INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
B 1,635,731

DISARMAMENT
Postwar Through 1957
including
Satellites and Missiles
Edited by
A. G. Mezerik
Vol. III. No. 39
December 1957
:
BUHR/good
JZ
5625
D57
1957
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE
A.G. MEZERIK Editor
PHYLLIS GREENE Associate Editor
15 WASHINGTON PLACE
NEW YORK 3 USA
UN BUREAU: ROOM 352
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PLAZA 1-0833 CABLE: UNOVIRS
Contents
DISARMAMENT: Postwar Through 1957
USSR Announces Boycott of UN Organs
New Apparent Areas of Agreement
Unilateral Disarmament
UN Goals Remote
Disarmament Negotiations As Part of Total Strategies
Proposals Serious
Not Frivolous
Widest Differences on Nuclear Weapons
Atomic Positions 1957 USSR
Atomic Positions 1957 - West
Control of Outer Space Objects
Inspection and Control Ideas Change
US Moves Away From Disarmament Toward Atoms for Peace
The Fourth Country Fear
Radiation Problem Brought to UN……………………………..
Public Demand for Test Bans Accelerates ...
Tests Continue at Faster Pace
Search for "Clean Bomb".
The UN Disarmament Subcommittee
USSR Proposes 82-Nation Disarmament Body
Commission Increased by General Assembly
Disarmament Pact Without China
US Maintains 250 Bases
The Crisis in the Middle East ....
United Nations Emergency Force
Economic Strains of Armaments
More Propaganda Than Disarmament
Shifts in Position Constant
Situation in Flux
General Assembly Acts to Inform Public
Chronology: 1945-1957.
References
Appendixes
A. Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament Submitted by the Soviet Union,
30 April 1957....
B. Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament Submitted by Canada, France,
UK and US, 29 August 1957 ....
C. Resolution of 12th General Assembly on General Disarmament Agreement,
14 November 1957 ....
D. Resolution of 12th General Assembly on Dissemination of Information About
Arms Race, 14 November 1957 ................
E. Resolution of 12th General Assembly on Enlargement of Disarmament
....
........
··
.....
Commission, 19 November 1957 .....
F. USSR Draft Resolution on Discontinuing Nuclear Weapons Tests
G. USSR Draft Resolution on Prohibition of Use of Nuclear Weapons
H. USSR Draft Resolution on Enlargement of Disarmament Commission
………….
………………
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A. G. Mezerik 1957
A
An arms race
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DISARMAMENT
Postwar Through 1957
unparalleled in peacetime has overridden
C
attempts at disarmament. Discussion among governments has ceased
and the United Nations apparatus for negotiations has bogged down.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Overshadows Disarmament
committee of United Nations
The impasse in disarmament negotiations followed quickly in
the wake of the launching of the USSR earth satellite on 4 October 1957.
The ardor for settlement had begun to cool even earlier at London
when, on 26 August 1957, in the midst of talks among the United States,
USSR, United Kingdom, France and Canada the Disarmament Sub-
the USSR announced the successful
test of an intercontinental ballistic missile which could, as the USSR's
chief spokesman, Nikita S. Khrushchev, said, "hit a target in any
area of the globe". (Reference 1).
The new USSR armed strength was reflected immediately at
the London discussions, where the debate, which had previously
seemed to offer some hope of agreement on limited disarmament
objectives, came quickly to an impasse and to an abrupt end.
USSR Announces Boycott of UN Organs
In the fall of 1957, during the period of the launching of the
earth satellites, the disarmament talks were resumed by the 12th
General Assembly of the UN in New York. The Western countries
and the Soviet group took adamant positions in this debate, which
2
Disarmament
ended with the USSR announcing a boycott of existing UN disarmament
organs. Today, true agreement on disarmament is farther away than
at any time in the history of these negotiations.
New Apparent Areas of Agreement
Prior to the breakdown in discussions, the disarmament pro-
posals of the two sides seemed, in 1957, to converge in areas where
before there had never been agreement. Both the West and the USSR
were espousing a partial agreement on disarmament; neither side
appeared to maintain its insistence on a comprehensive agreement.
There was apparent agreement on reduction of armed forces.
The former wide gap in positions on questions of control and
inspection had narrowed the US had accepted the Soviet- advocated
method of ground control posts, and the USSR had accepted the US
principle of aerial inspection.
There were other points on which the two sides seemed to agree;
but the increase in the number of these items was not an indication of
actual progress toward the signing of an overall disarmament treaty.
Unilateral Disarmament
Some governments had indeed reduced armed forces, but this
was done unilaterally rather than by agreement, and without reference
to the UN Disarmament Commission.
On a unilateral basis, the USSR, US and UK will, by the middle
of 1958, have cut down their armies to figures equal to or less than
those proposed in the Disarmament Commission where the same
powers have not come to an agreement on internationally supervised
reduction of armed forces.
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
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Disarmament Not Consideration
Disarmament is not the consideration in these reductions of
forces. This was made clear by US Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, who said, "You can expand or contract manpower very quickly,
depending on what your system of training is...The cuts so far in
contemplation in our own national military establishment are not de-
signed to, and will not actually, cut our military strength. It will
change the form of it, but we still have an immensely powerful military
establishment." (Reference 2).
Economy Motivates Unilateral Disarmament
Automation missiles and push-button warfare --
considerations are reasons behind unilateral cuts in manpower.
When, on 4 April 1957, the British government announced a great
slash in the size of its armaments and forces, it credited this reduction
to its inability to continue to support the burden of a large military
program. (Reference 3).
and economy
Unilateral action has advantages for countries now more de-
termined than ever to protect their right to arm. But unilateral action
bypasses the UN; it lacks guarantees that unilateral rearmament will
not follow unilateral disarmament; it is not the same as disarmament
by agreement, under binding international commitment and control --
UN disarmament goals.
UN Goals Remote
The UN disarmament goals are to get multilateral agreement for
regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments, for the
4
Disarmament
-
prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and for safeguarded in-
ternational control so that all may have confidence in the achievement.
(Reference 4).
Disarmament Negotiations As Part of Total Strategies
Disarmament, on this basis of international commitment and
control, is nowhere in sight. While the positions of the sides seem not
incompatible on some items, these items are presented as parts of
packages embodying other proposals which are known to be unacceptable
to one side or the other.
Proposals Serious. Not Frivolous
The proposals made by the US or the USSR are not made
frivolously. Each proposal, if adopted, would not only be in accord
with foreign policy objectives of the country making the proposal, but
would be disadvantageous to the other country.
The disarmament proposals of both sides are, in general, part of
the total fabric of policy of each country and harmonize with their
military and political strategies in the arms race. The USSR aims its
proposals at achieving freedom from the fear arising from the fact
that nuclear weapons are being manufactured and based in countries on
its borders. The US seeks agreements which would make possible the
inspection of USSR facilities, now secret.
The Soviet Union submitted its latest proposals to the UN London
Disarmament Subcommittee on 30 April 1957 -- slightly modified by a
memorandum to the 12th General Assembly on 20 September 1957. (For text
of proposals see Appendix A p. 49). The West's answer came four months later
J
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
5
in the form of the major proposals behind which it now stands. These
were submitted in London on 29 August 1957 and were the next day cate-
gorically rejected by the Soviet Union. (For text of proposals see Appendix B p. 57).
weapons
Widest Differences on Nuclear Weapons
The differences between the USSR and the West are widest on
nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union demands
accept - a
a renunciation of the use of atomic weapons. The US insists
on the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in
and the USSR has found this unacceptable.
Atomic Positions 1957
USSR
and the US will not
•
-
The procedure which the USSR proposes begins with complete
prohibition of the use of atomic weapons and goes on through elimina-
tion from arsenals, cessation of production and finally the destruction
of stockpiles. Specifically, as a first step, the USSR wants commitment
to renounce for five years the use of nuclear weapons, including air
bombs, rockets of any range of action carrying atomic and hydrogen
warheads, atomic artillery and so forth." (Reference 5).
Atomic Positions 1957 - West
The West's position rests on the premise that US nuclear weapons
are essential to Western defense and that to renounce unequivocally
their use is to expose Europe and all other US allies. The Western
position protects the right to use nuclear weapons, limiting this use
only by a provision which reads, "Each party assumes an obligation
not to use nuclear weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party
in a situation of individual or collective defense."
(Reference 6).
6
Disarmament
66
The first general objective" of the Western proposals is the
cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons and the
future use of this production exclusively for non-weapons purposes.
(Reference 7). This US proposal includes the provision that fissionable
material stockpiled or previously produced will be transferred "in
successive equitable stages" to non-weapons purposes. (Reference 6).
USSR Offers Resolutions Against Tests and Use
While all of these proposals are conditional on acceptance of
entire packages, the US and USSR have each introduced proposals which
stand independently. The Soviet Union's separate proposals call for a
ban of bomb tests and a renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons.
(For texts of draft resolutions see Appendixes F and G, p. 66 & 67). The US proposal
deals with outer space objects.
Control of Outer Space Objects
The US first raised this question of control of outer space ob-
jects in the most general terms at the 11th General Assembly on
14 January 1957. (Reference 8). A proposal providing for the creation of
a commission to study the problem of outer space objects and their
control, introduced by all the Western powers at the 12th General
Assembly, was adopted on 14 November 1957. (For text of resolution see
Appendix C, p. 63).
Inspection and Control Ideas Change
These very general proposals aimed at control of missiles and
satellites were in sharp contrast to the first proposals for control of
the atom bomb. At the opening meeting of the UN Atomic Energy
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
7
Commission, on 14 June 1946, the US proposed the Baruch plan, under
which complete control of "all phases of the development and use of
atomic energy starting with the raw material" would be entrusted to
an International Atomic Development Authority.
The Soviet Union, then in possession of neither atomic bombs
nor the secret of their manufacture, would not accept the American
proposals, which by vesting all rights on atomic development in the
international authority would have precluded the USSR from reaching
atomic parity with the US.
ance.
US Moves Away From Disarmament Toward Atoms for Peace
The successful production of nuclear weapons by the USSR
altered the American emphasis. This was first indicated by President
Dwight D. Eisenhower in his address to the Eighth General Assembly
on 8 December 1953. After stressing the size of the US' atomic
arsenal and the potency of the US' latest weapons, President
Eisenhower proposed an international pool of fissionable materials
to be contributed by the US and other atomic-producing countries.
This pool, designated for research and development, has since come
into being as a new organ affiliated with UN -- the International Atomic
Energy Agency. (See "The International Atomic Energy Agency', International
Review Service, Vol. III No. 29). The agency has a complete control and
inspection system which applies to countries receiving its assist-
Under the Eisenhower proposal, international control of atomic
weapons was not a condition for agreement as was required by the
Baruch plan. The vigorous US support of detailed inspection and
8
Disarmament
control and the USSR's equally vigorous opposition to this were both
modified during the "summit" conference at Geneva in 1955, when both
sides agreed on the impossibility of detecting stores of atomic weapons.
Today the US accent is not on control of nuclear weapons, but on the
creation of a system which would insure that all fissionable materials
manufactured will be used for peaceful purposes. This would not ex-
clude continued manufacture of atomic weapons from materials stock-
piled prior to the implementation of the disarmament agreement.
Manufacture of weapons would so be limited to those countries already
possessing stockpiles of fissionable materials -- the US, USSR and the
UK.
Concern for Indiscriminate Use
The USSR, the US and the UK have frequently expressed fear
that grave consequences will result from uncontrolled entry of other
powers into the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This concern was
expressed in a statement by President Eisenhower and UK Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan on 25 October 1957: "The indefinite accumu-
lation of nuclear weapons and the indiscriminate spreading of the capacity
to produce them should be prevented. (Reference 9).
Secretary of State Dulles expressed this fear: "The time will
come when the pettiest and most irresponsible dictator could get hold
of weapons with which to threaten immense harm.'
(Reference 10).
".
Q
The Fourth Country Fear
However, the fear of the big powers that fourth countries will
develop nuclear weapons has another basis. The development of a
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9
nuclear arms capacity by a country other than the US, USSR and UK
would threaten the existing relationship of military forces. This would
not only defer the chances for a disarmament agreement but would
bring new entries in the atomic arms race.
France is already manufacturing atomic weapons. (Reference 11).
Sweden, Germany and China have said that lack of effective nuclear
disarmament is pushing them toward creating nuclear weapons.
(References 12 and 13). Canada is in a position to manufacture weapons at
will. Japan has, or will have shortly, the technological proficiency
necessary. Many West European nations already have similar or
greater proficiency but individually are too small to bear the costs of
a nuclear weapons-building program. These countries have set up the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) where by joint
research and joint financing they will be in a position to develop atoms
for war as well as for peace. (Reference 14).
New Countries Want Bomb Tests
Countries which plan nuclear development are not prepared to
forego the testing of weapons. They view bomb tests as an essential
of the technology of development. Neither France nor these other
countries will support a UN ban on bomb tests. Nevertheless, all
countries are aware of the hazards of increased radioactivity as a
result of bomb testing.
Radiation Problem Brought to UN
In 1954, India asked UN for a ban on bomb tests. Syria and
Indonesia, during the 10th (1955) General Assembly discussion of
10
Disarmament
radiation, proposed that all nuclear weapons tests be suspended un-
til more is known about their radiation effects. These proposals
were not adopted.
Public Demand for Test Bans Accelerates
Each year, public insistence on banning tests increased and
broadened. This great pressure, however, has not brought agreement.
Although the problem of nuclear bomb tests was a major item on the
agenda of the 11th (1956-57) General Assembly, resolutions at that
session proposing to ban the tests were pigeonholed. At the 12th
General Assembly three separate resolutions requesting suspension
of tests introduced by India, Japan and the USSR were rejected,
although support for them was larger than in previous years.
USSR for Test Bans While Testing
The USSR, although proposing test bans, conducts its own large
testing program and promises to continue it until UN agreement is
reached. Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko said in the 1957 UN disarma-
ment debate, "There can be no question of the Soviet Union suspending
the tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons unilaterally, as some seem
to want it...because such a step would place it in unequal position as
compared to other powers possessing nuclear weapons and would be
detrimental to the interests of its security.'
(Reference 22).
Western Reaction to Test Bans
The West also includes suspension of nuclear weapons tests in
its proposals. These proposals, however, make test suspension an
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
11
inseparable part of the complete Western package. The rationale for
this stand, expressed by US Ambassador to the UN Henry Cabot
Lodge, is:
"Even if the agreement were obeyed by all concerned, and all
test explosions stopped, the efforts to pile up more and more atomic
and hydrogen bombs could go right on. Moreover, under such condi-
tions the efforts to reduce the radioactive fallout in such weapons
would also be suspended and consequently the weapons added to the
stockpiles would contain a larger amount of radioactive fallout than
they would otherwise. Finally, additional nations could and probably
would, without the aid of nuclear tests, nevertheless manufacture and
acquire their own nuclear weapons, using techniques now known."
(Reference 16).
-
Tests Continue at Faster Pace
US Minimizes Radiation Danger
It is the US position, concurred in by the UK, that no great
dangers are, as yet, connected with radiation from the tests. Am-
bassador Lodge said, "We know that nuclear testing has given concern
to many sincere people throughout the world. We believe these fears
are ill-founded, but we respect their motivations."
(Reference 7).
The two leading medical organizations of the US and the UK
reported in 1956 that an increase in the number and levels of atomic
tests would increase genetic danger. (References 26 and 27). Since
these reports were made, the rate of the tests has more than
doubled. In 1956, the USSR, the US and the UK together set off more
12
Disarmament
than twice as many atomic explosions as in any other year since
nuclear tests began. During 1957 until the middle of October there
had been 42 tests 24 by the US, 12 by the Soviet Union and six by
Britain. The actual total was probably more than this, since the Soviet
Union does not announce tests. The next largest count for explosions
in any single year was 19 in 1955.
(Reference 17).
Search for "Clean Bomb"
The US has evidenced recognition of radiation dangers in a
statement in which continuation of tests is also predicated. Mr. Lodge
said, "The tests themselves are enabling us to develop weapons with
reduced fallout so that radiation hazards in the event of hostilities
may be restricted to military targets. Thus if our testing program
should continue at the present rate, the radiation it puts into the
world's atmosphere would be less in future years. (Reference 16).
All countries have the same fear of radiation effects, and no
country can deflect radiation from the atmosphere above it. Damage
is universal, since the radiation from a bomb exploded over the
USSR passes over the US and vice versa. Both sides are currently
trying to perfect "clean bombs" with a reduced radioactive by-
product.
The "clean" bomb, were it to become a reality, would make
nuclear weapons part of the family of weapons which destroy localized
targets; and although the areas blasted will be much larger, the
destruction will not be universal. Problems of control and disarma-
ment would become more like those of conventional weapons on which
the UN disarmament apparatus has for so long concentrated.
C
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
13
The UN Disarmament Subcommittee
All major disarmament discussions emanate from the UN Dis-
armament Subcommittee. This body, brought into existence by the Gen-
eral Assembly on 28 November 1953, includes the US, UK, USSR, France
and Canada and is a subsidiary of the Disarmament Commission.
USSR Attempts to Change Composition of Disarmament Discussion
Because of the predominantly Western composition of this
subcommittee, the USSR has sought to bypass it in various ways. It
has offered to discuss disarmament directly with the US on the premise
that the two countries can by themselves arrive at disarmament
agreements. The US refuses all these bids for bilateral negotiations.
The US position is that discussions in which only the US and USSR
participate would result in building suspicions among the NATO
partners and incur the danger of shattering that alliance. The US re-
jected such a proposal on 9 October 1957, when President Eisenhower,
quoting Secretary Dulles, said, "We have got to beware of bilateral
talks when you have allies and comrades in very great ventures like
we have in NATO."
(Reference 18).
USSR Proposes 82-Nation Disarmament Body
On 28 October 1957, the USSR proposed that the General Assem-
bly abolish the subcommittee and enlarge the present Disarmament
Commission to include all 82 nations of UN. This proposal appeals
to countries other than those now on the subcommittee which have
expressed a desire to be included in disarmament discussions.
However, the USSR proposal would change the nature of dis-
armament meetings from private negotiation to public debate, where
14
Disarmament
declarations of disarmament rather than disarmament itself would be
the main objective. This was the situation prior to the creation of
the Disarmament Subcommittee.
For example, the Baruch plan had, after long debate, been
adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1948 by a vote of
55 in favor and the five countries of the Soviet group against. The
USSR never accepted the decision of the General Assembly, and the
Baruch plan remained an oft-repeated declaration of disarmament
which could not become operative without Soviet cooperation.
Because of this experience, the General Assembly concluded
that to effect disarmament it was essential that the parties princi-
pally concerned agree. The Assembly then created the five-country
subcommittee to permit these parties to negotiate in private.
Support for Broadening Disarmament Commission
The USSR, its position strengthened by successes in launching
earth satellites and the intercontinental ballistic missile, made it
clear to the 12th General Assembly that it would not continue to
participate in the subcommittee at all or in the Disarmament Commis-
sion as long as it retained its heavily pro-Western composition.
India
although an initiator of the five-nation subcommittee and
Yugoslavia had long been urging that the disarmament talks be widened
to include the points of view of countries which hold uncommitted
positions in the cold war.
US Favors Direct Responsibility
The US has opposed, and continued during the 12th General
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
15
Assembly to oppose, expansion of the disarmament talks. The US
position is that it cannot leave the power of decision on weapons
and armed forces to other countries not responsible for maintaining
US security. (Reference 19).
Commission Increased by General Assembly
During the Assembly debate, the US modified its position and
accepted an additional 14 members on the Disarmament Commission,
increasing its membership to 25. (For text of resolution see Appendix E, p. 65).
For new composition of Disarmament Commission see Chronology, 19 November 1957.) The se
new members, although alleviating the predominantly Western composi-
tion of the commission, do not alter the Western majority.
The Soviet Union declared this new 25-member commission
'unacceptable". (Reference 20). It shelved its previous 82-member
commission proposal and attempted to substitute a 32-member body
which would have limited the Western proportion to 50 percent. After
the General Assembly adoption of the 25-nation proposal and the de-
feat of the USSR's attempts to further increase the commission's size,
the Soviet Union restated that it would boycott UN disarmament talks.
(Reference 21).
The 12th General Assembly requested the Disarmament Com-
mission and its subcommittee to meet and for the subcommittee to report
to the commission by 30 April 1958. These deliberations will be meaning-
less unless the Soviet Union changes its boycott position.
Resumption of discussions inside UN would, however, not solve
all representation problems. The People's Republic of China --
Mainland China is not part of the United Nations; yet it must be
considered in any overall disarmament agreement.
16
Disarmament
Chinese Army World's Largest
The People's Republic of China has an army of about 3.5
million, the largest armed force in the world.
Until 1957, UN disarmament proposals, made by the USSR and
by the West as well, included the reduction of China's armed forces,
although Mainland China did not participate in the discussions.
Since the Nationalist government on Taiwan is the Chinese body
in UN, the People's Republic of China is not represented in UN disarma-
ment talks. Because of this, Premier Mao Tse-tung of Mainland China
has said that his government would not be bound by any action taken
by UN.
Disarmament Pact Without China Not Much Use
The lack of value of any disarmament agreement in which
Mainland China does not participate was pointed out by E. Ronald
Walker, the UN representative of Australia. Speaking to the General
Assembly political committee, he said, "We in Australia feel that a
disarmament agreement that did not impose suitable obligations upon
Communist China would not be of much use in our part of the world,
and this is one of the problems that lies ahead." (Reference 23).
The UN's inability to deal realistically with Mainland China is
matched by the situation with West Germany, also not a member of
the UN, but included in proposals for UN disarmament agreements.
The West German Arms Problem
-
West Germany has, outside UN, obligated itself not to produce
atomic, bacteriological and chemical weapons on its territory. (Reference 24).
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
17
This does not rule out the acquisition of atomic arms by Germany
from the US or other sources.
The USSR, along with Poland and Czechoslovakia, has demanded
that atomic weapons not be based on German soil and has proposed
agreements along this line, including provisions for the withdrawal of
both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from all Germany. From 1955
until 1957, the USSR called for reduction of West German forces to
150,000. West Germany has committed itself to supply to NATO an
army of 500,000 men.
The USSR has consistently held that any agreement on disarma-
ment must include West Germany as well as the American bases sit-
uated not only in Germany but across the world.
US Maintains 250 Bases
The US now maintains about 250 bases on foreign soil. The
Soviet Union has long sought UN agreement for eradication of the se
US bases. Particularly opposed by the USSR are the US bases in the
Middle East, where tensions are now high.
The Crisis in the Middle East
In the Middle East, the contest between the US and the USSR
has brought a deluge of arms into the area, narrowing the possibility
of maintaining the peace, much less of disarming.
The presence of oil, the strategic geographical location of the
Middle East, the Arab-Israel conflict along with the Palestine refugee
question and the competition between the US and the USSR for prestige
in the region make the Middle East the most dangerous of all the
18
Disarmament
world's potential explosion spots. Out of the crisis in this tense area
has come a new method for maintaining peace, the United Nations
Emergency Force.
United Nations Emergency Force
UNEF is today an international force which has been accepted
universally for temporary use in a specific situation. UNEF now serves
on the border between Israel and Egypt on the edge of the Sinai
Desert, at Sharm el-Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba and in the Gaza Strip.
Since November 1956, this force, comprising at its peak 6,000 men
from 10 nations, has acted as a deterrent power, diminishing the risks
of war by discouraging small and persistent border infiltrations.
Although UNEF is not a permanent international army capable
of enforcing peace in the face of aggression, it has already shown
indications of the ways in which such a force may evolve. UNEF has,
however, run into difficulties.
UNEF's New Difficulties
Countries which have contributed national troops to UNEF are
withdrawing them. Finland and Indonesia have withdrawn their troops,
and Sweden has limited its obligation to keep its troops on hand. This
contraction of the number of nations willing to contribute troops may
restrict UNEF's future; so may financial obstacles.
Although tiny in comparison with national armies, UNEF costs
about $24 Million yearly. (Reference 25). UN member countries --
supporting much larger armies showed little disposition to make
voluntary contributions to UNEF or to accept assessments voted by
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
19
the General Assembly. Most countries are already overburdened by
the cost of their national armaments.
Economic Strain of Armaments
The extent of the burden which armaments place on national
economies is made clear in the UK White Paper of 4 April 1957
announcing cuts in the British military expenditures. It read, "Over
the last five years, defense has on an average absorbed 10 percent of
Britain's gross national product. Some 7 percent of the working
population are either in the services or supporting them. One-eighth
of the output of the metal-using industries, upon which the export
trade so largely depends, is devoted to defense. An undue proportion
of qualified scientists and engineers are engaged on military work. In
addition, the retention of such large forces abroad gives rise to heavy
charges which place a severe strain upon the balance of payments.'
(Reference 3).
More Propaganda Than Disarmament
While the need to reduce the ever-rising arms expenditures
grows, this need has not yet caused any agreed disarmament to
happen. The disarmament discussions now are motivated more by
the desire of nations to influence public opinion or to quiet it. The
US presents resolutions on disarmament and asks for adoption, al-
though the resolution has been in advance unacceptable by the USSR
which would not abide by it if it were adopted. This was the case with
the Baruch plan, and it is the case with the 27-power Western resolution
adopted by the 12th General Assembly. The USSR, for its part, introduces
20
Disarmament
resolutions banning atomic bomb tests and renouncing the use of
nuclear weapons, although the US has long made known its opposition
to both measures.
Shifts in Position Constant
C
Agreement on disarmament between the great powers has al-
ways been remote. The United States, United Kingdom and France, on
the one hand, and the USSR on the other, have at one time or another,
publicly favored almost every kind of disarmament
key matters, have they favored the same things at the same time.
Shifts in position, as one or the opposite side has accepted proposals
put forward by the other, have become a constant practice. For 11
years, this pattern of negotiation without progress, of discussion
without disarmament, has been maintained and there has been no
international agreement to disarm. Agreement is now even more dis-
tant because of the new state of flux in the world picture.
but never, on
Situation in Flux
Many small nations are seeking the increased protection which
they might find from joining larger groupings such as NATO. Others
are moving to safeguard positions of non-involvement with the
quarrels of the two great powers. Meanwhile the arms race picks up
speed and the UN disarmament machinery is stalled. The deterrent
to war is not reason and agreement but the power of nuclear weapons,
of missiles and of satellites -- mutually readied and mutually
threatening.
International Review Service
21
Vol. III No. 39
General Assembly Acts to Inform Public
Inability to act paralyzed the 12th General Assembly, yet need
to act was ever present. One step the Assembly did take was to adopt
a resolution "to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to
the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the de-
structive effects of modern weapons". (For text of resolution, see Appendix D
p. 64).
The people of the world want peace and have expressed their
desire for it to their governments in many ways. This public demand
has, in fact, been a main reason why governments have, up to now,
continued negotiations for a disarmament agreement even while in an
increasing competition to build arms.
The public, when sufficiently informed, can yet become pressure
on governments so that they will take steps which permit both sides
to stop adding weapons to already swollen arsenals and to begin to
reason together.
############
US Drops Atomic
Bombs on Japan
6 & 9 Aug. 1945
CHRONOLOGY
Disarmament: Postwar Through 1957
Marginal notes indicate events outside dis-
armament negotiations but affecting them.
1945
UN Charter Provision
In the optimistic mood of the immediate post-
war world the great powers were agreed on the
basic principles for the elimination of atomic
weapons and for general disarmament. Provision
for working out disarmament agreements was
written into the UN Charter, signed on 26 June 1945.
The Charter makes United Nations action on
disarmament the responsibility of two separate
bodies, the General Assembly and the Security
Council. Chapter Four, Article 11, reads, "The
General Assembly may consider ... the principles
governing disarmament and the regulation of
armaments and may make recommendations with
regard to such principles". Chapter Five, Article
26, makes the Security Council, together with its
Military Staff Committee, responsible for plans
"for the establishment of a system for the regula-
tion of armaments", "in order to promote the
establishment and maintenance of international
peace and security with the least diversion for
armaments of the world's human and economic
resources".
Truman-Atlee-King Declaration
The first move to implement the disarmament
provisos of the Charter came on 15 November 1945,
when the governments of Canada, the United
Kingdom and the United States issued a declaration
(the "Truman-Atlee-King Declaration") proposing
the establishment of a commission under the United
Nations to deal with the international control of
atomic energy. The principle of this declaration
was agreed to by the USSR on 17 December 1945, at
a "Big Three" conference in Moscow. (Reference 28).
- 22 ·
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
23
1946
UN Establishes Atomic Energy Commission
On 24 January 1946, the first General
Assembly of the UN, acting unanimously, created
the UN Atomic Energy Commission -- comprising
the members of the Security Council plus Canada
-- and directed it to develop specific proposals
for:
"(a) Extending between all nations the exchange of
basic scientific information for peaceful ends;
""
(b) the control of atomic energy to the extent
necessary to insure its use only for peaceful
purposes;
"(c) the elimination from national armaments of
atomic weapons and of all other major weapons
adaptable to mass destruction;
"
(d) effective safeguards by way of inspection and
other means to protect complying states against
the hazards of violations and evasions". (Reference
29).
US Introduces Baruch Plan
At the first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy
Commission, on 14 June 1946, the US proposed the
Baruch Plan for an International Atomic Develop-
ment Authority, to which should be entrusted all
phases of the development and use of atomic
energy, starting with the raw material and in-
cluding:
"1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-
energy activities potentially dangerous to world
security;
"2. power to control, inspect, and license all other
atomic activities;
"3. the duty of fostering the beneficial uses of
atomic energy;
“4. research and development responsibilities of
an affirmative character intended to put the
Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and
thus to enable it to comprehend and therefore to
detect misuse of atomic energy". (Reference 15).
The international authority would conduct
continuous inspection of all phases of production
of fissionable materials, have the sole and exclu-
sive right to carry on atomic weapons tests and
promote the peacetime benefits of atomic energy.
"When an adequate system for control of atomic
energy ... has been agreed upon and put into
effective operation .., "national relinquishing of
24
Disarmament
1946, continued
atomic power would proceed in stages, the last of
which would be the destruction of all bomb stock-
piles. (Reference 15).
USSR Submits First Proposal
Five days after the Baruch Plan was intro-
duced, on 19 June 1946, the Soviet Union submitted
a Draft Convention on Prohibition of Atomic
Energy for the Purpose of Mass Destruction.
This sought the prohibition of the use, production
and storing of atomic weapons and the immediate
destruction of existing bomb stocks. (Reference 30).
The US ruled out this Soviet proposal for immedi-
ate prohibition of nuclear weapons on grounds
that the West, in the face of the USSR's greater
strength of land forces, would be left defenseless
if deprived of the atom bomb.
1947
The USSR objected to the Baruch Plan provi-
sions for inspection and for international ownership
and management of mines and factories. The
USSR also wanted "the principle of unanimity” (or
the right of veto) in "the adoption of decisions
relating to the control of atomic energy”.
(Reference 31).
First UN Resolution on Conventional Arms
Through 1945 and 1946, atomic energy was
the only subject of disarmament talks. On 29
October 1946, the USSR, in the Second General
Assembly, proposed reduction of armaments in
general. On 14 December 1946, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution calling upon the Security
Council to give "prompt consideration" to the
working out of proposals to provide "practical
and effective safeguards in connection with the
control of atomic energy and the regulation and
reduction of armaments”. (Reference 32).
-
Commission for Conventional Armaments Set Up
On 13 February 1947, the Security Council,
with the Soviet Union abstaining, set up the Com-
mission for Conventional Armaments, with the
same membership as the Security Council, to
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
25
:
1947, continued
submit proposals "for the general regulation and
reduction of armaments". (Reference 33). This
commission was barred from all matters assigned
to the Atomic Energy Commission, a condition
advocated by the US and opposed by the Soviet
Union.
USSR Proposes Atomic Control Plan
The Atomic Energy Commission, on 11 June
1947, received from the Soviet Union proposals
which in effect constituted an alternative to the
Baruch Plan. The Soviet plan followed the lines of
the Soviet 1946 position, calling for a convention
"establishing terms and principles of an atomic
control system" and providing for an "International
Control Commission" limited to information-
requesting and advisory powers and subject to veto
in the Security Council. (Reference 34).
1948
Percentage Troop Reductions Introduced
On 25 September 1948, the Soviet Union put
forward proposals to reduce armaments and
armed forces "by one-third during one year",
the 'percentage" position it held until 1955.
(Reference 35). The West -- on the premise of
Soviet troop superiority opposed cuts based on
percentages.
Baruch Plan Becomes UN Plan
On 4 November 1948, the Third General
Assembly, against strong Soviet opposition,
approved the Baruch Plan, which the US had
introduced on 14 June 1946 (Vote: 40 Yes, 6 No
(Soviet Bloc), 4 Abstain). From this time, the
Baruch Plan was called the "United Nations Plan".
(Reference 36). The same Assembly adopted
Western proposals calling for a census of armed
forces and armaments, excluding atomic weapons.
The Soviet Union opposed this.
26
Disarmament
USSR explodes A-bomb
September 1949
Korean War begins
25 June 1950
Korean truce talks
begin 10 July 1951;
war continues
1949
UN Atomic Energy Commission Suspends Work
The Atomic Energy Commission in dead-
lock since the 1946 introduction of the Baruch Plan
-- voted to suspend its work on 29 July 1949.
Disarmament consultations" were then carried
on by the US, USSR, UK, China, France and Canada.
1950
USSR Boycotts Disarmament Talks
The USSR on 19 January 1950, withdrew from
the disarmament organs -- and subsequently the
Security Council in protest against the failure
to seat the representative of the Government of
the People's Republic of China.
The Fifth General Assembly, on 13 December
1950, established a committee consisting of the
representatives of the Security Council and
Canada to consider consolidating the Atomic
Energy Commission and the Commission on
Conventional Armaments into a single disarma-
ment body. (Reference 38).
1951
Impasse New Disarmament Body Recommended
No disarmament talks took place during 1951
except for the meetings of the new committee
(13 December 1950), which on 23 October 1951
recommended that the General Assembly establish
a new commission to replace the two existing
ones.
1952
General Assembly Creates Disarmament Commission
On 11 January 1952, the Sixth General Assembly
established the Disarmament Commission to re-
place the Atomic Energy Commission and the Com-
mission for Conventional Armaments. The Soviet
Union, while agreeing with the establishment of the
new commission, opposed its terms of reference,
which were largely based on the Western position.
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
27
1952, continued
The Disarmament Commission was charged
with the task of preparing, by 1 June 1952, a draft
convention "for the regulation, limitation and
balanced reduction of all armed forces and all
armaments, for the elimination of all major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for
effective international control of atomic energy
to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the
use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.
(Reference 39).
The Disarmament Commission is responsible
to both the Security Council and the General
Assembly. Its membership is the same as that of
the UN Atomic Energy Commission.
Phased Disarmament Plan Submitted
On 5 April 1952, the United States put for-
ward a plan for disclosure and verification of all
armed forces and all armaments, including atomic,
as a first step towards disarmament. The process
of disclosure and verification was to take place in
five stages, proceeding from the less secret to the
more secret weapons, and was to be completed
within two years. (Reference 40). The Soviet Union
objected to the idea of stages and rejected the plan
as designed for "getting information from other
people while concealing data on atomic weapons
and secret weapons at home." (Reference 41).
Soviet Union Changes Position on Inspection
On 8 April 1952, the Soviet Union modified
a six-year old stand, proposing that the prohibition
of weapons of mass destruction and the establish-
ment of control should come into effect simultane-
ously. Under the Soviet plan, "continuous inspec-
tion" would be undertaken by an international
control organ, but "without interference in domestic
affairs of states". (Reference 42).
West Proposes Numerical Troop Ceilings
France, Britain and the United States on
28 May 1952, made a joint proposal setting - in
opposition to the Soviet "percentage'' reductions
W
numerical ceilings for all armed forces. These
would provide for a maximum of from 1 million to
1.5 million men each for China, the USSR and the
28
Disarmament
UK detonates first
A-bomb 3 Oct. 1952
US explodes first
thermonuclear weapon
1 Nov. 1952
(announced 2 Feb. 1954)
Stalin dies
3 Mar. 1953
Korean War ends
27 June 1953
USSR announces its
first thermonuclear
explosion
21 Aug. 1953
1952, continued
United States, and from 700,000 to 800,000 each
for Britain and France, with a consequent reduc-
tion in armaments. For other states, a ceiling of
less than 1 percent of the population was suggested
(Reference 43). All powers would reduce their armed
forces immediately after the completion of the
disclosure and verification operations proposed
previously by the US. (Reference 44).
On 12 August 1952 the Soviet Union rejected
the numerical ceiling" idea, holding that this
would not reduce or eliminate the large number of
Western military bases around the borders of the
Soviet Union or curb the Western military alli-
ances, such as NATO.
1953
Disarmament Subcommittee Established
-
On 28 November 1953 the Eighth General
Assembly, "endorsing the...hope that recent
international events will create a more propitious
atmosphere for reconsideration of the disarmament
question'', suggested that the five big atomic
powers (US, UK, USSR, France and Canada) meet
privately as a subcommittee of the Disarmament
Commission to negotiate a disarmament agreement.
(Reference 45).
Eisenhower Suggests International Atoms for Peace Agency
On 8 December 1953, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, addressing the Eighth General
Assembly, proposed the creation of an inter-
national atomic energy agency to which nations
would make joint contributions of fissionable
materials to promote the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. (Reference 46).
-
On 21 December 1953 the USSR agreed to take
part in the talks suggested by President Eisenhower,
but put forward an additional proposal, to be
examined in the course of the talks, calling on all
states to "assume a solemn and unconditional
obligation not to employ atomic, hydrogen, or other
weapons of mass destruction." (Reference 47).
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
29
1954
Negotiations for International Atomic Energy Agency Begin
The United States, on 11 January 1954, for-
mally invited the Soviet Union to negotiate an
agreement for the agency. The Soviet Union's
reply to the invitation was made conditional on
US acceptance of the 21 December proposal. (This
marked the first time the USSR did not include a
ban on manufacture as well as use - of atomic
weapons as the first step in a disarmament scheme).
The US did not accept conditional USSR participa-
tion and began the negotiations with its own allies.
India Proposes Bomb Test Ban
The 1954 US hydrogen bomb tests in the Trust
Territory of the Marshall Islands resulted in un-
expected "fallout" of radioactive ash which damaged
lives and property in the islands. Following this,
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on
2 April 1954, proposed a halt in nuclear test
explosions pending agreement on disarmament.
(Reference 48). The Indian Delegation presented
Mr. Nehru's proposal to the UN Disarmanent
Commission on 8 April 1954. The commission
took no action,
USSR Asks for Expansion of Disarmament Talks
On 19 April 1954 the Disarmament Commis-
sion rejected, by a vote of 9 to 1 (Lebanon and
China abstaining), a Soviet proposal to include
Mainland China, India and Czechoslovakia in
disarmament negotiations.
US Proposes New Atomic Authority
At the first session of the Disarmament Sub-
committee, the US, on 25 May 1954, submitted a
proposal for a UN Disarmament and Atomic
Development Authority. This included the right of
unlimited inspection -- field and aerial surveys,
anywhere and everywhere. In case of violation,
the proposed organ would be empowered to close
down plants and suspend supplies of nuclear mate-
rials. (Reference 49). This proposal was rejected
by the USSR on the ground that it would give the
central organ and its inspectors power to interfere
with national economic life and domestic affairs.
30
Disarmament
Truce in Indochina
21 July 1954
1954, continued
The Franco-British Plan
At the same session of the subcommittee,
the Franco-British plan a departure from
previous Western plans was proposed on
11 June 1954. Where the West had before favored
a five-stage disarmament procedure, the Franco-
British Plan outlined a program consisting of
three phases:
1) A “freeze" or limitation on armed forces and
military budgets;
2) a reduction of conventional armaments and
armed forces by one-half of an agreed figure,
followed by the prohibition of production of
nuclear weapons;
(The figure for armed forces was subsequently
specified by the sponsors as 650,000 each for
Britain and France and 1-12 million each for
USSR, US and China.)
3) the remaining one-half reduction of conventional
armaments and armed forces, followed by the
complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear
and other weapons of mass destruction.
As a preliminary step, all states possessing
nuclear weapons would regard themselves as
prohibited from the use of these weapons except
in defense against aggression. A control organ
was to be constituted and "positioned" before any
part of the disarmament program would begin.
The Franco-British Plan was designed to reduce
the frequency and freedom, as envisaged under
the Baruch Plan, of international inspection, and
to give the international control organ managerial
powers but not ownership status. (Reference 50).
US Approves, Soviet Union Criticizes Franco-British Plan
The US gave general support to the Franco-
British Plan. The Soviet Union criticized the
Franco-British proposal as constituting merely a
variation of the previous Western proposals.
The USSR also rejected the conditional ban
on the use of the bomb except in defense against
aggression. The USSR based its rejection on the
ground that there was no accepted definition of
aggression.
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
31
Trieste Agreement
5 Oct. 1954
1954, continued
Soviet Union Changes Position on Franco-British Plan
On 30 September 1954 the Soviet Union
announced to the Ninth General Assembly that it
was prepared to consider the Franco-British
Plan as a basis for a future disarmament conven-
tion. This brought the big powers into agreement
on consideration of a disarmament plan for the
first time since the Moscow Conference of 1945.
(Reference 51).
East and West Join in Sponsorship
Positions in the 1954 General Assembly
debate were much less rigidly held than in previous
times, and the debate culminated on 4 November 1954
in a unanimous resolution urging new efforts at
reaching a disarmament agreement. The resolution
was co-sponsored by the US, UK, USSR, Canada and
France the first joint East-West sponsorship
since 1946. (Reference 52).
1955
Unanimous Action on Atomic Energy
Also at the Ninth session of the General
Assembly, another unanimous resolution was
adopted, this one calling for the establishment of
an International Atomic Energy Agency and the
convening of an international scientific conference
on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. (Reference 53).
These two resolutions were the first ones dealing
with atomic energy or disarmament to be adopted
unanimously since 1946.
USSR Links Political Settlements to Disarmament
C
During the February-May 1955 meetings of
the Disarmament Subcommittee in London, the
USSR, on 10 May 1955, introduced comprehensive
proposals "on the reduction of armaments, the
prohibition of atomic weapons, and the elimination
of the threat of a new war". These proposals --
which incorporated parts of the Franco-British-
Plan were set out in three draft resolutions.
32
Disarmament
1955, continued
The first resolution was a declaration on the
relaxation of international tension and covered a
wide field of important East-West problems.
These included recommendations for the powers
to eliminate "propaganda for a new war", "to
withdraw their armies of occupation from
Germany to within their national frontiers", "to
reach agreement on the liquidation of foreign
military bases", to assist underdeveloped countries
"in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy",
"remove discrimination ... in the field of trade"
and "increase the interchange of representatives'
of industry, agriculture, science, art, students, etc.
(Reference 55).
USSR Accepts Western Troop Levels
In the second Soviet proposal of 10 May 1955,
the USSR abandoned its previous stand for a one-
third reduction in armed forces and accepted the
figures for numerical ceilings of the Franco-
British proposal. (See 11 June 1954).
USSR Proposes Ban on Nuclear Weapons Tests
The Soviet Union, in its 10 May 1955 memo-
randum, proposed the discontinuance of nuclear
test explosions as a first step in Disarmament.
Unlike the proposal of Prime Minister Nehru, this
was not to be a preliminary step pending a dis-
armament agreement, but an integral part of it.
These Soviet proposals moved back the ban on
use of nuclear weapons now to take place when
75 percent of armed forces cuts had been com-
pleted. A total ban and destruction of stocks was
not called for until all armed forces reductions
had taken place. The USSR adopted the Western
proposal that nuclear weapons should not be used
"except in defense against aggression" but added
the proviso, "when a decision to that effect is
taken by the Security Council" (where the veto
prevails). (Reference 55).
USSR Proposes Ground Warning System
The Soviet paper of 10 May 1955 contained
a statement to the effect that the abolition of
nuclear weapons could no longer be assured. It
advocated a system of international control to
prevent the diversion of atomic energy for peace ful
-
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
33
Atoms for Peace
Conference, Geneva
8-20 Aug. 1955
1955, continued
purposes to the making of atomic weapons as well
as to prevent surprise attack. A control organ
would establish control posts at large ports, at
railway junctions, on main motor highways and in
aerodromes, to see that there were no dangerous
concentrations of military forces and equipment.
In addition to this early-warning system, the con-
trol organ would also have the right to demand any
necessary information from states and have un-
impeded access to military budget records.
MAN
During the second stage of the USSR disarma-
ment program the control organ would have its
own staff of inspectors in all states. The control
aparatus would have the right of permanent
inspection -- "within the bound of the control
functions which they exercise" -- of unimpeded
access at all times to all objects of control. The
"control functions" were not defined by the USSR.
..
US De-Emphasizes Atomic Disarmament
At the summit'' conference in Geneva in
July 1955, the United States broke away from its
former policy in which the goal of atomic disarma-
ment was central to arms-control planning.
President Eisenhower, on 21 July 1955, proposed
the exchange of military blueprints and reciprocal
aerial inspection between the US and the USSR as
a prelude to disarmament.
This marked the change in emphasis from
programs for elimination of arms to ways and
means which would provide protection against
surprise attack without controlling nuclear or
conventional weapons. In making this proposal,
President Eisenhower said, "We have not as yet
been able to discover any scientific or other
inspection method which would make certain of the
elimination of nuclear weapons."
(Reference 56).
"
Eden Proposes European Buffer Zone
Also at the "summit' meeting, UK Prime
Minister Anthony Eden proposed a demilitarized
zone in Germany which could be used as a demon-
stration area of international inspection techniques.
Premier Edgar Faure of France proposed budget-
ary control over arms by transferring the funds
saved through disarmament to finance economic
development.
34
Disarmament
1955, continued
US Puts All Prior Stands Aside
When the Disarmament Subcommittee reas-
sembled on 29 August 1955, members followed
through with proposals developed at the "summit'´
meeting. The US urged acceptance of its open
skies plan and stated that it was prepared to accept
the Soviet plan for ground observers. In a major
move on 6 September 1955 the US placed all its
prior positions under reservation, now being
neither for nor against the proposals in which it
had joined with the British and French in 1954 and
the spring of 1955. The US attributed this action
to the impossibility of controlling nuclear disarma-
ment. (Reference 57).
At these subcommittee meetings, the Soviet
Union maintained the positions it had set forth on
10 May 1955.
US Accepts Soviet Inspection Plan
The first concrete objections by the USSR to
the US "open skies" proposal came directly from
Premier Nikolai Bulganin in a letter to President
Eisenhower on 19 September 1955. The Soviet
Premier contended that the US plan would not
include overseas installations and that it would not
lead to successful accomplishment of disarma-
ment', since it omitted mention of "the necessity
for reduction of armaments and prohibition of
atomic weapons". (Reference 58).
66
-
In replying to Premier Bulganin on 11 October
1955, President Eisenhower, without dealing with
the Soviet objections to his "open skies" plan,
said that he would accept the Russian proposal for
stationing inspection teams at key strategic centers
in the two countries. (Reference 58).
Disarmament Deadlocked: Atoms for Peace Positions
During the five-power foreign ministers'
meetings at Geneva 27 October 16 November 1955,
the 10th General Assembly debates that followed
and the next meetings of the full Disarmament
Commission, the Soviet and American positions
again diverged widely.
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
35
1955, continued
However, action on atoms for peace was
pushed forward by the General Assembly, with
the USSR agreeing to join negotiations on the
statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency.
On 3 December 1955 the 10th General Assembly
unanimously established a 15-member UN
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation to collect, evaluate and disseminate
information on the effects of radiation. (Reference
59).
1956
Soviet Bloc Pushes Atom Ban for Germany
The Warsaw Pact powers (USSR, Albania,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, Romania), meeting in Prague,
proposed, on 28 January 1956, a ban on nuclear
weapons for forces of all parties in Germany.
(Reference 60).
On 1 February 1956, Premier Bulganin, in
his continuing correspondence with President
Eisenhower, expanded on Soviet objection to the
“open skies” plan. He said, "Judge for yourself,
Mr. President. What would the military leaders
of your country do if it were reported to them that
the aerophotography showed that your neighbor had
more airfields? To be sure, they would order an
immediate increase in the number of their air-
fields. Naturally, our military leaders would do
the same in a similar case." (Reference 58).
In a letter to Premier Bulganin dated 1 March
1956, President Eisenhower accepted the idea of
extending disarmament supervision to apply to
"forces and facilities which we both have outside
our borders." (Reference 58).
US Switches to Fissionable Materials Control
In his 1 March 1956 letter, President
Eisenhower indicated a shift in US policy from
seeking control of nuclear weapons to seeking
assurance that all production of fissionable
materials would be devoted to peace. He said:
"In my judgment, our efforts must be directed
especially to bringing under control the nuclear
36
Disarmament
1956, continued
threat. As an important step for this purpose and
assuming the satisfactory operation of our air and
ground inspection system, the United States would
be prepared to work out, with other nations, suit-
able and safeguarded arrangements so that future
production of fissionable materials anywhere in
the world would no longer be used to increase the
stockpiles of explosive weapons...My ultimate hope
is that all production of fissionable materials any-
where in the world will be devoted exclusively to
peaceful purposes." (Reference 58).
Disarmament Plans Change from Comprehensive to Partial
At the Disarmament Subcommittee meetings
in London, from 19 March through 14 May 1956,
disarmament programs favored partial and
limited steps as interim measures toward a
comprehensive disarmament plan.
The Soviet Union, on 27 March 1956, submitted
proposals in which nuclear disarmament was men-
tioned only generally and was conditional on
reduction of conventional arms and armed forces.
US Links Political Settlements to Disarmament
The US, on 3 April 1956, submitted proposals
spelling out the control of production of fissionable
materials and the transference of stockpiles of
nuclear materials to peaceful purposes. Control of
nuclear weapons was not mentioned. The US plan
defined only one stage of disarmament, linking
subsequent stages to settlement of political issues
-- a position previously held (10 May 1955) by the
USSR, and now opposed by it.
The Western powers, at this session, moved
up their proposed levels for armed forces, now
favoring reduction to 2.5 million for the US and
USSR. (Reference 37).
Soviet Union Urges Unilateral Disarmament
Premier Bulganin wrote to the heads of
nations on 6 June 1956, requesting them to follow
the principle of "each one's taking concrete meas-
ures for reducing armaments, which measures
could be carried out without waiting for the con-
clusion of an international agreement on disarma-
ment. (Reference 58).
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
37
Hungarian revolt
Oct. - Nov. 1956
Suez Invasion
29 Oct. - 7 Nov. 1956
USSR threatens
UK and France
with rockets
5 November 1956
UNEF created
5 November 1956
1956, continued
The US, French, British, West German,
Italian and Turkish replies emphasized their
confidence in disarmament by international agree-
ment rather than by unilateral action. (Reference 61).
USSR Accepts West's New Troop Levels
On 9 July 1956 in the Disarmament Com-
mission, the USSR announced that it would accept
the armed forces levels proposals of the Western
powers-- 2.5 million for the US, USSR and China
and 750,000 for the UK and France as a first step,
with the ultimate level of 1-1 million for the three
big powers and 650,000 for Britain and France.
However, the USSR made this acceptance condi-
tional on imposing ceilings of 150,000 200,000
for countries other than those named. (Reference 62).
The Western powers immediately rejected the
Soviet condition, on the ground that it was designed
to keep Germany and Japan disarmed. (Reference 63).
-
The US, Britain and France in the 1956
Disarmament Commission meetings proposed
limiting bomb tests, and India asked for outright
test ban -- a demand supported by the Soviet Union.
No action on bomb tests was taken.
USSR Proposes Summit Disarmament Talks
On 17 November 1956 the Soviet Union proposed
a disarmament conference outside UN among heads
of government of the US, Britain, France, USSR and
India. (This had been suggested by the President
of Switzerland.) The US, UK and France rejected
this Soviet proposal for a summit disarmament
conference, stating they preferred to continue
negotiations within UN. (Reference 58).
Soviet Union Partially Accepts Aerial Inspection
In this 17 November letter, Premier
Bulganin changed his position on the Eisenhower
open skies idea, stating that the Soviet Union
"was prepared to consider the question of employ-
ing aerial photography with the area of disposition
in Europe of the principal armed forces of the
North Atlantic bloc and of the Warsaw treaty
countries to a depth of 800 kilometers east and
west of the demarcation line between the afore-
mentioned forces." (Reference 58).
S
38
Disarmament
1957
US Introduces Subject of Outer Space Control
The disarmament debate in the 1956-57 (11th)
General Assembly produced three new proposals.
The US, on 14 January 1957, proposed, although not
formally, that the testing of outer space objects be
brought under international inspection and control
to assure their development exclusively for peace-
ful purposes. The US said it was "ready to
participate in a fair, balanced reliable system of
control" on outer space. (Reference 64).
Bomb Test Registration Suggested
The question of nuclear bomb tests dominated
the 11th General Assembly disarmament discussion.
The US position barred test suspension without
international inspection and favored control of
fissionable materials production prior to elimina-
tion of bomb tests. (Reference 8). The USSR sub-
mitted a resolution for immediate suspension of
nuclear bomb tests as a first disarmament step,
independent of other disarmament proposals. The
Soviet Union opposed inspection connected with a
test suspension agreement.
K
Canada, Norway and Japan, on 18 January 1957,
suggested, as a first step toward suspension of the
tests, that the US, UK and USSR register their
tests in advance with UN-- an idea with which the
testing powers indicated agreement.
Soviet Union Asks Enlargement of Disarmament Commission
The Soviet Union, on 24 January 1957, pro-
posed the enlargement of the Disarmament Commis-
sion by the addition of Egypt, India, Poland and a
Latin American country. The USSR proposal
included adding India and Poland to the Disarma-
ment Subcommittee. (Reference 65).
The 11th Assembly did not vote on any one
proposal but referred them all to the Disarmament
Commission and Disarmament Subcommittee in a
unanimously-adopted resolution of 14 February 1957.
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
39
UK announces first
tests of hydrogen
bomb
15 May 1957
Soviet Union launches
intercontinental
ballistic missile
26 August 1957
1957, continued
Soviet Union Proposes Idea for Rocket Control
Disarmament negotiations were conducted
almost continuously during 1957, moving from the
11th General Assembly adjournment on 8 March to
The London Disarmament Subcommittee meetings
-- from 18 March to 6 September -- and resuming
at the 12th General Assembly, 17 September to
14 December.
At the subcommittee session, the Soviet
Union, on 18 March 1957, submitted a two-stage dis-
armament program with these innovations: the
inclusion of "rocket weapons with atomic or
hydrogen warheads' in proposals concerning
nuclear weapons, and a provision prohibiting
"atomic military formations or atomic or hydrogen
weapons of any type to be stationed outside...national
frontiers". (Reference 66).
Concessions on Test Suspension
On 14 June 1957, the USSR accepted the idea
of inspection for any agreement on nuclear bomb
test control and proposed temporary suspension of
tests for two or three years while a permanent ban
was negotiated. The US, on 21 August 1957, agreed
to a two-year suspension but linked this to accept-
ance of the Western proposal for a cutoff of produc-
tion of fissionable materials.
USSR and West Submit Major 1957 Proposals
The major Soviet disarmament proposals
were introduced to the subcommittee on 30 April
1957. The West submitted its comparable slate to
the subcommittee on 29 August 1957. Both the
Soviet and Western plans were designated as
"partial measures" for disarmament. (Full texts
of proposals reprinted here, Appendixes A and B.)
The West's 1957 Proposals
The Western proposals of 29 August 1957
called for:
1) Reduction of armed forces for the US and USSR
to 2.5 million, 2.1 million and 1.7 million, respec-
tively, in three stages, and for the UK and France
to 750,000 in the first stage and 650,000 in the
second and third.
(
40
Disarmament
1957, continued
2) Reduction of conventional armaments by gradual
and mutual deposit in storage depots under inter-
national inspection.
3) Control of fissionable materials by a cutoff of
production for weapons purposes and gradual
transfer of fissionable material stockpiles to
peaceful uses.
4) Prevention of surprise attack by aerial inspec-
tion and ground observation posts.
5) Suspension of nuclear tests.
6) Study of control of outer space weapons by
setting up a technical committee to consider the
possibility of an inspection system.
7) "An effective international control and an
inspection system'' under the Security Council.
The provisions of the Western paper were speci-
fied as "inseparable". (Reference 6).
The Soviet Union rejected the Western pro-
posals.
The USSR's 1957 Proposals
The USSR's related group of proposals, of
30 April 1957 -- later slightly modified at the 12th
General Assembly on 20 September 1957 called for:
1) Reductions of armed forces identical with those
proposed by the West, but with an obligation for all
three stages. This was unacceptable to the West,
which would commit itself to the first stage only,
the second and third depending on the settlement
of political questions the reunification of
Germany in particular.
2) Reduction of conventional armaments on the
same principle as that proposed by the West,
preferably 15 percent for the first stage. This
would have to include reduction of military budgets
by 15 percent in the first stage.
3) Prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons by
an initial renunciation of the use of these weapons
for five years.
4) A pledge to "make every effort to conclude an
agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic
and hydrogen weapons, their elimination from the
arsenals of states, the cessation of their produc-
tion and the destruction of their stockpiles”.
5) Discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons.
6) International control by a control organ under
the Security Council; control posts, except at
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
41
USSR launches
earth satellite
4 October 1957
1957, continued
5 4
airfields until the second stage, and a willingness
to consider establishing areas of aerial photo-
graphy".
7) Dismantling of some foreign military bases.
8) Reduction of troops of US, USSR, France and UK
in Germany, NATO countries and Warsaw Treaty
countries.
9) Prohibition of war propaganda by national legis-
lation.
10) An obligation of US, USSR and UK not to permit
the stationing of atomic military units and nuclear
weapons outside their national frontiers. (References
5, 67).
West Gives Priority to Outer Space Control
At the 12th (1957) General Assembly, both
sides stood by the proposals mutually unaccept-
able -- which they had submitted during the
London subcommittee meetings. The US made one
change in its position on 10 October 1957. This
was to give immediacy to the Western proposal
relating to control of outer space weapons by
making this proposal independent of the total
Western plan.
— —
Soviet Union Demands 82-Member Disarmament Commission
On 28 October 1957, the Soviet Union demanded
that, in view of the lack of progress of disarma-
ment talks, the Disarmament Subcommittee be
disbanded and the Disarmament Commission be
increased to include all 82 members of United
Nations. The USSR stated that, regardless of the
Assembly's decision, it would no longer partici-
pate in the subcommittee at all or in the Disarma-
ment Commission as then constituted.
The Assembly rejected the Soviet resolution,
but, on 19 November 1957, increased the membership
of the Disarmament Commission to the maximum
number acceptable to the US: 25. The countries
added were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy,
Mexico, Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia.
The nations already on the commission (as of
1958) were Canada, China, Colombia, France, Iraq,
Japan, Panama, Sweden, USSR, UK and US. (For
texts of resolutions and votes, see Appendixes E
and H.)
42
Disarmament
NATO members agree
in principle to station
US missiles in Europe
19 December 1957
1957, continued
The Soviet Union did not accept this re-
constitution and declared that it intended to carry
out its boycott of UN disarmament organs.
-
Assembly Endorses Western Plan
Meanwhile, the 12th General Assembly, on
14 November 1957, passed a resolution which incor-
porated the Western proposals of 29 August 1957,
recommending them to the Disarmament Commis-
sion and its subcommittee as the basis for a
disarmament agreement and asking the two bodies to
meet and for the subcommittee to report to the Com-
mission and report back to the Assembly by 30 April
1958. (For text of resolution and vote, see Appendix C.)
S
The 12th Assembly rejected three resolu-
tions calling for abolition or limitation of nuclear
weapons tests
submitted separately by Japan,
USSR and India. (For text of Soviet resolution
and vote, see Appendix G.)
-
Soviet Union Revives Proposal for Disarmed Zone in Europe
As the General Assembly was adjourning,
the Soviet government, on 12 December 1957,
addressed letters to member nations of the UN
in which the idea of a European de militarized
zone was presented in an expanded form. Under
this plan, the big powers would for swear the sta-
tioning or manufacturing of nuclear weapons in
both East and West Germany, Poland and
Czechoslovakia. (Reference 68).
Both Sides Call for New Disarmament Talks
The Soviet note also stated that "a top-level
meeting of representatives of the capitalist and
socialist countries could be of great significance.'
(Reference 68).
The NATO summit conference on 19 December
1957 declared that the 15 governments of the
alliance would welcome a meeting at the foreign
ministers' level to resolve the deadlock in the
disarmament talks. (Reference 69).
On 21 December 1957, in a speech to the
Supreme Soviet, Soviet Foreign Minister A. A.
Gromyko rejected the foreign ministers' meeting
proposed by NATO on the grounds that the
"Disarmament: Postwar Through 1957", IRS Vol. III. No. 39
Erratum
p.42, Line 12
Om
eliminate the words, "and report back to the Assembly"
#HHHHH
International Review Service Vol. III No. 39
43
1957, continued
composition of this meeting would be weighted
against the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko proposed
for the near future a special session of the 82-
member UN General Assembly or an international
disarmament conference. (Reference 54).
#####
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. "Interview Given by Nikita S. Khrushchev to W. R. Hearst, Jr., 22 November 1957," USSR
Mission to UN Press Release.
2. "The State Department's Record of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' News Conference,"
7 August 1957; New York Times, 8 August 1957.
3. "Text of White Paper on Defenses Issued by British Government," 4 April 1957; New York
Times, 5 April 1957.
4. UN General Assembly Resolution 502(VI) of 11 January 1952.
5. "Verbatim Record of the 681st Plenary Meeting," General Assembly: Twelfth Session,
20 September 1957; UN Document A/PV.681.
6. "Fifth Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission," 11 September 1957;
(Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America: Working Paper:
Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament); UN Document DC/113, Annex 5. (Re-
printed here, Appendix B).
7. "Verbatim Record of the 63rd Meeting of the Disarmament Commission," Disarmament Com-
mission, 30 September 1957; UN Document DC/PV.63.
8. "Statement of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. US Representative in Committee I on
Disarmament," 14 January 1957; US Delegation to 11th General Assembly Press Release
No. 2586.
9. "Text of Declaration of Common Purpose," issued by President of the United States, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, and Prime Minister of United Kingdom, Harold MacMillan, 25 October 1957;
US Department of State Bulletin, Volume 37, No. 959, 11 November 1957.
10. "Text of Radio and Television Address by Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, 22 July
1957;" New York Times, 23 July 1957.
11. Press Conference Held by M. Jules Moch, Representative of France on the Disarmament
Commission; UN Headquarters, 21 October 1957.
12. "Verbatim Record of the 884th Meeting of the First Committee," General Assembly: 12th
Session, 29 October 1957; UN Document A/C.1/PV.884.
13. New York Herald Tribune, 4 August 1957.
14. "Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)," Interim Com-
mittee for the Common Market and Euratom; Brussels, 1957.
15. "United States Proposals for International Control of Atomic Energy (Baruch Plan),” 14
June 1946; UN Atomic Energy Commission Official Records, First Year, First Meeting, UN
Document AEC/PV.1.
16. "Verbatim Record of the 866th Meeting of the First Committee," General Assembly: Twelfth
Session, 10 October 1957; UN Document A/C.1/PV.866.
- 44 ·
SUND
—
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY, continued
17. New York Times, 14 October 1957.
18. "The State Department's Record of Dulles' News Conference," 9 October 1957; New York
Times, 10 October 1957.
19. "Verbatim Record of the 890th Meeting of the First Committee," General Assembly: 12th
Session, 4 November 1957; UN Document A/C.1/PV.890.
20. "Verbatim Record of the 718th Plenary Meeting," General Assembly: 12th Session, 19
November 1957; UN Document A/PV.718.
21. New York Times, 20 November 1957.
22. "Verbatim Record of the 867th Meeting of the First Committee," General Assembly: 12th
Session, 10 October 1957; UN Document A/C.1/PV.867.
23. "Verbatim Record of the 872nd Meeting of the First Committee," General Assembly: 12th
Session, 16 October 1957; UN Document A/C.1/PV.872.
24. "Control and Reduction of Armaments: Disarmament and Security in Europe," Staff Study
No. 5, Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations; 84th Congress,
Second Session; Washington 1956.
25. "United Nations Emergency Force," Report of the Secretary-General, 9 October 1957;
General Assembly: 12th Session; UN Document A/3694.
26. "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation," Report of the US National Academy of
Sciences; Washington, 1956.
27. "The Hazards to Man of Nuclear and Allied Radiations," Report of the UK Medical Research
Council; London, 1956.
28. "International Control of Atomic Energy, Growth of a Policy," US Department of State, Pub-
lication No. 2702, US Government Printing Office.
29. General Assembly Resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946.
30. UN Atomic Energy Commission: "Draft International Convention to Prohibit the Production
and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass
Destruction," 19 June 1946; UN Document AEC/7.
31. "Verbatim Record of the 2nd Meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission," UN Document
AEC/PV.2.
32. General Assembly Resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946.
33. Security Council Official Records, Second Year Supplement No. 5, Annex 13.
34. UN Atomic Energy Commission: "Proposals on Atomic Energy Control Submitted by the
Representative of the USSR at the 12th Meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission," 11 June
1947; UN Document AEC/24.
- 45
-
M
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY, continued
35. General Assembly Official Records: Third Session, Plenary Meetings, 25 September 1948.
36. General Assembly Resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948.
37. "Summary Memorandum Submitted by the United States," 3 May 1956, Disarmament Subcom-
mittee; UN Document DC/SC.1/45.
38. General Assembly Resolution 496 (V) of 13 December 1950.
39. General Assembly Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.
40. "Verbatim Record of the Second Committee of the Disarmament Commission," First Meeting;
5 April 1952; statement of the Representative of the United States; UN Document DC/C.2/PV.1.
41. "Verbatim Record of the Second Committee of the Disarmament Commission," First Meeting;
5 April 1952; statement of the Representative of the Soviet Union; UN Document DC/C.2/PV.1.
42. "Verbatim Record of the Second Committee of the Disarmament Commission," Second Meeting;
8 April 1952; UN Document DC/C.2/PV.2.
43. Disarmament Commission: "Working Paper Setting Forth Proposals for Fixing Numerical
Limitation of All Armed Forces," submitted by France, United Kingdom, United States,
28 May 1952; UN Document DC/10.
44. Disarmament Commission: "Supplement to Tripartite Working Paper Setting Forth Proposals
for Fixing Numerical Limitation of All Armed Forces," submitted by France, United Kingdom,
United States; 12 August 1952; UN Document DC/12.
45. General Assembly Resolution 715 (VIII) of 28 November 1953.
46. "Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, Before the 8th General
Assembly of the United Nations, 8 December 1953," US Department of State Publication
#5314, General Foreign Policy Series 85.
47. "Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission," 21 December 1953, Statement
by the Government of the USSR; UN Document DC/53, Annex 7.
48. "Letter Dated 8 April 1954 from the Representative of India to the Chairman of the Disarma-
ment Commission;" UN Document DC/44.
49. Disarmament Commission: "Working Paper on Methods of Implementing and Enforcing Dis-
armament Programs: The Establishment of International Control Organs with Appropriate
Rights, Powers and Functions Submitted by the United States;" UN Document DC/53,
Annex 4.
50. "Memor and um Submitted by France and the United Kingdom," 11 June 1954, Disarmament
Commission Official Records, Supplement for April, May and June 1954, Annex 9.
51. General Assembly Official Records, 9th Session, Plenary Meetings, 30 September 1954.
52. General Assembly Resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954.
B
46 -
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY, continued
53. General Assembly Resolution 810 (IX) of 4 December 1954.
54. "Excerpts of Speeches by Gromyko and Khrushchev to Supreme Soviet," New York Times,
22 December 1957.
55. "Proposal by the Soviet Government on the Reduction of Armaments, the Prohibition of
Atomic Weapons and the Elimination of the Threat of a New War," 10 May 1955, Disarmament
Commission; UN Document DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2.
56. "Memorandum of the United States of America: Statement by the President of the United
States, Made on 21 July 1955 at the Gene va meetings of the Heads of Government of France,
The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States," Disarmament Commission; UN
Document DC/SC.1/28.
57. "Reference Documents on Disarmament Matters," Background Series (D-1 to D-42), The
White House Disarmament Staff; US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1957.
58. Texts of Correspondence Between President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin:
(Bulganin to Eisenhower)
(Eisenhower to Bulganin)
(Bulganin to Eisenhower)
(Eisenhower to Bulganin)
(Bulganin to Eisenhower)
(Eisenhower to Bulganin)
(Bulganin to Eisenhower)
(Eisenhower to Bulganin)
59. General Assembly Resolution 912 (X) of 3 December 1955.
60. "Disarmament, A Selected Chronology, January 1, 1918 - March 19, 1956," Staff Study No. 2,
Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Committee on Foreign Relations; 84th Congress, Second
Session; Washington, 1956.
61. New York Times of 10, 15, 18, 22 July and 8 August 1956.
62. "Statement by Andrei A. Gromyko, Representative of the USSR Before the UN Disarmament
Commission, 12 July 1956, Disarmament Commission Verbatim Record of the 57th Meeting;
UN Document DC/PV.57.
19 September 1955
11 October 1955
1 February 1956
1 March 1956
6 June 1956
4 August 1956
17 November 1956
31 December 1956
S
New York Times, 24 September 1955
New York Times, 13 October 1955
New York Times, 3 February 1956
New York Times, 7 March 1956
New York Times, 8 June 1956
New York Times, 8 August 1956
New York Times, 18 November 1956
New York Times, 1 January 1957
63. "Verbatim Record of the 57th Meeting of the Disarmament Commission," 12 July 1956; UN
Document DC/PV.57.
64. United States Delegation to the United Nations Press Release No. 2586; Eleventh General
Assembly, 14 January 1957.
65. "Report of the First Committee," General Assembly: Eleventh Session, 28 January 1957;
UN Document A/3514.
- 47 -
-
66. "Fourth Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission," 1 August 1957;
(Proposal on the Reduction of Armaments and Armed Forces and the Prohibition of Atomic
and Hydrogen Weapons Submitted by the USSR); UN Document DC/112, Annex 1.
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY, continued
67. "Fourth Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission," 1 August 1957;
(Proposals on the Implementation of Partial Disarmament Measures Submitted by the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics); UN Document DC/112, Annex 7. (Reprinted here, Appendix A.)
68. "Note of Soviet Government to the Governments of the Member States of the United Nations,”
USSR Mission to the United Nations Press Release, 12 December 1957.
69. "Texts of NATO Declaration of Principles and Communique," Paris, 19 December 1957; New
York Times, 20 December 1957.
#####
· 48 -
APPENDIX A: PROPOSALS FOR PARTIAL MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT
submitted by the Soviet Union, 30 April 1957.
The problem of disarmament is today vitally important. Its solu-
tion has significance of the first order for the preservation of peace.
The continuation of the armaments race increases mistrust in relations
between states, aggravates international tension, and intensifies the
danger of the outbreak of a new war.
The most recent developments in science and technology have
multiplied many times over the power of means of destruction and of
the mass annihilation of human beings. The period succeeding the
Second World War has been marked by rapid developments in military
equipment and especially in atomic and hydrogen weapons, the explosive
power of which is now equivalent to millions of tons of T.N.T. Rocket
technology is being developed speedily, and modern weapons have been
invented, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles with hydrogen war-
heads. The introduction of these types of military equipment into the
armaments of states has made vulnerable practically every point on the
globe.
There can now be no doubt that the outbreak of a new war in which
atomic and hydrogen weapons were used would visit extremely grave
consequences on the states taking part in it, and especially on those with
a high population density and a high concentration of industry. The
existence in the arsenals of states of weapons of this type brings into
especial prominence the question of banning atomic and hydrogen weap-
ons.
The government of states, and more especially of those which
possess atomic and hydrogen weapons and therefore bear special
responsibility for the preservation of peace, are bound to heed the
people's demand to end the armaments race and remove the threat of
atomic war.
Shah
The continuance of the armaments race has had serious economic
consequences. The ever-growing military preparations of states absorb
huge resources and lay a heavy burden upon their peoples.
The United Nations Charter imposes an obligation on states to
settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force. Conse-
quently the existence of unsettled international problems or disputes
cannot be invoked to justify states in maintaining large armed forces
and carrying on an armaments race. Propaganda for a new war, accom-
panied by incitement to enmity and hatred between peoples and pursued
in certain states in violation of a General Assembly resolution, is like-
wise impermissible and in conflict with the United Nations Charter.
The principle of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition
between states with different social, economic and political systems
corresponds to the vital interests of all countries, great and small.
- 49 -
APPENDIX A, continued
The Soviet government believes that the great powers ought to
take without delay measures to decrease the existing tension in inter-
national relations and the danger due to the existence of huge armed
forces and armaments, to the incessant armaments race, particularly
in atomic and hydrogen weapons, and to the continuance of propaganda
for a new war.
Considering that cessation of the armaments race will not only
remove the danger of the outbreak of a new war but will also relieve
the peoples of a heavy economic burden and enable the resources thus
freed to be used to improve their welfare,
Recognizing the necessity of reaching an agreement on a compre-
hensive disarmament program, including the complete and unconditional
prohibition of the use and manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons
and the destruction of stockpiles of those weapons, which would ensure
that all production of atomic materials was used exclusively for peace-
ful purposes,
Taking into account that the Western powers are not at present
prepared to conclude an agreement on a comprehensive disarmament
program, and desiring to release the disarmament issue from its
present deadlock,
Considering also that the implementation of partial measures as
a first step in disarmament could contribute to the conclusion of an
agreement on a comprehensive disarmament program,
Recognizing that the necessity of taking urgent and effective
measures to preserve peace calls for a united effort and for agreement,
especially between those states which possess the largest armed forces
and produce atomic and hydrogen weapons,
The Soviet Government proposes that the governments of the states
represented in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament
Commission should reach an agreement on partial disarmament meas-
ures.
M
Proposals for such partial measures, with necessary explanations
and comments, are set out hereinafter.
1. Armed Forces
The United States proposes that for the present an agreement on
conventional armaments shall be limited to an agreement to reduce
armed forces to 2.5 million men for the United States and the Soviet
Union and to 750,000 men each for the United Kingdom and France, and
to reduce armaments and military budgets by 10 per cent; but the
United States declines to agree in advance to make a further major
reduction in armed forces to the levels, proposed by itself, of 1-1.5
million men for itself and the Soviet Union and 650,000 men for the
United Kingdom and France, or to take measures to prohibit atomic and
hydrogen weapons.
- 50 -
APPENDIX A, continued
During the last year and a half the Soviet Union has reduced its
armed forces by 1,840,000 men, whereas the levels of the armed forces
of the Western powers have remained practically unchanged during that
period. The United States proposal to limit reduction of armed forces
to 2.5 million men for itself and the Soviet Union, in the absence of an
agreement on a comprehensive disarmament program and regardless
of the unequal situation of the two states, gives an advantage to one side
at the expense of the other. It cannot be ignored that the Soviet Union
has a territory much larger than, for example, that of the United States,
and lengthy frontiers the protection of which requires proportionately
numerous armed forces. Most particularly, it cannot be ignored that
the security of the Soviet Union is threatened in the west by the North
Atlantic bloc, in the south by the Baghdad Pact grouping, and in Asia
and the Far East by the Baghdad Pact grouping and the SEATO military
bloc.
The position of the United States, whose territory is smaller and
whose frontiers are shorter than those of the Soviet Union, is entirely
different. The crux of the matter is that the frontiers of the United
States are in no danger. To the east and the west the United States is
separated from other countries by oceans, extending many thousand of
kilometers, and to the north and the south it adjoins states from which,
according to its own admission, it does not anticipate any danger. There
is no need to prove at length that the United States of America has not
been and is not now threatened by the Soviet Union.
It appears from the foregoing that, whereas a reduction of armed
forces to 2.5 million men would not only give the United States security,
but also enable it to maintain large armed forces outside its frontiers
in foreign territories, the reduction of the Soviet armed forces to that
level would impair the security of the Soviet Union, whose frontiers,
unlike those of the United States, are not protected by natural obstacles
and are also over a considerable length common with those of countries
belonging to the aforesaid military groupings.
The situation would be different if the United States, the Soviet
Union and China agreed to reduce their armed forces at the second
stage to 1-1.5 million men, and the United Kingdom and France to
reduce theirs to 650,000 men. Such a substantial reduction of the armed
forces of these powers, together with prohibition of the use of atomic
and hydrogen weapons, would mean that progress was being made to-
wards effective disarmament and towards peace.
It follows that the United States, in proposing equal levels of 2.5
million men for the armed forces of the Soviet Union and for its own,
is not displaying a realistic approach to the solution of the problem of
reducing the armed forces of powers, in particular those of the Soviet
Union and the United States, the more so since this measure is proposed
without reference to any further reductions of armed forces or to any
measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons.
- 51 -
APPENDIX A, continued
The Soviet Union stands, as before, for the radical solution of the
disarmament problem that is, for the conclusion of an agreement on
a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments,
on the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their elimination
from the arsenals of states, and also on prohibition of tests of atomic
and hydrogen weapons. The Soviet Government has submitted a proposal
for that purpose to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission.
It is common knowledge that the Soviet Government has already
announced its acceptance of the proposal to reduce the armed forces of
the United States, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men and of
the United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men each, as a first step
towards further reductions in the armed forces of the United States, the
Soviet Union and China to 1-1.5 million men and of the United Kingdom
and France to 650,000 men. It is understood in both cases that the
strength of the armed forces is to include personnel employed in the
armed forces as civilians but in fact serving military installations and
equipment. The government of the Soviet Union still proposes that an
agreement should be concluded to reduce the armed forces of the four
powers to the aforesaid levels in two stages.
2. Conventional Armaments and Military Budgets
In connection with the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the
United States and the Soviet Union to 2.5 million men and those of the
United Kingdom and France to 750,000 men, the United States is pro-
posing that the conventional armaments and military budgets of states
reducing their armed forces should be cut by 10 percent. The Soviet
Union would consider it advisable to reduce conventional armaments
and military budgets during the first period of the execution of meas-
ures for the reduction of armed forces by a greater percentage -- by
15 percent
which would substantially reduce the burden of military
expenditure borne by the peoples of all countries.
M
The size of further reductions in armaments and military budgets
could be considered at a later stage.
3. Control
The execution of the measures proposed in paragraphs 1 and 2
above should be placed under appropriate international control. During
the first stage, embracing measures for the reduction of.the armed
forces of the United States of America, the Soviet Union and China to
2.5 million men and those of the United Kingdom and France to 750,000
men, the functions of control will include the collection and analysis of
information provided by states on their implementation of partial dis-
armament measures. Those functions should be performed, as agreed
by the parties, by a control organ established for the purpose under the
Security Council.
S
- 52 -
APPENDIX A, continued
Moreover, even during the first stage control posts are to be
established on the territory of states, on a basis of reciprocity, at large
ports, at railway junctions and on main motor highways, to ensure that
there is no dangerous concentration of armed forces and armaments.
The list of the points at which control posts are to be established will
be settled by later agreement. However, since we are now concerned
with the implementation of partial measures only, the solution of the
problem of control posts should be modified accordingly. During the
first stage, control posts should be established only in the western
border regions of the Soviet Union, in the territories of France, the
United Kingdom and other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and
the Warsaw Treaty, and in the eastern part of the United States.
Control posts may also be established, by agreement with other
states, in territories belonging to them lying within the aerial photog-
raphy zone.
The establishment of control posts at aerodromes is proposed
during the second stage of the implementation of the partial measures
(when the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are
reduced to 1-1.5 million men and those of the United Kingdom and
France to 650,000 men). The establishment of control posts at aero-
dromes must also be related to an agreement on appropriate measures
for the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and their
elimination from the arsenals of states.
4. Nuclear Weapons
Simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on measures
for the reduction of armed forces, armaments and military expenditure
provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, an agreement is to be
reached on atomic and hydrogen weapons, which owing to their enormous
destructive power constitute a particular danger. Accordingly states
should give, before the peoples of the world, a solemn undertaking to
renounce the use for military purposes of atomic and hydrogen weapons
of all types, including aerial bombs, rockets carrying atomic and
hydrogen warheads, irrespective of range, atomic artillery, etc. This
undertaking, given in the form of a declaration (see appendix), would
come into force from the beginning of the first stage of the implementa-
tion of measures for the reduction of armed forces and conventional
armaments.
-
The states parties to the agreement would give an undertaking to
make every effort to conclude an agreement on the complete prohibition
of atomic and hydrogen weapons, their elimination from the arsenals of
states, the cessation of their production and the destruction of their
stockpiles.
In view of the particular urgency of discontinuing tests of atomic
and hydrogen weapons, it is advisable at present to single out this
measure from the general atomic and hydrogen weapons problem as one
of high priority, and to solve it without delay.
- 53 -
APPENDIX A, continued
5. Foreign Bases
One of the causes of tension in relations between states is the
presence of military bases in foreign territory. When it is realized
that there are dozens, even hundreds, of military bases in foreign
territory, it is not difficult to appreciate their detrimental influence
upon relations between states.
The presence of military bases in foreign territory has of late
greatly intensified suspicion and tension, particularly since atomic
military formations are stationed, or it is planned to station such for-
mations, at many of them: a fact which gives grounds for viewing these
activities as actual preparation for a war in which atomic and hydrogen
weapons would be used. This situation represents a serious threat to
the peace and security of peoples, for even the slightest carelessness
may have fatal consequences for the peoples. Apart from this, such
activities on the part of the United States cannot but lead, in the natural
course of events, to counter-measures by the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Government therefore proposes that the question of
abolishing military bases in foreign territory should be examined and
that it should first be agreed which such bases can be abolished within
one or two years.
6. Forces in Germany
In its statement of 17 November 1956 the Soviet Union proposed
that the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of Germany should be
reduced by one-third as compared with the levels of those armed
forces obtaining on 31 December 1956. The Soviet Union believes that
such a reduction would do much to ease international tension, and
especially to improve the situation in Europe, and thus to facilitate the
solution of the problem of disarmament.
7. NATO and Warsaw Treaty Forces
The Soviet government considers that an agreement to reduce the
armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France sta-
tioned in the territory of the NATO countries and the armed forces of
the Soviet Union stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty
countries would be of great significance in lessening international
tension. The size of the reductions in the armed forces of those
countries could be determined in the course of subsequent negotiations.
8. Aerial Inspection
In its statement of 17 November 1956, the Soviet government
proposed that consideration should be given to the question of employing
aerial photography within the area of Europe in which the principal
armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and of the Warsaw Treaty
countries are stationed, to a depth of 800 kilometers east and west of
- 54 -
-
APPENDIX A, continued
the demarcation line between the aforementioned armed forces, provided
that the states concerned give their consent. In proposing this area for
aerial photographic operations the Soviet Union proceeded on the prin-
ciple that the line separating the armed forces of the North Atlantic
bloc from those of the Warsaw Treaty countries follows the demarcation
line in Germany and then the western frontiers of Czechoslovakia.
The representative of the United States of America in the Sub-
committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission proposed
the use of aerial photography in Europe, in a sector bounded to the west
by longitude 50 E., to the east by longitude 300 E. and to the south by
latitude 45° N. If the area of aerial photography is determined in this
way, the median line is moved from the demarcation line in Germany
and the western frontiers of Czechoslovakia into Poland -- in other
words, it is moved arbitrarily to the east. This plan for aerial inspec-
tion in Europe covers only a small part of the territory of the North
Atlantic Treaty countries, and a substantial proportion of that of the
Warsaw Treaty countries. It is true that the northern part of this area
includes the territory of Norway but, as is known, the principal NATO
forces are not stationed in the territory of that country.
The Soviet Union is, nevertheless, prepared to agree to aerial
reconnaissance being carried out within the sector of Europe proposed
by the United States, but with the proviso that the line bisecting the
aerial photographic sector should run near the demarcation line in
Germany, and that in the north the sector porposed by the United States
should not extend beyond the parallel passing through the northernmost
point of the demarcation line in Germany, and in the south should be
bounded by the parallel passing through the southernmost point of
Albania. A sector bounded to the west by the zero meridian, to the east
by longitude 25º E., to the north by latitude 540 N., and to the south by
latitude 39°38' N. would meet the requirements of this principle.
As to the area of aerial inspection in the Far East, the United
States Government proposes a sector extending from longitude 140º W.
to 160° E. and bounded to the south by latitude 45° N. The Soviet
Government considers that the area of aerial photography could be
expanded considerably by including in it: (a) the territory of the Soviet
Union east of longitude 1080 E., and (b) the territory of the United
States west of longitude 90° W. It should be noted that the two areas
of aerial photography are approximately equal in extent (the USSR area
being 7,129,000 sq.km. and the United States area 7,063,000 sq.km.).
As soon as an agreement on partial measures entered into force
a limited number of control posts could be set up at railway junctions,
on motor highways and at ports in the areas of aerial photography in
Europe and the Far East.
9. War Propaganda
Propaganda for war and incitement to war, and especially the
propaganda carried on in certain countries for the use of atomic and
•
- 55 -
APPENDIX A, continued
hydrogen weapons against certain states, are playing no small part in
straining relations between states and kindling animosity and hatred
between peoples.
The resolution on the prohibition of propaganda for war, adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947, is not being observed.
Only the Soviet Union and some other states have passed legislation
against propaganda for war. The absence of such legislation in other
countries creates a favorable soil for fanning militarist passions and
war hysteria. To ease international tensions and lessen the danger of
war, appropriate measures should be taken to put an end to propaganda
for war.
It is also inadmissible that in certain states the ideological strug-
gle is being allowed to enter into relations between states. To end a
situation in which ideological disputes and differences are used as a
means for straining relations between states, there is urgent need for
an agreement under which states would undertake not to allow their
ideological differences to enter into relations between states.
The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the proposals set
forth in this memorandum will be duly considered by the Governments
of the countries represented in the Subcommittee of the United Nations
Disarmament Commission, and that a mutually acceptable agreement on
the points raised in these proposals will be found.
- 56 -
APPENDIX B: PROPOSALS FOR PARTIAL MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT
submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States, 29 August 1957.
I. The Limitation and Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments
A. Within one year from the entry into force of the convention,
the following states will restrict or reduce their armed forces respec-
tively to the maximum limits indicated below:
France
United Kingdom
Soviet Union
750,000
750,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
United States
The definition of the armed forces will be annexed to the convention.
B.
During this same period, these states will place in storage
depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an
International Control Organization, specific quantities of designated
types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to
the convention.
C. The relation of other states to the convention, including the
agreed levels of their armed forces, will be determined later.
D. The states listed in paragraph I A will be prepared to negotiate
on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments upon condi-
tion that:
1
1. Compliance with the provisions of the convention has been
verified to their satisfaction.
There has been progress toward the solution of political
2.
issues.
3. Other essential states have become parties to the conven-
tion and have accepted levels for their armed forces and armaments,
fixed in relation to the limits set out in paragraphs A and B above.
E.
Upon the conditions cited above, negotiations could be under-
taken by France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States on a further limitation of their armed forces which would involve
agreed reductions for the United States and the Soviet Union to not less
than 2.1 million men each. The agreed level of forces for France and
the United Kingdom, corresponding to this figure, would be 700,000 men
each. The levels of other essential states would be specified at the same
time through negotiation with them.
-
F.
Thereafter, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations
could be undertaken on further limitations to not less than 1.7 million
men each for the United States and the Soviet Union. The agreed level
corresponding to this figure for France and the United Kingdom would
be 650,000 men each. The levels of other essential states would be
specified at the same time through negotiation with them.
S
- 57 -
APPENDIX B, continued
G. Upon the conditions cited in D above, these states will also be
prepared to negotiate on further limitations of armaments. The calcu-
lation of any such armament limitations will be in agreed relation to
the armed forces determined in paragraphs E and F above and will be
completed prior to the application of the further limitations in armed
forces. The parties must be satisfied before such further limitations
of armaments are undertaken and at all times thereafter that the
armaments at the disposal of any party to the convention do not exceed
the quantities thus allowed in each category.
H.
No measures for the reduction and limitation of armed forces
and armaments beyond those provided for in paragraph A and B above
will be put into effect until the system of control is appropriately
expanded and is able to verify such measures.
Military Expenditure
In order to assist in verifying compliance with the provisions of
paragraph I, and looking forward to the reduction of military expendi-
tures, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United
States agree to make available to the International Control Organization
information about their military budgets and expenditures for the year
preceding entry of the convention into force and for each year thereafter.
The categories of information to be supplied will be agreed in advance
and annexed to the convention.
III. Nuclear Weapons
II.
Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear weapons if an
armed attack has not placed the party in a situation of individual or
collective self-defense.
IV. The Control of Fissionable Material
A. The parties to the convention further undertake:
1. That all future production of fissionable materials will be
used at home or abroad, under international supervision, exclu-
sively for non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, beginning
one month after the International Board of Control described in
paragraph VIII has certified that the installation of an effective
inspection system to verify the commitment has been completed.
2. That they will cooperate in the prompt installation and in
the maintenance of such an inspection system.
3. That for the purpose of accomplishing the above under-
takings, the five governments represented on the Subcommittee
will appoint a group of technical experts to meet as soon as pos-
sible to design the required inspection system, and to submit a
progress report for their approval within the first ten months after
the entry into force of the convention.
- 58 -
APPENDIX B, continued
B. The parties which are producers of fissionable material for
weapons purposes at the time of cessation of production for weapons
purposes undertake to provide, under international supervision, for
equitable transfers, in successive increments, of fissionable materials
from previous production to non-weapons purposes, at home or abroad,
including stockpiling; and, in this connection
1.
To fix the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable mate-
rials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and
V.
C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissionable
material for weapons purposes provided in paragraph IV A 1:
2. To commence such transfers at agreed dates and in agreed
quantities at the fixed ratios following the cut-off date for produc-
tion of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.
1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control
any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons,
except where, under arrangements between transferor and trans-
feree, their use will be in conformity with paragraph III.
Gal
2. Each party undertakes not otherwise to transfer out of its
control any fissionable material or to accept transfer to it of such
material, except for non-weapons purposes.
Nuclear Weapons Testing
A. All parties to the convention undertake to refrain from con-
ducting nuclear test explosions for a period of twelve months from the
date of entry into force of the convention, provided that agreement has
been reached on the installation and maintenance of the necessary
controls, including inspection posts with scientific instruments, located
within the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the
United States, the area of the Pacific Ocean and at such other places as
may be necessary, with the consent of the governments concerned.
B. A group of technical experts appointed by the five governments
represented on the Subcommittee will meet as soon as possible to design
the inspection system to verify the suspension of testing.
C. Upon termination of the twelve months period, the parties will
be free to conduct tests unless they have agreed to continue the suspen-
sion for a further period under effective international inspection.
D. If the inspection system referred to in paragraph V A is oper-
ating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if progress satis-
factory to each party concerned is being achieved in the preparation of
an inspection system for the cessation of the production of fissionable
material for weapons purposes agreed to under Paragraph IV A 1 above,
all parties to the convention undertake to refrain from conducting nuclear
test explosions for a further period of twelve months. Such an extension
-
- 59 -
APPENDIX B, continued
will be made only with the understanding that testing may at the discre-
tion of each party be conducted twenty-four months after the entry into
force of the convention if the inspection system for the cessation of
production for weapons purposes has not been installed to the satisfac-
tion of each party concerned before the end of the twenty-four months
and if the cessation of production for weapons purposes has not been
put into effect.
E. If tests are resumed, each party undertakes to announce and
register in advance the dates of each series and the range of total
energy to be released the rein; to provide for limited observation of
them; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released
into the atmosphere.
VI. The Control of Objects Entering Outer Space
All parties to the convention agree that within three months after
the entry into effect of the convention they will cooperate in the estab-
lishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection
system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of
objects through outer space will be exclusively for peaceful and
scientific purposes.
VII. Safeguards Against the Possibility of Surprise Attack
A. From the entry into force of the convention the parties con-
cerned will cooperate in the establishment and maintenance of systems
of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack.
JORD
B. The establishment of such systems will be subject to agreement
on the details of its installation, maintenance and operation. It is pro-
posed as a matter of urgency that a working group of experts appointed
by the five governments represented on the Subcommittee be set up at
once to examine the technical problems and to report their conclusions
which could form the basis for an annex to the agreement.
C. With regard to inspection in the Western Hemisphere and in the
Soviet Union the Governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom
and the United States propose the following:
1. That all the territory of the continental United States, all
Alaska including the Aleutian Islands, all the territory of Canada
and all the territory of the Soviet Union will be open to inspection.
2. If the Government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad
proposal, to which is related the proposal for inspection in Europe,
referred to in paragraph D below, the Governments of Canada,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (with the consent
of the Governments of Denmark and Norway) propose that:
All the territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet
Union, Canada, the United States (Alaska), Denmark (Greenland),
- 60 -
APPENDIX B, continued
and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States and
the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees West longitude, east of
160 degrees East longitude and north of 50 degrees North
latitude; all the remainder of Alaska; all the remainder of the
Kamchatka peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands
will be open to inspection.
D.
With regard to inspection in Europe, provided there is commit-
ment on the part of the Soviet Union to one of the two foregoing proposals,
the governments of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United
States, with the concurrence in principle of their European allies and in
continuing consultation with them, subject to the indispensable consent of
the countries concerned and to any mutually agreed exceptions, propose
that an area including all of Europe, bounded in the south by latitude 40
degrees North and in the west by 10 degrees West longitude and in the
east by 60 degrees East longitude will be open to inspection.
E. If the government of the Soviet Union rejects this broad pro-
posal, then, under the same proviso expressed above, a more limited
zone of inspection in Europe could be discussed but only on the under-
standing that this would include a significant part of the territory of the
Soviet Union, as well as the other countries of Eastern Europe.
F.
The system of inspection to guard against surprise attack will
include in all cases aerial inspection, with ground observation posts at
principal ports, railway junctions, main highways, and important air-
fields, etc., as agreed. There would also, as agreed, be mobile ground
teams with specifically defined authority.
G.
Ground posts may be established by agreement at points in the
territories of the states concerned without being restricted to the limits
of the zones described in paragraphs C 1 and 2, but the areas open to
ground inspection will not be less than the areas of aerial inspection.
The mobility of ground inspection would be specifically defined in the
agreement with in all cases the concurrence of the countries directly
concerned. There would also be all necessary means of communication.
H. Within three months of the entry into force of the convention,
the parties will provide to the Board of Control inventories of their
fixed military installations, and numbers and locations of their military
forces and designated armaments, including the means of delivering
nuclear weapons located within an agreed inspection zone or zones, and
within such additional area or areas as may be agreed.
I. Any initial system of inspection designed to safeguard against
the possibility of surprise attack may be extended by agreement of all
concerned to the end that ultimately the system will deal with the danger
of surprise attack from anywhere.
- 61 -
APPENDIX B, continued
VIII. The International Control Organization
A. All the obligations contained in the convention will be conditional
upon the continued operation of an effective international control and
inspection system to verify compliance with its terms by all parties.
B. All the control and inspection services described in the con-
vention and those which may be created in the course of its implementa-
tion will be within the framework of an International Control Organization
established under the aegis of the Security Council, which will include,
as its executive organ, a Board of Control in which the affirmative vote
of the representatives of the governments represented on the Subcommit-
tee and of such other parties as may be agreed will be required for
important decisions.
C. All parties to the convention undertake to make available infor-
mation freely and currently to the Board of Control to assist it in
verifying compliance with the obligations of the convention and in cate-
gories which will be set forth in an annex to it.
D. The functions of the International Control Organization will be
expanded by agreement between the parties concerned as the measures
provided for in the convention are progressively applied.
E.
Other matters relating to the organization will be defined in
annexes to the convention. These matters will include the duties which
the organization is to carry out, the method by which it shall function,
its composition, its relationship to the General Assembly and the Security
Council of the United Nations, its voting procedures, its working condi-
tions, jurisdiction, immunities, and prerogatives.
IX. Movement of Armaments
In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control
will have authority to study a system for regulating the export and im-
port of designated armaments.
X.
Suspension of the Convention
A. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, par-
tially or completely, by written notice to the International Control
Organization, in the event of an important violation by another party,
or other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the
notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.
S
B. At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to
suspend its obligations, in order to afford opportunity for correction of
the violations or prejudicial action.
XI. This working paper is offered for negotiation on the understanding
that its provisions are inseparable. Failure to fulfil any of the provisions
of the convention would create a situation calling for examination at the
request of any party.
- 62 -
APPENDIX C: RESOLUTION OF 12TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON GENERAL
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT Adopted 14 November 1957
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954,
Emphasizing the urgency of decreasing the danger of war and
improving the prospects of a durable peace through achieving interna-
tional agreement on reduction, limitation and open inspection of
armaments and armed forces,
Welcoming the narrowing of differences which has resulted from
the extensive negotiations in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament
Commission,
Believing that immediate, carefully measured steps can be taken
for partial measures of disarmament and that such steps will facili-
tate further measures of disarmament,
1. Urges that the States concerned, and particularly those which
are members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission,
give priority to reaching a disarmament agreement which, upon its
entry into force, will provide for the following:
S
(a) The immediate suspension of testing of nuclear weapons with
prompt installation of effective international control, including in-
spection posts equipped with appropriate scientific instruments located
within the territories of the United States of America, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, in Pacific Ocean areas, and at other points as
required;
(b) The cessation of the production of fissionable materials for
weapons purposes and the complete devotion of future production of
fissionable materials to non-weapons purposes under effective in-
ternational control;
20
(c) The reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a pro-
gramme of transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under
international supervision, of stocks of fissionable material from
weapons uses to non-weapons uses;
(d) The reduction of armed forces and armaments through
adequate, safeguarded arrangements;
(e) The progressive establishment of open inspection with ground
and aerial components to guard against the possiblity of surprise
attack;
(£) The joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure
that the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively
for peaceful and scientific purposes;
2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to reconvene its
Sub-Committee as soon as feasible for this purpose;
3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to invite its Sub-
Committee to establish, as one of its first tasks, a group or groups of
- 63 -
APPENDIX C, continued
technical experts to study inspection systems for disarmament meas-
ures on which the Sub-Committee may reach agreement in principle
and to report to it within a fixed period;
4.
Recommends that any such technical group or groups be
composed of one expert from each of the States members of the Sub-
Committee and one from each of three other States Members of the
United Nations which shall be designated by the Secretary-General in
consultation with the Sub-Committee;
5. Invites the States concerned, and particularly those which are
members of the Sub-Committee, to consider the possibility of devoting,
out of the funds made available as a result of disarmament, as and
when sufficient progress is made, additional resources to the im-
provement of living conditions throughout the world and especially in
the less developed countries;
6. Requests the Sub-Committee to report to the Disarmament
Commission by 30 April 1958 on the progress achieved.
Vote: 56 Yes, 9 No, 15 Abstain, as follows
In favor:
Against:
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaya, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Jordan, Laos.
Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR, Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary.
Abstaining: Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Japan.
APPENDIX D: RESOLUTION OF 12TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON "COLLECTIVE
ACTION TO INFORM AND ENLIGHTEN THE PEOPLES OF THE
WORLD AS TO THE DANGERS OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE AND
PARTICULARLY AS TO THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECTS OF
GENE
MODERN WEAPONS" Adopted 14 November 1957. Vote: 71 Yes, 9 No,
1 Abstain
The General Assembly,
Considering that the armaments race, owing to advances of nuclear
science and other modern forms of technology, creates means whereby
unprecedented devastation might be inflicted upon the entire world, and
that peoples of all countries should be made to realize this,
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APPENDIX D, continued
Considering that any agreement, whether partial or general, on
the regulation of armaments necessarily implies adequate interna-
tional control,
Considering consequently that public opinion must be made aware
both of the effects of modern weapons of all kinds and of the necessity
of reaching a disarmament agreement providing effective measures of
control,
1.
Requests the Disarmament Commission to make recommenda-
tions on the nature of the information to be disseminated and requests
the Secretary-General to report to the Commission on the means
available for conducting such an international campaign;
Considering that it is therefore desirable to seek ways and means
of organizing an effective and continuing publicity campaign on a
world-wide scale, under the auspices of the United Nations and disre-
garding all ideological or political considerations,
2. Requests the Secretary-General to furnish the Disarmament
Commission whatever assistance it may request for this purpose;
3. Invites Member States to communicate to the Disarmament
Commission or to the Secretary-General in good time any views they
may see fit to submit as to the scope and content of the proposed
campaign.
APPENDIX E: RESOLUTION OF 12TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON ENLARGEMENT
OF DISARMAMENT COMMISSION Adopted 19 November 1957
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952 establishing
the Disarmament Commission,
1. Decides to enlarge the Disarmament Commission by the
addition of fourteen Member States which, for the first year, from 1
January 1958 to 1 January 1959, shall be: Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, India, Italy, Mexico,
Norway, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia;
Transmits to the Disarmament Commission the records of
the proceedings of the First Committee during the twelfth session of
the General Assembly at which disarmament was discussed.
Vote: 60 Yes, 9 No, 11 Abstain, as follows
2.
In Favor:
Lebanon, Libya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nepal, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
- 65 -
+
APPENDIX E, continued
Against:
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan,
Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Argen-
tina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma,
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salva-
dor, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, Laos.
Poland, Romania, Ukraine, USSR, Albania, Bulgaria,
Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Abstaining: Liberia, Malaya, Morocco, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Cam-
bodia, Cuba, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Israel.
Yugoslavia did not participate in the voting.
APPENDIX F: USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION ON DISCONTINUING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
TEST Submitted to 12th General Assembly 30 September 1957.
(Not put to vote, at request of USSR)
The General Assembly,
Taking into account the deep concern felt by all the peoples of the
world at continued tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons,
Considering that the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons
would be an important practical first step towards the complete
prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would constitute an
obstacle to the development and production of new and even more
destructive types of such weapons of mass destruction,

Noting that the continued testing of weapons of such types consti-
tutes a threat to human life and health,
Bearing in mind that the discontinuance of tests of nuclear wea-
pons would remove that threat, would be in accordance with the desires
of all the peoples of the world and would further the humanitarian aims
of the United Nations,
C
Calls on those Governments which carry out tests of atomic and
hydrogen weapons to conclude an agreement forthwith on the dis-
continuance of tests of such weapons, on the basis of the following
provisions:
C
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1. Tests shall be discontinued for a period of two or three years
as from 1 January 1958;
APPENDIX F, continued
2. An international commission, which shall report to the
Security Council and the General Assembly, shall be set up to super-
vise the fulfillment by States of their obligation to discontinue tests
of atomic and hydrogen weapons;
3.
Under the direction of the aforesaid international commis-
sion control posts shall be established, on a basis of reciprocity in
the territory of the USSR, the United States of America, the United
Kingdom and its possessions and in the Pacific Ocean area, including
Australia,
Calls upon other States to accede to the agreement on the dis-
continuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
APPENDIX G: USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION ON PROHIBITION OF USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS Rejected by 12th General Assembly, 6 November 1957
The General Assembly,
Bearing in mind that the use of nuclear weapons for military
purposes would bring untold misery to mankind and would entail
the mass slaughter of civilians, and also the destruction of large
towns and centres of material and intellectual culture,
Considering that the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons
is wholly in accordance with the peaceful purposes and principles of
the United Nations,
Desiring to facilitate agreement on the problem of the final
prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, together with their
elimination from the armaments of States and the liquidation of
stockpiles of such weapons, and on the reduction of armed forces
and conventional armaments,
Calls upon the States possessing nuclear weapons to assume, as
a first step, a temporary obligation not to use atomic and hydrogen
weapons, it being understood that if at the end of five years no compre-
hensive international agreement on the disarmament problem has
been reached, the question of an obligation by States to renounce the
use of nuclear weapons will again be considered by the United Nations.
Vote: 11 Yes, 45 No, 25 Abstain, as follows
In favor:
Against:
Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cambodia, Czecho-
slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Ukraine,
Yugoslavia, USSR.
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican
- 67-
APPENDIX G, continued
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Greece, Hon-
duras, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lebanon,
Liberia, Luxembourg, Malaya, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraquay, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vene-
zuela.
Abstaining: Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, India, In-
donesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Libya, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen.
APPENDIX H: USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION ON ENLARGEMENT OF DISARMAMENT
COMMISSION AND DISSOLUTION OF DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Rejected by 12th General Assembly, 19 November 1957
The General Assembly,
Desirous of contributing to the success of discussions on the
disarmament problem and to the achievement of an appropriate in-
ternational agreement,
Decides:
1.
To establish a permanent disarmament commission con-
sisting of all the States Members of the United Nations;
2.
To direct that the permanent disarmament commission shall
function continuously. The meetings of the commission shall be held
in public;
To assign this commission with the task of examining all disarma-
ment proposals submitted to the United Nations and of drafting appro-
priate recommendations for the sessions of the General Assembly;
3. To direct that the Commission shall elect a chairman and ..
vice-chairmen, who will have the task of directing the current work
of the commission and also of assisting States Members of the United
Nations in organizing consultations, meetings and the like on dis-
armament problems;
4. To request the Secretary-General to provide the commission
with the necessary services to ensure the success of its work;
5. In view of the establishment of the permanent disarmament
commission, to dissolve the existing Disarmament Commission and
its Sub-Committee.
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-
-
Vote: 9 Yes, 46 No, 24 Abstain, as follows
APPENDIX H, continued
6. To transmit to the permanent commission for examination
all proposals and documents relating to the question of disarmament
submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its twelfth
session.
In favor:
Against:
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 06552 4145
Ukraine, USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Iran,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia.
- 69.
Abstaining: Yemen, Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia,
Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, India, Indonesia,
Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal,
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand.
Yugoslavia did not participate in the voting.
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