THE P0LIT|0AL GEN|U8 0F HENRY |W.
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THE
STANH0PE PRIZE ESSAY
E0R 1869,
BY . . : .
CYRIL F. G RA N T,
COMMON ER () F BALLIC) I.
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** Ce roi généreux
Qui força les Français à devenir heureux.'— Voltaire.
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T. A N D G. S H R IMPT O N.
1869.

THE P0LITICAL GENIUS 0F HENRY W.
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T'EIE
STANH0PE PRIZE ESSAY
F0R 1869,
BY
CYRIL F. GRANT,
COMMONER OF BALLIOL.
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Ce roi généreux
Qui força les Français à devenir heureux.'— Voltaire.
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T. AND G. SHRIMPT O N.
1869.

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THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF HENRY IV.
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THE sixteenth century formed the great period of transition
in the history of modern Europe. It was an age when
old things were passing away, and when new
ideas and new forces evoked by them, were
nations. The revival of letters in the West,
followed as it soon was by the revolt against
the corruptions and despotism of the Church of
Rome, and accompanied by the formation and growth in
power and independence of the great bourgeois, or middle
class, had given rise to a freedom of thought and liberty of
action which had been unknown, perhaps impossible, during
the middle ages. There was a stir throughout all the states
and kingdoms of Europe which moved them to their very
foundations, and two sets of principles soon fully developed
themselves, and stood face to face as in hostile array.
On the one side were the old ideas of despotic rule, civil
and ecclesiastical, and of feudal sovereignty, the great cham-
pions for which were found in the successive monarchs of
Spain and Austria, and in the Pope; on the other, were
ranged the new principles of liberty and progress, of indi-
vidual energy and responsibility, and of the rights of sub-
jects, which were found in alliance with the Protestant faith,
and were making way in Germany, in the Netherlands, in
IEngland, and in France.
But the reformation of religion had advanced with very
unequal success in the various countries of Europe. While
in Italy and in Spain the iron heel of a pitiless persecution
had stamped it out, in many of the principalities of Germany,
as in the Netherlands, it had been cordially received, and in
England, after a brief reverse, it had become the established
faith of the kingdom. In France, on the con-
and of France. trary, though it had met with a sufficient num-
ber of adherents to give it a firm foothold in the country,
especially in the southern provinces, the powerful and the
rich, the great territorial seigneurs and the chief bourgeois
bodies, clung with blind fanaticism to the faith of the middle
ages. Hence arose the League, headed by Henry of Guise,
rope,
4.
favoured by the king, and fostered by the intrigues of
Philip II. of Spain, and by the Pope; while confronting it
stood the Huguenot party, the champion of the new prin-
ciples, headed by Henry of Navarre.
While France was thus made the battle-field of the old
and new ideas and principles, Henry III. fell a victim to the
very power he had at first fostered, and the Huguenot chief,
Henry of Navarre, claimed his rightful succession to the
throne. France was thus divided into two hostile camps,
and the stake for which they contended was the crown.
Before, therefore, Henry IV. could be king in anything more
than name, before he could give peace to his country, or
secure for himself the undisturbed possession of the throne,
that confederation of interests which gave strength and vi-
tality to the League, must be mastered. For in the League
were bound up all the influences hostile to the renewal of the
peace and the prosperity of France, the principle of religious
intolerance, the principle of feudal independence, as opposed
to monarchic rule, and, lastly, the principle of foreign inter-
ference. But Henry had other work to do in France besides
confronting the League.
“Peace hath her victories
No less renowned than war;”
and when the tumult of arms was over, the conqueror of the
League had to do the work of those great restorers, who,
coming after vast social convulsions, build up again the ruins
that have fallen down, and foster the seeds of good scattered
amid the débris. When four years of emergetic warfare had
secured peace to the country and stability to the throne,
years of unceasing effort were still required to efface the
traces of the civil wars which had desolated France, to give
back to her that prosperity to which she had so long been
a stranger, to extinguish the smouldering fires of religious
hatred and intolerance, and to establish the national policy
at home and abroad on such a basis as the exigencies of the
new age required. -
Thus the great political questions, for which the crisis of
the country demanded a solution at the hands of
the new monarch, naturally group themselves
in three divisions.
I. There was the great religious question, which is ever
found to lie at the root of other national ques-
tions, because it appeals to the deepest prin-
ciples of human nature; and here Henry IV. had not merely
to secure the principles of liberty, of conscience, and tolera-
tion, but also to determine the relations which should sub-
Political
Problems.
Religious.
5
sist between the religious parties into which France was
divided.
II. In internal administration, Henry IV. had to assert
Internal the authority of the Crown, to re-organize the
finances, and to establish on new foundations
the social institutions by which the resources of the country
might be developed.
III. In the sphere of European politics, Henry IV. had to
Forei secure the independence of France of foreign
Oreign. : e
interference, and to organize such a system of
alliances as should enable her to cope successfully with the
overwhelming power of Spanish and papistical absolution.
Under these three divisions it will be convenient to trace
the course of Henry’s political conduct, and thence to gather
the distinctive ideas by which he was guided.
I. The Reformation, as we have already noticed, had
Reli ions not assumed in France the character of a ma-
... tional movement. The series of religious wars
which had desolated the country, had been, on
the part of the Reformers, struggles for the merest tolera-
tion, frequently for very existence. Peace had succeeded
peace; each more hollow than the last, each to be broken
on the first opportunity. With a Catholic dynasty on the
throne, with the great lords united to the chief bourgeois
bodies in the closest bonds of Catholic confederation, the
successive edicts of toleration could not bear the character
of perpetual law. They were provisional acts, truces con-
cluded in the expectation of a speedy reunion of the two
parties, to be effected by a general or national council.
Thirty years of obstinate warfare had, however, taught the
lesson that the two parties would not coalesce one with the
other, and that neither party could extinguish the other.
As soon, therefore, as Henry IV. succeeded to the throne,
the Huguenots began to hope that their separation from the
body of the National Church would at length be recognised,
and their social position secured to them by an authorita-
tive and irrevocable decree. But the position of the new
monarch, placed as he was between an intolerant majority
on the one hand, and an aggressive self-asserting minority
on the other, was no easy one. Even when the flames of
the League were at last extinguished, they still smouldered
in the ashes, ready to burst out anew on the first oppor-
tunity. With every disposition to do justice to the Hu-
guenot party, Henry IV. could not but feel that by acting
precipitately, the risk he would himself incur would be
greater than any benefit he could confer on it. The
6
final settlement of the religious differences of his subjects,
must, he saw, be postponed till the time when the stability
of his power, and the internal order of his kingdom, should
enable him to pass such a law as should be at once adequate
to the circumstances and effectual in its operation.
Still, amid all the doubts and difficulties which beset the
first years of his reign, Henry was manifestly swayed by
certain great principles in regard to the religious condition
of the kingdom, to which he strove to give effect; principles
which have grown to be so familiar to ourselves, that we
can hardly estimate aright the self-mastery, the foresight,
and the generosity that first recognised them, and then
made them a living reality; they were the principles of
liberty of individual conscience, of toleration, of religious
freedom, and found their expression in the great edict which
we shall shortly have to notice. But before the public re-
cognition of these with their beneficent results could be
effected, one great act forced itself on Henry as a political
necessity.
The ecclesiastical supremacy of Rome had hitherto not
merely allied itself with the regal authority, but had at
certain periods claimed to be not only co-ordinate with it,
but its superior and its source. Philip II. cordially em-
braced this principle, and it was acknowledged by at least
the majority of the French nation. The idea of a monarch
professing the reformed faith, a heretical king ruling a Ca-
tholic people, was utterly alien from, not merely the pre-
judices, but the faith of the French. It was clear, therefore,
that this circumstance in Henry’s position, not only formed
an obstacle to his recognition as the rightful sovereign, but
must necessarily, while it lasted, forbid all hope of his ever
conciliating his Catholic subjects, and providing a solution
to the religious question which so deeply agitated the king-
dom. For it offended the faith of those who regarded the
profession of the Catholic religion as almost an attribute of
the kingly office; it gave vitality to the League, and pro-
tracted the religious wars which had desolated France; and
it formed a constant excuse for the interference on religious
pretexts of Philip II., of which he and the League were ever
ready to avail themselves. The course, therefore, seemed
clear. As an act of policy, overriding (if he had them) any
private scruples or prepossessions, as the one condition of
his thwarting the League, foiling the intrigues of Spain,
and satisfying the conscience of the majority of his people,
among whom the Catholic faith was the national faith,
Henry resolved upon embracing that religion and submit-
ting himself to the Church of Rome.
And certainly the results of this step soon made them-
7
selves felt in the sudden collapse of the armed opposition of
the League, and in the increased authority which the suc-
cessive edicts of toleration exercised. Still, however, the
time for the final settlement of the religious difficulties was
not yet fully come. The chief sting of Spanish intrigue and
interference had indeed been drawn, but Spain was still the
open enemy of Henry IV., and the minds of the Catholic
majority in France had not yet been sufficiently educated
to admit of full effect being given to the principle of reli-
gious toleration. It was not till the pernicious influence
of Spain had been shaken by the recovery of Amiens”, that
Henry IV. felt himself strong enough to set definitely at
rest the great question which had so long agitated and
divided his kingdom. On April 25, 1598, he signed at
Nantes the celebrated edict which was to close the period
of religious wars in France. -
The principle of this famous edict was one of the fullest
e and most generous toleration. In religious
§: matters entire liberty of conscience was secured
e to the professors of the reformed religion, and
the right of public worship was accorded to them in two
places in every department" throughout France. They were
placed on the same civil status as Catholics in every par-
ticular, all disabilities were removed, and they were, more-
over, protected from injury on account of their religious
views. In order to secure impartiality in the administra-
tion of justice, special courts were instituted for the trial
of causes in which their interests were concerned. Politi-
cally they were recognised as a distinct body; they were
permitted to hold synods and other councils, with the con-
sent of the King; their ministers were exempted from mili-
tary service; and, lastly, the possession of such towns as
they already held was secured to them.
Such was the outline of the Edict of Nantes. And, when
we read it by the light of the past history of France, we
cannot but admire the completeness of its concessions, and
the spirit of prudence as well as of justice which pervades it.
Particular clauses have indeed been censured, especially that
one which, by securing the possession of their towns to the
Huguenots, recognised them as a military power distinct from
the rest of France; but when we recall to mind the op-
posing interests which Henry TV. had to consult, we should
rather admire the general principles than find fault with
particular shortcomings. On the whole, we cannot but feel
that the balance between the contending interests was
* Recovery of Amiens, Sept. 25, 1597; Edict of Nantes, April 25, 1598;
Peace of Wervins, May 2, 1598. * “Bailliage ou sénéchaussée.”
8
fairly and rightly adjusted. And this was to be expected.
A Huguenot become a Catholic less from his own convic-
tions than from the necessities of the time, with sympathies
equally balanced between the two parties for whom he had
to legislate, with strength sufficient to preserve his judg-
ment unbiassed by the threats of the one party or the im-
portunities of the other, with an understanding sufficiently
vigorous to grapple successfully with the problem he had to
solve, Henry IV. was determined that the law he gave
should be no mere provisional act conceded to the necessi-
ties of a transient pressure, but a measure which should
offer a permanent solution of the difficulties which beset
the great question with which he had to deal. While con-
scious of the fact that he was legislating in the interests of
a comparatively small minority, he did not, therefore, yield
unduly to the wishes of the majority. He acknowledged to
the full the right of every man to entire liberty of con-
science, and recognised the duty of the temporal power to
extend its protection over all forms of religious worship.
This edict initiates a new era in history, in which the in-
terests of the lay community were no longer to be dependent
on ecclesiastical or religious sentiments, and the impulse
thus given was never lost. The reaction of Louis XIV.
could for a moment shake but could not destroy the work
of Henry IV. The identity of Church and State was broken,
and the idea thus inaugurated, though destined to be
checked and for a moment reversed, nevertheless sank deep
into the mind of the nation, and reasserted itself with a ter-
rible retribution, when the reaction against despotic into-
lerance arose at the end of the eighteenth century, to
redress and avenge all the injustice of the past.
II. When we turn from the religious to the civil affairs
of the nation, we have to notice the same tran-
sitional character of the epoch in which the ad-
ministrative capacity of Henry IV. was called
into exercise. He had much to reform and much to re-
construct. Standing on the common limit of mediaeval and
modern history, he reaped the fruits of the social toil and
the experiences of the one age, and sowed the seeds which
the other was to bring to perfection. In his hands royalty,
casting aside whatever confusion the middle ages had left in
its character and authority, appeared clearly in its modern
aspect of an administrative sovereignty, absolute both theo-
retically and practically; and this character it retained until,
at the close of the eighteenth century, it was subordinated
to, or rather associated with, the national sovereignty. On
the foundation of royalty, as thus constituted, a fresh system
of internal government logically ordered itself. The King,
Internal ad-
ministration.
9
no longer a feudal chief of territorial seigneurs, was the centre
of supreme national authority, directing the operations of the
State through the separate departments of official adminis-
tration. Thus from this point we trace the progress of the
nation towards unity, accelerated by the greater centralisation
of power, and towards civil equality, assisted as it was by the
humiliation of the old feudal nobility and the simultaneous
elevation of the different classes of the third estate. Nor
was this centralisation of power the only distinguishing
feature of the reign of Henry IV. He was emphatically the
first King of the French, for he first used the royal authority
for the benefit of the people, and taught the masses that
their interests were being watched over. And thus we find
the operation of his genius displayed in every department of
internal administration. To traverse, however lightly, the vast
field covered by his reforms would be impossible; we cannot
do more than notice the principal heads under which they
may be grouped, and point out their aim and tendency and
the general principles by which they were guided.
The chief difficulties which beset the government of
Henry IV., arose from the disordered state
of the finances. The State was overwhelmed
with debt, the people 'were overburdened with taxes. Nor
was this all. Few sources of revenue remained unimpaired.
The greater part of the demesne land had been alienated,
and the right of farming taxes had, for the most part, passed
into the hands of the State creditors. Lastly, between these
creditors and the people intervened an army of irrespon-
sible tax collectors, who were permitted to double and qmad-
ruple" the burden of the taxation by their extortions. The
task of remedying this state of things was entrusted to Sully,
but the entire confidence and unity of purpose which existed
between him and his master, assure us that the principles
adopted were due as much to the genius of Henry IV. as
to that of his minister.
The general plan of financial reform was simple. Little
shifting or re-adjustment of the burden of taxation was at-
tempted, but the abuses of the existing system were radically
removed. To meet the immediate distress, the arrears of
taxes due for the year 1596 were remitted. To relieve the
treasury, all alienated sources of revenue were reclaimed by
the king. Creditors were no longer permitted to farm taxes
for their own benefit, but all money collected was paid in full
into the treasury, and the people were thus placed in imme-
diate connection with the crown. Local governors were
Finance.
* “Je vis, avec vrai horreur qui augmenta mon zèle, que, pour ces trente
millions. . . . . il en sortait de la bourse des particuliers . . . . cent cinquante
millions.”—Mémoires de Sully, ii. 418.
10
forbidden to levy arbitrary taxes. The accounts of the tax
collectors were subjected to a rigorous examination ; and
all payments were made direct from the treasury. -
Such was the ground-work of the reforms adopted. Their
tendency is obvious. It is to break down the influence of
the feudal nobility, by the centralization of power in the
hands of the king ; and thus these reforms fall naturally into
their place in the general scheme of government which we
have already noticed.
The same vigour was shewn in the reconstruction of the
military establishments. In the place of the
feudal militia, and foreign mercenaries who had
hitherto constituted the armies of France, was
substituted a regular army, constructed with a view to per-
manent service, and to the nationality of the force. To
bring this change about, the pay of the men was raised",
and military academies were founded to train an efficient
staff of officers. The commissariat department was placed on
an adequate footing, a permanent camp was projected, and
hospitals were founded to receive disabled soldiers. Increased
honour was accorded to military orders of knighthood, and
great attention was paid to the science of gunnery, engineer-
ing, field tactics, and siege operations. To secure France
from invasion, a vast network of fortresses was traced along
the frontiers, and foundations were laid for the construction
of an adequate navy.
Nor were the other departments of internal administration
neglected. “L’industrie,” says Mons. Miche-
let, “ date de ce régne *,” and the expression is
hardly too strong to represent the enormous impulse given
to it by the legislation of Henry IV. The furious civil wars
through which she had passed, had thrown all France into
frightful disorder, and agriculture had suffered even more
than other institutions. In 1595 we read', “Les vexations
auxquelles ont été en butte les laboureurs, leur ont fait
quitter et abandomner non seulement leur labour et vocation
ordinaire, mais aussi leurs maisons; se trouvant maintenant
les fermes censes, et quasi tous les villages inhabités et dé-
serts.” To remedy this state of things decisive measures
were necessary. (A.) In the first place the labourers them-
selves must be protected. This was done in two ways: i. To
protect them from the disbanded soldiers who infested the
country and made agriculture dangerous, a law was passed
declaring it illegal for any man not in the immediate service
of the king to carry arms. ii. Creditors were moreover for-
Military
Reforms.
Agriculture.
* To eight sous a-day. * Henri IV., ii. 140.
* Preamble of the Declaration of March 16, 1595.
11
bidden to seize the persons, the tools, the cattle, or the
draught horses of the agriculturalists for debt. (B.) To in-
crease the facilities for agriculture, waste lands were enclosed,
marshes were drained, and forest land cleared. (C.) Thirdly,
the importation of grain was prohibited, whereas the facilities
for commerce and exportation were increased, and internal
communication rendered more easy by making roads, build-
ing bridges, and tracing canals. (D.) Lastly, works on agri-
culture, notably “Le Théâtre d’Agriculture, et ménage des
champs,” by Olivier de Serres, to whom this department of
reform was entrusted, were published.
Nor was this the only form of industry fostered. Agricul-
ture and tillage, if the chief, were not to be the
only sources of the wealth of France. Henry
IV. was determined, in spite of the strenuous opposition of
Sully, to make her a great manufacturing nation also. To
effect this, skilled labourers were invited from foreign coun-
tries, the importation of articles of luxury was prohibited,
while the exportation of such national products was stimu-
lated by their exemption from all export duties. The manu-
facture of silk was especially promoted by the planting of
mulberry-trees throughout France, and by the foundation
of manufactories.
No sketch of Henry’s internal reforms would be complete,
& without a brief survey of his legislation on
Social Re- tº *
forms. social questions. The ground to be gone over
here is as large as in any of the former de-
partments which we have noticed; the more important sub-
jects of legislation may, however, be summed up under the
following heads. (A.) The administration of justice was
made the subject of two specially important edicts: the
first limited the number of persons eligible for judicial ap-
pointments, and also decided in what courts they were to
sit ; the second, called “La Paulette,” rendered judges
more independent of local influence, by making their offices,
under certain conditions, hereditary. (B.) In another sphere
of social legislation, duelling was repressed, brigandage put
down, hunting laws enforced, and the discipline of the
Church restored. (C.) In dealing with education, Univer-
sities, especially that of Paris, were founded or enlarged, and
numerous museums, libraries, and academies were opened
or endowed. (D.) Sanitary edicts were passed on several
subjects, and their operation extended to all large towns:
hospitals were also founded and enlarged. (E.) Lastly, to
provide for those who were unable to better themselves even
under the new state of things, emigration, especially to
America, was encouraged, and several colonies were founded.
On reviewing these schemes of internal reform, it is not
Manufacture.
12
difficult to trace the action of the principle on which they
were framed, and to see how they fall in with the new con-
ception of royalty, which we have already noticed. To gather
the reins of government in the hands of the king, to destroy
the power of the feudal mobility, and to increase the im-
portance and prosperity of the labouring classes, this was
the aim and tendency of all Henry’s legislation; and we
cannot but admire the far-sighted statesmanship which ap-
preciated so truly the needs and the capabilities of the
country, and so carefully tended these, while at the same
time making them serve as parts of a scheme of State policy.
III. But it was in his foreign policy that the genius of
Henry IV. shone forth most conspicuously.
In tracing its action in the wider field of
European politics, we must ever keep before our minds
& the compact which had been more or less defi-
.* nitely formed by Philip II. of Spain and the
pe. Pope, to counteract the growing power of the
Reformation, by an effort to establish throughout Europe
an universal despotism, civil and ecclesiastical.
It was no imaginary danger which thus threatened Europe.
The unrelenting prosecution of the war in the Netherlands,
the attempted invasion of England, and the interference
of Philip II. in France, first by his intrigues with the
League, and then by his open war with Henry IV., all
testified to its real existence. Against this attempt, in
which the liberties of Europe were at stake, Henry IV. had
to combat, and in his efforts to frustrate it we find the clue
to the policy he pursued abroad.
In the year 1598 a treaty was concluded at Vervins be-
tween France and Spain. But this peace was
§: of a mere cessation of hostilities, rendered neces-
€I'VIIlS. iº
sary by the exhaustion of the two powers who
concluded it; not a guarantee on the part of Philip II. that
he intended to depart from his schemes of aggression, nor, on
his death, was it so interpreted by his successor. Spain was,
therefore, as hostile and as formidable to France as ever.
Nor was the case different on the northern frontier. Though
Henry IV. was not at open war with the German branch of
the house of Austria, no cordial relations subsisted between
it and France. Thus all around hung the dark cloud of
Spanish and Papistical absolution, threatening at any mo-
ment to close over Europe.
To avert this danger was the object of Henry’s policy,
and he prosecuted his designs in two ways: by rendering
assistance to the open enemies of Spain, and by forming
defensive alliances against her. The war of independence
was still maintained in the Netherlands, and this might be
Foreign Policy.
13
used as a wedge to split asunder the mass of Spanish and
Austrian power. It was, therefore, the policy of France
to yield a cordial support to the Netherlands; but above all
it was her policy to construct such a system of alliances in
Europe, as should enable her eventually to make head
against Spain. It is to this latter point that we shall direct
our attention, since the former falls under it, and has its
place in the general scheme.
And certainly the power with which Henry IV. designed
to measure his strength was such as might
well strike terror into the heart of Protestant
Europe. For the hereditary dominions of the
great Austrian house included Spain, the kingdom of Naples,
the Lowlands, and the States of Austria Proper; and to
these possessions Charles W. and his brother Ferdinand had
added Bohemia, Hungary, and Milan. The imperial title
of Germany had also been practically usurped by the princes
of this house. *
The principle on which Henry IV. formed the system of
alliances, by which he hoped to contend successfully with
this gigantic power, was one of the confederation and mutual
preservation of the smaller nationalities and powers, and
this principle he carried into effect in all directions.
In Italy, where Spain held sway by her possession of Na-
ples and Milan, Henry exerted himself to bring
. into his alliance the Grand Duke of Tuscany,
*.*.* the Pope, the Duke of Savoy, and the crowd of
smaller Italian powers. Further north, on the
frontiers of Italy, he conciliated Geneva, the Swiss League,
and the Grisons. Westward, in the Lowlands, he sought
the friendship of the United Provinces, or Holland, and
formed treaties with England. In Spain itself he retaliated
for the assistance rendered to the League, and the revolt of
Biron, by treating with Roussillon, Spanish Navarre, and Ca-
taluna. He also made overtures to assist the Moors in Ara-
gon and Valencia to revolt, though his plans were foiled by
the vigilance of Spain. The northern kingdoms of Denmark
and Sweden were embraced in this vast system of alliances;
and in the heart of the enemy’s country the German princes
of the empire, to the number of eighteen, were induced to
enter into alliance with France. Lastly, the Protestants in
Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria were invited to combine,
and join the League against ecclesiastical oppression. This
complicated scheme of policy was carried into execution by
an organised system of foreign diplomatic megociation, which
was in those days without precedent, and was as great a proof
of Henry’s creative capacity as was his successful adminis-
tration of internal affairs.
Power of
Spain.
14
Such was the system of alliances formed by Henry IV.,
The Grand and such were the object and principles on
#." which it was founded. But this formed but
a part of his grand scheme of European policy.
The central idea of this scheme, or Grand Design as it is
usually called, is however but a fuller expression of the leading
idea of all his foreign policy. It is that of a balance of power
in Europe, formed not on the basis of an armed neutrality,
necessitated by an equilibrium of material forces, but on a
free confederation of independent nationalities. To render
such a confederation possible, the house of Austria was to be
stripped of its exclusive possession of the Imperial title, which
was to be rendered once more practically as well as theore-
tically elective. It was also to be stripped of its possessions
in Italy, Belgium, Hungary, and Bohemia, and this territory
was to be assigned to the smaller powers of Europe. France
would rectify her frontier, but, for the most part, would be
satisfied with her position as head of the confederation,
a headship she would maintain less by her pretensions than
by her moderation, and by her devotion to the common
cause. This European coalition was to be represented by
an universal congress, which should arbitrate in all disputes
which might arise between states or between princes and
their subjects.
The outline of the Grand Design, thus baldly stated, cer-
tainly seems sufficiently fanciful; but before we pass sen-
tence on it, we must carefully discriminate between the
Utopian and the practical portions of it. Nor
is it difficult to see where the one passes into
the other. The first part consists of a series of projects for
the formation of an European confederation, built on some
vague dream of a Christian Republic and of everlasting
peace. Of this project, as far as we can judge, all that is
attributable to Henry IV. is the central idea of the possi-
bility of deciding European questions by other means than
by an appeal to arms. All the elaborate machinery by
which practical expression was to be given to this idea was
the work of Sully *, submitted perhaps by him to Henry
IV., and perhaps approved as an embodiment of that idea,
but never adopted, or incorporated into his schemes of
political action.
The second portion is altogether practical; it is in fact the
embodiment of the three ideas which guided
all Henry’s policy, namely, (a.) to curb the
power of the house of Austria; (8) to secure toleration for
the reformed religion; and (y.) to establish, as far as might
Part Utopian.
Part Practical.
& This is definitely asserted by Mons. Poirson, vol. ii. p. 873; and by Mons.
Michelet, Henri IV., vol. ii. p. 471.
15
be, an equilibrium of power in Europe. This was no vague
scheme, but the object of all Henry’s policy, and of that
system of alliances which we have traced : and it was to carry
these ideas into execution that he collected, in 1610, the
vast army, which, after years of patient organisation, he was
about to launch against Spain and Austria, when, in the full
vigour of his strength and genius, he was struck down by
the knife of the assassim.
Such was the part played in history by Henry IV. The
salient characteristics of his genius may be
summed up in a few words.
It is obvious at the first glance how all his policy was
e - e. marked by an intense spirit of nationality. In
sº this respect, as in some others, he resembled,
both in his weakness and in his strength, Eliza-
beth of England. Through all his life he was working for
France, whether to give her peace and prosperity at home,
or to raise her in the scale of nations abroad; and to this
motive may fairly and justly be ascribed that act which has
been so commonly denounced, his abjuration of the Pro-
testant faith. And it is probably this feature in his cha-
racter which contributes largely to his memory, being still
so cherished amongst his countrymen as furnishing the ideal
pattern for a King of France.
But his conduct as a statesman was marked by higher
qualities than this, by the wide and far-seeing
range of his views, and by the grasp as well as
the versatility of his intellect. On the field of
battle, in the midst of court intrigues, amid the perplexities
of financial reform, and on the troubled waters of European
politics, everywhere he seemed equally at home. Hence he
was singularly the man for the age ; he thoroughly compre-
hended it, and its needs. He saw its tendencies, and lent
himself, with a will all but indomitable, to control and direct
them. And here we are struck by the singular patience
with which he endured opposition, and steadily worked out
his plans. With much of the fire of the age of chivalry
which he was closing, and gifted with that imaginative in-
stinct which forecasts the future, and frames to itself aims
of such breadth as to seem to others visionary, he was yet
shrewd, calculating, and practical ; he never neglected the
possible good in the vain pursuit of the impossible better;
and his comprehensive schemes were ever tested and tem-
pered by the sobriety of administrative detail. It was this
which led a great historian to compare him to Julius Caesar;
and the resemblance both of their lives and of their cha-
racters is in many ways remarkable. Both were the cham-
Conclusion.
His versa-
tility.
I6
pions of change, both fought their way to absolute power,
both fell a victim to the prejudices they had striven against,
and both have received the enthusiastic admiration of suc-
ceeding generations.
And lastly, in seeking to form an estimate of the genius
of Henry IV., and to trace its action in the
work he accomplished, we must bear in mind
that his life, like that of Caesar, was but frag-
mentary and incomplete: we cannot see it as it would have
presented itself to us, had it been prolonged so as for
Henry to witness the results of his schemes. The great
undertaking for which he had for ten years been silently
preparing, he was not spared to carry out. At the very
moment when he was advancing as to assured victory he
was struck down, and with the master-spirit the work he
contemplated for a time fell too. But even thus we may
gain a measure of the singular capacity by which he was
able to forecast the future of Europe, and to direct its des-
tinies, by moting how the whole sequel of European history
has run in the tracks which he seems to have marked out
for it, and thus to confirm the justice and prescience of his
policy. For two-hundred-and-fifty years the broad ideas of
Henry’s policy have been growing more and more the ideas
of the civilised world. We have seen Spain and Austria
humbled, the Netherlands free and independent, the Papacy
limited in power, and the principle of toleration universally
received. We have seen France vindicate her favourite
claim to be the arbitress of peace on the continent. We
have seen central and Protestant Germany united, and ready
to assume the old imperial sway. Nor are there wanting
those who tell us that in the progressive spread of a better
Christian policy, the day is not far off when the dream of
constituting one free confederation of all Europe may in the
Providence of God be realised ; when arbitration will take
the place of arms in the settlement of European questions;
when that aspiration after the unity of free mations which
was cherished by the genius of Henry IV., will receive
that authoritative sanction which realisation alone can give.
Sagacity of
his plans.
liii.
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