HE
4491
B 384167
.P52
1916
LIBRARY
City of Philadelphia
Department of City Transit
384
A STUDY AND REVIEW
OF THE
N
PROBLEM OF PASSENGER
TRANSPORTATION IN PHILADELPHIA
BY
UNIFIED SYSTEM OF LINES
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLANS PROPOSED FOR ITS SOLUTION
WITH
SUGGESTED METHODS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT
BY
WILLIAM S. TWINING
DIRECTOR
SUBMITTED TO THE SELECT AND COMMON COUNCILS
OF PHILADELPHIA
MARCH 29, 1916
ARTES
1837
LIBRARY
VERITAS
SCIENTIA
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
IOUS UNUN
PLURIOUS
TUEBOR
SI-QUÆRIS-PENINSULAM-AMŒNAM
CIRCUMSPICE
THE GIFT OF
Phil. Dept. of City Transit
City of Philadelphia
Department of City Transit
A STUDY AND REVIEW
OF THE
HE
4491
386
.P:52
1916
PROBLEM OF PASSENGER
TRANSPORTATION IN PHILADELPHIA
BY A
UNIFIED SYSTEM OF LINES
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLANS PROPOSED FOR ITS SOLUTION
WITH
SUGGESTED METHODS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT
BY
WILLIAM S. TWINING
DIRECTOR
SUBMITTED TO THE SELECT AND COMMON COUNCILS
OF PHILADELPHIA
MARCH 29, 1916
Re-classed
CONTENTS
PAGE
PAGE
Letter of Transmittal
3-6
General Discussion of the Transportation Prob-
The Proposed Operating Lease of City-built
Lines..
38
lem
7-15
Transfers Between Lines
41
Elements of the Problem
General Discussion of Rapid Transit Lines.
45-57
The Service Element
77
Advantages of Rapid Transit Lines
45
The Fare Element
The Five-Cent Fare Policy
∞ ∞
8
Results Due to Location and Routing.
45
•
9
The Broad Street Line and Loop.
46
Independent Operator of City's Lines.
11
Objections to Loop
46
Burden not Realized Now
12
Through-Routing
48
•
Legal Questions not Discussed
12
•
The Ideal Local Transportation System for a
Data Forming Basis of This Report..
12
General Principles
12
Population of 3,000,000 Within a Circle of
12-mile Radius
48
•
The Financial Difficulties of the Problem of
City-owned Lines
13
Ideal System (A Unified Plan of Operation)
Applied to Philadelphia
50
Why Does the City Engage in This Experiment?
Why Called an Experiment?
14
15
The Middle Zone of the City and Its Transpor-
tation Problems
51
Main Issues
15
The Suburban Zone Service
51
•
A Study of the Rapid Transit Problem in Phila-
delphia with Suggestions for its Proper De-
velopment (Summary of Report)
Effect of Rapid Transit Lines in Distribution
of Population
52
17-20
Suggested Improvements in the Program
Issues
·
A History and Analysis of the Plans for Rapid
Transit Development in Philadelphia, 1913-
19
Discussion of Principle of District Assessment
for Local Benefits
53
20
1916
21-33
•
How are the Bills to be Paid for Constructing
and Operating the Rapid Transit System?...
Trunk and Terminal Lines to be Financed
by City Bonds
55
55
Outline of the Case
21
Former Taylor Plans Analyzed
22
Taylor Plans-Comparison of Previous Recom-
Branch Lines and Extensions Proposed to be
Financed on Principle of Assessment of
Local Benefits
55
mendations
22
Taylor Plans Comparative Merits of the For-
mer Plans .
29
Alternate Method of Financing Branches and
Extensions of the Trunk Portion of the Sys-
tem..
56
The Taylor Plan-Its Ideals
30
The Taylor Plan-General Defects
30
Suggested Improvements in the Plans for Rapid
Transit Development
59-69
The Taylor Plan-Suggestions for Attaining
Suggested Improvements in the Construction
the Ideal
31
Program of the Taylor Plan
59
Loan Bill and Ordinances Under Which Con-
struction was Authorized
31
Suggested Construction of Comprehensive Sys-
tem in Successive Steps
60
•
Present Situation Complicated by Past Mis-
takes
Construction Step No. 1
60
32
Construction Step No. 2
60
The City's Financial Standing Improvement
Which Will Result if the Burden be Placed
Upon the Car Rider
Importance of Erie Avenue as Temporary
32
Northern Terminal of Broad Street Lines...
Walnut Street Line
60
61
Financing of the Project
33
Temporary Stub-End Terminals
61
The Present Plans for Rapid Transit Develop-
ment
Train Capacity
61
35-43
Definition of the Taylor Plans
35
Reasons for Constructing Four Tracks on Broad
Street ..
62
Construction Program of Taylor Plan
Objections to the Construction Program of the
Taylor Plan
37.
Construction of Camden Tube
•
63
37
Successive Steps and Extensions in the Future.
Time of Construction and Operation..
63
63
Suggested Improvements in the Plans for Rapid
Transit Development-Continued.
Comparison of Cost of Construction-Amount
of Loan Suggested
Why is Construction in Progressive Steps Ad-
vised?...
PAGE
6 Comparison of Financial Results to the City
from Operation Under Different Plans.
(Operation by Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company)-(Camden Tube Included)... . . .
Comparison of Outlay-For 3-Year Period...
Comparison of Total Investment (City and
Company) and 1913 Population Served by
Steps 1 and 2 of Modified Program as Out-
lined in this Report with Taylor Plan……….
Average Fare per Revenue Journey Received
by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Com-
pany from 1900 to 1915
63
7
64
Effect of Gradual Construction by Steps on the
Lessee of City's System
8
65
Reservation of Space in Broad Street for
Through Lines of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
Change of City Hall Station
66
9
66
68
.71-74
Change of Existing Contract for City Hall Sta-
tion ...
Financial Operating Statistics
•
Estimated Financial Results of Operation Un-
der Various Plans of Construction and Lease. 71
Financial Consequences of Operating Deficits.... 75-78
Probable Effect of the Transit Program of City
Taxes
10 Estimated Average Fare Required per Rev-
enue Journey During 1915 if Lines Assumed
for Plan No. 16 of 1915 Annual Report of
Department had been in Operation
PAGE
80
81
82
83
84
75
How are These Deficits to be Met?
75
11 Estimated Average Fare per Revenue Jour-
ney Necessary to Support Entire Taylor
System if in Operation in 1915..
85
Who Should Carry the Burden of Deficits Re-
sulting from a Unified System?
76
What Adjustment of Carfare Would be Neces-
sary to Make the Unified System Self-sup-
porting?..
12 Estimated Average Fare per Revenue Journey
Necessary to Support Broad Street Line,
Delivery Loop, Frankford Line to Rhawn
Street and Darby Line
86
78
Appendix A.
MAPS.
PAGE
Building of Rapid Transit Lines in New York
City by Assessment Upon Property Benefited. 87-90
Frontispiece:
Appendix B.
Paying the Bills for City Planning..
. 91-93
No.
Appendix C.
Memorandum as to Legal Status of Assessment
for Rapid Transit Development in Pennsyl-
vania and City Solicitor's Opinion
STATEMENTS.
1 Taylor Plans Analyzed-Comparison of Re-
sults Based on Recommendations-Reports
of Transit Commissioner and Department
of City Transit-Operation by Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company Assumed
Subway and Elevated Lines for Suggested
Unified System and Plan of Through-Rout-
ing for Comprehensive System (Operation
by Philadelphia Rapid Transit Com-
pany)
.Facing
3
No.
1
95
Subway and Elevated Lines Suggested for
Independent (Competitive) System and Plan
of Through-Routing for Comprehensive Sys-
tem
Facing
10
PAGE
2 Plan for Rapid Transit Development in the
Business District
...Facing
46
3 Ideal Transportation System as Existing in
West Philadelphia
Facing
50
4
.. 23-25
3 Comparison of Fundamental Features of the
Different Taylor Plans
The Increased Area Brought Within the 30-
Minute Time Zone from the Business Dis-
trict by Steps 1 and 2.
.Facing
52
26, 27
2 Comparison of the Financial Feasibility of
the Rapid Transit Systems Discussed in
This Report
4 Comparison of Taylor Plans
5 Comparison of Financial Results to the City
from Operation Under Different Plans.
(Operation by Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company)-(Camden Tube Not Included).
28
42, 43
79
5 Trunk and Terminal Sections of Rapid Tran-
sit Lines to be Financed on City Bonds and
Extensions to be Financed by Local As-
sessment of Benefits...
.Following
6 Revised Location-Broad Street Subway-
City Hall Station
57
Facing 66
7 Broad Street Subway-Showing Distribution
of Race Street, City Hall and Chestnut
Street Stations
Following 69
No.
DIAGRAMS.
Diagram Illustrating Function of Rapid Tran-
sit Lines in a Unified System and the
Principle of Through-Routing
Diagram Showing Application of Principles
Applied to Existing Conditions in West
Philadelphia
1 Percentage Distribution of North Broad
Street Passengers (Inbound) at Delivery
Loop Stations, Taylor Plan
PAGE
No.
PAGE
High-speed Systems (One-Way Traffic-
Boarding)
.Facing
60
48
49
Facing
46
2
An Ideal Transportation System.....Facing
3 Application of Ideal Rapid Transit System to
Conditions in Philadelphia
.Facing
50
50
•
4 Comparison of Daily Passengers at Various
Stations on New York and Philadelphia
5 Modified Rapid Transit System with Through-
Routing
.Facing
6 Actual Fare Requirements of Unified Sys-
tem Assumed Under Plan No. 16, 1915 An-
nual Report of Department of City Tran-
sit; also showing a Suggested Program of
Fare Adjustment, 1920 to 1950......Facing
7 Results to City (Estimated) from Operation
of Unified System Under Different Plans on
5-Cent Fare Basis, Camden Tube Not In-
cluded
.Following
62
78
69

GLEN SIDE
JENKINTOWN
LINE
FOX CHASE
CITY.
OGONTZ AVE
GERMANTOWN AVE
CHESTNUT HILL
STENTON AVE.
CHEW ST
GERMANTOWN
WAYNE
LINE
SICHEL
CHELTEN AVE.
ROUTE OF
NORTHWEST
O GONTZ
OLD YORK RD.
ELEVATED BRANCH
NOT DETERMINED
AVE
OAK LANE
10TH ST.
5TH ST.
CITY
SING SUN LAND
OLNEY AVE OLNEY
LOGAN
ROXBOROUGH
WALNUT LANE
RIDGE AVE
MANAYUNK
SCHUYLKILL
GERMANTOWN
SUBWAY-ELEVATED
HENRY
RIDGE AVE
MIDVALE
AVE
FALLS
ALOF
ALLEGHENY
SCHUYLKILL
LINE
BALA
NORTHWESTERN
SUBWAY-ELEVATED
9TH ST.
CAR STORAGE
ERIE AVE.
ROUTE OF
NORTHEAST ELEVATED
BRANCH NOT
DETERMINED
5WARD HIGH-SPEE
SURFACE LINE
SURFA
FRANKFORD
WYOMING AVE.
FRANKFORD
ELEVATED
KENSINGTON
AVE.
BRIDGE
TO RHAWN ST
TORRESDALE AVE.
MARGARET ST
ORTHODOX ST.
RICHMOND ST.
LEHIGH AVE.
YORK ST.
DAUPHIN ST.
COLUMBIA AVE.
NORTH BROAD
STREET SUBWAY
2TH ST.
AVE.
KENSINGTON
CUMBERLAND ST
SUSQUEHANNA AV
BERKS ST
GIRARD
AVE
AVE
SOMERSET ST.
HUNTINGDON ST
CUMBERLAND ST
NORRIS ST.
RIVER
PETTY'S ISLAND
29TH ST.
CITY
54 TH
OVERBROOK
44TH ST
ST
PARKSIDE AVE.
RIVER
LANCASTER AVE
MARKET
69TH ST
PRESENT
MARKET ST
ELEVATED
60TH ST
56TH ST.
52ND ST
GIRARD
49TH ST
46TH ST.
AVE.
42ND ST
LINE
CHESTER AVE
54TH ST
40TH ST.
ST.
PRESENT
MARKET ST.
SUBWAY
GRAY FERRY AVE
WOODLAND AVE.
AVE.
FAIRMOUNT
GREEN ST
SP. GARDEN S
SPRUCE 51.8
BAINBRIDGE
ST.
RIDGE AVE.
CATHARINE ST
ELLSWORTH ST
--
8TH ST.
FRONT
WALNUT ST
FEDERAL ST.
TASKER ST.
WHARTON ST.
MORRIS
ST. I
SNYDER AVE.
SOUTHWESTERN
ELEVATED
UNION ST
DARBY
CITY
ELMWOOD
ISLAND RD.
CAMDEN
TUBE
PRESENT
MARKET ST.
ELEVATED
DELAWARE
BROAD
OREGON AVE
HOYT ST________
LEAGUE ISLAND
FRONTISPIECE
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
SUBWAY AND ELEVATED LINES
(Steps 1 and 2 shown in Red)
for
SUGGESTED UNIFIED SYSTEM
and Plan of
THROUGH-ROUTING FOR COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM
(Operation by Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company)
ELEVATED
SUBWAY
EXISTING TRACK
NEW TRACK
EXISTING TRACK
NEW TRACK
Proposed 35th Ward
LEGEND
Rapid Transit Lines
Surface Feeders to Rapid Transit Lines
Surface Feeders to Present and
Proposed Rapid Transit Lines
High Speed Surface Line
63RD ST.
SOUTH BROAD
STREET SUBWAY
Department of City Transit
City of Philadelphia
TO THE SELECT AND COMMON COUNCILS OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA :
GENTLEMEN :—Introductory to this, my first report on the Rapid Transit Problem
in Philadelphia, it may be well to state that it is submitted in compliance with the
Act creating the Department, which states:
“The Director shall, from time to time, make such recommendations to the
councils of said cities, as to him shall seem proper, for the improvement and de-
velopment of the facilities for transportation of persons and property within said
cities."
When I accepted this office under the City government, I had definite ideals and
convictions regarding the principal features of the transportation problem of Phila-
delphia, but I had no intention then of issuing a report of this character.
Further study of the situation, however, has shown me that a report is needed,
primarily in order to explain my motive and purpose in suggesting some changes in
the details and the financing of the plan for transit development now before the public,
popularly known as the "Taylor Plan;" also to make clear some of the technical and
financial features of that plan, and to advise City Councils what methods of executing
it I consider are rational and business-like, and will tend toward the final attainment
of the ideal which is so much desired.
The transit problem in Philadelphia is a real problem, and the solution of it is a
vital issue.
The problem may be expressed as a question, "What can be consistently done, and
what shall be done, to improve the transportation facilities of our City to provide for
future growth, and how, when and where shall such facilities be provided?”
The original "Taylor Plan" as published in 1913 was the result of a year and a
half of study and investigation of Philadelphia conditions and was supposed at that
time to be a complete answer to the problem.
No competent authority will assert that any general plan of such scope and char-
acter is absolutely final and perfect; all such plans must be altered and amended to
suit new ideas, new conditions and new data. As evidence that this is true as applied
to the "Taylor Plan," I quote the first paragraph of the 1914 Report of this Depart-
ment:
"In order to outline the present status of the project for which this
Department was established, I call to your attention the recommenda-
tions of my previous report, as partially modified and enlarged by addi-
tional recommendations which are referred to at length herein.”
3
Two revisions of the original plan have been issued by Mr. Taylor, the former
Director of this Department, and the main features of the final plan of 1915 are ex-
cellent in their conception. Different officials draw different conclusions and form
different opinions from the same data, and in this report I submit suggestions which,
in my judgment, will amend and improve the plans already published.
This report is supplemental to those that have preceded, and may be considered as
a fourth edition of the "Taylor Plan," differing in no essential features-only in de-
tails and policy-from the latest plan as issued in the 1915 Annual Report of this
Department. The ideas presented herein are set forth with the sincere desire to
secure to Philadelphia the best obtainable transportation service.
In view of my relation with this Department for the last three and one-half years,
as a member of the staff of Ford, Bacon & Davis, Consulting Engineers to the De-
partment, it seems unnecessary to state that I do not entertain the slightest oppo-
sition to the general plans already proposed.
The transportation problem of Philadelphia is a business and municipal one, and
the solutions presented in this and former reports are the personal opinions of in-
dividuals who are honestly striving to serve the City to the best of their ability.
I wish to state clearly and emphatically that I have no desire or intention to
recommend any curtailment of the comprehensive program of rapid transit develop-
ment outlined in the former reports of this Department. I realize fully the value and
great amount of work done by Mr. Taylor, my predecessor in this office, in procur-
ing the enabling legislation and thereby starting this important enterprise. I appreci-
ate the great difficulties with which he was confronted, and having had a small part
in planning this work, have tried in this report to so continue his plans that the ideal
may be eventually realized.
I am heartily in favor of the construction of each and every one of the radial lines
or routes which have been recommended, if, as, and when authorized by the citizens.
Acting as the legal consulting engineer for the City Councils in transit matters,
it is my duty to assist them to obtain for the public such benefits as are practically
possible—not to obstruct or delay any plan or its execution.
This Department certainly will not oppose the construction of lines anywhere and
everywhere so long as the citizens realize and are willing to assume the resulting bur-
dens. They alone must determine the extent to which they wish to furnish funds for
building such lines.
The Director of this Department cannot nullify or modify the acts of the citizens
or their representatives in City Councils.
Professional ethics demand that a report of this kind shall present the truth, and
the whole truth, in regard to the subjects discussed. This report aims to fulfill that de-
mand in regard to the transportation problem of Philadelphia as the Director sees it.
This report is not to be considered in any way as either a personal or political
attack, or criticism of plans originated under the former administration. It is made
only to serve the best interests of the City.
Although this report assumes that the present system and the new City-built
lines will be operated as a unified system, it must not be overlooked in considering the
4
problem that the City has no legal power to force a lease of its high-speed system
upon the present Company. The threat of a ruinous competition is the principal
weapon which the City may use in order to compel the execution of a lease of the new
lines by the present Company.
An engineer's work is principally constructive.
His aim should not be the de-
struction of either physical or financial property, but its conservation.
This is an engineer's report on a transportation problem, an experiment unique in
many features, and is intended to give such facts, advice and technical data as the
public may need in order to understand the fundamental difficulties inherent in an
enterprise which even its most enthusiastic advocates admit must burden for years to
come either the taxpayer or the car rider, as may later be determined.
It aims to point out some fallacies popularly believed, to make some suggestions
that should be helpful, to bring out such facts as have not heretofore been generally
known—or, if known, not appreciated as to their importance—and to serve the people
and the best interests of the entire City of Philadelphia. In its preparation I have
given much study as to how the burdens and benefits which the lines will produce
should be distributed, and suggestions are herein presented.
While in this report a program of construction is advised which calls for the
authorization at this time of only $35,000,000, I feel that the determination of the
amount that shall be authorized is a matter that rests entirely with the citizens and
their representatives in City Councils.
I would suggest, however, that this item be placed in the loan bill for the purpose
of rapid transit development with a broad authorization following the general word-
ing of the Act, i. e., "for the construction and improvement of subws, tunnels, rail-
ways, elevated railways and other transit facilities," or if this be considered inadvis
able or inexpedient, the item may be worded as follows:
Item-Towards the construction of subways, tunnels, railways, elevated railways
and other transit facilities along any or all of the following routes:
Frankford Line,
Broad Street Line,
Parkway-Roxborough Line,
Darby Line,
Together with any or all branches and extensions of same.
If legally possible, I advise that the lines be divided into sections, as has been done
in this report, and the people permitted to vote on each section of the plans indepen-
dently, the estimated cost of each section being apportioned in the loan. In this
way a definite expression can be obtained from the citizens as to their attitude toward
the transit problem as a whole and the extent of their interest in the individual lines.
I realize that the public in general does not possess the proper technical knowl-
edge and training to enable it to decide intelligently as to the merits of the suggested
alterations in routing, station locations, etc. Some of these changes involve problems
5
of railroad operation as well as construction. In addition, the public is often swayed
as to its judgment on such matters by sentiment.
The decision as to all such matters affecting this problem should not be influenced
by personal, political or sentimental consideration, and as all plans must by law be
submitted to and finally approved by the Public Service Commission of the State, I sug-
gest that, in order to avoid delay, the Commission be requested to review this situation
as far as their powers permit and render a decision as to these details as soon as pos-
sible.
I take this opportunity to thank my assistants in the Department for the efficient
aid they have rendered in the preparation of this report and their earnest endeavors
to aid in the solution of this public problem.
March 29, 1916.
Respectfully submitted,
William S. Tevining.
Director.
6
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
Elements of the Problem.
The entire transportation problem of the city contains but two fundamental elements-
service and car fare-what kind of service do the people want, and how much are they willing
to pay for it?
It is a purely economic problem, the service demanded by the public constituting the
cause and the car fare the effect.
If looked at from the other direction, and the car fare be fixed, the resulting service will
be automatically determined.
Rapid transit facilities are simply one element of service in the general transportation prob-
lem of the City. As the quality and amount of service rendered by a system must be a large
factor in determining the car fare, it may be said that the control and solution of the entire
problem centers in the fare.
The Service Element.
The prominent element of this problem as the public ordinarily regards it is the service to
be rendered. They regard the fare as fixed. But that it is not fixed and that it varies with the
cost of the service rendered will be shown in this report.
The term service has been defined as an agency for the accomplishment of some constantly
needed work or the supply of some recurrent demand. Transportation service in the mind of
the public is graded according to the degree in which it possesses each of the elements of
frequency, regularity, reliability, accessibility, speed and comfort.
In considering the service requirements of a city the population must be divided, not into
wards or political divisions, but into zones of density and distance from the center of the city-
into economic divisions.
The term “Unified Service" as used in this report means a joint operation of surface and
rapid transit lines in such a manner that each shall as nearly as possible render the service in
which it is most efficient and to which it is best adapted. The terms of such operation must be
fixed by agreement or law when ownership of the lines is not joint.
The cost of transportation service is the sum of the costs of supplying each of these ele-
ments continuously to such a degree as will meet the public demands.
The quality of the service depends on the proper adjustment and balancing of these ele-
ments to the traffic.
The capacity of a system to supply service rarely interests the public except as it affects
their comfort. If added only when and as needed it affects the cost of service positively
through the investment required to obtain it, and negatively by the better operating conditions.
Rapid transit lines when added to an existing surface system increase its capacity and
usually increase the cost of service. In return they improve the service rendered in limited
areas by an increase of speed and comfort of travel.
Passenger capacity of a surface system is the product of many factors and may be meas-
ured by the maximum number of cars that can be actually operated through the congested
district during the "rush-hour," multiplied by the number of passengers per car.
7
Before full capacity of the lines in a district is reached relief should be obtained by the
addition of rapid transit lines. As the improved service increases the speed and comfort of
travel and the accessibility of the congested area, such area becomes more attractive and grows
at the expense of other sections. Hence a vicious cycle exists which produces problems for city
planners and transportation engineers to solve. Capacity is always reached first in the busi-
ness district on account of the focusing there of many lines, more or less radial.
The existing system in Philadelphia is approaching the limit of its capacity in certain lim-
ited sections of the business district.
In this report the cost of unified service has been estimated carefully, assuming different
terms of lease and giving such weight to each of the elements as is considered to meet Philadel-
phia requirements as to quality. The cost must always include a proper return upon the value
of the plant used in the service.
A discussion of the elements of transportation service is beyond the scope of this report.
The Fare Element.
The fare on any transportation system is the result of the cost of the service divided by
the number of passenger journeys. The fare is thus seen to vary directly with the cost of the
service and inversely with the number of passengers. Expressed in a formula, it is:
Total cost of the service
Number of complete journeys
The average actual fare per journey.
From this formula, with any two elements known the third is readily found.
In this discussion the term "car fare" is as defined above, and means the average fare re-
quired to support the service. The actual fare collected on the cars may or may not be what is
here called the "fare.'
From this it is evident that the passenger fare required to support the service is not a
fixed amount; it varies from day to day, from year to year, and is different in each section of
the city. Like many other elements of this problem dealing with the city as a whole and con-
taining so many variables, the average fare required must be used, and is so considered in this
report.
If the fare collected be in excess of the fare as determined by the formula, a surplus will
result, available for distribution between the City and lessee according to the provisions of the
lease of the lines. If the fare collected be less than the fare as determined above, a deficit must
result.
The actual fare is fixed by economic conditions-the fare paid is fixed by City ordinance
or the operating company.
Diagram No. 6 (facing page 78) shows the difference between the two as applied to the
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company (actual since 1900) and the estimated average fares re-
quired up to 1950 for the unified system known as No. 16 of the 1915 Report.
Statistics show that with any given system, once it be constructed, the increase in passen-
gers is usually larger than the corresponding increase in the cost of service, and thereby a
gradual reduction in the fare required becomes possible as the traffic on the system approaches
the capacity for which it was designed.
The proposition to build these lines out of City funds largely arises from a vague idea in
the public mind that if the City builds these lines, a 5-cent fare will render the service profit-
able now. This is a misconception, for the resulting rise in car fare takes place the same as
8
though the lines had been built by the Company. The fact that the rider pays only 5 cents does
not prove that the fare to support the service has been only 5 cents. A deficit resulting from
this car fare appears first as a deficit in the City's interest, next as a deficit in the City Treasury,
next as an increase in taxes on real estate, and lastly in the form of rent or increased living ex-
penses, thus reaching the citizen by an indirect route. He has paid the increased fare (the
excess of cost of service over 5 cents), but not in a direct way.
The estimates made in this Department show that the ideal condition, the profitable oper-
ation of the unified system on a 5-cent fare, may eventually be actually possible. It is not
possible now—the actual fare on the existing system in 1915 being 5.166 cents per journey, and,
with the exception of three years when strip tickets were in use, the fare per revenue journey
has exceeded 5 cents since 1895.
Citizens should not delude themselves into the belief that the average fare is only 5 cents
now, and that it will be only 5 cents with the City as a partner in the enterprise, notwithstanding
that it may be so agreed upon and stated in the lease, because they must pay the full fare in
one shape or another, whatever it may be. The mere fact that the rider does not pay it on the
car should not blind him to the fact that the cost of service must be and always is paid in full in
some way.
✓
The Five-Cent Fare Policy.
It becomes necessary for the City to lend its credit in financing a public utility, in which
the income does not meet the cost of service, only because the City can transfer the resulting
loss to the citizens through taxation. The citizens bear the burden of loss in either case. The
Company, not having the resource of public taxation, would face bankruptcy under the same
conditions.
In the case of port development, where the City is in competition with other cities for
foreign and domestic shipping and where many factors in the problem are external to the city
and not in its control, there may well be City aid in its development. The transit problem,
however, is an internal problem, of local interest only-a monopoly of local transportation wholly
within the City's control, and containing within itself all the means needed for its solution.
No financial aid need be extended by the City if the public insistence upon the 5-cent fare be
temporarily abandoned.
As shown elsewhere in this report, should the comprehensive system be built at a cost of
say $60,000,000 and be in operation in 1921, as per Plan No. 16 of the 1915 Annual Report of
the Department of City Transit, under the terms assumed, the resulting car fare is estimated
to be about 5.59 cents, which is about 8 per cent. higher than the present fare of 5.166 cents, or
12 per cent. higher than the ideal 5-cent fare.
If the "Progressive Step" program, herein outlined, be adopted, and Steps Nos. 1 and 2 be
in use in 1921, under the same assumptions, the fare required has been estimated at 5.30 cents
-about 3 per cent. increase above the present fare.
All propositions heretofore submitted have been on the assumption that under the lease of
these lines to the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company the City would assume all excess fare
over 5 cents up to the limit of full interest and sinking fund on the bonds issued for the con-
struction of the lines, thereby paying about 12 per cent. of the car fares of the riders in 1921.
Should the City-built lines be leased on a basis of a 5-cent flat fare (as collected on the
cars) with universal transfers, the annual loss resulting is estimated to be in 1921, for the com-
plete system:
9
59
100
cents × 555,000,000 passengers=$3,275,000,
or, on the program herein outlined:
30
100
་
cents X 555,000,000 passengers=$1,665,000.
As these losses (which include the compensation to the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Com-
pany for loss of revenue due to the abolishment of the 8-cent exchange tickets) must be borne
by the City up to the limit of the full interest and sinking fund charges, all plans heretofore
have proposed that the City shall meet them by a tax on real estate.
It may be assumed that this will require an increase in 1921 of say 12 per cent. for the
complete system, or perhaps 5 per cent. for the smaller system. Why should this be done?
Why should not the City insert in the lease of the lines a clause providing for fare adjust-
ment to meet the total cost of service which may be outlined as follows:
"Before the operation of any part of the complete system of rapid transit lines is
begun the question of the proper fare to be charged in order to meet the cost of the ser-
vice rendered shall be reviewed and its proper amount determined by the Public Service
Commission of the State of Pennsylvania, and the Lessee and the Department of City Tran-
sit shall work out the details. This fare, when adjusted, shall be subject to reduction when
cost of service warrants.'
The probable fare required can only be approximately estimated now, as it will be affected
by the amount of construction authorized during the period of inflated prices.
For example, under such a provision of the lease, for the year 1921 and thereafter until
the cost of service warrants a readjustment in the City's tax, the fare, if the complete system
be in operation as per Plan No. 16 of the 1915 Annual Report of this Department, will aver-
age:
5.166¢ (Lessee's present fare) + 0.425¢ (City Tax)=5.591¢ per complete journey.
or, if Steps Nos. 1 and 2 only of the complete plan be in use, the fare will average:
5.30¢ per complete journey.
5.166¢ (Lessee's present fare) + 0.1344 (City Tax)
The lessee's portion of the fare in this illustration has been taken at the present rate in order
that the loss by abolishment of 8-cent exchanges to the Company may be fully met.
Provision should be made in the lease for the corresponding increase in the City tax por-
tion of the fare as more lines are added. It should be understood that the figures just given
are for illustrating the principle only. The portion of the fare representing the City's tax is
levied to meet the interest on bonds issued to pay for the new rapid transit lines. It should be
collected by the lessee and turned into the City's treasury exactly as in the case of the lease
of the City's gas works. This tax should produce the revenue needed to meet the City's obli-
gations-
0.425¢ X 555,000,000-$2,361,000 Interest and Sinking Fund on $53,082,000 Bonds.
Interest and Sinking Fund on $17,506,000 Bonds.
0.134 555,000,000
$744,000
10

GLEN SIDE
JENKINTOWN
LINE
FOX CHASE
CITY.
OGONTZ AVE.
LINE
CHELTEN AVE
GERMANTOWN
CHESTNUT HILL
AVE
STENTON AVE
CHEW ST
GERMANTOWN
WAYNE
NUT LANE
ROXBOROUGH
RIDGE AVE
MANAYUNK
SCHUYLKILL
GERMANTOWN
SUBWAY-ELEVATED
HENRY
ROUTE OF
NORTHWEST
O GONTZ
OLD YORK RD.
ELEVATED BRANCH
NOT DETERMINED
AVE
MIDVALE
AVE
OAK LANE
1501
5TH ST
CITY
SING SUN LAND
OLNEY AVE OLNEY
FALLS
ALOF
SCHUYLKILL
ALLEGHENY
RIDGE
AVE
LINE
BALA
NORTHWESTERN
SUBWAY-ELEVATED
CITY
OVERBROOK
54 TH
ST.
44TH ST.
RIVER
PARKSIDE AVE.
LOGAN
9TH ST.
CAR STORAGE
ERIE AVE
ROUTE OF
NORTHEAST ELEVATED
BRANCH NOT
DETERMINED
•WARD HIGH S
SURFACE LINE
FRANKFORD
WYOMING AVE.
FRANKFORD
ELEVATED
KENSINGTON
AVE
TO NAWN 37
TORRESDALE AVE
BRIDGE
5T
MARGARET ST
ORTHODOX ST.
RICHMOND ST
LEHIGH AVE.
YORK ST.
DAUPHIN ST.
COLUMBIA AVE.
NORTH BROAD
STREET SUBWAY
FAIRMOUNT
AVE.
KENSINGTON
CUMBERLAND ST
SUSQUEHANNA AV
BERKS ST
GIRARD
AVE
AVE
SOMERSET ST.
HUNTINGDON ST
CUMBERLAND ST
NORRIS ST.
RIVER
PETTY'S ISLAND
29TH ST.
PRESENT
MARKET ST.
GREEN ST
SP. GARDEN 51
SUBWAY
ST
CHESTNUT ST.
69TH ST
PRESENT
MARKET ST
ELEVATED
60TH ST
GIRARD
56TH ST
52 ND ST.
49TH ST
AVE.
LANCASTER
AVE
MARKET
46TH ST
42ND ST.
CHESTER AVE.
40TH ST.
UNION ST
DARBY
58TH ST
LINE
WOODLAND AVE
AVE.
ELMWOOD
ISLAND RD.
RIDGE AVE
FRONT
ST.
WALNUT ST
CAMDEN
TUBE
PRESENT
MARKET ST.
ELEVATED
DELAWARE
SPRUCE ST.
BAINBRIDGE ST.
8TH ST.
+
CATHARINE
ST
ELLSWORTH ST.
FEDERAL ST
WHARTON ST.
1
TASKER ST
MORRIS
ST
SOUTHWESTERN
ELEVATED
SNYDER AVE
ST.
BROAD
OREGON AVE.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
SUBWAY AND ELEVATED LINES SUGGESTED
(Steps 1 and 2 shown in Red)
for
HOYT ST-INDEPENDENT (COMPETITIVE) SYSTEM
LEAGUE ISLAND
and Plan of
THROUGH-ROUTING FOR COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM
ELEVATED
SUBWAY
LEGEND
}
Rapid Transit Lines
EXISTING TRACK Surface Feeders to Rapid Transit Lings
NEW TRACK
EXISTING TRACK
NEW TRACK
Surface Feeders to Present and
Proposed Rapid Transit Lines
Proposed 35th Ward High Speed Surface Line
63RD ST.
SOUTH BROAD
STREET SUBWAY
MAP NO.1
Should not this plan be preferable to any heretofore proposed, and meet all require-
ments of the problem? Under it, as the result of adding about one-half cent to each car fare,
commencing in 1921,
(a) The citizens get any and all lines as and when they order them, the 8-cent ex-
changes are abolished and the tax rate is unaffected by the transit problem,
(b) The City gets its interest and sinking fund charges,
(c) The present rate of fare of the lessee (the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company)
will not be disturbed.
Hence all parties interested should be satisfied.
It will not be attempted here to furnish details as to how this average fare can be secured
practically. That must be left to be solved in connection with the lease of the lines. It should
be arranged justly and equitably and it is entirely feasible. The principle must be settled now.
Shall the real estate taxes be raised 12 per cent. in 1921, or the car fares raised one-half cent?
The interest must be met then if the lines are built.
The question involved is not a moral one of right or wrong-it is a question of expediency,
of determining whether the citizens who enjoy the benefits of a service should pay the full cost
of the service which must always include a proper return upon the value of the plants which
supply it.
The disposition to transfer charges for public utilities is simply an indication of the public.
desire to escape from taxes wherever possible, and results from a fallacious idea that a trans-
ferred tax is an averted tax.
In order to make this report absolutely clear and prevent any misunderstanding of the
figures and facts given herein, I desire to emphasize the following statement, which appears in
substance in other places in this report:
All the subway and elevated lines included in the "Taylor Plan," with only such changes
as I have suggested regarding the City Hall section and the loop, can be built and the two
systems unified without any increase in the tax rate, if the people are willing to pay an aver-
age fare estimated not to exceed 53 cents commencing in 1921, which will take care of the
City's interest and sinking fund charges. This fare may be reduced gradually until it
reaches 5 cents about 1960.
Elsewhere in this report is explained the alternative-the effect on the tax rate if the fare
be not raised.
Independent Operator of City's Lines.
As stated elsewhere, this and all previous reports made by the Department have assumed
and recommended that the existing and the new systems be operated in combination.
should such a result finally be found to be impossible or inexpedient, for reasons financial
or otherwise, an alteration of routing will be desirable as the lines will then be operated in com-
petition with the existing system and not as a supplement to it.
Map No. 1 shows the suggested arrangement for a competitive system. The map clearly
shows that a system of this kind would work great damage to the existing system but that it
could later be used to supplement that system. By the general law of economics the new lines,
though originally leased to an independent operator, will probably at some time be unified with
the existing system.
11
Burden Not Realized Now.
A seductive feature of the present financial plans for the construction of the rapid transit
lines is found in the proposal to issue City bonds under the provisions of the recent Act pro-
viding for a life of 50 years, the payment of the interest and sinking fund charges during the
period of construction, and one year thereafter, out of the proceeds of the bonds themselves, and
a gradual sinking fund-all features expected and intended to place as much of the burden as
possible on posterity. The seductive feature is in the fact that the burden will not be real-
ized until possibly four years after the lines are authorized.
Legal Questions Not Discussed.
It is not my purpose in this report to try to pass on or discuss the legal phases of the au-
thorization by City Councils of the lines covered in the Ordinance of July 2, 1915, and the loan
bill approved June 30, 1915, or to discuss how they may be affected by the conditions and limita-
tions named therein, or to argue the point as to whether such limitations were right and proper
from other standpoints. I shall leave that to be determined by the proper authorities, who will
take such action in regard to it as they deem best. This matter must be passed on by the
Public Service Commission in any event. In this report I have made my recommendations
along lines which I regard as sound and businesslike and with full regard to the responsibilities
devolving on the taxpayers by reason of the cost of this undertakng. No section of the city
has been intentionally favored at the expense of others. Naturally and properly each section
aims to secure the best transit facilities obtainable to serve its people. In suggesting means to
meet the transit needs of the entire city, I have been guided by the respective urgency of these
needs and have formulated a schedule of construction for transit development which will event-
ually serve all sections of the city and not to impose an unprofitable liability on the taxpayers
or undue burden upon the car riders. (See note and City Solicitor's opinion-Appendix C.)
Data Forming Basis of this Report.
The technical data upon which this report is based are the same as those upon which pre-
vious reports of this Department have been based.
General Principles.
As it is very desirable to make a municipally-owned rapid transit system a commercially
successful business proposition, or as nearly self-supporting as possible, in order to avoid the
alternative of making up from general taxation the deficit in the City's bond interest and sink-
ing fund, it becomes most essential to observe in the design of the system certain principles
which may be fairly regarded as axiomatic.
These principles may be briefly stated as follows:
1. Locate rapid transit lines in general along direct routes where the congestion has be-
come too great for surface lines to run at fair speed and to properly take care of the traffic;
the main object of rapid transit lines in a unified system is to supplement the surface car
service by removing therefrom a large part of the passenger traffic and placing this traffic
above or below the street level where, being free from interference with other traffic, much
higher speed can be maintained and larger and heavier trains operated.
12
2. Construct each line in progressive steps, completing the most urgently needed section
first and adding extensions or branches only as their necessity or feasibility is demonstrated.
3. Plan the system as a comprehensive whole conforming to the ideal plan as nearly as
local conditions permit and with the underlying idea of operating all trains on the principle of
through-routing as far as possible, as this is now universally conceded to be the proper method
of operation. Avoid the so-called "looping" method of operation wherever possible.
4. Construct the minimum amount of subway line, as this is the most expensive form of
construction and hence carries the highest interest charge per mile. As a corollary of this, sub-
ways should be built only where no other form can be used or accepted on account of high
property damages resulting from the use of any other form, or for esthetic reasons, or where
some special or peculiar conformation of the streets makes a subway imperative.
5. Construct rapid transit lines to such points only in the outlying districts as will pro-
vide sufficient traffic to load the lines to an economical amount. Beyond such points the traffic
should be carried by either surface lines or by other cheaper forms of high-speed construction.
6. Locate rapid transit lines in the business district so they will act as channels through
which the main traffic flow between the residential and business districts may be conveyed with-
out confusion or congestion, and so as to require a minimum of transferring to reach the rider's
destination.
7. Utilize existing surface car facilities to the fullest extent possible and supplement them
by high-speed surface extensions into the suburbs, located on wide streets or private right-of-
way so as to provide economically for the development of the territory adjacent or tributary
to the rapid transit lines.
In my judgment, some of the plans and recommendations offered in the 1915 Annual Re-
port of this Department by my predecessor should be modified in accordance with the fore-
going principles.
While it would be much easier to accept such plans and recommendations as promulgated
than to convince the public that it is desirable from their standpoint to make alterations in them,
I believe it will be to the City's interest financially and to the general welfare of the passen-
gers on these lines to make certain modifications which will tend to expedite construction, re-
duce the cost of construction and operation, and also facilitate traffic movement to a greater
degree than the plans formerly recommended.
The general location of the main radial lines cannot be improved and such lines will serve
the City's needs adequately for many years to come, but the arrangement of the loop or ter-
minal tracks in the delivery or business district of the City I believe to be capable of improve-
ment so as to permit a more economical use of the City's streets and a more efficient method
of through-routing the rapid transit trains.
Also, for financial reasons, I do not favor the construction program as outlined,-as a busi-
ness project it should be broken into progressive steps to allow the City and the lessee intervals
of time in which to digest and assimilate each addition to the system.
The Financial Difficulties of the Problem of City-Owned Lines.
Rapid transit problems have developed in all large cities as one of the penalties that they
must pay for bigness or for over-size.
Usually no such problem exists until the city reaches 500,000 population, or its residential
section extends more than three miles from the business district.
2
13
The difficulty of financing rapid transit propositions is that they must be built originally
with train and passenger capacity largely in excess of the existing needs. They do not increase
the total volume of riding in a city to any great extent and the greater part of their traffic
is taken from other lines from which they draw by virtue of providing better, quicker or more
frequent service, or of providing satisfactory service at a lower fare.
The Germantown district today is served by two direct lines of surface cars from the center
of the city, and by two steam roads giving frequent service. The complaint from this district
is that the surface cars are too slow and on the steam cars the service is too infrequent and
the fare is too high. What is desired by these residents is the quick and comfortable service
of the steam roads at the 5-cent fare limit together with the frequent service of the surface
roads. This is equivalent to an improvement of service, and a fare reduction at the same time.
The problem which the City is attempting to solve seems to have but two answers—either a
higher unit fare than 5 cents per passenger, or the City must assist the operator of the lines
by assuming at the start a large share of the interest charges on the rapid transit system.
Why Does the City Engage in this Experiment?
Because the proposed rapid transit lines are not attractive to private capital.
A city is an assemblage of people organized for the purpose of securing the benefits-
social and commercial-of combined service and effort. A city will continue to grow so long
as the conditions of life therein are acceptable and inviting. Such growth calls for a larger
land area for residential purposes each year, and such land is now located chiefly in the city's
suburbs. New and suburban development causes a diversion of tenants, especially from the
older and less desirable sections of the city, to those new sections where they can obtain for
the same or less rent more desirable surroundings. The newer and suburban districts prosper
at the expense of the older parts of the city lying between the first and fourth mile zones.
Rapid transit lines do not directly affect the growth of a city, as this growth is from two
sources:
ated.
1. By accretions from without, and
2. By increase of population from within.
These lines shift population and traffic from one district to another more favorably situ-
The population of a city consists of people who are engaged in commercial or mercantile
industries or manufacturing, either as employers or employees, and the transit facilities of a
city are primarily not for pleasure purposes, but to convey the population between their homes
and their work, or between their homes and trading points.
As the main city grows constantly on the outer fringe it will be found that building de-
velopment usually follows close upon the introduction of so-called city improvements (grading
of streets, sewerage, water and gas supply, etc.).
Surface transit facilities in the past, while such development was within the four-mile
circle, have usually kept pace fairly well with the demands, but as the residential area is being
pushed farther and farther from the city's center there is more reluctance on the part of the
street car companies to follow the development. Further, as the distance traveled daily by
riders increases, more need is felt for quicker transit than surface lines can provide. This has
produced a demand which the present Company in Philadelphia is not able to assume the fin-
ancial burden of supplying. This fact only has brought the City face to face with the prob-
14
lem which it is proposed to solve by the City lending its credit and assuming liability for in-
terest on the cost of constructing such facilities.
Rapid transit lines, while in general providing for the comfort and convenience of the
traveling public, have also a commercial side.
Such rapid transit lines as have been built in the past were originated as business ven-
tures with the primary view of making money for their builders. In very few cases, however,
have the expectations of the original builders or promoters been realized.
Why Called an Experiment?
This enterprise upon which the City has embarked has been called an experiment; it may
be asked why is it considered an experiment?
It is a test on a large or working scale of an untried combination of elements to ascertain
the truth or practicability of the principles underlying the combination.
In no other city, particularly one with the population and covering the area of Philadel-
phia, has it been attempted to combine and unify the operation of surface and rapid transit
systems, giving free interchanges at all points of intersection, on a 5-cent fare, the routes
and extensions being under the control of a councilmanic body, and it being tentatively assumed
that all the burden of the construction of the system shall constitute the city's liability—no
guarantee by company to protect city from loss.
The transportation system in Boston resembles what is contemplated for Philadelphia
more nearly than that of any other city. But in Boston the program has been so arranged
that the facilities have been added gradually over a 20-year period, and the entire burden car-
ried by the Boston Elevated Railway Company. Up to 1915 not one dollar of the City's money
has been used to make up deficits in the City's interest due to lack of income.
The New York leases under the "dual system" resemble what is here proposed, but in New
York no attempt has been made to secure a unified system. In the New York territory are
three high-speed systems and four surface systems operating independently. The results in
Boston are not satisfactory to the lessee company, but appear to be to the City.
In New York City the "dual system" will not be in use for some months at least, so it is
too early to judge results.
Main Issues.
The real issue to be decided is not "Shall the Broad Street Line stop temporarily at Erie
Avenue and at Spruce Street?" but the much larger issues, "Shall this undertaking be handled
on a business or a political basis; shall the City build according to its necessities or according
to unwarranted sectional demands; shall Councils be guided by the advice of its Director of
Transit (or a board of capable and locally disinterested men), or by the demands of aggressive
and energetic citizens, actuated by local interests?"
The City has reached the parting of the ways-it must make a decision now as to the under-
lying principles and policies which are to govern.
15
A STUDY OF THE RAPID TRANSIT PROBLEM IN PHILADELPHIA
WITH
SUGGESTIONS FOR ITS PROPER DEVELOPMENT
SUMMARY OF REPORT.
The purpose of this Report upon the Rapid Transit Problem in the City of Philadelphia
is to call attention to certain features which I regard as unwise and inexpedient in the con-
struction and financial programs for the vast undertaking upon which the City has taken the
initial steps, and to present suggestions as to construction and the methods of financing the
construction cost and deficits from operation in interest charges that should effect (a) economy
in its construction, (b) a proper conservation of City funds and revenue, and (c) an improve-
ment in the service of the system.
The program upon which the City has entered is fully set forth in the report of this De-
partment for the year 1915, which contemplates and recommends the immediate construction
of a comprehensive system of rapid transit lines extending into several outlying districts of the
city, involving on the City's part an initial investment of $56,000,000 or more of City funds
for construction (in addition to private funds for equipment), and requiring annually an ad-
ditional investment from City revenue to meet deficits in interest charges.
This report is not to promulgate a new plan of routes or lines, and it clearly sets forth
the fact that in the general routes and extent of the lines as laid down in all former reports
between the suburbs and the business center of the city no change is suggested as they are not
open to criticism. A change of lines and of location of stations within the business district is
suggested for reasons fully given.
It assumes that everyone will admit that this comprehensive system is intended to take care
of the growth of Philadelphia for forty years to come-a metropolitan Philadelphia with
3,000,000 population.
It assumes, as all previous reports have done, that whenever and whatever rapid transit
lines are built, they will be operated by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, the surface
and rapid transit lines being operated as a unified system.
It also clearly shows that the extent of the financial burden resulting from the construc-
tion and operation of this system will depend directly on the answers to the following questions
in which every citizen is financially interested, either directly or indirectly:
(a) What lines shall be built?
(b) How far shall they be built from the center of the city?
(c) When shall they be built?
(d) Who shall pay for them?
(e) Shall lines to develop suburban property be built with City's funds; or shall the
property benefited share in the cost?
(f) Who shall operate them?
17
(g) Upon what terms shall they be leased?
(h) How shall deficits in City's interest charges on bonds be met?
(i) Shall the burden be put upon the City taxes on real estate and personal property,
or upon the car rider?
(j) If deficits are to be met out of the City revenue, what effect will it have on the tax
rate?
(k) If deficits are to be met by an increase in fare to the car rider, shall it be a uniform
increase, or shall the riders on the rapid transit lines only pay the increase?
(1) Why should the City engage in this experiment in transportation?
(m) Why is this called an experiment?
All these questions are fully discussed in the body of the report with a view to explaining
some points not clearly brought out in former reports and discussions of this experimental
undertaking upon which the City has now embarked.
It assumes what all previous reports have shown-that the operation of the unified system
will not produce sufficient net income to meet the requirements of the operator and the City's
interest and sinking fund, thereby creating a deficit in the City's account.
It shows what causes these deficits, of what they are made up, and suggests methods of
meeting them.
It shows that the average fare per journey on the present system is in excess of five
cents, and that five cents flat is inadequate to furnish the required net income.
It lays down the general principles on which rapid transit lines should be designed,
and also contains a general discussion of rapid transit in modern cities, showing what
would constitute an ideal system of unified operation, and shows the true function of surface
and rapid transit lines in unified and competitive operation. It discusses at length the proper
distribution of the burden which will result to the City from the operation of this system, and
suggests methods of financing which should serve to check unwarranted expansion of the system
and which should reduce the operating deficits.
Two appendices are added treating on the principle of assessing the cost of public im-
provements upon the territory receiving the benefit of such improvements.
The features of the City's present program which I regard as unwise and inexpedient
consist of:
1. The undertaking of the whole construction program at once during an era of abnor-
mally high prices and before the operator of the system has been determined upon, and before
settlement upon the terms of a lease for the operation of the lines upon their completion.
2. The financing entirely by City funds, of the construction of branch lines in suburban
or undeveloped districts where the traffic will for many years be inadequate to warrant such
outlay.
3. The diversion from the City's treasury of revenue from the general tax funds for
the payment of deficits in interest and sinking fund charges on City bonds issued to pay for
the construction of the system.
4. The location of certain lines and stations within the business district and the conse-
quent method of routing trains.
18
The suggested improvements in the program are:
1. That the terms on which a comprehensive system of rapid transit lines can be leased
to an operator be ascertained, and that no more construction than is now authorized be under-
taken until it is definitely known by whom the entire system is to be operated and upon what
terms.
2. Divide the comprehensive plan of routes into two parts (see Map No. 5):
(a) The sections forming the trunk lines, in and through the 25-minute street car zone
from City Hall. These lines to be considered as terminals and trunk lines, and
being for the general benefit of the city as a whole they should be financed on
City bonds.
(b) All extensions and branches of such lines into outlying or suburban territory are to
be considered as for local benefit chiefly, and the cost of construction of such ex-
tensions and branches should be borne by the property in the territory served by
them. As legal authority for such method of financing these extensions is lacking,
it is suggested in this report that proper laws be passed at the next Legislature to
empower the City to make use of this method at its option. Extensions to the
trunk system will not become necessities immediately, and as even the trunk sys-
tem will not be ready for use under three years from date, ample time is available
for obtaining such legislation. (See Opinion of City Solicitor-Appendix C.)
3.
Construct at this time of abnormally high prices only such portion of the trunk lines
as may be considered the necessary and terminal sections, viz.: Part of the Broad Street Subway
and the Frankford Elevated-the subway to extend from Spruce Street to Erie Avenue or
Pike Street with a line on Walnut Street from Sixteenth Street to Eighth Street, on Eighth
Street to Race Street and, by the opening of Ridge Avenue between Eighth and Ninth Streets,
on Ridge Avenue from Race Street to Broad Street, the line from Ridge Avenue to Pike Street
to be 4-track and the remainder 2-track. The Frankford Elevated to terminate for the present
at Bridge Street. All terminals to be considered temporary only, and sequence of construc-
tion of the remainder of the trunk routes to be the subject of later determination as conditions
warrant.
It is suggested that there be two tracks only in Broad Street at Market Street, and that
the City Hall Station be located just north of City Hall instead of under it, thereby bringing the
platforms much nearer the surface of the street, and greatly lessening the cost of construction,
and separating this station further from the Chestnut Street Station, and reducing congestion
at City Hall. (See Maps Nos. 6 and 7.)
4. Construct at such later dates and to such extent and in such sequence as they may be
properly authorized, the remainder of the comprehensive system of lines needed and now contem-
plated.
5. Take steps to obtain the necessary legislation to empower the City to finance the con-
struction of the extensions by means of bonds, the interest on which can be met by local assess-
ment on the property in the districts served. (See Opinion of City Solicitor-Appendix C.)
This report endeavors to make clear that the fundamental issues involved in this problem
now before the people are not personal, but municipal.
19
These issues are:
1. Shall the City in return for the burden it assumes receive a fraction of the financial
profits which will result from these lines; or shall these benefits all flow toward the enrichment
of a small number of suburban land owners and operators in real estate?
2. Shall the City embark in a vast experiment in city transportation gradually and with
fair business caution; or shall it provide the facilities now for two generations ahead and assume
the increased liabilities which result?
3. Shall the burden of deficits be placed on the property of the citizens in the shape of
an increase of taxes? or,
4. Shall this burden be placed in part at least on the ones benefited; namely, on the car
riders by an increase of fare?
These questions must be answered by every citizen for himself-upon him alone rests the
responsibility for the results of the decision.
20
A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PLANS FOR RAPID TRANSIT
DEVELOPMENT IN PHILADELPHIA, 1913-1916
On May 27, 1912, the Hon. Rudolph Blankenburg, then Mayor of Philadelphia, appointed
Mr. A. Merritt Taylor, a man of vision, constructive ability and experience in railroad
operation and finance, as Transit Commissioner, "to investigate the problems of improved tran-
sit facilities for Philadelphia, with a view of determining advisable means for obtaining rapid,
efficient and cheap transit throughout the city and its suburbs by the use of subways or other
approved modern methods, to consider fully the question of public and private ownership and
the financial and economic aspects of the problem, * * * to recommend ways and means
whereby efficient and rapid transit commensurate with the present and future needs of the
entire city and its suburbs may be secured within a reasonable number of years.
The report which resulted from this appointment was issued in July, 1913, and constituted
the original "Taylor Plan" of rapid transit development for Philadelphia and vicinity.
On July 1, 1913, Mr. Taylor was appointed Director of the Department of City Transit.
This Department was organized in compliance with the Act of Legislature, approved May 9,
1913. The Act creating this Department provides that "The Director shall from time to time
make such recommendations to the Councils of said cities, as to him shall seem proper, for the
improvement and development of the facilities for transportation of persons and property
within said cities."
In accordance with this mandate, several reports were issued by the Department of City
Transit during the period ending December, 1915.
Outline of the Case.
The latest plans for transit development in Philadelphia, popularly known as the "Taylor
Plans," comprise the following salient elements:
(a) A proposal that the City shall supply all funds for construction of a comprehensive
system of rapid transit lines to supplement the present system.
(b) A recognition of the fact that City Councils shall determine when and where such
lines shall be built and how financed.
(c) A proposal that the City-built lines shall be leased to the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company, for operation in connection with the present system, with free transfers.
(d) A proposal to lease the City-built lines to an independent operator if a satisfactory
lease with the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company cannot be secured.
(e) A proposal that the lessee shall supply all funds needed for the equipment of the
City-built lines and for all extensions of the surface system.
(f) A proposal that the fare per journey as paid on the cars shall be 5 cents only.
(g) A proposal that the City shall transfer all excess of cost of service over the revenue
derived from a 5-cent fare to the real estate taxes of the City, up to the full cash requirements.
of its bond interest and sinking fund.
(h) The assumption that the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company will be the operator
of the entire system.
21
(i) A modification of the "Contract of 1907" between the City and the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company, with an extension of scope.
Elements (b), (f) and (g) contain the dangerous features of the program-(b) because
it recognizes a political control of what is a highly complex business problem in transportation,
and (f) and (g) because they are fallacious in principle and socialistic in theory.
Former Taylor Plans Analyzed.
In speaking of the "Taylor Plan" there seems to be a general impression in the minds of
the public that it is something fixed and unalterable; a perfect conception, and therefore not sub-
ject to improvement. In order to show that the "Taylor Plan" of December, 1915, differs very
considerably from the plan promulgated in the Transit Commissioner's Report of 1913, I sub-
mit the following comparative statement showing the changes that were made in the plan year
after year. Elsewhere in this report will be found explanations of some of the changes, and
this introduction is for the purpose of making clear that it is a review of the different "Taylor
Plans" indicating some of the defects which have become evident with later study, and making
suggestions for further improvement. This report may be regarded as a fourth edition of those
plans. (See Statement 1.)
If the comparative statement of the original and the final "Taylor Plans" be analyzed it
will be found that running through them are certain fundamental elements (see Statement 3):
1. The comprehensive program of construction of lines radiating from the center of the
city into the outlying districts.
2. A financial plan using the City's credit to a greater or less extent for the purpose of
financing different portions of the system.
3. A unified system of operation in connection with the existing system, the assumed basis
being in all cases a lease of the City-built lines and a uniform fare over the entire city.
4. The elimination of the 8-cent exchanges and the substitution for them of free transfers.
This was not mentioned in the original "Taylor Plan" and has been developed during the nego-
tiations made in the attempt to secure unified operation under a modification of the 1907 Con-
tract.
In each of the plans the equipment of the City-built lines is assumed to be furnished by
the lessee of the lines.
Taylor Plans-Comparison of Previous Recommendations.
A comparison of the recommendations of the Report of 1913 with the Report of 1915 shows
that the City's credit, which at first was to be used to the extent of about $35,000,000 for the
construction of the Broad Street Line with branches and Delivery Loop only, has expanded to
over $60,000,000, now covering the entire construction of a more comprehensive system than
was contemplated in 1913, as the 1915 plans include the 29th Street-Roxborough Line and the
high-speed surface line in the 35th Ward, which were not a part of the original recommenda-
tions.
Furthermore, the elevated parts of the system, which were originally expected to be built
and owned by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company are in the later plans to be built and
owned by the City and operated by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company under the gen-
eral lease.
22
TAYLOR PLANS ANALYZED
STATEMENT 1
COMPARISON OF RESULTS BASED ON RECOMMENDATIONS-REPORTS OF TRANSIT COMMISSIONER AND DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
LINES, ETC.
North Broad Street Line
South Broad Street Line
Delivery Loop
Frankford Line
Darby Line
OPERATION BY PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY ASSUMED
ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION 1913
TRANSIT COMMISSIONER'S REPORT
To be built by City.
4-track subway in North Broad
Street to Pike Street only with
two elevated branches.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
To be built by City.
2-track subway in South Broad
Street to Bigler Street and
depressed tracks Bigler Street
to Government Avenue.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
To be built by City.
2-track subway in Arch, Eighth,
Walnut and Fifteenth Streets.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
To be built by Lessee.
2-track elevated Arch Street to
Bridge Street only.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
To be built by Lessee.
2-track elevated Thirtieth and
Market Streets to Ninth and
Main Streets, Darby.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
1914 ANNUAL REPORT
No change from 1913 Recom-
mendations.
No change from 1913 Recom-
mendations.
To be built by City.
2-track subway in Arch, Eighth
and Locust Street and 4-track
subway in Broad Street and
beneath City Hall.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
To be built by City.
Other recommendations same as
in 1913.
To be built by City.
Other recommendations same as
in 1913.
1915 ANNUAL REPORT
To be built by City.
4-track subway in North Broad
Street to Pike Street with 2-
track subway to Olney Avenue
with elevated branch on North-
east Boulevard and subway-
elevated branch to German-
town.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
No change from 1913 Recom-
mendations.
No change from 1914 Recom-
mendations.
To be built by City.
2-track elevated Arch Street to
Rhawn Street.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
No change in 1914 Recommenda-
tions.
SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REPORT
To be built by City.
4-track subway Pike Street to
Ridge Avenue.
2-track subway Ridge Avenue to
Spruce Street.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee. Extension Pike Street
to Olney Avenue to be built by
City with funds raised by local
assessment.
To be built to Oregon Avenue by
City at date undetermined. Ex-
tension beyond Oregon Avenue
to be built by City with funds
raised by local assessment.
To be built by City in lieu of Loop
to serve business district. 2-
track subway in Ridge Avenue,
Eighth Street and Walnut
Street.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
To be built by City.
2-track elevated Arch Street to
Bridge Street. Equipment to be
furnished by Lessee. Extension
Bridge to Rhawn Streets to be
built by City with funds raised
by local assessment.
To be built by City via Federal
Street and Woodland Avenue to
City Line at date undetermined.
Extensions beyond City limits
to be built with funds raised by
local assessment.
23
(Continued on next page.)
LINES, ETC.
Northwest Line
Chestnut Street Line
35th Ward High-Speed
Surface Line
Camden Tube
TAYLOR PLANS ANALYZED-Continued
ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION 1913
TRANSIT COMMISSIONER'S REPORT
Considered as a future line with
terminal in a separate loop
via Vine, Eleventh, Locust and
Seventeenth Streets.
Discussed and recommended to
be built by City, when Market
Street Line reaches capacity,
assumed as 1928.
Discussed and assumed that it
will be constructed at future
time by private capital.
1914 ANNUAL REPORT
Recommended to be built by
City subsequent to the Delivery
Loop.
2-track subway beneath Parkway
with elevated line on Twenty-
ninth Street, Henry Avenue
and Ridge Avenue to Roxbor-
ough.
Recommended to be built by City
when Market Street Line
reaches capacity, assumed as
1925.
Recommended and assumed as
constructed at same time as
other lines by private capital
for P. R. T. use. Surplus re-
sulting used for credit against
preferential.
$45,582,000 (C)
11,996,000
1915 ANNUAL REPORT
To be built by City.
2-track subway beneath Parkway
with elevated line on Twenty-
ninth Street, Henry Avenue
and Ridge Avenue to Roxbor-
ough.
Equipment to be furnished by
Lessee.
No change in 1914 Recommenda-
tions.
To be built (including track) by
City.
High-speed surface line on pri-
vate right-of-way in Thirty-
fifth Ward from Bridge Street
to Byberry.
No change in 1914 Recommenda-
tions.
$63,500,000 (A)
15,206,000 (B)
STATEMENT 1
SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REPORT
To be built to Twenty-ninth and
Hunting Park Avenue by City at
date undetermined. Extensions
beyond Hunting Park Avenue to
be built by City with funds
raised by local assessment.
Discussed but no date fixed for
construction. Only recom-
mended under certain contin-
gencies.
To be built by City with funds
raised by local assessment.
Recommended but not considered
as built.
$31,600,000 (G)
6,961,000 (G)
24
Note:
$9,563,100 (Deficit) (F)
$21,283,700 (Deficit) (F)
13,203,100 (Deficit) (F)
1,865,900 (Deficit)
Northwest line not in-
cluded in estimates of equip-
ment or City deficits shown
above.
(Concluded on next page.)
Note:
24,923,700 (Deficit) (F)
2,655,200 (Deficit)
Germantown Branch of
Broad Street Subway and Thir-
ty-fifth Ward Line not included
in estimates of equipment or
City deficits shown above.
$4,191,400 (Deficit) (F)
4,191,400 (Deficit) (F)
815,200 (Deficit)
City's Investment to 1923
Lessee's Initial Invest-
ment
Deficit to City as shown
in Report to 1930, in-
clusive
Actual deficit ta City
Treasury to 1930, in-
clusive (D)
Maximum Annual Deficit
to City Treasury (D)
$34,682,000
22,896,000
$5,225,600 (Surplus) (E)
5,994,400 (Deficit) (E)
1,280,100 (Deficit)
LINES, ETC.
Transfers
Exchange tickets
How Operated.
Conditions of Lease
Assumed beginning of
Operation
TAYLOR PLANS ANALYZED-Concluded
ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 1913
TRANSIT COMMISSIONER'S REPORT
Beyond Three Mile Limit.
Continued as at present.
Company not protected against
loss from competition.
of transfer passengers divided
on passenger mileage basis.
Fares
Lessee allowed 6 per cent. on in-
vestment.
Frankford and Darby 1918;
Broad Street and Loop 1919
Chestnut 1928.
1914 ANNUAL REPORT
At all intersecting points.
Eliminated.
Company's net income prior to
operation of City-owned lines
(except that derived from sale
of exchange tickets) guaran-
teed against loss from compe-
tition of high-speed lines.
Fares of transfer passengers
divided equally between City-
owned and Company-owned
lines.
Lessee allowed 6 per cent. on in-
vestment.
Frankford and Camden 1918;
Darby 1919; Broad and Loop
1920; Chestnut 1925.
1915 ANNUAL REPORT
At all intersecting points.
Eliminated.
Preferential payment to protect
Lessee against loss from diver-
sion of traffic based on actual
cash investment of Union Trac-
tion Company and Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company. Taxes
for paving and dividends
abated, Company to resume
payments beginning at $100,000
per year in 1921 and increas-
ing progressively at rate of
$100,000 per year up to limit
of liability under 1907 Con-
tract.
Other particulars same as given
for 1914.
Frankford 1918; Darby and Cam-
den 1919; Broad and Loop
1920; Northwest 1923; Chest-
nut 1925. Germantown Branch
and Thirty-fifth Ward Line not
considered in estimates of defi-
cits shown above.
STATEMENT 1
SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REPORT
At all intersecting points.
Eliminated.
Same as shown in 1914 Annual
Report.
Frankford
1920.
1918; North Broad
25
(A) Does not include Chestnut Street Subway.
(B) Does not include equipment for Germantown Branch of North Broad Street Subway, Chestnut Street Subway or Thirty-fifth Ward High-Speed Line.
(C) Does not include cost of construction for accommodation of Parkway Subway or Northwest Line.
(D) No account taken of Personal Property Tax assumed in former reports as income to City in aid of rapid transit development.
(E) 1914 to 1930, inclusive.
(F)
1918 to 1930, inclusive.
(G) Steps 1 and 2 of modified construction program.
STATEMENT 3
COMPARISON OF FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE DIFFERENT TAYLOR PLANS.
Original ideas and assumptions (1913):
1915 ideas and assumptions:
The present suggestions are:
speed lines:
1. To construct a limited system of three rapid 1. To construct a comprehensive system of 1. Construct a comprehensive system of high-
transit lines gradually-one subway, City-
owned and built, and two elevated lines
built and owned by the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company.
2. To execute agreement between City and Phil- 2.
adelphia Rapid Transit Company for
construction of elevated lines, equipment
of elevated and subway lines, and lease
of subway with scope sufficient to pro-
vide for future lines.
rapid transit lines now, on the City's
credit with the construction program sub-
ject only to such political, legal and acci-
dental delays as may develop.
To permit no delay in construction of the
lines in order to secure a Lessee of them;
this idea being that as better transit facili-
ties are admittedly needed they should
be constructed anyway:
(a) As evidence of the City's serious in-
tentions.
(b) As a threat of competition with the
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Com-
pany, and thereby influencing
that Company to concede more
favorable terms for an operating
lease.
(c) Even without certain knowledge as
to the ultimate cost of these ad-
vantages to the City and on esti-
mates only of the financial operat-
ing results.
(a) Two sections of the central part at
once, on City Bonds.
(b) The balance of the central part
later, on City Bonds.
(c)
The extensions and branches later,
on bonds secured by local assess-
ment.
2. Determine at once if possible, and in any
event before any large amount of addi-
tional construction is begun, the question
of how, by whom and upon what terms
this system shall be operated and what
lines and extensions shall be included in
the scope of the contract.
3. Finance construction of City share on bonds, 3. Finance all construction, (but not equip- 3. Finance all construction costs of central sec-
secured by personal property as per bill
ment) on City bond issue.
of June 17, 1913.
Operator to supply all equipment.
(Concluded on next page.)
tion of the lines on City Bonds, under the
provisions of the recent amendment to the
Pennsylvania State Constitution. Fin-
ance all construction costs for extensions
and branch lines on local bonds secured
by local assessment on property benefited.
Lessee to finance all equipment.
26
STATEMENT 3
COMPARISON OF FUNDAMENTAL FEATURES OF THE DIFFERENT TAYLOR PLANS-Concluded.
Original ideas and assumptions (1913):
4. No deficits in City's interest and sinking
fund charges admitted. Present com-
pany not protected against loss and ex-
change tickets not disturbed.
5. Unified operation with Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company with transfers beyond
the three-mile limit only.
1915 ideas and assumptions:
The present suggestions are:
4. Meet all annual operating deficits in interest 4. Meet all deficits in income to meet interest
5.
and sinking fund charges on bonds, out
of City taxes on real and personal prop-
erty up to the City's legal limit. Beyond
such limit, no provision to be made.
and sinking fund charges on City's
Bonds:
(a) Out of City Revenue, by increase of
taxes, which I cannot endorse, or
(b) By increase of car fares (excess over
existing rate being paid into City
Treasury to apply on deficits).
will equalize charges upon car riders and
provide for proper unified service.
A unified operation of the present system 5. Make such changes in Contract of 1907 as
and the City-built system based on a 5¢
fare and upon terms that will reasonably
protect the net earnings of the present
system.
27
STATEMENT 2
COMPARISON OF THE FINANCIAL FEASIBILITY OF THE RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT
(1)
Complete Taylor
Plan of 1915
(A)
(2)
Lines now au-
thorized by
Councils, and
Delivery Loop
(B)
(3)
Lines included
in Steps 1 and
2 of this
report
City's estimated investment for construction of lines-
bonds
$60,300,000
$48,400,000
$31,600,000
Cumulative deficit in City's interest and sinking fund
charges to 1940__
30,268,300
19,099,400
40,400
Total gross cost to City of systems as of 1940---
$90,568,300
$67,499,400
$31,640,400
Less credit due to sinking fund..
12,220,000
10,621,300
8,495,900
Net cost of system to 1940 (bond and deficit)
$78,348,300
$56,878,100
$23,144,500
City's cumulative deficit as of 1930__
Maximum deficit in any one year--
Year in which deficit disappears---
$20,770,400
$13,907,200
$4,191,400
$2,240,200
$1,676,300
$815,200
1943
1942
1930
Company's initial investment in equipment_-_.
Year in which cumulative deficit is wiped out.
$15,206,000
About 1962
$10,487,000
About 1962
$6,961,000
1940
NOTE:-Entire net income from Camden Tube was used as a credit in Columns 1 and 2, otherwise
deficits shown would be greatly increased. Results shown in Column 3 assume Camden Tube as not built.
This table shows that, owing to the operation of the provision recommended in the tentative form of
lease as to cumulative deficits being repaid out of surplus earnings of system, there will be no surplus to
the Company until near the expiration of the 50-year lease-under all plans except those herein recom-
mended, and any deficit carried over would probably be lost.
(A) The figures shown in this column refer to Plan No. 16 of the 1915 Annual Report and do not include line
to Byberry or Germantown Branch of Broad Street Subway.
(B) The figures in this column refer to Plan No. 8 of 1915 Annual Report and do not include the German-
town Branch.
28
These extensive changes in the construction and financial plans would not be so alarming
were it not for the fact that the assumed basis upon which these lines can be leased throws a
much greater burden upon the City than was contemplated in the Report of 1913, upon which
the City originally decided to act.
The Report of 1913 shows an estimated average rate of return on the entire investment in
rapid transit lines of 4.1 per cent., but these figures were based upon the assumptions (a) that
the exchange tickets would not be disturbed, (b) that transfers to the rapid transit lines.
would not be given within the three-mile limit, (c) that the present system would not be re-
imbursed for losses due to the competition of the rapid transit lines, and (d) that joint revenue
would be divided on a passenger mileage basis.
The forms of lease recommended in 1914 and in 1915 differ radically on all these points,
the last recommendations assuming that the exchange tickets will be wiped out and the Com-
pany compensated by the remittance of taxes sufficient to partially offset the loss. Transfers
are to be granted universally between surface lines, between rapid transit lines, and between
surface and rapid transit lines, and the Company's loss through competition of the rapid tran-
sit lines is to be made up and restored to them to a limited amount from the net earnings of the
rapid transit system before any payment may be made to the City for interest and sinking fund
charges.
As a result of these conditions large annual deficits are estimated to accrue in the City's
interest and sinking fund account. For the City to shoulder these annual deficits, caused by
a deficient net income from the unified system, means a considerable increase in the tax rate.
If the Company shoulders the deficits, as was substantially the case in Boston, it means either
an increase in the fare or the alternative of bankruptcy. Elsewhere in this report it is shown
that even were all excess of capital (commonly called "water") eliminated from the present
system, the complete unified system could not be profitable on the universal 5-cent fare. The
experience of Boston seems to prove this statement conclusively.
Taylor Plans-Comparative Merits of the Former Plans.
An opinion may be given here as to the comparative merits of the original and final rec-
ommendations from the City's standpoint.
Referring first to the original recommendations (Transit Commissioner's Report of 1913)
it may be stated that the general location of the routes recommended cannot be improved. The
location and routing of lines in the business district is not perfect, but this is not a vital
detail. The plan of financing is satisfactory, but the form of lease assumed is highly improb-
able, thereby making the estimated operating results untrustworthy as regards the City's li-
ability, and the financial results from such a lease, while possibly proper from a promoter's
point of view and so compiled as to put the undertaking in the best light, do not show the actu-
ally resulting loss of revenue from the City's treasury.
An examination of the 1915 recommendations shows the result which may always be ex-
pected where a private gain results from an expenditure of the people's money. Lines have
been added to satisfy the demands of property owners and others interested in suburban dis-
tricts, that the City shall assist to develop their property, and the City's credit has been
utilized and its liability increased from $35,000,000 to over $60,000,000.
The form of lease assumed is much more practicable, but under the vast expansion recom-
mended and the alterations in the form of the lease, the deficit to which the City becomes liable
has grown enormously.
3
29
A study of these two plans is very instructive since it shows that without some form of
check by which the burdens which the City assumes in such an improvement can be at least
partially transferred to the parties benefited, there is no limit to the pressure which will be
put upon this Department and City Councils for the development of what are now suburban
districts of the city. This is an exceedingly serious phase, and that it is not imaginary will
be seen by a comparison of the changes in recommendations within the short period of two
years. (See Statements 1, 2, and 3.)
The routes for rapid transit lines and financial plans outlined in the original report,
with the exceptions above noted, can be fully endorsed. The technical data upon which those
recommendations were made are full, accurate and reliable, and these same data when applied
to the recommendations of the 1915 report show that extensions into suburban territory beyond
what was originally recommended cannot be justified on economic grounds.
The Taylor Plan-Its Ideals.
This report must be considered as a fourth edition of the "Taylor Plan," for while not
written by Mr. Taylor, it is written by an engineer upon whom his mantle has fallen; by one
who is in full sympathy with him and who has the same ideals in view. It contains the same
spirit of service and differs from former editions only in the methods as to how the ideals shall
be attained.
Underlying this and the former reports submitted by my predecessor upon transit devel-
opment in Philadelphia is an ideal-A Unified Surface and Rapid Transit System of City
Transportation on a Five-cent Fare Basis, popularly expressed in the slogan: "One City;
One System; One Fare;" a slogan expressing a prophecy and a hope; a sentiment with a main-
spring of service.
It is an ideal difficult of attainment containing both sentimental and commercial elements.
Its realization will not be attained unless the difficulties are understood and overcome.
The difficulties in the way of the unified city result from sectionalism. This is a psycho-
logical element in the ideal which will not be discussed in this report.
The difficulties lying in the way of a unified transportation system are not legal, but
financial; the Contract of 1907 encourages and provides for unified operation.
The difficulties of operating the ideal system profitably on a 5-cent fare seem at present
to be insurmountable. When it is realized that the present system can barely exist on the fare
which during 1915 averaged 5.166 cents per revenue passenger it is difficult to see how the
same system can carry a large additional investment when that investment produces no notice-
able increase of traffic or net profits. (See Diagram No. 6.)
The Taylor Plan-General Defects.
The recommendations made in the former reports are now realized to be defective along
the following lines:
1. The first defect is that they do not contain any elements or features which would
tend to regulate or control the demand that City funds be expended for sectional or private
advantage. Without some form of control there will be no limit to the demands for these
facilities. The experience of Boston extending over a period of twenty years, the exper-
ience of New York over a period of more than ten years, and the sectional attitude already
shown here in the last two years, prove that without some form of control by which the bur-
30
den resulting from unwarranted expansion is placed partially upon the shoulders of those bene-
fited, the ideal aimed at can never be attained.
2. The second defect is the assumption that the civic and social benefits resulting from the
establishment of these lines on a 5-cent fare will warrant the resulting burden being trans-
ferred to the general real estate taxes of the City. This feature is discussed at length elsewhere
in this report.
3. The third defect is in the assumption without question that it is better to carry the
burden by a resulting property tax than by a personal tax in the shape of an adjustment of
the car fare to meet the burden.
Concerning these points this report is intended to be merely suggestive and advisory.
There would seem to be fair grounds that the burden might be equitably divided, that the
car fare might be adjusted so as to carry a portion of the burden, the balance being placed
upon the general real estate of the city or carried by district assessment.
The fact that an ideal is difficult to attain is no reason why that ideal should be aban-
doned. I am heartily in favor of the ideal, and this report is aimed to make such suggestions
as I believe will permit the attainment of as close an approximation to it as is now practi-
cable.
The Taylor Plan-Suggestions for Attaining the Ideal.
While this report contains a number of suggestions, which may or may not be regarded
as desirable or expedient in order to obtain the improved rapid transit facilities, which are
so much desired by all citizens of Philadelphia, it makes but one real recommendation, which is:
That All Citizens Should
(a) Drop personal prejudice in connection with the problem.
(b) Not allow any sentimental elements to obscure the practical elements of the problem.
(c) Show a spirit to consider the proposition fairly and to cheerfully assume burdens in
proportion to benefits.
Loan Bill and Ordinances Under Which Construction was Authorized.
The Contract of 1907 between the City and the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company con-
tained the provision:
"In case at any time in the future Councils shall, either of its own initiative or upon
petition of any of the citizens, determine that new lines of surface, elevated or under-
ground railway should be constructed within the city, it shall, by ordinance, determine
the route of such line, and the terms and conditions under which it shall be built, financed
and operated *
*
* ""
During 1915 a loan was authorized by the people for $6,000,000 toward the construction
of the Frankford Elevated Railway from Front and Arch Streets to Rhawn Street, and the
Broad Street Subway from League Island to Olney Avenue, with the necessary branch lines
northeast and northwest from Broad Street.
31
Councils passed an Ordinance, approved July 2, 1915, defining the route and extent of
these two lines, and making an appropriation of $6,000,000 toward their construction. The or-
dinance however does not specify, as the Contract required, who shall operate these lines and
upon what terms.
In both lines the routes specified are considerably at variance with the recommendations
of the former Director.
In both cases the routes were extended far beyond the limits economically warranted,
thus emphasizing the absolute necessity of some control over the demand that City funds be
expended beyond economic limits for sectional or private advantage.
The legal terms and limitations embodied in these bills may conflict with the economic re-
quirements, but this report does not intend to pass on this point, which is referred to the Law
Department for interpretation.
Present Situation Complicated by Past Mistakes.
The present situation in the transportation problem is complicated as the result of many
errors and mistakes made by legislators in the past. Probably the fundamental mistake was in
granting to the original passenger railways perpetual franchises for the use of the City's streets
with a very indefinite provision for recapture of the privileges. Another mistake was in the City's
requirement of an excessive franchise tax for the electrical equipment of the lines. A funda-
mental mistake was in not recognizing the fact that city transportation is essentially a monop-
oly and not suitable for a competitive business.
Besides these mistakes on the City's side, which are more or less evident in the situation to-
day, bad judgment in financing and in the terms of consolidation of the various lines have pro-
duced a burden on the existing system which it is difficult to eliminate or overcome.
The City's Financial Standing-Improvement which will Result if the Burden be Placed Upon
the Car Riders.
The legislation permitting the City to increase its bonded indebtedness from 7 per cent.
to 10 per cent. of the assessed valuation of real and personal property for the purpose of de-
veloping its port and rapid transit facilities was only granted upon the assumption that these
facilities would be in part at least self-supporting and not result in a large increase in the annual
tax rate. It was supposed that although the City would be the legal owner of any structures
built from the proceeds of these loans, they would be leased or operated so as to produce sufficient
income to make the project self-supporting and not be an additional burden upon the tax
revenue.
This is clearly stated in the law:
"In ascertaining the borrowing capacity of said City of Philadelphia at any time there
shall be excluded from the calculation a credit, where the work resulting from any previous
expenditure for any one or more of the specific purposes herein above enumerated shall be
yielding to said City an annual current net revenue, the amount of which credit shall be
ascertained by capitalizing the annual net revenue during the year immediately preceding
the time of such ascertainment. Such capitalization shall be accomplished by ascertaining
the principal amount which would yield such annual current net revenue at the average
rate of interest and sinking fund charges, payable upon the indebtedness incurred by said
City for such purposes up to the time of such ascertainment. The method of determining
such amount so to be excluded or allowed as a credit may be prescribed by the General As-
sembly."
32
If the contract under which these City-built lines are to be operated shall make provision
for a proper fare adjustment so that the enterprise will be self-supporting and not a burden
on the taxpayers this entire special borrowing capacity amounting to about $69,000,000 at the
present time will be free as far as any transit demands are concerned.
This fact should not be lightly overlooked as it greatly increases the strength of the City's
financial position.
These rapid transit lines are not attractive to the present Company simply because the
nominal 5-cent fare will not produce sufficient revenue to permit them to be financed.
If the fare be adjusted the City's credit need not be utilized at all, and the Frankford
Elevated, which logically should be a part of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company System
and not the City System, may be sold by the City to them at cost and the City money used for
subways only. In the original "Taylor Plan" as shown elsewhere, such ownership was con-
templated.
Financing of the Project.
Under all plans which have been presented to date the funds to pay for construction of
the entire system, except equipment, have been assumed to be provided by the sale of City
bonds, and legislation has been secured permitting the City to increase its indebtedness three
per cent. and to issue fifty-year bonds in place of thirty-year bonds to furnish funds for the
project.
The former Director of this Department requested that a loan of $50,000,000 be authorized
and appropriated for the construction of a comprehensive system, outlined in the 1915 Annual
Report of this Department, a summary of which is given elsewhere in this report.
The recommendation to build all these lines now or presently I cannot endorse for the fol-
lowing reasons:
1. I regard the program as being more comprehensive than is needed to meet the present
demands of the city and suggest that the program of construction be broken into steps, build-
ing the trunk or terminal sections and the most urgently needed portions of the lines only, dur-
ing this time of inflated prices.
2. I suggest that parts of the system for later construction, described elsewhere in this
report, be so financed as to place a portion at least of the resulting burden on the districts
benefited-either by special property tax or by personal tax (adjustment of car fares). (See
Map No. 5.)
There is no objection to the loan of $50,000,000 being authorized, but $35,000,000 only is
advised herein, this being a matter entirely in the hands of Councils and the citizens.
33
THE PRESENT PLANS FOR RAPID TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT
Definition of the Taylor Plans.
It is unfortunate that there exists in the minds of the public a somewhat hazy conception
of just what the "Taylor Plans" comprehend, and an assumption that they are absolutely per-
fect, and if altered in any way it will be to the disadvantage of the City. As stated elsewhere,
the original and the final plans differ radically at many points.
The final and official "Taylor Plans," as they appear in the Annual Report of the De-
partment of City Transit for 1915, are as follows:
"1. A special election should be authorized and held at the earliest date practica-
ble for the purpose of authorizing an increase in the City's indebtedness in the amount
of $50,000,000 for transit development, and in the broadest terms.
"2. Following the special election, appropriations should be promptly made for the
completion of the Broad Street Subway, including the Delivery Loop and elevated branches,
the completion of the Frankford Elevated, and if a satisfactory arrangement be not com-
pleted with the existing system for the operation of the City-built lines, then for the con-
struction of the Chestnut Street Subway to connect the Frankford Elevated Line with the
Woodland Avenue Elevated Line through the business district.
"3. The Woodland Avenue (Darby) Elevated Line should be constructed promptly,
connecting with the Market Street Subway-Elevated Line near Thirtieth Street, and
should be operated in connection with the Market Street Subway-Elevated Line so long
as the capacity of the latter will permit.
"4. Upon the completion of a satisfactory arrangement with the Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company, the Northwest Subway-Elevated Line in the Parkway, Twenty-ninth
Street, Henry Avenue and Ridge Avenue should be undertaken.
"5. A slight change should be made in the alignment of the Broad Street Subway
as before recommended, resulting in a material saving in cost of construction, and at the
same time leaving adequate space for additional subway between Filbert Street and Ridge
Avenue for occupation in the future by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, or such other
line as may be built.
"6. Every effort should be made to conclude a satisfactory agreement with the Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit Company before any expenditures are actually made on the Chest-
nut Street Subway, which will be essential to connect up the two aforesaid elevated lines
for independent operation.
"Prompt action is necessary, however, as the Frankford Elevated will soon be com-
pleted and must not be permitted to stand idle. It must, therefore, be furnished with ter-
minal facilities via Market Street or Chestnut Street.
"The Department has carefully worked up the practical details to be embodied in the
proposed agreement between the City and the Company in a manner whereby the interests
of the City will be properly protected from a practical standpoint.
"The legal points involved should be given careful consideration by the City Solici-
tor, and the document should be carefully gone over from a legal standpoint.
35
"7. The City should secure as quickly as possible all the real estate and real estate
easements necessary for the lines recommended, including the Chestnut Street Subway. The
Chestnut Street Subway will be needed within ten years in order to relieve Market Street,
whatever the method of operation of the City-built lines. It is of particular importance
that such real estate or easements be secured in cases where buildings are likely to be
erected or alterations made which might otherwise add to the cost to the City. All loan
authorizations for transit development should be in such terms that the necessary real es-
tate rights can be obtained thereunder to the best advantage.
"8. The construction of a high-speed line serving the Thirty-fifth Ward and con-
necting with the Frankford Elevated should be undertaken at an early date, and proper
arrangements should be made for the equipment and operation thereof.
"9. The bill prepared by the Department providing that cars should be through-
routed between lines built and owned by cities of the first class and lines built and owned
by corporations within cities of the first class, should be introduced in the Legislature at
the next session.
"The enactment of this bill is most important.'
An analysis of these and former recommendations shows that the "Taylor Plans" really
consist of four elements:
1. A comprehensive program of construction calling for the expenditure within the next
three years of a sum estimated now to be in excess of $63,500,000 for the construction of the
so-called Delivery Loop and lines radiating from the center of the city into five outlying dis-
tricts of the city.
2. A financial plan-using the City's credit upon which to borrow funds for construc-
tion and drawing upon the City's general and tax revenues for payment of annual deficits
in interest and sinking fund requirements.
3. The preparation and execution of a lease of this system to an operating company,
which it is expected will be the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company. The lines recommended
are designed with that end in view, with the idea of operating the surface lines and the City-
built lines as a merged system, and providing for a free interchange between the systems at
all points of intersection.
4. A modification of the "1907 Contract" with a view of eliminating the 8-cent exchange
tickets, which have been in use since 1895, and the substitution therefor of practically a uni-
versal system of free transfers on a 5-cent fare. This last element may be considered to be
somewhat dependent on, or a factor in, the third element and is fully discussed in the 1915
Report of this Department.
It is unfortunate that in the minds of many people this last element, the question of trans-
fers, exchanges and fare revision, is the cardinal feature of the "Taylor Plans.'
The pur-
pose of this report is to suggest what are logical improvements in certain features of the first
and second elements, namely the construction and financial programs, but not to discuss the
third and fourth elements excepting insofar as they may be involved in the modification of
the construction and financial programs.
36
Construction Program of Taylor Plan.
An examination of the past reports of this Department will confirm the statement that
the final recommendation is an evolution from the original recommendation which covered only:
(a) The building by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company of the Frankford Elevated
Line from Front and Arch Streets to Bridge Street in Frankford.
(b) The building by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company of an elevated line to Darby,
connecting with the present Market Street Elevated Line at Thirtieth and Market Streets.
(c) The building by the City of the Broad Street Line from League Island to Pike Street,
with two elevated branches and the Delivery Loop.
The estimated investment of the City in this system was about $35,000,000.
In the original report the Parkway Line was not considered, or recommended. Owing,
however, to the insistent demands of the residents in the northwestern portion of the city, the
Northwestern Line via the Parkway and Twenty-ninth Street was added, and a branch from the
North Broad Street Subway was projected into Germantown, and by the direction of Coun-
cils (the probable result of local demands) the extension from Bridge Street to Rhawn Street
of the Frankford Elevated was included. A high-speed surface line on private right-of-way
from Bridge Street to Byberry was finally added, and changes were made in the subway por-
tion of Broad Street above Pike Street, bringing the total estimated cost-using the former
estimates to about $62,000,000 for the entire system. Two lines only have been authorized by
City Councils to date and toward their construction $6,000,000 has been appropriated, leaving
$56,000,000 as the estimated cost of the remainder of the work, based upon prices ruling at the
time the estimates were made.
On account of the favorable prices obtained on the contracts let during 1915, which aver-
aged from fifteen to twenty per cent. below the estimated cost, the Department felt safe in
assuming that, if the contracts were let promptly during the period of low prices, the sum of
$50,000,000 would probably complete the entire program, and this amount was accordingly re-
quested for the construction program.
It is very unfortunate for the City that the low prices heretofore prevailing are no longer
available-a sharp rise in all building material and labor having taken place in the last few
months. Prices are now twenty to fifty per cent. above those existing a year ago, and as a busi-
ness proposition, ignoring the political and sentimental aspects of the program, I think the
City would be exceedingly unwise to construct as one unit or step at this time such a compre-
hensive construction program, which cannot be justified for traffic or business reasons, and
which will have capacity years in advance of the needs of the city.
In a program of this magnitude, running over a construction period of at least three years,
a contractor is bound to protect himself, and owing to the European war no one can safely pre-
dict the course of prices three years in advance.
This is only one of the many reasons for advocating that the final program, which is in-
tended to take care of Philadelphia's transportation needs for a period of thirty to fifty years,
should be broken into steps.
Objections to the Construction Program of the Taylor Plan.
My objections to the construction program are:
1. It is a much too comprehensive system of construction for the City to attempt to digest
in such a limited period as three years. It was born of an optimism concerning the growth of
37
Philadelphia which is not warranted by the existing conditions or statistics. It is intended
to take care of the rapid transit needs of the City of Philadelphia when the population reaches
3,000,000. It is not a good business venture to construct such lines so far in advance of their
need, as no man can safely predict the direction of growth in the city in the next two or three
generations. I believe in designing the system with a proper amount of foresight, and in mak-
ing provision for the future in a manner which seems to be in accordance with the probable
needs as measured by the city's characteristics of growth and past history. I earnestly wish to
see Philadelphia profit by the errors and mistakes made by other cities, and not spend money
recklessly and without regard to the carrying charges, simply because the City has sufficient
borrowing capacity available.
2. I do not advocate the City going into or committing itself to an extensive construction
program in advance of the question of operation of the lines being definitely settled; in
other words, until it is definitely known whether these lines will be operated by the Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit Company or by an independent operator. This question is a vital
one, and the commercial success of the system depends largely on the method of operation and
the terms of the lease. The discussion of this matter elsewhere should make clear my conten-
tion that this question of the lease should be definitely settled before the City commits itself
to a program affecting its welfare for generations to come.
3. To carry out this construction program at the present time, in this era of high prices,
will doubtless nearly-if not entirely-exhaust the City's credit. It may be a good political
move to do this, but in my judgment it is not good business, and my observation has been that
any political position not founded on a sound basis is an error in the long run. Political
theories are often wrecked by economic facts. The citizens as a whole should realize that any
warranted improvement benefiting one part of the city reacts beneficially on the entire city.
This report should make it plain that the City contemplates the gradual building of a com-
prehensive system which will fully serve the needs of the entire city.
The Proposed Operating Lease of City-Built Lines.
Regarding the second element of the "Taylor Plans," namely the operating lease, I may
state that the vital importance of securing an operator of the City-built lines on terms satisfac-
tory to the City, was early recognized and a suggested form of lease, following the general lines
used with the "dual subway" contracts in New York City, was submitted by the Director of
this Department to the controlling officials of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.
Nearly two years have elapsed since these officials signified their willingness to make such
a lease, but inasmuch as the tentative draft contained provisions for protecting the Company
against part of the losses through business diverted to the City's system, the Department felt
that it should have a reciprocal protection and insisted that the Union Traction Company, the
principal underlying subsidiary of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, should become
jointly responsible with the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, or in other words, the en-
dorser of the lease. Up to the present time the Union Traction Company has not signified its
intention to participate in the negotiations.
The Department believes, in view of the financial history of the Philadelphia Rapid Tran-
sit Company, that the City's position in this matter is entirely reasonable and proper-simply
business precaution.
Any form of operating lease which acts so as to protect the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
38
Company also adds additional security to the subsidiary company and consequently increases
the stability of the subsidiary.
It has been assumed in all the recommendations and discussions made by this Department
to date, that eventually an agreement will be reached with the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company by which they will become the operator of the City-built lines and that the present
surface and subway-elevated system would be operated jointly with the City-built lines.
For reasons given elsewhere in this report I strongly urge that no large amount of con-
struction work-at least no work beyond the first and second steps described elsewhere in this
report-be done pending the execution of a lease.
It is vitally important that the question should be settled as to who is to operate this system,
and upon what terms, and what routes are to be involved, in order to determine the financial
results to both the City and the lessee.
This report suggests that certain lines enumerated on Statement 2 of this report forming the
central or terminal and trunk portions of the comprehensive system be constructed in steps as
needed and financed out of funds provided from the sale of City bonds.
All extensions into outlying and suburban territory connecting with this central system
are suggested for construction when, if, and as ordered by Councils, after the enactment of
new legislation enabling the City to assess the cost of these local branches upon the property
of the district benefited. A full discussion of this appears elsewhere in this report; also full dis-
cussion is given in regard to the deficits which will result from the operation of this system,
under different methods of operation and how they are to be met.
The Contract between the City and the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, popularly
known as the "1907 Contract," contains a third clause, reading as follows:
"In case at any time in the future Councils shall, either of its own initiative or upon
petition of any of the citizens, determine that new lines of surface, elevated or underground
railway should be constructed within the City, it shall, by ordinance, determine the route
of such line, and the terms and conditions under which it shall be built, financed and op-
erated and the Company shall have ninety (90) days after the passage of such ordinance
to take such corporate action as may be necessary to accept the same, certified copies of which
action shall be duly filed with the Mayor within said period of ninety (90) days; but if the
Company shall fail to accept said plan within said period of ninety (90) days, or shall
reject the same within said time or, after accepting the same, shall fail to enter upon the
work in good faith and prosecute the same as required in such ordinance, then the City may
offer the right to construct and operate said road under said terms and conditions to such
other persons, company or corporation as may be willing to undertake the same: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, That any rights acquired by the Company under this section, and the section
immediately preceding, shall be subject to all the terms and conditions of this contract with
respect to a voice in the management, supervision of accounts, division of profits after the
return of six (6) per cent. upon the capital invested, and the right to ultimately acquire all
the interest of the Company at the expiration of fifty (50) years from the date of this con-
tract: AND, PROVIDED FURTHER, That in the case of the construction of new lines the cap-
ital necessary therefor shall, as far as practicable, be raised upon bond issues bearing the
guarantee of the Company as to principal and interest, which bonds shall be issued in
denominations of one hundred (100) dollars, five hundred (500) dollars, and one thousand
(1,000) dollars, and be offered to public subscription, but in no case shall they be sold for
less than par; and to such extent as it may be impracticable to finance new enterprises upon
bonds, or in case additional capital is needed for the purpose of extensions, additions and
39
betterments to existing lines, power or equipment, the same may be raised by an increase in
the capital stock of the Company, but only with the express consent of the City, and all
such increases shall be full paid at par in cash, and be subject to all the provisions herein
contained with respect to the original thirty million (30,000,000) dollars of capital stock
of the Company."
On July 2, 1915, an ordinance passed by Councils was approved by the Mayor, authorizing
the construction of the Frankford and Broad Street rapid transit lines, and $6,000,000 has
been appropriated toward their construction. This clause distinctly states that Councils shall
"by Ordinance determine the route of said such line and the terms and conditions under
which it shall be built, financed and operated." The above ordinance determines the route, and
partially sets forth the terms and conditions under which it shall be financed, but is absolutely
silent as to the operation of the road. Up to date the Rapid Transit Company has shown no
desire to operate these lines as is evidenced by the fact that they have not notified the City of
their desire to submit a proposition for the operation of these lines. The City is therefore
legally free to negotiate with other parties as to terms for the operation of these two routes.
The wording of the "1907 Contract" apparently contemplates separate and independent
contracts for each of the lines authorized. The contract evidently did not contemplate an ex-
tensive and comprehensive system as contemplated and recommended in the complete "Taylor
Plans."
The Contract clearly recognized that the building, financing and operating were inter-
dependent and so linked together that one element cannot be disregarded without nullifying the
intent of the Contract. This emphasizes again the absolute need of settling the question of
who is to operate these lines before the construction is undertaken-to determine in advance
whether this is to be a part of the unified system or supplementary to the existing system, or
to operate independently as a direct competitor of the existing system. If this be not determined
in advance of construction, the City may be placed in the position of hanging on a completed
subway a sign frequently seen, "This building for rent-will be altered as required to suit
tenant." That this is not a groundless fear is shown by the fact that New York City, after the
completion of the first subway, now 12 years ago, designed a comprehensive system of subways
known as Tri-Borough Route, and started on its construction hastily and without any knowl-
edge or certainty by whom the system would be operated. Parts of this system, representing
many millions of dollars, were completed and lay idle for several years; upon the final ex-
ecution of the lease the system was divided between two operating companies and some work
which had been done on abandoned routes was lost. Owing to the confusion which resulted
from the delay in changing routes the City has lost a large amount of money and interest
charges on completed sections of the route which had been standing idle and unused for many
months. It is largely to avoid such errors and to save the City from financial loss that I urge
and insist that the question of operation be settled in advance of any large amount of con-
struction and the form of lease determined so that the system, when built, will be in accordance
with the lease and conform as nearly as possible to the compromised wishes of the City and the
operator.
The preparation and negotiation of a lease of this character for a long period, involving
not only the liability for large sums upon the City's side, but the welfare of a large transpor-
tation company as well, involves a serious responsibility and will require the best legal and
technical talent available, as will appear from a study of what possibilities are involved in this,
the most vital feature of the entire undertaking.
In the determination of what is just and equitable there is much room for honest differ-
ence of opinion and the City must be very careful to avoid making an unwise contract, as
40
many now claim was done when the "Contract of 1907" was executed between the City and the
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company.
Owing to the urgency of the situation the City should promptly arrange for the renewal
of negotiations with the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, and secure from them a definite
expression as to their willingness and ability to presently agree upon and execute a satisfactory
lease; otherwise the City must look for an independent operator.
It will be necessary to modify some features of the contemplated program if the lines are
to be leased to an operator independent of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company. (See
Map No. 1.)
Should negotiations for a lease with the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company fail, the
City should at once formulate terms under which it is willing to lease to an independent opera-
tor and advertise these conditions so that bids can be secured.
The proposals up to date have been presented by the City to the Philadelphia Rapid Tran-
sit Company. The Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company has made but one counter-proposal,
dated March 25, 1914, and later all negotiations were broken off by the Company.
An earnest effort to cooperate must be made by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company
and by the Union Traction Company, its subsidiary, if this lease is to become a fact.
In the New York situation the first contract, involving about $39,000,000 for construction,
carried with it a fifty year operating lease of the system.
It is not likely that the City of Philadelphia could carry out its program on such lines,
as conditions here are radically different from those which existed in New York sixteen years
ago.
Transfers Between Lines.
→
As stated in the discussion of the financial results from the system, it has been assumed in
making up those figures that the lease just mentioned will provide that the present and the new
City-built systems be operated as a unified system and that practically universal free trans-
fers will be available on a 5-cent fare basis.
In this respect this report does not differ from all that have preceded it. It is strictly
necessary in making comparative estimates to use the same data in all cases and this has been
done in figuring the financial results.
This is not to be taken as either an endorsement or disapproval of this feature of the former
plans. The policy as to transfers involves the plan of financing the undertaking, the lease of
the system and other features discussed in this report.
The Department now feels that this matter of transfers should be left to be worked out in
connection with the financial plans and the operating lease, which must be finally passed on by
Councils and the Public Service Commission.
This element is only brought into the situation on the assumption that the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company will be the eventual lessee and operator of the municipal rapid
transit lines.
Should these lines be leased to an independent operator the two systems may be operated
independently and the same condition will then prevail as now exists in New York City, under
what is known as the "dual subway system."
This report contemplates the same transferring arrangement between lines as were as-
sumed possible and desirable under the former plans, and all statements of earnings are
comparable.
Elsewhere the effect of the changes recommended is considered, (a) as to the financing of
deficits, and (b) as to the financing of suburban extensions.
41
COMPARISON OF
42
COMPARISON OF TAYLOR PLANS.
TAYLOR PLAN (1915).
Step 1-$6,000,000-6%, 30-year City bonds.
Build portion of Frankford Elevated route and first
section of Broad Street Subway at City Hall. See page
37 of this report.
Step 2-$57,500,000-41%, 50-year City bonds.
Complete Frankford Line to Rhawn Street.
Complete Broad Street Line, Olney Ave. to League Is.
Complete Branches.
Complete Delivery Loop.
Complete Darby Line.
Complete Roxborough Line.
Complete Byberry Line.
See page 37.
Future Step:
None now contemplated.
See page 37.
Time lines start in operation-1918 to 1919.
(Concluded on next page.)
PLAN SUGGESTED IN THIS REPORT.
STATEMENT 4
Step 1-$6,000,000-6%, 30-year City bonds.
Identical with Taylor Plan, except for changes in City
Hall section of Broad Street Subway, described on
page 66 of this report.
Step 2-$25,600,000-41%, 50-year City bonds.
Complete Frankford Line to Bridge Street.
Build Broad Street Line from Erie Avenue to Spruce
Street.
Build Eastern Leg via Ridge Avenue, Eighth Street,
Walnut Street to Sixteenth Street.
See pages 60 to 63.
Future Steps-$14,300,000-41%, 50-year City bonds.
a-Parkway Line to Twenty-ninth and Hunting Park
Avenue.
b-Broad-Federal-Woodland Line to Cobbs Creek.
c-Broad Street south to Oregon Avenue.
To be constructed at such times and in such sequence as
financial and other conditions may warrant building the
balance of the trunk system.
Future Extensions-$13,300,000-Bonds-Interest rate to
be as agreed upon later.
Such branch lines as may be authorized by City Coun-
cils upon such terms as will not increase City's fixed
charges.
See page 63.
Time lines start in operation-1918 to 1919.
I. Program of Construction.
COMPARISON OF
COMPARISON OF TAYLOR PLANS-Concluded.
TAYLOR PLAN (1915).
Construction cost of entire Comprehensive Plan to be
financed on City credit:
$6,000,000—30-year 6% bonds-Step 1.
57,500,000-50-year 41% bonds-Step 2.
$63,500,000—Total.
II. Financial Plan for Con-
struction.
Camden Tunnel-private capital.
III. The proposed Lease of the
Municipally-built Lines.
(This Lease to cover all
financial details and terms
of operation as may be
agreed upon.)
IV. Alteration of 1907 Contract
between the City and
Company with view to
equalizing fares.
PLAN SUGGESTED IN THIS REPORT.
STATEMENT 4
Construction of Steps 1, 2 and Future, as described on
pages 60 to 63, to be financed on City credit:
$6,000,000—30-year 6% bonds-Step 1.
25,600,000-50-year 41% bonds-Step 2.
14,300,000—50-year 41% bonds-Future Steps.
$45,900,000-City bonds.
13,300,000-Local assessment.
$59,200,000-Total.
Camden Tunnel-private capital.
No further lines or extensions or branches contemplated. All lines or branches or extensions beyond Steps 1, 2 and
All equipment to be furnished by Lessee at his cost.
NOTE. All deficits in interest and sinking fund require-
ments to be paid out of general taxes or City revenues.
(See tentative form of lease in former reports of this De-
partment.)
Future to be financed on plan described on page 55.
All equipment to be furnished by Lessee at his cost.
NOTE.-All deficits in interest and sinking fund require-
ments to be met by one of the methods suggested in this
report.
Construction of Lines recommended at once without delay Construction to be limited to Steps 1 and 2 until Lease is
for execution of Lease.
Lease to Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company upon con-
ditions and terms satisfactory to the City. Operation of
present and City Systems jointly recommended.
If lines cannot be leased to Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company on satisfactory basis, lines to be leased to Inde-
pendent Operator.
Alter terms of Contract of 1907 so as to eliminate the eight-
cent exchange tickets and secure universal free transfers
between all present lines and new City-built lines.
secured.
Same basis assumed for Lease as Taylor Plans. (Not
discussed as to terms in this report.)
Same as Taylor Plans. (Not discussed in this report, as it
is an element affecting the terms of the lease above re-
ferred to.)
43
GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RAPID TRANSIT LINES
Advantages of Rapid Transit Lines.
The demand for rapid transit facilities in Philadelphia is partly the result of irritation
over the fare question and partly the result of a real need for such facilities which exists in
certain sections of the city. The residential section of the city has expanded in area until the
service of the present surface system is no longer adequate.
The average citizen has come to feel that not more than 30 minutes should be spent in trav-
eling from his home to his business, and probably, due to the socialistic ideas now prevalent,
he has come to believe that if the present Company cannot supply these facilities, the City
should supply them. He regards this as a proper field for municipal endeavor, and does not
realize the magnitude of the problem or the burdens which it involves.
Rapid transit lines are simply a development of city passenger transportation from sur-
face lines, and their function should be to extend the usefulness of those lines and not to
compete with them.
The two advantages possessed by rapid transit lines over the surface cars lie in their
higher speed and larger capacity.
The
The higher speed results from their being free from interference with other traffic.
speed of the lines is a direct function of the number of stops per mile. With ten stops per
mile the schedule speed would vary but little from that of the present surface cars. With two
stops per mile a schedule speed of 16 to 17 miles per hour is entirely feasible. With one stop
in two miles or over, a schedule speed of 25 miles per hour or higher may be attained.
The capacity of the lines is a direct function of the length of the trains and their fre-
quency.
Results Due to Location and Routing.
In all plans for rapid transit in Philadelphia will be found the feature that each is so de-
signed as to supplement the existing transit facilities-not to act primarily as a competitor,
although they must so act to some extent in the districts through which they operate.
The lines have been so located as to shorten the time of travel between the residential
and business districts of the city, and hence are located on as nearly radial lines as the street
formation of the city permits. Since it has been found that a rapid transit line without feeders
does not draw patronage from the territory through which it runs, to a greater distance than
one-half mile on each side of the line, the natural inference is that such lines should be not
more than one mile apart, and the recommendations in the Transit Commissioner's Report of
1913 are based on this spacing. This Report clearly indicates also the great advantages result-
ing to the citizens from the utilization of the present surface lines as feeders to these lines, it
being assumed that the two systems can be operated as a merged or joint system. This Report
also clearly shows that the advantages from rapid transit lines will largely accrue to the busi-
ness district and to the riders from, and owners of land in, the district lying beyond a radius of
four miles from the business center of the city.
This system is not intended principally for the city of to-day-which lies mostly within
the four-mile circle but for the suburbs of to-day, the city of the future, the city of a million
or more people who fifty years hence will reside in this area beyond the four-mile circle.
4
45
The comprehensive system of new lines now planned will mean a per capita investment of
about $40, based on the entire present population; but $120 or more, based on the population
chiefly benefited (suburban).
The chief advantage to the patrons of this transportation system lies in the reduction of the
time needed to travel from their homes to the business center or their work. This is recognized
as desirable-as tending to a better standard of living conditions, but in few cases can any
money value be assigned to this advantage, as the saving is not in commercial or salable time,
nor does it add to the rider's daily cash income. A fraction of the time now used in traveling
will be diverted by the riders to other uses, mostly non-commercial-non-producing.
The chief financial beneficiaries of these new lines will be the real estate owners, operators
and builders, in territory tributary to the lines, since, owing to the higher speed of these lines,
land lying considerably more distant from the business district of the city than the present
residential district is brought within the same time limit.
The direct result of this can be shown to be a shifting of the population and an increase
of the residential area outside of satisfactory surface car limits, increasing the average length
of passenger haul. The rider in many cases simply moves out on the new lines until his travel-
ing time becomes approximately what it is on the present system. It is greatly to be regretted
that under present laws it is impossible to assess any of the cost of construction of such a sys-
tem upon the property benefited. It is entirely a fallacy to assume that the increased revenue
from increase of general taxation due to such development will recompense the City for its
transit development, as there is no such surplus tax income resulting.
The Broad Street Line and Loop.
The fundamental idea underlying the location of the Broad Street Subway was to utilize
the main thoroughfare of the city running north and south to provide rapid transit in a north
and south direction equivalent to that provided on Market Street in an east and west direction.
It is well recognized that while Broad Street is the main north and south thoroughfare of the
city it has never developed as a business street to the extent that its central position would
warrant. The larger trading establishments of the city are located along the east and west
streets of the business district, principally east of Broad Street, and it was early found from the
traffic investigation that a rapid transit line serving Broad Street only would be undesirable, as
the destination of about sixty per cent. of the patrons of this line was in the territory east of
Broad Street. This would have brought about a wholesale transferring of the passengers either
to the Market Street Line at City Hall Station, or to the surface lines to an extent that
could be provided for only with great difficulty. It was, therefore, realized that it was abso-
lutely essential to carry part of this traffic directly into this eastern business district without
transferring. A large number of studies were made and routes suggested and tried out. The
so-called "loop" as finally decided upon and recommended in the original report of 1913 was
the result of a compromise, and it is not necessary at this time to go into the reasons which
forced or brought about its adoption. Some of the principal reasons have been given in for-
mer reports of this Department.
Objections to Loop.
My objections to the "loop" plan are based chiefly on its objectionably high cost for the
service of one line only, as the Parkway Line which is to be connected to the "loop" in the City
Hall Station cannot be operated on the "loop" when the Broad Street Lines reach full capa-
city, and its construction and operation violates Nos. 3 and 6 of the principles formulated on
46
This large loop recommended in Taylor Plans has the disadvantage of requring about
two miles of very expensive construction in order to serve three important stations only.
From North Broad Street Subway the distribution of passengers at the different stations
on the "loop" will be as follows:
To East and West Legs of the Loop
City Hall Station..….………………………………..
Chestnut Station
Eighth and Market Station
To North and South Legs of the loop:
Twelfth and Locust Station
Tenth and Locust Station
Tenth and Arch Station.
Twelfth and Arch Station
28.1%
13.3%
33.6%
75.0%
2.4%
3.0%
9.4%
10.2%
25.0%
100.0%
Locust and Arch Street legs inactive - This makes clear the reason for recommending
the modified plan by which the 8th Street District is reached by the shortest route
via Ridge Ave. and for using Walnut Street.
ST.
10.2%
9.4%
ARCH ST
12 TH St. Station
10TH St. Station
28.1% City Hall Station
13.3%
Chestnut St. Station
BROAD
گا
ST.
33.6%
Market St. Station
12TH St. Station
10TH St. Station
LOCUST ST
2.4%
3.0%
EIGHTH
DIAGRAM SHOWING
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NORTH BROAD ST.
PASSENGERS (INBOUND) AT DELIVERY LOOP STATIONS, TAYLOR PLANS
DIAGRAM NO. I
!.

EIGHTEENTH
87
THOMPSON
SEVENT
ய
ST
STILES
ST.
96
26
GIRARD
AVE.
94
101
SIXTEENTH
POPLAR ST.
08
00
SUBWAY
HOTEL
MAJESTIC
THOMPSON
66
WOWDENER
BRANCH
FREE LIBRY
GIRARD AVE.
6
FIFTEENTH
80
ST
BROAD
55
ST
POPLAR ST
STATION
OPERA HOUSE
METROPOLITAN
RIDGE
AVE.
87
BROWN ST.
24
76
SL
72
77
05
OR
S.
WALLACE
76
69
56
THIRTEENTH ST.
20
57
15
TWELFTH ST
PARRISH ST.
55
BROWN ST.
55
54
36
FAIRMOUNT AVE
MELLON ST
-PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD SUBWAY
ST.
TO
65
MOUNT VERNON ST
70
ELEVENTH ST
45
RIDGE
STATION
THIRTEENTH ST
WALLACE
AVE.
MOUNT VERNON
GREEN
ST
63
59
BOYS CENTRAL
GREEN ST
HIGH SCHOOL
SPRING GARDEN ST
دو
52
BUTTONWOOD
ST
HAMILTON
CALLONHILL
WOOD
31
ST
56
ST
VINE
25
LOGAN S
وه
34
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
PLAN FOR
RAPID TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT
IN THE
BUSINESS DISTRICT
100 200 300 Ft
MARCH 1ST 1916
42
45
SUBWAY
STATION
GIRLS'
NORMAL SCHOOL
GARDEN ST.
SPRING
STATION
BALDWIN LOCOMOTIVE WORKS
62
40
BUTTONWOOD ST
NOBLE ST
BROADTREEZ
P&R RAILWAY
29
52
THE PAR
FREIGHT HOUSE
BROAD ST FREIGHT STA
FREIGHT HOUSE
GALLOWFU
TWELFTH ST
FIRST
REGIMENT
ARMORY
WOOD ST
50
RACE
29
31
33
SUBWAY
21
23
-72
CHERRY
25
ARCH
PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD SUB
12
38
ELEVENTH ST
NOBLE ST
RC
HIGH
SCHOO
VINE ST
www
36.5
34
29
STATION
FENCIBLE
ADELPHI
THEATRO
LYRIC
THEATRE
PENNA
ACADEMY OF
PARKWAY
BUILDING
FINE ARTS
FIDELITY
QUIRING
39
BUILDING
AMERICA
STATION
CALLOWHILL
ST
33
38
39
+50
31
33
BULLETIN
BLOG
MASONIC
TEMPLE
35
PRESENT SUBWAY
BELL TEL
C
HOTEL
VENDIG
32
BE
TENTH ST
28
89
38
36
STATION
51
36
-50
READING TERMINAL
THIRTEENTH
DEPARTMENT STORE
WANAMAKERS
CITY HALL
WIDENE
BLDG.
BROAD
ST.
TRUST C
REAL EST
51 PENNA RR
BROAD ST STATION
FIFTEENTH ST
ARCADE BLDG
PENNSYLVANIA
MARKET
STATIONS
-100
EIGHTEENTH ST
SEVENTEENTH
MAP NO. 2
SIXTEENTH ST
SUBWAY
40
CHESTNUT
PENNA
WEST END TRUS
BLOG
41
COLONADE
HOTEL
GIRARD
TRUSTC
WILSON BLOG
TRUST C
LAND TITLE
UNION LEAGUE
WALNUT
36
NORTH
ANERICA
-37-6
BUILDING
KOLL PHI
ST
38
-57
WITHERSPOO
DENKLA BLDO
VINE ST
FRANKLIN SQ
RACE ST
34
30
30
27
N SNELLENBUR
AND C DEPT STORE
TWELFTH ST
COMM
TATACCH
37
SAVING FUNG
BENIFICIAL
35.
36
EIGHTH ST
SUBWAY
ARCH ST
THEATRE
60
50
ARCH ST
29
STRAWBRIDGE
BROS
AND CLOTHIER
"
DEPT STORE
DEPT STORE
SUBWAY
MARKET ST
BLUM BRO
STORE
DEPT
STATION
BINGHAM
HOUSE
ELEVENTH ST
TENTH ST
25
GIMBEL BROS
NINTH
T
LS POST OFFICE
61-4
-60'
COLLEGE
36
27
EFFERSON
MEDICAL
COLLEGE
NEFFERSON
MEDICAL
SUBWAY
37
35
RITZ CARLTON
STATION HOTEL
SUBWAY7
BELLEVUE
STRATFOR
HOTEL
ART
CLUB
LOCUST
AMERICAN
ACADEMY
OF MUSIC
HORTICULTURAL
HALL
SPRUCE ST.
STATION
וחחחחו
DEPT STORE
30
ப
STATION
CONFINENTAL
MOTEL
FRANKLIN
INST
SEVENTH ST
SIXTH ST
CHESTNUT
5T
24
LEDGER
INDEPENDENCE HAL
22
INDEPENDENCE
SQUARE
WALNUT
ST.
24
WASHINGTON SQ.
Locust
ST
20
21
page 12. The "loop" feature, as planned, represents an outlay for the terminal of the Broad
Street Lines of from 25 to 30 per cent. of the total outlay.
The "loop" is in reality a form of "stub-terminal" for the North Broad Street trains with
provision for through-routing North and South Broad Street trains on either side of the
"loop," thus introducing much complication. The large loop recommended with seven stations
located thereon, has the disadvantage of requiring about two miles of very expensive construc-
tion in order to serve three important stations only. The traffic figures in this Department esti-
mate that the distribution of passengers at the different stations on the "loop" will be as fol-
lows:
From North Broad Street:
To East and West Legs of the Loop:
City Hall Station.
Chestnut Station
Eighth and Market Station....
To North and South Legs of the Loop:
Twelfth and Locust Station...
Tenth and Locust Station.
Tenth and Arch Station..
Twelfth and Arch Station.
28.1%
13.3%
33.6% 75.0%
2.4%
3.0%
9.4%
10.2% 25.0%.
100.0%
These figures show that the Arch Street and Locust Street legs of the "loop" are inactive
--about seventy-five per cent. of the total business being done on the Broad Street and Eighth
Street legs. This makes clear the reason for recommending the modified plan by which the
Eighth Street district is reached by the shortest route (via Ridge Avenue) and for using Wal-
nut Street instead of Locust Street as a suitable connection for the Parkway Line in accord-
ance with principles laid down. The stations on the modified routes will be located so as to
adequately provide for the traffic as estimated above. (See Map No. 2.)
These figures also make clear the great amount of congestion which will be produced at
Eighth and Market Streets and at the Broad Street Stations near City Hall. They emphasize
the necessity for a wider street at Eighth Street, especially more sidewalk width and show the
great desirability of separating the City Hall and Chestnut Street Stations as this plan con-
templates. (See Map No. 7.)
The following is an extract from a paper entitled "Transportation and City Planning,
presented by Milo R. Maltbie, Public Service Commissioner, New York City, at the Fifth Na-
tional Conference on City Planning, held in Chicago, May 5th to 7th, 1913: "*** There are
several principles of considerable importance. IN THE FIRST PLACE, TERMINALS SHOULD BE ELIM-
INATED SO FAR AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE COSTLY TO ACQUIRE, EXPENSIVE TO MAINTAIN, AND IN-
CREASE RATHER THAN DECREASE CONGESTION. SO FAR AS POSSIBLE, THE LINES SHOULD BE OPERATED
THROUGH A CITY AND NOT TERMINATE THEREIN."
The following is an extract from a paper published in the January, 1914, issue of “The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science," entitled, "RELATION BE-
TWEEN TRANSIT AND HOUSING," by John P. Fox, Secretary of the Transit Committee of The City
Club of New York: "*** For Philadelphia, Broad street should be made the business axis,
with a straight transit line from north to south and without the ill-advised delivery loop sub-
way now planned, which would tend to duplicate in Philadelphia the evils of Chicago's congested
business center.”
47
(
Through-Routing.
•
The logical method of transportation in any large city must be on a through-routing plan
to be efficient. This shows beyond question that a train should not pass through the delivery
district more than once in each direction per single trip. (See Diagrams, pages 48 and 49.)
A rapid transit line for the purpose for which these are built in Philadelphia should be
double-ended whenever possible, serving a residential district on each end and the business
district in the central section, so that the expensive subway in the central section, which acts
as a terminal of the two lines, may be used efficiently in both directions. This is known as
'through-routing" method of operation, which is eminently desirable, and the modified plans
are so arranged as to provide for it. While the "loop" in the business district permits this
routing of North and South Broad Street trains, the traffic from the two lines will not balance
sufficiently to use the plan efficiently, hence the "loop" plan was selected. By balancing one-
half the North Broad Street traffic with the Northwestern Line and one-half with South Broad
and Darby, the "looping" necessity is eliminated and better operation of trains secured. (See
Diagrams Nos. 2 and 3.)
Surface Lines
Transferring
Terminal
Surface Lines
Transferring
Terminal
BUSINESS
DISTRICT
Rapid Transit LINE
DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING FUNCTION OF RAPID
TRANSIT LINES IN A UNIFIED SYSTEM AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF THROUGH ROUTING
The Ideal Local Transportation System for a Population of 3,000,000 Within a Circle of
12-Mile Radius.
These limitations have been taken because it is doubtful if a single five-cent fare can ever
be profitable to a unified system beyond such limits, except by assuming a density of popula-
tion greater than is now considered desirable. To accomplish it (if ever possible) full use must.
be made of surface and rapid transit lines, each to the economic limit of its possibilities.
The fundamental basis of the ideal design for such a system is to divide the area into three
transportation or traffic zones. In each zone the surface lines constitute the local system, and
in the outer two zones these surface lines concentrate the local traffic at convenient points or
terminals from which rapid transit lines run radially and directly to the business district. In
the outer two zones practically all riders must transfer at the terminals from one system to the
other.
48
High Speed
Surface Lines
f
Surface Lines
69Th Street
Transferring
Terminal E
60
52nd St.
BUSINESS DISTRICT
CITY
HALL
RAPID TRANSIT LINE
Market Street
Surface Car Terminal
To
Frankford
:
DIAGRAM SHOWING APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES
APPLIED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS IN
WEST PHILADELPHIA
The time of travel practicable to secure and generally considered by the public to be a
reasonable time of transit between residential and business districts has been assumed as follows:
Length of Journey
Zone
Service
On
Rapid Transit
On
Surface
Lines
Lines
First
All surface car
(Miles)
0
(Miles)
Time of
Journey
(Minutes)
4
25
Second Rapid Transit (Local) and Surface
combined
4
3
30
.:
Third
Rapid Transit (Express) and Surface
combined
7
4 to 5
35
•
Zone
Service
First
Rapid Transit
Surface
Second Rapid Transit
Surface
Third
Rapid Transit
Surface
•
Speed
(Miles per hour)
Time
on each line
(Minutes)
Total
Time of
Journey
(Minutes)
0
0
9
25
25
16
15
12
15
30
25
16 to 17
15
16 to 17
32 to 34
Beyond the third zone the territory is considered in the region of additional fare or com-
muters' zone of the steam roads.
49
Diagram No. 2 shows this plan as applied to an ideal round city, and Diagram No. 3
shows the same principles applied to Philadelphia as far as its topography, population and street
layout permit.
Under this design of a unified system, the rapid transit lines perform four functions:
1. That of terminal facilities in the business district.
2. That of channels for conducting traffic flow through the congested or older and already
developed sections of the city.
3. That of supplementing the surface car system-not competing with it for traffic.
4. That of supplying improved service to the outlying sections of the city-the "long
haul" rider.
In order that it may fulfil this second function properly, economically and at high-speed,
the line serving the Second Zone should have few stations between the business district and its
terminal, and the line to the Third Zone but one station (at the terminal of the line to Second
Zone for transfer purposes).
The lines when possible should for practical reasons be four-track through the First Zone,
and when extended to the Third Zone should branch into two or three lines, each wholly ex-
press, with the exception of the one stop at the end of the First Zone-in order to obtain
highest schedule speed and operation efficiency. Actually this can seldom be done, but stops
on these lines should be made only where imperative.
Rapid transit lines in such a system are not for local service within the 25-minute zone of
surface cars, but to bring a larger zone within that time limit. They are not to provide special
facilities for a few favored localities, but to better conditions for the whole district which they
serve. Rapid transit lines are necessities in, but not for, the present surface car zone. They
must run through this zone in order to reach the zone which they are properly intended to
serve. They are the trunk arteries of the system and not the small veins and capillaries, that
function being filled more suitably by the surface car system. Rapid transit lines used locally
within the surface car zone are luxuries. Their proper function in Philadelphia in a unified
system is to bring a larger mass of people within 30 minutes of the business center for the least
capital outlay, that is, to serve the greatest number of people acceptably with the least burden
upon all. In a unified system, rapid transit lines should be used as express routes only, for
limited trains running between terminal points, thereby supplementing and extending the use-
fulness of the local surface street car system, of which they can never take the place.
The surface car is a transportation enterprise using single cars and doing business on a
retail plan.
The rapid transit lines are for wholesale transportation, and should never be used where
the retail method is more suitable. Just as in commercial business, a large number of retail
dealers are needed to support one wholesale house, so in this line, a large number of surface
lines are needed to gather or collect local passengers in the districts four miles or more from
the delivery district, and deliver them to the rapid transit lines for transportation in wholesale
quantities to the delivery district. See Map No. 3 of "Ideal Transportation System as existing
in West Philadelphia."
Ideal System (a Unified Plan of Operation) Applied to Philadelphia.
The diagrams attached should make clear the proper function of rapid transit lines in a
unified system, showing what would be the ideal arrangement and what I consider the best
50

12 MILES
BEYOND 12 MILE RADIUS
STEAM RAILROAD COMMUTERS' TERRITORY
T
SURFACE FEEDERS
THIRD ZONE
SURFACE FEEDERS
THIRD ZONE
7 MILES
SECOND
TRAFFIC
THIRD
TRAFFIC ZONE
ZONE
|
SURFACE FEEDERS
SECOND ZONE
4 MILES
RAPID TRANSIT
LINES
LOCAL
STATIONS
FIRST
TRAFFIC
ZONE
IMILE
BUSINESS
DISTRICT
25 MINUTE
SURFACE CAR
RIDE
SURFACE FEEDERS
THIRD ZONE
EXPRESS STATION-
SURFACE FEEDERS
SECOND ZONE
|
-TERMINALS.
SURFACE FEEDERS
THIRD ZONE
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
DIAGRAM
OF
AN IDEAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Rapid Transit Trunk Lines
Surface Feeders to Rapid Transit Trunk Lines
LEGEND
-
Rapid Transit Trunk Line Extensions through the Second Zone
Surface Feeders to Rapid Transit Extensions
DIAGRAM NO. 2

BEYOND 12 MILE LIMIT
STEAM RAILROAD COMMUTERS' TERRITORY
Surface Feedersi
Third Traffic Zone
12 MILES FROM CENTER
SCHUYLKILL
DIAGRAM NO. 3
7 MILES
Surface Feeders
>ond Traffic Zon
4MILES
RAPID
TRANSIT
LINES
Surface Feeders
Third Traffic Zone
1
RIVER
25 Minute Surface
Car Zone
Surffac
Surface Feeders
Second Traffic Zone
LEAGUE
ISLAND
DELAWARE
MILE
Express &
Transfer Stations
RIVER
Business
District
DIAGRAM
SHOWING THE
APPLICATION
OF
IDEAL RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
TO
CONDITIONS IN PHILADELPHIA
||||
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
LEGEND
RAPID TRANSIT TRUNK LINES (LOCAL)
SURFACE FEEDERS TO RAPID TRANSIT LINES
RAPID TRANSIT TRUNK LINE (EXPRESS)
RAPID TRANSIT TRUNK LINES EXTENDED
THROUGH THE SECOND ZONE
SURFACE FEEDERS TO RAPID TRANSIT
TRUNK LINE EXTENSIONS
JGG

MAP NO. 3
SUBURBAN SURFACE
FEEDERS TO RAPID
TRANSIT TERMINAL
..CITY
HALL
66TH ST
63RD ST
FARE
FROM
CIT
LINE
SECOND
FARE ZONE
ABOUT 5 MILES
FROM
FROM
LIMIT 69TH ST
CITY
CITY
LINE
60TH ST
SHL95
52ND ST
46TH ST.
40 ST.
36 TH
132 ST.
771
SCHUYLKILL
RIVER
24 ST
19TH ST.
LSM SI
13TH ST.
15 All
8TH ST.
5TH ST.
¦ 2ND ST.
DEL
Market St. Ferries
South Street
IDEAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
EXISTING IN
AS
WEST PHILADELPHIA
MARKET STREET SUBWAY-ELEVATED
AND DISTRIBUTING
SURFACE AND SUBWAY-SURFACE TRANSFER LINES
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
ELEVATED
SUBWAY
}
LEGEND
MARKET STREET SUBWAY-ELEVATED LINE
SURFACE LINES RECEIVING TRANSFERS FROM WEST-BOUND TRAINS
SURFACE LINES RECEIVING TRANSFERS FROM EAST-BOUND TRAINS
eee SUBURBAN LINES - SECOND FARE ZONE FROM CITY HALL
LEAGUE ISLAND
A WARE
RIVER
PETTY'S ISLAND
compromise for the present as applying to Philadelphia conditions.
Here it is evident that
"ideal" conditions exist in two directions only-north and west. Broad Street and Market
Street are the only thoroughfares reaching the business district of sufficient width to permit
the construction therein of four tracks. The plans provide for four tracks in Broad Street
north, but only two tracks south of City Hall. Quite probably before the South Broad Street
Line is built it may be desirable to so change the plan as to provide four tracks to the south also.
In Market Street four tracks have been provided from Juniper Street to the west side of the
Schuylkill River only. Owing to the favorable street arrangement near Thirty-second Street it
has been possible to utilize the surface car system on a plan similar to that of Boston in its
Tremont and Boyleston Street Subways.
At Sixty-ninth Street the local rapid transit line transfers to a comprehensive system of
high-speed surface lines connecting with outlying towns and serving the large adjacent sub-
urban territory.
It so happens at Sixty-ninth Street that owing to different ownership of the feeder lines,
this is the start of the second fare zone as well as the second traffic zone. As but two tracks for
train service have been built in Market Street, express service at 25 miles per hour as defined
in this report is not now possible. (See Map No. 3.)
Ideal rapid transit service will not be possible for any suburban district under the present
plans excepting directly to the north, via Broad Street Subway. When the express tracks of
this line are next extended, they should be extended by two elevated branches, each about three
miles long.
There is no economic necessity or strategic reason for naming Olney Avenue as the north-
ern terminus of this route, as it is not an important traffic center.
On all other lines, owing to the limitation of street width, two tracks only are provided,
and local rapid transit service with half-mile stops will be given at a schedule speed approxi-
mating 16 miles per hour. Lines with three tracks are not desirable for Philadelphia conditions.
The Middle Zone of the City and Its Transportation Problems.
The principal developed section of Philadelphia, lying within the four-mile circle and con-
taining 1,250,000 people in 1913, covers what may be considered as the surface car zone of eco-
nomic service from a standpoint of time, as the running time from the business district inside
of this zone should be from 25 to 30 minutes, based on an average speed of 8.8 miles per hour,
and my observation has been that there is comparatively little complaint where good surface
car service is maintained within the four-mile limit. The chief complaint seems to be not the
car service, or the time involved, but the 8-cent fare which is troubling the people within this
particular district. Outside of this district the 8-cent fare is not the chief cause of complaint,
but the time element appears to be.
The modification of the "1907 Contract" which has been proposed in connection with
these new lines, is expected to remove the cause of the complaint as to the service within the
four-mile circle, and the construction of the municipal rapid transit lines will remedy to a
greater or less degree the complaint of the suburban districts.
The Suburban Zone Service.
Regarding the service in the suburban districts by a direct line as compared with the ser-
vice which will result from the present lines terminating at important junction points, it may be
51
well to discuss the matter in connection with the proposed temporary ending of the North Broad
Street Line at Broad Street and Erie Avenue.
The only large body of population lying beyond the four-mile circle lies to the north, north-
east and northwest, comprising the North Philadelphia, Germantown, Chestnut Hill and Rox-
borough districts.
The Northeast Section will be well provided for by the Frankford Line to Bridge Street.
The North Philadelphia, Germantown and Chestnut Hill sections should be satisfactorily
served for the present by the Broad Street Line with the temporary terminal at Erie Avenue,
and Roxborough will be greatly benefited by bringing the Ridge Avenue surface line directly
east on Allegheny Avenue and transferring to the Broad Street Subway at Broad Street and
Allegheny Avenue.
Service in the Germantown district by a direct line to Germantown and Chelten Avenues
as compared to the service herein recommended may be discussed here as an example.
The distance from Erie and Germantown Avenues to Chelten and Germantown Avenues
by the Germantown Avenue surface line-the most direct route-is 2 1/3 miles and the schedule
running time of the present surface cars is 15 minutes.
The distance by way of the rapid transit extension passing through Logan is 3.3 miles from
Erie Avenue with a schedule running time of 11 minutes. Assuming a person were directly
at the intersection of Germantown and Chelten Avenues, the maximum saving of time which
would result would be 3 minutes in time of transit, plus 1 minute for transferring at Broad
Street and Erie Avenue.
Inasmuch as the district within the five-minute walking zone of Germantown and Chelten
Avenues is largely business, and will contain relatively few passengers for the rapid transit line,
it is a fair assumption that the majority of the patrons boarding the rapid transit line at this
point will be brought there by means of a surface transfer, so that the time of transfer at this
point will probably be twice as long as at Erie Avenue, because at Erie Avenue there would
be twice the train frequency of the branch lines, so that for any one not within walking dis-
tance of the station the actual time saving will only be 21 minutes.
Based on the present traffic figures, only about 9,000 passengers per day would use this
station, and a considerable portion of this traffic will be business diverted from the steam
roads on account of lower fare, and not on account of time saving.
The relatively small advantage to even this, the most populous district in the suburban ter-
ritory, does not warrant the expenditure which would be involved in serving this district with
a subway and elevated line, the cost of which if built from Broad Street at Logan would be
$2,100,000, or $4,750,000 from Broad and Erie Avenue.
The logical method of reaching Germantown and Chelten Avenues at some later date is
shown on Frontispiece and Map No. 1 by means of a branch from the. Twenty-ninth Street-
Roxborough Line, and following on private right-of-way the east line of the Pennsylvania Rail-
road to Chelten Avenue, and thence along Chelten Avenue to the terminal proposed.
Effect of Rapid Transit Lines in Distribution of Population.
The time by surface car to-day from the Frankford district to the center of the city is
about 45 minutes, the distance being so great that the Frankford rapid transit line will only
bring that district within the 25-minute time limit of the street car zone; hence it is extremely
doubtful whether there will be any extensive development beyond that point, as it will have to
compete for population with other districts with more favorable time of transit.
52

CHESTNUT
HILL
ROXBOROUGH
MANAYUNK
BALA
OVERBROOK
69TH ST
TERMINAL
NELSON
JENKINTOWN
CHELTENH
OGONTZ
TWP
FOX CHASE
10 MILES
OAK LANE
ADDITIONAL AREA BROUGHT
WITHIN 30 MINUTE TIME ZONE
BY EXTENSION, NORTH OF ERIE
AVE., OF BROAD STREET SUBWAY
WITH ELEVATED BRANCHES
SMILES
GERMANTOWN
LLOGAN
FALLS
OF
SCHUYLKILL
CURAND
7 MILES
SMILES
OLNEY
6 MA
FRANKFORD
ERIE AVE
ERIE AVE
4MILES
Supper
DIAMOND
KENSINGTON
108813
22
ASPEN
SCHUYLKILL
GELEN
CALL
CITY
MARKET
EXPRESS AND
PETTYS
ISLAND
DELAWARE
CAMDEN
RIVER
563
MIMA
SNYDER
ARMEN
THIS MAP SHOWS (IN RED)
THE INCREASED AREA BROUGHT
WITHIN THE 30 MINUTE TIME
ZONE FROM THE BUSINESS
DISTRICT BY STEPS 1 AND 2
STREET RAILWAY LINES
100 POPULATION 1910 CENSUS
O 100 INMATES OF INSTITUTIONS
LEGEND
*** STEAM RAILROAD LINES
100 INCREASE IN POPULATION 1910 TO 1912
100 DECREASE IN POPULATION 1910 TO 1912
MAP NO. 4
The Frankford district must not expect to duplicate the development which occurred in
West Philadelphia, for the district west of Forty-fifth Street, in which the largest development
occurred, averages less than 15 minutes by the new rapid transit line from the heart of the
business district; the Frankford district is twice as far and this must be given full consider-
ation. The Broad Street Lines, as now planned with a temporary terminal at Erie Avenue,
will deliver people at Erie Avenue within 14 to 15 minutes, leaving a 15-minute zone for the
use of surface cars, and bringing this large area within the same time limit as Erie Avenue on
the surface system.
The attached Map, No. 4, shows the increase in 30-minute time zone area which will be
added to that zone, with the line terminating at Erie Avenue, and the additional area that will
be brought within the zone should the line be extended to Olney Avenue with elevated branches
on the Northeast Boulevard and to Germantown. A study and comparison of these areas should
be convincing proof that the Broad Street Subway should terminate for the present at Erie.
Avenue. (See Statement 8.)
Discussion of Principle of District Assessment for Local Benefits.
The principle of assessing the property for at least a portion of the cost of the city im-
provements necessary for its modern development is recognized in a more or less complete form
in Philadelphia. It may be well here to discuss its application to this transit problem of
Philadelphia and show how localities benefited should divide the burden.
The chief benefits resulting from the construction of rapid transit lines will accrue to two
zones of the city: (a) the business district, which may here be defined as the district contained
within a one-mile radius drawn from Eleventh and Market Streets, and (b) the districts lying
outside of a circle drawn with a radius of four miles from the same point. The middle zone
lying between the first and four-mile circles will probably be affected very little by these lines
and only along the lines themselves.
As all estimates of growth of population in Philadelphia show that within 50 years or
less the population in Philadelphia proper and the vicinity will exceed 3,000,000, and inasmuch
as the available land now lying within the four-mile circle is practically all developed, excepting
south of Oregon Avenue, the future growth will be largely distributed over the area outside of
the four-mile limit, and in this district will occur the greatest rise in land value.
Outside of the comfort and convenience resulting from the construction of these improved
facilities, the direct commercial profits will accrue very largely to the two districts mentioned.
In the business district the direct result will be a much larger volume of business trans-
acted and consequently a higher value for business locations in certain parts of this district.
In the outlying lands a large financial benefit will result to the land owner by virtue of
these lines bringing this land into the market for residential purposes.
The method proposed in this report of financing these improvements is based on the idea
of placing the burden of carrying charges on the district receiving the principal benefit.
The district lying between the one- and three-mile circles will receive comparatively little
direct benefit from the building and operation of these lines, but there seems to be no feasible
way of leaving this section of the city out of the calculation, as this land is already improved
and fairly well served now by the present surface car system. Actually this zone should carry
but a small part of the burden, and that part only on the section lying along and benefiting by
the lines.
While the rapid transit lines will draw some business from the territory inside of the four-
53
mile circle, they must be considered in that zone as trunk lines or channels connecting the resi-
dential district with the business district, and not built primarily to serve the intermediate dis-
trict, consequently these form the main and terminal sections of the system, and may, therefore,
be paid for by general bond issue.
The more or less radial extensions running beyond the four-mile circle and into land which
is largely undeveloped, may properly be considered part of the cost of real estate development,
and the financing arranged for before the construction actually takes place, upon the basis that
the property benefited by their construction and operation should assume the resulting burden.
The territory which has already been developed, such as now lies within the one- and four-
mile circles, is very slow to change and undergo further improvement. The tax records and
statistics show that very little change has taken place in this district in recent years.
The report here with appended (see Appendices A and B) shows that while some advan-
tages may accrue to this intermediate portion of the city the great financial advantages accrue
to what are now undeveloped suburban districts.
This plan of district assessment for improvements is now permitted under New York leg-
islation, and the Utica Avenue Elevated Line in Brooklyn is being built by local assessment of
the property benefited.
To show that property owners in Philadelphia realize the advantages and are willing to
co-operate, a prominent resident inquired recently whether the City would favor some of the
extensions beyond what are herein suggested for immediate construction, provided the bene-
fited sections would assume the burden of the interest charges locally.
Under Pennsylvania laws now existing this cannot be accomplished unless it be with the
voluntary consent of the affected properties. (See Appendix C.)
As showing the justice of the position herein outlined, let us discuss the extension author-
ized by Councils of the Frankford Elevated Line from Bridge Street to Rhawn Street.
This would provide for an extension of about three miles and if extended as an elevated
road along Frankford Avenue would probably cost from $1,500,000 to $1,800,000. If con-
structed as a surface high-speed line on private right-of-way without grade crossings (the pref-
erable plan), it would probably cost $600,000 or $700,000.
This extension would benefit all the property lying between the Pennsylvania Railroad on
the east and the Northeast Boulevard on the west, comprising 2,000 acres or more.
Assuming that the line is to be constructed as a surface high-speed line on private right-
of-way at a cost of $700,000 this construction cost would amount to only $350 per acre if assessed
equally upon the zone directly benefited. If bonds be issued by that district for the cost of the
construction, the carrying charges would probably run not more than $18 to $20 per acre per
year. On land to be developed, this is a burden too small to be considered as it would only
represent $1.00 or $2.00 per lot per year during the life of the bonds in the territory when de-
veloped. It may be claimed that such a plan will place too heavy a burden upon suburban
land. If this be true, then evidently the development is premature and the extension not needed
until it will bear the cost of its development.
The main advantage of the principle of assessing locally the cost of developing such sub-
urban property is that it acts as an automatic check to the demand for unwarranted extensions,
which clamor now has underlying it as a large factor the desire to get private advantage at the
City's expense. Under this plan the land owners, who are now most interested in such exten-
sions, will not clamor for it to be made until they are willing to bear themselves part of the
burden which the City would otherwise assume in its construction and operation.
From Rhawn Street northeast to the City Line is a very considerable area of the city which
54
*
might with equal justice clamor for improved service at the City's expense, but as the time of
travel increases with each addition to the extended lines, the outlying land becomes less and
less desirable for residential development of the type popular in Philadelphia.
How are the Bills to be Paid for Constructing and Operating the Rapid Transit System?
Under the "Taylor Plan" all money for construction is to be raised on the City's credit
by issuing City bonds for the entire amount. All equipment is to be furnished by the operat-
ing company.
Under the plan herein suggested only the trunk and terminal portions of the system are
to be financed and paid for on the City's general credit, out of City bonds. The outlying and
suburban sections are assumed to be built, or at least financed, on bonds secured by local assess-
ment upon the real estate for properties benefited by the construction and operation of these
extensions.
The following table gives the lines considered as terminal or trunk lines, and the lines con-
sidered as branch or suburban lines, and the relative proportion of the City's obligation and
the local obligation involved:
TRUNK AND TERMINAL LINES TO BE FINANCED BY CITY BONDS.
(Shown in red on Map No. 5.)
Estimated cost,
including real
estate.
When to be
built.
1. Frankford Elevated to Bridge Street.
$6,000,000
Step 1
Broad Street Subway-Pike to Spruce Street.
2. Ridge Avenue, Eighth Street, Walnut to Sixteenth Street
Parkway-Twenty-ninth Street to Hunting Park Avenue...
18,400,000
7,200,000
Step 2
6,200,000
Future
3. Southwestern Line-via Broad, Federal and Woodland Avenue
South Phila.-Broad Street, Federal to Oregon Avenue
5,500,000
Future
2,600,000
Future
Total ...
$45,900,000
BRANCH LINES AND EXTENSIONS PROPOSED TO BE
FINANCED ON PRINCIPLE OF
ASSESSMENT OF
LOCAL BENEFITS.
Broad Street, Pike to Olney Avenue..
$4,300,000
Broad Street, Oregon to League Island.
700,000
Northeast Branch on Boulevard....
1,500,000
Roxborough Extension from Twenty-ninth and Hunting Park Ave.
1,800,000
Germantown Branch
2,100,000
•
Frankford Elevated extension to Rhawn Street.
1,800,000
Byberry Line
1,100,000
Total ...
$13,300,000
Grand Total ..
$59,200,000
55
This total does not check with the estimates as given in table of comparative outlay as
Darby Line outside of City Line is omitted from these figures and routes do not exactly cor-
respond in the two estimates. (See Statement 7.)
The following quotation from a paper by Nelson P. Lewis, Chief Engineer of the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment of New York City, expresses these principles in such shape that
I quote from his paper as follows:
"The general principles which should, in the writer's opinion, govern the distribution
of the cost of city improvements may be briefly summarized as follows:
"1. Where there is local benefit, there should always be local assessment.
"2. The entire city or the metropolitan district should bear no part of the expense
unless the improvement is in some degree of metropolitan importance and benefit.
"3. Assessments should not be confined to the cost of acquiring and improving streets,
but should extend to any improvement which will increase the value of the neighboring
property, and should be apportioned as nearly as possible according to the probable benefit.
"4. A workable policy once adopted should be consistently adhered to.
5. The determination of a policy and its application to each case should be entrusted
to a board composed of men especially qualified, whose terms of office should so overlap as
to insure continuity of policy and purpose."
I have never heard any real objection made to the principle, though objections arise as to
the practical method of application. At present such methods for rapid transit construction
in Philadelphia appear to have no legal basis, and I would urge that whatever enabling legisla-
tion may be necessary the City should obtain at the next session of the Legislature, so that this
fair, just and equitable method of financing these lines may be available for use at the City's
option.
The principle of assessing property for city improvements is already well established, the
original cost of pavement being charged against the abutting property, as well as certain costs
for sewers, water pipes, etc., which are recognized as necessary for the development of the prop-
erty. Trunk and main sewers are charged against the city as a whole, local sewers being
charged against the property benefited. Logically there is no sound reason why a portion of the
rapid transit system in the suburban district, which is equally as necessary as the sewerage sys-
tem, should not be charged in part at least against the property benefited. (See Appendix C.)
Alternate Method of Financing Branches and Extensions of the Trunk Portion of the System.
In case it should be found undesirable or inexpedient for any reason, legal or otherwise,
to finance the cost of extensions by means of special bond issues assessed locally on the property
benefited to meet the carrying charges, I would make the suggestion that an alternate method
of placing the burden of these extensions on the territory and people benefited may be found
in a proper adjustment of the rate of fare of the rapid transit lines in such sections of the city,
this rate of fare being periodically adjusted so that it would grow less as the section builds up
and becomes more thickly populated and the number of riders increases per year, it being placed
at a figure at the beginning which will not be prohibitory.
56
This alternate method has the same advantage as local assessment of the property-acting
as an automatic check on unwarranted demands for extensions and thus protects the City
Treasury.
The additional fare required on each extension could be approximately determined in ad-
vance, and while it would be somewhat troublesome to work out the practical difficulties of a
two zone system with transfers and different fares in the two zones, I believe it is not impos-
sible to accomplish such a result if deemed desirable.
57

DARBY
CITY
SCHUYLKILL
OVERBROOK
69TH ST.
CHESTNUT HILL
BALA
LINE
GERMANTOWN
ROXBOROUGH
OVER
29TH ST.
PRESENT MARKET ST. SUBWAY-ELEVATED
LINE
~?
WOODLAND AV
OGONTZ
CITY
OAK LANE
LINE
OLNEY
I LOGAN
HUNTING PARK
AV.
ERIE AV.
BROAD
STREET
FRONT
ST.
4730
KENSINGTON
RIVER
PETTY'S
AV.
ISLAND
L.
/FOX
FOX CHASE
TO BUSTLETON AND BYBERRY
TO
RHAWN ST
ނ
FRANK FORD
OREGON AV
LEAGUE ISLAND
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
MAP SHOWING
TRUNK AND TERMINAL SECTIONS OF
RAPID TRANSIT LINES
TO BE FINANCED ON CITY BONDS
AND EXTENSIONS TO BE
FINANCED BY LOCAL ASSESSMENT OF BENEFITS
LEGEND
TRUNK RAPID TRANSIT LINES
EXTENSION RAPID TRANSIT LINES
• 35TH WARD HIGH SPEED SURFACE LINE
MAP NO. 5
BRIDGE ST.
י
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PLANS FOR RAPID
TRANSIT DEVELOPMENT
Suggested Improvements in the Construction Program of the Taylor Plan.
Briefly, it may be here stated that there is no intention to suggest changes in the location
or extent of the main radial rapid transit lines recommended in the "Taylor Plans."
The change contemplated is not in the main routes themselves the improvements suggested
herein relate chiefly to what I consider an unwise and unbusinesslike proposition to build these
lines all at once, and to carry them into suburban districts now very thinly populated-into sec-
tions which should for several years at least be served by surface lines.
I strongly favor the breaking up of the construction program into a series of steps with,
as yet undetermined, intervals of time between the steps, so that the construction program will
be extended over a period of years and the City and the operating company will be able to
digest and assimilate the results of each step before another is added.
In outline the suggested construction program consists of:
First. A progressive step method of construction whereby the Frankford Elevated be-
tween Arch Street and Bridge Street, and the Broad Street Subway between Spruce Street and
Erie Avenue, will be constructed first, leaving the extension of the former to Rhawn Street,
and the extensions of the latter to League Island, Olney Avenue, Germantown and the Boule-
vard (as provided by Ordinance of Councils and authorized by the people in the $6,000,000
loan) until a later date, at present indeterminate.
Second. A change in the lines of subway in the business district whereby the delivery
area will be more directly reached, the stations more advantageously placed and the cost of
construction lessened.
No change is now contemplated between Ridge and Erie Avenues, but it is proposed that
on the south two of the four tracks be diverted at this point to pass by way of Ridge Avenue,
Eighth Street and Walnut Street to near Sixteenth Street, leaving only two tracks to continue
southward in Broad Street. Also, it is proposed that the future Parkway Subway to the north-
west be designed to turn down Sixteenth Street and into Walnut Street, thus providing for the
ultimate routing of some of the North Broad Street trains through to Roxborough by way of
Eighth and Walnut Streets, while the remainder will be routed through to League Island,
and the Southwestern Line through the Fortieth Ward. This change in the Parkway Line
does away with the need for four tracks south of Filbert Street, and with the need for a
junction station under City Hall. Therefore, it is proposed to change the line of the two Broad
Street tracks between Arch Street and South Penn Square so as to permit the placing of the
City Hall Station at Filbert Street, where it can be brought nearer to the surface of the street
and where it will cause less congestion of traffic and will cost far less to construct. (See Map
No. 6.)
59
Suggested Construction of Comprehensive System in Successive Steps.
Construction Step No. 1.
Complete the Frankford Elevated to a point at or near Bridge Street on the northern end,
and build the section from Callowhill Street south, connecting with the existing Market Street
Line of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, permitting the Frankford Line to be
through-routed with the present Market Street Line.
Although the present ordinance, under which the Frankford Line is being constructed, au-
thorizes the building of the road north of Bridge Street as far as Rhawn Street, I do not con-
sider it desirable that it be built north of Bridge Street at the present time. Even if it be
legally decided that it must be built, that will not change the economic fact that it is not now
warranted.
The territory lying north and northeast of Bridge Street should for a number of years
be served and developed by trolley surface feeders, which in this district, for several years at
least, should be able to run at a schedule speed of at least 12 miles per hour. This speed is
now maintained by trolley lines connecting at this point.
Under these conditions the City is not warranted in spending a large amount of money for
the elevated construction as the maximum time saving to passengers living at Rhawn Street
cannot exceed three minutes. This difference is too small to warrant the use at present of
anything more expensive than high-speed surface trolley lines on private right-of-way. Fur-
thermore, Philadelphia should not, like New York, make the serious mistake of building high-
speed elevated lines into relatively remote suburbs and ignoring the capabilities of surface lines
as transportation feeders.
There is, furthermore, this point for consideration: Bridge Street on Frankford Avenue
is now the present limit of the 5-cent fare zone from the center of the city, and any extension
beyond this should be seriously considered in view of its evident effect on the operating lease of
the City's system. An independent company is now operating the surface trolley line north of
Bridge Street along Frankford Road to City Line, connecting with lines operating into Bristol
and Trenton, and legal complications might ensue, together with opposition from the Public
Service Commission if the City entered this territory as a competitor.
Construction Step No. 2.
Build the North Broad Street Subway from a point near Erie Avenue on the north to
Ridge Avenue on the south as a 4-track construction, dividing at Ridge Avenue into two
2-track subways-one pair of tracks extending south along Broad Street to a point near Spruce
Street, the other pair of tracks turning east along Ridge Avenue to Eighth Street, south on
Eighth Street to Walnut Street and west on Walnut Street to a point near Sixteenth Street.
On the lower end both lines would terminate in stub-terminals until the connections for through-
routing are established, as stub-terminals will provide sufficient terminal facilities for 30 trains
per hour. This would form the first section of the line and is in conformity with principles Nos.
1, 2, 4, 5, and 7 enunciated on page 12.
Importance of Erie Avenue as Temporary Northern Terminal of Broad Street Lines.
At no other point along the Broad Street Line is it possible as it is at Erie Avenue to focus
readily a large number of surface trolley lines which by transfer can utilize the high-speed lines
to bring the passengers which they may have collected into the center of the city. This utilizes
60

68,600
Atlantic Ave. Brooklyn.
Subway
65,000
60,000
55,000
50,000
45,000
PASSENGERS. 1"-10,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
DIAGRAM NO. 4
5,000
2 Track
COMPARISON OF DAILY PASSENGERS
AT VARIOUS STATIONS ON NEW YORK AND PHILA. HIGH-SPEED SYSTEMS
(ONE-WAY TRAFFIC-BOARDING)
NEW YORK
PHILADELPHIA
40,000
Fulton St.N.Y
Subway
34,800
City Hall.N.Y
3rd Ave."L"
35,000
2 Track
2 Track
Average day-1915
34,000-Grand Central.N.Y.
Subway
30,000 (Est)
Times Square.N.Y.
Subway
21,300
4 Track
2 Track
15th St. Phila.West.
City Hall.Phila (North).
Broad St.Subway
Market St. Subway
13,700-69th St.Term. Phila
Market St. "L"
10,300
15,500 (Est)
2 Track
-1916-
2. Track
2 Track
4 Track
ESTIMATED ON 1913 BASIS
JG
Erie Ave.Phila(South)
Broad St. Subway
32,700 (Est.)
the surface lines efficiently in the territory north of Erie Avenue and reduces the operator's
investment and the car mileage by about twenty-five per cent. as compared with operating the
two extensions above Erie Avenue. As this reduces both the operating expenses and interest
charge coming ahead of the City's share of the earnings it is greatly to the City's advantage,
as is evident from the statement of operating results attached. (See Statements 5 and 6.)
It will be noted that this will require the opening of Ridge Avenue through the block at
Eighth and Ninth Streets in accordance with the plans for the "Traffic Circuit," which have
formerly been proposed.
Walnut Street Line.
Walnut Street is now suggested in place of Locust Street for the location of the south line
of the subway, chiefly because it is planned that this line will eventually be extended to Six-
teenth Street, and north on Sixteenth Street to the Parkway, and then in a northwest direc-
tion to serve Roxborough, Germantown, etc. Furthermore the delivery on Walnut Street will
be more desirable than on Locust Street, and to that extent will reduce objectionable transfer-
ring. For this side of the route Chestnut Street might be more desirable, as it will involve
building 1,000 feet less of subway and provide better delivery for passengers, thereby reducing
transferring; but Locust Street can be used if deemed absolutely necessary for other than tran-
sit reasons. Walnut Street is suggested as a compromise, believing that Chestnut Street should
be left open for occupancy of future lines.
Locust Street was originally recommended for the south leg of the "Delivery Loop," be-
cause it was then expected that it might promptly be widened to 134 feet, and also because it is
impossible to place a station at Broad and Chestnut Streets unless this side of the Loop be taken
south to Locust Street.
As there is no immediate prospect of widening Locust Street, and as the curves and switches
which formerly controlled that location are eliminated in this plan, there is no engineering rea-
son why either Chestnut Street or Walnut Street may not be used for this portion of the Broad
Street-Northwestern Route.
As the number of streets in the business district available for use by rapid transit lines is
very limited, I feel that it is very important to use such streets efficiently; that is, pass trains
through the business district only once per trip and use only one street as the terminal of two
radial or trunk lines. This, if for no other reason, should force the adoption of through-rout-
ing operation.
Temporary Stub-End Terminals.
The method of operation favored in this report would utilize stub-end terminals at the
northern, southern and western ends of these lines as these stopping points are considered tem-
porary, to be used only until extensions are built on the northern end and additional lines are
brought in and connected on the lower ends, so that through-routing operation can be insti-
tuted.
Train Capacity.
The Broad Street Subway and Loop, as originally recommended, was designed to have a
maximum ultimate capacity of forty 10-car trains per hour over each track (400 cars per
hour).
5
LO
61
The present Market Street Line of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company is operated
with a stub-terminal on the eastern end at South Street Ferry, and is handling a maximum of
thirty-four trains per hour.
The proposition, therefore, to use stub-terminals at Broad and Spruce Streets and at Six-
teenth and Walnut Streets until such time as these lines are extended, is a perfectly good busi-
ness proposition, as there is every probability of these lines being extended long before the
Broad Street section has reached 75 per cent. of its maximum capacity.
Under this plan the important commercial district in the neighborhood of Eighth and
Market Streets, and the financial, hotel and railroad district along Broad Street north of Spruce
Street, will be served equally as well as by the present recommended plan, and by using the di-
rect route along Ridge Avenue the running time from Erie Avenue to Eighth and Market
Streets will be approximately the same as to City Hall Station.
Under these modified plans, the time of transit between Erie Avenue and Eighth and Mar-
ket Streets will be 13 minutes, a saving of 23 minutes over the time required in transit between
these two points by the former "loop" route.
Reasons for Constructing Four Tracks on Broad Street.
The wisdom of recommending the construction of four tracks in Broad Street between
Ridge Avenue and Erie Avenue may be questioned in view of the fact that one of the avowed
reasons for limiting the amount of construction work is to reduce the initial capital outlay, and
it may reasonably be inquired whether it will not be better to construct two tracks only in
Broad Street at this time and divert the money thus saved to the construction of one of the
other branches, such as the Parkway Line or the Woodland Avenue Line.
In the Transit Commissioner's Report of July, 1913, will be found Plan No. 56, showing
that this plan was originally considered, and the original estimates were prepared on a basis
of both four and two tracks.
At that time the estimated cost for the 2-track line from Race Street to Olney Avenue was
approximately $14,000,000, and the additional amount required to add two additional tracks in
the section, between Race Street and Erie Avenue, amounted to about $5,000,000, or about 30
per cent. additional.
As the estimated traffic on the Broad Street Line will be beyond the capacity of a 2-track
subway (400 cars per hour-one way) after 1930, it is not deemed advisable to recommend the
building of two tracks now and in a few years again tearing up the street for the purpose of
adding the other two tracks.
Should the Parkway-Twenty-ninth Street Line to the northwest-be built by 1930, two
tracks on Broad Street will be ample for several years beyond that date. This question, in view
of the service needed by the Parkway, may properly be the subject of a further discussion and
report.
The amount saved on the North Broad Street Line will not be sufficient to build either
of the other branches, and it may cost as much as $10,000,000 to add the other two tracks after
1930. It seems to be a better plan to finish each section of the route complete as far as it may
be carried rather than to again disturb the street-particularly a street like Broad Street,
which is the main automobile thoroughfare north and south.
Should the line be leased to an operator independent of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Company, I might advocate the building of only two tracks now, as the interval before the
other two tracks will be needed will be several years longer.
62

NEW LINES
RIDGE AVE.
TO NORRISTOWN &ALLENTOWN
TO ARDMORE
TO WEST CHESTER
TO MEDIA
TO COLLINGDALE
LANSDOWNE
CHESTNUT HILL
GERMANTOWN
BUSTLETON, BYBERRY, & SOMERTON
BRISTOL & TRENTON
TORRESDALE
OGONTZ AVE.
OLNEY AVE.
OLNEY AVE
OGONTZ
AVE
Future Extension of Express Tracks
OLD YORK ROAD
FOX CHASE
NEW LINES
OLD YORK ROAD
NEW LINES
GERMANTOWN AVE.
WAYNE AVE
ERIE AVE.
NORTH 5TH ST
BOULEVARD
ERIE AVE.
ERIE AVE. Terminal &
Transfer Station
(North End of Step No.2)
ALLEGHENY DO AVE. STATION
N.PHILA. EXPRESS STA.
10
CUMBERLAND OD ST STATION
SUSQUEHANNA 00 AVE. STATION
COLUMBIA O AVE. STATION
GIRARD AVE.
RIDGE AVE. DI
EXPRESS STA.
STATION
SP. GARDEN ST. DOSTA
FUTURE PARKWAY SUBWAY
*VINE ST. 00
Arch St
SP.GARDEN ST. STA.
Vine St
Ridge Ave.
Race St.
PRESENT MARKET ST. SUBWAY-ELEVATED
EXTENSION
CHESTER LINES
FUTURE SOUTHWEST
MEDIA
EDDYSTONE
(West Endof Step Naz)
16th St.
City Hall
Foundation.
Chestnut St.
Walnut St.
fe
-Spruce St
(South End of Step No.2)
Federal St
Bridge St
FRANKFORD ELEVATED
(Step No.1)
Broad St.
Future Extension
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
DIAGRAM OF
MODIFIED RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEM
TO LEAGUE ISLAND
WITH THROUGH ROUTING
(Steps 1 and 2 shown in RED)
JGG
DIAGRAM NO.5
When the territory north of Erie Avenue develops sufficiently to require rapid transit ser-
vice beyond that point, four tracks will be needed from the business center to Erie Avenue.
Construction of Camden Tube.
Under a proper franchise, subject to proper governmental permits and restrictions, per-
mission may be granted the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, or a subsidiary lessee com-
pany, to construct a tunnel connecting the Market Street Line with lines running into New
Jersey, to be built entirely with private capital and to be operated under such terms as to
fares, etc., as may be agreed upon.
Successive Steps and Extensions in the Future.
Step No. 2, which constitutes the trunk or terminal section of the Broad Street Subway,
should, at later dates as yet undetermined and to be fixed by the development and traffic neces-
sities of the city, be utilized to its fullest extent by building rapid transit lines and extensions
to connect therewith, (a) to Roxborough and Germantown, (b) Southwest Philadelphia, (c)
South Philadelphia, (d) Logan, Olney and points north of Erie Avenue; these lines to be
built at such times and in such sequence as traffic may warrant.
A comprehensive plan of through-routing will become effective only when such lines are
built.
The complete system is shown in diagrammatic form on Diagram No. 5.
Time of Construction and Operation.
The time needed for the construction of Step No. 1 should not vary to any extent from that
outlined in the Transit Commissioner's Report of 1913, except insofar as it may be necessary
to delay the final completion of the lines until it is finally determined whether they shall be
leased to the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company or to an independent operator. To com-
plete Step No. 1 (the Frankford Elevated) will probably require about one year after the exe-
cution of an operating contract.
The time necessary to complete Step No. 2 will be practically the three years allowed
under the former program, inasmuch as the time necessary to complete the entire line should be
the time necessary to complete the most difficult or slowest section of the line.
If the money be available and the contracts awarded during the fall of 1916, the lines should
be in operation by the fall of 1919.
Comparison of Cost of Construction-Amount of Loan Suggested.
Appended to this report will be found a comparative statement showing the estimated cost
of the comprehensive construction program as outlined in the 1915 Annual Report, and the
Steps Nos. 1 and 2 as suggested in this report. (See Statement 7.)
As previously stated in the 1915 Report a loan of $50,000,000 was requested to carry out
the construction program as outlined. The estimates used have been the same in each case as
far as possible based on the average prices prevailing in the last two or three years for contract
work of similar character in New York and other cities. In view of the rapid rise in the cost of
steel, cement and labor, which is now taking place, beginning with the latter part of 1915, it
63
may be doubted whether the work can be contracted now on the basis of these estimated
prices. In order to provide against this or any other contingency, I have deemed it wise to
ask that the authorization by the people at the present time for the completion of construction
of Steps Nos. 1 and 2, be made $35,000,000, although this figure should be considerably in excess
of the amount absolutely required, now estimated at about $25,600,000. Bonds should be issued
under this authorization only as needed, hence this authorization should in no wise burden the
City with unnecessary interest charges or with funds lying idle in the City Treasury, and any
balance not used on Steps Nos. 1 and 2 will be available for future steps of the construction pro-
gram.
Why is Construction in Progressive Steps Advised?
For reasons that are largely financial, I advise that the City's program for improved tran-
sit facilities be made to agree with the City's actual needs for such facilities.
The comprehensive system called for by the latest "Taylor Plans" if constructed at the
present time will doubtless call for an outlay within the next three years in excess of $63,000,000;
$6,000,000 has been appropriated for this work, leaving approximately $57,000,000 necessary to
complete this system.
A loan of $50,000,000 was requested in December, and according to a statement of the
Controller, $69,000,000 of the City's borrowing capacity is available and may be applied to this
purpose.
To many people it will probably seem strange, that with this large amount available,
there should be recommended at this time the expenditure of less than $30,000,000, and the con-
struction of but two initial steps of what is intended to eventually be a complete rapid transit
system.
The reason for keeping the initial expenditure within a conservative limit is that any ex-
penditure in excess of this amount, particularly at this time of abnormally high prices, becomes
an unwarranted burden.
A table is appended to this report giving a comparison of the amounts of the City's direct
obligation on the different plans. (See Statements 5 and 6.)
The results are summarized on Statement 2.
In the face of such figures, any proposal for an initial expenditure greater than stated
cannot be justified.
Full consideration has been given to the incidental advantages resulting from other rapid
transit lines, and from extensions beyond the points now advocated, and the construction con-
templated in Steps Nos. 1 and 2 is the result of careful study and consideration of any advan-
tages which the City might derive from a more extensive initial construction.
The final "Taylor Plans" construction program represents a construction outlay of over
$60,000,000 and a deficit in fixed charges will accrue by 1940 in excess of $30,000,000, making
the total cost to the City over $90,000,000. (See Statement 6.)
The progressive method of making provision for future needs is used in practically every
line of business.
The Wanamaker Store and Curtis Building are conspicuous local examples. These enter-
prises have developed by progressive steps extending over several decades, each having been
built to meet the needs of an established business. Had these magnificent buildings been.
erected thirty years ago, they would have been so far in advance of the business requirements
that financial disaster surely must have resulted.
64
If it is sound business to so conduct a private enterprise, the same argument should carry
weight in a city expériment such as contemplated.
The mere fact that the City finds it absolutely necessary to undertake this transportation
enterprise on account of its not being financially attractive to private capital warrants the posi-
tion herein assumed that this experiment, if financed on the City's credit, should be made grad-
ually and with caution.
The mere fact that the City can draw on the taxpayers for the deficit in its interest and
sinking fund obligations, while a private company has not that resource, should be no valid
argument for a reckless expenditure of the people's money.
Nearly every one admits the soundness of the principles underlying the progressive or
step program herein proposed. It is only when it is proposed to apply it to his own district or
locality that opposition is aroused.
here.
This is a psychological and political phase of the problem which it is useless to discuss
Every man should allow his conscience to decide his position when his personal interests and
rights conflict with those of the City.
In this connection it may be well to call attention to a matter which has been apparently
overlooked by the public; namely, that the "Taylor Plans" have never been officially approved
as a whole by Councils and are being constructed on the progressive or step program, so that
the program herein outlined is practically now in effect.
✔
About a year ago $6,000,000 was authorized and appropriated for what was popularly
understood to be a start upon the Frankford Line and the Broad Street Lines.
This initial appropriation of $6,000,000 may be considered as the City's endorsement of
a limited plan of rapid transit consisting of two routes only-and not the entire "Taylor Pro-
gram. As this sum was only about 20 per cent. of the sum estimated as the construction cost
of these routes, it is referred to in this report as Step No. 1 of the construction program.
This sum of $6,000,000 was borrowed at a 6 per cent. rate for interest and sinking fund,
thus drawing $360,000 annually on the tax revenues of the City.
It was explained at that time that it was not desirable to borrow more than the sum of
$6,000,000, which it was estimated would finance the construction contracts until cheaper funds.
were available, these cheaper funds being money borrowed under the new legislation, which
allows the issuance of 50-year bonds with graduated sinking fund and the capitalization of in-
terest and sinking fund during construction and first year of operation.
The only difference between the "Taylor Plan" and what is here advocated is that the
"Taylor Plan" called for about $50,000,000 to finish the comprehensive system in a second
step, whereas this plan contemplates an expenditure of about $25,000,000 in the second step,
leaving the balance to be carried forward when conditions warrant.
Effect of Gradual Construction by Steps on the Lessee of City's System.
The question will be raised whether the method of construction herein outlined is not to
the financial advantage of the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, the assumed lessee of this
system. This question cannot be answered either affirmatively or negatively without full
knowledge of the terms of the lease. It is the lease which will determine the advantages flow-
ing to the lessee-not the construction program. This is further discussed elsewhere.
In a joint and unified method of operation of the surface and rapid transit lines such as
65
is contemplated in this report and in all the former reports of this Department, certain interests
of the City and the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company must be considered as joint.
The Company and the City under the terms of the "Contract of 1907" and the assumed
terms of this lease are virtually partners in a city transportation enterprise and it is not logical
to assume that an advantage can accrue to one partner without a corresponding advantage to
the other, according to such terms as the lease shall provide.
It has been assumed in all discussions that the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company will
have prior claims upon the joint earnings of the lines to the extent of at least receiving its
operating expenses, taxes and the interest on its investment in the new lines and their equip-
ment and such amount as may be agreed upon as a recompense for diverted business in merg-
ing its system with the rapid transit lines. Such claims should also include any agreed financial
damage resulting from the establishment of a universal transfer, or any fare changes which may
be authorized in the "1907 Contract.'
The City will receive its share of the profits only after the allowances to the Company, as
agreed upon, are deducted.
This assumption is a fundamental feature in the form of lease proposed under the "Taylor
Plans."
It will be seen how highly important it is to operate the joint or merged system as efficiently
as possible, which means utilizing the existing system as far as it can be incorporated into the
joint operation, and it should be self-evident that the City's assumed liability should be kept as
small as possible.
Reservation of Space in Broad Street for Through Lines of the Pennsylvania Railroad.
The former reports of this Department have referred to the proposed occupancy of a part
of the space under Broad Street by the tracks of the Pennsylvania Railroad, in order to pro-
vide them with facilities for through-routing some of their local and southern trains.
In order to provide for the joint occupation of the street and avoid interference the reser-
vation for the Pennsylvania Railroad has been placed on the west side of Broad Street and
the tracks of the Broad Street Subway placed on the east side.
The construction of both the systems of tracks at the same time would be an advantage
both to the City and to the Pennsylvania Railroad from a financial standpoint, and a great
convenience from the standpoint of the public as it would not result in tearing Broad Street up
for two different construction periods.
The former reports have, in all cases, assumed that any additional expense resulting to the
City because of this joint arrangement will eventually be paid by the Pennsylvania Railroad and
that such provision will be inserted in any franchise granting the company the use of the City's
streets. Up to the present time these plans are regarded as tentative and study plans only,
worked out with the view of providing for what it is believed will be the future requirements
of its system. As this Department is in hearty sympathy with all legitimate plans to improve
the transportation facilities of the city along lines which seem reasonable and progressive, this
Department has arranged the Broad Street Line so as to reserve such space as seems reasonable.
Change of City Hall Station.
The alignment of the two tracks continuing down Broad Street to Spruce Street should,
in my judgment, be modified in the neighborhood of City Hall so as to remove the station from
!
66

STREET
GIRARD TRUST CO.
SOUTH BROAD STREET
—
—
CHESTNUT
LINCOLN
BUILDING
SOUTH PENN
JUNIPER
SQUARE
COMMERCIAL
TRUST CO
BROAD
15TH
CITY HALL STATION
CONTRACT
NO. 101
CITY
www
HALL
STREET
MARKET
STREET
STREET
BROAD ST. STATION
FILBERT
STREET
STREET
P. R. R.
SUBWAY
PLATFORM
PLATFORM
CITY HALL STATION (RELOCATED)
NORTH BROAD
ST.
MASONIC
TEMPLE
ARCH ST. M.E.
CHURCH
ARCH
STREET
U. G. I. CO.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
REVISED LOCATION
BROAD STREET SUBWAY
CITY HALL STATION
0 20 40
60 FL
MARCH 1ST, 1916
MAP NO. 6
ACADEMY OF FINE ARTS
CHERRY
STREET
underneath City Hall and place the same on a diagonal line running under the proposed
Plaza from Broad Street Station to a point at or near Arch and Broad Streets, thus secur-
ing a greater distance between the City Hall Station and the Chestnut-Walnut Street Station,
which for the present will form the southern and terminal station on this line. This station,
and also the Walnut Street Station, will become 2-track stations instead of 4-track stations as
formerly designed, and recommended by virtue of the Parkway Line being eventually through-
routed to North Broad Street via Sixteenth Street and Walnut Street. This will greatly
simplify both the construction and operation and will avoid all complicated switching arrange-
ments needed for the extreme flexibility of operation which the former "loop" provided in the
matter of right-hand and left-hand train operation around the "loop" in addition to the pro-
vision for through-routing of the North and South Broad Street Lines.
The location of the City Hall Station under the Plaza just north of the City Hall, and
diagonally between Broad Street Station of the Pennsylvania Railroad and Broad and Arch
Streets, will permit the utilizing of Arch Street surface cars for transfers east and west with
much greater facility than the present recommended location and will relieve the pressure and
congestion which will result to the Market Street Subway.
The location of the station beneath the City Hall was brought about as a result of limita-
tions due to track arrangement and three fundamental assumptions:
1. That the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company will either presently or eventually agree
to construct at their expense a 2-track subway east and west under City Hall, thereby operat-
ing their trains on a tangent as a substitute for their present express lines circling the City
Hall.
2. That this being done, the platform of the Fifteenth Street Station will be extended
eastward sufficiently to permit of making this station the main transfer point between the
north-and-south and east-and-west lines. These items have been estimated to cost the Company
at least $500,000.
3. That it is essential to connect the Parkway Line into this station in order to include
it in the transferring arrangements with the Broad Street Lines and to give it a proper ter-
minal.
In my opinion, it will be a fundamental error to make this the main transfer point between.
the cast-and-west and north-and-south lines, since at this point both lines will be carrying their
maximum load, and transferring between lines should be done at point of less congestion and
where better facilities can be arranged to provide for it.
Under these suggested modifications the bulk of the transferring will occur at two points
-Eighth and Market Streets and Broad and Walnut Streets. At both these points facili-
ties can be provided for taking care of such transferring as may be desirable.
A line should be, as far as possible, located and operated so that it will take the people
to the principal points in the business district as directly as possible without the use of transfers.
and I believe that a study of the plans herewith submitted will make it evident that transferr-
ing will be no more, and somewhat less, on this plan than on the plans formerly proposed.
This matter of transfers between rapid transit lines in a unified system is a vital one, and
may be fairly called the controlling one in Philadelphia, and it is only after a careful study
and observation of this situation for a number of years that I feel warranted in suggesting a
change of this character.
67
My objections to the present location of line and station are:
1. Its extremely high cost.
2. It is not the proper place to make a general transfer between rapid transit lines.
3.
The station is too close to the Chestnut Street Station on the south.
4. Liability of damage to the City Hall.
5. There exists no agreement with the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company in regard to
building the Market Street line through the City Hall and extending the Fifteenth Street
Station platforms as contemplated.
6. Excessive depth required.
7. All entrances and exits of the stations are either adjacent to, or inside the City Hall,
necessitating that all passengers cross the inclosing streets, congested with traffic of all kinds.
This is one of the most congested points in the city and this station would increase it by 300
per cent. or more.
The reasons in favor of the proposed location north of City Hall are:
1. Much lower cost of construction-fully $500,000 less than the present plan.
2. Better distribution of stations on the line by increasing the distance between the Race
Street, City Hall and Chestnut-Walnut Street Stations. (See Map No. 7.)
3. No great risk of damage to the City Hall, at least much less than by the other plan.
Platforms much nearer the street surface-about 7 feet.
4.
5. Much better light and air than if placed underneath a building. Station will not be
obstructed with heavy wall and underpinning columns.
6. Allows the utilization of the Arch Street surface line to relieve the Market Street Line.
7. Allows for such amount of transferring as may be deemed necessary to provide at this
station.
8. Permits of sub-surface connections under streets, making less congestion on surface than
otherwise.
Change of Existing Contract for City Hall Station,
The work so far done by the contractor for the City Hall Station consists largely of pre-
paratory and preliminary work, the sinking of sumps for drainage and the excavation of the
material down to approximately the level of the City Hall foundations.
No masonry or permanent work on the station has been placed, and the excavated material
can be readily replaced out of the new work and the City Hall restored to its former condition
without great delay or expense.
Up to date $79,775.47 has been paid the contractor on account of this contract, and the
final figures as to the total additional amount required in making the change cannot be com-
puted for some little time.
The contract under which this work is being done provides as follows:
"CHANGES. Should the Director change the design of any portion of the work or the
requirements of the specifications, the contractor shall conform to such change. If such
68
alteration shall increase the cost of the work to the contractor, the increase will be added to
the contract price to be paid by the City, and if the cost be diminished the amount of such
diminution will be deducted from the contract price. If the alteration should be merely
an increase or decrease in quantities of structure or work for which unit prices are bid and
provided in the contract, the contract price for Item 1 will be increased or diminished by
the difference in quantities at the respective unit prices. Should the change involve work
or material of a class for which the contract does not contain a price the increase or diminu-
tion of expense will be estimated by the Chief Engineer and shall be subject to agreement
between the Director and the contractor before proceeding with the changed work, or at
the discretion of the Director the work may be required to be done under the force account
item of the contract. No loss of prospective profit on portions of work cancelled will be
estimated to the contractor. Any change to be made at an increased cost may, at the op-
tion of the Director, be executed under a separate contract therefor, the work under this
contract being suspended, if necessary, until said changes are completed. The contractor
shall give every facility for making such changes and will not be allowed compensation for
delay, but during any delay that may result the charge for inspection and supervision will
be suspended."
Under this clause the Department appears to have full authority to make such changes as
are recommended in this report and to adjust the contract on a fair and equitable basis, such
adjustment being, of course, subject to the approval of the Mayor and the City Solicitor.
•
If the approval of the alteration be obtained promptly, work can start vigorously and this
contract completed ahead of the remaining section of the Broad Street Line, so that any delay
resulting from this change should not affect the date of opening of the Broad Street Line.
69

Stations
MAP NO. 7
15TH Street
חחחחר
Parkway
Broad Street
13TH Street
JUUUU
300 00
Callowhill Street
Vine Street
300800000U
Race Street
15TH Street
Broad Street
ח
חח
חח
ר
Parkway
Arch Street
Filbert Street
Market Street
CITY HALL
Chestnut Street
பபபடU
INNOI
69
Walnut Street
Locust Street
A
13TH Street
000000
品
​பயப
பபட0
659
Stations
Spruce Street
Plan showing station under City Hall
Modified Plan showing station under City Hall Plaza
and Parkway
BROAD STREET SUBWAY
Showing distribution of Race Street, City Hall and Chestnut Street Stations.
DEFICITS
SURPLUS
,000,000.(SURPLUS)
$1,000,000.
(CURVES BELOW ZERO LINE INDICATE DEFICITS
Steps 1 and 2 of Modified Construction Program
& ABOVE ZERO LINE A SURPLUS)
System as Authorized with Delivery Loop-Plan N°8-1915 Report
Complete System Assumed in Plán Nº 16-1915 Report
$2,000,000.
$3,000,000.
$3,200,000.(DEFICIT)
1915
1920
1925
1930
YEARS
DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING
COMPARATIVE RESULTS TO THE CITY
(ESTIMATED)
FROM OPERATION OF UNIFIED SYSTEM
UNDER DIFFERENT PLANS ON 5 CENT FARE BASIS
CAMDEN TUBE NOT INCLUDED
Figures Used in Plotting Curves Appear in Statement No. 5
1935
1940
1945
BMW
DIAGRAM NO. 7
FINANCIAL OPERATING STATISTICS
In the 1915 Report of this Department fifteen sets of statements are given, showing the
results estimated to be obtained by operating the different lines there recommended under a
lease by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, and an alternate plan assuming the lines
leased by an independent operator. The assumed forms of lease are there stated.
A study of these statements shows that in all cases the City will have to shoulder a heavy
annual deficit in its interest and sinking fund payments over a long period of years, because
the City's share of the net earnings of the lines will be far short of the amount for which the
City must obligate itself.
For the latest plan (complete system) the deficit for the year 1921 is estimated to be over
$2,000,000; by the year 1930 the total of the ten years' deficits will have amounted to over
$20,000,000, and by 1940 to over $30,000,000. (See Statement 6.)
These figures assume that the Camden Tube will be in operation by the Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company, and the entire net earnings of the Camden Tube have been applied as a credit;
otherwise the City's deficits would be considerably larger. (See Statement 5 and Diagram No. 7.)
In order to make a just and proper comparison of the results of operation of the lines sug-
gested herein, with the above results of operation of all the lines recommended in the 1915 re-
port, the same terms of lease are assumed to apply, and the calculations show a deficit in 1921—
the maximum of $815,000, reducing year by year as traffic increases and becoming a surplus
or profit in 1931, the total of the deficits in the preceding ten years amounting to $4,200,000.
This statement shows clearly the great benefit to the City in constructing the rapid transit
lines in successive steps and operating them to the fullest advantage in connection with the sur-
face lines.
Assuming that all the money necessary for the construction of the rapid transit system
has been raised either by the former plans or by the plan recommended in this report, and
the system constructed is ready for operation, what financial results from this operation may
be expected?
Results in comfort and convenience are well understood by the general public, and need
not be discussed here.
During the past three years this Department has estimated the operating results on many
different combinations of lines, and many different methods of operation.
The following statement is taken from the 1915 Report of this Department, and shows the
situation in regard to operating results:
'ESTIMATED FINANCIAL RESULTS OF OPERATION UNDER VARIOUS PLANS
OF CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE."
"As various plans of construction and lease have been discussed and developed, estimates
of the traffic, service and financial results of each to the City and operating company have been
prepared in complete detail.
"The principal of the various plans under consideration during the past year are as fol-
lows:
71
Plan No.
1. System recommended. . . P. R. T. Co. Operator..... Under terms of Program.
2. System recommended... Independent Operator....No transfers with P. R. T. Co. Frank-
ford not connected with Market.
3. System recommended... Independent Operator.... Transfers with P. R. T. Co. Under
4.
assumed joint rate agreement.
Frankford not connected with Mar-
ket.
System authorized.... . . P. R. T. Co. Operator..... Under terms of Program.
5. System authorized...... Independent Operator.... No transfers with P. R. T. Co. Frank-
ford not connected with Market.
6. System authorized...... Independent Operator.... Transfers with P. R. T. Co. Under
assumed joint rate agreement.
Frankford through-routed with
Market.
7. System authorized......Independent Operator.... No transfers with P. R. T. Co. Frank-
ford through-routed with Market
under assumed rental.
8. Same as Plan No. 4, but including Delivery Loop.
9. Same as Plan No. 5, but including Delivery Loop.
10. Same as Plan No. 6, but including Delivery Loop.
11. Same as Plan No. 7, but including Delivery Loop.
12. Broad Street Line as authorized, Independent Operator. No transfer with P. R. T. Co.
13. Same as Plan No. 12, but including Delivery Loop.
14. System authorized, P. R. T. Co. Operator. Under modifications of Program.
15. Same as Plan No. 14, but including Delivery Loop and Woodland Avenue Line.
16. Same as Plan No. 15, but including Northwest Line.
"Plans Nos. 1, 2 and 3 embrace the system recommended by the Department of City
Transit in its Special Report to Councils on February 11, 1915, made in accordance with a reso-
lution of Councils on February 4, 1915.
"Plans Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 7 refer to the system authorized by Councils June 30, 1915, under
various conditions of lease.
"Plans Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 11 embrace the system as authorized by Councils, but including
the Delivery Loop. These plans are given because of the conviction that the Delivery Loop
must necessarily be built as a part of the Broad Street Line.
"Plans Nos. 12 and 13 give the estimated results for the Broad Street Line alone.
"The estimates embraced in Plans Nos. 4 to 13 inclusive were used in the application to
the Public Service Commission for the Certificate of Public Convenience required under the
Public Service Company Act.
"In all the above plans of operation by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company the
terms of the 'Co-operative Program for Rapid Transit Development with Universal Free
Transfers' are assumed to apply. This Program was published in full in the Annual Report
of the Department for 1914, and appears on Statement No. 1 of this report.
72
"In the plans involving operation by a company independent of the Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Company it is assumed that the operating company will be allowed 6 per cent. on
its investment and that the balance of the net income would be divided between City and Com-
pany in proportion to their relative investments. As the security will be good, the Company
could probably borrow money on a 5 per cent. basis, in which case from this source alone it
will have for its profit, expenses, hazard and operating service, an amount equal to 1 per
cent. on the cost of equipment.
"Plans Nos. 14, 15 and 16 contemplate operation by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Com-
pany under a modification of the aforesaid Program as discussed in a previous section of this
report.
"The estimated cost of construction and equipment given for each plan includes interest
during construction and the necessary real estate or easements. The estimated cost of equip-
ment covers that equipment required at the beginning of operation. The investment in equip-
ment will increase from year to year as required by the growth of the traffic.
"Since the preparation of the estimates of cost of construction a contract has been let for
the City Hall Section of the Broad Street Subway at a price fully ten per cent. under the
estimates, and for a large part of the Frankford Elevated Line at a saving of about twenty-
three per cent. Although conditions at the time were unusually favorable for the letting of
such contracts, it is believed that the actual cost of construction throughout will be less than
the estimates."
The fact that it was necessary to estimate so many different ways of operating and making
so many different combinations of lines, shows how hazy, indefinite and uncertain are the
financial results of the enterprise upon which the City is to embark. It shows conclusively that
the operating results cannot be ascertained in advance of certain knowledge as to terms and
conditions of the lease, and by whom the system will be operated.
Under all sixteen of the plans shown there results a deficit from operation. The size of this
annual deficit and the period of years over which it continues vary with the different assump-
tions as to the operator, lines involved, and terms of lease.
It is not necessary in this report to go into the details of these sixteen plans. A tabula-
tion is given on page 28, showing the summary of results on three different assumptions as to
operation, but all providing for unified operation.
These figures present the only argument necessary to support the position which I wish to
urge as one of the features of this report; namely, that the operator and form of lease should be
settled as promptly as possible and in advance of any large amount of construction.
•
I am satisfied that the negotiation of this lease will be long and difficult, for while the City
and the lessee may agree on the fundamentals it will be hard to negotiate a lease which will
be satisfactory from a business standpoint and at the same time prove satisfactory to City
Councils, on account of the pressure which may be brought to bear on representatives of local
districts in Councils for extensions which connot be justified and which the lessee cannot as-
sume. The limit to which the City can go in developing this enterprise is the loss of its total
bond interest and sinking fund charges and although the lessee may agree to the lines author-
ized at the time of the lease, protection will be insisted upon which will limit the demand
for future extensions before they are justified.
Boston early recognized the true function of rapid transit lines in a unified system in
supplementing the surface car service.
Their elevated line has from the first been operated between one transferring terminal
at Sullivan Square in Charlestown and one at Dudley Street on the opposite side of the city,
73
the trains being through-routed across the business district. At each terminal large transfer-
ring accommodations have been provided and the transfer between systems is quick and con-
venient. These terminals are but 42 miles apart, as the Boston situation permits a different
focusing of surface lines from that of Philadelphia. After eight years of operation between the
original terminals the territory served has grown sufficiently to warrant the extension of the
rapid transit line from Charlestown on the north end to Everett, and from Dudley Street
on the south end to Forest Hills, the original terminals being still retained in service.
Surely fifteen years of successful operation of such a combination ought to prove its adaptability
to similar Philadelphia conditions.
The Boston development just described was made by the Company in order to satisfac-
torily and economically meet conditions that closely resemble those above Erie Avenue.
The following quotation from the last report to the Board of Directors of the Boston Ele-
vated Railway Company, referring to the load which that company has been practically
forced to assume by the construction of rapid transit lines in the city of Boston, may be taken
as an index of the Company's attitude toward such lines:
"If any stockholder should be disposed to criticise the management for allowing the
Company to increase its capital investment so rapidly or for assuming the burdens of addi-
tional subways as rapidly as it has done, you must remember that what has been assumed
by the Company is only a small part of what has been demanded by the public, that tre-
mendous pressure is being constantly exerted both before the Legislature and the other
public authorities to compel the Company to incur additional capital expenditures and to
assume the burden of additional subways, and that even in view of what has been done
people who are interested in special projects, many of them involving large expense, con-
demn the Company in unmeasured terms for its refusal to assume additional obligations
which in view of the foregoing it ought not to assume.
"Your Directors are firmly convinced that it is absolutely essential that in the near
future some adequate provision should be made for a substantial increase in the net reve-
nue of the Company. In their judgment no adequate relief is to be expected either from
the ordinary increase in the business, in a reduction of operating expenses or in any de-
crease in the charges ordinarily incident to the capital investment."
There is this difference between the Boston situation and the situation in Philadelphia.
The Boston lines are really under-capitalized, while the Philadelphia Lines are over-capital-
ized, making the Philadelphia Lines less able in their present condition to carry the burdens
which these lines impose. In negotiating this lease the City and the lessee will each have to con-
sider the practical limitations involved, and each must try to recognize that his standpoint is
not the only one from which this undertaking must be viewed.
Up to this time there has been no suggestion on the part of anyone to place any of the
burden upon the ones benefited, namely, the riders. All propositions and suggestions so far
submitted indicate that fares will be reduced under this plan of lease by means of the elimina-
tion of the 8-cent exchanges, and the suggestion has been made to reimburse the Company out
of proceeds of taxes. This is only another means of transferring the burden from parties bene-
fited to other parties for no reason other than political. It is not sound as an economic measure.
Sound economics dictate that for a period of years, until the system no longer requires it, the
fare per journey should be raised sufficiently to provide revenue with which to meet the City's
charges. The extra charge may be readjusted when the earnings of the system reach a point
where the fare can be reduced. Such increase of fare, however, is only suggested as a temporary
expedient.
74
FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF OPERATING DEFICITS
Probable Effect of the Transit Program on City Taxes.
The tables accompanying the 1915 Report showing the estimated deficits in interest and sink-
ing fund charges against the City were calculated on the assumption that the proceeds of the
one mill personal property tax made available under recent legislation will be used wholly to
lighten the burden of these fixed charges resulting from the construction of the City-built rapid
transit lines. Actually this extra revenue is now merged into the City's income, and as the law
does not specifically devote it to rapid transit purposes it should not (in stating the actual
City deficits) be considered as an offset to the deficit in the fixed charges. The comparative
figures (see Statements 5 and 6) do not include this tax as a credit to the operation of the lines.
It seems probable now that the deficit shown must be paid annually to the Sinking Fund
Commissioners out of the general tax revenues of the City. This will probably necessitate an
increase in the tax rate on real estate amounting to 4 or 5 cents per hundred dollars if the Step
Program outlined be followed, or an increase of 10 to 15 cents if the larger plan be adopted.
These deficits result as a consequence of the desire of the City that its residents shall enjoy
better transit facilities than private capital seems willing to provide on a 5-cent fare basis with
universal free transfers.
How are these Deficits to be Met?
The preceding article and Statement 2 show that the comprehensive system, if built and
operated as there assumed, will probably produce a drain upon the City's treasury of upwards
of $30,000,000 in 25 years.
This deficit of $30,000,000 in fixed charges in twenty-five years, averaging over $1,000,000
per year, can be met in only two ways. As the City has issued the construction bonds and is
therefore liable for the interest and sinking fund, any deficit will probably appear eventually
as an additional tax on real estate, or as an increase in car fares. At the beginning this tax may
represent an increase of 15 cents per $100 of assessed valuation, and will probably average 10
cents for a period of twenty-five years.
In my opinion, the deficits as now estimated are liable to be larger rather than smaller than
shown.
The annual deficit resulting from the operation of Steps Nos. 1 and 2 is estimated to dis-
appear in about ten years, and the accumulation to amount to a total of approximately $4,000,000,
or a total cost to the City by the year 1930 of less than $36,000,000 as compared with
$81,000,000 for the entire plan if constructed as an initial system, and by the year 1940 the
City's accumulated deficits will have decreased because of annual profits so that up to that
time the City's total investment will be less than $32,000,000 as compared with $90,000,000 for
the entire plan if constructed initially. As the maximum estimated annual deficit under the
suggested plan reaches only $815,000 and averages less than one-half that on the "Taylor Plan”
the resulting increase of the tax rate should not exceed 5 cents per $100 for a period of ten
years.
The deficits for the entire plan constructed as an initial system under Plan No. 16 of the
1915 Annual Report of this Department are based on the assumption that the Camden Tube be
75
built and operated by the Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company. The entire net earnings of the
Camden Tube are applied as a credit against any preferential payment to the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company on account of net income diverted from the surface system by the new
high-speed system. IF THIS TUBE BE NOT BUILT, OR THE NET EARNINGS NOT SO APPLIED, THE DE-
FICITS TO THE CITY WILL BE CONSIDERABLY LARGER. (See Statement 5.)
It is open to question how far the City is justified in using money raised from general taxa-
tion to pay deficits resulting from the operation of a City-owned rapid transit system.
In my judgment it should not be done except as a last resort, and then only to a limited
extent.
The alternative is a higher fare for the improved service.
Who Should Carry the Burden of Deficits Resulting from a Unified System?
A tax on real estate is the most common method of raising municipal revenue, as real
estate is the most tangible property upon which to levy taxes, and it is furthermore supposed
to bear more equitably upon the citizens than other forms of taxation. There may be good
grounds for questioning the justice and expediency of levying such a tax in order to make up
deficits in the City Treasury resulting from the City's participation in public utilities like pas-
senger railways.
The basis for proposing such a tax in the present case probably rests upon the following
assumptions:
(a) That in the real estate tax the owner will carry the burden-not the tenant.
(b) That a 5-cent fare is all that it is expedient to charge the car rider for a single trip
on a unified transportation system.
(c) That any increase of carfare must be made uniform over the unified system.
(d) That a uniform increase in fare would directly affect the entire population of the
city while an increase in real estate taxes would directly affect only about one-quarter of the
inhabitants of the city.
(e) That an indirect tax on real estate to meet the deficit is preferable to a direct per-
sonal tax in the shape of increased fare.
Considering these assumptions in the order given, it may be stated that the assumption
that the owner of the real estate pays the taxes will be recognized as a fallacy when it is under-
stood that every piece of property is occupied by a tenant. The fact that the owner may
be the tenant does not alter the fact that he is a tenant nevertheless, and his rent consists of
the sum of three items, (a) interest on the value of his property, (b) taxes, and (c) repairs and
maintenance. Any increase in taxes on the property, while he pays it as an owner, he also pays it
as a tenant. In a rented property the increase of taxes is added to the rent wherever pos-
sible. When, owing to economic conditions, this is not possible it is reflected in a fall in the
value of the real estate affected. Since with this explanation, all residents of the city are ten-
ants, it is readily seen that it is largely a matter of expediency whether the burden be dis-
tributed as an indirect tax over the real estate of the City or by a direct personal tax in the
shape of adjusted carfare.
The assumption that a 5-cent fare is all that it is expedient to charge for a single journey
on the unified system would give the impression that the average fare on the present system is
5 cents only. As a matter of fact for the last six years the average fare per journey has been
76
5.176¢, and for the year 1915 was 5.166¢, this increase above 5 cents being occasioned by the
additional revenue from the 8-cent exchange tickets (Statement 9). I have observed the attitude
of the public in the last two years on this question of fares and believe that the opposition of the
public to the exchange tickets, and the demand for uniform 5-cent fare, result more from the
feeling of injustice connected with the situation than from the money which is involved. Statis
tics show that only about 6 per cent. of the riders use these exchange tickets and the irritation
which they create is out of all proportion to the number of people affected. It is the injustice
of the situation by which free transfers are available at certain points while at other points,
equally or more deserving, 3 cents additional is charged. It is this unjust discrimination which
creates the irritation.
In the unification of the system, for which the lease of the new lines should provide, this
source of irritation should be eliminated.
Elsewhere in this report the question of adjustment of car fares has been discussed and Dia-
gram No. 6 is included showing that, assuming the unified system be in operation in 1921 as per
Plan No. 16 of the 1915 Annual Report of this Department, the increase of the average pas-
senger fare per trip to about 5.59¢ per passenger should carry all charges involved in a de-
velopment of the unified system, protect the existing system to an equitable degree as outlined
in the assumed lease, and relieve the City Treasury from any drain-in other words make the
unified system self-supporting.
If the Frankford Line to Bridge Street and the trunk section of the Broad Street Line
(being what is elsewhere referred to as Steps Nos. 1 and 2 of the Comprehensive System) be
constructed and in operation by 1920, it is very probable that the increase in the average fare
required to provide for the City's investment will be very much less than if the comprehensive
system be built.
Depending entirely upon the terms under which the system is leased the average fare prob-
ably required will be about 5.30 cents.
If such adjustment be made, the public should understand in advance that this increase is
not for the benefit of the existing Company but it is a direct tax laid upon the system by the
City in accordance with the terms of the Contract of 1907, and all revenue in excess of the
present fare should be collected by the Company and paid directly into the City Treasury as a
part of the City's income. There is ample precedent for this method of financing the operat-
ing deficits as a similar plan has been in use for many years in Boston in connection with the
East Boston Tunnel under Boston Harbor. In this case the Boston Elevated Railroad collects
6 cents per passenger per trip in either direction, and one cent of this is paid into
the City Treasury to carry the interest and sinking fund charges upon the cost of the tunnel.
It is identical in principle with what the City is now doing in connection with its own gas
works. The United Gas Improvement Company collects from the customers $1.00 per thousand
feet of gas, turning into the City Treasury quarterly 20 per cent. of their gross collections as
rental for use of the City's plant.
In order to reach the average fare stated above (should it be decided that an increase of
the average fare be made in order to meet these deficits), there seems to be no logical reason
why the fare should be uniform as between the two systems. The fare on the surface system
might properly be left at 5 cents, and the fare on the rapid transit lines be made of sufficient
amount so that the average fare resulting would be the figure necessary to carry the entire
proposition. This method would have the further advantage of requiring the lines in the City's
system to more directly earn the money required to carry the new investment in such lines, and
it would further have the advantage of placing the burden upon those people who are more
6
77
directly benefited and who are able to avail themselves of the advantages of the new lines.
Proper arrangements for transferring can undoubtedly be devised, and elsewhere a tentative
suggestion for such arrangement is made for discussion only. In all cases it should be evident
that eventually the ultimate consumer-in this case the citizen-must pay the resulting tax, and
he alone must decide in which shape he prefers to have it levied. The City cannot default on
its interest.
What Adjustment of Carfare Would be Necessary to Make the Unified System Self-Supporting?
Attached to this report is a diagram giving the average fare which the present company has
collected for a single journey since the year 1900, and this diagram has been projected into the
future, using the assumed income, operating expenses, passengers and other data used in the
estimation of the results shown in the 1915 Report of this Department. (See Diagram No. 6.)
Assuming that the comprehensive system recommended in the 1915 Report had been in
operation in 1915 on a uniform fare with universal transfers, all as contemplated under the last
suggestions as to lease, and assuming that no increase of passengers would have resulted from
the use of these new lines, the average fare necessary to produce the revenue probably would
have been 7.01¢. This would have permitted a return of 3 per cent. only on the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company stock. The operating expenses were assumed at 70 per cent., about
the same as those of Boston for the same year. The year 1915 being a year of low earnings
makes the operating percentage particularly high. (See Statement 10.)
The following statements show what fare will be required under different assumptions to
produce sufficient revenue to make the system self-supporting, and the diagram attached shows,
on the basis of the assumed terms of the lease and assumed income and passengers carried,
what fare will be required over a period of years in order to meet the requirements of the uni-
fied system. (See Statements 10, 11 and 12 and Diagram No. 6.)
This brings out some of the difficulties mentioned earlier in the report, and shows how it
may be possible to readjust the fare at stated intervals, as in the case of the gas lease, or at
the City's option, whenever the annual surplus earnings reach certain amounts.
These are matters to be provided for in any lease of the system, and show one of the many
difficulties for which provision must be made in a contract running over a 50-year period.
This also clearly shows that should a fare adjustment be determined upon it might become de-
sirable to introduce some form of ticket system such as "7 tickets for 40 cents" with possibly
an adjustment later of "9 tickets for 50 cents."
Diagram No. 6 clearly shows that before the expiration of the lease the ideal aimed at may
be realized and the 5-cent fare with universal transfers on the unified system may be attained.
To accomplish this, however, it will require that the system be extended as a business proposi-
tion and not be subject to unreasonable sectional demands or made the football of politics.
78
AVERAGE
FARE
(F) Surplus in excess of 6% on actual cash investment of Union
Traction and Philadelphia Rapid Transit Companies
6
CENTS
.90
(A)
(B)
.80
.70
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20
(E) Average Fare required to support "Unified System"
assumed under PLAN No. 16 of 1915 Annual Report
of the Department of City Transit including City's
Interest and sinking fund charges and allowing 6%
on capital stock of Union Traction and Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Companies in present System.
Increase in present fare limited to amount necessary
to support City's Investment
SUGGESTED
(G) Deficiency in net income necessary
for 6% return on actual cash invest
ment of Union Traction and Phila-
delphia Rapid Transit companies.
6) 2
PRO/GRAM
OF
(C)
DIAGRAM SHOWING ACTUAL FARE REQUIREMENTS
OF UNIFIED SYSTEM ASSUMED UNDER PLAN NO. 16
1915 ANNUAL REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF CITY TRANSIT
ALSO SHOWING A SUGGESTED PROGRAM
OF FARE ADJUSTMENT
1920 TO 1950
LEGEND
Surplus in Excess of 6% on Actual Cash Investment of Union Traction
and Philadelphia Rapid Transit Cos. in Present System
CENTS
6
5.90
Deficency in Net Income of 6% on Actual Cash Investment of Union
Traction and Philadelphia Rapid Transit Cos. in Present System
Surplus to be divided between City and Company
5.80
(H) Surplus to be divided between City and
Company
suggested program of fare
adjustment.
5.70
5.60
5.50
FARE
5.40
ADJUSTMENT
5.30
5.20
.10
CENTS
KB) Average Fare required to sup-
port Present System allowing
6% on actual money invested by
Union Traction and Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Companies.
(A) Average Fare of Present System
actual from 1900 to 1915
(C) Average Fare required to support
"Unified System"assumed under PLAN
No.16 of 1915 Annual Report of the
Department of City Transit including
City's interest and sinking fund charges
and allowing 6% on actual cash invest~
ment of Union Traction and Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Companies in present
system.
(D)
(D) Average Fare required to support "Unified System"
assumed under PLAN No. 16 of 1915 Annual Report
of the Department of the City Transit without City's
interest and Sinking fund charges, but allowing 6%
on actual cash investment of Union Traction and
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Companies in present
system.
FU.T.CO-PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT CO
40
CENTS
1900
1905
1910
1915
1920 YEARS
1925
1930
1935
1940
1945
CENTS
CENTS
DIAGRAM NO.6.
4
1950
AVERAGE
Сл
FARE
Year to
June 30
COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL RESULTS TO THE CITY FROM OPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT PLANS
(OPERATION BY PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY)
Financial Results to the City from Opera-
tion of the Recommended Comprehen-
sive System as Outlined in Plan No.
16 of the 1915 Annual Report
(Camden Tube Not Included)
(CAMDEN TUBE NOT INCLUDED)
Financial Results to the City from Oper-
ation of the Lines Authorized by City
Councils, but Including Delivery Loop
Under Terms of Co-operative
Program of May 27, 1914
(Camden Tube Not Included)
STATEMENT 5
Financial Results to the City from Operation of Steps
1 and 2 as Outlined in This Report
(Camden Tube Not Included)
Net Income City's Interest
Applicable to and Sinking
City's Charges Fund Charges
City's Annual
Deficit
Net Income City's Interest
Applicable to and Sinking
City's Charges Fund Charges
City's
Annual
Deficit
Net Income City's Interest
Applicable to and Sinking
City's Charges Fund Charges
City's Annual
Deficit
1918
1919
0
$360,000
$360,000
0
$360,000
$360,000
$121,200
$360,000
$238,800
595,200
595,200
$13,600
595,200
581,600
186,400
423,800
237,400
1920
0
!
1
789,700
789,700
76,800
595,200
518,400
532,800
423,800
(Surplus)=109,000
1921
0
2,361,200
2,361,200
246,100
2,166,700
1,920,600
734,900
1,550,100
815,200
1922
0
2,361,200
2,361,200
292,100
2,166,700
1,874,600
932,300
1,550,100
617,800
1923
0
2,361,200
2,361,200
552,200
2,166,700
1,614,500
1,043,100
1,550,100
507,000
1924
0
2,693,500
2,693,500
846,800
2,166,700
1,319,900
1,130,200
1,550,100
419,900
1925
0
2,707,400
2,707,400
825,200
2,180,600
1,355,400
1,131,200
1,553,800
422,600
1926
0
3,091,800
3,091,800
955,700
2,180,600
1,224,900
1,226,000
1,553,800
327,800
1927
$170,800
3,184,200
3,013,400
1,050,700
2,273,000
1,222,300
1,307,800
1,620,000
312,300
1928
540,500
3,184,200
2,643,700
1,134,900
2,273,000
1,138,100
1,407,800
1,620,000
212,200
1929
1930
722,900
906,800
3,184,200
2,461,300
1,223,100
2,273,000
1,049,900
1,482,200
1,620,000
137,800
3,203,800
2,297,000
1,324,300
2,273,000
948,700
1,568,300
1,620,000
51,600
Total 1918 to
1930, incl.
$2,341,000 $30,077,600 $27,736,600
$8,541,500 $23,670,400 $15,128,900
$12,804, 200
$16,995,600
$4,191,400
1931
$1,079,000
$3,203,800 $2,124,800
$1,417,500
$2,273,000
$855,500
$1,661,000
$1,620,000
(Surplus)=$41,000
1932
1,240,000
1
3,238,800
1,998,800
1,510,000
2,286,900
776,900
1,755,400
1,623,800
(Surplus)=131,600
1933
1,400,000
3,251,100
1,851,100
1,602,500
2,286,900
684,400
1,841,300
1,623,800
(Surplus)=217,500
1934
1,573,000
3,343,500
1,770,500
1,695,000
2,379,300
684,300
1,932,400
1,690,100
(Surplus)=242,300
1935
1,745,000
3,343,500
1,598,500
1,787,500
2,379,300
591,800
2,042,500
1,690,100
(Surplus)=352,400
1936
1,920,000
3,343,500
1,423,500
1,880,000
2,379,300
499,300
2,182,700
1,690,100
(Surplus)=492,600
1937
2,095,000
3,363,100
1,268,100
1,972,500
2,379,300
406,800
2,223,700
1,690,100
(Surplus)=533,600
1938
2,270,000
3,363,100
1,093,100
2,065,000
2,379,300
314,300
2,314,900
1,690,100
(Surplus)=624,800
1939
2,445,000
3,398,100
953,100
2,157,500
1940
2,620,000
3,409,400
789,400
2,250,000
Total
1918 to
1940, incl.
$20,728,000
$63,335,500
$42,607,500
$26,879,000
(Surplus)=712,100
(Surplus)=803,100
$40,400
NOTE:-No account taken of proceeds of the one mill personal property tax credited as an income to the City in aid of transit development and included at
$280,000 per year in former estimates of this department.
2,393,200
235,700
2,405,900
1,693,800
2,393,200
143,200
2,496,900
1,693,800
$47,200,100
$20,321,100
$33,660,900
$33,701,300
79
COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL RESULTS TO THE CITY FROM OPERATION UNDER DIFFERENT PLANS
(OPERATION BY PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY)
Financial Results to the City from Oper-
ation of the Recommended Comprehen-
sive System as Outlined in Plan No.
16 of 1915 Annual Report
Financial Results to the City from Oper-
ation of the Lines Authorized by City
Councils, but Including Delivery Loop
Under Terms of Co-operative
Program of May 27, 1914
STATEMENT 6
Financial Results to the City from Operation of Steps
1 and 2 as Outlined in This Report
Year to
June 30
Net Income City's Interest
Applicable to and Sinking
City's Charges Fund Charges
City's Annual
Deficit
Net Income City's Interest
Applicable to and Sinking
City's Charges Fund Charges
City's
Annual
Deficit
Net Income City's Interest
Applicable to and Sinking
City's Charges Fund Charges
City's Annual
Deficit
1918
0
$360,000
$360,000
0
$360,000
$360,000
$121,200
$360,000
$238,800
1919
0
595,200
595,200
$13,600
595,200
581,600
186,400
423,800
237,400
1920
0
789,700
789,700
312,200
595,200
283,000
532,800
423,800
(Surplus)=109,000
1921
$304,600
2,361,200
2,056,600
490,400
2,166,700
1,676,300
734,900
1,550,100
815,200
1922
613,000
2,361,200
1,748,200
705,700
2,166,700
1,461,000
932,300
1,550,100
617,800
1923
624,100
2,361,200
1,731,100
790,800
2,166,700
1,375,900
1,043,100
1,550,100
507,000
1924
794,300
2,693,500
1,899,200
900,800
2,166,700
1,265,900
1,130,200
1,550,100
419,900
1925
859,500
2,707,400
1,847,900
861,000
2,180,600
1,319,600
1,131,200
1,553,800
422,600
1926
851,600
3,091,800
2,240,200
955,700
2,180,600
1,224,900
1,226,000
1,553,800
327,800
1927
1,030,500
3,184,200
2,153,700
1,050,700
2,273,000
1,222,300
1,307,800
1,620,000
312,300
1928
1,194,300
3,184,200
1,989,900
1,134,900
2,273,000
1,138,100
1,407,800
1,620,000
212,200
1929
1,409,400
3,184,200
1,774,800
1,223,100
2,273,000
1,049,900
1,482,200
1,620,000
137,800
1930
1,625,900
3,203,800
1,577,900
1,324,300
2,273,000
948,700
1,568,300
1,620,000
51,600
Total, 1918 to
1930, incl.
1931
1932
$9,307,200 $30,077,600 $20,770,400
$1,746,000 $3,203,800 $1,457,800
1,886,000
$9,763,200 $23,670,400 $13,907,200
$12,804,200 $16,995,600
$4,191,400
$1,417,500
$2,273,000
$855,500
$1,661,000 $1,620,000
(Surplus)=$41,000
3,238,800
1,352,800
1,510,000
2,286,900
776,900
1,755,400
1,623,800
(Surplus)=131,600
1933
2,026,000
3,251,100
1,225,100
1,602,500
2,286,900
684,400
1,841,300
1,623,800
(Surplus)=217,500
1934
2,166,000
3,343,500
1,177,500
1,695,000
2,379,300
684,300
1,932,400
1,690,100
(Surplus)=242,300
1935
2,306,000
3,343,500
1,037,500
1,787,500
2,379,300
591,800
2,042,500
1,690,100
(Surplus)=352,400
1936
2,446,000
3,343,500
897,500
1,880,000
2,379,300
499,300
2,182,700
1,690,100
(Surplus)=492,600
1937
2,586,000
3,363,100
777,100
1,972,500
2,379,300
406,800
2,223,700
1,690,100
(Surplus)=533,600
1938
2,726,000
3,363,100
637,100
2,065,000
2,379,300
314,300
2,314,900
1,690,100
(Surplus)=624,800
1939
2,866,000
3,398,100
532,100
2,157,500
2,393,200
235,700
2,405,900
1,693,800
1940
3,006,000
3,409,400
403,400
2,250,000
2,393,200
143,200
2,496,900
1,693,800
(Surplus)=712,100
(Surplus)=803,100
Total, 1918 to
1940, incl.
$33,067,200
$63,335,500
$30,268,300
$28,100,700
$47,200,100
$19,099,400
$33,660,900
$33,701,300
$40,400
80
NOTE:-No account taken of proceeds of the one mill personal property tax credited as an income to the City in aid of transit development and included at
$280,000 per year in former estimates of this department.
The net income of Camden tube is included as a credit against preferential payments to Company in all results except for Steps 1 and 2, as outlined in
this report.
STATEMENT 7
Miles
Miles
of
line
of
Estimated
track
cost as orig-
puted
Frankford Line
Arch Street to Bridge Street.
6.34
12.68
$5,600,000
Bridge Street to Rhawn Street.
3.00
6.00
1,800,000
COMPARISON OF OUTLAY-FOR 3-YEAR PERIOD
Lines recommended in 1915
Department Report
inally com-
Estimated
cost as car-
ried in 1915
Report
Lines authorized
by Councils plus
Delivery Loop.
Estimated cost
as originally
computed
} $5,700,000 {
Steps 1 and 2
Miles
Miles
Present
of
suggestions.
line
of
track
Estimated cost
on original
basis
$5,600,000
1,800,000
$5,600,000
6.34
12.68
Byberry surface line on private right-of-way; con-
struction only
9.45
18.90
1,100,000
1,100,000
1
Broad Street Line
Broad Street, Pike Street to Olney Avenue.
2.16
4.32
4,200,000
3,900,000
Northwest Branch from Logan_
2.00
4.00
2,100,000
2,100,000
4,200,000
2,100,000
Northeast Branch, on Northeast Boulevard.
2.1
4.2
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
| | 1
111.
| 11
Connection to yard.
300,000
0.3
0.6
Pike Street to Ridge Avenue (4-track)
3.18
12.72
12,700,000
11,200,000
12,700,000
12,700,000
3.18
12.72
Ridge Avenue to Spruce Street on Broad Street.
1.40
5.60*
7,800,000
6,900,000
7,800,000
5,000,000+
1.4
2.8
Ridge Avenue, Eighth, Walnut to Sixteenth Street
(2-track)
6,700,000
2.1
4.2
Loop- 3 sides, with curves into Broad Street.
1.50
3.00
7,600,000
6,300,000
7,600,000
Spruce Street to League Island-
1
3.4
6.8
5,100,000
4,800,000
5,100,000
Darby-Woodland Avenue Elevated_
5.43
10.86
4,200,000
3,200,000
Parkway Line-Twenty-ninth Street.
8.09
16.18
7,500,000
7,500,000
Real Estate
2,300,000
1,800,000
Total
38.60
86.36
$63,500,000
$56,000,000
2,100,000
$50,500,000
1,300,000
$31,600,000
13.32
33.00
(Above figures allow 20 per cent. for engineering, in-
terest and sinking fund, during construction and
first year of operation.)
81
Already appropriated-(Step 1)
Balance, estimated amount, needed.
Chestnut Street Subway-not included above.
Size of loan requested.
City's Annual Interest and Sinking Fund Charges:
$6,000,000 at 6 per cent.
New loan at 42 per cent.
t
1
1
1
6,000,000
$57,500,000
8,500,000
6,000,000
$50,000,000
50,000,000
6,000,000
$44,500,000
6,000,000
$25,600,000
35,000,000
111
* 4-track.
$360,000
2,250,000
$2,610,000
† 2-track
$360,000
1,575,000
$1,935,000
NOTE.-Round figures only. All figures are based on 1914 and 1915 prices and probably too low for present conditions. At time 1915 Report was prepared it
was the judgment of the officials of the Department that the entire program of construction, in the light of contracts let during 1915, could be com-
pleted for $56,000,000. These estimates were accordingly revised and the revised figures appear in the 1915 Report. This assumption was based on the
fact that contracts let during the latter part of 1915 were more than 10 per cent. below the original estimates. It is further possible that the high
prices now prevailing are temporary and will not govern the cost. If this should prove to be the case, the present suggestions-Steps 1 and 2-should
be estimated at $28,000,000 instead of $31,600,000 as shown above.
.
STATEMENT 8
COMPARISON OF TOTAL INVESTMENT (CITY AND COMPANY) AND 1913 POPULATION
SERVED BY STEPS 1 AND 2 OF MODIFIED PROGRAM AS OUTLINED IN THIS REPORT WITH TAYLOR PLAN
(Step No. 1)
Frankford
Elevated
(To Bridge St.
only)
Construction Steps
(Step No. 2)
North Broad St.
Subway
Lines as authorized
by City Councils with
Total Steps 1 and 2 addition of Delivery
of Modified
Program
Loop and Darby Line
"Taylor Plan"
1,358,100
310,600
$139.20
8.69
$63,548,000 (A)
$204.58
14.72
(To Erie Avenue)
1913 population in time-saving area-actual_
1913 population brought within 25-minute ride from Mar-
ket Street by proposed rapid transit lines..
Total capital invested (City and Company-1921)
Investment per capita of 1913 population brought within
25-minute zone
361,100
543,100
904,200
162,200
$8,205,000
121,600
$31,301,000
283,800
$39,506,000
$50.59
$257.41
Total area (square miles) brought within 25-minute ride..
4.09
4.6
(A) Does not include Chestnut Street Subway or Northwest Line.
82
STATEMENT 9
AVERAGE FARE PER REVENUE JOURNEY RECEIVED BY
THE PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY FROM 1900 to 1915
Passenger Revenue
per Journey
Year
Passenger Revenue
Journeys
1900
$12,966,291
211,408,458
6.147 cents
1901
13,269,465
203,576,907
6.518
1902.
13,969,233
1903
15,268,524
250,685,298
6.091
1904
15,912,971
258,557,794
6.155
66
1905_
16,188,646
255,929,337
6.325
1906
17,483,145
273,665,507
6.389
66
1907_
18,085,519
366,278,018
4.938
1908_
18,288,763
389,618,031
4.694
66
1909.
18,317,530
386,394,566
4.741
66
1910-
17,991,001
346,244,502
5.196
66
1911.
20,612,687
397,127,083
5.190
1912-
21,727,468
418,963,705
5.186
66
1913.
23,020,932
445,771,313
5.164
1914
23,356,876
453,284,000 (A)
5.153
1915
22,971,595
444,687,000 (A)
5.166
(A) Estimated amounts for exchanges and deadheads have been deducted from the
actual amount of fare passengers for these amounts.
83
STATEMENT 10
ESTIMATED AVERAGE FARE REQUIRED PER REVENUE JOURNEY
DURING 1915 IF LINES ASSUMED FOR PLAN No. 16 OF 1915
ANNUAL REPORT OF DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN IN OPERATION.
REQUIREMENTS.
Operating Expenses and Taxes-Whole System (70% of Gross). $16,690,000
Company's Interest (Surface and Market)
2,259,471
Company's Rentals
7,364,997
City Sinking Fund (1907 Contract)
120,000
6% on Investment in Equipment of Rapid Transit Lines.
900,000
Amortization of Equipment Investment (begun later)
City's Interest and Sinking Fund Charges (A)
2,693,000
Total Requirements
$30,027,468
Revenue Derived from Sources Other than Passenger.
872,000
Passenger Revenue Required..
$29,155,468
Journeys, 1915
444,687,000
Passenger Revenue per Journey Required.
6.56¢
$31,155,468
7.01¢
If 3% be Allowed for Dividends on Phila. Rapid Transit Stock.. $2,000,000
Passenger Revenue Required.
Passenger Revenue per Journey Required.
Gross Revenue, 1915 = $23,843,605.
(A) Chestnut Street Subway not included.
84
STATEMENT 11
ESTIMATED AVERAGE FARE PER REVENUE JOURNEY NECES-
SARY TO SUPPORT ENTIRE TAYLOR SYSTEM IF IN OPERATION
IN 1915.
IDEAL SYSTEM.
FIXED CHARGES EQUAL TO 6% ON $125,000,000.
(Valuation of $125,000,000 Assumed for Present System.)
Operating Expenses and Taxes-all Lines (70% of Gross)
Fixed Charges-Surface and Market (6% of $125,000,000)
City's Sinking Fund (1907 Contract)
$16,690,000
7,500,000
120,000
6% on Investment in Equipment-High-speed Lines ($15,000,000).
900,000
Amortization of Equipment Investment (Assumed not begun until
later)
City's Interest and Sinking Fund Charges (A)
2,693,000
Total.
$27,903,000
Revenue Derived from Other Sources
Required Passenger Revenue
872,000
$27,031,000
Journeys-Year to June 30, 1915.
Passenger Revenue Required per Journey, 1915.
(A) Does not include charges on Chestnut Street Subway.
444,687,000
6.08¢
85
STATEMENT 12
ESTIMATED AVERAGE FARE PER REVENUE JOURNEY NECES-
SARY TO SUPPORT BROAD STREET LINE, DELIVERY LOOP,
FRANKFORD LINE TO RHAWN STREET AND DARBY LINE.
YEAR TO JUNE 30, 1921.
ALLOWING PHILADELPHIA RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY ITS PRESENT FARE 5.166¢
AND CITY'S 0.425¢-5.591 CENTS.
(Based on Modification of Plan No. 16 of 1915 Annual Report of Department of
City Transit.)
Operating Expenses and Taxes-all Lines.
Interest and Rental-Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company
$18,028,200
9,376,900
City's Sinking Fund (Suspended-to be made up later)
5% on Investment in Equipment of Rapid Transit Lines and Sur-
face Lines ($19,500,000)
975,000
Amortization of Equipment Investment (begins in 1925)
City's Interest and Sinking Fund Charges.
2,361,200
Surplus Available for Philadelphia Rapid Transit Stock.
1,417,800
Total Requirements.
$32,159,100
Revenue Derived from Other Sources.
1,090,000
Passenger Revenue Required to Support the Service.
$31,069,100
Estimated Journeys, 1921
555,699,000
Passenger Revenue per Journey
5.591¢
Total deficit
City's Interest and Sinking Fund. 0.425¢- $2,361,000
on 5¢ fare
Company's shortage below pres-
ent fare
0.166¢- 923,000
0.5914— $3,284,000
NOTE.-The Northwest Line and Chestnut Street Subway are not included
above, as it is assumed that operation has not yet begun on these lines.
86
APPENDIX A
BUILDING OF RAPID TRANSIT LINES IN NEW YORK CITY BY ASSESSMENT
UPON PROPERTY BENEFITED.
(A Memorandum Addressed to the Board of Estimate and Apportionment and The
Public Service Commission of New York City by The City Club of New York, October
2, 1908.)
"For many years the city has deemed it just to assess upon abutting property the cost of
opening streets and building sewers. The theory of such a tax upon property is that it receives
almost the exclusive benefit from the construction of a street or sewer adjacent to it. The
question naturally arises, does not a transit line, by the benefit that it confers, fall in the same
class as new streets and sewers? If a street railroad or rapid transit line be extended into an
undeveloped territory, is it not built primarily for the purpose of furnishing transit facilities
to future residents in that section? People will buy this property primarily because it has
good transit facilities and the value placed upon it is largely based upon its accessibility. THIS
BEING TRUE AND UNIVERSALLY ADMITTED, WHY SHOULD NOT THE PROPERTY THUS ENHANCED IN
VALUE BY THE EXTENSION TO IT OF A TRANSIT LINE PAY FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUCH LINE, TO
THE EXTENT THAT THE INCREASED VALUE WARRANTS IT, INSTEAD OF RECEIVING SUCH INCREASED
VALUE AS A PRESENT FROM THE CITY. This principle, in a modified and unofficial form, is oper-
ated in Berlin. The assessment is not collected by the city, but the street car company when
extending a line to outlying territory requires the owners of the property benefited to guar-
antee to the company a certain return upon the cost of such extension.
"To throw light upon the above question, the City Club has been making some painstak-
ing investigations, extending over several months, of the rise in value of land along the present
subway. The method of arriving at these values was as follows: Assessment values, as given
by the Department of Taxes and Assessments, were taken for the year of 1900 on vacant lots on
a basis of 60 per cent. of full value for the district from 79th Street to the Spuyten Duyvil;
65 per cent. between Central Park and Harlem River, and 60 per cent. in the Bronx. These
were compared with the assessment values of 1907 on a 90 per cent. basis for all these districts,
and in each case the full value was obtained by raising the assessment figures to 100 per cent.
In the districts which were largely built up all vacant lots were listed. Where there were few
buildings, as in the extreme northern portion of Manhattan, a sufficient number of such lots
were taken to show the general land values, and from these was figured the total value for this
district. To ascertain the proportion of the increase in land value attributable to the building
of the subway, it was necessary to deduct from the total rise what might be termed a normal
rise, or the increase that would have taken place through the natural growth of the city with-
out the added stimulus of a new transit line. The only basis of arriving at a judgment of what
such a normal rise probably was is to ascertain the rise for a period of equal length under
normal conditions. Accordingly the increase in value of the same land during the preceding
seven years from 1893 to 1900 was determined. It was found that values rose during this
87
period of seven years on an average of about 50 per cent. in the district on the west side below
135th Street, and on an average of about 43 per cent. from this point northward to the Spuy-
ten Duyvil. These percentages, then, may be taken in these districts as the best basis ascertain-
able for a judgment as to the normal rise for a period of this length, and if subtracted from the
rise which took place along the subway from 1900 to 1907, should indicate the effect of the
subway on land values during the latter period.
"By applying this method it was discovered that the land from 79th up to 110th Street and
between Central Park and North River had increased on an average about 45 per cent.,
which is about the expected normal rise. In the district along the Lenox Avenue line south of
the Harlem River the average increase was about 43 per cent., which would indicate that land
had not increased in value due to the building of the subway. The explanation of this un-
expected condition is no doubt that an elevated road already existed which gave fair service
to these districts, so that the additional facilities had little effect on land value, except in the
immediate vicinity of subway stations.
"The rise in land value along the Broadway branch from 110th to 129th Street was much
more noticeable, averaging about 70 per cent., but the locating of Columbia University at this
point affected values to an extent that makes it quite impossible to arrive at any reliable con-
clusions as to the proportion of rise that should be attributed to the subway.
"The situation from 135th Street northward, however, is entirely different. Between 135th
Street, 155th Street, Convent Avenue and North River the land increased in value between
1900 and 1907 about $17,825,000. Although the elevated road paralleled this district, yet ow-
ing to the topography the road was of little service, so the subway added very materially to the
transit facilities of the locality.
"The district between the Harlem and North Rivers from 155th to 178th Street increased
in value about $22,450,000; from 178th to Dyckman Street the increase was about $15,925,000;
from Dyckman Street to the Spuyten Duyvil the increase was about $13,100,000.
The aggre-
gate rise in this land from 135th Street to Spuyten Duyvil was about $69,300,000. If an esti-
mated normal rise of $20,100,000, based upon the rise of the previous seven years, be sub-
tracted from this, it leaves a rise of about $49,200,000, apparently due to the building of the
subway, which is 104 per cent. increase on the value of 1900.
"The rise in land values of The Bronx is likewise very noticeable. Taking a district along
the subway extending in width about a half mile on either side, the increase in land values was
somewhat as follows: From the Harlem River to Willis and Third Avenues the rise was about
$9,200,000; from that point to Prospect Avenue, about $22,100,000; from the latter point to
Bronx Park, about $13,500,000. The aggregate rise in land values for this district from the
Harlem River to the Bronx Park was about $44,800,000. Subtracting from this an aggregate
normal rise of $13,500,000, it leaves an increase of $31,300,000, due to the building of the subway.
"Since this property has been so enhanced in value by the building of the subway by the
city, could it not have contributed largely toward the expense of constructing the line and yet
have reaped a good increase in addition to such assessment? As previously stated, the aggre-
gate rise in land value above 135th Street in Manhattan caused by the subway was $49,200,000.
The cost of building the subway from this point to 230th Street was $7,375,000, or but 15 per
cent. of the actual rise caused by the new line. The property owners could have paid the en-
tire cost of this portion of the line and yet have had a net profit on their land of 89 per cent., or
an aggregate of $41,825,000 for the district.
"In The Bronx the situation was in most respects similar. The aggregate increase in
land value (of a district extending about a half mile either side of the subway), due to the
88
1
building of the subway, and in excess of a normal rise of $13,500,000, was about $31,300,000.
The cost of the line from 143d Street to Bronx Park was about $5,700,000. Had the property
which was benefited borne this expense through the form of an assessment, after paying such
assessment, there would have remained an aggregate profit of $25,600,000 in excess of the nor-
mal rise in value since 1900. This would be a profit of 77 per cent. on that property caused
by the increased transit facilities of the subway.
"It will be noted that the aggregate rise in land value in Manhattan from 135th Street to
the Spuyten Duyvil, and in The Bronx, due to the building of the subway, was $80,500,000. The
cost of the entire subway from the Battery to the Spuyten Duyvil and the West Farms branch
to Bronx Park was but $43,000,000. The property benefited, in the districts above noted, could
have paid this entire cost, and yet have had a net profit, due solely to its construction and oper-
ation, of over $37,500,000. Had it paid only for the portion running through its own territory,
there would have remained a profit of over $67,425,000. In view of this fact, would it not be
reasonable to require property benefited in outlying districts to pay for the cost of a rapid
transit line built to serve it?
"The data gathered from the influence on land values of the existing subway may be
applied to provisional rapid transit lines. Its application to the Fourth Avenue line in Brook-
lyn, contracts for which are under consideration, would indicate that the land along this pro-
posed line might not greatly rise in value, owing to the fact that it parallels, at a distance of
one block, an existing rapid transit line. This assumption is based upon the fact that the
building of the subway affected but very little the value of land west and north of Central
Park, owing to the proximity of an elevated road which gave reasonably good service. The
possibilities of an assessment plan may be best brought out by projecting a provisional line
through territory largely unoccupied, having at present no rapid transit facilities. The pro-
posed extension of a rapid transit line through Jerome Avenue in The Bronx, if built as a
reinforced concrete elevated structure, in order to make it noiseless, could be constructed for
about $2,550,000, and, judging by the effect on land values caused by the existing subway in
The Bronx, where the conditions were very similar, neither territory being within easy reach of
a rapid transit line, such a new line would increase land values in the Jerome Avenue dis-
trict fully $41,550,000. If the property holders were to pay for the cost of this new line, after
having paid such assessment, they would still have a profit of 90 per cent. on their land as
valued in 1907.
"If, on the completion of the Blackwell's Island Bridge, an elevated road were to be con-
structed of reinforced concrete, to connect with it and to extend out Jackson Avenue to Flush-
ing, with a branch leaving this main line at DeBevoise Avenue, and following that avenue to
the vicinity of Berrians Island, such line would be about 9 miles long and would cost about
$4,500,000. It would serve approximately 9 square miles of largely unoccupied territory, the
aggregate value of which at present is not less than $57,480,000. On the basis of the rise in
value caused by the subway line in The Bronx, the aggregate rise of this land in Queens would
be $54,600,000. In other words, the landholders in this district could afford to pay for such
new rapid transit line and yet enjoy an aggregate profit of $50,100,000, or a profit of 87 per
cent. upon the present value of their land.
"THIS PLAN WOULD LARGELY SOLVE THE PROBLEM THAT CONFRONTS THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION IN ATTEMPTING TO DECIDE BETWEEN FACTIONS, EACH CONTENDING FOR A LINE IN ITS PAR-
TICULAR SECTION. THE SINCERITY OF SPECULATORS AND REAL ESTATE VENTURERS WOULD QUICKLY
BE TESTED BY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THEIR PETITIONS BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ASSURANCE OF
A WILLINGNESS TO BE ASSESSED FOR THE COST OF THE DESIRED LINE.
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"Since territory now served by a rapid transit line does not greatly rise in value due to
an additional rapid transit line, it would probably be unjust to assess property adjacent to a new
line in such districts. That is, a subway extending from the lower part of Manhattan to the
Harlem River, or extending eastward under the East River and through the congested portions
of Brooklyn could not justly be assessed wholly upon adjacent property. SUCH PORTIONS OF NEW
SUBWAYS, IF BUILT BY THE CITY, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO BE PAID FOR WHOLLY OR IN PART AT
LEAST BY GENERAL TAXATION. It is very evident that property in the vicinity of a rapid transit
line does not benefit equally; UNSETTLED OUTLYING TERRITORIES WOULD BENEFIT MOST; territory
in the vicinity of express stations would rise in value more than that adjacent to local stations.
There are many conditioning factors to be considered in any attempt to lay an assessment upon
property for the building of rapid transit lines. These factors, however, are approximately as-
certainable, and any judicious commission would be in a position to secure the facts as con-
nected with the present subway, and, through them, would be able to lay an equitable assess-
ment upon land according to the prospective benefit that it would secure. THE LEGISLATIVE AC-
TION CONFERRING ON THE CITY THE POWER NEEDED TO CARRY OUT THIS PLAN AND PROVIDING FOR
A BETTER SYSTEM OF ASSESSMENT AND LAND CONDEMNATION COULD, NO DOUBT, EASILY BE PASSED.
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APPENDIX B
PAYING THE BILLS FOR CITY PLANNING.
(Extracts from a Paper Presented by Nelson P. Lewis, Chief Engineer of the Board
of Estimate and Apportionment of New York City, at the Fourth National Conference
on City Planning, held in Boston, Massachusetts, May 27 to 29, 1912.)
“*** The question of how the bills are to be paid is not only a pertinent but a necessary
one and cannot be avoided. To provide for a city of one hundred thousand, with no apparent
reason for exceptional growth, an ambitious scheme suited to a metropolis of several millions
is to invite disaster; while to limit the plan of a large and rapidly growing city occupying a
strategic position to one suited to its present size will seriously retard its future orderly develop-
ment and may prevent it from realizing the growth and importance of which its natural ad-
vantages appear to give promise.
"The feeling is common and not unnatural that if we are planning more for the future
than the present, coming generations which will reap the benefit should bear the greater part
of the burden. It seems easy to pay with borrowed money, particularly when the money can
be borrowed for fifty years, or the span of two generations. The habit of paying in this way
is easily acquired and is broken with difficulty. When anything is paid for with money bor-
rowed for a period longer than the possible or even probable life of the article purchased, the
city's credit is improperly used. A corporation which pays for its betterments from earnings
is on a sound basis. When large earnings are used to pay excessive dividends, and betterments
and renewals are paid from borrowed money representing additional obligations, there is
danger. When interest on existing debt is paid from funds raised by incurring more debt,
disaster is imminent. The only source of revenue of the American city is its power to tax.
Its credit is due to this same power plus the value of its own property. The larger the city's
debt which has been incurred for projects which are not self-sustaining, the greater will be the
demands upon its taxing power to meet interest and sinking fund charges due to such debt,
and the less will be its ability to undertake new improvements and at the same time meet the
enormous running expense of the modern city. It might not be a forced comparison to say
that the ordinary services which the city renders to the public through its administrative de-
partments, the expenses of which are met by the regular tax levy, are the dividends which it
pays to its stockholders, while for its betterments it must issue bonds or levy special assessments.
Every bond issue requires an increase in the tax levy for a term of years in order to meet in-
terest and amortization charges, curtailing by just so much the amount which can be expended
upon municipal housekeeping expenses. In order to keep the tax rate within reasonable limits,
expenses which should properly be met from the tax levy are often paid with borrowed money.
Is not the city which adopts this policy actually doing the same thing as the business corpo-
ration which incurs additional debt in order to pay dividends? * * *
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"In the more fundamental work of city planning, where unoccupied territory is being de-
veloped, the property will not have been assessed for improvements, and consequently the cost
of the acquisition and construction of new streets can properly be assessed upon the adjoining
property according to benefit, such benefit representing the entire cost in the case of local
streets and a portion of the cost in the case of thoroughfares of metropolitan importance. ONE
PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE INVARIABLY RECOGNIZED, NAMELY, WHERE THERE IS LOCAL BENEFIT THERE
SHOULD BE LOCAL ASSESSMENT. There can be no improvement which has been intelligently
planned and executed which will not result in some local benefit, and it follows that there should
always be some local assessment. No improvement, however small or however large, will be of equal
benefit to the entire city, and to distribute the burden of paying for it over the whole city ac-
cording to taxable values is unfair in that it is not placed according to benefit. The owners
of property in the immediate vicinity are frequently enriched at the expense of those whose
holdings are entirely outside the district directly affected.
"Perhaps this statement should be so qualified as to exclude certain great improvements
such as public buildings, bridges, docks, and rapid transit lines, and yet there is doubtless a
local benefit resulting from these. It may be urged that such things are not included in what
is commonly called city planning. If so, the definition of city planning needs revision, for
they are certainly most essential parts of any city plan. The City Club of New York several
years ago showed that as a result of the building of the first Rapid Transit Subway in New York
the actual land values in those portions of upper Manhattan and The Bronx which were most
directly affected were within seven years increased $80,500,000 above the normal increase for
that period. The cost of that part of the subway passing through the districts where this rise
in values took place was about $13,000,000, while the cost of the entire subway from the Bat-
tery north was $43,000,000. It is quite evident that if the $13,000,000 which was spent upon
that part of the subway traversing the district so notably benefited had been assessed directly
upon the property, its owners would still have netted a neat profit of some $67,500,000, while
had the cost of the entire subway been assessed upon the same limited district, the net profit
to the land owners would have been $37,500,000. Was it quite fair that property in distant
parts of the city, entirely unaffected by this great project, should bear the same proportion of
the burden as that which was so conspicuously advantaged? It is true that this improvement
is entirely self-supporting, interest and amortization charges being provided from the rental
paid by the operating company; BUT THE LOCAL BENEFIT WAS SO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT
THE RAPID TRANSIT LAW WAS SO AMENDED AS TO PERMIT THE ASSESSMENT OF ANY PART OF THE
COST OF FUTURE SUBWAYS. MANY NEW SUBWAYS ARE NOW BEING PLANNED, AND SOME ARE BEING
BUILT, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL IF ANY OF THEM WILL BE SELF-SUPPORTING FOR YEARS, THE ROUTE
FURNISHING THE MOST INTENSIVE TRAFFIC HAVING BEEN FOLLOWED BY THE LINE FIRST BUILT.
***
"It needs no extended argument to prove the equity and wisdom of local assessment wher-
ever there is local benefit. That it has been done to such a limited extent in the past is no
reason why it should not be more generally done in the future. That certain property owners
have heretofore been treated with such prodigal liberality is no good reason why others should
fatten through a continuation of an irrational and essentially unfair policy. To the degree that
the assessment plan is adopted, to that same degree will the city place itself upon a cash rather
than upon a credit basis. It may be urged that the adoption of such a policy would discourage
the agitation for and execution of many desirable city planning projects, that American cities
have been slow to appreciate the advantages of intelligent city planning, and now that there
has been a marked awakening it would be unwise to suggest the adoption of a policy which might
dampen this new-born enthusiasm. A desire for something which involves no direct cost is not
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a sign of intelligent interest. We are learning that the improvement of our cities pays. That
is a hopeful sign. If we have simply reached the stage where we want better conditions only
if someone else is to pay the bills, the hope has not a very substantial basis. If we want them
badly enough to pay for them ourselves in proportion to the benefit we feel sure will follow, we
are making real progress. ***
"While a few cities may now have statutory authority to carry out the policy which is out-
lined in the above paper, most of them lack such power. The following is suggested as an act
which, with such modification as local conditions and existing laws may require, would accom-
plish the purpose:
"In all cases where an administrative board is authorized to determine that an improve-
ment is to be made, the said board shall also determine what proportion of the cost and ex-
pense of the said improvement shall be assessed upon the property which shall be deemed to
be benefited thereby and what proportion of the cost and expense thereof shall be borne and
paid by the city.
"The said board may also determine in each case how much of the cost and expense of an
improvement shall be assessed upon a restricted area of peculiar benefit and how much, if any,
shall be assessed upon a larger area of indirect benefit. The said board may also determine
whether the entire assessment shall become due upon confirmation of the same, or whether it
may be paid in annual installments, and it shall also determine the number of such annual in-
stallments in which such assessments may be paid and the rate of interest which shall be charged
upon all such installments from the date of the confirmation of the assessment until each in-
stallment shall be paid; provided, however, that the number of installments shall not exceed
and the rate of interest to be charged upon the same shall be not less than
per cent. per annum.
nor more than
"The word 'improvement' as used in this section (or act) shall be deemed to include the
acquisition of title in fee or easement to any land required for streets, parks, bridges, tunnels,
waterways, drains, sewers or buildings required for any public purpose, or the construction of
streets, parks, bridges, tunnels, waterways, drains, sewers or buildings, or any other improve-
ment, the carrying out of which in whole or in part will increase the value of the property
in the immediate vicinity of such improvement or within a district including the same, or will
promote public utility, comfort, health or adornment for the entire city or part thereof.
"The general principles which should, in the writer's opinion, govern the distribution of
the cost of city improvements may be briefly summarized as follows:
1. Where there is local benefit, there should always be local assessment.
2. The entire city or the metropolitan district should bear no part of the
expense unless the improvement is in some degree of metropolitan import-
ance and benefit.
3. Assessments should not be confined to the cost of acquiring and improving
streets, but should extend to any improvement which will increase the
value of the neighboring property, and should be apportioned as nearly
as possible according to the probable benefit.
4. A workable policy once adopted should be consistently adhered to.
5. The determination of a policy and its application to each case should be
entrusted to a board composed of men especially qualified, whose terms
of office should so overlap as to insure continuity of policy and purpose."
1
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APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM AS TO LEGAL STATUS OF ASSESSMENT FOR RAPID TRANSIT
DEVELOPMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA.
In order to provide a wholesome control over the demands of outlying sections that unwar-
ranted extensions of high-speed lines be made at the City's expense, this report has suggested in
several places that the extensions into the outlying districts should be financed either directly or
indirectly by assessment upon the property benefited.
Owing to the urgency of the situation, this suggestion was incorporated into the report
on the basis of an informal opinion that in Pennsylvania it would probably require the enactment
of a special law only.
Since this report has been put in type, however, an official legal opinion of the City Solicitor
upon the points involved has been received and is inserted in this report as Appendix "C."
In view of this opinion, it is evident that it will be difficult for the City to adopt such a
method, and it will probably be necessary for the City to build the entire lines out of City bonds,
unless the districts affected are willing to submit to local assessment voluntarily, as has been the
case in a few instances in other cities.
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
OF THE
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA.
MARCH 30, 1916.
Assessment of Benefits upon Property-Owners, etc.
WILLIAM S. TWINING, ESQ.,
City Hall, Philadelphia.
Director, Department of City Transit,
DEAR SIR-Replying to your communication of the 15th inst., as to whether the City of Phila-
delphia is enabled to assess benefits upon the property-owners to bear the burden or portion of the
burden of the construction of additional transit facilities, three distinct questions are raised :—
1. Can this be accomplished under the present status of the law? 2. Can this be accomplished
by legislation? Or, 3. Would it require constitutional amendment?
1. There is no general statute which authorizes the City of Philadelphia, or municipalities
generally, to assess owners for local benefits conferred upon property. Those statutes confer-
ring the right to assess benefits upon the municipality do not include contemplated improvements
of this kind.
2. Since the decision of Hammett vs. Philadelphia, 65 Penna. 146 (1870), it is a well-settled
principle of the law that the Legislature may grant to municipalities the power of local taxation
for local benefits upon properties benefited. But the local benefit must not merely be incidental
to the contemplated improvement; it must be the primary object of it. In the case above men-
tioned, the Court used the following language:
"Local assessments can only be constitutional when imposed to pay for local improve-
ments clearly conferring special benefits on the parties assessed and to the extent of those
95
benefits. They cannot be so imposed when the improvement is either expressed or appears
to be for general public benefit."
In the case of WASHINGTON AVENUE, 69 Penna. 352, an Act authorizing the Commissioners to
make an artificial road through a number of townships, assessing the cost upon the abutting own-
ers, was held to be unconstitutional, the Court saying:
"To do so is confiscation, not taxation; extortion, not assessment, and falls within the
clearly implied restriction in the bill of rights."
It is further held by the courts that in any event only the owners of directly abutting
property can be assessed, and these are assessable for purely local benefits alone. The practical
difficulty encountered in attempting to apportion and assess a special tax on properties not abut-
ting on the improvement would be nearly or quite insurmountable. Although property in the
vicinity might be benefited, the imposition of such a tax would not be feasible, even if permis-
sible, and for that, among other reasons, this could not be done.
In the case of SAW MILL RUN BRIDGE, 85 Penna. 163, it was attempted to assess property-
owners for the building of a bridge. The opinion of the Court in part is as follows:
"Saw Mill Run crosses a public highway of the city. The bridge over it was built in
the line of this highway, in which every inhabitant of Pittsburgh may have some interest
and every citizen of Allegheny County and of the Commonwealth is entitled to assert some
right. In such an improvement surely no citizen can have exclusively private right and he
can scarcely have any definable private interest. The bridge was constructed to serve an ap-
parent and essential public purpose, and to impose the cost of it on idividuals selected out
of the mass of the community on any conceivable rule that viewers could adopt, would be the
placing of public burdens on private shoulders."
Again, in the case of GRAFIUS RUN, 31 Superior, 638, in construing an Act which authorized
boroughs or cities to alter the course of any channel, creek, etc., the Court held that it did not con-
fer on the city power to levy any special taxes against or assess any benefits upon any property
not abutting upon the line of improvement. In New York, a statute having the present pur-
pose in view has been passed, but its validity has not been judicially established. Wherever the
assessment of property-owners for benefits conferred has been sustained, the benefit has been a
direct one to the property abutting upon the highway or other place where the specific improve-
ment was physically located, and the amount could be actually ascertained by the measure of the
advantage to the particular property affected.
3. It follows from the foregoing decisions, which might be multiplied almost indefinitely,
not only in this State but elsewhere, that no Act of the Legislature having in view the assess-
ment of benefits upon property for the construction of transit facilities, or the assessment in any
other manner of all or a part of their cost upon individual property-owners, would be sustained
as constitutional. It also follows that the only method in which this could be done would be
by the slow process of constitutional amendment. As you are aware, an amendment to the Con-
stitution requires to be proposed at one session of the Legislature, acted upon affirmatively, re-
ferred to a second session, the Legislature meeting biennially, again acted upon favorably, and
then submitted to a vote of the people. This, together with the time elapsing for the passing of
the necessary statutory legislation, would compel an interval of four or five years before such an
amendment could become effective. Added to this would be the great difficulty, even after the
96
amendment of the Constitution, of formulating an Act of Assembly which would enable a
proper division to be made between that part of the cost which should be borne by the public
and that part to be charged against property-owners, and dividing the latter among such own-
ers individually.
I think these considerations, if they do not make it absolutely impossible, certainly make it
impracticable, to resort to this method of financing the contemplated improvement, and that in
considering the available means for so doing any project looking to the assessment of benefits
upon the owners of adjacent or other property may best be eliminated.
Yours very truly,
(Signed) JOHN P. CONNELLY,
City Solicitor.
97
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