JK
291
L5
The British
VERSUS
The American
System of Mational Government
BY
A. H. F. LEFROY

ADIOMI
ARTES
91817
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OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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291
L5

THE BRITISH
VERSUS
THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
A. H.
дидис
سو
BY
F. LEFROY, M. A. (Oxon.)
BARRISTER-AT-LAW.
Un
Being a paper read before the Toronto Branch of the Imperial Federation
League on Thursday, December 18th, 1890.
TORONTO: WILLIAMSON & CO.,
PUBLISHERS, MDCCCXCI.

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ONVINCED that to Canadians, of
the present generation especially,
nothing can, from a public point
of view, be of more importance
than that we should possess an
adequate appreciation of the essen-
tial features and the advantages
of the British institutions, and for of popu-
lar liberty, under which we live, as compared
with the institutions of the Americans, the writer
of the present paper ventures to publish it as a
very modest contribution towards that end. It
at all events points out some of the more obvious
characteristics of our British parliamentary system,
as contrasted with the Congressional system of the
United States.
TORONTO, February 9th, 1891.

THE BRITISH
VERSUS
THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

HE policy of Imperial Federation,
or consolidation, involves necessarily
very different considerations to the
people of one part of the Empire, to
what it does to those of another.
To us in Canada it seems an almost
universal opinion that this policy pre-
sents itself as the only practicable al-
ternative to that of continental union, or, as it is
perhaps somewhat unfairly called, annexation to
the United States. This being the case, I trust
that the subject of this paper will not be con-
sidered foreign to the proceedings of a Canadian
branch of the league. Nothing can be more certain
than that, should the policy of continental union
prevail, Canadians must come under the national
6
The British versus The American
system of the Americans. It is just conceivable,
though very improbable, that the separate local gov-
ernments in the various States into which the
Dominion would then be divided, would be permit-
ted to retain their present parliamentary system ;
but in all federal matters, we should have to accept
the American system. And if it should occur to the
mind of any one that the Americans might alter
their system to suit us, it may be sufficient to ob-
serve that under their Constitution no measure to
amend the same can come into effect unless it has in
its favour the concurring vote of not less than fifty-
eight separate legislative chambers in the various
States, independently of the Federal legislature, in
which a double two-thirds majority must be ob-
tained;* so that Mr. Woodrow Wilson, an American
critic, to whom I shall very often have occasion to
refer, in his lucid and interesting essay on cong
Slunar government, says that no impul short of
the impulse of self-preservation, no force less than
the force of revolution, can nowadays be expected
to move the cumbrous machinery of formal amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States.†
*Constitution of United States, Art. 5,
+Congressional Government (Boston, 1887), p. 242.
-~
I-
System of National Government.
7
It follows, therefore, that if on a comparison of the
two systems we find good reason to consider that the
British system, which is at present our own, is far
preferable to that of our neighbours, a valuable
weapon for Canadian use is added to the armoury
of the Federation league.
Fortunately there are many and famous writers
to aid us in forming an opinion; and let me say at
once that I do not aspire this evening to earn any
reputation for originality. My aim is to lay before
you some of the things which political thinkers of
established reputation have to say about the two
systems which we propose to contrast; and I warn
you therefore that this paper will be as full of
quotations as the illiterate theatre-goer found
Shakespeare's play of Hamlet.
Foremost among recent writers on the subject
stands, of course, Mr. Bryce, and I shall have so
often to call him to my support in criticising the
American system, that I feel almost bound to ob-
serve that an American advocate might very often
cite with considerable effect one passage in Mr.
Bryce's American Commonwealth to confute another.
The fact is that, though Mr. Bryce finds fault with
the institutions of the Americans in detail, he often
8
The British versus The American
praises them in the lump. It would be shock-
ing to say that he hedges. I would rather shel-
ter myself under the words of his reviewer in
the London Times, and say "that if he ever
drops a word of severity, he hastens to knock
the edge off his criticism by a timely admission.
To all his verdicts is appended a rider of extenuating
circumstances."* For example, in one place he states
that he who would desire to draw an indictment
against the American scheme of government might
make it a long one, and for every count in it cite
high American authority, and adduce evidence from
American history. But he immediately hastens to
add that a European reader would greatly err if he
were to conclude that their scheme of government
was, for the purposes of the country, inferior to the
political system of any of the great nations of the old
world. He scarcely notices the fact, however, that
in Canada we have the British Cabinet and Parlia-
mentary system applied to our Federal Government,
and certainly he does not attempt to show that the
many advantages which he declares that system to
possess in England, are less applicable to it when
*Times, Dec. 26th, 1888.
+American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, p. 300.
System of National Government.
9
adopted in this country. In one place he does in-
deed observe, with something of a sneer, that the
example of our Provincial legislatures, in each of
which there is a responsible ministry sitting in the
legislature, does not seem to recommend the adop-
tion of that system for imitation by the American
States. But the fact is that neither Mr. Bryce nor
his eminent contemporary, Professor Dicey, seem
to have devoted much attention as yet to the political
phenomena of this Dominion. It is to be hoped
that Professor Ashley will be able to persuade them
that, as he says, to the scientific student of politics,
Canada is of interest in the experiment which it is
making in the combination of Cabinet Government
with a Federal system.†
As may have been already conjectured, I do not
purpose dwelling this evening upon any of the ad-
vantages which may be supposed to accrue to us
from having at the apex of our political system
the representative of our ancient and historic mon-
archy, rather than a mere passing politician elected
for four years, whose very mediocrity often recom-
mends him as a safe candidate to the party tacticians.
*Ib., Vol. 1, p. 525.
+Constitutional History of Canada, p. 16.
10
The British versus The American
Possibly to those who admit of no sentiment in this
matter, and, also, take a very superficial view of
it, it may be sufficient to say with Mr. Phelps,
American Minister to England, that this is after all
principally a difference in form. "The Monarch
reigns for life, but does not govern; the President
governs for four or eight years, but does not reign."*
Still less do I intend to take up your time with
platitudes upon the evils of the constantly recurring
Presidential elections.
So, too, we cannot do more than glance at the
fact that the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives, which, as everyone knows, are the two Houses
constituting Congress, possess substantially equal
and co-ordinate power, a state of things existing in
no other great country in the world, whence arises,
says Mr. Bryce, frequent collisions between the two
Houses.† Congress was weakened," he says, "as
compared with the British Parliament in which one
House has become dominant, by its division into
two co-equal houses, whose disagreement paralyses
legislative action." +
* Nineteenth Century, March, 1888.
+American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, p. 183,
‡Ib., p. 278.
System of National Government.
11
In the same way, we can only glance at what Mr.
Woodrow Wilson calls the "treaty-marring power
of the Senate."* "The President," says the same
American critic, "really has no voice at all in the
conclusions of the Senate with reference to his
diplomatic transactions, or with reference to any of
the matters upon which he consults it; and yet with-
out a voice in the conclusion there is no consulta-
tion. * The Senate, when it closes its doors
upon going into 'executive session,' closes them
upon the President as much as upon the rest of the
world." We have seen a very recent example of
the working of this system in the rejection by the
Senate of the proposed Fisheries Treaty with Great
Britain.
*
What I wish to concentrate attention upon this
evening, for it is of the most far-reaching conse-
quences of all, is the different relation which exists
between the President and his Secretaries of State
on the one hand, under the American system, and
the Premier and other members of the Cabinet under
the British system, and between the Executive and
Congress on the one hand, and the Cabinet and
*Congressional Government, p. 50,
†īb., p. 233.
12
The British versus The American
Parliament on the other hand, and therefore I will
call your attention at once to the concluding words
of Article 1, Section 6, of the American Constitu-
tion which provide that "No person holding any
office under the United States shall be a member of
either House during his continuance in office." "The
founders of the American Constitution," says John
Morley, in his delightful life of Robert Walpole, "as
all know, followed Montesquieu's phrases, if not his
design, about separating legislature from executive,
by excluding ministers from both Houses of Con-
gress. This is fatal to any reproduction of the
English system. The American Cabinet is vitally
unlike our own on this account.' "*
Under the American system, therefore, the Presi-
dent and the Secretaries of State cannot be members
either of the House of Representatives or of the
Senate; they are under no direct responsibility to
Congress of any kind; nor can they take any direct
part in initiating or debating any measure. Under
the British system, on the other hand, the Ministers
of the Crown not only may, but must, have seats in
one or other House of Parliament, and are directly
*Walpole (Twelve English Statesmen Series), p. 154.
Syetem of National Government.
13
responsible to the popular house. In the words of
Bagehot, constantly referred to as the most acute
of English constitutional writers, the Cabinet under
our system is a board of control chosen by the legis-
lature out of persons whom it trusts and knows,
to rule the nation.* Cabinet Ministers form a
committee of the legislature, chosen by the majority
for the time being. They are accountable to the
legislature and must resign office as soon as they
lose its confidence, or else dissolve Parliament and
accept whatever verdict the country may give. They
are jointly as well as severally liable for their acts.
"The essence of responsible government," said the
late Lord Derby, "is that mutual bond of responsi-
bility one for another wherein a government acting
by party go together, frame their measures in con-
cert, and where, if one member falls to the ground,
the others almost as a matter of course, fall with
him."+ None of these principles hold true in Amer-
ica. The President is not responsible to Congress
for his acts. His ministers do not sit in Congress,
and are not accountable to it, but to the President
their master. Congress may request their attend-
*The English Constitution, 5th ed.,
P. 13.
+Central Government, by H. D. Traill, p. 26.
14
The British versus The American
ance before a committee, as it may require the at-
tendance of any other witness, but they have no
opportunity of expounding and justifying to Con-
gress, as a whole, their own, or rather their master's
policy. Hence an adverse vote of Congress does not
affect their or his position. They are not present
in Congress to be questioned as to matters of admin-
istration which arise, and yet an American writer
himself admits "that the only really self-govern-
ing people is that people which discusses and in-
terrogates its administration."* In America, again,
the administration does not work as a whole. It is
not a whole. It is a group of persons, each individu-
ally dependent on and answerable to the President,
but with no joint policy, no collective responsibility.
Borrowing freely from Mr. Bryce, I may sum-
marize the difference thus: With us and in Eng-
land, if the Executive ministry displeases the House
of Commons, the House passes an adverse vote.
The ministry have their choice to resign or to dis-
solve Parliament. If they resign, a new minis-
try is appointed from the party which has proved
itself strongest in the House of Commons, and co-
operation being restored between the legislature and
*Congressional Government, p. 303.
System of National Government.
15
the executive, public business proceeds. In America,
a dispute between the President and Congress may
arise over an executive act or over a bill. If over an
executive act, an appointment or a treaty, one
branch of Congress, the Senate, can check the Presi-
dent, that is, can prevent him from doing what he
wishes, but cannot make him do what they wish.
If over a bill which the President has returned to
Congress unsigned, the two Houses can, by a two-
thirds majority, pass it over his veto, and so end the
quarrel; though the carrying out of the bill in its
details must be left to him and his ministers, whose
dislike of it may render them unwilling and there-
fore unsuitable agents. Should there not be a two-
thirds majority, the bill drops; and however
important the question may be, however essential
to the country, some prompt dealing with it, either
in the sense desired by the majority in Congress or
in that preferred by the President, nothing can be
Anone till the current term of Congress expires.*
The American Constitution in its attempt to
create a number of effective checks and balances has
produced a system from which dead-locks cannot
fail to ensue, and which at a time of crisis may
*American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, page 282,
16
The British versus The American
endanger the very highest interests of the nation.
The efficient secret of the English Constitution,
says Bagehot, may be described as the close
union, the nearly complete fusion, of the ex-
ecutive and legislative powers.
* The fundamental
defect of the American system, to quote an
American critic in the North American Review,
seems to be in the separation and diffusion of
power and responsibility.+ Executive and legisla-
tive, says Woodrow Wilson, are separated by a
a hard and fast line, which sets them apart in what
was meant to be independence, but has come to
amount to insolation; ‡ while cabinet government,
on the other hand, is a device for bringing the execu-
tive and legislative branches into harmony and
co-operation without uniting or confusing their
functions. It is as if the majority in the Commons
deputised its leaders to act as the advisers of the
Crown and the superintendents of the public
business, in order that they might have the advan-
tage of administrative knowledge and training in
advising legislation and drafting laws to be submitted
to Parliament.
*The English Constitution, p. 10.
+Vol. III., p. 331.
#Congressional Government, p. 147.
System of National Government.
17
We must not, too, omit to notice that Congress,
though in the literary theory of the American con-
stitution, it should confine itself to the proper work
of legislation, and not usurp the functions of the
executive, has not hesitated to endeavour to do
the latter. Mr. Wilson declares that though the
form of their Constitution is one of nicely-adjusted
ideal balances, the actual form of their present
Government is simply a scheme of Congressional
supremacy.* Congress has entered more and more
into the details of administration, until it has
virtually taken into its own hands all the sub-
stantial powers of Government. At the same time,
he says, the secretaries, that is the executive
ministers, though not free enough to have any
independent policy of their own, are free enough to
be very poor, because very unmanageable, servants.
Once installed, their hold upon their offices does
not depend upon the will of Congress. They may
make daily blunders in administration and repeated
mistakes in business, may thwart the plans of Con-
gress in a hundred small, vexatious ways, and yet all
the while snap their fingers at its dissatisfaction or
*Congressional Government, p. 6.
†Ib., p. 45.
B
18
The British versus The American
*
displeasure. Thus, as under our system, we find
Parliament, or rather the popular House, concentrat-
ing in itself all real powers, so under the American
system Congress apparently endeavours to do the
the same, but with the great disadvantage, not ex
isting under the British system, of having the exe-
cutive ministers separate from it, and holding office
by an independent tenure.
Now, it must not be supposed that the Americans
deliberately adopted their present system in pre-
ference to the existing British system. The prin-
ciple of Cabinet Government, says Mr. Hearn, in
his work on the Government of England, seems to
have been altogether unknown in America at the
time of the Revolution. Neither in the writings of
Hamilton or of Jefferson, nor in the debates upon
the organization of their new Government, can we
discover any indication that the statesmen who
framed the Constitution of the United States had the
least acquaintance with that form of Parliamen-
tary Government which now prevails in England.†
The fact is that the system had not fully developed
itself at that time even in England itself, and
*Ib., p. 272.
+Government of England, p. 213.
System of National Government.
19
}
though some consider the second Rockingham min-
istry of 1782 the first of the modern ministries, Mr.
Hearn holds that it is in Lord Grenville's adminis-
tration in 1806 that we first find our modern
system of ministries permanently and completely
established.* Not that the Fathers, as the founders
of the American Constitution are called, did not
look to the England of their own day in framing
their scheme. It may be somewhat startling to be
told that the Americans have in their President
embalmed King George III. But, says Sir Henry
Maine, in his work on Popular Government, the
Constitution of the United States is in reality a
version of the British Constitution, as it must have
presented itself to an observer in the second half of
the last century. It is tolerably clear, he says, that
the mental operation through which the framers of
the American Constitution went was this: they
took the King of Great Britain, went through his
powers, and restrained them wherever they appeared
to be excessive or unsuited to the circumstances of
the United States. It is remarkable that the figure
they had before them was not a generalised English
king nor an abstract constitutional monarch; it
*Ib., p. 227.
20
The British versus The American
was no anticipation of Queen Victoria, but George
III. himself whom they took for their model. The
present British system of Cabinet Government was
exactly the method of government to which George
III. refused to submit, and the framers of the
American Constitution took George III.'s view of
the kingly office for granted. They give the whole
executive Government to the President, and they
do not permit his ministers to have seat or speech
in either branch of the Legislature. They limit
his power and theirs, not, however, by any contri-
vance known to modern English constitutionalism,
but by making the office of President terminable at
intervals of four years.* It may very well be that
the Americans improved upon the system of Govern-
ment at that time existing in England, but they
cribbed, cabined, and confined their new scheme
within the four limits of a written constitution,
whereas the British system has been permitted to
proceed in a course of natural and spontaneous
development. It is worth while to have dwelt for
a moment on this to explain the apparent paradox
that so intelligent a people as the Americans should
possess a system of Government so open to criticism.
*Popular Government, pp. 207, 212, 213.
System of National Government.
21
?
((
"The English Constitution," says one of them,
was at that time in reality much worse than our
own; and, if it is now superior, it is so because its
growth has not been hindered or destroyed by the
too tight ligaments of a written fundamental law."*
What then are the evils incident to the Ameri-
can system which we say are so great that Canadians
should never dream of exchanging their own system
of National Government for it? Mr. Bryce sums
up many of them in one general expression. There
is, he says, in the American Government, considered
as a whole, a want of unity. Its branches are un-
connected; their efforts are not directed to one aim,
do not produce one harmonious result. The sailors,
the helmsman, the engineer, do not seem to have
one purpose or obey one will, so that instead of
making steady way the vessel may pursue a devious
or zig-zag course, and sometimes merely turn round
and round in the water. For the present all is
comparatively well, for that vessel sails upon a
summer sea.t
To be more specific, I will enumerate some of the
more obvious defects of the American system, in
*Congressional Government, p. 311.
+American Commonwealth, Vol. 1, pp. 287, 303.

22
The British versus The American
the words of no mere academical critic, but of
Story himself, one of the most brilliant names
upon the roll of American jurists. In his Commen-
taries on the American Constitution he says: "The
heads of departments are, in fact, by the exclusion
from Congress of all persons holding office, prevented
from proposing or vindicating their own measures
in the face of the nation in the course of debate, and
are compelled to submit them to other men, who
are either imperfectly acquainted with the measures,
or are indifferent to their success or failure. Thus,
that open and public responsibility for measures
which properly belongs to the executive in all Gov-
ernments, and especially in a republican Govern-
ment, as its greatest security and strength, is com-
pletely done away. The executive is compelled to
resort to secret and unseen influence, to private
interviews and private arrangements, to accom-
plish its own appropriate purposes, instead of pro-
posing and sustaining its own duties and mea-
sures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in
the face of its representatives. One consequence of
this state of things is, that there never can be
traced home to the executive any responsibility for
the measures which are planned and carried at its sug-

System of National Government.
23
gestion. Another consequence will be (if it has not yet
been) that measures will be adopted or defeated by
private intrigues, political combinations, irrespon-
sible recommendations, and all the blandishments
of office and all the deadening weight of silent
patronage. The executive will never be compelled
* It will
to avow or support any opinions. *
assume the air of a dependent instrument ready to
adopt the acts of the legislature, when, in fact, its
spirit and its wishes pervade the whole system of
legislation. If corruption ever eats its way silently
into the vitals of the Republic, it will be because the
people are unable to bring responsibility home to
the executive through his chosen ministers."* And
so to exchange the grave, judicial language of Judge
Story, for the lighter style of Mr. Bryce: "Not un-
commonly there is presented the sight of an ex-
asperated American public going about like a
roaring lion, seeking whom it may devour, and
finding no one."†
But now let me call attention to some matters
which do not lie so obviously upon the surface. It
*Commentaries on the American Constitution, 4th ed., vol. 1,
p. 614, seq.
+American Commonwealth, vol. 2, p. 320.
24
The British versus The American
is necessary for every legislative body to evolve
some kind of organization. Debarred from having
the ministers of the day as a ruling committee con-
trolling all business, as with us, the Houses of
Congress took the alternative of distributing
business among a number of committees, to each of
which is assigned a specific class of subjects. In
1888 there were in the American Senate 41 standing
committees, each appointed for two years, and con-
sisting of from 3 to 11 members each, and in the
House of Representatives there were 54 standing
committees, each appointed for a period of two
sessions, and consisting of from 3 to 16 members
each. We may confine our view to the House of
Representatives, but the system in both Houses is
the same; and I shall take what I have to say
principally from the American writer, to whom I
have so often referred already, Mr. Wilson, though
he is entirely confirmed in what he says by the
independent testimony of Mr. Bryce. The way
business is divided among these committees is indi-
cated by their names, of which some of the principal
are Ways and Means; Appropriations; Banking
and Currency; Rivers and Harbours; Railways
and Canals; Foreign Affairs; Naval Affairs; Mili-
System of National Government.
25
tary Affairs, and Public Lands. Now, to some one
of these small standing committees, each and every
bill is referred, and it is positively startling to any
one accustomed to the free and open debate of a
British Parliament, to find that all legislation is at the
mercy of the particular committee to which it is
assigned. These committees deliberate in secret,
and no member speaking in the House is entitled to
state anything that has taken place in committee
other than what is stated in the report of that com-
mittee. They are practically under the control of
their chairmen, who are strict party men appointed
by the speaker, who is himself under the American
system a staunch and avowed partisan, making
smooth whenever he can the legislative paths of
his party, and the most powerful man in the House
by virtue of his function of appointing these chair-
I know not
men of the standing committees.
how better," says Wilson, "to describe our form of
government in a single phrase than by calling it a
Government by the chairmen of the Standing
Committees of Congress."* But these chairmen of
committees do not constitute a co-operative body
like a ministry. They do not consult and concur
*Congressional Government, p. 102.
(6
26
The British versus The American
in the adoption of homogeneous and mutually
helpful measures; there is no thought of acting in
concert. Each committee goes its own way at its
own pace. It is impossible to discover any unity
or method in the disconnected and, therefore, un-
systematic, confused and desultory action of the
House, or any common purpose in the measures
which its committees from time to time recom-
mend."*
We will now glance for one moment at the way
legislation is conducted under this system. In
the first place, as to the initiation of legislative
measures. Under the British system, which I can-
not too often repeat we now enjoy in Canada with
the many other privileges of British subjects,
public bills fall into two classes-those brought in
by the ministry of the day as responsible advisers
of the sovereign, and those brought in by private
members. In neither House of Congress, on the
other hand, are there any such thing as Government
bills. With us a strong cabinet can obtain the con-
currence of the legislature in all acts which facilitate
its administration; it is, so to say, the legislature.
In America the initiative of legislation actually
Ib., p. 61.
System of National Government.
27
belongs to nobody in particular. Any member may
introduce a bill or resolution upon any subject in
which he feels an interest. A dozen of these may
be presented upon the same subject, which differ
entirely from one another.
Let us then sketch after Woodrow Wilson* the
experience of the new member who goes to Wash-
ington as the representative of a particular line
of policy, having been elected, it may be, as an
advocate of free trade, or as a champion of pro-
tection. He can introduce his bill on the pro-
per day, but that is all he can do. If he supposes,
says Mr. Wilson, as he naturally will, that after his
bill has been sent up to be read by the clerk, he
may say a few words in its behalf, and in that belief
sets out upon his long-considered remarks, he will
be knocked down by the rules at once. The rap of
Mr. Speaker's gavel is sharp, immediate, and peremp-
tory. He is curtly informed that no debate is in
order; the bill can only be referred to the appropriate
committee. For there is no debate at all allowed
upon the first or the second reading of bills, which
amongst other things, prevents the public being
necessarily apprised of the measures which are
*Congressional Government, p. 64 seq.
28
The British versus The American
before Congress. Without debate, then, the bill is
committed, and we are told, the fate of bills com-
As a rule, a
When it goes
mitted is generally not uncertain.
bill committed is a bill doomed.*
from the clerk's desk to a committee-room it crosses
a Parliamentary bridge of sighs to dim dungeons of
silence, whence it will never return. The means
and time of its death are unknown, but its friends
never see it again. It is perfectly easy for the
committee to which the bill has been referred, and
therefore common, to let the session pass without
making any report at all upon bills deemed objec-
tionable or unimportant, and to substitute for
reports upon them a few bills of the committee's
own drafting; so that thousands of bills expire
with the expiration of each Congress, not having
been rejected, but having been simply neglected.
There was not time to report upon them. The
practical effect of this committee organization of the
House is to consign to each of the standing com-
mittees the entire direction of legislation upon those
subjects which properly come under its consideration.
When the committees do report to the House, it
might be supposed full debate would be allowed.
*Ib., p. 69.
System of National Government.
29
*
Not so.
It seems simply incredible, but it rests
upon the authority of Senator Hoar, of Massa-
chusetts, whose long Congressional experience, we
are told, entitles him to speak with authority, that
most of the committees have at their disposal dur-
ing each Congress but two hours each in which to
report upon, debate, and dispose of all the subjects
of general legislation committed to their charge.
And even that space of time is not allowed to free
and open debate. The reporting committee man is
allowed to absorb a great part of it, and as to the
rest, the Speaker recognises only those persons
who have previously come to a private understand-
ing with the maker of the report, and these only
upon their promise to limit their remarks to a cer-
tain number of minutes.† So that our new member,
says Mr. Wilson, finds that turn which way he may,
some privilege of the committees stands in his path.
The rules are so framed as to put all business under
their management; and as his first session draws
towards its close he learns that under their sway
freedom of debate finds no place for allowance, and
his long-delayed speech must remain unspoken.‡
*Congressional Government, p. 72.
+Von Holst's Constitutional Law of the United States, p. 109, note.
Congressional Government, p. 71.
30
The British versus The American
リ
​What chance, we may well ask, would a Lord
Shaftesbury or a Plimsoll, or even a Gladstone, or
any of the great reformers and philanthropists, whose
names lend lustre to the records of the Parliament
of Great Britain, have had under such a system as
that prevailing in Congress? It is highly probable
that they would have effected nothing, even if they
had ever reached Congress at all, which is very
doubtful; but fortunately they had to do with a
Parliament where there is no such practice of referr-
ing different classes of business to special committees,
but where every subject of importance is fully and
freely debated in committee of the whole House.
The House of Commons, it is true, has its com-
mittees, even its standing committees, but they are
of the old-fashioned sort, which merely investigate
and report, not of the new American type, which
originate and conduct legislation. Nor are they
appointed by the Speaker. They are chosen with
care by a committee of selection, composed of mem-
bers of both parties. But the lobbyist, the intriguer,
and the wielder of improper influences have every
facility afforded them in the American system of
small committees, conducting their proceedings with
closed doors. And that Americans themselves
System of National Government.
31
recognise this difference is indicated by the following
interesting extract from the Rochester Herald, which
I clipped from a newspaper last year: "The people
of this country are pleased beyond measure," it says,
"with the efforts being made in Canada to get rid
of the boodlers now rusticating there for their
country's good. A great cry has been made about
the boodlers lobbying against Dr. Weldon's bill.
The power of these criminals to prevent its passage
is not so great as many persons think. If the
Government says it can go through it will go
whether there is a lobby against it or not. That
institution cannot be worked so well in the Cana-
dian Parliament as in this country. In Congress,
for instance, one man is able to block legislation for
an indefinite period, if he so chooses; at Ottawa no
such blocking can be done, and the bill will come
up in its turn.”*
There remain two other most important matters
to which I would like briefly to refer before bring-
ing this paper to a close. John Stuart Mill, in his
essay on Representative Government, arrives at a
twofold division of the merit which any set of
political institutions possess, namely the degree in
*Toronto "Empire," March 15th, 1889.
32
The British versus The American
which they promote the general mental advance-
ment of the community, and the degree in which
they bring the individual intellect and virtue of its
wisest members more directly to bear upon the Gov-
ernment, and invest them with greater influence in
it.* How then do the British and American systems
compare in this respect? Under which system are
the best men and the best minds of the community
most likely to be drawn into public life, and allowed
to wield the most unfettered influence when they
get there, and which system is likely to conduce
most to the enlightenment and mental advancement
of the general public? The head of the British
Cabinet to-day, says John Morley, corresponds in
many particulars, alike in the source of his power
and in the scope of his official jurisdiction, with the
President of the United States. Which system
then is likely to bring the better man to these
exalted positions? I will take the answer from
Mill, one of the most impartial of critics. When
the party which has the majority in Parliament
appoints its own leader, he tells us, he is always one
of the foremost, and often the very foremost person
*Representative Government, People's ed., p. 12-13.
+Life of Walpole, p. 165.
System of National Government.
33
in political life; while the President of the United
States is almost always an obscure man, or one who
has gained any reputation he may possess in some
other field than politics.* And Mr. Bagehot puts the
same thought in this way: "Under a Presidential
Constitution the preliminary caucuses which choose
the President need not care as to the ultimate fit-
ness of the man they choose. They are solely con-
cerned with his attractiveness as a candidate; they
need not regard his efficiency as a ruler. If they
elect a man of weak judgment, he will reign his
stated term; even though he show the best judg-
ment, at the end of that term there will be by consti-
tutional destiny another election. But under a
ministerial government there is no such fixed
destiny. The government is a removable govern-
ment, its tenure depends upon its conduct. If a
party in power were so foolish as to choose a weak
man for its head, it would cease to be in power. Its
judgment is its life. * * A Ministerial Government
is carried on in the face of day. Its life is in debate.
A President may be a weak man; yet if he keep
good ministers to the end of his administration, he may
not be found out-it may still be a dubious contro-
*Representative Government, p. 105.
34
The British versus The American
versy whether he is wise or foolish. But a prime
minister must show what he is. He must meet
the House of Commons in debate; he must be able
to guide that assembly in the management of its
business, to gain its ear in every emergency, to rule
it in its hour of excitement. He is conspicuously
submitted to a searching test, and if he fails he
must resign."*
2
Next, let us consider under which system the
remainder of the ministry of the day are likely
to be composed of the better men. At each
change of party," says Bagehot, "the President
distributes, as with us, the principal offices to his
principal supporters. He has an opportunity for
singular favouritism; the minister lurks in the
office; he need do nothing in public; he need not
show for years whether he is a fool or wise. The
nation can tell what a Parliamentary member is by
the open test of Parliament; but no one, save
from actual contact, or by rare position, can tell
anything certain of a Presidential minister."+ But
I will turn to Mr. Wilson, for corroboration :
Among the great purposes of a national Par-
((
*The English Constitution, p. 65-6.
+The English Constitution, p. 203.
System of National Government.
35
liament," he says, "are these two, first, to train
men for practical statesmanship; and secondly, to
exhibit them to the country, so that, when men of
ability are wanted, they can be found without
anxious search and perilous trial. In those govern-
ments which are administered by an executive com-
mittee of the legislative body, not only this training
but also this exhibition is constant and complete.
The career which leads to cabinet office is a career
of self exhibition. The self-revelation is made in
debate, and so is made to the nation at large as
well as to the ministry of the day, who are looking
out for able recruits, and to the Commons, whose
ear is quick to tell a voice which it will consent
to hear, a knowledge which it will pause to heed.
But in Governments like the American, in which
legislative and executive services are altogether
dissociated, this training is incomplete and this
exhibition almost entirely wanting.
""*
And generally let us consider which system is most
likely to attract the best minds of the country into
public life. To look only to our own times, for it
would not be fair to compare a less democratic age
with ours in this respect, where are the Gladstones
*Congressional Government, p. 251.
36
The British versus The American
and the Beaconsfields, the Forsters and the Harting-
tons, the Salisburys and the Balfours, the Stafford
Northcotes and the Brights of American politics, not
to mention the scores of other names of men of the
highest attainments and scientific or literary emi-
nence who have adorned the benches of the British
House of Commons in our generation? Do they
exist in public life in America? Let an American
answer: "We have always had plenty of excellent
lawyers," he says, "though we have often had to do
without even tolerable administrators, and seem des-
tined to endure the inconvenience of hereafter doing
without any constructive statesmen at all. *
The forms of government in America have always
been unfavourable to the easy elevation of talent
to a station of permanent authority. * * We
have no great prizes of leadership, such as are
calculated to stimulate men of strong talents to
great and conspicuous public services. * * I
cannot insist too much upon this defect of con-
gressional government, because it is evidently rad-
ical. Leadership with authority over a great ruling
party is a prize to attract great competitors, and
is in a free Government the only prize that will
attract great competitors. Its attractiveness is
System of National Government.
37
* *
abundantly illustrated in the operations of the
British system.
A part in the life of Con-
gress, on the contrary, though the best career opened
to men of ambition by our system, has no prize at
its end greater than membership of some one of
numerous committees, none of which has the dis-
tinction of supremacy in policy or of recognised
authority to do more than suggest.
رو
And now, in conclusion, which system most con-
duces to creating an intelligent and an educative
interest in the general public about the affairs of
the country?
In America, says Bryce, politicians do not aspire
to the function of forming opinion. There is less
disposition than in Europe to expect light and
leading on public affairs from speakers or writers.
Oratory is not directed towards instruction, but
towards stimulation. The structure of the Govern-
ment, he says, provides the requisite machinery
neither for forming nor for guiding a popular
opinion, disposed of itself to recognise only broad
and patent facts, and to be swayed only by such ob-
vious reasons as it needs little reflection to follow.†
*Congressional Government, pp. 199, 203, 206, 214.
+American Commonwealth, vol. 2, pp. 230, 249.
39
The British versus The American.
So much for Mr. Bryce's testimony. Now let us
hear Bagehot: "Cabinet Government educates the
nation; the Presidential does not educate it, and
may corrupt it. It has been said that England
invented the phrase 'Her Majesty's opposition ;'
that it was the first Government which made a
criticism of administration as much a part of the
polity as administration itself. This critical opposi-
tion is the consequent of cabinet government.
The great scene of debate, the great engine of popu-
lar instruction and political controversy, is the
legislative assembly. A speech there by an eminent
statesman, a party movement by a great political
combination, are the best means yet known for
arousing, enlivening, and teaching a people. The
cabinet system ensures such debates, for it makes
them the means by which statesmen advertise
themselves for future and confirm themselves in
present governments.
*
* The deciding catas-
trophes of cabinet governments are critical divisions.
preceded by fine discussions.
*
* And debates
which have this catastrophe at the end of them-or
may have it-are sure to be listened to, and sure to
sink deep into the national mind. * * On the
other hand, the debates in the American Congress
System of National Government.
39
have little teaching efficacy; it is the characteristic
vice of Presidential Government to deprive them of
that efficacy; in that Government a debate in the
legislature has little effect, for it cannot turn out
the executive, and the executive can veto all it
decided."* Finally, let me call Mr. Woodrow Wilson,
for I have desired this evening to cite, as it were,
expert testimony for every criticism adduced. This
is what he says in his work on Congressional
Government: "The chief, and unquestionably the
most essential object of all discussion of public busi-
ness is the enlightenment of public opinion; and,
of course, since it cannot hear the debates of the
committees, the nation is not apt to be much in-
structed by them.
They have about them
none of the searching, critical, illuminating character
of the higher order of Parliamentary debate, in
which men are pitted against each other as equals,
and urged to sharp contest and masterful strife by
the inspiration of political principle and personal
ambition, through the rivalry of parties and the
competition of policies. They represent a joust
between antagonistic interests, not a contest of
principles. They could scarcely either inform or
*The English Constitution, pp. 19, 170.
*
*
40
The British versus The American
elevate public opinion even if they were to obtain
its heed.*
"Why is it," he asks, "that many
intelligent and patriotic people throughout this
country, from Virginia to California—people who
beyond all question, love their State and the Union
more than they love their cousins over the sea-
subscribe for the London papers in order to devour
the Parliamentary debates, and yet would never
think of troubling themselves to make tedious pro-
gress through a single copy of the Congressional
Record? Is it because they are captivated by the
old-world dignity of royal England, with its nobility
and its Court pageantry, or because of a vulgar
desire to appear better versed than their neighbours
in foreign affairs, and to affect familiarity with
British statesmen ? No, of course not. It is
because the Parliamentary debates are interesting
and ours are not. * * Every important dis-
cussion in the British House of Commons is an
arraignment of the ministry by the opposition-an
arraignment of the majority by the minority; and
every vote is a party defeat or a party triumph.
The whole conduct of the Government turns upon
what is said in the Commons, because the revela-
*Congressional Government, pp. 83, 85.
System of National Government.
41.
*
*
tions of debate often change votes, and a ministry
loses hold upon power as it loses hold upon the con-
fidence of the Commons.
It is, therefore, for
these very simple and obvious reasons that the
Parliamentary debates are read on this side of the
water in preference to the Congressional debates,
They affect the ministers, who are very conspicuous
persons, and in whom, therefore, all the intelligent
world is interested; and they determine the course
of politics in a great empire.'
"'*
Will Canada, as a part of that empire, consent to
exchange that perfected system of Parliamentary
Government, which, with other self-governing
British communities, she has received from the
hands of Great Britain, for a systen. which, on the
testimony of even Americans themselves, is so full
of serious drawbacks, and is so convenient to the
organizers of the caucus, the convention, and the
machine, to the lobbyist, the intriguer, and the
demagogue? Rather let us maintain intact and in
full working order that remarkable system, as John
Morley calls it, which combines unity, steadfastness,
and initiative in the executive, with the possession
of supreme authority alike over men and measures
*Congressional Government, p. 94-5.
42
The British versus The American
by the House of Commons,* that whenever and so
often as Providence sends us men of true light and
leading, of statesmanlike gifts and capacious minds,
they may find the appropriate. machinery ready to
their hands, that devoting themselves to public life,
they may gather up alike the reins of executive and
legislative power, and guide a grateful and consent-
ting nation forward along a well-ordered course of
advancement and reform. Very foolish should we be
if we ever allowed the good ship Canada to forsake
that noble British squadron that, led by the flag-
ship of Old England, passes down the stream of
history under the Union Jack. Very foolish should
we be, if we ever allowed any inducements to draw
this country away from the broad current of British
liberty and progressive development.
*Life of Walpole, p. 142.