ON MEANING. A SYMPOSIUM BEFORE THE
WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIA—
TION, DECEMBER, 1907.
I. MEANING AND IMAGE.
BY PROFESSOR W. B. PILLSBURY,
University of Michigan.
In the current use of the word meaning we have one of the
best instances of the current tendency to confuse structure and
function. Meaning can be very easily conceived and even
represented to ourselves as long as we consider its use alone,
but it is very illusive as soon as we attempt to pin ourselves
down to accurate definition, and gives even more trouble when
we attempt to point out the structures that stand at the basis of
the meaning. If we look to the history of the term we find that
Bradley had no difficulty in demonstrating that an image and
its signification were entirely distinct, that no image, as images
were ordinarily defined in the psychology of his day, could be
what the logician reasoned with or about. “Man’ that we have
in mind as we think ‘man is primarily distinguished from the
animal by his readier and more complicated responses’ is not
the picture that we have as we formulate the sentence or conclu-
sion. But if one looks to Bradley’s writings for a definite state-
ment of what meaning is as a conscious process, one is every-
where baffled, Meanings are the things that are really asso-
ciated. They are the only things that logic is concerned with.
They are organized into a universe that may or may not be said to
exist in advance of knowledge. When we ask however how this
world of meanings is related to the individual consciousness that
we know or to the images or particulars with which all knowing
is assumed to begin, we look in vain for a satisfactory answer.
The most that we get from Bradley or Bosanquet on this point
is metaphor, the metaphor of signal flags and their signals, of
words and their meanings.
It may be said with some truth that since Bradley all of the
discussions have been devoted toward giving a clear statement
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of the relation between meaning and idea, between the world
of thought and the mental content. This has been variously
pictured. Gore would have us believe, and with good warrant,
that image is stimulus, meaning the response, image, the struc-
ture, idea the use that is made of the structure. The view
harmonizes well with the current use of the two words and with
actual observations in the thought world.
More recently Hoernlé has insisted that meaning and image
cannot be separated, with the added implication that the mean-
ing is an ultimate process that cannot be further defined or
described.
We may accept both of these theories, but even then we
meet other difficulties in distinguishing the two processes.
There is no stimulus without response. What we ordinarily
appreciate is the reference not the symbol; as we think we have
meanings always, never images. If we accept Gore's definition,
meaning alone tends to be left in consciousness, image is a
vanishing quantity. By Hoernlé, too, the problem seems to be
stated only, not solved. To make image and meaning different
aspects of one psychic whole is a formal statement in denial of
the previously asserted separation that probably must be ac-
cepted but the assertion is supported by no definite proof nor
does it bring us much nearer an adequate idea of the relation
that we are concerned to understand. .
Still another use has been made recently of the distinction
between image and meaning. I refer to the discussion by
Woodworth and Thorndike of the necessity for an image in
advance of voluntary movement. From one point of view this
discussion avowedly contributes nothing to the elucidation of the
nature of meaning. It rather makes use of the earlier devel-
oped distinction to escape the impasse in the explanation of
the origination of voluntary movement. Briefly Woodworth
becomes convinced by observation of himself and others that
voluntary movements are frequently executed when there is no
image that can be detected, or at least no image that is at all
closely related to the movement that is performed. If there be
no image present, Woodworth argues that the only alternative
is to assume that the movement is controlled by pure thought or
meaning.
MEAAW/AWG A/VD VMA G.E. I 52
Before we can do justice to this theory or use it as a solvent
for the explanation of the relation between image and meaning,
it will be necessary to consider what seems to me the more helpful
constructive side of Woodworth's theory, the physiological ex-
planation. This, it will be remembered, is that movement is
determined by large masses of nervous elements acting as a unit,
that no part of the activity can be regarded as alone responsible
for the movement but the whole system must play its part." If
we carry this statement over to meaning it would indicate that
meaning would be the correlate of large masses of nerve units
that are closely connected. Image would presumably corre-
spond to the action of a relatively restricted number of elements
in the sensory area. This view seems to harmonize perfectly
with the facts. There is probably no voluntary movement that
cannot be thus referred to a vast mass of related elements, even
if we consider nothing but the sensory elements. As one reads
aloud even in a reflex sort of way the voice must be controlled
by the visual impressions from the page, by the sound of the
spoken words, whether loud or low, and by the sensory impres-
sions from the organs of speech as well. Were any one of the
sensory elements removed by blindness, deafness, or anaesthesia
of the muscles of speech, reading would be impossible or would
be uncertain in its quality. But in addition to all of this there
must be some control by the general purpose in reading and the
general meaning of the context that would determine the modu-
lation of the voice, and would inhibit the pronunciation of any
word that was not in harmony with the whole. It is certain that
one need be conscious of but very few of the elements in this
complex and of but one group at a time. Certainly too any one
group of elements in the complex may be unconscious and the
movement take place as it does. What dominates consciousness
is almost always the purpose of reading or of the movement of
whatever kind, not the sensations that pathological and physi-
ological facts assure us must be present during the movement.
This general complex is what too on any interpretation of the
kind must be called meaning. So far we may go with Wood-
worth in his statement of the nature of the processes that con-
trol action.
* Garman Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, p. 391.
I53 W. B. PIA, LSRUARY.
A similar series of experiments that emphasizes a slightly
different phase of the problem, and reaches conclusions of a
slightly different kind is that of Ach in Die Willenstätigkeit
und das Denken. Ach it will be remembered worked with
reaction times, and studied the sensory and other elements that
controlled the response in very much the same way as Wood-
worth. He too found that many responses were without any
preliminary image. When, e.g., the subject was working with
choice reactions, the stimulus alone would receive attention and
no noticeable imagery would intervene between stimulus and
response. What determined the response was the purpose or
awareness of the task that had been set by the experimenter for
that series and even this was often but vaguely conscious. The
response itself became very nearly reflex, but choice was made
between the several possible reflexes that had been developed
in the course of the experiments by the purpose that dominated
that particular series. The stimulus is always effective in some
degree and helps to determine the course of the action but all
of the sensory elements have dropped from consciousness as
they always do when motor responses become automatic. In
the theory of Ach, purpose or task is the essential element in
the determination of action. Idea and even stimulus takes a
secondary place. To bring together then the factors that
control voluntary movement, we find that we must have stimuli
from two or more different senses which share in the immediate
control of the movement, that these stimuli must be interpreted
by earlier experiences and coördinated by a present purpose or
task. What idea, if any, need be present cannot be said with
certainty. Either the remote or the resident sensation may be
conscious or may drop from consciousness and the purpose may
be but vaguely represented in consciousness and the action still
follow its usual course; but each and all of these factors must
be represented in the physiological activities out of which the
response grows.
If we agree with Woodworth and Ach that these are the
elements that are present in the voluntary act, our question
recurs to our original problem, how much of the process are we
to call image and how much are we to call meaning. Certainly
MEAAW/AWG AND /MA G.E. I54
the bare image alone can never suffice to control movement; we
must always have the larger appreciation of purpose that corre-
sponds in action to what the logician calls meaning. If now
however we accept Woodworth’s application of the word, then
all of the complex process outlined about must constitute the
meaning. In other words, dropping out the elements that may
not be conscious at the moment of action, what we are conscious
of and what is essential to action is the complex interrelation of
sensation with sensation and of sensation with idea and purpose,
and this it is that by their definition we must call meaning. But
if we we make strict application of this theory and connect it
with general observation it would seem that all action takes
place through meaning, never through image.
While then we may agree with Woodworth as to the facts of
the control of voluntary movement, we may take exception, it
seems to me, to his assumption that the meaning is anything
mysterious or unusual in consciousness, or even to the implica-
tion that it is any particularly new addition to the elements that
are ordinarily considered in a discussion of the voluntary move-
ment. His meaning or pure thought is not apparently, from his
physiological interpretation, anything added to stimulus, sen-
sation or idea, is in fact nothing more than a new coördina-
tion, a new interrelation between sensation, idea and earlier
experience, controlled or represented by the purpose or task of
the moment.
If we compare the factors involved in the control of move-
ment with the processes involved in meaning in reference to
thought, we can see that the two harmonize in so far as the
image is ever subordinate, while the meaning is always the im-
portant element. This I have attempted to show in earlier
papers before the society and it has also been asserted by Bald-
win for all concrete mental processes. Moreover each specific
sensory element is subordinated to and dependent upon the more
general purpose that dominates thinking as it dominates action.
If we say with Gore that meaning is function or response, image
structure or stimulus, we find that what response is given to
stimulus, or what use is made of structure depends upon the
* Thought and Things, I., p. 137.
I55 W. B. PIM, LSBUAP V.
general content or purpose of the moment, just as the action
depends upon the purpose or task set by oneself or another.
In this case too the physiological processes would be similar to
those that control action. We would have not one sensory ele-
ment, but a sensory content associated with a vast number of
other sensory and motor elements, dominated and controlled by
still other and more remote nervous processes,’So, in a simple
example, when I say ‘ that man is good the meaning of the
word good is to be found in the earlier associates of the word
and in the present context, the present purpose with which I
use the word. If I speak the word in this connection or to a
psychologist of a psychologist, I probably mean skill in psy-
chological analysis, or extended knowledge of psychological
facts, obviously, were I delivering a funeral oration or selecting
a man for a football team, the same words would have an entirely
different meaning. So both in action and in thought the im-
portant element is meaning not image, and meaning is the cor-
relate of the physiological processes that have long been recog-
nized as at the basis of thought and action. Meaning in this
sense is a total consciousness as opposed to some detached frag-
ment of that consciousness. In another sense however we find
some justification for the assertion of Bradley and Bosanquet
that meanings are always universal or typical. Even this how-
ever is only to say that consciousness in the concrete is never in
terms of bare particulars but is always made up of experiences
that have been rounded out and modified by other experiences.
Even in sense perception we never receive the bare sensation of
psychology; we always replace it by a construction that has
developed gradually through earlier experience, to explain,
harmonize, or standardize concrete experiences. We see acute
and obtuse angles in furniture but we perceive right angles.
Furthermore we are aware not of the acute and obtuse angles
that we see but of the right angles that we perceive. Similarly
in thought we deal not with the concrete changes of color in the
test tube but with interchange of atoms or ions, a statement of
theory grown out of experience to standardize or interpret
experience. So everywhere in scientific and every day thought,
we find that we deal with meanings, or with standards that have
MEA M/AWG AAWD IMA GE. 156
precipitated from experience not with the immediate experi-
ences themselves. In this sense all thought deals with con-
structions, with abstractions. Both of these uses of meanings
apply to all thought, and are in reality very closely related.
One cannot have this typical representative except in the larger
setting of consciousness, and on the other hand one cannot
think ideas in their relations without using these earlier devel-
oped types or standards.
We come then to the conclusion that meaning is practically
everything. We always see the meaning as we look, think in
meanings as we think, act in terms of meaning when we act.
Apparently we are never distinctly conscious of anything but
meanings. If meaning is thus the exclusive factor in conscious-
ness one-half of our problem still remains to be solved, what is
image. We have practically reversed the ordinary starting
point. Usually image is taken for granted and meaning must
be explained. The fact seems to be however that far from being
something ultimate and inexplicable added to image, meaning
is the concrete process, the process actually open to observation
and image needs accounting for. In this respect the relation
between image and meaning is much like that between sensation
and perception. Image is logically first, but is recognized late
in concrete experience, if it is present at all except as a theoret-
ical construction.
Our next problem then is to determine what the image is and
how it happens to exist in addition to the universal, the immedi-
ately given conscious experience. The simplest answer is to
say that image is just another meaning.' The image is the psy-
chologist's construction to explain the mental operations as the
ion is the chemist's to interpret his reactions. It is a type that
he sees as he looks into his own consciousness as the table top
with edges perpendicular is the type he sees in the world outside.
Just as the latter meaning too comes spontaneously under a given
set of circumstances so the interpretation of a mental state that
makes of it an image is the spontaneous outcome of another set
of circumstances. One is apparently a meaning on exactly the
same level as the other. A diamond looked at as a chemical
* Cf. Baldwin : ‘Discussion, Thought and Things,’ Psych. Bull., IV., p. 125.
I57 W. B. P// LSBUAE V.
substance is one thing, has one meaning, as a symbol of wealth
or affection it has others. When one looks at the experience
in the furtherance of a psychological investigation it takes still
a fourth meaning. The thing will have a different appearance
in each meaning. What gives the different meanings and the
different appearances is the difference in the purpose and in the
mental setting that is present. Under the influence of the dom-
inant mental process different interpretations start up to modify
the central element. These make the diamond now a piece of
crystallized carbon, now an investment, and again a token of
affection. When the observer later turns psychologist the same
experience becomes a complex of visual sensations, a revived
memory process or a mass of organic sensations. The psy-
chologist’s image then is but one meaning among many. It has
the same physiological basis. When one interpretation is given
the diamond, one group of associates is aroused by it, one
group of sensory nerve-cells is started into simultaneous re-
sponse; when viewed in another way another mass of cells is
aroused although each excitation irradiates from the same cen-
tral point. The image too is not so far as perceived a simple
element. It must be constituted of other elements grouped
about the common point of departure. In this case however
the aroused experiences are earlier mental experiences, rather
than other chemical, bartering or emotional experiences. An
image then is a meaning in both uses of the word. It is an
aggregation of one sensory element with other sensory elements
that interpret it, and it is a type or standard that is used by the
psychologist to explain the mental processes as the chemist uses
the atom to explain his reactions. This particular meaning
then is one that attaches to every experience in so far as it is
capable of psychological interpretation. In that sense too every
meaning may be regarded as made up of images so that what
temporally is prior is, from one point of view, logically a
sequence. This again is merely to assert that every experience
is capable of at least two interpretations, has at least two mean-
ings, a psychological and a physical.
The immediate incentive to the psychological interpretation,
to regarding an experience as an image or as composed of im-
MEAAV/AVG AAWD IMAGE. 158
ages, is to have a psychological question in mind. In this
respect again the psychological is not different from any other
meaning. The meaning of any object changes with its setting,
with the question in mind as one looks. What gives rise to the
psychological question varies with the individual and from
moment to moment with the same individual. We may agree
with the Dewey school that one powerful incentive is the failure
of memory or disparity between the memory and the renewed
experience in the external word. When mental processes fail
us we are compelled to be interested in the nature of the ordinary
and the exceptional memory content. But there are probably
other circumstances that give rise to the question, and given the
question the meaning or interpretation is bound to arise. We are
not here concerned with the natural history of the psychological
function. -
We have then practically inverted the ordinary relation be-
tween meaning and image. Where the usual view is that the
image is the primary process and the meaning is derived from
it in some way or is another ultimate, we find that in concrete
consciousness the meaning is the primary process, and image is
but another kind of meaning. This view has the advantage
that it can give some explanation of the image, while if we
assume the image as the starting point it is not possible to assign
a satisfactory place to the meaning in terms of the image. The
only alternative is to make it another ultimate, and that unneces-
sarily multiplies postulates, particularly as no essential relation
of one to the other can be established.