1
F
You
Medical Officers'
Correspondence School
Problems and Approved Solutions
Series of 1910


द
ин
393
1910
4
บ
!
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
MEMORANDUM
:
The general purpose of medico-military map
problems is to invite attention to various conditions
and factors which may influence the management of
the Medical Department with troops in campaign.
They are suggestive.
Hence the stimulation of thought along lines.
ordinarily relatively unfamiliar is of far more practi-
cal value than the mere correctness of the actual
solutions rendered. Such solutions merely apply to
individual concrete instances-but the solution of a
sufficient number of problems demonstrates broad
general principles upon which the efficient solution
of all such problems, or of the handling of actual
situations liable to be encountered in the field, must
depend.
General principles, and not fixed rules, must in-
variably be used. No set of rules can govern the art
of war, nor can they govern the tactical management
of a correlating sanitary service. Each situation
must be handled on its own individual merits-for no
two situations will be found alike. This implies
careful consideration of every possible factor which
can affect the situation before arriving at the final
decision to be deduced. It also means the exercise
of sound reasoning on the part of the student.
An "approved solution" is therefore not at all
to be regarded as the only solution, for it is quite
1
-2-
conceivable that dissimilar measures or combinations
may in their application give equally good results.
It is also thus apparent that an "approved solution"
is not necessarily the best solution--it is merely the
expression of a scheme which can be regarded as
fairly complete and as thoroughly workable and
practicable under the conditions assumed.
It can
always be improved upon.
It is believed that officers will learn quite as
much through an appreciation of their possible
oversights and errors as through the formulation of
solutions which approximate an approved solution.
For this reason, some of the more important varia-
tions from the latter have been noted on the prob-
lems returned. The appreciation of error means
that it will not be repeated. Careful comparison
in detail of the solutions returned, with the "approved
solutions," is therefore suggested.
The "approved solutions" in question have been
prepared in coöperation with the Department of Mili-
tary Art, Army Staff College.
The solutions received were previously made
anonymous in the office of the Secretary, Army Service
Schools, and have thus been commented upon im-
personally.
3
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 1
A train composed of all the ambulance companies
and field hospitals of the 1st Division is moving
north on the Frenchman-17-47-45 road.
Major X, Medical Corps, in command, is riding
at the head of this train and is nearing the house of
J. Aaron, north of 17, when a staff officer rides up and
orders:
"Halt your train as soon as the rear wagon
clears the Millwood road.”
Major X continues on at the head of his train;
where on the map does he give the order to halt?
Show in detail how you arrive at your conclusion.
(Note: Use 4" map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity.)
AN APPROVED SOLUTION
Answer:
He gives the order to halt where the 860 contour
line crosses the road on the map, or about 225 yards
north of 47.
Explanation:
It is assumed that there is no depletion through
assignment of ambulances to regiments.
Field Service Regulations (page 219) give the
road space of four ambulance companies as 1,160
yards, and of four field hospitals as 680 yards.
An interval of twenty yards between the two may
fairly be assumed. The total road space is thus 1,860
yards.
3
-4-
But elongation of the column, due to straggling,
has to be considered. Field Service Regulations
(page 220) state that this may amount to as much as
25 per cent. The degree of elongation of course de-
pends largely on unfavorable conditions of roads,
weather, animals, etc. The problem gives no in-
formation on these points. Conditions therefore may
be assumed as satisfactory and elongation as but 10
per cent, or 186 yards.
-
This gives a total present length of column
of 2,046 yards-say 2,050 yards. But commands
on the march ordinarily close up to proper in-
terval at the halt. Major X would therefore ordi-
narily disregard the factor of elongation in bringing
his column to position at the halt, but in this instance
his map shows him that he is coming to a steep hill
(grade about one in six) on Plum Creek, with the
road passing through a deep cut and opening imme-
diately on a bridge passing over a considerable stream
with steep banks, and presumably unfordable. The
bridge is probably of the ordinary country variety,
none too wide or strong. A wagon train halted on
this area, which covers some 200 yards, or a distance
just about compensating that of the elongation
of the sanitary train, may not only find it
difficult to hold wagons in position, but may block
the road or bridge, or overload the latter. Major X
will therefore halt his train in two sections, the rear
wagon of the forward portion being closed up so as
to just clear the bridge and the forward wagon of
the rear section stopping at the entrance of the cut
on Plum Creek Hill. He will leave a subordinate at
this point to carry out this plan.
Major X, knowing the present length of his
column, therefore lays off that distance north from
17 on his map. When he reaches the point which
—5—
the map shows to be 2,050 yards from 17, he gives
the order to halt.
Comment:
One purpose of this problem is to bring out the
magnitude of the organized sanitary units which the
Medical Department uses with the complete tactical
unit-the infantry division.
Another is the necessity for considering the
factor of elongation with marching troops.
Another is the necessity for careful reading of
the map and the use of all information which it
gives before arriving at any final conclusions of a
tactical nature.
T
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 2
An infantry division is marching west by the
single road 56-54-16-18-Terminal Bridge-Shaw-
nee St.-48-110-94-90-86.
The bulk of the cavalry is used as independent
cavalry; the advance guard consisting of one squad-
ron of cavalry, two regiments of infantry, one bat-
talion field artillery, one company engineers, one
ambulance company.
The weather is hot and fair; the roads dusty.
The Chief Surgeon, riding with the division com-
mander at the head of the main body, reaches Easton
at 12 noon and learns that the wagons containing the
Reserve Medical Supplies, which had not previously
joined, have caught up and are following at the rear
of the Supply Train.
He at once sends a message by his orderly to
the Medical Supply Officer marked "ordinary.
""
(a) At this time about where are the wagons
with the Reserve Medical Supplies?
(b) About where on the map will the orderly
meet the Medical Supply Officer?
(c) Assuming that the latter writes his reply
without delay, at about what time may the Chief
Surgeon, who remains at Easton, expect to receive it?
(d) How far will the orderly ride in performing
his duty?
Show in detail how you arrive at each of your
conclusions.
(Note: Use 2" map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity.
Use table of approximate road spaces given in Field Service
Regulations, 1910. Assume 3 miles interval between rear of
column and head of supply train.)
•
7
-8-
AN APPROVED SOLUTION
Answer:
To (a) The wagons containing the Sanitary Re-
serve are about one mile west of 56, near the angle
in the road.
To (b) The orderly meets the Medical Supply
Officer in the immediate vicinity of 18.
To (c) The Chief Surgeon receives his reply
about 7:00 p.m.
To (d) The orderly rides about twenty-eight and
a half miles in performing this duty.
General Consideration:
as
It must be remembered that "road space,
referred to in Field Service Regulations, is to be mod-
ified according to the tactical disposition of troops on
the march, intervals and elongation.
By the terms of the problem, the troops in ad-
vance of the main body need not be considered. The
sanitary organization included in the advance guard
is less its wheeled transportation. (See Par. 302,
F. S. R.)
The organizations composing the remainder of
the column, with combat trains, with their normal
road spaces, as given in Field Service Regulations,
are:-
Division Headquarters, say
Half troop of cavalry,
1 regiment of infantry,
2 brigades of infantry,
880 yards
5600 yards
1 brigade field artillery, (less 1 bn.) 3370 yards
350 yards
380 yards
• •
2 companies of engineers,
2 companies of signal corps,.
1 ambulance company, train only,..
3 ambulance companies, complete,
4 field hospitals, .
Total...
•
•
•
45 yards
45 yards
""
250 yards
840 yards
680 yards
12420 yards
The advance guard formation indicates that op-
position may be considered, hence the sanitary orga-
—9—
nizations march in advance of the field train. For the
same reason, it is assumed that ambulances are con-
centrated, though concentration or dispersion makes
no difference as to road space.
To this is added the road space of the field train
composed of the field wagons of all the organizations
of the division. (See Field Service Regulations, Par.
59). Determined by subtracting road space with
combat trains from total road space with field trains
as follows:
Division Headquarters, 7 wagons
(Par 40, F.S.R.)
1 regiment of cavalry,
3 brigades of infantry,
1 brigade of field artillery,
1 battalion of engineers,.
1 battalion of signal troops,
Total..
··
•
6 wagon companies,.
Field bakery..
Pack train...
Total...
•
• •
• ·
Then follows the ammunition train:
5 wagon companies....
•
2100 yards
To this is added the road space of the supply
train (less sanitary reserve):
•
140 yards
500 yards
2510 yards
900 yards
110 yards
80 yards
4240 yards
•
These aggregate normal distances are as follows:
Column of troops (head of main
body to rear) with combat trains,
Field train of entire division,
Ammunition train of entire division
Supply train of entire division
(less sanitary reserve),
Total...
2500 yards
230 yards
100 yards
2830 yards
12420 yards
4240 yards
2100 yards
Add for intervals between com-
batant units,
Add for interval between combat-
ant units and field train,.
Add for interval between field train
and ammunition train, heading
supply train,
2830 yards
21590 yards
200 yards
2500 yards
:
6000 yards
Total addition for intervals,. 8700 yards
Total normal length of road space.
30290 yards
—10—
or in round numbers say, thirty thousand yards.
To this, however, we must add twenty per cent
for elongation of actual column length. This does
not imply elongation of intervals. The problem
gives the weather as hot and the roads as dusty.
Reference to the map shows country hilly and irreg-
ular, the road crooked, with one long bridge to cross.
These combine to cause unavoidable extension of the
marching column.
From the Chief Surgeon at the head of the main
body to the sanitary reserve at the rear of the supply
train is thus some thirty-four thousand six hundred
yards, or almost exactly twenty miles.
Explanation of (a).
Measurement of the distance from Easton back
along the designated route to 56 shows it to be thirty-
six thousand two hundred and fifty yards; the length
of the column from the head of the main body to the
sanitary reserve has been shown to be thirty-four
thousand six hundred yards; hence the latter must
be sixteen hundred and fifty yards, or about a mile
west of that point, or just west of the angle in the
road west of 56.
Explanation of (b).
The orderly on receiving a message marked
"ordinary," will endeavor to ride at the rate of ap-
proximately five miles per hour. (Par. 64, Field Ser-
vice Regulations). He can not do much better than
this as the narrow country road is choked with mov-
ing troops. The wagon train, especially in view of
hilly country, dusty roads and heat, can make no
more than two miles per hour. (See Par. 147, Field
Service Regulations). They are approaching each
other at a combined rate of seven miles per hour, the
orderly moving five-sevenths of the total distance.
This total distance has been shown to be twenty miles.
-il -
They will therefore meet at about fourteen and three-
tenths miles from Easton (24860 yards), in the imme-
diate vicinity of 18.
Explanation of (c).
The orderly can not start to return until about 3
p.m. He has about fourteen and a half miles to make;
has just completed a similar distance, and presumably
had about completed an ordinary day's march when
the Chief Surgeon sent him off at noon. This means
that he will have had to ride at least thirty-eight
miles, perhaps more, since starting in the morning.
With hot weather, dust and hilly country, his horse
will probably be nearly exhausted before he reaches
Easton. To get there at all, the orderly can probably
not return faster than three and one-half to four
miles per hour.
Explanation of (d)
The orderly has to travel double the distance re-
quired by (c), shown to be a little more than fourteen
and one fourth miles, or a total of something over
twenty-eight and a half miles. It will be more rath-
er than less than this, from the necessity of at times
leaving the road and making detours to pass moving
organizations.
Comments:
This problem is intended to illustrate, among
other things:
1. The tactical composition of an infantry divi-
sion.
2. The magnitude of the smallest complete tacti-
cal unit used in modern war; as shown by the fact
that when the rear wagons are only about a mile from
the east boundary of the territory covered by the map
(the latter practically covering territory twenty miles
from border to border), the main body is just at its
western border, and the advance guard has passed off
12—
the map a number of miles further to the westward.
3. The influence of terrain, roads and weather
on elongation and speed of marching.
4, The speed of mounted orderlies.
5. The imperative necessity for mounted train-
ing for Hospital Corps men, all of whom are liable to
orderly or other mounted duty.
7
2.
;
Correspondence School for Medical Officer's
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 3
The advance guard of an infantry division is
unexpectedly engaged.
The column moves forward a short distance and
then halts, occupying the road.
The Chief Surgeon, riding at the head of the
main body, desires to send forward to the advance
guard the bearer and dressing station section of an
ambulance company, marching in the rear of the
main body. The roads are ordinary but level country
roads and the weather is cool and fair.
The main body consists, in its organization of
troops and their order of march, as follows:
Division Headquarters
3d Infantry Regiment
Hdqrs. Field Artillery Brigade
clusions.
Answer:
1st Field Artillery Regiment (less 1 battery)
2d Infantry Brigade
2d Field Artillery Regiment
3d Infantry Brigade
Battalion Engineers (less 1 company)
Battalion Signal Corps (less
company)
Ambulance Companies 1, 2, 3 and 4.
About how soon can the Chief Surgeon count on
the arrival for duty of the sanitary troops above
mentioned?
Show in detail how you arrive at your con-
In about 4 hours.
1
13
—14—
;
Explanation:
The solution of this problem primarily depends
upon the road space from the head of the main body
to the nearest sanitary organization and the interval
between the former and the reserve of the advance
guard.
The former is as follows: (See F. S. R., p. 219).
50 yards
880 yards
20 yards
Division Headquarters..
3d Infantry Regiment....
Hdqrs. Field Artillery Brigade (estimated)
1st Field Artillery Regiment (less 1 battery.
2d Infantry Brigade
2d Field Artillery Regiment.
3d Infantry Brigade……..
·
•
• •
•
•
•
Battalion Engineers (less 1 company).
Battalion Signal Corps (less company).
10 Ambulances, distributed through column. (See
Par. 144, F. S. R.)………
•
1830 yards
2800 yards
2150 yards
2800 yards
350 yards
290 yards
200 yards
Total.....
11370 yards
By the terms of the problem, the Ambulance
Companies will be found immediately following the
Signal Corps. The distance from the Chief Surgeon
to the nearest Ambulance Company is 11,370 yards,
or about 6 miles.
Elongation on the march is not here considered,
for the column of troops on halting is closed up.
It is assumed that communication is by mounted.
messenger, as the sanitary service receives no train-
ing in receiving or sending messages in other ways.
The Chief Surgeon gives his orderly an order,
marked "urgent", for the nearest Ambulance Com-
pany to send its bearer and dressing station section to
the Advance Guard as rapidly as possible. "Urgent"
means the highest speed consistent with certainty
of arrival. (Par. 64, F. S. R.). Were the road clear,
the orderly could deliver his message in about 30
minutes, but the problem states that the troops have
halted, occupying the road, presumably awaiting or-
-15-
ders and in more or less uncertainty. This will force
the orderly to go more slowly and make detours, de-
laying him very materially, depending largely on
local conditions of terrain and road, of which nothing
is stated. But it is safe to assume that the orderly
will be so delayed as to prevent his delivery of the
message under about 50 minutes.
The transportation of the Ambulance Company
ordered up is left behind, from the terms of the prob-
lem, from the fact that the road is blocked, and the
further fact that tactical considerations would not
permit it to come to the front at this time.
Were the roads clear, the bearer and dressing
station section could, with urging, march to the front
at the rate of about 3 miles per hour. But the re-
verse is the case, and the Hospital Corps detachment
will have to march across country, parallel with the
· road.
Under such conditions, they could presumably
move no more rapidly than 2 miles per hour.
This would bring the detachment abreast of Di-
vision headquarters about 3 hours and 40 minutes af-
ter the Chief Surgeon sent off his orderly.
But the "duty" of the sanitary detachment, re-
ferred to in the problem, lies with the Advance Guard.
The rear of the reserve of the latter is probably at
least 1 miles in advance of the Main Body (See Par.
110, F. S. R.) and it will take at least half an hour
more for the detachment, which can now use an open
road, to reach the reserve, or a total of about 41
hours.
It will probably go no further forward without
halting, for a sufficient force to attempt to stop a
division would probably have long since driven in
those at the immediate front and brought the reserve
of the Advance Guard into action.
During this delay of 4 hours the entire relief
-16-
work in the troops engaged has devolved upon the
sanitary personnel attached to regimental and other
organizations.
Comment:
This problem is intended to illustrate, among
other things:
1. The length of the divisional column and its
component organizations, under the assumed condi-
tions.
2. The usual interval between the Main Body
and Advance Guard of a large command.
3. Speed of mounted orderly under difficult con-
ditions.
4. The rate of movement of a small detached
command, under the assumed conditions.
5. The necessity for a proper distribution of
sanitary organizations in a large command on the
march in campaign.
;
:
:
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 4
The enemy holds a position on Mount Olivet. It
is believed that his artillery is posted along the gen-
eral line from 112 to the orchard three-quarters of a
mile north.
The brigade, to which an Ambulance Company
under your command is attached, is ordered to move
against the enemy's position west from Leavenworth
along the 68—48-104-108-110 road.
Will you probably have to handle casualities from
artillery fire anywhere on the proposed line of ad-
vance?
If so, where on the map is the danger zone which
is exposed to the enemy's view; what is its depth;
how long would infantry crossing it be under fire?
Show in detail how you arrive at your con-
clusions.
(Note: Use 2" map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity.)
Answer:
Yes, there are two zones in which casualty from
artillery may fairly be anticipated.
The first zone extends from just east of 108
about 600 yards to the eastward. Small columns
would cross it in 4 or 5 minutes. The casualties here
would be cared for by the Ambulance Company after
the combatant organizations and their sanitary de-
tachments had passed over and hostile fire had been
diverted.
The second zone begins at a point some 300 yards
east of 110, and on the eastern crest of the 110-126
ridge, and extends westward for some hundreds of
17
-18--
yards (variable with terrain but 700 yards on the line
in question) until blanketed from the hostile artillery
by the east slope of Mount Olivet. Troops crossing
the ridge would be thus exposed over zones from say
500 to 1,000 yards deep. Rapidity of movement
across this area would be largely determined by vol-
ume of hostile fire and cannot be definitely stated.
Probably it would take from 15 to 30 minutes to
cross this exposed area after deployment was accom-
plished. There would be many artillery casualties
here, together with some from long range rifle fire.
Explanation:
The terms of this problem clearly contemplate
direct fire only.
The extreme range of Field Artillery is given by
Straub (Medical Service in Campaign, page 32) as
6,500 yards. Field Service Regulations, par. 255,
class ranges for Field Artillery which are over 4,500
as "distant", between 3,500 and 4,500 as "long",
and between 2,500 and 3.500 yards as "effective".
It is clear, then, that troops on an exposed area
within 6,500 yards of hostile artillery may suffer
more or less casualty. The hill at 104 is so exposed,
so far as artillery is concerned, and is about 6,000
yards from the hostile guns. The exposed zone in
question is of about 500 yards in depth. But the
timber shown on the map to the west presumably,
materially if not entirely, screens it from the enemy.
Under any conditions, Field Service Regulations, par.
280, make it almost certain that an enemy would
make no use of artillery fire on such a distant area
even if exposed to view.
The first true area of danger is one of about 600
yards in depth lying a little to the eastward of 108.
This area is from about 4,300 to 5,300 yards from the
enemy's guns. It will afford the only opportunity
which the enemy will have to interfere with the ad-
-19-
vance until the advance reappears near 110, which
last point is only about 2,000 yards, or "distant
range" for rifle fire (Par. 255, F. S. R.) from the
probable lines of hostile infantry entrenchments on
the military crest of Mount Olivet. The enemy will
therefore presumably open up with his guns when
the advance appears about half a mile east of 108.
By the terms of the problem, about half of them are
so placed as to reach this area. After a few shots,
the fire will become fairly effective. It will be met.
by moving the advancing troops out of the road and
forwarding them over the exposed area fin small
columns. They will be sent forward at double time,
or at the rate of 160 yards per minute. This would
enable each man to cross this second exposed zone in
about 4 minutes. In spite of these tactical precau-
tions a moderate number of casualties may here be
expected. They will lie scattered in small groups
over an area approximately a third of a mile in depth
and with a probable frontage of -say-500 yards:
The advance would again come into effective
range for direct fire about 300 yards east of 110.
This fire, at 3,000 yards distance, would compel de-
ployment under protection of the ridge and the seek-
ing of cover to prevent heavy losses in the advancing
force. The latter would, after emerging from
shelter, remain under fire until it had crossed the
110 ridge and begun to descend into the valley to the
westward, when the eastern slopes of Mount Olivet
would blanket the guns. At this time, however, the
advancing force would have come under long range
(1,500 yards) fire from the hostile infantry. It is
probable, of course, that guns on the line in question.
would be moved forward or to a flank to avoid being
blanketed during the final advance.
There are several ways by which the areas of
exposure to fire may be determined. For the pur-
—20—
pose of this problem, the graphic or profile method,
given herewith, in which distances and elevations
are transcribed on plotting paper, the base line show-
ing horizontal distances and the ruled squares
altitudes, is perhaps the best. The method is so sim-
ple that explanation is deemed unnecessary.
With artillery on a line mile long, several pro-
files would be necessary to completely illustrate the
situation, but for the purposes of this problem only
one is necessary.
Comment:
The chief purpose of this problem is to indicate
the practical value of determining the visibility of
points or areas, in relation to the possible necessity
and extent of providing sanitary relief thereat, under
conditions of combat.
In attack, especially, the areas of possible loss
should be foretold with considerable accuracy, and
measures of relief tentatively planned in advance.
Special Note
On some of the 2" maps, the heavy contour line
on Mount Olivet is erroneously labeled 1,000. It
should read 1,100. This error is of course apparent
on referring to other features of the map.

Tr
225
209
175
150
425
Yog
फै
Horizontal Scale. Linch 1 mile
Vertical Scale: Linch=100 feet
201
960 yds
EXPOSED AREA
108.
-3goyds
"EXPOSED AREA
1032
+
450 yds.
EXPOSED REA
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth. Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 5
A Blue force is attacking from the west and
northwest against a Red force holding the hills about
Fort Leavenworth and Leavenworth.
The Chief Surgeon of the Blues asks for author-
ity to put in a field hospital near Kickapoo. He is
told by the Chief of Staff that he may do so, but that
he must select a point on the 43-41-23 road where
the tents will be out of sight of the enemy, who is
believed to have an artillery observation station on
the Sheridan's Drive Ridge at about the letter "H"
in Hancock of "Hancock Hill."
You are the Director of Field Hospitals. The
Chief Surgeon repeats his wishes and instructions to
you and says that, aside from any question of visibil-
ity, a location at either 23 or 41 would be equally sat-
isfactory to him.
To which of the two points just named would
you order the Field Hospital?
Show in detail how you would arrive at your con-
clusions.
(Note: An artillery observatiou station is a low entrench-
ment with overhead protection so that the eye of the observ-
er is only slightly above the level of the ground.
(Note: Use 4" map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity.
Answer:
The Field Hospital will be ordered to establish
at 41.
Explanation:
The problem may be solved by the profile meth-
od, but for purposes of comparison the following
method is used.
21
— 22 —
A straight line is drawn from the letter "H" in
Hancock of Hancock Hill to the point 23, represent-
ing an imaginary line of sight.
The elevation of the point 23 may be taken as 845
feet, it lying between the 840 and 850 foot contour
lines. As the visibility of the Field Hospital is being
considered, to this must be added the height of the
hospital tent, which is 11 feet. The altitude of the
tent ridge at point 23 is therefore 856 feet. The ele-
vation of the point "H" is 1080 feet.
The difference in altitude between "H" and the
ridge of the hospital tents at 23 is therefore 224 feet.
The distance between the two points, measured
along the imaginary line of sight, is 4600 yards.
Hence the line of sight slopes downward 224 feet in
4600 yards, or at the rate of 4.9 feet per 100 yards.
Inspection of the imaginary line of sight shows
several eminences which may need be considered
in connection with obstruction of vision; viz, the
hill near 15, the 862 hill south of Plum Creek, the
spur southwest of 45, and the little spur south of 25.
From "H" to hill near 15 is 900 yards, therefore
the line of sight has dropped 9 x 4.9 feet, or 44.1
feet, or is at 1080-44.1, or 1035 feet. But the map
shows the hill to be 860 feet high, hence the line of
sight clears this hill by 1035.9-860 feet, or 175.9
feet. It is clear, therefore, that hill 15 will not
screen the Field Hospital from observation.
From "H" to hill 862 is 2300 yards, hence the
line of sight at this point is 1080-(23×4.9)=967 feet
in altitude. As the hill itself is 862 feet, it is evident
that the difference of 105 feet would very much more
than bring the Field Hospital fully into view.
From "H" to where the line of sight crosses the
spur southwest of 45 is 3700 yards. Hence 1080-
(37X4.9)=898.7. But as the spur has an altitude of
23.
but 852 feet it clearly does not interfere with the
view.
From "H" to the small spur south of 25 is 4300
yards. Hence 1080-(43X4.9)=869.3 feet. But the
elevation of that part of the spur is 855 feet. The
difference between 869.3 and 855 is 14.3 feet. The
tent ridge is 11 feet above the ground. Hence not
only the tent ridge, but the body of the tent and
also the ground on which it stands would be visible.
The orchard of M. Aaron lies south of the the line
of vision and would not screen the tents. Hence
under the terms of the problem the Field Hospital
cannot be put at 23.
Applying the above method to the visibility of
point 41, we have the following:
Elevation of "H"
Elevation of 41
Difference of elevation
1080 feet
870 feet
210 feet
Distance from "H" to 41 approximately 5000
yards. Drop therefore equals 4.2 feet per 100 yards.
From the foregoing solution, and from inspection
of the new line of sight, it is evident that there is no
eminence which could obstruct vision unless it be the
hill southeast of 31. The distance to this hill from
"H" is 4500 yards. Hence 1080-(45X4.2)=891 feet.
But the point 31 is on the 910 foot contour, or 19 feet
higher than the ground at 41. The line of sight
would therefore pass 8 feet above a tent ridge 11 feet
from the ground. A Field Hospital at this point
would be invisible from "H", and would be put in
at this point with directions that it be extended
eastward for still better protection under the 31
ridge.
Comment:
The special purpose of this problem is practice in
the determination of matters of visibility. The lat-
-24-
ter will frequently be of practical importance to the
Medical Department; for stations for sanitary relief
should either be so thoroughly concealed that the en-
emy will not suspect their whereabouts and they will
not draw fire as possibly suspicious formations, or
they must be placed so completely in view that their
nature will be fully recognized and fire against them
will be refrained from intentionally.
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 6
The enemy is attacking from Leavenworth.
Your forces hold the high ground from Atchison
Hill extending two and one-half miles southwest,
with general line of evacuation through Lowemont.
You are Director of Ambulance Companies. The
commander of Ambulance Company No. 1 suggests
that he be allowed to put in a dressing station just
east of the little fork in the creek a quarter of a mile
from and a little north of west of the figures 1100 on
the Eleven Hundred Hill (southwest quarter of 4"
map).
(a) Discuss fully any reasons for or against this
location which might occur to you on examining the
map.
(b) If you decide to order Ambulance Company
No. 1 to go in somewhere else in this vicinity, give
in detail any reasons which guide you in your de-
cision.
(Note: Use 4" and 2" maps of Fort Leavenworth and
vicinity.)
Solution and Explanation:
The paramount consideration which governs the
location of an ambulance company dressing station is
the location of the wounded. They must be reached
and given attention, irrespective of whether the con-
dititions under which they lie are, or are not, rela-
tively favorable to the work of the Medical Depart-
ment. Questions of terrain, transportation, etc.,
25
-26-
are wholly secondary, and give rise to problems
which press for solution only after those of collection
and sanitary relief have received attention. It fol-
lows, therefore, that if a large number of wounded
lie in the immediate vicinity of the point suggested
by the commander of Ambulance Company No. 1,
this or another company will be ordered by higher
authority to go into operation in that general locality,
irrespective of any disadvantages which such situa-
tion may seem to have, so far as facility of sanitary
work is concerned.
But the problem does not state where casualties
have occurred or their number, but merely gives the
general lines of the defense. Until areas of con-
siderable casualty have actually been determined,
you, as Director of Ambulance Companies, will hold
your sanitary organizations in reserve, awaiting gen-
eral instructions from higher authority. But you
will desire to ascertain in advance the various posi-
tions which an ambulance company or companies
might have to occupy.
Since these tentative positions must depend in
turn upon the tactical dispositions of troops, and the
probable lines of attack by the enemy, your posses-
sion of some elementary knowledge of tactics is im-
portant.
By the terms of the problem, the line of defense
is two and one-half miles long. This implies a
defending force of a strength of at least a division
and presumably of all arms.
This force will clearly be distributed at such
commanding points as may be included in the as-
sumed line of defense. The map shows that such
points for infantry evidently are Atchison Hill,
Government Hill, Southwest Hill (both shoulders),
Zimmerman Hill east of 42, hill west of 68; cavalry
on flanks, say part near 136 and part on Cemetery
:
4
:
--27-
Ridge north of target range; artillery divided be-
tween Government Hill and hill crossed by 50-68
road. The main reserve will have to be at some
central point with ready access to both flanks--say
near 26 on the Zimmerman Road.
As the map
shows slopes of positions to be heavily wooded, the
infantry lines would probably be well down the
eastern slopes near the edge of the timber.
The terrain makes the position especially strong
in the center. Frontal attacks are also not usually
made. It may be concluded therefore that the main
attack will fall on one of the flanks. The left (north)
flank seems somewhat more probable, as although it
is strong, success here means control of the railroad
and a shorter distance to intersect the line of retreat.
With some such general situation in mind as is
outlined above, you, as Director of Ambulance Com-
panies, again examine the map.
The position suggested for the dressing station
west of Eleven Hundred Hill is seen to be behind the
center of the line as a whole. It offers the advan-
tages of protection from fire, and timber and water,
but these are merits common to various other posi-
tions also. Against its selection are the facts that
it is off all roads or trails, the nearest being 1,000
yards away, and thus is not so situated that wounded
would readily find it or naturally gravitate toward
it; it is down a steep grade (about 1 in 4) which
would render access by wounded on foot or litter a
matter of great difficulty. (See page 223, F. S. R.)
Its outlet to the north is obstructed by deeply gullied
creeks, rendering it inaccessible by wheeled trans-
portation from the rear, and helpless patients which
actually reached this point would have to be littered
some 1,000 yards to reach the railroad running to
Lowemont at a practicable point, or about 1,300 yards
to wagon transportation if an ambulance station is
-28-
established at the Baker house and a practicable
crossing of Salt Creek is made at that point by scal-
ing down the steep banks. The country back of the
suggested point is also densely wooded, and is fairly
rough east of the creek, which is bridged only by a
railroad trestle. There are no buildings or similar
facilities anywhere near the point suggested. These
factors combine to render the location highly un-
desirable as a dressing station. When distances from
it to the various points on the line of defense are
measured, they are seen to range from 2,000 to 3,000
yards; this fault in itself alone is a fatal objection to
the point for the purpose. A dressing station here.
would clearly impede rather than facilitate relief
work. You therefore decide unhesitatingly against
the establishment of a dressing station at the location
suggested.
On further examining the map it is seen that no
ideal situation for a dressing station is presented.
Merely the best use of existing conditions which are
imperfect from the standpoint of sanitary relief is
possible. But it appears that wounded from the
right flank and center will jointly drain rearwards
through the 28-30-100 'road, the right flank over
the 50-44-28 road and the center over the un-
improved 22-Zimmerman-28 road. As these roads,
with the Atchison Pike, are necessarily used also for
supply, congestion will have to be guarded against.
If a strong attack seemed to be developing
against the right wing, the company with ambulances
would be sent to the division reserve in the vicinity
of 28, pending such time as the point of most useful-
ness could be determined.
If the right flank is attacked, some point near 50
would probably be suitable. If a strong attack is
made against the center, a position just north of the
point 22 would offer the essential advantages of
-29_
nearness to firing line (500-600 yards), protection of
slope, accessibility and easy evacuation under cover
by practical roads. It would not interfere with the
movement of troops or supplies. It lacks a local
water supply, but this is desirable rather than essen-
tial in view of the supply carried on the pack mules
and ambulances. The latter could probably work
along the ridge road without much danger, as the
firing would be at a much lower level.
The map shows that the left flank is naturally
drained through the Atchison Cross-G-H road.
There is access to and from the center over the
rough road following the ridge and which the en-
gineers would probably have improved. But
wounded are not readily evacuated by a flank-they
tend to drift as directly as possible back to the rear.
The Moore house is at the fork of the G-16-Atchi-
son Cross and the G-F-E roads and on the direct
line of evacuation; it permits of direct loading on the
railroad to the base and offers the natural advantages
and facilities possessed by farm houses for the pur-
pose in question. But it is further to the flank than
is desirable, and if the enemy occupies Sheridan
Ridge, the dressing station would have to move to
some other point for better protection. Sending its
ambulances back to Frenchman, the ambulance com-
pany would in such case remove its station to the
protection of the cut near 16. Cuts are usually un-
desirable as locations for dressing stations by reason
of possible mutual interference between the interests
of moving troops and of the wounded, and the
present instance is no exception in this respect. But
nearness and protection are fundamental necessities.
With the enemy on Sheridan Ridge, the area
between Atchison Hill, and Sentinel Hill would be
fire swept and evacuation of wounded over this area
would be impracticable. But such evacuation could
-30—–—
still be continued during action from a dressing
station at 16 over the unimproved road to 22 and
beyond.
You, as Director of Ambulance Companies, there-
fore decide that Ambulance Company No. 1 will not
go into operation at the point suggested by its com-
mander, but feel sure that it will ultimately need to
be located at some other one of the points considered
in this connection. And it is even conceivable that
you may have to occupy all of them with the four
ambulance companies at your disposal.
Comment:
The purpose of this problem is to illustrate,
among other things:
1. The complete dependence of the tactical use
of sanitary units in battle upon the tactical use of
the combatant forces. The former never can be con-
sidered alone.
2. The importance of elementary knowledge
by the medical officer of the general principles gov-
erning the art of war.
3. The fact that while tentative plans for use of
the ambulance company can and should be made in
advance, no actual disposition should be made until
the need arises.
4.
That ambulance companies go into operation
only under general instructions from the Commander
or Chief Surgeon, leaving the necessary detail of
position to the Director of Ambulance Companies.
5. That a dressing station, once established, is
no more fixed in its position than that of combatant
organizations, but must change position if the tacti-
cal situation requires.
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE
1909-10
General Situation
War was declared April 15th between Tennessee
(Red) and Georgia (Blue). Both sides have been as-
sembling troops near the border before the declara-
tion of war.
Map Problem No. 8-1st Series
Special Situation-Blue
Major General A, now at Dalton, was on the dec-
laration of war assigned to command all the available
troops which consist of:
At Dalton-1st, 2d and 3d Infantry
1st F. A.
Co. A. (pioneer) and Co. B (pontoon).
Engrs.
Co. A, Signal Corps
Maj. Gen. A's headquarters and staff
Hq. and staff of Brig. Gen. B (com-
manding 1st Brig.)
At Ringgold
-
1st F. Hosp.
1st and 2d Amb. Cos,
4th and 5th Inf.
1st Bn. 2d F. A.
Hq. and staff of Brig. Gen. C (com-
manding 2d Brig.)
2d F. Hosp.
At Boynton-1st Cavalry
At Lafayette-8th and 9th Inf.
2d F. A. (less 1st Bn.)
Hq. and staff of Brig. Gen. D. (com-
manding 3d Brig.)
31
-32-
At Blue Ridge-6th Inf.
At Atlanta-Remainder of a complete division.
Ammunition and supply columns have just been
provided with animals and will be completely organ-
ized by the morning of the 16th.
The 7th Infantry is only partly organized, armed
or equipped. Remaining portions of the division
that are at Atlanta are in process of organization.
The main base is at Atlanta with sub-base at
Dalton and a supply depot at Lafayette. Ringgold
has been supplied from Dalton.
The troops at Dalton and the cavalry are regular
troops just filled up to war strength, the rest are
militia called to the colors. All troops have their
field trains.
A call for volunteers has met with such hearty
response that it is expected that two divisions can
be raised before arms, which have been purchased
abroad, can be delivered. As raised, these troops
will be assembled in camps of instruction
Atlanta and Savannah, respectively.
near
At Atlanta is an arsenal, ordnance depot, supply
depot, machine shops and a railroad shop.
The enemy is reliably reported to have assembled
a strong force, believed to be more than a division,
at Chattanooga. As far as known these comprise all
available hostile troops, though others are being or-
ganized. The Red newspapers are demanding an
immediate advance on Atlanta. Several troops of
hostile cavalry are now at Rossville.
-
A
Before the war, the Reds had about the same
strength of regular troops as the Blues, except in
infantry, but were known to have had five regiments
of regular infantry. Major General A had received
his orders and collected the above information by
7 p.m.
-33-
Required:
General A's orders.
General information to accompany problems:
-Georgia, 30,307 sq. miles.
Area-
Tennessee, 42,050 sq. miles.
Georgia, 2,216,331.
Tennessee, 2,020,616.
Population
The portion of the country considered is poor
farming country. There are more or less houses
along the roads even though none are shown on some
of the older sheets of the map.
The country will be taken as shown on the map,
changes since about 1890, when these maps were
made, not being considered.
The railroads are all single track, rather poorly
equipped and were in operation April 15th up to the
state line.
The streams all have hard bottoms and gently
sloping banks. The bottom of the streams is likely to
be full of irregularities and holes. As a general idea
of the size of the streams, the South Chickamauga at
Ringgold is about one hundred yards wide and about
two to three feet deep in April.
Roads are country roads, the road bed being
hard with a tendency to being stony.
High hills are wooded and usually have a sand-
stone cap with precipitous edges to the cap.
Valleys and low hills are cleared land with some
small clumps of trees.
Weather is mild and fair, trees are in full leaf.
The moon rose at midnight April 15th.
Size of towns.
Census 1890.
Chattanooga,
Atlanta,
Blue Ridge,
Boynton,
Dalton, (county seat).
30,154
89,872
1,134
50
4,315
-34-
Lafayette, (county seat)
Rossville,
Ringgold, (county seat)..
Rome,
491
200
437
7,340
Blue Ridge is on the Marietta and North Georgia R. R. about
fifteen miles north of Jasper.
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF colleGE
1910-11
Map Problem No. 8-1st Series
An Approved Solution
1st Blue Division,
Field Orders
No. -
1. The enemy has assembled a strong force,
estimated at about a division, at Chattanooga. Sev-
eral troops of hostile cavalry have occupied Rossville.
2. This division will concentrate on Ringgold.
3. The troops now at Dalton will march early
tomorrow on Ringgold; Brig. Gen. B commanding
the column.
Dalton, Ga., 15 April, 9 P.M.
4. The troops now at Lafayette, Brig. Gen. C
commanding, will march early tomorrow to Gordon
Springs and on the 17th via East Chickamauga creek
valley, on Ringgold. Only the field and combat
trains will accompany this column. Three days'
rations and forage will be carried. Brig. Gen. C will
detail an officer to take charge of removing the sup-
ply depot by rail to Atlanta, using hired civilian labor.
5. The 6th Inf. will move by rail tomorrow to
Ringgold.
6. The 1st Cav. will reconnoiter toward the
enemy, driving back the hostile cavalry.
7. The ammunition and supply trains will move
by rail to Dalton tomorrow.
8. All troops will be able to draw supplies at
Ringgold, where they will be furnished by rail from
Dalton.
9. Division headquarters will be at Ringgold
after 10 A.M. tomorrow.
By command of Maj. Gen. A,
X-Y-
Chief of Staff.
Necessary parts by telegraph in code to com-
35
—36 —
manders at Blue Ridge, Lafayette, Boynton and War
Department.
Copies to assembled brigade, regimental and in-
dependent detachment commanders and to staff at
Dalton.
1st Blue Division,
Commanding Officer,
Dalton, Ga., 15 April, 9 p.m.
1st Blue Cavalry,
Boynton.
Have the railroads between Rock Springs and
Chattanooga and between Dug Gap and Chattanooga
destroyed in several places. You are authorized to
use civilian labor and to requisition tools and ex-
plosives from near by. A carload of tools and ex-
plosives has been sent to Crawfish Springs, where it
will arrive at midnight and be subject to your order.
The mounted detachment of Co. A, Engineers, will
report to you at Boynton by midnight.
X- Y-
Chief of Staff.
—
-
— —
NOTE: It is assumed that a small detachment of Com-
pany A, Signal Corps, had established communications be-
tween Boynton and Ringgold and that all other places where
there are troops are connected with Dalton by the commercial
telegraph lines.
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE
1910-11
Map Problem No. 9-1st Series
Situation
Continuation of Problem No. 8, including ap-
proved solution thereto.
In Addition:
The enemy did not move on the 16th. On the
17th he moved through Rossville Gap and in the
afternoon established infantry outposts along the line
of West Chickamauga Creek covering the line Ring-
gold-Rossville road, inclusive, to Ringgold-Mission
Ridge road, inclusive. Hostile cavalry holds Boynton.
An indecisive cavalry engagement took place
three and one-half miles southeast of Rossville on the
afternoon of the 16th, our cavalry holding their
ground until hostile infantry appeared in support of
the hostile cavalry on the morning of the 17th.
By 4 p.m. General A is satisfied that the enemy
has halted for the night.
At 4 p.m. the 17th the Blue division is located as
follows:-1st Brigade, 1st Bn. 1st F. A. and 1st Sq.
1st Cav. on outpost on the line of 1000 hills two miles
west of Ringgold, outpost line extending across both
the Mission Ridge and Rossville roads.
gold.
Pontoon train and the troops that came from La-
fayette, except artillery, just east of Ringgold Gap.
Other special troops south of Ringgold.
Remainder of division north and west of Ring-
Supplies issued from the cars at Ringgold.
Secret service reports say the enemy has four
37
-38-
+
'
brigades of infantry, but that probably some of them
are but two regiments strong.
Required:
General A's intentions for the night of the 17th
and morning of the 18th, with (briefly) reasons there-
for.
12
;
O
*
1
1
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE
1909-10
Map Problem No. 9-1st Series
An Approved Solution
1st Requirement:
This evening General A will have his engineers
construct a number of crossings over the creek just
east of Ringgold. Then he will send the field trains
and all the pontoon train that is not actually in use
back during the night to the cross-road south of
where S of Catoosa appears on the map. One wagon
company with small arms and one with artillery am-
munition will march from Dalton at 3 a. m. to join
the field train at cross-road.
In the morning he will move out at 5 a. m. to
take up a position to defend the line of Peavine Creek,
the bulk of the cavalry being ordered at daylight to
move out to cover the left flank and to watch the
cross-roads northeast and southeast of Rock Spring.
One troop will at the same time move to observe on
the right flank. General A at first takes the defen-
sive but he will watch for an opportunity to take the
offensive.
2d Requirement:
The enemy is not greatly superior, hence a mis-
play on his part will give General A an opportunity
to take the offensive. The Ringgold Gap position is
a good one for a delaying action but is not adapted
to a protracted defense, especially so if a counter at-
tack is contemplated. The position close in front of
39
-40—
Ringgold has the same disadvantage as to adaptability
for a counter attack and, in case of a defeat, it would
be very difficult to withdraw from there. The high
hills around Ringgold are not well suited for use as
artillery positions in support of either of these posi-
tions.
The 1000 foot hill position now held by the out-
post is difficult to envelope, offers good artillery posi-
tions and good cover for strong reserves. With nu-
merous crossings over the creek in front of Ringgold,
it would be possible, in case of reverse, to withdraw
from it with comparatively small loss and, after de-
stroying the crossings, it would be easy to check
pursuit from the east bank of the creek.
Peavine Creek is an obstacle in front of the 1000
foot hill position, 1½ miles in front of the top of the
hill. The Blue position would hardly be on the top
of the hill, but rather, using the hill for artillery and
as cover for reserves (it is long enough for both), the
position actually held will naturally be down the
west slope far enough to get the advantage of Pea-
vine Creek as an obstacle. General A on the ground
could select the exact position, which cannot be done
from the small scale map. If the position is close to
the creek the enemy cannot use indirect artillery
fire.
Unless the enemy takes the defensive, which is
improbable, General A can hardly get farther west
than this without a fight to reach the position.
Should the enemy reach Peavine Creek in force
very early in the morning, still General A has a good
position on the 1000 foot hill and has his troops well
in hand for the fight.
Should the enemy move south in force General
A has a flank position and as soon as he is satisfied.
the enemy is well extended he will take the offen-
sive.
NOTE: On taking up the position in the morning General
A will move his other troops out in front of the outpost and
will then use his regular troops for the general reserve.
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE
1909-10
Map Problem No. 10-First Series
Situation-Red
Continuation of preceding problem, but other side.
The Blues on the 18th early occupied a position
east of Peavine creek, and were attacked at once,,
main attack against the hostile left. Due to the im-
pulsiveness of the troops in the secondary attack, it
was severely checked before the general reserve
could come into action. The enemy attempted a
counter attack against the Red right, but the general
reserve arriving, the counter attack was repulsed with
heavy loss. Enfilade fire of artillery kept the Reds from
following up this last advantage.
The Red loss was about twelve hundred.
At 3-30 p.m. offensive movement ceased and a
line six hundred yards west of Peavine creek was
ordered entrenched from one and a half miles north
of Boynton to one half mile south of that place.
The Blues also seem to be entrenching.
The Red forces consist of a complete division
(the 1st Inf. Brigade, 1st F. A., 1st Cavalry and the
special troops being regulars, recently filled up to
war strength, while the remainder are militia called
to the colors).
In addition to the division, two regular infantry
regiments which had been guarding the northern
frontier have become available by settling all differ-
ences with states to the north and these two regi-
ments have been formed into a 4th Separate Brigade
and joined the division on the 17th.
41
-42-
=>
The field trains are at Mission ridge, supply and
ammunition trains (less two wagon companies) at
Rossville. One wagon company with artillery ammu-
nition, one with small arms ammunition and three
field hospitals are close to the battlefield, having been
ordered forward.
The 2d and 3d Brigades, assisted by the engi-
neers, occupy the front line while the 1st and 4th
Brigades are reorganizing west of Boynton.
The bulk of the cavalry is covering the right
flank confronted by the hostile cavalry.
Two companies of irregular mounted rangers
have been left back with the trains.
Patrols report activity of the railroad at Lafay-
ette but have seen no troops except home guards
which kept small patrols out of the town.
Railroads are unserviceable south of Mission
Ridge as far as Rock Spring and Kensington.
At 4 p.m. a temporary truce covering the ground
between the lines was agreed to.
Required:
General M's intentions for the evening and the
next morning, with brief reasons therefor.
Atlanta Map.
Solved March 10, 1910.
#
>
First:
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF colleGE
1909-10
Map Problem No. 10-First Series
An Approved Solution
Intentions for the evening of the 18th:
To have the field train join the troops for a short
time; to care for the wounded and police the battle
field; to have the work of intrenching continued till
the field works are made strong and to have one com-
pany of engineers lay out and improve a road west
of the Boynton hills, from Boynton south till connec-
tion is made with the Nickajack Gap road.
Intentions for the 19th:
To leave one battalion of artillery and the 3d
Brigade to hold the Boynton position while marching
early with the remainder of the division on Nicka-
jack Gap; march to be south just west of the Boynton
hills and thence by the road toward the Gap. The
enemy's action will determine further movements,
whether to have the 3d Brigade follow as rear guard,
or, should the enemy move south, to have it hold him
in front while the division, taking advantage of the
cover afforded by the hills, makes dispositions to
counter this move. Field train to move on Crawfish
Spring, other trains to Eagle Cliff. Rangers to re-
connoiter south from Rock Spring, while cavalry cov-
ers the division's march.
Second:
The first thing to be attended to is the comfort
of the men after their exertions and excitement of
the day. The wounded have been cared for as well
43
{
——44–
às possible during the fight, now parties must be de-
tailed to search between the lines for the wounded
and to police the battlefield. After the fight the
troops will greatly appreciate the benefits of access
to the field train, even though it can be only for a
limited time.
As the enemy is intrenching it appears safe to
bring the field trains forward for the evening, though
they must be sent away before morning. By order-
ing them forward at once they will reach the troops
about dusk.
General M's mission is offensive. He has been
unable to drive the enemy from the field near Boyn-
ton, but thinks the enemy suffered fully as much as
himself. Since the enemy has intrenched, it appears
that a renewal of the direct attack has little prospect
of success. Of plans for the future, three courses
are open: to retreat, which does not seem to be war-
ranted; to take the defensive, which gives up all the
advantages of the initiative; or to continue the offen-
sive. The latter course keeps the initiative and still
has prospects of success, provided it can be done
without an attack of intrenchments.
↑
In order to turn the enemy he must be held in
front till the turning movement is fully under way.
This requires that the holding force intrench. Turn-
ing the hostile left most threatens the enemy and the
other difficulties are no greater than in turning his
other flank.
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF COLLEGE
1909-10
Map Problem No. 11-First Series
Situation-Blue
Continuation of Problem No. 9
On the 18th the enemy attacked the line of Pea-
vine creek but was repulsed. The Blue losses aggre-
gate 1100, being heaviest in the regular brigade and
lightest in the artillery. In the afternoon the enemy
began to intrench. The Blues remained in position
also intrenching.
Maj. Gen. A,
During the night it was learned that the 7th In-
fantry had been fully armed and would reach Dalton
at 8:30 a.m. the 19th. Arms for the 1st Brig. 2d
Div. had reached Savannah and would be issued at
Atlanta the 19th, after which this brigade would be
subject to General A's orders.
The morning of the 19th it was noticed that the
Red intrenchments had been extended and greatly
strengthened during the night.
At 8:30 a. m. the 19th the following messages
were received:
Ringgold.
War Department,
Atlanta, Ga.,
しし​H
393
1911
19 Apl.-8:10 A. M.
Senator S of Lafayette urges protection for that
place. He reports that he has positive information.
that hostile troops now occupy Rock Springs in force
and that small hostile parties are even now in the
outskirts of Lafayette. It is desired that all possible
consideration be shown the representations of this
distinguished civil officer.
45
Z.
Secy. of War.
-46-
First Cavalry,
Gap 3 miles northeast of Rock Springs, Ga.
19 Apl.-8:15 A. M.
Chief Staff,
Ringgold.
Hostile infantry in considerable numbers has ap-
peared in support of hostile cavalry. I will be forced
from this gap in the course of the next half hour.
Have noticed what appears to be a general move-
ment of the enemy in this direction.
M,
Colonel.
Required:
Gen. A's action.
Atlanta Map.
Solved March 14, 1910.
Department of Military Art
THE ARMY STAFF colleGE
1909-10
Map Problem No. 11-First Series
An Approved Solution
General A outlines his plan of action to his chief
of staff as follows. To retreat at once to Blue Moun-
tain, reserve leading, followed by remainder of divi-
sion except cavalry. Hill west of mouth of Mill
creek to be occupied by a stationary flank guard of a
regiment and a battery.
Bulk of cavalry to fall back on Nickajack Gap
and delay the enemy.
Railroad to be disabled at Graysville.
7th Infantry to detrain in gap just west of Dal-
ton and march via Trickum to gap one mile west of
that place and support the cavalry.
Field train to Dalton, moving rapidly.
Other trains to Phelps.
Division headquarters to Blue Mountain by 11 a.m.
NOTE: General A believes the report from La-
fayette means only hostile reconnaissance in that di-
rection, but should the enemy move on that place in
force General A will be well pleased.
47
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 7
Part I
General Situation:
As given in Map Problem No. 8, 1st Series, De-
partment of Military Art, Army Staff College, 1909-10.
Special Situation - Red:
As given in Map Problem No. 10 and following,
above series. Main base of Reds is at Nashville.
Requirements:
1st. Estimate of the sanitary situation existing
in the Red force at 4 p.m., April 18th.
2d. Recommendations of the Chief Surgeon, Red
force, based on the above.
3d. Estimate of the sanitary situation, Red force,
presumably existing at daylight, April 19th.
4th. Estimate of the sanitary situation presuma-
bly existing at noon, April 19th.
(Note: Use Ringgold Sheet of U. S. Geological Survey
Map of Georgia.)
Approved Solution and Explanation.
1st Requirement:
An indecisive engagement has been fought. The
secondary attack of the Reds was repulsed, but the
counter attack of the Blues was also checked on the
participation of the Red general reserve.
The general mission of General M is the offen-
sive. The enemy is, for the present, inferior in
49
-50--
strength, but this condition may be only temporary.
It is necessary therefore for General M to act quickly,
and to this end he will, if necessary, subordinate the
interests of the wounded. In making dispositions of
his present casualties, he must take into consideration
not only his own contemplated movements, but also
possible future action by the enemy.
On determining to make tomorrow the flank
movement revealed in the solution of Map Problem
No. 10, General M at once fully informs his Chief
Surgeon of his intentions; he realizes that while this
information makes no difference in the actual sani-
tary situation on the battlefield which now presents
itself to the Chief Surgeon, it will very materially af-
fect the time, and therefore the manner and means,
in which the situation must be met.
S
The roads are given as good and the weather as
fair and mild. This is highly favorable to sanitary
work. The almanac shows that the sun rises at 6:15
a.m. and sets at 6:35; dusk in that latitude and season
comes at about 7:15 p.m. As the attack was made
early and the fighting ceased about 3:30 p.m., the ac-
tion lasted about nine hours. As the moon does not
rise until nearly 3:00 a.m. of the night of April 18-19,
this fact will materially interfere with the removal of
wounded during the night.
The towns in the vicinity of the battlefield are
the little hamlet of Boynton with but fifty persons;
Mission Ridge, with a population so small as to be neg-
ligible; and Rossville, a village of two hundred per-
sons. None of these can be counted on for supplies.
It is true that their buildings offer a certain amount
of shelter; but Boynton is now within the zone of fire
and wounded able to reach Mission Ridge or Rossville
would preferably be at once loaded on railroad cars
there for removal to the far better conditions and con-
veniences a few miles further to the rear. These lat-
-51-
M
ler places have thus no sanitary importance except as
entraining points for wounded. Mission Ridge is six
and a half miles from Boynton and nearest the bulk
of the wounded; Rossville is seven miles from Boyn-
ton over a less level road; but Rossville will also prob-
ably receive some wounded from the north end of
the battlefield returning by the Ringgold-Rossville
road. There is thus no advantage to be gained by
selecting one of these equally accessible points, and
in fact undesirable congestion might thereby be pro-
duced. Possible congestion of the road ought always
to be avoided, especially with a moonless night.
Both Mission Ridge and Rossville will therefore be
desirable as points for entraining wounded. The field
train being at Mission Ridge and the supply and am-
mution trains being at Rossville ensures these points
being in telegraphic and telephonic communication
both with the battlefield and Chattanooga.
The large city of Chattanooga, the Red advanced
base, is distant only eleven miles from Boynton and
four or six from Rossville and Mission Ridge respec-
tively. The base at Nashville is about one hundred·
and fifty miles distant. However, this is of no spe-
cial importance in the present situation. The Chief
Surgeon of the Reds must get the wounded taken off
his hands in the shortest time and at the nearest
points; he has no concern as to the further destina-
tion of the wounded, once he has turned them over to
the sanitary service of the line of communications.
The railroad from Mission Ridge and Rossville
north is in working order, with sidings, and there is
plenty of rolling stock in Chattanooga.
As an integral part of the general sanitary situ-
ation, conditions at the base and on the line of com-
munications have to be considered, for no large force
could safely undertake an advance against an enemy
until proper sanitary organization and measures had
-52
been perfected for the service of the rear. It is
therefore to be assumed that:
1. A base hospital has been established at
Nashville.
2. A hospital train, equipped for two hundred
patients, is operating between Nashville and the front.
3. An evacuation hospital has been established
at Chattanooga, the advance base.
4. In anticipation of the forward movement, an
evacuation hospital, complete, is in readiness in Chat-
tanooga with its equipment packed to be loaded on
trains or wagons at short notice.
5. An advance sanitary supply depot is located
at Chattanooga. It has been notified to have a supply
of dressings, bandages, hospital stores, anaesthetics,
stimulants and similar articles equal to one-third the
allowance for the division packed in readiness for
shipment to the zone of hostilties.
6. A transport column has been organized. It
has followed the division to Rossville, where it now
awaits orders.
7. The Red Cross Society has been notified that
its services would be accepted at Chattanooga, Nash-
ville and intermediate points.
The situation on or near the battlefield is probably
about as follows:
At 4 p.m. the four Ambulance Companies may be
assumed to be all at the front. A fifth, on the basis
of the 4th Brigade, may or may not be assumed to be
present. Probably the latter would be the case.
Their normal zone of activity in such a situation as
this is well in advance of the Field Hospitals. Bearer
Sections of the Ambulance Companies, with pack
outfits, have followed the Red deployment, probably
establishing dressing stations along the sheltered
slope of the ridge running north and south through
Boynton. This would bring them within about half
-53-
a mile of the Red line of entrenchments. As the hills
rise rather abruptly several hundred feet high, these
stations are amply protected against danger from
overshots. The detail of the map is not sufficient to
indicate the probable exact location of these points
nor does it show trails which very likely exist. After
9 hours fighting, it is certain that at least three of
these companies would be in operation and probably
all of them. By this time, not only the areas of losses
would be determined, but an estimate of their num-
ber would be possible. Each Dressing Station would
have its prescribed sector in rendering assistance.
One would unquesionably be located at the nearest
sheltered point west of Boynton and near the road,
the others at sheltered points to the north and south
accessible to wounded from the field and if possible
to ambulances from the rear. Water is probably
available for Dressing Stations or Hospitals at many
more places than are indicated on the map. Some of
the ambulances are already working between the
Dressing Stations and Field Hospital No. 1, roads be-
ing opened across country by the engineers if impor-
tant and not too difficult. The agreement on a truce
implies the hasty breaking up of a couple of these
Dressing Stations further from Boynton and their re-
establishment until sunset between the lines in Pea-
vine Creek Valley and near the Boynton-Ringgold
road. Another would probably go in about a mile
north of the two just mentioned and remain until
sunset.
The natural lines of evacuation of wounded able
to walk from the battlefield in Peavine Valley are
along the Ringgold-Boynton and Ringgold-Rossville
roads. Stations for slightly wounded are habitually
located along such natural lines of movement. In
this instance two such stations would undoubtedly
have been established early in the battle. They
1
—54—
would have been located just east of the two cross-
ings over West Chickamauga Creek on the two roads
above mentioned, as all slightly wounded, stragglers
and skulkers would have to converge on these points,
where they would be detained, sorted out, attended
to, and continued to the rear or returned to the front.
The sanitary personnel for the former point would
come from the Field Hospital nearby; that for the
latter from a regiment on the left of the line. De-
tachments from the Provost Guard or battlefield
police would be posted at these points to enforce the
return of skulkers. Wounded would begin to move
through these stations early. As distances to en-
training points are short, rest stations are not needed.
Of the Field Hospitals, three are stated to be
"close" and are probably on the Mission Ridge-
Boynton road in the vicinity of West Chickamauga
Creek. During the day Field Hospital No. 1 has
opened up, probably just west of the crossing over
the creek mentioned. About the time that the
attack ceases at 3:30, Field Hospital No. 2 is seen to
be needed and is brought forward and established at
the nearest practicable point west of Boynton Gap
and under protection of the hills. At 4 p.m., when
the truce is declared, Field Hospital No. 3 is ordered
forward to the vicinity of the second and establishes
itself. This last hospital need set up only a part of
its tentage, practically thus becoming a more elabor-
ate Dressing Station. Field Hospital No. 4 has prob-
ably been back with the Field Train; at 4 p.m. it is
directed to empty its wagons, leave a small guard
over its property and come forward with its transpor-
tation and remaining personnel for duty to assist in
one of the hospitals near Boynton Gap.
The agreement on a temporary truce at 4 p. m.,
covering the ground between the lines, in one way
greatly relieves the general sanitary problem; in
55-
M
another way it creates a special situation the require-
ments of which are of immediate paramount impor-
tance, since during its relatively brief duration all
wounded between the lines must be removed, for if hos-
tilities are renewed they cannot again be safely reach-
ed. The duration of the truce is not given, but it may
be assumed to be until dusk. Further extension of ·
time would not greatly help the cause of humanity,
as the moon does not rise until a few hours before
daybreak, nor would it suit the plans of General M
to have it continue longer in view of his contemplated
turning movement. About three hours are there-
fore available in which to collect and remove wounded
from between the lines, and this implies the concen-
tration within this zone of all available sanitary
transportation, with any additional assistance neces-
sary from the fighting force. The factor of time
limit predominates, and removal takes precedence
over all but the simplest dressing necessary to pre-
vent infection, stop bleeding and prevent further
injury. Wounded are therefore not evacuated di-
rectly to the rear at this time but to suitable protec-
tion as near as possible to, but out of the actual zone
of, hostilities, where they can be more carefully
attended to after the field is cleared between the
lines and from whence they can conveniently at any
time be moved along the line of evacuation further
to the rear. Such points especially are the various
relief establishments located just west of the Boynton
Gap and protected by its slopes. The great majority
of wounded will concentrate here. During the night,
the houses at Boynton might be used for shelter by
the Dressing Stations withdrawn from between the
lines after cessation of the truce. They would be in
little danger of fire during the night and by day-
break they could be evacuated as having practically
served their purpose.
-56—
During the truce, each side will probably collect
only the practical equivalent of its own dead and
wounded. The Red loss is scattered along a front of
about two miles in Peavine Valley; but as the hardest
fighting occurred opposite the right of the Red posi-
tion it is safe. to assume that about 65 per cent of
the total loss occurred there. On the right, too,
the wounded probably lie further to the front.
From the nature of the fight, the area of distribution
here must extend nearly across the valley. How-
ever, this zone is almost all within of a mile of
Boynton Gap, and the road facilitates collection and
removal.
As the battle is over, at least temporarily, the
Chief Surgeon disregards regimental sanitary work
except as a part of the general situation and scheme
for relief, collection and removal in which all resources
are employed.
The Reds have a full division plus two regiments
present. The casualty loss of 1,200 or about 6 per
cent, falls most heavily on the 1st and 4th Brigades,
now reorganizing west of Boynton.
The situation in respect to casualties is then
about as follows:
Total for
Action
1,200
240
96
144
96
Casualties
Dead, 20%
Desperately wounded, 8%
Can walk to railroad readily, 12%
Can walk to railroad with difficulty, 8%
Must ride, sitting, distances beyond
say three miles, 20%
Must ridə, sitting, any distance, 20%
Must ride, recumbent, any dist., 12%
Totals
240
240
144
1200
Number near
Boynton
800
160
64
96
A
3
64
1
160
160
96
800
For litter purposes, all wounded who are forced
to ride under all conditions, whether sitting or lying,
should obviously be classed as recumbent.
It may be assumed that those on the right flank
-57-
--
3
who can walk will, after dressing, be able to walk to
Boynton (distance from limits of greatest casualty
about 2 mile) and that others can walk to some point
in the rear of the trenches (not more than ½ mile):
This means that transportation during the truce will
not have to be considered in clearing between the
lines for the following:
Total for
Action
144
Able to walk to advance base, 12%
Able to walk to Dressing Station and
Field Hospital (or three miles) 28% 336
480
Number near
Boynton
96
224
320
The dead, of whom there is a total of 240, with
160 on the right flank, are removed in any convenient
way. There remain to be transported a total of 480
for the entire action, with 320 of these on the right
flank. Perhaps two-thirds of these are between the
lines, requiring removal over short distances during
the truce of a total of 320 and something over 200 on
the right flank. These numbers include the desper-
ately wounded usually allowed to remain near where
they fall; but if left here untended on a fire-swept
zone they will surely die while with careful removal
by litter to shelter a chance of life may remain.
From Boynton, the average distance of carriage over
zone of greatest loss is perhaps a mile and the ter-
rain does not appear difficult. Probably the average
round trip for litters would take about an hour; for
ambulances, about half that time, There are 160
litters with the three ambulance companies working
in this vicinity, together with the 1st and 4th (Separ-
rate) Brigades. With the 2d and 3d Brigades there
are 140 litters, considering also one Ambulance Com-
pany in their vicinity. From these deductions for
loss or absence must be made. Moreover after the
first trip it is difficult to get litters returned to the
front, for the tendency is to retain them as cots for
the wounded brought in upon them.
-—-—_58-—-—--
There are at this time 48 ambulances concentrat
ing on the zone east of Boynton Gap, where the truce
permits their use and terrain seems not unfavorable.
Ability to use wheel transportation here will very
materially reduce the time and labor of collection and
removal. While the litter bearer and first aid sec-
tions of the Ambulance Companies can begin work
under the new conditions in a few minutes, it will
probably be half an hour before the dressing station
parties and ambulances are able to begin their respec-
tive work. Between the lines on the right flank
there are something over two hundred cases requir-
ing transportation, practically all recumbent. One
trip of half the litters and half the ambulances avail-
able here would be able to remove them all behind
the lines, and including time spent in delays at Dress-
ing Stations, this part of the field should be cleared in
about two-thirds the time available under the truce.
21
In the meantime the 2d and 3d Brigades have
collected the wounded on their fronts, the regimental
sanitary personnel and Ambulance Companies have
dressed them, and the litter men and 24 ambulances
have completed the evacuation between the lines in
this other part of the field. The estimate thus is that
the zone between the lines should be cleared well
within the limit of time which the truce imposes.
During this period all work of transportation behind
the Field Hospitals, except what can be done by
wagons, is suspended.
Having removed the wounded from between the
lines, movement toward the Field Hospitals, and
Dressing Stations again established in rear of the
lines, is resumed. Now also must be considered the
further removal of those hit between the lines whose
strength enabled them only to walk to the rear of the
trenches and the helpless whose evacuation the vol-
ume of fire has not previously permitted. Second trips
59–
by the ambulances will materially assist in this work.
At the time of expiration of the truce, all the
wounded should be removed from the field and danger
of fire, and most of them arrived at the establish-
ment near and to the west of Boynton Gap. It is
about as near to evacuate the left flank through
Boynton to Mission Ridge as over the Ringgold-Ross-
ville road to Rossville, though less severely wounded
might preferably go by the latter route to reduce
congestion. The above estimate errs on the side of
liberality, in that a certain number of wounded would
have been dressed and evacuated before 4:00 p. m.;
as an offset, the sanitary service in its first fight need
scarcely be expected to work smoothly.
With the clearing of the zone between the lines.
and the expiration of the truce, the sanitary situation.
changes. The problem then will be to get the wound-
ed, who have been collected at convenient points,
properly dressed and back to the railroad, where tel-
egraphic orders have long since caused trains to be
in readiness, with a personnel from the line of com-
munications to load and take over the wounded. And
this evacuation must be hastened, else the already
congested sanitary establishments may find themselves
overwhelmed.
As twenty per cent are dead, and eight per cent
cannot be moved further than from between the lines
and twelve per cent can walk back, there remain
sixty per cent of the total casualties requiring trans-
portation to the railroad, or a total of about seven
hundred and twenty-five wounded. Two-thirds of
these are just west of Boynton, and perhaps two
hundred and fifty of them will need to be transfer-
red lying down, since the force suffered severely
from artillery fire with its greater lacerating and
shocking effect. The distance, too, is considerable.
This would be no great number to handle under the
-60–
7:
+
conditions, however, provided that the time factor is
not unduly small. But the problem becomes very
serious under the present necessity of accomplishing
evacuation without such undue fatigue of the sanita-
ry personnel and animals as to unfit them to partici-
pate in the vigorous military movement which the
Chief Surgeon has been informed is planned for tomor-
row. In addition to the above day's work, and with
an exhausting movement tomorrow to consider, one
round trip of the ambulances is all that seems practi-
cable tonight, thus allowing men and animals to get
four or five hours' rest.
The Chief Surgeon therefore plans as follows:
While ambulances and litters are all engaged in
removing wounded from between the lines, he will
load and dispatch the twenty-four wagons of Field
Hospitals Nos. 1, 2 and 3, loading five less severely
wounded per wagon and thus removing one hundred
and twenty. The eight wagons of Field Hospital No. 4,
which comes up about 6:00 p.m., are immediately sent
back with forty more. The transport column which
arrives about the same time will remove forty eight
recumbent and twelve sitting cases. The necessity of
resupply probably empties the two wagon companies
of the ammunition train, stated to be at the front. But
one of these companies has artillery ammunition,
which is carried only in caissons, and the latter are
of so little utility in transporting wounded as prac-
tically to be negligible. If the twenty-seven wagons
of the small arms ammunition company can be secur-
ed, they would remove one hundred and thirty-five
wounded. After sunset, the forty-eight ambulances
of the four ambulance companies will be free to ope-
rate back of the Field Hospitals, and convey at one
trip one hundred and ninety-two recumbent and forty-
eight sitting. This plan provides for the evacuation
of two hundred and forty recumbents and three hun-
-
-61-
dred and fifty-sitting. But it may be that the ammu-
nition wagons will not be available. However, the
field train is coming up and twelve of its wagons will
be emptied of rations and available to send back at
. once with sixty wounded. The other wagons will re-
main until daylight and then return with their loads,
so that they need scarcely be considered in connection
with transportion of wounded. The commander at
Rossville will be requested to forward twenty-five
civilian wagons, whose capacity may be averaged at
three sitting patients per vehicle, or a total of seventy-
five. This tentative plan would evacuate a total of
two hundred and forty recumbents and four hundred
and ninety sitting patients at one trip, or about
enough to meet the situation. But if the Chief Sur-
geon fails, for any reason, to secure either the ammu-
nition wagon company, or the civilian vehicles, an
extra trip of the trains of one or more ambulance
companies will be necessary.
If General M approves this plan of evacuation
to the railroad, the situation now resolves itself into
the collection, dressing and temporary care of some
nine hundred and fifty wounded of all classes divided
among three Field Hospitals, four dressing stations
and two stations for slightly wounded. All the sani-
tary resources, except one Field Hospital, of the divi-
sion, are available and concentrated; the personnel of
four ambulance companies and four Field Hospitals,
less drivers and ambulance attendants, supplemented
if thought necessary by half the medical officers and
Hospital Corps men attached to fighting units, would
give about seventy medical officers and six hundred
men, or a total of over two-thirds as many as there
are wounded. Much of the litter work will be done
by details, The Chief Surgeon therefore need have
little fear but that the wounded can be fed, cared for
and dressed in the various relief establishments about
ww
-
-62-
ás rapidly as the transportation can take them away,
and that by midnight practically all wounded except
the ninety or so unable to travel will be off his hands
and his subordinates able to get a little rest.
As to conditions in the rear, the Chief Surgeon
does not concern himself. Sufficient hospital facili-
ties must have long since been provided for the cam-
paign, and as the Reds took the offensive the immi-
nence of battle was known several days in advance.
Hence any special facilities in the rear and necessary
transportation must have by this time been provided
as already outlined. Telegrams giving the number of
wounded and the probable hours of their arrival at
Mission Ridge and Rossville should be all that is nec-
essary to insure the presence in due time of the pro-
per railroad transportation at those points.
As to the disposal of the two hundred and fifty
dead, whose bodies will be collected during the truce,
it will be no great task to bury them. As the work
will not be done by the sanitary personnel, the only
direct concern of the Chief Surgeon is that it shall be
done in a sanitary way and with the preparation of
the required medical records. He charges the Sani-
tary Inspector with the oversight of this work.
2d Requirement:
The recommendations of the Red Chief Surgeon
to Major General M must depend upon the foregoing,
They would include the following points:
1. That during the truce, brigade commanders
of the 2d and 3d Brigades police their fronts.
2. That during the truce, the brigade command-
ers of the 1st and 4th Brigades each send all available
medical officers, Hospital Corps men, litters, and a
battalion without arms, without delay, to report at
the east end of Boynton Gap to police the battlefield
and care for the wounded.
3. That a suitable force be charged with the bu-
63—
rial of the dead in a place and manner to be approved
by the Chief Surgeon.
4. That the location of the several Field Hospit-
als and dressing stations, as already outlined in the
above consideration of the situation, be approved.
In this connection it goes without saying that the
Chief Surgeon would give the necessary directions to
the sanitary personnel directly under his own juris-
diction.
5. That Mission Ridge and Rossville be designa-
ted as entraining points for wounded.
6. That ambulance trains evacuate to Mission
Ridge, and then rejoin their organizations.
7. That the transport wagons of the Field Hos-
pitals also evacuate to Mission Ridge; the transportation
for the Field Hospital there remaining and the others
rejoining their organizations at the front.
8. That any empty ammunition wagons report to
the Director of Ambulance Companies at the west of
Boynton Gap to carry wounded to Rossville.
9. That all empty wagons of the field train re-
port to the Director of Ambulance Companies at
Boynton Gap to convey wounded to Rossville.
10. That the commanding officer at Rossville be
ordered to collect and send forward to Boynton Gap,
all available civilian transportation, up to twenty-five
wagons.
11. That the transport column proceed from
Rossville without delay and report to the Director of
Ambulance Companies at Boynton Gap to evacuate
wounded to Rossville.
12. That the hospital train be ordered to pro-
ceed at once to Mission Ridge to receive wounded.
13. That the Commanding General, line of com-
munications, be notified that suitable railroad trans-
portation will be required for about one thousand
mixed wounded, of whom three-fourths will arrive at
—64—
the railroad after 9:00 p.m. and be about equally di-
vided between Mission Ridge and Rossville.
14. That a Red Cross section, with equipment,
proceed at once from Chattanooga to Rossville, and
another to Mission Ridge, to assist in the care of
wounded to be evacuated through those points.
15. That one section of the evacuation hospital
now packed, with personnel, be sent to Mission Ridge
by rail and thence by wagon to Boynton Gap, report-
ing to the Director of Field Hospitals not later than
daylight tomorrow.
16. That a car containing the additional sanitary
supplies, now packed at the medical supply depot in
Chattanooga, be forwarded to Mission Ridge without
delay.
17. That the reserve sanitary supply wagons of
the division advance to the west end of Boynton Gap,
issue supplies up to daylight and then return at once
to Mission Ridge for replenishment. That all com-
manding officers be ordered to procure therefrom, by
midnight, any first aid packets or other supplies
needed to replenish the equipment of their troops.
3d Requirement:
Daylight of April 19th finds all wounded, who are
in condition to be moved, en route to the base. All
severely wounded Reds have been concentrated in
Field Hospital No. 2 just west of Boynton Gap. This
hospital is now being taken over by the personnel of
the evacuation hospital section. just arrived, who are,
on their part, turning over supplies from their own.
hospital equipment sufficient to newly outfit another
Field Hospital for the personnel they have replaced.
The evacuation hospital section is also receiving an
exceptionally high per cent of sick transferred from
the command, resulting from the vicissitudes of
the previous day. If a total of one per cent are
incapacitated for service, two hundred sick are thus
-65—
transferred to the evacuation hospital. Most are sit-
ting cases and can be removed to the railroad with
two trips of the transport column, or before evening.
Field Hospital No. 3 west of Boynton, likewise
No. 1 put into operation earlier near West Chicka-
mauga creek, is being broken up and repacked in the
wagons. The personnel of Field Hospital No. 4 left at
Mission Ridge is marching back to rejoin its trans-
portation and equipment after a few hours rest.
Field Hospitals Nos. 1, 3 and 4 will join the field train,
marching at its head. Field Hospital No. 2 left
behind will be at once available should the Red en-
trenchments be attacked. It will remain, complete,
attached to the 3d Brigade. Should the latter follow,
it will accompany it.
Only fifteen wagons of the ammunition wagon
company were emptied by resupply, and but twelve
civilian vehicles came up from Rossville. They re-
moved, between them, one hundred and thirty pa-
tients. To take the remaining eighty, nine ambu-
lances of Ambulance Company No. 3 had therefore
been ordered to make a second trip.
All four ambulance companies are resupplied,
packed up and available for service. No. 1, less
ambulances, will start at once to follow the leading
brigade of General M's force and Nos. 2 and 4, with
the ambulances of all three, will follow his main col-
umn. Ambulance Company No. 3, complete, must
remain with the 3d Brigade, to meet possible emer-
gencies. Meanwhile it will rest its transportation
and send out searching parties as may be practicable
to finally verify the search for wounded made the
previous night.
The transport column arrived about 6:00 p.m. the
previous night. All wounded able to be moved have
been sent to the railroad. The wagons of reserve
sanitary supplies have come up, issued supplies and
-66—–—–
are returning to Mission Ridge to replenish. The
regular hospital train has made two trips, and an im-
provised train has assisted in this work. The Hos-
pital Train is now about to start for Nashville with the
last load.
•
ligh
The chief surgeon of the Reds informs the Chief
Surgeon, Line of Communications, that the latter
will have to consider the possibility of caring for an
indefinite number of Blue wounded in case the turn-
ing movement now beginning forces the Blues to fall
back. He knows that the enemy lost heavily the
day before; he knows that the hostile wounded will
probably be evacuated as rapidly as possible; what
he does not know is what facilities the enemy pos-
sesses for such evacuation between the field and his
base.
4th Requirement:
The sanitary situation on the field at noon on
April 19th, irrespective of any orders given the Red
3d Brigade, as a result of the situation now developed
among the Blues, resolves itself into an evacuation
hospital section more than half full of severely
wounded Reds-20 per cent having died during the
night-and containing many sick, while the precipi-
tate withdrawal of the Blues leaves part of a Blue
field hospital back of their trenches containing a
similar number of severely wounded, the care of
which must be taken over by the Reds under the
Geneva Convention. The latter hospital will proba-
bly need to be considerably supplemented for efficient
service by transfer of both men and material, and
any Blue wounded housed in Ringgold will require
supervision, assistance and supplies from the sanitary
service of the Red line of communications.
In the service of the rear, certain changes now
become necessary. Since the trains are now
ordered to Eagle Cliff and Crawfish Spring, it may
-67—
be assumed that a new line of communication has
been established with Chattanooga via these points.
The sanitary service of the line of communications
will be rearranged accordingly. In anticipation of
another action, the hospital train is switching to the
new railroad line and sanitary supplies and two
sections of an evacuation hospital are loaded on cars
in readiness to move to Crawfish Spring, or other
required point.
The transport column will move to Crawfish
Spring as soon as it completes its present work; the
Chief Surgeon, Line of Communications, reinforcing
it with additional transportation, military or civilian.
A Red Cross Section will come up to assist in the
work at the evacuation hospital section left west of
Boynton. In anticipation of another engagement,
the evacuation hospital at Chattanooga will be cleared
or expanded.
Comment:
This problem presents special illustration of the
following points:
(1) The absolute necessity, from the standpoint
of military efficiency, as well as humanitarianism,
that the chief surgeon shall be at all times un-
reservedly in the confidence of his commander, know
the plans and purposes of the latter and be kept in-
formed as to the possible tactical movements by the
enemy.
Without such confidential knowledge the chief
surgeon in this problem could not properly comply
with the 1st and 2d Requirements.
(2) The fact that a truce for the purpose of
collecting wounded at once introduces a special fea-
ture which during its continuance dominates the
entire general sanitary situation. It usually implies
the need for free recourse to the assistance of the
-68-
men and transportation of the fighting troops in
order that the desired result may be attained.
Correspondence School for Medical Officers
The Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Series of 1910
Problem No. 7
Part II
General Situation:
As given in Map Problem No. 8, first series, De-
partment of Military Art, Army Staff College,
1909-10.
Special Situation - Blue:
As given in Map Problems No. 8, 9 and 11, above
series.
Requirements:
1st. Estimate the sanitary situation existing in
the Blue force at 4 p.m. April 18th.
2d. Formulate a plan for the clearing of the
battlefield, and calculate the time thus required with
the Blue force.
3d.
Estimate the sanitary situation existing in
the Blue force at 9:00 a.m., April 19th, and outline
the disposition of the sanitary units and wounded
thereon.
(Note: Use Ringgold Sheet of U. S. Geological Survey
Map of Georgia.)
AN APPROVED SOLUTION AND EXPLANATION
1st Requirement:
An indecisive action, lasting about nine hours,
has been fought. While repulsing the enemy, the
Blues have themselves been checked with heavy loss.
Being inferior in force, the mission of the Blues must
largely be the defensive until reinforcements can
come up.
69
-70-
gl
The presumption is thus made that General A
will not himself attack tomorrow; instead, he will
very likely have to sustain an attack or be flanked
out of his position by the Reds. As he will merely
follow the lead of the enemy, he has no plan. All
the information he can therefore give his Chief Sur-
geon is that it is reasonable to anticipate that there
will be no further move on either side until daylight.
However, it is equally reasonable to assume that some
move will be made after that time. The general sit-
uation is clear enough in any case to make it highly
important that all wounded possible shall be out of
the way at daybreak, so that the Blue command may
be in the best condition to meet any contingency.
This introduces a time factor which dominates the
general sanitary situation. The Chief Surgeon must
not only clear the field but he must clear it quickly;
in addition he ought to clear it in such a way as not to
unfit his sanitary personnel for further probable ser-
vice tomorrow.
Conditions of season, weather and roads are as
have been described in the previous, and companion,
problem.
The map shows that the town of Ringgold, at
railhead, is by far the most suitable point for the en-
training of the Blue wounded. Besides its suitabil-
ity for this purpose, it is well located for receiving
wounded from all parts of the battlefield, being at
the intersection of two roads traversing each flank
and about three miles distant from the latter. Its
population is given at 437, whence it may be inferred
that it contains a fair number of large dwellings,
school houses, barns, etc., suitable for temporary hos-
pital purposes, together with water, fuel, hay and
other conveniences. The railroad affords a ready
means of evacuating wounded as rapidly as the latter
could be placed in condition for the trip. The ad-
-71-
vance base at Dalton is about fourteen miles from
Ringgold. As the Reds have taken the aggressive
and the Blues are still numerically inferior, Dalton
stands in some danger of attack and capture. Under
present conditions therefore, the military preference
would be to evacuate wounded on the main base-
Atlanta. From a humanitarian standpoint it makes
little difference whether two or three hours is added
to a railroad trip after wounded are once loaded on
the cars.
Inasmuch as by the terms of the problem the or-
ganization of the Blues had not progressed as far as
that of the Reds-half the divisional sanitary service
of the front not being yet organized-it is fair to as-
sume that the sanitary services of the rear is equal-
ly in a state of relative unpreparedness.
However, the following advance preparations
have probably been made:
1. A base hospital has been partly organized
and equipped in Atlanta, and by the use of the exist-
ing civil hospitals in that city together with recourse
to assistance from civilian physicians and a more or
less trained nursing body collected in response to a
call for temporary sanitary assistance by the Blue
War Department, it is quite probable that any wound-
ed reaching Atlanta will be efficiently cared for.
2. A sanitary supply depot with such supplies
as have been obtained is located in Atlanta. The
troops at the front have probably been directly sup-
plied from this point.
3. A hospital train of tourist sleepers and pas-
senger coaches is being organized. A freight car
has been loaded with litter supports and litters, to be
used in improvising hospital cars from freight and
baggage cars.
4. The Red Cross is prepared to furnish an in-
complete line of supplies and some practically untrain-
ed and unorganized assistance.
-72-
L
No evacuation hospitals or transport columns.
have probably been organized, since the quota of
ambulance companies and field hospitals for the troops
at the front-which should be given prior considera-
tion are as yet incomplete. Facilities for the care
of any considerable number of sick and wounded at
Dalton are therefore lacking.
With respect to conditions on the field, part of
the Blue dead and wounded at this time lie in the
trenches, but as most of the casualties occurred in
the counter attack, by far the greater number of
such wounded lie between the lines in the vicinity of
the Ringgold-Boynton road. As the counter attack
was probably not pushed far to the front, wounded
very likely do not lie much to the west of the center
of the valley. It is impossible to state what propor-
tion of the Blue losses occurred in this disastrous
counter charge; but as the troops had previously had
the protection of trenches it may be that as much as
seventy per cent of the total loss occurred during the
counter attack.
b
As the Blues had choice of position and time for
preparation, evacuation of wounded has probably
been possible to a limited extent during the fight,
prior to the counter attack. But in a general way
the nature of the terrain does not encourage such a
movement during the fight. The 1000-foot hill to
the rear of the trenches opposes a natural obstacle.
The road on its west slope is open to Red artillery
fire, and while individuals and small groups might
pass over it, ambulance and wagon trains could
scarcely do so. The gap half a mile to the south of
the Ringgold-Boynton road might enable some
wounded to be withdrawn from the valley. But in
general, up to the time of the declaration of the truce,
the sanitary assistance given must have been largely
in the form of regimental first aid.
--73-
S
The truce which is declared at 4 p.m. probably
lasts until sunset or about three hours. It greatly
facilitates the clearing of the battlefield as a whole,
but at the same time it requires the special sanitary
situation between the lines to take precedence over
the general situation. The wounded between the
lines must be removed to a position of comparative
safety and easy approach within a limited period of
time. The first place of this nature is on the east
slope of the 1000-foot hill, but wounded able to be
brought thus far in vehicles should preferably con-
tinue the additional two miles-in time, about half an
hour-which will bring them to railhead, shelter,
care and comfort.
The Blue casualties are given as 1100. This is
nearly as many as in the Reds, who had twice as
many ambulance companies and Field Hospitals to
meet the needs of their own situation. The Blues
have but two ambulance companies and two Field
Hospitals on the ground; and it might be thought
that a battlefield situation already shown by no means
easy for the completely organized Reds would prove
almost impossible of proper solution by the Blues,
with only a fraction of their proper sanitary quota.
But the Blue Chief Surgeon appreciates that the fac-
tor of distance is of fundamental importance in
evacuation; glancing at the map, he sees that the
fortunate local advantage of shorter haul of wounded
to railhead in this case materially compensates for
the general disadvantage of relative deficiency of
transportation. Not only can more trips be made in
the same length of time but relatively fewer will
need to be transported at all. Many will have the
strength to walk three miles to Ringgold who never
would have the strength to go twice that distance,
or as far as from Boynton to Mission Ridge.
By working wheeled transportation between the
-74-
lines during the truce, it will not be necessary to
carry wounded far by litter. This will imply a ma-
terial saving over the time and labor otherwise re-
quired for collection. In many instances, the place
where the wounded man lies will be his loading
point. The Blue Chief Surgeon has plenty of litters
for the work to be done, and will be able to get all
the personnel necessary to handle them.
If about seventy per cent of all the casualties.
have occurred on the left of the Blue line, there will
be some 775 dead and wounded here. Of these,
probably thirty five per cent, or say about 275 slight-
ly wounded would have been able to return as far as
the trenches with their repulsed commands or subse-
quently. Practically all these are able to continue
back to Ringgold. Some 150 dead and sixty desper-
ately wounded must now be conveyed out of the fire
zone to suitable near points back of the trench lines.
Some 285 severely wounded requiring transportation
also still remain on this part of the field, and of these
some 100 must be sent back recumbent while some
200 can sit up. Hasty calculation shows the Chief
Surgeon at once that the transportation of his two
ambulance companies is not adequate to meet the
needs of the situation under the existing conditions
of time and distance. He can clear this part of the
field in two vehicle trips within the time allowed,
but some thirty per cent of his total casualties,
scattered in the trenches and over much greater dis-
tance in other parts of the field, would still remain
unmoved. Supplementing the official ambulance
transportation from some other source or sources
therefore becomes imperative. He has wagons in his
Field Hospitals and ambulance companies which he
will unload and use. Other possible temporary
sources of transportation are found in the ammuni-
tion wagons, field train, supply column and the civ-
ilian teams available in Ringgold.
7
-75—
One railroad is in operation to the rear. Ás
troops and supplies have recently been brought up, a
considerable number of freight cars are presumably
at Ringgold. More will by this time undoubtedly be
well on their way up from the rear, with the car con-
taining litters and litter supports, and with extra
sanitary supplies, in response to estimates of Blue
losses already telegraphed. The improvised hospital
train has probably arrived and been standing since
noon, but the bulk of the railway transportation will be
required from 6 p.m. to about midnight or after. The
provision of the necessary sanitary personnel to take
charge of these trains is no concern of the Chief
Surgeon of the Blues, but is part of the function of
the line of communications service. Under the pres-
ent conditions, it will probably be temporarily drawn
from that of the base hospital supplemented by civil-
ian assistance.
As to the location of the sanitary relief stations,
the occupancy of well prepared trenches probably
allows the provision of relatively efficient regimental
first aid. At the the time of the truce, most of the
wounded remaining in the trenches should have been
dressed and in condition for removal.
The map does not give sufficient detail to indicate
the exact location of the stations of the ambulance
companies. This would have to be determined on
the ground. It may have been possible to put a
dressing station somewhere near the Ringgold-
Boynton road on the west slope of the 1000-foot hill.
If so, the helpless wounded would have to be littered
back half a mile to an ambulance station established
on the east slope, for ambulances cannot work west
of the Chickamauga hills until the truce is declared
or darkness comes on. This littering, under the con-
ditions, would have been slow and very arduous
work. The ambulance company commander will not
-76-
?
have let his men do much if any of this work, as it is
rapidly exhausting and would soon unfit them for
handling the main sanitary emergency which later is
found between the lines. If a dressing station is lo-
cated here, wounded would be helped by the bearer
section back to it but not back of it-practically only
those who could walk could reach the ambulance sta-
tion. Such could probably continue on foot to Ring-
gold. If there proves to be no suitable location on
the west slope, the dressing station would have to go
in on the east slope on the road thus coinciding in
position with the ambulance station.
It is probable that Ambulance Company No. 1,
complete, reinforced by the bearer section and eight
ambulances of Company No. 2, would have taken po-
sitions as above outlined and so remained until the
truce. With the establishment of the truce, sanitary
men, material and transportation would be ordered to
move immediately to Peavine Valley, and temporarily
establish a dressing station between the lines near
the point of greatest Blue casualty.
The dressing party station of Company No. 2, with
bandsmen as bearers, would probably have been as-
signed to a protected point near the north end of the
1000-foot hill near the Ringgold-Rossville road, to
meet the needs of any wounded on the right of the
Red line. Four ambulances were assigned to work
with them.
At 4 p.m. the two field hospitals are in operation
in the town of Ringgold. One had been established
about noon, as the need became apparent. The other
had been held intact for emergency until 3:30 p.m.
when failure of the counter charge, and entrenching
by the Reds, indicated that existing conditions would
probably not be changed. Both were located in
buildings convenient to the railroad--neither had put
up any tentage that could be avoided. As the prime
-77-
sanitary necessity was for evacuation to the rear, their
function must obviously be chiefly that of forwarding
hospitals.
A station for slightly wounded had been estab-
lished at a suitable point near the railroad station in
Ringgold.
At 4 p.m. there is no hospital tentage on the
field. The chief surgeon, however, realizes that the
estimated number of casualties makes it certain that
some eighty or ninety extremely serious cases, quite
unfit even to make the short trip to Ringgold, will
have to be removed from between the lines and
temporarily cared for no great distance from the Blue
trenches. He therefore orders up a dozen tents and
sufficient personnel to care for these severe cases
from one of the field hospitals. He will locate these
tents in a protected place, if one can be found; if
not, he will put them under a Red Cross flag on a
conspicuous site not exposed to aimed fire on the
Blue trenches, so that the Reds may clearly see their
nature and respect them.
2d Requirement:
Any efficient plan for the policing of the battle-
field must depend upon a clear appreciation of the
sanitary situation.
On the declaration of truce, Ambulance Company
No. 1, with the bearer detachment from Ambulance
Company No. 2, immediately moves to the battlefield,
sends out its litter squads, and establishes a dressing
station at a point reachable by wagons and as near as
possible to the point of greatest Blue casualty. This
point would probably be near the Boynton - Ringgold
and Graysville-Lafayette cross-roads. A half mile
radius from this point would include the area of
greatest Blue losses. Its ambulances, as outlined
above, follow.
The former dressing station of Ambulance Com-
-78-
pany No. 2 is broken up, the dressing station party,
with bandsmen bearers, moves over into Peavine
Valley and re-establishes its station at the most de-
sirable point, probably about three-quarters of a mile
from station of Company No. 1, calling upon the
nearest Blue troops to furnish collecting parties and
litter transportation, in addition to that furnished by
regimental sanitary quotas, its quota of ambulances
accompanying it. Bearers from these two new
dressing stations will work toward each other and
get in touch.
With the above location of stations, the litter
distance in collecting wounded for either station is
practically never more than half a mile, and in large
part is less than this. Areas outside this maximum
radius would preferably be cleared of wounded by
loading them directly into ambulances and wagons.
The time limit requires that in this brief tem-
porary emergency, the sanitary personnel should
devote almost all its attention to bandaging, splinting
and stimulating the wounded. Together with the
band, a company without arms will therefore be
called for from each regiment as litter bearers, whose
actions will be directed by the regimental surgeons.
and Hospital Corps men under whose immediate
direction they will probably work. The latter will
do little but professional and technical work.
The distance of an average round trip for a litter
would be about three-fourths mile, and could certainly
be readily accomplished in three-quarters of an hour.
In the truce of three hours and over, an average of
four trips per litter could be made. The Chief Sur-
geon considers that there are immediately at hand,
on the field and in the trenches, twenty litters with
each ambulance company and each of the eight in-
fantry regiments, or a total of 200, not considering
those with the artillery or other troops. The four
-79-
trips of these litters which are possible during the
truce would collect 800 dead and helpless wounded;
the wagons and ambulances would collect many more
and no inconsiderable number of dressed wounded
are probably in the trenches awaiting opportunity
for removal. It thus appears that the Blue wounded
lying between the lines should certainly be collected
at suitable points before sunset.
The question as to whether the wounded so col-
lected can be surgically dressed within the time limit
must be determined. The ambulance companies and
infantry regiments which are here fortunately so
close have a total sanitary strength on paper of
forty-two medical officers and 351 enlisted men of
the Hospital Corps. All of these would of course
not be present on the other hand the truce and ex-
isting emergency would require and justify the tem-
porary detail on the main battlefield of nearly all the
sanitary personnel with artillery, cavalry and other
troops and organizations. The general nature of the
dressings here should be of a hasty, but practical
character. Such dressings will of course require
only a very few minutes. Severe bleeding, broken
bones, etc., require much longer attention. Some of
the wounded will have dressed their own hurts, or
have them bandaged by comrades. If there are now
at the outside a total of some 800 wounded requiring
attention, some 400 medical officers and Hospital
Corps men available, and a known time limit of about
three hours in which to work, it is evident that this
matter of sanitary relief should cause no great con-
cern to the chief surgeon.
The rather complicated question of the evacua-
tion of the wounded who have been collected and
dressed remains to be settled. We remember that
the general work of collection, dressing and removal
on the battlefield is synchronous.
-80
When the truce is declared, the twenty ambu-
lances assigned to the ambulance station just east of
the 1000-foot hill, on the Ringgold-Boynton road,
are ordered on the battlefield in Peavine Valley, co-
operating with the dressing station to be established
there. There are four others assigned to the dress-
ing station of Ambulance Company No. 2.
It re-
mains to be seen whether this total of twenty-four
ambulances will prove sufficient for their task under
the conditions of number, time, distance and terrain.
The chief surgeon estimates that there 1,100
casualties in all. An indefinite number of these have
already been attended to, but to be on the safe side
he will disregard that fact. Of the above, about 20
per cent, or about 225, are dead and will only be
littered or wagoned off the battlefield to the nearest
protected and available point east of the line of
trenches for further removal or disposal during the
night or subsequently; some 8 per cent, or about
eighty-five, ought not to be moved at all by reason of
desperate wounds, but necessity demands that they
be littered to some similarly located point as that for
the dead; some 35 per cent, or about 385, should be
able to walk the three miles back to Ringgold. There
remain 37 per cent, or about 400, to be considered for
removal to Ringgold and beyond, of which approxi-
mately 130 must be carried recumbent and 270 may
be carried sitting up.
The round trip distance is a little over seven miles
with one hill to cross. The time is daylight. Ambu-
lances would move as loaded without train formation
and might trot a little coming back. Deducting for
delays and time consumed in loading and unloading
the round trip would probably average, in this case,
two hours. The duration of the truce is about three
hours.
If the ambulances receive their first loads within
-81 —
half an hour after the truce is effective, they can dis-
charge them in Ringgold, return to the field and be
well started on the return to Ringgold by the time
the truce expires. The two trips of the ambulance
train could evacuate two hundred and forty sit-
ting and ninety-six recumbent, leaving about thirty-
five recumbent and thirty sitting cases for disposal.
One trip of the sixteen wagons of the two field hospi-
tals should readily dispose of these wounded and the
Chief Surgeon will have ordered these forward with-
out delay. Such wagons ordinarily should carry an
average of five mixed wounded each. Military nec-
essity might compel greater crowding and less favor-
able conditions than the present should imply less
crowding. To make good any unforeseen deficiency,
the ration wagons of the field trains can be used when
they come up and discharge their loads. There may
be empty ammunition wagons returning, and if nec-
essary some of the wagons of the supply train can be
emptied and sent forward for the purpose. The
Chief Surgeon thus has abundance of wheeled trans-
portation available. Through requests on the Chief
of Staff, he will draw on it sufficiently to be absolutely
certain of returning to Ringgold by a continuous
trip every case which can stand the journey.
His estimate, therefore is, that at dusk the dead
and desperately wounded will be collected at points.
somewhere just east of the Blue trenches, and all
other wounded would have been removed from the
field between the Red and Blue lines. The transpor-
tation with the latter would continue to arrive at the
Field Hospitals in Ringgold for an hour or more sub-
sequently.
-
3d Requirement:
The general situation at 9:00 a.m. on April 19th
depends upon the efficiency with which the work of
surgical relief and evacuation of wounded further to
1
-82-
-
the rear has been pushed during the night. Thë
situation has been specifically and abruptly modified
by news of the turning movement of the Reds which
General A received about half an hour ago. The or-
der for the Blue retreat, which is issued at about 8:30
a.m. of course comes as something of a surprise to
the Chief Surgeon, and if he had not as a precaution-
ary measure required unremitting effort in the care
and evacuation of the wounded during the night, the
Blue sanitary service would now be in a bad situation,
since everything in this vicinity which is not readily
mobile will have to be abandoned to the Reds.
On the battlefield, squads of Hospital Corps men
have done what they could under cover of darkness
to ensure that no wounded have been overlooked.
The dead have been buried. Some eighty or more
desperately wounded are located in tents pitched at a
conspicuous point near the trench line but out of any
probable zone of aimed fire. Tentage, supplies and
personnel needed for their care have come from Field
Hospital No. 1. On learning of the order to retreat,
the Chief Surgeon has directed all the personnel here,
except two medical officers and a dozen Hospital
Corps men, to return to their unit without delay.
He appreciates that the personnel left in charge is in
fact inadequate for anything but a temporary situa-
tion, but rests in knowledge of the fact that under
the Geneva convention, suitable care of wounded
prisoners is a duty associated with military success.
Details of medical officers and Hospital Corps men
attached to regiments have been assisting during the
night in the field hospitals in Ringgold; they have
now been ordered to rejoin their respective organiza-
tions without delay. Regiments were resupplied with
first aid packets during the night.
The dressing stations of the ambulance companies
on the field were broken up at the cessation of the
-83 --
truce. The personnel of these companies returned at
once to Ringgold and worked all night assisting in
the field hospitals. They are just now getting a little
rest. Both have replenished their stores and been
packed up since daylight but have remained in Ring-
gold until their services should be required on the
field. Their commander considers that if action is
renewed along the lines of the previous day, they can
get into position in half an hour or so; in the mean
time, the ambulances have brought in the day's incre-
ment of sick from the regiments.
On the order to retreat being given, Ambulance
Company No. 1 will accompany the main force to
Blue Mountain, where it is held in reserve. Half of
Company No. 2 is ordered to remain where it is un-
til the rear guard withdraws, which will not be for
several hours, when it will precede the latter through
Ringgold Gap and remain at Mill Creek, for possible.
service with the flank guard to be posted on the hill
to the west. Four ambulances remain with it. The
remaining half company, with dressing station party
and eight ambulances, will proceed at once to Nicka-
jack Gap for duty with the defending force there.
In respect to the field hospitals, little tentage has
been required or used in addition to that sent out to
the battlefield to shelter the severely wounded.
Other equipment has been entirely unpacked and is
being utilized at 8:30. The number of patients in
these hospitals at this time is problematical, depend-
ing on the rapidity of evacuation to the base during the
night. The sanitary service has been overwhelmed
unless pressure to the rear has been relieved. It
ought to have been possible to send off the hospital
train with 200 wounded twice in the fourteen hours
since sunset and one freight car hospital train with
300 wounded. But the military situation here is not
so completely paramount as on the battlefield; the
·
84-
▸
interests of individuals have been more considered
and the entraining of a number-a hundred or
more-of wounded has very probably been delayed.
Moreover, there are probably more than this number
of cases of sickness entering hospital this morning,
which further complicates the situation. If any trains.
are now available, all cases that can travel are put
aboard; those that cannot travel are concentrated in
Field Hospital No. 1 and provided from that hospital
with the minimum personnel and supplies to be left.
behind under the Geneva Convention. In the ab-
sence of trains, all sick and injured that can possibly
walk even a few miles will be forced to do so. The
ambulances of Ambulance Company No. 1, which is
to follow the main force in retreat, will fill with the
slighter cases and take away 100 or so; empty supply
wagons will take others; those that cannot walk or
be thus transported will have to remain. A surgeon,
a few Hospital Corps men and a number of villagers.
will take care of them. Major General A wires to
have the train bringing the 7th Infantry to continue
on to Tunnel Hill, or the mouth of Mill Creek, if
possible, to take over those sick and wounded who
are thus walking and riding. Ambulances of Com-
pany No. 2, on duty with the rear and flank guards,
must be kept empty and available for service.
Field Hospital No. 2 packs up and starts for the
rear with its personnel complete and its supplies lack-
ing only in some minor respects. Field Hospital No.
1 goes off short, perhaps a third, in respect to per-
sonnel and supplies which could not be completely
replenished from the insufficient supplies previously
sent up. The chief surgeon therefore wires Atlanta
to send men and material to Blue Mountain by first
train to replace these deficiencies. The field hospitals
move out preceding the field train in the column.
i
85–
Comment:
(1). Special stress has been put in this and its
companion problem (Map Problem No. 7, Correspond-
ence School for Medical Officers, series of 1910) on
estimates of the sanitary situation. If there is a
clear conception of the conditions which might fairly
be assumed to exist, the sanitary measures which
are appropriate will naturally suggest themselves.
(2) These two problems illustrate the fact that
while it is conceivable that the evacuation of wound-
ed with the offensive may be safely allowed a certain
delay dependent on known military purposes, the
evacuation of wounded on the defensive side should
practically never be delayed and suitable measures
for removal should always be pushed rapidly and un-
remittingly. And it is always a safe general principle
in handling wounded at the front to evacuate as early,
as rapidly and as completely as possible.
-