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ANALYSIS And Review OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT
ON

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
POLITICAL SOCIAL ECONOMIC
By
A. G. Mezerik
Volume VII No. 64
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT
Contents
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
ON
Political. Social
Social. Economic
Importance of Base Expenditures
Revenue from Bases Includes Aid.
V
(Research for this report was assisted by grants through the Institute for International Order)
By
A.G. MEZERIK
Introduction
Disarmament Matter for Great Powers.
Political Reality Requires Widespread Disarmament.
Big Powers Capable of Adjusting to End of Arms Race
Role of Armaments in Life of Underdeveloped Countries.
Military Expenditures in UDC's by Major Armed Countries
Purchase of Supplies Abroad .
Part of Wages Spent Locally
Bases are Widespread - Provide Employment
Concern for Recipients Sometimes Secondary.
Peaceful Competition in Aid a Possibility
Stockpiles
Part 1
Specific Forms of Aid Tied to Bases.
Direct Military and Defense Support.
Survival of Countries and US Defense Support Money.
Civilian Benefits Flowing from Military Alliances
National Budget Sometimes Small in Relation to Aid.
Provision of Arms to Underdeveloped Countries.
Non-Military Aid Also Predicated on Cold War Policy
Shifting Currents of Aid: Poland, Yugoslavia, UAR, Iraq
Relationship of Cold War to Bargaining Power of Underdeveloped Countries.
Cuba Conflict Stimulates New US Fund.
Raw Materials for Arms Building and Maintenance.
Countries Dependent on Income from Raw Materials
OA.G. MEZERIK 1961
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Table of Contents (Continued)
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Korean War End Caused Mighty Decline. .
Price Drops Cripple Underdeveloped Countries
Trade Also in Cold War Area.
Effect on Standard of Living .
Political and Security Implications
Effects on Internal Status Quo
Effect On Dictatorships.
Defense Arrangements Entrusted to Armed Powers.
Big Power Might Part of Arsenal of Underdeveloped Countries
Missiles Great Factor in Cuba; Impact of Threat to Use Force.
Maintenance of Armies by Underdeveloped Countries
Fear of Expansionism .
Big Underdeveloped Countries' Armies Supplied and Supported by Armed Countries
$5,000 Million Yearly Spent on Arms by Underdeveloped Countries
Expansion and Consolidation
The Arms Suppliers to Underdeveloped Countries
Planes, Tanks and Guns for Underdeveloped Countries.
Curtailing Ability to Revolt
The Force of Numbers
Search for Equalizers .
Avenues Toward Solutions .
Big Power Promises.
Redeeming the Promises
Tax Relief and Needed Public Works
Economic Planning Essential
•
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Part II
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The Economic Development Problem
Doubt on Conversion to Economic Development
UN Charter Provision..
The Political Necessities
Equal Voice in UN
Problems of Peaceful Change
Defense and Police Protection
UN Peace Force
"Window Pane" Concept of UNEF.
Congo Force as Model for Peace Force.
Objections to Peace Force.
Inspection System
Part III
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Table of Contents (Continued)
The Widening of Horizons
The Great Prize
References
APPENDIXES:
A: Armed Forces Estimates of NATO, Warsaw Pact & Other European Countries
B: Government Defense Expenditures in Relation to Total Budget, Country by Country
C: GA Resolution on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament
D: Raw Materials from Underdeveloped Country Sources
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT
ON
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Arms and armaments now have first call, almost universally, on vast quantities
of resources, on the youth of most of the world, and on the services of scientists of the
highest quality. In each year $100,000 million is spent by countries, large and small, for
military purposes. Everyone recognizes the benefits that would flow if this vast treasure
and the brains and the brawn of the millions of people involved could be turned to peace-
ful pursuits in a disarmed world. (See Appendix B)
The premise of this report is that the freeing of man's labor and nature's resources
from war and preparation for war is an altogether desirable thing. The purpose of this re-
port is to indicate that disarmament is therefore not only desirable for the great con-
tending cold war powers but also for underdeveloped countries, which spend $5,000 mil-
lion on armaments annually. The total stake of the underdeveloped countries in disarm-
ament and disarmament negotiations is, however, not always clearly understood. This
stake concerns not only the technicalities and details of armament reduction, inspection
and control, which are so much discussed by the big powers but also, and most impor-
tantly, the economic, social and political effects on underdeveloped countries of every
step taken by the big powers toward disarmament.
Disarmament Matter for Great Powers
The concept is widely held that disarmament is a matter affecting only the great
powers. In this context disarmament agreements are conceived to be a matter for nego-
tiation between the big powers. This emphasis clouds the much wider horizon of the
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
impacts on the rest of the world of the disarmament measures on which the two greatest
powers might agree.
Political Reality Requires Widespread Disarmament
While it is true that disarmament will make its primary impact on the two great
powers, it is also obvious that these big powers will not disarm under conditions that
would permit smaller nations to remain armed, which implies that all countries would need
to disarm.
This political fact, generally ignored, of itself justifies participation of all coun-
tries, large and small, in disarmament discussions, up to now limited to the biggest powers
and their close allies.
Big Powers Capable of Adjusting to End of Arms Race
While there are many points of view on what the consequences, particularly eco-
nomic, of ending the arms race might be on the great developed countries, and especially
on the US, there are few who will say that these countries, including the US, would be un-
able to solve the problems which arise.
Underdeveloped countries also can undoubtedly surmount all the problems which
will arise for them with the cessation of the arms race. But this task will be made immen-
sely more difficult if the impact of disarmament steps on underdeveloped countries is not
clearly understood in advance.
Role of Armaments in Life of Underdeveloped Countries
Armaments and armed forces today play an extremely important role in the life of
underdeveloped countries. This role is dual: one part consists of the defense and secur-
ity forces of the underdeveloped country itself; the second part is that played by the arms
race of the big countries in the life of the underdeveloped country. Since disarmament of
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VII NO. 64
3
(a)
the big powers is the subject of constant discussion, it is essential to examine this second
part with great care with a view to finding solutions for the problems which will face under-
developed countries during a transitional period.
Military Expenditures in UDC's by Major Armed Countries
The cessation of the arms race and the introduction of a measure of disarmament
will curtail the military expenditures of the major armed countries in certain underdeveloped
countries. These military expenditures are today of varying importance to the economies of
underdeveloped countries, and take several forms.
Purchase of Supplies Abroad
One form is the purchase of military supplies in an underdeveloped country by a
major armed country. These supplies may be for use in the major country, as has been the
case with simple products such as articles of clothing which can be processed more cheaply
in the underdeveloped country than under the higher wages in the purchasing country. In
1959 the US military spent $1.41 billion for work outside the US. (Reference 1)
A frequent example of military expenditures in underdeveloped countries is the local
purchase of food, fuel, clothing and other supplies by the major country for use by its sol-
diers who are stationed there. The aggregate of these purchases is considerable in such
countries as Korea, Turkey and Hungary.
Part of Wages Spent Locally
Moreover the soldiers and civilians from the country which maintains the base spend
a portion of their wages in the communities in which they are stationed. The money they
spend for food, travel, services and goods now provides a significant amount of foreign ex-
change for certain underdeveloped countries. Over 900,000 US soldiers were, in 1959, on
active military duty in foreign countries outside the US. (Reference 2)
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
D
Bases are Widespread - Provide Employment
Soldiers on duty abroad are stationed in bases scattered throughout the world. The
USSR maintains Soviet soldiers and bases in some Warsaw Pact countries including East
Germany and Hungary; the UK has a system of bases in its own possessions and in new
countries such as Cyprus as well as in other Commonwealth countries; and France main-
tains bases in its possessions and in French Community countries such as Senegal. The
US system of 250 bases is in thirty-six countries, extending through middle Europe, the
Middle East, and around the rim of Asia through the Northern Pacific.
These bases, as well as those of other armed developed countries such as Belgium,
Portugal and the Netherlands, provide employment for the local populations. On 30 Novem-
ber 1959, the US Department of Defense reported 90,255 foreign civilians under direct hire
and 182,588 under contract hire. Their total equals twenty-two per cent of all civilians
employed both within and without the US by the Department of Defense. (Reference 3)
Importance of Base Expenditures
The US Guantanamo Base in Cuba, now a subject of controversy, employs about
2,500 Cubans and has an annual payroll of about $5½ million which has always been con-
sidered valuable to the economy of Oriente Province in which the base is located. The
foreign exchange represented in this dollar payroll has also been important to the economy
of Cuba, which has not forced the closing of the base although diplomatic and trade rela-
tions between the US and Cuba are broken.
Revenue from Bases Includes Aid
Bases also provide direct revenue in the form of rents, which are important to
countries such as Libya. Most base agreements have connected with them commitments
to provide economic and development aid.
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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VII NO. 64
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Specific Forms of Aid Tied to Bases
Typical of the agreements which tie aid and bases together is the treaty signed on
10 February 1961 between the West Indies Federation, a British colony soon to become in-
dependent, and the US, which has maintained bases in the West Indies since 1941.
The new treaty specifically provides for US aid of more than $2,300,000 annually to
be given to the Federation for economic and social development.
The economic aspects of bases are, of course, not their major characteristics.
Agreements for maintenance of bases are obviously predicated on a much broader basis
and these agreements are continued or terminated on considerations in which economic
benefits do not frequently play the major part. Saudi Arabia, which receives adequate
foreign exchange from its large oil income, has asked the US to give up its huge base
there. Morocco had earlier requested US termination of its bases.
Direct Military and Defense Support
Most of the economic aid today given to certain underdeveloped countries by major
armed powers is tied directly to military use. US aid directly connected with military use
has been totalling about $2.5 billion each year more than half the entire US outflow of
aid for all purposes, which is just over $4 billion. In fiscal 1959 (1 July 1958 to 30 June
1959), fifty-five countries received economic aid tied to military assistance from the US.
(Reference 4)
G
Survival of Countries and US Defense Support Money
For some countries, the money supplied by US and tied to military use is vital to
economic survival. Countries in this group are the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the
Republic of China (Taiwan), Vietnam and Laos. In 1960 these countries, with the Philip-
pines, Thailand and other Pacific allies received US aid totalling $1½ billion. The funds
provided to Laos for military assistance exceeded the amount of the Laotian Kingdom's
total money supply in 1960. (Reference 5)
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The Republic of China (Taiwan) has received $3.1 billion in this kind of aid since
the government was established in Taiwan in 1949. Turkey had, from 1955 to 1958, re-
ceived $431 million tied to US military support. All of these countries as well as Spain,
Pakistan and Iran receive many forms of aid, although always directly and indirectly con-
nected with US defense. Spain has received $1 billion in economic aid since 1953. Pakis-
tan has received $1.3 billion in economic aid, in addition to $1 billion in military aid. Many
alliances in which armed countries participate with underdeveloped countries also provide
for civilian benefits to the latter.
Civilian Benefits Flowing from Military Alliances
The South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) has as its members Australia,
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the
United States. Their agreement provides for projects which have included the establish-
ment of the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering in Bangkok; programs aimed at improv-
ing the supply of skilled labor in Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand; a Cholera Re-
search Project; a Meteorological Communication Project; and various scholarship, fellow-
ship and professorship programs. (Reference 6)
National Budget Sometimes Small in Relation to Aid
The importance of aid tied to military use in relation to the total budgets of some
of the countries aided can be seen from the fact that in 1960 the US gran ted $36.5 million
to Jordan, which has a budget of $41.5 million. (Reference 7) That the assistance tied
to bases, alliances and defense has a marked relationship to the survival of certain under-
developed countries was recognized in the 1959 report of the Presidential Committee to
Study the United States Military Assistance Program. This committee said:
Economic assistance serves two main purposes: First, our own military
defense requires effective forces in the hands of our friends and allies,
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VII NO. 64
7
which, in turn, depend in large measure on the stability of the underlying
economic base of the individual countries. Secondly, our security requires
that both our allies and the uncommitted countries have an opportunity to
solve their pressing economic problems within the framework of the free
world. Without such an opportunity some of them would offer an easy tar-
get for communism. They are not only being attracted by well contrived
offers of assistance from the Communist bloc, but they are also impressed
by the economic achievements of Russia and Communist China, without
always fully understanding the real cost in human misery.
We recognize that some of our military allies among the less developed
countries are unable to support their part of the common military effort
without economic defense support assistance. (Reference 8)
The impact of US arms reduction on the economies of underdeveloped countries
was pointed out in 1957 by William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve Board, who said:
Just as a reduction in military outlays presents problems and challenges to
our own economy, it would present similar problems and opportunities in
many other countries.... For some countries...receipts of United States
defense expenditures represented a relatively...important source of dollars.
Less highly industrialized countries mainly in the Near East and Far East,
who received about one-seventh of our defense expenditures abroad in
fiscal 1956, would probably be most seriously affected by a reduction in
United States outlays. (Reference 9)
Provision of Arms to Underdeveloped Countries
The premise of defense support now given by the big powers to underdeveloped
countries is that this money enables the recipient to maintain a stable economy along
with a large army. The US supplies this army with armaments and transport as well as
the training required to handle them. In nearly all cases this aid is basic to the main-
tenance of the armies of the underdeveloped countries and their positions locally. The
USSR also provides military supplies and benefits to its allies. Arms have been provided
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
by the Soviet Union to all the members of the Warsaw Pact, Mainland China, Egypt, Syria,
Afghanistan, Guinea, Cuba and many other countries.
The country to which the USSR has delivered military aid most recently is Mor-
occo, to which the US had been providing military assistance and in which the US main-
tains bases. The USSR, in February 1961, delivered fourteen Soviet fighter planes to
Morocco.
Soviet assistance has enabled Mainland China, which produces small arms and
ammunitions, to undertake the production of Soviet-type artillery, jet aircraft, tanks and
submarines. (Reference 10)
Disarmament will, of course, diminish or remove the need for these armies and
armaments, releasing people and resources now involved. It is the transition period and
the interim problems of income, employment and security for which provision must be
made. This is particularly true because most other forms of economic aid now rendered
by the major powers are also affected by the arms race, although not so directly linked.
Non-Military Aid Also Predicated on Cold War Policy
US policies of non-military aid for economic development derive from the basic
US objective, since World War II, of confining the Soviet Union's power and influence
within narrow limits.
The place of non-military aid for economic development in this policy was de-
scribed by President Eisenhower in his State of the Union Message of 5 January 1956:
Because the conditions of poverty and unrest in less developed areas make
their people a special target of international communism, there is a need to
help them achieve the economic growth and stability necessary to preserve
their independence against Communist threats and enticements. (Reference
11)
President Eisenhower described not only US aid as being motivated by consider-
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VII NO. 64
9
ations of communism but he also said that the non-military aid rendered by the USSR has
similar motivation':
tions.
If the purpose of Soviet aid to any country were simply to help it overcome
economic difficulties without infringing its freedom, such aid could be wel-
comed as forwarding the free world purpose of economic growth. But there
is nothing in the history of international communism to indicate this can be
the case. Until such evidence is forthcoming, we and other free nations
must assume that Soviet bloc aid is a new, subtle, and long-range instru-
ment directed toward the same old purpose of drawing its recipient away
from the community of free nations and ultimately into the Communist orbit.
(Reference 12)
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Shifting Currents of Aid: Poland, Yugoslavia, UAR, Iraq
The cold war motivations of aid offered by both protagonists are clearly seen in
the record of the shifting of development funds made available by the US and the USSR to
Poland, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic and Iraq. The US began to render large-
scale economic assistance to Poland after the Polish uprisings of 1956. President John
F. Kennedy, on 30 January 1961, speaking in the context of the US goal for freedom of
the peoples in Eastern Europe, offered to broaden the existing aid being given to Poland.
In Afghanistan and the United Arab Republic, USSR aid has played a large role in
the promotion of neutralism. While the result of this aid has not been to make an outright
Soviet ally of Afghanistan or the UAR, the West is not able to rely on the support of either
country. Soviet aid to the Congo, directed, not through the UN, but given directly to the
Lumumba government, and its large-scale help to Cuba have had obvious cold war motiva-
Relationship of Cold War to Bargaining Power of Underdeveloped Countries
Nowhere has the connection between the cold war and economic development aid
shown up more clearly than in emerging Africa. After Guinea's break with France and
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
the West, the USSR became the largest supplier of aid to Guinea, its offers totaling $100
million.
In 1960, the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly
asked that all aid for the troubled Congo be channelled through UN. This stand was sup-
ported by the US, but was opposed by the late Premier Patrice Lumumba, who said:
If the United States refuses to help us except through the United Nations, we
will nevertheless accept aid from all sources....We are big enough and smart
enough to keep the "cold war" out of the Congo without the United Nations.
We will not be deceived. (Reference 13)
Premier Lumumba's reaction to the UN proposal recognized the fact that the cold
war and its concomitant arms race play a significant role in the bargaining power of cer-
tain underdeveloped countries.
[For analysis and review see IRS publications Congo and the United Nations: Volume
One Chronology and Review of Events (VI/61), December 1960, and Volume Two -
Analysis (VII/65), 1961.]
A
Cuba Conflict Stimulates New US Fund
In its quarrel with the US, the Castro Government in Cuba turned to the USSR for
help. The US had cut off its economic aid to Cuba as well as its purchases of sugar and
other Cuban exports. The USSR took the place of the US in becoming Cuba's largest
source of aid. The USSR, which views trade as part of its aid program, supplanted the
US as the biggest purchaser of sugar and the chief supplier of petroleum and other goods.
As the influence of the Castro movement - with its friendship for the USSR - grew
in other Latin American countries, the US responded by creating, in July 1960, a $500 mil-
lion program for the provision of capital to be used throughout Latin America in connection
with social and land reform. Peru was outside the cold war area until the revolution in
Cuba, and had previously received little aid. After Cuba had aligned itself with the USSR,
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Peru was among the first of the countries in Latin America to be promised a large loan in
the new US program.
[For analysis and review see IRS publications Cuba and the United States, Vol. VI No.
60, December 1960; and Latin America, Vol. IV No. 48, November 1958.]
Concern for Recipient Countries Sometimes Secondary
Peru's position in Latin America can be compared to that of Liberia in Africa.
Both countries are underdeveloped, with resources which need capital for development,
and each has been, until recently, outside the big power area of cold war conflict. The
capital for development made available to them and other countries in this position was
meager compared to aid offered by both sides to Yugoslavia and Egypt, to Asian allies
such as Thailand and Pakistan by the US, and by the USSR to Cuba.
Peaceful Competition in Aid a Possibility
Much of the aid granted for economic development has therefore had a direct re-
lationship to the cold war. It may well be that this aid for economic development will, in
the context of a world which has agreed to disarm, become the object of peaceful, rather
than cold war competition. In this event, the total amount may not be reduced, but this
fortunate situation should be safeguarded in advance.
The total impact of all economic aid provided by the big armed countries is slight,
however, compared to the importance of the income which underdeveloped countries re-
ceive from the export of raw materials, an important percentage of which is used in arma-
ments. Latin America, which in 1957 received $272 million of US economic aid, (Refer-
ence 14) exported copper, iron ore, lead, petroleum and zinc to the US, for which it re-
ceived $1,498 million. The prices at which these raw materials are sold are maintained
at their present level in part because of the demand created by purchases by the military
and for defense stockpiles.
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Stockpiles
The US imports 100 per cent of its natural rubber, tin and abaca, ninety-three per
cent of its nickel and chrome, and eighty-five per cent of its manganese and bauxite for
making aluminum. Cobalt, tungsten, copper and platinum are largely imported commodities.
Wool and certain agricultural products are also in this category. Oil has always been an
important import from underdeveloped countries. (Reference 15) Most of these commodi-
ties are purchased for stockpiling in the big armed countries. The US stockpile of stra-
tegic and critical materials represents an investment of over $8,000 million in other than
farm commodities. Ceylon, in 1961, was reported facing a crisis in rubber because of the
temporary cessation of British and US stockpile purchasing. Not only did the amount of
rubber sold by Ceylon decrease, but the price per pound dropped below the cost of pro-
duction. (Reference 16)
Raw Materials for Arms Building and Maintenance
Great as the sums involved in stockpiles are, even more is involved in the direct
sale of raw materials to armaments manufacturers who are building, on government con-
tract, planes or missiles. Tremendous amounts of oil, food products, wool, cotton and
other materials are also purchased by armies for their daily use. The diminished markets
resulting from the abandonment or constriction of stockpiling, the curtailment of the manu-
facture of armaments and decreases in armed forces could cause big price drops, smaller
sales with consequent loss of foreign exchange and a huge build-up of surpluses.
The Chief of State of a country which depends for its foreign exchange on the sale
of a commodity important to armaments put the problem in this way':
If the USSR were to accept the West's disarmament proposals, the US
would have a depression and it would survive it although it could
last eighteen months. We will not last six months, deprived of our
export revenue.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VII NO.64
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Countries Dependent on Income from Raw Materials
The problem of the size of the future market and the price of those raw materials
now being bought by the developed countries from the underdeveloped countries for the
making of armaments and the maintenance of armies can easily be demonstrated as
critical. More than half of Bolivia's export earnings come from tin; over two-thirds of
Chile's income is from copper; Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaya receive thirty
to fifty per cent of their foreign exchange earnings from rubber. The Middle East coun-
tries are almost entirely dependent on oil revenues and oil is one of the most vital neces-
sities to armaments and armies.
These and many other underdeveloped countries depend much more on their re-
ceipts from sales of these and other primary commodities than on any other foreign revenue
source. According to Paul Hoffman, Director of the UN Special Fund, earnings from export
sales bring underdeveloped countries $38 billion at the present volume of sales and at the
existing price level.
Korean War End Caused Mighty Decline
The Korean War was a shooting conflict, consuming vast amounts of raw materials,
and therefore affected market prices more violently than does the arms race. Neverthe-
less, the experience of the commodity and primary materials markets, once the fighting
ceased, is illuminating. In the years following the end of the Korean war, the New York
Journal of Commerce primary materials index dropped 51 per cent. Prices of some individ-
ual commodities or materials, most particularly affected by the war, fell even more. (Refer-
ence 17)
Price Drops Cripple Underdeveloped Countries
Price changes resulting from disarmament do not have to be as drastic as these to
cripple many underdeveloped countries. A change of only five per cent in average export
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOP ED COUNTRIES
prices is almost equivalent to the entire amount of private and public capital and grants
which come into underdeveloped countries in a year. (Reference 18)
Between mid-1957 and mid-1958 there was a ten per cent decline in the average
export prices of basic commodities. The loss to underdeveloped countries was equivalent
to one-sixth of their gold and foreign exchange holdings, or to about six years lending to
them by the World Bank. (Reference 19)
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, on 28 March 1961, speaking of the price drop of
1958, said that the loss of income to which the affected underdeveloped countries were
subjected was equal to more than twice the amount of economic aid by the US in the
same year. (Reference 20)
Trade Also in Cold War Area
The impact of disarmament in the future on the trade of the underdeveloped coun-
tries is, of course, not yet felt, but trade is also definitely in the area of the cold war.
Burma, faced with mounting resistance in selling its rice surplus in 1954, decided
that US rice exports were a cause of its difficulties. The USSR and other Communist
countries thereupon offered to buy a large portion of Burma's rice.
This use of trade as cold war policy was again in evidence during the dispute in
1956 between Iceland and Britain over fishing rights, when the Soviet Union purchased
Iceland's mounting surplus of fish.
The Soviet Union has taken agricultural surpluses cotton from Egypt and wool
from Uruguay - sending in return arms and other goods. The most recent instance in this
area is the large-scale Soviet purchase of sugar from Cuba after the US stopped its pur-
chases from that country.
Effect on Standard of Living
The greatest impact of a drop of export income would be on the standard of living
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VI! NO. 64
15
of people in an underdeveloped country. The fabric of stability will be torn if the standard
of living drops lower in underdeveloped countries and especially if the standard of living
in the developed countries remains fairly high. Should the US and USSR solve the economic
problems of converting from the arms race to disarmament while the underdeveloped coun-
tries find no solution, new rounds of revolution, rather than peaceful evolution, are prob-
able.
PART II
Political and Security Implications
These are some of the economic factors. The political and security implications
for underdeveloped countries are equally challenging. Underdeveloped countries are in-
volved not only with the armaments and the armed strength of the cold war antagonists
but also with those of other developed countries. Moreover, disarmament is a matter
which has a vital interest for those underdeveloped countries which themselves maintain
huge armies and rely on the implications of this internal armed strength to keep down in-
ternal rebellion and to dissuade external enemies from attacking.
Effects on Internal Status Quo
The fact of military involvement with one or the other major cold war antagonist
provides assurance for the continuation of the regimes of some underdeveloped countries.
Both the SEATO and the CENTO Pacts provide for action in the event of internal subver-
sion. In the case of Hungary, the Soviet forces based there used their might to install a
government more favorable to the USSR than was the incumbent group. In all these cases
there is no mistaking the meaning of the relationship of the armed strength of the cold war
antagonists to the composition and maintenance of the governments of the underdeveloped
countries.
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I
The maintenance of bases, the presence of outside military forces and the guarantee
of financial support have tended to keep in power governments such as those ruling Taiwan,
the Republic of Korea and Vietnam.
Effect on Dictatorships
This is especially true of dictatorships. The US acceptance of Francisco Franco
as an ally and the US maintenance of bases and expenditures in Spain of $1.4 billion since
1953 have helped not only militarily and economically to support the Franco regime but
have been a psychological factor in maintaining him internally. Dictatorships of one kind
or another also exist in Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, Portugal, the UAR and in com-
munist countries. Armaments and the armed strength of the big two countries play a role
in maintaining governments not reflecting the consent of the governed.
Defense Arrangements Entrusted to Armed Powers
Obviously, defense against external attack is a cardinal factor in all military al-
liances. Taiwan is, by such an alliance, under the protection of the US in any conflict
with Taiwan's avowed enemy, Mainland China. North Korea is similarly under the wing
of the USSR in a fight against South Korea. Connections such as these between the power
of the major country and the ability of these underdeveloped countries to defend them-
selves are well known, involving Turkey, Iran, Laos, Vietnam and Vietminh, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and others. In addition to these clear cold war situations, there are other less.
obvious relationships in which big countries have assumed responsibility for the defense
of smaller and weaker nations and areas.
While many of these defense arrangements have their origins in colonialism, some
have meaning in present day terms of protection against neighbors or other hostile coun-
tries. Kuwait and Bahrein have placed responsibility for their defense on the UK. The
A
'i
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17
UK also plays a special role in the defense arrangements of British Commonwealth mem-
bers. France has assumed defense responsibilities for the newly independent, French
speaking nations in Africa.
Big Power Might Part of Arsenal of Underdeveloped Countries
Some arrangements of this type are spelled out in treaties and agreements, but a
larger number are simply implied. There exists no specific agreement to guarantee that
India if attacked by China, or Israel if attacked by the UAR, would get US help; or that
Afghanistan if attacked by Pakistan, or Cuba if attacked by the Dominican Republic, would
get USSR help. In all these cases the armed might of the protector - explicit
explicit or implicit
is presently a weapon in the arsenal of these underdeveloped countries and is as such a
cardinal fact in the policy considerations of the underdeveloped countries concerned.
In some highly publicized situations, the expressed threat of one or the other big
armed country to come to the aid of an underdeveloped country, if attacked, has been used
by the government of the underdeveloped country as one of its power assets. Egypt, dur-
ing the Suez crisis, regarded the many USSR threats to use missiles in the event of attack
as its great deterrent. Soviet threats to use missiles if the French, British and Israelis
did not stop their invasion of the Suez in 1956 have been credited by Egypt with ending
the aggression against it.
Missiles Great Factor in Cuba: Impact of Threat to Use Force
The Government of Cuba reiterates that the USSR has promised that any aggression
against Cuba would be met by Soviet missiles. The Cuban Government credits these
Soviet promises with keeping a direct US attack from its shores.
It is the opinion of these and other underdeveloped countries that the survival of
their regimes has depended on the capacity of a major power to make good on promises,
such as these, to use force in their behalf if attacked.
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DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
This has been the case on occasions involving Turkey, Greece, Lebanon and Viet-
nam. In these instances, the threat that the big, heavily armed power would come to the
aid of an underdeveloped country has been used not only as an instrument of potential
force, but as a means by which some underdeveloped countries have raised their status
internally and among neighbors.
i
The promise that Soviet force might be used in behalf of the Government of Cuba
has helped Premier Castro to unify his own people and has given his words an added
significance with the peoples in the other countries of Latin America.
Maintenance of Armies by Underdeveloped Countries
The world is by no means in the situation where all the armaments are in the hands
of the two big developed countries, or of the five countries (US, UK, France, Canada and
USSR) which have historically participated in disarmament discussions.
Among the developed countries, West Germany is potentially a major armed power
and Italy and Belgium are not minor. Among the underdeveloped countries, many are armed.
Mainland China maintains the largest army in the world, and all agree that no disarmament
agreement could work unless China is part of it. India spends fifty per cent or more of its
budget for defense. Fearing Pakistan and China, India maintains a huge army.
Fear of Expansionism
The fear of neighbors by some governments of underdeveloped countries has re-
sulted in their maintaining huge armies in comparison with the size of their populations.
Israel, fearful of Arab invasion, spends more than thirty-three percent of its income on de-
fense, and maintains an army which is based on universal service of all its youth. The
UAR and other middle-east Arab states similarly maintain huge and expensive defense
establishments.
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19
Big Underdeveloped Countries' Armies Supplied and Supported by Armed Countries
Among the largest armies maintained by underdeveloped countries, other than China
and India, are those of countries leagued in pacts with the cold war antagonists. Taiwan,
South Korea and South Vietnam maintain armed forces of 600,000; 200,000; and 150,000,
respectively.
The financial support of these armies and the military equipment for them are a
responsibility directly assumed by the US. It is reasonable to assume that on the Sino-
Soviet side similar support maintains the large armies of North Korea and North Vietnam.
$5,000 Million Yearly Spent on Arms by Underdeveloped Countries
This is an area in which disarmament among the heavily armed nations would con-
tribute to large-scale production of the size of armies in underdeveloped countries. How-
ever, underemployment and unemployment are constant problems in the underdeveloped
countries and provision would have to be made in advance for the transition of the people
freed from military service into peaceful pursuits.
In any event, at the present time, according to the USSR, underdeveloped countries
are spending $5,000 million annually for military purposes. (Reference 21) It is hard to
visualize all underdeveloped countries, no matter what the inducement, agreeing to dis-
band their armies. Some believe that now, or the near future, is the time when they might
use force or the threat of force to induce change for the better.
Expansion and Consolidation
Many underdeveloped countries are not satisfied with the status quo. Some be-
lieve that the size of the areas which they control is too small. Some, and particularly
newly emerging countries, are convinced that the colonial powers which set down their
borders, separated ethnic groups which belong inside their countries. Morocco has de-
clared that it should logically encompass Mauretania; Ethiopia takes the same position
20
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
concerning parts of Somalia; and there are many other examples of this in Latin America,
the Middle East and Asia.
Some underdeveloped countries think that now is a propitious time for them to as-
similate contiguous areas which seem unable to govern themselves. The authorities of
Congo (Leopoldville) claim that Ghana seeks to annex parts of their country. The Arabs
say that they fear Israeli expansion into their countries, and Israel arms because of the
fear that the Arab countries will seek to "push them into the sea," a threat often made.
India and Pakistan arm against each other because each wants Kashmir.
The Arms Suppliers to Underdeveloped Countries.
Since underdeveloped countries
other than the comparatively small capability of
China, India, Israel and a few others have almost no arms industries of their own, all the
S
ܝ
above situations require that outsiders supply the arms. Presently developed countries are
supplying the arms to friendly governments - not linked in the security pacts. for defense
and policing. The US supplies supplies, planes, vehicles and arms for this purpose to
Tunisia and Guatemala; France supplies to Israel, Tunisia and Morocco; and the Soviet
Group, especially the USSR and Czechoslovakia, supply complete armaments equipment to
the UAR, Guinea and Cuba. Recently the USSR has supplied jet planes to Morocco. In
practically all cases the supplying country supplies the credits and in a good many cases
the country also supplies technicians.
Ma
Planes, Tanks and Guns for Underdeveloped Countries
Governments are, however, not the only suppliers of planes, vehicles and arms to
underdeveloped countries. The privately owned arms industries such as Bofors (Sweden),
Krupp (West Germany), Schneider-Creusot (France), Vickers (UK), Du Pont (US) and others
in Japan, Belgium and Switzerland are among the many companies which make direct sales
to buyers from underdeveloped countries. In nearly all developed countries there are
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL. VII NO. 64
21
interests dealing in used and obsolete armaments, perfectly good in the context of limited
military action in underdeveloped areas. The sales of these armaments companies and
those which sell air and ground transport are an important part of the present military
pattern in underdeveloped countries.
Curtailing Ability to Revolt
The stoppage of sales of planes, trucks and arms by private companies and the halt
in transfers of armaments by governments to underdeveloped countries would have many re-
sults. Among these would be the cessation of the flow of weapons and military supplies to
colonial peoples, now subjugated, seeking by force of arms to become independent. This
would affect groups such as the FLN in Algeria which now gets its arms in part from China
and the UAR, both recipients of arms from the Soviet group. The stoppage would also affect
the ability of discontented peoples to mount a revolt in countries such as the Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua and Cuba – all of which report internal attempts at rebellion.
The Force of Numbers
In some underdeveloped countries, such as Israel, a small population makes up in
arms the strength which it lacks in numbers. Israel has a population of 2.05 million; the
neighboring Arab countries have a population of forty million. A new equalizer in dis-
parate relationships such as this is necessary, as it also is in the cases of Afghanistan
and the USSR, Burma and Mainland China, and Guatemala and the US..
Search for Equalizers
In a few of the underdeveloped countries technological progress has already been
so great that it is clear that their nuclear potentials can be realized. This is particularly
true of India, Israel and China.
22
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOP ED COUNTRIES
P
These countries and some few others now participate somewhat in space research,
tracking and in communications. This, like nuclear energy, has great convertibility to war
since rockets need not carry nuclear warheads. The growing proficiency of some under-
developed countries in these areas indicates that all nations, and especially those which
are moving fastest in technology, must be brought into a world-wide disarmament inspec-
tion system.
Avenues Toward Solutions
PART III
This resolution':
P
I
This examination of the scope and depth of the economic, social and political ef-
fects on underdeveloped countries which might flow from any disarmament agreed upon by
the major powers is in general terms. Enough is revealed to indicate the importance not
only of further study of the possible effects of disarmament, but of the necessity for prep-
aration of methods by which the governments of underdeveloped countries can participate
in discussions. These methods would have the capability of providing underdeveloped
countries with a voice in disarmament decisions vital to them and in creating a vehicle.
for the protection of their interests.
A beginning toward these ends was made when Pakistan, at the 1960 General As-
sembly, sponsored a resolution titled "Economic and Social Consequences of Disarma-
ment."
Requests the Secretary-General to examine:
(a) The national economic and social consequences of disarmament in
different countries with different economic systems at different stages
of economic development, including, in particular, the problems of
replacing military expenditures with alternative private and public
civil expenditures so as to maintain effective demand and to absorb
the human and material resources released from military uses;
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23
(b) The possible development of structural imbalances in national econo-
mies as a result of the cessation of capital investment in armaments
industries, and the adoption of possible corrective measures to pre-
vent such imbalances, including expanding capital assistance to the
underdeveloped countries;
(c) The impact of disarmament on international economic relations, in-
cluding its effect on world trade and especially on the trade of under-
developed countries;
(d) The utilization of resources released by disarmament, for the purpose
of economic and social development, in particular of the underdevel-
oped countries;...
(For entire text of resolution see Appendix C)
The lack of enthusiasm by big powers to undertake disarmament measures has in
the past led to their support of studies as a substitute for the action they were hesitant to
take. This may be the intention in this case. However, recognition of the implication of
this study to underdeveloped countries could serve to broaden the scope of the resolution
and harden the determination of the UN Secretariat to make an exhaustive rather than a
cursory examination of the problems as they relate to underdeveloped countries.
Big Power Promises
While leaders of the great powers have not often recognized that the economic
consequences of their disarmament might be very costly for underdeveloped countries,
they have indicated that a part of their own savings, effected through cuts in their arms
and armed forces, should go to speed economic development in the underdeveloped coun-
tries. Promises of this kind have been made since 1953. In a speech to the American
Society of Newspaper Editors on 16 April 1953, President Eisenhower said:
This government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in de-
voting a substantial percentage of any savings achieved by real disarma-
ment to a fund for world aid and reconstruction.
France, too, supported this idea. At the Geneva Summit Conference in August 1954,
-
24
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UND ERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
Premier Edgar Faure proposed that money saved in disarmament be transferred into funds
to finance economic development. Premier Khrushchev of the USSR has frequently voiced
the same proposal and on 9 October 1959 the Soviet Union, presenting UN with the USSR
disarmament proposals, stated:
The appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form, whether from State
budgets or from public organizations, shall be discontinued, which will permit
the reduction or abolition of taxation of the population. The funds made avail-
able as a result of the implementation of general and complete disarmament shall
be used to subsidize national economies and to furnish extensive economic and
technical assistance to under-developed countries. (Reference 22)
President Eisenhower, on 13 October 1959, reiterated his position:
No other aspiration dominates my own being so much as this: that the nations
of East and West will find dependable, self-guaranteeing methods to reduce the
vast and essentially wasteful expenditures for armaments, so that a part of the
savings may be used in a comprehensive and effective effort for world improve-
ment. (Reference 23)
Redeeming the Promises
All these promises that some disarmament savings will be used by the major pow-
ers for economic development of underdeveloped countries are however vague and nebu-
lous; they are anything but firm commitments. Despite the earlier linking of funds for
economic development with savings from disarmament, the US, on 20 April 1960, said to
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC):
...that a resolution by the council at this session linking the two subjects
would not further either objective; it is more likely to be detrimental. (Refer-
ence 24)
This US stand was supported at the same time by the United Kingdom. Both felt
that any spelling out of earlier promises should be delayed until disarmament had been
achieved.
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25
Tax Relief and Needed Public Works
The big powers, even if sincere, face real problems in estimating what savings
would remain for diversion into the economic development in underdeveloped countries.
The needs of their own peoples for schools, hospitals, housing and public works have
priority. Citizens now overburdened with taxes for carrying armaments and armies will
demand and get tax relief.
Nevertheless, underdeveloped countries want to participate in discussions on how
much money is involved in these big power promises and when, where and under whose
auspices the money will be spent.
Economic Planning Essential
If the signs can be believed, the transition period following disarmament may re-
sult in retrogression for the underdeveloped countries rather than economic progress. Un-
employment, closing down of mines and other facilities, constriction of exports and sharp
drops in prices of commodities are not factors for development.
The experience of underdeveloped countries in the past indicate what may be ex-
pected. The wide fluctuation in prices of exports has on many occasions made economic
planning difficult, and the drops in prices of commodities have decreased the income
available for development.
US Ambassador Stevenson, in March 1961, related these experiences of underde-
veloped countries to a need for the creation of some apparatus by which such losses of
income could be avoided.
Ambassador Stevenson said:
We have been very preoccupied with commodity stabilization both because it
is the only means by which these smaller countries that are dependent on raw
material exports can maintain any increase in the standard of living and in
the economy but it is always very important to use because it makes our aid
go much further. (Reference 25)
26
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UND ERD EVELOPED COUNTRIES
Under conditions where the US would be disarming, not only commodity price
stabilization but the maintenance of a market big enough to absorb the production of the
underdeveloped countries would be required.
The Economic Development Problem
Were problems such as these to be brought under control, attention could again be
concentrated on economic development. The underdeveloped countries comprise a popula-
tion of 1,250 million people in 100 countries. Paul Hoffman, Director of the UN Special
Fund estimates the development need, in terms of foreign exchange of these peoples and
countries, at forty-five billion dollars in the next ten years, most of which would come
from sales of exports. Mr. Hoffman does not believe the remaining sum, less than ten
billion dollars, to be large. He says':
What is that figure compared to the one thousand billion dollars, let me repeat
that, one thousand billion dollars, that will, at the present rate, be spent in
the next ten years by our advanced countries on defense, on armaments.
According to the USSR, the five billion dollars now being spent by underdeveloped
countries on arms each year would, if redirected, lead to a rise of one-third in the standards
of living in the underdeveloped countries. (Reference 26)
The 1960 General Assembly debates brought forth many other comparisons of the
kind made by Mr. Hoffman and the representatives of the Soviet Union. Here are some
examples':
The highly developed countries spend on armaments a sum equal to the total
production of the underdeveloped countries.
One tenth of the production of our planet is being thrown into funds earmarked
for destruction and devastation instead of being directed towards the advance-
ment and progress of mankind.
The world spends at least 100 billion dollars per year on armaments, while the
industrialized countries have in the last ten years spent only about 40 billion
dollars on aid, assistance, investments, etc., for the underdeveloped areas of
the world.
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE VOL VII NO.64
27
The fact that the cost of a single B-17 super-bomber is equal to the total
assistance extended through the United Nations for the development of
underdeveloped countries in the course of one year points clearly to the
urgent need of abandoning the course now being pursued.
The allocation of only one tenth of the funds which the great Powers are
spending for military purposes today would increase the amount of assist-
ance to underdeveloped countries by ten billion dollars a year.
Unfortunately most of these comparisons - and this is also true of those made by
Messrs. Khrushchev, Eisenhower and Faure - are based on the illusion that when a gov-
ernment stops spending on armaments it will make the money saved available for develop-
ment. The reality is that the bulk of the money will, in the event of disarmament, simply
not continue to exist since the need of governments to create currency or incur debt to pay
for armaments will not exist.
UN Charter Provision
Doubt on Conversion to Economic Development
There is, however, no doubt but that the freeing of even a tiny part of the re-
sources and manpower now going into defense and preparation for war could be used for
development which would raise the standard of living throughout the underdeveloped coun-
tries and make the deserts bloom and the salt water sweet. Korea maintains an army of
600,000 and the countries receiving US defense support funds have three million of their
own nationals under arms. There exists a great reservoir of manpower, if there is any-
thing for them to do. These aspects of planning must proceed side by side with consider-
ation of disarmament. (Reference 27)
Planning of this kind is in accord with basic UN objectives. In the preamble of
the Charter is set down the goal of promoting "social progress and better standards of
living in larger freedom," using "international machinery for the promotion of the
-
28
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
economic and social advancement of all peoples...' The problem is to implement this
aspiration while providing protection for all concerned against potential economic and
political aggressors. (Reference 28)
The Political Necessities
The removal of the protection of the large, armed countries from smaller, weaker
that of the US from Formosa or that of the USSR from East Germany may
have grave consequences. Or if under "complete and general disarmament" the power
of strong indigenous armies - as the large armies of the UAR, Israel or India – is re-
moved, then the question arises of what will take its place. As part of disarmament
programs and planning, problems facing underdeveloped countries of defense against ex-
ternal aggression, subversion and propaganda mounted from without, and protection against
economic warfare must all receive continuing consideration.
countries
C
Equal Voice in UN
No defense for underdeveloped countries, in the event of disarmament, can be
visualized outside the framework of a world organization.
If this is to be the United Nations, the organs of UN, including the Secretariat,
must be remodeled to provide better representation for underdeveloped countries. The
demand for this has already been heard. During the 1960 General Assembly debates,
African and Asian states asked for better representation. Nigeria said that the African
states wanted all members of the UN to be able to participate effectively in its work;
they wanted to be represented on the executive organs. The representative of Nigeria
said that he believed the great powers should think less of their greatness and agree to
the new states taking part in the adoption of economic, social and political decisions;
otherwise the presence of the Afro-Asian countries would be meaningless. (Reference 29)
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29
Problems of Peaceful Change
The UN has up to now made little provision for solving certain kinds of political
problems among underdeveloped countries which seem bound to arise in the event of dis-
armament. These problems encompass a wide range including revision of borders, ethnic
and other adjustments up to and including the substitution of one kind of political, social
or economic setup for another. Involved here are also the problems of the creation of new
states out of existing countries and the suppression of states no longer viable. The UN
has not, as yet, discussed the bringing of tribal conflicts under control or what to do to
alleviate the pressure of growing populations to expand into neighboring areas.
Redistribution of ownership of, and rights and access to, natural resources is in-
evitable and already raises problems, as do punitive but peaceful economic measures such
as the embargoes placed on imports from an underdeveloped country by a developed coun-
try which might also, for the same reasons, remove its capital from the underdeveloped
country. There remain a gamut of problems relating to air space and to offshore fishing,
drilling rights and boundaries. The problems culminate in the requirement that the UN
have the prestige and the strength necessary to gain acceptance for its solutions.
Defense and Police Protection
At the core of all the political problems raised by disarmament is that which con-
cerns the international system of defense and police protection which will guarantee the
security of the underdeveloped countries in a world where the big countries are disarmed.
If the underdeveloped countries themselves are to disarm such a system must not only be
in place but enjoy their trust. This trust will come only if there exists, side by side with
the defense system, inspection machinery on which each underdeveloped country can rely
for assurance that potentially dangerous neighbors or more distant aggressive countries
are not secretly arming themselves in preparation for surprise attack or arming dissidents
30
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
to rise and capture power. Venezuela fears that Cuba is arming Venezuelan dissidents
along these lines and Cuba fears the continued US arming of Cuban dissidents to capture
power from Castro.
UN Peace Force
Systems of UN defense and inspection which could provide the underdeveloped
countries with assurance and security do not, of course, yet exist. There have, however,
been many proposals for the creation of a UN force which would be able to keep the peace.
As visualized, this type of force would be separate from any inspection apparatus estab-
lished under disarmament agreements. In recent years, ideas for a permanent force have
generally been based on the precedent of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), which was
created as a direct outgrowth of the crisis which resulted from the invasion of Egypt by
Israel, Britain and France in the last days of October 1956.
UNEF, however, was a specially created organization for a specific job and not a
general security organization charged with the problems of maintaining peace throughout
the world. Also, UNEF went into Egypt by agreement with Egypt, and an aggressor is not
likely to grant UN permission to establish itself on the scene.
"Window Pane" Concept of UNEF
The UNEF concept is that of a force functioning as a "window pane" interposed
between two potential antagonists. An aggressor on either side would have to shatter the
"window pane" and so alert the world to go into action against the aggressor. This inter-
position provides a satisfactory method where two known antagonists need to be separated,
but the method does not apply in places where there have been no hostilities and therefore
no demarcated border of conflict.
Similarly, UNEF has no police function and it was created by the UN General
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31
Assembly and not by the Security Council which is, under the UN Charter, the only organ
charged with the responsibility for peaceful settlement of disputes. (Reference 30)
Congo Force as Model for Peace Force
The Congo Force (ONUC) differs from UNEF in that it was created by the Security
Council and has a police function. ONUC however came into being to put down disorders;
it was not sent in at an early date to prevent disorders from occurring. A UN force would
have to be intent on preventing border incursions and protecting against internal subver-
sion supported from without.
Aside from the obvious dangers of possible invasions of sovereignty involved in
any force provided by UN to a nation, both the police force and the peace force share a
political weakness which has already been demonstrated in ONUC. Governments which
initially contributed soldiers to ONUC have found themselves in political disagreement
with UN, or favoring one or another faction inside the Congo. Countries have, on these
grounds and also because they have disagreed with the Secretary-General's handling of
the crisis, withdrawn their soldiers. A breakdown such as this could leave UN too weak
to defend any country, or could lead to political solutions unwanted by the host govern-
ment. Answers to these questions raised by recent experience seem to lead away from
national contributions and toward creation of a UN force of individual soldiers, who would
serve as UN civil servants now do.
Objections to Peace Force
Proposals for a permanent international peace force have, in the past, been met by
other objections. Prominent among these have been the objections of the USSR, which has
feared western domination of a UN army. Other arguments against a UN force are that it
might be used by a UN majority against a minority. Small nations, particularly those until
recently under colonial domination, also fear that big powers - either East or West - in
32
DISARMAMENT: IMPACT ON UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRI ES
control of UN might use an international police force to their own advantage and to the
detriment of weaker countries.
Inspection System
Even with international police and peace forces in operation, the problem of in-
spection remains, and it encompasses what goes on in the underdeveloped countries. Some
underdeveloped countries have considerable arms manufacturing capability, and others,
such as Mainland China, Israel and India, have the technological knowledge and the re-
actors with which atomic weapons can be made. All countries, developed or not, have the
ability to secrete arms or nuclear weapons; planes anywhere can quickly be converted
from peace to war. Inspection, in the light of these obvious facts, must be universal and
the inspection force international in composition and allegiance.
The Widening of Horizons.
Many of the problems ahead will only be seen as the discussion of the terms of a
disarmament agreement exposes new horizons. In relation to the underdeveloped coun-
tries, knowledge concerning the tasks of the future in a disarmed world can be compared
with the problems of old age. These could not have been known until man's life span
increased.
The Great Prize
For the underdeveloped country the prize of disarmament is, in the last analysis,
the creation of a system of world law which will protect the aspirations of the weak and
the less fortunate and which will nurture the hopes of the newly emerging countries.
Disarmament discussions are today centered on the great nations, as perhaps
they must have been up to now. The discussions of the great nations are preoccupied
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33
with whether there shall be "complete and general disarmament," disarmament without
control, control without decrease in armaments, or some solution which involves parts of
these. All the formulations are being considered primarily in the light of the interests of
the major countries. Solutions are being sought through research relating to discussions.
about regulation, inspection, detection, protection and the other manifold technical prob-
lems which are tied in with disarmament. These technical problems are in process of be-
coming a special science.
Concern for these technical problems should not be used to obscure the necessity
for keeping underdeveloped countries safe from collapse. The stability of the underdevel-
oped countries, without whom there can be no security for any country, depends on recogni-
tion of the political, social and economic impacts of disarmament on underdeveloped coun-
tries, on measures taken promptly to safeguard their transition, and on the participation of
underdeveloped countries in disarmament discussions at every level.
1
REFERENCES
1. Procurement Study, Hearings (Part I) before the Procurement Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 8 and 9 February 1960, p. 23.
2. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1960 (Eighty-first edition), U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Washington, D.C., 1960, p. 242; and Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Pro-
curement and Supply, Joint Economic Subcommittee on Defense Procurement, U.S. Congress, 16
February 1960, p. 20.
3. Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Within and Outside the United States, Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 29 December 1959.
4. The Mutual Security Program, Fiscal Year 1959, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of
Defense and International Cooperation Administration, February 1958.
5. Wall Street Journal, 25 January 1961.
6. SEATO Record of Progress: 1959-1960, The South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Bangkok, 1960.
7. The New York Times, 27 February 1961.
8. “Preliminary Conclusions" of Presidential Committee to Study the United States Military Assist-
ance Program, Washington, 17 March 1959; as reprinted in The New York Times, 18 March 1959.
9. Martin, William McChesney, Jr., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 7 March 1957.
10. Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Prepared by the U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency with the Department of State and the Department of Defense, for the Subcommittee
on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 17 June 1960, p. 23.
11. Eisenhower, Dwight D., State of the Union Message, joint session of U.S. Congress, Washington,
D.C., 5 January 1956; as reprinted in The New York Times, 6 January 1956.
12. Eisenhower, Dwight D., from statement by Douglas Dillon before the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, U.S. Senate, 3 March 1958, as reprinted in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol.
XXXVIII, No. 978.
13. Lumumba, Patrice, statement in Leopoldville; as reprinted in The New York Times, 7 August
1960.
14. Statistical Abstract. . ., op. cit., p. 873.
15. Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, op. cit., p. 45.
16. The New York Times, 14 January 1961; 11 February 1961.
17. Journal of Commerce, 29 March 1961.
- 35 -
REFERENCES, Continued
18. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1957, United Nations, Bangkok, 1958.
19. Commodity Survey, 1958, United Nations, New York, 1959.
20. Stevenson, Adlai E., US Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 3677, 28 March 1961.
21. Official Records of the One Thousand One Hundred and Ninth Meeting of the UN Economic
and Social Council, New York, 20 April 1960, pp. 81-82.
22. Verbatim Record of the One Thousand and Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the First Committee, UN
General Assembly, 9 October 1959. UN document A/C.1/PV.1026.
23. Verbatim Record of the One Thousand and Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the First Committee,
UN General Assembly, 14 October 1959. UN document A/C.1/PV.1027.
24. Phillips, Christopher H., US Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 3388, 20 April 1960.
25. Stevenson, Adlai E., op. cit.
26. Sobolev, Arkady, UN Economic and Social Council, Press Release ECOSOC/1780; Pro-
visional Summary Record of the One Thousand One Hundred and Ninth Meeting of the
Economic and Social Council, 20 April 1960. UN document PSR/ECOSOC/1109.
27. The Mutual Security Program..., op. cit., p. 38.
28. Charter of the United Nations, United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York.
29. Summary Record of the Two Hundred and Seventeenth Meeting of the Special Political Com-
mittee, UN General Assembly, 5 December 1960. UN document A/SPC/SR.217.
ļ
30. The United Nations Emergency Force, Vol. III No. 33, International Review Service, New
York, May 1957; and UNEF, Vol. II, International Review Service, New York, November 1956.
- 36 -
APPENDIX A: ARMED FORCES ESTIMATES OF NATO, WARSAW PACT & OTHER
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Belgium......
Canada
Denmark
United States
France
United Kingdom
Iceland
Italy......
Western Germany
Greece....
Country
Norway
Portugal
Turkey..
NATO
Luxembourg
Netherlands
...
5 Has announced cut of 9,000.
6 Has announced cut of 18,000.
SOURCE:
....
7 Has announced cut of 34,000.
8 Has announced cut of 20,000.
9 Has announced cut of 47,000.
10 Has announced cut of 40,000.
Estimate of
present
armed forces
based on
published
sources 1
2,814,632
752,800
2772,000
140,000
116,000
41,000
(3)
11
127,300
None
268,000
3,000
39,100
33,000
73,090
422,750
WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES
U.S.S.R......
Albania .....
Bulgaria.....
Czechoslovakia
East Germany.
Hungary.
Poland
Rumania
……………
Country
-
OTHER EUROPEAN STATES
Austria
Finland
Ireland.....
Spain
Sweden......
Switzerland
Yugoslavia
***
GRAD
- 37 -
••••
556,300
Estimates based on sources available to the public as of June 1956. Cong. Rec. July 26, 1956, p. 13414.
2 Reductions planned.
3 Goal of 500,000. The new West German Defense Minister, appointed in October 1956, is reported to favor
a goal of about 300,000 men, rather than the 500,000 planned by NATO. New York Times, October 17,
1956: 1; October 18, 1956: 32.
Estimate of
present
armed forces
based on
published
sources 1
***** •
4 Estimate of size of Soviet forces if the announced reductions were carried out. Special assistant to the
President on Disarmament, July 13, 1956.
42,900,000
555,000
6183,500
7225,000
113,500
8172,500
9570,000
10172,500
6,500
38,500
13,060
461,000
73,500
"CONTROL AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS: DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY IN
EUROPE, STAFF STUDY NO.5, SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS; 84TH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION;
WASHINGTON 1956.
APPENDIX B: GOVERNMENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN RELATION TO TOTAL BUDGET
Country by Country, 1952-57
Country
NATO
COUNTRIES
United States
France
United Kingdom
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
West Germany
Greece
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Turkey
WARSAW PACT
COUNTRIES
USSR
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
MIDDLE EAST
COUNTRIES
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Lebanon
Syria
(Figures on defense and armaments expenditures are not strictly comparable since governments do
not always classify expenditures under readily identifiable headings. It is also not possible to
make accurate comparisons between total budgets of countries some of which reflect expenditures
capital outlay, social and welfare, etc. — not assumed by other governments.)

India
Japan
Pakistan
Philippines
Thailand
Australia
New Zealand
Argentina
Brazil
Mexico
Spain
Yugoslavia
South Africa
Estimated
Population
Mid -1955
(in 1000's)
165,271
43,274
51,215
8,868
15,601
4,439
49,995
7,973
48,016
10,751
3,425
8,765
24,122
200,200
1,394
7,548
13,089
16,700
9,805
27,278
(53)17,000
22,934
21,146
5,200
1,748
1,427
1.425
4,145
OTHER
COUNTRIES
China-Mainland 582,000
381,690
89,100
82,439
21,849
20,302
9,201
2,136
19,111
58,456
29,679
28,976
17,628
13,669
Figures Given
for Years
Ending
30 June
31 Dec.
30 Nov.
31 Dec.
31 Mar.
31 Mar.
31 Mar.
30 June
30 June
31 Dec.
30 June
31 Dec.
28 Feb.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Ded.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
30 June
20 March
30 April
31 March
31 March
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 March
31 March
31 March
30 June
31 Dec.
30 June
31 March
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Dec.
31 Mar.
Figures Expressed In
millions of US $
thousand millions of francs
millions of E
millions of francs
millions of dollars
millions of kroner
millions of Deutsche mark
thousand millions of drachma
thousand millions of lira
millions of guilder
millions of kroner
millions of escudos
millions of Turkish
millions of rubles
millions of lek
millions of leva
millions of korunas
millions of Deutsche mark
millions of forints
millions of zloty
millions of leu
millions of Egypt.
millions of rials
millions of dinar
millions of Israeli E
millions of Jordan dinars
millions of Lebanese ₺
millions of Syrian
millions of Yuan
millions of rupees
thousand millions of yen
millions of rupees
millions of pesos
millions of baht
millions of Aus. E
millions of N.Z. E
millions of pesos
millions of cruzieros
millions of pesos
millions of pesetas
millions of dinars
millions of S. A. E
Rate of Ex- Gross Natl.
change for Product
1955
US Dollar
38
!
350
.36
50
(av.).97
6.9
4.2
30
625
3.8
7.14
28.75
2.8
4
50
6.8
(1954-56)
7.2
2.2
12
4
6
CO
.35
(1955-57)
75
.36
(1955-)
1.8
.36
(Free Rate)
3.2
3.58
2.34
4.76
360
4.76
2
20
.45Ե
.36 E
18
18.5
12.5
42
300
.36
391700
16790
19101
('54)430000
26770
27670
154000
13639
29 260
234 20
51800
20559
111
│! ! ! !
!
('54)1830
('54)114800
7424
8865
('54)31860
4760
929
('54)553200
84000
Note: Exchange rates quoted do not necessarily reflect the relation of pur-
chasing power of the national currency to that of the United States dollar.
Unless listed as estimate or free rate, exchange rates used in this table are
based or the 26th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements,
Baale. 1957.
1952
Total Gov't. Defense
Expenditure Expenditure
65408
3720
4704
90025
3635
4206
18530
8130
2262
5045
3230
5694
1580
460 200
9615
(BE)42500
29000
209
}
33
196
13
88
266
16322
6707
1815
635
4264
748
172
15365
28461
6464
22718
253
43976
1389
1110
21286
1415
531
7915
2657
404
1177
708
1168
470
108600
(BE)1122
(BE)5900
5000
44
1
8
55
9
18
105
4278
1850
858
182
844
165
18
3320
9257
434
7540
24
APPENDIX B (CONTINUED)

1953
1954
1956
Total Gov't.
Total Gov't.
Total Gov't.]
Defense
Total Gov't.]
Defense
Defense
Total Gov't.
Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure Expenditure
Defense
Defense
74274
3275
5007
94419
4232
4718
20623
7531
2529
5692
4043
6244
1751
(BE)86200
49000
(BE)97000
35600
186
|
514800 (BE)110200 (BE)552800 (BE)100300
10010
15800
(BE)1125
9000
(BE) 2100 (BE)17000
(BE)1100
(BE) 1900
51
265
13
100
(PR)196
23350
6946
868
1997
660
4862
825
183
16417
39925
5490
23930
50363
1292
1404
19303
1882
682
7892
2702
280
439
1324
1033
1456
500
36
(BE)8400 (BE) 87600
35400
82000 (BE) 47900
(BE) 10400- 116500
6800 (BE)39300
14
46
9
21
(PR)66
67772
3241
4847
46904
1090
1364
95793 (EST)18079
1806
4239
5144
870
20060
5522
9838
3375
2330
451
6019
1595
1170
1791
711
5225
1887
135
961
167
940
203
26
3775
11260
479
7389
4380
6510
2394
23
(E) 175
(E) 12456
61
356
15
125
(PR)221
24632
7677
999
1992
787
5273
788
194
18117
53661
48 28
27190
307
(BE)7787
(E) 39
(E) 2544
16
50
10
22
(PR)76
1955
4246
13458
650
7963
66386
40478
(E) 1180
(E)4127
(PR)5253 (PR)1405
(E) 102350|(EST)19154| (DE)95017| (DE)19459
(PR)4311 (PR) 1740
(RE)960
(RE)5378
6105
(E)3960
478
(RE)1766
(E)928
22512
(E)13084
2783
(RE)7274
(E)4297
(E)7433
(E) 1952
(E)725
(E) 2976
220
64570
3464
4997
(BE)86039 (BE) 10430
36100
(BE)7200
43100
7800
10900 (BE)115000 (BE)11900
(BE)4300 (BE)43000 (BE)4500
4152
5558
20932
11221
2489
(PR)6940
4345
(E) 7133
2654
(E) 195
(DE)17943
(E) 77
512
(E) 18
5814 (EST) 29737
1939
9345
165
1052
769
1853
160
854
944
4978
170
28
832
(PR)200
(E) 13828
(E) 56695
(E) 5681
(E) 31956
(E) 148
(E) 261
40626
906
1436
1666
993
5893
3720
448
(PR) 1689
1141
(E) 1960
834
322
1500 (BE)13800|
1800 (BE)17600
(E) 54
(DE)3978
(E) 17
539500 (BE) 105000 (BE)569600 (BE)10 2500 (BE)604600 (BE 96700
10600
17000
(BE)1100 (BE)14900
(BE)1500 (BE)18400
(BE)1000
(BE)1500
60
(E) 10
(E) 24
(E) 81
(EST)7193
1979
161
683
148
855
173
(PR)24
(E) 2621
(E) 12212
(E) 678
(E) 8474
- 39 ·
20
(E) 209
(E) 14844
(E) 112
(PR) 663
(E) 18
(E) 160
(RE)11648
(RE) 1033
(RE) 2511
(RE) 1042
(E) 5893
908
(E) 13828
(E) 71505
(E) 6696
(E) 35833
(PR)320
This table was prepared by Intemational Review Service with statistics from the
following sources; United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1956; United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, Yearbooks and Bulletins; International
Financial Statistics published by the Intemational Monetary Fund, and The New
York Times.
(E) 55
(DE) 4500
(E) 15
(BE)89887
(BE)9300
(BE)9606 (BE)97900
(BE)35500 (BE)1000 (BE)39100 (BE)1000
(BE)42100 (BE)6000
(BE)136700 (BE)12100 (BE)138800 (BE)10200
(BE)44400 (BE)4000 (BE)45200 (BE)3700
(PR)59
(E) 10
(E) 30
¡
(RE)2078
(RE)142
(RE)884
(RE)153
(E) 8 20
190
1957
(E) 69093
(E) 2621
(E) 18563
(E) 779
(E) 9538
|(BE)158500
(PR) 22
(E) 5766
(E) 4396
(E)5298
(E) 3 2062
(DE) 2983
(E)6885
(E)4809
(E) 33 25
(E) 19865
PR
RE
(E) 250
DE
BE
E
Est.
(E) 637
(E) 14338
(E) 1068
(DE) 2987
(DE) 1210
11
(E)40824
(E) 1499
(E) 358
(E) 1775
(E) 962
(E)11902
(DE)511
(E)1446
(E)912
(E) 785
(E) 75
(E)5871
(E) 72
| |
(RE) 2330
(E) 168
(DE) 1057
(DE) 137
8 1111
(E) 190
(BE)158500
(E) 25
CODE
Provisional results
Revised estimates
Draft estimates
Budget estimates
Voted estimates
Estimated figures
APPENDIX C: GA RESOLUTION ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT
A/RES/1516 (XV)
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY •
RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 1378 (XIV) OF 20 NOVEMBER 1959,
CONSCIOUS THAT THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT IS LIKELY TO SET IN MOTION GREAT
CHANGES IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIES OF STATES AND IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, AS A RESULT OF THE PROGRESSIVE DIVERSION OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL
RESOURCES FROM MILITARY TO PEACEFUL PURPOSES,
RECOGNIZING THAT EFFECTIVE ACTION AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS
WILL NEED TO BE TAKEN TO MAKE USE OF MATERIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES BECOMING
AVAILABLE AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DISARMAMENT, IN ORDER TO PROMOTE SOCIAL PROGRESS
AND BETTER STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE WORLD,
BEARING IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC STUDIES IN
THIS FIELD TO ENABLE MEMBER STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH ARE UNDER-DEVELOPED,
TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN THE EVENT OF DISARMAMENT,
CONVINCED THAT IT IS BOTH TIMELY AND DESIRABLE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH STUDIES,
1. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXAMINE:
(A) THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DISARMAMENT IN
COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SYSTEMS AND AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING, IN PARTICULAR, THE PROBLEMS OF REPLACING MILITARY
EXPENDITURES WITH ALTERNATIVE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CIVIL EXPENDITURES SO AS TO
MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE DEMAND AND TO ABSORB THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES
RELEASED FROM MILITARY USES;
(B) THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURAL IMBALANCES IN NATIONAL
ECONOMIES AS A RESULT OF THE CESSATION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN ARMAMENTS
INDUSTRIES, AND THE ADOPTION OF POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT SUCH
IMBALANCES, INCLUDING EXPANDED CAPITAL ASSISTANCE TO THE UNDER-DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES;
(c) THE IMPACT OF DISARMAMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
INCLUDING ITS EFFECT ON WORLD TRADE AND ESPECIALLY ON THE TRADE OF UNDER-
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES;
THE UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES RELEASED BY DISARMAMENT FOR THE PURPOSE
OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, IN PARTICULAR OF THE UNDER-DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES;
2. RECOMMENDS THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD CONDUCT THE PROPOSED
EXAMINATION WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF EXPERT CONSULTANTS TO BE APPOINTED BY HIM
WITH DUE REGARD TO THEIR QUALIFICATIONS AND TO THE NEED OF GEOGRAPHICAL
REPRESENTATION AND INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF COUNTRIES WITH DIFFERENT ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS AND AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT;
3.
APPEALS TO GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES TO GIVE FULL CO-OPERATION TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE FULFILLMENT OF THE TASK ENTRUSTED TO HIM;
4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SUBMIT A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE
RESULTS OF THE EXAMINATION TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL AT ITS THIRTY-
THIRD SESSION;
(0)
5. REQUESTS THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL TO TRANSMIT THE REPORT WITH
ITS VIEWS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS SEVENTEENTH SESSION.
40
-
948TH PLENARY MEETING,
15 DECEMBER 1960.
Sisal &
Evergreen
Carpet
Wool
Beryllium
Manganese⭑
Nickel
Tungsten
Zinc
THE US IMPORTS A
LARGE % OF MANY
VITAL RAW MATERIALS
Lead
Iron
Ore
APPENDIX D: RAW MATERIALS FROM UNDERDEVELOPED
0%
*35% or more Ma
COUNTRY SOURCES
50%
- 41 -
Mexico
Argenting
Brazi
Brazil
Cuba
Brazil:
100% 0%
Peru
SHARE FROM
LATIN AMERICA
Mexico
Mexico
Venezuel
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Mexico Peru
3 9015 06552 4137

Brazil Haiti
Bolivia
Argentina
Chile
TAB Peru
50%
100%
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce
7
į.
!.
!!
1.
}:
:
>