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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C0NGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING TELERETO
PART 21
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 180 THROUGH 183
AND EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
§ |
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 21
Joint CoMMITTEE ExHIBITS NOS. 180 THROUGH 183 AND
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS
Printed for the use of the *
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
§
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
EIARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOI’ER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERG USON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gåIn FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARE, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GER HARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HAN NAFORD, Assistant Counsel
John E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
SETH. W. Rich ARDson, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, A88istant (Jounsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, A 88istant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, 488tstant Counsel
II
j
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Pages
No. *
1– 399
401– 982
983–1583
1585–2063
2065–2492
2493–2920
2921–3378
3379–3927
3929–4599
4601–5151
5153–5560
;
Transcript Hearings
pages
1— 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
1059– 2586 TNov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
2587– 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4195— 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5461– 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6647— 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7889– 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
9108–10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
10518–12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
12278–13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
13709–14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
; through 33
35 *
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 110.
111 through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179. .
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
III
INDEX OF EXHIBITS
1792
12–18–45
1792
12–18–45
1792
12–18–45
254
317
Exhibit No.
Hearings, page
and date intro-
duced
Exhibits
page
No.
Description
* * * * sº sº sºm, sº
23
11–15–45
24
11–15–45
87
11–16–45
142
11–16–45
153
11–16–45
153
11–16–45
172
11–17–45
233
11–19–45
3.18
3.18
337
391
391
413
415
424
Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its
foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign estab-
lishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements,
espionage reports, etc.
Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific ship-
ping through Torres Straits.
Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector
Station.
Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrat-
ing his narrative statement.
Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating
his narrative statement. - - -
Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by
Admiral Inglis, previously marked “Exhibit 3–B in evidence” in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor
Board. -
Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for
Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans
for Pearl Harbor attack.
Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans
for Pearl Harbor attack. -
Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans
for Pearl Harbor attack.
Hearings, page |Exhibits * - 4 &
Exhibit No. 1 and date intro- page Description
duced No. •l
8–D------ 2480 425 | Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans
1–5–46 for Pearl Harbor attack. -
9-------- 256 923 || Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to
11–19–45 Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10-. - - - - - 279 1000 | Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl
11—20—45 Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with
instructions and receipt therefor.
11------- 319 1006 || Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed
11–21–45 blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12------- 363 1013 | Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14,
11—21–45 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the
services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years
1932 through 1941.
13- - - - - - - 387 1019 || Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding
11—21--45 . General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14- - - - - - - 397 1040 | Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant
11-21–45 General, entitled “Air Defense of Pearl Harbor” in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject
(see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate
Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS
(Naval Security).
15- - - - - - - 401 1042 | Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941,
11—23–45 Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941,
which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United
States.
22—A-- - - -
3839
2–6–46
4341
2–13–46
1694
12–15–45
2065
12–31–45
1077
1081
401
11-23–45
402
11–23–45
402
11—23–45
402
11—23–45
402
11–23–45
402
11—23–45
458
11—23–45
1061
1083
1084
1201
1226
1246
1252
1262
(a) Memorandum “Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation”, dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President,
by General Marshall and Admiral Stark;
(b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941;
(c) Memorandum “Far Eastern Situation” dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941,
from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek.
Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through
the Department of State.
Memorandum “Far Eastern situation” dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall
and Admiral Stark.
y y
Documents relating to proposed “Modus Vivendi,” including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated
Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed
message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents,
including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memo-
randum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with
attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21,
1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941.
#. ºnents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the
ar East. -
(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government;
b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 1601.15;
(c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador
brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President
and British Prime Minister.
Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed
statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign
Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of state-
ment made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.) *
É
Hearings, page
Exhibits
Exhibit No. and date intro- page Description
duced No.
22–B_ _ _ _ _ 1783 1269 || Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the
12–18–45 Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed
parallel action with reference to Japan. *
22–C__. - - 1783 1275 || Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the
12–18–45 Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles,
Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning “British-American Cooperation”.
22–D____. 1783 1292 || Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan,
12–18–45 concerning “British-American Cooperation” at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles’ subsequent
| conversation with the President. -
23- - - - - - - 476 1300 || Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by
11–24–45 Ambassador Winant. m
24- - - - - - - 476 1300 | Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by
11–24–45 Ambassador Winant. -
25- - - - - - - 574 1301 | Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction
11—26–45 in Japan to the Secretary’s proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766
to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26,
1941, to the Japanese Government.
26- - - - - - - 634 1303 | Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning
11–27–45 general policy toward Japan (so-called “green light” dispatch).
27- - - - - - - 670 1315 “Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941”, Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942),
11–27–45 Department of State Publication 1853. -
28-- - - - - - 670 1315 || “Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941”, Introduction and Documents (cloth edition,
11–27–45 1943), Department of State Publication 1983. -
29- - - - - - - 670 | 1315 “Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941”, vols. I and II (1943). Department of
11–27–45 State Publication 2008.
30- - - - - - - 670 1315
11–27–45
“Ten Years in Japan”, by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

778
11–29–45
2092
12—31–45
839
11–30–45
928
12–4–45
954
12–4–45
988
12–5–45
1326
1385
1389
1395
737
11–28–45
778
11–29–45
825
11–30–45
828
11–30–45
830
11–30–45
841
11–30–45
1316
1334
1390
1393
1409
1409
1412
1413
Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials
in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese repre-
sentatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941.
Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to
General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies.
(See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G–2, War Department, Washington, D. C.,
covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief
of Staff, concerning “Japanese-American Relations”, bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning “Resignation
of Japanese Cabinet” and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning “Warnings Sent
to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941”, with enclosures.
Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing
phrase “hostile action possible at any moment”, which draft contains a sentence that did not appear
in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See FXhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled “Basic Exhibit of Dispatches”.
(See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning
the handling of his codes and secret documents.
Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief
of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretſ ry, General Staff.
Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (979645) concerning report of promised armed
Support to British under certain conditions.
Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages
Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code
destruction message).
Hearings, page |Exhibits - - -
Exhibit No. and date intro- page Description
duced No.
42- - - - - - - 990 1416 Copy of Army Regulation No. 10–15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled
12–5–45 “General Staff—Organization and Duties”.
43- - - - - - - 997 1422 Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conver-
12–5–45 sations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth. - -
44- - - - - - - 1001 1423 Compilation entitled “Copies of Defense Plans”, which contains extracts from various basic Army and
12–5–45 Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents
attached to this exhibit.)
45- - - - - - - 1019 1471 Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning “Far
12–5–45 Eastern Situation” and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46- ... - - - - - 1027 1472 Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27,
12–5–45 1941, with routing slip.
47- - - - - - - 1041 1476 Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President
12–5–45 (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Depart-
ment; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for
Director of Naval Intelligence concerning “Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850”; dispatch
309859 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same cor-
respondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48- - - - - - - 1044 1481 | Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning “Method
12–5–45 of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers”, and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C.
Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii. -
48–A__ _ _ _ 2093 1484 || Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination
12–31–45 + of command.
49–- - - - - - 1053 1485 | Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC–1).
12–6–45
50- - - - - - - 1053 1551 | Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).
12–6–45
ºst sº sº me • ** *
1053
I2–6–45
1063
12–6–45
1067
12–6–45
1067
12–6–45
1076
12–6–45
1077
12–6–45
1088
12–6–45
1092
12–6–45
1094
12–6–45
1112
12–7–45
1284
12–10–45
1345
12–11–45
1585
* * * * * * *
1053
12–6–45
1593
1600
1627
1628
1630
1631
1632
1635
1636
1640
1641
1644
Report entitled “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2” (ABC–22).
Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, con-
cerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941.
(See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
“Notes on General Council Meeting”, Feb. 19, 1941, concerning “Defense Objectives” (revised Feb. 13,
1941).
Minutes of “Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff”, on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of
Pearl Harbor was discussed.
Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning “Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian
Department” by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
Minutes of “Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941’’, concerning use of planes in
proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched
to Hawaii.
List of President's appointments with º, representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone
calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6,
1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941.
exhibit.)
General Marshall’s aide memoire to the President concerning “Defense of Hawaii”.
(See table of contents attached to this
General Marshall’s memorandum for the President concerning “Ground Forces”.
Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed
Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General
in connection therewith.
t
12–15–45
Hearings, page |Exhibits
Exhibit No. and date intro- page Description
duced No.
64- - - - - - - 1544 1645 Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
- 12–13–45 -
65- - - - - - - 1541 1677 | Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
12–13–45 to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States
disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66- - - - - - - 1642 1680 | Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (96.1255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941
12–15–45 by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported
the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67- - - - - - - 1642 1682 | Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Gov-
12–15–45 ernment, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's
return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called “parallel action message”).
68- - - - - - - 1675 1689 || Log of U. S. S. Boise for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship
12–15–45 on certain dates.
69 - - - - - - - 1677 1715 Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and Decem-
12–15–45 ber 1941. -
70- - - - - - - 1695 1716 || Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the
12–15–45 President’s statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71 - - - - - - - 1696 1719 || Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract
12–15–45 § radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese
policies.
72- - - - - - - 1696 1721 | Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassa-
12–15–45 dor's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand;
digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning
reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand. -
73-- - - - - - 1700 1727 | Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to
the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of
State Department on the matter.
No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the
Konoye cabinet in Japan).
74–A-----
1703
12–15–45
2768
1–19—46
1705
12–15–45
1709
11–15–45
1712
12–15–45
1724
12–17–45
1724
12–17–45
1724
12–17–45
* * * * * * *
75- - - - - - -
- - - * * * *-
* * * * * * *
1724
12–17–45
1728
12–17–45
1754
12–17–45
1775
12–17–45
1735
1741
1744
1754
1757
1768
1770
1774
1837
1864
1866
1867
Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the
Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State
concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hos-
tilities. -
Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining
the delivery of the so-called “Ten Point Note” on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their
oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State
Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at
the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department
presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria, as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent
for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12,
1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called “green light” dispatch.
Navy dispatches concerning “Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)”.
exhibit.)
Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to
this exhibit.)
Office of Naval Intelligence “Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations” dated Nov. 1, Nov.
15, and Dec. 1, 1941. - -
Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6,
1941.
Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
(See table of contents attached to this
Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (93.1850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, Cin PAC, COM 14, and COM 16,
advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts
to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo
(so-called “Mori telephone call”).
:
Hearings, page
Exhibits|
Exhibit No. and date intro- page Description
duced No.
85- - - - - - - 1799 1870 Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through
- 12–18–45 Dec. 3, 1941. -
86- - - - - - - 1825 1901 | Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec.
12–18–45 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas. -
87- - - - - - - 1889 1907 || Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George W. Strong, concerning “Alert of
12–19–45 r Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940”, with attached documents referred to therein.
88- - - - - - - 1912 1937 | Sections of document “Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940”, concerning duties
12—19–45 of “War Plans Division (OP–12)”.
89 - - - - - - - 1938 1937 || Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and
12–20–45 Navy “For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii”.
90- - - - - - - 2066 1941 | Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland,
12–31–45 concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories,
and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies. . -
91 - - - - - - - 2067 1950 | Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo,
12–31–45 to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers
and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92- - - - - - - 2068 1960 Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of
12–31–45 §º. containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan.
- , 1942. -
93--- - - - - - lºs 1974 Photostatic copy of p. 2, G–2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94- - - - - - - 2078 1975 | 3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government,
12–31–45 . transmitting the so-called “Ten Point Note” which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by
- Secretary Hull on that date.
95- - - - - - - lºss 1987 | Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral
J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

i
2091
12–31–45
2091
12–31–45
2093
12–31–45
2094
12–31–45
2095
12–31–45
2095
12–31–45
2095
12–31–45
2095
12–31–45
2095
12–31–45
2096
12–31–45
2096
12–31–45
2349
1–4–46
2016
2023
2107
2118
2122
2140
2144
2258
Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study “Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern
Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940”, attributed to
Stanley K. Hornbeck.
Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, con-
cerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama
Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning “Japanese Convoy
Movement Toward IAdo-China”.
Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their
recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant
Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence
officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning “Investigation of
Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay”.
Log of U. S. S. Enterprise from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
Log of U. S. S. Learington from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
“Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941’’, by Commander, Enterprise
Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
“U. S. S. Leæington War Diary” for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this
Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
Cºpiºn of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec.
12, 1941.
“Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations”, prepared by Navy
Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General,
Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report,
and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry’s Findings of Fact.
3
- Bear p Tºxhibits
Exhibit No. º: #. page Description
duced No.
107—A_ _ _ _ 2479 2393 || “The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy”, including the Fourth Endorse-
1–5–46 ment by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer
by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108 - - - - - - 2364 2432 || Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28,
1–4–46 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled
“Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities”, described by
him as “a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation”.
109 - - - - - - 2476 2444 Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships
1–5–46 Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110 - - - - - - 2477 2444 Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8,
1–5–46 1941.
111 - - - - - - 2495 2457 | Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from
1–15–46 Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence
and memoranda.
112 - - - - - - 2496 2458 || Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before
1–15–46 the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113- - - - - - 2558 2502 | Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning
1–16–46 Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employ-
ment Schedules for Task Forces 1,-2, and 3.
113–A---- 2807 2532 | Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning “Battle
--" 1–19—46 Organization and Condition Watches”.
113–B_ _ _ _ 2807 2534 Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning “Task Forces—Organization
| 1–19–46 and Missions”. -
113–C---- 3449 2538 (a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential
1–31–46 Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for
patrol wing 2 (becember 1941).


3
115–A__ _ _
115—B_ _ _ _
2558
1–16–46
2558
1–16–46
3449.
1–31–46
3450
1–31–46
2558
1–16–46
2559
1–16–46
5015
2—20—46
2559
1–16–46
2559
1–16–46
2559
1–16–46
2561
1–16–46
2588
1–16–46
2568
2601
2672
2677
2700
2707
2713
2714
2716
2721
2727
2735
WPPac—46, and 'letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941,
Fº wºre-w which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan
–1, Rainbow 5).
Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth
Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports
dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See
table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Fourteenth Naval District, “Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing
assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force”.
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45–41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11,
1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo
plane attacks.
Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses
of the Hawaiian Islands.
Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning “Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area,” from
Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled “Steps to be Taken in Case
of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours”.
Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning “Avail-
ability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941”; (b) Compilation of dates on
which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated
Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating
areas, Hawaiian area. - -
Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the
circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and
Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
à
Hearings, Exhibit - a. º.
Exhibit No. º: tº. i. S Description
- duced No.
123- - - - - - 2588 2736 | Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a
1–16–46 combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942. *
123—A 5015 2743 || Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army
2—20—46 and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124- - - - - - 2674 2749 || Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29,
1–17–46 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan .
dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee
Exhibit, No. 1. - -
125- - - - - - 2678 2801 || Log of the U. S. S. Wright from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on
1–17–46 Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126- - - - - - 2767 2832 (a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled “Organization of the Naval
-- 1–19—46 Forces of the United States”; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of
- a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127- - - - - - 2768 2867 || Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7,
1–19—46 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same
subject.)
128- - - - - - 2768 2870 | Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii,
1–19—46 recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129- - - - - - 2842 2875 | Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R.
1–19—46 e Stark promulgating the plan. r
130- - - - - - 2879 2941 | Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese
1–21–46 and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov.
29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government
protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's
reply to Ambassador Grew. - *
131 - - - - - - 2892 2943 | Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army
1–21–46 Pearl Harbor Board. {
sº

|
132—A- - - -
29.17
1–21–46
5137
2—20—46
2965
1–23–46
2965
1–23–46
2965
1–23–46
2966
1–23–46
2966
1–23–46
2976
1–23–46
2943
2946
2953
3124
3171
3.187
31.87
3195
Selected items obtained by War Department from General. MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp.
7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript): -
(a) Memorandum “Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American
Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941”;
(b) Memorandum “Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British
Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941”;
(c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministr
eign Affairs, “On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great
Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941.”
Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters,
Tokyo (see pp. 13662–13665 Joint Committee Trarscript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo
and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881,
941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug.
19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and
Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a
peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the
progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
of For-
ritain—
Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks
Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request.
Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Com-
mission and Army Pearl Harbor Board. -
Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of
advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population charac-
teristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning
messages of Nov. 27–28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department,
concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting
memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian
Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen.
F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled “Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii”. (See Joint Com-
mittee Exhibit No. 13.)
i
Hearings, page |Exhibits
Exhibit No. and date intro- page Description
duced No.
139- - - - - - 3006 3196 || Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled “G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation”
1–23–46 by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140- - - - - - 3.188 3203 || Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including
1—26–46 proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate
General, and related material. -
141 - - - - - - 3311 3254 File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled “Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to
1–28–46 Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It”. -
142- - - - - - 3324 3302 || Compilation of Material Relating to so-called “Winds” code. (See table of contefits attached to this
1–29—46 exhibit.)
142-A-- - - 3324 3318 . (a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese
1–29–46 Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night
Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142--B_ _ _ _ 3674 3321 | Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see
2–4–46 p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142–C_ _ _ _ 374.1 3322 | Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three
2–5–46 messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated
Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called “winds” messages, indicating no interception by the British or
Dutch Governments of a “winds execute” message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142–D_ _ _ _ 3780 3323 || Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called “winds”
2–5–46. code.
143- - - - - . 3929 3332 | Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22
2–7–46 through 25.) -
144- - - - - - 3929 3332 | Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to
2–7–46 precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. §§
145- - - - - - 3929 3332 | Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the pro-
2–7–46 visions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

3929
2–7–46
3929
2–7–46
4083
2–8–46
4421
2–13–46
4794
2–18–46
5009
2–19—46
5013
2—20—46
5068
2—20—46
* * * * * =
* * * - - *
- - - - - -
* * - - - -
3929
2–7–46
3929
2–7–47
5122
2—20—46
5201
4—11—46
3332
3332
3332
3332
3333
3335
3351
3353
3430
3435
3436
3441
Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the
provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U.S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16,
1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
Rºgº of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry
. Clausen, A, U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept
dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy
Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. E. Halsey, suggesting
questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called “winds” message. *
Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in con-
nection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese 'mes-
sages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) º
Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, “General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Hono-
lulu on Dec. 7, 1941’’, prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the
city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled “The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii”,
with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Associ-
ation. -
Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15
to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 pre
ed by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning “Final Recom-
mendations Far Eastern Intelligence
rganization”.
Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of
Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)
g
Hearings, page |Exhibits tº a *
Exhibit No. and date intro- page Description
duced No.
158- - - - - - 5201 3441 | Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-
4–11–46 British convention concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this
exhibit.
159 - - - - - - 5201 3488 Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese
4–11–46 Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160- - - - - - 5240 | 3502 | Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and
4–11–46 continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161 – - - - - - 5241 3508 || Drafts of Secretary ISnox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to
4—11—46 Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit
g No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.) -
161—A-- - - 5464 3520 | Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions
5–23–46 made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162— — — ... -- 5269 3534 || Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000,
4–11–46 Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A---- 5464 3543 | Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit
5–23–46 No. 162. -
163- - - - - - 5292 3557 || Log of the U. S. S. Helena from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
4–11–46 -
164- - - - - - 5292 3593 || Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the
4–11–46 attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941. -
165- - - - - - 5292 3643 | Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German
4–11–46 Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166- - - - - - 5468 38%. State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This
5–23–46 dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State
Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

É
sººn sº * * * *
5468
5–23–46
5468
5–23—46
5469
5–23–46
5469
5–23—46
5469
5–23–46
5469
5–23—46
5469
5–23–46
5469
5–23–46
5470
5–23–46
5470
5–23–46
5470
5–23–46
3652
3666
3696
3789
3942
3978
3985
4030
4115
4121
4132
(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on
Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov.
26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7,
1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning
President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general
Far East matters.
Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December
1941, concerning a proposed modus vivendi, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit
No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and represent-
atives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached
to this exhibit.)
Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter
C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents
supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns
produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached
to this exhibit.) - -
Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6,
1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secre-
tary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of
State for the President.
Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign
naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former
Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of
contents attached to this exhibit.)
g
Hearings, page
Exhibits
Exhibit. No. 1 and date intro- page Description
duced No.
178— — — — — — 5470 4209 || Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Depart-
5–23–46 ment, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179- - - - - - 5470 4241 Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Com-
5–23–46 mittee, concerning Far East matters.
180 - - - - - - 54.71 4551 | Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
5–23—46 - -
181 - - - - - - 55.20 4565 | The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor
5–23–46 { Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182. - - - - - 5537 4702 || Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G–2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to
5–23–46 July 1, 1941
183- - - - - - 5468 4766 || Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel
5–23–46 (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the Utah by the Army Air Corps in 1937,
*. * concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940–45 production of B-17 4-engine
OIIloérS. - -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4551
EXHIBIT NO. 180
Table of Contents
1. Abbreviated chart of War Department Organization and Personnel as of
December 7, 1941.
2. Abbreviated chart of Hawaiian Department Organization and Personnel as of
December 7, 1941.
3. Abbreviated organization chart of the War Department, effective December
7, 1941. -
4. Abbreviated chart of the Organization and Personnel of the Navy Department
as of December 7, 1941.
5. Abbreviated Tactical Organization Chart, U. S. Pacific Fleet, December 7, 1941.
ABBREVIATED CHART OF WAR DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL ON 7 DECEMBER 1941
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
The President
CHIEF OF STAFF
t Gen. George C. Marshall
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
Col. Walter B. Smith
OVERSEAS pkpartuests GROUND #orces
CORPS Akras
chief signal, orrican other kervices
Maj. Gen. Dawson Olmstead


| d
SECRETARY OF WAR
enry L. Stimson
|
DEPUTY CHIEFS OF STAFF
Maj. Gen. William Bryden
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore
Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold
|
SECRETARY OF NAVY
(See Navy Chart)
|
ASST. SECY., GENERAL STAFF
Col. John R. Deane
ARMY AIR FORCES
Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold
CHIEF OF AIR STAFF, A-2
Brig. Gen. Martin F. Scanlon
| |
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OPERATIONS AND THAINING DIVISION
Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G–2 Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3
Brig. Gen. sherman Miles Brig. Gen. Harry L. Twaddle
PE & SONNEL brvision
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1
Brig. Gen. Wade H. Haislip
|
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
|
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Lt. Col. John T. Bissell
|
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Col. Hayes, A. Kroner
Col. Ralph C. Smith
|
Far Eastern Section
| |
Administrative Section Situation Section
t Col. Rufus S. Bratton
I,t. Col. Moses W. Lt. Col. Thomas J.
|
WAR PLANS DIVISION
Asst. Chief of Staff, W. P. D
Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow
I
SUPPLY DIVISION
Asst. Chief of Staff, G–4
Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell
Executive Officer -
Maj. Charles K. Gailey, Jr.
PLANS GROUP PROJECTS GROUP
Col. Charles W. Col. Robert W.
Bundy Crawford
Pettigrew Betts
See separate chart
for Hawaiian Dept. |
- MATERIEi, BRANCH
BRANCH administkative BRANCH
OPERATIONS
Col. Sadtler
1. Otis K
Traffic Mºon
and Signal Center
Col. Edward T. French
|
Communication Liaison
Signal Intelligence Service
Division
Lt. Col. W. T. Guest
Lt. Col. Rex W. Minckler
#
ABBREWIATED CHART OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL ON 7 DECEMBER 1941
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
COMMANDING GENERAL
Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short
CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. Walter C. Phillips
CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. James A, Mollison
G–1 (PERSONNEL)
Iat. Col. Russell C. Throckmorton
|
G–2 (INTELLIGENCE)
Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder
Assistant G-2
Lt. Col. George W. Bicknell
G–3 (operation; AND TRAINING)
Lt. Col. William E. Donegan
|
G–4 (SUPPLY)
Col. Morrill W. Marston
Maj. Robert J. Fleming
adjutanº GENERAL
Col. Robert H. Dunlop
|
ORDNANCE
Col. W. A. Capron
CHEMICAL WARFARE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Lt. Col. G. F. Unmacht 1.
- | |
PROVOST MARSHAL QUARTERMASTER
Lt. Col. Melvin L. Craig Col. William R. White
ENGINEER FINANCE
Co Col. A. K. B. Lyman Col. E. S. Ely
T. H. Green
|
SIGNAL CORPS
Lt. Col. Carrol A. Powell
|
24TH INF. DIVISION
Hrig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson
|
25TH INF. DIVISION
Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray
- |
COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND
Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin
|
SURGEON GENERAL
Col. Edgar King
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Col. Lathe B. Row
|
HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE
Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin
I
INTELLIGENCE
Col. Edward W. Raley
|
SIGNAL OFFICER
Lt. Col. Clay I. Hoppough
|
18TH BOMB. WING
Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph
14TH punkurt WING
Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson
|
WHEELER FIELD
|
HICKAM FIELD
Col. Col. William J. Flood
W. E. Farthing
|
BELLOWS FIELD
Lt. Col. Leonard D. Weddington



ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
| UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR c |
| WAR COUNCIL |
| SECRETARY OF WAR
BUREAU OF
PUBLIC RELATIONS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR
FOR AIR a
GFINFRAI,
COUNCIL
BUDGET AND
| LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
wº- CHIEF OF STAFF DEPUTY CHIEFs of STAFF
At present also Commander Field Forces Gen. Adm. and Ground Arm'd Force and Supply Air b
AIR | GROUND
ND
| EXECUTIVE FOR
RESE A
R()TC AFFAIRS
| GROUND | Ground Forces Available on Call for Combined
|
Planning and Training and for Combat Operation
- - GENERAI,
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF STAFF
AIR
} COUNCIL
CHIEFS OF CHIEF OF
SERVICES .4
F I C J C | I | El S
A | A A N N i
C | V | F | G | G.
GHQ Air Forces Available on Call for Combined Planning and ARMY SPECIAL
d - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AIR FORCES STAFF
Training and for Combat Operation
H
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR |
EXEMPTED
STATIONS
| CORPS AREAS
OVERSEAS
º
FORCES
ARMORED
FORCE
POSTS, CAMPS, AND
STATIONS
* All air functions with civilian officials.
b Algo Chief of Army Air Force
e All procurement except aircraft (legs armament)
* GHQ now 8
and operations.
bined air-ground training.
| Hº GHQ
E8 TPS ARM IES
uperhetles War Plans Division in the organization and control of task forces
It will continue to direct the training of the Ground Forces and com-
THEATERS OF
OPERATION
IXEFENSE
COMMANI)S
TASK
FORCES
AIR FORCE AIR
COMBAT COMMAND CORPS
Approved : CHIEF of STAFF,
RESERVES










ExHIBITs of Joint committer 4555
NAVY DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION, 7 DECEMBER 1941
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox -
Naval Aide Comdr. Frank E. Beatty
Technical Aide
Petroleum Reserves
Lend Lease Liaison
Public Relations, Rear Adm. A. J. Hepburn, ret.
Interior Control Board, Rear Adm. W. R. Sexton, ret.
Joint Boards
Board of Inspection and Survey (for new construction)
Research and Development Board
Defense Savings Bonds -
Under Secretary of the Navy James W. Forrestal
Naval Aide
Compensation Board
Naval Examining Board
Naval Retiring Board
Board of Medical Examiners
Army and Navy Munitions Board
Procurement and Legal Division
Naval Contract Distribution Division
Certification Supervisory Unit
Office of Judge Advocate General, Rear Adm. W. B. Woodson
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ralph A. Bard
Naval Aide -
Shore Establishments Division, Rear Adm. C. W. Fisher
Shore Station Development Board
Training, Liaison and Coordination Division
Administrative Office
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus Gates $
Naval Aide
Army and Navy Aeronautical Board
Office of Budget and Reports, Capt. E. G. Allen
Bureau of Navigation—Rear Adm. C. W. Nimitz
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery—Rear Adm. R. T. McIntire
Bureau of Ships—Rear Adm. S. M. Robinson
Bureau of Ordnance—Rear Adm. W. H. P. Blandy
Bureau of Supply and Accounts—Rear Adm. R. Spear
Bureau Of Yards and Docks—Rear Adm. B. Moreell
Bureau of Aeronautics—Rear Adm. J. H. Towers
Office of Chief of Naval Operations—Adm. H. R. Stark
Assistant CNO-Rear Adm. R. E. Ingersoll
Interdepartmental Committee Division—Rear Adm. S. C. Hooper
Central Division—Capt. R. E. Schuirmann t
Inspection Division—Rear Adm. J. W. Wilcox, Jr.
Fleet Training Division—Capt. W. A. Lee, Jr.
Fleet Maintenance Division—Capt. R. H. English
Ships Movements Division—Rear Adm. R. M. Brainard
Naval Districts—Rear Adm. A. Sharp
Communications Division—Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes
Assistant—Capt. J. R. Redman
Communications Security Section—Comdr. L. F. Safford
Intelligence Liaison Section—Lt. W. W. Bayley
War Plans Division—Rear Adm. R. K. Turner
Assistant—Capt. H. W. Hill
Plans Section—Capt. O. M. Read
Assistant—Comdr. R. O. Glover
4556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox—Continued.
Office of Chief of Naval Operations—Continued.
Office of Naval Intelligence—Capt. T. S. Wilkinson
Assistant—Capt. H. F. Kingman
Domestic and Special Intelligence—Capt. J. B. W. Waller
Security—Lt. Comdr. E. S. Earnhardt
Counter-Subversion—Comdr. Hartwell C. Davis
Foreign Intelligence—Capt. W. A. Heard
Far East—Comdr. A. H. McCollum
Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer
Central Europe—Comdr. E. H. Von Heimburg
U. S. Pacific Fleet—Adm. H. E. Kimmel
U. S. Atlantic Fleet—Adm. E. J. King
U. S. Asiatic Fleet—Adm. T. C. Hart
Marine Corps HQ. and Activities—Maj. Gen. T. Holcomb, Commandant
Coast Guard HQ. and Activities
Naval Coastal Sea Frontiers
1st Naval District, Boston, Mass.-Rear Adm. W. T. Tarrant.
3rd Naval District, New York, N. Y.-Rear Adm. E. J. Marquart
4th Naval District, Philadelphia, Pa.-Rear Adm. A. E. Watson
5th Naval District, Norfolk, Va.-Rear Adm. M. H. Simons
6th Naval District, Charleston, S. C.—Rear Adm. W. H. Allen
7th Naval District, Key West, Fla.-Capt. R. S. Crenshaw
8th Naval District, New Orleans, La.-Capt. J. A. Thompson, Jr.
9th Naval District, Great Lakes, Ill.—Rear Adm. J. Downes
10th Naval District, San Juan, P. R.—Rear Adm. J. H. Hoover
11th Naval District, San Diego, Calif.-Rear Adm. C. H. Blakley
12th Naval District, San Francisco, Calif.-Rear Adm. J. W. Greenslade
13th Naval District, Seattle, Wash.-Rear Adm. C. S. Freeman
14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, T. H.-Rear Adm. C. C. Bloch
15th Naval District, Balboa, C. Z.-Rear Adm. F. H. Sadler
16th Naval District, Cavite, P. I.-Rear Adm. F. W. Rockwell
º Potomac River Naval Command—Rear Adm. G. T. Pettingill
Severn River Naval Command—Rear Adm. G. T. Pettingill
NOTE.-The U. S. Atlantic Fleet, the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the U. S. Asiatic Fleet
together comprise the U. S. Fleet, whose commander-in-chief is appointed from among the
(and is the senior of) the commanders-in-chief of the component fleets. The U. S. Fleet is
an administrative organization for training purposes only and is a task organization only
when two or more fleets are concentrated or are operating in conjunction with each other.
All offices, divisions and bureaus, etc., are not subdivided ; the subdivisions of those
broken down are not exhaustive, and include only those sub-offices of more or less frequent
mention during the ºftºn of the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
Ranks of officers are as of 7 December 1941.
TACTICAL ORGANIZATION.—U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 7 DECEMBER 1941
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet—Admiral Husband E. Kimmell
Task Force One—Vice Adm. W. S. Pye, Commander
Task Force Two—Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey, Commander
Task Force Three—Vice Adm. Wilson Brown, Commander
Task Force Four—Vice-Adm. C. C. Bloch, Commander
Task Force Seven—Rear Adm. Thomas Withers, Commander
Task Force Eight—Vice Adm. W. F. Halsey, Commander
Task Force Nine—Rear Adm. P. N. L. Bellinger, Commander
Task Force Twelve—Rear Adm. J. H. Newton, Commander
Task Force Fifteen—Rear Adm. W. L. Calhoun, Commander
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE
Vice Admiral W. S. Pye (ComBatº'or)
BatDiv Two, 3 BB, WO-2 (9 WOS)
Rear Admiral D. W. Bagley, ComBatDiv 2
Tennessee, Capt. C. E. Reordan
California, Capt. J. W. Bunkley
Pennsylvania, Capt. C. M. Cooke, Jr.
BatDiv Four, 3 BB, WO-4 (9WOS)
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4557
Vice Admiral W. S. Pye—Continued.
Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson, ComBatDiv 4
West Virginia, Capt. M. S. Bennion
cº Colorado, Capt. L. E. Lindsey
Maryland, Capt. E. W. McKee
CarDiv One less Leavington—1 CW
Rear Admiral A. W. Fitch, ComCarDivOne
Saratoga, Capt. A. H. Douglas
Saratoga Air Group
WB–3 WO–3
WS-3 VT-3
CruDiv Nine, 5 CL, WCS9 (20 WSO)
Rear Admiral H. F. Leary, ComCruDiv Nine
Honolulu, Capt. H. Dodd
Phoenia, Capt. H. E. Fischer
Boise, Capt. S. B. Robinson
Helena, Capt. R. H. English
St. Louis, Capt. G. H. Rood
DesR'lotOne less DesRonk'ive 1.
Rear Adm. R. A. Theobald, ComDesR'lotC)ne (10 CL, 2 DL, 16 DD)
Raleigh, Capt. R. B. Simons
DesRon One, Capt. A. R. Early
Phelps, Comdr. W. Nyquist
DesDivOne, Comdr. W. S. Popham
Dewey, Comdr. A. J. Detzer, Jr.
MacDonough, Lt. Cdr. J. M. McIsaac
Worden, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Pogue
Hull, Lt. Cdr. R. F. Stout
DesDiv Two, Comdr. C. W. Flynn
Alwyn, Lt. Cdr. R. H. Rodgers
Farragut, Lt. Cdr. G. P. Hunter
Monaghan, Lt. Cdr. W. P. Burford
Dale, Lt. Cdr. H. E. Parker
DesRon Three, Comdr. T. J. Keliher, Jr.
Clark, Comdr. M. T. Richardson
DesDiv Five, Comdr. L. P. Lovette
Ca.38im, Lt. Cdr. D. F. J. Shea
Reid, Lt. Cdr. H. F. Pullen
Dowmes, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Fair
Conyngham, Lt. Cdr. B. S. Anderson
DesDivsix, Comdr. A. M. Bledsoe
Case, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Bedilion
Shaw, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Jones
Tucker, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Terrell
Cumumings, Lt. Cdr. G. D. Cooper
Oglala plus MinDivOne, 1 CM, 4 DM
Rear Adm. W. R. Furlong, ComMinbatrºor
Oglala, Cdr. E. P. Speight
MinDivOne, Comdr. J. F. Crowe, Jr.
Pruitt, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Beecher, Jr.
Preble, Lt. Cdr. C. F. Chillingworth, Jr.
Sicard, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Schultz
Tracy, Lt. Cdr. G. R. Phelan
ORG ANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComAir Batº'orº
BatDivOne, 3 BB, Vo—1 (9 WOS)
Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, ComBatDiv One
Arizona, Capt. F. Walkenburgh
Nevada, Capt. F. W. Scanland
Oklahoma, Capt. E. J. Foy
Carl)ivTwo, 1 CW
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComCarDiv Two
*After formation of Task Force Eight, Command of Task Force Two passed to Rear
Admiral M. F. Draemel. '
*
4558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey—Continued.
Enterprise,” Capt. G. D. Murray
Enterprise Air Group
WB–6 &:
VS–6 -
WO–6
VT-6
CruDiv Five, 4 CA, WCS 5 (16 WSO)
Rear Admiral R. A. Spruance, ComCruDiv Five
Northampton,** Capt. W. D. Chandler, Jr.
Salt Lake City,” Capt E. M. Zacharias
Pensacola, Capt. N. Scott
Chester,” Capt. T. M. Shock
DesR'lot'Two (10 CL, 2 DL, 16 DD)
Rear Admiral M. F. Draemel, ComDesR'lot'Two.
Detroit, Capt. L. T. Willtsie
DesRonFour, Capt. J. H. S. Desser
Selfridge, Comdr. W. Craig
DesDivseven, Comdr. L. B. Austin
Henley, Lt. Cdr. R. H. Smith
Blue, Lt. Cdr. H. N. Williams
Bagley, Lt. Cdr. G. A. Sinclair
Helm, Lt. Cdr. C. E. Carroll
DesDiv Eight, Comdr. S. B. Brewer
Mugford, Lt. Cdr. E. W. Young
Jarvis, Lt. Cdr. J. R. Topper
Patterson, Lt. Cdr. F. R. Walker
Ralph Talbot, Lt. Cdr. R. Earle, Jr.
DesRon Six, Capt. R. L. Conolly
Balch, ** Comdr. C. J. Rend
DesDivKöleven, Comdr. C. P. Cecil
Gridley,” Lt. Cdr. E. A. Solomons
Maury,” Lt. Cdr. E. D. Snare
Craven,** Lt. Cdr. C. F. M. Quinby
McCall,” Lt. Cdr. F. Moosbrugger
DesDidTwelve, Comdr., E. P. Sauer
Dunlap, ** Lt. Cdr. W. R. Roane
Fanning,” Lt. Cdr. W. R. Cooke, Jr.
Ellet,” Lt. Cdr. F. H. Gardner
Benham, ** Lt. Cdr. F. M. Worthington
MinDiv Two, 4 DM
Comdr. R. P. Whitemarsh, ComMinDiv Two
Gamble, Lt. Cdr. D. A. Crandell
Montgomery
Ramsey, Lt. Cdr. G. L. Sims
Breese, Lt. Cdr. H. F. Stout
**These ships formed Task Force Eight in accordance with CincPac Dispatch 280447
November 1941. -
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE
Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, ComScofor
CruDiv Four, 4 CA, WCS 4 (16 WSO)
Rear Admiral J. H. Newton, ComCruDiv Four
Chicago,” Capt. B. N. Bieri
Louisville, Capt. E. B. Nixon
Portland,” Capt. C. E. Van Hook
Indianapolis, Capt. E. W. Hanson
CruDiv Six, 4 CA, VCS 6 (16 WSO)
Rear Admiral F. J. Fletcher, ComCruDiv Six
Minneapolis, Capt. F. J. Lowry
Mew Orleans, Capt. H. H. Good
Astoria,” Capt. P. B. Haines
Sam Francisco, Capt. D. J. Callaghan
*These ships formed into Task Force Twelve in accordance with CincPac Mailgram
040237 December 1941. -
ExHIBITs of JoſNT COMMITTEE 4559
Vice Admiral Wilson Brown—Continued.
Leasington plus MAG 21, 1 CW
Capt. F. C. Sherman, CoLexington
Leavington,” Capt. F. C. Sherman
Lexington Air Group
WB–2
VS–2
VO–2
VT-2
Marine Air Group 21
HQ and Service Squadron 21
VMF-211**
VMSB-231***
VMSB-232
WMJ–252
DesRon Five, 1 DL, 8 DD
Capt. H. E. Overeach, ComDesRon Five
Porter, Lt. Cdr. F. I. Entwistle
DesDiv Nine, Comdr. G. C. Kriner
Drayton,” Lt. Cdr. L. A. Abercrombie
Lamson,* Lt. Cdr. P. V. Mercer
Flusser,” Lt. Cdr. G. H. Lyttle
Maham,” Lt. Cdr. R. W. Simpson
DesDiv Ten, Comdr. J. W. Murphy
Cushing, Lt. Cdr. C. Noble
Preston, Comdr. T. J. O’Brien
Perkins, Lt. Cdr. T. F. Wellings
Smith, Comdr. F. I. McInerney
MinFonTwo, 13 DMS -
Comdr. G. F. Hussey, Jr., ComMinFOnTWO
Hopkins, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Clark
MinDiv Four, Comdr. W. D. Hart, Jr.
Perry, Lt. Cdr. R. E. Elliot
Zane, Lt. Cdr. L. M. Lehardy
Wasmuth, Lt. Cdr. J. L. Willfong
Trever, Lt. Cdr. J. S. Smith, Jr.
MinDiv Five, Comdr. S. H. Hurt
Southard, Lt. Cdr. J. B. Cochran
Hovey, Lt. Cdr. J. E. Florance
Long, Lt. Cdr. W. S. Veeder
Chandler, Lt. Cdr. H. H. Tramroth
MinDiv Six, Comdr. E. D. Gibb
Dorsey, Lt. Cdr. R. M. McKinnan
Lamberton, Lt. Cdr. W. J. O'Brien
Boggs, Ct. Cdr. D. G. Roberts
Elliott, Lt. Cdr. C. Reynolds
Train Ron Four, 6 AP
Harris, Capt. O. M. Forster
Zeilin, Capt. P. Buchanan
Pres. Jackson, (not commissioned until 1942)
Pres. Adams, Cdr. C. W. Brewington
Pres. Hayes (not commissioned until 1942)
Crescent City, Cdr. W. C. Calhoun
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment
Major General C. B. Vogel
NOTE.-Task Force Three, less those ships assigned to Task Force
Twelve, those on the West and East Coasts, those in Pearl Harbor,
those operating independently in the Fleet Operating Area 25 miles
south of Oahu, and the USS Louisville (on Escort Duty in the Solo-
mons Islands Area), was operating as Task Force Three off Johns-
ton Island On 7 December 1941, under Command of Admiral Brown.
*These ships formed into Task Force Twelve in accordance with CincPac Mailgram
040237 December 1941.
** 12 planes of VMF-211 transported to Wake by Task Force Eight.
***CinePac Maílgram 040237 which formed Task Force Twelve, directed the transport
of VMSB-231 to Midway.
79716 O—46—pt. 21—3
4560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral Wilson Brown—Continued.
Major General C. B. Vogel—Continued.
Indianapolis, Captain E. W. Hanson
Southard, Lt. Cdr. J. B. Cochran
Hopkins, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Clark
Long, Lt. Cdr. W. S. Veeder
Dorsey, Lt. Cdr. R. M. McKinnon
Elliot, Lt. Cdr. C. D. Reynolds
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE FOUR
Vice Admiral C. C. Bloch, Coml4Naval District: (That Part of the 14th Naval
District activities which involve the Island Bases.)
Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District
Vice Admiral C. C. Bloch, ComEourteen
In Shore Patrol, Comdr. G. B. Wooley
Outer Harbor Patrol
Channel Entrance Patrol
USS Ward, Lt. Cdr. Wm. W. Outerbridge
Ready Duty Destroyer -
USS Monaghan
Harbor Channel Patrol
Entrance Channel Patrol
One Power Boat
Boom Patrol
One Power Boat
Inner Harbor Patrol
Four POWer Boats
A/B Boom
Minecraft -
Condor, Lt. Cdr. M. H. Hubbell
Reedbird
CoCicatoo !
Crossbill
Keosanqua
Base Defense Air Force
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger
Search and Attack Group
Air Combat Group
(Planes not permanently assigned. Forces supplied from .
available Army, Navy and Marine units in event of an air
alarm.)
Anti-Aircraft Defenses
Colonel H. K. Pickett, USMC
Harbor Control Post
Comdr. H. B. Knowles
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE SEVEN
Rear Admiral Thomas Withers, ComSubScoFor
SubRon Four less SubDiv 41, (1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD)
Capt. F. A. Naubin, ComSubRon Four
Argonaut, Lt. Cdr. S. G. Barchet
Ditchfield, Lt. Cdr. F. H. Ball
Widgeon, Lt. Cdr. J. A. Flennikan
Seagull, Lt. Cdr. D. B. Candler
SubDiv 42, Cdr. C. H. Roper
Narwhal, Lt. Cdr. C. D. Wilkins
Dolphin, Lt. Cdr. G. B. Rainer
Nautilus, Lt. Cdr. J. P. Thew
Argonaut, Lt. Cdr. S. G. Barchet
SubDiv 43, Cdr. N. S. Ives
Plunger, Lt. D. C. White
Pollack, Lt. Cdr. S. P. Mosely
Cachalot, Lt. Cdr. W. N. Christensen
Pompano, Lt. Cdr. L. S. Pairks
Cuttlefish, Lt. Cdr. W. P. Huttle
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4561
Rear Admiral Thomas Withers—Continued.
SubRon Six, 12 SS, 1 AS
Comdr. A. R. McCann, ComSubRon Six
Pelias, Cdr. W. Wakefield
SubDiv 61, Cdr. C. D. Edmunds
Tambor, Lt. Cdr. J. W. Murphy, Jr.
Tautog, Lt. Cdr. J. H. Willingham, Jr.
Thresher, Lt. Cdr. W. L. Anderson
Gar, Lt. Cdr. D. McGregor
Grampus, Lt. Cdr. E. S. Hutchinson
Grayback, Lt. W. A. Saunders
SubDiv 62 -
.* Triton, Lt. Cdr. W. A. Lent
Trout, Lt. Cdr. F. W. Fenno, Jr.
Tuma, Lt. Cdr. J. J. Crane
Grayling, Lt. Cdr. E. Olson
Grenadier, Lt. Cdr. A. R. Joyce
Gudgeon, Lt. Cdr. E. W. Grenfell
SubRon Eight, 6 SS, 1 AS
ComSubRon Eight -
Fulton, Comdr. A. D. Douglas
SubDiv 81
Gato, Lt. Cdr. W. G. Myers
Greenling, Lt. Cdr. H. C. Burton
Grouper*
Growler.”
Grunion.”
Guardfish”
SubRon Ten, 4 SS, 1 AS
ComSubROnTen
Sperry”
SubDiv 101
Drum, Lt. Cdr. R. H. Rice
Flying Fish"
Finback.”
SubDiv 102
Silversides*
ORGANIZA'ſ ION OF TASK FORCE EIGHT
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComAirBatPor
(NOTE.—Task Force Eight was formed, in accordance with CincPac dispatch
280447 November 1941, from units of Task Force Two.)
CarDiv Two, 1 CV
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, ComCarDiv Two
Enterprise, Capt. G. D. Murray
Enterprise Air Group
BV–6
VF-6
VS-6
- WT-6
CruDiv Five less Pensacola, 3 CA
Rear Admiral R. A. Spruance, ComCruDiv Five
Northampton, Capt. W. D. Chandler, Jr.
Salt Lake City, Capt. E. M. Zacharias
Chester, Capt. T. M. Shock
DesRon Six, 1 DL, 8 DD
Capt. R. L. Conolly, ComDesRon Six
Balch, Comdr. C. J. Rend
DesDiv Eleven, Cdr. C. P. Cecil
Gridley, Lt. Cdr. E. H. Solomons
Maury, Lt. Cdr. E. W. Snoire
Craven, Lt. Cdr. C. F. M. S. Quinby
McCall, Lt. Cdr. F. Moosbrugger
*Not commissioned until 1942.
4562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey—Continued.
Capt. R. L. Conolly—Continued.
Balch, Comdr. C. J. Rend—Continued.
DesDiv Twelve, Cdr. E. P. Sauer
Dunlap, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Roane
Fanning, Lt. Cdr. W. R. Cooke, Jr.
fºllet, Lt. Cdr. F. H. Gardner
Benham, Lt. Cdr. F. M. Worthington
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE NINE
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, ComBatWing'Two
PatWingOne, 36 VPB (A), 1 AV, 2 AUD, 1 AUP
Comdr. K. McGinnis, ComPatWingOne
Wright, Cdr. C. W. Weiber
Hulbert, Lt. Cdr. J. M. Lane
Ballard, Cdr. J. R. Dudley
Avocet, Lt. J. A. Jonson, Jr.
Patrol Squadron Eleven, Lt. J. A. Johnson
Patrol Squadron Twelve, Lt. Cdr. J. P. Fitzsimmons
Patrol Squadron Fourteen, Lt. Cdr. W. T. Rassieur
PatWing Two, 42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AWD, 1 AVP
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, ComPatWing'Two
Curtiss, Cdr. S. P. Ginder
Tangier, Cdr. C. A. F. Sprague
Thornton, Lt. Cdr. J. L. Kane
McFarland, Lt. Cdr. W. F. Kline
Swan, Lt. F. E. Hall
Patrol Squadron Twenty-one, Lt. Cdr. G. T. Mundorff, Jr.
Patrol Squadron Twenty-two, Lt. Cdr. F. O'Bierne
Patrol Squadron Twenty-three, Lt. Cdr. F. M. Hughes
Patrol Squadron Twenty-four, Lt. Cdr. T. U.Sisson
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE: TWELVE
Rear Admiral J. H. Newton, ComCrusco For
(NOTE:-Task Force Twelve was formed, in accordance with CincPac Mailgram
040237 December 1941, from units of Task Force Three.)
Leavington, Capt. F. C. Sherman
Lexington Air Group
WB–2
VF-2
VS–2
VT-2
Chicago, Capt. B. H. Bieri
Portland, Capt. C. E. VanHook
Astoria, Capt. P. B. Haines
DesRon Five less DesDiv Ten
Capt. H. E. Overeach, ComDesRon Five
Porter, Lt. Cdr. F. I. Entwistle
DesDiv Nine, Cdr. G. C. Kriner
Drayton, Lt. Cdr. L. A. Abercrombie
Lamson, Lt. Cdr. P. V. Mercer
Flusser, Lt. Cdr. G. H. Lyttle
Maham, Lt. Cdr. R. W. Simpson
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE FIFTEEN"
(Pacific Escort Force)
Rear Admiral W. L. Calhoun, ComBaseK'or (Units assigned, 4 CA or CL)
Chester, Capt. T. M. Shock
Portland, Capt. C. E. Van Hook
Louisville, Capt. E. B. Nixon
Boise, Capt. S. B. Robinson
*Task Force Fifteen was formed in accordance with CincPac Confidential letter
A3/A16–3/CV/C12, Serial O1777 of 1 November 1941, from units of CruDivs 4, 5 and 9
(Task Forces 1, 2, 3, 8 and 12). -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4563
Location of SHIPs on 7 DEC 1941
Ship Type
Alwyn - - - - - - - - - - - DD
Boise------------ CL
California- - - - - - - - BB
*Se- - - - - - - - - - - - - DD
Cassin - - - - - - - - - - - DD
Clark------------ DD
Colorado - - - - - - - - - BB
Conyngham------- DD
Cummings-------- DD
ale------------- DD
Dewey - - - - - - - - - - - DD
Downes - - - - - - - - - - DD
Farragut- - - - - - - - - DD
Helena----------- CL
Honolulu- - - - - - - - - CL
Hull------------ – D D
MacDonough- - - - - DD
Maryland- - - - - - - - BB
Monaghan-------- DD
Oglala------------ CM
Pennsylvania- - - - - BB
Pheonix-- - - - - - - - - CL
Phelps- - - - - - - - - - - DD
Preble----- - - - - - - - DM
Pruitt--- - - - - - - - - - DM
Raleigh-- - - - - - - - - CL
Reid------------- DD
Saratoga- - - - - - - - - CV
&W - - - - - - - - - - - - DD
Sicard---- - - - - - - - - D
St. Louis- - - - - - - - - CL
Tennessee- - - - - - - - BB
Tracy--- - - - - - - - - - DM
Tucker-- - - - - - - - - - DD
West Virginia- - - - - BB
Worden - - - - - - - - - - DD
Ship Type
Arizona - - - - - - - - - - BB
Bagley----------- DD
+ + Balch------------ DD
+ + Benham-- - - - - - - - - DD
Blue------------- DD
Breese- - - - - - - - - - - DM
+ + Chester - - - - - - - - - - CA
+ + Craven--...- - - - - - - - DD
Detroit---- - - - - - - - CL
+ + Dunlap.----------- DD
+ + Ellet-- - - - - - - - - - - - DD
+ + Enterprise- - - - - - - - CV
+ + Fanning-- - - - - - - - - DD
Gamble- - - - - - - - - - DM
+ + Gridley---- - - - - - - - DID
Helm - - - - - - - - - - - - DD
Henley--- - - - - - - - - DD
TASK FORCE ONE
Location
Pearl Harbor
TF in Philippines near Panay
Pearl Harbor
Do.
Do.
Navy Yard, Mare Island
Puget Sound Navy Yard
Pearl Harbor
Íño.
San Diego
Pearl Harbor
TASK FORCE TWO
Location
Pearl Harbor
D
O.
Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi.
of P. H.
Do.
Pearl Harbor
Do. t
Task Fº 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi.
Of P
Do.
Pearl Harbor
Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi.
Of P. H.
Bo.
Pearl Harbor
Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi.
of P. H.
Pearl Harbor
Do.
Do.
4564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Location
Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w
of P. H.
Do.
Pearl Harbor
DO.
Do. -
Task Force 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w
Of P. H.
Peanºrbor
O.
Escort Duty, Samoa Area
Pearl Harbor
Do.
Task Fºe 8, en route Wake-P. H. 200 Mi. w
Oi Hº". Hil.
Pearl Harbor
TASK FORCE THREE
Location
TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Fleet ºperating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
O.
TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Charleston, S. C.
Navy Yard, Mare Island
Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
San Diego
Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
Triºr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
O.
Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
TF Escort Duty Solomons Island Area
TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Fleet Operating Area, 25 Mi. S. of Oahu
Pearl Harbor
Navy Yard, Mare Island
Pearl Harbor
TF12, enr P. H.-Midway, 460 Mi. from Midway
Do.
Norfolk, Va.
Navy Yard, Mare Island
Pearl Harbor
Navy Yard, Mare Island
Task Force 3 off Johnston Island
Pearliarbor
O.
Do.
Seattle, Wash.
TASK FORCE SEVEN
Ship Type
+ + Maury - - - - - - - - - - - DD
+ + McCall----------- DD
Montgomery--- - - - DM
Mugford - - - - - - - - - DD
Nevada- - - - - - - - - - BB
+ + Northampton - - - - - CA
Oklahoma- - - - - - - - BB
Patterson---- - - - - - DD
Pensacola--------- CA
Ralph Talbot - - - - - DD
Ramsay---------- DM
+ + Salt Lake City - - - - CA
Selfridge---------- DD
Ship Type
+ Astoria----------- CA
Boggs------------ DMS
Chandler--- - - - - - - DMS
+Chicago.---------- CA
Crescent City - - - - - AP
Cushing- - - - - - - - - - DD
Dorsey----------- DMS
+ Drayton---- - - - - - - DD
Elliot ------------ DMS
+ Flusser- - - - - - - - - - - DD
Harris------------ AP
Hopkins----- - - - - - DMS
Hovey - - - - - - - - - - - DMS
Indianapolis- - - - - - CA
Lamberton - - - - - - - . DMS
+Lamson - - - - - - - - - - DD
+ Lexington - - - - - - - - CV
On 8-- - - - - - - - - - - - DMS
Louisville---- - - - - - CA
+ Mahan-- - - - - - - - - - DD
Minneapolis- - - - - - CA
New Orleans--- - - - CA
Perkins----- - - - - - - DD
Perry - - - - - - - - - - - - DMS
+ Porter - - - - - - - - - - - DD
+ Portland- - - - - - - - - CA
Pres. Adams- - - - - - AP
Preston---------- DD
San Francisco-- - - - CA
Smith------------ DD
Southard-- - - - - - - - DMS
Trever - - - - - - - - - - - DMS
Wasmuth----- - - - - DMS
Zane------------- DMS
Zeilin------------ AP
Ship Type
Argonaut.--------- SM
Cachalot - - - - - - - - - SS
Cuttlefish--------- SS
Dolphin- - - - - - - - - - S
Drum------------ SS
Fulton - - - - - - - - - - - AS
Gar-------------- SS
Location
Near Midway
Pearl Harbor
Navy Yard, Mare Island
Pearl Harbor
Portsmouth, N. H.
Off Guatemala
Off Mexico
New London, Conn.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4565
Ship Type ,- Location
Grampus--------- SS Portsmouth, N. H.
Grayback--------- SS Do.
Grayling- - - - - - - - - SS San Diego, Calif.
Greenling--------- SS New London, Conn.
Grenadier- - - - - - - - SS Portsmouth, N. H.
Gudgeon - - - - - - - - - SS Pearl Harbor
Litchfield--- - - - - - - DID About 60 Mi. S. W. of Oahu
Narwhal----- - - - - - SS Pearl Harbor
Nautilus---------- SS Navy Yard, Mare Island
Pelias------------ AS Pearl Harbor
Plunger---------- SS About 200 Mi. E. of Oahu
Pollack----------- SS Do.
Pompano--------- SS Do.
Seagull----------- AM Lahaina
Tambor---------- SS Near Wake
Tautog----------- SS Pearl Harbor
Thresher - - - - - - - - - SS About 60 Mi. S. W. of Oahu
Triton - - - - - - - - - - - SS Off Wake
Trout------------ SS Off Midway
Tuna------------ SS Navy Yard, Mare Island
Widgeon - - - - - - - - - ASR Pearl Harbor
TASIK FORCE NINE
Ship Type Location
Avocet ----------- AVD Pearl Harbor
Ballard----...------ AVD En route San Diego to Mare Island
Curtiss----------- AV Pearl Harbor
Hulbert - - - - - - - - - - AVD Do.
McFarland - - - - - - - AVD Do
Swan - - - - - - - - - - - - AVP Do.
Tangier- - - - - - - - - - AV Do.
Thornton --- - - - - - - AVD Do.
Wright-- - - - - - - - - - AV About 300 Mi. W. of Oahu
EXHIBIT NO. 181
[The United States News, September 1, 1945 (Extra Number) J
FULL TEXT OF THE OFFICIAL REPORTS CONCERNING
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN RELEASING THE ARMY AND NAVY
REPORTS, AUGUST 29, 1945 «,
I have here reports on the Pearl Harbor disaster. One is from the Army and
one is from the Navy. The Navy report gives a “Finding of Facts” by a Navy
Court of Inquiry. Attached to this Finding of Facts are endorsements by the
Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Rear Admiral T. I. Gatch ; Admiral E. J.
King, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Secretary of the Navy. You will find a
summation of the findings in the final endorsement by the Secretary of the Navy
at the end of the document. - -
From the Army we have the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and, bound
separately, a statement by the Secretary of War. Certain criticisms of the
Chief of Staff, General Marshall, appear in the report of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board. You will notice in the Secretary's statement that he takes sharp issue
with this criticism of General Marshall, stating that the criticism “is entirely
unjustified.” The conclusion of the Secretary of War is that General Marshall
acted throughout this matter with his usual “great skill, energy and efficiency.”
I associate myself wholeheartedly with this expression by the Secretary of War.
Indeed I have the fullest confidence in the skill, energy and efficiency of all our
War leaders, both Army and Navy. - #
4566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] * REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the Provisions of Public Law
339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts
Relating to the Attack Made by Japanese Armed Forces Upon the Territory
of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to Make Such Recommendations as It May
Deem Proper. Also, To Consider the Phases Which Related to the Pearl Har-
bor Disaster of the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as Di-
rected by the Acting Secretary of War, in His Memorandum for The Judge
Advocate General, 12 July 1944
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page *
CHAPTER I : Preamble : Authority for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and Its
Action Taken — — — — sº 1
CHAPTER II: Background 3
CHAPTER III: The Story of Pearl Harbor 12
CHAPTER IV : Responsibilities in Washington ------------------------- 50
CHAPTER V : Wyman and Construction Delays in Hawaii 55
CHAPTER VI: Conclusions ----------------------------------------------- 55
CHAPTER VII: Recommendations * * * * 56
Legends: RR—Roberts Record; R–APHB Record; D–Document; Ex—Exhibit.
Italics ours unless otherwise stated
CHAPTER 1. PREAMBLE : AUTHORITY FOR THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD AND ITs
ACTION TAKEN
This Board was appointed pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th
Congress, approved 13 June 1944, by Letter Order A. G. O. 8 July 1944 (AGPO-
A–A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)) as amended by Letter Order A. G. O. 11 July 1944
AGPO–A–A 210.311 (10 Jun 44)) and Letter Order A. G. O. 22 August 1944
(AGPO-A—A 248.7 (2 Aug 44)), and as supplemented by Supplemental Letter
Order A. G. O. 22 July 1944 (AGPO-A—A 210.311 (21 July 44)) which order made
reference to a memorandum for The Judge Advocate General of 12 July 1944—
Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944 alleging
neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning
Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects, and which was signed by Robert P.
Patterson, Acting Secretary of War. This supplemental order directed the Board
to consider the phase of the report which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster.”
Composition of the Board :
Lieut. Gen. George Grunert, 0.1534, USA
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, 0212769, USA
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 0.2871, USA
Col. Charles W. West, 012774, JAGD, Recorder (without vote)
Col. Harry A. Toulmin, 0205520, AC, Executive Officer (without vote)
Maj. Henry C. Clausen, 0.907613, JAGD, Assistant Recorder (without vote)
The Board interpreted these Orders and the memorandum referred to as con-
fining its investigation to the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The Board convened 20 July 1944 and was in continuous session from 24 July
1944 to 20 October 1944. It held hearings twice in Washington, D. C. ; twice in
San Francisco, Calif.; and in Hawaii. It has heard a total of 151 witnesses and
has interviewed many additional potential witnesses whom it found did not have
any pertinent information. There has been no available document, witness,
suggestion or lead which promised any materiality that has not been carefully
investigated by this Board. Every witness has been invited to give, in addition
to his testimony, any suggestions, opinions, leads to evidence, or any other infor-
mation that might possibly be pertinent. It has been our purpose, and we believe
we have effected it, to explore every available piece of information on this subject.
We have not had the opportunity, nor the organization, to comb personally and
exhaustively the official files, but we have called for the pertinent letters, docu-
ments, and memoranda. We believe that practically all of them have been
secured. although we have found a few files from which important and vital
papers are missing. In many instances we found these documents elsewhere or
were able to prove them through copies in other hands.
This Board has been without power of subpoena, but in no instance has its
invitation to appear and testify been ignored.
a Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
1 See copies of orders and memorandum, Exhibits 65 to 69, inclusive.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4567
[2] In view of the fact that the War Department appointed this Board,
under a joint resolution of Congress,” to examine the Army's part in the Pearl
Harbor disaster because Congress desired, as appears from the legislative history
of the Joint Resolution, a more thorough study, it has been necessary to examine
the record of the Roberts Commission and the Roberts Report in the light of the
new testimony adduced by this Board, new witnesses, and new documents; and
to set forth wherein the Board's findings are in harmony with the Roberts
Report; or, if in conflict, are correct and supported by fuller evidence.
The Board has made, therefore, a careful review of the record and exhibits of
the Roberts Commission. This Board has been materially helped and enlight-
ened by the Report and Record of the Roberts Commission. We append to this
report a section indicating the additional information and documents which have
been made available as a result of our extended investigation, and which prob-
ably did not come to the attention of the Roberts Commission; or, at least,
were not mentioned in either the testimony, documents or reports of the Roberts
Commission. -
We have been greatly aided by the Interim Report, Committe on Military
Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-eighth Congress, 2nd Session, pur-
suant to H. Rs. 30, A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Military Affairs
and the Committee on Naval Affairs to Study the Progress of the National War
Effort, and the Committee's records, counsel, and investigators, with particular
reference to the activities of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., Hans Wilhelm Rohl,
the Hawaiian Constructors, and others, as such activities had a bearing upon
the Pearl Harbor disaster and what led up to it. We have been aided by the
testimony of counsel from that Committee and the complete record of the investi-
gation of that Committee on this subject and its exhibits. We have also heard
testimony and investigated reports and reviewed affidavits of additional affiants,
whose testimony came to light, or documents were discovered, after the conclu-
sion of the investigation of the Committee on Military Affairs, as indicated in
its Interim Report. We have also been aided by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the Department of Justice, and the Report of the Tenney Committee in
California.
We transmit with this report the record of testimony of the witnesses consisting
Of 41 volumes and 70 exhibits. In the appendix to this report is a tabulation in
detail of the witnesses who testified and a list of the exhibits.
In order to facilitate the examination of the Board's record by the War De-
partment and by any others who may have Occasion to review the record and
exhibits, we append to this report and make a part of it extensive analysis of
the testimony of every witness, indexing each statement by reference to the
record, and with cross references of those statements to different parts of the
record where similar or different statements on the same subject were made
by other witnesses. We have also added cross references to the same subject
matter in the record of the Roberts Commission or the exhibits presented before
that Commission. It is, therefore, possible for anyone reviewing this report to
have a complete and, we believe, exhaustive analysis of every phase of the Pearl
Harbor matters, so that any part of the situation can be easily and promptly
reviewed. - -
In formulating this report the Board has been conscious of the deep spiritual
and moral obligation, as well as its professional and patriotic duty, to present
an impartial and judicial investigation and report. This we have earnestly en-
deavored to do, and have spared no pains or effort to that end. With that spirit
* Public Law 339—78th Congress, Chapter 247—2nd Session, S. J. Res. 133, Joint Res-
olution : to extend the statute of limitation to certain cases.
“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws,
articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons,
military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or
involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against
the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punish-
ment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in
connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any
other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States,
are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension
provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.
“Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to
proceed forth with with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe
described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as
the facts may justify.
“Approved June 13, 1944.”
4568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
animating our actions, we have deemed it helpful and wise to present the state
of mind and the background against which the events of the drama of Pearl
Harbor could be adequately judged; and to sketch in retrospection the events and
the knowledge of Such events of each of the principal actors on the scene, so that
their actions might be more fully understood and justly evaluated and judged.
At no time, however, has the Board acted as a court.”
This is necessary because we are now passing upon the matter several years
after the event. . We have endeavored to effect this reconstruction to some degree
in the Second chapter entitled “Background.” The same considerations have
been evaluated in the succeeding chapters, as this background affected the events
and actions of those involved in the matters under consideration. In so doing,
we hope we have avoided the human failing so aptly pointed out by St. Paul of
“forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things
which are before.”
In Chapter III we have presented the story of Pearl Harbor. This is a running
chronological story of the events that took place leading up to the Pearl Harbor
attack and through that fateful day and for a short period thereafer, so far as
Subsequent events reflected upon the conditions previously existing. We have
discussed in this Chapter III the arguments for and against each principal prop-
Osition, have examined all of the representations and defenses of General Short
and others involved in this matter. We have endeavored to state the surround-
ing facts and circumstances, the background, the considerations and factors
which influenced each principal officer or official in the execution of his duties. *
Therefore, whoever reads this report will have before him all of the considera-
tions for and against any proposition, all facts, any defense or any claim put
forward by those interested, and answers to such quéstions of import to the Serv-
ices and to the public, in Order to have the foundation for an impartial judgment.
In Chapter IV we continue the story in So far as it pertains to Washington. In
Chapter V we relate the story concerning the Pre-Pearl Harbor construction ac-
tivities and in Chapter VI come to Conclusions.
The Board was after facts; and the surrounding conditions, background, and
atmosphere which influenced the actors in this drama and brought them to their
fateful decisions. This we believe we secured successfully from military and
naval personnel of widely varying ranks; from civilians of varied stations in
life; and from official and other contemporaneous publications. The range of
witnesses ran from men in the ranks to generals and admirals, and from the
humblest in civil life to United States Senators and the President's Cabinet.*
[3] Each witness was invited, additionally, to express freely his views and
opinions on the record, and to submit any facts or leads to the discoveries of
facts which might be helpful to this Board. - -
We set out with no thesis to prove, nor person to convict. Our approach has
been, we hope, diligently and completely factual ; and also equally impartial.
Our conclusions are those compelled by the clear weight of the evidence from the
facts set forth in the record.
CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND
1. Introduction.—The purpose of this explanation of the background of publie
and private events as they existed in 1940 and 1941 is this. There existed during
this critical period much confusion of thinking and of Organization, of conflict of
opinion and diversity of views. The nation was not geared to yar, either
mentally or as an organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes.
The winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions: isolationists and
nationalists were struggling for predominance; public opinion was both against
war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we are negotiating for peace with
Japan, and simultaneously applying economic sanctions that led only to war;
we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving away much
of such armament. The Administration, State, War and Navy departments in
their policies, plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and there
by the ebb and flow of war events, public reactions, diplomatic negotiations and
newspaper attackS.
* Whenever any interested witness raised a question of proof that had not beeen previ-
ously discussed, or fully examined, or any newspaper report raising any question came to
our attention, we endeavored to get an answer so that the whole truth would be known
once and for all. - -
* Whenever there was a shadow or a shade of a doubt, we resolved it in favor of running
down the suggestion and introducing proof, if it had any suspicion of materiality.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4569
The War Department by its actions and its organization was still on a peacetime
basis; neither its management nor its general Staff had perfected its organi-
zation for war or for the conduct of a large enterprise. The whole machinery
of Government was geared to a different purpose and tempo than war. Valiant
and brilliant men were struggling to bring Order Out Of chaos, rather as individ-
uals or as small groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and
to accomplish practical things. As a result a few men. Without Organization
in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple
actions, and give directions that should have been the result of carefully directed .
commands, instead of action taken by conference. We were preparing for a
war by the conference method. We were directing Such preparations by the
conference method : we were even writing Vital messages by the conference
method, and arriving at their Contents by Compromise instead of by command;
that was the product of the time and conditions due to the transition from
peace to war in a democracy.
Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for appropriate
action and helpless before a strong course of events, that ran away with the
situation and prematurely plunged us into War.
2. Public Opinion.—The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the responsibilities and
courses of action taken by those Connected therewith can better be understood
when the background of public opinion and the State of the public mind are
likewise understood. Psychological conditions had a material effect upon the
events that took place. A brief review of the then state of mind of officials
and the public : and the facts known to the public and to the Government; and
our national policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper
perspective.
Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its actions to a
degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public opinion and the state
of the public mind. Successful war is waged through a state of mind and a
state of public readiness for war. A recognition of this fact is necessary to
the understanding of the background of public opinion and the state of our desire
to make war, which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and
the responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation will
lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain actions, or
the failure to take action, on the part of the Washington departments Concerned
and the higher commanders in the field.
For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant even to
consider a war.” There was a distinct lack of a war mind in the United States.
Insolationist Organizations and propaganda groups against war were powerful
and vital factors affecting any war action capable of being then by our responsible
leadership. So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in
minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by the people in
the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against Japan. Public
opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop ; in the later stages it
ran ahead of preparation for war. There was little war spirit either amongst
the general public or in the armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion
having its influence.” The events hereinafter recited must be measured against
this important psychological factor.
At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of preparation. It
had been at war for several years in China; both its people and Government
were psychologically and physically geared to war and were implemented with
a polished plan of action and equipment to do the job. It was animated by
Cunning, hatred and patriotism in a land where life is cheap; and nurtured in
an atmosphere of insane nationalism and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation
united for the single purpose of world conquest bsed on more than a thousand
years Of conflict.
As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan in 1932,
he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for adequate prepara-
* The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and
§ hºoposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time
Il •
* Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the
Strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened
if our fleet had gone out into deep blue water to fight : “A fight would have occurred in
which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred . . . our own losses
Would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our
carriers.” (R. 2878)
4570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tion militantly to implement our diplomatic policy, because of Japan's readiness
for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, in the latter part
of 1932: - -
“The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it
wants war.”
And he continued: - -
“At that time I said it would be criminally ‘short-sighted,' I think, not to recog-
nize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far East.
Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches through-
out the ten years of my service there, right up to the end” (R. 420.1). -
3. U. S. Policy (1922–1939).-The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor dis-
aster can only be understood when we examine our national policy as adminis-
tered by the State Department. That policy must be examined back a number
of years to see the long-term treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the
Pearl Harbor disaster.
[4] An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of the
United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on its fortifica-
tions of the Mandated Islands. * -
The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of
the Equator under date of Dec. 17, 1920, the Convention for the Control of Trade
and Arms and Ammunition between the Allied Powers under date of Sept. 10,
1919, and the Mandates between the United States and Japan regarding the former
German islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly the
island of Yap under date of Feb. 11, 1922, have the following in common:
a. “Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory,
ineluding control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In
short, it was a ‘government in trust.’” -
b. “No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in
the territory.”
c. “The Mandatory ... allow missionaries, nationals of any state member of the
League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose
of prosecuting their calling.”
d. “Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates,
whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned or the one direct with the United
States, are to be settled by a negotiation of “The Permanent Court of International
Justice.’” -
e. “Wested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and in
no way impaired.”
f. “The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be appli-
cable to the Mandated Islands.” *
g. “The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island
of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and their
respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of the exist-
ing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which imay be hereafter laid or operated
by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island of Yap.”
h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of
action with respect to Yap."
7 The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board : “Japan was given under a League
of Nations mandate full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part
of Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly
agreed in a treaty with Japan of Feb. 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands
pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was
extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and
harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically opened to
foreign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur,
Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit.
“Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of Feb. 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated
Islands provided that : “Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be
applicable to the Mandated Islands." Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Naviga-
tion concluded between the United States and Japan on Feb. 21, 1911, contained the fol-
lowing provisions : “The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally
with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come
with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other
which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the
country to which they thus come.”
“By exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treatv
with Japan of Feb. 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the United
States that the usual comity will be extended to , nationals, and vessels of the United
States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands.” The term “usual comity” in its
§º. to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means the courtesy
which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of other countries.”
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4571
Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up to those treaty
stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in the key Pacific islands
erected by the Japanese might have been made possible. Japan, without authority
of international law and in violation of the treaties and mandates above referred
to, for nearly twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals
from the mandated territory, and during this time built up army, navy and air
installations of tremendous strategical value.
As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enormous advantage of a
string of naval and air and army bases across our lifeline to the Philippines and
rendered futile and impotent any fortification of our own islands, such as Guam,
Midway, Christmas, Palmyra, etc. It also placed the dagger's point at the heart
of the Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the Mandated Islands
was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan.
Our policy through the successive years appears have been based upon a
combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to give offense to the
Japanese; a policy which, because of their temperamental characteristics, proved
to be one of weakness rather than of strength; it was also a policy of endeavoring
to treat the Japanese on the basis that they were civilized and that their word
could be trusted and at the same time one which treated them as if they were
uncivilized and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the
United States.
We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind: first to avoid war and
settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and contracts; and, while negotiating,
we applied exactly the opposite remedy of economic sanctions.
Efforts, to visit the Mandated Islands, presumably to glean information, were
said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 101–107; Pye, 1064–
1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527–1529; DeLaney, 1702–1703; Kimmel, 1807–1808; Layton,
3054–3055). The State Department explanation concerning these efforts is set
forth below. The net result was, however, that we did not get into these islands;
the Japanese fortified the islands and in Consequence the United States suffered.
The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his Department's views as follows:
“The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private
American vessels, just as visitS in general by American nationals and American
private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a
procedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to
the Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cog-
nizance of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of
the Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplo-
matic action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has
been found in the Department's files of any application having been made by the
Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals
or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940–
1941, the years concerning which you made inquiry. According to the informa-
tion made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the Office of
the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the
Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship Company with regard to possibilities of making
reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subse-
quent efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the
part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that
instance. . . .
“The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the
Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in
Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this
Government in requesting per [5] mission for visits by its public vessels
to the ports of other countries.
“No record has been found of any requests in 1940 and 1941 by the War or Navy
Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese Gov-
ernment proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's
having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to visits
to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at various
times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States naval
vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated
Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the Japa-
nese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to applica-
tions made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readiness to per-
mit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the unopened ports
*
4572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy Department,
however, cancelled the proposed visits to the opened ports for which permission
to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this Government in 1936
and in 1937, the Japanese GOvernment, on grounds of inconvenience, withheld
its permission for United States public vessels to visit the opened ports as well
as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands.
“In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in actual
practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports
in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination
in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922,
this Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government de-
cided to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese
war or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits
by Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as
Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribilof Islands which the Japanese
were permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Con-
vention of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent
to 1936 permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the
territorial waters of the Western Aleutian Islands.”
The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed diplomatic
immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying activities and unrestricted
communication by radio and cable with the mainland of Japan in reporting upon
the movements of our fleet and the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii.”
Neither the Army, the Navy, nor the F. B. I. had authority to tap these lines
and find out what was going on because of Our Own legal restriction, the Commu-
nications Act of 1934.” -
No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the results
thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in Honolulu. This man
had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. He used the commercial telephone
and telegraph for reporting on our defenses and fleet movements with impunity.
When he was arrested with his agents On December 7, a large number of his mes-
sages were found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a
result of eight months' work in piecing a portion of these together, Colonel
Fielder, G–2 under General Short and since that time G–2 in Hawaii, produced a
number of these reconstructed messages which clearly revealed that military
information was being gathered and transmitted to Japan. The day before this
event took place a radiophone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese
doctor's house in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and reported,
late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by General Short and
Colonel Fielder, G–2; but its exact meaning could not be made out. This message
is referred to as the Mori message (R. 2961). The next morning the Japanese
Struck. The evident trend of this message was to report upon the State of the
naval defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses.
This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been determined,
the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much important information gath-
ered, which would probably have prevented in large measure the Pearl Harbor
disaster, had the Army and Navy been permitted, with the FBI, to tap these lines
and find out what was going on. If the consular agents were conducting com-
mercial business no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting their
activities to consular business, we then had a right to know it and to take action
accordingly, either by an open breach or by preparing ourselves to meet what
they were doing.
Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of defense for a
nation such as ours: the diplomatic line of defense, the Navy, and the Army.
However, the diplomatic line—held by the State Department—ofttimes handi-
8 Admiral McMorris, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of the Commander in Chief
Pacific Fleet, 1941, said: “I never entertained any, doubt, any time during 1941, that
the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this, area.” (R. 2882)
9 Mémorandum of Sept. 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Commu-
nications Commission : “The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of , 1934, under which the
Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers,
prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted, between
points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Section 605).
Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way, Superseded, the
Commission did not intercept any messages over the radiotelegraph, cable telegraph or
º: circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior
to Dec. 7, 1941.”
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4573
caps and influences the preparation for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an
illustration, the policy of compromise between economic sanctions and negotia-
tions * in turn influenced War Department action, in that Short was told by the
War Department, which in turn reflected the State Department's warnings, to
take defensive measures but in doing so he was told not to alarm the population
nor to disclose intent.” There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of
standing up for American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japa-
nese behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well known
that people of the character of the Japanese and their national attitude of mind
respect Only force and strength and do not respect a policy of good intentions nor
demands of conduct without means to enforce same.
The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more aggressive rela-
tionship between the Department Of State, the Department of Justice, and the
War and Navy departments, in using all of their facilities as a coordinated team
for the defense of the United States.”
[6] The Japanese policy was typical of the Oriental mind, which is predomi-
nantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as they expect to get and then
settling on a compromise. Any Show of weakness merely strengthens the hand of
the bargainer, and any crack in the bargainer's front causes him to lose face and
bargaining power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing
Guam by removing its guns and Other equipment and thus attempting to Show
Japan the peaceful intentions of the United States, was undoubtedly considered
by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weakness and merely served to put Our
interests backward instead of forward. (R. 3062)
4. U. S. Policy (1939–1941).-We had been following the policy immediately
before the war which broke out between Germany, England, and France, of
veering away from anything that would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese.
In view of the tense international situation, particularly after the outbreak
of the European War in August, 1939, it became apparent that it would be
necessary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the
Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were available to
the assistance of England and France, with whom we were in deep sympathy;
and also, for the further purpose, that we were inadequately prepared to meet
any attack from Japan in the Pacific.”
As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the necessity of following
a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of Japan increased to one of great
national urgency. We were faced with a dual load of unpreparedness for any
war and the necessity of sending England and France what equipment and
supplies that were available. .
It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the necessity
of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it expedient to lean over
backwards to avoid any appearance in HaWaii of a warlike or belligerent atti-
10 The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said : “With regard to the lines along which this
Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record
is given in Chapter XIV of Peace and War (a publication issued, by the Department in
#24 # on pages 325–386 of Volume II of Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan,
--- 1.” -
* The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said : “With regard to your request for an expression
of the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military
directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against
“any country or to cause Japan to Commit an act of war against the United States.”
* The State Department counterproposals of the 26th of November, which Japan con-
sidered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army, and Navy Marshall-Stark, memorandum
could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering
his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy.
(R. Stimson, 4051–4053, 4078–4079).
* Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when
asked if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that
attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome :
“Captain LAYTON. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of
their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.
“General RUSSELL. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval
engagement off of Oahu ?
“Captain LAYTON. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American
people, and I use this example : During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion
of a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford
Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these
planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I
can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese
plane.” (R. 3047)
4574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ºtºlars, in View of and towards the large Japanese population of the
Slå Il(IS. --
Our general national policy and particularly the War Department policy, very
naturally conveyed itself to the Commanders in residence in Hawaii. Their
acts were colored and their dispositions tempered by the repeated cautions in
this direction as we sought for time to prevent an untoward incident from pre-
cipitating war with Japan before we were ready to meet it. The fact that they
Were no more fully advised of the progress toward a critical international situ.
ation in the Pacific must be taken into account.
This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to some
degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commercial restrictions
Which tended to Strangle her economic life and her preparation for war. For
instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan, the abrogation of Japanese com-
mercial rights under treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan,
the oil embargo and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy.
The net result was a national policy towards Japan which reflected itself in
the “Do-Don't” type of instructions that characterized the meSSages from the War
Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until Dec. 7, 1941. *
The policy of our Government as practiced by our public officials in their attitude
towards Japan was not one of appeasement openly, but it was that in effect.
Every effort was being exerted to prevent a rupture of relations with Japan, while
presenting a show of face by economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression.
Every effort was made to maintain the status quo until we were ready. Time
was our most precious commodity in 1941.
5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Earpansion.—No competent understand-
ing can be gained of the relationship with Japan unless we break down the prob-
lem into its essential aspects. Japanese industry had received a succession of
Serious blows by reason of our successive steps of not renewing the commercial
treaty with Japan, the cutting off of Scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade
in silk with Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and nu-
merous other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being made
to maintain the status quo leading up to the final visit of Japanese special am-
bassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl Harbor. This situation
generally trended, however, towards placating and appeasing Japan with such
firmness as was necessary to keep the negotiations going.
During all of this period the Government was not supported by a public that
was war-minded; just the contrary. Public irritation was increasing, but it was
still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary, Japan's attitude toward the United
States was one of increasing hostility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions,
starting in 1935 against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would
permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of considering the
views of the United States. Being unable to agree with them, it had no inten-
tion of doing so whatsoever,
During this period Japan made no corícessions. It was quite apparent that she
would continue her course until the patience of the United States was exhausted;
and the United States was forced into a position of an Open breach—the time
of that breach was stipulated clearly to the President November 27 by General
Marshall and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counterproposals to Japan on
November 26 anticipated that time—war came before we were fully prepared.
It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had been char-
acterized by the first overt act of war coming simultaneously with the declara-
tion. The services, both Army and Navy, were well aware of this Japanese char-
acteristic. It was, therefore, to be expected that an unexpected attack would be
made by Japan as the first indication of a breach of relations. This is well ex-
pressed by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified :
“General RUssFLL. Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the 7th
Of December?
“Mr. STIMson. Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that would
be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew more
about it, the attack that was framing up in the Southwestern Pacific. And I
knew also that there was a concentration in the Mandated Islands—I know now,
because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram, and an
(R. jº Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one third of the population.
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 45.75
order; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii
or Panama” (R. 4072).
[7] Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State Depart-
ment the following message:
TOKYO, January 27, 1941–6 p. m.
(Received January 27–6:38 a. m.)
“A member of the Embassy was told by my . . . colleague that from many
quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on
Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of ‘trouble'
between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use
of all the Japanese military faciilties. My Colleague said that he was prompted
to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan
seemed fantastic.”
GREW.
Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had been to avoid war to
the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our situation. It was, therefore,
obvious that the United States would have to avoid friction with Japanese
nationals as that would be a ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue
prematurely. On the other hand, Sabotage was to be expected from these Japa-
nese nationals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source of
great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis of precipitation
of an international incident with Japan.
The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. It had
no appreciation of the danger except as the press became increasingly insistent
in pointing out the progress of the advance towards war and the likelihood that
this outpost would be involved in the conflict as one of the first line elements of
our western defense.” l
The War Department was urging officially and privately that every effort be
made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of our serious state of
unpreparedness and because much of our available military resources were being
utilized to assist the United Nations. The battle of the Atlantic was the pre-
dominant factor in the public mind and dominated the policy of the War Depart-
ment, as evidenced by the transfer of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to
the Atlantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the War Department was
directed towards avoiding any incident that might precipitate war with Japan
while, at the same time, exerting its efforts to prepare for such a war. The
War Department was confronted with a grave lack of planes, antiaircraft guns,
and other implements of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate
defense mechanism. . The previous delay in implementing our defense had left us,
two years after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our preparations.
The Strong antiwar group in the United States made it unwise for the United
States to take stronger action against Japan.
These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of the War
Council.” Its policies were reflected in the actions of the Chief of Staff, U. S.
* Fortune Magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report in January which
showed that 55 per cent of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii; 25 per cent
not to defend ; and the balance did not know what they wanted.
* There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term, and the
§ º to which it refers. The situation was clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson,
WI10 Said :
“The first subject that was listed here is that of the ‘War Councils.” By the ‘War
Councils’ we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval
Qperations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and
the American Government. . . .
“The name ‘War Council’ is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I think,
the National Defense Law of about 1920 ; but it was purely a War Department board. It
did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it. . . .
“The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times
that we are talking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants,
and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I invited in ; and it had nothing to do with
the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of meetings—
they can hardly be dignified by the ‘organization'—but early, very soon after Mr. Knox and
I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we
Ought to meet with the Secretary of State : we were approaching important matters ; and
S0 We went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to meeting with
us Once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began meeting on Tuesday morn-
ings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were present in Washington, or able to come, and
those series of meetings went on until Mr. Knox died ; they lasted right through.
“They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and
We met once a week regularly ; and during the time at which you are about to inquire, just
79716 O—46—pt. 21 4
4576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army, as to measures taken for defense in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep
these factors in mind in reading the messages from the War Department to the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan
had been a mixture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Depart-
ment messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and at
the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate trouble with
the local Japanese population or excite the local public. As evidence of this was
the fact that Short responded to the situation by selecting an antisabotage alert
and the War Department took no exception to it. These two conflicting courses
of action were reflected in the messages and in the policies of the War Depart-
ment; they account in part for the attitude in mind of Short and others in the
Hawaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later.
Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific defense
was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen to the Philippines,
the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was there that the main attack, in
the first phase, was expected from Japan. No early attack was expected on
Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testified, it was a surprise to him (R. 9).
All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. Such mod-
ern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being flown to the Philippine
theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to strengthen the defenses of Mid-
way, Guam, Wake, and other localities judged to become the first involved. The
Hawaiian defense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it
was considered as our strongest outpost and had first priority On equipment and
maintenance (R. 14, 184).
[8] Planes flown from the mainland as late as Dec. 7, 1941, to Hawaii en
route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammunition until they were ready
to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold explains this was because of the necessity
of carrying sufficient gas to insure a safe arrival. (R. 168) This too led to a
state of mind, both officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the
Hawaiian Department, that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan
would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite well
down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of American territory
closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and that the implementing of
other defenses must give way in priority to those thought to become the first
involved (R. 2872).
Japan shrewdly calculated and estimated correctly this state of mind. It
arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, temporarily by-passing the
Philippines and the intermediate American islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii
Dec. 7, 1941, just as Ambassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of
Jan. 27, 1941. So clearly did Japan understand our national phychology that
it selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack, well knowing this to
be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief of Staff of the
Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, it will appear how well
that venture was prepared and executed, and how well timed as an answer to our
counterproposals of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum ;
because it was on and after the delivery of that document against which General
Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task force of Japan that
attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at Tankan Bay on the 27th or 28th
of November to launch the attack against Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.17
before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. . In fact, we were in such a meeting on the
Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Depart-
ment, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Navy, and myself were in constant contact.
“The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually
called with great regularity—the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary
of the Navy, the Chief of Staff—that was, of course, General Marshall—the Chief of
Naval Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark : and sometimes, General Arnold.
Well, that was also improvised, so to speak ; it had no custom before it. It was created
in the light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname, we called
it the ‘War Cabinet,” or the ‘War Council,” or something like that ; and evidently Mr. Hull,
from what you say, used that expression in his White Paner. *
“There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of
the President. at his office, and during this time about which you particularly ask, the
autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also : and, fortunatelv, I have records.
I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly,
and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, including
everything that was important, that I deemed to be important, in regard to the crisis that
was coming along : and including these meetings: so that I am in a position where I can
give you dates of these meetings prettv fully” (R. 4041–4043) (General Marshall, R. 5–6).
* The best attainable evidence supports this statement (R. 3033).
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4577
6. Public Demands Action Again&t Japane&c.—Our national policy has been to
avoid war. The difficulty with Our policy appears to have been its conflicting
nature that in the case of Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue in busi-
ness with Japan, and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both
negotiation and simultaneously to apply economic Sanctions against Japan.
As our nation was not prepared for War, it left the Administration, particularly
the State Department, without the full support of the public so it could proceed
with a firm policy toward Japan; and it left the War and Navy departments
without sufficient means to implement a more agressive policy towards Japan.
The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult for the State
Department to handle negotiations with Japan, which well knew our national
policy. It was difficult both to negotiate for a peaceful solution of differences
with a nation such as Japan, and at the same time impede negotiations by
applying economic sanctions such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting
off of the supply of oil and Scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty
With Japan.
This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions directed by the
War Department to its field commanders, who were required to both take all the
necessary precautions to meet War and at the same time to take no steps either
to excite the civil population or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy
was particularly difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large
proportion, some 30 per cent, of the population of the nationality of Japan.
The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out the War Department policy, that
in our preparations for war we would precipitate an issue with Japanese na-
tionals in the Hawaiian Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open
hostilities.
This state of public mind was further inflamed to demand action by the Govern-
ment against Japan, because of the latter's Open aggressions in 1941; but effective
action was impossible of fulfillment because of the long public policy of only main-
taining a very modest Army and Navy. Public opinion can change far faster
than a nation can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations
for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of public views, as
in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster
than preparations for war could be made. -
This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of negotiation
without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It likewise left the War
and Navy departments unable to fully Support the State Department in its negoti-
ations. This led to a compromise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed
by the press, in the form of a resort to economic sanctions.
But the difficulty with economic Sanctions was that, while it indicated a firm
policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggravated the situation in
that it made negotiations difficult of either progress or consummation. At most,
our national policy was one of defensive character while waiting for the prepara-
tions for war to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should
be made to behave herself and that our Government should do something about it.
7. Economic Sanction& Against Japam.—In 1938 and 1939 a series of “moral
embargoes” or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan by the United States.
During those two years there had been brought about a cessation of the United
States' export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and certain other
materials. There also resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic
materials, and as of July 1940, under the Export Control Act, the President had
curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials. Licenses were refused
for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools as of
September, 1940.
The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and result of
embargoes. He said :
“During the period up to, I think it was the autumn of 1940, I took the position
that economic embargoes against Japan—and embargoes are in the nature of sanc-
tions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults—I took the
position that we should not put embargoes On Japan, until we were prepared to
go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. I
pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations
with that country were bound to go steadily down hill and it might, and probably
would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I
felt it would be very shortsighted to get into a situation where we might be obliged
at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so conducive to
4578 CongressIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make threats and
then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working
out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abysinnian
campaign.
“But in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that
time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only Our national interests,
but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to
consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan’s expansion, but when. It
seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that
we must in Our Own interests put those embargoes into effect; and, shortly there-
after, those embargoes were put into effect.
“Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in
war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been
two years earlier.”
[9] It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic
sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General Herron as
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon Washington orders went
into an all-out alert into battle positions with live ammunition for six weeks
(R. 212).
In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The effect of
the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the winter of 1940-1941 the
shipment of many strategic commodities, including arms, ammunition, and imple-
ments of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine
tools, scrap iron, pig iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum,
and a variety of other commodities important to a war effort.
Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was the decision in
August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great
Britain that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action
in warning Japan against new moves of aggression, that the United States would
continue its conversation with the Japanese Government and offer her a reason-
able and just alternative to the course upon which that country was embarked.”
As was stated in the White Papers” as to economic sanctions, he (Grew) said
that “considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain
to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigor-
ous economic measures would probably avert war; that it was the view of the
Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course. . . . Finally he
warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and
dangerous suddeness which might make inevitable a war with the United States.”
As Ambassador Grew testified in Summary : .
“However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during
the period you mention—that is, the years 1940 and 1941—was almost steadily
downhill; we, of course, in dur Embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to arrest
that trend ; and I think everything was done that could possibly have arrested
it, in our work in Tokyo. But we were up against what I would call a “tidal
wave' of military extremism in Japan and I think the results as culminating in
Pearl Harbor proved that fact.”
The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in the State
Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicate that he too
was acting under what apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recogni-
tion of the inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of
Grew's communications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent
perspective Of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor.
On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State Department in-
dicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the military
and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that it was so serious
that it should be reported, even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February
1 he said the Outlook was never darker for peace; on July 25 the United States
froze Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he re-
ported the Japanese protest on U. S. economic pressure; on August 29 the United
States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil tankers to Russia and a military
mission to China; on September 6 Grew reported the statement of the Japanese
Premier that if the United States continued its economic sanctions it would pre-
* “Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931–1941,” Department of State,
Washington, p. 129.
* “Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. I and Vol. II: and
Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D. C.”
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4579
vent any settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on Sep-
tember 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that the Japanese could
only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement
would be a mere breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and
unless results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to
date, the Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time
and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the secrecy of
our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United States without advising
the public, whereas it was common knowledge in Japan.
On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy of the United
States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she would be forced to act.
His prediction was correct, because Tojo, the only Japanese Premier to stay on
the active Army list in that position, was made Premier on October 16. There was
an indication of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military
figure on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Emperor
ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When
they refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the
United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war.
The next step would probably be war itself.
Grew warned on October 30 that the Situation was fraught with the greatest
danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only possible but probable and
that Japan was preparing for hostilities “with dangerous and dramatic sudden-
ness.” It was on that date that Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a
later clipper for “technical reasons,” the significance of which was apparent.
On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet ‘that relations between
Japan and the United States were “extremely critical’ and that there was ‘immi-
ment possibility” that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of
conquest by force” (White Papers, p. 136).
This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the situation in
speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under Secretary of State
Welles Nov. 11, 1941.
The White Papers continue:
“On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a
‘sudden Japanese naval or military attack on regions not then involved.”
Seecretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of high officials
of this Government “stated that there was practically no possibility of agreement
being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break
out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safe-
guarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The
Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should
include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of Surprise a
central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultane-
ously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the
purpose thereof.” (White Papers, p. 144). It does not appear that such a statement
was sent by the Army and Navy to their field forces.
On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's Ten Points of
Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were verbally
rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired as to any other
basis of negotiations or a modus vivendi. The following day, at the request of the
Japanese Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull,
at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the “Ten Points,” stating the
[10] three primary considerations upon which the “Ten Points” were based.
On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark wrote a joint memorandum
to the President requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese as the
Army and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified
him of the agreement reached with the British and the Dutch for reciprocal action
in the case either one of them was attacked.
The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 27th to the
President did not reach him until after the meeting with the Japanese Ambassa-
dor on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of November. Whether or not the Secre-
tary of State, Mr. Hull, now disclaims that this document of the 26th was an
ultimatum, Ambassador Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R.
4208, 4215, 4221, 4222). They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted
because he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of No-
jºr 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contemporaneous events,
thus:
4580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
“The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final deci-
sion had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new proposal
which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday,
he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole
matter off. As he put it, “I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the
hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.'
“General RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, I don’t like to disturb you, but I have become
a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th
Of- •,
“Mr. STIMSON. This was the 27th.
“General RUSSELL. 27th.
“Mr. STIMson. The day after the 26th.
“General RUSSELL. Yes, sir. -
“Mr. STIMSON. The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he
would go on with it.
“General RUSSELL. Yes.
“Mr. STIMSON. Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the
27th, by telephone he told me that he decided to break it cff.
“I then called up the President and talked with him about it” (R. 4052–4053).
On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador, “The matter
will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy.” He warned that the Japanese
action would probably be “a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness
and risk.” His predictions were uncanny (White Papers, pp. 144–145). On
November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached Japan news
that the President had made a proposition to settle Japanese grievances by giving
her substantially most of what she wanted,” and on December 1 Grew reported
Japan cold to the proposals, a fact Secretary Hull had lound on the 26th when
he handed the President's Ten Points to the Japanese Ambassador. On the
same day, December 1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese
friend apparently high in that Government, Grew saying “everything was over
and that I would SOOn be leaving Japan.”
On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different from all
others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly indicated Japanese
intentions. The following day, on Sunday morning, the Pearl Harbor attack
OCCurred.
8. The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Complea.—The conditions in
Hawaii and the state of the pubiic mind in Hawaii were considered apparently
by the War Department to be primary factors to be taken into consideration
in the carrying Out of the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense
of the fleet. As elsewhere indicated in the War Department communications,
this was a fact: and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the Army also
gave weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation on the civil side.
It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United States to
exclude Japanese nationals from the United States and its territories, both for
self-protection and to protect American labor against cheap foreign labor of the
yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our fleet base and one of our most important defense
outposts, we permitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japa-
nese, to the extent of 30 per cent of the total population or 160,000.”
Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although born in the United
States, had not yet taken the Steps made available by Japan to become released
from their Japanese citizenship. These Japanese laborers and artisans were
comparatively economical in terms of performance, useful both in agricultural
pursuits and as artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in
* “Ten Years in Japan” by Ambassador Grew. o
* There are three classes of Japanese population : (a) old aliens known as Issei, about
37,500 ; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for
education known as Kibei, about 2,599 ; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-
educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95 per cent of the Japanese
children attend the Japanese language schools. ... Under Japanese law no Japanese is
released from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his
release from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a
release and they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approxi-
mately 50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around
these temples were centered the teachings of Japanese eulture, patriotism, and family
fealty (R. 3919–3920). See also Chanter I, “Gentlemen of Japan” by B. S. Haven. Ziff-
Davis Publishing Co.; “Feudal Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd.” by Stanley High, Readers Digest,
June 1943, pp. 19–23 ; and “Are the Japs Hopeless 2" by George Horne, Saturday Evening
Post, Sept. 9, 1944.
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4581
sugar cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands'; and it was
the urgent desire of these commercial interests apparently both to enjoy the
protection and profits from the basing of the fleet in Hawaii and also to have no
disturbance of such labor or to be led into any situation that would disturb these
profitable labor relations. -
This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to become domi-
nant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as to permit the Japanese
to become important political factors with membership in both the Senate and
the House of Hawaii, and to dominate, by way of majority, the Island governing
councils in some of the islands of the Hawaiian Group (R. 2941).
Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities. But up to
December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage. On December 7
a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the
Army. No Other specific instance of sabotage or alien enemy action had been
reported either by the War Department of Hawaii or by G–2 or the FBI in
Hawaii. -
Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Department order to
General Herron, by which his troops moved into the field in battle positions with
live ammunition in June 1940, had no effect upon the civilian population or their
anxieties. Subsequent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly
going on, including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect upon
the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing the local populace
paled by comparison with the contents of the local newspapers and their reports
of the war news and the progressively increasing threats of Japanese action.
Indeed, approximately a week before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local news-
paper in Hawaii carried a complete prediction of this attack on the following
Sunday (Exhibits 19–198). \
[11] The foregoing Statement of fact as to background should be considered
in connection with the communication of the War Department warnings as to
Sabotage, the action of General Short in placing the Department under the
Number 1 Alert against sabotage on November 27, and the claimed reasons for
not taking other defensive measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both
the civilian population and the alien population of Hawaii. .
The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of the responsible
commanders and their resulting state of mind is an important factor for con-
sideration. As part of this state of mind, it was generally considered that Japan
would never dare attack; and certainly, in the early stages of a war, She would
not dare risk the major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack.
The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly suicidal move
by Japan.
The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and the presence of the
large Japanese population built up a sabotage consciousness in the responsible
authorities as a more likely course of Japanese action than what was regarded
as the more remote military operation of a direct air attack. This background
is important to consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army
COmmander and the actions taken by his aSSOciates.
The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the evaluation
by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it was supplemented by the
American attitude that Japan would not dare attack the United States in what
was regarded as its home territory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet,
which was considered an asset and not, in reality, a liability.
Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939–2940) as to the protests
of local commercial interests to General Emmons when he proposed to take
action in removing the dangerous Japanese from the sugar plantations after the
Pearl Harbor attack. He said the political pressure brought to bear by these
interests was sufficient to bring about a cancellation of this effort of General
Emmons. It was significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing
nothing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so they
Could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which must have been
imposed heavily upon General Short. The constant application of such pressure
for a period of nearly a year upon General Short doubtless had a material effect
upon his mind and upon his anxiety about the Japanese population, about which
he could no nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal to have legal
action taken against those who failed to register as aliens (R. 3255–3256).
It was well known in Honolulu to both the FBI and G–2 of the Army that
there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to the best interests of
4582 CongressIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A Japanese combines in his Shinto
religion, centering about the Shinto temples, three things: patriotism, religion,
and family fealty. Those three things compose his entire emotional, political,
and family life.
The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the Islands
were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and disloyalty to the
United States. This was all well known and could have been cured promptly
by closing the temples and arresting the priests, as was done after December 7.
Then there were the Shinto societies, and particularly the Black Dragon Society.
The Japanese are well known as great organizers and they had countless Organiza-
tions, many of which were of potential subversive character. The Japanese ran
their own Japanese-language newspapers which promoted the same national
spirit. They had Japanese-language schools in which they taught Japanese
customs, family fealty, religion, and patriotism to Japanese children one hour
each day after their regular education in the American schools. Here again
our national policy, due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of
education, permitted these people to jeopardize the defense of Hawaii. After
December 7 the Japanese newspapers were put under strict control and used by
the United States for propaganda agencies to control the Japanese population.
and the Shinfo temples were closed.
9. Hawaiian Press.-The state of mind and the state of information in the
Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly before it, is not
better illustrated than the articles appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser and the
Honolulu Star-Bulletin. A mere recitation of these headlines would seem to
have been sufficient to have warned General Short and his subordinate officers
of the critical international situation.
The newspaper headlines in question read as follows: g
“U. S. Waits Jaran Renly” (29 No . 4 i–Homo nº lºt Star-Bulletin) : “Jananese
May Strike Over Weekend”; Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle”
(20 Nov. 41—Honolulu Advertiser); “Hull, Kurusu In Critical Meeting Today”
(1 Dec. 41—Honolulu Advertiser); “U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore
Mebilizing as War Tension Grows”; “Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Ten-
sion”; “War Fears Grow in Philippines” (1 Dec. 41—Honolulu Star-Bulletin);
“Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U. S.”; “Japan Gives Two
Weeks More to Negotiations” (2 Dec. 41—Honolulu Advertiser); “Huge Pincher
Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted” (3 Dec. 41—Honolulu Advertiser);
“Japan Spurns U. S. Program” (4 Dec. 41—Honolulu Star-Bulletin) : “Pacific
Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today” (4 Dec. 41—Honolulu Advertiser);
“Singapore on War Footing”; “New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo”; “Civilians
Urged to Leave Manila” (6 Dec. 41—Honolulu Star-Bulletin); “America Ex-
pected to Reject Jonan's Renly on Indo-China”- “Tamanese Navv Moving South”;
“Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup” (6 Dec. 41–Honolulu Advertiser);
“F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis” (7 Dec. 41–Honolulu
Advertiser. **
10. Summary.—We have learned a great deal about psvchological warfare
since this nation went to war. Looking backward, it is possible to see that the
psycholgical phases of the preparatory period for war leading up to the conflict
with Japan had an immense effect upon the state of mind of our own public,
officials and commanders; and upon what they did or did not do, prior to Decem-
ber 7. The deception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in
combination with our own failures to take precautions against the attack played
no small part in the disaster of December 7.
Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth and industrial
strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one would presume to attack it.
This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prevalent on the
mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii. -
With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more accurately
and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early January 1941 until
the attack and shortly thereafter.
22 Commlete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found in Exhibits
19 and 19A.
23 The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified
that these headlines resulted from deductions hased on current trends in international
relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them
(R. 3107–3109, 316.9—3170).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4583
[12] CHAPTER III. THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR
A. GENERAL
1. Introduction: Scope of the Chapter and Its Purpose.—This is a running
story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken leading up to Pearl
Harbor. We accompany this story with a discussion of the pros and cons of each
situation in order that all arguments for and against every explanation and the
circumstances Surrounding every Set Of facts may be clearly understood and
evaluated. Against Such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explana-
tions can be considered. We believe this chronological history of the entire trans-
action will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth.
After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we direct atten-
tion to the two primary periods, from January through September and from
October through December. As will be noted elsewhere this is a logical chrono-
logical division. In the latter part of the year 1941 there seemed to be a change of
understanding, appreciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part
of those in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be observed
because it is an important factor in what was done or not done in Hawaii.
2. Geographical.—The territory of Hawaii comprises an island group of which
the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu contains Pearl Harbor, located
on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was
also the headquarters during 1941 of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet
and Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction over
the Hawaiian Islands and our Other island possessions in the Pacific including
Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu was also the location of one of
the largest troop concentrations in the national defense system of the United
States while other national defense elements are located on the adjacent islands.
It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an outpost in the American de-
fense System. In view Of that fact, certain fundamental requirements of action
resulted which were incumbent upon the commander of the Hawaiian Dapart-
ment to follow. Hawaii is both an outpost for defense and offense, and is one of
the primary bastions of our national defense system. In priority of importance
it is rated on a par with the Panama Canal. -
The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and particularly
of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence; and the fleet Sea and air
base at all times. Aside from the necessity of preventing these islands from
falling into the hands of other nations as the springboard for an attack upon the
United States, the foregoing primary mission was that incumbent upon General
Short at the time Of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on the alert to
repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which attacks could be launched
upon our enemies. For this reason this outpost was implemented with the major
portion of the fleet and very substantial Army installations in order that the
mainland might rest Securely and be protected. There is no other fundamental
reason for the great concentration of naval and military power on the Island
of Oahu and associate islands. The very location of the Hawaiian Islands, ap-
proximately 2,000 miles from our Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location
for havad, air and ground forces, for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope
and flexibility of attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to
insure the maximum latifude of action a rainst Our enemies and the maximum
protection of the mainland of the United States.
3. Mission of Army in Hawaii...—The Army in Hawaii had a mission and a duty
to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this was :
“a. Joint TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control
and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
“b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air forces,
and against hostile sympathizers, to support the naval forces.
“c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect ship-
ping therein, to support the Army forces.”
The Army's mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, because it was the
Sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was in the harbor, it was there
to render such protection as it could to the fleet. The protection of the Islands,
other than for those purposes, was secondary and only necessary to the extent
of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. It should be
observed that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the responsi-
4584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bilities of the Army, because of the dual facts that the fleet when in the harbor
was not in a position to Support the Army forces either by reconnaissance or by
the protection incident to its being at sea in waters adjacent to the Islands, and
when in the harbor itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily
immobilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack.
4. Condition of the Hawaiian Department at the Time of Short's Assumption
of Command and Just Prior Thereto.—With the above mission in mind, the con-
dition of the Hawaiian Department just prior to the assumption of command
by General Short and Admiral Kimmel is a matter of interest. Admiral Richard-
son was the Senior naval Officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the
senior Army officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers
jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral Richardson
addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the status of the Army's
deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was sent to the Secretary of the
Navy. (R. 1802.) The Secretary of the Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary
of War, and called his attention to the serious conditions existing.”
Admiral Kimmel Summed up the situation in his testimony:
He was “astounded at the then earisting weakness” of the Pearl Harbor de-
fenses,” and collaborated with his predecessor in the preparation of a letter
dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:
[13] “(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense
of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ship's A A. guns while in port.
“(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, neces-
sitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet
planes for local patrols.
“(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District,
etc. -
“(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore” (Roberts Rec. 544).
He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768)
It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by Richardson and
Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short, that the lack of adequate
defense equipment and what was needed to bring it up to a satisfactory status
were clearly known to both the Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and
Navy departments. Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of
February, 1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of the
condition by all concerned of the condition of the Department of which he had
aSSumed COmmand.
General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17,
1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R 213) This alert lasted six weeks.
(R. 214–215) After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated
for a period. The alert was an all-out alert which was instituted under condi-
tions similar to positions and with full equipment and ammunition.
General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian popula-
tion by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar
to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.
When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with
the following language : *
“General HERRON. That was a refinement that the training men put over on
General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing.
There was Only One kind Of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do
it in accordance with the situation. But the training men like refinements, and
they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did
not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out
alert is Number One, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these
young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three
and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage.
It did not seem to him a very important change. I don’t suppose, and it turned out
to be vital. It was too much of a refinement” (R. 226–227).
In this connection, General Herron made a significant Observation on the re-
sponsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
“General GRUNE”T. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you
received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that
leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future
* See below in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence.
* Italics by the Board.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4585
*
the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your
judgment?
“General HERRON. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I
had better protect the island” (R. 228).
5. Organization of the Navy at Pearl Harbor.—Before proceeding to a consid-
eration of the Army problems and the action taken by the Army in preparing the
defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to understand the organization of the Navy
with waom General Short was to deal extensively and with which he was to enter
into various agreements and understandings, which have a material bearing
upon what was done or was not done.
To an Army man the Organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared to be quite
complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet
and Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Bloch was the Com-
mandant of the 14th Naval District. Admiral Bloch's duties consisted of the
following: -
a. Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to the Navy
Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized Navy Department
for local affairs, dealing with administrative matters such as plans, buildings,
work of the Navy Yard, repairing ships and the like, and providing for the
Fleet oil, docks, water protection and such services as minesweeping, anti-
submarine patrol, and the like.
b. An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting as a
subordinate of Admiral Kimmel; his duties related to the preparations for
the Offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to purely military
matterS.
c. Administrative control Over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of the Base
Defense Air Force. -
d. Commander Of Task Force NO. 4 in control Of the naval installations at
the Outlying island bases, such as Midway, Wake, Guam, etc.
It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly with the
Navy Department on certain phases of his work. He was primarily charged as
the Naval Defense Commander of the naval installations on shore-based naval
air forces, which were charged with Kimmel. He was the responsible com-
mander over the shore-based naval air forces, which were charged with the
mission Of naval long-distance reconnaissance.
Additionally, Block, in his capacity as a Defense Commander, had administra-
tive control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer, who was responsible
for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he had no power of disciplinary
control Over Admiral Bellinger, who was under Admiral Kimmel.
Admiral Bellinger's duties, in turn, were as follows:
a. Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander Patrol
Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and
aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.
b. Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus
Other units as assigned by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for conduct
Of Pacific Operations.
c. Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities
Of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all
Fleet aircraft actually based ashore.
d. Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation develop-
#. within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston
Slands. -
e: Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with the
above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the following
Senior Officers :
(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet Commander
for patrol wings was based at San Diego.
(2) Commander, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which Patrol
Wings 1 and 2 were a part.
(3) Directly under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his
Capacity as Commander Task Force 9.
(4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Com-
mander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
(5) Commanders of Fleet Task Forces 1, 2, and 3 or patrol planes
assigned to those forces for specific operations.
4586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[14] To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six positions
in Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941, namely,
(1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing
(2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2
(3) Commander, Task Force 9
(4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor
(5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District
(6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
In these various capacities he was responsible to the
(1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force
(2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2
(3) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his duties in connection with
Task Force 9
(4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his duties in connection
with the Naval Base Defefise Air Force
(5) Commander in Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with respect to
Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3.
In Admiral Bloch's testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore three hats.
He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which capacity he reported
direct to the Navy Department. In another capacity, as an officer of the Fleet,
he was directly under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. And again under
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander.
As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two governing
heads, Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General Short had to do business,
and their respective staffs with whom Short's staff had to deal, as well as the
many-titled Admiral Bellinger with whom General Martin dealt, the problem of
Co-Operation was made somewhat difficult.
By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short as
the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and air. General
Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and presented a single air com-
mander with whom the Navy had to deal; and Martin was under the direct com-
mand of Short. When the agreements and methods of operation arrived at be-
tween the Army and Navy are examined hereinafter, these relationships will be-
come important in understanding what was done and what was not done and
some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii.
|
1B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941
1. Selection of General Short.—General Short was selected for his high post of
Command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of this selection, he was called
to Washington to confer with General Marshall, to receive special written instruc-
tions from him and to confer with the sections of the General Staff and particu-
larly the War Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences
was to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and instructions
as to the responsibilities of his new command.
Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on the fifth day
of February, 1941. He assumed command on Feb. 7, 1941. Both Short and Her-
ron concur that the latter fully advised Short of the problems and conditions with
which he was confronted.
At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed certain basic
documents constituting fundamental instructions for his guidance in the conduct
of the command, such as the Joint Army and Navy Plan of 1935. This was modi-
fied by the subsequent agreements between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short,
and Bellinger and Martin. -
Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on Feb. 7, 1941,
a letter was written on that date by General Marshall to General Short compris-
ing a full presentation of the problems confronting General Short in his new
command. The letter was based upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then
Chief of Naval Operations, and said in part:
“Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the defi-
ciencies of Army material for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred spe-
cifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns . . .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4587
“What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this mate-
rial throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other
command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is the rather than a
major consideration for us, there can be little question about that ; but the Navy
itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it
difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii . . . -
“You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that
is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installa-
tions, but we cannot perform a miracle . . . -
“. . . However, as I have already Said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our
first concern is to protect the Fleet.
“My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm
is done us during the first sia: hours of unknown hostilities, thereafter, the easisting
defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk
of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine,
constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat
in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. º
“Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to
protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made
clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yester-
day, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy
fueds, engendered from fights Over appropriations, with the usual fallacious argu-
ments on both sides, Still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must
be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves
and irritations are concerned. . . .” (R. 14–17). -
Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound advice and an
admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such being the measure of his
instructions, it is interesting to observe in what particulars he complied with them
or varied from them and the reasons for his reactions. In conformity with the
instructions as to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and co-
operative relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewhere. By
the 19th of February he “had made a pretty thorough inspection or survey” (R.
321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff as to things that required
immediate attention, which were: -
“As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following
are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes.
“(1) Co-operation with the Navy.
“(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and
servicing of aircraft.
“(3) Improvement of the antiaircraft defense.
“(4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery.
“(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
[15] “(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies in roads and
trails.
“(7) Bombprocfing of vital installations such a command posts and com-
munication Centers.
“(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.”
The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the efforts of Short
to secure approvals and money for improving the defenses of Hawaii. It is also
replete with various instances of his being turned down by the War Department,
particularly because of lack of money in connection with permanent installations.
Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the equipment,
as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7, “Hawaii is on a far better
basis than any other command in the Army,” and the fundamental queston to be
considered is: What did Short do with what he had to meet the attack?
As elsewere stated, he was granted his request for the construction of many
types of installations, including the important Aircraft Warning System. (See the
discussion below of supply of equipment and construction, and also the delays
in construction.) -
Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as to the air
situation in clear, unmistakable language:
“I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian De-
partment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satis-
factory system of co-ordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first
priority.” (R. 19) w
4588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular reference
to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its Construction, and delays in sites
due to the Department of Interior delays:
“One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Air-
Craft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At
te present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is
about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service
increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands the
use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be
increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this
equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here. *
“The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in
Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. * * * I believe that this
matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of
War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior
to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting de-
tailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service.
“Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is
So dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I
believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was
Very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department who made several
personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to
locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War
Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I
be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to ex-
pedite its completion.” º
On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short:
“The progress that you are making in reaching close co-ordination with local
naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Depart-
ment, is most gratifying. * * * -
“The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General
requesting personnel, material and funds are being processed. To avoid delay
in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000
in the estimates now being prepared.” -
On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the Aircraft
Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of getting approvals
from the Department of Interior regarding matters pertaining to its National
Park Service: -
“The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establish-
ment of the aircraft warning Service Stations in the Hawaiian Department.
However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those
cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department
of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us the
temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose,
but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary
building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also
very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such
places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the
reservation. -
“I have given these matters my personal attention, and have conferred with
officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March
12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time.”
On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a letter showing full
appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and the protection of aircraft.
Among other things he said:
“On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would
suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19 some work has
been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but
in no case have arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes
in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I
asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must
necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited
cruising radius.” (R. 21–22) -
In this letter he also discussed at length the question of antiaircraft defense.
EXIIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4589
On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows:
“Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional
field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing
airfields is undoubtedly Sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details
to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for those purposes
will be included in estimates.” -
On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and amongst other
things reported progress, as follows: -
“Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are
making in co-operating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements
made with them :
“1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Four-
teenth Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
“2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and
Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agree-
ment.
[16] “3. Field Orders No. NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the
Army the provisions of the joint agreement.
“I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very co-operative and
we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy
air forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.
“We still have some detail work to do with reference to co-ordinating the air
force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that
in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming con-
vinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command.” (R.
26–27) -
On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of money needed
for the construction of airports and other defense projects totaling over $27,-
000,000. General Short followed this up with a letter on May 2 to General
Marshall in further explanation of his radiogram forwarding supporting data.
On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowledging the
receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying:
“The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island
looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead On the leasing of land parcels was
radioed on April 22. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the mat-
ter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you
in a Short time . . .
“It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely
well and do not hesitate to write at any time.” (R. 28)
On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a complete report
on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of the ground and the con-
struction of field fortifications, and the plans for repelling a serious attack, and
reporting his theory of the defense of Hawaii, saying:
“My theory of the defense of Hawaiii is based upon the following:
“1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points.
“2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly.
“3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient
motor transportation to move all reserves at Once if necessary. -
“4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserves with complete recon-
naissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying Out Of the plans.
“5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counterattack.”
On July 7 The Adjutant General sent General Short the following wire:
“For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous
Sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy
which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop
This policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive ac-
tion against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison
has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany
will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity
in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval
Comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the
British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop the Neutrality Pact with
Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic
4590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ports to be west of Panama Canal by First of August stop Movement of Jap
shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are
being requisitioned end.”
This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941. -
On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield on the
island of Oahu.
On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General Marshall the Joint Air
Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and exchange of facilities such as airfields.
On July 25, 1941, a very significant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning
him of the application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, par-
ticularly saying:
“Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate
immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but
you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate pre-
cautionary measures against any possible eventualities.”
On Aug. 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to the establish-
ment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and his reasons for so doing.
This brings to conclusion the communications between the Chief of Staff and
General Short to Oct. 1, 1941.
2. Short's Staff.-Short brought one Colonel Phillips to Hawaii with the view
to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for that assignment he placed
him successively in various sections of his General Staff. On November 1
Colonel Phillips was made Chief of Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed
to measure up to that most responsible and important assignment—the “alter
ego” of the Commanding General; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander
and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and candid
advice of high professional character and with a competent vision and knowledge
of what was taking place or might take place.
His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak and reflected itself
in the work of the several General Staff sections and in the Output thereof as a
whole. While the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff testifled that harmony ex-
isted, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a
lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board
that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.
Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a
position of such importance.” Short's selection of Phillips appears to have been
a mistake. An examination of Phillips’ testimony as to his conception of his
duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in
critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter (R. 1134–1144). In jus-
tice to Phillips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never
was present at important Navy conferences (R. 393—394, 534), and that informa-
tion of important and vital events came to him secondhanded.
Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had Phillips conduct
most of the staff conferences and apnarently rarely dealt directly with his prin-
cipal staff officers. He delegated to his staff little more than mere routine duties.
His direct relationship with his G–2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of
the then existing tense situation (R. 393. 519. 520. 521). Although he frequently
visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he held no
periodic conferences, and his second in command, General Burgin, was not taken
into his confidence as to existing cohditions nor was his advice sought (R. 2625).
3. Short's Actions in Building Defense Instal?ations And Adding Equim ment.—
There is no question that Short [17] made manv demands for equipment,
defense, construction, and personnel. He was active and diligent in this matter.
Excent as to aircraft and antiaircraft, his command annears to have been well
Supplied. In many instances, long delays were incurred in the anproval of defense
Construction and making funds availahle therefor, and some of the recommended
defense construction was disapproved by the War Department. -
4. Short's Reorganization of Divisions.—Short converted the square division,
known as the Hawaiian Division. into two triangular divisions and equipped them
with unusuallv heavy fire nower in both artillery and machine guns as a basis
for future expansion in time of war.
* R. 265, 1408–1409, 1946. 1977–1978, 2625–2626.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4591
General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified:
“General GRUNERT. "And in your division you had what artillery 7
“General MURRAY. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery,
but it is not generally known that we had practically doubled the gun strength
of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth
were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the
battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they
were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm, howitzers.
The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too.” (R. 3076–77)
5. Short’s Relationship With the Navy.—Turning from Short’s efforts to build
up the physical installations and equipment of Hawaii and his staff, and the
successful conversion of his single square division into two triangular divisions
on which his staff seemed primarily engaged, we come to his actions with the
Navy. Acting upon General Marshall’s instructions and admonitions of Feb. 7,
1941, which seemed to greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing an
amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger.
As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with the Navy.
Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in concept and in many
particulars equally admirable in the proposed plan of administration, under the
handicap of joint action by co-operation instead of unity of command, were of
guite limited effectiveness because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient
means to properly implement them.
The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effective would
have taken skilled professional officers of both services guided by a well-organized
composite staff and practiced in Operational tests.
The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a period
Of strained relations Occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in the actual event of
war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appreciate this defect.
- Short apparently mistook the conduct of “war by contract” for a conduct of
“war by command.” -
Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically into effect,
had the equipment and matériel available been utilized, had there been in existènce
a detailed plan of operation of the staff and lower echelons, and had sound judg-
ment been exercised in the Selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor un-
doubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly avoided.
(For a full discussion of the agreements see below in this chapter.)
6. Abandonment of Herron's Field Order No. 1: Adoption of Triple-Alert Sys-
tem: Sabotage Issues.—A further step, and one of great import, taken by Short
was the study that he initiated through his staff with a view to abandoning the
Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the regime of General Herron, and substituting
his temporary Standard Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on
July 14, 1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on Nov. 5, 1941
(R 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are defined by Short as
follows: -
“Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive
activities without any threats from the outside.
“Alert No 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition,
defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.
“Alert No. 3 was defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved to
their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt
at landing in sight” (R. 283).
Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395,400.) He says he sent
a copy to Washington. (R. 431.) , Alert No. 1 was purely antisabotage. Its effect.
When executed was to concentrate the planes in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where
they were vulnerable from the air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the
ground. He said he did this because of his deficiency of personnel in protecting
his planes against sabotage. If they had been put in dispersed positions about
the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vulnerable to wholesale
destruction from the air. This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in
effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air attack.
Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide dispersion
of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition at the guns and troops
and planes in positions of readiness for action and maximum protection. Under
Alert Number 1, the earliest time in which planes were planned to get off the
ground was four hours, while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available
aircraft is ready and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Like-
79716 O—46—pt. 21 5
4592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK"
wise, in connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other
similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alerts Numbers
2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours.
As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately
three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Histori-
cally, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General
Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of
Herron by which complete dispersal of planes, and troops, and guns was effected,
with ammunition at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other
witnesses—R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 27.28, 2772–2773, 3096–3097) that there was no
disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This
is significant, in view of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives
that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection of Alert Number
1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427–428, 532–533).
It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the
continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and
practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living
practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations
anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different from that of people
on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers ofttimes
contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events than anything
that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation
therefore lacks both substance and credibility.
At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementa-
tion of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage occurred
while Short was in command up to December 7. It was true that there were
35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37
per cent of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but in no
case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a [18] very exhaustive
investigation being made constantly by the FBI and by G–2, as well as by Navā3
Intelligence. &
We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions
of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General
Short adopted his antisabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the increasing
international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air
attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We
therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks
of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and
views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.
We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including
Some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese
would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence
in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, news-
paper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States
District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the FBI, General Wells,
executive vice president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Walter
Francois Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and
owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many
other witnesses such as ranch owners, Government officials, leaders in business,
that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant
position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a
relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There
appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation as to
what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case
of Stress.
7. Navy Long-Distance Reconnaissance.—He assumed that the Navy was con-
ducting long-distance deconnaissance, and in this he was joined by a large group
of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by him, if it had been made, would have
SOOn revealed the fact that his assumption that the task forces went out for
conducting reconnaissance at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance
as they were conducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces
of the Fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for
Jananese submarines so as not to interfere with their training ‘onerations. The
Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527. 1600. 1725. 1773, 1802.)
It should have been apparent upon examination of the focts hy him that any
such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent and limited in
Scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360 degrees around the Island.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4593
A further understanding by him of the actual facts would have disclosed very
promptly, as it did to his Air Force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any
means for such long-distance reconnaissance, nor did the Navy get from the
Army any such assistance, even though under the agreements the Army on call
was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for this purpose.
In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor available Ior this purpose only
six planes capable of this work. -
The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance reconnaissanse is set
forth in paragraph 18 (i) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which
rovideS : -
p “18. Navy.—The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall pro-
vide for . . . .
“i. Distant reconnaissance.” (R. 1745)
The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy assumed in its
agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval forces and particularly
carriers before they could launch an attack. The area of search extended two to
six hundred miles from the shore. It was assumed by Short that the presence
of task forces of the Navy at Sea insured Such reconnaissance being conducted.
Long-distance reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu
because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to destroy the
carriers and carrier-borne planes Of the Japanese but also put the forces on Oahu
on the alert for an effective reception of the attack if it got through. But, as
elsewhere stated, this long-distance reconnaissance was not being conducted by
the Navy and such air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose
of clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. The inshore
reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from shore, was substantially for
the Same purpose. - -
The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army and Navy
commanders and their staffs that carriers and their supporting craft would attempt
to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in position at dark preceding the dawn of
the day on which the attack was to be made: (R. 106) Under the protection of
darkness 300 additional miles could be covered SO that at dawn the attack could
be launched within approximately 300 miles from shore. This is apparently
substantially what actually did happen (Roberts Record 556–B).
The conception and estimate Of the situation was correct; steps taken to meet
it were either absent completely or so defective as to amount to little. The Navy
had available for long-distance reconnaissance, from November 27 to December 7,
1941, 50 PBY's and the Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes
would have been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance if a
360-degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766). It is signifi-
cant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant reconnaissance was made a
mission of the Army but Short and Bloch agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan
for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier and for the employment of the Army-
Navy air forces, to place the resnon ‘ihility for distance reconnaissance on the
Navy, leaving to the Army reconnaissance only to about 20 miles from shore.
This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for distance recon-
naissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was O. K.'d by
Kimmel and approved by the War Department.
The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the 600- to 900-mile
area) was not patrolled. Observations therein were infrequent and incidental.
Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that the few planes available would be wholly
ineffective for this purpose and employed them otherwise (R. 1763),
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were conversant with these condi-
tions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438–4439). It was obvious, therefore, that a Japanese
task force with carriers could launch an attack upon Oahu with a reasonable
Certainty of success since its discovery prior to such launching would have been
purely accidental and its chances of discovery remote.
An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of a dispersion
of its planes with the result that they could have been aloft, ready to intercept
the attack, and the damage done would have been greatly lessened.
The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the Aircraft
Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army.” The Army had put
into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training basis, which was operating for
.* See below for complete story of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system
Signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet was discovered.
4594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
all practical purposes, a number of mobile radar sets and an aircraft information
center. That it was in Operating condition, even with the state of training of
the personnel that then existed in late November and early December, 1941, was
amply proven by the successful operation of the system during previous tests
and exercises and of the station that discovered the attacking Japanese force 132
miles from the Island and the correct interpretation by the two enlisted men
Op. [19] erating the station, who duly reported the presence of a strange
force but were told by an inexperienced and only partially trained Air Force lieu-
tenant to “forget it.” This was at 0702 on Dec. 7, 1941.
If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to the Navy
the latter would have had the antiaircraft weapons on its ships in action, Since
only three to five minutes were required for that purpose, the Army antiaircraft
system could have been alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some
could have gotten Off the ground. * g
The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that being Oper-
ated by the Navy.
It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was constantly sup-
plying information of the greatest value to important naval commanders, a part
of which information was communicated to General Short by Admiral Kimmel
(R. 1771–1772). -
The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise General Short
that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force was discovered in the Mar-
shall Islands, in which force there were reported as present two or three carriers,
15 to 20 submarines, and possibly other vessels (R. 361). About the first of
December radio contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio
silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and most dangerous
phase of the movement of the enemy fleet (R. 1654–1655, 1662). The loss of such
contact of a threatening fleet in the year preceding was the occasion for a direc-
tive from Washington for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field
with live ammunition and remained there for Six weeks.
So here again, as in the case of the Army radar System, there was a failure of
transmission of the information by the Navy to the Army as the Army had failed
to transmit its radar information on the morning of December 7 to the Navy.
Such a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from
Pearl Harbor and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the
Japanese fleet resident in Japan, from whence the main attack was expected if
it ever did arrive (R. 106–107).
After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the Jaluit task
force and the fact that there was long belief that it was from Jaluit that the
attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor, there was produced in Hawaii
the more certain proof that this force had assembled at Tankan Bay in Northern
Japan and had moved from that point eastward and then Southward for the
attack, leaving Tankan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be
accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the earlier
naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does not change the situa-
tion. The Navy failed to give to the Army a very vital and important piece of
information. -
In conclusion, the last element in the tragic situation was the failure of the
subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army of the presence in the
outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, at about 0630, of a Japanese
submarine which was sunk by naval action (the destroyer U. S. S. Ward and a
naval patrol plane) about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that
Something was on the move and the whole naval and military establishments
should have been correspondingly alerted. The Ward reported this action to the
naval base watch officer at 0712 hours, who notified the Naval Chief of Staff.
The Army was not notified. (R. 536–537; Roberts Record 1725)
The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts in testimony
from senior commanders. The long-distance patrol of the Navy consisted of only
two or three PBY's and it was “nothing to amount to much” (R. 1820). General
Martin said: “I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that
WàS ; done. ‘Well,” he said, ‘this is all that I have. This is all I can put up’”
(R. 1822). - .
“General FRANK. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the
actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?
“Admiral BLOCH. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders
of the Commander in Chief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would be
the man to order that, in my opinion” (R. 1527).
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4595
As to Army reconnnaissance, General Mollison testified that such reconnais-
sance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not operate on Sundays,
saying, “I’m sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much
if it did” (R. 812). So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army
Air Forces did so little that it would amount to “a token payment only” (R. 824).
“General RUDOLPH. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they
didn’t have a boat out—an airplane, Seaplane” (R. 1232).
“General FRANK. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?
“General RUDOLPH. So I was informed” (R. 1233).
“General GRUNERT. Then, according to the instructions under which you were
functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance?
“Admiral BLOCH. There was no distant air reconnaissance Ordered in that
order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.
“General GRUNEIRT. But actually was there Some distant air reconnaissance
being made from time to time or continuously?
“Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not.
That would not be under me” (R. 1884). - -
With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it under the
joint air agreement, Admiral Bloch testified:
“So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval
District force” (R. 1884). &
“General GRUNERT. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December
whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?
“Admiral BLOCH. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what mis-
sions they were on, but there were planes in the air” (R. 1494).
So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed Such reliance
for protection by Naval long-distance reconnaissance and joint air action with
the Navy.
8. Agreements Between Army and Navy.—The basic document governing the
relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the
Hawaiian Islands is contained in the document entitled “War Plans, Joint Action
of the Army and Navy, 1935.” This was prepared in pursuance of the directive
of the Rainbow War Plan. It covers the Over-all policies of the functions and
agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsibilities in
the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii was Cate-
gory D. This category was defined as “Coastal Frontiers that May Be Subject to
Major Attack.” Under this category the coastal defense areas should, in general,
be provided with means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy
naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense
will generally find application. . . . In addition, antiaircraft defense of important
areas outside of harbor defenses should be Organized ; . . . Long-range air recon-
naissance will be provided. . . . (Page 39). - t
And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be “Protecting our
Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; . . . Insuring the security of those
portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial and com-
mercial operations.” -
It was also provided that there be furnished “a communication and intelligence
System to include an air [20] craft warning Service among the elements of
the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or in-
structions with the Navy.” This was a responsibility of the Army.
Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into entitled “Joint
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.” (Prepared by the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This
agreement was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the
fundamental plan for the defense of Hawaii.
The third agreement was that entitled “Joint Air Agreement,” signed March 28,
1941. This document was prepared by Major General Martin, U. S. Army Air
Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed
by Admiral Bloch and General Short. It provided for the combined air action
as follows:
“Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the
Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc.”
“Defense air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be
executed under the tactical Command Of the Army. The Naval Base Defense
4596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This force Will
remain available to the Army for repeated patrols Or combat or for maintenance
of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is
withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.” (Rob-
erts Record 555) -
This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and Short, was
implemented by certain additional documents signed by Bellinger and Martin as
operating plans. The date of these operating plans was April 9, 1941 (Roberts
Record 556a-O Vol. 5). .
Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting on behalf
of the Commander in Chief in signing the document, and there operated under
him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command of the planes, so far as the Navy
could implement the Agreement, as Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger,
however, was under the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged
with the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for the
base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement the Agreement.
Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed to do it with was Fleet avia-
tion. Bloch had supervisory control over Bellinger, but the Commander in Chief.
Admiral Kimmel, had to approve the Agreement (R. 1522).
Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readiness of the aircraft, but
did not have control of the aircraft, the readiness of which he was to determine.
The confusion inherent from the Navy's organization is best expressed in the
following question :
“General GRUNERT. Who would the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet,
hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or
Bellinger? . -
“Admiral BLOCH. I do not know.” (R. 1522)
This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy board
dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation
of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Islands. This report was signed by
Maior General Martin and Admiral Bellinger, (R. 1581)
Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in determining under
which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of per-
formance and responsibility. -
Plans which must wait to be put into practice and Only become operative when
war strikes under all the unexpected and changing conditions of an attack in-
evitably prove unsound in practice. The basic difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kim-
mel agreements was inherent in all, such agreements, as they constituted a vain
paper attempt to predict war procedure without having properly tested out the
proposed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they were
practical measures. - - .
The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, and the Short-
Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far enough to find out if their
plans were sound in practice. There was inadequate practice of them to enable
the respective organizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution
so that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses, strains
and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment that were incidents
of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this synthetic structure of agreements and
plans based upon them. The following analysis of these agreements shows that:
There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan and the
“Joint Action of the Army and Navy” of 1935. The second agreement was
the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short
and based upon it as Appendix No. 7 was an operating plan worked out by
General Martin and Admiral Bellinger.
As Admiral Bloch said:
“Ordinarily it would not be operative” (R. 1478).
He also testified:
“The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy departments
never Ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local com-
manders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part” (R. 1474).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4597
And again he testified :
“General RUssell. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, accord-
ing to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not
effective until Dec. 7, 1941?
“Admiral BLOCH. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it
happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for
distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my re-
sponsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose, but I never had any ;
I never had one.” (R. 1487) r
The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army had two basic
defects. First, they did not become operative until an emergency arose. The
agreement said (paragraph 15 (c), 2) :
“Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior
to M. Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed
upon by local commanders” (R. 1584).
The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were understood to
be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These commanders apparently took no
action to “mutually agree” to implement parts of the plan and, evidently were
going to let the agreements go until an emergency arose, when they became opera-
tive automatically. As Admiral Bellinger testified : -
“That could have been done at any time by the commandant of the 14th Naval
District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was approved
by and agreed upon by General Short” (R. 1591). *
But it was not done. The selection of M Day to initiate the putting of the
joint plan and agreements thereunder [21] into effect according to the
terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the War and Navy Depart-
ments. They took no action to put it into effect although a copy of this agree-
ment was forwarded to the War Department and presumably to the Navy
Department (R. 1474).
The consequence was that not unitl the morning of December 7 did the agree-
ment become operative, when it was too late to have gotten the benefit of the
co-operative action that it implied, and the training which would result from this
close teamwork by the Army and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified:
“The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority
to place that organization in the functioning status, except in the case of an actual
emergency” (R. 1582).
This brings us to the second defect: unity of command. If that had been put
into effect as provided in paragraph 9 (b) of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan this air agreement would have become effective by reason of such
unity of command. As Admiral Bellinger again testified:
“I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning
the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a
unity of command to make such an operation a success.
“General FRANK. You mean a unity of command before something happened?
“Admiral BELLINGER. Yes,
“General FRANK. Rather than when it happened?
“Admiral BELLINGER. Yes” (R. 1589).
Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity of command
could be put into effect either by the President of the United States or by joint
agreements of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy or when the
commanders of Army and Navy forces agreed that the situation required unity of
command and who was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to
effectuate what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal
cause of difficulties on Dec. 7, 1941, and the events leading up to and causing those
difficulties, that is, unity of command (R. 1587–1588).
It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was not put into
: in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective. As Admiral Bellinger
testified : -
“The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a function-
ing status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities
in order to concentrate on defense” (R. 1582).
Likewise General Short testifled :
“General Martin and I talked Over the situation and we felt that we should do
nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The responsi-
bility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the
4598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started
them out with untrained crews.
“That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into alert No. 1 rather than
Alert No. 2 or No. 3” (R. 286). -
“As I say, none of these fixed Stations was in Operation. We had gotten, along
in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using
them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that
the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4 to 7 a. m.). In
addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to
11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4” (R. 298).
“By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the possi-
bility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried
about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal functions.
They might have been Out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get
back in” (R. 460).
“Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and
the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training
of the infantry divisions” (R. 528). -
The reason for not so doing is shown by Kimmel's words:
“We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had
received no orders to mobilize” (R. 1811).
Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on the Commandant,
14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the Navy, for putting this plan into
effect, yet it would have been necessary to refer to Washington for a decision.
When asked why this would be so, he said:
“It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by
Japan an Overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American rela-
tions, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have.
required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and
certain action which should have been taken without reference to the Department”
(R. 1756). -
Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for Washington and
Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and that in turn meant that the Martin-Bel-
linger Air Plan of Co-operation, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, did not go into Operation.
The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral Bloch,
Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, “had
no planes assigned to him at this time” (R. 1751), so that he could do nothing to
carrv it out. As to the Army, Admiral Kimmel pointed Out: -
“There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii,
and we knew that there weren't going to be any” (R. 1753).
When asked why the Navy accepted the responsibility for distant reconnais-
sance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral Kimmel testified he
“accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn’t do any-
thing else and be sensible” (R. 1753).
Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement on long-distance recon-
naissance means not being available (R. 1595, 1606). Therefore, paragraph 18
in the air agreement providing the Navy will furnish distant reconnaissance was
without effect (R. 1605–1606). Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger
had were under command of Kimmel and were being used for Other purposes in
connection with reconnaissance with the Fleet for protecting maneuver areas
against Submarines. .
For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available and to the
extent that any planes were available the use of them would have interfered with
training, and for the further reason that the agreements were not to go into effect
until an emergency, the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the
Martin-Bellinger Air Agreement signed bw Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The
Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had to put the
plan into effect, the documents could only show what the working Scheme would
be. The inherent weakness in making such plans was the fact of their not being
operative in time to meet the attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washing-
ton took steps to make them operative as they could have done (R. 1606–1607,
1609). However, unity of command in Washington would have been a condition
precedent to unity of command in Hawaii.
[22] 9. Estimate of the situation.—The best indication of what the Army
and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense of Hawaii is found in
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4599
the estimate of the situation in the implementing, operation plans signed by
Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of
March 21, 1941. This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for
vigorous implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated in
this document. The document says:
“b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a
declaration Of war.
“c. A successful, Sudden raid against Our ships and naval installations on
Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific
for a long period. -
“d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) Submarines and/or an Orange fast
raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our
Intelligence Service. . . . II (a) Orange might send into this area one or
more submarines, and/or One or more fast raiding forces composed of Carriers
supported by fast cruisers. . . . III (b) It appears that the most likely and
dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at
present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers,
which would probably approach inside of 30 miles. . . . (c) In a dawn air
attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete
surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a
condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start . . .”
(Roberts Record 556–D–F).
It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was stated :
“Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable
undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a
carrier.” (Roberts Record 556–F). -
It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to Pearl Harbor
and was sunk at about 6:45 a. m. on December 7, but was not reported by the
Navy to the Army. Such a report would have been a Sure warning of an hour
before the attack of what was coming as recognized by paragraph 3 (d) of the
estimate of the Situation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan.
In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the information
that he had upon which to premise a successful course of action, it is necessary
both to take into consideration the background in the first chapter and Of the
official communications and official actions of those estimates of the Situation
at the time. - .”
It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned the State Department
on January 27 by wire of the possibility of an air attack upon Pearl Harbor.
This possibility had already been apparently thoroughly considered by the War
and Navy Départments, and it had been concluded that that was the strongest
danger to Hawaii. In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence
of Admiral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy
Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weaknesses of the
Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the resulting correspondence
between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War must be read in the
light of the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the
Army the following mission :
“b. Army—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against
hostile sympathizers.” -
General Marshall testified, however, as follows: .
“We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movements in Indo-China and the
Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault
on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on
Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern
planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous
for the Japanese to attempt such an attack” (R. 9).
As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War Stimson on
Jan. 24, 1941, in part as follows: -
“My dear Mr. Secretary:
“The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Depart-
ment and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This re-examination has been,
in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan,
and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on
ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily pos-
4600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the
naval base at Pearl Harbor.
“In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval
base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the
joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character men-
tioned above.
“The dangers envisioned in their Order of importance and probability are
considered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack
(2) Air torpedo-plane attack
(3) Sabotage
(4) Submarine attack
(5) Mining
(6) Bombardment by gunfire
“Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfac-
torily.”
It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air attack and
that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were sufficient by the Army.
It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson’s letter stimulating this letter of
Secretary Knox was based on Richardson's personal inspection and knowledge
of the Army situation. .*
Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following recommendations to
the Army : -
“Assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and antiair-
craft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii . . . that
the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readi-
ness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against
Pearl Harbor.” - .*
“(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long
as the present uncertainty exists.”
So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment then existing that the
most serious threat was an air attack and that all means should be taken to
implement against it.
On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of the Secretary
of the Navy under the subject “Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,” and
Said :
“In reply to your letter of Jan. 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise
attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete
concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of our mak-
ing every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort . . .”
“(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding
a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, and am directing him to COOperate with the local naval authorities
in making those measures effective.”
On the same day another communication was addressed to General Short, and
this time by General Marshall :
[23] “Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the
deficiencies of Navy matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred
specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns.
“The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine,
constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing
threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority.”
And not satisfied with this first letter, General Marshall on March 5, 1941, again
addressed General Short, saying:
“I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory
System of co-ordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first
priority.”
And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length with reference
to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the measures being taken to
meet this situation. He points out that antisabotage measures and suppression
of local disorders could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come
from the islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air attacks.
His estimate of the situation was :
ExHiBITs of JoINT COMMITTEE 4601
“The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability
of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack.”
Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of emergency
fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of bunkers to protect the
dispersed planes, as he discusses Such a problem at length and its solution
(R. 21–25).
On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, Annex No.
VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure; Agreement signed by the Commander
of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to
implement the above agreement, and Field Orders No. 1–NS (Naval Scourity)
putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement (R. 26–27).
He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and himself felt all
steps had been taken “which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces
to act together with the unity of command as the situation requires” (R. 27).”
This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the agreement could
not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any material way and there was
no unity of command. none proposed and none was ever put into effect under these
agreements. Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative.
This communication was acknowledged by Gºneral Marshall on May 5.
This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted to the
Chief of Staff on April 14 as indicating the best judgment in estimating the
situation by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by General
Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch.
It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating. a situation to
select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make
and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks
(R. 1121, 2662). In the present instance, it was clearly recognized, not only
in the foregoing correspondence, but in this formal joint estimate by the Army
and Navy of the situation, that the most serious attack to be met by the Army
and Navy was an air attack by Japan. Herewith is the following statement from
that estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and Ad-
miral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This estimate is
prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of the enemy's intention.
“2. Assumptions. . . . . .
c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu
where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack
On Oahu.
e. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six
Carriers against Oahu. . . .
c. . . . The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action
Open to the enemy. - -
“2. a. The most favorable plan of action Open to the enemy, and the action, upon
which we should base our plans of operation is the early morning attack in
which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:
(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before
attack. -
(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of
the attack. . . . . -
“4. . . . The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on
Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an Outlying naval base. . . .
“It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest out-
lying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks
and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak
and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness
for offensive action.”
C. CRITICAL PERIOD : OCT. 1 TO DEC. 7, 1941
1. Vital Messages.—In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the situation
Showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of the best military and
naval minds in Hawaii. Under established military doctrine, that Called for
preparation for this worst eventuality. (R. 436–437) Short so admitted that
this was the correct procedure (R. 436–437).
* Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27).
4602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The contrast between the written statements of many of the responsible actors
in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, as to their esti-
mate of an air attack by Japan on Oahu, is startling. -
The Secretary of the Navy wrote on Jan. 24, 1941, to the Secretary of War:
“The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are
considered to be : -
“(1) air bombing attack.
“(2) air torpedo attack.
“(3) sabotage” (Roberts Record, 1824–1825).
However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few days after
December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye testified his (Secretary
Knox) first remarks was : “No one in Washington expected an attack—even Kelly
Turner.” Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy and
was the most aggressive-minded of all (R. 1070). -
General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on Feb. 7, 1941, said:
“The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and sub-
marine constitute the real perils of the situation” (R. 17)
On Oct. 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before this Board : -
“We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii (R. 9).
[24] It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin were
responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference to air, and this
was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. Defense Plan. In that esti-
mate they put attack by air as the primary threat against Hawaii.
Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record: -
“If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been
in a functioning status” (R. 1626). -
Contrast what General Martin said:
“I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is from
a surprise attack with the information we had” (R. 1827).
Admiral Kimmel Said :
“We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese
were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was
going to be made on Pearl Harbor” (R. 1771).
The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, whereas
the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and the instructions from the
Secretary of the Navy as well as his own recommendations to the Secretary of
the Navy show that an air attack was the principal concern. -
Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement based on the
air estimate of Hellinger and Martin, testified as follows:
“General FRANK. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?
“Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir” (R. 1518).
General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying the air attack as a
primary threat and he had received the Marshall letter of February 7, 1941, and
Similar letters of General Marshall, and had replied setting forth in letters that
the air attack was his primary concern.
Witness what General Short says On this record to the Contrary:
“General GRUNERT. Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?
“General SHORT. It was” (R. 536). • -
We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of
the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Ad-
mirals in Hawaii, all ea pected an air attack before Pearl Harbor. As a general
statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect
it. :
Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War,
Mr. Stimson, who testified :
“Well, I was not surprised” (R. 4072).
Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated with his staff
in July and finally put into complete form on Nov. 5, 1941 (R. 333) had been
sent to the Chief of Staff (R. 431). General Marshall wrote General Short on
October 10 that it had just come to his attention and that upon an examination of
the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14,
containing those three alerts, “I am particularly concerned with missions assigned
to air units” (R. 29). .
He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the mission of
defending Schofield Barracks and all airfields on Oahu against sabotage and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4603
ground attacks, and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military
police duty. He thereby clearly warned General Short that the Air Force should
not be used for antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter:
“This (the action of using the Air Force for anti-sabotage duty) seems incon-
sistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in
view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have
been provided” (R. 29).
General Short replied on October 14, as follows:
“The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essen-
tial utilities. . . . However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just
passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon.”
General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, and
in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (of which
there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard dur-
ing the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile
landing effected. General Marshall further indicated that no potential ground
duty should be used as an excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force train-
ing, saying:
“I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on
the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing
effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps per-
Sonnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground
defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to
their own specific training requirements. -
“It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate
on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion pro-
gram and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is
concerned” (R. 30). -
Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his Air Force for its
normal purposes and not upon antisabotage guard duty, and emphasizes that
the use of the Air Force must be free and unfettered.
On October 16 Short received the following Navy message:
“The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C. N. O. which I have
been directed to pass to you. Quote: “Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a
grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American
and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate
under a new mandate which will not include reapproachment with the United
States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible.
Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her
present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two
powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including
such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor con-
stitute provocative action against Japan” (R. 279).
On Oct. 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, reading as follows:
“Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your informa-
tion. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no
abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent” (R. 4258).
This message was dated Oct. 18, 1941, according to the Gerow statement,
Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by General Marshall,
the same message was dated Oct. 20, 1941, as #266.
On October 28, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details of the
training of the air corps personnel.
On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, reading as follows:
“There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with
Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and
movements of their naval and military force is, in our opinion, that a 8wrprise
aggresive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines
[25] or Guam, is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and
concurs and requests action . . . inform senior Army officers in respective areas
utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation
or precipitate Japan action” (R. 4258).
On Nov. 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department: -
“It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24s on special
photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simul-
4604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
taneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location
and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval Vessels
including submarines . . . before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24s
are fully supplied with ammunition for guns” (R. 4259).
On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief,
Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the liaison officer, Lieutenant
Burr, to G—3 of General Short, which reads as follows:
“Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition
against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is
indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the Organization
of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in prepara-
tion for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and
Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against
sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform
naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo”
(R. 1775). -
And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio to the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department:
No. 472. “Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but
hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be
avoided, the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that
might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures should be Carried Out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil
population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur,
you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan.
Limit dissemination of this highly Secret information to minimum essential
officers” (R. 280–281, 4259–4260).”
This completes the pattern of the Communications and information that was
in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to elect the antisabotage
Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 or No. 3, which would have constituted
the defense against the most serious attack that could be made upon him in view
of the previous estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all
quarters of an air raid.” -
On the same day, Nov. 27, 1941, but after his decision to select Alert No. 1 and
the sending of a reply to the message, Short received from G–2, War Department,
through his G–2, Hawaiian Department, the following message:
“Advise only the C. G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with the
Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage
probable. Also possibilities that hostilities may begin” (R. 4260). -
Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The following colloquy
is important :
“General FRANK. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is
in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation
with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military
establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that
is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?
“General SHORT. Yes. -
“General FRANK. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our
War College teaching and our actual practice, in the organization. Now, in
coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army,
Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should
prepare for enemy action of what character?
“General SHORT. The Worst.
* A full discussion of the message follows:
* Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in
Chief Pacific Fleet, under dates of Dec. 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction of
codes and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruction
of similar means of our own evidently never reached General Short (R. 424–425).
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4605
“General FRANK. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in
this instance?
“General SHORT. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not
believe that there was going to be anything more than Sabotage; and, as I have
explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps par-
ticularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that
we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the
fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence
because when I reported action and there was no COmment that my action was
too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it.
They had a lot more information than I had” ” * * (R. 436–437).
“General FRANK. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about
how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in
general, may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith
in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and
to a certain extent of the line Of thought as a result of what was contained in
messages between the 16th of November and the 27th ?
“General SHORT. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions
of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating they wanted
more, and in sending planes Without any ammunition.
“General FRANK. All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming
in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?
“General SHORT. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: That
they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the
Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to
violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures. *
“General FRANK. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why,
when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not
taken to meet it. I assume that the answer
“General SHORT. You mean the estimate of the year—you mean the year before?
“General FRANK. No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate,
“General SHORT, Oh.
“General FRANK. Of 1941.
“General SHORT. Yes. -
“General FRANK. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the
question asked two or three questions back.
[26] “General SHORT. Yes” (R. 471–472).
General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the Chief of Staff
of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which continued up to the attack on
December 7 (R. 282). His message in reply to General Marshall was :
“Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. REUARD
four seventy two Nov. 27th” (R. 38, 286).
The indorsements So appearing on this reply are as follows: In the handwrit-
ing of the Secretary of War there appear the words “Noted HLS,” written in
pen : “Noted—Chief of Staff,” stamped by a rubber stamp on the message with-
out initials; and a rubber stamp “Noted, WPD” (in red ink) followed by pen
initials “L.T.G.” (R. 38, 4287). -
An examination of the wire received from General MacArthur, in response to
a similar message sent to General Short,” shows the same indorsements, includ-
ing “Noted—Chief of Staff,” with a rubber stamp but not initials. However, this
message has written in General Marshall's handwriting the words “To Secretary
of War, GCM.” This indorsement does not appear on the following message that
came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation below.)
The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was the “Action
Copy” as noted in pencil at its foot “OCS/18136—120.”
When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said:
“General RUssFI.L. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in
which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by
t;
* On November 27th the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General
Short, to MacArthur in the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and DeWitt on the West
Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from
Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security than those envisaged in the
Hawaiian Alert No. 1.
4606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
message from you over your signature by number. That message of General
Short reporting action merely states: -
“‘Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy
REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh.”
“The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by
Secretary Stimson and has a stamp ‘Noted—Chief of Staff,” and was initialed by
General Gerow. -
“The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates
to Stamping documents which do not bear your signaure. Does that indicate that
you did or did not see those messages?
“General MARSHALL. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from
§:Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, ‘Noted—Chief of
Staff.” -
“General RUSSELL. That is true.
“General MARSHALL. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will
find my initials. -
“General RUSSELL. Yes; I do see them. -
“General MARSHALL. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I
do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice.
One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it,
which in this case was the War Plans. Division, now the Operations Division,
and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where
I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution,
I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified,
I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed Of this. As a matter
of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to
the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection
at all.
“General RUSSELL. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's Office and
was by him initialed—would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him
or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?
“General MARSHALL. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that’
this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not
initial it. They evidently came in together.
“General RUSSELL. If they were together you might or might not have seen
them 2
“General MARSHAL. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be
that I had seen it” (R. 38–40). º
No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any record, either
internally in the War Department or externally, of any message to Short showing
the slightest exception taken to his course of action. It will be noted as to the
Chief of Staff, that while he did not initial the Short reply, he did initial the top
message from General MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both
went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substantially the
same time in answer to the same message from the Chief of Staff. The inference
from General Marshall's testimony is that possibly he only initialed the top one,
but that is speculation, as he said, “I do not know what the explanation is.”
(R. 39) -
2. Analysis of the Situation from November 24 to November 27.-The vital
message of November 27, No. 472, heretofore quoted as having been sent by the
Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, can be under-
stood and its proper place in this narrative determined only when we know the
events which led up to its being sent; when we know by whom drafted and by
what procedure the drafting was accomplished; and the circumstances under
which it was forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and
other documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the
message and the meaning of each part of it.” º
* The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in
the White Papers by defining with precision the War Council. There were really three
bodies that were closely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council
was that established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Depart-
ment. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they
gathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary, of State, and sometimes with
General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the Presi-
dent at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State,
Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General Marshall and
#ººl, stark. and occasionally, General Arnold. (R. 4041–4042–4043-4044, 4047–
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4607
The War Council met on the 25th of November, 1941. Fortunately, we have the
advantage of the contemporaneous diary of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson,
who was pictured in his diary with great clarity and precision the events as they
transpired, which were material to this issue. This diary reads:
“At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed
us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the
Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I
thought, as we read it, but I don’t think that there is any chance of the Japa-
nese accepting it because it was so drastic. . . . We were an hour, and a
half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of
Marshall. Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House, where we were until
nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and my-
self. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as-perhaps
next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning,
and [27] the question was what we should do. We conferred on the gen-
eral problem” (R. 4050–4051).
This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 (R. 4050–
4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War returned to his office,
he found a G-2 message that a Japanese expedition had started Southward,
south of Formosa; and he at once called Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the
report and a copy to the President. - -
On the following day, Nov. 26, 1941, the diary continues: “Hull told me over
the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make
the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japa-
nese, but to kick the whole thing over and to tell them that he had no other
proposition at all” (R. 4051–4052). - -
There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington for North
Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of the 26th, he had drafted in the rough
a proposed message to General Short apprising him of the situation as it was
developed. General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he
believes he discussed such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244–4246.)
General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, at which
time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th together with the
report from General Gerow of the events during the 27th which we are now
about to relate. (R. 36–37.)
Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it as:
“The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would
go on with it” (R. 4051–4052–4053).
What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his éonference
with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the “Ten Points.” As
Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered these “Ten Points” to be an
ultimatum. (R. 4221.) Whether or not the Secretary of State considers now
that this is not an ultimatum (see his letter of Sept. 28, 1943), nevertheless, the
Japanese did so consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force,
which as the evidence shows was waiting at Tankan Bay, to start the movement
against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27th–28th of November. As well put
by Ambassador Grew :
“Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years before-
hand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those re-
spects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail;
but as for the moment at which the button was touched, I don’t myself know
exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were
to the point at which they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my
belief that it was about the time Of the receipt Of Mr. Hull's memorandum of
November 26 that the button was touched” (R. 4215).
On the morning of the 27th of November 1941, Mr. Stimson's diary reads:
“The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what ‘ his final
decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new pro-
posal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested
yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken
the whole matter off. As he put it, I have Washed my hands of it, and it is now
in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.’”
Then the Secretary of War states:
“I then called up the President and talked with him about it.”
79716 O—46—pt. 21 6
4608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General Arnold
to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take pictures. (R. 4033.)
The Secretary related that General Marshall “is down at the maneuvers to-
day,” and “Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and
General Gerow.” At this point he says:
“A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the Presi-
dent was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed”
(R. 4054).
This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum
with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to
prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State
in handing the “Ten Points” counterproposals to the Japanese on the previous
day, which was, as the Secretary of State remarked, “washing his hands of the
matter.”
When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did not know of the very
complete evidence in this record of the movement of the Japanese task force
starting on the 27th–28th from Tanken Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement
on this subject is of interest:
“I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesman—who were
urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20–what became the
last of this Government's counterproposals. . . . It will thus be seen that the
document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum.” (Letter
from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Sept. 28, 1944.)
3. The Drafting of the Me88age #472 of the 27th.-We now turn to the drafting
of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and
other witnesses. The first meeting was between Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and
General Gerow. (R. 4239–4240). A second meeting between Secretary Stimson,
Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day.
(R. 4240) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says: - ',
“But the main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall
send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal
for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the tele-
phone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert,
namely, that he should be on the qui vive for any attack, and telling him how the
situation was.” (R. 4055) To continue with the diary:
“So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. Stim-
son here verabally testified—“We were sending the messages to four people, not
only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska'). So Gerow and Stark and I
went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got
it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the
exact statement from him of what the situation was.” (R. 4056)
The Secretary of War then stated:
“The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with
correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments,
and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right.”
(R. 4056) -
The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in the message
Of the 27th were these :
“Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment.””
The Secretary continues his testimony:
“That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had
been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I
had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and
the envoys from Mr. Hull ; [28] and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in
my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely,
that the man should be on the qui Vive for any attack, and telling him how the
situation was here” (R. 5046).
* However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the Sentence,
“Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment,” was
inserted by him or Colonel Bundy. -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4609
The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally that of
the Chief of Staff. Mr. Stimson Said :
“That is why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision
from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do
what I of course normally do : to see that the message as Sent was framed in
accordance with the facts” (R. 4057).
The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has indorsed
upon it, “Shown to the Secretary of War” (R. 4057). *.
The Secretary testified :
“I went over very carefully the whole message. * * * And I saw it after it
was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there” (R. 4058).
With reference to the other meeting that took place on the 27th in the draft-
ing of his message, #472, General Gerow's testimony is that at the meeting with
the Secretary of War the first two sentences, reported by the Secretary of War
as being drafted by him, were sentences which were softened by instructions or
information furnished by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the tele-
phone with the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th (R. 4247). General
Gerow testifies that the Sentence So softened Originally read “Negotiations with
Japan have been terminated” (R. 4270).
The sentence, “Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action pos-
sible at any moment” was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy (R. 4247).
The sentence, “If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act,” was thus phrased because
as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts Commission :
“We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed
reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect
the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against
Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit
the first overt act” (R. 4251–4252).
The next sentence: “This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as re-
stricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense” was in-
serted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The purpose of this language was
to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De-
partment (R. 4252).
General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the ambiguity of
the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a “Do-or-Don't” message
(R. 4252).
He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the relations
between the American Government and the Japanese Empire (R. 4256). The sole
information passed on to General Short by the War Department from October 20
to November 27 about what the soldier calls “enemy information” was in this
particular message (R. 4263). The only previous message that Short had had
of the international situation from the War Department was on October 20,
which read : *** w
“Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your in-
formation. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but
no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent” (R. 4264).
The sentence: “This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a
course of action that might jeopardize your defense” was put in by the War
Plans Division (R. 4271).
With reference to the phrase, “You are directed to take such reconnaissance
and other measures as you deem necessary.” Apparently at that time no investi-
gation was made by the War. Department to ascertain just what means General
Short had of conducting the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the
fact is that General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree
of reconnaissance. The record shows he did not fully and gainfully employ
these means for this purpose. General Short was recalled at substantially the
* However, General Gerow testified . (R. 4258) that there was a Navy Department
message of November 24 which contained information of the Japanese situation and
indicated possible Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander in Chief
Pacific Fleet to inform General Short of its contents.
* Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G-2, War Department, on Nov. 3,
1941, sent a letter to G–2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecy of
war between Japan and the United States in December, 1941, or February, 1942, as made
by a prominent Japanese. .
4610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
end of all the testimony and questions on this point. Short's position on this
message was that the direction to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile
directive and that it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was
entirely unfamiliar with the fact, “that the Navy was responsible for long-
distance reconnaissance.” -
He said this was “in spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved
that plan that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar
with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that
was responsible” (R. 4436–4437).
He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this matter
in his reply to the War Department:
“I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement,
they would have told me so.”
He said he based everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long dis-
tance reconnaissance, because it had been approved by the Chief of Staff and
the Chief of Naval Operations (R. 4438).
He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance aircraft even
though the agreement was not actually in effect at that time or the War Depart-
ment had overlooked the agreement, because he says, as elsewhere admitted,
that the Army and Navy agreement was not to go into effect until hostilities, or
their equivalent, had occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his
control and could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this
meSSæge. * -
For instance, the following colloquy occurred :
“62. General GRUNERT. You might clear up two additional points. First, we
will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Department
had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy,
as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention
to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agree-
ment?
General SHORT. I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing.
“63. General GRUNERT. Then you considered your report the answer to that?
“General SHORT. They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me
for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they
definitely told me to “report action taken,’ which I did; and I heard nothing
further from them. -
“64. General GRUNERT. We have had testimony before the Board, from a mem-
ber of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and
apparently the emergency, or the imminency Of such an emergency, [29]
was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that under-
standing, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance,
prior to such an emergency? -
“General SHORT. If the emergency existed it was their business; if it did not
exist, there was no necessity.
“65. General GRUNERT. Then, when do you judge the emergency came about?
“General SHORT. It wery definitely came about at 7: 55 on the morning of the
7th” (R. 4438–4439).
This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was not taking the
action which he could and should have taken or either more fully carrying out the
order, or of specifically and definitely reporting the complete circumstances of his
inability to do so. He did not call the attention of the War Department to what
was an apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the Navy
reconnaissance without any reasonably energetic inquiry to ascertain the correct-
ness of his assumption that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance.
He has no adequate explanation for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which
was in full operation Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of
the 27th, and which was used continuously after December 7 (R. 4441–4444).
For some time after December 7 the situation as to the dearth of spare parts was
the same as before December 7. -
The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part, “Report meas-
ures taken . . . Limit dissemination . . . to minimum essential officers” (R.
4071). He said he knew it was there and he understood it.
There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one at 9:30 the morn-
ing of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the first conference, the Secretary of
War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Gerow were there.
At that time General Gerow received instructions with reference to the prepara-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4611
tion of the message. He then consulted Admiral Stark (R. 4239–4240). The
second conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and
Mr. Stimson (R. 4240). General Bryden has testifled that although he was
Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General Marshall's absence,
he does not remember the message nor the Conference thereon (R. 900). While
the Chief of Staff reviewed the message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unfortunate
that during this critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and
missed the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a number of
people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor. Possibly had
he been present, the Marshall-Stark memorandum might have reached the Presi-
dent in time to have influenced the momentous decisions of November 26.
It is equally obvious that the November 27 message was the only message that
attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in
the counterproposals on the 26th of November to Japan.
No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this message.
It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely inadequate to
properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the background of events
that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate
an assessment for the responsibility On others.
The three principal major generals who were commanders under Short have
testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as to
the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact
that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted
by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the
War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value
both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War,
Chief of Staff, and other high officers of the War Department had, was not
transmitted to Short. The only summary of this information was the brief
and conflicting tone of the message of November 27, which was but a faint echo
of what had actually occurred.
It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the
counterproposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby
in full possession of all the information, which our ultrasecrecy policy did not
permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything.
The War and Navy departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much
of what they knew as they judged necessary.”
It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to
get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations,
which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941.
If it had not been for Mr. Stimson's initiative in calling the Secretary of State,
it is uncertain as to when he would have been advised of this most important
event. As it turned out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the
information was not material, since the Japanese delayed striking until
December 7. -
The effect of the counterproposals of November 26 on the resulting responsi-
bilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stimson's quotation of Mr.
Hull's comment to him, as follows:
“Now it is up to the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed
my hands of the Japanese.”
4. Analysis of the Nov. 27, 1941, Message.—The message of Nov. 27, 1941, from
the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, consists of
the following component parts: -
“Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back
and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment.” -
Comment : This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not
convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-
Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was mis-
leading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of
negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would
influence the Japanese-American relations, i. e., that war might not come. The
War Department was convinced then that war would come.
* Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that
#. Yºansmitted to Short and Kimmel were sufficient to properly alert their respec-
l We COIn In 8. In CIS.
º
4612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The statement that “Japanese future action unpredictable” was in conflict with
the Navy message which the War Department had directed be shown to Short,
to the effect that the attack would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the
Far East. It did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department
General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations.
A warning that “hostile action possible at any moment” indicated the necessity
of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. This is particularly true in
view of the Navy message of 16 October 1941, which said that there was a
possibility that Japan might attack. There was also received from the Navy on
November 27 a message containing these words:
“Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an
effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to
make an aggressive move within the next few days.”
[30] The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department:
“If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided comma the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should
not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense.”
Comment: This instruction embodied our well-known national policy against
initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the war must be Japan's. It
gives Short the right of defense, notwithstanding the restriction, but creates an
atmosphere of caution which he must exercise in preparing for such defense.
The third portion of the message is this: r
“Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such recon-
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should
be carried out So as not comma repeat not comma alarm the civilian population
or disclose intent. Report measures taken.”
Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including
reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for recon-
naissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed
elsewhere. •.
Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the
weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of alert than that taken would not
have alarmed the public. -
Short did report within an hour the measures taken (R. 286). Short's answer
to General Marshall's radio Said : -
“Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. REUARD
four seven two twenty seventh.” -
This in itself was sufficient to show that such Steps were inadequate, but as
he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Department erroneously
assumed that its responsible commander was alert to sabotage and to liaison With
the Navy and was taking the necessary responsible other steps mentioned in the
radio because he had been warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall.
Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Department placed
itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it did not direct Short to
take such measures as they considered adequate to meet this serious threat.
This is particularly true in view of the fact that much material information
relating to Japanese-American relations was in the War Department, which had
not been made available to Short.
The next and last portion of the message: “should hostilities occur, you will
carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 as far as they pertain to Japan.
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
Officers.”
Comment: (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that his
basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon it was to be used
and was a clear indiction to him to adopt adequate preparatory measures to
insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5. - f
(b) As to the directive to “Limit dissemination of this highly Secret informa-
tion to minimum essential Officers”: -
The War Department was security-conscious. The construction which Short
appears to have placed upon this language may have unduly limited the informa-
tion which reached responsible subordinate commanders. This part of the
message left broad discretion in Short as to the dissemination of the information
contained in the message, and had the personnel Operating the Air Warning Service
on the morning of December 7 known of the absolute imminence of war they
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4613
doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from the radar station
much differently.
It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions—not to alarm
the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission of the first overt act.
Comment on the message as a whole: General Short, as the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian
Islands and as such had a fundmental duty to properly employ all available means
at his disposal for that purpose in the face of any threat with or without
notification of impending hostilities. -
Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying information, which
undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental conception of the situation, the
responsibility rested on him to take measures to meet the worst situation with
which he might be confronted, and such action on his part, as Commander on
the spot, was mandatory despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by
the War Department of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate
imminence of War.
The same day G–2 of he War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian Department,
which clearly indicated that both sabotage and hostilities might begin and be
Concurrent. This message said:
“Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears
that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Ac-
tions of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that hostilities may
begin.”
This G–2 message nullifies all Short's explanations that his mind was put on
sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on this subject. The mes-
sage shows that hostilities were just as possible as sabotage. His decision to
adopt Alert No. 1 came on the 27th, before receipt of any message having reference
to sabotage. He had two threats: he only took measures as to one. The third
message, upon which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on No-
vember 28 from the War Department (G-2), came after he had made his decision
to go to Alert No. 1. This last message again mentions the critical situation as
to sabotage activities. It does not in any way change previous messages. Short
should have known, as a trained Soldier, that a G–2 message is informative and
is of lesser authority than a command message from the Chief of Staff.
When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations with Japan
had practically ended when he received the message of November 27, he said:
“I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically
unavoidable. . . . If I knew it was immediately imminent . . . but if I
had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone
into Alert No. 3. . . . It would have looked to me definite that the war was
almost upon us” (R. 450).
“General RUSSELL. General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November
the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum
which G–2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the
Japanese government? .* * -
“General SHORT. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so
afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came Out.
“General RUSSELL. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received
that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th Of November
told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of
Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as
far as it could in its negotiations with the [31] Japanese and that the
security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?
“General SHORT. I did not.
“General RUSSELL. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew
made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he
stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America
the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?
“General SHORT. At that time I was not in command ; but I have known of that .
later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about
it at that time” (R. 451).
This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained the
period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during which time mes-
sages and even letters could have been sent outlining and completely delineating
the entire situation to Short. *
Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Washington.
The War Department, although it had additional information of a most positive
4614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
character, left Short with this fragment of information regarding the U. S.-
Japanese negotiations contained in the two sentences inserted in the message of
the 27th by the Secretary of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's
reply to the message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for
defense, or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken.
5. Messages November 28 to December 6, Inclusive.—On November 28 the War
Department sent message No. 482 to Short, reading as follows: *
“Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against
subversive activities within field of investigated responsibility of War Department
(See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that you
initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of
your establishments comma protection of your personnel against subversive propa-
ganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not re-
peat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective meas-
ures should be confined to those essential to Security comma avoiding unnecessary
publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are be-
ing sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility
under existing instructions.” -
Short sent a reply to wire 482 of November 28 on the same day which outlined
at length the sabotage precautions he was taking. The War Department copy of
this wire, which is addressed to the A. G. O., shows that a copy was sent to the
Secretary of the General Staff, but no other indorsements are on it showing it
was read or considered by anyone else. This wire reads:
“Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth, full precautions are being
taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility
of War Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five end paren
and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards pro-
tection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants,
telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hors by confidential letter dated
June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use
the broad powers wested in him by Section sixty seven of the organic act which
provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Commanders of Military
and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent Or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to the authority.
stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written
demand on his HQrs to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection
as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection there-
with, being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory.
Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being
afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation Of this
headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one
enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to
close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the city and
county of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action neces-
sary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet
been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial Officials
are and have been cordial and mutual co-operation has been given on all pertinent
matters. Short.”
It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio No. 482, sent
to Short by the War Department on November 28.
On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following wire to
the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet :
“On 3d December we have, “Op. Nav informs'—this is a paraphrase, you under-
stand, sir “ ” *—‘informs C in C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14–16 that highly
reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplo-
matic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, London
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents’ ”
(Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB).” *
The story as to whether Short ever Saw or received this message is as fol-
lows: Admiral Kimmel visited Short Dec. 2 and Dec. 3, 1941. (R. 1513) Short
says: “I never saw that message” (R. 424), referring to the 3 December mes-
* A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force, by General Arnold.
* This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Page 424. This same
message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 5, Page 583, and Vol. 17, Page S–85.
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4615
sage. He also denied seeing the message from the Navy of December 4 and 6
hereinafter quoted (R. 424–425). However, Short was advised by the FBI that
it had tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consul’s cook and had found
the Consul was burning his papers (R. 3204). All other lines were tapped by
the Navy (R. 3204). Phillips testified Short was “informed of it,” but nothing
was done about it (R. 1243). Short denies such G–2 information, saying: “I am
sure he didn’t inform me” (R. 525). Colonel Fielder says the matter was dis-
cussed by Colonel Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it.
Colonel Bicknell, G–2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder (R. 1413–1414).
This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the
message of Dec. 4, 1941, or Dec. 6, 1941. The information we have is no better
than that contained in the Roberts Report, which reads as follows:
“The second of Dec. 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential
documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were
necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only) ; and the
third of Dec. 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval
commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy con-
fidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that
those essential to continued Operations should be retained until the last moment.”
(Roberts Report, Page 8).
[32] These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he
remembered them (R. 1513–1514). - -
Irrespective of any testimony On the subject the record shows that on Dec.
3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cablegram relative to the
relief of marines on Wake and Midway (R. 302, 394).
There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give in-
structions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the
tenseness of the situation.
On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, the message
about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported it at a staff meeting
on December 6 (R. 1414). - -
6. Dec. 7, 1941, Message.—This brings us to the final message from Wash-
ington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:18 p. m. Washington time,
December 7, which was 6 : 48 a. m. Honolulu time.
“Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m., Eastern Standard Time, today what
amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code
machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour may have we do
not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication.”
The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have been sent
So as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack might at least have
greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be set forth at length. It was
sent by commercial radio, the RCA. This is a commercial line. Early in the
morning in Honolulu the Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in
keeping in communication with the War Department radio. It is significant
that the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k.g. set. It was not a power-
ful set, like that of the Navy or the RCA. The Message Center of the War
Department, which is charged with the expeditious handling of messages, decided
to send this vital message by commercial RCA instead of War Department radio,
because it could not get through on its own set. Why this message was not sent
by the Navy radio, by FBI radio, or by telephone, and why these means of pos-
sibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satisfactorily
explained. The explanation that “secrecy” was paramount does not appear to
apply to those means.
Shivers of the FBI testified :
“We had our own radio . . . I would say within—depending on the length of
the message; a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by—
could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of
twenty minutes . . . our channels were not jammed . . . We used a frequency
that was assigned to us by the FCC . . . All of the stuff that went out from
here to-that went out over that radio, was coded” (R. 3221).
“General GRUNERT. Then any message that Washington wanted to get to you
during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think could
have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour?
4616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
“Mr. SHIVERS. The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes.
Yes, sir” (R. 3221). -
It is to be noted in this connection that not only was the FBI radio working
between Washington and Honolulu on December 6–7, but that testimony shows
numerous telephone conversations were conducted just after the attack, over
the telephone between Washington and Honolulu.
The story of the sending of this message in the War Department is as follows:
This message arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., Honolulu time, December 7.
The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message was not actually delivered to
the signal Office of the Hawaiian Department until 11:45 a. m., the attack having
taken place at 7: 55 a. m. The message was decoded and delivered to the
Adjutant General at 2: 58 p. m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack.
The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on the
morning Of December 7 and for 24 hours previous to that time was as follows:
The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with
Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washing-
ton to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel
Fielder (G-2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a
call from Washington on the same phone: it took no more than an hour as a
maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic to Hawaii by reason of
the attack (R. 2999). Furthermore, a war message could have demanded
priority.
It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected
by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple
means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department
telephone there also existed the FBI radio, which was assigned a special fre-
quency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty
minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa.
Shivers of FBI testified. (R. 3222) Short testified:
“General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took
some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there
was a possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In
other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more
important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as
possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after
the attack” (R. 310). -
Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage an immediate
attack, rather they thought more of a breaking of diplomatic relations, and if the
idea of an attack at 1 p.m., E.S.T., did enter their minds they thought of it as
probably taking place in the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was
still of paramount interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send
this massage by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or FBI
radio or the scrambler telephone or all three.
The result was the message did not get through in time due to the failure of the
War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philip-
pines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure that the message got through by
multiple channels (by code over naval or FBI radio to Hawaii), if the War
Department radio was not working. He left Short without this additional most
important information. Short testified as follows:
“If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen
minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of
danger from that message and we would have had time to Warm up the planes
and get them in the air to meet any attack” (R. 310).
Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief Signal Office, in
the War Department, testified that on Dec. 7, 1941, Colonel Bratton brought the
message to the code room in the handwriting of the Chief of Staff which “I had
typed for clarity” in a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it.
The message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities checked. It
was decided to send the message by commercial means, choosing Western Union,
as the fastest.
He stated that he personally took the message from the code room to the tele-
type operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 minutes to
transmit message to destination. It left at 12:01 (E.S.T., 6:31 a.m., Honolulu
time). The transmission to Western Union [33] was finished 12:17 p.m.,
E.S.T., or 7:33 a.m., Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The
message was actually delivered at 11:45 a.m., Honolulu time. The messenger
was diverted from his course during the bombing (R. 189–202).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4617
Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the FBI used
to Hawaii; he never used the scrambler telephone and sometimes he used the
Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on the morning of December 7, although
the Navy has a more powerful radio (R. 203–204).
7. Failure of Navy to Advise Short of Enemy Submarine in Pearl Harbor on
Morning Dec. 7, 1941.-The second failure was by the Navy Department, upon
whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor
area at 6:30 a. m. Between 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. it was sunk by the Navy. This
was reported at 7: 12 a. m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff, but the
Navy made no such report to Short. (R. 310–311; See Roberts Report p. 15.)
As Short Said :
“That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger.
The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They con-
sidered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty .
as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He
stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized
it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed
to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely
wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to
me had not—at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack”
(R. 311). -
8. Failure of Aircraft Warning Service to Advise of Approaching Planes, Dec. 7,
1941.-The third event that might have saved the day was the following:
The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warning stations
on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and had set up an Infor-
mation Center to utilize the aircraft warning information, plot the course of any
incoming planes and to advise the responsible authorities. The organization was
set up and operating and was being utilized from 4 a. m. to 7 o'clock on the morn-
ing of December 7 as a training method and had been so used for some time past.
The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Information Center to be
trained as liaison Officers, but had not yet gotten around to it. In the Informa-
tion Center that morning was a Lieut. Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the
Aair Corps, whose tour of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second
tour of duty at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but
there were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone oper-
ator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, the
first of personnel that had made the Center operative from 4 to 7 a. m. had
departed.
At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two privates who
had been on duty from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. One of them was Private Lockard,
who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft detector, and a Private George
E. Elliott, who was the plotting man to plot the information picked up on the
radar. - -
This plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private
Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close at 7 o'clock
and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to breakfast. He kept
the radar open for further operation to instruct his partner, Private Elliott.
While Lockard was adjusting the machine to begin the instruction of Private
Elliott, he observed on the radar Screen an unusual formation he had never
seen in the machine. He thought there was something wrong with it, as the
indicator showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure
that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine error.
He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that the machine was
operating correctly and that there was a considerable number of planes 132 miles
away from the island approaching from a direction 3 degrees east of north. Th
time was 7:02 a. m., Dec. 7, 1941. - *... --
In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that he plotted
these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the Information Center.
After some debate between them, Lockard did call the Information Center and
reported to the switchboard operator. The switchboard operator, an enlisted
man who testified, was unable to do anything about it, So he put Lieutenant Tyler
on the phone. Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in sub-
stance, “Forget it.” Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says
that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon which to base
any action ; yet he assumed to give directions instead of seeking some one com-
petent to make a decision.
4618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should not have assumed to
tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private Elliott, to “forget it,” because he
did not have the knowledge upon which to premise any judgment (R. 1102).
He should, in accordance with customary practice, have then used initiative to
take this matter up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact
that he said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge
upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. By his
assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the consequences of his action
should be imposed upon him.
If Taylor had communicated this information, the losses might have been
very greatly lessened. As General Short testified :
“If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if
the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would
not have been time to get them in the air . . . It would have made a great differ-
ence in the loss . . . It would have been a question of split seconds instead of min-
utes in getting into action” (R. 312–313). f
'The attack actually took place at 7:55 a. m.
When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was communicated,
apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight of B-17s was coming
from the mainland and he thought that they might represent what was seen on the
Screen of the radar machine. As a matter of fact, that probably had something
to do with it, as they did come in about this period and were attacked by the
Japanese, some of them being destroyed.
9. Navy Failure to Advise Short of Suspected Naval Concentration in the Jal-
tuits—About Nov. 25, 1941, the Navy through its intelligence sources in the 14th
Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington had reports showing the pres-
ence in Jaluit in the Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet, composed of air-
craft carriers, submarines, and probably other vesels.
Information of this fleet ceased about Dec. 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles
closer to Oahu than the mainland of Japan the present of such a strong force
capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval information.
This information was delivered to G-2 of the War Department as testified to by
General Miles. No information of this threat to Hawaii was given to General
Short by either the War or Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in
Hawaii. Short and his senior Commanders testified that Such information would
have materially altered their point of view and their actions.
Such information should have been delivered by the War Department or the
Navy for what it was worth, to permit Short to evaluate it; this was not done.
[34] The fact that the actual force which attacked Hawaii has now been
identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action.
10. The Navy Account of the Japanese Task Force That Attacked Pearl Harbor;
Sources of Information to Japanese.
The following account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has
been Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December 7 and
shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
He said that the task force which has been identified by the Navy through
numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from interiewing prisoners
who were in a position to know personally the orders and preparations for the
attack, had the following history, according to the Navy view of the correct.
story:
Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, for the
attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with great care and pre-
cision, as disclosed by the maps which were found in the planes which were shot
* The Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed
from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Tankan Bay
(sometimes called Hittokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the 7th and 22nd
of November. Tankan Bay is located at Etorofu Island in North Japan. It does not ap-
pear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in a
Japanese encyclopedia under the title “Hittokapu Bay.” The task force arrived in this
bay approximately November 25. The entire force departed on the 27th–28th of November
(see footnote 40), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the east (to
avoid being sighted by shipping) - and then headed for a position to the north of Oahu,
arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) for the 7th
of December (Hawaiian time). . The date of departure of November 27th–28th, according
to the numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowledge of this
matter and who independently picked the same date, is confirmed beyond doubt according
to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of six aircraft carriers,
º fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers as well as
Sllº) in 8 Tilles,
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4619
down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the two-man submarines. These papers
and orders show meticulous care in planning and timing, which would take very
considerable practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at
Tankan Bay was about November 22, and they awaited word to act before the
force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941.”
The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of six carriers, two battle-
ships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer division.
This is one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled, and after the date
of the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it took part in a number of similar successful and
very disastrous attacks in the Pacific Southwest. The elements of this task force
left individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tankan Bay in
an uninhabited spot where they were unobserved. The assembly was completed
and the task force departed on November 27-28, Eastern Longitude Time, which
was apparently after the date that the counterproposals (considered by the Japan-
ese as an ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to
Japan through Secretary Hull on Nov. 26, 1941. It is significant that the attack
of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army and Navy planes parked to-
gether wing-to-wing as protection against Sabotage (Alert No. 1) must have been
as a result of knowledge of that fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and
scheduled attack formations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes
on fire with incendiary ammunition; it is equally significant that it was well
known in the island that Alert No. 1 was put into effect November 27 and there-
fore can be assumed to have been Communicated to Japan, and that advantage of
such information was apparently taken by reason of the nature of the attack and
the way it was conducted.
It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a shot-down
Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been found upon one of the
crew in a two-man submarine, that there had been entered on these maps, which
were old Geodetic Survey maps of the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the
hangers that had been built on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be
built. Five of these hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the
Hawiian Department or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, showed five of
these hangers in full line and three in dotted lines as being hangers yet to be built.
The Japanese are well known as precise copyists. It is apparent that when they
made the maps found on the aviator and the submarine-crew members they had
knowledge later than 1936 of construction either that had been constructed or was
to be constructed, because they entered on such maps the additional three hangars
in full lines. . *
The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point substantially due
north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under forced draft to a point
between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from which the flight took off. The two-
man submarines were carried on top of the mother submarines and released
adjacent to the harbor.
Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured and those
that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured prisoners, show
that the attacking forces were to destroy without a trace any third power's ves-
Sels including Japanese Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task
force; to capture and maintain in radio silence any such vessels including
Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force,
but if such vessels had sent any radio communications to destroy them (R. 3043).
This is a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their own
people and to sink them without mercy because they happened to be operating by
accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally operate.
This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of approximately
424 planes; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actually attacked Pearl Harbor
(R. 3053). The pilots were the highest quality and training that have ever been
encountered in this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of
Midway, where four of these same carriers were engaged and were sunk (R. 3046).
The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the United States could
muster on December 7, on the carriers Lexington and Enterprise, was approx-
imately 180 planes (R. 3049).
Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have been
unable to bave brought the Japanese task force under gunfire because our battle-
* Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December 7 at
Honolulu is Japanese December 8. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii is 4%
hours. The time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours.
;
4620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ships were too slow and the remainder, of our force would probably have suffered
severe damage if not defeat on the high seas by reason of the great superiority in
the air before superior gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only
possible hope of OVercoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that pre-
vented fight of their planes so that the United States force would have superiority
of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air power.
He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, from any
source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and if it had been
expected the probability of the United States winning in any engagement of the
task force was not a bright one. He stated that this task force represented a
substantial per cent of the entire Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the
Jap carriers 424 aircraft against a possible 180 which we might have mustered
ſf we had had our own two carriers available to operate against them (R. 3048–
3049). -
The information upon which the story of the attack [35] is based has
been revealed so far as coming from several sources. First, the Otto Kuehn trial
revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet disposition and locations in Pearl
Harbor in the period December 1 to December 6, and a code delivered with the
information, so that communication of the information to Japanese offshore sub-
marines adjacent to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered
by the Japanese Consul direct to the homeland.
Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Consulate in
Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of the fleet in Pearl
Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This information the Japanese
Consul communicated principally by commercial lines to Japan. Additionally
Kuehn provided a code indicating what units were in the harbor and what were
out and means of signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat,
radio signals Over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his
yard, all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period during
which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6.
If such information had been available to our armed forces it would have
clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese Consulate
on the subject show clearly what was done and the intention of the Japanese. If
authority had existed to tap these lines, this information would have been avail-
able to both the Army and Navy. Kuehn was tried by a military commission
after signed confessions of his actions and sentenced to death. This was later
commuted to imprisonment for fifty years. It is significant that Kuehn was a
German agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him
from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until after Pearl
Harbor, right under the nose of the Army, the FBI, and Naval Intelligence.
As Shivers, head of the FBI in the islands, said:
“If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japa-
nese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that
the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this
system of Signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul Gen-
eral simply included the period from December 1 to December 6” (R. 3218).
Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over the
commercial line to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured was that while
he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the telephone wires and to
intercept telephone conversations, yet they could not get the information out of
the cable offices. He testified : *
“Colonel TOULMIN. I would like to ask him one question. What other means
of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than
a telephone connection?
“Mr. SHIVERS. He had commercial communication System.
“Colonel TOULMIN. Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial
lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines?
“Mr. SHIVERS. Off Of the lines themselves?
“Colonel ToulMIN. Yes.
“Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. & -
“Colonel TOULMIN. So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication
over those lines? t
“Mr. SHIVERs. Yes, sir” (R. 3223).
It was later discovered, when the torn meSSages of the Japanese Consul were
reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7, that many vital mes-
Sages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was keeping Japan advised
of the entire military and naval situation and every move we made in Hawaii.
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4621
Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone message on De-
cember 5 from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman newspaper reporter, Ostensibly
to her newspaper in Japan, an apparently meaningless and therefore highly
suspicious message. It was this message that was tapped from the telephone by
the FBI, translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it to
General Short at 6 o'clock on December 6 (R. 1417–1419, 2993). As Short Was un-
able to decipher the meaning, he did nothing about it and Went on to a party
(R. 1420). The attack followed in the morning.
In this same connection, the story of the spying activities of the German,
von Osten, is in point (R. 2442–2443, 3003). The telephone lines of the Japanese
Consulate were tapped by the Navy with the exception of one telephone line to the
cook's quarters, which was overlooked, and this was tapped by the FBI (R. 3204).
The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was the apparent
actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a few days prior to December 7,
their circulation in the harbor, by which they secured and presumably transmitted
complete information as to our fleet movements and dispositions.
The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack on
December 7 is even more astounding as to the complete freedom with which Japan
operated in getting intelligence out of Hawaii. Shivers of the FBI produced maps
1 and 2, which were copies of maps captured from the Japanese two-man sub-
marines that came into Pearl Harbor on December 7.
The FBI in endeavoring to reconstruct the intelligence operations of any agent
who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, Secured these maps
from Naval Intelligence (R. 3210). Maps 1 and 2 have a legend translating all
of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said:
“An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had
been Japanese submarines in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack.”
(R. 3210) -
“Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam
Field Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places” (R. 3211).
There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translated by the
FBI and shows that it was intended for use by the submarine commanders in
communicating with the Japanese task force enroute to Hawaii. It contains
such messages as “indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to Sea,” or
“enemy fleet put out to sea from or through”; in other words, describing the
presence, size, composition, and movement of the fleet (R. 3212).
As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of the harbor of the
submarine and this information had been prepared partly written in Japanese,
it is obvious that the Japanese must have been in the harbor a few days before
the attack and evidently were moving into and Out of the harbor at will. The data
on the chart show the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about
0410 when the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave the
harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left by the same
route. The map shows the location of Our battleships and other naval vessels
observed by the submarine (R. 32.12–3213). As the ships actually in the harbor
On December 7 were somewhat different from those shown on the map, it is con-
clusive proof that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the
fleet of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December 7 (R. 3210–3213). r
The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese was not open
sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason why the Japanese aliens did
not commit sabotage was that they did not want to stimulate American activity
to stop their espionage and [36] intern them. That was the last thing
they intended to do ; and Short appears to have completely misapprehended the
Situation, the psychology and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his
Sabotage alert.
Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes wing to wing,
etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported by Kuehn through the
Japanese Consul, were all known to the Japanese task force proceeding toward
Hawaii. That will explain why they were able to conduct such precise bombing
and machine-gunning. The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-
gunning of that field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concen-
trated on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps where
the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack of any consequence
upon the landing Strips.
From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of events taking
place bearing on the attack; and that aclue to such events and the Japanese
actions was in part available to Short and in part not available to him. Both
the War Department and the Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters,
4622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and Our governmental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the
Japanese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information.
If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his aothority, he had ample
opportunity from November 27 to December 6 to inquire of higher authority and
make his position and his actions certain of support and approval. This he
did not do.
11. Information Not Given Short.—In judging the actions of General Short
and Whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must be taken into account
information that he was not told either by the War Department or by the Navy.
Briefly summarized, he fundamental pieces of information were the following:
1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at Jaluit from
November 27 to November 30 and the disappearance of that force. Neither
the War Department nor the Navy Department saw fit to advise Short of this
important piece of information.
2. The fact that the Chief of. Staff with the Chief of Naval Operations had
jointly asked (on November 27) the President not to force the issue with
the Japuanese at this time (R. 9). -
3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Ambassadors
by the Secretary of State of the counter proposals; and the immediate
reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these counter proposals, which
#. Considered an ultimatum and indicating that it was the end of negotia-
tions.
4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew reporting the
progressive deterioration of the relationship with the Japanese.
5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as to whether his
report of November 27 as to “measures taken,” i. e., a sabotage alert and
liaison with the Navy, were satisfactory or inadequate in view of the in-
formation possessed by the War Department.
6. The following information not furnished also existed in the War Depart-
ment: Information from informers, agents and other sources as to the activi-
ties of our potential enemy and its intentions in the negotiations between the
United States. and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy de-
partments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reason-
ably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in
a position to know their potential moves against the United States. There-
fore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's
intentions and proposals.
This information showed clearly that war was inevitable, and late in Novem-
ber absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to
every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to
give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.
The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave only a small
fraction of this information. It would have been possible to have sent safely,
information ample for the purpose of orienting the Commanders in Hawaii, or
positive directives for an all-out alert.
Under the circumstances, where information has a yital bearing upon actions
to be taken by fleld commanders, and Cannot be disclosed to them, it would
appear incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility
for specific directives to such commanders.
Short got another form of assistance after November 28 from the War Depart-
ment, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed that the disaster of
Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the extent that its defenses were
available and used on December 7 if properly alerted in time. The failure to
alert these defenses in time by directive from the War Department, based upon
all information available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War
Department had an abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate
break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give him a
directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the real seriousness
of the situation, although the War Department thought he was. It is believed
that knowledge of the information available in the War Department would have
made him so. - -
General discussion of the information herein referred to follows:
The records show almost daily information on the plans of the Japanese
Government. In addition to that cited above and in conjunction therewith the
War Department was in possession of information late in November and early
in December from which it made deduction that Japan would shortly commence
an aggressive war in the South Pacific ; that every effort would be made to reach
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4623
an agreement with the United States Government which would result in elim-
inating the American people as a contestant in the war to come; and that
failing to reach the agreement the Japanese Government would attack both
Britain and the United States. This information enabled the War Department
to fix the probable time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty.
In the first days of December this information grew more critical and indica-
tive of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor positions who were
charged with the responsibility of receiving and evaluating such information
were so deeply impressed with its significance and the growing tenseness of our
relations with Japan, which pointed only to war and war almost immediately,
that such officers approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General
Gerow) and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the express
purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true picture of the war
atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the War Department and which was
uppermost in the thinking of these officers in close contact with it. The efforts
of these subordinate officers to have such information sent to the field were un-
successful. They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently in-
formed. The Secretary to the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when
told of the decisions of the War Plans Division. -.
Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned for their
interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something done. They are
Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler.
The following handling of information reaching the War Department in the
evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning, December 7, is cited as illus-
trative of the apparent lack of appreciation by those in high places in the War
Department of the seriousness of this information which was so clearly out-
lining the trends that were hastening us into war with Japan,
[37] At approximately 10 p.m. on December 6, 1941, and more than 15 hours
before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G–2 delivered to the office of the War Plans
Division and to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army information which in-
dicated very emphatically that war with Japan was a certainty and that the be-
ginning of such war was in the immediate future. The officers to whom this
information was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with the
necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the Chief of Staff
of the Army and Chief of the War Plans Division.
On the following morning, December 7, at about 8:30 a.m. other information
reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating an almost imme-
diate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Colonel Bratton,
Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, attempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the
Army in order that he might be informed of the receipt of this message. He
discovered that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approximately
11:25 a.m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received this information.
General Miles, then G-2 of the War Department, appeared at about the same
time. A conference was held between these two officers and General Gerow
of the War Plans Division, who himself had come to the Office of the Chief of
Staff. Those hours when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could
take action in matters of this importance and the passing without effective action
having been taken prevented this critical information from reaching General
Short in time to be of value to him. -
About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas department com-
manders, including Short in the Hawaiian Department. This message which
has been discussed elsewhere in this report, came into Short’s possession after
the attack had been completed. -
D. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPAL HAWAIIAN DEFENSES IN 1941 AND THEIR STATE OF
READINESS ON DEC. 6, 1941, OR THE REASONS FOR THEIR LACK OF READINESS
1. Aircraft Warning Service and Interceptor Command.—The Aircraft Warning
Service on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, was in operative condition for all practical
purposes. It had an Information Center and five mobile stations. It was
sufficiently operative to successfully pick up the Japanese force 132 miles from
Oahu. This was done by Private Lockard and Private Elliott, respectively radar
operator and plotter, and reported by these privates on their own initiative to
the Information Center where the Sergeant in charge of the switchboard received
the information and relayed it to Lieutenant Tyler, who was a pursuit officer
of the Air Corps on temporary duty for training. The stations had been used
from 0400 to 0700 hours each morning for the training of personnel, and the
79716 O—46—pt. 21—7
4624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
personnel was reasonably trained by that time, with the exception of certain
liaison officers who were still getting their training, like Lieutenant Tyler. If the
radar system and Information Center had been fully manned, as it could have
been and as it was immediately upon the disaster at Pearl Harbor and thereafter
without further physical additions, it could have been successfully Operated on
December 7.
The Air Warning Service had been operating on tactical exercises and maneuvers
prior to December 7 for some weeks.
On Dec. 7, 1941 this service could have been a great asset to the defense of
the islands had the Command and Staff understood its value and capabilities
and had taken more interest in implementing the temporary setup instead of
awaiting completion of the permanent installations.
The only mechanical difficulty that was being experienced was in connection
with the stand-by motor generator sets, which were to be used to supplement
commercial power in case the latter failed. There had been some minor difficulty
with the pumps on the motor generator set for the internal-combustion engines,
but that was not of Serious character.
The story of the delay in installing both the temporary, mobile sets and the
permanent sets is a follows:
Army personnel had been receiving radar instructions on Navy surface ships
and had gone to sea with the ships and had had the benefit of such practical train-
ing. Unfortunately the Navy had not detailed its liaison officers to the Informa-
tion Center, and in that it failed. There also had not been brought about, due
to the failure on the part of General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, a
complete integration into a single system of Army and Navy defense including
radar and particularly the Army, Navy and Marine fighters which were to pass
to the jurisdiction of the Army to form a compositive interceptor command, so
that the three elements of the system would be working—the aircraft warning
Service, the interceptor command, and the antiaircraft artillery.
The only reason that the Aircraft Warning Service was not on a full operating
basis on the morning of December 7 was due to the type of alert put into effect,
but otherwise it should have been in full effect. It was a fully operating service
and did so operate shortly after the attack.
Major Bergquist and Major Tindal had been sent to the Interceptor School at
Mitchell Field in the early summer of 1941. At that time the AWS was new to
the U. S. Army and its organization and development had just started in the
United States. For the system to be operative required a considerable amount
of highly technical electrical and radar equipment, the supply and manufacture
of which was critical.
The whole AWS project was new, novel, and somewhat revolutionary in prac-
tice. It took time to get the equipment through War Department priorities, and
it took time to teach and train Operating personnel, and to indoctrinate the whole
Army as well as the public to its operation and Value. This process had been
going on since May and June 1941.
Testimony before the Board has indicated that neither the Army, Navy, nor
civilian population of the United States or Hawaii anticipated the necessity for
immediate use of this service. There was, however, a small group directly in
charge of the AWS development in Hawaii, including Major Bergquist, Major
Tindal, Major Tetley, and Majór Powell, all of the Army, and Lieutenant Tay-
lor of the Navy, who were pushing the AWS project to the fullest extent that
their level of authority would permit. As a result of their efforts it is believed
that this Service in the normal course Of events would have been established and
in Operation in another two or three weeks, which in view of the lack of war-
mindedness of the services would have been to the great credit of this group.
Since the No. 1 Alert was the decision due to the logic and judgment of the
Department Commander, it is very doubtful had the AWS been 100 per cent com-
pleted that it would have been on a full-Out Operating basis on the 7th of De-
cember. General Short has stated in the Roberts report testimony, Volume 14,
page 1642, that had he had the material and fully equipped radar stations he
probably would have operated them just as he did.
Nevertheless, had General Short's judgment led him to have decided to go to
Alert 2 or 3 on November 27, or at any time prior to December 7, the AWS could
have functioned and the fighter airplanes could have been ready for active defense
within a period of minutes. From the damage that was accomplished by a few
fighters that did [38] get into the air from the Haliewa Airdrome it can
be assumed that the seventy or eighty fighters that could have been in the air
under normally active alert System would have made the Jap attack a much more
costly venture. This paragraph, however, is hypothesis.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4625
2. Status of the Aircraft Warning Service on December 7.-The Aircraft
Warning Services, consisted of the , Information Center and five mobile radar
stations, was in operation on the morning of December 7 and had been for several
weeks prior to that date. The fact that the Information, Center was not in its
permanent location and the radar stations were not permanently built had no
bearing upon the operation and effectiveness of the aircraft warning System.
“It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a
month prior to the attack on December 7th,” as testified by General Martin
(R. 1825).
The difficulty of putting the AWS into full operation as a practical matter
was the insistence of General Short that he retain control for training purposes
whereas the best training would have been to put the System into practical
operation.
Of this General Martin Said :
“The Department Commander would not turn those (the operating stations)
over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he (Short)
had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused
to turn them over unless he considered they were properly trained. So they
were still training under those conditions and had not been turned over to the
Air Force the morning of the attack on December 7th” (R. 1824).
Here again is another example of the whole Organization of the Army in
Hawaii being held in a training status instead of acquiring its training in or
near combat positions, where it would have been ready for any eventuality.
As General Martin said:
“They were capable of operating . . . the equipment used primarily in the
training of personnel to take over the Operation of the control area” (R. 1824).
General Martin is confirmed in this by Commander Taylor, loaned by the
Navy for the purpose of getting this service into operation. Commander Taylor
confirmed the fact that:
“On December 7th the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and
able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of
controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit
Squadrons at Wheeler Field . . . We had no liaison people to man any of the
positions . . . On December 7 all the communication lines were in ; the radar
stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air
warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equip-
ment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough
advance information could be given to pilots, so that they could come back with-
out being intercepted” (R. 1082).
However, the radio equipment that would have enabled control through inter-
ception a reasonable distance off-shore had been given to the Ferry Command.
The situation is treated elsewhere, but it should be pointed out, to avoid con-
fusion, that on and before December 7 the aircraft warning center was able
to pick up incoming planes and to give notification of that fact.
It was not fully able to perform its other function, which was supplementary
to the Information Center, that is, for full co-operation in conjunction with an
Interceptor Command to intercept the incoming planes in the full sense of that
arrangement.
So far advanced was the organization and apparatus that it would have been
fully complete within ten days to two weeks at the time of the attack. As
Commander Taylor said:
“The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting (a conference
to wind up the details of organization) to bring the thing into operation at the
end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it.” (R. 1083).
Taylor, in turn, is confirmed in this by one of the most energetic officers who
was working with Taylor in pressing this aircraft warning system to conclusion,
Colonel Bergquist, then a Major. He endeavored to have 24-hour service by
November 24 and stated that the mobile units could have stood it. There was
some minor trouble with the stand-by power gas engines, but this was of little
importance and the system could have run 24 hours a day. He had been
running a school since October known as the “Air Defense School” in which he
was training Army and Marine officers and as many pursuit officers of the Air
Corps as he could get. The delay was from the Signal Corps. As Colonel
Bergquist said :
“I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up
and get them operating” (R. 1201).
4626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Despite the efforts of General Martin with Department Headquarters, very
few results were secured in making the Signal Corps let go their technical op-
eration and allow the practical people who were going to operate it go to work.
This is described by Colonel Bergquist, who said: -
“One of the big arguments was : We wanted to take over the radar stations and
get them set up and Operating. The Signal Corps said no, that was their job;
they wanted to get them up and get them operating and then turn them over to
us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor
of the Signal Corps” (R. 1196).
This delayed the ultimate completion of the system by a month (R. 1196). He
stated that : -
“My opinion on that is that they (the enlisted men) were fairly well trained
at that stage of the game” (R. 1197). - -
This state of training is further described by him as follows:
“Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of
time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained.
We had plotters and information-center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly
well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers,
which is one of the positions on the board—on the control platform, that is—
by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order
to do two things: To both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control
board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better
carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions.
The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were
trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal—I mean Colonel Tindal; he was
a Major at that time—and I did have with me at that time Commander William
E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did
have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so
that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the
Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same
applies to the Bomber Command laison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian
Department headquarters” (R. 1191-1192). à
At this time the System had a maximum range of approximately 130 miles
(R. 1190).
On November 24 there was a conference of interested Army and Navy officers
on this subject, and the con [39] Sensus of opinion of these experts among
the younger officers who were actually getting this Information Center into
operation was expressed by Commander Taylor: -
“It was felt that the Information Center could be made to function adequately
within the next two weeks. (The conference was on Nov. 24, 1941.) We found
after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-
ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with
the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication
equipment we had at that time” (R. 1077).
This confirms the testimony of others that the only thing lacking was the
IFF equipment on the plants to enable identification of the planes in the air by
ground personnel. Considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Inter-
ceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for this purpose for the use of the
Ferry. Command (R. 1079).
As to the operability of the Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of
December 7, Commander Taylor testifying said:
“If we had had the Information Center completely manned there would have
been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that (the
Japanese) flight was’’ (R. 1085).
The Navy had not yet participated in the operation, although Commander
Taylor said they had been requested to do so about a week before Pearl Harbor
(R. 1086).
This brings us to the question of why General Short on his staff did not take
more vigorous action in putting this most important part of the defenses into
operation, particularly in view of the fact that both the long-distance reconnais-
sance by the Navy and the inshore reconnaissance by the Army were, for all
practical purposes, non-existent. Commander Taylor was asked, when he found
these delays, whether he had ever seen General Short, to which Taylor replied
in the negative by saying:
“I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely
tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.” (R. 1089).
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4627
“We saw every Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always
responsible” (R. 1088). -
Colonel Powell, Hawaiian Department Signal Officer, said repeated efforts to
get the Navy to co-operate by supplying naval officers to complete the working of
the service were fruitless. They were not interested (R. 3906).
It is significant that when Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, was asked if Short
had tried to expedite these matters he professed ignorance (R. 1143), but it was
Phillips, as Chief of Staff to Short, who Taylor and others said was principally
responsible for acting on Short's behalf in this matter (R. 1088).
Colonel Powell testified that the construction of permanent installations did
not hold up the placing of the Information Center and the radar stations into
operation because there was adequate equipment for this purpose that was
actually installed in temporary buildings for the Information Center and that
radar mobile stations were placed' around the Island.
As a consequence of the Information Center and the radar stations were in
operation some time prior to December 7. The only reason they were not
operated continuously 24 hours a day was the desire to conserve tubes, as they
were short of tubes and other spare parts.
Two permanent radars, No. 271, were received on June 3, and a third radar,
No. 271-A, was also received on June 3. On August 1 six mobile radar Stations
were received and shortly thereafter put into operation. They were complete
and self-contained and only needed to be placed at some appropriate elevation.
Colonel Powell testified that the entire service was operative about the 1st
of November, 1941. The installations for the permanent radar and Information
Center were held up by the Engineer construction and were not held up by any
lack of information or drawings or equipment of the Signal Corps. -
Colonel Powell testified that the location of the centers was made by a board
from Washington. This board ordered the abandonment of Kaala at 4,000 feet
on the theory that while the range would be extended to 150 miles from Hawaii
yet there would be no detection of planes within the 20-mile radius close to shore.
This does not sound logical, because the great necessity was the locating of planes
at a maximum distance from Hawaii. The other stations lower down were
fully capable of picking up the close, inshore approach of aircraft.
Colonel Powell added the significant statement that the Navy took little
interest in the radar system and “We were never able to get any liaison officer
over from the Navy to take part in the exercises or carry on the work” (R.3906).
This is confirmed by the fact that Navy liaison officers never were supplied for
the Information Center although it had been in operation for some weeks prior
to ºr 7 and the Army had supplied a number of officers to be trained
(R. 3906). -
General Short testified again as to the reason why he was interested in keep-
ing the aircraft warning service in training. He said:
“We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we
got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th
Came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those
hours. In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then
from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.
“Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a strain on this
material, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from
11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little more chance
for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was the situation,
and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to
educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, and using
this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what we considered
the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison officer functioning
with this outfit” (R. 298).
Two explanations have been advanced as to the reason why the Aircraft
Warning Service was not put into operation fully. The first was that the signal
equipment was not ready until very late; the testimony of Colonel Powell, in
charge of this matter for the Signal Corps, plus what actually occurred as to
its actually going into operation for nearly a month before the permanent con-
struction was erected, is ample to overrule this objection (R. 3896–3898).
The second explanation was that there were serious delays in construction.
But such delays in permanent construction did not delay the Aircraft Warning
Service because it was using temporary housing for its Information Center,
º § mobile radar stations were operative without any permanent housing
(R. ).
4628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As to the Interceptor Command and the Information Center of the Aircraft
Warning Service, General Burgin, Commanding General of the antiaircraft
artillery, said:
“It Worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes Coming
in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over” (R. 2604).
He explained how the Interceptor Command had been working during pre-
vious trials and exercises. While the Interceptor Command was not fully func-
tioning due to the lack of IFF instruments on the planes, yet there was ample
[40] AWS means for defense and interception that it could have used to a
material degree on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941. The Interceptor Command was
just being set up, but the nucleus of its operation was there, and it would have
been an effective instrument had it been used when the attack came. This was
not done.
3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses.—General Burgin commanded
the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiair-
craft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast
Artillery Brigade, composed of the 64th Régiment, 251st Regiment, and the
98th Regiment.
He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a tem-
porary basis, Saying: l
“We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular
thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to Interceptor Com-
mand . . . For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had,
every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would
go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the
Navy was coming in, with Carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an
attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways,
sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack
made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7 . . . On
Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The Fleet was
in the harbor.”
And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command :
“It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming
in, and immediately the Interceptor Command would take over. All that is, so
far as turning it over to the Interceptor Command, is that the Interceptor Com-
mand tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire” (R. 2602–2604).
This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Inter-
ceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning
of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack.
He said in his opinion it would not have made any difference anyway,
“because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had
been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off
than they actually were” (R. 2604).
He said of his antiaircraft batteries:
“They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that
the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition” (R. 2604).
A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who sup-
ported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops
when they went out for exercises in the field.
Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not even put his guns
into final positions because of the conditions now described.
General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field
artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go
on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the
situation as follows: -
“General RUSSELL. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to Dec. 7, 1941,
so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the
positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities? -
“General BURGIN. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position
they were to go in.
“General FRANK. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned
the land?
“General BURGIN. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all
fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice” (R. 2628).
He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would
have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE - 4629
and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five. As to this
he said:
“General RUssell. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have
been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian popula-
tion here on the island toward, the results of Alert NO. 3? -
“General BURGIN. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world. -
“General RUssell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3–
And I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had
ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate
combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it
would have provoked Opposition on the part of some of the responsible and in-
fluential civilian population here on the island?
“General BURGIN. I feel positive it would.
“General GRUNERT. Even though he might have explained that to the influential
citizens, there would still have been opposition? .
“General BURGIN. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.
“General GRUNERT. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think
might have voiced their objection? . …
“General BURGIN. Oh, my
“General GRUNERT. Is Dillingham one of them?
“General BURGIN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.
“General FRANK. Which Walker?
“General BURGIN. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells” (R. 2629).
He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association,
and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapple, etc.
In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that
one of the things that may have influenced Short in selecting Alert No. 1 and
not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then
and later from the large commercial interests on the Island using Japanese
labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in
their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned
(R. 2654).
As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans
had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have
been locked up before the war started and not afterwards (R. 2649).
4. Ammunition Issue: Short’s and the Ordnance Department’s Responsibility.—
The Ordnance Department in the Hawaiian Department in its misdirected effort
to safeguard and maintain ammunition in a serviceable condition objected to a
full issue thereof to troops except in an emergency. Such issues in an emer-
gency entailed delays which delayed troops in getting into position and action
(R. 2607). - .
General Burgin, who commanded the antiaircraft artillery, stated that he and
General Murray, who commanded one of the infantry divisions, personally went
to the staff and to General Short, who turned them down and refused to allow
the issue of the ammunition for the artillery and the infantry. Later there was
some relaxation of the issue of infäntry ammunition. Colonel Weddington
testified that on the morning of December 7 he had insufficient ammunition, that
there was none for his rifles and ground machine guns, and that the only extra
supply of ammunition was belted ammunition for his aircraft machine guns.
(R. 3026–3027).
The artillery ammunition situation is summed up by General Burgin as fol-
low S : -
[41] “They were all ready to go into action immediately with the exception
that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along
the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to Čoncrete, had the ammunition nearby.
I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his per-
mission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun
battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however,
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the
mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or
may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile
batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile
batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They
were not in field positions” (R. 2604–2605).
He described the efforts of General Murray and himself to get the Ordnance
Department to release this ammunition and how he was overruled by General
Short's staff and General Short himself, in the following language:
&
4630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
“General BURGIN. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more
elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose am-
munition from our storehouse and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was
almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the
minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out,
gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially
true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines.
We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself
went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition
for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were
put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty time,
that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.
“General FRANK. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding Gen-
eral or by a staff department? -
“General BURGIN. Both ; staff departments first, then the Commanding General
in perSon.
“General FRANK. Supported them?
“General BURGIN. In his office, to General Murray and to me.
“General FRANK. Well; what were the staff departments who opposed it?
“General BURGIN. The G’s; G–4s, the Ordnance.
“General FRANK. And their reasons were?
“General BURGIN. Same old reason, that they didn't want to issue any of the
clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on
and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time
should any occasion arise” (R. 2607—2608).
Apparently one of the reasons in General Short's mind was sabotage, if the
ammunition was Out with the guns. As General Burgin testified :
“As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was
pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent”
(R. 2608).
He testified that without ammunition for his guns it would take from a few
minutes to six hours before he could get his guns into position and firing. He was
never permitted to take live ammunition on any of his practices and as 50 per cent
of the mobile guns were on private land he had been unable to even place half of
his guns in position, and they were unable to take ammunition with them
(R. 2608–09–10). - -
Therefore on the morning of December 7 he was caught in this position with
only ammunition adjacent his fixed gun batteries, but half of his guns were
without ammunition.
As General Burgin Summed it up :
“It was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the
G–4s, or from General Short himself” (R. 2612).
General Maxwell Murray testified as to the difficulties in getting anmunition
for both his field artillery and his infantry, as follows:
“General GRUNER.T. . . First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammuni-
tion, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand
for the artillery, on December 7?
“General MURRAY. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it
had not been issued to troops.
“General GRUNERT. I mean “at hand' not ‘On hand."
“General MURRAY. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from
the magazines. I requested authority form General Short to draw artillery
ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks on the division
review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large
area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as
the dispersal area for the artillery” (R. 3075–3076).
“General GRUNERT. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say that there
was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action ; is that right?
“General MURRAY. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammuni-
tion in the gun parks. *
“General GRUNERT. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which
required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?
“General MURRAY. We had to draw it.
“General GRUNERT. Where did it come from ?
“General MURRAY. We drew it directly ; the majority of it was drawn at
Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery,
which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4631
adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, which was
down here near Pearl Harbor” (R. 3080).
General Murray had made arrangements to have separate entrances to get
the ammunition out of the storage houses, but even with that effecive arrange-
ment, plus piling ammunition in the warehouses according to unit, it would take
at least an hour to get the ammunition so the guns could go to the beaches to
defend the island. .
As General Murray Said :
“I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either
the infantry or the artillery” (R. 3081).
He had a limited amount of machine-gun ammunition and rifle ammunition.
He had a large number of machine guns in each rifle company, extra guns, and
“It was obviously impossible—most of our ammunition was not belted—it
was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without serious
delay” (R. 3081).
He had only two belt-loading machines for each heavy weapon company, and
it had taken three days to load up the belted ammunition on a previous trial
(R. 3081). After applying to General Short he had been authorized to draw
and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and
store it in the parks. He was not allowed to have mortar ammunition or high-
explosive grenades inside the barracks; that ordnance had to be left in the
Ordnance Depot, as was the artillery ammunition. He testified (R. 3081) that
it was General Short who was personally suppºrting his ordnance officer and G-4
in following the peacetime practice of holding [42] ammunition in depots
where it would take hours to get it out in..the event of a raid.
He testified that his movement of ammunition into the barracks was in vio-
lation of the standing orders of the post, but he had made that movement of am-
munition on the express authorization of General Short (R. 3091).
It is to be recalled that when the War Department ordered General Herron,
in 1940, into an alert in which he stayed for six weeks, he was able to draw his
ammunition immediately and take it with him into the field.
The testimony of General Burgin as to his inability to get ammunition for use
with his antiaircraft guns is borne out by the testimony of Colonel Weddington
of the Air Corps that when he was in command of the Bellows Field base his
efforts to get ammunition for his machine guns and rifles were met by a response
from the Ordnance Department, on each request he made, that the ammunition
was not available and was not authorized and that this was by General Short's
Order.
Lack of ammunition preparations was shown in the testimony of Colonel
Weddington, who was in command of Bellows Field prior to and on December
7 (R. 3026-3027). He testified that it was the custom for the ships (aircraft)
that were at gunnery practice to be parked on the ramp on Saturday afternoon,
close to one another. The guns were taken off the planes for cleaning, the
planes were out of gas and were not be refueled until Sunday, and the gas was
brought over by truck from Honolulu and did not arrive until sometime later
in the day. He also indicated that many of the pilots were away over the week
end.
It was in this condition that the attack was launched upon them and they
were unable to defend themselves. He said they had 30,000 rounds of belted
ammunition but no rifle ammunition for their guards and no machine-gun am-
munition. When the attack came they were also without any 30-caliber machine-
gun bullets. His repeated efforts to get ammunition from the Ordnance De-
partment met with the statement that it was not available and not authorized,
and its failure to be issued was on General Short's Order.
5. Status of Aircraft Defenses.—The difficulties with supply of both aircraft and
parts to maintain aircraft, due to the conditions depicted in Chapter 2, Background,
are no better illustrated than in the case of aircraft. The failure previous to 1941
to provide extended aircraft programs and the necessity for revising designs to
meet modern combat conditions, as revealed by the European War, joined to-
gether to put the War Department in a difficult situation with respect to a suffi-
ciency of aircraft.
On the deficiency of equipment in Hawaii, General Martin, Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Air Force, testified he had written General Arnold, Chief of
the Army Air Force personal letters as well as sent official communications with
reference to his obsolete aircraft, the lack of Spare parts for the modern craft
that he had, and the necessity for placing his aircraft in combat condition with
adequate weapons, et cetera. (R. 1858–A, 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1874 to
1889, inclusive)
4632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
While correspondence shows a failure on the part of the Army Air Forces to
supply the correct equipment, adequate equipment, spare parts, and enough of
it to be effective, yet Hawaii was better off than other commands. As General
Marshall experssed it:
“As to Hawaii, that had the largest troop concentration we possessed, it had
the maximum of material that we possessed, and we were accumulating the first
fighter planes, of the type that we possessed at that time, in the Hawaiian gar-
I’lSOIl.
“As to Panama : If the Hawaiian state of preparation in men and matériel was
100, Panama was about 25 per cent, and the Philippines about 10 percent, and
Alaska and the Aleutians completely negligible.”
As elsewhere stated, on Dec. 7, 1941, General Martin had under his command
123 modern pursuit and bombardment planes, 15 observation planes, 2 transports,
5 observation amphibians and 8 basic trainers. He had non-modern medium
bombers to the number of 39, 9 light bombers, and 62 non-modern pursuit Ships.
“When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands we had, you
might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s, an old obsolete type of
fighter which we then called a pursuit airplane. We had some old observation
planes, some B–18 bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at
all. They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as fast as you
sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always recognized as not being
a combat ship. In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were
obsolescent at the time they came over. A little later—as I remember it, about
May—we received som P-40 fighters. These ships were brought in on carriers and
flown off to the station after they arrived in Hawaii. About May we received 21
B-17s that were ferried over by air, 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September,
were transferred to the Philippines by air. The 12 remaining were ordered to pro-
ceed to the Philippines; and upon our request that they be delayed, that we could
continue the training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombard-
ment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of airplane, they
would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that were being transferred from the
mainland to the Philippines. . . . The types of ships which could have been used
in combat, which is the P-40, B-17, and ten A–20s, were always possibly 50 per
cent out of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning Of Our production
program all monies, as possible, were placed into the producing of additional
engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. There-
fore the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of
spare parts. We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts
through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position
to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how import-
ant it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had
an accident in One of our ships we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of
certain spare parts to repair other ships. . . . -
“Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters.
We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advance training
at the time; that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern
equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle
the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and con-
siderable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40
equipment. . . . The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was sometime
in May, we had a few of Our pilots that had flown the B-17s. They started
training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers remained with
the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews.
So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots, and all other
members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of
its equipment. . . . In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat,
so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technical School facility. We were
getting but a few technically trained men. . . . There were possibly 400 men
in these schools, as I remember” (R. 1858—A to 1861).
It is to be remembered that the record shows that the Japanese carriers had
over 400 modern aircraft which they brought against the Island, so that the
Superiority was overwhelming. -
[43] Although General Short gave a high priority to airfield construction,
there were many delays due in part to slowness in getting funds and to the in-
efficiency of contractors under the supervision of the District Engineer.
Some elements of the Air Force in Hawaii had been used during 1941 primarily
as a training force for officers and men who were being sent into the Philippines
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4633
and into the outlying islands. The personnel of these elements, therefore,
were largely untrained or partially trained personnel, as the more competent
were constantly being forwarded into what was then advance theaters where
the danger was deemed to be greater. Therefore, much of the Air Force was
in a training status primarily. This has been pictured elsewhere in this report
through the testimony of General Short, General Martin, Colonel Mollison, and
Others. -
The great effort in the latter part of 1941 was to get B-17s, of which 180 had
been allotted to Hawaii. As there were only 109 B-17s in the entire Army
(R. 154) it was obviously impossible to comply with this request. General
Marshall testified that he had sent General Arnold to the West Coast to see what
he could do to get these B-17s to the Philippines via Hawaii, and that they had
been held up by contrary winds and production delays for more than three or four
weeks. (R. 167–168) General Arnold testified as follows:
“General FRANK. Had anything held up B—17 production that in any way had an
effect on this situation ? *
“General ARNOLD. No ; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that
we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B-17s
we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had
only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing
Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers
required” (R. 180). - *.
Due to this condition the planes had been flown out with their guns, but without
their ammunition, to save weight, a factor that was interpreted by Short as
indicating that no attack was expected on Hawaii (R. 305).
However, the impression in Washington, as testified to by General Arnold,
was that the Hawaiian Air Force was in good shape despite its heavy training
mission. He testified : -
“We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably
better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here
in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were
always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in
active combat” (R. 179).
In order to develop this further, the following question was put and answer
gained :
“General FRANK. What I was about to approach was this point, which your
present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were
charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu
and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain train-
ing work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that
perhaps they got themselves into a, training State of mind rather than a War
state of mind. .
“General ARNOLD. I wrote to General Martin, as I Said from time to time, and
the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were
assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition
on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we
had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that
training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could we put that training so
it would interfere least with the creation of the Small air force that we did have?
And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and inter-
fere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have the air-
planes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most
needed” (R. 179–180).
It will, therefore, be seen that the Hawaiian Air Force was handicapped by
Conducting a training program not only for itself but also for other theaters
of action ; its ships were mainly obsolete, its modern ships were few, and there
was a marked deficiency of spare parts, and its airfield construction was lagging.
Such was the status on Dec. 7, 1941, of the Army Air Force installations.
E. STATUS OF DEFENSES ON SUNDAY MORNING, DEC. 7, 1941
1. Army Aircraft. On Sunday morning, Dec. 7, 1941, the status of the island
defenses was at the minimum.
As General Burgin testified :
“A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior
to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, One of these exercises with the
Navy.
4634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
“Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would
know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would
simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the
roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simu-
lated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to
December 7.
“General FRANK. On Sunday ?
“General BURGIN. On Sunday; but, by Some stroke, we did not go out on Decem-
ber 7. The Fleet was in the harbor.” R. 2603).
On that morning, due to Alert No. 1, all planes, with some minor exceptions,
were grouped together wing to wing. There were 80 pursuit planes in commission
and 69 out of commission in various states of repair. There were 39 bombers
in commission and 33 out of Commission. Of the bombers in commission the Only
ones available for a real mission were 6 Flying Fortresses and 10 A-20s. The
old B-18s were of minor value. There were a few fighter aircraft that morning
that were at a remote field, apparently unknown to the Japanese, where a Squadron
was practicing short landings. It was out of this group that there came the
brilliant performance of Major (then Lieutenant) Welch, who courageously got
his ship off the ground, together with his wing man. Major Welch and his wing
man shot down a number of Japanese aircraft. - .
The Navy had no PBY's in the air that morning, although they usually had
four to six for doing reconnaissance. Perhaps this explained by General Burgin's
testimony that while every Sunday morning the antiaircraft artillery had an
exercise with the Navy when the Navy sent its carrier-based planes from ship
to shore, and this continued up to the Sunday before December 7, the Navy
planes did not get into the air on this particular December 7 (R. 2603). The
Fleet was also in the harbor that Sunday, the only vesels of material character
that were out being the carriers Enterprise and Leavington. The Enterprise, with
the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, was about 200 miles
west of Oahu. Task Force No. 12 was approximately 425 miles Southwest of
Midway, with the carrier Leavington (R. 444-445): therefore there was not a
single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning (R. 540).
2. Naval Long-Distance Reconnaissance.—The situation as to the long-distance
reconnaissance supposed to have been conducted by the Navy is admirably and
frankly [44 explained by Admiral DeLany, who was assistant chief of staff
for operations on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, during
this period: Admiral DeLany testified that here was absolutely no protection
or screen thrown out by the Navy on the morning of December 7, and no attempt
to obtain information about the launching of an attack upon Oahu. He further
testified, “There was neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to
Conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance” as would be necessary
in order to maintain a 360-degree reconnaissance around the Island. They
realized the danger but there was nothing that could be done about it (R. 1728).
Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Navy Base Defense Air
Force, Commander Patrol Wing 2, and Commander Task Force 9, said that
on the morning of December 7 he had a total of 81 PBYs in Patrol Wings 1 and
2, which included those at Midway, leaving a total of 69 on Oahu, with 9 out
of commission. The reconnaissance work that was being conducted normally
each morning at sunrise was merely to search the fleet operating areas for
submarines so that the fleet could operate on exercises without molestation.
He usually sent out three to six planes “to guard against submarine attack.”
He testified that the only patrolling being done as a defense against a surprise
attack was in the vicinity of Midway (R. 1600). He testified as follows:
“General FRANK. You had no instructions from anybody to Conduct any
search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?
“Admiral BELLINGER. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some
apparent reason for doing so. That instances had occurred for one or two
different sectors over the periods during the year” (R. 1601).
Admiral Kimmel summarized the situation when he testified as follows:
“General RUSSELL. You have testified, and it has been supported by a line
of evidence here, that there was not available to the Army and Navy any means
for distant reconnaissance to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.
“Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct” (R. 1805).
“General GRUNERt. Were there any planes on distant reconnaissance on that
morning?
“Admiral BELLINGER. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the
true sense of the term ‘distant reconnaissance’” (R. 1629–1630).
ExHIBITs of Joint CoMMITTEE 4635
This failure to do distant reconnaissance cannot be excused for lack of planes
under Navy control because the Navy had 50 PBY's available. The only excuse
for not using them was, as stated by Admiral Kimmel :
“We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had
received no Orders to mobilize” (R—1811).
Admiral Bellinger testified that the relationship between the Navy and the
Army for the use of Army planes from the fighter group of the Army was not
in a functioning status. (R. 1622) He had 33 scout bombers, 7 fighters, and 9
scouts available on the morning of December 7, but they were not being used.
(R. 1623) As witnesses testified, they were accustomed to seeing PBY's go out
each morning, but on Sunday morning, December 7, they did not go out. (See
General Rudolph's and Colonel Brook's testimony, R. 993-994, 1232-1234.)
3. Aircraft Warning System.—The radar aircraft warning system had the
Information Center completed and organized with five mobile radar stations
which operating. They had been in operation from 4 to 7 o'clock each morning
for training purposes but had not gone into regular, operation. It was because
of their being in operation that Lockard and Elliott picked up the Japanese
attack force 132 miles from Oahu, and this organization functioned continually
after the attack, so it can be assumed that it was in operating condition (R. 439–
440–441). (See Lockard in other testimony.) *
As General Short said:
“I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained
to the point where they could do pretty well.”
as of December 7, 1941 (R. 508). They had three heavy radar sets complete.”
and six mobile sets complete (R. 509). The mobile sets were operating (R. 510).
“General FRANK. . . . The AWS system was operated with mobile sets up to a
distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct?
“General SHORT. That is correct” (R. 512).
The Interceptor Command “was actually operating,” according to General
Short. He said, “it was actually operating daily.” (R. 525) An order had not
gone out to Burgin and Martin, but it was working.
4. Antiaircraft Defenses.—As to the antiaircraft, much of it had never gone
into position so far as mobile guns were concerned, and none of the mobile guns
Was in position on the morning of December 7. Ammunition had not been issued
because the Ordnance Department objected to having it out convenient to the
guns because it might get dirty. As General Burgin said, “they didn’t want to
issue any of the clean ammunition . . . and, besides, we would get our ammuni-
tion in plenty of time should any occasion arise” (R. 2608).
As it took about six hours to get the ammunition fully out, distributed, and
broken Open, the delay was a very difficult one (R. 2608).
As General Burgin again testified:
“It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out, because
in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes
Out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was
especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of
the magazines. We tried the ordnance' people without results. General Max
Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled
for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the anti-
aircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our am-
munition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever
struck” (R. 2607).
The two divisions were in their quarters so that, it took them a number of
hours to move out after the attack. One of the principal difficulties was the
necessity of drawing their ammunition, as elsewhere discussed. -
The status of the antiaircraft was this: The mobile guns had to secure their
ammunition from Aliamanu Crater, between two and three miles from Fort
Shafter. The fixed guns had their ammunition in boxes adjacent to the guns.
He had 60 mobile guns and 26 fixed guns and the usual complement of 50-caliber
and 30-caliber. -
He testified as follows:
“They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that
the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition” (R. 2604).
On the morning of December 7 he had not gone into operation with the Navy
as on previous Sundays. (R. 2603). This was due to the Fleet being in the
harbor on that Sunday, and for some reason the Navy was not conducting its
usual Sunday exercises with him (R. 2603).
4636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. Summary.—Therefore, the situation on December 7 can be summed up as
follows: No distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy; the usual
four or five PBY's were not out; the antiaircraft artillery was not out on its
usual Sunday maneuvers with the Fleet air arm ; the naval carriers with their
planes were at a distance from Oahu on that Sunday ; the aircraft were on the
[45] ground, were parked, both Army and Navy, closely adjacent to one
another; the Fleet was in the harbor with the exception of Task Forces 9 and 12,
which included some cruisers, destroyers, and the two carriers Leavington and
Enterprise. Ammunition for the Army was, with the exception of-that near the
fixed antiaircraft guns, in ordnance storehouses, and the two combat divisions as
well as the antiaircraft artillery were in their permanent quarters and not in
battle positions. Everything was concentrated in close confines by reason of
the antisabotage Alert No. 1. This made of them easy targets for an air attack.
In short, everything that was done made the situaion perfect for an air attack
and the Japanese took full advantage of it.
THE ATTACK ON DEC, 7, 1941
1. Japanese Intelligence.—The details of the attack have been already ade-
quately described. To have a competent understanding of the attack and the per-
fection with which it was executed, we should remember that the Japanese had
had exceptional opportunities for Securing the very latest information from a
wide variety of sources in the islands as to the exact dispositions of the fleet and
of our military forces. The maps that were found upon Japanese aircraft that
were shot down or on Japanese aviators or upon Japanese submarine crew men
indicated a vast amount of meticulously accurate, up-to-date information. The
fact that one or more submarines were in Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th
and had circulated in the harbor and then gone out again showed a knowledge
of what was going on in Pearl Harbor that was substntially complete.
It is interesting to contrast this activity of the Japanese Navy in gaining de-
tailed information of our Fleet with the failure of our Navy to glean any informa-
tion concerning the task force that attacked Pearl Harbor from the time that it
left Japanese home waters, about November 22, 1941, and left Tankan Bay about
November 28, 1941, until the attack took place. -
For instance, the map found on a Japanese aviator brought down at Fort
Kamehameha on December 7th, Exhibit No. 22; Exhibits 23, 24, 25, and 26;
and Exhibit No. 48 illustrate with what meticulous detail the entire operation
was worked Out based upon adequate and complete intelligence by the Japanese.
It is difficult to understand this attack and its perfection without first studying
these maps. The Japanese came to the attack with full informaion of our dispo-
Sitions and defenses: we met the attack with absolutely no information about
the Japanese attacking force. The details of the securing of this information are
Set forth elsewhere in this report. The Japanese realized that this was the foun-
dation of their war and that perfection of execution would have a profound effect.
politically upon their allies and upon the countries of the Far East in which they
intended to Operate. -
2. Nature and Composition of the Attacking Force.—The strength of the at-
tacking force has already been stated in this report, based upon the extended tes-
timony of Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. It was one of the most power-
ful naval attacking forces ever assembled up to that time, because of the large
complement of carriers. Its aviators were of the highest quality of Japanese
encountered during the war. After they were finally disposed of during the later
days of the present Pacific war, the testimony is to the effect that no equal or
Superior Japanese aviators have been met.
Japan evidently brought to bear upon this attack the best brains, the best
equipment, and the finest intelligence, with the most expert planning, which
it had.
The first indication of the attack on the Island of Oahu was the detection by
the U.S.S. ANTARES of a suspicious obect in the prohibited area off Pearl
Harbor at 6:30 a. m. This was found to be a small two-man submarine, which
was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of the U.S.S. WARD and a naval
patrol plane between 6:33 and 6:45 a. m. on December 7th. The WARD sent
a report of this action to the Naval Base watch officer at 7:12 a. m., who im-
mediately notified his chief of Staff. A ready destroyer was dispatched to
investigate, but no alert warning was issued based upon the report. This was
one of the most important of a succession of mistakes made during this fateful
morning. The Navy admits that it did not advise General Short as it should
have done. - º
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4637
A second small two-man submarine was sunk inside the harbor between 8:35
and 8:43 a. m., and a third one was grounded in the Kaneohe Bay and was cap-
tured. There was a total altogether of five such submarines equipped with
two-man crews, one of which was captured. The remaining nine crew mem-
bers were killed, as confirmed by a Japanese citation later given to these ten
men raising them in rank (R. 3038). These two-man submarines were launched
from mother submarines a short distance from the Island of Oahu.
While Pearl Harbor was provided with an antitorpedo net to prevent the
entrance of submarines and this net was kept closed during the hours of dark-
ness, being opened only when necessary for a vessel to pass through the net,
it was kept open continuously during daylight hours, upon the assumption that
the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the neigh-
borhood, would detect any submarines. On the morning of December 7th the
net was opened at 4:58 a.m. for the entrance of two minesweepers and was left
open until 8:40 a. m. when it was closed by order as a result of the attack. The
net was not damaged and it was fully functioning. Apparently the submarine
got into the harbor at 7 a. m. It will be recalled that prior to December 7th
one or more Japanese submarines had already been in this harbor, passing
through the net when it was Opened at 4 a. m. to permit the garbage scow to
go through.
The attacking planes from the six carriers of the attacking force numbered
approximately 424 (R. 3048). -
Of this number about 250 to 300 took part in the attack. They consisted of
fighting, bombing and torpedo planes that simultaneously and successively at-
tacked Pearl Harbor and the adjacent air bases and airfields on Oahu, starting
at about 7:55 a. m. The attack ws over by 11 a. m. On these fields the aircraft
were carefully lined up, wing to wing, tip to tip, in the most perfect target
position for both bombing and machine-gun straffing. This is true both of the
Army and of the Navy. The PBY's of the Navy were substntially all destroyed,
and a large number of the Army aircraft met a similar fate. The landing strips
were substantially without damage, possibly indicating some subsequent inten-
tion on the part of the Japanese to employ those landing strips.
Immediately upon the attack being known to General Short he ordered Alert
No. 3. This was executed with more than expected promptness.
As already related, this force of attacking Japanese planes was detected about
132 miles north of Oahu. The Japanese force came Over the island as follows:
One force came from the north directly across the island, over Schofield Barracks,
Wheeler Field, to Pearl Harbor, attacking Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. An-
other force came in from the east attacking Kaneohe Field, Bellows Field, and
Pearl Harbor and a third force came in from the South attacking Hickam Field
and Pearl Harbor. The torpedo planes devoted their attention to the ships in the
harbor. A study of the bomb pattern of such places as Hickam Field shows that
the attack was concentrated upon the aprons where the planes were parked and
upon the hangars as well as upon machine shops. All objectives were entered
and carefully identi [46] fied by legends placed upon the U. S. Geodetic
Survey maps used by the Japanese.
It is significant as to maps secured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
that there is an abbreviation of a code which takes care of every major contingency
before, during and as a result of the attack. Nothing was left to chance. It is
particularly noted that the information of construction was shown by the fact
that as to Hickam Field the legend indicated, “All concrete structures—or in the
process of construction.” -
G. TIME ELEMENT IN THE EXPECTED ATTACK : THE EFFECT OF USING HAWAII AS A
TRAINING GROUND IN ADDITION TO ITS BEING A COMBAT OUTPOST
1. .1ttack a Surprise.—The Chief of Staff and all other witnesses, including
Kimmel and Short, have without exception stated that the attack was a surprise.
General Marshall testified that the Hawaiian commanders indicated their views
that an air attack was their very serious concern (R. 52). Yet he also testified:
“We did not, so far as I can recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason
being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses
there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to
attempt such an attack” (R. 9).
An analysis of the probabilities of success from the Japanese point of view shows
that the Japanese took an extraordinary chance, if the facts as to their strength
as We now know them are reasonably accurate. In race-track parlance, it was
4638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a “long-shot” and an extraordinary risk because the consequences of failure to
the Japanese might have been greater than those to the United States in the
event of success. It was a bold and considered venture.
Japan knew with reasonable accuracy the movements and location of our fleet.
It knew week-end conditions in Hawaii with the fleet in the harbor as well as We
did. It apparently knew of our assumption that Japan would not dare attack
the United States and that if it did, it would be in the remote islands of the Pacific,
including the Philippines. It accurately gauged our belief that Japan had its
eyes turned on Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and was proceeding southwardly
with its conquest. . -
Based upon this shrewd estimate of our national psychology and our estimate
of their intentions, Japan proceeded to the execution of the unexpected, the gain
from which it estimated would be incalculable value. In the daring attack Japan
was compensated by the gain to her of immobilizing and substantially destroying
the Pacific Fleet, which was a major threat to Japan’s left flank in its South-
ward move. The value of such a result was tremendous.
It gave both safety and freedom of action to Japan; and the ability to con-
centrate both on the Pacific Islands of the United States and the Philippines.
By that time Japan believed it would be so intrenched that dislodgment would
be substantially impossible.
Japan used in this attack from four to six carriers out of the total of eight
available to its fleet. The failure of this mission, by the destruction of such
carriers, would have been really fatal to its fleet, at least for long months to
come. The daring, therefore, of this attack was out of all proportion to its value
because had it not been Successful and had its carriers been destroyed it would
have been disastrous to the Japanese Navy.
But in making this estimate of Japan’s risky action and its considered chances,
we were doing so from the Occidental point of view. We were completely
ignoring the Oriental attitude, the Japanese cheap price of life, and her willing-
ness to conduct a suicide attempt without any foundation of Occidental reasoning
in order to gain an extraordinary advantage. Hull and Grew had Warned
of this psychology and her penchant for unexpected, reckless and suicidal moves.
This national urge to take a desperate chance of a military nature has since
then become well-known. It was our failure to take into consideration this
extraordinary chance-taking characteristic, due to the violent and uncivilized
reasoning of the Japanese mind, that would approve the making Of Such a
long military and naval chance for the Satisfaction of the first blow, and a
disastrous one, that was So satisfactory to the Oriental mind, which misled us.
2. Time Element—The Important Factor in All Estimates.—This analysis is
recited for the reason that apparently no One from the Chief of Staff down con-
sidered at the time the attack was made that any such attempt would be made.
This time element is important in understanding the state of mind of the
responsible authorities of the United States. The military estimates of he
situation from the War Department, the Navy Department, and in Hawaii,
clearly shown a reasoned and correctly stated analytical estimate of the situation.
The missing link in our search for the reason why steps were not taken to carry
out the logic of the military and psychological estimate of the situation seems
to be in this belief that there was ample time to prepare Hawaii. It was gen-
erally thought that Japan would not attempt this attack, if at all, until some
time later after it had made its attacks upon the Philippines and intermediate
islands. In that, the United States' calculations went far astray for lack of
understanding of the long-chance type of the military and naval minds of
Oriental Japan.
As a consequence a policy was followed that was disastrous to the defense
of Hawaii. They gambled upon having time for preparation that did not exist.
3. Earpected Time to Continue Training.—That assumption of time for prepara-
tion resulted in using a portion of the Hawaiian Army Air Force and the Navy
as a training force for the training of green personnel followed by the removal
of experienced personnel thereof, as they were trained, to other theaters. The
Board, although it realizes the great need of Organized air forces to serve as
training units and that the Hawaiian Air Force was one of the few available,
nevertheless it considers it a mistake to so utilize this outpost which should
have been on a purely combat basis and not subect to the weakening process of
a periodic turnover. -
Let us look at the consequence of this. The Navy was either training ashore
or constantly training at Sea through its three task forces. Those operations
in the area were not, as Short thought, for the purpose of eombat reconnaissance
ExHIBITs of Joint CoMMITTEE 4639
or defense duty, but they were training maneuvers for the constant training of
new personnel to be used elsewhere. •
The training problem, which had been frequently discussed with the War
Department and was well known by it, had assumed a position of importance
in Hawaii. This evidently strongly influenced Short's decision to Adopt Alert
No. 1.
He testified :
“In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would
require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically,
so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every
man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would
prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite
serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines.
We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also
sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the
Philippine Islands. We had only 6 Flying Fortresses in com [47] mission
to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that time a Flying Fortress was
relatively new and you could not just pick up a pilot here and there and say he
could fly a Flying Fortress. He had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of old
obsolete B–18 bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight,
but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships. They were put
on those. They were put on A-20s for a little time, and finally got to the B-17s.
With the limited number of ships we had it took time to train these crews;
not just the pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the
gunners So they could protect themselves from the Japanese going over the
Mandated Islands. - • .
“General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should
do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferrying group. The
responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us
to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it
if we started them out with untrained crews.
“That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather
than Alert No. 2 or No. 3 (R. 285–286). *
** * * We felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air
Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines.
Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philip-
pines” (R. 390). .
And again he testified before the Roberts Commission :
“Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about training
rather than expecting something to happen at the time” (Roberts Record 1622).
(See page 531 of the Grunert Record.)
General Martin, Chiew of the Hawaiian Air Force, testified even more vigor-
ously that the Selection of Alert No. 1 was largely influenced by their desire to
keep on training.
“General FRANK. Was there any advantage of conducting Air Corp training in
any one of three alerts? . . .
“General MARTIN. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to
get men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.
“General FRANK. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No.
3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?
“General MARTIN. Of course there was a difference. There would be more
under Alert No. 1” (R. 1864-1865).
Admiral Kimmel said:
“The principal one that arises at Once is the question of personnel, the necessity
for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training per-
sonnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new
personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have
a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly,
that the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought
pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained air-
Inen Of all ratings, and in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say,
was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they greatly depleted their stuff.”
(R. 1764-1765). -
It is therefore apparent that both services were placing great emphasis on train-
ing, possibly to the detriment of preparedness to meet an attack.
79716 O—46—pt. 21—8
4640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Short’s Trust in Navy to Give Him Timely Notice—Time Element Again.—
General Short accomplished what he set out to do, to establish a COrdial and
friendly relationship with the Navy. His instructions from the Chief of Staff to
do this were not for the purpose of social intercourse, but for more effectively
accomplishing the objective of a sound and complete detail working agreement
with the Navy to get results. He successfully accomplished fully only the cordial
relationship with his opposite numbers in the Navy, i.e., the top rank of the Navy;
he did not accomplish fully the detailed working relationship necessary for his
own full information, the complete execution of his own job and the performance of
his mission. The claim of a satisfactory relationship for practical purposes is
not substantiated. General Short testified : . . . -
“The one thing that that letter (General Marshałł's first letter of February 7th,
1941), emphasized to me, I think, more than anything else, was the necessity for
the closest co-operation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter im-
pressed me more than anything else” (R. 355).
Apparently Short was afraid that if he went much beyond social contacts
and really got down to business with the Navy to get what he had a right to
know in order to do his job, he would give offense to the Navy and lose the good
will of the Navy which he was charged with securing. That is evidenced by his
following statement:
“I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would
have resented it if I tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out,
and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy
any piece of information that he thought was of interest” (R. 363).
He testified that he relied for reconnaissance upon the task forces of the
Navy, which employed carriers to search the ocean 300 miles to each side,
giving each task force 600 miles of reconnaissance area, and with three forces
that would have meant covering 1,800 miles (R. 284, 384). Admiral Pye, com-
mander of One of the three task forces of the Pacific Fleet, testified that:
“The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all
the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about
eight days and about fourteen days in port” (R. 1036).
Kimmel testified the task forces were in training and not out for recon-
naissance (R. 1773, 1794–1795; Cf. Pye 1037, Burgin 2673). He said that this
was well known and undoubtedly Short knew about it (R. 1771–1773; Cf. Short
359). The Short and Kimmel testimony is in conflict on this point.
Again, Short said he was dependent on the Navy, and particularly the 14th
Naval District, or the War Department for securing information as to the
movement of Japanese ships (R. 291). He said that the combination of the
continuous flow of information that the Navy Department had as to the loca-
tion of Jap ships and the Navy task forces doing long-distance reconnaissance
with their carrier-borne planes, led him to the position that “it was a natural
thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject.
It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity”
(R. 300–301). It was for that reason that he accepted the Captain McMorris
statement, when visiting with Admiral Kimmel and his staff, that there would be
no Japanese attack in early December (R. 299–301). -
He said he was further strengthened in his opinion, during the period of the
27th of November to the 6th of December, that the Navy either knew “where
the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not
uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they
could handle the situation” (R. 303).
Short evidently believed that he was getting full information from the Navy
that was available to them. There does not seem to have occurred anything
that led him to think he was not being told all the pertinent official naval in-
formation there was available. He relied [48] upon Complete Official in-
terchange which was not in practice.
An examination of the facts showed that the naval forces were insufficient for
long-distance patrol, and General Short frankly confesses this situation (R.
375); General Short further points out that the Army had insufficient planes for
reconnaissance (R. 377–378). Although General Short “looked” on task forces as
the best means of reconnaissance” (R. 384), he did not know nor try to find out
their routes (R. 359–360, 475). Short could easily have learned that the task
forces conducted only incidental reconnaissance (R. 1773, 1794–1795) and that
the Navy was devoting itself to the submarine menace in the areas in which they
had their exercises (R. 1040, 1757, 3041). Short knew that his inshore patrol was
of limited value (R. 473); that Admiral Bloch did not have the planes to carry
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4641
out the agreement (R. 375); and that all that Admiral Bellinger had was a limited
number of PBY reconnaissance planes (R. 456, 1598, 1810); that Bloch had none
(R. 1493, 1526, 1532, 1771) and the carrier-borne planes were normally used for
anti-submarine reconnaissance (R. 1039–1040).
General Short's knowledge of the situation at the time of these events in 1941
is shown in the testimony of General Martin, who said:
“I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the
Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge.
Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a
decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than from
without” (R. 1856).
General Martin said emphatically the fact that the Navy had task forces out
influenced his decision, Saying: -
“. I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct
a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; . . .” (R. 1873).
This was despite the fact, as he said:
“. . . . we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance
was being done, because there wasn’t enough in the air, and your reconnaissance
from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time,
and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about” (R. 1857).
As an indication that Short was not getting the information is his own ad-
mission :
“General FRANK. Another thing : Do you feel that the Navy withheld from you
certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable
to you? -
“General SHORT. I don’t believe that they purposely withheld anything from me
that they thought really concerned me. -
“General FRANK. Don't you think that that information about the naval task
forge with-carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have
vitally affected you?
“General SHORT. Yes, possibly. -
“General GRUNERT. Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsi-
bility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or
what shouldn't be passed to you? -
“General SHORT. Oh, I think they did, definitely” (R. 409–410).
He did not learn of the early visit on the morning of December 7th of the
Japanese submarine. He did not learn of it until the 8th, when Admiral Kimmel
himself told him about it (R. 364–365). By his implicit trust in the Navy he let
them not only get the information but to evaluate it. In connection with the in-
formation about the Japanese submarine sunk by the Navy early December 7th,
he said this as to the Navy action :
“They did not connect it (the submarine which was sunk by the Navy) with
the general raid, they thought it was sparate” (R. 365).
But the point is that Short should have been given this information and have
made his Own evaluation. As he now testifies, if he had known of this submarine
information it “might have worked out to our very great advantage if they (the
Navy) had been handled differently” (R. 310). In this connection he said, “It
was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information
to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the
time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase
of it and just failed to notify me; that he (Bloch) could see then, after the fact,
that he had been absolutely wrong . . .” (R. 311).
Again, he was not advised of the Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between
the 25th and the 30th of November (R. 361). He said he was not advised of the
naval dispatch of December 3rd, 1941, and never saw that message. That was the
lmessage that showed that the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were
destroying certain codes and ciphers, and burning certain documents. He said
that he did not receive the naval messages of December 3rd, December 4th, and
December 6th from the Navy Department to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific
Fleet, regarding the destruction of confidential documents.
He said :
“General GRUNERT. You had none of the information that was disclosed in
those three messages?
“General SHORT. No, sir” (R. 425).
He expressed his relationship with the Navy in this wise: “I felt that Admiral
Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything
4642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
they thought had any bearing on my job; that if they were sure it was an
absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way they
might have given it (the information) to me” (R. 358).
This situation was Summed up as follows:
“General FRANK. The question as to whether or not you got the information was
placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?
“General SHORT. Absolutely.
“General FRANK. Do you feel that you were secure in that?
“General SHORT. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no
right to demand that they give me all information they had” (R. 358).
AS to naval task forces on which he so thoroughly relied for reconnaissance,
he did not have any regular means of knowing where they were or what they
were doing, “except as we (Admirals Kimmel, Bloch and Bellinger) happened to
talk about in a personal kind of way” (R. 359). *
This brings us to the further observation that Short in dealing with the Navy
was trying to do the job himself (R. 1248–1249), which resulted in that he
neither got the information completely, accurately, nor consistently, instead of
delegating it to his trained staff officers dealing with equally trained staff officers
of the Navy SO a professional, systematic job could be done. He relied on con-
fidence and natural trust rather than certainty of information; and on personal
visits and informal conferences instead of the definitions of an established or-
ganization Smoothly operating to an effective end.
[49] H. WHAT WAS DONE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK
1. Reason for Analysis of Action Taken After December 7, 1941.-The question
of insufficient means with which to adequately defend Oahu, has been raised.
General Short's energy was admirable and well directed towards improving the
defense of Oahu. As a consequence, we have examined the situation as to what
he did before the attack and what he did after the attack with what he had. The
first part of the examination has already been related in the previous portions
of the report. We now propose to examine two questions: How effectively was
Short able to use this very same material, personnel, and available facilities
after the attack; and what did Washington do after the attack in giving help to
Hawaii that might have been done before? wr
2. Hawaii and Washington Action.—Upon learning of the attack General
..Short immediately Ordered the Number 3 Alert (R. 1118). The 24th Division was
in all battle positions by 1600 hours December 7, 1941. The 25th Division was
in all battle positions by 1700 hours December 7, 1941. The Division Artillery
drew its ammunition and secured its issue of a unit of fire to take to beaches
within one to two hours. It is significant that the war garrison was increased
by Washington from 59,000 to 71,500 after IQecember 7 to defend Kaneohe Bay,
“back door to the island,” and that increases in air strength and in engineers
for aviation purposes were granted (R. 325). Harbor troops had ammunition
“immediately at hand.” The antiaircraft had theirs sometime later. The first
of the sixteen surgical teams reported to the hospital at 0900. At noon there was
started evacuation of women and children from Hickam and Wheeler fields and
harbor defense positions. The Ordnance Depot went into two underground rooms.
Slit trenches were then dug (R. 316–317). -
The Department Engineer, under the Department Commander, was put by
Washington in complete control of building of field fortifications. The troops
started on field fortifications. The slit trenches were not completed on 8 Decem-
ber (R. 321). The outlying islands were further garrisoned (R. 332). Orders
were issued in connection with the defense against chemical air attack, air raid
instructions were issued, klaxon horns were distributed for the aircraft warning
service and old gas masks were exchanged for new (R. 529–531). The Interceptor
Command, inactive before December 7 and still in the training stage (R. 1825),
was activated 17 December (R. 4136–4137). After December 7 “the Navy took
us over body and soul . . . . we did exactly as they ordered us to. We were
a part of their Naval Air Force, so to speak,” said General Rudolph (R. 1223).
Washington gave unity of command. Directives came from the War and Navy
departments to establish a joint operating center for a joint staff of Army and
Navy. This was done in tunnels in the Aliamanu Crater and put into use in
February 1942 (R. 1534). -
Daily reconnaissance was made after December 7, using Army B-17s and
Navy PBYs and “anything they had,” even the B-18s. Navy planes were sent
from the mainland by Washington after December 7; many B-17s came out almost
EXEHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4643
immediately. Additional PBYs were received and those damaged on December 7
were repaired. If the planes that were available by Washington after December 7
had been available before December 7, distance reconnaissance could have been
made, according to the testimony of Admiral Bloch (H. 1532–1534). However,
the necessity for the ferrying of bombers to the Philippines ceased since they,
too, were under attack.
The Interceptor Command was activated immediately after December 7
(R. 2604).
The status of the antiaircraft artillery and coast artillery was as follows.
After December 7 the ammunition was issued for use with the guns in the
field (R. 2605). The skeleton crews were replaced with full crews on the fixed
coastal guns (R. 2611). Only 40 per cent of the allowance of automatic weapons
existed before December 7, which was rectified after that date (R. 2613). The
whole command was put on a five-minute alert and old Alerts Number 1, 2, and 3
became obsolete, the men in camp after December 7 remaining right at their
guns (R. 2639). The radar and Interceptor Command installations, formerly
under the control of the Signal Corps, were taken away from the Signal Corps
immediately after December 7 and placed under the Interceptor Command
(R. 2644).
The aircraft warning system was started full time on December 7 as it could
have been weeks before, had the order been given (R. 4133). After December
7 the aircraft warning System personnel continued to operate efficiently. They
did so in conjunction with the 24-hour duty of the Interceptor Command. As
Colonel Bergquist said, in Contrasting his efforts to get the aircraft warning
service and the Interceptor Command co-operating before December 7, after
December 7 “I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted” (R. 1205–
1206). The AWS work moved much faster after December 7 (R. 1218). After
December 7 the controversy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps, which
Contributed to the delay in the activation of the Interceptor Command, disap
peared (R. 1216–1217). -
After December 7 the fighter planes were kept ready to take off instantly (R.
3911) and the antiaircraft warning service was put on a 24-hour basis, as it could
have been before, said Colonel Powell, Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment Corps (R. 3913). The aircraft warning sets were in continuous operation
after December 7 with three groups operating four hours each (R. 1029).
Tillman, an Engineer Corps civilian employee, testified that he as a trouble
shooter took charge of construction pertaining to the Aircraft Warning Service
after Colonel Wyman was relieved because progress was unsatisfactory (R.
2135). He found he was able to complete certain construction projects at air-
craft warning stations by scouting around for parts. Prior to December 7 the
crews on those projects were not working because they said they had nothing to
work with (R. 2149–2151).
The most remarkable change between December 6 and December 7 was the
change in construction activities under the District Engineers, Colonel Wyman.
A new field was begun at Kahuku on December 7. Bunkers were built at
Hickham Field; the field at Haliewa was expanded ; construction of a new field
at Kipapa was started; a temporary field was put on the Schofield golf course.
The troops started on field fortifications (R. 321). Authority was requested to
build ten airfields. Bombers were put on the outlying islands. “We were able to
go ahead and do a lot without funds.” Barracks were built with WPA money
(R. 325). A pool of lumber was authorized for the Quartermaster (R. 328).
All the material and contractors with their machinery were taken Over and
put to work. Priorities were established on jobs and get more accomplished,
according to Benson, President of the Hawaiian Contracting Company (R. 3737).
A job at Wheeler Field had not been completed for a long time, due to the delay
of plans from the Engineers (R 2542) Barking Sands airport and Kokee radar
station jobs had been delayed for many weeks with the material on the ground
awaiting someone to act. The Hawaiian Constructors had not put it up. After
December 7 the witness Bartlett went to the Site, erected the tower in five days
and had the station operating
On December 7 the runways under construction at Bellows Field were incom-
plete. On the Wednesday after December 7 the work began on a 24-hour-a-day
basis. The second runway was completed in seven days, that is, by the following
Thursday, said Colonel Weddington, base [50] commander at Bellows
Field (R 3020). After December 7 antiaircraft emplacements were constructed
at Bellows Field. When the attack struck, the planes were concentrated practi-
cally wing to wing, but after the attack they were dispersed on the field, 50 to 75
feet apart (R. 3014).
4644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Corps of Engineers also evidenced an appreciation of the situation by
raising the contracting authority of the District Engineer from $50,000 before
December 7 to $5,000,000 after December 7. The Corps of Engineers' red
tape of sending all contracts and changes to Washington to the Chief of Engi-
neers was then eliminated by Washington; testimony of Colonel Wyman (R.
3435, 3874). The Robert E. McKee Company, which had been discarded by
Wyman when he went to the islands in the middle of 1940, was invited by him
after December 7 to join the Hawaiian Constructors (R. 2405—2407).
Slit trenches had not been built until the day of Pearl Harbor (R. 1916), but
they were built extensively, together with air raid shelters, after December 7
(R. 838).
After December 7 Admiral Pye testified the Navy kept its forces out of the
harbor fairly continuously except for the time necessary in port to Overhaul
matériel and receive supplies (R. 1045). -
We, therefore, find that after December 7 an active and vigorous employment
of facilities, matériel and personnel was made, and full support and supplies
were furnished by Washington some of which might have been done before
December 7. The support from the mainland was vastly different after Decem-
ber 7 than before, and the record so reflects this condition. For instance, before
December 7 G–2 did not submit to General Short any strategical estimates but
after December 7 they submitted such a statement weekly. After December 7
the suspected aliens were rounded up and interned, the Japanese consul and his
200 agents were put out of business and all necessary steps were taken to
monitor both telephone and radio communication, all of which might have been
done without stirring up the civilian population or the Japanese prior to December
7, 1941. -
I. SUMMARY
The foregoing concludes the story of Pearl Harbor with the exception of the
matter of the construction of the Hawaiian defenses and the particular part of
Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., with respect to those defenses. Col. Wyman's part
in the Pearl Harbor disaster is treated in Chapter W.
In order to not disturb the continuity of the complete Pearl Harbor story
both at Hawaii and in Washington, the next succeeding Chapter No. IV is de-
voted primarily to the responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster of those in
Washington who had some part in the matter. In this way Chapters III and IV,
when read together, will give a balanced and complete picture of the principal
events and actions taken which contribute to the result Of the attack On Decem-
ber 7, 1941.
List of things done and action taken on or after 7 December 1941 by persons in the
Hawaiian Islands : Bloch, volume 13, pages 1532–34; Klatt, v 13, p 1465–66 ; Pye, v 9,
} 1045 ; Phillips, v 10, p. 1118; Murray, v 27, p 3080 : Martin, v 17, p 1825, 1850, 1911 :
lockard, v 9, p. 1029 ; Bartlett, v 22, p 2510–11 : Midkiff, v. 㺠2805–07–14–40–41 ;
Bergquist, v 10, p. 1205–06–16–17–18: Rudolph, v 10, p 1223; Weddington, v 27, p 3020–
13–14; Howard, v 17, p 1916; Pratt, v 18, p 1986; Locey, w 25, p 2790 ; King, v 23, p 2542–
37–38; Fielder, v 26, p. 2981; McKee, v 21, p 2405–07; Burgin, v 24, p 2603–04–07–09–11–
13–14–15–39–44; Reybold, v 6, p 580; Davidson, v 36, p. 4133–36–38–42; Powell, v 32,
p 3904—11—13; Wyman, v 29, p 3435–36—v_32, p 3874 (affidavit—v 29, p 3433–34;
Perliter, v 30, p 3712; Benson, v 30, p. 3737; Farthing, v 7, p. 838; Tillman, v 19, p. 2135–
###"; v 4, p 314–15–16–17–19–20–21–22–25–28–30–31–32–37—v 5, p. 500, 529–
CHAPTER IV. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON
1. General.—The preceding chapter has dealt primarily with Hawaii and the
actions of the responsible Officers in the Hawaiian Department. It has to Some
degree and to a lesser extent, by reason of the chronological Sequence, dealt with
what was done in Washington both with respect to the internal activities in
Washington and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will
be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only secondarily in
Hawaii.
2. War Council.—The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has discussed the activi-
ties of the group in the War Department known as the War Council. He also
described the group consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy,
Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations
of the Navy, who were also called colloquially the “War Council.” The third
group was that which included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of
War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, and occasionally Commanding General, Air Force, General Arnold.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4645
All three of these bodies were informal and constituted simply a group of men
exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies without regularity of
record of what they did, as far as this Board has been able to determine. It was
a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of poli-
cies, so that each of the independent actors in the Scene would know what was
going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions
that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent
on the action of Other members of the group.
3. Secretary of State.—The responsibility apparently assumed by the Secretary
of State (and we have no other proof that anyone else assumed the responsibility
finally and definitely) was to determine when the United States would reach the
impasse with Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the
negotiations with the Japanese; it was the Secretary of State who had long and
numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the contact man and the
responsible negotiator.
He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him should be
tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility rests with Congress.
It is important to observe that the President of the United States had been very
careful, according to the testimony of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the
United States did nothing that could be considered an overt act or an act of war
against the Japanese.
For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of November 27,
he was particularly concerned with SO phrasing it so as to carry out the Presi-
dent’s directive which was in accordance with our constitutional method of doing
business. Mr. Stimson Said :
“I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as
my business to do what I of course normally would do ; to see that the message
as sent was framed in accordance with the facts” (R. 4057).
Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the previous
day on November 26, when the Ten Points were handed by Secretary Hull to the
Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as of the 27th of [51] NO-
vember, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be committed by the United
States.
With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious responsibilities
were discharged. In making this statement we are deeply sympathetic with the
state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation, the chicanery, trickery and decep-
tion of the Japanese ambassadors with whom the Secretary of State had so long
and manfully struggled. What he did was human, but the results are the things
with which we are Concerned.
Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised through the
meetings of the War Council of the , inadequate status of the defenses of the
United States. Our Army and Navy were not ready for war, and undoubtedly
the Secretary of State had been fully advised of that fact. So serious was this
situation that General Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum
under date of November 27 on this subject.
This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, according to the
testimony of General Marshall. It contained two things: first, a statement that
the most essential thing then from the United States viewpoint was to gain time
and to avoid precipitating military action so long as this could be done consistent
with the National Policy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not
ready for war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter
military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of aggression
(described in the memorandum). The memorandum then recommended among
other things that “steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the
British and Dutch for the issuance Of warnings to the Japanese against taking
such aggressive action” (R. 9–10–11). The situation was delicate.
Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson's testimony. The War Council met with
Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The tentative U. S. proposals to the
Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read
it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it:
“Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going
to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all
our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don’t think that there is any chance of
the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic.”
Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the
Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to
this Government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues:
“We are an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Depart-
ment, and I got hold of Marshall.”
4646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by
the action of Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of
Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty.
Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His
diary describes it: .
“Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly
half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself.
There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought
up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as—perhaps
next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warn-
ing, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general
problem.”
Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the entire matter was
left for further consideration.
On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary continues:
“Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his
mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day
(the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that
he had no other proposal at all.”
Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not
to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of
War containing the plan for the “Three Months' Truce.”
Evidently the action “to kick the whole thing over” was accomplished by pre-
senting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the “Ten Points” which they
took as an ultimatum.
It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Am-
bassador Grew so aptly expressed it.
Again Mr. Stimson's diary relates “The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me
he was in doubt whether he would go on with it” (R. 4051-2-3).
Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State
that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the
Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact.
Witness what is says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941:
“The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final
decision had been with the Japanese—whether he had handed them the new
proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested
yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken
the whole matter off. As he put it, “I have washed my hands of it, and it is
now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.’”
His diary continues:
“I then called up the President and talked with him about it.”
He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark,
and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in
his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of
General Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, “A draft memo-
randum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was ex-
amined, and the question of need for further time was discussed” (R. 4054).
The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get more time for
defense preparations and not precipitate the issue evidently did not reach the
President or the Secretary of State in time to be considered befor the memo-
randum of the 26th was delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established
that the sending of this “Ten Point” memorandum by the Secretary of State
was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the attack on
Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed from Tankan Bay on the
27–28 November for its attack on Hawaii. It also appears that the delivery of
the 14-point reply of the Japanese to this memorandum was contemporaneous
with the attack.
4. War Department.—The intentions of the War Department not to precipitate
war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are clear and unmistakable.
The messages sent to the Hawaiian Department show this to be a fact. The Navy
apparently had the same idea because many of their messages likewise So indicate
the situation and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those
meSSages. -
To be concrete: the Navy message of October 16 concluded with the Sentence,
“In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such
preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor constitute
provocative action against Japan”; the message of November 24, from the Navy
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4647
Department to Hawaii said in conclusion : “Inform senior Army officers in respec-
tive areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already
tense situation nor precipitate Japanese action”; the message of November 27,
#472 [52] from the Chief of Staff to General Short says, “The United
States desires that Japan commit the first Overt act . . . these measures should
be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population nor disclose in-
tent”; the message from G–2 on the same day warns against an incident with
Japanese population by saying, “Axis sabotage and espionage probable”. All
this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message of the 27th was
“Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.”
In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of the 27th as
originally drafted started with the opening words, “Negotiations with Japan
have been terminated” (R. 4270) were changed by the Secretary of War after
consultation with the Secretary of State to the softer caution contained in the
Stimson-drafted sentences: “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to
all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Govern-
ment might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpre-
dictable. Hostile action possible at any moment.” Then followed the caution
not to commit the first Overt act.
In continuing on beyond November 27th, was the message from G-2 on November
28, #484, sent by General Arnold which was devoted to sabotage and defensive
measures. On the same day the War Department sent message #482 to Short
with similar tone and tenor. Short replied to #482 on the 28th with a very long
message all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communications
with Short by the Army until the final message of December 7, which arrived too
late.
Short was never informed of the Secretary of State's action in delivering the
“Ten Points” counter proposals. He testified he first saw or heard of that docu-
ment after the White Papers were published. General Short said, “I knew
nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State
Department paper Came Out.”
The message of November 27th did not convey to Short what it was meant to
convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing, it contained information
and instructions the significance of which should have been appreciated by Short
and his staff.
The two Navy messages of October 16 and 24, both of which cautioned against
precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short's confusion in interpreting
the message.
The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was heightened by the
message immediately following the one of the 27th. In the first place, Short
had no reaction from the War Department to his reply that he was acting only
to prevent sabotage and to keep contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this
action by the message on the 27th, from G-2, saying, “Actions of sabotage and
espionage probable.” Immediately following that the next day were two additional
message dealing with sabotage and espionage.
From that time on, November 28, until the message that was received after
the attack, Short received no other word by Courier, letter, radio, or otherwise.
The only claim that he received any additional information was that he was told
of messages of December 3, 4, and 6, about the Japanese destroying their codes
and the Navy being instructed to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving
this information.
These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War Department
undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the Hawaiian Department
in a proper state of defense.
The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department
had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of
the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known
to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army,
the Secretary of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question
of fact ; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end
of peace and the beginning of war.
If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been
given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility of the War-
Department to give orders to Short what to do, and tell him to go on an all-out
alert instead of a sabotage alert. º
As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached
G–2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December
4648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General
Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, with a warning from Col-
onel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a Vitally
important message. In fact the message implied war and soon. Whatever Was
the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General
Marshall on the night of December 6th, it was an unfortunate one. And further,
with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this
situation, standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this
vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was responsible for
the organization and Operation Of his own immediate office.
This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu
time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information was given to Gen-
eral Gerow’s Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there
is no evidence of action taken by that Division.
The responsibility of War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action
by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department,
It was in possession of the information which was the last clear Ghance to use
the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full
development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date.
Again, the equally important and vital information of December 7th, the day
of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morn-
ing of December 7. Colonel Bratton made an immediate effort to get the Chief
of Staff at that hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action
was taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest importance.
Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of Japanese inten-
tions, arrangements should have been made for immediate action to further warn
Hawaii and not leave the situation to be acted upon when the Chief of Staff
could not immediately be reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff's
for not providing an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a
situation when he could not readily be reached.
Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the actual state
of readiness of Short's command from November 27th to December 7th, 1941,
though this information was contained in Short's report of action taken on
November 27th.
5. Conflict between the Army and Navy Messages.—The practice of having Gen-
eral Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of the naval messages tended
towards confusion. We have taken Occasion to compare the messages of the
Navy and the Messages of the Army delivered to General Short from October
16 to December 7. We find : }
a. That they were conflicting.
b. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings of a conflict
and the Army messages predominant with the idea of avoiding a conflict
and taking precautions against Sabotage and espionage.
Short naturally took his choice between the two types of messages and followed
that of the War Department. Examination of the Navy messages of October 16,
24, November 27, December 3, 4, and 6, will show that their [53] tenor Was
predominantly war. One Army message of November 27 and two of November 28
predominated in antisabotage warnings.
Furthermore, the Navy message of November 27 and the Army message of
November 27 from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the Navy message flatly
stated, “This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to
stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended.” Now, contrast the opening sen-
tences of the Army message which indicates that negotiations may still continue,
where it says: “Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes. Only barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come
back and offer to continue.”
The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precautions against
Sabotage or overt acts, and no precautions as to the civilian population. To the
Contrary, the Army message gave explicit directions on this subject. This was
followed on the same day by a G-2 message, which said, “It appears that the
conference of the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage
and espionage probable.” The Navy war warning was further diluted in its
effect upon Short by the Arnold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November;
and the additional G–2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These November 28
ºnse messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on his sabotage
alert.
Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was given no
further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE - 4649
There is no explanation why Short was not told of the so-called ultimatum.
It was known to the Japanese because it was handed to them.
6. Military Intelligence Division.—Within the scope of its activities, this Divi-
sion performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital data. Through Colonel
Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of this information to Field Commanders,
There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not touched
by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government, either military
or civil. In this field were the Mandated Islands, the home land and the home
waters of the Japanese Empire, and the areas in which the Japanese Navy and
Army were operating.
In these fields, reliance was placed upon sources of information which were
inadequate. The Japanese Navy was lost to us for considerable periods in those
months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force which made the attack
on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled at Tankan Bay, and notwith-
standing that it was a relatively large convoy, sailed for thousands of miles
without being discovered. Part of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at
Pearl Harbor and on Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was
primarily a naval job, but Obviously the Army was intensely interested. Else-
where in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese had
assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and is not repeated
here.
Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G–2 in 1941, testified
as follows:
“But to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence
officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force
or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was
beyond our terms of efficiency” (R. 107).
The advantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The
Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them.
This was a problem of all Our Intelligence agencies. This should not come to
pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part
which we are to play in world affairs.
We must know as much about other major World powers as they know about
us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those
charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our secu-
rity. Our Intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It
must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M. I. D. It is a
national problem.
In the past our Intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of
interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct
all of these. *
7. War Plans Division.—The War Plans Division, the supervising agency
for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was charged with directing
the preparation of and co-ordinating the war plans for Hawaii. It had the
responsibility and duty to insure the implementing of such plans.
Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General Short
(and there were no letters from General Marshall to General Short after the
first of November 1941) no action after November 1, 1941, appears to have been
taken by way of communications or inspections, or full report of any sort, to
reveal whether General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it cor-
rectly, what his problems were, and what help could have been given him.
The War Plans Division took no action when Short put the Alert Number 1
into operation and so reported. It took no steps to stop the use of the Hawaiian
Department as a training station and put it on a Combat basis, such as an out.
post should have been, with threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the
Hawaiian defenses were being implemented and built according to schedule and
the right priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its
defense on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate the building
of defenses with his other defense preparations.
General Gerow’s own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organization and
management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas Departments, such as the
Hawaiian Department. The War Plans Division was responsible for the Over-
seas Department, said General Gerow (R. 4334–4335). The War Plans Division
was familiar with the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for
radar (R. 3425). It was their duty to do all they could to correct the deficiencies
but there is no proof that any action was taken (R. 4325–4326). The War Plans
Division was responsible for drafting the operational messages to the Hawaiian
4650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Department. Gerow was responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and
managed the drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he
failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried out and that
was the War Plans Division's responsibility.
He said:
“Admiral STANDLEY. Then who would have been interested in following up
that message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not?
“General GERow. The War Plans Division, Sir, should have been—
“Admiral STANDLEY. War Plans Division.
“General GEROW. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir.
“Admiral STANDLEY. That was not done then?
“General GERow. No, sir, it was not.
1. sk 1. & 1. 1. 1.
“Admiral STANDLEY. Then those instructions went by the board; nobody fol-
lowed them up, then 2
“General GEROw. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th.”
(Roberts Report 1857–1858).
And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that the reply
of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number, referred to that message.
He thought it referred to a G-2 message (Roberts Report 1857–1858).
[54] He also testified as follows:
“General GRUNERT. Without such co-ordination, there was liable to be confusion
and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that
the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff?
“General GEROW. It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting
concurrences between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something that
was going to be sent out” (R. 4336).
10: xx 1ſt sº & 1. N.
“General GEROW. The co-Ordination of concurrences, and then most of these
important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff.
“General GRUNERT. Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff?
“General GEROW. No. -
“General GRUNERT. It appears you do not know just who does it, do you?
“General GERow. Well, no sir” (R. 4337).
He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to co-ordinate all mes-
sages of the War Department that went to Our Overseas possessions (R. 4338).
Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as follows:
a. General Gerow failed to take action on Short's reply showing that he
was taking precautions against Sabotage only. He again failed to take action
in that he assumed liaison with the Navy meant Short was taking the correct
steps. The documents in the War Plans Division shows that the Navy's
responsibilities did not not start until war was imminent or had taken place
and that some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department
putting the agreements into effect was necessary.
b. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of November 27.
c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available information.
As Gerow testified as to Short's reactions to the message of the 27th : “No one
knows what he would have done had he been in that position and not having
perhaps all information we had here” (R. 1851).
d. BHe did not check on the Hawaiian Department's activities to determine
its state of readiness from November 28 through December 7 (R. 4306).
e. He relied upon the message of November 27 to give Short all the infor-
mation he needed for full preparation for war, but did not check to find out
if that was a fact (R. 4256).
f. The joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bellinger under
the joint agreement of General Short and Admiral Bloch as approved by
Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was the prime threat against
Hawaii; and when General Gerow was advised in a conference with the
Secretary of War and the report to the Secretary of War from the Secretary
of State, in addition to the Intelligence information with which he was pro-
vided as to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent upon
him to do two things which he failed to do :
(1) To correct Short's mistake in going to Alert Number 1 instead of to
Alerts Number 2 or 3; and -
(2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal
Defense Plan to put the Army, in conjunction with the Navy, on a complete
war footing, ready for any eventuality. h
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4651
8. Navy Department.—The Navy Department undertook by a signed agree-
ment to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It assumed this re-
sponsibility admittedly without means of carrying it out in Hawaii.
The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy submarines
in the outer harbor between six and seven a. m. the morning of December 7.
The Navy failed to advise Short of the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate
the information for himself.
9. Chief of Staff.-The responsibility for the conditions in the military com-
ponent of the War Department as depicted in this chapter rests with the Chief
of Staff. -
At about this time, November 25–December 7, 1941, there seemed to have
been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was imminent but also
there seems to have been the conviction that it would start in the Southwest
Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief that Hawaii was immediately in
danger. There was the belief both in Hawaii and in Washington that war was
on our doorstep but not on Hawaii's doorstep. This resulted in the main con-
sideration being given to General MacArthur and the Philippine Islands and
the resulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The un-
fortunate thing was that the Japanese “crossed us up” with a daring surprise
attack. When the famous November 27 message was being prepared, considera-
tion first was given to send it only to MacArthur and then it was decided to
include Panama, Hawaii and the Western Defense Command. This shows the
trend. . -
As a result of the message of November 27 Short ordered only a sabotage
alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same day. The import
of Short's reply was little noticed in the War Department by either General
Marshall or General Gerow. Just as General Short failed to interpret the full
Seriousness of the November 27 message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the
Chief of the War Plans Division failed to interpret the limited defense that
Short's reply indicated in the face of known impending war.
There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The Washington
officials had full knowledge of impending events, which full knowledge was not
available to Short. 3×
A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to “follow up” on
directions. The War Department had nine days in which to check up on the
state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do.
Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in February 1941,
General Marshall during this peacetime had written to him at length, advising
him on details of operation and here, late in November, with war expected
almost daily, he communicated none of those personal messages containing
needed inside information.
The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act was dele-
gated or not delegated had its influence on this situation. The Chief of Staff
had three deputies, Generals Bryden, Arnold, and Moore. None of these three
was given the secret information concerning the known Jap intentions. When
General Marshall went away on November 27 he had, prior to departure, pre-
pared a first draft of the November 27 message. It was the Secretary of War
who initially followed through on it on November 27. Then it was given to
Gerow to complete. Complete authority to act in General Marshall's absence
does not seem to have been given to any one subordinate. Had there been an
officer either with authority or with courage to act on the information that was
in the War Department on the evening of December 6, and had he sent a message
to Short, Hawaii should have been fully alerted.
As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in the War
Department that it was only a matter of days before war would ensue and the
War Department had notice that Hawaii was on only a sabotage alert, inade-
quate for full warfare. Had a full war message. unadulterated, been dispatched
or had direct orders for a full, all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been
ready to have met the attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at
both ends of the line. Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii.
Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III.
To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these events there
are specific things which appear in the [55] record with which he was
personally concerned. The following are of this nature:
a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold, and Moore,
of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they might act intelligently
for him in his absence,
4652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the international
situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time.
c. The delay in getting to General Short the important information reach-
ing Washington on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7.
d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short which
presumptively was on his desk on the morning of November 28, 1941.
e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness of the
Hawaiian Command during the period of November 8 to December 7, 1941.
The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering the conduct
of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as it existed in November
and early December, 1941. -
It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible with
all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for successful procedure
in either military or civil affairs. In both of these fields occasional mistakes
are made notwithstanding that such principles are followed. Such was the case
at Pearl Harbor.
This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinking in the War
Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in that it emphasized
probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities.
10. Summary.—In summarizing the “Responsibilities in Washington” it ap-
pears that the issue between the United States and Japan was precipitated
before the Army and Navy could prepare themselves to follow through on the
consequences thereof and that co-ordination and co-operation between the State,
War and Navy departments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect.
As to the War Department's responsibilities there was:
a. A lack of organization for war. -
b. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian
Department and to control its actions. -
c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based upon full
knowledge of its actions and full knowledge of the international situation.
d. Failure on November 26–27, November 28, during the period from
November 28 to December 7, and on December 6 and 7, to take adequate
and prompt action on vital information then at hand.
These responsibilities in no way mitigate those of General Short as Com-
manding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they do add others
to the list of those responsible.
(Chapter V of this report, as well as the conclusions based thereon which
relate to Colonel Wyman, have been omitted in accordance with the statement
of the Secretary of War dated August 29, 1945.)
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS
I. EXPLANATIONS
As a prelude to the citation of conclusions the following is pertinent:
1. Scope.—Attention is called to the fact that the record developed by the
investigation of this Board contains a great amount of evidence, both oral and
documentary, relating to incidents and issues about which no conclusions are
drawn. Evidence was introduced on these so that anything which might have
had a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster would be fully explored. The Board
considered that its mission implied the revealing of all pertinent facts to the end
that charges of concealment would be fully met. In formulating its conclu-
Sions the Board has selected for treatment only those things which it considers
material for a clear understanding of the events which collectively caused the
Pearl Harbor disaster. The full report of the Board discusses and analyzes
the testimony in its entirety and must be read for a clear understanding of the
history of the Pearl Harbor attack.
2. Estimates Upon Which Action Was Based.—The responsible officers in the
War Department and in the Hawaiian Department, without exception, so far
as this Board has been able to determine, estimated the situation incorrectly.
They were influenced in this estimate by facts which then seemed to impel the
conclusion that initially the impending War would be confined to the land and
seas lying south of the Japanese homeland, as forces of the Japanese Army and
Navy were concentrating and moving in that direction. British and Dutch
forces were being organized and made ready to move in opposition. The Philip-
pine Islands which were in this theater constituted a threat to the flank of the
Japanese forces if the United States should enter the war. Supplies and rein-
EXEHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4653
forcemens were being rushed to the Philippines. There was complete ignorance
of the existence of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Intelligent offi-
cers in high places made the estimate and reached the conclusions in the light
of these known facts. They followed a sane line of reasoning. These state-
ments are in explanation, not justification.
The estimate was in error. The procedure in arriving at it was faulty, because
it emphasized Japanese probabilities to the exclusion of their capabilities. Never-
theless, the thinking of these officers was colored and dominated by this estimate
and their acts were similarly influenced. -
3. Relationship of Commanders in Hawaii.-The relations between General
Short and Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, the commanders of the Army
and Navy forces in Hawaii, were very cordial. They were making earnest and
honest efforts to implement the plans which would result in the two services
operating as a unit in an emergency. These highly desirable ends had not been
accomplished at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.
4. Interchange of Information—State and War Departments.—The Board was
impressed with the apparent complete interchange of information between the
State Department and the War Department. As a result the War Department
was kept in close touch with international developments and the State Depart-
ment knew of the Army's progress and its preparations for war.
II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions group themselves logically in two divisions: the Pearl Harbor
attack, and operations of the Engineers in Hawaii. We shall consider these in the
order Stated.
1. Pearl Harbor Attack.-a. The attack on the Territory Of Hawaii was a Sur-
prise to all concerned : the nation, the War Department, and [56] the
Hawaiian Department. It was daring, well conceived, and well executed, and it
caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize its
destructiveness.
b. The extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was due primarily to two causes:
1. The failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department ade-
quately to alert his command for war, and
2. The failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert
taken by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to direct him to take
an adequate alert, and the failure to keep him adequately informed as to the
developments of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which in turn might
have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate One.
c. We turn now to responsibilities:
1. The Secretary of State—the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the
Secretary of State in delivering the counterproposals of November 26, 1941, was
used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the War by the attack on Pearl
Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the
efforts of the War and Navy departments to gain time for preparations for war.
However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable
disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government.
2. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his
relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:
(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an
increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had
an abundance and Short had little.
(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding Gºneral of the
Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize
the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly
that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of Novem-
ber 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war.
(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early
morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate
break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this.
(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Com-
mand between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat
of War.
3. Chief of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Major
General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties, in the following particulars:
(a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, adequately in-
formed on the impending war situation by making available to him, the substance
4654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of the º being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of
Staff, 0–
(b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on
November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the
message of November 27, 1941, (472) which contained confusing statements.
(c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the
November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to
take corrective action. *
(d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agree-
ments between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services
in the manner contemplated.
4. Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieut. Gen. Walter C.
Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars:
(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a
war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which
he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the
tense relations between our Government and the Japanese Empire and that hos-
tilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against
surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be
employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that
the enemy might launch.
--- (b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral cemmand-
ing the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for
implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence
which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which
they might have become Operative was through the joint agreement of the respon-
Sible COmmanders. - º -
(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance
being conducted by the Navy.
(d) To replace inefficient staff officers.
CHAPTER VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations: None.
“. .” GEORGE GRUNERT,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, President.
HENRY D. RUSSELL,
Major General, U. S. Army, Member.
WALTER H. FRANK,
Major General, U. S. Army, Member.
FRIDAY, 20 OCTOBER 1944. -
[57] - STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF WAR STIMSON
On Dec. 1, 1944, I made a public statement in this matter as follows:
“By joint resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of
War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an
investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of Dec. 7,
1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons at the facts might
justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution,
I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there
was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a board of three general officers which
was directed ‘to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by
Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 1941, and to
make such recommendations as it might deem proper.'
“This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking
investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington.
It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have
read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General
of the Army at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and
has given me fully the benefit of his views.
“I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision
taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weigh-
ing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice
and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So
ExHIBITs of JoſNT COMMITTEE 4655
far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my con-
clusions are as follows: ---
“The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or
other action, Concluded that there were Several officers in the field and in the War
Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise
the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded
evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.
“So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I
am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand
his relief from a Command status. This was done On Jan. 11, 1942, and in itself
is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and con-
scientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence
now recorded, it is sufficient action. -
“Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such
inadequacies of either personnel or Organization as were shown to exist either
in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded
does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer
in the Army.
“In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided
that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are .
made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession
of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to
accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where wit-
nesses are engaged in Combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision
will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.
“Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public
during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on
which it is based.” -
Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction,
Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has
made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was
assistant recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate
knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available
and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to
the action to be taken was correct.
Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not
to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and
especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including
the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the FBI, and others. From
these same sources there came to the Government additional information which
resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan.
The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more
fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious
danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication.
It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have
directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public
except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclu-
sions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public.
The War Department will make available to appropriate committees of Congress
the full reports and the record of the testimony.
My conclusions are as follows:
I
The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of
Oahu and Pearl Harbor in so far as the Army was concerned rested upon the
Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short.
It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of
the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various
theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the
Command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their
mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Wash-
ington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has
been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout
the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation.
79716 O—46—pt. 21 9
4656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local
defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local
naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the
General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications
that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans
and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the
local situation and conditions. Before Dec. 7, 1941, detailed plans for the de-
fense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General
Short as well as a joint agreement with the local naval authorities for joint
action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding Officer
had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions
thereof as the Occasion demanded. This last, however, had not been done at
the time of the Japanese attack. -
I find that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until
the latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical
[58] events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on
November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplo-
matic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that
an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were
possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his com-
mand was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that he
was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed
necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington
through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports
from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the
situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a
responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared for the worst
form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates
from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise
raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.
I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War
Department and which was not made available to General Short which would
have modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or
which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus
already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him
a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation, and, as later pointed
Out, I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more
adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I
find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of
being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan.
I. find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received
adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situa-
tion demanded ; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the
disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack
in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for recon-
naissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime neces.
sity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance
Or to Collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should
be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses sufficiently
manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded.
This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience
of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz: the failure to comprehend the
necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which
he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness
than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which
he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger
of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing
Such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his
Command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.
The underlying cause of this error of judgment was General Short's confidence
that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him it must be
borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned,
including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was
undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which
completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly
the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also
knew that the naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better
EXEHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4657
informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their
operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely
The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed
to operations in Southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the
Philippines. 4.
Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the
large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War
Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning
also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the
fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of Nov. 27, 1941, to
the effect that he was “alerted against sabotage.” He urges that this should be
regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think
it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department
warnings and the Department’s caution against alarming the civilian population
coupled with this failure to comment on Short’s report of November 27, confirmed
him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might dis-
regard all others.
But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do
not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an
air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable,
was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only
in case of “no threat from without.” Protection against the possibility of such an
attack was his own definite responsibility.
To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that
there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an
attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against
both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense
against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from
without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as
not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require
several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.
To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from
another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed
than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible
defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his
duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous forms of at-
tack on that outpost to the opinion of another Service. +
Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Depart-
ment of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such
a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his
independent responsibility as a theater commander.
I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my
statement of Dec. 1, 1944, and in my judgment the additional investigation does
not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action
beyond that which has already been taken.
II
Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of
the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War
Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff
specifically charged with the war plans and Operations, and messages to or from
the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War
Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various
officers had specially assigned duties.
[59] The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of
collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sec-
tions of the War Department and to the theater commanders.
I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him
adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the
development of the situation; that he was warned that Japanese future action was
unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no co-
sideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly
directed to take reconnaissance measures—the all-important measure to be taken
at the time.
Furthermore, as heretofore stated, I do not think that any special and detailed
warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justi-
4658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also
his duty. . -
There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to
General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's
attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this infor-
mation was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all Such
information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor,
and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communi-
cated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral
Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent comuni-
cation, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at
Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate. -
The information available to the War Department on or before Dec. 7, 1941,
which was not passed on to General Short included the following: Information
available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government in-
sisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by Nov. 25,
1941, later extended to Nov. 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to
the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that
Japan would yield no further; and information available the morning of Decem-
ber 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply
was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1 P. M.,Dec.
7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Em-
bassy at Washington were to be destroyed.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier
in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent
at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short.
The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, was that the War
Department had information through Secret Sources of information that the
Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had
been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation
shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had
given it to him prior to Dec. 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that
General Short had been fully advised by the War Department that war with
Japan was imminent and might commence at any time.
The War and Navy departments also had certain information which was not
forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu
was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor.
Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese
consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by Officers in the
War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track
of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.
Information was received by the War Department on Dec. 6, 1941, as to what
the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and
that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There
is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until
the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Depart-
ment, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he per-
sonally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the
Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans
Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen Subsequent to the
findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony
and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to
the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional
investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G–2 who received the message
on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after
9 A. M. on the morning of December 7. -
When the Chief of Staff received the above-mentioned information on the
morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to
the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American
Government at 1 P. M. and the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining
cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders
a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions
that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This
was the message, which in the case of General Short, did not arrive until after
the attack.
EXIIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4659
Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which
General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo
about Nov. 20, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in
case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great
Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would
be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed.
I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior
to Dec. 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance
of relations or war with the United States was Subsequently given and made
known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written
evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was
available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed.
With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe
the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short
more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on
the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy departments of the significance
of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack Specifically
on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department
functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne
in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hindsight,
and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with
which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event.
Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which
had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a
report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was
susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage ONLY
and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this
interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the [60] wording of his
message, nevertheless a keener Sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison
of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans
Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might
well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his
subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had
been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief
of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This
was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded
that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made
and no room for ambiguity permitted. -
It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December, 1941, the
responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters.
Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as
the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed,
may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is
understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were
exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must
be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander,
such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention
and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has
been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not be allowed to be distracted
by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible.
Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which
warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the
War Plans Division. -
Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized
and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received
oher assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the
performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps
were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization
as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time
of the Pearl Harbor disaster.
III
The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General
Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the
Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl
Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for
£
4660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
some of the shortcomings ºf the officers of the General Staff which I have just
enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from
a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations
with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of
the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in
detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount
duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for
and supervise the organization, equipment, and training of a great army for a
global war; to advise On, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems
of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop
and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United
States. It would hopelessly cripple the performance of these great and para-
mount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in
administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many
OutpostS.
It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its
duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the
responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective
Organization. But I do not find any such situation in this case. The scattered
and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor
disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff
which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with sub-
sequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of
the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be
attributed to the Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I
believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency.
IV
The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and
errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the
Roberts Commission in their report of Jan. 23, 1942 * and the Army Pearl Har-
bor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War
Plans Divisions are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with
the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission
did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to
the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance
with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agree-
ment With the conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of
my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.
V
In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with
responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be
construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his con-
duct of the negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might
have prolonged the negotiontions until such time as the Army and Navy were
better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what
amounts at best Only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in
this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.
WI
There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solely with the related investiga-
tion of Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed
On Dec. 1, 1944, were as follows:
“I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this
review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused
by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawai-
ian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman,
or other directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there
* This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts : Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired;
Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired ; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired; and Major Gen.
eral Joseph T. McNarney. +
ExHIBITs of JoſNT COMMITTEE 4661
is any evidence that Rohl, or anyone else directing such construction gave any
information to the enemy.”
The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no
further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.
I also stated on Dec. 1, 1944, that “as to other alleged misconduct and neglect
of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the ques-
tion of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and
the Judge Advocate General.” Until those officials are ready to report, I deem it
inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
report insofar as it relates to Golonel Wyman.
[61] NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY
FINDINGS OF FACTS
I
Pearl Harbor is situated on the Island of Oahu, near the city of Honolulu, the
capital of the Territory of Hawaii, distant 2,100 miles from San Francisco. It
is the only permanent outlying United States Naval Base in the Eastern Pacific.
It possesses great strategic importance as a point from which naval operations in
defense of the Western United States can be conducted, and Offensive Operations
against an enemy to the westward launched and supported. The United States
possesses no base on the West Coast of the United States that meets these require-
ments to an equivalent extent. -
II
Prior to 1940 certain subdivisións of the Pacific Fleet and, beginning in May,
1940, the entire Fleet operated in the Hawaiian area with Pearl Harbor as a base.
In May, 1941, three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four cruisers, and nine
destroyers were detached from the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.
For the purpose of conducting exercises and maneuvers at sea designed to in-
crease efficiency and readiness for war, the remaining major vessels of the Pacific
Fleet were organized in three main Task Forces. The operating schedule was
so arranged that there was always at least one of these Task Forces, and usually
two, at sea. Frequently, during Fleet maneuvers, the entire available Fleet was
at Sea.
The vessels and the Fleet planes thus rotated their scheduled periods in port,
periods essential to the mobility of the Fleet for purposes impossible of achieve-
ment at sea. At no time during 1941 were all the vessels of the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor.
The operating schedule in effect on 7 December, 1941, was issued in September,
1941. In accordance with its provisions Task Force One, under the command
of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N., and part of Task Force Two were in Pearl
Harbor at the time of the attack. Task Force Three, under the command of Vice
Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. N., was at sea, engaged chiefly in escorting the air-
craft carrier Leavington to Midway, to which point planes were being ferried.
Part of Task Force Two, under the command of Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey, Jr.,
U. S. N., and including the aircraft carrier Enterprise, was returning from ferry-
ing planes to Wake.
Task Force One included the preponderance of the battleship strength of the
Fleet. The three battleships of Task Force Two had been left behind in Pearl
Harbor because their slow speed did not permit them to accompany the ENTER-
PRISE to Wake. It was purely a coincidence that all battleships of the Pacific
Fleet, except one undergoing overhaul at the Puget Sound Navy Yard, were in
Pearl Harbor on 7 December.
III
Beginning at 0755, Honolulu time, on 7 December, 1941, an attack was delivered
from the northward of Oahu by Japanese carrier aircraft against units of the
United States Pacific Fleet then moored and anchored inside the Pearl Harbor
Naval Base, against Army and Navy aircraft, and against shore installations
On the Island of Oahu. An attack delivered simultaneously by Japanese midget
Submarines was without effect. The details of these attacks and the extent of
4662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the loss of life and of the damage inflicted by Japanese aircraft have since been
made matters of public record.
Within the same 24 hours the Japanese also delivered attacks on the Philip-
pines, Wake and Guam, as well as on Hong Kong and Malaya. The attack on
Pearl Harbor cannot be disassociated from these. All were the reprehensible acts
of a warrior nation, war-minded and geared to war through having been engaged
in hostilities for the past four years, and long known to have aggressive designs
for the dominance of the Far East. The United States was then at peace with
all nations and for more than 20 years had not engaged in hostilities.
In time of peace it is a difficult and complicated matter for the United States
to prevent an attack by another nation because of the constitutional requirement
that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck until
after a hostile attack has been delivered. This is a military consideration which
gives to a dishonorable potential enemy the advantage of the initiative, deprives
the United States Of an Opportunity to employ the Offensive as a means of
defense, and places great additional responsibility on the shoulders of Com-
manders afloat in situations where instant action, or its absence may entail
momentOuS COnSequences.
IV
From 1 August, 1939, to 25 March, 1942, the Chief of Naval Operations, charged
by law under the Secretary of the Navy with the operations of the Fleet and
with the preparation and readiness Of plans for its use in war, was Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. N. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet from
1 February to 17 December, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from 7 February to 17
December, 1941, was Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, U. S. A. The Commandant
of the 14th Naval District from 11 April, 1940, until 1 April, 1942, was Rear
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N. He was an immediate subordinate of Admiral
Kimmel and was charged by him with the task of assisting the Army in pro-
tecting Pearl Harbor. With respect to those duties connected with the defense
of Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Bloch's responsibility was Solely to Admiral
Kimmel. It is an established fact that this responsibility was discharged to
the complete satisfaction of the latter.
Admiral Kimmel and Lieut. General Short were personal friends. They met
frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial and co-
operative in every respect and, in general, this was true as regards their subor-
dinates. They frequently conferred with each other on official matters of com-
mon interest, and invariably did so when messages were received by either which
had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation, or
on their several plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his own
responsibility and of the responsibilities wested in the other. Each was informed
of measures being undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to a degree
sufficient for all useful purposes.
For some time preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States, engaged
in the protection of shipping and the patrolling of sea lanes in the Atlantic, was
passing through the preliminary stage of a transition from a state of national
military unpreparedness to an ability to cope successfully with two resourceful
and fully pre- [62] pared enemies. The vigorous and convincing represen-
tations made by Admiral Stark before congressional Committees, beginning in
January, 1940, showed clearly that the Navy was unprepared for War and greatly
needed ships, planes, and men. These representations, linked with the fall of
France, resulted in an Act of Congress in June, 1940, whereby appropriations
were voted for practically doubling the size of our Navy. -
During all of 1941 and for some time thereafter the problem confronting both
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, was one of
expansion and of distributing, to the best advantage, the limited supply of ships,
planes, guns, and men and intensifying the training of personnel while production
was being stepped up.
Under date of 30 December, 1940, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th
Naval District and the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, after conference with Admiral
Richardson, the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Lieut. Gen. Herron,
the then Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, initiated correspondence
addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations in which he set forth the inability of
the 14th Naval District to meet a hostile attack with he equipment and forces
at hand. He pointed out that, as Naval Base Defense Officer, he had no planes
for distant reconnaissance. He gave as his opinion that neither in numbers nor
ſº
f
ExHIBITs of Joint comMITTEE 4663
types were the Army bombers satisfactory for the purpose intended. He invited
attention to the Serious deficiency on the part of the Army with regard to both
fighting planes and antiaircraft guns. He noted also that an antiaircraft warn-
ing system planned by the Army was Scheduled for completion at an indefinite
time in the future.
This letter was forwarded to the Navy Department by Admiral Richardson,
by endorsement. He concurred in the opinion that the Army aircraft and anti-
aircraft batteries were inadequate to protect the Fleet in Pearl Harbor against
air attack, and urged that adequate local defense forces be provided. He further
expressed the opinion that the forces provided should be sufficient for full pro-
tection, and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the Fleet.
Under date of 24 January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter
to the Secretary of War, based upon the representations made by the Com-
mandant of the 14th Naval District and the recommendations of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and in general concurrence therewith. In this
letter the belief was expressed that, in case of war with Japan, hostilities
might be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or on the naval base at
Pearl Harbor. The dangers envisaged in the order of their importance and
probability were considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack. (2) Air torpedo
plane attack. (3) Sabotage. (4) Submarine attack. (5) Mining. (6) Bom-
bardment by gunfire.
Defense against all but (1) and (2) being considered satisfactory, it was
proposed that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit
aircraft and antiaircraft artillery, and the establishment Of an air warning
net in Hawaii; also that the Army give consideration to the question of balloon
barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving
the defenses at Pearl Harbor; that local joint plans be drawn for defense against
surprise aircraft raids; that there be agreement on appropriate degrees of joint
readiness for immediate action against a surprise aircraft raid; and that joint
execises for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held.
The Secretary of War, under date of 7 February, 1941, expressed complete
concurrence as to the importance of the subject and the urgency of making every
possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. He pointed out that the
Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of all overseas Army departments
and held a high priority for completion of its projected defenses because of the
importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. He outlined the details of
the Hawaiian project and stated the number of pursuit planes and antiaircraft
guns eventually to be supplied. He stated that the equipment for the aircraft
warning system was expected to be delivered in Hawaii in June, 1941, and that
all arrangements for installation would have been made by the time the equip-
ment was delivered.
Copies of these letters were furnished Admiral Kimmel, Lieut. Gen. Short,
and Rear Admiral Bloch.
In a letter dated 17 October, 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch reported to the Chief
of Naval Operations that the only increment that had been made to the local
defense forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, was the U.S.S.
Sacramento, an old gunboat of negligible gun power and low speed. He urged
that the Department send a number of small fast craft equipped with listening
gear and depth charges for antisubmarine purposes and further urged that he
be sent two squadrons of VSO planes to be used for patrol against enemy
submarines.
Admiral Kimmel forwarded this letter with the following endorsement:
“There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department to
furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs
may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet, may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case,
the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base
by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea
is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in
the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which
requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can possibly
be made available. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary
measures in meeting the Commandant’s needs.”
The Chief of Naval Operations replied, under date of 25 November, 1941, that
no additional vessels could be supplied for the present but that certain sub chasers,
due for completion in May, 1942, had been tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval
4664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
District, certain privately owned vessels might be expected at a future time, and
that there were no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval
District. -
It is a fact that, through 1941, the demand for munitions and war supplies
exceeded the capacity of the nation and in all important commands there existed
marked deficiencies in trained personnel and in material equipment and instru-
ments of war. Although shortages were inevitable, it is a further fact that they
had direct bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor.
VII
On 5 November, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff,
U. S. Army, submitted a joint memorandum to the President, recommending that
no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time and giving, as one of the basic
reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet over the U. S.
Pacific Fleet. *
On 7 December, 1941, the U. S. Pacific Fleet was numerically inferior to the
Japanese naval forces in both combatant and auxiliary vessels.
Aware of this existing weakness in relative fighting strength, and of the
vigorous steps being taken by the United States to overcome deficiencies, Japan
early sensed the advantage of striking before these steps could become effective.
Her advantageous position was strengthened by her extensive espionage system
which utilized her civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the
world, and enabled her constantly to keep accurately informed of the U. S.
naval building program and of the location and movements of U. S. naval vessels.
The topography of Oahu is peculiarly suited to the observation of Pearl Harbor
and its activities. The local [63] officials of the United States were unable
to overcome Japan's advantage in this respect. It was impossible for them to
prevent anyone from obtaining military information and, because of legal restric-
tions imposed by the federal statutes, they could not interfere with the mails and
the transmission of messages by radio, telegram, and cable.
In addition, haveing in mind Japan's traditional tendency to distort legitimate
actions of a peaceful nation into deiberate threats to her own Security and
prestige, the War and Navy departments were compelled to take every precaution
to avoid offending her supersensitive sensibilities. For example, as of 16 October
1941, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, to “take such preparatory deployments as will not constitute provocative
action against Japan” and, on 28 November 1941, the War Department directed
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to “undertake no offensive
action until Japan has committed an overt act.”
In contrast with the ease with which Japanese in United States territory, par-
ticularly in Hawaii, were able to obtain and transmit to Japan military informa-
tion of value, every obstacle was placed in the way of such information being
collected in Japan by foreign nationals.
As an instance of Japan secretiveness and surveillance of foreigners, including
those of the U. S. diplomatic services, the U. S. naval attache in Tokyo was com-
pelled to report to the Japanese Navy Department whenever he contemplated an
excursion beyond the limits of the city, and he was closely watched at all times.
He was effectively prevented from obtaining any information as to the type and
number of Japanese ships under construction and the capacity of their naval
shore establishment, as well as of the location and movements of Japanese ships.
It is a fact that the superiority of the Japanese Fleet and the ability of Japan
to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial advantage not attain-
able by the United States up to 7 December 1941.
VIII
A naval base exists solely for the support of the fleet. The fundamental re-
quirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured
demands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided
for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security
of the base, or for that of the vessels within its limits. Periodical visits to a base
are necessarily made by mobile seagoing forces in order that logistics support
may be provided and opportunity given for repair and replenishment, for rest
and recreation, and for release of the personnel from a state of tension.
To superimpose upon these essentials the further requirements that the sea-
going personnel shall have the additional responsibility for security from hostile
EXIIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4665
action while within the limits of a permanent naval base is to challenge a
fundamental concept of naval warfare.
There is not, and there has not been, any lack of understanding on the part of
the Army and Navy on this point. The defense of a permanent naval base is the
direct responsibility of the Army. The Navy is expected to assist with the means
provided the naval district, within whose limits the permanent naval base is
located and the defense of the base is a joint operation only to that extent. To
be adequate, the defense must function effectively during the periods when the
Commander in Chief and all the units of the Fleet are absent.
In the case of naval districts lying beyond the continental limits of the United
States, the commandant of the district occupies a dual status. As commandant
of the district, he is governed by all existing instructions relating to the duties
of commandants of naval districts and is answerable direct to the Navy Depart-
ment. He is also an officer of the Fleet and as such is under the Commander in
Chief of the Fleet for such duties as the latter may designate.
The fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was thus designated
as an officer of the Pacific Fleet is the circumstance that links the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, with the duty of assisting the Army in defending the perma-
nent naval base of Pearl Harbor. Except for this, the chief responsibility of
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was for the readiness, the efficiency, and
the security of the vessels of the Fleet while at sea. It is through gaining and
maintaining control of Vital Sea areas that a Fleet contributes to the defense of
the Shore and its activities.
The defense of the permanent naval base of Pearl Harbor was the direct re-
Sponsibility Of the Army.
IX
Under date of 27 February 1941, the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Rear
Admiral Bloch, in his capacity as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued an operations
plan establishing security measures, including air defense and surface ship
patrol, in order to co-operate with and assist the Army in protecting Pearl Harbor
and Safeguarding Fleet.
Under date of 28 March 1941, joint agreements were reached between Lieut.
Gen. Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, as to joint security measures for the pro-
tection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. It was agreed that when the threat
of a hostile raid Or attack was considered sufficiently imminent to warrant such
action, each commander was to take such preliminary steps as were necessary
to make available without delay to the other commander such portion of the air
forces at his disposal as the circumstances warranted.
Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels were to be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Army bombardment strength to participate
in each such mission was to be determined by the Commander, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, the number of bombardment planes released to Navy control to be the
maximum practicable.
Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu were to
be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Commandant, 14th
Naval District, was to determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these
missions, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control to be the maxi-
mum practicable.
When naval aircraft under the command of the Naval Base Defense Officer
Were insufficient for long-distance patrol and search operations, and Army air-
craft were made available, the Army aircraft so made available were to be under
the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
The Naval Base Defense Officer was entirely without aircraft, either fighters
or patrol planes, assigned permanently to him. He was compelled to rely upon
Fleet aircraft for joint effort in conjunction with Army air units. The Com-
mander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N., was by
Admiral Kimmel placed under Rear Admiral Bloch's orders, and was by the
latter directed to consult with the Army and to prepare a detailed naval partici-
pation air defense plan. Rear Admiral Bellinger thus was given the additional
status of the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, while retaining his
Status as an air Officer of the Fleet.
Under date of 31 March 1941, plans were drawn up and jointly agreed upon
by Rear Admiral Bellinger and Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding
Hawaiian Air Force. These plans were complete, and their concept was sound.
Their basic defect lay in the fact that the naval participation depended entirely
upon the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet. This [64] circum-
4666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stance was forced by necessity, but was at complete variance with the funda-
mental requirement that, to be adequate, the defense of a permanent naval base
must be independent of assistance from the Fleet.
The effectiveness of these plans depended entirely upon advance knowledge
that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of tims? and the plans
were drawn with this as a premise. It was not possible for the Commander in
Chief of the Fleet to make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base
Defense Officer, because of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews and because
of the demands of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at Sea.
X
Shortly after assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel issued
specific comprehensive instructions as to the steps to be taken for the Security
of the Fleet in the operating sea areas. Aware of the inadequacy of the shore
defenses of Pearl Harbor, he also required the vessels, while at the base, to assist
to the limit of their resources. These instructions were revised and brought to
date on 14 October 1941, were given wide circulation within the Pacific Fleet,
and were sent for information to other commands and to the Navy Department.
The security of the Pacific Fleet, operating in the Hawaiian Area and based
on Pearl Harbor, was predicated on two assumptions:
“(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present
existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and
misguided nationals of such powers may attempt
“(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft. -
(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the
Channel.
(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.
“(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by
(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
(3) a combination of these two.”
The measures prescribed to provide against these possibilities included con-
tinuous inshore, boom, and harbor patrols, intermittent patrol of the inner and
offshore areas by destroyers, daily search of operating areas by air, the covering
of sortie and entry, and daily sweeps for magnetic and anchored mines. The
only entrance to Pearl Harbor was guarded by an antitorpedo net.
The Task Forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and
destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition
was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Water-tight integrity was
maintained, horizon and surface battle outlooks were kept posted, the ships
steamed darkened at night, and the use Of the radio was restricted to a minimum.
Admiral Kimmel, recognizing the potentialities of the submarine as an instru-
ment of stealthy attack and believing that Japanese submarines were operating
in Hawaiian waters, was of the opinion that this form of Surprise attack against
his Fleet was the one most likely to be employed by Japan. Therefore, he had
issued, on his own responsibility, orders that all unidentified Submarines discov-
ered in Hawaiian waters were to be depth-charged and sunk. In so doing he
exceeded his orders from higher authority and ran the risk of committing an
overt act against Japan, but did so feeling that it is best to follow the rule
“shoot first and explain afterwards.”
Actually, in execution of these orders, a midget submarine was discovered
in an operating area, attacked and destroyed by the combined efforts of a naval
patrol plane and a destroyer of the inshore patrol, about an hour prior to the
air attack on the morning of 7 December. There was nothing however, in the
presence of a single submarine in the vicinity of Oahu to indicate that an air
attack On Pearl Harbor was imminent.
It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security
of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective. No naval units were either
surprised or damaged while operating at sea in the Pacific prior to or on
7 December 1941.
XI
While vessels of the United States Navy are lying in port, it is the invariable
custom to keep on board a number of officers and men sufficient to provide for
internal security, and to protect against fire and the entrance of water. The force
so remaining on board is always balanced as to ranks and ratings so that all
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4667
requirements can be met in case of emergency. A watch is maintained day
and night.
In other than normal situations a “condition of readiness” is placed in effect.
On the morning of 7 December considerably more than half of the naval personnel
were on board their ships in Pearl Harbor, more than ample to meet an emergency
in port. Their efficiency and their heroic behavior on that day are proof of their
fitness for duty.
The Navy's practice in numbering its three prescribed “conditions of readiness”
is opposite to the method adopted by the Hawaiian Department of the Army in
numbering its “alert.” With the Army, the No. 3 alert represents the maximum
State of readiness, while the Navy refers to that state as No. 1. In the interest
of clarification, definition of the respective states of readiness is here set forth :
ARMY ALERTS NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINEss
No. 1 Defense against sabotage and up- No. 1 Entire crew, officers and men at
risings. No threat from without. battle Stations. Action imminent.
No. 2 Security against attacks from hos- No. 2 Provides the means of opening fire
tile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, immediately with one half the arma-
in addition to No. 1. - ment. Enemy believed to be in vicin-
- - ity. -
No. 3 Requires occupation of all field No. 3 Provides a means of opening fire
positions. with a portion of the Secondary and
antiaircraft batteries in case of Sur-
prise encounter.
The alert in effect in the Hawaiian Department of the Army at the time of the
attack was their No. 1. The condition of readiness of the vessels in Pearl Harbor
at that time was an augmented Navy No. 3. This condition had been in effect
for many months preceding that date. To assume a high condition of readiness
in port and to man guns and stations which cannot be utilized in any circum-
stance is to impose on the entire personnel an unjustified state of tension and to
defeat the purpose for which the vessels have entered the base; i. e., to make
repairs, to replenish supplies, to give the personnel rest and relaxation, and thus
to prepare for operations at Sea.
The same holds true with regard to the patrol planes of the Fleet, and to a
Small number of fighters that had been left behind by the absent Carriers. They
were part of the Fleet, engaged in daily operations and, when not [65] Op-
erating, were undergoing Overhaul Or the crews were being rested in anticipation
of further operations. At the time of and immediately prior to the attack on the
morning of 7 December 1941, some were in the air covering the movement of a
task force, Others were on 30 minutes' notice, some Others were On 4 hours' notice,
and the remainder were under Overhaul.
These planes were not part of the permanent defense of Pearl Harbor. To
have kept the crews awake and ready with engines warmed up, in the absence
of any indication of an impending attack, would have been to undermine their
further usefulness. 4.
The Navy controlled none of the guns mounted on shore. The only means
available to the vessels of the Fleet for contributing to their own defense against
aircraft while in Pearl Harbor was their antiaircraft batteries. The antiair-
craft batteries installed on the ships in Pearl Harbor were incapable of a volume
of fire at all comparable to that of the batteries of the same ships today.
On all ships inside Pearl Harbor a considerable proportion of the antiaircraft
guns was kept manned day and night and with ammunition immediately at hand.
Also, by prearrangement with the Army, there Was in effect a system, correct
as to its details, for the co-ordinating of the antiaircraft fire of vessels of the
Fleet in port with that of the Army on shore. -
Existing Fleet orders provided for the establishment of air defense sectors
within the Pearl Harbor area, and for the berthing of ships within the Harbor in
such positions as to develop the maximum antiaircraft gun fire in each sector,
commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. -
These orders were carried out to the letter. On the morning of the attack the
vessels of the Fleet brought hostile planes, as they came within one or more of
these air defense sectors, under heavy fire intensified within a very few moments
by the full fire of the entire antiaircraft batteries of all ships.
It is a fact that the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of
7 December 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the
vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness
could have added little, if anything to their defense.
4668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
XII
An attack by carrier aircraft can be prevented only by intercepting and
destroying the carrier prior to the launching of planes. Once launched, the
attacking planes can be prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or
antiaircraft gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted,
engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire, some of the attacking planes rarely
fail to get through and inflict damage.
To destroy an aircraft carrier before she can launch her planes requires that
her location be known and that sufficient force, in the form of Surface or under-
water craft, or aircraft, or all three, be at hand. To have the necessary force at
or near the point of intended launching in time to insure the destruction of the
carrier, it is necessary that the carrier's presence in a general area, and within
narrow limits of time, be known or predicted with reasonable accuracy. Even
in time of War the fulfillment of this condition is difficult where vast Sea areas
are involved, and where both the point from which the carrier departs, as well
as the fact of her departure, are unknown.
This was the case during the days immediately prior to 7 December 1941.
Japanese carriers sailed at an unknown time from an unknown port. Their
departure and whereabouts were a closely guarded Japanese secret and were
likewise unknown, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding.
Although the U. S. Ambassador to Japan reported, as of 27 January 1941,
that there was a rumor to the effect that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was
planned, its authenticity was discounted in the Embassy for the reason that
such an attack, if actually contemplated, would scarcely be likely to be a topic
of Conversation in Japan. -
The Navy Department informed the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, of this
rumor and stated that the Navy Department “places no credence in these rumors,
Furthermore, based on known data regarding the present disposition and em-
ployment of Japanese naval and Army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor
appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.”
In time of war, an outlying naval base may be expected to become an enemy
objective, SOoner or later. It is an established fact, however, that no informa-
tion of any sort was, at any time, either forwarded or received from any source
which would indicate that carriers or other ships were on their way to Hawaii
during November or December, 1941.
The attack of 7 December 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circum-
stances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was
unpredictable. --
XIII
Where a carrier's presence in a general area is not known in advance and is
not predictable within narrow limits of time, there must be resort to procedure
which will give warning of a hostile approach. The usual procedure employed
by Carriers bent on delivering a surprise attack, although by no means the only
procedure possible, is to arrive about 700 miles from the objective at dark the -
night preceding the attack, steam at high speed during the night, and launch
the planes at dawn, about 400 miles from the objective. It is this general pro-
Cedure Which establishes early morning as the time when an air attack is most
likely to be delivered. The events of 7 December 1941 point to the likelihood of
this procedure having been followed by the Japanese.
The greatest degree of warning of an impending early morning air attack is
obtained if the hostile carrier be sighted prior to dark the night before. In
such event, a maximum warning of about 12 hours may be obtained. In the
case of an island base, such as Pearl Harbor, it is necessary to cover the circum-
ference of a circle of 700 miles radius each day (the direction from which the
attack is expected being unknown) in order to obtain either positive or negative
information.
Assuming 25 miles visibility (which in the Hawaiian area is not found every-
where nor always assured), an effective daily search requires the daily employ-
ment of 90 patrol planes which, in turn, requires that double or triple that num-
ber (180–270) be available, it being impossible to employ the same planes and
Crews every day, or even every other day.
If only the dawn circle of 400-mile radius is to be searched daily, the total
number of planes required to be available is 100–150. The maximum Warning is
then reduced to about two hours, -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4669
Where planes are not available to cover all sectors, the selection of sectors
to be omitted is left purely to chance and under such circumstances the advis-
ability of the diversion of all planes from other duties is questionable unless
there be information as to the fact of a hostile approach and of the direction,
within reasonable limits, from which the approach is expected.
Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to perform
this duty, even if the necessary number be available. The resulting dispersion of
strength not only renders the Fleet incapable of performing its proper function,
but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface
ships and submarines over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously
guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown
time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war.
[66] It was the duty of Rear Admiral Bloch, when and if ordered by the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and Sound reasons and after mak-
ing provision for such reconnaissance in case of emergency, specifically or-
dered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed
full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not
due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached
after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after
weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved.
In brief, the deciding factors were:
(a) The Naval Base Defense Officer, Rear Admiral Bloch, although charged
with the conduct of the reconnaissance, had no patrol planes perma-
nently assigned to his command.
(b) The only naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian area were the 69 planes
of Patrol Wing Two and these were handicapped by shortages of relief pilots
and crews. They were a part of the Fleet, and not a part of the permanent
defense of Pearl Harbor. The only other planes suitable and available for
daily long-range reconnaissance were six Army bombers.
(e) The fask assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to
prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent
he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in
patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war
were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or
other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the
light of available information.
(d) If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war would be
reduced because of the enforced Suspension of Fleet Operations. .
(e) The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would be reduced
seriously after a few days because of the inability of planes and crews to
stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance.
It is a fact that the use of Fieet patrol planes for daily long-range, all-around:
reconnaissance was not justified in the abscence of information indicating that
an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time. It is a further
fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with he inadequate number of
Fleet planes available. -
XIV
At the time of the attack, only a few vessels of the Pacific Fleet were fitted
with radar. The radar of vessels berthed in a harbor such as Pearl Harbor,
partially surrounded by high land, is of limited usefulness at best and does not
provide the necessary warning of a hostile approach.
The shore-based radar on the Island of Oahu was an Army Service and entirely
under Army control. The original project called for 6 permanent (fixed) and
6 mobile installations. The fixed installations had not been completed by 7
December 1941 and only 3 sets had been shipped to Oahu up to that time. On that
day there were in operation 5 mobile sets located in Selected positions, with
equipment in efficient condition, but inadequately manned.
Training of personnel had started on 1 November 1941. Lieut. Gen. Short
earlier had requested that the Navy assist in this training, and 15 of his men
had been sent to sea on vessels of the Fleet for that purpose. Admiral Kimmel
also had detailed the Pacific Fleet Communication Officer as liaison officer with
the Army. He could not supply six other naval officers requested for permanent
duty in the Information Center of the air warning system because no officers
Were available for Such detail.
During the second week of November, 1941, Commander W. G. Taylor, USNR,
was, by Admiral Kimmel, detailed to the Army Interceptor Command for duty
4670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in an advisory capacity, in connection with the setting up of the Army air warning
system. Commander Taylor had had experience with the British air warning
system and was familiar with radar in the stage of its development that existed
at that time. -
On 24 November 1941, he called a conference for the purpose of determining
how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime
basis, and to decide what additional personnel and equipment would be needed.
Two naval officers and 6 Army officers were present at this conference.
The minutes of the conférence, concurred in by all present, included an exhaus-
tive statement of deficiencies and the steps to be taken for their remedy. Copies
of the minutes were furnished the Conferees and copies were forwarded to the
Acting Commanding Officer of the Interceptor Command, and to the Acting
Signal Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Steps agreed upon as
necessary for the improvement of the system had not become effective by 7 Decem-
ber 1941. - :-
The Army Interceptor Command was barely in the first stages of organization
by 7 December. Four of its officers had been sent to school on the mainland in
order to fit them for their new duties. Until 17 December 1941, the Organization
was on a tentative basis only and the actual Order setting up the Command Was
not issued until that date. One of the principal weaknesses of the Interceptor
Command on 7 December 1941 was that the Information Center had no provision
for keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing
between those friendly and those hostile. -
Between 27 November and 7 December 1941, the Air Warning System operated
from 0400 to 0700, the basis for these hours being that the critical time of possible
attack was considered to be from one hour before sunrise until two hours after
Sunrise. On weekdays training in the operation of the system also took place
during working hours.
On the morning of 7 December the only officer in the Army Information
Center was 1st Lieutenant (now Lieut. Col.) K. A. Tyler, Army Air Corps. He
had received no previous instruction as to his duties, had been on duty there
only once before, and on the morning in question was present only in the capacity
of an observer for training. At 0715 that morning he received a call from the
radar station at Opana, located in the northern part of the Island of Oahu, to
the effect that a large number of planes, bearing approximately north, had been
picked up on the screen. Assuming that these were friendly planes because he
had heard indirectly that a flight of B-17s was en route from Hamilton Field,
California, to Oahu, he did nothing about this report. These B-17s actually
arrived over Oahu during the attack, and many of them were destroyed.
At the Opana station, where this report originated, Private Locard (now 1st
Lieutenant) and Private Elliott (now sergeant) were on duty with instructions
to observe and track flights and report them to the Information Center. Private
Locard had had some previous training but Elliott none. The station was
scheduled to shut down at 0700, but as the truck had not come to take these
men to their camp for breakfast, Private Locard continued to operate the radar
set in order to assist in the training of Elliott.
Shortly after 0700 there was picked up on the screen an unusually large
flight of planes, coming in from a northerly direction at a distance of about
136 miles. Checking the equipment to make sure, Locard decided to call the
Information Center and did so when the planes had come in to 132 miles. Hav-
ing reported the fact to [67] the Army officer on duty (1st Lieut. Tyler),
Locard and Elliott continued to track the planes in to twenty miles from Oahu,
when they lost them due to distortion.
For information of this flight to have been of value as a warning, it would
have been necessary for the planes first to have been promptly identified as
hostile, and then their presence and their bearing and distance immediately
reported to and received by higher authority, and disseminated throughout the
Command. The organization and training of the Information Center and Com-
munication System at this time was not such as to permit these important
requirements to be fulfilled. Actually, the oncoming planes were not identified
as hostile until the Japanese marking on their wings came into view.
XV
The greatest damage to ships resulting from the attack of 7 December was
that inflicted by torpedoes launched from Japanese torpedo planes. These
torpedoes were designed especially for the form of attack in which they were used.
Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE wº 4671
attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions
of restricted length of approach, the best professional opinion in the United
States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not prac-
ticable.
After a study had been made of the problem of protecting vessels in port
against torpedo attack, the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to the Com-
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 15 February 1941, stated that it was
considered that the relatively shallow depth of water (about 45 feet) limited
the need of antitorpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor; and in addition, that the
congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability
of the present type of baffles.
The letter further stated that certain limitations and considerations must
be borne in mind in planning the installation of antitorpedo baffles within
harbors, among which was the following:
(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed neces-
sary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet
of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally
drop torpeodes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots.
Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred
yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but
this may be altered. -
(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels ap-
proaching and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges
and harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
(e) Baffles should be clear of Cable areas, ferry routes, and channels
used by shipping.
(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure
the vessels' Safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane
attack from the land Side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel
attacking planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries
before they can range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon bar-
rages, and aircraft protection. *.
(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within a harbor
from torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force
such as a fleet is based, the installation of Satisfactory baffles will be diffi-
cult because of the congestion. -
On 13 June 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter to the Com-
mandants of the various naval districts, modified limitation (a) by stating that
recent developments had shown that United States and British torpedoes may
be dropped from planes at heights as much as 300 feet and, in some cases, make
initial dives of considerably less than 75 feet with excellent runs, This letter,
however, did not modify the view expressed in the letter of 15 February as to
the need for antitorpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor.
Barrage balloons and smoke were also considered as means of defense but
were rejected, the barrage balloons because they would interfere with the ac-
tivity of U. S. aircraft, and the smoke because the strength of the prevailing
winds would render it ineffective.
The especially designed Japanese torpedo and the technique for its use fall
in the category of the so-called secret weapon, of which the robot bomb and
the magnetic mine are exampleš. Such weapons always give to the originator
an initial advantage which continues until the defense against them has been
perfected. *
It is a fact that by far the greatest portion of the damage inflicted by the
Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due to the Secret development of a
Specially designed torpedo.
XVI
Strained relations between the United States and Japan had existed and
been a source of concern to this country for many months prior to 7 December
1941. That the Japanese policy in the Far East was one of aggression had
been well known for many years. Their program of expansion, which envisaged
79716 O—46—pt. 21—10
4672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Japan as the dominating power in the Western Pacific, was in direct conflict
with the policies of the United States and Great Britain, and opposed to agree-
ments established by treaty. -
At the instigation of the Japanese, negotiations were begun by the State
Department on 12 May 1941, looking to the peaceful settlement of existing
problems. On 17 November 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington
was joined by Mr. Kurusu in the capacity of special envoy. -
On 26 July 1941, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. The order
freezing these assets required a System of licensing shipments to Japan, and no
licenses were issued for Oil Or petroleum products.
There was a feeling on the part of U. S. officials that hostilities, unless prevented
by some means, would become an actuality in the not distant future. They were
familiar with the Japanese trait of attacking without declaration of war, as
had been done against China in 1894, and against Russia in 1904.
The Secretary of State held numerous conferences with the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy, at which the negotiations with Japan were dis-
cussed. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations
attended many of these conferences and were kept informed of the progress of
these negotiations. At the same time efforts to improve the military position of
the United States were being vigorously prosecuted. -
On 16 October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations informed Admiral ſimmel
by dispatch that a grave situation had been created by the resignation of the
Japanese Cabinet, that the new Cabinet would probably be anti-American, the
hostilities between Japan and Russia were a possibility, and that the Japanese
might also attack the United States and Great Britain. In the same dispatch,
Admiral Kimmel was directed to take precautions and to make such deploy-
ments as would not disclose Strategic intentions, nor constitute provocative action
against Japan. -
On the following day, 17 October 1941, Admiral Stark addressed a personal
letter to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated, “Personally I do not believe that
the Japs are going to sail into us and the message I sent you (that of 16 October)
merely stated the ‘possibility.’”
[68] For the purpose of viewing the events of the succeeding months in their
true relation to the events of 7 December, this date of 16 October 1941 may well be
taken as the beginning of a critical period which terminated in the attack of
7 December 1941.
In accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October,
Admiral Kimmel made certain preparatory deployments, including the station-
ing of submarines off both Wake and Midway, the reinforcement of Johnston and
Wake with additional Marines, ammunition, and stores, and the dispatch of ad-
ditional Marines to Palmyra. He also placed On 12 hours' notice certain vessels
Of the Fleet which were in West Coast ports, held six submarines in readiness
to depart for Japan, delayed the Sailing of one battleship which was scheduled to
visit a West Coast navy yard, and placed in effect additional security measures
in the Fleet operating areas. e
He reported to the Chief of Naval Operations the steps taken and received
written approval of his action. He continued the measures which he had already
placed in effect looking to readiness for war, preparation of the Pacific Fleet for
War being his assigned task.
He did not interpret the dispatch of 16 October as directing or warranting that
he abandon his preparations for war. He held daily conferences with his subor-
dinate commanders and the members of his staff, all experienced officers of long
service, and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might.
be incorrect. The Consensus throughout was that no further Steps were war-
ranted by the information at hand.
On 24 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations, addressed also to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
and to Commandants of naval districts with headquarters at San Diego, San
Francisco, Seattle, and Panama, which stated :
“Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful X
This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possi-
bility X Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action ad-
dressees to inform senior Army officers their areas X Utmost secrecy necessary
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese
action X Guam will be informed separately.”
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4673
The contents of this dispatch were made known to Lieut. Gen. Short and dis-
CuSSed with him. *
The reaction on Admiral Kimmel and his advisers was to direct their atten-
tion to the Far East. They did not consider that the expression “a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction” included the probability or imminence
of attack in the Hawaiian area, specific mention having been made of the Philip-
pines and Guam with no mention of Hawaii.
They recognized the capability of Japan to deliver a long-range surprise bombing
attack and that she might attack without a declaration of war. They reasoned
that she would not commit the strategic blunder of delivering a surprise attack
on United States territory, the one course that irrevocably would unite the
American people in War against Japan. Public opinion in the United States Was
far from being crystallized on the question of taking steps to curb her expansion
in the Western Pacific.
Conceivably, Japan might well have taken aggressive action against British
and Dutch possessions in the Far East, gaining the oil and other raw materials
that she was seeking, without military interference from the United States. An
attack elsewhere than in the Far East seemed, therefore, to be only a remote
‘possibility and not enough of a probability to warrant abandonment of the
preparation of the Fleet for war.
To continue these preparations was, therefore, Admiral Kimmel's decision, made
on his own responsibility in the light of the information then available to him
and in the knowledge that every precaution within his power, compatible with
maintaining the Fleet in a State of readiness for war, had already been taken.
On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from the Chief
of Naval Operations, reading as follows:
“This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan
looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an
aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number
and equipment of Japanese troops and the Organization of naval task forces
indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra
Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to Carrying out the tasks assigned. Inform District and Army author-
ities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Continental districts,
Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.”
This dispatch was sent also the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and has
since become known as the “war warning message.”
On the morning following the receipt of this dispatch, Admiral Kimmel dis-
cussed its contents with Lieut. Gen. Short, Rear Admiral Bloch, the flag officers
of the Fleet present, and the members of his staff.
After much further study, Admiral Kimmel and his advisers interpreted the
Warning to mean that war was imminent, and that readiness to undertake active
operations was expected. They were unable to read into it any indication that
an attack against the Hawaiian area was to be expected, particular attention
having been directed to the Japanese activities in the Far East, with objectives in
that area specifically mentioned. No reference was made to the possibility of a
surprise aggressive move “in any direction,” as had been done in the dispatch of
24 November.
There was nothing to indicate that defensive measures should take precedence
over all others. The “appropriate defensive deployment” that was directed was
not interpreted as referring specifically to the Pacific Fleet, in view of the de-
ployments of the Pacific Fleet already made in compliance with the directive
contained in the dispatch of 16 October. In addition, since that date, a squadron
of submarines had been sent to the Philippines, leaving only 5 in Pearl Harbor.
There were Other considerations which no doubt influenced Admiral Kimmel.
The Navy Department's dispatch of 30 November, addressed to the Commander
in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information, ordered
the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to scout for information of Japanese
movements in the China Sea. This appeared to indicate that the authorities
in Washington expected hostilities to occur in the Far East, rather than else-
Where.
On 28 November the Chief of Naval Operations advised Admiral Kimmel that
the Department had requested, and the Army had agreed to, the relief of Marine
garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops, and the replacement of
Marine planes with Army pursuit planes. This action, involving as it did a com-
plicated problem and the movements of sizeable U. S. naval forces westward to
effect their transfer, was an indication of the fact that the authorities in the
4674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
War and Navy departments did not then expect a hostile movement toward the
Hawaiian Islands.
On 28 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations repeated to Admiral
Kimmel the information contained in a dispatch which the War Department,
On 27 November, had transmitted to Lieut. Gen. Short, and other Army addressees,
to the effect that negotiations appeared to be terminated, that Japanese future
action was unpredictable, that hostile action was possible at any mo- [69]
ment, and that it was desirable that Japan commit the first overt act in case
hostilities could not be avoided. Such measures as were undertaken were to be
carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.
To this dispatch Lieut. Gen. Short had replied on 27 November: “Report De-
partment alerted against sabotage. Liaison with Navy.” The steps taken caused
the Army planes to be grouped in such manner as to afford better protection
against sabotage, although militating against their taking the air promptly. In
the absence of a reply from the War Department, Lieut. Gen. Short considered
that the alert he had placed in effect was approved.
Lieut. Gen. Short having, on 28 November 1941, received instructions from the
Adjutant General of the Army to take measures to protect military establish-
ments, property, and equipment against Sabotage, reported in detail the measures
that he had taken and repeated the fact that he had placed in effect Alert (No. 1)
against sabotage. He interpreted the dispatch from the Adjutant General as
further indicating that his alert against Sabotage constituted complete compli-
ance with the War Department’s wishes.
There was no mention in any of the dispatches received by Lieut. Gen. Short,
between 27 November and 7 December 1941, of the possibility or probability of
an attack against Oahu. -
As further evidence of the prevailing sentiment against the liklihood of an
immediate move toward Hawaii, it is a fact that a flight of B-17s from the
Mainland arrived over Oahu during the attack of 7 December, without ammuni-
tion and with guns not ready for firing. -
These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying before
the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came as a
surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy departments, and to the
Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their belief
that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.
From 26 November to 7 December 1941, conversations between Our Govern-
ment and Japan did continue, notwithstanding the statement contained in the
war warning message under date of 27 November 1941, that negotiations with
Japan, looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific, have ceased.
This statement was based upon the note delivered by the State Department
to the Japanese representatives on 26 November, a copy of which was furnished
the Navy Department. It did not in itself discontinue negotiations and conver-
sations, but, on the contrary, gave an “outline of proposed basis for agreement
between the United States and Japan.” The stipulations contained therein were
drastic and were likely to be unacceptable to Japan. -
The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War
and Navy departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the
conditions presented, and that diplomatic relations would be severed or that
war would be declared. The sending of the note therefore began the final phase
of the critical period which culminated on 7 December. *
Although it was stated in the press that a note had been delivered, none of its
contents was given out to the public until after the attack. Admiral Kimmel had
no knowledge of the existence of such a note nor of its contents until many
months after the attack. - X
In a personal letter to Admiral Stark, dated 26 May 1941, he had invited
attention to the importance of keeping commanders, well removed from Wash-
ington, informed of developments and eventualities, Stating :
“The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He
is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing
situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy,
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what
force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting
his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is dis-
turbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes
that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so neces-
sary to the conduct of military operations.
*
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4675
“It is realized that, on Occasion, the rapid developments in the international
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of
the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely
information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improve-
ment. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even
though necessarily late at times, Would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-Orient his possible courses of action to conform
to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situa-
tion, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must
be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training
by strategic dispositions, or otherwise to meet impending eventualities. More-
over, due to this Same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not
too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status
of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that
the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives
rather than by categorical instructions. -
“It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as
they occur and by the quickest secure means available.”
From time to time during this Critical period there was received in the War and
Navy departments certain other important information bearing on the current
situation. The testimony as to this information forms a part of the record of this
Court. The details of this information are not discussed or analyzed in these find-
ings, the Court having been informed that their disclosure would militate against
the successful prosecution of the war.
This information was not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
nor to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. No facilities were avail-
able to them, either in the Fleet or in the Hawaiian area, which would enable
them to obtain the information direct. They were dependent solely upon Wash-
ington for such information. ...
With regard to not transmitting this information, the stand taken by the Chief
of Naval Operations was that the “war warning message” of 27 November com-
pletely covered the situation. The fact remains, however, that this message,
standing alone, could not convey to the commanders in the field the picture as it
was seen in Washington.
Only three other messages were received by the Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet, from the Chief of Naval Operations between 26 November and 7 December
one informing him that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts
in the Far East, Washington, and London to destroy Certain codes, and the other
two relative to the destruction of United States codes at Guam and outlying
islands.
In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy
departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplo-
matic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an attack
in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information was embodied
in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after consulting with the
Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it decoded and [70] Sent to
the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and Hawaii, with instructions
that the naval authorities in those areas be informed of its contents.
The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m., Washington time
(6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at 7:33 a. m.
(Honolulu time). Thus there remained but 22 minutes before the attack began
for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action. Lieut. Gen. Short did not
receive the decoded dispatch until the afternoon of 7 December, several hours
after the attacking force had departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could have
been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. Even in this
event, however, there was no action open, nor means available to Admiral Kim-
mel which could have stopped the attack, or which could have had other than
negligible bearing upon its outcome. There was already in effect the condition
of readiness best suited to the circumstances attending vessels within the limits
of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.
XIX
It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate commanders, par-
ticularly those in distant areas, constantly supplied with information. To fail
to meet this obligation is to commit a military error.
4676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations and responsible
for the operation of the Fleet, and having important information in his possession
during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7 December, failed to
transmit this information to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a
clear picture of the existing Japanese Situation as seen in Washington.
OPINION
Based on Finding II, the Court is of the Opinion that the presence of a large
number of combatant vessels of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor On 7 December
1941 was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and main-
tenance Schedules. -
Based on Finding III, the Court is of the opinion that the constitutional require-
ment that, prior to a declaration of war by the Congress, no blow may be struck
until after a hostile attack has been delivered, prevented the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, from taking offensive action as a means of defense in the
event of Japanese vessels or planes appearing in the Hawaiian area, and that
it imposed upon him the responsibility of avoiding taking any action which might
be construed as an Overt act.
Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between
Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., and Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, U. S.
Army, were friendly, cordial and Co-operative, that there was no lack of appre-
ciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either, and
that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for
the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the com-
mon interest. -
Based on Finding VI, the Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in per-
Sonnel and material which existed during 1941 had a direct adverse bearing upon
the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.
Based on Finding VII, the Court is of the opinion that the superiority of
the Japanese Fleet over the U. S. Pacific Fleet during the year 1941, and the
ability of Japan to obtain military and naval information gave her an initial
advantage not obtainable by the United States up to 7 December 1941. -
Based on Finding VIII, the Court is of the opinion that the defense of the
Pearl Harbor Naval Base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the
Navy was to assist only with the means provided in the 14th Naval District, and
that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. The
Court is further of the Opinion that the defense should have been such as to
function effectively independently of the Fleet, in view of the fundamental re-
Quirement that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured de-
mands that the defense of a permanent naval base be so effectively provided for
and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the sécurity
Of the base, Or for that of the vessels within its limits.
Based on Findings IV, VIII and IX, the Court is of the opinion that the duties
of Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. N., in connection with the defense of
Pearl Harbor, were performed satisfactorily.
Based on Finding IX, the Court is of the opinion that the detailed Naval
Participation Air Defense plans drawn up and jointly agreed upon were complete.
and Sound in Concept, but that they contained a basic defect in that naval
participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging to
and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these
plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that
there would be advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected within
narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning.' -
The Court is further of the opinion that it was not possible for the Commander
in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to make his Fleet planes permanently available to the
Naval Base Defense Officer in view of the need for their employment with the
Fleet.
Based on Finding X, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's action,
taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect comprehensive
instructions for the security of the Pacific Fleet at sea and in the operating
areas, is indicative of his appreciation of his responsibility for the security of
the Fleet, and that the steps taken were adequate and effective.
Based on Finding XI, the Court is of the opinion that, by virtue of the infor-
mation that Admiral Kimmel had at hand which indicated neither the prob-
ability nor the imminence of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and bearing in mind
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4677
that he had not knowledge of the State Department's note of 26 November, the
Navy's condition of readiness on the morning of 7 December 1941, which resulted
in the hostile planes being brought under heavy fire of the ships' antiaircraft
batteries as they came within range, was that best suited to the circumstances,
although had all antiaircraft batteries been manned in advance, the total
damage inflicted on ships would have been lessened to a minor extent and to a
degree which is problematical ; and that, had the Fleet patrol planes, slow and
unsuited for aerial combat, been in the air, they might have escaped and the
number of these planes lost might thus have been reduced.
The Court is of the Opinion, however, that Only had it been known in advance
that the āttack would take place on 7 December, could there now be any basis
for a conclusion as to the steps that might have been taken to lessen its ill effects,
and that, beyond the fact that Conditions were unsettled and that, therefore,
anything might happen, there was nothing to distinguish one day from another
in so far as expectation of attack is concerned.
[71] It has been suggested that each day all naval planes should have been
in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all antiaircraft guns manned.
The Court is of the opinion that the wisdom of this is questionable when it is
considered that it could not be known when an attack would take place and that,
to make sure, it would have been necessary to impose a state of tension on the
personnel day after day, and to disrupt the maintenance and operating schedules
of ships and planes beginning at an indefinite date between 16 October and
7 December.
Based on Finding XII, the Court is of the opinion that, as no information of
any sort, was at any time either forwarded or received from any source which
would indicate that Japanese carriers or other Japanese ships were on their
way to Hawaii during November or December, 1941, the attack of 7 December
at Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumſstances then existing, was unpre-
ventable and that when it would take place was unpredictable.
Based on Finding XIII, the Court is of the opinion that the action of the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range recon-
naissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for
daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was nºt possible with the inadequate
number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any
information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area
Within narrow limits of time.
Based on Finding XIV, the Court is of the opinion that the shore-based air
warning System, an Army Service under the direct control of the Army, was
ineffective on the morning of 7 December, in that there was no provision for
keeping track of planes in the air near and over Oahu, and for distinguishing
between those friendly and those hostile and that, because of this deficiency,
a flight of planes which appeared on the radar screen shortly after 0700 was
confused with a flight of Army B-17s en route from California, and that the
information obtained by Army radar was valueless as a Warning, because the
planes could not be identified as hostile until the Japanese markings on their
wings came into view. -
Based on Finding XV, the Court is of the opinion that by far the greatest
portion of the damage inflicted by the Japanese on ships in Pearl Harbor was due
to specially designed Japanese torpedoes, the development and existence of which
was unknown to the United States. -
Based on Finding XVI, and particularly in view of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral
Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October
1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after
receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue the preparations of the Pacific
Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.
Based on Finding XVII, the Court is of the opinion that, although the attack
of 7 December came as a surprise, there were good grounds for the belief on the
part of high officials in the State, War, and Navy departments, and on the part
of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, that hostilities would begin in the
Far East rather than elsewhere, and that the same considerations which influ-
enced the sentiment of the authorities in Washington in this respect, support the
interpretation which Admiral Kimmel placed upon the “war warning message”
of 27 November, to the effect that this message directed attention away from
Pearl Harbor rather than toward it.
Based on Findings XVIII and XIX, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral
Harold R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the
operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in
4678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information
which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the
morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately information which
appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that
an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.
The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been
conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he
would have taken.
Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no
offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the naval Service.
RECOMMENDATION
The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.
, ORIN G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
EDWARD C. KALBFUS,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
ADOLPHUS ANDREWS,
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), Member.
The Court having finished the inquiry, then at 4 p. m., Thursday, October 19,
1944, adjourned to await the action of the Convening Authority.
ORIN. G. MURFIN,
Admiral, U. S. Navy (Ret.), President.
- HAROLD BIESEMEIER, -
Captain, U. S. Navy, Judge Advocate.
Nov. 2, 1944.
NAVY COURT of INQUIRY—FIRST ENDORSEMENT
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed forces
on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by the
Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. Forwarded for comment and recommendation.
2. The weighing of conflicting evidence and testimony is peculiarly the function
of a Court of Inquiry or Board of Investigation, and not that of the reviewing
authorities. Where the testimony is such as will reasonably support either of
two or more different conclusions, it is not within the province of the Judge
Advocate General to attempt to Substitute his evaluation of the evidence for that
of the Court. But where there is no creditable evidence in a record to support a
finding or opinion, or where the weight of evidence is so preponderantly on one
side that it appears unreasonable to reach a contrary conclusion, the Judge
Advocate General must hold, [72] as a matter of law, that such a finding
or opinion is not supported by the evidence adduced. See CMO 9 of 1928, P. 8;
CMO 12 of 1937, P. 8; CMO 5 of 1936, P. 11.
3. Attention is invited to the following portion of Finding of Fact XVIII:
“In the early forenoon of 7 December 1941, Washington time, the War and
Navy departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in
diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an
attack in the Hawaiian area could be eaſpected 800m.”
4. The Findings, standing alone, may be misleading, in the sense that it may
convey an impression that the Court concluded that responsible officials of the
War and Navy departments did in fact make the inference and deduction under-
scored above. The fact that the Court, in phrasing this Finding, used the past
tense of the verb “appear,” and used the expression “appeared to indicate,” rather
than “should have indicated” lends support to this construction. Such an impres-
sion would not be supported by the record, as the great preponderance of the
evidence before the Court refutes any such conclusion. It is quite clear from the
evidence that the responsible Officials of the Navy Dapartment had evaluated the
information available to them in Washington to mean that a hostile move by the
Japanese could be expected, not in the Hawaiian area, except by submarines, but
rather against Guam, the Philippines, and British and Dutch possessions in
the Far East.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 46.79
5. Those witnesses who, on 7 December 1941, held positions in the Navy Depart-
ment which qualify them to Speak authoritatively as to the prevailing opinion
there just prior to the attack, are all in Substantial accord that the Chief of Naval
Operations and his assistants had not deduced or inferred that an attack in the
Hawaiian area could be expected Soon. On the contrary, the consensus in the
Navy Department was that any attack would probably come in the Far East, and
the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was given a comparatively low
probability rating. Those witnesses who stated that the information available
to the Navy Department clearly indicated, by inference and deduction, that an
attack on Hawaii could be expected, were all officers who were not on duty in the
Navy Department at that time, or Occupied Subordinate positions. Their testi-
mony is opinion evidence, undoubtedly unconsciously colored by hindsight, and
arrived at by a process of Selecting, from the great mass of intelligence reports
available to the Chief of Naval Operations, those which in the light of subsequent
events proved to be hints or indications of Japanese intentions.
6. Therefore, any finding, opinion, or inference that the responsible officials of
the Navy Department knew, prior to the actual attack that an attack on Hawaii
was impending, is not supported by the evidence. The Court recognizes this fact,
as shown by its findings (last paragraph of Finding XVII) that:
“These considerations, and the sworn evidence of the witnesses testifying
before the Court, establish the fact that although the attack of 7 December came
as a surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy departments, and to
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, there were good grounds for their
belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.”
7. The foregoing remarks apply equally to the underscored portion of the
Opion expressed by the Court that : .
“Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for
the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him
in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important informa-
tion which he had regarding the Japanese situation, and especially in that, On
the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately information
which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent,
and, that am attack in the Hawaiian area might be easpected soon.”
As has been previously pointed out, the information herein referred to was not
construed by the Chief of Naval Operations and his principal advisers as indicat-
ing an attack in the Hawaiian area.
8. It is noted that the Court finds (Finding of Fact XVIII) that the time at
which the War and Navy departments had information indicating a break in
diplomatic relations on 7 December 1941, and the possibility of hostile action by
the Japanese on that date, was “in the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington
time.” It is not considered amiss to comment in further detail on this finding,
in view of a widespread misconception in some quarters that this information
was known in Washington on 6 December 1941. The evidence before this Court
establishes, beyond any doubt, that the information referred to was not avail-
able to any responsible official in Washington prior to approximately 10 a. m., the
morning of 7 December 1941.
9. The Judge Advocate General feels constrained to comment on the apparent
contradiction between the Opinion expressed by the Court that the Chief of Naval
Operations failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in failing to
transmit certain information to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the
final Opinion that “no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred
on the part of any person in the naval service. “That is only an apparent, and not
a real, incongruity, is shown by the Opinion that “had this important infor-
mation been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what
action he would have taken.” This statement, as well as the Finding of Facts and
Opinions taken as a whole, indicate that it was the conclusion of the Court, al-
though not clearly expressed, that the evidence adduced did not prove that Admiral
Stark's failure to transmit the information in question to Admiral Kimmel was
the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Fleet on 7 December 1941,
and that any casual connection between this failure on Admiral Stark's part and
the disaster would be entirely speculative. Such a conclusion is fully supported
by the testimony in this record.
10. Subject to the foregoing remarks, the proceedings, findings, opinions and
recommendations of the attached Court of Inquiry are, in the opinion of the Judge
Advocate General, legal.
/S/ T. L. GATCH,
The Judge Advocate General.
4680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6 NOVEMBER 1944.
NAVY COURT of INQUIRY—SECOND ENDORSEMENT
From : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Op-
erations. -
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Secretary Of the Navy on 15 July 1941.
1. I concur in the Findings, Opinion and Recommendation of the Court of
Inquiry in the attached case subject to the opinion expressed by the Judge Advo-
cate General in the First Endorsement and to the following remarks:
[73] 2. (a) As to Facts I and II, the routine practice of rotating units of
the Fleet, so that each vessel had approximately two thirds of its time at sea and
One third in port, was usual and necessary. Definitely scheduled upkeep periods
in port were required, not only for keeping the ships in good mechanical condi-
tion, but, also, for giving the personnel sufficient recreation to keep them from
going stale. Whether or not Admiral Kimmel was justified in having one task
force and part of another in port on 7 December is a matter which I discuss
later On.
(b) In Fact III the Court points out that, because of constitutional require-
ments, no blow against a potential enemy may be struck until after a hostile
attack has been delivered, unless there has been a declaration of war by Congress.
The great advantage which this gives an unscrupulous enemy is obvious. This
requirement made it impossible for Admiral Kimmel and General Short to
employ the Offensive as a means of defense, and, therefore, was a definite
handicap. 1.
(c) Fact IV sets forth that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Ad-
miral Bloch) was subordinate to Admiral Kimmel and was charged by him
with the task of assisting the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kim-
mel was, therefore, responsible for naval measures concerned with local defense.
(d) Fact V sets forth that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were personal
friends; that they met frequently ; that their relations were cordial and coopera-
tive in every respect; that they frequently conferred, and invariably conferred
when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the develop-
ment of the Union States-Japanese situation, or on their several plans in pre-
parting for war. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the
other in the defense of the base to a degree sufficient for all useful purposes.
This is important, in that it refutes the rumors which have been prevalent since.
the Pearl Harbor incident that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not co-
operate with one another. -
(e) Fact VI sets forth the information that the Navy Department and the
War Department had been fully informed as to the weaknesses of the defensive
installations at Pearl Harbor, and in particular that means to COpe With a carrier
attack were inadequate. It further sets forth that the Secretary of War, on 7
December 1941, expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the
subject and the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet a hostile
attack. It is made clear that Admiral Kimmel stressed the concept that the base
at Pearl Harbor should be capable of defense by local Army and Navy forces,
leaving the Fleet free to operate without concern as to the safety of the base.
It is further made clear that both the War and Navy departments had given
full consideration to this matter and had been unable, during 1941, to augment
Tocal defenses to an adequate degree, because of the general State of unprepared-
neSS for War. *
(f) Fact VII sets forth that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
Staff of the Army submitted a joint memorandum to the President on 5 November
1941, recommending that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan at that time, and
giving, as one of the basic reasons, the existing numerical superiority of the
Japanese Fleet over the United States Pacific Fleet. The Court, also, points out
that owing to security policies in the two countries, it was easy for Japan to
conceal her own strength, while at the same time Japan enjoyed a free opportunity
to obtain information as to Our Own Strength and dispositions. My comment is
that this state of affairs, coupled with the requirement that the United States
forces could take no overt action prior to a declaration of war, or actual attack,
must always place the United States distinctly at a disadvantage during the
period of strained relations.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4681
(g) Fact VIII stresses the fact that periodical visits to a base are necessary
for seagoing forces in order that supplies may be provided, and opportunity
given for repair and replenishment and for rest and recreation of personnel. The
Court points out that it is foreign to the concept of naval warfare to require
seagoing personnel to assume responsibility for security from hostile action
while within the limits of a permanent naval base. The Court remarks that this
concept imposes upon the Army responsibility for base defense, and that the
United States Army fully understood this responsibility. My comment is that
this principle is sound enough, but it cannot be carried to an illogical extreme.
In the case of Pearl Harbor, where local defenses were inadequate, the Com-
mander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet could not, and did not, evade responsibility
for assisting in the defense, merely because, in principle, this is not normally
a Fleet task. It appears from the record that Admiral Kimmel appreciated
properly this phase of the situation. His contention appears to be that Pearl
Harbor should have been strong enough for self-defense. The fact that it was
not strong enough for self-defense hampered his arrangements for the employ-
ment of the Fleet, but, nevertheless, he was aware of, and accepted the necessity
for, employing the Fleet in the defensive measures.
(h) Fact IX. This section of the Findings outlines the plans made by Admiral
Kimmel and General Short for the defense of Pearl Harbor. It points out that
the Naval Base Defense Officer was assigned responsibility for distant recon-
naissance, that no planes were assigned to him, but that the 69 patrol planes
belonging to the Fleet were to be made available to him in case of necessity.
The Court remarks that the basic defect of this section of the plan lay in the fact
that naval participation in long-range reconnaissance depended entirely upon
the availability of aircraft belonging to the Fleet, and that this circumstance,
forced by necessity, was at complete variance with the fundamental requirement
that the defense of a permanent naval base must be independent of assistance by
the Fleet. The Court further remarks that the effectiveness of these plans de-
pended entirely upon advance knowledge that an attack was to be expected
within narrow limits of time, that it was not possible for Admiral Kimmel to
make Fleet planes permanently available to the Naval Base Defense Officer (be-
cause of his own lack of planes, pilots, and crews, and because of the demands
of the Fleet in connection with Fleet operations at a base). My comment is that
the Court seems to have overstressed the fact that the only patrol planes in the
area were assigned to the Fleet. In my opinion, it was sound policy to place
all aircraft of this type at the disposal of Admiral Kimmel, whose responsibility
it was to allocate all the means at his disposal as best he could between the Fleet
and the base defense forces. -
(i) Facts X and XI set forth the states of readiness of the forces at Pearl
Harbor. In so far as the Navy is concerned, the state of readiness was predicated
On certain assumptions, which included the assumption that a declaration of war
might be preceded by surprise attacks on ships at Pearl Harbor or surprise sub-
marine attack on ships in operating areas, or by a combination of these two.
The measures prescribed by Admiral Kimmel included local patrols, daily search
of Operating areas by air, certain extensive antisubmarine precautions, the
netting of the harbor entrance, and the maintenance of “augmented Condition
3” on board vessels in port. “Conditions of readiness No. 3” provides a means
of opening fire with a portion of the secondary and antiaircraft batteries in
case of a surprise encounter. The Court points out this state of readiness did
permit ships to open fire promptly when Japanese planes attacked. Local Army
forces were in “Alert No. 1” which provides for defense against sabotage and
uprisings, with no threat from without. With respect [74] to this phase
of the matter I offer the comment that “Condition of readiness No. 3”
is normally maintained in port. However, it is prerequisite that vessels in this
Condition enjoy a considerable measure of protection by reason of adequate local
defense forces when dangerous conditions exist. This measure of protection was
not enjoyed by vessels at Pearl Harbor on 7 December, a matter which was well
known to Admiral. Kimmel. It must, therefore, be assumed that he was not
aware of the imminence of the danger of attack, a matter which I discuss further
later on. I also note from this section of the Findings that Army and Navy
aircraft on the ground, and naval patrol planes moored on the water, were not
in condition to take the air promptly. Some patrol plane Squadrons were in
“day-off for rest” status; some patrol planes were in the air for local patrol and
exercises; 50 per cent were on 4 hours’ notice. This is further indication of the
lack of appreciation of the imminence of attack, and led to the destruction of
4682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
large numbers of United States aircraft. This section of the Findings, also,
points out that there were no long-range reconnaissance in effect on 7 December,
a matter which I will refer to again later on. It will be noted that the last
paragraph of Fact XI reads: - -
“The Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December
1941 was the best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and
patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have
added little, if anything, to their defense.”
This seems to be a matter of opinion rather than fact, I do not concur, for
reasons Set forth later On.
(j) Fact XII. The Court sets forth that attack by carrier aircraft can be
prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior to the launching
of planes. It is further pointed out that to destroy a carrier before she can
launch her planes, her location must be known and sufficient force must be at
hand. The Court points Out that in this instance Japanese carriers Sailed at
an unknown time from an unknown port, and that it is an established fact that
no information of any SOrt was, at any time, either forwarded or received from
any source which would indicate that carriers prother ships were on their way
to Hawaii during November or December 1941. The Court deduces, and states
as a fact, that the Japanese attack on 7 December, under the circumstances
then existing, was unpreventable and unpredictable as to time. I concur that
there was no direct and positive knowledge that the Japanese attack force was
en route to the Hawaiian area. However, as discussed later on, there was infor-
mation that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that an attack on
Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted within fairly
narrow limits. - -
(k) Fact XIII discusses the difficulty of long-range reconnaissance with the
forces available to Admiral Kimmel. and points out that Admiral Kimmel, after
weighing all factors, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnais-
sance be undertaken. The controlling reason seems to have been Admiral Kim-
mel's feeling that if the Fleet patrol planes were used for routine reconnaissance
they would have been rapidly worn out and therefore, unavailable for Fleet pur-
poses. Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this matter. There
were many factors to be considered, and it is not easy to put one's self in his
place. However, after considering all of the information that was at his dis-
posal, it seems to me that he was not on entirely Sound ground in making no
attempt at long-range reconnaissance, particularly as the situation became more
and more tense in the few days immediately preceding the Japanese attack. It
is Obvious that the means available did not permit an all-round daily recon-
naissance to a distance necessary to detect the approach of carriers before planes
could be launched. However, there were certain Sectors more dangerous than
Others which could have been COvered to Some extent. And it would appear that
such partial cover would have been logical in the circumstances as known to
Admiral Kimmsel in late November and early December. A pertinent matter in
this connection is that when Admiral Richardson was Commander in Chief he
provided for distant reconnaissance by patrol planes, using the few at his dis-
posal to cover the most dangerous sectors in rotation. He considered the arc
between 170° and 350° to be of primary importance, and believed the most prob-
able direction of attack was from the southwest. These patrols were discontinued
when, or shortly before, Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Richardson.
(l) Fact XIV. This section sets forth the fact that the Army had assumed
responsibility for the air warning service, and was in the process of installing
radar and other elements of the air warning system, but that the whole system
was in an embryonic state on 7 December and not in condition to function. The
system was partially in use for training, and it so happened that a mobile radar
station d'd pick up the approaching Japanese planes when they were about 130
miles away, and reported this fact to the Information Center, where the only
officer present was an officer under training, who assumed the planes to be a
flight of Army Bombers known to be en route from the United States. He made
no report of the matter. My comment is that this is indicative of the unwarranted
feeling of immunity from attack that seems to have pervaded all ranks at Pearl
Harbor—both Army and Navy. If there had been awareness of the states of
tension that existed in Washington, and awareness of Japanese potentialities, it
appears that the air warning system, embryonic as it was, could have been used
to give at least an hour's warning before the air attack struck.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4683
(m) Fact XV states that the greatest damage to ships in Pearl Harbor
resulted from torpedoes launched from Japanese aircraft. The Court points out
that, through the harbor entrance was well protected against break-through by
enemy submarines or small craft, there were no antitorpedoes baffles within the
harbor for the protection of individual ships, because it had been assumed that
aircraft torpedoes could not be made to run in the extremely shoal water of Pearl
Harbor. The decision not to install torpedo baffles appears to have been made
by the Navy Department. Proposals to use barrage balloons and smoke were con-
sidered but rejected for technical reasons. It is evident, in retrospect, that the
capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were seriously underestimated.
(n) Fact XVI. In this section of the Findings the Court traces the deteriora-
tion of relations with the Japanese and outlines certain information given to
Admiral Kimmel on the subject. The more important items are as follows:
(1) On 16 October 1941, Admiral Kimmel was informed by CNO that a
grave situation had been created by the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet,
that Japan might attack the United States, and that it was necessary for the
Pacific Fleet to take precautions and to make such employments as would
not disclose strategic intentions or constitute provocative action against
Japan. -
(2) On 17 October, Admiral Stark addressed a personal letter to Admiral
Kimmel in which he stated his personal view that it was unlikely that the
Japs would attack the United States.
(3) On 24 October, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from CNO stating
that chances ( f favorable OutCOme Of negotiations with Japan were doubtful
and the indications were that a Surprise aggressive [75] *Overment in
any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.
(O) Fact XVII. In this section the Court sets forth certain information, which
was known in Washington and which was transmitted to Admiral Kimmel, which
the Court holds to have established the fact that the attack of 7 December came
as a Surprise to high officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, and to
the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area, and that there were good grounds for
their belief that hostilities would begin in the Far East, rather than elsewhere.
The summary of the information on which this is based is as follows:
(1) On 27 November 1941, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch from
CNO beginning with the words, “This dispatch is to be considered a war
warning,” and going on to say that an aggressive move by Japan was ex-
pected within the next few days; that there were indications of an
amphibious movement against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula,
or possibly Borneo; and directing Admiral Kimmel to execute an appro-
priate defensive deployment. -
(2) On 28 November, Admiral Kimmel received from General Short a
War Department message to the effect that negotiations appeared to be
terminated ; that the Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile
action was possible at any time; and that it was desirable that Japan
COmmit the first Overt act, in case hostilities could not be avoided.
(3) On 30 November, Admiral Kimmel was included as an Information
Addressee in a dispatch to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, directing
him to Scout for information of Japanese movements in the China Sea.
(4) On 28 November, CNO advised Admiral Kimmel that it had been
decided to relieve Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake with Army troops.
(5) Admiral Kimmel interpreted the foregoing as indicating that the
Department was not particularly concerned as to the possibility of a Jap-
a neSe attack On Pearl Harbor at the time.
(p) Fact XVIII. This section of the Findings deals with information that be-
Came available in Washington during the period beginning 26 November. It is
Set forth that from 26 November to 7 December, conversations, which had been
in progress between our Government and Japan, were continued, coming to an
end on 7 December. The circumstances under which information as to Japanese
intentions during this period came to the attention of the Navy Department are
Set forth as follows:
(1) Information was received from trusted sources during and prior
to this period which was made available in the Navy Department but
Which was not sent to Admiral Kimmel. This information indicates defi-
nite Japanese interest in dispositions at Pearl Harbor and indicates a desire
in Some cases to know where United States ships were berthed. Admiral
4684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.
Stark testified that he considered it undesirable to send Admiral Kimmel
this information, because to do so might compromise the sources from which
it was obtained. This contention has some merit, in my opinion. It was
Admiral Stark's responsibility to protect the source of this information.
However, it was equally his responsibility to give Admiral Kimmel a gen-
eral picture of the information which he was receiving. Admiral Stark
says that he considered that the dispatches he did send to Admiral Kimmel
gave an adequate picture of what was known and inferred as to Japanese
intentions. As set forth under “Opinions,” the Court holds that the in-
formation given to Admiral Kimmel was not an adequate summary of the
information at Admiral Stark's disposal. I have to concur in this view.
(2) In addition to the foregoing, the Court goes at length into the
handling of certain information which was received in the Navy Department
on the 6th of December, at 2100 on that date. The greater part of this
information indicated the Japanese views concerning certain United States
proposals for resolving matters under dispute between the countries, and
leaves no doubt that the United States’ proposals were unacceptable to
Japan, but do not come to the point of indicating a break in relations.
At or about 0700, 7 December, further trustworthy information was re-
ceived which indicated that the Japanese Government had finally given
up hope of being able to adjust relations with the United States and that
it was impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
This information was delivered at about 0900, 7 December, to the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, at about 0930 to the White House, and
at 0950 to the State Department for Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox.
Secretary Knox was conferring with Secretary Hull at the State
Department. -
(3) At about 10:30 a. m. On 7 December, further reliable information
was received in the Navy Department. 'The substance was that the Japa-
nese Ambassador was to deliver a note containing the information referred
to in the preceding paragraph to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. on
that day. This information was of significance because 1 : 00 p. m. in
Washington was dawn in Honolulu. It was delivered at once to the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, and immediately thereafter, to the State
Department, where the official who received it was asked to point out to
Mr. Knox and Mr. Hull its significance. In my opinion, the foregoing indi-
cates that at about 10:30 on 7 December (0500 Honolulu time) the Navy
Department, or at least some officers therein, appreciated that the infor-
mation just received pointed to the possibility—even the probability—of a
dawn attack on Pearl Harbor. General Marshall States that this informa-
tion came to his attention about 11:00 a. m. and that he immediately
telephoned to Admiral Stark that he proposed to warn General Short that
a break with Japan was imminent and that an attack against Hawaii could
be expected soon. Admiral Stark demurred at first, as to the need for
sending this message, but after brief consideration, asked General Marshall
to include in his proposed dispatch directions to pass the contents to naval
commanders. General Marshall sent a dispatch to the effect that the
Japanese were presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00 p. m.
Washington time on 7 December ; and that while the War Department did
not know the significance of the hour Set for delivering the note, he, General
Short, was to be on the alert accordingly and to inform naval authorities of
this tommunication. He sent this via commercial radio, which was the
usual means of communicating with the Hawaiian Department. The dis-
patch left Washington at 12: 17 on 7 December (6:47 a. m. Honolulu
time) and arrived in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. Honolulu
time.
This was 22 minutes before the attack began. By the time the message
had been decoded and delivered to General Short, the attack was already
under way. The Court states that if the most expeditious means of delivery
had been used (plain language telephone) this information could have been
received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began. The Court
remarks that even in this event there was no action open, nor means available,
to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or which could
have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome, since there was
already in effect a condition of readiness best suited to the circumstances
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4685
attending vessels within the limits of Pear Harbor naval base, and the Fleet
planes at their [76] air bases on Oahu. I cannot go along with this
reasoning of the Court. Even two hours' advance warning would have been
of great value in alerting planes and in augmenting the condition of readiness
existing on board Ship.
(4) On 3 December Admiral Kimmel was told that there was every reason
to believe that the Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts
in the Far East, Washington and London to destroy most Of their codes.
Admiral Kimmel says that “the significance of this dispatch was diluted
substantially by publication of the information in the morning newspaper
in Honolulu,” and that he did not regard it as a clear-cut warning of
Japanese intention to strike the United States.
(5) On 4 December, Admiral Kimmel received a dispatch directing the
destruction of secret and confidential documents at Guam, except those
necessary for current purposes, which were to be kept ready for instant
destruction in event Of emergency. This was followed on 6 December by
authorization for outlying islands to destroy secret and confidential docu-
ments “now or under later conditions of greater emergency.” -
(q) There was also available to the Navy Department on 28 November reliable,
information, received from a trusted source, to the effect that certain code words
would be inserted in the middle of the daily Japanese short-wave news broadcast.
When these words were heard, codes were to be destroyed. This information
was available in various places, including Pearl Harbor, and Admiral Kimmel
had it. A monitor watch was Set at various places to 100k Out for the expected
broadcast. On 4 and 5 December, the Federal Communications Commission
monitored the expected broadcast which was sent from Tokyo twice, first at 2200
on 4 December, and again at 2130 on 5 December. Various officers testified that
the implementing broadcasts were transmitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Director of Naval Communications, but Admiral Stark and
Admiral Noyes testified that they do not remember hearing anything about them.
It is an established fact that these implementing broadcasts * were never sent
Admiral Kimmel. However, as noted in paragraph 2 (p) (4) above, the Court
finds that it is a fact that Admiral Kimmel was informed on 3 December that the
Japanese had instructed diplomatic and consular posts in the Far East, Wash-
ington, and London to destroy certain COdes.
(r) The Court further sets forth the fact (mainly under Section XVIII) that
on 26 November a note, couched in strong terms, was delivered by the United
States State Department to Japanese representatives. The stipulations contained
therein were drastic, and likely to be unacceptable to Japan. Admiral Kimmel
had no knowledge of the existence of such a note, nor of its contents until after
the attack. The Court points Qut that Admiral Kimmel in May, 1941, had
particularly asked the Chief of Naval Operations to keep him informed of the
diplomatic situation in order that he might be “informed of all important
developments as they occur by the quickest secure means available.”
(s) Fact XIX. The Court points out that it is a prime obligation of command
to keep subordinate commanders constantly supplied with information, and
that Admiral Stark, having important information in his possession, during the
critical period from 26 November to 7 December, failed to transmit this informa-
tion to Admiral Kimmel, thus depriving the latter of a clear picture of the
existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington. I am in thorough accord
with this view of the Court.
(t) It will be noted from the foregoing that one of the most important phases
of this investigation is concerned with the handling of enemy information in
the Navy Department. In this connection it would seem essential to a thorough
exploration of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelli-
gence, who was largely responsible for handling information of the enemy. It
appears from the record that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the then Director of
Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness. I assume that
the Court believes that all essential information was obtained despite the fact
that Admiral Wilkinson did not testify; * however, it appears to me that the
failure to obtain his testimony was unfortunate.
* Later investigations indivate that the vital implementing broadcasts were not, in fact.
received by the Navy Department.
* Admiral Wilkinson’s testimony was later received but did not change any of the
opinions or facts established.
4686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. I submit the following comment as to the Court's Opinion.
(a) In the opinion based on Finding II, the Court expresses the view that
the presence of a large number of combatant vessels in Pearl Harbor on 7 Decem-
ber was necessary, and that the information available to the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not require any departure from his operating and
maintenance Schedules. I do not entirely go along with this opinion. Had all
of the information available in the Department been properly evaluated and
properly disseminated, I am inclined to believe that Admiral Kimmel's disposition
on the morning of 7 December would not have been as they actually were on
that OCCaSiOn.
(b) In the Opinion, based on Fact VI, the Court expresses the view that defi-
ciencies in personnel and material which existed in 1941 had an adverse bearing
upon the effectiveness of the defense of Pearl Harbor, on and prior to 7 December.
I offer the comment that, obviously, the Army and Navy were short of men and
material at the time and that available means were spread thin throughout the
various areas of probable hostility. The shortage of means available to Admiral
Kimmel must be taken into consideration. However, the pertinent question is
whether or not he used the means available to him to the best advantage. In
my opinion, he did not. The fault lay in the fact that he was not fully informed
by the Navy Department of what was known as to probable Japanese intentions
and of the tenseness of the situation, and further, that his judgment was to some
extent faulty and that he did not fully appreciate the implications of that infor-
mation which was given to him. .
(c) In the Opinion, based on Finding VIII, the Court holds that the defense
of Pearl Harbor naval base was the direct responsibility of the Army, that the
Navy was to assist only with means provided to the 14th Naval District, and
that the defense of the base was a joint operation only to this extent. As I
stated above, I think this is a narrow view of the question, and that Admiral
Kimmel was fully aware that, in view of the weakness of local defenses, the
Fleet had to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands in
general. - -
(d) The Court holds that Admiral Bloch performed his duties Satisfactorily.
I COncur.
(e) In the Opinion, based on Fact IX, the Court states that naval defense
plans were complete and sound in concept, but contained, a basic defect in that
naval participation depended entirely upon the availability of aircraft belonging
to and being employed by the Fleet, and that on the morning of 7 December these
plans were ineffective because they necessarily were drawn on the premise that
there would be advance [77] knowledge that an attack was to be expected
within narrow limits of time, which was not the case on that morning. I cannot
go along with this view. As I have already stated there could be no Question that
available aircraft had to be employed in the manner best Suited to the danger
that threatened. I doubt that, with the forces available, it would have been
possible to intercept and destroy the Japanese carriers before they launched their
planes, except by lucky chance. However, I do think that Admiral Kimmel Was
not sufficiently alive to the dangers of the situation, not entirely, due to his OWn
fault. This had a bearing of the amount of damage that Was incurred by the
Fleet when the Japanese did attack.
(f) The Opinion, based on Fact X, expresses the view that Admiral Kimmel’s
action, taken immediately after assuming command, in placing in effect Com-
prehensive instructions for the security of the Fleet at sea, is indicative of his
appreciation of his responsibility for the security of the Fleet and that the StepS
taken were adequate and effective. I concur in this.
(g) The Opinion, based on Finding XI, as to the effect that the measures taken
for the security in port were adequate and proper, and that only, had it been
known in advance that the attack was to take place 7 December could there now
be any basis for a conclusion as to the Steps that might have been taken to lessen
its ill effects. The Court takes note of suggestions that each day all naval planes
should have been in the air, all naval personnel at their stations, and all anti-
aircraft guns manned, and expresses the view that no such course Of action
could have been carried out as a matter of routine. I concur in this. The ques-
tion at issue is whether or not indications º, ºr a tightening up of pre-
cautions as 7 December approached. I think they id. e
(h) In the Opinion, i. on Finding xVIII, the Court holds that Admiral
Kimmel was justified in not providing for routine long-range reconnaissance in
the absence of any information indicating that the attack was tº be expected in
the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time. I have already discussed this
EXELIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4687
phase of the matter. I think that if all available information had been placed
at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, and that if he had evaluated it properly, he would
have found it necessary to do something about long-range reconnaissance in the
few days immediately preceding the 7th of December.
(i) In the Opinion, based on Fact XVII, the Court expresses the view that
there was good ground for belief on the part of high officials in the State, War,
Navy departments, and on the part of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area,
the hostilities would begin in the Far East rather than elsewhere. I concur
that the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese
operations. As a matter of fact, the Japanese did begin to operate in the Far
East on 7 December. However, it was not illogical to suppose that an attack on
Pearl Harbor would be regarded by the Japanese as one of the initial steps in
the campaign, and there is ample evidence that all concerned were aware of this
possibility—a possibility that was strengthened by information received in Wash-
ington, all of which was not given to Admiral Kimmel. .
(j) In the opinion, based on Facts XVIII and XIX, the Court expressed
* the view that Admiral Stark failed to display sound judgment in that he
did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very critical period from
26 November to 7 December, important information which he had received
regarding the Japanese situation, and especially, in that, on the morning
of 7 December 1941, he did not translnit immediately the fact that informa-
tion had been received which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic
relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might
be expected soon. I note from the first endorsement that the Judge Advocate
General takes exception to this Opinion, on the ground that the evidence
shows that Admiral Stark and his principal advisors (lid not construe this
information as indicating an attack in the Hawaiian area. While I concur
in the views of the Judge Advocate General as to the construction which
Admiral Stark placed upon the information in question, nevertheless, I note
that Commander Kramer (attached to the Communications Division of the
Navy Department) did take steps to invite the attention of the Secretary
of the Navy to the fact that 1:00 p.m. Washington time meant dawn at Hono-
lulu and midnight in East Asia. It, therefore, seems evident that, though
Admiral Stark did not have his attention drawn to the possible significance
of this information, nevertheless the implications - were appreciated by at
least some officers of his Office. The Court further expresses the view that
had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a
matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken. I take no
exception to this expression of opinion. However, it is a fair conclusion
that if Admiral Kimmel had been given all of the information available at
the Department, he would have been in a position to judge the situation
better than he did.
4. In the finai Opinion and Recommendation the Court finds that no offenses
have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or
persons in the naval service, and recommends that no further proceedings be
had in the matter. I concur that there is not adequate evidence to support general
court martial proceedings, but this does not bar administrative action, if such
action is found appropriate.
5. Despite the evidence that no naval officer was at fault to a degree likely
to result in conviction if brought to trial, nevertheless the Navy cannot evade a
share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor incident. That disaster cannot be
regarded as an “act of God,” beyond human power to prevent or mitigate. It
is true that the copintry as a whole is basically responsible in that the people
were unwilling to support an adequate Army and Navy until it was too late to
repair the consequences of past neglect in time to deal effectively with the attack
that ushered in the war. It is true that the Army was responsible for local
defense at Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, some things could have been done by
the Navy to lessen the success of the initial Japanese blow. Admiral Stark
and Admiral Kimmel were the responsible officers, and it is pertinent to examine
the possible courses of action they might have taken.
(a) Admiral Stark was, of course aware that the United States was pri-
marily concerned with its own possessions, and the most important United States
possessions in the Pacific were the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands.
His attention should have been Centered on those two places, as the Pacific situa-
tion became more and more acute. He had been informed by Admiral Kimmel,
in his letter of 26 May 1941, that Admiral Kimmel felt the need for early and
79716 O—46—pt. 21—11
4688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
accurate information as to the general situation, and that he needed to be in-
formed of all important developments as they occurred by the quickest and most
secure means available. This letter should have emphasized the obvious fact
that Admiral Kimmel was in a difficult position, that he had to use his initiative
to keep his Fleet dispositions in step with changes in the situation, and that in
order to do so he had to have an accurate running picture of the rapidly moving
course of diplomatic events. In my opinion, Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral
Kimmel an adequate summary of the information available in Washington,
particularly in the following respects:
(1) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the State Department's note of
26 November to the Japanese. This note was a definite step towards break-
ing relations.
[78] (2) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the substance of certain
information available to the Navy Department concerning the disposition of
ships inside Pearl Harbor, which indicated a Japanese interest in Pearl
Harbor as a possible target.
(3) Admiral Kimmel was not informed of the implementation of the
broadcast containing the code words. Admiral Stark says he never got this
information himself, but it is clear that it did reach Admiral Stark's office.
This, together with the handling of other matters of information, indicates
Jack of efficiency in Admiral Stark's Organization.
(4) Admiral Stark failed to appreciate the significance of the informa-
tion which he received indicating that a message was to be given to the
Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m., which information Admiral Stark received
on the morning of 7 December, although the implications were appreciated
by at least one of his subordinates. It appears that had this information
been handled by the quickest available means, and with due appreciation of
its significance, it might have reached Admiral Kimmel in time to enable him
to make some last-minute preparations that would have enhanced the ability
of the ships in Pearl Harbor to meet the Japanese air attack.
(5) There is a certain sameness of tenor of such information as Admiral
Stark sent to Admiral Kimmel. They do not convey in themselves the sense
of intensification of the critical relations between the United States and
Japan. .
(b) In my opinion Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to
keep him fully informed, nevertheless did have some indications of increasing
tenseness as to relations with Japan. In particular, he had the “war warning”
message of 27 November, the “hostile action possible at any moment” message
on 28 November, the 3 December information that the Japanese were destroying
their codes, and the messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of
United States secret and confidential matter at outlying Pacific Islands. These
messages must be considered in connection with other facets of the situation,
and Admiral Kimmel’s statement on this phase of the matter must be given due
consideration. After weighing these considerations, I am of the opinion that he
could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which "
the Hawaiian Islands were exposed. The following courses of action were open
to him :
(1) He could have used patrol aircraft which were available to him to
conduct long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors. Whether
or not this would have resulted in detecting the approach of the Japanese
carriers is problematical. However, it would have made the Japanese task
Hmore difficult. *.
(2) He could have rotated the “in port” periods of his vessels in a less
routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the Japanese to have
predicted when there would be any vessels in port. This would have made
the Japanese task less easy.
(3) If he had appreciated the gravity of the danger even a few hours
before the Japanese attack, it is logical to suppose that naval planes would
have been in the air during the early morning period, that ships' batteries
would have been fully manned, and that damage control organizations would
have been fully operational.
6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel were
faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in question, they
indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercising command com-
mensurate with their rank and their assigned duties, rather than culpable
inefficiency.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE - 4689
7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence ad-
duced, appropriate administrative action would appear to be the relegation of
both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judgment may not
result in future errors. -
8. In my serial 003191 of 3 November, to you, I set forth at length my views
concerning how much of the records bears such a relation to present military
operations as to require high security classification.
1 DEC 1944.
THIRD ENDORSEMENT TO RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF PEART, HARBOR COURT
OF INQUIRY
Subject: Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944.
1. On the basis of the record, findings, opinion and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General, and the
Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I find that the evi-
dence obtained to date indicates that there were errors of judgment on the part
of Admiral K.mmel and Admiral Stark. I am not satisfied, however, that the
investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence.
2. Further investigation into this matter will be conducted by an investigating
officer, and, in addition to the subjects recommended for further investigation
by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fieet in the Second Endorsement, will include
the taking of the testimony of Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum,
and such other investigation as may appear to be necessary in order to ascertain
all of the revelant facts relating to the Japanese attack. Pending the completion
of the necessary further investigation into this matter, I withhold decision as
to the institution of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
FourTH ENDoRSEMENT To RECORD of ProCEFDINGs of PEARL HARBOR Court
OF INQUIRY -
Subject, Court of Inquiry to inquire into the attack made by Japanese armed
forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, ordered by
the Secretary of the Navy on 13 July 1944, and further investigation by
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, ordered by the Secretary of the Navy on
2 May 1945.
1. Pursuant to Executive Order dated 18 December 1941, a commission headed
by Mr. Justice Owen J. Roberts conducted an investigation into the facts sur-
rounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The commission reported its
findings on 23 January 1942. The commission concluded in part that:
“17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action,
transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the
obligation under the system of co-ordination then in effect for joint co-operative
action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not
to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the
warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of
hositilities. The attitude of each, that he was not re- [79] Quired to in-
form himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other
to carry out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the
plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of
the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as commander
in chief, Pacific Fleet, and commanding general, Hawaiian Department.”
2. Pursuant to precept of the Secretary of the Navy dated 12 February 1944,
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), conducted an examination of witnesses
likely to have knowledge of facts in connection with the Japanese attack. Ad-
miral Hart completed his examination on 15 June 1944.
3. Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, directed the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith
with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe,
and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.
4690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, USN (Retired),
Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, USN (Retired), and Vice Admiral Adolphus An-
drews, USN (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, USN, as Judge
Advocate, was appointed on 13 July 1944. The Court was directed to convene
on 17 July 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring
into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on 7 December 1941; to inquire thoroughly
into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it
might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its
opinion as to whether any offenses were committeed or serious blame incurred
on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service, and, in case its opinion
was that offenses had been committed Or Serious blame incurred, to recommend
specifically what further proceedings should be had.
5. The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on 31 July 1944, and sub-
mitted the record of its proceedings on 20 October 1944. Certain portions of the
record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the
Court, have been classified “TOP SECRET" in the interest of national security,
and the balance “SECRET.”
The material which was classified “TOP SECRET’’ was so classified by the
Court of Inquiry and retained in that classification upon the recommendation
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations because
of the extreme care which has been necessary to safeguard information in the
hands of the Navy Department and especially the sources of that information.
These sources were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and
Navy, the Office of Strategic Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
otherS.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations now informs
me that it is still in the public interest that the sources of this information
be safeguarded. Accordingly, I have directed that all of the report of the Court
of Inquiry be made public except that part, publication of which in the opinion
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations would nec-
essarily disclose the sources of Secret information. To the Same end in the
discussion of the report of the Court of Inquiry the evidence before the Court
and the additional evidence discovered by Admiral Hewitt's investigation herein
I have avoided any reference which would disclose the sources of secret infor-
mation.
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor
Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy,
and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations and by
me was that the evidence secured by the Court did not warrant and would not
support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval
Service. -
6. The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor
Court of Inquiry, dated 1 December 1944, I found that the evidence obtained
indicated that there were errors of judgment on the part of Admiral Kimmel
and Admiral Stark, but that the inquiry had not gone to the point of exhaustion
of all possible evidence. Accordingly, I directed that further investigation would
be conducted by an investigating officer and that pending the completion of the
necessary further investigation I would withhold decision as to the institution
of any proceeding against any naval officer involved.
8. In order to insure that the further investigation would cover every material
Question, I directed that a thoroughi review be made of the prior investigations.
Upon the completion of this review of prior investigations and after examination
of the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Hoard, dated 3 December 1944, I appointed
Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN, as investigation officer, to examine Such witnesses
and obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order fully to develop
and clarify the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
The further investigation was completed on 12 July 1945. -
9. The comments of the Judge Advocate General and of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, in their endorsements to the
Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry record are approved subject to the following
remarkS: -
(a) Court of Inquiry Finding II. This finding states in substance, that the
presence in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 of Task Force One and the battle-
ships of Task Force Two was necessary.
The essential point here rests in Admiral Kimmel's statement to the effect that
he would not have had the Fleet in Pearl Harbor had he anticipated an air attack.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4691
The Second Endorsement indicates that the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
does not entirely “go along” with the opinion of the Court that the information
available to Admiral Kimmel did not require any departure from his operation
and maintenance schedules. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, states further
in this connection that Admiral Kimmel could have rotated the “in port” periods
of his vessels in less routine manner, so as to have made it impossible for the
Japanese to have predicted when there would be any vessels in port, and that
this would have made the Japanese task less easy. I concur in the comments of
the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding.
(b) Court of Inquiry Finding III. This finding states that, “Constitutional
requirements that war be declared by Congress . . .” make it difficult to prevent
an attack and precluded (ffensive action as a means of defense, and that Admiral
Kimmel had the responsibility of avoiding overt acts.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, comments that this gives an unscrupulous
enemy a great advantage, and that the Constitutional requirement preventing
offensive action as a means of defense was a definite handicap. Though, in con-
trast with our constitutional principles, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was
but a repetition of the historically treacherous Japanese method of inaugurating
hostilities and commencing a war, yet it does not appear that there was any
proximate casual relationship between the constitutional requirement and the
instant disaster. The constitutional inhibition and the injunction as to overt acts
did not preclude either long-distance reconnaissance or a sortie by the Fleet.
Further, it appears that prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel did not regard
this constitutional provision or his responsibility to avoid overt acts as sufficient
to prevent [80] the issuance of orders to bomb unidentified submarines
found in Operating areas.
(c) Court of Inquiry Finding IV. This states that Admiral Bloch was sub-
ordinate to Admiral Kimmel, and was charged with the task of assisting the Army
in the defense of Pearl Harbor and, consequently, Admiral Bloch had a respon-
sibility for naval measures concerned with local defense.
Upon the basis of all the evidence including Admiral Hewitt's investigation
it appears that :
(1) No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The
only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific
Fleet patrol planes. -
(2) The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral
Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were
operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by
him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules
stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnais-
Sance from Oahu. &
(d) Court of Inquiry Finding V. The Court here finds that relations between
Admiral Kimmel and General Short were friendly, cordial and co-operative;
that they invariably conferred when important messages were received, and
that each was sufficiently cognizant of the measures being taken by the other.
In this connection upon all the evidence it appears : -
(1) The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and
were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack,
including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war
plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet
that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of
a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between
the local Commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was
the case prior to the attack.
(2) The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of
mutual co-operation and not unity of command. Co-operation between the
local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence
of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information
concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.
(3) A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise
of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of informa-
tion between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no
Organized system to ensure such exchange.
The evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt indicates that there were informal
arrangements for the exchange of intelligence by the Army and Navy at Hawaii,
4692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f
P
which included the transmission to the Army of Some information concerning
Japanese ship movements. The evidence obtained both by Admiral Hewitt and
by the Naval Court of Inquiry indicates, however, that neither Admiral Kimmel
nor General Short was sufficiently informed of the degree of readiness put into
effect by the other. It appears that after receipt of the “war warning” and
prior to 7 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred on
Several occasions. They discussed the reinforcem:ent of Midway and Wake.
It does not appear that they discussed the conditions of readiness placed in
effect or to be placed in effect, or the question or advisability of placing in
effect air reconnaissance. General Short testified before the Naval Court that
after a conference with Admiral Kimmel, he placed in effect Army Alert No. 1
(the antisabotage alert). Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know
which degree of alert the Army had in effect, and that he made no specific
inquiry of General Short in this connection. -
That there was not full mutual exchange of intelligence also appears from
the evidence. Admiral Kimmel received dispatches after 27 November 1941
relating to Japanese destruction of codes and instructions to United States Out-
lying islands to destroy classified material. He testified before the Naval Court
that he did not direct that these be furnished to General Short, and that he did
not know whether or not they were furnished to him. General Short testified
that he had not Seen these dispatches.
In view of these facts, I cannot agree with the above finding by the Naval Court
of Inquiry. The system of mutual co-operation, of joint command, was not work-
ing effectively—it failed.
War experience has shown that: The responsibility for final major decisions
must devolve on one person; that is, there must be unity of command. However,
it is important to point out that the experience of this war has conclusively dem-
onstrated that there is no inconsistency between the existence of two or more
separate military or naval organizations as the functioning forces and an effective
exercise of unity of command in a theater or in an operation. Practically all of
the major operations of this war have been accomplished by two or more distinct
military organizations, some even belonging to diverse nations, but all acting
under a unified command. In such an operation, the commanders of the Several
forces and their staffs must function in close physical proximity, usually in the
higher echelons sharing a common headquarters or command post.
I do not find, however, that. Admiral Kimmel is Open to criticism for having
failed to advise the Army at Pearl Harbor that a submarine contact had been
made on the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly prior to the air attack. The
evidence supports the conclusion that the attempt to obtain confirmation of the
reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have
been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in Sending out
the ready destroyer.
(e) Court of Inquiry Finding VI. This states in substance that unavoidable
deficiencies in personnel and material had a bearing On the effectiveness of the
local defense of Pearl Harbor.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out however, that the pertinent
question is whether Admiral Kimmel used the means available to the best advan-
tage. I concur in this comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
(f) Court of Inquiry Finding VII. The Court finds that Japan had an initial
advantage because of the Japanese Fleet's numerical superiority, and the Superi-
ority of Japanese espionage.
The comment in the Second Endorsement on this point is confined to the general
statement that factors such as those referred to by the Court will always place
this nation at a disadvantage during a period of strained relations. This finding,
of course, in general was correct. Nevertheless, as applied to the specific issues
here presented, it overlooks the fact that : . º
(1) The numerical superiority of the Japanese Fleet was well known to
Admiral Stark and to Admiral Kimmel, and this fact was taken into account
in the war plans ; -
(2) Although unquestionably the United States was placed at a disadvan-
tage in restraining Japanese espionage activities, the Navy and War depart-
ments were nevertheless not without important Intelligence advantages of
their own which were not availed of to fine fullest extent.
[81] (g) Court of Inquiry Finding VIII. This states that it was the direct
responsibility of the Army to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base, and that the
Navy was to assist only with the means provided the Naval District.
<^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4693
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in agreement with “the fundamental
concept of naval warfare” discussed by the Court, but takes a more realistic
view on this point. He points out that Admiral Kimmel was fully aware that
in view of the weakness of local defense, the ships of the Fleet in port had
to be employed to protect Pearl Harbor. With this I concur. . It is to be
noted, moreover, that under the defense plan the Navy was responsible for the
maintenance of distant reconnaissance.
(h) Court of Inquiry Finding IX. The Court finds that the air defense plans
were defective because of the necessity for reliance upon Fleet aircraft which
could not be made permanently available for local defense.
The Second Endorsement states that the Court has overstressed the fact
that the only patrol planes in the area were Fleet planes; that it was sound
policy to place all such aircraft at Admiral Kimmel’s disposal; that it was his
responsibility to allocate the planes as best he could ; that the available aircraft
had to be employed in the manner best suited to the danger that threatened,
that it is doubtful whether with the available forces it would have been
possible to destroy the carriers before they launched their planes, except by a
lucky chance; that Admiral Kimmel was not sufficiently alive to the situation,
not entirely due to his own fault ; and that this had a bearing on the amount of
damage resulting from the attack. I concur in the comments of the Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, with respect to this finding.
(i) Court of Inquiry Findings IV, VIII, IX. Based on these findings the
conclusion of the Court is that Admiral Bloch satisfactorily performed his
(luties. -
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This conclusion is approved.
(j) Court of Inquiry Finding X. This holds adequate and effective Admiral
Kimmel's provisions for the security of the Fleet at sea.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, concurs. This finding is approved.
(k) Court of Inquiry Finding XI. The substance of this finding is that
Admiral Kimmel was maintaining the highest condition of readiness called for
by the information, available to him and that a higher condition of readiness
would have added little to the defense.
In the Second Endorsement it is pointed out that in fact the condition of
readiness being maintained at the time of the attack was only that condition
which is normally maintained when in port. This is maintained on the as-
sumption that the shore defenses are adequate to protect the Fleet. Such was
not the case at Pearl Harbor, as Admiral Kimmel knew.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, further states that he does not agree
with the conclusion of the Court that a higher condition of readiness would
have added little to the defense, and is of the view that the information avail-
able to Admiral Kimmel called for a tightening of the defense precautions as
7 December approached. With the comments of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, I concur. .
(1) Court of Inquiry Finding XII. The Court here finds that there was no
information indicating that Japanese carriers were on their way to attack
Pearl Harbor, and that it was not possible to prevent or to predict that attack.
The Sacond Endorsement to the Naval Court record states on this point: “There
was information that might logically have been interpreted as indicating that
an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely, and that the time could be predicted
within fairly narrow limits.”
It is to be noted that one of the principal matters covered in Admiral Hewitt's
investigation was the information available to Admiral Kimmel, particularly
during the critical period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, concerning the
location and movements of Japanese naval forces. This information consisted
principally of daily radio intelligence summaries setting forth the results of
sonitoring Japanese naval communications and estimates by the Fléet Intelli-
gence Officer. It appears that there was an unusual change in Japanese naval
radio calls on 1 December 1941; that this was regarded as indicating an additional
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale; that on 2
December 1941 Admiral Kimmel conferred with his Fleet Intelligence Officer as
to the whereabouts of Japanese fleet units, and that during that conference Ad-
miral Kimmel noticed and commented on the absence of information in the Fleet
Intelligence Officer's written estimate as to Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2,
which consisted of four carriers. (It has since been learned that these four
carriers were among the six carriers which in fact were then on the high seas
heading toward Pearl Harbor.) The other Japanese carriers were located by
4694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the Fleet Intelligence Officer in his written estimate, in Japanese home waters,
with the exception of possibly one carrier in the Marshalls. In this testimony
before Admiral Hewitt, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Captain Edwin T. Layton,
USN, described his conversation with Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941 as
follows :
“Q. Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best
you recall it?
“A. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, “What ' You don’t know where
Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?” and I replied, ‘No, sir, I do not.
I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of
these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.” Then Admiral Kimmel
looked at me as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and
yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, “Do you mean to say that they
could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?’ or words to that
effect. My reply was that, “I hope they would be sighted before now,” or words ,
to that effect.” . . .
“Q. Your testimony, Captain, was not quite, clear to me, arising out of your
description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am
trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information
concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious or jocular one?
“A. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said “Where are Cardivs
1 and 27' and I said, ‘I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say
that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a
long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a
half ago,” and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, “Do you mean
to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?" or words to that effect. In other
words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.
“Q. He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those
carrierS2
“A. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote
him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to
point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn’t so indicated their
location.”
It is to be noted further that the daily communication intelligence summaries
received by Admiral Kimmel stated, on December 3rd, that : “Almost a com-
plete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has
somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service
calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and
not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a
low ebb" and that the daily summaries delivered to Admiral [82] Kimmel
thereafter, and prior to the attack, indicated that there was no information as
to Japanese carriers. -
In view of the foregoing, I do approve the above finding by the Naval Court of
Inquiry. I concur entirely in the comment of the Commander of Chief, U. S. Fleet,
concerning this finding. I am of the view that the information as to the location
and movements of the Japanese naval forces which was received by Admiral
Kimmel during the week preceding the attack, coupled with all the other in-
formation which he had received, including the “war warning” and other mes-
sages from the Chief of Naval Operations, should have been interpreted as in-
dicating that an attack on Hawaii was not unlikely and that the time of such an
attack could be predicted within fairly narrow limits.
(m) Court of Inquiry Finding XIII. It is here stated that Admiral Kimmel's
decision not to conduct daily long-range reconnaissance was sound; that there
were insufficient planes for this purpose; and that such use of the available
planes was not justified.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, in his endorsement to the Naval Court
record points out that Admiral Kimmel had a difficult decision to make in this
matter of reconnaissance, and that there were many factors to be considered. He
states further, however, that after considering all of the information that was
at Admiral Kimmel's disposal, it appears that Admiral Kimmel was not on
entirely sound ground in making no attempt at long-range reconnaissance, par-
ticularly as the situation became more and more tense in the few days im-
mediately preceding the Japanese attacks. This comment adds that it is obvious
that the means available did not permit an all-round daily reconnaissance to a
distance necessary to detect the approach of Carriers before planes could be
launched, but that there were, however, certain Sectors more dangerous than
others which could have been covered to some extent, and that such particular
*EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4695
cover Would have been logical in the circumstances known to Admiral Kimmel
in late November and early December.
In addition to these comments, with which I concur the following points may
be noted : -
(1) Admiral Kimmel himself had maintained a partial long-range patrol
in the summer of 1941 on the basis of Intelligence received and reported by
Admiral Bloch at that time.
(2) Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he
decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.
(3) There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral
Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the “war warn-
ing,” as to the advisability or practicability of long-range reconnaissance from
Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been dis-
Cussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet
patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning
messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.
(4) The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the
attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily
for more than a few days.
(5) There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact avail-
able at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at
least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a dis-
tance of about 700 miles.
(6) The Sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the
most 1 kely Sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese
were to attack Pearl Harbor. -
(7) If a daily disuant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after
27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sector
probably would have been searched.
(8) The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200
miles due north of Oahu.
(n) Court of Inquiry Finding XIV. This states in substance that the Army
radar detection System was ineffective.
The evidence supports the substance of the comment on this finding, which
is made in the Second Endorsement; that is, that although the radar detection
System in Operation at Pearl Harbor was in an embryonic state, nevertheless,
even in its then condition it could have and should have served to give at least
an hour's warning of the attack.
(o) Court of Inquiry Finding XV. This states that the best professional
opinion in the United States and Great Britain, prior to 7 December 1941, was
that an aircraft torpedo attack under conditions of Shoal water and limited
approach such as those which obtained at Pearl Harbor, was not practicable
and that the Japanese attack was successful principally because of the employ-
ment of a specially designed torpedo, which was a Secret weapon.
The only comment in the Second Endorsement on this finding is that: “It is
evident in restrospect that the capabilities of Japanese aircraft torpedoes were
seriously underestimated.” The principal point upon which this Court of Inquiry
Seems to rest its findings is the further finding that it was not believed by
American and British naval authorities at that time that torpedoes could be
successfully launched from aircraft in waters as shallow as those at Pearl
Harbor. As a basis for this view the Court relies upon a letter by the Chief
of Naval Operations early in 1941 in which he indicated that torpedoes could
not be successfully launched from airplanes in water under a minimum depth of
75 feet (water at Pearl Harbor being approximately 45 feet). It is noted that
the Court also refers to a subsequent letter put out for the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in June, 1941, by Admiral Ingersoll, which is in conflict with the Court’s
findings. This letter stated, among other things, that : “It cannot be assumed
that any capital or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type
of attack if surrounded led by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack
to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.” This letter also advised
that torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in 13–15
fathoms of water, although several may have been launched in 11–12.
The records of the Navy Department indicate that in April, 1941, there was
circulated in the Department an Intelligence report which described the dem-
onstration of an aerial torpedo in England. It appears from this report that
the torpedo described was equipped with special wings, and that it required
4696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
no greater depth of water for its successful launching than the depth at which
it made its nqrmal run. *.
It further appears from the records of the Navy Department that the British
reported aircraft torpedo attacks during the year 1940 in which torpedoes were
successfully launched in 42 feet of water.
Finally, there is evidence in the record to indicate that nearly a year prior
to the actual attack, the feasibility and even the probability of an airplane
torpedo attack upon Pearl Harbor was contemplated. Secretary Knox's letter
of January, 1941, listed an air torpedo attack as second only to air bombing in
order of probability in a list of the types of attack upon Pearl Harbor which
he considered likely. His letter had been previously cleared with Admiral
Stark, and was received in February by Admiral Kimmel.
In view of the foregoing, the finding of the Court of Inquiry is not approved.
(p) Court of Inquiry XVI. The Court here finds that Admiral Kimmel's deci-
sion to continue preparation of the Fleet for war, made after receiving [83]
the 24 November dispatch, was sound in light (a) of the approval Of the Steps
which he had taken after the dispatch of 16 October which advised that hostilities
were possible, and (b) the information then available to him including Admiral
Stark's letter of 17 October 1941 and the dispatch of 24 November 1941, which
stated that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack
on the Phillippines or Guam, was a possibility.
The Second Endorsement summarizes the Court's finding and underScores
that portion of the 24 November dispatch which indicated that: “A surprise
aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or
Guam is a possibility . . .”
It should be further noted that Admiral Kimmel testified that the words, “A
surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philip-
pines or Guam,” meant to him that any attack other than on those two places
would be on foreign territory, but that the words also included the possibility
of a submarine attack on the Hawaiian Islands.
The Court refers in its findings to a part of a personal letter Sent by Admiral
Stark to Admiral Kimmel On 17 October, in which Admiral Stark Stated : “Per-
Sonally, I do not believe the Japs are going to Sail into us and the message I
sent you merely stated the possibility; in fact, I tempered the message handed
me considerably.” However, the letter also continued : “Perhaps I am wrong,
but I hope not. In any case, after long pow-wows in the White House, it was
felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend.”
To the letter was annexed a postscript stating in part: “General Marshall just
called up and was anxious that we make Some sort of reconnaissance So that
he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may
not be in Order On his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against
any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while
we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully, planned raid on
any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However,
we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry.”
It is noted that the Court does not specifically deal with the question of the
soundness of Admiral Kimmel’s decision to continue preparation of the Fleet, in
the light of the highly important information which he received from the Chief
of Naval Operations and otherwise during the critical period after the “war
warning” of November 27th.
(q) Court of Inquiry Finding XVII. The Court here finds that there were
good grounds for believing that the Japanese would attack in the Far East.
In respect of this finding, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, points out that
the Far East was the most probable scene for the initiation of Japanese opera-
tions, and that they were in fact initiated there. He notes further that all con-
cerned recognized the possibility that such a commencement of hostilities would
be coompanied by an attack upon Pearl Harbor. He adds that this latter pos-
sibility was considerably strengthened by information available at Washington,
not all of which was available to Admiral Kimmel.
It appears from the evidence obtained in Admiral Hewitt's investigation that
the possibility that the commencement of hostilities by Japan would include an
attack upon Pearl Harbor was also strengthened by information received by Ad-
miral Kimmel on and after the “war warning” of November 27th. The estimates
that had been made in the War Plans, which had been approved by Admiral Kim-
mel, of course contemplated that in the event of war with the Japanese a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor was distinctly possible. The information received by
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4697
Admiral Kimmel as to the location and movement of Japanese naval forces was,
at the least, consistent With these estimates.
The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the
Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the
southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese
attacks on the Phillippines and Malaysia. The information which was received
by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, indicated, however,
that on December 1 there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs ;
that on the basis of all information up to December 2, no reliable estimate could
be made of the whereabouts of four Of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was
no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive
information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the move-
ment which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded
areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air
attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precau-
tions to reduce the effectiveness of Such an attack.
(r) Court of Inquiry Findings XVIII and XIX. These state in substance that
Admiral Stark's failure from 26 November to 7 December 1941 to transmit to
Admiral Kimmel important information in his possession constitutes a military
Grrol".
The comment of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, as to this finding was to
the effect that Admiral Stark Was at fault in failing to give Admiral Kimmel
an adequate summary of information available in Washington.
The endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, on the Naval Court
of Inquiry Record, further pointed out that Rear Admiral Wilkinson, former
Director of Naval Intelligence, was not available to the Court as a witness.
It was noted that these findings, and the conclusions of the Court based thereon,
were concerned principally with the handling of enemy information in the Navy
Department and that consequently, it would seem essential to a thorough explora-
tion of the facts to have the testimony of the Director of Naval Intelligence, who
was largely responsible for handling this information. It was concluded that
the failure to obtain this testimony was unfortunate.
With this comment by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, I concurred. It
further appeared to me that the testimony of Captain McCollum, who was assigned
to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and who, according to other testimony in the
record, had important duties in connection with the handling of such information,
would be most helpful. Captain McCollum was also unavailable as a witness to
the Court. I ascertained that at the time both Rear Admiral Wilkinson and
Captain McCollum were actively engaged in combat operations against the enemy,
and would be so engaged until some date in the future. From the nature of the
duties which these officers were performing in their assignments, I determined
that in view of the paramount present needs of the war effort, their testimony
in this matter could not then feasibly be obtained.
During his later investigation, Admiral Hewitt was able to obtain the testimony
of Admiral Wilkinson and of Captain McCollum, as well as other testimony bear-
ing upon this finding of the Court of Inquiry. From this evidence the following
conclusions appear :
(1) Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States
Navy and Army Intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the
Japanese Government’s actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and
its intention to wage war.
(2) The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and
Navy departments was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained
by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available
to Intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War
Department had [84] information which led that Department to be-
lieve that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941.
This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to Gen-
eral Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photo-
graphic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain
information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval
vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes
were not made ready.
(3) The information obtained by the Navy Department was adequately
disseminated within the Navy Department.
(4) Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that
he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all
4698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate
to him important information which would have aided him materially in
fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure
to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send,
by telephone or other expeditious means, certain information indicating the
imminence of an attack by the Japanese that was available at Washington
on the morning of December 7th, were unfortunate.
(5) Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his
possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that im-
portant developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent.
This included the “war warning” message and similar important messages
which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.
(6) The available information in the possession of the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the “war warn-
ing” message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate com-
manders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger,
who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea
with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important
meSSageS.
10. From the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt it appears that prior to the
attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honoluku were
tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu but
no information was obtained prior to December 7 which indicated the likelihood
of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable
messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian
£11°83.
11. In its final opinion and recommendation, the Court of Inquiry finds that
no offenses have been committed or serious blamé incurred on the part of any
person or persons in the Naval service, and recommends that no further pro-
ceedings be had in the matter. -
With respect to this opinion and recommendation of the Court of Inquiry, I
concur in the comment expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement
that the Navy cannot avoid a share of responsibility for the Pearl Harbor inci-
dent, and that that disaster cannot be regarded as an “act of God” beyond human
power to prevent or mitigate. Whether or not it is true, as stated in the Second
Endorsement, that the Country as a whole is basically responsible in that the
people were unwilling to take adequate measures for defense until it was too
late to repair the consequences of their failure so to do, it appears that the Navy,
although its ranking officers were fully informed of the most recent developments
in the science of warfare, failed to appreciate the true significance of those
developments until their impact had been felt by a blow struck at a substantial
portion of the Fleet. By the same token, although the imminence of hostile
action by the Japanese was known, and the capabilities of the Japanese Fleet
and Air Arm were recognized in war plans made to meet just such hostile action,
these factors did not reach the stage of conviction in the minds of the responsible
officers of the Navy to an extent sufficient to impel them to bring about that
implementation of the plans that was necessary if the initial hostile attack
was to be repelled or at least mitigated. -
That this is so is manifested in the Case of the instant disaster in Several
in portant respects. -
(a) The destructive potentiality of air torpedo attack was not properly
evaluated, although there was ample information available on this subject
in the reports of action by and against the British. That this information
was recognized is shown by the inclusion in war and defense plans of appro-
priate provisions for defense against this type of attack, but that it was not
fully appreciated is shown by the fact that these selfsame provisions were
not put into effect until the initial attack had been successful.
(b) In respect of unity of command, again all of the plans made adequate
provision for joint action, mutual interchange of intelligence, and the fullest
utilization of all of the available resources of both the Army and the Navy, in
practice, none of these measures came into being to any appreciable extent prior
to the attack. (...)
(c) Within the Navy itself, conduct of the organization was such as to sub-
merge the Chief of Naval Operations in a multiplicity of detail pertaining to the
procurement and matériel programs incidental to the rapid expansion of the
Navy. This precluded him from giving to war plans and operation the undi-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4699
vided and continuing attention which experience has shown they require, and
tended to dull his perception of the critical significance of events.
In making these observations, I am not unmindful of the usual advantage of
hindsight, nor do I Overlook the fact that this war has proved that any carrier
strike, when pressed home with resolution, is almost impossible to deflect. After
giving due consideration, however, to all these factors, I am of the opinion that
there were, nevertheless, areas in which sound military judgment dictated the
taking of action which, though it might not have prevented or defeated the
attack, would have tended materially to reduce the damage which the attack
was able to inflict. Such action was not taken, and the responsibility must
center upon the officers who had it in their power, each within his respective
sphere, to take appropriate action.
12. I concur, therefore, with the Opinion expressed in paragraph 5 of the Second
Endorsement to the Court Of Inquiry record that it is pertinent to examine the
possible courses of action which Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel, as the
responsible officers, might have taken to lessen the success of the initial Jap-
anese blow.
(a) In paragraph 5 of the Second Endorsement on the Report of the Naval
Court of Inquiry, it is pointed out that Admiral Stark failed to give Admiral
Kimmel an adequate summary of information available in Washington, partic-
ularly in respect of :
(1) The State Department reply of 26 November 1941 to the Japanese,
which was a definite step toward breaking relations;
(2) Certain information indicating Japanese interest as to the disposi-
tion of the ships within Pearl Harbor;
(3) In failing to appreciate the significance of the information which
he received on the morning of 7 December indicating that a message was
to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. and in failing to transmit
it to Admiral Kimmel by the quickest means available;
(4) F, nally, it is pointed out in this section of the Second Endorsement
that there is a certain Sameness of tenor in the communication sent by
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel which failed to convey the [85]
sense of mounting intensification of critical relations between Japan and the
United States.
I concur generally with these. -
Concerning the other comments by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, it
might be added that Admiral Stark's omission consisted not only in the failure to
transmit fully to Admiral Kimmel certain of the available information, but also
in the failure properly and speedily to evaluate that information, particularly on
7 December 1941. Although it was not known on 6 December precisely when or
where the attack was to be delivered, there was ample evidence to base the con-
clusion that a surprise move was due within narrow limits of time. On the
morning of December 7 by 10:30 Admiral Stark had information indicating that
a message was to be given to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard
Time, and there was information available to him that this time corresponded to
dawn at Oahu and the middle of the night in the Far East. Although no one
stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor, yet all of these factors
pointed to the possibility of such an attack. An acute sensitivity to the tautness
of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communi-
cation to Admiral Kimmel, which might have provided a warning sufficient to
bring about some material reduction in damage inflicted by the Japanese attack.
(b) I concur with the comments set forth in paragraph (5) (b) of the Second
Endorsement to the Naval Court of Inquiry record. It is there stated that
Admiral Kimmel, despite the failure of Admiral Stark to keep him fully informed,
did have indications of the increasing tenseness of relations with Japan. In
particular, it is pointed out that he had the “war warning” message on 27 Novem-
ber, the “hostile action possible at any moment” message on 28 November, the 3
December message that the Japanese had ordered destruction of codes, and the
messages of 4 and 6 December concerning destruction of United States secret
and confidential matter at outlying Pacific islands.
In addition, it might be pointed out that Admiral Kimmel in his personal let-
ters, which are a part of the record before the Court, and as well in the war
plans approved by him, explicitly recognized the possibility of attack upon Pearl
Harbor by air; and, that the information received by Admiral Kimmel concern-
ing the location and movement of Japanese naval forces after 27 November 1941
4700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
should have been evaluated, as previously pointed out, as indicating the continued
and increasing possibility of such an attack. It is to be especially noted that
while Admiral Kimmel was directed in the war warning message of 27 November
1941, and again on 28 November when the Army message was relayed to him, to
execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the
tasks assigned in the Navy Basic War Plan, the chief action taken by him was
carrying forward the arrangements for the reinforcing of and continuing the
limited air patrols from the outlying islands, ordering on 28 November, the depth
bombing of submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area, and engaging in
unproductive conferences with General Short. He continued in effect the pri-
mary fleet activity of training and the lowest condition of readiness (Condition
III) of the fleet in port. He neither ordered long-range air reconnaissance from
Oahu to any extent nor advised his fleet air wing and other commanders of the
receipt of the war warning message. His failure to take other and more effective
action is neither explainable nor excusable by any ambiguity in the meaning of
or disagreement as to what would constitute an “appropriate defensive deploy-
ment.” Admiral Kimmel could have referred to the initial tasks stated in the
war plan of maintaining fleet security at bases and guarding against submarine
attack by Japan, and if he did not know what was meant by the phrase “appro-
priate defensive deployment,” he should have asked the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions for an explanation.
The Second Endorsement to the Naval Court record States that Admiral Kimmel
could and should have judged more accurately the gravity of the danger to which
the Hawaiian Islands were exposed, and that certain courses of action were open
to him, viz.: - -
(1) He could have used the patrol aircraft available to him to conduct
long-range reconnaissance in the more dangerGus Sectors, and thus made the
Japanese task more difficult, whether or not this would have resulted in the
detection of the approach of the Japanese carriers; (2) He could have
rotated the “in port” period of his vessels in a less routine manner, and thus
made it more difficult for the Japanese to have predicted when there would
be any vessels in port; (3) He could have maintained a higher condition of
readiness under which Naval planes would have been in the air during the
early morning period, Ships' batteries would have been fully manned, and
damage control Organizations fully operational. .
The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers,
a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through
the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects
of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practical pre-
cautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which
reasonably were open to him were:
(a) Establishment of long-distance air reconnaissance, covering the most
probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent
basis, with available planes and crews.
(b) Establishment of a higher condition of antiaircraft readiness, at least
during the dangerous dawn hours.
(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage-control readiness by ships
in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.
(d) Installation of antitorpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.
(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible
attack forces. --
(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into
port at irregular intervals.
(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of antiaircraft defense and air-
craft warning installations.
The evidence indicates clearly, however, that Admiral Kimmel's most serious
omission was his failure to conduct long-range air and/or sea reconnaissance in
the more dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack.
That this is so is manifest from the evidence obtained by Admiral Hºwitt.
The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured
information, after the receipt of the “war warning,” as to the approach of the
attacking force, were the Aircraft Warning Service, traffic analyses of Japanese
naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.
During the critical period after November 27, the limitations of the Aircraft
Warning Service and of radio intelligence were evident; the only remaining
practicable source upon which Admiral Kimmel was entitled to rely for informa-
tion as to the Japanese naval movements was distant air and/or sea recon-
naissance which, covering the most probable approach bearings would have had
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4701
a reasonable chance of success. The failure to detect the approach of the Jap-
anese task force contributed more to the success Of the Japanese attack than did
any other single factor.
In addition to the courses of action referred to by the Commander in Chief,
U. S. Fleet, it was, of course, always open to Admiral Kimmel also to take steps
to increase co-operation between his organization and the Army Command, and
to attempt to achieve effective joint command. That conditions were ideal for
his accomplishing such an objective is indicated by the evidence in the [86]
record and the finding of the Court that the Social relationship between him and
General Short was excellent. The need for Admiral Kimmel taking such meas-
ures existed from the time he took command of the Pacific Fleet. It increased in
urgency as the 7th of December, 1941, approached. -
13. The Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, to the
Naval Court record concludes that:
“6. The derelictions on the part of Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel
were faults of omission rather than faults of commission. In the case in
Question, they indicate lack of the superior judgment necessary for exercis-
ing command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties,
rather than culpable inefficiency. -
“7. Since trial by general court martial is not warranted by the evidence
adduced, appropriate administrative action woulds appear to be the relega-
tion of both of these officers to positions in which lack of superior judg-
ment may not result in future errors.”
The first endorsement of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy states his
conclusion and recommendation that trial by general court martial is not
warranted by the evidence produced.
14. On the basis of the record, findings, Opinion, and recommendation of the
Court of Inquiry, the First Endorsement of the Judge Advocate General thereto,
and the Second Endorsement of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, thereto ;
and the evidence obtained by Admiral Hewitt, and on the basis of the foregoing
(“Omments, I COnclude that : "-
(a) Then Rear Admiral Claude C. Bloch discharged his duties adequately.
(b) Then Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Admiral Harold B. Stark, par-
ticularly during the period from 27 November to 7 December 1941, failed to
demonstrate the Superior judgment necessary for exercising command commen-
Surate with their rank and their assigned duties. - -
(c) Both of these officers having been retired, appropriate action should be
taken to insure that neither of them will be recalled to active duty in the future
for any position in which the exercise of superior judgment may be necessary.
(d) The appropriate committees of Congress should be fully acquainted with
the Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts
Concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investiga-
tions, should be made to the extent that such action can be taken without injur-
ing current military Operations or the national security.
15. Accordingly, I direct:
(a) Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (Retired), shall not hold any
position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior
judgment.
(b) Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Retired), shall not hold any position in
the United States Navy which requires the exercise of superior judgment.
(c) The appropriate committees of Congress will be fully acquainted with the
Navy's investigations into this matter, and public disclosure of the facts con-
Cerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, obtained in these investigations,
will be made to the extent that such action can be taken without injuring cur-
rent military operations or the national security.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN
AUGUST 30, 1945.
I have read it [the Pearl Harbor reports] very carefully, and I came to the
conclusion that the whole thing is the result of the policy which the country itself
pursued. The country was not ready for preparedness. Every time the Presi-
dent made an effort to get a preparedness program through the Congress, it was
stified. Whenever the President made a statement about the necessity of pre-
paredness, he was vilified for doing it. I think the country is as much to blame
as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor.
4702 congressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 182
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMLATES
1 January-1 July 1941
Prepared by G-2, War Department
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sº - -
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- -
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-



ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4703
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ºn º
tº º tº
-
79716 0–46–pt. 21–12





4704 CongºFSSIONAL INvestigation PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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- - - - - - -
- - -
ſº ſiſ iſ ſiji



ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4705
2/2,~103
ºlº Cº. ººº-º-º- ºr ºl.
-----n -
º º tº cºlº, ºffice of tº secret ºf
ºr nº tº ºne ºr or starr -
Coº Mºº to the tecord section
Cº. º. to ºn leadquarter-
Copy No. 5 to ºn Section -
Copy ºld to Bºlº and ºr ºt Section
ºpy to ºtlan ºire section
Copy lºº to Cºntrºl ºropean section
cºpy ºn to ºn ºropean section
copy nº lo tº º ºstern section
on No. 11 to Latin ºr can section
Copy ºlz to ºn ºn section
copy ºld to elºne in ºlder - sº
on Nº. 1 to - - . -







4706 CongBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
sº
º-ºº-ºo: - ----
- No. -- -º-, lº-
---
- - -º-º-º-º:
- - - - - - - -
º, º ºr ºver (b) -º-º-º- pºlitical relatiº º-
-------------- (-) -
-) --- (------------
----------------------- - - - - -
--------------------- - - - - -
ºnly ºn ------------------ - - - -- ºr ha-ºº:
-- ºn tº ºr -i- ºr- hºw pºly ºn tº tº their
ºll - - - - - - - - -t- tº ºil in
- ºut ºf -ºlº pººl -º ºlº, º not yet tº
- tº ºr lº - ºr -n - ºr -li tº ºitiº ºn
º, if nº ºn-lº -º-º-º- ºr º ºf ºoº-, -ºº ºly
------------------------ tº . * - pººl.
- ºf ºpºlº - - - -, º quº ºr
-º-, *-** - - - -
(b) - ºn Pºlitiºn ºne ºn
|-º-º-º-º-º-º- - - - - - - full ºr of the ºdº -
ºpt-º- 27, 1940. ------ ºniº, ºlotº -ºut tº ººlin
-º-º- 12, 1940 - - -n publicitºr ºil-º-ºp which indicated
---------------------tº- ** * *
-------------------------- - ºil-pº -- tº-
--tº at-º- ºr---n -i- in tº ºt. -i tº dº ºff - -
-- tº poºl--lit-- or tº united State- º º, on
- -, -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-y in playing ºr hand, ºpt
-- - - - - - - - - - - nº and tº
--------------- - - - ------- tº ºn---
----------------- or tº ºviets ºn tº º is still
-------------- - -- the ºr, and hºnº ºf her bººt.
--------------- - -ntly ºn- ºr fish-i-
º) ºf
º

ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4707
---
- - - ----------------------------
-º-º-º-º- - -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º--------
- - - - ------------------
- *-----------------------
- - - - -ing - - - - - ----------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
-- - - - - - ----------------
(-) -- ºn fºr ºf -i- tº ºil-º-º-º-º-
nº ºn- - - - - - - - ºn ºp--------
ºf 3 to 1 ºr - ºne tºll -- ºr--> -tº-1----
- within - - - - - - - - - - -
--- - - - - - - - - - -
whº unprºlºlº -t ºf the Italiºn-- º ºn ºf tº º, -
tº - -tain - ºn their dºº- by tº ºn in ºn tº
-º- ºr ºn- - - - -----------------
---------------------------
ºping lºw- - - probably -- - - - -
ºil- ºf tº------tº-pº ---n - fºllº - -
pºlicy ºf all-º ºld tº tº dº - ºbº-º --
-------------------------------------
ºi-, -i- -- ºr 1-ing the ºl- ºr tº
-- ºf Gº-º-º-gº ºut tº ºp- - - - - - -
- possible tº ºn aid to ºr ------ in tº hº-
- - - - - -
2. ºne ºr ºne ºn tº
ºis -- tº priºry ºliº -idºratiºn in the -º-º:
--- ºne tºll ---no-i-land-ºld prºtº-tº----
------- ºr pot-------- in tº ºr --ºnt. --- *-
----------- - - - - - - - - - -
---n Isles ºn tº cº-- (-) ºr - ºr (b) ºr ºn-
------ (-) ºr in-i-
ºn 87.
4708 CongressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(*) ºn tº sº tº º ºn tº º, ºn
* * * * * * ºn tº º 'º ºn
ºn ºil º º ºr tº ºn
tº ºn tº º 'º - ºr .
ºne in º ºr ºf º ºx ºf ºne º ºr ºt tº ºn.
tº has ºr sº - ºr nº º tº ºne
ºn tººl of liºn, ºne-
º, º and tº ºntº lºng ºn tº ºn-
º, ºn ºr ºn ºly ºn tº pººl.
ºrial ºk has not been ºde ºn the ºld ºr tº the ºl-poºl.
of ºr ºrº is sº question º Gerº ºn ºrd tº riº.
full air attack on Britain, in º ºf ºr need to ºn ºr ºup cy
on the continent ºut her ºr force is gº, and ºn tº be ºpeº
to intº ºus tº use ºne ºn tº º or ºne ºr
ºtºlogged condition of ºººoºº ºnch end ºld ºn ºrºlºld prior to
ºil 15, a full-ºut attºº on Gºt ºn ºr tº Gº Air Forº ºr
tº tº dº -- ºngº ºn tº lºg º ºr ºn ºr ºf
nº ºr ºc ºn tº ºi - - -
tº º in ºn ---ºut ºn tº ºn tº tºº ºf fººt ºll
º ºf ºlly tº ºn tº º ºr ºn tº of tº gº on
ºngº ºn ºtº º be pººl.
(b) ºn lº ºn continº dº of ºn tº
ºpen nº ºn rººt ºf lºgº ºn ºf foºd for tº pºple ºn of
tº ºn to its ºr nº- ºr ble ºppºng tº
ºr in ºr - ºr by that tº lºng ºr tº
ºping loss to dº nº been ºrious they are tº though they
ºn bºº, critical ºn ºne º 'ºllºwed to have apprºtºly
sº ºne in cºlon, ºr production of submarinº,
though ºn to have been elºd up, ºr ºll reach a seriously high
ºre, ºr sºlº ºre tº creatly aided by air reconnaissance
º ºg º nº by ºne ºn extent of the ºriº and air
º, from º ºr to º sºlº ºrder, nº -bºa º ºn .
- 120 Sº
- -
-
-
-
|-


ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4709
-------- ºn tº ºn ºping 1- ºr- - -tº by the
ºr ºf ºne ºil º ºn pº toº anti-º ºr
º, º º ºr ºf ºn ºn tº º ºs º- tº
- - - - - -ºº lº ºrially dº in the
-º- ºr ºr - ºtiºn - ºtill ºliº tº hº ºppº
tº 5,000,000 ºn ºf oºº-ºoºng ºniº ºr and abºve -
ºn requiº tº ºn the ºritish º and tº cº ºn the ºr
* its present tº º ºs alsº believed tº be sºlº or ºld-
in ºly 1,200,000 ºn of oºº-ºoºº ºpping pº year-
ºn loº. º. ººgºng ºping for tº cºlºr nº lºº
-- believed tº ºn ºn pºlº 3,190,000 tº It is quitº
poºl that the ºpping loºs in 1941 tº be ºy ºn higº ºn
tº in 1940, º, unlº this occurs, tº ºurº indiº that the
ºn Iºlº cºnnot be stººd out by ºpping lºss ºthin the nºt
º, ºn befºº ºld rºble ºn toº º tº ºilable to tº -
(c) ºn ºn invºlon in gºt strºngº is an ºver-
prººt ºt to the ºritish telº ºn tº ºld tº operatiºn ºld
be of unprºtº ºfficulty, º ºritish º 1,650,000 regular
ºpº, fairly ºil ºppºd, ºth prºpºd dºtºnº, ºlºtºly strong
ºil toº and about lºº,000 Hº dº º quº of ºn tº
ºne ºutlº allºt ºnly be dºdºnt on their attºnt of prº-
cally cºlº ºr ºperiority ºr ºitºl -º ºut tº ºtºiºnº of
such ºr ºuperiºrity is a distinº poºlbºlº- ºr- tº ºn-
º a great ºntºgº in being able to lººn ºrº ºdiºlºry
ºrces from a brººd bºº, ºppºly 600 ºilº in lºgº, from the
ºn tip of ºriº to the ºriº an Iºlºnº- ºro- thºse bºº, ºr
pºlitionary forcºº ºld have relatively shoºt ºn its to England.
tº ºne alsº have another base line, ºf approximately the -
lºng the ºth ºrº- ºn alºng tº ºn tº but tº this lº
they would have ºn-id-bly long-------- ºr -- have the
-
ººd sº
- ſº

4710 congressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-ºliº ºf -º- ºr ºlº ºr - - - - - - - - - -
ºlº - º ºn ºf ºn in -
ºl-º-º- ºr -- - - - - - - - -
- -º- ºr it. - ºil - ºr ºn tº º-
-º-º-º-º-º-º- º ºil-º ºf i-º-º- - - -
- -
(d) º 'º ºn tº ºn ºf ºne- ºr ºf º- ºr-
tº ºf -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-y lº- tº ºn -------- -
bººt ºr bººk the ºn ºil to rºle if the tº ºr º-
ºn attack is ºtºliº inº- ºr it tº gº is ºr
nº. ººlºº ºritiºn ºl- iº high, º the ººº- ºr Gº-
ºrial -ºº º be -t- ºr by nº ºne -º- º ºr ºt
toº ºr lºy that a* ºr tº ºn ºping loº- ºr-
- * * * * * - ºne ºr tº
- not indiº tº they will be ºl. dºing tº prº yº-
ºn ºn ºf ºn -- a -º ºut ºilº º tº
possible at all tº and prºbablº as the ºr ºppº. Tº
ºn tº be rat- an ºl-tº-
3. * ºn tº sº tºº ºl- operatiºns in thin
tº have ºn Laº - the rºll-º- ºr nº ºn -- iº
ºn lººd, sº and air, ºr ºrale is at a lº ºbb and ºn be ºpºd tº
tº ºll lº- ºne ºritish -º- tº ºn lººr-º-luding
the sº- and the Rºd Sea apºlº tºº, with a good bºº at Alº-
and impºrtant strategic ºutpost in Cº. Cyprus, tº Lºnº and lº-
They alsº hold, though nºt ºily, the ºn ºn tº
ºr base at ºrºlº. The ºle sº is largely dº by the ºriº,
in ºpiº the British ºutpost at Mºlº. The Gºnº - ºne ºn-
siderable ºr forces intº Italy and the tº tº ºr - - - -
ºnly sº lººd tº into tºly ºn ºr tº bº on sºlº and
- -, -, -º an -º ºn tº ºn held ºn tº
º




ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4711
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-----------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - --------
- * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- - - - - - - - - - -------------
- - - - - - -------- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -º-º-º-º-
- ------- tº º, º - ºn - - - ------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ºlº - ºr- ºnly lºgiº -tººl--- iº tº º -
--------------------, -- - -
- - - - -----
- º 'º -º- ºr --- lººly ºne-º- in tº
---------------------------- - ---
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -º-º-º-
- - - - - - - -º- ºp-----, -º- ºr º-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
---------------, -, - tº 1---- tº--------
-------------------------------------- - -
---------------- - - - - - -
- tº-----------------it tº ºl----- ºllº -
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -
ºmni
º

4712 CongBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4713
|- |-|-|-
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4714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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tº
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4715
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* - -
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- - - ---
-
º
ºf ºl.
sº ºr or º, ºz.
º ºs of the ºn tº
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-- tº the situation º on the ºn-
ºne an ºne-
sº -
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ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4717
- - - -
- - -
*/2 × 4 & / .
- 5
º
-------------
-º-o-º-º:
º
-- - -
P- º lº-
- * * *ºtº º ºr staº, ºn-
--- - - - - -i-lº.
ºne ºf yellº fºr virus.
- - - -- lºlº --- --- - - -- 31-
- Cºrpse office ºf tº ºn 0- ºrought to G-
-----in ºne-º-º-º had - tº -º- ºbject with
D- - - ºr, Internatiºn ºth Divisiºn, Rockefellºr
---
2. Cºlºnel 5-ºns, in prº-ing this correspºndence,
------- ºr---------------- led hi- to beli-
ºn--- Jºº are ºvering tº obtain viºlent ºralas of
-- tº viº fºr the purpose of -º- ºrial ºrfare.
-- *-i- ºllie- Divisiºn ºnours in
--------- ºl-------------- through propºr -º-
---, - nºt any ºf -º- ºn -pºli- ºf viºlent strain- of
-- tº viºus frº-rºlling intº J-pº- ºr other totalitariºn
º- ºn h ºn - * > -- -
as ºn steps tº ent any ºn lies in . tº
ºrs tº ºrchase ºr or n ºs.
sº lººs,
ºri-º-º-, U- 5- ºr-.
ºg ºil-chief of staff, G-
-
C-p- ºr Dºy Cº-º ºf 5-rº
| 12013?
Nº
-
º
4718 CongBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
G-C
. . . . . .
--/-º-º- º *
---, 1-11-- tº-
---
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--- lºº.
------------
---, -, -º- or º sºle ºn
- * -
- -----------, -º-º-º-º- (-lºº
ºlº tºº ºl '), ---, 1- ºr- - -º-
lin- ºth ºr ºl- ºr- ºr ºff-- * *-
-- ****** - ºr- º ºp---ly ºne to coºl-
** - -º-, -itº Italy ºll ºn ºf tº 3-fººt-ºf-
tº-, -º- tº -i- º pºlitical - ºf the tº -
ºl--tº ºr ºl- ºr º- - - - tº tº sº.
- with its ºivºlent of 68 nºviº, 170 º-
- (3,100 ºl. - piº), º ºpe, tº ºperº -º
lines with hºr ºland tº ºne-of -o-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
-º-º- ºilable ºr -i-positiºn- º is pºrº - tº-dºº-
- ºut - -º- ºlly, -pº -- the United Sºtº ---n,
- iº -bºº to ºn-ºn in the ºr ºº tº oppºsitiºn in
tº º sºuth º º ºr ºre r-in-nºlly intº and
---
- º -- - - - -------
------ tº the pºt off- provideº º ºsault 1-
on cº-inº lºº, -th -º- ºr- ºth in-n- ºr,
ººt -ººd fºr lºº, by ºil-lº -º- ºf ºn-º-º-º-º:
-º-º-º-º- ºr -ial tº and ºliº the -l-º of ºurº-
* - - -ºº-ºº-ºº of the pºt ºn º-
ºr it has ºº in ºtº intº - ºr- ºr-tº-º-
- ***i-ly pºp-i- tº ºtiºn ºat-º-o-ºrding
---------------------- ºr º- lº-
of a ºral º off-lº ºthin the nº º ºxy-pºly ºr
ºn intº ºr
- º --- - *** ** - 11-ºn-op-
---- - - - but -ºo-º-º-º-º-º:
----------- -
- *-º-º-º-º-º-º- ºr- tº thin- hold ºut of
-º-º-º-y ºpiºd and pºp-d- tº ºpen-º-y ºver
--- in the sºuth China - - - now ºne the initial
op---------- into this --
5- - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- intº ºl--tº--------------------
--- - - tº-----
- - - - -
- *- tº-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-
----------- to - ºil-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-o-º-
tensive r-pri-º- ºld--at- that ºuth -º- in the
----------------------n the natiºn---
---------- lº- tº bºº -ºut-- the ºat-la of º-º-º:
-º-
- - ºn--
"º ºn - º 138 |
Cº-Cº . . ---, º's. -- -
ºne º cºlºr ºf sº, D-2.
º
------



ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4719
T-
-
| Office. The ' Sec. of War
Adm. A 'tºº
Lºº-
A. C. of 8 C-
A. C. of S. Cº-º
A C of 8 C- -
-
— A. C. of S. W. P. D. --- -
- The Adjutant General
- Budget ºleºlative Pººl
Statistic ºr nºn
ºut ºne for ºve. -
ºor-
- Neº any action.
— Pºtion of study
__. Note and -u-
- Remark and recommendation ºil-
Comment or concurren-
- Draft of ºnly.
Diº ºnly.
º ---
Signature.
—nºtºnºs
Cº.,
---
-
ſº ºr ºf
By direction of D. C. of 8.
-
º
79716 0–46–pt. 21
13
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4720 congBESSIONAL INvestigation PEarl Harbon attack
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4722 CongBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- -
-
- - -
CONFIDENTIAL * * * * *
: - - - - - - - -
- - º
Q-2/2342-191 - - - -
º º, ºl.
º Pº. Tº ºr cºlº tº º, º
ºbºt Jºº lºng ºpºlº.
is lºing ºperatiº ºve, fºr sº º, ºn pºrt ºf the
tºtical training ºf Jºe Divisiº. During tº
cour* of the ºr with China which stººd in July 1937, -ºlº
ºpportunity tº be ºn affºrded variº Jºse ºniº tº perfeº
the technique of this operatiºn ºr sºlº cº- sº tº
today it follows a pºttºm ºried º ºsted by ºr.
2. The tasti- ºd ºniº ºf Jºº lºng ºrº-
tiºns are as given in the attached ºrant frºm the Digº ºf
ºlitary Infoºtion - J-pº, Cºfidºl (see tº 1).
3. It will be noted tº the Jºº havº º sºlº
air and naval ºr in all ºr lºng ºpºrº in Chi-
hile it is ºblº tºº ºr prºº ºdºlº Jºº ºld
have cº-plºts air º nººl ºperiºrity in ºf ºtº - tº
Hºwaiian Iºlº ºr Pº, it is highly probable tº sº would
have the in ºr ºriº º ºn tº ºlippin- ºr -º-
- Co-idºlº dº nº-ºº-ºº ºf ºdº - ºf-
ing against ºf landings used by other countriº, ºlally
the British in the prºnt ºf ºne is ºlºblº in this Divisiºn.
5. in the defºº pº ºf the ºrº pºiº º your
staff respºnsibility, your recºndations are requested as to ºat
- hould be of the inº- - - -º- in -
ºth those defºnº planº and the ºining and equinºt ºf the
troops invºlved.
ºn MILES,
Cºrºl, U. S. Arºy,
Acting Assistant chief of Staff, G-2.
Inclºur- . . - - -
Copiº to nº tº 2^*
- - , º,
Deputy Chief of Staff
G-3 ºnn SCCON COPY
º
CONFIDENTIAL º
-
-





















ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4723
=
-
-R ---ARTMENT
------------------ -- /
-
-----------
------
----------
February 20, º
subject: Military cooperation with China.
- Lu) ºn tº Cºlº or cº-ºº-
-- The lilitary attache of the Chinese ºn-
Laºy, Colonel Teh-Chuan lºo, has made an informal, though
strong recºndation, that discussion be initiated be-
ºn his office and some ºr Department agency for the
purpose of coordinating the actions of the Chinese ºy
with those of any possible American military or naval
--tivities in that area.
- Colonel ºud º ºn-tº his Government ---
very desirous of such cooperation and that discussione
could be initiated at any time the United States Govern-
- ie-i-
3. This enorandum is ºn shed for inform-
tion only ºn reply has been made to Colonel ºuc, and
ºne is neº-sary.
--tº lºsiº Chief of st-ºf, G-2.
Motiºn ºn tº Fºº &
º/lº
ºn to ºne Division.
secreſ º
nº ºf . ---. -
Fº º º
------
-->




4724 Congressional INvestigation PEARL HARBor Attack
CON ID. TIAL
… 7 º' --
º
-
CH-1
º -
-------
------ ---
- - - - - - - - -
- - - -
- -
-- -------------
-------------------
-----------
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
mºnosºmon copy
11. --

ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4725
- CONº AL
---
- ----------
------- ---
---
-- (* ---
---
** º-º-º- * ***
- ------ º
º _ -
-"
-



4726 congBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
º-ſº-107
--- 27. -º-
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-------
--- --------------------
---------
-- - - - - - -lly this -i-.
- that ----of -- - - - - -
-----------------
º ºritish -------------
(b) - prº-iºn plana -i- ºp-
2- - - ºne-º------------
in this war-tº-the All-4------- lar-ly -tº-
-ºl- tº------d----------------------
-º-º-º----------------- -----------
p-ly tººl-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
th-ºr--------------------------
------------- ºr ºl- - -->
ºf -º-º-º-º-º- º º
------tº ºr cº-
-----------------------------
-- ---------
-- ºr----tº º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
-------------------- - - - - -
-º-, --- - - - - - * *
- -------------------
--------------------------
-- - - - - ----------------
-
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4727
- ------------------
-- Air Fºre- whi------L-ly q-ioned by
---ºft-ial-------- 0-------------
-----------------------------
------------------------ - -
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-li--
th- - -t-lii~---L--º-º-º- Day before -
-------------------------------
*i-------ºf 12-500 fir-li------
ºn-p------- **** - 13 p-----------
-- - - - - - - -----------
ºnfid-e-I believe tº -14 be di- fºr - - -p-
----------------------------
5- - - pººl-bº ------------
* - - -ºº ºf war - British -º-º- ºf the sit-i-
---------------tº-º-º-º-º-º-
---
4- tº - ºfiº ºf -º- ºritish ------

4728 congressional INvestigation PEARL Harbor attack
* Dº º
- ºr -
-º-º-º-º-º-
- -º-º-º-º: 's R º º
-
- º tº
ºn to chief of start º
- - -
Spanish cºate of sºon
º
- ºn enore duº prep red by secretary elies dated
February 19, on the spaniºn esti or (date
ºteº), as transmitted tº the
- adrid and mashington.
2. The value of this data lies ºn the presumption that it
comes from General ºranco after his conversations tº ºn.
and Pºtain. In sº, it is to the street ºne.
a limediate attack by Japan upon ºn long and
Singapore.
b. German attack in April against reece and ºne
Dardanºes.
* All-out ºn attack on ºngºland at the end of
ºrch, with actual invasion late in ºy or early in June.
* German invasion of Spain in lay or June.
- -
* The tº ºil neither help nor hinder the Germans.
sº in refuses to cooperate tº ºne- Italy or
Gerºny.
-
3. It may also be noved tº General Franco's esºte ºr
tº German air strength corresponds very closely to ours-10,000
planes in front line, lo,000 reserve.
* The sºlect enorandum ºn written by Secretary elles
on terruary 19th but reached as only today. I'm nº discreet
inquiries nºte in the state epartment regarding tº delº.
3.
º S.
sº
| - - Brigadier General, U. S. º.
º Acting set chief of ºff,



ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4729
-
- - -
- - -
º - - - -
º ---------
º z º. 7
DePaºerºr or sºare º Z º --
-
-----------
º
---------
º
March 6, 1941-
- º
--- Foreign Liaison officer, War Department.
ºr L--- 0-----
-------- Pºlans of the Axis Powere for the Immediate Future.
I enclose for the strictly conna ential in-o-º-º-on
of the appropriate officers of your Department a copy
of a memorandum of a conversation which took place ºn
February 19 between the British Ambassador and the Under
Secretary of State concerning the plans of the Axis -
Powers for the immediate future- -
º, º, ø,
ºne ---n
Liaison Cº-cer
Enclosure-
Memor-ºn-un -º co-º-º-º-on
------n -e ºr -------------
and the under secretary of state-





4730 CongressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- Co-º-º-L-EMA) -
-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
… . . . . * -
-
---------- - - ------------
Date - February is, -----
Guº Jeet- Conver-eations between ºr Samuel Hoare,
Britiºn ambassador to Spain, and Spanish
-----------
Participants: The British Ambassador, the Right Honorable
the Wiscount Halifax,
The Under secretary, Mr. Welles.
Copies --- º, A-5. Pºp, Eu |
Lord Halifax called to see me this afternoon at his
request. The Ambassador gave me the following information
ºlch tºe British Government had received yesterday from
Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador to Madrid.
Sº Samuel Hosºe had learned from the highest Spanish
autºno-tºes in whom he had confidence that General ºnco
in his conversations with Mussol in had been informed that
the axle plans for the immediate future were as follows:
1. An attack ºn the immediate future by Japan upon -
Hong Kong and Bingapore.
2. The German armies early ºn April would move
through Bulgaria against Greece and the Darda- -
nelle --
- ºne soviet ºvernment will neither nºnder or
help.
4. The all-out attºok on England will take place
ºne end - Marcº ºne Germans. General ºr nº
was in ºne-, -ere stated to have 10, Ooo front -
line planes with one nundred percent reserve-
Their plan or attack will be from the day the
*inal action starte, to ºeep at least 2,000
ºlames continuously in the air over England under-
ºn as much material destruction as possible.
-
---
sº coºl



ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4731
- tº ºn-- - - - - - - - - - - ---
- -------- --------- " ---n - - -----
-- ºne --- - - - - - - - -------
all sºlº colºnications. It is the ºn
ºpe tº tºle ºil result in ºver-ation -tº-
in ºil- and coºle tº lºolatiºn of ºland tº
the ºut------ - - - ---------- late -
May - --- in June, the actual in-lon -
tº plº-
5. The ºne nº lºt ºn elone and one ºred
- ºn in occupied ºnce near tº ºn an
------ - - - - ---n - ºne --- a---
-- a believe that there is no actual anºer -
in elon of ºpen before May or June.
The ºn ºn Mussolini and ºn tº place
-- ºne ------------ ºut-º-n - E --- ºr-- ---
------ ºn- ºr--nº e used - reque--- ºr--- ºut-º-
or ºld tº ºn and limited self to statinº ºt.
ºpºlº ºut not compºse her present poºl on of neº-
allºy. It ºf ºther stated that ºnco had lº-
ºted tº he would not contemplete any ºncement
ºtle ºn would alter tº ºt-tus or ºln.
ºnally -- Sºl Hoare º-ºo-ºº: that tº
--nº eation cº-een ºn- and ºn tº been 11-
ºr lººely to a dºcussiºn ºf the easures ºf ſolº cº-
ºn be ºn ºn and ºnce ºn tº be under-
ºn tº tº pºse ºf re-lº-nº lºººl ºn
--------







4732 CongreSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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ºu º





ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4733
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4734 congressional INvestigation PEarl Harbon attack
- - - -


ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
- ºf
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79716 0–46–pt. 21-14
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4736 CongBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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4738 congressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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4740 congressional INvestigation PEARL HARBor attack
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ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4741
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4742 CongBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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4744 CongºFSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-
Washington Post, March 25, 1941
Capital Parade
By Jºseph Alsop and nobert Kinner
- Lauchlin Currie's Report On China
º --- º ----------
- ºn the nº ºn dºs have
---------- -------------
- -- -
Cºn- ºr Lau-
lº Currie, the
-------- -
prºtº --
------- whº
----------
tº ºne-
ºn-------
- -tuºtiºn.
Currie does nºt prºtºnd to be a
military ºpert, but he is a good
repºrter, and he is -i- tº have
brºught back tº the President -
--------- list ºf the Chin-
nº ºr stºling a lºunter-
ºn-ºve again-------
The list, considering -- nature
ºf mºdern war, º mºnitiºn
brº. A dº--- ºld ºne
ºr--- º up-to-date pursuit
plane comparatively ---
title---aviatiºn gas, ---allºy-
and other tº materials, and a
certain amºunt of heavy artillery
and ammunitiºn -uld be enough,
------in-º-º-º-º-leader-
sºlº tº the Fººt through
Cºle ºth this ºn-rative
ºut ºf supplies the Chinese
ºn they cºuld knº-pol- ºut
ºf the Japanese invaders.
- -
SECOND development is
--tº-lated tº the ºt, indica-
ing tº ºur F--- policy -
already hºring ºn tº ºrg---
ºnline-tº-ºn-tº-
australia and -- ~-land of
several ºvy and light cruiser-
and a considerable-numb-º-º-
ºny- ºn a "cºurtºº visit."
Although secretary ºf the Navy
--nº ºntº has nºn-tº re-
ºted any suggestiºn ºf ulteriºr
motive, any ºver nºt tº
ºu--must cºnclude that hi-
"ºurtesy visiº is in reality ºn
enective cºrºntº-between the
tº main tactions in the Navy
Department.
The cautiºus fººtiºn, ºposed
the chief ºf Naval Operatiºns.
Admiral Harºld star- and nº
ºf the member of the general
ºrd has maintained that any
-º-ºn-1 american n-fºr-
crossing the lººth meridiºn would
tº attacked ºr turn- ºr by
the Iºnes. The ºcerº with
Far Eastern experience, whº are
---------ee-nºted ºn the general
ºrd, are the factiºn of dari-
They have maintained the cº-
º prºpºsitiºn, that ºn tº
------------------------
and - Zealand would nºt only
nºt be --------------- tº
Slºre would alsº be enºugh
tº deter the Japanese-ºurth-
ºur- in --- Anyºn-
--in-tº-man ºn tº that
-º- courtesy viºlinº and
-lºng “recreatiºn" at ºne-
- Auckland ºn prº- tº
ºn-ºre ºut nº dº
ºf Japanese nºrt-
-ºud-tº-º-º-º-º-º:
sº nº nºt ºn tº
-----------------------
-i-º-n -----------
ºniº ºur- a tº re-
------------ - -------
ºr sº ºne ºve, ºr cºurse.
been prº bºre thrºugh
ºther ºr --- ºn
Dr T. V. Sº, Chinº ºn
------------, -º- ºne ºn 1
----------------------
-----------------------
-------------------- in
---------------------
-----------------------
ºf the Eurºpean nº ºn tº
------------------in-
-
-U-I-Hoº-º-º-º-º-º-
-th sºcial authºriº -- ºn
clºse tº the President ºn has
--------------------ºugh
----------------------
- ºurs with - ºne-
alºn-tº re-iv----------
ºne-ºn-ºn-ºn-º-º-º-º-
ºne back a convert tº ºn-
on all points.
The division ºn --
-------------------
-------, which has ºrie-ºº.
many peºple here he repºrt-
tº dismiss as in the tº plº-
ºured and in the secºnd a sign
nº ºne- ---------en- and
belle in ultimatº -i-tºry. The
prºblem of getting in the supplies
he tº little of tº the Jap-
-- talk of "clºsing the Burma.
road" is nonsense, solº as there
are hundreds ºf fervºutly ener-
getic cºlles to repair ºne dam-
ºne ºf every bomb the Japanese
drop. The problem of air field-
and nº personnel he al-mini-
nº having been impressed by
the ºpiniºns of the fºreign air
----------hungking ºn Chinese
ſºng, and having ºn with his
ºwn - º coolies building
ºne of a chain of vast fields in-
tended to be used by the flying
ºre-tes. -
-º-º-effectiveness ºf the
propºsed ºnese ºffensive, nº
makes tº ºntº. First, the Japa-
----- ----------------
--------ustºn and demºral-
-ation than-i-generally ºurned
here, and thus not likely to stand
up under strong attack and -ee-
- with the ºn- ºr-----
alone, tº drop incºlºry bº
on Japan's concentra-lºst
undefended pape---tº-
industrial ºre---------ºut
prºbably be struck at the Japanese
-------
-
ON THE Cº. --- - -
balance sheet, Currie is de-
ºribed as agreeing with virtually
all the other Far Eastern experts,
- - that h-- ºnly
pre-ºn-dºnºr tº
Cºn---ºn-
attack on Sinº-
pore, ºr which
-ºpiº -----
-- the ºut-
- - - -- ºne
rºad's mºuth.
- - -ºn-
- -- -- Sinº-
-- is nº
º-º-º-º: -- - -
-- ºut-------- hºwever,
-nº-1-----º-º-º-
-- ºr--------------
ºn their
- -, -º-º:
have nº nº
ºil -- in -
-º-º-ºne-
ºn-ºn-º-º:
Iºlº º in Nº.
ºr tº alºn
- - -------
-- - -
---------- in ---
-- Leº - ºil-
ºr nº pºlicy tuºlº, and the
ºntº has been put ºf nº-
in the ºut-º-º-º-º-º-º:
ºr ºnline in ºne
ºr lº ille tº tº ºr
the decisiºn ºn ºur ºn pºlicy
--------------------















ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4745
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4746 congreSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4747
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4748 congressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4749
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47.50 congBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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4752 congBESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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-
4754 Congressional INvestigation PEARL HARBon attack
-
--~~ - -, -º-
-Dº you º Aºtº cº-oº ºr º-
ºr sºlº º ºſ º ºn.
- Tº ºr Plans Divisiºn ha- ºn tººd ºf the ºr
tº ºpers a strat-i- ºtiº ºf the situatiºn ºut.
º:*
2. -ºº º º sºlº be ſº not later ºn
-
date iºd intº as fºllº ºn tº pºss (a)
--tº º (º) ºn tº stºº ºlly pºp-ting in
---
-- ºn ºf ººº-ºº ºn lººding to a dºº-
- ----------- liº ºf ººlºº - - - - -al-
- in a ºn as tº hº-º-º- prºlº ºne ºf ºtiºn.
º ------ -- -º-º-º-ºng tº -º-
ºn of liºn ºf -º- ºn tº ºr ºf -lºng in -
--- - - - - -le lin- ºr -
ºte ºrº ºne ºf a lº - -
-- ºtiºn ºf -------------- -
a dºnatiºn of lines ºf ºoººº ºn tº her and cul-in-ting
-- - - - - - - - - -
(a) -- of ºat-
---
ºlº - (-º-º-º-º-)
- ---
(b) shipping
ºn hº - - -
Prod- - - - --
- -i- (- -----)
---
ONº ºn an
-- - - tº 5




ExhibiTs of JOINT COMMITTEE
---------
ºrulu-
-) -
-
---
-------
() --
-) ---
- - - -
- - - - - -----------
-- ºr 1- ºr - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - -
-º-o-º-ning - - - - - - - - -
-- - - - - - - - - - -
------------
º ºr -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-
---, -ing Cº - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - ----------
ºil º lºº
3. nº-º-tº-nº-------------
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
Vºy - - ---
- - -
--------------
- *------
º




4756 CongreSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Nº || | | | | | |
-- --
-- - D- - --tº- --- |-- --- - º,
ºi. - - - - - - -tº, -, - tº-
---> -- ~~
... tº twº-tº re-d in p-gº - is tº
- *-ºn - - - - - -
-- a-- - - - - - - - - -tº-
-º- ºr tº tºº - in tº - - -lly be -
li-oº-º-º-º-º- - - - infº-º-º-
-º-, - fºr as applicable, ºr yºur ºn-ni-e tº follº-
- - - -- or - ºting -ºtion ºntº
is invited to the - that - - - - - - -
-º- of the situatiºn but are -ly int-tºn ºntº
- -i-o-º-º-º-º-º-
- - - - -
- Q-, p-nº greatly ºperiºr land, air
and ºne ºre-, hºlds the initiative, which, through her
ºne-trated lea-hºp and integrated regiº, ºne is successfully
applying in an -i- off-i- ºcainst the ºritish Cºlº-
b. ----, -pire, -i- with superiº
-- - poºr ºut ºrigi-in-p-, -º-º-º-tºn -
battle 1-ship, is on the dar-i- and is lºing cround-
-- ºn United Gºat-, with a superior navy in
one ºn, but withºut arº -ºne ºr ºveloped co-and-
and -th but tº co-ºat ------, -º- in ºrbal cº-
sit-i- to the orº- an in -i- -pºp-º of the d-tº-ai-
ºut --- - - - - - - - to take overt batt-
--------------- in h- - - -nºr -----
---
- - - - - - -º- ºr-----------
-- ºr tº thºr- ºr- poºr- chi- Italy and ºn h-
-----how----------- *-ºn--- thº-
---------------------------th ºr-
-º- - */

ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
4757
-- ºlla º ºr - ºr in 1-
right ºut only bºº of tº bulk. In 1- iº in-tº-
ºl-cy it is a -- to ºll ºd of vºlu- - - -
and -u tº use of it - -------
sºlº Ilº,
--- Cººl, U. º. º.
ºng º Chief of Gºtº, O-º-
-ºin ºr - -
ºuropean and Asiatic ºutralº-
Nº || | | | | | ||
--


4758 CongressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL Harbor attack
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tº ºil -º ºr -ºº º º a sºlº ºn tº ºt-
---------- - - - - - -
- - - - - - -





EXELIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4759
coºpººl
(1) cºntain ºr isºlate the ºil-ºpiº. I- -
-º-, -º- ºritish ºl-y- ºria ºil -- tº-º-º-º-
air-t -ººk by land, - - -i-.
(2) Cºin ºr -ºlº tº ºilº I--
ºs --- *-º-º-º-º-º- tº- - - |
(3) ºn ºf the Philippº Iºlº and º-
--- º – tº --
ºlº intº ºr -, (-), (-), - (3) - -º-
ºn tº - ºf the ºn tº in º ºn -
- Jºgº ºil pºly ºr ºl-
--tº º- --- - - - - - -
-º-, by ºiº ºr ººlººg the ºilippi- tº -
• * ºr ºld ºn ºlº ºn tº º tº
If º 'ºtº ºº ºld ºly ºr º- -
ºr, ºn ºld º to ºs º allººn ºf º- ºl-
ºiliº for- º ºppliº ºn ºn- ºld ºn tº ºr --
- - - - -º- - - - - - -
º

4760 CongressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARPop Attack
ºf -, -ºl-
-º-º-º-ººººº tº Cº - --P-D-
ºn tº º ºſ º º-
1- tº -º- ºº yº lºº. ºº in
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-
---
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-
* -º- ºf º ºs º Lºs
º:
ºn MIL-
ºriº ºral, U. º Aºy,
* Assiº ºf ºf ºffe º-










ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
-
- - -
- ---
- - -- ºl. --
-, *º-
- º-º-º: ºs-ºs---
º: - - - - - - -
- * - ºr--
----- - - - - ---
º-º-º-º- ºr- Pºe - - -º- ºr-. --
In ºrº- º ºpera º cº- ºllº in º-
-lºgº, º cºins ºvº º 'º -- - - -
last ºf ºilº was a 1- ºf ºººoºº,000 tº- tº tº º-
º --- - tº 1--- - - - - - -
part ºf - ºf the lººrs, only sºlº priº ºf a -i-
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-
- - ºr years ºf - º -
- - - - - pºisºl -i- tº -i-





4762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
º) º ºs ººte -- a-- tº
-º-º-º-º-o-º-º-º- ºf the cº-º- ºr tº
- - -
* º ºr º
- Cº- - - - - - -
- ºf-twº ºrº ºn a -ll º ºr tº re-
ºpº ºf aid - ºffensive ºpens fº tº
ºn--- *-
- * pºse ºn ºn - ºperate º 'º -nº-
-
* * * * * * * participates in the -
* * * * *ivºy ºngº, cº ºld,
ºlºly coºpºe ºn tº uniºn ºn and sºry
* -ºº ºn- º º ºs ºld.
tº it - tº furnish wºº and fº
tº ºbº º sºlº alºng with planes, pilº
--- º
º
-
º, º Prºle - - - -ti- to re-lº -itº,
--- - - - - - - - - - -
-º-º- ºr-----
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4763
3. nº lºº
º ºp- hº ºn tº hºbº º ſºlº-
fºr yº. ºº 1937, it is ºliº tº fºllº -
- - - - - - - - - -
* -º º - - - -ºº º
º, ſºlº), ºak (cººlinº), and ºliº - ºl.
P-).
Lºg º ºs º- to -º- º -º- ºr tº
Pºpe, Jºlº, ºl, and tº tº hº alº ºn tº
- * * *, *p, * * *º-
Tº is ºp-ed tº the J- - bºilº -lº
Cºlo-20 tº 1-- a-- to º -º) fºr - ºf -º- -
-
-
-




4764 CongressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- -
º
º
º


EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
-
-
|
-
- -
- - -




4766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 183
UNITED STATES SENATE, r
May 20, 1946.
Mr. SETH. W. RICHARDSON,
General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the
Pearl Harbor Attack, --
Senate Office Building.
DEAR MR. RICHARDSON : I have gone over the book “The Case Against the
Admirals”, and it appears to me that we should have, for the record, the report
on the bombing of the Utah in the fall of 1937. We should also have the pro-
gram which was prepared by General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. The book
states they prepared a program to submit to the War Department calling for 108
B-17's for enlarging the Pacific Fleet so it would operate in the Pacific and also
provided for training of men to cost $21,000,000.
We should also have a copy of the budget of the Air Corps providing for
this. We should also have the evidence showing why the War Department
refused to submit the $21,000,000 item to Congress. -
I believe we should also secure copies of the letters from Colonel Knerr to
the Senate on the B-17 program.
On page 64 of the book is this quotation:
“The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the B-17's.
Instead of the B-17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive
type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300-miles.” -
We should put this evidence from the War Department into the records.
Sincerely,
/S/ Homi ER FERGUSON.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Room 4D757, THE PENTAGON,
. Washington, 15 June 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson.
In response to your letter of 23 May 1946 forwarding Senator Ferguson's
request of 20 May 1946:
1. Annexed under Tab A is a copy of the report of the bombing of the Utah
in August 1937, together with other papers pertaining to that exercise.
2. A memorandum dated 24 November 1937 from the Commanding General,
GHQ Air Force to the Assistant Secretary of War outlined a procurement pro-
gram for Fiscal Years 1940–1945 to bring the Army air strength up to the 2320
aircraft recommended by the Drum Board. The program approved by the
Secretary of War on 11 March 1938 as the Woodring Program was a revision of
a proposal submitted by the Chief of the Air Corps. The following table com-
pares the numbers of four-engine bombers included in the two programs:

GHQ Pro- Woodring
gram Program
Total objective-------------------------------------------------------------- 196 144
FY 1940 procurement-------------------------------------------------------- 53 67
FY 1941 procurement-------------------------------------------------------- 53 48
FY 1942 procurement-------------------------------------------------------- 33 0
FY 1943 procurement-------------------------------------------------------- 28 33
FY 1944 procurement-------------------------------------------------------- 40 11
FY 1945 procurement-------------------------------------------------------- t 0 8
3. The Air Corps' tentative estimates for Fiscal Year 1940 included $23,450,000
for 67 four-engine bombers based on the Woodring Program. In accordance
With the decision to eliminate four-engine bombers from the aircraft require-
ments for Fiscal Year 1940 and to use the funds set up for that purpose for the
procurement of attack and light bombers (see Tab B), the regular estimates as
Submitted contained no provision for the procurement of four-engine bombers.
However, subsequent estimates were submitted and approved calling for the
ExHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4767
allocation for 126 four-engine bombers of $29,610,000 from the supplemental 1940
appropriations. These estimates were based on the 5500 Plane Program, which
superseded the Woodring Program and was authorized under Public Law 18, 76th
Congress, approved 3 April 1939. The program provided for 178 four-engine
bombers; of that number 52 were on hand or procurable from the regular funds
for Fiscal Years 1939 and 1940, leaving 126 to be procured from the supplemental
1940 appropriations. Army Air Forces inventories show 160 such planes on hand
as of 30 November 1941.
4. A careful search of War Department files has failed to locate any corre-
spondence from Major General (then Colonel) Knerr to the Senate concerning
the B–17 program.
5. A careful search of War Department files has failed to locate any document
containing the language quoted from page 64 of “The Case Against the Admirals.”
ROBERT M. DIGGS,
Captain, A. U. S.
Incl.—2
Tab A
Tab B
Tab A
[Copy]
“Confidential” 17 MAY 1937.
Memorandum for The Secretary of the Navy: -
1. To further the investigation of the defense of our coast against attack from
Overseas, the President desires that a Joint Army-Navy Exercise be arranged
for this Summer, for the information of :
The President
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
The Chief of Staff
The Chief of Naval Operations.
2. The President outlined the Problem, as follows:
Time
During the coming Summer.
Locality
Between lines running Eastward from Cape Cod and from the Capes of the
Delaware, -
(Or) -
Between lines running Westward from San Francisco and from San Pedro.
The Problem,
(1) Attacking Fleet cannot go North or South of the Lines.
(2) Within twenty-four hours from zero time, the attacking fleet shall be
present within the limits of the area and within five hundred miles from the shore
line. s
(3) After arrival of the attacking fleet within the area prescribed, it should
remain there for a period of twenty-four hours.
(4) The attacking fleet shall be represented by a radio-controlled destroyer.
This target represents a battleship. Constructive hits will be allowed.
(5) The defending forces should be comprised of naval patrol forces, surface
and air-Army bombing planes.
Object of the Problem
To locate and test, actually, the ability of the defending forces to destroy
the attacking force.
(Signed) PAUL H. BASTEDO,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
Copy to : Colonel E. M. Watson, FA, USA, Military Aide to the President.
79716 O—46—pt. 21—16
4768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Copy]
Secretary
Navy Department Building
THE JOINT BOARD,
Washington, July 10, 1937.
J. B. No. 350
(Serial 611)
Confidential
To: The Secretary of War.
Subject: Joint Army and Navy Exercise.
Reference: (a) J. B. No. 350 (Serial No. 608) June 10, 1937.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a) with its enclosure.
1. Relative to the contemplated Joint Army and Navy exercise covered in
reference (a), The Joint Board understands that the following basic decisions
have been reached on the subject by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Opera-
tions after consultation with the President on the substance of enclosure (A),
reference (a). - -
a. Location. The exercise will be held in the land and water areas between the
parallels 38°15' N. (Hamilton Field), Latitude 33°40' N. (San Pedro Bay), and
within 300 miles of the COast line. - .
b. Time. 24 hour period beginning at 1200, August 12, 1937, ending at 1200,
August 13, 1937.
c. Forces.
(1) Navy and Coast Guard: The local forces of the 11th and 12th Naval
Districts, plus the Langley and Wright patrol planes, the necessary destroyer
squadrons, the UTAH and such Coast Guard units as may be made available by
the Coast Guard.
(2) Army: 2nd Bombardment Group, composed of 6, B-17 planes. 7th and
19th Bombardment Groups, composed of 19, B–10 planes.
d. Target. Target ship UTAH.
e. Bombs. Navy, Mark VII, water-filled, bombs not to exceed 50 pounds in
weight, when SO filled.
f. Command. The Commanding General, 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force, will repre-
sent the Commander in Chief of the field forces in the preparation for and in
the conduct of the exercise and will command Army units engaged therein.
The Commandants of the 11th and 12th Naval Districts will command the Naval
contingents. Command in joint operations will be determined under the prin-
ciples Outlined in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.
g. Publicity. This exercise will be considered a normal joint training exercise.
Any necessary publicity will be handled in a normal and routine manner so as to
avoid undue emphasis and SO as not to violate existing instructions COvering Secret
and confidential material and photographs. Information given out for publicity
purposes will be general in nature only.
2. Action recommended. Since time is pressing, The Joint Board recommends
that the two Departments proceed without delay with the preparation and issue
to their respective services of the necessary directives to carry out this exercise.
(Signed) Malin Craig,
MALIN CRAIG,
General, U. S. Army,
Senior Member Present.
JULY 16, 1937,
: APPROVED.
(Signed) WM. D. LEAHY,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
JULY 14, 1937.
APPROVED. Py Order of the Secretary of War,
(Signed) Malin Craig,
MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.
EXELIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4769
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE of CHIEF of NAVAL OPERATIONs,
Washington, July 10, 1937.
BLUE
Op–12A—CTB (SC) A16–3(9)/A21 Serial 308
Confidential
Not To BE SEEN BY ANY ONE of THE BLACK SIDE Prior TO COMPLETION OF EXERCISE.
From : Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4.
Reference (a) Joint Act of the Army and Navy 1935.
1. Coastal Frontier Defense JOint Air Exercise NO. 4 Will be held in the land
and water areas included between the parallels of Latitude 38°–15' N. (HAM-
ILTON FIELD) and Latitude 33°–40° N. (SAN PEDRO BAY), for a period of
twenty-four hours beginning at 1200 12 August 1937 and ending at 1200 13
August 1937.
2. Object. To exercise Army and Navy airplanes (BLUE), operating from
the coast, in locating and bombing a target (BLACK), moving at a limited dis-
tance Off the Coast.
3. Limits of Eajercise. First movements by BLUE will begin not earlier than
1200 12 August and the exercise will cease at 1200 13 August (Plus 8 time). No
forces, except plane guards, shall go north of Latitude 38°–15' N. nor south of
Latitude 33°–40° N. Between the above times and between the above latitudes
the target will be at Sea and available for bombing.
4. Forces. For this exercise, in addition to the units normally under the
Command of the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, the
following units will be made available:
[2] NAVY (To the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts,
by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet) :
(a) Aircraft, Base Force, U. S. Fleet :
WRIGHT (Flag)—VP—7F (About 6 P2Y-3)
VP—9F (about 6 PBY-1)
LANGLEY VP—11F (about 12 PBY-2)
VP—12F (about 12 PBY-1)
NotE: Any VP planes available in excess of 30 will be used
solely as plane guards.
(b) Three destroyer squadrons for plane guard duties only.
COAST GUARD (To the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Dis-
tricts, by the Commander, Coast Guard Division, San
Francisco) :
Cutters, patrol boats, aircraft and Coast Guard stations within
the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, as may be made
available after conference between the Commandant, Twelfth
Naval District, and the Commander of the Coast Guard Divi-
sion at San Francisco. Coast Guard participation will be
Subject to distress calls, or duties of an emergency nature,
Which may make necessary Coast Guard services elsewhere.
Such services will not be interfered with. Coast Guard vessels
and aircraft will be used as plane guards only.
ARMY (To the Command General, 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force) :
2d Bombardment Group—6 (B-17) planes.
7th Bombardment Group }
19th Bombardment Group 19 (B-10) planes.
4770 CongreSSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. Target to be bombed will be the UTAH, which will represent a BLACK de-
tachment of two battleships, one aircraft carrier and nine destroyers. Each
battleship has 16 5"/38 AA guns and 8–0’’.50 AA machine guns. Each aircraft
has 12–5’’/25 AA guns, 16–1'’.1 AA guns and 24–0’’.50 AA machine guns. Each
destroyer has 5–5"/38 AA guns and 4–0'’.50 AA machine guns. The UTAH
actually has no guns and she will not cruise in company with other ships. All
practicable precautions will be taken to avoid bombing any other ship than the
UTAH.
6. Bombs. To avoid excessive damage to the UTAH and danger to her per-
sonnel dummy water filled bombs only will be used, not to exceed 50 lbs. in
weight each when so filled, and the cases of characteristics similar to the [3]
Navy Mark VII water fillable bombs. These bombs will simulate the full sized
service bombs, and shall not be carried on any plane in numbers in excess of the
number of service bombs which could be carried. These bombs, both Army and
Navy, shall be painted different colors to distinguish the squadrons, and the
Commanding Officer UTAH will be informed by the Commandants, Eleventh and
Twelfth Naval Districts, previous to the exercise of the colors so assigned. Ar-
rangements will be made by the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval
Districts, with the Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air Force, so as to
prevent duplication of colors. The difference in weight between the dummy
bombs and the service bombs, which they simulate, will be carried by the BLUE
planes in sand, or other suitable ballast, which shall be retained until the dummy
bombs are released. The ballast may then be dumped at such a distance from
the target as not to confuse observers. The War Department has been requested
to adhere to these requirements.
7. Distinguishing Marks. The UTAH will fly international King flag and also
spread same horizontally so as to be visible from the air. Army and Navy
attacking BLUE planes will have no special distinguishing marks other than
those authorized to be worn and displayed by U. S. land and Sea forces. All
plane guard units, less planes, will fly international Preparatory flag.
8. Plane Guards. Vessels and planes assigned as plane guards will take no
part in the exercise other than that necessary to safeguard life of aviation per-
sonnel. Except as necessary for this, they will maintain radio silence and re-
main neutral. They will take care that their actions, dispositions and com-
munications do not assist one side or the other. Three squadrons of fleet de-
stroyers, all WP planes in excess of thirty, all Coast Guard vessels and planes,
and all district craft employed in the exercise will be used as plane guards solely.
All plane guards will be under the command of the Commandants, Eleventh and
Twelfth Naval DistrictS. -
9. Artificialities. Other than as stated previously artificialities will be avoided
so far as practicable. This particularly applies to bombing altitudes and tactics
employed in the presence of the UTAH. No altitudes, when in the presence of
the UTAH, will be used which are less than good tactics dictates for attacking
an enemy of the characteristics described in paragraph 5. The War Department
has been requested to adhere to this. - .
10. Command and Preparation will be in accordance with reference (a). The
Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air Force (Brigadier General Delos C.
Emmons), at March Field (Riverside, California), has been designated as the
representative of the Commanding General, Field Forces, who is assumed to have
taken over the Supreme command of the Army in the Pacific Coastal Frontier for
the purposes of this exercise. The Commanding General, First Wing GHQ Air
Force will command the Army's [4] contingent for this exercise. The
Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, will confer with him
directly in the preparation for and the execution of this exercise.
11. Reports. Complete diaries will be kept by all Naval and Coast Guard
units participating in the exercise and will be submitted to the Commandants
under Whom they operated. These diaries will be accurate as to times and
descriptions of events observed. Every naval unit, which drops bombs, will
Submit report in accordance with the requirements for “Formation Battle Prac-
tice (Bombing Maneuvering Target)", including particularly a record of the alti-
tudes at which bombs were dropped and the size of the service bombs which they
represented. Photographic observations of bombs dropped by Navy planes shall
be made from the planes dropping them. The Army will be requested to make
Similar. Observations. The Commandants of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval
Districts will forward, in duplicate, to the Chief of Naval Operations a com-
plete report of the exercise in sufficient detail as to events, times, tracks, posi-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4771
*
tions and bombing performances, as to permit an accurate analysis of the whole
twenty-four hour period.
12. Time. Zone plus eight time will be used. &
13. The U. S. Fleet, during the period 10–13 August, actually will be making
passage from San Francisco to San Pedro. Except for detachments specifically
assigned to this exercise, it will take no part in the Coastal Frontier Defense
Joint Air Exercise No. 4, and will be considered as not strategically present and
not free to act. The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, will inform the Com-
mandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, and the Commanding General,
First Wing GHQ Air Force—March Field (Riverside, California) of the approx-
imate positions to be occupied by the units of the fleet not participating in this
exercise.
14. Critique. Should a critique be held after the exercise, no funds will be
allowed for mileage or personal expenses in attending same.
15. Publicity. This exercise will be considered as a normal joint training
exercise. Any necessary publicity will be handled in a normal and routine man-
ner so as to avoid undue emphasis and so as not to violate existing instructions
covering Secret and confidential material and photographs. Information given
out for publicity purposes will be general in nature only. -
(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY.
CC: President (1) .
CinCus (1)
Chief of Staff, U. S. A. (2)
Combasſor (1) Coast Guard (1)
Comairbasfor (1)
Op–20, 22, 30, 38
ACW/mh
July 20, 1937.
AG 354.21 (7–20–37) (Misc.) E
Subject: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Air Exercise No. 4.
To : Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, Langley Field, Va.
1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Air Exercise No. 4 will be held in accordance
with the basic decisions contained in Inclosure (1) Joint Board No. 350 (Serial
No. 611) July 10, 1987, and with the instructions contained in Inclosure (2) letter
from the Chief of Naval. Operations to the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth
Naval Districts, dated July 10, 1937, subject : Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air
Exercise No. 4, which will be amended to meet certain variations therefrom con-
tained herein.
2. The numerical designation of this exercise would ordinarily be Number 3.
However, in order to obviate complications resulting from instructions already
issued to Naval Districts concerning a prospective exercised Number 3 on the East
Coast, this exercise is designated Number 4.
3. The Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, will represent the
Commander-in-Chief of the field forces in the preparation for and the conduct of
the exercise. For the purposes of this exercise direct communication between the
Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, and the Commandants of af-
fected Naval Districts is authorized. It is desired, however, that the Commanding
General First Wing, GHQ Air Force, confer with the Commanding General, Fourth
Army, with a view to having an officer of the Fourth Army at the headquarters of
the First Wing to represent the coastal frontier defense headquarters, through
which information would normally pass.
4. Object of eacercise. To exercise Navy airplanes (BLUE) in locating, and Army
airplanes (BLUE) in bombing a target (BLACK) moving at a limited distance off
the COaSt.
[2] 5. Forces to be made available. Approximately those mentioned in
paragraph 16. Inclosure (1).
6. Location. See paragraph 1 a. Inclosure (1). Relative to the statement
“within 300 miles of the coast line,” it is desired by the Navy Department that this
information be not communicated to anyone connected with the Scouting forces.
7. Time. See paragraph 1 b. Inclosure (1). Zone plus eight time (Pacific
Standard Time) will be used.
8. a. Bombs. The Navy Department, through the Chief of Ordnance, will
furnish the GHQ Air Force with 4000 Mark VII, water fillable bombs for use in
4772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f
the preparation for and the conduct of the exercise. It is contemplated that these
bombs will be available as follows: -
1,100 bombs—Langley Field
1,600 bombs—Hamilton Field
1,300 bombs—March Field
b. Bombs used during the exercise will be filled with water and will weigh not
in excess of 50 pounds, when so filled. Said bombs will be painted so as to be
able to distinguish between Squadrons dropping them, and the Commandants of
affected Naval Districts will be informed previous to the exercise of the dis-
tinguishing paints so assigned.
c. Bombs dropped during the exercise will simulate in size the service bombs
ordinarily used against a target of two battleships, one aircraft carrier, and nine
destroyers as described in paragraph 9 below. Bombs in excess Of those to be
dropped will not be carried. The difference in weight between the dummy bombs
and the service bombs which they simulate, will be carried in said or other suit-
able ballast, which Shall be retained until the dummy bombs are released, after
which the ballast may be dumped at such distance from the target as not to
COnfuse ObserverS.
9. Target to be bombed. Target to be bombed will be the UTAH, which will
represent a BLACK detachment of two battleships, one aircraft carrier, and nine
destroyers. Each battleship has 16 5"/38 AA guns and 80'50 AA machine guns.
Each aircraft carrier has 12 5''/25 AA guns, 16 1/1 AA guns, and 24 0'50 AA
machine guns. Each destroyer has 5 5"/38 AA guns and 4 0'50 AA machine guns.
The UTAH actually has no guns and she will not cruise in company with other
ships. All practicable precautions will be taken to avoid bombing any other ship
than the UTAH. - -
[3] 10. Distinguishing marks. The UTAH will fly international King
flag and also spread same horizontally so as to be visible from the air. Attacking
BLUE planes will have no special distinguishing marks other than those author-
ized to be worn and displayed by U. S. land and sea forces. All plane guard
units, less planes, will fly international Preparatory flag.
11. Plane guards. Wessels and planes assigned as plane guards will take
no part in the exercise other than that necessary to safeguard life of aviation
personnel. Except as necessary for this, they will maintain radio silence and
remain neutral. They will take care that their actions, dispositions, and com-
munications do not assist One side or the other. Three squadrons of fleet
destroyers, all WP planes in excess of thirty, all Coast Guard vessels and planes,
and all district craft employed in the exercise will be used as plane guards
Solely. All plane guards will be under the command of Commandants, Eleventh
and Twelfth Naval DistrictS.
12. Status of U. S. Fleet. The U. S. Fleet, during the period 10–13 August,
actually will be making passage from San Francisco to San Pedro. Except for
detachments specifically assigned to this exercise, it will take no part in the
Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4, and will be considered as
not strategically present and not free to act. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet, will inform the Commandants, Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, and
the Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force—March Field (Riverside,
California) of the approximate positions to be occupied by the units of the
fleet not participating in this exercise.
13. Artificialities. Other than as stated previously artificialities will be
avoided so far as practicable. This particularly applies to bombing altitudes
and tactics employed in the presence of the UTAH. No altitudes, when in
the presence of the UTAH, will be used which are less than good tactics dictates
for attacking an enemy of the characteristics described in paragraph 9 above.
14. Publicity. This exercise will be considered a normal joint training exer-
cise. Any necessary publicity will be handled in a normal and routine manner
80 as to avoid undue emphasis and so as not to violate existing instructions
covering secret and confidential material and photographs. Information given
out for publicity purposes will be general in nature only.
15. Command in Joint Operations. Command in joint operations will be
determined under the principles outlined in Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy.
[4] 16. Critique. The Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force,
will provide for any critique that he may deem desirable.
17. Cost. It is desired that the cost of this exercise be defrayed from normal
training funds at the disposition of the Headquarters involved. These funds to
be reimbursed from such other funds as may become available. -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE • 4773
18. Report8. Photographic Observations of bombs dropped by Army planes
will be made by the Army. Such information together with that provided by
Naval observers on the UTAH will be incorporated in a report on the exercise.
This report, in triplicate, will be forwarded by the Commanding General, First
Wing, GHQ Air Force, through the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, to
the Adjutant General of the Army.
19. The Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, will take such action as
is necessary to secure the bombs mentioned in paragraph 8 above; to con-
centrate the units of the GHQ Air Force involved ; and to provide observers
from units of the GHQ Air Force not participating in the exercise. .
20. Copies of this letter together with its inclosures have been furnished the
Commanding General, First Wing, GHQ Air Force, the Chief of the Air Corps,
and the Commanding General, Fourth Army, Copies, without inclosures, have
been furnished the Chief of Ordnance and the Navy Department.
By order of the Secretary of War:
Adjutant General,
2 InclosureS :
#3 B No. 350 (Serial No. 611), July 10, 1937. -
2—Ltr frcNO to Comdts. 11th & 12th Nav. Dists. dated July 10, 1937–
subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4.
[Copy]
CONFIDENTIAL
In reply refer to: WPD 4004–3
Subject: Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Exercise No. 4.
To : Chief of Naval Operations. -
With reference to your letter of July 10, 1937, to the Commandants of the
Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts, on the above subject, it is requested that
paragraph 2, thereof, be amended to read substantially as follows:
“2. Object. To exercise Navy airplanes (Blue) in locating, and Army
airplanes (Blue) in bombing a target (Black) moving at a limited distance
off the Coast.”
It is further requested that related paragraphs of the reference wherein it is
implied that the Navy will bomb the target be correspondingfly amended to
show that the target will not be bombed by Navy planes.
Chief of Staff.
[Copy]
Naval MeSSage
(Navy Department)
4. OP–12A—CTB
Branch 68
From : Chief of Naval Operations TO :
Released by: W. D. Leahy. CINCUS
Date: 22 July 1937. COM 11
NITE to NITE. - COM 12
TO :
CHIFOF STAFF, US ARMY
(MAIL)
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRBASEFOR
COMDT. COAST GUARD (MAIL)
USS UTAH
0022 My letter regarding exercise Four of July 10th has been amended to
read: Paragraph 2: “Object to exercise Navy airplanes Blue in locating and Army
airplanes Blue in bombing target Black steaming at limited distance off coast
all planes operating from coast”. The foregoing change is at the request of the
4774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
War Department. In pursuance thereof, the UTAH will not be bombed by Navy
planes in exercise Four 1300.
DISTRIBUTION:
12 * * * ORIGINATOR
10A 3: sk # 11 sk * ::
13 k + 1,
13D (2) * * *
19 3k sº *
22 :: 3: sk
38 :: :k i.
BUAER + + +
CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY + 4 +
COMDT. COAST GUARD + 4 +
Copies made in AGO for :
CG, GHQ Air Force;
CG, 1st Wing, GHQ Air Force. - - -
Chief of the Air Corps;
CG, Fourth Army; and ACOfS, G–2.
CONFIDENTIAL
Confidential
J. B. No. 350 (Serial 614).
WAR DEPARTMENT
NAVY DEPARTMENT
- 19 OCTOBER 1937.
THE PRESIDENT, -
The White House.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The following report is submitted on the Army and Navy
Joint Air Exercise held as a result of the memorandum of May 17, 1937, addressed
by your Naval Aide to the Secretary of the Navy: -
Coastal Frontier Defense Joint Air Ea:ercises. Navy patrol planes took off at
noon, August 12, and located at 3:37 P. M. the target ship UTAH, steaming at
15 knots, about 300 nautical miles southwest of San Francisco. The Navy re-
ported position of UTAH to Army and maintained contact until it was lost at
10:30 P.M. through poor visibility. On receipt of contact report from Navy, two
Army bombardment groups (41 bombers), took off near San Francisco. The
bombers failed to intercept the target due to lack of time for daylight search and
unfavorable weather. Contact with target was not regained by Navy patrol planes
until 10:45 A.M., August 13, when it was located about 245 nautical miles south-
west of San Francisco. The Army bombardment Squadrons took off by 9:30
A. M. on a search and attack mission, and were able to get into attack position
before noon, August 13, when the exercise ended. The low ceiling and restricted
visibility made it necessary to attack at altitudes of 400 to 700 feet. Three direct
hits were secured from 98 bombs dropped. Each bomb simulated a 300 lb. service
bomb. - -
Supplementary Eatercise. Unfavorable weather having interfered with satis-
factory Operations during the above exercise, a Supplementary bombing exercise
for August 14 against the UTAH, maneuvering at 15 knots, about 60 nautical miles
off the coast, was agreed upon. The weather proved favorable and the Army
bombed from 12,000 feet with 721 bombs, securing 37 direct hits and 49 within
50 feet of the side. The attached photographs illustrate the bomb patterns at
various altitudes. -
Conclusions. In view of artificialities, that must necessarily be introduced into
peacetime exercises, definite conclusions as to the potentialities of Army and Navy
forces to attack and/or defend in problems of this sort can not be drawn. Under
the actual conditions of the first exercise, it may be said that Navy aircraft were
able to locate and track, and Army aircraft to bomb and hit the target under un-
favorable visibility conditions. -
The exercises were of inestimable value in developing coordination of Army and
Navy communications and in affording the Army an opportunity to bomb a
maneuvering target at Sea.
HARRY H. WooDRING,
Secretary of War.-
CLAUDE A. Swanson,
Secretary of the Navy.
EXEIIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4775
[Copy]
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, October 21, 1937.
Memorandum for
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy:
I am delighted to see the report of the very worthwhile Coastal Frontier Defense
Joint Air Exercises.
It is my thought that they should be made an annual feature of joint Army-Navy
Coast Defense Exercises on both West coast and East coast and possibly also as
joint exercises at the Canal Zone and in Hawaii. The coordination of the two
services is sufficient in itself to justify this.
#: xx :k : xx * 3.
F. D. R.
Incl 2
Tab B
[Copyl
[1] * CONFIDENTIAL
G–4 ENH
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
SUPPLY DIVISION, G–4,
Washington, D. C., July 19, 1938.
G–4/27277–19
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Revision of Présent Approved Airplane Programs.
I. Facts bearing upon the problem. -
1. The Chief of Staff directed G–4 to submit a new requirements program for
airplanes in F. Y. 1940. In this program all B-17's (4-engine heavy bomber type)
are to be eliminated and the funds now set up for that purpose used for the pro-
curement of the attack and light bomber types. Experimentation and research for
F. Y. 1940 to be confined to medium and light bombers, pursuit or other light
aircraft.
2. Analysis and Discussion. a. The following table shows a comparison between
the original F. Y. 1939 Program and the changes directed to date, including revised
cost €8timate&:
F. Y. 1939 Programs as Now Revised
Original Approved F. Y. 1939 Program Bases on Latest Cost Estimates
147 Pursuit Monoplane.-----...------ - $6,074,628 || 147 Pursuit Monoplane---------------- $7,350,000
13 Pursuit Interceptors - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1, 920, 477 || 13 Pursuit Interceptors - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1, 920, 477
91 Bombers (2-Eng.) ------------------ 13, 769, 574 13 B-17 Bombers (4-Eng) I ------------ 3, 550,000
- 78 B-18A Bombers (2-Eng) 1---------- 7, 400,000
119 Attack Bombers. ------------------ 10, 195,087 | 119 Attack Bombers- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14, 300,000
24 C. & A. Observation.--------------- 1, 190, 880 24 C. & A. Observation---------- - - - - - 1, 190, 880
394 . Totals -------------- - - - - - - - -- 33, 150,646 394 Totals ----------------------- 35, 711, 357
For G. F. E. Deficiency FY '38 . . . . . . . . 1,600,000
Total Funds Required - - - - - - - - - - - 37,311, 357
Savings from F. Y. 1938 to apply 1 - . . 2,950, 000
Balance Required.-------------- - 34,361, 357
—i-
1 NotE.—Savings in F. Y. 1938 funds in amount of $2,950,000 (including YB-20 Project) have been applied
toward the purchase of these planes. Present indicated shortage in funds to carry out the revised F. Y.
1939 Program—$1,210,711 ($34,361,357—$33,150,646). - -
4776 CongressionAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. In addition to the above the following projects are under consideration for
F. Y. 1939 and will require funds as follows:
[2] 9 B-18A's (remainder of options for which funds were
directed to be reserved by the Assistant Secretary of War) ---- $ 850, 000
Changes to 78 B-18A's (larger engines and superchargers to
obtain greater speed) 1, 500,000
Purchase of 6 Commercial type training planes (Assistant Secre-
tary of War has directed that this item be resubmitted by
Chief of the Air Corps for F. Y. 1939 procurement) ----------- 25,000
Total for Additional Projects--------------------------- 2, 375,000
From the above a grand total of $3,585,711 will be required in addition to funds
now appropriated for F. Y.1939 airplane procurement to carry out the revised pro-
gram and additional projects under consideration. -
c. (1) Under the directive to use the funds now set up in F. Y. 1940 estimates
for 4-engine bombers for the procurement of attack-bombers, the F. Y. 1939 and
F. Y. 1940 requirements for this airplane can be combined at a substantial SaV-
ings in unit cost. (Present estimates indicate that for lots of over 200, the cost
complete will not exceed $100,000 each—a saving of $20,000 per airplane).
(2) The following table shows the present situation with respect to the num-
bers of medium and light bomber types on hand, on Order or in approved pro-
grams:
B-18's On hand 177 Attack on Hand (Modern type, 600–
B-18's On Order 133 lb. bomb load) -
B-18A's on order (revised F. Y. B10B's (Martin) (Part in dead
1939 Program) ----------------- 78 storage for lack of crews) --____ 124
Attack-Bomber, F. Y. 1939 Program 119
Total 388 TOtal ____ 477
Total Medium and Light Bomber Types____ 865
An additional 112 Attack-Bombers now set up in Woodring Program for F. Y.
1941. -
By utilizing all of the available funds now set up in the F. Y. 1940 estimates
for the 67 heavy 4-engine bombers under the Woodring Program (23,450,000),
and by combining these funds with available funds for attack-bombers in the
revised F. Y. 1939 Program, a total of approximately 340 Attack-bombers can be
procured. This will provide 154 more bombing airplanes than originally planned
for by previously approved programs (67 heavy bombers under the Woodring and
119 Attack-Bombers in the F. Y. 1939 Program—Total 186). As personnel is not
available to provide crews for these additional planes they will have to be dis-
tributed to active squadrons, thus bringing the normal number of 13 per squadron
to approximately 20 per Squadron.
[3] Furthermore, the procurement of additional bombers will accentuate
the existing shortage in bombs which was based on requirements under the
Woodring Program. The approved bomb procurement program (OCS 17874–8,
June 21, 1937) contemplates the procurement of bombs in step with planes to
maintain a proper balance between planes and bombs.
(3) In view of the above, G–4 believes that a part of the F. Y. 1940 airplane
funds should be used to reduce the critical shortage in bombs. With present
stocks, including the funds in the F. Y. 1939 Appropriation Act, there will still
be a shortage of $7,434,946 to complete 30 missions of bombs for the bombing
airplanes in the original program. Of this amount, $3,717,473 is now carried in
the estimates for F. Y. 1940. G–4 believes it to be advisable to provide the re-
mainder, $3,717,473, by reducing the funds set up for airplanes in F. Y. 1940 by
this amount (about 37 planes).
(4) G–4 also considers it advisable to deduct from the funds to be available
for attack-bombers in F. Y. 1939, the $3,585,711 shown to be required for pre-
dicted deficit and the additional projects in Paragraph b above.
(5) Under the above plan, funds for the procurement of attack-bombers will be
available as follows:
F. Y. 1939_____ __ $10,714, 289 ($14,300, 000–$3,585, 711)
F. Y. 1940 - 19, 732, 572 ( 23,450,000–3, 717, 473)
Total - 30,446,816—to be available.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4777
These funds will permit the procurement of approximately 304 attack-bombers by
a combined procurement for F.Y. 1939 and F.Y. 1940 (estimated unit cost $100,000,
which may be considerably reduced by a purchase of 300 or more).
II. Action recommended. The Secretary of War directs:
• 1. That a letter substantially as follows be sent to the Chief of the Air Corps:
a. The tentative estimates submitted for F. Y. 1940, based on the airplane re-
quirements under the Woodring Air Corps Program, will be resubmitted on the
following basis : -
(1) The requirement for the 4-engine heavy bombardment type is cancelled
for this FiScal Year.
[4] (2) Funds in the amount of $23,450,000 tentatively set up for the above
requirement will be reduced by $3,717,473 to provide for the critical shortage in
stocks of airplane bombs. The remaining funds; i. e., $19,732,527, will be applied
to the procurement of attack-bombers.
(3) Estimates will include requirements for radio and navigation equipment
and armament for airplanes in Program as revised.
b. Funds in the approximate amount of $10,714,289 will be made available in
F. Y. 1939 for the procurement of attack-bombers.
c. Funds will be held in reserve by the Chief of the Air Corps in F. Y. 1939 to
provide for the following requirements: -- w
9 B-18A's to complete present options (estimates $850,000).
6 Commercial type training planes (estimated $25,000).
Funds to provide B–18's in F. Y. 1939 Program with increased speed and
performance (estimated $1,500,000).
2. That the Chief, Budget and Legislative Planning Branch, be advised of
the above action.
3. That the Assistant Secretary of War be informed of the action directed in
Paragraph 1 above.
III. Concurrences.
The A. C. of S., G–1 (LDG)
The A. C. of S., G–2 (ERN)
The A. C. of S., G–3 (RMB)
The A. C. of S., WPD (GCM)
ACTION TAKEN : Ltr. to C. of A. C. and copy for ; ASW, 8–5–38 ERH :IG and
B & L. P. B. -
/S/ George P. Tyner,
GEORGE P. TYNER, -
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
| Stamped] Aug. 3, 1938. Approved. Hy order of the Secretary of War.
/S/ S. D. Embick
S. D. EMBICK,
Major General,
Deputy Chief of Staff,
ExHIBITS OF JOINT Committee 4779
JOINT COMMITTEE INDEX TO
EXHIBITS-IILUSTRATIONS
(The Joint Committee Exhibit to which each Item relates will be found indicated
in parenthesis following the description of the particular Item)
ITEM NO. DESCRIPTION
1.
2.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing the record of early flights 7 December
1941 obtained by OPANA radar detection station. (Ex. 4) .
Map of North Pacific Ocean showing distances in miles between Honolulu,
T. H. and San Francisco, California; Honolulu, T. H. and Hawaii, Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra and Christmas Islands; and Honolulu, T. H. and Tokyo,
Japan. (Ex. 5)
. . Map of Hawaiian Islands showing disposition of Army forces. (Ex. 5)
. Map of Oahu showing Army installations, including airfields. (Ex. 5)
. Diagram of Wheeler Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and formations of
attacking planes, times of attacks, disposition of U. S. planes, and locations
of bomb explosions in Japanese attack on 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 5)
. Diagram of Hickam Field, Oahu, T. H., showing number and formations of
attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks, disposition of U. S. planes,
and locations of bomb explosions in Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 5)
. Diagram of Bellows Field, Oahu, T. H., showing numbers and formations of
attacking Japanese planes, times of attacks and disposition of U. S. planes
in Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 5)
. Map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the disposition of the U. S. Pacific
Fleet on 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
. Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing fleet operating areas in the Hawaiian
Area. (Ex. 6) -
Map of the Hawaiian Islands showing U. S. Naval Installations in the
Hawaiian area showing U. S. Naval Installations in the Hawaiian area.
(Ex. 6)
Map of the South Coast of Oahu, T. H., showing the approaches to the Pearl
Harbor Entrance Channel and the Inshore Patrol Area. (Ex. 6)
Map showing the Pearl Harbor Anchorage Plan, 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
Diagram showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian area (a) 6 Dec. 1941,
(b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941, and (c) after the Japanese
attack 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
Map of Oahu, T. H., showing the disposition, number, types, and operational
and readiness condition of U. S. Navy aircraft on 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 6)
Map of the North Pacific Ocean showing the track of the Japanese Striking
Force. (Ex. 6)
Diagram showing air searches flown in the Hawaiian area (a) 6 Dec. 1941,
(b) prior to the Japanese attack 7 Dec. 1941, and (c) after the Japanese
attack, and the track of the Japanese Striking Force. (Ex. 6)
Diagram showing track of Japanese plane attack routes over Oahu, T. H.
(Ex. 6)
Map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the OPANA radar detector station.
7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 7) - -
Rough sketch map of the islands of Oahu and Kaui and the Kaui Channel,
bearing notations of information obtained with reference to the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations 7 Dec. 1941 as described in
the report of Robert N. Tait, Special Agent, CIC, dated 13 Oct. 1945 at
Sasebo, Kyushu. (Ex. 8) -
Chart of a method of searching 5° sectors through 360° to a radius of 833
miles from Oahu employing 72 B-17D airplanes. (Ex. 13)
Chart showing relation of 25 miles visibility to distance. (Ex. 13)
Chart showing radius of action of B-17D airplane under various load condi-
tions in relation to possible plans of action of carrier group attacking
Oahu, assuming carrier speed of 30 knots and carrier planes performance
600 mile range. (Ex. 13)
4780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ITEM NO. - DESCRIPTION
23.
Chart showing radius of action of B-17D airplane under various load condi-
tions in relation to possible plans of action of carrier group attacking
Oahu, assuming Carrier speed of 27 knots and carrier planes performance
400 mile range. (Ex. 13)
Schedule for B-17D combat crews. (Ex. 13)
Map reflecting disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet 7 Dec. 1941 together with
typewritten table reflecting the positions of the U. S. S. BOISE at times
indicated. (Ex. 68)
Guide to symbols employed on maps prepared by Admiral R. K. Turner.
(Ex.109)
Map dated 1 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
Map dated 2 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
Map dated 3 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
Map dated 4 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
. Map dated 5 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
Map dated 6 Dec. 1941 showing the location of ships. (Ex. 109)
. Map showing disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet 7 Dec. 1941 and particularly
the location of the U. S. S. WRIGHT On 27 November and 7 December
1941. (Ex. 125)
Map of Communications Installations on Island on Oahu, T. H., as of 7 July
1941. (Ex. 133)
. Map of Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Police Districts, Railroad Bridges
36.
and Highway Bridges. (Ex. 133)
Map of Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Electric Installations and Generating
Piants . (Ex. 133)
Map of City of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles 7 Dec.
1941. (Ex. 152)
Original Radar Plot of Station OPANA, 7 Dec. 1941. (Ex. 155)
37.
38.
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79716 O–46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 2































ITEM NO. 3
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2nd BN 299th INF
KMC DET
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79716 O—46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 3

















ITEM NO. 4
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79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 4

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79716 O–46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 5















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ITEM NO. 7
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79716 O–46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 7


ITEM NO. 8
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| H | 2544 g g d 247?? * . . . . -- - - i - a rº - * * * = . AR 2^3, . t 320 t?& 2 • 4 |
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- - ... - 3: - * * *- : " - : = - - a 2 & 5 ... ---
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2807 2.375 24, 22 º, & 8. : 2 *, 2* - . *3% . s.s “ º, 3 & * < x. —h
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* * - - • * : * : .
| | 22 8%. V 6 C 6 °C e. ; 3: 2:3 - - - - - = -º * T 4 ... " - º 7.59 ** 36% : * * & 32” f i
2583 | IAW | & | A 2.298 - - 4. - C 2 * re 63 ſ: º º c. º , $ 913 M.3 *” ..., & 5 or 9. -
! \ | | ! \ 2403 2 & 20 2 390 . . . tº - g . . : ; ; - º - * . º w Pº by viſu. \ºg **2C *...t ***
~ - 236 --- - 2 < * , . . . . * - - - . ...º. a. - ºr -º º º ". . -> tgº H
2354. 2391 2290 . .” - 2 :... .º. Qº 3. §º. - Firºs g-> 5. : & Cº -
| 239 | 2.28%. Q a se”. * * * u tº t :* * * it tº ºttº * - ~--> *- ~ v. §98 tº ri iwi Pt Ane vo/S º, 3- . . .
|- - 2008 2 350 *, º +. 256 º - º ~. º ... cz ! & 66. --
''. 24 H. 2505 23.63 2 ** . • 2 :9" **. - - A * - - - - - sº t - •
º . 2 328 233 6. . ‘sº gº. . . . . . . • **, ... = 2* ºn-sºº § *Sºrº * -º-º: [. NYA) 65 oso {6 c 1530 -
*: 2285 : * * ~ t | * * * * a irº '753 33 A - º - º <\ 685 |& Jø 4 & 3.C. *- * * * * .
º 2659 - 2 3 4 5 - 2 **,’. ---. 2 < | 2 < * , & wº mºw —º t º & L. * = - - . Gºº ºs fº '. • - H
}= 2.298 ! * { - - $3 - 2 ſº tº º ſ º Pº { • | | ||
sº 23 36 2260 ** * **, 2 * : * - * - | ** 2. 34. [. -- I795 933 º Yº" zºº & -->
z 34. .
º 2349 2 339 * ... : : \ :. . . V ..” \ it.2 *. ſº • . 80C :080 #-
* 26.30 • 24,08 's, •' . r - 2C, - º -
30 X- 24 86 2 70 2 * 0.4. 24, 76 ... 3 & O 229& . A - 20 • 222.8 96% ſº - "... esc *. f S 9 h t
}º —2379–at 208 I `S . ; : *k, g - 4 ; ; fº, ~ iſiº ºf $4 & ost, "o *26, t \; |
* , - ..." `s | * * '...}. 2:25 2. ~ \ 23 * 38 6 is 3.35 f
}º 2 & 3G *0---, -lººt—. --...-- - f 2. - - - 0 12sc '590
º 27:28 - -------------------- \ a 2 °º. i 2 * ºn 2 f 23 C, : gº H
|-}= 23CC , 247ſ ~. - ; : - 2xIc ºxyrs Tºsé ... yº & H.
- 2 & 6th 2542 2400 2370 ! i : tº - f *gº i 30
t * 2 & 4, - j > 1 . *. - * H
º 2721 257; 2533 25 o 7 24 OG 24, 84 2 355 23 & { 23°C º ; : * * > . \ l a - 2c, a **** H
* 257, - 234.9 - & 2 : é. - ; : 13 O’ 45° * . 22. . 2: *.*. - qr. - - :33: 64 C.
--- 27:25 25.99 .2638 2558 2 * } } 23 B3 23| | 2 3.38 gº 20*.C. --~ - ** & /. 2 *.9 C -----" 2037 ić.93 gº 8. - - - - ** ſº }-4 i
24, & * & “R = -- > - ºf * * * * * C gº s
- 264? 2622 tº 90 83 - 20 T- ~\ 3 --~~~ º - ºr . 1286 isso "* 25.6 -
}sº 2690 ° 25.30 2 : *%- 1630- ---- , 8 ºt t 23.2% -- Zºº, tºe S 540 * . . . . . | 820 * , f !
}= 4. • - - - - :300 º - & -
H 2539 2400 24, 34 23.6% 2298 24.94 ; 730 – i. - - - - - º: fººd 2500 *** j
Fº 2560 2643 24, 22 2800 * ~ * I 380 : ... ?",090 I 2505 —t- 24: 5-– 2C3 º, tº - º -- 2120 - }*4
ſº 2690 2630 2372 23.85 2 :- --- 2420 y *~ - ~ - º - º,242 755 #155 labs tº 3G *H |
º 2684. 2,70 42&l. 1380 * T--~ 2Cso & C º v. ' - à . *:::$25°san 300 - 2320 H .
º: . - 240 ... _-T 2500 * . . * * º * * º Nº. * 940 º i
ſº 2769 2672 2639 98 2370 —wo %, -** *---- AR Mºb º -- sº - Ž ;Atº w º º, ^ - 180 . • 2030 2550 ſº
H ABBREWIAtions 2588 2579 24 84 ~~ ... • ‘ 'N cR CPF 2500 - * SLI - ſº rº, "", "f 1530 }*4 i
H Lights: F. fixed. FL flashing; Q& Quick; I.Q. interrupted quick; S-L short-long; 2615 23.65 23 º 1800 26.30 - - -- - i - - (35 °ss a 778 | “...isce 2 i 20 -
º Occ. occultinº All alternating: GP. group: ife; R. red; G green: . 190 3 2385 * * T-> . | 26' 0. 2*, ºc AR 9 -- }{5 kº +
!-- m. miles; min, minutes: sec. seconds; ev. every: wis, visible; 26.30 26.30 2 396 2405 • | 50c `--> ** 830 - 1990 is 60 fo 2 }* :
- SF.C. sector; 09SC, obscured: AERO. aeronautical light. 2456 tº 98 23.80 23.65 23.7% - 2 2s20 26 Nº 235 . - |- -
}-4 sº 25.30 54 234.9 - * *. / 26 2 2,330 - \ f 7 go 1340 1950 36 75 H :
}* * Buoys: C. can: W. run; S. spar; ºf F. reflector. Day beacons: a 262) 24: 3 2540 f 989 393 24, 12 2 ” º 252 & S. t200 1570 H -
g- (Lights, buoyſ and beacons are white unless otherwise indicated) 2643 2559 2082 º' 1619 24.36 # N 2é9 & . ( p | S 89. & 10 | 420 | 420 # 650 }* i
- 2 - - 2,05 B99 vo/S Goé
º - 26.25 26.42 25.36 24, 36 * 25.0 650 tº S | 420 A 50 #00 2.82s,
lº R.Br. radio beacon R.T. radio tower: 2626 26 13 1716 t?2 2300 2 I ? § 200 2’ N | 98 865 590 ; : 30 gº ;
. . nº 2842 2622 23: 5 24, 40 176 . i 25 to 2392 ^. “ox 1330 p-
19 ºr * -- 2 i * J390 * ..., 2925 Fr-
º is mud. s. sand, c. gavel. Sh, shells. Sp. specks, Cl, clay. Co. coral. Or, oore, *. rock. 680 rus 2550 2500 ,” ſº N - 22:38 W 1 925 * º -
}*4 263.5 gree. globigerina, bº. Mock, wº. white, re. red y1, yellow, gy, gray. Sw, blue. Br. brown, 2573 2525 24.50 - --_----------— Aº ‘ &, • AN - 2500 * . Sº iogs 9&c. º |
}= fas, fine, crº. coarse, tºy rocky, sta. sticky, brº, broken, vol. volcanic 270 24.30 • * ** *. zºº's Tº O&
tº * 5 24 40 !-------- 2273 es º307 °. 94% 28.25 ſº
}= • 24.6% #390 razºº $52 wof S 625
|-4 - - 2728 ... / t - FT230 — -- “S-1290–-200. 9°. X-
P. b. position doubtful £. b. existence doubtful. 2? Is 2576 f 243 / i:4th \ - 2450 2056 . 790 - {2 - - 19'
º 2737 262s $80i 2515 207 o , - - 2*20 , | , \ - i46; 670 (150 ** 2°o 2325 }*
º: - 2737 2676 1258 & `s, - y |77| i .., 740 785 - . • 29te 2925 º:
}= 27;2 2650 • * ~ * -,107 25.35 * 1333 i.780 - * g 833 Yºo ºsc 1620 }-
}* AUTHORITIE8 2676 len f : 2075, 2250 ... I 573, t ... ſºft.*...* :22- a ". 2.753 31 75 hº
sº Surveys to 1929 and other sources 2688 2700 ; 4.45 % 2465 24.65 235 *37 1789 2065 860 lish-l. ~~~ | d * }-
t * , ', nºw..." | * &o 1930 |-
º 2320 ! 779 “E” ^* 1075 5ss 21:30 24.25
y !-
º # - |36 75 -
º 2745 ‘872 so.--" 1263 1930 360 a Nº. *. 22 tº ? & A 22 783 2900 º
!--- 2696 * - * = * - tºo '99 so 338 2:93 º:
I 3G 2 : 2875
hº RAD/OREACON SIGNALS 2890 1522 2525 1790 SouTH. 2800
For schedule of operations see Light List and for changes see Notor To Martners. 2?00 2+o ! 1540 ! - - 2525 H
}* Stations Signats s 2585 | |680 2 R | 2625 B | 2456 i–
}* Kilauea Point Lighthouse (Kauai) . . . Go 2 dashes for 60 sec, silent 120 sec. **40 2715 175 2550 % 2344 1673 2572 }* --isse - tº- M | 2900 }*
º Małapuu Point Lighthouse (Oahu) ... Go 4 dashes for 60 sec, silent 120 sec. 279 0 * 2665 2500 9&C }*
}*. 2570 wof S 3.175 |
sº 284.5 2780 2870 2040 1790 2200 2800 2750 H
*1 2 26.30 23.96 1919 24.00 k-
at 5 2700 |-
lº 29.20
H 2030 tº 5 2300 280C 2800 &m:
"******Hº-º-º-º-º-º-º-º- ºf-FFFE-º-º-º-º-º-º: Jº I Frºr-r-r-r-rº-º-º-º-º-Errºr-r 3.2% 269 o 2600 |{56 ~900 |-
r B-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-
tº a • ºw * & ------ º Dº * - LIDITITT ITITT TOTſ I-I-I-I I-I-I-I-I I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-TE -T-I-T-I-I-LI rººt C &gwº 2825 I
<3 • ? 3% 160 s * I —I- Fºrr- Lºſ CL-L-L-L-L-L-I-I-I-I-I-I-T-I-T-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-I-T-I -
30 59 I I Jºſ | r_____ ITL L. T. T. TITITITſ II. T. T.I. Jº I ºr Lºſ Lºt Lºſ -I-T-I-T-I-f º
l 30 158. I II ºf Lººtº º Tº T. F. Tº Tºº Ti | rººt C. L. E L E & I-I-I-I-I - X-l-Jºº Cº-I-Dºº!" Tººl |-
- -ms- i }{ LL.I.L. Ecº-Lºir-tº-rºt-r-I-T-I I-I-I *
40 éſe us- 30ſ 157° 3O' i II. Tºº } T-I-T-T- lººſ" E LLE ITI-I-T-TTT-I-I-I-I Iº ſº I 3E Cººrºººººººººººººººººººººº-º-º: HEE Lºſ
º —--— 156 30 155 -
z- __---" 30
Published at Washington, D.C., June 1040
BY THE U. S. COAST AND GEODFTIC
C SURVEY uGHTS BEACONS Buoys AND DANGERS CORRECTED tº e
FOR INFORMAſton RECEIVED TO CAT E of ISSUE (Hawaiian Islands/ U.S.C. & G.S A 102
1... O Colbert. Director.
|GOT 1941
PRICE 75 CENTS
79716 ()—46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 9
Aºf .


































































































ITEM No. 10
------- - - -
- - ises
Nº º- ºr recents - - º º - ---
- -- - - lso º - ------ --~~~~-------- --------
- - - ---------
- - --- --~~ --~~~
- cº- -
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- - - - - nº - º
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-
--- -
zºº -
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- tº cº-º-º: º - -
--- --> tºº. ºn see º º - ---
- -- - -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º: º - º º
--- º -- --- -*. º -º-º-º-º-º-º-º: -º-º-º-º:º º º
. -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º: - º, ºr --- -
--- --- - - -º-º-º-º- wº- - º -
- -- º ºr nº
--- RGE AN FIE º tºº-ºº: - * - a
- ---
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. sº tºº º -
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- - KAHUKU POIN T. OAHU, T. H. --- º º: º: º: º: ºf . . º
º º sº - - - - º
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--- --- - -- --- - * * * * *ºtºs ººgºº, º tº wº ---
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--- - º ---
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- --- HEELA NAVAL RADIO STATION º * \"\".") º
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--- - --> -- - - - -
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--- -- * - - -- - -w - -
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-- º - NAVAL AIR STATION * . . -
- --- º, - º - -º-º: º
-- - º: º
- -- -- …~ * -- OA - tº 3.
- sº - ºr " * ... KANEOHE, CAHU, T.H. . --- tº
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- -- NAVAL RADIO STATION ... * \". is . . . . - º º,
- - - - *** * - - -
- - - - *** * … tº -- - º º
- - -- - -
- - WAHAWA, OAHU, THS * * * - --- --- -- - - º
NAVAL RADIO STA * - - - - º, º --> º - -
- - - --- - --- *-* - *** * * - -
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- -- - LUALUALEI, OAHU, T. H. -- - . * º *
- - -- - º º sº º - t
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-- - º sº. º º º
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- --- º º wº HAWAI LAN IS LAN IDS
- --- …” - -
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- - --- -- BASE - -
º -- -- º-ºº: NAVAL AIR -- º º ASTE RN P A. RT - -
- - - - *-* * ..." ºr Leº . . . . . ------------ -
- º - º ºr. º -- ---
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º - º: ... º PUUNENE, MAUI, TH. - - - -
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-- ºr w x- * * : *. - - - -- - - sou Nºni NGs in raºrtion is - |--
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- - - - - º - WALUPE RADIC) STAT |ON - - - - * * * - - --- - º
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- - - - - as tº --- º --- º -
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EWA, OAHU, T. H. HOMESTEAD FIELD NAMAL AIR BASE * * * , , , a *. tº º º
-- - -- - º --- - ---
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-- - -- - -
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-- FORD ISLAND, PEARL HARBOR, T.H. . . - - - * * * --- - -- NAVAL RADIO STATION -
--- --- - --- -- - - --- - - - … º. -
- - - - - - - - -
-- - AR --- - - - * *HILO, HAWAII. T. H -
--- - --- -- - - - - - - -
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--- - -- --
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-- -- - EMERGENCY FIELD - * * * * * * -
| - - - --- --- - - - * ... --- --- º --- -
- - - º - - - -
-- --- - --- - --- - "MAALAEA, WAILUKU, MAU, T. H. * . -
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- - - - -- - -- º ----- -
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T - - º
- - - - - --- --- -
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- - ----- - - - -
- - - - - --- --- --- º - - º:
- . --- - - --- * - -
- - - -- - - º --- -
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- -
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--- - - ---
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----- - - - | - º
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- - -
--- --- wºod - --- … …" º, - - --
-- - --- º º --- - - - --- ---
-- --- --- º - - - - º ---
- - - -- - - - - - - - - - -
* . - - --- sº- --- - - * * , --
- - --- - - - -
- --- --- -- - - º -- - - - --- ---
- - -- --
- - -
--- --- - º --- º - - -
--- - - - --- - --- --- * --- - - -
- -- --- º weatrº --- - - * ... -
- --- --- --- --- -
--- - | --- --- - - -
- --- --- - - - º
--- º --- - - - *** *
- --- - --- - -
-- --- --- - * . -- * -- * s is º- --- * *
- - --- --- -- --- --- --~ ---
--- --- - -- - | - - ‘s zºº º -
-º-º-º- - --- --- - --- - - --- º º º - - -
- - * * * * Q- º: * * --- --- - . --- º - S -- --
º - - *** -- * * * * * * --- --- º -- º º - * * * --- º - -- -
* - nº ºn sex -º ---- - - --- --- - --- º, \\ --- º - - - -
- ------ º ºs- -º-º-º-º: - - --- --- --- - - - º - -- -- ---
--- --- - - --- --- º --- - --- 19.
- - * -º a nºn - - -ºº º ºxy- - --- --- --- */ º º º - - * * * * - - -
- *** -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º: --- --- --- - - º, º -** -º - --- --
- --- --- - -º - º/ º º --- --- -- - - -
- O ------ - --- --- --- --- º º, | º º º --- -- - -- -
- - - -
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º: - - --- --- --- --- --- º | mº -- - - --- -
-
--- - --- - - -- --- - - - - - --- -
tº º is nº º ºr -ºº -- * * * * - --- - - -
º, ... º.º. * * * * * * * * * *- - --- --- --- -- *. º º - - - -- --- -
-** *** *** * * * *** -º - --- --- --- - -- - º ---
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º- - ºs- --- --- --- --- --- --- - - --
- --- -
--- --- - - -
-- - - -
-- - - - tº --- -
-º-º-º-º-º: --- -- --- - --- -
ºw-º-º-º-º-º: - - - -
-
--- " --- --- --- --- --- - --- --- --- -
- - --- - | -
- - -- - ---
ºntºº-º-ºwals - - ---- ºw . --- - - | -
*** -ucº tºe-º-º-º: --- --- --- --- - º
- º - - -- --- --- - -
--- --- -
º-º-º-º-º-º- ºr º-º-º-º-º- - - - --- - - - --- -
| *-* - Cº-º-º-º-º-º: --- --- º º
- --- --- - - |- -
-- º - -
-- - -
--- ºfflºt-tº-te-tº-et-tº- - -
-- --- - -º-º-º-º-ºr-tºrtº- --- - - º - 155. -o-
-- - - – ºstereº *F- ºr=º - - so 156.
- - --- - -- - - - ----- - - - - - - - --
º -º- - - - 159 º 158 º
- 160 º - - - -
ºne-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
pºw-ºn p. c. º. ºol
ºº::::::::::::::::::::: * (Hawaiian Islands/ U.S.C. & G.S. 4102
ro- -º-º-º-º:
- s. coast AND geodetic survey price is cents
- by THE tº º --- warning * to wavestion may be attered interrupted or removed jº. 14 º
ºut ºnce ºn general temporary changes due to war
-º-are not ºn-te-ºn-tº-chart
79716 O—46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 10



































































































ITEM NO. 11
º --- tºº. sº
--- - - - - - - -
A. e. e. f. -
Pºki.
-- - nº sº. CITY
tº Awaiian isł, AN IDs
SOUTH COAST OF O A H U.
A H U A POINT TO BARBERS PO INT
º e s a
* * * h
fake ºf unaloa
- -
ºnie zºº Łaulºus; i.
-
sº tºxioixºs. Hºw FAºhensis
- . ** *-*AN ºr i-º ºr -
*º----------- --- -
º ---
- --------- --- -
tºº-º-º-º: --- ******** ***Nixºtº.
- ºx
- - aºxº ******** -
*** * * * * * * * * *º-º-º-º-º-º: tº ºtºyº
- º gº ºr w wºº -º cº- *******º-º-º-º-º-º:
*** * *** -º-º-º-º-º-º-º: sº-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
º sº ºssº -º-º-º-º-º: * * * * * * * * *
ºf Bºº tºº sº ºr ºr tº-º-º-º: º º
º - **º-º-º-º: -
| --- * * *-*. º: º
º º
ºsº Rºº. - - - *
-
- ºf ººº-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
* * * * * * * * * * * * *-* * *
*** * * * * * * * -
º ** * * * * ***** *** *****
º
--~~
- rººs ºssº
- -
*ºtºs
- sº
::::::::::::::::,” º º --
* * * * * * º pººr
- -- * I
3. º
s
" º
bishº, tº
- º º º )
º º
º
s
-
Anti-torpetone,
-
R. -
º - ANTI-TORPEDO & AMTI-80AT NET -
º -º-º-º-º-º: - -
| - - - s
- - * - - º
- -
-
-- ºrinº ºn A g -
- - - * -
| - kºalai ºr a . --
|*
t -
- º º
| - .
º: - s
- - --- -
º --- - - º - - ºcerº -
- y - - º
º :
º - º
- º - -
- - - -
- -
- º -
- . º
- - º
- º -
º -
|
- -
- - - ºvºiakº - º
- -
- - - -
- º -- - º
- -
- º
-
* -
º * * - -
--- - -
* - e. -- -- --- --- - - º - - - - - -
* - º: - - - - * -- * * -- - * - - * - -
ºs as +. sº " - - - - - - -- -- - - -- - -
- ". * * * * - - - -- * * * * - * . - - - --
* * -- - 1. - * * - - -- - - - -
. - - - - -- - -
º * * * * -- - * * * -- -- - - * * * *
- -- - --
- - - -- - - -- -- - - - - -
** * ºr -º º tº , º, . * * * -
- - - -- * * * - - -- º - - - - - -- -
- --- - º -- - - - -
º -- - * * * * - - - - - -- - - - º
- - - -> -- - -- - -
its - * , - - - --- - - - --
i º - - - - º ºr - - -- -- - - - - - - - -
º - - -: * * * * -- -- - - -
| - -- * - ... . - -- - -- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -
º * * - - - * - -- - - - º -
º -- * * - - - - .
º * , - * * -- - - - - - -
- - --- -- * * * - - - - - - -
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- - - - - - - -
- - - - - -- -- - -
. . - * * * - * - - - - - - -- - | -
rº is * * * -- - - -- tº º -- * º - - - - -- - - --- -
- -- - -- - - - --> - - -
*... º -- - - - - -- - - -- -- -- - - - -
. tº * * • * * - - - - - - - -- - - - * - - -
- -- - -
º - = - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - ---
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- - - - -
| - - -- --- - - . --- -
º - -- * * * , , - - - - - -- -- - -- - - - -
º * * - - - - - - - - -
- - - * -- --- - -- - Y - -
- -- -- - - -- ". -- -- - - -- -- -- º - - - - -
º -- --- -- - * - - -- * . - -- - - ---
- - -
- - . - -- -- -- -- - - - - - - -- *. --- --- - ---
- - -- - - --- -
- - * * * - ºn - -- -- -- - - -- - - - -- --- -
- - - - -- - - - . -
º - - s - -- -- -- -- - - - - - -- * - º - * ---.
-- - - - - - -
---. * , - - - - - - - -- - - - * - ----------- -
* . ºf a -*. -- - - - - -- - - - -- - -- -- - - - -- -------- - º
. - -- - - - - - - - - - --- -
- -- -- - - - -- - - - - - --- - -º-º-º-º- .
--- - º - - - - - - - - - - ---------- - -
-- - - - - -- - - - - - - -------- | -- |
- - - -- - * -- - - -------- ---
-- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - ------
--- - - - -- -- - - - ------------ -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -
- -- - - - º - - - - - --------- - |
- - - - - - - * - - - - - --- -
º- - - - - - - - - - *- - - - - - - - - H º
- - -
-- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - --- -
- - - - -
--- - º - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - |
- - - - -
- - - - - - ------------------------------- -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - --> * - - . - -- -
| - - - - - -- --- - ---
- - -
-- - * . --- - - º, -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
- - - .
- -- - -
-- - - - º - - -
- - - - - - - - - º
* - - - - . - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -
- - - -- - ---
- - - - . - **. - - º, --- -- - -
- - - - - - - - --
º - - - - -
- - - - - -
- - * , - --- --- -
- - - º -
- - - --- --- -
--- - - -
- -- -
-- - --- - - - -- º
- -- - - - - -
º - - - * . º -- ". tº
º ". - ---
O | | | | | -- - -- -
E. T | L I L E - - - - ---
U CA | l - - - - - - - -
- º º
- - |-
- - º,
- --- - - -
- - - - - - - - -- - -
-- - - -
- - --- - º
- - - - -- - -
- - -
- -
- - --- --- -
- -
º - --
- - -
- -
º, * -
- º º * - - - -
- - - -
º -- - -
º - - -
- -
- - -
- -
º -
- - - º - - - -
--- --
- - - - - - - - -
79716 O–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 11



























































































































ITEM NO. 12
- - -
º º -
- - º - -
-
º - - - º - - - -
- º - - -
-
º -- - -
- - - -
- - - - - ºn -
º ºn tº - º º
tº - tº ºn º
* * as tº º º nº º - - -
º º ** * * ºr tº
a. * º - - º - -
º º - … -
a fee. - - - - - - -
"º", A º' A º
\ - º º - - º - --- - - -
- - -
* º º
* º tº - - - * º -
º - - --
* - - - - *.cº. ºn
º **ELP's ob .
- - - º ºactºriºgº -- - ". º º
- wonºrs on * * * º
- - - - - - - newºº -- op - * - - -
º tº ºut-- nº * > -
* . * - º ºurs an - - sº -
- s º - tº º º - º - º - - - º - ---
* º º … * . - - - - *asusº - - º pºort-c - - - * * º - º - º -
º * * sº --- - * - - º º - -
R º º - tº º º º - º . **** - cº- N. * . - so a cº- art - -- sº º - at-º- ºn ,
- GAMBLE - *b* . - , º Medusa as - * , , , , - --
ºs MoºrGoºsºy-Dºº : . - - - * . , , º, .
º º TREveRº- poºr sº º
* Bººse – º – " ** -
º º **ss- aw
- a
º
H-bº º º - -
- - - º, --
-- º
Nevada as
-
º
anizona as
vestau an
tennessee º'ee ºf
W-VIRGINA BB
******
--
ºf gº.
º
---
-------->
*:::::… .
tº
-
". -
- oglala Kagº
-
- .
º O
.
* tº r" ºr w i wº O
º ** *** * - -
. | M. º. f* * * -- O. -
ºn º, º - - -
* ºres, "º º º
º - º an * * f casſº - Akº --
º ---
: * * º Merry ºf -
º: º *. | " -:
º * - - ºn -
º * O -
23 sº º º
... º.º., ... sº s ".
º º ºff a
º sº º º º - * -
** - -
2 sº *3 as
- º
º º º
º º
** º º, º
º: º
* º
* - +. *
º
fº
"lºllutiºn,
|
º
| | | !
º
º
º ºx. -
º, A Mº. º
* =
º \ N -
º º º º - \
*- 8-> - * * * - º
- - **** ºn sº ---. -
º
º º
- PE
s , i.e. ºn / ARL HARBOR
º * º **** * º /> º
º Sº Nº.
ºn twº
-
N º -- - * ********* sº.
|A º tº º
--- * ...N.
º
º º
ºw
ANCHORAGE PLAN
7 DEC.194
—one Nautical Mile -
- tº-ºn-
tº x. Altº it ºr stºriox
unº
-
ºr tº:
ſ ****
ANTI-TORPEDO AND
- ANTI-BOAT NET
wº
*** fees tº
tº º
º ºr ºssº
º,
º
* * * Kausehºusehº
ºx ºs
* ſ º
*g, *, *.*.*.*.* |
º º - ** agae Q
º
tº º, Art MY tº Arººs * * * º
79716 0–46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780)

































































































ITEM NO. 13
Q
|US 300 M
{
ENTERPRISE
— 200 NAUTICAL MILES -
&#32;：
§）,
AN
EMBER 94
K.
6 DEC
OR TO ATTAC
* *
TDEC.
|
CK.7 DEC.
|-
|-= |
==
(~4.
|---－
AFI
G
3
No. 1
(Face p. 4780)
79716 ()—46—pt. 21










º ITEM NO. 14
- - † =-º - º-----sº —w
158°20' 15, 10, 05/ 158°00' & # 45/ 157°40, . 35/
| . ——-s-s-s-º"T"-º-º: l - --5E--— ń. * f : ſ
º FEFFEF==EEEEEEEEEEI HHHHHHHºrrºr-HHHHHHrrºrHHHHHHHHHHHHºrrºr HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHºrrºrHHHHHHHHHHHHHEE F======EEEEEEEEEEEEEFFFFFFFEEEEEEEEEEF=====FFEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEFFFF 3: I H=======EEEEEEEEEE========EEEEEEEEEEF=======EEEF=====EEEEEEEEEEE=E=H++:EEE ====EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEffºrtre+EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
- - §3 | | - & S. 4.
H 1045 gro º
º CºQ J. M. Lava CoS 217 §3 - º
}- $45 1065 S83 Co S \\\\lllli IIIſ IIII I
ſ $30 \\\\\\\\"|||||||||||| 200 WWW"|"|ll. º
sº \\\\\. º ||||| Af - hº
º: 630 W* " , ""//, * NNN RBOR )
4& 4 isoo § % 740 rºo }70 N I - 45°
* s7s wº Jo ZZ 24. N }*
I tº 20 § &P \ \\ | | | | | | | | %. #8 $80 sº \\\\ /// % I
t 650 Ş \\ // / %2, ". KSA. | 2 § 2’s 24 \\ \ //// %. T
º Ş. \\ // %. * * * ~ * S ray I
I 622 G|5 $ NY //. 9 % I5] r" ~, Ş N DRN A - | | -
I S N 2 2 #72 º Ş, S. NS A. º T
º S$ N 600 2 223 \ e S 3 N . EIAWAIIAN ISLANDS }*
}º 575 S is ^ 635 .e.” 2 < 2&3 2K) .* ‘.... sº sº SS .” ~2. I
I 555 S SS 2° 2. Aſ S. ,' 6. “..., 53 ", sy S. __* ~. -
}* S > ~ 2 #37 os. ‘... 's, S ^. .* ~2. }*
- 550 S • 840 .* ~2. 2&tº ... ." - *-s S. \, ºt - * I
}- ** N- ſº _T 1. * 74 ". S, S- 77 3Fs *> → ~ * tº 3 1- * hº
Hso S- *… * * * * _* ~2. ſ/8 104" 56 ( \s 97, S I vº 30's ~ º-
F- S *~ w" 30's _* :286 .." / \ Yic- *º- /o --~~ |-4
º s- --so st % ~~ -: 185 &-S * A 2^ : E T- ~\ º ~ = I
*- -** g *r- sº-
º: 504 F– *- ºr 29% —- 229 ,” .50 ! 5& 88 ºr *… T-s > * - ºl
}* * - 585 - -Z -* --- ,’ & S / : E e —- 178 - --- ---
H E o – - * = * * , | # * ... = |V + —E º T
º –5 — + 300 — 3–E $8! ,' : -: - - - sm, sº - -H E
I = s - ‘y -- ge - CoS A4 190 122 .." z 45 30 \ &#– 15ſ, – •y —E RS. |C } * > º
. 310 =- T- 7. ,298 ~s Ts Wºº. ,' *S Z & 73 #– --~~ ”, º ~s tº <= I
}* & 45 =~ * --> %. &" ~. ~s 23; * 58 z 38 \ £ -** & ſwcatº *~ s 1237 I
I 2: --> * /NCR tº *~ S 24 I52 * A47 - :- #6 2 >S | SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS |-4
º: 2- T- $40 SC ~s ...' 53 f 24. * T- . . | . 2 -SS sº, | | RE ADY ON 4-H NO T ( E AT MEAN LOWER LOW WATER I
- .* *~ * * ;
*: 39 - ~~ .* 455 ^. 243 ~s , 79 / L
ſ 5 & sº 2. ~2^ *NS S - in , 6 275 SS S S * > O º:
} : 2 e 2 S s S 222 2. s/ 40 S NS § S }-
º 390 2_º,37° 22 258 N $s S * 84. z ... " NS SS - - - - - º
2^ 2/ N S X SS - Nautical Miles K-
| | 335 %2 / / 279 258 NN s gyS.’ # \\ - § - E== f ===; l r s & 3. & F. H
I 385 2 // . N SS 218 39S : 2 46 ºs \\ S Yards I
Tº N 130 89 6 : 4? A \ SN
-- 3:2 2ſ / \ N - * - 12 5; 5 A \ SS tº ſº Lº Dº fººt I- Jº------sº }*-I E-i k-
21°| H º ///, "I \ \ V\ Ş &rS A. sº 39 2 rºº. 3 º' ''', a || |\\\\\ N tºo a $oco toº H|21°
295' f 2 Z ** T. "Aſº |
* |H| % | | | | | | | \\ *S 142 A. ". * , ºxº AWP 24 6 & -5 TT READY ON 3O-MINNOTICE Honol H|*
© ,” : . ºf Zºº !-
. 295 || % *o Sp N 175 ors . 58 / 19 * /a: º% N tº ulu p-
- { 8 ///% N 193 | 90 /. 24. 12,'; * / 180 \ W * - - TIDE8 (referred to mean lower low water, Oahu Island }*
S & **9 : º - - - f - }*
º z Jö * * * * */// 180 240 \\\ 210 3y in ' * 37 2, # g .. •. - / //// \\\\\\\\ :::::::" §§ º:
k- /// \ - .2 f . ( . . - º =- - - |||| \ \\\\ earn sea level -- - - - --
02 264. "lilihullſlumlºw' ...' 2° 22 ; : Au-º-; i. * |||||||||||||||\\\ Dowest tide to be expected - 1.0 ft. }*
º | $35 º G /48 27 * * 'ºff \ff'... .3; "...i i . 279 rºy ABBREWIATIONS
-- 156 ...' S . - ..". § ;34. - k-
H 223 - ... ." \ 7 W. º Báy7 ºr tº Yº - - * * * * s Lights: F. fixed; FL. flashing; Qk. quick; l. Qºl inferrupted quick; S-L short-long; .
k l 205 ... • * ... wansnaress roº §:S - : y bº. 275 Occ. occulting. Alt. alternating: Gp, group; W. *...* º- kº-º-º:
hº .. .." ~7 45° - ~ : : - ... ." m, miles; min. minutes; sec. seconds; ev. every; D. fo --
* 3. ,- 2 ... :// ~ . . - , |7t, reestablished; vis, visible; SEC. sector: 0.5SC, obscured: AERO. aeronautical light. }-
|- rº tº mºº ! ...“ - * *f; - Q - º . - ; : Lights are white unless otherwise indicated T
º 172 - g - - - - - - Buoys: C. can; M. nun; S. spar; REF reflector; J. B. temporary buoy. P-4
#, | * 9 J2F UTILITY - NON COMBATANT ~ * I
|- rhy & -
I * - O R. Br. radiobeacon. ſ
-- 254. --
I 3? 9 JRS | ! | C.G. Coast Guard Station; R.?r. radio founer. E
|- | }*
H! . CI. clay; Co. coral; G. gravel; 9rs, grass; A. mud; ºr, rock; S. sand; SA. shells. I
| º, Sl 638 bă, *: ër. *: “...”. "..."..., gy. gray; ra. red; wh. white: gº, wellow. D
H '', àrd ; fºr. ! st. soft; atk. -
|ſ … • 264. . Af P. D. position doubtful: E. D. existence doubtful: 08 str. obstruction. i
ſ `... 2 |O J2F | | | -
ſ '•. * - - - HEIGHTS in feet above mean high toater. I
F- . ". . 165 --
F- ‘. 67 º [ ] § { ! L
ſ *S wºrs º AUTHORITIES }*
}- º v * * . . . . . . . * ~ . . '', Surveys ſo 1932. I
-- - .” F *...* A—º *º .” * *s, Surveys by U. S. Engineers and the U. S. Geological Survey. }-
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I ºva * 3: ; º *95 LZW Air Space Reservations, and are closed to the º No }-
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79716 O-46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 14
























































































































































































































ITEM NO. 15
100° 110° l2O" 130° 140° 150° 160° 170° 180° 170° 160° Igo. T 100° 90° 80°
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* …e., ºx-º: *% jºk; |33-OOE TRITON SS TASK FORCE 12~º -PN O— POLLACK SS | AIRCRAFT CARRIER . * . . . .” -º-; a tº sº tº º
f *0\º. - & * Uracas I / SoN OMA AT º * zºº. &s a º POMPANO SS | LIGHT CRUISER Sex? a. “. & *—, .* '•'. ſ
º . **6 ; TASK Force 8 Z () Sº & 3 DESTROYERS **** Manxani “”.e. (2, §. rº" & ©
| j arºs., WM. WARD BURRows AP Task Force 3-e ...a...e. Robiń." ANY PACIFIC FLEET 4 SUBMARINES Sº f : ...º.º.
º Z T | TRANSPORT GAR SS *º-s !º-ºº-s, "... * $º
i ºr Saipan I & Taong. Aton ANTARES AKS A | SUB RESCUE *>|-> 2. º:3, 2, anrass.
i Guam, # VEGA AK PEARL HARBOR | OILER * Ş. º sºon º *.
| Jºniwetokº ".g. ' - ...” sº -] .* oº: *Art
wº Sº...! HARRY º, SEAGULL AM, ARCTIC Af ~~~. Fulton as” & sº
& 4 & o ºx §) Xºlili - #| JANE CHRISTENSEN (Fr.) r * * Wººk_rººms ls
#9 • s, , *, *, * * • * S. O M|NNEAPOLIS CA sº Sºjº -
IS t • *.* "...s 6. $.. * , ... .ºOIlúTO € º * MARs HALL IS MAUNA Loay --~9. ºn S \
. . . . . . . .* Jalur. * z h Rf CHANDLER DMS TRENTON – GL3
<ºr. " **Roursºrs, sº “l " . #|IRVING L. HUNTº KAULA AG HOVEY DMS § 1. Tº sº
“A # •Fanning IA BOGGS DMS *:::::: #Buenº.
* Kapingamarangi 3' | sty Hawaii;N PLANTER\""º"9" | * ‘. Esmer *-
Ka. amarangi I GILBERT 1s *** - º owlan (Arch. de Cator) © *_ Aw? º
e O * Jarvis 1 LITCHFIELD DD calºos is §º G - g” F8 j \\
ºx is THRESHER SS º sº 2° º
•Ender I O
- .* *. “, º º- LOUISVILLE CA ..º. * • Malden I Pali 5' Ú/ º
... tº ºpes." | * *so, (2-SHIP CONVOY), PENSACOLA CA • Starbuck I f
‘’ º, *Aru Is NEW *\}. Ło ~~~. ICE • º ...”
*--> ſh. Laut 4. ** irºv.” O "*. ........(8-SHIP CONVOY) ongareva • ** }
10|| tº ſºlº. #sra.ca *...*f, *.s.l...”... ... … **** RICHMOND CL O H. e s a U-
| & % : ,C *: I8 Swains I • ger Is. Nassau I | I) • Flint, I Huach * MA
i *Darºnerston Wºº M tº KINGFISHER AM **oºl. ...tº
i sºftop;" º, ſº *c.,
ſ Derby .. **św. &s.” º: "e ** **
Broome Burketowns & * reimerical- * § • * '; ‘. •. * * *.
20|| a-ef -*- a coorſ, ———H+. O *Iq.
Mattaburr * * *::::... . nº. . . . . . Toc
*Alice Springs & * - * .. .* Menderson 1 Antofag
A U S T R A L I. A •Pitcairn I Pºcie! Chai:
& Easter Ie •salºome- s.relixe's Ambrosio cal
lbane d . Rapa I (Chite) Carrisal
60°
100° no 120° 130° 140° 150° I60° 170°
79716 o–46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 15















































































ITEM NO. 16
-30°
- 20° .
AlKSEARCHESHOWN
IN HAWAIIMN AREA.
Z 6 DECEMBER 94
E PRIORIO IIACKIDFC
| HFF intribº,
30°-
/. III] ºzº Lºs ºARL HAR BOR -
T'/iii. ::
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS






17.
(TN SKETCH OF MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF oAHU.)
ll.
O320 Q.
Second Attack Unit •
Ordered to deploy at Oklo hours.
Dive bombing unit
Attack run ordered et Cl25 hours.
Horizontal Bombing Unit
KANEOHº
HICKHAM
IFORD Island
First Attack Unit.
Oo310
10.
10.
ll.
l2.
13.
lºt .
lº.
16.
l?.
ITEM NO. 17
2.
Accended
Sketch.
(W) 01:25
+.
5.
Crdered to deploy at C310 hours.
Attack run ordered at 0320 hours.
Dive Bombing Unit.
WHEELER.
Torpedo Bombing Unit.
Horizontal Bombing Unit.
BARBERS POINT
Note: The Fighter Strikā ng Units in
each attack or ersted at will after
deploying.
79716 O—46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 17


ITEM NO. 18
- - - - - º- - -
- - - -
ºº: Cº. ºº -
- - - * .
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack º
- S. Con. Res. 27 -
* No. 7 pate 1/47 º
… 30.2%–
º
º " _
, --
---
- r - -
-
º - -
- - - -
- -
...” º º
- ". º
-
.* * CLARA º
---> - 4 *
* -
- 7 -
- - - -
-
...” - * > *
--- -- -
DINA
-- -
- -
- * *
- - -
- - - - - - - - - --
- - *
---
- - -
- - - - - - -
º C’’: ºv- - -
-- - * /t/
** a º * * , , -
- - -- - ** * - - -
- - ...” -- - - * , -
- - - - .* --> * º_ - 1
- - - - " -
- -
-** * - - , , ſº - - - - -- -
...”
-- - - - * -, -
- ". . - . . . . . . - - -
*.*.*. - . . . * - . 7: - -- .* -- -
--- - * - . - - -
* … . . . .” - - - - - - -º-;" -
- - *
- - - - -
- - - - -
* . zº- - 2. - --
- - - - - º
- - - -
*. ". - -> º --
* , ºº - * -- - - -
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- - --
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-
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-
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º
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- *** * * * *
-
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7 Dºc Y
Lº- ſ/-, *
-
|- - -
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 18

Æ 24 CZ /
W A I M E A 7
N I I H A U
BRIEFING
l, TOOK PLACE ON ABOUT 5 Decaibºr." -
2. ORDERS BY NAVAL WIRELESS "CLIMB MT. NIITAKA".
3. HEARD THAT "CIVILIAN RADIO BROADCASTING WAS NOT
RESTRICTED" - "GERMAN ATTACHE LOST ONE DOG" .
EVENING MEANING THAT A CARRIER LEFT FROM PEARL HARBOR.
OF "GERMAN ATTACHE WANTS A COOK AND TWO SERVANTS"
6 DECEMBER 1941 T^\ MEANING THAT ONE BB AND 2 CRUISERS CAME INTO
PEARL HARBOR AND ANCHORED.
EMPHATIC THAT ONLY CIVILIAN RADIO WAS USED,
CODE NAMES MANY AND WARIED.
4. HE BELIEVES THAT EVERY DAY FROM THE TIME THEY LEFT,
MESSAGES WERE SENT BY COMMERCIAL RADIO.
5. SURE THAT SOME 2nd GENERATION JAP FROM WAS
BOARD "AKAGI" AND THAT HE HEARD THE BROADCAST.
HE WAS A FIRST LT. AND A PAYMASTER.
SKETCH COPIED 10 OCTOBER 1945 FROM SKETCH OF LT. TAIT (CIC USA) labB. DURING INTERVIEW
WITH LT. COM. YOSHIS, SHIGA, IJN, AT OMURA.
PREPARED BY AC of S, G-2, W AMPHIBIOUS CORPS.
S LARGE SUB
(PILOT RESCUE)
NOTE:
HELLDIVERS ATTACKED FIRST
TORPEDOES ATTACKED SECOND
BOMBERS AND FIGHTERS THIRD
(NO MORE SIGNALS SEEN)
ONE SEAPLANE FROM CRUISER TAKES OFF ABOUT O430
FOR OBSERVATION PURPOSES AT 500 METER ALTITUDE (16,404 FT.)
PEARL HARBOR.
KN BY C.W. WIND - IF ANY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WERE IN OR AROUND
SIGNAL FROM BOMBER JUDGED BY FIELD GLASSES
AND SIGNAL FROM SEAPLANE - - THAT IS : WHETHER
OUR FORCES ARE ALERTED OR NOT. TWO ROCKETS
MEANING OUR FIGHTERS UP - ONE ROCKET MEANING ALL
QUIET. MICTAKE WAS MADE, 2 ROCKETS INSTEAD
OF ONE WERE FIRED.
5 MILES
KAHUKU PT.
KAENA PT . ". / - * w
/ i )
l
TORPEDO ATTACKERS
ſ FOLLOWED BY BOMBERS
WHEELER -S-
FIELD HELLDIVERS 7-
BELLOWS
FIELD
l
Y FIGHTERS
\ J. "Jill Sea.
\ ASNd
\
\
\
C HICKAM
PEARL HARBO Z zy' FIELD N
ŽN \
A ſ \ ^ HONOLULU
BARBERs Pr. Z Z f \ SS
N. 2% A | \ `-- - DLAMOND HEAD
, Z
TORPEDOES ONLY --~~~<=== \ /
l8 FROM THIS DIRECTION ~ | ^ LARGE SUBS ARRIVE
* *- / 7 DECEMBER AT O430
* -
* *
º
- > * * * * *
TORPEDOES ONLY __
24 SPLIT GOING THIS WAY
KANEOHE S-C 18 FIGHTERS
ITEM NO. 19
º lst WAVE -
18 HELL DIVERS (—
**. - SPLIT AND HIT
KANEOHE
Z22 Jé Cée Z."
79716 O—46—pt. 21
(Face p. 4780)















-
ITEM NO. 20
A. METHOD of. SEARCHING 5 SECTORs
THROUGH 360. To A RADIUS OF 833
MiLES FROM OAHU EMPLOYING 72 B-17D
Alſº PLANEs.
VISIBILITY ASSUMED TO BE 25 Mit-ES.
ALL MLES Nautical.
CROSS – HAT AREAS MºCAT R
ON #2.ɺº E. DICATE COvºRAGE
SHADED AREAs NDICATE OVERLAp
- —
(ºr -27&z-z-z-Z"
Confidential
i
MIDWAY
º
. -
-
- - --
FRENCH FRIGAT
| SHOALS
--
- -
- - - - - - - -- -- -
--- – - __º - - - " - - - - - -
- - - - --
- º – T. – - - - Cº - ºr - ºr .
- - º º X_-_-_-ºº ºx k ≤ x * * ~ * * - oº, sº -
-> –5– Fºxx-xxº~~~~< -
- - - - º-º-º-º-ºxº~~~~~º * * * SEARC- eacº
º 2 §º º, sº º- º
– a . ºs-
-
-
N
CHART 1.
333 MILES
PALM/PA
-
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 20



























ITEM NO. 21
l
º
|
i.
RELATION OF 25 MILE VISIBILITY TO DISTANCE
% OF COVCRAGE ON THE SEARCH OUT % OVERLAP
B s 9–10 20, 29–40–50–69–79–89–90–1999–19–22–30–40 so ed 70 eo 20 loo
l. These c rºes --- 1: tº the seercº ºut ºn . .
- - - - -
- . . . . . . . º - 10 - --
2. This ex-lºne: I - is ºased ºn the 5 searºº ºf ºr . . e.
ºr inciral en lºved in c ºr tº tºe sº curve en lie in -
- - - - - -
cº-struct o f the cºrres fºr the 3° and 4 ºrch sectºr .
ºn-strº-C ºn or -- r --- 2OO -- T t
º . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e. . ] ecºtels one ille. *
. ." Sºx' ºn Tºº º' * -
1200 nautical miles equels lº miles. Since the ºr * **t º
can be searched tº ºne lºre any time with 25 miles ". OO
is 25 miles to ei- ºr sile, tº r a tº cºn - overed –"
seercº º- + --º-er ºr - " -e- is nºticºl eº- ºr "-
-- 1200 ºiles, 50 cºre e is obtaine. 400
1. From the son ution an ovo ºne follow tº wºrri for 50
car, be cº--lied ºc - lot tº cºrres:
- - - L-
80 nautical iles 50 nºtical miles -
ØOO
Search rºiºs in neutical miles X tº TTTTTTET-
If the answer is -----ºr tº en one, it indicatºr ººrºº
in excess of 100% enº, therefºre, overlºr.
i
- -
For examºle at 300 ºiles:
- 800– ––
10 - |
#2 - 2 or 100 cºre-la- -
57 & 5 - - - - - - ØOO H
* -
1OOOH- -
11OO +-
|
1200 l
(c-242-97c-17)[s-9-41) - chART 2
79716 O–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 21

ITEM NO. 22
- PERFOMANCE OF B-17D AIRPLANE:
4.
Foº FAC” RADIUS OF ACTION ALLowANCE
THROTTLE OPERATIONS
S M ADE FCº. 1 ºr, ºut
**C. 2-2. Fºut ºf stº, E.
* Bººlºs of SEARCH ide? M. =s.
2590 gºu Fufu. No Bowes
*
45 POWER OUT ANC 545
5000 FEET ALTTUCF 143 cºors.
ºn s ºr acº toº ºf 3 -ºc alºº. A
ºs ººº-º-º-º:
RELATON TO PºSS.E. E. P. ANS OF
A class tº GROUP ATTACKNG OAHQ -
2 ºuts S-ow's ARE NAUTICAL MLES.
3 SECTIONS 2 & 3 NCCATE CNC Two
of Maº coºd TCNS. I-A MiG-7 - BAClus of a
occur our Nº. A 36C SEARC-
- - - e. F. A. I. :
------ - 2093 CAL Futu 4-6 -
65". POWER OUT fºg. Bºes
15,000 FEET ALTTUDET 133 *NCTS our
C, RADiºs witu maximum * --- -
1720 3A ºut e-scoreove º
- 65 POWER out 25-323. º FEET
TTLDE 33 ºcts cº-
5 assumeroºs
* CºR ER setto ac 2 Nors
= ~~~~ := P_*** creroº.ca
- tº M Rºcº led ** CTS
- * ~ 13 -ouss pºss as
- C S = 2 = ... =s -
- º: - -- -- --
- - - - --
º - -- -
º - - &_2-2/z c.22/2-2 –2
- --
- - -
- ſ º . ---
*- . ºr ºf ~ * > . .
º Cºnfid: R
SECTION
º
- º
º
º
SEC O
º \
º, -
2
º
g *.. T B
- -
. . º
º - ºtsº -
º º
--
º
º ºf C. -
- º
SECTION sº º
>
4. º: PENCH FRIGATE A
s: SHOALS pasº
- -
º º
º oº
* > -
CHART 3
-awaii
- -
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 22







ºwº-
6
FRENCH FRIGATE
SHOALS
- -
s ºffs
KALA º
ºw
ºº::R.
arrack Fort to Dawn + 242
Oaºu co
Q º Maui
- Awaii
193 ºroſs
2
3,
ITEM NO. 23
- - - - - -
*** - Cº - " - ºr ---n --- ºr
ºº:: * ~ *- :- - - -
ºf-AIO’, ſo lºss B_5_2_ººs of
*CTC" of a C-55 ER GROUP ºr Tacº Nº.
-a-
**-tº 5-ºx ºf Nautical mºlts
ºf CT ºf 53.5 °C,CATE on v. Two or
**"…º.º.º.º. Tºº Mºcº occur
L-Pºwº - -ºº StarC-
- A Pº-axi
-
º-Rººt ºf 3 -
FCF fºr **Cºus of ºººoº, 7 Lºwance -
5 **CE FOR. --R full T-acºl E 55ta arº,
aw 2-º- ºr Stº. E. -
* **~~< ºf SEARCH 1067 ºuts
2500 GA- Fut- No Boases
45% ºf Dº Aso sac-
Lº --- ---> * > * >
= **** * * ~ * ~~~~ : * ~ *
2.293 GA ºut 4 º’ ecºs
*5°. pº- -5° ---
-500 C ~ *: " - r >= 32 ºc-
º “ººs & Tº ºxº sowe loss tºº ºlis
* * - ------- -
1500 ºf ET ALTTUpf is a rºots
* ~ *RREE SPEEC 27 ºs
* CAFREE PLA is ºr tº:
- - - -, -o-º:
- Cº- --- Cº-º-º-º-º-
-->
- -- -
--- ---
** -*
-
CHART 4
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 2:






- *
ITEM NO. 24
operating schedule For 216 B-17 d combat crews
22
|O || || 16 || 7 || 18 || 19 || 20 25 26
CD
EF
AB
S
EF
| Days
| s=ARCH
ATRNG.
ALERT
:
#
.
#
#
º
AB#23
:
f
º
:
:
:
;
A3
CD
Ef
:
CD
EF
AB
º
;
8
CD
EF
AB
:
#
#
*
AB
CD
1. The 216 combat crews are divided into units of 36 ºch for the purpose of assignment to missions and are designeted by the letters A to F inclusive.
2. on the 1st day of operations, Groups A end B search, c and D conduct training and rest, F is on the elert for an ettack mission and the underscored group E is also on the alert for an
attack mission if airplanes of the maintenence and reserve force are in commission. Thus it is planned that 72 combat crews will search daily, 72 will conduct training and rest and 72 will be
on the alert for an attack mission.
s. It will be noted that over a thirty asy period each unit will
s. Fly a total of 10 search missions ºverer in 10 hours per his tº rº * * * * ºr -e- re-fod.
y - - º - - -
5. Be on the alert for etºacº missions to any's per period.
S. Conduct training and rest 10 days per period.
OPERATING SCHEDULE FOR 288 B-17D COMBAT CREWS
12 | 4 || 15 16 || ||7 19 20
GH
EF.
CD
DAYS |O || ||
SEARCH AB
REST GH
TRAINING | EF
ALERT
i
:
i
f
:
#
A8
:
:
:
:
H
:
:
i
1. The 288 combat crews are divided into units of 55 each for the purpose of assignment to missions and are designated by the letters A to H inclusive-
2. on the 1st day of operations, groups A and B search, G and H rest, E and F conduct training, D is on the alert for an attack mission and the underscored group C is also on the alert for an
attack mission if airplanes of the reserve and maintenance force are in corrission. Thus it is planned that 72 combat crews will search daily, 72 will rest, 72 will conduct training, and 72 will
be on the alert for an attack mission.
3. It will be noted that over a thirty day period units will average: -
-
a. 74 search missions averaging 10 hours per mission, or 75 hours per period. - -
b. 74 days rest per period.
C. 74 days training per period.
ºf. Tº days on the alert for attack missions.
REARKS
1. It should be noted that a minimum of 216 B-17 Combat Crews are considered necessary. Considerable doubt exists as to whether or not this number of combat crews are sufficient for
sustained opereticas. As has been Fºſted out, each combat crew will fly approximately 100 hours coarch per 30 day period and be on the alert for attack missions 10 days during the period.
Further it is possible that over en extended period of time combat crews may never fire * round of machine gun anmunition or drop a bomb. They must, therefore, conduct a certain amount of roºtine
+raining to maintain their combºt efficiency. This training would be accomplished on the ten days set aside for rest. It is not inprobable that a pilot would fly some 130 hours per 30 day period.
It is believed that combat crews, particularly pilots, could not perform continions flying duty efficiently if required to fly over 100 hours rer month for any length of time.
2. The 288 combat crew set-up is, therefore, recommended as an alternet- plan and it is requested that serious consideretion be given to assigning this number of combat &rews in furtherance
ºr the Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu.
c-242-97-mºs-e-4)- CHART 5
79716 O–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 24
*

ITEM NO. 25
100° 110° l2O’ 130° 140° 150° 160” 170° I50° - 14.0° 130° 120° 110° 100° 90° Po sition of USS BOISE. at times indicated:
*\ j\ S _- - - - - - - - mº ºf “Tº sº sº. ººmº ºr *- * * * 1840 - 27 Nov 1941. - Lat 16°.46;3
* # S- .N. lº”- 55° E.
\ſ \ ^sº _--~~~ NIS $ Medvezhi Is soornº. Long lº
© ) °Shelagsk. PERLA.. | g 1851 cº 27 Hov 194l sº Lat 169 <º 45° 25 M
70 kº- ſ” . Long 153" - 52'-5 E. x
§ :w 1927 - 27 Nov 194l - Lat 16° - 4.3" . . ;
ºf Nº. 9 V Long 153° - 44'-5 B.
1743 - 28 Nov 194l - Lat 149 - 56.75 N
Long 1489 - 43' P.
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS A9 N
1920 - 2° Nov 1941 - tº: *.e.".
The above positions were obtained by plotting
AºA'º Cº. Aſ - * courses and speeds back from the 2000 positions
§: 3. * 3 * *-i-. Z. ſfºs. “. on those dates. All data was obtained from the
60° Okhotsk agaeva } º by Tºtº & º º ºr ; * ºmº = º S.S. ſº ass="sº Uſ ~~ ...F.' tº BOISE log Q.
* * £6 3. ~ *% º:tº Il- O sº 2-S ſh º AIOCD SOAV BAY |:’. - th
&#;"Gillis Avd º *::::::::::::::::::::::::::::tion
** Seº’ Gºvzr of A LA skA sº , \ *:::::::: normal ÇCullº § g
£º * : * * Nº. and plottinge
ORTHOT’S K SEA * * g. §§ DISPOSITION OF
Irkutsko !.…º.º.º. as lºº, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
S- & *:::: º ºa. SEA ILE- YoºHAA- T- Queen charaoz. ...? w O O
\---- **- $ f - * = º, sº
soll -------- ---. . .” --~~ SAKHALIN I . —T ºriº-SFAII-B COLORADO BB §º:
I :* \ CASCO AVP Sº š. | 4|
sº g-nº- \" -3Aſy WILLIAMSON AVD º: - O
| £; * BAY - º TEAL AVP Aºtoriš º:
Derº sº 2 Portl o
| tº , , -- ~~ É 6 DESTROYERS sº ‘(g
*śemoro aſſ - B, 3 DEC. \ Empireſ, & §
t - OON g R º % | SEAPLANE TENDER * *...})*
I * : %. 173-OOW #. | STORE SHIP S. º. Ş Toledoº.
4ol Fº * 2° \ 5 SUBMARINES sºlº, U.N.I.T E D H S T A T E S-a-
I iºnºtºrino º . S. 3 O LERS and St. Louis
* 55 PROCYON AK ?” º, e.
I C H I N A ſº G # Zº Arty
| Kaifeng o *::cretawa 4 º' / o R T | N P\ A C / A' | Bor:#As AF
i Honou-shellºnel—a §§ {}{3} #. ALDEBARAN AF .Die
NANKING” -ºº: º . SEPULGA AO }_X. \º p-- O;
ao'll Shanghaº ARGONAUT SM § ** seminole Ars PLATTE Ao Sº, "T S.S. *::sº
º->28-99 N º TRoğt $s N A teches AO © `s P|NOLA AT tº º' Yºº - . . * - \ £ºvºcºl,
º: Ti41-ooE REGULUS A º &D, oſso - 7 DEC. TIPPECANOE AO - Y-shrownsville *
}*. volcaho. *** * * 26-OON - 158. OOW - ** xxxico Key West-sº
ISLE 8 e eMarcus I TAMBOR SS Y, ext WRIGHT AV PLUNGER SS BALLARD AVD * *Reye”Sº Yº Nºmazatlan | \ . . º ºg
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tº I eE erburyi
| 3. * . ... * : *. *º-" Louisvill; GA º: • Malden I &
l ". . . . ." §º. * * = §§ $º. (2-SHIP CONVOY). PENSACOLA CA • Starbuck I ſ
l RES ſº º #.ſh.º. 4. ** : g; & -- * **, º G "…, of York.I)Atafu I (8- SHIP CONVOY) Tongareva e” }
loft ºlºšº 2. t ºf... seasº. -- ~ 1:" RICHMOND CL O H. e E R U º
| ***ś <! º 2, Kº: *— rº-- . . º gº s Nassau I | • Flint I P.
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isbane tºy *º-ul. (chite) “.
|
60° DZEFE-EFE ==L-E-F-E-E-EEEEEEEEEs—a-ETE-E=EETETETEEEEEEEEEEEEETETETEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
100° 110 120° 130 140° 150° 160° 170° 180° 170° 160° 150° *E=- 14.0° 130° 120° no 100° 90° 80°
79716 O—46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 25








































































ITEM NO. 26
BATTLESHIP
Add Letter, on pin re.
cº, cc, (Battle cruiser)
and º (Monºer). -
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
Alſº CPAFT CAºſºl EP
IN CONCENTRATION
HEAVY CPU14 EP,
Lafoe lidºr causen,
LIGHT CPU tºº P.
DE6TROYER
Larger shape for DL, (over 800 ºn.)
<UEMAP, INE
Add Letter, on Pir For
* M \submarine Mine Layer)
PC, PE
º PC, PA
". PT, PTC
(*s * º “Tºo Yºst
X--
AD, AG
A.H.AY
APAC
AM, AM.
CM,CM:
DM.DM%)
Tenpea (wººd seas)
Mine chip (wºrk 3-s)
ACAEAK Navy CAAdo VE63EL
AQ TANKEP,
AP NAVY. Tº ANºpop."
() -
• NON-NAVY VE44 EL4 -
Agway TRANspoRTArion
COMMERCIAL VE&EL
O
• A 1 P C F A R T -
Alſº, BA&E (of, cAAAIEP)
Bonweep, squadron (a)
Flo HTEP souaonon (e.
PATROL squabºon (2)
º Under pin shows Number
of Planes when Less ºn squadron.
Long chank rºles wing (loo)
Rather +han squadron.
º
º scouring gouapºos (e.
º
• Misce LLANEoug NAVY vessels .
Guide To symbols
- -
• F L E ET TYPE COMBATA tº a VE 66 EL6 -
-
A R J C. ME OUM 3MAl- -
o: º tººk so to 3oo units to 50 units
. c. o N. c E N T P A T o N S -
*** -3-23 tº, ºvºº units, CA-10 ºf: tº units, pººl ºf
conce NTRATION WITH NO
HEAVY GUNº. "
3. º:
sº
Fºr convoy
-
• M 4 C E L L A N E O U → •
* | NFANTºy DIY141CN
ME CHANT Z.E.D. Olviº lon. -
- CAVALAY Divis loº- -
M MAP, NE FOP, CE
-
3. NAVAL BA&E
• UF, MARINE PASE
*UP, FACE PADEP,
<UP, MAP, NE PAA, DER
O Suspicious VE& KEL
*HOT spoºr"
SEE SPECIAL FILE
e – guanº AºNE NET
O MINE FIELD
O MOMP
O PLANE GUARD STATION
! D $HP PIN on wall MAP, AT sta
Q) *Hip PIN on WALL MAP, IN. Poºr
CI KHAP PIN on POPT Cºca-P, D.
© *H12 PIN ACCOUNTED FOR, N (Ask,
FORCE OF, UNDEP, INTEP tº C. N.C.
O SHIP UNDER OVEP, HAUL
O *Hi! P UNDER, CON<TF, UCT lor!
º
79716 0-46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 26










ITEM NO. 27
- - -> <- * ſ º - º POIRT S
- º - º º: }. - - - * A -
- - - ***** } º º º, -
--- * -º-º: "º- ſ "º" - º - -
º º - - -
- º º: - - *… * - - 1 C T O. R. I. A. º - º -
sº - --- - ºut-ºr-taº. - - c.
- tº - - ºr s 1. As o º *** Nº - - -
- *** - - i. ºo::...] º - - -
- A. -- - - - - - C - º - - -
* … . º - -
- º - - º,
- . - ºntº *. NEWPC
º - * . ---- -LAND
-
- HALIFAX
-
-
* * * * CASCQ RAY
- - º PORTSMO
-
--- s E C R ET - BOSTON
- - - -
4
| | DE C. 4. º - : DEC. -
- --- . - -º- - – f –- - PROVINCET -
-- | -- º - - .
- º º * º - T - | - - * - - - - º - - - - -
ºº:: º ºf - º - | •Tobolsk - NEW LONDO
- - - - * - - - - - -
ºf - - - ** * * * * ! ſº - º-
- * - *
- - -- - - - - - NEWPORT - P O E. I C N P O R. T S - -
E - - - - ºr ºr 1 º' Qº 120+**
- - - SCAPA FLOW º oo: "º
-t-. --- - + =90
| -- - Hºmº-Hº-º-º- º Bo: Ino
T. " - - - -- º º A- 50+ =
* - - - P ES † -50
* - - - - |* * = - 40+ =
-- a . - SOUTH ENGLAND I -
1. - --------
GIBRALTAR
SICILY
- - - - . -
§ 1 - - - pay ahea: LA SPEZIA
ºf º, tº - MALTA.
ALEXANDRIA
-
-
- -
---
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---> -- -
-- - - -
- º - .
--- º ---
- - -
- - - -
- --- - - --- -
DAKAR
FREETowsº
|
- - -- –– - - º - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
º
-
- --
- - ---------------
- - - - -
- -
- - - -
-
-
- - \. - – ºf º | JACKSONYILLE
YOKAHAMA
- - / º MIAMI
OSA, K.A.
- * . -º-º: • * SHANGHAI
- - - | - - º KEY WEST
- HONG KON, CANTON
ERTON. Rouge - -
- -:
- -
- - Lºº. sº tº
- - - |- | singapore ºle
- - - -- SOE.R.A.B.A.J.A - * - - - - -
- º - - - GUANTANAM0 | - - - - - - º
- ... " - - - - N - , | Alsº tº lº - -
---
- ºf fº - tº TCTEI I Lº-Tº-L LNEW ZEALANE
- - - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - º - U. - - - - . º - - - - - - -
º 40 º
- - º gº-F * - * *
- - ºn- Lºº Lº fººt-sº-sº *
- - - - - - -- - - --- -- * .
- º - º º º - - º - - - - º - - - - - º - - - - - - º - - - º - - | - - - ºn Tº TS -: Nº º BATAVIA --- ºr Wºº- :* º
º º º, º - - - - --> - - - - - - - - - * " - - - - - º - - - -- * - - *
- -- - - - . . . . . * - - - - - - - º - – * º - - - º
- º º -ºº ºf . º: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - y - ºn tº - - NAL ZONE º **** * 3. see -- -** - º
– -º-º-º-º-º-º-º- - - - - - - - - |CA ºy * * º *A | TARAKAN - - -
- - - - --> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - __ - |- - - -
- - - -
5 E C R ET -
- - -- - - - | -
- - - - - - - - - - - | - - - - - - - -
- - | | DE C. 4 I
- º T - - | - - -
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|| -
----- - - - - - - - º - -
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- - - - - | - . - - - s - | Po rº-ºr - º I ca. I CI- I cv. | _r=12 º I s s I à * º - - -
- - *** - - - - - - *. - - - - - - - - - - -- º ... " - - -
- - . * - * | Fuſºu - V ºn **_ºns
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -- | - - - - - - - SAMERINCIS: - ſº º gº * * * * * * *
- * *****
| - - - - - - ºr
- - - SAN Fºº, a tº
". | - - - º º - º º
- - - - - se" - -
| - º SAN DIEGO cº º º º ** * *
* - - - - - - -
. -
º º
Dutch AAMºº
º
** ***
HAWAII
-
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MANILA
7971; 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 27


























































































































ITEM NO. 28
- -
-vºtº No-
victor 1 a
bootnº
1 s L. A. N. D.
---
– ºr ºf
--
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---
-
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ſº -
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-
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º, *…
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New PCUND-
º * -
- - - - º - º - - - -
| - - - º
- LAND
--
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--- - - - - -
- * . . jº.
º' ºf º A 1. A d * A
- - - - --- F-ar- --"
HALIFAX º
cascº º
PORTSMOUTH
* ~.
- - - - ! - sº
-- 5 EC RET r ºf
- º º- º - - -
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---
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5
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BOSTON -
e bec. * ºwnerº
- * - - - - -
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- - - -
- - -
- - - -
|- -- -
º-º-º-º:
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•Tºbºlsk | nºwn: º º fº O - F O Palº I C N P O IX T S •
- ** * º 20-
SCAPA FLOW * * co
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--- ºr-º- - so
WESTERN-
! - ** * -
APPROATHIS PURTS
-
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----------
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* -º- ºr
ſº is
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- - -
- - -
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- - - - - - ----- - - - - -
- - - - - -
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a
*TºrºTT. 20 º
- 40
south England
PORTS
-
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ºn Autºlº tº GIBRAI TAR
º - 5 SICILY 5, a *. º * -
- - - "CHESAPCARE - . . .” - ºr ~ ***. **
- - ºr . - - - - - - ". - -
* * * * * * * * - - | - PAY AREA º & LA. Sºº. A 1- º - - Q-º-º: tº : tº
- - - - - - - - . º- - - T - - - - - -
\\\ o - - - __ - º º º - -
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- - - - - - º I - -º-º-ºrrºw- º
- Y -- º - Cºx * * Lºs ---
- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---axº~A.
* - º –, - * . - º - - - - - - - NORPOLK ** -
º Hº- - | - - - " |- - * →
- - - --- | | | | | Toº! -
- - - - - - - - --- - -
| - - - - - - - - - - - º ºf - - - tº a - - - - - º--º-º: - -
- - - - - Aº - - - - - º º - - - - - - - - º - º - - - - - *- - -- - ºt - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - º - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - º: - º - - - - - - - - - - -
º -º- ** - - -
- - - * - JACKSUNY LLL
- - - - - - - º - - º - --- - - - - - - - º
- - - - - - º - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - --- º KEY wº. ST - |
º: - - - º - - - - - - - ºf - BATON ROUGE
MOBILE
º, CANTON
--ON
- - - - - -
ºol RAPA-A. - º - - - -
- - º, - AUSTRALIA. -
- - - - - - - ". tº ºr - - -
- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - ---, -- - - - -
º - -- - Lºgº º - - - - - - - --> - ºº:: - - - - -º-º-º-º- - --------------- º oº-º-o-o- __ - ---
º - - - - - - . -º - - - - - - - - - - - - GT THOMAS - [" -- * - - - -
- - - - - --- º - º | " ' "...a " ":: * *** * *…**** * *
lº---- 3 -
- - - - - - - - - - -
- * - - - - - -º TU- NT* *-ūº | * **T*VA ** AL *** -
- --- *** * - - tº - - - - - -
Z
-* -
-
-
-
-
-
I
-
GUANTANAMO
-
-
-
-
cººr sº e --> * -
- - ** | dº º
- * -- - - Y. 7 * : ..., * - - - |CANAL TONE - | TARAKAN º- - - *
----------------- - - - - - - - ºr º - - - - - - -- - - - º - 2 - A - º - - - - is: - - - - - - - º ** - - - -
+ - | - - ºf . - - - --- - - - - - - - - tº º º D * > ***... "…~~~~~ ->
- - - - - - - ----- - | º - -
| - -- 5 EC RET
º - + -
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tº - - - -
. -- - - - - * * * | -
º º º - - - - - | IP A C I T I C - H
* | --~~~ EETEX Ici º Dº I sis. º-º-º: -
- - - - - - PUGET SOUND - º º
º ---
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79716 O–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 28









































































- -
ºf OFT
ITEM NO. 29
- - - -
* -
- *-
ºl.
-------->
- .
B. A. F. F. I v. º
Fº: - - - | - POI&T S
º - º º - - T." - - - - - - - - - - - T - - -
- - --- - a---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -- - - - -
- - - * -
- - - - -
-** - ºw I CTO RIA º - - . -- - -
" " - 1 s L. A. N. In bootnia º ...ſº - - º A I
- -- *... * *Exa ºr 2- . - -
L = ~~ Fºº FI ro->
I * …
-
3. - - **
º,
- - -
- - - - º
º º - - - - º
- -- - --- -
Cººnºus *. - - - | - º …” - º - - º
- - - - -
- º
--- - . -- ºº- - - - - - - - - º- NEWPOUND. º º - º
| -- . . . . . . . .” --- - Z -LAND * ºn
- - * - * > -
- --- º - - - - - - - - - -
ſº * * * , G R + p. x . A x tº º- -
HALIFAX - * -
A 1 » - - -
-
casco BAY -
-
S E C R ET
PORTSMOUTH - - º
foston --
5
E
C
R
E.
| 3 DEC. 41
- -
PROVINCETOWN
-- .
-*. º ---
NEW LONDON
- * * * *-*.
-Tobolsk
-
-
---
-
------
-
------ -
--- ---
-
- |9 - F O R. E. I C, N p O Tº T s -
NEWPORT * - - - º 20
scºpa Flow # * * *
I -*. - 80
WESTERN - - __ I - ** 50
Aºts., is "
º * º **Fº *TTTR*TT. - zoº 10
-- -
k- - 30 -
TTTT * 40
* SICILY º, a * * -o-º-º-º-o- - * -
"CHESAPEARE *
- -- - º º 3. **.
BAY AP EA - º & º | LA SPE *. -- ~~ o-o-º: - º
- T- - --
----- -------- --
ºr º º *- MALTA.
------
- to ºn ,
- - -
Nº. 101 RS
CHARLESTON º - * - - -
- º º º - - - --> º G L. º
-
º
- -- - -
Jacksonvº - -
- - --- - - - - - -
--- |- - . OS -
- - - - - - -
--- m SHANG-A.
- - • HUN - CANTON
- BATON ROUGE - ºf ON
MoBILE SINGAPORE
º º º . ~ * ~ * * º - - - - - - - - - - Nº º - - tºº. - - -º - - - - SOURABAJA ºn
--- º --- - - - - º - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - º - - -- ~~~~ - - - -
- - - - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---
KEY WESTWEST
º
- - - - - º :- - - - - - = \ -- - - - - - *_ - - - - - - - - - - - - -ºººº- º Nº. -- - - - - - --- - --- - -- - - - *- - - - -
º lº-- || 3 || - 2 . . .
-- tº Tº º ***** ** * * * * * * *
------- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - lº º - CERAM SEA • ** º º
* - (- - - - - - º - *- º - - - -
- tº ºn tº tº - - - - - - * - *** - ©º- - -
- | |CANAL ZONE • *-* ... & - a - TARAKAN - - - -
| - -lº º - - - -
| - - - - - - - *
| |
- - S E C R E
- -
- - - - - G- - - | |
-
| P A C I F I C
| TESET lºº Lº Lei cº º-º-º-º-º-º:
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| º ** º * -
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| -
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SAN DIEGO gº º * * * º, ** *, * - -
- º º
º X.
§ ---
HAWAII º *
- - - - MANILA
- *** *** = &º. - |
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 29


































































ITEM NO. 30
º
5 E. C. R. ET
DEC. 41
-
- -
- - º
-----
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-
-
---------
- - - - - - - - -
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a tºawson
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----.
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1 s L. A. N. D.
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a y
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TMEDWILLE *_
* rena.
wº
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wº.
--
------ 5 EC RET
4 DEC. 41
sº-
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A. A. Y. -
º
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5 EC RET
4 DEC. 4!
!-
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i
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:
T
sºobols: -
- - - - -
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-
- a
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Newfound - - - -
LAND º ſº- as ſº ºsº
HALIFAX *º. * * * * * º tº sº.
CASCO BAY
-- - º
PORTSMO
BOSTON
PROVINCETO
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79716 0–46–pt. 21
(Face p. 4780) No. 30
---, º º,
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- ITEM NO. 31
- - - - - - - Yºlº - . -
- - - - - - - - - - - - º - - - -
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79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 31























































ITEM NO. 32
* ALIFAX
- - -
- - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- º - - º - - - - - º
º, - - - - - - - - ºf DO 12 U. S.
- - - - - - - - - --
º *- - . . . * -- - - - º - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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- - - - " - - - - - * - - - - - º -
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5 E. C. R. ET || * - º * - - - - -
- - - - - -
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5 - - * --- - - - * - - -
E. C. * - º - - - -
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- - - - - - - - - - - - º 5 D E. C 4. - -- - º - - - - - -
- - - - º - - - - - - º - 4. -º-º-º-º-
- -- - - - DEC. ANº
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - -
sº- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
º - - - - - - - - - - - - T- - -
-º-º: CASCO RAY º
- -
PORTSMO
-
-
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-
-
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SOS TON
-
rºovincetown
* NEW LONDO -
- | | NEWPORT º - º: ſº - F o R p + c, N E O N T ST"
º - º wº T-Yº" Fºº- FIAC- ** Tº
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º - -Fºr-TEE-I-A Iº º -- ºs º- -** *-
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79716 O-46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 32

















































ITEM NO. 33
loo. 110° 120° l30° 140° 150° 160” 170° 180° 170° 130° 150° 140° 130° 120° Ilo" 100°
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• &C.I.Pr. of Wales A L A S K, A
sº Nome • Fail
Arºra 2. csºonro,
Z º & ****As Makheel
* {
s . . . . . 42- ſ * \. g *
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79716 O–46—pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 33
































































ITEM NO. 34
º
Lººp.
als indicate cable ºuts (existing).
º, circled, indicate Cable Bºuts
planned Sº not yet constructed.
Heavy lines, between ºuts, indicate tº
general trace of cable lines ſexistias).
Brºen lines, between huts, indicate tº
general trace of propºsed oable lines.
INCLO3(Jºº ºvo. 1
*** *4, 7 /9*.
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 34














ITEM NO. 35
*****
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
|
--- - 75 º - º 1..." - ...
- - - - - - - - - –
74. \ -
-
. º -
º ----- *- - *~. º -- - º | ºpºſe- ºr 99. |
- - - - *-i- ---- --- ---> --- LEGEND -
***... , º Kawalhapſ ºu. " *- º | - + H*
-º-, - --- º - º | -- - - º º: - . ------ – 4. . POLICE DISTRICTS
s | º §§ ** 45 RAILROAD BRIDGES || ||
- º - - - - º º --- -
----- - º º º ºf HIGHWAY BRIDGES
- 58 Mºº - º º ºfºº --- -------- -
* – . 7– . ELECTRIC LINE POWER HOUSE TO Tº
**** º SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, 22 MILES -
º º º: -º-º-º-º: -
-
--- º- - *. - -
- | ºº::"...º.º. ( . Essential telephone switch-
. º, R. BoARDs (outsibe Honoujºu) -"
- - -
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ISLANPº.9AH! -------- 9. "ºu º
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- - * - |
º ----- |- al) º ---
- - - - - - - -
**** * * -- tº - -
ºr ºr llllllllllllll-lº -
--- º - - --- --- - º -
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79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 35





ITEM NO. 36
. |NOLO tº Nº.
º -
ºn tº ---
- - Lºº º
**ºtº ºr ºn to a ºn ºrº - º
º ºne ºn-ºne to ºne- - º º º - ºn-r- - - - - - ---
º º - - ºr nº ºn -º-, -º-º-º-º: - ºut-º-n ---
º º --- ºr - --- ºn ºf -º-º:
- -oº ºr - - I - ºr º- ºr -- I -º- - - - - - - -
* tº ºr tº: - - - --~ 1 - … º. º
- -oo ºr use. º - - -º-, -º-º-º-º: --~~~~ *
ºf ººº- - I - - ºr dº nºt co-º.
* * * * * * * * ºn tº -º-º-º-º: º ºn tº -º-º-º-º-º:
tº ºn - ºr -º -- -------- º
º, sº tº ºr ºr as gau- - tº º ºn tº º -
ºn tº ºn --oo -ºº º- ----º-º-º:
ºn 1 ºn tº -oo - - - - - - - - - -
tº ºn tº ºn. -º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
ºn tºº - ºt. -º-, -º-º-º-º: -----------
ºn tº ºn-º-º: --- - - - - - -
- ºr -------- º ºu -º-º- º-º-º-º-º-º:
- ºut-------- - ºn tº anº -º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
-orº an º-º-º-º-º- ºr
º
º
º
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-º-º-º-º-º-º-
-o-º-º-º-º:
--
ºn º ºr --
ºw-oºººººooº ºs. … . . º
- | - - -
º -
º * ºn ºu- ºranº |
- ---
A tº --- -
-º-º:
* -ºooººooº º
"… * *.
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
º, ºranº -
ºw-on-on- -
º ºrº
- sº
**as ºn -
ſº
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2 -
* * *
ºnce .
ºdoº
º ºut-º-º-
* * * * **a - -ºo-ºo-º-º-
is sºooººoºººo- -
ºn tº
º ºn
-oo-ºº-ºooº- --- º
º
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tº unº-nº- ºw º cº-º-º:
º
---
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---
º,
ºn tº º
Sºº s ºº: .
-
rºooºººººººººº - -
--~~
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-º-º-º-º-º-º-º:
- --
NDEPENDENT GENERATING plants
*** -º -
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-
º ---
Corºccº to tº E. co syste- - tº- º:
º
e- * tº * * º * * | " ". T-
sº ºn . º - tº - - nº
- ºn tº ºw-ººººººº- --
º-ºº: º -- º
--- - º - -
º tº º - -* , alsº
* ----------
º
º ------------ º º º - º
tº ºn º -- *-ºn-
| - - . - º *** ------ O - -
- º-s, - -º-º- º -
* * * * | | | | | | * - *** * * * º, A ºuaº ºut-ºuatº - º
- -- --- --- - . º -o-º-º-º: -o-º-º- tºo- º - - - º ºccº. *o-station º
º ºf ºur ------ - -------º-º-º- - ---------- -
- - ºn - - - nº ºn - -
º ºr eanº º toº. -on-ºwn - - º-ºoooº-ºoº- O --
* º - º - º º º º ºf vº -º-º-º-º-º-º: -
- - -º -- --- - - | º “… a C. -------------
- ºf *cºat - ºn
- -
- - ºn kaºlº º º - anooºº- º,
-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º-º: * | * | * - - - a - pºor º-ºº:
- - º º - - º ºu º
ºf a * . º º º º ºr anº -o-º-ººoºº-ooºº
º tº tº tº º
-º-º-º-º:
ºf cowºctºp to M. E. co, sºmeº
- - -ºn-ºs -- ºut-
tº º º . - º
- - - I
-tº ºut tº, ºn
79716 0–46–pt. 21 (Face p. 4780) No. 36























































































































































ITEM NO. 37
[.
PoſNTS STRUCK by PROJECTIlºs (1) º
December 7, 1941 -
- -
º - -
- º
--- - - -
- - - º
º … º
| - - * - - - º º - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
| O Followed by Fire - 5 - - - … . . . . - - - º | - º - -
- - - - - - - -- - º - -
- - º - - i. - - - - - : - --- º º
º.
Q Strong Explosion, Damage to Buildings, Persons.
© Explosion, Damage Slight - º º
º º º º º - -
º -/ º - -
O No Known Explosion, or Damage - º
º º º º º - º - -> -
º - - º , ea - º
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(i) The compiler has not presumed. \\ º º
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ITEM NO. 38
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