the mere mechanical tex-
ture and diſpoſition of their bodies; yet it would
ftill be a certain truth, that this fo fimple me-
chanical texture, by the different make of the
organs of the fenfes, and texture of the brain,
in fo many thouſands of individuals and ſpecies
of animals, is adapted to the welfare and fup-
port of every individual, and of every ſpecies
and produces fuch innumerable skilful perfor-
mances and works of art, as human ingenuity
with all the affiftance of geometry, architecture,
mechanics, and other branches of the mathe-
matics, could not exhibit, nor even be able to
explain them. Is the Artist who conftructed
fuch machines therefore, the lefs to be admired
for his wiſdom and goodneſs in providing fuch
manifold benefits to living creatures by means
merely mechanical, and determinate laws of
motion? M. Buffon, however, according to his
own confeffion, looks on the Creator as a wife
and exalted Being; fince he regulates the ex-
iftence of things, and eſtabliſhes nature on per-
manent and immutable laws. But we have a
much more exalted idea of God, as we fuppofe
that he not only regulates inanimate things, but
likewife provides for the fubfiftence of fo many
millions of living creatures, and, by fixed and
invariable laws, produces fuch a rich variety of
benefits, delight, and happiness. If M. Buffon's
R
con-
+
242
NATURAL RELIGION
羹
​⭑
confeffion be ingenuous, which I will by no
means queftion, he muft not, like Epicurus,
banish God into the Intermundia or empyreal
heaven, but endeavour to difcern him where he
fhews himſelf near at hand, and in the most
clear and palpable manner.
SECTION XIII.
Let us then furvey the different inftincts of
brutes with this view; and the first thing wor-
thy of notice in animals is, their variety of
Motion; for our own experience teaches us,
that fomething more is required for it than
ftrength, and found flexible limbs. It is by
repeated trials, and after many falls, that we
learn to balance our bodies in equilibrio; to
diftinguiſh height and depth, land and water;
and yet, from the make of our bodies, theſe
motions are much more fimple and eafy to the
human ſpecies than to brutes. The birds, in-
deed, as well as men, have only two legs, but
then their body, inftead of ſtanding erect on
them, projects before and behind: Notwith-
ftanding this, a chicken is no fooner out of the
egg than it stands and runs without any need
of a fupport or guide; and ducklings hatched
by a hen know their element, and, without any
inſtruction, row their bodies through the water;
and when their feathers are not fufficiently oiled
to ward off the wet, they know an immediate
refource by preffing an oily juice with their bill
from a gland on their rump, and then drawing
2
their
Defended and Illustrated.
243
7
Other birds,
their feathers through the bill *.
immediately foar into the air from a high-built
neft, and, without dizzineſs, balance themfelves,
move their wings with equal ftrokes, turn about
by extending their legs and ſpreading their tails,
and, without any compafs, perform long jour-
neys or voyages in queſt of food, &c.
Had man more than two feet, it would
only put him to a lofs which he was to lift up
firft, and which next; whereas a colt is no
fooner brought forth, but he ftands on four
legs; in walking or trotting he moves his feet
crofs-wife, fo that the body's line of direction
always falls between determinate fupports on
each fide; when he gallops, he alternately fets
down the two hind feet, and then the two fore
feet, at once. But all quadrupeds, when in the
water, naturally perform the proper motions for
buoying themſelves up, and fwimming.
Some quadrupeds, as monkies, for inftance,
not only climb and leap, but dart themſelves
through the air from one tree to another for a
confiderable diſtance. There are other qua-
drupeds, as flying dogs, cats, fquirrels, lizards,
&c. which, to enable them to take fuch leaps
from one tree to another, are furnished with a
membrane, reaching from the fore feet to the hind
feet; and this they expand, moving it as wings;
fo that between leaping and flying, they reach
fuch trees as they moft delight in, at the dif-
* Derham's Phyfico-Theology, Book VII. Chap I. Spectacle
de la Nature, Tom. I. p. 281. Willough's Ornithologia, Lib. 1.
Swammerdam, Tom. I.
R 2
tance
}
244 NATURAL RELIGION
tance of forty or fifty paces. * The common
fquirrel, without any fuch wings, is not at a
lofs for paffing over any water; its ferry on theſe
occafions, for which he always chufes a calm, is
a thin piece of wood, and feating itſelf on its
little float, by the motion of its tail both ſteers
and rows itſelf to the place where it intended to
land. Every animal is acquainted with the
advantageous uſe of its limbs and organs; but
what fhall we fay of the wild goats and chamois,
who eafily climb to the tops of the moſt craggy
rocks, and then leap from the lofty fummit of
one to another. Who has taught theſe animals
to meaſure the diftances with their eye, that
they may not leap too fhort, or too far? Whe
has inftructed them to throw themſelves back-
wards with a ſwing that feems unnatural, and
to preſerve the balance of their bodies in fuch
amazing leaps? Who infpired them with fuch
intrepidity as to fear no depth or fall, who im-
mediately, at the beginning of their exiſtence,
to rely for ſafety on an art which they never
practiſed before ‡?
SECTION XIV.
As for infects with fix or more feet, and
others which are without any feet, I fhall men-
tion but few inftances: Not that I count them
to be lefs admirable than other animals, it
* Alb. Seba, Tom. I. Tab. C.
+ See Klein's Hift. Nat. Quadrupedum.
Ibid. p. 16. & feq.
‡
being
Defended and Illuftrated.
245
>
being my opinion, that Swammerdam, Reaumur,
and Roefel, ſpent their time in a much more
ufeful and noble manner in the furvey of fuch
infects, laying open to us the hidden wonders
of Divine Wiſdom in the very ſmalleſt of living
creatures, than they who deliberately publiſh
idle romances, or immoral works;
mention other particulars, what numberleſs dif-
ferent kinds of motion is obferved in the
ſmalleſt infect?
not to
The creeping of caterpillars may feem a
trifling thing; but if we confider that they
creep perpendicularly both upwards and down-
wards, it will eafily be conceived that ſomething
more is required in that action than regularly to
plant the feet one after another, and contract
the muſcles, and then extend them. The foot
of a caterpiller has a round fole with claws
bent inwards, which may be drawn together:
Now the caterpillar, when it creeps on a leaf
or twig, at every ſtep places the fole of its foot
flat, and contracts the claws inwards till it has
faft hold; but in taking off its foot, it turns
the claws outwards that they may let go their
hold *.
Poffibly, alfo the caterpillar, befides
this way of holding itſelf faft, draws the middle
part of the fole upwards, which caufes a va-
cuum, and the foot is compreffed to the ground
by the external air; at leaft, the conftruction
of the foles of its feet feems to confirm this
opinion.
Roefel Night-Birds, Clafs I. Num. V.
R 3
I
246
NATURAL RELIGIÓN
1
I queſtion whether the red or carnation-wood
caterpillar has feet adapted for fuch a method
of faſtening itſelf; at leaſt, it makes uſe of ano-
ther invention, which enables it not only to
climb on trees, but even to creep on glass: For
with its head it faſtens a kind of filament in a
zig-zag on a tree or glafs from one fide to the
other, thus making for itſelf a kind of rope-
ladder in order to climb up. Now, as the head
is always at work before, the feet which follow,
every where meet with a thread to faften on *.
Is there lefs defign, lefs underſtanding and art
in this, becauſe it is performed by a minute in-
fect, than if a man was to do the like? or is
not the skill and fagacity diſplayed in this in-
ſtance rather the more inconceivably great, as
having been communicated to an unexperienced
and irrational foul? There are many other very
extraordinary motions obfervable in thefe fpecies
of infects. A great number of the caterpillar
fpecies, on the appearance of danger, will fud-
denly let themſelves down from a confiderable
height along a thread, or, rolling themfelves up
into a ball, drop down ſo that they cannot be
found, nor can the fall hurt the hairy or briftly
kind of caterpillars. M. Roefel, difcovered a
caterpillar, which, with a feeming deliberation,
as foon as it reached the top of any place, firſt
draws back, and then with a ſpring leaps down-
wards, and always alights on its feet.
theſe are very extraordinary motions, in which
Ibid. Clafs II. Numb. XVII,
† Ibid. Clafs II, Numb. XVI.
All
nature
Defended and Illuftrated.
247
1
'
nature has inftructed them for their preſervation.
But who has inftructed thefe flow-creeping in-
fects, immediately after their change into moths
or butterflies, to fpread out their wings, fhoot
away into the air, and fly about with as much
alacrity as if they had long practiſed it? and
what is more, Who has taught aquatic infects,
at the approach of their transformation, to climb
out of the water on a ſtraw, and, after cafting off
the ſkin with which, in their chrysalis ftate, they
were inveloped, to dart themſelves through the air
much fafter than they did before in the water?
That animals without legs or wings fhould
move with any regularity or ſpeed, would feem
fcarce credible, did we not fee it in the ferpen-
tine fpecies, only by contracting and fuddenly
extending their bodies, and by winding and
bending the feveral parts. What to us appears
ftill more extraordinary, is their darting them-
felves up into trees, their rolling themſelves up in
coils, their raifing themfelves erect and fuddenly
fpringing on their prey, and fometimes catching
even birds or fishes*. Thus a dextrous motion
in this fpecies fupplies the want of every other
apparatus. Another kind of motion is obſerved
in fnails, earth-worms, and the like, which, by
ejecting a flimy juice, make a flippery path,
and then propel themfelves forward in a finnu-
ous motion by contracting and extending their
bodies. They likewife bury themſelves in the
earth, after they have firft moistened it in the
*See Jones's Abridgement of the Philofophical Tranfactions,
Vol. V. p. 179. Catefby, Vol. II. p. 43.
R 4
fame
1
248
NATURAL RELIGION
1
fame manner, and at the fame time draw in a
leaf after them for their fubfiftence. But the
motory ſkill in land animals is of fuch an in-
exhauſtible variety, that I muſt content myſelf
with theſe few inftances, and proceed to de-
fcribe that of aquatic animals.
SECTION XV.
There are fome creatures in the water which
not only regularly fwim in that element, but
at pleaſure ſhift their abode and take their walks.
on the dry land. Others, from fwimming in
the water, will take a flight into the air; and
others again have the motions proper to all the
three elements, as the Draco Arboreus volans
Amphibius*; not to mention, for the preſent, a
multitude of amphibious infects. The very act
of fwimming is not performed by all aquatic
animals in one and the fame manner: That
a fiſh rows and fteers itſelf by the motion of its
fins and tail, and thus poifes its body without
falling on its fide, may, in fome meaſure, be
conceived from the rowing and fteering of a
boat; and poffibly, this invention may have
- taken its rife from an imitation of the fiſhes, as
thofe veffels, whofe hull refembles the body of
a fwift fiſh, are generally accounted the beſt
for failing. But it is far from being ſo eaſy to
explain how a fiſh raiſes or depreffes itſelf in
the water, to what height or depth it pleaſes,
though it continues always of the fame weight.
* Vid. Alb. Seba, Tom. I. Tab. C.
The
Defended and Illuftrated.
249
The general opinion is, that this is chiefly per-
formed by the contraction and expanfion of the
air-bladder. When the fiſh is for finking itſelf,
it contracts the bladder, and, at the fame time,
the muſcles of the belly, which compress the
air within, and thereby leffens the bulk of its
body. Now, as the fifh takes up lefs room in the
water by this contraction of the belly, it becomes
ſpecifically heavier than water, and, according
to the laws of hydroftatics, finks to the bottom;
when a fiſh is for aſcending towards the ſurface,
he gives the compreffed air its natural ſpace, by
which the body of the fiſh is enlarged ſo as to
take up more room; and its fpecific gravity
being now less than that of the water, it riſes to
the top *.
*. But whether this be the cafe, or to
whatever caufe we attribute it, as in fishes hav-
ing no bladder; yet this motion implies the
moſt exact knowledge and practice of the laws
of hydroſtatics, and the elafticity of the air.
A certain ſpecies of fhell-fiſh or fea-fnails, either
by contracting its body fo as to admit water into
its fhell, becomes heavier, and finks; and, on
the other hand, by expanding its body again,
fo as to fill its whole fhell, forces out the water
and becomes lighter, and confequently re-afcends;
or elſe by compreffing and rarifying the air in-
cloſed in its ſhell, by contracting and dilating
It is thus that an anonymous writer, and likewife Mr. Ray,
explains the motion of fifhes in a perpendicular direction, as
may be feen in Lowthorp's Abridgment of the Philofophical
Tranfactions, Tom. II. p. 845-
its
250
NATURAL RELIGION
}
1
its body, finks to the bottom, or afcends to the
furface of the water *.
When theſe fea-fnails are on the furface of
the water, fome fpecies of them turn up their
fhell fo as to make it refemble a boat; then
they extend their bodies above the furface,
round the edge of the fhell, which buoys them
up; and thus they move flowly on the water,
as other fnails do on the dry land. There is
alſo a water infect, which is no lefs adroit in
floating on its back, and rowing itſelf along
with its feet. The Nautilus puts out a mem-
brane which ferves him for fails, and throwing
out its arms on both fides, instead of oars, makes
its way on the water, by failing like a fhip.
Certain other aquatic infects propel themſelves
through the water without either wings or fins,
by ejecting the water from behind with fuch an
impetus, that the refiftance of the water without
moves them forward.
In short, there is not only an aſtoniſhing
variety in the mechanical difpofition of the
bodies of animals, but alſo a variety of me-
chanical habitudes fo implanted in the fouls of
brutes, that they ftand in no need of any pre-.
vious inftruction or invention; but they are
congenial with them; and therefore they owe
* Concerning the Nautilus fee Spectacle de la Nature, Tom. III,
p. 231. Concerning the Tortoife, fee Memoires de l'Academie
de Sciences, Tom. I. p. 414. And concerning the Sea Snails,
fee Swammerdam, Tom. I. p. 165.
+ See Swammerdam, Tom. I. p. 168.
See Roefel's Suppl. Tab. XXII.
Spectacle de la Nature, Tom. III. p. 251.
all
Defended and Illuftrated.
251
all their skill to a fuperior Intelligence, and the
over-ruling Wiſdom of their Creator. The
mechanical ſtructure of the body gives only a
poffibility of motion, as a puppet, by means of
its joints and wires, repreſents human geſtures;
or as a ſhip with oars, fails, and rudder, can be
carried to any place intended; whereas the skill
and dexterity in ufing the organs, in order to
attain any end according to the animal's choice,
does not belong to the body, but is the effect
of an underſtanding, from which all motion is
derived.
If after all the experience, all the art and
knowledge which the human foul is capable of
acquiring in this world, the organical bodies of
feveral ſpecies of animals were fucceffively pro-
pofed to it, in order to move them in any
particular element; or if fuch an animal were
placed before us that we might point out the
manner in which it ought to move; we ſhould
be convinced that, befides the
proper organs for
fuch motions, great art and knowledge are re-
quired, in compariſon of which, all the skill in
mechanics that we are mafters of, would fall
very ſhort of the end propofed. How can we
therefore explain the manner in which fuch
aptitude and skill is produced in, and impreffed
on, irrational fouls?
SECTION XVI.
As for the inftinct obferved in brutes for ac-
quiring proper food, I ſhall not, at preſent,
enter
2,52 NATURAL RELIGION
enter on proving, that every creature for that
end muſt be ſuppoſed to have tafte, fmell, fight,
a mouth, a ſtomach, entrails, and a fufficient
provifion of proper aliment in due feaſon, and
climate; and that there must be a confor-
mity between all theſe. But my deſign here,
is not merely to fhew the wisdom and deſign of
the Deity in the bodily texture of brutes, but
his immediate impreffion on the faculties and
endowments of the foul. Thus, if we pre-
fuppofe the food and the neceffary organs for
feeding of every animal, it is very eaſily con-
ceived, that every creature knows its food at
feeing it; the eyes and nofe, as it were, inti-
mating to the mouth how to gratify the defire
of the ftomach after the food that is fet be-
fore it. This, however, is far from being all
that is required; for as it is not in every ſeaſon
of the year, nor in every climate, where the
proper food is provided for them; or, if it be
in fight, perhaps it is not to be come at without
art and cunning. Addrefs and ingenuity are
farther neceffary to enable brutes to take right
meaſures, in order to come at their food.
SECTION XVII.
As for the circumftances of time and place
for procuring food, I find, by a general furvey,
four or five examples of remarkable ingenuity,
by which fome animals procure food for them-
felves and their young.
First,
Defended and Illuftrated.
253
*
1
Firft, There are fome which ftand in no need
of laying up provifions for themſelves; 'their
life beginning and concluding with the fum-
mer: but their offspring would periſh, did not
the parents take care that their young ſhould,
at the right ſeaſon, find nouriſhment ready for
them at the place where they enter into life.
Thus it is with many infects, which, within
the courſe of one year, are transformed, then
copulate, lay eggs; and fometimes, immediately
on the conclufion of this laft function, as if
they had fulfilled their deſtination in this world,
fall aſleep quite ſpent and languid. However,
before their departure, they do not depofit their
èggs at random, as if they haftened to be eaſed.
of them at any rate; but if they had their
origin in the water, they lay their eggs in that
element; or if they were originally land in-
fects, lay them on fome herb, and that not the
neareſt at hand which the butterfly has ex-
hauſted of its nutritive juice, but on that which
they have longeſt forbore, and wherewith their
brood may be plentifully nouriſhed. As this is
done in autumn, they do not lay their eggs
on leaves which are foon to fall, though they.
feed on fuch things; but on a fprig of the tree
that produces leaves proper for that fpecies.
Now, as the eggs of every fpecies are not
hatched before the leaves, on which the young
maggots fubfift, are put forth, plenty of food
is provided for thefe little animals from the firft
moment of their exiftence.
;
{
Other
254
NATURAL RELIGION
Other infects, the eruca of which feed on
ordure, wood, carrion, wool, living creatures,
or whatever it be, obferve the like œconomy;
none of them laying their eggs but where their
brood will be plentifully provided for. The
wife Creator has given particular organs to fome
infects, or inſpired them with contrivances for
inferting their eggs in the proper place; as the
gad-fly, grafhopper, &c. which with their ſting
bore or dig a hole where they know their
young will be fafe, and in no want of food.
Perhaps, fome perfons might be apt to afk,
concerning fuch minute creatures, to what pur-
poſe are theſe infects fent into the world? But
if we obſerve their wonderful inftinct and fa-
gacity, we may clearly perceive that they do
not derive their origin from blind chance
; but
that they are ſo admirably furniſhed with every
thing requifite for their fubfiftence, &c. that it
can be nothing lefs than infinite Wiſdom which
has provided for them. Vain man! fubmit
thy ignorance to the Supreme Intelligence; and
reflect that whatever has been formed by fuch
a Being, and with fo much defign, is, and
muſt be good, whether thou canft conceive it
or not. Allow exiſtence to thoſe living crea-
tures, though never fo minute; fince they de-
rive their origin from the fame bountiful hand
as thou doeft.
SECTION XVIII.
Secondly, On a furvey of thofe animals,
which fubfiſt one or more winters, when vege-
tables,
1
:
Defended and Illuftrated.
255
.
tables, proper for their food, do not grow, we
find that fome of them fall afleep at the ap-
proach of that ſeaſon, and retire to the lurking
holes which they had prepared for that pur-
pofe. But this is the refource of fuch creatures
as are able not only to endure the intenſe winter
cold, but alſo to faft for fix months. If the
winter ſurpriſed them fo, that, in the midst of
their endeavours to provide food, they were
enfeebled and benumbed with hunger and cold,
and fell down feemingly void of life; it might
be faid, that there was nothing elſe wonderful
in this, but that their bodies remained the whole
winter undecayed. But fince they have the
forefight, at the proper feafon, to prepare a
recefs for their long fleep, which is not done
without remarkable skill, this muſt be acknow-
ledged to proceed from the direction of a Su-
perior dom. Some fpecies of caterpillars,
which have ot reached their full growth before
the coming on of winter, creep into fome ſhelter
from the inclemency of the weather; and after
paffing the winter there in a ſtate of infenfibility,
on the first appearance of the leaves they iffue
out, and ſpend the remainder of their life in the
open air, and propagate their fpecies before they
die. Others weave for themſelves a moft curious
bed in fome leaf, or fecret place, or bury them-
ſelves in the earth; and there prepare a commodi-
ous winter apartment. Here, without hungering
or freezing, they brave the inclemency of win-
ter, and in the fpring, after their transformation,
appear again re-animated in the form of beau-
1
tiful
256
NATURAL RELIGION
;
tiful butterflies. Ants, flies, fpiders, fcarabæi,
fnails, frogs, lizards, and fnakes, pafs the win-
ters in the fame manner*. There are alfo not
a few fpecies of birds, which on account of
their inability of procuring food in the winter,
retire into the water, or fome cavity in the
earth, and fleep during that inclement ſeaſon.
This, at leaſt, is certainly true of the ſwallow-
kind, fome of which retire to fleep under the
earth, others into hollow cavities of old buildings.
or trees; and others again cling together by the
legs, and immerge themſelves in the water; but
all of them revive on the approach of fummer +.
There are alſo ſome quadrupeds, which, at the
cloſe of fummer, dig for themſelves a fubter-
raneous retreat, as the tortoife and Alpinę mar-
motto 1. Other quadrupeds can fhift without
food, at leaſt, a confiderable part of the winter,
lying half a fleep in their caverns, as the bear,
and badger. As for the cameleon and fala-
mander, they may, in fome meaſure, be faid
to keep a perpetual faſt.
Thus thefe, and other creatures, bear the
want of food through a particular inſtinct adapt-
ed to their nature, and founded on the wife
* See Klein's Prodromus Hift. Avium; p. 217.
† See Klein, ibid. p. 195-219, who has, by unexception-
able teftimonies, proved, beyond all doubt, that the common
fwallows do not, at the approach of winter, remove to a foreign
country, but hang in clusters on the ftems of bulrufhes in lakes;
which, bending by their weight, bury them under water.
This has been proved of the marmotto, in a very entertain-
ing manner, by the above-mentioned M. Klein, p. 233, in op-
pofition to the common erroneous opinion, that they lay up food
for winter.
fore-
1
?
1
Defended and Illustrated.
257
forefight of their Creator. They never before
experienced the winter ſeaſon; nor have they
ephemeries to acquaint them when that feafon
comes on; and yet they infallibly know their
time to retire from the world. They do not
lay up any ſtore for winter, nor feek food and
a milder air in remote countries, as fome other
animals do. This would be an unneceffary toil
to them; 'fince they are fupported during their
long fleep, as well as others that are awake.
Befides, they know nothing of want, hunger,
or cold; for no fuch painful fenfations inter-
rupt their fleep; fo that they may be ſaid to
enjoy a perpetual fummer. One thing very re-
markable is, that fuch animals being brought
into the air, and warmed, before the coming in
of the fpring, revive for a ſhort time; but the
general confequence of this is certain death foon
after: On the other hand, when fome of theſe
animals are kept the whole year in a mild air,
with plenty of food, they are as lively and active
in the winter as at any other feafon; which is
particularly obſerved of the marmottos, which
are carried about by the Swifs as a fhow.
SECTION XIX.
Thirdly, There are certain animals which build
granaries againſt winter; furniſhing themfelves
in harvest with provifion for fix months, as if
they forefaw that a winter would come on, when
they ſhould be put to their fhifts, and calcu→
lated what fort of provifion, and how much,
S
would
2
}
1
258 NATURAL RELIGION
would ferve their families for fo long a time.
Such good œconomifts, among the infects, are
bees and wafps; among quadrupeds, the mar-
motto and field-mice; and among the birds, the
pica glandaria and pica nucifraga *. Though
the animals that fleep during winter give them-
felves no concern about laying up provifion,
this latter fpecies could not fubfift without
taking care for futurity; and if they provided
only for their prefent neceffities, they would
perifh in the winter. Therefore, in the time
of plenty, they exert themfelves in providing
againſt the approaching day of diſtreſs; and
they are never found to be fhort in their reckon-
ing, or to confume their provifions too foon.
It is not to be thought, that this exact con-
duct can poffibly ariſe from any reflection in the
animals themſelves; fince this would require a
genius and knowledge far fuperior to that of
irrational Beings. Thofe creatures that have
lived but one fummer, can have no experience
of the viciffitude of ſeaſons, nor of the nature of
the inclement winter; no idea of the meaſure-
ment of time, to know when that feafon begins,
nor how long it will laft. Juft reaſoning, con-
fideration of what is to come, and invention of
the propereft means for attaining a certain end,
are not to be attributed to brutes, as they all act
in one uniform manner; but, on the contrary,
they act without defign or plan, blindly, and
almoſt like machines, yet according to the wifeft
See M. Leffer's Infecto Theologie, p. 166, and Klein's Qua-
drupedum Hift. p. 56.
rules
}
F
}
Defended and Illustrated.
259
rules of defign and forefight; and thus their
ignorance refers us to a fuperior Intelligence,
which, in their ftead, has contrived and pro-
vided for them.
•
SECTION XX.
>
A Fourth method of fupporting themſelves
is obferved in the emigrating animals, which
vifit all parts of the world in ſearch of food.
Some of theſe live not from one year to the
other; nor are they folicitous about propagat-
ing their fpecies, but during the term of their
exiſtence find food in abundance. Among theſe
may be claffed the locufts, which die in the fame
year that they are hatched *. Other creatures
of a longer life remove only on extraordinary
emergencies; becauſe their favourite food is
not to be found every year, in the ſame plenty,
in the place of their uſual abode.
This occa-
fions Germany often to be vifited by fuch multi-
tudes of field-mice, which continue their courſe
over wide rivers and lakes. In fevere winters
are alfo feen, in the fame country, ftrange birds,
which are probably driven thither by extreme
cold and famine from the more northern cli-
* Concerning_the locusts, it may be accounted a gracious
provifion of the Divine Superintendency, that they do not begin
to lay their eggs till September; fo that the weather in autumn,
and the enfuing winter, feldom proves fo favourable as to hatch
them all; and the nipping frofts in the fping helps to deftroy
moſt of thoſe which come to life, otherwife many countries
would be over-run with thoſe deſtructive infects, every female
laying fifty or fixty eggs. See Hift. de l'Academie Royale de Berlin,
Tom. VIII. p 83:
S 2
mates;
260
NATURAL RELIGION
mates; not to mention the long and tedious
journies of fome fpecies of wild beafts, parti-
cularly wolves.
But what I chiefly here intend is to take no-
tice of thoſe animals which come and go at
certain ſeaſons every year; and of theſe I ſhall
only mention certain birds and fishes, as in-
ftances that are well known. Some birds of
paffage fly low and in fcattered flocks, gradually
making their way farther towards the fouth;
and yet they obſerve their determined period,
returning one year exactly at the fame time, as
in the preceding. Others are obferved to fly
at a great height under the direction of a leader.
When theſe are got together at a certain time
of the year, they immediately afcend to a great
height in the air, and, following their leader,
fly over fea and land to remote climates, which
afford them a milder air and plenty of food
and in the fucceeding year, they return in large
flocks at a certain period, and difperfe over the
country, and fometimes even re-vifit the very
neft they had left the year before. It would
be impoffible to enumerate every particular cir-
cumftance, I must therefore refer the reader to
a more exact furvey *.
•
;
The annual voyages of fishes are regulated in
the fame manner; for, on a ftated time indi-
cated to them by Nature, they perform voyagès
through a great part of the world, wherever
the water fwarms with plants, infects, or ſmall
* See Derham's Phyfico-Theology, and Klein's Prodrom. Hift.
Avium.
2
fiſhes,
Defended and Illuftrated.
261
fishes, for the fupport both of themſelves and
their young; ejecting their ſpawn among fuch
plants. The herrings annually come in innu-
merable fhoals from the coldest parts near the
poles, to almoſt every coaft of the globe; and
particularly haunt both fhores of Scotland and
England, as well as the North Sea; and return,
both old and young, (when, or in what man-
ner, the Creator knows) to their winter quar-
ters which fwarm with an inexhauftible ſtore
of fiſh, which are every year poured out in vaſt
plenty all over the world *.
•
I cannot forbear adding a Fifth method for
the ſupport of thoſe animals which keep to one
country or climate; and though the winter
ſeaſon affords them but few means of fub-
fiftence, yet they either know how to avail
themſelves of fuch, or can make ſhift with a
little.. Among theſe we may reckon moft wild
quadrupeds, and a great many ſpecies of birds:
concerning thefe, it may truly be ſaid, "That
they fow not, neither do they reap, or ga-
"ther into barns;" neither do they travel into
foreign countries, "and yet their heavenly Fa-
"ther feedeth them."
SECTION XXI.
Thus fo many millions of animals, of fo
many thouſand different fpecies, by the wife
* Concerning Fishes of Paffage, fee Bradley's Works of Na-
ture, p. 58; but for Herrings, and the Fishes which purſue
them, fee Anderfon's Account of Iceland.
$ 3
pro-
*
!
262
NATURAL RELIGION
{
provifion of the Creator, according to their fe-
veral instincts, find their various forts of food.
However, to fome animals, contrivance and ar-
tifice are further neceffary, in order to come at
their prey thofe, whofe lot it is to live on the
abundance of others, cannot come at it as eafy
as the ox or ſheep does; and though they are fur-
niſhed with inftruments of every kind, as teeth,
claws, ftings, &c. together with ſwiftnefs and
ftrength, they muſt further have a conſciouſneſs
of their powers and weapons, and fufficient
knowledge and addrefs to make the beft ufe of
them. If their prey be too nimble for them,
or is guarded by nature againſt furprize, their
itrength and addrefs will require the affiftançe
of cunning to draw it into a fnare, Some ani-
mals are fo weak, flow, and unprovided with
weapons, that if their impotence were not com-
penſated by certain ftratagems, they, and their
whole fpecies, muft long fince have periſhed,
Now, as beafts of prey are endued with vari-
ous contrivances far furpaffing their intellects,
or even thoſe of a man, no doubt they derive
them from the wife and gracious Author of
their nature for this end; namely, that they may
ſupport themſelves and their offspring, and that
they may diminiſh the number of individuals in
other fpecies, and by that means keep them in
the defigned proportion.
Let us, firſt, take a furvey of fome of theſe
innate artifices, or inftincts, of brutes, that we
may the more clearly perceive the underſtand-
ing and wonderful fagacity exhibited in them.
Some
Defended and Illuftrated.
263
1
Some birds, though not of the aquatic kind,
live on fiſh; fuch are the corvus aquaticus, or
the cormorant, the fea-fwallow, the ſea or fiſh-
eagle, the fiſh-hawk, the offifraga the baliatus,
the king's-fither, and the ifpida. As none of
theſe are ſkilled in ſwimming, it might be ſup-
poſed that they would find a greater difficulty
in coming at their food than aquatic fowls.
But they haunt the fhore; and when a fhoal of
fiſh paffes by, which they quickly diſcern at a
great diſtance, they are inftantly on the wing
after them, and hover about watching an op-
portunity; then they plunge into the water, and
take up a fifh *.
But ftill more remarkable is the method
practifed by the white-headed eagle in getting
its prey. This bird watches the fea-hawk, and
on feeing it take up a fifh out of the water, he
makes towards, the hawk, which, finding itſelf
clofely purfued, drops the fiſh; and fuch then
is the rapid flight of the eagle, that it ſeizes the
prey before it drops into the water again †.
The focial manner of building, and economy
of the beavers is fufficiently known; and they
who have ſeen it are filled with aſtoniſhment
at the hazardous enterprizes of thoſe creatures
in felling whole trees, and raifing them again,
in order to build their habitations, or to make
dams across the water. The principal defign
of this conſtruction is, that from the dam they
* Concerning the Fifh-Hawk, fee Catefby, Tom. I. p. 2.
+ See Catesby, ibid. Lowthorp's Abridgment, Tom. III.
P. 589.
S 4
may
>
t
264
NATURAL RELIGIÓN
'
•
may ſpy out the fiſh, and furprize them by a
fudden leap, which they perform in a masterly
manner.
prey,
Other animals there are which alſo get pof-
feffion of their prey by leaping on them, though
the creatures they lie in wait for be an over-
match for them, both as to ftrength and ſwift-
nefs. Thus a certain fpecies of fpiders will,
by a fudden ſpring, catch even flying infects;
and toads alfo dart themſelves on birds in their
flight, and devour them. There is alſo a kind
of wild cat which flies directly at the eyes of its
and ſcratches them out in an inſtant *.
Who would imagine that a creature without
feet, arms, wings, &c. fhould catch birds? that
a creature without teeth fhould encounter ano-
ther armed with a fnout, legs, and claws, or
with ſcales and fins? that an animal, whoſe
throat is three times fmaller than the bulk of
its prey, fhould not only conquer, but fwallow
it whole, and digeft it? However all this is
done by different kinds of ſnakes, which either
lye on the ground, or, fpringing up into trees,
hang down from a bough as if they were dead,
till an opportunity offers of feizing, by a fudden
fwing, fome bird, or fifh out of the water be-
neath, which they fuck till their throat is fo
ftretched as to receive it entire †.
See Hooke's Micrography. Klein's Quadruped. Hift.
Nat. &c.
+ See Jones's Abridgment of the Philofophical Tranfactions,
Vol. V. P. II.
SECA
1
265
Defended and Illuftrated.
SECTION XXII.
The inftincts of beafts of prey likewife ex-
hibit the fame furpriſing invention, and the
ſame perfect ſkill, in the uſe of the means to-
wards the end for which they are framed.
Only let the defigned end be propofed as a
queftion; and let all the ingenuity, experience,
and ſcience of the human mind be conſulted ;
then will it be found that nothing more fit or
better adapted could ever have been contrived
by its utmoſt efforts.
Teach the fpider, if you can, a better way
of catching flying infects than by its web, or a
more advantageous conftruction and difpofition
of its fnare. Can you give it any advice for
carrying and faftening its thread from one tree
to another, from the top of one houſe to ano-
ther, and, acroſs rivers and lakes, from one emi-
nence to another? By the time you could have
hit on any contrivance, the ſpider would have
ten times reached the place intended, by throw-
ing out its thread ladders to be carried by the
wind, which faften, if not at the place intended,
at leaft at fome other anfwering its end.
SECTION XXIII.
Beafts of prey are not endowed by the great
Creator with exiftence, and fo much ingenuity,
in order totally to exterminate any ſpecies of
animals, but to curtail the fuperabundance of
them,
!
$
266
NATURAL RELIGION
1
them, and to keep the number within a certain
due proportion to other fpecies. There must be
beafts of prey; fince, without fuch Beings, the
chain of nature would have a chaẩm in it; and
therefore they make a part of the quantity and
numberless multitudes of creatures that have
life. But as they are to live at the expence of
other fpecies, the all-wife Creator has confined
them within narrow bounds. It has been ob-
ferved, that the ſtrongeſt and moſt deſtructive
beaſts of prey are not endued with any particular
artifice or contrivance; that they do not mul-
tiply in fuch great numbers as other less noxious
animals; and that they deftroy each other; and
that a great part of their young are devoured
by other fpecies, as young crocodiles by fith.
Some alfo are under a particular reftraint or in-
difpofition, which diminiſhes the carnage they
would otherwiſe make; either being locked up
in fleep during the winter, or when they meet
with their prey, digeft it but flowly, and by that
means are provided for a confiderable time, as
ferpents and crocodiles, which fwallow animals
entire; or they endure hunger for a long time,
as bears and wolves. The crocodile, when it
is in want of every thing elfe, fwallows pieces
of wood, and large ftones; but theſe only ferve
to keep the ftomach from contracting. Befides,
the ſtiffneſs of all the parts makes him ſo long
in turning his unweildy body, that moſt other
creatures eaſily eſcape him *. Some noxious
-
Concerning the limitations of Beafts of Prey, fee a beau-
tiful paffage in Catesby, Tom. II. p. 63.
animals
Defended and Illuftrated. 267
1
animals likewife, in the want of animal food,
make ſhift with herbs, roots, or any thing that
comes in their way; whereas, if any voracious
beaft of prey was poffeffed of all the advantages
of fize, ftrength, cunning, fwiftnefs, &c. his
fuperiority would prove exceeding detrimental
to other animals, even, perhaps, to the total
extirpation of ſome ſpecies.
The balance in the animal kingdom is not a
little promoted by the means of defence granted
to the weaker kinds. Some that are a prey
to others, have alfo their weapons to protect
themſelves; and Nature has taught them the
moft advantageous way of ufing them: They
alſo know the weakneſs of their enemy, and
where to ftrike the moſt decifive blow. Others
preſerve themſelves fafe, or avoid danger by
fubtilty, fwiftness, or circumfpection; and every
weaker kind has fuch a portion of theſe means
of defence, as fuffices, in fome meaſure, to
balance the ftrength, fwiftneſs, or artifice of
their enemies; and to preferve from their avi-
dity the number of individuals requifite to con-
tinue and propagate that fpecies in a conſtant
proportion.
SECTION XXIV.
Almoſt every ſpecies of reptiles, when they
have attained to their full fize, exert a very par-
ticular forefight, in preparing for their tranf-
formation. They dift urlen themſelves of all
their excrements; they forfake the place where
they
268 NATURAL RELIGIO'N
!
they lived in affluence, withdrawing to fome
bye corner where they may, in ſafety, wait the
time of their change. Part weave a kind of
web and fold themſelves up in leaves, which
they faſten to the boughs of trees, that they
may not fall to the ground with the other leaves
in autumn, juſt as if they knew the exact time
of the fall of the leaf *. Others only creep with-
in a fiffure in the bark of a tree, or under the
roof of a houſe, or under a leaf on the ground.
Others again get amongst the roots of trees,
or bury themſelves fome little depth in the
earth: in ſhort, every fpecies of them has his
own ſtated model for building and fortifying.
•
Every thing of this kind, in every fpecies,
has its determined fhape, dimenfions, and con-
ftruction; every thing is woven and wrought in
the moſt delicate manner; and care alfo is
taken that they may eaſily detach themſelves
from their manfion, when they are transformed
into moths or butterflies; for, in this laſt ſtate,
they are without teeth or other inftruments to
loofen or tear afunder their web,
Such a multifarious art implanted in theſe
little creatures for their neceffary defence and
ſupport, and exerciſed with ſuch a ready apti-
tude, without any previous experience, defign,
reflection, or invention, of their own, cannot
proceed from a blind nature; which rather, in
thefe inftances, difplays the underſtanding, de-
fign, providence, and wifdorn of the great
Creator.
*Roefel's Day-Birds, Clafs II. N. III.
SEC-
Defended and Illuftrated. 269
"
SECTION XXV.
All birds, and feveral fpecies of quadrupeds,
exhibit an admirable precaution and ſkill in the
conſtruction of their nefts and recefles, as if
they were intended not only for habitations,
but fortreffes. But as this might carry me too
far in a part of Natural Hiſtory which is not
fufficiently confirmed by obfervations, nor cir-
cumftantial enough; therefore I fhall rather en-
ter on the means ufed by animals for their
defence againſt affaults.
We may obferve, in general, that fome ef-
fectually fecure themfelves merely by the cele-
rity of their natural movements; fo that by a
ſpring, flight, or fudden leap, they baffle their
enemy. The reſource of others lies in a par-
ticular ftratagem or contrivance. The hare,
ſeeing the hounds at her heels, fuddenly fquats
down that the hounds may run beyond her ;
then ſhe ſtarts up, and runs either backwards
or fideways, and even leaps to and fro in order
to put the dogs to a fault. When the grey
cafuaris with the oftrich bill is hunted, he
always runs irregularly, the better to avoid the
arrows that are ſhot at him *.
Aquatic fowls, when fhot at, inftantly dive,
and are always fure not to appear above water
till they are got a good way from the place
where they firft plunged in. The flying fiſh
* See Klein's Prodrom. Hift. Nat. p. 17.
avoids
1
270
NATURAL RELIGION
avoids the dolphin by rifing up out of the water
into another element by the help of its long
fins, and flying in the air till it can with fafety
deſcend again into the water. The Sepia, or
cuttle-fiſh, loligo, and polypus, have a veffel full
of a black liquor, which, when in danger, they
eject, and thus make their efcape in the black
cloud which it occafions; or,, as others think,
they do it in order to furprize their prey un-
obſerved.
Other animals rely on their coat of mail, and
natural weapons, againſt all affaults. The ar-
madilla is a very flow creature, but provided
with a complete ſuit of armour of hard ſcales or
fhells, which admits of a ſtrong flexure in all
its joints, ſo that he rolls himſelf up head and
feet together; and, being inclofed within this
impenetrable armour, betakes himſelf to fleep
fecure from all danger *. The hedge-hog has
as little fhare of fwiftnefs as the laft-mentioned,
but winds itſelf up in fuch a manner as to
form a prickly ball; fo that its enemy dearly
pays for any attempt to faften on it. Another
of this animal's refources is, to thrust its leaft
defenfible parts, as the head, belly, and feet,
into a hollow tree, or fome hole in the earth,
or a rock, leaving its back expofed, which is all
over prickles. The porcupine, by an inſtan-
taneous ftretching of its fkin, has a faculty of
fhooting its quills at its enemy; and as they are
}
* See Seba, Tom. I. N. 2, 3. Tab. 31.
† See Mem. de l'Acad, de Sciences, 1727. P. 547-
barbed,
x+
Defended and Illuftrated.
271
1
barbed, it is difficult to get them out of the
wound *.
There is no need of ſpecifying other animals
whofe armour and weapons are more generally
known; therefore I thali only obferve, in ge-
neral, that every creature has naturally a know-
ledge of its ftrength, and all poffible dexterity
in the uſe of its weapons, whether they be teeth,
claws, ftings, horns, or hoofs, &c. A horfe is
never feen, like the boar, to go about defending
itſelf from the wolf with its teeth, but turns
its hind parts towards him, and looking behind,
or between its legs, kicks his enemy with its
hind feet. On the contrary, the boar faces the
wolf or hounds that purfue him, and attacks
them with his tuiks; and this is practifed by
whole herds of horfes, or fwine, when they
defend themſelves against any ravenous beaſt;
at the fame time forming a circle, and placing
their young in the area of it. The heron al-
ways holds out its pointed bill towards the falcon
when he hovers above it. The fhend young
he-goat puſh with their horns while they are, as
it were, in their infancy; for they learn how to
manage their weapons even before they have
them.
SECTION XXVI.
Another kind of inftinct ftill remains to be
confidered; and that is, what prompts brutes
* See Seba, Tom. I. Tab. I. Mem. de l'Acad. de Sciences,
Tom. I. p. 28.
1
to
272
NATURAL RELIGION
1
to propagate their ſpecies. This inftinct is com-
mon to all creatures, which accordingly are found
to be of two fexes. This, which is the means
by which the whole world is conftantly fupplied
with living creatures, and which maintains the
univerfal defign of the creation, is in all cir-
cumftances a wonder of nature, and plainly dif-
plays the traces of a Divine Wiſdom. I fhall
only touch on a few particulars which beſt an-
fwer my purpoſe.
Firſt, The propagation of animals could not
be continued, did not the males and females of
each ſpecies experience a genial warmth at a cer-
tain time; and therefore, at a determined feaſon,
they ſeek and invite each other, and mutually
gratify their defires with equal inclinations; yet
how various is this period of time in fo many
thouſand different fpecies of animals! and not-
withſtanding it must be owned, that no other
time would better anſwer the end of each ſpe-
cies, whether it be confidered according to the
duration of the lives of the parent-animals, the
duration of their pregnancy, or the temperature
of the air for the fupport of their offspring.
It is remarkable, that, at the impulfe of na-
ture, every animal knows its mate of its own
fpecies, and diftinguishes it from all others;
though amongſt fome fpecies of quadrupeds,
but much more among birds and fiſhes, and
moſt of all among infects, there is ſuch an abfo-
lute reſemblance, that, by the cloſeſt inſpection,
we can fcarce help, fometimes, miſtaking one
for the other.
Thus
Defended and Illuftrated.
273
>
Thus had not nature implanted in every animal
a clear idea and diftinguishing mark of the fpe-
cies, and of its different fexes, and a love to them
beyond all others, the confequence would be a
wild intermixture among the animals of different
fpecies. Every fpecies would gradually dege-
nerate, and multitudes of heterogeneous creatures
would be produced; a circumftance quite incom-
patible with the perfection and happineſs of ani-
mate Beings: And this confufion in nature would
be increaſed by the fterility of the offspring of
fuch intermixture. This knowledge of their
ſpecies in animals is the more admirable, as the
female differs in ſhape and colour from the
male; which is more particularly oblerved in
many birds, fishes, and infects, fo that the two
ſexes might eaſily be taken for two different
fpecies.
I have alſo frequently wondered how animals
know the females of their ſpecies at a diſtance,
only by the found of the voice. How is it that
the young female nightingale knows the voice
of her mate among all the various warblings of
the inhabitants of the wood? and how comes
it, that other birds of different fpecies are not
charmed by its melody, fo as to haften to the
harmonious fongſtreſs and pay their addreffes to
her? Who informs them that this is a call of
one of their own fpecies to pair, and inviting
them to haften to the place from whence it is
heard?
T
SEC-
274
NATURAL RELIGION
}
1
1
SECTION XXVII.
..
It would be endleſs to enumerate all the in-
ftincts of animals appertaining to the propagation
of their fpecies, and to fhew how curiouſly and
artfully the birds prepare nefts for their eggs and
young; with what forefight fome infects lay
their eggs in a cluſter when the young are gre-
garious, and others, on the contrary, fcatter them
fingly, but always in places where the young
brood find their natural element and food, though
the parent-infects have forfaken that element and
food, at their transformation; how fome aquatic
birds only bury their eggs in the fand, to be
hatched by the heat of the fun, while others
perform that office in nefts by their own warmth,
and afterwards, with the moſt tender care feed
their young out of their own craw, or bring food
proper for their ftomachs; how quadrupeds bite
afunder the umbilical ligament from their young,
lick them into form, and fuckle them; how
birds and quadrupeds, and fome of the inhabi-
tants of the waters, call to their young, give
them notice of danger, and defend them, and at
length wean and drive them away; how among
the bees, wafps, and ants, it is neither the fires
nor the dams, but the barren ones, who feed and
tend on the young; not to mention many other
inclinations and actions relating to the preferva-
tion and defence, to the pleaſure and happineſs,
of themſelves and their offspring.
It would be the height of depravity not to
own, that theſe proceedings are in the moſt wife
manner
Defended and Illuftrated.
275
manner directed to a wife end, and that they
muſt be originally derived from a moſt perfect
underſtanding and free choice. But, on the other
hand, we muſt be ſtrangers to brutes and their
nature, ſhould we attribute to them fuch a faculty
as is neceflary to fuch knowledge and invention,
when it is ſo very manifeft that they perform every
thing without any experience or reflection, with-
out any pattern or inftruction, without any general
knowledge or particular practice; but immedi
ately at their firſt production diſplay mafter-pieces
of art by an innate dexterity, and do not conduct
their operations according to any plan of their
own, but uniformly and according to one and
the fame copy, like their
like their parent-animals. Such
knowledge, art, wifdom, and defign, far fur-
paffes all the powers of animate and inanimate
nature; and therefore is to be attributed folely to
the one infinitely wife Author and Director of
all nature.
T 2
DISSER-
:
!
276 NATURAL RELIGION
♦
DISSERTATION VI.
Of man confidered in himſelf, and particularly of`
the human foul.
IT
SECTION I.*
T is now time to turn our thoughts to our-
felves, and confider the human ſpecies with
regard to its deftination or end. It is ufual to
place man in the center of the univerfe, as the
fole object to which all the phenomena and de-
figns which are vifible throughout the whole
creation are directed. This ſelfiſh opinion cir-
cumfcribes the perfections and works of the
Deity within much too narrow limits. It leads
us to confider the univerſe and all nature from
a wrong point of view; which involves our ideas
in confufion and perplexity. As far as we exalt
ourſelves contrary to, and above, what we are
framed for; fo far we only bring difquietude and
unhappineſs on ourfelves. It is true, the world
is created for the fake of animate beings; fuch
are we, and all nature co-operates to our fup-
port and welfare: However, the world was made
for every poffible fpecies and rank of living crea-
tures, and not for the human fpecies alone.
Every animal, according to its mode of exiſtence,
has received the moſt conformable proportion of
bodily and mental powers, by which it is con-
ducted to a certain happineſs or complacency
adapted
Defended and Illuftrated.
277
adapted to its nature. What then is the part
affigned to us? In what link of the chain of
nature are we placed? Whither are we to direct
our efforts, and how far may we extend our de-
fires? If, on the one hand, we are apt to enter-
tain too high thoughts of ourſelves; yet, by
neglecting the ſcience of felf-knowledge, we
may, on the other hand, place ourſelves too low
in the ſcale of beings. On the earth we are
every where ſurrounded by brutes; are we then
to place ourſelves entirely on a level with them,
and blindly to imitate their actions? They have
their natural inſtincts, innate difpofitions and fa-
gacity, which we have not; and confequently
if we make their inftincts the rules of our con-
duct, we ſhall always act contrary to our nature.
Befides, every animal has its particular inſtinct,
and as it were, its peculiar law of nature: which
of them all are we to follow? If their food
would not be palatable to, or agree with our
conftitution; as little fhould we, in general, act
agreeable to our natural endowments, by affuming
a manner of living foreign to our nature.
We have, indeed, many things in common
with brutes; and I ſhall by no means paſs over
the reſemblance between us and them: but in
many very important particulars we differ from
them, fo that it would be very wrong to commence
our felf knowledge from our analogy with brutes,
and to proceed no father. We are not to feck
ourſelves out of ourſelves, nor to indulge fantaſtical
fuppofitions to know what we are; what is the
extent of our faculties, and powers; and wherein
T
I 3
our
278 NATURAL RELIGION
1
our nature, mode of life, and happineſs conſiſt.
Our internal, clear experience, and the confci-
ouſneſs of what paffes within us, furniſh the
moſt ſure and infallible light to enable us to takę
a ſurvey of ourſelves.
SECTION II.
Every one, by a certain feeling in a determined
body, diftinguiſhes what he calls I from things
that are foreign to, and without, him. Now,..
at any time, according to this feeling, fo far does
he attribute any thing to himſelf, or his particular
being. But that, of which he is infenfible, and in
which he feels neither pain nor pleaſure, is dif-
ferent from this I, and without him. I here
ufe the word feeling in a general ſenſe, to denote
all perceptions by any of the fenfes, and con-
fequently it includes feeing, hearing, fmelling,
and tafting, befides that fenfation particularly
called feeling; and all fuch fenfations I look
upon as a conſciouſneſs in us of a preſent and
particular Being. For when we are not con-
fcious of any thing that has come to paſs in us,
we fay that we did not feel, fee, hear, finell, or
tafte it. Thus, as man is, by the perception com-
monly called feeling, in many parts, and many
ways, conscious of a definite body, fo far he knows
that that whole body, which extends to the epider-
mis, is what he calls I, or himſelf.
There is, however, a difference in the parts
that compofe a human body; fome not being
in themſelves fenfitive, but only as they are con-
nected with other parts that have a feeling, and
there-
Defended and Illuftrated.
279
1
therefore are reckoned parts of us, on account of
their intimate union with other fenfitive parts.
The only fenfitive parts of our body, properly
fpeaking, are the nerves; on the contrary, the
hair, nails, bones, cartilages, and all the juices
have no fenfation, and are accounted parts of us
only as they are connected with the nerves, and
fubject to certain changes, which are perceivable
by us: If it were otherwiſe, a confiderable part
of our blood might run out of our veins without
our feeling or perceiving it; and we might cut
our hair or nails, without the leaſt ſenſe of pain.
It is not the teeth of themſelves, which affect
us with the pain called the tooth-ach, but the
nerves to which they adhere; and if only the
nervous tegument or periosteum was taken off
from the other bones, they might be ſawn aſunder
without any ſenſe of pain, as if they were parts.
foreign and detached from the body. Hence it
appears, that all the parts of the body are not of
equal concern to us; and that if man be confidered
only as a corporeal being, the principal conſtituent
part of him is the net-work of the nerves.
It is now generally allowed, that our preſent
corporeal I did not formerly, nor will imme-
diately after this inftant, any longer confiſt of
juſt ſo many, or the fame identical, parts. The
body which we first had in the womb was ex-
ceeding fmall: Immediately after our birth, it
became fomething larger; and fince that time
it is grown fifteen or twenty times heavier than
it was when we were born; confequently fleſh,
fish, milk, bread, herbs, fruit, roots, water,
wine,
T 4
*
280
NATURAL RELIGION
1
wine, &c. which once did not belong to what
is called 1, and which without any feeling I could
cut, chew, boil or roaſt, have been incorporated
with, me, and are become part of myſelf. I have
a feeling and confcioufnefs of them; I love, pro-
tect, feed and cheriſh them, as part of myſelf.
The neceffity of repleniſhing with daily food
is a proof that, on the other hand, there is a con-
ftant diminution or lofs of our parts; which re-
quires fuch a recruit. By perfpiration and fric-
tion, fome parts are continually flying off from
us, without our feeling any thing of it. The ex-
periment of Sanctorius, who carefully weighed
himſelf for the fpace of twenty years, that he
might conduct himſelf according to the weight
of his body, proves beyond all difpute, that after
the ſpace of ten years, very little of our former
body remains *.
And when, by fome accident, we lofe a finger,
a hand, an arm, or a leg, or if they are cut off by
a chirurgical operation, all fenfation ceafes in
-thofe amputed parts as if they had never belonged
to our bodies; and we can cut or burn them
without the leaft fenfation of pain. Thus it ap-
pears, that it is no definite fubftance which con-
ftitutes my individual felf, or I, but that all ſub-
ſtances contribute to it that enter into fellowship
with us; for as foon as any fubftance is joined
to my body, it partakes of my perception and
confciouſneſs, and fo becomes a part of myſelf.
But thoſe parts being perfpired, abraded, or other-
* See Bernoulli's Diff. Medice, Phyfico de nutritiene, Tom. I.
p. 275.
wife
Defended and Illuftrated.
281
wife feparated from my body, I can no longer
diſtinguiſh each part in purticular, from thoſe
which never had any connection with me.. Nay,
there is not one minute of our exiſtence, in which
we can pronounce our bodies to be the very fame
which we brought into the world with us; nor
can we tell when, or from whence, or how long
the parts of our prefent bodies have been incor-
porated into us by means of our food.
I am as little able to determine the quantity
of matter, or number of members, which necef-
farily appertains to the individual I. The body
may be ſmall, meagre, emaciated, or of a´Lil-
liputian fize; it may grow, become ftrong, ro-
bust and heavy, and equal the coloffian ftature
of an inhabitant of Brobdiniak: The ſmalleſt
human body partakes of fenfation, pleaſure, pain,
and conſciouſneſs, equally with the largeft; the
one is a diſtinct entire man as well as the other.
And in the caſe of lofing an arm or a leg, how-
ever we may be deprived of an uſeful member
yet the individual I is not maimed, feparated, or
multiplied, by fuch lofs of a limb; my confci-
ouſneſs ftill remains fimple, found, and undi-
vided. Even fuppofing a man could fee with-
out eyes, hear without ears, tafte without a
tongue, fmell without a nofe, feel his other
limbs without hands, and in this ftate have
felf-conſcioufnefs, he would account thoſe or-
gans fuperfluous and unneceffary; at leaſt not
effential to his individual I, but intended only
as ornaments.
If
7
282 NATURAL RELIGION
}
#
1
If then we account what we call ourſelves to
be ourſelves, and are confcious of our being dif
tinct perfons or individuals; if we diftinguish
ourſelves from other fubftances, not becaufe we
have a definite body, a certain fize, and deter-
minate limbs, but as having a conſciouſneſs of
ourſelves, and a knowledge of the things with-
out us, in whateyer bodies, or of whatever big-
nefs they may be; it inconteftably follows, that
it is not properly the body, which conftitutes the
man, or the individual I, but that Being, which,
within the body, has a conſciouſneſs of its ex-
iftence ?
SECTION III.
This will appear ftill more evident, if we con-
fider ourſelves relatively to our duration; for
every man, after a courſe of many years, ftill
reckons himfelf the very fame identical perfon.
But certainly he cannot fay fo with regard to his
corporeal parts: fince he does not know them
by any internal durable marks to be his own,
but only as he has a prefent feeling in them.
He cannot affirm of any fingle particle of his
whole body, that it is the fame which formerly
was a part of himſelf, or whether it be a recent
addition. His whole body, in its preſent ſtate,
may be new and have been frequently changed
as a garment, and has experienced a continual
diminution and increafe; it may have but few,
or many, or all, of its old parts; but there are no
marks to diftinguish either the whole body or the
2
parts
Y
Defended and Illuftrated.
283
1
parts of it, or whether it has continued one and
the fame or not.
Thus no man, in any part of his duration, can
prove himſelf to be one and the fame as he before
was, with regard to the body; but only according
to that Being from which he derives his confci-
ouſneſs. Thus He that now feels, hears, fees,
thinks, underſtands, invents, and wills this or
that, at the ſame time is conſcious that he is the
very fame perfon who, yeſterday, fome months
ago, or ten, twenty, thirty, or forty years fince
fucceffively faw, felt, planned, invented, and
refolved fuch and fuch things. Hence alfo it is
evident, that the Being within us, which has a
conſciouſneſs of itſelf, continues the fame amidſt
all the ebbs and flows, and viciffitudes of the
body.
Moreover, if we do but form to ourſelves a
clear idea of conſciouſneſs or ſelf-knowledge, we
fhall eaſily conceive, that this confcioufnefs refides
only in a continued Being, which, amidſt a variety
of changes, always remains the fame.
Now there is not in the whole world a more
evident and certain truth than this: That we
have a conſciouſnefs and knowledge of ourfelves,
and of things without us. No iceptic has ever
run fuch a length, as to deny his own confci-
oufneſs, his own perceptions and feelings. Take
away this, and there is an end at once of all
truth and certainty; for if we have no knowledge
of our own perceptions and their correfpondence
with things, we cannot be fufceptible of any idea
or conviction. Now as there can be no felf-con-
ſciouſneſs
28.4 NATURAL RELIGION
ſciouſneſs without either a clear, or at leaſt ob-
ſcure, recollection of our exiſtence in many paſt
circumſtances, and during many incidents; it is
evident that a Being within us, which has a con-
ſciouſneſs of itſelf, muſt have continued under
feveral changes of the body, and be the very ſame
which formerly felt, thought, and willed in us.
Whatever be the condition of the body; whether
the whole, a part, or none of it, be the fame as
at the commencement of its exiftence; that does
not affect our duration or continuance, nor make
us other men. Though every thing in us be in-
ceffantly fluctuating and changing; yet, amidſt
all changes and incidents, there is ftill within us
a Being, which, by its prefent confcioufnefs, is
convinced that it is the very fame which was be-
fore under different circumftances; and it is re-
latively to this confcious Being, that every man
during the whole courfe of his life looks on him-
ſelf to be one and the fame identical perfon.
SECTION IV.
As we are fenfible and thinking Beings, in a
word, as we have a confcioufnefs of our exiftence,
and the power of willing or volition, we attribute
to ourſelves a Soul. Now as our determinate
being, or perfonality in particular, chiefly depends
on that Being which is confcious of itſelf; it is
the foul that principally conftitutes the man.
And that thing within us, which has the know,
ledge or confciouſneſs that itſelf continues the
fame amidít all other changes and viciffitudes,
2
is
1
Defended and luftrated.
285
is the felf fame foul, notwithſtanding all the
changes of the body; and, from this permanency
of the foul in its unchangeable identy, every
man, during the whole courfe of his life, ac-
counts himſelf one and the fame perfon.
Whenever a thing ftill remains one and the
fame amidſt various other alterations, it is termed
a Subſtance, or a thing fubfifting by itſelf. On
the other hand, when a thing by intervening
alterations ceafes to be, it is termed the Mode,
accident, or quality of a thing. For inftance,
wax may be hard or foft, hot or cold, fixed or
fluid, of various forms or colours; may be in
motion or at reft; yet, notwithſtanding all theſe
outward changes, it remains one and the fame
thing, and therefore wax is a fubftance. On the
contrary, hardneſs, heat, cold, form, colour,
&c. are only modes or accidents of this fubftance,
and are liable to be fuperfeded by other changes.
The hardneſs ceaſes in wax when it is made ſoft,
its round form gives way to any other which fuc-
ceeds it; and when it is moved, there is necef-
farily an end of its reft.
If men had clear ideas, or words precifely de-
finite in their fignification; or if they had only
confulted their own internal fenfation, it would
never have been difputed, whether the human
foul be a fubftance, or only a certain quality or
accident of the body. For, that we have a con-
ſciouſneſs of our exiftence cannot be denied; and
there can be no ſelf-conſciouſneſs unless I have
a recollection of the preceding part of my dura-
tion, and find myſelf to be one and the fame
perfon
#
286
NATURAL RELIGION
}
perſon through manifold circumftances and
changes. But I cannot look upon myſelf to be
one and the fame perfon with regard to the
body; fince I know not whether any fingle par-
ticle of it remains with me, or has been changed.
The foul alone, that confcious Being within us,
knows itſelf, by its inward fenfation, to be one
and the fame Being in ſeveral ſtates and con-
ditions, and by this knowledge has an idea and
conviction of its exiftence, of duration in general,
and of the time of its duration. Now if what
always continues under various mutations, and
never ceaſes to be the fame identical thing, is to
be termed a Subſtance; it muſt be an incon-
teſtable truth, that the human foul, which, from
its own knowledge has a conviction that it is the
fame identical Being which formerly perceived,
thought, and willed various things, muft be
eſteemed a Subftance, and ought by no means.
to be claffed among the mere modes or qualities.
of any other thing.
$
SECTION V.
I cannot but wonder that philofophers have
not ſtruck into this eafy and certain road to attain
a knowledge of ourſelves; and therefore they
have in one ſenſe been ftrangers to themſelves,
and their own fouls. They have looked for
themſelves out of themſelves; yet, as they could
not affirm the human body to be the ſoul, they
fell into an erroneous opinion, which has been
propagated from age to age even to our times,
that
Defended and Illuftrated,
287
that the foul can be nothing but a quality of an
organized body. Indeed, they exprefs themfelves
differently; but are all very obfcure, indefinite,
and ambiguous. They would have the foul to
confiſt in a due conformation of the parts of
the body, in a due temperature of the body,
in a certain harmony or harmonic motion, in
a vital power, &c.
But whatever mode or quality of the body
they ſuppoſe the foul to be, they will never, in
fuch a quality, know themſelves as Beings which,
amidſt all changes and viciffitudes, have a con-
ſciouſneſs that they always continue the fame.
Whether they ſuppoſe it to be a dormant, per-
manent quality, or a conformity of difpofition;
whether it be proportion, or a certain compoſition;
it can never be confiftent with the fenfations,
thoughts, emotions, propenfities, and defires of
the foul, which we have an internal conſciouſneſs
of. But on any alterations in the texture and
compofition of a fubftance, the prior quality of
the texture and compofition totally ceafes, and is
fucceeded by others which are the conſequence
of ſuch alterations. Thus the figure of a dye
cannot retain the properties of a ball. How
then can a mutable texture and changeable
compofition be fuppofed to be fomething that
is permanent, and endued with a conſciouſneſs
of its exiftence? The prefent certainly could
not take place while the paft was in being;
nor can the paſt fubfift jointly with the prefent.
Should it be ſuppoſed that other fucceffive cor-
poreal parts contributed to form the fame com-
poſition,
288
NATURAL RELIGION
$
pofition, as the cafe is in a ſtream of water, or
a ray of light; yet the prefent corporeal parts,
which had replaced the preceding, would by
no means have their continued definite exiſtence
in common with the other. Now if it be fup-
pofed that the foul is thus conftituted, then the
prefent, at moft, would be but a foul of a fimilar
texture with the paſt, and caft as it were, in the
fame mold, and they would be two diftinct fouls;
and the ſubſequent foul would know nothing of
things that occurred to the preceding,
If the other idea of the foul's being an active
quality or motion be admitted; then it is alſo
evident that every motion, whether active or paf-
five, by any alteration ceaſes to be what it was
before. Thus on a change in any motion, it can-
not, without contradiction, be ſuppoſed that the
newly imparted motion is one and the fame with
the preceding, or that the former continues in
the prefent, or that they are all one identical
motion. Sweetnefs does not continue when bit-
terneſs takes its place, and even a favour com-
pounded of both is no longer either the one or
the other. A fubfequent found may with as
much truth be faid to be a tafte, or a certain tafte
that fucceeds the former be faid to be a found.
It would be no leſs abfurd to ſay that a profpect
from a window is a harmony of founds, or that the
cold blafts of wind blowing in at it is a profpect,
&c. In fuch a fucceffion of changes, what can
be faid to be one and the fame, and to be always
permanent, amidſt all fuch changes and varia-
tions ?
But
L
!
量
​Defended and Illuftrated.
289
1
**
But the foul has a confcioufnefs of itſelf, that
it is a permanent Being, which folely has ex-
perienced in its fimple effence all thofe thou-
fand kinds of various favours, fmells, founds,
and images; and which, in its preſent, views its
former ftate, and, even by thofe very viciffitudes
knows itlelf to be the fame Being that it was in all
the occurrences of the time paft. Hence it
ap-
pears, that the foul is no changeable quality or
mode of another thing, but a Subftance, endued
with an intellectual fenfe of its different ftates.
SECTION VI.
Such an intelligent fubftance, or the foul, in
every man is fingle or individual. Whatever
includes in itſelf a confciouſneſs of all outward
and inward fenfations, of all pleaſure and pain,
of all imaginations, thoughts, propenfities, de-
fires and paffions, is but one fingle Being. It is
the fame being that feels a pain in the head, the
hand, the inteftines, and in the foot; which
fmells with the nofe, taftes with the tongue,
fees with the eyes, and hears with the ears. The
fenfible organs
organs that convey thefe partly fimilar,
and partly different perceptions, are with regard
to place, a-part, and may be feparated from each
other; but the fenfitive Being is identically one
and the fame. Though millions of different
points of our ſkin or internal parts were pricked
with needles, yet the feeling of thefe innume-
rable punctures refides only in one fimple, in-
dividual Being. But this very being which, by its
fenfation,
U
290 NATURAL RELIGION
1
'
fenfation, has a confcioufnefs of preſent objects,
by its imagination and memory, alfo recollects paft
and abſent things, of which it once has had a per-
ception. That which thinks is the fame which
has been affected with pleaſure or pain; that
which wills is the fame Being who thinks that
fuch a thing will do it good.
The divifion which fome have made of man
is a moſt unnatural chimera, and claſhes with
all our felf-conſciouſneſs. I mean thoſe who have
imbibed a notion that the foul and fpirit, or ac-
cording to others the intellect and volition, are
two diftinct fubftancès. For as only one being
has a conſciouſneſs of what paffes in us, that
which exifts in one confcioufnefs, cannot be two
fubftances. On the contrary, if each ſubſtance
had its diftinct knowledge, we muſt have two
fouls and be double perfons, like thoſe that con-
fift of two bodies, and, the heads alone excepted,
are more or leſs incorporated together; fuch bo-
dies, having in reality two fouls, are two diftinct
perfons.
It is worth while to take a view of this very
fingular and extraordinary cafe in all its circum-
ftances, as it will greatly conduce to explain the
nature of man and the human foul. There have
been inftances of twins joined together, fome
with all their limbs perfect, and others deficient
in fome of the external or internal parts. In
others the limbs of the lefs perfect have, from
their birth, been blended with thofe of the more
perfect. There was a moft remarkable inftance
at the beginning of this century of complete.
female
$
Defended and Illuftrated.
291
'
female twins growing together at the os facrum,
who were ſhewn in moft parts of Europe*. As for
imperfect twins, Scotland in the reign of James
IV. produced a no leſs wonderful inftance in two
male twins, in whom all the parts above the
navel were double, but all below only fingle †,
In fuch monſters two fouls actually exift in one
body, each having a conſciouſneſs of itſelf, with
more or fewer parts of the body in which each
has a common fenfation. The fouls, however,
which feel the changes in one and the fame part
of the body, are no lefs diftinct and feparate,
than two entire complete perfons who receive
an image in their eyes, or perceive it in their
thoughts, from one and the fame point of an ex-
ternal object, or both hear the fame found. But
there is a very great difference between the two
*Theſe two girls were born on the 26th of October, in 1701,
in the village of Szany, in the county of Commorra in Hungary,
and had all their limbs perfect, but were joined together back-
wards at the os facrum. The paffages for the urine and fœces were
common to both; but each, as neceffity required, could make the
neceffary evacuations, and their menfes alfo flowed, at different
times. Sometimes while one flept, the other was awake, while
one was at work, the other was at reft; one was fometimes eating,
while the other was drinking or doing fomething elfe; but they
fat, ſtood, walked, and lay down both together, but with much
difficulty and uneafinefs as may eaſily be conceived from the junc-
tion of their bodies. In converfing together, they writhed their
necks in order to face each other; and fometimes they even quar-
reiled and came to blows. On any indifpofition of the one, the
other, not affected with the fame difeale, felt an uneafinefs in her
mind, a debility in her fenfible organs, and i regular motions in
her internal parts; and it is remarkable that one of theſe young
women was troubled with a vomiting, the other being all the
while perfectly cafy, and that they both had the fmali pox at the
fame time.
† Vide Buchanan de rebus Scoticis. Lib. XIII.
U 2
fouls,
292
NATURAL RELIGION
;
fouls, both with regard to the perception of the
fame alteration in the parts which they have in
common, and of their confequences; and ftill
much more in other perceptions, thoughts, and
mental affections. For inftance; one fleeps while
the other has no inclination to fleep, one feels
and obferves, while the other does neither; and
their thoughts are employed on quite different
fubjects. One reafons and judges differently
from the other, and one head according to its
ftock of knowledge, might entertain opinions
either philofophical or religious oppofite to thoſe
of the other. It is alfo obferved, that the dif-
poſitions and affections of two fouls that exiſt
in one body, abfolutely clafh with each other;
one is fprightly, the other melancholy; one fears,
the other hopes; one loves, the other hates
not to mention that one may be fick and die,
while the other lives and enjoys a good ſtate of
health. In fhort, where there are two feparate
Beings or individual fubftances, each of them
feeling, thinking, and willing differently for it-
felf, and endued with a confcioufnefs of thofe
acts, there we may be certain are two fouls, and
two perfons. Accordingly ſuch two-headed mon-
fters have, in the chriftian church, been always
baptized as two perfons, and called by different
names; which at the fame time is a proof, that
it is not the body, but the foul, which is fuppofed
to conflitute the individual man.
Hence it ap-
pears, that if there were in reality two fuch feparate
fubftances in every man, as the pretended foul
and fpirit, or the intelligent and willing fub-
fance,
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
293
•
ftance, each of which had a feeling or a con-
ſciouſneſs of itſelf, there would in each human
body be two fouls; which is abfurd, and con-
tradicts all experience. This error derives its
origin from the different reprefentations and dif-
pofitions of the foul, by which it becomes at
variance with itfelf; which gave rife to the opi-
nion of different fubftances in man. But the
very fame Being within us, which has a know-
ledge of a thing that, according to the orga-
nical or fenfible repreſentation, appears to it as
good and inviting, is alfo the very identical
Being which is confcious that the
very fame
thing, according to the more juft reprefentations
of reafon, muft be accounted evil, and looked
upon with averfion. It is here with the foul
juſt as when it views a ftick half of which is
immerged in water, which, to the fight, appears
crooked and broken; but reafon knows it to
be ſtrait and entire.
SECTION VII.
Now, as in the regular way there is only one
foul in a human body, and that fingle fubftance
perceives every thing from all the local points of
the whole body, and has a confcioufnets of every
thing that happens in it; fo this perception and
confcioufnefs does not refide in many parts
placed without each other, [partes extra partes]
nor in what is joined together or extended. Thofe
many parts are without the fingle foul, which
alone in all parts perceives every thing.
U 3
This
fingle
}
294
NATURAL RELIGION
$
fingle fubftance therefore is different from all the
local points of the whole extended and com-
pounded body; it being a fimple effence, the one
indiviſible center, in which all the changes which
happen within the whole compaſs of the body
terminate. Different parts which are placed with-
out each other cannot, by any means, have a
common feeling and conſciouſneſs; fince, upon
this fuppofition, every part would feel of itſelf
and be a foul, and confequently every perfon
would have as many fouls, as there are diftin-
guiſhable fenfible parts without each other. But
the body and the head itſelf confift, like all ex-
tended bodies, of feveral parts which are with-
out, and diſtinct from, each other, conſequently
the one is not the other; and as the head is not
the foot, and the latter not the hand, fo every
atom or particle of the body, and even of the
head itſelf, is not that which is next to it. There-
fore if every part has perceptions in itſelf, the
perception of one part cannot be the perception
of the other. Thus to place perception and
conſciouſneſs in the body, or in its extended and
conjoined fubftances, and making them common
to many parts, is affigning as many fouls to one
body as there are fenfitive particles in it.
Let us illuftrate this point by an example.
When feveral perfons hold each other by the
hand, and one of them receives the electrical
fhock, it is inſtantaneouſly communicated to the
whole company. Thus in many bodies in con-
tact with each other, a fimilar alteration happens;
yet each has his own particular fenfation, which
has
}
Defended and Illuftrated. 295
has no relation to any other, and confequently
they are different perfons with different fouls.
Now had the contiguous parts of our body each
its determinate perception of any impreffion
made upon the ſenſes; it might in like manner
be certainly faid, that every one part in itſelf
was a foul. But neither the foot nor the hand
nor the head, nor any fmaller part of the body
perceives in itſelf; it is the fingle foul alone that
perceives all in all. It is not the eye which
particularly fees, nor the ear which particularly
hears, &c. it is one and the fame foul which fees
in the eye, hears in the ear, fmells in the noſe,
taſtes in the tongue, and alone feels in millions
of particles of the whole body, if ſo much as a
needle's point be ſtuck in any of them. Thus
the foul is fomething different from all the nu-
merous parts wherein it feels; and confequently
it is a fimple ſubſtance, and not at all extended,
compounded, or divifible, but is totally and in all
reſpects different from the body.
Now as every one may, without much labour
and application of mind, perceive and feel that his
fenfitive corporeal parts are very numerous, and
yet that the Being which feels in all thofe parts,
and is endued with confcioufnefs, is but one fin-
gle being; it is no lefs eafy to diftinguish the foul
from all the corporeal parts, fo as not to confound
his real perfonality which he calls I, with the
body, in which at prefent he has a conſciouſneſs.
But he that will not be taught by his own fen-
fation, muſt be referred to the before-mentioned
monſters. In them were manifeftly two diſtinct
U 4
fenfitive
-
1
1
296 NATURAL RELIGION
$
me.
C
fenfitive beings, two fouls having a diftinct con-
ſciouſneſs, and different thoughts and volitions.
Now theſe two fouls, in the inftance given by
Buchanan, had a common feeling in the lower
parts which were fingle, and confequently both
reckoned them as appertaining to his individual
1. Each fays of the one leg, It is my leg;'
each of them complains on its being pricked
with a needle, that his leg is pricked, It hurts
Now if the part affected was that being
which perceives and feels, one leg would be two,
and every particle in it that is affected would be
doubled; to that thefe parts which are affected
in common would be without both fouls, and
diſtinct from both; which is abfurd. Now as the
laws of fenfation and perception in fuch monſters
do not differ from thofe in others who have but
one foul; fo the corporeal parts in which they
are affected, are in all men foreign to, and dif-
ferent from, that foul.
SECTION VIII.
The difference of the foul from all the parts
of the body alfo appears in the foul's confciouf-
nefs of duration, as I have hinted above. The
foul knows itfelf to be the fame in which for-
merly fo many perceptions, thoughts, and voli-
tions have paffed, and of courfe knows itſelf in-
ternally, in the fucceffion of its different changes,
to be a particular permanent Being. Now, we
know not any outward or inward particle of the
body by any particular mark, whether it be old
of
L
1
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
297
A
<
or lately added to it; only by our prefent feeling
we.know, that it belongs at this inftant to our
perfonality. Thus the body is given to the foul
as a kind of mirror, in which it knows itfelf,
the world, and the Creator of both. As for the
mirror itself, the foul is not informed whether
it always remains the fame, or whether it after-
wards fees the objects in another which has
fucceeded in lieu of the preceding mirror: that
is of no concern to it; it fuffices that the foul
therein difcerns itſelf and other things, and thus,
by recollecting its former ftate, can be continually
raifing itſelf to a higher degree of perfection. To
purſue the fimilè, the body is like a clear gentle
ftream or liquid mirror, in which a man fees
himſelf; the water is perpetually changing, though
imperceptible to the beholder, who ftill fees him-
felf in the fame place, and without the leaft ap-
parent alteration,
SECTION IX.
I muft here take notice of two criterions which
plainly diftinguith the foul from the body, and
which to me appear very manifeft and indifpu-
table. First, we difcover in ourfelves two kinds
of perceptions, which we divide into external
and internal, or fenfual and mental. The dif-
ference between thefe is moft clearly feen by
comparing ſtrong and violent perceptions of the
former, with thofe of the latter; for example,
a painful wound in the corporeal parts, and a
mental refentment of an injury or affiont. As
for
*
298 NATURAL RELIGION
for the firft, we can point exactly to the place
which pains us; but the ſecond has nothing local
in it: We cannot in the latter cafe complain of
any pain in the head, palpitation of the heart,
or ſmart in any fenfible part of the body. The
cauſe of this is evident; for pain having its
fource in our bodies, the parts capable of being
hurt are without each other, and locally dif-
ferent; and the foul, which minutely attends
to the preſent ſtate of the body, can point out the
parts where this alteration has happened. But
the reſentment of an affront rifes in the foul
itfelf, not from the reprefentation or perception
of any thing corporeal, but of its own imper-
fection, and injury. Now there are no diftinct
parts within or without the foul, to fhew where
any
hurt has been 'received.
It might be alledged in faint and languid
mental affections, as in melancholy, pining, and
the like, that theſe are bodily affections which
in a confuſed manner oppreffing many parts of the
body at once, make it difficult to determine any
particular part as the feat of the pain. When a
diftemper is fecretly undermining us, the body is
generally in a bad diſpoſition, yet we are not able
to fhew any determinate place, wherein the pain
refides above any other. But violent affections of
the mind admit of no fuch fubterfuge; neither
are the bodily confequences of fuch a refentment
to be confounded with the paffion, confidered-
in itſelf. It is true, a violent paffion may caufe
a ferment in the blood, may bring on vomiting,
the gout, the ſtone, tremors and palpitations,
&c.
Defended and Illuftrated.
299
c. but every one is too fenfible in what part
or member theſe pains refide, and at the fame
time is conſcious that the indignation which
agitates his mind, does not refide in the foot,
the kidney, the ftomach, or the heart.
I need not obferve that the mode of the fen-
fations themſelves is very different in the two
cafes for though it is very plainly felt, it is not
to be deſcribed. However, we may obferve the
difference in ourſelves, not only in ftrong fenfa-
tions of both kinds, but even in the moft faint
and languid affections. When the eye is offended
at irregularity, crookednefs, difproportion, de-
formity, or a wrong affemblage of colours, every
one knows in himſelf, that the impreffion is not
fo much made on the eye as on the mind; for
how ſhould an oblique, or a fhort line hurt the
eye more than one that is ftrait and of a proper
length but the mind, from its own idea of im-
perfection, feels a difpleaſure from thefe; as on
the other hand, from its knowledge of them,
it takes delight in order, proportion, and ſym-
metry. As the foul naturally ſeeks its own per-
fection, it loves the models of perfection, by
which its underſtanding and difpofitions are im-
proved, and its tranquillity eſtabliſhed. Objects
that are full of deformity and imperfection, vitiate
the foul's tafte, and gradually incline her towards
imperfection.
Secondly, another proof of the difference be-
tween the foul and body may be drawn from
our arbitrary notices of ideas. When, by means
of our fenfible organs, a thoufand objects are at
once
30,0
NATURAL RELIGION
2
once prefènted to us, we cannot, without a motion
of the will or volition, take notice of one object
above all the reſt which perhaps make a ftronger
impreffion on us, by removing our attention to
that which makes a much fainter impreffion on
the fenfes.
The repreſentation of abfent things in the mind
is, in itſelf, always weaker than that made by pre-
fent objects; but we are able, at our pleaſure, to
make the ideas of abfent things more plain and
ftriking than any reprefentations of things that
are prefent, and even fo as to be infenfible both
of what we actually fee and hear. Among the pre-
fent things by which we are affected, found which
ſtrikes on the ear, may be more faint and weak
than the light which paints objects in the eye;
but it is in our power to attend to a ſoft ſound,
without minding the more ftriking objects of
the fight. Thofe things which directly face the
centre of the eye are reprefented in the moſt
diftinct clearness; but other objects more ob-
fcurely and imperfectly, as they lie on either fide
of the centre of the eye. However, an object
that prefents itſelf fideways may be fo inviting,
that we determinately turn the axis of vifion
obliquely to it, in order to furvey, it with more
attention than any other.
The foul, therefore, has a power of giving a
preponderating clearncfs and ftrength to a part
of an entire fenfible reprefentation, which in
itſelf makes the fainteft impreffion on the fenfes;
fo that all the other objects of the reprefentation,
though clearer in themſelves, are, as it were,
obfcured,
Defended and Illuftrated.
301
}
obfcured by it. I could appeal to inftances of
very celebrated authors, who, amidst all the noiſe
of children, have made very difficult calculations,
and formed curious hypothefes; and of a perfon
now living, who has produced very folid argu-
ments, and cleared up many important points
while he ftood at an open window facing a
market-place; but this power every one daily
experiences in himſelf, though generally in a
lefs degree.
If the repreſentation of objects in the mind be
only a re-action or counter-working of the brain
against the organical impreffion, and the moft
perfect attention to a part of the whole repre-
fentation, nothing but the ftrongeſt re-action, or
counter-working of the brain against a certain
part of the fenfible impreffion; then, according
to the laws of corporeal motion, the ſtrongeſt
re-action muſt every where be equal to, and cor-
refpond.with, the ftrongeſt action; and thus our
attention would neceffarily be fixed on that object,
which had made the ftrongeft organical impref-
fion on the brain. Now as this is confuted by.
daily experience, it must be an inconteſtable
truth, that the foul cannot be a material Being;
fince it is not fubject to the laws of motion in its
voluntary ſpeculations, and acts differently from
what a body, according to its nature, muſt do.
SECTION X.
་
I have defignedly made choice of thefe proofs,
which, in a plain and palpable manner, evince
2
the
302
NATURAL RELIGION
t
the difference between the foul and the body by
internal fenfations; fuch proofs being not only
more conciſe and intelligible, but alſo more evi-
dent and inconteftable, than fubtil arguments
drawn in a long chain of reaſoning from the ef-
fential conftitution of matter and ſpirit.
But I do not mean by this to queftion the va-
lidity of fuch arguments. It is certain, that it
may juftly be afferted, that none of the operations
and properties of the foul can be accounted for
from matter, or any thing appertaining to it:
For who will prefume to affirm that he can
clearly fhew how, from the texture of the body
and its motory powers, we repreſent to ourſelves
things without us; form general or abſtract ideas;
have a conſciouſneſs of ourſelves; compare things
together in our thoughts, and acquire a know-
ledge of their agreement and combinations? Who
muft not allow, that the laws of motory powers
in the body are of a nature quite different from
thofe of the mental faculties, of underſtanding
and volition? Can our ideas, can reflection, exa-
mination, and judgement depend on points, lines,
angles, degrees, or figure? Can pain and plea-
fure, love and hatred, be explained by the laws
of gravitation, elaſticity, or any mechanical laws
whatever? The confequence is, that to ſuppoſe
the foul to be matter of any kind is an opinion
diametrically oppofite to all reaſon and verifimi-
litude.
SEC-
Defended and Illuftrated.
{ 303
SECTION XI.
The dependence of the foul on the body does
not, in the leaſt, invalidate its internal knowledge
of itſelf. As every thing that is material and in-
animate was made for the fake of living creatures,
fo likewiſe the human body, which is lifeleſs in
itſelf, is defigned for the foul, in which properly
ſpeaking life refides. Hence the body is juftly
termed organical, fince every member is to the
foul an organ for performing its vital functions;
the eyes being the organs of fight, the ears of
hearing, and the.brain of all reprefentation and
affections. So that the prefent organical body
ferves as a mirror, in which the foul as it were
fees and perceives all things. The vaſt univerſe
with its parts, changes, and properties is repre-
fented in our microcofm the body. We have no
immediate knowledge of the material world, but
derive it entirely from the changes caufed in the
organs of the fenfes by feeing, hearing, fmelling,
tafting, and feeling; and if we wanted any one
of theſe inftruments, a part of the mirror which
exhibits every thing to us, would be obfcured:
without eyes we ſhould know nothing of colours,
and without ears we ſhould be utter ftrangers to
found. But what has been faid of the outward
material world is no lefs applicable to our own
bodies. Some parts of our bodies are difcerned
by other parts by means of the eyes we fee all
our limbs, and feel them with the hands; by
the ears we hear our motions and words; and
lafily,
304
NATURAL RELIGION
laftly, every other alteration which happens in
the whole body impreffes itſelf on the brain, as
the general firſt inftrument of fenfation. Thus,
as in a mirror, we fee not only the objects with-
out and different from the looking glafs, but
even difcern the looking glaſs itfelf; fo that not
only the material world without, but alſo the
body itſelf is exhibited in the human body.
Moreover, the foul, which, like the eye, fees
every thing in this mirror, fees itſelf alfo therein,
fo far as to difcern that itſelf is the only Being
which feels, thinks, and wills every thing within
it;
and that it differs both from the external ob-
jects perceived, and its own inftruments of per-
ception. For we have already thewn how the
foul, as the only confcious being in us, looks
upon all the various parts of the body, as diffe-
rent from itſelf and from each other; how it
well knows itſelf to be always one and the fame
permanent Being by its confcicufnefs, but knows
not whether any fingle particle of the whole body
be the fame or not, and confequently is diftinct
and different from all and every particle of its
whole body; how the foul has very keen internal
pains, the feat of which it cannot locally point
out in any part of the whole body, and therefore
it contains nothing that relates to extenfion and
locality.
Laitly, the body, and, through that medium,
the material world is alfo to the foul as a mirror
of the Deity For by the underſtanding, it dif
covers in the inanimate vifible things, the First
Living Caufe; in the variety, order, and harmony
of
Defended and Illuftrated.
305
of things, the infinite Knowledge and Wiſdom
of that Cauſe; and in the utility of inanimate
things to the welfare and pleaſure of animate
Beings, how every thing is graciously defigned
for the beſt by the Supreme Being. Thus the
body is to the rational foul an inftrument, not
only of fenfual pleaſure, but of a more fublime
intellectual delight, which enkindles in it an
ardent defire, or longing after what is fpiritual
and infinite.
SECTION XII.
Since the body is fuch an inftrument to the
foul, it is no wonder that it ſhould depend on this
inſtrument; that, in this mirror, it ſhould have no
fight of fome things; that of others it ſhould have
clear or obfcure, plain or confuſed, flow or quick,
regular or irregular, juft or falfe images; that,
according to thefe reprefentations, it perceives
complacency or difguft, inclination or averfion.
If alooking-glafs, through fome defect in its tex-
ture, does not reflect the images of certain bodies
according to the rules of optics, or is full of dark
fpots or flaws; be the eye ever fo found, it will
have no view of the objects in fuch a mirror.
Should the mirror be clouded or foul in fome
places, or all over, thefight of the objects reprefent-
ed in it would be fo far confufed and imperfect. If
the plate of glaſs, inftead of being gound even
and fmooth, fhould be full of kns or inequa-
lities, or have the leaft mixture or tinge of any
colour in it, the objects would be mifreprefented
X
and
зав
NATURAL RELIGION
and disfigured. Thus by fuch a disfigurement
and falfe tinge of objects, their juſt figure, pro-
portion, regularity, and beauty would be changed
into an illufory deformity; and the eye, inſtead
of viewing them with any delight, would turn
afide from them with difgutt. The eye however,
notwithſtanding all theſe accidental defects of
the glaſs, would ftill retain its juft contexture,
internal ftrength, and perfection, and would not
be, in the leaſt weakened or injured by theſe
defects. Farther, if the looking-glafs was broken
to fhivers, it would not at all follow, that the
eye would be deftroyed and lofe its ſtrength, or
that the images which the eye had once received
by means of that glaſs would be totally oblite-
rated. Though we fuppofe a mirror to be re-
quifite for every part of the reprefentation, it
does not follow that another glafs could not be
allowed to the eye, in lieu of that which was
broken.
It will not be neceffary for me to enter on a
particular application of every part of theſe pre-
mifes to the foul, and its dependence on the
body. The compariſon is clear in itſelf, and is
perfectly applicable to the fubject. Every one
may eaſily obſerve, from what paffes in himſelf,
how the caſes adduced may be accounted for,
by the want of this or that organ, or the want of
experience, and the ignorance confequent there-
on; by the weakneſs and timidity of the under-
ftanding; by the obfcurity and confufion of the
images; by fleep, deliquium, and apoplexy; by the
fancy,incapacity, and error; byinclinations, paffions,
4
and
1
1
1
1
此
​Defended and Illuftrated.
357
and vices, as far as all theſe depend on the body;
and even by death itſelf. From all theſe accidents,
it may eaſily be conceived that however great a
dependence the foul may have on the body; yet
that does not in the leaſt hinder the foul from
being an effence diftinct from the body, fub-
fifting by itſelf, and amidſt all internal and ex-
ternal changes ftill permanent in its identity.
Now this truth being grounded on certain ex-
perience, and internal perception, and entirely
confiftent with the dependency of the foul on the
body; it appears alfo, that this dependence can
furniſh no juft proof againſt the moſt manifeft ex-
perience; fince, to conclude in general from the
dependency of one thing on another, that they
are homogeneous, fimilar, or identical, is to rea-
fon very prepofterouſly.
SECTION XIII.
But another fuppofed objection made on this
head is, That it is quite incomprehenfible how a
fimple and a compound Being can reciprocally
depend on each other; whereas, on the con-
trary, fuch a mutual dependence may be eafily.
conceived, when things are of the fame nature,
and of one and the fame mode of exiſtence :
confequently, if the foul be alfo fomething that
is material, they may both act, and be mutually
dependent on each other. This ftale and trite
objection is well known; and, to fome, has ap-
peared of ſuch weight, that they held, the union
of a fimple Being, as the foul is, with a compound
X 2
body
308 NATURAL RELIGION
body, to be not only inconceiveable, but con-
tradictory and impoffible. Others, on the con-
trary, have exerted their abilities in various ways
to repreſent the thing both poffible and compre-
henfible.
In anſwer to this, I affirm, that if the reality of
any thing be demonftrated by manifeft expe-
rience, the bare incomprehenfibility of the man-
ner how it is fo, or is poffible, ought not to de-
ſtroy the certainty of it. Now daily experience
fhew us, first, that the body, concerning which
we have a conſciouſneſs that it belongs to us, is
compounded. Secondly, that the foul, as the
only Being which has a knowledge of all the
changes which happen in any of the parts of
the body, is one and the fame permanent and
indiviſible ſubſtance, different from all and every
one of the local and changeable parts of its
body. But, thirdly, that the changes in the
foul, namely, feeling, thinking, and willing, are
regulated by the change or alteration of the
motions in its organical body, and thefe motions,
on the other hand, depend on the operations
of the foul. Therefore, however obftruſe and
incomprehenfible the manner of its being fo,
or being poffible, may be; yet that truth, of
which we have fuch a clear knowledge both
internally and externally, must remain in its fulk
certainty.
Nay, the primary motive powers, and the man-
ner of the propagation of motion from one
part to the other, and how one acts on another,
and their reciprocal dependency, in our very bo-
dies,
Defended and Illuſtrated.
309
dies, are no lefs incomprehenfible, than the mutual
dependency between the alterations or changes
in the foul and the body; yet who, on this ac-
count, will deny, or fo much as queſtion the
reality of what he fo plainly feels and fees,
namely, the motion of bodies, and the depen-
dence of one body on another with regard to
fuch motions? But the experience in both is
equally manifeft, only with this difference, that,
to the obfervation of the body as a compounded
Being, and of the action of one body on ano-
ther, an outward organical experience fuffices;
but the obfervation of the fouìi, and of its being
diſtinct from the body, requires an internal
experience. But as, without the conſciouſneſs
and perception of our ſimple and permanent Be-
ing, nothing at all can in any wife be clear
and evident to us, the whole ftrefs of the point
lies in this, that we carefully attend to the dif-
ference between this fimple Being, which has a
conſciouſneſs of every thing; and feveral parts
of the body, in which it has a conſciouſneſs
of itſelf; and this is prefently known by very
fenfible perceptions. For what can be more
evident than that the fimple Being, which has
a conſciouſneſs of all things, cannot be that
compound one in which it has this confciouf-
nefs? And that this fimple Being which has a
conſciouſneſs of the permanence of its identity,
muſt be different from all and every particle
of our whole body, fince we have no confci-
ouſneſs or knowledge, whether they be ftill one
and the fame? What juftifiable doubt there-
X 3
fore
1
310
NATURAL RELIGION
$
fore can arife against fuch manifeft evidence,
from our ignorance of the manner of the union
between this fimple, felf-conscious, and perma-
nent Being, and a compound body?
SECTION XIV.
He that will undertake to fhew, that fuch an
union implies a contradiction or impoffibility,
ſeems to be ignorant of what knowledge is re-
quifite for fuch a proof. We have not fuch a
clear knowledge of the foul or the body, the
compound or the fimple Being, from which
this can be deduced; and the whole terminates
in a mere incomprehenfibility and ignorance.
On the contrary, the poffibility of this union,
no less than the union of the corporeal parts
with each other, may be demonſtrated.
An actual union of the foul and body, ap-
pears to me confonant to truth from many proofs.
I ſuppoſe that every compound body is compofed
of fimple parts, which must be endued with
fuch a power as can affect the organs of the
compound body, like motion: For without
fimple parts, we can no more affign a fufficient
cauſe of a compound body, than of a number
without units. If feveral inert particles be af-
fembled from different places and united, ſuch a
conjunction does not fhew us how the com-
pound body has thereby acquired a power and
action, which none of the fingle parts had be-
fore; but if each particle does not contribute its
determinate power or action, the whole will re-
main
Defended and Illuftrated.
311
main inactive. Put a hundred thousand cy-
phers together, and the total will ftill be a cypher:
and the conjunction of a hundred thouſand inert
particles will, after all, produce only an inert com-
pound. Thus, it is to no purpoſe to explain the
folidity and coheſion of bodies, by ſuppoſing them
to be compounded of minute hooks faftened
to each other; for as thofe hooks are alſo com-
pounded, or put together, the fame queftion
ftill remains from whence the parts of the hooks
hang together. If it be faid that the great hooks
cohere by means of fmaller; yet as thoſe ſmaller
hooks confiſt of ſeveral parts connected together,
the fufficient caufe of the connexion must be
traced to the fimple component parts. This
being pre-fuppofed, it follows that in the body
itfelf, its texture, and changes, the fimple parts
muft, by their power, act on fimple parts in
compound bodies, and the compound in their
turn on the fimple parts. It follows likewife,
that for fimple things to be in an actual union
with compound, that is, with a greater number
of fimple things, is poffible in general. Thus,
if the foul be a fimple, and the body a compound
fubftance, this does not in the leaft hinder their
active union Befides, this relates only to the
effential powers and nature of the foul, which
diftinguish it from the body, and yet admit of
an union and fellowship with the body.
That the foul diftinguiſhes itſelf only by its
vitality, fenfation, confcioufnefs, thought, and
volition, from all the fimple atoms or elements
that compoſe the whole body, has been already
X 4
fufficiently
↓
1
1
312 NATURAL RELIGION
1
Y
}
fufficiently proved: But as it is affected by the
body, and in its turn, acts on the body, there
muft, at leaſt, be alfo a general conformity and
communion of nature between the foul and the
fimple atoms of the body, in order to effect ſuch
an intimate union.
The foul, for example, has theſe things in com-
mon with all the clements or primary particles
that compofe the whole body, viz. that it is a
fimple fubftance; that it exifts in a certain or-
der, together with other fimple fubftances; and
that it helps to occupy a fpace, in which each
has its particular place, but at the fame time,
can change its place and be moved, or can move
itfelf. For who is there that, from his own
perceptions and knowledge, can poffibly deny
that the foul has its determinate place in the
body? Who is there that is not fufficiently con-
vinced, that the foul does not refide in the feet
or in the hands, in the belly or in the breaft,
but in the head; that we do not think in all
the parts of the body, nor even in all parts of
the head, as the tongue, nofe, eyes, or ears,
but only in the brain? Who can deny that the
foul can change its place; that, during this life,
it moves itſelf with the body; and that, after
death, it can be feparated from the corporeal
elements? But if theſe things be certain, it muſt
be no lefs fo, that when the corporeal elements
themfelves are affected by the motion of other
adjoining elements, and thofe again by others
Contiguous to them, they actuate the whole
body, and put it in notion; confequently the
foul
1
Defended and 1
313
Illuſtrated.
foul must have the active and paffive nature of
the elements in common with them, and con-
duct itſelf according to the fame laws by which
motion, and the organical fyftem, is produced
in the elements of the compound.
Therefore the foul in the machine of a li-
mited organical body dwells in a certain place,
and has, like other elements, a natural tendency
to cohere with the fimple elements that are
neareſt to it, and to remain in fuch a coheſion.
In this machine, it receives from without the
very fame impreffions which the whole body
undergoes; and partakes of all the internal
changes which happen throughout the machine,
as an automaton. But as there is not one fin-
gle element of our body, which has
any con-
ſciouſneſs of its internal paffive or active changes,
the foul alone diftinguishes itſelf from all the
corpufcular elements of the whole body, by its
fpirituality, which reprefents to it in a proper
manner the alterations it has undergone; and,
by reflection, it acquires a knowledge of them.
But the foul, like other elements, contributes
likewiſe to the cohefion of the body, and to
the organical motions and functions appertaining
to life. But as the foul acting with the ele-
ments of the body, does this but blindly and
ignorantly, it has a power fuperior to them,
namely, that of determining according to its
ſpontaneous volition this natural power of moving
in certain parts; and is fo advantageouſly poſted
in this machine, that only a fmall organical
power is required to put the whole machine
in
314
NATURAL RELIGION
in motion. In a word, it is like the pilot at the
helm of a ſhip, who is affected on one hand
indeed by the motion and toffings of the fhip,
but alone is conſcious of what himſelf and the
ſhip ſuffer; and, on the other hand, he is ne-
ceffarily an additional burden to the fhip, but
by a ſmall turn of the helm directs its motion
according to his own will.
Wi
DISSER-
T
Defended and Illuftrated. 315
1
DISSERTATION VII.
A compariſon drawn between men and other
animals, with regard to the manner of living,.
for which they were created.
W
SECTION I.
E now proceed to examine the manner
of living for which the Creator has
adapted the human fpecies; and to this end
nothing can be more proper, than to draw a
compariſon between ourſelves and the brute-
creation. This way to knowledge has been
advantageouſly purſued, by fome, in the anatomy
of the human body, by comparing its parts
and veffels with thofe in the bodies of brutes,
and even with vegetables, which has thrown
great light on the difcovery of the ufe and
benefit of the corporeal parts. The first thing
to be confidered in every animal, is its manner
of living, fince in this their effential difference
lies; and there are as many animate Beings
poffible, as there are poffible ways of living.
The manner of living peculiar to every ſpecies
of animals, is alſo the end for which they were
created; and all their parts, and particularly
their inward faculties, are regulated according
to that way of life. How then can we acquire
a better knowledge of, and more juſtly diſtin-
guish
316 NATURAL RELIGION
I
guiſh the manner of life for which our fpecies
was formed, than by drawing a compariſon be-
tween our faculties and thoſe of other animals?
This compariſon appears the more neceffary,
as many authors have treated of it very licen-
tiouſly, being guided merely by their own brutish
inclinations. For they only exhibit to us a per-
fect fimilarity between man and brutes, or rather
the pre-eminence of the latter above the former.
They are fo little cautious in concealing their
drift, that they would fain reduce themselves
and others nearly to an equality with the brutes,
from the dictates and impulfe of nature itſelf,
inſtead of exciting the human mind to aſpire
after thoſe higher degrees of perfection and hap-
pinefs, which are within our reach, and adapted
to our nature.
It is well known that M. Rouffeau, of Geneva,
has lately exerted his imagination, in repreſenting
to us, among other animals in a defart, an ori-
ginal man in his natural ftate, as a brute, or
fomething worfe, (plus bête que les bêtes). This
is not done, with the view of other writers on
the Law of Nature, to fhew, under a fiction,
that fuch a ftate is rather unnatural and ex-
tremely miferable; and by that confideration to
induce us to a focial and friendly life with other
men: but to maintain, that nature has formed
man only for a brutal ftate, and that he would
be moſt happy in fuch a ftate; that, on the other
hand, reflexion, fociety, dominion, property, and
the difference of ftates, are unnatural; and that all
the improvements fuppofed to refult from them,
tend
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
317
ގ
tend only to render mankind more wretched and
depraved *. However, he muft himſelf allow
that fuch a primitive ſtate is now no where to be
found, perhaps never was, and probably never
will. I alfo believe that the nature of every man
muſt recoil at fuch a brutal ſtate; and that no
perfon, whatever difcontent he might labour
under, would with rather to be a forlorn brutal
favage, than a member of human fociety. On
what grounds then is fuch a contradictory opi-
nion built? and where is the utility of broach-
ing it?
The difference between the human and brutal
fpecies, according to Rouffeau, confifts not fo
much in knowledge, as in liberty, and the con-
ſciouſneſs that he has a freedom of choice; and
in a power of gradual improvement. Laftly,
that when he fees living creatures, eſpecially
thoſe of his own fpecies, expiring, dead, or in
pain, he feels a repugnancy or difquietude, which
we call compaffion. But fuch liberty and progref-
five improvement as tend effentially to diftinguifh
men from brutes, have in reality no fhare in
Rouffeau's ſyſtem; for the due exercife of thofe
qualities for that end requires a ſtate of reflexion,
and even language, and human fociety. But,
if we believe that author, fuch a ftate is con-
trary to the nature of man, who has no need
of reflexion and ſpeech; and ſubverts the law of
nature, by which we are all equal; confequently,
he is but one ſtep removed from all manner of
See Rouffeau's Difcours fur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité
parmi les hommes. Publiſhed at Amſterdam, 1755.
im.
318
NATURAL RELIGION
t
imperfection, and wretchedness: For, accord-
ing to him, knowledge, inftead of mending our
morals, only makes us more haughty, infidious,
and wicked; arts, by the many conveniences
and delights arifing from them, enervate both.
foul and body; and when once we are habitu-
ated to them, we cannot but be unhappy at
being deprived of them, though we are not at
all the happier in the poffeffion of them
property has introduced deceit and oppreffion;
the difference of ranks, dominio nover others;
laws and ordinances, are fupported only by the
right of the ftrongeft, that is, by violence and
tyranny, enflaving the weaker, and facrificing
their liberty and life to the arbitrary caprice of
their fovereign. Virtue, honour, and friendſhip,
are but a mere farce. I cannot fay how he rates
religion; at leaſt, according to his way of reaſon-
ing, he may alſo claſs that among our misfortunes;
Quid non religio potuit fuadere malorum? But what
then is the ftate? what other means are there for
man, by virtue of an actual uſe of his liberty, to
attain to a higher degree of perfection, and to dif-
tinguifh himſelf from the brute, if it be not in the
focial and converfible ftate, in which he may uſe
the faculty of reaſon, that was beſtowed on him as
a peculiar privilege and dignity? Liberty, and a
progrefs towards perfection, are impracticable,
and conferred in vain on a lonely dumb favage,
whofe gratifications extend not beyond brutal
enjoyments.
SEC-
Defended and Illuftrated.
319
རྩྭ
SECTION III.
M. Rouffeau fays, that our prefent ſtate of
reflexion and focial life hath only corrupted
mankind, and made them unhappy; that it
would have been better for us to have remained in
a brutal ſtate, which is natural to us. Does then
his compariſon between our preſent ſtate in civil
fociety, and a feigned natural, or rather brutal
ftate, make us happier or better? By no means.
For if we look on a focial life with fuch eyes,
we muſt be diffatisfied and uneafy; we muft
deſpiſe arts and ſciences, virtue and religion; and
avoid all converfation with men as mere hypo-
crites: We muſt envy thoſe of wealth and high
rank; muſt entertain a conftant rancour againſt
our governors and magiftrates, and look upon
them as oppreffors: In a word, our whole life
muſt appear to us a ftate of mifery and unhap-
pineſs. Are we therefore to ſeek ſhelter among
the Hottentots and other rude favages, or even
among wild beafts, as our natural companions?
Is it with them only that we can enjoy tran-
quility? No man, certainly, would choofe fuch a
way of life, not even Rouffeau himſelf. Rouffeau
ftrips his natural favage of reafon, ingenuity, in-
vention, ſpeech, &c. until he comes to human
fociety; in which ſtate, he fays, all the human
powers first unfold themfelves. Is it then at
fuch a time that theſe powers firft fpring up in
a mán? Can fociety impart to him faculties
which nature has withheld from him? If not,
why
1
1
320
B
NATURAL RELIGION
why is no mention made of them in the natural
ftate? or are they not natural to man, becauſe
not practicable in a fictitious folitary brutal ftate?
Why not rather argue thus? As the powers na-
turally innate to man can be exercifed only in
a focial life, therefore a focial life muſt be na-
tural to man.
Can man be without reflexion, without
fpeech, reafon, ingenuity, and invention? Is he
not thereby adapted for the perception of gene-.
ral and clear ideas, for comprehending truth, for
reaſoning, for forefight of what is to come; for
arts and ſciences; for the knowledge of himself,
of the world, and his Creator? Why then has
nature implanted in man, and in him only, the
idea of beauty, proportion, fymmetry, and per-
fection in things without us, in ourſelves, and in
others; but that we might enjoy a ſublime plea-
fure in the contemplation of the world, might
make ourſelves and others more perfect, and
uniformly practiſe every focial virtue? Nature'
hath given nothing in vain; fhe has certainly
appointed us for the uſe of our faculties and
powers. Hence it appears, that the only ſtate
natural to, and becoming a man, is that in
which his natural faculties, conferred on him
by the Creator as a peculiar privilege, can be
exerciſed on the contrary, that ſtate is un-
natural and inhuman which deprives us of the
uſe of all thoſe noble advantages, and reduces
us to the ſtate of a ftupid, dumb favage, paffing
his whole life in one continued indolent and*
torpid ſtate, without thought or fentiment.
SEC-
*
Defended and Illuftrated.
321
man;
#
SECTION IV.
Sometimes M. Rouffeau ſeems to confound
the exerciſe of the powers or faculties with
nature itſelf, and accounts a thing unnatural and
oppoſite to the nature of man, becauſe the ex-
erciſe of the powers does not take place of itſelf,
and out of the focial ftate: For he continually
affirms, that reflection, abftract ideas, fpeech,
general ideas, &c. are contrary to the nature of
and yet he grants that, together with
many other natural faculties, they develop them-
felves in the focial ftate. Thus, according to
him, nothing is nature, but a power that fpon-
taneouſly manifefts itſelf even in thoſe individuals
who live in a folitary ſtate; and all the reſt is
only fuperinduced and adventitious, out of na-
ture, and contrary to it. But the power, or innate
faculty and tendency, which conftitutes nature,
is, and ever refides in a thing; though the ex-
erciſe of ſuch power, through fome defect or
impediment, be not of itſelf, or in every ftate
and fituation, carried into practice. The exer-
cife of the natural powers frequently fuppofing
a certain definite ftate or circumftance, as a con-
dition in the want of which, the actual exerciſe
of the powers of nature does not take place;
though the nature or effence of every thing con-
tinues immutable. Here we may appeal to the
nature of inanimate things, whoſe action, through
fome outward obftructions, may be hindered for
ages; but, by an alteration of circumftances, it
Y
will
322
NATURAL RELIGION
will immediately. fhew its permanency: Befides,
animate Beings furnish us with numberless in-
ſtances of the fame kind.
It is the nature of the bees to make wax and
honey, and with the former to build cells, and
to lay up the honey in them: But the practice
of this natural propenfity is connected with theſe
circumftances; viz. there muſt be a whole
fwarm of bees affembled together, and they muft
have a queen to prefide over them. If a fingle
bee was to be put in a hive with flies or other
infects, or if the queen was taken from a ſwarm,
the exerciſe of their powers is immediately fuf-
pended; and yet the nature of the bee remains
perfectly the fame: fo that it must thence be
concluded, that a ftate or circumftance in which
the natural faculties of an animal may be brought
into action, is natural to that animal, and con-
formable to its nature; and, on the contrary,
that a ftate or circumftance that obftructs the
exerciſe of its natural powers, is contrary to its
nature. M. Rouffeau deals with his original
man, juſt as if he was to place a bee among
flies, or other infects, and, becauſe it collects no
honey or wax in fuch a diſagreeable fituation,
was to conclude that the nature of bees leads to
no fuch thing; but that it is rather contrary to
their nature, and a quality acquired by mixing
in fociety. He firſt tranſlates his primitive man
from the natural ſtate of human fociety, into an
unnatural ſtate among brutes; and then, from
the want of exercifing his natural powers, draws
a conclufion againſt the whole nature of man.
One
i
Defended and Illustrated:
323
One error generally begets another for as
M. Rouffeau difowns true nature, and does not
diftinguiſh the exercife of the natural powers,
together with the conditions annexed to it, from
nature itſelf; he could not have any juſt idea of
what is either natural, unnatural, or contrary to
nature. This eſpecially betrays itſelf, when he tells
us,
that freedom of choice and reflexion in men,
are not to be accounted natural; and farther re-
preſents fociety, fpeech, reflexion, the forming of
general and abſtract ideas, knowledge, the arts and
fciences, and poffibly alfo humanity, friendſhip,
virtue, and religion, as mere inftitutions, and all
unnatural. As if, in the nature of man, as in
mechanical powers and the inftincts of animals,
every thing was fo circumfcribed, that he muſt
act by a blind impulfe, without forethought, and
only in one way. But the pre-eminent nature
of man confifts in this very thing, viz. that by
underſtanding and reflexion, he can voluntarily,
according to the rules of truth and perfection,
determine on that to which he is not blindly
impelled by nature, and which yet correfponds
with his nature. Now, the uſe of reaſon, and
the noble operations of the underſtanding and
will, of which it is productive, flow from the
rational or reflective faculty. Therefore, the uſe
of found reaſon, with the noble operations of the
underſtanding and will, of which it is produc-
tive, are, in themſelves, natural to man; and
the focial converfible ftate, correfponding with
the uſe of found reaſon, and the exerciſe of the
underſtanding and will accompanying it, in
Y 2
which
1
KA
324
NATURAL RELIGION
which the dignity of human nature confifts, is
the natural ſtate of man. On the contrary, a
brute-man, who has no congenial inftincts, found
reafon, or other powers of his own, but only
imitates the propenfities of other creatures, is an
animal without nature; and ſuch an imitation
is quite unnatural: confequently, a favage lonely
ftate among brutes, in which reaſon, and all
the powers that characteriſe a man, are buried
and rendered uſeleſs, is not a ſtate natural to
man, or a ſtate congruent with his nature; but
a moſt unnatural ftate, in which nothing that is
human can be exerted by him. The innate
rules of found reafon, contrary to, or without
which, men cannot premeditately think on or
chufe any thing, are the rules of congruity, or
contrariety, the end of which is the knowledge
of truth; and the rules that direct us to the
purſuit of what is good and perfect, and to the
avoidance of what is evil and imperfect, the end
of which is happineſs. Therefore every thought
and defire which correfponds with this rule,
and leads us to the diſcovery of truth, the pof-
feffion of knowledge, and to perfection, is con-
gruent with our nature, and therefore natural.
Hence it is natural to man, by knowledge and
experience, to inveſtigate neceffary and beneficial
truths; and, by virtue and the fciences, to pro-
mote his own external and internal perfection and
happineſs, together with that of others. On the
other hand, it is quite unnatural for man to give
himſelf no concern about uſeful knowledge, but
to continue in a brutish ftate of dumb ignorance,
without
Defended and Illuftrated.
325
without in the leaft ufing his endeavours either
to make himſelf or others more perfect and
happy than the beaſts of the field; ſo as neither
to fulfil any duty, exerciſe any virtue, nor practiſe
any art. It is ſtill more unnatural, in defiance of
reaſon, to maintain contrarieties, and deny things
that are congruent; and it is a very unnatural
choice to promote imperfection, uneafinefs, and
wretchedneſs, in ourſelves and others. There-
fore let M. Rouffeau himfelf judge, whether his
whole ſyſtem be not utterly unnatural, and even
contrary to naturę.
SECTION V.
M. Rouffeau has likewife charged the focial
ſtate with evils barely accidental, as if they were
effential to it; though there are many abuſes
incidental to the ſocial ſtate, that does not render
that ftate unnatural in itſelf, nor prove it to be
pernicious. The beſt and moſt neceffary things
may be abuſed; but are they, therefore, to be
looked on as evil, corrupt, and pernicious? Rouf-
feau's declamation againſt the accidental incon-
veniencies of the ſocial ſtate, by no means proves
what he endeavours to demonftrate; and, what
is worſe, he not only propofes no expedient for
purging civil fociety of thofe evils, but deprives
us of all the good which we derive from that
ftate.
In drawing a compariſon between man and
brutės, we ſhall take care not to tranfgrefs by
our partiality to either fide: I ſhall not only fhew
Y 3
What
$
ง
326 NATURAL RELIGION
•
what we have in common with other animals,
but wherein they excel us, and vice versa. But,
first, it muſt in general be fuppofed, that the
great Creator has made both men, and brutes
capable of arriving at a certain degree of per-
fection, delight, and happineſs. The fuperiority
on either fide will point out to us the kind of
happineſs to which our nature is adapted, and
has a tendency.
#
S E C TI O N VỊ
What man has in common with brutes, is
chiefly a fenfitive life in an organical body;
which we derive from our parents at our birth,
fupport by food, and then propagate our fpecies,
and die. Both have internal vital powers, which
perform their functions without any thought or
premeditation; both exert a voluntary motion of
the members, in order to move from one place
to another, or to uſe outward things.; to avert
danger, or for the relief and refreſhment of
their bodies. Both are endued with fenfes, and
have fenfible reprefentations of prefent objects
by their feeling, hearing, taſte, fight, and ſmell;
which are alfo accompanied with imagination
and memory, or a repreſentation and recollection
of what is paſt *. Both fpecies, by means of
* In attributing to animals fenfes, imagination, and memory,
as to man, I mean no further than a general conformation or re-
femblance, which, by no means, excludes the particular diverfities.
In man, the excellence of thofe faculties is heightened by a ma-
nifeft conſciouſneſs of them; whereas beafts feem not to have a
knowledge either of the paft or prefent, nor of themſelves, nor of
other things, in the fame manner as we have.
the
"
Defended and Illuftrated. 327
the fenfes, feel pleaſure and pain, and thereby
are united to a fenfitive defire or averfion; that
is, to certain paffions. Thus are we, in common
with brutes, fubjects of fenfitive happineſs or
mifery; and our paffions keep us continually
active in promoting the former, and avoiding
the latter. A natural inftinct prompts us to pro-
pagate our fpecies with a mate of the fame
kind, to love our young, to feed and protect
them. Laſtly, we are liable to the fame ge-
neral bodily accidents, arifing from the con-
nection of things, the laws of motion, and the
texture of our bodies; from our food and drink,
fair and foul weather, and the influence of the
●lements on the body. We may be hurt and
wounded by the ſhock of harder bodies; abortive
births fometimes happen among us, and man is
no leſs fubject to aches, difeafes, and death, than
the brute creation.
}
Hence we may conclude, that ſuch actions
which men, by the analogy of nature, have in
common with brutes, confidered in themſelves,
alfo correfpond with the human nature, and
confequently are conducive to thofe ends for
which the Creator defigned us. Herein con-
fifts the general law of nature, which the an-
cient civilians have faid to be fo called, becauſe
nature itſelf has taught it to every living crea-
ture; namely, to love itfelf, to endeavour to avert
all evil and danger, to propagate its fpecies, to
feed, cheriſh, and protect its offspring, &c.
Hence we fee, in particular, that God has
granted to us all the fenfitive pleaſure that other
animals
Y 4
1
}
328 NATURAL RELIGION
animals are capable of, and that we experience
it in the fame manner; the great Creator having
continually annexed thefe agreeable fenfations
with the natural ufe of the bodily powers and
fenfible organs; and confequently that it is con-
fiftent with the defign of the Supreme Being
that we ſhould feek and find part of our hap-
pineſs in organical delight.
SECTION
VII.
But in this fort of happineſs that proceeds
from fenfitive pleaſure, brutes have fome ad-
vantages above the human fpecies. It is not
one of the leaft of thoſe advantages, that brutes
do not want any clothing or artificial weapons,
any houfes or attendance; and confequently
they are under no neceffity of inventing, learn-
ing, and practising the feveral trades by which
thefe wants are fupplied. They bring their
cloathing, weapons, and other neceffaries into
the world with them; and if they ſtand in need
of any thing, nature has implanted in every
ſpecies an inſtinct and ſkill capable of acquiring
it, which they need only to follow, in order to
fupply all their neceffities at all times, without
error or diſappointment. Thoſe animals which
make uſe of dwellings, are able of themſelves to
dig or build them with amazing ſkill and ad-
drefs. Thoſe which uſe any covering or cloath-
ing, and even changes of apparel, nature has
taught to fpin or weave it, and to caft off their
old garments. If brutes fometimes are obliged
"
to
Defended and Illuftrated.
329
to ſeek their food with great trouble, or to pre-
pare it for uſe, or, to lay up in ſtore againſt a
ſeaſon of want; nature has inftructed them how
to earn their living, or feek their food; how to
prepare it for uſe, and to conftruct granaries
for laying it up before winter fets in. Are
they expofed to enemies, or liable to hurts and
diſeaſes? they are, on this account, provided
with arms, and the knowledge of the proper
remedies, and the most advantageous way of
ufing of them. In propagating their fpecies,
and the care of their young, there is no need of
inftructing them in the duties of the matrimo-
nial ſtate. At the propereft ſeaſon they ſelect a
mate, and prepare foft nefts for their young,
carefully warming, feeding, and, if neceflary,
fuckling them; and, on occafion, defending
them with an intrepidity of which at other times
they ſeem not to have the leaft fpark. If fome
fpecies of brutes be of a focial nature, the fun-
damental laws of a well-regulated common-
wealth are written in their hearts, and every
individual diſcharges his duty without com-
pulfion or puniſhment.
But how naked, how deſtitute, how ignorant
does man come into the world? What time and
labour has it coft the human fpecies to invent,
and bring to their prefent perfection, the arts
and ſciences fubfervient to their wants, conve-
niency, or pleaſure? On us nature has bestowed
no inſtinct or natural ſkill; the faculty of reaſon
is all we hold of her, in order to procure many
things which we cannot well be without. More-
}
over,
1
330 NATURAL RELIGION
}
over, the arts and fciences invented by that
faculty were, at firft, but rude and imperfect;
the improvement of them has been the work
of ages, and yet they are not carried to the
perfection of which they are capable: neither
are they hereditary in the families of artiſts ;
but muſt be continued by inftruction, and be
learned only by fedulous application, and that
in an imperfect manner. When the improve-
ment of arts or ſciences is neglected by men,
or when they difcourage the inventors of them,
they immediately decline, and the taſte of the
age becomes vitiated; it falls into a favage ig-
norance, and many inventions are utterly loft.
That reafon, which alone was given us in or-
der to attain to our happineſs, muſt be conti-
nually kept in action. The human ſpecies by
their bodily wants, and the want of
proper in-
ftincts, are referred to the uſe of their reaſon,
and the knowledge of themſelves and the
world; and are incited to perfeverance and di-
ligence, if they would avoid ignominy, pain,
and difquietude, and enjoy any degree of plea-
fure. Befides, the uſe of reaſon is alſo neceffary
to check the exorbitancy of our fenfual defires,
and to reſtrain thoſe abuſes by which any kind
of pleaſure that is within our reach, might turn
to our detriment.
SECTION VIII.
The wealthy and fashionable part of the
world will perhaps fay, Let thofe whofe por-
tion
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
33T
tion is poverty rack their minds with invention
and application. We have no occafion to ſtuff
our heads with deep fpeculations, to plan
ſchemes, or by ſtudy to embitter the enjoyments
which we can command at our eafe. Thank
Heaven! Our anceſtors have already made am-
ple provifion for us; mechanics, artiſts, and your
men of letters, are glad to wait on us when we
have need of them: Let it be our care to pleaſe
ourſelves, and to take our ſwing of pleaſure and
diverfions.
But not to infift, at preſent, that, without
the exerciſe of the underſtanding, there can be
no moderation in fenfual pleaſures; a man,
who has fuch ideas of things, would be far
from knowing himſelf, and, by gratifying his
nature in fuch a brutal manner, would utterly
wander from the path of human felicity. Sen-
fual pleaſure is not the only, nor the final, end
of human nature. Herein confifts one great
difference between men and brutes: when the
latter have ftilled the cravings of the fenfes ;
when they have eat and drank their fill, and
at the proper feafons have confummated their
Loves, they are in their way, perfectly ſatisfied;
their knowledge and defires extend no farther,
and they want nothing more. In reality, time
never appears tedious to them; ſtrangers to any
farther or higher gratifications, they have nei-
ther faculties nor aptitude, neither incentive to,
nor reliſh of them. They feek no fuperfluous.
delights; they are never follicitous about the
delicacy of food, and know nothing of the dif
quietudes
332
NATURAL RELIGION
quietudes of ambition. In fhort, they can, ac-
cording to their nature, be much ſooner ſatisfied,.
and at a cheaper rate, than the human fpecies.
But could man, without any trouble or art,
or even without any labour of the underſtand-
ing, obtain all the pleaſures he has in common
with brutes, would he then be happy? and
could his nature be perfectly fatisfied therewith?
would he not ſeek further and fublimer plea-
fures? would the human foul take up with
fuch trash? He cannot long hold out under fu-
perfluous fenfual pleaſures: neceffity requires
but little; the ftomach is foon filled, and the
pleaſures of love are momentary.
And if even
the temperate enjoyment of fenfual pleaſures be
not ennobled in us by ingenuity, taſte, under-
ſtanding, penetration, converfation, and fidelity,
it makes but a faint and languid impreffion on
and to him, who endeavours to extend them
beyond the neceffities of nature, the delightful
part entirely ceaſes: he clogs and weakens his
ſtrength, renders himſelf unfit for the pleaſure
he fo eagerly thirfts after; and, inftead of reap-
ing any pleaſure, involves himſelf in pain and
diſeaſes. Is he for entertaining himſelf in a
more elegant manner, with the innocent plea-
fures of the fight and hearing, with affemblies,,
plays or mufic, with fuperb houſes, gardens, &c.
yet thoſe when the novelty of them ceaſes, will
loſe their agreeableness, and become tafteleſs
and infipid, while the rational foul is not a whit
the better for theſe refinements. Man is by no
means created for the long enjoyment of any
us;
fenfual
Defended and Illuſtrated:
333
fenfual pleaſure; nor can the fatisfaction he
reaps from them, equal that of the brutes. He
who uſes them no further than neceffity re-
quires, or as refreſhments after more ferious oc-
cupations, and feafons them with wifdom and
gratitude to the benign Author of them, enjoys
greater and more exalted pleaſures, than the
fenfualift who makes it his daily employment
to gratify his appetites.
But is the remainder of our days to be a me-
lancholy, fluggiſh void? would not fuch an in-
active ftate render us a burden to ourſelves?
The human mind requires fomething farther.
Thus whether our induſtry be excited by neceſ-
fity, affection, avarice, or ambition, on one hand
neceffity, and, on the other hand paffion, (which
extends our defires above all bodily and external
wants) fhew that we cannot be fo eafily made
happy and contented as the brutes are. Are
theſe deſires then to be fatisfied by wealth or
honour? By no means: while they continue to
be paffions in us, we are not a ftep nearer to
folid content or real happineſs. A great increaſe
of wealth and abundance only doubles our toils
and cares, our folicitude and avarice; and empty
honour is a fleeting fhadow, which we eagerly
purfue, without ever getting it in our power.
Înward contentment is not to be procured by
wealth or honour, confidered in themſelves,
but flows from a concioufnefs of wiſdom and
virtue by which both of them were acquired,
and by which we are regulated in the uſe of
them.
Thus
334
NATURAL RELIGION
Thus it appears, every way, that man, ac-
cording to his nature, ftands in need of much
more to render him happy, than what makes
brutes perfectly fo according to their nature;
and that for the attainment of human happineſs,
we muſt exert thofe powers which diftinguiſh
us from the brute creation. Is not man poffeffed
of the more fublime faculties of underſtanding,
fagacity, and found reafon? Has he not a pleaf-
ing perception of regularity, and ſymetry, of
perfection, beauty, and defign in the productions
of nature and art. Does he not feel in himſelf
a defire after knowledge, an impulſe that excites
him to inveſtigate the conftitution, effence, pro-
perties, the cauſes and effects, of things? Does
he not obſerve that he is allured to the know-
ledge of himſelf, his nature, his intellectual
powers and affections, his origin, and the grounds
of his complacency, truft, and hope? Is he not
delighted with wisdom, courage, prudence, in-
genuity, benevolence, equity, affection, friend-
ſhip, fidelity, goodnefs, magnanimity, and every
virtue which he perceives in others? Does not
admiration, emulation, felf-love, nay his very
love of eaſe, ſpur him on to employ himſelf in
uſeful occupations, to delight in praiſe-worthy
exerciſes in order to attain fatisfaction and per-
fection, and to promote the common good?
Certainly he that is a ftranger to theſe noble
fentiments, or palls and vitiates the relish of
them; he who, fwayed by fenfe alone, would
fupprefs and choak the activity of the rational
faculties, muſt neceffarily experience, during an
I
irkſome
t
Defended and Illuftrated.
335
irkſome and tedious length of time, felf-con-
tempt, diſgrace, forrow and fear, by reaſon of
his ignorance, doubts, fervility and turpitude:
muſt feel the want of that perfection and hap-
pinefs which is peculiar to his nature, and be
pained with the reſtleſs ſtrugglings of his op-
preffed dignity. Nay, fome mental exercifes
are not fufficiently maſculine and improving for
the human mind, but ought to be looked upon
as puerile trifles, on which a man only fquan-
ders away his time, and fpends his life unprofit-
ably. Whatever brings no real benefit to our-
felves or others; whatever does not relieve our
neceffities, or promote our conveniency and
well-being; whatever does not enrich the un-.
derſtanding with the knowledge of important
truths, nor incline the will to virtue and bene-
volence, truft and hope, can never afford any
folid fatisfaction to mankind.
SECTION IX.
I fhall now fubjoin the third privilege that
Brutes enjoy beyond us with regard to the hap-
pineſs allotted to them: viz. they are not at
all troubled about futurity; while man on the
contrary, were he even poffeffed of all he could
defire, is frequently difturbed by a concern
about future events, and by that means embit-
ters his preſent gratifications.
It is evident from all that we obferve in
brutes, that, to reprefent to themſelves their
own future condition, or that of other things
about
336
•
NATURAL RELIGION
}
about them, is beyond their capacities. The
prefent fenfation puts them in mind of fome
craving of their nature, and an innate ſkill or
address directs them how to fatisfy it. In this
they act with pleafure; and having enjoyed
what they defired with undisturbed fatisfaction,
they are eafy and at reft. The morrow never
enters into their thoughts, and they very feldom
know any wants. They are never troubled with
anxiety or fear about any diftant or future cala-
mities; and even death itfelf comes upon them
unexpected, as they never had feen it before, or
been under any apprehenfions of grief or terror
at its approach.
But man's conceptions are not limited to pre-
fent objects; he will, he muft, look forward.
His underſtanding, by comparing the paſt with
the prefent, fhews him partly what is to come,
at leaſt the poffibility of certain future events.
He confiders the various chances and accidents,
good or bad, which may fall out in the future
courfe of his life; he forms fchemes of happi-
nefs; he meditates and computes; he exerts all.
his prudence and fkill to remove every thing
that may obftruct the defign he has in view.
Nevertheleſs he cannot plainly fee into the courſe
of things; the way before him is intercepted by
a dark cloud. Hope and fear accompany him
on either fide, and happineſs and mifery feem
to wait for him at a diftance. Nay, when man
has reached the propofed end of his moft ardent
wifh, his defires immediately take wing, and
reach forward to infinitude. Among all thefe
and
Defended and Illuftrated.
337
endleſs endeavours after an uncertain happi-
nefs, he is, in reality, haftening to certain death.
In fhort, it is againſt the nature of man, on
the one fide, not to think beforehand; and, on
the other, to expect without emotion the future
calamities that are poffible, and death which is
certain and inevitable. Hence it follows that,
with all our boafted underſtanding, which is fo
very keen-fighted, we fhall be much more un-
happy than brutes, if we do not improve it to
wiſdom and virtue, which alone will always
remain with us, and can promife us as lafting
content; and if it does not bring us to the
acknowledgment of an all-wife, benign, and
powerful Creator and governor of the world,
under whoſe providence and protection we may
be ſecure, and who, even by theſe natural con-
ceptions and defires of future good, quickens
our hopes, and incites us to the purfuit, of a
fublimer and more lafting felicity.
SECTION X.
It appears from the premiſes, that men, by
the want of fome advantages which are granted
to brutes, are under a neceffity of ufing their
reafon. Now if, on the contrary, it can be
proved, they owe to their reafon all the advan-
tages they enjoy fuperior to brutes, then will it
be alfo manifeft, that their deficiency in this
reſpect, is made a means of far greater advan-
tages. But as all the benefit and advantage
which animate Beings do or can enjoy, muſt be
looked
1
Z
338
NATURAL RELIGION
i
looked upon as the end which the Creator had
In his view; fo muft it likewiſe be the defign of
the Deity that man ſhould uſe his reaſon, and
thereby attain to advantages and pre-eminences
proper to his rational nature.
*
Though man, by nature, not only ftands
equally in need of corporeal things as brutes do,
but labours under a much greater; yet, inftead
of having their inftinct and innate ſkill, he
comes into the world quite helpleſs and igno-
rant. This deftitute ſtate lays him under a ne-
ceffity of exerting his peculiar gift of reaſon, to
make up for his other deficiencies; accordingly
the human ſpecies being affembled together by
neceffity, have invented vocal figns, or a lan-
guage, in order to impart to each other their
thoughts and concerns. They have ranſacked
the bowels of the earth, and all nature, to di-
verfify their food, apparel, habitations, and uten-
fils: They have fucceffively invented, and im-
proved one mechanic art after another. They
have obferved the courfe of the ſtars, in order to
regulate the time for agriculture and their voy-
ages to other countries. Architecture, commerce,
and the divifion of territories proved the ſources
of Arithmetic and Geometry. The accidents
to which the human body is obnoxious put
them on inventing various medicines. That mén
might live in ſafety, and be provided againſt
rapine and violence, and at the fame time might
enjoy the conveniency of a focial life, regular
focieties were founded; towns were built, laws
inftituted, and magiftrates appointed. The more
men
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
339
7
men had fupplied their bodily wants, the more
they experienced the happy effect of a proper
ufe of their reafon, the higher fenfe they began
to entertain of the excellence of their rational
faculties, and to know the diftinguiſhing happi-
nefs to which they lead. Now, if that neceffary
inſtinct, ſkill, and canning which are obſerved
in brutes had been natural or hereditary to the
human fpecies, they would have had neither
capacity for, nor incentive to, any higher degree
of perfection. But our natural want of inferior
endowments, compels us to make ourſelves am-
ple amends for it by dint of our own faculties;
and as this can only be done by the exercife of
reaſon, knowledge, induftry, and morality, our
very imperfections point us out the way to a
much higher ſtate of perfection. Let us, there-
fore, take a view likewife of the principal ad-
vantages which are offered to us above the brute
creation, if we will follow the inclinations of
nature, and behave like reaſonable Beings.
SECTION XI.
First, by the uſe of reafon we acquire even in
fenfitive things, very eminent advantages above
the brute creation. Our palate is gratified by a
variety of pleaſing taſtes, which are procured by
an elegant choice of food, and to which brutes
are utter ftrangers. Their hearing, being in a
natural uncultivated ftate of wildnefs, is delight-
ed only with one particular found or modulation
of the voice. Brutes are feldom obferved to
Z 2
mind
+
340 NATURAL RELIGION
}
mind the notes of a different fpecies of animals,
or to listen to the harmony of mufic which
works fo powerfully on the human mind. Lan-
guage is quite beyond their capacity; and their
natural converfation confifts only of inarticulate
founds, making known certain wants or fenfa-
tions. Their fight has no perception of variety,
form, fymmetry, or refemblance; of the mingling
of colours, fhades, beauty and proportion. The
utmost delight which they know of, or have
within their power, extends no farther than the
fatisfying the moſt craving of their wants.
By theſe inſtances, I would willingly put
mankind in mind, that all theſe various enter-
tainments and pleaſures of the ſenſes, form but
the very leaſt part of the advantages we enjoy
above the brute creation.
SECTION XII.
The fecond advantage which man enjoys
above brutes, confifts in the intellectual delights
which ariſes in him by furveying the beauties of
art and nature; the mental pleaſure hè derives
from truth, and knowledge, from hiſtory and
invention, from converſation and genius. Man
alone has a capacity and defire to inveſtigate the
conftitution and caufes of things, by his penetra-
tion to afcend from himſelf, and from animate
and inanimate nature, to the firſt inviſible Cauſe,
the infinite moft perfect Being, and to make
fuch knowledge a fource of the fublimeſt and
moſt raviſhing pleafure. To theſe gratifications
brutes
!
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
341
#
{
}
brutes are utter ſtrangers; nor have the titilla-
tions of fenfe the leaſt part in exciting them. Yet
the excellencies of this knowledge are far fupe-
rior to all fenfual pleaſures; it imparts to the
human mind its genuine food, its true vigour,
and, at the ſame time, an innocent and exalted
pleaſure. This will more plainly appear from
the following contraſt.
The enjoyment of fenfible things is limited to
a narrow circuit, beyond which if they are ex-
tended, they ceaſe to be pleaſures. But the foul
is ever capable of an increaſe of knowledge,
and the more it has acquired, the more it thirſts
after it; its capacity for farther improvements
increaſes, and the pleaſures accruing to it from
fuch acquifitions, inftead of abating or ceafing,
regale the human mind with ever-growing
delight. Senfual enjoyments may imperceptibly
be carried to excefs; and we may feveral ways
be miſled by bodily indulgencies, ſo as to impair
our health and ſtrength, our reputation and ſub-
ftance, and to bring on ourfelves pain, infamy,
forrow and remorfe. But of true knowledge,
who can ſay, that it is carried to excefs, or is
pernicious? on the contrary, knowledge is ever
improving, ever delighting us, and brings no
forrow or remorfe with it.
The organs and powers of the body naturally
become more blunt and languid in the decline
of life. The pleaſures of fenfe leave us, how-
ever defirous we may be of retaining them; by
degrees we grow out of conceit with life; and
the whole material world no longer affords any
joy
Z 3
342
NATURAL RELIGION
joy or delight. But if only the faculty of think-
ing remains found and entire, the foul improves
in vigour, fagacity, fcience, and wifdom. A
delight in truth, and defire of intellectual im→
provements, accompany us till death, and even
far beyond the term of life and the extent of
our preſent faculties.
Senfual pleaſures ceafe with the fleeting en-
joyment of them; the remembrance of them is
a mere dream; the ftrength which food, &c.
had imparted to the body again languifhes. But
knowledge remains with us as long as we live;
it becomes a property, a perfection, interwoven,
as it were, with the effence of the foul. We
can reflect on it whenever we pleaſe, and the
pleaſure and benefits of recollection fall little
fhort of our first acquifition of it; especially
fince the bare ſurvey of our ſtore of truths, can-
not but be productive of new degrees of know-
ledge.
If, with the pleaſures of fenfe, we compare
in particular the knowledge of God, of his moſt
wife and gracious views in the creation and dif-
pofition of the world, and the influence it has
on our tranquillity and contentment; the plea-
fures of the underſtanding, which are derived
from the fource of all perfection, muft be al-
lowed infinitely to furpafs all the gratifications
which we have in common with brutes. But
this fpeculation is too extenfive to be properly
purſued in this place. Something of it has been
faid above; but I fhall referve a farther difcuf
fion of this fubject for the conclufion of this
book.
I
Defended and Illuftrated.
343
p
I am well aware, that it is not given to every
man to be knowing and learned; ncr are all
the learned capable of invention, or the more
fublime ſciences. However, all of us, as men,
can perceive, obferve, reflect, think, and read
what others have invented, obferved, and at-
chieved. There are many beneficial and agree-
able fpeculations which require no great learn-
ing, and preſent themfelves in converfation, in
Hiſtory Travels, works of genius, Divinity,
and Morality; in the improvement of agricul-
- ture, and gardening; in furveying the variety of
animals, vegetables, and every part of nature,
and admiring the wifdom and goodness of the
Creator fo confpicuouſly diſplayed in it. Thus,
it very rarely happens that a man, through want
of genius or opportunity, cannot partake of fuch
gratifications as raife mankind above all brutai
or fenfual pleaſures.
?
SECTION XIII.
The third privilege which we enjoy above
the brutes flows from the preceding; and that
is a rational knowledge of God, of the univerſe,
and of our own nature, which affords a generous
pleaſure to the mind, arifing from the perfection
of others, as well as our own.
Every animal, in its kind, has indeed the en-
joyment of the pleaſures which are conveyed by
the organs of fenfe; but has no enjoyment of the
perfection of thofe organs; its felf being without
any conſciouſneſs cr perception of it. Every
fpecies
24
344 NATURAL RELIGI O N
i
}
fpecies, in their corporeal parts that contribute to
life, fenfation, motion, and propagation, is of a
moſt admirable ſtructure, and withal furniſhed
with neceffary inſtincts and ſkill; but not one
of them is capable of knowing or taking delight
in its own perfection, whether it lies in the for-
mation of the body, or the powers of the foul.
The variety, order, and harmony of things with-
out them, are, as it were, invifible to brutes;
and confequently they are not at all affected by
them. Beauty, art, and defign make no impreffion
on them; not to mention their utter incapacity
of elevating their minds to the contemplation of
the fountain and origin of all perfections, or of
knowing any thing of the amiableness of virtue.
It is man alone who fees or perceives what is
fpiritual in the things that are on earth: It is
not by any ftimulation of our fenfible organs
caufed by inanimate matter, but by a peculiar
energy of the fublimer faculties of the foul, that
we perceive the beauty, art, perfection, and de-
fign of things, admire them, and delight in the
fpeculative knowledge of them. It is our un-
derſtanding alone which knows the import and
true fignification of the letters written in the
book of nature, and, in the difplay of the high-
eft wiſdom and love, perceives the fupremely-
perfect Cauſe. And this knowledge raviſhes,
and delights the mind in a manner far tranf-
cending all the titillations of the groffer fenfes.
This feeds, ftrengthens, and enlivens the foul, as
a Being abstracted from the body. This alone
fixes the mind in a folid tranquillity, and infpires
it
Defended and Illuftrated.
345
i
it with noble defires of a felicity ſuitable to our
nature. Befides, in the knowledge and con-
verfation of fuch perfons as exhibit an image of
perfection, we find a certain complacency to
which brutes are entire ftrangers. The expe-
rience, knowledge, and ingenuity of fuch; their
mental endowments; their delicate táfte, and
judgement; their courage, prudence, and tem-
perance; their honour, fidelity and benevolence;
their friendſhip, gratitude, equity, juſtice, and
other virtues, draw us to them with the cords
of love; and the moſt abandoned perfons can-
not withhold their efteem and reverence, from
fuch an affemblage of mental and moral perfec-
tions.
However, nothing is nearer to us than our-
felves, and in order to act like men, we muſt not
mould our underſtanding and will only accord-
ing to the perfection of others, but chiefly after
the Divine pattern, and the laws and defign
which God has exhibited in the nature of things;
by which means we attain to real perfection,
and have a well-grounded reafon to rejoice in,
and be delighted with our own perfections. No
idea can be fo pleafing to us, as that which re-
prefents us amiable in our own eyes.
The gifts of nature and fortune are, indeed,
agreeable to us; we are pleafed with the elegant,
form, the health, ftrength and vigour of our
bodies, the quicknefs and acuteness of our fenfi-
ble organs, our memory, fancy, fagacity, and
reafon; we are pleafed with an honourable de-
fcent and confanguinity, with wealth, eaſe, dig-
nity,
1
346 NATURAL RELIGION
*
nity, and honour. But nothing flatters us in a
more agreeable, delightful manner, than what
we owe to our own endeavours, and have made,
as it were our own, efpecially with regard to
intellectual improvements. When, by converfa
tion, enquiries, obfervation, reading, reflection,
and invention, we have acquired a remarkable
degree of knowledge, wifdom, and fkill; when
we have difpoſed and habituated our inclinations
to pure, benevolent, and noble views; when we
have a confciouſneſs of the performance of our
duty, of virtuous endeavours, and praiſe-worthy
actions; when we have irradicated our minds
with an unclouded complacency, a ferene forti-
tude, and confident hope; we then enjoy a
pleaſure, which preponderates every other confi-
deration, and renders us truly happy.
2
I muſt farther fubjoin another compariſon,
which daily experience renders neceffary. The
capacity we diſcover in our underſtanding, is
certainly a very agreeable object of our fpecula-
tion; yet the keeneſt intellect, and the moſt ex-
tenfive knowledge, frequently caufe men to fall
into difquietudes, if the will does not acquiefce
in the ends which God had in view when he
created us. He never can enjoy himſelf; all
the gifts of nature and fortune cannot ſatisfy that
man, who tortures himſelf with difcontent and
envy, when he fees others crówned with the
advantages of body, mind, or fortune. Or if
others are fimple, ignorant, weak and vicious,
this again fills him with contempt and hatred :
or, perhaps, the world is wanting in the esteem,
· honour,
A
Defended and Illuftrated.
347
honour, affection, and praiſe, that are due to
him; and this racks him with indignation, ran-
cour, and malignity. Befides, he labours, by
his fagacity and knowledge, to diſcover fome
flaw in nature, to cenfure providence, to exclude
God out of the world, and to give himſelf up,
without any comfortable hope or truft, to a
blind deſtiny or lawless chance. In fhort, all
the talents of fuch a man ferve only to render
him more uneafy and wretched; just as the
miſers abundant wealth only induces him to
make the lefs ufe of it, and live the more penu-
riouſly. The perfection of the will is wanting
in both; and it is that which muſt give the
right turn to our contentment, and without it,
no enjoyments or advantages can reach the hu-
man heart. Man is chiefly born for rational
complacency and inclinations. The more he
knows, ſeeks, loves, and enjoys his own perfec-
tion and that of other things, agreeably to the
concatenation of Beings in the world, the greater
is his felicity; and according to his ftate, he
may be far happier than any other animal, if he
does but regulate his will by the great end, for
which the providence of God has placed him in
the world.
+
SECTION XIV.
There is ftill another important advantage
which eminently diftinguiſhes man above other
animals. They indeed, by their fenfible organs
and instincts, acquire a certain degree of perfec-
tion,
348 NATURAL RELIGION
:
tion, and of delight and happineſs flowing from
it: But they are all confined within the fame
immoveable limits, and cannot go a hair's
breadth farther. One bird, for inftance, of a
certain fpecies, does not build its neft of a diffe
rent form or materials, or more curiously, or
more compactly than another; and the modern
feathered race have made no manner of im-
provements in the architecture of their prede
ceffors. Spiders alfo, in weaving their webs,
keep to the old faſhion which obtained among
their ſpecies fome thouſands of years fince. The
tuneful modulations and warbling notes of the
nightingale, are the fame as they were in the
days of Adam. The bees invariably obferve
that œconomy and government, of which they
have always experienced the benefits. In fhort,
no brute, or ſpecies of animals, can advance in
perfection; they are at once, without any in-
duſtry or application of theirs, as perfect as they
ever will or can be. But this is all organical;
and they know no higher perfection than what
defcends to them hereditarily: they have no in-
clination for any thing higher, and confequently
have no defire, nor ufe any endeavours, to im-
prove either themfelves, or their condition.
Man, on the contrary, comes into the world
without any limited fkill or inftinct; but he has
an unlimited underſtanding, a will ever defirous
of higher perfection, and a rational freedom to
chooſe the beſt means in order to attain his
ends. This makes man the only animal on the
face of the earth, who is capable of improve-.
ment,
Defended and Illuftrated.
349
+
ment, and becomes more perfect than his an
ceftörs, and even than himfelf when in his in-
fancy. Arts, commerce and navigation daily
improve among the human fpecies; and noble
improvements are continually made in the fci-
ences eſpecially in experimental philoſophy,
geometry, and natural hiftory.
The only question here, is, whether the men
of this age are likewife improved in virtue and
morality. I could heartily with, that this quef
tion would not admit of any diſpute: However,
it appears to me, that, at leaft, feveral barbarous
cuſtoms, fome inhuman and unnatural vices,
which once were very common, have been ex-
ploded, and are now held in abhorrence, partly
by the prevalence of a better tafte, partly by
wife laws and ordinances, and partly by the in-
troduction of a nobler and purer religion. But
it ſeems entirely to depend on proper regulations
in the polity of ftates, and in the education of
youth, more effectually to check the vices which
ftill prevail. Mankind is ſtill, in general, capable
of a much greater degree of perfection, not only
with regard to the underſtanding, but alfo to
the will; and as the virtues are more congruous
to human nature than the vices, there is no
doubt but pofterity, by their natural and united
efforts towards a greater degree of perfection,
may far ſurpaſs the prefent generation in virtue.
and knowledge. In confidering individuals a-
mong men, and comparing them with other
animals, the difference between them is ftill
more confpicuous. Every animal is born with
all
1
{
350 NATURAL RELIGION
L
all the perfection it will ever attain tô. It can-
not improve itſelf by any application, induftry
or fagacity; it never, in the leaſt, thinks of any
fuch thing. It has no idea of any thing better;
no hope, with or defire, after what is to come,
or what may poffibly happen. On the contrary,
every man is always endeavouring to advance
towards perfection; and there is not one of us,
who, during this life, becomes fo perfect in re-
ality, as he could, or would wifh to be. After
the moſt affiduous endeavours, guided by all the
wiſdom he is mafter of, man ever falls fhort of
his ideas, powers, and defires. However happy,
great, powerful, rich, beloved, and honoured
however learned, fkilful, fagacious and prudent;
nay, however generous and benevolent, tempe-
rate and virtuous, he may be; yet has he ſtill an
idea of a much higher degree, and more refined
kind, of perfection. This he is not yet poffeffed
of, though he thinks himſelf qualified for it,
and ardently wiſhes, and longs for, and ftrives
to attain it. In a word, our defires ever fhoot
beyond the mark we have reached, and extend
to infinitude; no man is ſo abſolutely eaſy and
contented, as not to admit of a progreffion and
augmentation of happiness.
SECTION XV.
But fhould a man follow his nature; that is,
fhould he, befides his rational endeavours after
friendſhip, a comfortable fubfiftence, honour, and
the pleaſures of fenfe, feek his principal point of
con-
1
4
Defended and Illuſtrated. 351
contentment in the perfection of the underſtand-
ing and will; I fay, fhould he act thus, will he
then be able, in this world, to fatisfy his nature,
that is, can he render himſelf abfolutely eaſy
and happy?
It is eafily feen that, in this queſtion, both
the obſtructions to our eaſe and content, and
the helps nature has furniſhed us with againſt
thofe obftacles, are to be confidered. To the
former, I can readily anfwer; fince it relates to
what every one knows from his own experience.
Our natural tendency is thwarted by ſo many
obſtructions both external and internal, as render
it quite impracticable to fatisfy it fo abfolutely,
that nothing better or farther remains to be
wifhed for. The connection of corporeal things
in the world fubjects us to many diſagreeable
incidents not to be foreſeen or obviated; which
however, not only give us pain when they re-
ally happen, but even before that, the very ap-
prehenfion of them, as poffible, fills us with
anxiety and difquietude. Thoſe with whom
every one chiefly converfes, together with the
cuſtoms of fociety, and the tenor of the times
in which we live, many ways traverſe our de-
figns. Thus when, by theſe cauſes, our plea-
fure, our honour, or our well-being fuffers, or at
Teaſt is hindered from afcending to the wifhed
for height, we fret, and are often overwhelmed
with dejection. How many pains, ailments,
and difeafes affault our bodies? Death is certain;
but the time of it is uncertain, and the manner
of it is unknown to us. Our mind, by educa-
tion
$
352
NATURAL RELIGION
tion and intercourse, fometimes receives a bad,
and fometimes a good tincture, and, in its func
tions and enjoyments, chiefly depends on the
conftitution of the body. And fhould we uſe
the greateſt attention and diligence towards ac-
quiring a true, folid, and beneficial knowledge,
towards the complete diſcharge of our duty, the
practice of virtue, friendſhip, and philanthropy;
yet we ſhall be far from fteering clear of every
error and overfight, from attaining to that height
of knowledge we aim at, and from entirely re-
ducing all our affections and ſenſual appetites to
the dominion of reaſon; neither will the moſt
circumfpect deportment and unexceptionable
behaviour gain us the love, friendſhip, and ef
teem of all men.
It is very certain that a great deal of imper-
fection and difquietude may be avoided, or at
leaft alleviated and foftened, and that much real
good may be acquired, and many important en-
joyments be procured, by vigilance, wisdom, and
virtue: But a ftate of perfection and happineſs,
every way adequate to our defires, is not to be
hoped for here; and the greateft precaution,
wiſdom, and virtue, are not fufficient to preferve
us from all vexation and uneafinefs. Our cafe
is fo much worſe than that of the brutes, that a
drachm of preſent pain or forrow, in our eſti-
mate, outweighs many pounds of paft gratifica-
tions, and that we foreſee and anticipate evils
at leaſt, that our wishes extend our defires and
efforts very far beyond the greateſt happineſs
and good fortune that is attainable in this life.
1
;
And
Defended and Illuftrated.
353
And though the whole courſe of human life
were tranquil, fortunate, and happy; yet the
hearer it approaches towards death, the idea of
a certain determined period or conclufion, would
naturally embitter it with anxiety and terrour.
•
I now ſpeak of man, confidered abſtractedly
from religion, in order to fhew that no degree
of wisdom and virtue will content our nature,
unleſs we elevate our minds to the knowledge
of the Supreme Being, and his defigns in creat-
ing the world. For as, without this knowledge,
the underſtanding never can diſcover a fatisfac-
tory cauſe and the connection of things, nor
the perfection of the world; fo neither can the
human mind be eſtabliſhed in a folid tranquility
without being poffeffed with love and reverence
towards our Creator, a thorough reliance on his
gracious providence, and the hope of a more
perfect and endleſs mode of exiftence for which
the Supreme Being has defigned us. Therefore
it will not be foreign to my purpoſe to eſtabliſh
theſe two great truths, namely, the doctrine of
a Divine Providence, and the Immortality of the
Soul as the baſis of our contentment, and tran-
quility of mind; and to conclude with ſhewing
in the cleareſt manner, how very much our
happineſs is influenced by Religion.
+
A a
DISSER-
1
}
}
354
NATURAL RELIGIO N
DISSERTATION VIII.
{
Of Providence; in which feveral Objections raised
against it are confuted.
T
SECTION I.
HE Providence of God is a confequence
of the creation; thoſe internal perfections
of wiſdom, goodneſs, and power, which moved
the Deity to bring the world into exiſtence ac- *
cording to a pre-conceived plan for a certain
end, extend their influence throughout the whole
duration of the world, and to every part, ftate,
and circumſtance of it. For it would be wrong-
ing thoſe infinite perfections of God, to fay, that
either his wiſdom did not in the firſt formation
moft clearly foreſee how the whole contexture and
difpofition of the future world would correfpond
with his defign; or that, with fuch a knowledge
of
every future incident, he did not at once and
unalterably determine the events which were to
correſpond with the end he had in view; or,
laftly, to fay that fomething can exift out of
God, and independently of his power. There-
fore not the ſmalleſt matter can at any time
have exifted or come to paſs in the whole uni-
verfe, which God had not foreſeen from eternity,
or the exiſtence of which does not depend on his
operation.
I
Hence
{
2
1
J
*
Defended and Illuftrated.
355
,*
Hence it appears that to deny a divine Pro-
vidence, is to deny the very being of God and
his perfections, together with the work of crea-
tion. To fuppofe any thing to be in the world
which the Creator did not foreſee, or which he
expected to fall out otherwiſe, is nothing leſs than
to limit his underſtanding, and, inftead of om-
niſcience and the moſt perfect wiſdom, to attri-
bute to him ignorance, fhort-fightedness, pre-
cipitancy, inconfiftency, and error. If it be faid,
that God no longer troubles himſelf with the
world and its trifling incidents, this is to meaſure
the Divine Knowledge and Will on the minute
ſcale of human weakneſs. For fuch a fuppo-
fition implies that, in God, the exiſtence of
things muſt precede the knowledge of them, as
it does in men; as if the Deity could not know
what really exifts, without an attentive furvey of
it, and yet looked upon fuch things as not worth
his notice. But the Divine Knowledge does by
no means depend on the exiſtence of things; fo
far from it, that the exiftence of things entirely
depends on God's knowledge and determination.
Nothing that is fortuitous can ever exift, which
has not a perfect poffibility; and nothing of that
kind can be poffible, which was not before con-
ceived and comprehended in the infinite under-
ftanding; in which, at once and in the greateſt
clearneſs, all poffibility was prior to real exiſtence.
This therefore is the effential fource of all that
is poffible; this, without any temporary fore-
thought, examination, or effort, reprefents to it-
felf whatever has a fufficient cauſe of exiſtence
A a 2
in
{
}
y
356
NATURAL RELIGION
in the connection of things: and herein there is
nothing too mean or too little for his notice
fince the Creator fees his great defigns totally
and abfolutely fulfilled, through the whole courfe
of time, by the harmony of the ſmalleſt parts.
This knowledge is likewiſe a conftant motive
to the divine volition, for maintaining the world
unalterably in its entire fubfiftence and its whole
duration. For if God's decree concerning actuak
occurrences and the means conducive to them
did alter, his motives to this change muſt be dif-
ferent from thoſe by which he acted at firft; and
confequently his former defigns and determina-
tions would be deficient in wiſdom and good-
nefs, and he muſt have erred in his choice either
at first, or afterwards; which is inconfiftent with
the Divine perfections.
But how could the world remain unaltered
according to the will of God, without the inter-
vention of the Divine power to maintain its actual
exiſtence? It is certain that the cauſe or ground
of its exiſtence is not in itſelf, or in nature: For,
unleſs it had been created by God, it could
never have exifted; fo that the firft exiftence of
the world muft have been the immediate effect
of an act of the Divine power. Now, the only
change produced in the nature of the world by
creation is, that, from being before but barely
poffible, it is now become a real fubfifting world;
and its first exiſtence can by no means be an in-
dependent or efficient caufe of its fubfequent
duration. Therefore, the world can either at
this inftant, nor at any other period of its dura-
tion,
Defended and Illuftrated.
357
+
tion, be the caufe or ground of its fubfiftence.
As it was at firft created a world; it cannot have
become independent and felf-exiftent; in a word,
it cannot be God: The ſecond, third, and fourth
moments of its exiftence, as well as the first,
depended entirely on the power of the felf-
exiſtent Creator; and, by his continued opera-
tion only, its duration can be upheld. If it was
God's will that a-world fhould remain in actual
exiſtence, which could not continue fo by its
own nature; it implies that God, by the energy
of his power, would uphold every part of that
world, and conduct it according to his pre-con-
ceived plan.
Some perfons, perhaps, may object, that as an
artiſt can conftruct a machine, which will after-
wards regularly move according to the end he
had in view, without his ever putting his hand
to it; fo, after the great Architect of the univerfe
had compleated the more perfect work of the
creation, we may conclude that the world now
fubtiſts and acts by itſelf, and anſwers all the
defigns, without any intervention of the
of God.
power,
But this objection is founded on a fuppofition
that is utterly falſe; for man does not in the
leaft contribute to the duration of a machine.
The fubftance and the power of it exiſted before
the artiſt had employed his ſkill to conftruct it:
He borrows them both from nature, and only
gives to the fubftance a determinate figure, dif
pofition, and conformity, that the natural power
may produce the propofed effect. The fubftances
A a 3
that
358
NATURAL RELIGION
}
that compoſe the machine, owe not their dura
tion and continuance, their inward power, and
folidity, to the artificer. Therefore he may well
leave it to itself; for what came into being with-
out his concurrence, may alfo fubfift without his
intervention. But it does not thence follow, that
the fubftances originally exiſt and continue with-
out a ſuperior Being, and ſtand in no longer need
of a preferver.
SECTION II.
Hitherto a Divine Providence has been proved
from thoſe operative properties of the moſt im-
mediate influence in the work of creation; a
furvey of the world itſelf will, in the next place,
afford a lively conviction of the fame truths.
We here fuppofe what I have proved at large,
in the third Differtation, namely, that the world
was produced for the fake of all poffible fpecies
of animate Beings. In this furvey of the world
is diſplayed an infinite underſtanding, which has
thoroughly foreſeen all the operations of the
powers of nature, in their various combinations,
and at all times; and hath, as it were, counted,
weighed, and meaſured all things according to
the end it had in view; fo that the world might,
according to its primary conftruction, without
any further change in the laws of nature, remain
for ever in the very fame ftate and order, and
perfectly fulfill the Creator's defign, if ſuch were
the Divine pleaſure.
1
It
1
1
1
Defended and Illuftrated:
359
1
It is quite otherwiſe in machines conſtructed
by man for, by the want of an exact forefight,
the best machine which ever came from the
hands of the moſt ingenious artiſt, ſoon begins
to decline a little from the end propofed; and
this defect is continually increafing. This ir-
regularity and diſorder unquestionably has its
foundation in the firft conftruction of it, and
poffibly in fomething that is fo minute as to
eſcape the notice of the artift; for who is fo
fharp-fighted as, in the prefent ftate of his ma-
chine, to be able to difcern every thing that may
hereafter happen to it from latent caufes in the
machine itſelf?
The material univerfe is, as it were, a vaſt ma-
chine; but a machine confifting of an incom-
parably greater multiplicity and diverfity of parts
than any artificial piece of mechaniſm, and the
various defigns of it infinitely more numerous.
As the habitation of all poffible living creatures
of different ſpecies, it is divided into a vast num-
ber of luminous and opaque globes, the latter of
which move round the former in determinate
periods and orbits, in order to receive light and
warmth, day and night, and the heceffary viciffi-
tude of feafons, according to the conftitution of
the inhabitants of every globe.
Farther, the orbits of the planets are frequently.
interfected by the courfe of the comets, that ap-
proach them from the very remote regions of the
heavens. But the track of the comets through
our ſolar ſyſtem, which always ftands open to
A a 4
them,
*
360 NATURAL RELIGION
1
?
them, is not over the fame part; they come from
fo many different quarters, and their directions are
fo various, that ſometimes they paſs cloſe by the
fun, fometimes by this or that planet; and fore
men are not without apprehenfions, that if our
earth fhould eſcape one of theſe celeſtial bombs,
they may poffibly carry away one of our neigh-
bouring globes, or move our fun out of its place.
This is, at leaſt, what no aftronomer can inſure
us from.
The periods and courſes of all the planets are
punctually regular; they ftill obferve the fame
diſtance from the fun and from each other, as
they did at the beginning of the world; and their
attractive forces remain in the fame equilibrium
and proportion. All obfervations that have been
made on the fixed ftars for theſe two thouſand
years alfo agree, with refpect to their longitude,
latitude, and diſtance from the pole: the altitude
of the fun, the meridian line, day and night,
years and feaſons, are precifely the fame in all
parts of the world as they were at that time.
This is a palpable proof that the Author of Na-
ture, in the firſt pofition of the heavenly bodies,
their diſtance from each other, their laws, the
reciprocal attraction of their powers, and the di-
rection and velocity of their courfe, which he
fettled at the beginning, hath, for innumerable
ages, forefeen the future ftate of the world and
its parts, and provided that no accident fhall
happen to it, which fhall difturb, hinder, or
defeat his benign and glorious defigns. And
this
Defended and Illuftrated.
361
.
this Divine Providence is our fecurity againſt col-
lifions of the heavenly bodies, from which no
philofopher or mathematician could infure us.
SECTION III.
A third inſtance of the influence of Divine
Providence leads us directly up to the end or
final caufe of the creation, according to which
the world was to afford a conftant dwelling and
proper food to all poffible living creatures. Thus
we fee, on our earth, as many thouſand ſpecies
of living animals as there could poffibly be; and
all of them propagating their fpecies in a deter-
minate proportion. To this purpofe each of them
is provided with its particular organs of life,
motion, fenfe, and generation, with various in-
ftincts and faculties, together with proper food,
as fo many natural means. The effects of this
appear on all fides before our eyes; we fee all
the ſpecies of animals not only continuing in be-
ing, but in their due proportion to each other.
Thus, the Great Creator, in the fupport and
preſervation of all kinds of animals in every part
of the globe, has exhibited the cleareſt diſplays
of his Providence; having, with the most exact
precifion, adapted their nature, organs, fecundity,
fize, weapons, ftrength and fwiftnefs, to their
refpective kind of food, the alteration of the wea-
ther in every climate, and, in general, to what-
ever might be hurtful or beneficial to them: fo
that every fpecies is fufficiently provided againſt
any emergencies which may fall out in the courſe
of
1
362
NATURAL RELIGION
>
of time; and yet are always kept within the re-
quifite limits and proportion.
Thus experince evinces to us, that God, when
he had refolved on the creation, fettled at the
fame inſtant the whole feries of natural events,
according to his grand defign; conſequently, he
willed that it should be arranged in perfect wif-
dom. But as to the continual influence of his
fuperintendency and action in the ſupport of the
world, the certainty of it, from obfervations on
nature, is attended with a little more difficulty.
For how ſhall we diſtinguiſh this influence from
natural operations, without making it a fuper-
natural operation, or miracle?
.
In granting that there are miracles, or divine
fupernatural operations, we ſuppoſe, that they do
come to pass in the world, or in nature; yet in
fuch a manner that nature, or the natural
powers
of matter are quite paffive, and do not in the
leaſt contribute any thing to them on their part;
and that, on the contrary, the immediate ope-
rations of God counter-act the efforts and laws
of the powers of nature. But the uniform
maintenance of the courfe of nature cannot be
ſuch an operation of the Divine power; fince it
would rather clafh with it. For if God did every
thing immediately, and by miracles, this would
be doing every thing fimply by himſelf; and to
what purpoſe then did he fet about a creation of
finite things? If every inftant he is checking the
tendencies of created fubftances, and breaking
in on the laws of their nature, why did he ever
implant fuch laws and tendencies in them?
Now,
{
Defended and Illuftrated.
363
Now, as fuch miraculous operations of God
cannot come into account here, where we are
ſpeaking of the fettled and regular preſervation
of all things, the queſtion is, What influence
of the Divine power remains, which may be
diſtinguiſhed from the work of nature? I an-
fwer, where the limits of nature, that is, of the
fubftances that are in the world and their powers,
require a dependency on the Supreme Being, there
we rationally conceive not only fuch an active in-
fluence of an infinite power, for the prefervation
of the ſubſtances and their qualities, as harmo-
nizes with their nature and the deſign of the
creation; but we may alfo conclude its influence
from our experience, which refers us from limited
Beings to the infinite effence, as alone equal to
fuch a government.
Of ſuch a preſervation we may form an idea
from a compariſon of the moral influence which
the authority of a fovereign has on the conduct
of his officers, and their dependent power in
the maintenance of the laws. Inferior governors,
befides the laws which are the rule of their au-
thority, have not only their firft political origin
from the power of the fovereign, but owe their
continuance to the continual influence of that
power.
Now, as we know from experience, that there
is a dependent power which continues in per-
petual action, I may well fay, that it fpeaks the
influence of the firft independent Power. Thus
in the continual fupport of magiftrates, we be-
hold the influence of fovereignty. By the con
tinual
364
NATURAL RELIGION
tinual circulation of the index of a clock, we
know that the ſpring is continually in action.
}
SECTION IV.
We farther know from experience, that the
place of every fubftance and its changes depend
on the things that are neareft to it, and the ac-
tion of their powers. Why is this piece of wood
at reft? why does that ſwim? and why does
another piece fall? Only change their neigh-
bours, and that which fell perpendicularly ſhall
float in an horizontal direction; that which was
at reſt ſhall fall; and that which ſwam fhall be
at reft. Nay, the fituation of the globe itſelf,
together with its daily and annual revolution
through the expanfe, depends on the powers
and actions of the neighbouring globes, and
chiefly of the Sun.
In my opinion, this general obfervation proves
the Creator's preferving influence in nature: for
the dependence of place and motion proceeds
from the approximation of one body to the other,
Why is a here? becauſe bbb having fuch and
fuch powers, are placed around it. But where-
fore are bbb in fuch a place? becauſe they are
furrounded by ccc; and if I afk how ccc came
in their feveral places, Ifhall be referred to ddd.
Now what inference can be drawn further?
either that the dependency of a muſt be carried
on ad infinitum; which, in reality, is juſt as if no
natural caufe at all could be affigned for it; or
that there must have been a firſt infinite Power,
on
$
Defended and Illustrated.
365
}
on which all natural powers and their operations
are dependent.
It is in vain to fuppofe the univerſe itſelf to
be a real infinite fpace; and nature an infinite
power in it. All the parts of the univerfe, as
the fixed ſtars, the planets, and all animate and
inanimate bodies that are within our ken, are
undeniably limited, finite things, and may be
numbered. Now, a number of finite things
that actually exift, cannot be infinite, and con-
fequently cannot conftitute an infinite whole;
fince a greater number ftill can be conceived.
Even ſuppoſe that the number of things actually
exifting included every thing poffible; yet the
number of finite poffible things must be deter-
minate and finite. Therefore, on what were
the powers of nature, now in a reciprocal depen-
dence, originally dependent, if there was no in-
finite Power diftinct from the world, and from
which they derive both their exiſtence and pre-
fervation ?
SECTION V.
Certainly a more admirable diſplay of art and
intelligence there cannot be, than the perpetual
formation of fo many millions of animals and
plants in the world. There can be nothing
more evident and the evidence conſtrains us to
}
acknowledge the fuperior power of an intelligent
Being, by whoſe influence the blind properties of
atoms in the feeds of plants and animals, nearly
as the rays of light through glaſs, receive a
direction
366 NATURAL RELIGION
'
direction which forms fuch myriads of different
contextures. What has been faid above, againft:
the origin of animals from a wild chance, is no
lefs applicable to the propagation of them by-
blind natural powers.
1
Therefore our very fenfes muft convince us,
that God's omnipotent influence in the world
did not abfolutely ceafe with the creation, but,
equally with his knowledge and will, extends to
the whole duration of the world, fulfilling his
defign concerning the welfare of animate Be-
ings; and this is what we term a Divine Provi-
dence. Yet we are not to look upon it only as
a general, but, with regard to us, as a particular
Providence; not in fuch a fenfe, however, as if
God regarded other Beings only in a general
way, taking man alone into his particular
thoughts and more watchful attention. For, in
that ſenſe, the providence of God both over the
animate and inanimate creation, may be called a
particular providence; his wisdom having,
through all fucceffions of time, had a clear view
and perception of every thing, the very fmalleft
particles, the moſt minute occurrences, in the
world. But we call the Divine providence, with
reſpect to mankind, a Particular Providence,
only as it denotes a moft gracious provifion for
our welfare in particular.
[
This idea is perfectly well-grounded; for if it
be true, that we have more excellent privileges
and nobler faculties (preparatory to a more fub-
lime happineſs) than other animals, and that on
this globe, man alone, on account of his capa-
city
Defended and Illuftrated.
367
в
✔
city of knowing and worshipping his Creator,
is placed in a fellowship and communion with
the Deity; then the view which God had to
our welfare, and confequently his goodneſs to-
wards us, muſt make a diſtinguiſhed part of this
Providence, and, in this fenfe, be particular.
Thus, it becomes every individual perfon to
ground his tranquillity of mind on this Particu-
lar Providence. He will then confider the
ge-
neral difpofition of the world, the powers of na-
ture and the laws by which they act, the earth
itſelf and all its various conveniencies, as things
by the divine appointment, particularly, concur-
ring to his welfare. For all nature exerts its
powers for man'; and if it does not, in every re-
ſpect, promote his bodily comfort; yet is it every
where to him an inftructive book, leading him
to the knowledge of his Creator and his infinite
Perfections, and affording him a rational delight
in the contemplation of them. The good which
he enjoys with regard to his foul and body, as
health, beauty, faculties, organs, underſtanding,
fagacity, and memory, he will look upon as gifts
conferred on him by the all-wife Creator and
giver of all good, for fome eminent degree of
happinefs. This will make him overflow with
gratitude, and flame with ardour to accompliſh
the end for which he was created.
}
What is to come, as he can neither forefee,
nor alter it, he compofedly refers to the great
Governor of the world; in the mean time, hop-
ing for the beft, yet ready to bear with a calm
and ſteady fortitude whatever preffures or fuffer-
ings
1
368
NATURAL RELIGION
}
ings the weakneſs of his nature, and the frailty
of his ftate in this world, may, in the general
courſe of things, bring on him. He is affured
that, according to the gracious decree of Provi-
dence, the iffue of every thing muſt be the beſt
for him. The infirmities and difeafes incident
to old age he looks upon as benefits; fince they
gradually deprive him of, and wean him from
the fenfitive pleaſure of this animal life, and
quicken his defires after a more réfined and laſt-
ing happineſs. He is alfo fully convinced that
God never would have conferred on him fuch a
nature, according to the laws of which he could
not but have an idea of, and a defire after, an
approaching ſtate of fupreme felicity, had he not
in his gracious Providence formed him for that
fublime happiness.
This is without doubt, the only frame of
mind which can bring our defires into regularity
and order, and render us refigned and eaſy amidſt
all the changes and chances of this mortal life;
indeed no other is correfpondent to our nature,
to the connection of things, and to the Divine
purpoſes and perfections. As it flows from a
conviction of God's gracious Providence, they
muſt have a very prepofterous idea of that ador
able Providence, who make it a rock of offence
and a fnare, falling into difquietudes, anxieties,
doubts, and perplexities, on account of its dif-
pénfations. They preſcribe rules for the pro-
ceedings of Providence in the oeconomy of the
world, and their own perfonal interefts, accord-
ing to their own defires and fhort-fightedneſs;
and-
Defended and Illuftrated.
369
►
?
and when, in either cafe, things fall out contrary
to the abfurd plan they have formed, they will
no longer allow that there is any providence,
any wiſdom, defign, or goodneſs exhibited in
the world; nor will they hardly own a Deity:
In their opinion all is confufion, irregularity,
and inconfiftency. They, indeed, in fome mea-
fure, intoxicate themſelves with preſent fenfual
enjoyments, in order to ftifle their doubts and
folicitudes; and yet they look upon human life
as a ſcene of dulnefs and forrow, and imagine
that nothing but evil is to be feen throughout
the whole world. According to theſe Gentle-
men, it is a blind chance, a fatal neceffity, a
lifeless nature, unconfcious of itfelf, which has
caft them into a troubleſome world, where they
are daily expofed to the waves, rocks, and ftorms
of the tumultuous fea of life; and in this difmal
and hopeless uncertainty of their deſtiny, they
haften with fear and trembling to meet death,
as the final period of their exiſtence.
*
The caufe of this unhappy difpofition of mind
confiſts in entertaining feveral erroneous opinions
concerning Providence, though a depraved will
feems alfo to have no ſmall ſhare in it.
1. They imagine that an over-ruling Provi-
dence would not permit any evil in the world;
as if the finite things of which the world con-
fiſts, could be abfolutely perfect, and exempt
‹ from all manner of defect or imperfection.
2. They look upon themſelves as proper
judges of the imperfection that is in the world;
as if the limited underftanding of men could
Bb
abfolutely
{
་
370
}
NATURAL RELIGION
abfolutely comprehend the connexion and har-
mony of all things; and, confequently, take upon
them to cenfure as imperfect what conduces to
the perfection of the whole.
3. They place themfelves in the center of
univerfal nature, and pretend that every thing
muſt be created only for them; as if the world
was not the more perfect, for being adapted to
all poffible animate beings, and as if, in reality,
it was not more advantageous to themſelves,
than a world conftructed according to their vain
fancies, and fufficient for the human fpecies
only.
4. They urge that Divine Providence would
maintain a conftant eaſe, health, and profperity in
the world, with clear fkies and a perpetual calm;
although diſappointments, adverfity, and afflic-
tion, ftorms, tempefts, and changes of weather,
are evidently of fuch ufe in the moral and phy-
fical world.
5. They would have all manner of evil kept
at a diſtance from them, though it be contrary
to nature and the whole connexion of things;
and would have a Providence continually work-
ing miracles in their favour, permitting nothing
but what is good to approach the virtuous, and
pouring down every evil on the wicked, though
by continual miracles, by which, inſtead of one
evil, a thouſand would be introduced; whereas,
in the preſent ſtate of things, evil itſelf is made
fubfervient to fome good end.
6. They confine Providence within the limits
of this tranfitory life; and unhappily cut them-
felves
Defended and Illuftrated.
371
felves off from all hope of that endleſs life whịch
is to come; whereas, the latter is the principal
object which divine Providence has in view with
regard to mankind; and the most powerful
confolation which can be reaped from the doc-
trine of Providence, is, that it carries up our
thoughts and defires to a more fublime and per-
manent ſtate of felicity and glory.
C
SECTION VI.
1. Let us now fucceffively bring to the teſt,
and briefly obviate, thofe feveral difficulties
which have been raiſed againſt a Divine Provi-
dence. The first objection is of very long ftand-
ing, viz. If there be a God and a fuperintend-
ing Providence, whence comes it to pafs, that
there is fo much imperfection and evil in the
'world?' This, on the one hand, ſuppoſes, and
indeed very juftly, that from the nature of a
Deity, nothing that is imperfect or evil can be
derived. But, on the other hand, there is a
great defect in this objection, ſince it quite over-
looks the nature of the creatures, and does not,
in the leaft, confider what comports with it, and
what is congenial to them; though both theſe
muſt be compared together, in order to judge
how much imperfection the infinite Creator
might annex to finite things. Why, God in this
reſpect ſhould be confidered as the moſt adorable
artiſt, but working with perishable materials;
or, as the moſt wife legiflator, but prefiding over
limited creatures; and if we confider him in this
Bb 2
light,
募
​372
NATURAL RELIGION
5
t
1
light, the honour of the Supreme Being is not
in the leaft arraigned by whatever imperfection
there may be in nature.
It is offending againſt reafon not to confider
the relations between two things, according to
the nature and effence of both; for fuch an
omiffion muſt neceffarily lead to confufion and
inconfiftency. To this is owing that ſhocking
error of too many, who, from the imperfection
and evil obfervable in the world, deny a Provi-
dence, a Creation, and a Deity, and affert that
the world, or nature, is the primary ſelf-exiſtent
Being. But what a ftrange folly is this! They
cannot conceive how the work of the firſt ſelf-
exiftent Being ſhould be in any degree imper-
fect, or evil; and yet to affirm that the firft felf-
exiftent Being itſelf contains all thoſe imperfec-.
tions and evils among its effential properties, is
no myſtery to them.
་
Others would have the world paſs for the
work of two felf-exiftent neceffary and eternal,
but entirely oppofite and contending, Beings;
one good, the other evil: and from hence they
derive the mixture of good and evil that is feen
in the world *. But this is transferring the im-
perfection and evil that is in the world to the
Creator himself, and making the perfection of
the fupreme and beft of Beings limited and de-
pendent. Befides, how can a neceffary and an
}
་་
*A
* This abfurd opinion, fo contrary to any rational idea of the
Deity, is attributed to the Manichees, Vid, Bayle's Crit. Diction.
art. Manichees, and Bruker's Hift. Crit. Philof. T. I. p. 171.
T. III. p. 489.
infinite
Defended and Illuſtrated.
373
}
A
infinite Effence be twofold and different? How
can both have an infinite underſtanding, an in-
finite will, and an infinite power; yet the one
neither thinking, willing, nor acting, like the
other? Their knowledge and views muſt neceſ-
farily claſh; one wills good, the other evil; and
one has not more power than the other, to exe-
cute his will, &c.
It is really to be lamented that men could be
fo blind, as to harbour fuch a chaos of abfurdity
and impiety; and that M. Bayle, who was a
'man of parts, ſhould exert all his abilities to give
fome little ſhadow of probability to fuch an ex-
travagant chimera.
SECTION VII.
It is to the immortal honour of M. Leibnitz,
that, by an effulgent ray of true light, he has
difperfed that ignis fatuus, which had fo long
milled mankind into the most dangerous by-
ways; and ſhewed them the right path, which,
notwithſtanding all our imperfections, leads us
up to the moſt perfect Being.
The infinite underſtanding of a ſelf-exiſtent
Being could not repreſent to itſelf any thing,
befides its felf, as poffible, but only finite, mu-
table, and dependent things. For if nothing
were wanting to their perfection; if they were
without any effential limits, immutable, inde-
pendent, neceffary, felf-exiftent and eternal
how could it be conceived that they entirely
owed their exiſtence to God, as the firft Being?
There-
Bb 3
;
374 NATURAL RELIGION
A
Therefore if nothing, befides God, be conceive
able but finite things; then the particular nature
and effence of every fingle thing is determinable
only by the different poffibility of the boundaries
fixed to it, as in mathematical figures, of which
there are as many poffible, as there are different
boundaries allowed by ſpace.
But on this very account, that every thing
which is poffible, out of God, muſt have its pe-
culiar effential limits of perfection, fince other-
wife it could no more be what it is, than a tri-
angle would be a triangle, and at the fame time
have the properties of a circle; it likewiſe fol-
lows, that there was fomething without the li-
mits of each fingle thing, which, according to
its nature, it was impoffible ſhould appertain to
that thing. Fleſh for inftance, with the folidity
and hardneſs of iron or ſteel, would not be
flexile nor fufceptible of any impreffion, and
confequently would be no longer flesh. If a
tree, now an inanimate thing, had fenfation; it
would be of the animal claſs. A dog endued
with underſtanding and ſpeech, we ſhould look
on as an animal of a middle ſpecies, between a
man and a brute. Thus if men had the facul-
ties of angels, they would ceafe to be men.
The limits of every individual thing are as effen-
tial to it, as to mathematical figures. A Triangle
cannot be conceived without feparating from it
a fourth fide and a fourth angle, and, confe-
quently, cannot be a fquare; and a fquare with
the rotundity of a circle, is not to be conceived
in imagination. Therefore the Divine under-
ſtanding
Defended and Illuftrated.
375
S
ſtanding could not pre-conceive each limited and
poffible thing, out of God, but as deficient in
one or more perfections.
·
This effential want of one or more perfections,
which must be fuppofed in all limited things,
includes alfo in its felf the poffibility of evil,
both natural and moral. For among things
endued with a limited power, and mutually de-
pendent on each other, it muſt alſo be poffible
for the weaker to be overcome, injured, or de-
ftroyed by the ſtronger; or it may poffibly de-
ftroy its felf, by its own contending powers.
The poffibility of the exiſtence of flowers and
plants, in a great meaſure, depends on the de-
ftruction effected in them both by internal and
external cauſes. The flesh of animals could not
exift if it was of an inflexible hardnefs, and was
not nouriſhed with food; and confequently, it
could not be totally exempt from hurts, wounds,
pain, and death. The exiſtence of fuch Beings
as the fouls of men and brutes, implies that
their perceptions must depend on an organical
body; confequently, the want or defect of ſome
organ, or even infanity muſt be poffible in fuch
creatures. A finite underſtanding, which is to-
tally ignorant of many things, and has only ob-
ſcure, uncertain, and imperfect ideas of others,
is, in proportion to its limits, more or less fubject
to ignorance, error, and irregularity. Theſe de-
fects may likewife fhew themſelves in the ideas
of good and evil; fo that the latter may be chofen
inftead of the former, and, on the contrary,
good may be rejected under the appearance of
B b 4
evil.
*
3
376 NATURAL RELIGIÓN
evil. Thus it is evident, that a world confifting en-
tirely of finite things, cannot be conceived without
a poffibility of natural and moral evil; and that,
particularly, the welfare and happineſs of ani-
mate Beings cannot be greater, or more durable,
than the finitenefs of their effence will admit of.
Now what could the moſt perfect wiſdom
and forecaſt do in this refpect? Was the Deity
not to create any world at all, that evil might
not come into being? But that would be to fup-
prefs all poffible degrees of perfection, on ac-
count of the want of a perfection which was
impoffible; to abrogate effential good by reafon
of accidental evil; and, becauſe the life and
pleaſure that animate Beings enjoy could not but
be finite and limited, to withhold every mode
of life and pleaſure in non-entity.
Would that Prince bear the character of a
wife, good, and powerful monarch? would he
be thought endued with a fagacity answerable
to fuch noble qualities, who fhould oppoſe the
peopling of his dominions, and the building of
towns and villages, becauſe all his fubjects could
not be equally wealthy and ſkilful, or enjoy the
fame term of life, and an equal degree of health
and felicity; becauſe here and there one might
be drowned, or die a violent death; or, laſtly,
only becauſe one time or other they muſt all
die, and fome inftances of fraud, robbery, mur-
der, and adultery, might occur among them?
By no means; on the contrary, a wife, gracious,
and powerful Prince promotes every poffible
good, and ufes all poffible forecaft and precau-
tion
Defended and Illuftrated.
377
tion against evil. Hence he derives the ſublime
fatisfaction of reflecting, that the country over
which he prefides is full of life, affluence, and
provifions; that arts, fciences, and virtue flourish
in it, and towns, villages, and chearfulneſs are
feen every where; that vice, difquietude, and
calamities are, in a manner, loft in the delight-
ful fcene and as for the incorrigible perverfe-
nefs of fome wicked and flothful fubjects, he is
fenfible that it cannot be brought in competition
with the general rectitude, and the happy ftate,
of the other inhabitants of his dominions.
How then would it be confiftent with the
wiſdom and goodneſs of God, to have omitted
creating fo many poffible degrees of perfection,
on account of fome imperfection adherent to
the nature of created Beings? An univerſe con-
taining all poffible animate Beings, includes all
Internal Perfection, delight, and happineſs, and
all external perfection and beauty correſpondent
to the former; fo that every degree of pleaſure,
according to all the poffible modes of life, is
enjoyed in the world, by means of fenfible or-
gans, paffions, motion, food, propagation, under-
ſtanding, genius, knowledge, love, and all the
nobler faculties of the foul. The exiſtence of
theſe, and the communication of a fuitable de-
gree
of life and happineſs to whatever was ca-
pable of pleaſure, was the gracious end which
the Deity had in view when he exerted his crea-
tive power. Accordingly, the whole conftitu-
tion of the univerfe is difpofed with the moſt
confummate wiſdom; and the nature of inani-
mate
378
NATURAL RELIGION
mate things is continually at work for the com-
fort and welfare of animate Beings, without the
thought, direction, or coöperation of man. The
mechanical rules according to which all vifible
occurrences come to pafs, both in the larger ce-
leſtial bodies, and our earth, intrinfically concur
in promoting that falutary end.
The corporeal organs of living creatures by
which they fee, hear, fmell, tafte, &c. are ad-
mirably formed for delight. The inward fa-
culties of the foul; the inftinct and fagacity of
brutes; the laws by which perception, imagina-
tion, memory, and confcioufnefs, the under-
ſtanding and will, as it were intuitively regulate
themſelves; all directly tend to the acquifition
of a kind of happineſs correfpondent to the na-
ture of every ſpecies. Whatever therefore de-
viates from this rule in the world, is not derived
from what God has brought into exiſtence and
ftill upholds, theſe being abfolutely good and
perfect; but from the effential limitations of fi-
nite things, that is, from the want of fuch per-
fection as muſt have been incompatible with the
nature of thoſe things. It is by no means, the
eſtabliſhed operations of their faculties, or the
laws of nature, nor the immediate defign of
God, but a fortuitous conſtitution owing to the
effential imperfection of finite things, that has
cauſed the powers and laws of nature fometimes
to claſh with each other.
In fuch a world, however, Good must abun-
dantly predominate; fince it is founded on the en-
tire conftitution and œconomy of nature, as it was
firft
د
Defended and Illuftrated.
379
1
firſt brought into exiſtence. Thus Evil muſt be
far out-weighed by Good, as it has no other cauſe
but thofe accidents which are produced either by
the limited nature of things, or the abſence of a
greater effential perfection. Nay, Evil itſelf muft,
at leaſt, end in Good, and be conducive to the
perfection of the whole, or even of individuals,
their claffes, and fpecies; fince it happens only
cafually, and even according to the laws of Good,
and therefore it always retains its direction to-
wards that end. Hence alfo it appears, that it
was congruous to the laws of the moſt confum-
mate wiſdom to permit fuch deviations from
rectitude; fince they are, in a manner, loſt amidſt
the perfection of the whole, and could not be
prevented without a privation of fuperior Good;
and as they even contribute towards the improve-
ment of it.
SECTION VIII.
2. But, Secondly, it is manifeft that they, who
cenfure the creation and Providence in their ſhal-
low knowledge and fuperficial infight into the
connection of things, pronounce that imperfect
and evil, which, in reality, is good, and no leſs
conducive to the perfection of the whole, than
of the fpecies, claffes, and individuals. The con-
fequence of this is, that according to their erro-
neous notions, they exaggerate and magnify the
Evil, and only caft a curſory glance on the vaſt
furplus of Good, that is in the world.
On the one hand, there are many things in
the world, of which the defign, neceffity, be-
nefit,
t
380 NATURAL RELIGION
1
nefit, and correfpondence with other things, the
wit and fagacity of man can by no means un-
fold. To determine the perfection or imper-
fection of the univerſe, in the whole or its parts,
with regard to ſpace and time, requires an infinite
underſtanding. Confidering our incapacity for
fuch knowledge, how rath and preſumptuous is
it in us to affert any thing to be uſeleſs, deficient,
or evil, merely becauſe we do not know what
end it ferves. In an inferior point of view, things
may appear irregular and deformed, in which a
more exalted eye, with more reafon, difcovers
beauty, order, and fymmetry.
1
We ſhould act a much more rational and be-
coming part, if, from the perfection of the many
things we clearly know, we argued that what
we do not comprehend is likewife regular and
beneficial; than if we concluded, contrary to the
known nature and qualities of fo many things,
and merely from our ignorance of others, that
they are uſeleſs, deficient, irregular, and evil.
Therefore to cenfure the works of creation and
the conduct of Providence, even in particular
occurrences which perhaps cannot be demon-
ſtrated to be productive of good, muſt be looked
upon as a proof of folly and prefumption..
But how many have already expoſed their
own weakneſs and prefumption by carping at
nature, frequently from mere ignorance, and
pronouncing that to be uſeleſs and evil, which
experience has fince fhewn to be highly bene-
ficial, and neceffary for the fubfiftence of men
and other animals, and to the perfection of the
world?
4
$
>
1
1
**
Defended and Illuftrated.
381
}
world? When Lucretius, in imitation of Epi-
curus, maintains that the nature of things could
not have been inftituted by the Deity, on ac-
count of the many defects he obſerved in it, he
begins with finding fault with the hills, rocks,
woods, lakes, and feas, as taking up fo much
room on our globe without affording any ad-
vantage; and affirms, that one-half of the earth
is quite uninhabitable *, on account of exceffive
cold and heat. What palpable ignorance! and,
at the fame time, what an abfurd inference
does he draw from the premiſes! He knew not,
though even in his time it was not univerſally
unknown, that all countries, however hot or
cold, were inhabited; and from thence he con-
cludes that they were uninhabitable. Such rea-
foning as this is far from being juft or logical:
I do not know that thofe parts of the globe are
inhabited; therefore I conclude that they are
not. I cannot conceive that men can poffibly
• endure the extremes of heat and cold in thofe
climates; therefore it cannot be fo; and con-
fequently, the earth was neither formed nor
is regulated by a wife Providence.' Into fuch
ridiculous errors do men ufually fall, by pre-
fuming, from their own ignorance, to cenfure
the works and conduct of the all-wife God. We
have, in this age, a much more accurate and
certain knowledge of the globe than the anci-
ents had, and are affured that the whole earth,
from the fultry Equator to the frozen Pole, is
habitable, and actually inhabited.
•
<
C
* See Lucretius, Lib. V. ver. 196.
f
The
!
382 NATURAL RELIGION
The various benefits and advantages arifing
from mountains, which gave Lucretius fuch of
fence, is alſo fufficiently known at prefent *. For,
befides the variegated beauty and grandeur of
the proſpect yielded by a fucceffion of hills and
valleys, eminences and plains, mountains are
generally a pleaſant and healthy abode for great
numbers of men and animals, who there find a
fecure recefs, with a falubrious air, and plenty
of food. Without hills, feveral fpecies of ani-
mals, trees, and plants would be wanting, fince
many of them will flourish only in mountainous
parts. In the bowels of rocks and mountains
are alfo produced metals, gems, minerals, and
foffiles. They likewife impart a ſtability and
firmness to the external fhell of the earth; efpe-
cially where they extend in a length no leſs
ftupendious than their height. Hills are, for
the moſt part, a fence againſt the fury of the
floods and winds; and, which is one of their
principal properties, they imbibe the humidity
of the atmoſphere; and to the water which is
thus ftrained through the bowels of the moun-
tains, all the fprings, brooks, and rivers, owe
their origin, direction, and courfe; confequently
they promote the fertility of the earth, and the
ſpeedy intercourſe by navigation between diſtant
countries; and likewife fupply the inhabitants of
the earth with drink, and medicinal fprings and
baths. Even the rugged icy mountains, with
See Derham's Phyfico-Theology, B. III. cap. 4, and Ber-
trand's Eai fur les ufages des montagnes, avec une lettre fur le Nil.
their
こ
​Defended and Illuftrated.
383
their ſnowy fummits, are ftore-houſes of this
neceffary mixture, and from time to time the
fun by thawing the fnow plentifully diſtributes
it in torrents to the adjacent countries.
A poet, indeed, may, in his imagination, look
with horror on mountains, and fuppoſe that the
earth would have been a kind of paradife, if it
were ſmooth and level. But this, by no means,
becomes a philofpher; for it may be eafily con-
ceived, from the reafons juft mentioned, that
all the forgoing benefits would ceaſe if there were
no hills, and that the earth would become a mo-
rafs or lake of ftagnated water, the fœtid and
noxious exhalations of which neither man or
beaſt could endure; nor would they be able to
remove from one place to another.
է
As to the complaint concerning the feas and
lakes, which overflow fuch vaft tracts of our
globe, and are fuppofed to afford no conveniency
or benefit to it; I fhall only obferve, that by ac-
curate calculations of the quantity of rain, fnow,
and dew, it evidently appears, that there is not
too much water on our earth; it being an in-
conteſtable truth, that the rain, fnow and dew,
are owing to the exhalations of rivers, feas, and
lakes, in proportion to their furfaces *. Now
the quantity of rain, fnow, and dew, not ex-
ceeding what is requifite to fertilize the earth, is
an undeniable inference that rivers, feas, and
In the Sweedifh Philofophical Tranfactions, Tom. VIII.
M. Waller has, by many experiments, proved this to be a con-
ftant law of nature; and yet the exhalations increaſe according
to the degree of heat and the wind.
lakes
}
I
1
3
384
NATURAL RELIGION
lakes are not fuperfluous or uſeleſs, i. e. do not
take up too much room on the ſurface of the
earth; but that the wife providence of the
Creator is eminently difplayed in them; fince he
has fo preciſely adjuſted the meaſure of natural
cauſes to the wants and conveniences of mankind
through all future ages. Nay, in the very lakes,
the great Creator, according to his grand de-
fign, maintains more living creatures than could
fubfift on an equal fpace of dry land. Befides
it would be with a very ill grace that men could
complain of want of room on the globe, when
it is evident, that the earth would conveniently
bear an addition equal to its preſent number of
inhabitants.
SECTION' IX.
Lucretius finds another fault with Provi-
dence, on account of the great number of noxi-
Ious animals that are in the world. He com-
plains that we are born naked, crying, defence-
lefs, and quite unable to fhift for ourſelves,
and grow up amidft afflictions and calamities,
which increaſe as we advance in life; while, on
the other hand, brutes bring into the world with
them their cloathing and weapons; want no
toys or lullabies of nurſes, to quiet them, no
changes of garments, no houfes or fortifications
to defend them; but every where find their
food ready prepared by nature *,
* Lucretius, Lib. V. ver. 219-235.
But
Defended and Illuftrated.
385
But on this very account they are irrational
creatures, confined within the ſcanty limits of a
lower kind of happineſs. To man, on the con-
trary, natural wants were neceffary, that he
might become converſable, knowing, ingenious,
difcreet, wife, focial, public-fpirited, benevolent,
virtuous, and fupereminently happy; and might
be continually improving in whatever exalts and
dignifies human nature. Had we, after being
weaned from the breaft, no need of any farther
eare and affiftance, we ſhould, like the brutes,
be concentered in ourſelves, learn no language;
and confequently be unable to make any uſe of
our reaſon, or to receive inftruction: We fhould
acquire no evident conſciouſneſs, no knowledge
of ourſelves or other things, no art or ſcience,
no conveniency of life, nor any fublime mental
complacency; much leſs could we be educated
to practiſe decency and virtue.
Therefore, that defect, which gives Lucretius
fo much offence, is, in effect, the very founda-
tion and origin of our diftinguiſhed happineſs,
and the beſt means which the Divine wiſdom
and goodneſs could have chofen, for inciting
man to that exertion of his faculties, which is
moſt conducive to his improvement and welfare.
Did all men according to their ability, anſwer
this noble end, of a hundred that are now mi-
ferable there would hardly be two; and even
their afflictions would be alleviated by fome
good, and confequently their life would be ren-
dered fupportable and eafy.
c'c
SECT:
386 NATURAL RELIGION
SECTION X.
3. I fhall, in the next place, obviate, the third
objection, which places the works of creation and
providence in a difadvantageous light. Man is
apt to ſuppoſe his fpecies, and even his own in-`
dividual felf, to be the univerfal center, and the
ultimate end for whofe fake all other thing's
were created. Thus whatever is not evidently
and immediately beneficial to himſelf, he judge's
fuperfluous and ufelefs; and whatever does not
correfpond with his wiſhes, he pronounces irre-
gular and evil.
Hence it is, that fome men cannot conceivé
the reaſon of fuch numbers of defpicable worms
and infects, fo many different kinds of veno-
mous, hurtful, and rapacious beafts. They can-
not conceive why they not only kill, devour,
and prey upon one another; but are injurious to
man, deſtroy his works, ravage the promifing
fruits of his induſtry, aggravate the common
evils of life, and even threaten life itself; not to
mention other occurrences in the world, which
claſh with their particular views.
Indeed, if man alone could fill the immenfity
of the Creator's plan; did we alone deſerve that
a world ſhould be created merely for our fakes
only; then might we, with fome colour of rea-
fon, exclude many things out of nature, and
form new regulations according to our own
fancies. But this is not the right point of view
from which we ſhould take a furvey of the uni-
verſe ;
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
387
<
verfe; fince many things, when confidered in this
light, will neceffarily appear confuſed, irregular,
and miſplaced. The fubfiftence of all other pof-
fible living creatures, befides the human fpecies,
alfo makes a part of the Creator's extenſive plan,
which likewife includes the perfection of the
whole, and renders the world every where full
of motion and life. The chain of poffible living
creatures, and the connection of things admit of
no chaſm or breach; and if we view the world
rightly, we ſhall not find any thing in it that is
ufelefs; nor any creature, however minute or
deſpicable, which does not contribute to the
perfection of the whole; and, confequently,
correfponds, at leaſt mediately, with the exif-
tence and welfare of every thing that exifts.
í
I, for my part, rejoice in the innocent plea-
fures of brutes, and, with rapture and aſtoniſh-
ment, repreſent to myſelf the immenfe quantity
and variety of thoſe natural delights which are
enjoyed by an innumerable multitude and amaz-
ing variety of living creatures, not only on our
globe, but in all the vaft celeftial bodies that
are diffeminated throughout the immeaſurable
expanſe. I reflect with wonder on the great
Creator's boundleſs, intuitive knowledge, which
fets before him at once all the delights and fa-
tisfactions of his numberless creatures, in which
he fees, not without a divine complacency, the
glorious end of his creation accomplished. I
elevate my thoughts to this divine knowledge,
and look upon it as the true and only point of
view from which the univerſe appears in its
Cc 2
entire
¢
388 NATURAL RELIGION
entire connexion, and proper light. I then, with
pleaſure, allow even the loweſt claſs of animals
to exiſt, as well as myſelf; and am ſenſible that
as we men conftitute the middle link in the
chain of all poffible Beings, and are placed in a
middle degree of perfection, and yet are capable
of a higher and more perfect felicity, and natu-
rally ſtrive after it; ſo there muſt be millions of
other created Beings in the world fuperior to us
in perfection and happineſs, who leave no void
or chaẩm in the Creator's noble plan, and now
enjoy all poffible degrees of felicity above what
we experience in our preſent ſtate, the infinite
happineſs of the Deity alone excepted.
But, we fhould neglect to place a proper value
on the advantages we enjoy by the connection
of things, if we would have only thoſe few ani-
mals to exift which are of immediate uſe and
benefit to us. For in a populous city one handi-
craft or trade cannot well be carried on without
a fecond, the fecond without a third, &c. and
at laſt not one can be brought to perfection
without them all; fo that every one of the
meanest mechanics, is not without fome influ-
ence in the general and particular welfare of the
community. Thus alfo the exiſtence of every
animal, according to the connection and grada-
tion of things, contributes its part not only to
the perfection of the whole, but alſo to the fup-
port and conveniency of other creatures, either
immediately or mediately; and chiefly of man;
fince all things are under his dominion, and he
only knows the uſe of them all.
SECT.
Defended and Illuſtrated.
389
SECTION XI.
Perhaps it may be objected: Granting that
ufeful and harmleſs creatures may be allowed
to live as well as the human fpecies; to what
• purpofe do fuch fwarms of vermin exift, that
fpoil and deftroy our feeds, roots, meat, clothes
and houfes, and teize us with their teeth, ftings,
&c? Why should there be fuch numbers of
fnakes, toads, and fcorpions? What is the uſe
of wolves, bears, tigers, &c. which often make
fuch havock among our flocks and herds, and
not feldom attack man himſelf?'
How fpecious foever this queſtion, and the
difficulty concerning the order and connection
of things which lurks under it, may appear; yet
it is entirely founded on the fame erroneous
opinion of the Creator's injuftice and want of
forefight, that has been expofed and confuted
in the preceding fheets. We are placed in a
world, which is the dwelling of all poffible liv-
ing creatures; and yet we would fain have the
whole world for ourſelves only, and will not
bear with the leaft inconveniency from our
neighbours; and even from fome imaginary in-
conveniency, we deny things to be neceffary or
beneficial, purely becauſe their uſe is not mani-
feftly known to us,
All thoſe animals which we are pleafed to
hate or defpife, are certainly a part of the poffi-
ble living creatures; fince we fee that they real-
ly exift: Confequently thefe, together with our
Cc 3
felves
}
390
NATURAL RELIGION
1
5
felves, appertain to the world; as it is inhabited
by an affemblage of all poffible living creatures,
and every one of them, as it contributes to its
perfection, has a right to live as well as we.
As for the Divine appointment concerning the
animal kingdom, we men have the leaft reafon
to complain; for we are a fpecies of the moſt
ravenous animals in the world, and can with
little difficulty, not only maſter, kill, or tame
the reſt of our fellow-creatures, but make many
of them adminifter to our pleaſure or conveni-
ence. Therefore, if we would avoid the impu-
tation of ingratitude and want of thought, we
muſt acknowledge that a particular and gracious
Providence ſuperintends us, which, with the de-
fenceleſs ſtate of the body, hath given us under-
ſtanding and fagacity to invent the means of
fubduing other animals, and hands for making
all neceffary inftruments and utenfils.
༣
With regard to noxious animals in particular;
it is one great advantage to mankind, that they
can live in every climate and on all forts of
food, and confequently, can inure themſelves to
all parts of the earth; and where-ever men fix
their habitations, and build towns and villages,
the larger beafts of prey voluntarily withdraw,
or elſe are driven away by the inhabitants, or
quite extirpated, as the wolves were by the Eng-
lifh. Moſt of them, as the wolves in Germany,
and the crocodiles in other parts of the globe,
naturally avoid mankind, and can either be kill
ed by proper weapons; or elſe we can eafily rid
ourſelves of them, or get them into our power
by ftratagem.
Befides,
Defended and Illuftrated:
391
Befides, it is no flender proof of a Divine Pro-
vidence in this particular, that beafts of prey in-
creaſe but flowly, endure hunger a long time,
deſtroy each other, and by that means are kept
within proper bounds. With regard to veno-
mous beafts, the clamour is much greater than
is confiftent with truth; and I may venture to
fay, that thoſe who are loudeft in their cenfures
on this account, never faw a venomous ferpent
or fcorpion alive, and, perhaps, have been only
ftung by a gnat, a fly, or a bee. Beverley, in his
hiſtory of Virginia, fays, that it is a very great
miſtake, to imagine that the woods in that
country abound with fnakes, and that it is ex-
tremely dangerous to travel there on account of
the rattle-fnakes in particular: Whereas very
few perfons ever faw a rattle-fnake alive. M.
Kalm likewife tells us, that in all the European
fettlements throughout North America, noxious
reptiles have been totally exterminated. And
all accounts are unanimous in obferving that, in
general, no fpecies of ferpents offers to attack a
man, unleſs he be the firft aggreffor *.
That infects, birds, and mice, deſtroy feeds
and grain is not to be denied: But, without
them, many other animals, which are manifeſtly
ſerviceable to mankind, could not live. Befides,
if all the feed that is fown was to grow up, and
ripen into grain, it would cauſe too great a
plenty of corn; ſo that the price would hardly
* See the English Philofophical Tranfact. Vol. XXXVIII.
num. 433. and thofe of Sweden, Tom. XIV. p. 319, and Lin-
naus's account, Tom. XI. p. 255.
1
Cc 4
reward
"
3
M
+
}
392
NATURAL RELIGION
reward the farmer's toils. Did every bloffom
produce its fruit, the tree would be too much
weakened and exhaufted, and the fruit itself
would be too fmall and taſtelefs. If the furplus
therefore, by the wife ordinance of God, is af
figned to ſuſtain mice, birds, worms, and cat-
terpillars; ftill a fufficient provifion remains for
man, and corn and fruits attain to their natural
perfection. It is alfo for man's health and be-
nefit to be continually kept in action, and to
exert his forethought; fo that he may not earn
too much with too little labour.
It was the Providence of God only, who, in
his infinite wiſdom, could bring thofe things to
an equilibrium, and fo blend fruitful and barren
years, that man fhould be kept in continual
employment; and yet at the fame time, that di-
ligence ſhould not go without its reward, nor
any periſh for want of food. Let us alſo admire
the beneficial variableness of the weather on
another account; for, when fwarms of locufts,
mice, and the like, threaten a whole country
with devaſtation, and no human prudence is
able to prevent it by deſtroying them, immedi
ately a fudden change of weather obliges thefe
vermin to ſhift their quarters, and ſweeps away
the young brood from which fuch calamities
were dreaded.
SECTION XII.
Moreover, it is a matter of admiration, that,
by the great Creator's natural inftitution among
beafts
3
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
393
beafts of prey, they deftroy each other. It may
perhaps be aſked, Why are not all animals in-
noxious? Why is not their nature fo difpofed, as
to feed only on inanimate things? Why muft
there be a perpetual war, carnage, and blood-
fhed among them? Poffibly this may be no
manner of offence to fome who are too infenfible,
if not rather too cruel, with regard to their fel-
low-creatures; but others may be more tenderly
inclined towards brutes, and have a fellow-feel-
ing of their fufferings and tortures. But it is not
the heart and its affections that we are to confult
here; but found reafon only is to pronounce
fentence in this cafe. Let us, then, fuppofe it
fo ordered, that all animals on the face of the
earth were intirely to live on inanimate things;
and it will manifeftly appear, that not the tenth
part of the various fpecies of living creatures
could fubfift; and even on that fuppofition, they
muft have died at laft. The multitude of beafts
of prey among infects, birds, quadrupeds, and
fishes, either muft have been all wanting, or their
fpecies muſt have been fupplied by thoſe that
live on vegetables; the confequence of which
would be, that they would lay waſte the whole
furface of the earth, and leave it like a barren
rock. Certainly the produce of the vegetable
kingdom, at prefent, ferves in part to nourish
mankind, tame and wild animals, birds and
infects, every where. Now if carnivorous ani-
mals were ſtinted to a vegetable food, not only
the grafs, but the leaves, bloffoms, and fruit of
every tree, would within a few years be totally
deſtroyed,
}
394
NATURAL RELIGION
}
deſtroyed, which muſt neceffarily cauſe a general
famine and mortality among living creatures.
Nay, it would be with the greateſt difficulty..
that even the human ſpecies could ſubſiſt, if, be-
fides fruits and vegetables, man did not alſo eat
the flesh of other animals, and, if the latter had
not before fed on other creatures. And how
fhould the vaſt fhoals of fish, and innumerable
tribes of infects, live upon what little herbage
the water affords?
Hence it is evident, that the earth, and all
the elements would appear much more folitary,
and we be deprived of the greateſt part of the
living creatures that inhabit them; which would
neither conduce to the perfection of the world,
nor be agreeable to the plan of the infinite Cre-
ator. Befides, the furviving animals would be
no gainers by ſuch an inſtitution, for they muſt
die naturally; fince, according to the eſtabliſhed
laws of motion, an organical body, like that of
animals, cannot laft for ever; and their natural
death would be much more lingering and pain-
ful, than what they undergo in being killed in a
moment by their enemy. Such a natural death
of animals is pregnant with another very great
diſadvantage to men and brutes; for the mul-
titudes of dead carcafes of terreftrial animals
would in a manner cover the dry land, and the
dead fishes floating on the furface of the fea,
would infect both air and water, if they were
not devoured by carnivorous animals: Hence,
beſides the diſagreeableness of the fight of fo
many putrifying bodies, the living muft expect
all
1
1
ورم
Defended and Illuftrated.
395
all the horrors of an irremediable and increaſing
peftilence *:
Thus we ſee the wiſdom and goodneſs of the
Divine appointment that fome animals fhould
prey on others; for by this means the world is
filled with a greater variety of animals, and con-
fequently of pleaſures and enjoyments, which
is, certainly, an additional perfection. As things
are now circumftanced, a due provifion of food
is made for all, fince they are not to be entirely
fupplied from the vegetable kingdom. By this
appointment likewife, every fpecies of animals is
kept within fuch due bounds; fo that as it were,
only the excrefcences are pruned away, while it
cannot increaſe too much on the one hand, nor
be quite extirpated, on the other.
It is true, many animals are killed; but in the
mean time, while they live, they enjoy their
being without any care or follicitude about fu-
turity. The approach of death does not imbitter
their enjoyments, fince they never reflect on it;
and after death, their dead bodies, inſtead of ly-
ing as a nufance and difmal fpectacle to others,
foon become re-animated in other creatures, by
ferving them for food. Befides, every fpecies of
* Mr. Haffelquist, in the Swediſh Philofophical Tranfactions,
Tom. XIII. p. 203. obferves that the Mountain-Falcon, the Vul-
ture, and wild Dog in Turkey, Egypt, Natolia, and India, are of
great uſe, by clearing the country of the dead Horfes, affes, mules,
camels, &c. which they greedily devour; for the Turks are fo
indolent and filthy, that they never cauſe ſuch carcafes to be in-
terred. It is alſo his opinion, that the veneration and benevo-
lence which the Muffelmans exprefs towards thofe carnivorous
birds, by bequeathing large fums to feed them with fleſh every
morning, is owing to this good office.
mortal
氯
​396 NATURAL RELIGION
咐
​>
mortal creatures is renewed and multiplied in a
determined proportion by propagation; and the
world continues always equally full of animate
Beings.
Let us farther adore the infinite providence
of the all-gracious Creator, in not imparting to
beaſts of prey more fecundity, force, cunning,
fwiftnefs, voracity, and weapons, than were ne-
ceffary to deftroy the overplus of other fpecies,
and the carcaffes of the dead; but, on the other
hand, has endued the fuffering and innoxious
animals, inſtead of force and weapons, with a
greater fecundity, fwiftnefs and fagacity, than
their enemies; fo that whatever dangers threaten
them, there is always fubfifting fuch a number,
as correſponds with the proportion that the dif
ferent fpecies were defigned to bear to each
other. Therefore, no fpecies is too much kept
under, diminiſhed, or totally rooted out; nor does
any multiply, on the extinction of another.
This demonftrates a Divine Providence, which
has not taken only a curfory and general furvey
of incidents occurring in the ſeries of things, but
has precifely weighed and calculated every fingle
event and circumftance of all future times, ac-
cording to natural caufes and effects. For if
every contingency had not been foreſeen, the
particular fucceffion of occurrences must have
been left to a blind chance; and confequently,
the balance in the animal kingdom would have
been long fince deſtroyed; and the individuals of
fome fpecies would have become too numerous,
and others would have been too much reduced,
and even annihilated.
SECT.
Defended and Illuftrated.
397
2
SECTION XIII.
4. As to the fourth Objection, cited above, it
would argue great prefumption and ignorance
to with for unmixed profperity and perpetual
fun-fhine in the world, and, on account of afflic-
tions, tempefts, &c. to deny a Providence: for
fuch a world, and a life of continual pleaſure
and uninterrupted joy without any mixture of
adverfity, would not only be impoffible, but
really detrimental to mankind.
Let us for once, at leaſt in imagination, con-
ftruct another kind of world for ourſelves, and
ſee whether it would be poffible for it to pro-
mote our well-being, or even to exift. We will
fuppofe that there fhall be no lightening, tem-
pefts, earthquakes, or inundations to terrify or
injure us; no troubleſome heat, or piercing cold
to incommode us; but a perpetual ferenity and
mild temperature of air in every part of the
globe. Suppoſe the rains and winds fhould
come and go at our command; and that there
were no deferts or fandy waftes, no morafs or
precipice; that the mountains were funk into
plains; and that the earth was every where
equally fertile, without weeds, thorns or thiftles,
and fmiled on its inhabitants with variegated
beauty. Suppofe that grain and fruit every year,
without any failure, rewarded the cultivator's toil
with ample increaſe; if we ſhould allow exif-
tance to vermin, venomous reptiles, and beafts
of prey; let them at leaſt be banished to ſome
large
+
1
398
NATURAL RELIGION
large iſland. The young, both of the human
and brutal fpecies, fhall in our imaginary world
be born in the highest perfection of their bodies,
without the leaſt deformity, weakneſs, or diſeaſe.
There ſhall be no complaining of poverty or
fickneſs; nothing fhall be heard but the voice of
joy and exultation; and every one fhall wanton
in conftant health, pleaſure, and affluence. We
will bariſh from thence the idea of death, fo
that he ſhall not torment us; and it fhall be in
our option to live here for ever, or infenfibly to
die away, as if we dropped into a fweet fleep.
As to violent Paffions and vices, I am at a lofs
whether I fhall alſo exclude them from this de-
licious world, and fupply their place entirely
with their oppofite virtues; for fome pretended
philofophers will have the former to be more
nearly allied to the moft perfect world and the
moſt profperous times, than the latter.
But is not this all a mere chimera? and when
we form fuch an imaginary world, do we not
look upon direct inconfiftencies as things that
are poffible? Certainly, the earth can never be
level, and at the fame time be watered fo agree-
ably with brooks, ſtreams and rivers; its ferti-
lity cannot be every where alike, while the foil
brings forth all the various kinds of herbs, plants,
grain, and trees. It can yield no foffils, minerals,
metals, medicinal fprings and baths; unless it-
be compoſed of divers parts and different ftrata,·
and without a fermentation or inflammation,
burſting out in fome few places into earthquakes.
Our Globe muſt want an atmoftphere, unless it
emits
Defended and Illuftrated.
399
$
emits thoſe exhalations which occafion lighten-
ing, wind, and other meteors. If we would
enjoy the light of the moon, with the flux and
reflux of the fea, we muſt alfo, from its preflure
or attraction, expect ftorms and inundations. If
the fun is to rife and fet, the ſpring, fummer,
and autumn, are to circulate in a grateful fuc-
ceffion, and the earth to be every where com-
modious and habitable; how then can we defire
one conftant degree of warmth, and one conti-
nual calm, funſhine, and ferenity? Can the fea-
fon be wet for a dry or aduſt ſoil, and dry for a
rich and moift foil, at the fame time? can a fhip
fail out of harbour with an eaſterly wind, and
at the fame time another come into it with
fwelling fails before a wefterly gale?
But as for ourſelves, we could not be men,
and at the fame time be naturally immortal;
we could not uſe an organical body as the in-
ftrument of the foul, without its being fubject
to the laws of mechanifm, to infirmity, diforder,
death, and corruption. Can we, at the fame
time, have the eyes of a man and thofe of a fly,
fo as to be both Microſcopes and Teleſcopes?
can we have ears to receive every found from
the greateſt diſtance, and yet without confufion?
could our tender ſenſations and flexible limbs be
confiftent with a rigid impenetrable body, in-
fenfible of bruiſes, hurts, wounds, or any pain
whatever?
· To live perpetually in fenfual pleaſures is no
lefs contrary to human nature, as we are con-
vinced by daily experience. The nerves and
fibres
!
!
400
NATURAL RELIGION
1
1
fibres of the body are impaired by continual ti-
tillation, but the mind efpecially is enervated,
and becomes immerfed in brutal fenfuality by it.
Indolence, floth, wantonnefs, ignorance, pride,
ſtupidity, malice and prefumption, would be the
confequences of fuch a life; whereas, labour,
difficulties, and difappointments, whét and
ftrengthen the powers and faculties both of body
and mind, and prevent our falling into many
vices and follies. The forrów which mingles
with our joy, enhances its value, as winter does
that of the ſpring and fummer. Adverfity, how-
ever bitter, is frequently a falutary medicine to
the foul, and confines our exorbitant defires
within proper bounds. If we do not bring ca-
lamities and difgrace on ourſelves; if we take
wiſdom for our guide, we fhall, amidſt all the
viciffitudes of forrow and joy, acquiefce in the
gracious mixture of each; and human life will
not only be fupportable, but even agreeable on
account of the variety.
They, who think that in general the miferies
of human life preponderate the fatifactions of it,
ſeem to eſtimate its value by the exorbitant de-
fires of an effeminate voluptuoufnefs, which
would continually inebriate the mind with fen-
fual gratifications; and, on the difcontinuance of
fuch enjoyments, or the intrufion of any ſlender
inconvenience, they vent their ſpleen in pufilla-
nimous complaints. Thefe men are ftrangers
to the tranquillity and fweet complacency, that
arife from a proper uſe of time; from the con-
templation of nature, and the wiſdom and good-
4
nefs
Defended and Illuftrated.
401
nefs of the Creator fo confpicuoufly difplayed in
it; from the investigation of truth; from works
of genius and invention; from a quiet confcience,
and the diſcharge of the feveral duties we owe
to God, our neighbour, and ourſelves. They
feem to be unaffected with the comfortable hope
of a better life, which feems to have no in-
fluence on them in the enjoyment of the pre-
fent; and fince the latter, according to the na-
ture of man, cannot give them abfolute content,
they defpife and reject the nobler mode of ex-
iftence that is to come.
As to the feemingly unequal diftribution of
felicity in this world, if we will eſtimate the
happineſs of human life not from the external
fplendor of wealth, riches and honours, but from
the inward perception of pleaſure; the difference
among men, whatever their outward ftate and
circumſtances may be, is not very great *.
The poor,
and inferior clafs of men, enjoy
their cheap and homely viands with greater re-
lifh and chearfulneſs, than the rich and honour-
able do their coftly dainties. Any little fortunate
incident gives the humble peafant no lefs joy,
than conquefts and victories elevate a powerful
monarch. Whatever ideas others who are un-
accuſtomed to it, have of the painfulneſs of toil
and hardſhip, cuſtom makes them eaſy and even
pleaſant to the labouring man; and they enhance
the value of every fmall intervening pleaſure.
It matters not whether their fatisfaction arifes
* See Pope's Effay on Man, Epif. IV. ver. 47, & feqq.
Dd
from
f
402 NATURAL RELIGION
from magnificent and fumptuous things, or from
mean and ordinary objects, if the pleaſure and
fatisfaction they reap from them equals that of
the rich and great.
In fuch an equality among men, with regard
to worldly enjoyments, it is wiſdom only which
gives one the fuperiority over another; fince we
cannot, according to our nature, attain to a
higher degree of perfection and felicity, than by
paffing with felf-applauſe through the lower de-
grees of human life. Hence a wife man neither
undervalues nor embitters the prefent life, or the
ſtation he is placed in, by melancholy reflections
and idle complaints. He knows himſelf, with
regard to pleaſurable fenfations, to be on a foot-
ing with perfons of the higheſt rank and condi-
tion. Thus he enjoys his own prefent good,
without any envious or uneafy longings after a
greater good enjoyed by others. He does not
abfolutely defpife corporeal gratifications; but
his rational ufe of innocent pleaſures improves
and refines them. In the mean time, he exer-
cifes his faculties in furveying the perfections of
other men, of nature, and its great Author; im-
proves his underſtanding with the knowledge of
uſeful truths, and his heart by benevolence, virtue,
and contentment. This fecures him from dif-
quietudes, murmurs, and anxiety. He renders
life happy by a pure and exalted delight, and
felf-approbation, unknown to groveling and re-
pining tempers. He rifes fuperior to the difa-
greeable incidents annexed to the frailty of his
nature; he folaces himſelf with the comfortable
affurance
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
403
1
affurance that he is under the powerful and
gracious protection of the Moft High, and with
the pleafing anticipation of a future, and ftill
more exalted and fublime happineſs, to which
he is adapted by the great Author of his Being.
SECTION XIV.
5. In anſwer to the fifth objection, we may
obferve, that a wife man will neither expect nor
defire Providence to work miracles in his behalf;
nor is it a ftumbling ftone to him, that, in the
connexion of things, the good and virtuous are
liable to calamities and afflictions; and that the
wicked, inſtead of being immediately puniſhed,
often enjoy a larger fhare of external good.
things than others. In the first place, he is not
ignorant how often we are miſtaken in judging
of the happineſs of the wicked and the afflictions
of the good; and when in particular cafes, this
is fo in reality, he is perfuaded that fuch cala-
mitous events are entirely conſiſtent with a moſt
wife Providence, and that they will end, at laft,
in good.
On an attentive furvey of mankind and the
incidents of life, it will appear that the judge-
ment that we form of men from their temper,
deportment, and condition is for the moſt part
erroneous. For, in general, thoſe whom we
think hardly dealt by, either are not truly good
and pious, or, perhaps, have plunged themſelves
into misfortunes by their own indifcretion
elfe, in reality, they are not unhappy.
Dd 2
ز
or
When
'
404 NATURAL RELIGION
When we ſee an humouriſt or projector
brought into misfortunes by his whims, or a
fanatic by his unfeaſonable zeal; when we fee
a litigious man puſhing too far, what he con-
ceives to be, a juſt cauſe; or many others with-
out induſtry, forefight, capacity, or œconomy,
expecting their wants to be fupplied by praying,
reading, and going to church, but fruftrated in
fuch vain expectations; another, refting on his
fimplicity and ignorance, unprovided for; laftly,
when we ſee a morofe, felf-willed, and conten-
tious man furrounded with many enemies; are
we to look on fuch men as truly good and pi-
ous? can we think them entitled to complain,
that they ſuffer undefevedly. The generality of
men are blind to their own faults; hence they
endeavour to ſhift all the blame from themſelves,
and vent their spleen againſt others, againſt
chance or fatality, not fparing even Providence
itſelf.
But may we not, on the other hand, be mif-
taken in judging another perfon vicious and pro-
fane; fince we are often deceived by felf-love,
or the appearance of piety. Many of the vulgar,
and fome others of ftrong prejudices, are apt to
look upon all lawyers as knaves, all naturalifts
as infidels, all mathematicians as athiefts, and
all people of rank and diftinction, as void of
virtue and religion. But fuppofe, that ſome per-
fons who thrive in the world, are not unexcep-
tionably to be claffed among the virtuous and
devout; are we, therefore immediately to pro-
nounce them diffolute and profane? By no
means;
Defended and Illuftrated.
405.
means; for there is a middle ſtate in morality,
and ſeveral degrees of perfection. Many perfons
are not abfolutely good; and yet are not to be
looked upon as abfolutely wicked. They may
be poffeffed of ſeveral valuable qualities, as dili-
gence, good-nature, ingenuity, &c.
Are they
to be deprived of all the natural rewards of in-
duftry, becauſe fome virtues, and particularly
the moſt fublime, are wanting in them? or are
they, without injuftice, to be pointed at as the
moſt abandoned villains?
Farther, many form to themſelves very erro-
neous ideas of happineſs and mifery; as if the
former depended on a deceitful external appear-
ance, and not on the tranquility and compla-
cency of the mind. He that places happineſs in
opulence, pomp, honour, power, or indolence,
repreſents others happy in his thoughts, who
amidſt all the affluence of external goods, by
their inſatiable defires and unruly paffions, are
far from being fo in reality; on the other hand,
he thinks himſelf miſerable, if every thing does
not fall out according to his wifhes; eſpecially
if he thinks himſelf more deferving than others.
But, with regard to thofe occurrences by
which the innocent and pious fuffer fome real
evil, and, on the other hand, fome real good
accrues to the wicked and profligate; no miracu-
lous and fupernatural interpofition of Providence
is rationally to be expected: It is fufficient that,
in the permiffion of theſe oppofite events, they
are both directed to a good end, and in due time
will be properly adjuſted.
Dd 3
+
The
1
406
NATURAL RELIGION
}
}
The nature of man is fuch, that he can live
in any part of the earth, and has dominion over
all the creatures, and can apply every thing to
his own uſe and advantage. He not only enjoys
the fame fenfual pleaſures as other animals do,
but his capacity can augment and heighten every
enjoyment. He, who has a peculiar knowledge
of perfection, order, proportion, fymmetry, virtue,
morality, and religion, is naturally led to defire
what is good and happy; and a natural defire
and capacity of growing in perfection and hap-
pineſs, even to infinity, is implanted in human`
nature.
•
Now, it behoves man to make all poffible uſe
of fuch noble endowments; and for this end,
the Creator has propoſed it to the foul with fuffi-
cient motives. For with the knowledge of truth
and perfection, and the practice of virtue, he has
connected a tranquillity of mind, complacency
and delight, which never fail, and to which no
fenfual enjoyments can be compared. More-
over, fuch is the connection of things in nature,
that thoſe qualities of the human mind which
correfpond with the Divine views, namely,
knowledge, prudence, temperance, fidelity,
good-nature, probity, &c. neceffarily produce
agreeable effects, fuch as health, competency,
friendſhip, and honours; which are to be looked
on as the external rewards of a virtuous and
wife conduct, and which are generally appointed
by Providence with a view to our temporal
happineſs.
Hence
4
Defended and Illuftrated.
407
•
Hence we may alfo conclude, that the prof-
perous and unfortunate events, which are not
immediately owing to our own conduct, but to
the univerfal combination of things appointed
by God, however contradictory they may ſeem
to juſtice and goodneſs; yet, according to the
ſame wiſe and gracious Providence of the Crea-
tor, they muſt have fome connexion with our
welfare. For nothing happens in the courſe of
nature which God had not before known and
approved; and nothing can pleaſe him but what
is good, fo that whatever he permits is for a
good and wife end.
Such natural incidents may justly be confi-
dered in the fame light as the works of nature;
fince they derive their origin from one and the
fame Author, with the fame defign, and by the
laws of the fame unerring wifdom. Now, daily
experience and found reafon teach us in millions
of inftances, that the parts of animals, plants,
and of the whole earth; the powers of nature,
the laws of motion, the conformation and dif-
pofition of the celestial bodies, &c. were not
ordained in vain; fince they all combine to pro-
mote the good of animate Beings. But when
we cannot form any conjecture of the ufe and
benefit of fome particular plants, animals, or
natural events, what conclufion are we rationally
to draw from fuch phænomena? Shall we con-
clude that fuch things are entirely uſeleſs? We
ought rather to lay it down as a maxim, that
nothing falls out in nature without defign; and
that every thing has its benefit and ufe, though
Dd 4
un-
1
!
=
408 NATURAL RELIGION
unknown to us. Thoſe may be faid to turn
fuch natural incidents to the greateft advantage,
who receive good, not as the work of chance,
but as the gift of the great Governour of the
univerfe; and, when viewed in this light, they
are an incentive to gratitude, love, and obedi-
ence towards God, beneficence towards men,
and to a continual advancement in piety. On
the other hand, unprofperous events prove a
benefit to thoſe, who, looking on them as di-
vine chaſtiſements and admonitions, refolve to
lead the remainder of their lives agreeably to
the will of God.
SECTION XV.
But it may ſtill be aſked, What benefit can
there be in permitting evil to befal the innocent
and pious, exclufive of a future compenſation?
I am apt to think, that whoever has beſtowed
any attention in confidering the connection that
is in the nature of things, muft eafily compre-
hend that the evil inherent in the limited nature
of finite things, may, in the order and courſe of
nature, be every where employed as the means
of good.
Such an innumerable variety of different
things, with different powers and tendencies,
muft neceffarily be every inftant acting contrary
to each other. However, they are brought into
fuch a connection and combination as the ſtones
that are joined in a bridge by a ſkilful architect;
wherein every ftone, even by its gravitation,
con-
I
*
·Defended and Illuftrated.
409
contributes to the ſtability of the arch, and of
the whole ſtructure. The tendency of every
particle of matter, of every drop of water and
globule of air, to move itſelf to one and the
fame point, and propel that which is next to it,
gives to the earth its globular form and ſolidity,
to the water its hydraulic laws, and to the air
its elaſticity; from all which we continually
derive fo many advantages. The oppofite ten-
dencies, or centripetal and centrifugal powers of
the planets, are productive of their regular revo-
lutions and ſtated periods. The war of the
elements in our atmoſphere, which neceffarily
muſt ariſe from the different kinds of exhala-
tions, is the cauſe of the fertilizing fhowers that
fucceed thoſe collifions of the clouds. The cor-
ruption of the organical bodies of plants and
animals conduces to the propagation and fupport
of others. Every thing is by nature ſubject to
decay and putrefaction; but, at the ſame time,
nothing putrifies in vain throughout all nature.
To mankind in particular, their imperfection
proves a ſtep to fome perfection, which is either
beneficial to the whole human fpecies, or to in-
dividuals. Thus we come into the world naked,
defenceless, and unable to help ourſelves; but
this imbecility proves the fource of fociety,
fpeech, and the exerciſe of reaſon. Man was
defigned to experience neceffity and diſtreſs, that
he might be incited to the invention of arts and
fciences, and learn to commiferate others.
We muſt paſs through by-ways and intricate
mazes, before we can find the ftrait path of
truth;
$
'
410
NATURAL RELIGION
1
truth; we must firft be warned from inadver-
tency by examples, before we make uſe of the
means of prudence. If we take a ſurvey of all
the good, which at preſent reſults to mankind
from ſciences, arts, laws, polity, commerce, and
the conveniencies of life, it will be found that it
is generally owing to fome preceding evil; if
much evil ftill prevails among us, it will cer-
tainly be productive at laſt of ſome general good.
SECTION XVI.
Having confidered evil as it is, by Divine
Providence, made fubfervient to the general
good; I fhall now briefly point out, how far
even individuals are, or at leaſt may be, benefited
by any evil befalling them without being accef-
fory to it; only previouſly obferving, that misfor-
tunes are not of equal benefit to all men. The
firſt benefit accrues from it to the underſtanding.
Misfortune, neceffity, indigence, and calamity
render men prudent, ingenious, wife, and dili-
gent in their calling; whereas, on the contrary,
a continual flow of profperity begets floth, igno-
rance, and a careleſs ſtupidity.
The ſecond benefit arifing from affliction re-
lates to the will. It preferves us from pride,
arrogance, contempt of others, fenfuality, and
all kinds of diffipation; rendering us laborious,
regular, temperate, patient, humble, courteous,
and compaffionate.
The third benefit is content and tranquillity
of mind. Misfortunes and calamities give us a
/
more
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
411
more pleaſing reliſh of the mixture of good in
our lives, and fortifies us againſt afflictive inci-
dents on the contrary, by profperity we con-
tract an inſenſibility of enjoyments that are be-
come familiar to us, and a more painful fenſe of
any little croſs accident or diſappointment.
The fourth benefit relates to human fociety.
Thoſe who have gone through many trials, and
have been exerciſed in adverfity, make the beſt
members of the commonwealth; being induſtri-
ous, regular, temperate, patient, humble, com-
paffionate, and benevolent. Theſe virtues, not
only exhibit a good example, and promote the
publick welfare; but alſo procure eſteem, affec-
tion, pity, honour and affiftance to him who is
poffeffed of them, becauſe even under calamity,
he approves himſelf firm, wife, and virtuous.
SECTION XVII.
;
6. As to the fixth objection, I am very far
from denying, that there are fome fingular in-
ftances of the moft preffing afflictions, in order
to ſupport which, the afflicted perfon muſt begin
betimes ſeriouſly to reflect on what old age and
the decline of life will naturally remind him of;
namely, that we are not chiefly defigned for this
world. For when the longeſt and happieft life
is drawing near a conclufion; the remembrance
of it vaniſhes like a fleeting dream. Our eyes
naturally look forward to remote objects, and
our defires extend to futurity; and this anticipa-
tion increaſes in proportion, the lefs we are at-
tached
1
412 NATURAL RELIGION
P
tached to preſent objects. Thus when thoſe
days come in which we ſhall have no pleaſure,
either on account of the infirmites of age, or
fome affecting calamity, the comfortable hope
of a better and more permanent life, will allevi-
ate the preſent afflictions. We have therefore
no juſt cauſe in the most afflictive circumftances
to complain of the difpenfations of Providence,
like thoſe who are without hope; nor, on the
other hand, to envy the tranfient profperity of
the wicked, feeing that they are reſerved for
greater puniſhments.
When men are induſtrious to avoid thinking
of their glorious privilege, immortality, it is a
fatal fign that they are far gone in impiety, and
that their thoughts have deviated from their
natural courſe. For if they were free from the
fear and dread of future puniſhment, they would
find that the idea and hope of immortality na-
turally ſhoot up from the innate laws of our
mental faculties, and our natural defire of being
happy; the origin of which is ſeated in a prof-
pective intellect, according to the defign of the
great Author of our nature, and is agreeable to
his perfections.
They who are not abfolutely the flaves of vice
and fenfuality, muft, at leaſt, wish to be con-
vinced of this truth; and muſt perceive within
themſelves the voice of nature, enjoining them to
extend their defires to infinitude, and live for
ever; fince all worldly enjoyments, even the
moft refined and intellectual, will, by a clofe re-
flection on death, prove diffatisfactory and infipid.
I
Defended and Illuftrated.
413
I fhall, therefore, in the enfuing Differtation,
endeavour to place in a clear and confpicuous
light this valuable truth, viz. the foul's immor-
tality; which not only ſhortens and alleviates our
prefent forrows, but refines and fublimates all
the delights we are fufceptible of in the world,
and adminifters peace and ferenity in the very
hour of death.
DISSER-
t
414
NATURAL RELIGION
1
DISSERTATION IX.
Of the immortality of the Soul, and the advantages
of Religion.
T
SECTION I.
HE comfortable hope that the human
Soul is formed for an ever-during and
infinitely happier life than the preſent, is chiefly
grounded on God's defign in the creation, and
his peculiar Providence over mankind. We
may indeed, from the nature of the Soul, con-
ceive a poffibility of its continuing in exiſtence,
and retaining its conſciouſneſs, and confequently
of its living and being happy, even after the
death of the body; but it is only from the de-
fign and providence of our all-gracious Creator
we derive a certain affurance, that this will really
be the cafe.
The creation, in general, is defigned for the
welfare of animate Beings: But for what mode
of life and happineſs every creature is formed,
may be gathered from the particular nature of
each ſpecies of animals, and the laws by which
it is regulated; fince the Deity makes ufe of
theſe as the means, by which his defigns are to
be carried into execution. The general longing
after happineſs which is natural to all living
creatures, in every one of them is directed and
deter-
Defended and Illuftrated.
415
determined to purſue its particular end, by its
natural powers, and the laws by which thofe
powers are regulated. Now, as it is natural to
man, from the powers and laws of his under-
ſtanding and volition, to have, above all other
animals, not only an idea of his poffible future
duration, and higher degree of happineſs; but
alfo to extend his defires beyond the fhort en-
joyment of a mixed happineſs in this life; it
evidently appears that he is naturally formed
and defigned by his Creator for a life of endleſs
duration, and a more ſublime happineſs hereaf-
ter, and is incited to prefs forward towards the
attainment of them.
Divine Providence has exhibited a fingular
goodneſs towards mankind by indulging them,
above all other animals, with ſo many rational
entertainments and corporeal gratifications, fuch
a delightful fore-taſte of truth and perfection,
fuch a defire and capacity of ever growing in
perfection; and even with a glimpſe of the in-
finite wiſdom, love, power, and felicity of their
Creator. But if we were never to attain to a
more perfect enjoyment of theſe noble advan-
tages in a more durable and better life, they
would, by ſuch a fudden deprivation of them by
death, be entirely fruftrated, juft when we were
at the loweſt ſtep towards perfection. Mankind,
by having an idea and forming a fketch of a
perfect and durable felicity which they never
were to enjoy, would be rendered more difcon-
tented and unhappy; eſpecially if, in this life, not-
withſtanding all their rational endeavours after
2
know-
1
416 NATURAL RELIGION
3
knowledge, virtue, piety, and happineſs, they
laboured under the preffure of affliction. As
this would be inconfiftent with the attributes of
God, and the love he has manifefted to his ra-
tional creatures; we may, on the contrary, be
well affured that his gracious Providence will,
through this ſhort ſtate of preparation, lead us
to a higher degree of perfection and happineſs,
to which he has adapted our nature.
This is a fhort fketch of thofe reaſons, which
corroborate our natural longing after, and lively
hope of, a more durable and better, life, and
ſweeten our preſent ftate. Let us now take a
clofer furvey of them.
SECTION H.
In the first place, we do not in this caſe form
an idea of any thing that is abfurd, contradic-
tory, or impoffible; but it is derived from the
rules of found reaſoning, and there is an internal
and external poffibility of the thing itſelf.
Who can deny but that, by the exertion of
his reafon, he muft think on futurity, and that,
his idea of it admits of no limits or bounds?
Confequently, who can difown that he has a
conception of a future life of a much longer du-
ration than that, to which he fees himſelf at
prefent confined? Thus every one experiences
in himſelf, that he can form an idea of a much
longer life than the prefent. But no idea can
be formed of any thing but what is poffible.
Therefore every one must be convinced that a
much
Defended and Illuftrated.
417
+
1
much more durable life than this is, in itſelf,
poffible. Now whatever is in itſelf poffible,
muſt be acknowledged by every one, according
to his own perception and found reafon, to be
poffible with regard to his Soul. If the Soul
was only a quality, or material part of the body,
it might be thought impoffible that it ſhould
eſcape the putrefaction of the body, and furvive
it. But the Soul is that Being within us which
has a conſciouſneſs of itſelf, and by that means
knows, with unquestionable certainty, that it
is the very fame which formerly perceived,
thought, and willed this or that; and confe-
quently that, amidſt a fucceffion of various
changes, it has continued one and the fame Be-
ing, and therefore is not a quality belonging to
any other thing, but a fubftance that exifts by
itſelf. However, though the Soul knows itſelf
to be one and the fame permanent Being; it is,
on the other hand, quite ignorant concerning
any one fingle particle of the whole body which
it inhabits, whether it be ftill one and the fame
with that wherein it formerly acted. Thus, by
its internal conſciouſneſs, it diftinguishes itſelf
from every atom that compofes its whole body,
as a particular, immaterial, and fimple Being,
which, amidst all the outward alterations of the
body, remains unalterably the fame by its own
effence. Hence it appears, that as the Soul is
an uncompounded fimple fubftance, it cannot
by diffolution, decay, or corruption of the body,
which is compounded, be feparated into ſmall
particles; nor can it naturally perish, or be an-
E e
nihilated.
418
NATURAL RELIGION
nihilated. And though its connexion with
corporeal parts be diffolved, and its manfion be
fallen to ruins; yet even after death it remains in
being, as it is in itſelf unperiſhable. It is true,
this unperishableness does not include life in it,
fince the Soul enjoys it in common with the in-
animate elements, and the fimple atoms of bo-
dies. But the Soul is diftinct from all corporeal
atoms; being alone endued with an internal and
external conſciouſneſs. Now, as all power and
energy properly refide in fimple fubftances, and
do not owe their origin to compounded things;
fo likewife, the faculties or powers of the Soul,
by which it has a knowledge of itsſelf and other
things, muft properly refide only in the Soul as
a fimple effence; and be effentially peculiar to
it, notwithſtanding the exerciſe of them depends
on an organical body, as its inftrument in this
prefent life. Now, as the ſmalleſt atoms which
compofe bodies, when they are ſeparated and
difunited, ftill retain their internal power, and
exert it on their re-union with other elementary
atoms; fo it is evident, that the Soul muft alfo
even after death, retain its effential power or
faculties, and its felf-confcioufnefs; and there-
fore it is poffible, that it will actually exert fuch
a power, i. e. that it can live hereafter, when
placed in a fuitable ſtate.
Now, if we were to afk of thoſe who deny
the immortality of the Soul, what reafon they
can adduce to ſhew, that a future ftate is im-
poffible; they must be obliged to own them-
felves at a lofs how to prove this negative. Why
fhould
1
Defended and Illuftrated. 419
→
1
ſhould not the Creator, after having once im-
parted life and ſelf-conſciouſneſs to the Soul, be
able to keep this power perpetually in action?
As he has created' fo many perpetual movers as
the ſtars and planets are, why may not he alſo
have created a perpetual thinking and living
fubftance?
SECTION III.
But as it may be proved feveral ways, that
the future exiftence of the Soul, after death, is
poffible, we have the lefs reafon to doubt the
probability of it. Granting that the Soul, during
this life, depends on the body and its organs,
for the exertion of its faculties; yet there is,
nevertheleſs, a poffibility that its powers will
afterwards become quite independent of the bo-
dy. How many powers are there in nature,
which at firſt ſtand in need of a medium or inftru-
ment for the exertion of them; but, afterwards
can act without any fuch helps? The Soul, be-
ing as yet in the loweſt degree of its perfection,
fees every thing in the mirror of the body, and
is obliged to regulate itſelf by phænomena or
appearances exhibited by it: but as it certainly
has an immediate idea of the body which is its
Speculum, while it is united to the body; fo is
alfo fuch a ſtate of the Soul poffible, wherein it
fhall attain to an immediate and intuitive know-
ledge of other things, and ftand in no need of a
corporeal Speculum.
E e 2
Or
420
NATURAL RELIGION
Or, if we fuppofe that the Soul, for the exer-
tion of its faculties, is for ever to continue in a
perpetual dependence on fomething elfe; it may
perhaps, after this life, on its emigration into the
manfions of pure fpirits, fee all things in God,
as Malebranche has laboured to prove it does
even in its preient ſtate *. Or, according to the
conjecture of ſome modern philoſophers, it may
be faid, that the Soul, inſtead of being abfolutely
divefted of all matter, will, after its feparation
from the body, ftill retain an ætherial vehicle,
in which it ſhall fee all things; as the primitive
fathers held concerning angels . It may there-
fore be ſuppoſed, that when the Soul is difen-
gaged from its clofe union with groffer matter,
and paffes into the heavenly regions, or perhaps
remains in the world; its knowledge both of it-
felf, and the things without it, by the medium
of ſuch an ætherial ſpeculum or vehicle, will be
much more perfect than in the prefent body.
This hypothefis I look upon as the moſt natu-
ral; at leaſt, the poffibility of it is moſt obvious
to our conceptions.
If we fuppofe the particles of æther or light,
befides their reciprocal agency on each other,
and on groffer bodies, to have the power of re-
flecting, and reprefenting to themſelves the vari-
ous phænomena within the fphere of their acti-
vity; it is certain that their conſciouſneſs of
themſelves and things without them, would far
* Sre his Recherche de la Verité, L. I. P. II. Ch. I.
蟹
​+ Mr. Leibnitz feems inclinable to this opinion. See his Re-
cueil des diverfes Picces, T. I. p. 119. Theodic. §. 120
& 124.
furpafs
Defended and Illuftrated.
421
}
furpaſs that of the Soul in its preſent ſtate.
For, as far as we know, there is nothing in the
whole univerſe of fuch a rare contexture as æ-
ther or light; nothing which fo eafily penetrates
all other bodies, fo accurately forms and difco-
vers the qualities of all things, fo inftantaneouſly
receives all changes, and, by its ftupendous ve-
locity, communicates them in a very fhort time
to the diſtance of millions of miles. Now, if
every particle of light had an internal perceptive
and reflective faculty, it would form a fuperior
fpecies of Souls; fince the texture and changes
of things would almoſt inſtantaneouſly be com-
municated to it from all parts by the adjacent
fubftances, and confequently, all the reft would
ſerve as a mirrour in which it would by one
ſudden glance, have a clear view of a confider-
able part of the univerſe, and its various altera-
tions. Where then is the impoffibility of the
fuppofition, that a departed Soul may be in fuch
a ftate? and why fhould a grofs material body,
or even animal fpirits, be thought neceffary for
it in order to exert its faculties; when itſelf may
be ſuppoſed to be light, and to dwell in pure
light, in which all things would be clearly vi-
fible to it? We perceive that the Soul, even in
this life, is not always beholden for its ideas to
the material organs of the eyes, ears, or other
members; but, when from internal caufes, or
the power of imagination, the fame alterations
as at other times happen from without, are
made in the brain, it acquires the fame ideas
of them, as if it faw the objects with the eyes,
E e 3.
and
f
422 NATURAL RELIGION
and heard them with the ears. Thus it matters.
not by what inſtruments corporeal things and
their changes imprefs the Soul (it is fufficient
that by any way whatever it acquires a clear
and complete knowledge of them) if according
to its effential faculties it fhall be able to com-
prehend all things within the ſphere of its know-
ledge.
SECTION IV.
Thus the poffibility of the perpetual exiſtence
of feparate Souls is not clogged with
any diffi-
culty, either with refpect to God, to nature, to
the connection of things, or to the foul itſelf:
Nor ought it to appear abfurd and contradictory
to any one who allows, that the Soul is a fimple
fubftance that exiſts by itſelf, and to which felf-
conſciouſneſs is an effential property; now this,
to every one who does but attend to his own
mind and perceptions, muſt be as clear and evi--
dent as any truth can be.
The capital queftion ſtill remains unanſwered,
viz. What fatisfactory argument can we derive
from natural reafon to induce us to believe that,
after this life, our Souls fhall be immortal? This
is not neceffarily deducible from the poffibility
of the thing; but relates to what man is defign-
ed for, and adapted to in a future ſtate. If every
living creature be formed by the Creator for a
certain manner of life, and mode of happineſs ;
their natural faculties, and the law by which
they are regulated, coincide with the defign of
their
Defended and Illuftrated.
423
q
4
their Creator. Thus, from our natural faculties
and the laws of them, the mode of life for
which man was created may be determined.
But it has already been fhewn at large, that,
according to the great Creator's defign, all pof-
fible fpecies of living creatures ſhould exift; that
there are as many living creatures as poffible
modes of life and happiness; and that, confe-
quently, every fpecies was formed for a particu-
lar mode of life and felicity. It has been
likewiſe fhewn in the preceding Differtations,
that every determined mode of life contains in
itſelf the laws and grounds, which regulate all
the powers both of body and Soul of every ſpe-
cies; and that even, in irrational creatures their
faculties, inftincts and innate fagacity, perfectly
correſpond with the mode of life allotted to
each, and are directed to that end according to
the higheſt wiſdom and goodneſs.
Now, among all poffible modes of life, this
alfo is by no means impoffible; namely, that
one may be raiſed from a fenfual life to a more
perfect, ever-during, and fpiritual life; and the
regular tendency of our nature, particularly of
the mental faculties, carries us directly to this
mode of life, as its ultimate end. Therefore,
this tendency of the natural faculties of the hu-
man Soul cannot be given it in vain; fuch a
mode of life being that for which we are formed
by the all-wife Creator; and his defign will be
fully accompliſhed in us, as well as in the brute
creation.
E e 4
SEC-
424
NATURAL RELIGION
SECTION V.
We have above demonftrated from the nature
of the human Soul, which is a fimple unperifh-
able ſubſtance, that among the various poffible
modes of life, ſuch a life is alfo poffible wherein
a Soul is exalted from an imperfect organical
life to a more perfect, endleſs, and fpiritual mode
of exiſtence. We have likewife fhewn, that it
may live and retain a reflective confcioufnefs
when feparated from the body; and that its
fpiritual faculties, when no longer obſcured and
impeded by ſenſible ideas, or diverted by ſenſual
enjoyments, may be ever increaſing in a certain
and intuitive knowledge of the internal effences
of things; in clear conceptions of the variety
and harmony of nature, of the wifdom and
goodneſs of the Creator diſplayed in his works
in the love of virtue, and delight in goodneſs;
in perfection, tranquility, and happineſs; and
rifing in conformity to the perfections of the in-
finite Spirit, yet always infinitely inferior to him.
Now if, agreeably to the Divine plan, and the
rules of wiſdom, all poffible modes of life muſt
actually exist in the world; then we may con-
clude that there muft alfo be in the univerſe a
fpecies of Souls, which, from the imperfect de-
grees of animal life, is ever afcending by juſt
gradations to higher degrees of perfection and
happineſs in a ſpiritual life.
;
But if we even omit fuch an univerſal truth,
and only examine the tendencies of our fuperior
faculties;
Defended and Illuftrated.
425
faculties; it muſt be allowed that they lead di-
rectly, and only, to that end, and find no reft
elſewhere. The natural defire of being happy,
is, in general, common to us with all other ani-
mals. But the particular mode of happineſs that
is congruous to our nature, or to which the
Author of nature has formed and adapted us,
the natural faculties which are peculiar to us,
and the laws by which they act, muſt indicate.
Every defire of being happy is neceffarily regu-
lated by the limits, within which our ideas of
what is good are confined. As we cannot defire
any good, of which we have abſolutely no idea;
fo, on the other hand, it is natural to the will
to defire every known good. If we fuppofe
Souls, that have an idea only of one fpecies of
good, their defires and endeavours muſt be li-
mited by it: their wishes can extend no farther,
and they are by their nature formed for that
mode of life and happineſs which reſults from
the fruition of that known good. But if we
again fuppofe other Souls, of different, or more
enlarged conceptions of good, their deſires muſt
alſo have another end in view, and be more ex-
tenfive and enlarged; and, confequently, they
are, by their nature, formed for another, and
more fublime mode of happineſs.
This difference between man and brutes has
been made to appear in the comparifen drawn
between them in the feventh Differtation. The
Soul of every creature has its own peculiar way
and meaſure of comprehenfion, by which one
particular thing appears as good, and every thing
elſe
*
426 NATURAL RELIGION
elfe continues unknown, and confequently in-
different, to it; and thus every creature is, by its
natural powers, determined to its peculiar mode
of life and happineſs. All brutes, however, are
alike in this particular, namely, that they have
a perception only of the fenfible and preſent
good, without any knowledge or defire of, or
aptitude for, a greater and rational perfection, a
more refined and exalted happineſs. Therefore
they are, by their nature, incloſed within the un-
alterable boundaries of the fenfual, preſent life,
without a capacity of becoming more perfect and
happy, or endeavours after it. They procure for
themſelves their bodily neceffaries; and enjoying
them with reliſh and delight, are fully fatisfied.
A fublimer and future happineſs never enters into
their thoughts, and confequently does not awake
their defires, or diſturb their repofe: Even death
itſelf comes upon them unexpected; and they
die without knowing that their life is come to a
period.
Man, on the contrary, by his natural powers,
and the rational idea he has of himſelf and other
things, is formed with a capacity and inclination
for a fublimer, purer, and more durable perfec-
tion and felicity than this tranfitory life affords.
Theſe are the natural confequences, and necef-
fary effects of that reaſon, which is the effential
property of all men; namely, that their thoughts,
by comparing the prefent with the paft, are led
to what is future; that they acquire an idea
of time and duration; that they extend their
thoughts forward; and that when they confider
them-
Defended and Illuftrated.
427
themſelves and the prefent life relatively to the
future poffible duration, their innate defire of
life keeps pace with their idea of future time,
i. e. they wish for an endleſs life. It is the na-
tural and neceffary effect of found reafon, that
all men, by their general and abſtract ideas,
have a notion of a higher degree of perfection,
of more refined pleaſure and happineſs, than
what they actually enjoy, or can attain to, in
this life. Confequently, it is certain that their
defires can never be perfectly fatisfied with the
low and imperfect happiness of this world; for
the idea of the greater poffible good inceffantly
occurs to them. In a word, the defires of man
muft, according to his intellectual facultics, ne-
ceflarily extend themſelves to infinity, and be-
yond the limits of this ſhort, uncertain, and im-
perfect life. Hence it appears, that with regard
to the external end in view, the diftinctions be-
tween men and brutes are many and important.
Brutes are, by their nature, incapable of improv-
ing in perfection and happineſs; whereas man,
even in this life, is continually growing in per-
fection, though he can never be perfect and
happy to the extent of his nature and defires in
this life, Brutes have no conception of a higher
and more durable good, than what they enjoy
here; but man, on the contrary, can, in his
thoughts, extend the duration of life, and en-
large the degrees of happineſs to infinitude.
The brute creation are merely fenfitive beings
and are ſuſceptible only of the pleaſures of fente;
whereas we, as rational creatures, are capable
2
of
1
428
NATURAL RELIGION
1
of a more exalted and fpiritual life. Irrational
creatures extend their thoughts no farther than
the prefent; but we can, and muft, confider
what is to come. Brutes, in the enjoyment of
bodily neceffaries, are perfectly fatisfied, and
eafy; man, on the contrary, amidſt all the ra-
tional and fenfual pleaſures which he can poffi-
bly enjoy in this life, ftill finds a void; fome-
thing ftill is wanting which he longs after.
Brutes pay the great debt to nature, without
being terrified by the view of approaching death,
without any thoughts or defires of a longer, or
better life.
Man alone knows beforehand that
he muft die: the thoughts of his latter end ruffle
and diſcompoſe him; and, without the comfort-
able hope of a better life, he muſt inevitably die
with reluctance, if not with perturbation and
· térror.
SECTION VI.
Now, as this defire, in man, after a more
durable and blifsful life than the prefent, natu-
rally flows from the powers and laws of his
underſtanding and will; and as it is fuitable to
the nature of the Soul, and its capacity for a
higher degree of perfection and happineſs, it is
not to be looked upon as a wild chimera or pleaf-
ing reverie which has no foundation in nature.
Even the errors, and inordinate worldly de-
fires of men evince, that infinitude is the end
they aim at, and that their diſappointments and"
delufions are owing to their very nature; for as
wę
Defended and Illuftrated.
429
"
we are created for higher enjoyments, we eager-
ly toil and labour to fatiate our boundleſs defires
with finite and perishable things.
Hence we muſt neceffarily conclude, that
the wife Creator formed us for that mode of life
and happineſs, to which the tendency of our
nature, and the laws by which it is regulated,
lead us. It is not leſs natural for us to think on
what is to come, and to repreſent to ourſelves
our future ſtate of an immeaſurable duration;
than it is to the brute creation to mind only
what is prefent. A capacity and will of ever
improving in happineſs is as natural to man; as
it is to brutes to limit their deſires and difpofi-
tions within certain unalterable boundaries of
perfection. It is as natural to us, who have an
idea of a more durable and fublime happineſs,
as poffible, not to be fatified with this life and
its grovelling and often-embittered pleaſures, but
to wifh for a happier and more permanent ftate;
as it is to irrational creatures to reft ſatisfied in
their preſent gratifications and inftincts, without
looking for or defiring any farther enjoyment.
Now, if all this be certain and evident, then is
our natural defire after a better and more dur-
able life no leſs defigned by the Creator, as an
incentive to make us ftrive after that for which
we are created, than their natural inſtincts and
inclinations are to brutes. Is it to be fuppofed,
that a longing after any kind of food is natural
to brutes; and yet that no fuch food is to be
found in the world, to fatisfy their hunger or
fupport their lives? that there fhould be in ani-
mals
430 NATURAL RELIGION
?
mals an impulſe to couple and propagate their
fpecies, and yet that all of them fhould be
males? Can it be imagined that birds of paffage
are endued by nature with an inclination to af-
femble towards the winter, and to foar above
the clouds, in order to fly to fome diftant coun-
try; and yet that there fhould be no fuch cli-
mate, wherein they could live during the ſeverity
of that ſeaſon? Can it be thought that aquatic
infects, towards the period of their chryfalis-ſtate,
have a defire to quit the water and rove in the
air, if they were not to live in that element after
their transformation? By no means:—the voice
of nature never deceives; it is an impulſe, a call
from the great Creator to the particular mode
of life determined for every creature; it is an
intimation of, and, at the ſame time, the means
of accompliſhing, his defign. Why then fhould
the Deity implant in the nature of his rational
creatures fuch an idea, fuch an ardent defire,
of a more durable and better life than the pre-
fent, if there was no fuch ftate, for which he
had defigned them.
SECTION VII.
All the privileges and advantages which the
Providence of God has conferred on man in
particular, confirm us in the perſuaſion, that
there is ſuch a ſtate; fince thofe fuperior endow-
ments are in effect ſuitable and beneficial to us,
only with a view to a future, fpiritual life: If,
on the contrary, we were not deſigned for a
better
1
/
Defended and, Illuftrated.
431
better life than the preſent, they would have been
conferred on us in vain, and rather been a tor-
ment to us. But we are affured, that nothing
has been made in vain in all nature, nothing
particularly imparted to living creatures, not
even to the loweft clafs of animals, but what
contributes to their welfare; and that all the
benefits and advantages that proceed from their
natural powers, are defigned by the Creator,
as the end he had in view. This is agreeable
to the Divine wisdom and goodneſs; whereas
the contrary fuppofition would be entirely in-
confiftent with thofe attributes.
What would pofitive, general, or abſtract
ideas of things which do not fall within the
compaſs of the fenfes avail us, if they did not at
all concern us, and we were only created for a
ſenſual life? But if we are formed for a ſpiritual
life, then thofe ideas lay the foundation of a
more exalted ſtate of perfection. To what pur-
pofe is our profpective faculty, or the idea we
have of a future ftate, but to torment us with
the diſmal thought that all things will foon in-
evitably come to an end, and confequently to
embitter our prefent life? But if we are created
for a future and more durable life, then our
diſtant proſpect into the remoteft ages to come
will be a raviſhing view; it will add a reliſh to
our enjoyments of the prefent good, by the
hope of an ever-growing blifs and increasing
perfection, and will make us-fuperior to all tem-
poral calamities, and even to the fear of death
itſelf.
How
432
*
NATURAL RELIGIO Ň
1
}
How little do truth and knowledge contribute
to that eaſe and fatisfaction that we wish for!
fince every little improvement in ſcience, only
makes us more fenfible of our ignorance, or dif-
turbs our tranquillity by new doubts and con-
jectures; at leaſt, our defires after the multifari-
ous knowledge of things will never be fatified
in this life. But if we fuppofe this terreſtrial
globe to be the firft manfion we are to dwell
in, and the feminary in which the rudiments of
knowledge are taught us, as introductory ele-
ments to higher things, then will our preſent
imperfect knowledge open to us a moft pleafing
profpect; and we may, from our flight fore-tafte
of truth in this life, form a delightful idea of
our future improvement in knowledge; how
we ſhall hereafter in the realms of light, with
enlarged ken view univerfal nature, and admire
all the Divine myfteries which are now con-
cealed from our eyes.
What does wiſdom, in this life, contribute to
our happineſs? Irrational creatures, by a blind
inſtinct are more unerringly led to that end,
though they neither have any certain end in
view, nor defignedly employ the beſt means for
attaining it. The moſt enlarged underſtanding
could never invent any thing fo well adapted to
their respective ways of living, as what they per-
form by an innate fagacity. Man, on the con-
trary, attains to ſkill in arts through a fucceffion
of miſtakes and errors: it is by repeated loffes
that he becomes wife, and fcarcely acquires
fufficient experience in his old age. Nay, his
'wiſdom
Defended and illuftrated.
433
wiſdom and forefight create him much difquie-
tude; fince he anticipates difficulties, dangers,
and misfortunes. But if the aim of our wiſdom
be a higher degree of perfection, to which no
blind inftinct could direct us, namely, a god-
like complacency, flowing from the knowledge
of truth, and the conformity of our behaviour
to, and a cloſer union with, the All-wife Being;
we muſt aſcend at firſt by the lower fteps, and,
notwithſtanding the flips of our probationary
years of difcipline, advance in wiſdom and vir-
tuous difpofitions; that we may be qualified for
a higher fphere, where we fhall improve in re-
fined knowledge according to the moſt perfect
pattern of wiſdom, and enjoy a pure and undif
turbed felicity. In the mean time, it behoves
us carefully to employ all the means which
God has put into our hands, to exalt ourſelves
from a ftate of imperfection to that real per-
fection, for which we are defigned by our
Creator.
SECTION VIII.
Moreover, thoſe virtues and moral perfections
which we boaſt of poffeffing above the brute
creation, can be of no great advantage to us, if
our hopes be bounded within the narrow limits
of this animal life. I would by no means de-
preciate the preſent fatisfaction that accrues from
wiſdom and virtue; but would only obſerve, that
both our virtue and wifdom are imperfect in
this life. The Bee, by an unconſcious inſtinct,
Ff
dif-
434 NATURAL RELIGION
discharges its duty for its own advantage and
the common good of the hive, much more ef-
fectually and diligently than we do with all our
boafted virtue. It is the fame with all animals,
they are perfectly regular in all their proceed-
ings; man alone deviates from the rules of his
duty. If our temporal happineſs was to depend
on virtue, it would, on that very account, be
but imperfect: For the connexion between vir-
tue and temporal happiness is not fo intimate, as
to prevent a virtuous man from being made un-
happy by finifter events, or even by his virtue
itſelf; at leaſt, by his fteddy adherence to his
duty and the dictates of his confcience, he muſt
forfeit many of the profits and advantages of
this life. If therefore, we have no hope after
this life, can thoſe perſons be eſteemed happy,
who facrifice all that is dear and valuable to
them, and even their lives, for their country or
the cauſe of truth? who, though to their own
manifeſt detriment, make good their promiſes;
who prefer the general good to their own pri-
vate intereſt; who punctually conform to the
laws; who ftand up for right, juftice, and reli-
gion, whatever ridicule and odium it may draw
upon them; not to mention many other teftimo-
nies of the moft exalted virtue? fince all that ſuch
excellent perfons, during their continuance here,
are to expect from their diftinguifhed virtue, is
nothing but vexation and oppreffion. Would
not the generality of men be induced from
hence to conclude that virtue was an empty
name? But if the Soul be the principal part of
man;
Defended and Illuftrated.
435
เ
3
man; if its perfection, the foundation of which
muſt be laid here, is increafing to eternity; if
the reward of our virtuous endeavours is not to
be expected from the Creator until we enter on
our future ftate; then it can by no means be
thought imprudent to facrifice the low, tranfitory
advantages of time, to the refined and exalted
happineſs of eternity.
Lastly, what fhall I fay of Religion? If our
exiſtence was to come to a period with this life,
neither our external nor internal happineſs would
be promoted by the knowledge of God; but it
would rather be an allay to both. In ſuch a
cafe, religion would afford us only an empty
fpeculative knowledge of a Being infinitely too
high for us ever to approach; nay, our idea of
the Deity would then neceffarily create difquie-
tude and averfion in us. If death is to put a
period to our Being, to what purpoſe has the
great Creator given to us, above other creatures,
a power of approaching him in the devout fer-
vours of prayer and meditation? why has he
conferred on man alone a capacity of ever im-
proving in mental perfection? Why has he im-
planted in the human mind a notion of a futurę
ftate, and a longing after an ever-during life of
exquiſite happineſs, if no ſuch ſtate is intended
for us hereafter? Could we worship ſuch a God
as an all-wife and gracious Being, who, to render
us miferable, had given us a glimpſe of a hap-
pineſs, to which we never fhall, nor can attain?
Should we not rather look on irrational crea-
tures, which are without repining ignorant of a
Supreme
Ff 2
心
​436 NATURAL RELIGION
Supreme Being and a ftate of higher perfection,
and ſatisfied with fenfual pleaſures and their low
and tranquil fphere, as much happier in effect
than the human fpecies? Nor can the know-
ledge and worſhip of God contribute to our ex-
ternal happineſs in this world, where piety and
profperity have no connexion, but the profligate
and impious, by human addrefs and favourable
circumftances, often ſee their wickedneſs prof-
per, and live in honour, pomp, affluence, health
and feftivity; whereas the good and virtuous,
frequently, even on account of their ſtrict adhe-
rence to the laws of God, are oppreffed with
calamities and live in penury and contempt.
Therefore, if the devout behaviour of men to-
wards the Supreme Being meets with no equi-
table recompence, either here or hereafter;
then religion must be looked upon as entirely
vain, and without the leaft influence on human
happiness. This would at once banish from
among men all veneration for God's effential
perfection and wiſdom, love of his infinite good-
nefs, confidence in his gracious providence,
prayer for his direction and affiftance, gratitude
for mercies received, voluntary refignation to
his afflictive difpenfations; all hope of an ap-
proaching recompence, and dread of his avenging
justice.
If, on the contrary, we fuppofe the Soul to
be created for immortality in the world of fpi-
rits; if it fhall have a nearer acceſs to the infi-
nite and Eternal Spirit, and be treated by him
according to its behaviour in this world; then
4
religion
}
Defended and Illuſtrated.
437
1
religion prefents us with a true and adorable
idea of God and his perfections, and of the end
he has in view in his government of mankind.
It will be an incentive to induce us to coöperate
with the great Creator's glorious plan; and, from
the fore-taſte of a low, mixed, and tranfient
happineſs, to hope for, to pant after, that which
is more pure, exalted, and refined, and will en-
dure to all eternity.
SECTION IX.
The Brute creation would have the advantage
over us, if this life was to be the period of our
exiſtence; for by their inferior faculties they
attain to all the perfection, content, and hap-
pineſs, which their nature will admit of. Irra-
tional creatures know not who firſt created,
preferves, and feeds them: they have no idea of
the real Author of their being, no ſenſe of his
bounty, no defire to imitate or approach him;
and yet God takes pleaſure in fatisfying with
good things fuitable to their nature, even thoſe
creatures which have no knowledge of him,
nor are able to praiſe him for his loving-kind-
nefs. But it is to man alone, that he makes
himſelf known as his Creator; he exhibits to
him his perfections in the mirror of nature,
has ftamped on him his image and reſemblance,
and excites him to aſpire after a godlike and
´immortal life. How then can it be imagined
that God, the beſt and moſt perfect Being, is
fo void of compaflion, as to impart to man
fublime
Ff 3
+
438 NATURAL RELIGION
fublime ideas and unbounded defires, only to
diſappoint and torment him? Has he given us,
a capacity to know him, only to withdraw
himſelf from us for ever? Has he given us a
diſtant view of the moſt exquifite felicity, only
that we might have an idea of a happineſs we
never fhall be admitted to? Has he ftirred up
in us ardent longings and ftrong defires after a
better and more durable life, only to the end
that the deſpair of ever obtaining it, may imbit-
ter even our prefent life?-By no means.
We
have too many proofs of God's paternal affection
towards us, ever to harbour fuch unworthy
thoughts of the best and most benevolent of
Beings.
It would likewiſe be taxing the juftice of God
not to believe that the good and virtuous, who,
in the preſent connexion of things have, for
their faith in God and obedience to his com-
mands, ftruggled with a great fight of afflictions
in this life, fhall be the more gloriously re-
warded in a better ftate; and that, on the
other hand, the profligate and oppreffors, who
have profpered in their wickedness, and lived
here in riot and affluence, fhall be puniſhed
hereafter according to their demerits. For we
may be well affured, that the law of nature is
the law, the will, and inftitution of God; and
that the whole behaviour of every man lies open
to his omniſcience. Therefore it cannot be in-
different to the fupreme Being, whether they
conform to his will, or live in open violation of
his laws; and much less could he intend that
the
Defended and Illustrated.
439
the innocent and obedient ſhould, during their
whole exiſtence, groan under calamities, and
that the guilty and difobedient ſhould revel in
uninterrupted profperity. Such an inconſiſtent
connexion of good fuccefs with bad actions, and
adverfity with good actions, would afford no
motivé to piety and virtue; but would necef-
farily induce men to throw off all the reftraints
of religion, and to pay no regard to the divine
precepts. Such a method of proceeding would
be quite repugnant to all the rules of wisdom,
as it would counteract the whole defign and
will of God; and confequently God's govern-
ment of the world would be quite prepofterous,
and contrary to reaſon, equity, and juſtice.
However, as fuch contradictory events are not
uncommon in this world, God's wifdom, juf
tice, and love towards mankind, might be juftly
called in queſtion, if there was no other life in
which this feeming inconfiftency will be unra-
velled, and, in the laft fcene of the Drama,
injured innocence will be rewarded, and tri-
umphant wickedness puniſhed. How then can
we doubt, but that the Supreme Being fuffers
fuch promiscuous events for fome particular rea-
fons, for a ſhort time; and that a day will
come, when the good deportment of men fhall
be the more abundantly recompenfed, and when
the wicked ſhall be doomed to condign puniſh-
ment.
SEC-
F f 4
449
NATURAL RELIGION
SECTION X.
It is a vain attempt for Atheiſts, to endeavour
to buoy up the fpirits of their diſciples againſt
the thoughts of annihilation, by pretending that
virtue in this life meets with a reward equivo-
lent to any calamities it may undergo. For all
human virtue is very imperfect, and as fuch
cannot in itſelf procure a perfect compla-
cency, or undisturbed tranquility of mind;
especially fuch a calmnefs as will hold out
againſt accumulated misfortunes. But virtue
without religion (if fuch an imaginary quality
deferves the name of virtue), is certainly of the
very loweſt kind, or rather only a fine-fpun
felf-love, which finds its fatisfaction in certain
fpecious, natural propenfities, and owes its ex-
iſtence to conſtitution, and fometimes to imagi-
nation, or caprice, without any fenſe of duty.
As human nature is expofed to bodily pains,
diſeaſes, infults, poverty, lofs of liberty, infi-
delity of pretended friends, and many other
accidents out of our power, by which, how-
ever, it is moſt fenfibly affected; it is but a
very unequal counter-poife to a complication
of evils, when they affault the mind of man
with combined efforts, that he has a high con-
ceit of himſelf, and applauds his paſt life and
actions as unblameable, juft, and full of moral
beauty. The hope of a happier ſtate to come,
will rife fuperior to the preffure of afflictions, or
at leaſt alleviate them; but to him, who, con-
contrary
Defended and Illuftrated.
441
Contrary to nature, denies himſelf that comfort-
able hope, how terrible muſt be the reflection,
even in his moft profperous days, that he muſt
foon ceaſe to be? and much more fo, if, during
the fhort time of his exiftence, he is to pafs
through various calamities, indigence, and af-
fliction.
As we are Beings much too imperfect, too
weak and dependent, and too fenfible of our
infirmities, to fubfift purely by ourſelves, and
to have our fatisfaction, pleaſure and happiness,
entirely within our own power and choice; ſo,
on the other hand, our ideas and defires take
too high a flight for our nature to be fa-
tisfied with the low degree of internal and
external perfection attainable in this life, or
with the preſent groveling, fhort-lived enjoy-
ments. Real tranquility of mind belongs only
to that man, who, knowing his dependence on
the all-wife and gracious Director of the uni-
verſe, places a ferene confidence in his Provi-
dence; who, with circumfpection and firmneſs,
walks in the paths of religion and virtue, and
feconds the deſign of his Creator; and, in the
chearful enjoyment of the prefent good, extends
his hope to a future ftate of infinitely greater
and more laſting perfection and happiness, as
the true end for which he was created.
SECTION XI.
If the Atheiſt was free from all other errors,
and only rejected the hope of immortality; this
alone
.
442 NATURAL RELIGION
T
alone would be fufficient to difturb his tranqui
lity and happineſs in the prefent life. He
cannot, if he attends to the dictates of his own
nature, totally baniſh the thoughts of his ap-
proaching end; and the daily inftances of mor-
tality, even among his friends and acquaintance,
continually remind him of it. Thus the innate
love of life that is implanted in us, makes death,
to fuch a man, a dreadful ſpectre haunting him
every where, and diſturbing all his preſent de-
lights. As he advances towards the decline of
life, the gloomy terrors of his thoughts form a
thick cloud around him, which excludes every
ray of hope or comfort, until he is plunged into
difpair at his irrecoverable, unfupportable ſtate.
But if we examine the ſeries of his thoughts and
actions during his whole life, every part of it will
induce us to deplore his mifery, and to place a
higher value on religion, were it only for its
powerful and happy influence on our temporal
happineſs.
As for thoſe atheiſts who have erred only by
an exceffively abftracted and ſubtile way of think-
ing, I need not repreſent to them, that they act
contrary to the natural inclinations and defires
of human nature. They know it; they are
confcious of their deviations from the paths of
happineſs; they lament their ſtate, and expreſs
many a heart-felt wish to be convinced of thofe
truths, which afford a diſtant view of that tran-
quility of mind which human nature ardently
longs after.
All
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
443
All the rational complacency we can enjoy
arifes from the contemplative knowledge of
perfection, as well of things without, as of
things within us. Thus the greater perfection
a man perceives in the things without him, and
the more he improves, and fees his own grow-
ing perfections, the more tranquil, eafy, and
happy he is. On the contrary, he that denies
all ſuch perfection, and looks upon himſelf and
other things as a mere heap of imperfections,
not only deprives himſelf of many pleaſures and
fatisfactions, but by his erroneous ideas ſpreads
a comfortleſs gloom over his whole train of
thoughts. An atheift, in the first place, ba-
niſhes from his mind the fupreme Model of all
perfection, the eternal Source of all life and
underſtanding, of all wisdom and goodneſs;
and fubftitutes in lieu of him an eternal, in-
active, lifeless matter, void and incapable of any
internal perfection, infenfible of its own ex-
iftence, and entirely ſubject to a blind neceflity. -
Let him furvey the natural world in what
light he pleaſes; he ftill, by his preſumption,
baniſhes every thing out of it that can yield him
any fatisfaction or delight. For the truth of
this, I appeal to the experience of thoſe who
difcern in the works of nature, order, congruity,,
intelligence, and defign; who, by acknowledg-
ing the infinite fkill, wifdom, providence, and
goodness of the Creator, are filled with admi-
ration, eſteem, reverence, love, and gratitude,
towards him. Such happy perfons can pathe-
tically fet forth, what a great, fublime, and
valuable
•
1
t
ג
1
1
444
NATURAL RELIGION
valuable part of human complacency an atheiſt
deprives himſelf of; fince it is impoffible for
him, from his own principles, to furvey things
from ſuch a pleaſing point of view. And if,
againſt his will, a ray of the divine wisdom
ſhould dart upon him from the mirror of na-
ture, the ſenſe of it is attended with fhame and
horror. He fees nothing in this immenſe ſpace
but a wild neceffity, which, without intelligence
or defign, tyrannizes over lifeless matter, di-
vides, mixes, forms, or annihilates it, juſt as
it happens. Nay, he labours to diſcover only
confufion and imperfection in the world, and
habituates himſelf to look on all things as irre-
gular, deficient, noxious, and abominable.
Contrary to his own inward perception and
felf-conſciouſneſs, he looks upon himſelf as a
material clod, and in his thoughts annihilates
his real felf, his rational Soul. He fees that in
the neceffary courfe of things he is to live but
for a ſhort term of years, and then to return to
non-entity. While others are amuſing them-
felves with innocent recreations, he is brooding
over jejune and unnatural reveries, which, in-
ftead of exhilerating, oppreffes both body and
foul. He is a ſtranger to the pleafing taſk of
chearful thankſgivings to the Giver of all good,
to the comfortable hope of a future ſtate, to a
firm confidence in the gracious protection of
God, and to patience, refignation, and fubmif-
fion to his wife guidance. Amidſt all his com-
plaints againſt the evil and vanity of human
life, againſt fate and neceffity; his fole comfort
is,
}
3
Defended and Illuftrated.
445
is, that he muſt be carried away by the rapid
current of time into the abyfs of an eternal an-
nihilation.
SECTION XII.
But do thoſe unhappy perfons, who, without
owning a Deity, or fo much as beſtowing any
reflection on good or evil, blindly give them-
felves up to the purſuit of ſenſual pleaſures act a
wifer part? I think not. As they lay afide all
ufe of their mental powers, and have no reliſh
for truth, knowledge, or fcience, and are utter
ſtrangers to rational enjoyments; they act con-
trary to their nature, and forfeit the nobleft
portion of human happineſs. Their under-
ftanding is a rude and barren defart, which,
inſtead of producing knowledge and compla-
cency, is over-run with ignorance, infamy, dif-
fipation, uncertainty, fear, and anguish. Men
of this ftamp gradually loſe the reliſh even
of fenfual pleaſures, which, by their intempe-
rance, make a more languid impreffion on their
blunted fenfes. They are cloyed with corporeal
gratifications, and in reality enjoy much lefs of
them than thoſe who only uſe them fparingly, as
refreſhments and relaxations after uſeful labour
or mental employments. Theſe men, on the
contrary, are flaves to their paffions, undermine
their conftitution, and bring the body to a pre-
mature decay. They enfeeble both the powers
of body and mind; bring on themfelves pains
and diſeaſes; extinguish their natural faculties;
ruin
446
NATURAL RELIGION
1
ruin their fortunes, and expoſe themſelves to
pity and contempt: Their pleaſures leave them
at the cloſe of the fcene, and their jollity ends
in fear and dread, in grief and horror.
SECTION XIII.
But let us leave fuch mifcreants, who are a
fpecies of animals of a middle rank between
men and brutes, and let us turn our eyes to a
fhrewd atheiſt, who labours to prove, That not
only fenfuality, but all the moſt flagitious crimes
and abandoned vices, together with an open
contempt of all religion and confcience, are the
only means to conduct us to happineſs. It has
heretofore been a matter of difpute, whether
atheiſm might be faid to lead men to vice, and
to be in itſelf dangerous to human fociety: But
whoever has perufeḍ La Mettrie's writings, will
no longer doubt it; and muſt be convinced,
that the conduct of Spinofa, and fome few like
him, who led irreproachable lives, was not influ-
enced by a ſyſtem of atheiſm, but purely by
their conftitution, education, or cuſtom.
La Mettrie fets out on the fame principles as
other atheiſts: For he afferts, that there is no
God; that the world and nature are eternal ;
that whatever exifts, owes its origin to chance;
that man is a mere mechanical machine; that
Soul and Spirit are empty words without a
meaning; that there is no other life but the
prefent. But what are the inferences he draws
from theſe premiſes? Why, that all the hap-
pineſs
1
•
*
M
Defended and Illuftrated.
447
E
pineſs of man arifes from a vigorous conftitution
of a found and healthful body, and confiſts in
corporeal ſenſations; that confequently whoever
defires to be happy, muſt indulge to the full
thoſe agreeable fenfations which are natural to
his bodily machine; but that whatever does
not coincide with, or in the leaſt thwarts, thoſe
organical fenfations is to be accounted a delufion.
He farther affirms, that every thing in which a
man according to the difpofition of his corporeal
machine finds a pleaſure, whether it be good or
evil, is the real effential means of happineſs,
and ought to be purfued as fuch. Love and
fenfuality, according to the particular tempera-
ment or difpofition of La Mettrie, conftitute the
fummum bonum of man. But if another perfon
ſhould find greater pleaſure in other things, he
may, according to that gentleman, indulge him-
felf in them to the full without fear or fcruple.
Learning, wisdom, and knowledge, are frequently
torments to mankind; juftice, virtue, duty, pro-
bity, and conſcience, are mere follies and chi-
meras, and obſtacles to our happineſs; though
the appearance of them may indeed have its
ufe among the vulgar. Thus. even a villain, a
thief, a murderer, a drunkard, a debauchee,
or a blood-thirſty tyrant, if they take delight in
the enormities they are guilty of, may render
themſelves happy by them, if each of thoſe
mifcreants does but fecure himſelf from damage;
the ſubject from condign puniſhment, and the
tyrant from the avenging hand of fome refolute
patriot. Others, who are fufferers by the crimes
of
L
448
NATURAL RELIGION
of ſuch wretches, are indeed to be lamented
however, thoſe perfons, whofe machine is thus
formed or tempered by nature, cannot act
otherwiſe, nor be happy in any other manner.
I do not charge thefe confequences unjustly
on the above-mentioned French author ; but
they are fuch as are manifeftly contained in his
writings, and many of them couched in much
more harſh and ſhocking terms. At the fame
time, they are confequences from which I can-
not comprehend how any atheift, if he allows
of the fame principles as La Mettrie, can excul-
pate his hypothefis. But happily for mankind,
they contain in themſelves the most obvious
confutation of atheiſm, and inſpire every one,
who has a rational concern for his own happi-
nefs, with a deteftation of the impure fource
from which ſo much depravity, and ſuch fla-
grant crimes derive their origin. If that infa-
tuated author, after making man a machine,
and treating of him as a plant, inſtead of en-
titling his laſt book "A Treatife on a happy
Life * "
had called it l'homme bête, et plus que le
bête, he would have clearly informed us of its
real contents.
>
1
SECTION XIV.
How miferable would the general prevalence
of theſe doctrines render civil fociety, and indeed
all mankind! If fuch an hypothefis was allowed
* See his Traité de la vie heureuſe, &c.
to
M
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
449
to be true, why ſhould any one, as a huſband,
father, citizen, foldier, or as a virtuous man,
facrifice his eaſe, pleaſure, fortune, health, or
life, to wives and children, to fellow-citizens,
to his king and country? Virtue and confcience,
honour and fame, would be but mere empty
founds, why then ſhould he employ for others,
and not for himſelf alone, this his only life,
after which nothing more was to be expected?
What would reftrain a wicked or ambitious man
from violating the moſt facred engagements,
from practising fraud in order to attain riches,
from perpetrating murder clandeftinely, that he
might get poffeffion of an eftate, from puſhing
his own intereft by falfhood, perjury, and flan-
der, and building his fortune on the ruins of
others; if he has once placed his only happineſs
in fuch objects, with a total difregard of every
other confideration? Could a friend or brother,
a huſband or a wife, a father or a ſon, be fecure
of their freedom, honour, fubftance, or life, if
they were obſtacles in the way of another man's
advantage or pleaſure? Would the puniſhments
of the law avail any thing againſt ſuch an ab-
folute depravity? By no means. Who would
think fo meanly of himſelf, as that he could not
invent fome contrivance or fubterfuge by which
he might elude the law, or compafs his ends
without being detected, or perhaps under a fpe-
cious ſhow of juftice. Even Kings and Poten-
tates would not be fafe in their perfons, if
confcience was entirely extinguiſhed in the hu-
man breaſt, and ftratagem or violence were
allowed
G g
'
t
450
NATURAL RELIGION
allowed to be legal means of obtaining the
fucceffion to a crown, or even of private revenge.
How could human fociety, how could the
atheiſt himſelf and every individual, ſubſiſt? Do
not fuch principles induce one to act in direct
contrariety to the nature of all men, to the ge-
neral end for which we were defigned? Are
we, therefore, created to be atheifts, and by
that means to render ourſelves happy?
SECTION XV.
But let us confider man in himſelf, abſtracted
from any connection
connection; would La Mattrie's
fyftem of atheiſm make him happy? He him-
felf declares, that genius, reafon, and know-
ledge, only tend to make a man uneafy and
wretched . This I readily grant, when he
adopts fuch opinions and rules of life as La
Mettrie himſelf did; fince they are utterly irre-
concilable with found reafon and true know-
ledge. I look upon this as a confeffion that he
had no reliſh for truth and real knowledge,
and, confequently, had rejected all that pure
and fublime delight which flows from a juft
furvey of the combination of things, and the
due exerciſe of the intellectual faculties. To
me it is a declaration of the confufion and per-
turbation in which his mind was involved, when
he confulted his reafon and confcience concern-
+ See his Traité de la vie beureuſe par Seneque, avec un Dif-
cours du Traductɩur fur le même Jujet, p. 29.
ing
મ
Defended and Illuſtrated.
451
>
ing the doctrines he inculcated. Theſe muſt
neceffarily have been very difagreeable inmates
to him, often putting him to the blufh, and
raiſing in him the moſt violent conflicts, by their
continual and keen reproaches for his abfurdity
and impiety. It is morally impoffible that an
atheiſt can privately confer with his under-
ſtanding, without feeling an inward revolt in
his mind againſt his favourite opinions; efpeci-
ally, if he lays down to himſelf fuch rules of
life, as are directly repugnant to natural juſtice
and honeſty.
La Mettrie labours to make the world appear
one continued hateful ſcene of defect and con-
fufion. This thing he affirms to be fuperfluous,
that deformed, a third noxious; one creature
ſhould not move in this manner, another in
that, &c. Even his idol nature has neither
fight nor judgment, is become feeble and effete;
and a blind chance governs all. He himself has
no foul; but is only a machine, periſhable as
the very brutes; and without any hope beyond
this life. Thus by imagining every thing, not
excepting himſelf, to be indigefted heaps of im-
perfection, he neceffarily deprives himſelf of
every ſubject of lafting tranquility and pleaſure
that is agreeable to human nature. Muft he
not be extremely troubled and chagrined, when,
looking round from his falfe point of view, he
fees every thing as fortuitous, confufed, unne-
ceffary, deficient, evil, horrid and dangerous?
He fuppofes himſelf to have been caft into the
wide world by a blind chance or fatality, with-
Gg 2
out
1
452 NATURAL RELIGION
out any end or defign; and, notwithſtanding
his weakness, expofed to a thouſand accidents;
while no fuperior power protects him, no gracious
providence defigns him for a moft durable hap-
pinefs; but he is left entirely to himſelf, out of
hutnour both with himſelf and nature, and with-
out any hope in futurity.
Theſe melancholy and even dreadful thoughts
he endeavours, as well as he can, to fupprefs in
himſelf and others, by worldly enjoyments and
fenfual pleaſures. But, before he can induce
men to believe that they may give themſelves
up to all manner of riot and debauchery, and
revel in thoſe enjoyments which are moft agree-
able to their difpofitions; he must first argue
them out of all reafon and conſcience, all ſenſe
of right and wrong, of virtue and decorum.
Poffibly the heart of La Mettrie may not have
been ſo corrupt as to approve of actions fub-
verfive of all order, peace, fafety, and the wel-
fare of ſociety; fince he was totally immersed
in fenfuality and voluptuoufnefs. But unhap-
pily he was for erecting atheiſm into a general
fyftem; and, of courſe, it was neceflary that he
ſhould be an advocate for every vice; otherwife
he, in more paffages than one, betrays an aver-
fion to thofe vices, which. are productive of
detriment to others, and are pregnant with mi-
fery in human fociety. He pities the oppreffed;
he condemns the oppreffors; and confequently
he muſt certainly have had an inward ſenſe of
moral good and evil, and been convinced that
juſtice and virtue are ſomething more than mere
2
founds.
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
453
founds. How then can he, that is infected
with thofe vices, be exempt from a conſciouf-
nefs of his own depravity, efpecially when he is
aware of their various bad confequences? Can
it be fuppofed, that La Mettrie really believed,
that a Tiberius or a Domitian enjoyed the fame
inward peace and ſelf-applauſe as a Titus Vefpa-
fian, or a Marcus Antoninus?
+
However, as his darling vice, luft, was not
to be vindicated but by laying down a general
principal, which gives the appellation of good
to all manner of vices and crimes, even thoſe
which he himſelf cenfures; he falls into ftrange
contradictions, and vindicates himself only in
his own vitiated imagination. It appears in one
paffage, as if he was fomething recovered from
the paffion which generally intoxicated him *
"I have indeed, fays he, formerly poured out
"from my pen all the ebriety which voluptuouf-
"nefs had infufed into my fenfes; but, at prefent,
"I am extricating myſelf from the fnares of
"that Syren, and perhaps only from conftitu-
«tion, temperament, approve of greater mode-
"ration. For the future, neceffity alone, that
"true fource of pleaſure, fhall excite my ap-
"petite, and, if I may be allowed the expref-
"fion, point out the hour for indulging it."
Here was fome ſmall fign of his beginning to
ſhake off beastiality and reäffuming the nature
of a man. He immediately after owns, that
fenfual pleaſures are by their nature too mo-
* Ibid. p. 126.
G g 3
+ Ibid.
mentary,
454
NATURAL RELIGION
mentary, and do not happen frequent enough,
to conſtitute a ſtate of permanent felicity. How-
ever, he would have them looked upon as tran-
fient flaſhes of happineſs, des eclairs dé bonheur,
without which the joys of this life would be
imperfect and mutilated, How then can he be
happy by the enjoyment of fenfual pleaſures, if
a few pleafing moments are all they can afford?
Certainly the happineſs of man must be che-
rifhed by a more genial warmth, a purer and
more conftant flame, and the wildfire of fenfual
pleaſures muſt be tempered by cool reafon and
a fenfe of our duty; otherwife, voluptuouſneſs
will, like deftructive lightening and inward con-
flagrations, entirely confume our ftrength, our
health and faculties, and even life itſelf.
This frank confeffion of a man who looked
upon fenfual pleaſures as his fole and fupreme
good, is, in my opinion, a ftrong proof that they
are no more than a fleeting, illufory fhadow of
happineſs, incapable of fatisfying human nature;
But fince, by fuppreffing the dictates of reaſon,
religion, and morality, they neceffarily become
unnatural, exceffive, and impatient of reſtraint,
their grovelling and momentary gratifications are
repaid with pains, diſeaſes, infamy, calamity,
remorſe, fear and dread, and even an untimely
death. If we view the voluptuous atheiſt in the
meridian blaze of his fruition; yet fince, accord-
ing to his opinion, his exiftence ends with, this
life, he is to be looked upon only as a criminal,
who knows himſelf to be under an irrevocable
fentence of death. For though he be fed with
the
!
}
Defended and Illuftrated.
455
the choiceft dainties, and nothing can be with-
held from him that his heart can wifh; yet the
abfolute certainty of a painful end muſt embitter
every gratification. However he may
ſtrive to
think only of the prefent delightful enjoyments,
and to ſtrain his nerves to the higheſt pitch of
rapturous fenfations, the buſy imagination will
intrude upon him, and continually prefent him
with the horrid image of death. Let us hear
what la Mettrie himfelf fays on this ſubject *.
"I own, that, with all my philoſophy, I cannot
help looking upon death as the moſt ſhocking
neceffity in nature; and fain would I for ever
"baniſh from my mind an idea that afflicts me
fofenfibly-I feem, in fome meaſure, to ceaſe
to exift, whenever it occurs to me that one
e one day I ſhall be no more." This inward
horror which fets the fenfualift in a true light,
is an inconteftable evidence of the latent gall
that embitters the pleaſures of thoſe who reject
the belief of a future ftate.
<<
<<
SECTION XVI.
The nature of man may be confidered either
as connected with others, or in himſelf; and in
both theſe circumftances, religion has an equal
congruity with his ſtate, and an equal influence
on his happineſs.
* See La Mettrie's Abregé des fyftemes, §. 8. j'avoue moi même,
que toute ma Philofophie ne m'empeche pas de regarder la mort comme
la plus trifte neceffité de la nature, dont Je voudrois pour jamais
perdre l'affligeante idée---je ceffe d'etre en quelque forte, toutes les
fois que je penfe, que je ne ferai plus.
Gg 4
Our
456
NATURAL RELIGION
Our difpofitions and capacity lead us to a fo-
cial life, to the exerciſe of our rational faculties,
to live like men, and confequently to be happy
in a manner becoming the dignity of human
nature. The helpless ftate of infancy demands
the affiftance and fociety of parents, without
which we ſhould inevitably perifh as foon as we
were born, or the whole courſe of our life would
be favage and wretched for want of education.
Now, if parents were void of religion, and en-
tirely engroffed by the irpleaſures, their natural
affection for their children would frequently be
ftifled by the blandiſhments of voluptuousness,
or the trouble of bringing them up. The an-
cient cuſtom of expofing children to wild beafts
would revive, or at leaſt the improvement of
the body and mind would be neglected; or they
would be privately made away with, as the fruits
of unlawful embraces too frequently are. It is
conſcience alone which reftrains thouſands from
fuch unnatural proceedings, and carries them
chearfully through all the trouble and expence
of bringing up their offspring: Thus, it is to
the religious principles of their parents, that
children owe for the moft part, their life,
health, and mental acquirements.
But parents, without protection and ſafety,
and a competency of the neceffaries and conve-
niencies of life, which are the happy confe-
quences of fociety, would be unable to educate
their children; fo that the cultivation of the
focial duties among men greatly contributes to
the preſervation and happineſs of their offspring.
Now,
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
4.57
Now, fince human fociety cannot ſubſiſt with-
out religion, it is evident that children, in their
early infancy, enjoy the happy fruits of religion,
and the various benefits of fociety.
Let us now ſuppoſe a number of children
brought up according to La Mettrie's principles,
and intended to form a ftate. Let timely care
be taken to inculcate on their tender minds,
that God, ſpiritual Beings, the foul, conſcience,
and morality, are mere chimeras, and a torment
and vexation to thoſe who believe any thing of
them; that we are only corporeal machines,
which have nothing to expect after this animal
life, ſo that we ought to make the most of it;
and that there can be no happineſs but by living
according to our unruly paffions and appetites. I
fay, ſuppoſe theſe perfons, after fuch an extraor-
dinary education, were to form a ftate or com-
munity, and to act on the principles they had
imbibed from their infancy, what would be the
iffue? As they muſt have adopted a rule of life,
by which every one might exempt himſelf from
all political duties, and, without any reſtraints,
follow courſes deftructive of the fafety and wel-
fare of the ftate; it is morally impoffible that
fuch members will bear with coercive laws in a
fociety, and folemnly bind themſelves not to do
any thing detrimental to the commonwealth,
and to the mutual obfervance of juſtice and be-
nevolence. Such a ftate muft foon come to
ruin, and every individual would be fuperlatively
wretched in himſelf by his unfocial difpofition,
which is contrary to human nature,
On
458
NATURAL RELIGION
}
On the other hand, we will fuppofe a num-
ber of men bleffed with a practical knowledge
of God, and a conviction of his gracious defign
in the works of creation; thefe will make the
law of nature and the focial duties their rules of
action. They will injure no man, and will give
to all their due; they will promote the public
good, freely performing every kind and benevo-
lent office, and chearfully difcharging the duties
impofed on them for the fupport and welfare of
the ſtate. This generous and amiable behaviour
does not in the leaft abridge the community, of
any innocent recreation or pleaſure of this life,
whether merely corporeal and improved by a
rational œconomy or mental arifing from an in-
veſtigation of nature, or the cultivation of arts
and ſciences. Nay, I affirm that even the plea-
fures of ſenſe and worldly entertainments are
enjoyed with greater refinement and a higher
reliſh, when religion moderates our paffions, and
regulates our defires; when pleaſures and diver-
fions are uſed only as neceffary recreations, to
relax the mind after intenſe application; when
fidelity, love, friendſhip, fincerity and good-na-
ture are duly cultivated; when invention, wit,
and pleaſantry in converfation are kept within
proper bounds by good fenfe, truth, and decen-
cy; and, laftly, when it is far from being the
leaſt agreeable, among other amuſements, to
contemplate the order, regularity, beauty, and
perfection of nature, as a pleafing tranfcript of
the infinite wiſdom, art and defign, of the good-
nefs and omnipotence, of the great Creator.
SEC-
i
Defended and Illuftrated.
459
SECTION XVII.
As there never will be, in fact, a fociety,
whereof every member arrives at perfection by
living according to the dictates of religion; 10
neither can there actually be a community con-
fifting entirely of atheiſts. It is fufficient that
the ideal plan of a republic of atheiſts betrays
the greatest imperfection, deſtroys itſelf, and is
directly oppofite to the nature and happiness of
mankind. On the other hand, a commonwealth
animated by, and encouraging religion, exhibits
the nobleſt idea of perfection, and includes the
means of an unfhaken ftability; and though, by
the fault of too many individuals, no community
will ever arrive at fuch a ftate of perfection, yet
it ought to be the object of our most ftrenuous
endeavours. We are inceffantly bufied in mak-
ing improvements not only in arts and fciences,
and every uſeful invention, but alſo in things
that tend to the conveniency and embelliſhment
of life; though we are at the fame time very
fenfible that it is beyond our power to bring
them to perfection, and into univerfal practice.
But it would be very abfurd in us on that ac-
count to affert, that fuch arts and inventions
were fuperfluous and incongruous to human
nature, and that it were better for mankind if
they were entirely ignorant of them. It would
therefore imply no leſs an abfurdity to believe,
that, becauſe religion will never be univerfally
practiſed, it is on that account uſeleſs to human
fociety;
1
鲁
​460 NATURAL RELIGION
fociety; and that, on the contrary, atheiſm and
vice promoted the public welfare.
Thoſe few who are fincerely religious, and in
their daily behaviour act according to the dic-
tates of reaſon, and the duties of chriſtianity,
promote credit, candour, and mutual confidence
in the intercourfes and tranfactions of men in
fociety, and render fuch a life ſupportable. By
the behaviour of fuch perfons who are an orna-
ment to the human fpecies, what a golden age
would take place among mankind, if it was
poffible to purge fociety of all degenerate mem-
bers and all fovereigns, who have the welfare
of their ſubjects at heart, ought to use all the
means that are confiftent with juſtice and hu-
manity, to ſpread the influence, and enforce the
laws of religion; fince they give a fanction to
the bands of fociety, and promote a voluntary
obedience to fuperiors, and unanimity among
· equals.
If fome vices be of any advantage to human
fociety, this is not the effect of them confidered
as vices; but happens to be fo merely by acci-
dent, or rather by the wife provifion of the Cre-
ator, who has made the connection between
men fo intimate, that thofe who endeavour to
injure others, are, contrary to their intention,
fometimes made fubfervient to the public good.
The wicked man, however, does more hurt to
himſelf and others, than it is poffible, he can
ever do good to the community.
SEC-
Defended and Illuftrated.
461
SECTION XVIII.
3
But if we confider the importance of religion
to the tranquillity and happineſs of every indivi-
dual, confidered abftractedly from his connexion
with other men, it will evidently appear that
nothing but religion can fatisfy our natural fa-
culties, fince they were ultimately deſigned for
it by their innate laws; and that the practice of
religion affords a true and lafting complacency.
A man comes into the world like a perfon
who is carried on board a fhip in a profound
fleep, and when he awakes, finds himſelf on the
main ocean, but had never feen the fea nor a
fhip before, nor even heard of them. Will the
ſmall company of which the ſhip's crew confiſts;
will proper provifions and a few trifling amufe-
ments make him eaſy in his new manſion? Will
he not naturally afk, with fome emotion, Where
am I? how came I here? What am I to do in
this place? Whither am I going? Who has the
management of the veffel? And certainly that
man muſt either doze, or trifle his life away, or
paſs it in continual melancholy and dejection,
who never has put theſe queſtions to himſelf
concerning his ftate in this world? And how
can he make himſelf eafy on his head, but by
the comforts of religion, and the light it throws
on fuch doubts and fears.
If no rational caufe either of ourſelves, or
other things, is to be found in an infinite feries
of fucceflions, in a blind neceffity or chance, in
nature
462
NATURAL RELIGION
?
nature or an inanimate world; whoever builds.
his defires and hopes on fuch chimeras, will
reap nothing but doubt, confufion, difquietude,
and defpair. But the devout acknowledgement
of an infinitely wife, gracious, powerful and
living Effence, as the eternal and felf-exiftent
Being by whom the whole inanimate world and
nature, together with all poffible living crea-
tures, have been brought into exiſtence, and by
whom man, in particular, was formed for an
endleſs life and perpetual felicity; fuch a difpo-
fition, fuch ideas, I fay, impart to the faculties
of the rational foul perfect eaſe and tranquillity.
That a living Effence is felf-exiſtent and eternal
may be eaſily conceived; but that a Being which
has not exiſted from eternity, and to which,
from its nature, it muſt have been indifferent to
be or not to be, to be in this or in that manner,
ſhould be the firſt Being, the original ſource of
all Beings, is utterly inconceiveable. It is agree-
able to the whole nature of things, that the
world had a beginning, does not exift neceffari-
ly, and was formed for the fake of animate Be-
ings, and not for its own fake. Upon fuch an
hypothefis, the univerſal cauſe of the exiſtence,
difpofition, and connexion of things becomes
evident; and it is no longer a mystery why the
univerfe is divided into luminous and opaque
globes, namely, that they might be proper man-
fions for all poffible fpecies of animals. Hence
it is alſo manifeſt why the opaque revolve round
the luminous globes, why the former are fur-.
rounded with an atmoſphere, why they enjoy
certain
1
1
Defended and Illuftrated.
463
certain degrees of light and heat; and, that we
are convinced of the primary caufe, and ulti-
mate deſign, of all the laws of motion. Hence
we likewiſe underſtand why our earth abounds
with ſo many wonderful animate and inanimate
creatures, how every poffible mode of life in-
cludes thofe laws by which the ftructure of
their feveral bodies, and the faculties and in-
ftincts of their fouls are regulated; and, laftly,
how by our fuperior endowments we are formed
to grow towards perfection, and to emerge, as it
were, out of a fenfual and perishable life, to a
ſpiritual life which ſhall know no end or decay.
SECTION XIX.
In this diſplay of the connection of all things,
which fimple natural religion exhibits to us, all
is harmony and congruity; and leaves no ob-
ſcurity or confuſion in the mind, but forms it to
every kind of perfection, and fatisfies its natural
defires. In it we have a paragon of all perfec-
tion, not to be viewed without rapturous admi-
ration, love, and reverence. We ourſelves are
only intelligent and wife, according to our
knowledge of that fupreme underſtanding
which diſplays itſelf in this wonderful arrange-
ment of the univerfe, and of the noble ends
which are therein carried to execution with af-
toniſhing ſkill. Our knowledge of nature and
its variety, of the general and particular laws of
motion, of the revolutions of the heavenly bo
dies, of the caufes of meteorological alterations
in
464 NATURAL RELIGION
}
in the atmoſphere and on the earth, of the
qualities and propagation, of the aliments and
growth of animals and plants, and every other
object of knowledge; all thefe, however extene
five and clear, are but a very faint adumbration
of the amazing wifdom and regularity diſplayed
by the Deity in his work of creation. Nor is
this fpectacle of nature any farther delightful and
edifying, than as we diſcover in it the harmony
and conformity of things, and the moſt gracious
defign planned and executed in the fittest man-
ner. Then, we meet with an inexhauſtible
ſource of the moft fublime complacency; and
are preſented with fucceffive fcenes of new
wonders, of mafterpieces and models of infinite
wiſdom, in furveying and inveſtigating the
works of creation. Then it is, that we perceive
the value and privileges of the foul, when we
fee, even in the book of vifible nature, the
moſt exalted wifdom connected with the moſt
exuberant goodneſs, of the invifible Creator.
We then reliſh the advantages of religion when
when we are able to difcern internal beauty,
order, harmony and benefit, in a word, the cor-
reſpondence of the creation with the real defign
of the great Creator, in thoſe things which to
the faſcinated atheiſt appear irregular, confuſed
and imperfect, incongruous, evil, and horrid.
SECTION XX.
{
But if it be aſked, what happy influence Re-
ligion has on the will? I anfwer, that to be
happy
"
465
Defended and Illuftrated.
happy and contented in what we all naturally
defire, and in fuch a ftate religion places us,
partly by bringing our defires into a conformity
with our nature; and partly by dealing out to
us fo many and fuch noble mental enjoyments,
as preponderate any afflictions, and fweeten the
bittereft cup of adverſity.
ཉ
I fay, firſt, that religion places us in a happy
ftate, by regulating our defires in a conformity
with our nature. Man is naturally defirous of
many things, which are conducive to the im-
provement of his body, his foul, or ſtation in
life, and confequently, are productive of cor-
poreal or intellectual gratifications. But his de-
fires are ever enlarging; they know no bounds,
and extend themfelves to infinitude. Nothing,
therefore, can fatisfy and allay our natural long-
ing, but what has the increaſe of true perfection,
durable happiness, and even infinitude for its
end;
and makes this its ultimate view, with
which all its other purfuits harmonife and coin-
cide, and confequently, regulates our defires and
inclinations. But it is only an active knowledge
of God and of the defigns he had in view, or,
in other words, Religion, which can produce
fuch happy effects.
Nothing can be conceived in itſelf more per-
fect, than an Effence endued with a felf-exiftent
and eternal life; an Intelligence that has a clear
knowledge of whatever is poffible, and of all
poffible congruities in whatever is poffible, i. c.
of all truth and perfection; a Will which, from..
the infinite plenitude of its own felicity, is in-
Hh
clined
}
466 NATURAL RELIGION
2
clined to impart to all poffible living creatures,
all the perfection and pleaſure which comports
with the nature of every fpecies in the connec-
tion of things; a Power by which the immenſe
univerſe was created, as an habitation for ani-
mate Beings, and is maintained in the moft
magnificent grandeur, the exacteft order, har-
mony, and fymmetry; a Being on whom every.
thing which has breath depends, and who, with
a fublime complacency peculiar to himſelf, con-
tinually beholds his grand fcheme accompliſhed
in the perfection of his works, and particularly
in the pleaſure and happineſs of his living crea-
tures. This auguft idea includes whatever we
can conceive to be great and glorious; it excites
in us admiration, love, and reverence by an
attentive furvey of the vifible works of nature,
and of the wifdom and goodneſs, exhibited in
them, and becomes lively, ftrong, and operative:
it forms our underſtanding and will, as far as
our nature admits, into a fimilar perfection; ſo
that being enamoured with fuch a glorious pat-
tern, we difdain whatever is baſe, indecent, or evil,
and delight in thofe perfons whofe behaviour
bears the livelieft impreffion of the Divine image.
But, whenever we confider the defign of the
all-gracious Creator as particularly relative to
ourfelves, that He has formed us for happineſs,
and for fuch a happy ftate as fhall raiſe us from
the preſent tranfitory and imperfect life to a
more refined, exalted, and perpetually-encreafing
felicity; nothing can more completely fatisfy all
our wiſhes and defires in their utmoſt extent;
3
4
nothing
Defended and Illuftrated:
467
nothing can more powerfully move us to coöpe-
rate with the Divine appointment, and to em-
ploy all our powers, and terminate all our wishes
in the attainment of that glorious end, the ex-
cellency of which no words,can exprefs. We
experience in ourſelves that the infinitely-wife
and benevolent Creator has implanted a ten-
dency to that end in our nature; fo that, when
we déviate from it, we must act contrary to our
nature, and, as it were, hate ourselves. The foul
by its own natural faculties, and the laws by
which thofe faculties are regulated, is put into
the direct path of truth and perfection. Our
looking upon objects naturally produces clear
ideas, and by that means, excites in us a defire
of certainty, light, and knowledge. Even in
our childhood, our rational and reflective faculties
form general and poſitive ideas of what we ob-
ferve; from thence we proceed to enquire after
cauſes and fufficient grounds, and can never de-
liberately form contradictory propofitions, or
withhold our affent from thofe that agree toge-
ther. We naturally delight in order, fymmetry,
and perfection both without, and within our-
felves; nay, the uniform practice of the feveral
duties of Natural Religion, of public and private
virtues, attracts our efteem and regard, and in-
cites us to follow the example. We are fo
conftituted by nature, that we can wifh for no-
thing that has not the appearance of good; nor
can we fhun any thing but what we look upon
as evil. Of many good things we chooſe the
teft, and of many evils we fubmit to the leaſt;
· H h 2
nor
468 NATURAL RELIGION
nor can we fet any limits to our defires of good,
of perfection, of pleaſure and felicity.
Now, the more we perceive in thefe innate
principles of our nature, the moſt wife and be-
neficent defign of our Creator to promote "our
happineſs, and to increaſe it to all eternity; the
more willing and active fhall we be in coöpe-
rating with an appointment which will fatisfy
all our defires. Of this we may be affured by
the content and tranquility of mind, which are
the confequence of fuch a behaviour, and may
comfort ourſelves with the thoughts that we are
under the gracious protection of God, whofe
precepts and example we have followed with
uprightness and fincerity. In fuch a frame of
mind we ſhall need no terrifying idea of God's
power and avenging juftice to compel us to obey,
or deter us from offending him, when we have
voluntarily made the Divine views the end of
cur endeavours, and the fole rule of our conduct.
SECTION XXI.
Thoſe who reprefent religion, and a life re-
gulated by its precepts, as auftere, melancholy,
and void of all pleaſure and enjoyment, muſt
have the moſt erroneous ideas not only of reli-
gion, but alſo of the nature and happineſs of
man; or they must be of a moft depraved mind.
If we confider ourfelves with regard to the pre-
fent life only, religion is productive of fuch a
variety of rational enjoyments, as far furpaſs the
falſe pleaſures of ſenſe and diffipation.
Does
Defended and Illuftrated.
469
ד
1
Does religion prohibit us from tafting any
palatable food or drink? by no means; on the
contrary, it doubles and enhances that gratifica-
tion, as it reminds us of the bountiful Giver, who
has created fuch a variety of foods, and adapted
the palate to ſuch a diverfity of grateful taftes.
It increaſes the enjoyment of thoſe good things
by recommending to us temperance and in-
duſtry, that we may come to every repaſt with
a clear confcience, chearful health, and fresh
appetite.
Does religion deny us conveniency and elegance
in our apparel, houſes, and fervants? not in the
leaſt. It rather makes it a duty to thoſe whoſe
conftitutions and ftation in life require it, to
procure thoſe conveniences. But at the fame
time it admoniſhes us againſt effeminacy, as it
enervates both body and mind; and warns us
from luxury and debauchery, as ruinous to our
faculties and fortunes, and from oftentation,
which, inſtead of procuring us efteem and friend-
ſhip, only expoſes us to envy and ridicule.
Does religion forbid us the comforts of a
married life? far from it. But it recommends
to us moderation in corporeal gratifications, and
a mutual and conftant affection, inftead of in-
temperate fallies of unruly paffions and vagrant
defires; fince the former is more conducive to
our peace of mind, health and vigour of body,
and our domeſtic happineſs. It likewiſe teaches
usto love and cherish our offspring, in compliance
with the calls of nature; and to make them
ufeful members of fociety.
Hh 3
If
'470 NATURAL RELIGION
}
If a perfon takes delight in raifing elegant
ftructures or planning beautiful gardens, in
mufic, and chearful converfation; religion does
not make a crime of theſe things, if purſued with
moderation; but will give him a more lively
and rational enjoyment of thefe pleaſures and
entertainments. For he, who, according to the
precepts of religion, is very fparing in theſe en-
joyments and recreations, ufing them either as
requifite to his health, or to relax the mind after
uſeful labour, or fevere ftudies; he, who can
furvey with a philofophic eye the products of
fields and gardens; who feafons converfation
with difcourfes of learning and knowledge, and
tempers the ſprightlineſs of wit with decency,
good-nature, and truth; experiences infinitely
more refined, more noble and exquifite pleaſures,
than the perſon who is continually indulging
himſelf in theſe entertainments even to fatiety,
and often to the detriment of his health or
fortune.
1
}
SECTION XXII.
Therefore fince religion, inftead of abridging
us of any corporeal enjoyments, only renders
them innocent, and by that means increaſes,
quickens, and exalts them; fo that it fatisfies the
animal part of our defires much better than
guilty vice could do; how much more muft
it promote and improve the pleaſures of the
mind!
I fhall
Defended and Illuftrated.
471
₹
·
7
I fhall not here dwell on the pleafing tran-
quility which fpreads itfelf through the foul,
when we find the fufficient cauſe of all things,
and of our own exiſtence, in an eternal, wife,
gracious, and powerful Being. How attractive,
how elevating is the centemplation of his infinite
perfections, whether they are confidered in
themſelves, or in the vifible works of nature!
What pleaſure arifes from the noble end
which the Deity had in view, namely, the
welfare of all animate Beings, and particularly
the diſtinguiſhing felicity defigned for the
human ſpecies! How raviſhing the delight of
tracing through every part of nature the means
for accompliſhing this glorious end, appointed
by the Creator! I fhall only briefly fhew, that
all the arts, ſciences, and intellectual exerciſes,
which are the peculiar employment of the ſoul,
when it as agreeably to its nature, are not only
confiftent with religion, but improved by it, and
directed to fome real benefit and advantage.
It is true, fuperftition and idolatry, which are
a ſcandal to religion, cheriſh and ſupport igno-
rance and error, as the parents to which they
owe their origin. But fince religion has received
light from the knowledge of Nature, of Lan-
guages, of Hiftory and Philofophy, it feeks
more and more to improve and propagate thefe
feveral branches of knowledge; but chiefly em-
ploys them for the illuftration and fupport of
the moſt fublime and important truths.
Who can but be pleafed, that it is given to
him to know the peculiar advantages and pri-
Hh 4
vileges
1
472
NATURAL RELIGION
vileges of his own nature, and the noble end
for which he was created? But religion is the
only fource from which fuch knowledge can be
derived. As the atheiſt looks upon himſelf to
be no better than a brute, a plant, or a machine,
and accounts his foul a non-entity, or at moſt
the moſt ſubtle part of the brain, which de-
rives its origin from mere matter, and with ſuch
a gloomy profpect before him, finds that his
whole effence will foon return to duft; he not
only greatly debafes the dignity of his nature,
but becomes melancholy, pufillanimous, and
uneafy. But Religion, on the contrary, ac-
quaints us with the dignity of the rational foul,
impreffed with the image of God, and with our
approaching future ftate of boundleſs perfection
and infinite duration; which cannot but yield
an exquifite fatisfaction to a rational felf-love,
and excite us to nobler views and higher efforts,
that will give us a fore-tafte of a fuperior hap-
pinefs. Religion carries a man through an uni-
form and chearful diſcharge of whatever duties
are incumbent on him, from his ftation in life;
fince he is affured, that it is the poft affigned to
him by his Creator, and has the comfortable
teftimony of a good confcience, that he acquits
himſelf with uprightness and fincerity to the
beſt of his power. But to the man of irregular
defires, the practice of virtue and his duty is a
galling burden; and when he outwardly com-
plies with them, it is with reluctance and mur-
muring, fince his heart is taken up with objects
•
of
Defended and Illuftrated.
473
On
of a very different nature; fo that even his good
actions yield fuch a man no fatisfaction.
the other hand, it is an inward reward annexed
to virtue, that a man performs what he is bound
to do, with alacrity and pleaſure; and that he feels
the fatisfaction refulting from a regular behaviour,
and the comfortable affurance, that the moſt
perfect of Beings is pleafed with his affiduity
and faithfulness in the diſcharge of his duty.
Thus, like an ingenuous and dutiful ſon, he
not only takes delight in his intellectual im-
provements in knowledge and wiſdom; but has
the additional fatisfaction to know, that his fin-
cere and conſtant application gains him the love
and affection of the univerfal Parent of man-
kind. Nay, the external rewards of diligence,
probity, peaceablenefs and fidelity, feldom fail.
Increaſe of happineſs, domeftic profperity, the
love and eſteem of others, have a natural and
neceffary connection with virtue and piety. As
pride, felf-conceit, envy, hatred, anger, ca-
lumny and diſcord, find no place in the foul of
a good man; it is the better adapted as an ha-
bitation for meeknefs, benevolence, ſympathizing
humanity; and the more cordial friendſhip it
entertains for the wife and good, the greater
happineſs it procures to civil fociety. Man is
born for love and benevolence; and he who
cordially practiſes it towards others, and meets
with a reciprocal return, guards himſelf as much
as poffible from turbulent paffions and outward.
enmity, and acts agreeably to his nature.
Indeed
474 NATURAL RELIGION
}
Indeed, it is not within the power of the moft
eminently-pious to regulate profperous and ad-
verfe events according to their own will; and in
this refpect, the good and virtuous feem to have
little or no advantage above the wicked and
prophane. But thefe events affect our tranqui-
lity and happineſs according to the frame of
mind of the perfon who is fubject to them.
Now, I would afk, which has moft fatisfaction
in temporal profperity, he that looks on it as
the effect of mere chance, and expects that it
will fatisfy his boundleſs defires; or he that re-
ceives it as the extraordinary bounty of the
Supreme Being, and is refigned to every ftate
or event which falls to his lot? which of the
two will beft accommodate himſelf to afflictions,
he that has nothing to truft to but a fatal necef-
fity, and has no hopes beyond this life; or he
that, in every event which happens to him,
acknowledges a wife and gracious Providence,
according to whofe direction the prefent evil
fhall work-for his good, by preparing him for a
bleffed eternity. Lastly, Which is moſt uncon-
cerned about impending ftorms, he' that, with-
out rudder or pilot, commits himſelf to the
boisterous fea of life; or he who, with well-
grounded confidence, refigns himſelf to the
guidance of a kind, judicious, and Omnipotent
hand? To conclude, though from our child-
hood, we have daily before our eyes the cer-
tainty of our death; yet as the manner and
time of it is involved in impenetrable darkneſs,
no ſyſtem of philofophy is fufficient to enable
us
Defended and Illustrated.
475
us compoſedly to meet that awful change. It
is Religion alone which can impart that fortitude.
For, to him who does not extend his views beyond
this life death muft neceffarily be terrible,
fince it puts a period to his whole being. This
muſt embitter all his temporal enjoyments; and
the melancholy idea of a great impending evil,
damps the fruition of the prefent good, and repre-
fents human life as vain, of no value, and even
miferable; fince our nature does not reft fatif-
fied in fuch fhort, grovelling, and imperfect en-
joyments. Religion alone, by exhibiting to us
the certainty of a future ftate, renders our whole
life ferene, eafy, and happy; it enhances our
preſent pleaſures by the comfortable hope of a
much happier and ever-during ftate; it alleviates
our temporal fufferings by the expectation of
eternal bliss; it makes us wait for death with
patience and refignation, as an entrance into a
more exalted and perfect life; and, in every
reſpect, fully fatisfies our nature and its bound-
lefs defires after an ever-growing felicity and
perfection, for which it was defigned and adapted
by the great Author of our Being.
FINI S.
CONTENT S.
2
DISSERTATION I.
Concerning the Beginning and Origin of Men and
Animals,
DISSERTATION
P. *.
II.
Men and Animals do not derive their Origin either
from the World, or from Nature,
DISSERTATION
III.
P. 60.
Proving that the material World is, in itfelf void of
life, and confequently incapable of intrinfic perfection;
from whence it follows, that it is not ſelf-exiftent
eternal, and neceffary; but must have derived its
existence from fome other Being,
DISSERTATION
IV.
p. 88.
Of God, and his defign in the creation, or final caufes.
DISSERTATION V.
p. 145.
Of God's particular views, or final causes, in the
animal kingdom,
DISSERTATION
P. 206.
VI. ·
Of man confidered in himself, and particularly of the
human foul,
DISSERTATION
p. 276.
VII.
A comparifon drawn between men and other animals,
with regard to the manner of living, for which they
were created,
P. 315.
DISSERTATION VIII.
Of Providence; in which feveral Objections raised
against it are confuted.
DISSERTATION
P. 354.
IX.
Of the immortality of the Soul, and the advantages of
Religion,
P. 414.
f
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