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Collated - Pereart
Τ Η Ε BENEVOLENCE
S.
OF THE
DEITY,
FAIRLY AND IMPARTIALLY
CONSIDERED:
IN
THREE
P A R T S
.
The firſt explains the ſenſe, in which we are to underſtand Bea
nevolence, as applicable to GOD:
The fecond aſſerts, and prcves, that this perfection, in the
ſenſe explained; is one of his effential attributes.
The third endeavours to anfwer objections.
Under one or other of theſe heads; occafion will be taken to
view man as an intelligent moral agent ; having within him-
felf an ability acid freedom to will., as well as to do in, oppo.
ſition to NECESSITY from any extraneous caiſe whatever :-
To point out the ORIGIN OF EVIL, both natural and moral :
---And to offer what may be thought ſufficient to thew, that
there is no inconfiltency between infinite benevolence in the
Deity, which is always guided by infinite wiſdom, and any
appearances of eòil in the creation.
BY CHARLES CHÂUNCY, D. D.
SENIOR PASTOR OF THE FIRST CHURCH OF
CHRIST IN BOSTON.
1
AMERICA :
MASSACHUSETTS..
.
BOSTON: PRINTED BY POWARS & WILLIAM
MDCCLXXXIV
Apt
10.
137
18
BUHR
INTRODUCTION
BENEVOLENCE is that quality, in the human
mind, without wbich we could not be the objects
of one another's eſteem: Neither, were we wholly
deſtitute of it,, could we, whatever other qualities
we might be endowed with, place that confidence in
each other, upon which the well-being of the world,
in so great a meaſure, depends. Were we poſeljed
of power, but no: benevolence, it would operate in
tyranny ; were we the ſubjeets of wiſdom, but no-be-
revolences it would be nothing better than craft :
And the higher we enjoyed theſe properties in degree,
the greater reaſon we ſhould have, bad we, at the
Fanie time, no benevolence; to. Shun one another through
fear of miſchief. It is benevolence, tempering our
other qualities, and making way for their exerciſe in
the methods of kindneſs, that conſtitutes us wortby:
objeEts of each other's love, and lays the foundation:
for that mutual truſt between mon and man, without
which there could be.no: Sütch thing as public happia:
reſs.
And this obſervation, extended to all other crea-
ted intelligent agents, is equally true : Yea, it is so
far true, with reſpect even to the uncreated Supreme.
Being himſelf, as that, if we had no idea of him as
benevolent, we could not eſteem him, though we
imight fear him: Neither could we place our truit
in him, though.we might in a ſervile way, do bom.age:
to him. Benevolence is that ingredient in his cha-
rafter which exhibits him to our view as amiably
perfeet; and wortby of our warmeſt love, and in-
tire confidence. His other attributes, ſeperate from
this
bizz
1V. INTRODUCTION:
this, are inſuficient to inſpire theſe affections į ricr are,
they indeed at all.Juited to fuck a purpose. “ Eternity,
and immenſity amüze our thoughts : Tifinite knowo
ledge and wiſdom fill us with.edmiration : Omnipo-
tence, or irreſistable power, is great cnd adorable ;
but, at the ſame time, if conſidered fimply by itſelf
Ptis alſo dreadful and terrible : Dominion and ma-
jeſty, clothed with perfect and impartial juſtice, iş
worthy of our higher praiſes ; but ſtill to ſinners it ap-
pears rather awful and venerable, than the object of
ci fare and love • Holineſs and purity are inextrejfilly.
bqutiful and amiable perfeétions, lut of too bright a
glory for
finners to contemplate with delight. Tis good-
nefs that finiſhes the idea of God, and repreſents
to ys under the lovely chara&ter of the beſt as well
as greateſt Being in the univerſe. This is that attri-
bute, which both in itſelf is infinitely amiable, and,
as a ground-work interwoven with all the other per-
feptions of the Divine Neture, makes every one of
them ailjoto become objexts of our love, as well as
of our admiration." 'Immenſe and eternal goodneſs,
goodneſs all-powerful and all-wiſe, goodneſs inveſted
with jupreme dominion, and tempering the rigor of
unrelenting juſtice : This is indeed the deſcription of
a Perfect Being ; a chara&ter truely worthy of
God.
But though. Benevolence thus eſſentially enters
into the character of the Deity, it has been objected
to ly. Forne; and abuſed by others. And it may be
more obječtions have been levelled againſt, and great-
er reproaches coſt upon, this attribute of the Divine
Nature, then any of the other ; though it is, in its
* Dr. Clark's ferizons.
felpa
!'*.
و
INTRODUGTION
felf, the 90ſt lovely of all the perfections of.God, and
eminently" that perfection, which, being intimately
conjoined with the reli, in all their exerciſes, is tlhę
.
true and only fource of all created exiſtence, and de-
pendent happineſs, whether in preſent poffeffion or fu-
ture proſpect.
. With reſpect to fome, their abuſes of the Divine
benevolence don't so much. Spring from any diſtinę
notions they have formed of the nature of this prin
ciple, aş exiſting in the Deity or the methods, iz.
which they concluda it ought to operate; as from
wrong ſtate of mind. They are diſſatisfied with
their ſituation in the world, and quite out of humour
becauſe they don't partake ſo liberally of the good
things of providence, as they imagine they might do.
And, thsir, diſcontent is ſtill beightened if they meet
with diſappointments, and are reduced to ſuffering
circumſtances, though by their own folly. And be-
ing out of freina, ulizaſy, and reſileſs in their ſpirits,
they find. fault with their Miker, and vent themſelves
in reflections on his goodneſs; as though it were great-
ly defeative; Otherwiſe, as they iinagine, à more
ad uz tageous condition in life might have been allot-
to them, and would bave been, if the Deity had
been as good as they can ſuppoja:bim to be. Theſe are
the complaints, by which the. infinitely benevolent
Creator, and Governor, of all things, is abufed by
ih2 leſs knowing, and inquiſitive, who are the moſi
Fungrous : But, as their complaints don't so much!
originate in judgment, as a bad temper of
inind, this chiefly needs to be reEtified, and then
their complaints will ceaſe of courſe,
There
.
و
1
!
vi
INTRODUCTION
There are others whoſe objections againſt the Divine
Benevolence ariſen from a vain mind, proudly aſpi-
sing to comprehend that which is above the reach of
their capacities. Some appearances, in the conſtitu-
tion of, nature;. and government of providence, are
ſuch as they can't account for, upon the plan of in-
finite benevolence. They find themſelves unable to:
conreat theſe, with other appearances, so as to con-
Nitute an whole · which they diſtin Etly and
particularly perceive to be an abſolutely good
one, free'd from all difficulties : And they are:
therefore rather diſpoſed to diſpute the exiſtence of an
infinitely perfect principle of benevolence, than to
call in queſtion their own capacity to ſee through the
whole of its operations : Though, if ibere be ſuch a
principle, it inult be employed about the univerſal
Tyſtem of things; and, for that reaſon, requires an
underſtanding, in order to adjtft its exerciſes, thai.
can take in conneētions; and dependencies, vaſtly
tranſcending the moſt enlarged conceptions of ſuch im-
perfect creatures, as we are. Nothing can be ſuf-
ficient to ſatisfy ſuch obječtors, till they have firſt
learnt to be modeſt; entertaining juſt apprehenſions.
of their own weakneſs, and the unſearchable great-
nefs and goodneſs of God.
There are yet cthers; whoſe objections againſt ,
and abuſes of, the benevolence of the Deity, take
riſe from their miſconceptions of the nature of this.
Divine attribute. Having formed to themſelves.
wrong'apprehenſions of ſupreme abſolute benevolence,
and the methods of its diſplay, they either deny that
God is thus benevolent, because fome 'detached apa
pearances
1
INTRODUCTION.
vii
i
pearances of goodneſs are not ſuch as they were led,
from their miſtaken notions, to expect they ſhould be:
Or elſe, they reproach this glorious attribute of the
Divine Being, giving: falſe and diſhonourable repres
jentations of it, conformably to the erroneous thoughts
they have previouſly entertained of its nature, or
manner of exerciſe.
Some there be who ſeem to have no other idea of
abſolutely perfect benevolence, than an uncon-,
controulable impulſive principle, neceffarily ur-
ging on to the greateſt communication of good, and
the total prevention of evil; its prevention fo as that
it ſhould have no place in the creation, in any ſhape,
or viero whatſoever. And the conſtitution of nature,
not falling in with this notion of goodneſs,they queſtion_.
the reality of any principle of benevolence : Not conſi-
dering that benevolence if. feated in an infinitely perfeet
mind, like God's, is never exerted blindly, or neceſi
ſarily, but always under the conduet ofreaſon and wife
dom: Which thought juſtly purſued, will ſufficient-
ly account for all appearances, however ſeemingly in-
conſiſtent with goodneſs; as we may have occaſion to
jbew bereafter, in its proper place : Whereas, į
principle of benevolence, though of infinite propel-
ling force, if not guided in its operations by wiſdom
and intelligence, inſtead of producing nothing but
good, might, by blindly counteràEting itſelf, produces
upon the whole, as the final reſult of its exertions,
infinite confufon and diſorder.
The effeet of miſtaken notions of Divine Goodneſs,
in others, is, not their denying that God is good, in-
finitely good, but speaking reproachfully of this
ditribute
1
viii
.
1
IN I RODUCTION
an
attribute of bis natüre: Andi perhaps, the reflectis
ons wlich have been caft upon the benevolence of the
Deity; from this cauſe, have been equally malig-
nant with a total denyal of it, and done as much
diffèrvice to the intereft of true religiin; and real vir
Tuet in the world. Amore fborking idea can -Scarcé
be given of the Deity, than that which repreſents
biñ as arbitrarily dooming the greater part of
tlié rạce of men te eternal miſery: Was he whol-
lydėſtitute of goodneſs; yeá; poſitively 'malevolent
in bis nature, a worfe repreſentation could not be
well made of him. And yet, this is the true import
of the doctrine of abſolute and unconditional re-
probation; as it has been taught; even by those who
Profefs faith in God ej a ben volent; yeo; an infiº
nitely benevolent Being But they could not have
taught this doetrine; it would have been impoſſible, if
ibey.bad not firſt entertained intirely wrong concep-
tions of benevolence, as attributed to the Deity. 'ſis
in:eed ffrange that any, who feel within themſelves
the working of kind affe&tion; ficuld give' in to an
opinion fo reproachful to the Father of mercies. To be
Jure their ideas of goodneſs in God, if they have any,
muſt be totally different from all the ideas we bave
of goudneſs, as we apply the term tö ourſelves, çi.
any created intelligent agent whatſoever. And if
their ideas are thus diferent, and may confequently
fignify the ſame thing with what we call cruelty in
nien; or any other creatures endowed with moral
agency, they can really mean nothing when they ſay,
that God is good": And it is of no importance, of not
the leaſt fignificancy, whether they call him good; or
que,
From
:
INTRODUCTION
N. 18
From thaſe, and ſuch-like cauſes; be that is goad
ſo far beyind all other:beings, as that it may be jut.
ly said of hin, in a comparative lenje, he only is
geod, has been bafélý tracticed, either by: objections
ågainſt the exiſtence of airy principle of goodneſs:in þim;
or by ſuch repreſentations of it as þavetendea toaxhi.
bitbim, to the vierò of tbe world rather an: odious that
atovely bèingAn attempt therefore to remove away
theſe objections, wipe off the leafperfions; and Jet
furth the benevolence of the Deity, in its true
glory, will not be condemned as a thing needlefs
This is the deſign of the preſent undertaking, and I
fyrve the rather entered upon it, as I am fülly perſuar
ded; that the knowledge of God, in his amiable: beaute.
ty, as an infinitely benevolent being, will.lgy. the belt
and furėjt foundation for that sincere eſteen of bim,
and love to him, and truſt and hope in him, in which
conſiſts the ſum of true religion.
I ball offer what I have to ſay, in proſecution of
this deſigri, under the tree following general heads.
1. I fell aſcertain the ſenſe in which I attri-
båte perfect and abſolute benevolence to the Deity:
II. I ſhall look into the natural and moral world;
and endeavoir to make it evident, frove what is
there to be ſeen, that this is the idea we are moſt ob-
vigu.lý ani fairly led to form of God.
· III. I Mall examine thaſë appearances which
$92. iy be alledged as objections againſt the ſupreinely
perfect benevolence of the Deity, and show that they
äre no ways inconfitent herewith.
And in diſcourfing to theſe points, I Mall rather apa
ply, ta men's underſtandings, than tseir imaginati-
Olis
İNT ROD U C T I O N.
ons ; endeavouring to ſet what I have to ſay in the
sleareſt, and ſtrongeſt point of rational light, that I
am able. And if I ſhould now and then be led to
Speak of thing's abſtruſe in their nature, I hopes I
Mall give no juſt occaſion for complaint; that I talk
Jo as not to be underſtood. And if I ſhould be really
unintelligible to an attentive reader, tolerably verifed
in ſuch matters, I am willing it ſhould be attributi
éd, not ſo much to the obfcurity of the things them-
felves, as to my own confuſed conception of them. For
it is with me a ſettled point, that any man may ex-
preſs that clearly and intelligibly, of which he bas
clear and diſtinēt ideas in his own mind, unleſs he is
either criminally negligent, or has ſome deſign to ferve
by covering himſelf with clouds and darkneſs :
i
PART
PART 1. Explaining Benevolence as attributed
to the DEITY.
1
T T
It may
HE firſt thing neceffary, in treating of
Divine Benevolence is to aſcertain the ſenſe
in which this perfe&tion is aſcribed to the Deity.
In order whereto,
be
proper to begin with fixing the
general notion of goodneſs, as a moral' attribute.
And here we ſhaall meet with no great difficulty.
We have clear and diſtinct ideas of this moral
quality. 'Tis as readily perceived by the mind
as any ſenſible quality, whatſoever, and as readi-
ly diſtinguiſhed from all others.
A principle diſpoſing and prompting to
the communication of happineſs, is the firſt
idea that enters into its compoſition. As there-
fore perceiving beings only are capable of hap-
pineſs, they only are the objects of goodneſs.
Inanimate matter, 'tis true, in all its various
forms, may paſſively: be the occaſion of happi-
nefs,-c0 creatures that are either ſenſible, or in-
telligent. And, upon this account, it may be
conlidered as an object, about which goodneſs
may be employed, and by means of which it
may be manifeſted : . Though, being void of
perception,
12
THE BENEVOLENCE
perception; it cannot itſelf immediately be the
object of goodneſs, becauſe an incapable ſubject
of happineſs. But whatever beings are endow-
jed with perception, as they are hereby rendered
capable of happineſs, in än higher or lower de:
gree, in proportion to their facựlties, they are
the proper objects of goodneſs : And goodneſs
corſifis in a difpofition to make them happy.
* This diſpoſition alſo muſt be exerted freely.
Ara hence it is that we don't attribute goodneſs,
as a character, to the brute ereatures. Not that
they exiſt without kind propenfions, or that hap-
pineſs to others, in various kinds, is not the ef-
fect of their ſeveral exertions : But as thefë- in-
fiintive principles are thrown into exerciſe. by
mecbánical impulfe, we look upon the animals
, in
whom they are implanted; as inftruments only
in the diffuſion of good, not the moral cauſes of
it. Communicated happineſs ņruſt be the cho-
jen aet of ſome ogent; otherwiſe we never coño
Tider it as a miocl quality, and call it commenda-
tle goodneſs. Accordingly, the good mans is
not a meer fallive inſtrument in the beſtowment
of good : Neither do we call a man good,
tho he does good; if it be beſide his intenti-
on; and by accident only. But he is the good man,
and he only; whoʻvoluntarily acts for the benefit of
others. His offices of:kindneſs are the reſult of
Free chcice ; and for this reaſon we apply good-
nels to him; under the notion of a moral virtuer
This diſpoſition muſt alſo be exerted with
a truly benevolent deſign. We don't call that
man
1
OF THE DEITY.
13
i
man good, whoſe actions may be productive of
good to others, if it was beſide his intention in
doing them: Much leſs will he deſerve this chaa
racter, if he did them with a view to ſerve him.
felf only, not them. And, inſtead of benevolent,
he will be quite the reverſe, if; in the inſtances
wherein he manifeſts goodneſs to others, his de-
fign is to entrap and enſnare them; making uſe
of that which has the appearance of intended
kindneſs, as an enticement to lead them aſide,
and bring upon them fome greater evil. A worſe
character can ſcarce be given a man. It is in-
deed the character of that Being, who, of all
Beings, is the moſt malevolent.
In fine, this diſpoſition muſt be exerciſed
under the guidance of reaſon, and in conſiſtency
with right and fit conduct :' Nor otherwiſe da
we conſider it as a moral perfection. If we look
within, - and reflect upon our perceptions, we
thall find, that our idea of benevolence, as a
- commendable. quality, is not a ſingle diſpoſition ;
buť a diſpoſition exerciſed under the conduct of
äntelligence, and within the limits of moral truth
and right. Conformably whereto, experience
teaches us, that we do’nt expect, that the man,
we call benevolent, ſhould act for our advantage
without thought, and at random : We ſhould
eſteem ſuch blind benevolence great weakneſs,
and look upon the expreſſions of it as little bet-
ter than fo- inany inſtances of follý. Neither do.
we expect, that the benevolent man ſhould do
us kind offices, in contradiction to the known
laws
84 THE BENEVOLENCË.
1
laws ofjuſtice and truth. Such a diſplay of good-
neſs would make an odious appearance to our
uncorrupted minds, and we ſhould rather caſi
it an inſtance of vice, than virtue. The truth is,
whenever we ſpeak of benevolence, as a moral
character, we conſider it as directed by wiſdom
and exerciſed within the bounds of right rèefon:
And the more wiſely and juſtly it is conducted,
and exerciſed, the higher do we riſe in our efti-
mation of it, as a tovely quality,
Theſe are the ingredients that conſtitute
the compleat general idea of moral goodneſs ,
which is the fame, whether we apply it to
men, or angels, or any created intelligences what-
ſoever ; or even to the Supreme Being himſelf,
Only, when we aſcribe goodneſs to the Deity,
we muſt remove away all defects, and conceive
of it as infinitely perfect. Goodneſs in men is al-
ways mixed with frailty and imperfection. Even
in angels, and the higheſt order of created moral
agents, 'tis finite and defective. But as to the
quality itſelf, 'tis the fame in kind, in all intelli-
gent moral Beings whatſoever. Every Being,
in heaven and earth, to whom this attribute may.
be applied, partakes of the fame quality, though
not in the fame manner, nor in the fame degrée
.
and proportion.
Some, I am fenſible, pretend, that the good,
neſs, and other moral attributes of God, are not
only different in degree, but in kind likewife, from
moral qualities in the creatures : infomuch that
the words goodneſs, juſtice, veracity, and the
j
like
ŐF THE DEITY:
14
1
or
are
like, are no otherwiſe applicable to the Deity:
than as they ſtand to fignify ſome unknown
qualities, anſwerable indeed (as they unintelli
bly ſpeak) to thoſe diſpoſitions in inferior moral
agents ; but yet; in their nature, altogether
tranſcendent, and not to be conceived of by us.
But this is certainly a moſt abſurd notion. For, ;
if when we apply the terms good, juſts faithful,
and the like to God, the qualities ſignified
by theſe words; and applied to men;
other created intelligent agents,
not
the qualities intended, but other inconceiv-
able ones of a quite different kind, we really mean
nothing when we ſay, that God is juſt, true, and
faithful; but aſcribe to him an unknown charac
ter. In which caſe, how can we make him the
object of our adoration and worſhip? We muſt
certainly, upon tħis ſuppoſition, worſhip him
as an unknown God, if we worſhip him at all. The
truth is, we muſt know what goodneſs, jultice,
and faithfulneſs, in God, are; or we ſhall unin-
telligibly apply theſe attributes to him; uſing
words that have no meaning at all : And, with-
out all doubt, we are capable of this knowledge.
The moral attributes of the infinitely perfect Be
ing, 'tis true, aré incomprehenfibile by ſuch narrow
underſtandings as our's, and perhaps by'thé uni-
derſtandings of all creatures whatſoever. But this
does not mean, that we know nothing at all
about their true nature ; but only that their mode
of exiſtence, manner of exerciſe, and degree of per-
feétion, tranſcend our, and all other finite, capa
cities
.
16
THE BENEVOLENCE
5
cities. In this ſeniſe, the moral qualities of the
Deity ſurpaſs all underſtanding, while yet; wë
have as poſitiøe, clear; and diſtinct ideas of their
real nature, as of the nature of any qualities ap-
plicable to ourſelves : Infomuch that we may
with all deſirable certainty, argue from them,
to the directing of our worſhip forining our
expectations, foundihg our hopes, and govern-
ing our conduct : Nor otherwiſe would religion
be an intelligible, or reaſonable ſervice: I may add
here, the opinion which makes moral qualities;
in God; totally different in kind; from moral dil
poſitions tri men, and other inferior intelligent
agents, is altogether unintelligible. We have no
conceptions of different kinds of goodneſs; or
juſtice, or véracity; tho' our ideas of a difference;
in degree, between theſe qualities, are clear and
diſtinct. Accordingly; nothing more corr mor
than to ſpeak of goodrieſs, and juſtice, and faitli-
fulneſs, as qualities-- more or leſs excellent and
perfect, in proportion to the manner, and degreez
of their exerciſe. But we nějer ſeverally diſtin-
guiſh theſe qualities into kinds, attributing one
kind of goodneſs, or juſtice; or veracity; to theſe
Beings; and 'nother to thoſer. Nor indeed is.
there any foundation in truth for ſuch a diftinc-
tion. They are properties; in their naturė,..in
variably one and the ſame, whatever ſubjects they
are applied to, whether finite or infinité, God or
man. And it would be groſsly abſurd to rank
them feverally into forts, as truly ſo as if we
< Thould divide -roundneſs, or ſquareneſs into diffe-
rent
OF THE DEITY
*7
}
.
i
rent kinds of roundneſs or ſquareneſs. We pro-
perly diſtinguiſh theſe figures into more perfect of
Zefs perfect, and we have diſtinct ideas of ſuch a
difference : But of different kinds of roundneſs or
Jquareneſs, we have no idea at all? And thus to
diſtinguiſh them is a felf-evident abfurdity. The
ſame is true of goodineſs, and all other moral
qualities. They are invariably one and the fame
thing in kind, whatever beings they are applied
to. They are incapable of a diviſion into diferent
kinds. We have not the leaſt conception of ſuch
à difference; tho we clearly underſtand what iš
meant, when they ăre diſtinguiſhed as to their
degrees of perfection, and modes of exerciſe. Så :
that to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice, and the like;
to God; and to fảy, at the ſame time, that theſe
qualities, as applied to him, mean ſomething
wholly different in kinå from what they mean,
when attributed to inferior moral agents; is to
talk in the dark, uſing words without any ideas:
The tendercy of which muſt be to destroy all
real knowledge of the moral character of the Su-
preme Creator, and conſequently all religion ;
for if we have no ideas of the morál åttributes of
God, we can have no foundation on which to
build any rational religion, but inuít live as
Ħithout God in the world.
It appears, then, upon the wholë, that the
goodneſs of God; is the ſame thing with goodneſs
in all other intelligent moral beings; allowing
önly a due difference in degree and proportion. So
that if we remove from our ideas; even of a good
man,
1
18
THÈ BENEVOLENCE
man; all frailties ärid defects, and add to it bound-
leſs perfection in mode and degreë, we ſhall entertain
juſt thoughts of the Divine Benevolence; and need
not fear being led into a miſtaken notion of this
moſt glorious attribute of the Supreme Being.
But it may be worth while to be ſtill more
particular, and critical, in the application of the
general idea of goodneſs to God, and in going over
its ſeveral parts as thus applied.
A natural diſpoſition then in the Deity, moving
him to the communication of happineſs,” is the
firſt ingredient in the "notion of guiódneſs as at-
tributed to him. When I ſpeak of gxoodneſs as a
natural diſpoſition in the Deity, I would be un-
derſtood to mean à certain ſtate of mind, call i
inclination, propenſion, diſpoſition, or whatever
elſe may be thought more proper, analogous to
what is fignified by a benevolent diſpoſition in men,
or aiiy other created moral agents. Such a dif-
poſition we find within ourſelves. 'Tis natural
to us, one of the principles implanted in our
original framė; and what we all partake of, ini a
leſs or greater degree. And ſome principle an-
fwerable hereto; I ſuppoſe inherent in the nature
of the Supreme Being, and neceſſary in hiin, in
the famé ſenſe that intelligence is a natural and
neceſſary perfection : Inſomuch that we ſhould as
truly wrong him, to conceive of him without à
benevolent, as without an intelligent principle :
Only, the principle of benevolence in God, like
that of intelligence, ought always to be conſi
dered as infinitely perfect, both as to its mode o
exiſtence,
1
OF THE : DEITY
19
exiſtence, and manner and degree of operation :
Nor fhould we allow ourſelves to think of this
diſpoſition in the Deity, without removing out of
our minds thoſe weakneſſes and imperfections,
which attend the like diſpoſitions in ourſelves.
In order whereto, and to help us in forining
the moſt juſt and honorable thoughts of benevo-
lence, as a diſpoſition in God, it may be proper to
obſerve, that the two grand principles, in human
nature, ſelf-love and benevolence, the former det
termining us to private, the latter to públic, gond,
are accompanied, each of them, with particular
appetites and paſſions, ſeverally adapted to pro-
mote the more effectual proſecution of theſe
ends, as occaſion may require : Nor ſhould
we have been ſo well qualified to purſue ei-
ther our own good, or the good of others, had
it not been for the implantation of theſe ap-
petites and paſſions, which are filled to haften
our exertments, and give them an additional
force, anſwerable to the ſtate and circumſtances,
we aurſelves, or others, may be in. Self-love
is a general, calm, diſpaſſionate principle; and
would not, in a variety of caſes, (eſpeciaļly con-
Gidering the flow progreſs we make in know-
ledge, and the weakneſs of it at beſt, have
been fufficient, fingly and alone, to put us up-
on ſeeking, or ſhunnįng, with requiſite fpeed
and vigor, the things neceſſary to our own
preſervation: , And therefore the author of our
beings has kindly and wiſely, provided againſt
this defect, by the implantation of particular
appetites
20
THE BENEVOLENCE
appetites and propenſions, attended with une
eaſineſs proper'to rouſe our attention, and calli
us forth to action. The ſame may be fáid of the
general common principle of Benevolence: "Tis
calm and difpaffionạte: And tho' a 'Atrong and
noble principle, yeſ, as planted in fuch imper-
fect beings as we are, Inight provę inſufficient.
to put us upon thoſe exertions, for the good
of others," which their circumſtances, in this
preſent ſtate, would render neceffary: The
God of Nature has therefore given us parti-
cular affections, apt to be excited upon pro-
per occaſions, and make us active in vfing
our endeavours to contribute our part towards.
the priduction of ſocial happineſs. Thus, the
kelpleſs ſtate of children, requiring the conſtant
care and patience of others, in miniftring to
their wants, a ſtrong affection is planted in the
hearts of parents, diſpoſing their both to do,
and bear, almoſt any thing for their advantage
Nor without this ŠTOR GEE is it conceivable,
how they ſhould fo often deny themfëlves, and
go through ſo much toil and labour, for the
fake of their offspring : which yet their cir-
cumſtances make abfolutely neceſſary. In like
manner, the dangers mankind are liable to, and
the difficulties, forrows, and diſtreſſes, they
meet with, ſo often call for the ſudden, vigo-
rous exertment of ſome kind hand, that pity is
an affection God has fixed in our nature : And
to this it is owing, that we are ſo readily mov-
ed to activity, in prs:portion to the diſtreſs of
the object preſented to our view. Now,
A
OF THE 24
Τ .
.
DEITYNuw, when we attribute benevolence to God,
we muſt cautiouſly diſtinguiſh between the ge-
neral principle itſelf; and thoſe particular affe&tions
which accompany. it in us men, and are attend-
ed with uneaſineſs, tho' wiſely ſuited to the im
perfection of our preſent ſtate. They are eaſily
and evidently difinguiſhable from each other
And, 'tis probable, there are orders of created
beings, in whom they are in fact diſtinguiſhed
the perfection of whoſe powers and ſtate are ſuch,
as that they have no need of theſe additional
excitements. Much more may this be ſuppoſed
to be the caſe, with reſpect to the infinitely
perfect cauſe of all exiſtence. 'Tis common, it
is true, in ſpeaking of the Deity, to aſcribe to
him theſe paſſions and affections. Inſtances to
this purpoſe are frequent, even in the ſacred
writings themſelves. But ſuch attributions are
to be underſtood in a looſe and figurative ſenſe
only. And we ſhould always take care to ſepa-
gate from benevolence, when attributed to God,
all the modes of it that are ſuited only to imper-
Kect beings, in an imperfect ſtate ; as is the caſe
with reſpect to us men. But as to the principle
itſelf, cinſidered without theſe affections, arguing
weakneſs, and uneaſineſs, in the ſubjects of
them, and heightened beyond all conceivable
bounds, in mode and degree, I ſee not but it
may, int ſtrict and proper fenfe, be attributed
to the Deity; as containing nothing in it buc
what is worthy of him, and conſiſtent with his
character as an abſolutely amiable and perfect
being
It
THE BENEVOLENCE
It is the opinion, I am well aware, of fomo
great and learned men, that benevolence, as 4
diſpoſition, inclination, or propenſion, ought not
to be aſcribed to the Deity. They allow in-
deed that benevolence, as a diſpoſition, is planted
în man; but ſay, that the general principle itſelf,
together with the particular affections belonging
to it, are deſigned only as auxiliaries in ſupport
of reaſon, which needed fuch help, in creatures
fo weak and imperfect as we are : But that, in
God, whoſe underſtanding is infinite, and who
perfectly fees all poſſible connections of ideas,
and fitneſſes and unfitneſſes of actions ariſing
therefrom, there can be no need of ſuch an ad-
ditional aid. And conſequently, that we ought
to conceive of him as giving exiſtence, and
happineſs, to his creatures folely from the fit-
neſs and reaſonableneſs, of the thing as an ob-
ject of intelligence : And that it would reflect
diſhonour on him, to ſuppoſe hiin in the leaſt
excited hereto from any natural ſtate of mind,
call it temper, inclination, diſpoſition, or by
any other name, ſignifying the like idea.
The anſwer whereto is, that the particular:
propenſions, belonging to benevolence in us,
were undoubtedly planted in human nature (as
has been obſerved) in conſideration of the im-
perfection of our preſent ſtate and powers : But
that this is, by no means, the truth of the caſe,
with reſpect to the general principle itſelf; which
ſeems to have been a matter of ſuch neceffity,
as that, if it had not been planted in uur nae"
ture,
Ô È THE DEIT Y.
23
ture, our reaſon, tho' ever ſo perfect, would
have been inſufficient to put us upon exerting
ourſelves in purſuit of Social happineſs : Nor
indeed could we have reaſonably done it. And
the famie, perhaps, upon examination, will be
found to be the real truth, with reſpect to the
Deity likewiſe : Which, that we may clearly
conceive of, let it be obſerved,
It is neceſſary, with reſpect to all beings
whatſoever, that they have fume conſtitution or
niture; which nature muſt be previouſly ſup-
paſed, and, in ſome meaſure, known, or it will
bé impoffible to determine whether they are
capable of action, or not: Or, if they are;
what would be reaſonable and 'fit action in
thens. As for example-It is by knowing the
conftitution of man, that he is formed with a
capacity to receive pleaſựre ; with a ſtate of
mind inclining him to purſue its both for his own
private good, and the good of others ; with
the powers of intelligence and volition, qualify-
ing him to diſcern what will conduce to theſe
ends, and to will the exertion of his endeavours
for the accompliſhment of them : I ſay, it
is from our thus knowing the conſtitution of
man, that we underſtand what is fit and reaa
fonable conduct in him Was he differently
cinſtituted, what is now reaſonable and fit,
might not be fo: On the contrary, it might,
as to him, be unreaſonable, and unfit
.
Had man been forned with the powers of
intelligence and volition, but without any ca-
pacity
ز
24
THE BENEVOLENCE
pacity in his nature for the enjoyment of hap:
pineſs
, or any ſtate of mind naturally inclining
him to purſue it, as å valuable erid, either
with reſpect to himſelf; or others, of what uſe
would intelligence or volition have been to him
Moſt certainly, upon this ſuppoſition, he could
never have been excited to ačtion; either with
reference to himſelf; or others : Neither would
there have been, as to him; any reaſonable
heſs or fitneſs in action cf any kind.
Or if, in addition to the principles of intel-
ligence and volition; he had had planted in his
nature, a capacity for the perception of 'kapa
pineſs, and priváte affeEtion; inclining him to
ſeek his own intereſt, as an últimate end; hé
would, in this caſe, have been excited to ac-
tion ; but then, his actions would have wholly
centred in himſelf: Nor could he have put forth
his endeavours, in purſuit of ſocial happineſs,
otherwiſe than as he might perceive 'a tendency,
in ſuch purſuit, to promote his own. This
would have been his governing end, and eve-
fy thing would have appeared (yes, and res
élly would have been, as to him) reaſonablez-
or unreaſonable ; fit, or unfit, as it itoca con-
nected with this end; and had a tendency in
its nature to forward, or obitruct it.
But if, together with the powers of inteili,
gence and volition, we ſuppoſe ſocial as well
as private affection, to have been implanted in
him, diſpoſing him to purſue the happineſs of
others, as well as his own, a proper foundation
iş
}
1
OF THE DEITY,
$
25
is now laid in his nature for benevolent actions.
He is as truly conſtituted for the pirſuit of
social as private goodi And it is now eaſy to un-
derſtand the meaning of fitneſs, when predicated
of benevolent actions and how it is eternally rea-
Jonable, from the fitneſs of the thing itſelf, for a
being ſo conſtituted to ſeek the welfare of others,
as well as his own : Nor is this language readily
intelligible, upon any other fuppofition.
And this reaſoning extends to all created be-
ings whatſoever ; and I ſee not but it equally
takes place with refpect to the Supreine Being
himſelf. We muſt ſuppoſe hiin exiſting with
tome conſtitution or other, which conſtitution,
as to him, being ſelf-exiſtent, muſt be looked up-
ön as neceſſary, in the ſame ſenſe that we call his
exiſtence itſelf neceffary. And what conſtitu-
tion can be inagined more worthy of the Deity,
or conſentaneous to all the ideas we have of per
fection, than that which ſuppolės him to exiſt,
not only with the powers of intelligence and voli-
tion, heightened in degree of perfection beyond
äll bounds; but with the principles alſo of jelfu
love, and benevolenče, heightened in like rnánner)
diſpoſing him to ſeek his own, and the happineſs
of others? Upon the previous ſuppoſition of ſuch
a conſtitution of nature, the conduct of the Deity,
in creating the world, and giving being and
happineſs to lo many creatures, is intelligible :
Otherwiſe, not very eaſily to be accounted for.
It can indeed be ſcarce conceived, if the Su-
preme Being exiſted without any natural ſtate of
mind,
26
THE BËNE VOLÉNCÉ
mind inclining him to the communication of
happineſs, how he could have communicated it;
or judged it reaſonable to do ſo:
It will probably be ſaid here, the communi-
čation of happineſs is, in itſelf, a fity reaſonable
thing : And the Deity, if ſuppoſed to be an in-
finitely reaſonable being, muſt have ſeen a fitneſs
and reaſonableneſs in it, and accordingly have
willed it: For, tọ à perfeetly reaſonable being;
there cannot be a more ſuitable or eífectual mo-
tive to action, than the reaſonableneſs of the acti-
on itfelf:
The reply is, Ít is readily acknowledged, thật
to a reaſonable being, the reaſonableneſs of an ac-
tion is a fufficient excitement to it, and the on-
ly one that is ſo : But then I add, that no rea -
ſonable being can be fuppoſed to exiſt merely
with the principles of reaſon, without any other
ingredient in his nature. And if a conſtitution of
nature is previouſly ſuppoſed, no action can have
any reaſonableneſs in it, but in conſiſtency with
this ſuppoſed nature. To apply this particular-
ly to the Deity: If, when he is ſpoken of as a
reaſonable beings nothing more is meant than
his ſimply exiſting with the powers of intelligence
and volition, it does not appear how he could
have ſeen any acțion to be reaſonable, or choſen
it as fuch: Intelligence and volition, conſidered
fimply, and as abitracted from all perception of
happineſs, and connection with it,' in any view
whatſoever, are really worthleſs powers, and
can ſerve for no manner of uſe: And the caſe
would
1
OF THE DEITY.
27
.
1
1
would be the fame, ſhould we heighten them in
degree, even to infinity. The being, poſſeſſed of
them, could have no excitement to action, but
would eternally exiſt indifferent to every thing:
The Deity therefore muſt be ſuppoſed to exiſt
with ſentiments of happineſs, and a capacity for
it, in addition to the powers of intelligence and
volition, together with a natural ſtate of mind
inclining him to purſue it, either with reſpect to
himſelf, or others, or both : And according to the
idea we frame of his näture, in theſe reſpects, fo
muſt our ideas be of reaſonable action in him.
If we ſuppole him exiſting with a ſtate of mind
diſpoſing him to purſue happineſs, with reſpect
co others, as well as bimſelf, 'tis now eaſy to un-
derſtand the meaning of fitneſs of benevolent acti-
on in him ; and how it would be reaſonable, eter-
nally reafonable, from the fitneſs of the thing, for
him to communicate being and happineſs : But
if a principle of benevolence is not ſuppoſed to
have place in the Deity, if he is to be conceived
of as naturally deſtitute of all deſire of the håp-
pineſs of others, and as having no inclination to
purſue it as a valuable end, how could hé do
it? What exciting reaſon could he have to do
it ? 'Tis true, he might, from his all-compre-
henſive underſtanding, perfectly know all the
various ways in which creatures might be made,
and conſtituted happy : But the deſireof making
them happy, not being ſuppoſed natural to him,
this knowledge of his could have no tendency
to put him upon acting for the procurement of
· this
.
28
THE BENEVOLENCE
this end : Nor can it be ſuppoſed fit or reaſcha
able that it ſhould. For no conducts, in any bea
ing, is fit and reaſonable
, but what agrees with
his naturcl.ſtates and powers, not perverted. Sa
far as he ačts in, conſiſtency with his nature, he
acts as it is fit and reaſonable he ſhould act : Not:
otherwiſe, Reaſonableneſs, or fitneſs therefore, in
benevolençe, to a being who has no diſpoſition to
it in his nature, iş unintelligible and abſurd.
I ſhall only add, we can judge of the benevo-
lence of the Deity, only from the ideas we have
of benevolence in ourſelves; removing away all:
weakneſſes, and adding infinite degrees of per-
fection. And, in this way of judging, we are
directly led to conceive of this quality, as origi-
nating in lonie ſtate of mind, analogous to that we
çall benevolent in curſelves. With reſpect to
curſelves, 'tis found true, in fact and experiences,
that the ſpring of ſocial action is benevolence of tem-
për ; a diſpoſition natural to us tho' capable of
being ſtrengthened, and rendered ſtill more per:
fect. And if we have any idea at all of benevo-.
lence in the Deity, it is the jome'in kind. The only
difference is, that the diſpoſition in him is origi-
nally and abſolutely perfect, both' in mode, and
degree. To proceed; .
This difpofition in the Deity muſt be exerted
freely. Otherwiſe, it will be a mechanical prin-
ciple, rat a morel one; which would deltroy our
itiea of it as a commendable quality. Nor is there
any inconliftency in faying, that this diſpoſition
neceferily inheres in the Divine mind as a naturali
principle,
!
29
OF THE DEITY.
principle, and yet that it is capable of being
exerted freely. For thus it is, in fact, with re-
fpect to ourſelves, Benevolence is a diſpoſition
planted in our nature, and exifs neceſſarily there.
What I mean is, we poſſeſs, this turn of mind,
diſpoſition, or inclination, independently of our
qwn choice; and yet, our exertions, in acts of
beneficence, ſpring from our wills, which are
determined freely, and not impelled by force.
We feel it to be in our power, notwithſtanding
the propenſion in our nature, inclining us to be-
nevolence, either to will, or not wilt, theſe or
thoſe beneficent acts. And accordingly, we
neither eſteem ourſelves, or others, virtuous or
praiſe worthy, otherwiſe than as our or their ofa
fices of kindneſs proceed from free choice.
There are, it is true, ſome particular propen-
ſijons, in our nature, which have the appearance
of being mechanicak. Not only the inclinations
themſelves, but the exertments in conſequence
of them, ſeem to be, in à degree, neceſſary, as not
reſulting from any proper act of the will. Such
is the STORGEE, or natural affection of parents to-
wards their offspring. And ſuch is the affection
of pity, which is a more univerſal propenſion, and
common indeed, in a leſs or greater degree, to
all mankind. Theſe propenfions ſeem to be of
the mechanical kind, operating neceſſarily, and not
from choice : At leaſt, this appears to be the caſe,
in ſome inſtances, and with reſpect to ſome
perſons. And if, inſtead of truſting the well-
being of helpleſs children, and perſons in immi-
1
nent
A
30: THE BENEVOLENCE
1
nent diſtreſs, to the general, cool principle of
benevolence, in ſuch weak, imperfect creatures
as we are; the Deity has planted this propelling
force in our conſtitution, for the good of the
world, which could not otherwiſe be ſo effectu-
ally provided for, it is no more than might be
expected from his wiſdom and goodneſs. But
then, as parental kindneſs, and pitiable exertions,
upon the view of miſerable objects, are thus, in
a meaſure, mechanical, we ſcarce allow the namę.
of virtuous to them: To be ſure, we never call
them virtuous, only as there was room for choice,
and in proportion as they ſprang from the free
determination of the mind. Nay, even with re-
fpect to the general principle of benevolence it-
ſelf, there is no virtue in it, conſidered fimply
as a natural affection, nor in any
of its exertions,
otherwiſe than as they are choſen asts : And the
more they are ſo, the higher do we riſe in our
opinion of theim as truly excellent and virtuous.
And the 'ſame reaſoning: extends with equal
force to the Deity. He is morally good, and we
speak of him as ſuch, becauſe his exertions for
the benefit of others are choſen ačts ;' tho', at the
ſame time, they originate in a natural principle
of benevolence. Such a principle neceſſarily
inheres in him, i. e. independently of his own
choice : And yet, his benevolent exertions, in all
inſtances, and kinds, are perfectly voluntary, and
fo intirely depend on his will, as that they could
not have been, if he had not freely willed that
they ſhould be. And 'tis this that gives us the
idea
1
OF THE DEITY.
.
gt.
idea of benevolence in God as a moral charaēter.
If he was neceſſarily urged on to the beſtowment
of being and happineſs, from the benevolent ſtate
of mind that is natural to him, there would be
no value, morally ſpeaking; in his communicati-
ons of goodneſs : But as this diſpoſition, though
neceſſarily inhering in his nature, is yet freely
exerted, he is juſtiy looked upon as a moral
agent in the good he difpenſes, and therefore
worthy of the higheſt love and gratitude. Nor
is it at all more difficult to conceive how benevo-
lence in the Deity ſhould be a neceſſary difpofiti-
on, and yet a moral perfection, than it is to con-
ceive how intelligence or volition ili hiin ſhould be
in one ſenſe neceſſary, and in another nioral. The
Deity neceſſarily exiſts à being endowed with the
principles of intelligence and volition; and yet, he
freely exerts theſe principles : Nor otherwiſe
would they be motal ones. The ſame may be
faid of his benevolence: He neceſſarily exiſts with
this ftate of mind; and yet, he truly wills
the communication of good; in all inſtances
whatſoever. And tliis conſtitutes benevolence
in him a moral character.
This diſpoſition muſt be exerted alſo with
á nobly benevolent intention, 'not with a fe-
Cret, hidden view to make thoſe miſerable, and
with inhanced aggravation, who are the ob-
jects of that which has the appearance of com.
municated goodneſs. Some there are, who,
though they call the Deity benevclent,yet, repre-
fent him as making ſome of his creatures, and
beſtowing
1
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
beſtowing upon them riches of goodneſs with a
expreſs deſign, that they ſhould miſuſe them, and
by this means give occaſion for the infliction of
his wrath upon them, and in an inhanced
meaſure, and this forever. Yea; there are thoſe;
who make the infinitely benevclent Ged the
grand and only efficient, 'not only in the beſtow-
ment of good, but even in the abuſe of it; and
that he has fo laid his plan; and connected á
chain of cauſes, as that this abuſe ſhall invio:
Jably be brought into event, and on purpoſe
that its final reſult ſhould be the everlaſting
damnation of a great number of the creatures
his hands have formed. Some late writers
will not diſown; that this is a juſt repreſenta-
tion of their publiſhed ſentiments. What their
idea of' benevolence is, I will not pretend to
fay; but this I will ſay; that it eſſentially dif:
fers from that moral quality, which goes by the
name of benevolence among inen; and it moſt cera
tainly would, in any created intelligent moralagerit
be deemed, not merely malevolence, but male-
volence in the higheſt degree. And to attri-
bute fuch benevolence to the all-perfect Deity,
would be to make hiin, not conſtructively and
by diftant conſequencë, but directly and in
explicit terms, a more malevolent being than
even the evil one has ever been repreſented
to be. For he is only a teinpter to wicked-
neſs ; but, according to this ſcheme, the in-
. finitely good God is its efficient, its only pro-
per. Fauſe, and in order to produce eternal ini:
ſery
t
Ô È THE DEITY.
33
Téry as its effect. Far be it from reaſonable
creatures to harbour in their breaſts ſuch dir-
honorable conceptions of the only good God!
If he is poffeſfed of that moral quality we call
benevolence; he muſt; if we can form any idea
of what benevolence mieans, in all the inanifefta-
tions of it to his creatures; intend their good; with-
out any ſecret reference to the contrary ;- in-
fomuch, that if they chuſe that to their hurt;
which was truly deſigned for their good, they
thern elves; (and not the God that inade them;
ánd has been kind and good to them,) are
thargeable with tlie guilt and folly of theif
miſconduct:
Finally, tliis diſpoſition in the Deity muſt
likewiſe be exerted - under the dire&tion of in-
telligence, and in conſiſtency' with fit conduct I
fay under the direktion of intelligence, becauſe
otherwiſe it would be that blind forr of bene-
volence which is really of no worth, morally
ſpeaking. And I add, in confijtency with fit-
neſs of conduct, becauſe there is certainly ſuch
thing as unfitneſss . as well as fitneſs of con-
duck, in the production of happineſs. And
the latter muſt be regarded by an infinitely
wiſe and intelligent being: Nur otherwiſe
would he act reaſonably, whatever benevulence
he might diſcover in his exertions.
Some may be ready to think, that the will
of the Supreme Being is the only meaſure of
fitneſs, in the cominunication of good; that
what he wills is for that reafun ft, and there is
E
a.
no
34
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
no need of any other to make it ſo. But this
is a great miſtake. There is, beyond all doubt, a
certain fitneſs and unfitneſs of conduct, in order to
the production of good, antecedently to, and
independently of, all will whatſoever, not ex-
cepting even the will of God himſelf. Love and
hatred, juſtice and injuſtice, truth and falſehood,
hypocriſy and ſincerity, gratitude and ingratitude,
áre, in their natores, ſeparate from all chcice;
fitted to the contrasy purpoſes of ſocial good, and
ſocial evil : Nor is it poflible for any will, whe-
ther in heaven or earth, to alter their natures, or
that fitneſs
, there is reſpectively in them to pro-
mite theie ends. This may be more readily
underſtucd, perhaps, in an inſtance of fime other
kind. Circles and ſquares are fitted, each of
them, from their very nature, tu ſerve different
purpoſes: Infi.much that it would be prepoiter-
uus and abſurd to make uſe of a circle to an-
ſwer the purpoſes, which are peculiarly fitted
to the nature of a ſquiare, and vice verſa : Nor
could any will whatſoever make an alteration
in the cafe. All'intelligent beings capable
of kn wing the reſpective uſes of theſe
figures, muſt know that they are fitted
anfwer diferent purpoſes; for which reaſon,
they could not will, without the ſuppoſition of
abſurdity, the employment of a circle for that
tiſe to which the nature of a ſquare only is peculit
arly fisted. And the fame is equally true, with
reſpect to thoſe qualities we call mcral and ima
moral. The inaking a number of creatures with
inoleuilent
to
OF THE "DEITY: 35
Matevolent affe£tion, branching itſelf into the fëm
veral modifications of hatred, bitterneſs, wrath,
malice, and the like, is a meth d of conduct un-
fit in itſelf t.) promote their common- happineſs":
Nor could it be conſtituted a fit method to at-
tain this end, by any will whatſoever, not the
will of the Supreme Sovereign himſelf. For
wrath, malice, and hatred, are, in their natures,
abſolutely unfit to promote ſocial good. And
this is as ſelf evidently true, as that three and
three are unfit to inake ſeven; and would be fi,
whether ſuch creatures were brought into ac-
tual exiſtence, or not; and muſt have been ſeen
to be ſo by an eternal being, comprehending
all the poſſible ways, wherein creatures might
be made to exiſt : · And, to ſuch a being there-
fre, it muſt have appeared unreaſonable and
unfit to make creatures, with foch a contti:
tution, in order to ſuch an end : And he inuſt,
accordingly, if wiſe, have refuſed to do it. In
like manner, falſehood, deceit, injuſtice, ingrati-
tude, and the like, are, independerrtly of all will,
unfit in their ‘nature to produce ſocial happineſs,
and inuſt have been perceived to be fo, by a
being infinitely intelligent :: Upon which ac-
count, he could not be ſuppoſed, without pal-
pable abfurdity, t) make creatures, in rder to
their mutual and comin in good, with natural
difpofitions urging them on to thoſe unfirnelles of
a ition, with reference to this end.
add, neither can it be ſuppoſed, that the Deity
quldbehimſelf unjuſt deceitful, and the like,inor-
der
And I may
36
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
der to promote the corrimcn good of his creatures
any more than that he hould bring them into
exiſtence with diſpoſitions to be ſo. For itijuf?
tice, falſebocdi deceit, and the whole train of
acts we call immoral, are, in their naturę, abſo-
lutely the ſame, whether we attribute them to
God, or inan; and ſo far from being fit to
promote the good of the creation, that they
would, if repeated without reſtraint, certainly
bring about its ruin. And this muſt be known to
a perfectly intelligent agent : For which reaſon,
He would never in the methods of injuſtice, deceit,
and falſehood, exert his benevolent difpofition in
order to effect the happineſs of his creatures. It
whold be unreaſonable in him to do ſo, and
refled dishonout on him, as not regarding the
eternal fitneſs, and propriety of action, in profe-
curing his deſigns.
It may perhaps be thought reproachful to the
Deity to have it faid, that he cannot, by a ſo-
vereign act of his will, conſtitute good, evil
and evil, good. And it might, with as much
reaſon, be looked upon as diſhonorable to his
infinite underſtanding, that it cannot make
truth, falſehood; and falſehood, truth; For theſe
are equally impoſſible. There is ſuch a thing
as eternal and immutable truth; And it reflects.
kopor, not diſhonor, on the infinite underſtand
ing, that it will, and mufi, perceive this to be
tràth. . And it is, in like manner, etérrelly and
immutably true, that ſome actions are fit, and
cthers unfit, in order to ſuch an end: And 15
IS
OF THE DEITY.
isran' honor, not a diſhon“r, to an infinitely per.
fect will, that it is limited in its deferinina-
tions, by the fitneſs of action. It is not a real
leſſening to the true liberty of the will of God,
that he is thus confined, as it were, by the fit-
neſſes of action, any: mare than it is to his powergia
that it does not extent to impoſibilities.
And as there is fitneſs and unfitneſs of conduct,
in order to the production ofg.ind, fo is there
likewiſe a greater fitneſs in one method of con-
duct than another, in order to promote this end.
We know. this to be the truth with reſpect
to ourſelves. And indeed one great uſe of our
reason is to help us in caſes of this nature, by
pointing out that particular method of conduct,
among a variety that may open to our view,
which is best fitted to anſwer the end we have
in purſuit. And the ſaine is as true, with re.
ſpect to the Supreme Being. There are; ante-
cedently to all will and choice, ſome ways of
acting better accommodated to anſwer. The de-
lign of common happineſs than others. And as he
muſt be ſuppoſed to have, in his all-compre-
henſive inind, an intire view of all the ways,where-
in it is poſible happineſs ſhould be proinoted, he
maſtif he afts wiſely,pitch upon that, which is the
fittoft, and beſt adepted, upon the whole, and all
circumstances conſidered, to anſwer this deſign.
And the reaſon here is the ſame, as in the caſe
of fit and unfit. methods of conduct. As the for
mer is felected becauſe fit, for the ſame reaſon,
in general, that muſt be choſen which is the
fortest, and will beít anſwer the end. So
THE BENEVOLENCE
So that happineſs, as communicated from
the Deitr, is, by no means, the effect of mere
inclination, blindly end boundlefily exerted : Neither-
is it the reſult of unaccountable will and pleaſure ;
pleaſure not excited by the eternal fitneſs and rea-
Jonableneſs of action : No; but the exertions of:
the Deity, in benevolent acts, are all directed
and governed by an unerring principle of wiſ-
dom and intelligence: Inſomuch that he cannot
do a benevolent action, but within the limitati-
ons (if I rnay fo fpeak) of 'reaſonable and fit
conduct. It is not poſſible (I mean morally fo,
in the ſenſe in which we ſay, it is in poſſible
for God to lie: It is not poſſible,) for him to
difpenſe happineſs in any other way. It would
argue fome defect in wiſdom, or ſome depravity.
in diſpoſition, which is inconſiſtent with the
fuppoſition of his being infinitely perfect and
intelligent. No happineſs therefore ought to.
be expected from the Deity, but what may re-
fult from wife and fit conduct : But I may pro-
perly adui, all the happineſs that can, in this
way, be communicated, may fairly and reaſon-.
ably be looked for,
The ſum of what has been ſaid concerning,
henevolence, as attributed to the Deity, is, that it
ſuppoſes a natural ſtate of. mind, inclining him
to the communication of good ;? a ſtate of mind
anaingous to kind affečtion in rus inen, only as kind
affection in us is attended with frailty, in him it.
iş abſolutely perfect, both as to mode of exif-
tence, and manner of exerciſe : That, as he
exiſts
OF THE DEITY.
3.0
exiſts a free agent, in the higheſt and mčít glo-
rious ſenſe, he is not mechanically, or neceſſarily,
urged on, from this natural diſpoſition, to the
conniñunication of good; but acts herein vot
luntarily, and of choice : And, in fine, that, as he
is an infinitely wiſe and intelligent, as well as free;
agent, his exertions, in order to the production
of good, are never unfit, never unreaſonable, but
always fit,reaſonable, and abſolutely and perfečtly ſo.
So that, in one word, benevelence in the Deity figo
nifies preciſely the ſame thing with “ a diſpolia
tion freely ti'cominunicate all the good that is
conſiſtent with wiſe and fit conduct :” For, fu-
premely perfect benev lence :f nature, being;
in him, c«njoined with an all-címprehending
underſtanding, and unerring wiſdom, he muſt
know all the ways of producing happineſs, and
the greateſt fun of it that can be wiſely produced:
And this therefore is the happineſs that may rea-
fonably be expected fliould be produced by him;
that is to ſay, all the happineſs to the whole, and
every part of the creation, than can be, not in
reſpect of omnipotence, conſidered as a natural
power, but in the way of fit and reaſonable con-
duct. What this comprehends, is not diitinaly
and fully known by creatures, formed with ſuch
narrow capacities as our's: For which reaſon, in
all perplexed caſes (as to us there muſt néceſſarily
be inany) it becomes us to be modeſt and cautious ;
ever taking care that we do not raſhly determine
tbat to be inconſiſtent (with goodneſs, wiſely and
reaſonably diſpenſed,' which, in reality, may be
a
THE BENEVOLENCÊ
.
a gord argument in proof of it; and would
appear to
to us to be lo; had we ane intire view
of the whole cafés in all its connections and
dependencies;
I ſhould have how proceeded to look into
the conſtitutiön of nåture, and inquire whether we
are not therefrom led into this conception of
the benevolence of the Deity : But I ſhall firſt
dilate ä little upon a few deductions, which ſeemn
too important to be wholly paſſed over in
Glence:
In the firſt place, it is obvious to deduce;
from the explariation that has been given of be-
nevolencé as a moral quality, a.juſt conception
of the thing meant, when the Deity is ſpoken of
as infinitely good. There may have been, in the
minds of time, indiſtifict if not wrongs appre-
henſions of what is ſignified by this adjunct.
1 he application of it; if applied intelligibiy, is
ñot intended to ſuggeſt, that benevolence in-
finite in degree is diſplayed in every commo-
fication of goodneſs from the Deity. For it is
évident to common ſenſe, that theſe commu;
nications are various ; fonte mariteſt goodneſs
in one degree, others in another; and foon;
with inconceivable diverſity: Neither is it to
be ſuppoſed; becauſe God is infinitely beneve-
tent, triat he has in fact inade an infinite max
nifeſtation of his goodneſs. This, perhaps, is
impoſſible ; and for this veiy good reaſons
becauſe infinity in benevolence knows no tounds,
but there is itill room for more, and higher
diſplays
OF THE DEITY: gi
:
ز
diſplays of it. The trưe idea thereforė of the
epichet, infinite; when applied to God as benevoj
kent; is, as I apprehend; plainly this ; that he
has within himſelf a boundleſs ſource of be-
nevolence; that he is ſo benevolent, in his na-
ture, 'as that he may go on eternally making
diſcoveries of his goodneſs, or, in other words;
that this perfection of his is, ſtrictly ſpeaking,
inexhauſtable, not capable of being exerted to
à ne plus. It is obſervable, we do not ſay that
God is almighty, omnipotent, becauſe he has
exerted his power to the utmoſt ; for. he may
go on exerting it without end; otherwiſe, he
could not be ſaid to be infinite in power: In
the ſame ſenſe God is infinitely benevolent. But
then, as he is infinitely incelligent and wife,
as well as benevolent, he never manifeſts, either
his power, or goodneſs, but under the guid-
ance of intelligent wiſdom. Whatever this
directs to, he wills ſhall be ; and whatever he
wills ſhall be; is actually brought into event.
This points out the reaſon, and the true one,
why God; though infinitely powerful and bene-
volent in his nature, is yet under a limitation
as to the diſplay of thoſe attributes. He inania
feits no more power; or goodneſs, than unerring
wiſdom directs to : Nor could it be otherwiſe,
unleſs thefe perfectionis were to be manifeſted
blindly, and at random ; the abſurdity of which
is to glaring to be ſuppoſed. This leads
To another obvious and important deduc-
tion, which is, that no communications of
F E
goodneſs
42
THE BENEVOLENCE
!
goodneſs may reaſonably be looked for froři
the Deity, though infinitely benevolent, but
fuch as fall in with what wiſdom directs to, as
fit and proper. We may pleaſe ourſelves, and
too often do, with vain expectations, taking riſe
from falſe ideas we have in our minds of infis
nite benevolence, as exiſting in the breaſt of
God. But it ought to be remembered, and
ſeriouſly conſidered, that the ſame Deity who is
infinitely benevolent, is alſo infinitely intelli-
gent, wiſe, juſt, and holy, and cannot there-
fore, unleſs with grofs abſurdity, be ſuppoſed to
inanifeſt his benevolence in any acts of good
neſs, but in harmony with thoſe perfections, all
which are equally effential ingredients in his
nature. Many men are apt to imagine, that
God is all goodneſs; and that they may hope
for every thing from this attribute of his:
without ſo much as once thinking how unrea-
fonable, and unfit it would be in an infinitely
intelligent, wiſe, and juſt being to make diſplays
of his benevolence in any inſtances, or degrees;
but urider the guidance of wiſdom, and in per-
fect conſiſtency with rectitude. What are out
ſentiments of thoſe good-natured, kindly affec-
tioned iren; who diſpenſe their bounties, not
with underſtanding and wiſdom, but in a ran-
dom way, without thought or conſideration ?
We pity their weakneſs, and wiſh they had more
diſcretion. And ſhall we attribute that to the
all-perfect Deity, which we eſteem a diſgrace
even in man! Benevolence, though infinite in
its
OF THE DEITY:
43
i
ſuch advantages as they may be favored with,
its fource, or principle, muſt yet be limited, re-
ftrained, and governed in all its manifeſtations,
by wiſdom, equity, and juſtice; or it may, in
the final reſult of its operations, do more hurt,
than good; to be ſure, it will not otherwiſe
bring honor to the being poffeffed of it, if, at the
ſame time; he is ſuppoſed to be endowed with
intelligence and wiſdom, in a ſufficient degree,
for his direction in the diſplays of his goodneſs.
Another deduction ſtill, highly intereſting
and important, is, that intelligent moral beings
have no juſt ground, from the infinite bene-
volence of God, to expect the enjoyment of that
happineſs they are made capable of, but in con
ſequence of, or connection with, a wiſe and
virtuous uſe of their implanted powers, under
The reaſon is, becauſe God, though he has with-
in himſelf an infinite, never-failing ſpring of
benevolence, yet will not ſuffer it to flow from
him, in any inſtance or degree, but under the
guidance of wiſdom that cannot err. And
can it be thought wiſe or fit, that moral agents,
whether they are virtuous or vicious, without
regard had to their reſpective oppoſite charac-
ters, ſhould be indiſcriminately treated as ſui-
table objects of the Divine benevolence? How
would ſuch a conduct comport with the de-
fign of heaven in the beſtawment of intellec-
tual and moral powers ? To what purpoſe
were they given, if it was a matter of indiffe-
rency, in relation to their being fit objects of
their
1
1
THE. BENEVOLENCE
their Maker's kind notice, how they en:ployed
them? And how could even theſe moral be-
ings themſelves, entertain in their minds, be-
coming conceptions of the wifdom and recti-
tude of the Supreme Creator and Ruler, upon
this plan of manifeſting his benevolence ?
Beſides, it may be juſtly queſtioned; whether
moral agents can be made truly happy, but by
a wife and right uſe of their implanted facul-
ties. The goodneſs of God, under the direc-
tion of wiſdom, has given them various fa-
culties, and placed them within reach of ob..
jects fitted to yield them the enjoyment, they.
were formed capable of; but if they will ſeek
for happineſs in other ways, and not in this,
which å good God has purpoſely adapted to
give it to them, how ſhould they be the ſub-
jects of it ?. It cannot be. There muſt be an,
agreement between faculties and objects, and
a due application alſo of theſe faculties to their
reſpectivé objects, or there can be no proper ſa-
tisfaction. It is indeed iimpoſſible there ſhould
be, according to the preſent conſtituted way of
enjoyment. The nature therefore of intellec
tual' moral beings muſt be changed into foine.
other, or they muſt, in a meaſure, act up to
their character as pofieffing this nature ; other-
wiſe, they can no more enjoy the happineſs,
pr:per to this kind of beings, than righteouſ-
neſs can have fellow.ſhip with vnrighteouſneſs,
or light have communion with darkneſs,
OF THE DEIT Y.
1
I have hitherto confidered this deduction on
ly in general, as it reſpects all intelligent mo-
sal beings, in all worlds. But it may, with
pertinency be applied more particularly to us
men, ąs containing that in it which is well
worthy of our moſt ſerious attention." We are
formed by the God that made us, not only with
animal, but intellectual and moral faculties ;
in which view of our conſtitution, we have
nothing to expect, in a way of favorable no-
tiče, from the Deity, though infinitely bene-
volent, but what is ſuited to the faculties, he
has given us, and to be enjoyed only in con-
pection with, or in conſequence of, a due and
proper uſe of them. Was benevolence in God
a propenfity in his nature, of the inſtinctive
kind, blindly urging him on to a gratification
of it, it might be done at any rate : But, far
from this, it is a diſpoſition inhering in an all-
perfect mind, and that is inſeparably. conjoined
with infinite knowledge and wiſdom, and can
therefore be never manifeſted ad extra but with
reaſon, and in conſiſtenoy with rectitude. And
as we men are formed, not only with bodily
appetites, but with intellectual and moral pow-
ers alſo, ſhall it be imagined, that ſuch a be-
ing as God is, Ihould make us the objects of
his benevolence, in any way but that, which is
fuitably adapted to the nature he has given us ?
And if; inſtead of cultivating our fuperior
powers, and exerciſing them in a due manner
ýpon their proper objects, we neglect their
improvement,
1
46
THE BENEVOLENCE
improvement, or, what is much worſe, pervert
them to the purpoſes of vice and folly, mak-
ing uſe of them, not to anſwer the poble ends
for which they were given us, but to invent and
contrive ways for the more enlarged gratificatie
on of our inferior inclinations : I ſay, if, inſtead
of acting up to our rank as men, we thus de-
grade ourſelves into the claſs of brutes, what
may we real nably expect, but evil, rather
than gond, from even the infinitely good God
It is owing to ſuch characters as our's, that the
creation has been marred and in ſo great a meae.
fure filled with diſorder and confuſion. And
ſhall that Being, who is the righteous King and
Judge, as well as Creat or of men, make this
kind of perfins the ſpecial objects of his bene-
volent noticeIs it not far more reaſonable,
and fit, and this, even, from a princple of be-
nevolence, that he ſhould recompenſe to them
according to the evil of their dcings ? As
one expreſſes it much better than I can do
♡ Becauſe God is ſupremely good, therefore
will he puniſh the obſtinately vicious; ſince to
be indulgent to them, would be to encourage
what muſt produce the greateſt miſery to the
moral world. As certainly as God deſires the
welfare of his rational creatures, that is, as cer-
tainly as he is goud, he will puniſh obftinate
tranſgreſſors, and maintain the hon: r of his
laws and government, nor ſuffer thoſe to be
trampled upon with impunity,: ntil impiety,eru-
elty,injuſtice, intemperance,anů brutal debauche
ry,
OF THE DË I TY.
fý, become univerſal. No ſtate of things can
appear ſo evil, as this appears, to an infinitelya
wife and good Parent and Governor. He will
therefore certainly take the methods proper to
prevent it. And as puniſhing the perverſe and
obſtinately wicked, according to their demerits,
and with circumſtances of terror, ſufficient to
reſtrain others from like practices, is a proper
and neceſſary means to this end, obſtinate fin-
ners muſt expect ſuch puniſhinents ; and t) pro-
miſe themſelves impunity becauſe God is good;
is to hope that God will ceaſe to be good to the
Whole, and to the beſt deſerving, that he nay
be
fatally indulgent to thoſe who are not objects
of his mercy." He goes ons in the following
pathetic but infinitely reaſonable exhortatory
advice, “ Give up then, preſumptuous ſinner,
all thy deceitful hopes. As God hath made thee
rational and free, thu canit not be happy,
but by piecy and go dneſs, by an imitation of
the Deity, and in his preſence and favor. As
leng as thou continueſt wicked, thy temper in-
capacitates thee for the Divine favor, and for
real happineſs. God cannot ſhew mercy to ſuch
as thee, without letting in a deluge of wicked-
neſs, the greateſt evil conceivable, on his moral
creation. And to puniſh ſuch is neceſſary tothe
welfare of the pious and virtuous, and of all
who inay become holy, Repent therefore im.
mediately, and become qualified for mercy;
otherwiſe, the unchangeable goodneſs of the
Divine nature, inſtead of promiſing thee im-
punity;
8
THE BENEVOLENCE
punity, will inſure thy deſtruction ; which will
be the more dreadful, as proceeding from infi-
nite goodneſs, and evidencing thy guilt to be
ſo malignant, that even infinite clemency could
not extend to thee."
ft may with propriet y be added here, that the
Supremë Being himſelf, as he is an intelligent
' moral agent in abſolute perfection; is infinitely
happy from the delight he takes in always chuſings
willing, and doing, and with perfect freedom, that
which isright and fit: Andas he has madeusmen
with intellectual and moral powers; after the fimilia
tude of his own; though in a low degree, he has
planted a capacity in our nature of being hap-
py with the like kind of happineſs, he himſelf
exiſts in the enjoyment of But then it ſhould
be remembered, we muſt be the ſubjects of this
happineſs in the ſame way that he is, that isa
by a wiſe and fit uſe of our rational and meral
faculties; or, in other words, by ſo governing
cur elections, volitions, and conſequent acions,
as that they may be conformed, as nearly as inay
be, to the eternal rule of right: This is the
way, and the only one, in which we can at:
tain to the happineſs that is ſuited to the na-
ture of ſuch beings as we are. Benignity of
heart, probity of mind, conſcious integrity
ſelf-approbation, and a good hope of the appro-
bation of our Maker, evidenced to us by an
habitual, ſteady courſe of freely chuſing and
practiſing the things that are comely, just, pure;
lovely, and of good report;' are the
fource
3
true
OF THE "S
49
DEITY:
Cource of the moral happineſs we are formed
capable of. We may,in conſéquence of the im-
perfection that is natural to us as creatures, from
free choice, act below our character as men ;
walking in impiety, fenfuality, unrighteouſneſs;
deceit, malignity, and the like vicious ways.:
But, inſtead of being adapted to yield us seal;
ſolid ſatisfaction, they powerfully tend to make
us miſerable ; and miſery will be the reſult of
ſuch a walk; according to the conſtitution of
nature; unleſs Cuisiteracted by the Deity; which,
to expects, would be the vaineſt thing in the
World: Yea; it ſhould ſeen impoſible, that
a rațional moral Being ſhould be happy, whoſe
choice; and conſequent practiceſ are a contra-
diction to his reaſon, and a violation of the rule
of right: . It would be a ſubverſion of that or
der, which is the eſtabliſhment of a good God;
that the happineſs proper to an intelligent na-
ture might, in this way, be attained to
would be happy, as beings of our rank in the
ſcale of exiſtence, we muſt act up to our charac-
ter, and not as if we had no underítanding, and
there were no difference between us and the
beaſts that perih. Tie bleſſed God himſelf, as
ani intelligent moral being; is morally happy, and
con plcrely to: But how? By invariably chur-
jag, and acting, ſo as to approve himſelf per-
fectly holy, juſt, faithful, and good; both in
the internal diſpoſition of his mind, and in all
the manifeſtations he makes of himſelf to his
creatures. We are made capable of the like
kind
G
THE BENEVOLENCË
kind of happineſs : But how fhall we becomie
the percipients of it ? By an imitation of God
in benignity of temper and conduct, in purity;
in righteoufneſs; in charity, and in every thing
that is amiable, and worthy of eſteem: In
this way God is happy and in this way we
may be happy alſo, but in to other. if, ac-
cording to our meaſure, we are perfect as God
is perfect, holy as he is holy, juſt and true as
he is, we may depend we ſhall never fail of
being as happy; with God-like happineſs, as
our nature will allow of: In this way, he has
judged it wife and fit to make us happy'; not
has he given us the leaſt reaſon to expect he
will do it in any other, or to imagine it pof-
fible he thould, in conſiſtency with wiſduin
and rectitude.
:
PART 11
OF THE DEITY
PART. IF
SOWE
Proving, that the Deity.is:fupremely and perfeEily
benevolent, in the ſenſe that goodneſs, as a moraš
quality, has been explained to belong to him
OMÉ have endeavoured to prove, by. meta-
phyſical reaſoning, that the Deity, is perfect-
ky and infinitely benevolent; · And I ſee not, I
muſt confeſs, tant that may be offered in this
way of reaf)ning which is ſtrictly concluſive:
We may be as füre, from the exerciſe of that
power of diſcernment we are naturally endowed
with, of the perfect benevolence of the Divine
Being, as of his exiſtence, or of any of the per-
fections we connect with it. The ſame intel-
lectual power that aftures, us there muſt be an
eternal felf-exiſteni Deity, aſſures us alſo; and
in the fame way, that he muſt be.poflefed, not
of this or that perfection, only, but of every
perfection: For; having always exiſted with-
out any exterior cauſe to limit his 'exiſtence, ei-
ther as to its nature, manner, or properties,
there is; and muſt be, preciſely the ſame rea-
fón to fupple. hion, the ſubject of all perfecti-
ons, as' of any.one in particular: Benevolence,
therefore, fuprenely perfect. benevolence, is
as juſtly applicable to him as immenſity, {pi-
rituality,': omnipotence, or any of the Divine.
attrib:ites, t) which the epithet, natural is
for nonly applied, to diſtinguish them from
thoſe
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
ܪ
thoſe that are called moral Not that thefę.
terms of diſtinction import any difference be
tween the perfections of God, in regard of their
neceffary, co-eternal exiſtence in the Divine
Nature: They are rather intended to point
out a difference in their kind' cnly: The na-
tural perfections of God are of one Jert; his
moral ones of another; The former are, in their
very nature; different from the latter ; ypon
which accodht they have been, as they realcn-
ably might be, diftinguiſhed by different ada
joncts: But they are all
, without diſcrimination;
naturät properties: The Deity eternally exified
in poſſeſſion of them and they are eſſential
to his very being, and equally fo; Inſomuch
that he cannot be ſuppoſed to exiſt with the
exception of one, any more than all f theri: TË
may with as much reaſon and truth be affirmi
ed of him, that he is, by nature holy, juſt; and
good, as that he is almighty; immenſe, om-
nipotent; and that he always was ſo, and al-
ways will be ſo, and that it is impoſible he
ſhould exif otherwiſe.
But; as this method of arguing may ap-
pear to fome abftrufe, and not fo well adapted
to carry
conviction with it; I ſhall leave it, and
go on to another that is more eaſy and familiar,
and, it may be, at the ſame time, more
-ſtrikingly concluſive.
By the things that are made, the eternal pow-
er and Godhead of the Creater may be, and
are; clearly perceived by duly attentive minds
and
i
1
OF THE DEITY
and the fame may be faid, and with equal
truth, of his all-perfect benevolence. Do we
attribute almighty power to God; from the ef-
fects of power he has produced ? And fall we
not conceive of him as perfectly benevolent;
from the effects of his goodneſs we every where
fee in our world, and in all parts of the uni
verſe we have any knowledge of ?" How nung
berlets' are the creatures he haş forined with
capacities. of enjoyment ! How amazingly van
rious are theſe capacities ! What abrındant pro-
viſion has he made for filling them with the
good that is ſuited to their reſpective natures ?
And how in menſe is the quantum of good en-
joyed by them all, confidered in one collective
view. ! Every creature we caſt our eyes upon,
diſcovering pleaſure in its exiſtence, from the
good it is made capable of enjoying, and actu-
ally does enjoy; is, at once, both an inſtance,
and proof, of the Divine benevolence: How
inconceivably is this evidence increaſed in
its Atrength, when ſuch multitudes of beings in
the creation of God, (the number of which no
man can county) have been, through a long
fucceffion of ages, and ſtill are, the percipi-
ents of his bjuntiful.care, and munificent good-
neſs! Can any one, in the fuber exerciſe of his
ụnderitanding, queſtion, whether this is a clear
proof of benevolence in the Deity ? Especial-
ly, when there has been the diſplay of ſuch
aſtoniſhing ſkill and contrivance in the formati-
on of faculties, and the making and placing
objects
f
34 THE BENEVOLENCX
objects within the reach of them, ſo admirably
ſuited to yield them delight, and in ways and
degrees beyond conception various: Who can
help, in this view of things, breaking forth ia
fime ſuch words of admiration as thoſe of pious
David, « Thou, Lord, art good, and dift
good ! Thy tender mercies, are over all the
works of thy hands !??
But, as iç is a matter of no ſmall importance,
that we entertain in our minds lively concepti-
ons of the benevolence of the Deity, I ſhall be
particular, and diſtinct. in mentioning ſome of
thoſe effects of it, which muſt, unleſs we are
greatly faulty in the uſe of our intellectual
powers, oblige us to conſeſs, that God is good,
ſupremely and perfectly goods
Only, before I enter upon this argument, and
in order to clear the way to it, I deſire the follow-
ing remarks may be previouſly well conſidered:
The first is, That this ſyſtem of our's is not
to be conſidered fingly, and by itſelf, when we
are arguing about the benevolence of the Deity
And for this plain reaſon, becauſe there are
other ſyſtems of beings, t? whom God has made
manifeſtations of his goodneſs. If we may de-
perd upon the bible, as, a. facred book, there
are certainly other beings, capable of happi-
neſs, and in act:jal po Teflion of it, beſides thoſe
which dwell on this earth:
Nay, more than
this, their capacities for. happineſs are much
larger, than the capacities of any of the beings
belonging to this ſyfiem; and they actually ean
jog
1
6 F THE DEITY: Š
in
joy it, in a much higher degree: But if any
ſhould eſteem this
eſteem this a conſideration of little
weight; I would add, there are ſo many glubes
viſible to our fight; equally capable; with this
globe we live upon, of crntaining inhabitants,
furniſhed with ſentiments of happineſs, and
means of obtaining it, that it is, without all
dabt, the truth of fact, that they are filled
with ſuch inhabitants. With reſpect to our
earth, we certainly know, that it has relation
to life and enjoyment: It is indeed fo conſtituted
as to ſupport in being and happineſs innumera-
ble animated creatures of various kinds, Arid
why ſhould the other globes; revolving in the
ſame heavens; be looked upon as meer dead mat-
ter? We have infinitely greater reaſon, from
what we ſee to be fatt, in our own globe, to fupe
poſe that they all are fo formed as to be ſub-
ſervient to the preſervation of numberlefs perceia
éping beings, to the honor of the Creator's mu-
nificence. The all-powerful, and infinitely wiſe,
God could as eaſily have modelled the other
globes to the purpoſes of maintaining life, and
fendering it comfortable, and happy; to milli-
ons of creatures, as he has done this : And the
thought that he has actually ſo rade and contrived
the other globes, in the heavens, is perfectly
analogous to what we behold of his goodneſs,
with reſpect to our own fyltem : It is indeed
the inoſt obvious and natural inference, front
the confideration of hiin as a benevolent, as well
as powerful and wiſe Being:
1
$6
THE BENEVOLENCE
Move
If now we are riàturally led; from iknown ap-
pearances, to argue; that there are other beings
belides thoſe on this globe.; and that this globe;
frith all thë anjinate and intelligent beings dwel*
ling on it, is only cne of the fyſtems that
bias been produced by the infinitely benevolent
cauſe of all things; the conſequence is plain;
viz. that this world of our's ought to be con-
fidered as only a part of ſoine great vhole, about
which the benevolezice of the Deity is employed:
And in this view.of the caſe, the füll diſcovery of
benevolenceis not to be looked for; in our fyf-
tem fingly and ſeparately, but in the all collec-
tively. conſidered: And it would be injurious
to the Deity; to complain of him fot want of
goodrieſs, meerly becauſe the inanifeítation of
it'to our particular ſyſtem, conſidered-ſingly, and
apari from the ref, is not fo great as we may ima-
gine it could be: It is no'argoment that the
Deity is not abſolutely good, becauſe the greateſt
communicable good is not to be found in our world:
Was our world indeed the only one in which
there. werę perceiving beings, and we knew
this to be fait, the argument might then carry
wéight with it: Fr, if the Deity was abſolute
ly and perfectly good, our world, in this caſe;
would be the proof of it, confidered fimply in
it +feif: But if there are other frítems, they muſt
be taken care of, and provided for, as well as
Qur's': Andno more happineſs is required forout
fyftem, even from infinitely perfect benev. lence;
ulrart is proper for a part of ſome great whole.
Anct
OF THE DEIT Ý.
S*
And it is enough to illuſtrate the real bem
ing of an abſolutely perfeit principle of bene!
Volence, if the diſplays of it towards our world,
one of the conſtituent parts of this whole, are
clearly diſcerned to contain as much good as car.
reaſonably be fuppoſed to fall to our ſhare.
A ſecond remark though not very foreign from
the former, is, that; in arguing concerning the
Divine Benevolence, we ought not to conſider ics
diſplays as they affect individual beings only, but as
they relate to the particular ſyſtem of which they
are parts. For; as all particular ſyſtems are, pro-
bably, related to ſome univerſal cire, and, pro-
perly ſpeaking, are ſo many parts conſtituting
this great whole, deſigned; by the Deity, for the
fill manifeſtation of his infinitely perfiet bene-
volence : In like manner; the ſeveral beings;
in any particular ſyſtem, are the parts conſtitui-
ting that a particular whole : And the Divine
benevolence therefore, is to be eſtimated from
its amount to this wholė, and not its conſtitu-
ent parts, ſeparately conſidered: Theſe, it is
true, mulč partake of good; but then, the good
looked for ought to be no other than is pro-
per to parts, bearing fuch a relation to fuch
a whole.
To be fure, thie orily fair way of judging of
the Divine benevolence, with reſpect to our
world, is to conſider it, not as diſplayed to
Separatë individuals, buſ to the whole ſyſtein, and
to theſe as its conſtit:en't parts: For it is trus
in fact, that the Deity originally made, and
H
conitantly
+
38. THÉ BENEVOLENCE
conſtantly governs, all the various kinds of bez
ings, on this earth, and all the individuals in
each of theſe kinds, with a relative view: He,
conſiders them not fimply as ſo many kinds of
beings, much leſs as ſo many ſingle individuals;
but as parts conſtituting ſuch a particular. sy-
ten in the univerſe: We therefore find, cliat
the individuals in every kind are wiſely and va-
riquſly related to each other; and not only fog
but the kinds themſelves are, in like manner;
related to one another, fo as to be parts pro-
perly fitted to fill up this syſtems and conſti-
tute it a good particular while: And, accord-
ingly, our ideas of the Creator, as benevolent;
are to be fetched from the diſcoveries he has
made of goodneſs to the fyftem made up of
theſe parts, and not to any of the parts as dem
tached from the ſyſtem to which they are re-
lated. And, in this way of judging of the in-
finitely benevolent Deity, no more good is to
be expected from him, with reſpect to any ſpe
cies of beings; or any individuals in theſe ſpe-
cies, than is reaſonably conſiſtent with the good
of the whole ſyſtem of which they are parts.
And, if there appears to be the manifeſtation
of so much goudneſs, towards them as might:
reaſonably be expected for ſuch peris, bearing
fich a relation to a good whole, it is all the gocda
neſs that can be expected from benevolence,
though infinite, if, at the ſame time, it is wife
and reaſonable,
It
OF THE DEITY.
$9
It will probably be ſaid here, infinitė benevo-
Jence is not to be reſtrained, by confitutions and
fülems, from doing all the gi'od it poſſibly can
to every individual capable ſubject of happi-
nefs ; and that the naoji good ought to be pru.
duced, though it ſhould be by Jingle unrelated
acts of benevolence. To which the anſwer is,
that infinite þenevolence will d., all the good it can':
But for any t) ſuppoſe, that it may do nare
good, upon the whole, by fingle unconnected diſ-
plays, than by relative ones, is only talking in
the dark. For who can ſo much as gueſs at the
reſult of fich unconnestad diſplays of g odneſs?
It may be, in the nature of things, for aught
any man living, knows to the contrary, impoft
fible that ſo much happineſs ſhould be cominu-
nicated in this way, as may be communicated
in the way of acting that, in fact, takes place.
And as the Deity has thought fit to diſplay his :-
goodneſs, not by unrelated acts, but ſuch as are
conneEted with fome general plan, conſtitutiin, or
ſyſtem, this ought to be preſumed to be the fittejt
and mit eiftual method for the communica-
tion of the greateſt good, unleſs it can be fully
: and clearly proved, that it is not : And till then,
if we would judge fairly and impartially of the
Divine Benevolence, we muſt form our ſenti-
ments of it, not from its diſplay to individuals
,
Jingly, conſidered, but to the Syſtems of which they
are parts ; looking for no more g::od to the in-
dividuals than is conſiſtent with the place they
bear in the conſticution of the whole.
Another
po
THE BENEVOLENCE
Ancther remark is, That we muſt not judge
of the benevolence of the Deity meerly from the
axtual good we ſee produced, but ſhould like-
wife take into conſideration the tendency of
thole general laws confirmably to which it is
produced. The reaſon is, becauſe the tendency
.
of theſe laws may be obſtructed, and lefs good ac-
tually take place, than they are naturally fitted to
produce: In which caſe, it is no argument of
want of goodneſs in the Deity that no more good
was c mi unicated; though it may be of folly
in the creatures.
This I look upon to be the moſt important
remark: deferving previous confideration, in
the preſent debate ; and ſhall therefore be par-
ticular in explaining myſelf upon it. In or.
der whereto let it be obſerved,
It is, in fact, true, that the Deity does not.
communicate either being or happineſs to his
creatures, at leaſt on this earth, by an immedi-
ate act of power, but by. concurring with an
eſtablijed çıúrſe of nature.. What I mean is, he
brings creatures into exiſtence, and makes them
happy, by the intervention of ſecond cauſes, opé-
rating, under his direction and influence, in 2.
ftated, reguler, uniform manner. They are all
brought into being, and preſerved in being,
in this way: And not only fo,' but all the
happineſs they attain to the enjoyment. of, is,
- in like manner, dependent on general. laws,
whcie opcration the Deity does not coun..
ters
OF THE DEITY. &
ter-at, but concurs with, in order to pro-
duce this effect. This is univerſally true of all
the animate, kinds on the earth : And it is
And it is par-
ticularly. true of men, its only inhabitants that
are endowed with rational and moral powers,
They are brought into exiſtence according to
a ſettled yiliforme courſe of nature : And: their
ex-
iſtence, which, at firſt, is nothing more than
a variegated: capacity.. for happineſs, is upheld by
Bated laws; and it is by ſtated. laws ſtill that
this capacity, agreeably to its diverſe nature,
-is opened and expanded, and gradually
, fitted
for the happineſs that is proper to it."
There are all unqueſtionable fails.. And
the conſequence from them is another fact as
indiſputable, viz. that lefs good may be produ-
çed by the operation of theſe cauſes, than they.na-
turally tend to produce, and actually. would pro-
duce, if they were not obſtructed in theit ope-
ration. To illuſtrate my meaning by an exam-
ple. It is by the intervention of ourſelves, in a
great meaſure, that we come to the enjoyment
of that happineſs
. Our implanted capacities tend ta.
The good we are originally formed for is put
very, much into our own power.; inſomuch. that
we are more or lefs. happy; in confequenoe of
our own conduct. This is one of the general
laws, according to which the Deity operates in
the communication of good. And it ſo uni-
verſally takes place, that he does not ſo much
as. uphold us in being; excluſively of our own
!
care
.:
THE BENEVOLENCE
care in providing, and uſing, that faſtenancea
without which, according to another law of
nature, we cannot be preſerved in life. Nei-
ther does he open and enlarge our implanted
faculties, or fill them with the good that is
ſuited to thein, but with the concurrence of
eurſelves : inſomuch that the increaſe, eſpeci-
ally of our mental and moral capacities, is fo far
put into our own power, that it is, in a great
meaſure, dependent on ourſelves, whethey they
attain to any conſiderable degrees either of per-
fection, or happineſs. And it is true, in expe-
rience, that a great part of niankind do not
arrive to that extent, either of perfe&tion or bapa
pineſs, their original capacities would have allow-
ed of, and they might have attained to, had
- they more wiſely. fallen in with the tendency of
that general law, which makes their perfection
and happineſs ſo much dependent on themſelves.
They do not uſe their own powers, in order to
stheir own good, as they might do ; and fo conje
hort of that degree of good, this general law. ten-
ded to produce, and would actually have pro..
duced, had it not been their own fault. It is
therefore owing to themſelves, and not to the Dei-
ty, that they do not partake of good, in larger
meaſures : And it would be a wrong.to his
infinite benevolence to judge of it weerly from the
good they aktually enjoy; without taking into.
conſideration the tendency of this, among the
other general laws by which he operates in dif
playing his goodneſs.
F THE DEITY,
62
1
It will poſibly be ſaid here, infinite benevo
lence cannot be confined to general laws, in the
communication of good : Or if general laws
are expedient; it may seaſonably be expected,
that a perfectly benevolent being ſhould intera
pole, as occaſions may make it neceſſary, to
prevent that miſchief which might take places
If general laws were ſteadily and rigidly ada.
hered to.
As to the firſt part of this objection; thai
infinite benevolence is not to be relrained; in
its exertionswithin the limits of general laws;
it is more than we can pre:end to affirm; upon
any other foot than that of meer conjecture.
For notwithſtanding all that we can prove to
the contrary, the method of coinmunicating
good by general laws may be the fitteſt : And
the Deity, who is perfectly acquainted with all
the methods in which it is poſſible, that good
thould be communicated, might ſee it to be
the fitteft ; and, for that reaſon, ſelect it from
all others, as the only one in wlich he was de
terinined to minifeit his infinite bene vjolence. And
Indeed, we ourſelves, weak as we are, can dife
cern this to be the fiute;and left method we
are aðle to conceive of. For it is the alone
foundation of all our rational exertions, whether
of body or mind, ſeparate from which they
would be, in a inander, uſeleſs, as they could
not be direct:d to any end.' Did the Deity ob-
ſerve no rule,.120 order, no stated courſe, in his com-
munications, what ſhould we be able to inaks
ef
ba
THE BENË VÔLENCË
1
ز
'
of ſuch a method of conduct? What beauty of
harmony could we diſcover in it? What rules
could we forni from it to govern our own
purſuits ? Appearances that do not reſult from
eftabliſhed laws, operating in a ſtated, uniform way)
are abſolutely unintelligible. For being, by
ſuppoſition, ſingles feparate, independent effects;
nothing could be argued from themThey
could not be ranged in order, ſo as to ſerve any
valuable purpoſe ; but muſt be perceived by
every intelligent mind as a looſe, rude, unica Eied
heap of irregularity and confufion. Theſe ap-
pearances only; which take place in a uniforni
way, according to eſtabliſhed laws, are capable
of being reduced to a certain rule, and ſo as to
lay a proper foundation, either for ſcience or
foreſight: Nor do any cther feem to become the
widum of an infinitely intelligent agent.
Inconveniences, it is true, may ariſe frcin this
method of acting by general laws, in a pated
way. And, perhaps, it is impoſſible, in the
nature of things, that general laws ſhould be ſo
framed as abſolutely to prevent all irregulcrity:
But may nut the fame be faid, of any other
method of conduct that could be pitched upon,
with equal truth ? And for auglit we can ſay
to the contrary, there may be leſs dänger of
irregularities in this, than any other method
whatſoever ; at leaſt; of irregularities that can-
not be rectified in the final iſſue of things, lo far
as it can be done in conſiſtency with wiſdom and
rectitude:
The
i
I
Ô F THE DEITY:
$
65
1
The other branch of the objection is; that, if
general laws ſhould be thought expedient, it may
however be expected; that an infinitely benevolent
being would interpoſé, as occaſion required, to
prevent the niiſchief which would otherwiſe, take
place. In reply whereto; it inay be obſerved, tho'
inconveniences will probably ariſe; for the preſent,
when general laws are ſtatedly kept to; yet it may
be poſible, as has been jutt hinted, that theſe in-
conveniences may be remedied, ſo far as it can
be wiſely done, in the final reſult of their
Ope-
ration : And if ſo, there can be no abfolute
need that they ſhould; by interpoſitions; be pre-
vented for the preſent. But was this impoſſible,
who knows what would be the conſequence
of theſe deſired interpoſitions ? It is certain they
would entirely alter the preſent method of com-
municating good : And will any man take up-
on him to determine, that good upon the whole,
and not evil, would be the reſult of ſuch an
alteration ? Poſſibly this method of communi-
cating good by general laws, uniformly adhered
to, is, in the nature of things, a better adapted
one to produce the greateſt good, than the other
method by interpofitions continually repeated. It is
true, if by interpofitions no other effect would
follow than the preventivn of the miſchief they
are introduced for, they might well be deſired:
And I ſee not indeed but they might reaf na-
bly be expected from an infinitely benevolene
being. But it is certain; they would be fol-
lowed with o$her effects; and I may add, bad
I
onés
66
THE BÉNÉVOLENCE,
ones too, which might be more than a bas
lance for the good it is intended they ſhould
produce. As thus :—They would render all
foreſight abſolutely uncertain, and, in no mea-
ſure, to be depended on ; they would put a
final bat in the way of men's ctivity and in-
duſtry, in the uſe of their various powers, whe-
ther bodily, or mental; and, in ſhort, they
would totally deſtroy the whole buſiness of life,
which is carried on upon this fuppofition, that
fuch and ſuch actions will be followed with
fuch and f:ch confeqerences, in virtue if thoſe
eſtabliſked laws, which uniformly take place in the
wirld. No one indeed čan ſo much as conjece
ture what theſe interpofiticns would finally ifiue
in. If they did ſome good, they might poffi-
bly do more hurt. · And for aught we know,
they might, upin the whole; counter-act the
very end for which they were introduced : That
is to ſay, they might be the occaſion of an over-
balance of miſchief. And if ſo, the Deity,š
not interpofing, in the manner pleaded for, is an
inſtance of goodneſs, and not an argument in
proof of the want of it.
The great thing more particularly aimed at,
by theſe interpofitions, is, the prevention of mo-
ral evil; which has done ſo much hurt in the
world. And could the Deity, in this way, have
prevented the abuſe of moral powers, without
bringing on, at the ſame time, other conife-
quences, as truly fatal to the happineſs of mo-
ral agents, he would, no dcubts have done ito
And
4
:
OF THE DEITY.
or
And his not doing it ought to be looked upon
as a ſtrong preſumptive argument, that he could
not, without the following of theſe bad effects;
unleſs it can be clearly ſhown, that no ſuch ef-
fects would have followed thereup n. The en-
trance of wickedneſs into the world, it is readily
owned, has di ne vaſi miſchief : But will any an
undertake to prove, that leſs miſchief would have
'been done, if this had been prevented by the
interpoſitions, pleaded for ? Poſſibly, no interpon
,
fitions, b.it ſuch over-bearing ones as would have
deſtroyed moral agency, would have certainly and
abſolutely prevented moral evil: And the deſtruc-
tion of moral agency would, I will venture to
fay, have at once destroyed the true and only
foundation, on which the greateſt and most
valuable
: part of the happineſs, that is commu-
nicable froin the Deity, is built ; as any intela
ligent reader will eaſily perceive, by purſuing
the thought in his own mind; and as we máy.
bave occaſion largely to purſue it hereafter:
It appears then, upon the whole, that we
have no juſt reaſon for complaint, that the Dei-
in communicates good by general laws; whoſe
operation he does not counter-act; but con-
curs with; in a regular uniform, courſe. The
main queſtion therefore, in the preſent argu-
ment, is, whether thoſe laws are as good as it
might reaſonably be expected they ſhould be,
if eſtabliſhed by a perfeEtly benevolent being?
And this muſt be determined (the other previ-
qus remarks having had their due weight)-by
the
:
3
68
THE BENEVOLENCE
the tendency of the laws themſelves to the pro-
duction of good, as well as by the good that is
aktually
. produced by them. Theſe fhould be
ç nlidered'not fingly, but in one conjunct view.
The good actúally priduced ought to come
into conſideration, becauſe it cannot well be
1: pp:»ſed, that an infinitely benevolent God wuld
have eſtabliſhed any laws for the manifeſtation
of his go dneſs, unleſs he had foreſeen by his
žajinite preſcience that it w:vuld hereby have
bcen eventually and aétually diſplayed : It ſhould
feeni as though he would not have carrieci any
plan into executin, but what would have had
this effect. But then, the tendency of theſe laws
ought to be conſidered likewiſe, becauſe this
might manifeſt greater benevolence than the good
that is actually produced. The laws might be
well adapted in their nature, and tendency, to
effect more grid tħan is actually accompliſhed :
And that more giod is not produced may be
owing, not to any defect. in the laws, but to a miſs
zife of them by his creatures : for which they are
anſwerable, and not the Deity.
And this is particularly worthy of confiderati-
on, with reſpect to our world; which is not in
the ftate now, that God originally made it, but
ab. 'unding with evils,. introduced by ourſelves,
againſt the manifeſt tendency of thoſe laws which
he was pleaſed to eſtablish; in order to effect
its greater good, fo far as it could reaſonably and
wiſely be done. And that this end is not ac-
compliſhed, is wholly chargeable to that abuse
of
OF THE DEITY, бg
of our faculties, whereby we have perverted
the tendency of thoſe laws, which would others
wiſe have operated to its taking effect. It is
impoſſible therefore we ſhould judge fairly of
the Creator's benevolence, from a view only of
our world, under its preſent actual enjoyments ;
But if we would form right lentiments : f it, we
muſt conſider the tendency of the Divine ſcheme
of operation, and what the ſtate : f the world
would have been, if the rational and moral be-
ings in it had acted up to the laws of their 110-
ture, and given them full ſcope to operate for
the producti n of good. This will give us the
idea of good, in fime meaſure, anſwering the plan
of it, in the Divine mind. Every other view
of it, ſeparate from this, will be either partial,
or falſe, and fall ſhort of exhibiting to us the
true character of the Deity as benevolent.
The laſt remark, though not the leaſt im-
portant, is, that, in judging of the Divine be-
nevolence, we muſt carry our thoughts beyond
the preſent to ſome future ſtate of exiſtence, and
conſider them as conne&ted in the Divine plan of
operation for good. Was death the entire der
ſtruction of all the intelligent moral beings that
have exiſted, or will exiſt, on this eirth, it
would be dificult, I may ſay impofible, to en-
tertain the thought, that the Creator was be-
nevolent, in the ſenſe we are pleading for. And
one of the reaſuns, why ſome are to ready to
call in queſtion his abſolutely perfeEt go dneſs,
is their looking up.n the preſent ſtate, in an
independent
0
THE BENEVOLENCE
$ndependent view, and not as inſeparably conjoined
with ſome future one.
And no wonder they
are puzzled with difficulties, and find their ſelves
unable to reconcile actual appearances with the
idea of infinitę benevolence. For if it ſhould prove
the real truth of the caſe, that the preſent ſtate
cf things is nothing more than a part of the
Divine plan carried into execution, and a part
too that is related to another ſtate, that will ſuc-
ceed in due time, it cannot be but that preſents
appearances, conſidered independently of this
connection, ſhould be ſuch as are not to be aca
counted for. It is no other than might reaſon-
ably be expected. And the only way to remove
thein, and judge impartially of the Divine Be-
nevolence is to extend our thoughts to another
State of exiſtence, Connecting the preſent with
one hereafter to come, and conſidering both in
one conjunct view.
And poſſibly, there are no irregularities, in the
preſent ſtatę, but are ſo taken care of ,in ſome future
one, as that they will finally prove an illuſtration of
the Deity's benevolence. We are too ſhortfighted to
trace any irregularities in the preſent ſtate, through
all their connections, either bere er hereafter ;
and therefore cannot pretend to affirm, with any
degree of probability, that they may not finally
turn out a proof of benevolence, rather than an
objection againſt it: Nor is there the leaſt room
for diſpute, but that the evils now ſuffered may
hereafter be repaid by an over-balance of enjoya
ments. And, in this way, the goodneſs of Godia
notwithſtanding
Ô È THE DÉITY.
: notwithſtanding the preſent intervening dark ap-
pearances, may gloriouſly ſhine forth, in the
winding up of his ſcheme for the prüduction of
good.
And it is the rather proper, in arguing about
the Deity's benevolence, to take into conſideration
another ſtate of exiſtence, becauſe this is the
thought we are moſt obviouſly led to, even from
preſent appearances themſelves; which care in
their nature the evident marks, not of a compleated
plan of operation, but of one that is depen-
dent on ſomething ſtill to come to render it per-
féet. Though there is enough viſible, in the pre •
ſent ſtate, to give us an idea of the Supreme Being,
as proſecuting a ſcheme for good ; yet there are,
at the ſame time, plain diſcoveries that the
ſcheme is but begun, that what we now fee is
only a part of it carried into execution, and that
what is wanting to finish it; is to be locked for
in fome future ſtate of exiſtence. It is quite na-
tural, from what we knw if the preſent ſtate, to
look upon it as only introductory to another, and
preparatory for it. Preſent appearances are fitted
to give us this idea of it. They are ſuch as
well ſuit a probation-ſtate, one that is intended
to train us up for fuine future cne, that will take
place in due time. Whereas, if we conſider
theſe appearances, without any connection with
futurity, and as deſigned to exhibit an entire vietei
of the Divine plan, with reſpect to this world,
we ſhall needleſsly run ourſelves into perplexity,
and unavoidably think inore di unorably of the
Deity,
7%
THE BÉNËVOLEN C E
as we can
Deity, than we have any occaſion to do. Från
fo far as we are able to judge, preſent appears
onces, if they compleated the Icherreef God, are
ni:t ſo perfectly adjuſted as it might reaſona-
bly be thought they would, by ſuch a being
demonſtrate God to be. And;
without the ſuppoſition of a future ſtate,
perhaps it is impoſſible, in the nature of
things, thač fuch creatures as
we are, in
ſuch a world as this, ſhould be univerſally treated
by the Deity, at all times, and in all caſes, as,
it is eternally fit and juſt that we ſhould be.
And if this ihyuld be the truth, as I am cin-
fident no one can prove it is not, it may be
nécelery, in the nature of things; that the Divinė
fcheme, with reference to this fyftem, in order
t its being perfect, luuld extend t's another ſtate;
and nit be confined to this.
Having briefly mentioned theſe previous re-
marks, the way is now clear to the main point;
which is to make it evident, that the appear-
ances of goods in our world, are ſuch as fairly
lead us to conceive of the Supreme Creator as
abſolutely and perfectly benevolent. I do not mean,
that the preſent cetual amount of theſe appearances
is ſo much good as will anſwer to the idea of in-
finitely perfect. benevolence : But what I intend is;
that: they ariſe from ſuch laws; and are ſo circum-
fianced and related, as that, in this view of them
(as has been explained above) we may clearly
and fully argve, that the originál authcr of them
is. Supremely and infiniieły good.
I have
!
- 0 F THỂ D E 1 TY.
73
I have it not in my view, here, minutely to
conīder all the effects of benevolence apparent
in the conſtituțion, and government of this
world of ous. This would be beyond the
reach of my ability, and a needleſs labot. It
will be a fuficient enforcement of the preſent
ärgurnent, if ſo much is ſaid as to make it plain,
that all the good, ſuitable for jach a ſyſtem as
this, is apparently the tendency of nature, and
the Divine adininiftration ; and that it actually
prevails ſo far as this tendency is not perverted
by the creatures themſelves whom God has
made ; for which he is not anſwerable, as has
been hinted already, and will be iñore fully
Thown hereafter.
The way in which I ſhall endeavour to il-
liſtratë this imporcànt ſubject ſhall be, by gia
ving, in the firſt place; fome general touches on
the viſible frame of inanimate nature ; then by ta-
king ſome tranfient notice of the inferior créa-
turės made capable of happineſs ; and finally by
viewing niore critically and fully the intelligent
moral beings, in this world, towards whim the
Divine goodneſs has been diſplayed, in the
largest ineaſures.
We ſhall begin our illuſtration of the preſent
argument, with ſome general touches on the
viſible frame of inónimate naturė, and the pur-
poſes of goodneſs to which it is ſubſeivient. Not
that goodneſs is coinmunicable to inanimaié
mattër. Neither the ſun, nor moon, nur earth,
K
و
to
:-74
THE BÉNÉVOLENCE
to which they are related, are themſelves capat
ble recipients of good. The ſenſitive and intel-
ligent beings, in theſe globes, are the only ob-
jects of benevolence. But yet; the globes them-
ſelves may well be conſidered as illuſtrations of
this.noble quality, if it be found that they are
conſtituted fo as to be paſively inftrumental in
occaſiwning goed to nyinberleſs beings, formed
with capacities for enjoyment. And this is the
real truth.
An illuſtrious inſtance of it we have in the
fun, whoſe conſtituent parts, magnitude, and
ſituation in the heavens, are admirably accom-
modated to the deſign of conveying light and
beat, in the most ſuitable proportions, to this
eartb ; without which it would have been an
unfit habitation for any of thoſe cnimated, and
intelligent beings, who now exiſt happy on it.
And it is an additicnal diſplay of giodneſs, as
well as wiſdom, in the Creator, that he has, by
the earth's annual and daily revolutions, fo con-
veniently diſtributed theſe bleffings ; cauſing
the viciffitudes of day and night, feed time and
harveſt, ſummer and winter. It is true, all parts
of, the earth are not, by this means, equally
favoured with light and keat: Neither was it
poſible that they ſhould. But yet, the kind-
neſs of the Deity has adjufied this inconvenience,
as well as the nature of things would perrit.
For, on the one hand, he has guarded the earth
againſt the miſchiefs of froſt, in thoſe parts
where there is a defe Et of beat, by providing for
it
OF THE DEITY.
75
it'a covering of ſnow, that, inſtead of leffening,
improves its fertile capacity, which capacity he
has alſo wiſely adapted to ſuch producti'ns as
require a leſs degree of heat to bring them to
maturity ; hereby providing for the ſupport of
life, even in theſe places ; which he has likewiſe
taken care to render comfortable both to the ra-
tional, and meerly animal ſubjects of it: Tu the
former, by a growth of wood, in vaft plenty, fur-
niſhing them with fuel to keep them warm; and
to the latter, by a natural increaſe of furr upon
their ſkins, in thoſe feaſons when it is needed
as a defence againſt the ſeverities of the cold.
On the other hand, he has contrived refreſhing
breezes, where the earth and its inhabitants are
expoſed to the direEt rays of the fun; which
commonly increaſe as that afcends, whereby
the heat is ſo corrected, as that they are both
preſerved from ſuffering by its violence. Beſides
which, he has fitted the earth’s fertility, in theſe
parts, to this proportion of heat: infomuch that
its productions, in certain kinds, are abundant,
for the ſupply, both of animal and intelligent life,
And wherein could the Deity have made the ſun
more ſerviceable to our world ? It is not con-
ceivable, how he ſhould, in this reſpects have
given a more full and ample diſcovery of his
benevolence.
Our globe is another inſtance, manifeſting the
riches of the Divine goodneſs, as well as wif-
dom. For though it is, itſelf, incapable of good;
yet it is wonderfully adjuſted to occaſion good
1
to
76
THE BENEVOLENCE
to innuinerable creatures capable of it, by its
diſpoſition into ſeas, dry-land, and çir
, encom-
pafing it about, all accurately correſponding
with each other. Had the ſurface of this globe
teen all dry-land, none of thoſe animated kinds,
in their numberleſs individuals, could have had
exiſtence, whoſe proper element is water; and
who are fitted, by a ſuitable (rganizatiin of
parts, to live in it, exerting themſelves, and
moving about, with eaſe and pleaſure : And
confequently there would have been a lefs, ma-
nifeſtation of good, than there might have been,
becauſe a gręcter, by this method, is now ac-
tually fecn. Beſides, if there had been no ſease
there could have been no rains, without which
the dry-land muſt have been uſeleſs to the pure
poſes of vegetation ; and then animal life would
have wanted a ſupport, at leaſt, in the preſent
way.-Or, had the earth been univerſally cus
vered over with water, n ne of thoſe creatures,
on the other hand, could have had exiſtence,
whether rational or meerly animal, who are fitted,
by their make, for a dwelling on the dry-land :
Neither could there have been thoſe infinitely
various productions for neceſſity, fonvenience, and
delight, which are now ſo many evidences of the
Creater's bounty.--And it is beyond man to
imagine a better contrivance fur good, than the
air that furrounds our earth. It is this that
makes way for the tranſmiſſion of light, without
which the faculty of ſeeing, in all anin als, world
have been uſeleſs : It is this that provides for
the
OF THE DEITY.
, , ,
the eaſe and freedom of motion upon the earth
wich out which life itſelf had been beſtowed ta
little purpoſe : It is this that communicates
found, without which we could not have cons
veyed our thoughts to one another, by the lielp:
of ſpeech i not to ſay any thing of the pleaſure,
in various kinds, which reſults from the har-
mony there is between one found and another :
It is this that gives riſe to the wind, which
niixes and tempers the exhalations interſperſed
in the atmoſphere, corrects
, the heat in hotter
climates, and carries the clouds, from place to
place, to diſtill the rain that is needed : And;
in a word, it is this that preſerves life, by the
power of breathing, in all creatures, from the
highelt to the loweſt: And to this, it is alſo owa
ing that ſo many.ciales of creatures, by the help
of ſuitable organs, are able to wing their way .
through the regions above, aſcending to the
tops of mountains, and tall trees, where they find
both nouriſhment and ſhelter. The proper re-
flection from all which is, that the benevolent Den
ity. could not have better adapted inanimate na-
ture. fur the diffuſion of good. It is viſible
wherever we caſt our eyes. Neither carth, non
lea, nor air, are empty of living inhabitants ; but
they are all filled with them ; and proviſion, at
the ſame time, made both for their ſupport and
comfort,
The diſpoſition of material nature, I know, has
been objected to, and complaints made, becauſe
its parts were not bercer adjuſted. But the
more
18
THE BENEVOLENCE
more accurately theſe complaipts have been ex-
amined, the more groundleſs they have always
appeared. Is it complained, that there are too
wide ſeas ? It has been made evident, by the
beſt obſervations, that the proportion between
the ſea and dry-land could not have been ſettled
with greater exactneſs, for the ſupply of that
moiſturę which is neceſſary to render the earth
fruitful. Is it complained, that the water in the
fea is falt? This was a neceſſary quality to keep
it from putrefaction. And beſides, it loſes this
quality, before the exhalations from it fall in
rain, or, by being condenſed on the tr ps of
mountains, are formed into ſprings whether for
the ſervice of the earth it felf, or the creatures
that are on it. Is it complained, that the fur-
face of the earth is too unequa! Some ine-
quality was abſolutely requiſite in order to
guard againſt inundations from the sea. Nor is,
that inequality uſeleſs which nakes even the
higheſt mountains for theſe are the ſources of
ſprings, to the great benefit of all living crea-
tures : And, in their bowels, are contained
thoſe minerals and metals, which are fo advan-
tageous to mankind. In a word, there is nothing
in the order or diſpoſition of the parts of this
earth that can juſtly be complained of; as is
evident from this, that, if we do but make an
alteration in our thoughts, and purſue it in its
confequences, we ſhall foon fee our own folly.
There is not indeed any part of inanimate na-
Eure but what ſerves to fhew forth the Crea-
tor's
OF THE DEITY.
j
bor's goodneſs, by that variety of uſes it is ac
curately fitted to ſerve, Tome of which we are
acquainted with; though the intire number cf
them, the wifeſt philoſophers have not been yet
able to inveſtigate, and it may be, never will :
But
yet,
the more cloſely they view the con-
ftitution of the world, the more reaſon they con-
tinually find fur furprize at the riches of goods
neſs, as well as wiſdom, therein fo clearly ſhi-
ning forth.
We go on, in the next place, to take a
tranſient view of the animal world, in which I
include all the creatures, on this earth, endowe
ed with perception and life, mankind only except-
ed. And I thus diſtinguiſh them from man-
kind, calling them ani rial; not becauſe I fup-
poſe they exiſt without ſome ſuperior prineiple of
the ſame kind with the higheſt principle in men;
but becauſe, if they do poſleſs ſuch a princi-
ple, it is in so low a degree as to render it im
propër to rank then with intelligent, much more.
with moral beings, as men are.
But whether
they have minds, or not, they are capable ob-
jeets of goodneſs; and the Deity has accordingly
contrived, in the beſt manner, to make the dif
plays of it towards them.
One ſignal instance whereof is, his diſtributing
their animal life into fu many different forts. Here-
in the order of the material world is conſulted,
and one uniformide!ign of good evidently càrried
on. And, by this means alſo, the wiſeft and beſt
method has been taken for the fulleſt manifef-
tation
30
THE BÉNÉVOLENCË
tati' n of animal gord. For no one ſpecies of
animated beings could have fupplied the place
of various fpecies, ſo as to have made way for
an equally large diſcovery of benevolence. It is
only anong different kino's of ani als, conſti-
tuted variou;ly capable of happineſs; that all the
Happineſs meer anin:als itay be forned to enji v;
is to be liked for. This we find to be the
truth of fact. And it is by this method like:
wiſe, that chafins are prevented, and the creati: 'n
Filled with being and happineſs. Theſe inferior
kinds are fo many well adjuſted parts in the
chain of exiſtence: And, perhaps, this fyftem
could, in no other way, have been conſtituted fe
full andcoherent a whole.
Another inſtance illuſtrating the Deity's good-
nefs is; the care he has taken; notwithſtanding
this difpofition of animals into ſuch various kinds,
fo' to provide for them all, as that they are .je-
verally capable of attaining the happineſs that is
proper for them. It is accordingly true of thein
all, in all their various claſſes, that they havë,
organs' fitged to give them pleafing Senſations" ;
and their implanted inſtincts are wiſely adapted
to their reſpective natures, ſeverally deterini-
ning them to that which is ſuitable for their pres
ſervati ni and happineſs : Beſides which, they
are not inly end jwed with thë pưwer of propa-
gating their kind, but favoured with ſuch a con-
texiure of body, cr furniſhed with ſuch infirit-
ments of defence, with a natural fagacity to uſe
them, as are admirably fitted tu guard theni
againſt
Ô & THE DEITY.
81
againſt the injariés, to which they are more
pe-
culiarly expoſed. And, in conſequence of
this proviſion, the général tendercy of their nature
is to good: And they actually enjoy a great
over-balance of it. So far as we are acquainted
with them, inſtead of going on heavily with life,
they give plain indications that it is comfortable
and pleaſant to them. And, from what we know of
Our own animal frame, ſo analogous, in many re-
ſpecti, to their's, we liave ſufficient reaſon to
believe, that life, under the circúiriſtancés in which
they hold it;is'accompanied with many gratifica-
țions : rendering it infinitely preferable to non-ex-
ijtenice.
Nor does it argue any want of goodneſs in
the Deity, that they are not all equally happỹ,
or that they none of them enjoy that degree of
Happineſs which is common to other beings
of a füpériər order. It is enough to the purpoſe
of the preſent argument; if ſo much happineſs is
allotted to thenijas is proper t\creatures in their
ſtatė, and filling up füch a place in the ſcale of
beings. This is all that can be reaſonably look-
'ed for, in order to a perfect diſplay of the Crea-
tor's benevolence.
.
Neither are the inconveniences they may natu-
Fally be liable to; "an obječtion of any weight.
For as their ſtructure' is material, (at leaſt ſo far
as it is fo) they åre; from their very make, ſub-
jected to the fame general laws which take place
Iñi thematerial world. And i ċ mighe be an im_
poſibility that they ſhould be ſo framed as not to
I
bc
82
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
1
1
ܪ
be liable to inconveniences, And unavoidablit
inconveniences are not to be mentioned; as in-
confiftencies with the moſt perfect benevclence; un-
leſs it can firſt be proved, that no fyftem ought
to be made, nor laws eſtabliſhed, but what are
abſolutely freed from them : Which perhaps
n ay not be the caſe, with reſpect to any ſyfteni;
in the whole circle of exiſting nature,
It is a ftill further manifeſtation of the Cre-
ator's goodneſs towards theſe inferior kinds, that
he has contrived, to make them, in ſome rrea-
ſure, uſeful to one another. Perhaps, they are
ſo claſſed into forts, as that they not only fill
up the creation, bot, at the ſame time, do it ſo
as to be, in the beſt manner, conducive to the
good of each other. There may be an eſtab-
liſhed general relation between all the ſpecies of
inferior creatures, in conſequence of which the
.particular intereſts of the ſeveral kinds, inſtead
of interfering, are mutually ſubſervient to each
other. This is undoubtedly the truth of fact,
in many inſtances. Several of the lower kinds
are ſerviceable to the ſuperior : And it locks
as though they were purpoſely placed in ſuch a
ſubordination to this end. Nay, ſome of the
higheſt animal ſpecies are, in like manner, uſe-
ful to mankind : And they ſeem to have had
- this degree of ſubordination aſſigned them fer
this very purpoſe. And there may be a cer-
tain order running through the whole animal
world, tending to render all the various kinds
as-ſerviceable to one another, as the nature of
things would permit,
There
OF THE DEITY,
83
1
There is certainly a bond of union eſtabliſhed
between the individuals of every Species. As they
have fime inſtincts determining them to their :
own private good, fo have they others that unite
then to their reſpective. kinds. They diſlike foli-
tude and diſcover pleaſure in the co npany ofeach
other, :. Some live together in flocks; ſeem un-
eaſy when ſeparated, and will run ventures that
they may get aſſociated with their ſpecies. And
there is univerſally a ſtrong affeEtion in the fe-
males t:wards their young. They are urged on
by their natural STORGEE, not only to exert
themſelves in providing for their fuftenance, but
in fecuring them againſt danger. They will
riſque their own eaſe, and engage in combats
for the fake of their young ; expoſing them-
ſelves to greater extremities on their account, than
their own. Even the moſt favage:aniinals are af-
feétionate to their offspring ; and will take care
of them with all deſirable tenderneſs.
It is readily acknowledged; the inſtinɛts by
which individuals are attached to their own
kind; are not ſo ſtrong, but that they may be
miſcheivous- to one another ; and the relation be-
tween the ſeveral ſpecies may be ſtill
: more
looſe, inſomuch that it may ſeem: as though ſome.
kinds were rather deſtruElive; than: beneficial, to
other kinds. But this notwithſtanding, indivi-
duals may exiſt with reſpect to their own kinds,
and the ſeveral kind's with reſpect to each other,
in the beſt manner it was poſſible they ſhould,
in order to their con ſpiring, as parts, to promote
the
84
THÈ BENEVOLENCE
1
the common happineſs. And if fome inſtances
of a contrary aſpect, to ſuch ſhort-fighted crea-
·tures as we are, could be mentioned, it ought
not to be eſteemed a counter-balance to what is
jo evidently the general tendency of the animal. con-
Fitution. It becomes us, in ſuch caſes, to take
care how we rafhly cenſure the benevolent Deity;
eſpecially, if it be conſidered, that detached in-
françes may have the appearance of evil, to our
imperfect view ; while yet, in their connection,
they may be good. And as good is ſo apparently
the general tendency, we haye tufficient reaſon,
from hence, to think that this is the real truth
with reſpect to theſe special inftances; unleſs
we could clearly prove ihe contrary. In order
whereto,
It is pleaded, I know, that fome animal kinds
live on others, to the intire deſtruction of their
bring and bappineſs. But this notwithſtanding,
gey may, in the wiſeft manner, be uſeful to
cré an ther; and even this very objection may
te a tirong evidence of it. It is trụe, the de-
Bruction of life will follow, if ſome animals are
food to others. But it may be true alſo, that
there could not have been ſo much life, and con-
fequently happineſs, in the creation, had it not
been for this expedient. Perhaps, ſo many kinds.
of creatures as now exiſt, and it was neceſſary.
phould exiſt in order to fill up this ſyſtem, could
not, in any other eſtabliſhed way, have been
Supported in being. And if it was neceſſary, as
we cannot ſay it was not, in order to the main
tenance
OF THE DEITY!
80
tenance of life, in ſuch a variety of kinds, that
it hold be upheld, by a ſucceſion of individuals
in each kind, and not bị the continued exiſtence
of the ſame individuals, we are, at once, let into
the wiſdom and goodneſs, not only of the general
law. fubjecting all animals to death; but of that
more limited one alſo, according to whịch ſome
fpecies live upon others. The ſcheme, in this
view of it, is certainly intended for good. And
pore good, upon the whole, may be cominuni-
cated in this, than any other way. And there-
fore it is ſo far from arguing a defe of bene-
volence in the D,zity, that it is a ſtrong illuſtra-
tion of it. Belides, we know not the intire plan:
of heaven, with reference to the animal world.
Perhaps, their preſent exiſtence is only an intro-
duction to, fornething further. ļt may poſſibly
be the first ſtage of their being, and a ftep to
fome other ſtate, this may be previouſly neceſ-
fary to fit them for And as we are able to ſee
but a little way into the deſign of the Deity, with
reſpect to theſe inferior creatures ; and yet, 'arę
at no loſs, from what we do fee, certainly' to
deterinine that it is a delign" tending to good: in-
fiead of complaining that it is not a better contrivs
ed ſcheme, we have reaſon rather to look upon it
as the beſt in its kind, and to believe that it will
gurn out f), in the final reſult of its operation. -
To proceed,
The moſt important head of argument, in the
preſent debate, is the conſtitution and government
of the intellectual and moral world ; by which
I
86
THE BENEVOLENCE
I mean ourſelves, the higheſt arder of beings it has
pleaſed God to place on this earth, and that or-
der towards which he has made the largeſt diſa
plays of hiş benevolence.
And there is one thing peculiar in our conſtitu-
tion which it may be proper to give a general touch,
apon, before we come to particulars. What I
fpeak of as thus peculiar, and worthy of notice,
is our compound make ; in conſequence of which
we are partly, animal, and partly rational; being
allied both to the higheſt, and the loweſt ora
ders, of beings in the univerſe. And the gi-
ving us this conſtitution is an illuſtrious inſtance
of the Divine goodneſs, and naturally leads us
to conceive of the Deity as abſolutely and perfect:-
by benevolent.
It may, indeed ſeem, at firſt view, as though
there was an argument rather proving the impera
fection: than perfection of the Deity's benevolence.
But it is far otherwiſe. For it is by means of this
compound make, that inanimate mature is not only
enjoyed but perceived to have beauty and order, and
to be a contrivance worthy of the Supreme Crea-
tor. The inferior kinds, are variouſly capable of
a lower fort of happineſs, from their relation to
and ſituation in, this material world : But this
is all. Being deſtitute of reafon, at leaſt in any
conſiderable meaſure, ſenſitive enjoyment is the
bigheſt they can attain to. It is the unis
on of reaſon and senſe, in ſuch a ſuperior degree,
that enables us men, at the fair e time that we
enjoy ſenſitive good, in common with the ina
ferior
OF THE DEITY.
8
1
jerior creatures, to diſcern the wiſdom, and power,
and benevolence, of the Deity, herein diſplayed..
And it is from hende alſo, that we become
capable of that more noble happineſs, which is
the reſult of the exerciſe of reaſon upon the or-
der of the material world, and the adjuſtment
of bodily organs chereto, ſo as to occaſion fo
much ſenſitive pleaſure. In a word; if there
had not been ſome order of beings, like us, of
a compound make; who were, at once; qualified
for enjoyment from this material world, and for
perceiving, in ſome meaſure, the connections and
dependencies, by means whereof this is accom-
pliſhed I ſay, if there had not been ſome
ſuch order of creatures, this material world muſt
have been comparatively loft. No honor would,
in an attive way, have been reflected on the Deity;
and little, very little; of that happineſs would
have been enjoyed, which there is now a pro-
per foundation laid for, according to the eſta-
bliſhed courſe and order of nature. So that fúcha
de conſtitütion as our's ſeems to have been ne-
ceſſary in order to a compleat diſplay of that
good, this material world was fitted to produce
And it looks as though it was principally made
with a view to lis men, and that the inferior crea-
tures, in their various kinds, were formed for the
prevention of needleſs voids, and to fill up this ſyſtein:
To which purpoſe they are admirably fitted;
ås; by their gradual and inſenſible fubordina-
tion, they make iť the best coherent wholė; in
its kind.
--
88
THE BENEVOLENCE
It is not pleaded, that we are, by this .core.
pound makes the moſt perfekt beings that can be
brought into exiſtence : Neither is this necef-
fary in order to the molt perfe£t diſplay of bea
nevolence. It is ſufficient, if by this makej
we are fitted for the world to which we are
more eſpecially related; and rendered capable
of as much happineſs as is proper for beings in
our ſituation, and bearing ſuch a part in the ge-
neral plan for the manifeſtation of good.
Neither is it pretended, that this compound
conititution is not liable to inconveniences. For
ſo far as we are nigterial, be the matter of which
we are made what it will, or our bodily orga
nization what it will; we muſt of courſe be
ſubject to thoſe laws; by which the material world
we are related to, is governed: And; if ſome
inconveniences ſhould ariſe herefrom, it bught to
be attributed; not to want of goodneſs in the Deity,
but to neceſſity in the nature of things i eſpecialy
if it appears, that he has, in the best conceiva
able manner, taken care to prevent theſe incort-
veniences; as we ſhall preſentļy ſee that he has.
And ſo I proceed to a diftināt confideration of
both parts of our frame, in order the more fully
to illuſtrate the Divine benevolence froin its dié
plays towards us, the higheſt order of beings in
this fyftem.
Our lower part firſt preſents itſelf to view:
ÅS to which, we are allied to the inferior kinds;
and partake, in common, with thein, of a bó-
dily organization fendering us capable of pleaſurez
in
OF THE DEIT Y.
89
,
in various ways é Though we are highly ſet
a bove them, even with reſpect to this our ani-
mal part. Its exterior form has greatly the pre-
éminence; as bearing the evident marks of fupe-
rior beauty and majeſty. And the ſame may
be faid of its ſeveral members ; which are fitted
for a much greater diverſity of uſeful exerti-
ons Beſides, it is endowed with ſome powers,
which they are deſtitute of : Such is the power
of ſpeech ; and ſuch are the powers of perceiv-
ing beauty and harmony in the objects of ſight
and of hearing : All which are rich ſources of
gooil, and adminiſter unſpeakably to the benefit,
and delight, of life. The advantage; it is true,
would, in ſome reſpects, haye been on the ſide
of the creatures below us, had not the union of
breaſon with ſenſe, in our conſtitution, turned the
ſcale in our favour. They have a quicker ſa-
gacity, with reſpect to the things which belong
to their preſervation and ſafety. They ſurpaſs
us; at leaſt inany of them, in the natural firin-
neſs of their make, whereby they are better fit-
ted to endure hardſhips, They can more ea-
fily provide themſelves with the means of ſub-
ſiſtence, not being called to that labor and
pains, which nature has made neceſſary for us.
And they ſooner come to an ability to ſhift
for themſelves. And this diſpoſition of things
is juit as it might be expected it would be,
upon the ſcheme of perfe£t benevolence. For,
the giving thoſe creatures the advantage, in there
reſpects, is, on the one hand, a fit diſplay of
M
goodneſs
go
THE BENEVOLENCÉ
goodneſs towards them ;, as they have only their
appetites and inſtin Ets, with a low degree of rea-
fon, at moſt, to guide and direct chém Andy
on the other hand, it is no evidence of any den
fest of goodneſs towards us, becauſe being en-
dowed with reaſon and underítanding, in a com-
paratively high degrees the advantage, by this
means, turns greatly on our ſide; as indeed
it ought to do. If they have a ffonger ani-
mal ſagacity, our larger degree of reaſon is
more than a balance for it. If they are, any
of them, more robuſt in their make, we are
notwitſtanding better able, by the help of cur
reaſon, to guard - ourſelves, than neture has
guarded them. If they are ſupported with leſs
care, we,, by the exerciſe of reaſon, can make our
greater care a pleaſure yand, by means of it, bring
in a much richer ſupply for the comfort of life.
And if it is in a more gradual and leiſurely:
way, that we come to the uſe of our animal
powers, we can, by the help of reaſon,
make them more extenſively uſeful afterwards,
by employing them to a. vaſtly greater variety
of good purpoſes. Beſides, our animal frame
is originally made for a longer duration ; and the
time required in order to its coming to its fer-
fecitate, inay be, in the beſt manner, adjuſted
thereto. And further, as we are deſigned for
intellectual and moral, as well as animal growth,
this method of coming to maturity, bý pow and
gradual ſteps, may be the moſt ſuitable one to
promote theſe ſeveral intentions, as-united in the
fame conſtitución
So
!
ܪ
و
OF THE DEITY.
9.1
So that there is no compariſon between the
inferior creatures, and us men. We have much
the advantage of them : At leaſt, we are quali-
fied to turn the balance in our own favour. For
it is in our power, by the help of our under-
ſtandings, to render our animal life far more
eaſy and happy, by guarding it againſt inju-
ries; by providing for it neceſſaries ; by di-
verſifying its pleaſures; by multiplying its de-
lights ; and by refining and exalting its en-
joyinents, in a variety of ways, not withiz the
reach of their capacities.
But we have conſidered as yet only that lowe:-
er fort of happineſs we are furniſhed for, by
means of our animal make, This, it is true, is
very confdercble : Andi mankind have ſuch an
opinion of it, if we may gueſs at their thoughts,
by their practice. For ſenſual
, pleaſures are the
great object of their purſuit. Too many in-
dulge to thein, as though they were deſigned
for no higher happineſs. Our fault indeed is,
not that we have no value for animal gratifi-
cations, but that we value them too highly, and
place top inuch of our happineſs in them; as
they contain only. the loweſt fort of good we are
fitted for the enjoyment of, by means of our
animal part. For it is to be remmembered;
That a great proportion, even of that happi-
neſs which is, proper to us, as intelligent and mc-
ral agents, originates in our animal frame, which
fits 11s, by its various, well adjuſted organs, to
have communication with the materiał world,
in
i
92
THE BENEVOLENCE
in a certain ſtated way, eſtabliſhed by the au-
thor of nature. How many four ideas are we be-
holden to our ſenſes for? They are indeed the pri-
mary inlets to the inaterials of knowledge, the true
foundation of all intelle&tual happineſs. It is.
from hence, in a great meaſures that our reaſon,
imagination, inventicn, and other ment al pow-
ers, are ſupplied with objects, which not only
employ their exerciſe, but yield thoſe various
pleaſures which vaſtly furpaſs the higheſt animal
.
delights. Nay, even the ſocial, and moral hap-.
pineſs we are formed for, takes riſe, in part at
lealt, from our animal nature, by means of which
we become viſible to, and converſible wich, each
other, and capable of interchanging thoſe vari,
ous offices of juſtice, and kindneſs, and friend-
fhip, which chiefly lay the foundation for thoſe
moral and focial pleaſures, which are the moſt
refined and exalted we are made capable of enjoy-
ing: Nor, unleſs we had poffeffed ſuch materi-
al bodies, could there have been thoſe ways of
communion with one another which now take
place, or thoſe occaſions for helping and plea.
ſing each other, which fo frequently ariſe from
our preſent conftitution, and give ſo large a
ſcope for ſocial and moral exerciſes, and thoſe für
blime pleaſures which are the reſult therefrom.
Beſides all which, it is owing to our animal
-frame, that we have. fenfes and appetites to re-
- ftrain within the bounds of a juſt decorum. ;
- which conſtitutes a proper ſphere of doininion
for our reaſon, and gives opportunity to empley
0, F THE DE IT Y.
it to very excellent purpoſes, by putting us up-
on the practice of fobriety, chaſtity, and mo-
deration, thofe private virtues which tend to
ennoble the mind, and prepare it for the moſt
exalted exerciſes and entoyments it is made capa-
ble of.
And it is this view of the inferior part of our
conftitution, that gives us the true and full idea
of its main dengn and uſe. We ſhould enter-
tain but a poor low thought of our bodily organi-
zation, if we looked upon it as contrived for
ho higher an end, than meer animal gratifica-
tions. It was proper indeed, for many reas
fons, that it ſhould be furniſhed, as it really is,
for this kind of pleafüre : But the great thing
aimed at, by the Deity, in employing ſo much
ſkill in adjuſting the ſtructure of our bodies,
was, that he might fit.us, by this means, for
ſuch a communication with material nature, as
might lay the beſt foundation for thoſe intellectual
and moral exerciſes, and the noble pleaſures reſult-
ing' therefrom, which fo highly exalt our na-
tures, juſtly giving us the firſt place among
the
numerous claſſes of beings which inhabit this
earth.
I
may properly add to what has hitherto been
ſaid, that the Deity's benevolence, with reſpect to
our inferior part, is conſpicuous, not only in the
poſitive good he has fitted it to be the means of to
the mind, but in the care he has alſo taken to
fecure it againſt inconveniences. It may poſſibly
be thought, that perfect goodneſs would have aba
Solutely
- 94
THE BENEVOLENCE
folutely freed our bodies from all inconveniences
whatſoever. But this may be only a miſtake
of our own. It is certain, in point of fact, that
that bodily organization, whereby we are fitted
for the perception of good, is liable to be dif-
ordered, yea, deſtroyed, in numberleſs ways : Nur
can we ſay, that it was poſſible, in the nature
of things, abſolutely to have ſecured it from this
liableneſs to diſturbance. All therefore that can,
with reaſon, be required of the Deity, upon the
fcheme.of perfeet benevolence, is, that he ſhould
provide for the ſecurity of our animal-ftruture.
againſt miſchief, in the beft manner that was con-
ſiſtent with the operation of thoſe laws, he has,
eſtablifhed for the diſplays of his goodneſs to-
wards this ſyſtem, And this, ſo far as we are
able to judge, he has actually done; partly, by:
putting it in our power to contrive ſuitable
méthods for our own ſafety; and partly, by
planting within us a variouſly modified principle
of ſelf-preſervation, urging us on to avoid every
thing that we apprehend will be hurtful to us!
But principally, by annexing the ſenſation of
pain to thoſe touches upon our bodily mechaniſm,
which tend to diſturb' its order ; hereby rouling.
the principle of ſelf-love, and putting us upon
the moſt effectual exertions in order to our
own ſecurity. And wherein could the Deity.
have contrived better for our being guarded
againſt miſchief? I know.indeed that the very
capacity of perceiving pain is urged as an argu-
ment againſt the benevolence of the Deity : But
with
CF T H D EỈ TỶ.
8
t
with nothing more than the bare ſhadow of
reaſon. For it is a moſt uſeful capacity. Even
the principle of ſelf-preſervations with all its ap-
pendages from the body, and affiftances from
the mind, would have been eſſentially defective,
was it not for this additional ſtimulus: Noris it con
ceivable, how we could have been in any tolerable
meaſure, ſecured me from danger, without ſome
tuch expedient as this. Some warning ſeems to
have been abſolutely neceffary, eſpecially to
creatures, whoſe knowledge of the material world,
and its capacity to do them hurt as well as good,
is not intuitive, but gradual and experimental , as it
is beſt it ſhould be for many reaſons : Some of
which we may have occaſion to inéntion here-
after : I ſay, ſome warning of the miſchiefs we
are expoſed to, in fuch a world as this, was,
neceſſary : And what more proper One, than
that, which makes every thing, hurtful at the ſame
time painful ? What warning ſhort of this would
have beene ffectual to have anſwered the purpoſed
end ? Notwithſtanding the new force or ſtimulus,
herefroin awakening the principle of ſelf-prefera.
vation, we are careleſs enough in guarding our
felves againſt even thoſe things which we know
to be hurtful, by feeling that they are painful.
And was it not for the feinfation of pair, which
we are ſo ready to complain of as inconfiftene
with goodneſs, in the Creator, we ſhould not
enjoy any' happineſs in compariſon with wháč
we do now. It is this that rouſes our attention
to guard ourſelves againſt thoſe external objects
what
:
}
96
THE BENEVOLENCE
thát may caufë wounds and bruiſes; or in any
ottier way. do miſchief to our bodies : It is this
that minds us of the neceſſity of food and raiment;
and puts us upon the vſe of care properly to
ſupply nature in theſe reſpects: And it is this, in
one word, more than any thing in our conſtitu-
onthat tends to make us cautious and pru-
dent, looking about; and employing our thoughts
and pains that we may enjoy life with as little
inconvenience as inay. be. So that the ſenſation
of pain is a noble contrivance for good, and
ſtrongly argues benevolence in the Creator, rather
than the contrary. It is indeed the grand ex-
pedient to prevent thoſe inconveniences, which, had
it not been for this.contrivance, muſt have been
inevitable. And as to thofe that are fo; notwith-
ſtanding this proviſion of nature, ſuch as the difu
poſition of our animal framne, and thoſe diſorders wa
are naturally ſubječted to, we ſhall particularly
take notice of them, hereafter, in a more pro-
per place.
In the mean timë, let us go to the other part
of our conſtitution, where by we are allied to
the higheſt order of beings in the univerſe, and
rendered capable of iútelletual and inaral pleas
furésthe higheſt in kind that are communicable
from the Deity. And here it will be worth
while to be a little particular ’n illuſtrating the
Creator's benevolence, from the proviſion he has
made for our enjoyment of both theſe forts of hap.
pineſs.
Te.
Ở F THE DEITY.
97
To begin with the care he has taken to pro-
vide for our enjoyment of intellectual happineſs;
which we ſhall ſhow to be ſuch as is ſufficient
to lead us into an idea of him as perfe&tly and
abſolutely benevolent.
The mental capacities we are endowed with, here
properly come into conſideration. And theſe we
Thåll find, upon inquiry, to be wonderfully
adapted to qualify us for intelle&tual acquire-
ments; it is not indeed conceivable how an order
of beings ſituated as we are ſhould have been
better furniſhed for this noble purpoſe,
Our mental capacities are of two forts. The
firſt furniſhes us with the materials of knowledge;
the other qualifies us for the proper uſe of them.
The powers furniſhing us with the materials
of knowledge are ſenſation and reflection ; both
which are admirably fitted to anſwer the end
for which they were implanted in us.
Senſation, the firſt of theſe, is that capacity by
means of which impreſſions from without become
perceptions within, variouſly affecting the mind,
and giving riſe to what we call ſenſible ideas. And
in vain had our bodies been ſo curiouſly fitted
with organs, and external objects fired, by their
mediation, to make impreſſions on our minds,
was it not for this capacity. Barely a füfcep-
tibility of impreſſions, from material nature, would
not have been ſufficient for the purpoſes of in-
Jelligence. Beſides this, a perceiving power in the
mind was neceſſary. And it is in confequence
of this, that corporeal objects, by the medium
N
of
98
THE BENEVOLENCE
+
It was
of bodily organs, are the occaſion of various
diſtinct ſenſations, preſenting to the view of the
underſtanding ſo many ideas, as objects to ein-
ploy its exerciſe. The inferior creatures, it is
true, are formed with this capacity, in common
with us men; but with this difference.
planted in them for the ſake of animal life; as,
an expedient to render that comfortable and
happy; whereas we are endowed with it, not for
this end: only, nor yet principally, but that we
might be furniſhed with the proper materials for .
the acquirement of knowledge, and the enjoyment
of that pleaſure which reſults therefrom. And a
noble capacity it is to this end, It is from
hence that we derive all our ſenſible ideas ; that
is to ſay, all our ideas of color, taſte, found, light,
beat, cold, and, in a word, whatever ideas we
have' of external objects, or any of the nodes
or properties that belong to them.
The other power, furniſhing us with the inat
terials of knowledge, is reflection, of the mind's
ability to look within, and take notice of its
own operations. And theſe, thus obſerved, give
riſe to another ſet of ideas; different in kind from
thoſe we received from ſenſation. Neces ob-
jects, by the exerciſe of this faculty, are pre-
fented to the view of the mind, which have no
affinity with external nature; ſuch as thinking,
willing, knowing; believing, doubting, loving, bo-
ping; fearing, and the like: Furniſhing the ma-
terials for å new fort of knowledge, ſuperier in
its nature to that which refults from fenfible
ideas,
*
99
OF THE DEITY.
Ideas, and ſuited to yield us far more exalted
pleaſure. It is from this ſet of ideas that we riſe
above the material world, and are enabled to
turn our vier to moral objects, in the mental
furvey of w chwe may entertain ourſelves
with the hig? eſt ſatisfaction,
Theſe now are the inlets, and the only ones, to
all our ideas : Infoinuch that we have no noti-
on in our minds, n:r can fòrm any,but from the
ideas we receive in thoſe-ways. * Butyet, we have
no reaſon to complain for want of intellettual
materials. It is true, the fimple ideas originally
let into the mind, whether by ſenſation, or re-
flestion, are but few : Yet, they are capable
of being put together with ſuch variety as to
make new complex ones almoſt to infinity. Some
conception we may fraine of this, from the con-
poſition of words, out of the letters of the alpha-
bet. Theſe, though few in number, are yet
fufficient for the formation of words without
sind: Which words are again capable of being
placed in fuch poſitions, with respect to each
other, as to be proper ſigns for the conveyance
of all manner of truths to the mind. In like mane
ner, our ſimple ideas, though not very numerous,
are yet capable of being compounded ſo as to ex-
hibiinew.images beyond account:And theſe come
plex forms are again capable of being put together
with
1
* Tam not convinced, by any thing I have feon: wrote upon
thie ſubject, that we have any ideas, but what take riſe from
jenfation and reflection, or that we can have any, upon the
prefent eſtabliſhment of nature, any other way. They are all
derived from this ſource, and may be traced up to it.
foo.
THE BENEVOLENCE
with almoſt an infinite variety. So extenſive is
the ground work laid by thoſe powers of ſexſati
on and reflection, for acquirements in knowledge,
and mental pleaſure the conſequence therefrom.
The other sort of faculties, or thoſe which
qualify us for the uſe of theſe materials of know-
ledge, are fuch as theſea
The firſt is, the mind's ability to lay up the
ideas it has received, in either of the above ways,
as it were, in ſtore for uſe afterwards, with a
readineſs to revive them, without the preſence
of external objects, or the help of thoſe inward
reflections; by which they were at firft occafion.
ed. This is done by the memory; which is a
néceſſary faculty, For, the mind not being ca-
pable of attending to many ideas at once, we
Thould have been but poorly qualified for pro-
ficiency in knowledge, had we not been en
dowed wi:h a power to recall ideas into view, as
we night have occaſion for them; after they had
lain out of ſight. And this ability we are ac-
cordingly furniſhed with : Nor is it à meer past
five one ; but dependant, in a good meaſure,
on the will. It is true formerly imprinted ideas
will ſometimes obtrude themſelves upon the
mind, and come undeſired to the view of un-
derſtanding: But this notwithſtanding, the
mind can of choice. lay up ideas; : and is able to
a good degree, as it pleaſes, to recall them, It
can, on purpoſe, employ itſelf this way : And
the readineſs, with which it often revives the
perception of paft ideas, is really aſtoniſhing.my
I
OF THE DEITY.
IONI
I need not ſay any thing to point out-rhie zifé-
fulneſs of this faculty, and the mighty bielp it
is fitted to afford us in intelle&tual
. acquirements.
Were we not thus furniſhed,' we ſhould necef-
ſarily be confined to preſent ideas, as they might
happen, in a palive way, to be excited in our
minds. Whereas now we have it in our power
to employ our thoughts on any of thoſe ideas
which have, at any tirne, been imprinted on our
ininds, as we are pleaſed to call for them, in
the purſuit of intellectual happineſs. And what
an unſpeakable advantage is this? It not only
makes the way to knowledge much eaſier and
quicker than it could otherwiſe have been ; but
greatly enlarges.the capacity for it, by laying
a proper foundation in our nature for very con-
ſiderable attainments in this kind.
Another power is diſcernment; by which I un-
derſtand an ability to diſtinguiſh ideas from one
another, according to the real difference there,
is between them. And a very important faia
culty this is. Without it the former faculties
would be, in a manner, ufelefs. It is not meerly
the power of receiving ideas, or the power of
recalling them into view after their diſappear-
ance, that would have been fufficient for åttain-
ments in knowledge. A faculty to diſcriminate
them from one another was further neceſſary :
Nor otherwiſe would our thoughts have been
any other than fo many confuſed ideas. What
we call judgment is chiefly dependant on this
faculty. It conſiſts in the-mind's readineſs to
difcern
1
THE BENEVOLENCE
diſcern the difference there is between ideas
And the more nicely and accurately it is able
to diſtinguiſh them, the better and more perfect
is the judgment. It is owing to this faculty
that ideas lie clear and determinate in the minds
and by the help of it we are not only preſerved
from perplexity in our notions, but from miſ-.
takes alfo, arising from a ſeeming likeneſs in
ideas when they really differ. It is, in fhirt,
in, conſequence of thiş fàculty, that we are able
to reaſon clearly and folidly, ſetting betare our
own view, and the view of others, the evidence
of truth in a ſtrong and fàtisfactory pint of
light. The uſefulneſs of this faculty may be
learned from thoſe perceptions of truth, which
have taken riſe from it, to the increaſe of know-
ledge, 'in ſo many inſtances, redounding for
greatly the benefit of mankind.
Another power the mind is furniſhed with,
is that of compounding, enlarging, and diminiſhing,
the ideas that have been let into it: By means
whereof it is capable, in a ſenſe, of making neza
,
objects of perception, by preſenting to the view
of the underitanding the original ideas, received
by Jenfation or refle&tion, in new complex forms with-
out end. In conſequence of this compounding
Puwer, we become, as it were, Creators'; being
able to frame images at our pleafure, hereby mul-
siplying the objects of thought, and giving occạ-.
fion for infinitely various new perceptions, accom-
panied with pleaſure, we muſt otherwiſe have
been ſtrangers to. The imagination is chiefly
employed
ÖF THE DEIT Y... 183
:
1
Empl-yed in this work of making new complex
ideas. It is able indeeds with quickneſs and vi-
vacity, to revive former images ; but its power
lies principally in framing new forms or ſpecies,
which exiit only in conception. And a wonder-
ful faculty it is to this purpoſe. H:\w admirably
quick is it in its operations? Huw ſuddenly
can it unite and blend together the moſt diſtant
ideas, varying them from their ſimple crigi-
hals; and ſetting them befre the mind with in-
finite diverſity ? This power, it is true, is pecu-
liarly liable to abuſe. It may be proſtituted to
vain and baſe purpoſes. It may be debaſed
with mean images, or polluted with vicious
ones. But yet, it is in itſelf a noble capacity :
And had we not been endowed with it, thoſe
excellent productions of art and genius would
never have had a being; which are ſo variouſly
fitted, b:ath for the ſervice of life, and the enter-
tainment of the mind. :::
A ftill more uſeful power is that whereby we
äre enabled to aſſemble ideas in various poſitions
and arrangements, in order to compare them toge-
ther, and view them in the reſpects and relations
they bear to each other. It is owing to this fä-
culty that we perceive neto truths: For every
different juxta-poſition of ideas exhibits to the
mind ſome agreement. or diſagreeinent it was
not befi re acquainted with, and opens to its view
ſome new diſcovery. This faculży, as emriployed
in finding out new truths, by placing ideas in
various poſitions pr: orders with reſpect to each
others
104 THE BENEVOLENCE
گا۔
other;:is:wlåtiis. principally meant by, învention.
Bút as it is employed in placing invented truths,
or propoſitions already perceived to be truths,
in like poſitions, in order to deduce ftill ether
truths,nitis called reaſoning; which is the wobleſt
and moſt uſeful operation of the mind; and
that indeed fuk which alſ ics faculties were prin-
cipally deligned
The laſt power of the mind which I ſhall
mention, and indeed: I have cnly: mentioned
the foregoing cries for it would require a
volunić to enlarge ſeýerally on theinas might
eaſily be done : 1 ſay; "the laſt power the mind
is furniſhed with; is that of abſtraction ; by which
it makes particular ideasĝeneral ones. And this
it does by, withdrawing or ſeparating from them
theſe and thoſe circumſtances which accompa-
nied them; as excited by particular objects, and
confidering them in that general view only,
wherein many other objects do agree with them.
: As for example : The fame ideas ſignified by
the term redneſs; : being perceived to day uponi
the fight of a cherry, which was perceived yeſ-
terday: upon the fight of a bricks and the day
before: upon the fight of blood, the mind con-
fiders this idea abſtračted from theſe particular
objeEt's; or at leaſt thoſe concomitant ideas which
accompanied its perception from each of them,
imaking it a general idea comprehending all
exiftences, thảc agree in being red. And to this
faculty: we are beholden for the benefit of lan-
guage. Particular names for particilar ideas wculd,
in
OF THE DEITY.
IOS
to ; ,
in a great meaſure, have deſtroyed the uſe of
{peech, by rendering it infinitely tedious.
Abſtraction is the remedy againſt this. It is the
mind's capacity to make general ideas that has
given riſe to general names; by means whereof
language is made eaſy, and we are qualified with
convenient, ſpeed, by the intervention of words,
ſpoken or written, to convey our thoughts to
one another. Belides, it is of valt ute, in ac-
quiring knowledge, to have this power of con-
fidering ideas in an abſtraited view ; as, with-
out it, the making progreſs in underſtanding
would have been an infinitely lengthy buſineſs.
And further, we have it in our power, by the
help of this faculty, more fully and thoroughly.
done; conſidering them fingly, and e-part from
all others, and ſo as to have the compleateſt
conception of them, in their ſeveral properties
and relations.
Thoſe now are the powers, qualifying us
for intellectual acquirements. And how adini-
rably fitted are they to this end ?: Material 119-
ture is, by this means, in a great meaſuré, ſub-
jected to our cominand. We can view external
objects, even in their abſence, by their images
retained in the mind; exainine their relations
and dependencies ; enquire into their properties
and powers; and inveſtigate numberleſs truths
concerning thera : Applying them to the uſes
of life, or the entertçinment of the mirel in fpecu-
lation. And this intelle&tual pleaſure is always
ready
9
4
1
106
THE BENEVOLEN CE
ready at hand: And it will not; like animal des
light, pall the deſire, and bring on ſatie:y and
diſguſt; but the oftner we repeat it," the more
we ſhall be delighted : For it is, in itſelf, a no-
ble exerciſe, and fitted to yield continually
growing ſatisfaction to the mind. Nor are we
confined to material nature only ; but, being
furniſhed by reflection, with another ſet of ideas,
haye it in our power to bring even the moral
world alſo under examination ; enquiring into
its qualities, relations, and dependencies, and
herefrom diſcovering the moſt important truths,
not only applicable to the purpoſe of governing
our own conduct, but of giving our minds the
higheſt pleaſure it is capable of from contempla-
tion. It is from hence that we perceive a dif-
ference of powers in our own conſtitution, ſome
fuperior, others inferior, and become acquainted
with that government of them wherein conſiſts
that moral oeconomy, which is our greateſt glory
as men: It is from hence that we argue, with
ſo much probability; the exiſtence of number
Jeſs orders of beings, of-like mental powers with
ourſelves, though poſſeſſing them in far more
exalted degrees : And, in fine, it is from hence
- that we are capable of riſing in our thoughts to
the exiſtence of ſome uncreated original being,
at the head of all, endowed with the higheſt
poſſible perfections, in the contemplation of
who:n the mind may take the greateſt compla-
cency. The forming us with faculties whereby
we are qualified for ſuch noble intellettual at-
tainments
OF THE DEITY.
10g
1
tainments, evidently carries with it the marks
of benevolence. Nothing indeed but ſupreme and
perfet goodneſs, could have ſo wonderfully
adorned and endowed our nature,
It is readily acknowledged, tbėſe capacities, as
planted in us, are but low and fmall, in com-
pariſon with what we may ſuppoſe them to be
in many other beings above us. And this May
ſeem to fome an objection, if not againſt the
benevolence of the Deity in general, yet againſt
that abſolute perfection of it which we are plead.
ing for. But it is an objection of no great
weight. For if theſe capacities in us, however
low and imperfect; in compariſon with whag
they are in other beings, are well adjuſted to
the ſtate and circumſtances of an order of crea-
tures bearing ſuch a part in the generat ſahena
for good, it is all that can be required of rea...
Jonable benevolence, though, hưightened to infinity
Had no other beings been brought into exil
tence beſides us men, the objection, in this caſe,
it is owned, would have held good: But as we
are only one of the numerous orders that con-
ſtitute a general ſyſtem, this quite alters the caſe;
making thoſe capacities only an; evidence of
wid and reaſonable benevolence, which are fitted
for a particular part; ſuſtaining
ſuch, a place, in
the conftitution of this whole. In this view of
the matter, it is eaſy to ſee how benevolence
may be infinitely perfect, while yet' the creatures
that are produced by it are variouſly endowed
with capacities, fome ſuperiar, others inferior ;
Nor
108
THE BENEVOLENCE
Nor could they, otherwiſe have been fitted to
fill the place aſſigned them in the chain of being:
Neither could they have anſwered thoſe good
ends, they were particularly formed for. Had
the brute creatures, for inſtance, been endowed
; with the capacities that belong to vs men, they
would have been unfit for the place they now
take up in the creation : Neither could they
have been the means of that good, they are now
properly the occaſion of. · And the ſame may
be laid of us men. Had we been endowed with;
the capacities of angels, we ſhould not have been
formed for ſuch a world as this, and for anſwer-
ing thoſe ends, in it, which we are now fitted
to anfwer, and it might be neceffary ſhould be
anſwered in order to a full manifeftation of
Divine goodneſs. The truth is, the perfećtion of
benevolence conſiſts, not ſimply in the largeneſs
.
of-the capacities it beſtows upon any beings, but
in fitting thein to the ſtate and circumſtances of
beings in ſuch a ſituation, and bearing ſuch a
Iloce, in the general plan of operation for good :
And if our capacities are thus adjuſted, which
cannot be diſprcyed, it is all that can reofcably be
expected. It is no argument of the want of benevo-
lence in the Creator, that they are not greater: Nay,
had they been greater, the benevolence diſcovered
would have been, in the ſame proportion, leſs
wiſe and perfect.
It is conféffed likewiſe, that mankind are not
endowed with thoje mental powers, in equal degrees.
So far is this from the truth of fact, that the ca-
pacities of ſcarce any two men are exactly alike."
Somo
OF THE DEITY 109
i
Some excel in one turn of mind, others in anos
ther; ſome have no great genius for any thing,
others are diſtinguiſhed with a very extenſive
one, fitting them for almoſt every thing And
perhaps ſome individuals in the human ſpecies
differ as widely from others, in their rational
powers, as thoſe others do from the next ſpecies
below them. And this may poſſibly be eſteem-
ed by fome another objection againſt the plea we
are making for an abſolutely perfeet principle of
benevolence in the Deity. But neither does this
appear to be an objection, carrying with it any
conſiderable force, It may be, fome fuch di-
verſity, as that which is viſible in men's mental
powers, could n it have been prevented; in con-
ſiſtency with thoſe general laws, according to
which mankind were intended to be made hap-
Py.
One of theſe laws (which we have had
occaſion already to mention) puts it very much,
into men's own power, by induſtry and proper.
application, to enlarge their capacities, and
make progreſs in intellectual attainments : And
in conſequence of this law, a difference in men's
powers will be unavoidable ; though we ſhould
even ſuppoſe, what perhaps is not true, that they
were alike in their originalimplantation. Beſides,
the exerciſe of mental powers, being, according
to another law of nature, in to great a mea-,
fure, dependant on the mechaniſm of the lody,
this alſo renders it impoſſible but that they ſhould
bé. different ; for a difference in bodily organiza-
tion cannot but take place, in ſuch a world as
this, unleſs the laws of nature ſhould be inter-
rupted
terminates ng
110 THE BENEVOLENCE
rupted in their courſe. So that to object againſt
a diſparity of inental powers is, in true confe-
quence, to object againſt the general plan ac-
cording to which this ſyſtem is made; upheld,
and governed : Which, in fùch ſhort-lighted
creatures as we are, can be no other than ob-
jetting in the dark, by urging that which finally
But to come more direcly to the point.
This difference in men's capacities, whatever
it is awing to, whether a difference in their
original implantation, or a difference in the bo-
dy's mechaniſm, either of which amounts to prea
ciſely the ſame thing, in the preſent argument :
I ſay,this inequality of powers is ſo far from argu..
ing want of goodneſs in the Deity, that it ſtrong-
ly illuſtrates the glory and perfetion of it.
Poſſibly, the gradation in beings, by means
of which all ſpaces are filled up, could not
have been ſo accurately compleat, unleſs there
had been a difference between the individuals in
each ſpecies as well as between the ſpecies
themſelves. Some diſparity between men com-
pared with one another, and between the
creatures in every other claſs conſidered, in the
like comparative view, might be neceſſary to
ļink together the ſeveral ſpecies, ſo as to make
one coberent chain, without any void or chafm.
Or however this be, it is eaſy to ſee the pre«
ferableneſs of the preſent conſtitution to its contrary;
as being better fitied to promote the happineſs
of ſuch an order of creatures as we are. Were
our
OF '
or
THE DEITY.
tii
our mental powers fo exactly alike, as that one
man could not go beyond another, but every
man muſt have within himſelf the whole ſource
of intellectual furniture, there would be no room
for that converſe between man änd man, which
is, in the preſent ſtate of things, one of the
chief pleaſures, as well as improvements of the
mind : To be ſure, it could not be carried on
with that mutual ſatisfaction it now may ; nor
cauld it turn out to ſo great advantage. Beſides,
if there was no ſuch thing as one man's excel-
ting another, as there could not be upon the
preſent ſuppoſition, the ſtrongeſt ſtimulus, that
now proinpts us to exert ourſelves in order to
enlarge our intellectual powers, would be wants
ing; and by means thereofour very powers them-
ſelves, lo far as we can judge, muſt be in dan-
gėr of being rendered inactive, and of decreas
ſing in their fitneſs for exerciſe. And further,
if our capacities had been preciſely the ſame,"
that ſubordination in the human ſpecies, thoſe
ſuperiorities and inferiorities; could not have ta-
ken place, without which life itfelf could not
have been enjoyed; in ſuch a world as our's, with
tolerable comfort. And what is of yet greater
importance, there would not have been the oc-
cofion for thoſe interchangeable offices of huma-
nity and ſocial kindneſs, which, upon the pre-
ſent ſcheme, not only enlarge our ſphère of mu-
tual ſerviceableneſs, but give opportunity for
the exerciſe of many virtues perfective of our
piature, and fitted to yield us high degrees of hap-
pineſs
riz* THE BENEVOLENCE
/
pinels we muſt otherwiſe have been ſtrangers to.
The plain truth iſ, the conveniences and plea-
fores, poſſible to be enjoyed by the human kind,
do not ſeem to have been obtainable, in a world
conſtituted as this is, but by an union of counſels
and endeavours ; every one doing his part in
order to promote the good of the whole. And
different capacities are the requiſite expedient to
this purpoſe. Theſe not only fit the feveral in-
dividuals for reciprocal ſervices, but ſecure
their mutual dependance on each other ; here:
by properly linking them together, and making
way for thoſe various exertments which are ne-
ceffary for the common benefit. . If mankind
could at all have enjoyed the advantage of foci-
etý, without this inequality of powers, it is very
evident that they could not have enjoyed it to lo
good a purpoſe as with it. Their being various
W endowed is that which piits it in their power
to be váriouſly uſeful to each other, ſo as that the
häppineſs of every individual may hereby be
incfeated beyond what it could otherwiſe have
been. "And it is the inſufficiency there is in
eýefy man for his own happineſs by himſelf fir-
gly
, and alone, and his being obliged to depend
on others for many things, without which he
múlt be very uncomfortable, that is, in reality,
the only efectual bond that unites the human
fpecies, fecuring their attachment to each other,
and ſtimulating them to thoſe mutual ſervices,
upon which the good of all the individuals does
vety much depend,
It
OF THE DEITY.
113
9
It is ſtill further acknowledged, that our in-
fellectual powers, at firſt, are weak and feeble,
and it is in a slow and leifurely way, under
düe cultivation, and in the uſe of labor and pains,
that they gain ſtrength, and advance to any
conſiderable degrees of their attainable perfec-
tion. And this likewiſe may be thought an ob-
jećtion againſt the plea for an abſolutely perfect
principle of benevolence in the Deity. But it
is, duly conſidered, an argument rather enfors
cing this plea; than in any degree leſſening its
real weight.
Perhaps, no mind, the infinitely comprehen-
live one only excepted, cán be fo perfect as to
Be incapable of progreſſion in underſtanding. For
one degree of knowledge is ſo connected with
another, and ſo naturally prepares the way for
it; as that it may be an impoſſibilitity but that
évery created mind ſhould be capable of attaining
ſtill higher degrees of it. So that if we were at
áll miade capable of intelligence, it ſhould ſeein
áš though it muſt have been, in general, in
the way of progreſſion. And as to the particu-
lar method of progreſſion that takes place, with
reſpect to the hunian mind, it is the moſt na-
tural and rational one that could have been con-
trived, for an order of beings conſtituted in
other reſpects, and ſituated, as we are ; as we
ſhall evidently fee by going over its parts
that
are objected to.
It is.complained, that our faculties are weak
at firſt, and advance in a love and gradual way
P
of our nature;
14 THE BENEVOLENCE
to their attainable maturity. To which the rêa
ply is; That; as the only way, accerding to
the eſtabliſhed order of nature, in which the
mind can be furniſhed with ideas, is by the
medium of the bodily ſenſes, and its own re-
flections afterwards, it was impoſſible but that the
attainment of knowledge, with reſpect to us;
should be in a flow and leiſurely manner. And
though our faculties are feeble at firſt, it is best
they ſhould be foj and an inſtance of goudneſs,
in the Creator, rather than the centrary. Fory
it is to be remembered, they could be of no
manner of ſervice till ſupplied with proper ob-
jects, and there had been tịne to learn the vſe
of them. We muſt have been, at firſt, whatever
was the ſtate of our faculties, totally unacquaint-
ed withi ourſelves; and with the world about
us : And it would have required time, and expe=
rience, and inſtruction, before we could have ac-
quired knowledge fufficient for the proper ap-
plication of any thing to the purpoſes of life:
faculties feeble at firft, but yet capable of gra-
dually advancing t: a mature laté; ſeem the
beſt ſuited thereto of any we could have been
endowed with. There is evidently a congruity
and proportion between ſuch faculties, and the
method accrding ti which knowledge is attain
äble by ſuch creatures as we are. Inſtead of
having faculties in their full ſtrength and vigor,
before it was poffible, conformably to the eſta.
bliſhed order of nature, that we could make the
proper
OF THE DEITY
its
A
A
proper uſe of them, it ſeems much better that
they ſh uld gradually open and enlarge, as ideas
are gradually let into them to employ their ex-
erciſe, and fit then for the offices and enjoy.
ments of life. And perhaps the time of our com:
ing to a mature ſtate of faculties, is, in the beſt
manner, adjuſted to the time requiſite for the
mind toget ſtored with ideas, and furniſhed with
that ſkill in the uſe of them, which is proper for
full grown powers. Beſides, as we come into
the world, and muſt do ſo according to the
prefent laws of nature, with infant bodies, what
mire fit than that we should have at first in
fant minds alſo ? How unſuitable would a manlj
mature ſtate of mind be, for an infant body? What
miſ-matched companions would they be for
each other? It is moſt proper, as the body flow
lý and gradually advances to its attainable. ma-
turity, that the mind Inould do fo likewiſe. There
is, upon this ſcheme, an apparent adjuſtment
between the two grand parts of the human frame;
and it is all along preſerved in the joint pro-
greſs they gradually make towards the maturity
they are deſigned to attain to. And, it may
bie, that ſtate of tuition and diſcipline we
placed under, while we leiſorely paſs through
the ſeveral periods of infancy, childhood, and
youth, is the beſt fitted initiation into a ſtate of
manhood, or full grown. faculties. It is certainly
of eminent ſervice in many reſpects; as hereby
opportunity is given, while ideas are lecting
into the mind, and the faculties are opening
and
are
316 THE BENEVOLENCE
and expanding, to introduce that attentiveneſs,
teachableneſs
, and modeſt diffidence, which are the
grand preparatives for conſiderable attainments
in uſeful knowledge. And that exerciſe which
we are now called to, and put upon, is the moſt
natural and ſuitable method, not only to ſtreng-
then and improve our faculties, but to form that
habit of induſtry and diligence, without which
we ſhall in vain think of advancing iņ intellec-
tual purſuits. And this leads to the other part
of the complaint, which is,
That'our attainments in knowledge are con-
nected with care and labor; inſomuch that we
can never make any conſiderable progreſs in
underſtanding, unleſs we apply ourſelves, with
diligence, to cultivate and improve our minds.
And here it is queried; Why could not we have
been formed, at once in the ſame degree of
intellectual perfe&tion we are ever capable of at-
taining to And would not this have diſcovered
greater benevolence than is diſcovered in the me-
thod that now takes place? Why ſhould the
benefit of intelligence be truſted, in ſuch a mea-
fure, with ourſelves, and be made to depend
upon cur own induſtry? What'need of ſo much
pains, and ſuch a tedioụs round-about way in
order to knowledge, and the happineſs that is
conſequent thereupon, when it might have been
given at once, without fo niuch ado'? To
which the proper anſwer is that the commu-
nication of knowledge, in the way here, pleaded
for, may be an impoffibility in the natyre of
things
OF THE DEIT Y.
117
:
things : Or, at leaſt, ſuch a communication of
it may be leſs fitted, upon the whole, and all
things conſidered, for the production of so
much good, as is capable of being produced in
the method that at preſent takes place. Per-
haps, the putting intellectual attainments into,
the power of creatures themſelves, in a good mea-
ſure, making them poſſible only in the way of
due care and diligence, is the beſt adapted of
any
method, that could have been pitched upon
to produce the greateſt ſum of happineſs, it is
certain, that if as much knowledge, as we are
ever capable of attaining to, was the abſolute
gift, of nature, and (if the ſuppoſition may not
be thought an impoffible one) a gift beſtowed
at once, upon our firſt coming into exiſtence;
it is certain, I ſay, that knowledge.communicat-
ed this way would not be an endowment that
had any value in it morally ſpeaking : For which
reaſon it cquld not be the ſource of that plea-
Jure, which might have reſulted from it, had
it been an acquiſition of our own. And it can-
not be denied, 'that pleaſure is natyrally con-
nected with the idea of knowledge, as the fruit
of our own induſtry. "We need only attend to
our perceptions, in order to be convinced that
we feel pleaſure in viewing this quality under the
notion of a purchaſe of our own; in the way.
of diligence ; And it is indeed one of the
bigheſt
and nobleſt ſorts of pleaſure we are ca-
pable of enjoying. But, it is plain, this plea-
(ure could not have been perceived ; there
would
$T& THE BENEVOLENCE
would have been no foundation laid for it in
pature, if it was not in our own power, by
care and pains to make intellectual improve-
pent's. If knowledge had been the gift of the
Deity, independently of ourſelves, we ſhould
have had no reaſon, were we endowed with it
in ever ſo high a meaſure, for the leaſt ſelf-ap-
probation on this acconnt : Nor could we rati-
anally have enjoyed that pleaſure which is now
a natural conſequence therefrom. So that the
preſent method for the communication of in-
Fellectual good is a better fitted one for the pur-
poſe, than that which is pleaded for in the ob,
jection"; becauſe knowledge abſolutely communi-
Çated is noi capable of yielding so much happi-
hefs, as that which is attained to, by proper
faculties, in the uſe of labor and pains: For
there would be wanting the cor.ſcious reflection
on our own merit in the procurement of it: We
could not look upon it as our own acquiſtion,
and conſequently could not, unleſs upon à falſe
bottom, perceive that ſelf-approbation, from
whence alone can reſult the nobleft-kind of plea,
ſure we are capable of. The truth is, it is re-
ally beſt that intellectual, and indeed every other
kind of good, is made to depend, in ſo great
a meaſure, upon ourſelves. For it is this that
gives riſe to the various exerciſe of our facul.
ties, affording, at the ſame time, both proper
Scope and reaſon for the ir employment.: Where-
as, if good was communicated without the con.
currence of our own endeavours, it is no t-eaſily
conceivable,
OF THE DEITY.
遵义 ​1
conceivable; how there could have been either
room or reafon for thoſe noble exertions, which,
upon the preſent plan, are properly called f rth,
and ſuitably recompenſed. Beſides, there could
be no ſuch thing as any moral attainment, if
nothing could be acquired by the due exera,
ciſe of our natural faculties. The capacity of
making, acquiſitions, by our own endeavo irs
ſuitably employed, is the true and only baſis
of all our mor at perfection. It is in cunſequence
of this, and this only, that we become capable
of virtue, and worthy of praiſe and commendation:
And had we not this power, we ſhould be
nothing more than meer perceptive beings, who
do not act, but are atteil upon : N rs if we
were thus the paſive recipients only of good,
would there have been any fjundation laid in
our nature, for the higheſt and nobleſt of all plea-
ſure the pleaſure, I mean, which is confe-
quent upon the reflection on good as our own
ettainment, by a right application of our own
powers.
So that, upon the whole, inſtead of coma
plaining of God for nit furniſhing us with
powers, wonderfully contrived tfie us for in-
tellectual attainments, and the happineſs con.
ſequent thereupon, we have reaſon rather to
admire the greatneſs of his benevolence. It
does not indeed appear, wherein he could have
diſplayed his goodneſs, as guided by wiſdim,
more conſpicuouſly than he has done, to an
order of beings in ſuch a world as Qur's, and
as
j
28
THE BÉNÉVÖLÉNCE
as fuiſtaining ſuch a place in the ſcale of intelli
gent exiſtences:
I now go on to illuſtrate thë benevolence of
the Deity, by taking as conciſe a view.as. I well
can of thoſe powers, he has endowed us with;
fitting us for moral happineſs, the higheſt any
being can be made capable of. And thoſe, the
other mental powers, already mentioned, not
being unattended to, are; in général; the fol-
lowing ones.
The firſt power in our nature (call it common
fenſe; moral ſenſe, moral diſcernment; or give
it any other name that may be thought better
is that by which we are enabled ät oncë, with
out the tabor of a long train of reaſoning, to dif-
tinguiſh between moral good, and moral evil,
in alt inſtances that are of primary inportance;
and effentially connected with the good of the
moral world.
There is an unalterable difference between
virtue and vice,or, what me and the ſame thing;
between moral good, and moral evil. They
have their reſpective natures, and are unchange-
able oppoſites. Vicećannot be inade virtue, nor
on the contrary, can-virtue be made vice. They
are in theinſelves what they are, and will remain
ſo without variation, or the fhadow of turning
It is, on the one hand, fit and right, that we ſhould
be pious towards Gid, righteous towards our
fellow-
men, and ſober with reſpect to ourſelves's
and, on the other, unfit and wrong, that we
Ihould be impious towards the Deity, unjuſt
>
in
OF T H È DEIT Y.
121
1
In our treatment of men, and intemperate in
the gratification of our animal appetites : Nor
is it poffible this moral order thould be inverted.
No will, , 110 power, either of men, or angels, or
even the Supreme Ruler himſelf, can make it
right to be impious, inſtead of pious towards
God; or únrighteous, inſtead of righteous to-
wards men; or intemperate, inſtead of fober,
in regard of ourſelves. To ſuppoſe this, would
be to eraſe the foundations of the moral ſyſtem,
to deſtroy the relation that fubfifts between the
Creator and his creatures, and between the
créatures with reſpect to one another, and to
make virtue and vice nothing more than arbi-
trary names, having in themſelves no certainly
fixed nature:
And as virtue and vice, moral good and mo-
Fal evil, are thủs different froin each other, ſo
is this difference obviouſly and at once, pero
ceivable by all morally intelligent minds, unleſs
they have been greatly corrupted. There may
indeed be inſtances of moral conduct; in mati
ters of comparatively ſmall importance, with
reſpect to which it may be difficult to diſtinguiſh
between the right and wrong.. And the analo-
gy here, it may be worthy of notice, is very
exact between the natural, and the moral world.
Light and darkneſs may be fo mixed, that one
can ſcarce know which to call it: Sweet and
bitter may be ſo blended together, that it may
be difficult to ſay which is prevalent. Colors
may be fo dilated, and placed on a portrait,
Q
that
.
122 THE BENÉ VOLEN CE
---
that the eye of a ſkilful painter may not be able
to difcern the preciſe point where one begins,
and another ends. But, notwithſtanding theſe
mixtures, light is never the ſame thing with
darkneſs, nor bitter with ſweet; nor one color
that of another; and they are, unleſs in ſuch coma
plicated caſes, readily and at once diſtinguiſhed
from each other. In like manner, there n'ay
be, and often are, in the moral world, cafes
wherein the boundaries between good and evil,
and the ſpot that divides them, may not be eaſi-
ly, if at all, diſcerned; ſo as to be able to ſay,
with preciſion; here viëtue runs into vice, and
viče into virtue. But this kinders not but that,
in the main and eſſential branches of morality;
the virtuous, and the vicious conduct may obvi-
ouſly be perceived, where the inind's perceptive
power has not been, in a great degree, vitiated;
and hurt. And, in very truth, the God of nature
lias, in his abundane goodneſs, ſó formed our
minds, and given us ſuch a power of diſcern-
ment; that it muſt be owing: unleſs we are ideots,
or madmen, to ſome heinous faultineſs, we our-
felves are juítly chargable with, if we are not
able, without difficulry; to diſcern the difference
betweentight and wrong in the more important points
of moral obligation. Will any man,(who has
not ſtrangely perverted the proper uſe of his
perceptive powers)pretend, that he cannot, or
that he does not, fee it to be fit and right,
on the one hand, that ſuch a creature as he
is; rolnted to God, and dependant on him,
ſhould
:
OF THE DEITY.
123
g
hould yield to him the love of hỉs heart, and
the obedience of his life ; and, on the other,
that it would be unfit and wrong to withdraw
his affection from him, and behave vith diſre-
fpect towards him ? Will any man,in the due ufe
of his difcerning power, calmly and deliberate-
ly fay, that he cannot perceive it to be right,
that he ſhould do to others, as he would they
ſhould do to him, in like circumſtances; and
wrong; unalterably wrong, that he fhould do
otherwiſe ? Will any man, not having darken-
ed his heart, declare, ſpeaking the truth, that
he does not ſee it to be right, that he ſhould
govern his paſſions, and keep his ſenſual ap-
petites within the reſtraints
the reſtraints of reaſon
and wrong
evidently
.. wrong, to give
way to anger, wrath, malice, and to take an
unbounded liberty in gratifying his animal na-
ture? That man, be he who he may, if not
void of com:non ſenſe, is wholly. inattentive to
its dictates, who perceives no moral difference
between revering, and mocking his maker;
between being honeſt and knavilh, in his trans-
actions with his neighbour;.: between' being
chaſte, and lewd ; between living ſoberly and in
the practice of drunkenneſs Or if he does not
perceive the former to be ainiable virtues, and
che latter dereftable, infamous vices. The mo-
Fal diference in theſe, ways of conduct is ſelf-
evident. There needs 'nó argumentation, no:
feries of inter:nediate ideas, to point it out,
Barely mentioning them, provided it is done in
words
3
124 THE BENEVOLENCE
0
words that are clearly underſtood, will at once
enforce conviction, unleſs in feeing, men will
not ſee; in which cafe it would be a vain thing
to expect that reaſoning thould have an effecteak
influence on them. For illuſiration, I fhall
bring to view here a particular inſtance. That
rule of conduct, “ do to others as you would
they fhould do to you;" is ſo evidently fit and
right, that, upon the bare propoſal of it, the
mind at once diſcerns it to be juſt and equal. To
vſe arguments to make it appear reaſonable, ,
would be only to darken the evidence of its bez
ing ſo. No medium of proof could, in this:
caſe; be introduced, which would not more .
need to be proved, than the thing itſelf it is
brought to prove. It is not indeed eaſily con-
reivable, that any map, who has the unders
ſtanding of a man, and is not under undue in-
fluence from evil affection, fhould heſitate one
moment in his judgment as to the ſuitableneſs.
of this moral rule of conduet, its equity is ſo:
obvious, and ſo inſtantly and glaringly ſtrikes
the diſcerning power, we are all naturally fur-
niſhed with. And, in truth, however com=
mon it may be, among men, to throw practi-
cal contempt upon this rule in their treatment
of one another, none do it becauſe they enter-
tain in their minds an opinion of it as an unfair,
unequal regulator of their behavior; but be-
cauſe they are thoughtleſs and inattentive, or
-fuffer themſelves to be enticed, and led afide by
ungoverned pride,paffion and luft of one kind or
another
OF : THE DEIT Y.
I 25
another. This is the true reaſon, why they act
in contradiction to the rule of right, not only in
this, but in all other great and important caſes
in moral life. They indulge theſe and thoſe
vicious gratifications, not becauſe they do not
perceive them to be unreaſonable, but becauſe
they are excited hereto by the luſts of the flesh,
or mind, or both. It is true, the moral power
of diſcernment, as well as the other intellectual
faculties, may, in common with the bodily or-
gans, be ſu debilitated, if not fpoiled, by men's
accuftoming themſelves to do, evil, as to be
unfitted for the proper uſe for which they were
implanted in their nature. And, perhaps,
there are ſome, among wicked men, who, by
having long habituated themſelves to live and
act, as hurried on by the impetus of ungoverned
paffions and affections, ſuch as an irregular love
of themſelves, and their own ſeparate intereſt;
the love of honor; the love of riches; the love
of ſenſuality, and other lufts : I ſay, there are
thoſe, who, by a courſe of thus conducting,
have gradually fo weakened their inoral fight,
as to be, in a great meaſure, if not totally,
unable to diſcern thoſe actions to be wrong,
which are glaringly fo, and appear to be ſa,
with a meridian luſtre, to all who have eyes tº
fee. But this is not the common and ordinary
ftate even of wicked men. There
There are, it may
be, comparatively few, but have ſo much ma-
ral diſcernment, as not to be able to go on in
viçious practice, in inſtances that are great and
heinous,
a 26
THE BENEVOLENCE
not good : Nori
heinous, without remonftrances from within,
They do not ſinfully gratify their appetites, be-
cauſe they have no right, or ſenfe, of its being
unfit, and wrong that they fhould do ſo; but
becauſe they are tempted of their luft and over-
come. The law in their miembers, getting the
better of the law in their minds, influences them
to do that they approve not; yea, many times,
that they even hate; it is fo oppoſite to the light
in them, which ought to be the guide of their
conduct:
* The account I have thus given of that im-
planted power in our nature, which enables us
at once, without labor and pains, to diſcern
the difference between right and wrong in all
great and important inſtances in inoral lifë, isi
I imagine, ſtrictly juſt, and verified to be ſo
by the univerſal experience of mankind. The
plain truth is, we are ſo formed by the Ged of
nature as that we as readily, and with as much
certainty, perceive moral qualities as thoſe that
are poſſible. By the intervention of our bodily
organs, we directly perceive the difference be
tween white and black, ſweet and bitter, and
know that the one is not, and cannot be, the
other. By the diſcerning power of our minds
we perceive, in the like direct and immediate
way, theſe and thoſe qualities of temper and
conduct, and are at once fatistied that they are
either morally good, nyt evil ; or morally evil,
möräl
fined to fome anong men, in diſtinction from
others,
OF THE DÈ ITÝ.
1 27
7
others; but is common to all; as being a power
the wh le human race come into the world en:
dowed with. And it is from this power that
moral reaſoning takes riſe. It fupp ſes ſuch a
perception of moral qualities as is common to
all, and in which all, not having corrupted their
minds, acquieſce as primary principles; and in
theſe, reaſoning, with reference to the moral
world, muſt finally terminate in order to its be-
ing ítrictly concluſive ; and wherein it fails of
doing ſo, by, a non-connection in the chain of
-intermediate ideas brought to view, it is eſſenti-
ally defective ; or ſhould the connection be juſt;
but not diſcerned by any to be ſo, it muſt, as
to them, be the fame as if it was really inſuffi-
cient arguing. Primary moral truths, ſuch as
are perceived, and aſſented to, as ſuch ; and
this, without heſitation, by mankind in commong
in conſequence of that power of diſcernment
they come into being furniſhed with; are the
only baſis on which there can be reaſoning to
any purpoſe anong men, with relation to the
moral ſyitem. Reaſoning powers, if there were
no firſt moral principles, in which mankind
could
agree
without debate; would ſerve rather
to pron'ɔre endleſs wranglings,than virtuous pur-
füics,in oppoſition to thoſe that are vicious. The
author of our beings has therefore wiſely, as well
as kindly, taken care to plant in our nature &
morally diſcerning power, which is admirably
fitte 1 c. diting ih without difficulty, betweera
righr and wood, that weinighi chuſe and purſuç
the
1
128
TH É BENEVOLENCE
1
the former, and refuſe and avoid the latter. In
virtue of this powers and by the exerciſe of it,
if we have not weakened, nor ſpoilt it, we may,
as it were, by a glance of our moral ſight; in all
important caſes, lo perceive the difference there
is in actions as to pronounce with certainty,
that theſe are morally good, thoſe morally evil.
What a noble implantation is this power in our
nature? What a mighty guard againſt vice; and
preparative for virtuous practice ? Wherein
could better proviſion have been for ſuch im-
perfect beings as we are to engage our care to
act up to that which is right, and not allow our-
ſelves in doing what is wrong? We are cer-
tainly laid under the ſtrongeſt obligations of love
and gratitude to that Glorious Being, who has
implanted in us this excellent power, and ſhall
be inexcuſably blind if we do not ſee that he is
benevolent, and baſe to an high degree if we do
not find ourſelves diſpoſed to make our humble
and thankful acknowledgements to him as ſuch.
Another power in our nature is that of ſelf-de-
termination, which gives riſe to our volitions, and
conſequent actions, and is; in true propriety,
the cauſe of them. This power in us nten,
whether it be called ſelf-sletermination, or by
any other name, is the only baſis of moral ob-
ligation. Unleſs this be firſt ſuppoſed, to talk
of moral agency is a contradiction to conimon
ſenſe, and in itſelf a groſs abfurdity. We might,
it is true, without the implantation of ſuch a
power in our nature, in conſequence of a chain
i
of,
1
2
OF Í HE DEIT 129
YY.
..
fects :
of exterior cauſes, not within the reach of our
controil, be made inſtruments in the producti-
on of any' effects which are unavoidably con-
nected with their chain of fatality; ſhould even
volition of choice be one of its links. But
agents, free agents, we could not be, of whom
it might, in conſiſtency with truth, be affirm-
ed that they were the producers of theſe ef-
The author of this chain of cauſes,
which inevitablŷ gives exiſtence to them, is
their reals and only proper cauſe. A power in
man that will fübject his volitions to his com-
inand, and conſtitute him the efficient of thoſe
effects that are conſequent upon them, is the
only bottom upon which agency can, with
the leaſt ſhadow of propriety, be grounded.
There is, in the nature of things, an eſſential
difference between conſcious voluntary machines,
and agents; that is, in other words of preciſely
the ſame irport, beings that are, ſtrictly ſpea--
king, cauſes of the effects that are aſcribed to
them. Such agents are we men ; and we are,
or maybe, as certain ot it as that we polleſs ex-
iſtence. For it is as évident a truth, and as evi-
dently perceived by the mind to be fo. We
do not ordinarily make ourſelves fo ridiculous
as to endeavour, by reaſoning, to prove to our-
Telves that we exiſt. We know that we do
without argumentation, becauſe we feel that
do. It is an object of direct, immediate, and
unavoidable perception, ſuperſeding the uſe of
arguments, and indeed rendering it needleſs,
R
not
130
THE BENEVOLENCE
not to fay abſurd. The fame may be ſaid, and with
equal proprietys of that power;. We are natu-
rally endowed with, which conſtitutes us agents,
or beings that are efficiently the cauſes of their
own .volitions and actions: To go about to
prove this, by a long train of reaſoning, would
be very like holding a candle to the fun, in
its meridian luſtre, för light that we might be
able to fee. It is a firſt, and fundamental
principle in morals, and to be evidenced, not
by arguing, but by an appeal to common ſenſe;
or, in other words, the perceptions of mankind
univerſally. We all feel the exiſtence; and
operation of this power every day we live. The
languige of all the world, their projections;
their purſuits; and the whole frame and order
of their affairs, relative both to this, and the
ſtate that is beyond it, are founded on this fup-
poſition, and would be ſo many downright in-
conſiſtencies, if they were not, from their own
perceptions, fo certainly convinced, that this
ſuppoſition was the real truth, as to admit it
into their minds as fuch without the leaſt he-
ſitation :
Many there were, I know, 'among the pagan
philoſophers, in foriner ages, who thought, and
fome there are among the philoſophers, not to
fay divines, of the preſent age, who-agree with
Stein in thinking, that all effects take riſe from
chain of cauſes, with the Deity at its head as
the only efficient, ſounavoidably linked together,
connected with, and slependant on each other,
that
:
OF THE DEIT Y.
131
that the coming of theſe effects into event, in
conſequence of the unavoidable operation of
theſe cauſes; is not only certain, but abfolutely
inevitable. And they conſider mankind, with
all their powers, as ſo many links in this ad-
amantinė chain, no one of which can poſſibly
fail in the production of the effect aſſigned to it.
Thoſe, among the absettors of this ſcheme,
who are capable of looking forward to conſe:
quences not very far diftant, clearly and fully
perceive its inconſiſtency with nien's being free
agents, and that is totally deſtroys the idea of
moral good and evil. They accordingly de-
clare with an honeſt, frank openneſs, that the
diſtinction that is commonly made between mo-
ral good and evil has no foundation in nature,
however well adapted it may be to vulgar pre-
judices and conceptions. And they are herein
conliſtent with themſelves. And furter, as.
it is ſuppoſed in this ſcheme of their's, that
there is no evil in the creation but what is
: natural, intended for the production of good,
and fo unalterably 'connected with it as that
it ſhall finally terminate in it, by effecting the
complete" happineſs of all, without limita-
tion, or exception, it reflects. infinitely leſs re-
proach upon the Deity. than the ſcheme of thoſe,
who would grafë free agency upon the doctrine
of fatality, and ill-deſert in men, upon the ope-
ration of cauſes over which they have no power;
and, as the reſult of all; fix valt multitudes.
of thein in the place where they ſhall be tor-
mented
!
132
THE BENEVOLENCE
!
inented day and night, without intermiſſion, for-
ever and ever. This is the ſcheme embraced
by: fome at this day, and by fome too who are
called divines, and would be looked upon as
the only orthodox ones among their brethren.
But it is ſo groſsly falſe an one, ſo debaſing
to the nature of man, and ſo diſhonorary to
the perfectly benevolent God, 'that it is ſtrange
any. Thould entertain a favorable opinion of it.
The chief thing they ſay in its ſupport is,
that it leaves mankind at liberty to do as they
ſhall pleaſe, to conduct without reſtraint con-
formably to what they liave willed, and choſen.
And what greater liberty can be deſired ? If
we may not be thought capable of acting mo:
rally well or ill, while we are able, without
hindrance from exterior cauſes, to do as we
chufe to do, what can make us moral agents ?
Whiat more is neceſſary ? What more are ve
conſcious of, from any perception of our minds
The anſwer is at once obvious. It is not true,
that our perceptions go no further than to al-
fure us, that we can do as we have willed, and
are pleafed to do. Beſides this, and far beyond
it, they certify it to us, that we are at liberty
to will or not to will, to chufe or not to chuſe,
the doing of theſe and thoſe actions. We feel
in ourſelves a power over our volitions, and ſuch
an one as enables us to direct, fufpend, ver-
rules or put an intire ftop to them : Nor, un-
leſs we were poffeffed of this dominion, could
we be agents, however great liberty right be
allowed
-
..
133
OF THE DEITY.
allowed us in bringing into event what we have
previouſly willed. It is eſſential to free agency,
and ſuch a uſe of it as to make us capable of
good or ill deſeſts, that our volitions, upon which
our actions follow, ſhould be within the reach
of our cominand. The birds of the air, and
the beaſts of the field, will and chufe what they
d) as really as we men ; and it may, with as
much truth, be ſaid of them, as of us, that they
do as they are pleaſed to do. Their whole courſe
of conduct is the effect of previous choice and
pleaſure. But we never call them agents, nor
do we eſteem them ſuch. And why? The rea-
ſon is, becauſe they have no power over their
volition. They are effects produced in them
by the operation of eauſes, not within their
governing command. The ſame may be ſaid
of inad-men. Their actions are voluntary. They
do nothing, but in conſequence of previous will
and pleafire; but we do not account them ca-
pable either of moral good or evil. Should
they do ever ſo much miſchief, we do not charge
then with ill defert, however loud we may be
in complaints that they are not reſtrained from
doing hurt, by being kept under due confine-
ment. And what is the reaſon of our think
ing thus differentły of diſtracted men, and
others who have the full ufe of their inental
powers ? The true and only reafon is, the for-
mer'are hurried on to volition by a wild im-
petus, over which which they have no power ;
but the latter have it in their power, to reltrain,
ånd-
134
THE B-E-NEVOLENCE
and govern their wills and choices : Nor, una
leſs they were endowed with this power, would
it conſiſt with common ſenſe to think, or ſpeak;
of them as moral agents. If, inſtead of being
the cauſes of their volitions, they were pro-
duced in them as unavoidable effects of an ef-
tabliſhed concatenation of cauſes exterior to
them, and over which they had no dominion,
not more than they have over the palpitation of
their hearts or the motion of their lungs; they might
be conſcious. machines, meer paſſive initruments,
capable of being wrought upon in various
ways; but agents they could not poflixby be.
With reſpect to them, the application of the
words, virtue or vice, reward or puniſhment,
would be nothing better than ſo many unmean:
ing ſounds. Moſt certainly, 'the ideas thoſe
words are made the ſigns.of, in common ſpeech,
could not be applied to them with the leaft
degree of propriety, I might rather ſay, with
out the greateſt abſurdity: What conceivable
abſurdity can be more ſhocking to the human
mind, not corrupted with a falſe glare of vain
ſcience, than for men to commend or blame
themſelves, or for others to do it, for what
they are no more the cauſes of, than of the beat-
ing of their pulſè, and could no more prevent
than the ebbing and flowing of the ſea, the riz
ſing or ſitting of the fun, or the motions of any
the ſtars they fee rolling in the heavens !
sit may be worthy of remark here, this plan
of fatáliſm is wholly the product of metaphy-
fical ſubtilty, and on direct contradičticn to the
in variable
1
1
1
OF THE DEITY.
35
;-..
invariable confciaufnefs, mankind have of a
power within themſelves to give notion to the
faculties, both of their ſouls and bodies. Nay,
even thoſe who pretend to believe the doctrine
of fatal cauſality, directly contradiét... by their
practical ſentiments, and in a ſteady uniform
courſe, what they profeſs:in words. For their
whole conduct in life is juſt as, ther's is, who
really think they are poſielted of an active ſelf
moving power, and are the cauſes of their own
volitionsand the effects conſequent upon then
and, I may add, juſt as it would be, if they
were fully of the fame ſpeculative, opinion.
Their practice in life is a confutation of their
faith in theory:
It is readily allowed, liberty. in man, in op:
poſition to neceſſity; is one of the great wonders
of God. The power in our nature that conſti-
tutes us free agents is an amazing contrivance
of infinite. wiſdom. The modus of its exift
ence and operation is too great a deep for us
to fathom It has tried, and puzzled the
greateſt geniuſſes in all ages, and in all
parts of the world. And, perhaps, we ſhall
never be able, at leaſt on this ſide mortality, to
take in a comprehenſive idea of it. But is this
a good reaſon why we ſhould deny, or diſpute,
the real being of ſuch a power in ourconſtituti-
on? Do any know, or can they,by metaphyſical
ſearching, find out the nexus between foul and
body? Can they tell us how they influence each
other ! And yet, it is certain there is this nexuss
and
136 THE BENEVOLENCE
1
and mutual influence between them : Nor can it
bediſproved by all the fubtilty of vain reaſoning
The Tame' may be ſaid with reſpect to the pow-
er of man over his volitions, and conſequent
actions. The manner of its exiſtence goes bés
yond our' inveſtigation's but the real exiſts
ence of ſuch a power can never be diſproved;
However itmay be darkened and perplexed. We
feel it to be a truth, in conſequence of which
we are in a reafonable ſenſe, maſters of our
felves. Our daily experience, if attended to, wil]
indubitably affure us, that the exertions of our
minds and bodies are under our own dominion.
The plain truth is, ſuch a power in men aś
will make themi cäufes, real proper cauſes, of
their volitions, and the effects conſequent upon
themi; is the grand ſupporting pillar of the world,
tönfidered as inoral. Take this away, and it
ät once falls into deſolation and utter ruit. If
men's volitions, and their conſequent effects,
are the reſult of invåriable: necelfitý, in virtue
of exterior cauſes fó inviolably connected, as
that they will, and muſt, come to paſs; the
aüthor of this connection, (which, according to
this plan, is God) is the only agent in our world,
and the only efficient, and real author, of what-
ever has been, or ſhall hereafter be brought
into event ; not excluding any of the moſt
complicated villanies that have been, or may
be perpetrated by any of the ſons of Adam.
Is this a ſcheme of thoughts fit to be embrac-
ed by intelligent creatures? Will it not die
rectly:
OF THE DEITY
137
1
That the character of God; as a inoral Gover-
kéčtlý, and certainly follow, from the fuppofi-
tion of its truth, that virtue and vice are idle
names, having no reality in nature? That.mer's
accountableneſs to God, and liableneſs to be
puniſhed upon the foot of ill-defert, are vulgar
notions only, incapable of aný folid ſupport:
mor, is a vaïn imagination ? And, in a word,
that religion, whether natural or revealed, is a
-Senſeleſs prétendė, fuired onlŷ to ſerve the pur-
poſes of politicians andprieſts? It would indeed,
upon this ſcheme, be ridiculouſly abſurdto fup-
pofe there ever was, or could be any ſuch thing.
Having thus evinced, from our conſcious
perceptions, that we are the ſubjects of an in-
iward, governing power over our faculties, in
virtue of which we are conſtituted free agents,
as being the true and proper cauſes of our va-
lition, and conſequent actions, it will be eaſy
to point out the benevolence of the Deity in
putting this power in our nature. It is indeed
the moſt important one we are endowed with,
and the orily baſis of the higheſt happineſs, in
- kind, we are made capable of enjoying. Had
not this power been planted in us, we ſhould
have been pallive inſtruments, not-moral agents.
It is this power that diſtinguiſhes us from all
the various claffes of inferior animals, and rens
Mers it poſſible-for us to perceivė pleaſure før
ſuperior in its nature to any, they can be the fubą
jects of. 1 hey have no perception of felf-appro.
bation, from a conſciouſneſs of having done well,
S
nes
1
1
/
+
138 THE BENEVOLENCE
1
-nor of the pleaſure that is the natural reſult
aherefrom. This, perhaps, is the higheſt kind
of pleafure communicable from the Deity; and
it is perceivable only by moral agents. No
beings, to whom the Deity has not
coinmitted
the care of governing their faculties, can, by the
exerciſe of them, deſerve the applauſe of their
own hearts, and enjoy the ſublime fatisfaction
ariſing herefrom : But it is within the reach of
the capacity of all fuch to feel this ſelf-appro-
bation, and conſequent pleaſure; and they, may
go on in this enjoyment with continually in
.creaſing degrees, in proportion to the degrees
of virtưe they diſcover in the good government
of theſe various faculties, they are entruſted
with the care of. What a nobly intereſting power
is this, that makes us free agents, as, by doing
ſo, it makes us the capable percipients of hap-
pineſs more highly exalted, in kind, than it
could otherwiſe have been ? It is not conceiva-
ble, wherein the perfectly benevolent Being
could have made a better, and, at the faine time
á wiſer proviſion for our enjoyment of the high-
eſt kind of happineſs : Eſpecially, if it be re-
membered, that he has conſtituted ſuch a con-
nection between this happineſs he has made us
capable of, and the actual enjoyment of it, as
that it cannot be enjoyed but in conſequence of
a right exerciſe of that power, which characters
iſes us moral agents ; by which means,
coming to the enjoyment of this happineſs, we
may be the ſubjects of, is a conſtant, continually
abiding,
our
1
OF THE DEITY139
cy.
.
abiding, and powerful motive to 'engage our
eare thus to exerciſe this power in our nature.
What an admirable contrivance for our good is
this? How amazingly does it illuſtrate both the
wiſdom, and benevolence of God! It may fur-
ther enlarge our idea of this benevolence; if it
be conſidered, that our Creator has, in like inan-
ner, conſtituted a connection between careleſsneſs
in the exertion of this power, (or., in exerting it
an undue wrong manner with ſelf-diſapprobation,
and conſequent uneaſineſs. This, it is.poflible,
may appear to fòme, at the firſt glance; an oba
jection againſt the Divine benevolence; rather
than a proof of it. But a little attention will
fhew the contrary: What was the deſign.of our
maker in thus connecting diſapprobation and
uneaſineſs
' with a careleſs, inattentive; and wrong
exertion of the power that conſtitutes us agents ?
Was it that he might make us unhappy? No.5
but quite the reverſe: It is an expedient he
purpoſely contrived; a connection he wiſely and
kindly conſtituted, that he might prevent our
making ourſelves. miſerable: His view was, that
we might perpétually carry in our own-breaſts a
powerful motive to make curſelves happy.. And
one of the moſt conſtraining motives it is to put
us upon fo uſing our determining power; as that
we may hold: exiſtence with felf-approba-
tion and that heart-felt pleaſure which reſults
the refrom. I may properly add yet further here,,
this command we are entruſted with over the
exertion of our faculties, and a right uſe of iter
are
:
140
THE BENEVOLENCE
are the true and only baſis of that approbation
of our Maker, and that confciouſneſs of it with,
in ourſelves, upon which is raiſed, that inward
peace and ſatisfaction of faul which yield tho
higheſt reliſh to life, and have in them a ſuf-
ficiency to ſupport and comfort us under all tho
various viciſſitudes, trials, and events, we may
be called to paſs through, while in the world,
and, what iš moręinconceivably more, this
inward fenfe of the approbation of God, the
foundation of which is the right uſe of the power
of decermination we åpe endowed with, is that
only, which can rationally relieve us in the view
of death, and inſpire the hope of a glorious,
immortality beyond the grave, as the reward
good God will beſtow upon thoſe, who have act-
ed their part well on the ſtage of life. Some,
perhaps, inay bé diſpoſed to treat the notion of
happinętš, as taking riſe from the approbation
of God, and the percepcion of it in the breaſt,
with fñeering contempt. But they oughit, with-
out fear of giving them any juſt occaſion of of-
fence; to be freely told, they are fo formed by:
the author of nature, that they could not be
chargable with this guilt, if they had not firſt
corrupted, and in a great ineafure ſpoilt, their
perceptive powers, by having walked according
to the courſe of this world, fulfilling the deſires
of the fleſh and inind, : It is, beyond all doubt,
owing to this, if any can find within themſelves
a diſpoſedneſs to prophane this highly important
and intereſting matter with banter and ridicule,
If
OF THE DEITY,
147
If there is ſuch an exiſting being as God (as
there moſt certainly is) his approbation muſt
be worth more than all earthly good, and á
conſciouſneſs that we are the objects of it muſt
yield inward delight, greater than can be con-
ceived of by thoſe whoſe affections are ſet upon
the inanițely lower pleaſures of time and fenfe
Free agency, in oppoſition to neceſſity, is that
only which can, in confiftency with reaſon, pre-
pare the way for what we mean by the ap-
probation of God. And it is an argument of
his benevolence, and the greatneſs of it, that
he has ſo made us, as that, by ą right uſe of
our powers, we may attain to a conſciouſneſs
of being the objects of this approbation, and
a perception of pleaſure in conne&tion herewithin
or conſequent hereupon, whichexceeds all other
pleaſurable lenſations, while yet it is only a fore-
taſte of far more noble and exalted pleaſures
at God's right hand forever.
Belides what has hitherto been ſaid, it may be
further worthy of notice, our being free agents
is that which not only makes us living images
of the Deity in that perfection ofhis nature which
is his greateſt glory, but capable percipients, in
a degree, of that happineſs which is his higheſt.
Did the exertions of the Divine Being take
riſe from the fame neceffitý as-his iminenſity,
or eternity, he would not be a free agent. In
order to this, he muſt be poſſeſſed of a power
aver his yolitions, as well as a power of exer-
ptian in conſequence of which he has willed and
choſen.
1:S
21
Our
142 THE BENEVOLENCE
choſen. Had he not this power, it would be
abſurd to attribute to him that liberty, which
is inſeparable. from free agency · Nor would
any diſplays of his perfections
, be morally van
luable in the leaſt degree, as they would; in this
cafe, be the effects of natural neceffity, not of
free choice. It is their being exertions, föllow.
ing upon what was freely willed that gives them
the denomination of moral, and claiins our:
love and gratitude. This power in the Deity>
which enables hin with freedom, in oppoſition
to, neceffity, both to, will, and to do, is his
greateſt glory. And it is, perhaps, froin the
exerciſe of this power, that his bleſſedneſs, in
the enjoyment of himſelf, principally flows.
Now, by the implantation of a like power to,
this in our nature, we are inade after the ſimi-
ļitude of God; and, by a right ufe of this.
power, we are capable of being, in a noble:
degree, happy as he is, and with the like kind
of happineſs. Without .controverſy, the moſt
exalted happineſs, it is poſſible we ſhould en
joy, is that which is connected with, and depen.
dant on, a free, but wiſe and good; uſe of that
power, in the exerciſe of which we may manis
feſt it both to ourſelves, and others, that we are
benevolent, holy, juſt, faithful, and, in a word,
perfect, according to our meaſuré, as God is.
perfect. Had we not this power, we could be
happy in no other ſenſe, than that in which all
neſs could not be the reſult of our own choice; in
the
OF THE DEITY.
143
the free exerciſe of our powers' ; but the effect
ef exterior cauſes, over which we had no com-
mand. We might, it is true, in this
, way be
in a degree, happy ; but our happineſs would
not be worthy the name, in compariſon with
that which ariſes from a morally good conduct,
in conſequence of a right uſe of that power which
makes us free agerts. It may be ſubjoined
here, the Supreine Being would not have been
so happy as he might have been, had not this free-
dom of will and choice been one of the glorious
perfections of his nature; and the exerciſe ofthis
perfection is invariably accompanied with de-
light. He is ever pleaſed with his elections,
and they are a ſource of eternal fatisfaction to
him. The ſame may be ſaid of us men, all
due allowance being made for the infinite fupe-
riority of God to ſuch creatures as we are. : We
could not have been ſo happy without freedom
of choice, as we may now be in conſequence of
our being endowed with it. It is with plea-
ſure we view ourſelves as dignified with the
power of free election, and the exerciſe of this
power is always attended with fatisfaction ; but
with fatisfaction of the higheit kind, and in
the higheſt degree within the reach of our capa-
cities, when exerciſed in a due manner, and in
conſiſtency with what is right and fit. If we
cannot diſcern the benevolence of God; and the
greatneſs of it, in iimplanting this power in our
nature, it ſhould ſeem as though it muſt be be-
cauſe we have ſo blinded our eyes that we can,
not,
144 THE B EN EVOLENCE
not, or hardened our hearts that we will hot, feel
and own it to the praiſe of the glory of his
goodneſs:
Another power ſtill; relative to moral agen-
cy, and an highly beneficial one, is confcience:
No one will deny, that this is one of the powo
ers -implanted in our nature. It is an object
of immediate perception. We all feel, or have
felt, its operation in usa
It would carry me too far out of the way of
my preſent deſign, ſhould I enlarge in afcet-
taining with preciſion the more ſpecial office of
this power, in diſtinction from the other powers
we are endowed with. It may, however be need-
ful juſt to ſay, that its office is that of a witneſs,
not of a lawv-giveř: The work appropriated to
it is, 'not to point out to us the virtues we ought
to practice; or the vices we ought to avoid;
which would be to invade the province of ſome
other of our powers; but to be in our breaſts
a teſtifier for, or againſt us, as we have donë
that which we knew to be right, or wrong. The
apoſtle Paul has given 'us a very exact account
of the work of conſcience; in his epiſtle to the
Romans. Speaking there of thoſe Gentiles, in
his day, who, not having the revealed law, yet
practiſed, from the principles planted in their
nature, the duties which this law preſcribed, he
ſays; they herefrom made it evident, that they
were not wholly deſtitute of a rule or ſtandard
for their moral conduct, for that the law of
God appeared from hence to be; as - it were,
engraven
ز
}
OF THE DEITY.
J45
engraven on their hearts.: Upon which he adds;
their conſcience alſo beäring witneſs, and
their thoughts the mean while accuſing or elſe
excuſing one another." This great apoſtle ac-
curately diſtinguiſhes Here between is the law
written on the heart," and « conſcience;” not
making it the work of conſcience to tell men
what the precepts of this law were, but to tef-
tify in their favor, or disfavor, as they had
been either obedient or diſobedient to thein ; in
conſequence of which their thoughts either ac-
quit or condemn them. This witneſs-bearing
power of conſcience may, it is true, be ob-
Itructed in its influence, and diverted in ſuch a
yariety of ways, that the deſign and tendency of
its implantation in us may not be fo fully anſwered,
as might be wilhed. Virtuous men may, through
Luperſtitious fears, wróng notions in religion,
unreaſonable jealouſies and fufpicions, loſe in a
great meaſure, the advantage that would other
wife ariſe from the teſtimony of conſcience in
their favor. And vicious men by blinding their
eyes, and hardening their hearts, may fo hinder
the operation of its witneſs, as that the check
it would give to their mad courſe of conduct
is, in a manner, taken away. But it is capable,
even with reſpect to ſuch men as theſe, of being
ſo rouſed as that its voice ſhall be hearkened
In ſpite of all their efforts to the contrary,
it will affure them, and upon teſtimony carrying
with it ſtronger evidence than a thouſand our
ward witneſſes, if God has not been in their
T
thoughts
146. THE BENEVOLENCE
19
thoughts, but they have behaved with irreverit
ence and undutifulneſs towards him; that they
are impious wretches; if they have gone on in
a courſe of fraudulent, unjuſt dealing, that they
are knavés; and if they have accuſtomed them
felves to an intemperate, unchafté, lewd way of
living that they are thorough-paced debauchees.
In there, and-fuch like caſes, it will ſay to them,
a's Nathañ did to David, * Thou art the man.'
How advantageous a power then is confcience ?
Howkindly, as well as wiſely, is it adapted to prom
mote; on the one hand, tlie right exercife of our
moral liberty, and; on the other, to reſtrain us
from all vicious practice ? Our Creator theres
forè has manifeſted benévolence in giving this
power a place in our conſtitution. And his be
nevolence will ſhrine out with yet more conte
ſpicuous Iuftre, if we go on, and confider the
affection's, or paffions, he has annexed to con
fcience, as auxiliaries in order to anſwer the
end of the implantation of this power in us:
They are ſuch as theſe
...!!!
Joy, úpon its giving teflimony to a man's healin
ving acted his part well. If there are any, who
have not felt the working of this affection, it
muſt be becauſe-it was never in the power of
conſcience to ſet it in motion. For the plea-
ſurable ſenſation to which we give the name of
joy is naturally connected with its witneſs to a
man's having done what was right. The apof-
tle Paul has expreſſed this in very fignificant
words.” Says he, « This is our rejoicing, the
teſtimony
.
.
147
1
i
espe
OF THE DEITYteſtimony of our conſcience, thar in fimplicity,
and g: diy ſincerity, not by fleſhly wiſdom, but
by the grace of God, we have had our conver-
fation in the world." And what he has.thus faid
rience. A converſation ordered; not by the
wiſdom of this world, but by the rule of itrict
virtue, will put it in the power of conſcience to
tell the man, whoſe character this is, that he has
dine well, upon which,, agreeably to a: Divine
eſtabliſhment, that affectionunleſs. obſtructed
in its motions will be excited, which will
yield joy much,greater, both in kind and degree,
than their's, whoſe only pleaſure is that which
takes, riſe from their bodily ſenſes. A moſti
kins and powerful-incentive thisz, to: virtuous.
practice.
And as the witneſs of conſcience, when-in fac.
vor of a man, is connected with joy; fo is its
teſtimony; when againſt him,, accompanied with."
Thame. This is a paſſion we can much better:
underſtand the meaning of by internal feelings.
than: by outward: defcription. And we are
none of us ignorant of what is intended: by:
it, aş we have often had occaſions, from our:
own pereeptions to know what it is.. Its pro-
per object is, that which is, in, its nature,, re--
proachful. And as, nothing is more reproach-
ful than moral deförır, ity, nothing is more pow-
erfully fitted to excite. the exerciſe of this
palin.
And the God of nature has ſo formed
him that we cannot eaſily avoid the motion of
thame,
:
ز
A
14&
THE BENEVOLENCE
cs. Were
ſhame, upon having made ourſelves morally
deformed, eſpecially when conſcience ſhall ſpeak
to us, and tell us that this is our juſt character..
There have all along been, it muſt be owned
and there now are thofe, who, by debauching-
their minds, and weakening, if not deftroying,
their natural ſenſibility, have, in a manners,
eradicated the innate principle of ſhame, being
able, without a bluſh, notwithſtanding the power
of conſcience, to do thoſe things which are-
groſsly ignominious, and reproachfül. This is:
emphatically expreſſed, by Jeremiah, in theſe
words, «. Thou haſt a whore's forehead; thou,
refuſedſt to be aſhamed." And again,
they aſhamed, when they had committed abo-
mination ? Nay, they were not at all ahạmedi
neither could they bluſh.". But this is not the .
ordinary ſtate of viciouş men. Few, compara...
tively, are fo blinded, and hardened as not to,
be filled with confuſion of face, when conſcience
tells them in direct and poſitive terms, that they
have been, and know that they have been, adol-
terers, fornicators, oppreffors, extortioners, and
the like. Such is the turpitude of theſe vices,
and fuch the fi:itableneſs in their nature, to excite
thame, that this paffion, when they have commitz
ted theſe abominations, and conſcience teſtifies:
to them that they have, will be put into moi
tion, in a lefs or greater degree, even by an ef-
tabliſhed conſtitution of heaven, till the very
paſſion itſelf has been fo debilitated, a's to have
No:power to raiſe abluih. And it is in kindnels.
to
OF THE DEITY.
A
to the world, that the God of nature has im,
planted in man this paſſion of ſhame. It is one
of the ſtrongeſt reſtraints froin an undue, wrong.
uſe of our moral liberty. And was it not for
this powerful reſtraint, mankind would be more
abandoned to vicious conduct than they now
are, as we may reaſonably conclude from the
mad behaviour of thoſe, who, by their debau-
cheries, have ſo ſuppreſſed the operation of this.
paſſion, as that they are able, notwithſtanding
its implantation in them, to commit abomina-
tions in almoſ every kind, without being alham-
ed of what they have done, But it may be
worth remelnbering here, even theſe ſhameleſs
livers in the practice of vice may, upon ſome
folemn alarm in providence, have their con:
ſcience fo awakened, as to bear witneſs to their
abuſe of their moral liberty in fo lively and
powerful a manner; as to difenable them to
Took back upon their paſt follies without the.
einotion of ſhame, and to a degree that will
not ſuffer them to live at eaſe. The exact
truth is, Such is the moral deformity of vice,
fuch its ignominious and diſgraceful nature,
that it is naturally fitted to excitė ſhame; and
there will accordingly be the perception of it
in the breaſts of wicked men, whenever they
live in the practice of it, and it is teſtified to
them by conſcience that they have done ſo, till
by an habitual courſe of immoral conduct, they
have fo blinded their eyes, and ſtupified their
their hearts, así to be paſt feeing and feeling.
There
.: ;;
A
350 THE BENEVOLENCE
ing
There is yet another paffion. capable of being.
excited upon the witneſs of conſcience against
a man, and this is that uneaſy fenſation; which
ſignified by the words, remorſe, regret, hirror:
of mindia Few there be, perhaps none, but:
have felt, in a greater or leſs degree, the mean,
of theſe words, and of the paflion inten.
ded to be pointed out by them and they
know allo and from inward perception,
that it is a kind of uneaſineſs quite different in,
its nature from every other. It is eſſentially:
connected with ſelf-condemnation, a conſciouſ
neſs, and feeling of ill-deſert, upon having:
done wrong. And the pain of mind capable
of being excited herefrim is inexpreſſibly great..
The wife Solomon has ſaid, “a man may ſuſtain:
his infirmities, but a wounded. ſpirit who can
bear ?". And this ctfervativn of his has cften:
been verified in experience. Such has been
the preffure of remorſe, in confequence of the
teſtimony of conſcience, that it has exceeded the
patient's art as well as ability to live under it
without ſenſations of diſtreſs beyond all deſcrip-
tion. Some may difpoſed to think, that this
is an argument of defect in the diſplay of the
Deity's benevolence, rather than an iſlustration of
its greatneſs, But ſuch a miſtake in their appre-
henfions muſt ariſe from not duly, conlidering the
deſign, and tendency of the connection between
this remorſe, and the witneſs.of conſcience againſt a
man, which is, that he might be powerfully
guarded againſt vicious practices which wilt.
nos
5
OF THE DEITY .
}
not only deprive him of the happineſs that is
peculiar to morally good conduct, but expoſe
him to ruin as the final reſult of a licentious;
debauched courſe of life. In this view of the
matter, the bitterett reinorle, from a fenfe of
guilt, is an argument of kindneſs in our Maker";
yea, of the greatneſs of his bénevolence in thus
taking care that we might be happy, and not
miſerable.
I have now laid what was in my intention to
offer, in illuſtration of the Divine benevolence,
in the proviſion he has made by the conſtitus
tion of the nature he has given us, that we might
be morally happy.
Before I proceed, I ſhall ſubjoin a thought not
unworthy of notice, through it ſhould be a dia
greſſion. It is this.-The paſſions of ſhame,
and remorſe, upon the conviction of conſcience,
are not only an illuſtration of the Deity's be-
nevolence, in guarding us againſt an ill uſe of
our elective power, but a ſtrong proof that we
are endowed with this power. Every one knows,
from what he has felt within himſelf, the diffe-
rence between thoſe uneaſy fentations, that are
occaſioned by evils, which are the effects of
exterior cauſes, whoſe operatinn is neceſſary,
and over which we have no command, and
thý ſe that are the production of our own folly, in
miſuſing the power we have over our own vo*
litions. Uneaſineſs will be excited in a man's
breäſt, when he meets with diſappointments,
loftes, and misfortunes, which were brought
upon
i
4. THE BENEVOLENCÉ
1
upon him by mechanical cauſes, in a train of
neceſſary operations ; but he will not feel re-
morſe, ſelf-condemnation, and conſcious guilt.
And why? The true reaſon' is, becauſe theſe
evils, however grievous, are the effects, not cf
his own will, ör choice, but of cluſes extrinſick to
himſelf, and whoſe operation it was not in his
power to counteract. A mån that is born.
blind may feel the emotion of uneaſineſs on
this aựcount, he may be forry; and wiſh he had
not come into exiftence with this defect ; but
he cannot reproach himſelf for it, or feel the
leaſt degree of guilty, remorſe : Whereas, if he
loſt his right by an intemperate, debauched
courſe of living, he will, if eonſcience is ſuffered
to do its office, be ſelf-conden ned; and filled
with bitter reſentinenţs againſt himſelf. In like
manner; if the lightning of heaven ſhould de-
ftroy the life of his wife, or child, he would feel
the working of grief, but not of ſhame, or re-
morſe :: Whereas, if he maliciouſly laid violent
hands on them, and new them, he would, if
he was not 'a: monfter, reproach and ë ndemn
himſelf, feeling that bitter remorſe which Aows
from great conſcious guilt. What now ſhould
be the reaſon of theſe different ſenſations ? It
can be no other than this, that there is a differ
rence in the cauſe of their production. If a man
had no power over his volitions, but they were
the effects of invollable neceſſity, in virtue of
a previous cončatėnation of cauſes, he would
be no incre to blame, nor could be any more,
tho
1
1
OF THE DEITY:
153
the
ſubject of remorſe, than fire which occafions
miſchief, or a ſtone that break's á man's head by
accidentally falling from fome height. The
plain truth is the ſenſations of ſhame and remorſe
are grafted on the ſuppoſition of liberty of choice,
in oppoſition to neceſſity:. Take away this li-
berty; and conſider men's volitions; not in their
power, But as effects produced in them by cau-
ſes exterior to them; over which they have no
controul; and they are not; nor can be; the
Subjects of blame;, ör of that ſhame, and re-
morſe; which flow from it. And as we are fo
conſtituted by the author ofotif beings; as that we
fhall; and mult, blamé ourfelves in conſequence
of certain volitions and effects proceeding from
them; and feel frame and reinorſe upon this ac-
count; it ſhould ſeem as evident as it well can
be, that we have within ourſelves a power to
Will; ör Hot to will; to chuſe; or to refuſe.
We certainly think we have this power; and we
havė, at the ſame time, as much reaſon for this
conception; as we ſhould havez if this was the
real truth. And if it is not, we are ſo made
as that, by deception blended with our very na.
ture; we are inevitably infitienced to condemna
ourſelves; and feel thë anxieties of guilt, and
bitter remorſe, for what we are no more the cau-
fes of, and no more worthy of blame for,
than being laid ſenſeleſs by an apopleckic fit
or a ſtroke of the numb-palíy.
I now go on, in as brief a manner as I wel
- gan, farther to illuſtrate the Divine benevolence
U
from
:
|
THE BENEVOLENCE
154
from the providential care he has taken; not
only to perpetuate the exiſtence of percipient
beings, in all their various claffes, but to ſup
port them in life, and to render it, agreeably
to their reſpective natures, comfortable and plea-
fant to thein.
Exiſtence in our world is perpetuated, with
reſpect to all the claſſes of percipient beings,
not by a continued prolongation of life in the
fame individuals, but by a ſucceſſion of others of
the ſame kind, in their room, as they, in va-
ricus periods, are taken off froin the ſtage of
time. And an adınirably wiſe and benevolent
contrivance this is for the beſtowment, and en-
joyment, of more life and happineſs, than there
could have been, if exiſtence had been perpetu-
ated without death, in the ſame individuals
as we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to point out
particularly. In the mean time, it is to be
obſerved, that this fucceſſion in percipient life
is effected conformably to a general eſtabliſhed
law, that of propagation, which extends to all
orders of percipient beings, from the higheſt
to the loweſt. Almighty God, without all
doubt, could, if he had ſo pleaſed, have con-
ſtantly ſupplied the place of all individuals, ofeve-
ry ſpecies, as they ceaſed to be here any longer,
by bringing new ones into being, as he did the
firſt of our race, by immediate creation ; but
he choſe rather to do it; by the intervention
of ſecond caufes, operating under his influence
and direction. It would have argued benevo-
lence,
OF THE DEITY.
ISS
lence, and to an high degree, had he: perpetu-
ated life and enjoyment in the former of theſe
ways ;- but, as his benevolence is always mani-
feſted under the guidance of wiſdoin, he has
preferred the latter of them; and with good
seaſon. For amazing ſkill and contrivance are
daſplayed in: carrying into effect this law of
propagation; and it is ſo done; in concurrence .
with other wiſely contrived laws; as to föt off
the goodneſs of God in the moſt conſpicuous.
luſtre. This is a point we ſhall more fully
conſider afterwards in its proper places ſhall
therefore only fåy at preſent, if the giving of
life, and a capacity of enjoying happineſs, to
vaſtly various claſſes. of beings, with innume-
rable individuals in every claſs, is a proof of
benevolence, it muſt be a greatly enhanced evi-
dence of it, tu perpetuate this life, and capa-
city of.. enjoyment; in fò many ſucceſſions,
through all ages, from the beginning of tine.
It will ſurely betray blindneſs, of intellectual
fight; or badneſs of heart, if we cannot diſcern
the diſplay of riches of goodneſs, in thus mak-
ing proviſion for prolonging, and multiplying,
both life and happineſs to: ſuch millions of
creatures:
The manifeſtation of the Divine benevolence
is likewiſe marvellouſly conſpicuous in the care..
God:continually takes for the preſervation and
comfort of life in all the claſſes of percipient
creatures, however numerous, when, by pror.
pagation, they are brought into exiſtenca
Το.
:
156 THE BENEVOLENCE
To fuppoft: life, ſo as that it may be enjayed
with pleaſure, in a ſingle individual only, ara
gues benevolence, it wilt argue it, in a ftill
:
higher degree, hould it be ſupported, with
enjoyment, in a claſs of percipient beings, CON-
taining a goodly number of individuals : But
how anazingly muſt the argument riſe in
ftrength, when the claffes of creatures, are nu-.
merous beyond conception, and the individuals,
in thoſe claſſes much more {Q.! Did we behold,
among men of large ability to do, good, one
who found within himſelf a heart to provide
and diſtribute ſupplies to hundreds of perſons,
conflicting with the ſtraits, and difficulties ari.
fing from poverty, and in fuch noble meaſures.
as to render life pleaſant to them, and ſaw him
going on doing this in a ſteady uniform courſe,
accounting and feelipg himſelf happy. in the
fatisfaction of others from the communications,
of his bounty : I ſay, if we knew of ſuch a mann,
what would be our ſentiments of him in regard
of benevolence : We ſhould think him a mi-
racle of goodmefs. We îhould never mentien
his name but with honor, and eſteem him wor.
thy to be held in high reputation by all who
have any degree of rationaf moral diſcernment.
But what a nothing is the benevolence of this
good man, in compariſon with the benevolence
of God, whoſe bounty: daily ſupports millions
of inen, and numberlefs inillions of inferior
creatures, has ſupported thein through thouſands
of paſt fucceffions in life, and will yet ſupport
them,
OF THE
657
DEI TY
1
them, having ſettled an eſtabliſhinent herefory
till tiine fhall be no more.
The preferving providence of God extends
even to vegetables, who, in all their kinds,
and individualsi bave life though with-
out perception ; which lite is preferved and per-
petuated by fucceſſion, and fo as to manifeſt all-
wife goodneſs, though nor to thoſe exiſtences
thémfelves, not being capable of enjoyinent,
yet to others, whos together with life, are en:
dowed with a perceptive power. Of thefe I
am now more particularly fpeaking, and they
are all the providential care of a good
God. We maintains life in then, in their nu.
merous claſſes, and fill more numerous indi-
viduals, and carries it on to its appointed ſtate
of maturity, and perfection, and all along withi
a balance of pleafure in their favor. Whether
they are men or: beaſts; whether they are fowls
of the air, or frlhes of the fear whether they
are infects, or other animals fo low in the des
fcending. fcale of fubordination, as not to be
viſible to human fight, but by the help of glaſs-
es; the benevolent God is the grand eficient
in ſupporting their life, and providing for its
comfort. It is true, they are both ſupported,
and provided for, by the intervention of fecord
cauſes ; but, far froin leflening, this increafes
the greatnefs and glory of the Divine gnodneſs.
Did God immediately preſerve and happify
{ife in his creatures, the beneficence hereby
#iſplayed would be confined to a ſingle act of
his
158. THE BENEVOLENCE
mediate power.
his power only; but as he does this by:a train
of intervening means, and inſtrumental .cauſes
his goodneſs. is, as it were, multiplied in pro-
portion 10. the variety of theſe wiſely adapted
means and cauſes. For they are all; inſtances of
goodneſs, as truly as one iinmediate act of
powa
er would be. A very ſenſible writer has per-
tinently expreſſed himſelf upon this head, in
theſe words; whatever God effects by the
interpoſition of means, and a train of interme-
diate cauſes, he could: produce by his own im-
He wants not clouds: to:
diſtil rain,
nor human induſtry to make
the earth fruitful nor the fruitfulneſs of the
earth to ſupply foods nor food to ſuſtain life.
He could do this by his own immediate power
But he chooſes: to maniſeſt his providences,
power, wiſdom, and goodneſs; in a variety of
inſtances, and diſpoſitions.; and yet, his power .
and: goodneſs are not only as much concerneds:
and exerciſed, in this way, as if he produced
the end without the intervention of means, but
even much more : Becauſe his power, wiſdom,
and goodneſs, are-as much exerted, and illuftra«.
ted, in every ſingle intermediate ſtep, as if he
had done the thing at once, without any in-
termediate ſtep at all. There is as much powe .
er, wiſdom, and goodneſs exerciſed: in; produ-
cing rain, cr. in making the earth fruitful, or
in adapting food to the nouriſhment of our bo-
dies : I ſay, there is as much power, wiſdom,
and goodneſs, exerciſed in any one of theſe
ſteps,
OF THE DEITY. ,
159
.
miker
iteps, as there would be in nouriſhing our bo-
dies by one immediate act, without thoſe in
termediate means.". In the method of preſer-
vation therefore, which God has pitched upon,
he has in admirable wiſdom contrived fo to
exerciſe his goodneſs, as both to multiply and
beautifully diverſify the diſplays of it. For this
is the real truth, with reſpect to every inter-
mediate ſtep in the way of preſerving provi-
dence. It is by vapors exhaled from the earth
and feas, by the heat of the ſun, that the
- clouds are formed : it is from the clouds that
the rain falls; it is by the rain, and other con-
curring caufes, that vegetables of every ſpecies,
with their individuals, are preſerved in life and
growth; it is by means of theſe vegetables, that
innumerable multitudes of inferior perceptive
creatures are ſupplied with food ; and it is from
both theſe, that we men, the higheſt order of
beings in this lower world, are nouriſhed and
ſupported in life and vigur. What an aſtoną
iſhing train of intermediate inſtrumental cau,
ſes are held out to view, as made uſe of in
carrying on the great and important work of
preſervation! And yet, every one of theſe in- ,
ſtrumental cauſes, as intended, eſtabliſhed, and
adapted, to accompliſh the preſervation of life,
manifelt goodneſs, and, to a marvellous degree,
as truly as if it was effEted by one almighty act
of immediate power ; ând as juftly give occa-
fion for grateful acknowledginents to that in-
finitely benevolent being, who is thus good to
all
!
100 THE BENEVOLENCE
1
all his creatures, and cohtinually fo, as he eveint
moment concurs with each one of theſe varis
ous ſubordinate cauſes bý whole operation; un:
der his influence; they are to provided for aš
to be ſupplied with the fupports of life.
It may with pertinency be added here, that the
beñevolence of God, had it not been diſplayed
under the guidance of perfect wiſdoi), would
probably have preſerved life; in the creatures
to whom he had given it, in an immediate way
by one continued ſingle act of power: But his
goodneſs, as manifeſted in fuch a way, would
have been leſs, far leſs than in the way of in-
ftrumental means and cauſes, the way in which
it is now done: In order to convey a clear and
jun idea of this; let it be obſerved;
It is not conceivable; how the inferiof cream
tures, in any of their claffes; could have had
pleaſure in life, had it been ſupported without
means, by a continued ſingle act of almighty
power. For it is by the means employed in
preſerving their life, that they are che percipi-
ents. of moſt of that enjoyment they are made
capable of. Was it not for the focd they live
upon, and the ſatisfaction they take in procur-
ing, and then eating it, of whát advantage
would life be to them? In what way could they
enjoy it, or be happy in its continuańce to them?
It is owing to the wiſdom of God, in fo contriv-
ing to preſerve their life, as that his gordneſs is
not only manifeſted, but the manifeſtation of it
is multiplied in proportion to the multiplication
of
:
OF THE DEITY,
161
1
of the means that are uſed to this end, for that
theſe means give riſe to the delight they take
in life. Had your life been preſerved by an
immediate act of power, where ſhould we have
looked for tlie happineſs proper to their re-
ſpective natures? Their life, fo. far as we are
able to judge, muſt have been preſerved'in vain.
There would have been nothing, which could
have yielded them pleaſure. The admirable
contrivance diſcovered in their various ſenſes,
and ſuiting objects to them, would have been
to no purpoſe. Both their ſenſes, and theſe
objects, would have been altogether uſeleſs.
They could not have been the means of gra..
tification to them.
And the fame may be ſaid of us men, fo far
as we agree with the inferior creatures, as to
our animal part. We, as truly as they, are ſo
made with reſpect to our bodies, that life, con-
fidered as bodily only, would have yielded us,
comparatively, little or no delight, had it been
ſupported by an immediate exertion of the pow-
er of God. There would, in this caſe, have
been no room for thoſe inſtrumental, ſecondary
cauſes, in the adminiſtration of providence, which
are now, not only the means by which we are
continued in bodily life, but the means alſo by
which our life, in this view of it, is ren-
dered pleaſant and happy to us. To what
purpoſe was the wiſdom of God employed, in
ſo curiouſly contriving our bodily faculties, and
adapting fo great a variety of objects to give
W
theın
162
THE B È NÉVOLENCE
!
them pleaſure; if it was not, that he might difa
play his goodneſs, and the riches of it, by pre-
ferving life in a way, that ſhould be cloſely
connected with making it, at the ſame time, de-
firably ſweet and pleaſant ? And this goodneſs
of his is enlarged in proportion to the number,
variety; and adaptation of thoſe objects; which
are, at oncé, the means both of preſerving life,
and rendering it inore happy than it could have
been; in the way of power immediately exerta.
ed from above
But the goodneſs of God, in the work of
preſervation, with reſpect to us men, is not
confined, as it is in regard of the inferior crea;
tures, tổ tlie animal pleaſure only; which he has
connected with his continuing us in life, and
the mediate way in which he does it. For, as
we are endowed with intellectual and moral
powers, as well as bodily ſenſes and appetites;
we are made capable of happineſs, and in a no
ble degree, by the exerciſe of theſe powers upon
the very means, and inftrumental cauſes, by
which we are fupported in life. The amazing
contrivance God has manifeſted, in the forma
tion of our bodies with fenfes and appetites; and
in the adaptation of ſuch a multiplicity of ob-
jects to give them ſatisfaction within reaſona:
ble limits, is, a vaſtly plentiful ſource of plea-
ſure to the mind; as well as body, but in a far
ſuperior and more exalted kind. Is the body
To fitted, by its make, to be ſupported, and, at
the ſame time, delighted by this variety of
objects,
OF THE DEITY.
163
objects, the mind alſo is fo framed, as to be
capable of being much more delighted in the
view. it may take of the riches of wiſdom and
ſkill, the Deity has manifeſted in fo contriving
the method of fuftentation, as that, by means.
of it, we may, enjoy the happineſs that is ſuited
to the nature of intelligent, as well as animal
beings. The conſtitution, indeed, of the earth
we live on is ſuch, that moſt of its producti-
ons appear to have been intended, as they are
well adapted, to carry into effect the work of
preſervation, fo as that, we might not only be
ſupported by à vaſt variety deſirable for food,
raiment, and the reaſonable gratification of our
bodily appetites, but that, we might alſo take
occaſion, even from this very way in which our
bodily life is fupported, and with pleaſure, fo
to exerciſe our mental powers, as that, unleſs
it be owxing to ourſelves, we may be even
more happy as intelligent, than animal crea-
tures, And we may be ſtill inore happy as
moral beings. For among all the objects in
nature, though they are inconceivably multi-
plied with variety, there is not one that is ſuited
to the preſervation and comfort of life, and made
uſe of by the Deity to this purpoſe, but what
affords juſt matter for, and a powerful excite-
ment to thoſe religious, devotional, grateful
acknowledgments" to our daily preſerver and
benefactor, which conſtitute no ſmall part of
that moral happineſs, we are made capable of
There are, perhaps, fèw truly pious perſons, but
have
164
THE BENEVOLENCE
ܝܪ
have felt more pleaſure in contemplating, admirin
ing, and adering the amazingly wiſe,and benevo-
lent way, in which they are ſupported in life
with ſo much comfort, than they ever did from
the gratification of their bodily ſenſes. They
certainly nright ; and if they have not,, it muſt:
be afcribed to the dullneſs of their moral per-
ception, or a faulty perverfion of it.
The truth is, had the preſervation of life, in
the creatures on whom God has beſtowed ex-
iſtence in this world, been affected by a ſingle
continued exertion of Almighty power, there
would not have been that multiplied manifeſa
tation of the Divine goodneſs, which we have
now ſo r:uch reaſon to admire, and te tliank-
ful for. The alwiſe God; no doubt, eculd
have made man, and the other percipient be-
ings on earth, and preſerved them in life, by an
immediate act of power ; but then their make,
and the way in which they might be fitted for:
the enjoyment of happines, muſt have been,
in many reſpects, diferent from what it now is,
and the whole ccriftitution of the world alſo
muſt have been modelled čpen a different
plan. Poffibly, there may be ſuch creatures,
exiſting in fuch a world. But for ſuch crea-
tures as exiſt in ſuch a w:rld as our's, preſer-
vation in life, not by ſecundary inftrumental
cauſes, but an intediate twarciri
f power,
would be fo far from increafire, that it wild
leffen, the manifeſtaticns if the Divine beneve-
lence. For, in the latter of theſe ways, its ma-
nifeftation
OF THE
165
DEIT Y.,
nifeſtation would be confined to one act only,
whereas, in the heavenit is manifeſted in every
intermediate ſtep, and is conſequently diverſi-
fied, and multiplied, in proportion to the num-
ber, and variety of them.
There is yet, in the adminiſtration of provi-
dence, another proof of the Divine goodneſs,
and a more ſtriking one, to thoſe who are believ.
wers in revelation, than any that have been
mentioned. It is the redemption of man by
Jeſus Chriſt.
This great work of God, as we are told in the
ſcriptures, from whence alone all our knowledge
of this matter muſt be ferched, took riſe from
his rich love, and diſintereſted good will towards
the race of man. The infinitely good God,
(if we máy depend upon the bible) was not exci.
ted to purpoſe, or contrive, or reveal, or exe-
cute the goſpel-plan of ſalvation, by any mno-
tive extraneous to himſelf, but benevolence of
heart was the true fource, and the only one,
from whence it all proceeded. Had not God
been moved by the eſſential, immenſe goodneſs
of his own nature, he would not have coine in-
to it. The movement hereto was within himſelf.
He conſulted his own bowels of love andınercy,
and from hence it was, that he employed his
wiſdom to contrive it. It ſprang from this
ſource antecedently to all other conſiderations
Whatever,
I
But
166 THE BENEVOLENCE
and itir up compaſſion in him that ic.was. loves
But then it ſhould be minded, the million
of his own fon from heaveny into our world
to become incarnate, that he might by being:
obedient to death, make atonement for the fins
of men, and we his exaltation, in conſequence
of this. obedient ſubmiffion, at the right hand
of God, to finiſh the worky he had begun on
earth; are the grand means' by which this ſtu-
penduous benevolence of the Deity, in the
buſineſs of ſalvation, is carried into effect. Onlys
it ſhould be carefully obſerved, that neither the
incarnation of the bleſſed Jeſus, nor any thing he
ever did, or ſuffered, or may be now doing
in heaven, are to be conſidered as the original
motive to the plan of redemption. For the in-
tervening mediation of Jeſus Chriſt was poſterior
to, and conſequent upon, this good will of God,
and one of the glorious effects of it. The .
fcripture always views it in this point of light.
Some may have expreſſed themſelves, ſo as to:
lead one to think that the blood of Chriſt was
Hits Thed to pacify the reſentments of God, and
to produce in him a willingneſs to become
reconcilable to ſinful man; But ſuch a mode
of conception is highly injurious to the father
of mercies, and utterly ſubverſive of that be-
pevolence in God, to which even the appoint-
ment of Chriſt to be the Savior was originally
owing. So far was the blood of Chrift from
being intended to work upon the heart of God,
and
.
OF
F T HỀ D E L T 7.
1
16
فر
1
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and becauſe he delighted in mercy,that her ſpaa
red him not, but: delivered him up for us all."
The incarnation, obedience, ſufferings, and
death of Chriſt are therefore to be conſidered as
the way, or method, in which the wiſdom of
Gud thought fit to bring into event the redemp.
tion of man.. And a moſt wiſely concerted me
thod it. is. In this way, mankind are obvit:
oufly led into juſt ſentiments of the vile nature;
and deſtructive defert of fin ; as alſo of that fa
cred regard, which God will forever ſhew to
the honor of his own governing authority :
Nor could they, in any way, have been more
powerfully engaged to turn fiom their iniqui-
ties, and ſubmit to the government of heaven;
as preparatives without which they can have
no reaſonable hope of being happy. Perhaps,
there is nothing more powerfully ſuited to
work on the human mind, iinpreſhing it with
an holy awe and reverence of the Divine Mas
jeſty, hatred of fin and reſolutions to forſake it; tham
à ſerious turn of thought to the ſorrows and ſuffer-
ings of Jeſus Chriſt, appointed by the wiſdom of
an infinitely benevolent God, as the only way,
in which he has judged it expedient to admit
his offending creatures to the benefit of a par:
don: What horrible ideas inuſt that man en-
tertain of fin, what adorable apprehenfionis of
the authority, the righteouſneſs, and holineſs of
the great Governor of the world, who conſiders,
in a believing, realiſing, affecting manner, what
the bleffed Jeſus did, and ſuffered, in his ftate
ef
1
568
THE BENEVOLENCE
of humiliation, as the only method conforma-
bly to which the alwiſe God, though infinite-
ly good, has thought fit to make the grant of
'
forgiving mercy?
Though this method of our redemption by
Jeſus Chriſt appears to be a wiſely concerted one
for the diſplay of the Divine benevolence; on
account of the reaſons we have mentioned; yet
we may; at preſent, be ignorant of other rea-
fons which concur to make it for We mult
indeed be acquainted with the whole affair of
redemption, that is, with the whole effect that
would have been conſequent upon ſin, and the
whole: effect of deliverance from it, and this
throughout our whole exiſtence; and we muſt
alſo be acquainted with all the ways, in which
there may be a connection between the media
ating work of Chriſt, and ſalvation, before we
may, with any face of propriety, prétend per-
fectly to fee into the wiſdom of this method of
God's manifeſting his benevolence. It may be
a mean moſt wiſely connected with its propoſed
end in ways unthought of by us at preſent. :
Nor is this an objection of any weight againſt
its, fitneſs as a inean well adapted to accoma
pliſh its end. For it is a certain truth, that
moral ineans often look forward to diſtant fua
turity, and the wiſdom of their connection, with
the end to be effected by them, is not diſcerna
ed, at leaſt in perfection, till the end and the
means can be compared with each other. The
ſtate of things, for inſtance, under the Moſaic
diſpenſation,
OF THE DEITY. 169
1
difpenfation, was, according to the new-teſta-
ment repreſentation, a moral mean in crder to
fome future, diftant enå; and its fitneſs, as ſuch,
was little underſtood till the diſpenſation of
the Meſias': Nor is it yet ſo clearly and fully
perceived, as perhaps it may be, even in this
world, in the spining days of greater light and
knowledge; and certainly will be in that world;
where we ſhall có know even as we are known!
And this is undoubtedly the cafe; with reference
to the method of our falvation by Jeſus Chrift:
It was contrived by God, in order to his wiſely
diſplaying his benevolence towards finners. And
the ſcripture has ſaid enough to ſatisfy us for
the preſent; that it is a wife and fit method, par-
ticularly in thoſe ways wherein we have thewn
it to be fo : But there is no need of fuppofing,
that it has fully revealed the whole of what
may. be known in another world?, tending to il-
fuſtrate the wiſdom of it'; what I mean is that
Tevelation may not have explained in direct, and
poſitively clear and full terms; wherein the
obedience of Chriſt to death” has virtue and
efficacy in the affair of man's redemption, as
à wiſe, fit, and benevolent inean in order to
this end. And, perhaps, it might not be con-
venient it ſhould, had it been poftible.
But ſome may fay, this method of ſalvation;
through the mediatory doings and ſufferings of
Jeſús.Chrift, inſtead of magnifying the benevos
lence of the Deity, is rather a diminution of it,
if not an inconfitency with it. And ſo it really
X.
would
:
170 THE BENEVOLENCÉ
would be, if God had wanted pity, and the dea
fign of the mediatïon of Chriſt had been to
excite it in him ; but this was no part of the
intention of his undertaking for finners. For.
it was God who fent hi in upon this work ;
and he was moved to it from his own bowels of
mercy. His own infinite benevolence of heart
put him upon ic : Nor ſhould we ever have
heard of Chriſt, or of the way of redemption
through him, if the motive hereto had not been
; within the breaſt of God. This is the account
the ſcripture always gives of the matter. Says
our Savior himſelf, “God ſo loved the world,
that he gave his only begotten Son, that who-
ſoever believeth in him ſhould not periſh but
have everlaſting life.” Every word in this
text is emphatically expreſſive of the truth we
are upon.” God ſo loved the world,” ſo greatly,
ſo inconceivably ; was ſo moved by the origi-
nal, eſſential, and eternal goodneſs of his na
túre, that “ he gave,” that is, of meer mercy
and free favor ; without any thing obliging, or
conſtraining him hereto ; he gave “his only
begotten fon," and for this moſt benevolent
end, that " whoſoever believeth in him ſhould
not periſh, but have everlaſting life.” You
obſerve, the gift of Chriſt, through which
we have redemption, ſprang originally from the
love of God. His own merciful nature put him
upon the beſtowment of this gift, änd upon no
leſs a deſign than the ſaving of men from deſtruc-
tion, and opening a way for their admiſſion to
life
of-
OF THE DEIT Y.
177
:
for us.
life and immortality in heaven. The ſame ac-
count is frequently to be met with elſewhere in
the , new-teſtament books. Says the apoſtle
Paul, “ God commendeth his love towards us,
in that, while we were yet ſinners, Chriſt died
You perceive ať opce, that God's love
is here repreſented as that which gave riſe even
to Chriſt's dying for us.
To the like purpoſe
is that declaration of the apoſtle John., « In
this was mani feſted the love of God towards us,
becauſe that God ſent his only begotten fon
into the world, chat we inight. live through
him.". And the ſame thing is either expreſſ-
ed, or implied in many other paſſages in ſcrip-
ture, which it would be needleſs to mention.
And wherein could the Deity have inore illuftri-
ouſly diſplayed the greatneſs of his benevolence,
than by the conftitution of his own ſon to be
the medium through whom Lalvation ſhould be.
communicated to us ?
It may perhaps be faid, Had God, by one ſin-
gle act of free, ſovereign grace, without any in-
tervening means, proclaimed his readineſs to
pardon finners, and admit them to his favorable
notice, would he not have manifeſted more
goodneſs, have more conſpicuouſly diſplayed
the riches of his grace, than he could have
done in any other way?
It would, no doubt, have been evidential of
goodneſs, if God had thus made an abſolute fo-
vereignr grant of pardoning, ſaving mercy to the
finful fons of men ; bu i there would in this way,
have
1
172
THE BENEVOLENCE
/
have been a far leſs“ manifeſtation of it, than in
the method the goſpel reveals. Had the work
of preſerving providence been effected by a fina
gle act of almighty power, though it would
have argued goodneſs it would not have done
it, as hias been fhewny, with ſuch conſpicuous
variety, and enlargedneſs, as by the interven-
tion of means, and inftrumental cauſes. The fame
may be faid, with like truth, of the work of
redemption. As it is carried into effect, not by
an abſolute ſovereign grant from Godbut in
à mediate way, his benevolence is more glori-
oully illuſtrated than it otherwiſe would, or
eould have been. For it is as true, with re-
ſpect to redeeming grace, as preſerving good
neſs, that it is inhanced by every intervening
ſtep by which it is carried on, and in proporţi-
on to the number and important worth of theſe
ſteps. It argues benevolence in God, that he
ſhould find within himſelf an heart to enter-
tain a thought of faving ſinful man ; his bene-
volence is greater, in that he should be willing
to find his own Son, from heaven into our
world, in order to accompliſh this purpoſe of
his heart; the benevolence is ſtill heightened,
in ſending him, though in the form of God,
to take : upon hạm " the faſhion of a man ;">
and it riſes beyond all conception, when we
behold this Son of his love, after he had aifu-
med human nature; " becoming obedient ta
death, the death of the croiſs," hereby making
way for the beſtowrient of pardoning, faving
mercy,
+
OF THE DEIT Y,
173:
mercy, ſo as that the beſtowment of it ſhould
be honorary to his perfections, and the autho-
rity of his government as Ruler of the world,
Surely, the goodneſs, as well as wiſdom of God,
are diſplayed much more illuſtriouſly in this me-
diate way, than if it had been effected by one
meer ſovereign act of grace! Yea, ſo far as we
are able to judge, more benevolence is inani-
feſted in this method of our redemption, than:
in all the other works of God's providence ;
and we have abundant reafon given ús, upon this
"
occaſion, to admire and exclaim, “Herein is
love, not that we have loved God, but that.
he has loved us, and ſent his fon to be the
propitiation for our ſins! O the breadth, and
length, and depth, and height of the love of
God! It pafſeth all understanding.",
PART III,
174 'THÉ BENEVOLENCE
PART
III,
.
Anſwering the principal objections which have beers
urged againſt the benevolence of the Deity.
TI
HE traces of goodneſs are ſo viſible, in
every part of the creation we know any
thing about, particularly in this world of our's,
and in the formation of man, his implanted fa-
culties, and the methods by which, according
to eſtabliſhed laws, under the government of
providence, they may be improved to his be-
ing as perfect and happy as can reaſonably be
deſired, that it is ſtrange' any fhould call in
queſtion the Creator's benevolence: And yet,
no one of his attributes have been more vió.
lently attacked. The great difficulty objected,
is the evil there is in the world. This world
of our's, and mankind in particular, its nobleſt
inhabitants, which are repreſented as monuments
of the Deity's goodneſs, are mentioned as proofs
of a deficiency in this very point.
Say theſe objectors, if an infinitely benevo-
lent Being is the Supreme Creator, and Ruler,
whence came thoſe imperfections, and poſitive
evils, which abound in the world, and which
all ranks of creatures are ſubjected to ? How
ſhall we account for the miſeries, in innumera-
ble kinds, which men in particular lie groan.
ing
OF THE DEITY,
175
>
!
ing under 3. What ſhall we ſay of the many dif "
eaſes, accompanied with torment of body, and
anguiſh of mind, to which they are liable, and
which finally put an end to their preſent ſtate
of exiſtence ? And could theſe things be ac-
counted for, who can reconcile that moral ir-
regularity, which has been introduced into the
world, and its direful effects, with the ſuper-in-
tending agency and government of a being
abſolutely holy and good ?
This, in general, is the difficulty pleaded.
And a very great one it is; but a difficulty, it
may be worth remarking, as we paſs along, not
levelled againſtChriſtians only,or the religion they
profeſs, but againſt all religion, natural as well
as revealed : Infomuch, that let men's religion
be. what it may, whether they are Jews or Hea-
thens, Deiſts or Chriftians, they are equally em-
barraſſed with it. For it being a fure fact, that
fin and miſery are in the world, if they believe
that 'a wiſe and good God made and
governs it, they are all under like obligations
to do what they can to reconcile theſe two
things, which have ſuch an appearance of in-
conſiſtency with each other. And this accor-
dingly has been the endeavor of perſons of
all different religions, in all parts of the world.
W bence came evil ?, has indeed, in all ages,
been a perplexing queſtion ; and no one, it
may be, has more puzzled the greateſt pre ..
tenders to reaſon, as well as religion.
IB
176 THE BÉNÉVOLENCE
Ít was this that gave riſe to the ſcheme of
two independent oppoſite principles in the univerſe;
the one good, from whom is derived every
thing that is gocd; the other evil; from whom
is derived every thing that is evil, whether natural
or moral. It is obfervable, even this Manichean
xotion, however ridiculous, is yet founded on the
ſuppoſition of ſuch evidences of goodneſs in the
creation, as are too glaring to be denied: The
fault therefore of the ſyſtem is, not ſo much that
it diſputes the exiſtence of a benevolent cauſe, as
that it weakly imagines the exiſtence of ano-
ther oppoſite one; equally powerful and inde-
pendent; the ſuppoſition of which two co-or-
dinate Deities looks too much like an arbitrary
contrivance, invented only for the ſake of re-
moving away the difficulty ariſing from the
appearance of evil
. To be fure, it is an opi-
nion ſo far from being founded on ſolid proof,
that it cannot be ſupported by any argument
fetched from the principles of true reaſon. It
is indeed a ſcheme utterly deſtructive of itſelfe
Forthefetwo oppoſite principles being, by ſuppo-
ſition; perfectly equal, it is impoſſible there ſhould
have been, either good or evil, unleſs by their mu-
tual conſent in operation ; and it is impoffible
alſo there ſhould have been this conſent, upon
any other plan than that, of the production of
good and evil in equal proportions. And is
this the truth of fac ? So far from it, that, in
the whole circle of exiſtence, there is no ap-
pearance of ſuch equality. The truth is;, the
uniform
OF THE DEITY.
177
uniform, invariable tendency of nature, with
reſpect to all the creatures we know any thing
of, is their perfection and happineſs within
their proper ſphere : Nor can it be truly ſaid
of any ſpecies of creatures that they do not ac-
tually attain to the enjoyment of good, much
out-weighing the evil they are obliged to fuf-
fer; which could not have been the caſe, if
there was. ' exiſting an evil power of opera-
tion equal to the good one. Some of the crea-
tures, upon this hypotheſis, muſt have carried
the marks of the evil principles that produced
them, in the tendency of their conſtitution to riſe-
ry, balancing the tendency of it to good: Other-
wile, there would not be an equality in the ex-
'ertions of theſe oppoſite equal powei's.-But I
need not enlarge in the refutation of lo pal-
pable an' abſurdity. However, the difficulty,
which occaſioned it, deferves to be ſeriouſly and
thoroughly debated. And this will be more
clearly and intelligibly donė, by going over its
ſeveral parts; and treating the diſtinctly as ſo
many objections.
Only, it may be fit to make one previous
general remark, which I eſteem an important
one, and defire may be kept in mind through
the whole that may follow. It is this; that no
objection ought to be eſteemed ſufficient to fet
aſide the poſitive proof, that has been giver of
'the Deity's benevolence, which,when thoroughly
'examined, will be found finally to terminate in
IGNORANCE.
What I mean is, that no appear:
Y
A
ance
178
THE BENEVOLENCE
ance in nature, capable of being alledged, ought
to be looked upon as concluſively arguing an
inconſiſtency with goodneſs, MEERLY or ONLY
becauſe we may not be able particularly and ful-
ly to point out their conſiſtency with each other :
I ſay, meerly or only for this reaſon, becauſe
there is an evident difference between our not
particularly diſcerning wherein the conſiſtency of
two things lies, and clearly perceiving that
there is a real inconſiſtency between them. And
could any appearance be alledged, between
which and infinite goodneſs, the human mind
clearly perceives a real inconſiſtency, it is "rea-
dily confeſſed, it would be a fufficient reſtraint,
in true reaſon, from attributing this perfection
to the Deity. But the caſe is quite otherwiſe;
where the aimount of all that can be ſaid con-
cerning any appearance is only this, that it
ſurpaſſes our ability particularly to trace the
ways, wherein it may tend to good. And ſhall it
be thought ſtrange that there ſhould be, in na-
ture, appearances of this fort'? It is no more
than might reaſonably be expected, conſidering
the imperfection of our faculties, and incapa-
city therefrom to view the works of God as con-
nected with, and dependant on, each other, in
the Divine plan of operation. No eye but
God's can take in the whole ſcheme of creation
and providence. And therefore it is probable;
the higheſt order of created beings are inca-
pable of feeing perfectly into the reaſons of the
Divine conduct. Much leſs may it be thoughts
that
OF THE DEITY.
179
that this ſhould be the privilege of ſuch com-
paratively low, weak creatures as we are. So
far arę we from comprehending the connection
of the univerſe in its various parts, their mu-
tual. dependence on, and ſubordination to, each
other, that our knowledge is confined to a few
beings and things in it, and to a very ſmall part
of the folieme of God, even with reſpect to theſe.
And ſhall it then be counted an objection of any
weight againſt the goodneſs of God's works,
that we are not able, in every inſtance, to ſee
wherein they are connected with good? Ought
it not rather, to be concluded, as to ſuch in-
ſtances, that the defect lies, not in the tendency
of God's works, but in our incapacity to connect
thein together, and view them in the reference
they bear to each other? This
This is certain-
ly no inore than a fit expreſſion of humility and
modeſty in ſuch fort-ſighted creatures as we
are. And it were to be wished, that our inqui-
ries into the meaſures of the Divine conduct
were more generally made under the habitual
influence of theſe principles. I would not be
miſunderſtood in what I now fay. I have no
intention to reſtrain mankind, imperfect as they
are, from reaſoning with all freedom upon the
preſent, or any other ſubject, wherein the De-
ity is concerned: Much leſs have I it in view
to ſtop the mouths of objectors, only by bid-
ding them be humble and modeſt, becauſe God
is above them, and his ways and thoughts high
above their's as the heavens are high above the
earth
180. THE BENEVOLENCE
6
earth. I am ſenſible, that humility duly regu-
lated by reaſon and religion, as it ought al-
ways to be, is no enemy to the freeit debates,
not thoſe which relate even to the proceedings,
of God. It is the pretence of humility, not
the principle itfelf, that makes an out-cry against
ſuch inquiries. And to this falfe humility, at
leaſt in part, it may be owing, that fo many ab-
ſurdities, horribly reproachful to the nature
and government of God, have been enibraced
in the world. It has dirbtlefs too often be
trayed men into ſuperftition and bigotry, giving
them a mean, abject caſt of mind, whereby
their intellectual faculties have been very much
unfitted for the right diſcharge of their proper
office. This, in truth, is the rock which-mul-
titudes have ſplit upon; not conſidering that
ſubmiflion even to the Deity ought always to
be exerciſed under the conduct of reaſon and
good ſenſe. And if thus exerciſed, though it
will be an effectual reſtraint from pride and ar-
rogance, keeping men within the ſphere of
their powers, and making them modeſt and
cautious, eſpecially in regard of the things which
they are able to consider not in their intire con-
nection but fingly and as ſeparate parts of fome
great whole: Yet, it will, at the ſame time, put
them upon due care and pains, in the uſe of
th faculties, that they know the truth ; it
will diſpoſe them freely and fairly to hear and
examine whatever may be decently offered
on both ſides of a queſtion, that they may be
rationally
OF THE DEITY.
181
ز
rationally prepared to make a wiſe and impar-
tial judgment in the caſe ; in a word, it will
influence them to forrn their ſenti nents, not
according to the authoritative deciſions of men,
or the opinions generally prevailing in the pla-
ces where they live, but according the truth
of things ſo far as they are able under the
advaittages they are favoured with, be they
more or leſs.
It will not be ſuppoſed after ſaying this,
that the preſent remark is made with a view to
take Shelter under the pretence of that humility
anil inodeíty, which bec:ime creatures, eſpeci-
ally ſuch in perfeit ones as men are, towards
the great Creator. It is freely confeſſed, there
are many things, poſible to conception, which
are abſolutely inconſiſtent, in true reaſon with
infinite benevolence. And it is as readily con-
ceded, that we are endowed with faculties, ena-
bliny us clearly and certainly to diſcern this
inconſiſtency : Inſomuch that no folid reaſon
can be affigned, why we ſhould call in queſtion
the truth of our perceptions in this cale, any
more than in others. And ſhould we do it, in-
ſtead of humility and ſubmiſſion, I fee not but
we ſhould diſcover downright contempt of our
implanted powers. And, in truth, could any
appearances, in all nature, be produced between
which and infinite goodneſs the human mind
could, clearly perceive a real, poſitive inconfiftency,
it could, acting rationally, aflent to it as true
that there was exiſting an infinitely benevolent firſt
cauſe,
182 THE BENEVOLENCE
caufe. Here therefore is full ſcope allowed for
the objectors in the preſent diſpute. And if
they are able to produce, in the whole compaſs
of being, any appearances that will excite in the
minds of rational agents the idea of a real, uns
doubted. inconſiſtency with goodneſs, it is granted,
their end is anſwered, they have argued con-
cluſively. But then, it ought to be acknowled-
ged, on the other hand, that if theſe appear-
ances, in their laſt reſult, center in ignorance,
and only prove that our capacities are ſcanty,
and not formed to take in the whole of what is
proper to be conſidered in the caſe ; and that
good, the greateſi good, may be the production of
theſe appearances, in the end, for all that we
know, or can prove, to the contrary , I ſay, in
this view of the matter, it ought to be ingenu-
qully confeſſed, that ſuch appearances, in ſtrict
seaſoning, conclude nothing againſt the beneve-
lence of the Deity. For this is certainly the truth.
of the caſe. And all the reproach that is re-
flected on the Divine goodneſs by this kind of
arguing can reaſonably be looked upon as no
other than the effect of ignorance; not to ſay
pride and arrogant preſumption, in taking upon
us to judge and determine in matters ſo evis
dently beyond the reach of our powers.
This general obſervation, which I believe
no one will deny to be juſt, I eſteem fully ſuf-
ficient to anſwer the general objection againſt
the benevolence of the Deity, which has been
brought from the appearances of evil in the crea
ation,
OF
183
T ĦË D È Ì Ť
ation. However, I ſhall not content myſelf
with this general reply, bet proceed to a diſtinct
confideration of the particular objections con-
tained in the general one above-mentioned
And they may be reduced to theſe three, the in-
perfeEt powers of ſo many of the creatures who are
capable of happineſs; the moral diſorders which
have taken place in the world; and the natural
evils which are fo numerous, and turn ſo much
to the diſadvantage; eſpecially of man.
I. The firſt objection againſt the infinite be-
nevolence of the Deity is taken from the imper-
fe&tion of ſo many of the creatures on this earth
of our's.
What a diminutive creature, com-
paratively ſpeaking, is even man, the moſt per-
fect of them all ? How ſmall his capacity for
happineſs? And how much finaller ſtill the
capacities of the inferior perceiving beings,
through their
ſeveral ranks, in the de-
ſcending ſcale, of ſubordination ? And
could it be thus, if God was infinitely
good ? Could not án infinitely benévolent Cre-
ator have communicated nobler capacities for
happineſs? And if he could, how can his not
doing it be reconciled with the idea of him as
an infinitely benevolent Being ?
In anſwer to this difficulty, it may be faid,
the bringing into exiſtence an abfolutely per-
fect creature is not within the reach of infi-
nite goodneſs, aided by almighty power. The
very idea of a' créature is eſſentially connected
with comparative imperfection ; as it derives
its
|
184. THË BËNË VOLEN C E
its being from another, is dependent on that
other for its continuance in being, and is nex
ceſſarily finite in its nature and powers. To ſupa
poſe a created being infinite, would be to ſup-
poſe it equal with its Creator ; which is too
abſurd to be admitted. Abſolute perfection
therefore is an incommunicable glory of the
only true God. And ſhould there be a crea-
tion; comparative imperfection muſt exiſt in it;
otherwiſe it could not exiſt at all. Conſequently,
if ſuch imperfection is an evil, it is ſuch an one
as muſt take place, or there could be no diſa
play of the Divine benevolence. --But the truth
is, meer imperfection is no evil; to be ſure no
poſitive one : Nor may God, with the leaſt
propriety; be conſidered as the author of it:
This matter has been ſet in a clear and ſtrong
point of light by Arch-Deacon Law, in his
32d. Note on Arch-Biſhop King's “crigin of
ovil.”. His words are theſe, “God is the cauſe
of perfection only, not of defeet, which ſo far
forth as it is natüral to created beings hath no
cauſe at all, but is meerly a riegation, or non-
entity. For every created thing was a negatiön
or non-entity, before it had a poſitive being,
and it had only ſo much of its primitive nega-
tion taken away from it, as it had poſitive be-
ing conferred on it, and therefore, fo far forth
as it is; its being is to be attributed to the fo-
vereign cauſe that produced it : But ſo far
forth as it is not, its not being is to be attri-
buted to the original non-entity out of which it
wan
1
OF THE DEITY
was .produced. For that which was once moz
thing would ſtill have been nothing had it not
been for the cauſe that gavę being to it
and therefore, that it is ſo far, nothing ſtill; (that
is, limitted and
defective;) is only to be attriby.
ted to its own primitive nothingneſs. As for 137
Itance, if I give a poor man á hundred pounds
that he is worth lo much money is wholly
owing to me, but that he is not worth an hun
dred more is.owing wholly to his own povera
tý. And juſt ſo, that I have ſuch and fuch
perfections of being is wholly owing to God,
who produced me out of nothing; but thac
have fuch and ſuch defects of being is only owing
to that non-entity out of which he prodjiced me.
It will probably be ſaid here, we ſee in the
creation innumerable beings with implanteg
faculties, making them the capable percipients
of happineſs in indefinitely various degrees
come in an higlier, others in a lower," ţill we
-have got down to the loweſt we can conceive
bf. Can this be the work of an infinitely benevo-
lent Being.? Would he have made ſo many crea-
tures fo imperfect, as to be capable of happineſs
in ſuch low degrees only? If it was his pleaſure
to bring beings into exiſtence, from non-entity,
Would he not:if infinitely good, have endowed
Ithem with higher and more noble capacities for
happineſs? The obvious anſwer is this, if in
la création, in which there are beings inconcei-
-vably various in their capacities for happineis,
there may be the cominunication of MORE
Z
GOOD
1
186 THE BENEVOLENCE
، ܪ
GOOD, than could otherwiſe have been come
municated, it is ſo far from being an objection
againſt the Divine benevolence, that theſe be-
ings of lower capacities for-the enjoyment of
happineſs were brought into exiſtence that it
is at once an illuſtration, and ſtrong proof of it:
It is readily owned, if the whole reſult of com-
municated good was nothing more than the
production of fuch imperfect beings, às are ca
pable of happineſs in a low meaſure only, it
might be thought the Deity, if infinite in bénevo-
lence, had been wanting in the manifeſtation
of it. But, if there are other beings gradually
riſing, in the ſcale-of exiſtence, to an incon-
ceivable height in their capacities for the en-
joyment of happineſs, and of the moſt ſuperior
kind too; why ſhould it be thought ſtrange,
that there ſhould be imperfect ones alfo, in the
like gradually deſcending 'ſcale ? Eſpecially, if
they are all conſidered as parts of fome CRÉAT
WHOLË, feverally concurring to inake one uni-
verſal, gleriouſly connected ſyſtem; capable of
yielding as much good, as the infinitely be-
nevolent Being, guided in his exertions by
unerring wiſdom, has thought fit to commua
nicate.
In this view of the matter, it is not necef.
ſary, that every ſyſtem making the univerſal
one, or that every creature in each ſyſtem,
ſhould be equally perfect. For, though, with
reſpect to particular ſytiems, and beings, com
pared with one another, there ſhould be ever
fo
OF THE" DEITY: 7
18
fo great a diverſity ; yet this ought'not, in rea
fon, to be eſteemed an objection againſt th
Divine benevolence, if, upon the whole, ther
is the diſplay of as much good as infinite wit
dom has thought proper : Nay, upon ſuppoſitio
there may, in this way, be the communicatio
of more good, than in any other, it would b
an objection again t infinite benevolence, if, i
was not in this way diſplayed. The creatio
is, in fact, a diverſified one. It therefore lies up
on the objectors. againſt the benevolence of th
Deity to make it appear; that lefs good is capa
ble of being communicated upon this plan, tha
might have been upon fo ne other. Until thi
is done, which never will be, as it has never ye
been, no complaint can reaſonably be mad
againſt the Deity, as having been wanting i
his benevolence, on account of bringing int
exiſtence a creation, diverſified in the manne
we ſee this is in which we hold our beings.
There are only. two ways in general, in whic
an infinitely benevolent caufë is ſuppoſed capa
ble of exerting itſelf in the communication o
goodi. One is, by diſplays: ad ultimum: poſſe
that is, to the utmoſt in all inftances whatever
the effect of which diſplays would be one or
der, only of beings, the moſt: perfect. there ca
be. Bit this ſuppoſition is, perhaps, an im
poffible one, as.it carries with it that which look
very like a.contradiction. That which is infi
site is unlimited, and not to be reſtrained with
in any bounds. To ſuppoſe therefore, a ne plu
of
8:8
THE BENEVOLENCE
.
!
of exertion in an infinite being, is to ſuppoſe that
This being is reſtrained within certain limits
which feciş to contradict his being infinite. If,
the Deity is infinitely benevolent, hış exertions
in manifeſting the glory of this attribute canne-
ver be’exhaufted. To füppoſe otherwiſe, would
be to ſuppoſe that he was not thus, infinite;
ftriệtly and properly ſpeaking, the word utmoſta
,
or any other word of ſimilar ſignification, can-
not be applied to an infinite being, : with
refpect to any of his cominunications. He
ought rather to be conceived of, as having with=
in hifëlf an ability to-go'on comixunicating
to eternity. . Cominunications to the iutmoſt; fo
far as we are able< to conceive of the matter,
are incompatible with the idea of an infinite
ability to communicate. Beſides, ſhould the
benevolence of the Deity (was this poffible) be
diſplayed in all inſtances to the utmost, this at-
tribote of his would appear more like a natural
inftinét, méchanically and blindly urging hiin on
to the communication of happineſs, than a mot
ral diſpoſition, immutably guided in all its ex-
ercions by onerring wiſdom, and in conſiſtency
with unſpotted rectitude. The other way of
the Deity's communicating good, may be by
limited diſplays of it, in particular inſtances
the conſequence of which might be the produc-
tion of créatures indefinitely diverſified in their
powers ; fome capable of happineſs in one de-
gree, others in another, and fo on, in a gra-
dial aſceņtion, without diſcontinuity, to the
higheſt
OF THE DEITY. : 189
higheſt conceivable perfệction. This, I ſay,
may be the effect of limited exertions of bene,
volence, in an infinitely productive cauſe, with
reſpect to the particular parts of ſome great and
good while. And the reafon is obvious at firſt
view. Fisifany one conceivable degree of imper
fection will argue a defect in the exertions of an
infinitely benevolent Being, another will argue
the fame thing with equal truth, and no ſtop
can be made till' we have got to the higheſt
created perfection. If a low reptile, for inſtance,
cannot be the production of an infinitely be
nevolent cauſe, becauſe leſs perfect than a man;
a man, for the ſame reaſon, could not have had
exiſtence, becauſe leſs perfect than an angel ;
and an angel, for the ſame feafon ſtill, could
not have been made, becauſe leſs perfect' than
foine being of a yet fuperior order, and fo on,
till there are no creatures but of the higheft,
and moſt perfect claſs in the creation. So that,
if there can be any limited exertions of Divine
beneválence, there are no creaturés; be their
capacities for happineſs as low as any in na
ture, but may have exiſtence in a ſcale of beings,
which ſhall gradually afcend to as high perfec-
tion as infinite benevolence, guided by infinite
wiſdom, fhall think fit to create.
The only inquiry then is, which of theſe
forts of exertion are capable of yielding, upon
the whole, the moſt good. And it will not be
denied, that the preſumption is ſtrong in favor
of the latter., as they actually take place in a
world,
t90THE BENEVOLENCE
world, that wil! readily ; be owned to be the
effect of infinite benevolence, conducted by
üinerring wiſdom, if it be poſſible, that more
good Thould be the reſult of ſuch exercions, than
of any other within the reach of our ability
to point out. And that this is not only poffi-
ble, but highly probable, if not certain; I ſhall
endeavour to evince by the following reaſons;
which appear to ine-ftrongly concluſive, efpe-
cially if conſidered in one conjunct view:
The firſt, I would offer; may be fet in the
following light. We fee; in fact, that the
various ſpecies of creatures, living on our earthy
are fo conſtituted, as that the exiſtence of one
of them is no kindrance to the exiſtence of ano-
ther ; but they are all well enough capable of
exiſting together, as the extent of the world
gives a füfficiency of room for it. The exiſt-
ence of man, the top-creature in this ſyſtem,
is no bar to the exiſtence of any other claſs of
creatures, in the deſcending ſcale, quite down
to the loweſt perceiving animal : But there is
as real a ſufficiency of ſpace for their exiſtence,
as if he had not been made ; and as like a ſuf
ficiency for him, as if they had not been in bed
ingAnd the fame may be faid, with equal
truth, of all the other orders of beings, with
reſpect to the exiſtence of one another, in this
part of the creation. --And ſhould we extend
our thoughts to other worlds, and -the various.
claſſes of beings in them, there is the ſame rea-
lon ſtill to think, that the exiſtence of one of
them
OF THE DEITY
eher does not interfere with the exiſtence of
another. Angelss, and any ſuperior order of be,
ings, may as eaſily be made capable of exiſting,
at the ſame time, as if one only of theſe orders
had been created. Andas to all the other claſſes
of beings; in all worlds, they are doubtleſs fe
made, as to be all of them capable of exiſting;
as, truly as if only one claſs of them had been
brought into exiſtence.
Upon the truth now of theſe premiſes, it
plainly follows, that the capacity for happineſs,
in the univerſe, is enlarged by means of the di
verſity of beings that have exiſtence in it. And
if the capacity is enlarged, it is, from hence,
demonſtrably certains that the quantum of good
may be greater than it could have been, if,
inſtead of this diverfity, fewer orders of beings,
för a ſingle one only, had been made.
It is, indeed, from this diverſity of beings,
duly ſubordinated to each other, that the pleni-
tude of nature ariſes. A few orders of beings
only would not have ſerved to this purpoſe,
The creation is filled up, by that admirably nice
and curious variety in the claſſes of creatures,
whereby they are fitted to be proper links in
the chain of existence ; all concurring, as ſo
many well adjusted parts, to conſtitute one
whole without void or chaſm. Thus we are
naturally led to think, from what falls within
the reach of our obfervation, in this ſyſtem to
which we belong. For, it is evident, that, if
the order of men only had been created, the
rooni,
1
1
#ga T H B : BỀNỀ V Ở LÊN CỀ
toom that is now filled with the inferior ranks
of creatures would have been a . väftchafm.
Men would have multiplied no faſter than they
do, if there were no ibrutes : Nor would they
have been better accominodated. One of the
brutal ſpecies does not hinder the exiſtence, or
increaſe or ſupport, of another ; but there is
both room and ſuitable proviſion for them all.
And ſhould any other claſſes of the creatures
be pitched upon; they are ſo conſtituted as that
there would be room ftill for all the other or
ders. And the ſame reaſoning will hold good,
if extended to all other ſyſtems. There are vari-
ous ranks of creatures in them. And, perhaps,
botherwiſe, they would not have been fo fulí
of being as they miight have been. -
The truth is, This world of ours is to con-
trived, as that we can no where difcern in it
any void. It appears, on the contrary; by means
of the various ranks of-creatures,gradually tiſing
in perfection to men; the higheſt order of them,
to be perfectly filled with being. And, if there
is no- chafm in this ſyſtem, of which we are a
main part, why ſhould we ſuppofe .one, in the
other fyſtems conſtituting the Univerſe :It:is
far more reaſonable; from the analogy of nature,
to think, that the gradation ſtill goes on riſing,
in other worlds, beyond the bounds of our moſt
enlarged imagination.
And what though, in this valt diverſity; there
Thonld be orders of beings formed for happinefs
(at leaſt in-the-firit Itages-of-their poſſible ex
iſténce)
OF THE DEITY.
193
-
:
iſtence) in an imperfect; low degree only ? Is
it not ſuificient to anſwer, that no capacity for
happineſs, however ſmall, ſhould be excluded
the création, ſo long as it is not an hindrance
to the exiſtence of other gradually riſing capa-
cities, till we have exceeded all conception:
Eſpecially, if it be added, that the leaving out
any capacity for happineſs, however diminutive,
in this chain of beings, will proportionably
Tubftract from the ſum total of general happi-
neſs; which, in this caſe, would not be fo
great as it inight have been.
The ſhort of the caſe is, the creation of God,
by means of this diverſity of beings, gradually
and regularly riſing in perfection, even to the
higheſt poffible degree, becomes a mojt perfeEi
and contiguous whole ; demonſtrating the riches
and glory of the Creator's goodireſs, far beyond
what it could have done, if the continuity had.
been broken,' by the non-exiſtence of any of the
ranks of creatures, which now make it an ab-
foliitely full and well-connected univerſe.
It may adå both light and force to the preſent
argument, if I juſt fubjoin, That the various
ranks of creatures are fo far from being an ob-
ſtruction to the exiftence of one another
that their exiſtence in this multiform be-
{towiñent of it, is a greater bleſſing than it would
have been, if they had exiſted fingly and clone,
This is certainly the truth, in fact, with reſpect
to the order of man.
The exiſtence of the
other claſſes of beings below him is ſo far from
being a differvice to hiin, that, if they had nog
Аа
been
194
THE BENEVOLENCE
been created, he muſt have enjoyed exiſtence
without many of the advantages, tending to
the comfort of it, which he now poffefſes. And
this is moſt probably the truth, with reſpect to
all the other ſpecies of creatures:. They are
placed in ſuch a degree of fubordination, as
to be fitted to be uſeful to one another : In:
ſomuch that every claſs of beings, by reaſon of
this ſubſervient diverſity, enjoys exiſtence un-
der more deſirable circumſtances than it could
otherwiſe have done. And this may be the
real truth of the caſe, throughout the whole
compaſs of percipient exiſtence.
Another conſideration, not improper to be
mentioned, in proof of the point we are upons
is, its being plainly impoſible, that any ſingle ora
der of beings could be formed capable of all the
good, which many orders; varioufly endowed
with faculties, may be fitted for the enjoyment of.
It is indiſputable, that every being, of whatever
rank, whether high or low, muſt have its own
proper nature. This, we at once perceive to
be neceſſary, in regard of beings that have ma
terial bodies. They are indeed ranked into
different claſſes, on account of their different
bodily make. And a difference in bodily ſtruci
can no more exiſt in the fame bodies,
at once, than they can occupy different pla-
ces, at the ſame time. And, as different or
ganizations of parts, in perceiving beings that
have bodies, are intended, among other uſes,
to form different capacities, in kind ſometimes,
as
ture
3
:
195
OF THE DEITY.
as
as well as degree; it is plain, that beings thus
differently organized can no more be capable
of juſt the ſame good, than they can parcake of
the fame bodily ſtructure. And the fame is
true of incorporeal beings. They muſt,
in all their different claſſes, have different men.
tal powers : Otherwiſe, they could not be rank-
ed into different orders. And there is no rea-
fon to think, but that different mental powers,
as well as bodily ones, ſhould form different
capacities for happineſs, and such, many times, as
cannot exiſtin the ſame minds, at the ſame tiine:
The conſequence from all which is obviouſly
this ;-That ſhould the moſt perfect order of
beings be created that could be, it muſt be an
order of foine certain nature and conſtitution,
which nature could not be capable of all the
different powers of innumerably various natures,
fome of which, at leaſt, are abſolutely: incoin-
patible with each other. And if no ſingle ora
der of beings could be endowed with the various.
faculties, of all natures, it is impoſſible they
ſhould be the ſubjects of all the various. degrees
and kinds of happineſs, which, theſe natures:
may be feverally fitted for, and capable of.
Perhaps, it will be objected here. thougli no
ſingle order of beings could be capable of juſt
the ſame happineſs; which various, orders might
be capable of, yet one order poſibly might
be fo formed as to be qualified for greater hap+
pineſs of another and more. perfect kindi
1
196 THE BENEVOLENCE
account.
In reply whereto, it ought to be conſidered,
that the firſt link, in the chain of diverſified
beings we have ſuppoſed, is the inoſt perfect
order that can be. And it is certain, if all the
happineſs of all the ſubordinate ranks of beings.
be added to the happineſs of this higheſt crdern,
the ſuoz-total will be greater, than if the happi-
neſs of this higheſt order only is taken into the
And the ſtrength of this reaſoning,
will ſtill increaſe, if it be remembered,. agree-
ably to what has been already obſerved, that
the exiſtence of none of the ſubordinate ranks.
of beings is any obitruction to the exiſtence of
the higheſt, but that they may all exiſt together.gr
and as free from interference, as if only one:
of them had been brought into exiitence.
Another argument ſtill, to the purpoſe we are
upon, is this ; that the infinitely benevolent:
Being ought always to be ſuppoſed to exiſt him-
ſelf in producing good, with intelligence, wiſe:
deſign, and according to fom.t-method diſcover-
ing exquiſite ſkill and contrivance. A myſte-
rious fomething, capable of happineſs without.
faculties fitted for ſuch an end; or actually en-
joying it, without regard to any ſtated metliod
adapted to the purpoſe, is a ſuppoſition if not
imponible in itſelf, yet entirely diſſonant from
the idea we entertain of good wiſely commu-
nicated. In order to this, there muit be facul-
ties previouſly created and contrived for the
perception of this good ; and more than this,
it ipuſt be the effect of the exerciſe of thele
faculties
و
OF THE
197
DEITY,
faculties upon their proper objects, according
to fome well-eſtabliſhed conftitution. And in
a. diverſified creation, one filled with different.
ranks of beings; all variouſly endowed with 'ca-.
pacities fitted to make them happy, according
to ftated laws, in a certain degree; I ſay, in
fuch a creation as this, there may be a manifeſa
tation of more art and contrivance in diſpenſing
good, than in a creation in which one order.
only of beings ſhould have exiſtence, though
the ſkill herein diſplayed thould be as great as
it could be. For it is indeed impoffible, that
all the methods of wiſe contrivance ſhould be
diſcovered in the make of any ſingle order of
beings whatever. And of this we have as good,
proof as we can deſire; becauſe it is
, evident from
what we ſee, in fact, that ſome of theſe methods
are of ſuch a nature as to be incompatible with
aliy, ane claſs of beings that can poſſibly be
made, It is a contradiction that any order of
beings ſhould have a mental ſtructure only, and
yet, at the ſame time, poffefs bodies with vari-
aus organs admirably contrived for the convey-
ance of ſenſations of ſuch a kind. And unleſs
the ſame beings could have bodies, and not
have them, at the ſame time, it is impoſſible that,
the whole of that contrivance, which is actually
diſcovered in the creation, could be manifeſt-
ed in the make and circumſtances of any one
order of beings that.could be created. So that,
had the goodneſs of the Deity been diſplayed
towards one rank of beings only, however pern
fect,
1
.
198 THE BENEVOLENCE
feet, and not to numberleſs orders of them, va..
riouſly endowed and lituated, there could not
have been thoſe amazing diſcoveries of exqui-
fitely wiſe contrivance and art, which are now
viſible in all parts of the creation * obliging us
to own the pertinency of thoſe words of admi-
ration, How manifold are thy works, O Lord!
In wiſdon baſt thou made them all.
Should any object here, Though juſt the ſame
traces of wiſdom which are diſcernable in the
creation, according to its preſent plan, could
not have taken place, if one order of beings,
an order could pot have been made, that might
have diſcovered greater ſkill and wiſer contri-
vance, though of another kind. It may be ſuf-
ficient to return a like anfwer to one we had
occafion to give before, viz. That this very
order of beings may be the higheſt in the aſcen-
ding ſcale of exiſtence, and compleat the mani-
feſtation of the riches of Divine wiſdom, in the
manner of communicating good.
But beſides what has been hitherto fàid, it may
be worth while to enquire, whether much of the
moſt valuable. kind of good could have been
communicated, had not the creation been a din
verſified one, like to that which really exiſts.
It will not be denied, that intelligent moral beings.
the moſt noble, and formed with capacities:
for the higheſt good, in kind as well as degree..
And perhaps, upon examination, it will be found,
that a great part of the good they are capable
* Vid, Taylor, p. 48 of his Keye.
of
t
5
are
OF THE DËİTY
199
A
of is to effentially conñëcted with a divertified
conſtitution of beings and things; as that they'
could not poſſeſs it but upon this plan. It is
certainin point of fact, that the intelligent
moral beings, in our ſyſtem do; from this di-
verſity, receive, according to eſtabliſhed laws;
thoſe numberleſs ideas; which are the ſource
of all thoſe acquirements in knowledge, which
give them their
wholė. intellectual pleaſure. And
It is from the ſame diverſity that thoſe various
relations and dependencies ariſe, which are the
foundation of their moral diſpoſitions, and give
occaſion for the exerciſe of them, in infinitely
various fit ways; to the production of all the
happineſs they are capable ofi And there is
reaſon to think, that this is the truth of fact,
among all intelligent moral beings, in all worlds.
I do not mean, that their ideas, the ſpring of
their intellectual delight, are conveyed into their
minds in juſt the ſame way that ideas are let
into our's ; or, that the relations ſubſiſting among
them, giving occafion for moral exertments, ac-
companied or followed with high pleaſure, are
preciſely tlie ſame that take place among us. But
what I intend is; that they all come by their
ideas, the foundation of their intellectual happi-
neſs, according to fume conftitution, wiſely con-
trived and adapted to fuch a purpoſe ; and that
they are alſo fo endowed, and ſituated with reſpect
to one another, as that there may be fit occaſions
for the exerciſe of their moral powers, in order to
their perceiving the pleaſure that is proper to
moral
i
ఎం. THE BENEVOLENCE
moral agents. And it ſeems as though they-could
not otherwiſe, in a rational, wife way, enjoy
the happinefs that is ſuited to ſuch kind of
beings. It is truè, if the happineſs of intelli-
gent moral creatures might be fuppoſed to con-
hift in indolent eaſe, or a meer inactive enjoy-
ment of exiſtence, there would be no room for
diſpute upon the matter : But ſuch an Epicua
rean ſort of happineſs ought not to be aſcribed
to an infinitely wiſe agent as its cauſe, how-
ever benevolent ; for it is not worthy of a com-
munication from hiin. Happineſs, in reſpect
of intelligent moral beings, ought always 'to be
conceived of as the reſult of intelligent moral
powers, regularly exerted, according to eſtabliſh-
ed laws, wiſely adjuſted to the nature of ſuch
beings. They ought to be conſidered, as re.
ceiving their ideas, not by immediate infufion,
but in conformity to fome ſtated order, mani-
feſting wiſe deſign and contrivance: They ought
to be conſidered, as making a regular uſe
of their intellektual faculties in the inanagement
of their ideas, in order to their perception of
intellettual delight : And they ought alſo to be
conſidered, as fo ſituated with reſpect, to other
beings, as to have proper occaſions for the ex-
erciſe of their moral powers, in various fit ways,
ſo as to enjoy pleaſure herefrom.
And now, in a diverſified conſtitution, there
is room for the conveyance of all poſſible ideas
into all various minds, not by meer impreffiə
on, but in certain ways, and according to ftat-
ed
OF THE DEIT Y.
20
1
1
ed làws, manifeſting the greateſt wiſdom and
deſign : And there is likewiſe all the ſcope that
can be deſired for all poſſible relations and de:
pendences, from whence, according to the ab-
Itract reaſon of thingsy may ariſe à fitneſs and
propriety in infinitely various exertments of
mmoral diſpoſitions, making the beings poſſeſſed
of them wiſely, and rationally as happy as they
can be Whereas, in a creation of one order
of beings only; be their perfection as great as
poſſible, it is not conceivable, how they ſhould
be capable of thät happineſs which may naturally
and wiſely reſult from the contrarý plan...
There is èertainly one fort of happineſs, which
I efteemi à confideration fufficient of itſelf to
bear the whole weight of the preſent cauſe : I
fay; there is one fort of happineſs (perhaps the
nobleſt, and moſt God-like) which could not
have place in the creation, but upon ſuppoſiti-
on of its being, in ſome meaſure, à diverfified
one's What I mean is, that if there had been
one order only of beings, éqúal in perfection and
happineſs, there could not have been the plea-
Jüre that is the reſult of the communication of
good. For it is only upon the plan of diverſity
in beings; that one creature can be the object
of another's beneficence. Reduce the creation
to a perfect equality, and all participation of that
part of the Creator's happineſs, the communicatior,
of good, is, at once, nece{farily deſtroyed. For
where the ſame perfection and happineſs, both
in kind and degree, is, at all tiines, equally pof-
B.b
fefred
202
THE BENEVOLENCE
oz
feffed by all beings, it is evident, that good can-
not poſſibly be communicated from one to ano
ther. And can it be imagined that the Deity
would pitch upon a plan for the communication
of good, which would render it impracticable for
any of his creatures, either to refer ble him in
that which is his greateſt glory, or to partake, in
any meaſure, cf that which is his greateſt pleaſure ?
There is no truly benevolent mind, but will
readily be reconciled to a diverſity in beings, ra-
ther than the pleaſure of communicating good ſhould
be excluded the creation : And excluded it muſt
be, if there is not ſome diverſity. Upon any
other ſuppoſition, not one being, in the creation
could be the object of another's beneficence ;
and conſequently, the nobleſt and moſt truly
divine pleaſure, that which ariſes from doing
good, could not have place in the whole circle
of exiſting creatures.
So that it is evident, a
diverſity of beings is ſo far from being an ob-
jection againſt infinite: benevolence, that it really
flows froin it as its proper cauſe. There could
not have been the manifeſtation of ſo much
goodneſs, if there had not been some difference
between the creatures broughe; into exiſtence. ;
And the leaſt attention will obviouſly lead any
one to deterınine, that if goodneſs may be the
cauſe of any diverſity at all, no ſtop can be
made, without continuing it down, through all
variety of orders, ſo long as the balance ſhall
turn in favor of happineſs, or, in other words,
so long as exiſtence can be called a good, and
pronounced better than not to be.
I
"
103
OF THE DEITY.
mente
I ſhall only fubjoốn, upon the whole, that we
know not but thofe beings, who are the perci-
pients of happineſs, in the loweſt and moſt im-
perfect degrees, may be deſigned for a much
higher ſtate of exiltence. This may be poffible
to the power and wiſdom of the infinitely be-
nevolent Creator; and that he has not actu-
ally made proviſion for it; in the plan upon
which he intends to operate for the general good,
is more than any one can pretend to determine.
It is highly probable from reaſon only; and cer-
tain from revelation, that man, though, at pre-
fent, one of the loweſt intelleEtual meral beings,
is yet deſigned for exalted perfection and hap-
pineſs. He is now in an infant itate; compared
with what this may be introductory to And,
for all that can be proved to the contrary, he
may go on in intellectual and moral attain-
ments, till he has reached as great perfection,
and is poſſeſſed of as great happineſs, as, at
preſent, comes to the ſhare of any of the ranks
of created beings : Though they alſo: may be
fuppoſed to be gradually riſing in perfection
and happineſs, in proportion to their greater ori-
ginal capacities.; ſo that the diſtance will ſtill:
be preſerved among the various: orders, of
creatures; and go on to be ſo, forever:
II. I now proceed to the ſecond objection,
taken from thoſe moral, diſorders, which, it is
pleaded, could not have exiſtence in the crea-
tion, if it was produced and governed by an
finitely boly: anà benevolenti, being. Such
Maker
ai
204
THE BENEVOLECE
Maker and Ruler of the univerſe, it is ſaid,
muſt have taken effectual care for the preven-
tion of moral evil, and the unhappineſs ariſing;
therefrom. It cannot be ſuppoſed, that a be-
ing infinitely averſe from moral impurity would
have fuffered the works of his hands to bę de-
filed with it. It cannot be imagined, that an
infinitely benevolent Being would have left crea-
tures of his own forming to ſuch immora, conduct
as would reflect diſhonor on his goodneſs, by
bringing unhappineſs and miſery into a world
of his contriving and making? It is not poffi-
ble that fuch a being as the Deity is reprefented
to be, thould place his creatures in çircum-
Itances, wherein they might pervert their powe
ers, and involve themſelves in ruin. Theſe
things cannot be. They are not worthy of an
infinitely holy and good God: Eſpecially, if it
be conſidered, that the exiſtence of moral evil
cannot be conceived of without permiſſion, at
leaft, from the Deity : Nay, it cannot be ſup-
poſed, but that he muft have foreſeen, not only
the poſſibility, but the high probability, of its
taking place in the world; and yet he ſuffered
it to do ſo : Yea, fo far was he from prevent-
ing it, that it ſeems as though ſome of the molt
important meaſures of his conduct were formed,
upon the fuppoſition of its actual being in the
univerſe.
This is the objection urged at large, and, !
think, in its full force, againſt the creation and
government of an infinitely holy and benevo-
lent
OF THE DEITY,
F
905
1
Qne.
lent Being, And it is far from being a trifling
Had it fo been, ſuch numbers of philo-
ſophers and divines, in all parts of the world,
would not have employed fo much of their time
and pains in order to remove it. And it is,
perhaps, a difficulty that cannot be perfectly re-
moved, in the preſent ſtate of human faculties,
But this is no proof that it cannot be done, IE
ought to be remembered, that we men are buc
a low order of intelligent creatures; and what
wonder is it, if that ſhould be a difficulty, and
an infuperable one, to us, which may be none
at all to a ſuperior order of beings. It is a cer-
tain fact that moral evil exiſts in our world;
and it is as certain a truth, that God is infi-
nitely benevolent. And ſhould we find oure
ſelves unable to point out fo clearly and fully,
as we might deſire, the confilency between
this fact, and this truth, we may, notwithſtand-
ing, keeping within the reach of our faculties,
go) fo far as to ſay, and upon rational grounds,
that which may be ſufficient, if not to ſilence
all objection, yet to ſatisfy ourſelves, that ino-
ral evil may exiſt, and the Deity at the ſame
time be infinitely benevolent, 'Let it then be
obſerved,
Though the being of moral evil, in our world,
is not denied; it may have been exaggerated.
A great deal of this kind of diſorder, it is rea-
dily owned, we are acquainted with ; but not
fo much as has been pretended. If we may be-
lieve the repreſentations of ſome, this world, by
reaſon
.
106 THE BENEVOLENCE
!
Feaſon of the vices, of all kinds, which are
almost univerſally committed in it, is little beta
ter than hell itſelf. But it is not fair, in ma-
king an eſtimate of the corrupt ſtate of the
world, to enumerate all the horrid irnmoralities,
which have been perpetrated, at the fame time
overlooking the many ſhining virtues whichi
have adorned the character of multitudes. The
greateſt vices can be matched with as great vir-
tues. If ſome have funk their moral powers ſo
as to become capable of the baſeſt änd vileft
actions ; others have improved ther's fo as to
exhibit a truly God-like temper and conduct.
And, it may be, notwithſtanding the out-cry
that is made of the wickedneſs of the world;
if a juſt compariſon could be made, it would
be found, that it is far more than balanced
with the good that is in it of the moral kind..
But however this is, it is not diſowned that there.
are moral diſorders in the world, and many of
them too, and of various forts : Nor is it pre-
tended, that this has not been the caſe in all
ages; though it is very evident, that in fome
they have not prevaileď to fo great a degree as.
in otbers.
And now, that I may, in as clear a manner.
as I poſſibly can, offer what may be proper in
order to account for this appearance; and recon-
cile it with perfect wiſdom and goodneſs in the
great Creator and Governor of the univerſe, it
may be neeeffary to obſerve, that the evil ſpe-
cified in the objection, and called moral, includes
it
OF THE DEITY 2017
in it two things, irregularity in the beings chare
geable with it, and conſequent unhappineſs as the
fruit thereof; either by the conſtitution of nature,
or poſitive infliction from the Deity. And I ſhall,
accordingly, be diſtinct in fpeaking to each of
them.
As to the first ;--The very fupposition of mo-
ral irregularity, as distinguiſhed from natural,
and ineaning the ſame thing with vice or wica
kedneſs, is eſſentially connected with free agency,
in the beings upon whom this guilt is faſtened.
Its nature indeed conſiſts in wrong determinations,
and diſorderly conduct, which yet are voluntary,
and argue a wilful miſapplication of moral and
rational powers. And as this is the true notion of
moral irregularity, in contradiſtinction to meer
weakneſs and imperfektion in cauſes that are inca-
pable of blome : I ſay, this being the true idea
of this firſt part of moral evil, free agents
them.
ſelves, and not the Deity, are the sole and pro
pegi authors of it.
It takes riſe intirely from
them, and would not have been but for their
corrupt choices, and voluntary perverſion of fa-
culties, which they might have employed to
wife and good purpoſes.* And ſhall the Deity
be charged with want of goodneſs, for that which
is not the work of his hands, but a produc-
tion wholly owing to the creatures; inſomuch,
that it could not have: exiſted, had not they
abuſed the powers he was pleaſed to endow
و
them
Vid. A thought in Hutchieſon on vice being the degenerace
of powerş deſigned for good.
{
08
THE BENEVOLENCE
,
them with; perverting their deſign and tena
dency, and by this means bringing unhappi-
neſs upon themſelves, and confuſion into the
world
But could not the Deity, it will be here ſaid,
have prevented this abuſe of liberty, and per-
verſion of moral powers ? And if he could have
prevented this miſchief, how comes it to paſs
that he did not ? And how can his not taking
this care be reconciled with his character as in-
finitely holy and benevolent? In anſwer wherea
to, I ſee not; I confeſs; but the Deity, if infi-
nitely holy and benevolent; muſt have pervented
this moral diſorder, if he could have done it. Only,
let it be remembered, when I ſay, if he could have
donè it, I ſpeak not ſo much of a natural, as
moral ability; an ability invariably guided, in
all its exertions; by perfect wiſdom; and in exact
conformity to the abſtract reaſon and fitneſs
of things. And it ſhould ſeem; as though, in
this ſenſe, it was not within the power of the
infinitely benevolent Cauſe of all things; to have
prevented moral defection. If it was, what
imaginable reaſon can be aſſigned, why it was
not actually done? And; in what poſſible way;-
can the non-prevention of it be reconciled with
that goodneſs, which is attributed to the Deity
as an eſſential character? Whereas, if he could
910t prevent it; in conſiſtency with wiſe and fit
conduct, it is a good reaſon why he did not do
it, and he may notwithſtanding be fairly and
juſtly acknowledged as an infinitely benevolent
being
+
OF T H DEI TY 209
1
the only conceivable ways, in which the Deity
being. And that this is the real truth of the
matters, it ſhall now be my buſineſs to ſhow:
In order whereto, let it be obſerved,
If the D:ity could have prevented the abuſe of
moral liberty, it muſl have boen in one of theſe
three ways, either by not giving free agents a
place in the ſcale of beings; or by making
chem ſo perfect as to be incapable of any
Wrong conduct ; or by interpoſing, at all times,
as occafion might require, to hinder the miſuſe.
of moral powers, in beings that poffefs them,
either in a higher or lower degree.
Theſe are
1
و
can be ſuppoſed to haveitin his power to prevent :
moral diſorder in the creation. And will any ſay,
that he must, if infinitely benevolent, in one or
other of theſe ways, have certainly prevented it ?
So far is this from being capable of proof, that
there is good realon, on the contrary, to think,
it was naturally, or rorally impoſſible, that he
thould, in either of them, have done it.
As to the firſt ;-The not giving free agents
a place in the ſcale of beings would have
been a groſs reflection upon the benevolence of
the Deity, inſtead of making way for its bright-
er diſplay. For the quantum of good, capable
of being communicated, would, upon this ſu s-
poſition, have been greatly leſſened, and indeed
reduced to a very pittance, comparatively ſpeak-
ing: And the good enjoyed would have been
of the loweſt and moſt iniperfect kind 000.
For there is no pleaſure like that which is intel-
Сс
leEtual
10. THE
THE BENEVOLENCE
Lectual and moral; none lo noble and divine in
its nature, none ſo fatisfying to the ſubjects
of it. ' Beſides, if there were no moral agents
exiſting, there could be no way for the Deity
to manifeſt his moral glory, which is his great-
eft. He might, it is true, by creating and go
verning an unintelligent world, or creatures in it
endowed with intelligence in ſo low a degree as
to be incapable of moral conduct, diſplay; in
a meafure, both power, and contrivance, as
well as goodneſs; but he could make no ma:
nifeſtation of holineſs or juſtice, or thoſe mo-
difications even of goodneſs, mercy; forbear:
ance,' long-ſuffering, forgiveneſs. If there was
no free agency, there could be no virtue, nor
any of that fublime happineſs, which may be
the reſult of it. There could riot; in one word,
be any ſuch thing as moral government; with-
out which the richeſt diſplays of the moſt ami-
able perfection could have no place in the
creation. And would it now have been for the
honor of the Deity to have withheld the bleſs
ſing of moral liberty, by net giving exiſtence
to free agents ? Can it be thought fit, that ſuch
an intelligent moral agent, as. God is; ſhould
create beings, but with ſuch conſtituted
powe
ers, as that in the whole circle of exiſtence,
there fhould be no living images of hinſelf, no
creatures made capable of that intelligent moral
conduct, or of that rational moral happineſs,
which compleat his character as a moſt glori-
ous and blefred Being? Is it reaſonable that
the
:
1."
OF THE
211
DEITY,
the high privilege of moral intelligence ſhould
þe excluded the creation? That no being ſhould
be made capable of virtue, and that trueft kind
of happineſs which is the reſult of it ? Will
any ſay, it is better there ſhould be no free
@gency, than that beings ſhould be liable to abuſe
iť? This cannot juſtly be pleaded ; for if free
agents are liable to abuſe their liberty, they are
alſo capable of making a good uſe of it, to
their conſequent, unſpeakable happineſs. And
can it be thought right, that ſo glorious a ca-
pacity for happineſs as. free agency, ſhould be
totally withheld from all beings, becauſe it
might poſſibly have been perverted in its ten-
dency? What though foine ſhould abuſe it;
might not others make a wiſe improvement of
it ? And why ſhould this be prevented ? Why
put out of their power, by, the non-beſtowment:
of freedom of choice?
It is true, if the gift of liberty was likely
upon the whole; , to produce more moral evil
than goods it would be a ſufficient reaſon why
it ſhould be withheld.. But there is no folid
ground on which to build ſuch ai fuppofition..
It may be juſtly queſtioned; whether this is
the caſe, even in this: world of our'sy where
moral freedom is enjoyed but in a low and im-
perfect degree : Much leſs may it be thought
to be fo, in other words,, among ſuperior orders.
of intelligent moral beings. Perhaps, taking in-
to, conſideration all the ranks of this kind of
beings, in all parts of the creation, but a few
comparatively,
bile of wrong conduct ? This is the ſecond way, in.
212 THE BENEVOLENCE
comparatively, have miſuſed their moral freedoman
To be fure, it is not known to be otherwiſe
and therefore, for all the proof that can be given
to the contrary, the effect of moral and intel-
lectual endowment may have been the happineſs:
of the creation, inconceivably: beyond what it
could have been, if theſe endowments had not
been beſtowed. And ſhould this be the truth
of fact, as it may be, can it be thought fit
,
that fo much happineſs
. fhould never have been,
by not giving exiſtence to free agents at all, be-
cauſe fome have fooliſhly miſmproved their
moral liberty to their own diſadvantage? It
cannot, with any reaſon, be pretended.
But, it will be faid, could not the Deity have
made all free agents so perfect as to be incapa-
which it is imagined, that he might have pre-
vented moral evil, and would have done it, if
he had been infinitely benevolent. To which
it
may be replyed as follows.
That, if all free agents had been made with
ſuch perfect moral powers, as is here fuppoſed,
it muſt have been an unavoidable bar to that
diverſity in the creation, which, as has been
already proved, is ſo far from leffening thequan-
tity of communicable good, that it really makes
way for a richer and fuller communication of
it, upon the whole, than would otherwiſe. have
been poftible. And, was there no other rea-
fon, this muſt have been effectual, to restrain
the infinitely benevolent Deity, from making
all
OF THE DEITY.
213
all beings ſo nearly equal in their rational and
moral powers.
But, letting this.paſs for nothing, it may be
juſtly queſtioned, whether the creation of intel-
ligent beings to perfect as to be incapable of mil-
conduct, is not an impoſſibility in the nature of
things. For, ſhould wę fuppofe çreatures as
perfect as they can be, they would yet be
finité : And how intelligent moral beings that are
finite ſhould be wholly incapable of becoming
faulty, in any kind, or degree, is beyond all
conception. It is certainly inorę reaſonable to
think, that the infinitely perfect Being is the
only one that can be abſolutely impeccable
. For he
only can ſee, at once, all the poſſible connecti-
ons of ideas, and unerringly know what is right
and fit in all caſes whatever : And he only' is
iminutably and everlaſtingly diſpoſed to chuſe
and act according to the truth and reaſon of
things.
But, ſhould it be ſuppoſed naturally poſ-
ſible for free agents to be at once created fo per-
fect as that it could not be that they thould
err in choice or bebaviour; it will still rernain a
queſtion, whether it be morally poñible, i. e.
poffible in conſiſtency with wife and fit conduct
in the Deity ? And, perhaps, thus morally ſpeak-
ing, it is not poſſible. This, it is probable,
may ſeem a paradox to fome ; but there are
reaſons for its ſupport, which are juſtly con-
cluſive ; though they ſhould not amount to
ſtrict demonftration.
So
ز
1
314
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
So far as our knowledge extends, it is cere
tain, in point of fact, that intelligent moral bea
ings, are not when they firſt come into exiſtence,
either ſo perfect or happy: as they may be, and
indeed cannot but be, if the tendency of their
faculties is not obſtructed. They are fo forned,
ſome of them at leaſt; as, to be capable of pro-
greſs, both in perfection and happineſs, to a
very high degree : Which progreſs is very
much dependant on themſelves, the uſe they
make of their implanted powers, and the pains
they are at to cultivate and improve them. Thus.
it is with man, the higheſt intelligent moral agent
we are particularly acquainted with. His facul-
ties, at firſt, are feeble, and not to be exerciſed
but in a low degree : Yet they are ſo made as
to be gradually capable of enlargement, even
beyond what could have been imagined, if it
had not been for experience. And this enlarge-
ment is, in a great meafure, though not wholly,
dependent on himſelf: infomuch, that he will
be m're or leſs perfect and happy, both as an
intelligent and moral being, in proportion to the
uſe he makes, of his faculties. Neither the per-
fection, n F happineſs, he is capable of, is.com-
municated to him independent of his own choice:
and conduct, but in conne&tion: therewith, or in
conſequence thereof, and as a reward therefor.
If he makes a wiſe and good improvement of the
powers he is end wed with, he will reap the
advantage of his pains in ĉi rreſponding attain..
ments in perfection and happineſs : Whereas, if
he
.
OF THE DEITY.
a
hie takes no care to cultivate his faculties, the
effect will be, their remaining in a low, impera
fect ſtate : Nay, ſuch is the conſtitution of his
hature, as we may ſee afterwards, that, by mila
improving them, he may not only check their
growth; but bring thein into a declining con
dition, ſo as that they máy become gradually
unfit to yield him any fruit but that of unhappi-
neſs and miſery.
This is the truth of fact; reſpecting the high-
eſt, if not the only, “order of intelligent moral bet
ings, in this world. And the fact; ſo far as we :
are able to judge; is perfectly agreeable to what
is wife and fit in the reaſon of things. As the
beings, we are ſpeaking of, are made capable
of happineſs, in conſequence of their own
choice and conduet, and in proportion to the re-
gularity therein diſcovered, what more juſt than
its dependence thereon? In whaé nļore proper
way could wiſe, though infinite, benevolence
communicate happineſs to them? Whiat una
ſuitableneſs is there in making happineſs their
own acquiſition, the fruit of their own induſtry?
What reaſonable beings would not chuſe exift-
ence upon theſe terms? And who will ſay; that
they would make an unwiſe choice ? It
is certain, this method of communicating hap-
pineſs may be the wiſeft and beſt ; and that
glorious intelligent Being, who perfectly ſees
the fitneſs of things; in all poſſible connecti-
on, may know it to be fo : And ſhould this
be the caſe, as cannot be diſproved, it was not
poſſible
016
THË BÉNÉVOLENCE
i
poffible for him; acting morally, or, in other
words, as an intelligent wife agent, to have com
municated it any other way:
: And this reaſoning, if extended to the other
rank's of free agents, in other worlás, will equal-
ly hold good. It is fit and right, in true rea-
fon, that they alſo ſhould be fo conſtituted, as
thàt their perfection and happineſs ſhould not be
communicated with their beings, but made to
depend, in ſome ſuitable meaſure, on the wife
and regalar exerciſe of their powers : The
confequence of which muſt be their liableneſs,
in common with mankind, though in various
degrees, according to their various capacities
and circumſtances, to a voluntary perverſion of
their faculties. This, I ſay, appears to an at-
tentive mind the fittej), method of communi-
cating good to reaſonable moral beings : And
the Deity perceiving it to be fo; may have all
along obſerved this rule, in the beſtowment of
it. Nor is there a known fast to the contrary,
in the whole creation ; Though, if we may
give credit to the writings called ſacred, there
is a fa£t, relating to ſome of the intelligent be-
ings, in other worlds, which perfectly coincides
with this method of difpenſing happineſs. For
we there read of the angels which ſinned, and
of the angels which kepr not their firſt eſtate ;'
which account of theſe moral intelligences does
not conſiſt with their being created happy, in-
dependent of their own virtuous conduct, but
Juppoſes the contrary : Obviouſly leading to the
thoughta.
1
1
OF THE DEITY.
217
:
thought, that they were made, as men are, capable
of happinefs, but yet liable to a voluntary ſelf-cor-
suption. And all the ranks of moral beings might be
created in like circumſtances: And, I will add muſt
have been ſo created, if this was moſt wiſe, and fit,
as we have ſeen there is reaſon to think it was,
and no proof can be given to the contrary.
Not but that there are free agents, who may,
before this time, have got beyond any probable
danger of moral defection. And this inay be
the caſe, even of men, in ſome other ſtate ;
though fo inferior an order of intelligent beings.
But then, this freedom from danger ought to be
-conſidered, as owing, net to the perfection of
their faculties, as, at firſt, communicated to
them ; but partly to the ſtrong, habitual turn
- that has been given them, by wiſe and regular
exerciſe ; and partly, though principally, to
the ſuperintending influence of the Deity, who inay
think it fit and wife, after ſuitable trial and im-
provement, to preſerve them from all faulty con-
duct, fo far, at leait, as that they ſhall never
fall from the perfection and happineſs of their
preſent ſtate.
Buty before intelligent moral beings have gone
through ſome ſtate of trial, wherein they have
made the happineſs proper to their natures, their
own choice; and have to conducted themſelves
:. As to be worthy of it, and to have fitted them-
felves, by a courſe of ſuitable exerciſe, for the
enjoyment of it: I ſay, before this, it does not
Teem meet and fit, that it ſhould be con-
Did
ferred
27
218
THE BENEVOLENCE
ferred on them; much leſs in ſuch a way as that
it could not be but they muſt be happy. - It is cer-
tainly conſonant to the notions we moſt readily
and naturally form of right and fit, that ſuch
kind of beings ſhould come to the, enjoyment
of happineſs, in conformity to ſome method
wiſely adjuſted to their proper natures : And
what more ſuitable one can be imagined than
this, which makes happineſs, not the unavoida-
ble privilege of their creation; but the effect of
their own moral freedom ? Which beſtows it.
not abſolutely,' but in conſequence of their own vir-
tuous conduit, or, in other words, as the reſult
herefrom, according to ſettled laws, under the
notion of a motive hereto, or a ſuitable reward
therefor? This, to be ſure, ás has been obſer-
ved, may be the fittest way of communicating
happineſs to all moral beings, without diſtincti-
on ; and might appear to be fo to the 'infinite
and ſupreme Mind: And, if this was the real
truth, as we cannot ſay it was not, it could not
be within the moral power of the Deity, to
have created free agents, and put them at once,
without previous trial or improvement, in a ſtate
of full.perfeétion, and confirmed happineſs. And
if ſo, they could not have been made impecca-
ble, as it is pleaded they might have been, and
muſt have been, if their Maker had been an
infinitely benevolent Being.
Bu There is yet another way, in which it is
thought the Deity might have prevented Troral
evil; and this is, by interpoſing, at all times,
1
As
OF THE DEITY..
219
impreſſion from the Deitý, free agents ſhould
as occaſion ſhould require, to keep free agents
from miſuſing their liberty. If by this interpoſition
be meant (and it muſt mean, if to the purpoſe
for which it is introduced) ſuch a preſidency of
the Deity over free agents as is accompanied, at
all times with ſuch exertions as ſhall be certainly
effeitual to reſtrain them from perverting their
faculties, it may be anſwered, as under the for-
mer head, that it looks like a moral impoſibility,
or, in other words, a method of conducting to-
wards free agents which is unfit, in the reaſon of
things; as not being ſuited to the nature of fuch
kind of beings. The exertions of the Deity
ought always to be conceived of as directed
by perfitt wiſdom : And if, as the effect of ſuch
exertions, free agents are brought into exiſtence,
the ſame wiſdom that created them, requires
füch à method of conduct towards them, as is
confiſtent with the powers beſtowed on theni.
And can it be juſtly ſaid, that ſuch a method
would be taken, if, by, any extrinfic power, their
faculties were unavoidably put into exerciſe in
one certain way only 2. If all conjunctures of cir
cumſtances Mould conſtantly be prevented, in
which their moral freedom: could poſſibly be abu-
fed; or, if motives ſhould, in all caſes, be fet
in ſuch a ſtrong and powerfül light; as that no
wrong choice
. could." bie: vizade; or if, by innsediate
be kept, in all times of temptation, from all
bazard of being drawn afide: I ſay, ifj
, in any of
theſe ways, the Deity ſhould exert himſelf to the
prevention
1
220
THE BENEVOLENCE
ed by the power of the Supreine Will.
prevention of moral irregularity, how would ſuch
a method of operation conſiſt with the proper
* powers of free agents ! It does not appear to the
human mind a thing fit, that they ſhould be thus
irreſiſtibly guided, by any extrinſic power, though
it were even Divine. This inechod of govern-
ment is well ſuited to the unintelligent part of
the creation, which, being poſſeſſed of no felf-
directing principle, muſt be abſolutely conduct-
But
the influence of the Deity on free agents muſt
needs be of a different kind : Otherwiſe, it would
not harmonize with the eſſential powers of their
nature. And why indeed ſhonld there be any
beings at all endowed with moral liberty, if they
are not left to the free uſe of their faculties?
What room would there be upon fuppofition
of ſome foreign over-ruling influence, either for
their chuling or acting virtuouſly? What fcun-
dation for the moral government of them ? And,
in a word, what diſtinction would there be, in
reality of conſequence, between them and meer in
animate beings, as to the Deity's exerciſing rule
over them?' It is true, being endowed with the
faculty of perception, they would be capable of
happineſs; but this could have no connection
with, or dependance on, any proper sboice of their
own. It would be an unavoidable communication
of good ; good difpenfed, not as the effe&t of the
regular exerciſe of a ſelf-directing principle, not
in conſequence of any real determining power of their
own, but by the irreſiſtible will of the Deity, in
his
1
ز
$
OF THE DEITY. 2
his government of thein. And will any call this
a fit rnethod of dealing with free agents ? It can-
not be ſo pronounced, unleſs by thoſe, who
have no idea of good, but as communicated to the
utmoſt, without regard to the natures of eſſentially
different beings, and that wiſe conduct which
ought always to be uſed with reference to them.
But, after all that has been offered; ſome will
fay, ſhould it be allowed to be fit, that an order
of moral agents ſuch as men are, might be brought
into exiſtence, and that it would conſiſt with the
benevolence we attribute to the Deity, to place
them in a ſtate, wherein their virtue ſhould be
put to a trial ; why; need this 'trial have. been
fo dangerous an one? Why ſhould there have
been the inplantation of theſe appetites, pro-
penfities, affections, and paſſions, in their nature;
with a variety of external objects ſo ſuited to
give them pleaſure, as almoſt unavoidably to
entịce them to will; and to act, in contradiction
to the rules of virtue, and ſo as to make thema
felves unhappy? Would a kind and good Crea-
tör have put them to a trial ſo difficult and hazard-
ous ? Yea rather could he have done it, if he
had been infinitely benevolent ?
In anſwer to this, which, perhaps, is an ob-
jection to the Divine benevolence, the moſt
difficult of any intirely to remove, . it may be
obſerved as follows.
In å creation inconceivably diverſified, it may
be proper there ſhould be as great a variety
of moral beings, as of meerlý. aniinal ones; and
that
!
62% THE BENEVOLENCE
.
that there ſhould be a ſimilar gradation from
the higheſt to the loweſt order of them : The
conſequence from which is, that the capacities.
of theſe moral beings muſt be various, and their
attainment to a confirmed, virtuous temper pro-
portionably more or leſs difficult. The claſs
of men, I ſuppoſej
, máy juftly be reckoned the
loweſt of the moral kind; for which reaſon,
their conducting in life fo as to deſerve the
character of virtuous may be inoſt difficult. But
this notwithſtanding it may be fit there fhould
be ſuch a claſs of moral intelligencés, in order
to compleát that variety in exiſtence, which the
infinitely wiſe Deity might judge expedient for
a
full manifeſtation of his benevolence. As
many orders of beings, as might be thought
proper; not united to matter of any kind, may
have been brought into exiſtence, the loweſt of
which may furpaſs in glory the higheſt of thoſe
who are einbodied; among whom alſo there
may be as great a variety in the mode and degree
of their perfection In which view of the mat-
ter, it is no other than might be expected, that
there ſhould bę, fuch a creature as man, what-
ever comparative imperfection may attend his
make, and whatever difficulties may lie in the
way of his attaining to that virtue and happineſs,
he is formed capable of : Eſpecially, if it ſhould
be found, that, for a being compounded as he
is, there is nothing in his conftitution but what
is wiſely and kindly adapted to promote his good,
with reſpect to both parts of his compoſition.
Has
!
1
OF THE DEITY.
28
+
Has he animal appetites and propenſities?
Theſe, as planted in him by his Maker, were
intended, and are wiſely adapted, to guard hini
againſt inconveniences; and not only ſo, but to
give him pleaſure. And he is, accordingly, ſur-
rounded with objects purpoſely ſuited, by the
benevolent Creator, to yield him this pleaſure: Nor
can he reaſonably be charged with acting below
his character; as a man, if, within proper limits,
he gratifies theſe natural appetites. They are
therefore a wiſe contrivance to increaſe, not to
diminiſh, his happineſs,
Has he implanted in him a variety of affeca
tions and paßions ? They are all deſigned to
promote his good, not his hurt. Was he del
titute of ſelf-love, low feeble and languid would
be his endeavors, if he endeavored at all, to pres
ferve life, or render it ſo comfortable as it might
be? Had he no fear, how often would he run
into danger, and expoſe himſelf to numberleſs
diſaſters? Had he no reſentment; how would
he invite injuries, and ſuffer abuſes of every kind
in ſuch a world as this ? Had he no ambition,
what a powerful ſtimulus would be wanting in
his conſtitution to excitehis endeavors to excel in
this or the other art and ſcience, or in any thing
laudable and praiſe-worthị? And the ſame inay
be ſaid of every other affection and paffion. They
all tend to good, and we ſhould enjoy leſs of, it with
out them than with them. Itis true, they are capable
of abuſe ; and ſo muit have been, or we could not
have been free agents, placed in a ſtate of trial.
And
1
dat
e
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
And ſhould we abuſe that to our hurt, which our
Maker deſigned, and wiſely adapted; to promote
our good, would it not be highly unreaſonable
to bring ſuch an abuſe, as a complaint againſt his
benevolence? And yet, this is the real purport of
the objected difficulty, put into plain Engliſh:
Unleſs it ſhould be faid, that the Deity would
have manifeſted more kindneſs to us men, if he
had not planted theſe appetites and pallions in
our nature, than he has done by planting them ;
as the danger of our falling from virtue and be-
coming miſerable, by means of them, is ſo great
as ſcarcely to be avoided. But will any one of
ſound underſtanding calmly and deliberately ſay,
(to ſpeak in the words of a very ſenſible and ju-
dicious writer) " That the Creator, if he would
have approved himſelf wiſely benevolent to man-
kind, ſhould have precluded all from the plea-
fure they taſte in eating and drinking, becauſe
otherwiſe fome will prove intemperate : That
he ſhould have appointed marriage, and the care
of children, to be unattended with any ſenſible
pleaſure, becauſe otherwiſe ſome perſons would
be lewd and unjuſt ; that we ſhould receive no
pleaſure from beauty of any kind but moral,
left fome ſhould fooliſhly, and wickedly prefer
the beauties and pleaſures of ſenſe arid imagina-
tion, before the beauty of virtue :
That none
ſhould naturally love themſelves, and be ſtrong-
ly excited to take care of their own welfare, leſt
ſome ſhould be tempted to gratify this paſſion
with the injury of others. That we ſhould
have
$
OF THE DEIT Y.
225
have been formed indifferent to oppreſſion, in
juſtice, and wickedneſs, and have felt no re-
fentment at the view of thoſe, to prevent any
perſon's being angry, even when they are not
injured: That there ſhould have been naturally
no fatisfaction attending a juſt ſelf-approbation,
that men might not be inclined to value them-
felves without réafon; and no deſire to recom-
mend ourſelves to the eſteem of others, by ex-
cellent qualities and benevolent actions, left
ſome ſhould endeavor to gain the favorable
opinion of others by fooliſh, or wicked actions :
That inen ſhould have been without the paſ
fion of thamė, to reſtrain them from what is
baſe, and deſerving infamy, left fome be aſham-
ed of what is virtuous and honorable : That
there fiould have been no attraction in liberty,
leit fome ſhould be tempted to licentiouſneſs
and nothing appear deſirable in a power to
do great good; that none might ſtrive for a
power of doing great miſchief: And that no
noble émulation ſhould have been felt in the
human boſom, leſt envy ſhould creep in, and
make felf-tormentors, and miſchievous to their
neighbours. Would this have been a better
conſtitution, than the preſent ? Whát wiſe
and conliderate perſon can think it?” The plain
truth is, there is no appetite, affection, or paſſi-
on, as planted in our nature by the God who
made us, but what was intended, and wiſely
adapted, to anſwer fome valuable purpoſe or
infomuch, that it would have been
greatly diſadvantageous to uś, had we not been
E
furniſhed
ocher ;
Ea
226 THE BENEVOLENCE,
1
furniſhed with them. And ſhould they, by not
being kept under due government, prove the
occaſion of ſin, and conſequent miſery, could
the Creator, in conſiſtency with reaſon, be charg-
ed with not having been benevolent ? Eſpe-
cially, if it be conſidered, that theſe very appe,
tites and paſſions, might have been a means;
wiſely improved, of promoting that virtue in us,
which would yield the full happineſs proper
to ſuch beings as we are.
Some will ſtill plead, if appetites and paffi-
ons, in ſuch a conftitution as our's, fhould be
ſuppoſed to be proper, why need they have
been heightened to ſuch a degree of ſtrength?
Or if even this ſhould have been expedient, why
were not our intellectual and moral powers
proportionably exalted, that the undue influ-
ence of appetite and paſſion might the more
eaſily be controuled ? Would it not have been
more kind in our Creator, and have argued
' greater benevolence, if he had given us ſtronger
rational abilities, and weaker animal propenfi-
ties? Eſpecially, as it is principally owing
to the ſtrong impetus of our bodily inclinations,
that we are ſo generally led aſide into the path
of vice and folly, to our own great diſadvan-
fage. The anſwer I would return to this ob-
ection, which, far from being a triling one,
deſerves a ſerious conſideration, is as follows.
If our appetites and paſſions, in their na-
tural ſtate, and as implanted in us by our Créa-
tor, had been lowered in their ſtrength, they
might
>
OF THE DEITY.
127
might have been inſufficient to anſwer the good
ends of their original implantation. In like
manner,had our intellectual powers been height-
ened, they might have unfitted us to live in
ſuch a world as this is. The contrivance of the
Deity in man's conſtitution, and the adjuſt-
ment of its various parts, both aniinal and
mental, is perfect, and will admit, other things
remaining as they were, of no amendirent.
One power is ſo cloſely connected with,and near-
ly related to another, and that other to another
ftill, and the whole to ſuch a world as we are
placed in, that no alteration could be made in
one part, but what would affect another, and
that other ſtill another, and ſo on, till: there
muſt be a total alteration, not only in man,
but the world he lives in ; the abſurdity of
which will be explained, and the pertinency
of this whole paragraph juſtified, in its proper.
place hereafter.
It may alſo be wortliy of 'notice, that a varie-
ty in the trial of various claſſes of intelligent
moral beings, in point of difficulty and hazard,
may be a wiſe contrivance of the Creator for
the more illuſtrious diſplay of his goodneſs, in
harmony with his other moral attributes. It is,
certain, with reſpect to us. men, that our trial,
as individuals, is, for wife and good ends, ad-
mirably various in point of difficulty and dan-
ger; and why might it not, for like good ends,
be a more difficult one, ſhould we be confi-.
dered as a claſs of beings, than has been allotted
228
THE BENEVOLENCE
;
to other claſſes of a ſuperior order? There is
an analogy in this with the whole conduct of
God, which has been various, both in making
and governing all the creatures he has given
exiſtence to. And, it may be, his benevolence,
by means of this variety, is more wiſely, and
fully diſplayed, than it would have been by
any other.
And one claſs of beings would
have no imore reaſon to complain, fhould the
difficulty of their trial, in conſequence of this
expedient variety, be greater, and attended with
more hazard, thạn the trial of another claſs
I ſay, they would have no more reaſon for com-
plaint, than they have becauſe they were not:
inade that other claſs of creatures.
It ought to be conſidered fill further, that
men's appetites and paſſions, by being indulged
beyond what is fit and right, may be heighten-
ed in their impetus, and quite altered from their
natural ſtate. And when this is the caſe, as
we all know it too commonly is, by not keep-
ing them within thoſe reſtraints we both mighty
and ought to have done, we ourſelves, and
not our Creator, are to blame, if diſorders, are
introduced into our frame, and our trial, by
This means, is made more difficult and dange-
rous, than it otherwiſe would have been ; and,
inftead of reflecting on the Deity for not hav-
ing been ſo benevolent, as we fondly imagine
he might have been, we ſhould condemn our-
ſelves, and throw the blame wholly on our
own wickedneſs and folly ; for to this it ought,
in all reaſon, to be aſcribed.
It
OF THE DEITY.
::.229
It is acknowledged, that the natural ſtate of
the appetites and paſſions may be altered, and
often is fo, and much for the worfe, even where
the ſubjects of this alteration are not the blam-
able cauſes of it. By propagation, a diſad-
vantageous bodily temperature may be convey-
ed, fubjecting the defcendants from parents to
a greatly heightened force of animal propenſity,
And by the neglect alſo of theſe to whom
the care of children has been commit-
ted, in reſtraining their inclinations and
paſſion; or by purpoſely allowing them to take
an unbounded latiçude, they may increaſe in
ſtrength, ſo as to be, with great difficulty,
kept under the government of reaſon. In which
caſes, the trial of theſe perfons will be attended
with much more danger, than the trial of
others of the ſame ſpecies. But this is to be
accounted for, and may juſtly be fo, by duly
condidering, that the ſtate theſe perſons are in
is the effect of general laws, wiſely contrived,
and powerfully adapted, to proinote the good
of the fyſtem, of which they are parts ; Nor
could the difficulties, they are ſubjected to,
have been prevented without the extraordinary
interpoſition of the Deity, the inconveniences
of which lrave already been mentioned ; or
without an alteration in theſe laws, that is,
without altering the plan upon which this
world, and the creatures that are in it, were
formed, which would be to ſubſtitute another
world in the room of this, which may be as
ſuitable
:
230
THE BENEVOLENCE
!
that the difficulty of a
fuitable án one,, in that variety which confti.
tutes the univerſe, as wiſdom has thought pro-
per. What has been fuggeſted here will be
enlarged upon, and lèt in a clear light, when
we come to anſwer the objection from natural
evil.
In fine, it may tend to break-the force of
the objection we are upon to bear in mind,
a
temper and conduct, however great, is not
unſurmountable; as it may be counter-acted
by a wiſe improvement of that reaſon, con-
ſcience, moral diſcernment, and other powers
which our Maker has implanted in our con-
ftitution; on purpoſe. to check the undue in,
fluence of our appetites and paſſions, and to
keep them within their proper ſphere è eſpe-
cially, as, in addition hereto, We, may, upon
juſt grounds, hope for the finiles of heaven
upon our careful endeavours, in the uſe of
the means, helps, and advantages, we are fa-
vored with, to get delivered from the dominion
of fin and luft, and to become poſſeſſed of
that nobleſt of all moral powers, a freedom,
without hindrance or controul, to do that which
is right and good. And let it be remembered,
the greater the difficulty we are put to in order
to this, the greater our virtue will be į laying
à juſt foundation for a proportionably higher
reward, in ſelf approbation here, and pleaſure
forevermore in the future world. Beſides all
which, it may be depended on as a ſure truth,
that
OF THE
DEITY.
the good God will make all reaſonable allow-
ances for whatever diſadvantages our ſtate of
trial may be attended with ; conducting to-
wards us, conformably to that eternal rule of
equity, « according to what a man has, and
not according to what he has not, ſhall be gi..
ven to him.” And this fame rule, adapting
it to all other claſſes of beings, in all worlds,
is that by which the Supreme Ruler" and
Judge will meafure his conduct towards them :
In conſequence of which, they will all, in re-
gard of juſt and fair treatment, be brought to
an exact equality. Leſs will be required of
thoſe beings, whoſe powers were ſmall, and
their difficulties great ; and proportionably
more of thoſe," whoſe powers were greater, and
their difficulties leſs. So that, however low
the capacities of us men are, and whatever dif-
ficulties our ſtate of trial may be attended with,
the Supreme King and Judge will be equally
impartial and juſt in his dealings towards us,
as with reſpect to any of the beings that are
above us, in the ſcale of exiſtence.
The ſum of what has been faid; in order to
reconcile moral irregularity with benevolence
in the Deity is, that it ought not to be attributed
to him, as its productive cauſe ; but to the
creatures that were made free. agents : That the
making of free agents wás neceſary in order to
the communication of the higheſt good in kind;
becauſe, if they had not been made, this kind
of good would have been wanting in the crea-
tion:
32
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
tien : That, if free agents were at all brought
into exiſtence, it muſt have been with powers
So far imperfect, as to import a poſſibility of their
erring, without interpoſitions of the Deity to pre-
vent it: That their could not have been ſuch in=
terpoſitions, in confiitency with wiſe and fit con-
duct; becauſe they would, in true conſtruction,
deſtroy the very notion of free agency; and to-
gether with it all foundation for
any
diftinction
between moral right and wrong i And finally;
that however low a claſs of moral agents we
men are, and however difficult our trials by
means of implanted appetiteş an 1 paffions, nay
be, ſuch an order of beings might be fit, in
that variety of exiſtences the wiſdom of God
might judge proper, in order to a full diſplay
of his perfections in general, and his benevo-
lence in particular From which premiſes, if
true, as we have ſeen good reaſon to think them
to be, and no proof can be given to the con:
trary, it follows, that the aétual defeation of free
agents is not to be imputed to any deficiency of
goodneſs in the Deity; and therefore that there
can be no real inconſiſtency between the exiſt-
ence of this moral depravity and infinite benevo-
lence, whatever there may be in appearance.
I would only obſerve, before I proceed, it is
all along fuppoſed, in the above reaſoning, that
the entrance of moral diſorder into the creation
would have been irreconcilable with pure and
nnbounded goodneſs, unleſs every thing had been
done, which, in true reaſon, was fit and pro-
per
OF THE DEIT Y.
233
1
abiem
per. to be done, to have prevented it. And
could it be proved, in reſpect of any claſs of in-
telligent moral beings, or in reſpect of any in-
dividual in chis claſs, that the Deity had been
wanting in what was reaſonably neceſſary, on his
part, that there might not have been a defec-
tion, I ſee not but it would be an invincible ob-
jection againſt the infinite benevolence of his nà-
ture. For it is not ſuppoſable, but that a being
ſupremely and abſolutely good ſhould defire
the happineſs of his whole creation ; eſpecially of
intelligent moral creatures, in all their variousranks,
and numberleſs individuals : And that he ſhould
operate, in all wiſe and reaſonable methods, to
promote it.. And it would certainly argue a
deficiency in his goodneſs, if he could ſee them
ait wrong, and not exert hirnſelf so far as he
might do, in conſiſtency with reaſon and wiſdom,
to hinder it. It is indeed impoſſible, if we may
ſay any thing is ſo, not only that infinite bene-
volence ſhould put innocent moral agents into cir-
cumſtances, wherein their ſeduction would be
unavoidable ; but that it ſhould withhold its co-
operation, in any proper ways, agreeable to
their nátures, to advance the perfection and
felicity they are made capable of To us men,
it may poſſibly ſeem, as though more might
have been done for the human ſpecies, ſome of
thern at leaſt, to have fecured their attachment
to virtue: But are we ſure of this ?... Are we
Deity has been wanting in any thing, proper
FE
OD
*24
THE BENEVOLENCE
on his part, to keep mankind from debaſing
their natures ? It is true, we were not placed in
the higheſt claſs of moral beings : But can we
ſày, that the order of the creation, and the wiſe
and good ends for which it was made, would
not allow, that a rank of beings, conſtituted
and endowed as we are, ſhould be in it ?. Or
will we take upon us to ſhow, that the conduct
of the Deity, towards us, has not been fo wiſely
and fitly adjuſted to the deſign of making us
happy, as it might reaſonably have been ? Can
it be proved, that the only good God expects
more from us, than he ought to do, in true
equity ? Or that he has neglected any ſuitable
method of operation to guard us againſt error,
either in choice or practice? Are we not conſci-
ous to ourſelves, when we do-wrong, that we
do it freely, and as furniſhed with all the pre-
ſervatives againſt fuch conduct, which we could
reaſonably expect, or deſire, as moral agents, and
wliich might have been effectual to our reſtraint,
if we had carefully uſed them, in the dve ex-
erciſe of underſtanding and attention ? And if
this is the real truth, as we are conſcious to
ourſelves that it is, ſhall we reflect upon, the
Deity, as not having exerted himſelf, in all
pro-
per ways, to prevent our miſconduet ? We can-
not pretend, without the higheſt arrogance, to
ſay, much leſs to prove that he has not done
all that he could wiſely do to preſerve us inno-
And more than this would have been
inconſiſtent with his own abſolute perfection. Sa,
that
cent:
ܪܢ
A
OF THE DEITY.
235
;
that he may be infinitely good, notwithſtanding
the degeneracy of mankind, which we know molt
about, and complain moſt of.
I now proceed to conſider, in the ſecond
place, the unhappineſs ariſing from immoral
conduct. For by the evil complained of, in
the objection, is meant, n't only the irregularity
of free agents, but the miſery connected herewith,
or conſequent hereupon, either by the conſtitution
of nature, or infliction from the Deity. If wrong
determinations, and unreaſınable purſuits, were
not accompanied nor followed with unhappineſs,
either to the faulty agents themſelves or others
by their means, the objectors againſt infinite
goodneſs would not, it may be, bę fo ftrenuous
in urging this difficulty : But as the fact is,
they are bitter in their complaints, thinking it
extremely hard, that creatures, for only mif
uſing their liberty, ſhould be ſubjected to confe-
quent puniſhment, natural or penal; and that
others likewiſe ſhould be inade ſuch great ſufferers
by their vices and follies. How, ſay they, could
the Deity, if infinitely benevolent, not only per-
mit creatures of his own forming to corrupi
themſelves, but conneet miſery with their fo doing;
conitituting things fo as to make their wrong
doing an occaſion of unhappineſs, in infinitely va-
rious kinds, not only to themſelves, but to
others alfy ? What a wide door has hereby been
opened 'for the entrance of miſery into the crea-
tion ? Who can compute the immenſe ſum of
pain and torment, of one fort or another, this
conititution
.
236 THE BENEVOLENCE
1
conſtitution has paved the way for ? And can
it be attribuied to an infinitely benevolent
Cafe ? Could ſuch a ſtate if things have ever
been, if a goed God had been at the head of
it, as its fiipreme directing Cauſe ?
It is anſwered, in the firſt place, by freely
owning, that moral irregularity is unav dably
connected with unhappineſs; inſomuch, that
by far the greater part of thoſe evils which
abound in the creation are the natural «r penal
effect here if : Nay, it is readily granted, that
the conſtitution of things is ſuch, that moral in-
telligent beings are capable of fo corrupting their
implanted powers, as that miſery muſt be the
cinſequence; both to themſelves and others alſo,
in certain degrees, while they continue in this
ſtate of degeneracy. Nay, I deny not, but the
conſtitution of things is ſuch, as that unhappi-
neſs muſt be the fruit of abuſed snoral freedom,
in another period of exiſtence, ſo long, and in
ſuch proportion, as the wiſdom of the Supreme
Creator and Governor may think requiſite.
But then I add, in the next place, that this
is ſo far from arguing want of goodneſs in the
Deity, that it very conſpicuouſly illuſtrates the
benevolence of, his nature. It will probably
ſeem ſtrange, to thoſe who have not exerciſed
their thoughts upon this ſubject, to hear it ſaid,
that unhappineſs may be the fruit of benevolence,
and an argument in proof of it, rather than an
objection againſt it. And yet, this is the real
truth; and I doubt not but that may be ſaid
upón
OF THE
737
DEITY
upon the matter, which will make it clearly
and fully appear to be fo.
Only, let it be previouſly remembered, that
the poſſibility of moral irregularity has been al-
ready accounted for, and the actual being of it,
in the creation, reconciled with infinice good
neſs: Which being ſuppoſed, in this part of
the argument, I proceed to ſhow,
Wherein the unhappineſs that is connected, in .
nature, or by poſitive infliation from the Deity,
with the miſuſe of moral powers, is fubfervient
to the general good of the rational creation,
which is hereby more effectually promoted thạn
it would have been, if free agents " might
have aɛted wrong with impunity.
And it is very obvious, in the firſt place,
that a great part of the unhappineſs following
upon voluntary miſconduet is of the medicinal
kind, and ſtrongly tends to the cure of its pa-
tients. The uneaſy ſenſations occaſioned by
vicious practice, together with thoſe various
other pains, which are naturally conſequent
thereupon, what are they but ſo many motives
to repentance, and a due care to make a wiſer
uſe of moral powers? What better adapted
means could have been contrived to rouſe the
faulty agents to attention, bring their to con-
ſideration, and put them upon endeavours to
prevent their own ruin,? If they found no in-
convenience in an irregular courſe, what ſhould
ſtop their progreſs, having entered on it
What probable proſpect would there be, in
this
.
238
THE BENEVOLENCE
:
this caſe, of their ever coming to themſelves,
and recovering a right mind ? And is it not for
their good, that their vicious conduct ſhould be
attended with ſuffering, while this.ſtiffering is con-
fidered under the notion of a mean's powerfully
fitted, in a reaſonable way of operation, to check
their folly, and reduce them to virtue ? Does
not pain, in this view of it, ceaſe to be an evil,
and become a real good? And ought not the
Deity, who has thus conſtituted things, to be
looked upon as a phyſician and friend, des
ſigning their intereſt, and not as an enemy,
who is doing them harm ? And the caſe is
juſt the ſame in reſpect of puniſhments more poli-
tively inflicted. They are a means wiſely adap-
ted to promote the welfare of thoſe who ſuffer
them, and are ſo intended by the all-merciful
Governor of the univerſe, ſo long as they are
capable of amendment by any means whatever.
And if, after this, they ſhould be continued in
fuffering circumſtances, even ſuch a method of
conduct would be perfectly conſiſtent with in-
finite goodneſs, for fome other reaſons we may
have occaſion to mention afterwards.
It is very evident, in the next place, thai
the evils connected with immoral action, in the
Divine government, are for the good of others,
as well as the faulty agents themſelves. They
are indeed, at leaſt in this lower world, with
which we are beſt acquainted, a general diſcou-
rageinent to vicious practice; a ſtanding, per-
petual means provided by the Deity to ſecure the
virtue,
OF
OF THE DEIT Y.
virtue, and by conſequence the greateſt hap-
pineſs, of the human ſpecies, it may be, the only
rational moral agents here exiſting. It is highly
probable, if not certain, that mankind, confi-
dering their various propenſions, though all
ſuited to their condition, and ſubjected to the
guidance of their reaſon, would not be reſtrain-
ed within any tolerable bounds of decency, if
it was ſeen that no diſadvantage followed, when
any of their rank perverted the order of their
faculties, and purſued an irregular courſe of
action. The unhappineſs, inſeparably conjoined
with voluntary, continued miſconduct, by the
known, eſtabliſhed laws of the Divine admini-
ſtration, is one of the grand reſtraints provided -
for their ſecurity : And were this to be taken
off, they would, without all doubt, notwith-
ſtanding all the remonftrances of reaſon againſt in-
clination, be foon loft to all ſenſe of virtue, and
trample upon the ſacred obligations to the
practice of it. And if it is for the good of man-
kind that this ſhould be prevented, ſo far as
may be, in all ſuitable ways, it is equally for
their good, thạt vice ſhould be connected with
miſery ; becauſe a powerful, and yet well adap-
ted means, to chis end. And it ſhould ſeem
indeed as though this connection was a neceſſary
proviſion, in the government of the whole intel-
lectual fyſieni, to preſerve it from confuſion, and
accompliſh,by a regular and conſiſtent inethod of
operation, the
great thing intended and purſued
by the Deity, viz, its greateſt good. It may, pero
haps,
THE BENEVOLENCE
haps, be thought more noble for rational crea-
tures, eſpecially the higher order of them, to
be influenced to right conduct ſolely from the
fitneſs of the thing in itſelf conſidered : But,
it may be, there are no created intelligences
above the need of other motives. It is certain,
an averſion from miſery inuſt be looked upon as
a leading principle in all their natures, from
the bigheſt to the loweſt of them : And if ſo,
what a powerful guard muft it be to their in-
nocence, to ſee the loſs of it, in other beings
like themſelves, attended, in fact, with vexa -
tion and ſorrow? How ſtrongly muſt it tend
to ſecure their adherence to the rule of right,
to behold a deviation from it, in this and the
other inſtance, accompanied with miſery, by the
Divine conftitution ? It is reaſonable to think,
it may be owing, in part, to this connection, that
the whole moral creation is preſerved, under the
ſuperintendency of the Supreme Governor, in
a regular, orderly ſtate. It muſt be confeſſed,
it is true, 'that ſome ranks of rational beings have
probably never acted below the dignity of their
character and conſequently that they know not,
from what have ſeen among themſelves, what un-
happineſs ineans:But who can ſay, that the ſad effets
of immoral conduct, in one ſyſtem of intelligent
beings, may not, in the Divine adminiſtration,
be ſo related to others, as to be uſeful to them
alſo? What is there unreaſonable in ſuppoſing,
that the evils ſuffered, by means of abuſed fa-
culties, in this world of our's, may, in ways,
ſurpaſſing
i
OF THE DÈ IT Y: -
Türpaſting our cornprehenſion, be capable of
promoting, in a meaſure, the good of noral
beings, in other parts of the creation. It is
çertain, in the fyſtem of waterial nature, that other
globes, and foine of them vaſtly diſtant too,
åre: uſeful to this earth; às that alſo in return
may be, in ſome degree, uſeful to them And
it is by this mutual uſefulneſs, to each other,
that they become one harmonious good whole.
The like may be ſaid of the intellectual generel
.
Syftem ; It may be cónftitúted the beſt whole;
by the mútual ſubſerviency of the various
ranks of rational beings to each other, and
their jointly conſpiring, according to ſome ſet-
tled order, to advance the general good. And,
among the ways, wherein the wifdom of the
infinitely benevolent firſt Cauſe may have inade
the ſeveral claffes of intelligent agents capable
of being thus uſeful, this we are confidering
may be one. The miſery, which the indivi-
duals of: one order, of moral beings; may, by
their diſorderly purſuits, bring upon themſelves,
may be deſigned, in the divine : plan, and
adapted, to promote the good, not only of that
particular order, but of other. orders likewiſe, by
exhibiting a moſt powerful motive to diſcou-
rage the like miſconduct, and ſecure an at-,
tachment to the law of reaſon and right.
But, if any ſhould think this is carrying the
matter too far, and upon conjecture only, it
cangot however be denied, that the unhappia
meſs accruing to ſome of the individuals of
Gg
ſpecies
any.
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
1
ſpecies of moral beings, in conſequence of their
having choſen and acted perverſely, may be of
Service to the reſt of the ſame ſpecies, by mini-
ſtring to them feaſonable and proper warnings
And it may, upon the whole, be a kindneſs to
this order of beings, and an argument of the
Deity's benevolence towards them, that he has
thus connected vice and unhappineſs together,
For it is one of the moſt powerful reſtraints
from irregular cction, and as ſtrong an induce-
ment to the choice and practice of virtue. And
fo far as they are preſerved in due order, this,
without all doubt, is one of the great means by
which it is accompliſhed:
And ſhould we purſue this reafoning, and
examine its force as applied to a future ſtate,
and the puniſhments there is reaſon to think will
be there inflicted on wicked men, we ſhall find
it à ſufficient vindication of them. For if they
are, conſidered, as che preſent argument requires
they ſhould be, under the notion of a needful
moral mean intended and calculated to promote,
upon the whole, more good in the intelligent
creation, than might otherwiſe be reaſonably
expected, they are ſo far from being the effect
of ill-will, that they really ſpring from benevo-
lence, and are a proof of it. It carries the
ap-
pearance, I own, of hardſhip and ſeverity, for
creatures to exiſt in Suffering circumſtances :
But if their ſufferings, whether in this or ano-
ther ſtate, are the fruit of their own miſ-do-
ings, and it is for the real benefit of the moral
creation,
OF THE
243
DE IT Y.
1
creation, upon the whole, (as we have ſeen that
iç is.) that ſuch. Sufferings ſhould be the confe-
quent effect of fuch conduct; why ſhould the
goodnels of the Deity be called in queſtion?
Et is true, the fufferers in a future ſtates if ſup-
poſed to be paſt amendment, can reap no ad
vantage themſelves from their ſufferings : But
then, it is to be conſidered, theſe ſufferings were
originally intended for their good. by being
preſented in the forebodings of their own
minds, as a powerful motive, not only, to, re-
ftrain, them from thoſe courſes which would
end in theſe ſufferings, but to urge them on
to thoſe virtuous purſuits which would be fol-
lowed with all the happineſs. they were made
capable of. And if, notwithſtanding ſo. po.w-
erful a means, uſed with them for their good,
they have gone on debaſing their națures,, till
they haze rendered them, incurable by any of
the means the wiſdom of God has ſeen fit to uſe
with them, w.hy: ſhould it be thoughc: a dift
honor to infinite goodneſs, to ſubject them to
that nuiſery: they have thus, expoſed themſelves;
to, by their own wickedneſs, that they might
be a warning: to others, and ſerve as public exam-
ples for general good, ſo long as the wiſdom of
God ſhall know it to be beſt: Is it not better that.
· Some individuals ſhould be in. ſuffering. circum-
ſtances, if they will not, by any of the methods
of God's dealing with them, be brought back
to the choice and praćtice of virtue; I ſay, is
it not better, that ſome individuals ſhould be
mnade
!
THE BENEVOLENCE
244
و
made miſerable, in conſequence of an eſtaba
liſhed connection between vice and mifery, than
that the virtue of the moral creation," together
with all the happineſs dependant thereon,
fhould be endangered, through waņt of ſuch a
proviſion for their ſecurity? The plain truth
is, the benevolence of the Deity, is not confined
to particular beings, or orders of beings, buit
is abſolutely univerſal; and ought therefore to.
be conceived of as exerting itſelf in thoſe ways
which are beſt adapted to advance the gener al
good of the creation. And if, by connecting
miſery with moral irregularity, this end is, in the
moſt effectual manner, promoted, as we have
feen reaſon to think it is, the eftablifhment of
ſuch a connection, notwithſtanding what nay:
eventually happen to particular individuals,
muſt be an argument of goodneſs, rather than
of inconſiſtency with it.
There is yet another way wherein it may be
for the good of the intelligent creation, that wicz.
kedneſs ſhould be connected, in the manner it:
is, with niſery. What I intend is, that by:
this connection occaſion is given for ſuch mani-
feftations of the Divine glory, as are ration-
elly and powerfully ſuited to promote the vir=
tue, and conſequent happineſs, of moral beings ;
which manifeſtations there would have been no
room for, or, at leaſt, not in ſo great a degree,
had it not been for this conneЕtion. It is, evi-
dently from hence, that moſt of the moral at-:
tributes of the Deity become capable of a more
illuſtrious
OF THE DEITY, 945.
illuftricuş diſplay, than would otherwiſe have
been poſſible : And it may be, some of them
çould not have been manifeſted at all, had not
this given the opportunity therefor. The 10-
lineſs of the Divine Being would not have ap-
peared ſo conſpicuous, if moral agents might
have behaved ill, and not found it to their
diſadvantage : Neither would his juſtice have
ſhone with ſuch a diſtinguiſhing luttre as he
could not, ſo fully and impartially, havę ren-
dered to them according to their deſerts. And,
as to the various modifications of goodneſs,
ſuch as mercy, forbearance, patience, long-ſuf-
ſering, forgiveneſs, it does not appear, how-
theſe perfections of tlie Deity could have been
at all diſplayed, had it not been for theſe evils that
are the conſequent fruit of voluntary miſcon-
duct. The idea of pity, and mercụ, and paz-
don, as Divine atļributes, exerciſed towards mo-
ral agents; is eſſentially connected with their
oftual ſuffering, or, at leaſt, liableneſs to it, on
account of their ill-doings : infomuch, thát,
were it not for the unhappineſs we become ob ,
noxious to, "upon being faulty in their beha-
vior, they could have had no notion of theſe
amiable, Divine glories,' And it is from hence
that thoſe marvellous diſplays of goodneſs,in theſe
mncdes of exerciſe, have taken riſe, which tend;
not only to the eternal honor of the Deity, but
the beſt and greateſt good likewiſe of moral
and intelligent beings. Nor is. it difficult to
fonceive how the diſplay of theſe attributes of
the
1
146
THE BENEVOLENCE
the Supreme Creator ſhould operate to this enda
For it is obvious, upon the Nighteſt attention,
that riches, of forbearance, long-fuffering and
forgiveneſs, are naturally
, adapted to work pow..
erfully upon intelligent minds, if they have
been faulty, to lead them to repentances and
bring them back to the practice of virtue, the
only way to true happineſs. And, perhaps, fo.
long as there are any remains of iogeņuity, no-
thing is more rationally ſuited to produce this
effect. And where any, under the infuence, of
thefe Divinę diſplays, have been recovered to
ą virtyous diſpoſition, there are no motives,
better fitted to {trengthen and eſtabliſh it, than
thoſe which may be ſelected from that pity and
mercy, which the Deity has exerciſed towards,
them. Beſides, there will be the excitement
of pious affections in their minds towards the
Divine Being, accompanied with high, pleaſures
which pleaſure they could never have perceive
ed, but in this method of conduct. And, I may,
add, this fame goodneſs of the Deity, appear-
ing in his lenity, and patience, and mercy, to-
wards guilty moral agents, is as naturally, fitted
to produce, in other intelligent beings, who are
not the immediate objects of it, ſuch ſentiments,
and affections, attended with correſponding de-
light, which they could not otherwiſe have been,
the ſubjects of whereby both the virtue and
happineſs of the rational and moral creation iş
better provided for, than it could have been,
in a different ſtate of things.
It
.
.
OF THE DEITY.
24t
It will not from hence follow, it is owned, that
moral irregularity ought
to have been permitted :
Nor was the above reaſoning intended to juſtify
ſuch a permiſſion ; this having been before ac-
counted for upon other conſiderations. The only
inquiry here in debate is, whether the conne&tion
of unhappineſs with this moral irregularity is re-
concilable with goodneſs ? And the argument
we are upon, is, I think, ſufficient for the proof
of the affirmation ; as it has particularly point-
ed out the way wherein the good of intelligent,
beings is better provided for by this expedient,
than it could otherwiſe have been. For by means
of the evils that accompany ill-doing, occaſion,
we have ſeen, has been offered for ſuch
a diſplay of the Divine imoral perfections as
is the greateſt encouragement to virtue,
noť only to the 'agents who may have acted
wrong, but to others alſo; beſides that it lays a
foundation for ſuch pleaſing perception as could
not have been enjoyed in any other method.
In fine, whereas it is complained, that wick-
edneſs is made an occaſion of ſuffering, not only
to the guilty 'agents themſelves, but to other's
likewiſe, in various ways, ſo as to render life
very uncomfortable ;—The anſwer is, that this
unavoidably ariſes from the conſtitution of na-
ture, at leaſt, in reſpect of the human ſpecies.
It is impoſſible, upon ſuppoſition of the exiſt-
ence of ſuch an order of beings as men are, but
that they ſhould ſuffer more or leſs by the vices
and follies of one another, According to the
proverbs
}
38 THẺ BỀNEVO LEN CE
7
ز
proverbs as old as Solomon, ü fooliſh son is the
heavineſs of his mother ; and again a fooliſh Fon is
e grief to bis father. And the conſequences of
oppreſſion, rapine and violence, whether public
or private; muſt be felt and groaned under, in
a world, where creatures are fo nearly allied to;
and dependant on, each other. Nay; the penal
evils, which the Deity may, in kindneſs; inflict
to ſtop the progreſs of wickedneſs, muſt; many
times, touch the innocent as well as guilty, while
they live mixed together, as in the preſent
ftate : Nor could it be otherwiſe without an.
inverſion of the courſe of nature: So thầt; if
this objection proves any thing; it is that ſuch
an order of beings ought not to have been crea-
ted. But we have already ſeeni; that the Deity
was not obliged to make only the inoſt perfeči
beings; yea; that the communication of the
greateft good required the creation of all ranks
of beings, in the deſcending line; fo long as
the enjoyment of exiſtence could be called ani
happineſs. Nor may ſuch creatures as we'are;
who have ſo narrow a view of the works of
God, and the whole ſyſtem of the univerſe;
take upon us to fay; that an order of beings
conſtituted as we are, could not, in conſiſtency
with wiſdom and goodneſs; have a place in the
creation or that ſuch creatures, with all the
evils to which they are ſubjected, would not
make a beautiful, neceſſary part, in the Divine
plan, contrived to form a ſcene wherein the
perfections of the Deity might be moſt admira-
bly
.
ز
1
249,
:: OF THE DE'I T.Y.
bly; diſplayed in producing, upon the whole,
the greatest posſible good.
Beſides, it ought to be conſidered, that theſe.
evils, which wicked men bring upon others by
their vices, are ſuppoſed to bear hard upon the
benevolence of the Creator and Governor of the
univerſe, chiefly on the preſumption, that the
preſesit is an entire independent ſtate, ..not having
relation to, or connection with, any future ex-
iſtence : Upon which ſuppoſition, it is
owned, the difficulty objected would be an un-.
ſurmountable one. But will any pretend to
demonſtrate, that there is no future ftate, that
death puts a tetal end to the being of man, and
all further capacity of enjoyment? And if this
cannot be demonſtrated, which muit be confeffed
to be the truth of the matter, it is poflible, that
the evils which any ſuffer in this may be made
up to them in another ſtate : Nay, it is poffi-.
ble, that theſe evils which they ſuffer may be
intended as a means to prepare and qualify them
for greater-bappineſs, in ſome future period of
exiſtence, than they could otherwiſe have en-
joyed. And this leads to another remark of
great importance in the preſenti argument,
which is
That the evils ſuffered by fome, through the
faulty conduct of others, are ſo over-ruled, in
the all-wiſe, gracious government of the Deity,
as to give occaſion for the exerciſe and improve.
ment of ſuch virtues as tend to promote their
greater happineſs. Vice, it is true, has intro-
Нh
duced
ajo ' THE BENEVOLENCE
duced into the world a great many trials, grieita
ous to bear : But it is as true, that they are
capable of being improved to advantage. And
what though any fhould ſuffer through the
caprice, the pride, the hatred, the inalice, and
other ungoverned paſſions and luits of wicked
men, if they may hereby be gainers in the end?
And this is made.poffible as the Deity has con-
ftituted things. For thefe very diſtreſſes, which
are cauſed by the prevalence of fin and folly,
are ſo many opportunities offered, in provi-
dence, for the exerciſe of meekneſs, patience,
forgiveneſs, and the like virtues; which, being
often, by this means, thrown out into action, be-
come fettled moral diſpoſitions, not only forming
à moſt beautiful character, but together with
it a. capacity for happineſs, which could not
otherwiſe have been enjoyed. It is certains
that the exertment of the mind, in one par-
ticular way, is the method, according to the
eſtabliſhed laws of nature, by which it con-
tracts a faculty in this way of exertion, and
becomes poffeffed of what we call habits, in
any kind. And it is as certain, that opportua
nities offered, in the courſe of providence, for
the frequent repetition of theſe exertments, are
the occaſion by which the inind receives that
correſponding bent, or turn, to which we give
the name, habit or diſpoſition. Froin whence it
follows, that the evils ſuffered through the
fault of others, as they give opportunity for
ħcts of meekneſs, and forbearance, and for
giveneſsa
OF THE 'DEITY.
251
1
giveneſs, are properly adapted to form the vira
tuous diſpoſitions anſwering to theſe acts. And
accordingly it is ſeen, in fact, that none among
men are poffèffed of theſe excellent virtues, in
d. confirmed a degree, as thoſe who have taken.
occaſion from the evils they have ſufferedz. to.
be much in the exerciſe of acts of patience,
contentment, and reſignation. They have, by
this means, got förmed in them, and greatly
ſtrengthened, the diſpoſitions to theſe virtues.
Nor is this, all : But their capacity for moral
rational happineſs is, thereby proporcionably.
enlarged. Theſe virtues, when called forth in-
to exerciſe, are;. at preſent, rewarded with
pleaſurez and; ſuch pleaſure as none know the
value of but thoſe who have felt what it is.
Beſides, which, there is no reaſon to think but
that, in, ſome other and future ſtate, they ſhall
further reap the fruit of their moral improvements,
in anſwerable meaſures of rational ſatisfaction
and delight. To be ſure, it cannot be prova
ed; that this may noț ; yea, that it will not,
be the caſe. And upon this ſuppoſition, it is.
eaſy. to. conceive, how. the evils which good
men have ſuffered, through the wickedneſs of
their fellow-creatures, mậy.finally turn out to
their benefit. What ſpecial uſe there may be,
in another ſtate, for thoſe diſpoſitions, which
have been formed in this, and, particularly ſuited. -
to trials from the perverſe behaviour of others,
we know, not: But thus much we may be ſure ofs.
eluat virtuous habits,, by what means ſoever they
have
252
THE BENEVOLENCE
}
have been formed, improved, and ſtrengthen
ed, do enlarge the general capacity for ration-
al moral happineſs, inſomuch, that, if there
is anothere is anothøy ſtate, the fubjeéts of theni,
on this account, muft be the more happy im
proportionable returns of true and ſolid plea-
fure.
The ſum of the whole argument is this, that
the connection of unhappineſs with moral irregula-
rity is a ineans wiſely adapted to operate pew-
erfully upon rational moral agents, to reduce
them to a right conduct, if they have been
faulty, and to preſerve them inviolable in their
attachment. to virtue, if they have been inno-
cent: Inſomuch, that it may be owing to this
.connection, there is ſo much order and happiness
in the intelligent creation ; of both which, had
not this connection been conſtituted, there
would undoubtedly, have been much leſs than
there now is, and has all along been. The
conſequence wherefrom is, that this proviſion,
fitted for the production of ſo much gocd, is
ſo far from being inconſiſtent with benevolence,
that it is a ſtrong indication of it.. And whereas
the ſufferings of the virtuous, by the wickedneſs
of the vicious, are great and trying, theſe alſo,
upon ſuppoſition of another ſtate (which cannot
be proved to be an unreaſonable, much leſs an impoli-
Ele one) may be, in the end, for their advantage;
as they are capable cf being improved ſo as.
that the fruit, upon the whole, ftall, be more
har nineſs, than if theſe ſufferings had not been
endured ;
OF THE DEITY. 253
endured : And if they may poſſibly be a means.
to produce greater. good, they cannot prove a
deficiency in the benevolence of the Deity, but
are rather an argument in proof that he is
endowed with this attribute.
I have now offered what I had to ſay in il-
luftration of the confiſtency. between infinite be-
nevolence, and moral irregularity, together with
all its conſequent unhappineſs. And I fee not,
upon the review, but the reaſoning employed
to this purpoſe is ſtrictly concluſive. God ha-
ving created free agents, it appears, froin what
has been diſcourſed, that they are the proper and
fole, cauſes of all the moral diſorder that is com-
plained of, and not the Deity ; who has done
every thing that he could, in conſiſtency with
reaſon and wiſdom, not only to prevent their
abuſe of their faculties, but to promote their
improvement of them fo as to attain to the.
higheſt perfection and happineſs : And further,
that the very evils, he has connected with their
voluntary miſconduct, are kindly intended, and
wifely adapted, to bring about their beſt good,
and will certainly do it, if it is not their own
fault. So that, upon the whole, it cannot be
conceived, what the Deity could have done
more, in a wiſe and rational method of opera-
tion, to have made intelligent moral beings, in
all their various orders, as happy as their origi-
nal capacities would allow of : Which is as
much as can be expected, even from benevo-
lence that is infinite.
It
I
1984. THE BENEVOLENCE
Et now remains to conſider the third and laft
objection, to the infinite: benevolence of the
Deity. And this is taken from the naturale
evils, cominion to all perceiving beings, in this,
world, of our's,, in all their claſſes from the
Higheſt to the towelt, fuch as pains, diſeaſes
and diſaſters, in various kinds, and degrees
and, at laſt, death, moſtly accompanied with
diſtreſs, and ſometimes, with aggravated, cir.
fümſtances of iniſery and torment. And the
complaint upon, this head is, that theſe evils are.
hot only permitted by the Deity, but were, in
a fenfè,, appointed.; as being the effect of that:
cönftitution of things, which he contrived,
and eſtabliſhed, and has all along upheld:
Nay, it is urged, with reſpect to ſome of theſe
evits, ás to: their kind, if not degrée, that the
Deity intended they ſhould take place, andi,
originally endowed the creatures with fuch na-.
tures, as that à liableneſs to them was, abſo
"Jutely neceffary. And would an infinitely be..
nevolent Being, fày the movers of this objec-,
tion, have brought creatures into exiſtence.
under ſuch circumſtances, ſubjected, by the
very laws of their nature, to pain and miſery?
Does this look like the doing of ſupremely
perfect goodpeſs? Can it be fuppoſed; that
ſuch a fate of things could have been, if oria.
ginally planned, and all along conducted: by a.
Being eſſentially, and infinitely kind and good ?
I anſwer by acknowledging, that the percei-
ving beings of all orders, in this lower world.org
are
* T H E LÀ E L T Ý.
i
Fre liable to pain, and deaths and that they
were made thus liable by the God, who gavė
them exiſtence under ſuch circumſtances, as
that theſe evils could not be avoided. Only
let it be remembered, and confidered; before I
"come to a particular reſolution of this diffia
"culty
That even thele naturat evils; ſo far as inais
kind are concerned in them, are all of them
increaſed in their malignity, by means of that
moral diſorder, which they have introduced
into the world. And to this famę cauſe; and
not to the Author of our beings it is owing
alſo, that the kinds of natural eyils are
become more numerous: Had it not been for
the luſts of men, we ſhould never have heard
of many tormenting diſeaſes, which multitudes
now lie groaning under. And as to thoſe
which were unavoidable, in confequence of the
eſtabliſhed laws of nature, they would have
been comparatively few, and attended with
only tolerable degrees of pain. An intemper
rate, luxurious, debauched courſe of living
through the prevalence of ungoverned appetites
and ſenſual inclination, in oppofition to the
dictates of reaſon, and the remonſtrances of
-conſcience, is that which has aggravated, as
well as multiplied, the evils of the world. It
is therefore very unfait to take occaſion, froin
the vexations and ſorrows of hunan life, in
its preſenc degenerate ſtate; to reflect diſhonce
on the goodneſs of the Deity. The only juig
WAY
ago
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
way of forming an impartial judgment, in the
caſe, is, to conſider thefe evils, not as multi-
plied and aggravated, through men's pervert-
ing their powers, and acting counter to the
rules preſcribed for the government of them ;
but as it may reaſonably be fuppofed, they
would have taken place, according to the courte
of nature, not hindered in its regular opera-
tion. The miſeries that infect the human ſpe-
cies, in the former view, are the ſole fruit of
their own folly, not an effect of God's produ:
cing, for which men themſelves, and not God,
are anſwerable : Though I inay add here, his
goodneſs is ſuch, that he has done every thing
fit and proper, that even theſe evils of men's
own bringing upon themſelves may turn out,
in the end, to their final good, as we have al-
ready ſeen. In the latter view only of the evils
of life is diſcovered the proper effect of thoſe
laws of nature, which the Deity has eſtabliſh-
liſhed, and which we are, at preſent, called to
conſider, in order to vindicate his ſupreme
benevolence.
And here it may be again proper, before I.
proceed to the particular evils complained of
as inconſiſtences with the Divine goodneſs, to
obſerve in general, that they are the effects of
eſtabliſhed laws, the deſign and tendency of
which are greatly beneficial. And though
they may be, in fome inſtances, more eſpecial-
ly at certain times, the occaſion of evil, they
are notwithſtanding eventually productive
of
1
OF THE DEITY.
257
of a valt overbalance of goodi , The air we
breath in may, in conſequence of the laws of
nature, be ſometimes ſubjected to thoſe hetero-
geneous mixtures, which will, until it is purified,
make it of ſuch an ill temperature, as to oC-
caſion hurt both to man and beaft; but yet,
life itſelf in all animals, without which there
could be no enjoyment, is abſolutely depen-
dant on it, and preſerved by means of it.
Fire, conformably to the laws of nature, may
unhappily be the occaſion of extenſively ruin-
ols defolation ; while yet, it is one of the most
uſeful creatures of God. Storms and tempefts,
thunder and lightning, may ſometimes be the
cauſes of no ſmall hurt, by deſtroying the lives,
or ſubſtance, of numbers of individuals ; but,
by clearing the air, and diſengaging it from
thoſe noxious exhalations that were blended
with it, it fits it for reſpiration, and in this
way does good, beyond all compariſon for
ſurpaſting the evil it ever brings into event.
The fanie may be ſaid of earthquakes,. inun-
dations, famiñes, and peſtilences, they are the
effects of laws, which are not only, in that ge-
neral tendency, good, but actually produce
more and greater good, than they ever do evil.
In ſhort, the laws of nature are all of the be-
neficial kind, and we feel that they are ſo, by
the enjoyment of innumerable good things..
which are the effects of their operation; and
the evils they may, at any time, be the occa..
Ii
lion
258
THE BENEVOLENCE
1
fion of, are not worthy of being mentioned,
they are lo much over-balanced with good.
And it may be, upon the whole, beft, in
this world of our's, that general laws thould be
ſo eſtabliſhed, as that evils ſhould ſometimes
be occaſioned by them. The final cauſe of
ſuch an eſtabliſhment might be the good, para
ticularly of mankind. A world, in which there
is a mixture of evil with good, may be moſt
ſuitable for ſuch creatures as we are. Were the
laws of nature ſuch as to leave no room för
thoſe occaſions of forrow, fear, and fuffering,
we are now ſubjected to, this earth might have
been a place altogetheř unadapted for training
us up for the enjoyment of God, the ſupreme
good. It was, perhaps, highly expedient, if not
abſolutely neceſſary, that we ſhould live in a
world of diſcipline, a world that would, in the
natural courſe of things, be the occaſion of dif-
ficulties, inconveniences, and trials, by means
of which we might be formed to a meetneſs for
another world, in which we ſhould be totally
freed from them. An uninterrupted ſtate of
eaſe and pleaſure, would, morally ſpeaking, be
tłia roin of mankind. We need a mixture of
evil with good to check our pride, to
reſtrain our ſenſual appetites ; to take off
our affections from the things of the earth ;
and to excite in us a juſt ſenſe of our depend-
ance on God. And we need alſo, every now
and then, to be alarmed by this or that difa.
penſation, which ſhall ſpeak with a voice more
loud
:
OF THE DEITY.
259
ز
loud and awful, than is common and ordinary.
The inhabitants of the world in general, and
thoſe of this or the other place, in ſpecial, are
fometimes ſunk into a ſtate of fuch careieſneſs
and ſtupidity, have ſo. little faith in God, and
are fo given up to comınit aļl iniquity with
greedineſs, that, humanly ſpeaking, there is
no room left to expect their reformation and
amendment, but by ſuch manifeſtations of the
power, the greatneſs, and majeſty of God, as
even force a faith in him, and a ſerious atten-
tion to his character as the moral Governor of
the world. The courſe of nature is, according-
ly, wiſely and mercifully adapted to both theſe
ends; giving: occafion, at all times, for diſci-
plinary trials; and bringing on alſo, at certain
intervals, ſuch tremendous events as are pow-
erfully fuited co. alarm their fears, and engage
them to betake themſelves to a better courſe
1. of conduct. And it is highly probable, the all-
wife good God has ſo, adjuſted the laws of nature,
as that they ſhall operate; in all ages, and in
all places, fo, as may beſt anſwer his benevolenc
deſigns in the moral government of his intel-
ligent creatures. What I mean is, he may
have ſettled ſuch laws, with reſpect to natural
cauſes, inay have ſo proporcioned their force,
ſphere of action, degree and manner of opera-
tion, as that, under his. all-powerful and all-
wiſe concurring influence, they ſhall conſpire
together to produce thoſe effects, at ſuch cimes,
and in ſuch places, which may be füited ta
their
1
260 THE BENEVOLENCE
I
their moral ſtate, and ſerve for warning, or
correction, or ruin, as he ſhould judge moſt ex-
pedient. It is from theſe laws of nature, that
tempeſts, faminęs, peftilences, earthquakes, and
the like evils, take their rife. And they rnay
reaſonably be viewed as the great inſtruments of
providence.
It is by theſe, at leaft in part,
that God keeps this degenerate world within
re/traint, Were it not for the diſplays he makes,
at proper times, and in proper places, of his
being, perfections, and governing providence,
in theſe ways of terror, mankind might, at length,
forget there was a God, or live as though there
was none.
But it will, perhaps, be ſaid here, why ſhould
.
beings be made fo imperfect as to need a con-
ftitution of things, in conſequence of which
there would unavoidably be theſe evils ? Could
not the Deity have make mankind, in particu-
lar, more perfect, and placed them in a world,
in which, conforinably to eſtabliſhed laws, they
might have enjoyed good without any mixture
of evil ? And if he could, would he not have
done it, if infinitely benevolent? Theſe queſ-
tions, and all other of a ſimilar kind, are only
ſo many vague, unſupported ſuggeſtions, im
porting, that a world, fo conftituted as our's is,
could not, upon the ſuppoſition of infinite bene-
volence, have been brought into exiſtence. But
this is ſo far from being a truth, that, had
not the Deity created ſuch a world as this in
which we live, he would not liave nianifeſted ſo
much
1
i
261
OF THE DEIT Y.
much benevolence, as he might have done, and aca
tually has done. It has been already faid, and large-
ly proved, that there may be the communicati-
on of more good by the creation of a diverſity
of beings, variouſly capable of happineſs, from
the greateſtconceivable height, quite down to the
loweſt. It is therefore no objection againſt in-
finite benevolence, that all beings are not a
like perfect, but rather a proof of it; becaufe
the leſs perfect, in all their gradations, ſo long
as they are at all capable of enjoyment, inſtead
of diminiſhing, increaſe the fum total of good.
Why then ſhould they be excluded the creation?
Why ſhould not our world, imperfect as it is in
compariſon with other w:rlds, have been brought
into exiſtence, with all its inhabitants, animal
and rational, however low ſome of them may be
in their capacities for the perception of happi-
neſs? They are all, according to their ſeveral
ranks, capable of pleaſure, and actually enjoy it,
and an over-balar.ce of it, notwithſtanding all
the evils they are liable to. If therefore they
had not been made, nor the world in which they
live, becauſe ſo conſtituted as ſometimes to be
the occaſion of evil, the place they now fuf-
tain in the creation would have a vaſt void.
And what a nighty chaſm in nature would
this have been the means of ? How much
leſſened muſt have been, that good, which might
have been communicated ? None of that hap-
pineſs would have been poſſible, which is now
enjoyed, has been, and may hereafter be en
joyed
262
THE
THE BENEVOLENCE
joyed, by innumerable beings which have exift-
ed, and may in future time exiſt, on this earth.
And is it not more for the honor of the bene-
volent Deity, that this happineſs ſhould have
been communicated; than that he ſhould have
withheld it? In a diverſitied creacion, there
muſt be a diverſity in the diſplays, of goodneſs,
ſhould they proceed even from an infinitely be-
nevolent being. If the diſplays. of goodneſs,
therefore, in the conſtitution of our world, and
the innumerably various creatures in it, are
leſs than in the conſtitution of other worlds, and
the creatures in them, it is no other than inight
reaſonably be looked for. There is, beyond
all controverſy, more benevolence diſcovered
in making ſuch a world as our's, than if the
place it occupies in the creation had been a
blank ? And what is more, for aught any man.
living can prove to the contrary, cr pretend
without arrogance to prove, it may be a fit link
in that chain of exiſtence, which God may have
intended for as full a manifeſtation of his be-
nevolence, as, in his infinite wiſdom, he has
judged proper.-But, inſtead of enlarging any
further here, I ſhall rather proceed
To a more direct anſwer to the objection:
againſt the infinite benevolence of the Deity, as
fetched from thoſe natural evils, which all the
percipient beings in our world, and mankind
in ſpecial, are, from their very inake, and the
laws of nature, ſubjected to. And here I ſhall
be particular in enumerating the principal of
theſe
OF THE DEITY.'
263
1
theſe evils, and endeavor to account for them,
in confiliency with goodneſs, ſhould it be ſup
poſed to be infinite, but guided, at the ſaine
time, by unerring wiſdom.
The frít evil complained of is pain. This
indeed is nearly connected with moſt of the
other evils, and conſtitutes ſo great a part of
them, that it might be conſidered in general,
and the anſwer to it, if jufc, eſteemned a full
reply to them all. But I chuſe rather to ſpeak
to it diſtinctly, and particularly, as one of the
èvils objected to. It is ſuppoſed in the objec-
tion, that it is in itſelf an evil, and ſuch an
one as there was no occaſion for, and could
not have had exiſtence from an infinitely bene-
volent Being. But this may be a great mil-
take. Pain, in a relative view, and as introa
duced into ſucli a world as our's, may loſe its
nature as an abſolute evil, and be rather wore
thy of being called a réal good.
Some have endeavoured to account for pain,
ſo as to make it conſist with goodneſs, by
ſaying, thảt it gives a quicker and ſtronger
reliſh for pleaſure ; and that pleaſure could
not have been felt, at leaſt in many caſes, and
with fo high a' guſt, had it not been for pre-
ceeding experience of the thing meant by the
ſenſation of pain. But it is evident, beyond
all reaſonable diſpute, that there 17.ay be tlie
perception of pleaſure without any previous
perception of pain ; becauſe this is the real
truth with reſpect to him, who is God over all.
blefled
.
64
THE BENÉVOLENCE
bléſed forever more. It will not be pretenda
ed; that the perfectly and infinitely happy Be-
ing ever knew what pain was; from any ex-
perience he ever had, or could have, of it
within himſelf. And it is poſible; I might
father ſay highly probable, that there are crea
ted beings of a ſuperior order to the nobleſt
in our world, who never felt pain; having
never had occaſion, or reaſon for ſuch percep-
tion..
Others, in vindication of the Divine bene-
volence, have ſuppoſed, that the conſtitution,
particularly, of man, is fó exquiſitely nice,
that a touch upon his nervous ſyſtem will oc-
cafion pleaſure, or pain, according to the de-
gree and manner in which it is doneand
that the bodily mechaniſm is ſuch, that it
could not have been otherwiſe. But this, per-
häps, is going too far beyond the ken of
human underſtanding. We know not; nor is
it poſſible we ſhould know, the height, or
depth, of that contriving ſkill which is a glory
peculiar to the Infinite Mind.
The true and proper anſwer to the objected
difficulty we are conſidering is this, that all
the perceiving beings in our world, whether
rational or irrational, of an higher or lower or-
der, were ſubjected to the ſenſation of pain, not
for its own fake, but in wiſdom and kindneſs,
ahat it might be an excitement to their care in
providing for the ſupport and comfort of life,
and that it might alle läeep them upon their
guard
THE DEITY.
but low creatures, perhaps the loweſt among
guard againſt whatever might be hurtful to
them. We men, though the firſt order of be-
ings on this earth; are, comparatively ſpeaking,
all the moral exiſtences in the creation of God;
and as we are ſuch imperfect creatures, and
live in a world wherein we are ſurrounded
with dàngers; and liable to innủinerable diſa[m
pers, and attacks upon our health ảnd life, paim
appears to be a wiſe and benevolent proviſion
of the God of nature for our holding exiſta
ence with any tolerable degree of ſafety: Thic
has been already illuſtrated; Part II. to which
I ſhall only add; the ſphere of our underſtand-
is fo limited; and ſuch the danger of our
being expoſed, in thouſands of caſes, to the loſs
of health, limbs; and life itſelf, that our greateſt
fecurity is this ſenſation of pain. It ſupplies
the deficiencies in our make, and afifts our fee-
ble powers; by being a conſtant, álarining mo
nitor, calling upon us in time to provide for
our well-being, and to guard ourſelves againſt
wounds, bruiſes; diſtempers; and whatever mighc
be diſadväritageolis; or deſtructive to us:
Iç may be ſaid here, what need of ſo troua
bleſome a ſenſation as this of pain to guard us
ägainſt dangers, and diſorders ? Might not this
have been done in a more eaſy way, and yet
ås efféctual ani one? And if it might, how comes
it to påfs that it was not? Would not an infi-
nitely benevolent Being have been thus kind,
his creatures :
KI
Th
ing
266
THE BENEVOLENCE
The anſwer is obvious:
The making ſuch
án order of imperfect beings as we are, has beer
already accounted for, and ſhewn to be confi-
ſtent with infinitely wiſe benevolence.
This
being fo, a more kind expedient could not
have been contrived, for ſuch creatures as we are;
ſo far as we are able to judge; than the ſenſa-
tion of pain, for our ſecurity from danger, and
hurt, and to promote our real welfare. Moſt
certainly, no one is able to point out a better;
or to make it evident there could have been a
better. Was it not for this expedient, mankind;
notwithſtanding the utmoſt efforts of their rea-
fon, wiſdom; and foreſight, would, in innume'-
rable inſtances, rụn into danger, and expofc
themſelves to thouſands of difficulties, and in-
conveniences, they are, by this contrivance of
the Divine ſkill and goodneſs, in a great mea-
Jure freed from. It is indeed ſo uſeful, I might
more juſtly ſay fo neceſſary, an ingredient in the
human conſtitution, that it would be ſcarce
poffible life ſhould be preſerved without it. To
be ſure, it could not with that comfort and
falety it may now. be.
.: Beſides all which, it ought to be conſidered,
that we men are moral, and not meerly animal,
beings; and it might be in the view of our be-
nevolent Creator, by means of this ſenſation of
pain, he has made zis capable of, to reftain üs
from luxury, intemperance, lewdneſs, and des
bauchery, an indulgence to which would be
hurtful to our ſouls as well as bódies; debaſing
QUB
OF THE DEITY.; 267
:
our nature, and bringing us down to a level
with the very brutes; than which nothing would
be more diſhonorary to the God who made us,
or greater reproach to ourſelves as moral and
intelligent agents. By this expedient alſo, fo
uſeful in ſo many other reſpects, occaſion is of-
fered, eſpecially in certain caſes, and at certain
timeș, for the formation and improvement of
the virtues, patience, meekneſs, concentinent,
and reſignation to the all-wiſe, righteous, and
þoly, Governor of the world, which may be
greatly ſerviceable to us here, and abundantly
more ſo in fomne future ſtate of exiſtence.
To go on to other evils, coinplained of.
Such are hunger and thirſt, toil and labor,
to all which we are ſubjected. But theſe, if
conſidered as they ought to be, are ſo far from
being deſigned evils, that they were purpoſely
contrived for good, tend to good, nor could
ſuch imperfect creatures as we are have poffefied
exiſtence ſo well without, as with them.
The way in which the wiſdom of God has
thought fit to manifeſt his goodneſs iņ preſerv-
ing the lives he has beſtowed on uş, is, by the
uſe of food. Our bodies are ſo conſtituted as
that, even, their ſolids are daily upon the waſte,
and their fluids, in a perpetual fux; inſomuch
that new: acceſſions of matter are neceffary to
jupply. what falls, off, and wears, away. Death
mult otherwiſe foon, and unavoidäbly, be the
effect. Now this ſupply is made by eating and
drinking; and to this we are urged, partly by
the
268". IM
TML BENEVOLENCE
the fatisfaction we naturally take in what we
eat and drink, but principally by that hunger
and thirſt, which, though, ſometimes heighten-
ed to a degree that may be greatly troubleſome,
are yet neceſſary, and bring far more pleaſure,
than pain along with them. Was it not for
the implantation of this expedient in our nature,
we Thould be in danger of dying before our
time, through negligence in providing, or throw
ing in, the recruits that are continually neceſ:
ſary for the ſupport of our bodily ſyſtem,
Hunger and thirſt are what nature has made,
and intended to give us warning of this danger,
and to puſh us on to a due care, to prevent, in
time, thoſe inconveniences that would befall
our bodies, if not ſupplied with food and drink
to ſtrengthen and uphold their
But it will be laid, what need of labor in or
der to procure the things needful for the body
Could not the earth, without the coil of man,
have yielded a ſufficiency for his bodily fup:
port? And would not this have been the con-
ftitution of nature, if an infinitely benevolent
Cauſe had been at its head, as its Supreme Di-
rector ? I anſwer, Had the conítitution of na-
ture been thus altered, there muſt have been an
analogous alteration in the make of man, other-
wife greater inconveniences would have taken,
place, than thºſe that are now complained of,
that is, the Deity would not have manifefted fó,
much benevolence, as he has now done. Had
the earth been ſo made as that it ſhould ſpon.
taneouſly
OF THE DEITY. 809
$
ancouſly have yielded ies produce, and mans,
labour by this means have been rendered needleſs,
what would have been the conſequence but indo-
lentináctivity? And what the conſequenceofthat,
but the loſs of health, the want vigorand ſpirit,and
a general tediouſneſs accompanying life ? And
what is more, the bringing on death muchi foo.
ner, and with more diſtreſſing anxiety and pain,
than would otherwiſe have been the caſe. Inaco
tion, and no exerciſe, naturally and powerfully
tend to relax the ſolid parts of the body, to wea-
ken the circulation of the Auids, and fo to dif-
order the ſecretions intended for the finaller
veſſels, as that, inſtead of affording them a pro-
per fupply, they would fill them with obftructi-
ons; which, if not removed, would effect a dif-
folution of the bodily machine, either ſuddenly,
or in a more flow and lingering way. With
reſpect, therefore, to beings conſtituted as we
áre, labor is highly expedient ; and it is a
proof of benevolence, rather than an objection
againſt it, that we are ſubjected to it. Mr.
Addiſon has ſet this in a beautiful, as well as
clear and ſtrong point of light. His words,
which none will think unworthy of tranſcribing,
are theſe
.. I conlider the body as a ſyſtem
of tubes, and glands, or to uſe a more ruſtick
phraſe, a bundle of pipes and ſtrainers, fitted
to one another, after To wonderful a manner, as
as to make a proper engine co work with.
This deſcription does not only comprehend the
bowels, bones, tendons, veins, nerves, and asy
teries
$70
THE BENEVOLENCE
Í
'
teries, but every mufcle, and every ligatora,
which is a compoſition of fibres that are fo
many imperceptible tubes or pipes, interwoven
on all ſides with inviſible glandsor ſtrainers. This
general idea of a human body, without confi-
dering it in the niceties of anatomy, lets us
fee how: abſolutely neceſſary labor is for the
right preſervation of it. There muſt be free
quent motions and agitations to mix, digeft,
and ſeparate the juices contained in it, as well
as to clear and cleanſe that infinitude of pipes,
and ſtrainers, of which it is compoſed, and to
give their ſolid parts a more firm and laſting
tone, Labor, or excerciſe ferments the humors,
cafts them into their proper channels, throw .
off redundances, and helps nature in thoſe ſex
cret diftributions, without which the body can-
ņot fubfiit in its, vigor, nor the ſoul act with
chearfülneſs. I might here mention the effect
which this has upon all the faculties of the mind,
by keeping the underſtanding clear, the ima-
gination untroubled, and refining thoſe ſpirit,
that are neceſſary for the proper exertion of our
întellectual faculties, during the preſent laws of
union between foul and body. It is to:a, ner.
glect in this particular that we muſt aſcribe the
fpleen, which is ſo frequent in men of fudious
and ſedentary tempers, as well as the vapors to.
which thoſe of the other fex are ſo often ſubject.
Had not exerciſe been abſolutely neceſſary for
our well-being, nature would not have mada
the body fo proper for it, by giving ſuch an
activity
1
OF THE DEITY.
望 ​172
tivity to the limbs, and ſuch a pliancy to
every part às neceſſarily produces thoſe com-
preſſions, extenſions, contortions, dilatations,
and all other kinds of inotions that are neceſſary
for the preſervation of ſuch a ſyſtem of tubes
and glands as has been before mentioned. And
that we might not want inducements to engage
us in ſuch an exerciſe of the body as is proper
for its welfare; it is ſo ordered that nothing
valuable can be procured without it. Not to
mention riches and honor, even food and rai-
ment are not to be come at without the toil of
the hands, and ſweat of the brows. Providence fur-
niſhes materials, but expects that we ſhould work
them up ourſelves. The earth muſt be labored
before it gives its increaſe, and when it is for-
ced into its ſeveral products, how many hands
muſt they pafs through before they are fit for
uſe ? Manufactures, trade, and agriculture,
naturally employ more than nineteen parts of
the ſpecies in twenty ; and as for thoſe who
are not obliged to labor, by the condition in
which they are born, they are more miſerable
than the reſt of mankind; unleſs they indulge
themſelves in that voluntary labor, which goes
by the name of exerciſe." I ſhall add here,
if it was fit ſuch an order of creatures as we
men ſhould have had a place in a ſcaleof beings
indefinitely diverſe from each other, which no
one, without high arrogance, will pretend to
fay, no reaſonable complaint can be made on
Account of that labor we are called to.
ya
1
014 THE BENEVOLENCI
gar?
was indeed, for a ſpecies of beings conſtituces
is we are; nearly and neceſſarily connected with
the welfare both of our ſouls and bodies. If
we may pay any regard to the ſacred books of
revelation; Adam; even in paradiſe was oblin
ged to labor ; for he was put into the
den of Eden to dreſs it.", The exerciſe he
was called to might be different; in kind and
degrée; from that which falls to our ſhare, a
xt is our lot to live on the earth ſince it was
doomed to “ bring forth thorns and thiſtles,
that it might be an occaſion of that toil and
*fweat of face," without which we cannot eain
the bread we eat. And, as the moral ſtate of
the world has been, from the time of the
lapfe of the firſt of our race, it may be beſt it
Hould be thus, more conducive to the honor
of God, and our own good, than otherwiſe it
would have been.
- It may properly be ſubjoined (till further,
had it not been for the contrivance of labor,
this earth would have been a rude wilderneſs :
Nor fhould we have ſeen thoſe curious produc-
tions of art, which are ſo beautiful, and, at the
ſame time beneficial, and delightfome. How
could we, without labor, have had houſes accom-
modated to the convenience and comfort of
life, and other fructures both ornamental and
ſerviceable? The world indeed is filled with a
yariety of works, innumerable in their kinds,
adapted to gratify the ſenſes, and anſwer ma:
py valuable purpoſes, which could not have
been
OF THE DEITY.
273
been brougħt iñito effect without labör of body
or mind; or both. And in vain, comparative-
ly ſpeakings were we formed with hands, and
eyes, and various mechanical turns, had not the
Creatoř intended we ſhould labor : Nor would
he havė. întënded this; if a variety of wiſe and
benevolent ends inight not have been anſwered
kèřeby; ſome of which we have pointed out;
and might eaſily have mentioned many more.
There are yet other evils complained of;
among which are - bodily diſorders in innume-
rable kinds, eſpecially thoſe in conſequence of
which ſome are idiots,' and others diſtracted,
and by this means not onlý objects of pity, but
the occaſion of rio finall trouble to their rela-
tions, and fometimes to the communities in
which they live as individuals.
The exiſtence of theſe evils, in our world,
in its preſent ſtate, is not denied. But it máy
bë juſtly queſtioned; whether they would have
been either ſo multiplied, oř heightened in their
malignity, had it not been for the prevalence
of folly and vice, which is chargeable on us
as its author, and not on God. Such indeed
is our conftitution, and ſuch the eſtabliſhed
laws of nature, that, aſide from the wrong con-
duct of mankind, there might have been fome
of theſe evilis ; bür, without all doubt, they
would have been far leſs in number, and får
lighter in degree; in compariſon with what they
now are. But be this as it may; as they are
the effects of eſtabliſhed natural laws, intended
LI
for
274 THE BENEVOLENCH
1
for good, and productive of it in innumerable
inſtarices, they ought not to be complained of;
eſpecially, if it be remembered, that pre-eſta-
bliſhed general laws, for ſuch a world as our's,
are preferable to immediate, unrelated exertions
of the Divine agency; and inconveniences may
have been lefſened; rather than increaſed there:
by: Were there no general laws, but every
thing was effected by immediate, unrelated acts
of Divine power, the bad conſequences ariſing
herefrorn would be at once obvious. ( There
would be no arts and ſciences, no ſkill or in-
duſtry ; no regular methods of providing for
our bodies, or improving cur minds in the
knowledge of things ; all which evidently pre-
ſuppoſe, and are entirely founded on fòme fet-
tled, certain laws of the univerſe diſcoverable
by us.'
The reader, if he pleaſes, may turn
TO Part II, where he will find this point large-
ly conſidered.
It may be further ſaid here, as mankind are
brought into exiſtence, not by immediate
exertions of Divine power, but in conſequence
of the general law of propagation, they are, in
virtue of this laws ſubjected to evils, which
would not have been prevented, but by an extra-
ordinary interpoſition of heaven, which, if com
mon, might be followed with more inconvex
niences, for aught we can ſay to the contrary
than it would guard againft." By a variety of
ways, and means, this law of nature may be to
obſtructed in its operation, or ſuch a turn given
OF THE DEITY.
275
to it, as that children may come into the world
with a bodily machine, unfitted for the ſoul
to work by-; in confequence of which fome
might be idiots, and ſome naturally turn wilde
Theſe caſes, indeed, are comparatively rare.
It is more common for children to derive from
predeceffors, and as the effect of their vices too,
bdily conſtitutions ſubjecting them to infirmi-
ties, and diſeaſes, various in kind, and foine-
times greatly aMictive in degree. And, per-
haps, moſt of the diſorders mankind groan un-
der, eſpecially as to the malignant degree of
them, are owing to this cauſe. But theſe in-
oonveniences notwithſtanding, it is better,
beyond all compariſon better, this law ſhould
have been eſtabliſhed, chan, otherwiſe. For it
is by fucceffion, and not a continued exiſtence
of the ſame individuals, that the human ſpecies
is preſerved in being. And as this is not done
by a conſtantly created ſupply of individuals
how could it have been better effected, than by
this law of propagation ? Eſpecially, if it be
conſidered, that it has inade way for the mani-
feſtation of riches of wiſdoin, as well as good's
neſs, in the formation of different ſexes, in the
adjuſtment of a different bodilyorganization, and
the contrivance of natural propenſions, all which
are a Imirably. fitted to bring into event the
intention of this law. And it is ſo cloſely cons
nected with other laws, good in theinfelves,
and productive of good' ; ſuch as the law. of
kuva, particularly, between the ſexes, which
gives
276
THE BENEVOLENCE
.
gives occaſion for many reciprocal ſervices
greatly beneficial, of which we could otherwiſe
have had no idea ; and the law of growth from
infancy and childhood, to a ſtate of maturity
with reſpect to both mind and body, which makes
way for thouſands of kind offices in parents to-
wards children, as alſo for the trial and im-
provement of many important virtues : Such, }
Tay, is the connection between the law of pro-
pagation, and other laws of nature, that the
Freſent fyftem muſt, in many reſpects, haye
been altered, if this had not been eſtabliſhed
&
that is, in other words, this world muſt have
been ancther world, and not the world it now
is : While yet, ſuch a world as this is muſt have
been brought into exiſtence, or the Divine bez
nevolence would not have been ſo amply ma-
nifeſted, as, by this means, it might be, and
really has been
There are two other evils ſtill particularly
complained of; the ſhortneſs of life, and the
unavoidable neceſſity of death.
As to the firſt, the brevity of life ; it might
be enough to ſay, in general, it was ordered
by unerring wiſdom, and, at the fame time,
argues benevolence; as life, fhort as it is, is
much preferable to non-exiſtence.But we ſhall
be more particulaſ in conſidering this complaint.
It is readily allowed, the general limitation of
life, with reſpect either to the human ſpecies,
or any of the claſſes of inferior creatures, cans
not be accounted for upon philoſophical prin
ciples;
OF THE DEITY.
277
fiples; but muſt finally be reſolved by repair-
ing to the all-wiſe pleaſure of Him, who is
infinite in underſtanding, as well as goodneſs,
All the ſpecies of percipient beings, in our world
are ſubjected to the fame general laws of na-
țure ; and yet, the time of the duration of their
exiſtence is, notwithſtanding, greatly various.
Some of the brutal kind are confined within
the period of gwenty or thirty years, others
ſeldoin reach' beyond fifteen or twenty , others
ſtill are quite old at about ten or twelve. The
ļike difference there is between the continuance
of being in the animals of more inferior claſſes
A ſingle year completes the time of exiſtence
as to ſome of them; a few months as to others
and life may be much ſhorter, with reſpect to
many of thoſe ſpecies which are viſible to us,
only by the help of glaſſes. This variety in
the duration of life is, no doubt, effected by
the operation of general laws, but then it muſt
be by the operation of thoſe laws, conformably
,
to a peculiar difference of conſtitution in theſe dift
ferent ſpecies of creatures ; and this, as alotted
to them by God, and not to be accounted for,
þut by recurring to his all-wiſe good pleaſure.
This is eminently true, with reſpect to man.
Notwithflanding the general laws of nature,
and their tendency to bring on a diſſolution
of our bodily ſtructure, no good philoſophical
reaſon can be given; why this diffolution ſhould
be effected withiin ſuch a general, limited time.
If we may give credit to the Moſaic hiſtory,
the
1
478
THE BENEVOLENCE
the Anti-Deluvian patriarchs lived, fome of
them at leaſt, till they were fix, ſeven, eight,
nine hundred years old : and it is particularly
remarked of Methuſelah, that “his days were
nine hundred and fixty nine years :" Whereas,
the life of man, from the time of the food, has
been confined within much narrower limits
About 4 feventy years, according to the com-
putation of king David, was the general period
of life in his days; and fo it has been ever.
ince,
Some have attempted to affign the philoſo
phical reaſon of this difference in the period of
human life. And, in order hereto, they have
recurred to the natural firmneſs and vigor of
the human conftitution, which, at firſt, was
propagated without thofe contracted weakneſſes
and decays, which have been gradually increa-
fing ever ſince, and deſcending from parents
to children. And, together with the original
ftrength of the human ſtructure, they have ta-
ken into conſideration the peculiar aptitude
of the productions of nature to afford nutri-
ment; which, they ſuppoſe, were in their greats
eft perfection at firſt, but have been conti,
nually upon the decline. And, adding to theſe
reaſons, the kind of food, the firſt generations of
men lived upon, which, they imagine, was not
fleſh, but the fruit of the earth; they think it not
Itrange, that their lives ſhould be protracted to
a period fo much longer than the common
term of life at prefent.
But
OF THE DËIT Y.
ቸ
套 ​ang
But however plauſible this account may ap-
pear to any; it is far from being ſatisfactory
and inſuperable objections might eaſily be made
te it, if it would net occaſion too great, and,
what ſome may think, a needleſs degreſſion.
The truth is, after all that has been ſaid by
learned men to ſolve this difficulty, it ſtill re-
mains a myſtery in reaſon and philoſophy. Nor
can any thing be offered, with reference to its
folution, that may more reaſonably be acquieſc-
ed in than this, So it pleaſed the ſovereign good
God; who, as he is the Creator of man, and of
all the crders of inferior beings in our world,
may allign to him, and to them, what time of
exiſtence he ſhall judge fit. And the periods
of life, however various in the various orders
of creatures, were doubtleſs ordered in good-
neſs, as well as wiſdom.
There is evidently
an analogy between this diverſity, and the di-
verſity that takes place in the ſeveral claſſes of
beings ; and it might be as fit there ſhould be
both theſe diverſities, as either of them, in or-
der to a wife and benevolent conſtitution of
the links in the chain of exiſtence. Nor may
any cne, unleſs endowed with a larger ſhare
of underſtanding than belongs to the order of
men, preſume, without vanity, to aſſert, much
leis to prove, that it was not better things
Thould have been thus, than otherwiſe.
There are, moſt certainly, good reaſons;
with reſpect to us men, why our years ſhould
agt bę lengthened beyond the general period
of
šo Í HÉ B ENEVOLENCE
I
1.
of ſeventy or eighty. Our preſent life; as wë
ate intelligent moral beings; qught; in agree. "
ment with philoſophy as well as divinity; to be
looked upon, not as intended for the enjoy-
ment of the greateſt happineſs, we are made
capable of, but rather as a probátion-ſeáion that
will finally iſſue in it; in conſeqrience of an ac-
quired meetneſs for it. This is the light, in
which it is reaſonable we ſhould view our life
here on earth ; and if the period; afligned for
its continuance, is a duration ſufficiently long
for the attainment of that perfection and hap-
pineſs; which is the grand deſign of God; it is;
in true reáfon long enough? Nor would it be
defirable it ſhould be pröğracted to a greater
length. In fhoft; our exiſtence; and continua
ance in it; in this world, were deſigned by
our all-wife benevolent Creator for a quite dif:
ferent purpoſe from what we are too commonly
apt to imagine.
He intended both; not fo
much for the enjoyment of our higheſt happi-
Hefs here. aš to preparë us for it in a better
ftate. This is the true and proper idea of lifes
And the limitation of its continuance is ad
ínirably wëll adjuſted to this notion of it:
Thoſe who are fornied to a preparedneſs, by
á wife and right improvement of their time;
and talents, for an admiſſion to the joys of
God's preſence, will not complain of the hort-
neſs of life. And as to others, who chiefly
employ themſelves to the purpoſes of this, and
not the coming world ¿ who make no provit
Lion
· ON THE DEITY:
286
$
:)
3
lion for another ſtate, but walk in the way of
their hearts, and in the fight of their eyes,
fulfilling the deſires of the fleſh and mind;
the period of life is full long enough for their
continúance here : : Nor would it anſwer any
valuable end, if it were of a ſtill greater length.
In all probability, they would grow more bold
and daring in iniquity, more hardened in vice,
and more ripe for inhanced: degrees of the
Divine vengeance. . Beſides, the preſent term
of life is, one would think, a ſpace full long
enough for ſuch perſons to be continued: nuſan-
čes to the world. And it: is really a kindneſs
to inankind in général, that they are limited,
by the law of their nature, to threeſcore or
fourſcore years.
The other evil, I mentioned as complained
of; anid the laſt I ſhall mention, is the unavoid-
able neceſity of death... And this is common
to all the percipient beings in our world, from
the higheſt to the loweſt claſs of them. And
their fubje&tion to death, in conſequence
of the operation of the laws of nature, .- 18. à
wifer and better contrivance for the production
of good, and a ſtronger proof of the bénevo-
lence of the Deity, than an eſtabliſhment the
reverſe of this.
As to the creatures inferior to man, in all
their degrees of ſubordination, it is obvious,
uporì the flighteſt attention, that more bénévo-
lence may be manifeſted by their ſucceeding
one another in life; than by their continuance
in
Mm
.
i
THE BENEVOLENCE
j
in being without death. In the former of
theſe ways of communicating life, there may
be -inconceivably more of it, and conſequent-
ly more enjoyment of good, ſo far as life is
at all a baſis for ſuch enjoyment, than in the
latter. There can be no reafonable room for
doubt as to this. Should as many ſpecies of
percipient beings, and as many individuals in
each of theſe ſpecies, be brought into exift-
ence; as this world of our's could contain,
without unavoidable inconvenience if there
was no death to make way for a ſucceſſion in
life, there would be but a very ſmall pittance
of life, in compariſon with what there might.
be, conformably to the method in which hea-
ven has contrived to communicate it
.: Upon:
the ſuppoſition of no death, in the caſe pro-
poſed, there could be no multiplication of life.
It would always continue preciſely the ſame
with reſpect to the numbers that enjoyed it :
Whereas, upon the preſent plan, there may be
the conținyance of every ſpecies, with a like
number of individuals, in thouſands of ſuccef-
fions. And ſhould a calculation be made of
life multiplied in this way, it would amount
to a fum inconceivably greater, than it could.
otherwiſe have been. Millions of animals, in:
every claſs, are capable, in this way, of being
brought into life, and made percipients of en-
joyment, which muſt have remained in non-en-
tity, had it not been for this contrivance of
death; and its being made an eſtabliſhment of...
nature.
1
OF THE DEITY.
1
283
nature. In ſhort, by means of the preſent
ſcheme of God, there has been, and may 'yet
be, as much more life, and enjoyment, among
the inferior ranks of animals, than there would
have been, without the introduction of death,
as there already have been, and may ſtill be,
ſucceſſions in their life ; for, in every ſucceſſion,
there may be as much life, and enjoyment, as
in the firſt claſs that had exiſtence.
· It ought to be conſidered yet further here,
that, had it not been for death, the law of pro-
pagation ſtill continuing in force, there would
not have been, long before the preſent day,
room in our world for a millionth part of the
animals that might be brought into exiſtence
yea, the increafe of a very few of thë claſſes of
theſe animals would have fo filled the earth,
: that the reſt muſt have been ſhut out.
And what has been thus fàid of the inferior
animals is equally true, thould it be applied to us:
men. Was it not for death, there muſt have
been, beyond .conception, leſs life, and con-
fequently enjoyment, than there has been, and
fill may be, upon the preſent pian of nature.
If we take into confideration only thoſe of our
Tace, who, in ſucceſfive generations, have had
existence, there would not have been woom. on
this earth for a thouſandth part of them, at one
and the fame time, much leſs would there have
been a poſibility of this, if all that have died,
before their arrival to a capacity of increaſing
their kind, Thould be taken into the number.
and
284 THE BENEVOLENCE
and they had all gone on: muļtiplying to this
đáy, conformably to the law. of propagation
Perháps, an hundred worlds, as large as this,
would not have been ſufficiently extenſive for
their exiſtence, and comfortable ſupport, in the
way they are now provided for. Inſtead there-
före of objecting againſt the benevolence of
the Deity for the introduétion of death into the
world, we have reaſon father to admire and
adore that wiſdom of his, which has contri-
ved and eſtabliſhed this effectual way for the
fuller, illuſtration of that infinite goodneſs,
which is fo amiable an attributę, of hia nature,
Some, that they might keep at the utmoſt
diſtance from reflecting diſhonor on the Divine
benevolence, on account of the law of death,
have fuppofed it was in itſelf a matter of ne-
ceflity, and could not have been otherwiſe; as,
the bodies of all animals, from the loweſt to.
the higheſt claſs of them, being compounded
of heterogeneous parts, are naturally corrupti-
ble, and muſt unavoidably, in time, undergo that
diſſolution, which is the thing meant, by death
Whether it be true, or not, that animal bodies.
muſt have been ſubjected to such coğruptibiz.
lity, as that a diffolution could not have been
guarded againſt, and prevented, I hall not
diſputę at preſent, Bus thus much is unqueſ-
tionably true, that the time of exiſtence, with
out the coming on of a diffolution, is differenç
in different claſſes of the inferior animals į
which cannot be accounted för, by the ope..
fation
: OF THE DEITU
283
ration of any of the laws of nature, without
recurring to that wiſdom of God, which to
förmed the bodily conſtitution of all animals,
and ſo differenced it with reſpect to the diffe-
fent claffes of thein, that the laws of nature
ſhould be unable, unleſs by accidental interfe,
ſance, to effect a diſſolution in any of them,
but in conformity to that ſpecial difference, as to
the general time, that had been previouſly alot
ted for their continuance in being,
And with reſpect to the race of men, in para
ticular, ſo far as we may receive for truth what
Mofes has "related, the time of their bodily dir-
ſolution, the fame general laws of nature full
fubfiſting, and in operation, has been greatly
varied. Men live ; nowgenerally 'Tpeak-
ing, but ſeventy, or eighty years :- Whereas,
in the Anci-Diluvian ages, they lived ſome
hundreds of years; and they might, had God
ſo pleaſed, have gone on living as mamy thou
fànds Yea, their ſpecial conſtitucion might
have been fuch, for-aught any one can prove
to the contrary, as that they ſhould not have
ſeen corruption, But, in the plan of God,
it.
* According to the new teſtament writings, there will be
no death, among the true feryants of Jeļu's Ghritt, in the
reſurrection-world. They will have bodies thetc, aş: they
have here. Their hodies may be théré' more refined, and
with greater ſkill organized, to as to be fitter nachines for
the fuul to act by; but they will be bodies ſtill, and yet
not ſubject, to mortality.. Hence that emphatically ſtrong
declaration of the apoſtle Paul, “This corruptible muſt. put
on
286 THE BENEVOLENCE
it has been ordered otherwiſe. He has ſo con
Aituted our bodily ſtructure, that it ſhall, with-
in ſuch a general period, naturally fall to pieces.
And this general period he has, fixedpot from
any 'neceſſity there was for it by reaſon of the
corruptibility of the materials of which it is
formed; but by lo contriving the continuance
of;
on incorruption, and this mortal muſt put on immortality,
So, when this corruptible fhall have put on incorruption,and
this mortal has put onipimortality, then Hall be brought to
paſs the ſaying that is written, " death is ſwallowed up in
; victory:" It is from hence evident, that materiał budies
'mayby the ſkill of the all-wife and ah-powerful Archi-
tect, be fo formed, as that, under his over-ruling guidance:
· and proteclion, they may continue in exiſtence without
death forever. According to the fame writings alfo it is:
evident, that mankind would not have been lubjccted to,
death, had it not been for the lapſe of the firit man, Adam..
But it is evident likewiſe, that it could got have been the
intention of God, that Adam, together with all that might
proceed from him, fhould have lived on this earth at one and
the ſapae time ; and for this very good feafos, becauſe it.
was plainly impoffible that they should. This world could
not have contained and ſubfifted them ; unleſs their bodiess
and the manner of fupporting them, had been quite diffe-
rent from what they, now are. If therefore they had not dieds
fome other way muſt have been provided to make room for
thoſe who would have been brought into being. Perhaps,
in certain periods, numbers of thoſe who had been fitted
therefos, might have been tranſlated to ſome other place of
abode, to enjoy happineſs there, in ſome ſuperior mode of
exiſtence, But bé this as it may, this non-ſubjection towe
death was not owing to a created natural incorruptidility:
þut to a ſpecial promite from Almighty God, that, while
inaccent, they thould be fo protected, and preferved, as not
to ſee corruption. But, innocence being loft, the promife
..of immortality became vacated, and death of courſe too
place : Only, it was left with God to fix the general period
of life ; which he has done with wiſdom that diſcovers great
goodneſs.
:
OF THE DEITY:
287
1
of one generation, as that the fucceffion of
another ſhould be admirably adapted to mani-
feft both wiſdom and goodneſs in providing for
the exiſtence of mere life, and conſequent en-
joyment, than there would otherwiſe have
been on this earth.
. It might alſo be with a view to promote
morally good purpoſes, that the law of death,
eſpecially as to its general time, has been eſta-
bliſhed by God. It is not eaſy to conceye of
any motive more ſtrikingly adapted to excite
to conſideration, and ſuch a behavior in life:
as may lay a juſt foundation for calmneſs and
ſerenity of mind, when the time comes that
we muſt depart out of this into another ftate.
And it is, most certainly, à very powerful re-
ſtraint froin vicious practices, eſpecially in thoſe
kinds, and degrees, which naturally tend to hatten
death, and bring it on before its proper time. '
It is indeed one of the wifeſt and beſt contri-
vånces for the government of men, and to keep
them within the reſtraints of reaſon and virtue.
As Dr. Sherlock, in his excellent treatiſe on
death, expreſſes it, “ Mortality and death are
neceſſary to the good government of the world.
Nothing elſe can give a check to ſome men's.
wickedneſs, but either the fear of death, or exe-
cution of it. Some men are ſo outrageouſly
wicked, that nothing can put a ſtop to them,
and prevent the miſchief they do in the world,
but to.cut them off. This is the reaſon, of ca-
pital puniſhments among men, to remove thoſe.
8
1
(
.
988: THE:BENEVOLENCE
out of the wêrld who will be a plague to manac
kind. while they live in it. For this reaſon Gods
deſtroyed the whole race of mankind; by:a deluge?
of water, excepting: Noah, and his family; bea:
cauſe they were incurably wicked.. : For this :
reaſon he ſends plaguess and famine; and fwords:
to cortect the "exorbitant growth of wickednefs;
to leffen, the pumber of finners, and to lay re..
ſtraints on thein: And if the world be ſuch: a :
bedlam as it is under all theſe reſtraints, what: :
would it be were it filled with immortal.fins
hers !"
Upon the whole that has been faid, in rela
tion-to natural evils, it appears, either that it:
could not have been prevented in fuch a world.
as our's:;:0řs that it is miſcalled evil; being
rather the contrivance of wiſdom in order to
the production of more good, than there other-
wife would have been. It is concèded; a better:
world than this, more perfect, and more power-Z
fully adapted to make happy, might be created
by the Deity; but then it ought to be remem:
bered, ſuch a better world may be already one
of the links in the diverſified chain of exiſtencei
The only proper queſtion therefore iš; whether
the making ſuch a world as this, is not a proof of
more benevolence; than a chaſmi would be in:
that part of the creation, which it now. occut.
pies? If ſo, imperfect as it is, .comparatively:
ſpeaking, it is better. it ſhould be, than not be
And, for ſuch an imperfect world as this ought
to be, in an indefinitely variegated creation, inti;
order
OF
289
Ť HÊ DEITY:
order to its being a proper part in the chain of
exiſtence, no alteration, it may be; notwithſtanda
ing all the complaints that have been made of
deficiences; redundances; deformities, and evil's;
could be made without damage to the ſyſtein.
if in ſome things, abſolutely viewed; an álter-
ation for the better might be ſuppoſed; yet
this very alteration, confidered, as it ought to
Be, in its relation to other parts; which, as
truly aš theſe; go to the conſtitution of the
whole; it might turn out greatly to its difadə
řantage. Ärch Deaconi Law; in his 42 Note;
on Arch Biſhop King's origin of evil;” has
well expreſſed himſelf upon this head. Sayš
he, " we may ſafely conclude; that there could
have. been no partial alteration of this ſyſtem,
but for the worſe; as far as we know; at leaſt not
for the better. They who hold that there
might have been a total one; that the whole
Icheme of tliings mighit poffibly have been al
tered, or reverſed; and that either the, ditës
contrary, or à quite different. One; would have
been equally; or more worthy of God } . the
men; I ſay, that. hold this; are obliged to ſhow
the poſibility of conceiving of it; and to ex-
plain the manner how it may be before we are
Obliged to believe them. And when they liave
done tliis; and compleated their fyſtem, and
made a total alteration of things; as they imia-
gine, for the better, they are at laſt got only to
the abſurdity of putting this ſyſtem into ati
higher elaſs s whereas, all the different claſſes,
ini
NA
1
290
THE BENEVOLENCE
in every conceivable degree of perfection, were
ſuppoſed to be entirely filled at the firſt. We
mult therefore take things as they are, and ar-
gue only from the preſent nature of them, col-
lectively. In which view,' we ſhall find ne
poſſible alteration of any thing, but what would
produce greater inconveniences, either in itſelf,
or others, to which it bears a ſtrict relation.”
He
goes on, taking occaſion to borrow a ſection
from Mr. Maxwell's general remarks on Cum
berland, in theſe words." The nature of things,
in the natural world, is ſo exactly fitted to the
natural faculties and diſpoſitions of mankind,
that were any thing in it otherwiſe than it is,
even in degree; mankind would be leſs happy,
than they now are; Thus the dependence of
all natural effects upon a few ſimple principles
is wonderfully advantageous in many reſpects.
The degrees of all the ſenſible pleaſures are ex-
actly ſuited to the uſe of each; ſo that if we
enjoyed any of them in a greater degree we
ſhould be leſs happy : For our appetites of thoſe
pleaſures would, by that means, be too ſtrong
for our reaſon ; and, as we are framed, temp
us to an immoderate enjoyment of them, ſo as
to prejudice our bodies. And, where we en-
jov ſome of thein in to high a degree, as that
it is, in many caſes; very difficult for the ſtrong-
eſt to regulate and moderate the appetites of
thoſe pleaſures, it is in ſuch inſtances where it
was neceſſary to counterpoize ſome diſadvanta-
ges, which are the conſequences of the purſuit
of
OF THE DEITY.
1
29-1
1
of thoſe pleaſures. Thus the pleaſing ideas,
which accompany the love of the ſexes, are
neceſſary to be poffèffed in fo high a degree,
to balance the cares of matrimony, and alſo the
pains of child-bearing in the female fex. The
ſame may be faid, of our intellectual pleaſuresi
,
Thus did' we receive a greater pleaſure from be-
nevolence, foth would be encouraged by an
iinimoderate bounty. And were the pleafures:
of our inquiries into the truth greater, we ſhould
be too ſpeculative;, and leſs active. It ſeems;
alſo probạbļe, that the degree of our intellec-
tual capacity is very well ſuited to our objects;
of knowledge; and that had we a greater degree
thereof; we ſhould be lefs happy. Moreover,
it is probably fó adapted to the inward' frame."
of our bodies, that it could not be greater,
without either an alteration in the laws of na-
ture, or in the laws of 'union between the ſoul
and body. Farther;. were it much greater than
it is, our thoughts and; purſuits would be fo:
ſpiritual and refined; that we ſhould be taken
too much off from: ſenſible pleaſures.,
ſhould probably be conſcious of fome defects
or wants in our bodily organs; and would be
ſenſible that tliey were unequal to fo, great à
capacity, which would neceffitily be fallowed
by uneaſineſs of mind. And this feems to hold.
in the brute-creation. För; methinks, it would
be for the diſadvantage of a lirfe to be endow-
ed with the underſtanding of a inan : Sučh ara
unequal
We..
292 THE BENEVOLENGE.
!
Às : for our
/
unequal union muſt be attended with continuat
diſquietudes, and diſcontents.
pains, they are all either warnings againſt bo-
dily diſorders, or are ſuch as, had we wanted
them, the laws of nature remaining as they are,
we Mould either have wanted ſome plealures we
now enjoy, or have pillefed them in a lęfs de
gree. Thole things in nature which we cannot
reconcile co the foregoing opinion, as being iga
n rant of their uſe, we have good reaſon, from
analogy, to believe are really advantageous, and
adapted to the happineſs of intelligent beings of
the "fyftem though we have not fo full and
complete a knowledge of the entire ſyſtem, as
to be able to point out their particularities,
F rom theſe obfervations we may conclude, that
all the various parts of our fyſtein are ſo adıni-
rably ſuited to one another, and the whole con-
trived with ſuch exquiſitę wiſdom, that were
any thing, in any part "thereof; in the leaſt
Otherwiſe than it is, without an alteration in
the whole, there would be a leſs ſum of hap
pineſs in the fyfter than there now is.”
I have now faid all that I intended to ſay,
in illuſtration of the ſupremely perfect benevo-
lenge of the Deity, as alſo in ſolving the objec-
tions which have been made againſt this attri-
hute of his from the known appearances in
nature." How far, what I have offered; may be
worthy of notice, must be left with thcle into
whoſe hands it may fall, to judge. If any ſhould,
think the argning is incóncluſive, finding them,
felves
زر
!
OF THE DEITY .
293
felves, at the ſame time, unable to reconcile
the manifeſtations of Divine goodneſs with the
character of God, as infinitely benevolent, let
them not, on this account, queſtion in their
hearts whether he is endowed with this moſt
amiable perfection. For there is no way of rea-
loning, by which we can prove that he poffef-
Les" any perfection, but it may in the ſame
way
, be proved, that he is ſupremely, benevo-
lent. Nor would it be any thing frange
fhould we, who are fo low. an order in the
fcale of intelligent beings, be unable to remove
away, theſe difficulties that may attend, in ſome
inſtances, the diſplay of this Divinę attribute.
Inſtead therefore of perplexing our own minds,
or the minds of others, with ſeeming inconſif-
tencies in God's manifeſtations of his goodneſs,
let, uş adore before him as a Being infinitely
benevolent'; patiently waiting for the coming
day of revelation, when it ſhall be made to appear
with a meridian luftre, that nothing was ever.
done in the conduct of God towards our world
but in 'harmony, with wife goodneſs, accurate,
juſtice, and the moſt perfect conſiſtency. with
all thoſe moral qualities, which conſtitute. the
bleſſed Gud an infinitely amiable. Being
FIN
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