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IXI)
J. J.3
, S 5.73
T H E
EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
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E M P E R () R W | L L | A M
A N D H IS RE I GN
FROM THE FRENCET
OF
ED OU ARD SIM ON
I N T W O W O L U M ES
VOL. II
COPYRIGHT EDITION
† on b on
R EMING TO N & CO., PUBLISHERS
HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.
1886
i
C O N T E N T S
——º-o-º---
C H A P T E R XI
PROJECTED ALLIANCES_1867–70
THE KING's VISIT TO PARIS.—THE UNITY OF GERMANY IS CONTINUED.
THE ZOLLVEREIN.—HOSTILITY OF AUSTRIA.—THE CABINET OF
VIENNA REJECTS THE ADVANCES OF PRUSSIA.—TWO PARLIAMENTS
IN BERLIN.—FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE DEPOSED
sover EIGNs.—SEQUESTRATION OF THE KING OF HANOVER's FoR-
TUNE.—LEGISLATIVE AND MILITARY UNITY. —INAUGURATION OF
THE FIRST FEDERAL SEA-PORT. —THE NATIONAL PARTY EAGER
TO PROCEED FASTER THAN THE GOVERNMENT. — THE KING
PROMISES TO REALISE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.—RECIPROCAL
SUSPICION OF FEANCE AND GERMANY.—PRUSSIA REFUSES HER
ASSISTANCE IN THE ROMAN QUESTION.—FRANCE BAFFLED IN HER
DESIRE OF SEEING THE TREATY OF PRAGUE EXECUTED.—TEIE
EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND AUSTRIA.—THE INTERVIEW OF
SALZBURG. —DISPLEASURE OF PRUSSIA. — FRENCH EXPLANA-
TIONS.—ANGRY CIRCULAR OF PRUSSIA.—DISAGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN BERLIN AND VIENNA.—NEGOTIATIONS OF ALLIANCE
BETWEEN FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND ITALY.—BERLIN AND PARIS
APPEASED. — FRANCE PROPOSES DISARMING, WHICH PRUSSIA
REFUSES.—PLEBISCITE IN FRANCE. —PRUSSIA CONSIDERS WAR.
INEVITABLE. –HER RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND RUSSIA.—TOAST
OF THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR.—ROYAL INTERVIEW AT EMS.—
FRANCE AND THE SAINT GOTHARD RAILWAY...................... 13
4. CONTENTS
CHAPTER XII
THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE, THE
FRIENCH DECLARATION OF WAR.—
1869–1870
ORIGIN OF THE CANDIDATURE OF THE PRINCE OF HOHENZOLLERN.—
MARSHAL PRIM AND THE SPANISH AGENTS.—FRANCE TRIES TO’
PREVENT THE CANDIDATURE.—EVASIVE REPLY OF BISMARCK.—
bRINCE LEOPOLD OF HOHENZOLLERN ACCEPTS THE CANDIDATURE.
WITH KING WILLIAM's CONSENT.-MARSHAL PRIM COMMUNICATES
WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.—NEW STEPS TAKEN IN
BERLIN.—INTERPELLATION IN PARIS. —DECLARATION OF THE
DUKE OF GRAMONT. — M. BENEDETTI’s MISSION TO EMS. —
RENUNCIATION OF PRINCE LEoPold.--KING william REFUSEs
TO BIND IIIMSELF FOR THE FUTURE. –AGITATION IN PARIS.
NO RESULT FROM THE MISSION AT EMS.—BISMARCK OPPOSED TO
THE KING MAKING MORE CONCESSIONS. —IRRITATING DESPATCH
FROM BISMARCK.—EXCITEMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY. —
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AT SAINT CLOUD.—WARLIFKE DECLARA-
TION OF THE DUKE OF GRAMONT.—SEVERAL CABINETS INTER—
POSE IN WAIN IN FAVOUR OF PEACE.-FRANCE DECLARES WAR.
—PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—PATRIOTIC
MANIFESTATIONS IN BERLIN.—THE PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH
VOTES THE CREDIT FOR WAR.—RECRIMINATIONS AGAINST
FRANCE AND TIII. EMPEROR.—NATION AL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY.
—TIIIE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOUTH PLACE THEIR ARMIES
TJNDER TIIE COMMAND OF TIIE KING OF PRUSSIA.—RUSSIA AND
ENGLAND SIDE WITH PRUSSIA.—REVIVAL OF THE PROJECT OF
ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND ITALY.--—THE ARCH-
DURE ALBERT IN PARIS.—GENERAL LEBRUN IN VIENNA.--—
OBJECTIONS OF AUSTRIA.—THE ROMAN QUESTION.—FIRST
DEFEATS OF FRANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
CHAPTER XIII
WAR WITH FRANCE. PROCLAMATION OF
THE GERMAN EMEPIRE 1870-1871
EUROPE THINKS THAT FRANCE WILL BE VICTORIOUS..—TRUE SITUA-
TION OF BOTH ARMIES.–PROCLAMATION OF KING WILLIAM TO
COWTENT'S - 5
"THE INHABITANTS OF FRANCE.—THE CATASTROPHE OF SEDAN.—
KING WILLIAM AND THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—TELEGRAMS TO
THE QUEEN.—FALL OF THE EMPIRE.--THE GOVERNMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND PRUSSIA.— ATTITUDE OF THE
NEUTRAL POWERS.—M. JULES FAVRE AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS
AT FERRIERES.—MISSION OF M. THIERS TO THE EUROPEAN
CABINETS.—PROGRESS OF THE GERMAN INVASION.—CAPITULA-
TION OF METZ.—THE EMPRESS EUGENIE. –TWO PRUSSIAN
PRINCES NOMINATED MARSHALS.–FRANCE ORGANISES NEW
ARMIES.—NEGOTIATIONS AT VERSAILLES FOR AN ARMISTICE. –
WAR TO THE KNIFE.-DEFEAT OF TIIE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. –
FAILURE OF THE ARMY OF PARIS.—TREATIES OF ALLIANCE
BETWEEN THE CONFEDERATION OF THE NORTH AND THE
SOUTHERN STATES.—NECESSITY FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES OF
UNION TO PRUSSIA.—CONCESSIONS MADE TO BAWARIA.—THE
KING OF BAWARIA PROPOSES THE REVIVAL OF THE GERMAN
EMPIRE. —KING WILLIAM REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE IMPERIAL
DIGNITY EXCEPT FROM THE SOWEREIGNS.—DEPUTATION OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH AT VERSAILLES. — WARLIKE
HARANGUES.—PROCLAMATION OF THIE EMPIRE. –ITS MILITARY
ORIGIN AND CHARACTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . © - tº e º 'º º 82
CHAPTER XIV
THE END OF THE WAR.—THE TREATY
OF PEACE.—1879–1873
WAR CoNTINUED BY THE DELEGATION OF TOUR.S.—PUBLIC OPINION
IN FRANCE FAVOURABLE TO PEACE. – NEW DEFEATS OF THE
FRENCII FORCES. — BOMBARDMENT OF PARIS. — USELESS
MEASURES OF DIPLOMACY. —RIOTS IN PARIS.—CAPITULATION.—
GAMBETTA’s OPPOSITION.—NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BORDEAUX.—
PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE AT VERSAILLES.—ANNEXATION OF
ALSACE AND LORRAINE DECIDED LONG BEFORE BY GERMANY. —
INDEMNITY OF WAR.—FRESH DISTURBANCES IN PARIS.—THE
GERMAN TRoops ENTER PARIS. – REVIEW OF THE GERMAN,
TRoops AT LONGCHAMPs. – THE EMPEROR's TELEGRAMS
ANNOUNCING WICTORY...—HIS RESENTMENT AGAINST THE FRENCH
NATION. — REJOICINGS IN BERLIN DISTURBED BY THE COM-
6 CONTENTS
MUNIST INSURRECTION IN PARIS.—BISMARCK MISUNDERSTANDS
TEIE CHARACTER OF THIS INSURRECTION.—NEUTRAL ATTITUDE
OF THE GERMAN TROOPS.— THE GOVERNMENT PREOCCUPIED
WITH THE QUESTION OF PAYING THE INDEMNITY.-FRUITLESS
NEGOTIATIONS OF PEACE AT BRUSSELS.—THE EMPEROR WILLIAM
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—M. THIERS URGES THE LIBERA-
TION OF FRENCH TERRITORY..—THE RESULT OF THE LOAN OF
THREE MILLIARDS CAUSES ASTONISHMENT IN GERMANY.
EVACUATION OF FRENCEL TERRITORY. — JUDGMENT ON THE
CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON FRANCE. –GERMANY EXPLAINS THE
MOTIVES OF HER. RIGOUR.—TO WHOM MUST THE CONQUERED
PROVINCES BELONG ! — ALSACE-LORRAINE DECLARED A
COUNTRY OF THE EMPIRE.-GERMANY HOPES TO RECONCILE
TEIE ANNEXED POPULATIONS BY A POLICY OF PATIENCE AND
GENTLENESS.—PROMISES OF AUTONOMY.—A DICTATORIAL REGIME
ESTABLISHED FOR TWO YEARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 26
CHAPTER XV
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS.—
1871-1886
INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AFTER THE WAR.—DISCONTENT AND AMBITION
OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.—THE MILITARY QUESTION IN THE
PARLIAMENT.—THE MILITARY SEPTENNIAL GRANT.-FIELD-
MARSHAL MOLTKE...—NEW AUGMENTATION OF THE EFFECTIVE
FORCES.—STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE
GOVERNMENT.—ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF THE EMPEROR.
—JUDGMENT OF PRINCE BISMARCK ON THE EMPEROR.—
REPRESSIVE LAW AGAINST TEHE SOCIALISTS.—ORIGIN OF THE
PROJECT OF ECONOMICAL REFORMS.—DIRECT INTERVENTION OF
THE EMPEROR.—HIE CLAIMS FOR HIMSELF THE INITIATIVE OF
REFORM. — HIS DISCONTENT WITH THE PARLIAMENT. — HE
BAFFLES THE ATTEMPTS OF THE PARLIAMENT TO ENCROACH ON
ROYAL PREROGATIVES. — ALL FUNCTIONARIES EXPECTED TO
SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ELECTIONS.—THE EMPEROR
DEFENDS THE SOWEREIGNTY OF PRUSSIA AGAINST THE IMPERIAL
PARLIAMENT......... © tº dº e º ſº e e º 'º e º 'º e ºs tº e º e º ºs tº e g º sº tº º º sº e º e º & ............. I Go
COWTENTS 7
CHAPTER XVI
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE.-1871–1886
THE DEPOSED SOWEREIGNS.—THE EI, ECTOR OF HESSE-CASSEL AND
THE DUKE OF NASSAU.--THE DUIKE OF AUGUSTENBURG.—HIS
RENUNCIATION.—HIS DAUGHTER MARRIES PRINCE WILLIAM OF
PRUSSIA.—SINGUIAR CONTRAST IN THE DESTINIES OF FATHER
AND DAUGHTER.—THE KING OF HANOVER REMAINS HOSTILE.—
AFTER HIS DEATH, HIS SON MAINTAINS THE SAME ATTITUDE.—
HIS MARRIAGE WITH A DANISH PRINCESS.—HIS RIGHT OF
SUCCESSION TO BRUNSWICK. — LAW OF REGENCY DIRECTED
AGAINST THE PRETENSIONS OF THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND.—
DEATH OF THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.—PRUSSIA DECLARES THE
DURE OF CUMBERLAND IN CAPABLE OF SUCCEEDING..—PRINCE
ALBRECHT OF PRUSSIA. APPOINTED REGENT OF BRUNSWICK.—
THE TWO FRENCH CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF PRAGUE FALL
WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. — PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA
ABROGATE THE ARTICLE OF THAT TREATY RELATIVE TO THE
NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF SCHLESWIG,--THE DANISH DEPUTIES
IN THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT.--THE INHABITANTS OF ALSACE-
LORRAINE HOSTILE TO THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND NOT
RECONCILED BY THE PROMISE OF AUTONOMY.—THEIR. DEPUTIES
JOIN THE PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION. — THE CONQUERED
PROVINCES SUBMIT UN WILLINGLY TO THEIR FATE.--THE POLES.
—VARIATION OF PRUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THEM.—POLISH
INSURRECTION OF 1848.-ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS OF NATIONAL
REORGANISATION.—ATTITUDE OF THE POLES IN THE PRUSSIAN
CHAMBERS AND IN THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.—SCHEME OF
RESTORING POLAND REJECTED BY PRUSSIA.—THE POLES AND
CATHOLICISM.–ANTAGONISM BETWEEN POLES AND GERMANS.—
EXPULSION OF THE POLES. — THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT
FAVOURABLE, THE PRUSSIAN CHAMBERS HOSTILE, TO THE
POLES. — PRUSSIAN LAWS FOR DIMINISHING THE POLISH
ELEMENT. — THE FUTURE OF THE POLISH QUESTION.—THE
GROUPS COMPRISED UNDER THE NAME OF ENEMIES OF THE
EMPIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * I 79
8 t • CO WTENT'S
CHAPTER XVII
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE. 1871-1886
CHURCH AND STATE UNDER FREDERICK WILLIAM III.—IDEA OF THE
PRUSSIAN STATE AND OF THE PAPACY. — VARIATIONS OF
PRUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE WATICAN. — FREDERICK
WILLIAM IV AND THE WATICAN.—THE CATHOLICS IN 1848.-
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.—ACCESSION OF KING WILLIAM.
—FIRST YEARS OF RELIGIOUS PEACE.-INFLUENCE OF THE
EVENTS OF ITALY AND OF THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA.—DISTRUST
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CATHOLICS.—ORIGIN OF
THE PARTY OF THE CENTRE.-PETITION AGAINST CONVENTS.—
VATICAN COUNCIL. - INTERNAL DISSENSIONS OF GERMAN
CATHOLICISM. — GERMAN BISHOPS AT FIRST OPPOSED TO
THE DOGMA OF INFALLIBILITY. —THEY SUBMIT. —THE OLD
CATHOLIC HERESY. — HOSTILITY OF PROTESTANTISM. — THE
RELIGIOUS COMPLICATED BY THE NATIONAL QUESTION.—THE
EMPEROR A. STRONG PROTESTANT.--THE CATHOLICS AND THE
ELECTIONS OF 1871. ––THE EMPEROR DISPLEASED WITH THE
OCCUPATION OF ROME BY THE ITALIANS.—THE GERMAN PARLIA-
MENT DECLARES ITSELF AGAINST INTERVENTION.—CONSTITU-
TIONAL GUARANTEES DISCARDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND
THE PARLIAMENT.—THE POPE CONGRATULATES THE EMPEROR.
—THE POPE AND THE PARTY OF THE CENTRE. —RUPTURE AND
CONFLICT. —ILLUSIONS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. —FIRST
MEASURES AGAINST ROME. — THE ‘KULTURKAMPF.’ — THE
CABINET OF BERLIN TRIES TO ASSOCIATE FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS TO ITS POLICY. —THE FUTURE ELECTION OF THE POPE.-
DISAGREEMENT WITH FRANCE, ITALY AND BELGIUM.–LEGISLA-
TIVE MEASURES.—EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS.— LAWS OF MAY
1873.−FAvour SHOWN TO THE OLD CATHOLIC SECT.-OPPOSI-
TION OF THE POPE AND OF THE BISHOPS.—CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN THE POPE AND THE EMPEROR. --— ARREST AND
DEPOSITION OF BISITOPS.—THE BISHOP OF MAYENCE AND THE
CELEBRATION OF SEDAN. — DISASTROUS RESULTS OF THE
CONFLICT. — CHANGE OF OPINION IN BERLIN. — DANGER OF
SOCIALISM. —DEATH OF PIUS IX. —ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE EMPEROR.—CoRRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEO XIII, THE
EMPEROR AND TIIE CROWN PRINCE.-CIVILITIES EXCHANGED
BETWEEN THE WATICAN AND THE COURT OF BERLIN.—
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BERLIN AND ROME.-FIRST CONCES-
CO WTENTS 9
SIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN CABINET.--—MODIFICATIONS OF THE
LAWS OF MAY.—CATHOLICS AND PROGRESSIVE LIBERALS.—THE
CROWN PRINCE IN THE WATICAN.—FURTHER CONCESSIONS OF
THE CABINET OF BERLIN.—THE ARCHIBISHOPS OF COLOGNE AND
OF POSEN.—THE QUESTION OF THE CAROLINE ISLANDS.—THE
CABINET OF BERLIN PROPOSES THE POPE AS MEDIATO.R.—
DEXTERITY OF PRUSSIAN DIPLOMACY. —THE POPE's DECISION
ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES.—THE POPE's GRATITUDE.—ON
RELIGIOUS GROUND THE POPE MAINTAINS HIS FORMER POSITION.
—FURTHER CONCESSIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.—THE LAWS OF
MAY ABANDONE.D.—FIFTEEN YEARS OF BARREN LEGISLATION.—
RETREAT OF THE GOVERNMENT. — A GRIEVOUS ERROR OF
IMPERIAL POLICY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * s a s a s 2 & e 2OO
CHAPTER XVIII
SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY.—1878-1886
THE QUESTION OF RELIGION YIELDS TO THAT OF SOCIALISM.—THE
GOVERNMENT SEEKS THE HELP OF THE FOURTH ESTATE AGAINST
THE THIRD ESTATE. — EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND FRENCH
EMPIRE.—THE PARISIAN COMMUNE AND GERMAN SOCIALISM.—
ANXIIETY OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.—THE EMPEROR
AND THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM.–INFLUENCE OF THE ATTEMPTED
AssassinATIONS.—CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THE DOUANES.—
THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM.—ATTACKS AGAINST CAPITAL.—ANTI-
JEWISH AGITATION.—THE EMPEROR IN FAVOUR OF GOVERN-
MENTAL INITIATIVE. – HE STIMULATES THE ZEAL OF THE
PARLIAMENT.-REFORM OF TAXATIONS.—THE INSURANCE FUNDs
FOR WORKPEOPLE.—THE RIGIIT OF LABOUR RECOGNISED BY
THE GOVERNMENT. — COLONIAL POLICY. — ACQUISITION OF
COLONIES IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH SEA.—CON FLICTS WITH
ENGLAND. — PROTESTATION AGAINST THE CONGO TREATY
BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL.-AGREEMENT BETWEEN
FRANCE AND GERMANY. —THE AFRICAN CONFERENCE OF BERLIN.
—PORTUGAL DEFENDS HER. RIGHTS. — FURTHER CONFLICTS
WITH ENGLAND. — CONFLICTS WITH SPAIN. — FUTURE OF
GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY............................ • - - - - - - - - 244
IO COWTENTS
CHAPTER XIX
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE.—1871–1886
THE GERMAN EMPIRE IS PEACEFUL.—COMPARISON WITH THE EVENTS
OF THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE-PACIFIC VIEWS OF THE
EMPEROR.—SAYING OF VOLTAIRE ON THE GREAT POWERS.—
POLICY WITH REGARD TO FRANCE.-DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF
THE EMPEROR AND OF BISMARCK.—ADVANCES MADE TO AUSTRIA.
—THE CABINET OF VIENNA AND THE NEW EMPIRE.—INTER-
VIEW BETWEEN THE TWO EMPERORS AT ISCHL. —THEIR AGREE-
MENT. — CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH THE CZAR. — RUSSIAN
SERVICES DURING THE WAR OF 1870.-RUSSIA REVIVES THE
EASTERN QUESTION. — GERMANY SUPPORTS HER. — EUROPE
RECOGNISES THE IMPERIAL TITLE OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—
THE CABINET OF BERLIN DRAWS CLOSER TO AUSTRIA.—MEETING
OF THE THREE EMPERORS IN BERLIN.—GUARANTEES OF THE
TERRITORIAL “STATU QUO.’ — FRANCE AND GERMANY. —
RECRIMINATIONS OF THE CABINET OF BERLIN.—RUMOURS OF
WAR.—HOSTILE SPIRIT OF THE GERMAN PRESS.—DIPLOMATIC
INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. — THE CZAR IN
BERLIN. — PEACE IS PRESERVED. — COOLNESS TOWARDS THE
FRENCH CONSERVATIVE PARTY. — THE CABINET OF BERLIN
OFFENDED BY THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA.—INTENDED WAR OF
RUSSIA AGAINST TURKEY. —THE EMPEROR WILLIAM TRIES IN
VAIN TO PREVENT IT--THE CABINET OF BERLIN ALLOWS EVENTS
TO TAKE THEIR COURSE.—TREATY OF SANTO STEPHANO.-
ARMING OF AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND.—CONGRESS OF BERLIN.—
DISMEMBERMENT OF TURKEY. — DISCONTENT OF RUSSIA.—
ATTACKS OF THE RUSSIAN PRESS ON GERMANY.—THREATS OF
RUSSIA.—NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BERLIN AND VIENNA.—THE
EMPEROR WILLIAM AT ALEXANDROVO.—PRINCE BISMARCK IN
VIENNA.—SIGNATURE OF A PROTOCOL.—HESITATION OF THE
EMPEROR OF GERMANY. — TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.—NEW ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA.—PRINCE
BISMARCK AT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR's.-FRANCE IS INVITED
TO JOIN THE AUSTRO-GERMAN LEAGUE. — THE SPEECH AT
CHERBOURG.—THE CABINET OF BERLIN MAKES ADVANCES TO
THAT OF PARIS.—ASSASSINATION OF ALEXANDER II, EMPEROR OF
RUSSIA.—ALEXANDER III CONTINUES HIS FATHER's POLICY. —
RENEWIED FRIENDSHIP OF THE COURTS OF BERLIN AND ST.
PETERSBURG. — MEETING OF THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND
CONTENTS I I
ALEXANDER III AT DANTZIG. --— RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE EMPIRES.–NEW DIFFICULTIES.
-----RUSSIA ADHERES TO THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE. —JOY
OF THE EMPEROR WILLIAM.–PROOFS OF FRIENDSHIP OF THE
RUSSIAN COURT. — MEETING OF THE THREE EMPERORS AT
SKIERNEWICZE. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT INCLINED TO
TURKEY. —TEHE BALKAN STATES DESIRE THE ALLIANCE WITH
GERMANY. —THE SOVEREIGNS AT THE HOMBURG MANOEUVRES.—
THE KING OF SPAIN AT HOMBURG AND IN PARIS — SOUTH
EUROPE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. –ITALIAN POLICY DURING
AND AFTER THE WAR OF 1870. EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN
BERLIN AND ROME. —KING WICTOR EMMANUEL IN BERLIN.—
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM IN MILAN.—THE INCIDENT OF TRENT.——
ITALY ADHERES TO THE ALLIANCE OF THE EMPERORS.—SPAIN
AND GERMANY. — THE CROWN PRINCE IN MADRID. — THE
CAROLINE ISLANDS.—THE COURT OF BERLIN AND THE CON
FLICT WITH SPAIN.—THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT GIVES WAY AND
APPEALS TO THE POPE FOR MEDIATION.—THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE
IS THE MODIFIED CONTINUATION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE. –
'THE EMPEROR WILLIAM THE SOUL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
—INFLUENCE OF THE POLICY OF FREDERICK THE GREAT AND
OF THAT OF THE FRENCH SECOND EMPIRE ON THE POLICY OF
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM.—ROYAL POWER AND THE PARLIA-
MENTARY SYSTEM.–THE MESSAGE OF 1882.--THE EMPEROR’s
PREDOMINANCE IN THE GOVERNMENT.—QUESTIONS LEFT TO HIS
SUCCESSOR: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
QIhr (Emperor &ailliam and his ſteign
*s º •->{o}<é----—
CHAPTER XI
PROJECTED ALLIANCES 1867–70
THE KING's VISIT TO PARIS.–THE UNITY OF GERMANY IS CONTINUED.
THE ZOLLVEREIN.—HIOSTILITY OF AUSTRIA.—TFIE CABINET OF
VIENNA REJECTS TIME ADVANCES OF PRUSSIA.—TWO PARLIAMENTS
IN RERLIN.—FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITII THE DEPOSED
SOVEREIGNS.—SEQUESTRATION OF THE KING OF HANOVER's FOR-
TUNE.—LEGISLATIVE AND MILITARY UNITY..—INAUGURATION OF
"THE FIRST FEDERAL SEA-PORT. —THE NATIONAL PARTY EAGER
TO PROCEED FASTER THAN TIIE GOVERNMENT. —— TIIF KING
PROMISEs to REALISE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.—RECIPROCAL
SUSPICION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY.—PRUSSIA REFUSES HER
ASSISTANCE IN THE ROMAN QUESTION.——FRANCE BAFFLED IN HER
DESIRE OF SEEING THE TREATY OF PRAGUE EXECUTED.—THE
EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND AUSTRIA.—THE INTERVIEW OF
SALZBURG. — DISPLEASURE OF PRUSSIA. — FRENCH EXPLANA-
TIONS.—ANGRY CIRCULAR OF PRUSSIA.—DIS AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN BERLIN AND VIENNA.—NEGOTIATIONS OF ALLIANCE
BETWEEN FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND ITALY.—BERLIN AND PARIS
APPEASED. — FRANCE PROPOSES DISARMING, WHICH PRUSSIA
REFUSES.–PLEBISCITE IN FRANCE. – PRUSSIA CONSIDERS WAR
INEVITABLE. —HER RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND RUSSIA.—TOAST
OF THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR.—ROYAL INTERVIEW AT EMS. —
FRANCE AND THE SAINT GOTHARD RAILWAY.
RING WILLIAM and the Emperor of Russia were
the first sovereigns to accept the Emperor's
hospitality, the one being accompanied by Count
WOL II B
I4 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD AEI IS REIGN
Bismarck, the other by Prince Gortchekoff who
was followed by a large suite of officials; but in
spite of this appearance of diplomatic activity, the
Imperial meeting was barren of political results.
The Royal visitors came to divert themselves from
the cares of Government, and not to revive the
recollection of disputes which all but caused a
European war. Napoleon, with the same tact he
had shown six years before at Compiègne, abstained
from speaking to the King of Prussia on embarrass-
ing subjects. Forgetting the dark clouds on the
political horizon, the sovereigns gave themselves
up to the pleasures of the hour, and to the enjoy-
ment of the splendid sight of Paris at her gayest,
and of the Fêtes, alike cordial and magnificent, of
the Tuileries. The resentment of France against
Prussia was suppressed in the presence of King
William, whose affable manners and fine appearance
enchanted everybody who came near him. After
a stay of a fortnight, the King on his return to
his palace of Potsdam, wrote his thanks to the
Emperor and Empress for the reception he had
met with in Paris. At the moment of writing
these words, could he foresee under what very
different circumstances he would meet the Emperor
three years later
The regulation of the Luxemburg affair would
not modify the programme which the Cabinet
PROJECTED ALLIANCES I 5
of Berlin had framed since Nikolsburg. On
the contrary, it realised it, with more energy than
ever. In the work it had undertaken, it was
obliged to consider national opinion which criticised
the new order of things from various points of
view. The German patriots were of opinion that
the Treaty of Prague had divided Germany into
two parts. However defective the old Confedera-
tion might have been, it was at least the symbol
of unity; but the Treaty of Prague created two
Germanies, that of the North and that of the
South, the latter comprising several States not
joined to each other by any bond whatever. And
a former Federate State, the Grand-Duchy of
Luxemburg, had just been separated from the
Confederation. Finally, the German Provinces
of Austria were excluded from the common
Fatherland to which they belonged by their
history, their language, and their nationality.
IPrussia had become great, she had added to
the power of her Dynasty at the price of dividing
Germany. It was admitted that the conqueror
of Sadowa could not perform greater things for
the time being, and he was granted a respite,
but only on condition that he should resume and
complete his work as soon as circumstances would
allow.
The Court of Berlin was animated with the
16 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
desire of acting in accordance with these views,
especially as the interests of Prussia made this
policy imperative. The new Provinces were not
fully assimilated to the old Prussia by whom they
were conquered ; the Governments of South
Germany had not altogether given up hopes of a
return of Fortune to Austria, formerly their
protector against Prussian aggression ; and finally,
the democratic party, very active in South
Germany, spread dislike to the Prussian policy
among a people averse to the military and severe
institutions formed in Berlin. It was therefore
with the object of neutralising these hostilities, of
calming patriotic anxiety, of securing its moral
and material conquests, that the Prussian Cabinet
regulated its German policy as if the Treaty of
Prague were no longer in existence. It advanced
prudently, but still it advanced, and moderated
the ardent zeal of its followers when that zeal
appeared excessive.
As we have already related, the National
Liberals proposed to the Parliament of the North
the introduction into the Federal Constitution of
an Article authorising the admission of the
Southern States. Count Bismarck, whilst accept-
ing the proposal in principle, pointed out that
one promise, laid down by the fourth Article of
the Treaty of Prague, was wanting, that is, the
PROJECTED ALLIAMCES 17
formation of a Confederation of the South. He
said that if there were two Parliaments, one of
the North, the other of the South, it would be
impossible to keep them long asunder. The
Chancellor soon found means to supply the absence
of two Parliaments. -
The war with the Southern States had for the
time abrogated the Treaties uniting all Germany,
with the exception of Austria, in the Zollverein or
Association of Customs. The Treaties of Peace
had stipulated the provisionary re-establishment
of the ancient order of things, reserving the right
of further negotations. Since then, and subse-
quently to conferences held in Berlin, the Govern-
ments had consented to the revival of the Zollverein
on the bases strictly identical with those of the
Confederation of the North. As in the latter,
executive power was assigned to the King of
Prussia, and legislative power was to be exercised
by a council of Governments, and by a Parliament
of Customs, composed of all the members of the
Parliament of the North and of deputies chosen
by the inhabitants of the South. The day before
his departure for Paris, Bismarck signed the Pre-
liminary Convention, ratified a month later by
the various Governments. In the Chambers of
the South, the anti-Prussian Opposition en-
deavoured to prevent the conclusion of the new
18 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Treaties. The Bavarian Chamber in particular
made the greatest difficulties, and even sent a de-
putation to Berlin in the hopes of obtaining some
concession to the economic autonomy of the South.
The King and Bismarck were deaf to their
prayers; the delegates were told that they had no
choice but to accept or refuse the Treaties as they
stood, and if they chose the latter course, Prussia
would annul the Secret Treaties of the 23rd of
August 1866, concluded in the interest of South
Germany's safety. Under these threats, and
dreading the dissolution of the Zollverein, the
States yielded. Thus, within a year of the
signature of the Treaty of Prague, the demarcation
of the Main, established by the fourth Article, was
exceeded by the Treaties of the 23rd of August
1866, investing the King of Prussia with the
command of all the forces in time of war, and by
the Treaties of the 7th of July 1867, creating
unity of Customs by means of a Parliament, in
which members elected by the whole of Germany
met, alike Northern and Southern. In the month
of September, on opening the first ordinary session
of the Chambers of the North, the King was
able to announce this double result amid the
acclamations of the Assembly. The Parliament
passed, by a large majority, an address in favour
of complete unity, to which Bismarck replied
PROJECTED ALLIAMCES I9
that the Government would use no pressure on
the Southern States as they would know when
and how to unite themselves to the North.
In all these transactions, the Cabinet of Berlin
had acted without consulting Austria, one of the
contracting parties to the Treaty of Prague.
This Power was not wholly resigned to the new
order of things. The Cabinet of Vienna, directed
by Count Beust, former Minister to the King of
Saxony and antagonist of Bismarck, sought the
friendship of the two great Powers adjoining
Prussia, supposed to be jealous of the new greatness
of the House of Hohenzollern. It made advances
to Russia by promising to obtain the revision of
the Treaty of Paris. It formed friendly relations
with France whose mediation had brought about
the Treaty of Prague, to which Prussia was
showing so little deference. On this subject
Count Beust did not dissemble his displeasure,
especially when the Prussian Cabinet revealed the
Secret Treaties with the Southern States. The
Austrian Cabinet maintained that these Treaties
were in contravention to the fourth Article of the
Treaty of Prague; it did not protest, but it said
it had the right to do so. Another time the
Cabinet of Vienna insisted at Berlin on the
execution, hitherto delayed, of the fifth Article
of the Treaty of Prague relative to the retrocession
20 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM A VD HIS REIGN
to Denmark of the Northern districts of Schleswig.
Prussia objecting to the interference of France
in this matter, Count Beust asked whether the
best way of avoiding it would not be by carrying
out the arrangements agreed upon without delay.
Meanwhile the Bavarian Government had, with
the knowledge of Prussia, made overtures of
alliance to Vienna. Prussia, after the settlement
of the Luxemburg affair, considered her situation
towards France merely as a truce Even in Paris
during the Exhibition, and in spite of the pacific
assurances of his master, Bismarck stated in private
that war with France was inevitable. It was
therefore natural that the Prussian Cabinet should
try to prevent Austria from forming an alliance
with France. Had it not proposed to that Power,
shortly before the war of 1866, to make common
cause against France
The Bavarian Government, directed by Prince
Hohenlohe, was entirely devoted to the cause of
Brussia, that is, the unity of Germany under King
William's sceptre. Its project consisted in forming
a Confederation of the Southern States under the
presidency of Bavaria, to unite the two Confedera-
tions by Treaties, and finally to conclude with this
vast association and with Austria an alliance
offensive and defensive. Count Beust declined
these overtures, not without mentioning the trans-
PROJECTED ALLIANCES 2 I
gression of the Treaty of Prague, to which Bavaria
had made herself party by signing the secret
Treaty with Prussia. The Cabinet of Munich, not
discouraged by this refusal, sent one of her diplo-
matists, Count Tauffkirchen, to Berlin and thence
to Vienna to renew the negotiations. It was at
the time of the Franco-Prussian dispute about
Luxemburg; in case of war, Bavaria desired an
agreement between Prussia and Austria. The
Bavarian agent offered from Prussia important
concessions to the Cabinet of Vienna. Prussia
offered the latter compensations, the guarantee of
its German and non-German dominions, and the
accession of Russia to the new alliance. The
Cabinet of Vienna replied by a peremptory refusal.
It declared to the Bavarian diplomatists that the
proposal looked like a coalition against France, and
it did not mean to purchase very doubtful advan-
tages at the price of the friendship of that Power.
It spoke severely of the violation of the Treaty of
Prague, and declined the suggestion of aggravating
that violation by itself avoiding the stipulations of
that Treaty.
Austria was forbidden by the Treaty of
Prague to have any share in the reorganisation
of Germany, and now she was asked to ally herself
closely to Germany in her new form The Estates
of South Germany should be reserved as they
22 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM A MD HIS REIGN
were not threatened. The Luxemburg question
was settled, thanks to Austria and the other
European Powers; but perhaps it would not be
so easy to settle a conflict resulting from the
rupture of the Treaty of Prague by those who
had signed it.
After these emphatic declarations, it was
necessary to renounce the idea of an alliance with
Austria. Bavaria and the other Southern States
therefore threw all their energies into the projected
Union with the Confederation of the North. At
the end of April 1868 the Session of the new
Parliament of Customs was opened in Berlin. The
speech from the throne mentioned in glowing terms
the meeting of delegates from all Germany in one
Chamber. The National Liberals were not slow
in provoking an universal manifestation against the
shackles which the Treaty of Prague imposed upon
the realisation of complete union. This manifest-
ation was not warmly seconded by the Southern
Deputies, some of whom even expressed the anti-
Prussian sentiments of their constituents, and
offered stubborn resistance to all proposals tending
to widen the competence of the Parliament. In
spite of this opposition, the questions with which
the Parliament was occupied, were all decided in
the spirit of union and concentration ; the air of
the Capital of the Northern Confederation was by
PROJECTED ALLIA WCES 23
no means favourable to the views of separatists.
The latter were, however, supported even in the
Prussian Chambers to which the Deputies of the
annexed Provinces had been admitted since 1867.
We must add that the protestations of the
adherents of the deposed sovereigns were made
ineffectual by the resolute attitude of the Prussian
Government.
Ring William, who had without hesitation
executed and completed the annexation of Nassau,
Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, was particularly
anxious to secure to the former sovereigns their
private fortunes, and to indemnify them pecuniarily
for the loss of their dominions. Conventions had
been concluded on this subject. The Duke of
Nassau, resigned to the loss of his throne, accepted
the indemnity offered by Prussia. Similar conven-
tions had been made with the King of Hanover
and the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, but not without
exciting much opposition in the Chambers from
the Liberals. Count Bismarck zealously defended
King William's generosity. He said that if
considerations of policy had commanded the
expropriation of the sovereigns for the benefit of
the nation, it was only just to indemnify them
to a certain extent. If they were reduced to
poverty, foreign Courts would sympathise with
their adversity. In his opinion a poor pretender
24 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
was more dangerous than a wealthy one. It was
true that the King of Hanover had not formally
abdicated his rights of sovereignty, but his private
views were of little consequence as he had affixed
his signature to the convention of indemnity.
What would be the use of asking him for a
renunciation which would have no value in his
eyes so soon as circumstances would allow him
to break it !
Scarcely had the Chambers yielded to these
arguments and approved the Conventions, than
the Prussian Government prevented the King of
Hanover and the Elector of Hesse-Cassel from
benefiting by them. The former, residing at
Hietzing near Vienna, was still holding communi-
cations with his faithful followers in his former
Kingdom. Deputations were sent to him, and
loyalist manifestations were organised. King
George had also countenanced by his authorisation
and supported by his donations, the formation in
France of a Hanoverian Legion, composed of
former officers and soldiers of his Army, and even
recruited in part by young Hanoverians. The
Elector of Hesse-Cassel also turned the fidelity
of his partizans to account, and encouraged them
by subsidies. He communicated to the European
Powers a protestation against the usurpation of
which he said he was the victim. Such were the
PA2OJECTED A.J., I, IA WCAE'S 25
facts on which Bismarck founded the defence of
the measures about to be taken : the confiscation
of the fortunes and of the revenues secured to the
two Princes. A royal ordinance was issued to this
effect, ordering the sequestration of this wealth,
and its union to a common fund, administered by
the State, and to be used either for opposing the
hostile plans of these Princes, or to apply certain
portions to the improvement of their former posses-
sions. The Chambers, who had been all along
averse to the grants to the deposed sovereigns,
were more than willing to sanction the confiscation.
The same concord between Government and
Parliament was shown on Federal topics. The
work of legislative unity was being rapidly com-
pleted, either by application of Prussian laws to
the Confederation, or by replacing the particular
laws of the various States by Federal laws.
Thus the Prussian law of Military Service became
Federal; and to the Diplomatic Representation
of the States was substituted that of Federal
agents nominated by the King of Prussia. The
Credit for the Army was voted without opposition
or reduction. The Liberal Party did not grudge
it as before the war of 1866. And when some
isolated complaints were heard about the huge
military budget, Moltke silenced them by saying
that the best way of diminishing it was the
26 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
formation in the centre of Europe of a Power
which, without being conquering, would yet be
strong enough to prevent its neighbours from
making war. To his mind, that Power could be
no other than United Germany.
But while accepting this help of the Liberal
Party, the Government was careful to suppress in-
discreet zeal for immediate unity. As such may be
characterised the proposal of nominating a Federal
Ministry; Bismarck opposed it strongly in the name
of the autonomy of the Federal States. Excessive
centralisation he considered unsuited to Germany
and to her historical traditions; whereas autonomy,
though causing much weakness, was still, within
certain limits, adapted to the country. He was
constantly recommending prudence and avoidance
of precipitation.
Berlin was then mostly engaged in perfecting
the military system ; and next to that system,
greatest care was bestowed on the seaports and on
the arsenals.
Dantzig, Kiel, Wilhelmshaven were the three
principal seaports of the Confederation, the two
first on the Baltic, the latter on the German
Ocean. Wilhelmshaven with its stupendous
structures, was completed in 1869, and in the
month of June of that year the King went to its
inauguration, making a truly triumphal progress.
PROJECTED ALLIAMC ES 27
At Bremen, especially, enthusiasm reached such a
height that even the King was carried away and
poured out his feelings in a speech. With a certain
modesty he owned that he had been very fortunate
in his enterprises, and that he had found admirable
men to carry out his ideas. ‘Everybody is not
so happy,” he said ; “my §te brother held similar
views without being able to realise them.’ And
at a banquet given him on the same day he
added: “Every object of our ambition has not been
accomplished; the next generation will see the
completion of the edifice of which we have laid the
foundations.” -
At that time one year alone separated him
from events that were signally to advance the
construction of his edifice. A feeling of great
uneasiness prevaded Europe; all men felt them-
selves oppressed by an approaching storm, and
yet the horizon seemed cloudless. From every
side came protestations of peace ; nowhere was
there discord, much less hostility. Thus in nature
repose and silence precede the fury of the tempest.
In the month of February 1870, King William
opened the Session of the Northern Parliament,
the last of the triennial legislature. As on former
occasions, the King drew attention to the close
union of North and South : he mentioned the
treaties of alliance, and the works of defence of
28 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN'
‘the common Fatherland ;’ he praised the blessings
of peace, confirmed the pacific views of all the
Powers, but did not forget to add that each nation
had the right and duty to organise itself as it
thought fit. The Confederation of the North was
exceeding its limits daily by drawing closer and
closer its connection with South Germany. The
Grand Duke of Baden, son-in-law to the King,
was particularly eager to break all barriers between
North and South. The Customs and Army being
assimilated, legal proceedings were to receive the
same treatment. A Convention was signed, allow-
ing Baden the protection of the Courts of Justice
of the Confederation, and it called forth in the
Parliament new manifestations in favour of such
measures. A Liberal speaker inveighed against the
policy of delay. Treaties, he said, were nothing,
nationality everything. The people of Baden and
their Prince were German : why not admit them
into the Confederation ? ‘We must,” he exclaimed,
‘cross the Main, whose demarcation we only accepted
by compulsion. Germany must no longer be
divided into two halves. Baden once joined to
the Confederation, no powers of diplomacy would
keep the other States away. Who should prevent
them 2 Austria Ž She has enough to do at home.
France 2 Her Dynasty is fully employed in the
tack of maintaining its power. Germany is without
PROJECTED ALLIANCES 29
fear and has no dread of the foreigner. Baden
desires union with the Confederation; the Prussian
Government alone prevents it.’
Such language was embarrassing to the Govern-
ment. It could not, without putting itself in the
wrong, assist in a flagrant violation of International
Treaties. At least the moment had not arrived for
so bold a step. South Germany was far from
being unanimous in the desire of a close union to
the North. Count Bismarck would not risk
offending Austria and France merely at the
pleasure of Baden. He wished to have the entire
South at once; then the result would be in pro-
portion to the peril incurred by the rupture of the
Treaty of Prague. He rejected with energy all
injunctions and requests. He feared that the step
would be inopportune ; that Bavaria and Hesse did
not think with Baden. “And what hurry is there 7
Had not the King of Prussia more military
authority in Germany than any Emperor had
enjoyed for five centuries' Had the old Empire
ever possessed unity of economical policy 2 We
must wait. Government and Parliament are of
one opinion; they desire the unity of all Germany,
and consider the Confederation of the North as a
transitory institution.’
After such declarations, the Liberal Party
would have been wrong in persevering ; it withdrew
VOL. II C
30 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
its motion, consoling itself with the promises
of the future which King William confirmed some
months later, on the 26th of May, when he closed
the Session. After enumerating the various
legislative tasks accomplished within the last
three years, he added that the past guaranteed
to the German people the realisation of national
hopes. He ended by saying that the Confedera-
tion of the North, while developing its institutions
as well as its national union with the South,
would add the forces of Germany to the support
of general peace.
All these political and Parliamentary speeches
tended to prepare the abrogation of the Treaty
of Prague, concluded under the mediation and
advice of France. We must now speak about
the footing established since King William's visit
to Paris between the mediating Power and the
victorious belligerents of 1866.
In spite of the pacific settlement of the
Luxemburg question, there remained sufficient
mutual distrust to keep Paris and Berlin on the
alert. The Prussian General Staff, irritated at
the concessions the King had made in the
interests of peace, and perhaps somewhat under
the pressure of Europe, continued its comments
and its preparations for a future emergency. The
monster cannon, exhibited by Prussia on the
PROJECTED ALLIANCES 3 I
Champ de Mars, appeared to the Parisians as
a preventive memento. Neither was the French
Staff inactive. Marshal Niel had set to work
at the reorganisation of the French Army; and,
in the debate on that subject in the Corps Légis-
latif, he drew on his side the great enemy of the
Empire, M. Thiers, who wished no toleration
to be granted to further Prussian usurpations.
- The question was framed thus : Prussia being
resolved to unite North and South by exceeding the
demarcation of the Main, would this eventuality
constitute a cause of war for France : One
portion of Imperial Diplomacy was not of opinion
that France should draw her sword to prevent
Germany from constituting herself as she chose ;
in any case it wished the Emperor to declare
himself plainly in one sense or the other, to
regulate his policy accordingly, and to give up his
undecided attitude towards Prussia, sometimes
conciliatory and sometimes the reverse. France
had cares more important to her direct interests
than the German question : the affairs of Rome
were becoming daily more complicated, and the
situation in the East more alarming. On both
these points the French Cabinet would have liked
Prussian support, which the Cabinet of Berlin was
not inclined to grant. To assist France in Rome it
would have to break with the Florentine Govern-
32 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
ment; and to proceed with her in Oriental affairs,
to offend the susceptibilities of Russia. And Italy
and Russia were two Powers whom it was essential
to conciliate in case of a war with France, which
Bismarck considered inevitable. At that moment,
in order to obtain the aid of Prussia in these two
questions, France would have been obliged to bind
herself formally to recognize Prussia as the
absolute mistress of Germany. Napoleon could not
bring himself to make a decisive choice between
these two policies; and his opposition to German
schemes showed itself by fits and starts in the
midst of friendly manifestations.
Nothing caused more irritation in Berlin than
the protestations of France on the subject of the
Treaty of Prague, regarding as much the fourth
Article on the demarcation of the Main as the fifth
on the Northern district of Schleswig. On this
ground Napoleon found himself in a false position
from a legal point of view. He had forbidden his
Ambassador to assist at the negotiations of peace
between Prussia and Austria, and had refused to
affix his signature to the Treaties made between
the belligerents. By what right did he now
demand the execution of those Treaties? That
was the gist of Bismarck's reply to the observa-
tions of France and of Denmark as far as the fifth
Article was concerned. Prussia had only treated
PROJECTED A LLIANCES 33
with Austria : consequently the execution of the
Treaty of Prague did not concern France or
Denmark.
Bismarck further declared, alluding to the
Northern districts of Schleswig, that Prussia
would not give up plans necessary for her
strategical position, nor even the other districts,
unless Denmark guaranteed the nationality of the
German inhabitants.
In Paris considerable importance was placed
on this question. Public opinion, very displeased
with the Imperial Policy that had abandoned the
cause of Denmark, exacted that that little country
should have the moderate satisfaction of recovering
a slight portion of Schleswig. Diplomatic corres-
pondence became more sharp and bitter. Russia,
at the request of the Cabinet of Paris, interposed
in favour of France, but in vain ; Bismarck was
inexorable. He would not suffer France to inter-
fere; and he declined all negotiations on the
subject. His agents abroad used language as
threatening as if war were at hand ; the tone of
the Prussian official Press was most violent against
the French Government. Once again the French
Cabinet withdrew : a conciliatory despatch from
the Marquis de Moustier put an end to the in-
cident.
Other projects were engaging attention in
34 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Paris. Not being able to bend the Cabinet of
Berlin, nor on the other hand to form the
resolution of granting it absolute liberty, the
Æmperor Napoleon turned towards Austria who
had greater cause to complain of the non-execution
of the Treaty of Prague. In the month of August
1867, the Emperor and Empress of the French
went to Salzburg to pay a visit to the Emperor
and Empress of Austria. The official explanation
of this visit was that the Emperor Napoleon
wished to condole with the Austrian sovereigns
on the tragic end of the Emperor Maximilian of
Mexico. But in reality it was brought about by
projects of alliance. Napoleon III was accom-
panied by none of his Ministers, whereas the
Emperor of Austria had with him the two Prime
Ministers of Austria and Hungary, Counts Beust
and Andrassy. Prince Metternich, Austrian
Ambassador in Paris, and the Duke of Gramont,
French Ambassador in Vienna, were also present.
The interview of Salzburg had no immediate or
practical result. The Emperor Napoleon would
have wished to conclude a real Treaty of Alliance;
the more prudent Emperor of Austria and his
Ministers were anxious to avoid all provocation of
Prussia. They confined themselves to drawing up
a paper on the ideas on which they agreed, but
which amounted merely to the maintenance of the
PROJECTED ALLIA WC. ES 35
Treaty of Prague and of the integrity of the
Turkish Empire. Both sovereigns parted in the
belief of having thus laid the foundation of a future
alliance. -
In Berlin this interview caused displeasure
and suspicion. It was also remarked with vexation
that the sovereigns and inhabitants of South
Germany gave the Emperor and Empress of the
French a cordial reception, and that the Southern
Press contained articles hostile to Prussia.
The Cabinets of Vienna and Paris, in order
to calm the susceptibilities of Prussia, made haste
to give her reassuring explanations. On the 25th
of August, two days after the interview of
Salzburg, the French Cabinet stated in a circular
to its agents that the Emperors had confirmed
each other's pacific views; and that their interview
could only fortify the maintenance of peace.
These protestations did not convince the
Cabinet of Berlin, and Bismarck did not conceal
his suspicions. On the 7th of September he
replied to the French despatch by another circular
in which he laid stress on the unfavourable rumours
spread about the interview. The assurances to the
contrary had given him satisfaction, especially as
this occasion showed ‘how impatient Germany was
of foreign interference with her affairs.’ Prussia
would do nothing to precipitate the national
36 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
movement, and she would succeed in her efforts,
provided the foreign powers would avoid all steps
calculated to wound German susceptibility. Con-
sequently, the Cabinet of Berlin could not be
otherwise than highly gratified by protestations
against foreigners meddling with her affairs; it
would use no pressure on the Southern States,
but suffer them to exercise their own discretion
as to the union with the North. No clearer ex-
pression could be given to the resolution of
consulting neither Austria nor France, when
Prussia should break the Treaty of Prague by
crossing the demarcation of the Main.
Meanwhile, as we have seen above, the Cabinet
of Berlin was working assiduously at the organisa-
tion of the Northern Confederation and its fusion
with the South. It was distrustful of France,
but was disposed to humour Austria. King
William forbade any celebration of the second
anniversary of the battle of Sadowa. But this
truce was not of long duration. In a work issued
by the Austrian General-Staff, a Prussian telegram,
intercepted during the war of 1866, was inserted.
This gave rise to an acrimonious correspondence
between the two Cabinets. Count Beust had
scarcely smoothed over this unpleasantness than
another incident occurred. A dispute arising
between France and Belgium on the subject of
PROJECTED ALLIANCES 37
Railway Concessions, Count Beust advised Belgium
to yield to France. This occasioned a succession
of notes between Vienna, Dresden and Berlin
which produced much bitterness. Some months
later a speech of Count Beust to the Austro-
Hungarian delegates furnished a cause of complaint
to Berlin. Questioned on the state of Foreign
Affairs, the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor stated
that the treaties between Prussia and the Southern
States completely altered the Treaty of Prague.
A Prussian despatch came at once to deny that
allegation, and to reproach the Cabinet of Vienna
with its hostility to the Northern Confederation.
However trifling these squabbles may appear,
they had a serious foundatſon. Prussia was aware
that negotiations had been carried on ever since the
meeting at Salzburg between Paris, Vienna, and
Florence, and after having been abandoned for
a time, were resumed in 1869 by the Italian
Government. A project of alliance between these
three Powers had been sketched. Prussia was to
be required to keep strictly to the Treaty of
Prague, and in case of refusal, Austria and Italy
were to ally themselves with France against
Brussia and her German allies. Italy would
enter into this war with 100,000 men ; Austria
would follow a little later; the former should
occupy Munich ; the latter should operate in
38 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Bohemia so as to effect a junction with the
Italian Army. But this time again the
negotiations were impeded by the resistance
of the Emperor Napoleon, who declined to
withdraw his troops from Rome, a condition
without which Italy refused to conclude any-
thing. The three sovereigns exchanged letters,
which made Napoleon hope that the alliance
would be effected later on.
Officially, there seemed to be some improve-
ment in the relations between Berlin and Paris;
both parties avoided any collision. But every
negotiation fell to the ground, as invariably
happens when either side is distrustful or not really
desirous of coming to any agreement. Both
countries also made some display of their Armies.
On this point the Emperor Napoleon did not
yield to King William ; all his speeches were full
of it. ‘The constant object of my efforts is
attained,’ he said on the 18th of January 1869 to
the Corps Législatif; ‘the military resources of
France are now equal to her mission in the world.’
By the side of these warlike words, what effect
could be made by assurances of peace
Nevertheless, early in 1870, an agreement
between France and Prussia seemed possible. The
Emperor had realised the transformation of the
institutions of 1852 in a Liberal spirit, entrusting
PROJECTED ALLIANCES 39
responsible Ministers, chosen from the ranks of
the Liberals, with power, and placing at their head
Monsieur Emile Ollivier, a member of the advanced
Opposition. The latter was in favour of a concili-
atory policy towards Germany; he was of opinion
that France had no right to interfere with her
internal organisation. Did the Emperor share this
opinion, or was he weary of so many useless efforts
to obtain territorial settlements' However this
may be, he proposed in Berlin reduction of the
military forces as a proof of the pacific intentions of
both countries. This means of appeasement,
seemingly so rational at first sight, scarcely ever
produces the desired effect. The difference of
military régimes, and of foreign and internal
necessities, rarely allows an arrangement on this
subject; and negotiations begun on this topic
usually give rise to suspicions and animosities which
produce a more serious state of things than the one
they are intended to improve.
The idea of disarming did not originate in
Paris. It had been advanced several times in the
Northern Parliament and in the Prussian and
Saxon Chambers. In the German Parliament
in the month of May 1869, it was proposed when
the Prussian Government asked for more taxes
to cover its deficit. The Opposition was against
taxes and in favour of less military expense.
4o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Bismarck replied with extreme vehemence. “Who
could have the courage,’ he asked, ‘to take the
responsibility of disarmament, and thus to deprive
the nation of its best means of security ? Not
only in France, but everywhere, peace must be
maintained sword in hand.’
Not disheartened, the Opposition renewed its
attempt on the 5th of November 1869 in the
Prussian Chamber. It proposed reduction of the
military expenses of the Confederation, and negotia-
tions for universal disarming. It said that ‘the
maintenance of a state of preparation for war was
provoked by the attitude of the Cabinets, not
by the rivality of nations.’ This proposal ex-
pressed the wishes of the German people, who
were crushed by the taxes requisite to defray the
military establishment. On the other hand, the
uncertain relations with France, and the resistance
of the Prussian Government, decided the majority
to reject the motion, which obtained the support
of one hundred votes, one-third of the Chamber.
A similar motion was received more favourably a
few days later by the two Saxon Chambers, but it
remained of course under the circumstances without
practical result.
The French Ministry of the 2nd of January
1870 flattered itself that its pacific disposition in
foreign affairs, its Liberal tendency in internal
PROJECTED A LJ, IAAWC ES 4. I
administration, and the suppression of the
Emperor's absolute power would be considered in
Berlin as guarantees sufficient to make King
William's Government inclined to disarm. But
such a concession was far from being made in
Berlin. The Prussian Government bore in mind
that Parliamentary majorities are often as much
disposed as absolute sovereigns to form impulsive
resolutions. The King and his Chancellor, deter-
mined as they were to seize the first opportunity
of uniting North and South, had never lost sight
of the probability of internal difficulties in France
that might facilitate the destruction of the Treaty
of Prague, on which Napoleon always founded
himself when interfering in German affairs. These
difficulties soon appeared. The enemies of the
Empire did not conceal their intention of using
their newly-acquired liberties for its destruction.
We may judge how, with such views, the
Prussian Government received the French pro-
posal of disarming. Count Daru, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, applied, on the 1st of February
1870, to the English Cabinet to act as intermediary
with Prussia. He was convinced that such a
step taken by England would have the best result.
How could the Cabinet of Berlin refuse when
France had removed every pretext by promising
to disarm 2 To Lord Clarendon's overtures,
42 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Bismarck replied by declining even to communicate
them to the King who would be very grieved by
them and who would consider them as showing
a change of policy of England towards him. The
Chancellor added that it would be impossible
for him to modify a military system so deeply
rooted in the traditions of his country, and forming
one of the bases of the Federal Constitution.
In spite of this refusal, Count Daru made another
attempt through England, but with no greater
success. Bismarck told the English Ambassador
that Prussia could not abate one jot of her military
system.
When the French Ministry was about to have
its Liberal Reforms sanctioned by a plebiscite,
thus confirming a second time the rule of the
Imperial Dynasty, it was desirous of giving a
manifest proof of its pacific sentiments. It pro-
posed and passed in the Chambers the reduction
of the contingent of 1870 from 100,000 to 90,000
men. On the 30th of June, during the debate on a
similar proposal for the year 1871, Ollivier affirmed
that “never had the maintenance of peace been
more certain than at the present moment.’
These peaceful protestations did not lull
Prussian vigilance. Knowing its own object and the
projected alliances of its adversaries, the Cabinet
of Berlin sought help in foreign support as well as
PROJECTED A.J., LIA WCES 43
in its own vast military preparations. It yielded in
1867 on the Luxemburg question, because it did
not think itself ready for war. It was of another
opinion in 1870 when all the military forces of
Germany were concentrated under its direction.
Under these conditions, King William and his
Chancellor, without wishing to provoke hostilities,
had no further interest in avoiding a conflict with
France ; on the contrary, it would be to their
advantage to profit by the first occasion that might
offer to let France play the part of aggressor.
Prussia knew that in a war with France she
would have to reckon with the resentment of
Austria, and she was aware of Napoleon's incessant
efforts to form a triple alliance in which Italy
should join. That Power had been, since 1866, a
doubtful ally of Prussia. After acquiring Venice
she wished to be mistress of Rome by the with-
drawal of France. In 1867, the Cabinet of Berlin,
solicited on both sides, had refused to help France
or to form engagements with Italy. It pointed
out to Florence that North Germany, consisting of
a mixed population, could not, without giving deep
offence to its Catholic subjects, support a policy
hostile to the Pope. On the other hand it peremp-
torily declined the Conference proposed by France,
and it called the Government of Hesse-Darmstadt
to account for acquiescing in the French project.
44 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
It tried to humour Italy, whose sovereign, in spite
of his French predilections, was bound by his duty
as a Constitutional King, to bend to the opinion of
Parliament and country which was then favourable.
to Germany.
King William looked for real support to St
Petersburg. The friendship of Alexander II for
his uncle overruled all the resolutions of the
Prussian Cabinet and neutralised all the efforts of
Prussia's opponents. The two nations did not love
each other and were far from sharing the feelings
of their rulers. In 1863 the Prussian Chamber
had shown its aversion by opposing the Convention
that assured to Russia the co-operation of Prussia
against the Polish Insurrection. A solemn
occasion proved to Europe that the two sovereigns
were closely united for the future as much as in
the past. On the 12th of December 1869, the
fifty-fifth anniversary of King William's nomination
as Knight of the military order of Saint George,
his Imperial nephew sent him the Grand Cross of
that order, an almost exceptional distinction. At
the banquet given by the King on that occasion
the Russian Ambassador said in his toast that
‘this sign of Imperial friendship formed a new
pledge of the link uniting both sovereigns, both
nations, and both armies, a pledge conformable to
the interests of Russia, of Prussia, and of Europe.”
PROJECTED ALLIA WO ES 45
What gave special significance in the eyes of
Diplomacy to this speech, was the fact that it
followed the nomination of the new French
Ambassador at St Petersburg. Napoleon had
recently confided that post to one of his most
faithful followers, General Fleury. The Russian
Court, the official circles, and the Czar himself
had given him a reception that caused uneasiness
and even anger in Berlin. It was merely a slight
cloud that soon passed away. Russia had only one
object in view : the revision of the Treaty of Paris
of 1856. France could not engage herself on this
subject without estranging England ; Prussia,
more free in this respect, could promise much
without compromising herself. Therefore, on
what basis could the French Ambassador found
a close alliance with Russia 2 Undoubtedly Russia
would not support Prussia in breaking the Treaty
of Prague to attack France; but neither could
France expect the help of Russia in aggression
on Germany.
The Emperor of Russia went to Ems early in
June 1870, and there received a visit from the
Ring of Prussia. The interview had an official and
political stamp, the Czar being accompanied by
Prince Gortchakoff, the King by Count Bismarck.
According to particulars that transpired later on,
the two Cabinets were agreed on the affairs of the
WOL II D
46 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
East and of those of Poland, both questions con-
cerning Russia and her antagonist Austria, and
confirming her in her friendly attitude to Prussia.
The sovereigns parted pleased and reassured.
It was at the very moment when Prussia and
Russia were exchanging at Ems assurances of
mutual attachment, from which France might
suffer, that an event occurred in Paris revealing
the state of French opinion.
A Convention had recently been concluded
between Switzerland, Italy and the Confederation
of the North, on the subject of the construction of a
railway uniting Germany and Italy by Switzer-
land and by a tunnel through the Saint Gothard.
Germany had agreed to give ten million Francs
towards this enterprise, and the Parliament was
requested to vote the necessary credit. Some
difficulties were made by the Opposition, but
Bismarck soon silenced them by demonstrating the
utility of the work and its political importance.
He said that political interests absolutely required
a railway depending only on neutral Switzerland,
and not being subject to the rule of any great
Power. The Chancellor begged the Parliament to
believe that only considerations of the greatest
weight could have induced the Government to make
a grant to a foreign line. ‘We must have,” he
concluded by saying, “ direct communication with
PROJECTED ALLIA WC. ES 47
our friend Italy, who will, I am sure, be a steadfast
friend.” With these words he secured the vote of
the majority.
In ordinary times, this utterance of Count
Bismarck would have been allowed to pass without
comment. But the state of the public mind in
France was such, that the slightest move of Prussian
policy caused irritation. Ten years were required
to pierce the Saint Gothard tunnel: the danger
of Germany and Italy fraternising was therefore
not very imminent. But the slightest spark fall-
ing on inflammable material causes a conflagration.
The newspapers were full of the question, the
Chambers became excited, and a Deputy of the
majority gave notice of forthcoming interpellations.
Did Napoleon really mean to make the occasion
a protest for war? It has been maintained since,
and a proof of this hypothesis has been found
in the circumstance that the Government asked
for time to reply to the interpellation. It must
therefore have considered the Saint Gothard a
serious question. But the storm passed by once
more. The Convention of the three countries
would not give rise to foreign intervention ; no
one had a right to oppose an agreement about
the construction of a railway. The only point
that might excite the attention of the other
Powers, was the neutrality of Switzerland. In
48 | THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
this respect, the Convention had guaranteed all
rights involved, and the Helvetian Government
had offered the most formal explanations in Paris.
What would Europe have said had France seized
that occasion of disturbing peace 2 If the idea
was conceived for a moment, it was promptly
abandoned. On the 20th of June, the Duke of
Gramont, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared
in the Chamber that all international guarantees
having been furnished, France had no need to
mix herself in the question. º
The conflict allayed on the subject of Saint
Gothard, was soon to burst forth on another point
with irresistible fury.
CHAPTER XII
THE HOHIENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE. THE
FRENCH DECLARATION OF WAR.—
1869–1870
ORIGIN OF THE CANDIDATURE OF THE PRINCE OF HOHENZOLLERN.—
MARSHAL PRIM AND THE SPANISH AGENTS. —FRANCE TRIES TO
PREVENT THE CANDIDATURE.--EVASIVE REPLY OF BISMARCK.—
PRINCE LEOPOLD OF HOHIENZOLLERN ACCEPTS THE CANDIDATURE
WITH KING WILLIAM’s CONSENT.-MARSHAL PRIM COMMUNICATES
WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT.—NEW STEPS TAKEN IN
RERLIN.—INTERPELLATION IN PARIS.—DECLARATION OF THE
DUKE of GRAMONT. — M. BENEDETTI's MISSION TO EMS.—
RENUNCIATION OF PRINCE LEOPOLD.—KING WILLIAM REFUSEs
TO BIND HIMSELE FOR THE FUTURE.-AGITATION IN PARIS.—
NO RESULT FROM THE MISSION AT EMS.—BISMARCK OPPOSED TO
THE KING MAKING MORE CONCESSIONS.—IRRITATING DESPATCH
FROM BISMARCK.—EXCITEMENT IN FRANCE AND GERMANY. —
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AT SAINT CLOUD.—WARLIKE DECLARA-
TION OF THE DURE OF GRAMONT.—SEVERAL CABINETS INTER—
POSE IN VAIN IN FAVOUR OF PEACE.--FRANCE DECLARES WAR.
—PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—PATRIOTIC
MANIFESTATIONS IN BERLIN.—THE PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH
VOTES THE CREDIT FOR WAR.—RECRIMINATIONS AGAINST
FRANCE AND THE EMPEROR.—NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN GERMANY.
—THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOUTH PLACE THEIR ARMIES
UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA.—RUSSIA AND
ENGLAND SIDE WITH PRUSSIA.—REVIVAL OF THE PROJECT OF
ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND ITALY.—THE ARCH-
DUIKE ALBERT IN PARIS.—GENERAL LEBRUN IN VIENNA.--
OBJECTIONS OF AUSTRIA.—THE ROMAN QUESTION.—FIRST
DEFEATS OF FEANCE.
IN 1868 a Revolution took place in Spain by which
Queen Isabella was dethroned. In consequence of
50 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
that event, the Provisional Government convoked
the Constituent Cortes who voted a Constitutional
Monarchy, promulgated on the 6th of June 1869.
Meanwhile the Government had already confided
Marshal Prim with the task of preparing a
candidateship for the throne, and of submitting
it to the Cortes. Negotiations were carried on
successively and through various intermediaries
with King Ferdinand of Portugal, father of the
Ring Regnant, with the Duke of Montpensier
and with the Duke of Genoa, nephew of King
Victor Emmanuel. They were all without re-
sult. King Ferdinand declined; the Duke of
Montpensier was opposed by the Cortes, to say
nothing of Napoleon's objection to his being
chosen ; and as to the young Duke of Genoa,
his uncle the King was very much in favour of
such a scheme, but his claim was put out of the
question by the opposition of his mother who
acted on the advice of her father, King John of
Saxony.
In this state of things, some Spanish agents,
not without having felt their ground at Berlin,
fixed their attention on Leopold, Hereditary
Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, elder brother
of Charles, Prince, and later on King, of Roumania.
Prince Leopold had married a daughter of King
Ferdinand of Portugal; after the refusal of the
THE HOH ENZOD LERN CANDIDATURE 5 I
latter, they pitched upon his son-in-law, who
expressed himself ready to accept the Spanish
Crown, if the King of Prussia, as head of the
house of Hohenzollern, would consent. The agent
to whom this important negotiation had been
confided, was not ignorant of the fact that Prince
Leopold would be opposed, as a Prussian Prince,
by Napoleon, and he mentioned this consideration
to Marshal Prim. The latter declined to take it
into account. He alleged the necessity of finding
a King, the refusal of the other Princes, and the
right Spain had of choosing her future sovereign.
The negotiations were therefore carried on at
T)üsseldorf where Prince Anthony, father of Prince
Teopold, was residing. King William and Count
Bismarck were then consulted on the subject, but
privately, and without the official participation of
the Prussian Government.
The appearance in Berlin in the month of
March 1869, of a Spanish Diplomatist formally
accredited to the Prussian Court, his interviews
with Bismarck coinciding with the rumours of
Brince Leopold being a candidate for the Spanish
Crown, roused the attention of the French
Ambassador. Benedetti, after having applied to
Paris for instructions, interrogated the Under
Secretary of State, Herr von Thile, without con-
cealing the importance attached by the French
52 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Government to this affair. Although Herr von
Thile solemnly declared that there would be no
question of Prince Leopold aspiring to the
Spanish Throne, the Ambassador formed the
intention of applying straight to Bismarck, when
he was summoned to Paris. After he had nar-
rated his impressions to the Emperor, the latter
said: ‘The candidateship of the Duke of Mont-
pensier is hostile to my Dynasty, it concerns
only me, and I can consent to it; but that of
the Prince of Hohenzollern is essentially anti-
national, the country will not endure it, and we
must prevent it.’
These instructions originated the conflict after-
wards so disastrous to France. On his return to
Berlin, M. Benedetti had an interview with the
Chancellor on the 11th of May, by which he was
convinced that Herr von Thile was ignorant of
the intentions of the King and his adviser. The
latter did not deny the existence of the candi-
dature, but he represented it as giving little
pleasure either to the Prince or to the sovereign.
But on being asked whether the King would give
his sanction to the acceptance of the crown, he
took refuge in vague generalities.
For the time being, the question remained in
abeyance. Prussia knew beyond a doubt that the
Court of the Tuileries was strongly opposed to
THE HO HEAVZOL LERN CAND IDATURE. 53
the Prince of Hohenzollern and that his election
would result in hostilities.
From July to October, Spain was a prey to
a series of Carlist and Republican insurrections.
To put an end to these disturbances, Marshal
Prim revived his project at the solicitation of
M. de Salazar y Macaredo, who had conducted
the first negotiations with the Court of Düsseldorf.
About the 15th of June 1870, this agent returned
to Madrid bearing a letter from Count Bismarck
who stated that, although the Prussian Govern-
ment had not followed up the proposal of the
candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern in 1869,
it had not abandoned the idea which might be
useful later on. Still the affair was not to be
treated officially, but privately, with the Prince
and the Chancellor.
Under these conditions, the negotiations soon
came to a result. Prince Leopold accepted the
Crown, and King William, as head of the family,
gave his consent. It was agreed that this fact
should be kept absolutely secret for a few months
until the assembly of the Cortes had elected the
sovereign. Marshal Prim did not keep the secret.
On the 2nd of July, receiving the French Ambas-
sador, M. Mercier de Lostende, he said: ‘I have
to inform you of a fact that will not be agreeable
to the Emperor,” and he explained the circumstances
54 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
which he said had compelled him to act as he did.
On receiving this intelligence from the Ambassador,
the French Government immediately applied to
Berlin. The Duke of Gramont, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, telegraphed on the 3rd of July
1870 that “he hoped the Prussian Cabinet had
no hand in this intrigue,’ and that the impression
produced by it in Paris was very bad. Interpel-
lated by the French Chargé d'Affaires, Herr von
Thile took refuge behind the assertion that the
Prussian Government had no knowledge of this
transaction, and that he was totally ignorant of the
negotiation and of its result.
The alarm was given, and Paris began to be
excited, and the Government gave vent to its
irritation. Its organ, Le Constitutionnel, said on
the 4th of July that it could not suppress its
astonishment “at seeing the sceptre of Charles V in
the hands of a Prussian Prince.’ The next day,
the 5th, a Deputy of the moderate Opposition, M.
Cochery, asked, in the name of several of his
colleagues, to be allowed to interpellate the Govern-
ment on this candidature. This step was as un-
timely as the article of the Ministerial Journal
was imprudent. If France wished to avoid a
conflict, she had only to keep silence and negotiate.
Nothing obliged the Government to reply at once
to the interpellation; as it commanded the majority,
THE HO HENZOD LERN CAND IDATURE. 55
it could ask for an adjournment. From the 6th of
July, the situation became more critical. On that
day the Duke of Gramont read a declaration
framed by the Council of Ministers. Very
moderate towards Spain, whose rights it declared
France respected, the Imperial Government used
most resolute language against Prussia. ‘We do
not consider, it said, ‘that respect for the rights of
a neighbouring people obliges us to suffer a foreign
Government to disturb the present balance of
power in Europe to our disadvantage, and to
jeopardise the honour and interest of France, by
placing one of its Princes on the throne of Charles
V. We have a firm hope that this event will not
occur. We rely on the wisdom of Germany and
the friendship of Spain to prevent it. If it were
otherwise, we should know how to fulfil our duty
without hesitation and without weakness, sustained
as we are by your support, gentlemen, and by that
of the nation.’
Consternation reigned at Madrid. Marshal
Prim and the Regent Serrano confessed that they
had not calculated the importance of their actions.
They would have wished to recall them ; but they
could not withdraw at their pleasure a candida-
ture which they had done their utmost to make
acceptable to the Prince and to the King of Prussia.
They suggested to the French Government the
56 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
expedient of inducing the Prince himself to
resign his claim under pretence of the King
withdrawing his sanction. To carry out this
intention France sent her Ambassador Benedetti
on the 7th of July to Ems, where King William
was taking the waters. These discussions lasted
six days. According to the instructions of
the Duke of Gramont, Benedetti was to repre-
sent to the King the difficulties the Prince's
candidature would cause the Emperor Napoleon,
and to request him to induce the Prince, in the
interest of peace, to send in his resignation.
The position of King William was trying.
After authorising the Prince to accept, he was .
now called upon to retract that authorisation.
His personal dignity was concerned, especially as
the French Government had addressed him in
threatening terms in its Parliament. Neverthe-
less, he preserved a moderate attitude. While
we maintain that Count Bismarck must have
considered the Hohenzollern candidature as the
means of causing a rupture, we cannot deny that
the King, on his part, showed the desire of con-
ciliation. Whether he regretted having given his
consent, or whether he looked with alarm on the
prospect of a terrific war between the two nations,
whatever his motive may have been, he did not
refuse the French Ambassador's demand. What
THE HO HEAVZOL LERM CAND IDATURE 57
he seemed most to desire was that his self-esteem
should be considered, and that he should be
given time to make arrangements. &
On the 9th of July, in the audience which he
granted to the Ambassador, he aimed at freeing
himself and his Government from all responsibility
for the negotiations carried on directly between
Brince Leopold and the Spanish Cabinet. Having
been consulted by the Prince, he could not refuse
his sanction. Now he could intervene no further
unless it was to inform Prince Anthony and his
son, that if they withdrew from the candidateship
he would approve their resolution. He asked for
a delay to enable him to receive the Prince's
answer. The French Government became im-
patient ; it wanted a prompt decision so as to make,
if necessary, military preparations. In Prussia all
measures had been taken ; the men on leave had
been recalled. The Duke of Gramont stated on
the 10th that France did not wish to be like
Austria in 1866, who had allowed her actions to be
anticipated by those of her adversary. ‘If the
King does not advise the Prince to renounce, it
will cause war immediately, and in a few days we
shall be on the Rhine.’ On the 11th, M. Benedetti
obtained another audience. The King maintained
the same ground, having received no reply from
the Princes. The French Government required
58 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
|
him to take the initiative of discussion; he
wished to leave the Princes full liberty to
form their resolution. But it was easy to guess
that, solicited as he was by friendly Courts and
even by the Spanish Government itself, he was
striving to bring the Princes to take the step
which he would afterwards sanction. He said
to the Ambassador that he was expecting the
reply next day, and that he would at once inform
him of its tenour. He added that he was quite
aware of the preparations made in Paris, ‘and
I will not conceal from you that I am taking
my precautions against being surprised.’ The
Ambassador further represented to the King the
state of French opinion which obliged the Emperor
to explain himself without delay before the
Chambers. “Peace will not be disturbed,” said
the King, ‘if the French Government will wait
until I am able to preserve it effectually, and
will allow me the necessary time.” Thus the
King alluded to the event which was to take
place next day.
On the 12th, Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern
telegraphed from Sigmaringen to Marshal Prim
that in the name of his son he resigned his candi-
dature because of the complications and painful
position it inflicted on the Spanish nation. On
receiving this telegram, which had been addressed
THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 59
at the same time by the Prince to M. Olozaga,
Spanish Ambassador in Paris, the Spanish Govern-
ment notified to the Princes that it accepted the
renunciation.
This solution produced various emotions in
Paris. The Council of Ministers was divided
between pacific and warlike feelings. The former
predominated at first. ‘We have secured peace,’
said M. Emile Ollivier, ‘and we shall not let it
escape.’ This pacific tendency found utterance
in the Ministerial Press, whose principal organ
rejoiced over the satisfaction obtained without
bloodshed. But this was only a momentary
respite. In the highest Governmental spheres,
some influential persons were in favour of energetic
policy which would either transform Prince
Leopold's renunciation into a personal defeat of
Ring William, or else by a sudden rupture break
a situation which had long been unendurable.
The influence of these persons was used over a
large portion of the Chambers, the Press and the
Public ; and it was supported for other reasons
by the anti-dynastic party. Whether Imperial
diplomacy would be frustrated by Prussia's firm-
ness, or whether the Emperor would be forced to
run the risk of a formidable war: in either case the
enemies of the Empire were unanimous in saying
that by accepting the renunciation after having
6o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIG. W.
spoken so haughtily, the Emperor was humiliating
himself and diminishing his prestige; and that by
refusing to acknowledge it and thus provoking
Prussia, he was engaging France in a perilous war.
Thus the fervent friends and the bitter enemies of
the Empire united in cutting off all means of
retreat from the Government. The streets and
public places resounded with cries for war; the
ministerial papers that represented the renunciation
as a triumph of the Government, were torn to
pieces with frantic anger; all men asked for
more energetic resolutions, that is, for war.
Yielding to the influence of the few and the
clamours of the many, the Cabinet at once opened
new negotiations with King William. The
Prussian Ambassador, Herr von Werther, having
returned from Ems to Paris, had, on the 12th of
July, at the very moment when Prince Leopold's
renunciation was being announced, an interview
with the Duke of Gramont. The Minister of
Foreign Affairs pointed out to the Prussian
Diplomatist that the French Government would
attach no importance to the renunciation until it
had been formally approved by the King ; and
as the latter maintained that he did not think of
injuring France by authorising the Prince's
acceptance, why would he not say so in an official
document which could be read in the French
THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDI DATURE 61
Chambers? Following up this idea, the Duke of
Gramont wrote on the spot a synopsis of a letter
to the Emperor, in which the King was to
express his satisfaction at the Prince's renun-
ciation, and his desire of seeing all causes of
dispute between the two countries at an end.
Over and above this communication, the Duke
sent, on the evening of the 12th, a telegram to
M. Benedetti, which was followed a few hours
later by another. In these two messages, alleging
the wild popular excitement, he ordered the
Ambassador to demand a declaration from the
Ring, by which he should associate himself to
the Prince's renunciation, and promise not to
authorise his candidature again.
On the morning of the 13th, the French
Ambassador, even before the hour fixed for the
audience, followed the King on the public
Promenade, and informed him of the instructions
he had received. The King assured the
Ambassador that he had no secret design ; that
when he was acquainted with the Prince's renuncia-
tion he would approve it, but that he could not
fetter his future liberty of action, as the French
Government demanded in so unexpected a manner.
This interview on the Promenade, terminated
by the King's categoricai reply, made the audience
to a certain degree superfluous that was appointed
VOL. II E
62 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
for the day when the King received direct
information of the Prince's renunciation. Accord-
ingly on receiving that information, and not
being desirous of renewing conversation on the
same topic, the King sent his Aide-de-Camp,
Prince Radziwill, to the Ambassador to say
that he authorised him to inform the French
Government that he approved the Prince's resolu-
tion. It was in vain that Benedetti, obeying
instructions from Paris, solicited another audience ;
the King sent word that he adhered to what he
had said in the morning. ‘The King has con-
sented,” said his envoy, “to give his entire and
unreserved approbation to the step taken by
the Prince, and he can do no more.’ The
Ambassador having pointed out that he was
obliged to send the King's explicit approbation,
Ring William again sent word that he authorised
him to do so. A telegram to that effect was
drawn up by M. Benedetti in the presence of
the King's envoy.
The King's mood had obviously changed since
the 12th. He had brought about, though in-
directly, the Prince's withdrawal; he had then
approved that resolution and had authorised the
French Ambassador to inform his Government of
the fact. But what he refused to do, was to
intervene officially by a letter to the Emperor,
THE HOHENZOD LERN CANDIDATURE 63
or to bind himself for the future. On the 13th,
he received from his Ambassador in Paris an
account of the request made by the Duke of
Gramont of a letter he should address to the
Emperor. The feeling it excited in the King was
extreme indignation; he believed that he was
asked for a letter of apology. Under this im-
pression, he again refused to see the French
Ambassador. The latter, not being aware of
the communication sent by the Duke of Gramont
through the Prussian Ambassador, could not
counteract the mischievous effect it produced.
The King considered it as a new exaction and
an insult to his dignity. At that moment, com-
munications between Ems and Berlin were becom-
ing very frequent. Count Bismarck, who had
been enjoying a holiday at his castle at Varzin,
returned to the Capital on finding what a serious
turn affairs were taking. Public opinion through-
out Germany was in the wildest state of excite-
ment. Everybody believed that the French
Government was eager for war and desired to
provoke it by constantly making fresh demands
insulting to the King. The Ministerial Press
fortified this opinion; it gave the public to under-
stand that the King had already made too many
concessions, and that it was time to refrain from
doing so any further. Telegrams were sent by
64 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
various German towns to condemn the King's
conciliatory attitude. On the 13th, in an inter-
view with the English Ambassador, Count
Bismarck declared that Germany would take up
the challenge, and, even though the Spanish
episode had come to a conclusion, she would
demand satisfaction for the insult offered to the
Ring and the nation by the threatening language
of France.
Such was the frame of mind of the King, the
Government, and the Public, when, on the 14th,
M. Benedetti received orders to insist once more on
obtaining from the King a promise that he would
forbid Prince Leopold again to accept the candi-
dature, and that he would authorise either the
French or the Prussian Ambassador to acquaint
the French Government with this decision. M.
Benedetti, after his conversation with the King
on the day preceding, gave up all ideas of direct
measures; he felt convinced that his communica-
tions would have no result. His mission was at an
end, and he was preparing for departure. Accord-
ing to custom, he asked for an audience in order to
take his leave. The King sent word by his Aide-
de-Camp that he was just starting for Coblentz,
but that he would receive him at the railway
station in the reserved saloon. Benedetti accord-
ingly proceeded to that meeting place at the hour
THE HO HENZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 65
appointed, and remained for some minutes alone
with the King, who said that he had nothing more
to communicate to him on the subject on which
they had spoken ; and that if negotations could
be resumed, it was for his Government at Berlin
to carry them on.
These details of the events that took place at
Ems from the 9th to the 14th of July, are of vast
importance for what follows. We may see that the
part played by King William from the time the
question of the Hohenzollern candidature arose,
was throughout one of extreme moderation, and
that his object was to appease the conflict. Un-
fortunately, the same cannot be said of Paris or of
Berlin. The violent declaration of the Duke of
Gramont, the constantly increasing exactions of the
Imperial Government, by no means warranted by
the circumstances, had furnished Bismarck with
the pretext for a rupture for which he knew him-
self ready. The patience and long-suffering of the
King with regard to France, appeared to him
excessive, and dangerous to the projects of Prussia
in Germany, and he determined to put an end to a
situation which had long been weighing upon him.
The King had caused a report of his
interviews with the French Ambassador to be
drawn up and sent to Bismarck, with authorisation
to place the facts before the public. Thereupon
66 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
the Chancellor drew up a note in laconic terms
betraying his irritation. In reading it, the public
would believe that the French Ambassador had
offended the King by unseemly proceedings, and
that His Majesty had in consequence refused to
receive him. Instead of mentioning the reception
and interview at the railway station, the note
merely said that ‘the King had seen the Ambas-
sador en passant.’ This letter was addressed
to the newspapers, and was officially transmitted
to the Prussian Representatives at the Foreign
Courts. The moment it was issued, it produced
intense anger throughout Germany, and that anger
was augmented by the commentaries of the papers.
The French Ambassador had insulted the King,
the French Government had aimed a blow at the
honour and dignity of Germany ; satisfaction must
be asked for the affront, a reply must be given
to the challenge, a reply deciding once for all the
quarrel originating with the victory of Sadowa.
In Paris the effect of this document was still
more tremendous, thanks to the manner in which
the Government commented on its terms. Inserted
in the Berlin journals, telegraphed to those of
the Provinces and of foreign countries, the note
presented the character of a newspaper article,
open to discussion and controversy. What gave
it a significance particularly wounding to France
THE HOH ENZOLLERN CANDIDA TURE 67
was the fact that it had been communicated to
diplomacy in order to be imparted to the foreign
Cabinets. On the morning of the 14th, the
Prussian Article was yet unknown to the Parisian
public, when it was already circulating in the
Chambers where it came opportunely to the sup-
port of the war-party. The Government was no
longer master of the situation; in order to be
so, it should have had the sincere desire of
preventing war, and the requisite sang-froid to
avoid everything tending to excite popular
fury. This desire was absent alike from the
Court and from the Ministry; and instead of
sang-froid, resentment and passion inspired the
conduct of those in power. If we admit that
Count Bismarck had set a trap for the French
Government, we must also own that the latter was
eager to fall into it.
When the despatches arrived, announcing that
the offensive article in the official Gazette of
Berlin had been communicated to Diplomacy,
the Council of Ministers was immediately called
together at Saint Cloud. Until that moment
peaceful views had prevailed over the Emperor.
Napoleon III was himself inclined to accept the
renunciation of the Prince of Hohenzollern,
hoping that this solution would end the difficulty,
especially as it proved French diplomacy to have
68 7"HE EMPEROR WILLIA M AMD IIIS REIGN
been successful. This view was also shared by
M. Emile Ollivier, the President of the Council,
who, after one of the meetings of the Ministers,
was preparing a pacific declaration to the Cham-
bers, when the incident of the Berlin telegram
occurred, enlarged and exaggerated by the Duke
of Gramont. In the Council at Saint Cloud, the
Emperor, worn out by his illness, overwhelmed by
the passions of the multitude, recoiling before a
weighty responsibility, declared that he would, as
a constitutional sovereign, conform to the opinion
of the majority of his Ministers. The discussion
was short, but intensely vehement, The Empress
was strongly in favour of war, as she considered
the honour of France at stake. Among the most
ardent advocates for war was the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister for War. The
latter, Marshal Leboeuf, if we may believe the
story of his colleague the Duke of Gramont, threw
his portfolio violently on the ground, swearing
that he would never resume it if war was not
declared, and that he would give up his ‘báton
de maréchal.” Thus war was decided, and the
Duke of Gramont proceeded to the Corps Légis-
latif to inform it of that decision.
Some foreign Cabinets interposed in those days
of crisis in favour of peace. The impression
throughout Europe on first hearing of the Hohen-
THE HOH E WZOL LERN CAND IDATURE 69
zollern affair, was favourable to France. Even in
Germany, and above all in the South, people could
not conceive why Prussia and France should go to
war about a merely dynastic question. Other
countries could understand the displeasure with
which France saw the installation of a branch of
the Prussian Monarchy in Spain; but these first
impressions were soon effaced by the passionate
policy of the Duke of Gramont, and an attitude of
reserve was assumed by the Cabinets of Europe.
Nevertheless some further attempts were made at
conciliation. The Emperor of Russia and the King
of Bavaria suggested the idea of a direct declaration
of King William, an idea to which, as we have seen
above, he was strongly opposed. England made a
similar suggestion, but it was declined at Berlin
like other proposals of a like nature. A second
English proposition, to have recourse to the good
offices of a friendly power, met with the same
reception at Berlin and Paris. The Cabinet of
St Petersburg had further suggested in London on
the 13th of July the framing of a protocol in which
the Plenipotentiaries of the great Powers should
ratify the renunciation of the Prince of Hohen-
zollern. This project, though acceptable to France,
was not communicated to the Cabinet of the
Tuileries, as England felt assured that Prussia
would reject it.
70 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The decision of the Council of Ministers at
Saint Cloud was taken, on the 15th of July, by the
Duke of Gramont to the Senate and by M. Emile
Ollivier to the Corps Législatif. This communica-
tion gave a brief account of the negotiations at
Ems, the refusal of the King to receive the French
Ambassador, and the wounding manner in which
that refusal had been officially made known to the
European Cabinets. The declaration added: “We
have omitted nothing to avoid war. We are about
to prepare ourselves for that which is offered us.”
At that moment everybody was infected by the
warlike fever which seized even men formerly most
opposed to hostilities. M. Rouher, President of
the Senate, excited an enthusiastic manifestation in
that assembly. In the Corps Législatif, the
leaders of the anti-dynastic Opposition were the
only persons who spoke against the declaration of
war. M. Thiers, among others, pronounced
himself against any hurried decision; other
speakers of the Opposition asked to see the
despatches on which the Government based its
action. These isolated voices were not heeded,
chiefly because they emanated from the enemies of
the dynasty. War was voted by the Senate
unanimously, and by the Corps Législatif with only
ten votes against it.
On the 19th of July, the declaration of
THE HO HEAVZOLLERN CANDIDATURE 7 I
war was officially notified to the Prussian Govern-
ment by the French Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.
It said that the project of placing a Prussian
Brince on the Spanish Throne was directed against
the territorial safety of France; that the King of
Prussia had refused to guarantee that such a scheme
could never be realised with his consent, but
had, on the contrary, reserved for himself the
liberty of acting as circumstances might require :
that France saw therein a standing menace to
herself and to the balance of power in Europe;
that that settlement had been aggravated by
the refusal to receive the French Ambassador,
or to enter with him into further explanations;
that, in consequence, the French Government
considered itself from that moment in a state
of war with Prussia. This declaration was to be
applied equally to the Allies of Prussia.
On the 22nd of July, the Deputies went in a
body to the Tuileries. In his allocution, the
President threw all the responsibility of the war
on Prussia, quoting the saying of Montesquieu :
‘The real author of war is not he who declares it,
but he who makes it necessary.’ The next day, in
a proclamation to the French people, the Emperor
again denounced what he called the invading policy
of Prussia, the excessive armaments of that power,
and its overbearing conduct towards France. He
72 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
was not making war on Germany, whose independ-
ence he respected ; he demanded the establishment
of a state of things securing the future safety of
France, and a peace which would make it no longer
necessary for one nation to arm itself against the
other. Finally, on the 28th of July, after having
confided on the previous day the Regency to the
Empress, he addressed a proclamation to the Army
on setting out from Saint Cloud to put himself at
the head of his forces. In this production he
appealed to their courage, but did not conceal from
them that they were going to fight one of the best
armies in Europe, and that ‘the war would be long
and trying.’
King William had not hidden from the French
Ambassador during the negotiations at Ems that
Prussia had made her military preparations. The
declaration of the Duke of Gramont in the Corps
Législatif on the 15th of July, was rightly con-
sidered in Berlin as a definitive rupture. Accord-
ingly, on the 16th of July, Count Bismarck laid
the facts and the situation before the Federal
Council. His complaints were directed especially
against the Duke of Gramont, who, without waiting
for the declaration he had demanded from the
King, had replied to M. Cochery's interpellation in
a violent strain. He justified the King, who,
having promised secrecy to the Spanish Cabinet,
THE HOHENZO LLERN CANDIDATURE 73
had kept his own Government ignorant of the
affair. The declaration of the Duke of Gramont
had from the beginning cut off every confidential
explanation with the Prussian Government. After
the reception which that explanation had received
from the French Chamber, and after the subsequent
conduct of the French Government, it was no
longer to be doubted that that Government had
wished to humiliate Prussia or to provoke war.
Nothing therefore now remained but to accept war
or to obtain guarantees from France against the
return of similar events, dangerous to the peace and
the prosperity of Europe.
It was also of vital importance to the Cabinet
of Berlin to assure itself of the sympathy of
Foreign Governments, by proving that France
was completely in the wrong. This was the drift
of Bismarck's despatch of the 18th of July. He
accused the French Government of distorting
facts, and of making conciliatory action on the
.* part of friendly powers impossible. The French
Government in provoking war was moved by the
worst instincts of hatred and jealousy, and by
the desire of suppressing liberty in its own
country through complications abroad.
Still more unmeasured was the language held
by the King in his speech of the 19th of July, on
the opening of the Parliament of the North for an
74 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Extraordinary Session. He said that the Govern-
ment of the Emperor of the French had seized in
the Candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern a
pretext for war which it maintained even after the
Prince's withdrawal. In former days, owing to her
internal divisions, Germany had been obliged to
submit to similar insults; but now Germany was
strong enough to punish the violent actions of
France. The German and the French people were
called to a more salutary struggle than that of
arms. But the rulers of France knew how to turn
to account for their own individual interests the
natural but irritable self-love of the great
neighbouring nation.
The whole world was struck by the tone
of this discourse, so peculiarly hostile to the
person of the Emperor Napoleon; it was to be
foreseen that if Prussia were victorious she would
not spare the Imperial Dynasty. A similar
spirit of animosity pervaded the explanations
furnished by Count Bismarck to the Parliament
in the sitting of the 20th. The Federal Chancellor
began by stating that the Government had
throughout received no official document except
the declaration cf war of the French Government.
The telegram relating to the events of Ems was
a mere newspaper telegram, not an official despatch,
as the French Government had made believe to
THE HO HENZO L LERN CAND IDATURE 75
its Chambers, with the object of creating a pretext
for war.
Count Bismarck, replying to the declaration of
war, explained himself further on this subject, and
in even more violent terms when writing to foreign
Cabinets. The King never thought of reviving
the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern;
but to ask the King to bind himself for the future
was outrageous arrogance. The French Govern-
ment had never opened official negotiations with
Prussia; everything had been confined to the
interviews at Ems; the German nation would not
allow itself to be humiliated; the war had been
forced upon Germany, and, the civilized world
would acknowledge that the reasons alleged by
France were but invented pretexts.
The address of the Parliament was the faith-
ful echo of the language of the Cabinet. It said
that for the second time did a Napoleon provoke
the German nation to war; the sensible part of
the French nation had not been able to prevail
over the multitude maddened with envy and
ambition ; friendly nations would consider the
victory of Germany as liberating them from
the incubus of Napoleonic ambition, and as
the punishment of iniquities of which they had
been the victims. This address, together with
the credit for war, was voted unanimously. The
76 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
next day on the closing of the Session, the
President, in proclaiming the ‘Sacred War,’
hailed King William as Generalissimo of all the
German Armies.
In truth, the French declaration of war had in
a few days given a prodigious impetus to the work
of unification carried on by Prussia. The Germans
of North and South felt themselves one in front of
the foreign enemy. South Germany fancied herself
on the eve of a French invasion, and thought of
nothing but taking refuge under the wings of
Prussia. However much the sovereigns of the
South may have secretly rebelled against this
submission, was it possible for them, without im-
perilling their crowns, to resist it ! What
guarantee would France offer them, she who had
only recently claimed Hessian and Bavarian
territory ! Victorious Prussia would deprive
them of their independence; and even if she
were defeated, she would make peace with France
at the expense of sovereigns who had proved
false to their country. French as well as Austrian
Diplomacy had given timely warning to the
Government of the Emperor Napoleon that
foreign aggression would find Germany united
against the common enemy, and that the cries
of Prussia's opponents would be drowned in the
cheers of German patriotism.
THE HO HENZO L LERN CANDIDATURE 77
Immediately after the sitting of the Federal
Council on the 16th of July, the Southern Govern-
ments, Barvaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darm-
stadt, mobilised their contingents. The sovereigns
of these States announced that measure to King
William, placing their troops under his command,
according to the stipulations of the Treaties of
Alliance of the 23rd of August 1866. Louis II,
Ring of Bavaria, signalised himself above all the
others by the ardour of his manifestations, and his
Ministers exerted all their eloquence to carry the
vote of the Chamber which was divided into two
almost equal parts, the one favouring, the other
opposing, Prussian direction. Not less ardently
did King William express his thanks to these
sovereigns and to the entire German nation. On
the 25th, he stated in a proclamation that all
Germany was under arms, ready to go forth
under his command to a war from which would
result the unity and liberty of Germany.
Over and above these German auxiliaries, the
Cabinet of Berlin possessed a valuable ally in
the Government of Russia. We have seen above
how the agreement between the two sovereigns
had been renewed, some weeks before the conflict,
in the interview at Ems. Without counting on
the help of England, Prussia was reassured in
that quarter. The English Court had lively
WOL II F
78 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
sympathy for Prussia, the heir to whose throne
was son-in-law to Queen Victoria. The Liberal
Ministry then in power was on cold terms with
the Imperial Government of France, and could
act in accordance with the Queen's predilections
without deviating from their foreign policy.
Thus the only anxiety that Prussia could have
abroad, was the possibility of an alliance between
France, Italy and Austria.
The negotiations between these three Courts
had not ceased since 1869, although the scheme
then conceived fell to the ground owing to
Napoleon's reluctance to abandon Rome. Early
in 1870, the three countries were engaged with
their military affairs. With this object, Archduke
Albert of Austria came to Paris in the month of
February. The Archduke praised the French
Generals, but was of opinion that France was not
ready for war, and advised them to precipitate
nothing and to make more complete preparations.
Some months later, in the beginning of June, the
French General Lebrun was sent to Vienna to
combine the plan of a campaign in case of a future
alliance. France was to proceed over the Rhine
with 300,000 men, mobilised in a fortnight, and to
effect a junction in Bavaria with the Austrian
Army. This plan presupposed a Treaty of Alliance
which had still to be concluded. For the time
THE HOHEAVZO/, LEEN CAND IDATURE 79
being no further steps were taken than the letters
exchanged between the three sovereigns in 1869.
Time was required to come to terms; and Napoleon
did not give his future Allies that time. On
General Lebrun's return, the Hohenzollern incident
occurred, and Napoleon went to war without
securing any alliance.
In the second half of July, that is, after the
declaration of war, negotiations were renewed. The
French Government, pressed by the circumstances,
asked for the help of Italy and Austria, appealing
to the correspondence between the three sovereigns.
Francis Joseph and Victor Emmanuel were not
inclined to respond. Austria knew that she was
observed by Russia, who only consented to remain
neutral so long as Austria remained so too. It
was also necessary to consider the sentiments of
Hungary, little disposed to draw her sword to
revive Austrian supremacy in Germany. In Italy,
Victor Emmanuel was personally favourable to
armed intervention for the benefit of France; but
his Ministers and his subjects were not of the same
opinion ; and to bring them round, it would have
been necessary to promise them the solution of
the Roman Question. And indeed, neither Austria
nor Italy was prepared for war. The Cabinet of
Vienna, without repudiating the moral obligation
resulting from the correspondence of 1869, asked
8o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIG. W.
time for discussion so as not to precipitate its
resolutions. The Florentine Cabinet made the
Roman Question of vital importance; that of Vienna
declared that it would sign nothing without Italy,
whose demands with regard to Rome it declared to
be perfectly reasonable. France continued to treat
in Paris with the Plenipotentiaries of Italy and
Austria. The latter Power proposed armed
neutrality for herself and for Italy, which would
allow them to prepare their armaments without
involving at once war with Prussia; to this Power
they would first address a demand to maintain in
Germany the statu quo agreeably to the Treaty
of Prague; and they would then make common
cause with France if they met with a refusal.
Then Italy should enter Bavaria with 100,000
men, and occupy Munich; Austria should fortify
herself in Bohemia, and operate a junction with
the Italian Army in Bavaria. Meanwhile the
Cabinet of Vienna would assert for Italy the
right of occupying Rome after the withdrawal of
the French garrison. The Emperor having re-
jected this last condition, the negotiations were
transferred to Florence. That was early in the
month of August. The Cabinet of Vienna was
still hesitating; the immediate vicinity of Prussia
and Russia made it think twice. King Victor
Emmanuel was, on the contrary, ready to march
THE HOHENZOLLERN CAND IDATURE 8 I
without delay, if Austria would consent to give
passage to the Italian troops on their way to
Bavaria; the Italian Ministry had even relin-
quished the Article concerning Rome, and had
confined itself to demanding the evacuation of
that city by the French. The Cabinet of Vienna
declined to allow passage to the Italians, alleging,
not without reason, that it would be an act of
hostility against Prussia, whereas Austria wanted
two or three months more to complete her military
preparations.
During these negotiations, the campaign had
begun between France and Germany. The 6th
of August was signalised to France by defeats,
resulting in the fall of the Ollivier-Gramont
Ministry, destroying at the same time, without
hope of revival, the Emperor's projects of alliance.
CHAIPTER, XIII
WAR WITH FRANCE.—PROCLAMATION OF
THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1870-1871
EUROPE THINKS THAT FRANCE WILL BE VICTORIOUS.–TRUE SITUA-
TION OF BOTH ARMIES.–PROCLAMATION OF KING WILLIAM TO
THE INHABITANTS OF FIRANCE.--THE CATASTROPHE OF SEDAN.—
RING WILLIAM AND THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—TELEGRAMS TO
THE QUEEN.—FALL OF THE EMPIRE.--THE GOVERNMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND PRUSSIA.—ATTITUDE OF THE
NEUTRAL POWERS.—M. JULES FAVRE AT THE HEAD-QUARTERS
AT FERRIERES.—MISSION OF M. THIERS TO THE EUROPEAN
CABINETS.—PROGRESS OF THE GERMAN INVASION.—CAPITULA-
TION OF METZ.—THE EMPRESS EUGENIE. —TWO PRUSSIAN
PRINCES NOMINATED MARSHALS.—FRANCE ORGANISES NEW
ARMIES.—NEGOTIATIONS AT VERSAILLES FOR AN ARMISTICE.-
WAR TO THE KNIFE. – DEFEAT OF THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. —
FAILURE OF THE ARMY OF PARIS.—TREATIES OF ALLIANCE
BETWEEN THE CONFEDERATION OF THE NORTH AND THE
SOUTHERN STATES.—NECESSITY FOR THE SOUTHERN STATES OF
UNION TO PRUSSIA.—CONCESSIONS MADE TO BAWARIA.—THE
KING OF BAWARIA PROPOSES THE REVIVAL OF THE GERMAN
EMPIRE. –KING WILLIAM REFUSES TO ACCEPT THE IMPERIAL
DIGNITY EXCEPT FROM THE SOVEREIGN.S.—DEPUTATION OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF THE NORTH AT VERSAILLES. — WARLIKE
HARANGUES.—PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPIRE. –ITS MILITARY
ORIGIN AND CHARACTER.
WHEN the European public saw the French
Government throwing itself with such passion
WAR WITH FRANCE 83
and precipitation into the war, which the Cabinet
of Berlin after the 12th of July no longer attempted
to evade, it was of opinion that France had good
reasons for such a course of action. It believed
in the existence of a secret alliance with Italy
and Austria; it was convinced of the military
superiority of France, both in numbers and in
readiness for war. Thus Europe held an opinion
similar to that current before the campaign of
1866, when all the world predicted the triumph
of Austria. It was held to be certain at the
end of July 1870, that France would be victorious
over Prussia and her Allies. Even in Berlin
where the military situation of France was supposed
to be well known, the Prussian General Staff
had a moment of doubt, when it dreaded lest
that power should prove stronger and readier
than authentic information represented.
This advantageous opinion, expressed uni-
versally, contributed in no slight degree to
maintain the French Government in the illusions
which had led it into the recent negotiations.
It is true that it did not possess signed treaties
with Italy and Austria; but, fully convinced that
it would soon boast of brilliant triumphs over
its adversary, it felt sure that it could then obtain
Allies, who would meanwhile have leisure to com-
plete their armaments.
84 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The Emperor and his Minister of Foreign
Affairs, the latter in causing the rupture with
Prussia, the former in yielding to the advocates of
war, had relied on the affirmations of the leaders of
the Army, who assured them that they were more
than ready. But they were fully aware that the
effective force of the army was insufficient.
Brussia was equally aware of that fact ; she had
ascertained after the plebiscite, that 300,000 votes
had been given by the active Army. On that
occasion Lord Malmesbury expressed his surprise
to the Emperor that France had only 300,000 men
under arms instead of 600,000, as was stated in
official returns. It is true that the French
Government in declaring war justly relied on the
reserves as well as on the rapidity of mobilisation,
which was to enable it to transfer hostilities to
German territory, and thus to anticipate the action
of the Prussian Army.
Under such ideas the plan of campaign was
conceived; it was an offensive plan, based on the
final junction of the French Army in South
Germany with the auxiliary forces of Italy and
Austria. Events soon came to prove the fallacy of
these designs. The French Army from the be-
ginning of the war was numerically far inferior to
the united armies of Prussia and of the rest of
Germany, which also had in mobilisation an advance
WAR WITH FRANCE 85
of several days on the French Army. Bravery and
heroic feats of arms, could not remedy this state of
things, nor prevent the consequence that, after the
first reverses, the French plan of campaign would
have to be suddenly changed for a plan of defence
against the enemy, reassured and encouraged by a
series of successes.
We shall not write the history of this war,
of which we have only to speak so far as its
result affected the position of King William and
the destiny of his reign. The fate of arms was
opposed to France from the beginning to the end
of this gigantic struggle. The French troops
fought with heroism that called forth the admira-
tion of Europe, and their reverses regained for
France many sympathies that had been alienated
by the unwise policy of the Government. Vain
efforts | Barren sympathies Blow after blow laid
French military power in the dust.
Fortune seemed to favour France for an instant.
On the 2nd of August a French division seized
Saarbrücken, a Prussian town on the frontier.
That was the first and last advantage. The 4th
and the 6th of August are marked by the German
victories of Weissenburg, Worth, Reichshoffen, and
Spicheren. King William had repaired to
Mayence where he took, from the 2nd of August,
the command of the German Armies. On the 11th
86 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIG. W.
his head-quarters were at Saarbrücken, from which
town the French had been repulsed. On the same
day, when about to cross the French frontier, he
addressed a proclamation, thoroughly military in
character, to the inhabitants of French territory
which his troops were about to occupy. The
King stated that, as the Emperor Napoleon had
declared war against him, he was obliged to throw
back the aggressors, and that he was waging war
against the French soldiers, not against the peaceful
inhabitants, to whom he promised safety of person
and property, provided they did not commit acts of
hostility against the German forces.
Decisive battles soon took place near Metz.
Brilliant victories were achieved by the Germans
on the 14th of August at Colombay-Nouilly; on
the 16th, at Vionville or Mars-la-Tour; and on
the 18th, at Gravelotte.
After the battle of Gravelotte, the French
Army, under the orders of Marshal Bazaine,
driven from all its strongholds, cut off from all
communications with Paris, was obliged to retreat
to Metz. Two German Armies invested that
fortress, whilst two others, under the com-
mand of the Crown Princes of Prussia
and Saxony, continued their march on Paris.
On the 23rd of August, the Army of Baden
laid siege to Strasburg. The Government of
WAR WITH FRANCE 87
the Empress Regent then gave orders to Marshal
MacMahon, who was preparing to proceed to Paris
to protect the Capital, to direct himself towards
Sedan. During this march, when he had
nearly reached Beaumont, the Marshal was
attacked by the Germans, beaten and severed from
all communication with Metz. On the 31st, the
Germans, having crossed the Meuse, drove Mac-
Mahon's Army to the very walls of Sedan where
the Emperor had already arrived. On the same
day, Marshal Bazaine tried to effect a passage
to the North, but was defeated at Noisseville
and again thrown back into Metz. Another
attempt on the following day, the 1st of
September, had no better result. On the same
day, the destinies of the Imperial Army and of
the Empire were fulfilled before Sedan. Enclosed
as in an iron circle, in a place without provisions,
ammunition or materials of any kind, the Emperor,
with the intention of avoiding useless bloodshed,
gave orders that the white flag should be hoisted,
and asked for capitulation. “Monsieur mon Frère,’
he wrote to King William, “not having been able
to die in the midst of my troops, nothing remains .
for me but to give up my sword to your Majesty.’
“While regretting the circumstances under which
we meet,' replied the King, “I accept your
sword, and request you to appoint one of your
88 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
officers, furnished with full powers, to treat about
the capitulation of the Army which has fought
so bravely under your orders.’
Several circumstances conspired to bring about
this disastrous result of the first part of the war.
Independently of those which we exposed at the
beginning of this chapter, we must add the
Emperor's personal unfitness for commanding an
Army during a campaign, the difficulties thus
created for the Generals entrusted with operations,
and consequently the want of unity and connec-
tion in the conception and execution of tactics.
We must above all bear the fact in mind that the
Emperor was at that epoch overcome by disease,
and a prey to agonies that must have paralyzed
his faculties. He had always carefully concealed
the state of his health from those around him,
especially from his Ministers, who, if they had
been well-informed on this momentous point, would
probably have prevented his departure for the
army. Later on, and before the battle of Sedan, his
malady became so much worse, that the question
of his return to Paris was mooted, but it was
given up for political considerations, the details
of which do not enter into the plan of this work.
On the 2nd of September, early in the morn-
ing, he left Sedan, and stopped half-way between
that town and Donchery, at Frénois, where Count
WAR WITH FRANCE 89
Bismarck came to confer with him at his request.
The German General Staff having demanded the
full capitulation of the French Army, the Emperor
tried to obtain milder conditions, which were
peremptorily refused by the German military
authorities, but to which the Federal Chancellor
would have consented, provided the Emperor in
his turn would consent to negotiate for peace.
Napoleon III absolutely refused to do so. He
alleged from the military point of view that he
was no longer commander-in-chief, and from the
political point of view that the legal Government
and the Power of the State were now represented
by the Empress-Regent and the Ministers in
Paris. Under these conditions, Count Bismarck
declined to modify the decisions of the General
Staff; at the same time King William would
only grant the interview demanded by the
Emperor after the signature of the capitulation.
He was compelled to resign himself to his fate.
The whole army and the garrison of Sedan were
declared prisoners of war to be sent to Germany.
The officers were allowed to keep their liberty
and their swords, under the condition of giving
their word of honour that they would not serve
again in that war against Prussia. The flags,
the cannons, the horses, all the materials of war
were to be delivered to the conquerors.
90 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
King William, when once the capitulation was
signed, showed himself courteous and considerate
towards his fallen enemy. Deviating from the
usage of war which allowed him to await in his
camp the appearance of the captive Emperor, he
repaired, on the 2nd of September, to the castle of
IBellevue, near Frénois, where Napoleon had taken
up his abode. The King was accompanied by the
Crown Prince, by other German Princes, and by a
numerous suite of Generals; the Emperor, who
awaited him at the foot of the staircase, conducted
him to the upper apartments. Their interview, of
which nobody was witness, lasted a quarter-of-an-
hour; its details have not been divulged. The
accounts that have been given emanate from
doubtful sources, excepting what the King himself
related in despatches sent to the Queen of Prussia
and afterwards made public. After the victory of
Sedan, the King was inspired by a very natural
emotion, augmented by a kind of religious
mysticism. Speaking of ‘the great historical
event,” he wrote to the Queen : ‘It is like a
dream, even after seeing events hourly take their
course. Thinking that after a great and prosperous
war, I could expect no more glorious event
for my reign, and seeing to-day the fulfilment
of this prodigious historical act, I bow before God
in humble adoration. ' And he added about the
WAR WITH FRANCE 9 I
interview with the Emperor : “We were both
deeply moved at meeting under such circumstances.
I cannot express what I felt on reflecting that
three years before I had seen the Emperor at the
summit of power.’ The next day in a telegram to
the Queen, he again refers to the interview.
‘What an impressive moment that of the meeting
with Napoleon He was overcome, but dignified
in his attitude and in his resignation.”
The King assigned as residence to the Emperor
the castle of Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel, where
he stayed until the end of the war, treated with
all the consideration due to a sovereign. His
Empire crumbled to the dust with Sedan. The
catastrophe of the 2nd of September became
known in Paris on the 3rd. The Government
could not keep it secret. The Revolution, which
had long been latent in the Parisian population,
manifested itself in the Corps Législatif through
the Deputies of the Seine. The defeats of the
6th of August had resulted in the fall of the
Ollivier Ministry; even at that moment the
Emperor was attacked, a Deputy of the Left
demanding, though unsuccessfully, his deposition.
The capitulation of Sedan became the signal of
insurrection. All Paris, the rulers as well as
the people, lost their presence of mind. The
former no longer defended themselves; the latter
92 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
followed the guidance of those who took advan-
tage of the movement. A proposal of deposition,
presented to the Corps Législatif in the sitting
of the 4th of September, was sent to be examined
by the Bureaux, when the Chamber was invaded
by a vast multitude, crying out, “Long live the
Republic l’ The Empress-Regent was obliged to
take refuge in flight from the fury of the rabble.
The Republic was proclaimed at the Hôtel de
Ville; the Deputies of Paris organised an Admini-
stration called ‘the Government of National
T)efence.’
The two great Armies of France, the one
prisoner in Germany, the other pent up in the
fortress of Metz, being no longer an obstacle,
the Armies of King William rapidly advanced
on Paris. The King's headquarters were on
the 5th of September at Rheims, and on the
18th at Ferrières, where the first consultations
on the subject of peace were to be opened.
The Government of National Defence, following
more closely the letter than the spirit of King
William's Proclamation of the 11th of August,
imagined that the fall of the Empire would
simplify the cruel position of France towards
the enemy. The Dynasty which had declared
war being reversed, and the men now in power
having been throughout opposed to war and in
WAR WITH FRANCE 93
favour of German unity, and now demanding
nothing but peace, what motive could the King
of Prussia have to continue the invasion of France 2
It was further to be considered that free France
would defend her integrity to the last drop of her
blood; that she would voluntarily give up neither
an inch of her territory nor a stone of her fortresses.
Such were the ideas which the new Minister of
Foreign Affairs, M. Jules Favre, expressed on the
6th of September, in a circular addressed to the
French agents in foreign countries. The Cabinet
of Berlin was not slow in disabusing him of these
convictions. Far from accepting the view that the
Emperor Napoleon was the sole promoter of war,
Count Bismarck in two despatches of the 13th and
of the 16th of September, threw the responsibility
of the conflict on the French nation. He stated
that the vast majority of the Chambers had voted
for war, and that the Emperor was justified in
assuring the King that he had been forced into a
war to which he was personally averse. The
French nation would not forgive its defeat ; on
the contrary, it would desire to avenge it, even
though Germany were to withdraw her forces
from France without territory or war-contri-
butions. In order to be secure against future
aggression, Germany would ask for guarantees
from the French nation itself, and not from a
WOL II G
94 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
transitory Government. In one word, so as to
make future aggression more difficult, Germany
would extend her frontiers to the south-west,
and transform the French fortresses, hitherto
gates of issue for the aggressor, into bulwarks of
her safety. She had no intention of meddling
with the internal affairs of France, who was
free to adopt any form of Government that
might suit her ; the conditions of peace were
independent of that question ; but in any case,
Germany would require Strasburg and Metz.
Thus the accession to power of the Republican
Government did not modify the reciprocal positions
of the two belligerents. Nevertheless, hope was
entertained in Paris that the friendly intervention
of the great Powers might induce the victor to
soften his rigour. These Powers, some of which
were cool and others timid, and others guided
merely by their selfish interests, had long
renounced any idea of intervention, which, indeed,
the Cabinet of Berlin declined as soon as the
fortune of arms smiled upon Germany in so
extraordinary a manner.
The Imperial Government, after the defeats of
the 6th of August, had begun new negotiations
in Florence with a view to a special alliance with
Italy. The Cabinet of Vienna had withdrawn
under the pretext of difficulties extraneous and
WAR WITH FRANCE 95
internal. Hungary was showing herself partial to
Prussia, and Russia was threatening to turn against
Austria if she espoused the cause of France. In
spite of the friendly disposition of King Victor
Emmanuel, the French Cabinet was unsuccessful
in its application. Prince Jerome Napoleon,
arriving in Florence on the 20th of August on a
special mission, met with a freezing reception.
The Italian Government had, indeed, already
forfeited its liberty of action. On the 9th of
August it concluded an arrangement with England
obliging both countries to act in unison in all
questions relative to neutrality and mediation. The
Italian Government and nation had only one object
in view : the occupation of Rome. The recall of
the French Garrison, the defeats and disorgan-
isation of France facilitated the realisation of that
project which was only prevented by the agreement
made with the Emperor Napoleon. The fall of the
Empire on the 4th of September removed this last
obstacle ; from that moment Italy entered on the
plenitude of her liberty of action, and made use of
it without delay by proceeding to the occupation
of the Eternal City.
On the 19th of September the investment of
Paris was completed. At the desire of the French
Government, the English Cabinet applied to the
German head-quarters, with the object of obtaining
96 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
for M. Jules Favre an interview with Count
Bismarck. This request having been granted, the
two statesmen held conferences, on the 19th and
20th of September, at Ferrières, a castle of Baron
Rothschild near Meaux. During these interviews
the French Minister was sentimental and the
German Minister coldly logical. They could not
come to an agreement on any single point. M.
Jules Favre repeated that the Empire alone wished
for war, and that the nation itself was peacefully
inclined ; Count Bismarck maintained the contrary.
The former wished to buy the ransom of France
with gold, the latter declared that Strasburg and
Metz were the ‘keys of his house,’ and that
Germany insisted on having them. M. Favre
replied that France would consider herself
dishonoured by ceding her Eastern Departments.
Count Bismarck retorted that all great countries
had, since the beginning of history, ceded provinces
after disastrous wars without any detriment
to their honour. Even though she suffered the
loss of Alsace and Lorraine, France would be as
extensive as she was previous to the annexation of
Nice and Savoy. M. Jules Favre expressed
himself willing to accept the Convention of an
Assembly, with armistice and reprovisioning of
Paris, but Bismarck would consent to neither,
unless one of the forts of Paris were given up to
, WAR WITH FRANCE 97
him as well as Toul, Bitche and Strasburg whose
garrison was to be prisoner of war. On being
consulted as to these conditions, the Government
of Paris refused them, and again proclaimed that
France would not cede an inch of her territory.
Meanwhile, in consequence of the investment
of Paris, the Government of National Defence
was divided into two parts; some of its Delegates
withdrew to Tours, forming a delegation of the
central Government which remained in Paris.
The German armies had continued their onward
march, as well as their operations against the
fortresses. Toul capitulated on the 23rd and
Strasburg on the 28th of September. On the 5th
of October, King William had established his head-
quarters at Versailles.
While M. Jules Favre was seeking the
conference with Count Bismarck in order to
ascertain under what conditions France could
obtain peace, the Government of National Defence
made a last attempt to secure allies, or at least
the help of powerful mediators. With this object
M. Thiers, who had placed himself at the disposal
of the Administration of the 4th of September,
was sent on a mission to the European Courts.
From the 12th of September till the 20th of
October, the old statesman visited in succession
London, Vienna, St Petersburg, and Florence.
98 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
In none of these cities were his measures at-
tended with happy results. He was received with
the consideration due to his celebrity; but none
of the Cabinets were inclined to adopt his views.
In London, the Gladstone-Granville Ministry ab-
solutely refused to intervene in this Continental
war even as mediator, much less as the ally of
France; all that M. Thiers could obtain was the
promise that the English Cabinet would recognise
the French Government, the child of Revolution
not yet consecrated by national suffrage. Such
was also the issue of his visit to Vienna, with
this difference : the Imperial Chancellor, Count
Beust, declared himself ready to join any step
that might be taken in favour of France by Russia.
In truth, so far as the attitude of the neutral
Powers was concerned, the key of the situation
was to be found at St Petersburg. At the
beginning of the conflict, the Czar's Court used
its influence with King William to remove the
cause of contention; and it was largely owing to
the urgent advice of Alexander II that King
William brought about the retractation of the
Prince of Hohenzollern. These favourable feelings
had been modified when the French Government
made further exactions after the withdrawal of the
candidature ; nevertheless, Alexander II still
preserved his friendship for France, and advocated,
WAR WITH FRANCE 99
after her first defeats, the preservation of her
entire territory and of the Imperial Dynasty.
The catastrophe of Sedan and the fall of the
Empire gave once more full liberty to Russian
policy, which, from that moment, became pre-
occupied with the transformation of things in
Central Europe, and with the influence it would
have on Russian interests in the East. The
Cabinet of Berlin was quick in deriving advantage
from this situation, and the two sovereigns entered
into reciprocal engagements, which left the one
master of his hostilities with France, and assured
to the other the future help of Prussia in the
projected revision of the Treaty of Paris of 1856.
Russia had thenceforth no other interest than
that of circumscribing the contest between France
and Germany, and of assisting the Cabinet of
Berlin to obtain what it most desired—a prompt
termination to the war. Thus, when M. Thiers
arrived at St Petersburg, he received nothing
but the expression of personal sympathy, coupled
with the reproach, addressed to the Government
of Paris, that the proposals of Ferrières should
have been rejected. He was further told (and he
himself was fully convinced of the fact) that the
Ring of Prussia was compelled to consider the
public opinion of Germany, and that France
would have to resign herself to territorial sacrifices.
Ioo THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The reply of St Petersburg was in substance
identical with that of London. The English
Cabinet had interposed with the object of obtaining
for M. Jules Favre the interview of Ferrières; and
similarly the Russian Cabinet declared itself willing,
if the Government of Paris desired, to obtain for
M. Thiers a meeting with Count Bismarck.
After leaving St Petersburg and passing through
Vienna, where his defeat had been predicted, the
French statesman repaired to Florence, his last
hope, destined to be dispelled like the others.
Ring Victor Emmanuel declared that he was per-
sonally inclined to come to the assistance of France,
but his Ministers were in favour of absolute neu-
trality. France was thus left alone to face
Germany, and either to continue the struggle or
to submit to the conqueror's conditions. In order
to ascertain those conditions, M. Thiers, as soon as
he had returned to Tours, asked permission from
the delegation of the Government to make use
of the Russian offer. Thanks to this offer, he
obtained on the 27th of October a safe-conduct
allowing him to proceed to Paris to obtain the
necessary instructions for negotiations with the
Central Government. * - -
Before the return of M. Thiers to France, and
up to the moment of his arrival at the King of
Prussia's head-quarters at Versailles, events had
JVA R WITH FRANCE IOI
occurred aggravating the condition, already so
desperate, of France. The youngest and most
enterprising member of the Government of Paris,
M. Gambetta, had left the Capital on the 8th of
October in a balloon for Tours. It was his inten-
tion to organise national defence in the Provinces.
The day after his arrival at Tours, he issued a
fiery Proclamation to the French people. He
enumerated the great resources of Paris, which
he declared to be impregnable unless by hunger;
but the city had supplies that would last for
many months, and during that interval the pro-
vinces could come to its assistance. France should
have no other thought besides war and obedience
to the Republic. The French nation must rise as
one man, preferring death to dismemberment. The
actions were suited to the words. With an
energy that called forth universal admiration, the
Government of Tours, over which Gambetta pre-
sided as Dictator, organised resistance, formed a
new army, and gathered together every possible
resource for defence both in men and in materials.
All these efforts could not arrest the progress
of the invasion. From the 11th to the 31st of
October, the Germans took successively Orleans,
Soissons, Schlestadt and Dijon. Round Paris
they repulsed the sallies of Malmaison, Cham-
pigny and le Bourget. But all these defeats of
Io 2 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
heroic soldiers waned when compared to the
appalling and decisive catastrophe of Metz.
After the battle of Gravelotte, Marshal
Bazaine had unsuccessfully attempted several
sallies. He has since been reproached with his long
inaction, which induced people to attribute it to
political calculations and to premeditated betrayal
of his military duties. Without giving judgment
on facts which have not yet been fully elucidated,
we are obliged to own that the Marshal lost
precious time in conferences and negotiations,
thus exhausting the resources which would have
enabled him to hold out a long time against the
besiegers. On the 7th of October, after an
unfortunate battle at Woippy, lasting nine hours,
Bazaine considered the situation desperate. His
only thought was to obtain the most favourable
conditions he could, and with this object he sent
General Boyer to the head-quarters at Versailles.
Marshal Bazaine and his officers still held
themselves to be bound by their oath to the
Empress-Regent, and consequently incompetent
to treat with the enemy without her sanction.
That was far from being an obstacle in the eyes
of the King of Prussia and his Chancellor. On
the contrary, the revolution of the 4th of September
received anything but the sympathy of the King.
In order to overcome his repugnance to the new
WAR WITH FRANCE IO3
*
Government of Paris, it required the most
energetic representations of the Chancellor, who
declared to the whole world that it was immaterial
to him with what sort of Government he negotiated
provided it accepted his conditions. It was only
when the Government of Paris refused to consent
to territorial cessions, that Count Bismarck
transferred his efforts to the Empress who had
taken refuge in England. That Princess showed
herself impervious to all his overtures. In the
latter part of September she wrote epistles to
the Emperors of Russia and Austria, imploring
their intervention to save France from dismember-
ment, whatever might be the form of its Govern-
ment. She firmly resisted all suggestions made
to her to treat directly with Prussia, and constantly
refused to augment by any act of hers the
difficulties under which the new rulers of France
were labouring.
Marshal Bazaine offered to treat for his army
and for the fortress of Metz ; he demanded the
free departure of his forces with confinement in
France, and promise not to bear arms against
Germany during the remainder of the war. These
conditions were rejected. The authorities at King
William's head-quarters could not treat with the
army of Metz without negotiating peace at the
same time ; but peace could not be concluded
IoA THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
without the Empress-Regent, who was to come
with her son to Metz, to place herself in the midst
of the Army, and then to open conferences.
General Boyer, after returning to Metz to
confer with the Marshal, proceeded to London to
the Empress who, after several days' reflection,
answered the Prussian proposal in the negative.
Obeying the same sentiments of patriotism that
had guided her conduct since the 4th of September,
she refused to take part in a scheme which would
have the effect of placing the Imperial Army of
Metz in opposition to that of the Loire, formed by
the Republican Government, and which might
probably add to the already overwhelming mis-
fortunes of France the still more terrible scourge
of Civil War. She wrote to the King of Prussia
proposing a fortnight's truce and the reprovisioning
of Metz; but she declined, for her part, to treat on
the basis of French dismemberment. That was
the definitive rupture of all negotiations, and the
fall of Metz became only a question of a few days.
On the 21st of October, the Army encamped
within the walls of Metz found itself without
provisions. On that day, the first suggestion made
was to attempt a rally, less in the hope of victory
than with the design of diminishing the number of
men to be fed. At the last moment Bazaine
opposed this measure, thinking that a fews days'
WAR WITH FRANCE IoS
prolongation of barren resistance would be too
dearly bought at the price of terrible bloodshed.
From that moment he formed the resolution of
capitulating. Negotiations with Prince Frederick
Charles, nephew of the King and Commander-in-
Chief of the besieging Army, were opened on the
25th, and terminated on the 27th of October.
The conditions were identical with those of Sedan :
capitulation of the town and its forts with all the
material of war, all the army of the Rhine to be
prisoners and the officers to be liberated on parole.
Enthusiasm was at its highest in the German
Camp and at the King's head-quarters. The
consequences of this victory were accurately esti-
mated. Prince Frederick Charles issued a pro-
clamation congratulating his soldiers on this
triumph over the ‘best army of France,’ on having
taken Metz which had never been taken before,
and on ‘reconquering this bulwark of Germany, by
which victory,’ he continued, ‘the power of France
is broken. The importance of this event is
incalculable.” King William expressed equal joy
in his telegrams to the Queen, in his letters
to the German sovereigns and princes, and in
his Proclamation to the Army. “Never,’ he said,
‘has there been a more glorious war. The last
of the hostile armies, which has been in the field
since July, is annihilated.’ At the same time
Ioô THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
he raised Marshal Moltke to the rank of Count,
and made Field-Marshals of his son the Crown
Prince and of his nephew Prince Frederick
Charles, the one commander of the army of Sedan,
the other commander of that of Metz. “It is
the first instance of such a nomination in our
House,’ he wrote to the Queen when informing
her of it. The King of Bavaria congratulated
him in a telegram, adding that he would be
surnamed by posterity: “William the Victorious,’
‘Wilhelm der Siegreiche.” The King of Wurtem-
berg expressed himself in terms equally eloquent.
Very different, as we may believe, was the
effect produced on the Government of Tours by the
catastrophe of Metz. M. Gambetta addressed the
French people in an impassioned Proclamation.
‘Marshal Bazaine is a traitor l’ he exclaimed.
‘He has made himself the tool of the man of
Sedan, the accomplice of the invader.” He
implored the nation to save itself, accusing the
Empire of being the cause of all their disasters,
and declaring that France would never own herself
conquered. ‘You have been betrayed, he said,
addressing the Army, “not dishonoured. Now
that you are liberated from your unworthy leaders,
fight for the preservation of France l’ At the
same time the Government of Tours issued a
decree ordering universal levy. War to the knife
WAR WITH FRANCE Io'ſ
was resolved upon at the very moment when
M. Thiers was about to negotiate at the German
head-quarters.
M. Thiers, on his arrival in Paris on the 30th
of October, was the first to bring the news of the
capitulation of Metz which he himself had learnt
on his way to the capital, and which the Govern-
ment of Paris had contradicted on the previous
day. As soon as it was spread in the evening,
this news produced the most painful emotion,
increased by the further intelligence that the
Germans had reconquered, on the same day, after
a bloody skirmish, the position of Le Bourget in
the outskirts of the capital. The leaders of the
democratic party, who had previously made vain
attempts at insurrection, now used with greater
success the irritation of the masses to overthrow
the Government of the Hotel de Ville. The
members of that Administration were made
prisoners by the rioters on the 31st of October,
but were subsequently rescued by a battalion of
the National Guard devoted to the cause of order.
So as to shelter itself from future attacks, the
Government convoked on the 3rd of November the
electors who voted almost unanimously for the
existing régime.
M. Thiers, on leaving Paris, was able to see the
commencement of the insurrection ; but for two
Io.8 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AM D HIS REIGN
days he remained ignorant of its issue. He came
to Versailles, in compliance with the advice of the
neutral Powers, to prepare an armistice which
should enable an Assembly to meet, with which
the German Cabinet could treat about peace. It
is not certain that either party was desirous of
realising this scheme. We have seen above that
Tours wished for war to the knife, and that it did
not doubt that new armies could relieve Paris.
M. Gambetta was desirous of delaying the elections
until France had obtained a decisive victory.
Accordingly, in authorising M. Thiers to treat for
an armistice, the Government of Tours was particu-
larly anxious not to offend the neutral Powers
that had counselled that measure. The views of
the Government of Paris were not very different
from those of the Delegation of Tours; only in
Paris the rulers were made very timid in taking
any step resembling capitulation, because of public
opinion, suspicious, hostile and menacing.
At the head-quarters at Versailles was to be
found no eagerness to suspend military operations.
The Germans thought Paris more exhausted than
it really was; and, foreseeing an early surrender
of the city, they were loth to agree to a truce,
more favourable to the adversary who was reor-
ganising his forces, than to the German Armies.
whom it would arrest in the course of their vic-
WAR WITH FRANCE Io9
tories. But there as well, political prevailed over
military considerations. The English Cabinet and
the Emperor of Russia had strongly urged the
necessity of an armistice. South Germany was
beginning to weary of the war, in which its
sovereign did not take a personal part, and the
end of which would be advantageous for the new
organisation of Germany. They therefore con-
sented to hold a conference with the French
delegate.
The negotiations of Versailles lasted five days.
M. Thiers explained that he appeared in deference
to the wishes of the neutral Powers. Count
Bismarck, on his side, made much of Germany's
concession in treating with a Republican Govern-
ment not yet recognised, whilst the Imperial
Government, represented by the Emperor resident
at Cassel, was the only one acknowledged by
Europe. He also pointed out the military
advantages which France, more than Germany,
would derive from the armistice. On certain
points an agreement was easily made : such as an
armistice of four weeks, free elections, the meeting
of an Assembly in Paris or elsewhere, as might
suit the French Government.” The only question
which frustrated the negotiation, was the repro-
visioning of Paris which M. Thiers demanded,
whereas the German General Staff was against it,
WOL II H
IIo THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
or would only admit it on the condition that two of
the Parisian forts should be surrendered. On
hearing these stipulations, from which Count
Bismarck, after conferring with the King and the
Generals, declared that he would not recede, M.
Thiers asked to be allowed to consult the Govern-
ment of Paris. For that purpose the latter
delegated M. Jules Favre and General Ducrot, who
went to confer with M. Thiers in a house near the
Pont de Sèvres. The result of this deliberation
was negative. Contrary to the advice of M.
Thiers, who insisted above all on the urgency of
convoking an Assembly, the members of the
Government rejected the German conditions, as they
dreaded any responsibility before the threatening
attitude of the masses. M. Thiers left Versailles
to return to Tours on the 7th of November.
The Cabinet of Berlin was careful to cast the
responsibility of this abortive conference on the
members of the French Government. The speech
read in the name of the King on the 24th of
November at the opening of the Extraordinary
Session of the Parliament of the North, attributed
the continuation of the war by France to the
absence of a Government whose members “would
consider their own future inseparable from that of
their country.’ It accused them of sacrificing the
forces of a whole nation in a fruitless struggle.
WAR WITH FRANCE I I I
Undoubtedly, it added, ‘this war will weaken
France seriously; but she will not forget her
defeats; she will desire to avenge them later on.
For that reason Germany will be obliged to secure
a frontier easy of defence and of a nature to
preserve the South from the dangers of a menacing
position which France owed to her conquests of the
past.’ -
As we have said above, the Government of
Tours hoped for success in the struggle about to
recommence, and this opinion was then shared by
the majority of Frenchmen. They did not think
that all was lost, and they considered that their
honour required them to take arms once more
against the enemy who had announced his intention
of demanding important territorial cessions.
A large army had been formed on the Loire, and
as soon as the negotiations of Versailles were
broken off, that army took the offensive. It began
with some success. On the 9th of November,
after a victorious skirmish at Coulmiers, the French
compelled the enemy to evacuate Orléans, from
whence they hoped to fight their way as far as
Fontainbleau to relieve Paris. But their early
success was of short duration. They were repulsed
on the 28th of November at Beaune-la-Rolande,
and a series of hostilities round Orléans brought
the Germans back to that town on the 4th of
II 2 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
December. In the month of November, the enemy
had taken possession of the fortresses of Verdun,
Nouveau-Brisach, Ham, Thionville, and la Fére.
Amiens was occupied on the 4th, and Rouen on
the 5th of December. From that moment the
Army of the Loire, formed with so much zeal and
care, and the foundation of so many hopes, was
annihilated. )
Paris had also made prodigious efforts.
Several sallies were attempted from the 29th
of November to the 2nd of December. They
were heroic combats, in which all the united
forces in the capital took part. After two days
of furious fighting, the French army was thrown
behind the Marne; and the positions it had main-
tained on that river were taken on the 2nd of
December. The hope of effecting a junction
between the armies of the Loire and of Paris
had to be abandoned. The King of Prussia
confirmed this result in an order of the day to
the Army on the 6th of December. ‘The Armies
of the Empire,’ he said, ‘and those of National
Defence, are defeated ; the German troops have
passed beyond Rouen, Orléans, Dijon. If the
enemy insists on continuing war, the German
Army will persevere in its efforts until it obtains
a peace worthy of its great sacrifices.’
This peace was to contain, over and above
WAR WITH FRANCE II 3
the conditions to be imposed upon the vanquished,
certain results as to which the conquerors would
have to come to an agreement between themselves.
We have seen above that before the war the
Cabinet of Berlin had centered its efforts on the
union of the Southern States with the Northern
Confederation. While avoiding any ostensible
pressure on the sovereigns of those States, it
had employed all its diplomacy to bring them
to draw still closer the bonds formed by the
Treaties of Alliance of 1866 and by the union of
the Douanes. King William would personally
have desired to receive an external symbol of
Prussian supremacy in Germany. In 1866 his
great object had been to increase the area of his
dominions; German unity was to him at that
time only a secondary consideration. Having
attained that object, and seeing no immediate
prospect of enlarging his hereditary States,
Federal Reform occupied his ambition. He had
destroyed the ancient Confederation, which had
been, in spite of its faulty constitution, the
official representation of National Unity. Was
not Prussia bound to indemnify the nation for
loss 2 Could she allow it to be said that she
enjoyed the advantages of the war without caring
for the fate of Germany ? Full of these considera-
tions, the King was preparing himself to seek new
114 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
greatness with the view of exalting still more the
prestige of his house while remaining in touch
with the views of the majority of German
patriots.
While awaiting the moment of freeing himself
from the restrictive clauses of the Treaty of
Prague, the King would willingly have accepted
the title of Emperor of North Germany. To
that effect, some time before the war of 1870,
conferences had been opened with the Kings
of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. King William only
asked them to recognise his Imperial title,
promising to adhere strictly in every other respect
to the Treaties of 1866. The Cabinet of Berlin
said that the object of this measure was to
consecrate before foreign powers the unity of
Germany, exposed to the hostility of France
and to the dubious attitude of Austria. Would
not the King of Prussia, in assuming the Imperial
title, put a stop to any further aggressions of
the house of Hapsburg 2 Serious opposition
would not be made by France, too much occupied,
in Prussian opinion, by internal complications
to object to a measure sanctioned by the sovereigns
of the South. But that sanction it was not so
easy to obtain. Neither the King of Bavaria
nor the King of Wurtemberg showed them-
selves inclined to espouse the views of Prussia.
WAR WITH FRANCE II 5
Accordingly, the negotiations fell to the ground:
and considering the state of opinion at Munich
and Stuttgart, they would probably not have been
revived but for the sudden declaration of war
by France. -
The Southern Governments, whatever may
have been their reluctance to join Prussian policy,
would have found it most difficult to resist, had
they been so inclined, the popular movement of
Germany. The French Government, by its con-
duct in the Hohenzollern affair, and by the rupture
it had precipitated, was playing the part of an
aggressor, and that aggression was threatening the
whole of Germany. Undoubtedly, the Southern
States could have proclaimed their neutrality by
the help of sound guarantees and of vigorous and
prompt military action of France; but the French
Cabinet was not desirous of that neutrality, which
would in truth have fettered the co-operation of
Italy and Austria, on which it relied. They were
in consequence compelled to come to an immediate
decision, because events were crowding on each
other with prodigious rapidity. The rulers of
Wurtemberg and Bavaria could not forget the
terrible lesson of 1866, when the Kings of Han-
over and Saxony, the Duke of Nassau and the
Elector of Hesse-Cassel had seen their States
invaded and their crowns lost or imperilled,
II 6 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
for not having accepted the alliance of their mighty
neighbour. In the impossibility of making common
cause with France against a German Power, and
not being able to assert their neutrality, the
Southern sovereigns decided without hesitation to
follow the general current. This resolution saved
their thrones, but involved them still more in the
policy of submission to Prussia. The Emperor
Napoleon began war with Prussia at the moment
when she was about to cross the demarcation of
the Main, and to consummate the union of North
and South. When the Emperor had been defeated
at Sedan, Prussia saw no further reason to hold
the Treaty of Prague in esteem, because Austria
would certainly not draw her sword to enforce its
stipulations. The natural consequence of the
events of Sedan was to establish triumphantly
Prussian supremacy throughout Germany. The
sovereigns of the South had no choice but to bend
before circumstances. A certain tinge of covetous-
ness was cast over their resolution, taken in the
month of September, of opening negotiations
as to their becoming members of the Prussian
Confederation.
The German Armies were in possession of the
Provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and there was
every appearance that this occupation would end
in definitive conquest. To whom would those
JVA R WITH FRANCE I 17
‘Provinces belong Such was the question asked
in the Courts of the South, giving rise to a
multitude of speculations. At Carlsruhe the wish
was expressed of uniting those territories to the
Grand Duchy of Baden, thus forming a Kingdom
to be ruled by the Grand-Duke, son-in-law of the
Ring of Prussia. Bavaria should receive compen-
sation in the Baden Palatinate with Heidelberg.
But such projects could not be realised without
the consent of Prussia, whose good graces would
have to be purchased by absolute submission to her
plans of German reorganisation. Prussia, too, had
her reasons for considering the Southern Courts,
and Bavaria in particular. Having decided on
taking Strasburg and Metz from France, she could
only justify that conquest by considerations of
the safety of South Germany, and she could only
defend these interests by effecting the union of
North and South. She found it necessary to realise
this union at any price, even by some concessions
in favour of the autonomy of those States, and
especially of Bavaria.
Such was the spirit in which negotiations were
opened, in the middle of September 1870, between
Bavaria and Prussia, with the participation of
Baden, Wurtemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt. They
were commenced at Munich, but soon transferred
to Versailles, to King William's head-quarters.
II 8 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND H IS REIG. W.
Prussia asked at first for entire and unreserved
adhesion to the Northern Confederation, a solution
acceptable to Baden, Wurtemberg and Hesse-
Darmstadt, but not to Bavaria who demanded
for herself the preservation of certain rights, and
for her King a privileged position in the future
Confederation next to the King of Prussia. The
negotiations with Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt
came to a conclusion on the 15th of November ;
and on the 25th, Wurtemberg accepted the same
arrangement. These three States agreed to the
constitution, slightly modified, of the Northern
Confederation; the new treaties were completed
by military conventions, establishing the fusion
of the respective Corps d'Armée with the Federal
Army of the North, under the command of the
King of Prussia.
The Treaty with Bavaria was signed at
Versailles on the 23rd of November. The con-
cessions obtained by the Cabinet of Munich were
reduced to mere trifles, and yet excessive in the
eyes of the Centralists of the North, though far
too insignificant to satisfy the Federalists of the
South. The King of Bavaria was allowed the
command of his army in time of peace. He was
granted the administration of the Post-Office
and partial autonomy of indirect contributions.
A committee was conceded, in the Federal
WAR WITH FRANCE I IQ
Conncil, for Foreign Affairs under the Presidency
of Bavaria. The right of the King of Prussia,
as President of this Council, to declare war,
was made conditional on its consent.
Such were the Treaties submitted on the 24th
of November to the sanction of the Parliament of
the North, assembled in an Extraordinary Session.
They met with intense opposition from the National
Liberal and from the Progressive Party. Some
attacked the concessions made to Bavaria; others
demanded a Constitutional Assembly to examine
the Treaties. For several days it was doubtful how
the Parliament would vote, because of the attitude
of the National Liberals. To overcome this opposi-
tion, Bismarck's intervention was required, and he
made the acceptation a question of Cabinet. The
Parliament sanctioned the Treaties on the 10th of
December.
According to the Treaties, the new association
received the title of Germanic Confederation, and
the King of Prussia that of its President. These
titles were soon to undergo an important altera-
tion. The King of Bavaria, satisfied with the
concessions, more apparent than real, made by the
Prussian Cabinet to his rights of sovereignty,
consented to defer to the wishes of King William.
On the 4th of December, King Louis addressed
him a letter, informing him that he had invited
I 20 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM A ND HIS REIGN
the Confederate sovereigns to revive the German
Empire and to confer the title of Emperor on the
President of the Confederation. In his communi-
cation to the sovereigns, the King of Bavaria laid
great stress on the confraternity of arms of the
German tribes ‘commanded by the heroic King
of Prussia,’ and he esteemed himself happy in
being entitled by his position to take the first
step towards the coronation of German Unity.
The sovereigns immediately gave their consent,
so that the Imperial titles could be introduced
into the new Constitution before the final vote
of the Parliament of the North. This Assembly
passed, on the same day, an address to the future
Emperor to prove their adhesion to the measure
taken by the sovereigns, and nominated a deputa-
tion of thirty members to carry that address to
Versailles.
Following the example of the Parliament of
the North, the Chambers of Baden, Wurtemberg,
and Hesse-Darmstadt sanctioned the Treaties of
Union, without any opposition worth mentioning,
in the month of December. The Bavarian Upper
Chamber was equally pliant. But the Lower
Bavarian Chamber was bitterly hostile. It
required all the eloquence of the Ministers to
carry the vote against a commission which had,
by an overwhelming majority, advocated the
WAR WITH FRANCE I 2 I
rejection of the Treaties as injurious to the
sovereignty and autonomy of Bavaria. The
speeches of the Ministers, without denying that
the country was making sacrifices to Prussian
supremacy, may be resumed in the argument that
Bavaria was absolutely bound to ratify the Treaties,
as her isolated opposition could not possibly be of
any avail. After lengthy debates, occupying no
less than ten sittings, the Chamber passed an
assenting vote on the 23rd of January 1871,
though with the protestation of a large number
of members.
To tell the truth, King William attached slight
importance to the votes of the various Chambers.
He was not desirous of receiving his new dignity
from the hands of a Parliament ; the assent of the
sovereigns was in his eyes far more essential. The
arrival of the Deputation of the Parliament of the
North did not give him much pleasure : he had
even expressed himself rather ironically on the part
which some of the Liberal Leaders, former
adversaries of his policy, had taken in the decision
of the Parliament. While consenting to receive
the Deputation, he would only do so after being in
possession of the answers of all the sovereigns.
For that reason the Deputation, which had arrived
at Versailles on the 16th of December, was not
received until the 18th, at which date the Treaties
I 22 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
had not yet obtained the sanction of the Southern
States.
This reception took place on a Sunday at the
Prefecture of Versailles where the King resided.
A service had been previously celebrated in the
Chapel of the Palace, temporarily arranged for
Protestant rites. During the audience, the King
was attended by the Crown Prince, some other
members of his family, several Confederate
sovereigns, a large number of German Princes,
the Federal Chancellor Count Bismarck, and a
numerous staff of Generals and officers. The
speaker of the Deputation was President Simson,
the very man who, twenty-one years previously,
had harangued Frederick William IV on a similar
occasion. It is true that the positions were
reversed. On the 3rd of April 1849, Simson
offered, in the name of the National Parliament
of Francfort, a Crown which the King refused by
saying that in his opinion the Parliament was
giving what only the sovereigns had the right to
give. On the 18th of December 1870, Simson
brought the acquiescence of the Parliament to an
act accomplished by the sovereigns on their own
authority and without having consulted their
Chambers. Thus King William gave his accept-
ance under conditions, the absence of which had
formerly caused his brother's refusal.
WAR WITH FRANCE - I 23
The address of the Parliament of the North
and the speech of its President, betrayed great
irritation against France. The one energetically
praised the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, the
other dwelt with pride on the spot where this
ceremony was taking place: ; a town where more
than one war had been meditated and carried out
against our fatherland,’ and recalled to memory the
fact that near at hand treaties had been concluded,
resulting in the downfall of the ancient German
Empire. The same spirit breathed throughout the
answer which the King read in a voice quiver-
ing with emotion. He praised the ‘miraculous
decree' of Providence, which united him to the
representatives of the nation in the old residence of
the Kings of France; he could only attribute to
God victories such as he dared not hope for at the
beginning of the war; he promised not to sheathe
his sword until he had secured the German
frontiers against future aggression ; and he con-
cluded by thanking the Deputies for their address,
although at the same time he emphasized the
previous consent of all the sovereigns.
Such was the solemnity performed while the
cannons were thundering on Mount Valérien.
Some days afterwards, it had a characteristic
epilogue. On the 1st of January 1871, when
the Generals were dining with the Emperor
124 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
William, the Grand-Duke of Baden reminded
them of the saying of Frederick William IV:
‘An Imperial Crown can only be conquered on
the field of battle,’ and he added: ‘This saying
has been verified by the Emperor.’ On the
same day the Emperor seized the occasion of
justifying his policy against the former attacks of
the Liberal Party. Receiving a Deputation
from the Prussian Herrenhaus, he thanked them
for the constant support they had given to his
plan of reorganisation of the Army, even at
a time when it met with an opposition that might
have been ruinous to the future of Prussia.
If the 18th of December 1870 had allowed the
civil element to appear for a moment, the 18th of
January 1871 was entirely dedicated to the Army.
The constitution of the new Empire had been
promulgated on the 30th of December. On the
18th of January, the anniversary of the coronation
of the first King of Prussia, the Emperor William
addressed a proclamation to the German People
and an order to the Army to notify that he had
yielded to the desire of the German sovereigns
that he should ‘revive and accept the Imperial
dignity which had been in abeyance for sixty
years.’ These few words epitomised the triumph
of the House of Hohenzollern, which had assumed
the Crown of Charlemagne after it had been aban-
WAR WITH FRANCE I25
doned by the House of Hapsburg. But that which
imparted the true characterisation to this revival of
the Empire, was the exclusively military style of the
solemnity which took place that day at Versailles.
All the Prussian and German Princes, the
Ministers, 500 Generals and Officers, deputations of
all the Corps d'Armée engaged in the siege, with
their flags, were assembled in the “Galerie des
Glaces’ of the Palace. An altar had been erected,
at which the Almoner of the Army celebrated
Divine Service, followed by a sermon. Then,
passing before the standard-bearers, the Emperor
read the Decree of the Promulgation of the
Bmpire, and then gave the two proclamations to
the Nation and to the Army to be read by the
Federal Chancellor.
Thus the German Empire was revived in the
midst of a bloody war, under the walls of the
enemy's capital, and accompanied by the thunder-
ing of the cannons; it was proclaimed before those
who had been most prominent in creating it, and
who were henceforth destined to be its guardians.
This military origin of the new German Empire
is of vast importance; it gives it its fundamental
character; it establishes its basis and its principle
of existence, according to the law that makes
empires derive their vitality from the principle to
which they owe their birth.
VOL. II I
CHAPTER XIV
THE END OF THE WAR. THE TREATY
OF PEACE.—187()-1873
WAR CONTINUED BY THE DELEGATION OF TOUR.S.—PUBLIC OPINION
IN FRANCE FAVOURABLE TO PEACE.—NEW DEFEATS OF THE
FRENCH FORCES. — BOMBARDMENT OF PARIS. — USELESS
MEASURES OF DIPLOMACY. —BIOTS IN PARIS.—CAPITULATION.—
GAMBETTA’s OPPOSITION.—NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF BORDEAUX.—
PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE AT VERSAILLES.—ANNEXATION OF
ALSACE AND LORRAINE DIECIDED LONG BEFORE BY GERMANY. —
INDEMNITY OF WAR.—FRESH DISTURBANCES IN PARIS.—THE
GERMAN TROOPS ENTER PARIS. — REVIEW OF THE GERMAN
TRoops AT LONGCHAMPS. — THE EMPEROR's TELEGRAMS
ANNOUNCING VICTORY..—HIS RESENTMENT AGAINST THE FRENCH
NATION. — REJOICINGS IN BERLIN DISTURBED BY THE COM-
MUNIST INSURRECTION IN PARIS.—BISMARCK MISUNDERSTANDS
THE CHARACTER OF THIS INSURRECTION.—NEUTRAL ATTITUDE
OF THE GERMAN TROOPS.— THE GOVERNMENT PREOCCUPIED
WITH THE QUESTION OF PAYING THE INDEMNITY. —FRUITLESS
NEGOTIATIONS OF PEACE AT BRUSSELS.—THE EMPEROR WILLIAM
AND THE FRENCEI REVOLUTION.—M. THIERS URGES THE LIBERA-
TION OF FRENCH TERRITORY...—THE RESULT OF THE LOAN OF
THREE MILLIARDS CAUSES ASTONISHMENT IN. GERMANY.
EVACUATION OF FRENCEL TERRITORY. — JUDGMENT ON THE
CONDITIONS IMPOSED UPON FRANCE. –GERMANY EXPLAINS THE
7"HE END OF THE JVA R 127
MOTIVES OF HER RIGOUR.—TO WHOM MUST THE CONQUERED
PROVINCES BELONG ! — ALSACE-LORRAINE DECLARED A
COUNTRY OF THE EMPIRE. –GERMANY IHOPES TO RECONCILE
THE ANNEXED POPULATIONS BY A POLICY OF PATIENCE AND
GENTLENESS.—PROMISES OF AUTONOMY.—A DICTATORIAL REGIME
ESTABLISHED FOR TWO YEARS.
WHILE the Emperor William was inaugurating at
Versailles the revival of the German Empire, the
scourge of war was desolating France. In
consequence of the defeat of the Army of the
Loire, the delegation of the Government of Paris
was obliged to leave Tours and take refuge at
Bordeaux, where it established itself on the 9th of
December. At that epoch, the French public,
discouraged by the long series of defeats, shaken by
the suffering inflicted on the country by the
prolongation of war, disenchanted as to the military
usefulness of the new levies, began to reconcile itself
to the idea of peace. The nation had fulfilled all
the duties imposed upon it by patriotism. After
Sedan, it had offered heroic resistance to the
invasion, and had honourably sustained the conflict
with the numerous and admirably organised armies
of Germany. Considering this crushing superiority
of the enemy, France, unable as she was rapidly to
repair her disasters, and occupying an isolated
position in Europe, might well submit without
shame to the consequence of her defeat, that is,
to the signature of peace. Such, however, was not
I 28 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
the opinion of the two chiefs of National Defence,
M. Gambetta at Bordeaux and General Trochu in
Paris. They sincerely believed that they could
retrieve the fallen fortunes of France by prolonged
resistance. Strongly against the wish of a large
part of the nation, war was continued, producing
during two weary months nothing but a new and
lamentable series of defeats and disasters. In the
month of December, the names of Beaugency,
Dieppe, Blois, Phalsburg, Montmédy, Vendôme,
Nuits, Tours, Amiens; in January 1871, those of
Mézières, Bapaume, Rocroy, Villersexel, Péronne,
Mans, Alençon, Saint Quentin, Longwy, only
remind us of lost battles, of fortresses stormed or
reduced to capitulation, and of the German invasion
penetrating more and more into the interior of
France. Bapaume was in reality a success for the
French Army of the North, but it was a victory
without any practical result.
The Army of Paris was not more fortunate.
After the battle of Champigny on the 2nd of ~
T}ecember, the iron circle had completely closed
round the capital which the German Army then
proceeded to appal by bombardment. Even in
November hopes were still entertained at the head
quarters at Versailles, that Paris would give way
as soon as she was exhausted and without pro-
visions, and that the fall of the capital would be
THE END OF THE WAR I 29
followed by the submission of the whole country.
In the entourage of the King and of his advisers,
many people believed that they would spend
Christmas at Berlin. Early in December, their
hopes became less confident, and the plan of
reducing Paris by bombardment was being sug-
gested. Count Bismarck was strongly in its
favour; the prolonged resistance of Paris was not
without causing him anxiety. What he most
dreaded, was the intervention of the neutral
Powers in his negotiations of peace with France,
an intervention that might be detrimental to
Germany. The more the war was prolonged,
the more probable such an intervention was
becoming. The Chancellor urged the King to
accelerate the preparations of bombardment, for
which the General Staff had long been clamoring.
Very powerful feminine influences had been
opposed to this project from reasons of humanity,
and from the consideration of the danger threaten-
ing the countless monuments and treasures of art
contained in the French capital. But views of
this nature could not long prevail over German
soldiers and statesmen. Towards the end of
December, everything was ready for the bom-
bardment, which began on the 27th of that month.
It was continued almost without interruption
throughout the whole of January. Its results
130 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
were but insignificant from a military point of view,
but it caused terrible disasters and disturbances
in the interior of the besieged city.
Foreign Diplomacy made an attempt to stop
the bombardment. The heads of the Eumbassies
who had remained in Paris, addressed, on the 13th
of January, a communication to Count Bismarck,
in which they mentioned the disastrous effects of
the bombs that had struck women, children and
invalids of every nationality, imperilling the lives
and possessions of all ; they therefore implored
the Federal Chancellor to give orders for the
protection of foreigners, to whose departure the
belligerents opposed difficulties. This step was
not attended with success. Count Bismarck, in
his reply to the Diplomatists, declared that the
foreigners had to thank themselves for the danger
they were in by staying in a besieged city; that
Paris being the fortified camp of a hostile Army,
the laws of war allowed its reduction by every
possible means; that the hospitals were not ex-
pressly chosen to be fired at ; and that it was
impossible to prevent the deplorable fatalities from
so great a distance.
The resistance of Paris was, however, drawing
to its close. On the 19th of January, General
Trochu made a sally with all the forces at his
disposal. The Army was thrown back with great
THE END OF THE WAR’ I3 I
loss, and was compelled to withdraw into the city.
That was the last attempt, and its failure, becom-
ing the pretext of popular riots, resulted in the
dismissal of General Trochu. The provisions were
all but exhausted, the communistic element
hampered the measures of defence, which became
weaker and weaker as one defeat followed the
other.
The Government of Paris, no longer paying
heed to the high-flown declarations of the fanatics
who desired a universal sally, resolved on treating
about the capitulation. On the 23rd of January,
M. Jules Favre repaired to Versailles to confer
with Bismarck. The next day and the following
days he was again at Versailles, where he signed,
on the 28th of January, a Convention, of which
the principal conditions were: an armistice of three
weeks, ending on the 19th of February, with
reprovisioning of Paris; the surrender of the forts
and of the material of war; the disarmament of
the ‘enceinte,' the National Guard to keep its arms
and to maintain order; the extension of the
armistice to the rest of France, to begin in three
days; the convocation at Bordeaux of a National
Assembly, freely elected, to decide on the continua-
tion of war or the conditions of peace; the payment
by the city of Paris of a war contribution of
200,000,000 Francs. In that convention, the
132 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
conditions of which were fairly moderate as far
as Paris was concerned, the French negotiator
had omitted to provide for the safety of the Army
of the East, which was in great danger at that
moment, having been excluded from the benefit of
the truce. Accordingly, pursued to the Swiss
frontier, that last Army of France, amounting to
80,000 men, was compelled, on the 1st of February,
to take refuge in Switzerland where it was dis-
armed.
Thus the war was virtually at an end. It was
in vain that M. Gambetta attempted at Bordeaux
to continue hostilities in the Provinces and to
prevent the meeting of the National Assembly,
by excluding from it a vast category of individuals,
all those who had served under the Empire or
had been its partizans. The country desired peace ;
the restrictive measures relating to the elections
were annulled by the Government of Paris on
Bismarck protesting strongly against them.
The French National Assembly met at Bordeaux
on the 12th of February; it was composed mostly
of adversaries of the Republic and of determined
partizans of peace; in this respect it was the
faithful representative of national opinion. The
next day it received the resignation of the Govern-
ment of National Defence; it nominated, on the
17th, M. Thiers head of the Executive, and on
THE END OF THE WAR I 33
the 19th, it entrusted him with the mission of
proceeding to Versailles to treat for peace.
The negotiations were opened at the German
head-quarters on the 21st of February. It was
well known at Versailles that M. Thiers came
with the firm determination of concluding peace
without delay. He had announced it at Bordeaux
when accepting power. ‘To make peace,’ he
exclaimed, “to reorganise and strengthen credit,
to revive industry, such is the only policy conceive-
able at this moment.” With such a negotiator,
enjoying the full approval of the National Assembly,
the Emperor William had no cause to apprehend
the possibility of disagreement as to conditions
settled beforehand, and about which the sovereign
and his entourage were to show themselves inflexible.
But the negotiations did not proceed without
a hitch ; at certain moments they threatened to
break off; the enormous sum fixed for indemnity
and the extent of the territorial concessions,
demanded by Germany, made M. Thiers recoil
aghast. He well knew the unpopularity he
would incur by agreeing to such conditions. The
first measure taken was the prolongation of
the armistice until the 26th of February : five
days alone remained to bring the negotiations
to a close; Germany had formed the resolution of
not allowing a longer delay.
134 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The historical fact, which is perhaps the most
prominent of the 19th century, and whose influence
will extend for many years over the connection of
France and Germany, we mean the annexation of
Alsace-Lorraine to the latter country, was not
entirely an improvisation of the war of 1870. The
German historian who replied to M. Thiers that
Germany was waging war, not against France, but
against the conquests of Louis XIV, was only
repeating a doctrine taught for over half a century
in the German Universities, and written in
countless German books and newspapers. In 1814,
when the peace of Paris was concluded, influential
voices were raised to demand that France should
be deprived of her Eastern Provinces. The leaders
of German Catholicism were the first to demand
this chastisement of Revolutionary France. Their
opinion did not prevail over the coalesced Govern-
ments. They were further aware of the fact that
the inhabitants of these Provinces were unwilling
to be separated from France. Professor Görres, of
the Munich University, lamented this 'unwilling-
mess, but predicted that Alsace and Lorraine would
be in the future a cause of contention between
France and Germany.
The idea of reconquering Alsace and Lorraine
had not ceased to haunt the students of the
German Universities. Count Bismarck agreed on
THE END OF THE WAR’ I 35
this point with the Professors, his former masters.
‘I could well understand,’ he wrote in 1848 in a
Prussian paper, ‘that the first manifestation of
German strength and unity should be the recon-
quest of Alsace and the hoisting of the German
flag on Strasburg Cathedral.’ A sovereign of
South Germany, King William of Wurtemberg,
was of the same opinion when the war broke out
in the East in 1854. According to him, it would
be necessary to give Strasburg to South Germany
in order to make its inhabitants enthusiastic for
German Unity, as France would be able to invade
the Southern States before the Confederation
could come to their assistance. The old King,
in giving utterance to this opinion, could not
foresee that in 1870 France would be quite un-
prepared for such an invasion.
In 1866, on the eve of the war with Austria,
Bismarck's thoughts were again turned to Alsace.
At the last moment, according to an account he
himself gave later on, he made overtures to the
Emperor Francis Joseph with the object of com-
ing to an agreement with Austria. ‘We have
powerful armies,’ he said: ‘let us unite and make
an evolution to the West ; let Austria to the
South, Prussia to the North, march against
France; reconquer Alsace, and make of Strasburg
a Federal Fortress. Undoubtedly, there exists
136 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
no legitimate reason for war with France; but we
can justify ourselves by the reflection that France
also had no legitimate reason for depriving us
during a time of peace of Strasburg and Alsace.
If we were to offer this gift to the Germans, they
would willingly bend to our double domination.’
This proposal was not accepted at Vienna, and
war broke out.
If we are fully impressed with these facts, we
can easily understand that, on going forth to the
war of 1870, King William, his Chancellor, and
his Generals were full of the plan of depriving
France of her Eastern Provinces in case of victory.
Accordingly, on the 14th of August, the King
appointed a Governor General for Lorraine, and
on the 21st of the same month, a Governor General
for Alsace. The latter, as soon as Strasburg had
been occupied, installed himself in that town, and
issued a proclamation declaring that ‘Strasburg and
Alsace would remain in the possession of Germany.’
The idea of seizing Alsace and Lorraine, long
prevalent in the upper circles, became popular
among the masses after the first victories. It
was ardently supported by the papers inspired by
the Cabinet of Berlin. Orders were issued from
the German head-quarters, and the language of
the Press left no doubt as to what would be the
first of the conqueror's conditions of peace.
THE END OF THE WAR’ I 37
We have seen above that Count Bismarck
declared in his interview with M. Jules Favre at
Ferrières in the month of September, that he
required Strasburg and Metz, ‘those keys of his
house.” Such was thenceforth the invariable
theme of the German Administration in its official
declarations and in its diplomatic correspondence.
After the disaster of Sedan, this was the only
condition on which France could obtain peace
unless favoured by a return of fortune. Accord-
ingly, in the month of February 1871, M. Thiers
had to listen to the same language on this question
as M. Jules Favre six months earlier, with this
aggravation, that the German Armies were in
actual possession of the territories which their
leaders had determined never to restore to
France.
It was a painful task for the new head of the
French Government to carry on these negotiations
at Versailles. How was it possible to treat with
adversaries who had already formed their resolution
and whose first word was an ultimatum ? M. Thiers
fought bravely on every point. As it was impos-
sible to obtain peace without territorial concessions,
he gave up Alsace and Strasburg with the hope of
saving Lorraine and Metz. In former days
Bismarck had indeed not shewn himself averse to
leaving France in possession of Metz, provided she
138 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
would dismantle its fortifications and would pay an
indemnity sufficient to defray the expenses of
another fortress to be built on the German frontier.
But now neither the Emperor nor the General
Staff nor Bismarck himself would hear of this
project. They demanded Metz and a portion of
Lorraine. The negotiations which were nearly
broken off by the persistent refusal of M. Thiers,
were revived on Bismarck offering to restore
Belfort to France. This fortress had capitulated
on the 15th of February. He demanded in return
a short occupation of Paris by the German troops.
It was in vain that M. Thiers protested, imploring
the Chancellor not to inflict this last humiliation on
the unhappy city, and representing the danger
public order would be in during the presence of
foreign troops in the midst of an excited population.
His prayers were of no avail. The Emperor had
decided that this satisfaction should be given to his
soldiers, who had for long months been contemplat-
ing from a distance the steeples of the churches and
the lofty monuments of the capital.
Then there remained the indemnity of war
to be discussed, a question on which the Germans
brought the same rigour to bear as on that of
Alsace-Lorraine. If on the latter subject their
demands had not varied considerably since the
days of Sedan, on the pecuniary question they
THE END OF THE WAR I 39
had risen prodigiously. In September the
Chancellor's entourage spoke of a sum of three
milliards; but since then it had been increased
threefold and fivefold. In the consultations
held at Versailles with several prominent members
of German Finance, the amount had been raised
to eight, ten and even fifteen milliards. Out
of all these different claims, Bismarck chose the
medium sum of six milliards, against which M.
Thiers protested with extreme energy, swearing
to his adversary that he would denounce to the
whole of Europe the exorbitant extortions of
Germany. The German Cabinet had till then
successfully evaded foreign interference with the
negotiations of peace ; speaking in a conquerous
style, it had to a certain extent intimidated the
other powers, none of whom ventured to intervene
in favour of France. England herself had declined
to take a step, solicited by France, for diminishing
the territorial cessions demanded. But the English
Cabinet now professed itself willing to ask Germany
to reduce the indemnity of war. Bismarck was
warned in time, and succeeded in snatching from
England the credit of this very mild intervention.
Before the Queen's Ambassador could present
officially the request of his Government, the
Chancellor proposed the sum of five instead of
six milliards, and M. Thiers accepted this proposal.
140 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Under these conditions the Convention of the
26th of February 1871 was concluded. According
to its terms, France renounced in favour of the
German Empire all her rights in Alsace and in a
part of Lorraine, ‘which Germany should possess
for ever.' France bound herself to pay the sum of
five milliards of francs, one milliard at least during
the year 1871, and the remaining four milliards
within three years. The evacuation of French
territory was to be effected gradually, in proportion
to the payment of the indemnity. Belfort and
a line of demarcation still to be defined, remained
to France, a concession costing nothing to
Germany, as Belfort was of slight strategical value.
It was finally stipulated that, after the ratification
of the Convention by the National Assembly and
by the Emperor of Germany, commissioners should
meet at once at Brussels to conclude the definitive
treaty of peace. To these arrangements was added
a supplementary Convention by which the truce
was prolonged until the 12th of March ; it was
further stipulated that until the ratification of the
preliminaries of peace, German troops, amounting
at most to 30,000 men, should occupy a part of
Paris, especially defined for this object, and
situated within the inner circle.
The conditions made at Versailles were soon
known in Paris. However hard they may have
THE END OF THE WAR I4 I
been, they did not so much move the populace
as the thought of having to submit to the
presence, though temporary, of the enemy's forces.
Dangerous disturbances were dreaded from the
democratic population, who would now be able to
disguise their subversive plans under the mask of
patriotism. M. Thiers did his utmost to calm the
public mind by issuing a manifesto imploring the
people to submit to the inevitable, and describing
the misfortunes which their resistance would bring
upon the whole country. He then hastened to
Bordeaux and urged the Assembly to ratify the
Convention without delay, and thus possibly prevent
the occupation of Paris by the Germans. But
however promptly the Assembly may have acted,
the vote could not be given until the evening of
the 1st of March, and on the morning of that day
the German troops had begun their entry into
Paris.
The debates at Bordeaux were very stormy;
they gave rise to every sort of opposition. The
tribune was filled with unhappy Deputies from
Alsace and Lorraine, protesting against their
separation from France; with adversaries of peace,
reproaching M. Thiers with having submitted to
the German conditions; with Bonapartists defend-
ing themselves from the attacks of all the other
factions. But the majority was in favour of
WOL II R.
142 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
peace ; there was no other choice but to accept
the preliminaries as they stood or to resume
hostilities, and time was short and every moment
precious. The Convention of Versailles was agreed
to by 546 votes against 107. M. Thiers immedi-
ately sent this intelligence to Versailles.
As mentioned above, the entry of the German
troops into the capital was fixed for the 1st of
March. The state of the public mind in Paris,
the tumultuous manifestations of certain battalions
of the National Guard, did not fail to produce
some impression at the head-quarters at Versailles.
The German authorities would willingly have
renounced even a temporary occupation, lest the
troops should be obliged at some moment or other
to defend themselves against a rising or to assist the
police in the maintenance of order. The imprudent
provocation of certain demagogues determined the
German General Staff to effect the entry of the
troops. Each regiment of the three Corps d'Armée
united before Paris was to furnish one battalion, so
that the total should not exceed 30,000 men, the
number stipulated in the Convention. The first
half of these troops met in the morning on the
race-course of Longchamps, to be reviewed by the
Emperor. The latter, who came from Versailles
in a carriage, mounted a horse near the Grand
Stand; by his side he had the Princes of his
THE END OF THE WAR I43
House, the King of Wurtemberg, the Grand
Dukes of Baden, Weimar, Oldenburg, and Meck-
lenburg-Schwerin, two Princes of Bavaria, and the
Dukes of Coburg, Altenburg, and Meiningen.
After the review, the Emperor returned to
Versailles, whilst the troops marched through
the Bois de Boulogne to the Place of the Arc de
Triomphe de l'Étoile. The triumphal Arch had
been barricaded by the populace, who wished thus
to prevent what it considered a profanation of its
glorious memories. The German troops, making a
circuit round the Arch, marched down the Champs
Elisées to the Place de la Concorde, where the
railling of the Garden of the Tuileries formed the
boundary of the region of occupation. The other half
of the troops, which was to have made its entry on
the following day, the 2nd of March, did not
advance beyond Longchamps. The news of the vote
of the Assembly of Bordeaux having reached
Versailles, all the troops quartered in Paris
evacuated it on the morning of the 3rd of March.
That day the Emperor William again reviewed his
troops on the same race-course where three years
previously he had been the guest of the Emperor
Napoleon. In his allocution to the officers, he
attributed as usual his success to Providence ‘who
has allowed us to be the instruments for the
accomplishment of such great historical actions.”
144 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The same religious sentiment pervades all his
other utterances. On the 2nd of March, after
having ratified the Convention, he announced the
event to the Empress in giving homage ‘to the
God of Hosts, who has throughout blessed our
enterprises and brought about this honourable
peace.’ He did not omit to impart his joy to the
allied sovereigns. He wrote to the King of
Saxony: “We are now at the end of a war which
has been imposed upon us with a frivolity of which
there is no example in history.’ He addressed
himself in the same terms to the Emperor of
Russia, but added these words which are a revela-
tion : ‘Prussia will never forget that it is owing to
you that the war did not assume the most extreme
dimensions. May God bless you for it !” The
Czar wrote in reply: ‘I share your joy. May God
grant that a lasting peace may ensue ! I am glad
to be able to give you the expressions of my truest
sympathy. May the friendship that unites us
secure the glory and happiness of our two countries.’
In order to prove still more his gratitude to his
Imperial Nephew, the Emperor William conferred,
on the day of the review of the Guards at Long-
champs, one of the regiments on Alexander II,
recalling the recollection ‘of the fraternity of arms
of the two armies when they entered together the
enemy's capital in 1814.’
THE END OF THE WAR’ I45
The Emperor left Versailles on the 7th of
March, and transferred his head-quarters to
Ferrières. On the 13th of the same month he
left Ferrières to return to his dominions. At
Saarbrücken, where he was received by a deput-
ation of the Rhenish towns, he seized once more
the occasion of expressing himself in strong terms
against the enemy he had beaten. “In spite of the
slyness and trickery of the foreigners who wished
to wrest victory from us,’ he said to the deputation,
‘they have not escaped a just punishment ; may
God be a merciful judge to the victims ' ' And he
added modestly : ‘I have been able to do but little;
the wisdom of Moltke and the ability of my
Generals brought about our brilliant triumphs.”
From Nancy he addressed a proclamation to the
whole German Army, thanking it for ‘having
preserved the national soil from a hostile invasion,
and for having reconquered for Germany the
provinces of which she had so long been
deprived.” On the 15th of March he arrived at
Francfort, in which town he made a solemn entry,
and then continued his triumphal journey to Berlin.
The whole population issued forth to receive the
conqueror who had left the city seven months
previously as King of Prussia, and who now
returned as Emperor of Germany.
The Emperor's triumphant joy was somewhat
146 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
marred when he received the news, a few days
later, of the Communist Insurrection in Paris on
the 18th of March. He had arranged and signed
the foundations of peace, and was in possession
of the conquered provinces; but he had yet to
obtain the indemnity of war, those five milliards
on which the new Empire relied to discharge
its debts incurred for the war, to re-establish and
complete its armament, and to subsidise a vast
number of public works. The return of the
occupying forces to Germany depended on the
payment of the stipulated sums; but the Parisian
Insurrection might delay that payment, prolong
the German occupation, and even cause the renewal
of hostilities.
At first, the Prussian Government did not
seem fully aware of the real nature of this insurrec-
tion. Bismarck himself, on whom the Emperor
had conferred, on the 22nd of March, the title
of Prince, discerned, in the midst of democratic
passions and low greed for spoliation, ‘einen
Grund der Berechtigung,' a certain degree of
justification. He fancied that the moderate
portion of the Parisians had taken arms for the
purpose of acquiring autonomy for Paris, according
to the model of Prussian municipal organisation.
Events were soon to show that he was mistaken
on this point. The moderate Parisians did not
THE END OF THE WAA) I47
think, in the presence of a Foreign Army, of
demanding autonomy for the capital; they did
not even take part in the Insurrection, which
was directed by the most violent leaders of
French and Cosmopolitan Revolutionary Radical-
ism, who were desirous of making Paris a State
in the State, of destroying the unity of France,
and of putting the ideas of the Communist school
into practice. Even if the Government of M.
Thiers and the National Assembly had granted
the autonomy of Paris on the widest scale, the
Insurrection would not have been quelled, its
object being to erect itself as a Government in
opposition to the Central Administration.
Whatever may have been its cause, the un-
certainty of the views held by the Cabinet of
Berlin on the character and the real strength of the
Insurrection, gave to the attitude of that Cabinet
an air which encouraged up to a certain point the
men of the Commune, and weakened the authority
of the Government of Versailles, for it was in that
town that M. Thiers, abandoning Paris, had estab-
lished the seat of his power and of the National
Assembly. Much surprise was occasioned by the
benevolent neutrality which the chiefs of the
German troops maintained at first towards the
rebellious Government, and which they even
directly notified to its leaders.
148 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
But what most engaged the attention of the
Emperor and of Prince Bismarck was the question
of the payment of the indemnity of war. Paris,
the seat of the financial establishments of France
and the centre of her wealth, being in the hands
of rebels, could the Government of Versailles fulfil
its engagements? Under these auspices the open-
ing took place at Brussels of the negotations for
which France and Germany had delegated Pleni-
potentiaries on the 19th of March. Both parties
were full of different anxieties. M. Thiers only
thought of promptly putting an end to the
insurrection, and for that purpose he asked
Germany to deliver up the prisoners of war
detained at Mayence and Coblentz. The German
Chancellor, on the other hand, was extremely eager
to receive his money; let France sign the peace,
he said, let her begin the payments stipulated in
the preliminaries, and he would give back the
captive soldiers., The German Cabinet maintained
that the Government of Versailles was not strong
enough to crush the Insurrection; let it accept the
help of the German troops, or if it refuse that offer,
let it revert to the conditions of the preliminaries
of Versailles, that is to withdraw all its troops
behind the Loire, whereupon Germany would act
alone against Paris.
The French negotiators had, to tell the truth,
THE END OF THE WAR I49
left Versailles without being furnished with the
requisite instructions; it was just after the
Governmental exodus from Paris, and Versailles
itself was in the utmost disorder and confusion.
In this state of things, the negotiations could not
advance in Brussels. Germany demanded payment
in gold; the French Plenipotentiaries proposed to
discharge the debt in bonds, an offer by no means
acceptable to the Germans who had become
incredulous as to the future of France. The
French Plenipotentiaries asked Germany, as she
had taken two provinces from France, to assume
a proportionate amount of the debt; but the
Cabinet of Berlin emphatically refused to do so.
Thus both parties came to suspect each other of
want of sincerity. The Cabinet of Berlin accused
that of Versailles of wishing to prolong affairs in
the hope of obtaining foreign intervention to soften
the conditions of peace. Accordingly, at the end
of the month of April, Prince Bismarck informed
M. Thiers that if he did not make haste and sign
the Treaty of Peace, the German troops would
again occupy Paris. At the same time he asked
for an interview on German territory. M. Thiers
declined to appear in person, but he had himself
represented by M. Jules Favre, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
Francfort was the place of rendezvous. The
150 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
German threats had produced an effect. M. Jules
Favre arrived with the firm intention of concluding
peace, and he made a point of revealing his
pacific intentions during his first meeting with
the Chancellor on the 6th of May. Prince
Bismarck was the bearer of an ultimatum, the
contents of which he imparted to the French
Minister in a note which he read to him on the
following day. This document stated that Ger-
many had lost all confidence on witnessing M.
Thiers’ utter inability to suppress the Insurrection;
that she could no longer remain a passive spectator
of events; and that she could not intervene in Paris
unless she received satisfactory guarantees. ‘The
French Army must either withdraw beyond the
Loire, or the forts of Paris be again surrendered
to the German troops. The prolonged occupation
is irksome to Germany; her soldiers, kept back
from their homes and occupations, are eager to
return. It must further be considered that the
preliminaries of peace have not provided for this
prolonged occupation that imposes on Germany
sacrifices of money which she will no longer endure.
All this must end, peace must be signed, and the
debt discharged, or France must submit to the
German intervention and risk the renewal of
hostilities.’
When such a prospect was placed before their
THE END OF THE WAR’ ISI
eyes, the French negotiators yielded without delay.
Scarcely any further discussions were raised. In
order to obtain a somewhat wider area round
Belfort, it was necessary to give up to Germany
some kilomètres of the Luxemburg frontier.
France was further obliged to pay the debt in gold
or silver or in notes of the Bank of England,
Prussia, Holland, or Belgium (those of the Bank
of France being excluded) or in ‘traites’ of the
first class. A further stipulation was made of the
evacuation of various Provinces, those of the Seine
and its vicinity, as well as of the forts of Paris,
which were not to be evacuated until the German
Government considered order sufficiently estab-
lished in Paris and in France.
Such was the definitive Treaty of Peace, signed
on the 10th of May at Francfort. Far from
modifying the preliminaries of Versailles, it aggra-
wated them on the points we have indicated. It
had to be submitted for the sanction of the
Emperor William and of the National Assembly
of Versailles. The latter resigned itself, but not
without giving utterance to a last protestation.
Napoleon III was accused of having brought about
the invasion ; mention was made of the occupation
of one-third of French Territory, the annihilation
of the French Army, the indifference of the
Powers, and the disturbances of Paris, causing
152 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
the lengthened occupation by the Germans. The
Assembly ratified the Treaty on the 18th of May,
by 440 against 98 votes. Prince Bismarck returned
once more to Francfort where he exchanged on the
20th of May the ratifications with the French
Plenipotentiaries.
If the National Assembly was anxious to free
the French Nation from all blame, it was, on
the contrary, on the latter in its totality that the
Emperor and the German Parliament threw all
responsibility. The Address voted by the Par-
liament to the Emperor, said that the calamities
afflicting France proved the often ignored truth
that even the most powerful nation is only safe
from disasters by confining itself to the develop-
ment of its internal resources. The Emperor
confirmed this judgment in his reply. “The
disasters of France, ‘he said, “are the consequence
of eighty years of incessant Revolutions uprooting
everything, from the dynasty downwards. May
they act as a warning to ourselves ' '
When peace was concluded, M. Thiers had no
more urgent solicitude than that of obtaining finan-
cial resources, so as to liberate French territory as
soon as possible by early payments of the debt.
Several conventions were concluded during the
years 1871, 1872, and 1873, to regulate those
payments as well as the successive evacuation of
THE END OF THE WAR I 53
the occupied departments. Their promptitude
excited much surprise at Berlin, whence distrust
was not entirely banished. Germany was of
opinion that France might recommence hostilities
after having paid the two first milliards, thus
liberating Paris from the presence of the German
troops. The German Government was therefore
greatly astonished at seeing her discharge, to the
last franc, her enormous ransom. The loan of three
milliards, voted in 1872, only one year after the
first loan of two milliards and a half, was covered
twelve times, offers coming from all parts of
Europe. This fact seemed almost miraculous.
Gradually, as the payments were made, the German
troops withdrew. The command of these forces
had been entrusted to Marshal Manteuffel, whose
tact and moderation greatly contributed to prevent
collisions between his army and the inhabitants.
On the 16th of September 1873, the last German
soldiers, leaving Verdun, evacuated French territory.
The war was thus terminated. France had
been compelled to buy peace at a cost considered
very severe throughout the whole of Europe. Even
Germany confessed that the conditions were hard ;
but the organs of the Government, while making
this avowal, justified their rigour before European
opinion. They appealed to the past and to the
present, to the agreement of history, and to
154 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
international morality. They said that victorious
Germany had acted towards France as the latter
would assuredly have acted had fortune favoured
her. For half-a-century, the French politicians
had desired the left bank of the Rhine. M. Thiers
himself had been one of those who most powerfully
excited the antagonism of the two races. On that
point, all the French Governments had been but
the echo of the nation; the latter was responsible
for the war, and not the Government of the hour;
therefore it was but just that the nation should pay
the penalty of its aggression. The triumphs of
Prussia in 1866 had raised French irritation to the
highest pitch, and from that moment all France
was inspired by the one thought of avenging
Sadowa, although that battle was only disastrous to
Austria. The reason was that France could not
bear the idea that any other nation should be her
military superior. She would have considered
magnanimity as a sign of weakness, and as soon as
she was certain of peace, she would have meditated
further aggressions. How did Napoleon I treat
Prussia after the battles of Jena and Tilsit He
inflicted much harder conditions upon her, much
more cruel humiliations.
The official journals of Berlin further stated that
Germany had no thought of avenging herself; she
only desired to take precautions, to maintain her
THE END OF THE WAR I 55
safety by fortifying herself and by weakening her
adversary. That was why France, who wishod te
advance her frontiers beyond the Rhine, had been
thrown back behind the mountains of the Vosges,
the German frontiers drawn 150 kilomètres nearer
to Paris, and the gates of invasion, Strasburg and
Metz, turned into bulwarks of German defence.
For the same reason an indemnity of five milliards
had been exacted, a sum such as no nation had ever
paid, and which would attain the double object of
indemnifying Germany for all her outlays for war
and for defence, and of making it difficult for
France to renew hostilities for many years, by
imposing a terrible burden upon her.
These arguments, whether sound or merely
specious, did not efface at the time the painful
impression prevalent throughout Europe, nor did
they convince France that she had been treated
with equity. The fact is, that the future alone can
answer the question whether more moderate treat-
ment would have been more serviceable to the
cause of general peace and to the interests of both
nations. -
Germany was occupied with the problem of
deciding what should be done with the conquered
Brovinces. In a former chapter of this work, we
spoke of the competition of the Dynasties of Baden
and Bavaria. The Cabinet of Berlin had to choose
156 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
between the King of Bavaria, promotor of the
revival of the Imperial dignity, and the Grand-
Duke of Baden, son-in-law to the Emperor.
Wavering between the duties of gratitude and the
links of relationship, it decided to give the Pro-
vinces to neither. It was necessary further to
consider whether Prussia, after having abolished
the Kingdom of Hanover and the Electorate of
Hesse-Cassel in the North, could consistently
create a Kingdom of Baden in the South, adjoining
the French frontier. But at the same time the
Emperor William perceived, probably with regret,
that he was obliged to renounce the plan of
annexing Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia. The war
having obtained for the Hohenzollern Dynasty the
hereditary Imperial Crown with extensive powers,
it would have been difficult to justify this new
territorial aggrandizement to the German
sovereigns who, for all their sacrifices, only
derived from the war the preservation of their
thrones with very diminished rights of sovereignty.
During the war and the earlier stages of
the negoitations for peace, it was proposed to
make a neutral State of Alsace-Lorraine. The
Cabinet of Berlin refused to agree to this plan.
Prince Bismarck explained that the first condition
of the stability of a neutral State was the firm
wish of the populace to maintain and defend its
THE END OF THE WAR I S7
neutrality. “Such is the case,’ he said, ‘of Belgium
and Switzerland ; such would not be the case of
Alsace-Lorraine.” As in 1814 Görres had described
the French proclivities of the Alsatians, so Prince
Bismarck, after the lapse of half-a-century, pointed
out that these populations would be inclined, in a
future conflict between France and Germany, to
break their neutrality in favour of the former
Power. He therefore concluded that Alsace-
Lorraine, having been conquered by United
Germany, ought to belong to the whole Empire,
and to form an Imperial State with its own special
administration. This would be more agreeable to
the feelings of the Alsatians than embodiment in
Brussia or Baden. The task of assimilation must
be left to time.
The Emperor expressed this thought when he
received a Deputation of the Parliament on the 2nd
of April. ‘Undoubtedly, he said, “German
Nationality is not destroyed in these Provinces,
but it has been greatly effaced; accordingly we must
not expect a prompt change. We must be patient
and indulgent. ' And he added in a strain similar
to that in which he addressed the Hanoverians five
years previously : ‘It would not be desirable nor
even right for people thus severed from their
ancient community to remain indifferent. It is
WOL II L
158 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
only by clemency that we can revive German
patriotism in these Provinces.’
Prince Bismarck expressed himself of the
same opinion when he brought a bill into the
Parliament for the purpose of postponing the
introduction of the new Constitution of the
Empire into Alsace-Lorraine until the 1st of
January 1874. He defended a policy of patience
and conciliation in order to reconcile the inhabitants
to their present rulers. He was convinced that
Germany could offer them more autonomy than
France ; that the more the Alsatians felt the
independence of their Province, the more would
they detach themselves from their former political
centre; and that the Empire, while striving to
diminish the local attachments of the various
German States, ought, on the contrary, to fortify
those of Alsace-Lorraine. These were promises for
the future. But at the present moment Germany
found herself, like every other conqueror, the ruler
of a population that submitted to what it could not
alter, but still entertained hopes of liberation, and
was unwilling, in consequence, to respond to the
advances of its new master. In this state of things
the Cabinet of Berlin was not inclined to realise
immediately an autonomous policy, and it there-
fore decided on a dictatorial régime. Under
these impressions the Parliament voted, on the 3rd
THE END OF THE WAR - I 59
of June 1871, the law declaring Alsace-Lorraine
a country of the Empire, but limiting the dicta-
torial period to the 1st of January 1873, during
which the country should be governed from Berlin
by Imperial decrees. It was further stipulated in
that same law that, even when that period was at
an end, the legislative power, such as other German
States possessed for their especial legislation, should
be exercised for Alsace-Lorraine by the Emperor
and the Federal Council with the co-operation of
the Imperial Parliament. The Emperor was, in
fact, absolute sovereign of the conquered countries.
CHAPTER XV
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS.—
1871–1886
INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES AFTER THE WAR–DISCONTENT AND AMBITION
OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.—THE MILITARY QUESTION IN THE.
PARLIAMENT,--THE MILITARY SEPTENNIAL GRANT.-FIELD-
MARSHAL MOLTKE. – NEW AUGMENTATION OF THE EFFECTIVE
FORCES.—STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE
GOVERNMENT.—ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS OF THE EMPEROR.
—JUDGMENT OF PRINCE BISMARCK ON THE EMPEROR.—
REPRESSIVE LAW AGAINST THIE SOCIALISTS.—ORIGIN OF THE
PROJECT OF ECONOMICAL REFORMS.—DIRECT INTERVENTION OF
THE EMPEROR.—HE CLAIMS FOR HIMSELF THE INITIATIVE OF
REFORM. — HIS DISCONTENT WITH THE PARLIAMENT. — HE
BAFFLES THE ATTEMPTS OF THE PARLIAMENT TO ENCROACH ON
ROYAL PREROGATIVES. — ALL FUNCTIONARIES EXPECTED TO
SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ELECTIONS.—THE EMPEROR
DEFENDS THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PRUSSIA AGAINST THE IMPERIAL
PARLIAMENT.
GERMANY had been perfectly united in the war
against France; dissentient opinions, overcome by
the external danger, had vanished in the national
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS 16,
movement; but they were not annihilated, and so
soon as the danger was over, they revived with the
same doctrines, the same demands, and even more
determined in their opposition. The Imperial
Bower did not as yet feel quite assured of its new
authority. The independent and almost dictatorial
action it had displayed during the year of war, had
to submit to a control, variabre in its motives, often
carping and untimely, such as might be expected
from a Parliament elected by Universal Suffrage.
Foreign wars often divert attention from internal
difficulties, but they do not destroy those difficulties;
men and circumstances remain the same, however
brilliant the victory achieved.
Nothing proves more clearly this truth, so often
verified by the course of history, than the fifteen
years of the Imperial reign of William the First.
We see the revival during the period from 1871 to
1886 of the Parliamentary questions and dissensions
that agitated Prussia before 1870 and even before
1866. We see the revival of the antagonism
between Royal or Imperial and Parliamentary
Power; of the disputes on the Budget ; of the
struggle of Liberalism with the principle of
authority ; of the resistance of the civil element of
the nation against the extension of the military
element. And we see all these serious problems
aggravated by complications occasioned by foreign
I62 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
nationalities rebellious to the Empire, and by
religious and social dissensions.
The Liberal Party in Prussia and in North
Germany, which had been a powerful auxiliary in
the Emperor's work of unification, soon wearied of
the unimportant position assigned to it by the
Government. Its help had been valuable for the
preparation of the Empire. It had excited
enthusiasm, stimulated the half-hearted, hidden
the dangers, and embodied a compact majority
to raise and sustain the incipient Empire. It
believed itself worthy of taking part in the
Government it had helped to construct by its
speeches and its votes; it also wished that its
principles should be considered in the laws and
institutions about to be created. These double
pretensions found decided adversaries in the
Emperor and in Prince Bismarck, the Chancellor
of the Empire. The Emperor of Germany was
too mindful of the King of Prussia to admit in
his new Government practices and principles
different from those which resulted in his conquests
of 1864, 1866, and 1870.
In the course of this history, we have seen that
of all the questions of Prussian policy, the military
question was first in importance. That question
decided the fate of the Hohenzollern Dynasty and
was the principal cause of the definitive rupture
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS 163
between King William and the Liberal Party.
As may be remembered, the Constitution of the
Northern Confederation fixed the effective and the
military expenses for a period ending in 1871,
which date happened to coincide with the amalga-
mation of that body with the German Empire.
It therefore became necessary in the first Session
of the Imperial Parliament to regulate this affair.
No other solution would be agreeable to the
Emperor than the application to all Germany of
the system prevalent in the North. He would
not have an Army depending for support on the
capricious votes of Parliamentary majorities. As
he had formerly expressed himself: ‘I desire a
Royal, not a Parliamentary Army.” Carrying out
all the consequences of that principle, the Emperor
came to the conclusion that the Constitution and
military law ought to place these two points, once
for all, above all dispute, that is, to establish the
amount to be spent on the Standing Army in time
of peace simultaneously with the sum voted for its
maintenance. But, as things were still in a state
of transition, the Government contented itself with
fixing the military Budget for three years.
Even this diminished request found stubborn
opposition in the Parliament, and in order to make
it acceptable, the Imperial Ministers had to urge
the greatest considerations of policy and external
164 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
safety, to which an opposition is almost invariably
bound to yield under penalty of seeing its patriot-
ism suspected. The Military Budget was voted
for a period of three years which expired in 1874.
At that epoch the question returned to the
Parliament under the form of an organic law.
The Government demanded an effective force of
401,600 men, to be maintained as long as the law did
not decree otherwise. But a law of the Empire
which could only be modified by the united consent
of the Emperor, the Federal Council, and the
Parliament, was an infringement of the Parlia-
mentary control over the Budget, and it was
immediately recognised as such by all parties.
The Parliament was agitated by the various
sections of the Opposition, by the Liberals and by
the adversaries of the Prussian supremacy who
would be the first to profit by the new law. The
leaders of the Army called forth all the sentiments
of patriotism. They pointed out that foreign
Powers were jealous and hostile, France in
particular, by no means resigned to her fate and
only waiting for the opportunity of avenging
herself and of breaking the Treaty of Francfort.
Moltke exclaimed : ‘What we conquered in six
months, we shall have to defend for half a
century !' But the Opposition seemed deaf to all
argument. The new law seemed doomed even
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMEWTS 165
before it was discussed. The Emperor became
very excited and irritable, and gave full expression
to his anger.
On his birthday, the 22nd of March 1874, he
said, addressing the Generals who came to offer
him their congratulations: ‘I cannot conceal from
you that a new crisis seems to be threatening the
Army. That which I formerly demanded for four
years and ended by acquiring ; that which has
been tried by experience, I shall ever retain and
defend.’ Lively debates ensued. But on all sides
the necessity of a compromise was felt. One
portion of the Liberals, dreading the result of a
conflict, proposed an arrangement by which the
effective force should remain invariable for a period
of seven years. Again Moltke came to the fore,
and showed that the power of Germany was the
best guarantee for Europe, the best curb to France
who meditated revenge. ‘Our disarmament would
mean war,’ he said. The septennial military grant
was voted on the 14th of April by a considerable
majority. Some months later, the organisation
of the Army was completed by the creation of the
‘Landsturm, comprising the men who had left
the ranks and the Reserve, and requiring them
to undertake the defence of fortresses and of
German territory. Thanks to these various organ-
isations, the German Army comprised, on the 1st
166 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
of January 1878, in time of war 1,283,791 men,
to whom were added 900,000 men of the ‘Land-
sturm, making a total of over 2,000,000 soldiers.
But even this number did not appear sufficient
to the Emperor and his military advisers. The
septennial period ending on the 31st of December
1881, the Government proposed in the Session
of 1880, its prolongation until the 31st of March
1888. It also demanded the increase of the
effective force in time of peace to 427,270 men,
and the calling out of the first class of Reserve
for the periodical manoeuvres. After violent
debates, the new law was passed on the 15th of
April 1880, though with a majority smaller than
that of 1874. On this occasion also, the Govern-
mental speakers urged the danger threatening
from France. The Emperor himself, on the 2nd
of September, the tenth anniversary of Sedan,
issued a proclamation to the Army reviving the
recollections of the last war, and containing the
following admonition : ‘Let the Army remember
that it can only achieve brilliant successes by being
a model of the fulfilment of all the obligations
of honour and duty, as well as of the severest
discipline ! May my words be remembered even
when I am no more l’
With this concentration of formidable military
power in the hands of the Emperor, was combined
THE EMPEROR AWD THE PARLIAMENTS 167
a policy of rigid resistance to Parliamentary
demands. The Liberal Party brought in a series
of Bills to augment Parliamentary authority. It
proposed again and again pecuniary indemnity for
the Deputies, and the creation of Imperial
Ministries with responsible members. The Govern-
ment invariably replied with peremptory refusals.
Nay, it even proposed restrictions on certain
immunities guaranteed by the Imperial Consti-
tution, such as the substitution of a biennial instead
of annual vote on the Budget, and the introduction
of a sort of disciplinary power over the Deputies
while exercising their functions. At certain times
the suggestion was made of controlling Universal
Suffrage by substituting open instead of secret
votes. These various ideas did not find favour
with the Parliament, whose majority gradually
became less friendly and almost hostile.
In his turn, the Imperial Chancellor became
impatient of the barriers placed before his designs.
The autonomous tendencies of the Federal States
often rose against Prince Bismarck's centralising
policy, and he loudly complained that the zeal for
unity was waning. The opposition of Bavaria,
among others, prevented the establishment in
Berlin of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the
Empire, and Leipzig was chosen as the town in
which it was to sit. In order to neutralise these
I68 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
disintegrating influences, Prince Bismarck thought
for a moment of strengthening his Ministry, by
including in it. Herr von Bennigsen, the leader of
the moderate Liberals. The latter would only
accept office if some of his political friends were
also entrusted with power, and his party demanded
certain constitutional guarantees as to the applica-
tion of the surplus accruing from the taxes. The
Emperor, who had never been able to overcome his
dislike of the members of the old Liberal opposition,
would not grant these demands, and the Chancellor
gave up his idea. Not being able to agree with
the Liberals, he sought auxiliaries in members of
the Right and of the Centre. In that endeavour
he was seconded by terrible events.
In 1878, within a space of a few weeks, the
Emperor's life was imperilled by two attempted
assassinations. He was fired at on the 11th of
May by a tramp named Hodel, and on the 4th of
June by a Dr Nobiling. Both criminals, who
belonged to the most advanced Socialist Party,
acted in the hope of realising their ideas of
destruction. The amazement was great in Ger-
many and throughout the civilised world. The
Public involuntarily thought of the French
population, in the midst of which the Emperor
sojourned in the time of war for several months
without being the victim of the insults, much less
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS 169
of the attacks, of frantic patriots; and now it was
from the ranks of his own people that the bullets
of the assassins were aimed against him who had
accomplished such great deeds for the glory of the
nation |
The Emperor, who had not been hurt on the
11th of May, was seriously wounded on the 4th
of June. His illness was long, and for a time a
fatal issue was dreaded. He entrusted his son
the Crown-Prince with the management of affairs.
These crimes made a deep impression on Prince
Bismarck. During the Emperor's illness, he
had a conversation on this subject with General
Grant, former President of the United States,
who was then making the tour of Europe.
The American General, having expressed the
horror he felt at the crimes, the Chancellor seized
the occasion of giving him a description of the
Emperor's character. “We see an attack made on
the life of an old man, one of the best men in the
world. There never was a man with a more
modest, generous, humane character than the
Emperor. He is quite distinguished from those
born in so high a position, or at least from most of
them. You know that people of his rank, born in
the purple, come to believe themselves different
from their fellow-creatures. They place little
importance on the feelings and wishes of others.
170 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Their whole education tends to suppress human
sympathy. The Emperor, on the contrary, is
sympathetic and humane in everything. He has
never in his life injured anyone, nor hurt his feel-
ings, nor treated him with harshness. He is one of
those whose kind nature wins the hearts of all.
He is always occupied with the happiness and
welfare of his subjects and his entourage. It
is not possible to conceive a type of gentleman
more noble, perfect, amiable and generous. He
is adorned with all the lofty qualities of a Prince
and all the virtues of a man. I thought that
the Emperor could pass through his Empire alone
and unattended without the slightest danger, and
yet we see that people have attemped to murder
him. Our Emperor is in all things so republican
that even the most bitter republican would admire
him if his judgment were impartial.’ The
Chancellor added: “We see a sovereign whose
clemency all but abolished capital punishment, the
victim of an attempted assassination.’ At the
moment when he spoke thus, the Chancellor did
not foresee that five years later another crime,
unsuccessful in its result, would be carried out at
Rüdesheim by German Anarchists, on the very
day when the Emperor was presiding at the
inauguration of the National Monument on the
Niederwald, in commemoration of the war of 1870.
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS 171
The words of Prince Bismarck that we have
just quoted, partly explain the change the
Emperor's internal policy underwent after 1878.
The Emperor's intervention became more and more
frequent in the important acts of his Government.
He had always asserted his authority, and now,
in spite of his great age, he was even more active
than formerly.
Some days after the 11th of May, the Prussian
Government laid a Bill before the Federal Council,
“for the protection of the State and of Society
from the dangers threatened by the excesses of
the Social Democrats.’ This Bill was passed by
the Council, but the Parliament was less pliable.
The Bill contained a provision giving the Federal
Council the absolute right of prohibiting the
meetings and of suppressing the publications of
the obnoxious Party. Constitutional scruples again
induced the Parliamentary majority to reject a
Bill implying a sort of Dictatorship over the Press
and public meetings. In the sitting of the 14th of
May, the Parliament threw out the Bill by 241
votes against 56. Some days later, during the
excitement caused by the second attempted
assassination, the Assembly might have modified
Its decision if it had been consulted. The Govern-
ment did not give it the chance of so doing.
Discontented with an opposition increasing daily in
172 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
power and audacity, the Chancellor profited by the
situation to appeal to the country. On the 11th
of June, an Imperial Ordinance pronounced the
dissolution of Parliament, justifying this measure
by the rejection of the law against the Social
Democrats.
The project of law which was presented to the
new Parliament, augmented the rigours of its
y
predecessor. To the interdiction of meetings and
publications, it added the expulsion from certain
towns and districts of the offenders under the new
law. The Opposition, as violent as in the former
Parliament, found itself deserted by a section of
the National Liberals, elected for the greater
part because they told their constituents that
they were in favour of the Chancellor's policy.
With some modifications, the most important of
which limited the operation of the law to the
period of two years and a half, the Bill was passed
on the 19th of October by a majority of 227
votes against 149.
This repressive law was not the only result of
the double attempt at regicide. The Government,
under the auspices of the Chancellor, undertook
a vast legislative labour, embracing the whole
social and economical domain, and soon extending
to the religious domain ; and when the Chancellor's
conceptions were rejected by the hostile majority,
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS 173
the Emperor openly interposed to give the initia-
tive and the responsibility of the Premier the
assistance of his sanction. We shall see how this
direct and public intervention was called forth
when the Imperial Parliament or the Prussian
Chamber of Deputies ventured to encroach on
affairs which the Emperor considered the exclusive
property of royal and imperial power.
On the 12th of February 1879, at the opening
of Parliament, the Emperor announced the great
change planned for the policy of the Douanes, and
declared that the system followed since 1865 had
borne evil fruits, adding that this reform was con-
nected with the Socialist question. He said that
repressive laws were not sufficient to solve that
question; it was necessary to cure the evils from
which the working classes were suffering. Two
years later, on the 17th of November 1881, he put
forth the same idea even more energetically. He
again recommended the Parliament to adopt laws
for the benefit of the working classes; he saw in it
a question of internal peace, the means of giving the
poor the greater amount of security and help to
which they were entitled. He added that undoubt-
edly these reforms could not be suddenly realised,
but he said that he felt himself bound before God
and man to take the initiative without considering
the probability of immediate success. The
VOL. II M
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174 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
opposition of the Parliament and the needless
delays with which it encumbered the examination
of these laws provoked new exhortations on
the 14th of May 1883, in a message expected by
nobody in the middle of the Session. The Emperor
declared once more that he had always considered
it his first duty to devote his especial solicitude
to the lot of the working classes. He therefore
requested the Parliament to terminate the debate
on the Budget in the first part of the Session,
so that it might be able to devote itself in the
latter part to the examination of the economical
projects.
On another subject the Emperor expressed still
more frankly his displeasure with the Parliament.
In the Session of 1884, the repressive law against
the Socialists was again brought forward to be
prolonged, as was deemed necessary. The Opposi-
tion was violent and tenacious, and the Emperor
was extremely displeased with its conduct. On
the 22nd of March, when he received the deputa-
tion of the Parliament which came to congratulate
him on the anniversary of his birth, he expressed
in strong terms his surprise at the dilatory manner
in which this affair was being treated by the
Assembly. He said that the Opposition seemed
to have forgotten the circumstances by which the
law was called forth. He had to shed his blood
THE EMPEROR AND THE PARLIAMENTS 175
before the dangers menacing Society were recog-
nized. The opposition against the law was there-
fore directed against his own person. On the other
hand, the parliamentary parties were united in
opposing the laws for the benefit of the working
classes; but he was firmly attached to these laws,
and he requested the members of the deputation
to use all their influence for their adoption.
As we see, the Emperor not only spurned the
Constitutional doctrine which shelters the
sovereign's responsibility under that of his
Ministry, but he also made a point of showing
himself to be the only initiator and promoter of all
the acts of the Government, whether as represent-
ing the Prussian Ministry or the German Empire.
In this respect his ideas had not been modified
since his coronation as King of Prussia in 1861.
On the contrary, his years and his brilliant
triumphs had only fortified his conception of royal
authority.
In the month of December 1881, a violent
debate was caused in the German Parliament on
the subject of the pressure and influence exercised
by the Government on the Electors. The Minis-
ter of the Interior had not only defended this
right of the Government, he had even declared
that all functionaries were bound to give him their
176 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
support, and that in acting thus they would be
worthy of the Emperor's gratitude. This speech
was answered by a vote of censure, passed by a
large majority. -
In consequence of this vote, the Emperor
addressed the Ministry on the 4th of January
1882, in a letter in which he established, in formal
terms, the predominance of royal and imperial
power in the administration of the Government.
At first he only alluded to Prussia, but he gave
clearly to understand that his letter was applicable
to the whole Empire. The right of the King to
direct the government and the policy of Prussia,
had not been abrogated by the Constitution; the
actions of the Government are the actions of the
Ring; they emanate from his decisions and
express his will, it is therefore erroneous to repre-
sent these actions as emanating from the will of
his Ministers. The Emperor desired, in con-
sequence, that no doubt should remain as to his
right of directing personally the policy of the
Ringdom and of the Empire, and that it should
be thoroughly established that the Constitution
had not the power to modify this right of the
Crown. Finally, he said that he expected all.
the functionaries to support his policy throughout,
and, far from opposing the Government during
THE EMREROR AWD THE PARLIAMEWTS 177
the elections, he required them to give it their
Zealous adhesion.
Two years later under similar circumstances,
the Prussian Chamber having demanded the pro-
secution of functionaries accused of influencing the
electors, the Emperor made the official journal
declare, on the 15th of May 1884, that such
motions were encroachments on the prerogatives
of the Crown, and that he had given orders to
the Ministry to uphold royal rights whenever the
occasion offered. f
In another circumstance the Emperor again
intervened between the Chancellor and the Im-
perial Parliament. In the autumn of 1885,
numerous expulsions of Austrian and Russian
Poles had been ordered by the Prussian Govern-
ment in the Province of Posen. Legislation
relative to foreigners appertaining to the Empire,
interpellations on this subject were announced
in the Parliament. An Imperial message came on
the 1st of December to declare that the Parliament
of the Empire was not to meddle with the internal
affairs of Prussia, and that it was to respect the
sovereignty of the King of Prussia as it respected
that of the Confederate Princes. -
By these transactions we discover that the
Emperor was determined to rule effectually; We
178 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
are also able to discover that the Empire had
to struggle against numerous adversaries imme-
diately after its creation, and we shall now enter
into minuter details about these adversaries.
CHAPTER XVI
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE.—1871-1886
THE DEPOSED SOWEREIGNS.—THE ELECTOR OF HESSE-CASSEL AND
THE DUKE OF NASSAU.—THE DUKE OF AUGUSTENEURG.—HIS
RENUINCIATION.—HIS DAUGHTER MARRIES PRINCE WILLIAM OF
PRUSSIA.—SINGULAR CONTRAST IN THE DESTINIES OF FATHER
AND DAUGHTER.—THE KING OF HANOWER REMAINS HOSTILE.—
AFTER HIS DEATH, HIS SON MAINTAINS THE SAME ATTITUDE.—
HIS MARRIAGE WITH A DANISH PRINCESS.–HIS RIGHT OF
SUCCESSION TO BRUNSWICK. — LAW OF REGENCY DIRECTED
AGAINST THE PRETENSIONS OF THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND.—
DEATH OF THE DUIKE OF BRUNSWICK.—PRUSSIA DECLARES THE
DUIKE OF CUMBERLAND IN CAPABLE OF SUCCEEDING...—PRINCE
ALBRECHT OF PRUSSIA. APPOINTED REGENT OF BRUNSWICK.—
THE TWO FRENCH CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF PRAGUE FALL
WITH THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON. — PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA
ABROGATE THE ARTICLE OF THAT TREATY RELATIVE TO THE
NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF SCHILESWIG.—THE DANISH DEPUTIES
IN THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT.—THE INHABITANTS OF ALSACE-
LORRAINE HOSTILE TO THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND NOT
RECONCILED BY THE PROMISE OF AUTONOMY.—THEIR DEPUTIES
JOIN THE PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION. — THE CONQUERED
PROVINCES SUBMIT UN WILLINGLY TO THEIR FATE.—THE POLES.
—VARIATION OF PRUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THEM.—POLISH
INSURRECTION OF 1848.-ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS OF NATIONAL
REORGANISATION.—ATTITUDE OF THE POLES IN THE PRUSSIAN
CHAMBERS AND IN THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.-SCHEME OF.
I8o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
RESTORING POLAND REJECTED BY PRUSSIA.—THE POLES AND
CATHOLICISM.–ANTAGONISM BETWEEN POLES AND GERMANS.–
EXPULSION OF THE POLEs. - THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT
FAVOURABLE, THE PRUSSIAN CHAMBERS HOSTILE, TO THE
POLES. — PRUSSIAN LAWS FOR DIMINISHING THE POLISH
ELEMENT. - THE FUTURE OF THE POLISH QUESTION.—THE
GROUPS COMPRISED UNDER TIIE NAME OF ENEMIES OF THE
EMPIRE.
FROM the day of its birth, the German Empire saw
itself menaced from without and from within by
dynastic, national and religious animosities, which
all found Parliamentary representatives.
Several of the Princes who had been deposed in
1866, made their peace with the Emperor William
shortly after the war of 1870. The Elector of
Hesse-Cassel having died in exile in 1875, his son
made a compromise with the Emperor, by which he
and his family definitively renounced all their claims
to the Electorate. The Duke of Nassau had long
resigned himself to the loss of his Crown : the
marriage of his daughter in 1885 with the eldest
son of the Grand-Duke of Baden, grandson of the
Emperor William, confirmed his reconciliation to
the Court of Berlin.
Another marriage made peace between that
Court and the Augustenburg family. As we
related in a former chapter, Duke Frederick,
whose rights had served for a pretext for the armed
intervention of Prussia against Denmark, was
obliged to leave Schleswig-Holstein on the very
THE EN EMIES OF THE EMPIRE I81
day that Prussia became its mistress. He retired
to another part of Germany, living in seclusion, and
seeing his last hopes destroyed by the Prussian
victories of 1870. Isolated and saddened by his
many reverses, he died suddenly at Wiesbaden on
the 14th of January 1880. The only satisfaction
that he was permitted to foresee was the marriage
of his daughter with Prince William of Prussia,
eldest son of the Crown Prince and future heir to
the thrones of Prussia and of the Empire. The
English Court and the relatives of Prince William
favoured this marriage, which offered the daughter
the prospect of some day reigning over those
Duchies, the possession of which the father had
vainly defended. When this union was first
proposed, the Emperor declared that he would
only consent to it if Duke Frederick would regulate
his position and that of his family towards the
Prussian Dynasty, so as to prevent all possibility
of future discord. Consequently, the Duke issued
a declaration stating that all his efforts had been
directed towards the liberation of the Duchies from
Denmark, and towards their incorporation with
Germany. The Duchies having become an integral
portion of Prussia, and thus of Germany, all his
wishes were fulfilled, as he had invariably post-
poned his personal interest to that of German
Unity.
I 82 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Duke Frederick died at the very moment when
this declaration was placed in the Emperor's hands.
His son and heir, Duke Ernest Günther, as well
as Prince Christian, the deceased Duke's brother
and son-in-law to Queen Victoria, confirmed that
declaration, and received pecuniary indemnities
for so doing. At the same time the Emperor gave
his consent to the marriage of his grandson with
the young Princess of Augustenburg, which took
place in Berlin on the 27th of February, after
her solemn entry into that city, an entry which
suggested to the imagination of the spectators
the singular contrast between father and daughter
—the former expelled from Kiel by a General of
the same sovereign who, fifteen years later, was
to give the latter a magnificent reception in the
capital of the Empire.
This picture of the reconciliation with three of
the deposed dynasties found its shadow in the
attitude of the fourth and most important dynasty.
Ring George of Hanover, living in exile, sometimes
in Vienna and sometimes in Paris, persisted in
protesting against the seizure of his Kingdom by
Prussia, who, on her part, retained the greater part
of the King's fortune. But he had given up every
thought of active hostility. Before the war of
1870, he had disbanded the legion, formed in
France and Switzerland, of old Hanoverian soldiers
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE 183
and volunteers; he had dismissed the officers who
had been faithful to him, and had ceased to employ
agents to represent him in foreign countries. The
triumph of Prussia over France and the creation of
the German Empire must have destroyed his last
hopes, at least for the immediate future, although
his implacable opposition to the new order of things
was not diminished. He could still boast of a
considerable number of faithful partizans in
Hanover, chiefly among the nobility, but also
among the citizens and the peasantry. This
fidelity was proved by the elections; a certain
number of deputies, both in the Prussian Chamber
and in the Imperial Parliament, formed the
‘Guelph Group, and constituted the most
prominent among the groups of the Opposition.
Ring George V died on the 12th of June
1878, eight days after the attempted assassination
that nearly cost the life of the sovereign who
had dethroned him. His son and heir followed
exactly the conduct of his father. On the 10th
of July he addressed a letter to the ‘King of
Prussia’ (not to the ‘Emperor of Germany’), in
which he reserved his rights to the throne of
Hanover, although he declared that, considering
the obstacles that were placed to his taking
possession of power, he would assume the title of
‘Duke of Cumberland,’ which he bore as member
184 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
of the Royal Family of England. Some months
later, on the 21st of December, he married a
daughter of the King of Denmark. On this
occasion a deputation of the Hanoverian aristo-
cracy repaired to Copenhagen; and that demon-
stration, taking place as it did in Denmark which
had never been really reconciled to Prussia, greatly
irritated the official circles of Berlin.
The Duke of Cumberland, as the nearest agnate
of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, was the heir
presumptive to the throne of Brunswick, whose
occupant, Duke William, had remained unmarried.
Immediately after the decease of George V, the
German Press had discussed this question of succes-
sion, and the official papers stated that the Prince
who had declared himself hostile to the Emperor
of Germany, could not be allowed to become the
sovereign of a state of the Empire. The influence
of the Prussian Government was exercised to that
effect in the Duchy of Brunswick, where all minds
were occupied with conjectures as to what would
follow when the throne would be vacant. Full of
these considerations, the Brunswick Chamber
passed, on the 15th of February 1879, a law
organising a Council of Regency to assume power
on the Duke's decease, and giving the command
of the troops of the Duchy to the Emperor of
Germany for the time that the Provisional
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE 185
Government lasted. That was, as the public well
knew, the first measure for the exclusion of the
Duke of Cumberland.
The Duke of Brunswick died on the 18th of
December 1884 in his castle in Prussian Silesia.
The events that had been foreseen took place
immediately; a Prussian General took military
possession of the Duchy. The Council of Regency,
opposed to the pretensions of the Duke of
Cumberland, established its communications with
the Cabinet of Berlin, from which it received its
investiture and its instructions. The Duke of
Cumberland, by a manifesto dated the 18th of
October 1885, notified his accession, to which
nobody paid any heed in Berlin or in Brunswick.
The majority of the Brunswick Chamber was
hostile to the lawful heir, and it would have been
ready to vote annexation to Prussia had that
country hinted at such a measure. According
to the law, the Provisionary Government could
only last one year, after which the Chamber
would have to elect a Regent. Prince Bismarck
resolved on making the Federal Council pass a
law declaring the Duke of Cumberland incapable
of succeeding, although that Prince had stated,
that he accepted for the Duchy of Brunswick the
Constitution of the Empire with all the ob-
ligations contracted towards it by the late Duke.
I 86 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
In Berlin it was objected that as he had
maintained his rights on Hanover, now an integral
portion of Prussia, he was in a state of war with
Prussia, and for that reason unqualified to assume
a place among the Confederate sovereigns. These
arguments carried almost unanimously the votes
of the Federal Council, the Brunswick Chamber
having signified its adhesion beforehand. On the
21st of October 1885, this Assembly nominated
as Regent of the Duchy a nephew of the Emperor
William, Prince Albrecht of Prussia, who assumed
the Government on the 2nd of November. The
future will show whether this Regency is the
prelude to the creation of a state for the younger
branch of the House of Hohenzollern, or to incor-
poration with the Prussian Monarchy; in any
case it adds another success to the many successes
of the Emperor's reign.
Among the enemies of the Empire, during
the first years of its existence, we must include the
Danish inhabitants of North Schleswig. We may
remember that the Emperor Napoleon, as medi-
ator between Prussia and Austria in 1866, had
obtained the insertion in the Treaty of Prague
of two clauses, the one fixing the Main as the
limit of Prussian supremacy in Germany, the
other allowing the population of North Schleswig
the faculty of declaring itself by Universal Suffrage
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE 187
for the retrocession of their districts to Denmark.
Prussian policy had from the first submitted with
bad grace to these two conditions, and had always
endeavoured to elude them. The fall of the
Emperor Napoleon in 1870, allowed the Cabinet
of Berlin to rid itself of those clauses, so incon-
venient to its liberty of action, and so very
wounding to its self-esteem. With the mediator,
fell the considerations to which Prussia had to
yield in 1866. For the Confederation of the
North extending to the Main, was substituted
the German Empire extending to the Alps.
There only remained the fifth Article of the
Treaty of Prague relative to North Schleswig.
The Court of Copenhagen had taken repeated
measures for the settlement of the question accord-
ing to the wishes of the Danish inhabitants; the
Prince and Princess Royal had paid several visits
to the Court of Berlin, during which that question
had been discussed. No agreement was made, and
Prussia seemed determined not to admit a com-
promise.
At the Congress of Berlin of 1878, as we shall
see further on, the Cabinet of Berlin had occasion
to serve the interests of Austria by allowing her to
occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Cabinet of
Vienna was soon in a position to recognize this ser-
vice. Prussia always declined foreign intervention
I88 7"HE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIG. W
in the execution of the Treaty of Prague.
Had not that Treaty been signed with Austria
alone 7 Was Prussia bound to give an account of
its execution to any other Power ? To put these
questions, was to answer them in a sense favourable
to Prussia. Accordingly, the Cabinet of Vienna
in the summer of 1878, informed that of Berlin
that it was inclined to accept its views. Where-
upon a Treaty was signed in Vienna on the 11th
of October, by which Austria, complying with the
wishes of the Emperor William, and Prussia,
desirous of strengthening the friendship of the two
Powers, agreed to abrogate the clause of the fifth
Article of the Treaty of Prague, relative to the
retrocession to Denmark of the Danish districts of
North Schleswig. This arrangement deprived the
few Danish Deputies in the German Parliament
of their best weapon ; no longer able to invoke the
Treaty of Prague, they could only justify their
demands by appealing to the principle of nationality;
an argument which found no echo in an assembly
little accessible to the claims of non-German popula-
tions.
The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine had had
experience of this; although of German race, they
could not reconcile themselves to the idea of final
separation from France. Like their ancestors of
1814, the Alsatians of 1870 showed themselves
THE EN EMIES OF THE EMPIRE 189
hostile to Germany. The conquerors at first
indulged in illusions; they thought the identity
of origin would pave the way to a reconciliation
which a model administration would complete.
Prince Bismarck even promised them autonomy
more extensive than they had ever enjoyed under
French rule; he played the part of their advocate,
defending them against the zealots who wished
to have recourse to violent measures. But his
labours were ineffectual. At first, the Deputies
of Alsace-Lorraine even disdained to take their
seats in the Imperial Parliament; their constitu-
ents showed themselves sullen or angry, and left
a void round all German functionaries, officers and
immigrants. It was only by degrees that the
Deputies of the conquered Provinces recognised
the necessity of taking part in Parliamentary
deliberations in order to defend their interests by
coalescing with other groups, such as the Danes,
the Poles, the Guelphs and the Catholics. The
Dictatorship ended in 1874. The Constitution of
the Empire was introduced into Alsace-Lorraine,
and at the same time an Assembly was created
of the delegates of the country. The Government
of Berlin applied the principle of decentralisation:
Strasburg became the seat of a Lieutenant of the
Emperor, who was surrounded with Ministers, and
who ruled the country independently of the German
WOL II N
190 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Administration. It does not appear that up to now
these efforts have worked a great change in the
spirit of the population. Its Deputies, at least,
persevere in an attitude of systematic hostility, and
we always find them in the Opposition when an
occasion presents itself of combating the Govern-
mental policy. The Emperor has visited Alsace-
Lorraine several times, either to preside over local
solemnities or to direct military manuoevres. He
always met with the homage due to his great age
and personal character. But the reserve of the
multitude has only slightly lessened in the course of
fifteen years; the inhabitants still show that they
only submit to the result of conquests as a tem-
porary arrangement, and the Chancellor places the
Deputies of Alsace-Lorraine among the “enemies
of the Empire.’
An equal or even higher rank in the same
category is assigned to the Poles in the Provinces
of Posen and of Eastern Prussia. The policy
adopted by the Prussian Government towards
its Polish subjects has undergone frequent varia-
tions during a period of seventy years, that is, since
the Treaty of Vienna which ratified, in the name
of Europe, the three partitions of Poland made
previously by Russia, Prussia and Austria. Some-
times there seemed to be a disposition to administer
the Grand-Duchy of Posen by Polish Governors
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE I9 I
in the spirit of Polish nationality; then that
system was abandoned for its antithesis, Germanisa-
tion, that is, an exclusively German Government,
with the mission of extirpating, or at least of
crushing as much as possible, the Polish element.
The task of the rulers became further complicated
by religious antagonism. The great majority
of the Poles belong to the Catholic religion, whilst
the Prussian functionaries and the German minority
are Protestants; so that in the course of years
Polish and Catholic, on the one side, German
and Protestant on the other, have become identical
terms in political phraseology.
The insurrections that broke out after 1830 in
the Polish Provinces of Russia and Austria, had
their accompaniment in the Province of Posen.
If external order was maintained by the Prussian
authorities, conspiracies, directed by the Polish
emigrants in Paris, found numerous partizans. In
consequence of a trial for high treason, a certain
number of Poles was incarcerated in the central
prison of Berlin when, on the 18th of March 1848,
that city became the scene of bloody disturbances.
The changes which then were made in the
organisation of the Prussian Government, produced
their effects on the administration of the Province
of Posen, where the insurrection was raging in
consequence of the events in Berlin. In order to
192 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
quell these troubles, Frederick William IV
consented to give the Province a national
administration, and he sent down a special Com-
missioner for that purpose. It was an ungrateful
task, and condemned beforehand to sterility. A
portion of the Province being inhabited by
numerous Germans, it was proposed to draw a line
of demarcation between the two administrative
regions, the one German, the other Polish. This
attempt was frustrated by the constantly recurring
opposition, first of one nationality, then of the
other. It had to be given up, and finally the
resolution was formed of suppressing the Polish
revolt by force of arms.
The projects of Polish reorganisation were thus
put aside for ever. Since 1849, the Prussian
Government endeavoured, on the contrary, to
substitute everywhere the German for the Polish
element, and to make the German language pre-
dominant in the Church, in the schools, and in the
administration. This régime, which had prevailed
before 1848, was easily maintained so long as
Prussia was an absolute Monarchy, but it en-
countered a new and serious obstacle when that
Monarchy became constitutional, and when the
Province of Posen, like the other departments of
the Kingdom, was entitled to send Deputies to the
Berlin Diet. The Polish constituents naturally
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE I93
elected Deputies of their own faith and nationality,
who formed in the Prussian Chambers a section of
the Opposition, small in number, but influential by
reason of its tenacious efforts and the votes it could
give to the other adversaries of the Government.
Eastern Prussia and the Province of Posen,
according to the Pact of 1815, were not members
of the Germanic Confederation. They were, how-
ever, not allowed to maintain this distinct position
under the rule of King William. In 1867, they
were united to the territory of the Northern Con-
federation; and in 1871, to that of the German
Empire. On both these occasions, the Polish
Deputies protested in the most solemn manner,
appealing to the promises and manifestoes of
Frederick William III. They maintained that
their Province had a right to an autonomous and
Polish Government, and that it had no desire of
being swallowed up by the German Empire.
Their protestations were peremptorily silenced
by the Government. Whenever the question
was brought forward, Prince Bismarck said that
what the leaders of the Polish faction wanted,
was in reality the separation of their Kingdom
from Prussia and the revival of an independent
Poland with the limits of 1772. Such a project,
said the Chancellor, would imply for the monarchy
the loss of the mouth of the Vistula, the surrender
194 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
of Dantzig, of Thorn and even of Eastern
Prussia, the Polish claims necessarily separating
that Province from Brandenburg and Pomerania.
Prussia, as a German State, would prefer not to
include within her dominions the disintegrating
Polish element; but in order to free herself from
it, she could not renounce possessions which had
become a political and strategical necessity.
As we have said above, the antagonism of race
in the Provinces inhabited partly by Poles and
partly by Germans, was complicated by the
antagonism between Protestants and Catholics.
The Polish Priests, uniting their agitation to the
political agitation of the Polish upper classes,
fought at the same time against the adversaries
of their race and religion; in fact it became
difficult to distinguish whether the Polish Deputy
in the Parliament of Berlin had been elected to
defend the cause of Poland or that of the Church
of Rome. We shall see further on how this state
of things contributed to prolong and to embitter
the conflict between the Imperial Government and
the Catholic Church, which began in 1871.
Since the creation of the German Empire,
the two nationalities have not ceased to fight
savagely, the one accusing the other of oppressing
its opponent. Has the German element gained
ground, as the Poles assert : Or has the reverse
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE I 95
taken place, as the German Government maintains?
As this question had been the inexhaustible subject
of violent controversy both in the Parliament and
in the Press, the Government of Berlin took a
determination of exceptional gravity in the course
of the year 1885. It resolved on nothing less than
the wholesale expulsion from Prussian territory
of Poles who had immigrated from Russia and
Austria, whose numbers were increasing in the
Prussian Provinces, where the Polish race was
already predominant.
This measure produced intense excitement
because of the multitude of interests affected and
of moral principles outraged. The public was
soon to learn that the expulsion was but a
fragment of a vast system of legislative enactments
to be directed against Poland. On the 16th
of January 1886, on opening the Prussian Chambers,
the Emperor declared that ‘the undermining of
the German by the Polish element in some of
the Eastern Provinces, imposed upon the Govern-
ment the duty of taking measures to guarantee
the existence and development of the German
nation.’
Some weeks before the King uttered these
words, the question of the expulsions had been
placed by the Polish Deputies before the Imperial
Parliament. As the affairs, concerning the domicile
tg6 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
and sojourn of foreigners, appertained to Imperial
Legislation according to the Constitution, the
Parliament was competent to deal with this
subject. But such was not the opinion of the
Emperor and his Ministers. We have mentioned
in what manner the Emperor intervened directly
by contesting the right of the Parliament to busy
itself with the actions of the King of Prussia.
In spite of this prohibition, the question gave
rise to a long debate in the month of January,
in which the Catholics and the Progressive
Liberals took the part of the Poles. Two days
after the royal address to the Prussian Chambers,
the Imperial Parliament voted, by an overwhelm-
ing majority, a motion, by which it declared the
expulsions neither justified nor conformable to the
national interests of the German Empire.
Following the example of the Emperor, the
Prussian Chambers opposed the resolution of the
Parliament, not by attacking it directly, but by
declaring beforehand its adhesion to the measures
which the opening speech described as being in
preparation against the Poles. On this occasion
Prince Bismarck announced in the plainest terms
that a real war was to be waged against that
unfortunate race. ‘We have found,’ he said, ‘that
all our efforts to reconcile the Polish nobility to
Germany are barren, and that we must change
THE EAWEMIES OF THE EMPIRE I 97
our system, and diminish the Polish, so as to
augment the German, population. We have enough
Poles who are Prussian subjects; we must get
rid of those who are foreigners. It is a political
measure which we intend to carry out emergetically,
and any amount of votes of the Imperial Parlia-
ment will not alter our resolution.’
The legislative measures were soon put forward.
Several projected laws, framed by the Prussian
Government, had the object of creating a fund
of 100,000,000 marks for the purpose of buying
the estates of Poles and of establishing German
settlers in their stead, and also for the construction
of German Churches and schools. Another project
deprived the Polish communities of the right of
nominating the professors of their schools and
colleges, and transferred their right to the Govern-
ment.
Of these various proposed enactments, that
relative to the purchase of estates caused the
greatest sensation. These estates, in the Province
of Posen, belong mostly to the Polish Aristocracy,
and are encumbered with mortgages. The Govern-
ment therefore relies on the poverty of their
owners for their acquisition, and these owners it
considers enemies of the German Empire. It is a
kind of expropriation with a political motive.
These measures are strenuously opposed by
198 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
considerations of humanity and also by Conser-
vative principles, and even in the most favourable
case it will take a long period to produce the effects
desired by the Prussian Government. They will
not destroy the antagonism between the two races,
nor will they put an end to the Polish question,
which concerns not merely Prussia and Germany,
but also Russia and Austria, and which may revive
with any great political convulsion in Europe,
assuming the double form of an international and
revolutionary movement.
It is worthy of remark that the Polish question
had the effect of bringing to light a certain dis-
agreement between the Imperial Parliament and
the Prussian Chambers. This is not the first
time that such a disagreement is discernible. In
1848, the Prussian National Assembly rose against
the encroachments of the German Parliament of
Francfort; and at the present date it would
appear, after what has happened, that the
Prussian Chambers are more Prussian than
German. -
By their opposition to the policy of the Govern-
ment, the groups of which we have spoken
naturally became troublesome and inconvenient.
Guelphs, Danes, Poles and the inhabitants of
Alsace-Lorraine thus acquired the name of enemies
of the Empire. The same qualification was also
THE ENEMIES OF THE EMPIRE I99
given to the most compact group of the Opposition,
to the Catholic Deputies forming the party of
the Centre. The action of this party belongs to
the prodigious struggle between Church and State
in the German Empire, of which we shall now
describe the details.
CHAPTER XVII
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE.—1871-1886
CHURCH AND STATE UNIDER FREDERICK WILLIAM III.—IDEA OF THE
PRUSSIAN STATE AND OF THE PAPACY. — VARIATIONS OF
PRUSSIAN POLICY TOWARDS THE WATICAN. — FREDERICK
WILLIAM IV AND THE WATICAN.—THE CATHOLICS IN 1848.-
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES.—ACCESSION OF KING WILLIAM.
—FIRST YEARS OF RELIGIOUS PEACE.—INFLUENCE OF THE
EVENTS OF ITALY AND OF THE WAR WITH AUSTRIA.—DISTRUST
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CATHOLICS.—ORIGIN OF
THE PARTY OF THIE CENTRE.-PETITION AGAINST CONVENTS.—
VATICAN COUNCIL. — INTERNAL DISSENSIONS OF GERMAN
CATHOLICISM. — GERMAN BISHOPS AT FIRST OPPOSED TO
THE DOGMA OF INFALLIBILITY. —THEY SUBMIT. —THE OLD
CATHOLIC HERESY. — HOSTILITY OF PROTESTANTISM. — THE
RELIGIOUS COMPLICATED BY THE NATIONAL QUESTION.—THE
EMPEROR A STRONG PROTESTANT.--THE CATHOLICS AND THE
ELECTIONS OF 1871. –THE EMPEROR DISPLEASED WITH THE
OCCUPATION OF ROME BY THE ITALIANS.—THE GERMAN PARLIA-
MENT DECLARES ITSELF AGAINST INTERVENTION.—CONSTITU-
TIONAL GTJARANTEES DISCARDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND
THE PARLIAMENT.--THE POPE CONGRATULATES THE EMPEROR.
—THE POPE AND THE PARTY OF THE CENTRE.-RUPTURE AND
CONFLICT. —ILLUSIONS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. —FIRST
MEASURES AGAINST ROME. — THE “KULTURKAMPF.’— THE
CABINET OF BIFRLIN TRIES TO ASSOCIATE FOREIGN GOVERN-
MENTS TO ITS POLICY. —THE FUTURE ELECTION OF THE POPE.—
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 2O I
DISAGREEMENT WITH FRANCE, ITALY AND BELGIUM.–LEGISLA-
TIVE MEASURES..—EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS.— LAWS OF MAY
1873.−FAVOUR SHOWN TO THE OLD CATIIOLIC SECT.—OPPOSI-
TION OF THE POPE AND OF THE BISHOPS.—CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN THE POPE AND THE EMPEROR. — ARREST AND
DEPOSITION OF BISHOPS. —THE BISHOP OF MAYENCE AND THIE
CELEBRATION OF SEDAN. — DISASTROUS RESULTS OF THE
CONFLICT. — CHANGE OF OPINION IN BERLIN. — DANGER OF
SOCIALISM.–DEATH OF PIUS IX. —ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATIONS
of THE EMPEROR.—CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEO XIII, THE
EMPEROR AND THE CROWN PRINCE. –CIVILITIES EXCHANGED
BETWEEN THE WATICAN AND THE COURT OF BERLIN.—
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BERLIN AND ROME.—FIRST CONCES-
SIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN CABINET.-MODIFICATIONS OF THE
LAWS OF MAY.—CATHOLICS AND PROGRESSIVE LIBERALS.—THE
CROWN PRINCE IN THE WATICAN.—FURTHER CONCESSIONS OF
THE CABINET OF BERLIN.—THIE ARCHIBISIIOPS OF COLOGNE AND
OF POSEN.—THE QUESTION OF THE CAROLINE ISLANDS.—THE
CABINET OF BERLIN PROPOSES THE POPE AS MEDIATOR.—
DEXTERITY OF PRUSSIAN DIPLOMACY. —THE POPE's DECISION
ACCEPTED BY BOTH PARTIES.—THE POPE's GRATITUDE.—ON
RELIGIOUS GROUND THE POPE MAINTAINS HIS FORMER POSITION.
—FURTHER CONCESSIONS OF THIE GOVERNMENT.—THE LAWS OF
MAY ABANDONED.—FIFTEEN YEARS OF BARREN LEGISLATION.—
RETREAT OF THE GOVERNMENT. — A GRIEVOUS ERROR OF
IMPERIAL POLICY.
DURING the Reign of Frederick William III, father
of the Emperor William, the position of Prussia
towards the Vatican offers two different phases.
At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the King
of Prussia was one of the most energetic advocates
of the temporal power of the Papacy. Prussia
having by that European Treaty acquired the
Provinces of the Rhine and the Grand-Duchy
of Posen, the inhabitants of which were mostly
Catholics, it was decidedly to the interest of Prussia
2 oz THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
to be on friendly terms with the Holy See and
to regulate in a satisfactory manner the religious
requirements of her new subjects. With this
view a Concordat was concluded in 1821, establish-
ing the dioceses and their dotations. These
arrangements, necessitated by urgent political
interests, could not suppress the religious an-
tagonism between the Protestant Government of
Berlin and the Roman Curia—between the King,
head of the Protestant Church of Prussia and the
Bope, Supreme Pontiff of the Catholic Church.
The very idea of the Prussian State, as conceived
by its Electors and Kings, would necessarily clash
with that of the Papacy, inasmuch as it invested
that State with a legislative omnipotence aspiring
to embrace the whole range of social and political
life. The way in which the various Prussian
sovereigns exercised that absolute legislative
power, fixed the nature of their relations with
the Pope and the Episcopate. So long as they
abstained from excessive interference in Catholic
affairs, these relations were pacific ; but when
a certain limit was overstepped, they became
hostile and resulted in conflicts. This happened
towards the end of the reign of Frederick
William III. The question of mixed marriages
between Catholics and Protestants, and of the
orthodoxy of the teaching of the Professors of
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 2O3
Theology at the University of Bonn, contemplated
by the Bishops from the point of view of Roman
Canonical Law, whereas the Prussian Government
desired to judge them from the point of view of the
jurists of Protestant Prussia, gave rise to a serious
conflict, in the course of which the Archbishops of
Cologne and Posen were violently taken from their
Sees and declared prisoners of State.
Totally different was the system adopted by
Frederick William IV. When he succeeded his
father in 1840, his first thought was to make peace
with Rome, to give the Church the regulation of
subjects relating to dogmas and to conscientious
questions, and to allow the two imprisoned prelates
to return to their flocks. At the same time he
established in the Ministry of Public Worship a
Special Committee for Catholic affairs, composed of
Members of the Church of Rome. From that time
the two Powers lived in peace, each satisfied with
the other. The King and his Government had no
cause to regret their moderation. In the troubled
times of 1848 and the following years, the Catholic
districts of Prussia returned as a rule Conserva-
tives to Parliament. ‘It is to the fidelity of my
Catholic subjects, Frederick William subsequently
declared, ‘that I owe the preservation of my
throne.” In order to reward them for their loyalty,
he introduced into the Prussian Constitution of
204 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
1850 three Articles, guaranteeing complete
autonomy to the Catholic Church, and perfect
liberty of communication between the Episcopacy
and the Holy See.
This state of things, satisfactory to all parties,
prevailed when King William ascended the throne,
and he expressed his pleasure at it to the Catholic
Bishops who appeared at Konigsberg in 1861 to
congratulate him on his coronation. In the month
of April 1866, he gave utterance to similar senti-
ments when speaking to the Archbishops of
Cologne and Posen, who had been recently elected,
and who came to give him the usual oath of
allegiance. That moment marked the limits of
the period of repose and concord between Church
and State. The Italian events, the dangers
menacing the temporal power of the Pope, the
alliance of Prussia with Italy, the defeat of Catholic
Austria and her exclusion from Germany, pro-
duced profound emotion in the Catholics of
Germany. In the old confederation, Catholic
Austria was the presiding Power, and the Catholic
equalled in number the Protestant population. In
consequence of the war of 1866, Austria no longer
constituting a portion of Germany, the Protestant
population was in the majority, and a Protestant
sovereign held the sceptre. This gave rise to appre-
hension and suspicion, which could not fail to result
THE EMPEROR AWD THE POPE 2O5
in hostilities as soon as the Protestant Government
would begin to tyrannise over the Catholic
Church. We must add that this coolness of the
Catholics towards the new Confederation created
under the auspices of Prussia, provoked from the
first the hostility of the Liberal and Unitary
Party who fancied they discovered in the Catholics
the enemies of German Unity as well as the
partizans of Austria, who was as yet far from
being reconciled to her conqueror. Similar
suspicions prevailed in the Governmental circles
in Berlin. Bismarck had brought them from
Francfort where he had represented Prussia in
the Germanic Diet. During the conflict which
was then raging between the Government of
Baden and the Catholic Church, he was strongly
for resistance; in his eyes, it was the cause- of
all the Protestant Governments against the
Catholic Clergy.
From the year 1867, the antagonism of both
parties became stronger and stronger in the
Prussian Chambers as well as in the Parliament
of the North. The Catholic Deputies constituted
a separate group, regulating their votes according
to the amount of favour and solicitude manifested
by the majority for the interests of the Church.
As we have already stated, the Liberal and Pro-
testant Party was not so peacefully inclined, and
WOL II O
266 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
the signal of hostilities was given by that
party.
In the Session of 1869, a petition from the
working classes was laid before the Prussian
Chamber, demanding the suppression of convents
and religious congregations. The Committee of
Petitions answered through its President, a member
of the Liberal Party, favourably to the petitioners.
This was a violation of the Constitution which
gave the right of association to all citizens without
exception; the Ministers acknowledged this fact,
and pronounced themselves against the petition.
It was finally adjourned by the Liberal Party,
who feared that it would place difficulties in the
way of the union of the Catholic South with the
Protestant North if they persisted in an act of
manifest and unprovoked hostility.
In 1869 Europe was on the eve of witnessing
the Vatican Council which was to take important
decisions as to the Pope's spiritual power. Many
adversaries of the Papacy hoped that the loss of
temporal power would result in a similar loss of
spiritual power; and they were greatly surprised
on discovering that the Pope was now, more than
ever, determined to assert the latter, so as to
regain the former, which he considered essential
to his independence, and to the exercise of his
functions as Supreme Pontiff. It also became
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 2 of
evident that the attachment of Episcopacy, Clergy,
and Laity towards the person of Pius IX, became
more zealous and intense with every new misfortune
that afflicted him. On the other hand, among the
theologians most conspicuous in Germany, was
discernible a disagreement with the Vatican, which
only awaited the meeting of the Council to burst
forth violently. These dissenting theologians en-
joyed much credit with the Protestant Govern-
ments, and especially with that of Berlin, which
hoped that their influence would either moderate the
decisions of the Council or sow the seed of a vast
schism. It was supposed that these discontented
theologians and the Protestant Cabinets entertained
the idea of a German Catholic Church, independent
of Rome, with a German head living on German
territory, and therefore completely under the power
of the future Emperor of Germany.
Facts have since proved that the Cabinet of
IBerlin overrated the influence of the discontented
theologians over the clergy and the faithful. It
thought that when the latter were reduced to the
necessity of choosing, they would declare them-
selves for the German theologians against the
Vatican. Impressed with this view, the Prussian
Government assumed an expectant attitude towards
the Council, and rejected all advice recommending
it to use pressure on the Pope and his entourage.
2O8 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Of all the future decisions of the Council, that
concerning the dogma of Infallibility was most
engrossing to the Cabinets of Europe. They im-
agined that the proclamation of this dogma would
seriously injure the authority and sovereignty of
the Governments. They fancied that they were
only defending their legitimate interests when they
used all their influence in Rome to prevent what
they considered a disastrous resolution.
The German Bishops were at first not very
favourable to the proclamation of the dogma, in
which they saw no innovation in the Church, but
merely the confirmation of the decrees of previous
Councils. In this view they were of one mind
with the supporters of the proclamation. But
they were of opinion that this act would be in-
opportune, considering the state of Europe and the
conflicts that might ensue with heretical Govern-
ments. The majority of the Council having given
an opposite decision, these prelates left Rome
before the final vote, thus combining what they
supposed to be their duty with their respect for
the Pope. The German Protestants hoped that
what was opposition before the vote would become
schism after it; it allowed itself to be deluded by
fallacious symptoms, without taking a lesson from
recent events. Thirty years previously, the con-
flict with the Archbishops of Cologne and of Posen
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 209
had given birth to a sect called ‘German-Catholic,’
which had caused a certain amount of agitation, and
given rise to controversy, and even to some local
disturbances, but in a few years it was for-
gotten. The question of the dogma of Infallibility
had a similar effect, though it was perhaps some-
what stronger in its manifestations, because of the
factions and political passions by which it was
embittered. Under the auspices of a Munich
theologian of the name of Döllinger, and of
some other dissatisfied priests, a heresy was
organised, which assumed the title of “Old Catholic,’
because it pretended to represent the true Catholic
faith, maintaining that the dogma of Infallibility
was a revolutionary innovation of the Vatican.
In Berlin the new heresy was hailed with
rapture : great hopes were placed on the celebrity
of the apostates by whom it was headed. The
Government thought itself near the realisation of
its long cherished dream of a Church independent
of Rome, of a Church tamed to proper subservi-
ency to the Civil Power which already completely
governed the evangelical and Protestant Church.
Under the influence of this erroneous idea, began
one of the most serious and singular struggles
of modern times, a terrific contest between the
two great Powers whose antagonism fills the annals
of history, and who were about to measure their
2 Io THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
strength once more, when the Pope had again
become a defenceless priest without territory and
without soldiers, and when his opponent was an
Emperor at the pinnacle of earthly glory.
As we have already stated, policy had taken
possession of the religious question. The Catholic
parts of Germany were those where the spirit of
autonomy never prevailed, and where there was
strongest opposition to the predominance of Prussia
and of her tendency to unification. The war with
France did not at first enjoy the sympathy of the
Catholics; but they fulfilled their patriotic duty in
the Army, especially when it became likely that
France, if victorious, would make South Germany
her prey. The inhabitants of Bavaria, Baden, the
Rhenish Provinces, Westphalia, Posen and Silesia.
fought against France with the same bravery as
their Protestant fellow-countrymen; a fact acknow-
ledged in terms of the warmest eulogy by the
Emperor and the Generals of his army. Never-
theless, in spite of this confraternity of arms,
Protestant Germany, and the National Liberal
Party in particular, made the defeat of France the
starting point for a war against Catholicity.
“After having defeated Catholic Austria, they
said, ‘we have defeated Catholic France, and now
we shall defeat the Vatican.” They also said :
‘The German Empire of 1870 must not resemble
THE EMPEROR AWD THE POPE 2 II
the ancient Empire in any respect; the latter was
a rival, but also a prop of the Papacy; the new
Empire must be like its chief, absolutely Protes-
tant.” These words and threats, manifestations
of party-spirit, nourished the bitterness already
prevalent in theological disputes. They terrified
the German clergy and made them regret the
opposition offered to the Council. The Catholics
saw themselves attacked by adversaries at once
religious and political. They were thrown against
their will into the ranks of the opponents of the
Imperial Government; they had no choice but to
organise themselves into a compact party and to
defend themselves against the worse that tyranny
could do. Such was the origin of the party which
was formed early in 1871 among the Catholics of
the various German States; it called itself the
* Party of the Centre,’ because its members took
their seat in the centre of the Chamber in which
the Imperial Parliament held its deliberations.
During the General Election of 1871, two
objects were placed at the head of the Catholic
Programme : defence of the temporal power of
the Pope, and defence of the autonomy of the
Church. Relative to the former, urgent measures
had been taken with the Emperor, then at
Versailles. Countless petitions were addressed to
him; the Catholic aristocracy of Prussia implored
2 I 2 7'HE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
of him to oppose the seizure of Rome by the
Italians, Rome being the last bulwark of the
temporal power. The Emperor was personally
not opposed to this demand. We have seen by
the narration of the events subsequent to 1859,
that William the First did not sympathise very
ardently with the efforts of the Unitary Party in
Italy, whose actions he considered revolutionary,
and whose aggressions against Rome he held in
particular abhorrence. Prussian policy had been
since 1867 favourable to the temporal power.
‘The Catholic inhabitants of Germany, Bismarck
wrote on the 30th of October 1867 to the Prussian
Minister in Rome, ‘have the same right as the
Protestant inhabitants that their religious con-
victions should be considered. For this reason a
State with a mixed population must not act
towards the Head of the Catholic Church in a
manner offensive to the faithful. But in order
to take a definitive position, it is above all necessary
to be certain that the Papacy will maintain a
situation recognised by the majority of Catholics
of German nationality.’ A fortnight later, on
the 15th of November, at the opening of the
Prussian Chambers, King William declared ‘that
his efforts tended to satisfy the claim which
his Catholic subjects had on his solicitude for the
dignity and independence of the Pope.' Nor did
TH/E E.J/PEROR AND THE POPE 2 I 3
he, as Emperor at Versailles, abandon these ideas.
Pope Pius IX had written to him twice during
the war in the interest of peace and reconciliation
with France. The Emperor had received these
missives with the respect and courtesy due to
the Sovereign Pontiff, but without allowing them
to have any practical influence on his policy.
The Pope wrote in a similar strain to the French
Bishops. The footing between the Emperor and
the Holy Father was not injured by the war.
The occupation of Rome by the Italian Army
greatly displeased the Emperor; and at the head-
quarters at Versailles it was even suggested to
offer the Pope a place of refuge in one of the
Catholic towns of Germany. In the month of
February 1871, a Deputation of the Catholic
Enights of Malta having proceeded to Versailles
to ask for Imperial intervention in favour of Pius
IX, the Emperor did not hesitate to declare that
his opinion had not changed with regard to the
Pope, the Spiritual Head of his Catholic subjects;
that he considered the occupation of Rome a
lawless, act of violence on the part of Italy; and
that, when the war was over, he would enquire
with the other sovereigns what measures were
to be taken against this usurpation.
A month later, after the signature at Versailles
of the preliminaries of peace, the private feelings of
214 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
the Emperor were subdued by the considerations of
policy requiring him to detach Italy from France.
Accordingly, when opening the first Session of the
German Parliament on the 21st of March, he
declared his intention of respecting the independ-
ence of other Powers in everything appertaining to
their internal transactions and affairs. This disavowal
of any design of intervening in Italian affairs, was in-
sufficient for the Protestant majority of the Parlia-
ment. On the proposal of the leader of the Liberal
Party, this Assembly inserted in the answer to the
Imperial Speech, a paragraph to the effect that
‘the days of interference in the private affairs of
foreign nationalities might never return under
any form or pretext.” This vote, given under the
auspices, if not at the direct instigation, of the
Imperial Chancellor, destroyed the first of the two
points of the Catholic programme; and the second
point soon underwent the same fate. Taking a
precedent from the Prussian Constitution of 1850,
the Catholics, considering the attitude of their
adversaries and especially the stress laid on the
Protestant character of the Empire, proposed the
insertion in the Constitution of several Articles
guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of
the Catholic Church. Prince Bismarck was
absolutely opposed to this motion. The Catholic
Party comprised Poles, naturally hostile to the
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 2 I 5
absorption of the Polish Provinces by the Empire;
Bavarians, hostile to the Prussian Supremacy;
Guelphs, hostile to Prussia as Catholics and as
former subjects of the King of Hanover. The
Catholic Party (or as it soon came to be called, the
Party of the Centre) was directed by an eminent
Hanoverian, former Minister and Crown Lawyer
of the deposed sovereign. In the eyes of the
Chancellor, the Catholic Party was made up of
enemies of Prussia and of the Empire; the Church
which that Party defended, became the accomplice
of these enemies, and the Pope, the Head of that
Church, an antagonistic Political Power, to be
combated with every weapon of the State. The
attitude of the German Episcopacy greatly
deceived him. The German Bishops, after
pronouncing themselves against the declaration
of the dogma of Infallibility, gave way before
the decision of the Pope and of the Council;
they submitted, and promulgated in their dioceses
the decrees of the Vatican, exhorting the faithful
to follow their example. Under these conditions,
the Chancellor thought it no longer necessary
to spare the Centre. He opposed the motion
of the Catholics, asking for constitutional guarantees,
and caused its rejection by the Parliamentary
majority, blindly devoted to his policy.
But the rupture with the Holy See was not yet
21.6 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
complete. The Pope had not retaliated. On the
contrary, he wrote on the 6th of March to the
Emperor at Versailles to congratulate him on his
election to the Imperial dignity, and to thank him
for his expressions of friendship, which he said,
“would contribute in no slight degree to secure the
rights and the liberty of the Catholic Religion.’
Prince Bismarck, trying to detach from the
Catholic Party the purely political and anti-
Prussian elements, entertained the hope of attain-
ing that result by taking steps at the Vatican. It
would seem that he was not unsuccessful at first ;
Rome seemed inclined to moderate the ardour of
the Centre ; but this disposition was only transient.
The Vatican soon gave up the idea of taking a
direct part in Parliamentary contests, or of
weakening or deserting a party which was defend-
ing the Church against Protestant oppression.
Thus the struggle began between Church and
State, between Pope and Emperor. The Prussian
Government in opening hostilities believed that it
could keep them within the limits of a purely
political dispute in which the Papacy, attacked on
all sides and weakened by its recent disasters,
would easily succumb. The newspapers that were
known to express the Chancellor's opinions, stated
that he only wished to draw the limits of the rights
of the Church and of those of the State, without
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 217
injuring religion or encroaching on dogma. After
the lapse of fifteen years, the Prussian Government,
like many others, was obliged to own that that line
of demarcation can never be drawn, that the
problem cannot be solved, considering the different
principles of the two contending powers, and that,
when once the secular power enters on this field, it
is carried on from aggression on the Pope to
religious presecution.
The first blows were struck in 1871, by two
important measures against the Catholic Church
in Prussia. Prince Bismarck suppressed, in the
Ministry of Public Worship, the Committee for
the direction of Catholic Affairs, which he accused
of defending the interests of the Roman Curia
against the Prussian Government, instead of
defending those of the latter; he also considered
incompatible with their duty towards the State,
the position of these functionaries who had
submitted as faithful sons of the Church to the
Decrees of the Vatican on Papal Infallibility.
Henceforth Catholic affairs were to be examined
and treated by officials bound by no link to the
Holy See.
The second measure consisted in a law, by
which the inspection of schools was taken out of
the hands of the priests, and placed in those of
functionaries nominated by the Government.
218 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
By thus removing the influence of the Catholic
Clergy from the schools, encouragement was given
to the opponents of the Council. In some colleges,
the professors who had been entrusted by their
Bishops with religious instruction, had refused to
teach the dogma of Infallibility, and had in con-
sequence been suspended by their ecclesiastical
superiors. These professors resisted ; the Govern-
ment took upon itself not only to maintain them
in their functions, but also to oblige the pupils,
against the will of their parents, to listen to
instructions contradicting their religion. Thus in
a few months after the commencement of hostilities,
the State had already exceeded its limits by
encroaching on religious convictions. From that
moment, events proceeded with fearful rapidity.
Dignity, faith and self-esteem were engaged on
both sides; the rigour of the Government was
met by the inflexible resistance of the Clergy, and
the measures of the Government soon proceeded
from severity to barbarous persecution of the
priests and of Catholicity.
The heretical professors were excommunicated
by the Bishops. The Government intervened to
compel the latter to revoke their excommunication,
which it said was not merely an ecclesiastical
penalty. The Bishops refused, and the whole
Prussian episcopacy protested. The Government
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 2 I 9
reverted to the policy prevalent at the end of the
reign of Frederick William the Third. It said
it was supreme and capable of legislating on every
subject, and that it was for the Church to submit
to every enactment, however severe. The Bishops
and priests who would not yield, were treated
as rebels and criminals towards the State and
the sovereign. The Emperor William, convinced
that the Catholic Clergy were wanting in loyalty,
adopted entirely.the views of his Ministry. He
placed at the head of the Department for Public
Worship, Herr Falk, a Protestant lawyer, who,
in the struggle between Church and State,
interpreted the laws wholly in favour of the
latter. The resolution was formed of deciding
once for all the old quarrel between Pope and
Emperor, of crushing the priest under the
supremacy of the sovereign. It was a struggle,
said the Cabinet of Berlin, for the well-being
of civilisation, of which the Church had become
the declared enemy; it was a ‘Kulturkampf,’ a
‘battle for culture,’ as an eminent Deputy of the
advanced Liberal Party termed it.
The campaign against the Church was con-
ducted by Prince Bismarck on the domain of
diplomacy and policy; and by the Minister of
Bublic Worship, on that of legislature and adminis-
tration. The Chancellor, fully aware of the great
22 o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS PEIG. W.
power of the Papacy, was desirous of coming to an
understanding with the other European Govern-
ments as to the election of the future Pope. Pius
IX was very old, and his end could not be far off;
the choice of his successor was of the greatest
importance considering the state of affairs. On the
14th of May 1872, Prince Bismarck addressed a
communication to the Foreign Cabinets, in which
he invited them to take measures as to the choice
of a candidate for the Papacy. He said that the
concordats and the decrees of the Vatican Council
had altered the footing between the Pope and the
Episcopacy. The Pope had now become what he
had never been before, an absolute master, to whom
the Bishops were blindly subservient, accepting the
position of delegates of a foreign Government. It
was for the European Powers to consider whether
they would admit a state of things incompatible with
their interests, and whether it would not be wise to
come to some decision as to the course to be
pursued in the event of the Papal throne becoming
vacant. This step of Prince Bismarck was calculated
to prevent Germany from being left in isolation in
her contest with the Church of Rome; but it was
not attended with a successful issue. A dis-
agreement soon arose with France whose Episco-
pacy was accused by the Cabinet of Berlin of
employing secret machinations to confirm the
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 22 I
German Clergy in its resistance to the tyranny
of the Government. Early in 1875 a diplomatic
incident arose on the subject of the attitude of
the Belgian Clergy and of some fanatical dis-
turbances in that country. The Government of
Ring Leopold declined to grant Prussia's demand
that it should introduce into the Belgian Code
more stringent laws against such occurrences.
The Italian Government was also requested to
change some of its laws by the German administra-
tion which had been wrought up to the highest
pitch of frenzy by the vehement speeches and
epistles issued at that epoch by the Pope. Prince
Bismarck was burning to punish His Holiness for
his strong language. He expressed himself of
opinion that the law of guarantee of 1871, passed
for the preservation of the sovereign Pontiff's
liberty and independence, was an Italian law of .
local, not of international, importance, and there-
fore open to revision and modification by the
Italian Government. The German Cabinet asked
for this revision, so that the Pope might be
prevented from expressing his opinion too freely
on the conduct of other Powers. This request
ended as unsuccessfully as the others. The Italian
Government, like the rest of Europe, showed no
desire of adding to its many internal troubles by
VOL. II P
222 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
entering on another conflict with the Vatican and
with the whole Catholic world.
Meanwhile the Cabinet of Berlin was displaying
incessant activity in internal legislation. Having
found all efforts useless to sow dissension between
the Pope and the Episcopacy, it attempted to
wean the Clergy from the Bishops, and finally
to alienate the laity from their Clergy. But
these attempts were as barren of result in Germany
as elsewhere ; and the Government was soon to
be convinced of this fact. The period extending
from 1871 to 1876, presents a long series of
laws and decrees tending to intimidate and
crush the Catholic Clergy; in 1871, the introduc-
tion of Civil Marriages, a measure to which
the Emperor's assent was only obtained after
the Premier's most strenuous representations,
so repugnant was it to his religious convictions;
in 1872, the promulgation of the Imperial
Law of the expulsion of the Jesuits and
their affiliated congregations, and of the law
depriving priests of the inspection of the schools
of their parishes. The year 1873 is the most
momentous of these years of warfare against the
Church; it gave birth to the ‘Laws of May, thus
named from the month in which they were passed.
By this legislation the State intervened in the
government of the Church and even in the
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 223
minutest religious practices. The Articles of the
Prussian Constitution relative to the autonomy
of the Catholic Church were modified for the
benefit of administrative control, and in the
following year entirely abolished. Further laws
placed the education of the clergy under the
regulations of the State, restricted the disciplinary
power of the Bishops over their priests, deprived
the Pope of supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction by
organising a lay tribunal to judge the members of
the priesthood both in their disputes with the
Episcopacy and in the State Prosecutions against
Clergy and Bishops, and a new form of oath was
introduced for the latter.
In the course of the year 1874 a law was
passed to suspend from their functions all priests
who had not submitted to the Laws of May, and
to deprive the recusant priests of their allowances.
Another law gave the Government power to
administrate those Bishoprics that had become
vacant by the deposition of their heads. All
religious congregations, with the exception of
those devoted to nursing the sick, were prohibited
and banished from German territory.
At the same time the Government lavished its
most gracious favours on the Old-Catholics. This
sect could boast, at the time its numbers were
largest, of barely 40,000 adherents out of 16,000,000
224 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Catholics who remained faithful to the Pope ; and it
counted in its ranks not more than forty apostate
priests who now venomously attacked the Pope
and his Bishops. Although these ex-priests and
their followers openly declared their separation
from Rome, the Government pretended to consider
them as Catholic as the great body of Catholicity
itself; and maintained that they had a right to
share in the Catholic Churches and in everything
appertaining to these Churches. It recognised the
individual they set up as their Bishop, who received
his investiture from a schismatic Dutch prelate,
and it assigned him a pension drawn from the
Budget of the Catholic Church.
Against these flagrant acts of injustice, the
Clergy and the Catholic Parliamentary Party
defended themselves as best they could. The
ardour and vehemence of their resistance was
not less energetic than the passionate despotism
of the Ministry. Pope Pius IX was the first to
take vigorously the part of the Bishops who were
persecuted for their fidelity to the Holy See. He
extolled their opposition to the new ecclesiastical
laws, declared these laws null and void, and ex-
communicated the partizans of the Old Catholic
sect. The more the Prussian Government
persevered in its persecuting policy, the more
the Pope's language became severe and bitter.
T//E EMPEROR AND THE POPE 225
On the 24th of June 1872, overcome with emotion
caused by the laws preceding those of May,
Pius IX, receiving the delegates of a Catholic
association resident in Rome, expressed himself
in the bitterest terms on the persecution the
catholics in Germany were suffering, and which
he declared had long been arranged and con-
templated. He denounced in particular Prince
Bismarck as the arch-tyrant; he said that he had
told him that a triumph without moderation
cannot be lasting. Then, imploring those present
to pray to Heaven for the protection of the
Almighty, the Pope added in a Scriptural
metaphor: “Who knows whether a little stone may
not soon fall from the mountain to crush the foot
of the giant º' Many Catholic Courts, in former
years and in the present time, had heard similar
reproaches from the Pope without being greatly
moved. But the Court of Berlin, little accustomed
to such criticisims, was goaded by this allocution
to the last verge of frenzy. By a somewhat
strained interpretation, words applying to the
religious policy of the Imperial Government, were
construed as containing an insult to the person of
the Emperor, and in consequence all diplomatic
communication with the Vatican was broken off.
Once again, in 1873, shortly after the Laws of
May had been passed, the Pope appealed directly
22.6 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
to the Emperor William himself. Endeavouring
to throw the responsibility of the conflict on the
influence of Prince Bismarck, Pius IX attempted
to convince the Emperor of its disastrous result.
He said that he had been informed that the
Emperor did not approve of the policy of his
Government, a policy calculated to undermine the
foundations of the Imperial throne. He spoke
frankly, as his standard was truth and his duty
was to speak that truth even to those who did
not profess the Catholic religion, ‘as everybody
who had been baptised was attached in a certain
degree to the Pope.’ This letter aggravated
instead of diminishing the conflict, as it expected
the Emperor to disavow his Chancellor's proceed-
ings and to own that he had acted in contradiction
to his sovereign's orders. Nothing irritated the
Emperor more than a doubt expressed as to the
supremacy of his personal authority and the
reality of his initiative. His Protestant con-
victions were highly offended by the last clause of
the Pope's epistle. On the 3rd of September he
answered in the sharpest terms. No measure, he
said, could be adopted in Germany without his
consent. It was the Catholics who disturbed
religious peace by organising a political body. He
would punish all those who disobeyed the laws with
the utmost severity, The Pope was badly
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 227
informed as to the real state of things, and it was
for him to use his authority for stopping an
agitation which had nothing in common with
religion. And in conclusion the Emperor pro-
tested against any religious affinity with the Pope ;
as a Protestant he recognised no other inter-
mediary with God than Jesus Christ.
Such was the last interchange of personal
communications between the Emperor and Pius
IX. The conflict now entered on its acutest
stage. To each cruel law and to each persecuting
decree, the Bishops replied by ardent and
energetic protestations, and bore fines and
imprisonment with the utmost fortitude. From
1873 to 1877, all the Prussian Bishops were
deposed, one after the other, by the Government;
most of those who had taken refuge in exile,
continued to administer their dioceses by secret
delegates. The conflict assumed daily more and
more the appearance of a religious war between
Protestants and Catholics. It excited great
interest in England. Meetings were held and
resolutions passed to encourage the Emperor in
the course he was pursuing. In reply to an
address voted under the presidency of Lord John
Russell, the Emperor said openly that he was
fighting a battle such as many a German Emperor
had fought in past centuries.
228 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The Catholic Clergy in the various German
States took an active part in hostilities.
Monseigneur von Kettler, Bishop of Mayence,
sent a circular on the eve of the anniversary
of Sedan in 1874, to his priests, requesting them
not to take part in the patriotic festivities
celebrating that event. ‘It is not,’ he said, ‘the
victory over France, it is the triumph over the
Catholic Church in which they are rejoicing.
Let them assert that our sentiments are not
patriotic | Rather suffer that calumny than profane
religion.” In the Imperial Parliament and in
the Prussian Chambers, the Clergy had numerous
representatives who joined the great party of
the centre whose number, from forty members in
1869, swelled to nearly 100 in 1878. In every
General Election, that party gained more votes,
and it soon became an important power, often
pronouncing the doom of a measure introduced
by the Government, when voting jointly with
the other sections of the Opposition.
In the course of the year 1877 it was rumoured
that a change of religious policy was at hand. A
more pressing anxiety occupied the Emperor's
mind, the increasing agitation of the Socialist
Party. In looking back on the past, the Emperor
and his advisers were obliged to own that the Laws
of May had not diminished the resistance of the
THE E / PEROR AND THE POPE 229
Clergy, the immense majority of which had pre-
ferred exile, suspension, imprisonment and starva-
tion rather than submit to those oppressive laws.
Religious peace was profoundly troubled. The
Government thought it would only have to break
the opposition of a few Ultramontane leaders,
whereas it had to persecute the whole body of the
Clergy and the faithful, devotedly attached to their
Bishops. Thousands of parishes were destitute of
priests. In many places the congregations were
reduced to meet in prayer without any sacerdotal
assistance. Many churches were desecrated by
the intrusion of the Old Catholics. The religious
wants of a large portion of the populace were
without the means of satisfaction.
The Government could not remain indifferent
to this situation, which was particularly distasteful
to the Emperor. It began to cast about for means
of escape from this dilemma, but they were difficult
to find without injury to the prestige of the State.
The Catholics designated the Minister Falk as the
deadly enemy of religious concord. It was he who
had elaborated and brought forward most of the
Laws of May, and who had advanced farthest on
the evil road of aggression and persecution. These
views, often expressed in Parliament, and empha-
sized by many influential members of the highest
Court circles, gradually became more prevalent.
23o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The Emperor, however Protestant his views may
have been, was himself too strongly in favour of
religious orthodoxy not to feel some sympathy for
similar tendencies in the Church of Rome. In his
eyes also, the champions of the Church were the
natural champions of Conservative policy: was not
that condition of public affairs an anomaly, which
forced the whole body of the Catholic Clergy into
the ranks of the Opposition ? -
The Socialist Party was very active; it had
succeeded in returning some of its leaders to
Parliament; its affiliations with the Socialists of
other countries were known to exist. A law
tending to prevent the Socialistic Propaganda
was introduced in 1876 in the Imperial Parliament,
but it was rejected owing to the united votes of
Liberals and Catholics. On the 22nd of February
1877, when he opened the Parliamentary Session,
the Emperor spoke of ‘the dangers which
anarchical tendencies might bring on the safety
and regular development of our public insti-
tutions;' but adding that the organisation of the
Empire and the good sense of the German people
formed a solid defence against these dangers.
Such were the views of the Emperor when
events of vast importance corroborated them in
1878, and brought about a change of policy. Pius
IX died on the 7th of February. Some months
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 23 I
later, as we have related in a preceding chapter,
the Emperor was twice the victim of attempted
assassinations. In both cases the criminal was a
fanatical Socialist. The Pope's death facilitated
the reconcilation between the Vatican and the
Court of Berlin ; and the two attempts on his life
exercised profound influence on the Emperor and
on his religious and internal policy.
The accession of the new Pope was a natural
opportunity for the revival of personal com-
munications which had ceased for five years. In
notifying to the Emperor his elevation to the
Apostolic See on the 20th of February, Leo XIII
expressed his regret at no longer finding the friend-
ship which had formerly subsisted between Prussia
and the Papacy; and he appealed to the Emperor's
magnanimity that peace might be restored to his
Catholic subjects. The Emperor replied on the
24th of March in terms equally friendly, manifest-
ing the hope that his Holiness would use his
influence on the Clergy to induce them to submit
to the laws of the country. The Pope appreciated
the spirit of the Emperor's letter, and in another
epistle dated the 17th of April, he again expressed
his desire that peace might be restored between
the two Powers, but pointed out that such a result
could only be obtained by the modification of the
Laws of May. But at that moment the Prussian
232 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Government was not prepared to go so far. For
that reason, the Emperor postponed his reply,
when the attempted assassination of the 4th of
June withdrew him for a time from the manage-
ment of affairs. The Crown Prince, taking
his father's place, answered on the 10th of June,
that, as the Pope declared that he could not
recommend the clergy to submit unreservedly to
the laws, Prussia, according to her constitution,
could not subordinate her legislation to a Foreign
Power. He added, however, that in spite of this
difference of principle, both parties would find the
way to peace in their conciliatory spirit.
Thanks to this correspondence, the ice was
broken, although peace was still remote. Both
sides desired the cessation of hostilities, Berlin
in particular. It was solemnly declared that the
Emperor William would not go to Canossa: a
dignitary of the Church wittily answered that
Rome could be reached without passing through
Canossa. Such was, in fact, the course finally
pursued.
The beginning was not easy. A powerful
Government decides only by degrees to withdraw
its measures, and to own that it has been in the
wrong. The Cabinet of Berlin had fettered its
liberty of action by a series of laws which it could
only revoke with the assistance of the Parliament
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 233
and the Chambers; and it had to deal with the
majority which had passed those laws at its own
express demand. . It therefore decided on asking
the assistance of those who were in the greatest
straits. Prince Bismarck was at that time pre-
paring economical reforms for which the assistance
of the Party of the Centre was indispensable. In
the interest of these reforms as well as in that of
religious peace, it was essential to come to an
agreement with the Vatican. The Minister Falk
was dismissed in June 1879 with a large pension
and with a patent of nobility for which he had long
been yearning; his resignation was the first
condition made by the Catholic Party. The
negotiations with the Holy See, which were
opened in the summer of 1878 at Kissingen be-
tween Prince Bismarck and the Papal Nuncio to
the Court of Bavaria, Monsignor Masella, were
continued the following year at Gastein by the
Chancellor and the Nuncio Monsignor Jacobini, and
subsequently in Vienna between that prelate and
the German Ambassador.
The time was now long past when the
Chancellor aspired to subordinate the laws
of the Church to those of the State. Prince
Bismarck owned that it was impossible to draw
an exact line of demarcation for the two legislatures,
and that it was absolutely necessary to be contented
234 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
with a modus vivendi, whereby the State would
put its laws in harmony with the Church, and
the Church would do her best to make her in-
stitutions acceptable to the State.
An understanding was not, brought about very
rapidly. It was necessary to fill the vacant
Bishoprics. The Government required that the
IBishops should notify to the authorities the
nomination of curates; the Pope consented, pro-
vided the Laws of May on the education of the
Clergy were modified. Negotiations then stopped.
The Cabinet of Berlin then obtained from the
Barliament the discretionary power of renouncing
the application of the Laws of May. The Holy See
protested against the discretionary power, but
derived whatever benefit might accrue from it.
The vacancies in the Bishoprics were gradually
filled up. In some cases the exiled Bishops
returned, in others the Pope made new nom-
inations approved by the Government. The
latter made large use of its discretionary power
with regard to those orders of Nuns who devoted
themselves to nursing. In the month of August
1881 it appointed a Plenipotentiary at the Vatican,
and in the following January at the opening of
the Prussian Chambers, the Emperor was able to
announce that Prussia was once more in friendly
communication with the Pope. In the month of
THE EMPEROR AAWD THE POPE 235
November at the opening of another Session,
he again expressed himself with satisfaction on the
same subject. The Pope seized this opportunity
of opening a correspondence with the Emperor. A
Papal Epistle of the 3rd of December 1882, though
couched in the most cordial and conciliatory terms,
strongly insisted on the revision of the Laws of May
as indispensable for the establishment of religious
peace. The Emperor, in his answer of the 22nd
of December, declared himself ready to make
concessions in that sense, if the Pope would
allow the Bishops to notify the nomination of
curates. On the 30th of January 1883, the Pope
replied that his concessions must always depend
on the revision of the Laws of May, and the
restoration of the autonomy of the Church in
everything concerning the exercise of Sacerdotal
duties and the education of the Clergy. Two
more years elapsed in discussing these points and
the priority of mutual concession. Meanwhile
a great change had taken place in the Imperial
Parliament. The Party of the Centre had suc-
ceeded in attaching to its cause the Party
of Progressive Liberals who had formerly
applauded the Chancellor's persecuting policy, but
who were now entirely separated from him. This
Barty now gave its votes to the Catholics
defending the liberty of their Church. The
236 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Catholics were less successful in the Prussian
Chamber where the Protestant spirit and the
compact phalanx of the ministerial majority were
predominant. They wished for peace with the
Catholics, but after asserting the triumph of the
Government. The latter was, however, proceeding
from concession to concession. It was desirous of
satisfying the demands of the Vatican, but it
wished to avoid the appearance of yielding to the
pressure of the Centre.
At the end of December 1883, the Crown
Prince, who had been paying a visit to the King
of Spain at Madrid, returned home by Italy. In
his former visits to Rome, when the religious
conflict was raging, the heir to the Crowns of
Prussia and Germany carefully avoided the
Vatican. This time he was not inclined to omit
any act of courtesy towards the Pope, nay, it was
for this very purpose that he went to Rome.
The Pope was not disposed to resent the fact
that the Protestant Prince had accepted the
hospitality of the Court of the Quirinal. But
the Crown Prince had, in return, to submit to
all the formalities, on the observation of which
Leo XIII insisted as strenuously as Pius IX,
so as to define his position towards the King of
Italy, whom he considered the lawless usurper
of the Pontifical States.
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 237
The Prince was received by the Pope with
cordiality and with all royal honours. Their
meeting could not be other than cordial, as the
Government of Berlin had some months earlier
still further softened the rigour of the Laws of
May. In the course of the summer it had
introduced and carried a law abrogating in part the
injunction on the Bishops to notify the nomination
of priests, as well as the competence of the
ecclesiastical tribunal and the right of the State to
object to any nomination. The same law also-
restored the liberty to priests of preforming
sacerdotal functions in vacant parishes. Thus the
Government was yielding step by step, but
dexterously contriving to appear as if it were acting
on its own discretion, and avoiding all formal
settlements with the Curia.
But the principal cause of dissension was not
removed : the education of the Clergy, which had
been in a great measure withdrawn from the
control of the Bishops by the Laws of May. There
were other enactments of those laws, against which
the Holy See was constantly protesting ; and one
of them was the existence of the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal. And finally there remained to be settled
the question of Cardinal Ledochowsky, Archbishop
of Posen, and Monseigneur Melchers, Archbishop
of Cologne, who had both been deposed by the
VOL. II Q
238 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Government. The former had suffered a long
term of imprisonment, a fate from which the latter
only escaped by flight an hour before he was to
have been arrested. Both prelates were now
living in Rome. The following years brought a
partial solution of these various difficulties. The
Bishoprics and parishes, once more provided with
pastors with the Pope's assent, were again paid
the dotations which had been withheld for so many
years. The Pope, in order to be conciliatory in
his turn, induced the Archbishop of Cologne to
resign, and rewarded him for that submission with
a Cardinal's hat, and another priest, less hated by
the Prussian Cabinet, was raised to the Archi-
episcopal See. Early in 1886, the archdiocese of
Posen was provided for in an equally satisfactory
manner. Cardinal Ledochowsky was considered
in Berlin as a political chief, as the leader of the
Polish Aristocracy of the Province of Posen. The
Prussian Government not only refused to allow
him to return to his See, but also to suffer any
Bolish priest to be his successor. The Pope at
last yielded on this point, and nominated a German
priest of Eastern Prussia to the Archbishopric
of Posen, and the Government acquiesced in this
arrangement.
It is true that these concessions of the Pope had
been preceded by an act of deference on the part
THE EMPEROR A WID THE POPE 239
of the German Cabinet that surprised all Europe.
In the course of the year 1885 a serious difference
had arisen between Germany and Spain on the
subject of the possession of the Caroline Islands in
the South Sea. A 'rupture was dreaded between
the two countries. The national sentiment of the
Spaniards had risen to such a point that it broke
the first law of international right, that is, the
respect due to Ambassadors. The Court of Berlin
found itself placed by this unforeseen incident in
the alternative of yielding to the threats of the
Spanish populace, or of maintaining its pretensions
at the risk of a maritime war and even of an
internal revolution in Spain, of which Don Alfonso,
the recent guest of the Emperor, would be the
victim.
Desirous of avoiding this double calamity,
dreaded by the Emperor and the Court, Prince
Bismarck took the initiative of a bold proposal.
He determined to apply to the Pope for mediation.
It was indeed a wonderful step of diplomatic
strategy for a Protestant Cabinet like that of
Prussia to show this deference to the Sovereign
Pontiff who had not yet been thoroughly reconciled,
and especially on a question concerning a nation so
profoundly Catholic as Spain. This act appeased
Spain who could only with ill grace have refused
the arbitration of the Holy See ; it silenced the
24o THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
Party of the Centre which was beginning to blame
the attitude assumed by the Government in this
question ; and it gratified the Pope, who could not
but feel honoured by this mark of confidence of a
great Government, recently his adversary.
Everything proceeded satisfactorily. In the
course of September, both Governments agreed
to submit their difference to the Pope. One month
later, the Pope gave his decision as mediator.
It was favourable to Spain on the principal point,
that is, on the question of sovereignty. The Pope,
said in the Consistory of the 15th of January
1886: “The supreme authority of the Church has
received a most momentous homage. What could
not the Papacy do, if it had greater freedom ''
Letters of extreme courtesy were exchanged
between the Pope, the Emperor and the
Chancellor. Leo XIII thanked the Emperor
as well as Prince Bismarck. He invested the
latter with his greatest order, expressing the joy
which his step had given to the whole Catholic
world no less than to the Vatican. But he did
not omit to remind the Chancellor that Pope
and Church were not yet in the enjoyment of
full liberty of action.
In spite of all these manifestations of friendship,
the Pope did not yield on the religious question,
7"HE EMPEROR A WD THE POPE 24 I
nor did he abandon the Bishops and the Party of
the Centre, who had for fifteen years been defending
the rights of the Papacy. In an Encyclica which
he addressed on the 6th of January 1886 to the
Prussian Bishops, he again approved all their
claims as to seminaries and the education of the
Clergy, and he firmly maintained his demand that
on these points the Church should be secured from
the interference of the State. In other times such
a Papal manifestation, to which all the Prussian
Bishops answered by a collective address expressive
of their devotion, would have brought down on the
Catholic Church in Prussia the utmost severity of
the Government. But now, on the contrary, the
Cabinet of Berlin replied by new concessions. On
the 15th of February it placed before the Upper
Prussian Chamber a bill equivalent to the abandon-
ment of the Laws of May. It restricted Govern-
mental control over the seminaries, abolished the
Ecclesiastical Tribunal and gave back to the Pope
and the Bishops supreme jurisdiction over the
Clergy.
A member of the Episcopacy, who had pre-
viously been appointed by the Emperor to sit in the
Herrenhaus, acted the part of intermediary between
that Assembly and the Roman Curia. In accord-
ance with the Vatican, he introduced a series of
Amendments on the Ministerial Bill, which, if
242 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
adopted, would make it still more favourable to the
autonomy of the Church, and with these improve-
ments it was passed by both Chambers. Prince
Bismarck, in a most important and significant
speech, did not hesitate to confess that the Laws
of May and the whole “ Kulturkampf, had totally
failed to produce the desired result. Assurances
of confidence and of profound esteem for the Pope
were uttered by the very statesmen who, fifteen
years previously, had given the signal for hostilities
with the Vatican.
The conflict between the Pope and the Emperor
was thus virtually at an end. The “Kulturkampf’
was over, perhaps not for ever, as neither party
had yielded in principle, the Prussian legislator
being especially far from renouncing his doctrine
of the omnipotence of the State. But nevertheless
the Prussian Government ended by retracting.
Fifteen years of ecclesiastical legislature were so
many years of wasted energies. Of the two
combatants, the State was the first to be weary.
The Emperor only entered on this question with
reluctance; and it is said that he finally regretted
it as a grievous error of his reign. Only desirous
at first of punishing some obstinate Bishops, he
found himself at last carried on so far as to aim
a blow at religion, which he said he ‘desired to
THE EMPEROR AND THE POPE 243
preserve to his people as the foundation of all
things.’ The fact is that the danger of Socialism
had long made him feel those regrets more keenly
and had given his thoughts another direction.
CHAPTER XVIII
SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY.—1878–1886
THE QUESTION OF RELIGION YIELDS TO THAT OF SOCIALISM.–THE
GOVERNMENT SEEKS THE HELP OF THE FOURTH ESTATE AGAINST
THE THIRD ESTATE. — EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND FRENCEI
EMPIRE.—THE PARISIAN COMMUNE AND GERMAN SOCIALISM.–
ANXIETY OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.—THE EMPEROR
AND THE IDEA OF SOCIALISM.–INFLUENCE OF THE ATTEMPTED
ASSASSINATIONS. —CHANGE IN THE POLICY OF THE DOUANES.—
THE PROTECTIVE SYSTEM.—ATTACKS AGAINST CAPITAL.-ANTI-
JEWISH AGITATION.—THE EMPEROR IN FAVOUR OF GOVERN-
MENTAL INITIATIVE.—HIE STIMULATES THE ZEAL OF THE
PARLIAMENT.—REFORM OF TAXATIONS.—THE INSURANCE FUNDS
FOR WORKPEOPLE. –THE RIGHT OF LABOUR RECOGNISED BY
THE GOVERNMENT. — COLONIAL POLICY. — ACQUISITION OF
COLONIES IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH SEA.—CONFLICTS WITH
ENGLAND. — PROTESTATION AGAINST THE CONGO TREATY
BETWEEN ENGLAND AND PORTUGAL.-AGREEMENT BETWEEN
|FRANCE AND GERMANY. —THE AFRICAN CONFERENCE OF BERLIN.
—PORTUGAL DEFENDS HER. RIGHTS. — FURTHER CONFLICTS
WITH ENGLAND. — CONFLICTS WITH SPAIN. — FUTURE OF
GERMANY's COLONIAL POLICY.
WE have seen above how the war, waged by the
Government since 1871 against the Church of
Rome, had diminished in vehemence after 1878,
SOCIALISM A VD COLONIAL POLICY 245
crossed as it was by the attempts on the Emperor's
life and the Socialistic agitation. The Emperor
and his Premier, who were in the habit of never
treating two subjects at once, decided, when
appalled by the double attempt at regicide, on
neglecting the contest with the Vatican so as to
devote themselves entirely to the Socialistic
problem.
It would not be in accordance with truth to
maintain that these crimes were required to draw
Prince Bismarck's attention to Socialism and
economical reforms. These themes occupied his
thoughts so far back as the earliest period of his
administration when Liberalism placed so many
difficulties in the way of his policy. In the same
manner as other statesmen of many countries and
ages, he sought a counter-balance to the Liberal
Party which was that of the Bourgeoisie, or what
used to be called in France the Third Estate.
Formerly the Feudal Party had offered that
counter-balance; but now it was no longer able to
do so. It had been injured and disorganised by
the all but revolutionary policy followed by the
King's Government, under the auspices of a
Minister taken from the ranks of the extreme
Conservatives. The example of the Second French
Empire, then at its greatest brilliancy, was not lost
on the Prussian Government. Observing that the
246 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
rural population sustained the French Empire
which it had founded, the enterprising Prussian
Premier was led to use the working classes for a
similar purpose, to remind the Third Estate that
there was a Fourth Estate whose views and
tendencies had a foundation at least as legitimate
as those of the Bourgeoisie. Bismarck was in
correspondence with Lassalle, the great apostle of
Socialism and of the claims of the German working
classes; he endeavoured to penetrate his designs,
to discover the points whereby Monarchy and
Democracy could be united in legal activity.
These thoughts were fully engaging him when
the events of 1864 took place. Foreign policy
threw the solution of the social problem into the
shade ; the military triumphs reduced his parlia-
mentary opponents to silence and freed him from
their untimely control. While the Prussian
Armies were fighting successively in Denmark,
Bohemia and France, socialistic Democracy was
organising its forces. The King's military exploits
left it cool and it stood aloof from the ovations
which the Bourgeoisie, now fully reconciled by the
victories and conquests, lavished on the sovereign
and his Chancellor.
The Communistic Insurrection in Paris in 1871
was a warning to the new Empire. The Parisian
Commune included foreign elements, among whom
SOCIALISM AMD COLONIAL POLICY *
247
those from Germany were not the most insignificant.
If it was true, as said later on in Berlin, that the
defeated Commune had scattered many of its
fragments over Germany, France could answer
she was only sending back what Germany had
bestowed upon her. Had not, indeed, the Inter-
national Association of Workmen, which gave its
most powerful leaders to the Commune, been set
on foot by Marx, a German, and directed by
numerous Germans ? However this may be, many
accomplices of the Parisian incendiaries took refuge
in Germany where they were received with
enthusiasm by the Socialists who sang the praises
of the Commune, and delared that if the occasion
offered they themselves would act in a similar
Iſla, Illſle]".
The Cabinet of Berlin was fully aware of the
necessity of watching this movement. The
legislation of the German Empire admitted the
right of meeting in large numbers, and the Socialist
Party made use of that right. It held frequent
meetings in North and South Germany and in
Switzerland. The Government thus learned that
it was mistaken as to the views of the Parisian
Commune, and that the German Socialists asked
more than municipal autonomy which was universal
in Germany.
All the European Governments were filled
248 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
with consternation at the Commune. The French
Government gave the alarm through M. Jules
Favre. Spain, Italy, Russia, and some German
States would have liked nothing better than
concerting in common repressive measures. That
question had been the topic of conversation between
the Chancellors of Germany and Austria at their
first interview at Gastein in 1871. They wished
to repress disorders, but also to remove grievances.
Prince Bismarck was eager to gain over his
sovereign to vast plans of economical reform, by
which he believed those classes, who were desirous
of emancipating themselves from the Bourgeoisie,
would be induced to rally round the Emperor.
It was not difficult for him to persuade the
Emperor that as he had previously taken from
Liberalism the idea of German Unity, so he should
now take possession of Social Reform. Frederick
the Great said when he was still Crown-Prince :
“When I come to the throne, I shall be a true
Ring of the poor.” Was not the execution of
such designs as much in accordance with the
economical traditions of the Great King, as the
Emperor's military and political actions ?
Thus, from the year 1877, the Emperor was
always speaking in his public manifestoes of the
Social Question, of the rights of labour, of the duty
of the State to provide for those who served under
SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY 249
its standard. In that year, when opening the
Session of the Parliament, he mentioned the
dangers resulting from the Socialist and Anarchical
Party, and enjoined on the various States the
necessity of providing work for the people. His
mind received a deep and lasting impression from
the attempted assassinations of 1878, and it did not
require much reasoning on the part of his
Chancellor to persuade him to follow up repressive
laws by reforms and innovations favourable to the
working classes.
These reforms struck a great blow at the
Liberal Party which believed in the doctrines
of Free Trade of the Manchester School. In
1862, on first assuming the direction of affairs,
the Chancellor was himself in favour of these
doctrines. His predecessors had bequeathed to
him the conclusion of the Commercial Treaty with
France, which was copied from that signed between
the Emperor Napoleon and England in 1860.
Bismarck, who was then a Free Trader, desired
to secure the good-will of the Emperor of the
French, who had set his heart upon this Treaty
with Germany; and in order to gain his object,
he used strong pressure on the South German
Governments. But times had now greatly changed.
The Chancellor was a convert to the principles of
the Protective system ; he desired to protect
250 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
native work, to screen it from foreign competition,
to increase the workmen's wages whilst adding to
the revenues of the Empire which would profit
from increased duties on foreign importations.
These revenues he tried further to augment by
indirect contributions, to be independent of Parlia-
mentary control; and also to ease the burthen of
the poorer classes by relieving them from direct
imports. The Chancellor also intended these
various reforms to have the result of procuring a
Budget for the Empire, thus freeing it from the
different States who had hitherto supported it
by their subsidies. ‘It is the Empire,’ said
Bismarck, ‘that must in future fill the coffers of
the Confederate States, and in a manner inde-
pendent of Parliamentary votes.’
From this double point of view, the reforms
could not but please the Emperor, whose disposition
was benevolent and who was sincerely desirous
of assisting the working classes. He, accordingly,
entered vigorously into the new system and
announced it at the opening of the Parliamentary
Session on the 12th of February 1879. He
accused the policy of Free Trade of not having
kept its promises, and declared that it was essential
to make national productions predominate in the
national market.
This just and humane solicitude shown by the
SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY 25 I
Emperor and his Minister for the material interests
of the multitude, unfortunately gave rise to inter-
pretations that certainly wronged the intentions
of the sovereign. These reforms were planned
in the hope of satisfying the real wants of the
people, so as to detach them from the socialistic
and revolutionary agitation directed against the
opulent classes. It was against these classes that
another agitation arose, excited by members of
the Aristocracy and by ministers of the Protestant
Church. It began by attacking the School of
Manchester and the great capitalists; but it soon
used language as violent as that of the Socialists in
denouncing the rapacious Bourgeoisie, and its chief
representatives, whom it asserted to be of the
Jewish persuasion. Such was the origin of the
movement directed against the Jews. It styled
itself ‘Anti-Semitic,’ and professed to defend the
Teuton against the Jewish race. Herr Stöcker,
Court Chaplain to the Emperor, directed this
agitation, and signalised himself by extreme activity
in forming an Anti-Semitic political Party, in
organising meetings and in inducing people to
sign petitions. The Catholic Party stood aloof
from this movement, although the Jewish Deputies
in Parliament had favoured, with little tact and
less prudence, the anti-Catholic policy of the
Government. The Emperor did not bestow
252 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
serious attention on an agitation which, however
much it may have alarmed the Jews and excited
the multitude, he considered merely ephemeral,
and which the Crown Prince had blamed in public
in the severest terms.
At this epoch, the Governmental atmosphere
of Berlin was impregnated with Socialism :
thoughts and maxims were uttered by Royalty
which might have been taken from the programme
and vocabulary of the most advanced Socialist.
All the speeches and messages of the Emperor
prove this assertion. ‘The Parliament must co-
operate to cure social evils,’ he said on the 15th
of February 1881; ‘we must try to augment the
well-being of the working classes.’ When the
Session was re-opened on the 17th of November,
he returned still more emphatically to this subject:
‘It is our duty to recommend this task to the
Parliament, and we wish some day to take with
us the thought that we have secured for the
country, guarantees of a lasting internal peace,
and also to those who are in want, the more
efficacious help to which they have a right.' The
Progressive Party was irritated at this language;
it accused the Chancellor of misusing the Emperor's
name so as to further his own selfish policy.
Prince Bismarck declared formally that he was
only the echo of his master's will. “You will not
SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY 253
succeed,” he said, ‘in forbidding the Emperor to
speak, or in reducing him to silence.’ The
Emperor, in fact, did not cease to insist on the
solution of the Social Question. In the Session
of 1882, he mentioned the efforts he was making
to “cure the social evils.’ At the opening of the
Session of 1883, he repeated that repressive
measures were not sufficient. ‘Our Imperial
duty,’ he said, ‘requires us to use every means
of improving the lot of those who work, and to
consolidate peace between the different classes.’
And he spoke in this strain at each ensuing
Session.
These various Imperial manifestations were
always accompanied by projected laws which
were passed by a considerable majority, after
giving rise to strenuous opposition. The Emperor's
great age was taken into account as well as the
prestige surrounding his name, and thus useful
reforms were accepted as well as other reforms
of more doubtful merit. From 1879 to 1885,
the economical system of Prussia and of all
Germany was utterly reversed. The Government
passed from Free-Trade to Protection; it multi-
plied indirect duties, and abolished some of the
direct duties. It proposed, though unsucces-
fully, a monopoly on tobacco and afterwards on
brandy. It gradually bought up the principal
WOL II R
254 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
railways, placing them under the immediate
management of the State. As to the working
classes, it revived the old Trade Corporations, but
without giving them their former obligatory
character; and it created, chiefly at the cost
of capitalists, Insurance Companies against
accidents and illness and for those invalided by
work.
The future must show the result of these efforts
of the Emperor William. In Germany, as else-
where, the workman is not grateful for reforms,
even when he profits by them, if they are in any
way imposed upon him. The Socialist Party in the
Empire has taken advantage of the declarations
made by the Emperor and his advisers upon the
rights of labour, the existence of social evils and the
possibility of curing them by legislative measures.
The leaders of this Party boast that their agitation
has compelled the Government to intervene in the
name of the State and with the resources of the
Treasury. They only consider what the Emperor
has granted them as a preliminary instalment.
They have by no means given up their aggressive
attitude. They still hope to realise completely
their programme, directed equally against Monarchy
and against the opulent classes.
If the Socialistic and economical reforms, under-
taken since 1878, have not given the Government
,SOCIALISM AMD COLONIAL POLICY 255
direct advantages, they have at least contributed to
divert the Parliament and the German public from
busying themselves with questions of general policy
which are considered in high circles as the exclusive
domain of the Crown. Those reforms, as we have
seen above, also lessened the intensity of the
religious conflict, which had gradually become the
common meeting-ground of the various sections of
the Opposition. Such was equally the case with
Colonial Policy, which constitutes a startling
innovation in the political system of the Empire,
and which originated in the year 1876.
At first only slight experiments were tried, as
is always the case with colonial enterprise. The
German merchants, established in Africa and Au-
stralia, were the first to solicit the inauguration of
a policy which the great majority of Germans was
slow to appreciate and to sanction. A first attempt,
made in 1880 by the Government for the protection
of a Hamburg company, was frustrated by the
resistance of the Parliament. Private enterprise
was then aroused, and applied itself to the acqui-
sition of African territories, without receiving aid
from the Government, discouraged by the Parlia-
mentary check. º
It was not until 1884 that Prince Bismarck
decided on endowing the Empire with Colonies,
or at least affording the Colonial establishments
256 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
of German merchants the official protection of
the Empire. The choice of territories to be
acquired was comparatively restricted. Asia and
America being in the possession of European or
indigenous masters, Africa and Australia alone
possessed territories still unappropriated. The
Government sent learned explorers into those
countries for the purpose of discovering profitable
land, and of concluding treaties of cession with the
native chiefs. One acquisition soon followed the
other, and they were for the greater part accom-
plished in the second half of 1884; and on the 30th
of October of that year, a circular of the Govern-
ment of Berlin notified to the Foreign Powers that
it had taken possession of a whole series of
territories on the West Coast of Africa.
In these enterprises, the German Cabinet
could not avoid collisions with the great Colonial
Powers who entertained the tradition that they
were the exclusive rulers of the ocean and of the
shores it laves. England, in particular, saw with
a jealous eye the efforts of this upstart amid
Colonial and Maritime Powers; her agents and
her merchants lost no opportunity of impeding
its progress.
But the German Chancellor was not a man to
yield. On the contrary, he at once launched forth
on a most determined conflict with the British
,SOCIALISM A ND COLO WIAI, POLICY 257
Cabinet. The latter having concluded with
Portugal a Treaty regulating the possessions of the
latter Power on the Congo, and stipulating com-
mercial privileges in favour of both countries, the
German Government protested against that Treaty,
and succeeded in imparting its views to most of the
other maritime Powers. For the same reason he
gave all the assistance he could to the International
Association of the Congo, patronised and supported
by the King of the Belgians, which tended to
consolidate its dominion to the detriment of
Portugal. At the same time, the German Cabinet
received in Berlin the President of the Transvaal
Republic, whose relations with England were not of
the best. He was actually treated with Royal
honours.
Such were the circumstances under which the
German Government began, in the course of
the year 1885, negotiations with the French
Republic for the purpose of substituting the col-
lective and international action of Europe and
America to the English and Portuguese domination
on the Congo. On this occasion an intimacy was
established between Berlin and Paris, such as had
not existed since the war of 1870. Both parties
were eager to affirm, what was true in part, that
their agreement only applied to one particular
point, where their interests happened to be identical.
258 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
GP
There was, therefore, no need to lay stress on
the advantages conceded on either side, that is, to
examine whether Germany had obtained on the
Congo more from France than France had obtained
from Germany. However this may be, Europe
witnessed for the first time since many years,
France and Germany acting jointly, and taking
together the initiative of an important diplomatic
action.
In the Autumn of 1884, long conferences took
place between Prince Bismarck and the French
Ambassador at Berlin. It soon transpired that
both Cabinets agreed on all questions concerning
the West Coast of Africa, and had resolved on
inviting the Maritime Powers to take part in a
Conference to meet in Berlin with the object
of framing an International Convention, of which
the principal Articles had already been settled
by the two Governments. Without occupying
itself with questions of territoral sovereignty, or
with the litigations existing on that subject, the
Conference was to proclaim commercial liberty
on the Congo, and to secure freedom of naviga-
tion on that river as well as on the Niger; it
was also to establish certain rules which were
henceforth to prevail in the Public Right of
Europe respecting the formalities to be observed
SOCIALISM AMD COLONIAL POLICY 259
for new occupations on the coast of Africa to
be considered effective.
The Powers accepted this invitation. Portugal
acquiesced in the Franco-German proposal, al-
though foreseeing the difficulties she would
encounter in a conference full of her enemies.
Abandoned by England, the Government of Lisbon
preferred an international regulation to an un-
certain state of things, liable to constant
dissensions. The English Cabinet was the last
to accept the Conference, and it did so with
obvious repugnance; especially as it was annoyed
by Germany's opposition to its Egyptian policy.
The Conference of Berlin was sitting all
through November and December 1884 and
January and February 1885. Its work proceeded
more slowly than the Chancellor expected. The
IPortuguese Plenipotentiaries defended with the
greatest tenacity the ancient rights of their country
against the demands of the Belgian Association.
They prevailed on certain essential points, but they
had to yield to France and Germany in everything
concerning liberty of commerce and navigation.
Thanks to its agreement with France, the
German Government thus took its place among
the Colonial Powers in West Africa. It carried
its point against England who had not expected to
encounter so completely continental a power as
26O THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Germany in colonial enterprise. But the era of
conflicts was not closed by the Treaty of Berlin.
The German Government had disputes about a
part of New Guinea and also about the Cameroons.
On both questions, England came to terms with
her adversary. In the month of May 1885, the
Emperor William was able to proclaim his protec-
torate over a portion of New Guinea. The
German Administration was not wrong in calculat-
ing that England would yield, so as not to alienate
Germany on the Egyptian Question.
Germany had also, in the year 1885, a conflict
with Spain who showed herself much less ready to
yield than powerful England. As we mentioned in
a former chapter, the difference was settled by the
Pope's arbitration.
It would be difficult to predict what the future
of the German Colonies may be. The Empire has
refused up to now to make them really dependant
on the Central Government. Its military system
excludes the use of German troops in these distant
countries. The Germans are ready to emigrate to
America to improve their fortunes, but they are
not inclined to go to war in a tropical climate.
But without troops, the Empire could never
realise effective occupations, such as are contem-
plated in the International Treaty of 1885.
Hitherto the German Parliament has not shown
SOCIALISM AND COLONIAL POLICY 261
much enthusiasm for colonial policy, and in so
doing it does not seem to be greatly opposed to
the individual convictions of the Emperor.
CHAPTER XIX
THE EMPEROR, AND EUROPE.—1871-1886
THE GERMAN EMPIRE IS PEACEFUL.—COMPARISON WITH THE EVENTS
OF THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE. –PACIFIC VIEWS OF THE
EMPEROR.—SAYING OF VOLTAIRE ON THE GREAT POWERS.—
POLICY WITH REGARD TO FRANCE.-DIFFERENT OPINIONS OF
THE EMPEROR AND OF BISMARCK.—ADVANCES MADE TO AUSTRIA,
—THE CABINET OF VIENNA AND THE NEW EMPIRE.—INTER-
VIEW BETWEEN THE TWO EMPERORS AT ISCHL. —THEIR, AGREE-
MENT. — CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH THE CZAR. — RUSSIAN
SERVICES DURING THE WAR OF 1870. —RUSSIA REVIVES THE
EASTERN QUESTION. — GERMANY SUPPORTS HER. — EUROPE
RECOGNISES THE IMPERIAL TITLE OF THE KING OF PRUSSIA. —
THE CABINET OF BERLIN DRAWS CLOSER TO AUSTRIA.—MEETING
OF THE THREE EMPERORS IN BERLIN.—GUARANTEES OF THE
TERRITORIAL “STATU QUO.’ — FRANCE AND GERMANY. —
RECRIMINATIONS OF THE CABINET. OF BERLIN.—RUMOURS OF
WAR.—HOSTILE SPIRIT OF THE GERMAN PRESS.—DIPLOMATIC
INTERVENTION OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. — THE CZAR IN
BERLIN, - PEACE IS PRESERVED. — COOLNESS TOWARDS THE
FRENCEI CONSERVATIVE PARTY. — THE CABINET OF BERLIN
OFFENDED BY THE ATTITUDE OF RUSSIA.—INTENDED WAR OF
RUSSIA AGAINST TURKEY. —THE EMPEROR WILLIAM TRIES IN
VAIN TO PREVENT IT--THE CABINET OF BERLIN ALLOWS EVENTS
TO TAKE, THEIR COURSE. –TREATY OF SANTO STEPHANO. —
ARMING OF AUSTRIA AND ENGLAND.—CONGRESS OF BERLIN.—-
DISMEMBERMENT OF TURKEY. — DISCONTENT OF RUSSIA.—
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 263
ATTACKS OF THE RUSSIAN PRESS ON GERMANY. —THREATS OF
RUSSIA.—NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN BERLIN AND VIENNA.—THE
EMPEROR WILLIAM AT ALEXANDROVO. — PRINCE BISMARCK IN
VIENNA.—SIGNATURE OF A PROTOCOL.—IIESITATION OF THE
EMPEROR OF GERMANY. — TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.—NEW ATTITUDIE OF RUSSIA.— PRINCE
BISMARCK AT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR’s.-FRANCE IS INVITED
TO JOIN THE AUSTRO-GERMAN LEAGUE. — THE SPEECH AT
CHERBOURG.—THE CABINET OF BERLIN MAKES ADVANCES TO
THAT OF PARIS.—ASSASSINATION OF ALEXANDER II, EMPEROR OF
RUSSIA.—ALEXANDER III CONTINUES IIIS FATHER's POLICY. —
RENEWED FRIENDSHIP OF THE COURTS OF BERLIN AND ST.
PETERSBURG. - MEETING OF THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND
ALEXANDER III AT DANTZIG. — RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE EMPIRES..—NEW DIFFICULTIES.
—RUSSIA ADHERES TO THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE. —JOY
OF THE EMPEROR WILLIAM. — PRO OFS OF FIRIENDSHIP OF THE
RUSSIAN COURT. — MEETING OF THE THREE EMPERORS AT
SKIERNEWICZE. — THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT INCLINED TO
TURREY. —THE BALKAN STATES DESIRE THE ALLIANCE WITH
GERMANY. —THE SOWEREIGNS AT THE IIOMIBURG MANOEUVRES..—
THE KING OF SPAIN AT HOMBURG AND IN PARIS, - SOUTH
EUROPE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.--—ITALIAN POLICY, DURING
AND AFTER THE WAR OF 1870.—EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN
BERLIN AND ROME. –KING VICTOR EMMANUEL IN BERLIN.—
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM IN MILAN.—TIII), INCIDENT OF TRENT.—
ITALY ADFIERIES TO THE ALLIANCE OF THE EMPERORS.—SPAIN
AND GERMANY. — THE CROWN PRINCE IN MADRID. — TIHE
CAROLINE ISLANDS.—THE COURT OF BERLIN AND THE CON-
FLICT WITH SPAIN.—THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT GIVES WAY AND
APPEALS TO THE POPE FOR MEDIATION.—TIIE TRIPLE ALLIANCE
IS THE MODIFIED CONTINUATION OF THE HOLY ALLIANCE. –
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM THE SOUL OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
—INFLUENCE OF THE POLICY OF FFEDERICK THE GREAT AND
OF THAT OF TIII, FRENCEI SECOND EMPIRE ON THE POLICY OF
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM.—ROYAL POWER AND THE PARLIA-
MENTARY SYSTEM.—THE MESSAGE OF 1882.--THE EMPEROR's
PREDOMINANCE IN THE GOVERNMENT.-QUESTIONS LEFT TO HIS
SUCCESSOR.
THE Emperor opened the first Session of the
Imperial Parliament shortly after his return from
264 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
France, on the 21st of March 1871. In his speech
on that occasion he solemnly affirmed that the
German Empire would resist the temptation of
abusing its newly acquired strength, and that
United Germany would be a sure guarantee of the
peace of Europe.
At that time there was much incredulity as to
the sincere spirit of those assurances. Had not
the very sovereign, whom German victories had
just dethroned, declared twenty years previously in
terms equally energetic : “The Empire will be
peace ' ' Nevertheless, during the eighteen years
of his reign, Europe witnessed three great wars and
several expeditions into remote countries, the
origin of which was to be traced to the Empire, to
say nothing of the other conflicts resulting more or
less directly from Imperial policy. The similarity
of events and circumstances was very striking, and
the public mind was filled with extreme anxiety.
It was further to be considered that if Germany
had completely vanquished her adversary, she was
very far from having reconciled it. She had
imposed upon it conditions which she herself owned
to be severe. Was it not to be dreaded that the
defeated Power would, without any delay, collect
such forces as remained to it, and seek alliances with
all the enemies of Germany, so as once more to try
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 265
the fate of arms in the hope of finding it more
favourable %
As far as the Emperor himself was concerned,
he had every reason to be satisfied with his
triumphs. He had augmented the Hohenzollern
monarchy with conquests recognised by Europe.
He had increased the splendour of his dynasty
by adding to the Crown of Prussia the Crown
of Charlemagne, and he had dowered the restored
Empire with two inestimable Provinces. What
more could he wish than to preserve the fruit
of so many labours and to protect it from future
disasters ?
‘The great utility of modern history,” said
Voltaire, ‘and the advantage it has over ancient
history, is the lesson it teaches to all potentates,
that ever since the fifteenth century the various
nations have combined against a power woshe
strength has become excessive.’ Voltaire, in
writing these lines, was thinking of Charles V and
of Louis XIV, and after his time, this observation
was verified by the career of Napoleon I. These
momentous examples were calculated to impress
the Emperor William, and to confirm him in such
sentiments of moderation and prudence as are not
always entertained by those whom Fortune has
never betrayed. .
The lessons of history as well as the desire of
266 7'HE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
repose, very natural in a man who had passed his
seventy-fourth year, have certainly imparted to
the Emperor's external policy that character of
firmness and circumspection from which Germany
was the first to benefit. The merit of pursuing
this policy is due above all to the Emperor himself.
He knew how to resist on several occasions counsels
and suggestions far less pacific, how to avoid
carefully the pretexts of foreign conflicts, and
how to lessen their violence if he could not prevent
their occurrence.
After the signature of peace, the isolation
of France was the first object of German policy.
This was at the time an easy task, a defeated
country not being in much request as an ally. But
it was necessary to bear the future in mind when
so great a nation as France could not fail to
regain much of her former power, especially as
she had shown, even in her most appalling reverses,
signs of her marvellous vitality. On this subject
great difference of opinion arose at first between
the Emperor and his Chancellor. . When the
Emperor, in his Declaration of War, pointed out
the Napoleonic Empire in particular to the hatred
of the German Armies, he probably did not foresee
that the fall of that Empire would bring about
the establishment of a republic, that form of
Government which is favoured by no European
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 267.
sovereign, and which is peculiarly repugnant to the
private views of the Hohenzollern dynasty.
The Revolution of the 4th of September and
the institution of the Government of National
Defence were to him absolutely hateful; and,
provided the conditions were equal, he would rather
have made peace with the Empire or with any sort
of Monarchical Government. But considerations
of policy obliged him to sign the Treaty of Peace
with whoever might be at the head of affairs,
provided he received the requisite guarantees.
On this last point, Prince Bismarck had decided
views. His opinion, to which he had extreme
difficulty to make the Emperor agree, was in
favour of signing peace with the Republic, the
Government resulting from the Revolution of
September having proved itself capable of surviv-
ing. He further strongly advocated the support
of the Republic by Germany, as it would probably
cause internal dissensions in France, and would
certainly isolate it in Europe, making it less able
to contract alliances with Monarchical States. On
these points, great divergency of opinion prevailed
in the Emperor's entourage. He who was most
hostile to Prince Bismarck's views and who most
strongly expressed ideas similar to those held by
the Emperor on the subject of the French
Republic, was Count Harry von Arnim, the Ger-
268 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS PEIG. W.
man Ambassador in Paris. But finally the
Chancellor triumphed over the Ambassador, who
was soon recalled from his post to be complicated in
a political trial by which Prince Bismarck crushed
his enemy with relentless severity. It was there-
fore with the French Republic that the Court of
Berlin concluded all arrangements respecting the
execution of the Treaty of Francfort, and
terminated the regulation and payment of the
indemnity of war. Faithful to this policy, the
Cabinet of Berlin persisted thenceforth in showing
extreme coldness to the Monarchical Parties in
France, and this coldness extended even to the
Conservatives. The fall of the Administration of
M. Thiers was received with great displeasure in
Berlin; Marshal MacMahon, his successor, had to
struggle during the whole course of his Presidency
against the hostility of Prince Bismarck. We shall
speak further on of the consequences of this
hostility.
Whilst the Cabinet of Berlin was thus giving
its assistance to Republican France, an assistance
by which she profited without feeling grateful
for it, it was solicitous of acquiring the support of
the great Continental Powers, on which France
might have founded hopes for the realisation of
future plans of vengeance.
Austria was first to be considered. At the
7"HE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 269
beginning of the war, that Power had shown
hostility to Germany and had even contracted
conditional engagements with Napoleon III; but
it soon found itself compelled to give up that
policy, partly because of the attitude of Russia,
but chiefly because of the defeats of France, which
followed each other with appalling rapidity. The
Emperor William, far from showing any resent-
ment to Austria, was constantly sending friendly
messages after the battle of Sedan to the Emperor
Francis Joseph. He expressed his regret at not
seeing him by his side as ally in the war against
France, and Prince Bismarck lost no time in
opening conferences with a view to future alliance.
The first overtures were made through the inter-
mediary of Prince Luitpold of Bavaria, closely
related to the House of Austria, and staying at
the German head-quarters during the war. Pre-
paratory to an alliance between the three Empires.
Prince Bismarck was desirous of bringing about
a closer friendship between the Courts of Vienna
and St Petersburg, so as afterwards to arrange
an understanding between the Monarchical Govern-
ments as to the course to be pursued towards the
Republic, which was prevalent in France and might
soon be so in Spain and Italy. This project, very
pleasing to the Czar, was coldly received in Vienna
where the Government declared that it would
WOL II - S
270 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
not bind itself without being certain of more real
advantages than were promised by that Monarchical
League.
In spite of this first refusal, the powers at the
German head-quarters at Versailles were not
discouraged. On the eve of the creation of the
German Empire it was essential to come to an
understanding with the Power that had signed
the Treaty of Prague with Prussia. In the month
of December 1870, notes were exchanged between
Versailles and Vienna. The Austrian Administra-
tion, while professing its readiness to be on the
best terms with the future Empire, declined all
discussions on the past and present of Prussian
policy, and refused even to inspect the documents
relating to the new constitution of Germany,
which, however, the Emperor Francis Joseph
acknowledged without reserve or reluctance.
The Insurrection of the Commune in Paris
revived the scheme of a closer intimacy between
the Continental Empires, and this time it was
not difficult to arrange interviews between the
Emperors of Germany and Austria and their
Chancellors. These interviews took place in the
month of August at Ischl, Salzburg, and Gastein,
on Austrian territory. Although they did not
realise the alliance desired by the Emperor William,
these meetings were attended with results of
THE EMPEROR AWI) EUROPA; 27 I
considerable importance. Explanations were made,
and a certain plan of general policy was drawn : the
principle of non-intervention was applied to Italy
in the Roman Question, and to France in her
internal affairs; assistance was to be given to
Austria by Germany should she be attacked by
Russia; and united opposition was to be made
against the excesses of social democracy. The
Austro-Hungarian Chancellor wrote to his agents
after these interviews that they had revived the
friendship of the two sovereigns; and the Emperor
William, at the opening of Parliament on the 12th
of October, laid particular stress on this result:
“The German nation,’ he said, ‘will rejoice sincerely
in finding its relations with Austria freed from all
perturbation resulting from the reminiscences of a
struggle which arose from the painful inheritance
of a thousand years.’ A sponge was thus passed
over the events of 1866. The Emperor of Austria
took the hand offered by his ancient rival; and in
order still more thoroughly to confirm the new
policy, he shortly afterwards dismissed Count
Eeust from the office of Chancellor, as Prince
Bismarck always considered that statesman an
obstacle to the sincere reconciliation of both
Cabinets.
The intimacy between the Courts of Berlin and
St Petersburg had for some time been increasing.
272 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The two sovereigns, during their interview at Ems in
June 1870, exchanged new assurances of friendship
and mutual support, to which the Czar had shown
himself faithful during the war. He had used his
influence at Stuttgart with the King of Wurtem-
berg, his brother-in-law, in favour of Prussia; and
at Copenhagen by deciding the Danish Cabinet
to preserve strict neutrality. Finally, he had
checked the action of the Cabinet of Vienna, which
was leaning towards France. Personally, Alex-
ander II had testified by congratulatory telegrams
to his uncle the joy he felt at the German successes.
On his side, the Emperor William gave due praise
to the friendship of Russia, which had greatly
contributed to the triumph of Germany.
The policy of the Russian Court was far from
being approved by the Russian Nation, and Prince
Gortchakoff shared these sentiments whilst obeying
the orders of his master. But it was easy to
foresee that the Prussian Government would seize
the first favourable opportunity of maintaining its
interest and of giving Russia compensation for
the important changes that were to take place
on her western frontier. Under the dominion of
these ideas, Prince Gortchakoff sent a circular on
the 19th of October 1870, to the Great Powers,
informing them that Russia did not consider
herself any longer bound by the Treaty of Paris
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 273
of 1856, as far as the restrictions were concerned
which that Treaty imposed upon the rights of
sovereignty in the Black Sea. This circular
caused extreme irritation in London and surprised
the German Administration which did not expect
that the Russian Cabinet would demand the
effective recognition of the services rendered to
Prussia while the Franco-German war was raging.
But having no means of refusal, it assumed the
part of a mediator. Bismarck agreed with Russia
as to the injustice done by the Congress of Paris,
but only took exception to the manner in which
the Cabinet of Russia tried to rid itself of a
European Treaty. Russia having agreed to plead
her cause before a Congress of the Powers that
had signed the Treaty of Paris, the Cabinet of
Berlin took the initiative of negotiations which
resulted in the meeting of a Congress in London.
Against his will and yielding only to the represen-
tations of Russia, Prince Bismarck had to acquiesce
in the admission of France. But he profited by
the occasion of the Congress to make it recognise
the Imperial Title adopted by the King of Prussia.
Russia obtained from the Conference whatever she
demanded, thanks to the support of Germany.
The two Courts had every reason to be satisfied
with each other and with the result of their friend-
ship.
274 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
The Cabinet of Berlin, thinking it had thus
discharged its obligation to Russia, turned its
attention to Austria. By her aggrandizement
and the establishment of the German Empire,
Prussia, formerly the handmaid and dependant of
Russia, was now her equal, and resolved on
following her own course, on defending her
interests regardless of family links and personal
connections which had often injured these interests.
When the war was over, the alliance of Austria
was more necessary to her than that of Russia;
but in order to secure the friendship of the Cabinet
of Vienna in Western affairs, it was necessary to
give it an equivalent in the East, to counterbalance
the expansion of Russia. What she had lost in
Germany, Austria was to recover in the Balkan
Peninsula. Such was the point of view of the
Agreement effected at Ischl in 1871, and which
was further developed the following year when
the Emperor of Austria visited Berlin. Count
Andrassy, successor of Count Beust, managed this
interview of the two sovereigns, which became an
interview of three sovereigns by the unexpected
arrival of the Emperor of Russia: unexpected by
Austrian Diplomacy, but probably prepared by the
Emperor William who was desirous of averting
from his nephew an exclusion which might have
been falsely interpreted in Russia. The visit of
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 275
the Czar was not meant to disturb the Austro-
German Alliance, nor had it that result. He
came to reassure Austria as to Russian Policy in
the East, and to confirm his agreement with the
two Empires as to the maintenance of peace in
Europe on the basis of the territorial distribution
established for the West by the Treaty of
Francfort and for the East by the Treaties of
Paris and London. The Cabinet of Berlin had
thus obtained great results for its policy: the
recognition of the conquests of 1870 by Russia
and Austria, and the closer union of these two
Powers under the auspices of the Emperor
William, who thus became the arbiter of Con-
tinental Europe.
From that date the Emperors were seen every
year to confirm their intimacy by visits to their
respective territories. In the spring of 1873, the
Emperor William and Prince Bismarck visited St
Petersburg, and some months later they repaired to
Vienna. In the following years, the Emperor
William met the Czar at Ems, and the Emperor
Francis Joseph at Gastein or at Ischl.
This intimacy of the three Emperors was
singularly contrasted by the attitude of the Cabinet
of Berlin towards the French Government. As
soon as France found her territory liberated from
the German troops, the Press and Society spoke
276 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
more freely about Germany, and they did not
dissemble either their deep resentment against the
conqueror or their hope of some day taking their
revenge. The accession of Marshal MacMahon to
the Presidency caused a certain amount of dis-
pleasure at Berlin, not in Court circles, but in those
of the Chancellor. The Marshal was supposed to
entertain the desire of restoring the Orleans
Dynasty, and Prince Bismarck, for the reasons we
mentioned above, preferred the maintenance of the
Republic, especially as he considered the Princes of
that Dynasty the most prominent representatives
of a policy of revenge. The French Clergy, whose
conduct had been highly patriotic during the war,
showed, after peace was signed, a bitter feeling
towards Germany who was then issuing her most
persecuting edicts against the Catholic Church. In
Berlin the French Government was further accused
of favouring the Carlist Insurrection in Spain, and
of allowing her functionaries on the Spanish
frontier to take the part of the Pretender. Ger-
many had recognised the Administration of Marshal
Serrano, Regent of Spain, and her exampfle was
followed by all the other Powers, excepting Russia
who was favourable to Don Carlos. Prince
Hohenlohe, the German Ambassador, received
orders to remonstrate in Paris and even to
announce that the Cabinet of Berlin would, if
7"H E //MPEROR AMD EUROPE 277
necessary, take measures by sea to prevent the
Carlist operations.
To all these grievances, Germany added others
early in 1875. The strangest and most improbable
rumours were circulated. Germany asserted that
France was the centre of a vast Catholic League,
comprising Austria and Italy, reconciled to the
Pope, and having the object of making war on the
German Empire. Finally, and this was the most
serious consideration, France was reorganising her
army. Her intentions were manifestly aggressive
towards Germany. The Berlin Administration
recommended these facts to the consideration of
the Great Powers. Its official organs believed
that the situation was alarming, that France was
seeking war, and that Germany, if such was the
case, might not allow her to choose her own
favourable moment for declaring it. The German
Ambassador in Paris was instructed to speak to
the French Government on this subject.
The anxiety was great throughout Europe.
Nobody believed that France was desirous for war,
although the language of the French papers was
very violent. On the contrary, it was dreaded,
perhaps without foundation, that Germany wished
to complete her enemy's ruin. The French
Government became concerned, and called the
attention of Europe to the situation in which it
278 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
was placed. Europe intervened. England spoke
firmly to Berlin; Lord Derby said that she was
convinced that France had no desire to renew
hostilities, but that no one could blame her for
reorganising her army and for placing herself in a
state of defence. Russia corroborated the views of
England. The German administration yielded to
the views of these Cabinets, and the incident was
terminated when the Czar and Prince Gortchakoff
arrived in Berlin on the 10th of May. The
Emperor William, who appears to have been unaware
of it until the last moment, was undoubtedly sincere
when he said to the French Military Attaché :
“They wished to sow discord between us.” The
Czar affirmed to the Diplomatic Corps at Berlin
that peace was secured; and the Russian Chancellor,
before leaving the German capital, issued a circular
to the same effect. Finally, when the Autumn
Session of the Parliament was opened, the Emperor
William said that there was no cause to fear the
disturbance of peace.
The crisis was over. Recriminations have
frequently been exchanged between Berlin and
Paris since that time ; but no incident like that
of 1875 has appeared to threaten another war
between France and Germany. German Policy
has ever since become less hostile to France who
has been able to work at her reorganisation
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 279
without impediment. The German Cabinet de-
clined the invitation of taking part in the Parisian
Universal Exhibition of 1878, and decided the
various States of the Empire to follow its example.
The reactionary events of the 16th of May were
badly received in Berlin, and the German Govern-
ment clearly showed what it thought of them by
immediately strengthening the garrisons of Alsace-
Lorraine.
The French incident caused a certain coldness
between Russia and Germany. Prince Bismarck
was vexed with England and frantic with Russia,
and especially with Prince Gortchakoff, for being
so eager to maintain peace which he asserted had
never been imperilled. But if the two Chancellors
were not on good terms, the political agreement of
both Empires did not as yet suffer in any per-
ceptible degree. The Cabinet of St Petersburg,
influenced by the movement in favour of the Slav
Races, was seriously considering the eventuality of
a war against Turkey. The Emperor William was
personally opposed to it, as he was opposed to all
wars: he had nothing to gain and might lose
much in a general conflagration. For a moment
he fancied he had induced the Czar to give up his
plan, but this was an illusion. The Panslavists
urged it, and the Nihilists were threatening. The
Russian Cabinet looked upon a foreign war as a
28O THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
safety-valve against revolution. Prince Bismarck
did nothing to persuade Russia to give up her
designs. He had no desire of drawing upon
himself the hatred of the Slavs by opposing
the war which would probably be of sufficient
duration to weaken Russia considerably, and such
a prospect was delightful to German patriotism.
Germany therefore allowed events to take their
course. After useless attempts made in Constan-
tinople to induce the Sultan to consent to reforms,
which would assuredly not have satisfied the Slav
populations, Russia declared war to the Sublime
Porte.
It was in vain that the English Cabinet
insisted at Berlin on the Chancellor preventing
this measure; Queen Victoria herself applied to
Prince Bismarck, but with as little success as
her Ministry. Russia entered on the Campaign
with Germany's consent, and Bismarck accentu-
ated it in terms most friendly towards that
Power.
In the course of this war there was a moment
when another determination had to be made.
However close the links of friendship may have
been which united the Courts of Berlin and St
Petersburg, the former could not forget the
engagements contracted with Austria. After a
bloody, checkered and laborious war, Russia had
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 28 I
marched to the very gates of Constantinople,
and imposed upon Turkey the Treaty of Santo
Stefano, which utterly reversed the Treaty of
Baris, depriving the Sultan of all his European
dominions, Thrace excepted. The agreement
between Russia and Austria was broken by this
Treaty, as the former made herself mistress of
the Balkan Peninsula to the detriment of the
latter. The Cabinet of Vienna found a natural
ally in England, where the Tory Ministry showed
itself resolute in opposing this dismemberment of
Turkey. Austria and England armed, the former
by mobilising her troops, the latter by sending
her squadron into Turkish waters. What would
have happened had Russia entered Constantinople,
of the vicinity of which she was completely in
possession ? The two Powers could not have
prevented that occupation, which Germany would
probably have approved, considering the terms on
which both countries found themselves.
It is probable that Russia became alarmed ;
Prince Gortchakoff saw that England and Austria
were détermined, and he did not place implicit
confidence in Germany. He therefore yielded
to the demand of the two Cabinets that the Treaty
of Santo Stefano should be submitted to the
examination of the Powers that had signed the
282 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
Treaty of Paris, and he asked the Cabinet of Berlin
to invite them to a Congress.
The Congress was opened in Berlin under
the presidency of Prince Bismarck. Turkey,
conquered and crushed, had to pay the costs.
They all took their share in the spoils, while
boasting of their generosity in not taking every-
thing from the Sultan. But if Turkey was all
but annihilated, Russia was not left in full posses-
sion of her booty. She obtained territories in
Europe and Asia, but she was not allowed to
create a Great Bulgaria. Greece received some
territory, to the profound grief of the Slavs;
but what annoyed them most, was that Austria
was installed in the possession of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, that is, the western portion of the
Balkan Peninsula.
During the Congress, the Emperor William
was prostrated by the illness resulting from the
wounds he received from Nobiling's revolver on
the 4th of June, and he therefore could not
intervene in favour of the Czar, whereas England
and Austria found powerful supporters in the
Crown Prince and in Bismarck. Russia rose from
the Congress with anything but satisfaction: not
having created an accomplished fact, she placed
herself under the necessity of admitting discussion.
“T)o not force me to choose between yourself and
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 283
Austria,’ said Prince Bismarck ; but she did so
force him, and he placed himself on the side of
Austria at the risk of incurring the hostility of
the Slav Nations. That hostility burst forth so
soon as the Congress was over. ‘This Congress,’
said Prince Gortchakoff, ‘is the blackest part of
my career.” The Russian Press gave utterance
to its hatred of Prince Bismarck in the most
savage terms. It said he had betrayed the friend-
ship of Russia and favoured her adversaries.
A violent controversy ensued between the
papers of both countries. Like two friends on the
point of quarrelling, they enumerated the services
they had rendered each other. Had not Prussia
been friendly during the Crimean War and
the Polish Insurrection ? “Certainly, said the
Russians; but we have repaid these services by
allowing Prussia to defeat Austria in 1866 and
France in 1870.’ ‘Very true,” said Prussia; ‘but
it only depended on me to forbid Russia in 1877 to
make war on Turkey, a war which resulted for
Russia in aggrandizements in Europe and Asia.”
Russia only thought of what she had not
obtained at the Congress, and accused the German
Cabinet of causing her disappointment. All classes
became interested in the quarrel. Russia seemed
inclined not to carry out the Treaty of Berlin, but
it was too late. England and Austria were
284 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
determined to uphold it, and Germany could
refuse nothing to those Powers. The attitude of
Russia became threatening. During 1878 and
1879, the Russian Press was incessantly attacking
Germany. At the same time the Russian Govern-
ment made demonstrations on her frontiers,
reinforcing her garrisons, and moving her troops
about in a manner, the significance of which did
not escape the German military authorities.
Russian Generals, when they were travelling, held
warlike speeches. Prince Gortchakoff when stay-
ing at Baden, received a French journalist, to
whom he suggested ideas of a nature to raise the
belief in an agreement between Russia and France
on the subject of an impending war against
Germany.
At this moment, Prince Bismarck was about
to realise a plan he had long entertained: a formal
Alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
In 1867 and in 1870, Count Andrassy had pre-
vented his Cabinet from siding with France; he
was the very man to prevent Russia from making
an alliance with France, menacing alike to
Germany and to Austria.
In the month of August 1879, Prince Bismarck
was staying at Gastein, and invited the Austrian
Premier to visit him. A project was then
elaborated of a double alliance which soon became
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 285
the pivot on which European policy turned. It
was not an easy task for the German Chancellor to
persuade his master to break with Alexander II.
At the decisive moment the Emperor William
showed signs of withdrawing. Against Bismarck's
desire, the Emperor William accepted an interview
with the Czar who happened then to be travelling
in the western Provinces of his Empire. Public
opinion in Germany, very hostile to Russia, was
offended by this step which it considered an act of
excessive condescension. The interview took place
at the Station of Alexandrovo on Russian territory
near the Town of Thom. The Czar, echoing the
feelings of his people, accused Bismarck of for-
getting his promises of 1870. He alluded to the
conferences at Ems preceding the war, when
Bismarck, as he asserted, pledged himself to
support Russia's Eastern Policy. The Emperor of
Germany tried to calm, exhort and warn his
Imperial nephew. This interview crossed and
impeded Prince Bismarck's negotiations with the
Court of Vienna, though it did not stop them or
prevent their completion. On the 19th of
September, a fortnight afterwards, the Chancellor
proceeded to the Austrian capital whose in-
habitants gave him a cordial welcome, thus showing
their antagonism to Russia. How could Austria,
designated as she was by the Russian Press as the
WOL II T
286 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
object of a future war, reject the powerful friend-
ship offered to support her against her formidable
adversary? After some conferences between the
Emperor Francis Joseph and Prince Bismarck, a
protocol was drawn up, establishing the conditions
of the Alliance between the two Empires, which thus
superseded the Triple Alliance. The Austro-Ger-
man Policy was to be purely defensive. The two
parties proposed to assist each other to repel foreign
aggression, and agreed to maintain the state of
things established in Central Europe.
The Emperor of Austria applied his signature
to the Treaty ; that of the Emperor of Germany
had still to be obtained. The Prussian Ministry,
whom the Chancellor had acquainted with the
transaction on his return to Berlin, gave of course
its adhesion to the Treaty; and the Vice-
President undertook the delicate mission of pro-
ceeding to Baden-Baden, where the Emperor was
then staying, and of obtaining his signature to
the Treaty. The Emperor only yielded to Bis-
marck's most pressing representations. The Chan-
cellor had even to go so far as to threaten to
resign, a threat that always had the desired effect
on his sovereign, who often declared that he
would never separate himself from his Chancellor.
It was not until the 15th of October that the
Emperor signed the Treaty, and even then he
Z"H AE AEMA’ERO AE AAWD EUROPA) 287
did not yield until it had been attenuated in some
respects, and until he had obtained the right of
communicating its contents to the Emperor of
Russia. It had been concluded for four years,
and before that term expired, it was renewed for
an indefinite period. Prince Bismarck's funda-
mental idea was to make it the starting-point of
a kind of constitutional alliance between Germany
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire; but this
scheme was defeated by the Hungarians, who raised
objections which the statesmen could not over-
•COIſle.
Nevertheless, the Austro-German Treaty of
the 15th of October 1879 was directed especially
against Russia, and in a certain degree against
France; these being the only Powers against which
Germany and Austria could think themselves
compelled to take such extreme precautions.
The Court of Russia did not wish to appear
moved by the news of this alliance. The Czare-
vitch visited the Court of Berlin in November,
and met with the most cordial reception. On the
other hand, Prince Gortchakoff, old, ill and weary,
lost more and more influence and interest in his
department, a circumstance which allowed both
cabinets to avoid many collisions liable to take
place between the two Chancellors.
Prince Bismarck, who had shown a tendency
288 THE EMPEROR WLILIAM AND HIS REIGN
to be civil to France during the Congress,
continued this line of conduct after it was over.
Although trying to close the doors of the other
great Cabinets against her, he endeavoured to
conciliate her by polite proceedings and by support-
ing her in questions wherein Germany was not
interested. For that reason he favoured the
plans of Grecian aggrandizement, and seconded
the policy of France in Egypt. The day after
the signature of the Austro-German Treaty, and
before leaving Vienna, he went to the French
Ambassador to reassure him as to the nature of
the alliance and to inform him that it contained
nothing aggressive to France. He even proceeded
further, and for a moment entertained the idea
of associating the French Republic to a great
League of Peace of Central Europe. He wished
to prevent the aggrandizement of Russia and
England at the expense of the European dominions
of Turkey, and to regulate this question to the
sole profit of Germany, France and Austria. If
Prince Bismarck hoped by these measures to divert
the attention of French statesmen from the
question of Alsace-Lorraine, he was destined soon
to be disabused of this illusion. In the month
of August 1880, Monsieur Gambetta, the peculiar
representative of the policy of revenge, held a
speech at Cherbourg affirming that France had
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 289
forgotten nothing and was only biding her time.
Berlin replied to this speech by again ordering
the celebration of the anniversary of Sedan, which
was to have been suppressed this year for the
first time. Nevertheless the two Governments
remained on a peaceful footing, the German
Cabinet showing itself on the whole favourable
to French Foreign policy. In the questions of
Tunis and of China, France found help and even
encouragement at Berlin. In the question of
West Africa, as we have seen above, the two
Governments went so far as to act in common,
and the Emperor made the most of this agreement
in his speech on the opening of Parliament on
the 20th of November 1884.
Russia, wounded in her self-love, crossed in
her aspirations by the Austro-German Alliance,
might well be thought capable of completing a
rupture which had only been averted by the
personal friendship of the Czar and the Emperor
William. All Europe was convinced that this
friendship would not survive either of these august
persons, the Czarevitch being supposed to entertain
sentiments differing from those of his father towards
the German nation and the Prussian Dynasty.
An unexpected and awful event was soon to
destroy this idea ; once more it was to be proved
that a sovereign cannot always continue to hold
290 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
the views he held when heir-apparent. On the
13th of March 1881, Alexander II was assassinated
by Nihilists. Three days afterwards the Russian
Minister for foreign affairs declared in the name
of Alexander III, ‘that the Czar's policy would be
peaceful, that Russia would remain faithful to her
friends, and that she would maintain her hereditary
sympathies.’ The sense of these words was clear.
It was made, if possible, still more so by the
Emperor William exclaiming on the 22nd of March
when he received a congratulatory telegram from
the Czar: ‘It is delightful to find in the new
Emperor the old friendship and fidelity.’ The
Crown-Prince completed these friendly manifesta-
tions. After being present in St Petersburg at
the funeral of Alexander II, he went to Moscow
where he assured the German colony that the
old friendship of Russia and Germany was
undiminished.
The new Czar gave a solemn sanction to this
assertion. At his wish, the two sovereigns met at
Dantzig on the 9th of September. The Czar was
accompained by M. de Giers, the representative of
Prince Gortchakoff in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, but he did not bring with him his Minister
of the Interior, General Ignatieff, a bitter opponent
of Germany. The Emperor William was ac-
compained by the Crown-Prince and Prince
THE EMPEA OR AND EUROPE" 291
Bismarck. It was a true visit of reconciliation
between the two Courts. The Triple Alliance was
almost revived. ‘Our interviews,’ said the
Emperor William on the opening of the Parliament
on the 17th of November, “with the Emperor of
Austria at Gastein and with the Czar at Dantzig,
were the expression of the intimate personal and
political connection uniting us to those sovereigns
and allying Germany to those two powerful
neighbouring Empires. This connection is a firm
guarantee of lasting peace, which is ensured by the
agreement of the policy of the three Imperial
Courts.”
But the year 1882 again jeopardized this
concord, and proved that the opinion of the
Russian nation was at variance with that of its
ruler. In January one of the most illustrious and
popular Generals of the Russian Army held at a
banquet a most violent speech against Germany
and Austria. The Government apologised to the
Austrian Ambassador, and gave the indiscreet
General orders to travel in foreign countries. The
General did not mend matters by holding a speech
in Paris to some Servian students, in which he
foretold an alliance of all the Slavs with France to
destroy the preponderance of Germany. He was
recalled and reprimanded, but the whole world
292 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
perceived that he was expressing the opinion of the
vast majority of his countrymen.
Nevertheless, the Russian Government tried to
appease the irritation of Berlin and Vienna.
Prince Gortchakoff, the most determined enemy
of German policy, resigned definitively on the 9th
of April. In the following autumn, a brother of
Alexander III was present at the manoeuvres
that took place in Silesia under the command of
the Emperor William. In November, M. de Giers,
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on his way
to Italy, held conferences with the Premiers of
Germany and Austria. But it was not until the
following year that Russia really joined the
Triple Alliance. The year 1883 was decisive for
that great League of Peace, as it was styled by
the Northern Courts. As we mentioned above,
the Austro-German Alliance had been renewed
for an indefinite period. Several other States had
grouped themselves round the two Empires. On
the other hand, the confidence between Berlin and
St Petersburg was not completely restored. It
was remarked that the German Government was
augmenting its garrison on the Russian frontier,
strengthening its squadron in the Baltic and
finishing the fortress of Posen. At that moment
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs came to
Berlin to confer with the Emperor and the Chan-
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 293
cellor. This time peace resulted from the inter-
views. The Russian Cabinet, eager to enforce
Conservative principles under the horror of Nihilist
crimes, associated itself to the two other Courts
for the preservation of peace of which Russia had
the greatest need. Peace with Germany implied
agreement with Austria on Eastern policy, in the
spirit of an equal division of action and influence in
the Balkan Peninsula. Subsequent events tried
this agreement, which was proved two years later
by the Bulgarian and Roumelian crisis, and was
not found wanting.
The Emperor of Germany, whose supreme
desire was to preserve peace during the rest of
his reign, derived such intense pleasure from this
change of Russian policy, that he expressed it
in glowing terms to the Deputation of the
Prussian Chambers that came to pay him their
respects in November 1883. He praised the Czar
and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, who both gave
the strongest assurances in favour of peace and of
Bussia's friendship to the two other Empires. In
fact, since that time no hitch has occurred in the
relations between Germany and Russia. The
Russian Court has never lost an opportunity of
declaring its cordial feelings. On the 26th of
February 1884, the seventieth anniversary of the
Emperor William's nomination as Knight of the
294 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
military order of Saint George, a military Deputa-
tion, headed by a Grand-Duke and uncle to the
Czar, proceeded to Berlin to congratulate him.
The old fraternity of arms was celebrated ;
memories were revived of the War of Independence
of 1813, memories that contrasted singularly with
Prince Bismarck's recent plans of an alliance with
France. On another occasion, the son of the
Crown-Prince went to St Petersburg to be present
at the fetes given in honour of the Czarevitch
coming of age. The officers of the two armies met
and fraternised on the frontier. |
The official confirmation of the Triple Alliance
soon followed. In September, the three Emperors.
met in the little Polish town of Skierniwicze on the
borders of Austria. Alexander III and Francis
Joseph met for the first time: all they had to do
was to confirm their Alliance of the previous year.
The Emperor William had proclaimed that fact on
the opening of Parliament in the month of March ;
and he repeated in the Autumn Session that he
considered the friendship of the three Emperors
lasting, confirmed as it was once more by the
interview of Skierniwicze.
The adhesion given by Russia since 1883 to
the Alliance of the Emperors of Germany and
Austria, did not remain without an echo in the
Courts of the Balkan States and at Con-
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 295
Af
stantinople. The policy of Germany towards
Turkey had recently undergone profound changes.
Prussia was now all politeness to the Sultan. At
his request Prussian generals and officers were sent
to instruct the Ottoman Army, financiers to
organise the Douanes and the Administration, and
lawyers to reform justice. The Sultan sent one of
his Marshals to Berlin to ask his admittance in the
Alliance of the Emperors; but this demand was
not granted because of the effective guarantees it
would have entailed and to which Germany would
not consent. The principle was adopted in Berlin
of contracting no engagement that could oblige
Germany to take arms unless her interests were
immediately affected. The Porte was promised the
protection of both Empires, but great latitude of
ways and means was reserved.
The same course was pursued with regard to
the other Balkan States. In September 1883,
Roumania and Servia declared their adhesion to
the Alliance without receiving any Treaty in
return. In the autumn of the same year, the
Emperor William held great manoeuvres in the
vicinity of Homburg; he was surrounded by a vast
number of German Princes, and had invited the
Rings of Spain and Servia to be present.
These manoeuvres, more brilliant than any that
had ever been held before, had a most painful
296 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
epilogue. Don Alfonso, King of Spain, who had
undertaken the voyage to Germany with the object
of making himself acquainted with the German
Army and of concluding an advantageous Com-
mercial Treaty, thus fortifying the friendship of
both countries, received a most flattering reception
from the Emperor William. According to the
custom of the Northern Courts, the Emperor
nominated him honorary Colonel of an Uhlan
regiment, as a mark of singular distinction. It
happened that this regiment was then quartered at
Strasburg. This reception and nomination excited
the susceptibilities of Paris, of which some dema-
gogues made use to organise an insulting demon-
stration against Don Alfonso as he was returning
to his kingdom through the French capital. It
was easy to convince Berlin that in insulting Don
Alfonso they really meant to insult Germany. The
Emperor William was the first to look upon the
incident in this light, and he organised a counter-
demonstration by sending an Aide-de-Camp to
Madrid to inform the injured Monarch of the
impending visit of his son the Crown-Prince.
This visit took place in November with great
solemnity. The Crown-Prince proceeded to Genoa,
from which port the German squadron conveyed
him to Barcelona.
South Europe seemed inclined to enter the
THE EMPEROR AWD EUROPE 297
sphere of German policy, of which Italy had been
the first to feel the attraction. Hesitating during
the war of 1870, divided between her reminiscences
which impressed upon her the duty of gratitude
to France, and political interests which drew her
towards the conqueror, she gradually yielded to
those interests and connected herself with the
German Empire which was then fighting enemies
that were also her own : the Holy See and the
French Conservatives. This convention was
facilitated by the members of both Royal Families.
The Prince and Princess Royal of Italy paid a
visit to Berlin in 1872, and it was followed next
year by one from Victor Emmanuel, who passed
through Vienna on his way to Prussia. Early
in 1875, the German Crown Prince went to the
Italian Court to announce his father's visit, who
proceeded to Milan in the month of October, in
which city he had an interview with King Victor
Emmanuel. The Court and the populace gave the
Emperor an enthusiastic reception ; the munici-
palities of the great cities, including Rome, voted
him addresses; in the official banquets toasts
were given reviving the memory of their united
campaign of 1866. The newspapers were eager
to give the Imperial visit the character of a
demonstration against the Pope. They said it
was the league of the lay Powers against the
298 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
spirit of reaction whose head-quarters were at
the Vatican. This journey, with which the
Emperor William declared himself enchanted,
had a somewhat unpleasant epilogue, considering
the cordiality which had been revived between
his Court and that of Vienna. When he was
passing through Trent, he heard under his windows
the acclamations of those who seemed to expect
from the friendly meeting of Milan the realisation
of their dreams of the annexation of South Tyrol
to Italy. It was a passing cloud which the
Emperor had forgotten when, a few days later, he
extolled at the opening of Parliament the national
union and the mutual friendship of Germany and
Italy. From that date, the intimacy between
Berlin and the Quirinal has frequently been mani-
fested. The alliance of Germany and Austria,
applying especially to the preservation of the
territorial ‘statu quo of Central Europe,
naturally attracted Italy who was always anxious
about the future. Though not admitted as a
member of the Alliance, she shared in many of
its advantages. She had to break with her
internal Radical Party, and especially with those
who wished to complete Italian Unity at the cost
of the integrity of Austria; but she obtained
certain promises of protection against foreign
aggression, which was not very probable, but she
THE EMPEROR A WD EUROPE 299
had to pledge herself to give similar assistance to
the two Empires.
In Spain, German policy was equally predom-
inant. Germany was the first of the Great Powers
to recognise the restoration of the Bourbons in
1875. Don Alfonso, whose second wife was an
Austrian Arch-Duchess, was thus drawn nearer
to the powerful ally of Francis Joseph. When
invited to the German manoeuvres in 1883, Don
Alfonso found a courteous and sympathetic host.
This voyage ended later on in the incident we have
related. A political alliance was not concluded
between the two Courts, they were satisfied with
commercial treaties. But the insults to which the
Ring was a prey in Paris were bitterly resented
by the Court of Berlin, who fully understood the
significance of the proceeding as directed against
Germany. Under the impression of this event,
the Emperor decided on sending the Crown-Prince
to Madrid to return the King's visit. In order
to avoid French territory, the Crown-Prince passed
through Italy where he was again received with
signal honours. His reception in Madrid was
excellent, but not so enthusiastic as in Italy. He
arrived in the Spanish capital in the midst of a
serious Governmental crisis, and public opinion
believed that Prussia was in favour of the Con-
servatives. Spain was very suspicious of foreign
300 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
interference in her internal affairs, and soon after-
wards she showed her resentment against the
statesmen who had brought about her altered
position in international policy.
In fact, in 1885, the last moments of Don
Alfonso were grievously troubled by the dispute
about the Caroline Islands. Prussia was going
to take possession of those Islands, asserting that
Spain had never formally occupied them. The
conflict that ensued caused violent demonstrations
in Madrid and other towns against the Ambassador
and the Consuls of Germany. Public opinion was
somewhat disconcerted : it could not reconcile the
recent proofs of friendship towards the King with
the sudden occupation of Islands which had been
considered for centuries as Spanish Colonies. But
the personal feelings of the Court of Berlin finally
prevailed over official policy, which had behaved
in this affair with an inconsiderate rudeness for
which the visit of the Crown-Prince had assuredly
not prepared the Spaniards. The German Govern-
ment, recognising the King's dangerous position,
resolved on yielding, but not without giving a
signal proof of its consummate ability. As arbiter
of the dispute it chose the Pope, with whom it had
long been negotiating the termination of the
religious conflict. Thus it extricated itself with
marvellous skill from a dispute that might have
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 3o I
resulted in a serious maritime war, and conciliated
at the same time the good graces of the Pope, who
greatly valued this homage, and who expressed
himself to that effect to the College of Cardinals.
The Triple Imperial Alliance, of which the
Court of Berlin is the soul, has not found so much
favour in South as in North Europe. Spain and
IPortugal are too remote from the Centre of Europe
to be obliged to take part in the questions that
may excite it; and, thanks to their geographical
position, they are safe from those territorial
disputes which give rise to most of the conflicts
of the rest of Europe. As to Italy, the Papal
Question will, for many years to come, fix her in
her choice of allies; she has taken the side of the
Triple Alliance, which signifies the maintenance
of the existing state of things; but she will
probably abandon it when it can no longer
guarantee the present situation.
It was, beyond all doubt, that guarantee of
the existing political situation that most attracted
the Emperor of Germany in the Triple Alliance.
Under a modified form, this Alliance of 1883 recalls
to memory the Holy Alliance, of which King
Frederick William III was one of the founders,
and which was valued by his son, who resembles
him in many particulars. The Holy Alliance,
which presented itself as the defender of Con-
WOL II U
302 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
servative principles against the Revolution, had
in reality no other object than that of guaranteeing
to its members the conquests recognised by the
Treaty of Vienna. Similarly, the Alliance con-
cluded in the present day under the auspices of
the Emperor William, is especially solicitous of
preserving the conquests made by the three
Empires since 1870. The maintenance of peace
being the best means of obtaining this result, the
Alliance of the three Emperors acts logically in
preventing the outburst of general wars. Will it
always succeed in so doing 2 The contemporaries
hope it may, but are not absolutely certain that
it will. We must not forget that in the early
period of the Triple Alliance, Russia was able to
proceed to the very verge of a great war without
being prevented by the other two Empires. We
have also been able to see in 1885, that the recom-
mendations of the three Courts could not prevent
the Roumelian rising, nor the war between Servia
and Bulgaria. Such collisions can only be frus-
trated by armed intervention : but the Emperor
of Germany always shrinks from this extreme
measure, the only measure that can enforce the
obedience of young nationalities that place their
interests and passions above public rights and
international treaties. The future must tell
whether the Triple Alliance will be spared this
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 3O3
trial; or, if it be necessary, whether the Empires
will be as united for action as they have been up
to now for diplomacy.
The Emperor William will remain during his
life the director of this Alliance, which is particu-
larly advantageous to Germany while preserving
general peace. The interests of Germany are at
present opposed neither to those of Russia nor
of Austria. War is not to be dreaded with either
of these Powers, or with both. Antagonism exists
only between Russia and Austria, and all the art
of German diplomacy is being employed to prevent
a collision between these two countries, of which
Germany could not be an unmoved spectator. The
maintenance of peace between Russia and Austria
is the best safeguard that the German Empire and
its sovereign can desire for the conquests of 1866
and 1870.
Events form and transform the heads of Empires.
When he was still heir to the Prussian throne,
the Emperor William thought more of consoli-
dating royal power against Liberal encroachments
than of making vast conquests that could only be
the result of terrific wars or of Revolutionary dis-
turbances. The events of 1848 and the French
Second Empire exercised decisive influence on his
action and policy. The unitary movement of
Germany, while threatening the minor States, must
3o4 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
have appeared to him as the means of elevating
Prussia and his Dynasty. During the disturbances
of March he left Berlin full of bitterness against
those who insulted royal power; but he returned
some months later with the thought that the
popular movement of Prussia and Germany might
be made subservient to the interests of the House
of Hohenzollern. He soon perceived that a power-
ful army was essential to the realisation of such
projects; he devoted himself to removing all
deficiencies from the Prussian Army, and he
found many difficulties arise from this undertaking,
but also all his incomparable triumphs.
The accession of the Second French Empire
could only encourage him in the pursuit of his
plans. The example of Frederick the Great un-
doubtedly fired the Emperor's military spirit; but
the policy of Napoleon III showed him the possi-
bility of realising schemes which would have seemed
like so many chimeras to an extremely Conser-
vative Prince before 1852. In order to enlarge
Prussia and to exclude Austria from the Germanic
Confederation, it was necessary to overstep the
limits of the Treaties of 1815. Napoleon III was
the first who had the courage to proclaim that he
abhorred those Treaties. He condemned them
because they diminished the territory of France
and ignored the principle of nationality which he
THE EMPEROR AWD EUROPE 3O5
supported in the interest of Italy against Austria.
The Emperor William had the good luck of finding
as contemporary a French sovereign who became
a supporter of Prussian power in Germany, because
he was a partizan of the redistribution of European
territory, and a declared advocate of the principle
of nationality. It is therefore the policy of the
French Empire that greatly inspired and helped
that of the Emperor William. Thanks to that
policy, Prussia was victorious in the Danish war
at the very beginning. Had Napoleon been
opposed to that war, it could never have assumed
the character of a contest between a great Power
and a small country of slender resources. It was
further owing to that policy, and indeed we may
add it was owing to the opinion then current in
France, that Prussia was able to dissolve the
Germanic Confederation in 1866. That measure
dealt a fatal blow to the Treaties of 1815, detested
by the Empire, and it injured at the same time the
House of Austria, detested in France ever since
the days of Cardinal Richelieu.
Profiting by these happy foreign circumstances,
the Emperor William succeeded in realising long
meditated schemes, and in renewing Prussia's great
feats of arms which had ceased since the death of
Frederick the Great. In this enterprise, policy
and dynastic interest induced him to put aside
306 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AMD HIS REIGN
many personal feelings and convictions, which were,
however, so deeply rooted in his character, that
they often made him waver on the eve of
momentous decisions. But when his work was
accomplished he returned to his starting point ; he
threw aside auxiliaries tainted with revolutionary
ideas, and he sought alliances such as his father
would have valued. He considers the Alliance of
the three Empires a guarantee at once against
foreign and internal enemies; against those who
covet his territory, and against those who hate his
Crown.
When we draw a parallel between the reign
of Frederick the Great and that of William the
Victorious, we remark that the latter has escaped,
at least up to now, from the danger of such a
coalition of Great Powers as threatened at one
time the very existence of Frederick and of
Prussia. That great prince was always compelled
to fight against several enemies at once, whereas
William I never encountered more than one at
a time, the other Powers standing by, inactive
spectators. On the other hand, the Emperor
has been battling during his whole reign with
an adversary unknown to Frederick, we mean
the Parliamentary régime. The reader has been
able to see during the course of this history, that
the Emperor has often changed friends and enemies
TILE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 3o 7
according to circumstances, but he never put aside
his hostility to Parliament. He opposed its
origin during the reign of his brother, and only
submitted to it later on as a soldier submits to
unpleasant orders. Perhaps he foresaw that it
would some day be constantly interfering with
his plans. The fact is, the achievements' of the
one are opposed to the principles of the other ;
the sword and the tribune have never been on
good terms. The Emperor William attempted
to reconcile these two elements. Seeing the ardour
of Prussian Liberals for German greatness and
unity, he believed they would willingly give him
that military power so essential to the fulfilment of
these mighty projects. This attempt of ruling in a
Parliamentary spirit which characterised the ‘new
era,’ as the Regency was then called, was unsuccess-
ful, because the Regent would not consent to the
division of power which that system would entail.
The Regent was further obliged to conceal his
future plans, whose existence was not suspected
by the Liberals as they considered him to be
firmly attached to the ancient treaties and the
established right of Europe. Under these con-
ditions, the Liberals only saw in the proposal of
augmenting the Army, as well as in the request
for enormous loans, an encroachment of the military
system which they did not wish to encourage,
308 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM AND HIS REIGN
unless the Crown granted them a suitable share
of executive power. The dispute began before
the Regent ascended the throne, and the coronation
at Königsberg was darkened by the clouds of an
imminent conflict. Three Liberal Ministries being
unable to break the opposition of the Lower
Chambér, the King chose for Premier that states-
man whom he knew to be determined to support
him in the execution of his interior and foreign
enterprises.
To the ‘new era,’ which was of very short
duration, succeeded the long era of the constitu-
tional conflict which was only appeased by the
brilliant military triumphs of 1866. The sovereign
did not yield an inch, and although he asked
Parliamentary sanction for the actions of the
dictatorial period, he frankly declared that if similar
circumstances were again to arise, the Crown
would pursue the same policy. The conflict was
lessened, but not terminated. It revived, before
1870, in the Parliament of the North, and after
that year, in the Parliament of the Empire. There
was no longer a divergency merely on one question;
the dispute concerned the limits of Royal and
Parliamentary power, as difficult to define as
those of Church and State. The message of the
4th of January 1882, must be regarded as the
expression of the Emperor's political creed, and as
THE EMPEROR AND EUROPE 3O9
his final decision on internal policy. He declares
in that message that in Prussia as in the
German Empire, the sovereign dominates the
Government; and he claims for himself and for
his successors the right of personal direction of
the Government. That is the doctrine that
brought about the conflict with the national
representatives, and which is contested by all
sections of the Liberal Party. It is a question
which the Emperor William will not finally solve
and which his heirs will inherit with other
problems, such as Socialism and the definitive form
of the German Empire.
Every mortal has his own work assigned to
him, and for that work the suitable time must
appear. The Emperor William is one of the few
who have succeeded in everything. No reign was
ever inaugurated so silently, to proceed with so
much fame and to shine with such intense
brilliancy. If any cares trouble the last years
of the old Emperor, it can only be the fear that
his successor may not be able to quell the rebel-
lious elements which he himself silenced, even as
Neptune silenced the fury of the ocean with his
trident.
THE END
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