BE
551
.R461
Newbattle Abbey
LIBRARY.
Press N, Shelf b,
be
UN
བ་མས་
!
M
ME
EMO
NET
SSIT
SERO
SERIO
SED
mm
Syrus
:
8.36,
Mion:
--
A
Reefold do, Eduarenton, Bp. of
DISCOURSE
OF THE
/
Several Dignities,
A N D
CORRUPTIONS,
OF
MAN's NATURE,
SINCE THE
F ALL
Written by the Ever Memorable
Mr, JOHN HAL ES of Econ.
Now firſt Publiſh'd from his Original Manuſcript.
LONDON:
Printed for E, CURLL, next the Temple Coffee
Houſe in Fleet-ſtreet. M.DCC.XX. [Price 3 s.]
RAGI
Director
He went on the
2. Se mere
logo
BE
X
THE
4-25-521011 retorn
ED I TO R’s
PREFACE
HE general Suſpicion under
T
mbich al Pofthumous Pieces
labour, of being thought ſpurious,
obliges me to give the Publick a
particular Account of this Work. Being in-
formed by the Reverend Mr. Ivy, Chaplain
to the late Lord Biſhop of Briſtol, that a
Friend of his was poſeljed of a very valu-
able Manuſcript written by the learned
Mr. Hales of Eton, and that he had
been ſo kind to recommend me to his Friend
for the printing of it, according to his
Defire, I wrote to the Gentleman about
A 2
ita
[ iv
+
it, from whom I received, with the Ma-
nufcript, ibe following Letters, mbicb, I
think; fufficiently prove the Genuineneſs
of it beyond Diſpute.
For Mr. Curll, Bookſeller, at bis Houſe
in Fleetſtreet, London.
SIR,
Received yours on Monday, and in
anſwer to your Queries, I ſend you
the following Account.
I
The Title of Mr. Hales's Treatiſe is,
A Diſcourſe of the ſeveral Dignilies, and
Corruptions of Man's Nature, ſince the
Fau.
As to the Genuineneſs of the Book,
be pleaſed to know, that Mr. Hales, in
the hard Times of Uſurpation, was
content to become a Tutor to a Lady's
Son in Buckinghamſhire; from whence,
after about a Years ſtay, retiring elſe-
where, and dying ſoon after, it was
preſerved amongſt the Papers of the ſaid
Lady, who was iny Relation. This
Manuſcript was writ over by a very ig-
norant
[v]
norant Amanuenfis, and full of falle
Spellings, but corrected by: Mr. Hales
himſelf, with his own Hand, in ſeveral
Places, where the Miſtakes were moſt
material. It bore Mr. Hales's Name in
the Title Page, in his own Hand;
which indeed was the Reaſon why I
tranſcribed it, nothing doubting of the
Genuineneſs of it ; for otherwiſe I
ſhould not have taken the Pains to have
writ it over my ſelf, as I did. But be
cauſe the Original was ſo very deficient
in its Orthography, and I having, when
I tranſcribed it, no deſign of printing
it, I thought it not worth the preſerving
after it had given me ſo inuch trouble.
Had it been in Mr. Hales's own Hand,
which was very plain and legible, my
Pains might have been ſpared ; but
the Matter falling out otherwiſe, I took
care to correct all the falſe Spellings,
as you will find when you ſee the Book
it felf. Some ingenious Gentlemen
that have peruſed it, make no queſti-
on at all of Mr. Hales's being the Au-
thor of it, being a very well writ Trea-
tiſe. This is all the Account I am able
to give you of it. If you deſire to ſee
it,
[ vi ]
it; I will ſend it up to you, either by
Coach or Carrier, as you ſhall think
beſt, fome Time this Week, if I
hear from you Time enough to
do it.
Sir,
Ch. Ch. Oxon,
Apr. 27th.
I am,
Your Humble Servant, &c.
Accordingly I deſired the Gentleman to
ſend me the Manuſcript, which I received
with the following Letter.
SIR,
Ccording to my Promiſe, I have
ſent
you
Mr. Hales's Book. Your
Judgment is right, in thinking it might
be ſomething Philoſophical, the Na-
ture of the Subject requiring it; yeť
it is nothing at all, as far as I can per-
ceive, abſtruſe or obſcure, eſpecially
to any Gentleman that has been but
moderately acquainted with Univerſity
Learning, or reliſhes Treatiſes of this
kind. Some few Expreſſions there are
chat betray the Time they were writ
in
1
[ vii]
in (our Language not being then ſo
refined, as it was after the Return of
King CHARLES the Second) which I
thought fit rather to let alone, than
alter, both out of Reſpect to Mr. Hales,
and my own Inſufficiency to correct
any Thing that bore his Name. Be-
fides too, it might have rendered the
Author leſs Genuine in the Eyes of
ſome Gentlemen, who are Judges of
Stiles, and would rather have him as
he is, in his own natural Colours,
than in a new, though more modiſh
Dreſs.
I ſee no need of a Preface (which
fometimes makes the Portal bigger than
the Houſe) any farther than juſt to
give a fhort Account of the Genuine-
neſs of the Book, concerning which,
all that I can ſay, I ſent to you in
my
former Letter. Mr. Hales's Memory
is ſtill freſh in the Minds of many;
but they who deſire to be fully fatis-
fied concerning him, may conſult
Wood's Athene, &c. where he is de
{cribed at large.
I
[ viii]
2
jo have only this to add, that if you
think-fit to have any Thing, ſaid by
the Publiſher to the Reader, my Name
may not be mentioned in it; for I ab-
kor being in Print, as much as ſome
others deſire it:
+
I
I am.,
1
CK..Ch. Oxon,
Apr. 30, 1719.
Sir,
Tour Humble Servant, &c:
Thus far as is proper to the Authentick-
neſs of the following Sheets.
It may ſeem ſuperfluous, after ſo many
learned Men have ſpoken in Praiſe of Mr.
Hales, to add to his Character"; but
every one into whoſe Hands this Poſtbumous
Treatiſe fhall fall, may not perhaps have
an Opportunity of ſeeing or knowing any
Part of his Life, and therefore I think
it not only a Juſtice due to the Memory of
tbat Great Man, but a decent Civility
to the Reader, to give a ſhort Account of
bim.
L
Nr.
[ ix ]
6
Mr. Anthony à Wood in bis Athena
Oxonienſes Jays thus,
John Hales, one of the moſt judi-
cious and learned Divines of the Church
of England, was in ſuch great Eſteem,
that his Name is ſeldom mentioned
without the Epithet of Ever Memorable.
He was the younger Son of John Hales
(Steward to the Family of the Horners
in Somerſetſbire) born in the Year 1584,
in the City of Bath, and educated there
in Grammar Learning. At Thirteen
Years of Age he was admitted in the
Univerſity of Oxford, and was for ſome
Time a Scholar of Corpus Chriſti College;
where he ſo diſtinguiſhed himſelf
, that
Sir Henry SAVILE (that worthy Pa-
tron of Learning and learned Men) in
the Year 1605. removed him to Merton
College, where at the next Election he
was choſen Fellow, at which, and in
other Stations and Conditions he ex-
ceeded all Competitors. In 1618, he
was Chaplain to Sir DudLEY CARL-
TON, Ambaſſador to the United Pro-
vinces, and was preſent at the Synod of
B
Dort.
"
( x )
Dort. At his Return to England he was
made Fellow of Eton College: He had
been ſome Time Greek Profeſſor of the
Univerſity of Oxford, and at laſt was
Prebendary of Windſor. : He was a
great Sufferer by the Iniquity of the Rea
bellion, eſpecially in the latter Part of
his Life, dying in great Want 'on the
9th Day of May, in the Year 1656,
having lived to the Age of Seventy
Two Years, and was buried in Eton
College Church Yard, according to his
own Defire. Over his Grave, after-
wards, was an Altar Monument erected
with the following Inſcription.
Mufarum Charitum Amo
· JOHANNES HALESIUS
(Nomen non tam Hominis quam Scientia)
Hic non jaret
At Lutum quod alumpfit optimum
Infra ponitur :
Nam certe Supra mortales emicuit
Moribus ſuaviffmis,
Ingenio ſuaviffimo pleno Pectore fapuit
Mundo ſublimior,
Adeoq; aptior Angelorum Confortio,
>
1
?
I
Ætatis fuæ 72.
Imo
(xi)
im
}
?
Impenſis Pet. Curwenni,
Olim bujus Coll. Alumni.
The next, and undoubtedly the beſt Aue
thority, is the moſt learned Dr. PEAR-
SON, Biſhop of Cheſter, who had been
intimately acquainted with him *
2
Reader, if Mr. Hales were unknown
unto thee, be pleaſed to believe what I
know and affirm to be true of him ; I
ſhall ſpeak no more than my own long
Experience, intimate Acquaintance
and high Veneration grounded upon
both, ſhall freely and fincerely prompt
me to. He was a Man, I think, of as
great a Sharpneſs, Quickneſs, and Sub-
tilty of Wit, as ever this, or perhaps,
any Nation bred. His Induſtry did
ſtrive, if it were poſſible, to equal the
largeneſs of his Capacity, whereby he
became as great a Maſter of Polite,
Various, and Univerſal Learning, as
ever yet converſed with Books, Pro-
portionate to his Reading was his Me-
ditation, which furniſhed him with a
* Sce his Preface to Mr. Hales's Golden Remains.
Judg.
[ xii]
Judgment beyond the vulgar reach of
Man, built upon unordinary Notions,
raiſed out of ſtrange Obſervations and
comprehenfive Thoughts within him-
ſelf. So that he really was a moſt pro-
digious Example of an acute and pier-
cing Wit, of a vaſt and illimited Know-
ledge, of a ſevere and profound Judg.
ment.
1
Altho' this may ſeem, as in it ſelf it
truly is, a grand Elogium, yet I cannot
eſteem him leſs in any Thing which be-
longs to a good Man, than in thoſe intel-
lectual Perfections : And had he never
underſtood a Letter, he had other Or-
naments ſufficient to endear him. For
he was' of a Nature (as we ordinarily
fpeak) ſo kind, ſo ſweet, fo courting all
Mankind' ;' of an Affability ſo prompt,
fo' ready to receive all Conditions of
Men, that I conceive it near as eaſy a
Task for any one to become ſo know-
ing as lo obliging.
}
As a Chriftian, none more ever ac-
quainted with the Nature of the Goſpel,
becaufe none more ftudious of the
.
Know-
1
[ xii]
Knowledge of it, or more curious in
the Search, which being ſtrengthened
by' thoſe great Advantages before "men-
tioned, could not prove otherwiſe than
highly effectual. He took indeed to
himſelf a Liberty of judgiúg, not of
others, but for himfelf; and if ever any
Man might be allowed in theſe Matters
to judge, it was he who had ſo long,
ſo much, fo advantagiouſly conſidered ;
and which is more, never could be faid
to have had the leaſt worldly Defigns
in his Determinations. He was not
only moſt truly and ſtrictly Juſt in his
ſecular Tranſactions, moſt exemplary
Meek and Humble, notwithſtanding his
Perfections, but beyond all Example
charitable, giving unto all, preſerving
nothing but his Books, to continue his
Learning and himſelf; which when he
had before digefted, he was forced at
laft to feed upon, at the fame Time
the happieſt and moſt unfortunate Hel-
luo of Books, the grand Example of
Learning, and of the Envy and Con-
tempt which followeth it.
This
[ xịy ]
1
This Teſtimony may be truly given
of his Perſon, and nothing in it liable
to the leaſt Exception, but this alone,
that it comes far ſhort of him ; Which
Intimation I conceive more neceffary
for ſuch as knew him not, than all whịch
hath been ſaid.
$
.
>
+
1
1
I. confeſs, while he lived none
was ever more ſollicited and urged to
write, and thereby truly to teach the
World tháo he ; none, ever ſo reſolved
(pardon the Expreſlion, fo Obſtinate)
againſt it.. His facile and courteous
Nature learnt only not to yield to that
Solicitation. And yet he cannot be ac-
cúſed for hiding of his Talent, being ſo
cominunicative, that his Chamber was
a Church, and his Chair a Pulpit.
As for any farther Particulars of his
Life, being confined to Brevity, I muſt
refer the Reader to Mr. Wood, and like-
miſe to Dr. WALKER, and the late Hi-
ſtorical and Critical Account of. Mr.
Hales's Life and Writings. The Au-
thor of which laſt Book has recovered many
valus
A
[ xv )
valuable Circumſtances and Tranſactions of
Mr. Hales's Life.
I am perſwaded, that the judicious
Reader, upon perufal of this Diſcourſe,
will think it worthy of a Place among the
beſt of Mr. Hales's Performances : And
if it be objected, that his Stile is ſomewhat
obſolete, let ſuch know, that it is the Opini-
on of thoſe who tranſmitted the Manuſcript
to me, and other judicious Perſons who have
ſeen theſe Sheets, that there are ſuch
Beauties in our Author's Language and Ar-
gument, as may make our modern Criticks
bluſh.
E. Curll.
St. Michael,
Sept. 29, 1719.
మములు మంత్రం
tr
votre volte
G
1
th
A
ES
SS SES KARGAS SZOEGASOGOS 2012
W2232SCSES SCHWC5082303256365
for the
1
А
.
>
DISCOURSE
Of the ſeveral
Dignities, and Corruptions
OF
MAN's Nature, ſince the FALL,
I
To is an Opinion no leſs weak; than
erroneous, and favouring as much
of vulgar and common Sudg*
ments, as it is in it ſelf prejudicial
to the Advancement of Knowa
ledge, to paſs by all ordinary Occurrences
without any Notice, or Admiration,
and to think nothing wonderful that is
common. This it is, which hath at all
Times cauſed that uſual Complaint, Plit. tita
that Men have been ever curious and eaner 8. Epift.
Enquirers after Novelties, rather than 20.
Excellencies; and that the very nearness
B
of
7
(2)
2.
!
Cicero de of worthy Objects, bath at once made them
Divin. lib. both deſpiſed and unknown. Thus, like
Children, with an idle Diligence, we
turn over this great Book of Nature,
without peruſing thoſe ordinary Char-
acters, wherein is expreſſed the greateſt
Power of the Worker, and Excellency
of the Work; fixing our Admiration
on thoſe unuſual Novelties, which, tho'
for their Rareneſs they may be more
eminent, yet for their Nature, are leſs
worthy. Every blazing Comet, or
burning Meteor, ſtrikes more Wonder
in the Beholder, than thoſe glorious
Lamps of Nature, with their admira-
ble Motions and Order, in which not-
withſtantling, the very Heathen could
acknowledge a Divinity. Sol Spectato-
rem, niſi cum deficit, non haber. Nemo ob-
rum lib. 2. ſervat Lunam niſi laborántem, adeo natu-
Sen. Nat. rale eft, magis nova, quam magna mirari.
Qu. l. 7. So ſenſible are we rather of Things new
than great, and weigh not ſo much
their Worth as their Rareneſs. Wherc-
as indeed, Things of that Condition
are not to be admired, but pitied ra-
ther, as being the Errors and Imper-
,fections of Nature, implying Impoten-
if the Effect be deficient, or Enor-
miry, if fuperfluous. But things are
faid to be the Subjects of Wonder, in re-
gard of the greater Perfection and Ex.
actneſs
Cic. de
Nat. Deo-
1
(3)
aEtneſs of their Nature ; ſuch as always
imply a more extraordinary Abſolute-
nels of Power, and Eminency of Opera-
tion in the Worker. And of this con-
dition I may ſafely propoſe Man: A
Creature, in whom if we conſider how
it has pleaſed that eternal Eſſence to
ſtamp à moſt divine Character of his
own infinite Perfections, and to make
Him, amongſt all his Works, the moſt
univerſal Place of Reſidency for all cre-
ated Excellency; we cannot but ac-
knowledge Him to be one of the great.
eſt Wonders of the World, yea indeed,
Himſelf a World. For altho' in a pre-
cife Reference or Collation of Man,
with the Particulars of the greater Fa-
brick, it be an Obſervation more wicty
than true, and favouring more of Poetry
than Philoſophy, that Man is a Micro.
coſm, and Repreſentative of Nature,
yet if we underſtand that Proportion
and mutual Reference only in a Gene-
rality, we ſhall find the Affertion veri.
fied, mor only in Poetical Liberty, (in
which' Reaſon attends Imagination, and
rather makes Objects, than finds them,)
but alſo in the more ſtrict, and ſevere
Cenſures of Truth. For Inſtance ; As
the whole World of Things, conſiſts
either in ſpiritual or material Creatures,
thie - ſpiritual agreeing in one general
B
Nature
1
(4)
}
Nature of reaſonable, and underſtand-
ing Effences; and the material rang;
ing themſelves into fundry Orders, ſome
partaking of Motion only, as having
nothing but Bodies;, ſome of Life állo,
and that in ſundry: Degrees of Dignity
and Perfection : So alſo Man in his Na,
ture and Subſtance conliſtech of Spirit,
and of Matter; his Spirit a reaſonable
Ellence, and a divine or celeſtial' EG
ſence; his Body a moving Body, and a
living Body; and laſtly, his Lifé, a mor-
tal, and immortal Life, So that in this
general Diviſion, without farther En-
quiry after the Proportion in the ſmaller
Parcels of the World, it is true that
every Man is a little and a living
World. The Heavens, Elements and
all mixt Bódies have their Motion, and
fo hach Man: The Herbs, Plants, &c
have their Vegetation, and ſo hath
Man; The Beaſts, Fiſhes, &c, 'have
their Senſe and Animality; fo 'hath
Man : The Angels, &c. have their Im.
materiality, Immortality and their Un-
derſtanding, and ſo hath Man; Others
will have the Will to reprelent the firſt
Mover, becauſe it is that, which can
draw with that, and primarily ſet on
work all ſubordinate Faculties. The
Heart repreſents the Sun, as being in
the Midit; the Blood, the Rivers; the
Bones,
1
(5)
1
Bones, the Rocks; and the like» . But
becauſe this Proportion, which I have
already obſerved, is more Philoſophical,
and leſs Strained, I ſhall reft ſatisfied
therewith. Here then, is a World to
paſs through and ſearch, if the Suffici-
ency of a Surveyor could faįthfully dif-
cover each Paſſage and Country there.
of,
Firſt, therefore, it ſhall not be need.
ful to inſiſt overmuch upon Man in
his Materials, or ſenſitive Conditions,
or to commend him in his Anatomy.
Since this would be to communicate a
far meaner Degree and Order; and as
if he had no higher Pitch of Excellency,
to borrow, and piece it up with, than
Generalities; a Labour not only need-
leſs, but hurtful, as being a ready Way,
by prailing to Prejudice : For we com-
monly ſee, that as moſt Kind of Plants,
or Trees exceed us in our Vegetation
and Particles, ſo many Sorts of Beaſts
have a greater Activity, and Exquiſite:
neſs in their Senſes than we. And the
And the Hooker
lib. 1. $6.
Reaſon is, becauſe Nature aiming at a
ſuperior, and more excellent End, is in
thoſe lower Faculties more remiſs and
negligent. It ſhall fuffice therefore on-
ly to lay a Ground-Work in theſe lower
Parts, for the better Advancement of
Man's greater Perfections, which have
ever
(6)
ever fome Dépendance on them. For,
whereas the principal Acts of Man's
Soul, are, either of Reafon, proceeding
from the Underſtanding, or of Practice
from his Will; Both thefe have their
Foundation in, or at leaſt their Depen-
dance on the Organs, and Faculties of
the Body; which, in the onc, precede,
in the other, follow. To the one, they
are as Porters, to admit, and convey;
to the other, as Meſſengers, to perform,
and execute. To the one, the whole
Body' is an Eye, through which it feeth;
to the other, an Hand, by which, it
worketh. In the Works of the Unders
ftanding, there muſt be a Veni, and a
Vidi; before a Vici, and therefore, in
thefe, the Offices of the Bôdy precede,
And in the Will, there muſt be a Sic
Volo, before a Sic Fubeo: The Actus
Elicitus, which reſpecteth the Soul, be-
fore the Actus Imperatus, wbich hath its
Termination in the Body. And there,
fore here, the Miniſtry of the Body fol-
lows the Power and Authority of the
Will. Concerning the Body therefore,
this Truth is to be reſolved on, Thač
the reaſonable Part of Man, in his pre-
fene Eſtate, doch depend in all the Cir-
cumſtances of its ordinary Operations,
on the happy, or diſordered I'empera-
gure of the Body. For cho? theſe Mini-
feria!
I
1
lib.6.
(7)
ſterial Parts have not any Superiority,
to Over-rule the Soul, yet they have a
diſturbing Power to hurt and hinder her!
Operations: And hence it is, that the
ſundry Difeaſes of the 'Body do often )
times ſlacken, yea fometimes conſume,
and quite extirpate the deepeſt Imprel
ſions, and moſt infixed and ſettled. Hao:
bits of the Soul. For as in the Body
Politick, the Prince, (whom Seneca
calls the Soul of the Commonwealth.) Sen. De
receiveth either no Paſſages of State, or lib. 1.c.4.
falſe Ones, where there is Negligence,
or Diſability in thoſe ſubjectare Itiqui-
rers, (whoni Xenophon terms the Eyes, Cyroped.
and Ears of Kings.) In like Manner the
Soul of Man being as yet 'not an abrow
lute and independent - Worker, but
receiving all her Morions from the 111-
formation of the bodily. Inſtruments,
muſt continue like a ineer rafd Tabula,
if they out of Indiſpoſition or D.fabilla.
ty
be weakened. The.Soul hath not
inic ſelf that eminent Weakneſs, which
is obſervable in many Men, but only as
it is overſhadowed, and eclipted, with
the Interpoſition of earthly, and flug-
giſh Organs. In the Operations of
Men's Souls, there are two Defeats ;
one, an Imperfection of them ; the other's
an Inequality of them. The former of
theſe I do not ſo aſcribe to bodily Weak-
neſs,
>
(8)
1
Politic.
lib. 7.
nefs, as if I conceived no Darkneſs in
trinſecally rooted in the Soul it felt:
But for the Inequality and Difference of
Men's Underſtanding in their ſeveral
Operations, I ſuppoſe that principally
proceeds from the Temperature of the
inſtrumental Faculties of the Body, in
fome, yielding enablement for quick-
neſs of Apprehenſion, in others, preſſing
down, and entangling the Underſtands
Ariftot
. ing. And therefore Ariſtotle in the
ſeventh Book of his Politicks, aforibes
the Difference and Inequality, which
he obſerves between the Afiatick, and
European Wits, unto the ſeveral Cli-
mates, and Temperature of the Regions
in which they lived, according where-
unto, the Complexions and Conſtitu-
tions of their Bodies only could be al-
tered; the Soul being in it ſelf (accord-
Arift. de ing to the fame Ariſtotle in his third
Anima,
Book de Anima) impaſſible, and unal-
terable from any bodily Agents; and
to the ſame Purpoſe again he ſaith, that if
an old Man had a young Man's Eyes, his
Sight would be as ſharp, and as diſtinct
as a young Man's is. So then it is mania
feſt 'that the Weakneſs of Apprehenſi-
on in the Souls of Men, comes nor from
any Darkneſs inſeparably accompany-
ing them, but only from that neceſſary
Co-exiſtence which it hath with a
Body
lib. 3.
(3)
Body ill diſposed for Information and
Affiſtance. For he that is carried in a
Çoach (and the Body is vehiculurh Ani-
me) tho' he were of himſelf more nim-
ble and active, muſt yet receive ſuch
Motion as it confers? And he that
reads through Spectacles, tho' of him-
ſelf he be happily ſharp Sighted, yet
muſt be content with the Impreſſion of
ſuch Species as the Proportion and
Quality of the Glaſs affordeth. But this
Dependance is not ſo neceſſary, but that
the Soul may be exempted, and vindi-
cated from the Oppreſſion of the Body
and that, firſt in extraordinary, and
next in more common Actions; in Acti-
ons extraordinary, as thoſe moſt pious
and religious Operations, of the Soul,
Aſſent, Faith, Invocation, and whereini
the Soul is carried beyond the Sphere
of Senſe, and tranſported into a more
elevate Operation. For, to believe and
know, that there are laid up for pious
and holy Endeavours, thoſe foys, which
Eye hath not ſeen, nor Ear heard, and
to have ſome few Glimpſes and Fruition
of them, (which St. Paul calls Arrhabo, Fibercovi
do Primitias Spiritus) What is this 8. 23.
but to leave Senſe behind, and out-run
our Bodies ? [See this learnedly handled
by Mr. Hooker, lib. 3. fect. 8. and
Bacon's Advancement of Learning; lib. 2.
C
fole
1
( 10 )
1
fol. 109.] Divine Truth doth as much
repugn the Reaſon, as Divine Goodneſs
the Will of Man. Sarah laughed when
Abraham believed ; and the Philoſo-
phêrs mocked when St. Paul diſputed :
And Reaſon expected that the Apoſtle
ſhould have fallen down dead, when
contrarily Faith ſhook the Viper into
the Fire. There is a great Difference
between the Manner of yielding our
Aflents to God, and unto Nature; for
in Philoſophy, we firſt know, and then
believe; But Divinity, on the other
Side, goeth Ordine retrogrado, working
Science by Faith: And yet even Re-
ligion it ſelf hath afforded Senſe ſuch a
Confinity, as to give it ſome Manner of
Service and Light, in that great Myfte
ry. For the whole Doctrine of Cüriſt,
tho' fome Parts thereof be exempted
from ſenſitive Apprehenſion, yet gene-
rally is delivered by Parables, Simi-
litudes, Proverbs and the Faith in
Chriſt confirmed by the Sacraments,
ſuch, as are moſt agreeable to the Capa-
city, and in the Sight of the Senſes.
Now, for the Exemption of the more
ordinary Actions of the Soul from any
Sway or Predominance of the Body, it is
chiefly wrought by theſe three Means,
Education, Cuſtom, Occaſion : And
therefore by the Rule of Ariſtotle, tho'
in
1
(11)
/
in Agents purely Natural it holds true, Ethic. lib.
yet in Man it is not univerſal, That 2. c. 1.
any thing, which comes by Nature, is
alterable by Cuſtom. For we com-
monly ſee, that the Tillage and Culture
of the Mind doth many times draw
it away from the Barrenneſs of its own
Nature.
Exercetq; frequens Tellurem, atq; imperat
Arvis.
Education then and Cuſtom do, as
it were, cozen the Body and revenge
Nature; infomuch, that tho' Elements,
Climates, Complexions, &c. do work
the Mind unco an unhappy Temper,
yet by a continual grapling with theſe
Prejudices it getteth at lait the Victo-
ry, tho' not without much Reluctancy
and Rebellion in Nature ; ſhe being
never ſo thoroughly conquered, but that
The Ever concinues in her Oppoſition :
And as for Occaſion; That alters the
natural Inclination of the Will, and
Affection, rather than of the Under-
ſtanding; for ſo we ſee, that the Bene
of Mens Deſires carry them oftentimes,
by reaſon of Occurrences contrary to
the Diſpoſition, which the State of the
Body hath ftamped on them. Thus we
often read of Men in War, who not-
withſtanding
C%
.
( 12 )
withſtanding of themſelves timorous,
and yielding, yet, when the Condition of
the Place hath raken away all Occafions
of Flight and the Cruelty of the Ad-
verſary all Hope of Mercy if they
ſhould be ſubdued, have ſtrangely for-
ſaken their own Inclinations, and got-
ten ſtrange and proſperous Victories by
an unnatural Fortitude.
Now, for thoſe inward Senſes, which
are commonly accounted three, I take
the two latter to have a more eminent
Degree of Perfection in Man, as being
indeed the Foundations and Grounds of
the Operations of the Soul, Memory,
ånd Fancy, or Imagination. Here,
by Memory, I underſtand not the bare
and ſimple AEt of that Faculty, which
is the Conſervation of ſome Object
formerly treaſured up, but that rather
which the Latines call Reminiſcentia,
or Recordatio, which is a Reviving, or,
as we ſpeak, a Calling to Mind of for:
mer Objects, with a Kind of Diſcourſe,
and Meditation of them. The Dignity
hereof in Manis ſeen, both by the per-
fecting the Underſtanding of Man in
Matter of Learning and Diſcourſe, as
allo by affording ſpecial Aſſiſtance in
the Direction and Managing of our
Actions, conforming them either to the
Rules of Morality, or the Principles of
Practice
( 13 )
1
Practice gathered from Hiſtorical Oba
ſervations, while the Mind, by the
Help of the Memory, is, as it were,
converſant with paſt Ages.
The principal Corruptions of this
Faculty, are, 1. Too great Slightneſs,
and Shallowneſs of Obſervation, when,
out of an Impatience of profound
Search, and a gluttonous Deſire to feed
upon the Objects of Worth, and Uſe,
the Earneſtneſs of Appetite weakens
the Digeltion; and the Eagerneſs to
take in, makes Men forgetful to retain.
This is the Reaſon why many Men
wander over all Arts, and Sciences,
without any Solidity in any. They
make not any ſolemn Journey to a par-
ticular Coaſt and Head of Learning;
buc view all, as it were, in tranſitu ;
have no ſooner begun to ſettle on one,
but they are in haſte to viſit another:
But ſuch Men are no more able to
find the Uſe, or ſearch the Bottom of
any Learning, than he, that rides Poſt,
is, to make a Deſcription, and Map,
of his Journeys, tho' by much Employ-
ment he may toil and ſweat in travel-
ing from Place to Place; Omnis Feſti-
natio ceca eſt; Windings, and Inſtabili-
ty of the Wit, as well as Body, dazzle
and diſable the Eye, and it is true
in the Mind, as well as in the Stomach,
IQQ
-
t
( 14 )
Rhet. lib.
2. C. 12.
too quick a Digeſtion doth_always
more diſtemper than nouriſh, and
argues nothing but Crudities in Learn-
ing. The Reaſon is, becauſe our
Memories are always joined with ſome
Meaſure of Love; where the Treaſure
is, there will the Mind be alſo. Where
therefore our Love is moſt conſtant,
our Memories will be moſt faithful.
Thus ſudden, vaniſhing, and broken
Ariſtot. Deſires, which, like the Appetites of
ſick Men, are for the time violent, but
give preſently over, as they argue an
eager Love of what we purſue, and by
Conſequence, a Difeſteem of that, which
we ſoon forſake, ſo do they neceſſarily
infer Weakneſs in the Memory; by how
much they make our Hopes the ſtrone
Seneca, de ger. For, (as Seneca ſpeaks) Caduca
Ben. lib. 3 Memoria futuro imminentium.
Other
Cauſes there are, as namely the Links
of the Parts of the Body of an Homo-
genial Science, which communicate to
each other, Strength and Luftre; and
therefore Ímpatience in the thorough
Search of them muſt needs infer For-
getfulneſs. Another Cauſe may be
Diſtruſt ; and therefore an Unexerciſe
of it; and on the other Extreme, a too
great Confidence in it, and thereupon
a burthening and oppreſſing it with
a Multicude of Notions,
Now
from 3
(15)
Now for the Imagination; The Dig.
nity hereof conſiſts either in the of-
fice, or in the Latitude of it. Its
Office is to be aſſiſtant both to the Un-
derſtanding and the Will. Its afift-
ance to the Underſtanding, is princi-
pally in Matter of Invention, to fup-
ply it with Variety of Objects whereon
to contemplate, as alſo to quicken and
elevate the Mind' with a Kind of Heat,
and Rapture proportionable in the in-
ferjour Part of the Soul, to that, whichi
in the ſuperiour, Philofopers call Ex-
taſy; whereby it is poffeffed with fuch
a ſtrong Delight in its proper Object,
that the Operations thereof are reftlefs;
and violent. And of this kind is that
of the Poet,
Eft Deus in nobis, agitante Calefcimus Itlo.
Hence it is, that Men of low and
narrow Imaginations, who have no
Sharpneſs and Activity in that Part, are
commonly of as Now Capacities; to
whom nothing is facile and natural, but
with much Reluctancy, and Violence
beaten out. Thus Fancy is, as I may
ſo ſpeak, the Sluice, through which all
Men's intellectual Operations have boch
their Entrance and Diffuſion.
The
( 16 )
The Office of the Imagination to the
Will is, to further and increaſe its Dex
fire towards ſome convenient Object.
For it often comes to paſs, that the
Imagination fways more with the Will,
than Argument, and hath a more im-
mediate, and powerful Inſinuation to
perſwade, than the Peremptorineſs of
Reaſon hath to command. And the
Reaſon hereof is, becauſe Liberty be-
ing Eſſential to Man's Will, that Courſe
muſt needs moſt of all perſwade the
Faculty, which doth infer the leaſt
Violence to the Liberty, that is done
rather by Argument of Delight, than
of Neceſſity. For Man's Will is a
Monarch, and therefore that is true in
Part, which Seneca hath obſerved of
Kings. Apud Reges, etiam que proſunt,
ita tamen, ut deleétent, ſuadenda ſunt.
Not driving them thereunto by Logical
Illations, but by alluring them by the
Sweetneſs of Eloquence; not preſſing
the Neceſſity of Morality by naked Ar-
gument, but rather ſecretly inſtilling
it into the Will, that it might at laſt
find it ſelf reformed, and yet not per-
ceive how it came fo. Another Reaſon
is, becauſe the Deſires of Men are fixe
as well on Pleaſure as Profit; ſo that
thoſe Inducements muſt needs have
molt
1
( 17 )
moſt Authority, which have that Mix-
ture of vtile, and Dulce, together.
Concerning the Latitude of this Fa:
culty, it hath therein à double Preros
gative above other Powers. One, the
Multiplicity of Thoughts; anotler, in
the framing of Objects. Now, by
Thoughts, I underſtand thoſe Spring-
ings and Glances of the Hearts ground.
ed upon the ſudden Repreſentation of
ſundry
, and different Obječts. For when
thé Mind once begins to be fixt and
permanent, I call it rather Medication
than Thought. The Múltiplicity of
Thought is grounded, firſt, upon the
Tranſcendency, and Abundance of the
Objects; and next upon the A&tivity
and Quickneſs of the Apprehenſion.
The former I call Tranſcendency of
Obje&ts, becauſe, in the Latitude and
Univerſality thereof; it includes all the
Variety of Objects that belong unto
other Faculties; and for the Quickneſs
of Working, the Motions of the
Thoughts agree in two great Contra-
fies, Suddenneſs of. Journey, and Vaſte
neſs of Way; while like Lightning,
they are able to reach from one End of
the Heaven to another; and with one
Light and imperceptible Excurſion, to
leave almoſt nö Part of Natüre un's
travelled.
D
The
}
1
(78)
The next Thing is the Latitude of
Imagination in framing of 'Objets ;
wherein indeed it hàth a larger Privi-
lege than other Faculties. For, Reaſon
and all other Faculties have their fixe
Limits, and Determinations in Nature :
But the Imagination is á Faculty
boundleſs and impatient of any impoſed
Limits, ſave thoſe which it ſelf maketh,
And hence it is, that in Matter of Per-
fwading, and Inſinuation, Poetry, My.
thology, and Eloquence, (the Arts of
Imagination) have ever (as was ob
ſerved) been more forcible than thoſe
that have been rigorouſly grounded on
Nature and Reaſon. It being.(as Sca-
Scal. Ex- liger excellently obſerves) the natural
ercit 307. Infiniteneſs of the soul. Aſpernari cer.
torum finium præfcriptionem." Now the
Liberty of the Imagination is Threefold.
1. Creation (as I may fo ſpeak) and
new making of Obječts. 2. Cómpofi-
tion, or mere mixing them, and 3.
Tranſlation, or placing them. To the
firſt belong thoſe Poetical Deities, and
Metamorphoſes, and the like ; To the
other, thoſe monſtrous Chimæras; ſuch
as Horace ſpeaks of,
II.
Humano Capiti cervicem Pictor Equinam
Si jungat
Το
.
(19)
1
*
To the Third, thoſe Allegories and
Rhetorical Metaphors. All which, tho
in themſelves they be_falſe, yet do ſo
couch and wrap up Truth, that it is
made, thro? 'théir Appearance, more
forcible and operative.
Now for the Corruptions of this Fa-,
culty, I conceive the Principal to be
theſe Three. 1. Error. 2. Levity. 3, Stue
pidity. The Error of the Imagination
may be taken actively and paſſively;
the Error which it produceth, and the
Error which it beareth. Hence thoſe
ſtrange and ſtrong Deluſions, wherewith
the Minds' of melancholy Men (im
whom this Faculty hath the moſt
piercing Operation) have been perempto-
rily poſſeſſed. - Hence thoſe vaniſhing
and ſhadowy Aſſurances, Hopes, Fears,
Joys, Vilions, which the Dreams of
Men, the immediate Iſſue of this
Power do produce, which whether it
be done by affecting only the Fancy,
and that with ſo ſtrong Poffeflion, as
gives no Admiſſion to the Species of
outward Things, or whether it be done
by the Impreſſion of ſuch Forms and
Shapes upon the Spirits, that are to
ſpread themſelves upon the outward
Senſes, as may thereby affect them
with the fame Images (not by Recep-
tion from without, but by Impreſſion
D 2
and
}
)
Sect. Ia
Probl. 12;
( 20 )
and Transfuſion from within) it is
plain, not only by various Relations,
Ariftot. but by continual Experience what
Problem. ſtrong Effects and powerful Conſe-
quences it hath had.
The Errors that are in the-Fancy,
are for the moſt part of the ſame Na-
ture with thoſe that are wrought by
it; ſuch was the "Error of that Man,
who would not be perſwaded but that
he had Horns in It's Forehead, and for
that Reaſon would not move forth, mor
uncover his Face to any. Certainly,
Jealouſy is the work of Fancy; and
he deſerves ſuch a Puniſhment that
belies himſelf with it." And the Cauſes
of theſe Errors are by Francis Miran-
dula aſcribed. 1. To the Variety of
Temper in the Body, with the Predo-
minance of thoſe four Humours, which
give Complexion thereunto.
2. The
Impoſture of the outward Şenſes: 3,
Tho leaſt of all, to the Government of
the Will. Laſtly, to the Miniſtry of
Angels; of which we find an Exam-
ple (as I conceive) in that evil Spirit,
which promiſed to be a lying Spirit in
the Mouth of Ahab's Prophets, &c.
And by the Way, from the three firſt
Cauſes, we may obſerve the Miſery
of Man's corrupted Nature, wherein
thoſe Powers, which were' ordained
for
--
( 21 )
for mutual Affiſtance, do now exerciſe
a mutual Impoſture. And as Man did
join with a fellow Creature to diſho-
nour, and (if it had been poſſible) to
cozen his Maker; ſo in the Faculties
we may diſcover a joint Conſpiracy
in the working of their own Over-
throw and Reproach, and a ſecret Joy
in one, to be deluded by another.
The next Corruption is Levity, and
too much Volubility of this Power,
proceeding from the over ſwift Ob-
truſion of the Species thereupon,
whereby it is ſo oppreſſed with that
floating and unconſtant Humour, that
it maketh many needleſs Excurſions
upon impertinent Things; and inter-
rupts the Courſe of its entire and na-
tural Operations. There may be a
time, when the Fancy may have Li-
berty to Expatiate: But again, Some
Objects will require a 'more penetrat-
ing, and permanent Act. And there-
fore to have a vaniſhing and lightning
Fancy, that knows not how to faſten
it ſelf on any particular ; but like an
Object of divers Colours, ſhall either
in one, or an immediate Succeſſion of
Acts, preſent unto the Underſtanding
an Heap of Species, and ſo diſtract its
Opecation, argues, not Sufficiency, but
Weaậneſs and Diſtemper in this Power.
The
6
(22)
1
The laſt Corruption of this Facul-
ty, is Heavineſs, and Stupidity, from
whoſe peremptory. Adheſion with too
violent an Intention of the Fancy on
ſome particular Objects, it many times
wrought, not only a Dulneſs of Mind,
à Syncope, and Benumbing of the Fa-
culty, it ſelf, but oftentimes even Mad-
nefs, Diſtraction, and Torment, which
is the Reaſon why ſome Men either
out of the Depth of their Contempla-
tion on ſome Difficulcies of Learning,
(as it is reported of Ariſtotle in his
Meditation of the Fluxes of the Sea)
or out of fome deep Paſſion, as Love,
Fear, Deſpair, and the Like, have at-
tempted ſuch ſtrange Practices on
themſelves and others, as could not
but proceed from a ſmothered, and en
tangled Reaſon.
Thus much ſhall ſuffice, touching
Man's common and Corporeal Faculties
I proceed now to the Soul.
Of which I muſt ſpeak in a double
Reference, either according to the Mo-
tions and Impreſſions which it maketh
on the Body, and receiveth from it;
or according to the immanent and un-
communicated Perfections, which it
hath reſiding only in its own Eſſence,
Touching the former, I refer thoſe
Effects, which arę meerly from the
Body
(23)
+
Body to the Soul, as the Tempers
, and
Humours thereof, to the Enquiry of
Phylitians, &c.' And ſhall in this place
only obſerve that, which is more Effen-
tial to Man; I mean the Generality
and the Particulars' of the Paſſions of
his Mind, with the moſt eminent Dig-
nities and Corruptions which the Soul
and Body of Man contractech from
thenti:
Pamions therr ate nothing but thoſe
natural, perfective; and unconſtrained
Motions of the Things whereundo they
agree,
untó that Advancement, or Ele-
vation of their Ñatures, which they
are, by the Wiſdom, Power, and Pro-
vidence of their Creator, in their own
ſeveral Spheres, and according to the
Proportion of their Capacities, ordain-
ed to receive, by a regular Înclination
into thoſe Objects, whoſe Goodneſs
bears a natural Conveniency, or Vir-
tue of Satisfaction towards their
Powers : Or, by an Antipathy, or Aver-
fion from thoſe, which bearing a Con-
trariety to the Good they deſire, muſt
needs be noxious and deſtructive, and
by Conſequence, odious' to their Na-
tures. This being the Property of all,
(I mean ſtill unconſtrained, and Self
Motions,) and Paffion very evidently
partaking of that Nature; It follows
that
( 24 )
that the Root and Ground of all Paſſi-
ons, is principally the Good, and ſecon-
darily, and by Conſequence the Ill of
Things. This being premiſed touch-
ing the Nature, and general Effence
of Paſſions, the Diviſion of them muſt
be grounded thereon. Now ſince all
Appetite (which I make here propor-
tional to Paffion) being a blind Power,
is independant on the Direction of
Knowledge, from the Diverſity of
Knowledge in, or annexed to things,
may be gathered the prime Diſtincti-
on of Paſſions. Now Knowledge, in
reſpect of created Agents, may be con-
ſidered, either as disjoined and extrin-
ſical to the things moved, or as in-
trinſical and united thereunto; which
Knowledge ſerves as a Law and Rule
to regulate each Nature, that they
might ever have Reference to ſome
fixed End, not various and caſual.
Paſſions that proceed from that ſever-
Vid. Hoo-ed and extrinſical Knowledge, are the
ker, lib. 3.
$ 3.p. 8. Motions of meerly natural Agents,
which are governed to their particu.
lar or general Ends, by the Wiſdom,
and Power of Him that made them.
But the Paſſions of Reaſon proceed
from a Knowledge conjoined, and in-
trinſical to the Mover, which is three-
fold; Mental, Senſitive, Rational.
From
A
( 25 )
1
1
From all which ariſe fundry De-
grees of Paſſions and Motions. Mental
Pallions, are thoſe, purer and abſtract-
ed” Delights, or other the like Agita-
tion of the ſupreme Part of the Mind,
which Ariſtotle calls vos, the Latines,
Mens, or Apex Mentis :' Wherein is the
leaſt Commerce and Intermixtion withi
inferior and earthly Powers, which
Motions are grounded, i. On an ex-
traordinary Knowledge of Viſion, or
Revelation; ſuch as was Pauls Novi 2 Cor. sza
hominem raptum, &c. And the Prophets2.
and Holy Mens of God Viſions; or on
an exquiſite natural Apprehenſion,
wherein Ariſtotle placed his greateſt
Felicity; to wit, in the higheſt and
divineft Contemplations of Truths,
which he makes to be the Object of
the ſupreme Part of the Soul. And ic
was the Speech of a Philoſopher (viz.
Heraclitus, to the fame Purpoſe, Ani-
ma ficca eſt Sapientiflima. That a Mind
not ſteeped in the Humours of carnal
and groſs Affections, nor drowned in
the Waves of a tumultuous Fancy, but
more elevate and foaring to its Origi-
nal, by divine Contemplacions, is al-
ways endowed with greater Wiſdom.
And this Paſſion of the Mind is indeed
nothing elſe but the Love thereof, or
at leaſt, an immediate Effect flowing
E
from
1
1
( 26 )
.
!
from Love, and not barely from the
Knowledge, and Viſion of Truth.
Senſitive Paſſions are thoſe Motions
of Proſecution, or Flight, which are
grounded on the Fancy, and on the
Apprehenſion of the common Senſe,
and is common to brute Beaſts; which
indeed, if we will believe Seneca)
are not affections, but certain Chara
acters and Impreſſions, ad fimilitudi-
nem Paffionum,' which he calls Impetus,
and Affectuum Veſtigia; the violent Mo-
tion's of Nature, and the Shadows, or
Footſteps of Affections.
I come therefore briefly to thoſe
middle Paſſions, which I call Rational;
not formally, as if they were in them
ſelyes'. Acts of Reaſon, or barely Im-
material Motions of the Soul; but by
way of Participation, or Dependance;
by Reaſon of their immediate Subor-
dination in Man, unto the Government
of the Will and Underſtanding, and
not barely of the Fancy; which two
Echic. lib.
are the principal Superintendents in
Man's Actions. And thus Ariſtotle
accounts the ſenſitive Appetite, (tho'
in it ſelf Brutiſh) to be, in ſome Sort,
a reaſonable Faculty. Now Paſſion
thus conſidered, is divided according to
the ſeveral References it hach to its
Objects; which is principally the Good,
and
1. C. 13.
6.27)
and ſecondarily the Ill of Things. And
either conſidered after a fundry Man-
ber: For they may be taken either
bạrely or alone; or under fome Conſi-
deration of ſome Difficulty and Danger
of Miſcarriage. And boch theſe are to
be determined by ſome particular Con-
dition of Union, or Diſtance to the Sub-
ject; for all Objects offend or delight
the Power in Virtue of their Union
thereunto. The Object then, may be
-conſidered ſimply in its own Nature,
as ic preciſely abſtractech from all other
Circumſtances; including only the na-
tural Conveniency, or Diſproportion,
which it beareth to the Faculty; and
ſo the Paſſions are, in reſpect of Good,
Love; in reſpect of Evil, Hatred :
Which are the two Radical, Funda-
mental, and the moſt tranſcendent
Paſſions of all the reſt, and therefore
well called, Pondera & Impetus Animi.
Secondly, The Object may be conſider-
ed as abſent from the Subject, in re-
gard of real. Union, tho never without
that Unio Objectiva; and the Object
thus conſidered, worketh, if Good,
Deſire; if Evil, Flight, and Abomina-
tion. Thirdly, it may be conſidered
as preſent, by a real Contact, or Uni-
on; and ſo it worketh, if Good, De-
light and Pleaſure; if Evil, Grief and
Sorrow
3
E 2
1
)
( 28
1
Sorrow. Again, as the Object bears
with it the circumſtances of Difficul-
ty and Danger, it may be conſidered,
either as exceeding the natural Strength
of the Power, which includeth, in
Good, an Impoſſibility to be obtained,
and ſo it worketh Deſpair; and in
Evil, a great Diffidence, and Unlike-
lihood of being avoided, and ſo it
worketh Fear : Or fecondly, as not
exceeding the Pollibility of the Power,
whether in Good, which it preſenteth
as attainable, and ſo it worketh Hope;
or in Evil, which it preſenteth as a-
voidable, and ſo it worketh Boldneſs:
Or as requitable, if it' be paſt, and ſo it
wogketh Anger.
Having thus laid the general Divi-
fion of Paſſions, before I ſpeak of the
Particulars, I muſt ſpeak ſomething of
the Generalities of Paſſions, and what
Dignities are therein moſt notable, and
the moſt notable Defects.
Now, Paffions may be the Subject
of a threefold Diſcourſe, Natural, Mo-
ral, and Civil. In their natural Con-
fideration we ſhould obſerve in them
their eſſential Properties; their Ebbs
and Flows; their Springings and De-
cays; the Manner of their Impreſſions.
In' their moral Conſideration we may
likewiſe ſearch how the Indifferency of
them
1
1
( 29 )
them is altered into the Domination of
Good, or Evil, by Virtue of the Per-
turbation and Violence of their own
Motions, or of the Dominion of right
Reaſon, what their Miniſtry is in , Vir-
tuous; and what their power and 10-
dependence in irregular Actions; How
they are raiſed and ſuppreſſed, ſlackned
and governed, according to the par-
ticular Nature of theſe Things, 'which
require their Motion. In their Civil,
and Judicial Reſpect, we ſhould alſo
obſerve, how they may be feverally
wrought upon, and impreſſed ; How
,
and in what Manner, and what Occa-
fions. it is fit to gather, and fortify, or
to flacken and remit them, as may be
molt advantagious
to thë End propoſed.
What Uſe may be made of each Man's
particular Age, Nature, and Propenſi-
on, for the Advancement of the pub-
lick Peace and Honour: And this Uſe
of Paſſion is copiouſly obſerved in a
learned Diſcourſe of Ariſtotle's, the
ſecond Book of his Rhetorick: And I
will omit it, as deſiring a greater In-
ſight, &c. than my ſmall Experience
can reach unto. The Dignities, which
arife from .either of the other, I ſhall
in Part obſerve, tho' not diſtinctly, and
aſunder, buc in a brief, and confuſed
Collection of ſome Particulars, uſing
this
( 30 )
this Order. Firſt, obſerving them aca
cording to the Antecedents of their Mo-
tions and A&ts: Secondly, according
to the Acts' themſelves; and thirdly,
according to the Conſequences of them.
Touching the Antecedents to the
A&t of Paſſion, they are either outward
Motives thereunto, as namely the Ob-
jects unto which it is carried, and the
Cauſes whereby it is occaſioned; or the
inward Root, or Principals of the Aa,
whereby they are wrought and go-
verned. The two former are more ob-
fervable in the particular Paſſions, eſ-
pecially the latter of them; and there-
fore thither I refer their diſtinct Hand-
ling. For the third, the Dignity of
Pallion chiefly conſiſts in a Conſonancy
and Obedience to the Preſcriptions of
Reaſon; For there is in Man's Facul.
ties a natural Subordination, whereby
the Actions of the inferior, receive
their Motion and Direction, 'from the
Influence of the other. Now Appetite
was in Beaſts only made to be governed
by a ſenſitive Knowledge; but in Man
Senſe ought not to have any command-
ing, or moving Power, but only an inftru-
inental, miniſterialand conveying Power,
in reſpect of the Object. The Action of
the Senſe was not ordained to couch the
Affection, but to preſent it ſelf pri-
marily
1
( 31 )
marily to the Underſtanding, upon
whoſe Determination and Conduct the
Paſſions were to depend, to ſubmit all
their Inclinations chèreunro, and to be
its Miniſters in the Execution of all
ſuch Duties, as it ſhould deem any
Way expedient for the Perfection and
Advancement of Man's Natúre: $6
that herein conſiſts a great Pärt of Man's
Ruin by the Fall," thát álbeit the Unite
derſtanding itſelf be Blinded; and
therefore not able to reach unto the
true Preſentation of any perfect Good
to the inferior Parts; yet that ſmall
Portion of Light, which it yet' retain-
eth, for the Government of our Acti,
ons, is made uneffectual, and ſufficient
only to convince, not to reform. The
Corruption then, of Paſſion in this Re-
fpect, is the Independence thereof upon
its true Principle, when it ſtays not
to look for, but anticipates and pre-
vents the Diſcourſes of Reaſon, relying
only on the Judgment of Senfe, witin
which it retains an unnatural Union :
So that herein is mainly verified that
Complaint, Homo in Honore, &c. Man
being in Honour was without Under-
ſtanding, and is become as the Beaſts
of the Field that periſh. For, as in
the Body, if any Part be diſſolved, and
not knit unto the Parts adjoining, by
Nerves
#
E-nic. lib.
C. 138
( 32 )
t
Nerves and Sinews, it cannpt."yield
Obedienee unto the Government of the
motive Faculty, but when that would
wry them one Way, they fall another;
ſo it is in the Mind of Man; when that
natural Continuity and Union of Facul-
ties is once diffolved, when Affections are
by ſome fecret Schiſm diſunited from
Reaſon, there cannot be that ſweet
Harmony in the Motions thereof, which
is required to the Weal and Honour of
Man's Nature. Paſſions though of ex-
cellent Worth and Service for the heat-
ing and enlivening of Virtue, for add-
ing. Spirit and Edge to all good De-
ſigns, and bleffing them with an hap-
pier Iſſue, than they could alone attain
unto; yet if once they forſake their
Bonds, and become ſubject only to their
own Laws, if they encroach upon Rea-
fon's Right, and dare once uſurp the
Throne, and, like Fire, break thoſe
Limits preſcribed to them, there is
then nothing more Tumultuous, Ty-
rannical, and Irreclaimable; Nec mea
liores unquam fervos, nec dominos natura
ſentit deteriores.
For it is true, as well in Man's little
Commonwealth, as in greater Eſtates,
there are no more peftilent and perni-
cious Diſturbers of the publick Good,
than thoſe which are beſt qualified for
Service
( 33 )
Service and Employment, if once they
grow mutinous and impatient, nego
lecting the common Advancement for
their own private Ambitions, and de-
ſirous to raiſe theit own Supremacy by
the Ruin of the whole. And indeed;
it is univerſally true, Things moſt uſe-
ful and excellent in their Regularity
are moſt dangerous in their Abuſe and
Obliquiry:
The next Gonſideration was accord-
ing to the Exerciſe of the Act of Palli-
ons, which may be conſidered either
according to the general Subſtance; or
ſome particular Accidents, in the Man-
ner of its Being. For the firſt, it is al-
together Good, as being Nothing elſe
but natural Motion, ordained for the
Perfection, and Conſervation of the
Creature. And in this Conſideration
(ſo it be always Motion Natural, that
is governed by, and dependeth on right
Reaſon) I find not any Corruption,
cho' I find an Error and Abuſe. That,
I mean, which makethi Paſſion in
gene
ral a Defeet and Perturbation, and
would therefore reduce the Mind to a
ſenſeleſs Apathy, condemning all the
Life of Paſſion, as Wars, ſerving for
nothing elſe but to tofs and trcuble
Reaſon: An Opinion, which, whilſt it
goeth about to give unto Man an abo
F
folute
( 34 )
ſolute Supremacy and Government over
himſelf, leaveth ſcarce any thing in him,
which he may command and govern.
For alcho' there be in the Will towards
the Body, an Imperium, or Soveraign
commanding Act, yet in Propriety and
Vigour, this is not ſo much to be term-
ed Command,' as Employment ; the
Body being rather the Inſtrument, than
the Servant of the Soul ; and the Power
which the Will hath over it, is not ſo
much the Command of a Maſter over
his Workmen, as of a Workman over
his Tools. The chief Subjects to the
„Will are the Affections; in the right
Government whereof are manifeſted the
largeſt Extents of its Abſoluteneſs and
Power. The Strength of every thing
is exerciſed by Oppoſition : We ſee not
the Violence of a River till it meet with
a Bridge; and the Obftinacy of Winds
ſhews not it felf in the empty Air, till
it meet with Woods to grapple with.
So it is in the Will, whoſe Power is not
exerciſed in the uncontrouled. Com-
mand of the Body, but rather in the
repairing the Breaches, and feeling the
Mutinies, wherewith untamed Affecti-
ons diſquiet the Peace of Man's Na-
ture; fince Enormity and Rebellion, in
Things otherwiſe of ſo great Uſe, re-
quire Amendment, not Extirpation ;
and
1
( 35.)
1
and we make ſtrait a crooked Thing,
not break it. And therefore, as He, in
Tacitus, fpake well to Otho, abouť to
kill himſelf; Majori animo tolerari ad-
verſa, quam relinqui; ſo may I ſay of
the Paſſions of the Mind, there is more
Honour in ſubduing them, than in
killing them; and that both the Power
and the Profit of the Will is more ad.
yanced by the Yoke, than by Death ;
by the tributáry Service, than by the
Confuſion, and Extirpation of them.
Now, concerning the Accidents or
Manner of thoſe Acts, that are from
Paſſion, it may be conſidered, either in
Regard of their Quantity, or Extenſion,
or their Quality, and Intenſion. And
þoth theſe may be conſidered two Man-
ner' of Ways. The Quantity of Paſſi-
ons is either continued in Reſpect of their
Durance, or fevered in Reſpect of the
Multiplicity, and Re-iteration of them.
The ſame muſt be ſaid of the Quality
of them, wherein ſometimes they are
too remiſs, and defective; ſometimes
again too exceffive, looſe and exorbi.
tant, according to the Variety of Con-
ditions. Now concerning all theſe I
obferve this one general Rule. The
Permanency, or Vaniſhing, the Multi-
plicity or Slowneſs, the Exceſs or De-
fect of any Paſſion, is to be grounded
on,
1
F. 2
30
on, and regulated by the Nature only
of its Object, as it bears Reference to
ſuch or ſuch a perſon, but never by
the private Humour, Complexion, Pre«
judice, Habit, Cuſtom, or the like Qua-
lifications of the Mind it felf, To ſee
a Man of ſenſeleſs, and unapprehenſive,
or, in better Terms, of a mild and
gentle Nature, overpaſs ſome ſmall In-
diguities without notice or Feeling; or
to ſee a Man of an hot and eager Tem-
per poffered with the Extremity of a
tedious Paſſion, upon the Senſe of ſome
greater Injury, wherein his Honour and
good Name is in Danger of being
tainted, is not in either of theſe any
great Matter of Commendation. Be
cauſe tho' the Nature of the Object did
in both warrant the Quality of the
Paſions, yet in ſuch Perſons they pro-
ceed out of Perſonal Humour and Com-
plexion; and not out of a ſerious Con-
ſideration of the Injuries themſelves ,
Of theſe two Extreams the Deficient is
not ſo commonly ſeen, as that which
is in Exceſs and Enormity : And thereç
fore we will a little here obſerve what
Courſe may be taken for the allaying
this Vehemency of our Affections,
Vid.Echic Whereby they diſturb the Peace and
lib. 2. c. 9 Tranquility of Man's Mind : And this
& lib. 10. is done either by oppoſing contrary Paſ-
ſion
-
do
1
1
1
as
( 37 )
fion to. Contrary, and ſo as it were
plucking the Thoughts back into other
Meditations; as Husbandmen uſe to do
with thoſe Trees that are crooked; or
elſe it is done by ſcattering, and di-
ſtracting of them, and that, not only
by the Power of Reaſon; but ſome-
times alſo by cautelous Admixture of
Paffions amongſt themſelves, thereby
interrupting their free courſe, and
Current. For as oftentimes the Af-
flictions of the Mind are bred one
of another, Grief by Anger.
(Circumſpexit eos cum Ira condoleſcens)
and Fear by Love, (Res eſt plena timo. Mark 3.
ris Amor) and Deſire by Fear; (Fings-
Tac. Hift.
bat metum, quo; magis concupiſceret) &c. lib. 1.
and ſo in the reit: So are ſome Paſſions
ftoped, or at leaſt bridled and mode: 1.5 h. 4.
rated by others; Amor ejicit metum) 18.
Thus we ſee in the Body Military, (as Hooker
Tacit.) Vnus tumultus ejt alterius Reme-shemos this
dium: And in the Body Natural, fome Example
Diſeaſes are expelled by others; ſo like-of Saul.
wiſe, in the Body Moral
, Paſſions, as lib. s. $.
38.
they mucually generate, ſo they weaken
each other. Whether the Paſſions we
admit be contrary, as Phylitians cure a
dead Paſſion by a burning Fever ; or
whether they be only of a different tho?
not repugnant Nature, and then the
Effect is wrought by revoking ſome of
thoſe
1
( 38 )
1
thoſe Spirits, which are otherwiſe all
employed in the Service of one Paſſion,
by, divercing the Intenſion of the Mind
from one ſtrait Channel, into fundry
croſs and broken Streams; as Men uſe
to ſtop, one Flux of Blood by making
another; which Diſſipation of Paſſions,
as it, is principally wrought by con-
founding them amongſt themſelves, ſo
in ſome particular Paſſions, two other
Ways, either by the Communication
of them, in divers Subjects, or Exten-
fion of them on many Objects. The
firſt is ſeen in Matter of Grief; The
Ethic. lib. Mind doth receive, 'as it were, ſome
9.60!lRelief, and feel ſome few Glimpſes of
Comfort, when it finds its Paſſion ge-
neracive on others, and produce Sim-
pathy, and the like Effect of them; for
hereby it is, as it were, disburthened
by the Transfuſion of its own Sorrow,
and cannot but find that lighter, to
the ſuſtaining whereof it hath the AG
fiftance of other Men's Shoulders : And
they were good, tho' common Obſer-
vations : Cute leves loquuntur, ingentes
ſtupent, & Ille dolet vere qui ſine Teſte
dolet. · That Grief is moſt unſupporta-
ble, which hath feweſt Vents to diffuſe
it felf. For the latter, we may ſee
how Multiplicity of Objects doth wea-
ken and remit à Paſſion: As for Ex-
ample
1
( 39 )
ample, Love. I take it, that that Man Ariſtok.
that hath a more univerſal 'Love, háth Ethic, lib.
a leſs vehement Love, and the ſpread-lib.g. C. 10
ing of the Affection is the weakening
of it. (I mean in Things Heteroge-
neal, and not Subordinate; for a Man
may
love a Wife more with Children
than without, becauſe they' are the Seals Súvda,
and Pledges of that Love.) For being tre xvelo
but one in Him, the Rays and Affecti-
ons, as the Sun-beams in a Glaſs be-
ing more united, might'withall be more
fervent. I remember not, that I ever
read of a 'miraculous and admirable
Love' amongſt Men, 'which went be-
yond Couples; And therefore we fee, guías
that in that Eſtate, there is the greateſt uvéler aus
Affection wherein is leaſt Community.ziyorlas
.
Nuptial Love, as it is the moſt indivi.
ſible, ſo is it regularly the ſtrongeſt.
I do not then (by the Way) condeñn
all the ſtrong and united Paſions, but
only I obſerve how thoſe, which fröm
this Union are Exorbitant, and work
Prejudice to the Soul, may by a ſea-
ſonable Diſtraction of them be reduced
unto an wholſome Temper. For as it
is noted amongſt Men, thoſe who have
Bodies moſt obnoxious to daily Mala-
dies, are commonly more ſecure from
any mortal Danger, than thoſe who
free from general Diſtempers, do yet
find
( 40 )
find the Surprize of one more violent:
So is it with Men's Paſſions: Thoſe,
which have a Nature ſubject , unto Va-
riety of them, and are ready upon every
Occaſion to break out into them, do
commonly find them leſs offenſive, than
they, who have not their Pallions ſo
voluble, and ready to ſpread themſelves
on divers Objects, but exerciſing their
Intention more earneſtly upon one.
The laſt Conſideration of Paffioris
was according to their Conſequents,
which are the Ends and Effects of
them. The moſt general good Effect
of Paſſions is that, which Tully hath
obſerved of Anger, that they are the
Sharpners and Whetſtones of Virtue,
which makes it more Operative and
Fruitful. Thus Anger and Zeal whet
on Fortitude, and ſharpen its Sword;
Love, Sympathy, and Compaſſion, are
the Inciter's of Bounty; Hope is the
Stay and Anchor of Patience; Fear is
the Sharpner of Induſtry, and Caution,
and a Counter poiſe in all our Actions
againſt Violence,- Raſlineſs and Indif-
cretion. Thoſe Imputation's therefore
of thoſe Stoical Philoſophers, which
call theſe Paſſions Diſeaſes, and Percur-
bations of the Mind, are but light and
empty. For it is abſurd to think that
all Man's Reſt is either healthful, or
clear,
( 41 )
clear; or on the other side, that all
Motions are diſeaſed and troubled: For
what Water is more ſweet and tranfm
parent than that of a Spring, which is
in perpetual ſliding ? Or what more
thick and loathſome, than that which
ftandeth in a Puddle corrupting it felt?
The Agitation then of Paſſions, as long
as they ſerve only to drive forward,
not to drawn Virtue; ſo long as they
keep to their Dependance on Reaſon,
and run only in that Channel, where-
with they thereby are bounded and
confined, are of excellent Service in
all the Concerns of Man's Life; and
ſuch, as without which, the Growth,
the Succeſs, the Diſpatch of Virtus
would be much impeded and im-
paired.
For the corrupt Effects of Paſſions
in general, they are many more. They
may either be, in Reſpect of them.
ſelves, one amongſt another; or in
Reſpect of the Underſtanding, Will
and Body. The firſt is the mutual
Generation one of another, which I
have already touched : The which is
not always a corrupt Effect, but only
then, when in the Paſſion generating
there is ſome Irregularity. In Reſpect
of the Underſtanding, and Will, I con-
G
ceive
( 42 )
1
See Dr.
ceive the Corruptions to be principal-
ly four.
The firſt is, Impofture, and Seducti-
tbeChurcson, concerning which we are firft to
lit». 3. c. remember, that there is in every Man
26. & Ti-a Nature and original Struggling be-
tagDifp.
tween Appetite and Reaſon, whichi yet
33.part1.proceeds from Corruption and the Éall
of Man; not from Nature entire, (as
the Papiſts contend) For tho the
Light of Reaſon be by Man's Fall much
dimmcd, and decayed; yet thoſe ſmall
Glimmerings thereof, which remain,
are fo adverſe to our unruly Appetite,
as that it laboureth againſt us, as the
Philiſtines againſt Sampſon, to deprive
us of thoſe ſmall Reliques, and Re-
mainders of Sight, which we yet re-
rain; and being impatient altogether of
a Check or Reſiſtance, endeavoureth
all it can to muffle Reaſon, and to ob-
literate thoſe Principles, and original
Truths, which could not but reſtrain
the Unrulineſs of ſuch Rebellious Sub-
jects, if they might be ſuffered to ſhine
forth clearly upon them. And hence
it is, that every Man when he hath
given Place to the Violence of Appe-
tite, laboureth next to incline, and pre-
pare
his Mind fur Aſſent, and to get
Reaſon on the fame Side with Pallion.
And one Reaſon hereof may be a Love
of
$
!
( 43 )
of our Paſſion; for Paſſion joined with Ethic. lib.
Reaſon, is like to an Humour, that 6.c.5. &
falling down from the Head to the cap. 13.8
lib. 7. c.8.
Eyes, darkens' the Sighit thereof; or,
as fonie concave Glaſſes, which repre-
ſent the Species of Things to the Eye,
not as they are in themſelves, but with
thoſe Inverſions, Crookedneſs, and
Wreſtings, which the Indiſpoſition of
the Glaſs frameth unto them. So like.
wiſe the Underſtanding being once in-
vaded by Paſſion, judgeth not of Things
according to their Natural, and naked
Truth, but according as it finds them
bear in the Fancy thoſe Impreſſions
of Pleaſure, which are moſt agreeable
to our corrupc Nature. Another Rea.
fon is, the Love of our Eaſe. For every
Man, tho' he can be content to delighie
in the Pleaſure of a corrupe Paſſion, yet
that Part of it, which hath che Sting
in it, which pricketli and pierceth, is
unpleaſant : And therefore there is' re-
quired the Hand of Reaſon, by Apo-
logies, Pleadings and Precences, cither
to' mollify the Paſſion, that it ſhall not
pierce, or harden, or arm the Subject,
that it ſhall ſuffer. And beſides,
all this Excecation of the Paſſions may
be ſeen in the Practice of Hereticks,
whoſe Cuſtom it ever was, Prius pere
ſuadere, quam docere, to creep upon the
1
G 2
1
1
1
( 44 )
Affe&tions of Men, and get Footing
there, before ever they would adven-
ture the Entertainment of their falle
Doctrines. For wlien ſilly and un:
itable Minds ſhall be once brought to
ſuch a Prejudice, as to have their Lives
and Perſons in Admiration; when they
ſhall fee an Impoſtor come to them as
a Perfon' that had utterly renounced
the World, and cloathed with Pover-
ty, and Repentance, drawing in and
out his Breath with no other Motions
than Sighings, bringing nothing with
him but the plentiful Promiſes of Sal-
vation, Tears in his Eyes, Oil and
Honey in his Mouth, and the moſt
exquiſite Picture, without any Life at
all, of true Holineſs, which it is poffi-
ble for the Art and Hypocriſy of
Man's Invention to draw out, how
can the Underſtanding chuſe (eſpeci ..
ally being framed before unto Belief,
by thoſe too credulous Qualities, Igno-
rance and Fear) but, be inclinable,
and prepared to receive whatſoever
Doctrines thoſe fubtle and hidden
Murtherers ſhall adminiſter unto
them.
The ſecond Effect is,
Alenation, or
withdrawing of Reaſon; that when it
cannot ſo far prevail, as to blind and
ſeduce Reaſon, by getting the Allow-
ance,
( 45 )
}
an
ance, and affirmative Confent thereof,
it may yer at leaſt ſo far inveigle it,
as to with-hold it from any negative De
termination, and to drive the Mind
from a ſerious and impartial Conſider-
ation of what Appetite purſueth, for
fear leaft it ſhould : be convinced of
Evil, and ſo find leſs Sweetneſs, than
if it were ſuffered to run on in a free
and uninterrupted Purſuit thereof.
And this is the Rea fan of that affected
and voluntary Ignorance (which St.
Peter fpeaks of, This they are willing
ly ignorant of.) And this is that, which
Ariſtotle calls Agrolav én begasp 608ws.
elected, or voluntary fgnorance, which,
for their Security's Sake, Men nouriſh
in themſelves.
But then, Thirdly, If Reaſon be per-
emptorily. reſolved neither to be deluded,
nor come over to the Patronage of
Evil, nor diverted from the Knowledge
of Good; then doth. Paſſion ſtrive to
confound and diſtract the Apprehenſi-
ogs thereof, that they may not with
any Firmneſs or Efficacy of Diſcourſe
endeavour to interrupt the Current of
ſuch irregular Mocions. For as Things
preſented to the Mind ſolely and open-
ly in the Nakedneſs aud Simplicity of
their own Truth, do gain a more firm
Afſenţ unto them, and a more fixt In-
tuition
(46)
tuition of them ; ſo on the other Side
thoſe Things which come mixed, and
troubled, dividing the Intention of the
Mind, between Object and Paſſion,
cannot obtain any ſettled, effectual,
or ſatisfactory Reſolution from the Dif-
courſes of Reaſon: They gain but halfa
Knowledge, not any diſtinct, clear, and
applicative Apprehenſion of the Truth;
but a confuſed, broken Conceit of
Things in their Generality; not much
unlike unto Night-talkers, or ſuch like,
who cannot be faid to be thoroughly
aſleep, or perfectly awake, but to be
Ethic. lib. in a middle Kind of inordinate Temper
7.6 3. betwixt both: . Or like Stage Players,
their Diſcourſe is never driven ſo far,
as if it did belong to them ; it is never :
thoroughly conſidered, with an aſſum-
ing, applying concluding Conſcience,
but only lurks in the Habic and Root
of Knowledge within, altogether choaked
with the Mifts of Paſſion,
The laſt is that other, which in the
3.6.7." "fame Place Ariſtotle calls Teorílict,
Raſhneſs, or Precipitance, which is the
laſt, and moſt tyrannical Violence Palo
fion uſeth, when, in Spight of Reaſon,
it furiouſly conſtraineth the Will có
determine and allow of any Thing,
which it purpoſeth to put in Practice.
For the Body, ſometimes it producech.
Ethic. lib.
l
too
(47)
too violent Dilation, ſometime's 'too
heavy. Oppreſſion of the Heart. The
Scattering, the Collecting, the Confu-
fion, the Retiring, or the like Pertur-
bation of the Spirits. The Cauſes of
all whith, as impertinent to thiş Dif-
courſe,'I'refer to natural Philoſophers,
and Phyſicians, and now proceed to con-
ſider of fóme Particulars, according to
their former Diviſion.
Now the two fundamental Paſſions,
are thoſe of Love and Hatred; of which
in this precedent Method.
And firſt, concerning Love, we will
touching the Antecedents thereof con-
ſider its Objects, and its Cauſes. Both
which will coincidere and fall into one.
Love then conſiſts in a Kind of Expan-
fion, or Egreſs of the Heart, and Spi-
rits, to the Object loved, as to that
whereby it is drawn and attracted:
Now as in Nature, ſo in the Affections
alſo, we may obſerve' in the Object's a
double. Attraction. The firſt is, That
natural and impreſſed Sympathy of
Things, whereby one doth inwardly
incline to an Union with the other,
by Reaſon of ſome prime Qualities dif-
poſing the Subjects to that natural and
ungoverned Friendlip; ſuch is the
Love between a Loadſtone and Iron,
and divers other meerly natural Things.
The
( 48 )
The other is, that common and more
diſcernable Attraction, which every
Thing receives from thoſe Natures, or
Places, whereon they were ordained,
and are ſtill directed by the Wiſdom
and Providence of the firſt Cauſe, &c.
Which Attraction as in meerly natural
Agents, God himſelf worketh for the
Perfection, and Conſervation of their
Being: So in Man it is wrought by
that reaſonable Power, which God
hath made his Vicegerent, as it were,
and, (as I may fo Ipeak) the. Ubiqui-
tary Agent in all the Motions of Man's
Little World; which Soul as in its own
Nature and Eſſence, ſo likewiſe in its
Operations, and Powers, bears fome
Reſemblance to the Creator, in direct-
ing, governing, and overſeeing all our
inferior Actions. To apply then thoſe
Proportions in Nature to the Affection
of Love in Man we ſhall find, firſt a
Secret, which I will call Natural; and
next a Manifeſt, which I will call Mo-
ral and Diſcurſive Attraction. The
firſt of theſe is that natural Sympathy,
wrought between the Affection and the
Object, in the firtt Concurrence of them,
without any Suſpenſion of the Act, or
further Inquiry after the Diſpoſition of
the Object, which comes immediately
from the outward, Natural and ſen-
ſitive
1
1
+
( 49 )
tive Virtues thereof; whether in Shape,
Beauty, Motion, Speech, Behaviour, or
the like: All which coming under the
Sphere of Senfe, I may call Judiciary.
Phyſiognomy, which is not a bare De.
light in the outward Qualities, but a
further Preſumption of the Judgment,
concluding therehence a lovely Diſpo-
ſition of that Soul; which animateth,
and quickneth thoſe Graces. And in-
deed we may well ground ſome good
Prefumption of the Similitude in the
Qualities of the Soul with thoſe which
are moſt obvious and conftant in the
Body, from the Love which is between
the Body and Soul, far ſtronger than
ány natural Love whatſoever (fince as
Ariſtotle tells us) chat Similitude and Re-Ethica
ſemblance in the Properties, is the Ground lib. 8
of Love. And hence is that Speech of
Solomon's; As in Water, Face anſwer-
eth Face, ſo the Heart of Man, to Man.
So ftrong and ſignificant are thoſe Cha-
racters which are ſtamped on the Body
by the Motions of the Soul. But yet
herein tho' it be injurious for a Man
out of too much Auſterity of Mind to
reject the Judgment of Senſe, and re-
belliouſly to quarrel with this Inſtinct ;
yet it is fic that in this Cafe, conſider-
ing the univerſal Deceitfulneſs of Things,
and what a Divorce, Habit and Edu-
H
cacion,
(50)
-
tion, and Hypocriſy, &c. have wrought
in many between the 'out and the in-
ſide of their Natures, we ſhould bring
a yielding and fearful Judgment, the
Love of Bias, which may eaſily upon
the Aſſurance and Warrant of Judg-
ment after it felf. The firſt Motions
of the Heart in the Love of any Friend
ſhould be Motus trepidus, like the Mo-
tion of thoſe Bodies, that are not fully
fixed in their natural Placę. But when
a Friend,, or any other Object, is
thoroughly known to bear a Similitude
with our Nature and Virtues, and by
that Agreement, to be, as it were, a
Man's Self, then may all our Motions
and Affections tend thereunto, as unto
the Center of Quier and Repoſe. For
as a Man's Self, ſo his Friend likewiſe,
for the ſame Reaſon, may be the Cec-
ter of his Thoughts and Affections. But
here likewiſe we muſt obſerve that Pro-
portion of Nature, that if our Affection
cannot ſtand in Private towards the
Good of any Friend in Private, with,
out the Damage and Inconvenience of
that Publick Body of which he is a
Member, the Univerſalmult be eſteemed
more dear and precious. ' A Scandal to
the Body, and a Schiſm or Breach from
the whole, is more offenſive, more
dan.'
1
8.6. 8.9,
( 51 )
dangerous, more unnatural, than pri-
vate Separation.
From this general and fundamental
Cauſe of Love proceed divers others
more ſpecial, whereof the firſt and
principal is á Similitude between the
thing loved, and that which is the
Square and Rule of Love. Now the
Rule and Square of Love (that we may
not ſpeak of Divine Love) is a Man's
Self, or that Unicy and Proportion which
the Thing loved beareth to the Party
loving. Which by Ariſtotle is called Ethic. lib.
in one place 'Iobtus, in another 64.0163159 iz
and elſewhere xovavia, in another, <zuſsins.
The Root then of every Man's Love
unto himſelf is that Unity and Identity
which he hath with himſelf; it being
natural in every Thing to take Delight
in the Simplicity of its own Goodneſs;
becauſe the more ſimple, and one, it is,
the more it is like the Fountain of its
Being, and therefore the more Perfection
it hach in it. And this Love of Man
unto himſelf, is, if ſubordinate to the
Love of God, and governed thereby,
Debitum Naturæ, a neceſſary Love; and vid. Arift.
ſuch, as the Neglect thereof, is a Treſ-Ethic. lib.
paſs againſt Nature. Now then as we S.
Love our ſelves for Unity, which we
have with our felves, fo whereſoever
we find any Union and Sinilitude, un-
to
H 2
( 52 :)
to us, any part of our ſelyes, either in
Nature, or Habits, upon that alſo do
the Beams of this paſſion extend. Now
a Thing may repreſent our ſelves, either
in Subſtance, or Nature ; as the Wife
may be ſaid to be a part of the Huse
band, or the Children the Branches of the
Parents, &c. Or elſe in Quality, or AC-
cidents, as one Friend reſembleth ano-
ther in natural, and one Man another in
habitual Qualities; all which are then
regular and good, when ſubordinate
to that greater, our Love of God, and
when governed by the Dictates of a
rightly
informed Reafon, which amongſt
many others are theſe three.
Firſt, That our Love carry its right
Report, and no Siniſter, and bye End,
with it. That we love a Friend
for himſelf, and all other Things for
thoſe Reaſons, which are natural and
good, without any indirect Reference
ſolely to our own Benefit: Hominum
Charitas (ſays Tully) Gratuita eft. True
Love is Free, without Self-reſpects; but
to ſhrowd our own private Commodi-
ty under the Name of Friendſhip, Non
eft Amicitia, ſed Mercatura; is only a
politick and covered Merchandiſe; for
our own Profit, no intire and juſt Af-
fection. "Secondly, That our Love be
not erroneous and prejudicial to draw
the
( 53 )
the Mind ſo far into an honourable
Eſteem of a Man's Perſon and Parts,
as that thereby thofe Weakneſſes, and
Imperfections (which are faſtned unto
every Man, that he may not be ac-
quainted with his own Emptineſs, with
his Dependance on Divine Bounty, and
with his neceſſary Uſe of Mens Society)
may not be preſented in ſuch falſe Ap-
pearances unto us, as may work, Firit,
an Opinion of their Goodneſs; and
next, an unhappy Diligence in the Emu.
lation of them. Thirdly, That our
Love keep in all the Kinds thereof, its
due Proportion, both for the Nature of
them, it being in ſome, a Love
of Reverence; in others, of Fellow-
ſhip; in others, of Compaſſion; and
the like,) as alſo for their ſeveral Di-
ſtances in Degrees of Intention, which
are to be more or leſs, according to the
natural, moral, or divine Obligations,
we find in the loved Perſon.
Another ſubordinate, and leſs Princi-
pal of Love, may be Love it ſelf ; (I
mean in another Man,) for as it is na-
tural, according to Ariſtotle to Praiſe, ſo
ſure it is natural and neceſſary to Love
Þinévitejass, Men of loving and good
Natures. And herein is chat verified,
that Love is as ſtrong as Death. For
as it is one common and good Office
of
1
(:54)
of Death to take away all Envy, and
Emulation between thoſe, whoſe Lives
were full of Oppoſition, (for it is noted as
a prodigious Hatred between thoſe Two
emulous Brothers, (nec fuxiis poſt fat a
modus, flammæque Rebelles Seditione Rogi)
Even ſo likewife Love hath a Kind of
coactive and conſtraining Power to
draw and reconcile unto it ſelf the
moſt repugnant and differing Affection.
For being of a tranſient Nature, and
going forth, or tranſporting it ſelf in-
to the Perſon beloved, it cannot chuſe
but (according to the Condition of all
natural Agents) work reſemblable and
like Affections unto it ſelf. For beſides
that hereby an Adverſary. is convinced
of injurious nouriſhing and detaining
' of Enmity, he is moreover mollified,
and invited to a mutual Exerciſe of
Love. It being as neceſſary to repay,
as it is odious to hate a Friend. And
this is the Occaſion of thoſe words of
Prov. 25. Solomon, Thou ſhale heap Coals of
Fire on his Head, which, tho' perhaps
with earthly and ignoble Minds it hath
the Property of hardning them in their
Hatred, yer with Minds ingenuous,
and of any worth, or value, it hach
a clean contrary Effect, to melt, ſepa-
rate, and purge it from the Droſs of
thoſe
21.
( 55 )
}
(
thoſe corrupt Affections, wherewith be-
fore it was polluted.
The next two Cauſes- I will join in
one; Namely, Abſence from, and Pre-
ſence with, the Thing, loved ; both
which, in a different Reſpect do exer-
ciſe Love; and therefore, Firſt, I like
not abſolutely that Speech of AriſtotleEthic
. lib.
(unleſs he mean it. of the tranſient...C. 5.
Adions) that though Diſtance of Place
do not diffolve the Root ; and Habit,
yet
it doth the Exerciſe of Love, For
in the Mind of Man (as natural Bodies
in the Reſpect of the Place, there iſ
fues not only a Love of Delight in the
Fruition, but alſo a. Lave of Deſire,
in the Privation of their Good. And;it
is indeed the Miracle of Love, ouveljaven
aj ourselv, to collect and knit together
in one, Things far feparated from each
other. And herein alſo Divine Love
hath the ſame Prerogative with Divine
Faith; That as This, is the Being, Sub-
liſtence or Poſſeſſion of Things to come,
and diſtant in Time ; fo That, is the
Union and knitting of Things Abſent,
and Diſtant in Place; but much more
then (even according to Ariſtotle, in
the fame Place) doch Preſence to the
Goodneſs of an Object loved, increaſe,
and exerciſe our Love, becauſe it gives
us a more compleat Sight and Union
to
>
( 56 )
18.
1 Cor. 13.
8.
19.
Mat.7.23.
to the Excellency of the Object loved,
1 John. 4. and therefore St. John ſpeaks of a Per:
fection, and St. Paul of a Perpetuity of
our Love unto God, grounded on the
Fullneſs of his Viſion, which we ſhall
enjoy for Ever with Him, which being
now but per fpeculum, dwo in anigmate,
makes us, as to know, fo likewiſe for
1 Cór.2.8. to love but in Part only. If they had
known, they would not have crucified
the Lord of Life. Their Ignorance, and
their Hatred went together, Simul ut
2 Tim. 2. definunt ignorare, deffant et odiſſe. And
indeed in the Scripture, Knowledge and
Job 9.21. Love are identical, and the moſt in-
Pfal. 1. 6. ward Work of conjugal Affection is
Pfal
. 33. called Knowledge. Now as it is with
Rom. 8. living Creatures, ſo it is with the Af-
fections; they are nourifhed many
Times, and luſtained after the ſame
Manner as they were produced. But
it is plain that all Love proceedech
from Knowledge, and all Knowledge
preſuppoſes fome Preſence of the Things
known, either' a Preſence by Report,
and Revelation, which is a Knowledge
of Faith ; or by immediate Repreſen-
tation of the Thing it ſelf, which work-
eth a Knowledge of Viſion, Preſence
then of the Object begetteth, and theres
fore, according to my firſt Conſequence,
it nouriſheth this Affection. Another
Cauſe
29.
Gen. 4. 1.
( 57 )
I
Cauſe may be an Aggregate of divers
Qualifications in the Object, as Simpli-
city, Ingenuity, &c. which Ariſtotle in Ariſtota
his Rhetorick hath touched. But fRhet. lib.
proceed to the Confequents, and Ef. 2. C. 4.
fects of this paſſion; whereof the firſt
may be Union, and a knitting together
of the Thing loved, with the Party
loving. And hence it is, that in this
Life ronë arë ſaid to love God, but
that are united to Him; Ând there:
fore as God's firſt Love to Mari was Epheč. 2.
in making Man like unto Himſelf; fo 12.
his ſecond great Love, was in making
Himſelf like Man, &c. But the Wicked, Rev. 22.
they are all “ASEOS, de Alieni ; and extra, 15.
and procal, all Arguments of Separation;
and by Confequence of Hạcred. Now
that I make Union an Effect of Love;
I mean no other Union than that of
Similitude; and Conformity, a mutual
Conſonancy in the ſame Motions; In-
clinations; Deſires, and withal ſome
Kind' of Endeavor (if I may lo ſpeak)
of real Union, ſeen in the Embracings,
Kiſſings, in the Exitiency, and Egreſs
of the Spirits, in the Diſcovery, and
Expanfion of the Heart and Thoughts,
in the Simplicity of the Demeanours,
and generally in all other mutual Cará
riages. Love hath, in Moral and Di.
vine Things, the fame Effect, that Fire
I
hath
( 58 )
hath in Natural, a congregating of Ho.
mogeneals, and a ſeparating of Hetero-
geneals : So we ſee in the Love of
God, the deeper and more earneſt that
is, the more is the fpiritual Part of Man
elevate and remore from the earthly.
And therefore in Heaven, where Love
ſhall be preſent, all Things ſhall be
harmonious and homogeneal, I mean
not in Eſſence and Nature, but in a
pure and unmixed Spirituality of Af-
fections, in a perfect Conformity of
fincere and holy Deſires. From this
Union ariſeth another Effect, a Reſt
and Satisfaction in the Mind, in the
Thing United, which can only be total,
and perfect in the Union of the Soul
with * God, the greateſt Good there-
of. But proportionably there ariſeth
from the Union unto any other Ob-
jects of Love, a ſatiating of the Power;
which is only then good and regular,
when the Object is natural, and the
Action limited. Diſproportion and E-
normity are the two Corruptions in this
Effect.
A third Effect, which I will obſerve
of Love, is the Stay and Immoration
* But here Gerſon is faulty in applying the Three-
Fold Appetite to the Trinity.
of
( 59 )
1
of the Mind on one Object, with an
alienating of it from all other. Love
and Knowledge have a mutual ſharp-
ning each of the other; For, as Know-
ļedgę doth generate Love, ſo doth Love
nouriſh, and exerciſe Knowledge. The
Heart and Treaſure can ſeldom be fe-
vered; the Eagles will always reſort tº
the Body; David's Love gave Length
and Perpetuity to his Meditation, even
all the Day long. And herein methinks
may conſiſt another Proportion of the
Strength of Love with Death; for as
this doth naturally collect and draw in
thoſe Spirits, which before lay ſcattered
in the outward Parts, to guard, as iç
were, and arm the Heart in its great
Conflict, with that laſt, that griſly Ene-
my, which it muſt then ſuſtain, uniting
all thoſe weak and languiſhing Forces,
which Nature hath to teſtify the natų-
ral Love which each living Creature
beareth to its own Conſervation; ſo
doth Love draw and unite all thoſe Spi-
rits of the Body, which any Way ad-
miniſter either to the Fancy or Appe-
tite, to ſerve only for the pouriſhing
that Affection for the Viſion of that
Treaſure, whereunto, the Heart it ſelf
is already attracted. And this is the
Reaſon of that proverbial Speech, Amur
I 2
elf
(60)
eft otioforum negotium; that Love hath
this ſtrange Property in it; to make a
Man ever idle, and yet never without
Motion and Employment; ever idle, by
alienating it from other ; ever imployed,
by fixing it on its own Objects.
Another Effect which is obſerved of
of Love, is, Jealouſy, or Zeal; where-
by is not meant that ſuſpicious, inquir,
ing, quick fighted Quality, of finding
out the Blemiſhes, and diſcovering the
i Cor.13. Blots and Imperfections of a Friend
But only a provident and follicitous
Fear, leſt ſome or other Evil ſhould
either violate the Security, or blemiſh
the Goodneſs of whom we Love, like
Penelope in the Poet, In té fingebam
violentos. Troas ituros, &c. And the
Reaſon is that ſweet Communion and
Sympathy between Lovers, that mu-
tual Incorporation, as it were, of each
into the other, whereby the Wounds
and Stains of the one, do redound to
the Grief and Shame of the other. He
that is not jealous for the Credit and
Security of what he pretendech Af
fection to, loves Nothing but himſelf,
in thoſe Pretences. " If a Phariſee beſtow
his Alms, not out of a Fellow-feeling
of his Wants, whom he ſuccoureth, buč
that he may be ſeen of Men, he loveth
>
not
1
( 61 )
not his Brother, but his own Sin: If a
fiery Sophifter pretend Affection only
for this reſerved Reaſon, Quia magnareſt
do prevalet, he doth not-love the Truth,
but his Ambition. There is another
Effect of this Paſſion, on the Body's
which they call Liquefaction, or Lan-
guor, a Melting, as it were, and a De-
cay of Spirits, by Reaſon of that in
tenſive fixing of them on the Perſon
loved. Love is of all other the moſt
inmoft and viſceral Affection, and there.
fore the work of it is called the Bowels
of Love.
But, thus much it ſhall ſuffice me
to have ſpoken of the fundamental Paſo
Gion of all. The next in Order is Ha-
tred, of which the-Schools make two
Kinds; an Hatred of Abomination, or
Loathing, which conGifts in a pure Aver-
fion from Something; and an Hatred
of Enmity, which is not a flying, but
a purſuing Hatred. I ſhall not diſtinct-
ly ſpeak of theſe two, but in general
of the Dignities and Corruptions of this
Pallion. The Object then, of all Ha-
tred is Evil, whether it be of Contra-
riety, Privation, Contradiction, or Re-
lacion ; 'which howſoever in Reſpect
of the Exiſtence of it, it be, in ſome
Cafes, good, for the manifeſting of
the
Bu
1
( 62 )
1
the Glory of God, and the Trial of the
Heart of Man, yet, as it worketh De
formity, Oppreſſion and Diſquiet of our
Nature, it is againſt the created Law,
of that inbred Love, which each Thing
muft bear unto its own Perfection, and
by Conſequence, is to be hąted.
Beſides this general and fundamental
Cauſe, there may be others leſs gene,
ral, whereof the firſt is, Fear. I mean
not a ſubmiſſive, reverend, obedient
Fear, nor a Fear of Admiration ; but a
ſlaviſh Fear, a Fear of Terror, a Fear of
Rebellion ; now there is a double Roog
of this Fear; outward, and inward.
The outward is that Cruelty, Oppreſſion,
&c. which we receive from the potent,
and therefore unavoidable Malice of the
Perſon ha fed, And herein Averſation
and Loathing is not only allowable, but
neceſſary and natural. But the inward
Root is, the Guilt and Burthen of an
unclean Conſcience. Now, from this
Fear ariſeth a double Hatred. One,
of a Man's own Conſcience; becauſe
that is always affrighting the Mind
with thoſe Indictments, which it hạch
againſt it : The Worm of Conſcience
is of all Creatures moſt hateful ; ſo that
a wicked Man, when he once begins to
know himſelf,' loves every Thing, but
God,
1
( 63 )
God, better than himſelf. The othér
is againſt the Authors, and Executio-
hers of Juſtice, of the Deſert of whoſe
Indignation we are from within coria
vinced. Another particular Cauſe may
be Diſparity in Affections, and Deſires;
for notwithſtanding there be many
times Hatred,' where there is Similia
tude (as ſündry Men do uſe to haté
their own Vices in others, being not
content to have their Uſe, unleſs they
have the Monopoly and Impropriation
of them) Yer this ever proceeds from
fome enſuing Inconveniencies, which
are likely to follow therefrom. Now
this Diſparity fometimes is natural, in
a ſecret Antipathy and Reluctation of
Qualities ; ſometimes, moral ; wherein
we have our Averſion from the con.
trary Actions of other Men (if naught)
ſecured. So that this Paſſion glaunce
not from the Action to the Perſon, nor
break out into the Deſire of Diſgrace
a'nd Overthrow of whom we hate, una
leſs our own Credit lies at the Stake
ready to be betrayed, if it be not pre-
vented by the ſpeedy Overthrow of
thoſe, whoſe unreclaimable Courſes
will ruin, or indanger it: Laſtly, thoſe
Actions may be civil, and reſpect So-
ciety; and then, as the Oppoſition con-
Gifts
( 64 )
fifts in two Things, Oppoſition of
Man's Hopes; and of his Parts; by
croſſing the one, and dif-eſteeming the
other. So Corruption may eaſily pro-
ceed from two violent and unreaſons
able Grounds, Ambition and Self-love;
the one purſuing its Hope, the other
reflecting upon its Worth. And to this
particular may be reduced that Hatred
which ariſeth out of Parity, or out of
a Corrivalty, or Emulation in the ſame,
in the Arts or Purſuits, either by Rea.
ſon of Covetouſneſs, or Envy; a greedy
Deſire of our own; or a difcontented
Sight of another Man's Good. Affecti-
ons very unfit for Society, when para
ticular Love of Members to themſelves
ſhall prejudice the Love they ſhould
bear unto the whole
The laſt Cauſe is a ſettled and
pera
manent Intuition of the Object, a pe
netrating, jealous and interrupting
Fancy. Becaute Evil being often viewed
and throughly ſearched, doth generate
an habitual and inveterate Deteffation.
Firſt, becauſe the After-Apprehenſion
comes not ſimple, but with a foreſtala
led Reſolution of finding Evil therein.
Secondly, ic being in this, as in all
other Diſcoveries, true, that the former
Knowledge is a Mafter and Light unto
the
(65)
the other latter: But light, fluent
and wandring Fancies, tho they be ap-
prehenſive of Injuries, and therefore fi-
able to an oftner Arger: Yet by Rea-
Ion of the Volubility of he Mind, joined
with an Infirmity and Unexerciſe of
Memory, are for this Cauſe leſs ſubject
to a rooted Hatred:
I now proceed to che, Conſideration of
this Paſſion in its Act. Now, there is
a Four-fold Direction of the Quantity
and Quality of our. Hatred taken from
the Object.. 1. The Unalterableneſs of
the Will, warrants the Inveterateneſs of
our Hatred. 2dly, The Importuniry and
Infinuation of the Evil, warrants the
Reiteration of it. zdly, The Greatneſs
exacts the Intention of it.. 4thly;. Thế
Remiffion of it warrants the Modera-
tion of it. We may inſtance for the
Three former, in Sin; as, for otheě
Things, which Circumitances alter,
they may be hared with a preſent, but
not a cultomary Hatred, not a contem
plative (as I may ſo ſpeak) and perpe-
tual Deteſtation." Sin is, of all other
Evils, the moſt inſeparable, purſuing,
and active Enemy: Never bere capa-
ble of an utter Overthủow, but ſtill
furniſhed with a continual Supply of
Strength to oppoſe, with new Policies
K
áno
1
( 66 )
-
and Stratagems to circumvent, with
an infinite Multitude of plauſible Im-
poſtures, fo inſinuate into a Nature
That is leaſt armed and fenced againft
ſuch Alfaults. And therefore here on.
ly is that irreconcileable and multi-
plied Hatred neceſſary to be main.
tained. And now for the Greatneſs of
Sin, which belongeth to the Intenſion
of the Quality thereof; whether we
conſider it in its own Nature, as it is a
Rebellion againſt the moſt abſolute and
perfect Will; or in its Effects, either
in Regard of the Tranſcendency, and
Diffuſion of it, being a leprous and
overſpreading Pollution ; or the Infi-
niteneſs of it both in Guilt, and in
the Conſequence of it, the Puniſhment
of it ; our Hatred cannot be too deep
and implacable. Whereas in the pro-
ſecuring of other Evils with Hatred
(being either ſo intenſe in their Nam
ture, or not ſo diffuſive in their Ex-
tenſion) it is a Matter of as great
Difficulty to be right, as it is of Cor-
ruption and Deformity to miſcarry.
Of which, amongſt many, I will note
two: As, firft, when a Man ſhall ap-
ply his Hatred of Proſecution againſt
that Evil, which is the proper Object
of Averſation. For ſome Things there
be,
1
.
( 67 )
be, whoſe Evil is only. Conditional,
which hurt not their Nature, but their
Application, and theſe require a par-
ticular For bearance, and not any far-
ther violating of their Naturę. Se-
condly, when the Paſſion is fo Intenſe,
that it cannot admit of any, Admix-
tion of Love, tho' the Object can ad-
mit of ſome Admixtion of Good : Or
when the Hatred is abſolute and ge-
neral againſt only relative Evils, v.g.
There is not any Man between whoſe
natural Faculties and ſome Objects or
other, there may not be diſcovered
either an Inſufficiency, or Reluctancy
(and Ariſtotle gives a Reafon) Now if Ethic. lib.
in this Caſe he ſhall preſently fall not
only into a relative and perſonal Ha-
tred, but unto a profeſſed villiſying,
unto an abſolute and ſlanderous Op-
poſition, to an Undervaluing and Con-
-tempt of Perſons, led thereunto with a
more particular Affection; or unto an
open Deſire of the not being thereof;
he doth diſcover in the Degrees of his
Hatred, a Corruption no leſs unrea-
ſonable than violent; it being almoſt
all one, as if a blind Man ſhould loath
the Sun; or a deaf Man ſhould will
all Tongues cut out. I haſten to the
Conſequents or Effects thereof, where
K 2
5.C. 5
1
of
A
( 68 )
1
+
>
of ſome ate Good, which may be
theſe.
Firſt; Security againft the Oppoſition
of Evil. “And therefore we ſhall' obo
ſerve in many Evils, that "no Man is
brought within the Danger, that is not
at firſt drawn into the Love of them :
All inordinate Corruptions then only
wound the Soul, when they entangle
the Will. Secondly, Confidence, or ſome
good Preſumprion in our own, or afe
fifting Strength, againſt the Evil. : Borli
which Effects do proceed from a cer-
tain Covetouſneſs and Furniture againſt
the onſet of Evil, which the Hatred
thereof doth Cauſe. "Thirdly, It work,
eth the fame Manner of Victory, for
odium ſemper ſequitur ex animi Elatione
(as Scaliger obſerves) which I think
principally holds true in moral, and
practick Courſes, wherein this is a ge-
neral Rule, He loves Evil that is over-
come by it, whoſe Will
' is drawn to af-
fent unto it. Perfect Hatred is ſtrong
and invincible, and hath that Property,
which the Apoſtle giveth Love, to ex-
clude all Fcar. Fourthly, Now and then
in reſpect of the Objects, it worketh
Reformation : For as Countenance and
Encouragement is the Foſterer, ſo Ha-
tred and Contempt, is, as it were, Play
fick
1
( و6 )
on
fick to purge out an Evil. Opinion
ſtamps Worth
many uncurrant
Coins, which
go,
rather becauſe they
are received, than becauſe they are
warrantable. And therefore, if a Man
naturally deſirous of Reputation, ſee
his Courſes generally deſpiſed, he can-
nor.ro unnature himſelf. as ſtill to feed
on thoſe Delights, which he perceives
to provoke others unto Loathing and
Contempt. For the bad Effects. Firſt,
obſerve Ariſtotle's Rule, That Hatred Rhet. libi
is, Teo's te gevecs againſt the whole Gene-2. 5. 4.
rality of its Objects ; ſo then all the
Actions and Effects of this paſſion are
corrupt, which are not tranſcendent,
but admit of private Reſervations, and
peculiar Indulgences; ſince there muſt
needs be Irregularity, and a Deprava-
tion in that Ad, which is converfant
about an uniform and ſimple Object,
to wit, Evil with a various and diverſe
Motion, as may be ſeen in Sin, in which
that Man whoſe Hatred is not an uni-
verſal and tranſcendent Hatred againſt
every particular Evil, even thoſe which
his perſonal Relations make more pe-
culiar unto him, if a Man ftill retains
ſome privy Exceptions, ſome reſerved
and covered Delights, fome Apologies,
&c. Certain it is, his Hatred is either
blind
1
1
1
( 70 )
blind in not ſeeing, or lame in not
oſcaping his Boſom and retired Evils,
Or is it rather indeed a perſonated than
a true Hatred ; rather a Meteor of the
Brain, than a Paſſion of the Mind. A
ſecond Effect is rather Incredulity in
nov giving Credit to thoſe good 'Re.
ports which an Enemy obtaineth, or
Envy or Malignity at the sight of them
For ſuch is the Condition of rankerous
and ſwelling Conditions, as of raw and
ſwelling Wounds, which by Reaſon of
the Quickneſs of its own Pain, does as
much abhor the Goodneſs of a Surgeon's
Hand, as the good Offices of an Ene-
my's Sword
So is it with malicious
Minds; they are tormeríted with no
thing more than the Perſon of an Ene-
my: They can equally draw Nou-
riſhment to this their Paſſion, from the
Good and Ill of whom they hate; yea
commonly greater too, from the Good,
than from the Evil, for, odiorum acriores
Caufæ quando iniqua, Tacitus obſerves
this berween Domitian and Agricola.
When Hatred is built upon a bad Foun-
dation it commonly raiſeth it ſelf higher;
and the Reaſon is, becauſe in ſuch Paf-
fions the leſs we have from the Objects
the more we have from our ſelves, and
what is defective to make up our
Hatred
!
1
()
Hatred in his Deſert, is ſupplied by the
Riſing and Tumour of our own Stomachế.
As we ſee in the Body, that thiņ and
empry Nouriſhment will ofren ſwell it
higher, than that which is Maſly and
Material.' And here obſerve the mue
tual Offices which corrupt Affections
exerciſe amongſt themſelves. Hatred
firſt generates Envy, and this again doch
reciprocally increaſe Hatred, and both
join in a Conſpiracy by fo much more
dangerous to that Soul, wherein they
lurk, than to the Enemy, whom they
rage againſt; and by much they are
more near, inward, and hurtful there-
For certainly a venemous and
murthering Quality is the moſt miſchien
vous, where it toucheth cloſeſt. And
from this ariſeth that 'Engolpersuxíc, a Rei
joycing at the Miſeries and Ruin that
befalls an Enemy. But I proceed,
Another Effect is a ſiniſter and crooke
ed Suſpicion, whereby we fearch with
a prejudicial and envious Eye the Actia
ons and Purpoſes of our Enemies; and
according as the Sharpneſs of our Wits,
or the Cuſtom of our own Practices,
we attribute unto them ſuch Ends, as
is likely were never framed, but in the
Forge of our own Brains. It is reckoned
up as One of thoſe noble Attributes of
Love,
unto.
( 72 )
9
that it thinketh nå Evil; And cers
tainly there is not a more black and
helliſh Subtilty of Hatred, than that
which can collect out of every Acti-
on ſome clofe Impiety, and pierce into
the reſerved, and hidden Paſſages of the
Heart. (And therefore Agripina thac
The might not diſcover any Hatred to
Nero would not acknowledge the
Miſchief intended her to be directed
from him) Like that Man in Ariſto-
tle, who thought wherefoever he went,
he ſaw his own Pixure walk before
him. And indeed all ſuch Suſpicion
proceeds from ſome Hatred or other.
For, as to think the worſt of our own
Actions, and to fear the Goodneſs of
them, is a sign of Hatred to our own
Sins, ſo to have the Humour of caſting
the worſt Gloſſes on other Mens Lives,
argues a great Hatred to their Perá
fons; But here is a Difference; we
Search for Evil in our felves to expel
it; but we ſearch for Evil in another
to find it.
Another Effect is a proud and" haugha
ty Carriage, wherewith we contemn the
Worth of another Perſon : There is a
Tumor Cordis, as well as Tumor Cerebri :
It is not only Knowledge puffeth up;
there is as well a ſtubborn, as a learned
Pride
( 73 )
Pride againſt the Perſon, as againſt the
Weakneſs of our Brother, a Pride where
by we will not yield to a Stooping and
Reconciliation with him, as 'whereby
We will noţ ſtoop to the Capacity and
Edification of him. Hencé Ariſtoțle Rhet. lidi
obſerves that Hatred, when it is ſimple, 2. C. 4.
and alone, is without Grief, and I také
it to be, becauſe all Grief comes from
the Hapening of ſome Evil, if to others;
then it is the Effect of Love; if to our
ſelves, then it would cauſe - Humility,
neither of which Attributes are com
patible with Hatred, whoſe Property
is to conceive in it ſelf ſuch Worth,
as may draw it to an inſolent Dir
eſteem and Contempt of another Man.
The laſt Effect is Impatience, and Fury
in' the Proſecution of an Enemy's Ruin,
and therefore that worthyEffect of
Love, contrary to this, is called Mares duría,
Longanimitas, Long-ſuffering. But Ha-
tred is of a fierce and purſuing Nam
ture, lo far from admitting any Peace,
or yielding to Condition of Parley, that
it reſts not ſatisfied with the Miferies,
but deſires the very utter Overthrow
of an Enemy. For this is the Diffe-
rence that Ariſtotle makes between
Anger and Hatred, that the one only
proſecutes Retaliation, the other, the
Anoia
Dewi
( 74 )
"
Annihilation of the Subject of its Re.
venge.
The next Paſſions to theſe Two, are
Deſire and Abomination. Of which I
will ſpeak briefly, Only propounding
two or three Rules, which may ſet out
the Dignities thereof; ſince they differ
only in Act and Habit from Love
and Harred; or as a Man ſitting, from
a Man-walking. The firſt Rule is that,
concerning Objects of an inferior and
tranſitory Nature, our Deſires be nei-
ther hafty nor precipitate, nor vaſt
and unlimited. And in Matters of
higher and more neceffary Condition,
that they be not either wavering and
interrupted Deſires, or negligent and
unexerciſed Deſires. For the firſt, we
know the Nature of all ſublunary and
earthly Goods, they have all Some-
thing of the Serpent in them to de.
ceive.
The Way of Riches and Profit is a
thorny Way; the Way of Ambition, a
flippery Way; and the Way of Learn-
ing an intricate and involved Way:
And certainly he had need of better
Eyes, than a blind Paffion affords, that
in ſo ill Ground, will make good Hafte
and good Speed together. In Labyrin,
tho properantes ip/a velocitas implicat.
He
( 75 )
.
1
He is not the likelieſt Man to get out
of a Maze, that runs faſteſt. An over-
nimble Deſire is like the Stomach of a
ſick Man newly, recovered, more greedy
than Strong, and fuller of Appetite than
Digeſtion, whence come raw and un-
concocted Counſels, blind and ungo-
yerned Reſolutions. We never have
the Patience to inquire after the right
Way to our deſired End; it being the
Suſpicion of our Greedineſs, that the
true Means are commonly the moſt
tedious, and that Honeſty, for the
moſt Part, goes the fartheit Way a-
bout.
For the ſecond Rule; it ſeems ne .
ceſſary for many Reaſons. Firſt, for
the Unnaturálneſs of it ; becauſe a
reſtleſs and unſatisfied Deſire is there
only requiſite, where the Object there-
of is ordained to accompliſh and per-
fect Man's Nature; not there, where
it is a Means for his Benefit and Com-
fort only. Tis then a corrupt Deſire
that proceeds not from our Want, but
our Vice, as that is not a natural
Thirft, but an Inflamation and Diffem-
per of the Body, which cannot be ſa-
tisfied. Secondly, it worketh Anxiety
and Perturbation of the Mind, and is
no more likely to be a true Means to
lead
I a
( 76 )
i
öf any
lib. 3•
lead us unto ſome farther Good, than
a miſty troubled Way and uncouth is,
to bring a Man to his Place of
Abode. Thirdly, It doth diſtract our
nobler Cares; Martha's Sollicita, and
Mary's Neceſſarium can hardly be found
in the fame Affection. Fourthly, they
make a Man unthankful in receiving
Favours from another; For faith
Sen de Seneca, Caduca Memoria futuro immi:
nentium; it is a ſtrong Preſumption that
he feldom looks back upon what is paft,
that is earneſt in the Purfüic of Some
thing to come; and next, though the
ſhould look back, yet the Conſidera-
tion firſt, of ſuch a Benefit would be
but flight and vaniſhing: For the Mind
finding preſent Content in the Liberty
of a roving and unbounded Tallion,
is marvellous unwilling to give per-
manent Entertainment'to Thoughts of
another Nature. And tho this like,
wife were granted, yet; fecondly, ſucli
Thoughts would rather be Thoughts of
Murmuring and Undervaluing, chain of
Thankfulneſs: Every Man being wil-
ling .rather to think ill of another's
Bounty, thạn of his own Paſſion; and
to conceive the Gift rather ſmall and
unworthy, than to acknowledge the
infatiabte
( 77 )
.
infatiable Vaſtneſs of our own De
fires.
The next Rule obſerved, did reſpect
thoſe higher and more glorious Ob-
jects of Man's Felicity, wherein our
Deſirés muſt be reſolute, full of Quick-
neſs and Perfeverariçe. The true Des
ſires of this Naturë, are deſcribed-by.
the moſt pathetical and ſtrong Simi-
litude which Nacure alords us ; by
Hunger and Thirſt, and thoſe not com-
mon neither, but by the Braying of a
tired Hart after the Rivers of Water,
and the Gaping of dry Ground, after
the Sweetneſs of a ſeaſonable Shower:
And the Reaſons are, Firſt, becauſe
we are but poor and ſhallow Veſſels,
and thoſe Paffages are quite ſhut up,
by which we ſhould give Admittance
to the Matter of our true Happineſs;
yea fo full are they already of thoſe
rebellious Pallions, that ſtruggle and
fight with any Thing of a contrary
Nature which is entertained, as that
our greateſt Vehemency will not be
fufficient either to empty; or to fill
The laſt Rule was that they ſhould
not be faint and ſluggiſh, but induſtrious
and painful, both for the avoiding Op-
poſitions; and diſcreet applying of the
Furthe-
qur felves.
.
( 78 )
Furtherances required thereunto. And
indeed, that is no true, that is no ope-
rative Defire. Children may wiſh for
Mountains of Gold. Balaam may wiſh
for a bleſſed Departure, and an Atheiſt
may wiſh for a Soul as earthy in Sub-
ftance, as Affection. But theſe are Eja-
culacions rather of a ſpeculative Fancy,
than of a working Pallion.
The next Paffions belonging to the
concupifcible Faculty, are thole which
are wrought by the Preſence and Union
of an Object. And that is, when eicher
we by our Deſires have reached the
Object, and then it cauſeth Joy and
Delight, or when in our Flight the
Object hath overtaken us, and then it
cauſeth Grief: Paſſions which bear the
moſt inward Relarion unto all our
Actions. Now thefe Paffions are di-
vers, according to the Diverſity of their
Objects. If their Object be ſenſitive or
bodily, the Delight is called, Voluptas,
Pleaſure; if Divine, Gaudium, Joy;
and ſo for Grief; if its Object be the
Body, it is Pain; if the Soul, it is
Grief.
Firſt, then for Delight, (not to ſpeak
of it according to thoſe ſeveral Confi-
derations of it, but confuſedly) The
Object may be ſaid to be, whatſoever
is,
( 79 )
A
is, eithet medicinal for the Repairing,
for natural for the Conferving, or any
way accidental for the Advancing of a
Creature: Other Things which eat out
and undermine Nature, may happily
yield ſome Meafure of vaniſhing Con
tent to Minds that tạfte every Thing
with an erroneous and corrupted Pa
late 'And therefore Seneca is bold to Seneca.
find Fault with Virgil's Epithet" of Epift. 593
Mala Gaudia, Joys, which iſſue from a
polluted Fountain as not having in
them that inſeparable Attribute of an
abſolute Delight, which is to be in-
variable. But of the true Objects of
Delight, ſome are ſenſitive and Cor
poreal, ſuch as repair decaying Nature,
and in this kind there often' happens a
double Corruption; viz. an unnatural
Delight, and an unlimited : Other Obi
jects there are, which leave the Body,
and belong to the Soul; and they are
both the moral and contemplative
Alations of the Mind; all which, be-
cauſe they are the Catalogue of Things
under the Sun, are never without Vexa-
tions and Vanities. And therefore there
are more divine Contemplations, which
bring with them a ſatiating Joy, a
Joy unſpeakable, a Peace pait Under-
ſtanding. Nor does this Property of
over-
(80
1
overflowing and ſwallowing the Mind,
add any Degrees of Offerice and
Anxiety
to the Soul; for it is not the Weakneſs
of the Soul, as it is of the Body, to
receive Annoyancé by that which it
delightech in; nor does the Mind deſire
to ſubdue and conquer, but only to be
united with, and, if it were poſſible,
to be incorporated into its Object :
And here, the only Corruption is the
Deficiency of it ; for though this blet
ſed Light leave not any Man in the
Shadow of Death, yet it takes us not
quite out of the Shadow of Sin ; yet
af leaft: qur. Endeavours muſt be, that
though our Joy cannot be a 'trúe re-
pleniſhing Joy, yet it may be an opera-
tive Joy.
Other more particular Cauſes of De-
light than the Object, are all thoſe that
have Power any Way to make preſent
the Object to 'the Faculty ; And this
is done three Manner of Ways, by
Contemplation, by Confidence, by
Fruition.
Contemplation adds unto the Soul á.
double Delight: Firſt, from its own
Propriety, it being the peculiar and na-
tural Agitation of Man's Mind, and
exérciſing of thoſe Powers, whoſe Feli-
city conſiſts in Working; Inſomuch
that
1
1
( 8i )
that thoſe Things, which we abhor to
know experimentally, our curious and
contemplative Nature deſires to know
ſpeculatively: And therefore the De
vil's firſt Tempration was drawn from
the Knowledge as well of Evil, as Good.
Buc then, Secondly, Contemplation, in
that Object of true Happineſs and Dea:
light, affordeth farther Joy, in that is
doth, in ſome Sort, præ-unite Souls and
Happineſs together. . And this is the
Reaſon why Ariſtotle prefers contem-
plative Knowledge before practick. For
tho' This, in Reſpect of its ſhedding it
ſelf
upon Society, and its immediate
Reference unto Communion, be of a
perfecter Nature, yet certainly, in that
Sweetneſs of Content, that Serenity and
Brightneſs of Mind, that Exaltation of
Nature, which we receive from thoſe
noble Motions of the higher Mind, the
Other doch far, in Pleaſure and Satis-
faction, furpaſs all active Happinliša
And therefore in the Body the Parts of
Viſion are before thoſe of Action; the
right Eye, before the right Hand. Thus
we may obſerve in God (tho' there
can be no Acceſſion, nor Intermiffion
of Delight, yet by Anthropopathy to
us-ward) He did not ſo much Joy in
his Fiat, as his Vidit; not ſo much when
M
he
(82)
he gave his Creatures Nature, as when
he ſaw their Goodneſs; Nature being
the Object of Power,' but Goodneſs,
of Delight. But in this Delight, not-
withſtanding its Excellency, there may
be a Corruption in the Exceſs thereof.
For tho it be true what Seneca faith,
that Corpus eft pondus de pana anima,
yer for the Soul to attempt Liberty,
and, as he ſpeaks, by a continual wani
dring Speculation; ſubducere ſe Custodia
in qua tenetur, to deny Aſſiſtance to,
or forbid the Employments of the Body,
is a Practice beyond its Commiſſion,
and comes within the Compaſs of Con-
tempt, Neglect or Malignity ; ſo that
to ſeparate theſe two, (as
Hermits with
their vowed Sequeſtration do) is as
wicked in Religion, as it is monſtrous
in Nature, to fee a Fire burn without
Light, or ſhine without Heat.
ſecond Cauſe is ſure Confidence of
the Mind; ſo that whatſoever doth
encourage Hope, doth therewithal
ſtrengthen and enlarge Delight. Spe-
Rhet, lib.rantes gaudent, faith Ariſtotle; for-where
1.C.11,12. Hope is ſtrong, there is both an Alie-
nation of the Mind from all our preſent
Wants and Oppreſſions, and withal a
Tranquility thereof in the Sight of fu-
ture Good. But here we must take
heed
( 83 )
$
1
9
heed of deep Corruption in our De
light, that we have no ungrounded
Confidence, and partly out of Preſump-
tion, partly from Security, to reſolve
upon uncertain and caſual Events. A
prefumptuous Delight, tho' it may for
the Time miniſter great Content, yet in
the End, if it miſcarry, will work
heavy Inconveniences. For the Mind
being puffed up with a windy and un-
nouriſhing Comfort, is quite diſabled
for bearing the ſudden Aſſault of an
Evil, as having its Forces ſcattered by
Security, which Fear and Caution
would have colle&ted. For we know
in Bodies, Union ſtrengthens natural
Motions, and weakneth' violent; fo
likewife in the Mind, the Collection
and Uniting of our Endeavours, doth
both enable the Mind for the Profe-
cution of its own Ends, and reſiſting
all Oppoſitions.
A laſt and proper Cauſe of Delight,
is Fruition of Good, and the real 'Union
thereof unto the Mind ; And there-
fore in Matter of Pleaſure and Joy,
the more the Union is, the more iş
the Delight: Thus we ſee the Preſence
of a Friend yields more Content, than
his Abſence, and the Embraces more
than his Preſence ; fo in the outward
Delights,
M%
( 84 )
2
Delights, thoſe of Incorporation are
greater, than thoſe of Adheſion, as it
is more natural to delight in our Meats,
than in our Garments. In the Under
ſtanding likewiſe, thofe Aſſents which
are moſt clear, are moſt pleaſant ; and
Perſpicuity argues the perfecter Union
of the Object with the Power: And
therefore we have thoſe two, Specu-
lum Ænigma put together by St. Paul ;
where the Obſcurity of our Knowledge
of God is attributed unto this, that we
fee him not, Facte ad faciem, with an
immediate Union, but his Image only
at a Diſtance, and in theſe three Glaſ-
fes ; In ſpeculo Verbi, Filij, Mundi ; the
laſt of Nature, and the two firſt of
Faith.
The chief Effect of this paſſion is an
Opening and Dilatation of the Heart,
and other Parts; a Lightneſs of Body, ,
with a clear and uncontracted Coun,
tenance expreſſing the Serenity of the
Mind, whence it háth the Name of
Lætitia, a broad and ſpreading Paſſion,
It hath an Exultation and Egreſs of
the Spirits, diſcovering a Kind of Loſe
neſs of Nature in her Security, where
by every part of the whole Man is
made quick and active, doing many
Things not out of a foſe-determined
Reſa
1
1
I
( 85 )
Reſolution, but out of an Inſtinct and
Power violently tranſporting che Mind,
and violently drawing both it and the
Body to a Neglect of themſelves, and
to a ſtrong Expreſſion of fo powerful
a Paſſion, Nam gaudio Cogendi vis ineft.
Joy hath its Co-action and Tyranny,
exerciſed on all the Parts .of the Mind
and Body; on That, by alienating from all
orher Objects;ton This, by driving it into
Motions, which Reaſon left alone, with-
out the Heat of Paſſion, would not ex-
erciſe. Inſomuch that ſome are reported
in a ſudden Joy, by a too violent ſpring,
ing out of the Spirits, and Alteration in
the Body, to have fallen Dead. And
this Diffuſion of the Spirits hews. the
Haſte and Forwardneſs of Nature in ftris
ving, as it were, to meet her Object,
and to make Way and Paſſage from its
Entrance into her, if ſhe be not fully
poſſeſſed of it, and to expel and ſcatter
all adverſe Humours.
The oppoſite Paſſion to this of De-
light, is Grief and Sorrow, which is ei-
ther ſenſitive, or intellectual. Senſi-
țive, is that Anguiſh and Diſtreſs,
wherewith Nature groaneth under an
invincible Violation of the Body.
Paffion, in this Senſe, little condu-
cing to the Advancement of Na-
ture; being always joined to ſome Meaç
fure
1
A
( 86 )
}
fure of Decay, but only, as it ſerves
ſometimes for the better fortifying it
againft the fame or greater Evils. It
being the Condition of corporal Dee
lights. by Cuſtom , to grow burthen-
fom, fo of Pain to become eaſy. The
Intellectual, which is called a wound-
ed Spirit, is ſo much certainly the more
quick, and pungent and piercing, by
how much a Spirit is more vital than
a Body
The Cauſes of this paſſion are, what,
foever hath the Power to difturb the
Mind by its Unity and Application un
to it. There are two Conditions then,
of the Object of Grief; That it muſt
be evil, and preſent; Evil, and that
not only formally in it felf, but ap,
prehenſively to the Underſtanding; and
therefore we ſee that many Things,
which are in their Nature cotrupt
and deadly, yet out of a particular Di-
ſtemper of the Mind, and Deceitfulneſs
of the Evil, may prove pleaſant there-
unto : And this, I mean the miſplacing,
or the unjuſt fufpending of it, is the
chief Corruption of this paſſion. The
next Condition is, that it be preſent;
and that is, either by Memory, and
then it is called Repentance, or by
Fancy or Suſpicion, which is Anxiety
of the Mind ; or laſtly, by Senſe, which
I
1
( 87)
I call-Anguiſh; the firſt is Dolor macala,
the ſecond is Dolor metus, and the third
is Dolor laboris.
For the first then, Nothing can pro-
perly and truly work Grief by the Mi
niſtry of the Memory, when the Ob-
ject or Evil is long ſince paſt, but
thoſe Things which do withal ſtain
our Nature; and work Impreſſions of
permanent Deformity. For often it
falls out that many Things which for
the Time of their Continuance are irk:
ſom and heavy, prove yet afterwards
the Occaſion of greater Joy', Sed hæs
olim meminiffe juvabit. The Obje&s
then, of our Repentance are not our
paffive but our active Evils; not the
Evils of Suffering, but thoſe of Doing,
For the Memory of Afflictions paft, re-
preſents unto us, Nature looſed and
delivered ,' and Thould therefore lo
much the more increaſe our Joy, by
how much Redemption, for the moſt
Part, is a greater "Bleſſing than Im-
municy.
Concerning Grief of Præ-occupation,
which we affume by a ſuſpicious Fear
and Expectation of Evil, I know ngt
what Worth it can have in it, upleſs
perhaps this be one, that by fore-ac-
cuftoming the Strength to Evil, it be
1
3
more
( 88 )
}
more ſtrengthned to ftand under it :
For it is the Property of Cuſtom and
Acquaintance, not only to facilitate
Evils, (to which purpoſe Seneca faith,
Perdidiſti tot mala, si nondum miſera eſé
didiciſti) but farther to work fome
Manner of Delight in Things at firſt
troubleſom and tedious; even fo,
that Contumacity and Perſeverance in
Grief doch ſo alter the Nature of it,'
Vt fiat tandem infelicis Animi voluptas
Dolor, faith Seneca The laſt Preſence
of Grief was real, when ſome pon-
derous Evil, either of Ami&tion, or Sin
doch bruiſe Man, even oftentimes in
his tendereſt Part, his Soul and Con-
ſcience. And in this I cannot find,
confidered merely in it ſelf, any Diga
nity ; yet in a relative Senſe, in Conti
deration of the Ends and Effects, which
it produceth, it may have fome; where-
of the principal good Effects are two,
Fear and Suſpicion. Care or Sollici-
touſneſs to avoid thoſe Evils, whether
active or paſſive, with which our
Nature hath been ſtained or oppreſſed,
and thence Experience hath taught
them to hate, as the burnt Child, che
Fire.
The evil Effects of Grief commonly
follow the Exceſs of it ; and they reſpect
the
( 89 )
she Reaſon, the Will, and the Body
In the Reaſon, it diſtracts, works Ir-
reſolution and Weakneſs, drawing the
main Streams of it to a dreadful Con
templation of its own Miſery, rather
than to a fruitful Diſcourſe how to
avoid it ; for as the Motions of a
wounded Body, ſo alſo the Diſcourſes of
a wounded Mind, are faint, uncertain
and tottering. Secondly, It works in
the Will, Deſpair. For it being the
Property of Grief to condenſate, and
as it were, on all Sides, to beſiege the
Mind, the more violent the Pallion iss
the more obſcure are the Paſſages out
of it ; ſo that the Mind is conſtrained,
having no Object but its Pain, to re-
flect upon, to fall into Deſpair, and a
fearful Contemplation of its own irre-
coverable Eſtate, ſtanding ſtupified and
aſtoniſhed at its own Miſery. And
from hence proceeds another Effect;
Fury, Blaſphemy, Execration, as we
may ſee, even in that Mirrour of Pa-
tience, Job himſelf. And laſtly, In the
Body it worketh ſuch Obſtructions of
the Spirits, as cauſe Faintneſs, Melan-
choly, &c. This Paſſion of Grief is
diſtributed into many other kinds; as
Grief of Sympathy, which is Mercy:
Grief for another's Good, which is
N
called
(90)
I
4
called Envy. Grief for our own Want
of the Good,' which another hath,
which is Emulation ; of all which to
ſpeak would be too tedious. (Vid.
Ariftot. Rhet. lib. 2. c. 8, 9, 10, 11.)
The next Rank and Series of Para
ſions are thoſe, which reſpect their Ob-
ject as annexed unto ſome Degrees of
Difficulty in the obtaining, and that
is Hope; or the avoiding it, and that
is Fear. By Hope I underſtand an
earneſt and ſtrong Inclination unto
fome great Good, apprehended as pof-
fible to be obtained, though not with
our own Strength, nor without ſome
intervenient Difficulties:
Concerning the Object or fundamen-
tal Cauſe of Hope, it hath theſe three
Conditions. 1. To be Future.
lible. 3. A difficult Good. Firſt, Fu-
ture; for Good is the object of our
Senſe; now, Hope is without Sight;
but yet it will not hence follow, that
the more a Man hath of the Preſence
of the Object, the leſs he hath of the
Hope thereof. For indeed tho’ Hope
be quite aboliſhed by the compleat
Preſence, yet it is increaſed by a par-
tial Preſence of its Object. And as in
mally Bodies, tho' violent Motions be
in the. End weakeſt, as being fartheft
from
2. Pof.
(91)
from the Strength that drove them,
yet natural, are always ſwifteſt towards
the Center, as nèarer approaching un-
to the Place that draws them. So in
the Hopes of Man, tho' violent and
groundleſs, prove weaker and weaker,
yet thoſe thảr are ſtayed, and natu-
ral are ever more ſtrong when they
have procured a larger Meaſure of
Preſence and Union to their Object.
Qao propius accedimus ad ſpem fruendi,
to impatientius caremus ; That Fruition,
which is joined with ſome Emptineſs
and Defect, muft needs ſtrengthen our
Hopes, as arming them with a double
Defire of Goodneſs, and of Uniformity.
For it is the Nature of Good, to in-
crea fe the senſe of the Remainders of
Evil, ſo that though the Number of
our Defeats be leſſened by the Increaſe
of our Perfectior; yet the Burthen and
Moleſtation of them is increaſed ; and
therefore the more Poffeffion we have
of Good, the greater is our Wearineſs
of Evil; and the more Nature feels her
Defects, the more the deſires her Re-
ftauration.
The next Condition is Poſſibility;
For though the Will ſometimes may be
tickled" with Impoſſibilities; yet na
Hope can refpečt its Object' under
N 2
that
( 92 )
that Apprehenſion, ſince Impoſſibility
worketh two Paſſions moſt repugnant
to this, Hatred and Deſpair. By the
Way, Note, what Deſpair is Regular.
I mean that, which drives us out of
our ſelves, and ſtops the Paſſage for
any preſumpruous Opinion of our own
Sufficiency to break through. But
that Deſpair, which out of a ground-
leſs Incredulity to the Power, or Dif.
fidence to the Goodneſs of a ſuperior
Agent, (eſpecially in Things Divine.)
doth both defile and ruin Nature
defiles it, in that it conceiveth baſely,
of God himſelf, in making our own
Unworthineſs more Omnipotent, than
his Power, and more hurtful, than he
is Good; and ruins, in that the Mind
is thereby driven to Flight, and damna-
ble Contempt of all natural Means of
Recovery, and breaking through the
Streights of an oppreffed Conſcience.
The laſt Condition, was Difficulty;
in Reſpect of our ability to perform it;
And therefore Hope hath not only an
Eye to Bonum, but to Auxilium too;
no Man waits for that, which is ab-
ſolutely in his own Power to beſtov
upon himſelf: For;: Omnis Expectatio eft
ab extrinfeco; ſo that herein all thoſe
Hopes are corrupt and fooliſh, which
arë
1
}
( 93 )
are grounded, either in Error concern-
ing the Power, when we conceive that,
which is impotent, of fufficient Strength
to advance our Nature, or compaſs our
Projects; or concerning the Will
, of
others; when being ignorant thereof,
with a dead Hope, we preſume upon
their Help without Ground and War-
rant for ſuch Confidence; whenge
ariſech a ſluggiſh and careleſs Şecurity'a
Kind of Reſt and Quiet, ſuch as is that
of a ſleeping or dreaming Priſoner, which
is rather Stupidity and Senſeleſsneſs,
than any true Peace. True Peace comes
from a living Hope, grounded upon
ſome Certainty and Knowledge, and
which muſt have theſe two Properties
in chem; Tranquility and Serenity :
Otherwiſe it is but like the Reſt of Mare
Mortuum, whoſe unmoveableneſs is not
from Nature, but a Curſe.
The Cauſes of Hope follow. Where-
of the firit is our own Want and
Weakneſs put together; the one driving
us to the Object, the ocher to the Means.
For every created Subſtance, as it is by
Nature indigent, ſo it is, by the ſame
Naturę, impotent likewiſe. But not-
withſtanding this Cauſe, the Subject
now and then is driven into the guite
oppoſite
1
1
(194)
oppoſite Paſſion. And therefore I pro-
ceed.
The next Cauſe is Experience and
Knowledge, both in the Nature of the
Thing hoped for, and of the Means
codducing to the Attainment thereof.
For 'though it may fall out, that Igno-
rance of our own Strength, and others
Oppolition may in hot and eager Minds
work Preſumptions of Succeſs, and an
Rhet. lib. empty Hope (wherefore Ariſtotle ob-
Wichic. lib. ſérves young Men, and Drunken to he
3. c. 8. Eviabid'es, by Reaſon of that adventitious
Heat, by which they are made bold
and: opiniative). Even as on the other
Side, Strength of Underſtanding and
Accuteneſs, becauſe he fees ſo far into
the Object, works Diffidence, Slowneſs,
and Irreſolution (as Pliny obſerves Ari-
ſtotle faith of old Men, they are
Plin.Epiſt. Avonds dice Tady suwereicy) Yet if we mark
lib. 4,7;, it, both the former of theſe proceed
from ſome Opinion of Knowledge, as
the latter doth from the Conceit of Ig.
norance. For there Ariſtotle ſaith,
drunken Men are confident; Quia
putant ſe Superiores; and of young Men,
Quia wyla adevar osonlar : And then thoſé
that have attained to ſome higher Pitch
of Knowledge, and are withal ſenſible
of their own natural Impotency; out
of
Rhet. lib
2. C. 13.
1
(95)
of the Vaftneſs of Diftance, which ei-
roneoufly and ignorantly they conceive
to be between themſelves and the End
they frame unto themſelves as weak
Hopes, asi třièy imaginé, chat conceive
infinite Défires : “And indeed genetaily,
the more active and quick our Life, the
more fenſible it is of all noxious Quà-
Kities, Weakneſſes and Defects thereof.
So then properly, Knowledge and Ex-
perience is the true 'Cauſe of Hope.
Now this Experience may be fuch, as
either we 'out felves have had, or ſuch
as we have obſerved other Mén 'to
Kave. For the Firſt; Nothing could
more afføre the Hopes of David of a good
Iffue iñ his Goliah Conflict, than the
divine Aliſtance, w Kich he formerly
had againſt a Lyonand a Bear. Faith
and Hope.can make uſe of double Eyes,
to look two Ways at once, both back-
ward' with 'the Eye of Memory upon
Actions paſt, and forward with the Eye
of Reſolution and Courage upon ſe-
cond Encounters. The fecond is the
applying of other Mens Examples and
Succeſſes to our preſent Advantagę.
For ſince the Nature of moft Men, is
like that of Flocks and Herds, to tread
in one anothers Steps, (Preſidents ha-
ving the fame precedency to Reaſon,
which
( 96 )
1
which a true and living Guide on the
Way hath to a Mercury's Finger ; the
one only pointing to, the other lead.
ing in the Way) It hath pleaſed Na-
ture to make Man not only a moral,
but a ſociable Creature: So that when
the 'Reaſon of Precepts can in no wife
further our Hopes to be good, they
may be confirmed by the Senſe of
Examples. Segnius irritant, &c. as both
bringing with them leſs Authority,
and likewiſe inferring Diſcredit upon a
ſluggiſh and unneceſſary Deſpair. "It is
true indeed God hath bleſſed fome Men
with a greater Excellency of Gifts than
others, yet we are not to think that
ever any was made (as, of Cato Şe-
nior) in convitium humani generis. This
being one End of Nature in framing
Men of eminent Virtues, not only that
we might wonder, but believe and
know, that the fame Things, which
for their Greatneſs are the objects of
Admiration, may as well, for their
Poſſibility, be the Object of our
Hope.
The third Cauſe of Hope may be
our own Goodneſs and Facility of Na-
ture, whereby we finding a Readinets
in our ſelves to further the Purſuiçs of
another Man, may expect the like from
others.
( 7 )
otliers. For it is obſerved by Ariſto- Rhet. lib.
tle of young Men, ſua ipforum innocená 2. C.12.
tia cæteros metiuntur. They therefore,
which are ſoft and facile to yield, are
likewiſe to believe, and darc truſt choſe,
whom they are willing to pleaſure.
And indeed, that is the Rule of Na-
ture, which makes a Man's Self the
Pattern of whatfoevert it hath made
his Neighbour the Object."
,: The laſt Cauſe proceedeth hence, and
that is, Crédulity, in relying on thoſe
Promiſes which are made for the Fur-
t'herance thereof. And in theſe two
laſt Cauſes, the chief Corruption is not,co
let our Judgments come between them
and our Hopes, otherwiſe, (if : what
Tacitus ſpeakes; in another Sanfe ) Fina
gunt creduntq; If Facility feign Affiftana
ces, and' our Credulity rely upon them,
then' will the Ifue be that of Ixion's
Hope, a Cloud for Juno. And there-
fore Ariſtotle out of an Eaſineſs to
Hope, collects in young Men an Eaſie
neſs to be deceived.
T'he Effects of Hope follow. Where
of the firſt is, to free the Mind from
all Anxieties, Suſpenſions: and Demurrs,
all which ariſe out of the Floating and
Inſtability of the Mind, which indeed
is a Dram of Deſpair, and therefore al
0
together
I
( 98 )
1
together incompatible with the oppoſite
Paſſion: And
And herein Hope is well
called an Anchor ; for tho? there be
but one Hope joined with Certainty,
yet the reſt baving in them fome
ground for Fear, or Caution, this ſhould
be only a Fear of Coverouſneſs, not of
Diffidence. Becauſe where there is a
Diftruft in the Means, there is, for the
moſt Part, Weakneſs in the Action ;
and therefore Ariſtotle hath put Hope
and Confidence together ; 'Enričov a raison
Jappaxlov isi. A good Hope is ever
grounded on Faith, and always worketh
fome Meaſure of Affiance in the Means
unto ir.
A ſecond Effect is to work fome
Kinds of Diftaſte and Wearineſs in our
prefent Condition. Now there is one
Diſtafte, whịch ariſeth out of Weak-
neſs, and another out of Want : That
which Weakneſs produceth, is a fickle
and inconftant Motion of the Mind,
whereby it always deſireth an Alteration
of Eſtate, which is wrought, either thro'
Impatience to undergo any Manner of
Oppoſition in our Proceedings, whence
the Mind, upon the firſt Difficul-
ty, is frighted from its Perſuit; or
out of a Itrange Sharpneſs of Appre-
henſion, or Suípicion rather, which in-
ables
1
1
1
1
1
( 99 )
ables the Mind to diſcover Inſufficiency
in that, wherein it deſireth to receive
Content, or out of Curioſity and Search,
when we ſuppoſe that thoſe Things,
which cannot in their Nature, may at
leaſt in their Variety and Number yield
ſome Content; and, as united Sands,
bring Weight and Satisfaction with
them. But all this Diftafte, which
ſpringeth from our Impotency, is not
the Effect of Hope, but that which is
grounded on our Emptineſs and wants :
Whereupon followeth
The third Effect; An carneft Con-
tention in the Perſuit of that Good,
which ſhould fill up our Defects: And Rom. 10:
hence you may obſerve that there is
not any Paffion, which doch ſo much Creaturz.
imploy, or ſo little violate Reaſon, as
this of Hope doth. It being an excit-
ing Paſſion, and moving every Agent
to his proper and ſpeedy Operation,
for the gaining its Perfeétion, which
the Mind fo earneſtly breaths after, and
the Want whereof doth work ſuch
Wearineſs in it.
The laſt; A contented Repoſe and
Patience; and this Patience is three
fold: A Patience for the Diſtance, and
a Patience for the Difficulties in our de
fred Good. Hafty running Hopes are
22.
Gemitus
0 %
as
( 100 )
as improper in their. Nature, as they
are commonly vain and empty in their
Succeſs.
The oppoſite Paſſion is Fear; which
is a ſerious Averſation from ſome in-
clining and approaching Evil, appre-
hended as burthenſom to our Nature,
and not eaſily reſiſtable by our Srength.
It is an humbling and debaſing Paſ-
fion, which always implies fome Mån-
ner of Servitude and Subjection, in
whom it reſideth: And therefore, the
fundamental Cauſe of it may be our
Weakneſs and Subjection, whereof the
one implies a Diſability in us, the other
an Obligation and Neceſſity to under-
go an Evil. So that Fear is a naked
and diſobedient Paflion. Foras Naked-
nefs hath three eyil Properties in it;
viz. to diſable for Defence, to expofe
to Injury, and, from both thoſe, to
work Shame in us, by the Conſcioufi
neſs of our own dejected Eſtate'; fo
likewife Fear hath thofe two Roots
(not Effects properly) to make us impo-
tent and obnoxious; and from both,
it infers that Shame, which cannot but
follow the Apprehenſion of a double
Baſeneſs. For altho' Seneca ſaith, that
Rubor eft Virtutis Color, and therefore
a Companion rather of Perfection than
Weak-
1
7
( 101 )
Weakneſs; yet it is rather à Symptom
of á Mind 'virtuouſly diſpoſed, in der
claring the quick Apprehenſion of
its Lapſes and Defects, than any ne-
ceſſary Adjúnet to Virtue it ſelf; it
proceeding not from the Confidence
and Strength, but from the Conſcioul
neſs and Infirmity of Virtue, which
hath this proper Effect to make the
Mind more ſharp Sighted and appre-
henſive of other Stains. So then, the
Roots of this Paſſion, are Weakneſs and
Subjection both together, and not other-
wife. And therefore we fee ſundry
Times, Strength ſhakes off the Yoke of
Obedience, and inſtead of Homage,
pays. Violence and Rebellion;' as we
ſee not only in that civil Government
of Men, bứt alſo in that natural Go-
vernment of Creatures by: Man, to
whom by the Law of the Creation they
were all made Subject ; yet the Strength
-of many of them hath taught them
to forget their originali Bondage, and
inſtead of fearing, co terrifie Man, their
Lord. And whenever we: tame any
of them, this is not ſo much the Work
of Supremacy, as of our Realon; and
we are beholding therein to the work-
ing of our Wit, and not to the Pre-
rogative of our Nature. 'And thus as
we
2
( 102 )
we ſee Strength, ſo likewiſe Immunity
in the midſt of Weakneſs takes away
Fear. Whence we fee good Men dare
even defie Death, and inſult and tram-
ple on che Grave, which they are even
now about to enter; becauſe, tho' by
Reaſon of their Weakneſs they are not
delivered from the Mouch of Death,
yet they are from its Teeth, and
Sting; tho' not from the Earth of the
Grave, yet from the Hell of the Grave;
tho' not from Sin, yet from the Male-
diction and Strength of Sin, the Law.
Qur Adverſary muſt be ſtrong, as well
as our felves weak, if he look for
Fear.
The Corruption then of this Paſſion
in Relation to theſe Cauſes, is that which
ariſeth, either out of an Error of Hu-
mility in underſtanding our ſelves, or
of Judgment and Suſpicion in miſtak-
ing of others. There are ſome Men,
who, (as the Orator ſpeaks of deſpair-
ing Wits) De Viribus ſuis peffime meren-
tur ; who are unthankful unto Nature,
and deſerve that Weakneſs, which they
unjuſtly complain of. The Sight
theſe Mens Judgments is not unlike
that of perſpective Glaſſes, the two
Ends whereof have a double Repre-
fentation; the one fuller and nearer
than
1
( 103 )
1
than it truly ſhould be; the other
ſmaller, and at a far greater Diſtance.
So they look upon themſelves with a
diſtruſting and deſperate Judgment ,
which repreſents every Thing remote
and impotent;
on others, with an
over-reaching Judgment, which repre-
fents all Perfection too perfect.
The more caſual Cauſes are, Firit,
The Suddeneſs of an Evil, when it
ſeizeth upon us, as it were in the Dark;
and uncovered; for all Darkneſs, as
well in Events, as Times, is dange-
rous, and comfortleſs; all Unacquain-
tance then of it muſt work Amazement,
whilft Foreſight either worketh Boldneſs
to encounter it, or Patience to undergo
it. Ambiguaram Rerum fciens, eoque in-Tacit. An:
trepidus. For, as the fame Man ſpeakech, nal. lib..
Hift.lib.I.
Opportuni · magnis conatibus, fo alfo Opa
portuni magnis
Timoribus Tranfitus Rerum.
All Innovation in the moral, as well
as in the politick, is dangerous, and
therefore fearful. For as it is in the
Wars of Men, ſo likewiſe in the Evils,
thoſe are more dangerous and terrible,
which are by Way of Invaſion, 'than
thoſe which are by Way of Battle.
Invadunt Urbem Somno- Vinoque Sepala
1
t
· tam.
But
I
( 104 )
But here obſerve, that there is one
Evil that fets upon us, cum Furto,
another that ſets upon us, cum Pompa,
which, like Thunder, hurts not only
with its Danger, but with its Noiſe,
and preſents unto our Eyes, as it were
the compleat Furniture and Variety of
all the Inſtruments of Terror. And
both theſe being in their Extremity,
are alike , evil, and Occaſions of a
deadly Fear.
Another Cauſe is the Nearneſs of
Evil, for as it is with the objects of
Senſe in a Diſtance of Space, fo is it
with the objects of Paſſion in the Dia
ſtance of a coming Evil. A Remotion in
either, the leſs it is, the greater it makes
the Object preſent; and by Conſes
quence the weaker is the Impreſſion
therefrom upon the Faculty.; and the
Reaſon is, becauſe no Evil hurts us by
a ſimple Apprehenſion of its. Nature,
but its Union with us, and Propin-
quity is, a Degree of Unión.
Another. Cauſe is, the Newneſs of
Evil, when neither the Mind it felf
hath had precedent Encounter (Magni-
tudinem rerum
rerum Confuetudo ſubducit)
whereby to judge of its own Strength,
nor any Example of ſome proſperous
Reſiſtance heretofore ; and the Reaſon
is,
-
1
!
j
(195)
iş, becauſe all Admiçation is, ip fome
Sorë, a Kind of Fear; it being the Pro-
perty of Man, not only to fear that
which is againſt, but that allo which
is above our : Nature, and that, not
Ohly with a 'Süppoſition of Power and
Regency, but with a Suppoſition of Excel-
lency and Victory,when the Faculty finds
the Object tool trong, and diſpropor-
tioned thereunto. And therefore when
ány' Evil fhall at once burthen out,
Nature, and by its Novity poſe our
Underſtanding, it cannot but make our
Fears 'the ſtronger, by how mých Ig-
norance hatli made our Reaſon wea.
ker. Now the Corruption is, when
(as Ariſtotle, ſays of Anger', that it
runs away from Reaſon with an hálf
Meffage) the Objeet Thall be bluck'd
away from the Underſtanding with
an, half Judgment, with that broken
Knowledge of Wonder, rather than
with a ſerious. Conſideration of whát
Referencë it béarech tó, or Damage
it is likely to bring upon our Na.
ture.
Another Cauſe may bé Conſcience
of Evil. For Wickedneſs, 'when it is
condemn'd of its own Witneſs, is ex-
ceedingly timorous, and being preſs'd
with Conſcience always forecafteth
terrible 'Things. So that every evil
P
... Man
"
3
13
( 100 )
)
4.
Man hath a double Flight from God
à Flight from the Goodneſs, and a
Flight from the Juſtice of his. Will.
All Sin is, like the Sea, very barren
and fruitleſs, fave in caſting, up Foam
and Mire, the Shame and Froth of a
tempeſtuous Mind; but I proceed to
the Effects of this Paffion.
The firſt may be Suſpicion and Cre-
dulity of the Approach of any Evil.
Hiſt. lib. Retineri commeatus dum timet credit ;
faith Tacitus. And the. Reaſons may
be, Firſt, becauſe the Nature of Man
being ſubject unto infinite Dangers and
Annoyances, hath therefore impreis'd
upon ič a Wiſdom of Providence to
foreſee thoſe Evils, which cannot. fo
eaſily be fhifted off in their Onſet, as
they may at their Diſtance bé pre-
Again, In Fear, the Mind of Man
Pronze adis drawn to a nearer Senſe of its own
Religfo. Impotency, and to, a. more prejudicate
culrese: Opinion of the adverſe. Power, as if
mel men that were ready to oppreſs it. So that,
as Tacitus faith, Inclinatis ad Greden-
dum : So may I ſay too, ad timendum
animis loco omnium etiam"Fortuna. For
as Cloth once, died from its natural
White, will take no other but a dar-
ker Colour; lo Minds once ſteeped in
the bitter Humours of this melan-
cholly
vented.
tes.
Hiſt. lib.
1.
(107)
cholly Paffion, will ſeldom admit of
any; but more black and fearful Con-
ceits.
ir Laſtly, A Reaſon 'may be, that na-
tural Love, and by Conſequence, Cre-
dit, which eyery: Man yieldeth to his
own... Thoughts and Preſumptions,
whereby he: will be eaſily ioduc'd to
believe whateyer Fancy his. ungathered
and diſtracted Mind can nouriſh: And
this Effect of Fear is generally in it
felf à Corruption of it,
Another ill Effect, is Diflike and In-
credulity of thoſe ſtrengthening Means,
which Řeaſon preſentech for the free-
ing thereof. Whence iffue Inconſtan-
cy and continual Change of Reſolu-
tion, hating all Counſils when they
are preſent, and over-eſteeming them
when they are too far paſt. Pavidis Tacit. An-
confilia in incerto, & Timor etiam Auxi-Curtius.
dia reformidat. And the Reaſon is,
becauſe this is a multiplying and genera-
tive Paffion, ever producing Motions
of its own Nature. He which fears
Danger in another’s Power, will eaſi-
ly fear Error, or Impotency in his own
Aids, and it is common with Men to
think themſelves unwiſe, when they
feel chemſelves unhappy.
P 2
Again,
nal. lib. 3.
i
( 1087)
Again, It is theil Properby) of Feab
to make us to reflect' upon our own:
Weakneſs. The tranſient and reflective
A'&ts- of the Underſtanding repreſent
ope the other, that whilſt that, where
bý we look upon others is ſtronger ; this;
whereby we look on our ſelves, is
weaker And this is here true, that
the more we ſee of Danger from with
our, the leſs we have of inward Strength
for Reffance..
A third ill Effeet may be, a Weak.
ning both of the Faculties of the Mind,
and of the Spirits in the Body, Where-
by the one is made unfit for Search or
Council the other for Service or Exé-
cution. Not as if- all the regular „Mo,
tions of inferior Powers, did not ſerve
to ſharpen the Counfils and Projects
of the higher, but it is to be under-
ſtuod of all Invaſion only, and Tyran,
ny: And then, as in the States of Poli-
tick, ſo in Moral, and Self Common
wealths, there are three Ways to infer
Weakneſs: One is Foreign Incurſion,
and that is done by the Confuſion
and unfer viceable Mixture of Paſſion
and Reaſon: Another is, Civil Diſſen-
tion; and that is the Tumult and
Diſorder of the Spirits, by this Moti,
And the laſt is, an Emptineſs
and Dereliction in the Parts; and that
is
+
on.
1
( 109 )
is. ihere'effected by: the retiring of the
Spirits into the capital City of the
Heart, whereby the outward i Partisi
are left weakened and unguarded
which tho it. be a ſtrengthening of the
better Parts, is yet al. Weakneſs of the
major. Part of Man..;
word vir
ir 231
? The laft. Effect is uſeful;-and that is
Care, Wiſdom and Cautiga; in Uſe of
the Means for qur: Prefervationii: Pop
as, in::the Scripture, Timor Domini, lakin
Fear that is grounded on the Word of Ariſtot.
God; ſain Morality: a Timor ground=fl15.5.0.8
.
ed on the Word of Reaſon, is Fons
Sapientiæ, and Radix Visa, jas Security
is the only Root. both of Negligence
and Folly. Tacitus obſerves upon one
of the wifeſt Policies that ever Tibe-
rius did practice (that his writing to
the Legions abroad, tanquam adepto
principatu, when at home. he us’d only
Modeſty and Refuſals) that it was
done, ex Formidine; ſo wiſe a Coun:
filler was, his Paſſion to him.
The next Paſſion, and laſt, is An-
ger. I will not now ſever this Paffion;
as Ariſtotle doth, in its feveral::De Echic. 1.4.
grees, viz. a Tharp Anger; a bitter
Anger ; and an hard and knotty. An- Eph. 4.
ger. Nor, with St. Paul, as only differ-
ing in Degree, or in order to the Cons
ftitution
1
.
( [10)
.
ditution of the. Subject, or his di-
vers Cuſtoms, Eductions, or Habits.;
but, : as in the reft, fpeak of the
Çauſes, etc.
The fundamental Cauſe is Contempo
from others joiñed with Love of our
ſelves. Whether it be of Diſeſteem,
which impeachech his Nórice; or a
Diſappointing of his purpoſes, which
eroſlech his Succeſs ; or flandering,
which ſpoileth his Credit; which if they
be done by one, from whom we may
hope to receive Revenge; works not
only Anxiety and Grief, which is a
Motion of Flight, : but Hope alſo, and
Defire to help it felf; if not in the Rea
covery of its own Good, yet in the
Comfort of another's Evil. For all Ca-
lamity is either legal, or malignant,
Cum ſuo Supplicio torquetur, quieſcit
alieno. When it feels it ſelf, vt pre-
fently proceeds, either by Courſe of
Juſtice, or violent Revenge, to pleaſe it
ſelf with other Men's Evil. For the
farmer Kind of Contempt, as it is the
common Property of Man with all
other Creatures, being Animal Watu.
rale, to love himſelf ; ſo alſo being 4,
rimal Socrabile e Politicum, to be loved
of others : Becauſe hereby chat Love of
himſelf, which proceedeth from Judg.
1
vi!!
menit
1
(11)
1
ment and Realon,, is confirmed; for
every, Man doth more willingly believe
that, whereunto he hath greater Au?
thority to perfuade hímſelf: And there
fore when a. Man poſſeſſed with a Love
of himſelf
, or his Friends, thalt find
either of them ſlighted by thoſe, from
whoſe Judgments he hoped for: Con
firmation, thence not only ariſech
a. Grief that his own Judgment is un-
dervalued, and Expectation deceived;
but an eager Deſire of proving the con-
trary. Such Concemners are all tholo
ungratefưl Perſons, who light received
Favours, and out of a ſwelling and
high Stomach, cannot endure to: 26
knowledge any Obligation; but delire
to receive Benefits as Men, cloſely and
behind their Backs; that ſo neither
ophers noctheir own Eye might be
witnels unto it. Gratis oneri habetur.
Such is the Pride :of ſome Men, that
they cannot endure to be overcome
no. not. im Kindneſs. And therefore,
Ubi multe, Beneficia antevenere... pero
gratia, Odium redditur. Which cannot
but work double. Anger : An Anger
againſt our own Weakneſs, fox, che
Ghoice of ſo unfit a Subject, and
Anger at that contemptuous Pride,
which hath To bafely entertained them.
Hither
+
an
( II2 :)
1
Hither alſo we may refer thoſe locked
änd, cloſe Men, who even to their
Friends are ſo reſerved, as if none were
worthy; to whofe Judgments or Truſt
they might commit themſelves, and as
if they put more Confidence in a Paper,
than in a Friend:
The ſecond Contempt adds to this,
as being, nor a flighting, a privative
only, but a poſitive Injury, and an Al-
fault of our Power; not an Opinion
only, but an Oppreſſion of our Weakneſs.
A Courſe more likely to incenfe Nature,
by how much the more, Oppoſition is
mote ſenſible in:Motion, than in Reſt.
Methinks theſe two former Contempts,
are like a Bank, and a Bridge, or Lock, to
the Water; whereof the former doch only
confine the Water, and not oppoſe it,
as not hindering its Motion 'natural
(and to this we compare that Contempt
of Diſeſteem) wherein we ſee nor any
manifeſt Tumults, but only a fecret
Swelling and Riſing of the Water
which breaks not out into Outrage and
Violence; but the later reſiſting the
natural Courſe of the Stream in the
Precipitancy of its own Channel, makes
it ſometimes, not only over-ſwell all the
Sides, and ſo break through both Banks
and Bridge; but in the mean Time,
'work's
9
1
:
i
!
(113)
works in it great Tumult and Noiſes
Spumens e fervens, dui ab Obice ſrevioř
ibit ; and to this I compare the la-
ter, hindring of our Counſils and
Actions.
But the laſt is the greateſt, as not
only diſhonouring a Man in private
and reſerved Opinion, but in the Eyes
and Ears of the World, not only by
making him odious in his Life, but alſo
in his Memory, and preſerving the Rot-
tenneſs (if I may lo ſpeak) of his Name,
beyond the Rottenneſs of his Grave :
And for this Reaſon we can not bur be
To much the more incenſed, by how
much Perpetuity accumulates, either to
Weakneſs or Perfection.
Other more accidental Cauſes there
are, whereof ſome may be conſidered
ex parte patientis; others, ex parte in.
ferentis
,
Touching the Pacient, there are three
Qualifications, which can make him
more inclinable to Anger upon Suppoli-
tion of the Fundament.
The firſt is his Excellency, whether
inward of Nature, or accidental of
Fortune. For hereby Men are made
jealous of their Credit, and Impatient
of Abuſe, as well perceiving, that all
Injury infers fome Impotency in the
Q
Patients
( 114 )
1
Patient, and of Excellcncy, at leaſt con-
certed, in the Agent, as Ariſtotle ſays,
υπερέχειν όιούλας ύβείζονες, which cannot
ftand with the Height and Diſtance of
him that is oppreſſed, even by his Su-
periors, much leſs his Equals, nor with
his own good Opinion of himſelf. Manet
alta mente repöſtum Judicium Paridis,
&c. 'It wrought a deep Indignation in
the Mind of Wiſdom and Power to
ſee a wanton Judgment give Beauty
the Precedency in their Emulation.
The ſecond is the Subject's Weakneſs,
when the Mind finds it ſelf moſt of all
aſſaulted in thofe Things, wherein it
is moſt deficient, which Ariſtotle hath
obferved, when he tells us, that ſick
Men, poor Men, and Lovers, are moſt
ſubject to this Paffion. It being as
great a Pain, and greater Contempt,
to rub and provoke an old Wound,
than to make a new. And this Injury,
which is exerciſed upon open' and naked
Creatures is more intolerable than the
other : That proceeding only from Strife
and Emulation, but This, from Inſulta-
tion and Pride : The one, a Dis-eſteem
and Opinion only; the other a Con-
tumely and Exprobation. The one is a
Conflict of Judgments, the other of
Paſſions, and therefore likely to be the
greater
( 115 )
greater. Again, thoſe Men of whom
Ariſtotle ſpeaks, are moſt tender to feel
an Injury, moft ſuſpicious to fear it,
moſt 'interpreting to over-judge it.
Laſtly, to give a Reaſon of both thoſe
former Cauſes together, it is a fruſtrat-
ing of their Expectation, whilſt Men
of Worth and Excellency expect rather
Approbation and I'mitation, than Con-
tempt; and Men weak and defective,
expect Compaſſion to cover, and not
Pride to mock, and ſo double their
Wounds; and bosh of theſe are, in
ſome Sort, Debts of Nature; it being
the Law of Reafoń, to honour Merit,
as it is the Law of Mercy, to cover
Nakedneſs. And we may well conceive
Anger will be ſtrong, when it thinks
it ſelf lawful.
The laſt Quality of the Subject is,
his fufpicious, apprehenſive and inter-
preting Fancy, ready to pick out In-
jury there, where it can not be found:
And therefore Seneca ſpeaks wiſely;
Non vis effe iracundus ? ne fos curiojus.
It is commonly ſeen in Matters of Čen.
ſure and Suſpicion, that the more, Sight
and Reaſon goes out, the leſs abidech
within. Nor is it hard for a Man por.
ſeſſed with this Opinion, that he is the
common Subject of other Mens Con,
Q2
tempt,
( 116 )
1
tempt, to find out either in the De
fect of Nature, &c. ſome juſt Occaſion
of Exception, which yet being farther
proved, will be rather Strangeneſs than
Injury. And this is generally a Cor-
ruption of this paſſion.
In Reſpect of the Agent, one is, hiş
Baſeneſs, which works a double Cauſe
of Anger ; one, for an Injury of Omiſ
fion, in neglecting Superiors; another,
for a poſitive Injury, for the Evils of-
fered them. Secondly, another Quality
in the Agent, is, his Impudence in
Words, or in Carriage; for all Impu-
dence carries with it Stiffneſs and Con,
tentions, and Boldneſs, all which are
Incitements to this paſſion. For as
Shame, being a Degree of Fear, worketh
an Acknowledgment of our own Weak-
neſs, and, by Conſequence, Lenity and
Mercy; ſo Impudence, in all Things
contrary thereunto muſt likewiſe pro-
duce a contrary Effea. Again, thoſe
Things, which we do impudently, we
do willingly: Now nothing does more ag-
gravate the Wrong, than that it proceeds
from the Will of Man, and of Reaſon,
becauſe Man's Power is in his Will;
and Paſſions are therefore more eaſily
born withal, becauſe they work un-
grounded, and are our Imperfections
,
not
1
( 117 )
am
not our Power. Again, to plenary,
ſpontaneous Action, there are required
Antecedent, Deliberation, Approbati
on, and Aſſent; and conſequently, Re-
ſolution, Perſeverance and Conſtancy;
all which take away 'whatever is re-
quired to Lenity, as Confeſſion and
Repentance ; and withal, add more un-
to the Injury; as an A&tion exerciſed by
the whole Man, and implying a per-
feet Conſent, and Unicy of our ſelves
thereumto, whilſt other Paffions, as they
proceed from more Diſcord in our ſelves,
To they produce lefs in other Men.
Another Thing in the Agent, is, his
near Relation, whether natural or mo-
ral, by Blood, or Friendſhip. And the
Reaſon is, becauſe our Expectation is
diſappointed; for in Union we did ex.
pect Sympathy, and not Diſcord. Se-
condly, Anger is a Kind of Divulſion of
Things before joined. There therefore,
where is the greateſt Union, muſt needs
be the ſtrongeſt and the moſt violent
Separation; As in the Body, the Divul-
fion of the Soul is more horrible, than of
an Arm, or ſome other Member.
Another Cauſe is a too great Free-
dom and indiſcreet Uſe of Speech,
eſpecially if it be Rebuke. Anger' is
by Nothing more nourilh'd, than by
much
( 118 )
much Speaking; tho' not in the Party
ſpeaking ; becauſe Speech is to Anger,
as Fear to Grief, a ſpending and vent-
ing, of it. Laſtly, another. Cauſe is,
Contention and Difference, whether it
be in Opinions, or Inclinations; be-
cauſe it is always joined with an Un-
dervaluing of other Men's Choice,
which on the one 'Side, or the other,
if it be not ſeaſoned with Sobriety
and Moderation, will ſeem rather an
Humour of Oppoſition, than Zeal to
the Truth, wherewith many Men are
ſo far poſſeſſed, that one muſt hardly
dare to ſpeak the Truth in their Com-
pany, left they endanger it, and make
themſelves ſeem Heretical: So ſtrongly
do they delight in changing any Thing,
tho' not in Melius, yet in Aliud. Like
Chryſippus in Laertius, who uſed to
boaſt that he wanted Opinions; but
thoſe once gotten, he never wanted
Arguments and Sophiſms to defend
them.
To conclude the Cauſes, we will
Thew ir regularly in theſe Conditions.
Firſt, that it ſtill obſerve Proportion
and Conformity to the Rules of Love,
otherwiſe it is not Ira in Deli&tum, but
Ira in Fratrem. Secondly, That it keep
Proportion unto a true and whole Judg-
ment,
1
1
( 119 )
ment, left it be 'unadviſed. It muſt
be true that is there and ſettled, both
in A&t of Interpretation, (and that
reachedh to the Injury) and in the Aet of
Direction, (and that reacheth to the
Paſſion). It muſt be whole both in .
due weighing the Intenſion and Re-
miſſion of our Injury, not from the
Nature of the Act, but from ſome Qua-
lificacions adjoined thereunto; and alſo
in fully derermining of the Act of Paſ-
fion, not only inferring, Quod fit, law-
ful, but quid fit, in the Manner of it
alſo. And this I take to be the pro-
per Way of governing this Paſſion.
But now I proceed to come Effects of
Anger : They are ſuch as are wrought
in our felves or others: Thoſe in our
ſelves are outward in the Body, or in-
ward, on Reaſon. Thoſe on the Body
are, 'Clamour, Inflamations, Fire in the
Eyes, Palenefs, &c. which 'I do not al-
together miſlike, as teſtifying our juſt
Difpleaſure at an Offence received : For,
though I would not have a Man in his
Paffion ſuffer Metamorphoſis, and turn
his Face into a Torment, puniſhing
himſelf as much with the Diſgrace as
· his adverſary with the Terror of his
Uglineſs ; yet neither can I like that
ſecret and unrevealed Anger, that Po-
litick
( 120 )
litick and ſtomach Anger, which cloſely
Throwds it ſelf under a clear Counte-
nance, which being unnatural to this
Ethic. lib. Paſſion (it being its Property, Non in-
4. C. 3. fidiari, ſed palam agere) will quickly
degenerate into Malice and Rancor.
The inward Effect of this paſſion is,
to incite Reaſon to judge of the Wrong,
and Means of Revenge, which is then
corrupt, when done by Prepoſſeſſion,
Tranſporting, &c. which is to make
Reaſon a Party, and not a Judge. In
which ill Office, there is not any Paſ-
fion more fruitful than Anger, both by
Reaſon of its Suddenneſs and its Vio
lence.
Ethic.
lib. 7.
The laſt Effect of Anger is Expedi-
tion and Dexterity, in executing the
Means of our Satisfaction: But here is
to be avoided one main Corruption.
I. Precipitancy, or Impatience of De-
lay, or Attendance on the Determina-
tion of right Reaſon: In which Rela-
tion, Ariſtotle compares it to an hafty
Servant, that runs away with half his
Errand.
The Effects of this Paffion corrupt-
ing others, whether it be a mutual
Provoking to Faction, or an Amend-
ment of them, becauſe they are im-
pertinent to the Dignity and Cor.
ruption
( 121 )
vultus
tuption of this Paſſion, I let them
paſs.
. And now let us proceed to the Dig-Trifticia
nities of Man's Soul, which are proper
corrigirur
to it, in a more independent Conſide-animá.
ration, and it may be gathered, either
from the Conſideration of the Whole,
or the Parts thereof. The Whole hath
many Dignitles, and rare Excellencies
comprized in it, under this Name of
Divinity, which may be diſcovered
in a twofold Refpect; in Reſpect of
its Original, and in Relation to its Na-
tures :
- I call its Original, Divine, not by
any Transfuſion of its Subſtance from
God, as if it were ſome Portion or
Practice of his Nature; but only bed
cauſe he concurs more immediately,
powerfully, and totally in the framing
thereof, than of any Form, or Nature ;
as infuſing it into the Body, and creat-
ing it by his Power, without any Afw
ſiſtance of the Parents, ſave only to
fit and prepare the Body for its Re-
ception.
Concerning the Dignity of the Soul
in its Nature and Eſſence, the very
Light of Reafon hath reached thus far,
as to confeſs' that the Soul of Man is,
in ſome fort, a Spark or Beam of the
R! Brightneſs
+
( 122 )
1
17.
Brightneſs of a Deity And it is wara
ranted by an Oracle. more infallible,
: that it was breathed into him by. God
1 Cor. 15. himſelf, and was made. Secundun Iman
ginem , Similitudinem Dei, and fo truly
and lively, that it is more notable in
him, than in the whole World beſides:
Other Thiðgs are only, tanquam opifi.
cium, wherein is repreſented the Wily
dom and Power of God ; but Mani, in
his original Purity, beſides that was
tanquam Cera, wherein was impreffed
by that divine Spirit, a ſpiritual Reſem,
blance of its owri Goodneſs and San-
&ity, beſides, other: Attributes, For;
though, there are ſome in them not
only uncommunicated, but abſolutely
inimitable and unſhadowable by any
Excellency in Man's Soul, as Immen
ſity, Infiniteneſs, Omnipotence, Omni-
ſcience, &c. yet I underſtand that what,
ſoever eminent Perfections the Power
and Bounty of God conferred upon
Man's Soul, are all of them ſo many
Shadows and faint Repreſentations of
his Perfections.
The Properties then, wherein the
Image conſiſts, are three; and the firſt
is Spirituality; and this may be proved,
Firſt, from its Manner of Working,
which is immaterial, by conſidering 06-
jects
( 123 )
jects as univerſal, and purified from
the Groſſneſs of Matcer. Secondly,
From its Independance on the Body,
in that Manner of Working, which it
uſeth only by way of Deliverance and
Conyeyance, not of Aſiſtance to eli-
cite an immediate Act. Phaạtaſmata
Sunt Objecta, non Inffrument a Operationis.
As Light doth not at all concur to the
Act of Seeing, which foly flows from
the vital Power; but only ſerves as an
extrinfical Allutant. Another Reaſon
may be the Difference between 'mate-
rial and and immaterial Powers; be-
cauſe badily Faculties are offended with
the too grear Excellency of tlie Object :
But the Underſtanding is Comforted
with the higheſt Contemplations. And
again, Habet Animus Argumentum ſue
Divinitatis (faith Seneca) quod illum
Divina dele&tant.
The Second is, Simplicity, which fol-Ariftot.
lows the Form. For where there is de Anima.
Matter, there is Compoſition. I ex-
clude not, from the Soul, all Manner of
Compoſition ; for it is proper only to
God to be abfolutely and perfe&tly
Simple ; but I exclude all effential Com-
policion.
The Third 'follows from theſe and
that is, that it is immortal ; Interitus
lib. 3. c. 6.
R2
eft
( 124 )
Pleflis
15.
eft Şecrétio, &c. Now then, where there
is no Union, there is no Separation, and
by Conſequence, no Death. Again,
Hooker Nulla Géns adeo extra Leges
, eft projecta,
libos: $ 2. ut non aliquos Deos credat, (faith Seneca)
189. Du which cannot but be railed out of a
ſecret Hope, that either in this Life,
Veritat. or another, their Piety ſhould be re
Relig. warded. Again, from the Nature of
the Object; we may eaſily
riſe to know
the Nature, both of the Faculty, and
of the Eſſence. Where therefore, no
mortal Object beat's full Convenience,
nor is able to fatiate and quiet The
Faculty there
there, and the Eſſence,
whence it flows, are both immortal. The
ſenſitive Parts find full 'Satisfaction in
this Life ; only the Reaſonable, the Un-
derſtanding, and Will, can never be
repleniſhed in their Mortality. Every
Man is an Alexander, tho' not in Con-
queſts, yet in Empires. This World is
too ſtraiç and empty"; only the Sight
and Poſſeſſion of God can faciate our
Underſtandings and Wills; both which
aim ad Summum , That ad ſummam Cau-
fam; to the firſt of Truths; this ad
"Summum Bonum, to the laſt of Ends.
And therefore he, which is firſt and
ļaſt, can ſatisfie theſe two ſearching and
unquier Faculties.' "All our Knowledge
we
( 125 )
we heap. up here, ſerves“ only as a
Mirrour to view our Ignorance in ; and
we have only Light enough to diſcó-
ver that we are in the Dark. Hoc eft
quod palles? Or do'we' toil and ſweat
for that, which we fooner forſake tha'n
find? Is it natural for the Gaining of
Knowledge to haſten unto That, where-
by we loſe both that and our felves?
And labour for a Purchaſe, which like
Lightning is at once begun and ended;
yea, ſooner loſt than gotten. Certain
ly. were not Man conſcious of his own
Immortality, could he have a ſtrong
and evident Perfwaſion of his final
Corruption (or Annihilation) there
could be no' ſtronger Inducement to
Sottiſhneſs, Riot, and all other ſenſual
and unbridled Practices.
Other Reaſons, vid. Ariſtotle. And
others are taken from the Cauſes of Ariſtot. 3.
Corruption, which is wrought eicher de Anima.
by Contraries, Defect of the Cauſe,
or Defect of the Subject: None where-
of can be verified of the Soul.
Other Attributes there are more ac-
cidental to God, to which it beareth
a Reſemblance, (though a dark One.)
And the firſt of them is his Power.
For theſe two great Parts of his
Workmanſhip, his Creation and Re-
demption,
( 126 )
demption, are: Incommunicates appro-
priated unto Him. Yet in many 0.
cher Proceedings of God's Works, there
is fome Analogy in the Works of Men.
For, Firſt, in the mașing and ſwaying
of the World, there was. Nothing pro-
perly created but the Chaos, and our
of the Obedience, thereof, the Power
did educe and extract thoſe Forms of
Heaven and Earth: So Man; alſo in
his Works of Art doth ex potentia obe-
dientiali, of any propoſed Maſſe, pro-
duce, Non per Naturam, fed Imperium,
Forms of Art full of Decency and
Beauty. The Second is Beauty, of
which there is a Reſemblance in Man;
for altho' the Fall hath fo darkned
his Eyes, as to make him walk in a
Maze, without Method and Diſpoſiti-
on ; yet certain it is, that in the Mind
of Man, there ftill remains a Pilot, ſtill
a Light of Nature, fome Glimpſes of
Reaſon, whereby our Actions may be
directed unto their true Ends. An-
other, is Knowledge, which doubtleſs
was after an eminent Manner infuſed
into the Heart of Man, when he was
able, by the Intuition of the Creatures,
to give unto them all, Names, accord-
ing to their ſeveral Natures; and in
them to Thew Himſelf as well a Phi-
loſopher,
1
( 127 )
+
loſopher, asa Lord.: And tho' by his
Fall he robbed himſelfof this, as well.
as of all other moſt excellent Degrees
of his Perfection, yet ftill Man, by his
Nature, is a curious and enquiring:
Creature, winding it Ielf into all the
Paſſages of Nature, and continually
turning over that World of Knowledge.
There are two main Defires in each
Creature; one of Perfection; the other,
of Perpetuity. This Ariſtotle attributes
more eſpecially to each Creature living,
which by generating ſibi fsmile, doch
revenge it følf on the Law of Cor-
ruption : And that Immortality, which
they can not retain in their individuals,
they procure by deriving their contin-
ual Nature to a continued Offspring
But in Man (tho' in Reſpect of his
Life, the other is as well true, chat
other Defire of Perfe&tion is more ve-
rified. Firſt, Becauſe of his own. Im-
mortality, he needs not, fo much the
other; and then, becauſe Knowledge,
the Perfection of Man, iş to him, as I
may ſo ſpeak, a new Generation of
bim, being of ſufficient Power to ex-
empt, tho, Perſon indued therewith,
from all Period or Reſolution of Time,
and to make him ſurvive his Morta-
lity.
Another
( 128 )
.
Another Attribute is his Holineſs,
which though through bưr Fall it be
quite taken from us, yet ſtill here is
the Opus operatum; tho’ the Ignorance
of the true End take away the Sancti-
ty of it, the Top of Nature yet reach-
eth unto that of Grace; we have in
us the Teſtimonies, though not the
Goodneſs of our firſt Eftaté ; the Ruins
of a Temple to be lamented, though
not the holy Places to be inhabited.
Now it follows to ſpeak of theſe
Parts of Man's Soul, his Underſtanding
and his Will.
Concerning the Underſtanding, tho’
the 'Dignity of it may conſiſt in the
Latitude of its Objects, yet principally
in its Operations, both ad extra in re-
fpect of the Objects; and ad intra, in
reſpect of the Will. Thoſe which re-
ſpeet the Objects, are either paffive or
active Operations. Paſſive, are either
the firſt Apprehenſions of the Soul, by
the Adminiſtration and Miniſtry of
the Senſe, or elſe, Diſcourſe ; of all
which the principal Dignity conſiſts
in the End, to wit, Knowledge. The
Excellency whereof, being before hand-
led, I proceed to their moſt obvious
and uſeful Corruptions, which are ein
ther,
1
( 129 )
ther, Opinion or Error; the One doubca
ful, the Other peremptory:
The Cauſes of Opinion are two ;
Firſt, Diſproportion between the Uni
derſtanding and the Object. When
the Object either. is too bright and
excellent or too dark, the One dazles
the Power, the Other affects it rföt ;
the One: "like" Lumen ad Veſpertilio
nem; the others like a Miſt, to përs
plex the Eye." The Object::of the Var
derſtanding muſt have a' double Tenn
per; it muſt have ſome Abſtraction in
it, and fome. Materiality; Abſtraction,
in Reípect of the Spiricuality of the
Underſtanding; and Materiality, 'ią
Refpect of the Senſe, on : whichi as: on
the Medium,' the Underſtanding des
pends.
The next Cauſe may be, Acuteneſs
and Subtilty of Wit, when Men'out
of an Ability, like Carneades, to diſ
courſe probably on either Side, are
forced to make Choice of Something
elſe to aver, or elſe to float, and be
equally inclinable to either Part; which
*tho' it be in it ſelf a Defect of Learn Diverti-
ing, yet is both commendable and tate ratio-
uſeful; becauſe it takes away all num, kas
Suſpicion of Hereſy, and lefſens the
Number of them, gives more Occaſion
S
of
2
Plin. Ex
( 130 )
1
1
2
of inquiring into che Truth; and, to
conclude, argues Modeſty ; (uoleis in
Divinity, and then it is Infidelity) which
will noc fuffer it. ſelf to be captivated
by its owo. Conceits, or by thoſe Rea-
fons, in which it ſelf is able to deſcry
Weakneſs.'
The other was Error; whereby I
underſtand a peremptory and habitual
Aflent fixed: on ſome Falſehood. And
this is ſo much the more dangerous,
by how much the nearer it comes to
true Knowledge. · For, asthat hath a
commanding Power over the Under-
ftanding, fe hath Herely, whereby it
poffefſeth the Mind with an irreſiſtible
Credulity. The main Cauſe of this,
is Sin; but there are others more im-
mediate. As firſt, In the Abuſe of
Principles ; if the Root and Fountain
be bitter, 'the Branches and Streams
have their Corruptions alſo. And this
is done either by abuſing and pervert.
ing them in their own Conceits, wbich
is Error llationis ; or by transferring
them, or other Sciences, and then it
is Error Dependentia.
The Former
Plato usd, when he inveighing ar
gainſt Oratory, was then moſt of all
an Orator ; making a Sword of Elo-
quence to wound it ſelf. Men neyor
more,
1
6
p. 49.
( 131')
more wrong Knowledge, than when Like Sci-
they promiſe to clear it moſt; nor doing the
pio entera
they ſo much build upon Truth, as Capitol
.
hide in it; nor make it their Founda- Liv. 26.
tion, but their Cloke. By 'Reaſon of
the later, ſo many of the ancient Phi-
loſophers denied thoſe two'main Doca
trines of the Creation and Reſurrecti.
on; whilft Religion, which ſhould Hooker
ſubdue and captivate the Underſtand: lib.1.9 16.
ing, is made to Itoop and bow unto
Reaſon; and whilſt thoſe Aſſents, which
ſhould be grounded on Faich, and not
Diſcourſe, are admitted according to the
Conformity they have řith Nature,
and no further. Thus 'as Men, which
ſee through a coloured Glaſs, have all
Objects, how different foever repre-
ſented under the ſame Colour; ſo they,
which examine all Concluſions by fore-
Italled Principles for that Purpoſe, think
every Thing, of wharfoever Nature, te
be died under the Colour of their Con-
ceits, which can not but be very pre-
judicial unto Knowledge; and Error ea-
lily thereby creeps in,
Another Cauſe may be the Affecta- Hooker
tion of Singularity ; when Men Thall lib: 3. $ 7.
delire rather to walk ini Mázés, than in
beaten Paths; to be guilty of their own
invented Errors, than content withi'a
S 2
derived
( 132 )
0
reverentius,
derived and imputed Learning, and had
rather be accounted the Purchaſers of
an Hereſy, than the Heirs of Truth;
the Authors of Tyranny, than the Sucr
ceffors of lawful Government. He thať
will always peremptorily be his own
Scholar, hath very ſeldom a wilę Man
to his Maſters
Another Cauſe is a too credulous and
prejudicial Opinion of Authority; when
we bow our Judgments not ſo much
to the Nature of Things, as to the
Learning of Men, and credere, quam ſcire
It is indeed 4 Wrong to
Authors to read them always with
Scepticiſm; and to doubt of every Thing,
is to get Reſolution in Nothing. But
yet our Credulity muſt not be peremp
tory, but with Reſervation; there muſt
pot be a vile Captivating and Religna.
tionof the Judgment into another Man's
Hand, Belief without Evidence of
Reaſon, muſt be only there abſolute,
where the Authority is unqueſtionable,
and where it is Impiery to err, there
only it is impious to diſtruít. As for
Men's Aſſertions, Quibus plerumque poteft
Subeffe falfum, , what he ſaid of Friend,
{hip is more warrantable in Knowledge,
Sic crede, tanquam diffenfuruş. It is too
much impofing on Man's Underſtand-
ing
( 133 )
>
pers in the which bred more Diftem-
ing, to ſubdue and inthral it unto
any;
and to eſteem the Diffent from ſome
particular Authorities, as Preſumption
or Self-conceir : Nor indeed' was there
any
pers in the Body of Learning, than Fa-
ations and Sidings; when, as - Seneca
faid of Cato, he would rather eſteem
Drunkenneſs a Virtue, than-Cato Vi-
cious. For Peripatetick, and Platoniſt,
and Scotift, and Thomiſt, odc. and O-
thers of thoſe learned Idolaters; fhall
rather count Error Truth, than their
great Maſters: erroneous. ' But yet, not Vid.Hook
as if I left, every Man to the unbri-lib. 1. 86.
dled Raſhneſs of his own Head ;s or to a faith of
preſumptuous. Dependence on his own Ariſtotle.
Judgment, with Contempt and Neglect
of Others. But I conſider à double
Eſtate of Learning, Inchoation and Pro-
greſs.. In this later, there are required
a diſcerning Judgment, and_fome Li-
berty of Diſſent; yet for the biher,
Ariſtocle's Saying is true, Oportet diſcena
tem credere; for as in the Generation of
a Man, he firſt receives Nutriment from
the Womb, afterward from his Nurſe,
afterward hath the Freedom of his own
Choice or Diſlikė, fo in the Generation
of Knowledge, the firſt Knitting of Joints
and Members of it into oñé Body, is
beſt
what he
1
1
( 134 )
,
beſt effected by the Authority and
Learning of ſome one Brain; bac beo
ing grown, unto ſome Stature, not tº
give is the Liberty of its own Judg.
ment, : were to confine it ſtill to its
Cradle. : 'Tis true, indeeds that Arifto-
tle, and, all thoſe worthy Founders of
Learning do well deſerve ſome Credit,
as well to their Authority, as to their
Matter.; and to have more Sway over
our Aſſents, than an ordinary Witneſs
over a Judge, by his Evidence. But
yet there is a Difference between Re-
verence and Superſtition: We may
aft
fent unto them as Ancients, but not as
Oracles, As I will not diftruſt all, that
without manifelt Truthi they deliver, fo
likewiſe will I ſuſpend my Belief; and
where I find Reaſon peremptory, I
will rather ſpeak Tçuch with my Mi-
ftriſs. Nature, than maintain an Herefy
with my Maſter Ariſtotle. As there
may be Friendfhip, fo there may be
Honour with Diverſity of Opinions ;
and, there never yet was a Divorce be-
tween Reverence and Diſſent, Plura
fæpe peccantur,dum demeremur, quam
dam
offendimus. We diſhonour our Ancefors
more by reverencing them, than by opis
poſing them in their Errors. Our Opia
nion is foul, if we think thar.? they
had
( 135 )
:
nimis vo-
mus.
had rather have us Followers of them,
than of the Truth. (See Hooker, lib.
2. .9 7. p. 74. & Ariftot. Ethic. lib. 6.
C. 11.)
Another Cauſe of Error may be a
Quod
Faſtening too peremptory an Affection lumus, fa-
on ſome particular Objects; as if Truth cile credi.
were the Handmaid to our Paſſions,
or Chamäleon like could alter it ſelf
to the Temper of our Deſires, Vitia
noſtra, quia amamus, defendimas. Thus,
as it is uſual with: Men of deceitful
Palares, in Sickneſs, to conceive every
Thing they taſte, of ſome diſagreeing
Savour; lo chefe Minds prepoſſeſſed
with ſome particular Fancy; (Intus ex-
iſtens prohibet alienum) they can fee No.
thing in its proper Colours. ;
Another Reaſon is, Curioſity. It is
the Vanity of Man, as well in Know.
ledge, as in any Thing elſe, to eſteem
that, which is far fetched and dear
bought, moſt precious ; as if Danger and
Rarity, were the only Things of Worth:
And Ignorance is ſo oppoſite to Man's
Nature, that tho'ir be holy, it pleaſeth
not. He which thinks he may know
every Thing, wants this one Know-
ledge, that he muft be ignorant of
ſome Things.
The
( 136 )
7
1
The Actions of the Underſtanding
are ſeen in Invencion, Wit, Judgment.
Of. Invention, there are two Parts, the
Diſcovering the Truth, and the Tradi
tion of it. But this is ſeen in Con-
templation; and therefore now, of its
Corruptions. And the firſt is, a di-
ftruftor Diffidence of our own Ability,
when as to all ill-affected Bodies, every
light Weakneſs is more felt, than any
viclent . Diftemper, where the Conſti-
tution is ſtronger : So with ſuch fear-
ful Wics; every Inquirya is eſtimated,
not according to the Nature of the
Seneca. Object; fed ex Debilitate noftra, non cala
cant Spinas, fed habent, like * Plutarch's
Womans. Darkneſs.'
Another. Cauſe is, That too much
Reverence of Antiquity ; whilft among
thriftlefs. Perfons, who are negligent of
repairing their Efate, Divitiarum A.
bundantia in Cauſis Paupertatis eft: : So
theſe, when they only reſt in the Le-
gacies our anceſtors left, and never im-
prove their own Inventions, they only
purchaſe a large Meaſure of Ignorance
in thoſe Inquiries. i :..
The laſt is, Immaturity : Learning
is a Tree, which ſpreadeth it ſelf into
Tuſc. qu.
1. 2.
* Seneca ſays this of Harpaſte his own Nurſe.
many
( 137 )
1
many Branches, o difficile ergo eft paus
ca ei effe not a, cui non fint omnia, aut
pleraque.
The other Part, is, Tradition; which
conſiſts, either in Speech, Writing or
Eloquence.
There was not, I perſuade my ſelf,
amongſt the Ancients, a greater Mean
of Truth, than the Freedom of their
owo Opinions. For notwithſtanding
that this Liberty was often Times the
Occaſion of many prodigious Births, yet
this Diſadvantage was countervailed
with many godly and fruitful iſſues, all
which would have been undiſcovered,
had Men laboured only in Conditions,
and bridled their Underſtandings from
farther Inquiry.
Again, leſs prejudicial it is to Learn-
ing, to have many Errors (which, I con-
fels, naturally follows this Self-Liberty,
with Freedom of Dillent) than fewer,
with a Kind of neceſſary Subtcriprion,
which follows the inthralling of our
Inventions unto che Wits of others. Bee
ſides, even of thoſe very Errors, I make
no Queſtion, but there bath been great
Uſe made, by thole great Inquirers into
Truth.' For Firſt, There are very few
Errors that have not ſome way or o.
T
ther
I
1
}
( 138 )
ther annexed to them, which happily
might never have been obſerved, had
not Freedom of Opinion vented thoſe
Errors. It is an Ērror in that Man,
that ſhall preſume of a Treaſure hid in
his Land, to dig and turn it up to no
other End, but to find his imaginary
Gold, yet the ſtirring and ſoftening
the Ground, is a Mean to make it
more fertil. Laſtly, This Uſe hath
thoſe Errors in Inquiry after Truth,
that they let us know what is not ;
and it is ſpeedier to come to a po-
ſitive Concluſion by a negative Know-
ledge, than a bare Ignorance; as he
is Tooner likely to find out a Place,
who knoweth which is not the Way,
than he which barely knoweth not the
Wav.
The laſt Prejudice or Cauſe of Dif-
ability in the Inventions may be Im-
maturity and Unfurniture, for Want of
acquainting a Man's Self with the Body
of Learning ; for Learning is a Tree or
Body, which, in one continued Sub-
ſtance brancheth it felf into ' ſundry
Members; ſo that there is not only
in the Objects of the Will, which are
the Good of Things, but in the Ob-
jects of the Underſtanding, alſo, which
are
( 139 )
)
are the Trunk; a certain Unity, and
mutual Concatenation, whereby every
Part hath fome Reference to another :
Inſomuch, 'that in the handling of par-
ticular Sciences, there be often ſuch
Occurrences as do neceſſarily require an
Inſight into other Sorts of Learning.
So that, That of Tully is generally true,
Difficile est parca ei nota effe, cui non Tuſc
. qu.
ſint aut pleraque, aut omnia; all that lib. 2.
addreſs themſelves, either to the Inven-
ventions of Arts not known, or to the
poliſhing of ſuch as are already found
out, muft ground their Endeavours on
the Experiments of Knowledge in ſun-
dry Kinds of Learning.
As for that other part of Invention,
which I call Tradition, Communica-
tion, or Diffuſion, I comprehend it
with in that one Perfection peculiar to
Man from all other Creatures, viz.
Oration, or Speech; wherein I conſider
a double miniſterial Reference, the one
to the Eye, the other to the Ear; that
is, Vox Scripta, a viſible Voice ; this, De Subtil.
vox Viva, a ſpeaking Voice. To which
purpoſe. Scaliger ſpeaks acutely; Eft
quidem Recitator, Liber loquens; Liber,
Recitator mutus. The Dignities, which
this particular confers on Man, and
wherein
T2
( 140 )
1
Ariftot.
Politic,
wherein it gives him a Pre-eminence
above all the Creatures, are taken from
the End of the Offices thereof, for the
Worth of a miniſterial Inſtrument is to
be gathered from the Regularity of its
Function, whereunto it is natural-
ly inſtituted. Now there are Ofices
peculiar unto the forenamed Branches,
ard there are, which are common unto
both.
The End, whèreunto living and ori-
lib, 1. c.2.ginal Speech was principally ordained,
is, to maintain: mutual Society, among
Men incorporated into one Body. And
therefore Tully will call it Humang
Societatis Vinculum, the Ligament and
Sinew, whereby the Body of human
Converſation is compacted and knit
into One
; ſo then, tho' it be true
which Ariſtotle hath obſerved, That
Man is, out of his own natural Pro-
penſion, Animal Politicum, a ſociable
and converſiog Creature, yet that Man
to whom Nature hath denied this one
Band, by which he ſhould be ſervice
ably united unto the other Body, is
nothing but an unſinewed Part, a Mem-
ber out of Joint, whereby he is made
a double Monſter; a Monſter in the
Defect of his own Nature, wanting,
next
( 141 )
'spis
next to his soul, his principal Per-
fedtion; and a Monſter in Regard
of his Unſerviceableneſs to that civil
Society, wherein by Nature he is in-
corporated.
The principal and main Corruption
of this Speech, in Régard of uniting
the Minds of Men : together (which
only Dignity I obſerve in it alone) was
that Puniſhment indicted by God on
the Babel-Rebels, Confuſion of Tongues,
whereby human Society being before
that Time, by Reaſon of the Unity of
Language, more collected into one,
was looſed and unjointed, and a more
notable Diviſion made amonſt them
and indeed, (if we obſerve it), as all
Bleflings Divine conliſt in Union and
Peace; (for if Man had continued in
his State of Innocency, he ſhould have
injoyed a conſtant and ſettled Union
with God, with his own Heart, and
with the reſt of his Society) ſo, on the
contrary Side, the Rebellions and ex-
orbitant Practices, of Men have been
ever by God puniſhed with Separation
and Diviſion; Separation firſt from Him,
by denying us the Fruition of his Fas
vours ; Seperation next from our felves
by Death; Seperation, laſtly from one
another,
( 142 )
another, as in many other Circum-
ftances according to the Nature of ſome
other Crimes'; ſo in this more eſpecial-
ly, the Confuſion of Tongues, it be-
ing at once both a Puniſhment and
a Diſappointment of that impious At-
tempt. i Concerning the other part of
Tradition, which is by Writing, I ſhall
not much in fiſt upon any Dignity pe-
culiar to it, in Reſpect of Man; becauſe
it is not any intrinſical Part of his
Worth, : but only an artificial Inftru-
ment of: ſpreading or deriving the Con-
çeits of his Mind, farcher than that for-
mer of Speech can do, wherein con-
fiſt the principal Dignities thereof, in
Spreading, I ſay, and Diffuſion of our
Notions farther, both in a larger La-
titude, in Reſpect of the Time pre-
ſent, and in a deeper Succeffion, in
Reſpect of the Time to come. For
this double Prerogative hath Writings
above Words, that they ſpeak .far-
ther than our Mouths can do, while
we live; and that they out-live us
too, and derive themſelves upon Po.
fterity.
Of the Perfections common both to
Interpret.
Speech and Writing, the firſt and prin-
cipal
Ariſtot, de
On l.
( 143 )
cipal is, to be the Interpreters of the
Cogitations; to reveal and communi-
cate the Conceits of the Mind, for the
Good, either of the Hearers or Readers,
with this Difference, that Words in-
mediately repreſent Conceits, and
Writing, Words. So that Words are
nothing elſe but audible Notions; and
Writing, viſible Words. · Man being
by Nature a converſing and diſcourſing
Creature, and yet not able to repre-
ſent his Conceits immediately to the
Apprehenſion of another (it being, the
Privilege of God only to read the
Heart) ſtands therefore in Need of an
inftrumental Conveyance, by the Mi-
niſtry, whereof he may diſcover any
Thoughts, which, for any Cauſe, he
deſires to communicate unto others;
and that is Speech; reaching"ic felf
(as I'faid) to the Ear, by natural
Organs; or to the Eye, by artificial
Furtherance. So that there is in the
Apprehenſion and Diſcovery of any
Notion, the fame Manner of Repre-
ſentation, which is obſervable in Glaſſes
and other reflecting Bodies. For a
Glaſs receiving the Sun's Brightneſs
can reflect it upon another Glals, and
the
( 144 )
1
the fame upon another, and ſo mula
tiply the ſame Image ; ufque adeo a ſpe-
culo Speculi tralucet Imago; ſo likewiſe
the Mind receiveth firſt by Senſe, or
with Diſcourſe, the Species of fome Ob-
ject, whence a Conceit being framed,
conveys it ſelf upon the Speech, and
that in ſome Cafes, upon the Paper,
and yet ſtill it is the ſame Thing
that is repreſented by all theſe.
There are fundry Corruptions of
theſe two, both in Nature, from the
Indiſpoſition of Organs, in Negligence,
from the Rudeneſs of Education, and
in Morality, by abaſing them in ex-
preſſing any vicious Conceirs; as many
ill Thoughts, as the Heart can mould
in it ſelf, (and thoſe are infinite) fo
many Ways is it poſſible for Speeches
to be depraved. I ſhall therefore leave
ſo endleſs a Search, and faſten on that,
which I conceive to be the greateſt of
all other, and thạc principally. For as
every Thing, is then moſt regular,
when it retains the Purity of its firſt
Office and Inſtitution; fo on the other
Side it is moſt depraved, when it be
comes unnatural, and diverts it felf
from that Şervice, whereunto it was
prin.
( 145 )
principally ordained. Thus a Picture,
tho' it be never ſo much in the Frame
abuſed, cracked, ſpotted, or any other
Way made unvaluable, yeť if the Rex
ſemblance, which it bears towards him,
whom it repreſents, be'expreſs and live-
ly, you ſtill call it a true Picture;
whereas, if that be a falſe and deceitful
Reſemblance, be all other Adventions
and Ornaments never fo exquiſite, we
ſtill account it falfe and corrupt : So
it is with the Speech of Man, which
tho' of never fo great Weakneſs and
Inſufficiency, or different from the Ace.
count of the Perfections, either of Na-
ture, Art, or Honeſty, (for thoſe are
the three chief Means of Dignity in the
Speech) working pleaſing Delivery for
the Ear, plauſible Language for the
Fancy, profitable Invention for the
Judgment; yet, if it retain that one
Property of ſharpening it ſelf to the
Conceits of the Mind, and making
level and proportionable the Words with
the Thought, it may be ftill ſaid to be,
tho? not a good, yet a regular and
right Speech, in that it is conformable
to the firſt Inſtitution : But be all other
Excellency never ſo Good, and beyond
ordinary Perfection, yet if it be a falſe
U
Image
3
1
7
>
( 146 )
Image of our Inventions, if it turn once
to Diffolution and Diſappointments
Nature is diverted from her · prime
End, and the Faculty quite depraved,
as forſaking the original Office it
ſhould exerciſe in communicating the
ſecret and retired Motions of the
Mind.
.
1
LAUS DEO. Amen:
Α Ν
1
ingin
:. Α Ν
INDEX
1
А
A Baburetor Error, differ from com
Bomination
74
Abuſe or Error, differ from Cora
ruption
133
Acquaintance
88
Admiration of unuſual Novelties 2. A
kind of Fear
105
Affections, Subjects to the Will 34.
When diſquiet Nature's Peace, Ib.
Qught to be ſubdued, not ſtifled, 35
Agrippina
72
Alienation
44
Anger, 109. A Cauſe of Grief, 31. Its
3
Vent
118
33
26
Apathy
Appetite, Senſitive
Arrhabo
Attraction
9
4!
$
>
B.
An INDEX
B В
Elief, the Difference between it and
Knowledge
Body, the Inſtrument, not Servant to
the Soul,
34
Beliefne beledigerence between it and
с
1
S
72
IIS
Arriage; proud and haughty
Cenſure
Confidence
Contemplation
Curioſity
82
80
135
D
1
D
Elight, 78. It's Diviſions , 79
Deſire
74
Detpair
92
Diffurbers of publick Good, 32, 33
Divinity works Science by Faith
10
e
Į,
Mulation
90
Error, iso
19, 135
Evil, its Degrees, 61. Security againſt
the Oppoſition of it
E
68
i
F
F
Ancy, 12. It’s Error, 29. A Cauſë
of Fear,
64
Fear
,
3
JOO
OOA
An INDE X.
Fear bred by Love, 37. A credulous
Quality, 44. Its Diſtinctions, 62, 63
Oppoſite to Hope
Friendſhip
47
Fruition.
82
G
OD, how ſeen
Grief, bred by Anger, 37. Its
Cure by Sympathy, 38. Whence it
proceeds, 73. Grief or Sorrow, 85.
Its dangerous Exceſſes, 88, 89. Its
Vent
118
)
84
GOD
*
H
HA
Atred, 61. Its Definition 68
Hope, 90. Its Cauſes, 93, 94,
95, 96. Its Effects
97, 98, 99
Hypocriſy, 44, Its true Character, 16.
I
J
6
Ealouſy
Ignorance, a credulous Quality 44
Imagination, 15. Its Office, 16. Its
Lacitude, 16. Íts threefold Liberty, 18.
Its Corruptions
19
Immacuricy
Impofture
136
42
K,
1
An INDE X.
1
1
1
K
$
K
Nowledge, the Difference between
it and Belief
IO
1
3
i
.)
84
19, 21
Ætitia, defined
Levity
Long-ſuffering
173
Love, the Cauſe of Fear, 37. Its Objects
and Cauſes, 47: Its Ground, 49: Di-
vine Love, its Rule, 51. Its Princi-
pal, 53. Its other two Cauſes, 55.
Love of God to Man
. 57
M
7
.
MA
3, 4. His
AN, his Excellençy, 3, 4.
Perfections
6, 7, &c.
Motion, natural
3
Memory
I 2
O
Bjects framed by Imagination '18
Obſervation, Slightnefs of it 13
Oppoſition ſhews the Strength of every
Thing
34
Otho, wiſe Advice to him
35
P
1
1
An INDEX:
anderen
P.
PA
Aſſions, their general Definition, 23
Their Objects various, 27. Their
Generalities, 28. Their Dignities, 29.
Antecedents, 30. Corruptions or Dé.
fects, 31, 32. Exerciſe of their Acts
· 33. Diviſions of their Accidents and
Acts, 35. A nice Diſtinction of paf-
fonate Reſentments, 36. Their Ex-
tremities cured by Contrarieties, 37-
Their Ends and Effects, 40. Their
corrupt Effects, 41, &c.". The funda- :
mental Paſſions
.47
Pleaſure and Joy, how they differ 78
Pride, ſtubborn and learned
73
S
r
Ss
Implicity
173
Soul, not independent of the Body
7. Its Dignities, 121. In it ſelf im-
paſſible, 9. Its double Reference, 22.
The Objects of its ſupreme Part, 25
Stupidity, 19. Its various Corruptions
and in Extremes
Suſpicion
106, 115
Sympathy
22
47, 89
T.
An INDEX
3
T
Tradition
187
V. ,
$
Ehiculum Anime
V Eliaderſtanding
9
6
W.
t
WT
III, not Sovereign, but Imploy-
ment of the Body
3.4
Wits, Difference of them cauſed by
Climates
8
N
Eal
60
ZE!
1
FIN I S.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 05988 9454
1
i
3
!
سے لینی پ
V
11,
SILAS WRIGHT DUNNING
· BEC
UNIVERSITY
GENER
收 ​HUNT
A 3 9015 00392 458 9
University of Michigan - BUHR
的​系
​