tº § *** . .
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A HISTORY
OF
GREEK PHILOSOPHY
WOL. I.
LONDON : PRINTED BY
SPOTTIS WOODE AND CO., NEW-8TREET 80UARE
AND PAR [,][AAFENT STREET
l
A HISTORY
GREEK PHILOSOPHY
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE
TIME OF SOCRATES
WITH A G E W E R A L T W T R O D U 0 7"I O W
TRANSLATED . THE GERMAN OF
I)R. E." ZELLER
PROFESS OR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF B E R LIN
fuith the 3mthor's sanction
BY
S. F. ALLEYNE
I N T W O V O L U M ES
VOL. I.
LONDON
L O N G MAN S, G RE EN, A ND CO.
1881
All rights reserved
*
º as tº
ºf
:
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2 ve”,
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
THE present work is a translation of the fourth and
last edition of the first part of Dr. Zeller's “Philo-
sophie der Griechen.' That this part, containing the
General Introduction to the entire subject and the his–
tory of the earliest philosophers, should appear after
others dealing with the later periods, is in some mea-
sure to be regretted, because Greek Philosophy is best
treated as a whole, and gains immensely by being
studied in the order of development; yet those who
are acquainted with the previously translated portions
of Dr. Zeller's work will be the more ready to welcome
the introductory volume, without which, indeed, many
things in the later philosophy, and in Dr. Zeller's treat-
ment of it, would have remained comparatively obscure.
There is no need to speak highly of a work so well
known. The translator has endeavoured to make her
version as literal as possible, considering the require-
ments of the English language and its deficiency in
precise equivalents for German philosophical terms—a
vi TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
deficiency giving rise to many difficulties which she
cannot hope to have always successfully overcome.
She desires to express her hearty thanks to Mr.
EvelyN ABBOTT, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College,
Oxford, for his valuable assistance in reading over the
proof sheets, especially in regard to the Greek notes.
It is, perhaps, necessary to add, respecting the
numerous references, that Vol. I. and II. stand for the
volumes of the present translation, and Part I. II. and
III. for the divisions of the German work.
CLIFTon : December 6, 1880.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
TWENTY YEARS AGo, when I published in its later form
the first volume of this work, originally designed on
a different plan, and a far more limited scale, I ex-
plained in the following words the principles which
had guided me in its composition: “In the treatment
of my subject I have constantly kept in view the task
which I proposed to myself in my first approaches to it:
viz. to maintain a middle course between erudite en-
quiry and the speculative study of history: neither, on
the one hand, to collect facts in a merely empirical
manner; mor, on the other, to construct a priori theories;
but through the traditions themselves, by means of cri-
tical sifting and historical combination, to arrive at a
knowledge of their importance and interdependence.
This task, however, in regard to the pre-Socratic philo-
sophy was rendered peculiarly difficult by the character
of the sources and the divergencies of modern opinions
respecting them : it was impossible adequately to fulfil
it without a number of critical discussions, often
descending to the minutest details. That the clearness
viii A UTHOR'S PREFA CE.
of the historical exposition, however, might not be
thereby impaired, I have consigned these discussions
as much as possible to the notes, where also the testi-
monies and references respecting the authorities find
a fitting place. But the writings from which these are
taken are many, and some of them difficult to obtain,
so that it has often been necessary to give the quota-
tions at length to make it possible for the reader to test
the authenticity of my exposition without an unwarrant-
able expenditure of time. Thus the amount of notes,
and consequently the size of the whole volume, have
increased to a considerable extent; but I hope I have
chosen rightly in attending before all things to the
scientific requirements of the reader, and in doubtful
cases preferring to economise his time rather than the
printer's paper.”
I have kept to the same points of view in the pre-
paration of the following volumes, and of the new
editions which have since become necessary. The hope
that I have therein adopted the proper course has been
fully justified by the reception given to my work; and
though the principle (not previously quite unknown to
me) has recently been pressed upon my attention, that the
ancient philosophers must be treated philosophically,
I have never yet been able to convince myself that the
method hitherto pursued by me has been a mistake. I
still hold, more strongly than ever, that the philosophic
apprehension of systems of philosophy (which, however,
must be distinguished from philosophic criticism) en-
A UTHOR'S PREFACE. IX
tirely coincides with the historic apprehension of them.
I can never indeed consider that a proper history has
been written if the author has stopped short at the bare
enumeration of isolated doctrines and statements without
enquiring as to their centre of gravity, examining their
interconnection, or tracing out their exact meaning;
without determining their relation and importance
to the various systems collectively. But, on the other
hand, I must protest against the misuse of the noble
name of philosophy for the purpose of depriving his–
torical phenomena of their distinctive character, of
forcing upon the ancient philosophers inferences which
they expressly repudiate, of effacing the contradictions
and supplying the lacunae of their systems with adjuncts
that are pure inventions. The great phenomena of the
past are much too great in my eyes for me to suppose
that I could do them any service by exalting them above
their historical conditions and limitations. In my
opinion, such a false idealisation makes them smaller
instead of greater. At all events, nothing can thereby
be gained for historic truth, before which every predi-
lection for particular persons and schools must give way.
Whoever would expound a philosophic system must re-
produce the theories held by its author in the connection
which they had in his mind. This we can only learn
from the testimony of the philosophers themselves, and
from the statements of others concerning their doctrines;
but, in comparing these testimonies, in examining their
authenticity and credibility, in completing them by in-
X. A UTHOR'S PREFA CE.
ferences and combinations of various kinds, we must be
careful to remember two things: in the first place, the
inductions which carry us beyond direct testimony must
in each case be founded on the totality of evidence in
our possession ; and when a philosophic theory seems to
us to require certain further theories, we must always
examine whether other portions of the author's system,
quite as important in his estimation, do not stand in the
way. Secondly, we must enquire whether we are justi-
fied in supposing that the philosopher we are considering
propounded to himself the questions which we are pro-
pounding to him, returned to himself the answers which
we derive from other statements of his, or himself drew
the inferences which to w8 appear necessary. To pro-
ceed in this spirit of scientific circumspection has been
at any rate my own endeavour. To this end, as will be
seen in the later no less than in the earlier editions of my
work, I have also tried to learn from those writers who
here and there, on points of greater or lesser importance,
have differed from me. If I am indebted to these writers
for many things that have assisted in the completion
and correction of my exposition, it will nevertheless be
understood that, in all essential points, I could only re-
main true to my own view of the pre-Socratic philo-
sophy, and have defended that view as persistently and
decidedly as the interest of the subject demanded,
against objections which seemed to me unconvincing
and untenable.
I dedicated the second edition of the present work
AUTHOR'S PREFA CE. xi
to my father-in-law, Dr. F. CHR. BAUR, of Tübingen.
In the third I was obliged to omit the dedication,
because he to whom it was addressed was no longer
among us. But I cannot refrain from recalling in this
place, with affection and gratitude, the memory of a
man who was not only to me in all personal relations
a friend and father, but also, in regard to my scientific
labours, has left for me and for all his disciples a shining
example of incorruptible love of truth, untiring perse-
verance in research, inexhaustible diligence, penetrative
criticism, and width and coherence in the treatment of
history.
BERLIN : October 18, 1876.
CONTENTS
() F
T H E FIRST V O L U M E.
TRANSLATOR's PREFACE
AUTHOR's PREFACE .
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
*-*
CHAPTER I.
AIM, scope, AND METHOD of THE PRESENT work
CHAPTER TI.
ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
i. Supposed derivation of Greek philosophy from Oriental
speculation e e º º e e
ii. Native sources of Greek philosophy.
1. Religion º º
a. Greek religion e
b. The Mysteries . e e e -
iii. Native sources of Greek philosophy (continued).
2. Moral life: civil and political conditions
iv. Native sources of Greek philosophy (continued).
3. Cosmology * ſº - º & *
v. Ethical reflection.
4. Theology and Anthropology in relation to Ethics .
PAG #
vii
xiv CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME,
THE PRINCIPAL PERIODS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK
INTRODUCTION. ON THE CHARACTER AND DEVELOPMENT OF
:
CELAPTER III.
PAGR,
ON THE CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY 129–163
CHAPTER IV.
PHILOSOPHY e * tº ſº © * * 164—183
FIRST PIERIOD.
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FIRST PERIOD e tº tº . 184—210
FIRST SECTION.
THE EARLIER IONIANS, PYTHAGOREANS, AND
ELEATICS.
I. THE EARLIER Ion IAN PHYSICS.
. Thales
. Anaximander
. Anaximenes .
. Later adherents of the Ionian School. Diogenes of Apollonia
II. THE PyTHAGoREANs.
. Sources of our knowledge in regard to the Pythagorean philo-
sophy . &
. Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans . ſº º sº. ſº sº
. The Pythagorean philosophy: its fundamental conceptions:
Number and the Elements of Number
. Systematic development of the Number system, and its appli-
cation to Physics
211
227
266
280
306
324
368
419
CONTENT'S OF THE FIRST VOLUME,
XV
7
:
. Religious and ethical doctrines of the Pythagoreans .
. Retrospective summary: character, origin, and antiquity of the
Pythagorean philosophy . - º
. Pythagoreanism in combination with other elements: Alcmaeon,
Hippasus, Ecphantus, Epicharmus . e & & º
III. THE ELEATICS.
. Sources in regard to their doctrines. Treatise on Melissus,
Xenophanes, and Gorgias
. Xenophanes
. Parmenides
. Zeno .
. Melissus tº & tº - - º g
. Historical position and character of the Eleatic School
PA(; R.
481
496
521
533
556
580
608
627
638
IE R. R. A.T A.
Page 4, line 9—for Shepherd Bookoi read herds of grazing Boaxoi.
», 54, line 2 from foot—for particulars read particular.
,, 72, line 19—for seventeenth read seventh.
,, 94, 2, line 17—for sup. p. 93 read sup. p. 91, 3 ; cf. 98, 4.
,, 145, 1, line 2—for the Protagoras read Protagoras.
,, 214, n. 1ine 28 (first column)—for Anacolius read Anatolius.
,, 219, 3, line 10 (second column)—for affinity read infinity.
,, 231, m. line 20 (first column)—for 238, 1 read 228, 3.
, 247, 1—for 223, 1 read 233, 1.
., 251, line 9—for surrounds read surrounded.
, 260, 4—for 151, 1 read 251, 1.
, 263, 2—for pp. 197, 200 read 241, 244.
, 265, 3–for 197 read 241.
, 269, 2, line 8—for 268, 1 read 267, 1.
,, 288, 3—for 241, 1 read 241, 2.
,, 289, 1, line 9—for 291, 1 read 291, 2.
, 292, 1–for 290, 4 read 291, 1.
,, 352, 1–for 336, 4 read 336, 5.
, 434, 2, line 2—for 426, 6 read 429, 6.
, 444, 1, line 3—for conservation read assertion.
,, 444, 2—for 442, 1 read 443, 1.
, 468, 1, line 5 from foot (second column)—for 415 read 526.
,, 527, 3–for 372, 1 read 372, 4.
, 527, 4, line 4 from foot—for 491 read 528.
,, 531, 2—for 529, 5 read 530, 2.
,, 538, 1—for 547, 1 read 548, 1.
, 543, 1, line 14 (second column)—for 547, 1 read 548, 1.
,, 554, 4–for 547, 1 read 548, 1.
,, 554, 4–for 542, 1 read 548, 1.
, 560, 1, lines 18 and 19—for infra read supra; for 544, 1 read 545, 1.
,, 566, 1—for 549, 1 read 548, 2; for 560, 2 read 562, 5.
,, 587, line 8—omit therefore
, 608, 2, lines 4 and 7—for 543 read 617, n. ; for 590, 1 read 591, 1.
, 623, line 19—for connections read connection.
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE GREEKS
IN ITS
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,
IWTRODÚCTION.
CHAPTER I.
AIM, SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE PRESENT WORK.
THE term Philosophy, as in use among the Greeks,
varied greatly in its meaning and compass." Originally
it denoted all mental culture, and all effort in the
direction of culture; * even as orogºta, the word from
which it is derived, was applied to every art and every
kind of knowledge.”
A more restricted significance
seems first to have been given to it in the time of the
Sophists, when it became usual to seek after a wider
knowledge by means of more special and adequate
1. Cf. the valuable evidence of
Haym in Ersch and Gruber's Allge-
meine Encyklopaedie, sect. iii. b. 24,
p. 3 Sqq.
* Thus Croesus says to Solon
(Herodotus, i. 30) that he had heard
&s pixocoq'éav yºv troAAhv 6eapíms
eiveksv étrexhAv6as. Similarly, Pe-
ricles (Thucydides, ii. 40), in the
funeral oration: pixokaAoûuev ytºp
ust' siteAetas kai pixooroqoºyiew &vev
WOL. I.
Maxaktas. The same vague use of
the word is long after to be met
with even among writers who are
not unacquainted with the stricter
SeſkSø.
* Cf. Aristotle's Eth. Nie. vi. 7,
sub init., and the verse quoted by
him from the Homeric Margites.
Cf. also infra, the section on the
Sophists.
2 INTRODUCTION.
instruction than ordinary education and the unmethodi-
cal routine of practical life could of themselves afford."
By Philosophy was now understood the study of things
of the mind, pursued not as an accessory employment
and matter of amusement, but exclusively and as a
separate vocation. The word Philosophy, however, was
not as yet limited to philosophic science in its present
acceptation, nor even to science in general, for which
other designations were much more in vogue: to philo-
sophise was to study, to devote oneself to any theoretic
activity.” Philosophers in the narrower sense, down to
the time of Socrates, were Ordinarily designated as wise
men or Sophists,” and, more precisely, as physicists.”
A more definite use of the word is first met with in
Plato. Plato calls that man a philosopher who in his
speculation and his practice has regard to essence, and
not to appearance; Philosophy, as he apprehends it, is
* Pythagoras indeed, according
to a well-known anecdote, had pre-
viously assumed the name of phi-
losopher; but the story is in the
first place uncertain ; and in the
second it keeps the indeterminate
sense of the word according to
which philosophy signified all
striving after wisdom.
* The expression, for example,
in Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2, 23) has
this sense; for the philosophy of
Euthydemus (according to section
1) consists in his studying the wri-
tings of the poets and Sophists;
and similarly in Conv. 1, 5, Socrates
compares himself, as airoup'yos ris
quxoa opias, with Callias, the disci-
ple of the Sophists. Also in Cyrop.
vi. 1,41, pixogoſpelvimeans generally
to cogitate, to study. Isocrates uses
it in this way (Paneg. c. 1) when he
calls his own activity rºv trepl rows
Aóryovs pińooroq tav, or even simply
quxogoſpía, piñooroºpeiv (Panath. c. 4,
5, 8; trepi &vrtöoor. 181–186, 271,
285 and elsewhere. Plato himself
adopts this wider meaning in
Gorgias 484 C and 485 A sqq.,
Protagoras 335 D, Lysis 213 D.
Cf. also the commencement of the
Menea:enws.
* This name was given, for in-
stance, to the seven wise men, to
Solon, Pythagoras and Socrates;
also to the pre-Socratic natural
philosophers. Wide infra, loc. cit.
* Pvorikot, pugioxóryot, the recog-
nised name for the philosophers
especially of the Ionian schools,
and those connected with them.
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY, 3
the elevation of the mind towards true Reality,+the
scientific cognition and moral exposition of the idea.
Finally, Aristotle still further limits the sphere of Philo-
sophy, by wholly excluding from it practical activity;
but he fluctuates between a wider and a marrower
definition. According to the wider, Philosophy includes
all scientific knowledge and research ; according to the
narrower, it is restricted to enquiries concerning the ulti-
mate causes of things, the so-called “First Philosophy.’
Scarcely, however, had this beginning been made
towards a precise determination of Philosophy when
the attempt was again abandoned; Philosophy in the
post-Aristotelian schools is sometimes exclusively de-
fined as the practice of wisdom, the art of happiness,
the science of life; sometimes it is hardly discriminated
from the empirical sciences, and sometimes confounded
with mere erudition. This confusion was promoted,
not only by the learned tendencies of the Peripatetic
school and of the whole Alexandrian period, but also
and more especially by Stoicism, since Chrysippus had
included in the circle of his so-called philosophical
enquiries the arts of grammar, music, &e., while his
very definition of Philosophy, as the science of things
divine and human, must have rendered difficult any
precise limitation of its domain." After this period
science became more and more involved with mythology
and theological poetry, to the increasing disturbance of
the boundaries of both these spheres; and the concep-
* Appealing to this definition, mathy, says he, is the business of a
Strabo, at the opening of his work, philosopher. Further authorities
declares geography to be an essen- for the above will be given in the
tial part of philosophy; for poly- course of this work,
B 2
4 INTRODUCTION.
tion of Philosophy soon lost all distinctness. On the
one hand, the Neo-Platonists regarded Linus and
Orpheus as the first of philosophers, the Chaldean
oracles as the primitive sources of the highest wisdom,
and the sacred rites, asceticism and theurgic superstition
of their school as the true philosophy; on the other, the
Christian theologians, with equal right, glorified mo-
mastic life as Christian philosophy, and gave to the
various sects of monks, including even the Shepherd
Bookol, a name which Plato and Aristotle had reserved
for the highest activity of the human intellect."
But it is not merely the name which is wanting in
accurate limitation and fixity of import. Uncertainty
of language usually implies uncertainty of thought, and
the present case forms no exception. If the extent of
the term Philosophy was only gradually settled, Philo-
sophy itself only gradually appeared as a specific form
of intellectual life. If the word fluctuates between a
wider and a narrower significance, Philosophy similarly
fluctuates; being sometimes restricted to a definite
scientific sphere, and sometimes mingled with alien
ingredients of various kinds. The pre-Socratic Philo-
sophy developed itself partly in connection with mytho-
logical ideas. Even for Plato the mythus is a necessity,
* pixooroºpeſv and pixooropta are
the ordinary terms employed at
that period to designate the ascetic
life and its various forms; so that,
for example, Sozomenus, in the case
above mentioned (Hist. Eccles. vi.
33), concludes his statement about
the Boarkoſ with the words kal of
wev $6e équxogóqovv. Christianity
itself is not unfrequently called
quxoaroq'ía; thus Melito, in Euse-
bius's Church History, iv. 26, 7,
speaks of the Judaic-Christian re-
ligion as # kaff huas puxoa opia.
Philo similarly (quod omnis pro-
bus liber, 877 C, D; vita contemplat.
893 D) describes the theology of
the Essenes and Therapeutae, with
its allegorical interpretation of
Scripture, as piñocoq ety, Trérpios
qiaoropia.
DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY, 5
and after the period of Neo-Pythagoreism, polytheistic
theology acquires such an influence over Philosophy
that Philosophy at last becomes merely the interpreter
of theological traditions. With the Pythagoreans,
the Sophists, Socrates, the Cynics and the Cyrenaics,
Scientific speculation was connected with practical en-
quiries, which these philosophers did not themselves
discriminate from their science. Plato reckons moral
conduct as much a part of Philosophy as knowledge ;
while after Aristotle, Philosophy was so increasingly
regarded from the practical point of view, that it ulti-
mately became identified with moral culture and true
religion. Lastly, among the Greeks, the sciences (in
the modern acceptation of the term) were only by slow
degrees, and at no time very accurately, discriminated
from Philosophy. Philosophy in Greece is not merely
the central point towards which all scientific efforts
converge; it is, originally, the whole which includes
them in itself. The sense of form peculiar to the Greek
cannot let him rest in any partial or isolated view of
things; moreover, his knowledge was at first so limited
that he was far less occupied than we are with the study
of the particular. From the outset, therefore, his glance
was directed to the totality of things, and it was only
by little and little that particular sciences separated
themselves from this collective science. Plato himself,
excluding the mechanical and practical arts, recognises
only Philosophy and the various branches of mathematics
as Sciences proper; indeed, the treatment he claims for
mathematics would make it simply a part of Philo-
sophy. Aristotle includes under Philosophy, besides
G INTRODUCTION.
mathematics, all his physical enquiries, deeply as these
enter into the study of the particular. It was only in
the Alexandrian period that the special sciences attained
to independent cultivation. We find, however, among
the Stoics, as well as the Peripatetics, that philosophic
enquiry was blended with, and often hampered by, a
great mass of erudition and empirical observations. In
the eclecticism of the Roman period, this erudite
element was still more prominent; and though the
founder of Neo-Platonism confined himself strictly to
questions of pure philosophy, his school, in its reliance
on the authorities of antiquity, was apt to overlade
its philosophic expositions with a superabundance of
learning.
If, then, we are to include in the history of Greek
Philosophy all that was called Philosophy by the
Greeks, or that is brought forward in philosophic writ-
ings, and exclude all that does not expressly bear the
name, it is evident that the boundaries of our exposition
will be in part too narrow, and in part, and for the most
part, much too wide. If, on the other hand, we are to
treat of Philosophy in itself, as we find it in Greece,
whether called Philosophy or not, the question arises
how it is to be recognised and how we are to distinguish
it from what is not Philosophy. It is clear that such a
test can only lie in the conception formed of Philosophy.
This conception, however, changes with the philosophic
standpoint of individuals and of whole periods; and
thus it would appear that the sphere of the history of
Philosophy must constantly change in like manner and
in the same proportion. The dilemma lies in the
1) EFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 7
nature of things and is in no way to be avoided; least
of all by basing our procedure, not on fixed conceptions,
but on confused impressions, and indefinite, perhaps
contradictory, ideas; or by trusting, each writer for
himself, to an obscure historical sense to determine
how much he shall include in his exposition or reject
from it. For if philosophic conceptions alter, subjective
impressions alter yet more, and the only resource that
would at last remain to us in this uncertain method—
namely, a reference to learned usage—would not improve
matters from a scientific point of view. One thing, at
any rate, follows from these reflections. We must have,
as the basis of our exposition, as true and exhaustive a
theory as we can of the essence of Philosophy. That
this is not altogether impracticable, and that some
degree of unanimity is attainable on the subject, there
is all the more reason to hope, because we are here
concerned not with the terms and constituents of any
one philosophic system, but with the general and formal
conception of Philosophy, as it is assumed, tacitly, or
in express terms, in every system. Different opinions
are possible, to some extent, even here; but this diffi-
culty is common to all walks of knowledge. We can
only, each one of us according to his ability, seek out
the truth, and leave what we find to be corrected, if
necessary, by advancing science.
How Philosophy is to be defined, is therefore a
question which philosophic science alone can answer. I
must here confine myself to a statement of the results
at which I have arrived in regard to the matter, so far
as this is necessary for the task I have in hand. I con-
8 INTRODUCTION.
sider Philosophy, first, as a purely theoretic activity;
that is, an activity which is solely concerned with the
ascertainment of reality; and from this point of view,
I exclude from the conception and history of Philosophy
all practical or artistic efforts as such, irrespective of
their possible connection with any particular theory of
the world. I next define Philosophy more precisely as
science. I see in it not merely thought, but thought
that is methodical, and directed in a conscious manner
to the cognition of things in their interdependence.
By this characteristic, I distinguish it as well from the
unscientific reflection of daily life as from the religious
and poetical view of the world. Lastly, I find the dis-
tinction between Philosophy and other sciences is this:–
that all other sciences aim at the exploration of some
specific sphere, whereas Philosophy has in view the
sum total of existence as a whole, seeks to know the
individual in its relation to the whole, and by the laws
of the whole, and so to attain the correlation of all
knowledge. So far, therefore, as this aim can be shown
to exist, so far and no farther I should extend the do-
main of the history of Philosophy. That such an aim
was not clearly evident from the beginning, and was at
first abundantly intermingled with foreign elements, we
have already seen, nor can we wonder at it. But this
need not prevent our abstracting from the aggregate of
Greek intellectual life all that bears the character of
Philosophy, and considering it in and for itself, in its
historical manifestation. There is, indeed, some danger,
in this mode of procedure, of doing violence to the
actual historical connection; but this danger we may
GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 9
escape by allowing full weight to such considerations as
the following: the constant interminglement of philo-
sophic with other elements; the gradual nature of the
development by which science won for itself an inde-
pendent existence; the peculiar character of the later
syncretism; the importance of Philosophy for culture
in general, and its dependence on existing conditions.
If due account be taken of these circumstances, if in
the several systems we are careful to distinguish what
is philosophical from what is merely accessory, and to
measure the importance of the individual, in regard to
the development of philosophic thought, by the precise
standard and concept of Philosophy, the claims of
historic completeness and scientific exactitude will be
equally satisfied.
The object of our exposition having been thus
determined on one of its sides, and the Philosophy of
the Greeks clearly distinguished from the phenomena
akin to it and connected with it, there remains the
farther question as to the extent and boundaries of
Greek Philosophy; whether we are to seek it only
among the members of the Greek race, or in the whole
field of Hellenic culture; and, in the latter case, how
the area of that field is to be determined. This is, of
course, more or less optional; and it would in itself be
perfectly legitimate either to close the history of Greek
science with its passage into the Roman and Oriental
world, or, on the other hand, to trace its effects down
to our own time. It seems, however, most natural to
call Philosophy Greek, so long as there is in it a pre-
ponderance of the Hellenic element over the foreign,
10 INTRODUCTION.
and whenever that proportion is reversed to abandon
the name. As the former is the case not only with the
Graeco-Roman Philosophy, but also with the Neo-
Platonists and their predecessors; as even the Judaic-
Alexandrian school is much more closely related to the
contemporary Greek Philosophy, and had much more
influence on its development, than any phenomenon of
the Christian world, I include this school in the compass
of the present exposition. On the other hand, I exclude
from it the Christian speculation of the first centuries,
for there we see Hellenic science overpowered by a new
principle in which it henceforth lost its specific character.
The scientific treatment of this historical material
must necessarily follow the same laws as the writing of
history in general. Our task is to ascertain and to
expound what has happened ; a philosophic construction
of it, even if this were possible, would not be the affair
of the historian. But such a construction is not
possible, for two reasons. First, because no one will
ever attain to so exhaustive a conception of humanity,
and so exact a knowledge of all the conditions of its
historical development, as to justify his deducing from
thence the particulars of its empirical circumstances,
and the changes undergone by these in time; and next,
because the course of history is not of such a nature
that it can be made the object of an à priori con-
struction. For history is essentially the product of the
free activity of individuals, and though in this very
activity an universal law is working, and through this
activity fulfilling itself, yet none of its special effects,
and not even the most important phenomena of history
IIISTORICAL METHOD; AGAINST HEGEL. 11
in all their particular features, can be fully explained
from the point of view of a priori necessity. The
actions of individuals are subject to that contingency
which is the heritage of the finite will and under-
standing; and if from the concurrence, the collision,
and the friction of these individual actions, a regular
course of events as a whole is finally produced, neither
the particular in this course, nor even the whole, is at
any point absolutely necessary. All is necessary in so
far only as it belongs to the general progress, the logical
framework as it were of history; while as to its chrono-
logical manifestation, all is more or less contingent. So
closely are the two elements interwoven with each
other that it is impossible, even in our reflections,
wholly to separate them. The necessary accomplishes
itself by a number of intermediaries, any one of which
might be conceived other than it is ; but, at the same
time, the practised glance can detect the thread of
historical necessity in notions and actions apparently
the most fortuitous; and from the arbitrary conduct of
men who lived hundreds and thousands of years ago,
circumstances may have arisen which work on us with
all the strength of such a necessity." The sphere of
history, therefore, is distinct in its nature from that of
Philosophy. Philosophy has to seek out the essence of
things, and the general laws of events; history has to
exhibit definite given phenomena of a certain date,
and to explain them by their empirical conditions.
* A more particular discussion moral order of the world.—Theolo-
of these questions will be found gisches Jahrbuch, v. vi. (1846 and
in my dissertation on the freedom 1847); cf. especially vi. 220 sqq.;
of the human will, on evil, and the 253 sqq.
12
INTRODUCTION.
Each of these sciences requires the other, but neither
can be supplanted by or substituted for the other; nor
in its procedure can the history of Philosophy take the
same course that would be applicable to the formation
of a philosophic system. To say that the historical
sequence of the philosophic systems is identical with
the logical sequence of the concepts which characterise
them,' is to confound two very different things. Logic,
as Hegel conceived it, has to expound the pure cate-
gories of thought as such ; the history of Philosophy is
concerned with the chronological development of human
thought. If the course of the one were to coincide with
that of the other, this would presuppose that logical
or, more precisely, ontological conceptions form the
essential content of all systems of Philosophy; and that
these conceptions have been attained in the progress
of history from the same starting-point, and in the
same order as in the logical construction of pure con-
cepts. But this is not the case. Philosophy is not
merely Logic or Ontology; its object is, in a general
sense, the Real. The various philosophic systems show
us the sum total of the attempts hitherto made to gain
a scientific view of the world. Their content, therefore,
cannot be reduced to mere logical categories without
1 Hegel's Geschichte der Philo-
sophie, i. 43. Against this asser-
tion objections were raised by me
in the Jahrbücher der Gegenwart,
1843, p. 209, sq.; and by Schweg-
ler in his Geschichte der Philoso-
phie, p. 2 sq.; which objections
I repeated in the second edition of
the present work. This gave occa-
sion to Herr Monrad, professor at
Christiania, in a letter addressed
to me, bearing the title Devi logica
rationis in describenda philosophiæ
historia (Christiania, 1860), to de-
fend the proposition of Hegel. In
consequence of this treatise, which
I cannot here examine in detail, I
have made some changes in the
form of my discussion, and also
some additions.
HISTORICAL METHOD; AGAINST HEGEL. 13
depriving it of its specific character and merging it
in the universal. Moreover, while speculative Logic
begins with the most abstract conceptions, in order
thence to attain to others more concrete, the historical
development of philosophic thought starts with the
consideration of the concrete, first in external nature,
then in man, and leads only by degrees to logical and
metaphysical abstractions. The law of development
also is different in Logic and in History. Logic is
occupied merely with the internal relation of concepts,
irrespective of any chronological relation; History treats
of the changes effected in course of time in the notions
of mankind. Progress, from anterior to posterior con-
cepts, is regulated, in the former case, exclusively
according to logical points of view ; each conclusion is
therefore linked to the next that is properly deducible
from it by thought. In the latter case, progression
takes place according to psychological motives; each
philosopher constructs out of the doctrine inherited
from his predecessors, and each period out of that
handed down to it by tradition, whatever their own
apprehension of the doctrine, their modes of thought,
experiences, knowledge, necessities, and scientific re-
sources enable them to construct; but this may possibly
be something quite other than what we, from our stand-
point, should construct out of it. Logical consequence
can only regulate the historical progress of Philosophy
to the extent that it is recognised by the philosophers, and
the necessity of following it acknowledged; how far that
is the case depends on all the circumstances by which
scientific convictions are conditioned. Over and above
14 INTRODUCTION.
what may be directly or indirectly derived from the earlier
Philosophy, either by inference or polemic, a decisive in-
fluence is often exercised in this respect by the conditions
and necessities of practical life, by religious interests, and
by the state of empirical knowledge and general culture.
It is impossible to regard all systems as merely the
consequences of their immediate predecessors, and mo
system which contributes special thoughts of its own
can in its origin and contents be thus restricted. What
is new in those thoughts arises from new experiences
having been made, or new points of view gained for
such as had been previously made; aspects and elements
of these which before were unnoticed are now taken
into account, and some particular moment is invested
with another meaning than heretofore. Far, them, from
assenting to the Hegelian position, we must rather
maintain that no system of Philosophy is so constituted
that its principle may be expressed by a purely logical
conception; not one has formed itself out of its pre-
decessors simply according to the law of logical progress.
Any survey of the past will show us how impossible it is to
recognise, even approximately, the order of the Hegelian
or any other speculative logic in the order of the philo-
sophic systems, unless we make out of them something
quite different from...what they really are. This attempt
is, therefore, a failure both in principle and practice, and
the truth it contains is only the universal conviction
that the development of history is internally governed
by regular laws.
This conviction, indeed, the history of Philosophy
ought on no account to renounce; we need not confine
LA WS AND UNITY OF HISTORY. 15
ourselves to the mere amassing and critical testing of
traditions, or to that unsatisfactory pragmatic pro-
cedure which is content to explain particulars severally
in reference to individual personalities, circumstances
and influences, but attempts no explanation of the
whole as such. Our exposition must, of course, be
grounded upon historical tradition, and all that it treats
of must either be directly contained in tradition, or
derived from it by strictest deduction. But it is impos-
sible even to establish our facts, so long as we regard
them merely in an isolated manner. Tradition is not
itself fact; we shall never succeed in proving its trust-
worthiness, in solving its contradictions, in supplying its
lacunae, if we do not keep in view the connection of
single facts, the concatenation of causes and effects, the
place of the individual in the whole. Still less, how-
ever, is it possible to understand facts, apart from this
interconnection, or to arrive at a knowledge of their
essential nature and historical importance. Where,
lastly, our exposition is concerned with scientific sys-
tems, and not merely with opinions and events, there
the very nature of the subject demands, more urgently
than in other cases, that the particular shall be studied
in relation to the aggregate; and this demand can only
be satisfied by the concatemation of every particular
known to us through tradition, or deducible from
tradition, into one great whole.
The first point of unity is constituted by indi-
viduals. Every philosophic opinion is primarily the
thought of some particular man, and is, therefore, to
be explained by his intellectual character and the cir-
16 INTRODUCTION.
cumstances under which it was formed. Our first task,
then, will be to unite the opinions of each philosopher
into a collective whole, to show the connection of those
opinions with his philosophic character, and to enquire
into the causes and influences by which they were
originally conditioned. That is to say, we must first
ascertain the principle of each system, and explain how
it arose; and then consider how the system was the out-
come of the principle: for the principle of a system is
the thought which most clearly and fundamentally ex-
presses the specific philosophic character of its author,
and forms the focus of union for all his views. Every
individual thing in a system cannot, of course, be ex-
plained by its principle; all the knowledge which a
philosopher possesses, all the convictions which he forms
(often long before his scientific thoughts become
matured), all the conceptions which he has derived
from multifarious experiences, are not brought even by
himself into connection with his philosophic principles;
accidental influences, arbitrary incidents, errors and
faults of reasoning are constantly interposing them-
selves, while the gaps in the records and accounts often
prevent our pronouncing with certainty on the original
connection of the various constituents of a doctrine. All
this lies in the mature of things; but our problem must
at any rate be kept in view until we have exhausted all
the means in our power for its solution.
The individual, however, with the mode of thought
peculiar to him, does not stand alone; others ally them-
selves with him, and he allies himself with others;
others come into collision with him, and he comes into
IA WS AND UNITY OF HISTORY. 17
collision with others; schools of philosophy are formed
having with each other various relations of dependence,
agreement, and contradiction. As the history of Philo-
sophy traces out these relations, the forms with which
it is concerned divide themselves into larger or smaller
groups. We perceive that it is only in this definite
connection with others that the individual became and
effected that which he did become and effect; and
hence arises the necessity of explaining the specific
character and importance of the individual by reference
to the group which includes him. But even such an
explanation as this will not in all respects suffice; for
each individual, besides the characteristics common to
his class, possesses much that is peculiar to himself.
He not only continues the work of his predecessors, but
adds something new to it, or else disputes their pre-
suppositions and conclusions. The more important,
however, a personality has been, and the farther its
historical influence has extended, the more will its
individual character, even while opening out new paths,
disappear and lose itself in the universal and necessary
course of history. For the historical importance of the
individual depends upon his accomplishing that which
is required by an universal need; and so far only as this
is the case, does his work become part of the general
possession. The merely individual in man is also the
transitory; the individual can only work in an abiding
manner and on a grand scale when he yields himself
and his personality to the service of the universal, and
executes with his particular activity a part of the
common work.
WOL. I. C
18 INTRODUCTION.
But if this hold good of the relation of individuals
to the spheres to which they belong, is it not equally
true of the relation of these spheres to the greater
wholes in which they are comprehended ? Each nation
and, generally speaking, each historically coherent por-
tion of mankind, has the measure and direction of its
spiritual life traced out for it, partly by the inherent
specific qualities of its members, and partly by the
physical and historical conditions that determine its
development. No individual, even if he desires it, can
withdraw himself from this common character; and he
who is called to a great sphere of historical action will
not desire it, for he has no ground for his activity to
work on except in the whole of which he is a member ;
and from this whole, and thence only, there flows to him
by numberless channels, for the most part unnoticed,
the supplies by the free utilization of which his own
spiritual personality is formed and maintained. But
for the same reason all individuals are dependent on the
past. Each is a child of his age as well as of his nation,
and as he will never achieve anything great if he does
not work in the spirit of his nation," so surely will he fail
unless he stands on the ground of all previous historical
acquirement. If, therefore, the spiritual store of man-
kind, as the work of self-active beings, is always subject
to change, this change is of necessity continuous; and
the same law of historical continuity holds good also of
each smaller sphère, so far as its natural development is
not hindered by external influences. In this process of
* Or of the whole to which he belongs—his church, school, or what-
ever it may be.
LA WS AND UNITY OF HISTORY. 19
development each period has the advantage of the cul-
ture and experience of the previous periods; the historic
development of mankind, therefore, is upon the whole a
development towards ever higher culture—a progression.
But particular mations, and entire groups of nations,
may nevertheless be thrown back into lower stages by
external misfortunes, or their own internal exhaustion;
important tracts of human culture may long lie fallow ;
progress itself may at first be accomplished in an in-
direct manner, through the breaking up of some imper-
fect form of civilisation. In defining, them, the law
of historical progress in its application to particular
phenomena, we must be careful to explain progress
merely as the logical development of those qualities
and conditions which are originally inherent in the
character and circumstances of a nation, or field of
culture. This development in every individual case is
not necessarily an improvement; there may come dis-
turbances and seasons of decay, in which a nation or a
form of civilisation ceases to exist, and other forms
work their way forward, perhaps painfully and by long
and circuitous paths, to carry on the development of
history. Here, too, a law is present in the historic
evolution, inasmuch as its general course is determined
by the nature of things; but this law is not so simple,
nor this course so direct, as we might have anticipated.
Moreover, as the character and sequence of the historic
periods are the result of law and mot of chance, the
same may be said of the order and character of the
various developments contained in them. Not that
these developments can be constructed & priori in
C 2 -
20 º INTRODUCTION.
reference to the general concept of the sphere in ques-
tion; that of the State, for instance, or Religion, or
Philosophy. But for each historic whole, or for each of
its periods of development, a definite course is marked
out by its own fundamental character, by its external
circumstances, by its place in history. That the course
thus prescribed by existing conditions should be ac-
tually followed, is not more wonderful than the fulfil-
ment of any other calculation of probabilities. For,
though accidental circumstances often give an impulse
and a direction to the activity of individuals, it is
natural and necessary that among a great number of
men there should be a variety of dispositions—of cul-
ture, of character, of forms of activity, of external con-
ditions—sufficient to furnish representatives of all the
different tendencies possible under the given circum-
stances. It is natural and necessary that each historical
phenomenon should either, by attraction or repulsion,
evoke others which serve to supplement it ; that the
various dispositions and forces should display themselves
in action; that all the different views of a question
that may be taken should be stated, and all the different
methods of solving given problems should be tried. In
a word, the regular course and organic articulation of
history are not an à priori postulate ; but the nature
of historic conditions and the constitution of the human
mind involve that the historic development should, not-
withstanding all the contingency of the individual,
follow, on the whole and in the main, a fixed law; and
to recognize the working of such regularity in any
given case, we need not abandon the terra firma of
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 21
facts, we need only examine the facts thoroughly, and
draw the conclusions to which they themselves contain
the premises. -
What we ask, therefore, is but the complete applica-
tion of a purely historic method. We would have no
theoretic construction of history, proceeding from theory
to fact; our history must be built up from below, out
of the materials that are actually given. It stands to
reason, however, that these materials cannot be made
use of in their rough state; we must call in the aid of
a searching historical analysis to determine the essence
and internal connection of all the phenomena concerned.
This conception of our problem will not, I trust, be
open to the charges raised against the Hegelian construc-
tion of history. Rightly understood, it can never lead
to the distortion of facts, or the sacrifice of the free
movement of history to an abstract formalism, since it
is upon historical facts and traditions, and upon these
alone, that we propose to base our reasoning as to the
relation of past phenomena: Only in what has been
freely produced shall we seek for historical necessity.
If this be thought impossible and paradoxical, we might
appeal to the universal conviction of the rule of a
Divine Providence—a conception which before all things
implies that the course of history is not fortuitous, but
is determined by a higher necessity. In case, however,
we are dissatisfied (as we may reasonably be) with
an argument resting solely on faith, we have only to
examine more closely the concept of liberty to convince
ourselves that liberty is something other than caprice
or chance, that the free activity of man has its inborn
22 INTRODUCTION.
measure in the primitive essence of spirit, and in the
laws of human nature; and that by virtue of this
internal subjection to law, even what is really fortuitous
in the individual act becomes necessity in the grand
course of historic evolution. To follow this course in
detail is the main problem of history.
Whether in regard to the history of Philosophy it
is necessary or even advantageous for the writer to
possess any philosophic conviction of his own, is a .
question that would scarcely have been raised had not
the dread of a philosophic construction of history
caused some minds to overlook the most simple and
obvious truths. Few would maintain that the history
of law, for instance, would find its best exponent in a
person who had no opinions on the subject of juris–
prudence; or political history, in one who embraced no
theory of politics. It is hard to see why it should be
otherwise with the history of Philosophy. How can
the historian even understand the doctrines of the
philosophers; by what standard is he to judge of their
importance; how can he discern the internal connection
of the systems, or form any opinion respecting their
reciprocal relations, unless he is guided in his labours
by fixed philosophic principles P But the more de-
veloped and mutually consistent these principles are,
the more must we ascribe to him a definite system; and
since clearly developed and consistent principles are
undoubtedly to be desired in a writer of history, we
cannot avoid the conclusion that it is necessary and
good that he should bring with him to the study of the
earlier Philosophy a philosophic system of his own.
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 23
It is possible, indeed, that his system may be too
contracted to interpret for him the meaning of his
predecessors; it is also possible that he may apply it to
history in a perverse manner, by introducing his own
opinions into the doctrines of previous philosophers,
and constructing out of his own system that which he
should have tried to understand by its help. But we
must not make the general principle answerable-for
these faults of individuals; and still less can we hope
to escape them by entering on the history of Philosophy
devoid of any philosophic conviction. The human mind
is not like a tabula rasa, the facts of history are not
simply reflected in it like a picture on a photographic
plate, but every view of a given occurrence is arrived at
by independent observation, combination, and judgment
of the facts. Philosophic impartiality, therefore, does
not consist in the absence of all presuppositions, but in
bringing to the study of past events presuppositions
that are true. The man who is without any philo-
sophic stand-point is not on that account without any
stand-point whatever; he who has formed no scientific
opinion on philosophic questions has an unscientific
opinion about them. To say that we should bring to
the history of Philosophy no philosophy of our own,
really means that in dealing with it we should give the
preference to unscientific notions as compared with
scientific ideas. And the same reasoning would apply
to the assertion that the historian ought to form his
system in the course of writing his history, from history
itself; that by means of history he is to emancipate
* By Wirth in the Jahrbücher der Gegenwart, 1844, 709 sq. .
24 INTRODUCTION.
himself from any preconceived system, in order thus to
attain the universal and the true. From what point of
view then is he to regard history, that it may do him
this service P From the false and narrow point of view
which he must quit that he may rightly comprehend
history 2 or from the universal point of view which
history itself must first enable him to attain? The
one is manifestly as impracticable as the other, and we
are ultimately confined within this circle: that he alone
completely understands the history of Philosophy who
possesses true and complete philosophy; and that he
only arrives at true philosophy who is led to it by
understanding history. Nor can this circle ever be
entirely escaped : the history of Philosophy is the test
of the truth of systems; and to have a philosophic
system is the condition of a man’s understanding history.
The truer and the more comprehensive a philosophy is,
the better will it teach us the importance of previous
philosophies; and the more unintelligible we find the
history of Philosophy, the greater reason have we to
doubt the truth of our own philosophic conceptions.
But the only conclusion to be drawn from this is that
we ought never to regard the work of science as finished
in the historic any more than in the philosophic domain.
As in a general manner, Philosophy and Experimental
Science mutually require and condition one another, so
it is here. Each forward movement of philosophic
knowledge offers new points of view to historic reflec-
tion, facilitates the comprehension of the earlier systems,
of their interconnection and relations; while, on the
other hand, each newly attained perception of the
IIISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 25
manner in which the problems of Philosophy have been
solved or regarded by others, and of the internal con-
nection and consequences of their theories, instructs us
afresh concerning the questions which Philosophy has
to answer, the different courses it may pursue in an-
swering them, and the consequences which may be
anticipated from the adoption of each course.
But it is time that we should approach our subject
somewhat more closely. ſº
26 INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER II.
ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
§ I.—Is Greek Philosophy derived from Oriental
Speculation f
IN order to explain the growth of Greek Philosophy, we
must first enquire out of what historical conditions it
arose; whether it evolved itself as a native product
from the spirit and culture of the Greek people, or was
transplanted from without into Hellenic soil, and grew
up under foreign influences. The Greeks, we know,
were early inclined to ascribe to the Eastern nations
(the only nations whose culture preceded their own) a
share in the origin of their philosophy; but in the most
ancient period, certain isolated doctrines merely were
thus derived from the East." As far as our information
extends, not the Greeks, but the Orientals, were the
first to attribute such an origin to Greek Philosophy
generally. The Jews of the Alexandrian school, edu-
cated under Greek influences, sought by means of this
theory to explain the supposed harmony of their sacred
writings with the doctrines of the Hellenes, agreeably
to their own stand-point and interests;” and in the same
manner the Egyptian priests, after they had become
1. Cf. infra, the chapters on ject will be found in the chapter
Pythagoras and Plato. relating to the Judaic Alexandrian
* Further details on this sub- Philosophy.
ORIENTAL ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
27
acquainted, under the Ptolemies, with Greek Philosophy,
made great boast of the wisdom, which not only pro-
phets and poets, but also philosophers were said to have
acquired from them." Somewhat later, the theory gained
admittance among the Greeks themselves. When Greek
Philosophy, despairing of its own powers, began to ex-
pect its salvation from some higher revelation, and to
seek for such a revelation in religious traditions, it was
natural that the doctrines of the ancient thinkers should
! We find nothing in Herodotus
as to any Egyptian origin of Greek
Philosophy. In regard to religion,
on the other hand, he not only
maintains that certain Greek cults
and doctrines (especially the wor-
ship of Dionysus and the doctrine
of Transmigration, ii. 49, 123) were
imported from Egypt to Greece,
but says in a general manner
(ii. 52) that the Pelasgi at first
adored their deities simply under
the name of the gods, and after-
wards received the particularnames
of these gods (with the few excep-
tions enumerated in c. 50) from
Egypt. That this assertion is
chiefly founded on the statements
of the Egyptian priest appears pro-
bable from c. 50 ; and still more
from c. 54, where Herodotus relates
from the mouth of these priests a
story of two women who, carried
off by Phoenicians from the Egyp-
tian Thebes, founded the first ora-
cles—one in Hellas, the other in
Libya. This story manifestly arose
from a rationalistic interpreta-
tion of the Dodomaic legend of the
two doves (c. 55), and was imposed
on the credulous stranger through
the assurances of the priests, that
what they told about the fate of
these women they had ascertained
by repeated enquiries. As the
priests then represented themselves
to be the founders of the Greek re-
ligion, so at a later period they
claimed to be the founders of Greek
Philosophy. Thus Crantor (ap.
Proclus in Tim. 24 B) says, in refer-
ence to the Platonic myth of the
Athenians and Atlantides: paptu-
podot 3& kal of Tpoq àral rôv Aiyv-
Tríav čv oth Nais rais &rt oroſopévals
Tajra yeypdq6at Aéyovres—there-
with giving a valuable hint for es:
timating the worth of such state-
ments; and Diodorus asserts, i. 96:
the Egyptian priests related, ék
Tów &vaypaqāv táv čv rais ispats
8í8Aots, that Orpheus, Musæus,
Lycurgus, Solon, &c., had come to
them ; and moreover, Plato, Py-
thagoras, Eudoxus, Democritus,
and GEnopides from Chios, and that
relics of these men were still shown
in Egypt. These philosophers had
borrowed from the Egyptians the
doctrines, arts, and institutions
which they transmitted to the Hel-
lenes; Pythagoras, for example,
his geometry, his theory of num-
bers, and transmigration ; Demo-
critus, his astronomical knowledge;
Lycurgus, Plato and Solon, their
laws.
28 INTRODUCTION.
be ascribed to the same source; and the more difficulty
there was in explaining these doctrines from native
tradition, the more readily was their origin attributed
to races, long since revered as the teachers of the
Greeks, and whose wisdom enjoyed the highest reputa-
tion, because the unknown has generally a charm for
the imagination, and seen, as it must be, through a
mysterious haze, is wont to look greater than it really
is. Thus, after the period of Neo-Pythagoreism there
spread, chiefly from Alexandria, the belief that the most
important of the ancient philosophers had been in-
structed by Eastern priests and sages, and that their
most characteristic doctrines had been taken from this
source. This opinion in the following centuries be-
came more and more general, and the later Neo-
Platonists especially carried it to such an extent that,
according to them, the philosophers had been scarcely
more than the promulgators of doctrines perfected ages
before in the traditions of the Asiatic races. No wonder
that Christian authors, even after the time of the Refor-
mation, continued the same strain, doubting neither the
Jewish statements as to the dependence of Greek Philo.
sophy on the religion of the Old Testament, nor the
stories which made Phoenicians, Egyptians, Persians,
Babylonians and Hindoos the instructors of the ancient
philosophers." Modern science has long ago discarded
the fables of the Jews respecting the intercourse of the
| Among these the Alexandri- the Hellenic philosophers generally
ans were again preeminent. Cle- are represented as having borrowed
mens dwells with especial predilec- portions of the truth from the He-
tion on this theme in his Stromata, brew prophets, and given them out
Plato to him is simply 6 €: ‘E8patov as their own (ibid, 312 C, 320 A).
ºpiñágopos (Strom. i. 274 B); and
OPINIONS OF ANCIENTS AND MODERWS, 29
Greek sages with Moses and the prophets; but the idea
that Greek Philosophy partly or entirely originated in
the Pagan East has more facts to urge in its behalf.
It has also found support in the high opinion of Oriental
wisdom induced by our better acquaintance with the
Chinese, Persian and Indian sacred records, and by our
researches into Egyptian antiquity; an opinion which
harmonizes with certain philosophical speculations con-
cerming a primitive revelation and a golden age. More
sober philosophy, indeed, questioned the truth of these
speculations, and thoughtful students of history sought
vainly for traces of that high culture which was said
to have adorned the childhood of the world. Our
admiration, too, for the Oriental Philosophy, of which,
according to its enthusiastic admirers, only some frag-
ments had reached the Greeks, has been considerably
modified by our growing knowledge of its true content
and character. When, in addition to this, the old un-
critical manner of confusing separate modes of thought
had been abandoned, and every notion began to be
studied in its historical connection, and in relation with
the peculiar character and circumstances of the people
among whom it appeared, it was natural that the differ-
ences of Greek and Oriental cultivation, and the self-
dependence of the Greek, should again be more strongly
emphasized by those best acquainted with classical anti-
quity. Still, there have not been wanting, even quite
recently, some to maintain that the East had a decisive
influence on the earliest Greek Philosophy; and the whole
question seems by no means so entirely settled that the
History of Philosophy can avoid its repeated discussion.
30 INTRODUCTION.
One point, however, is to be noted, the neglect of
which has not unfrequently brought confusion into this
enquiry. In a certain sense, the influence of Oriental
conceptions on Greek Philosophy may well be admitted
even by those who consider that Philosophy to be purely
a Greek creation. The Greeks, like the other Indo-
Germanic races, arose out of Asia, and from this their
earliest home they must originally have brought with
them, together with their language, the general ground-
work of their religion and manners. After they had
reached their later abodes, they were still open to in-
fluences which reached them from the Oriental nations,
partly through Thrace and the Bosphorus, partly by
way of the AEgean and its islands. The national
character of Greece, therefore, was even in its origin
under the influence of the Oriental spirit, and Greek
religion, especially, can only be understood on the sup-
position that foreign rites and religious ideas from the
North and South-east were superadded to the faith of
Greek antiquity, and, in a lesser degree, even to that of
the Homeric age. The latest of these immigrant gods,
such as Dionysus, Cybele, and the Phoenician Heracles,
can now with sufficient certainty be proved alien in
their origin; while in the ease of others, in the present
stage of the enquiry, we have still to be content with
doubtful conjectures. In considering the Oriental
origin of Greek philosophy, however, we can only take
into account those Eastern influences, the entrance of
which had nothing to do with the early religion of
Greece, or the development of the Greek character
generally; for the scope of our work involves our re-
ORIENTAL ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 31
garding the philosophy of the Greeks, at any rate
primarily, as a product of the Greek spirit; and to
enquire how that spirit was formed would be beside the
purpose of the History of Philosophy. Only in so far
as the Oriental element maintained itself in its specific
character, side by side with the Hellenic element, are
we now concerned with it. If, indeed, Röth were cor-
rect in asserting, as he does," that Philosophy did not
spring from the civilisation and spiritual life of the
Greeks, but was transplanted among them as something
foreign, and that the whole circle of notions lying at
its root came ready made from without, then, and then
only, we might derive Greek Philosophy absolutely
from the East. But if, on the other hand, it was the
immediate product of the Greek philosophers' own re-
flection, in that case it has essentially a native origin,
and the question can no longer be whether, as a whole, it
came from the East, but whether Oriental doctrines had
any share in its formation, how far this foreign influence
extended, and to what exten we can still recognize in
it the Oriental element proper, as distinct from the
Hellenic element. These different cases have not
always hitherto been sufficiently discriminated; and
the advocates of Oriental influence especially have fre-
quently neglected to explain whether the foreign
element came into Philosophy directly or through the
medium of the Greek religion. There is a wide differ-
ence between the two alternatives, and it is with the
former alone that we are here concerned.
Those who maintain that Greek Philosophy origin-
Geschichte unserer abendländischen Philosophie, i. 74,241.
32 INTRODUCTION.
ally came from the East, support their opinion partly
on the statements of the ancients, and partly on the
supposed internal affinity between Greek and Oriental
doctrines. The first of these proofs is very unsatisfac-
tory. Later writers, it is true, particularly the adher-
ents of the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic Schools,
speak much of the wisdom which Thales, Pherecydes and
Pythagoras, Democritus and Plato, owed to the teaching
of Egyptian priests, Chaldeans, Magi, and even Brah-
mans. But this evidence could only be valid if we were
assured that it rested on a trustworthy tradition, reaching
back to the time of these philosophers themselves. And
who can guarantee us such an assurance? The assertions
of these comparatively recent authors respecting the
ancient philosophers must be cautiously received even
when they mention their references; for their historical
sense and critical faculty are almost invariably so dull,
and the dogmatic presuppositions of subsequent philo-
sophy are so intrusively apparent in their language, that
we can trust very few of them even for a correct version
of their authorities, and in no single instance can we
hope for a sound judgment concerning the worth and
origin of those authorities, or an accurate discrimination
of the genuine from the spurious, the fabulous from the
historic. Indeed, when anything, otherwise unknown to
us, is related by them of Plato, Pythagoras, or any of the
ancient philosophers without any reference to authori-
ties, we may take for granted that the story is founded,
in the great majority of cases, neither on fact nor on
respectable tradition, but at best on some unauthenti-
cated rumour, and still oftener, perhaps, on a misunder-
ORIENTAL ORIGIN OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 33
standing, an arbitrary conjecture, a dogmatic presuppo-
sition, or even a deliberate invention. This is true in
an especial manner of the question as to the relation of
Greek Philosophy with the East; for, on the one hand,
the Orientals had the strongest inducements of vanity
and self-interest to invent an Eastern origin for Greek
Science and culture ; and, on the other, the Greeks were
only too ready to allow the claim. It is precisely with
such unauthenticated statements that we have here to
do, and these statements are so suspiciously connected
with the peculiar standpoint of the authors who make
them, that it would be very rash to build hypotheses of
great importance in history on a foundation so insecure.
If we put aside, then, these untrustworthy witnesses,
and have recourse to older authorities, the result is no
better; we find either that they assert much less than
the later writers, or that their assertions are based far
more upon conjecture than historical knowledge. Thales
may have been in Egypt: we have no certain evidence
of the fact ; but it is not likely that he there learned"
more than the first rudiments of mathematics. That
Pythagoras, visited that country, and that his whole
philosophy originated thence, was first asserted by
Isocrates, in a passage which is more than suspected of
being a rhetorical fiction. Herodotus says nothing
about his having come to Egypt, and represents him
as having derived from the Egyptians only a very few
doctrines and customs, and these at third hand. The
distant journeys of Democritus are better attested; but
what he learnt in the course of them from the bar-
barians we are not certainly informed, for the story of
WOL. I. D
&
34 INTRODUCTION.
the Phoenician Atomist Mochus deserves no credit."
Plato's travels in Egypt also seem to be historical, and
have at any rate much more evidence in their favour
than the subsequent and improbable statements as to
his intercourse with Phoenicians, Jews, Chaldeans and
Persians. Whatever later authors may have said, or
rather surmised, about the fruits of these travels, Plato
himself clearly expresses his own opinion of the wisdom
of the Egyptians, when he ascribes to the Greeks, as
their special characteristic, a taste for knowledge, and
to the Egyptians, as to the Phoenicians, a love of gain.”
As a fact, he praises them in various passages, not for
philosophic discoveries, but for technical arts and poli-
tical institutions; * there is not a trace, either in his
own writings or in credible tradition, of his having
taken his philosophy from them. Thus the assertions
as to the dependence of Greek on Oriental Philosophy,
when we exclude those that are wholly untrustworthy,
and rightly understand the rest, dwindle down to a very
small number; even these are not altogether beyond
question, and at most only prove that the Greeks in
particular cases may have received certain impulses
from the East, not that their whole philosophy was
imported from thence.
A more important result is supposed to be derived
from the internal affinity of the Greek systems with
Oriental doctrines. But even the two most recent advo-
* Further details, infra. —Gesch. der Phil. i. 153 sqq.
* Rep. iv. 435 E. A passage on * Cf. Zeller, Phil. der Gr. Part
which Ritter, in his careful enquiry ii. a, p. 358, note 2; also Brandis,
into the oriental origin of Greek Gesch. der Gr.-röm. Phil. i. 143.
philosophy, rightly lays much stress.
THEORIES OF GLADISCH AND ROTH. 35
cates of the theory are not agreed as to the precise
meaning of this affinity. Gladisch, on the one hand,
thinks it evident that the principal pre-Socratic systems
reproduced without any material alteration the theories
of the universe of the five chief Oriental nations. The
Philosophy of the Chinese, he considers, reappears in
Pythagoreism ; that of the Hindoos in the Eleatics;
that of the Persians in Heracleitus; that of the Egyp-
tians in Empedocles; that of the Jews in Anaxagoras.
Röth, on the other hand,” no less distinctly affirms
that ancient Greek speculation arose out of Egyptian
creeds, intermingled, though not to any great extent
except in the cases of Democritus and Plato, with the
ideas of Zoroaster. In Aristotle, he says, Greek Philo-
sophy first freed itself from these influences; but in
Neo-Platonism Egyptian speculation once more renewed
its youth, while, at the same time, the Zoroastrian doc-
trimes, with a certain admixture of Egyptian motions,
produced Christianity.
If we examine impartially the historical facts, we
shall find ourselves compelled to reject both these
theories, and the improbability of an Eastern origin
and character in regard to Greek Philosophy generally
will more and more appear. The phenomenon which
Einleitung in das Verständniss
der Weltgeschichte, 2 Th. 1841,1844.
Das Mysterium der Ægyptischen
Pyramiden und Obelisken, 1846.
On Heracleitus, Zeitschrift für Al-
terthºms-Wissenschaft, 1846, No.
121 sq., 1848; No. 28 sqq. Due
verschleierte Isis, 1849. Empedokles
wºnd die AEgypter, 1858. Hera-
cleitos und Zoroaster, 1859. Anar-
agoras undalie Israeliten, 1864 Die
Hyperboreer und die alten Schinesen,
1866. Die Religion und die Philo-
sophie in ihrer Weltgeschichtlichen
Entwicklung, 1852. In what fol-
lows I keep principally to this last
treatise.
* Gesch. alms. Abendl. Phil.
i. 74 sqq., 228 sq., 459 sq. In
the second part of this work he
ascribes to the doctrines of Zoro-
aster a share in Pythagoreism.
D 2
36 INTRODUCTION.
Gladisch thinks he perceives, even supposing it to exist,
would admit of a twofold explanation. We might
either ascribe it to an actual connection between the
Pythagorean Philosophy and the Chinese, between the
Eleatic and the Hindoo, &c.; or we might regard the
coincidence of these doctrines as naturally resulting,
without any external connection, from the universality
of the Greek genius, or some other cause. In the
latter case the phenomenon would give no clue to the
origin of Greek Philosophy, nor, however striking such
a fact might appear to us, would it add much to our
historical knowledge of Greek science. If, on the
other hand, there were really such an external historical
connection as Gladisch assumes between these Greek
systems and their Eastern prototypes, we ought to be
able in some way or other to prove the possibility of
such a connection; to show, from a survey of the actual
circumstances, that there was a probability of such
accurate intelligence concerning Chinese and Hindoo
doctrines having reached Pythagoras and Parmenides;
we must explain the inconceivable phenomenon that the
different Oriental ideas did not become intermingled
on their way to Greece, nor in Greece itself, but
arrived there and maintained themselves separately,
side by side, so as to produce exactly the same number.
of Greek systems, and that in the very order corre-
sponding to the geographical and historical position
of the peoples among whom they arose. Lastly, we
must give some kind of answer to the question how
theories, so evidently borrowed from Parmenides by
Cf. especially, in reference to this, Amaragoras und die Israeliten, x. sq.
THEORIES OF GLA DISCH AND RöTH. 37
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, and so deeply rooted in
their own doctrines that they must be considered their
scientific points of departure (e.g. the impossibility of
an absolute origination or decease), could be derived in
the case of one philosopher from India, in that of a
second from Egypt, in that of a third from Palestine.
All this appears equally impossible, whether we suppose
the influence of Oriental doctrines on Greek Philosophy
to have been indirect or direct. That it is impossible
to believe in a direct influence of the kind Gladisch
himself admits; appealing, with justice, to the ut-
terances of Aristotle and of the other ancient authors
concerning the origin of the systems anterior to Plato,
and urging the reciprocal interdependence of these
systems. But does the theory become more probable if
we assume that the Oriental element “entered Philo-
sophy through the instrumentality of Greek religion?”
Where do we find in Greek religion, especially in the
religious tradition of the centuries which gave birth
to the pre-Socratic Philosophy (except, indeed, in the
dogma of transmigration), a trace of all the doctrines
to which the philosophers are said to have been led by
it 2 How is it credible that a speculative system like
the Vedanta Philosophy should be communicated by
means of Greek mythology to Parmenides; and Judaic
monotheism, by means of Hellenic polytheism, to
Anaxagoras 2 How could the Oriental doctrines after
their convergence in the Greek religion have issued
from it unchanged in this definite order P And
Einleitung in das Verständ- die Isr. xi. sq.
miss, &c. ii. 376 sq. Anaa.. und * Anaa.. und die Isr. xiii.
38 INTRODUCTION.
if they had done so, how can that which the various
philosophies produced from the same source (their na-
tional religion), even when they undoubtedly borrowed
it one from the other, be referred to utterly different
Oriental sources? It is easy to meet these objections,
which might be greatly multiplied, by saying,' whether
all this be possible, and how it may have come about,
we will not here enquire, but content ourselves at
present with simply establishing the facts. Such an
answer might suffice if the evidence for the facts only
included the hearing of unimpeachable witnesses, and
a comparison of their testimony. But that is by no
means the case. The proofs of the parallelism between
Greek and Oriental doctrines which Gladisch claims
to have discovered, would, under any circumstances,
demand investigations much too complicated to leave
the question of its possibility and reasonableness wholly
untouched. If we consider his own representation of
this parallelism, we are met at decisive points by such
uncritical reliance on interpolated writings and untrust-
worthy statements, such confusion of earlier and later
authorities, such arbitrary interpretation of the theories
concerned, that it is plain we have to do not merely
with the proof of the historical fact, but with a connec-
tion and interpretation extending much farther.” We
1 Loc. cit. xiv. -
* Cf. what is said, infra, of
Heracleitus, of Empedocles, and
of Anaxagoras; also in the text of
this passage, as it appeared in the
second and third editions, about
the Pythagorean and Eleatic Philo-
sophy (Zeller, Phil. der Gr. 3rd ed.
p. 29 sq.) This I do not repeat here,
not because Gladisch's counter-
arguments seem to me unanswer-
able, but because a thorough refuta-
tion of his hypothesis would require
more space than I can devote to it,
and because the derivation of Py-
thagoreism from China, and the
THEORIES OF GLADISCH AND ROTH. 39
become involved, as already remarked, in the following
contradictions: that characteristics equally to be found
in several Greek philosophers must have had an entirely
different origin in every case; that doctrines evidently
borrowed by one philosopher from another must have
been communicated independently to both from an
Easterm source, and to each man from a separate Eastern
source; that systems which evolved themselves out of
one another, in a historic sequence which is indisputable,
must each have merely reproduced what it had already
received, irrespectively of that sequence, from this or
that Oriental predecessor. How little this construction
of Gladisch comports with actual facts may also be
seen from the impossibility” of bringing into connection
with it two such radical and important phenomena in
the history of Greek Philosophy as the Ionic Physics
before Heracleitus, and the Atomistic Philosophy.
As to Röth, his view can only be properly considered
in the examination of the separate Greek systems.
So far as it is carried out, I am, however, unable, to
agree with it, because I fail to see in his exposition of
Fgyptian theology a faithful historical picture. I can-
doctrines of Parmenides from India
is really inconceivable, and has
never been elsewhere entertained.
Cf. Supra, p. 36. Thus ac-
cording to Gladisch, Pythagoras
got his doctrine of Transmigration
from China (where, however, it did
not originate), and Empedocles his
from Egypt.
* In regard to the Atomistic
philosophy, Gladisch attempts to
justify this (Amaa.. und die Isr. xiv.)
by saying that it was developed
from the Eleatic doctrine. But the
dependence is in this-case no other
and no greater than in the case of
Anaxagoras and Empedocles; and
Atomistic has an equal right with
their doctrines to be considered an
independent system. The omis-
sion of Thales, Anaximander, and
Anaximenes, Gladisch (loc. cit.)
leaves unexplained. Yet Thales is
the founder of Greek Philosophy,
and Anaximander the immediate
predecessor of Heracleitus.
40 IAWTRODUCTION.
not now enter into a discussion of the philosophy of
religion, nor stop to refute the theory' that abstract
concepts, such as spirit, matter, time and space, and
not presentations of personal beings, formed the original
content of the Egyptian"religion, and other religions of
antiquity. I must also leave the task of examining the
results which Röth derives” from Oriental texts and
hieroglyphic monuments to those better acquainted
with the subject. For the purposes of the present
enquiry, it is enough to notice that the affinity assumed
by Röth between the Egyptian and Persian doctrines,
and the myths and philosophic systems of the Greeks,
can only be proved, even on the author's own showing,
if we consent to repose unlimited confidence in untrust-
worthy witnesses, uncertain conjectures and groundless
etymologies. If, indeed, each transference of the names
of Greek gods to foreign deities were an adequate proof
of the identity of these gods, the Greek religion would
hardly be distinguishable from the Egyptian; if it were
permissible to seek out barbarian etymologies, even
where the Greek signification of a word is ready to
hand,” we might perhaps suppose the whole mythology,
together with the names of the gods, to have emigrated
from the East to Greece; *
* Loc. cit. p. 50 Sq., 228, 131
SQQ-
* e.g. p. 131 Sqq., 278 sqq.
* As, for instance, when Röth
derives Pan and Persephone from
the Egyptian language; translating
Pan as Deus egressus, the emanated
creative spirit (loc. cit. 140, 284),
and Persephone (p. 162) as the
slayer of Perses, i.e. of Bore—Seth
or Typhon; whereas it is clear
if Iamblichus and Hermes
that the root of II&v is tria, Ion.
Taréopal, Lat. pasco; and that
IIepareq,óvn, as well as IIéporms and
IIeporets, comes from trépôw; and
that Greek mythology says nothing
of a creator spirit Pan, or of a Perses
in the sense of Typhon (if even
one of the Hesiodic Titans be so
named), or of any slaying of this
IPerses by Persephone.
* Scarcely, however, even in
IMPROBABILITY OF THE ORIENTAL THEORY. 41
Trismegistus were classical authorities for Egyptian an-
tiquity, we might congratulate ourselves on the ancient
records' with which they acquaint us, and the Greek
philosophical sayings which they profess to have dis-
covered” in old Egyptian writings; if the Atomistic doc-
trine of Moschus the Phoenician were a historical fact,
we might, like Röth,” attempt to find in the theories of
Phoenician cosmology, respecting the primitive slime,
the sources of a doctrine hitherto believed to have been
derived from the metaphysic of the Eleatics. But if
the universal principle of criticism be applicable to
this, as to other cases—viz. that history accepts
nothing as true the truth of which is not guaranteed
by credible testimony, or by legitimate conclusions
from such testimony—then this attempt of Röth will
only show that the most indefatigable efforts are in-
sufficient to prove a foreign origin in regard to the
essential content of so indigenous a production as
Greek science.”
that case, with the facility of Röth,
who on the strength of the above
etymologies, and without citing any
authority, transfers the whole my-
thus of the rape of Persephone
and the wanderings of Demeter to
the Egyptian mythology, in order
then to assert that it first came
from Egypt to the Greeks (loc. cit.
p. 162). g
e.g. the book of Bitys, which
Röth (p. 211 Sqq.) (on the ground
of a very suspicious passage in the
work of the Pseudo-Iamblichus on
the Mysteries) places in the eight-
eenth century before Christ. If this
book ever existed, it was probably
a late invention of the period of
Alexandrian syncretism, and worth
about as much, in the light of
Egyptian historical evidence, as
the book of Mormon is in regard
to Jewish.
* For example, the distinction
of vows and juxi. Cf. Itôth's Allmar-
Kungen, p. 220 sq.
* Loc. cit. 274 sqq.
* A more detailed examination
of Röth's hypotheses will find a
fitting place in the chapter on the
Pythagoreans; for, according to
him, it was Pythagoras who trans-
planted the whole Egyptian science
and theology into Greece. Cf.
also what is said of Anaximander,
Infra.
42 INTRODUCTION.
A proof. of this kind is, generally speaking, very
difficult to establish when it is based solely on internal
evidence. It may happen that not only particular
motions and customs, but whole series of them may bear
a resemblance to another series in some other sphere of
civilisation ; it may also happen that fundamental con-
ceptions may seem to repeat themselves without thus
affording adequate proof that they are historically inter-
connected. Under analogous conditions of develop-
ment, and especially between races originally related
to each other, many points of contact invariably arise,
even when these races have no actual intercourse;
chance often brings out surprising similarities in de-
tails; and among the more highly civilised races scarcely
any two could be named between which striking paral-
lels could not be drawn. But though it may be natural
in that case to conjecture an external connection, the
existence of this connection is only probable if the
similarities are so great that they cannot be explained
by the above more general causes. It must have been
very astonishing to the followers of Alexander to find
among the Brahmans not only their Dionysus and
Heracles, but also their Hellenic philosophy; to hear
of water being the origin of the world, as with Thales;
of Deity permeating all things, as with Heracleitus; of
a transmigration of souls, as with Pythagoras and Plato;
of five elements, as with Aristotle; of the prohibition
of flesh diet, as with Empedocles and the Orphics;"
and no doubt Herodotus and his successors must have
1. Cf. the accounts of Mega- and Nearchus in Strabo xv. 1, 58
sthenes, Aristobulus, Onesicritus sqq., p. 712 sqq.
IMPROBABILITY OF THE ORIENTAL THEORY. 43
been often inclined to derive Greek doctrines and usages
from Egypt. But for us, all this is not sufficient proof
that Heracleitus, Plato, Thales and Aristotle borrowed
their theorems from the Hindoos or Egyptians.
It is not merely, however, the want of historical
evidence which prevents our believing in the Oriental
origin of Greek Philosophy; there are several positive
reasons against the theory. One of the most decisive
lies in the general character of that philosophy. The
doctrines of the most ancient Greek philosophers have,
as Ritter well observes," all the simplicity and indepen-
dence of first attempts; and their ulterior development
is so continuous that the hypothesis of alien influences
is never required to explain it. We see here no conflict
of the original Hellenic spirit with foreign elements, no
adaptation of misapprehended formulae and conceptions,
mo return to scientific traditions of the past, in short,
none of the phenomena by which, for example, in the
Middle Ages, the dependence of philosophy on foreign
sources is evinced. All developes itself quite naturally
from the conditions of Greek national life, and we shall
find that even those systems which have been supposed
to be most deeply influenced by doctrines from without,
are in all essential respects to be explained by the inter-
mal civilisation and spiritual horizon of the Hellenes.
Such a feature would certainly be inexplicable if Greek
Philosophy were really so much indebted to other
countries as some writers both ancient and modern
have believed. On this theory there would be another
strange and unaccountable circumstance,—that the
* Gesch. der Phil. i. 172.
44 INTRODUCTION.
theological character of Oriental speculation should be
entirely absent from Greek philosophy. Whatever
science there was in Egypt, Babylonia or Persia, was in
possession of the priestly caste, and had grown up in
one mass with the religious doctrines and institutions.
In regard to mathematics and astronomy, it is quite
conceivable that Oriental science should have been de-
tached from this its religious basis, and transplanted
separately into foreign lands; but it is most improbable
that the priests should have held theories about the
primitive constituents and origin of the world, capable
of being transmitted and adopted apart from their doc-
trines concerning the gods and mythology. Now in the
most ancient Greek Philosophy we find no trace of
Egyptian, Persian or Chaldaean mythology, and its con-
nection even with Greek myths is very slight. Even
the Pythagoreans and Empedocles only borrowed from
the mysteries such doctrines as had no intimate relation
with their philosophy (that is, their attempt at a scien-
tific explanation of nature): neither the Pythagorean
doctrine of numbers, nor the Pythagorean and Empe-
doclean cosmology, can be connected with any theologi-
cal tradition as their source. The rest of the pre-
Socratic philosophy does, indeed, remind us in certain
isolated motions of the mythic cosmogony, but in the
main it developed itself either quite independently of
the religious belief, or in express opposition to it. How
could this possibly be if Greek science were an offshoot
of the Sacerdotal wisdom of the East 2
We must further enquire whether the Greeks at the
time of their first attempts at Philosophy could have
IMPROBABILITY OF THE ORIENTAL THEORY. 45
been taught anything considerable in this sphere by
Orientals. There is no historical or even probable
evidence to show that either of the Asiatic nations with
which they came in contact possessed any philosophic
science. We hear, indeed, of theological and cosmo-
logical notions, but all these, so far as they really appear
to go back to antiquity, are so rude and fanciful that
the Greeks could scarcely have received from them any
impulse towards philosophic thought which their own
myths could not just as well have afforded. The sacred
books of Egypt probably contained only prescripts for
ritual, ecclesiastical and civil laws, interspersed perhaps
with religious myths; in the scanty notices remaining
of their contents there is no trace of the scientific,
dogmatic theology which modern writers have sought to
discover." To the Egyptian priests themselves, in the
time of Herodotus, the thought of an Egyptian origin
in regard to Greek Philosophy never seems to have
occurred, eagerly as they strove, even then, to derive
Greek myths, laws, and
1 Röth, loc. cit. p. 112 sqq.,
and p. 122. He appeals to Cle-
mens, Strom. vi. 633 B sqq. Sylb.,
where the Hermetic books being
mentioned it is said: there are ten
books, rö, eis Thy Tipºv &våkovra Tów
trap' airo's 9eóv kal thu Aiyvirtſav
eñoré8étav repléxovira otov repl
6vuátov, &rapxóv, iſuvov, eúxöv,
troutröv, Šoptóv kal tăv toitous
6poſtov, and ten other books rept
Te vöuov kal 6sóv kal Täs 6Ams
tratēetas róv ispéov. But that the
contents of these books were
even in part scientific, cannot be
deduced from the words of Clemens;
religious ceremonies from
even the last-mentioned ten proba-
bly treated, not of the nature of
the gods, but of religious worship,
and perhaps, in connection with
this, of mythology: when Clemens
says that these writings contained
the whole ‘ Philosophy’ of the
Egyptians, the word must be taken
in the indeterminate sense of which
I have spoken above, p. 1 sq. More-
over, we do not know in the least
how old these books were, or
whether they continued up to the
time of Clemens without alterations
and additions.
46 INTRODUCTION.
Egypt, and little as they shrank from the most trans-
parent inventions' in pursuance of this end. The
scientific discoveries which they claim to have given to
the Greeks” are confined to astronomical determinations
of time. That the doctrine of transmigration originated
in Egypt is only a conjecture of Herodotus;* and when
he says (ii. 109) that the Greeks appear to have learnt
geometry there, he founds the assertion not on Egyptian
statements, as Diodorus does, but on his own observa-
tion. This justifies the supposition that in the fifth
century the Egyptians had not troubled themselves
much about Greek or any other Philosophy. Even
Plato, judging from the previously quoted passage in
the fourth book of the ‘Republic, must have been
ignorant of the existence of a Phoenician or Egyptian
Philosophy. Nor does Aristotle seem to have been
aware of the philosophic efforts of the Egyptians, will-
ing as he was to acknowledge them as forerunners of
the Greeks in mathematics and astronomy.” Demo-
1 Thus, (ii. 177) Solon is said
to have borrowed one of his laws
from Amasis, who came to the
throne twenty years later than the
date of Solon's code; and (c. 118)
the priests assure the historian that
what they related to him about
Helen they had heard from Mene-
laus' own mouth. We have already
seen examples of this procedure,
supra, p. 27, note 1.
2 Herod. ii. 4.
8 ii. 123.
4 To the astronomical observa-
tions of the Egyptians (on the
conjunctions of the planets with
each other and with fixed stars)
he appeals in Meteorol. i. 6, 343,
b 28; and in Metaph. i. 1,981, b 23
he says: Öto trepl Atºyvirtov ai
p.a6mplattical trpárov réxval ovvé-
ormorav. čke? y&p & petón axoxáſeuv
to tôv ispéov č6vos. This very
passage, however, makes it pro-
bable that Aristotle knew nothing
of any philosophic enquiry pursued
in Egypt. He contends loc. cit.
that knowledge is on a higher level
when it is pursued only for the end
of knowing, than when it serves the
purposes of practical necessity, and
observes, in connection with this,
that purely theoretic sciences
therefore first arose in places where
people were sufficiently free from
anxiety about the necessaries of
IMPROBABILITY OF THE ORIENTAL THEORY. 47.
critus assures us that he himself, in geometrical know-
ledge, was quite a match for the Egyptian sages whose
acquaintance he made." So late as the time of Diodorus,
when Greek science had long been naturalised in Egypt,
and the Egyptians in consequence claimed for themselves
the visits of Plato, Pythagoras, and Democritus,” that
which the Greeks are said to have derived from Egypt
is confined to mathematical and technical knowledge,
civil laws, religious institutions, and myths; * these
only are referred to in the assertion of the Thebans
(i. 50) ‘that Philosophy and the accurate knowledge of
the stars was first invented among them, for the word
Philosophy is here equivalent to Astronomy.
Admitting, then, that the Egyptian mythologists
referred to by Diodorus may have given to the con-
ceptions of the gods a naturalistic interpretation in
the spirit of the Stoics; “that later syncretists (like the
life to be able to devote themselves
to such sciences. The above-quoted
words indirectly confirm this asser-
tion. Had Aristotle considered
Philosophy as well as Mathematics
to be an Egyptian product, he
would have been particularly un-
likely to omit it in this connection,
since it is Philosophy of which he
asserts that as a purely theoretical
science it stands higher than all
merely technical knowledge. That
the rudiments of astronomy came
to the Greeks from the barbarians,
and more particularly from the
Syrians and Egyptians, we are told
in the Epinomis of Plato 986 Esq.
987 D sq. Similarly Strabo xvii.
1, 3, p. 787, ascribes the invention
of Geometry to the Egyptians, and
that of Arithmetic to the Phoeni-
cians; perhaps Eudemus had al-
ready expressed the same opinion,
if indeed Proclus in Euclid. 19, o
(64 f. Friedl.) took this statement
from him.
* In the fragment in Clemens,
Strom. i. 304 A, where he says of
himself after mentioning his distant
journeys: kal Aoyſoy &věpátov
TAetotov Šohkovga kal ypguuéov
êvv6égios uetà &troëéºtos ojöets ká
He trapſiAAače, où6' oi Aiyvirtſov
raxeóuevo Apteborárrat. The in-
terpretation of the last word is
questionable, but the term must in
any case include those of the
Egyptian sages who possessed the
most geometrical knowledge.
* i. 96, 98.
* Cf. c. 16, 69, 81, 96 sqq.
* Diod. i. 11 sq.
48 INTRODUCTION.
author of the book on the mysteries of the Egyptians,
and the theologians quoted by Damascius)" may have
imported their own speculations into Egyptian myths;
that there may have existed in the time of Posidonius a
Phoenician manuscript reputed to be of great antiquity,
and passing under the name of the philosopher Moschus
or Mochus;” that Philo of Byblus, under the mask of
Sanchuniathon, may have constructed a rude cosmology
from Phoenician and Greek myths, from the Mosaic
history of creation, and from confused reminiscences of
Philosophy—such questionable witnesses can in no way
prove the real existence of an Egyptian and Phoenician
Philosophy.
Supposing, however, that among these nations, at
the time that the Greeks became acquainted with them,
philosophic doctrines had been found, the transmission
of these doctrines to Greece was not at all so easy as
may perhaps be imagined. Philosophic conceptions,
especially in the childhood of Philosophy, are closely
bound up with their expression in language, and the
knowledge of foreign languages was rarely to be met
with among the Greeks. On the other hand, the inter-
preters, educated as a rule for nothing but commercial
intercourse and the explanation of curiosities, were of
little use in enabling people to understand instruction
in philosophy. Moreover, there is not a single allusion,
on which we can rely, to the use of Oriental works by
Greek philosophers, or to any translations of such works.
* De Princ. c. 125. Damascius worthy source for the history of
expressly calls them oi, Aiyúirtuol Egyptian antiquity.
traff' huàsquxóoroqot yeyovótes. They * Wide infra, the chapter on
are therefore the most untrust- Democritus.
NATIVE SOURCES OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 49
If we ask ourselves, lastly, by what means the doctrines
of the Hindoos and the other nations of Eastern Asia
could have been carried into Greece before the time
of Alexander, we shall find that the matter presents
numerous difficulties. All such considerations as these
would, of course, yield to well-attested facts; but it is
a different matter where we are concerned, not with
historical facts, but for the present with mere conjec-
tures. If the Eastern origin of Greek Philosophy were
to be maintained by trustworthy evidence, or by its own
internal characteristics, our conception of the scientific
condition of the Eastern nations and of the relation in
which the Greeks stood to them must be formed in
accordance with that fact; but since the fact in itself
is neither demonstrable nor probable, it is rendered
still more improbable by its want of harmony with what
we know from other sources on these two points.
§ II.-The Native Sources of Greek Philosophy.
IRELIGION.
We have no need, however, to seek for foreign ante-
cedents: the philosophic science of the Greeks is fully
explained by the genius, resources, and state of civili-
sation of the Hellenic tribes. If ever there was a
people capable of creating its own science, the Greeks
were that people. In the most ancient records of their
culture, the Homeric Poems, we already meet with that
freedom and clearness of spirit, that sobriety and mode-
ration, that feeling for the beautiful and harmonious,
which place these poems so distinctly above the heroic
WOL. I. E
50 INTRODUCTION,
legends of all other nations without exception. Of
scientific endeavour, there is nothing as yet ; no neces-
sity is felt to investigate the natural causes of things;
the writer is content to refer them to personal authors
and divine powers, the explanation that comes upper-
most in the childhood of mankind. The technical arts
too, which support science, are in a very elementary
stage; in the Homeric period even writing is unknown.
But when we consider the glorious heroes of the Homeric
Poems—when we see how everything, each phenomenon
of nature, and each event of human life, is set forth in
pictures which are as true as they are artistically per-
fect—when we study the simple and beautiful develop-
ment of these masterpieces, the grandeur of their plan,
and the harmonious accomplishment of their purposes,
we can no longer wonder that a nation capable of ap-
prehending the world with an eye so open, and a spirit
so unclouded, of dominating the confused mass of phe-
momena with so admirable a sense of form, of moving
in life so freely and surely—that such a nation should
soon turn its attention to science, and in that field
should not be satisfied merely with amassing knowledge
and observations, but should strive to combine particu-
lars into a whole, to find an intellectual focus for
isolated phenomena, to form a theory of the universe
based on clear conceptions, and possessing internal
unity; to produce, in short, a Philosophy. How natural
is the flow of events even in the Homeric world of gods!
We find ourselves, indeed, in the wonderland of imagi-
nation, but how seldom are we reminded by anything
fantastic or monstrous (so frequent and disturbing an
THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS, 51
element in Oriental and Northern mythology) that this
fabled world is wanting in the conditions of reality
Amidst all the poetry how clearly we recognise that
same and vigorous realism, that fine perception of what
is harmonious and matural, to which, in later times,
after deeper study of the universe and of man, this
same Homeric heaven necessarily proved such a stum-
bling-block. Thus, although the intellectual culture
of the Homeric period is separated by a wide inter-
val from the rise of philosophy, we can already trace
in it the peculiar genius out of which Philosophy
Sprang.
It is the farther development of this genius as
manifested in the sphere of religion, of moral and civil
life, and in the general cultivation of taste and of the
intellect, which constitutes the historical preparation for
Greek Philosophy.
The religion of the Greeks, like every positive
religion, stands to the philosophy of that people in a
relation partly of affinity and partly of opposition.
What distinguishes it from the religions of all other
races, however, is the freedom which from the very
beginning it allowed to the evolution of philosophic
thought. If we turn our attention first to the public
ritual and popular faith of the Hellenes, as it is repre-
sented to us in its oldest and most authentic records,
the poems of Homer and Hesiod, its importance in the
development of philosophy cannot be mistaken. The
religious presentation is always, and so also among the |
Greeks, the form in which the interdependence of all
phenomena and the rule of invisible powers and º!
E 2
52 INTRODUCTION.
versal laws first attains to consciousness. However
great may be the distance between faith in a divine
government of the world, and the scientific knowledge
and explanation of the universe as a connected whole,
they have at any rate something in common. Religious
faith, even under the polytheistic form it assumed in
Greece, implies that what exists and happens in the
world depends on certain causes concealed from sensu-
ous perception. Nor is this all. The power of the
gods must necessarily extend over all parts of the world,
and the plurality of the gods is reduced to unity by
the dominion of Zeus and the irresistible power of
Fate. Thus the interdependence of the universe is
proclaimed; all phenomena are co-ordinated under the
same general causes; by degrees fear of the power of
the gods and of relentless Fate yields to confidence in
the divine goodness and wisdom, and a fresh problem
presents itself to reflection—viz. to pursue the traces of
this wisdom in the laws of the universe. Philosophy,
indeed, has itself been at work in this purification of
the popular faith, but the religious motion first con-
tained the germs from which the purer conceptions of
Philosophy were afterwards developed.
The peculiar nature of Greek religious belief, also,
was not without influence on Greek Philosophy. The
. Greek religion belongs in its general character to the
+-class of natural religions; the Divine, as is sufficiently
proved by the plurality of gods, is represented under
a natural figure essentially of the same kind as the
Finite, and only exalted above it in degree. Man,
therefore, does not need to raise himself above the
THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 53
world that surrounds him, and above his own actual
nature, that he may enter into communion with the
Deity; he feels himself related to God from the very
outset. No internal change of his mode of thought,
no struggle with his natural impulses and inclinations,
is demanded of him ; on the contrary, all that is in
human nature is legitimate in the sight of God—the
most godlike man is he who cultivates his human powers
most effectually, and religious duty essentially consists
in man’s doing to the glory of God that which is ac-
cording to his own nature. The same stand-point is
evident in the Philosophy of the Greeks, as will be
shown further on ; and, though the philosophers as a
rule, took few of their doctrines direetly from religious
tradition, and were often openly at variance with the
popular faith, still it is clear that the mode of thought
to which the Hellenes had become accustomed in their
religion was not without influence on their scientific
tendencies. It was inevitable that from the naturalistic
religion of Greece there should arise, in the first in-
stance, a naturalistic philosophy.
The Greek religion, furthermore, is distinguished
from other naturalistic religions in that it assigns the
highest place in existence neither to external nature,
mor to the sensuous nature of man, as such, but to hu-
man nature that is beautiful and transfigured by spirit.
Man is not, as in the East, so entirely the slave of
external impressions that he loses his own independence
in the forces of nature, and feels that he is but a
part of mature, irresistibly involved in its vicissitudes.
Neither does he seek his satisfaction in the unbridled
54 INTRODUCTION.
freedom of rude and half-savage races. But, while
living and acting with the full sense of liberty, he con-
siders that the highest exercise of that liberty is to
obey the universal order as the law of his own nature.
Although, therefore, in this religion, Deity is conceived
as similar to man, it is not common human nature that
is ascribed to it. Not only is the outer form of the
gods idealised as the image of the purest beauty, but
their essential nature, especially in the case of the
Hellenic gods proper, is formed by ideals of human
activities. The relation of the Greek to his gods was
therefore free and happy to an extent that we find in no
other nation, because his own nature was reflected and
idealised in them; so that, in contemplating them, he
found himself at once attracted by affinity, and elevated
above the limits of his own existence, without having
to purchase this boon by the pain and trouble of an in-
termal conflict. Thus, the sensuous and natural become
the immediate embodiment of the spiritual; the whole
religion assumes an aesthetic character, religious ideas
take the form of poetry; divine worship and the
object of that worship are made material for art; and
though we are still, speaking generally, on the level of
naturalistic religion, nature is only regarded as the
manifestation of Deity, because of the spirit which re-
veals itself in nature. This idealistic character of the
Greek religion was no doubt of the highest importance
in the origin and formation of Greek philosophy. The
exercise of the imagination, which gives universal
significance to the particulars of sense, is the prepara-
tory stage for the exercise of the intellect which, ab-
THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 55
stracting from the particular as such, seeks for the
general essence and universal causes of phenomena.
While, therefore, the Greek religion was based upon an
ideal and aesthetic view of the world, and encouraged to
the utmost all artistic activity in setting forth this view,
it must have had indirectly a stimulating and emancipa-
ting effect upon thought, and have prepared the way
for the scientific study of things. From a material
point of view, this idealistic tendency of religion was
beneficial principally to Ethics; but from a formal
point of view, the influence of religion extended to all
parts of Philosophy; for Philosophy presupposes and
requires an endeavour to treat the sensible as a manifes-
tation of spirit, and to trace it back to spiritual causes.
Some of the Greek philosophers may possibly have been
too rash in their procedure in that respect ; but this
we shall not at present consider. The more readily we
admit that their doctrines often give us the impression
of a philosophic poem full of bold inventions, rather
than a work of science, the more clearly we shall see
the connection of those doctrines with the artistic
genius of the Greek nation, and with the aesthetic
character of its religion.
But although Greek Philosophy may owe much to
religion, it owes more to the circumstance that its de-
pendence on religion never went so far as to prevent, or
essentially to restrict, the free movement of science.
The Greeks had no hierarchy, and no inviolable dog-
matic code. The sacerdotal functions were not with
them the exclusive property of a class, nor were the priests
the only mediators between the gods and men; but
56 INTRODUCTION.
each individual for himself, and each community for
itself, had a right to offer up sacrifices and prayers. In
Homer, we find kings and chiefs sacrificing for their
subjects, fathers for their families, each person for him-
self, without the intervention of priests. Even at a later
period, when the development of a public cult in temples
gave more importance to the sacerdotal order, the func-
tions of the priests were always limited to certain offer-
ings and ceremonial observances in their particular
localities; prayers and sacrifices were still offered by the
laity, and a whole class of matters relating to religious
ceremonial were left, not to priests, but to public func-
tionaries designated by election, or by lot—in part in
combination with officers of the community or state—
to individuals and heads of families. The priests,
therefore, as a class, could never acquire an influential
position in Greece at all comparable with that which
they enjoyed among the Oriental nations." Priests of
certain temples, it is true, did attain to considerable
importance on account of the oracles connected with
those temples, but, on the whole, the priestly office con-
ferred far more honour than influence; it was a politi-
cal dignity, in respect to which reputation and external
qualifications were more regarded than any particular
mental capability; and Plato * is quite in harmony
* This, by the way, is one of
the most striking arguments against
the hypothesis of any considerable
transmission of cults and myths
into Greece from the East; for
these Oriental cults are so closely
bound up with the hierarchical
system that they could only have
been transmitted in connection with
it. If this had anywhere been the
case, we should find the importance
of the priests become greater the
farther we went backinto antiquity,
whereas in point of fact it is ex-
actly the contrary.
2 Polit. 290 C.
THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 57
priests, in spite of all the honours accorded to them,
merely servants of the commonwealth." But where
there is no hierarchy, a dogmatic code, in the sense of a
general law of faith, is manifestly impossible; for there
are no organs to frame and maintain it. Even in itself,
however, it would have been contrary to the essence of
Greek religion. That religion is not a finished and per-
fected system that had grown up from one particular spot.
The ideas and traditions which the Greek races brought
with them from their original abodes were carried by
each individual tribe, community and family into dif-
ferent surroundings, and subjected to influences of the
most various kinds. Thus, there arose a multiplicity
of local rites and legends; and from these, a common
Hellenic faith gradually developed itself, not by the
systematising of theology, but by a free convergence
of minds; in which convergence the most important
factor, beside the personal intercourse and religious
ceremonies of the national games and festivals, was Art,
and above all, Poetry. This explains the fact, that in
Greece there was never, properly speaking, a system o
religious doctrine generally admitted, but only a myth-
ology; and that the conception of orthodoxy was abso-
lutely unknown. Every one was indeed required to
honour the gods of the State; and those who were
convicted of withholding the prescribed honours, or of
trying to overthrow the religion of the State, were |
often visited with the severest punishments. But i
\º the spirit of his country when he makes the
* Cf. Hermann. Lehrbuch der 44 sq. for more detailed proofs of
Griech. Antiquitäten, ii. 158 sqq., the above statements.
58 -- INTRODUCTION.
though Philosophy itself was thus hardly dealt with,
in the person of some of its representatives, on the
whole, the relation of individuals to the faith of the
community was far freer than among nations who
possessed a definite confession of faith guarded by
a powerful priesthood. The severity of the Greeks
_x-against religious innovation had immediate reference
not to doctrines, but to cult; only so far as a doctrine
seemed to involve consequences prejudicial to public
worship did it become the object of attack. As to
theological opinions, properly so called, they were left
unmolested. The Greek religion possessed neither a
body of theological doctrine nor written sacred records.
It was founded entirely upon traditions respecting
the temples, descriptions of the poets, and notions of
the people: moreover, there was scarcely any tradition
which was not contradicted by others, and in that way .
lost much of its authority. Thus, in Greece, faith was
too indefinite and elastic in its form to admit of its
exercising upon reason either an internal supremacy,
or an external restraint, to the extent that we find to
have been the case in other countries.
This free attitude of Greek science in respect to
religion was full of important results, as will be evi-
dent if we consider what would have become of Greek
Philosophy, and indirectly of our own, without this
freedom. All the historical analogies that we can adduce
will give us but one answer; namely, that the Greeks
would them have been as little able as the Oriental na-
tions to attain an independent philosophic science.
The speculative impulse might indeed have been awake,
THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS. 59
but, jealously watched as it would have been by theology,
internally cramped by religious presuppositions, and
shackled in its free movement, thought could scarcely
have produced anything more than a religious specula-
tion akin to the ancient theologic cosmologies; and
even supposing that at a much later period it had
turned to other questions, it could never have had the
acuteness, freshness, and freedom by which the Philo-
sophy of Greece became the teacher of all the ages.
The Hindoos were the most speculative nation of the
East, and their civilisation was of the highest antiquity,
yet how greatly inferior were they, as regards philoso-
phic achievement, to the Greeks' The same must be
said of the Christian and Mohammedan Philosophy in
the Middle Ages, though this had the advantage of being
preceded by the Greek. In both eases, the principal
cause of the inferiority manifestly lay in the depen-
dence of science upon positive dogmas; and the Greeks
are to be considered as singularly fortunate in having
escaped this dependence through the force of their
peculiar genius, and the favourable course of their his-
torical development.
It has been usually supposed that between Philo-
sophy and the religion of the mysteries a closer bond
exists. In the mysteries, according to this view, a
purer, or at any rate a more speculative, theology was
imparted to the initiated ; and, by means of the mys-
teries, the secret doctrines of Eastern priests were trans-
mitted to the Greek philosophers, and through them to
the Greek people in general. But this theory has no
better foundation than the one we have just been dis-
60 INTRODUCTION.
\
\
-\
cussing in regard to Oriental Science. It is proved
beyond a doubt, by the most recent and thorough
investigations' of the subject, that originally no philo-
sophic doctrines were conveyed in these religious cere-
monies; and that at a later period, when such doctrines
began to be connected with the mysteries, this occurred
under the influence of scientific researches. Philosophy,
therefore, should be regarded rather as having imparted
wisdom to the mysteries than as having received it from
them. The mysteries were originally, as we have every
reason to believe, ritualistic Solemnities, which, in their
religious import and character, differed nothing from
the public worship of the gods, and were only carried on
in secret because they were designed for some particular
community, sex, or class, to the exclusion of any other,
or because the nature of the divinities to whom they
were sacred demanded this form of cult. The first, for
example, applies to the mysteries of the Idaean Zeus and
the Argive Here, the second to the Eleusinian mysteries,
and especially to the secret rites of the Chthonian
deities. Mysteries first appeared in a certain opposition
to public religion, partly because elder cults and forms
of worship which had gradually disappeared from the
one were maintained in the other, and partly because
foreign rites like those of the Thracian Dionysus and
* Among which the following
have been chiefly consulted: Lo-
beck's fundamental work (Aglao-
phamus, 1829), and the short but
thorough exposition of Hermann
(Griech. Antiq. ii. 149 sqq.), espe-
cially Preller's Demeter und Per-
Sephone, as well as his investiga-
tions in Pauly's Real-Encyklopædie
der Klass. Alterth. (under the
headings Mythologie, Mysteria,
Eleusinia, Orpheus); lastly, the
Griechische Mythologie of the same
author. On the mysteries in
general, cf. also Hegel's Phil. der
Geschichte, 301 sq.; AEsthetik, ii.
57 sq.; Phil. der Rel. ii. 150 sqq.
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 61
the Phrygian Cybele were introduced as private cult-º-
under the form of mysteries, and blended themselves, in
course of time, more or less with the ancient secret
rites. But in neither case can the mysteries have com-
tained philosophic theorems, or doctrines of a purer
theology essentially transcending the popular faith."
This is sufficiently proved by the circumstance that the --~~~~
mysteries most frequently celebrated were accessible * {
all the Greeks. For even had the priests possessed any
higher wisdom, how could they have imparted it to
such a mixed multitude 2 And what are we to think of
a secret philosophic doctrine into which a whole nation
could be initiated without a long course of previous in-
struction, and without having its faith shaken in the
traditional mythology? Speaking generally, it is not at
all in keeping with the habits of the ancients to take
advantage of ceremonial observances for the purpose of
instructing the people by means of religious discourses.
A Julian might make the attempt in imitation of
Christian customs; but in classical times there is not a
single instance of it, nor does any trustworthy witness
ever assert that the mysteries were designed for the in-
struction of those who took part in them. Their parti-
cular end appears far more in those sacred rites, the
witnessing of which was the privilege of the initiated
(Epoptae); whatever oral communication was combined
with these ceremonies seems to have been restricted to
short liturgical formulae, directions for the performance
of the holy rites, and sacred traditions (ispo, Aéryot), like

* As Lobeck, loc. cit. i. 6 sqq., which distinguishes him, expresses
has exhaustively shown. * Leibniz, himself to the same effect in the
with the sound historical judgment Preface to the Theodicee, section 2.
62 INTRODUCTION.
those which were elsewhere commected with particular
acts of worship; tales about the founding of cults and
holy places, about the names, origin, and history of the
gods to whom this worship was sacred; in a word, my-
thological explanations of the cult given by the priests,
or even by laymen, to those who asked for them. These
liturgical and mythological elements were afterwards
made use of to combine philosophical and theological
doctrines with the mysteries, but that such was the case
from the beginning is a theory without foundation.
There is no trustworthy authority for it, and on general
grounds it is unlikely that the mythopoeic imagination
should ever have been dominated by philosophic points
of view; or that at a later period there should have been
introduced into mystic usages and traditions ideas and
hypotheses which the scientific reflection of the Greeks
had not as yet attained. In course of time, indeed, with
the deepening of the moral consciousness, the mysteries
gradually acquired a higher signification. When the
school of the Orphics, whose doctrines from the first
are parallel to Greek Philosophy," was founded in the
* The first certain trace of the of the Homeric poems) published,
Orphic writings, and of the Or-
phico-Dionysiac consecrations, is
to be found in the well-attested
statement (vide Lobeck, loc cit i.
331 sqq., 397 sqq., 692 sqq.; cf. Ger-
hard, Ueber Orpheus und die Or-
phiker, Abhandlungen der Berl.
Acad. 1861; Hist. Phil. Kl. p. 22,
75; Schuster, De vet. Orphica
theogoniae indole, 1869, p. 46 sqq.)
that Onomacritus (who resided at
the court of Pisistratus and his
sons, and with two or three other
persons, undertook the collection
under the names of Orpheus and
Musaeus, oracular sayings and
hymns (TeAeral) which he had
himself composed. This forgery
falls somewhere between 540 and
520 B.C. It is probable, however,
not only that Orphic hymns and
oracles had been in circulation pre-
viously to this, but that the union
of the Dionysiac mysteries with
the Orphic poetry had long ago
been accomplished. Two or three
generations later, the names of the
Orphics and Bacchics were used
THE RELIGION
63
OF THE MYSTERIES.
century before Christ, or even earlier, the in-
fluence of the philosophers upon this mystic theology
seems to have been far greater than the reaction of the
theologians upon Philosophy; and the more we con-
sider particular detail, the more doubtful it becomes
whether on the whole Philosophy ever borrowed any-
thing considerable from the mysteries or mystic doc-
trimes.
There are two points especially, in regard to which
the mysteries are supposed to have exercised an im-
portant influence on Philosophy: these are Monotheism
and the hope of a future life.
A speculative interpre-
tation has also been given to some other doctrines, but
they appear to contain nothing beyond the common
by Herodotus (ii. 81) as identical,
and Philolaus appeals in support
of the doctrine of transmigration
(vide infra, Pythag.) to the utter-
ances of the ancient theologians and
soothsayers, by whom we must
chiefly understand Orpheus and
the other founders of the Orphic
mysteries. Aristotle's testimony
certainly cannot be adduced in
favour of the higher antiquity of
the Orphic theology. Philoponus
indeed observes (De an. F, 5, in re-
ference to a passage from Aristotle,
De an, i. 5, 410, b. 28) that Aris-
totle, speaking of the Orphic poems,
says the poems ‘called Orphic–
&reið, whºokei’Oppéos éival tă ărm,
&s kal airbs év Tots trepl pix00 o'blas
Aéyet attoº uév ydp eiori Tà 56Y.-
para raúra öé pmoliv (for which
we ought, most likely, to read
qaolv) 5voua kpefrtov čvéreaſe kata-
reſvai (read 'Ovopadkpitov čv šarea,
karaðerval). But the words attoo
pºv yiſp eigi rā 56Yuara show by
their form that they are not a quo-
tation from Aristotle, but a remark
of Philoponus; and he is probably
only repeating a Neo-Platonic ex-
pedient, by which the Aristotelian
criticism of the Orphic poems was
to be rendered harmless; that
Aristotle never so expressed him-
self is clear, from the passage in
Cicero, N. D. i. 38, 107, which pro-
bably refers to the same writing of
Aristotle: Orpheum Poétam docet
Aristoteles nunquam fuisse. The
Orphic theogony is not ascribed to
Onomacritus; other Orphic wri-
tings are said to have been com-
posed by Cercops, the Pythagorean
Brontinus, Zopyrus of Heraclea
(the same who worked with Ono-
macritus at the edition of Homer),
Prodicus of Samos, and others.
(Suidas, 'Opp. Clemens, Strom. i.
333 A : cf. Schuster loc. cit. and
p. 55 sq. For further remarks
vide infra.)
(34 INTRODUCTION.
and ordinary thoughts of all mankind." Even, however,
in these two cases, the influence seems neither so
certain nor so considerable as has commonly been
believed. In regard to the unity of God, the theistic
conception proper is as little to be found in the mystic
as in the popular theology. It is impossible to imagine
how the unity of God in the Jewish or Christian sense 2
could be inculcated at the feasts of the Eleusinian
deities, or of the Cabiri, or of Dionysus. It is a
different matter, certainly, in respect to the pantheism
which appears in a fragment of the Orphic theogony,”
where Zeus is described as the beginning, middle, and
end of all things, the root of the earth and sky, the
substance and essence of air and of fire, the sun and
moon, male and female; where the sky is called his
head, the Sun and moon are his eyes, the air is his
breast, the earth his body, the lower world his foot,
the aether his infallible, royal, omniscient reason. Such
a pantheism was not incompatible with polytheism,
a soil which the mysteries never quitted. As the
gods of polytheism were in truth only the various
For example, the mythus of
the slaying of Zagreus by the Titans
(forfurther details cf. Lobeck, i. 615
sqq.), to which the Neo-Platonists,
and before them even the Stoics,
had given a philosophic interpreta-
tion, but which in its original
meaning was probably only a
rather crude variation of the
well-worn theme of the death of
Nature in winter, with which the
thought of the decay of youth and
its beauty was connected. This
myth had no influence on the ear-
lier philosophy, even if we suppose
Empedocles to have made allusion
to it—v. 70 (142).
* We find the unity of God in
this sense affirmed in so-called
Orphic fragments (Orphica, ed.
Hermann, Fr. 1–3), of which some
were probably, and others certainly,
composed or altered by Alexan-
drian Jews.
* Wide Lobeck, p. 520 sqq.;
and Hermann, Fr. 6. Similarly the
fragment from the Ata.0%ikai (in
Lobeck, p. 440; in Hermann, Fr. 4)
was eſs Zets, eſs 'Atºms, eſs “HAtos,
e’s Atóvvoros, eſs 6ebs év trøvreorgi,
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 65
parts and forces of the world, the different spheres of
mature and of human life, it is natural that the rela-
tions of these spheres among themselves, and the
preponderance of one of them over others, should in
time be brought to light; and, therefore, in all highly
developed naturalistic religions, we see that kindred
deities become blended together, and the whole poly-
theistic Olympus is resolved into the general concep-
tion of an all-embracing divine essence (6sſov). But
the Greek religion, because of its plastic character, is
just one of those which most resists this fusion of T
definite forms of deity. In Greece, consequently, the
idea of the divine unity was arrived at less by way of
syncretism than of criticism; not by blending the
many gods into one, but by combating the principle of
polytheism. The Stoics and their successors were the
first who sought to reconcile polytheism with their
philosophic pantheism, by giving a syncretic interpreta-
tion to polytheism; the older pantheism of Xenophanes
was, on the contrary, bitterly and openly hostile to the
doctrine of the plurality of gods. The pantheism of
the Orphic poems, in the form above described, is
probably much later than the first beginnings of Orphic
literature. The Ala8%kat are certainly not anterior to
the Alexandrian Syncretism ; nor can the passage re-
specting the theogony, as it now stands, date from the
time of Onomacritus, to which Lobeck' assigns the
greater part of the poem. For this passage was in
close connection with the story of Phanes-Ericapaus,
devoured by Zeus. Zeus includes all things in
* Loc. cit, 611.
WOL. I. F
66 INTRODUCTION.
himself, because he swallowed the already created
world, or Phanes, that he might then produce all
things from himself. We shall presently show that
the swallowing of Phanes' originally formed no part
of the Orphic theogony. We must, therefore, in all
cases distinguish the original text of the Orphic passage
from the modifications it may afterwards have under-
gone. As part of the original text we may apparently
claim the verse so frequently quoted,” and which is
probably referred to by Plato:*
Zets kepakh, Zets pºéarga, Atos 6’ x travra rérvictat.”
The idea in this verse, however, and other similar ideas
to be found in those portions of the Orphic writings
supposed to be ancient, contain nothing essentially in
advance of a conception familiar to Greek religion, and
the gist of which was already expressed by Homer when
he calls Zeus the Father of gods and men.” The unity
of the divine element which polytheism itself recog-
nises, was made concrete in Zeus as king of the gods;
and so far, all that exists and all that happens is ulti-
mately referred to Zeus. This idea may perhaps be
expressed by calling Zeus the beginning, middle, and
end of all things; but the expression certainly does not
* In the enquiry into the Or- the circumstance that the words
phic cosmogony, infra.
* Ap. Proclus in Timaeus, 95 F,
and the Platonic scholiast, p. 451,
Bekk.
* Laws, iv. 715 E. Further
references as to the employment of
this verse by the Stoics, Platonists,
Neo-Pythagoreans and others, are
given by Lobeck, p. 529 sq.
* This theory is supported by
quoted from Orpheus by Proclus
in Timaeus, 310 D; Plat. Theol. 17,
8, p. 363: rö 8& Airm troAirolvos
&petrero, coincide with the Pla-
tonic passage. Afrn is also called
troAirolvos in Parmenides. W. 14.
* Cf. also Terpander (about
650 P. c.), Fr. 4: Zeß révrov &pxà
wdivºreov &yſtwp.
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES 67
imply that Zeus is himself the ideal complex(Inbegriff)
of all things." There is consequently no evidence that
the standpoint of the religious motion, which conceives
the gods as personal beings, side by side with the world,
has here been exchanged for that of philosophic specu-
lation, which regards them as representing the general
essence of the universe.
The case is somewhat different in regard to the
second point in question, belief in immortality. The
doctrine of metempsychosis seems really to have passed
from the theology of the mysteries into Philosophy.
Even this doctrine, however, was in all probability
originally connected, not with all, but only with the
Bacchic and Orphic mysteries. Those of Eleusis, being
sacred to the Chthonian divinities, were regårded as
specially important in their influence upon man's future-
life. The Homeric hymn to Demeter already speaks of
the great difference in the other world between the lots
of the initiated and uninitiated; * and there are later
eulogies of these mysteries, from which it is clear that
they guaranteed happiness not only in this life, but in
the life to come.” There is nothing here, however, to
imply that the souls of the initiated are to come to life
again, or that they are immortal in any other sense
than was admitted by the ordinary faith of the Greeks.
i Even monotheism allows ex- 5x8wos, Šs rā6’ browev čwux8ovíov
pressions such as é; attoo ral &v6pótrov"
Ši' airoi, kal eis airov rà tróvra s 6 &rexhs iepāv, bs t” upopos,
(Romans, xi. 36)—év airé ºpew oštro8° àpoinv
ral kivočueða kal équév (Apg. aioav exel, półkeyás rep, Širo (694,
17, 28), without meaning by them eūpāevrt.
_{*
that the Finite is actually merged * Cf. the references in Lobeck
in Deity. i. 69 sqq. p
* v. 480 sqq.
F 2
68 INTRODUCTION.
In this world wealth and fruitful fields' were expected
from Demeter and her daughters in return for worship
rendered to them; and in a similar manner, after death,
the partakers of the mysteries were assured that they
should dwell in Hades, in closest proximity to the di-
vinities they had honoured, while the uninitiated were
threatened with being cast into a marsh.” If these
rude notions, at a later period, and among the more
educated, received a spiritual interpretation,” there is
no reason to suppose that this was so originally, or
that the initiated were promised anything in the
future except the favour of the infernal gods; the
popular opinions about Hades remained quite un-
affected by them. Even Pindar's celebrated utterances
carry us no farther. For in saying that the partakers
of the Eleusinian mysteries know the beginning and
end of their life,” he does not assert the doctrine of
transmigration,” and though in other passages this
doctrine is undoubtedly brought forward,” it is still
* Hymn to Ceres, 486 sqq.
* Aristides, Eleusin. p. 421 Dind.
The same is asserted of the Diony-
sian mysteries (to which perhaps
this beliefitselfmay originally have
been peculiar) in Aristophanes,
Frogs, 145 sqq.; Plato, Phaedo, 69
C; Gorgias, 493 A.; Republic, ii.
363 C; cf. Diog. vi. 4.
* Thus Plato in the Phaedo and
Gorgias, and, in a lesser degree,
śs. in the words (in Plu-
tarch, aud. poèt. c. 4, p. 21 F):
às TptoróA8tol
keºvot 3porów, of taota belx0évres
TéAm
poxodor és "öov' rota 86 yap pièvous
exe?
(fiv Čorri, toſs 3’ &AAotori rāvr' éke?
rakó.
* Thren. Fr. 8 (114 Bergk):
5A310s, 80 ris ióðy keºv' eio' into
x0óv’ olós uév 8tov rexevrév, oičev
6& Stöoróorov apxºv.
* For the words can only pro-
perly mean that he who has re-
ceived the consecration regards
life as a gift of God, and death as
the transition to a happier state.
Preller's explanation (Demeter und
Persephone, p. 236) seems to me less
natural.
° Ol. ii. 68 sqq. Thren. Fr. 4,
and infra, p. 70, note 4.
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES.
69
questionable whether the poet borrowed it from the
Eleusinian theology; and even if he did apply the
Eleusinian myths and symbols in this sense, it would not
certainly follow that such was their original meaning."
In the Qrphie theology, on the contrary, transmigra-
tion is clearly to be found, and the probabilities a.I'ê
very strongly against its having come there through
the medium of the philosophers.
Several writers
mention Pherecydes as the first who taught immor-
tality,” or more precisely, transmigration;” but the
testimony of Cicero and other later authors is not suffi-
cient, in the absence of older evidence,” to prove this
statement.
Even if we admit the probability that
Pherecydes spoke of transmigration, the assertion of his
having been the first to do so rests only cn the fact
that no previous writings are known to contain that
* The revival of dead nature
in the spring was considered in the
cult of Demeter as the return of
souls from the under world, and
harvest was looked upon as the
descent of the souls thither (vide
Preller, Dem. und Pers. 228 sqq.;
Griech. Mythologie, i. 254,483); and
this does not apply solely to the
souls of plants, to which it prima-
rily relates, but to the souls of
men. At these seasons also de-
parted spirits appear in the upper
world. It was easy to interpret
these notions as in plying the en-
trance of human souls into the
visible world from the invisible,
and their return into the invisible
again. Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 70 C:
trañaiās uèv of v čari ris Aóryos, . .
às eiolv [ai puxal] v0évôe dºpt-
káueva èket ſcal r&Aw ye āeºpo
dqukvoúvrai kal yºyvoviral ék Töv
Teóved tww.
* Cie. Tusc. i. 16, 38, and after
him Lactantius, Instit. vii. 7, 8.
Augustin c. Acad. iii. 37 (17), Epist.
137, p. 407, B. Mawr.
* Suidas; $epekööms; Hesychius,
De his qui erud. clar. p. 56, Orelli;
Tatian c. Graec. c. 3, 25, according
to the obvious correction in the
edition of Maurus. Cf. Porphyry,
Antr. Nymph. c. 31. Preller also
(Rhein. Mus. iv. 388) refers with
some appearance of probability
what is quoted by Origen (c. Cels.
vi. p. 304) from Pherecydes, and
Themist. Or. ii. 38, a, to the doc-
trine of Transmigration.
* Cf. Aristoxenus, Duris and
Hermippus-—so far as they have
been quoted in Diog. i. 116 sqq.
and viii. 1 sqq.
70 INTRODUCTION.
doctrine. Still more uncertain is the theory' that
Pythagoras was the first to introduce it. Heracleitus
clearly presupposes this; Philolaus expressly appeals to
the ancient theologians and soothsayers” for the theory
that souls were fettered to the body, and as it were
buried in it, as a punishment. Plate*-derives the same
theory from the mysteries, and more particularly from
the Orphic mysteries; and Pindar teaches that certain
favourites of the gods are to be permitted to return
to the upper world, and that those who thrice have
led a blameless life will be sent to the islands of
the blest in the kingdom of Cromos.” In this last
representation, we perceive an alteration in the doc-
trime; for whereas the return to corporeal life is else-
* Maximus Tyr. xvi. 2; Dio-
genes, viii. 14; Porph. v.; Pyth.
19.
* Ap. Clemens, Strom. iii. 433
A, and previously ap. Cicero, Hor-
tens. Fr. 85 (iv. 6, 483 Or.) This
passage, as well as others from
Plato, will be quoted at length in
the section on the Pythagorean
Metempsychosis, infra.
* Phaedo, 62 B; Crat. 400 B.
Cf. Phaedo, 69 C, 70 C ; Laws, ix.
870 D; and Lobeck, Aglaoph. ii.
795 sqq.
* Pindar's eschatology follows
no fixed type (cf. Preller's Demeter
wnd Persephone, p. 239), while, in
many places, he adopts the usual
notions about Hades, in Thren. 2
it is said that after the death of
the body, the soul, which alone
springs from the gods, remains
alive; and in two places transmi-
gration is alluded to, viz. in Thren.
Fr. 4 (110), quoted by Plato, Meno,
81 B :
oia i ö& pepae póva wolvåv traxalog
wrév}eos
6éčeral, és Töv širepòey &Atov keſvov
évárq àrei
&völöof juxāv ráxiv,
ék Töv Baat?, fies & Yavol Ical orbével
xpatrvol oroq tº piéytotot
&vöpes aiſſour” is 5& Töv Aoirov
xpóvov #pares àyvoi ºpos &v6pówww.
Raxeovral.
And Ol. ii. 68, after mention of the
rewards and punishments in Hades
ãoroi 3’ &róxuaoravčarpts
êicatépetl usivayres àrà réutraw
&öſcov čxeiv
$vxdv, *relaav Atôs 66bv trapū Kpóvov
Túparty évêa wakópov
vāoos, [vāorov) &keavíðes aſſpai wept-
*Peel O'ly.
Thren. Fr. 3 (109), where the
wicked have the lower world, and
the righteous, heaven, assigned as
their dwelling-place, cannot be ac-
cepted as genuine.
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 71
where always regarded as a punishment and a means
of improvement, in Pindar it appears as a privilege
accorded only to the best, giving them an opportunity
of earning higher happiness in the islands of the blest,
instead of the inferior happiness of Hades. But this
use of the . doctrine presupposes the doctrine itself, and
according to the quotations from Plato and Philolaus,
we must assume that Pindar derived it from the Orphic
mysteries. It is certainly conceivable that it might
still have reached the mysteries through Pythagoreism,
which must early have been connected with the Orphic
cult." But the most ancient testimonies, and the Py-
thagoreans themselves, refer it solely to the mysteries;
and it is besides very doubtful whether the Pythagorean
doctrines could have been prevalent in Thebes, in the
time of Pindar,” whereas that city is, on the other hand,
known to have been an ancient seat of the Bacchic and
Orphic religion. Lastly, the doctrine of metempsychosis
is ascribed to Pherecydes, and regarded as anterior to
Pythagoras, not only by the writers we have quoted,
but indirectly by all those who make Pherecydes the
teacher of Pythagoras. * We have, therefore, every
reason to believe that it was taught in the omni.”
mysteries prior to the date of Pythagoras. According
to Herodotus, the Orphics obtained it from Egypt:*
* A number of Orphic writings * On which vide infra, Pytha-
are said to have been invented by goras and the Pythagoreans.
the Pythagoreans; vide Lobeck, * ii. 123: trpárov 68 ka, toirov
Aglaoph. i. 347 sqq., and supra, Tov A6)ow Aiyêtriot eign of eiróvres,
p. 62, note. &s &v0pórov puxh &6ávatós éoti,
2 Cf. what will hereafter be roo odºuaros 3& karap6tvovtos és
said in the history of the Pythago- &AAo (§ow aiel yivöuevov Čačeral'
rean philosophy, of the propagation étéâu & trepiéA6m révra tº xepoaſa
of that philosophy. . kal 1& 6axárqua kal treretvá, airis
72 INTRODUCTION.
but this theory either rests upon a mere conjecture
of his own, or a still more untrustworthy statement of
the Egyptian priests; as historical evidence, it is of
no value whatever. As to the real state of the case,
history tells us nothing, and no guess that we can
make even approximates to certainty. It is possible
that Herodotus may be right in the main, and that
the belief in transmigration was really transplanted
from Egypt into Greece, either directly, or through
certain intermediaries which cannot precisely be de-
termined. But in that case, we can scarcely agree with
him in supposing the Greeks to have become acquainted
with it in the first beginnings of their culture, still less
can we connect this acquaintanceship with the mythical
personalities of Cadmus and Melampus : the most pro-
bable assumption would then be, that the doctrine had
been introduced into Greece not very long before the
date when we first meet with it in Greek writings—
perhaps, therefore, about the seventeenth century.
But it is also conceivable that this belief, the affinity
of which with Hindoo and Egyptian doctrines indicates
an Eastern source, may have originally immigrated
from the East with the Greeks themselves, and have
been at first confined to a narrow circle, becoming after-
wards more important and more widely diffused. It
és àv0p6trov géºpia yuáuevov čaršūvetv.
Thy repuſix vow 8% airfi yívea 6at év
ºrptorxtAfolat reori, roëtq rô A6-yº
eior of ‘EAA#vov čxpñoravro, oi wºv
mpérepov of 8* iſotepov, &s iótº
éovräv čávri Tôv éyò eiðds r&
oùvápara oi Ypápo. Cf. c. 81 :
rotori 'Oppikolai kaxeoplevotori kal
Bakxukoſal, oùor 5* Aiyvirtíotai.
Herodotus thought (according to
ch. 49) that Melampus had intro-
duced the cult of Dionysus, which
he had learned from Cadmus and
his followers, into Greece ; but, on
the other hand, in C. 53, he inti-
mates that he considers the Orphic
poems more recent than Homer
and Hesiod.
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 73
might be urged, in support of this view, that similar
notions have been found among races which never in
any way came under Egyptian influence." Nor can we
altogether dispute the possibility of different nations,
without any historical connection, having arrived at
the same opinions concerning a future state. Even so
strange a theory as transmigration seems to us may
thus have been reached in several cases independently
one of the other. For if the natural desire to escape
death engenders a universal belief in immortality, a
bolder fancy, in nations not yet capable of spiritual ab-
straction, might well shape this desire and belief into
the hope and expectation of a return to earthly life.”
* According to Herodotus, iv.
94 sq., the Thracian Getae believed
that the dead came to the god Zal-
moxis or Gebeleizin; and every
five years they sent a messenger to
this god by means of a special hu-
man sacrifice, entrusted with com-
munications to their departed
friends. That the theory of trans-
migration was involved in this
cannot be deduced from the state-
ment of the Greeks of the Helles-
pont, that Zalmoxis was a scholar
of Pythagoras, who had taught the
belief in immortality to the Thra-
cians. Herodotus says that it was
the custom of another Thracian
tribe (Her. v. 4) to bewail the
newly born, and to praise the dead
as happy; because the former are
about to encounter the ills of life,
while the latter have escaped from
them. But this custom proves
even less than the other in regard to
metempsychosis. The Gauls, how-
ever, are said to have believed, not
only in immortality, but also in
transmigration: Caesar, B. Gall. vi.
14, in primis hoc volunt persuadere
(Druides) non interire animas, sed
aſ aliis post mortem transire ad
alios. Diodor. v. 28, sub fin. : éviorxãet
ºyàp trap' &üroſs 6 IIv6ayópov A6-yos,
§ti rās puxās róv &v0p6trov &6a-
várous elval orvuòé8mke kal 6t’ érów
&ptop, #vov tróxiv 8toov, eis repov
orópa rās bux?s eigõvouévns. On
this account many persons, adds Dio-
dorus, place letters to their friends
on the funeral pile. So Ammian.
Marc. xv. 9, sub fin.
* If the soul is conceived as a
breath-like essence which dwells in
the body, and leaves it after death
according to the opinion of the
ancients, and especially of the
Greeks, the question inevitably
arises whence this essence comes,
and whither it goes. For answer
to this question, a child-like imagi-
nation is most easily satisfied with
the simple notion that there is a
place, invisible to us, in which the
departed souls remain, and from
which the newly born come forth.
And we do, in fact, find in many
74 INTRODUCTION.
However this may be, it appears certain, that
among the Greeks the doctrine of transmigration came
not from the philosophers to the priests, but from the
priests to the philosophers. Meantime it is a question
whether its philosophic importance in antiquity was
very great. It is found, indeed, with Pythagoras and
his school, and Empedocles is in this respect allied with
them; a higher life after death is also spoken of by
Heracleitus. But none of these philosophers brought
the doctrine into such a connection with their scientific
theories as to make it an essential constituent of their
philosophic system: it stands with them all for a self-
dependent dogma side by side with their scientific
theory, in which no lacuna would be discoverable if it
were removed. A philosophic basis was first given to
the belief in immortality by Plato; and it would be
hard to maintain that he would not have arrived at it
without the assistance of the myths which he employed
for its exposition.
From all that has now been said, it would appear
that Greek Philosophy in regard to its origin was no
more indebted to the religion of the mysteries than to
the public religion. The views of nature which were
contained in the mysteries may have given an impulse
to thought ; the idea that all men need religious con-
secration and purification may have led to deeper study
of the moral nature and character of man; but as
different nations, not merely the this there is but a step to the
belief in a kingdom of the dead, theory that the same souls which
but the idea that souls return to previously inhabited a body should
the body from the lower regions of afterwards enter another body.
the earth or from heaven. From
THE RELIGION OF THE MYSTERIES. 75
Scientific instruction was not originally contemplated
in the tales and practices of the mystic cult, any
philosophic exposition of these presupposed that the
expositor had already attained the philosophic stand-
point; and as the mysteries were after all only made
up of general perceptions and experiences accessible to
everyone, a hundred other things could really perform
for Philosophy the same service that they did. Philo-
sophy did not require the myth of Kore and Demeter
to reveal the alteriation of matural conditions, the
passage from death to life and from life to death; daily
observation sufficed for the acquisition of this know-
ledge. The necessity of moral purity, and the advan-
tages of piety and virtue, needed not to be proclaimed
by the glowing descriptions of the priests concerning
the happiness of the initiated and the misery of the
profane. These conceptions were immediately con-
tained in the moral consciousness of the Greeks.
Nevertheless, the mysteries were by no means without
importance in regard to Philosophy, as the results of
our enquiry have shown. But their importance is not
So great, nor their influence so direct, as has often been
imagined.
§ III.-The Nulive Sources of Greek Philosophy continued.
MORAL LIFE, CIVIL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS.
THE ideality of the Greek religion finds its counter-
part in the freedom and beauty of Greek life; it is
impossible to regard either of these characteristics,
strictly speaking, as the ground or consequence of the
76 INTRODUCTION.
other; they grew up side by side, mutually requiring
and sustaining one another, out of the same matural
temperament and under the same favourable conditions.
As the Greek reverenced in his gods the natural and
moral order of the world, without therefore renouncing
in regard to them his own value and freedom, so Greek
morality stands in a happy mean between the lawless
license of barbarous and semi-barbarous races and the
slavish obedience which subjects the peoples of the
East to the will of another and to a temporal and
spiritual despotism. A strong feeling of liberty, and
at the same time a rare susceptibility to measure, form,
and order; a lively sense of community in existence
and action ; a social impulse which made it an absolute
necessity for the individual to ally himself to others,
to subordinate himself to the common will, to follow
the tradition of his family and his country—these
qualities, so essential in the Hellenes, produced in the
limited area of the Greek states a full, free and
harmonious life, such as no other nation of antiquity
can exhibit. The very narrowness of the sphere in
which their moral perceptions moved was in itself
favourable to this result. As the individual knew that
he was free and had a right to protection only as being
a citizen of this or that state, and as, in the same way,
his relation to others was determined by their relation
to the state to which he belonged, every one from the
beginning had his problem clearly marked out for him.
The maintaining and extension of his civil importance,
the fulfilment of his civil duties, work for the freedom
and greatness of his people, obedience to the laws,
GREEK POLITICAL LIFE, 77
these constituted the simple end which the Greek
definitely proposed to himself, and in the pursuit of
which he was all the less disturbed because his glances
and endeavours seldom strayed beyond the limits of
his home, because he excluded the idea of seeking the
rule of his actions elsewhere than in the laws and
customs of his state, because he dispensed with all the
reflections by which the man of modern times labours
to reconcile, on the one side, his individual interests
and matural rights with the interest and laws of the
commonwealth, and, on the other, his patriotism with
the claims of a cosmopolitan morality and religion.
We cannot, indeed, regard this narrow conception of
moral problems as the highest possible conception, nor
can we conceal from ourselves how closely the dismem-
berment of Greece, the consuming disquiet of its civil
wars and party struggles, not to speak of slavery and
the neglect of female education, were connected with
this narrowness; but our eyes must not therefore be
closed to the fact that on this soil and from these
presuppositions a freedom and culture arose which
give to the Greeks their unique place in history. It is \
easy also to see how deeply and essentially Philosophy
was rooted in the freedom and order of the Greek state.
There was not, indeed, any immediate commection be- }
tween them. Philosophy in Greece was always the!
private concern of individuals, states only troubled, º
themselves about it in so far as they interfered with
all doctrines morally and politically dangerous; it
received no positive encouragement or support from
cities and princes until a late period, when it had long

78 INTRODUCTION.
passed beyond the highest point of its development.
Nor was public education concerned with philosophy,
or science of any kind. At Athens, even in the time
of Pericles, it scarcely included the first rudiments of
what we should call scientific culture; nothing was
attempted beyond reading, writing, and a certain
amount of arithmetic: history, mathematics, physics,
the study of foreign languages, and so forth, were
altogether ignored. The philosophers themselves, and
especially the Sophists, were the first to induce certain
individuals to seek for wider instruction, which, how-
ever, was even then restricted almost exclusively to
rhetoric. Besides the above-mentioned elementary
arts, ordinary education consisted entirely of music and
gymnastics; and music was primarily concerned, not
so much with intellectual training as with proficiency
in the Homeric and Hesiodic poems, and the popular
songs, singing, playing on stringed instruments, and
dancing. But this education formed complete and
vigorous men, and the subsequent discipline of public
life engendered such self-confidence, demanded such
an exercise of all the powers, such acute observation
and intelligent judgment of persons and circumstances,
above all, such energy and worldly prudence, as must
necessarily have borne important fruit to science when-
ever the scientific need arose. That it could not fail
to arise was certain; for in the harmonious many-
sidedness of the Greek character, the development of
moral and political reflection called forth a correspond-
ing and natural development of speculative thought ;
and not a few of the Greek cities had attained, by
GREEK EDUCATION. 79
means of civil liberty, a degree of prosperity which
ensured leisure for scientific activity to some at least
of their citizens. Although, therefore, in ancient times,
the political life and education of the Greeks had
no direct concern with Philosophy; and although,
on the other hand, the earliest Philosophy, as a rule,
neglected ethical and political questions, yet the train-
ing of men and the fact that circumstances took the
form required for the production of Philosophy were
important elements in its history. Freedom and
severity of thought were the matural fruits of a free
and law-directed life; and the sound and sterling
characters which grew up on the classic soil of Greece
could not fail, even in science, to adopt their standpoint
with decision, and to maintain it clearly and definitely,
with full and unwavering purpose."
Lastly, it was one of the chief excellences of Greek
education that it did not split up human nature, but,
by the even development of all the powers of man,
songht to make of him a beautiful whole, a moral work—f-
of art. This trait we may venture to connect with the
fact that Greek science, especially in its commencement,
chose the path that is indeed generally taken by thought
in its infancy—the path downward from above; that it
did not form a theory of the whole from the aggrega-
1 This intimate connection of
†† with philosophy is strik-
ingly shown by the fact that many
of the ancient philosophers were
distinguished as statesmen, legis-
lators, political reformers and
generals. The political activity of
Thales and of the Pythagoreans is
well known. We are told that
Parmenides gave laws to his native
city, and that Zeno perished in his
attempt to free his countrymen.
Empedocles restored democracy in
Agrigentum; Archytas was no less
great as a general than as a states-
man ; and Melissus is probably
the same person who vanquished
the Athenian fleet.
80 INTRODUCTION,
tion of individuals, but sought to gain a standard for
the individual from the study of the whole, and at once
to shape a collective representation from the existing
fragments of cosmical knowledge; that philosophy in
Greece preceded the particular sciences.
If we examine somewhat more closely the circum-
stances which conditioned the progress of Greek culture
before the appearance of philosophy, two phenomena
especially claim our attention : these are the republi
form of the government, and the spread of the Greek
races by colonisation. The centuries which immedi-
ately preceded the earliest Greek Philosophy, and those
which partly coincided with it, are the times of the
legislators and of the tyrants, of the transition to those
constitutional forms of government on the soil of which
Greek political life attained its highest perfection.
When the patriarchal monarchy of the Homeric period,
in consequence of the Trojan war and the Doric migra-
tion, and through the extinction, disqualification or
banishment of the ancient royal houses, had entirely
given place to oligarchy, the aristocracy became the
means of spreading freedom and higher culture through-
out the smaller circle of the ruling families. After-
wards when the oppressions and internal deterioration
of these families had evoked the resistance of the
masses, the popular leaders came mostly from the ranks
of their hitherto masters, and these demagogues almost
everywhere eventually became tyrants. But as the
government by a single person, because of its very
origin, found its chief adversary in the aristocracy, and,
as a counterpoise, was forced to fall back for support
POLITICAL LIFE OF THE GREEKS. 81
upon the people, it became itself a means of training
and educating the people to freedom. The courts of
the tyrants were centres of art and culture; and when
their rule was overthrown, which generally happened in
the course of one or two generations, their inheritance
of power did not revert to the earlier aristocracy, but to
moderate constitutions founded on fixed laws. This
course of things was as favourable to the scientific as to
the political training of the Greeks. In the efforts and
struggles of this political movement, all the powers
which public life brought to science must have been
aroused and employed, and the feeling of youthful
liberty imparted to the spirit of the Greek people a
stimulus which must needs have affected their specula-
tive activity. Thus the laying of the foundations of
the scientific and artistic glory of Greece was eagerly
carried on side by side with the transformation of her
political circumstances; a connection of phenomena
which is very striking, and which shows that among the
Greeks, as among all healthy nations, culture has been
the fruit of liberty.
This general revolution was effected more quickly
in the colonies than in the mother country; and the
existence of these colonies was of the highest importance
in regard to it. During the 500 years which elapsed
between the Doric conquests and the rise of Greek
Philosophy, the Greek races had spread themselves, by
means of organised emigration, on all sides. The islands
* For example, those of Peri- wise men, there is no tradition of
ander, Polycrates, Pisistratus, and the philosophers being connected
his sons. But, excepting the story with tyrants before the appearance
of Perlander's relation to the seven of the Sophists.
WOL. I. G
82 INTRODUCTION.
of the Archipelago, as far as Crete and Rhodes; the
western and northern coasts of Asia Minor; the shores
of the Black Sea, and the Propontis; the coasts of
Thrace, Macedonia and Illyria; of Magna Graecia and
Sicily, were covered with hundreds of settlements;
Greek colonists had penetrated even to distant Gaul,
to Cyrene, and to Egypt. Most of these settlements
attained to prosperity, culture, and free constitutions,
sooner than the states from which they emanated. Not
only did the very disruption from their native soil pro-
duce a freer movement, and a different organisation of
civil society, but their whole situation was much more
convenient for trade and commerce, for enterprising
activity, and for all kinds of intercourse with strangers
than was the case with the cities of Greece proper; it
was therefore natural that in many respects they should
outstrip the older states. How greatly they did so, and
how important the rapid growth of the colonies was in
regard to the development of Greek Philosophy, is best
seen from the fact that all the Greek philosophers of
Il O es, one or two Sophists only excepted,
belonged either to the Ionian and Thracian cologies, or
to those in Italy and Sicily. Here at the limits of the
Hellenic world were the chief settlements of a higher
culture, and as the immortal poems of Homer were a
gift from the Greeks of Asia Minor to their native
country, so also Philosophy came from the east and west
to the centre of Greek life; there to attain its highest
perfection, favoured by a happy combination of all
forces, and a coincidence of all necessary conditions,
at an epoch when, for most of the colonies, the
COSMOLOGY. 83.
brightest period of their history had passed away be-
yond recall.
How thought gradually developed itself under these
circumstances up to the point at which the earliest
scientific endeavours, in the strict sense of the word,
were made, we learn to some extent from the still
existing records of early cosmology and ethics, though
our information from these sources is far from being
complete. e
§ IV.-Native Sources of Greek Philosophy continued.
COSMOLOGY.
In a people so richly endowed as the Greeks, and so
eminently favoured by circumstances in regard to their
intellectual development, reflection must soon have
been awakened, and attention directed to the pheno-
mena of nature and of human life ; and attempts must
early have been made, not merely to explain the external
world in reference to its origin and Čauses, but also to
consider the activities and conditions of mankind from
more general points of view. This reflection was not,
indeed, at first of a specifically scientific kind, for it
was not as yet regulated by the thought of any general
interdependence of things according to fixed law. Cos-
mology, until the time of Thales, and, so far as it allied
itself with religion, even longer, retained the form of
a mythological narrative; Ethics, until the time of
Socrates and Plato, that of aphoristic reflection. The
fortuitous, and sometimes even miraculous, interference
of imaginary beings took the place of the interdepen-
G 2
84 INTRODUCTION.
dence of nature; instead of one central theory of human
life, we find a number of moral sayings and prudential
maxims, which, abstracted from various experiences, not
unfrequently contradicted one another, and, at the best,
were reduced to no general principles and brought into
no scientific connection with any theory of human
nature. Though it would be a mistake to overlook this
distinction, and to place either the mythic cosmologists
or the gnomic poets in the number of the philosophers,'
as has been done by some writers, both ancient and
modern, yet we ought not, on the other hand, to under-
rate the importance of these early attempts, for they
were at least useful in calling attention to the questions
which science had first to consider, and in accustoming
thought to combine particular phenomena under general
points of view ; and thus a good deal was done towards
a beginning of Science.
The most ancient record of mythic cosmology
\ \among the Greeks is the Theogony of Hesiod. How
much of this work is derived from still more ancient
tradition, and how much is invented by the poet him-
self and his later revisers, cannot now be discovered
with certainty, nor is this the place to enquire. It is
* As was certainly done in the
most flourishing period of Greek
Philosophy by the Sophists and by
the adherents of systems of natural
Philosophy. Plato is evidence of
the former in Prot. 316 D, cf. ibid.
338 E sqq.; and of the latter there
is mention in Crat. 402 B; and
also in Aristotle, Metaph. i. 3,983 b,
27 (cf. Schwegler on this passage).
The Stoics afterwards were especi-
ally addicted to representing the
ancient poets as the earliest philo-
sophers, by the allegorical inter-
pretation of their writings; and in
the Neo-Platonists this practice
passed all bounds. Tiedemann was
the first to declare Thales the
starting-point of Philosophy, vide
his Geist der speculativen Philoso-
phie, i. Preface, p. xviii.
COSMOLOGY, HESIOD. 85
enough for our purpose to observe that the Theogony,
with the exception of a few subsequent interpolations,
was undoubtedly known to the earliest philosophers in
its present form.' We find in it nothing approaching
to a scientific apprehension or solution of the cosmo-
logical problem. The poet proposes to himself the
question from which all cosmogonies and histories of
creation start, and which, indeed, obviously suggests
itself even to the most undisciplined intellect, the
question as to the origin and causes of all things. But
in the Theogony this question has not the scientific
importance of an enquiry into the essence and reasons
of phenomena. With childlike curiosity the poet asks:
Who made all things? and how did He make them P
and the answer simply consists in positing as the first
being something that cannot be explained away by
thought, and making the rest originate from this by
means of some analogy drawn from experience. Now
experience points out two kinds of origin. All that
we see either forms itself naturally, or else is made
with a design by definite individuals. In the former
case production takes place by the action of the ele-
ments, by growth, or by generation ; in the latter,
either mechanically by the elaboration of some given
material, or dynamically, as we work upon other men
* Cf. Petersen (Ursprung und shall hereafter consider) and the
Alter der Hesiod: Theog. (Progr.der remarkable utterance of Herodotus—tº
Hamburgischen Gymn.), 1862), who li. 53, are decided evidence against
seems to me to have proved at any the supposition that the Theogony
rate this much, whatever we may is no older than the sixth century;
think of his other theories. The the general character of its con-
polemic of Xenophanes and Hera- ceptions and language, however,
cleitus against Hesiod (which we attest this even more strongly.
86 INTRODUCTION.
by the mere expression of our will. All these analogies
are applied, in the cosmogonies of different nations,
to the origin of the world and of the gods; as a rule,
several of them at once, according to the nature of
the object in question. To the Greeks the analogy
of generation must have been the most obvious, be-
cause, in accordance with the particular bent of their
imagination, they had personified the various parts of
the world as beings akin to humanity, whose origin
could be represented in no other way. In any case
they must have kept to an analogy drawn from nature,
for Greek thought was too naturalistic and polytheistic
to maintain, like the Zoroastrian and Judaic religions,
that everything had been called into existence by the
mere fiat of a creator. In Greek mythology the gods
themselves were created, and the deities worshipped by
the people belong altogether to a younger race of gods;
there is, therefore, no divinity who can be regarded as
the first cause of all things, without beginning, and who
possesses absolute power over nature. So in Hesiod it
is the genesis of the gods on which his whole cosmogony
turns. Most of these genealogies, and the myths con-
nected with them, are nothing more than the expression
of simple perceptions, or picture-thoughts, of the kind
that imagination everywhere produces when the know-
ledge of nature is in its infancy. Erebus and Nyx are
the parents of Æther and Hemera, for day in its
brightness is the son of might and darkness. The earth
brings forth the sea of herself alone, and rivers in her
union with the sky; for the sources of streams are fed
by the rain, while the ocean appears to be a mass of
COSMOLOGY, HESIO D. 87
water which has been from the beginning in the depths
of the earth. Uranus is emasculated by Cronos, for the
sun-heat of harvest time puts an end to the fertilising
showers of the sky. Aphrodite springs from the seed
of Uranus, for the rain in spring awakens the genera-
tive impulse of nature. The Cyclopes, Hecatonchires
and giants, the Echidna and Typhoeus are children of
Gaea; other monsters are the progeny of night or of
the waters, partly because of their originally physical
import, partly because what is monstrous cannot spring
from the bright heavenly gods, but only from darkness
and the unfathomable deep. The sons of Gaea, the
Titans, were overthrown by the Olympians; for as the
light of heaven subdues the mists of earth, so the all-
ordering Deity has bound the wild forces of nature.
The thought contained in these myths is very limited;
whatever in them transcends the most obvious per-
ceptions is the result, not of reflection concerning the
natural causes of things, but of an activity of fancy
from which, even when it produces something really
significant, we must be careful not to expect too much.
Even in the combination of these myths, which is
principally, no doubt, the work of the poet, we fail to
discover any leading thought of deeper import." The
* Brandis (Geschichte der tion of the higher principle. But
Griech-Röm. Phil. i. 75) finds not
merely in the beginning of the
Theogony, but also in the myths
of the dethronement of Uranus, and
the conflict of the sons of Cronos
with their father and the Titans,
the doctrine that the determinate
proceeds from the indeterminate,
and that there is a gradual evolu-
these thoughts are much too ab-
stract to admit of our seeking in
them the motive of the mythopoeic
fancy. The poet does not seem to
have been influenced by any specu-
lative idea even in the arrangement
of these myths; the three genera-
tions of the gods merely form the
thread on which he strings his
88 INTRODUCTION.
passage in the Theogony which sounds most like a
philosophic conception of mature, and was almost the
only passage employed by the ancient philosophers in
that sense, is the commencement of the poem (v. 116
sqq.). Chaos was the first to exist, then came Earth
(with the abyss, or Tartarus) and Eros. Of Chaos were
born Erebus and Night; Earth first brought forth of
herself the sky, the mountains, and the sea; then in
marriage with the sky she produced the progenitors of
the different families of gods, except the few that are
derived from Erebus and Night. This representation
certainly attempts to get at some motion of the world's
origin, and we may so far consider it as the beginning
of cosmology among the Greeks; but as a whole it is
very crude and imperfect. The poet asks himself what
was really the first of all things, and he finally abides by
the Earth as the immovable basis of the Cosmos. Out-
side the Earth was nothing but gloomy might, for the
luminaries of heaven were not as yet in existence.
Erebus and Night are therefore as old as the Earth. In
order that another should be produced from this first one,
the generative impulse or Eros must have existed from
the beginning. Such then are the causes of all things.
If we exclude all these beings from our thought, there
remains for the imagination only the idea of infinite
space, which at this stage of culture it does not con-
ceive in an abstract manner as empty mathematical
space, but concretely as an immeasurable, waste and
genealogies, and by which he con- the edition of Hesiod of Gaisford-
nects them together externally. Reiz, verse 116.
1 Proof of this will be found in
COSMOLOGY. HESIO D. 89
formless mass. The first of all things, therefore, in
reality is Chaos. In some such way as this perhaps the
foregoing theory of the beginning of the world may
have arisen in the mind of its author." It is founded,
indeed, upon a desire for enquiry, an endeavour to
attain clear and coherent notions, but the interest
which rules it is that of the imagination rather than
that of thought. No question is asked concerning the
essence and general causes of things, the problem is
merely how to learn something about the actual facts
relating to the primitive condition of the world and to
its ulterior developments; and in the solution of this
problem, we naturally find that the poet is guided by
the intuitions of his imagination, and not by intelli-
gent reflection. The commencement of the Theogony
is, considering its date, a thoughtful and pregnant
myth, but it is not as yet a philosophy.
The next writer after Hesiod of whose cosmology we
know anything at all definite is Pherecydes of Syros,”
* Whether this author or some
older poet was the composer of the
Theogony is, as has already been
observed, of little importance.
Brandis (Gesch. der Gr-Röm. Phil.
i. 74) supports the latter theory.
It is unlikely, he says, that the
poet, had he invented the myth of
Tartarus as one of the first princi-
ples of the world, or of Eros as the
creative principle, would have made
no further use of them in his Cos-
mology. But not to speak of the
doubtful origin of the 119th verse,
which mentions Tartarus, but
which is wanting in Plato (Symp.
178 B), and Aristotle (Metaph. i. 4,
984 b, 27), I should rather ex-
plain this circumstance as showing
that the myths subsequently intro-
duced belonged to the older tra-
dition, and the opening verses
to the author of the Theogony
itself.
* For his life, age, and writings,
cf. Sturz, Pherecydis Fragmenta, p.
1 sqq. Preller in the Rhein. Mus.
iv. (1846) 377 sqq. Allgem. En-
cyclop. of Ersch and Gruber, iii.
22, 240 sqq. Art. Pherecydes, Zim.
mermann in Fichte's Zeitschrift für
Philosophie, &c. xxiv. B, 2 H. S. 161
sqq. (reprinted in Zimmermann's
Studien. Vienna, 1870, p. 1 sqq.).
This last, however, credits the old
mythographer with much that is
90
INTRODUCTION.
a contemporary of Anaximander;" in later story a mira-
culous person like Pythagoras.”
In a work, the title
of which is variously given, he says that there existed
before all things, and from etermity, Zeus, Chronos, and
Chthon.”
alien to him. Conrad, De Pherecy—
dis Syrii aetate atque cosmologia.
Coblenz, 1857.
* He is described as such by
Diogenes, i. 121, and Eusebius,
Chron. 60 Ol. The former, probably
following Apollodorus, places his
most flourishing period in the 59th
Olympiad (540 B.C.), and the latter
in the 60th Olympiad. Suidas
(‘Pepek.) in a very obscure passage
fixes his birth in Ol. 45 (600–596
B.C.). His age is given by the
Pseudo-Lucian (Macrob. 22, a pas-
sage where he certainly seems to
be meant) as 85. Neither of these
statements, however, is altogether
trustworthy,though perhaps neither
is far from the truth ; and there
are besides other reasons against
our drawing any such definite con-
clusion as Conrad, who thus sums
up (p. 14) his careful discussion of
this question: Pherecydes was
born in the 45th Olympiad or
shortly before, and died, ‘octogena-
'rius fere,' towards the end of the
62nd Olympiad. (Between Ol. 45,
1, to 62, 4, moreover, there are only
71–72 years.) Nor does the asser-
tion that Pythagoras tended him in
his last illness help us at all, partly
because it is itself very untrust-
worthy, and partly because this
occurrence is placed by some before
Pythagºras' emigration to Italy,
and by others in the last period of
his life. Cf. Porph. Vita Pythag.
455 sq.; Iamb. Vita Pythag. 184,
252 ; Diog. viii. 40,
By Chthon he seems to have understood the
* Cf. the anecdotes in Diog. i.
116 sq.
* The commencement of this
work, in Diog. i. 119 (cf. Damas-
cius, De Princ. p. 384; and Con-
rad, p. 17, 21) was as follows:
Zebs uèv kal Xpóvos és àel kal X6&v
ju. X90win 68 &vopa €yévero Tºj,
éretà? airfi Zeus yepas àtö07. By
'yāpas we cannot, with Tiedemann
(Griechenlands erste Philosophen,
172), Sturz (loc. cit. p. 45) and
others, understand motion; nor
with Brandis the original qualita-
tive determination, for this latter
is far too abstract a conception for
Pherecydes, and he can hardly have
regarded the earth as moved.
Neither interpretation, in fact, can
be got out of the word; what it
means is: Since Zeus conferred
honour upon her. We may either
understand by this honour, what
always seems to me the most pro-
bable, the adornment of her surface,
mentioned immediately after (the
garment with which Zeus covered
the earth); or else, with Conrad, p.
32, the honour of her union with
Zeus, by which the Earth became
the mother of many gods (p. 74, 2).
Pherecydes means to derive the
name yū from yépas. This circum-
stance of itself forbids the substi-
tution of trépas for yépas, proposed
by Rose, De Arist. libr. ord. 74;
but the sense we should get by this
change is, in my opinion, very un-
Satisfactory.
COSMOLOGY.
PHERECYDES. 9]
earth ; by Chronos, or Cronos," that part of heaven
nearest the earth, and the deity ruling it;” by Zeus, the
highest god, disposing and forming the whole universe,
and himself at the same
* So he is called by Hermias
(Irrisio, c. 12), who expressly says
that Kpévos is the same as Xpévos.
In Damascius, on the contrary,
where Conrad, p. 21, also reads
Kpóvov, I find in the manuscripts no
other reading than Xpóvov.
* By the Cronos of Pherecydes
is generally understood Time—so
Hermias loc. cit. and Probus on
Virgil's Eclogues, vi. 31. Phere-
cydes himself indicates this signifi-
cation when he puts Xpévos instead
of Kpóvos. Yet it is scarcely credi-
ble that so ancient a thinker should
have placed the abstract conception
of Time among the primitive
causes; and Cronos, in fact, ap-
pears as a much more concrete na-
ture when it is told of him (vide
infra) that he created from his seed
fire, wind and water, and that he
was the leader of the gods in the
conflict with Ophioneus. That this
only means that in course of time
fire, wind and water arose, and that
in course of time Ophioneus was
conquered, I cannot believe. If the
gods at strife with Ophioneus re-
present certain powers of nature,
Cronos, their leader, must be
something more real than merely
Time; and if fire, wind and water
were formed from the seed of Chro-
nos, this seed must be conceived
as a material substance, and Chro-
nos must consequently represent a
certain part, or certain constituents,
of the world. If we consider that
fire, wind and water are formed in
the atmosphere during tempests,
and that the fertilising rain is re-
time the highest heaven.”
presented in the mythus of Uranus
as the seed of the god of heaven ;
that Chronos, according to this
original import, was not the god of
Time in abstracto, but the god of
the warm Season, of the time of
harvest, of the sun-heat (Preller,
Griech. Mythol. i. 42 sq.), and, as
such, was a god of heaven—that he
was so regarded by the Pythago-
reans when they identified the
vault of heaven with Xpóvos, and
called the sea the tears of Chronos
(vide infra, Pythagorean system)—
if we consider all this, the opinion
given above, concerning which even
Conrad's (p. 22) and Brandis's
adverse judgment (Gesch. der Entw.
der Griech. Phil. i. 59) have not
shaken me, will appear to have far
the most probability in its favour.
* To Zeus, as the divine creator
of the universe, the passage in Aris-
totle's Metaphysics, xiv. 4, 1091 b,
8, refers: ol ye usuryaevot abrów
(scil. Tàu &pxafov troumróv) ſcal T6
u% uvBukós &taura Aéyeuv, otov
‘pepekööms ſcal étépoi twes, to
'yevviorav irpátov Šptorov T.06aori.
As the notion of Zeus as god of
heaven is based upon the idea of
the sky itself, and as the gods of
Pherecydes generally represent at
the same time certain parts of the
world, we may assume that he did
not discriminate the world-creating
power, which he calls Zeus, from
the upper portion of the sky. The
assertion of Hermias and Probas
(loc. cit.) that by Zeus he under-
stood AEther, and of Probus (loc.
cit.) that he understood fire, show
92
INTRODUCTION.
Chronos produces from his seed fire, wind and water;
the three primal beings then beget numerous other gods
in five families.”
When Zeus, in order that he might
fashion the world,” had changed himself into Eros (who,
according to the ancient theory, must be the world-
that we are here concerned with an
interpretation of the Stoics, and
not with an original and authentic
text. That Hermias should reduce
AEther and Earth to the troudāv and
tróaxov is also entirely in harmony
with the Stoic point of view. Cf.
Zeller, Phil. der Gr. Part III. a, 119,
second edition.
* Damascius, loc. cit. : row 6&
Xpóvov trol?iorat éic too yovov Šavrot,
Tºp kal truedua kal iſoap, . . . Šć
&v év trévre uuzoſs Šimpnuévov
troAA}v yeweav orva rival 9eów, rhy
TrevTéuvXov ka?\ovuévny. To the
same pivXoi (as Brandis thinks, p.
81) the statement of Porphyry
perhaps refers (De antro nymph.
c. 31), according to which Phere-
cydes mentions uvXobs kai 866pous
kal &vrpa kal 6&pas kal tróAas;
though Porphyry himself sees in
them the yevéaeus kal &moyevéoets
ºvxóv. Preller (Rh. Mus. 382,
Encycl. 243) thinks that Pherecydes
here intends to speak of five admix-
tures, in various proportions, of the
elementary substances (AEther, Fire,
Air, Water, Earth), in each of
which one of these elementary sub-
stances predominates. It seems to
me, however, very hazardousto as-
cribe to the ancient philosopher of
Syra a theory of the Elements in
the sense of Empedocles or Aris-
totle (a theory which presupposes
a far more developed stage of phi-
losophic reflection), or to believe
that he anticipated Philolaus in
fixing the number of these elements
at five. Conrad's modification also
of this interpretation, by which
the five uv Yol are made to signify
the five layers, circumfolding each
other, of earth, water, air, fire and
aether (loc. cit. p. 35), attributes to
Pherecydes, as it appears to me, a
view of the world that is too scien-
tific and too similar to Aristotle's ;
the theory, especially, of a fiery
sphere invisible to us, and the pre-
cise discrimination of aether from
fire and air, is, according to all
other traces of it, much later. It
would be more reasonable to sup-
pose that Pherecydes distinguished
Olympic gods, fire-gods, wind-gods,
water-gods and earth-gods. Suidas
says that the work of Pherecydes
was named Éirt duvros, from the
Auxoſ. Preller (Rh. Mus. 378)
conjectures instead trevrépuxos.
Conrad (p. 35) adds to the above-
mentioned five pluxol the two divi-
sions of the lower world, Hades and
Tartarus. It is supposed(though this
is not quite clear from Origen, C.
Cels. vi. 42) that Pherecydes him-
self distinguished Hades and Tar-
tarus. Nothing certain, however,
can be made out on the subject.
Blato, in Soph. 242 C: 3 pºv (ušov
Sumyelºral) &s rpta rā, śvra, troNeue?
8è &AA#Aous évíore airów &rra tril,
Totè 5è kal pixa yiyvöueva yáuovs
Te ſcal tăkovs ſcal rpoqās rôv
éicyóvov trapexetal, doubtless refers
to the exposition we have been
considering.
* Proclus in Tim. 156 A.
COSMOLOGY. PHEIRECYDES.
93
forming force), he made, we are told, a great robe, on
which he embroidered the earth and Ogenos (Oceanos),
and the chambers of Ogemos; he spread this robe over
an oak upborne by wings" (ütróttapos), that is, he
clothed the framework of earth floating in space” with
the varied surface of land and ocean.” Ophioneus, with
His words in Clemens, Strom.
vi. 621 A, run thus : Zēs trote:
qāpos uéya Te Kai kaxów ſcal év
airó toucíAAet yiv kal &ymvov Kal
rà & ynvoj 50%para. In reference
to this, Clemens (642 A) says: ā
Śróirrepos Spös kal to éir' airfi
tretroikiWuévov ºpäpos.
* The wings in this case denote
only free suspension, not swift
motion.
* Conrad opposes the above
explanation on two accounts. First
he agrees (p. 40) with Sturz (p. 51),
that the winged oak is not merely
the framework of the earth, but of
the whole universe, and that the
woof spread over the oak is the sky.
Against this, I can only repeat
what I have already, in the second
edition of this work, replied to
Sturz, that the tissue on which
land and sea are embroidered (this
alone can be meant by the words
év airó troucíAAet; and Clemens
also calls the pāpos itself retrol-
kixuévov) cannot signify the sky.
It would be easier to understand
it as ‘the visible things that en-
compass the world’— therefore
the surface of the earth and sky
(cf. Preller, Rh. Mus. 387, Encyklo.
244); but since earth and ocean
are mentioned as the only objects
embroidered on the woof, we have
no ground for thinking of anything
besides the terrestrial surface.
Secondly, Conrad (p. 24 sqq.) Sup-
poses that by x0&v Pherecydes in-
tends Chaos, the primitive matter,
which contains all matters, except
aether, in itself. Out of this,
through the working of Zeus or
AEther, the elemental matters
earth, water, air, and fire were
made ; and the earth itself when
separated from the primitive matter
was called X60uín, as distinguished
from X66v. But the words quoted
from Diog. p. 72, 3, already ex-
clude such a theory; for who would
infer from the mere interchange
between X6&v and X60Vím that
in the one case we are concerned
with the mixture of all substances,
and in the other with the earth
which resulted from this mixture?
Damascius, whom we have no right
to charge with error in this matter,
expressly mentions Zets, Xpóvos and
X00via as the three first principles
of Pherecydes (De princ. c. 124, p.
384). Again, when Pherecydes,
according to Damascius, says that
fire, air and water were made by
Chronos éic row yovov Šavroſſ, how
can it be maintained that Zeus
separated them out of X66v P Con-
rad, lastly, urges that his theory
best explains the statement (vide
Achilles Tatius in Phaenom. c. 3,
123 E; Schol. in Hesiodi Theog.
116; Tzetz. in Lycophron, 145) that
Pherecydes, like Thales, made
water his first principle; but this
does not help him much. For that
statement rests upon suspicious
testimony, and is besides entirely
94
INTRODUCTION.
his hosts, representing probably the unregulated forces
of nature, opposes this creation of the world, but the
divine army under Chronos hurls them into the deep of
the sea, and keeps possession of heaven."
As to any
further battle of the gods, between Zeus and Chronos,
Pherecydes seems to have
erroneous on the chief point, and
Conrad himself acknowledges (p.26)
that in the chaotic primal matter
which he thinks is denoted by the
name of X6&v, Earth must have
preponderated, to occasion the
choice of this name. If there is
any error, the cause of it may lie
elsewhere, either in the doctrine of
Pherecydes himself, or in a misap-
prehended account of the doctrine.
IEven an antithetical comparison of
IPherecydes and Thales, like that in
Sextus, Pyrrh. iii. 30, Math. ix. 360
(Pherecydes made earth, and Thales
water, the principle of all things),
might, by the careless hand of a
copyist or compiler, be turned into
a parallel between them; or some-
one who found Pherecydes classed
with Thales, as one of the oldest
philosophers, may have ascribed to
him Thales' doctrine. Perhaps even
what Pherecydes said of Oceanus,
or his statement about the seed of
Cronos, or some other definition
that has not come down to us, may
have been explained in this way.
Whether Pherecydes thought that
the sea oozed out of the earth con-
ceived as moist in its primeval
condition, or was filled by water
from the atmosphere (the water
arising from the yovh of Cronos),
is not clear from our documents;
for it is certainly possible that the
production of water by Cronos may
not apply to the water of the sea.
Celsus ap. Origen c. Cels. vi.
This is the
42; Max. Tyr. x. 4; Philo of By-
blus ap. EuS. praep. Ev. i. 10, 33
(the latter represents Pherecydes
as having borrowed this trait from
the Phoenicians); Tertullian, De
cor. mil. c. 7. -
* Preller (Rh. Mus. 386) seeks
to establish the contrary, and I fol-
lowed him in my second edition.
Put though we find traces, with
Apollonius and others (v. infra), of
a theogony in which Ophion, Kro-
nos and Zeus follow one another as
rulers of the universe, we have no
right to refer this representation
to Pherecydes himself. With him
Ophioneus fights indeed for the
possession of heaven, but that he
had it to begin with is not stated,
and it is irreconcilable with the
assertion that Zeus had been there
from eternity, and still more with
the utterance of Aristotle (supr. p.
93); for he adduces as a peculiarity
of Pherecydes that in contradistine-
tion to the older Theogonies he had
declared the first principle to be
the most perfect, as they are blamed
because Baat?Mečev kal &pxeiv paolv
où rows trpátovs, oiov vökra, K.T.A.,
&AA& rôv Ata, and did not therefore
regard the world-ruling power or
Zeus as the trpárov. Pherecydes
must himself have so regarded him.
This, as Conrad rightly observes,
also excludes the theory that Zeus
first became lord of heaven and
king of the gods by the overthrow
of Cronos.
been silent.”
COSMOLOGY. PHERECYDES. 95
essential result to be gathered from scattered fragments
and traditions respecting the doctrine of Pherecydes.
If we compare it with the Hesiodic cosmogony, it
undoubtedly evinces progress of thought. We find,
even thus early, a definite attempt to discriminate, on
the one hand, between the material constituents of the
universe — the earth, and the atmospheric elements;
and, on the other, between matter and plastic force.
In what is said of the conflict of Chronos with Ophi-
oneus, we seem to discern the thought that in the
attainment of the present cosmical order the forces of
the abyss were limited by the influence of the higher
elements." But the expression of all this is mythical,
and in accordance with the older cosmological mytho-
logy. The world is not formed by the natural operation
of original matter and forces; it is wrought by Zeus
with the mysterious power of a god; the reduction of
phenomena to natural causes, which fs the first real
commencement of Philosophy, is not here to be found.
It would therefore be of little importance to the
history of Philosophy to know that Pherecydes took
certain details of his theory, such as the personality
of Ophioneus, from Phoenician or Egyptian mytho-
logy; but whether important or not, the statement
cannot be adequately proved by the testimony of so
untrustworthy a writer as Philo of Byblus;” and the
distinction between the destroying Serpent god of
Pherecydes and the serpent-shaped Agathodaemon is so
The serpent is a chthonic loc. cit., and Allg, Encyclo. p. 244.
animal, probably signifying Ophi- * In Euseb. loc. cit.
oneus. Wide Preller, Rhein. Mus.
96 INTRODUCTION.
apparent, that we might as well identify the former
with the serpent form of Ahriman, or even, like Origen
(loc. cit.), with the serpent of the Mosaic paradise, if so
obvious, and among the Greeks so common, a symbol
required a foreign derivation to account for it. The
impossibility of referring the whole cosmogony of Phe-
recydes, in its essential features,' to the Egyptians, will
at once appear on an intelligent comparison of his pre-
sentations with the Egyptian myths.” The assertions
of certain later and untrustworthy writers” as to his
Oriental teachers are of little importance as evidence.*
If our knowledge is imperfect in regard to Phere-
cydes, it is still more so in respect to some others, who
contemporaneously, or nearly contemporaneously, with
him set up various cosmological theories. Of Epimen-
ides, the well-known hierophant of Solon's time,” we
* Zimmermann, loc. cit.
* Another doctrfme attributed
to Pherecydes, and which equally
must have come from the East,
the dogma of Transmigration, has
already been discussed, p. 68 sq.
* Josephus, Contr. Apion. 1, 2,
end, reckons him as belonging to
the Egyptian and Chaldaean schools.
Cedren., Synops. i. 94 B, represents
him as travelling into Egypt. Suidas
(£epek.) says he used the secret
writings of the Phoenicians; the
Gnostic Isidorus in Clemens, Strom.
wi. 642 A, represents him as in-
spired by the prophecy of Cham;
by which, however, is probably in-
tended, not the Egyptian and Phoe-
nician wisdom as a whole, but a
Gnostic work bearing that title.
* We are, in the first place,
entirely ignorant on what tradition
these statements are based ; and
next, it was easy and obvious to
connect the teacher of Pythagoras
(who was known to have held the
Egyptian doctrine of Transmigra-
tion), as well as Pythagoras him-
self, with the Egyptians. The
Chaldaeans, in what concerns Phe-
recydes, were perhaps first added
by Josephus; while the statement
of Suidas probably originates with
Philo of Byblus.
* On the personality of Epi-
menides, his activity in Athens, and
the stories that connected them-
selves with him, cf. Diog. i. 109
sqq.; Suidas, 'Etruevſöns ; Plu-
tarch's Solon, 12; S. Sap. Conv. 14;
An Senis. ger. resp. i. 12, p. 784; Def.
orac. i. 1, p. 409; De fac. lun. 24,
25, p. 940; Plato, Laws, i. 642 D
(and also my treatise on the 1.na-
chronisms of Plato, Abhandlungen
der Berlinischen Akademie, 1873.
EPIMEWIDES. 97
are told by Damascius that,' according to Eudemus, he
admitted two first causes, the Air and Night; * and
proceeding from these a third, Tartarus. From them
sprang two other beings, not precisely designated, whose
union produced the egg of the universe ; a denotation
of the celestial sphere which is found in several cos-
mogonies, and which very naturally resulted from the
representation of the world's origin as analogous to the
development of animal life. Whether this notion was
transplanted from Western Asia to Greece, whether it
was arrived at independently by Greek mythology, or
whether, lastly, it had been preserved in ancient tra-
dition from the earliest sources of the Greek race,—are
questions we must leave unanswered. From this egg
other existences were produced. The thought contained
in this cosmogony, as far as our meagre information
enables us to criticise it, is unimportant, whether we
consider Epimenides himself to have made the altera-
tion in the Hesiodic representation, or, in doing so,
to have followed the example of some more ancient
predecessor. The same holds good of Acusilaos,” who
was much more closely allied to Hesiod, for he repre-
sents Chaos as bringing forth a male and a female
being—Erebus and Night; AEther, Eros,” Metis, and
History of Philosophy, p. 95 sq.)
What Damascius quotes from him
is taken from his own theogony,
Diog. i. 111.
† De Princ, c. 124, p. 384, Kopp.
2 These two principles evidently
represent, after the manner of the
Hesiodic Theogony, a sexual
syzygy: the Air, 6 &#p, is the male
principle; Night, the female prin-
WOL. I. H
ciple.
*Ap. Damascius (loc. cit.) again
according to Eudemus ; Brandis,
p. 85, also rightly refers to Plato,
Symposium, 178 C, Schol. Theocrit.
argum. Id. xiii. Clem. Al. Strom.
vi. 629 A. Josephus contra Apio-
ºnem, i. 3.
* Schol. Theocrit. classes him
as the son of Night and Æther.
98
INTRODUCTION.
a number of divinities being the result of their union.
There are some other traces of cosmogomic tradition;'
but we pass them over, in
order to proceed at once to
the consideration of the Orphic cosmogonies.”
Four versions of such cosmologies are known to us
under the name of Orpheus.
In one of these, the
version used by Eudemus * the Peripatetic, and most
probably before his time
Alluded to by Brandis, loc.
cit., p. 86. It is said that Ibycus,
Fr. 28 (10), like Hesiod, made Eros
spring from Chaos; and that the
comic poet Antiphanes, ap. Ire-
naeus (adv. Her. ii. 14, 1), differed
on some points from Hesiod.
2 For what follows, cf. Schuster,
De vet. Orphica Theogoniſe indole.
Leipzig, 1869.
* Damascius, c. 124, p. 382.
That by this Eudemus is intended
the pupil of Aristotle, is plain from
Diogenes, Prooem. 9. Cf. Damas-
cius, p. 384.
* Metaph. xii. 6, 1071 b, 26:
às Aéyovoiv of 6.e0x6 you of ék vvictos
Tyevvövres. Ibid. xiv. 4, 1091 b, 4:
of 8& troumral of &pxalot taúrm épotos,
j Bagińetely kal &pxeiv paolv oë
rows trptºrovs, otov vökta kal oipavov
# x40s h &keavov, &AA& Töv Ata.
These words cannot refer simply to
systems in which Night, though
placed among the oldest deities,
occupies only a third or fourth
place (as is the case in the Hesiodic
and ordinary Orphic theogony).
They presuppose a cosmology in
which either Night alone, or Night
in conjunction with other equally
original principles, has the first
place; for Metaph. xii. 6 treats of
the primitive state which preceded
all Becoming; and in reference to
this, Aristotle says it is equally im-
by Aristotle “ and Plato,”
possible for the theologians, who
make all things arise out of Night,
and for the physicists, who com-
mence with the mixture of all
things, to explain the beginning of
motion. Also the second passage
agrees so little with the ordinary
Orphic cosmology, that Syrianus,
commenting on it (Schol. in Aris.
935 a., 18), finds fault with Aris-
totle for misrepresenting the Or-
phic doctrine. This passage must
equally point to a theogony like that
spoken of by Eudemus; for here
Night is made the first principle;
as with Hesiod, Chaos, and with
Homer, Oceanus; the sky it cer-
tainly is not in either of the repre-
sentations known to us; but in the
Eudemic Orpheus, the sky occupies
the second place, and in Hesiod the
third. As the Eudemic Orpheus
alone, as far as we know, with the
exception of Epimenides, puts Night
in the place of Chaos as the first of
all things, it is very probable that
Aristotle, as well as his scholar
Eudemus, may be referring to him.
* Schuster (loc. cit. 4 sqq.
thinks this is probable from Craf.
402 B, and Tim. 40 D sq. (where
by the poets who affirm themselves
to be the sons of the gods are
meant Orpheus and Musaeus; these
are mentioned by name, Rep. 364
E, while nothing of the kind is said
ORPHIO COSMOG ONIES. 99
Night is represented as the first of all things. Beside
Night are placed the Earth and the sky,' both of which
apparently proceeded from Night, as with Hesiod the
Earth came forth from Chaos; Night being here sub-
stituted for Chaos.” The children of Uranus and
Gaea are Oceanus and Thetis;* obviously a very slight
departure from the Hesiodic tradition. A second
theogony (perhaps an imitation, or possibly the foun-
dation of Pherecydes' story of the battle of the gods)
seems to be alluded to by Apollonius," for he represents
his Orpheus as singing how at first earth and sky and
water separated themselves out of the commingling of
all things, how sun and moon and stars began their
courses, and mountains, rivers and animals came into
being; how Ophion and Eurynome, daughter of Oceanus,
ruled in Olympus, how they were afterwards hurled into
of Hesiod). It is no argument
against it (as Schuster shows), that
in the verses' quoted by Cratylus,
the marriage of Oceanus and The-
tys is described as the first mar-
riage, whereas they themselves are
the children of Uranus and Gaea ;
and because the Timaeus begins the
sketch of the Theogony with the
words, Tús re kal Oüpavoo traſões
'Olceavós re kal Tºm6üs éyevé00mv, it
does not follow that Plato denies
Night to be the first principle. If the
passagerelated to the HesiodicTheo-
gony (which does not, like Plato,
make Cronos and Rhea children of
Oceanus and Thetys), Chaos and
Night would still have been passed
over; but Plato could as well
leave out Night in this passage as
Aristotle, Metaph. xiv. 4, the earth;
and Metaph. i. 8, 989 a, 10 (pmol
8& kai “Hoto80s thv yiv trpcºrnu
ºyevéorðal rôv oropºdrov), Chaos. He
begins with those gods who, as
parents, open the series of gods
springing from sexual union; what
was prior to the earth and the
heavens he does not enquire.
* Eudemus, loc. cit.; Joannes
Lydus, De mensibus, ii. 7, p. 19,
Schow. His words, Tpets trpátai kar’
'Oppéa éčegAdat ma'av ćpyal, vot kal
ºyā kai oilpavös, are rightly applied
to this Eudemic “Theology of Or-
pheus' by Lobeck, i. 494.
* In favour of this theory, vide
Arist. Metaph. xii. 6 (supra, 98, 4),
and especially Damascius, p. 382:
# 6é trapé, Tó IIepiirarr; tıkö Eööflug,
ăvaºye'ypappuévn &s toū 'Oppéos odora
6eoNoyia Tráv to vomrov čawārmarev
. &mb 3& Tijs vukrös émothoaro
thv &xpfiv.
* According to Plato; cf. p. 98,5.
* Argonaut. i. 494 sqq.
H 2
100 INTRODUCTION.
the ocean by Cronos and Rhea, and these in their turn
were overthrown by Zeus. Traces of this theogony are
also to be met with elsewhere;' but philosophic concep-
tions are as little to be detected in it as in the poems
of Hesiod. A third Orphic cosmogony” places at the
beginning of cosmical development water and primi-
tive slime, which latter solidifies and forms the earth.
From these two a dragon arises, winged, and with the
face of a god: on one side he has the head of a lion,
and on the other that of a bull. He is called by the
mythologists, Heracles and Chronos, the never-aging
one ; with him is united Necessity, or Adrastea (accord-
ing to Damascius, in a hermaphrodite form), who is
said to be spread abroad incorporeally throughout the
universe to its remotest ends. Chronos-Heracles pro-
duces a gigantic egg,” which, dividing in the midst,
forms with its upper half the sky, and with its lower, the
earth. There seems to have been further mention” of a
Cf. what is cited by Preller,
Rhein. Mus. N. F. iv. 385 sq., from
Lycophr. Alear. v. 1192; and Tzet-
zes, in h. 1., Schol. Aristoph. Nub.
247; Schol. Æschyl. Prom. 955;
Lucian, Tragodopod. 99. Though
Orpheus is not named in these pas-
sages, we find in them, as in the
Orpheus of Apollonius, that Ophion,
Chronos and Zeus are regarded as
the three kings of the gods, of
whom the two first were overthrown
by their successor. Perhaps the
statement of Nigidius Figulus re-
lates to the same theogony (Serv.
ad Ecl. iv. 10), namely, that ac-
cording to Orpheus, Saturn and
Jupiter were the first rulers of the
world; the tradition which he fol-
lows, however, seems to have set
aside Ophion and Eurynome.
* Ap. Damascius, 381.
nag. Supplic. c. 15 (18).
* According to Brandis, i. 67,
Chronos first begot Æther, Chaos
and Erebus, and afterwards the
egg of the world; Lobeck's view of
the passage (Aglaoph. i. 485 sq.),
however, seems to me undoubtedly
correct; according to this view,
what is said of the begetting of
AEther &c. is referred, not to the
cosmogony of Hellanicus, but to
the usual Orphic theogony in which
it is really to be found.
* The confused representation
of Damascius leaves it somewhat
uncertain whether these features
really belong to this theogony.
Athe-
ORPHIC COSMOGONIES. 101
god who had golden wings on his shoulders, bulls' heads
on his haunches, and a huge Snake appearing among
various animal forms on his head; this god, described
by Damascius as incorporeal, is called Protogomos or
Zeus, and also Pan, as bringing order into all things.
Here not only is the symbolism far more complicated
than with Eudemus, but the thoughts, too, are in
advance of the cosmogonies we have been considering.
Behind Chronos and Adrastea are the abstract notions
of time and necessity; the incorporeality of Adrastea
and Zeus presupposes a discrimination of corporeal and
spiritual which was unknown even to Philosophy until
the appearance of Anaxagoras; the spreading out of
Adrastea through the universe reminds us of the
Platomic doctrine of the World-soul; and in the con-
ception of Zeus as Pan we recognise a pantheism, the
germ of which lay, indeed, from the beginning in the
naturalistic religion of the Greeks, but which cannot
be proved by authentic evidence to have actually
existed before the period when the individuality of the
various gods had been destroyed by religious syn-
cretism, and when Stoicism had done much to spread
abroad the pantheistic theory of the universe; for mone
of the older systems, however pantheistic in tendency,
had so great or so general an influence. The pantheistic
element comes out still more clearly in the story of the
birth and swallowing of Phanes' (infra, pp. 104, 106).
* That this trait was present in mentioning Phanes from any other
the Orphic theogony of Hellanicus exposition than that from which
is clear from Athenag. c. 16 (20), he had previously made quotations
for it is most improbable that he exactly corresponding with the
should havetaken the Orphic verses Hellanicus theogony of Damascius.
102
INTRODUCTION.
If, therefore, this cosmogony, as is usually supposed,'
was known to Hellanicus of Lesbos in the middle of
the fifth century, we must assign many ideas which ap-
peared only in the later Greek Philosophy to an earlier
period. Lobeck, however (loc. cit.), and Müller” rightly
question whether such could have been the case.
Damascius himself hints at the doubtful source of the
account “he follows;" its content bears pretty evident
internal traces of an after
date, and as we certainly
know that spurious writings of a very late period were
circulated * under the name
Cf. Schuster, p. 32, whose other
conjectures, however, p. 83, do not
commend themselves to me.
* Which Brandis accepts, loc.
cit. p. 66.
* Fragmenta hist. Graec. i. xxx.
* His words, loc. cit., are: Totaúrm
pºv ii ouvâ0ms 'Oppukh 9eoNoyta. ii
8è karū tow Ieptévvuov pepouévn
kal ‘EAAávikov, eſtrep whical 6 airós
éo riv, oùra's #xel. They appear to
me to convey that the work of
which they are treating was attri-
buted to Hieronymus as well as to
Hellanicus, and that Damascius
himself, or his authority, was of
opinion that under these two names
one and the same author was con-
cealed; who in that case naturally
could not have been the ancient
logographer of Lesbos.
* Wide Müller, loc. cit. Schu-
ster, in his excursus on the theo-
gony of Hellanicus, loc. cit. pp. 80–
100, conjectures with Lobeck that
its author was Hellanicus, other-
wise unknown to us, the father of
the philosopher Sandon (Suidas,
Xàvöwv), whose son (the Stoic
Athenodorus of Tarsus) was the
instructor of Augustus, and whom
of the Lesbian logographer,
Schuster calls, I know not why,
Apollodorus. This conjecture has
in its favour that Sandon, according
to Suidas, wrote inrobéorets sis
*Oppéa ; and if Hellanicus, like his
grandson, and probably also his
son, was a Stoic, this would agree
with the fact that the theogony (as
Schuster, loc. cit. 87 sqq. proves)
has points of contact with the
Stoic pantheism and treatment of
myths. The saying of Damascius,
however, quoted in note 3, seems
to me to contradict this assump-
tion. If Hellanicus of Tarsus, in
the end of the second century before
Christ, published an Orphic theo-
gony under his own name, it is
difficult to see how this work could
bear the name of Hieronymus as
well, and how Damascius could
Imagine that the same author was
concealed under these two names.
Schuster (p. 100) believes that
Hellanicus wrote the theogony,
but borrowed the material of the
first part from a work by Hiero-
nymus. But this theogony cannot
have been known as the production
of Hellanicus, for Athenagoras ex-
pressly ascribes to Orpheus the
ORPHIC COSMOGONIES.
103
there is every probability that the Orphic theology does
not belong to him at all, whatever may be the truth
as to its authorship and the time of its composition.
verses which Schuster rightly con-
siders as having belonged to this
work; besides, it was natural that
a poem professing to set forth an
Orphic theogony should announce
itself as a work of Orpheus. Da-
mascius does not say that Hellani-
cus and Hieronymus were des-
cribed as the authors of the theo-
gony; but as he calls the theogony
used by Eudemus, c. 124: jī trap&
Tó trepitrarmtikó Eööhug &vaºye'Ypap-
plévn; so by h karð ‘rov ‘Iepdºvvptov
qepopuévn kal ‘EAAdvikov, he must
mean a theogony, the contents of
which Hieronymus and Hellanicus
had expounded, but the author of
which, as of all the other theogo-
nies, was Orpheus. As to the fact
that the divergences from the com-
monly received Orphic theogony
are the same in both cases, and that
Damascius conjectures the two au-
thors to be one and the same, the
easiest explanation seems to be
that this exposition may have been
found in two manuscripts, of which
one bore the name of Hellanicus,
and the other that of Hieronymus,
and that Damascius believed one
of these to have been falsely
ascribed to its so-called author by
the real author of the other. Now
it appears from Porph. ap. Euseb.
prap, ev. x. 3, 10, Suidas, Zápoxêts,
Athen. xiv. 652 a, and others (cf.
Müller, loc. cit. and i. 65 sqq.), that
in later times writings about fo-
reign nations were in circulation
under the name of Hellanicus of
Lesbos, the authenticity of which
there was good reason to doubt;
in particular, the Aiyvirtuakā is
mentioned as a work that stands in
Epictetus, Diss. ii. 19, 14; cf. Pho-
tius, Cod. 161, p. 104 a, 13 sq., for
the type of a book of fables, and
cannot possibly have emanated
from the Lesbian writer, if only
because Moses is mentioned in it
(v. Justin, Cohort. 9, p. 10 a). We
hear, on the other hand (Joseph.
Ant. i. 3, 6, 9), of an Egyptian
Hieronymus, who wrote an āpxalo-
Xoyia powikikh, but who cannot
possibly (as Müller, loc. cit., be-
lieves) be the same person as the
IPeripatetic of Rhodes. It seems
a probable conjecture (Müller, ii.
450) that he was the person who,
according to Damascius, had trans-
mitted this Orphic theogony; and
the idea gains considerable support
from the observation (Schuster, loc.
cit. 90 sqq.) that this theogony in
its commencement, just where it
differs from the ordinary Orphic
theogony, coincides with the Phoe-
nician cosmogonies. This Hierony-
mus may have affixed the name of
Hellanicus to the Aiyvirtuakö at the
same time that he published the
Phoenician history under his own
name, and may have expressed him-
self in both works to the same
effect concerning the Orphic theo-
gony. That he composed such a
theogony is, as we have said, un-
likely. He seems rather to have
confined himself to developing
what he took from the common
theogony by borrowing the notion
of water and primitive slime from
the Phoenician cosmology. His
exposition must have been used by
Athenagoras as well as by Damas-
cius, for a Neo-Platonist can hardly
be suspected of dependence on the
104 INTRODUCTION.
Lobeck considers that we have a more ancient
Orphic cosmogony in that designated by Damascius
(c. 123, p. 380) as the usual Orphic theogony, or the
one contained in the rhapsodies, and of which many
fragments and notices' have been preserved. Here
Chronos is represented as the first of all existences. He
brings forth AEther and the dark immeasurable abyss,
or Chaos: from these he then forms a silver egg, out of
which, illuminating all things, proceeds Phanes, the
first-born god, called also Metis, Eros, and Ericapaeus;”
he contains within himself the germs of all gods, and
for this reason, as it would appear, is described as her-
maphrodite, and endowed with various animals' heads,
and other attributes of the kind. Phanes alone begets
Echidna, or Night, and, in marriage with her, Uranus
and Gaea, the progenitors of the intermediate races of
gods, whose history and genealogy are essentially the
same as with Hesiod. When Zeus attains sovereignty
he devours Phanes, and consequently is himself (as in
our previous quotation from Orpheus”) the ideal sum
(Inbegriff) of all things. After having thus united all
Christian apologist (Schuster, p.
81); and besides, the exposition of
Damascius goes farther than that
of Athenagoras; what is said in
the former of Hellanicus and Hie-
ronymus is wanting in the latter.
* Cf. Lobeck, loc. cit. 405 sqq.
* There have been many conjec-
tures as to the signification of this
name. Cf. Göttling, , De Ericap.
(Jena, 1862), who derives it from
ëap and kámos or kārus (breath),
ventorum vernalium afflatus; Schus-
ter, loc. cit. 97 sq. With the ma-
jority of commentators, I consider
an Eastern origin probable, though
I must leave it an open question
whether Delitzsch (cf. Schuster,
loc. cit.) has most reason for refer-
ring it to the Cabbalistic designa-
tion of the first of the ten Sephi-
roth, !"Els 'ns (long-visaged),
or Schelling (Gotth. v. Samothr. W.
W. , i. , Abth. viii. 402 sq.) for
preferring the Old Testament
bºs Tys (long-suffering).
* Cf. Supra, p. 64 sq.
ORPHIC COSMOG ONIES. 105
things in himself, he again puts them forth, producing
the gods of the last generation, and forming the world.
Among the stories of the younger gods (for the rest of
which I must refer the reader to Lobeck), the most
striking is that of Dionysus Zagreus, son of Zeus and
Persephone, who, rent in pieces by the Titans, comes
to life again in the second Dionysus, after Zeus has
swallowed his heart, which was still entire.
The theory that this whole theogony dates from the
period of Onomacritus and the Pisistratidae, since the
time of Lobeck’ has found much favour, but I am
unable to support it. The utterances of ancient authors
which are supposed to contain allusions to such a
theogony, do not carry us beyond the theogony which
Eudemus made use of. Its existence is first distinctly
attested in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise on the
world,” subsequently therefore to the Christian era, or
at any rate not long before it;* for, as we have seen
(supra, p. 65 sq.), the passage from the Platonic Laws
(iv. 715 E) proves nothing, and still less can be de-
duced from the Aristotelian citation," on which Brandis”
relies so much. Since Plato in the ‘Symposium' (178B)
does not mention Orpheus
among those who assert the
antiquity of Eros, we may rather indeed suppose that
* Lobeck, however, advances it
(p. 611) very cautiously, ut statin
cessurus, si quis Theogoniam Orphi-
cam Platone aut recentiorem aut
certe non multo antiquiorem esse
demonstraverit.
* C. 7; according to Lobeck (i.
522 and elsewhere) we must sup-
pose this to be an interpolation.
* The date of Valerius Soranus
is rather earlier. Varro in Au-
gustine's Civit. Dei, vii. 9, gives us
two verses of his, which seem to
refer to the Orphic theogony, and
perhaps to the particular passage
quoted from trepi kāoruow. Yet he
was only a later contemporary of
Cicero.
* Metaph. xiv.4; cf. Supra, p. 98,4,
* Loc. cit. p. 69.
106 INTRODUCTION.
the doctrine of this theogony, in regard to Eros-
Phanes, was unknown to him; and since Aristotle's in-
dications, as above noted, only correspond with the
theogony used by Eudemus, we cannot refer them to
any other. If, however, Plato, Aristotle, and Eudemus
did not possess that representation of the Orphic doc-
trines, which was at a later period in ordinary use, we
must conclude with Zoéga" and Preller,” that it was
not in circulation until after their time. I agree like-
wise with Zoéga that so learned a mythographer as
Apollonius” would scarcely have made Orpheus sing of
Ophion and Eurynome as the first rulers of the world,
and Cronos and Rhea as the second, if the Orphic tra-
dition then current had recognised Phanes and the elder
gods. Even subsequently to this there are still traces
to show that Phanes, the illuminating one, the centre
of the subsequent Orphic cosmogony, was only another
name for Helios, who, according to the later representa-
tion, was a much younger god.” Lastly, if we consider
the story of Phanes, with the description of Zeus that is
involved in it, with reference to its internal character
and purpose, we shall find that it is impossible to assign
| Abhandlungen, edited by Wel-
cker, p. 215 sqq.
* In Pauly's Real-Encyl. v.999.
* Cf. Supra, p. 99.
* Diodorus, i. 11 : many ancient
poets call Osiris, or the sun, Diony-
sus : &v Etſuoxtros uév . . . &orpo-
qavº Atóvvorov . . . 'Oppets 5é.
roëveká ulv kaxéovori pāvmrå re kal
Atºvvorov. Macrob. i. 18: Orpheus
solem volens intelligi ait inter cetera:
. . . $v 6% viv kaaéovoi pāvmté ré
kai Aióvvorov. Theo. Smyrn. De
Mus. c. 47, p. 164, Bull, from the
Orphic, Špirot: #Atóv te, pávnra
Pléyav, kal vökra Méxatvav-ºdvºra
uéyav, standing here, as the want
of a connecting particle shows, in
apposition to ##Atov: Helios the
great illuminator. Iamblichus,
Theol. Arith. p. 60: the Pythago-
reans call the number ten pávnro,
kal jºuov. Helios is often named
baé909; e.g. Iliad, xi. 735. Od.
v. 479; in the epitaph in Diog. viii.
78, and elsewhere.
ORPHIC COSMOG ONIES. 107
this story to a very early period. Not only do we clearly
discover in it that pantheism of which we have already
spoken," but the story can only be accounted for by a
desire to reconcile the later interpretation, according to
which Zeus is the ideal sum of all things, and the unity
of the world, with the mythological tradition which
represents him as the progenitor of the last generation
of gods. To this end the Hesiodic myth of the swal-
lowing of Metis by Zeus (in its origin most likely a
rude symbolical expression for the intelligent nature of
the god) is introduced, Metis being combined with
the Helios-Dionysus of the earlier Orphic theology,
with the creative Eros of the cosmogonies, and also
perhaps with Oriental divinities, to form the personality
of Phames. Such an attempt, it is clear, could not
have been made until the period of that religious and
philosophic syncretism, which from the third century
before Christ gradually gained ground, and was first
reduced to a system by the allegorical interpretation of
myths among the Stoics.” To that period therefore we
In this, however, as 1t
* Wide supra, p. 64 sq.
2 Schuster is of a different
opinion, though he agrees with me
in placing the rhapsodic theogony
not earlier than the last century,
or last but one, before Christ. The
verses, he says (p. 42 sq.), which
are quoted in the writing trepl
kóo uov, loc. cit., could very well date
from the time of the Pisistratidae,
as they do not go beyond the well-
known fragment of Æschylus
(cited Part II. a, 28, 2); and the
myth of Phanes-Ericapaeus, as well
as that of Dionysus Zagreus, need
not have come to Greece from the
East earlier than the sixth cen-
tury.
seems to me, the peculiar character
of the Orphic fragments has not
been sufficiently attended to. Pan-
theistic conceptions are certainly
found in the poets of the fitth cen-
tury, and even earlier; but it is
one thing to say generally, ‘Zeus
is Heaven and Earth,’ and quite
another to identify Zeus in detail,
as these verses do, with all the
different parts of the world, and
among other things to attribute
both sexes to him (Zeis &pormv
'yevero, Zeus épéporos én Aero
vöuſpm). No representation of the
latter kind can be proved to have
108 INTRODUCTION.
must assign the elaboration of the Orphic theogony
which we have now been considering.
To sum up, then, the results of our enquiry, the
direct gain which Philosophy has derived from the
ancient cosmologies appears to be less than we may
have been disposed to believe. Firstly, because the
conceptions on which they are founded are so simple
that thought could well have attained to them without
any such help, so soon as it began to apply itself to
the scientific investigation of things; and, secondly,
because these cosmologies in their mythical symbolism
are so ambiguous, and intermingled with so many
fantastic elements, that they afford a very uncertain
foundation for intelligent reflection. If, therefore, the
ancient theologians are to be considered the precursors
of the later physicists, their merit, as was asserted at
the outset of our enquiry, mainly consisted in this:
that they turned the current of reflection towards cos-
mological questions, and left to their successors the
problem of explaining the totality of phenomena by
the investigation of its ultimate causes.
existed in the more ancient period.
We cannot even argue directly
from AEschylus, or his son Eu-
phorion (the probable author of
the fragment), to Onomacritus and
the time of the Pisistratidae.
Lastly, in the Orphic verses, Zeus
is said to be all, because he has
concealed all things in himself, and
brought them again to light ; and
that (as already shown on p. 65)
is the true meaning of the stories
about Phanes in the later Orphic
theogony. There is nothing analo-
gous to this thought before the ap-
pearance of the Stoic philosophy.
It seems the most probable suppo-
sition, therefore, that this feature
was really imported from the
Stoics into the Orphic theology,
and was merely a lifeless imitation
of the theory (Part III. a, 139,
second edition) that the Deity from
time to time took all things back
into himself, and again put them
forth.
IETHICAL REFLECTION. 109
§ V.—Ethical Reflection. Theology and Anthropology in
their relation to Ethics.
If the external world roused the Greeks in their
lively feeling for nature to attempt cosmological specu-
lation, the life and ways of men must no less have
occupied the mind of a nation so intelligent and versa-
tile, so full of freedom and capability in practical life.
It was inevitable, however, that reflection should take
a different course in regard to Ethics from that which
it followed in regard to cosmology. The external
world presents itself even to sensuous perception as a
whole,_a building, the floor of which is the earth, and
the roof, the vault of heaven ; in the moral world, on
the contrary, the unpractised glance sees nothing at
first but a confused mass of individuals or small ag-
gregates moving about capriciously and promiscuously.
In the one case, attention is chiefly fixed upon the
cosmos, the grand movements of the heavenly bodies,
the varying conditions of the earth, and the influence
of the seasons,—in short, upon universal and regularly
recurring phenomena; in the other case, the interest
centres on personal actions and experiences. There the
imagination is required to fill up the lacunae in man's
knowledge of nature by means of cosmological inven-
tions; here we require the understanding to set rules
for practical conduct in specific cases. While therefore,
cosmological reflection is from the outset employed
upon the whole, and seeks to elucidate its origin,
ethical reflection restricts itself to particular observa-
tions and rules of life, which are indeed founded on a
110 IWTRODUCTIO.W.
uniform manner of regarding moral relations, but are
not consciously and explicitly reduced to general prin-
ciples; and are only connected with more universal
considerations respecting the lot of man, the future
destiny of the soul, and the Divine government, in the
indeterminate and imaginative mode of religious pre-
sentation. Ethical reflection is therefore much more
barren than cosmological; starting from a sound and
intelligent observation of what is real, it has certainly
contributed not a little to the formal exercise of thought;
but having arisen from a practical rather than a scien-
tific interest, and being concerned rather with particu-
lar cases than with general laws and the essential nature
of moral action,--from a material point of view its
influence on philosophic enquiry has been far less im-
mediate than that of the old cosmology. The pre-
Socratic Nature-Philosophy was directly connected
with cosmology, but it was only in the sequel that
there arose a scientific moral Philosophy, as the philo-
sophic counterpart of popular wisdom.
Among the writings which show the growth of
this ethical reflection, the Homeric poems must first
be mentioned. The great moral importance of these
poems rests, however, far less on the maxims and moral-
observations which occasionally appear in them, than on
the characters and events which they depict. The tem-
pestuous force of Achilles, the self-forgetful love of the
hero for his dead friend, his humanity to the suppliant
Priam, Hector's courage in death, Agamemnon's kingly
presence, the ripe wisdom of Nestor, the inexhaustible
cunning, the restless enterprise, the wary persistence of
ETHICAL REFLECTION. HOMER. 111
Odysseus, his attachment to home and kindred, the
sight of whom he prefers to immortality with the sea-
goddess, the faithfulness of Penelope, the honour every-
where accorded in the poem to valour, prudence,
fidelity, liberality, generosity to strangers and needy
persons; and, on the other hand, the woes which ensued
from the outrage of Paris, from the crime of Clytem-
nestra, from the treachery of the Trojans, from the
discord of the Greek princes, from the arrogance of
the suitors, these and the like traits made the poems
of Homer, in spite of all the barbarism and violence
that still prevailed in the spirit of that time, a hand-
book of wisdom for the Greeks and one of the principal
instruments of their moral education. Philosophy, too,
has profited more in an indirect manner from these
pictures of human life than directly from the reflections
accompanying them. The latter are confined to short
scattered moral sayings, like the beautiful utterance of
Hector on fighting for one’s country," or that of
Alcinous on our duty to desolate strangers,” or exhorta-
tions to courage, constancy, reconciliation, and so forth,
which are given for the most part, not in a general
form, but poetically, in reference to the particular
occasion ; * observations on the acts and ways of men,
and their consequences,” reflections on the folly of
* Il. xii. 243: eis oiovos ūpt-
aros, &pſilveréal trepi Târpms.
2 Od. viii. 546: ávrl ſcaa tºyvä-
row £eſvás 6' icérms Te Térvktai.
Cf. Od. xvii. 485 and elsewhere.
* Such as the numerous speeches
of the chiefs: ävépes éorrè &c.; or
the discourse of Odysseus, téraaffi
8% ºpačín, Od. xx. 18; or the ex-
hortation of Phoenix, Il. ix. 496,
508 sqq.; or Thetis' injunction to
Achilles, Il. xxiv. 128 sqq.
* Such as the sentences: Il.
xviii. 107 sqq. on anger. Il.
xx. 248, on the use of the
tongue ; Il. xxiii. 315 sqq.
praise of prudence; the observa-
tion in Od. xv. 399, and others.
112 INTRODUCTION.
mortals, the wretchedness and uncertainty of life,
resignation to the will of the gods, abhorrence of in-
justice. Such utterances incontestably prove that not
only moral life, but also reflection on moral subjects,
had made a certain degree of progress in the time to
which the poems of Homer belong, and what has
previously been said on the importance of popular
wisdom in regard to Philosophy applies with equal
force here. We must not, however, on the other hand,
overlook the distinction between these incidental and
isolated reflections, and a methodical moral Philosophy,
conscious of the end it is pursuing.
Hesiod's rules of life and moral observations are-
of a similar character; but it must be regarded as some
approximation to the modes of scientific reflection, that
he utters his thoughts on human life, not merely in-
cidentally in the course of an epic narration, but in a
didactic poem designed for this express purpose. In
other respects, even apart from the economic directions,
and the various superstitious prescripts, which occupy
the second part of the ‘Works and Days, the thoughts
are as incoherent, and as much derived from single
experiences, as the maxims in the Homeric discourses.
The poet exhorts to justice, and warns against in-
justice, for the all-seeing eye of Zeus watches over
the actions of men; well-doing alone brings blessing ;
l Thus in Od. xviii. 129 : oièëv
sity as he wills. Od. vi. 188: bear
3kiðvárepov yaſa Tpépel àvöpétroto
what Zeus has ordained. On the
etc. Il. vi. 146 (cf. xxi. 464):
otn rep påNAwv Yevsh tolfiès Kal
&vāpāv. Il. xxiv. 525: The fate
of mortals is to live among sighs;
Zeus decrees prosperity or adver-
other hand, cf. Od. 132: Man is
wrong to call the gods the authors
of evil, which he himself has
brought down upon himself by his
faults.
JHOMER AND HESIOD. II3
crime, on the contrary, will be punished by the gods."
He recommends frugality, diligence and contentment,
and warmly rebukes the opposite faults; * he says it
is better to keep the toilsome path of virtue than to
follow the more attractive road of vice; * he counsels
prudence in business, friendliness to neighbours, courtesy:
to all who are courteous to us.” He complains of the
troubles of life, the cause of which he seeks, like the
mythologists, in wrong done to the gods by the pride
and presumption of men.” In the account of the five
ages of the world,” he describes (it may be under the
influence of historical reminiscences”) the gradual-de-
terioration of man and his circumstances. Though in
this Hesiod departs considerably, in many respects, from
the spirit of the Homeric poems, yet the stage attained.
by moral reflection is in both cases essentially the
same. But in Hesiod it assumes a more independent
attitude, for which reason only we recognise in him,
rather than in Homer, the precursor of the Gnomic
poets. *
We should be better able to trace the farther de-
velopment of this reflection if more remained to us of
* “Epya kal huépal, 200–283, contented with his originally happy
318 and childlike state, stretched forth
SqQ.
* Ibid. 359 sqq. 11 sqq. 296
Sqq.
* Ibid. 285 sqq.
* Ibid. 368 sqq. 704 sqq. 340
SQQ-
* In the myth of Prometheus
("Epya kal juépal, 42 sqq.; Theo-
gnis, 507 sqq.), of which the general
significance is the same as other
mythical explanations of the evils
by which we feel ourselves op-
pressed; namely, that man, dis-
WOL. Is I
his hand towards good things
which God had forbidden him.
* “Epya kal juépal, 108 sqq.
* Cf. Preller, Demeter und Per-
sephone, 222 sqq.; Griech. Mythol.
i. 59 sq.; Hermann, Ges. Abh. p.
306 sqq. and others. We must
not, however, be too minute in our
conjectures concerning the histo-
rical circumstances on which this
mythus is founded.
114 INTRODUCTION.
the numerous poems written in the next three centu-
ries. Very few of such fragments as we possess carry
us beyond the beginning of the seventh century, and
these contain scarcely anything relevant to our present
enquiry. Even from the fragments of the seventh
century we can glean but very little. We may listen,
indeed, to Tyrtaeus,' exalting courage in battle, and
death for one's country; or describing the disgrace of
the coward and the unhappiness of the conquered; we
get from Archilochus” (Fr. 8, 12–14, 51, 60, 65), from
Simonides of Amorgos” (Fr. 1 sqq.), from Mimmermus"
(Fr. 2 et passim), complaints of the transitoriness of
youth, the burdens of old age, the uncertainty of the
future, the fickleness of men; and, at the same time,
exhortations to limit our desires, to bear our fate man-
fully, to commit the results of our actions to the gods,
to be moderate both in sorrow and in joy. We find in
Sappho" gnomic sentences, such as these: “The beau-
tiful is also good, the good is also beautiful” (Fr. 102);
‘Wealth without virtue does not profit, but in their
union lies the acme of happiness.' Nor must we omit
to mention in this connection Simonides’ elaborate
satire on women (Fr. 6). On the whole, however, the
older lyricists, as also the great poets in the end of the
seventh century, Alcaeus and Sappho, and long after
them Anacreon, seem to have dealt but sparingly in
such general reflections. It was not until the sixth
century, contemporaneously, or nearly so, with the rise
1 Fr. 7–9 in Bergk's edition of 2 About 700 B.C.
Greek lyrics, to which the follow- * Before 650 B.C.
ing quotations relate. Tyrtaeus * About 600 B.C.
lived about 685 B.C. * About 610 B.C.
GNOMIC POETS, SIXTH CENTURY. 115
of Greek Philosophy, that the didactic element in
poetry appears to have again attained greater import-
ance. To that period belong the Gnomic poets—Solon,
Phocylides, and Theognis; their sayings, however, even
irrespective of what we know to be interpolated, are
mostly of doubtful authenticity. During the first half
of the sixth century AEsop also lived, whose legendary
form seems at any rate to prove that instructive
fables about animals, in connection with the general
growth of moral reflection, had then become greatly
developed and popularised. In all these writers we
find, as compared with the older poets, an advance
clearly indicating that thought had ripened by the
acquisition of more varied experience, and by the study
of more complex situations. The Gnomic poets of the
sixth century had before their eyes an agitated political
existence, in which the manifold inclinations and pas-
sions of men found ample scope, but in which also the
vanity and evil of immoderate aims and intemperate
conduct had been demonstrated on a grand scale.
Their reflections, therefore, are no longer concerned
merely with the simple affairs of the household, the
village, or the ancient monarchy; the condition of man
as to his political circumstances is the prominent and
determining element even in their general moral pre-
scripts and observations. They heap up lamentations
over the misery of life, the illusions and instability of
men, and the vanity of all human endeavours; but it
is only to assert the more forcibly that the moral
problem consists in seeking man’s greatest happiness
in the maintenance of just measure, in the order of
I 2
116 INTROI) UCTION.
the commonwealth, in the impartial distribution of
justice, in the reasonable repression of his desires.
This tone is already predominant in the elegies ascribed
to Solon. No mortal, we are there told, is happy, all
are full of trouble" (Fr. 14); each thinks to find the
right, and yet no one knows what will be the result of
his doings, and no one can escape his destiny (Fr. 12,
33 sqq., Fr. 18); * hardly any can be trusted (cf. Fr.
41), mone keeps measure in his efforts; the people by
its own injustice destroys the city, which the gods would
have protected (Fr. 3, 12, 71 sqq.). As opposed to
these evils, the first necessity is law and order for the
state, contentment and moderation for the individual :
not wealth, but virtue, is the highest good; superfluity
of possessions begets only self-exaltation; man can be
happy with a moderate amount, and ought in no case
to draw down upon himself the certain punishment of
God by unrighteous gains.” The well-being of the
state depends upon a similar disposition. Lawlessness
and civil discord are the worst evils, order and law the
greatest good for a commonwealth; right and freedom
for all, obedience to the government, just distribution
of honour and influence—these are the points which
the legislator should keep in view, no matter what
offence he may give by it."
* Fr. 14. otö& udicap oëbels
in Hesiod, Fr. 43, 5 et passim.
aréAeral 8poros, &AA& trovmpol
* In Herodotus, 1, 31, Solon
Trávres; here trovmpbs, in opposition
to uákap, is not to be understood
actively (trévos, causing evil), but
passively (trévos, suffering evil,
érímrovos), as in the well-known
verse of Epicharmus (vide infra,
chapter on Pythagoreism, sub fin.)
distinctly says that death is better
for men than life.
* Fr. 7, 12, 15, 16, and the
well-known story of Herodotus, i.
30 sqq. -
* Fr. 3, 30 sqq. 4–7, 34, 35, 40.

PHOCYLIDES. THEOGNIS, 117
We meet with the same principles in the few au-
thentic fragments that remain to us of the writings of
Phocylides (about 540 B.C.). Noble descent is of no
avail to individuals, nor power and greatness to the
state, unless in the one case wisdom is superadded, and
in the other order (Fr. 4, 5). Mediocrity is best; the
middle rank is the happiest (Fr. 12); justice is the
ideal sum of all virtues." With these ideas Theognis”
also substantially agrees; but in this writer we find
sometimes his aristocratic view of politics, and some-
times his dissatisfaction with his lot (a consequence
of his own personal and political experiences), brought
into undue prominence. Brave and trustworthy people
are rare, Theognis thinks, in the world (v. 77 sqq.
857 sqq.). Mistrustful circumspection is the more to
be recommended in our intercourse with our fellow
men (v. 309, 1163), the harder it is to fathom their
sentiments (v. 119 sqq.). Truth, he complains (v.
1135 sqq.), and virtue, sincerity and the fear of God
have deserted the earth; hope alone remains. Vain is
the attempt to instruct the wicked, instruction will not
alter them.” Fate, however, is as unjust as mankind.
The good and the bad fare alike in the world (v. 373
sqq.); good fortune does more for a man than virtue
(v. 129, 653); foolish conduct often brings happiness,
and wise conduct, misery (v. 133, 161 Sqq.); Sons
suffer for their fathers’ crimes; the criminals them-
1 Fr. 18, according to others, Plato remarks in the Meno, 95 D)
of Theognis, or perhaps taken from it is not very consistent that The-
some unknown writer. ognis should say in v. 27, 31 sqq.
* A native of Megara, contem- et passim, that from the good we
porary of Phocylides. learn good; and from the evil, evil.
* W. 429 sqq., with which (as
118 INTRODUCTION.
selves go unpunished (731 sqq.). Wealth is the only
thing that men admire;’ he who is poor, be he never
so virtuous, remains wretched (137 sqq. 649). The
best thing for man, therefore, is never to be born ; the
next best to die as soon as possible (425 sqq. 1013): no
one is truly happy. But though this sounds very dis-
consolate, Theognis ultimately arrives at the same prac-
tical result as Solon; not indeed in reference to politics,
for he is a decided aristocrat—the nobly born are with
him the good; the mass of the people, the bad (e.g.
v. 31–68, 183 sqq. 893 et passim). His general moral
standpoint, however, approaches very nearly to that of
Solom. Because happiness is uncertain, and because
our lot does not depend upon ourselves, he tells us we
have all the greater need of patience and courage, of
equability and self-possession in good fortune and in
evil (441 sqq. 591 sqq. 657). What is best for man is
prudence, what is worst is folly (895, 1171 sqq. 1157
sqq.); to guard against arrogance, not to overstep the
right measure, to keep the golden mean, is the height
of wisdom (151 sqq. 331, 335, 401, 753, 1103 et
passim). Here, a philosophic moral principle is of
course still wanting, for these scattered rules of life are
not as yet based upon general enquiries concerning the
essence of moral activity, but the various influences and
experiences are already beginning to unite, much more
consciously and definitely than with the older poets, to
form a uniform and connected theory of human life.
* W. 699 sqq. Cf., among tan, who by some authors is
others, the Fragment of Alcaeus in reckoned one of the Seven wise
Diog. 1. 31, and the saying there men.
quoted of Aristodemus the Spar-
THE SE VIEW SAGES.
119
Antiquity itself marked the importance of the epoch
when ethical reflection began to be more decidedly
developed, by the legend of the seven sages.
Their
names, as is well known, are variously given,' and
such details as have come down to us respecting their
lives” sound so improbable that we must regard them
as fiction rather than history. The maxims, too, which
are ascribed to them” are intermingled to such an extent
* Only four are mentioned in
all the enumerations: Thales,
Bias, Pittacus and Solon. Besides
these, Plato (Prof. 343 A) names
also Cleobulus, Myso and Chilo;
instead of Myso, most writers (as
Demetrius Phalereus ap. Stobaeus,
Floril. 3, 79; Pausanlas, x. 24;
Diog. i. 13, 41; Plutarch, Conv.
S. Sap.) substitute Periander
for Myso. Euphorus ap. Diog. i.
41, and the author mentioned
anonymously in Stobaeus, Floril.
48, 47, have Anacharsis. Clemens,
Strom. i. 299 B, says the accounts
fluctuate between Periander, Ana-
charsis and Epimenides; the last
is mentioned by Leander, who has
also Leophantus in place of Cleo-
bulus (Diog. loc. cit.); Dicaearchus
leaves the choice of the three
doubtful sages to be decided be-
tween Aristodemus, Pamphilus,
Chilo, Cleobulus, Anacharsis, and
Periander. Some include also Py-
thagoras, Pherecydes, Acusilaus,
and even Pisistratus, in the num-
ber (Diog. and Clemens, loc. cit.).
Hermippus ap. Diog. (loc. cit.) men-
tions seventeen names among
which the accounts are divided ;
viz. Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias,
Chilo, Myso, Cleobulus, Periander,
Anacharsis, Acusilaus, Epimenides,
-Leophantus, Pherecydes, Aristode-
mus, Pythagoras, Lasus of Her-
mione, Anaxagoras; if we add Pam-
philus and Pisistratus, and the
three named by Hippobotus (ap.
Diog. loc. cit., together with nine
others), Linus, Orpheus, and Epi-
charmus, we get in all twenty-two
persons of very various periods,
who were counted among the seven
wise men.
* For instance, the anecdote
related in Diog. i. 27 sqq., Phoenix
in Athen. xi. 495, and elsewhere
in different versions, of the tripod
(or, as others say, the goblet, cup,
or dish) which was fished up out
of the sea, and intended for the
wisest, was first given to Thales,
passed on by him to another, and
so on, until at last it returned to
him again, and was dedicated by
him to Apollo. Cf. the accounts
of the meetings of the four sages in
Plutarch; Solon, 4; Diog. i. 40
(where two descriptions of such
meetings, probably analogous to
those of Plutarch, are quoted from
Ephorus and a certain Archetimus;
cf. also the statement of Plato
(Protag. 343 A) about the inscrip-
tions they dedicated together at the
temple of Delphi; the interpolated
letters, ap. Diogenes, the assertion
in Plut. De E. c. 3, p. 385, about
Periander and Cleobulus.
* Wide Diog. i. 30, 33 sqq.;
58 sqq. 63, 69 sqq. 85 sq. 97
120 INTRODUCTION.
with later ingredients, and with proverbial expressions
of unknown origin, that very few can be traced with
any certainty to either of these men." They are all,
however, of the same character, consisting of isolated
observations, maxims of prudence, and moral sentences
belonging entirely to the sphere of popular and practical
wisdom.” This quite accords with the circumstance
that most of the seven Sages were celebrated as states-
men and lawgivers.” We cannot but agree, there-
fore, with Dicaearchus" in regarding them as intelligent
men, and capable legislators, but not as philosophers,
or wise men in the sense of the Aristotelian School.”
They only represent the practical culture which, about
the end of the seventh century, received a new impulse
in connection with the political circumstances of the
Greek nation.
sqq. 103 sqq, 108; Clemens,
Strom. i. 300 A sq.; the collections
of Demetrius Phalereus and Sosi-
ades ap. Stobaeus; Floril. 3, 79 sq.;
Stobaeus himself in different parts
of the same work, and many others.
* For example, the lyric frag-
ments in Diog. i. 71, 78, 85; the
word of Pittacus, which Simonides
quotes in Plato, Prot. 339 C; that
of Cleobulus, also quoted by Si-
monides, ap. Diog. i. 90; that of
Aristodemus, quoted by Alcaeus,
Diog. i. 31.
* The remarkable statement of
Sextus (Pyrrh. ii. 65, M X, 45)—
which would presuppose physical
enquiries in others of the wise men
besides Thales; viz. that Bias
maintained the reality of motion—
stands quite alone, and is probably
only an idle and ingenious de-
duction from one of his poems or
Though they cannot be reckoned philo-
apophthegms.
* Solon and Thalès were thus
distinguished, as is well known; Pit-
tacus was Aesymmetes of Mytilene;
Periander, tyrant of Corinth ; Myso,
according to Hipponax (Fr. 34 b,
Diog. i. 107), had been declared by
Apollo the most blameless of men ;
the name of Bias was used prover-
bially for a wise judge (Hipponax,
Demodicus, and Heracleitus ap.
Diog. i. 84, 88; Strabo, xiv. 12, p.
636 Cas, ; Diodorus, Ea.c. de virtute
et vit. p. 552 Wess). Chilo is said
by Herod. (i. 59) to have inter-
preted a miraculous portent.
* Diog. i. 40. Similarly Plu-
tarch, Solon, c. 3 Sub fin. The as-
sertion to the contrary in the
Greater Hippias, 281 c, ascribed to
Plato, is manifestly incorrect.
* Cf. Arist. Metaph. i. 1, 2;
Eth. N. vi., 7.
THE SEWEN SAGES. 121
sophers, in the stricter meaning of the term, they
stand on the threshold of Philosophy, a relation which
tradition has strikingly expressed by distinguishing as
the wisest of the seven, to whom the mythic tripod re-
turns after completing its round, the founder of the
first school of Natural Philosophy.
In order to acquaint ourselves thoroughly with the
soil from which Greek Philosophy sprang, we have
still to consider how far the motions of the Greeks
about God and human nature, before the middle of
the sixth century, had been altered in the course of
advancing culture. That some change had occurred
we may take for granted, for in proportion as the moral
consciousness is purified and extended, the idea of
Deity, from which is derived the moral law and the moral
government of the universe, must also become purified
and extended; and the more man realises his liberty
and his superiority to other natural existences, the
more will he be inclined to distinguish the spiritual
element of his own nature in its essence, origin and
future destiny from the corporeal element. The pro-
gress of morals and of ethical reflection was therefore
of great moment to theology and anthropology; but
their influenee was more broadly apparent when Philo-
sophy had attained to an independent development.
The older poets, subsequent to Homer and Hesiod,
in their motions of Deity, do not essentially transcend
the standpoint of their predecessors; we can only
discover, by slight indications, that a purer idea of
God was gradually forming itself, and the presupposed
plurality of gods more and more giving place to the
T22 INTRODUCTION.
conception of Zeus as the moral ruler of the universe.
Under this aspect Archilochus celebrates him when he
says (Fr. 79) that he beholds the works of men, both
the evil and the good, and even watches over the doings
of animals; and the more the poet is convinced that
fate and fortune order all things, that the mind of man
changes like the day which Zeus allots to him, that the
gods raise those that are fallen, and cast down those
that stand (Fr. 14, 51, 69)—the more earnest are his
exhortations to commit all things to God. So also
Terpander consecrates the introduction of a hymn
(Fr. 4) to Zeus, as the beginning and director of all
things; and the elder Simonides sings (Fr. 1) that Zeus
has in his hand the end of all that exists, and orders it
as he wills. But similar passages are to be found even
in Homer; and in this respect the difference between
the two poets is, perhaps, only one of degree. Solon
more decidedly passes beyond the older anthropomorphic
idea of God, when he (13, 17 sqq.) says, “Zeus, indeed,
watches over all things, and nothing is hidden from
him, but he is not aroused to anger by individual acts
as mortals are ; when crime has accumulated, punish-
ment breaks in like the tempest which sweeps the
clouds from the sky, and so, sooner or later, retribution
overtakes everyone.” Here the influence of moral re-
flection reacting upon the notion of Deity cannot be
mistaken.” We see the same reflection in Theognis
' A later contemporary of 160, and other passages), but the
Archilochus, about 680 B.C. express antithesis of Divine retri-
* That the Divine retribution butive justice, and of human pas-
is often long withheld is a thought sidn, shows a purer conception of
which we continually meet with, Deity.
even as early as Homer (Il. iv.
ANTHROPOLOGY. 123
with a different result; for the thought of the gods’
power and knowledge leads him to doubt their justice.
“The thoughts of men, he says, “are vain (v. 141, 402);
the gods bring to pass all things as seemeth them good,
and vain are all a man’s efforts if the daemon has
destined him to adversity. The gods know the mind
and deeds of the just and of the unjust’ (v. 887).
This consideration is sometimes connected (as in v.
445, 591, 1029 sqq.) with exhortations to resignation,
but in other places the poet irreverently accuses Zeus of
treating good and evil alike, of loading sinners with
wealth, of condemning the righteous to poverty, and of
visiting the sins of fathers on their innocent children."
If we may suppose such reflections to have been at all
frequent in those times, we can the more easily under-
stand that some of the ancient philosophers should
contemporaneously have opposed to the anthropomor-
phic motions of polytheism an essentially different
conception of God. This conception, indeed, could
only have come from Philosophy; unphilosophic reflec-
tion did no more than prepare the way for it, without
actually quitting the soil of the popular faith.
The same may be said of anthropology. The history
of this order of ideas is completely bound up with the
theories about death and a future state. The dis-
crimination of soul and body originates in the sensuous
1 W. 373. év Taitfi uotp: röv re Sikatov čxeiv;
Zeo pſae, gayadºw ore ori Yap irdv- etc.
Tecſ.O’LA) 01/0.0'0'é!S . .
ãv6pdºrov 3’ eſſ oio 6a wdow nal 6vuov similarly 731 sqq., where the ques.
ékáotov . . . tion is likewise asked:
trós 5% gev, Kopovſöm, Toxuá včos kal Tour’ā0avárov 8agiNet, trós
&vöpas àAitpous éortl 6tratov K.T.A.
124 INTRODUCTION.
man from his experience of their actual separation,
from beholding the corpse out of which the animating
breath has departed. Therefore the notion of the soul
at first contains nothing but what may be immediately
derived from that experience. The soul is represented
as an essence of the nature of breath or air; as cor-
poreal (for it dwells in the body and quits it at death
in the manner of something extended"), but without the
completeness and power of the living man. In regard
to the soul after its separation from the body and de-
parture to the other world, we know from the Homeric
representations what was thought on the subject; * the
substance of the man is his body; * the bodiless souls in
Hades are like shadows and shapes of mist, or like forms
which appear in dreams to the living, but cannot be
grasped; vital power, speech, and memory have deserted
them; “the sacrificial blood of offerings restores their
speech and consciousness, but only for a little time. A
few favoured ones, indeed, enjoy a happier fate; * while

* The soul of a murdered per-
son, for instance, escapes through
the wound. Cf. Il. xvi. 505, 856;
xxii. 362, and many other pas-
sages in Homer.
* Od. x. 490 sqq.; xi. 34 sqq.
151 sqq. 215 sqq. 386 sqq.; 466
sqq.; xxiv. sub init. ; Il. i. 3;
xxiii. 69 Sqq.
* The airbs in opposition to
the juxh, Il. i. 4.
* This is the usual description,
with which Od. xi. 540 sqq. 567
sqq. is certainly at variance.
* e.g. Tiresias, who by the
favour of Persephone retained his
consciousness in Hades; the Tyn-
daridae, who alternately lived above
later allegorists have sought so
and beneath the earth (Od. xi.
297 sqq.); Menelaus and Rhada-
manthus, who, the one as the son-
in-law, the other as the son of Zeus,
were taken to Elysium instead of
dying. (Od. iv. 561 sqq.) The
strange statement that Hercules
was himself in Olympus, while
his shadow remained in Hades
(Od. xi. 600)—a notion in which
many profound meanings—is to
be explained simply from the fact
that vv. 601-603 are an interpola-
tion of a later period, when the hero
had been deified, and it was there-
fore impossible to think of him as
any longer in Hades
ANTHROPOLOGY. 125
the saying of Achilles that the life of the poorest la-
bourer is better than dominion over shadows, applies to
all the rest. But as this privilege is limited to solitary
cases, and is connected not with moral worth, but with
some arbitrary favour of the gods, we can hardly seek
in it the idea of future retribution. This idea comes
out, it is true, more strongly in Homer, when he
speaks of the punishments undergone by souls after
death; but here again only marked and exceptional
offences against the gods' incur these extraordinary
penalties, which, therefore, have rather the character of
personal revenge; and the future state generally, so far
as any part of it, either for good or for evil, goes beyond
an indistinct and shadowy existence, is determined far
more by the favour or disfavour of the gods than by
the merits of mankind.
A more important conception of the future life
might be found in the honours accorded to the dead, and
the idea of universal moral retribution. From the
former sprang the belief in daemons, which we first
meet with in Hesiod.” This origin of daemons is
shown, not only by the hero-worship which afterwards
sprang up, but by the passage in Hesiod * which says
* The Odyssey, xi. 575 sqq., re-
lates the punishment of Tityus,
Sisyphus and Tantalus; and in Il.
iii. 278, perjured persons are
threatened with punishment here-
after.
**Epya kal juépal, 120 sqq.
139 sq. 250 sqq.
* Loc. cit. 165 sqq. Cf. Ibycus
Fr. 33 (Achilles we read married
Medea in Elysium). The same
poet represents (Fr. 34) Diomede,
like the Homeric Menelaus, as be-
coming immortal. Pindar, Nem.
x. 7, says the same thing. Achilles
is placed by Plato in the Islands
of the Blest (Symp. 179 E; cf.
Pindar, Ol. ii. 143); Achilles and
Diomede likewise—vide the Scolion
of Callistratus on Harmodius
(Bergk Lyr. gr. 1020, 10, from
Athen. xv. 695 B).
126 INTRODUCTION.
that the great chiefs of the heroic times were taken
after their death to the Islands of the Blest. The
theory of opposite states, not merely for individuals,
but for all the dead, is contained in the doctrine we lately
considered of the mystic theologians, that in Hades the
consecrated ones live with the gods, the unconsecrated
are plunged in night and a miry swamp. But this
motion must have acquired a moral significance later
on ; at first, even when it was not so crudely appre-
hended, it was still only a means of recommending the
initiatory rites through the motives of hope and fear.
Transmigration' took its rise more directly from ethical
considerations; here it is precisely the thought of moral
retribution which connects the present life of man with
his previous and future life. It appears, however, that
this doctrine in early times was confined to a somewhat
narrow sphere, and became more widely diffused first
through the Pythagoreans and then through Plato:
Even the more general thought on which it is founded,
the ethical conception of the other world as a state of
universal retribution, seems to have been slow to receive
recognition. Pindar, indeed, presupposes this concep-
tion,” and in after writers, as in Plato,” it appears as an
ancient tradition already set aside fy the enlightenment
of their time. In the Lyric poets, on the other hand,
we find, when they speak of the life beyond, that they
still keep in all essential respects to the Homeric repre-
sentations. Not only does Anacreon recoil with horror
from the terrible pit of Hades (Fr. 43), but Tyrtaeus
* Wide supra, p. 67 sqq. * Rep. i. 330 D, ii. 363 C.
* Wide supra, p. 70, note 4.
ANTHROPOLOGY. 127
too (9, 3) has no other immortality to set before the
brave than that of posthumous fame; Erinna (Fr. 1)
says the glory of great deeds is silent with the dead;
and Theognis (567 sqq. 973 sqq.) encourages himself
in the enjoyment of life by the reflection that after
death he will lie dumb, like a stone, and that in Hades
there is an end of all life's pleasures. There is no
evidence in any Greek poet before Pindar, of the hope
of a future life.
We find then, as the result of our enquiry up to this
point, that in Greece, the path of philosophic reflection
had been in many ways cleared and prepared, before
the advent of Thales and Pythagoras, but that it had
never been actually attempted. In the religion, civil
institutions, and moral conditions of the Greeks, there
was abundant material, and varied stimulus for scien-
tific thought : reflection already began to appropriate
this material; cosmogonic theories were propounded:
human life was contemplated in its different aspects
from the standpoint of religious faith, of morality, and
of worldly prudence. Many rules of action were set
up, and in all these ways the keen observation, open
mind and clear judgment of the Hellenic race asserted
and formed themselves. But there was as yet no at-
tempt to reduce phenomena to their ultimate ground,
or to explain them naturally from a uniform point of
view from the same general causes. The formation
of the world appears in the cosmogonic poems as a
fortuitous event, subject to no law of nature ; and if
ethical reflection pays more attention to the natural
connection of causes and effects, on the other hand it
128 INTRODUCTION.
confines itself far more than cosmology within the limits
of the particular. Philosophy learned indeed much
from these predecessors, in regard both to its form and
matter; but Philosophy did not itself exist until the
moment when the question was propounded concerning
the natural causes of things.
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 129
CHAPTER III.
ON THE CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY.
IN seeking to determine the common characteristic
which distinguishes a long series of historical pheno-
mena from other series, we are at once encountered by
this difficulty:-that in the course of the historical
development all particular traits alter, and that conse-
quently it appears impossible to find any single feature
which shall belong to every member of the whole that
we want to describe. Such is the case in regard to
Greek Philosophy. Whether we fix our attention on
the object, method or results of Philosophy, the Greek
systems display such important differences among
themselves, and such numerous points of contact with
other systems, that, as it would seem, we cannot rest
upon any one characteristic as satisfactory for our
purpose. The object of Philosophy is in all ages the
same—Reality as a whole; but this object may be ap-
proached from various sides and treated with more or
less comprehensiveness; and the Greek philosophers
differ in this respect so greatly among themselves, that
we cannot say wherein consists their common difference
from others. In like manner, the form and method
of scientific procedure have so often altered both in
Greek and other philosophies, that it seems hardly
WOL. I. K
130 3. INTRODUCTION.
possible to borrow any characteristic distinction from
thence. I cannot, at any rate, agree with Fries' in his
assertion that ancient Philosophy proceeds epagogically,
and modern epistematically; that the one advances from
facts to abstractions, from the particular to the univer-
sal, the other from the universal, from principles, to the
particular. For among the ancient philosophers, we
find the pre-Socratics employing almost exclusively a
dogmatic, constructive method; and the same may be
said of the Stoics, Epicureans, and, more especially, of
the Neo-Platonists. Even Plato and Aristotle so little
confine themselves to mere induction that they make
science, in the strict sense of the word, begin with
the derivation of the conditioned from first principles.
On the other hand, among the moderns, the whole of
the large and influential empirical school declares the
epagogic method alone to be legitimate; while most of
the other schools unite induction with construction.
This distinction, therefore, cannot be carried out. Nor
can we assent to the observation of Schleiermacher,” that
the intimate relation persistently maintained between
poetry and philosophy is characteristic of Hellenic, as
compared with Indian Philosophy, where the two ele-
ments are so blended as to be indistinguishable from
each other, and with the Philosophy of northern nations,
where they never entirely coincide; and that as soon
as the mythologic form loses itself, with Aristotle, the
higher character of Greek science is likewise lost. The
last assertion is indeed untrue, for it was Aristotle who
conceived the problem of science most clearly and defi-
Geschichte der Phil. i. 49 sqq. * Ibid. p. 18.
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 131
nitely; and of the other philosophers, not a few were
quite independent of the mythological tradition—for
example, the Ionian physicists, the Eleatics, Atomists,
and Sophists, Socrates and the Socratic Schools, Epi-
curus and his successors, the New Academy, and the
Sceptics; others, with the freedom of a Plato, made
use of mythology merely as an artistic ornament, or
sought, like the Stoics and Plotimus, to support it
by a philosophic interpretation, without allowing their
philosophic system to be conditioned by it. On the
other hand, Christian Philosophy was always depen-
Tūent on positive religion. In the Middle Ages, this
dependence was far greater than the dependence of
Philosophy upon religion in Greece, and in modern
times it has certainly been no less great. It may be
urged that the Christian religion has a different origin
and a different content; but this is a secondary con-
sideration in regard to the general attitude of Philoso-,
phy to Religion. In both cases, unscientific motions are
presupposed by thought without any previous demon-
stration of their truth. But, in fact, no such decisive
contrast in scientific procedure is anywhere discoverable
as would justify us in ascribing one definite method,
universally and exclusively, to Greek, and another to
modern Philosophy. As little do the results on each
side bear out such a distinction. We find among the
Greeks, Hylozoistic and Atomistic systems, and these
are also to be found among the moderns; in Plato and
Aristotle we see a dualistic idealism opposed to ma-
terialism, and it is this view of the world which has
become predominant in Christendom ; we see the sen-
K 2
132 INTRODUCTION.
sualism of the Stoics and Epicureams reproduced in
English and French empiricism ; and the scepticism of
the New Academy in Hume ; the pantheism of the
Eleatics and Stoics may be compared with the doctrine
of Spinoza; the Neo-Platonic spiritualism with Christian
mysticism and Schelling's theory of identity; in many
respects also with the idealism of Leibnitz: even in
Kant and Jacobi, in Fichte and Hegel, many analogies
with Greek doctrines can be shown ; and in the ethics
of the Christian period there are few propositions which
have not parallels in the sphere of Greek Philosophy.
Supposing, however, that in all cases parallels were not
forthcoming, still the features peculiar on the one hand
to Greek, and on the other to modern Philosophy, could
only be regarded as generally distinctive of each, if
they existed in all the Greek systems, and were absent
from all the modern. And of how many characteristics
could this be asserted P. Here again, therefore, we have
failed to discover any true mark of distinction.
Nevertheless, an unmistakable family likeness
binds together the remotest branches of Greek science.
But as the countenances of men and women, old people
and children, often resemble one another, though their
individual features are not alike, so is it with the
spiritual affinity of phenomena that are connected his-
torically. It is not this or that particular characteristic
which is the same; the similarity lies in the expression
of the whole, in the formation of corresponding parts
after the same model, and their combination in an ana-
logous relation; or if this is no longer the case, in our
being able to connect the later phase with the earlier,
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 133,
as its natural consequence, according to the law of a
continuous development. Thus the aspect of Greek
Philosophy altered considerably in the lapse of years;
yet the features which subsequently showed themselves
were already present in its earliest shape; and however
strange its appearance in the last centuries of its his-
torical existence, closer observation will show that the
original forms are even then discernible, although time-
worn and decomposed. We must not, indeed, expect to.
find any particular quality unaltered throughout its whole
course, or equally present in each of the systems; the
general character of Greek Philosophy will have been
rightly determined if we succeed in indicating the pri-
mitive type, in reference to which the different systems,
in their various declensions from it, are intelligible.
If, for this purpose, we compare Greek Philosophy
with the corresponding productions of other nations,
what first strikes us is its marked difference from the
more ancient Oriental speculation. That speculation,
the concern almost solely of the priests, had wholly
developed itself from religion, on which its direction
and content constantly depended ; it never, therefore,
attained a strictly scientific form and method, but re-
mained partly in the shape of an external, grammatical,
and logical schematism, partly in that of aphoristic pre-
scripts and reflections, and partly in that of imaginative
and poetical description. The Greeks were the first
who gained sufficient freedom of thought to seek for the
truth respecting the nature of things, not in religious
tradition, but in the things themselves; among them
first a strictly scientific method, a knowledge that follows

134 INTRODUCTION.
no laws except its own, became possible. This formal
character at once completely distinguishes Greek Philo-
sophy from the systems and researches of the Orientals;
and it is scarcely necessary to speak of the material
opposition presented by the two methods of conceiving
the world. The Oriental, in regard to nature, is not free,
and has consequently been able neither to explain phe-
momena logically from their natural causes, nor to attain
liberty in civil life, nor purely human culture. The
Greek, on the contrary, by virtue of his liberty, can per-
ceive in mature a regular order, and in human life can
strive to produce a morality at once free and beautiful.
The same characteristics distinguish Greek Philo-
sophy from that of the Christians and Mohammedans
in the Middle Ages. Here, again, we find no free en-
quiry: science is fettered by a double authority—by
the theological authority of positive religion, and by
the philosºphical authority of ancient authors who had
been the instructors of the Arabians and of the Chris–
tian nations. This dependence upon authority would
of itself have sufficed to cause a development of
thought quite different from that of the Greeks, even
had the dogmatic content of Christianity and Moham-
medanism borne greater resemblance to the Hellenic
doctrines than was the case. But what a gulf is there
between Greek and Christian in the sense of the early
and mediaeval Church ! While the Greek seeks the
Divine primarily in nature, for the Christian, nature
loses all worth and all right to existence in the thought
of the omnipotence and infinity of the Creator; and
nature cannot even be regarded as the pure revelation
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 135
of this omnipotence, for it is distorted and ruined by
sin. While the Greek, relying on his reason, seeks to
know the laws of the universe, the Christian flees from
the errors of reason, which to him is carnal, and
darkened by sin, to a revelation the ways and mysteries
of which he thinks himself all the more bound to
reverence, the more they clash with reason and the
natural course of things. While the Greek endeavours
to attain in human life the fair harmony of spirit and
nature, which is the distinctive characteristic of Hellenic <)
morality; the ideal of the Christian lies in an asceti-
cism which breaks off all alliance between reason and
sense: instead of heroes, fighting and enjoying like
men, he has saints displaying monkish apathy; instead
of Gods full of sensual desires, sexless angels; instead
of a Zeus who authorises and indulges in all earthly
delights—a God who becomes man, in order by his
death openly and practically to condemn them. So
deeply rooted an opposition between the two theories of
the world necessitated an equal contrast in the ten-
dencies of Philosophy: the Philosophy of the Christian
Middle Ages of course turned away from the world and
human life, as that of the Greeks inclined to them. It
was, therefore, quite logical and natural that the one
Philosophy should neglect the investigations of nature-
which the other had commenced ; that the one should
work for heaven, the other for earth ; the one for the
Church, the other for the State ; that the science of the
Middle Ages should lead to faith in a divine revelation,
and to the sanctity of the ascetic as its end, and Greek
science to the understanding of nature’s laws, and to the
136 INTRODUCTION.
virtue which consists in the conformity of human life
to nature; that, in short, there should exist between the
two Philosophies a radical opposition coming to light
even when they apparently harmonise, and giving an
essentially different meaning to the very words of the
ancients in the mouths of their Christian successors.
Even the Mohammedan view of the world is in one re-
spect nearer to the Greek than the Christian is, for in
the moral sphere it does not assume so hostile an atti-
tude to man's sensuous life. The Mohammedan philoso-
phers of the Middle Ages bestowed also greater attention
on natural research, and restricted themselves less ex-
clusively to theological and theologico-metaphysical
questions than the Christians. But the Mohammedan
nations were wanting in that rare genius for the intel.
lectual treatment and moral ennobling of natural in-
stincts by which the Greek was so favourably distin-
guished from the Oriental, who was careless of form,
and carried both self-indulgence and self-mortification
to excess. The abstract monotheism, too, of the Koran
is even more directly opposed to the deified world of the
Greeks than the Christian doctrine is. The Moham-
medan Philosophy, therefore, in regard to its general
tendency, must, like the Christian, be pronounced essen-
tially different from the Greek. In it we miss the free
outlook upon the actual world, and therewith the activity
and independence of thought, so natural to the Greeks;
and though it starts from a zealous desire for the know-
ledge of mature, the theological presuppositions of its
dogmatic creed, and the magical conceptions of the
latest antiquity, are always in the way. Lastly, the
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 137
ultimate aim which it proposes to itself consists far
more in the consummation of the religious life and the
attainment of mystic abstraction and supernatural illu-
mination, than in the clear and scientific understanding
of the world and its phenomena.
On these points, however, there can be little con-
troversy. It is a far more difficult task to determine
the specific character of Greek Philosophy as distin-
guished from the modern. For modern Philosophy
itself arose essentially under Greek influence, and by
means of a partial return to Greek intuitions; it is,
therefore, in its whole spirit, far more allied to Hellenic—T
Philosophy than the Philosophy of the Middle Ages, in
spite of its dependence on Greek authorities, ever was.
This similarity is heightened, and the difficulty of
differentiating them increased, by the fact that the old
Philosophy, in the course of its own development,
approximated to the Christian conception of the world
(with which it has been blended in modern science) and
paved the way for that conception. The doctrines
which were the preparation for Christianity are often very
like Christian doctrine modified by classical studies; the
original Greek doctrines resemble in many respects the
modern doctrines which subsequently developed them-
selves under the influence of the ancients; so that it seems
hardly possible to assign distinctive characteristics that
are generally applicable. But there appears at the outset
this fundamental difference between the two Philoso-
phies—viz. that the one is the earlier, the other the later;
the one is original, the other derived. Greek Philosophy
sprang from the soil of Greek national life and of the
138 INTRODUCTION.
Greek view of the world; even when it passes beyond
the original limits of the Hellenic sphere and prepares
the transition from the ancient period to the Christian,
its essential content can only be understood in relation
to the development of the Greek spirit. Even at that
period we feel that it is the abiding influence of
classic ideas which hinders it from really adopting the
later standpoint. Conversely, with the modern philo-
sophers, even when at first sight they seem wholly to
return to the ancient modes of thought, we can always,
on closer inspection, detect motives and conceptions
foreign to the ancients. The only question is, therefore,
where these motives and conceptions are ultimately to
be sought 2
All human culture results from the reciprocal
action of the inward and the outward, of spontaneity
and receptivity, of mind and nature; its direction is,
therefore, principally determined by the relation that
exists between these two sides, which relation, as we
have already seen, was always more harmonious in the
Greek race than in any other, by reason of its peculiar
character and historical conditions. The distinctive
peculiarity of the Greeks lies, indeed, in this unbroken
unity of the spiritual and the natural, which is at once’
the prerogative and the confining barrier of this classical
nation. Not that spirit and nature were as yet wholly
undiscriminated. On the contrary, the great superiority
of Greek civilisation, as compared with earlier or con-
temporary civilisations, essentially depends on this fact
—that in the light of the Hellenic consciousness there
disappears, not only the irrational disorder of primitive
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY, 139
and natural life, but also that fantastic confusion and
interminglement of the ethical with the physical, which
we almost everywhere meet with in the East. The
Greek attains his independence of the powers of nature
by the free exercise of his mental and moral activity;
transcending merely natural ends, he regards the sensible
as an instrument and symbol of the spiritual. Thus
the two spheres are to him separate; and as the ancient
gods of nature were overpowered by the Olympian
deities, so his own natural state gives place to the
higher state of a moral culture that is free, human, and
beautiful. But this discrimination of spirit and nature •
does not as yet involve the theory of radical opposition-T
and contradiction—the systematic breach between them
which was preparing in the last centuries of the ancient
world, and has been so fully accomplished in the Chris-
tian world. The spirit is always regarded as the higher
element in comparison with nature; man looks upon
his free moral activity as the essential aim and content
of his existence; he is not satisfied to enjoy in a
sensuous manner, or to work in servile dependence on
the will of another; what he does he will do freely, for
himself; the happiness which he strives for he will
attain by the use and development of his bodily and
mental powers, by a vigorous social life, by doing his
share of work for the whole, by the respect of his fellow
citizens; and on this personal capability and freedom is
founded that proud self-confidence which raises the
Hellene so far above all the barbarians. The reason
that Greek life has not only a more beautiful form, but
also a higher content than that of any other ancient
…”
140 INTRODUCTION.
t
race, is because no other was able to rise with such
freedom above mere nature, or with such idealism to
make sensible existence simply the sustainer of spiritual.
If then this unity of spirit with nature were understood
as a unity without difference, the expression would ill
serve to characterise it. Rightly apprehended, on the
other hand, it correctly expresses the distinction of the
Greek world from the Christian Middle Ages and from
modern times. The Greek rises above the world of
outward existence and absolute dependence on the forces
of nature, but he does not on that account hold mature
to be either impure or not divine. On the contrary, he
sees in it the direct manifestation of higher powers;
his very gods are not merely moral beings, they are at
the same time, and originally, powers of nature; they
have the form of natural existence, they constitute a
plurality of beings, created, and like unto men, restricted
in their power of action, having the universal force of
nature as etermal chaos before them, and as pitiless
fate above them ; far from denying himself and his
nature for the sake of the gods, the Greek knows no
better way of honouring them than by the cheerful en-
joyment of life, and the worthy exercise of the talents
he has acquired in the development of his natural
powers of body and mind. Accordingly moral life also
is throughout founded upon natural temperament and
circumstances. From the standpoint of ancient Greece
it is impossible that man should consider his mature
corrupt, and himself, as originally constituted, sinful.
There is, consequently, no demand that he should re-
nounce his natural inclinations, repress his sensuality,
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 141

and be radically changed by a moral new birth; no
demand even for that struggle against sensuality which
our moral law is accustomed to prescribe even when it is
no longer based upon positive Christianity. On the con-
trary, the natural powers as such are assumed to be good,
and the natural inclinations as such to be legitimate;
morality consists, according to the truly Greek concep-
tion of Aristotle, in guiding these powers to the right
end, and maintaining these inclinations in right measure
and balance: virtue is nothing more than the intelligent
and energetic development of natural endowments, and
the highest law of morals is to follow the course of
nature freely and rationally. This standpoint is not
a result of reflection, it is not attained by a struggle
with the opposite demand for the renºunciation of nature,
as is the case with the moderns when they profess the
same principles; it is, therefore, quite untrammelled
by doubt and uncertainty. To the Greek it appears as
matural and necessary that he should allow sensuality
its rights as that he should control it by the exercise of
will and reflection ; he can regard the matter in no
other light, and he therefore pursues his course with
full security, honestly feeling that he is justified in so
doing. But among the natural presuppositions of free
activity must also be reckoned the social relations in
which each individual is placed by his birth. The
Greek allows these relations an amount of influence
over his morality, to which in modern times we are not
accustomed. The tradition of his people is to him the
highest moral authority, life in and for the state the
highest duty, far outweighing all others; beyond the
142 INTRODUCTION.
limits of the national and political community, moral
obligation is but imperfectly recognised; the validity of
a free vocation determined by personal conviction, the
idea of the rights and duties of man in the wider sense,
were not generally acknowledged until the transitional
period which coincides with the dissolution of the ancient
Greek standpoint. How far the classical epoch and
view of human life are in this respect removed from
ours, appears in the constant confusion of morals with
politics, in the inferior position of women, especially
among the Ionian races, in the conception of marriage
and sexual relations, but above all in the abrupt opposi-
tion between Greeks and barbarians, and the slavery
which was connected with it, and was so indispensable
an institution in ancient states. These shadow-sides of
Greek life must not be overlooked. In one respect,
however, things were easier for the Greek than for us.
His range of vision, it is true, was more limited, his
relations were narrower, his moral principles were less
pure and strict and universal than ours; but, perhaps,
on that very account, his life was the more fitted to
form complete, harmoniously cultured men and classical
characters."
The classic form of Greek art was also essentially
conditioned by the mental character we have been de-
scribing. The classic ideal, as Vischer * well remarks,
is the ideal of a people that is moral without any break
* Cf. Hegel's Phil. der Gesch. der Phil. s. Kant, i. 79 sqq.; and
p. 291 sq. 297 sqq. 305 sqq.; AEs- especially the thoughtful and for-
thetik, ii. 56 sqq. 73 Sqq. 100 sqq.; cible remarks of Wischer in his
Gesch. der Phil. i. 170 sq.; Phil. Æsthetik, ii.237 sqq. 446 sqq.
der Rel. ii. 99 sqq.; Braniss, Gesch. 2 AEsth. ii. 459. -
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 143
with nature : there is consequently in the spiritual con-
tent of its ideal, and therefore in the expression of that
ideal, no surplus which cannot be unrestrainedly poured
forth in the form as a whole. The spiritual is not ap-
prehended as opposed to the sensible phenomenon, but
in and with it; consequently, the spiritual attains to
artistic representation only so far as it is capable of
direct expression in the sensible form. A Greek work
of art bears the character of simple, satisfied beauty,
of plastic calm; the idea realises itself in the pheno-
menon, as the soul in the body with which it clothes
itself by virtue of its creating force; there is as yet no
spiritual content which resists this plastic treatment,
and which could not find its adequate and direct repre-
sentation in the sensible form. Greek art consequently
only attained to perfection where, from the nature of the
subject, no task was proposed to it which could not be com-
pletely accomplished in the way we have just described.
In plastic art, in the epic, in classic architecture, the
Greeks have remained unrivalled models for all time;
on the other hand, in music they seem to have been far
behind the moderns; because this art, more than any
other, by its very nature leads us back from the fugitive
external elements of tone to the inner region of feeling
and of subjective mood. For the same reasons their
painting seems only to have been comparable with that
of the moderns in respect of drawing. Even Greek lyric
poetry, great and perfect as it is of its kind, differs no
less from the more emotional and subjective modern
lyric poetry than the metrical verse of the ancients from
the rhymed verse of the moderns; and if, on the one
tº nº H1 - " 'oe .
/
144 INTRODUCTION.
hand, no later poet could have written a Sophoclean
drama, on the other, the ancient tragedies of fate as
compared with modern tragedies since Shakespeare,
fail in the natural evolution of events from the
characters, from the temperament of the dramatis
personae; and thus, like lyric poetry, instead of fully
developing its own particular form of art, tragedy has
still in a certain sense the epic type. In all these traits
one and the same characteriss manifested : Greek art
is distinguished from modern by its pure objectivity;
the artist in his creation does not remain within himself,
in the inner region of his thoughts and feelings, and
his work when accomplished suggests mothing internal
which it has not fully expressed. The form is as yet
absolutely filled with the content; the content in its
whole compass attains determinate existence in the
form ; spirit is still in undisturbed union with nature,
the idea is not yet separated from the phenomenon.
We must expect to find the same character in Greek
Philosophy, since it is the spirit of the Hellenic people
that created that Philosophy, and the Hellenic view of
the world that there receives its scientific expression.
This character first shows itself in a trait which indeed
is not easy to define in an exhaustive and accurate
manner, but which must strike every student in the
writings and fragments of ancient Philosophy: in the
whole mode of treatment, the whole attitude which the
author adopts in reference to his subject. That freedom
and simplicity, which Hegel praises' in the ancient philo-
sophers, that plastic repose with which a Parmenides, a

* Gesch. der Phil. i. 124.
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 145
Plato, an Aristotle handle the most difficult questions,
is the same in the sphere of scientific thought as that
which in the sphere of art we call the classic style.
The philosopher does not in the first place reflect upon
himself and his personal condition: he has not to deal
with a number of preliminary presuppositions and
make abstraction of his own thoughts and interests that .
he may attain to a purely philosophic mood; he is in
such a mood from the very beginning. In the treat-
ment, therefore, of Scientific questions he does not
allow himself to be disturbed by other opinions, nor by
his own wishes; he goes straight to the matter in hand,
desiring to absorb himself in it, to give free scope to its
working within him; he is at peace as to the results of
his thought, because ready to accept whatever approves
itself to him as true and real." This objectivity was no
doubt far more easily attainable for Greek Philosophy
than for our own; thought, having then before it neither
a previous scientific development nor a fixed religious
system, could grapple with scientific problems from their

jectivity, furthermore, constitutes not only the strength,
but also the weakness of this Philosophy; for it is
essentially conditional on man's having not yet become
mistrustful of his thought, on his being but partially
* Take, for example, the well- the shortness of human life.’
very commencement with complete freedom. Such ob-
~
known utterances of the Protagoras:
‘Man is the measure of all things,
of Being how it is, of non-Being how
it is not.’ ‘Of the gods I have
nothing to say ; neither that they
are, nor that they are not; for
here is much that hinders me,
the obscurity of the matter and
WOL. I.
These propositions were in the
highest degree offensive at that
period; there was in them a de-
mand for a complete revolution of
all hitherto received ideas. Yet
how statuesque is the style ! With
what classical calmness are they
enunciated 1
146 - INTRODUCTION.
conscious of the subjective activity through which his
presentations are formed, and therefore of the share
which this activity has in their content; in a word, on
his not having arrived at self-criticism. The difference,
however, between ancient Philosophy and modern is
here strikingly and unquestionably displayed.
This characteristic suggests further points for re-
flection. So simple a relation to its object was only
possible to Greek thought, because, as compared with
modern thought, it started from a much more incom-
plete experience, a more limited knowledge of nature,
a less active development of inner life. The greater
the mass of facts with which we are acquainted, the
more complicated are the problems which have to be
solved in attempting their scientific explanation. The
more accurately, on the one hand, we have come to in-
vestigate external events in their specific character; the
more, on the other, has our inner eye become keen for
introspection, through the intensifying of religious and
moral life; the more our historical knowledge of human
conditions widens, the less possible is it to apply the
analogies of human spiritual life to natural phenomena,
and the analogies of the external world to the pheno-
mena of consciousness; to rest satisfied with imperfect
explanations abstracted from limited and one-sided ex-
perience, or to presuppose the truth of our conceptions
without accurate enquiry. It maturally followed, there-
fore, that the problems with which all Philosophy is
concerned should in modern times partially change their
scope and significance. Modern Philosophy begins with
doubt; in Bacon, with doubt of the previous science;


CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 147
in Descartes, with doubt of the truth of our concep-
tions generally—absolute doubt. Having this starting-
point, it is forced from the outset to keep steadily in
view the question of the possibility and conditions of
knowledge, and for the answering of that question it
institutes all those enquiries into the origin of our
conceptions, which at each new turn that they have
taken have gained in profundity, in importance, and in
extent. These enquiries were at first remote from
Greek science, which, firmly believing in the veracity
of thought, applied itself directly to the search for the
Real. But even after that faith had been shaken by
Sophistic, and the necessity of a methodical enquiry had
been asserted by Socrates, this enquiry is still far from
being the accurate analysis of the intellect undertaken
by modern Philosophy since Locke and Hume. Aristotle
himself, though he describes how conceptions result from
experience, investigates very incompletely the conditions
on which the correctness of our conceptions depends;
and the necessity of a discrimination between their
objective and subjective constituents never seems to
occur to him. Even the scepticism posterior to Aristotle
gave no impulse to any more fundamental and theoretic
investigations. The empiricism of the Stoics and the
sensualism of the Epicureans were based as little as the
neo-Platonic and neo-Pythagorean speculation on en-
quiries tending to supply the lacunae in the Aristotelian
theory of knowledge. The criticism of the faculty of
cognition, which has attained so great an importance
for modern Philosophy, in ancient Philosophy was
proportionally undeveloped. Where, however, a clear
- L 2
148 INTRODUCTION.
recognition is wanting of the conditions under which
scientific enquiry must be undertaken, there science
must necessarily itself be wanting in that certainty of
procedure which due regard to those conditions alone
can give. Thus we find that the Greek philosophers,
even the greatest and most careful observers among
them, have all more or less the failing with which
philosophers have been so often reproached. They are
apt to cease their enquiries prematurely, and to found
general concepts and principles upon imperfect or in-
sufficiently proved experiences, which are then treated
as indisputable truths and made the basis of farther
inferences; to display, in short, that dialectical ex-
clusiveness which is the result of employing certain
presentations universally assumed, established by lan-
guage, and recommending themselves by their apparent
accordance with nature, without further enquiring into
their origin and legitimacy, or keeping in view while
so employing them their real foundation in fact.
Modern Philosophy has itself been sufficiently faulty
in this respect; it is humiliating to compare the
speculative rashness of many a later philosopher with
the circumspection displayed by Aristotle in testing the
theories of others, and in examining the various points
of view that arise out of the questions he is discussing.
But in the general course of modern science the demand
for a strict and exact method has more and more made
itself felt, and even where the philosophers themselves
have not adequately responded to this demand, the other
sciences have afforded them a far greater mass of facts
and laws empirically established; and further, these
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 149
facts have been much more carefully sifted and tested,
and these laws much more accurately determined, than
was possible at the period of ancient Philosophy. This
higher development of the experimental sciences, which
distinguishes modern times from antiquity, is closely
connected with that critical method in which Greek
Philosophy and Greek science generally were so greatly
deficient. *
The distinction of subjective and objective in our
conceptions is nearly allied to the distinction of the
intellectual and corporeal, of phenomena within us and
phenomena without. This distinction, like the other,
is generally wanting in clearness and precision with the
ancient philosophers. Anaxagoras, it is true, represents
spirit as opposed to the material world ; and in the
-Platonic School this opposition is developed to its
fullest extent. Nevertheless, in Greek Philosophy, the
two spheres are constantly overlapping one another.
On the one hand, natural phenomena, which theology
had considered to be immediately derived from beings
akin to men, continued to be explained by analogies
derived from human life. On such an analogy were
based not only the Hylozoism of many ancient physi-
cists, and that belief in the animate nature of the world
which we find in Plato, the Stoics and neo-Platonists,
but also the teleology which, in most of the philosophic
schools since Socrates, has interfered with, and not un-
frequently overpowered, the physical explanation of
nature. On the other hand, the true essence of psychic
phenomena was also not determined with accuracy; and
if only a certain number of the ancient philosophers
I50 INTRODUCTION.
contented themselves with such simple materialistic
explanations as were set up by many of the pre-Socratic
physicists, after them by the Stoics and Epicureans,
and also by individual Peripatetics; yet even in the
spiritualistic psychology of a Plato, an Aristotle, or a
Plotinus we are surprised to find that the difference
between conscious and unconscious forces is almost ig-
nored, and that hardly any attempt is made to conceive
the different sides of human nature in their personal
unity. Hence it was easy to these philosophers to
explain the soul as compounded of distinct and radi-
cally heterogeneous elements; and hence, too, in their
conceptions relating to God, the world-soul, the spirits
of the stars, and similar subjects, the question of the
personality of these beings is generally so little con-
sidered. It was in the Christian period that the feeling
of the validity and importance of human personality
first attained its complete development ; and so it is
in modern science that we first find on this point con-
ceptions sufficiently precise to render the confusion of
personal and impersonal characteristics so frequently met
with in ancient philosophy henceforward impossible.
The difference between Greek ethics and our own has
been already touched upon ; and it need scarcely be said
that all our previous remarks on this subject equally
apply to philosophic ethics. Much as Philosophy itself
contributed to transform the old Greek conception of
moral life into a stricter, more abstract, more general
morality, the characteristic features of the ancient view
were in Philosophy only gradually effaced, and were
always more or less present down to the latest period of
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 151
antiquity. Not until after Aristotle was the close union
of morals with politics, so inherent in the Greeks, dis-
solved; and down to the time of Plotinus, we can still
clearly recognise the aesthetic treatment of ethics,
which was also essentially distinctive of the Hellenic
spirit.
The spiritual life of the Greeks in the thousand
years that elapsed between the rise and close of their
Philosophy certainly underwent great and important
changes, and Philosophy was itself one of the most
efficient causes by which these changes were brought
about. As Greek Philosophy represents generally the
character of the Greek spirit, it must also reflect the
transformations which in course of time that spirit has
undergone ; and the more so, because the greater num-
ber and the most influential of the philosophic systems
belong to the period when the older form of Greek
spiritual life was gradually melting away; when the
human mind was increasingly withdrawing itself from
the outer world, to be concentrated with exclusive energy
upon itself—and when the transition from the classic to
the Christian and modern world was in part preparing,
and in part already accomplished. For this reason, the
characteristics which appeared in the philosophy of the
classical period cannot be unconditionally ascribed to
the whole of Greek Philosophy; yet the early character
of that Philosophy essentially influenced its entire sub-
sequent course. We see, indeed, in the whole of its
development, the original unity of spirit with nature
gradually disappearing; but as long as we continue on
Hellenic ground, we never find the abrupt separation
L52 INTRODUCTION.
between them, which was the starting-point of modern
science.
In the commencement of Greek Philosophy, it is
before all things the external world which claims at-
tention. The question arises as to its causes; and the
answer is attempted without any preliminary enquiry
into the human faculty of cognition; the reasons of
phenomena are sought in what is known to us through
the external perception, or is at any rate analogous to it.
But, on the other hand, just because as yet no exact
discrimination is made between the external world and
the world of consciousness, qualities are ascribed to cor-
poreal forms and substances, and effects are expected
from them, which could only in truth belong to spiritual
beings. Such are the characteristics of Greek Philo-
sophy up to the time of Anaxagoras. During this
period, philosophic interest chiefly confines itself to the
consideration of nature, and to conjectures respecting
the reasons of natural phenomena; the facts of con-
sciousness are not yet recognised or investigated as
special phenomena.
This Philosophy of nature was opposed by Sophistic,
which denied man's capacity for the cognition of things,
and directed his attention instead to his own practical
aims. But with the advent of Socrates, Philosophy
again inclined towards a search for the Real, though
at first this was not formulated into a system. The
lesser Socratic schools, indeed, contented themselves
with the application of knowledge to some one side
of man’s spiritual life, but Philosophy as a whole, far
from maintaining this subjective view of the Socratic
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 153
principle, culminated in the vast and comprehensive
systems of Plato and Aristotle, the greatest achieve-
ments of Greek science. These systems approximate
much more closely to modern Philosophy, on which
they have had an important influence, than the pre-
Socratic physics. Nature is with them neither the
sole nor the principal object of enquiry; side by side
with physics, metaphysics has a higher, and ethics
an equal prominence, and the whole is placed on a
firmer basis by the enquiries concerning the origin
of knowledge and the conditions of scientific method.
Moreover, the unsensuous form is distinguished from
the sensible phenomenon, as the essential from the acci-
dental, the eternal from the transitory; only in the
cognition of this unsensuous essence—only in pure
thought—is the highest and purest knowledge to be
sought. Even in the explanation of nature, preference
is given to the investigation of forms and aims as com-
pared with the knowledge of physical causes; in man,
the higher part of his nature in its essence and origin
is discriminated from the sensual part; and the highest
problem for mankind is accordingly found exclusively
in the development of his spiritual life, and above all
of his knowledge. Although, however, the Platonic
and Aristotelian systems show themselves thus akin in
many respects to modern systems, yet the peculiar
stamp of the Greek spirit is unmistakably impressed
on them both. Plato is an idealist, but his idealism is
not the modern subjective idealism : he does not hold with
Fichte, that the objective world is a mere phenomenon
of consciousness; he does not, with Leibniz, place per-
154 INTRODUCTION.
cipient essences at the origin of all things; the ideas
themselves are not derived by him from thought, either
human or divine, but thought is derived from partici-
pation in the ideas. In the ideas the universal essence
of things is reduced to plastic forms, which are the
object of an intellectual intuition, in the same way
that things are the object of the sensuous intuition.
Even the Platonic theory of knowledge has not the
character of the corresponding enquiries of the mo-
derms. With them, the main point is the analysis
_-of the subjective activity of cognition; their attention
is primarily directed to the development of knowledge
in man according to its psychological course and its
conditions. Plato, on the other hand, keeps almost
exclusively to the objective nature of our presentations;
he enquires far less about the manner in which intui-
tions and conceptions arise in us, than about the value
attaching to them in themselves; the theory of know-
ledge is therefore with him directly connected with
metaphysics: the enquiry as to the truth of the pre-
sentation or conception coincides with that respecting
the reality of the sensible phenomenon and of the Idea.
Plato, moreover, however low may be his estimation of
A the phenomenal world in comparison with the idea, is
º removed from the prosaic and mechanical modern
| view of nature; the world is to him the visible god,
the stars are living, happy beings, and his whole expla-
nation of nature is dominated by the teleology which
plays so important a part in Greek Philosophy posterior
to Socrates. Though in his ethics he passes beyond the
ancient Greek standpoint, by the demand for a philoso-
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 155
phic virtue founded on science, and prepares the way
for Christian morality by flight from the world of sense;
yet in the doctrine of Eros he maintains the aesthetic,
and in the institutions of his Republic the political
character of Greek morality in the most decided
manner; and despite his moral idealism, his ethics do
not disclaim that inborn Hellenic sense of naturalness,
proportion, and harmony which expresses itself in his
successors by the principle of living according to nature,
and the theory of goods and of virtue founded on that
principle. The Greek type, however, comes out most
clearly in Plato's mode of apprehending the whole
problem of Philosophy. In his inability to separate
science from morality and religion, in his conception of
Philosophy as the complete and universal culture of
mind and character, we clearly recognise the standpoint
of the Greeks, who made far less distinction between
the different spheres of life and culture than the mo–
derms, because with them the fundamental opposition
of spiritual and bodily perfection was much less de-
veloped and insisted on. Even in Aristotle this stand-
point is clearly marked, although, in comparison with
that of Plato, his system looks modern in respect of its
purely scientific form, its rigorous conciseness, and its
broad empirical basis. He, too, regards the concep-
tions in which thought sums up the qualities of things
as objective forms antecedent to our thought ; not
indeed distinct from individual things as to their ex-
istence, but as to their essential nature, independent;
and in determining the manner in which these forms are
represented in things, he is guided throughout by the

156 INTRODUCTION.
analogy of artistic creation. Although, therefore, he
bestows much greater attention on physical phenomena
and their causes than Plato does, his whole theory of the
world bears essentially the same teleologic aesthetic
character as Plato's. He removes the Divine spirit
from all living contact with the world, but in his con-
ception of nature as a uniform power working with full
purpose and activity to an end, the poetic liveliness of
the old Greek intuition of nature is apparent y and
when he attributes to matter as such a desire for form,
and deduces from that desire all motion and life in the
corporeal world, we are reminded of the Hylozoism which
was so closely related to the view of nature we are
considering. His motions about the sky and the hea-
venly bodies which he shares with Plato and most of
the ancients, are also entirely Greek. His ethics alto-
gether belong to the sphere of Hellenic morality. Sen-
sual instincts are recognised by him as a basis for moral
action, virtue is the fulfilment of natural activities.
The sphere of ethics is distinguished from that of
politics, but the union between them is still very close.
In politics itself we find all the distinctive features of
the Hellenic theory of the state, with its advantages and
imperfections: on the one hand, the doctrine of man’s
matural vocation for political community, of the moral
object of the state, of the value of a free constitution;
on the other hand, the justification of slavery and con-
tempt for manual labour. Thus, while spirit is still
closely united to its natural basis, nature is directly
related to spiritual life. In Plato and Aristotle we see
neither the abstract spiritualism, nor the purely physical
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 157
explanation of nature of modern science ; neither the
strictness and universality of our moral consciousness,
nor the acknowledgment of material interest which so
often clashes with it. The oppositions between which
human life and thought move are less developed, their
relation is more genial and harmonious, their adjust-
ment easier, though certainly more superficial, than in
the modern theory of the world, originating as it does
from far more comprehensive experiences, more difficult
struggles, and more complex conditions.
Not until after the time of Aristotle does the Greek
spirit begin to be so greatly estranged from nature that
the classical view of the world disappears, and the way
is being prepared for the Christian. How greatly this
change in its consequences affected also the aspect of
Philosophy, will hereafter be shown. In this period of
transition, however, it is all the more striking to observe
that the old Greek standpoint was still sufficiently
influential to divide the Philosophy of that time very
clearly from ours. Stoicism no longer carries on any
independent investigation of nature; it withdraws itself
entirely from objective enquiry and substitutes the
interest of moral subjectivity. Yet it continues to look
upon nature as the thing which is highest and most
divine; it defends the old religion, inasmuch as it was
a worship of the powers of nature; subjection to natural
laws, life according to nature, is its watchword; natural
truths (bvaucai évvotal) are its supreme authority; and
though, in this return to what is primitive and original,
it concedes only a conditional value to civil institutions,
yet it regards the mutual interdependence of all men,
I58 INTRODUCTION.
the extension of political community to the whole race,
as an immediate requirement of human nature, in the
same manner as the earlier Greeks regarded political
life. While in Stoicism man breaks with the outer
world in order to fortify himself in the energy of his
inner life against external influences, he yet at the
same time entirely rests upon the order of the universe,
spirit feels still too much bound to nature to know
that it is in its self-conciousness independent of nature.
But nature, consequently, appears as if filled with spirit,
and in this direction Stoicism goes so far that the dis-
tinction between spiritual and corporeal, which Plato
and Aristotle so clearly recognised, again disappears,
matter becomes directly animate, spirit is represented
as a material breath, or as an organising fire; and, on the
other hand, all human aims and thoughts are transferred
to nature by the most external teleology possible.
In Epicureanism the specific character of the Greek
genius is otherwise manifested. Hylozoism and teleo-
logy are now abandoned for an entirely mechanical
explanation of nature; the vindication of popular re-
ligion is exchanged for an enlightened opposition to it,
and the individual seeks his happiness, not in sub-
mission to the law of the whole, but in the undisturbed
security of his individual life. But that which is
according to nature is the highest, to the Epicurean as
to the Stoic ; and if in theory he degrades his external
nature into a spiritless mechanism, so much the more
does he endeavour to establish in human life that
beautiful harmony of the egoistic and benevolent im-
pulses, of sensuous enjoyment and spiritual activity,
CHARACTER OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 159
which made the garden of Epicurus the abode of Attic
refinement and pleasant social intercourse. This form
of culture is as yet without the polemical asperities
which are inseparable from modern repetitions of it, on
account of the contrast it presents to the strictness of
Christian ethics; the justification of the sensual element
appears as a natural presupposition which does not
require any preliminary or particular apology. However
much then Epicureanism may remind us of certain
modern opinions, the difference between that which is
original and of natural growth, and that which is
derived and the result of reflection, is unmistakable
on closer examination. The same may be said of the
scepticism of this period as compared with that of
modern times. Modern scepticism has always some-
thing unsatisfied about it, an inner uncertainty, a secret
wish to believe that which it is trying to disprove.
Ancient scepticism displays no such half-heartedness,
and knows nothing of the hypochondriacal unrest which
Hume himself" so vividly describes; it regards ignorance
not as a misfortune, but as a natural necessity, in the
recognition of which man becomes calm. Even while
despairing of knowledge it maintains the attitude of
compliance with the actual order of things, and from
this very source evolves the drapašta which is almost
impossible to modern scepticism, governed as it is by
subjective interests.” 4.
Even neo-Platonism, far removed as it is from the
* On Human Nature, book i. * Cf. Hegel's remarks on the
part iv. section 1, 509 sqq.; subject. Gesch. der Phil. i. 124
Jacobi's translation. Sq.
160 INTRODUCTION.
ancient Greek spirit, and decidedly as it approaches that
of the Middle Ages, has its centre of gravity still in the
antique world. This is evident, not only from its close
relation to the heathem religions, the last apologist
for which it would certainly not have become had no
essential and internal affinity existed between them, but
also in its philosophic doctrines. Its abstract spiritual-
ism contrasts, indeed, strongly with the naturalism of
the ancients; but we have only to compare its concep-
tion of nature with that of contemporary Christian
writers, we need only hear how warmly Plotinus defends
the majesty of nature against the contempt of the
Gnostics, how keenly Proclus and Simplicius dispute
the Christian doctrine of the creation, in order to see
in it an offshoot of the Greek spirit. Matter itself is
brought nearer to mind by the neo-Platonists than by
the majority of modern philosophers, who see in the
two principles essentially separate substances; for the
neo-Platonists opposed the theory of a self-dependent
matter, and explained the corporeal as the result of the
gradual degradation of the spiritual essence. They
thus declared the opposition of the two principles to
be not original and absolute, but derived and merely
quantitative. Again, though the neo-Platonic meta-
physics, especially in their later form, must appear
to us very abstruse, their origin was similar to that of
Plato's theory of Ideas; for the properties and causes
of things are here regarded as absolute essential natures,
over and above the world and man, as objects of an
intellectual intuition. Moreover, these essences bear
to each other a definite relation of higher, lower, and
CHARACTER of GREEK PHILosophy. 161
co-ordinate, and thus appear as the metaphysical coun-
terpart of the mythical gods, whom neo-Platonic alle-
gory itself recognised in them, recognising also in their
progressive emanation from the primitive essence the
analogue of those theogonies with which Greek specu-
lation in the earliest times began.
To sum up what we have been saying. In the
Philosophy of the middle ages, spirit asserts itself as
alien and opposed to nature: in modern Philosophy, it
strives to regain unity with nature, without, however,
losing the deep consciousness of the difference between
the spiritual and the natural: in Greek Philosophy is
represented that phase of scientific thought in which
the discrimination and separation of the two elements
are developed out of their original equipoise and har-
monious co-existence, though this separation was never
actually accomplished in the Hellenic period. While,
therefore, in Greek, as in modern Philosophy, we find
both the discrimination and the union of the spiritual
and the natural, this is brought about in each case in a
different manner and by a different connection. Greek
Philosophy starts from that harmonious relation of spirit
to nature in which the distinguishing characteristic of
ancient culture generally consists; step by step, and
half involuntarily, it sees itself compelled to discrimi-
mate them. Modern Philosophy, on the contrary, finds
this separation already accomplished in the most effec-
tual manner in the middle ages, and only succeeds by
an effort in discovering the unity of the two sides.
This difference of starting-point and of tendency de-
WOL. I. M
162 . INTRODUCTION.
*w- - -
termines the whole character of these two great phe-
momena. Greek Philosophy finally results in a dualism,
which it finds impossible to overcome scientifically; and
even in its most flourishing period the development of
this dualism can be traced. Sophisticism breaks with
simple faith in the veracity of the senses and of
thought. Socrates breaks with unreflecting obedience

*— A— _------->“”
to existing custom. |Plato opposis to the empirical
world an ideal world, but is º
world any explanation of the other; he can only explain
matter as something non-existent, and can only subject
human life to the idea by the arbitrary measures of
his State. Even Aristotle keeps pure" spirit entirely
distinct from the world, and thinks that man's reason
is infused into him from . In the lesser Socratic
schools and the post-Aristotelian Philosophy this dualism
is still more evident. But we have already seen that,
in spite of this tendency, the original presupposition of
Greek thought asserts itself in decisive traits; and we
shall find that the true cause of its incapacity to re-
concile these contradictions satisfactorily lies in its
refusal to abandon that presupposition. The unity of
spiritual and natural, which Greek thought demands
and presupposes, is the direct unbroken unity of the
classic theory of the world; when that is cancelled
there remains to it no possible way of filling up
chasm which, according to its own stand-point, canno
exist. The Hellenic character proper is not of cours
stamped with equal clearness on each of the Greek
systems; in the later periods especially, of Gree
OHARACTER • OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 163
Philosophy it became gradually blended with foreign
elements. Nevertheless, directly or indirectly, this
character may plainly be recognised in all the systems;
and Greek Philosophy, as a whole, may be said to move
in the same direction as the general life of the people
to which it belongs.
M 2
164 INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER IV.
PRINCIPAL PERIODS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK
PHILOSOPHY.
WE have divided Greek Philosophy into three periods,
of which the second begins with Socrates and ends with
Aristotle. The propriety of this division must now be
more closely examined. The utility of such a course
may seem indeed doubtful, since so eminent a historian
as Ritter' is of opinion that history itself recognises no
sections, and that therefore all division of periods is
only a means of facilitating instruction, a setting up of
resting places to take breath ; and since even a disciple
of the Hegelian school ’ declares that the History of
Philosophy cannot be written in periods, as the links of
History consist wholly of personalities and aggregates
of individuals. This latter observation is so far true
that it is impossible to draw a straight chronological
line across a series of historical phenomena without
separating what is really united, and linking together
what is really distinct. For, in regard to chronology,
the boundaries of successive developments overlap each
other; and it is in this that the whole continuity and
connection of historic as of natural development con-
1 Gesch. der Phil., 2nd edition, * Marbach, Gesch. der Phil.,
Pref. p. xiii. Pref. p. viii.
PRINCIPAL PERIODS. 165
sists. The new form has already appeared, and has
begun to assert itself independently, while the old form
is still in existence. The inference from this, however,
is not that the division into periods is to be altogether
discarded, but only that it must be based upon facts,
and not merely upon chronology. Each period lasts as
long as any given historical whole continues to follow
one and the same direction in its development ; when
this ceases to be the case, a new period begins. How
long the direction is to be regarded as the same must
be decided, here and everywhere, according to the
part in which lies the centre of gravity of the whole.
When from a given whole, a new whole branches off,
its beginnings are to be referred to the subsequent
period in proportion as they break with the previous
historical connection, and present themselves under a
new and original form. If any one supposes, however,
that this grouping together of kindred phenomena is
merely for the convenience of the historian or his
reader, and has no concern with the matter itself, the
discussions in our first chapter are amply sufficient to
meet the objection. It surely cannot be considered un-
important, even for the purposes of convenience, where
the divisions are made in a historical exposition; and,
if this be conceded, it cannot be unimportant in regard
to the matter itself. If one division gives us a clearer
survey than another, the reason can only be that it
presents a truer picture of the differences and rela-
tions of historical phenomena; the differences must,
therefore, lie in the phenomena themselves, as well as
in our subjective consideration of them. It is un-
166 INTRODUCTION.
deniable, indeed, that not only different individuals, but
also different periods, have each a different character,
and that the development of any given whole, whether
great or small, goes on for a time in a definite direction,
and them changes this direction to strike out some other
course. It is this unity and diversity of historical
character to which the periods have to conform ; the
periodic division must represent the internal relation
of phenomena at the different epochs, and it is con-
sequently as little dependent on the caprice of the
historian as the distribution of rivers and mountains on
that of the geographer, or the determination of natural
kingdoms on that of the naturalist.
What division then shall we adopt in regard to the
history of Greek Philosophy It is clear from our
second chapter that the commencement of this history
ought not to be placed earlier than Thales. He was
the first, as far as we know, who, in speaking of the
primitive causes of all things, abandoned mythical
language;—though it is true that the old custom of
making the history of Philosophy begin with Hesiod is
not even in our days, wholly discarded.' Socrates is
generally considered as the inaugurator of the next
great movement, and for this reason the second period
is usually said to open with him. Some historians,
however, would bring the first period to a close before
the time of Socrates; for example, Ast,” Rixner,” and
Braniss. Others, again, like Hegel, would prolong it
beyond him.
! It is still followed by Fries, * Grundriss éiner Gesch, der
Gesch. der Phil., and Deutinger, Phil., 1 A § 43.
Geseh. der Phil., Wol. 1. * Gesch. der Phil., i. 44 sq.
FIRST PERIOD, 167
Ast and Rixner distinguish in the history of Greek
Philosophy the three periods of Ionian Realism, Italian
Idealism, and the Attic combination of these two ten-
dencies. Braniss starts with the same fundamental dis-
tinction of Realism and Idealism, only he attributes
both these tendencies to each of the first two periods.
According to him, therefore, Greek thought, like Greek
life, is determined by the original opposition of the
Ionic and Doric elements. Absorption in the objective
world is the characteristic of the Ionic ; absorption—in
self, of the Doric race. In the first period, then, this
...i. in two parallel directions of
Philosophy, the one realistic, the other idealistic ; in Af
the second, this opposition is cancelled, and lost in O
the consciousness of the universal spirit; and in the |
third, the spirit, deprived of its content through So-
phistic, seeks in itself a new and more lasting content. iº
According to Braniss, therefore, there are three periods
of Greek Philosophy. The first, beginning with Thales
and Pherecydes, is further represented on the one side
by Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heracleitus; and on
the other by Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Parmenides;
a Doric antithesis being opposed at each stage of this
period to the Ionic thesis; finally, the results of the
previous development are summed up in a harmonious
manner by the Ionian Diogenes and the Dorian Empe-
docles. It is recognised that Becoming prºmºſ
Being, that Being expands itself into Becoming, that
the inner and outer, form and matter, unite in the con-
sciousness of the universal spirit; the percipient spirit


* Gesch. der Phil. 3. Kant, i. 102 sqq.; 135; 150 sq.

...-e-º' S
tº hºvº (“
tº 7..… (-,-2' tº 24-
168 INTRODUCTION.
stands over against this universal spirit, and has to reflect
it in itself. Here the second period commences; and in
its development there are three moments. By Anaxa-
goras, spirit is distinguished from the extended object;
by Democritus, it is opposed to the object as a purely
subjective principle; by the Sophists, all objectivity is
placed in the subjective spirit itself; the universal is at
length completely suppressed, and spiritual life is en-
tirely lost in the actual sensible presence. Thus thrown
back upon itself, however, the spirit is forced to define
its reality in a permanent manner, to enquire what is
its absolute end, to pass from the sphere of necessity
into that of liberty, and in the reconciliation of the two
principles to attain the ultimate end of speculation.
This is the commencement of the third period, which
extends from Socrates to the end of Greek Philosophy.
Much may be urged against this derivation. In the
first place, we must question the discrimination of an
Tonic Realism and a Doric Idealism. What is here
called Doric Idealism is, as we shall presently find,'
neither idealism nor purely Doric. This at once de-
stroys the basis of the whole deduction. Ast and
Rixner, moreover, divide the Ionic and Doric Philo-
sophy into two periods: a division quite unwarrantable,
since these two philosophies were synchronous, and
powerfully reacted upon each other. It is to some ex-
tent then more correct to treat them, like Braniss, as
moments of one interdependent historical series. But
we have no right to divide the series, as he does, into
two parts, and make the difference between them
* Cf. the Introduction to the First Period.
FIRST PERIOD. 169
analogous to that between the Socratic and pre-Socratic
Philosophy. Neither of the three phenomena assigned
by Braniss to his second period has this character.
Atomistic (even as to date, hardly later than Anaxa-
goras) is a system of natural Philosophy, as much as
any other of the earlier systems; and to the Empedo-
clean system especially (by virtue of a similar attitude
to the Eleatics) it stands in so close an affinity that we
cannot possibly place it in a separate period. It dis-
covers no tendency to regard spirit as purely subjective,
—its sole concern is the explanation of nature. So,
too, in Anaxagoras we recognise a Physicist, and a
Physicist anterior to Diogenes, whom Braniss places
before him. His world-forming mind is primarily a
physical principle, and he makes no attempt to enlarge
the sphere of Philosophy beyond the accustomed limits.
There is, therefore, no good ground for making as
decided a line of demarcation before him as before
Socrates. Even Sophistic cannot be separated from
the systems of the first period, as will presently appear.
The two periods into which Braniss has divided the
pre-Socratic Philosophy are followed by a third, com-
prehending the whole further course of Philosophy to the
end of Greek science. This partition is so rough, and
takes so little account of the radical differences of the
later systems, that it would of itself furnish a sufficient
reason for repudiating the construction of Braniss.
On the other hand, however, Hegel goes too far in
the contrary direction. He considers these differences
so great that the opposition between the Socratic and
the pre-Socratic schools has only a secondary importance
170 INTRODUCTION.
in comparison with them. Of his three main periods,
the first extends from Thales to Aristotle, the second
comprehends all the post-Aristotelian philosophy, with
the exception of neo-Platonism; the third embraces
neo-Platonism. The first, he says,' represents the com-
mencement of philosophising thought until its develop-
ment and extension as the totality of Science. After
the concrete idea has been thus attained, it makes its
appearance in the second period as forming and per-
fecting itself in oppositions: a one-sided principle is
carried out through the whole of the presentation of
the world ; each side developing itself as an extreme,
and constituting in itself a totality in regard to its
contrary. This breaking up of science into particular
systems results in Stoicism and Epicureanism. Scep-
ticism, as the negative principle, opposed itself to the
dogmatism of both. The affirmative is the cancelling
of this opposition, in the theory of an ideal world, or
world of thought; it is the idea developed into a
i totality in neo-Platonism. The distinction between
the old naturalistic philosophy and later science is
brought forward as a ground of classification in the
first period; it is not Socrates, however, who is the
inaugurator of a new series of development, but the
Sophists. Philosophy attains in the first part of this
* Gesch. der Phil., i. 182 (cf.
sqq., 290) makes one period from
ii. 373 sq.). This, however, does
not quite agree with the previous
distinction of four stages, i. 118.
Similarly Deutinger, whose expo-
sition I cannot further discuss,
either here or elsewhere (loc. cit.
p. 78 sqq., 140 sqq., 152 sqq., 226
Thales to Aristotle (which is the
second according to him), and
divides it into three parts: 1,
Rrom Thales to Heracleitus; 2,
from Anaxagoras to the Sophists;
3, from Socrates to Aristotle.
FIRST PERIOD. 171
period, in Anaxagoras, to the conception of vods; in
the second part, vows is apprehended by the Sophists,
Socrates, and the imperfect Socratics, as subjectivity;
and in the third part, vods developes itself as objective
thought, as the Idea, into a totality. Socrates, there-
fore, appears only as continuing a movement begun by
others, not as the inaugurator of a new movement.
The first thing that strikes us in this division is
the great disproportion in the content of the three
periods. While the first is extraordinarily rich in re-
markable personages and phenomena, and includes the
noblest and most perfect forms of classic philosophy,
the second and third are limited to a few systems which
are unquestionably inferior in scientific content to
those of Plato and Aristotle. This at once makes us
suspect that too much of a heterogeneous character is
included in this first period. And, in point of fact,
the difference between the Socratic and pre-Socratic
philosophy is in no respect less than that between the
post-Aristotelian and the Aristotelian. Socrates not
only developed a mode of thought already existing; he

introduced into Philosophy an essentially new principle—
and method. Whereas all the previous Philosophy had
been immediately directed to the object, -while the
question concerning the essence and causes of natural
phenomena had been the main question on which all
others depended,—Socrates first gave utterance to the
conviction that nothing could be known about any
object until its universal essence, its concept, was
determined ; and that, therefore, the testing of our
presentations by the standard of the concept—philo-
172 INTRODUCTION.
sophic knowledge of self—is the beginning and the
condition of all true knowledge. Whereas the earlier
philosophers first arrived at the discrimination of pre-
sentation from knowledge through the consideration
of things themselves; he, on the contrary, makes all
knowledge of things dependent on a right view as to
the nature of knowledge. With him, consequently,
there begins a new form of science, Philosophy based
upon concepts; dialectic takes the place of the earlier
dogmatic ; and in connection with this, Philosophy
makes new and extensive conquests in hitherto unex-
plored domains. Socrates is himself the founder of
Ethics; Plato and Aristotle separate Metaphysics from
Physics; the philosophy of nature—until then, the
whole of philosophy—now beeomes a part of the whole;
a part which Socrates entirely neglects, on which Plato
bestows hardly any attention, and even Aristotle ranks
below the ‘first philosophy.’ These changes are so
penetrating, and so greatly affect the general con-
dition and character of Philosophy, that it certainly
appears justifiable to begin a new period of its develop-
ment with Soerates. The only question that might
arise is whether to make this beginning with Socrates,
or his precursors the Sophists. But although the latter
course has been adopted by distinguished authors,' it
does not seem legitimate. Sophistic is doubtless the
* In addition to Hegel, ef K. F. of the first great period with the
Hermann, Gesck., d. Platonismus, Sophists; Hermann and Ueberweg
i. 217 sqq. Ast (Geseh. der Phil., make them the commencement of
p. 96). Ueberweg (Grundriss der their second period; and Ast of his
Gesch, der Phil., i. § 9). Hegel, third.
however, opens the second section - …'

FIRST PERIOD. 173
end of the old philosophy of nature, but it is not as
yet the creation or beginning of a new philosophy:
it destroys faith in the possibility of knowing the
Real, and thereby discourages thought from the in-
vestigation of nature; but it has no new content to
offer as a substitute for what it destroys; it declares
man in his actions, and in his presentations, to be the
measure of all things, but it understands by man,
merely the individual in all the contingency of his
opinions and endeavours; not the universal essential
nature of man, which must be sought out scientifically.
Though it is true, therefore, that the Sophists share
with Socrates the general character of subjectivity, yet
they cannot be said to have inaugurated, in the same
sense that he did, a new scientific tendency. The closer
definition of the two stand-points proves them to be
very distinct. The subjectivity of the Sophists is only a
consequence of that in which their philosophic achieve-
ment mainly consists—viz., the destruction of the earlier
dogmatism: in itself this subjectivity is the end of all
Philosophy; it leads to no new knowledge, nor even,
like later scepticism, to a philosophic temper of mind;
it destroys all philosophic effort, in admitting no other
criterion than the advantage and caprice of the indi-
vidual. Sophistic is an indirect preparation, not the
positive foundation of the new system, which was intro-
duced by Socrates. Now it is usual, generally speaking,
to commence a new period where the principle which
dominates it begins to manifest itself positively with
creative energy, and with a definite consciousness of its
goal. We open such a period in the history of religion
174 INTRODUCTION.
X. With Socrates then the second great period of Greek
with Christ, and not with the decay of naturalistic re-
ligions and Judaism ; in Church history, with Luther
and Zwinglius, not with the Babylonian exile, and the
schism of the Popes; in political history, with the
French Revolution, not with Louis XV. The history
of Philosophy must follow the same procedure; and,
accordingly, we must regard Socrates as the first repre-
sentative of that mode of thought, the principle of
which he was the first to enunciate in a positive manner,
and to introduce into actual life. t

Philosophy begins. On the subject of its legitimate
xtent there is even more difference of opinion than on
that of its commencement. Some make it end with
Aristotle, others with Zeno,” or Carneades; * a third
class of historians, with the first century before Christ; *
while a fourth is disposed to include in it the whole
course of Greek Philosophy after Socrates, including
the neo-Platonists.” In this case, again, our decision
must depend on the answer to the question, how long
the same main tendency governed the development of
Philosophy? In the first place the close interconnection
of the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian philosophy
is unmistakeable. Socrates first demanded that all
knowledge and all moral action should start from
knowledge of conceptions, and he tried to satisfy this
demand by means of the epagogic method, which he
introduced. The same conviction forms the starting-
1 Brandis, Fries, and others. * Tennemann (Grundriss), Ast,
2 Tennemann, in his larger work. Reinhold, Schleiermacher, Ritter,
* Tiedemann, Geist, der Spek. Ueberweg, and others.
Phil. * Braniss, vide supra.
SECOND PERIOD. 175
point of the Platonic system; but what in Socrates
is merely a rule for scientific procedure, is developed
by Plato into a metaphysical principle. Socrates had
said: Only the knowledge of the concept is true know-
ledge. Plato says: Only the Being of the concept is
true Being, the concept alone is the truly existent.
But even Aristotle, notwithstanding his opposition to
the doctrine of Ideas, allows this : he too declares
the form or concept to be the essence and reality of
things; pure form, existing for itself; abstract intelli-
gence, restricted to itself—to be the absolutely real.
He is divided from Plato only by his theory of the
relation of the ideal form to the sensible phenomenon,
and to that which underlies the phenomenon as its
universal substratum—matter. According to Plato,
the idea is separated from things, and exists for
itself; consequently the matter of things, having no
part in the idea, is declared by him to be absolutely
unreal. According to Aristotle, the form is in the
things of which it is the form; the material element in
them must, therefore, be endowed with a capability of
receiving form; matter is not simply non-Being, but
the possibility of Being; matter and form have the
same content, only in different fashion—in the one it
is undeveloped, in the other developed. Decidedly as
this contradicts the theory of Plato considered in its
specific character, and energetically as Aristotle opposed
his master, yet he is far from disagreeing with the uni-
versal presupposition of the Socratic and Platonic philo-
sophy, viz. the conviction of the necessity of knowledge
based on concepts, and of the absolute reality of form.
176 INTRODUCTIOA.
On the contrary, his very reason for discarding the
doctrine of Ideas, is that Ideas cannot be substantial
and truly existent, if they are separated from things.
Thus far then we have a continuous development of
one and the same principle ; it is one main fundamental
intuition which is presented in these three forms. So-
crates recognises in the concept the truth of human
thought and life; Plato, the absolute, substantial rea-
lity; Aristotle not merely the essence, but also the
forming and moving principle of empirical reality;
and in all we see the development of the self-same
thought. But with the post-Aristotelian schools this
order of development ceases, and thought takes another
direction. The purely scientific interest of Philosophy
gives place to the practical; the independent investiga-
tion of nature ceases, and the centre of gravity of the
whole is placed in Ethics: and in proof of this altered
position, all the post-Aristotelian schools, so far as they
have any metaphysical or physical theory, rest upon
older systems, the doctrines of which they variously
interpret, but which they profess to follow in all essen-
tial particulars. It is no longer the knowledge of
things as such with which the philosopher is ultimately
concerned, but the right and satisfactory constitution
of human life. This is kept in view even in the reli-
gious enquiries to which Philosophy now applies itself
more earnestly. Physics are regarded by the Epicu-
reans only as a means to this practical end; and though
the Stoics certainly ascribe a more independent value
to general investigations concerning the ultimate
grounds of things, yet the tendency of those investiga-
THIRD PERIOD, 177
tions is nevertheless determined by that of their Ethics.
In a similar manner, the question of a criterion of truth
is answered from a practical point of view by the Stoies
and Epicureans. Lastly, the Sceptics deny all possi-
bility of knowledge, in order to restrict Philosophy
entirely to practical matters. Even this practical philo-
sophy, however, has changed its character. The earlier
combination of Ethics with politics has ceased ; in place
of the commonwealth in which the individual lives for
the whole, we find the moral ideal of the wise man who
is self-sufficient, self-satisfied, and self-absorbed. The
introduction of the idea into practical life no longer
appears as the highest object to be attained; but the
independence of the individual in regard to mature and
humanity,+apathy, & Tapašta, flight from the world of
sense; and though the moral consciousness, being thus
indifferent to the outward, gains a freedom and univer-
sality hitherto unknown to it, though the barriers of
nationality are now first broken down, and the equality
and affinity of all men, the leading thought of cosmo-
politism is recognised, yet on the other hand Morality
assumes a one-sided and negative character, which was
alien to the philosophy of the classic period. In a word,
the post-Aristotelian philosophy bears the stamp of an
abstract subjectivity, and this so essentially separates it
from the preceding systems that we have every right
to conclude the second period of Greek Philosophy with
ristotle. -
It might, indeed, at first sight, appear that an
nalogous character-is-already to be found in Sophistic
nd the smaller Socratic schools. But these examples
vol. 1." N


178 INTRODUCTION.
cannot prove that Philosophy as a whole had received
its later bent in the earlier period. In the first place,
the phenomena which prefigure in this way the after
philosophy are few in number, and of comparatively
secondary importance. The systems which give the
measure of the period and by which the form of Philo-
sophy, generally speaking, was determined, bear quite
another character. And in the second place, this affinity
itself, when more closely examined, is less than it
appears on a superficial glance. Sophistic has not the
same historical significance as the later scepticism ; it
did not arise out of a general lassitude of scientific
energy, but primarily out of an aversion to the pre-
vailing naturalistic philosophy; and it did not, like
scepticism, find its positive completion in an unscien-
tific eclecticism or a mystic speculation, but in the
Socratic philosophy of the concept. The Megaric
philosophers are rather offshoots of the Eleatics than
precursors of the sceptics; their doubts are originally
directed against sense-knowledge, not against reason-
knowledge. A universal scepticism is not required by
them, nor do they aspire to & Tapašta as the practical
end of scepticism. Between Aristippus and Epicurus
there exists this striking difference: the former makes
immediate and positive pleasure the highest good, the
latter absence of pain, as a permanent condition. Aris-
tippus seeks the enjoyment of that which the external
world offers; Epicurus seeks man's independence in
regard to the external world. Cynicism, indeed, pushes
indifference to the outward, contempt of custom, and
repudiation of all theoretic enquiry further than the
THIRD PERIO D. 179
Stoa, but the isolated position of this school, and the
crude form of its doctrine, sufficiently prove how little
can be argued from it as to the whole contemporary
mode of thought. This remark applies to all these im-
perfect Socratic schools. Their influence is not to be
compared with that of the Platonic and Aristotelian
doctrines; and they themselves prevent the possibility
of their more important action, by disdaining to develop
the principle of intellectual knowledge into a system.
Only after the Greek world had undergone the most
radical changes could attempts like those of the im-
perfect Socratics be renewed with any prospect of
SUICCéSS.
The second period then, closes with Aristotle, and
the third begins with Zeno, Epicurus, and the contem-
porary scepticism. Whether or not it should extend
to the conclusion of Greek Philosophy is a doubtful
question. We shall find later on," that in the post-
Aristotelian philosophy three divisions may be dis-
tinguished: the first, including the bloom of Stoicism,
of Epicureanism, and of the older Scepticism; the
second, the period of Eclecticism, the later Scepticism,
and the precursors of neo-Platonism; the third, neo-
Platonism in its various phases. If we count these
three divisions as the third, fourth, or fifth periods of
Greek Philosophy, there is this advantage, that the
several periods are much more equal in duration than
if we make all three into one period. But though
they are thus equalised chronologically, they become
even more disproportionate in content; for the one
* Wide the Introduction to Part III.
* N 2
180 INTRODUCTION.
*
century from the appearance of Socrates to the death
of Aristotle embraces an amount of scientific achieve-
ment equal to the eight or nine following centuries put
together. And, what is here most essential, Philosophy
in these 900 years moves in the same uniform direction.
It is governed by an exclusive subjectivity, which is
estranged from the purely speculative interest in things,
and reduces all science to practical culture and the
happiness of man. This character is displayed (as we
have just observed), by Stoicism, Epicureanism, and
Scepticism. It is seen in the Eclecticism of the
Roman period, which selects what is probable out of the
different systems entirely from practical points of view,
and according to the standard of subjective feeling and
interest. Finally, it is an essential part of neo-Platonism.
This will be shown more in detail hereafter ; at present
it is enough to notice that the attitude of the neo-
Platonists to natural science is exactly the same as that
of the other schools posterior to Aristotle; and that
their physics tend in the same direction as the Stoical
teleology, only more exclusively. Their ethical doctrine
is also very closely allied to that of the Stoics, being in-
deed the kast outcome of that ethical dualism which
developed itself after the time of Zeno; and the dualism
contained in their anthropology had already been pre-
pared by Stoicism. In regard to religion, the position
originally adopted by neo-Platonism was precisely that
of the Stoa, and even its metaphysic, including the
doctrine of the intuition of the Deity approaches much
nearer to the other Aristotelian systems than might at
irst sight be supposed. The neo-Platonic theory of
THIRD PERIOD. 181
emanation, for example, is an unmistakable repetition
of the Stoic doctrine of the Divine reason permeating
the whole universe with its various forces: the only
ultimate distinction between them is the transcendency
of the Divine; from which arises for man, the require-
ments of an ecstatic contact with Deity. This transcen–
dency itself, however, is a consequence of the previous
development of science, and of the sceptical denial of all
objective certainty. The human spirit, scepticism had
said, has absolutely no truth within itself. It must,
therefore, says neo-Platonism, find truth absolutely out-
side itself, in its relation to the Divine, which is beyond
its thought and the world cognisable by thought. But
it follows that the world beyond is presented entirely
according to subjective points of view, and determined
by the necessities of the subject; and just as the dif-
ferent spheres of the real correspond to the different
parts of human nature, so the whole system is designed
to point out and to open the way for man's communion
with God. Here too them, it is the interest of human
spiritual life, not that of objective knowledge as such,
which governs the system; and thus neo-Platonism fol-
lows the tendency peculiar to the whole of Philosophy
subsequent to Aristotle. While, therefore, I attach no
undue importance to this question, I prefer to unite the
three sections into which the history of Philosophy after
Aristotle is divided into one period, although its outward
extent far exceeds that of either of the preceding periods.
To sum up, I distinguish three great periods of
Greek Philosophy. The philosophy of the first is
Physics, or more accurately a physical dogmatism; it
182 INTRODUCTION.
is physical, because it primarily seeks to explain natural
phenomena from their natural causes, without making
any definite discrimination of spiritual and corporeal in
things, or the causes of things; it is a dogmatism, be-
cause it directly pursues the knowledge of the objective,
without any previous enquiry into the conception, pos-
sibility, and conditions of knowledge. In Sophistic,
this attitude of thought to the external world is at
an end, man's capacity for the knowledge of the real
is called in question, philosophic interest is averted
from mature, and the necessity of discovering a higher
principle of truth on the soil of human consciousness
makes itself felt. Socrates answers the demand in
declaring the cognition of the concept the only way to
true knowledge and true virtue; from which Plato
further concludes, that only pure concepts can be true
reality ; he establishes this principle dialectically in
conflict with ordinary presentative opinion, and deve-
lops it in a system embracing Dialectic, Physics, and
Ethics. Finally, Aristotle discovers the concept in the
phenomena themselves, as their essence and entelechy,
carries it in the most comprehensive manner into all
the spheres of the actual, and establishes the prin-
ciples of the scientific method on a firm basis for after
times. In place of the former one-sided philosophy of
nature there thus appears in the second period a philo-
\ sophy of the concept, founded by Socrates and perfected
by Aristotle. But since the idea is thus opposed to the
phenomenon, since a full essential Being is ascribed to
the idea, and only an imperfect Being to the pheno-
menon, a dualism arises, which appears indeed more

*
N
GENERAL SUMMA R Y. 183
glaring and irreconcilable in Plato, but which even
Aristotle is unable to overcome either in principle or
Th" result; for he, too, begins with the opposition of &
form and material, and ends with..that of God and the
world, of spiritual and sensible. Only the spirit in its
absoluteness, directed to no external object and suf-
ficing to itself, is perfect and infinite; that which is
external to it cannot increase this inner perfection or
be otherwise than valueless and indifferent for it. So,
too, the human spirit ought to seek its unqualified
satisfaction in itself, and in its independence of every-
thing external. Thought in pursuing this tendency
withdraws from the object into itself, and the second
period of Greek Philosophy passes into the third.
Or to state the same more succinctly. The spirit,
we might say, is, during the first stage of Greek
thought, immediately present to itself in the natural
object; in the second it separates itself from the natural
object, that it may attain a higher truth in the thought
of the super-sensible object, iTuring third it asserts
itself in its subjectivity, in opposition to the object, as \--~
supreme and unconditioned. The stand-point, however,
of the Greek world is thereby abandoned, while at
the same time no deeper reconciliation of the opposing
elements is possible on Greek soil. Thought being
thus separated from the actual, loses its content, and
becomes involved in a contradiction, for it maintains
subjectivity to be the final and highest form of being,
and yet opposes to it the Absolute in unattainable
transcendency. To this contradiction Greek Philosophy |
ultimately succumbed.


184 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
FIRST PERIOD.
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
INTRODUCTION.
CHARACTER AND DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY DURING
THE FIRST PERIOD.
Four schools are usually distinguished in the pre-
Socratic period—the Ionic, the Pythagorean, the
Eleatic, and the Sophistic. The character and internal
relation of these schools are determined, partly accord-
ing to the scope, partly according to the spirit of their
enquiries. In regard to the former, the distinctive
peculiarity of the pre-Socratic period is marked in the
isolation of the three branches which were afterwards
united in Greek Philosophy: by the Ionians, we are
told, Physics were exclusively developed; by the Pytha-
goreans, Ethics; by the Eleatics, Dialectic : in Sophistic,
we are taught to see the decline and fall of this ex-
clusive science, and the indirect preparation for a more
comprehensive science." This difference of scientific
tendency is then brought into connection with the in-
1 Schleiermacher, Gesch. der
Phil. p. 18 sq., 51 sq.; Ritter,
view, and adopted the following
division : 1. The older Ionian
Gesch. der Phil. i. 189 sqq.; Bran-
dis, Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil. i.
42 sqq.; Fichte's Zeitschr, für Phi-
los. xiii. (1844) p. 131 sqq. In his
Gesch. der Entwicklungen d. Griech.
Phil. (i. 40), which appeared sub-
sequently, Brandis abandoned this
º
JPhysics, including the Heracleitean
doctrine. 2. The Eleatics. 3. The
attempts to reconcile the opposition
of Being and Becoming (Empe-
docles, Anaxagoras, and the Ato-
mists). 4. The Pythagorean doc-
trine. 5. Sophistic.
PHYSICS, ETHICS, DIALECTIC. 185
trinsic difference between the Ionic and Doric tribes: 1
some writers” making this the basis of their whole theory
of ancient Philosophy, and deriving from the particular
traits of the Ionic and Doric character, the philosophic
opposition of a realistic and an idealistic theory of the
world. How the further division of our period is then
connected with this point of view has been shown already.
These differences, however, are by no means so real
or so deeply seated as is here presupposed. Whether
the Pythagorean doctrine was essentially ethical, and
the Eleatic, dialectical in character, or whether these
elements can be regarded as determining the two
systems, we shall presently enquire; and we shall find
that they, as much as any part of the pre-Socratic
Philosophy, arose from the inclimation of natural
science to investigate the essence of things, and
especially of natural phenomena. Aristotle makes the
general assertion that with Socrates, dialectical and
ethical enquiries began, and physical enquiries were
discontinued.” Hermann is, therefore, quite justified
* Cf. Schleiermacher, loc. cit.,
p. 18 sq. ‘Among the Ionians,’ he
says, “the Being of things in man
is the predominant interest, and
calm contemplation finds its ex-
pression in Epic poetry. Among
the Dorians the Being of man in
things predominates; man strives
against things, asserts his inde-
pendence in regard to them, and
proclaims himself as a unity in
Lyric poetry. Hence the develop-
ment of Physics by the Ionians,
and of Ethics by the Pythagoreans.
As Dialectic, is equally opposed to
the two branches of Philosophy,
so the Eleatics are neither Ionians
nor Dorians, but a union of the
two ; they are Ionian by birth, and
Dorian by language.” Ritter ex-
presses similar opinions, loc. cit.
Ritter shares them to some extent
(p. 47), and in a less degree,
Brandis, p. 47.
* Ast, Rixner, Braniss (vide
Supra, p. 166 sqq.) Petersen, Phi-
lologisch, histor. Studien, p. 1 sqq.;
Hermann, Geschichte und System des
Plato, i. 141 sq., 160; cf. Böckh's
excellent remarks on this subject,
Philolaus, p. 39 sqq.
* Pará. Amin. i. 1, 642 a,
24: among the earlier philoso-
phers there are only scattered fore-
186 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY,
in saying that it is impossible to maintain, even from
the stand-point of the ancient thinkers, that Dialectics,
Physics and Ethics came into existence together, and
were of equal importance contemporaneously, for there
could have been no question of any leading ethical
principle until the preponderance of spirit over matter
had been recognised ; nor could Dialectic, as such, have
been consciously employed, before form in contrast with
matter had vindicated its greater affinity to spirit.
The object of all philosophic investigation, he con-
tinues, in its commencement was nature, and if even
enquiry was incidentally carried into other spheres, the
standard which it applied, being originally taken from
natural science, remained foreign to those spheres. We
are, therefore, merely importing our own stand-point
into the history of the earliest philosophic systems, in
ascribing a dialectic character to one, an ethical
character to another, a physiological character to a
third; in describing this system as materialistic, and
that as formalistic, while all in truth pursue the same
end, only in different ways." The whole pre-Socratic
Philosophy is in its aim and content a philosophy of
nature, and though ethical or dialectical conceptions
may appear here and there in it, this never happens
to such an extent, nor is any system sufficiently dis-
casts of the conception of formal
causes: ałrtov Šē too u%) éA6eiv rob:
Trpoyevertépous étrl Tov tpétrov too-
rov, 3rt to rí ºv sival ical roëptoraoréal
Thy oiglav oil, ºv, &AA’ #paro uév
Amuákpitos trpºros, &s owic &vayicat-
ov 8& rſ, pvaukň 6eaſ-ovoptg, &AA’
ékpepópevos ūr' airrot row trpdypatos,
étrl Xokpárovs 6% rooto wºv müşh9m,
to 6% (mtéïv tá trepl púgews éamée,
trpos 3& Thu Xphoruov &perhu kal
Thu troxiruchy &rékatvav of pixogo-
q,00vres. •
* Gesch, und Syst, d. Plato, i.
140 sq.
PHYSICS, ETHICS, DIALECTIC 187
tinguished in this respect from all the others, that we
can properly characterise it as dialectical or ethical.
This result must at once cause us to mistrust any
º of a realistic and an idealistic philo-
ophy. True idealism can only exist where the spiritual
garded as the more primitive of the two. In that sense,
for example, Plato, Leibniz and Fichte are idealists.
Where this is the case, there always arises the necessity
for making the spiritual as such the object of enquiry;
Dialectic, Psychology, Ethics are separated from natural
hilosophy. If, therefore, neither of these sciences
ttained a separate development previous to Socrates, it
roves that the definite discrimination of the spiritual
rom the sensible, and the derivation of the sensible
rom the spiritual—in which philosophic idealism con-
ists—was still alien to this period. Neither the Pytha-
oreans nor the Eleatics are, in reality, idealists; at
my rate they are not more so than other philosophers,
ho are assigned to the realistic division. In com-
arison with the older Ionic school, we find, indeed,
hat they attempt to get beyond the sensible pheno-
enon; instead of seeking the essence of all things
ike their predecessors in a corporeak substratum, the Py-
hagoreans sought it in Number, the Eleatics in Being
ithout further determination. But the two systems
o not advance equally far in this direction ; for if the
ythagoreans give to Number as the universal form of
he sensible, the same position and significance as the
leatics subsequently to Parmenides give to the abstract
oncept of Being, they stop greatly short of the Eleatics
is consciously distinguished from the sensible, and re-_










188 THE PRE-SOCRATION PHILOSOPHY.
in the abstraction of the qualities of the sensible ph
nomenon. It would, therefore, be more correct to spea
of three philosophic tendencies instead of two : a real
istic, an idealistic, and an intermediate tendency. W
have really, however, no right to describe the Italian
philosophers as Idealists. For although their first
principle is, according to our ideas, incorporeal, the
precise discrimination of spiritual from corporeal is
with them entirely wanting. Neither the Pythagorear
Number, nor the Eleatic One, is a spiritual essence
distinct from the sensible, like the Platonic ideas; or
the contrary, these philosophers maintain that sensible
things are according to their true essence, numbers; o
that they are one invariable substance." Number and
Being are the substance of the bodies themselves, the
matter of which the bodies consist, and for this reason
they are apprehended sensuously. Conceptions o
number and conceptions of magnitude interpenetrat
one another with the Pythagoreans; numbers becom
something extended; and among the Eleatics, eve
Parmenides describes Being as the substance which fill
space. So in the further development of the system
there is a confusion of spiritual and corporeal. Th
Pythagoreans declare bodies to be numbers: but virtu
friendship and the soul are also numbers, or numeric
proportions; may, the soul itself is regarded as a co
poreal thing.” Similarly, Parmenides says,” that reaso
* This may be in itself a con- held by the ancient philosophers.
tradiction (as Steinhart points out * Aristotle, De An. i. 2, 404
in the Hall. Allg. Literature. 1845, 17. Wide infra, Pythagoreans.
Nov. p. 891), but it does not fol- * That Parmenides says th
low that it may not have been only in the 'second part of h

















REALISM AND IDEALISM. 189
in man depends upon the admixture of his bodily parts,
for the body and the thinking principle are one and
the same ; even the celebrated proposition about the
unity of thought and Being has not the same meaning.
ith him as in modern—systems—It cannot be, as,
Ribbing calls it,” “the principle of idealism, for it is
hot derived from the thi iſldu Kill garises fro
Thought, but conversely from the theorem that Thought
alſº under the conception of Being; in the former
ase only could it be idealistic, in the latter it must be
onsidered realistic. Again, when Parmenides connects
is Physics with his doctrine of Being, he parallels
he antithesis of Being and non-Being, not with the
ntithesis of spiritual and corporeal, but with that
f light and darkness. Aristotle asserts that the
ythagoreans presuppose, like the other natural philo-
ophers, that the sensible world embraces all reality;”
e makes them to differ from Plato in that they hold
umbers to be the things themselves, whereas Plato
istinguishes the ideas from things; * he describes the
ythagorean Number, notwithstanding its incorpore-
lity, as a material principle.” He includes Parmenides,
tirely to the explanation of nature
ël Ll2 allSé OIC
oem proves nothing against the
bove application of the words. If
e had been clearly conscious of
e difference between spiritual and
pressed himself even in his hypo-
etical explanation of phenomena.
* W. 94 sqq.
* Genet. Darst. der platon.
eenlehre, i. 378, cf. 28 sq.
* Metaph. i. 8, 989 b, 29 sqq.
"he Pythagoreans, it is true, admit
on-sensible principles, but they
evertheless confine themselves en-
rporeal, he would not thus have
às àuoMo'youvres toſs &AAois puorio-
Aóyous, Šti Tô ye by roor’ or riv
ãorov airømtöv čoºri kai trepietamºpe v 6
kaxočaevos oëpavós.
* Metaph. i. 6, 987 b, 25 sqq.
* Metaph. i. 5, 989 a, 15:
‘patvout at 6% ral oirot Tov čplbubv
voutgovres àpx?iv efval kal &s 5Amy
toſs of ori, kal &s tra.0m Te Kal éðels.
Ibid. b, 6: éoticagº .. 6° às év iſºms
etàel r& grouxeia. Tørretv. čk rotºrov
Y&p Ös évvirapxávrov avved tâval
cal tretradio 9at paal rºw oia'tav.














190 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
with Protagoras, Democritus and Empedocles, among
those who held that the sensible only is the real; and
it is from this source that he derives the Eleatic theory
of the sensible world.” On all these points we must
allow him to be fully justified. The Italian philo-
sophers likewise commence with an enquiry into the
essence and grounds of sensible phenomena; and the
seek for these in that which underlies things, and is
not perceptible to sense. In so doing, they transcen
indeed the ancient Ionian Physics, but not the later
systems of natural philosophy. That the true essenc
of things is to be apprehended not by the senses, but
by the understanding alone, is also taught by Hera
cleitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomisti
Philosophy. They, too, hold that the ground of th
sensible lies in the not-sensible. Democritus himself
thorough materialist as he was, has no other definitio
for matter than the Eleatic conception of Being; Hera
cleitus considers the law and relation of the whole t
be alone the permanent element in phenomena; Anaxa
goras is the first who distinguishes spirit clearly an
definitely from matter, and he is for that reason, in
well-known passage of Aristotle, placed far above al
his predecessors.” If, therefore, the opposition of Ma
* Metaph. iv. 5, 1010 a. 1
(after speaking of Protagoras, De-
mocritus, Empedocles, and Parme-
nides): ałrtov Šē ràs 56&ms rotºrous,
3rt repl wºv táv čvrov thu &A#6slav
éorkómovy, rô 5’ 8vra. ÖréAaflov sivat
T& aio 6mtā uávov.
2 De Coelo, iii. 1, 298 b, 21 ff.:
&ceivot 5 [of trept MéAlgorów re ka?
IIappeviðmw) ātā ºrb unbºy uév &AA
trap. Thu Tów aio.6m rôv oãortav Štro
Aapabávelv eival, rotatºras Sé riva
[sc. &Kuvárovs] voioſal trpárol pāore,
efirep #otal tis yuáo is 3 ppóvmorus
oiſta aethveykav ćr raûra roës
éke?6ev Aóryovs.
* Metaph. i. 3,984 b, 15: vojv 8
tus sitàv éveſval ka0árep &v rois Cºol




















IONIANS AND DORIANS. 191
terialism and Idealism is to furnish a principle of
division for ancient philosophy, this division must be
limited not only, as Braniss maintains, to the epoch pre-
ceding Anaxagoras, but preceding Heracleitus. Even
then, strictly speaking, it is not applicable, nor does
it take account of the intermediate position of the
Pythagoreans between the Ionians and the Eleatics.
This double tendency of philosophic thought is also
said to correspond with the opposition of the Ionic and
Doric elements, and, accordingly, all the philosophers
until the time of Socrates, or rather Anaxagoras, are
assigned either to an Ionic or a Doric series of develop-
ment. This division is certainly more exact than that
of some of the ancient historians," who divided the
whole of Greek Philosophy into Ionian and Italian.
But even in regard to the most ancient schools, so far
as their internal relations have to be represented, such
a division can hardly be carried out. Among the
Dorians, Braniss counts Pherecydes, the Pythagoreans,
the Eleatics and Empedocles. Ast makes the addition
of Leucippus and Democritus. Now it is difficult to
see how Pherecydes can be placed among the Dorians,
and the same may be said of Democritus, and probably
kal év tº pörel rov ałrtov roi, kóguov
kal Tästä;eas trägms oiovvi'povépávm
trap' eikh Aéyovras rows trpátepov.
* Diogenes, i. 13; that he is
here following older authorities is
clear (as Brandis loc. cit. p. 43
shows) from the fact of the schools
he mentions only coming down to
the time of Clitomachus (129-110
B.C.) cf. Augustine. Civ. Dei, viii.
2; the Aristotelian Scholiast, Schol.
in Arist., 323, a, 36, and the Pseudo-
Galen (Hist. Phil. c. 2, p. 228)
Kühn ; this last further divides the
Italian philosophers into Pythago-
reans and Eleatics, and so far agrees
with the theory of three schools—
Italian, Ionian, and Eleatic (Cle-
mens, Al. Strom. i. 300 c.) The re-
view of the earlier philosophers in
Aristotle's first book of Metaphysics
follows the order of dogmatic points
of view, and would be out of place
in regard to our present purpose.
192 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
of Leucippus. Moreover, the founder of Pythagorism
was by birth an Ionian of Asia Minor; and though the
Doric spirit manifests itself in his mode of life, his
philosophy seems to betray the influence of the Ionian
Physics. Empedocles was born, it is true, in a Doric
colony; but the language of his poem is that of the
Ionian epos. The Eleatic School was founded by an
Ionian of Asia Minor, it received its final development
in an Ionian settlement, and in the person of one of its
last great representatives, Melissus, it returned to Asia
Minor." There remain, therefore, of pure Dorians, only
the Pythagoreans, with the exception of the founder
of the school, and, if we will, Empedocles. It has
been said that it is not necessary that the philosophers
of either division should belong to it also by birth; *
and this condition certainly ought not to be insisted on
in the case of every individual. But it is surely indis-
pensable with regard to each division as a whole; all
their members should be either Doric or Ionic, if not
by birth, at least by education. Instead of this, we
find more than half the so-called Dorian philosophers,
not only belonging by birth and extraction to the
Ionian race, but receiving their education from it,
through national customs, civil institutions, and what
is especially important, language. Under these cir-
cumstances, differences of tribe are of very secondary
moment. They may have influenced the direction of
1 Petersen (Philol. hist. Stu- has been shown by Hermann,
dien, p. 15) also thinks he can dis- Zeitschrift für Alterthumsw., 1834,
cover an AEolic element in the p. 298.
Eleatics. That there is not the * Braniss, loc. cit. p. 103.
slightest ground for this conjecture
IONIANS AND DORIANS, 193
thought, but cannot be regarded as having determined
it."
In the ulterior development of these two series,
the Ionian and the Dorian, Braniss opposes Thales to
Pherecydes, Anaximander to Pythagoras, Anaximenes
to Xenophanes, Heracleitus to Parmenides, Diogenes of
Apollonia to Empedocles. Such a construction, how-
ever, does great violence to the historical character and
relation of these men. On the Ionian side, it is incor-
rect to place Heracleitus beside the earlier philosophers
of that school, for he does not stand in a relation
of simple progression to Anaximenes, as Anaximenes
stands to Anaximander. Diogenes, on the other hand,
was entirely uninfluenced by the philosophy of Hera-
cleitus; we cannot, therefore, say with Braniss (p. 128)
that he was expressly related to that philosopher, and
that he summed up the result of the whole Ionic
development. Braniss is even more arbitrary in his
treatment of the Dorians. In the first place, Phere-
cydes, as has already been said (p. 89 sq.), is not, pro-
perly speaking, a philosopher, still less is he a Doric or
idealistic philosopher; for what we know of him bears a
close relation to the old Hesiodic-Orphic cosmogony, the
mythic precursor of the Ionic Physics. Even the dis-
crimination of organising force from matter, on which
Braniss lays so much stress (p. 108) had been brought
forward in a mythic manner by Hesiod, and in a more
definite and philosophic form by Anaxagoras the Ionian;
whereas it is entirely wanting in the Italian Eleatics,”
* So Ritter also decides,i. 191 sq. as plastic force; but this second
* The second part of Parme- part speaks only from the point of
nides' poem (v. 131) mentions Eros view of ordinary opinion.
WOL. I. O
194 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY,
and is of doubtful value among the Pythagoreans. It is
true that the belief in the transmigration of souls was
shared by Pherecydes with Pythagoras, but this isolated
doctrine, which is rather religious than philosophic,
cannot be taken as decisive for the position of Phere-
cydes in history. Further, if we connect Xenophanes
with Pythagoras, as Parmenides is connected with
Xenophanes, or Anaximenes with Anaximander, we
ignore the internal difference which exists between
the Eleatic stand-point and the Pythagorean. It is
manifestly improper to treat a doctrine which has a
principle of its own, essentially distinct from the
Pythagorean principle, and which developed itself in a
separate school, as a mere continuation of Pytha-
gorism. Again, as we shall presently show, to place
Empedocles exclusively in the Pythagorean-Eleatic
series is to close our eyes to all aspects of the question
but one. Lastly, what right has Braniss to pass over
the later development of Pythagorism accomplished
by Philolaus and Archytas; and the development of the
Eleatic doctrine effected by Zeno and Melissus, while
he recognises men like Anaximenes and Diogenes of
Apollonia, who were in no way more important, as
representatives of particular stages of development P
His scheme is a Procrustean bed for historical pheno-
mena, and the Doric Philosophy suffers doubly. At
the one end it is produced beyond its natural propor-
tions, and at the other it is denuded of members which
are essentially part of its growth.
The same holds good of Petersen’s' earlier attempt
* Philol. hist. Stud. pp. 1–40. p. 285 sqq.), from whom the abov
On the other hand. cf. Hermann remarks are partly taken. - .
(Zeitschr, für Alterthumsw., 1834, ,
IONIANS AND DORIANS. 195.
to determine the historical relation of the pre-Socratic
schools. Here, too, the general principle is the oppo-
sition of realism, or rather materialism, and idealism.
This opposition developes itself in three sections, each
of which is again subdivided into two parts: first, the
opposing elements stand over against one another in
sharp contrast; and secondly, there arise various at-
tempts to conciliate them, which, however, accomplish
no real adjustment, but still incline to one or other of
the two sides. In the first section, the oppositions
begin to develop themselves—the mathematical idealism
of the Doric Pythagoreans confronts the hylozoistic
materialism of the older Ionians (Thales, Anaximander,
Anaximenes, Heracleitus and Diogenes). A reconcilia-
tion is next attempted on the idealistic side by the
Eleatics; on the materialistic by the physician Elothales
of Cos, his son Epicharmus and Alcmaeon. In the
second section, the contrasts become more marked; we
encounter, on the one hand, pure materialism, in the
Atomists; on the other, pure idealism in the later
Pythagoreans, Hippasus, CEnopides, Hippo, Ocellus,
Timaeus, and Archytas. Between these two, we find on
the idealistic side the pantheism of Empedoeles, on the
materialistic side the dualism of Anaxagoras. In the
third and last section both tendencies pushed to excess
equally lead to the destruction of Philosophy through
the scepticism of the Sophists. Thus one uniform
scheme is undoubtedly carried through the whole pre-
Socratic Philosophy, but it is a scheme that scarcely
corresponds with the actual order of history. It is
unwarrantable, as we have just seen, to divide the philo-
O 2
196 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
sophers of this period into materialists, or realists, and
idealists. Nor can we, for reasons to be stated more
fully later on, admit the propriety of placing Hera-
cleitus in one category with the ancient Ionians, among
the materialists. On the other hand, we must demur
to the separation of the later Pythagoreans from the
earlier; because the so-called fragments of their writings,
which alone would justify it, are certainly to be re-
garded as forgeries of the neo-Pythagoreans. How the
Eleatics can be assigned to an intermediate position
between the Ionians and Pythagoreans, whereas they
carried to the utmost that abstraction from the sensible
phenomena which the Pythagoreans had begun, it is
difficult to say, nor can we concur in opposing to the
Eleatics, Elothales, Epicharmus, and Alcmaeon as ma-
terialists with incipient dualism. These men were not,
indeed, systematic philosophers; but any isolated philo-
sophic sentences they adopted seem to have been chiefly
derived from the Pythagoreans and Eleatic doctrines.
Lastly, how can Empedocles be considered an idealist ;
and Anaxagoras with his theory of votis a materialist P
and how can the system of Empedoeles, with its six
primitive essenees, of which four were of a corporeal
kind, be described as pantheism, and more particularly
as idealistic pantheism P'
* Steinhart is allied with Bra- ism, but a mixture of the Doric and
miss and Petersen (Allg. Encykl. v. Ionic elements. The Ionic Philo-
Ersch. und Grube, Art. “Ionische sophy he considers to have had
Schule,” Sect. 2, vol. xxii. 457. He three stages of development. In
distinguishes, like them, the Ionic Thales, Anaximander, and Anaxi-
and Doric Philosophy; in the case menes, he says, we first find obscure
of the Pythagoreans, however, and and scattered intimations of a
still more in that of the Eleatics, spiritual power that rules in the
what he finds is not pure Dorian- world. In Heracleitus, Diogenes,
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. 197
The foregoing discussions have now paved the way
for a positive determination of the character and course
of philosophic development during our first period. I
have characterised the Philosophy of that period (irre-
spectively for the present of Sophistic), as a philosophy
of nature. It is so by virtue of the object which oc-
cupies it: not that it limits itself exclusively to nature
in the narrower sense, that is to say, to the corporeal,
and the forces unconsciously working in the corporeal;
for such a limit of its sphere would necessarily presup-
pose a discrimination of spiritual and corporeal which
does not as yet exist. But it is for the most part
occupied with external phenomena; the spiritual, so
far as that domain is touched, is regarded from the
same point of view as the corporeal; and consequently
there can be no independent development of Ethics and
Dialectic. All reality is included under the conception
of Nature, and is treated as a homogeneous mass, and
since that which is perceptible to the senses always
forces itself first upon our observation, it is natural that
everything should at first be derived from those prin-
ciples which appear most adapted to explain sensible
existence. The intuition of nature is thus the starting-
and above all in Anaxagoras, the
recognition of the spiritual princi-
ple becomes constantly clearer.
to me a doubtful proceeding to
separate Empedocles from the
Atomists and Anaxagoras, to whom
Lastly, Leucippus and Lemocritus
deny the spiritual principle in a
conscious manner, and thus prepare
the destruction of this exclusively
physical philosophy. Leaving out
of the question the opposition of
the Doric and Ionic elements, the
importance of which Steinhart him-
self considerably restricts, it seems
he is so nearly related ; nor can I
convince myself that the Atomistic
Philosophy had its origin in a reac-
tion against the theory of a world-
forming spirit, and is later in its
origin than the Anaxagorean phy-
sics. And lastly, as will presently
appear, I cannot altogether agree
with Steinhart's view of Diogenes.
198 - THE PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS:
point of the earliest philosophy, and even when imma-
terial principles are admitted, it is evident that they
have been attained through reflection on the data fur-
mished by the senses, not through observation of spiritual
ife. The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, for in-
stance, is immediately connected with the perception of
regularity in the relations of tones, in the distances and
movements of the heavenly bodies; and the doctrine of
Anaxagoras of the uoils which forms the World has refer-
ence primarily to the Wise organisation of the world.
and especially to the order of the celestial system.
Even the Eleatic theses of the unity and unchange-
ableness of Being are not arrived at by opposing the
spiritual as a higher reality to the sensible pheno-
mena; but by eliminating from the sensible all that
seems to involve a contradiction, and by conceiving the
corporeal or the plenum in an entirely abstract manner.
Here too, therefore, it is, generally speaking, mature
with which Philosophy is concerned.
To this its object, thought still stands in an imme-
diate relation, and considers the material investigation
of nature as its first and only problem. The knowledge
of the object is not as yet dependent on the self-know-
ledge of the thinking subject, on a definite conscious-
ness of the nature and conditions of knowing; on the
discrimination of scientific cognition and unscientific pre-
sentation. This discrimination is constantly spoken of
from the time of Heracleitus and Parmenides, but it
appears, not as the basis, but only as a consequence of
the enquiry into the nature of things. Parmenides
denies the trustworthiness of the sensuous perception,

GENERALI, CHARACTERISTICS. 199
because it shows us an immoveable Being; Empedocles,
because it makes the union and separation of material
substances appear as a process of becoming and passing
away; Democritus and Anaxagoras, because it cannot
reveal the primitive constituents of things. We find
in these philosophers no definite principles as to the
nature of knowledge which might serve to regulate
objective enquiry, in the way that the Socratic demand
for knowledge based on conceptions probably served
Plato: and though Parmenides and Empedocles in
their didactic poems exhort us to the thoughtful con-
sideration of things, and withdrawal from the senses,
they do so almost always in an exceedingly vague
manner; and it does not follow because such a discrimi-
nation finds place in their poems, that in their systems
it may not be the consequence instead of the presuppo-
sition of their metaphysic. Although, therefore, their
metaphysic laid the foundation for the after develop-
ment of the theory of knowledge, it is not itself, as yet,
a theory of knowledge. The pre-Socratic Philºsophy
is, as to its form, a dogmatism: thought, fully believing
in its own veracity, applies itself directly to the object;
and the objective view of the world first gives rise to

--~~~
the propositions concerning the nature of knowledge
which prepare the way for the later Philosophy of sº
ceptions.
If we ask, lastly, what are the philosophic results of
the first period, we find, as has already been pointed
out, that the pre-Socratic systems attempted no accu-
rate discrimination between the spiritual and the cor-
poreal. The early Ionian jº. everything

200 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
from matter, which they held to be moved and animated
by its own inherent force. The Pythagoreans substitute
number for matter; the Eleatics, Being, regarded as in-
variable Unity: but neither of them, as we have already
remarked, distinguished the incorporeal principles as to
their essential nature, from the corporeal phenomenon.
Consequently, the incorporeal principles are themselves
apprehended materially, and so in man, soul and body,
ethical and physical, are considered from the same
points of view. This confusion is particularly striking
in Heracleitus, for in his conception of everiving fire
he directly unites primitive matter with motive force
and the law of the universe. The Atomistic philoso-
phy is from the outset directed to a strictly material
explanation of nature, and therefore neither within
man nor without him does it recognise any immaterial
element. Even Empedocles cannot have apprehended
his moving forces in a purely intellectual manner, for
he treats them precisely like the corporeal elements
with which they are mingled in things; so too in man
the spiritual intermingles with the corporeal; blood is
the faculty of thought. Anaxagoras was the first to
teach definitely that the spirit is unmixed with any
material element ; but in Anaxagoras we reach the
limit of the ancient Philosophy of Nature. Moreover,
~according to him, the world-forming spirit operates
merely as a force of nature, and is represented in a half
sensible form as a more subtle kind of matter. This
particular example, therefore, cannot affect our previous
judgment of the pre-Socratic Philosophy so far as its
general and predominant tendency is concerned.


GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. 201
All these traits lead us to recognise as the charac-
teristic peculiarity of the first period, a preponderance of
natural research over introspective reflection ; an absorp=
fion with the outer world which prevents thought from -
bestowing separate study on any object besides nature,
from distinguishing the spiritual from the corporeal in
an exact and definite manner; from seeking out the
form and the laws of scientific procedure for themselves.
Overborne by external impressions, man at first feels
himself a part of nature, he therefore knows no higher
problem for his thought than the investigation of
nature, he applies himself to this problem, impartially
and directly, without stopping previously to enquire
into the subjective conditions of knowledge; and even
when his investigation of nature itself carries him be-
yond the sensible phenomena as such, yet he does not
advance beyond nature considered as a whole, to an
ideal Being, which has its import and its subsistence
in itself. Behind the sensible phenomena, forces and
substances are indeed sought which cannot be perceived
by the senses; but the effects of these forces are the
things of nature, the essences not apprehended by
sense are the substance of the sensible itself, and no-
thing besides; a spiritual world side by side with the
material world has not yet been discovered. -
How far this description applies also to Sophistic
we have already seen. The interest of natural research
and the belief in the truth of our presentments are
now at an end, but no new road to knowledge and higher
reality is as yet pointed out ; and far from opposing the
kingdom of the spirit to nature, the Sophists regard

202 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY,
man himself as a merely sensuous being. Although,
therefore, the pre-Socratic natural philosophy is
abolished in Sophistic, Sophistic like its predecessors
knows of nothing higher than Nature, and has no other
material to work on ; the change consists not in oppos-
ing a new form of science to a previous form, but in
making use of the existing elements, particularly the
Eleatic and Heracleitean doctrines, to introduce doubt
into scientific consciousness, and to destroy belief in
the possibility of knowledge.
Thus we are compelled, by the results of our in-
vestigation, to bring the three oldest schools of Philo-
sophy—the Ionian, the Pythagorean, and the Eleatic–
into a closer connection than has hitherto been cus-
tomary. They are not only very near to each other in
respect to time, but are much more alike in their
scientific character than might at first sight be sup-
posed. While they agree with the whole of the early
Philosophy in directing their enquiries to the explana-
tion of nature, this tendency is in their case more
particularly shown in a search for the substantial
ground of things: in demanding what things are in
their proper essence, and of what they consist; the
problem of the explanation of Becoming, and passing
away, of the movement and multiplicity of phenomena
is not as yet distinctly grasped. Thales makes all
things originate and consist in water, Anaximander in
infinite matter, Anaximenes in air; the Pythagoreans
say that everything is Number; the Eleatics that the All
is one invariable Being. Now it is true that the Elea-
tics alone, and they only subsequently to Parmenides,
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS. 203
denied movement and Becoming, whereas the Ionians
and the Pythagoreans minutely describe the formation
of the world. But they neither of them propounded
the question of the possibility of Becoming and of
divided Being in this general manner, nor in the estab-
lishment of their principles did they attempt particular
definitions in regard to it. The Ionians tell us that the
primitive matter changes; that from matter, originally
one, contrary elements were separated and combined in
various relations to form a world. The Pythagoreans
say that magnitudes are derived from numbers, and
from magnitudes, bodies; but on what this process was
based, how it came about that matter was moved and
transmuted, that numbers produced something other
than themselves, they make no scientific attempt to
explain. What they seek is not so much to explain
phenomena from general principles, as to reduce phe-Î
nomena to their first principles. Their scientific in-
terest is concerned rather with the identical essence
of things, the substance of which all things consist,
than with the multiplicity of the phenomena and the
causes of that multiplicity. When the Eleatics, there-
fore, entirely denied the Becoming and the Many they
merely called in question an unproved presupposition
of their predecessors; and in apprehending all reality
as a unity absolutely excluding multiplicity, they only
carried out more perfectly the tendency of the two
older Schools. Heracleitus was the first to see in
motion, change, and separation, the fundamental
quality of the primitive essence; and the polemic of
Parmenides first occasioned Philosophy to enquire more
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204 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
thoroughly into the possibility of Becoming." With
Heracleitus, then, philosophic development takes a new
direction: the three older systems, on the contrary, fall
together under the same class, inasmuch as they are
all satisfied with the intuition of the substance of which
things consist, without expressly seeking the cause of
multiplicity and change, as such. This substance was
sought by the Ionians in a corporeal matter, by the
Pythagoreans in number, by the Eleaties in Being as
such. By the first it was apprehended sensuously, by
the second mathematically, by the third metaphysi-
cally; but these differences only show us the gradual
development of the same tendency in a progression from
the concrete to the abstract ; for number and mathe-
matical form are a middle term between the sensible
and pure thought; and were afterwards regarded, by
Plato especially, as their proper connecting link.
The turning-point which I here adopt in the
development of the pre-Socratic Philosophy has been
already remarked by other historians in respect of the
Ionian schools. On this ground Schleiermacher” first
distinguished two periods in the Ionian Philosophy, the
*l
* From this point of view it conception of Being and Becoming.
might seem preferable to commence But the connection between Parme-
the second section of the first period nides and Xenophanes would thus
with Parmenides, as well as Hera- be broken ; and as the doctrine of
cleitus, as my critic in the Reperto. Parmenides, in spite of all its his-
rium of Gersdorf (1844, H. 22, p. torical and scientific importance,
335) proposes, seeing that up to the approximates closely in its content
time of these two philosophers (as and tendency to the earlier sys-
e observes) the question, whence tems, it appears on the whole bet-
all things arose, had been answered ter to make Heracleitus alone the
by theories of matter, and that starting-point of the second section.
i Heracleitus and Parmenides were * Gesch. der Phil. (Worl. v. J.
the first to enquire concerning the 1812) p. 33.
EARLIER AND LATER PHYSICISTS. 205
second of which begins with Heracleitus. Between
this philosopher and his predecessors, he says, there is a
considerable chronological gap, probably in consequence
of the interruption occasioned to philosophic pursuits
by the disturbances in Ionia. Moreover, while the
three most ancient Ionians came from Miletus, Philo-
sophy now spreads itself geographically over a much
wider sphere. Also, in the content of his philosophy,
Heracleitus rises far above the earlier physicists, so
that he may, perhaps, have derived little from them.
Ritter, too, acknowledges that Heracleitus differs in
many respects from the older Ionians, and that his
theory of the universal force of nature places him
quite in a separate order from them. Brandis,” in
still closer agreement with Schleiermacher, holds that
with Heracleitus commences a new period in the de-
velopment of the Ionian Philosophy, to which, besides
Heracleitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, De-
mocritus, Diogenes, and Archelaus likewise belong ;
all these being distinguished from the earlier philo-
sophers by their more scientific attempts to derive the
multiplicity of particulars from a primitive cause, by
their more explicit recognition or denial of the dis-
tinction between spirit and matter, as also of a Divinity
that forms the world; and by their common endeavour
to establish the reality of particulars and their varia-
tions in opposition to the doctrine of the Eleatic One.
These remarks are quite true, and only, perhaps, open to
question with regard to Diogenes of Apollonia. But it
• Gesch. der Phil. 242, 248; * Gr.-röm. Phil. i. 149.
Ion. Phil. 65.
206 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY,
is not enough to make this difference the dividing-line
between two classes of Ionic physiologists; it is deeply
rooted in the whole of the pre-Socratic Philosophy.
Neither the doctrine of Empedocles, nor that of Anaxa-
goras, nor that of the Atomists can be explained by the
; development of the Ionian physiology as such ; their
relation to the Eleatics is not the merely negative rela-
i tion of disallowing the denial of Reality, Becoming, and
f Multiplicity; they positively learned a good deal from
the Eleatic school. They all acknowledge the great
principle of the system of Parmenides, that there is no
Becoming or passing away in the strict sense of the
| terms; consequently they all explain phenomena from the
combination and separation of material elements, and
\ they in part borrow their concept of Being directly from
the Eleatic metaphysics. They ought, therefore, to be
placed after the Eleatic school, and not before it. In
regard to Heracleitus, it is less certain whether, or how
far, he concerned himself with the beginnings of the
Eleatic Philosophy; in point of fact, however, his posi-
tion is not only entirely antagonistic to the Eleatics, but
he may generally be said to enter upon a new course
altogether divergent from that hitherto followed. In
denying all fixedness in the constitution of things, and
recognising the law of their variability as the only per-
manent element in them, he declares the futility of the
previous science which made matter and substance the
chief object of enquiry; and asserts the investigation
of the causes and laws which determine Becoming and
Change to be the true problem of Philosophy. Thus,
although the question as to the essence and material

EARLIER AND LATER PHYSICISTs. 207
substance of things was not overlooked by Hera-
cleitus and his followers, any more than the account of
the formation of the world was omitted by the Ionians
and Pythagoreans, the two elements stand with each of
them in a very different relation. In the one case, the
enquiry as to the substance of things is the main point,
and the notions about their origin are dependent upon
the answer given to this question ; in the other, th
chief question is that of the causes of Becoming and
Change, and the manner of conceiving the original
substance of Being depends upon the determinations
which appear necessary to the philosopher to explain
Becoming and Change. The Ionians make things arise
out of the rarefaction and condensation of a primitive
matter, because this best adapts itself to their motion
of primitive matter; the Pythagoreans hold to a
mathematical construction, because they reduce every-
thing to number; the Eleatics deny Becoming and
Motion, because they find the essence of things in
Being alone. On the contrary, Heracleitus makes fire
the primitive matter, because on this theory only can
he explain the flux of all things; Empedocles presup-
poses four elements and two moving forces; Leucippus
and Democritus presuppose the atoms and the void,
because the multiplicity of phenomena seems to them
to require a multiplicity of material primitive elements,
and the change in phenomena a moving cause; Anaxa-
goras was led by similar considerations to his doctrine
of the épotopspſ, and the world-intelligence. Both
sets of philosophers speak of Being and Becoming; but
in the one case the definitions respecting Becoming
ºrs
º
208 THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY,
-Y into more particularly by Empedocles and the Atomists.
appear only as a consequence of their theory of Being ;
in the other, the definitions of Being are merely pre-
suppositions in the theory of Becoming. In assigning,
therefore, the three most ancient schools to a first
division of pre-Socratic Philosophy, and Heracleitus,
and the other physicists of the fifth century to a second,
we follow not merely the chronological order, but the
internal relation of these philosophers.
The course of philosophic development in the second
division may be more precisely described as follows:—
First, the law of Becoming is proclaimed by Heracleitus
unconditionally as the universal law of the world; the
reason of which he seeks in the original constitution of
matter. The concept of Becoming is next enquired
Generation is identified with the union, and decease
with the separation of material elements: consequently,
a plurality of original material elements is assumed,
the motion of which has to be conditioned by a second
principle distinct from them; but whereas Empedocles
makes his primal elements of matter qualitatively dif-
ferent one from another, and places over against them
moving force in the mythical forms of friendship and
discord, the Atomists recognise only a mathematical
difference between the primitive bodies, and seek to
explain their motion in a purely mechanical manner
from the operation of weight in empty space; space
they consider indispensable, because without it, as they
believe, no plurality and no change would be possible.
This mechanical explanation of Nature Anaxagoras finds
inadequate. He therefore sets spirit beside matter as


























THE LATER PHYSICIST.S. 209
moving cause, discriminates them one from the other as
the compound and the simple, and defines primitive
matter as a mixture of all particular matters; a mix-
ture, however, in which these particular matters exist
and are already qualitatively determined. Heraclei-
tus explains these phenomena dynamically, from the
qualitative change of one primitive matter, which is
conceived as essentially and perpetually changing ;
Empedocles and the Atomic philosophers explain them
mechanically, from the union and separation of different
primitive matters; Anaxagoras finally is persuaded that
they are not to be explained by mere matter, but by
the working of the spirit upon matter. At this point,
in the nature of the case, the purely physical explana-
ion of nature is renounced; the discrimination of spirit
pposition to matter, demands a recasting of science
enerally on the basis of this conviction. As, however,
hought is as yet incapable of such a task, the imme
iate result is that philosophy is bewildered in regard
o its general vocation, despairs of objective knowledge,
nd places itself, as a means of formal development, in
he service of the empirical subjectivity which acknow-
edges the validity of no universal law. This is effected
n the third section of the pre-Socratic Philosophy by
eans of Sophistic."
| Tennemann and Fries adopt distinguish the two main currents
om matter, and the higher rank which it assumes in
is arrangement of the pre-Socratic
hools on purely chronological
rounds. Hegel bases it on scien-
fic observations concerning the
ternal relation of the systems.
e does not, however, expressly
WOL. I.
of ancient physics, and, as before
noticed, he separates Sophistic from
the other pre-Socratic doctrines. It
is to be found, too, in Braniss, to
whose general presupposition I
must nevertheless demur. Among



















2}0
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
the more recent writers, Noack,
and previously Schwegler, adopt my
view; Haym, on the contrary (Allg.
Encyk. Sect. 3 B. xxiv. p. 25 sqq.),
though in harmony with me in
other respects, places Heracleitus
before the Eleatics. In his history of
Greek Philosophy, p. 11 sq. Schweg-
ler discusses: 1, the Ionians; 2,
the Pythagoreans; 3, the Eleatics;
and 4, Sophistic, as the transition to
the second period. He defends
the subdivision of the Ionians into
earlier and later, for the reasons
stated on p. 202 sq.; and assigns
to the earlier, Thales, Anaximander,
and Anaximenes; to the later, He-
racleitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras,
and Democritus. So also Ribbing
(Platon. Ideenlehre, i. 6 sqq.) con-
siders that since Heracleitus,
Empedocles, the Atomists, and
Anaxagoras are, in their principles,
lower than the Pythagoreans and
|Bleatics, they, as well as the older
Ionians, must be placed before
them. Ueberweg has the follow-
ing division: 1, the older Ionians,
including Heracleitus; 2, the
Pythagoreans ; 3, the Eleatics;
4, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and
the Atomists. The Sophists he
places in the second period, of which
they form the first chapter; Socra-
tes and his successors, as far as
Aristotle, constitute the second;
Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scep-
ticism, the third. I cannot now
enter upon any detailed examina-
tion of these differentclassifications.
It will be seen in the course of
this exposition what are my objec-
tions to the theory of Strümpell
(Gesch. der Theoret. Phil. der Grie-
chen, 1854, p. 17 sq.), in point of
chronology as well as the internal
aspects of the subject. His expo-
sition of the pre-Socratic Philoso-
phy is as follows: First, the older
Ionian Physiologists, starting from
the contemplation of the changes
in nature, arrive in Heracleitus at
the conception ofcriginall?ecoming.
To this doctrine the Eleatics op-
pose a system which entirely denies
Becoming, whilecontemporaneously
the later Physicists, on the one
side Diogenes, Leucippus, and De-
mocritus; on the other, Empedo-
cles and Anaxagoras, reduce it to
mere motion. A reconciliation o
the opposition between Becoming
and Being, and between Opinion
and Knowledge, was attempted by
the Pythagoreans ; and Sophistic
is a dialectic solution of this oppo-
sition. It will suffice at presen
to say that the position of Hera
cleitus, the Eleatics, Diogenes, and
more especially the Pythagoreans,
appear to me more or less misre-
presented by this arrangement.

























THALLES.
211
§ I.—THE EARLIER IONIANS, THE PYTHA-
GOREANS AND ELEATICS.
THE EARLIER IONIAN PHYSICS.1
I. THALES.2
THALES is reputed to be the founder of the Ionian
Naturalistic Philosophy. He was a citizen of Miletus,
a contemporary of Solon and Croesus,” whose ancestors
* Ritter, Gesch. der Ion. Phil.,
1821. Steinhart, Ion. Schule, Allg.
Encyk. v.; Ersch und Gruber, Sect.
II., vol. xxii. 457–490.
* Decker, De Thalete Milesio.
Halle, 1865. Older monographs
in Ueberweg, Grundriss, der Gesch.
der Phil., i. 35 sq., 3rd edition.
* This is beyond question; but
the chronology of his life (on which
cf. Diels on the Chronicle of Apol-
lodorus, Rhein. Mus., xxxi. 1, 15
sq.) cannot be more precisely fixed.
According to Diogenes i. 37, Apol-
lodorus placed his birth in the
first year of the 35th Olympiad,
i.e. 640–639 B.C. Eusebius places
it in the second year of the 35th
Olympiad, and Hieronymus also in
the 35th Olympiad, Chron. 1. But
this statement is probably founded
only on some approximate calcula-
tion of the eclipse of the sun,
which Thales is said to have pre-
dicted (vide infr. p. 213, 3). This is
not, as used formerly to be supposed,
the eclipse of 610 B.C.; but, ac-
cording to Airy (On the Eclipses of
Agathocles, Thales, and Xerares,
Philosophical Transactions, vol.
cxliii. p. 179 sqq.); Zech (Astrono-
mische Untersuchungen der wich-
tigeren Finsternisse, &c., 1853, p. 57,
'ith which cf. Ueberweg, Grund-
iss der Gesch. der Phil. i. 36,
third edition); Hansen (Alhand-
lºngen der Königl sächs. Gesellsch.
der Wissenschaft. vol. xi.; Math.
phys. Kl. vol. vii. p. 379); Martin
(Revue Archéologique, nouv.sér., vol.
ix. 1864, p. 184), and other autho-
rities, that which occurred on the
28th, or, according to the Grego-
rian calendar, the 22nd of May,
585 B.C. Pliny, in his Naturai
History, ii. 12, 53, places it in the
fourth year of the 48th Olympiad
(584-5 B.C.), 170 A.U.C.; Eudemus
ap. Clemens, Stromata, i. 302 A,
about the fourth year of the 50th
Olympiad (580–576); Eusebius in
his Chron. in Ol. 49, 3, 582–1;
they, therefore, take the second
eclipse, which is most accurately
calculated by Pliny. About the
same time (under the Archon Da-
masius, 586 B.C.) Demetrius Phale-
reus ap. Diog. i. 22 makes Thales
and the rest to have received their
designation of the seven wise men.
According to Apollodorus, Diog.
i. 38, Thales was 78 years old;
(Decker's proposal, p. 18 sq., to sub-
stitute 95 does not commend itself
to me) according to Sosicrates
(ibid.), 90; according to Pseudo
Lucian (Macrob. 18), 100; according
to Syncell. (p. 213 C), more than
100. His death is placed by Dio-
genes, loc. cit., in the 58th Olym-



F 2

212
THALES.
are said to have immigrated to their later home from
Phoenicia, but more probably from Boeotia."
piad; likewise by Eusebius, Hiero-
nymus, and Cyrillus, loc. cit.; but
in that case, as is shown by Diels,
and confirmed by Porphyry (ap.
Abulfaradasch, p. 33, ed. Poeocke),
his birth cannot have been assign-
ed by Apollodorus to Ol. 35, 1, but
to Ol. 39, 1 (624 B.C.; 40 years
before the eclipse), and the diver.
gent statements must be ascribed
to some ancient corruption of the
text in the source consulted by
Diogenes. As to the manner of
Thales's death and his burial-place,
some untrustworthy accounts are
to be found in Diog. i. 39, ii. 4;
Plut., Solon, 12; some epigrams
relating to him, in Anthol. vii. 83
sq., Diog. 34. Whether the Thales
mentioned in Arist. Polit. ii. 12,
1274 a, 25, as the scholar of Ono-
macritus, and the teacher of Ly-
curgus and Zaleucus, is the Milesian
philosopher, or some other person,
matters little; and the unfavour-
able judgment, which, according
to Aristotle, ap. Diog. ii. 46 (if,
indeed, the statement be his at all),
Pherecydes passed upon Thales, is
equally unimportant.
* Herodotus, i. 170, says of
him : 0&New &vöpös Mixmaſov, to
&véka9ev yewos éévros folviicos;
Clemens, Strom. i. 302 C, simply
calls him folvić to yévos; and, ac-
cording to Diogenes, i. 22, (where,
however, Röper, Philol. xxx. 563,
proposes to read toxitetſºno av,
and fix60w), he seems to have
been regarded as a Phoenician im-
migrant, settled in Miletus. This
statement is probably founded on
the fact that his ancestors belonged
to the Cadmean tribe in Boeotia,
who were intermingled with the
The con-
Ionians of Asia Minor (Herod. i.
146; Strabo, xiv. 1, 3, 12, p. 633,
636; Pausan.vii. 2,7). According to
Pausanias, a great number of The-
ban Cadmeans established them-
selves in Priene, for which reason
the name of the place was altered
to Cadme. Hellanicus in Hesychius
sub voc. also calls the inhabitants
of Priene Kabulou. For Diogenes,
i, 22, says: fiv rolvvu 6 Oaxis, és
puév ‘Hpóðotos kai Aoûpts kal Amuá-
kpitós pma'i, Tarpos uév 'Eğapitov,
p.mtpos 3& KAeoBovXívms, ék Töv
Onxiāāv (or 0mAvö.) of eign poſvi-
kes, eúryevéotatoi Tôv &trö Kääuov
ical 'Ayfivopos. He thus explains
the poiviš by “descendant of Cad-
mus’; following either Duris or
Democritus, or, at any rate, some
very trustworthy source. Herodo-
tus, however, shows by the word
&vékaðey that not Thales himself,
but only his remote ancestors had
belonged to the Phoenicians. If
Thales was only in this sense
$olvić, his nationality, even if the
story of the immigration of Cad-
mus have any foundation in his-
tory, is Greek and not Phoenician;
nor is this statement affected by
the circumstance (vide Schuster,
Acta Soc. philol. Lips. iv. 328 sq.;
cf. Decker, De Thale., 9) that the
father of Thales perhaps bore
a name that was Phoenician in its
origin. Diog., loc. cit., and 1, 29,
according to our text, calls him in
the genitive’E£aputov. For this we
must read 'Eğaušov ; and some
manuscripts have 'Eğaplixov or
'EğauvočAov, which certainly points
to a Semitic extraction. But this
Graeco-Phoenician name, like that
of Cadmus and many others, may
JBIOGRAPHY.
213
sideration in which he was held by his fellow-citizens is
sufficiently shown by the place which he occupies as
chief of the seven sages." This has reference in the first
instance, it is true, to his practical ability and worldly
prudence of which other proofs have come down to us; ”
but we hear also that he distinguished himself by his
knowledge of mathematics and astronomy;” and that he
have been kept up centuries long
among the Phoenicians settled in
Greece. We cannot infer from it
a direct Phoenician descent, either
for Thales or his father. His
mother's name is wholly Greek.
* Cf. p. 119 sq.; Timon ap.
Diog. i. 34; Cic. Legg. ii. 11, 26;
Acad. ii. 37, 118; Aristophanes,
Clouds, 180; Birds, 1009; Plautus,
Rud. iv. 3, 64; Bacch, i. 2, 14. In
Capt. ii. 2, 124, Thales is a pro-
verbial name for a great sage. For
sayings ascribed to him cf. Diog. i.
35 sqq.; Stobaeus, Floril. iii. 79, 5;
Plutarch, S. sap. conv. c. 9.
* According to Herodotus, i.
170, he counselled the Ionians, be-
fore their subjugation by the Per-
sians, to form a confederation with
a united central government to re-
sist them ; and, according to Diog.
25, it was he who dissuaded the
Milesians from provoking the dan-
gerous enmity of Cyrus by an
alliamee with Croesus. It is not
consistent with this, and in itself
is hardly credible that he should
have accompanied Croesus in his
expedition against Cyrus (as Hero-
dotus relates, i. 75), and by plan-
ning a canal, should have enabled
him to cross the Halys. It is still
more incredible that Thales, the
first of the seven wise men, should
have been such an unpractical
theorist, as a well-known anecdote
represents him. Plato, Theaetetus,
174 a ; Diog. 34, cf. Arist. Eth. N.
vi. 7, 1141 b, 3, &c. Little more,
however, is to be said for the story
of the oil presses, intended to re-
fute this opinion; not to mention
the aneedote in Plutarch, Sol. anim.
c. 16, p. 971. The assertion (Cly-
tus ap. Diog. 25), povăpm airbv
'yeyovéval kal iówaorthv, cannot be
true in this universal sense; and
the stories about his celibacy, for
which cf. Plutarch, Qu. conv. iii. 6,
3, 3; Sol. 6, 7; Diog. 26; Stobaeus,
Floril., 68, 29, 34, are equally
worthless.
* Thales is one of the most
celebrated of the ancient mathe-
maficians and astronomers. Xeno-
phanes eulogises him in this
respect, cf. Diog. i. 23: 50ke? §§
kard Tuvas trpáros &0 rpoxo'yūgal
ical fixtakās ékMetheus kal Tpor&s
trpoettreſv, Šs pmotv Eğ6muos év tá
treph Tāv &orpoxo'youpévov igropig'
66ev airby kal Eevoq'dvms kal ‘Hpóðo-
ros 6avudget uaprupe; 5' airó kal
“Hpdicxettos kai Amuákpitos. Phö-
mix ap. Athen. xi. 495, d: ©axis
'yūp, 30 ris àortépav čvářoros etc.
(others read &otéov). Strabo, xiv.
1, 7, p. 635: Qaxis . . . 6 trpá-
tos (pugioxolytas Špèas év toſs
“EAAmori Kal waffnuarukňs. Apuleius
Floril. iv. 18, p. 88 Hild. Hippo-
lytus Ref. haer. i. 1; Proclus in
Euclid. 19 (vide following note).
214
THALES.
was the first to transplant the elements of these sciences
The anecdote quoted from Plato,
Theaet. 174 A, in the previous note,
has reference to his reputation as
an astronomer. Among the proofs
related of his astronomical know-
ledge, the best known is the above-
mentioned prediction of the eclipse
which occurred during a battle be-
tween the armies of Alyattes and
Cyaxares or Astyages (Herod. i.
74; Eudemus ap. Clem. Strom.
i. 302 A.; Cic. Divin. i. 49, 112;
Pliny's Hist. Nat. ii. 12, 53); it
was probably in consequence of
this that the prediction and expla-
nation of solar and lunar eclipses
generally were ascribed to him.
See Diog. loc. cit.; Eusebius, Pr. Ev.
x. 14, 6; Augustine, Civ. Dei, viii.
2; Plutarch, Plac. ii. 24; Stobaeus,
Ecl. i. 528, 560; Simplicius, in
Categ. Schol. in Arist. 64 a, 1, 65
a, 30; Ammonius, ibid. 64 a, 18;
Schol. in Plat. Remp. p. 420; Bekk.
Cic. Rep. i. 16. Theo in the pas-
sage taken from Dercyllides,
Astron. c. 40, p. 324 Mart, and re-
peated by Anacolius, in Fabric.
Bibl. gr. iii. 464. The latter says,
following Eudemus: ©axis 6* [eipe
TrpáTos] jàtov čica stipu kal Thy karð.
Tàs Tporås airrod treptočov [al.
Trépobov &s obic form &el ovuòaível.
(On this opinion, which we meet
with elsewhere, cf. Martin loc. cit.
p. 48). In partial agreement with
this, Diogenes says (i. 24 sq. 27)
that Thales discovered thv &to
Tporºs étrº Tporºv rápotov of the
sun, and declared the sun to be
720 times as large as the moon.
He, or according to others, Pytha-
goras, first proved that the triangles
constructed on the diameter of a
circle are rectangles (ºrpótov kara-
'ypájau kökxov to Tptywyov Šp60-
yóviov); that he perfected the
theory of the orkaxmva Tpſywya
(Cobet : okax. Kai Tpty.), and in
general the Ypapputkm 6ewpía; de-
termined the seasons, divided the
year into 365 days, Imeasured the
height of the pyramids by the
length of their shadow (this accord-
ing to Hieronymus; the same in
Pliny, Hist. Nat. xxxvi. 12, 82; a
little differently in Plutarch S. sap.
conv. 2, 4, 147); Callimachus ap.
Diog. 22 says that he was the first
to mark out the constellation of
the Little Bear, which is repeated
by Theo in Arati Phaen. 37, 39,
and by the Scholiast of Plato, p.
420, No. 11, Bekker. Proclus as-
serts that he first showed that the
diameter halved the circle (in
Euclid, 44, 157 Friedl.), and that
in an isosceles triangle, the angles
at the base are equal (ibid. 67
and 250 Friedl.); that the angles
at the vertex are equal (ibid. 79,
a, 299, according to Eudemus);
that triangles are equal when
they have two angles and one
side equal to one another; and
that by means of this proposition
the distance of ships on the sea
could be measured (ibid. 92 [352];
this is also on the authority of
Eudemus). Apuleius, Flor. iv.
18, p. 88 H., says that Thales dis-
covered temporum ambitus, vento-
Twm flatus, Stellarum meatus,
tonitruwm Sonora miracula, siderum
obliqua eurricula, Solis annua rever-
ticula (the rporal, the solstices of
which Theo and Diogenes in the
previously quoted passages, the
Scholiast on Plato, p. 420 Bekk.,
speak); also the phases and eclipses
of the moon, and a method of de-
termining quotiens Sol magnitudine
sua circulum, quem permeat, meti-
atur. Stobaeus ascribes to him
BIOGRAPHY.
215
into Greece from the countries of the east and south."
some other philosophical and phy-
sical theories hereafter to be men-
tioned, also the division of the
heavens into five zones (Ecl. i. 502,
Plutarch, Plac. ii. 12, 1); the dis-
covery that the moon is illuminated
by the sun (ibid., 556, Plac. ii. 28,
3), the explanation of her monthly
obscuration, and of her eclipses,
560. Pliny, Hist. Nat.xviii.25, 213,
mentions a theory of his about the
Pleiades, and Theo in Arat. 172, a
passage relative to the Hyades.
According to Cicero, Rep. i. 14, he
made the first celestial globe; and,
according to Philostratus, Apoll.
ii. 5, 3, he observed the stars from
Mycale. How much of these re-
ports is true cannot now be ascer-
tained ; that the prediction of the
eclipse of the Sun cannot be histo-
rical, Martin shows in the Revue
Archéologique, nouv. Sér. vol. ix.
(1864) 170 sqq.; cf. especially p.
181 sq.
* Arithmetic, says Proclus, in
Euclid. 19, o [65] was discovered by
the Phoenicians; Geometry by the
JEgyptians, on the occasion of the
overflowing of the Nile, Oaxïs 6&
Tpótov eis Atºyvirtov čA6&v wethya-
'yev eis rêv ‘EAAáða. Thu 6eapfav
Taúrmv, kal troAA& uèv airbs eips,
troXAóv 63 Tâs àpx&s roºs uer' airby
$qºmyńoraro. Whence Proclus got
this information he does not state,
and though it is not improbable
that Eudemus may be his au-
thority, we know not whether the
whole account comes from that
source, nor who may be the autho-
rities of Eudemus. Thales's Egyp-
tian journey, his intercourse with
the priests of that country, and
the mathematical knowledge which
he gained from them are spoken
of by Pamphile and Hieronymus,
ap. Diog. 24, 27; the author of the
letter to Pherecydes, ibid. 43;
Pliny, Hist. Nat. xxxvi. 12, 82;
Plutarch, De Is. 10, p. 354; S. sap.
conv. 2, p. 146; Plac. i. 3, 1 ;
Clemens, Stromata, i. 300 D, 302;
Iamblichus v. Pythag. 12; Scho-
liast in Plato, p. 420, No. 11
Bekk. (cf. Decker, loc. cit., p. 26
sq.), a conjecture as to the reason
of the overflowings of the Nile was
also attributed to Thales, and may
perhaps be connected with this
statement (Diodor. i. 38; Diog. i.
37). If it be true that Thales was
engaged in trade (Plutarch, Sol. 2,
asserts this, prefixing ‘‘paolv’), we
might suppose that he was first led
to Egypt by his commercial jour-
neys, and then made use of his
opportunity for the advancement
of his knowledge. We cannot,
however, regard his presence in
Egypt as absolutely proved, pro-
bable as the assertion may be ;
since the tradition on the subject
cannot be traced further back than
Eudemus, whose date is still 250
or 300 years from that of Thales's
supposed journey, still less can his
acquaintance with the Chaldaeans
be proved by such late and uncer-
tain testimony as that of Josephus,
Contra Apionem, i. 2; or the length
of his stay in Egypt by that of the
Placita falsely attributed to Plu-
tarch (i. 3, 1). A scholium (Schol.
$n Ar. 533, a, 18) states that he
was sent for into Egypt as a
teacher of Moses—a specimen of
the manner in which history was
manufactured in the Byzantine pe-
riod and even earlier. That he de-
rived philosophical and physical
theories from the East, as well
as geometrical and mathematical
knowledge, is not asserted by any
216
THALES.
That he inaugurated the school of ancient physicists is
affirmed by Aristotle, and seems well established. He
is at any rate the first whom we know to have instituted
any general enquiry into the natural causes of things,
in contradistinction to his predecessors, who contented
themselves partly with mythical cosmogonies, and
partly with isolated ethical reflections.”
of our witnesses, except perhaps
Iamblichus and the author of the
Placita. Röth's attempt (Gesch.
der Abendl. Phil. ii. a, 116 sqq.) to
prove this from the affinity of his
doctrine with that of Egypt, falls
to the ground so soon as we as-
cribe to Thales, only what there
is good reason for ascribing to him.
* Metaph. i. 3, 983 b, 20.
Bonitz, in commenting on this pas-
sage, rightly reminds us that it is
not Greek Philosophy in general,
but only the Ionian Physics, the
origin of which is here attributed
to Thales. Theophrastus says (ap.
Simp, Phys. 6 a., m), but only as a
conjecture, that there must have
been physicists before Thales, but
that his name caused them all
to be forgotten. Plutareh, on the
other hand (Solon, c. 3, end), re-
marks that Thales was the only
one of his contemporaries who ex-
tended his enquiry to other than
practical questions (repairépo tºs
xpetas Étréabai Tà 6eapfg). Simi-
larly Strabo (sup. p. 213, 3) Hip-
polyt. Refut. Haer. i. 1; Diog. i. 24.
The assertion of Tzetzes (Chil. ii.
869, xi. 74) that Phereeydes was
the teacher of Thales has no weight,
and is besides contradicted by the
chronology.
* Thales does not appear to
have committed his doctrines to
writing. (Diog. i. 23, 44; Alex.
In answer to
in Metaph. i. 3, p. 21, Bon. The-
mist. Or. xxvi. 317, B; Simplicius,
De an. 8 a, cf. Philop. De an. C 4;
Galen. in Hipp. de Nat. hom. i. 25,
end, vol. xv. 69 Kühn.) Aristotle
always speaks of him from some
uncertain tradition, or from his
own conjecture (Metaph. i. 3, 983
b, 20 sqq., 984 a, 2; De caelo, ii.
13, 294 a, 28; De an. i. 2, 405 a,
19, c. 5, 411 a, 8; Polit. i. 11,
1259 a, 18, cf. Schwegler, in Me-
taph. i. 3); similarly Eudemus, ap.
Proclus in Euclid. 92 (352), Röth
(Gesch. der Abendl. Phil. ii. a, iii.)
concludes that the supposed Thale-
sian writings must be genuine, be-
cause of their agreement with the
propositions attributed to Thales.
This is a strange inference, for in
the first place he himself only con-
siders two of the writings authen-
tic; and as to the contents of these
two, nothing has been handed down
to us. These writings are the
vavrukh &orpoxoyia and the treatise
repl rporãs. In the second place
it is obvious that traditions about
Thales's doctrine might as easily
have been taken from spurious
writings, as, on the other hand, the
authors of such writings might
have taken advantage of floating
traditions. Among the works as-
cribed to Thales the vaurich &orpo-
Aoyſa (mentioned by Diog. 23,
Simpl. Phys. 6 a., m) seems to have
TVA TER AS PRIMITIVE MATTER.
217
this enquiry, he declared water to be the matter of
which all things consist, and from which they must have
arisen."
known by the ancients from historical tradition.
As to the reasons of this theory, nothing was
Aris-
totle * indeed says that Thales may have been led to it
been the oldest. According to
Simplicius, it was his only work.
Diogenes says it was held to be a
work of Phocus the Samian. Ac-
cording to Plutarch (Pyth. orac.
18, p. 402), who considers it ge-
nuine, it was written in verse; it
seems to be intended by the étrº,
mentioned in Diog. 34. Whether
the poem, trepl tre're&pov, ascribed
to him by Suidas (Oax.), is or is
not identical with the vaurikh
&orpoxonyta, cannot be ascertained.
Two other works, which many
writers consider to be his only
writings, repl rporms kal ionuepias,
are quoted in Diog. 23 (cf. Suidas).
The Pseudo-Galen (In Hippocr.
De humor. i. 1, 1, Vol. xvi. 37,
R) quotes a work, trepi àpxöv ; but
this testimony is itself sufficient to
prove that the work is not authen-
tic, Neither the verse quoted
Diog. 35 (cf. Decker, p. 46 sq.), nor
the letter (ibid. 343 sq.) can be
considered as genuine. To which
of these writings Augustine refers
in Civ. D. viii. 2 (where he asserts
that Thales left books of instruc-
tion) it is not of much consequence
to know. The same may be said
of the doubtful allusions to books
of his in Josephus (C. Apion. i. 2),
and of the quotations in Seneca,
Nat. qu. iii. 13, 1, 14. 1 ; iv. 2, 22;
vi. 6, 1 ; Plutarch, Plac. i. 3; iv.
1; Diodorus, i. 38; Schol. in Apoll.
Rhod. iv. 269.
1 Arist. Metaph. i. 3, 983 b,
20 : 0&Aſis ºv 6 Tis rotatºrms
&pxmºyös pixooroq tas Ščap sivaſ pnow
[sc. orouxetov kal &px?iv ráv čvrov)
Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 118: Thales . . .
ea aqua dicit constare omnia, and
many others (a list of these is
given in Decker, p. 64). We
find in Stobaeus, Eel. i. 290, and
almost word for word in Justin.
Coh. ad Gr. c. 5; Plut. Plac. i. 3,
2, the expression: &px?iv Tóv Švtov
&reqfivato Tô iſoap, & #6aros yáp
qmail travra, eival kal eis iſoap &va-
Affeo'6&t ; but this is taken from
Aristotle, who, shortly before the
words just now quoted, says that
most of the ancient philosophers
knew only of material causes: é:
of y&p éotiv Štravra. Tä, övta kal
ěč of yi-yveral trpárov kal eis 8
q6eſperat Texevratov . . . . tooto
arouxetov kal Taürmv &px?iv paoſiv
eival tăv čvtov. Aristotle is, there-
fore, in reality our only source for
the kncwledge of Thales's propo-
sition.
* Loc. cit. z. 22: Aaflöv forws
Thy Stróxmipu Čk rod trävrov
ôpºv thv Tpoq’hu ärypåv of oav kal
aútb to 6epubv éic rońrov yiyvópºevov
kal Toârg (ºv . . . kal 61& rô
travtov rā ortrépuata rºv qigou
5-ypèv čxeiv, to 6' iſoap &px?iv ràs
qāorea's sival roſs trypois. By
6epubv is not to be understood (as
by Brandis, i. 114) warmth gene-
rally, including that of the stars
(see following note); it relates to
the vital heat of animals, to which
trövtwv is limited by the context.
218 THALES.
through observing that the nourishment of all animals
is moist, and that they all originate from moist germs;
but this he expressly states to be merely his own conjec-
ture. It is only by later and less accurate authors that
the conjecture of Aristotle is asserted as a fact, with
the farther additions that plants draw their nourish-
ment from water, and the stars themselves from damp
vapours; that all things in dying dry up, and that
water is the all-organising and all-embracing element;"
that we must assume one primitive matter, because
otherwise it would be impossible to explain the trans-
formation of the elements one into another; and that
that one matter must be water, because everything is
derived from water, by means of rarefaction and con-
densation.” All this makes it difficult for us to come
to any definite conclusion on the subject. It is possible
that the Milesian philosopher may have been influenced
by the considerations that Aristotle supposes; he may
have started from the observation that everything
living arises from a liquid, and in decaying, returns to
* Plut. Plac. i. 3, 2 sq. (so Eu-
sebius, Pr. Ev. xiv. 14, 1, and in
essential agreement with this,
Stobaeus, loc. cit.); Alex. ad Me-
taph. 983 b, 18; Philoponus,
Phys. A, 10; De an. A, 4 a ;
Simplicius, Phys. 6 a., 8 a ; De
calo 273 b, 36; Karst. Schol. in
Arist. 514 a, 26. It has been al-
ready shown by Ritter, i. 210, and
Krische (Forschungen auf dem Ge-
biete der alten Philosophie, i. 36)
that Simplicius is here speaking
only from his own conjecture or
that of others, that the subsequent
passage where he refers to Theo-
phrastus does not relate to the rea-
sons of the system of Thales, and
that we have consequently no right
to conclude (as Brandis does, i. 111
sqq.) the existence of trustworthy
documents concerning Thales's rea-
soning from the supposed agree-
ment of Aristotle and Theophrastus.
* Galen. De Elem. Sec. Hoppocr.
i. 4, vol. i. 442, 444, 484, speaking
simultaneously of Thales, Anax-
imenes, Anaximander, and Herac-
leitus. It was in truth Diogenes
of Apollonia (vide infra) who first
proved the unity of matter by the
transformation of the elements.
WATER AS PRIMITIVE MATTER. 219
a liquid state; but other observations may likewise have
conduced to this theory, such as the formation of solid
ground from alluvion, the fertilising power of rain and
of streams, the numerous animal population of the
waters; in conjunction with such observations, the old
myth of Chaos and of Oceanos, the father of the gods,
may also have had some effect on him; but the exact
state of the case cannot be ascertained. Nor can we
say whether he conceived his primitive watery matter
as infinite; for the assertion of Simplicius * is mani-
festly based upon the Aristotelian passage which he is
elucidating;” and this passage does not mention
Thales. It does not even affirm that any one of the
philosophers who held water to be the primitive matter,
expressly attributed the quality of infinity to that
element. Supposing such an assertion had been made,
it would be more reasonable to refer it to Hippo (vide
infra) than to Thales, for the infinity of matter is else-
where universally regarded as a conception first enter-
tained by Anaximander; Thales most likely never
raised such a question at all.
He is said to have discriminated * from water, as
* Phys. 105 b, m: of uèv Év ti
orrouxetov Štroriðévres Tooto &melpov
ëAeyov tápleyéðel, Šotrep Oaxis pièu
iſãwp, etc.
* Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 16: of 8&
trepi pigeos àwavres àel Šro rifléaoruv
étépav twä (pāoriv ré &reſpº táv
Aeyouévov orouxetov, oiov iſoap 3)
&épa ) to ustašū rottov.
* The question there is (loc.
cit.) not whether primitive matter
is intinite, but whether the infinite
is the predicate of a body from
which it is distinguished, or is to
be held (with Plato and the Pytha-
goreans) as something self-depend-
ent, existing for itself. Aristotle,
therefore, does not say all the
Physicists regard primitive matter
as infinite, but all give to the infi-
nite some element as substratum;
and this he could very well say
even if certain physicists had not
expressly mentioned the affinity of
the first principle. The word
âmavres is limited by the context
to those Physicists who admit an
âtreupov. -
220 THALES.
primitive matter, the deity or spirit which permeates
this matter, and from it forms the world." Aristotle,”
however, expressly denies that the ancient physiologists,
among whom Thales stands first, distinguished the
moving cause from matter; or that any other philo-
sopher except Anaxagoras (and, perhaps, before him
Hermotimus) had brought forward the doctrine of an
intelligence organising the world. How could Aristotle
have used such language if he had known that Thales
named God the reason of the world P But if he did not
know it, we may be sure that the assertions of later
writers are not based upon historical tradition. More-
over, the doctrine which is attributed to Thales entirely
accords with the Stoic theology;” the very expression in
Stobaeus appears to be borrowed from the Stoic termi-
nology; “Clemens of Alexandria,” and Augustine,” dis-
tinctly declare, that neither Thales nor the physicists
1 Cic. N. De. i. 10, 25. Thales
. . . aquam dirit esse initium re-
'rum, Deum autem eam mentem,
quae ea aqua cuncta fingeret, a state-
ment which, as Krische observes
(Forschungen, 39 sq.), is the same
in substance, and is apparently
taken originally from the same
source as that of Stobaeus (Ecl. i.
56): 9axis votiv roi, kāoruov row
6ebv, and the similar passage in
Plut. Plac. i. 7, 11 (consequently
we must not in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.
16, 5, read with Gaisford: ©axis Tby
kóopov eival bebv, but votiv too
réopov 6eóv). Athenag. Supplic. c.
21; Galen, Hist. Phil. c. 8, p. 251 ;
Rühn.
2 Cicero, loc. cit. ef. Stobaeus,
1oc. cit.: to 5% wav ćujuxov Šua kal
Saipávay TAñpes' 5thkely 5è kal Biê
rod atouxelööows trypoſ, Šávauv
6etav kivm ruchy airow. Philoponus,
De An. C. 7 u, makes Thales to
have said: ás i tpóvoia uéxpt rôv
éoxátov 51%ket kal oi6év airhy
A&v6ável.
* Metaph. i. 3, 984 a, 27 b. 15.
* God is described, for example
by Seneca (Nat. qu. prol. 13) as the
mens universi; by Cleanthes (vide
Tertullian, Apologet. 21) as the
spiritus permeator universi; by
Stobaeus, Ecl. i. 178, as Sāvapus
kivmtikh Tås #Ams; by Diogenes,
vii. 138, as vows, which pervades
all things (6(mkeiv).
* Strom. ii. 364 C; cf. Tert. c.
Marc. i. 13, Thales aquam (Deum
pronuntiavit).
* Civ. D. viii. 2.
ORGANISING FORCE. 221
who succeeded him regarded God or the Divine Spirit
as the framer of the universe, but that Anaxagoras was
the first to hold this doctrine. We may, therefore,
certainly conclude that the opposite theory is an error
of the post-Aristotelian period, the source of which we
shall presently find in some passages of Aristotle. It
by no means follows from this that Thales personally be-
lieved in no god or gods; but the tradition that credits
him with the thesis that God is the oldest of all things,
because He has had no beginning, is not very trustworthy.
For this assertion is no better attested than the innu-
merable other apophthegms ascribed to the seven sages,
and was probably attributed to Thales originally in
some collection of their sayings in the same arbitrary
manner that other sayings were attributed to the rest.
Moreover, Xenophanes is elsewhere invariably considered,
as the first who, in opposition to the Hellenic religion,
declared the Deity to have had no beginning. Accord-
ing to certain authors, Thales taught that the world is
full of gods. This statement is much more probable
than the preceding.” But what are we to understand by
1 Plut. S. sap. conv, c. 9; Diog.i.
35; Stobaeus, Ecl. i. 54. This is
no doubt the meaning also of the
statements in Clemens, Strom. V.
595 A (and Hippolyt. Refut. haer, i.
1), according to which Thales re-
plied to the question: tí Éott to
6elov ; Tô phre &px?iv uſite réAos
ëxov. For immediately after,
another saying of Thales is quoted
concerning the omniscience of God
(the same given in Diog. 36 and
Valer. Max. vii. 2, 8). Conse-
quently, the impersonal 6etov has
here the same significance as the
personal 6eós. Tertullian (Apolo-
get. c. 46) transfers Cicero's story
(N. D. i. 22, 60) about Hiero and
Simonides to Croesus and Thales;
but this is a mere oversight.
* Arist. De An. i. 5, 411 a, 7:
kai év tá, 8x4, 6é rives abrºv [rhy
Wvxhyl Meulx6aſ pagiv, 36ev tows Kal
©ax?s ºf 6m trăvta TAjipm 6eóv
eival. Diog. i. 27: Tov kóguov
tuyvyov kal Saipºvov trafipm. Simi-
larly Stobaeus (vide supra, p. 220, 2).
The same proposition is also ap-
plied in a moral sense (Cicero, Legg.
ii. 11, 26).
222 THALES.
the expression, the diffusion of the soul throughout the
universe? Aristotle's cautious “perhaps’ shows us how
little such an interpretation is supported by tradition.
Indeed, it may safely be asserted that not only later
writers, but Aristotle himself, in his own way, ascribed
notions to Thales which we have no right to expect
from him. That he conceived all things as living, and
personified all active forces after the analogy of the
human soul, is certainly probable, because this is in
harmony with the imaginative view of nature which
everywhere, and especially among the Greeks, precedes
scientific enquiry: it is, therefore, quite credible that
he may (as Aristotle affirms) have attributed a soul to
the magnet,' on account of its power of attraction—that
is to say, regarded it as a living being. In the same
manner, doubtless, he conceived his primitive matter as
living, so that, like the ancient Chaos, it could beget
all things by itself, without the intervention of an or—
ganising spirit. It is also entirely consonant with
ancient Greek thought that he should see present
deities in the forces of nature, and a proof in the life
of nature, that nature is full of gods. But we cannot
believe that he combined the several powers of nature,
and the souls of separate beings, in the notion of a
world-soul; for that notion presupposes that the infi-
nite multiplicity of phenomena has become a unity in
the conception of the world; and that efficient power
* De An. i. 2, 405 a, 19: éotice airby kal roºs &#xois Stöðval
88 ral Oaxºs é; &v &touvnuovetſovot juxās rekuaipówevov čk rās uayvärt-
kivmtików ri rhy juxhv ŠtroNaßeiv, 80s ical toi hAércrpov. Cf. Stob. Eel.
efrep row Atôov čpm buxºv čxeiv, i. 758: Oaxis ical r& pvra guyuza
3rt row otömpov kivet. Diog. i. 24: @a.
'AptorroréAms & kal “Irrías paolv
ORGANISING FORCE. 223
is distinguished from matter and conceived as analo-
gous to the human spirit, not only in particular indi-
viduals, where this is natural in the simpler stages of
opinion, but in the universe generally. Both ideas
seem to lie beyond the first narrow limits of early
philosophy, and the historical evidence does not justify
us in attributing them to Thales.' We may con-
clude, therefore, that while he conceived his primitive
matter as living and generative, while he shared the
religious faith of his people, and applied it to the
consideration of nature, he knew nothing of a world-
soul or of a spirit permeating matter and forming the
universe.”
As to the manner in which things originated from
water, Thales seems to be silent. Aristotle certainly
says that the physicists, who hold one qualitatively de-
termined primitive matter, make things arise out of it
by rarefaction and condensation,” but it does not follow
that all these philosophers without exception were of
that opinion.” Aristotle might have used the same
form of expression if only the majority had held it,
1 Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 2: Oaxis
kal oi &r' airot va Töv icóapov can-
not of course be taken as historical
evidence.
* Some such answer must also
be given to the question which, in
the last century, was so vigorously
debated, but which is now almost
wholly neglected, whether Thales
was a Theist or an Atheist. The
truth is no doubt that he was nei-
ther one nor the other; neither in
his religious faith nor his philoso-
phy; his religion is Greek polythe-
ism, his philosophy is pantheistic
hylozoism.
* Phys. i. 4, at the commence-
ment: ás 6' oi puorukol Aéryovoru São
Tpétrol eioſiv. of uév yöp #v trouh-
oravres to by orówa to Širokeſpevov
. . . . taxNa yewv&ot trukvármri
kal wavórmri troXA& Trotobvres . . .
of 6' ék rot, Évös évoča as rās evav-
Tiórntas Šickpívea 6al, Šotrep "Avagſ-
Alavöpós (pmartv.
* Heracleitus, for instance, re-
garded things as arising out of fire,
not by rarefaction and condensa-
tion, but by transformation.
224 THALES.
and if it appeared to him the most logical theory of
derivation. Simplicius' is the first who expressly con-
nects Thales with Anaximenes as having adopted this
theory; not only, however, does Theophrastus disagree
with him, but Simplicius tells us himself that his state-
ment is only based upon the general bearing of Aristotle's
words.” What is said by Galen "in a passage of doubt-
ful connection, and also by other writers,” in a similar
strain, is most likely taken from the same source. It
is most probable, on the whole, therefore, that Thales
never entertained the question, but contented himself
with the indefinite motion that things arose or were
produced out of water.
What we hear from other sources about the doctrine
of Thales consists merely of isolated empirical obser-
vations or conjectures, or else of statements so imper-
fectly guaranteed that they cannot be considered
authentic. The latter holds good not merely of the
various mathematical and astronomical discoveries
and moral maxims which are attributed to him,” of
the assertion" that the heavenly bodies are glowing
* Phys. 39 a kal of $v 6: Kal
kivočuevov thv 3px?iv Štrobéuevoi,
às GaAſis kal 'Avačplēvms, paváget
kal trukvåget thv yéveauv trouotivares.
So 310 a., u, Pseudo-Alex. in Me-
taph. 1042 b, 33, p. 518, 7; Bon.
and the anonymous Schol. in Arist.
516 a, 14 b, 14.
* Simpl. Phys. 32 a., u : étrl yèp
roºrov učvov ['Avačupévous] Oedºppa-
gros év tá ‘Iotopig thv uávorw
eſpnke kal Thy riſkvoortv. (This
saying, moreover, ought only
to be applied to the ancient
Ionians. Theophrastus ascribed
also to Diogenes rarefaction and
condensation, vide infra): 37Aov
6é às kal oi &AAoi Tà wavórmti kal
Tvkvörmti éxpóvro, ical yèp’Apato-
TéAms repl travrov rottaw site icot-
wós, &c. -
* Wide supra, p. 218, 2.
* Hippol. Refut. i. 1; Arnob,
Adv. nat. ii. 10; Philop. Phys.
C. 1, 14, who, in both passages,
so entirely confuses Thales with
Anaximenes, that he attributes to
Thales the doctrine of air as primi-
tive matter.
* Cf. p. 120, and p. 213, 3.
* Plut. Plac. ii. 13, 1 ; Achill.
Tat. Isag. c. 11.
I)OOTRINES A TTRIBUTED TO THALES. 225
masses, analogous to the earth, that the moon receives
her light from the sun," and so forth ; but even of the
philosophic doctrines of the unity of the world,” the
infinite divisibility and variability of matter,” the un-
thinkableness of empty space,” the four elements,” the
mixture of matters,” the nature and immortality of the
soul," the daemons and the heroes.* All these originate
with such untrustworthy witnesses, and most of them
either directly or indirectly so entirely contradict more
credible testimony, that we can attach no value to them
whatever. What Aristotle” gives as a tradition is more
likely to be true, viz. that Thales supposed the earth
1 Plut. Plac. ii. 28, 3; Plut.
Conv. sap. C 15 (Ös 5& Oaxis Aéyet,
rijs y?s āvaipeBeforms orityxvaſiv Tov
&Aov čeiv köopov) can hardly be
quoted, as the Banquet of Plutarch
is not a historical work. Moreover,
the meaning is doubtless merely
that the annihilation of the earth
would (not will at Some time) be fol-
lowed by a destruction of the whole
universe.
2 Plut. Plac. ii. 1, 2.
* Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2; Stob. Ecl.
i. 318, 348.
4 Stob. i. 378, where the older
reading, Öréyvoorav, recommended
by Röth, Abendl, Phil. ii. 6, 7, is
grammatically inadmissible.
* According to the fragment of
the spurious writing, trepl &pxów
(Galen, vide supra, p. 216, 2), and
perhaps also Heraclit. Alleg. hom. c.
22, the four elements are expressly
reduced to water. Jt will here-
after be shown that Empedocles
was the first to establish four as
the number of the material ele-
ments.
* Stob. i. 368. In the parallel
passage of Plutarch's Placita, i. 17,
WOL. I.
1, Thales is not named : oi àpxafot
is the expression used, which is
evidently more correct, and was
probably the original expression of
Plutarch.
* According to Plutarch (Plac.
iv. 2, 1) and Nemes. (Nat. hom. c.
2, p. 28), he described the soul as
ºpiois &eikivmtos ?) airokivm ros; ac-
cording to Theodoret, Gr. aff, cur.
v. 18, p. 72, as pào is àictvm ros
(where, however, &etkivmtos possibly
ought to be read); an interpolation
to which the passage of Aristotle
quoted above doubtless gave occa-
sion. Tertullian, De Am. c. 5 at-
tributes to Thales and to Hippo
the theorem that the soul is com-
posed of water. Philoponus, De
An. c. 7, restricts this to Hippo,
while, in another passage, De An.
A 4, he ascribes it both to
Hippo and Thales. Choerilus ap.
Diog. i. 24, and Suidas, Oaxis, says
that he was the first to profess be-
lief in immortality.
* Athenag. Supplic. c. 23; Plut.
Plac. i. 8.
* Metaph. i. 3, 983 b, 21; De
Caelo, ii. 13, 294 a, 29.
Q
226 THALES.
to float on the water; for this would harmonise per-
fectly with the theory of the earth's origin from
water, and easily adapt itself to the old cosmological
notions: we may also connect with it the further state-
ment' that he explained earthquakes by the movement
of the water. This last assertion, however, seems to
rest entirely on one of the writings falsely ascribed to
Thales, and doubtless the ultimate source of other
doctrines that have been attributed to him. The
statement of Aristotle is better attested, but we gain
little information, even from him, as to the doctrine of
Thales as a whole.” All that we know of it may, in
fact, be reduced to the proposition that water is the
matter out of which everything arises and consists.
The reasons that determined him to this theory can
only now be conjectured; how he more closely defined
the process of the origination of things from water is
also very uncertain; but it is most probable that he
considered primitive matter, like mature in general, to
be animate, and that he held to the indeterminate con-
ception of beginning or generation, without defining
this as brought about by the rarefaction or condensa-
tion of the primitive matter.
However meagre and insignificant this theory may
seem, it was, at least, an attempt to explain phenomena
by one general matural principle, and in this light it
was of the highest importance; we find that a series of
* Plut. Plac. iii. 15, 1; Hippol. militates against the supposition
Refut, har. i. 1; Sen. Nat. qu. vi. (Plut. Plac. iii. 10) that he held the
6; iii. 14. The last, however, earth to be spherical, a conception
seems to refer to a treatise falsely which is foreign to Anaximander
attributed to Thales. . and Anaximenes, and even to
* On the other band, this theory Anaxagoras and Diogenes.
ANAXIMANDER.
227
$
more extended enquiries are directly connected with
those of Thales, and that even his immediate successor
was able to attain much more considerable results.
II. ANAXIMANDER."
WHEREAs Thales had declared water to be the primitive
matter of all things, Anaximander” defined this original
* Schleiermacher, Ueber Anaari-
mandros (1811; Werke, Philos.
ii. 171 sqq.); Teichmüller, Studie
2ur Gesch. der Beſſ. Tº O, I re-
gret that I cannot make use of
Lyng's treatise, “On den Iomiske
Naturphilosophi, isſer Anawiman-
ders’ (Abdruck aus den Vid. Sels-
kabets Forhandlinger for 1866), as
I am not acquainted with the lan-
guage in which it is written.
* Anaximander was a fellow-
citizen of Thales, and also his pupil
and successor, according to later
authorities (Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 30 ;
Math. ix. 360; Hippolyt. Refut.
har. i. 6; Simpl. Phys. 6 a., m ;
Suidas, &c.; this is likewise implied
by the epithet étatpos, ap. Simpl.
De Coelo, 273 b, 38; Schol. in Arist.
514 a, 28; Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev.
i. 8, 1 ; of Sodalis in Cicero, Acad.
ii. 37, 118; of yuápipios, in Strabo,
i. 1, 11, p. 7; and the latter is actu-
ally interchanged with uaônths,
ibid. xiv. 1, 7, p. 635). According
to Apollodorus (Diog. ii. 2) he was
sixty-four years old in the second
year of the 58th Olympiad, 546–7
B.C., and died soon afterwards, so
that his birth must have occurred
in Ol. 42, 2 (611 B.C.), or, as Hippo-
lytus (Refut. i. 6) thinks, in Ol. 42,
3. Pliny (Hist. Nat. ii. 8, 3) says
he discovered the inclination of the
zodiac. The worth of these state-
ments we cannot certainly esti-
mate; but there is much to be said
for the conjecture of Diels (Rhein.
Mus. Xxxi. 24) that Anaximander
gave his age in his own work as six-
ty-four; that Apollodorus (who, ac-
cording to Diogenes, had this work
in his hands), following some inter.
nal evidence, calculated that the
work was written in Ol. 58,2; and
that the statement of Pliny is
based on the same calculation, in-
asmuch as he found mention of the
obliquity of the ecliptic in this
work. But Diogenes adds, as a
quotation from Apollodorus: ákuá-
oauté "rm uáàtata karð IIoxvkpárnv
Töv ×400 tipavyov, which is rather
surprising, as Anaximander was
considerably older than Polycrates,
and died about 22 years before
him. Yet we need not, with Diels,
loc. cit., assume that these words
originally related to Pythagoras
(whose &Kuh certainly falls under
Polycrates, as he is said to have
emigrated in his reign when forty
years old), for they are also to be ex-
plained as the inexact reproduction
of an observation of Apollodorus
respecting Anaximander. I am in-
clined to suspect that Apollodorus,
in order to get a synchronistic date
after the manner of ancient chrono-
logists, had made the 3xpº of this
philosopher (ºrm) pretty nearly co-
incide with the commencement of
the tyranny of Polycrates, which is
Q 2
328
ANAXIMANDER.
element as the infinite, or the unlimited."
By the in-
finite, however, he did not understand,” like Plato and
the Pythagoreans, an incorporeal element, the essence
of which consists exclusively in infinity; but an in-
finite matter: the infinite is not subject but predicate,
it designates not infinity as such, but an object to
which the quality of being infinite belongs.
It is in
this sense only, says Aristotle,” that all the physicists
generally placed in the third year
of the 53rd Olympiad, and in the
44th year of Anaximander's life.
Eusebius (Chron.) assigns Anaxi-
mander to the 51st Olympiad.
Nothing is known of his per-
sonal history, but the statement
(AElian, V. H. iii. 17) of his being
the leader of the Milesian colony
in Apollonia indicates that he
filled a distinguished position in
his native place. His book, Trepl
q)`jorews, is said to have been the
first philosophical writing of the
Greeks (Diog. ii. 2; Themist. Orat.
xxvi. p. 317 C. When Clemens,
Strom. i. 308 C, says the same of
the work of Anaxagoras, he is evi-
dently confusing him with Anaxi-
mander). Brandis rightly observes,
however (i. 125), that according to
Diogenes, loc. cit., the work must
have been rare, even in Apollodo-
rus's time, and Simplicius can only
have known it through the quota-
tions of Theophrastus and others.
Suidas mentions several writings
of Anaximander's, but this is
doubtless a misunderstanding; on
the other hand, a map of the world
is attributed to him (Diog. loc. eit. ;
Strabo, loc. cit, after Eratosthenes;
Agathemerus, Geogr. Inf. 1). Eu-
demus, ap. Simpl. De Coelo, 212
a, 12 (Sºhol. in Arist. 497 a, 10)
says he was the first who tried
to determine the sizes and distances
of the heavenly bodies. The in
vention of the sundial was as-
cribed to Anaximander by Diog.
ii. 1, and Eus. Pr. Ev. x. 14, 7;
and to Anaximenes by Pliny, Nat.
Hist. ii. 76, 187, in both cases er-
roneously, as is probable; for the
invention, according to Herod. ii.
109, was introduced into Greece by
the Babylonians; but it is possible
that one of these philosophers may
have erected in Sparta the first
Sundial ever seen there.
* Arist. Phys. iii. 4, 203 b, 10
sqq.; Simpl. Phys. 6 a, and many
others; see the following note.
* As Schleiermacher, loc. cit.
p. 176 sq., exhaustively proves.
* Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 2: Trávres
às àpxfiv riva riðéaori rôv čvrov
[rö &reipov], of uév čo Trep of IIv6a-
7ópelot kal IIAárov, ka9' airb, oùx
ãs orvuòeBmkós tui étépºp, &AA’ oãotav
airó by to &melpov . . . . of 8&
trepi pāorews àravres àeł Śwortóéaoruv
érépav rivă pâgu tę &teſpº Tów
As youévov orouxetov, oiov #8wp ſh
&épa ) to uerași rotºrwy. Cf. Me-
taph. x. 2, 1053 b, 15. According ©
to the theory of the Physicists the
&v was not itself a substance, but
had some pious for its substratum,
ékeſvov yap 6 uév ris diafav eivaí
qmori to $v 6 3’ &épa, § 5% (Anaxi-
mander) to &meipov.
THE INFINITE. 229
speak of the infinite; and among the physicists he
unquestionably reckons Anaximander." According to
the unanimous testimony of later authors,” Anaximan-
der's main argument for his theory was that the infinite,
and the infinite alone, does not exhaust itself in con-
stantly producing. This is the very argument that
Aristotle quotes” as the chief ground for maintaining
an infinite corporeal matter; and he does so in speaking
of the theory which we recognise as Anaximander’s,
viz. that the infinite is a body distinct from the de-
terminate elements. From the infinite, Anaximander
(whom Aristotle for that reason places beside Empe-
docles and Anaxagoras) derived particular kinds of
matter, and the world which is compounded of them,
by means of separation * (Aw88cheidwng), a doctrine
which would be impossible unless the infinite were
itself something material. Lastly, though it is difficult
to discover how this philosopher preeisely defined his
infinite, all testimony is agreed as to its eorporeal
mature; and among the passages of Aristotle which
possibly may refer to Anaximander, and of which some
must of necessity refer to him, there is none which
does not imply this corporeal nature.” That he in-
* Cf. loc. cit. p. 203 b, 13; vide
infra.
* Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 118; Simpl.
De Caelo, 273 b, 38; Schol. 514 a,
28; Philop. Phys. L, 12 m ; Plut.
Placita, i. 3, 4, and to the same
effect Stob. Ecl. i. 292: Aéyet of v:
51& ri &melpóv éotiv ; iva uměčv
éAAeſtrm, i. Yéveals i ögºla'rawévm.
* Phys. iii. 8, 208, a, 8: oëre
y&p iva i. Yéveous uh étrixeirm, divay-
kaſov čvepyeig timepov eival orópia
aiorówitóv, cf. c. 4, 203 b, 18, and
Plut. loc. cit,
* Wide inf. p. 234, 3, and p. 250.
* In our text of Simpl. Phys.
32 b, o, we have : évoča as Tês
évavrićtmtas Év rig introkeſpevº
&treſpº 6vri ào'àuart ékkpívea 6aſ
qºmotiv 'Avačiuavöpos. Instead of
ão 6part Schleiermacher, loc. cit.
178, proposes toread ord part. Bran-
dis (Gr. Röm. Phil. i. 130) prefers
&owadrº; but this could only be
230
ANAXIMANDER.
tended therefore to designate by the infinite a matter
infinite as to its mass, cannot be doubted;" and it is
admitted on the supposition that
Simplicius by the āoróparov here
understood that which is not as yet
formed into any determinate body.
Meanwhile adºpları is not merely
better sense, but it has also in its
favour that Simplicius in the pre-
vious context (p. 32 a, Schol. in
Ar. 334 b, 18) has been speaking
of Anaximander's orápa to inrokei-
wevov; and similarly Aristotle in
the passage immediately preceding
the one here in question, Phys. i.
4, 187 a, 13, speaks of the orówa.
to Širokeiuevov, and elsewhere (vide
previous note) of the ātrepov gºpia
airómtöv. These words signify:
“In the primitive matter conceived;
as āmelpow a 6p.a.’
| Michelis (De Amaa. Infinito.
Ind. lect. Braunsberg, 1874) indeed
asserts the contrary in the tone of
one who holds his own infalli-
bility to be indisputable. His
arguments, however, seem to me
insufficient. He maintains that
Aristotle, in a passage never
hitherto understood (Phys. iii. 4,
204 a, 2 sq.), distinguishes the
positive infinite or absolute from
the negative infinite, which relates
only to the corporeal and the sen-
sible, the former being what Anaxi-
mander meant by his &meipov. But
the passage contains no trace of
any such distinction, nor has any
writer previously discovered such ;
it only says that we may either call
that an ātreupov, the measuring of
which can never be completed; or
that which does not allow of being
measured: Tó pººl reqvicéval buiéval,
ãotrep pou?) &opatos; in other
words (cf. c. 5, 204 a, 12), that
which does not fall under the con-
ception of magnitude, and, there-
fore, can as little be measured or,
consequently, limited, as the voice
can be conceived of as visible. So
understood, the expression àmeipov
has nothing at all to do with the
Absolute as such : the Štreipov in
this sense coincides much more with
that of which it is said (Phys. iii.
4, beginning) that it can neither
be called &neupov (in the ordinary
sense), nor tre+repaguévov, as, for in-
stance, the point or the tra,00s.
Michelis himself is forced to allow
(p. 7 sq.) that Aristotle never
again mentions this ‘positive in-
finite.” How little Aristotle ever
thought of it, Michelis might have
seen had he studied the passage in
Phys. i. 2, 185 a, 32 sqq., where,
without any restriction, it is as-
serted of the Štreipov generally, and
not of any particular kind of
&reupov, that it is to be found only
év tá, troorg, oùoríav Šē &tepov eival
% trouármra h tré60s oik Övöéxeral
ei Wº karð oup18eflmicos, ei äua kai
troo’, &rra elev, for the Absolute is
oùota, if it is anything; and such
an oiota that the troorov cannot,
not even karū a vuòeºmicos, belong
to it. The conception of the Abso-
lute and that of the Štreipov, accor-
ding to Aristotle's view, plainly
exclude one another; for the Ab-
solute is the perfected energy, pure
and simple ; the Štreipov, on the
contrary, is what is always unper-
fected, always Švváuet, never évep-
'yeſ', (Phys. iii. 5, 204 a, 20 c.
6, 206 b, 34 sqq ; Metaph. ix. 6,
1048 b, I4), which, consequently,
can be only material cause, and is
never employed in any other sense
(Phys. iii. 7, 207, 4, 34 sqq.; cf.
THE INFINITE.
231
probably in this sense that we should understand the
expression àTsupov."
He was induced, as we have seen,
to determine primitive matter in this way, chiefly by
the consideration that primitive matter must be infinite
to be able continually to produce from itself new
essences. It was easy for
c. 6, 206 a, 18 b, 13). Aristotle,
unquestionably therefore, neither
himself thought of an immaterial
&meipov, nor attributed it to Anaxi-
mander. Even in respect of that
&melpov, which Michelis wrongly
regards as his ‘positive Infinite,’
he says expressly, Phys, iii. 5, 204
a, 13: &AA’ oix oitos offre paolv
eival of pâgicovires eival to &melpov
oùre jueis (mroßprev, &AA’ &s &ötéč0-
ãov. As little can it be said that
Aristotle, at any rate, did not
ascribe to Anaximander's àtreupov,
a corporeal materiality, for he
manifestly does so in the passages
quoted, p. 228, 3, and p. 229, 3.
Michelis's argument (p. 11), that
the passage in Metaph. x. 2, 1053
b, 15(vide Supra, p. 233, 1) identifies
Anaximander with Empedocles (it
also identifies him with Anaxime-
nes), and that, according to my
view, the same opinion is ascribed
to him as to Melissus, proves no-
thing. We cannot conclude that
because the pixta of Empedocles is
not a corporeal matter that there-
fore Anaximander's &meipov is none;
nor can it be pronounced impossible
that Melissus should have been led
to a determination of Being, which
brought him into contact with
Anaximander, as Plato was brought
with the Pythagoreans by his doc-
trine of the Unlimited. In fine
(p. 11), Aristotle, of whose words,
moreover (Phys. iii. 4, 203 b, 4),
Michelis has a wrong conception,
Aristotle to show (loc. cit.)
must himself, according to this
writer, have distorted Anaximan-
der's doctrine; and all other autho-
rities, especially Theophrastus, in
his utterance, quoted p. 233, 1, must
be held guilty of the same thing.
From this point, however, all pos-
sibility of any historic demonstra-
tion is at an end, and Michelis
substitutes for it a simple sic volo,
sic jubeo.
* Strümpell (Gesch. der theor.
Phil. der Gr. 29); Seydel (Fortschritt
der Metaph. innerhalb der Schule des
Ion. Hylozoismus, Leipzig, 1860, p.
10); and Teichmüller (Studien zur
Gesch. der Begr. 7, 57) believe that
the &neupov means with Anaximan-
der that which is qualitatively in-
determinate, as distinguished from
determinate substances. But the
word seems to have first received
this signification from the Pytha-
goreans, and even with them it is a
derived signification; the original
meaning is ‘the Unlimited' (only
that the Unlimited, as applied to
numbers, is that which sets no
limit to division nor to augmenta-
tion, vide infra, Pyth.). For Anaxi-
mander this signification results
partly from the same cause that he
assigns for the &meipia of primitive
matter (viz., that it would other-
wise be exhausted); and partly
from this consideration, that it is
precisely because of its infinity
that the ātreupov can embrace all
things.
232 ANAXIMANDER.
that this proof is not conclusive; but it might never-
theless have appeared sufficient to the unpractised
thought of the earliest philosophers," and we must at
any rate allow that Anaximander, "by maintaining the
theory, first raised an important question in philo-
sophy. -
So far there is little room for disagreement; but
opinions are greatly divided as to the more precise
meaning of Anaximander's primitive matter. The
ancients are pretty nearly unanimous in asserting that
it did not coincide with either of the four elements;”
according to some it was not a determinate body at all,
others describe it as intermediate between water and
air, or again between air and fire; while a third account
represents it as a mixture of all particular kinds of
matter; a mixture in which these have been always
contained, as distinct and determinate, so that they
can be evolved from it by mere separation, without any
change in their constitution. This last theory has
formed the basis in modern times” of the assertion
* The same mistake, however, Anaximander for Anaximenes, re-
was made by Melissus, and after-
wards by the Atomist, Metrodorus;
vide infra, Mel, and Metrod.
* Authorities will presently be
given. The Pseudo-Aristotelian
writing, De Melisso, &c., c. 2, 975
b, 22, alone maintains that his pri-
mitive matter is water (vide infra)
and in Sextus, Math. x. 313, it is
said that he made all things arise,
& Švös kal trouot, namely, air. But
although his name is twice men-
tioned, it seems very probable that
the statement may have sprung
from the erroneous substitution of
peated by a copyist from the text of
Sextus, or some other author whom
he was transcribing. In the Pyrrh.
iii. 30 he gives a correct account of
both these Philosophers.
* Ritter, Gesch. der Ion. Phil.
p. 174 sqq., and Gesch. der Phil. i.
201 sq., 283 sqq., where his former
concession that Anaxagoras held
things to be contained in primitive
matter only as to their germ and
capability, and not as distinct
from each other, is virtually re-
tracted.
THE INFINITE. 233
that among the earlier, no less than among the later
Ionic philosophers, there were two classes—the Dy-
namists and the Mechanists—i.e. those who derived all
things from one primitive matter by means of a vital
transformation, and those who derived them from a
multiplicity of unchanging primitive matters by means
of separation and combination in space. To the first
belong Thales and Anaximenes, Heracleitus and Dio-
genes; to the second, Anaximander, with Anaxagoras
and Archelaus. We will now examine this theory,
since it has an important bearing not only on the
doctrine before us, but also on the whole history of
ancient Philosophy.
Much may be said in its behalf. Simplicius' ap-
pears to ascribe the same view to Anaximander which
we find in Anaxagoras, viz. that in the separation of
matters from the infinite, kindred elements become
united, gold particles with gold particles, earth with
earth, and so on, these different and distinct kinds of
'yápas à p’ of 5uakpuðueva roës ºre
* Phys. 6 b, u, after a descrip-
kóo wous kal Thu Tów &AAwu pāoruv
tion of Anaxagoras's doctrine of
the primitive elements, he proceeds
thus: kai Taijrá pmauv 60éâq)paotos
trapatamoria's ró ‘Avačupdvöpp Aéyetv
Töv 'Avačayópav. čkeſvos Yép pmoiv
év tá 6takptoei Toi) ātretpov Tó.
ovyyev'ſ pépeotal mpos &AAmAa, kai
ti uév év tá, travti xpvabs ºv,
ºyſveoróat Xpworöv, 3 ru 88 y? yńv,
ôpioios 3& kai Tôv &AAov čkaarov,
&s oi yuouévov &AA’. Strapxóvrwv
Tpérepov. Cf. p. 51 b, u: oi 5è
troAAö. Pºv čvurápxovira ö, äkkplve-
orðai éAeyov rhv yévecru ävaipoovres,
às 'Avačíuavôpos kal 'Avačayópas.
Tās 5è kiwāorews kal ris yewégews
ałriov čtréatmore Tov votiv 6 'Avača-
éyévvmorav. ‘Kal otºrw uév, pnot,
Aapíšavávrovë6čelev &v 6'Avačayópas
Tås uèv Šxukås &pxàs &treſpous troueiv,
Thy 6é Tſis kivſio’ews kai Tàs yewéorea's
airíav atav row votiv. ei Sé ris Tºw
pièu Töv Štrávrov ŠtroAdBot patav
eival púoruv &óptorov kal kar’ eiðos
kal karū uéyebos, orvuſbaivet 880 Tès
àpxès airby Aéyeiv, thv too &metpou
qºquy kal row votiv' &ote patveral
tà owpatikā Otouxeta trapatamoria's
trouév 'Avačupid vôpºſ.’ The same
words are quoted by Simplicius,
p. 33 a, as borrowed from Theo-
phrastus's pugikh iotopia.
234 ANAXIMANDER.
matter having been already contained in the original
mass. His authority for this statement is supposed to
be Theophrastus. We meet with the same view, how-
ever, elsewhere,' and Aristotle seems to justify it when
he describes Anaximander's primitive matter as a mix-
ture.” He also expressly mentions him as one of the
philosophers who thought particular kinds of matter
were developed from the one primitive matter, not by
rarefaction and condensation, but by separation.” This
proves, apparently beyond question, that Aristotle
himself conceived this primitive matter of Anaximan-
der as analogous to that of Anaxagoras; for that which
has to be separated from matter must previously have
been contained in it. But these reasons, on closer in-
spection, are very insufficient.” In regard to the Aris-
totelian passages, Aristotle himself tells us” that he
uses the expressions “separated ' and “contained, not
only where one kind of matter is contained in another
* Sidonius Apollinaris, Carm.
xv. 83 sqq., according to Augus-
time, Civ. D. viii. 2; Philoponus,
Phys. C, 4. In Irenaeus C. haer, ii.
14.2, it is not clear what conception
of the Šteipov he means: ‘Anawi-
"mander autem hoc quod immensum
est omnium initium subjecit (šté0e-
to) seminaliter habens in semetipso
omnium genesin.”
* Metaph. xii. 2, 1069 b, 20 :
real tour eart to 'Avačayópov čv kal
’Eutrečokxéous to utyua kal 'Avač-
Audväpov.
* Phys. i. 4: és à’ of pugikol
Aéyova, São Tpétrol eioiv. of uév yāp
$v trouha'avtes to by gºua to Štokeſ-
Auevov, 3) rôv rpiów (Water, Air,
Fire) ru, 3 &AA0, 8 €ort trupos uév
Trvicvárepov &épos 3& Aerrérepov,
TāAAa yewv&ot trukvármti kal wavó-
Tnti troAA& trouotivres . . . . of 6’
éic rot, Évos évoča as Tàs évavrićrmºras
ékkpívea 6al, Šotrep "Avačuavöpós
qmail kal &got 5’ evical troAAá pagu,
eival &gtrep 'Epſtrečok?\ms kal’Avača-
ºyópas' ék too pºlypiatos yāp kaloirot
ékkpivoval r&AAa.
* Cf. Schleiermacher, op. cit, p.
190 sq.; Brandis, Rhein. Mus. of
Niebuhr and Brandis, iii. 114 sqq.;
Gr. Röm. Phil. i. 132 sq.
* De Coelo, iii. 3, 302 a, 15:
ëorro è?) orotxeſov Tóv orapudºrov,
eis 6 rāAAa orópata Šiaupstral, évv-
Trápxov Švváplet h évépyetz . . . .
év učv yöp o'apri Šbag Kal ékáorp
rów rototrov čveoti čvváuel trip kal
'yń' pavepā yöp Taira é; £keſvow
éickpupéueva.
THE INFINITE. 235
actually, but potentially; therefore, when he says that
Anaximander represents the particular substances as
separating themselves from the primitive matter, it does
not at all follow that they were, as these definite sub-
stances, included within it. The primitive matter can
be equally conceived as the indeterminate essence out
of which the determinate is ultimately developed by a
qualitative change. As to the comparison of Anaxi-
mander with Anaxagoras and Empedocles, it may as
easily refer to a remote as to a particular resemblance
between their doctrines," and it is the former kind of
* In the passage just quoted,
Phys. i. 4, Aristotle distinguishes
those philosophers who place primi-
tive matter in a determinate body
from Anaximander and those, Šool
ev kal troAAd paauw, who maintain
that the év (the primitive matter)
is at the same time one and many,
because it is an assemblage of
many substances qualitatively dis-
tinct. We may indeed question
whether Anaximander is to be
counted among these latter; the
words, kai Šarou 6', are not conclusive
against it; since they may not only
be explained, ‘and similarly those,'
&c., but also, and ‘generally
speaking, those.” But (cf. Seydel
loc. cit. p. 13) in the subsequent
passage, ék too utyuatos, &c., the
kal oitou cannot include Anaxi-
mander, for he is the only person
with whom the oirot (through the
kai) can be compared, since he alone,
not the év trouha'avtes to Öv orópia,
taught an éickptoſis of the évauTuárm-
tes out of the év. If so, however,
the philosophers, āool Év Kal troAAd
(paatu eival, while they were likened
with Anaximander in regard to the
ëkkplots, are at the same time dis-
criminated from him in another
respect ; he cannot, therefore, be
counted among those who consider
primitive matter to be šu kal troAAá,
and he did not conceive it as a
mass of various matters, retain-
ing their qualitative differences in
the mixture. Büsgen (Ueber d.
&Teipov Anaasimanders, Wiesbaden,
1867, p. 4 sq.) thinks that in this
passage Anaximander must be
reckoned among those who admit
the év kai troAA&, as there would
otherwise be no contrast between
him and those who assume one
uniform first principle (Anaxime-
nes, &c.); but he misconceives the
train of ideas. Anaximander is
not placed with Empedocles and
Anaxagoras in an opposition to
Amaximenes and others, in regard to
the Unity or Plurality of primitive
substances, but in regard to the
manner in which things proceed
from them (rarefaction and conden-
sation or separation); it is, how-
ever, at the same time pointed out
how Anaximander differs from
these two philosophers; and subse-
quently how they differ from one
another. Büsgen's attempt (p. 6)
236
ANAXIMANDER,
reference that is intended.
mander's primitive matter
In the same way Amaxi-
might be called pºlypia, or
at any rate might be loosely included under this ex-
pression (which primarily relates to Empedocles and
Anaxagoras), without ascribing to Anaximander the
theory of an original mixture of all particular matters
in the specific sense of the phrase.'
We cannot there-
fore prove that Aristotle ascribed this doctrine to him.
Nor does Theophrastus; he
to press into his service Phys. i. 2,
sub init., and i. 5, sub init. is also a
mistake ; for in the first of these
passages Anaximander, if he were
named at all, would be ranked
among those who assume a uto.
&pxh ſcuovuévn; and the second
does not aim at a complete enume-
ration of the different systems:
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the
, Pythagoreans, are none of them
mentioned, and it is only in a
forced manner that Heracleitus can
be brought in under the category
of those who hold the rarefaction
and condensation of primitive
Imatter.
* Separation corresponds to
mixing (róv yap airów Mišís écriri
kal xopioubs, as it said in Metaph.
i. 8.989 b, 4; a passage well worth
comparing with the one before us);
if all things arose by separation
from the primitive matter, this
matter was previously a mixture of
all things. In , the same way,
therefore, that Aristotle can speak
of a separation or division, when
the separated elements were only
potentially contained in the primi-
tive matter, he can likewise, in the
same case, speak of a mixture. It
is not the least necessary that the
Auſyna should first have been
expressly says that Anaxa-
brought about by a meeting to-
gether of the particular substances,
as Büsgen (p. 3, 7, 11 sq. of the
treatise mentioned in the pre-
ceding note) seems to assume in
regard to the Štreipov of Anaxi-
mander; this, indeed, is absolutely
incompatible with the concept of
primitive matter, of the Eternal
and the Unbecome. In consider-
ing the above-mentioned passage,
it must also be observed that here
the uſ yua is primarily ascribed
to Empedocles, and only in the
second place to Anaximander, by
the addition kal 'Avačipadvöpov.
We might here admit a slight
2eugma, so that the word, which
in its full power could only be
used of Empedocles, might be ap-
plied in its general conception
(Unity including in itself a Multi-
plicity) to Anaximander, and this
is all the more justifiable, since the
passage belongs to a section of
Aristotle which (perhaps because
it was originally a draft intended
for his own use) is unequalled
among all his writings for scant
expression, and in which the proper
meaning of the author is often
only discoverable by complèting
thoughts which he has scarcely
indicated,
THE INFINITE. 237
goras can only be held to agree with Anaximander on
the subject of primitive matter if we attribute to him as
his original principle a matter without definite qualities
(uta púats àóptotos), instead of a mixture of deter-
minate and qualitatively distinct substances." That
the doctrine of Anaxagoras might ultimately be reduced
to this theory, which is certainly divergent from its
primary sense, had already been remarked by Aristotle.”
Theophrastus” drew the same inference, and makes his
comparison of Anaxagoras with Anaximander contingent
on its admission. This shows that he ascribed to
Anaximander a primitive matter in which no particular
qualities of bodies were as yet present, not a matter
that comprehended all particular substances as such
within itself. Besides, the text in question does not
attribute this latter doctrine to Anaximander ; for the
words to which this meaning is ascribed 4 refer to
Anaxagoras.”
1 In the words quoted between
inverted commas, p. 233, 1, kai otta,
aév–’Avačuávöpq, the only passage
that Simplicius there cites textu-
ally from him.
* Metaph. i. 8, 989 a, 30; cf.
ibid. xii. 2, 1069 b, 21.
* Töv Avačayópav eis rov 'Ava-
ëluavöpov ovva,66v, as it is said in
Simpl. Phys. 33 a.
* Simp. loc. cit. from ékeſvos
7&p to Štrapxóvtov, where Brandis
(Gr. Röm. Phil. i. 13) sees a state-
ment about Anaximander emana-
ting from Theophrastus.
* These words may certainly
refer to Anaximander, but they
may also refer to Anaxagoras; for
though ékeſvos usually points to
the more remote, it very often ap-
Moreover these words are not given by
plies to the nearer of two previ-
ously named subjects, cf. e.g. Plato,
Polit. 303 B; Phaedr. 231 C,
233 A, E ; Arist. Metaph. i. 4,
985 a, 14 sq.; Sext. Pyrrh. i. 213.
That this is only possible when
the idea indicated by ékelvos and
nearer in order of words is farther
in the thought of the author I
cannot admit (Kern, Beitr. 2 ur
Darstellung der Phil. des Xeno-
phanes, Danzig, 1871, p. 11: Büs-
gen's observations on the same
subject, and on the &tepov of
Anaximander, I must pass over).
When, for example, Aristotle says
(Metaph. xii. 7, 1072 b, 22): rö
'yap bektukov too vomro0 kal rijs
obotas vows évépyet 8& éxov. čar'
érceivo (the éxelv and évépyeºv, ac-

238
ANAXIMANDER.
Simplicius as a quotation from Theophrastus, but as an
expression of his own opinion.
This may be based
upon the testimony of Theophrastus, and the conjecture
is in itself probable enough. But it can only be main-
tual thought) uáAAov rotºrov (in a
higher degree than the mere faculty
of thinking) & Soke? 6 vows 9etov
ëxeuv; –ékeſvo relates not merely
to what is the nearer in order of
words, but also to the principal
idea; totrov to what is farther,
and is only introduced in a compa-
rison with it. When (Ibid. x. 2,
beginning) it is asked whether the
#v is a self-dependent substance, as
the Pythagoreans and Plato think,
à uáAAov Štrökeitat ris pào is, kal
trós bei Yuwpipwrépaſs Aex87val kal
MāAAov čo Trep of trepi pāorews: éiceſ-
vov ydp, and so forth (vide Supra,
p. 228, 3), it cannot be supposed
that the physicists to which the
ékeſvalvrefers, are farther from Aris-
totle's thought than the Pythago-
reans and Plato. Similarly in the
Phaedrus, 233 E, the trpoo attoovres,
to which ékéivot relates, are not
only the nearest mentioned term,
but also the leading idea. Still less
could we expect to find this rule
of Kern's scrupulously carried out
by so recent a writer as Simplicius.
In this case it is not Anaximander,
but Anaxagoras, of whom he pri-
marily speaks. If €keſvos be re-
ferred to Anaximander, we make
Simplicius say: 1. According to
Theophrastus Anaxagoras's doctrine
of primitive substances is similar
to that of Anaximander. 2. Anaxi-
mander admitted that particular
substances were contained as such
in the &neupov, and were moved in
regard to one another when the
process of separation took place.
3. But motion and separation were
derived (not by Anaximander, but)
by Anaxagoras from vows. 4.
Anaxagoras, therefore, seems to as-
sume an infinity of primitive sub-
stances, and one moving force, vows.
5. If, however, we substitute for
the mixture consisting of many
substances (i. e. the theory which,
according to this explanation, be-
longed to Anaximander) a simple
homogeneous mass, the theory of
Anaxagoras would harmonise with
that of Anaximander. Of these
five propositions, the second would
stand in no sort of connection with
the third and fourth, and would be
in striking contradiction to the
fifth ; and in the fourth, the infer-
ence that Anaxagoras therefore be-
lieved in an infinity of matters, has
no foundation in the preceding
proposition: ékéivos, therefore, can
only be Anaxagoras. Even the
&Teipov, of which this ékeſvos is
said to have spoken, forms no ob-
stacle, for Anaxagoras (vide p
879, German text) maintained the
âmeupta of primitive substance very
decidedly; and Kern is surprised
that the expression, &teipov, gene-
rally used to describe Amaximan-
der's primitive matter, should
designate that of Anaxagoras, but
this passage shows (cf. also Me-
taph. i. 7, 988 a, 2, where Aristotle
applies to his doctrine the expres-
sion &relpía Tów arouxetov, as Kern
himself observes) how little we
need regard that difficulty. Theo-
phrastus directly reduces the pri-
mitive substances of Anaxagoras
to the pāoris roß &tepov.
THE INFINITE, 239
tained so long as it opposes nothing that demonstrably
comes from Theophrastus. Schleiermacher' and Brandis”
have conclusively shown that Simplicius had no accurate
and independent knowledge of Anaximander's doctrine,
and that his utterances on the subject are involved in
glaring contradictions. His evidence, therefore, should
not induce us, any more than that of Augustine and
Sidonius or Philoponus, to attribute to Anaximander a
doctrine explicitly denied to him by Theophrastus. On
the other hand, the testimony of so trustworthy a
witness as Theophrastus, together with the further
evidence hereafter to be cited, justifies us in main-
taining that this philosopher did not regard his primitive
matter as a mixture of particular matters, and that
consequently it is improper to separate him, as an
adherent of a mechanical system of physics, from the
dynamists Thales and Anaximenes. And this so much
the more, as it is improbable, on general grounds, that
the view which Ritter attributes to him should belong
to so ancient a period. The theory of unchanging
primitive substances presupposes, on the one side, the
reflection that the properties of the several kinds of
matter could have had no beginning, any more than
matter as a whole; but among the Greeks we do not
meet with this thought until after the period when the
possibility of Becoming was denied by Parmenides, to
whose propositions on this subject Empedocles, Anaxa-
goras, and Democritus expressly go back. On the other
side, this theory (of unchanging primitive matter) is
united in Anaxagoras with the idea of an intelligence
* Loc. cit. 180 sq. * Go". Röm. Phil. i. 125.
240 ANAXIMANDER.
that orders the world; and even the analogous motions
of Empedocles and the atomists were conditioned by
their conception of efficient causes. None of these
philosophers could have conceived a primitive matter
as qualitatively unchangeable, if each—Anaxagoras in
woffs, Empedocles in Hate and Love, the Atomists in
the Void—had not also admitted a special principle of
movement. No one has discovered any such doctrine
in Anaximander; nor can we conclude, from the small
fragment known to us of his work,” that he placed
motive force in individual things, and supposed them
to come forth by their own impulse from the original
mixture; it is the infinite itself" that moves all things.
All the conditions, therefore, of a mechanical theory of
physics" are here wanting, and we have no ground for
i Ritter, Gesch. der Phil. i. 284.
* Ap. Simpl. Phys. 6 a. 3 &
8& # yéverts eart roſs odori kal
Thy (p60pāv eis raira yive,00at Kará
to xpedºv. Stöðval yèp airò Tſaw ſcal
Sticnwrās &ölkías karū thv toº xpóvov
tdºw. Simplicius adds that Anaxi-
mander is speaking troºmtikorépous
êvéuaoiv.
* According to the statement
in Arist. Phys. iii. 4, quoted infra
p. 248, 1.
4 That is, of mechanical Phy-
sics in the sense which Ritter gives
to the expression in his division of
the Ionian Philosophers into Dyna-
mists and Mechanists; by Mecha-
nists he understands those who
make the determinate matters, as
such, preexist in primitive matter;
by Dynamists, those who make the
distinguishing properties of the de-
terminate matters first develope
themselves in their emergence from
a qualitatively homogeneous primi-
tive matter. It is not, however,
incompatible with the latter theory
that natural phenomena should
further be mechanically explained,
by the movement and mixing of
the matters that have issued from
the primitive matter. As Anaxi-
mander (this is proved by Teich-
muller, loc. cit., p. 58 sq., and will
hereafter appear in this work)
adopted this latter procedure, it
must not surprise us, though the
inevitable result is that neither
a purely mechanical nor a purely
dynamical explanation of nature
was proposed and completed by
him. Still less ought it to asto-
nish anyone (as it does Teich-
müller, p. 24) that I should refuse
to Anaximander a specific moving
principle, while I afterwards
(vide infra) make the movement
of the heavens proceed from the
&meipov. Ideny that Anaximander
had a moving principle distinct from
ANAXIMANDER. 241
seeking such a theory in Anaximander in opposition to
the most trustworthy evidence.
If Anaximander did not conceive his primitive
matter as a mixture of particular substances, but as a
homogeneous mass, we must next enquire what was
the nature of this mass. The ancients, beginning
with Aristotle, unanimously assert that it consisted of
none of the four elements. Aristotle several times
mentions the view that the primitive matter in re-
gard to its density is intermediate between water and
air," or between air and fire,” and not a few ancient
writers * have referred these assertions to Anaximan-
der; for example, Alexander," Themistius,” Simplicius,"
Philoponus,” and Asclepius.” But although this theory
has been recently defended” against Schleiermacher's
objections,” I cannot convince myself that it is well
the primitive matter, the Štreipov;
and I maintain, precisely for that
reason, that he placed the motive
power in this primitive matter it-
self, and derived the motion of the
heavens from that of the Štreipov.
Where is the contradiction?
* De Caelo, iii. 5, 303 b, 10;
Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 16; c. 5, 205 a,
25 ; Gen. et Corr. ii. 5, 332 a, 20.
* Phys. i. 4, 187 a, 12, vide inf.
p. 248, 1; Gen. et Corr. loc. cit.
and ii. 1, 328 b, 35; Metaph. i. 7,
988 a, 30; i. 8, 989 a, 14.
* Cf. Schleiermacher, Joc. cit.
175; Brandis, Gr. Röm. Phil. i. 132.
* In Metaph. i. 5, 7, pp. 34, 2;
36, 1 ; 45, 20; 46, 28; and ap.
Simpl. 32 a.
* Phys. 18 a, 33 a ; 33 b (pp.
124, 230, 232 sp.). The ground
of this definition is here, p. 33 a,
thus stated: As the elements are
WOL. I. R
opposed to one another, one element
conceived as infinite would an-
nihilate all the rest. The Infinite
must, therefore, be intermediate
among the various elements. This
thought can hardly belong to
Anaximander, as it presupposes
the later doctrine of the elements;
it is no doubt taken from Arist.
Phys. iii. 5, 204 b, 24.
• Phys. 104; 105 b : 107 a ;
112 b ; De Coelo, 273 b, 38; 251
a, 29; 268 a, 45 (Schol. in Ar.
514 a, 28; 510 a, 24. 513 a, 35).
* De Gen. et Corr. 3; Phys. A
10; C 2, 3.
* Schol. in Arist. 553 b, 33.
* Haym, in der Allg. Encykl.
iii. Sect. B., xxiv. 26 sq.; F. Kern,
in the Philologus, xxvi. 281, and p.
8 sqq. of the treatise mentioned
supra, p. 237, 5.
* Loc. cit. 174 sqq.
242
ANAXIMANDER.
founded. One of the Aristotelian passages quoted cer-
tainly seems to contain a reference to expressions which
Anaximander employed;' but the reference is itself
Questionable, and even if it be admitted, it does not
follow that the whole passage relates to him ;” while,
* De Coelo, iii. 5, at the begin-
ning: éviol yèp év uóvov Štrott0evral
kal rotºrov of uév iſãop, oi 8' dépa, of
#6aros uév Aertórepov, &épos 6&
Trvkvörepov, 6 trepuéxely paal tróvras
roës otpavots &teipov čv cf. Phys. iii.
4, 203 b, 10 (supra, p. 248, 1), where
the words tepuéxeiv Štravra kai
travra kušepváv are, with some pro-
bability, ascribed to Anaximander;
and Hippolytus, Refut. Haer. i. 6.
* The words, 6 Tepiéxelv–ättel-
pov čv admit of two interpretations.
They may either be referred solely
to the subject immediately preced-
ing the $6aros Aertórepov, &c., or
to the main subject of the whole
proposition, the év. In the former
case, those who make primitive
matter a something intermediate
between air and water, would be
credited with the assertion that this
intermediate something embraces
all things. In the latter case, the
sense of the passage would be as
follows: some assume only one
primitive matter—either water, or
air, or fire, or a body that is more
subtle than water, and more dense
than air ; and this primitive mat-
ter, they say, embraces all worlds
by virtue of its unlimitedness. In
point of grammar the second in-
terpretation seems to me undoubt-
edly the best; but one thing may
certainly be urged againstit (Kern,
Beitrag, &c., p. 10), that, accord-
ing to Phys. iii. 5, 205 a, 26, où0sis
to $v kal &meipov trip rotmorev oëbè
ºv táv purioMáyov (Heracleitus,
ibid. 205 a, 1 sq., is particularly
classed among those who regard
the All as limited), and that con-
sequently the relative clause, 6 tre-
piéxeiv, &c., cannot contain any
reference to those who made fire
their primitive matter. But such
inaccuracies are not so very un-
common with Aristotle, and in the
present instance I do not think it
impossible that in a comprehensive
statement, such as we have here,
he should have ascribed the infinity
of matter, either explicitly or im-
plicitly admitted by the great
majority of philosophers, to all
without exception, and should have
expressed this doctrine in the
words of the man who first intro-
duced it. On the other hand, it is
quite conceivable that one of the
philosophers (or if only one held
it, the one philosopher) who made
the primitive matter intermediate
between water and air, may have
adopted Anaximander's expression,
trepiéxeiv Trävras robs oipavois, to
characterise its infinity (Anaxi-
mander himself, Phys. iii. 4, only
says, repuéxelv Štravta); in the
same way that Anaximenes (vide
finfra) says of the air that it 3Aov
Töv kóa'uov trepiéxel, and Diogenes
(Fr. 6, infra) also applies to the air
another expression of the Anaxi-
mandrian fragment: Trävra kugep-
váv. The passage we have been
considering, therefore, does not
warrant us in ascribing to Anaxi-
mander a doctrine which, as will
THE INFINIT.E. * 243
on the other hand, the very next words clearly imply
the contrary. For Aristotle here ascribes to the philo-
sophers, who believed the primitive matter to be some-
thing intermediate between air and water, the theory
that things originated from primitive matter by means
of rarefaction and condensation; and this he distinctly
denies of Anaximander." No other passage can be
quoted from Aristotle to show that he found this
definition of primitive matter in Anaximander's writ-
ings.” As to the statements of later writers, they
immediately be shown, is not
ascribed to him by Aristotle.
* Aristotle thus continues (De
Coelo, iii. 5) immediately after the
words quoted above: 800i ºu obv
to #v rooro trotodoſiv ščap h dépa )
58aros uév Aerrórepov &épos 6&
rvkvárepov, eit' ék rotºrov trukvármti
ka) uavótmri TäNAa yewv&oiv, &c.
2 Kern, Philolog. xxvi. 281,
thought that the passage (quoted
sup. 228, 3), Phys. iii. 4, might be
so taken; since, according to this,
Anaximander must be reckoned
among the philosophers who con-
ceive of the Infinite as a body in-
termediate between two elements.
In the Beitrag zur Phil. der Xen.,
p. 8, he prefers to interpret, the
words thus: the physicists all as-
sign as substratum to the Infinite
one of the elements, or that which
is intermediate between them. I
cannot adopt this explanation. I
think that Aristotle would have
expressed this thought otherwise.
IHe would have said perhaps: Öro-
ri0éaoru èrépav ruč, pºorly ré àtreſpº,
# ru rôv Aeyouévov arouxetov, h to
perači, rotºrwy. On the other hand,
I still consider that the words,
£repay rivă pâoriv táv Aeyouévoy
otolxetwv, may have a more general
signification, an elemental body,
different from itself, so that the
matter underlying all particular
substances would be included
under the expression. The possi-
bility of this view appears, not
only from Aristotle's comprehensive
use of a touxetov (e.g. Metaph. i. 8,
989 a, 30, cf. b, 16, xii. 4; De An.
i. 2, 404 b, 11), but also from the
definition of the word (Metaph. v.
3); nor does the word Aeyop,évov
present any difficulty, for we have
no right to find an allusion here to
‘the four elements.’ Aristotle, on
the contrary, expressly says, loc.
cit., 1014 a, 32; Tô Töv orogórav
otolyeſa Aéryovoſiv oi Aéyovres eis &
6taipei Tai Tà oðuata čoxara. Éiceſva
8è unkét’ eis &AAa etóel Suaq,épovra,
kal etre év eſte tràefa, rô, rotatºra,
raúra arouxeſa Aéyovo w. Similarly,
De Coelo, iii. 3, 302 a, 15 sqq.
The Aeyóueva arouxeſia are, accord-
ing to this, those equally divided
bodies, which form the ultimate
constituent or constituents of com-
pound bodies. Such undoubtedly
is Anaximander's &neipov, if we
understand by it a matter to which
the properties of determinate sub-
st 2
244 ANAXIMANDER.
appear to be entirely based on the passages in Aristotle.
Simplicius, at any rate, cannot be quoting directly from
Anaximander, otherwise he could not speak so unde-
cidedly as he does," and he could not ascribe to this phi-
losopher, as if it were a subject of indifference, the double
theory of matter as intermediate between air and fire,
and again as intermediate between air and water;” for
these two theories obviously exclude one another, and
cannot both have been found in Anaximander's work.
Nor ean Simplicius have found among his predecessors
allusions to that work, otherwise a different turn would at
once have been given to the discussion. The same may
be said of Porphyry,” who in that case would not have
grounded his opinion (which differs from the opinion of
Alexander) solely upon the Aristotelian passage. This
also holds good of Alexander” and Philoponus.” These
later statements, therefore, one and all, depend entirely
upon conjecture, and the words of Aristotle were only
referred to Anaximander because they seemed to apply
to no other philosopher. Now it is elear from the un-
doubted testimony of the most trustworthy authorities,
that Anaximander did not consider his primitive matter
stances do not yet belong. We
are almost forced to take this view
of Aristotle's words, because the
passage would otherwise apply nei-
ther to Anaxagoras, nor to the
Atomists. For neither the Öuoto-
pepſi, nor the atoms, belong to the
four elements, or to that which is
perašūtoãrwv; but Aristotle himself
maintains the ātreupta of the Öuoto-
pepſi, and of the atoms; these must
also, therefore, be a âtépa pūois,
which serves as substratum to the
&neupov.
* Phys. 32 a.
* The former, Phys. 107 a. The
latter, Phys. 105, b. De Coelo, 273
b, 38; 251 a, 29.
* Simplicius, Phys, 32 a.
* In Metaph. 983, a, 11; Schol.
553 b, 22: rhy’Avačudvöpov 66%av,
bs &px?iv č6ero Thy usraft pºortv
&épos re ſcal trupbs, 3 &épos re ſcal
$5atos' Aéyeral yèp &pſporépos.
* Even he is uncertain, in the
passages quoted, whether Anaxi-
mander's Infinite is intermediate be-
tween air and fire, or air and water.
THE INFINITE. 245
as intermediate between two definite kinds of matter;
but that he either was silent as to its nature, or ex-
pressly described it as that to which none of the pro-
perties of particular substances belongs. For when
Aristotle, in the above-mentioned passage, speaks
generally of those who posited as primitive matter a
definite element, or something intermediate between
two elements, and derived all other things from it by
the processes of rarefaction and condensation, it is
obvious that his design is not to draw a distinction
between these philosophers and others who equally as-
Sumed a primitive matter of the same kind, but made
things to arise out of it in a different manner. On the
contrary, in refuting the theory of a derivation of things
by means of rarefaction and condensation, he believes
that he has refuted the general theory of a primitive
matter of definite quality. This is still clearer from the
passage in the Physics, i. 4. ‘Some of them, he here
says, “starting from the pre-supposition of a determi-
mate primitive matter, make things to originate from it
by means of rarefaction and condensation; others, like
Anaximander, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles, maintain
that opposites are already contained in the One primi-
tive matter, and are produced from it by means of
separation.” Here it is perfectly evident that he con-
ceives rarefaction and condensation to be as essentially
connected with the theory of a qualitatively determined
matter, as separation with that of an original mixture
of all things, or of a matter without qualitative deter-
minateness. Nor can it be otherwise; for in order to
* Wide supra, p. 234, 3.
246 ANAXIMANDER.
arise by separation out of the primitive matter, parti-
cular matters must either potentially or actually have
been contained in it; but this would only be possible if
the primitive matter were itself not a particular matter,
not merely intermediate between two other particular
matters: but including them all equally in itself. If
we further consider that this chapter of the Physics
is occupied, not with the manner in which things
originate from elements, but with the number and
nature of primitive substances themselves," it seems
beyond question that Anaximander was opposed to the
rest of the Ionians, not only from the first point of
view, but from the second, and that consequently his
infinite can have been neither one of the four elements,
which were afterwards admitted, nor an intermediary
between two of these elements. This probably explains
why Anaximander is passed over in Metaph. i. 3, and
also a remark,” which otherwise would have no histori-
cal point, and which the Greek commentators” them-
selves apply to him. “Some, says Aristotle, “seek the
Infinite, not in any particular element, but in that out
of which all particular elements arose; because each
particular substance, conceived as infinite, must exclude
those substances that are opposed to it.’
* This Haym, loc. cit., denies;
but it unquestionably results from
C 2. Sub init.
2 Phys. iii. 5, 204 b, 22: &AA&
pºv oë6é &v kal &m Aoûu évôéxeral
eival to &repov orópa, otte às Aé-
'yova'ſ rives to trap& ràortoixeta, ść of
raúta yeuvāoriv, où6 &trades, eio l yáp
rives, oi tooto trototo, to &meipov,
&AA’ oik &épa ) iſãop, Ös ph taxAa
“3.
This reason,
q0eſpnſtal ºrb roß &treſpov airóv.
ëxovo's yūp trpos &AAmAa évavittooru,
ofov 6 pºv &ºp juxpos, to 5’ iſãop
5-ypov, to 8& trop 6epuðv. &v ei ºv
£v &n'eipov čq,0apro èv #öm TäAAa:
vov 3’ repov eivaſ paoru è; of
Taijra.
* Simp. 11 a ; Themist. 33 a,
(230 sq.).
THE INFINITE. 247
indeed, which points to the later theory of the elements,
can hardly have been so stated by Anaximander. But
whether Aristotle inferred it, after his manner, from
some ambiguous utterance, or arrived at it by his own
conjecture, or whether later authors may, perhaps, have
interpolated it, the doctrine in support of which it is
adduced no doubt belongs originally to Anaximander.
Theophrastus expressly says so" in describing Anaxi-
mander's Infinite as One matter without qualitative
determinateness; and with this Diogenes” and the
Pseudo-Plutarch,” and among the commentators of
Aristotle, Porphyry, and probably also Nicolaus of
Damascus,” agree; of these the two first, at any rate,
appeared to have used a special source. Simplicius
himself says elsewhere the same thing.” That Anaxi-
mander's primitive matter was not a qualitatively
determined matter is, therefore, certain ; the only
doubt that remains is whether he expressly denied to it
all determination, or merely abstained from qualifying
it at all. The latter hypothesis is the more probable of
the two; it is actually maintained by some of our
authorities, and appears simpler and, therefore, more in
accordance with so ancient a system, than the other
theory, which constantly presupposes considerations like
those above cited from Aristotle; it also furnishes the
* Ap. Simpl.videsupra, p. 223, 1. * Simpl. Phys. 32 a.
* ii. 1 : épaakev &px?iv Kul o'rol- * Phys. 111 a. Aéyovorivoi repl
xerov to &reupov, où 5uopiſov &épa h ’Avaštuavópov [to &m supov sival] to
$6ap 3) &AAo ‘ri. trapë rà arouxeta é of Tà o'rouxeia
* Plac. i. 3, 5: āpaptdvei 58 yewv&oruv. 6 a. Aéyet 6 airhy
oiros uh, Aéyov tí Čott to Šteipov, [thv 3px?iv) uhre jöop &AAo róv
trörepov &#p éotiv h iſoap # yń ) kańovuévov orotxetwv, &AA’ &répay
#AAa riva ord wata. Tuvâ púaiv Štreipov. Also 9 b.
248 AWAXIMANDER.
most reasonable explanation of the fact that Aristotle
only mentions Anaximander when he is discussing the
Question of the finiteness or infinity of matter, and of
the production of things from it, and not when he is
dealing with its elementary composition; for in the
case we are assuming, no distinct utterance of Anaxi-
mander would have been known to him on this point,
as on the two former (not even the negative state-
ment that the Infinite is not a particular substance),
and so he prefers to be wholly silent on the subject. I
therefore believe that Anaximander held simply to this
proposition: that the Infinite or infinite matter existed
before particular things. As to the material constitu-
tion of this primitive substance, he has given us no
precise information.
Anaximander further taught that the Infinite is
eternal and imperishable."
In this sense he is said
to have designated the first principle of all things
by the expression àpxiſ.” He conceived motive power
* Arist. Phys. iii. 4, 203 b, 10
(cf. De Caelo, iii. 5; Supra, p. 242,
2). The Infinite is without begin-
ning or end, etc.: bib, ka0&trep
Aéyouev, où taúrms &px?), &AA’ airm
Töv &AAwvelva. 50ket kal tep t #xe i v
à tra vºt a kal tra vra k v 8 ep v 3 v, &s
qaa w śoot uh trouovoi trapö. Tö &ret-
pov &AAas airtas, olov votiv h pixtav’
kai Tojt’ eival rô 6e?ov' & 6 & v at ov
ºy &p kal & v & Ae 6 pov, Ös pmoly 5
'Avačuavópos kal of TAetorrow rôv
quotoxóryov. The words in spaced
type are probably taken from Anaxi-
mander's work; only for &váAe6pov,
&yńpo may have been substituted as
Hippolytus, Refut. Har. i. 6 Itaúrmy
(riv apviv) 5’ &íðuov eival kal dyſpa,
kal Távtas reptéxeiv robs kéguous]
thinks likely. More recently Diog.
ii. 1 : tá pºšv uépm weraßAAelv, to
8è trav duetá8Xmtov sival.
* Hippolyt. loc. cit., and Simpl.
Phys. 32 b, certainly assert this;
and Teichmüller (Stud. 24r Gesch.
der Begr. 49 sqq.), who disputes it,
does violence, as it seems to me, to
the wording of these passages. It
is another question whether the
statement is true, and this we can
scarcely ascertain. Like Teich-
müller, I cannot regard it as self-
evident, that he employed the ex-
pression àpxh; and my doubt is
strengthened by the circumstance
that a similar remark about Thales
PRIMITIVE MATTER. 249
to be combined from the beginning with matter;' or, as
Aristotle says (loc. cit.), he taught that the Infinite not
merely contained, but directed all things.” He thus
regarded matter, after the manner of the early Hylo-
zoism, as self-moved and living ; and in consequence of
this motion he supposed it to produce all things from
itself. When Aristotle (loc. cit.), therefore, designates
Anaximander’s Infinite as the Divine essence, he
describes it correctly,” though we do not know whether
Amaximander himself used that expression.*
(that he called water &px?) I
can discover neither in Diog. i. 27,
nor elsewhere; and consequently I
cannot credit it. But if Anaxi-
mander did call his Infinite the &px?
or the épx?) travrov, or designate
it in any other similar manner, this
would only be saying that the Infi-
nite was the beginning of all
things, which is far enough from
the Platonic and Aristotelian con-
cept of the dpy?, the ultimate cause.
1 Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 1:
'Avačíuavôpov . . . to &reipov påval
Thy Tāorav airtav čxelv Tàs roo
Travros yewéoredºs Te kai pºopas.
Herm. Irris. c. 4: 'Avač, too 5-ypo?
trpeg Burépay &px?iv eival Aéyet thv
&#6tov Icívmaruv, kal Taitº, tú Mév
'yevyāg 9at Tö, Öe p6etpea flat. Hip-
polyt. l.c. : Tpbs & Tofftºp rivnaiv
&fölov efval, év fi orvuòaivet yived 6at
rows otpavods. Simpl. Phys. 9, p. :
âtrelpöv Tuva pūgiv . . . . dpx?iv
ë9ero, is thv diföuov kivmoriv airíav
eival ris rôv čvrov 'yevéaea's éAeye.
Similarly 107 a ; 257 b.
* The expression icv8epvāv,
which, in its simplest meaning,
signifies the guidance of the ship's
movements by the rudder, here re-
lates primarily to the movement of
the celestial system.
* Röth (Gesch. der Abendl. Phil.
ii. a, 142) believes that the self-
dependent moving force attributed
to the Infinite presupposes an in-
telligence, a conscious spiritual
nature, and that the Infinite of
Anaximander must thus be con-
ceived as infinite spirit; but this is
an entire misapprehension of the
contemporary modes of thought,
and is contradicted by Aristotle's
well-known assertion (Metaph. i.
3, 984 b, 15 sq.) that Anaxagoras
was the first who declared vows to
be the principle of the world. In
appealing for want of any other
evidence to the words of Theo-
phrastus quoted above (p. 233, 1),
he has overlooked the fact that
Anaximander is here compared
with Anaxagoras only in respect of
his definition of the arapatukö, a rol-
xeia. Not to mention other inac-
curacies, this does away with the
discovery, of which Röth (loc. cit.)
is so proud, that Anaximander's
doctrine of the Štreipov has more
theological than physical import-
ance, and that it is in complete
harmony with the Egyptian theo-
logy, as he endeavours to prove.
* The text of Simpl. Phys. 107
a, which is only a paraphrase of
250 ANAXIMANDER.
We are farther told that he represented particular
substances as developing themselves from the primitive
matter by means of separation (Éckpivso-flat, àtrokpt-
weabat)," and Anaximander himself seems to have used
this word;” but what he precisely understood by sepa-
ration does not appear. He apparently left this con-
ception in the same uncertainty as that of the primitive
matter, and that which floated before his mind was
merely the general motion of an emergence of the
several matters distinct from one another, out of the
original homogeneous mass. We hear, on the other
hand, that he made the division of heat and cold the
first result of this separation.”
the passage we have quoted from
Aristotle, cannot of course be ad-
duced in support of it. I am unable
to give such a decided negative to
this question as Büsgen does, loc.
cit., p. 16 sq.; but Anaximander
certainly could not have named his
Infinite ºrb 6eſov in the monotheistic
sense; he only called it 9eſov, divine.
* Arist. Phys. i. 4, vide Supra,
p. 234, 3; Plutarch in Eus. loc. cit.;
Simpl. Phys. 6 a. oik &AAotov-
puévov too ortoixetov riv Yévecru
trouet, &AA’ &Irokpwouévov táv čvav-
Tlwv Ště, Tâs &föíow kuwägews. And
similarly ibid. 32 b ; 51 b (vide
supra, pp. 228, 3; 233, 1), where,
however, Anaximander's doctrine
is too much confused with that of
Anaxagoras, Themist. Phys. 18 a ;
19 a (124, 21; 131, 22 sq.); Philo-
ponus, Phys. C 2. The incorrect
statement of Simplicius that Anax-
imander believed in rarefaction and
condensation, was no doubt based
upon the false supposition that his
primitive matter was intermediate
From the mixture of
between two elements, and that he
was consequently alluded to by
Aristotle, De Caºlo, iii. 5 (vide
Supra, p. 242, 1); Phys. i. 4, at the
beginning (vide supra, p. 234, 3);
cf. Philoponus, Phys. c. 3.
* We gather this partly from
the use of the word priori in Arist.
loc. cit., and also from considering
the manner in which he reduces
both the cosmogony of Empedocles
and that of Anaxagoras to the
concept, €kkpived 6al. Moreover, it
is impossible to see how Aristotle
and his successor could have been
led to attribute the éickpious to An-
aximander, unless they had found
it in his writings.
* Simpl. Phys. 32 b: rös évay-
tuármºras . . . Škkpivea'6at pnotiv
'Avačuavöpos . . . Švaviruðtmºres 6é
eiot 9epubv, iſvXpov, Šmpov, jºypov Ical
ai &AAal. More precisely Plut. (ap.
Eus. loc. cit.); qºmal 6& to €k row
ââtov yóviptov 6epuoi te łcal juxpod
karð. Thu yévéoly Tow8s toū kóapov
&Tokpt07val. Stob. Ecl. i. 500 :
FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 251
these two he appears to have derived the fluid element,"
which, like Thales, he regarded as the immediate
(though not, like him, as the ultimate) substance of
the world. On this account, probably, and perhaps
also in imitation of his predecessor, he calls water the
seed of the world.” From the fluid universal matter,
by successive separations, three kinds of matter were
parted off: the earth, the air, and an orb of fire, which
surrounds the whole like a spherical crust;” this at least
seems to be the meaning of the scattered indications
'A. Šic 6eppot, kal juxpoſſ wiyuaros
[eival row oilpavóv]. That Aristotle,
as is usually believed, reckoned
dryness and moisture among the
primordial oppositions, as well as
cold and heat, Simplicius does
not say: he himself gives, accord-
ing to the doctrine of Aristotle,
this explanation of the “evavrićrm-
Tes.’
* Arist. Meteor. ii. 1, 353 b, 6,
mentions the opinion that the trpá-
Tov Š-ypov at first filled the whole
space around the world, when it
was dried up by the sun : Tó uèv
6tarptoſav rvedaara kal Tporås iºtov
kal orexhums (paal trouelv, to 6é Aei-
q6&v 6&Aatrav sival, and this is
why the sea also dries up little by
little, Alex. in h, l., p. 91 a (Arist.
Meteor. ed. Idel. i. 268; Theo-
phrasti Op. ed. Wimmer, iii. fragm.
39) remarks: raûrms Tús Óðims
éyévovto, ös ioTope? 6 Oeóppaotos,
'Avačiuavöpós Te Kai Atoyévms. Simi-
larly Plac. iii. 16, 1 : ‘A. Thy 64Aaor-
oráv pmoliveival tăs trpátims trypacrias
Aeſ/avov, is to wºv traetov uépos
ăveşāpave to trip, to 8& ŠtroAelq6év
61& Thy kicavoriv pieté8&Aev. This
is the Öypôv of which Hermias (vide
supra, p. 249, 1) speaks. That in
respect to this theory Aristotle or
Theophrastus could have said of
Anaximander what the work about
Melissus (vide supra, 232, 2) says
of him; iſèap påuevos éival Tó trav,
I cannot admit with Kern (Oeoppé-
a row trepl Mexíagov, Philologus,
xxvi. 281, cf. Beitr. 2wr Phil. d.
Åenoph. 11 sq.); for these words
describe water, not only as that
out of which the world has arisen,
but as that of which it eternally
consists, as its a touxetov (in the
sense discussed in p. 243, 2), and
this contradicts the most distinct
declaration of both these philoso-
phers. Still less can I allow, with
Rose (Arist. libr. ord. 75), that
Anaxagoras regarded moisture or
water only as the matter of all
things, and that the Štreupov, which
all our authorities with one accord
attributed to him, was foisted upon
him by the nomenclature of a later
period.
* Widel’lutarch, preceding note.
* Plut. ap. Eus. according to the
quotation, p. 250, 3: kai Tiva èic
toūtov ſp?Aoyos orgaipav trepiq oval
tº repl rºw yºv &épi, Ös ré 36Vöpp
q'Aouáv, fortivos àtroßayeforms ſcal eſs
rivas ātrokNeto'6eforms kökxovs inro-
orrival rôv #Atov Kai Thy geaftvmw
ſcal robs &otépas.
252
ANAXIMANDER.
that we find upon the subject."
The heavenly bodies
were formed of fire and air; when the fiery circle of
the universe burst asunder, and the fire was pent up in
wheel-shaped husks of compressed air, from the apertures
of which it streams forth ; the stoppage of these aper-
tures occasions eclipses of the sun and moon, and the
waxing and waning of the moon are produced in the
same way.”
* On the other hand, I cannot
agree with Teichmüller (loc. cit.
pp. 7, 26, 58) that he conceived
his àreupov as originally a great
sphere, and the eternal motion of
it (supra, p. 248 sq.) as a rotation
whereby a spherical envelope of
fire was parted off and spread over
the surface of the mass. No such
notion is ascribed to Anaximander
by any of our authorities; for the
orqaipa trupés lay, not round the
âtreupov, but around the atmosphere
of the earth. Indeed, if we say
that the Infinite comprehends all
things, or all worlds (pp. 242, 1 ;
248, 1), we exclude the presupposi-
tion that it is itself comprehended
by the limits of our world. But a
spherical Infinite is in itself so
great and so direct a contradiction,
that only the most unquestionable
evidence could justify our ascribing
it to the Milesian philosopher;
and, in point of fact, there exists
no evidence for it at all.
* Hippolyt. Refut. i. 6; Plut.
in Eus. loc. cit.; Plac. ii. 20, 1 ; 21,
1; 25, 1 (Galen. Hist. Phil. 15);
Stob. Ecl. i. 510, 524, 548; Theo-
doret, Gr. aff. Cur. iv. 17, p. 58 ;
Achilles Tatius, Isag. c. 19, p. 138
sq. All these writers agree in what
is stated in our text. If, however,
we attempt any closer definition of
this conception, we find consider-
This fire is kept up by the exhalations
able divergencies and lacunae in
the accounts. Plutarch, ap. Euseb.
only says that the sun and moon
were formed when the fiery globe
burst asunder, and became en-
closed within certain circles. Hip-
polytus adds that these circles
have openings in the places when
we see the stars; the stopping up
of these occasions eclipses and the
phases of the moon. According to
the Placiła, Stobaeus, Pseudo-Ga-
len, and Theodoret, Anaximander
conceived these circles as analogous
to the wheels of a cart; there were
openings in the hollow circle of the
wheel filled with fire, and through
these openings the fire streamed
out. Finally, Achilles Tatius says
that Anaximander thought the
sun had the form of a wheel, from
the nave of which the light
poured in rays (like the spokes)
spreading out as far as the circum-
ference of the sun. The last theory
formerly seemed to me to deserve
the preference. I must, however,
concede to Teichmüller (Studien,
p. 10 sq.), who has carefully ex-
amined all the texts on this subject,
that that of Achilles Tatius does
not look very authentic; and as
we are further informed (Plac. ii.
16,3; Stob. 516) that Anaximander
made the stars Štrö Töv kölcNov kal
Töv orgapóv, €q’ &v čkaoros 8é8mke
FORMATION OF THE WORLD.
253
of the earth; and, again, the heat of the sun assists the
drying up of the globe and the formation of the
sky."
That the moon and planets shine by their own
light” follows necessarily from Anaximander's theories
respecting them.
The movement of the heavenly
bodies he derived from the currents of air caused
q’épearðal, which is confirmed by the
Tporal too oëpavoo, attributed to
him by Aristotle (Meteor. ii. 2, 355,
a, 21), it now appears to me pro-
bable that Röth (Gesch. der Abendl.
Phil. ii. a, 155) has taken the right
view in interpreting the wheel-
shaped circles filled with fire (Röth
wrongly says encompassed with
fire on the outside) as the starry
spheres; these spheres, in their
rotation, pour forth fire through an
aperture, and produce the pheno-
menon of a fiery body circling round
the earth. As, however, these rings
only consist of air, Teichmüller is
not wrong (p. 32 sq.) in disputing
the theory of solid spheres and a
solid firmament (Röth, loc. cit.;
Gruppe, Cosm. Syst, d. Gr. p. 37
sqq.) as held by Anaximander.
In agreement with this view, there
is the statement (Stob. 548; Plac.
ii. 25, l ; Galen, c. 15) that, ac-
cording to Anaximander, the moon
is a circle nineteen times as large
as the earth; since it is quite pos-
sible that this philosopher, for
reasons unknown to us, may have
considered the circumference of
the moon's orbit (which in that
case would coincide with the moon's
sphere) to be nineteen times the
size of the earth's circumference.
When, however, we learn from the
same source (Stob. i. 524; Plac.
20, 1 ; 21, 1 ; Galen, Hist. Phil. c.
14, p. 274, 276, 279, K.) that he
made the sun's circle twenty-eight
times as large as the earth, and the
sun itself (the opening of this circle
which we behold as the sun's dise)
the same size as the earth—this is
incompatible with the theory that
the sun's circle is the sun's sphere,
and its size, consequently, that of
the Sun's orbit ; for that the sun's
orbit should be only twenty-eight
times as large as the sun's disc, is
a glaring contradiction of ocular
evidence, which we cannot ascribe
to Anaximander. Hippolytus, how-
ever, says (as Teichmüller, p. 17,
rightly observes) eival 5& rov ſcèicAov
toū āAtov Štrakaielkogiiraaortova rās
orexhums, and if we connect with
this the statement that the moon is
nineteen times as large as the
earth, we shall have the sun's orbit
513 times the size of the earth's
circumference, and consequently
513 times that of the sun's circum-
ference, which would of course seem
sufficient to Anaximander. But
from the nature of our evidence we
cannot pass certain judgment in
the matter.
* Arist. Meteor. ii. 1 (cf. p. 251,
1); ibid. c. 2, 355 a, 21, where
Anaximander is not indeed men-
tioned, but according to Alexan-
der's trustworthy statement (loc.
cit. and p. 93 b) he is included.
* What is asserted in the Pla-
cita, ii. 28, and Siob. i. 556, of the
moon, is denied by Diog. (ii. 1), but
(as appears from the passages we
have quoted) without foundation.
254
ANAXIMANDER.
by the revolution of the spheres;' his theories on their
position and magnitudes” are as arbitrary as we might
expect in the childhood of astronomy; if, however, he
really taught that the stars were carried round by the
movement of circles out of which they received the fires
by which they shine, he claims an important place in
the history of astronomy as the author of the theory of
the spheres.
The same would apply to his discovery of
the obliquity of the ecliptic,” if this has been rightly
* Arist. and Alex., cf. previous
note and supra, p. 251, 1. In what
way the rotation of the heavens is
effected, Aristotle does not say,
but his words in c. 2, as also in
the passage cited p. 251, 1, from
c. 1, can scarcely bear any other
construction this: than that the
heavens are moved by the rvetua-
ra, an idea which is also found in
Anaxagoras and elsewhere (Ideler,
Arist. Meteor. i. 497). Alexander
thus (loc. cit.) explains the words
of Aristotle, quoted p. 251, 1:
§rypoi, Yêp Švros roß repl thu
'yūv rátrov, rà trpára rās 5)pórmtos
5th Toà j\tov čarpfgeoffat kal
ºyſveoróat rô Twetuatd re é; airrot, kal
ºrporâs #Atov re ical orexhums, &s 61&
T&s &rpitãas raûras kal r&s àvaôupad-
orets kāketvov rás Tpotras trotovuévov,
ãv6a raûrms attois xopmyſa 'yfveral
arepl raúra Tpetropévov. Whether
the remark that Theophrastus as-
cribes this view to Anaximander
and Diogenes, refers to this por-
tion of Anaximander's exposition
is not quite certain. Teichmüller's
theory, loc. cit. 22 sqq., that Anaxi-
mander derived the movement of
the firmament from the turning of
the 3re pov, conceived as spherical,
on its axis, I cannot admit, for
the reasons given, p. 252, 1, irre-
spectively of the testimonies just
quoted. Nor can I admit, as Teich-
müller alleges, that there is any con-
tradiction in my connecting (p. 249,
2) the révra Kv3epváv, ascribed to
the Infinite, with the movement of
the heavens, while I here derive
this movement from the rveſ uara.
When Anaximander says that the
Infinite by its own movement pro-
duces that of the universe, this does
not prevent his describing (cf. 250
sq.) more particularly the manner
in which that movement is brought
about, and seeking accordingly the
approximate cause for the revolu-
tion of the starry spheres in the
currents of the air.
* According to Stob. 510, and
the Plac. ii. 15, 6, he placed the
sun highest, then the moon, and
the fixed stars and planets lowest
(Röper in Philologus, vii. 609,
wrongly gives an opposite inter-
pretation). Hippolytus says the
same, only without mentioning the
planets. On the size of the sun
and moon cf. p. 253. The state-
ments of Eudemus, quoted p. 234,
2, refer to these theories.
* Pliny, Hist. Nat. ii. 8, 31.
Others, however, ascribe this dis-
covery to Pythagoras; wide infra,
Pyth.
FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 255
ascribed to him. In accordance with the notions of
antiquity, Anaximander, we are told, regarded the stars
as gods, and spoke of an innumerable or infinite
multitude of heavenly gods."
The Earth he supposes to have existed at first in a
liquid state, and to have been gradually formed by the
drying up of the moisture by means of the surrounding
fire; the rest, having become salt and bitter, running -
off into the sea.” Its shape he conceives as a cylinder,
the height of which is a third part of its breadth; we
inhabit its upper surface.” At rest in the centre of all
things, its equilibrium is maintained because it is
equally distant from the extreme limits of the universe.”
The animals also, he thought, originated from primi-
tive slime, under the influence of the sun's heat, and as
the idea of a gradual succession of animal species cor-
responding with the periods of geological formation was
1 Cicero, N. D. i. 10, 25 (after
Philodemus), Anaaimandri autem
opinio est nativos esse Deos, longis
intervallis orientes occidentesque
eosque innumerabiles esse mundos.
Plac. i. 7, 12: 'Avačíuavöpos toys
ãorrépas oipavlovs 6eoûs. Stob. in
the parallel passage Ecl. i. 56:
*Avačíuavôpos étreqívaro toys &teſ-
povs oilpavows 9eoûs; Ps Galen. Hist.
Phil. c. 8, p. 251 Ki: ’Avačíuavôpos
6è rolls &teipovs vows (Heeren in
Stobaeus, loc. cit. rightly substitutes
oùpavows for vows)0sobs elval; Cyrill,
c. Jul. i. p. 28 D : 'Avačípavöpos
6ebv biopigeral éival robs dreſpous
kóopious. Tert. Adv. Marc. i. 13:
Amaarimander universa coºlestia
(Deos pronuntiavit). How we are
to understand the infinite number
of these gods we shall soon more
particularly enquire.
* Wide supra, p. 251, 1.
* Plutarch in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8,
2; Plac. iii. 10, 1; Hippolyt. Refut.
i. 6. Diogenes (ii. 1) makes the
form of the earth spherical instead
of cylindrical, but this is an error.
Teichmüller goes thoroughly into
the subject, loc. cit. 40 sqq.
* Arist. De Caelo, ii. 13, 295 b,
10; Simpl. in h. 1. 237 b, 45 sq.;
Schol. 507 b, 20; Diog. ii. 1; Hip-
polyt., loc. cit. The assertion of
Theo. (Astron. p. 324), taken by
him from Dercyllides, that Anaxi-
mander thought the earth moved
around the centre of the universe,
is a misapprehension of what he
(Anaximander) said as to the sus-
pension (ap. Simpl. loc. cit.) of the
earth. Alexander expresses himself
more cautiously.
256 ANAXIMANDER.
naturally beyond his reach, he assumed that the land
animals, including man, had at first been fishes, and
afterwards, when they were able to develope themselves
under their new shape, had come on shore and thrown
off their scales." He is said to have regarded the soul
as of the nature of air,” and we have no reason to think
this improbable; what, however, is more certain, is
that in his theories of the origin of rain, of the winds,
of thunder and lightning,” almost everything is re-
ferred to the influence of air. But these theories have
little connection with his philosophic doctrine.
As all things were produced from one primitive
matter, so must all return to it; for all things, says our
philosopher," must undergo, according to the order of
time, penance and punishment for their injustice. The
separate existence of individual things is, so to speak, a
wrong, a transgression which they must expiate by their
destruction. Anaxagoras is said to have applied the
same principle to the world as a whole, and to have
admitted, in consequence, that the world would be
destroyed, but that on account of the perpetual motion
of the infinite substance, a new world would be
1 Wide Plutarchap. Eus.loc. cit.;
Qu. Com. viii. 8, 4; Plac. v. 19. 4;
also Brandis, i. 140, but especially
Teichmüller, loc. cit. 63 sqq., who
rightly calls attention to the points
of contact between this hypothesis
and the Darwinian theory. But I
cannot follow him in his statement
(p. 68) that Anaximander, accord-
ing to Plutarch, Qu. conv.forbade
the eating of fish. Plutarch does
not seem to me to say that Anaxi-
mander expressly interdicted fish
eating, but only that his doctrine
of the descent of men from fishes
implied that the use of fish as food
was unlawful.
* Theod. Gr. aff, cur. v. 18, p.72.
* Plutarch, Plac. iii. 3, 1,7, 1;
Stob. Ecl. i. 590; Hippolyt. loc.
cit.; Seneca, Qu, Nat. ii. 18 sq.;
Achilles Tatius in Arat. 33; Plin.
Hist. Nat. ii. 79, 191, makes Anaxi-
mander foretell an earthquake to
the Spartans, but adds significantly
‘Si credimus.’
“In the fragment quoted, p.
240, 2.
INFINITE SERIES OF JWORLDS. 257
formed; so that there would thus be an endless series
of successive worlds. This matter, however, is Open to
dispute.' We are repeatedly assured that Anaximander
spoke of innumerable worlds, but whether he meant by
this, worlds in juxtaposition, or worlds in succession,--
and whether, upon the former theory, he thought of a
number of complete systems, separate from each other,
or only different parts of one and the same system, are
questions that are not easily answered.” Cicero says that
Anaximander regarded the countless worlds as gods.
This would incline us to the idea of whole systems, like
the worlds of Democritus. The countless “heavens’ of
which Stobaeus speaks (as also the Pseudo-Galen) seem
to necessitate the same interpretation, since Cyrillus
substitutes “worlds’ for ‘heavens.’ The Placita, how-
ever, have the word ‘stars, and this we must take to
have been Anaximander's real meaning. For if he had
said the innumerable worlds that are supposed to exist
outside our system are gods, he would not merely have
stood alone among all the ancient philosophers, but it
would be difficult to say how he could have arrived at such
a theorem. For in all periods, and without exception,
gods have been understood to mean beings that are the
objects of human adoration : even the gods of Epicurus
are so, though, on their side, they trouble themselves
little about men.” But these worlds, entirely with-
drawn from our perceptions and sight, and admitted
only on the strength of a speculative hypothesis, are not
* Wide Schleiermacher, loc. cit. p. 255, 1.
195 sq.; Krische, Forsch. i. 44 sqq. * Cf. Part III. a, 395, second
* Wide the texts given, supra, edition.
WOL. I. S
258 A NAXIMANDER.
capable of inspiring our adoration, and have nothing in
themselves that could appeal to the feeling of piety;
whereas the ancient worship of the stars, deeply rooted
as it was in the Hellenic modes of thought, is to be
met with perpetually, as we know, among the philoso-
phers. Anaximander's countless gods must, therefore,
be the stars. The explanation of his likewise calling
these gods “heavens’ may be found in what we have
gathered about his conception of the stars. That which
we behold under the form of Sun, moon, or stars, is to
Anaximander only a luminous aperture in a ring which
is formed of air and filled with fire, and rotates at a
greater or less distance around the earth. The con-
centric light-emitting rings which thus surround us,
and together with the earth form the universe, might
therefore be properly called heavens, and perhaps they
might be called worlds; but it is likewise possible that
later writers, adopting the language of their own times,
may have substituted “worlds’ for ‘heavens’ by way
of explanation or emendation. Besides, Anaximander
might well speak in this sense of an infinite number
of heavens, since (in accordance with this theory) he
must have regarded the fixed stars, not as placed in a
single sphere,” but each one as the aperture of its own
ring. For at so early a period as Anaximander's, it
ought not to surprise us if that which no man could
reckon were called infinite in number.
* Simplicius, for example, says * Such a sphere must have
(in the passage quoted supra, p. 233, been perforated like a sieve, since
i) of Anaxagoras, to whom nobody each star indicates an opening in
attributed the theory of several it; and (according to p. 254, 3) it
systems, that vows, accordingtohim, would have hidden the sun and
produced roës re réguous kal Thy moon from us.
rów &AAwv pågiv.
IWFINITE SERIES OF WORLDS. 259
On the other hand, the assertion which ascribes to
Anaximander an infinity of successive worlds seems to
be borne out by his system. The correlative of the
world's formation is the world's destruction; if the
world, as a living being, developed itself at a definite
epoch out of a given matter, it may easily be supposed
that it will also be dissolved, like a living being, into
its constituent elements again. If creative force and
movement, as essential and original qualities, be
ascribed to this primitive matter, it is only logical to
conclude that by virtue of its vitality it will produce
another world after the destruction of our own ; and for
the same reason it must have produced other worlds
prior to the earth. Thus we assume an infinite series
of successive worlds in the past and in the future.
Plutarch, indeed, expressly says of Anaximander, that
from the Infinite, as the sole cause of the birth and
destruction of all things, he considered that the heavens
and the innumerable worlds arise in endless circulation,"
and Hippolytus speaks to the same effect.” “The Infi-
nite of Anaximander,’ he says, “eternal and never
growing old, embraces all the worlds; but these have
each of them a set time for their arising, their exist-
! Ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 1: * Refut. i. 6: ośros àpx?iv čpm
('Avaštuavöpóv pagi) to &melpov ºdval
rhv traorav airíav čxelv ris roß
travros yewéore&s re . . . kal (p60pás.
&E of 6% pmol rods re očpavois
&mokekpio'0ai kai ka96Xov robs &mav-
ras &melpovs $vras kóopovs. štreq’ſ-
waro 5& Thy péopây yívea 6al ical troAt
Trpárepov rºw yéveauv é; &neipov
aióvos àvakvk}\ovuévov ºrdvrov
aúróv.
Töv Švrov quoru Tuva roß &reipov, &
is yívea 6al rows oipavous kal rotºs év
airrois kócruous. Taºrmv 6’ &föuov eival
kal dyſipw, hw kal Trávras repuéxeiv
roës kóorpiows. Aéyet 6* xpóvov
&s épio uévris tims Yevéorews kal ris
oùortas kal Täs p00pas. These pro-
positions seem, by the way, to be
taken from another source from
what follows.
S 2
260 ANAXIMANDER.
ence, and their destruction.” Cicero, too,” makes
mention of innumerable worlds, which in long periods
of time arise and perish; and Stobaeus attributes to
Anaximander the theory of the future destruction of
the world.” This is also countenanced by the state-
ment that he believed in a future drying up of the Sea,"
for in that case there would be an increasing prepon-
derance of the fiery element, which must ultimately
result in the destruction of the earth, and of the system
of which it forms the centre. The same theory of a
constant alternation of birth and destruction in the
universe was held by Heracleitus, who approaches more
closely to Anaximander than to any of the ancient
Ionian physicists, and also most probably by Anaxi-
menes and Diogenes. We have reason, therefore, to
suppose that Anaximander also held it; and that he
already taught the doctrine of a perpetual vicissitude
between the separation of
| In neither of these passages
can the innumerable worlds be un-
derstood otherwise than as succes-
sive worlds. When Hippolytus
directly connects with his mention
of the kóo wou the remark that the
time of their beginning is deter-
mined, this can only mean that
these céopot have a definite dura-
tion, and we must then explain the
plurality thus: there are many
worlds, because each world only
lasts for a time. The connection
of the two propositions, that the
&metpov is eternal, and that it em-
braces all worlds –points to the
same result. It might embrace all
coexisting worlds even if it were
not eternal; but it could only em-
brace successive worlds, if it out-
things from the primitive
lasted them all. With Plutarch,
the arising or passing away too
Tavros and the āvakvKMovuévaev
trávrav airów, sufficiently show that
successive worlds are intended.
* In the passage quoted at
length, Supra, p. 255, 1, where the
words, longis intervallis orientes
occidentesque, can only apply to
worlds of which one arises when the
other disappears, even supposing
that Cicero or his authority con-
fused these worlds with the Štreipot
oùpavol designated as gods by
Anaximander.
* Ecl. i. 416. Anaximander
. . . q6aprov 'rby icóopov.
* Theophrastus, and probably
also Aristotle, Supra, p. 151, 1.
INFINITE SERIES OF WORLDS. 261
matter, and their return to primitive matter; as well as
an endless series of worlds in succession, which was the
natural result of that doctrine."
Whether he likewise maintained the co-existence of
an infinite number of systems, or of a plurality of
systems apart from one another, as the Atomists after-
wards did, is another question. Simplicius, and ap-
parently Augustine, assert this of him ; * and some few
modern writers have agreed with them.” But Augus-
time certainly does not speak from his own knowledge,
and he does not tell us his authority. Nor is Simplicius
! What Schleiermacher urges
(loc. cit. 197) against this theory
does not seem to me conclusive.
Anaximander, he thinks (according
to the texts quoted, supra, p. 229,
2, 3), could not have supposed a
time in which generation was ar-
rested, and this must have been the
case from the commencement of a
world's destruction to the arising
of a new world. But in the first
place, the words, iva # yéveals wh
étriNeſtm, do not assert that ‘gene.
ration may never and in no way
be arrested, but rather that “the
generation of perpetually new beings
can never cease.’ It does not cease
if it is continued in a new world
instead of the one destroyed; and
thus it becomes very questionable
whether we can attribute to Anaxi-
mander a notion which, strictly
understood, would exclude a begin-
ning as well as an end of the
world; namely, the notion that on
account of the incessant activity of
the first cause (vide Sup. p. 249, 1)
the world can never cease to exist.
He might think that he was proving
this activity all the more conclu-
sively by making it always form a
new world after the destruction of
an old one. Rose's opinion (Arist.
lib. ord, 76) that the theory of
an alternative formation and des-
truction of worlds is a vetustissuma
Cogitandi ratione plane aliena has
been already answered in the text.
We find this theory in Anaximenes,
Heracleitus, and Diogenes (to all
of whom, however, Rose equally
denies it); and moreover in Empe-
docles.
* Simpl. Phys. 257 b : of wév
ºyap &meſpous ré, traj6et rows kóg-
povs 5to8éuevoi, &s of trepi 'Avač-
tuavópov kai Aevicintrov kai Amuákpi-
tov Kal iſatepov of trep) 'Emíkovpov,
ºuvouévows airobs kal pſeupowevous
itré9evro èr (itempov, &Awu prév
&ei Yuvouévov &AAwu 8& pºetpouévov.
Cf. inf. p. 262, 2. Aug. Cºv. D. viii.
2: rerum principia singularum esse
credidit infinita, et innumerabiles
mundos gigmere et quaecumque in eis
oriuntur, eosque mundos modo dis-
Solvi modo iterum gign existimavit,
quanta quisque aetate sua manere
potuerit.
* Büsgen especially, p. 18 sq.
of the work mentioned (supra, p.
235, 1).
ANA XIMANDER.
quoting from Anaximander's writings,' and he clearly
betrays that he is not sure of what he is saying.”
No
trustworthy evidence from any other source can be
cited in favour of this philosopher's having held such a
theory,” a theory which his
* As already observed on p. 237
sq , and clearly proved by the con-
tradiction s resulting from the com-
parison of the expressions shown to
be his, supra, pp. 233, 1 ; 241, 6;
244, 1, 2.
* Cf. De Colo, 91 b, 34 (Schol.
in Ar. 480 a, 35): of 5& kal rô
TAñ6el & reſpous kóquovs, &s 'Avašt-
aavópos pièv Štreipov tº preyéðel thy
āpx?iv 0éuevos, &meſpous é; avrov
[—tfis] tº trafiðel Kóruous roleſv
§ 0 k e º Aeſkirtros 3& kai Amuákpt-
ros &tetpovs ré, traí6el Tovs köopovs,
&c. 1/id. 273, b 43: kal kóguous
&metpovs of ros kal ékaotov Tów
kóguav čğ direpov too towātov
grouxetov Štré6ero, ös 6 o ice t.
* The state of the case in re-
gard to Cicero and Philodemus has
already been investigated, pp. 257;
260, 2; where the passages cited
(p. 259, 1, 2) from Hippolytus and
Plutarch have also been sufficiently
considered. Plutarch indeed says
in the preterite: Toàs re oipovows
&rokekpío 6al ſcal ſcaflóxov robs &mav-
tas dreſpous āvras kóa'uovs, but that
proves nothing; for in the first
place the kóa'uoi may have the same
meaning as oilparol (cf. p. 258), and
in the next, it might be said of
successive worlds that an infinite
number of them had come forth
from the étreupov ; for they had
already been innumerable in the
past. It has also been shown (p.
257) that Stobaeus, i. 56, proves
nothing. When Stobaeus (i. 496)
says "Avačíuavöpos 'Avačºvávns 'Ap-
xéAaos Eevoq'dvms Atoyévns Aeëlcitr-
general system not merely
tros Amuáxpitos 'Earíkovpos direipovs
kóa pious év tá, direfpq cató, traorav
treptaya”) hy. Tov 8' dreipovs &moſph-
vapiévov toos Kóguous 'Avačuavöpos
To toov attoos & réxeiv &AAñAwy,
'Eiríkovpos &viorov eival to we'raču
Töv kóo wov čudo-rmua, his meaning
no doubt is that Anaximander, like
Democritus and Epicurus, believed
in numberless coexistent worlds,
and this likewise holds good of
Theodoret (Cur. gr. aff. iv. 15,
p. 58), who attributes to the same
philosophers, enumerated in the
same order as Stobaeus, troAAoûs
kai Greipovs kóopious. Theodoret,
however, is evidently not an in-,
dependent witness, but has been
drawing upon the text, the words
of which Stobaeus gives more
completely. The account itself
also seems here to be very untrust-
worthy. For little confidence can be
placed in an author who attributes
the ātreupou kóguoi to Anaximenes,
Archelaus, and Xenophanes, and
by the addition of karū traorav
Treptaywyhv, which is quite inappli-
cable to the Atomists and Epicure-
ans, clearly betrays that he is here
confusing two different theories,
that which makes innumerable sug-
cessive worlds to proceed from the
replaywyal (the circular motion
spoken of by Plutarch, supra, p.
259, 1), and that which main-
tains innumerable contemporaneous
worlds. What Anaximander really
said concerning the equal distance
of the worlds, whether his utterance
related to the distance in space of
INFINITE SERIES OF WORLDS. 263
does not require, but often actually contradicts. We
might imagine that it necessarily resulted from the
unlimitedness of matter; but the successors of Anaxi-
mander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes, prove
how little such necessity existed at that early stage of
thought. None of them find any difficulty in supposing
our world to be limited, while the matter surround-
ing it, and not formed into any other worlds, extends
itself to infinity. The reflection which Schleiermacher
attributes to our philosopher,' that there must be many
worlds, in order that death and destruction may rule in
one, while life and vitality prevail in another, appears
much too artifical for the time. It is, therefore,
difficult to see how Anaximander could have been led
to a theory which is so entirely independent of the
sensible intuition, the immediate origin of all ancient
cosmology. Such a theory must, indeed, have been
peculiarly remote from a philosopher holding so de-
cidedly, as Anaximander did, that every particular was
derived from one first principle, and returned to it
again.” Democritus was quite logical when he made his
innumerable atoms, which were guided by no uniform
principle, combine with one another in the most diverse
parts of infinite space, and so form independent world-
systems. Anaximander, on the contrary, starting from his
conception of the One Unlimited which rules all things,
could only arrive at the theory of a single universe,
combined by the unity of the force that forms the world.
the vipavoi, or to the distance in Loc. cit. p. 200 sq.
time of the successive worlds, we * As Schleiermacher himself
cannot determine. acknowledges, loc. cit. 197, 200.
264 ANAXIMANDER.
If we now compare Anaximander's doctrine, as re-
presented in our present enquiry, with what we know of
the doctrine of Thales, we shall find that it is far richer
in content, and betokens a higher development of philo-
sophic thought. I am not indeed inclined to ascribe
any great significance to the conception which is prin-
cipally dwelt on by historians as constituting the most
convenient designation for Amaximander's principle,
viz., the infinity of primitive matter; for the endless
succession of natural creations, which chiefly determined
Amaximander in adopting it, might have been attained
independently of this principle;' and the unlimited
extension of the world in space, which would have ne–
cessitated it, was not taught, as we have seen, by this
philosopher. On the other hand, it is an important fact
that Amaximander should have taken for his point of
departure, not a determinate substance like Thales, but
indeterminate and infinite matter; and whatever may
have led him to such a doctrine, it implies an advance
on his part beyond merely sensuous observation. Thales
said nothing about the manner in which things arise
out of the primitive matter. The “separation' of Anaxi-
mander is still sufficiently vague, but it is at any rate
an attempt to form some notion of the process, to reduce
the multiplicity of phenomena to the most general oppo-
sitions, and to attain a physical theory of the genesis of
the world, free from the mythical elements of the an-
cient theogonic cosmology. The ideas of Anaximander
on the system of the world, and the origin of living
beings, not only show reflection, but have exercised
* As Aristotle observes, vide supra, p. 229, 3.
HIS HISTORICAL POSITION. 265
important influence on subsequent philosophy. Finally,
he admitted a beginning as well as an end of our world,
and an infinite series of successive worlds. This doc-
trime evinces remarkable consistency of thought. It is
besides the first step towards the abandonment of the
mythical notion of the origin of the world in time, and
through the idea that creative force can never have
been idle, it prepared the way for the Aristotelian doc-
trine of the eternity of the world.
I cannot, however, agree in the opinion that Anaxi-
mander should be separated from Thales and from his
successors, and assigned to a special order of develop-
ment. This opinion has been maintained in modern
times and on opposite grounds by Schleiermacher' and
Ritter:” by Schleiermacher, because he sees in Anaxi-
mander the commencement of speculative natural
science; by Ritter, because he regards him as the
founder of the mechanical and more experimental
physics. With reference to the latter, it has already
been shown that Anaximander's theory of nature has as
little a mechanical character as that of his predecessor
or immediate successors, and that he especially approxi-
mates to Heracleitus, the typical dynamist. For the
same reasons, Schleiermacher is incorrect in asserting
that, in contrast with Thales and Anaximenes, his ten-
dency is more towards the particular than the universal;
for Anaximander was remarkably strict in upholding
the unity of animate nature.” He admits, indeed, that
* On Anaximander, loc. cit. p. 177 sq., 202.
188; Gesch. der Phil. 25, 31 sq. * Wide supra, p. 256, and
* Gesch. der Phil. i. 214, 280 Schleiermacher on Anaximander,
sqq., 345; cf. Gesch. der Ion. Phil. p. 197, who is styled by him the
266 ANA XIMENES.
contraries emanate from the primitive substance; but
this proves nothing, since Anaximenes and Diogenes hold
the same opinion. Lastly, I must dispute the assertion
of Ritter that Anaximander owed nothing to Thales.
Even supposing that from a material point of view
he appropriated none of Thales’ ideas, it was formally
of the highest importance that Thales should first have
instituted the enquiry concerning the universal principle
of all things. We have, however, already seen that Anaxi-
mander was probably connected with Thales, not only by
his hylozoism, but by the particular theory of the liquid
state of the earth in its commencement. If we farther
consider that he was a fellow citizen and younger con-
temporary of Thales, and that both philosophers were
well known and highly esteemed in their native city, it
seems unlikely that no impulse should have been received
by the younger from the elder; and that Anaximander,
standing midway chronologically between his two com-
patriots, Thales and Anaximenes, should be isolated
from them scientifically. The contrary will become
still more apparent when we see the influence exercised
by Anaximander over his own immediate successor.
III. ANAXIMENES.”
THE philosophic theory of Anaximenes is generally de-
scribed by the proposition that the principle or ground
philosopher ‘whose whole enquiry know hardly anything, except that
inclines so decidedly to the side of he came from Miletus, and that his
unity and the subordination of all father's name was Euristratus
oppositions.' (Diog. ii. 3; Simpl. Phys. 6 a).
* Gesch. der Phil. i. 214. Later writers represent him as
* Of the life of Anaximenes we a disciple (Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 118;
AIR. • 267
of all things is air."
That he meant by air something
different from the element of that name, and distin-
guished air, the elementary substance, from the atmo–
spheric air,” cannot be proved, nor is it probable.
He
says indeed that air in its pure condition is invisible,
and that it is only perceptible through the sensations
of its coldness, warmth, moisture, and motion; * but this
Diog. ii. 3; Aug. Civ. D. viii. 2);
friend (Simpl. loc. cit. De Caºlo, 273
b, 45; Schol. 514 a, 33); ac-
quaintance (Eus. Pr. Ev. x. 14, 7);
or successor (Clem. Strom. i. 301
A. Theodoret, Gr. aff, cur. ii. 9,
p. 22, Aug. l.c.) of Anaximander.
Though it is probable, from the
relation of their doctrines, that
there was some connection between
the two philosophers, these state-
ments are clearly based, not on his—
torical tradition, but on a mere
combination, which, however, has
more foundation than the strange
statement (ap. Diog. ii. 3) that he
was a pupil of Parmenides. Ac-
cording to Apollodorus, in Diog.
loc. cit., he was born in the 63rd
Olympiad (528–524 B.C.), and died
about the time of the conquest of
Sardis. If by the latter is meant
the conquest by the Ionians under
Darius in the 70th Olympiad (499
B.C.), which is used nowhere else
as a chronological epoch, Anaxi-
menes would have died 45–48 years
after Anaximander; on the other
hand, in that case, Ol. 63 would
seem much too late for his birth.
To obviate this difficulty Hermann
(Philos. Ion. art. 9, 21) proposes to
substitute for Ol. 63, Ol. 55 (as
given in Euseb. Chron.); and
Röth (Gesch. der Abendl. Phil. ii.
a, 242 sq.) Ol. 53. As, however,
Hippolytus (Refut. i. 7, end) places
the prime of Anaximenes in Ol.
58, 1, Diels (Rhein. Mus. xxxi. 27)
is probably right in his conjecture
that the passage in Diogenes should
be thus transposed: ye yévmºral pºv
. . trepi Thy Xépôeavy &Aworiv,
érexeirmore 5& rà éémkootfi rpírm
ôAvpurić64, and that Suidas thence
derives his statement: yé yovev čv
ºrf ve ÖAvutrigăt v tí, Zápéeov
&Adéo et àre Köpos é IIépons Kpoºrov
kaffelaev. Only, says Diels, Suidas
or some later interpolator has
wrongly introduced Eusebius's date
év tá ve ÖAvutridói. The conquest
of Sardis that Diogenes means is
the conquest by Cyrus (Ol. 58, 3,
or 546 B.C.), and the word, yé yovev,
or yeyévrral (as is often the case)
relates not to the birth, but to the
time of life, the ākpah. The work
of Anaximenes, a small fragment
of which has been handed down to
us, was, according to Diogenes,
written in the Ionic dialect ; the
two insignificant letters to Pytha-
goras, which we find in Diogenes,
are of course apocryphal.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 3,984 a, 5,
*Avašupévms 6* &épa kai Atoyévms
trpórepov iſãaros kal udator’ &pxhv
Tubéag, rôv &m Aóv orwad rov, and
all later writers without excep-
tion.
* As is assumed by Ritter, i.
217, and still more decidedly by
Brandis, i. 144.
* Hippolyt. Refut. haer. i. 7:
'Avačuptévns 6: . . . &épa štepov špm
208 AWAXIMEWES.
is perfectly applicable to the air around us, and our au–
thorities evidently so understand it, for they none of
them ever allude to such a distinction, and the majority
of their texts expressly designate the primitive matter
of Amaximenes as one of the four elements, as a
qualitatively determined body." On the other hand,
he ascribed one property to the air, which Anaximander
had already employed to discriminate primitive being
from all things derived; he defined it as infinite in
regard to quantity. This is not only universally
attested by later writers,” but Amaximenes himself
implies such an opinion” in saying that the air em-
braces the whole world; for when the air is conceived
as not comprehended by the vault of heaven, it is much
easier to imagine it spread out to infinity than to place
any definite bound to so volatile a substance. Moreover
definita.
Thy cºpyhv eival, é, oi, Tū yevópeva
Tà yeyovára kal rà éoróweva kal
6eous kal 6eia yive00al, Tå Öè Aottrö.
Ák rôv roštov diroyávov. To hè siè0s
toū dépos rouot,Tov Štav učv čua-
A&Taros ?, tºyel &3m2 ov, 5mA000.0at
5é ré juxpº kal Tá, 6epu% ſcal T6
votepº kal tº kivovuévg.
* E. g. Aristotle, loc. cit., and
Phys. i. 4; Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev.
i. 8, 3: 'Avačiuévnv 6é pagi thv táv
&Awv &px?iv rov &épa sineſv Kal
•rodrov eival rig utv yével &meipov
Tais 5è treph airbv trouárma w &ptopué-
vov. Simpl. Phys. 6 a., u : uſav pºv
Thy jirokeupévmy pilotu kal &melpóv
qmaiv . . . oilk &éptorov 8& . . .
&AA& &ptoruévnv, &épa Aérywv airfiv.
So De Caelo, vide infra, p. 270, 3.
2 Plut. and Hippol., vide the
two previous notes. Cic. Acad. ii.
37, 118: Anaarimenes infinitum
aera ; Sed ea, qua ea eo orirentur
N. D. i. 10, 26: Anaari-
'memes aera deum, statuit, eumqué
gigmi (a misapprehension on which
cf. Krische, i. 55) esseque immensum
et infinitum et semper in motu ;
Diog. ii. 3: ośros doxhv dépa eitre
kal rô &tepov; Simplicius, Phys. 5
b: 'Avačíuavöpov, ka? 'Avačuévnv
. §v učv, &meipov 8& Tópleyéðel to
orrotxeſov Štrobeuévows ; ibid. 6 a.,
vide preceding note; ibid. 105 b,
vide supra, p. 219, 1; ibid. 273
b: év Tó &retp% . . . tº 'Avačiué-
vows kal 'Avačiudvöpov. Also Sim-
plicius, De Caelo, vide infra; ibid.
91 b, 32 (Schol. 480 a, 35): 'Ava-
Épévms row dépa šmeipov dipx?iv eival
Aéyajv.
* In the words quoted by Plut.
Plac. i. 3, 6 (Stob. Ecl. i. 296):
ofov ji juxh ji huerépa &hp of ora
orvykpare: huàs, kal 3Xov row itéopov
wveſſua kal &hp trepiéxet.
AIR. 269
Aristotle' mentions the theory according to which the
world is surrounded by the boundless air. This passage,
it is true, may also apply to Diogenes or Archelaus,
but Aristotle seems to ascribe the infinity of primitive
matter to all those who consider the world to be sur-
rounded by this matter. We can scarcely doubt there-
fore that Amaximenes adopted this conception of Anaxi-
mander. He also agrees with him in the opinion that
the air is in constant movement, is perpetually changing
its forms,” and consequently perpetually generating new
things derived from it; but what kind of movement this
is, our authorities do not inform us.”
Phys. iii. 4; wide supra, p.
219, 2 ; ibid. c. 6, 206 b, 23: ágrep
qaolv of pugio.Aóyot, To £o orapua
ro5 káguov, oš i obota h &AA0 tº
rotojrov, &tepov elvai. Cf. also the
passage quoted on p. 242, 1 ; De
Caelo, iii. 5. -
2 Plutarch ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8,
according to the quotation on p. 268,
1: Yevvågøal 3& révra kará riva Tüc-
vagu rotºrov, kal tróAw &patagu'.
+hy ye who kivmotiv č aióvos &T-
&pxeiv. Cic. N. D. i. 10 (note 1).
Hippolyt, according to the quota:
tion, sup. p. 268, 1: Kluetotal 5: Kal
&et ot, yapuetaBáAAelvöga Heraß-
Aet, ei º Kivoiro. Simpl. Phys.
6 a kívnow 68 kal oitos diólov
Troteſ St’?)w kal Thy petafloºr Ytve-
orðal. Thereason why he was never-
theless reproached, Plut. Plac. i. 3,
7, for recognising no moving cause,
is well explained by Krische, Forsch.
54, in reference to Arist. Metaph. i.
3, 984 a, 16 Sqq.
* Teichmüller (Studien, &c. p.
76 sqq.) thinks, as in regard
to Anaximander (Sup. p. 252, 1),
that this was a revolving mo-
Lastly, it is said
tion; that the infinite air was
supposed to rotate from eternity.
I cannot acquiesce in this view, if
only for the reason that not one of
our authorities recognises such a
theory. A rotation of the Unlimited
seems to me in itself so contra-
dictory a notion that we ought not
to ascribe it to Anaximenes, except
on overwhelming evidence; if we
would represent to ourselves the
eternal motion of matter, the ana-
logy of the atmospheric air would
far more readily support the
theory of a swinging movement.
Telchmüller appeals to Arist. De
Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a, 9: (&ort' ei Big
vov i yü uévet, kal avv^x6ev Čiri to
Mégov qepowevm 5ta rhv 5tvmoriv, raş-
tnu y&p thv airlaw ºrdvres Aéryovoriv,
ôto 63 kai rºv yiv rávres àorot Tov
oùpavöv yewv&oriv, Širl to uéorov orvy-
ex0ely partv); but this passage (even
apart from what will be observed
concerning it later on) seems to
me of small importance in the
question; for it does not say
whether the whirling motion which,
in the formation of the world car-
270 ANAXIMENES.
of him, as of Amaximander, that he declared his primi-
tive matter to be the divinity; whether he expressly
did so is questionable and improbable, since like his
predecessor (vide supra) he reckoned the gods among
created beings. But in point of fact, the statement is
not untrue, because, for him also, primitive matter was
at the same time primitive force, and so far, the creative
cause of the world.”
Simplicius says” that Anaximenes made air his first
principle because of its variable nature, which especially
fits it to be the substratum of changing phenomena.
According to the utterances of Anaximenes himself," he
seems to have been led to this theory chiefly by the
analogy of the world with a living being. It appeared
to him (in agreement with the ancient opinion, founded
on the evidence of the senses) that in men and animals
the expiration and inspiration of the air is the cause of
life, and of the cohesion of the body; for when the
breathing ' ceases or is hindered, life becomes extinct,
* Röth (Gesch. der Abendl. Phil.
ii. a, 250 sqq.) opposes Anaximenes
ried the terrestrial substances into
the centre, existed before these
substances; and this by no means
necessarily follows. Democritus,
for instance, does not conceive the
atoms as originally whirling; that
movement arises only at certain
points from the percussion of the
atoms.
1 Cicero, N. D. loc. cit.; Stob.
Eel. i. 56 : 'Avač. Tov &épa (6eov
âtreqfivaro); Lactantius, Inst. i. 5,
p. 18: Bip. Cleanthes et Anarimenes
aethera dictint esse Stºmmu'm Dewm.
IHere, however, aether is used in
the modern sense, Tert. contr. Marc.
i. 13, Amazinemes aerum (Deum
pronuntiavit).
to Xenophanes, and says that he
started from the concept of spirit
as the primitive divinity. He calls
him accordingly the first spiritual-
ist. But this gives a very false
notion of the import of his prin-
ciple, and the way in which he
arrived at it.
* De Coelo, 273 b, 45; Schol.
in Arist. 514 a, 33: Avačluevms 6&
éraipos 'Avačipid vôpov kal troAfrns
&tepov Pušv kal airbs fºré9ero rhy
&px?iv, oi, whv štt &óptorov, &épa y&p
*Aeyev elval, oióHevos &okeſv to roſ,
&épos et axxoforov trpos uera&oxfiv.
* Wide supra, p. 268, 3.
RA REFACTION AND CONDENSATION. 271
the body decomposes and perishes. It was natural for
Anaximenes to suppose that such might also be the
case with the world. For the belief that the world was
animate was very ancient, and had already been intro-
duced into physics by his predecessors. So in the
manifold and important effects of the air, which are
patent to observation, he readily found proof that it is
the air which moves and produces all things. But
philosophy had not yet attained to the discrimination
of motive cause from matter. The above announcement,
therefore, was equivalent to saying that the air is the
primitive matter; and this theory was likewise sup-
ported by common observation, and by a conjecture
which might easily occur to the mind. Rain, hail, and
snow, on the one hand, and fiery phenomena on the
other, may equally be regarded as products of the air.
Thus the idea might easily arise that the air must be
the matter out of which all the other bodies are formed,
some of them tending upwards, and others downwards;
and this opinion might likewise be based on the appa-
rently unlimited diffusion of the air in space, especially
as Anaximander had declared the infinite to be the
primitive substance.
All things then, says Anaximenes, spring from the
air by rarefaction or by condensation." These processes
i Aristotle (Phys. i. 4, sub init.
De Coelo, iii. 5, sub init. vide supra,
p. 243, 1) ascribes this theory to a
whole class of natural philosophers.
It was so peculiar to Anaximenes
that Theophrastus assigns it to him
alone (perhaps, however, he means
alone among the earliest philoso-
phers), vide supra, p. 224, 2. For
further testimony, cf. Plut. De Pr.
Frig. 7, 3, supra, p. 272, 2; Plut.
ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 3, supra,
p. 269. 2: Hippolyt. Refut. i. 7 ;
Hermias, Irris. c. 3; Simpl. Phys.
6 a ; 32 a. The expressions by
which rarefaction and condensation
are designated are various. Aris-
totle says Advooris and trókvooris; in-
272 ANAXIMENES.
he seems to have regarded as resulting from the move-
ment of the air." Rarefaction he makes synonymous
with heating, and condensation with cooling.” The
stages through which matter has to pass in the course
of these transformations he describes somewhat un-
methodically. By rarefaction air changes into fire;
by condensation it becomes wind, then clouds, then
water, then earth, lastly stones.
bodies compound bodies are then formed.”
stead of pºd woots, Plutarch and
Simplicius have àpators, āpatov-
a 6al; Hermias has āpatočgevos kal
6taxeówevos ; Hippolytus, Štav eis
To &patótepov 8taxv67. According
to Plutarch, De Pr. Frig. (cf. Simpl.
Phys. 44 b), Anaximenes him-
self seems to have spoken of con-
centration, of relaxation, extension
or loosening. The Anaximandrian
doctrine of separation is only at-
tributed to him in Mörbeke's re-
translation (Ald. 46 a, m) of
Simplicius; De Caelo, 91 b, 43;
(Schol. 480 a, 44): the genuine
text has instead of 5& éé Évès travra.
Tyívea 6a Aéyovort kar’ eißeſav (so
that the transmutation of matters
only follows one direction, and does
not go on in a circle, as with Hera-
cleitus): ās’Avačiuavöpos kai 'Avaş-
tuévns. In Phys. 44 a, rarefaction
and condensation are explained by
Simplicius in his own name, as oriry-
kpions and bidºpiois.
* Wide supra, p.269,2.cf. p. 270.
* Plut. Pr. Frig. 7, 3, p. 947:
# ka94 rep ’Avačiuévns 6 traXabs
$ero, pºſite to juxpov čv oborig u%re
to 9eppäv àtroAetropiev, &AA& ré0m
kowo, rås iſãms étriylvöueva Tats
aeragoNaſs to Yap overtexNéuevov
airis ical trukvoúuevov ºvXobv elvaí
qmail, to 8& àpatov ſcal to XaAapov
From these simple
The texts
(oira, tra's Övouáo as kal Tô Đàuart)
6epuðv. In support of this, as is
further observed, Anaximenesurged
that the air which is breathed out
with the open mouth is warm, and
that which is ejected in closing
the lips is cold; the explanation
given by Aristotle being that the
one is the air inside the mouth, and
the other the air outside it, Hippol.
loc.cit. (p. 267, 3, and note 3, infra).
According to Porphyry, ap. Simpl.
Phys. 41 a, Ald. Anaximenes re-
garded the moist and the dry as
fundamental contraries; this state-
ment is, however, open to suspicion;
the more so, because Simplicius
bases it upon a hexameter, which
he says emanated from Anaximenes,
but which is elsewhere ascribed to
Xenophanes (vide infra, chapter on
Xenophanes), and which cannot
have been taken from the prose
of Anaximenes. Most likely, as
Brandis thinks (Schol. 338 b, 31,
loc. cit.), Eevoſpávmy should be sub-
stituted for 'Avačplēvmv.
* Simpl. Phys. 32 a ; and pre-
viously in the same terms, p. 6
a : 'Avačuévns àpatočaevov učv
Töv &épa trop yived 6at q\mat, trukvoú-
uevov 6* &veuov, eita vépos, eita èrt
paxxov iſãop, -īra 'yūv, eira Atôovs,
to be taxa €ic rotºrwy. Hippol.
FORMATION OF THE WORLD.
273
inexact as to this point.
the air first produced the
for that reason, supported
after the passage quoted p. 267, 3:
Trvkvoiaevov yap kal &patočaevov Sud-
qopov paived 6al 3rav Yap eis rô
apatórepov 6taxv0ſ, trip yívea flat,
puéora's 5& étrév eis dépa trukvoúuevov
é; &épos vépos dirorexeo 0f karū thv
tróAmoriv, instead of which, perhaps,
we should read: uéows Śē td.Xiv eis
dépa, Trvkv. č &ép. véq. atroteWeſtorðat
k. T. trixmou—as Röper (Philol. vii.
contend—perhaps, however, dvé-
povs may be concealed in the
Aéorws, and the following words
should be otherwise amended: étu
8è uáAAov iſèap, Éirl traetov truk-
va,0évra yiv, kal eis to udzuara truk-
ydºratov Atôovs. šare rà kvpu%rata
Tús Yevéarea's évavría éival 6spuév te
kal juxpóv . . . . &véuovsö& Yevvā-
oréal, &rav ćiciretrukvouévos 6 &#p
āpaia,0els pépmrat (which no doubt
means, when the condensed air
spreads itself out anew; unless
we should substitute for &pata,0ets,
&p6els, carried up aloft, which, in
spite of the greater weight of the
condensed air, would be quite as
possible in itself as the presence
(p. 274, 2) of earth-like bodies in
the heavens), givvex9óvra ö& kai étrl
TAeſov traxv6évra vépm yeuvâ0.0at
[Yevráv, or, avvex0ávros kal étri
TAetov traxv0évros v. yewvāorðat], kal
oùrws eis iſãop HeragáàAeiv.
' Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 118: gigni
autem terram aquam igment tum exc
yeyevia:6at Aé-yely rºv yiv.
610), and Duncker (in his edition)
WOL. I. T
therefore which suppose Anaximenes to have fixed the
number of the elements at four," are to be considered
In the formation of the world, the condensation of
earth,” which Anaximenes
conceived as broad and flat, like the slab of a table, and
by the air.” He ascribed
his omnia. Hermias loc. cit.; Ne-
mes. Nat. Hom. c. 5, p. 74, has the
same, but less precisely.
* Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8,
3 : triXoupévov 8& roß &époc trpcºrnu
The
same follows from the theory that
the stars first arose out of the va-
pours of the earth. How the earth
came first to be formed, and took
its place in the centre of the uni-
verse, is not explained. The words
triNovuévov roß &épos in Plutarch
admit of the notion that in the
condensation of the air the densest
parts sank downwards. Instead
of this, Teichmüller (loc. cit. p. 83)
prefers to account for it by the
theory of the whirling motion (of
which we have spoken supra, p.
269, 3); but the passage from Aris-
totle, De Coelo, ii. 13, there quoted,
does not seem to me to justify
this course; for the word "rdvres in
this passage cannot be so strained
as to include every individual phi-
losopher who ever constructed a
cosmogony. For example, Plato
(Tim. 40 B) knows nothing of the
6tvmoris. Heracleitus never men-
tions it, and the Pythagoreans did
not place the earth in the centre
of the universe.
* Aristotle, De Caelo, ii. 13,
294 b, 13; Plutarch ap. Eus.
loc. cit.; Plac. iii. 10, 3, where
Ideler, without any reason, would
|
--------, -, -, ºr r-,--- rary;…---r . . . r. . . ºil
274 ANAXIMENEs.
the same form to the sun and stars, which he likewise
thought were floating in the air;" in regard to their
origin, he supposed that the increasing rarefaction of
the vapours ascending from the earth produced fire;
and that this fire, pressed together by the force of the
rotation of the heavens, formed the stars, to which
a terrestrial nucleus was therefore ascribed.” He is
said to have been the first to discover that the moon
takes her light from the sun, and the reason of lunar
substitute 'Avačayópas for 'Avači-
Mévns, Hippol. loc. cit.
* Hippol. loc. cit.: Thy đê yńv
tr}\aretav eival étr' &épos àxoupévmu
ôpiota's 5& kal #Atov Kal areaſivmu kal
Tà &AAa. Šarpa. Trávra yöp triplva
iſvra étroxeto,0ai Tô &épt 51& TAdºros.
The flatness of the sun is also
spoken of by Stobaeus, i. 524;
Plac. ii. 22, 1
tréraxov Tov #Atov). Of the stars,
on the contrary, the same authori-
ties (Ecl. i. 510; Plac. ii. 14) say
that Anaximenes made them àAwv
Strmv karatretrnºyéval rô kpwortaX-
Aoetàet; and in accordance with
this, Galen (Hist, Phil. 12) says:
'Avač. Thy trepiqopäu riv čotármu
'ymtvmweival (Plac. ii. 11, 1). Our
text has instead: thv trepiqopāv
rºw égordºra, ris yńs eival Tov
oùpavóv; but the pseudo-Galen here
seems to give the original reading.
It is possible then that Anaximenes,
as Teichmüller (loc. cit. 86 sqq.)
supposes, made only the sun, moon
and planets float in the air, and
considered the fixed stars as fas-
tened into the crystalline vault of
heaven, in whatever way he may
have explained the origin of this
latter (Teichmüller thinks that like
Empedocles, Plac. ii. 11, 1, he sup-
('Avač. TAarov &s
posed it to be formed of air liqui-
fied by the action of fire). But in
that case Hippolytus must have
expressed himself very inaccu-
rately.
* Hippol. loc. cit.: ye yovéval 3&
t& àorrpa €k yſis 51& To thvircuáða
éic raúrms &vío Tao'0ai, Žis āpaiovuévns
To trip yivea-6al, ék 5& rod rupbs
Peteopºgouévov robs &orépas ovv-
to Tao'6at, eival 3& kal yea;6eis pàoets
év tái Tôtrº róv &gtépov a vuqepo-
plévas €iceivous (or, according to Stob.
i. 510: Tupívnv pºv thv pågiv táv
ãortépov, treptéxeiv 6é Tuva kal yetóðm
ordpata orvurepiq’spáueva toûtois
ã6para). Plut. ap. Eus. loc. cit. :
Töv #Atov Kal rhv orexhvny kal r&
Aoutrā āorpa Thy &px?iv Tijs Vevéorews
ëxelv čk yūs. ātro®aſveral yotiv Tov
#Alov yiv, 513, 8& Thy đêeſav ktvmoriy
kal uda' iravös 6epuordºrmv kivmoriv
(perhaps 9epuðrúta should be
read here without kivmoiv) Aa3eiv.
Theodoret asserts (Gr. aff, cur.
iv. 23, p. 59) that Anaximenes
held that the stars consisted of
pure fire. This assertion, which
was probably taken from the com-
mencement of the notice preserved
by Stobaeus, must be judged of in
the light of the foregoing texts.

FORMATION OF THE WORLD,
275
eclipses."
The stars, he thought, moved, not from
the zenith towards the nadir, but laterally round the
earth, and the Sun at night disappeared behind
the northern mountains; * the circular form of their
* Eudemus ap. Theo. (Dercyl-
lides), Astrom. p. 324 Mart.
* Hippol. Joe. cit.: oi klveſorbal
3& 5 to yºv tá šarpa Aéyet ka9&s
ërepot insixáſpagu, &AA& repl yńv,
ãortrepel trepi Thy huetépav ice pax?iv
orpéteral to trixtov, kpúrreo 6at te
Töv #Atov oix àro yńv yewóuevov,
&AA’ into róv Tijs yūs ūymAotépav
Mepôv orkerówevov, kal 61& Thy TAeto-
va juáv aitoöyevouévny &róa Taoiv.
Stob. i. 510: oix Strö Thu yńv Šē,
&AA& repl airhu arpéqsoróat rows
ãorrépas. According to these tes-
timonies (that of Hippolytus espe-
cially, seems to come from a trust-
worthy source), we should include
Anaximenes among those of whom
Aristotle says in Meteor, ii. 1, 354
a, 28: To troAAoûs tretorðfival rôv
&pxatov ueteopoxórywu Töv #xtov ph
q'épé00ai jiro yiv, &AA& repl Thu yńv
kal Tov rátrov tootov, diſpavíčeorðat 8&
kal trouelv vökta 61& To 5pm Mºhv eival
Tpos &pictov thu yńv. Anaximenes
is the only philosopher, so far as
we know, who had recourse to the
mountains of the north, for the
explanation of the sun's nightly
disappearance, and there is besides
so great a similarity between the
words of Hippolytus concerning
him, and those of Aristotle concern-
ing the ancient meteorologists, that
we may even conjecture with some
probability that Aristotle is here
thinking specially of Anaximenes.
Teichmüller thinks (loc. cit, p. 96)
that the words, &pxaïot uereaſpo-
Aóryot, do not relate to physical
theories, but like the āpxatou kai
5tarpi Sovres trepl r&s 6eoAoyias, at
the beginning of the chapter, to
mythical ideas about the ocean, on
which Helios fares back during the
night from west to east. This in-
terpretation cannot be based upon
the context, for there is no connec-
tion between the two passages,
which are besides widely separated
from each other. The mode of ex-
pression also is decidedly against
such a view. Aristotle always
calls the representatives of mythi-
cal and half-mythical cosmologies
theologians; by werewpoxoyla, on
the other hand (ueteopoxóryos is
never used by him except in this
passage), he understands (Meteor. i.
1 sub init.) a specific branch of
natural science (prépos Tàs we66öov
Taürms), and in this, as he expressly
remarks (loc. cit.), he agrees with
the ordinary use of the words; me-
teorology, meteorosophy, and the
like, being common expressions to
designate natural philosophers. Cf.
for example, Aristophanes, Nub.
228; Xen. Symp. 6, 6; Plato,
Apol. 18 B, 23 D; Prot. 315 C.
We know that Anaxagoras, Dioge-
nes and Democritus also made the
Sun go laterally round the earth
(infra, vol. ii.). Now it might
seem that if Anaximenes conceived
the segment of the circle which the
sun describes between his rising
and setting above the horizon, to
be continued and completed into a
whole circle, he must necessarily
have supposed it to be carried be-
neath the earth. But even if this
circle cut the plane of our horizon,
it would not therefore be carried
T 2
276
ANAXIMENES.
orbits he attributed to the resistance of the air." In
the stars no doubt we must look for the created gods of
under the earth, that is, under the
base of the cylinder on the upper
side of which we live (cf. p. 273, 3);
it would form a ring passing round
this cylinder, obliquely indeed, but
still laterally; it would go not into
'yńv, but trepi yiv. As Anaximenes
made this circle dip at a certain
distance from the northern edge of
the earth's habitable surface, which
edge, according to his geographical
ideas, would not be very far from
the northern shore of the Black
Sea, he might well believe that
without some elevation of the earth
at this, its northern verge, the sun
would not entirely disappear from
us, and that in spite of such eleva-
tion, some of its light would pene-
trate to us even at night, if it
were not diminished (according to
the opinion of Hippolytus) by the
great distance. But I by no means
exclude the possibility that, ac-
cording to Anaximenes, the sun
and stars (of the stars, indeed, he
expressly says this) and by infer-
ence the planets (if he supposed
the fixed stars to be fastened into
the firmament, vide p. 274, 1) may
have descended at their setting,
either not at all, or very little be-
low the surface of the horizon. As
he imagined them to be flat like
leaves (vide p. 274, 1) and, therefore,
borne along by the air, he might
easily suppose that when they
reached the horizon, the resistance
of the air would hinder their far-
ther sinking (vide the following
note). What has now been said
will, I hope, serve to show the true
value of Röth's strictures (Gesch.
der ahendl. Phil. 258) on those who
cannot see that a lateral motion of
the stars is absolutely impossible
with Anaximenes. Teichmüller
(loc. cit.) admits that he held a
lateral rotation of the sun around
the earth, a rotation in which the
axis of its orbit stands obliquely
to the horizon. Only he thinks
that after its setting it does not
move close round the earth, or
upon the earth behind the high
northern mountains (p. 103)—a
notion which, so far as I know, no
one has hitherto ascribed to Anaxi-
menes. In the Plac. ii. 16, 4, and
therefore, also in Pseudo-Galen, c.
12, we read, instead of the words
quoted above from Stob. i. 510:
*Avačupévms, Šuotas Širo (Galen,
manifestly erroneously, reads ém)
Thy yīv kal repl airhu arpéqeoréal
robs &otépas. Teichmüller con-
cludes from this passage (p. 98)
that the motion of the sun (of the
heavenly bodies) is the same above
and beneath the earth, that the
circular movement of the firma-
ment has the same radius above
and below. But trepi does not
mean above, and whatever kind of
motion it might in itself characte-
rise, as contrasted with Örö (this
we have already seen in the passa-
ges from Aristotle, Hippolytus and
Stobaeus), it can only be used for a
circular lateral movement. In the
Placita, it seems to me we have
simply-an unskilful correction, oc-
casioned perhaps by some mutila-
tion or corruption of the true text,
and authenticated by the other
writers.
* Stobaeus, i. 524, says: 'Avači-
plévns trópivov Štrápxeiv Tov #xtov
&teq fivaro, Štrb tren'vkvapiévov 6&
&épos kal &vrtrömov čw8o0neva rä
FORMATION OF THE WORLD.
277
whom Anaximenes, as well as Anaximander, is said to
have spoken;' but the same doubt arises in his case as
in Anaximander's, viz., whether the infinitely many
worlds ascribed to him * relate to the stars or to an in-
finite series of successive systems.”
However this may
be, we are justified by the testimonies of Stobaeus” and
#arpa rās rporâs troueto 6ai. Simi-
larly Plac. ii. 23, 1: ‘A. Örö retu-
kva'uévov &épos kal &vtitätrov
éga,6eto 6al tº &otpa. In both au-
thors this stands under the heading
repl Tporów iMov (in Stobaeus,
Tepl ošo'ías #Atov . . . kal Tporów,
&c.), and they probably, therefore,
meant what are usually called the
two solstices, which Anaximenes
might have explained in this man-
ner consistently with his notion of
the sun. It is noticeable, however,
that they both speak of the dis-
placement (Stobaeus says also rpo-
trai) of the Šarpa, to which rporal
in this sense are not elsewhere at-
tributed. It is, therefore, probable
that the proposition ascribed by
these writers to Anaximenes had
originally another meaning, and
signified that the stars were forced
by the resistance of the wind from
the direction of their course. The
expression employed does not hin-
der this interpretation. Aristotle
himself speaks (De Caelo, ii. 14,
296 b, 4) of Tporal rôv čo Tpav;
Meteor. ii. 1, 353 b, 8, of Tporal
#Atov kal orexſivms; and ibid. 355 a,
25, of Tpotral Too oipavoi); and
Anaxagoras, who is so often allied
with Anaximenes in his astrono-
mical theories, taught, according
to Hippol. i. 8, line 37: Tporâs 68
trutéto flat kal fixiov kal orexhvnv
&ma,00vuévous Štrb toi, &épos. orexívmw
6è troAAákis Tpéreo 9at 61& To u%)
6tſvaa-6ai Kpateſv rod puxpo5. Tooth
seems to designate every change in
the orbit of the heavenly bodies,
which altered the previous direc-
tion of their course. Thus the
proposition of Anaximenes quoted
above must have been intended to
explain, not the Sun's deviation at
the Solstices, but the circular orbit
of the heavenly bodies—those, at
least, which are not fixed in the
firmament. At the same time,
however, it may be that he wishes
to explain why their orbits are con-
tinued without descending, or in
descending very little, beneath the
plane of our horizon, vide previous
note. By Tpotral he would mean in
that case the inflexion in the curves
described by them.
* Hippol. vide supra, p. 267, 3;
Aug. Civ. D. viii. 2: omnes rerum
causas infinito aćri dedit: mec deos
negavit aut tacuit: non tamen ab
ipsis aérem factum, Sed ipsos ea.
aëre factos credidit; and after
him, Sidon. Apoll. xv. 87; cf.
Krische, Forsch. 55 sq.
* Stob. Ecl. i. 496; Theod. Gr.
aff, cur. iv. 15, p. 58.
* That he did not assume a
plurality of co-existent systems, is
expressly stated by Simplicius, vide
p. 278, 1.
* Loc. cit. 416: 'Avačſuavöpos,
'Avačuévns, 'Avačayópas, 'ApxéNaos,
Aloyévms, Asúncurtros p0aprov Tov
kóguov, kal of Xroikol 'p6aprby rov
kóapov, kat' éktróportv 6é. The
destruction of the world by fire is
278 ANAXIMENES.
Simplicius," which mutually support and complete one
another, in attributing to him the doctrine of an alter-
nate construction and destruction of the world.
The hypotheses concerning the origin of rain, Snow,
hail, lightning, the rainbow,” and earthquakes,” which
are ascribed to Anaximenes, sometimes on good au-
thority, are for us of secondary importance; and his
theory of the mature of the soul,” based chiefly upon
the ordinary popular opinion, he himself does not seem
to have further developed.
This survey of the doctrines attributed to Amaxi-
menes may now enable us to determine the ques-
tion already raised: did Anaximenes owe nothing to
Anaximander except in some minor points of his en-
quiry P* It seems to me that his philosophy taken as
a whole clearly betrays the influence of his predeces-
sor. For Anaximander had in all probability already
expressly asserted not only the infinity, but the ani-
mate nature and perpetual motion of primitive matter.
Anaximenes reiterates these theories, and, by virtue
of them, seems to reach his conclusion that air is the
primitive matter. It is true that he returns from the
here ascribed, not to Anaximander,
&c., but only to the Stoics; though
it is not improbable that Anaxi-
mander also held it. Wide supra,
p. 260. -
| Phys. 257 b, : āorot &el uév
qaa weival icóruov, où pºv row airov
àel, &AA& &AAore &AAov yivénevov
icard. Twas xpóvov reptăöous, &s
'Avačip.évms re ical ‘HpókAettos kal
Atoyévms. *
* Hippol. loc. cit.; Placita, iii.
4, 1, 5, 10; Stob. i. 590; Joh.
Damasc. Parall. s. i. 3, 1 (Stob.
Floril. Ed. Mein. iv. 151). Theo
in Arat. v. 940.
* Arist. Meteor. ii. 7, 365 a., 17
b, 6; Plac. iii. 15, 3; Sen. Qu. Nat.
vi. 10; cf. Ideler, Arist. Meteorol.
i. 585 sq. Perhaps in this also
Anaximenes follows Anaximander,
vide Supra, p. 256, 3.
* In the fragment discussed
p. 268, 3, and p. 270, from which
doubtless the short statement in
Stob. Ecl. i. 796, and Theodoret,
Gr. aff, cur. v. 18, is taken.
* Ritter, i. 214.
HISTORICAL POSITION. 279
indeterminate conception of infinite substance to a
determinate substance, and that he represents things as
arising out of this not by separation, but by rarefaction
and condensation. But at the same time he is evidently
concerned to maintain what Anaxagoras had held about
the primitive substance; and thus his principle may
be described as the combination of the two previous
principles. With Thales, he accepts the qualitative
determinateness of primitive matter; with Anaximander
he expressly asserts its infinity and animation. For
the rest he inclines chiefly to Anaximander. Even if
we cannot with justice ascribe to him the doctrine of
the destruction of the world, and of innumerable worlds
in succession, we can still see his dependence on his
predecessor" in his ideas concerning the primitive
opposition of heat and cold, the form of the earth and
stars, on atmospheric phenomena, in what he says of the
stars as the created gods, perhaps also in the opinion
that the soul is like air in its nature. Yet this depen-
dence is not so great, nor his own original achievement
so insignificant that we should be justified in refusing
to recognise any kind of philosophic progress in his
doctrine.” For Anaximander’s motion of infinite matter
is too indeterminate to explain particular substances,
and the “separation by which he accounts for all pro-
duction of the derived from the original, is open to the
same charge. The determinate substances, according
to him, are not as such contained in the primitive sub-
* Strümpell, therefore, in doctrines, as with the chronology.
placing Anaximenes before Anaxi- * Haym. Allg. Enc. Sect. iii. vol.
mander, is as little in accordance xxiv. 27.
with the internal relation of their
280 LATER IOWIANS.
stance: separation is therefore only another expression
for the Becoming of the particular. Anaximenes at-
tempted to gain a more definite idea of the physical pro-
cess, by which things are evolved from primitive matter;
and to that end, he sought the primitive matter itself
in a determinate body, qualified to be the substratum of
that process. Such an attempt was certainly of great
importance; and, considering the state of enquiry at
that period, marked real progress. On this account,
the latter Ionian physicists especially followed Amaxi-
menes; to such an extent indeed, that Aristotle at-
tributes the doctrine of rarefaction and condensation
to all those who take a determinate substance for their
principle;' and a century after Anaximenes, Diogenes
of Apollonia and Archelaus again set up his theory of
primitive matter. • .
IV. THE LATER ADHERENT'S OF THE IONIC SCHOOL.
DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
AFTER Anaximenes, there is a lacuna in our knowledge
of the Ionic school. If we consulted only the chronology,
this lacuna would be filled by Heracleitus; but the
peculiar nature of his philosophy separates him from
the earlier Ionians. Meanwhile the theories of the
Milesian physicists must have been propagated during
this period, and even have given occasion to farther
definitions. This is clear from the subsequent appear-
ance of similar doctrines, about which, however, our
* Wide supra, p. 243, 1.
HIPPO.
281
information is for the most part very scanty.
The
philosophers whom we have to mention in this connec-
tion are chiefly allied with Anaximenes; they make
either the air itself, or a body of the nature of air, their
primitive matter.
But the doctrine of Thales likewise
found adherents; for example, Hippo,' a physicist of the
time of Pericles,” whose country is uncertain,” and his
personal history unknown.”
1. Cf. Schleiermacher, Werke,
Abtheilung, iii. 405–410; Bergk,
Ireliquide Comaed. Att. 164, 185; .
Backhuizen Van den Brink, Varia
lectiones ea; historia philosophiſe an-
tiqua (Leyden, 1842), 36–59.
* This is clear from the state-
ment of the Scholiast of Aristo-
phanes, Nub. 96, exhumed by
Bergk, that Cratinus in the Pa-
noptai ridiculed him (infra, p.
283, 3). His theories also point
to a later date. The detailed en-
quiries concerning the formation
and development of the foetus seem
to contain some allusions to Empe-
docles (vide Backhuizen Van den
Brink, 48 sq.). He seems also to
be thinking of Empedocles when
he combats the hypothesis that the
soul is blood (this, however, is less
certain ; for that idea is an ancient
popular opinion). These enquiries,
at any rate, serve to show the ten-
dency of the later physicists to the
observation and explanation of or-
ganic life. The more abstract
conception of Thales' principle,
which Alexander ascribes to him,
is likewise in accordance with this.
That he had already been opposed
by Alcmaeon (Cens. Di. Nat. c. 5)
is a mistake (Schleiermacher, 409).
* Aristoxemus ap. Cens. Di.
Nat. c. 5, and Iamblichus, V. Pyth.
267, describe him as a Samian,
Like Thales, he declared
and this is, of course, the most
probable; others, perhaps con-
fusing him with Hippasus, say
that he came from Rhegium (Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 30; Math. ix. 361 ;
Hippolyt. Refut. Har. i. 16), or
Metapontum (Cens. loc. cit.). The
Same blunder may have occa-
sioned his being placed by Iambli-
chus (loc. cit.) among the Pythago-
reans; though the author of that
catalogue scarcely needed this ex-
cuse. Perhaps Aristoxenus had
remarked that he studied the doc-
trines of Pythagoras; and Iambli-
chus, or his authority, therefore
made him out a Pythagorean. The
statement that he came from Melos
(Clemens, Cohort. 15 A.; Arnob.
Adv. Nat. iv. 29) can be more dis-
tinctly traced to a confusion with
Diagoras (who, in the above-quoted
passages, is coupled with him as an
atheist), if not to a mere slip of
the pen, in the text of Clemens.
* From the attacks of Cratinus
nothing more can be gathered
than that he must have resided
for some time in Athens; Bergk
(p. 180) farther concludes from
the verse in Athen. xiii. 610 b,
that he wrote in verse, but it does
not follow that he may not also
have written in prose. The con-
jecture (Backhuizen Van den
Brink, p. 55) that Hippo was the
282 HIPPO.
water to be the first principle of all things,' or as Alex-
ander,” probably with more accuracy,” says, moisture
(tò iºpov), without any more precise determination.
He was led to this chiefly as it seems by considering
the moist mature of animal seed; “it was at any rate for
this reason that he held the soul to be a liquid analo-
gous to the seed from which, in his opinion, it sprang.”
He probably therefore concluded, like Anaximenes, that
that which is the cause of life and motion must be also
the primitive matter. He made fire originate from
water; and the world from the overcoming of water by
fire ; * on which account his principles are sometimes
author of the writing trepi àpxöv,
falsely ascribed to Thales, and
quoted supra, p. 216, 2, and p. 226,
l, is to me very improbable, be-
cause of the expressions, &pxal and
otolyetov, which it contains.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 3, 984 a, 3;
Simpl. Phys. 6 a., 32 a ; De Coelo,
268 a, 44; Schol. in Arist. 513 a,
35; Philop. De An. A, 4; C, 7.
* Ad Metaphys. p. 21, Bon.
* Aristotle classes him gene-
rally with Thales, without defi-
nitely saying that he made water
his first principle ; this was first
said by later writers. But from
Aristotle's procedure elsewhere, we
can see that he would have had no
scruple in identifying the Öypov
with the more determinate $60p.
* Wide the following note.
Simplicius, De Coelo, 273 b, 36;
Schol. in Arist. 514 a, 26; and
Philoponus, De An. A, 4, say more
distinctly that Thales and Hippo
held water to be the primitive
matter, on account of the mois-
ture of the seed and of nourish-
ment in general. It has been
already observed, however (p. 218),
that in so doing they merely turned
Aristotle's conjecture (Metaph. i. 3)
into a formal statement.
* Arist. De An. i. 2, 405 b :
Töv 8& poptikorépov kal iſoap rives
&teq fivavro [thv juxhv] ka04trep
"Introv. Treto'67 vat 5' éotraoru èic ris
'yovſis, 3rt trèvrov trypt. Kai yüp
éAéyxel rows aiua pāorkovras rhy
Wuxhv, 3rt à yov) oix aiua (he
sought to prove, according to Cens.
loc. cit., by study of animals, that
the seed comes from the marrow)
Taºrmv 5' eival rºw ºrpiórmy juxhv.
Herm. Irris, c. 1 (cf. Justin, Co-
hort. c. 7): Hippo considers the
soul to be a úðap yovorouáv. Hip-
polyt. loc. cit. : thv 5* buxºv troré
uêvéºykéqaxov čxeiv (read Aéyet, or
with Duncker: épm éival) roté &
§§op, kal yèp to a répua sival to
qawópevov juiv ć irypoo, ää of pnot
Juxºv yived 6ai. Stob. i. 798 ; Ter-
tull. De An. c. 5; Philop. De An.
A, 4 C, 7.
* Hippol. l. c. : "Introv 6& 6
‘Pnyivos àpxès éq m ºvºpov ºrb Šēop
kal 0epubv to trip. yewv&uevov 33 to

HIPPO. 283
asserted to be fire and water." What his more exact
opinions were as to the constitution of the universe—
whether, the erroneous statement that he held the earth
to have been the first,” had any real foundation in fact
—whether in harmony with Anaximander and Anaxi-
menes, he may perhaps have taught that out of fluid,
under the influence of fire, the earth was first formed,
and out of the earth, the stars—we have no means of
determining.” As little do we know on what ground
Hippo was charged with atheism,” as he has been in
several quarters. The unfavourable judgment of Aris-
totle as to his philosophic capacity,” however, greatly
reconciles us to the meagreness of the traditions respect-
ing his doctrine. He was no doubt less of a philoso-
pher than an empirical naturalist, but even as such,
from what we hear of him,” he does not seem to have
attained any great importance.
trip Širo iſèatos katavikāoral thy roß
'yevvioravros Óðvaulv, a votijo aſ Te
Töv kóopov.
* Wide previous note and Sex-
tus, loc. cit.; Galen, H. Phil. c. 5, p.
243.
* Johannes Diac. Alleg. in Hes.
Theog. v. 116, p. 456.
* This holds good of the state-
ment alluded to (p. 281, 2) that
Cratinus made the same charge
against Hippo that Aristophanes
did against Socrates, viz. that he
taught that the heavens were a
Trviyevs (an oven or hollow cover
warmed by coals), and that men
were the coals in it. He may have
supposed the sky to be a dome
resting upon the earth; but how
this could be brought into connec-
tion with his other notions, we do
not know.
* Plut. Coomſm. Not. c. 31, 4 ;
Alexander, loc. cit. and other
commentators; Simpl. Phys. 6 a ;
De An. 8 a.; Philop. De Art. A,
4; Clemen. Cohort. 15 A, 36 C ;
Arnob. iv. 29; Athen. xiii. 610 b ;
AElian, V. H. ii. 31; Eustach. in
Il. 4, 79; Odyss. T 381. What
Alexander and Clemens say about
his epitaph as the occasion of
this imputation explains nothing.
Pseudo-Alex. in Metaph. vii. 2;
xii. 1, p. 428, 21, 643, 24, Bon., as-
serts that his materialism was the
cause ; but this is evidently a
conjecture.
* In the passages cited p. 282,
1, 5.
* Besides what has been al-
ready quoted we should here men-
tion his theories on birth and the
formation of the foetus, Censor. Di.
284 IDAEUS.
As Hippo was influenced by Thales, so Idaeus o
Himera appears to have been influenced by Anaximenes.
Anaximenes most likely also originated the two theorie
mentioned in some passages by Aristotle; * accordin
to the one, primitive matter in respect of density stand
midway between water and air; according to the other
between air and fire. That both theories belong to
younger generation of Ionian physicists is probable, fo
they occupy an intermediate position between olde
philosophers; the one between Thales and Anaximenes
the other between Anaximenes and Heracleitus. W
must, however, primarily refer them to Anaximenes,
since he was the first who raised the question of the
relative density of the different kinds of matter, and
who explained the formation of particular substances
by the processes of condensation and rarefaction. In
this way he arrived at the opposition of rarefied and
condensed air, or warm air and cold air; if warm air
were adopted as the primitive element, the result was
an intermediary between air and fire; if cold air, an
intermediary between air and water.”
Nat. c. 5–7, 9; Plut. Plac. v. 5, 3,
7, 3, into which I cannot now en-
termore particularly, and a remark
about the difference between wild
Atoyévns . . . &épa [äpx?iv
ëAečav). Besides this we know
nothing of Idaeus.
* Wide p. 241, 1, 2. These pas-
and cultivated plants in Theophrast.
Hist. Plant. i. 3, 5 ; iii. 2, 2.
Athen. xiii. 610 b, contains a verse
of his against trouxvua£muogºvn,
which resembles the famous saying
of Heracleitus; he quotes the same
verse, however, as coming from
Timon, who might have borrowed
it from Hippo.
1 Sext. Math. ix. 360: 'Avašt-
Aévms 5& kal 'I6aios 6 "Inepaſos kal
sages do not relate to Diogenes,
as will presently be shown.
* In connection with Anaxi-
menes we should mention Melesa-
goras; according to Brandis, i. 148,
Clemens (Strom. vi. 629, A) names
him as the author of a book trans-
scribed from Anaximenes; and as
holding similar doctrines to those
of Anaximenes. Clemens also
says: rö 8& “Hortóðov werfixNašav








DIOGENES OF APOLLOWIA.
285
arly presuppositions, even
is reſov Aéryov kal &s tota ééfivey-
av Etſum^ós re kal 'AkovoríAaos of
Mexmorayópov yūp
&Aeyev Topytas & Aeovtºvos kal
Eöömuos 6 Nāšios of ioTopikol, kal étrl
toūrous 6 IIpokovváguos Bíov .
'Aubiaoxós re kal 'Aptorok??s ſcal
Aédvöpios kal'Avačuévns, kal ‘ENAd-
wikos, and so on. But this Melesa-
goras, who was made use of by
various historians, can Scarcely
have been any other than the
well-known Logographer, who was
also called Amelesagoras (see Mül-
ler, Hist, of Gr. ii. 21), and the
Anaximenes, whom Clemens names
among a number of historians, is
certainly not our philosopher, but
likewise a historian, probably
Anaximenes of Lampsacus, men-
tioned by Diogenes, the nephew
of the orator. It is a question,
moreover, whether we ought not
to read Eüpfixov instead of Mexm-
orayópov, or Mexmorayópas instead
of Etſumaos; and whether the words
'Auq (Moxos, &c., are to be con-
nected with ēkWeyev, and not with
rð ‘Hmorić6ov uérfixAačav, &c.
1 The statements of the an-
cients respecting him, and the frag-
ments of his work, have been
carefully collected and annotated
by Schleiermacher (Ueber Diogenes
v. Apollonia, third section of his
collected works, ii. 149 sqq.) and
by Panzerbieter (Diogenes Apollo-
ates, 1830). Cf. also Steinhart,
Allg. Encycl. of Ersch and Gruber,
Sect. I. vol. xxv. 296 sqq.; Mul-
lach, Fragm. Philos. Gr, i. 252
sqq. Of his life we know very lit-
Diogenes of Apollonia' is a philosopher with whom
e are better acquainted; and his doctrine shows in a
triking manner that the Ionic school maintained its
when other and more de-
tle. He was a native of Apollonia
(Diog. ix. 57, &c.), by which Ste-
phen of Byzantium (De Urb. s. v.
p. 106, Mein.) understands Apol-
lonia in Crete, but as he wrote in
the Ionic dialect, it is doubtful if
this can be the city. His date
will hereafter be discussed. Ac-
cording to Demetrius Phalerius
ap. Diog. loc. cit., he was in danger
through unpopularity at Athens,
by which is probably meant that
he was threatened with similar
charges to those brought forward
against Anaxagoras. But there
may be some confusion here with
Diagoras. The assertion of Antis-
themes, the historian (ap. Diog.
l. c.), repeated by Augustine, Civ.
Dei, viii. 2, that he attended the
instructions of Anaximenes is
merely based on conjecture, and is
as worthless in point of evidence as
the statement of Diogenes (ii. 6)
that Anaxagoras was a hearer of
Anaximenes; whereas, in all pro-
bability, he was dead before Anaxi-
menes was born, cf. Krische, Forsch.”
167 sq. Diogenes's work, repl
‘ptorea's, was used by Simplicius,
but (as Krische observes, p. 166)
he does not seem to have been ac-
quainted with the second book
of it, which Galen quotes in Hip-
pocr. vi. Epidem. vol. xvii. 1 a.
1006 K. That Diogenes composed
two other works is doubtless an
error of this writer, founded on a
misapprehension of some of his
utterances (Phys. 32 b), vide
Schleiermacher, p. 108 sq.; Pan-
zerbieter, p. 21 sqq. -




286 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
veloped ideas had been introduced into it. On one side
he is closely connected with Anaximenes, on another he
in all probability transcends him : not only is his expo-
sition more methodical in form and more careful as to
details, but he is also distinguished from his predecessor
in having ascribed to the air, as primitive cause and
primitive matter, certain spiritual qualities, and having
tried to explain the life of the soul by the air so appre-
hended. To gain a fixed basis for his enquiry," he
determined the general characteristics which must
belong to the primitive essence. On the one hand he
said it must be the common matter of all things, and
on the other, an essence capable of thought. His
argument for the first assertion was the following. We
know that things change one into another, that sub-
stances mix, and that things influence and affect each
other. None of these phenomena would be possible if
the various bodies were distinct as to their essence.
They must therefore be one and the same, must have
sprung from the same substance, and must be resolved
into the same again.” In proof of the second assertion,
* According to Diogenes, vi.
81; ix. 57, his work began with
the words: Aóryov travros &pxáuevov
Sokéet uot xpe&v elva, thv 3px?iv
&vauqua Shrmtov trapéxed 6al, thy 8&
&pumvrtmv štååv Kal geuvâv.
* Fr. 2 ap. Simpl. Phys. 32 b :
euo, 5& Sokéel, to uèv šáutraveirety,
Trévra rö, äávra &mb row airod
&repowojača, Kai To atto eival. kal
Toºro etºxov. ei yüp v Tóðe Tó
kóguq &6vra viv Yū kal iſoap kal
TúAxa, §a'a paſveral év táče tº
kéguq àvra, ei Tovtéav Tl fiv, to
§repov toà érépov repov čov tí ióſm
ºpógei Kal oi to airò £ov were mirré
troXAaxós kal itepotooto, oièapti,
oùre utoryeo.62 &AA#Aous hôāvaro,
otre diſpéAma is rô Érépº otºre 8AdBm
. oiâ’ &v otte putov čk tās yīs
q oval, otre @ov oſſite &AAo ‘yevé00al
oëbèv, ei un oiro ovvioraro, &are
Twijrb elvai. &AA& tróvra raûra ék
toū aitot, Étepoločaeva &AAore
&AAoſa 'yfyveral kal és To airo àva-
xopéet. Fr. 6, ap. Simpl. 33 a.
où6èv 6' oióv te yevé00al rôv ćrepot-
oupévov ćrepov čtépov trply &v ro
airo Yévnrat, and Arist. Gen. et
Corr. i. 6, 322, b, 12. What Dio-
THE PRIMITIVE ESSENCE. 287
Diogenes appealed in a general manner to the wise and
felicitous distribution of matter in the world; and
more particularly, to this testimony of our experience—
that life and thought are produced in all living natures
by the air which they breathe, and are bound up with
this substance.” He therefore concluded that the
substance of which all things consist must be a body
eternal, unchangeable, great and powerful, and rich in
knowledge.” All these qualities he thought he dis-
covered in the air ; for the air penetrates all things,
and in men and animals produces life and conscious-
ness; the seed of animals, also, is of a nature like air.”
He, therefore, with Anaximenes, declared air to be the
matter and ground of all things.” This is attested
almost unanimously" by ancient writers; and Diogenes
himself says" that air is the essence in which reason
genes ix. 57, says he taught—viz.
that nothing comes from nothing
or to nothing—is here indeed pre-
supposed, but whether he expressly
enunciated this principle we do not
know.
* Wide notes 1, 2, and 7.
* Or as Theophrastus De Sensu
8, 42. Cicero, N. D. i. 12, 29, says
the Deity; cf. Arist. Phys. iii. 4
(supra, p. 248, 1). Sidon. Apoll.
xv. 91, discriminates the air of Dio-
1 Fr. 4, Simpl. loc. cit.; oil yèp
&v oſſºra ösöá00at [sc. Thu äpx?iv]
oiáv re ºv &vev vohotos, Šare Trévrov
uérpa šxeiv, xeluóvás Te kal 0épeos
ical vuktös kal juépms kai jetöv kal
&véuov kal eißtów kai Tà &AAa et
ris BoöXeral évvoéea 6al, eúptokot
&v oita Stakeſpeva Ös &vvotov
káAAtoºra.
* Fr. 5, ibid.: ári 63 trpos toūrous
kal ºrdàe ueydaa a mueſa &v0patros
7&p kal rô &AAa (ga &vatvéovra
Øet rô &épt, Kai Tooro airtois kal
Juxh éori kai vámoſis . . . kal éâv
âmaxNax95 &mo?vhakei kal # vömoris
ériMeſtret.
* Fr. 3 from Simpl. Phys. 33 a.
genes as the matter endowed with
creative energy, from God, but this
is of course unimportant.
* The passages in question are
given in extenso by Panzerbieter,
p. 53 Sqq. In this place it is
sufficient to refer to Arist. Metaph.
i. 3, 984 a, 5; De An. 405 a,
21; Theophrast, ap. Simpl. Phys.
6 a.
* Fr. 6, ap. Simpl. 33 a kat
plot àokést to thv vömov čxov eival
6 &hp kaxeóuevos into táv &v0pátrov,
kal Strö Toârou trèvra kal kv6epvāorðal
kal travrov kpatéeiv. &tó yöp uoi
toūtov Šokéet #60s eivat (instead of
atro Panzerbieter here reads airoi; ,
288 I) IOGENES OF APOLLONIA,
dwells, and which guides and governs all things, because
its nature is to spread itself everywhere, to order all
and to be in all. Nicolaus of Damascus, Porphyry,'
and in one passage,” likewise Simplicius, attribute to
Diogenes as his first principle the substance intermediate
between air and fire,” so often mentioned by Aristotle.
This is unquestionably an error, into which they were
probably misled by Diogenes' opinion, that the soul, by
analogy with which he defines his primitive essence,"
was of the nature of warm air. Nor can I agree with
Ritter's similar theory,” that the primitive essence of
Diogenes was not the ordinary atmospheric air, but a
more subtile kind, ignited by heat ; for not only do all
the accounts, and Diogenes' own explanations, speak of
the air as ‘that which is usually called air; ” but accord-
ing to his own principles it would have been impossible
for him, while deriving all things from air by rare-
faction and condensation, to seek the original principle
(that which constituted the basis of all the different
forms and changes of the atmosphere), not in the
this I prefer to Mullach's amend-
ment, which retains dirb, but sub-
stitutes vôos for €60s) kal étrº Tráv
dqix0at kai rāvra övari0éval ical
ev travrl éveſval kal éorrl uměé Év 8 ru
ph ueréxel rotºrov . . . . kal tróvtov
Töv Çiğov 5& # juxh Tô airá čoºrw,
&hp 9epuárepos pév toà éto èv ć
éogèv, roi, Hévrol trapà tê hextº
troMAöv juxpórepos. This soul is
besides very different in different
beings: äuws & 13. Távra tº airró
kal ºf kal épé kal dicotet Kal rhy
&AAmy vámoriv čxei Štrb too airoi,
ºrdvra kal épetlis 5eſkvvoru, adds
Simplicius: 3ri kal to otéppa rôv
@ov rvevuarööés éorri kai vohorels
'yſvoviral row dépos obv rá; aluati to
8xov orópa KaraNapióðvovros Stö. Töv
qXeBóv. -
* According to Simpl. Phys. 33
b; 6 b.
* Phys. 44 a.
* Wide supra, p. 241, 1.
* Cf. the passage cited, p. 287,
2, 7, and the general canon of
Aristotle, De An. i. 2, 405 a, 3, to
which Panzerbieter (p. 59) refers
in support of his hypothesis. Wide
also p. 268, 2.
* Gesch, der Phil. i. 228 sqq.
THE PRIMITIVE ESSENCE, 289
common aerial element, but in some particular kind of
air." Schleiermacher's conjecture also º is improbable,
that Diogenes himself held air to be the primitive
matter, but that Aristotle was doubtful as to his mean-
ing, and so ascribed to him sometimes the air in
general, sometimes warm or cold air. Such hesitation
on the part of Aristotle respecting the principles of
his predecessors is without precedent; from his whole
spirit and method it is far more likely that he may
have sometimes reduced the indefinite notions of earlier
philosophers to definite concepts, than that he should
have expressed himself in a vacillating and uncertain
manner in regard to their definite theories. Aristotle
repeatedly and decidedly declares that the principle of
Diogenes was air; he then speaks of some philosophers,
without naming them, whose principle was intermediate
between air and water. Now it is impossible that these
statements can relate to the same persons; we cannot
doubt, therefore, that it is air in the common accepta-
tion of the word, which our philosopher maintains to be
the essence of all things.
We find from the above quotations that Diogenes,
in his more precise description of the air, ascribed to it
two properties which correspond to the requirements
* Though he may have gene-
rally described the air in compa-
rison with other bodies as the
Aerrouepérratov or Aetrótarov
(Arist. De An. loc. cit.), it does not
follow that he held the rarest or
warmest air alone to be the primi-
tive matter; on the contrary, he
says in Fr. 6 (vide infra, p. 291, 1),
after having declared the air gene-
WOL. I. U
rally to be the first principle, that
there are different kinds of air—
warmer, colder, and so forth. Fur-
ther particulars on this point will
be given later on.
* In his treatise on Anaxi-
mander, Werke, 3te Abth. iii. 184.
Cf. on the contrary, Panzerbieter,
56 Sqq.
290 IDIOGENES OF APOLLOWIA.
claimed by him in general for the primal matter. As
the substance of all things, it must be eternal and
imperishable, it must be contained in all things, and
permeate all things; as the cause of life and order in
the world, it must be a thinking and reasonable essence.
In the air these two aspects are united; for, according
to Diogenes’ view, because the air permeates all things,
it is that which guides and orders them; because it is
the basal matter of all, all is known to it; because it is
the rarest and subtlest matter, it is the most movable,
and the cause of all rhotion.' We are expressly told”
that he spoke of the air as the Infinite, and the state-
ment is the more credible, since Anaximenes, whom
Diogenes in other respects follows most closely, employed
a similar definition. Moreover Diogenes describes the
air in the same way that Anaximander describes his
ãºrsipov; and Aristotle says that the infinity of primi-
tive matter was held by most of the physiologists.”
But this definition seems to have been regarded by him
as of minor importance compared with the life and
force of the primitive essence; that is his main point,
and in it he discovers the chief proof of its air-like
nature.
On account of this vitality and constant motion,
the air assumes the most various forms. Its motion
consists, according to Diogenes (who here again follows
* Wide p. 287,7, and Arist. De An.
i. 2, 405 a, 21 : Atoyévms 6', 30 rep
£repot rives, &épa (scil. §réAage rhy
Jux}v), roorov oimbels trávrov Aerro-
aspérrarov eival kal &pxfiv' ical Stå
rooto yiv6orkeiv re ſcal rivetv rhy
Juxºv, f uèv trpátáv čari kal ék
rotºrov rô Aoirã, yiv6orkeiv, f 6&
Aetrºrórarov, kivmtiköv eival.
* Simpl. Phys. 6 a. Probably
after Theophrastus: rhy be rod
travros pūoriv &épa kal oirós (pmoſiv
&neipov elval kal &föuov.
* Wide p. 26%, 1.
PA REFACTION AND COND ENSATION. 29]
Anaximenes), in qualitative changes, in rarefaction and
condensation;' or, which is the same thing, in heating
and cooling; and so there arise in the air endless
modifications in respect of heat and cold, dryness and
dampness, greater or less mobility,” &c., corresponding
to the different stages of its rarefaction or condensation.
For the rest, Diogenes does not seem to have enume-
rated these differences systematically, after the manner
of the Pythagorean categories, though he must have
derived the different qualities of things, some from
rarefaction, some from condensation, and must so far
have coordinated them on the side of heat or cold.”
Nor do we find any trace of the four elements; we
do not know whether he assumed definite connecting
media between particular
1 Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 13:
kooruotroteſ 6% of ros' 3rt too travros
kivovuévov kal iſ uév Špaloo m 6&
Trvkvod yewopuévov Štrov ovvercüpmare
To trvkvov a varpoqºv trothoral, kal
oiſt a rö, Aottrö, Katë Töv airov A6)ov
T& kovipórara. Thu &va rāštv Aagóv-
Tatov #xtov &toreAéoat. Simpl. loc.
cit. after the words just quoted : é;
of trukuovuévov ſcal pavovuévov kai
perağäAAovros roſs tra,6eat thv táv
&AAav yívea flat pop piv, kal Tawta
pºv Oedºppagºros ioTope? repl rod
Aloyévous. Diog. ix. 57, cf. what is
cited from Aristotle, p. 243, 1, and
Arist. Gen. et Corr. ii. 9, 336 a, 3
SQQ.
* Fr. 6, supra, p. 287,7 (after the
words 3 ti pº pietéxel rotºrov):
Pueréxel 6* oëbè $v Šaotos to repov
Tć Štěpºp, &AA& troXAol Tpátrol kal
airoi, toº &épos kal ris vohorios eio'ſv.
êorti yap troXàtporos, kal 6epuárepos
ical puxpótepos kal &mpôtepos kal
ūypôrepos kal otaguárepos kal éév-
substances and the primi-
tépmv kívmortv čxov, ſcal &AAat troXAal
étepotóories évetoi ral jiàoväs kal
Xpotis &reſpot. Panzerbieter ex-
plains #50wh (p. 63 sq.) by taste, as
the word also stands in Anaxago-
ras Fr. 3; Xenophon, Anab. ii. 3. 16.
Still better would be the analogous
meaning “smell, which the word
has in a fragment of Heracleitus.
ap. Hippol. Refut. Har. ix. 10; and
in Theophrastus, De Sensu, 16, 90.
Schleiermacher, loc. cit. 154, trans-
lates it feeling (Gefühl); similarly
Schaubach (Anawagor. Fragm. p.86)
Affectio; Ritter, Gesch. der Ion.
Phil. 50, behaviour (Verhalten);
Gesch. der Phil. i. 228, inner dis-
position (innerer Muth); Brandis,
i. 281, internal constitution (innere
Beschaffenheit); Philippson, “TA'm
drðpartvm, p. 205, bona conditio
interna.
* As Panzerbieter sets forth in
detail, p. 102 sqq.
U 2
292 DIO (; ENES OF APOLLONIA.
tive substance, or identified the endless multiplicity of
particular substances with the innumerable stages of
rarefaction and condensation, so that the air would
become at one stage of condensation water, at another
flesh, at a third stone. The most probable supposition,
however, and the one which seems to result from the
above statements of his about the different kinds of air,
and also from his opinion on the development of the
foetus (vide infra)—is that he employed neither of the
two modes of explication exclusively, and, generally
speaking, in the derivation of phenomena, followed no
fixed and uniform method.
The first result of condensation and rarefaction was
to separate from the infinite primitive substance, the
heavy matter which moved downwards, and the light
matter which moved upwards. From the former the
earth was produced; from the latter, the sun, and no
doubt the stars also." This motion upwards and down-
wards Diogenes was forced to derive in the first place
from heaviness and lightness, and secondly, from the
inherent animation of matter as such. For the moving
intelligence with him absolutely coincides with matter;
the different kinds of air are also different kinds of
thought (Fr. 6); that thought was added to material
substances, and set them in motion,” is a view which
would have been impossible to him. But after the first
division of substances has been accomplished, all motion
proceeds from the warm and the light.” Diogenes ex-
plained the soul of animals to be warm air; and so in
1 Plutarch, vide Supra, p. 290, 4. 111 sq.
2 As Panzerbieter represents, * Fr. 6, supra, p. 287, 7.
FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 293
the system of the world he regarded warm matter as
the principle of motion, the efficient cause; and cold
dense matter," as the principle of corporeal consistency.
In consequence of heat,” the universe he thought had
acquired a circular motion from which also the earth
took its round shape.” By this circular motion, how-
ever, he seems to have intended merely a lateral motion;
and by the roundness of the earth a cylindrical, and
not a spherical shape; for he assumed with Anaxagoras
that the inclination of the earth’s axis towards its
surface arose subsequently from some unknown cause
(äic Toij attopatov), and that the axis at first ran per-
pendicularly down through the earth.”
* From the union of these by
means of vómous arose (according to
Steinhart, p 299) sensible air. I
know not, however, on what evi-
dence this assumption is based; it
seems to me inadmissible for the
reasons I brought forward against
Ritter on p. 288. Nor do I see any
proof of the accuracy of the further
observation that ‘ the sensible air
is supposed to consist of an infinite
number of simple bodies;” for T)io-
genes is never mentioned by Aris-
totle in the passage, De Part. Anim.
ii. 1, to which note 33 refers.
* Whether primitive heat or
the sun's heat, is not stated, but
from Alex. Meteorolog. 93 b, the
sun's heat seems to be intended.
* Diog. ix. 57: Thy đê yńv orpoy-
'yūAmv, épmpetouévnv čv Tó uégº,
thv oráortagu eiàm pvtav karū thv čk
too 9epuoi) trepiqopāv kal tričiv Štrb
toū Wuxpov, on which cf. Panzer-
bieter, p. 117 sq.
* According to the Plac. ii. 8, 1
(Stobaeus, i. 358; Ps. Galen, c. 11,
to the same effect) Diogenes and
He was the
Anaxagoras maintained: ustã to
ovatāvut Tov icóa'uov cal r& ©a ék
Tús yūs éðayayev čºykAtôňvaí tra's
Töv kóopov čk too attopadºrov eis to
peomuſ pivov attoo uépos (forws, adds
the author doubtless in his own
name, Širo trpovotas, in order to
show the difference between the
habitable and uninhabitable zones).
Anaxagoras, however, said, accord-
ing to Diog. ii. 9: T& 3’ &otpa kat’
&px&s pièv 60xoetóós évéx6ival àote
karū kopuqºv rās yńs (perpendicu-
larly over the upper surface of the
earth, which, like Anaximenes and
others, he supposed to be shaped
like a cylinder, cf. vol. ii. Anaa..) tow
&el pauvéuevov sival tróAov, Šotepov
6è thv čykxtortv Aabeiv; so that, ac-
cording to this, the stars in their
daily revolution would at first have
only turned from east to west late-
rally around the earth s disc, and
those above our horizon would
never have gone below it. The
obliquity of the earth's axis to its
surface was produced later, and
caused the paths of the sun and
294 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
more disposed to adopt Anaxagoras's notion as to the
shape of the earth, and the original motion of the
heavens, since Anaximenes had led him to the same
result. Like Anaximander, he conceived of the earth
in its primeval state as a soft and fluid mass gradually
dried by the sun's heat. This is also proved by its
having received its form in course of the rotation.
What remained of the primitive liquid became the
seas, the salt taste of which he derived from the evapo-
ration of the sweet portions: the vapours developed
from the drying up of the moisture served to enlarge the
heavens."
stars to cut the plane of the hori-
zon; hence arose the alternation of
day and night. What we are to
think in regard to the details of
this system is (as Panzerbieter, p.
129 sqq. shows) hard to say. If
the whole universe, that is, the
heavens and the earth, inclined to
the south, nothing would have
changed in the position of the earth
in relation to the heavens, and the
temporary disappearance of most of
the stars below the horizon, and the
alternation of day and night, would
be inexplicable. If the heavens
(or which is the same thing, the
upper end of the earth's axis) had
inclined to the south, the sun in
its revolution around this axis
would have come nearer and nearer
the horizon the further south it
went. It would have risen in the
west and set in the east ; we should
have had midnight when it was in
the south ; midday when it was in
the north. If, on the other hand,
the earth had inclined to the South
and the axis of the heavens had re-
mained unaltered, it would seem
The earth is full of passages through which
that the sea and all the waters
must have overflowed the southern
part of the earth's surface. Pan-
zerbieter, therefore, conjectures
that Anaxagoras made the heavens
incline not to the south, but to the
north, and that in the passage in
the Placita we should perhaps read
trpooflápetov or uegoſłópelov, instead
of Peo mp3plvöv. But considering
that our three texts are agreed
upon the word, this is scarcely
credible. We shall, however, find
(infra, vol. ii.) that Leucippus and
Democritus believed in a depression
of the southern part of the earth's
disc. If these philosophers could
discover an expedient unknown to
us but satisfactory to them, by
which they could escape the obvious
difficulties of this hypothesis, Dio-
genes and Anaxagoras could also
have discovered one ; and on the
other hand, their theory of the in-
clination of the earth gives us a
clue to the opinions of Leucippus
and Democritus on the same
subject.
* Arist. Meteor. ii. 2, 355 a, 21;
FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 295
the air penetrates: if the outlets of these are blocked
up, there are earthquakes." In the same way Diogenes
held the sun and stars” to be porous bodies, of a forma-
tion like pumice stone, the hollows of which are filled
with fire or fiery air.” The theory of the origin of the
stars from moist exhalations,” in connection with that
just quoted from Alexander on the growth of the
heavens by the evaporations of the earth, would lead
us to conjecture that Diogenes supposed the sun alone
to have been at first formed from the warm air drawn
upwards, and the stars to have afterwards arisen from
the vapours evolved by the Sun's heat, by which vapours
the sun himself was thought to have been continually
sustained. As this nourishment is at times exhausted
in each part of the world, the Sun (so at least Alexander
represents the doctrine of Diogenes) changes his place,
as a beast his pasture.”
Alex. Meteorol. 91 a ; 93 b, pro-
bably following Theophrastus; cf.
Supra, p. 254, 1.
* Seneca, Qu. Nat. Vi. 15; cf.
iv. 2, 28.
* Among which he likewise
reckoned comets, Plac. lii. 2, 9;
unless Diogenes, the Stoic, is here
meant.
* Stob. Ecl. i. 528, 552, 508;
Plut. Plac. ii. 13, 4; Theod. Gr. off.
cur. iv. 17, p. 59. According to the
last three passages, meteoric stones
are similar bodies; but it would
seem that they only take fire in
falling; vide Panzerbieter, 122 sq.
* So, at least, Stob. 522 says of
the moon, when he asserts that
Diogenes held it to be a kiorampoet-
8ès āvaupta. Panzerbieter, p. 121
sq., interprets in the same way the
statement in Stob. 508 (Plut. loc.
cit.) that the stars, according to
Diogenes, are àuditvotal (exhalations)
toū kóapov; and he is probably
more correct than Ritter (i. 232)
who, by Sudirvoial, understands or-
gans of respiration. Theodoret,
loc. cit., ascribes the 6tan vo&s to
the stars themselves; it would be
easier to connect them with the
fiery vapours streaming from the
StarS.
* Cf. p. 254, 1. Some other
theories of Diogenes on thunder
and lightning (Stob. i. 594; Sen.
Qu. Nat. ii. 20), on the winds, Alex.
loc. cit. (cf. Arist. Meteor. ii. 1,
beginning), on the causes of the
inundation of the Nile (Sen. Qu.
Nat. iv. 2, 27; Schol. in Apollon.
Rhod. iv. 269) are discussed by
Panzerbieter, p. 133 sqq.
296 I) IOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
Diogenes shared with Anaxagoras and other phy-
sicists the belief that living creatures' and likewise
plants” were produced out of the earth, no doubt by the
influence of the sun's heat. In an analogous manner
he explained the process of generation, by the influence
of the vivifying heat of the body of the mother on the
seed.” In accordance with his general standpoint, he
thought the soul to be a warm, dry air. As the air is
capable of endless diversity, souls likewise are as various
as the kinds and individual natures to which they
belong.” This substance of the soul he appears to have
derived partly from the seed,” and partly from the outer
air entering the lungs after birth; * and its warmth,
according to the above theory, from the warmth of the
mother. The diffusion of life throughout the whole body
he explained by the theory that the soul or warm vital
air streams along with the blood through the veins." In
1 Placita, ii. 8, 1; Stob. i. 358.
* Theophrastus, Hist. Plant.
iii. 1, 4.
* For further details, cf. Pan-
zerbieter, 124 sqq., after Censorin.
Di. Nat. c. 5, 9; Plut. Plac. v.
15, 4 etc.
* Fr. 6, after the words quoted,
p. 291, 1: kal travtov Šºšov 8& # juxh
ºró airó or riv, &hp 9epuárepos uév
toū āśa, Év ć Čauèv, toi, uévrol trapū
T6 hexíq, troAAöv juxpárepos. §uotov
8è rooro to 6eppov oičevos Táv Óav
éotlv, Štrel oiâè róváv6pótrov &AA#-
Aois. &AA& Stapépet wéya uév oë, &AA’
ãate trapatraſota elval, où uévrol
&rpskéws ye āuotov čóv . . . &re
ošv troxvrpétrov čveoûorms rās repot-
&otostroAirpora kal tº Çiğa kal troXA&
ſcal otre ióémv &AAñAous éoukóra otre
6taurav cite vömoriv Štrb roi, txh9eos
Töv Štepowdºoreov. čudos 88, &c. (supra,
p. 287, 7); cf. Theophrastus, De
Sensw. 39, 44.
* For he expressly remarks that
the seed is like air (ºrvevuaróðes)
and foam, and derives thence the
designation, &ppoètoria. Wide supra,
p.287,7; Clemens, Paedag. i. 105 C.
* Plac. v. 15, 4.
* Simpl. loc. cit.; cf. Theophras-
tus, De Sensu, 39 sqq. From these
passages it is clear that Diogenes
limited the habitation of the soul
to no particular organ; the state-
ment, therefore, in the Placita, iv.
5, 7, that he transferred the jºyeuo-
vikov to the &primptoich coià la răs
kapātas, can only be accepted in the
sense that this is the chief seat of
the vivifying air. Cf. Panzerbieter,
87 sq.
VITAL AIR. RESPIRATION. 297
support of this doctrine he entered into a detailed, and
according to the then state of anatomical knowledge, an
accurate description of the venal system." Sensations he
supposed to arise from the contact of the vital air with
external impressions,” and sleep and death from the
partial or entire expulsion of the air by the blood.”
The seat of sensation he sought in the air contained in
the brain;* appealing in proof of this to the pheno-
menon, that we are not conscious of external impressions
when we are occupied with something else.” Desire
and disinclination, courage, health, and so forth, were
the effect, he thought, of the various proportions in
which air mingles with the blood.” The intellectual in-
feriority of sleeping and intoxicated persons, of children,
and of animals, he attributed to the greater density and
moisture, and the less perfect circulation of the vital
air." The vital air itself, however, he was of course
obliged to presuppose in all living creatures. On this
ground he tried to prove, for example, that fishes and
oysters have also the power of breathing.” He even
* Given by Aristotle, H. Anim.
iii. 2, 511 b, 30 sqq., commented
on by Panzerbieter, p. 72 sqq.
Hearing arises: ärav 6 év roºs &alv
&?ip Kumbels ötro row £o Ölašig irpos
Töv Yképakov ; sight, when the
* The somewhat ambiguous
statements, Placita iv. 18, 2 ; 16,
3; confused by the introduction of
the Stoic #yepaovikov, are discussed
by Panzerbieter, 86, 90; further
details are given by Theophrastus,
loc. cit.; cf. Philippson, "TAm &věpa-
trivn, 101 sqq.
* Plac. v. 23, 3. Ö
* Smell, says Theophrastus,
loc. cit., he attributed rig trepi Tov
éºykéqſaxov dépt; Totºrov yūp &6povv
eival kal oriupletpov tº dwarvoſ.
image that enters the eye combines
with the air within (utyvva 9a).
* Loc. cit. 42 : §rt 5& à évròs
dhp aio 6dueTai pukpóv &v učptov rod
6eoû, ormuelov elval, Šti troAAárcis
trpós &AAa Töv votiv čxovtes of 6°
ôpópºevoir’ &Kočopiev.
* Theophrastus, loc. cit. 43.
* Wide supra, p. 296, 2; Theo-
phrastus, loc. cit. 44 sqq.; Plac.
v. 20.
* Arist. De Respir. c. 2, 470 b,
30 ; Panzer. 95.
298 IDIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
ascribed something analogous to respiration to metals,
supposing them to absorb damp vapours (ikpuas), and
to exude them again, and thus seeking to explain the
attractive power of the magnet.* Only animals, how-
ever, he considered, can breathe the air as such. Plants
are entirely irrational, for the reason that they do not
breathe it.”
Like Anaximander and Anaximenes, Diogenes is
said to have assumed the perpetual alternation of the
world's construction and destruction, and an endless
number of successive worlds. Simplicius' expressly
says this, and the statement that Diogenes believed in
an infinity of worlds" must have reference to it, for his
whole cosmogony shows, even more clearly than the
assertion of Simplicius (loc. cit.),” that he could only
conceive the totality of simultaneous things as one
whole limited in space. Stobaeus" speaks of a future
end of the world, and Alexander,’ of a gradual drying
up of the sea, which must both have a similar reference;
and even without this explicit testimony, we must have
supposed Diogenes on this point, likewise, to have been
in agreement with his predecessors.
In considering his theory as a whole, we must allow
that notwithstanding its superiority to the previous phi-
losophic theories in scientific and literary form, and in
* Alex. Aphr. Quast. Nat. ii. * Where kóoaos could not be
23, p. 138, Speng. used in the singular if many con-
* Theophrastus, loc, cit. 44. temporaneous Worlds like those of
* Phys, 257 b : vide supra, p. Democritus were in question. Plac.
278, 1. ii. 1, 6 (Stob, i.440) seems to refer
* Diog. ix. 57; Plut, ap. Eus, to Diogenes the Stoic.
Pr. Ev. i. 8, 13; Stob. i. 496; * i. 416, vide supra, p. 277, 4.
Theodoret, Gr. aff, cur. iv. 15, p. * Meteorol. 91 a, according to
58. - Theophrastus, vide supra, p. 251, 1.

IIIS HISTORICAL POSI TI ON. 299
s comparative wealth of empirical knowledge, there is
contradiction involved in its fundamental conceptions.
f the orderly constitution of the world is only to be
naerstood in reference to a world-forming reason, this
resupposes that matter as such does not suffice to
xplain it; its cause cannot therefore be sought in one
lementary body, and so Diogenes is forced to ascribe
o this body qualities which not merely from our point
f view, but absolutely and directly, exclude one
nother ; for on the one hand he describes it as the
ubtlest and rarest, because it is the all-permeating
nd all-animating, and on the other, he makes things
rise from it, not only by condensation, but also by
rarefaction, which would be impossible if the primitive
lement were itself the rarest in existence." That it is
ot merely” the warm air, or the soul, but air in general
hat Diogenes calls the rarest, we are at any rate clearly
told by Aristotle,” who says that Diogenes held the soul
to be air, because air is the rarest element and the
rimitive matter; and Diogenes himself (Fr. 6) says
that the air is in all things, and permeates all things,
which could not be unless it were itself the subtlest
element. Nor can rarefaction” refer to a secondary
form of air arising from previous condensation; for the
ancient philosophers, with one accord, attribute the
power of rarefaction, as well as condensation, to primi-
tive matter;" and this indeed lies in the nature of
* As Bayle has already re- * In the passage quoted, supra,
marked, Dict. Diogéne. Rem. B. p. 290, 1.
* As Panzerbieter (106) and * As Ritter holds, Ion. Phil.
Wendt zu Tennemann, i. 441, sup- p. 57.
pose. * Wide supra, p. 290, 4.

30K) DioGENES OF APOLLONIA.
things, for rarefaction and condensation mutuall
presuppose each other, and a condensation of on
portion of a body of air is impossible without th
simultaneous rarefaction of another. Thus, there i
a contradiction in the bases of the system, resulting
from the fact that its author adopted the idea of
world-forming reason, without therefore abandoning thi
ancient Ionian materialism, and especially the theorie
of Amaximenes on primitive matter.
This circumstance would in itself lead us to com.
jecture that Diogenes' theory did not wholly arise ou
of the development of the ancient Ionian physics, but
under the influence of another philosophy, having -ā
different standpoint; and that contradictory element:
had therefore appeared in it. This conjecture becomes
still more probable when we see, contemporaneously with
Diogenes, the very definitions which contradict his
materialistic presuppositions, brought forward by Anax-
agoras in connection with a more logical doctrine,
We have no certain information, it is true, as to the
exact date of Diogenes," but we have the testimony o
Simplicius,” based probably upon Theophrastus, that

* The only fixed date, the men-
tion of the aerolite of Aegospota-
mos, which fell 469 B.C. (Stob. i.
508; Theod. Gr. aff, cur. iv. 18,
p. 59; and Panzerbieter, p. 1 sq.),
leaves an ample margin.
* Phys. 6 a. Kal Atoyévns &
6 'AtroAXavidºrms, oxe50w veðtatos
rów Tepl raûra axoMaordvrov, rö.
pºv traetorra ovutre+opmuévos Yé-ypa-
qe, rà uºv karð ‘Avačayópav rá 3&
karð Aeëkurtov Aéyov. Cf. Supra,
p, 290, 1; p. 291, 1; with the ap-
peal to Theophrastus. That Theo
phrastus really supposed Diogene.
to be later than Anaxagoras seem
probable likewise, because in dis
cussing their theories he repeatedly
places Diogenes after him. So D.
Sensu, 39; Hist. Plant. iii. i. 4
vide Philippson."rxmåv6porium,199
Diogenes is also described as
younger contemporary of Anaxa
goras by Augustine, Civ. Dei, viii
2; and Sidon. Apoll. xv. 89 sqq.
and for the same reason apparently
HIS HISTORICA I, POSITION.
301
ater than Empedocles.
essentially from it.”
in Cic. N. D. i. 12, 29, his name
comes last among all the pre-So-
cratic philosophers.
1 This date is further supported
by the circumstance which Petersen
has shown to be probable in his
Hippocratis Scripta ad Temp. Rat.
Disposita, part i. p. 30 (Hamb.
1839, Gym-Progr.), namely that
Aristophanes, Nub. 227 Sqq., is al-
luding to the doctrine of Diogenes
spoken of on p. 297, 6; which doc-
trime in that case must even then
have attracted attention in Athens.
* Panzerbieter, 19 sq.; Schau-
e appeared later than Anaxagoras, and wrote in partial
ependence upon him. The carefulness of Diogenes in
gard to the details of natural science, and especially
e great precision of his anatomical knowledge, would
ssign him to a period when observation had made
ome advances: the period of a Hippo and a Democritus."
m the same way we shall find reason to suppose him
On these grounds some de-
endence of Diogenes on Anaxagoras seems probable,
nd the internal evidence of their doctrines is wholly in
avour of this view. The striking similarity between
hem makes it hardly credible that these doctrines
hould have been produced independently of each other.”
ot only do Diogenes and Anaxagoras both require a
orld-forming reason, but they require it on the same
round, that the order of the universe was otherwise
nexplicable to them : both describe this reason as the
ubtlest of all things; both derive the soul and life
We cannot, however, consider
naxagoras as dependent on Diogenes, and Diogenes as
the historical link between him and the older physicists.”
bach, Anaaag. Fragm. p. 32; Stein-
hart, loc. cit. 297, considers Dio-
genes to be rather earlier than
Anaxagoras.
* Cf. the section on Anaxagoras,
infra.
* Schleiermacher on Diog.
Werke, 3te Abth. ii. 156 sq., 166
sqq.; Braniss, Gesch. der Phil. s.
Kant, i. 128 sqq., vide Supra, p. 167.
Krische is less positive, vide Forsch.
170 sq. Schleiermacher, however,
afterwards changed his opinion, for
in his Gesch. d. Phil. p. 77 he de-
scribes Diogenes as an eclectic with-










302 DIOGENES OF APOLLOWIA.
Schleiermacher indeed thinks that had Diogenes bee
acquainted with the work of Anaxagoras, he must hav
expressly opposed Anaxagoras' theory that the air i
something composite; but in the first place we have m
evidence to show that he did not oppose it; and i
the second we have no right to apply the standards o
modern philosophy to the methods of the ancients, nor
to expect from these latter a profound investigation o
theories differing from their own, such as even a Plato
did not always impose upon himself. The main prim-
ciple of Anaxagoras, however, the separation of the
organising reason from matter, Diogenes seems to me
clearly enough to oppose, in his 6th Fragment.”
Schleiermacher indeed finds no trace in the passage
of any polemic of this kind, but merely the tone of a
person who is newly introducing the doctrine of vojs;
but the care with which Diogenes demonstrates that all
the qualities of intelligence belong to the air, gives me
the opposite impression. In the same way it seems to
me that Diogenes” is so careful to prove the unthink-
ableness of several primitive substances, because he had
been preceded by some philosopher who denied the
unity of the primitive matter. That he is alluding to
Empedocles only, and not to Anaxagoras,” is improbable,
considering the many other points of contact between
Diogenes and Anaxagoras. If, however, he had Empe-
docles chiefly in view, that alone would show him to be
out principle belonging, with the Phys. 32 b : trpós pugiox6)ovs &vre-
Sophists and Atomists, to the third pmkéval, offs Kaxet airòs oroptorrás.
section of pre-Socratic philosophy, * Wide supra, p. 287, 7.
the period of its decay. * Fr. 2, vide supra, p. 286, 2.
! He says of himself in Simpl. * Krische, p. 171.
HIS HISTORICAL POSITION. 303
younger contemporary of Anaxagoras, and his philo-
ophy might be supposed to have appeared at a later
ate than that of Anaxagoras. Schleiermacher con-
siders it more natural that spirit should first have been
discovered in its union with matter, and afterwards in
opposition to it; but this is hardly conclusive in regard
to Anaxagoras's relation to Diogenes; for the direct
unity of spirit with matter, which was the starting point
of the elder physicists, we do not find in Diogenes; on
the contrary, he introduces thought, because the purely
physical explanation of phenomena does not satisfy him.
But if the importance of thought has once been re-
cognised, it is certainly more probable that the new
principle should be first set up in abrupt opposition to
material causes, than that it should be combined with
them in so uncertain a manner as by Diogenes." The
whole question is decided by this fact, that the con-
ception of a world-forming reason is only logically
carried out by Anaxagoras; Diogenes on the contrary
attempts to combine it in a contradictory manner, with
a standpoint entirely out of harmony with it. This in-
decisive sort of eclecticism is much more in keeping
with the younger philosopher, who desires to make use
of the new ideas without renouncing the old, than with
the philosopher to whom the new ideas belong as his
original possession.” Diogenes is therefore, in my
* This is also in opposition to subsequent inclination of the vault
Erische, p. 172.
* We cannot argue much from
the agreement of the two philoso-
phers in certain physical theories,
such as the form of the earth, the
primitive lateral movement and
of heaven; the opinion that the stars
are stony masses; or on the doc-
trine of the senses, for such theories
are, as a rule, so little connected
with philosophic principles, that
either philosopher might equally

304 DIOGENES OF APOLLONIA.
opinion, an adherent of the old Ionian physics, of the
school of Anaximenes; sufficiently affected by the
philosophic discovery of Anaxagoras to attempt a com-
bination of his (Anaxagoras') doctrine with that of
Anaximenes, but for the most part following Anaximenes
in his principle and the application of it. That there
would be a retrograde movement," according to this
view, from Anaxagoras to Diogenes proves nothing;
for historical progress in general does not exclude re-
trogression as to particulars : * that Anaxagoras, on the
other hand, cannot be immediately related to Anaxi-
memes” is true; but we have no right to conclude from
this that Diogenes (rather than Heracleitus, the Elea-
tics or the Atomists) forms the connecting link between
them. Lastly, though the theory of the 6potopspſ, may
be a more artificial conception than the doctrine of
Diogenes," it by no means follows that it must be the
more recent; it is quite conceivable, on the contrary,
that the very difficulties of the Anaxagorean expla–
nation of mature may have had the effect of confirming
Diogenes in his adherence to the more simple and
ancient Ionic doctrine. The same might be con-
jectured in regard to the dualism of the principles
professed by Anaxagoras; " and thus we must regard
well have borrowed them from the
other. But Diogenes' explanation
of the sensuous perception, at any
rate, shows a development of the
doctrine of Anaxagoras (vide Phi-
lippson, "ran ävěpwrívn, 199), and
his superiority in empirical know-
ledge marks him rather as a con-
temporary of Democritus than a
predecessor of Anaxagoras. In his
theories also of the magnet he seems
to follow Empedocles.
* Schleiermacher, loc. cit. 166.
* From Anaxagoras to Arche-
laus there is a similar retrogression.
* Schleiermacher, loc. cit.
* Ibid.
* On this account, Brandis (i.
272) considers Diogenes, with Ar-
chelaus and the Atomists, in the
light of a reaction against the
dualism of Anaxagoras.

CHARACTER AND PLACE IN HISTORY. 305
the theory of Diogenes as the attempt of a later philo-
sopher, partly to save the physical doctrine of Anaxi-
menes and the earlier Ionians as against the innovations
of Anaxagoras, and partly to combine them with each
other."
However noteworthy this attempt may be, the
philosophic importance of it cannot be ranked very
high ; * the chief merit of Diogenes seems to consist in
his having enlarged the range of the empirical know-
ledge of nature, and laboured to prove more completely
the life and teleological constitution of nature in de-
tail. But these ideas were themselves supplied to him
by his predecessors, Anaxagoras and the ancient phy-
sicists. Greek philosophy, as a whole, had in the time
of Diogenes long since struck out paths that conducted
it far beyond the point of the earlier Ionian physics.”
* As is thought by most modern
writers, cf. Reinhold, Gesch. d. Phil.
i. 60 ; Fries, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 236
sq.; Wendt zu Tennemann, i. 427
sqq.; Brandis, loc. cit.; Philippson,
loc. cit.,198 sqq.; Ueberweg Grundr.
i. 42, etc.
* The doctrine that Steinhart
(loc. cit. p. 298) finds in him, and
considers an important advance,
viz., ‘that all the Phenomenal is
to be regarded as the self-abnega-
tion of a principle that is perma-
nent and persistent in itself, goes
far beyond any of the actual ex-
pressions of Diogenes. In reality,
he merely says (Fr. 2; wide supra,
p.286, 2) that all becoming and all
WOL. I.
reciprocal action of things among
themselves presupposes the unity
of their primitive matter. This is,
in truth, a noteworthy and preg-
nant thought, but the conception
of primitive matter and of the rela-
tion of primitive matter to things
derived, are the same with him as
with Anaximenes.
* We are reminded of the phy-
sical notions of Diogenes, or, at any
rate, of the ancient Ionic school, by
the Pseudo-Hippocratic work, repl
q ūgios traištov (cf. Petersen, p. 30
sq. of the treatise quoted supra,
p. 301, 1). Here also we find evi
dence of the continuance of that
school.
306 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
THE PYTHAGOREANS.]
I, SOURCES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE IN REGARD TO THE
PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY.
AMONG all the schools of philosophy known to us, there
is none of which the history is so overgrown, we may
almost say, so concealed by myths and fictions, and the
doctrines of which have been so replaced in the course
of tradition by such a mass of later constituents, as
that of the Pythagoreans. Pythagoras and his school
are seldom mentioned by writers anterior to Aristotle,”
and even from Plato, whose connection with them was
from it. Chaignetºs-careful work
displays much more sobriety. But
* The recent literature concern-
ing Pythagoras and his school is
given by Ueberweg, Grundr. i. 48.
Of more comprehensive works, be-
sides the accounts of Greek philo-
sophy in general, and Ritter's
Gesch. d. Pythag. Phil. (1826), we
have the second volume of Röth's
Gesch. d. Abendlichen Philosophie,
which treats at great length (Abth.
1, pp. 261–984, and 2, pp. 48–319)
of Pythagoras; and Chaignet's
work in two volumes, Pythagore
et la Philosophie Pythagoricienne.
Röth's exposition, however, is so
entirely devoid of all literary and
historical criticism, launches out
so confidently into the most arbi-
trary conjectures and the most ex-
travagant fancies, and leaves so
much to be desired in regard to the
intelligent apprehension and the
correct reproduction of authorities,
that in respect to our historical
knowledge of Pythagoreanism,
hardly anything is to be learned
he places far too great confidence
in spurious fragments and untrust-
worthy statements, and is thus not
seldom misled into theories, which
cannot stand before a more search-
ing criticism. This could scarcely
be otherwise, since he starts from
the presupposition (i. 250, 4) that
the authorities (without exception)
are ‘walables, tant qu'om m'a pas
démontré l'impossibilité qu'ils he le
soient pas,’ instead of asking in
each individual case whether the
testimony is based on a tradition,
founded on the historical fact, and
only in proportion as this seems
probable, giving credence to it.
* The little that can be quoted
respecting them from Xenophanes,
Heracleitus, Democritus, Herodotus,
Io of Chios, Plato, Isocrates, Anaxi-
mander the younger, and Andron
of Ephesus, will be noticed in the
proper place.

EARLIER AND LATER AUTHORITIES. 307
so close, we can glean very few historical details re-
specting them. Aristotle, indeed, bestowed much
attention on the Pythagorean doctrine; not only dis-
cussing it in the course of his more comprehensive re-
searches, but also treating it in separate treatises: l yet
when we compare what he says with later expositions,
it is found to be very simple and almost meagre. While
later authors can expatiate at length upon Pythagoras
and his doctrines, he is never mentioned, or at most
Once or twice, by Aristotle; his philosophic doctrines
are passed over in silence, and the Pythagoreans are
everywhere spoken of as if the writer were ignorant
whether, and how far, their theories were really derived
from Pythagoras himself.” Even the accounts which
we get from the writings of the older Peripatetics and
their contemporaries—Theophrastus, Eudemus, Aristo-
* The statements concerning the
writings in question, repl rôv IIv6a-
'yopetav, trepi Tūs ‘Apxvteſov pixooro-
qtas, rà ék Too Tuatov kal Tów
'Apxvretary, trpès tº 'AAkplatovos,
are given in Part. ii. b, p. 48,
second edition. As to the treatise,
Treph Töv IIv6ayopetov, vide also
Alexander in Metaph. 542 b, 5;
Fr. 31, 1 Bon. ; Stob. Ecl. i. 380;
Theo, Arithm. 30; Plut. ap. Gell.
N. A. iv. 11, 12; Porphyry, V.
Pythag. 41 ; Diog. viii. 19, cf.
Brandis, Gr, Röm. Phil. i. 439 sq.;
ii. b 1, 85; Rose, De Arist, libr.
ord. 79 sqq. Perhaps the so-called
treatises on Archytas and the rest
are identical with those on the
Pythagoreans, or with certain parts
of them. Meanwhile, however
probable it may be that the treatise
on Archytas is spurious, this is
not substantiated by Gruppe (Ueber
d. Fragm. d. Arch. 79 sq.), or by
Rose's argument from the frag-
ment hereafter to be quoted or
by what he adduces (loc. cit.) from
Damascius. Still more hazardous
is Rose's repudiation of all the
above writings. The quotation in
Diog. viii. 34, 'AptorotéAms repl
Töv kvěuov, would equally apply
to a portion of the treatise on the
Pythagoreans, if, indeed (as is
most likely), there be not some
misunderstanding or interpolation
in the passage.
* oi kaAoûuevot IIv6ayópelot ;
Metaph. i. 5, at the beginning; i.
8, 989 b, 29 ; Meteor. i. 8, 345 a,
14; oi repl thy ’Iraxtav KaNoëplevot
8è IIv6ayopetot, De Coelo, ii. 13, 293
a, 20; Tów 'IraNuków rives kai ka-
Aovuévov IIv6ayopetov, Meteor. i. 6,
342 b, 30; cf. Schwegler, Arist.
Metaph. iii. 44.
x 2
308 THE PXTHAGOREA.N.S.
xenus, Dicaearchus, Heracleides, and Eudoxus –are far
slighter and more cautious than the subsequent tradi-
tion; nevertheless, from them we can see that legend had
already taken possession of Pythagoras and his personal
history; and that the later Peripatetics had begun to de-
velop the Pythagorean doctrines according to their fancy.
These sources (of which it is true we possess only
fragments) give us scarcely a single detail which we
did not already know through Aristotle. Farther de-
velopments of the Pythagorean legend, which relate,
however, rather to the history of Pythagoras and his
school, than to their doetrines, appear during the third
and second centuries, in the statements of Epicurus,
Timaeus, Neanthes, Hermippus, Hieronymus, Hippo-
botus, and others. But it was not until the time of
the Neo-Pythagoreans, when Apollonius of Tyana wrote
his Life of Pythagoras, when Moderatus compiled a
long and detailed work on the Pythagorean Philosophy,
when Nicomachus treated the theory of numbers and
theology in accordance with the principles of his own
school—that the authorities concerning Pythagoras and
his doctrines became copious enough to make such
expositions as those of Porphyry and Iamblichus pos-
sible.” Thus the tradition respecting Pythagoreanism
1 Röth, Abendl. Phil. ii. a, 270,
adds to these lyco, the opponent of
Aristotle (cf. Partii. b, 36, 2, second
ed.), and Cleanthes the Stoic. But
it is more probable that the former
was a Neo-Pythagorean than a con-
temporary of Aristotle; and the
Cleanthes of Porphyry is certainly
not the Stoic, but most likely a mis-
spelling for Neanthes (of Cyzicus).
* To the beginning of this pe-
riod belongs also (Part iii. b, 74
sqq.) the work from which Alex-
ander Polyhistor (Diog. viii. 24
sq.) has taken his exposition of the
Pythagorean doctrine, and on
which that of Sextus, Pyrrh. iii.
152 sqq.; Math. vii. 94 sqq.; x.
249 sqq., likewise appears to be
based.
EARLIER AND LATER AUTHORITIES. 309
and its founder grows fuller and fuller, the farther re-
moved it is from the date of these phenomena; and
more and more Scanty, the nearer we approach them.
With the range and extent of the accounts, their mature
likewise changes. At first many miraculous stories
about Pythagoras were in circulation. In course of
time his whole history developes into a continuous
series of the most extraordinary events. In the older
statements, the Pythagorean system bore a simple and
primitive character, in harmony with the general
tendency of the pre-Socratic philosophy; according to
the later representation, it approximates so greatly to
the Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines that the Pytha-
goreans of the Christian period could even maintain
that the Philosophers of the Academy and the Lyceum
had stolen their so-called discoveries, one and all, from
Pythagoras.” It is plain that such a development of the
tradition could not have been brought about by history,
for how can we suppose that the writers of the Christian
period had at their command a mass of authentic in-
formation unknown to Plato and Aristotle; and how
can we recognise as genuine Pythagorean doctrines,
propositions which Plato and Aristotle not only do not
attribute to the Pythagoreans, but for the most part
* Porphyry, V. Pyth. 53, pro-
bably after Moderatus.
* It is clear that precisely the
opposite was actually the case, and
that the ancient Pythagorean doc-
trine contained none of the accre-
tions which afterwards made their
appearance. This is betrayed by
the author when he says that Plato
and Aristotle collected all that they
could not adopt, and omitting the
remainder, called that the whole
of the Pythagorean doctrine; and
also in the statement of Moderatus
(loc. cit. 48) that the number theory
with Pythagoras and his disciples
had been only symbolical of a
higher speculation (cf. Part iii. b,
96 sq., second edition).
310 THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
expressly deny that they held, and claim as their own
personal discoveries 2 The so-called Pythagorean doc-
trines which are not acknowledged as such by ancient
authorities are Neo-Pythagorean, and the miraculous
tales and improbable combinations with which Pytha-
gorean history is so largely adorned in the later authors,
no doubt in great part emanate from the same source.
But if the untrustworthy and unhistorical character
of these expositions is in the main indisputable, we
cannot venture to make use of the statements they
contain, even where these statements are not in them-
selves opposed to historical probability, and to the more
ancient and trustworthy authorities; for how can we, in
regard to minor particulars, trust the assertions of those
who have grossly deceived us in the most important
matters ? In all cases therefore where the later au-
thorities, subsequent to the appearance of Neo-Pytha-
goreism, are unsupported by other testimony, their
statements may generally be supposed to rest, not on
real knowledge or credible tradition, but on dogmatic
presuppositions, party interests, uncertain legends,
arbitrary inventions, or falsified writings. Even the
agreement of several such authorities cannot prove
much, as they are accustomed to transcribe one from
the other without any preliminary criticism; their
assertions merit attention only in cases where they may
either be directly referred to older sources, or where
their internal nature justifies us in the belief that they
are founded on historical tradition.
* Thus Tamblichus copies Por- tions, copied Apollonius and Mo-
phyry, and both of them, as far as deratus.
we may judge from their quota-
FA RLIER AND LATER AUTHORITIES. 311
What has just been said in regard to the indirect
authorities for the Pythagorean doctrine, equally ap-
plies to the so-called direct sources. Later writers,
belonging almost without exception to the Neo-Pytha-
gorean and Neo-Platonic period, speak of an extensive
Pythagorean literature, the nature and compass of
which we may gather not only from the few writings
we possess, but far more from the numerous fragments
which exist of lost works." A very small fraction,
however, of these writings may with any probability be
ascribed to the ancient Pythagorean school. Had this
school possessed such a mass of written works, it would
be hard to understand why the ancient authors should
not contain more distinct allusions to them, and es-
'pecially why Aristotle should be so entirely silent as
to Pythagoras' own doctrine,” when several of these
* A review of these is given in
Part iii. b, p. 85 sqq., second edi-
tion. Mullach, however, has
printed, in his second volume of
fragments, most of those omitted
in the first.
* Diogenes, viii. 6, mentions
three works of Pythagoras: a rat-
6evrtkov, a troAttukov, and a puoi-
ków. Heracleides Lembus (about
180 B.C.) besides these speaks of a
treatise, trepi rod 3xov, and a ispos
Aóyos, in hexameters. How this
last is related to the iepòs Aóyos,
consisting of twenty-four rhapsodies
which, according to Suidas, must
be attributed to Orpheus, and ac-
cording to others, was written by
Theognetus the Thessalian, or
Cercops the Pythagorean, and is
probably identical with the Orphic
Theogony (Lobeck, Aglaoph. i.
714) cannot be discovered. That
the fragments of a IIv6ayópelos
iſuvos about number (ap. Proclus
Žn Tim. 155 C, 269 B, 331 E, 212
A, 6 A, 96 D; Syrian in Metaph. 59
b; Schol. in Arist. 893 a, 19 sqq.;
Simplicius, Phys. 104 b ; De Coelo,
259 a, 37; Schol. 511 b, 12; cf.
Themist. in Phys. iii. 4, p. 220,
22 sq.; in De An. i. 2, pp. 20, 21;
Theo, Mus. c. 38, p. 155; Sext.
Math. iv. 2; vii. 94, 109; Iambl.
V. P. 162. and Lobeck, loc. cit.)
belong to the iepos A6-yos of Pytha-
goras, it is impossible to prove;
but Proclus distinguishes the Py-
thagorean hymn very distinctly
from the Orphic poem. Iambl.
V. P. 146; cf. Proclus in Tim.
289 B, gives the commencement of
a second ispos Aó)0s in prose, which
was also ascribed to Telauges.
Fragments of this are to be found
in Iamblichus, Nicom. Arithm. p.
312
THE PPTHAGOREANS,
writings bear his very name."
11; Syrian in Metaph.; Schol. in
Ar. 842 a, 8, 902 a, 24, 911 b, 2,
931 a, 5 ; Hierocles in Carm. Aur.
p. 166 (Philos. Gr. Fr. ed. Mull. i.
464 b); cf. also Proclus in Euclid.
p. 7 (222 Friedl.). This ispos
Aóryos, as appears from the above
quotations, is chiefly concerned
with the theological and metaphy-
sical import of numbers. In Diod.
i. 98 there is mention of a ispos
Aóyos of Pythagoras, by which we
must probably understand the one
in verse, and not the prose work
which seems to have been later.
Besides the above-named writings
Fieracleides, Joc. cit., notices others;
Trepl buxºis, trepi ei oreBetas, “Helo-
thales,’ and “Croton’ (these last
were dialogues, as it would seem),
kal &AAovs; Tamblichus (Thºol.
Arithm. p. 19) a a tºy ypaupa trepi
6eóv, probably to be distinguished
from the ispol A6-yot; Pliny, Hist.
Nat. xxv. 2, 13; xxiv. 17, 156 sq.,
a book on the influences of plants;
Galen, De Remed. Parab. Vol. xiv.
567 K, a treatise trept a kíAAms;
Proclus, in Tim. 141 D, a Aóryos
Trpès”A8apiv; Tzetzes. Chil. ii. 888
sq. (cf. Harless, in Fabr. Bibl. Gr.
i. 786), irpo'yvoorturé, Bu68ta; Ma-
lal. 66 D; Cedren. 138 C, a his-
tory of the war between the
Samians and Cyrus; Porphyry, p.
16, an inscription on the grave of
Apollo in Delos. Io of Chios (or
more probably Epigenes, to whom
Kallimachus attributed the rplay-
plot) asserted that he composed
pseudo-Orphic writings (Clemens,
loc. cit.; Diog. viii. 8), and that
Hippasus had stolen from him a
Avoritikos A6-yos, and from Asto, the
Crotonian, a whole series of works
(Diogenes, viii. 7). A ſcard.6ao is
eis 38ov seems to have given rise to
But we are expressly
the tale of the philosopher's jour-
ney to Hades (vide infra, 340, 2).
Nietzsche (Beitr. 2. Quellenkunde,
d. Laërt. Diog., Basel, 1870, p. 16
sq.) refers to the same source the
statement in Diog. viii.; airoi,
Aéyoval ical rôs orkotridógs, substi-
tuting conjecturally a kottas Atóao
for a kotić6as. The verses in Jus-
tin (De Monarch. c. 2, end) have
reference to a poem forged or in-
terpolated by a Jewish hand;
other fragments of Pythagorean
writings are to be found in Just.
Cohort. c. 19 (Clemens, Protr. 47
C, &c.; cf. Otto, note on the
passage in Justin); Porph. De
Abstin. iv. 18; Iambl. Theol.
Arithm. 19 ; Syrian, Schol. in Arist.
912 a, 32 b, 4 sqq. It is doubtful
whether there was a system of
Arithmetic in circulation under
the name of Pythagoras, to which
the statement of his having written
the first work on Arithmetic may
refer (vide Malal 67 a ; Cedren.
138 D, 156 B; Isodor. Orig. iii. 2).
The numerous moral maxims
which Stobaeus quotes in the Flo-
rilegium from Pythagoras do not
seem to have been taken from any
work falsely attributed to him. The
so-called golden poem was by many
ascribed to Pythagoras, although
it does not itself lay claim to such
an origin (vide Mullach in his
edition of Hierocles in Carm-aur.
9 sq.; Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 410,
and the summaries of the extracts
from Stobaeus, loc. cit.), and Iam-
blichus, V. P. 158, 198, speaks in
a general manner of many books
embracing the whole of philosophy,
which were some of them written
by Pythagoras himself, and some
under his name.
* For the story of the conceal-
JPYTHAGO REAN WRITINGS.
313
told that Philolaus was the first Pythagorean who
published a philosophical work, that before his time no
Pythagorean writings were known," and that Pythagoras
himself wrote mothing ; * nor did Hippasus,” although
we possess some supposed fragments of his work.
Iam-
blichus" says that Pythagorean writings were in exist-
ment of these writings (vide infra,
note 4), which, according to Iambli-
chus, was no longer believed, even
in the time of Aristotle, cannot be
brought forward, more especially
if Io had already been acquainted
with them (vide preceding note).
Röth's groundless statement that
Aristotle and the other ancient au-
thorities knew only of the Pytha-
goreans, the exoterics of the school,
and not of the esoteric doctrines
taught to the Pythagoreans—(an
indispensable and fundamental
presupposition of his whole expo-
sition) will be examined infra. If
this statement be disproved, there
is an end of the attempt to recon-
struct the iepos Aóryos of Pythagoras
from the fragments of the Orphic
poem, said to be identical with it
(Röth, ii. a, 609–764); since the
Pythagorean origin of this poem is
not only wholly undemonstrable,
but quite incompatible with all
credible accounts of the Pythago-
rean doctrine. Disregarding Lo-
beck's classical labours, Röth con-
fuses in such an uncritical manner
statements from Orphic and Py-
thagorean works relating to writings
entirely distinct, and separated from
each other by centuries; so that
his whole pretentious and elaborate
discussion can only mislead those
who are less instructed, while for
the learned it is utterly valueless.
* Diog. viii. 15, but especially
section 85: Tottév pman Amuſºrptos
(Demetrius Magnes, the well-known
contemporary of Cicero) év ‘Ouavû-
Lois trpátov čkö00val rôv IIv6ayo-
plków trept piloteas. Iambl. V. P.
199; vide infra, note 4.
* Porph. V. Pythag. 57 (re-
peated by Iambl. V. Pyth. 252 sq.).
After the persecution of Cylon:
éčéAutre kai ji étria thum, śāntos év
toſs oth9ea w śtt puxax6eloa &xpt
Tóte, uðvøv táv Švarovvérov trapſ,
toſs Ščo 8tauvmuovevouévov otre
'yöp IIv6ayópov at yºypappa fiv, and
so on. Those consequently who
escaped from the persecution wrote
summaries of the Pythagorean doc-
trine for their adherents. But
Porphyry himself presupposes that
there were ancient Pythagorean
writings, and, therefore, adds that
the Pythagoreans collected them.
In Diog. viii. 6, we read : éviou uév
oùv IIv0ayópav uměč Šv karaxeitreºv
oriyypapuá pagi. This is more
emphatically stated in Plut. Alea’.
Fort. i. 4, p. 328; Numa, 22; Lu-
cian, De Sulut, c. 5; Galen, De
Hipp. et Plat. i. 25; v. 6, T xv.;
68, 478, K (although he, in another
place, vide sºpra, p. 312, quotes a
work of Pythagoras); Joseph. Con.
Ap. i. 22, perhaps after Aristobu-
lus; Augustin, De Cons. Evang. i.
12
* Diog. viii. 84: p.mal 3' airby
Amujitptos év ‘Ouoviſuous uměčv
karaXitreºu a tºyypaupa.
* V. Pyth. 199: ©avudgeral 6&
kaijitſis puxaxis &kpiBeta év y&p to-
314 THE PPTHAGOREANS,
ence, but that until the time of Philolaus they were
strictly preserved as secret by the school, but this asser-
tion can have no weight against the evidence we have
just cited; it is rather indeed a confirmation of the fact
that the later writers themselves could find no authen-
tic traces of the existence of Pythagorean writings
previous to Philolaus. When, therefore, the savants of
the Alexandrian or Roman period presuppose that such
writings must always have existed, at any rate within
the Pythagorean school, this theory is entirely based on
the assertions of the so-called ancient works themselves,
and on the opinions of a generation which could form
no idea of a philosophic school without philosophic
literature, because it was itself accustomed to get its
science from books. Moreover, the internal evidence
of most of these reputed Pythagorean fragments is
strongly against their authenticity. The greater num-
ber of the fragments of Philolaus indeed, as Böckh has
shown in his excellent monograph," must certainly be
considered genuine, not merely on the score of external
testimony, but also, and far more because in content
and mode of expression they agree with one another,
and are in harmony with all that we know from well
authenticated sources as Pythagorean ; there is only
one passage of any importance in a philosophic point of
view to which we must make an exception.” On the
oraúrats')eveafs érôvoúðels öväevi pat- Seiner Werke, 1819. Cf. also
veral rôv IIv6ayopetov Šmouvnudºtov
trepire revX&s ºrpo ris biXoAdov #Al-
kfas, &AA’ of ros trpátos ééâveyke rô.
6pvXočueva raûta Tpía 88Aſa.
* Philolaus des Pythagoreer's
Lehren, nebst den Bruchsticken
Preller, Philol. ; Allg. Encykl. won
Ersch und Gruber, sect. iii., vol.
xxiii. 370 sq.
* Since the above was first
written, the genuineness of these
fragments of Philolaus, already de-
PHILOLA US.
315
ied by Rose; Arist. libr. ord. p. 2,
as been warmly contested by
chaarschmidt (Die angebliche
Xchriftstellerei des Philolaus, 1864),
nd the work to which they belonged
as been assigned to the first, or
t earliest, the second century be-
ore Christ. Though I adhere to
y original opinion respecting
hem, I cannot fully expound my
easons for it in this place, but
ill merely indicate the chief
oints. To begin with, as regards
he tradition concerning the writing
f Philolaus, the existence of a
work under that name is presup-
posed by Hermippus (ap. Diog. viii.
85) and Satyrus (ibid. iii. 9) about
200 B.C., for they tell us that
Plato bought the work of Philo-
laus, and copied his Timaeus from
it. Both speak of this work as
well known, and it is difficult to
see how, if it did not exist, the
statement could have arisen. Be-
sides, Hermippus borrowed the as-
sertion from an older writer.
Already about 240 B.C. the book
was known to Neanthes, as is
shown by the statement of this
author in Diog. viii. 55, that up to
the time of Philolaus and Empe-
docles the Pythagoreans admitted
everyone to their instructions, but
that when Empedocles had made
known their doctrines in his poem,
they resolved never to impart them
to any other poet. The design of
Neanthes in this story can only be
to couple Philolaus with Empedo-
cles as one of the first Pythagorean
writers; not (as Schaarschmidt, p.
76 thinks) to account for the in-
troduction of esoteric doctrines by
the oral teaching of Philolaus;
Philolaus in that teaching, accord-
ing to Neanthes himself, only did
ther hand, according to the above quotations, there
what everyone else had done up to
that time. Diogenes, it is true,
afterwards speaks of Empedocles
alone, and of the exclusion of
poets; but he cannot legitimately
conclude from this that Neanthes
‘did not know as yet of any work
written by Philolaus.’ Diogenes
makes this observation in his bio-
graphy of Empedocles; he may
perhaps have adopted from Nean-
thes only what concerned his sub-
ject. Or again, Neanthes may
have merely mentioned the prohi-
bition to which Empedocles, as the
first of the so-called Pythagorean
writers, had given rise. According
to these authorities, too, we must
refer the well-known verses of
Timon. ap. Gell. N. A. iii. 17, to
the work of Philolaus; for it is
hardly conceivable that they should
relate to no particular work, but
to any Pythagorean book whatso-
ever (Schaarschmidt, 75). It is
true that Philolaus is never men-
tioned by Aristotle, though a word
is quoted from him in Eth. Eud. ii.
8, 1225 a, 33 ; and Plato in the
Timaeus places his physical theories,
not in the mouth of Philolaus, but
of a Pythagorean otherwise un-
known. But Plato had every rea-
son to do this, supposing there
existed a writing of Philolaus
which would immediately have ex-
hibited the great difference of his
physical doctrines from those of
the Pythagoreans. And with re-
gard to Aristotle, though it is im-
possible that he can have derived
his numerous and minute state-
ments about the Pythagorean doc-
trines merely from oral tradition,
yet he never mentions his authori-
ties; just as elsewhere he quotes
much from the ancient philosophers








316
THE PPTHAGO REANS,
can be mo question as to the
without saying whence he gets it.
We cannot, therefore, argue from
his silence respecting Philolaus,
that no work of his was known
to him. On the other hand, if
we compare Metaph. i. 5, 986 b,
2 sqq. with the fragment of Phi-
lolaus in Stob. Ecl. i. 454 sq.
(vide infra, 371, 2); Metaph. xiii.
6, 1080 b, 20; xiv. 3, 1091 a, 13
sq., with Stob. i. 468; Metaph. i.
5, 985, b, 29 sq. with the fragment
in Iambl. Theol. Arithm. p. 56, 22
(vide infra, § iii.), it will appear
very probable that Aristotle in
these passages is referring to the
work of Philolaus ; and considering
the scanty number of the fragments
we possess, it is not surprising that
further proofs are not forthcoming.
(For other details, cf. Zeller, Aris-
toteles wºnd Philolaos. Hermes. x.
178 sq.) Xenocrates, too, accord-
ing to Iambl. Theol. Arithm. p. 61
sq., occupied himself greatly with
the writings of Philolaus; and if
this evidence is not quite unim-
peachable, yet it has in its favour
that Xenocrates agrees with Phi-
lolaus in his doctrine of aether (vide
Part ii. a, 809, 1). We meet with
the same theory in the Platonic
Epinomis (vide loc. cit. 894, 2), but
there also (977 D, sqq.) there seem
to be echoes of Philolaus (ap. Stob.
i. 8, infra, 371, 1). The external
evidence, however, is decidedly in
favour of the supposition that Phi-
lolaus really composed the writing
attributed to him, and that we
have received from tradition genu-
ine remnants of it. In his judg-
ment of the fragments themselves,
I cannot agree with Schaarschmidt,
as he assigns them all, without ex-
ception, to the same author; and
on this presupposition easily de-
spuriousness of the writing
rives arguments from some agains
others; whereas the question o
identity of authorship was the ver
first he should have determined
I, for my part, consider the interva
so great between the fragment i
Stobaeus, Eel. i. 420 (vide infra),
and the large majority of the rest,
both in form and content, that
could not ascribe all to the same
author unless I called them all
alike unauthentic. Schaarschmidt
himself calls attention to the fact
that the utterances of this frag-
ment about the world-soul are in
contradiction to the doctrine of the
central fire elsewhere attributed
to Philolaus. It further appears
to me that, as he has not sufficiently
discriminated between the various
fragments, neither has he done sobe-
tween the fragments of Philolaus's
work, and the accounts given us of
that work. He attributes (p. 37) to
the ‘fragmentist’ the Stoic hyewo-
vuköv, and the Platonic Demiurgus
in the text, Stob. Ecl. i. 452, as
well as (p. 30) the expressions,
eixtkptveta rôv orouxetov, pixoperd-
Boxos yéveals, ibid. 488; whereas
the author whom Stobaeus follows
may in this case, as in many others,
have applied to ancient doctrines
the language and conceptions of
later times. On page 38 the con-
clusion drawn by Athenagoras
(Suppl. 6), from a quite indefinite
expression of Philolaus (the Unity
and Immateriality of God), is
treated as the saying of the so-
called Philolaus himself. On page
53 “Philolaus' is said to speak
in Stob. Ecl. i. 530, of a triple
sum ; though the narrator clearly
distinguishes his own remark
‘ that, according to Philolaus,
there was in some sort a triple

PHILOLA US.
317
ttributed to Pythagoras; and the scattered fragments
un,’ from what Philolaus actually
aid ; and he afterwards directly
scribes two suns to Empedocles.
here may indeed be found in the
tatements of writers like Stobaeus,
seudo-Plutarch, Censorinus, and
Boethius about Philolaus, many
inaccuracies, lacunae, and uncer-
tainties; but we ought not to
consider this (as Schaarschmidt
does, e.g. p. 53 sq., 55 sq. 72) a
proof of the spuriousness of the
writings which they are describing,
for their statements have very
often the same defects in cases
where they can be confirmed by
more trustworthy evidence. But
Schaarschmidt seems to me not
seldom to raise objections which
can only be based on an incorrect
view of the passages and doctrines
in question. He says, for instance
(p. 32 sqq.), that the passage in
Stob. Ecl. i. 360 contradicts the
statement of Aristotle (De Coelo,
ii. 2, 285 a, 10), that the Pytha-
goreans assumed only a right and
a left in the world, and not an
above and a below, a before and a
behind; but this latter statement
is explained by another from the
work on the Pythagoreans (Schol. in
Arist. 492 b, 39), which even, were
it spurious, we could scarcely as-
sign to a period so recent as the
Neo-Pythagorean. The Pythago-
reans (we there read) admitted no
above and below in the ordinary
and proper sense, because they
identified the above with the left
side of the world, and the below
with the right; and at the same
time the above with the circumfe-
rence, and the below with the
centre. This last conception seems
to be precisely the meaning of the
mutilated passage in Stobaeus; it
resolves the opposition of the
above and the below into that of
the outward and inward. Schaar-
Schmidt (p. 38) also finds it incon-
ceivable that Philolaus should have
called the Central fire, to rpátov
ăpuoq8&v to Év (vide infra), but he
might have understood it by the
help of Aristotle, who equally
speaks of the forming of the év
with reference to the central fire;
and according to him, it was a re-
cognised theory that the number
One arose from the odd and the
even. Nor can we with Schaar-
Schmidt (p. 65) consider it un-
Pythagorean that the Štreipov and
Trepaivov should be distinguished
from the éptuov and reptororów ; for
we find the same thing in the table
of contraries (Arist. Metaph. i. 5,
986 a, 23). To pass over other
instances, Schaarschmidt (p. 47
Sqq.) cannot admit that the five
elements of Philolaus belong to the
ancient Pythagorean doctrine: 1st,
because the Pythagoreans (he says),
according to Aristotle, admitted no
material element; 2, because Em-
pedocles was the first to teach the
doctrine of the four elements; and
3, because Aristotle was the first
who added to these, as a fifth ele-
ment, aether. All three of these
reasons I dispute. First, the Py-
thagoreans no doubt put numbers
in the place of material substances
as the ultimate ground of things ;
but certain Pythagoreans, for ex-
ample Philolaus, may nevertheless
have sought to explain more pre-
cisely how things arise from num-
bers, by reducing the qualitative
fundamental difference of bodies
to the difference of form in their
constituent atoms. Plato does
this from a similar standpoint.
3}8
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
of these which have come down to us, both in respec
The Pythagorean doctrine does not
assert that there are no bodies, but
only that bodies are something de-
rived. Second, in regard to Em-
pedocles, that philosopher was un-
questionably some decads anterior
to Philolaus; why then may not
his theory of the elements (as I
suggested in my second edition,
p. 298 sq., 508 sq.) have given rise
to the theory of Philolaus? Third,
it cannot be proved that Aristotle
first taught the existence of a fifth
element, though it played an im-
portant part in his doctrine. The
origin of this idea is evidently Py-
thagorean. AEther is admitted by
all the philosophers of the older
Academy, who retrograded from
Platonism to Pythagoreism; in the
Epinomis, and by Speusippus, by
Xenocrates, and by Plato himself
at the end of his life (Part ii. a,
809, 1 ; 860, l; 876, 1 ; 894, 2,
2nd ed.). For all these reasons,
I can only agree with Schaar-
schmidt's conclusions to a very
limited extent. No doubt the
Philolaic fragments have not been
transmitted to us free from adulte-
ration. I have already (pp. 269,
305, 2nd ed.) questioned the value
of the fragment of the repl (buxās,
given ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 420 sq. I
have also expressed my doubts
(Ibid. 271, 4, 6; 247, 3) of the mono-
theistic sentence cited by Philo,
Mundi Opif 23 A, and of the
saying in Iamblichus, in Nicol.
Arithm. 11. Of the other frag-
ments, what is quoted in the third
edition of this work, p. 387, from
Theol. Arithm. 22, may perhaps
most readily cause hesitation. But
such a reflection does not seem
impossible at a period when the
conception of vows had already been
discovered by Anaxagoras;
especially as we find Aristotl
(Metaph. i. 5, 985 b, 30) nami
woos and puxh among the thing
which were reduced by the Pytha
goreans to particular numbers
while, on the other hand, it i
deserving of note, that the Platoni
and Aristotelian theory of th
multiplicity of the parts of th
soul which was known to other so
called Pythagoreans (vide Par
iii. b, 120, 2nd ed.) is absent fro
this fragment; the difference
which exist between the phe-
nomena of life and those of the
soul are here directly connected
with the corporeal organs. The
same argument tells in favour of
the genuineness of most of these
fragments. The influence of the
Platonic and Aristotelian philo-
sophy, which is so unmistakeable
in all pseudo-Pythagorean writings,
is not perceptible in them. We
find much that is fantastic and
strange to us (for instance, the nu-
merical symbolism, vide p. 337,
third edition), but nothing that is
distinctive of later Pythagoreism,
such as the opposition of form
and substance, spirit and matter,
the transcendant conception of
God, the eternity of the world,
the astronomy of Plato and Aris-
totle, the world-soul and the de-
veloped physics of the Timaeus.
The tone and exposition (apart
from certain particulars which are
to be placed to the account of later
expositions) entirely accord with
the conception we should naturally
form of the language of a Pytha-
gorean in the time of Socrates; it
also contains things which can
scarcely be ascribed to a more re-
cent author, such as the distribu-










PYTHAGO REAW WRITINGS. 319
to their form and content," can only serve to strengthen
our suspicion. Opinions are likewise unanimous as
to the spuriousness of the treatise on the World-soul,
attributed to Timaeus of Locris, but obviously an extract
from the Timaeus of Plato. The demonstration of Ten-
nemann” in regard to this is amply sufficient. As to
Ocellus of Lucania, and his work on the universe, the
only question can be whether or not the work itself
claims to be of ancient Pythagorean origin; for that it
is not, is perfectly evident. Its latest editor, however,
rightly maintains that the work claims for its author
the so-called Pythagorean, to whom ancient writers with
one accord” ascribe it, whenever they mention it at all.
Of the other relics of the Pythagorean School, the most
important are the works of Archytas; but after all that
has been said on this subject in modern times," my
tion of chords (discussed by Böckh.
Philol. 70), for which, according to
Nicom. Harm. i. p. 9, Meib., Pytha-
goras had already substituted the
octachord. Schaarschmidt's judg-
ment on the Philolaic fragments is
endorsed by Ueberweg, Grundr. i.
47, 50, by Thilo, Gesch. d. Phil. i.
57, and Rothenbücher, System der
Pyth. mach den Angaben des Arist.
(Berlin, 1867). Rothenbücher
seeks to establish his opinion by
a criticism of the fragment, ap.
Stob. Ecl. i. 454. I cannot, how-
ever, at present enter upon the
discussion of this criticism, as there
will be opportunity for replying to
its chief allegations later on.
* The fragments are mostly
Doric, but Pythagoras no doubt
spoke the Ionic dialect of his na-
tive city, where he had lived up to
the period of his manhood.
* System der Plat. Phil. i. 93
sqq.; cf. the further proof given
by Hermann, Gesch. wind Syst. der
Plat. Phil. i. 701 sq.
* Mullach, Aristot. de Melisso
&c.; et Ocell; Luc. De univ. nat.
(1845), p. 20 sqq.; Fragm. Philos.
i. 383; cf. Part iii. b, pp. 83, 99
115, second edition.
* Ritter, Gesch. der Pyth. Phil.
67 sqq.; Gesch. der Phil. i. 377;
and Hartenstein, De Archytae Ta-
rentini Fragm. (Leipzig, 1833)—
both, especially Ritter, discard the
greater number of the fragments,
and these the most important from
a philosophic point of view. Eggers
(De Archytae Tar. Vita Opp. et
Phil., Paris, 1833); Petersen
(Zeitschrift für Alterthumsw. 1836,
873 sqq.); Beckmann (De Pythag.
Reliquiis); and Chaignet (loc. cit.
i. 191 sqq., 255 sqq.) recognise the
greater number. Gruppe (iber die
Fragm, des Archytas) repudiates

320 THE PYTHIAGOREA.N.S.
judgment is still that among the numerous longer or
shorter fragments attributed to him, by far the greater
number have preponderating evidence against them ;
and those which may be considered authentic can add
little to our knowledge of the Pythagorean philosophy
as a whole, belonging as they do chiefly to mathematics,
or other specific branches of enquiry." This judgment
is not to be set aside by the fact that Petersen,” in
order to explain the undeniably Platonic element in
the so-called books of Archytas, regards him as having
anticipated the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, and Beck-
mann” makes him out in this respect a disciple of
Plato; for not a single ancient authority alludes to
this pretended Platonism of Archytas. Where the rela-
tion between Plato and Archytas is mentioned, we hear
only of a personal relation, or a scientific intercourse
which would by no means involve a similarity in philo-
sophic theories.” On the contrary, where the philo-
all without exception ; and Mul-
lach (Fr. Phil. Gr. ii. 16 sq.)
thinks it probable that we possess
next to nothing of Archytas. Cf.
Beckmann, p. 1.
1. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. viii. 2
g, E, ; and Eudemus, ap. Simpl.
Phys. 98 b, 108 a ; , Ptolemaeus,
Harm. i. 13; and Porphyry, in Ptol.
Harm. p. 236 sq., 257, 267, 269,
277, 280, 310, 313, 315; cf. Part
iii. b, 91, second edition.
2 Loc. cit. 884, 890.
3 Loc. cit. 16 Sqq. Similarly
Chaignet, i. 208.
* This, strictly speaking, is
true of the two pieces of evidence
on which Beckmann (p. 17 sq.) relies
so much, namely that of Eratos-
thenes (ap. Eutoc, in Archimed. De
Sphaera et Cyl. ii. 2, p. 144 Ox.
quoted by Gruppe, p. 120) to the
effect that of the mathematicians
of the Academy (robs trapö tä
IIAárovi év 'Akaënufg yeagérpas)
Archytas and Eudoxus were the
two who solved the Delian pro-
blem ; and that of the Pseudo-De-
mosthenes (Amator. p. 1415), who
says that Archytas was previously
held in contempt by his country-
men, but acquired his honourable
reputation in consequence of his
connection with Plato. The first
of these statements is given by
Eratosthenes himself as a mere
legend; and the second has proba-
bly about as much historical foun-
dation as another assertion in the
same work: that Pericles became
the great statesman he was, through
the teaching of Anaxagoras.
ARCHIVTAS. 321
sophic opinions of Archytas are spoken of, he is always
described as a Pythagorean, and that not only by the
more recent writers subsequent to Cicero's time,' but
even as early as Aristoxenus,” whose acquaintance with
the later Pythagoreans is beyond question; indeed
Archytas clearly calls himself a Pythagorean,” in a
fragment the authenticity of which can scarcely be
disputed." It is true that the School of Archytas is
also mentiomed as an independent school,” but that
does not disprove our thesis. This school is as much a
Pythagorean school as that of Xenocrates is Platonic,
or that of Theophrastus Peripatetic. If, however,
Archytas was a Pythagorean, he cannot have been at
the same time an adherent of the doctrine of Ideas;
* Among these Beckmann (p.
16) cites the following: Cic. De
Orat. iii. 34, 139 (a passage which
is remarkable, because while agree-
ing in other respects with the above
mentioned testimony of the Pseudo-
Demosthenes, it makes Philolaus,
instead of Plato, the instructor of
Archytas; we must read with
Orelli, Philolaus Archytam, and
not Philolaum Archytas). Ibid. Fin.
v. 29, 87; Rep. i. 10; Valer. Max.
iv. 1, ext, ; vii. 7, 3, ext. ; Apul.
Dogm. Plat. i. 3, p. 178, Hild. ;
Diog. viii. 79; Hieron. Epist. 53,
T. 1, 268, Mart. Olympiodor. V.
Plato, p. 3, Westerm. To these
may be added, besides Iamblichus,
Ptolemaeus, Harm. i. c. 13 sq.
* Diog. viii. 82: yeyóvari 5’
'Apx.jrat Tétrapes . . . Tov če IIv6a-
yopulcov Aptoráčevös pmat umöétrore
atparnyolovra iittmbival. Beck-
mann's doubt of this passage is
unfounded. Cf. also Diog. 79. We
should beinclined to read’Apx|rtrov
for 'Apxörov in the text of Iambli-
WOL. I.
chus, V. P. p. 251 (of 5& Aourol
Töv IIv0aºyopetov &tégºrmoſav Tijs
'Itaxias TAhv’Apxºtou roi, Tapavrf-
vov), for in the time of Archytas
there was no longer any necessity
for the Pythagoreans to flee from
Italy; the passage is, however, so
mutilated, that we cannot even
discover the connection in which
the statement occurred in Aristox-
€IlllS.
* Cf. Part ii. b, 711 sq., and
£nfra, p. 364, 4. Stob. Floril. 101,
4, calls him a Pythagorean, Suidas
'Aptoráč., more precisely, a pupil of
Xenophilus, the Pythagorean.
* According to Porph. in Pto-
lem. Harm. p. 236, his work,
trepl waſ nuatukis, began with these
words: kaxós uot Sokoúvri [sc. oi
IIv6ayópezoil to repl rà ua6%uata
ôtayvóvas' kal oë6èv &rotrov, Öp6ós
airot's trepi čkaarov 9eapeſv repl
ºyàp Tâs róv 3Awy pāorios épôās
8tayvávres éueAAov kai repl rôv karū.
piépos oia èvrl & headai.
* Wide Beckmann, p. 23.
Y
322 THE PIV THAGOREA.N.S.
for it is not merely impossible to prove' that this
doctrine was known to the Pythagoreans, but Aristotle's
evidence is most distinctly to the contrary.” Since
therefore in the fragments of the so-called Archytas we
encounter Platonic as well as Peripatetic doctrines and
expressions, we must consider these a sure sign of a
later origin, and consequently reject by far the greater
number of the fragments. Even supposing the modern
case for their defence were successful, they could not be
regarded as records of the Pythagorean doctrines; for
if they can only be rescued by making their author a
Platonist, we cannot be sure in any given case how far
they reproduce the Pythagorean point of view.
A contemporary of Archytas, Lysis the Tarentine,
has latterly been conjectured by Mullach” to be the
author of the so-called Golden Poem ; but the corrupt
passage in Diogenes viii. 6 “is no evidence for this, and
the work itself is so colourless and disconnected, that it
looks rather like a later collection of practical precepts,
some of which had perhaps been long in circulation in
a metrical form.” In any case, however, it does not
* Plato's utterances in the So- * In his edition of Hierocles,
phist, 246 sqq. cannot, as Petersen p. 20; Fragm. Philos. i. 413.
(loc. cit.) and Mallet (Ecole de * yéyparrat 8& ré IIv6ayáog

Mégare, liil, sq) believe, relate to
the later Pythagoreans (cf. ii. a.
215 sq.), and the polemic of Aris-
totle's Metaphysics against a num-
ber-theory bound up with thc
doctrines of Ideas is directed not
against Pythagoreans, but the va-
rious branches of the Academy.
* Metaph. i. 6, 987 b, 7, 27
sqq.; cf. c. 9, beginning; xiii. 6,
1080 b, 16, c. 8, 1083 b, 8; xiv.
3, 1090 a, 20; Phys. iii. 4, 203
a, 3.
orvyypſippiata tpia, traidevruköv, troAi-
Tuköv, purikóv' to 8& pepópevov čs
IIv6ayópov Aëotáðs éori rod Tapav-
Tívov.
* As is certainly true of the
well-known Pythagorean oath, v.
47 sq., which is generally con-
sidered as the property of the whole
school, and, according to Iambl.
Theol. Arithm. p. 20, is also to be
met with in Empedocles (cf. Ast.
in Theol. Arithm. and Mullach,
notes on the golden poem, loc. cit.);
P}"THAGOREAN FRAGMENTS. 3:33
4 *
materially contribute to our knowledge of the Pytha-
gorean philosophy.
In regard to the remaining fragments, with few
and unimportant exceptions, those which bear the names
of well-known ancient Pythagoreans, such as Theano,
Brontinus, Clinias, and Ecphantus, are certainly spur-
ious. Most of them, however, are attributed to men
of whom we either know nothing at all, or are ignorant
when they lived. But as these fragments precisely
resemble the rest in their content and exposition, we
cannot doubt that they too claim to be of ancient
Pythagorean origin. If they have no such origin, they
must be considered deliberate forgeries, and not the
genuine productions of a later Pythagoreamism approxi-
mating to the Platonic or Peripatetic philosophy.
Moreover, the later Pythagoreanism which professes to
be older than Neo-Pythagoreanism, has been altogether
derived from these fragments, whereas all historical evi-
dence agrees that the latest ramifications of the ancient
Pythagorean School do not extend beyond the time of
Aristotle. In truth, few or no elements of ancient
Pythagoreanism are to be found in these numerous
passages. Of these fragments and of the other vestiges
of Pythagoreanism, so much as claims our attention
from a philosophic point of view will be treated further
on; we shall also discuss more at length the fragments
we possess of the writings of certain philosophers whose
relation to Pythagoras is not quite ascertained, such as
Hippasus and Alcmaeon.
the same may probably hold good it, ap A. Gell, vi. 2, proves nothing
of v. 54. Consequently the quota- in regard to the age of the poem.
tion which Chrysippus makes from
Y 2
PYTHIAGORAS.
II. PYTHAGORAS AND THE PYTHAGOREANS.
CoNSIDERING the number of traditions in existence
respecting the founder of the Pythagorean school, the
amount which can be relied on with any historical
probability, when separated from the labyrinth of un-
certain legends and later conjectures, is very small.
We know that his father's name was Mnesarchus,” that
Samos was his home and doubtless also his birthplace;”
* Heracleitus, ap. Diog. viii.
6, Herodotus, iv. 95, and most of
the other authorities. The name,
Marmacus, given to him, according
to Diog. viii. 1, by several writers,
is perhaps founded merely on a
scriptural error. Justin (xx. 4)
calls him Demaratus, which is
most likely also founded on scne
confusion or another.
* He is called a Samian by
Hermippus (ap. Diog. viii. 1), by
Hippobotus (Clem. Strom. i. 300,
D), and by later writers almost
without exception; Iamblichus
(V. P. 4) mentions the statement
that both his parents were descend-
ed from Ancaeus, the founder of
Samos; Apollonius. however (ap.
Porph. V. P. 2), asserts this of his
mother only. His Samian origin
may be reconciled with the state-
ments that he was a Tyrrhenian
(vide Aristoxenus, Aristarchus,
and Theopompus, ap. Clement. and
Diogenem, loc. cit.; the similar
passage in Theodoret, Gr. aff, cur.
i. 24, S, 7, together with Eus. Pr.
Ev. x. 4, 13, is taken from that
of Clemens; Diodor. Fragm. p.
554 Wess.) or a Phliasian (anony-
mous writer cited by Porph. Pyth.
p. 5); if we suppose with O. Mül-
ler (Geschichte der hell. St. u. St.
ii. b, 393) and Krische (De Societ.
a Pyth. conditæ Scopo politico, p. 3,
etc.) that he came of a Tyrrheno-
Pelasgic family, which had emi-
grated from Phlius to Samos.
Pausanias (ii. 13, 1 sq.) actually
relates as a Phlian legend that
Hippasus, the great grandfather of
Pythagoras, went from Phlius to
Samos, and this is confirmed by
Diog. L. viii. 1; in the fabulous
tale of Ant. Diogenes, ap. Porph.
V. P. 10, and in the better attested
statement, ibid. 2, Mnesarchus is
spoken of as a Tyrrhenian who had
emigrated from his home. On the
other hand, the statement in Plut.
Qu. Conv. viii. 7, 2, that he was an
Etruscan by birth is evidently a
mistake, as also the opinion (ap.
Porph. 5) that he originally came
from Metapontum ; Neanthes (in-
stead of which our text of Por-
phyry, as we have seen, gives Cle-
anthes) ap. Porph. V. P. 1, makes
Mnesarchus a Tyrian, who, on ac-
count of his services at Samos,
received the right of citizenship
there (Clemens and Theod. loc. cit.
say incorrectly that he asserted
Pythagoras himself to have been a
Tyrian or a Syrian); but the state-
ment is of little consequence, since
it may be explained partly by a
HIS DATE.
325
but the time of his birth, death, and removal to Italy
can only be approximately determined; "'the statements
confusion of Túpios and Tufiñmvös,
and partly from an attempt to ac-
count for the supposed oriental
wisdom of the philosopher by his
extraction. Probably in reference
to this story, Iamblichus, V. P. 7,
represents him as having been born
during a journey of his parents to
Sidon. The well-known story of
Heracleides of Pontus, and of Sosi-
crates (ap. Cic. Tusc. v. 3, 8 ; Diog.
i. 12; viii. 8 ; cf. Nicom. Arithm.
sub. init.) about Pythagoras' con-
versation with the tyrant Leo of
Phlius, in which he declared him-
self to be a pixóoroqos, points to a
connection with Phlius.
1 The calculations of Dodwell
and Bentley, the former of whom
places his birth in Ol. 52, 3, and
the latter in Ol. 43, 4, have been
sufficiently refuted by Krische, loc.
cit. p. 1, and Brandis, i. 422. The
usual opinion now is that Pytha-
goras was born about the 49th
Olympiad, that he came to Italy
about the 59th or 60th, and died
in the 69th. This is no doubt ap-
proximately correct, and greater
exactitude cannot be attained;
even the statements of the ancients
are probably based only upon un-
certain estimates, and not upon
distinct chronological traditions.
According to Cicero, Rep. ii. 15;
cf. Tusc. i. 16, 38; iv. 1, 2; A.
Gell. xvii. 21 ; Iambl. V. P. 35,
Pythagoras came to Italy in the
62nd Olympiad, the fourth year of
Tarquinius Superbus (532 B.C.),
whereas. Liv. i. 18, represents him
as teaching there under Servius
Tullius. Others, doubtless after
Apollodorus, name the 62nd Ol. as
the period in which he flourished
(so Clem. Strom. i. 302 B, 332 A.;
Tatian, Con. Graec. c. 41; Cyrill.
in Jul. i. 13 A ; Euseb. Chron.
Arm. T. ii. 201, vide Krische, p.
11). Diodorus (loc. cit.) even gives
Ol. 61, 4, and Diogenes, viii. 45, Ol.
60. Both statements are probably
founded on the assertion of Aris-
toxenus, who, following Porphyry
9, makes Pythagoras emigrate to
Italy in his fortieth year, to escape
from the tyranny of Polycrates.
According to the date assigned to
the commencement of the tyranny,
the former or the latter date was
fixed for Pythagoras (cf. Rohde,
Quellen des Iambl. in his Biogr. des
Pyth. ; Rhein. Mus. xxvi. 568 sq.;
Diels, Ub. Apollodor's Chronika, ibid.
xxxi. 25 sq.). If the fortieth year
of the philosopher's life be placed
in Ol. 62, 1, we get Ol. 52, 1 as
the date of his birth (572 B.C.);
this would agree with the text of
Eusebius, Chron., which states that
he died in the Ol. 40, 4 (497 B.C.),
if we suppose him to have attained
his 75th year (Anon. ap. Syncell.
Chron. 247 c.). The traditions as
to the length of his life vary exceed-
ingly. Heracleides Lembus (ap.Diog.
viii. 44) gives it as 80 years (which
may have been derived from Diog.
viii. 10); but most writers, follow-
ing Diog. 44, have 90: Tzetz. Chil.
xi. 93, and Sync. loc. cit., say 99;
Iamblichus (265) nearly 100 ; the
biographer, ap. Phot. (Cod. 249, p.
438 b, Bekk.) 104; a Pseudo-Py-
thagorean, ap. Galen. (Rem. Parah.
T. xiv. 567 K) 117, or more. If
Pythagoras (as asserted by Iambl.
265) was at the head of his school,
for 39 years, and if his arrival in
Italy occurred in 532 B.C., his death
must have occurred in 493 B.C., and
supposing him to have been 56
326
PYTHAGORAS.
of the ancients as to his teachers seem almost entirely
(Iambl. 19) when he came into
Italy, we should get 588 as the
year of his birth. If, on the other
hand (Iambl. 255), the attack on
his school, which he is said not to
have survived very long (vide infra
p. 282, 1, third edition), be brought
into direct connection with the
destruction of Sybaris (510 B.C.),
his death must have taken place in
the sixth century. Lastly, Antilo-
chus in Clem. Strom. i. 309 B.
places the #xurcía of Pythagoras
(not his birth as Brandis, i. 424,
says) 312 years earlier than the
death of Epicurus, which, according
to Diog. x. 15, happened in Ol.
127, 2; this would bring us to Ol.
49. 2, and the philosopher's birth
must be put back to the beginning
of the sixth century. We are ta-
ken still farther back by Pliny,
who, according to the best attested
reading of Hist. Nat. ii. 8, 37, as-
signs an astronomical discovery of
Pythagoras to the 42nd Olympiad,
or the 142nd year of the City;
while, on the contrary, his abbre-
viator, Solinus, c. 17, says that
Pythagoras first came to Italy
during the consulate of Brutus,
therefore A. U. C. 244–5, or 510
B C. Röth (p. 287 sq.) combines
with this last statement the asser-
tion of Iambl. (V. P. 11, 19) that
|Pythagoras left Samos at the age
of eighteen, received instruction
from Pherecydes, Thales, and
Anaximander; was 22 years in
Egypt, and after its conquest by
Cambyses (525 B.C.), 12 more in
Babylon; and at the age of 56
again returned to Samos. Conse-
quently he places his birth in 569
B.C.; his return to Samos in 513
B.C.; his arrival in Italy in 510;
and his death in 470. But these
statements are entirely destitute of
evidence. Röth supposes that
Iamblichus may have borrowed
them from Apollonius (of Tyana),
but even if this were true, we must
still ask where Apollonius obtained
them? There is no mention even
of the so-called Crotonian memoirs
on which Apollonius (ap. Iambl.
262) founds his narrative of the
expulsion of the Pythagoreans
from Croton. This narrative,
however, cannot be reconciled with
Röth's calculation, as it makes the
residence of Pythagoras in Croton
precede the destruction of Sybaris
(Iambl. 255). Now it is true that
his death must be put back at least
to 470 B.C.. if, as Dicaearchus and
others maintain (vide infra), the
attack on the Crotonian Pythago-
reans, from which Lysis and Ar-
chippus alone are said to have es-
caped, took place in the lifetime of
Pythagoras; nay, in that case, we
must even allow 18 or 20 years
more; for the birth of Lysis, as we
shall find, can scarcely have oc-
curred before 470. The only in-
ference from this, however, is that
the statement must be discarded ;
that Dicaearchus does not here de-
serve the credit of trustworthiness
which Porphyry (V. P. 56) accords
to him ; and that no thoughtful
critic could regard this judgment
of Porphyry's as decisive in favour
of the narrative of Dicaearchus.
Pythagoras cannot have lived to the
year 470 B c.: this is evident from
the manner in which he is spoken of
by Xenophanes and Heracleitus,
both of whom are before that date
(vide infra, p. 381, 1, third edition,
283, 3); their expressions certainly
do not give us the impression of re-
lating to a person still alive. More-
HIS THEA. VELS.
327
destitute of any Secure historic foundation," and even
his connection with Pherecydes, which has in its
favour an old and respectable tradition,” is not quite
beyond a doubt.”
over, none of our authorities, except
Solinus, who is not to be depended
upon, place the arrival of Pytha-
goras in Italy later than Ol. 62.
For Iamblichus himself (that is to
say, Apollonius) does not intend this
(V. P. 19) when he says that he
first came there twelve years after
the conquest of Egypt by Cambyses
(therefore after 425 B.C. Even
Apollonius, ap. Iambl. 255, as al-
ready observed, makes him outlive
by very little the destruction of
Sybaris), but Iamblichus is too care-
less or too ignorant of claronologi-
cal matters to remark the contra-
diction into which his narrative
has fallen. It is clear, however,
that none of our informants had at
their command trustworthy and
exact chronological details as to
the life of Pythagoras. Perhaps,
indeed, all their statements were
inferred from a few notices, e.g.
concerning his migration in the time
of Polycrates, or the Pythagorean-
ism of Milo, the conqueror at the
Traës. We must, therefore, leave
it undecided whether and how long
the philosopher survived the end
of the sixth century.
* Diog. viii. 2, names Phere-
cydes and Hermodamas, a des-
cendant of the Homerid Creophy-
lus of Samos, and, according to
Iambl. 11, himself called Creophy-
lus. Neanthes (ap. Porph. 2, 11,
15) adds to these Anaximander,
Iamblichus (9, 11, 184, 252) Thales.
Instead of Thales, Apuleius (Floril.
ii. 15, p. 61, Hild.) names Epime-
mides, with whom, according to
Of his distant journeyings, which
Diog, viii. 3, Pythagoras was ac-
quainted. The Scholiast of Plato,
p. 420, Bekk. says that he first
attended Pherecydes' instructions,
then those of Hermodamas,
afterwards those of Abaris, the
Hyperborean (vide infra). Thus
it is plain that as time went
on, celebrated names continued
to be added to the list. Abaris
and Epimenides are, however,
also called disciples of Pythagoras
(Iambl. 135).
* Besides the text already
quoted, Diog. i. 118 sq.; viii. 40
(after Aristoxenus), Andron, and
Satyrus; the epitaph of which
Duris, ap. Diog. i. 120, speaks;
Cic. Tusc. i. 16, 38 ; De Div. i. 50,
112 ; Diodor. Fragm. p. 554; Ps.
Alex. in Metaph. 828 a, 19, Fr.
800, 24 Bon. &c.
* For in the first place it was
very natural that the thaumatur-
gist, Pythagoras, should have been
represented as the pupil of an older
contemporary of similar character,
who likewise held the dogma of
Transmigration; and secondly, the
accounts on the subject are not
agreed as to details. According to
Diog. viii. 2, Pythagoras was
brought to Pherecydes at Lesbos,
and after Pherecydes' death, handed
over to Hermodamas in Samos.
Iambl. 9, 11, says that he was
instructed by Pherecydes first in
Samos, and then in Syros. Por-
phyry (15, 56) says, following
Dicaearchus' and others, that he
tended his master, who was sick in
Delos, and buried him before his
328
PYTHAGORAS.
are said to have acquainted him with the wisdom and
religious ceremonies of the Phenicians,' the Chaldaeans,”
the Persian Magi,” the Hindoos, the Arabians,” the
departure to Italy; on the other
hand, Diodorus (loc. cit.), Diog. viii.
40, and Iambl. 184, 252, following
Satyrus and his epitomiser, Hera-
cleides, say that shortly before his
own death he went from Italy to
Delos for that purpose.
* According to Cleanthes (Ne-
anthes), in Porphyry, V. P. 1,
Pythagoras was brought as a boy
to Tyre by his father, and there
instructed by “the Chaldaeans.”
Iambl. V. P. 14, says that when he
left Samos on his great travels, he
first went to Sidon, and there met
with prophets, the descendants of
the ancient Mochus (vide supra, p.
48, and infra, chapter on the
Atomists, note 2), and other hiero-
phants ; that he visited Tyre,
Biblus, Carmel, &c., and was initi-
ated into all the mysteries of the
country. Porphyry (V. P. 6) is
more moderate; he merely states
that Pythagoras is said to have
gained his arithmetical knowledge
from the Phoenicians.
* According to Neanthes, Py-
thagoras had, when a boy, been
instructed by the Chaldaeans (vide
previous note). According to all
other testimony, he first came to
Babylon from Egypt, either of his
own accord, or as the prisoner of
Cambyses. This statement ap-
pears in its simplest form in Strabo,
xiv. i. 16, p. 638: IIv6ayópaviorto-
potow . . . . &meA6etu eis Atyvirrov
ical Bağvačva piñouafletas x&piv.
Clemens, Strom. 302 C, merely
says: XaAbatov rekal Mdywy roºs
ãptorous ovveyévero; Eus. Pr. Ev.
x. 4, 9 sq.; Antipho, ap. Diog. viii.
3; Schol. Plat. p. 420, Bekk.
Porph. 6 say that he learned as-
tronomy from the Chaldaeans. In
Justin xx. 4, he is said to have
travelled to Babylon and Egypt,
ad perdiscendos siderum motus ori-
ginemgue mund; spectandam. Apul.
Floril. ii. 15, states that he was
instructed by the Chaldaeans in
astronomy, astrology, and medicine.
According to Diogenes in the book
of Prodigies (ap. Porph. 11) he
1earned the interpretation of dreams
from the Chaldaeans and Hebrews
(or from the Hebrews only 2). In
Iambl. V. P. 19 ; Theol. Arithm.
p. 41, we are told that in the con-
quest of Egypt by Cambyses he
was carried as a prisoner to Baby-
lon, remained twelve years in that
city, where in his intercourse with
the Magi, he not only perfected
himself in mathematics and music,
but completely adopted their reli-
gious prescripts and practices.
That Iamblichus is here following
some older authority (Apollonius,
no doubt), is shown by the state-
ment of Apul. Floril. ii. 15. Many
maintain that Pythagoras was ta-
ken prisoner by Cambyses in his
Egyptian campaign, and was only
set at liberty a long time after by
Gillus the Crotonian ; and that in
consequence of this he had the
benefit of the instructions of the
Persian Magi, especially Zoroaster.
*. Pythagoras must early have
been brought into connection with
the Magi, and especially with Zo-
roaster, if what Hippolytus says is
true (Refut. Her, i. 2, p. 12 D);
cf. vi. 23: Atóðwpos 3& 6'Eperptees
a writer otherwise unknown) kal
'Aptoſtóševos 6 povo ticós part irpos
HIS TRAVELS.
329
Zapdrav Tov XaAbalov čAmAv6éval
IIv6ayópav; he imparted to Pytha-
goras his doctrine, which Hippoly-
tus proceeds to describe, but in a
very untrustworthy manner. This
statement of Hippolytus, how-
ever, is hardly sufficient to prove
that Aristoxenus asserted a per-
sonal acquaintance between Pytha-
goras and Zoroaster. He may,
perhaps, have observed the simi-
larity of the two doctrines, and
hazarded the conjecture that Py-
thagoras was acquainted with
Zoroaster; for there is no certainty
at all that Hippolytus himself
knew the work of Aristoxenus.
What he says about the Zoroas-
trian doctrines which Pythagoras
adopted cannot have been taken as
it stands from Aristoxenus, because
it presupposes the story about Py-
thagoras' prohibition of beans to
be true, while, as we shall presently
find, Aristoxenus expressly con-
tradicts it. Besides, the evidence
of Aristoxenus would merely prove
that even in his time similari.
ties had been discovered between
the Pythagorean and the Zoro-
astrian doctrine, then well known
in Greece (cf. Diog. Laërt. i. 8 sq.;
Damasc. De Princ. 125, p. 384, and
that these resemblances had been
explained after the manner of the
Greeks by the hypothesis of a
personal relation between the
two authors. Plutarch seems to
have derived his shorter state-
ment from the same source as
Hippolytus; there is, therefore, all
the less reason to doubt that here
too, as in Hippolytus, Zaratas ori-
ginally meant Zoroaster; supposing
even that Plutarch himself, who
(De Is. 46, p.369) makes Zoroaster
to have lived 5000 years before the
Trojan war, discriminated them.
Our most ancient authority for
this relationshipis Alexander(Poly-
histor), who, according to Clemens,
Strom. i. 304 B, said in his work
on the Pythagorean symbols: Na-
gap&rq, tº 'Agovpiq plaðm rejoral rov
IIv6ayópav. This Naçãparos is evi-
dently Zoroaster; if, indeed, Zapárg
ought not to be substituted. That
Pythagoras visited the Persian
Magi we are likewise told in Cic.
Fin. v. 29, 87 ; cf. Tusc. iv. 19,
44; Diog. viii. 3 (perhaps after
Antipho); Eus. Pr. Ev. x. 4; Cy-
rill. c. Jul. iv. 133 D; Schol. in
Plat. p. 420, Bekk.; Apul. (vide pre-
ceding note); Suidas, IIv6. Valer.
Max. viii. 7, 2, assert that he
learned astronomy and astrology
in Persia from the Magi. Anto-
nius Diogenes relates, ap. Por-
phyry, V. P. 12 (év toſs Štěp
©očAmv &triotous, the well-known
book of fables described by Phot.
Cod. 166, and treated not only by
Porphyry, but also by Röth, ii. a,
343, as a work of the highest au-
thenticity), that he met Zd 8paros in
Babylon, was purified by him from
the sins of his previous life, and in-
structed in the abstinences neces-
sary to piety, and in the nature
and reasons of things.
* Clem. Strom. i. 304 B: ákm-
kośval re trpos rotºrous Taxatóv Kal
Bpaxuávov Tov IIv6ayópav BoöAeral
(namely, Alexander in the work
quoted in the previous note); after
him, Eus. Pr. Ev. x. 4, 10; Apul.
Foril. ii. 10 : of the Brahmins
whom he visited, he learned qua
mentium documenta corportzmgue
eacercitamenta, quot partes animi,
quot vices vitae, quae Diis manibus
pro merito sui cuique tormenta vel
praemia. Philostr. V. Apoll. viii. 7,
44, says that the wisdom of Pytha-
goras was derived from the Egyp-
tian yupuwitat and the Indian sages
* Diog, in Porphyry, 11.
330
PYTHAGORAS.
Jews,' the Thracians,” the Druids of Gaul,” but above
* That Pythagoras borrowed
many of his doctrines from the
Jews is asserted by Aristobulus in
Eus. Pr. Ev. xiii. 12, 1, 3 (ix. 6, 3),
and the same is repeated by Joseph.
Con. Ap. i. 22, and Clem. Strom. v.
560 A (who thinks that the ac-
quaintance of Plato and Pythago-
ras with the Mosaic writings is
shown in their doctrines). Cyrill.
c. Jul. i. 29 D, Jos. appeals in Sup-
port of this to Hermippus, who, in
his work on Pythagoras, says:
raira ö’ étrpatte kal éAeye tas
'Iovöatav Kal Opalcóv Šáčas uplodge-
vos kal wetapépov eis éautów. He
had also said the same, as Origen,
c. Cels. i. 13, relates with the word
Aéyeral, év tá, trpátº trepl vouc0e-
Tôv, If even these authors derived
their statements from Aristobulus,
it is not certain that Hermippus
really expressed himself thus ; but
supposing he did so, it would only
prove that this Alexandrian sage,
of the early part of the second cen-
tury before Christ, had found the
assertion among the Alexandrian
Jews, and believed it; or else that
he had himself observed some
similarities between the Pythago-
rean and Jewish doctrines, and
had inferred from them that Py-
thagoras was acquainted with the
customs and doctrines of the Jews.
* Hermippus, ap. Jos., vide pre-
ceding note. This statement was
no doubt based upon the likeness
of the Pythagorean mysteries to
those of the Orphics, and especially
in their common doctrine of Trans-
migration. In consequence of
this likeness, Pythagoras was re-
presented as the pupil of the Thra-
cians; he had, it is said, received
his consecration from Aglaopha-
mus in Libethra; as the pseudo-
Pythagoras himself (not Telauges
as Röth ii. a, 357, b, 77, supposes)
says in the fragment of a ispos Aóryos
in Iambl. V. P. 146, cf. 151, and
following that authority, Procl. in
Tim. 289 B; Plat. Theol. i. 5, p. 13.
Conversely, in the legend of Zal-
moxis (ap. Herod. iv. 95, and
others after him, e.g. Ant. Diog.
ap. Phot. Cod. 166, p. 110 a ;
Strabo, vii. 3, 5; xvi. 2, 39, p. 297,
762; Hippolyt. vide next note),
the doctrine of immortality of the
Thracian Getae is derived from
Pythagoras.
* Surprising as this sounds, it
is undeniably asserted by Alex-
ander in the passage quoted p.
329, 4; and Röth (ii. a, 346) is
entirely on a wrong track when he
discovers in it a misunderstanding
of the statement that Pythagoras
met in Babylon with Indians and
Calatians (an Indian racementioned
in Herod. iii. 38, 97, who, being of
a dark colour, he calls also Ethio-
pians, c. 94, 101). The idea pro-
bably arose in this way. The
Pythagorean doctrine of Transmi-
gration was found, or supposed to
be found (vide Supra, p. 73,1), among
the Gauls, as every such simila-
larity was thought to be based
upon a relation of teacher and
taught, either Pythagoras was
made a disciple of the Gauls, as
by Alexander, or the Druids were
made disciples of the Pythagorean
philosophy, as by Diodorus and
Ammian (vide supra, 73, 1), into
which, according to Hippolyt.
Refut. har. i. 2, 9 E; ibid. c. 25,
they were regularly initiated by
Zamolxis. Iambl. (151) says also
that Pythagoras was instructed by
the Celts, and even by the Ibe-
rians.

HIS TRA VELS.
331
ll with the mysteries of the Egyptians'—even the
ourney to Egypt, though this is comparatively the
est attested and finds supporters” among quite recent
| The first known author who
peaks of Pythagoras being in
gyptis Isocrates, Bus. 11 : 5s (IIv6.)
&qikówevos eis Aiyvirtov kal uaffnths
éketvav yewóuevos tív T' &AAmv pixo-
oropſav irpáros eis toūs"EAAmvas €kó-
puge, kal Tô trepl r&s 6vorías kai Tàs
&yia retas rās év roſs ispots truq'avéo-
repov táv &AAwy €atroëacrew. The
next testimony, Cic. Fin. v. 29, 87,
merely says AEgyptum lustravit;
similarly Strabo (vide Supra, 328,1);
Justin, Hist. xx. 4; Schol. in Plato,
p. 420, Bekk.; Diodorus, i. 96, 98,
learned much more from the state-
ments of the Egyptian priests, said
to be taken from their sacred wri-
tings, vide supra, p. 27, 1. ‘Plut.
Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2, 1, makes out
that Pythagoras was a long while
in Egypt, and adopted the precepts
concerning the ispatikal &ytotetal,
such as the prohibition of beans
and fish. The same authority,
De Is. 10, p. 354, derives the Py-
thagorean symbolism from Egypt;
Ps.-Justin (Cohort. 19) says the Py-
thagorean doctrine of the Monad as
the first principle came from there.
According to Apul. Floril. ii. 15,
Pythagoras learned from the Egyp-
tian priests carimoniarum poten-
tias, numerorum vices, geometriſe
formulas; according to Valer.
Max. viii. 7, 2, he found in the an-
cient books of the priests, when he
had learned the Egyptian writing,
innumerabilium saculorum observa-
tiones; Antipho (Diog. viii. 3 and
Porph. V. P. 7 sq.) relates how
Polycrates introduced him to Ama-
sis, and Amasis to the Egyptian
priests; and how he thus after
many difficulties, which his perseve-
rance at length overcame, gained
admittance to the Egyptian mys-
teries and holy rites. He says
also that he learned the Egyptian
language. From this author,
Clemens, Strom. i. 302 c, and
Theodoret, Gr, aff, cur. i. 15, p. 6,
no doubt derive their statement
that he was circumcised in Egypt.
Anton. Diogenes (ap. Porph. V. P.
11) says that he learned the wisdom
of the Egyptian priests, especially
their religious doctrine, the Egyp-
tian language and the three
kinds of Egyptian writing. Iam-
blichus, V. P. 12 sqq. (cf. p.
325, note), gives a circumstantial
account of his wonderful voy-
age from Mount Carmel to Egypt
(whither, according to Theol.
Arithm. 41, he had fled from the
tyranny of Polycrates), and goes on
to tell of his 22 years' intercourse
with the priests and prophets, in
which he learned all that was worth
knowing, visited all the temples,
gained access to all the mysteries,
and devoted himself to astronomy,
geometry, and religious exercises.
The king in whose reign Pythago-
ras came to Egypt is called by
Pliny (Hist. Nat. xxxvi. 9, 71.)
Psemetnepserphres (for which the
manuscripts also give Semetnep-
sertes and other forms); the priest
who instructed him is said by Plu-
tarch, De Is. 10, to have been
Oinupheus of Heliopolis. Clem.
Strom, i.303 C, names Sonches. Plu-
tarch (De Is. 26; Solon, 10) makes
Sonches the instructor of Solon.
* E.g. independently of Röth,
Chaignet (Pythagore, i. 43 sqq.;
ii. 353), who is very inaccurate when
332 PYTHAGORAS.
writers—cannot be satisfactorily established. The mos
ancient evidence for this journey, that of Isocrates, i
more than a hundred and fifty years later than th
event to which it refers, and moreover is contained
not in a historical work, but in a rhetorical oratio
which itself makes no pretension to historical credi
bility." Such testimony has obviously no weight a
all; and even if Isocrates did not himself originat
the idea that Pythagoras had been in Egypt, there
would still remain the doubt whether the source from
which he took it was grounded on historical tradition.
This, however, is not only beyond the reach of proof,
but is contrary to all probability. Herodotus, it i
true, remarks on the analogy of one Pythagorean usag
with a custom of the Egyptians; * he also says that th
he says (i. 46) that I declare it
certain that Pythagoras never went
to Egypt. I say it is undemon-
strable that he was there; I never
said it was demonstrable that he
was not there.
* The Busiris of Isocrates is
one of those works in which the
Greek rhetors, after the time of
the Sophists, sought to surpass one
another in panegyrics on evil or
worthless persons and things, and
in accusations against men univer-
sally admired. The Rhetor Poly-
crates had written an apology for
|Busiris. Isocrates shows him how
he should have handled his theme.
He explains his points of view very
candidly, c. 12. The adversary of
Busiris, he says, has ascribed
wholly incredible things to him,
such as the diverting of the Nile
from its course, and the devouring
of strangers. It is true that Iso-
crates cannot prove what he affirms
of him, but he certainly does not
attribute to him impossible deeds,
nor acts of bestial savagery: Étrett'
e i kal T vy x d v opi e v & u p 6 t e-
pot iſ e v 8 fi A €ºyo v Tes, &AA’ ow
éyò ačv kéxpmual totrous toſs A6-yois,
ois rep Xph toos étalvoovras, at 5’
ois trpoo’ikel rows Aoûopotivtas. It
is evident that writings which an-
nounce themselves as rhetorical
inventions cannot be of the smallesſ,
value ; and if we cannot prove from
this work that Busiris was the
author of the whole Egyptian cul-
ture, neither can we accept it as
historical evidence for the presence
of Pythagoras in Egypt, and his con-
nection with the Egyptian priests.
* ii. 81. The Egyptian priests
wearlinen trousers under their wool-
lengarments, in which they were not
allowed to enter the temple, or to
be buried. Ópoxo-yéovoſt 8& Taijra
Toto's 'Oppukoto's kaxeoplévolai Kai
Bakxukotoſi, Čobal 5& Aiyvirt{otori, kal


HIS TRA VELS. 333
elief in Metempsychosis came from Egypt into Greece; 1
ut he never hints that Pythagoras brought it thither,
eeming rather to assume that it had been transmitted
o the Greeks” before the time of that philosopher.
s to the presence of Pythagoras in Egypt, though
here was every opportunity for mentioning it, he pre-
erves so strict a silence that we can only suppose he
new nothing of it.”
ave been aware of it.”
v6ayopetouai. That is, “they agree
this respect with the so-called
rphics and Bacchics, who, how-
ver, are in truth Egyptians, and
ith the Pythagoreans; ' not, as
6th (ii. a, 381) and (in spite of
he previous remark) Chaignet (i.
5) translate it: “They agree in
his with the usages of the Orphic
nd Bacchic rites of consecration,
hich, however, are Egyptian and
ythagorean.’
" ii. 123. The Egyptians first
aught Immortality and Transmi-
ration: roiſt4, T6 A6-yº eio l of
AA#vovéxpío avto, of uèv trpátepov,
i 8& Ša repov, Ös ióía éovröv éðvrt:
&v éyò eióðs r& obváuara oi
(t),
* Though it is probable that
Berodotus, in the passage just
Juoted, when speaking of the later
philosophers who adopted the doc-
rine of Transmigration, was espe-
sially referring to Pythagoras, he
loes not necessarily mean that Py-
hagoras himself acquired it in
Egypt. Herodotus names Melam-
bus as having imported the Egyp-
ian Dionysiac cultus into Greece
vide supra, 71, 4); it would seem,
herefore, that Melampus is pri-
marily alluded to among the ‘an-
Nor does Aristoxenus seem to
Thus there is an entire dearth
f all trustworthy evidence respecting the supposed
cients’ who introduced the doctrine
of Transmigration into the Orphic
Dionysiac mysteries. In that case
Pythagoras would not have required
to go to Egypt, in order to become
acquainted with this doctrine.
* For Röth's explanation (ii.
b, 74) that Herodotus purposely
avoided mentioning Pythagoras
from his antipathy to the Cro-
toniates, who were hostile to the
Thurians, is not only very far-
fetched, but demonstrably false.
Herod. does mention him in ano-
ther place (iv. 95), and with the
honourable addition : ‘EAAhvav oi,
Tó &00eveord tº oroplatfi IIv6ayópp.;
and in ii. 123 (previous note) he
passes over his and other names,
not from aversion, but forbearance.
If he is silent as to his connection
with Egypt, the most natural rea-
son for his silence is that he knew
nothing of any such connection.
Also in ii. 81 (vide supra, p. 332, 2),
he would doubtless have expressed
himself otherwise, if he had derived
the Pythagoreans from Egypt in
the same manner as the Orphics.
* None of our authorities, at
any rate, who speak of Pythago-
ras' Egyptian journeys, refer to
Aristoxenus.
















334 PYTHAGORAS.
- r
all the more indemonstrable. The whole character
journeys of Pythagoras in the East; our authoritie
become more copious as we recede from the philoso
pher's own time, and more meagre as we approaeh it
before the beginning of the fourth century they entirel
fail. Each later writer has more to tell than his pre
decessor; and in proportion as the acquaintance of th
Greeks with the Oriental civilised nations increases
the extent of the journeys which brought the Samia
philosopher to be instructed by them likewise increases.
This is the way that, legends are formed and not his-
torical tradition. We cannot, indeed, pronounce it im-
possible that Pythagoras should have gone to Egypt or
Phoenicia, or even to Babylon, but it is on that account
of the narratives of his journeys strengthens the Sup-
position that, as they now stand, they can have been
derived from no historical reminiscence; that it was not
the definite knowledge of his intercourse with foreign
nations which gave rise to the theories as to the origin
of his doctrine; but, conversely, the presupposition o
the foreign source of his doctrine which occasioned the
stories of his intercourse with the barbarians. There
is quite enough to account for such a presupposition,
even if it were founded on no actual contemporary
tradition, in the syncretism of later times, in the false
pragmatism' which could only explain the similarity of
Pythagorean doctrines and usages with those of the
East by the theory of personal relations between Py-
thagoras and the Orientals, and in the tendency to
* There is no English equivalent the tendency to explain the history
for the German word Pragmatismus, of thought by imaginary combina-
which may perhaps be explained as tions of fact.—Note by Translator.




















HIS EMIGRATION. 335
panegyric of the Pythagorean legend which loved to
concentrate the wisdom of the whole human race in
its hero." The statement that Pythagoras visited Crete
and Sparta, partly to become acquainted with the laws
of those countries, partly that he might be initiated
into the mysteries of the Idaean Zeus, stands on no
better foundation.” The thing is in itself conceivable,
but the evidence is too uncertain, and the probability
of any historical tradition as to these details too scanty
to allow of our placing any trust in the assertion. So,
too, the theory that the philosopher owed his wisdom
to Orphic teachers * and writings, even though it may
not be wholly wrong as to the fact, is doubtless based,
as it stands, not on any historical reminiscence, but on
the presuppositions of a period in which an Orphic
theosophy and literature had formed itself to some
extent under Pythagorean and Neo-Pythagorean in-
fluences. The truth is, that we possess no document
which deserves to be considered a historical tradition
concerning the education of Pythagoras and the re-
sources at his command. Whether it be possible to
supply this want by inferences from the internal nature
of the Pythagorean doctrine, we shall enquire later on.
The first luminous point in the history of this
1 Because Pythagoras could
scarcely have attained that “poly-
mathy,' for which he is extolled by
Heracleitus (vide infra, p. 336, 4),
otherwise than by travels (Chaig-
net, i. 40; Schuster, Heracl. 372),
it does not at all follow that he
went to Egypt, or visited non-Hel-
lenic countries. Moreover, Hera-
cleitus rather derives his learning
from writings which he studied;
it is possible, however, that these
may have been collected by him
previously on his journeys.
* Justin. xx. 4; Valer. Max.
viii. 7, ext. 2.; Diog. viii. 3 (Epi-
menides); Iambl. 25; Porph. 17,
cf. p. 363, 2.
* Wide supra, p. 330, 2.
336 PYTH A G O RAS.
--~~~~~~. --, . . . - * - - * * . - . . . . . . . . . . ; -º-º:
philosopher is his emigration to Magna Græcia, the date
of which we cannot precisely fix," nor can we do more
than conjecture the reasons which led to it.” His
activity, however, does not seem to have begun in
Italy. The ordinary accounts, it is true, do not leave
space for a long period of activity in Samos. Other
texts, however, maintain that he at first laboured there
successfully * for some time, and if this assertion, con-
sidering the fables connected with it and the untrust-
worthiness of its evidence, may hardly seem deserving
of notice, yet the manner in which Pythagoras is
mentioned by Heracleitus and Herodotus would appear
to bear it out." Heracleitus soon after the death
of this philosopher speaks of his various knowledge
and of his (in Heracleitus's opinion erroneous) wisdom,
as of a thing well known in Ionia.” Now, it is not
likely that the report of it had first reached Ionia from
Italy. For, according to other testimony (vide infra),
* Wide supra, p. 324, 2.
* The statements of the ancients
are probably mere arbitrary con-
jectures. Most of them assert with
Aristoxenus (ap. Porph. 9) that the
tyranny of Polycrates occasioned
his migration (Strabo, xiv. 1. 16, p.
638; Diog. viii. 3; Hippolyſ. Refut.
i. 2, sub init. ; Porph. 16; The-
mist. Or. xxiii. 285 b ; Plut. Plac.
i. 3, 24; Ovid. Metam. xv. 60, etc.),
and that this assertion contradicts
the uncertain story of Polycrates's
commendatory letters to Amasis is
no argument against it. But it
cannot be considered as proved,
since the combination was perfectly
obvious. Others (Iambl. 20, 28)
say that he emigrated because the
Samians had too little taste for
philosophy. On the other hand,
Iambl. 28 says he did so in order to
avoid the political activity, which
the admiration of his fellow-citizens
would have forced upon him.
* Antipho. ap. Porph. 9; Iambl.
20 sqq., 26 sqq.
* As Ritter pertinently re-
marks, Pyth. Phil. 31. What
Brandis says to the contrary does
not appear to me conclusive.
* Fr. 22, ap. Diog. viii. 6:
IIv6ayópms Munodpxov ioropſ my
#arcmo’ev &v0p6trov učAuota trávrov,
ical ékNešćuevos Taütas Tās ovyypa-
ºp&s étroimaev čovrot goq inv, troAvua-
0minu, kakotexvimv. (Cf. ibid. ix. 1.)
The words ékaeś . . . ovyypaſpès,
which I cannot think inserted by
the narrator, must refer to writings
previously mentioned by Hera-
cleitus. Cf. p. 227, 2; 2nd edit.

PYTHIAGORAS IN ITALY. 337
the spread of Italian Pythagoreanism was brought
about by the dispersion of the Pythagoreans long after
the death of the master. Again, the well-known and
often quoted narrative of Zalmoxis' presupposes that
Pythagoras had already played the same part in his
own country that he afterwards played in Magna Graecia.
In this story a Gaetic divinity takes the form of a
man and communicates with Pythagoras. The motive
of that fiction evidently is to explain the presumed
similarity of the Gaetic belief in immortality with
the Pythagorean doctrine (vide supra, p. 73, 1); yet
the story could never have been invented if the name
of the philosopher had been unknown to the Greeks on
the Hellespont, from whom Herodotus received it, and
if in their opinion his activity had first commenced
in Italy. Whether among his countrymen he found
less appreciation than he had hoped for, or whether
other reasons, such as the tyranny of Polycrates or the
fear of the Persian invasion, had disgusted him with
his native city, in any case he left it and took up his
abode in Crotona, a city with which he may possibly
have had some personal connections, and which may
well have commended itself to him on account of the
far-famed salubrity of its site and the vigorous activity
of its inhabitants.” Here he found the proper soil for
1 Herod. iv. 95.
* According to a statement (ap.
Porph. 2), he had some previous
connection with Crotona, having
travelled thither as a boy with his
father; but this is hardly more
historical than the story mentioned
by Apuleius, Floril. ii., 15, that
Gillus, the Crotoniate (the Taren-
WOL. I.
time of that name mentioned in
Herod. iii. 138), liberated him
from his Persian imprisonment.
According to Iambl. 33, 36, 142,
Pythagoras visited many other
Italian and Sicilian towns besides
Crotona, especially Sybaris. That
he went first to Sybaris, and thence
to Crotona, however (vide Röth, ii.
338 PYTHIAGORAS.
his endeavours, and the school he established was until
its dispersion so exclusively associated with lower Italy,
that it is often described as the Italian school."
But this portion of his life is still so much obscured
by fabulous legends that it is hard to discover anything
with a historical foundation in the mass of pure in-
vention. If we may believe our informants, even the
person of Pythagoras was surrounded with miraculous
splendour. A favourite, and even a reputed son, of
Apollo,” he is said to have been revered by his followers
as a superior being,” and to have given proof of this his
higher nature by prophecies and miracles of all kinds."
a, 421), is nowhere stated. Röth
deduces from the words of Apollo-
nius, ap. Iambl. 255, on which he
puts an entirely wrong interpreta-
tion, and from Jul. Firmic. Astron.
p. 9. (Crotonam et Sybarim erul
incoluit), that after the destruction
of Sybaris, Pythagoras betook him-
self to the estates which the Syba-
rites had given him; that, however,
and everything else that he says
about this country life, is pure
imagination.
* Aristot. Metaph. i. 5, 987 a,
9, c. 6, sub. init. ; c. 7, 988 a, 25;
De Coelo, ii. 13, 293 a., 20; Meteor.
i. 6, 342 b. 30; cf. Sextus, Math.
x. 284; Hippolyt. Refut. i. 2;
Plut. Plac. i. 3, 24.
* Porph. 2, appeals in support
of this to Apollonius, Iambl. 5 sqq.,
to Epimenides, Eudoxus, and Xeno-
crates; but the first of these three
names can only be introduced here
through a mere blunder. For the
well-known Cretan mentioned by
Porph. 29, and Iambl. 135,222, as
a disciple of Pythagoras, and by
others, vide p. 327, 1, as his teacher,
can scarcely have been alive at the
date of Pythagoras's birth; the
other two names must likewise be
considered doubtful. Xenocrates
(as I have already observed in
Part ii. a, 875, third edition) may
perhaps have mentioned the state-
ment as a report, but he cannot
himself have adopted it. -
* Porph. 20; Iambl. 30, 255.
After Apollonius and Nicomachus;
Diodor. Fragm. p. 554; Aristotle,
ap. Iambl. 31, 144, quotes as a
Pythagorean classification: too
Aoyukot, Cºot, rb uév éott 6eos, to 5’
&v6pwros, to 5’ oiov IIv6ayópas; and
AElian. ii. 26, attributes to him the
often repeated statement (also in
Diog. viii. 11, and Porph. 28) that
Pythagoras was called the Hyper-
borean Apollo. Cf. the following
note.
* According to AElian, loc. cit.
cf. iv. 17, Aristotle had already re-
lated that Pythagoras had been
simultaneously seen in Crotona and
Metapontum, that he had a golden
thigh, and had been spoken to by a
river god. This statement, how-
PXTHA (? ORAS IN ITALY.
339
He alone among mortals understood the harmony of
the spheres;" and Hermes, whose son he was in a prior
state of existence, had allowed him to retain the re-
membrance of his whole past amidst the various phases
ever, has such a suspicious sound,
that one might be tempted to con-
jecture an error in the words, kā-
kelva è trpoo’etriXéºyel 6 rot, Nukoud-
Xov, with which Ælian introduces
it, and to suppose that Nicoma-
chus, the celebrated Neo-Pythago-
rean, and not Aristotle, was AElian's
authority; had not Apollon. Mirabil.
c. 6, likewise quoted the same thing
from Aristotle. It cannot possibly
have been Aristotle himself, how-
ever, who stated these things.
He must have mentioned them
merely as Pythagorean legends,
and then himself have been taken
by later writers as the authority
for them. This, indeed, is possi-
ble, and therefore these statements
can furnish no decisive proof of .
the spuriousness of the Aristote-
lian treatise, trepi Tôv IIv6ayopetwy,
which they naturally recall to us.
The same miracles are related by
Plutarch, Numa, c. 8 ; Diog. viii.
11; Porph. 28 sqq.; Iambl. 90
sqq.; 134, 140 sq. (the two latter
after Nicomachus; cf. Rohde, Rh.
Mus. xxvii. 44). According to
Plutarch he showed his golden thigh
to the assembly at Olympia ; ac-
cording to Porphyry and Iambli-
chus, to the Hyperborean priest of
Apollo Abaris. For further par-
ticulars, vide Herod. iv. 36 (cf.
also Krische, De Societ. a Pyth.
cond. 37), who refers the legends of
Abaris, told by later writers, with
some probability, to Heracleides
Ponticus. Many other miracles,
often of the most extravagant
description, such as the taming of
wild beasts by a word, foretelling
of the future, and so forth, are to
be found in Plutarch, loc. cit.;
Apul. De Magia, 31; Porph. 23
sq.; Iambl. 36, 60 sqq., 142, who
unfortunately, however, have not
named the ‘trustworthy ancient
writers’ to whom they owe their
information; cf. also Hippol. Re-
fut. i. 2, p. 10. It is clear from
the statement of Porphyry, ap.
Eus. Pr. Ev. x 3, 4, that even in
the fourth century there were
stories current in proof of Pytha-
goras's supernatural knowledge of
the future. Andron is said to have
spoken in his Tottrovs of the prophe-
cies of Pythagoras, and especially
of an earthquake which he fore-
told from the water of a stream
three days before it happened.
Theopompus then transferred these
stories to Pherecydes. The verses
of Empedocles, ap. Porph. 30,
and Iambl. 67, relate things much
less wonderful. They do not im-
ply supernatural knowledge, for
the ancients (according to Dioge-
nes, viii. 54) were not agreed as to
whether the verse referred to Py
thagoras or to Parmenides. For
the rest it is quite credible that
during the lifetime of Pythagoras.
and immediately after his death,
rumour may have asserted much
that was miraculous about him, as
was subsequently the case with
Empedocles.
* Porph. 30; Iambl. 65; Simpl.
in Arist. De Coelo, 208, b, 43, 211
a, 16; Schol. in Arist. 496 b, 1.
z 2
340 PPTHAGORAS.
of his existence." There is mention even of a descent
1–into Hades.” His doctrines are said to have been im-
parted to him in the name of his divine protector by
the mouth of the Delphic priestess Themistoclea.” It
cannot, therefore, be wondered at that on his first
appearance in Crotona “ he attracted much atten-
' Diog. viii. 4 sq. after Herac-
leides (Pont.); Porph.26,45; Iambl.
63; Horat. Carm, i. 28, 9; Ovid.
Metam. xv. 160; Lucian, Dial. Mort.
20, 3, et pass. Tertull. De. An. 28,
31. Aceording to A. Gellius, iv.
11, Clearehus and Dicaearchus, the
disciples of Aristotle, asserted that
Pythagoras maintained that he had
formerly existed as Euphorbus,
Pyranderand others; butthewerses
of Xenophanes, ap. Diog. viii. 36,
say nothing of any recollection of
a previous state of existence. He
is also said to have kept up con-
stant intercourse with the soul of
a friend who had died (Herm. in
Joseph. Con. Ap. i. 22). Further
particulars later on.
* By Hieronymus, no doubt the
Peripatetic, ap. Diog. viii. 21, cf.
38; Hermippus, vide Diog. viii.
41, in imitation of the story of
Zalmoxis (Herod. iv. 95), puts an
insipid natural interpretation upon
this legend, about which Tertullian,
De Aa. e. 28, is unnecessarily
angry. Its true origin is probably
to be found in a work attributed to
Pythagoras, called Katé8agus eis
d'âov. Cf. Diog. 14 : &AAè kal airbs
Čy rfi Ypapſ, pnot, 6t' étrö, (for
which Rohde, Rh. Mus. xxvi. 558,
appealing to Iambl. Theol. Arithm.
p. 41, would substitute ºkkaidera)
kai Siakootww éréwv éé àfösa trapa-
weyevija:0ai és àv60&rous. , Ibid. 4:
roiráv pmaw ‘Hoakaetºns à IIovrtkos
repl atroß rôs Aéyety, às stn work
yeyovës Aibaatöms, where the pre-
sent Aéyetv points to some writing;
cf. what Rohde, loc. cit, further ad-
duces. That writings of this kind
were not strange to the Pythago-
reans is well known. The Orphic
Katabasis is said to have been
composed by the Pythagorean Cer-
cops (Clem. Strom. i. 333 A).
* Aristox, ap. Diog. viii. 8, 21;
Porph. 41. A statement so
mythical, and so improbable in
itself, gives us, however, no
right to identify Pythagoreanism,
with the Delphic philosophy, as
Curtius does, Griech. Geschich, i.
427.
* Dicaearchus, ap. Porph. 18;
cf. Justin. Hist. xx. 4; speaks of
lectures, which, in the first instance,
he delivered before the Council of
Elders (to tav yepávrov &oxeſov),
and then by command of the autho-
rities before the youths, and finally
the women. A lengthy and decla-
matory account of the contents of
these lectures is given in Iambl.
V. P. 37–57, and a modernised
paraphrase in Röth, ii. a, 425–450.
I do not believe that this enlarged
version is taken from Dicaearchus;
partly because it seems too poor in
content for this philosopher, and
partly because Dicaearchus, accor-
ding to Porphyry, makes Pythago-
ras appear first before the ruling
council, and then before the
youths; whereas in Iamblichus he
is represented to have made his first
PYTHIAGORAS IN ITALY.
341
tion,' and soon acquired the highest renown throughout
Italy.”
Disciples, both men and women,” flocked to
him, not only from the Greek colonies, but from the
whole of Italy; * the most celebrated legislators of
appearance in the gymnasium, and
then on the report of his lecture
there, to have been commanded to
speak before the council. It would
seem that a later biographer of Py-
thagoras had added to the state-
ments of Dicaearchus; and it is
probable that this was none other
than Apollonius; since Iamblichus
in his V. P. 259 sq. adduces a nar-
rative from him in a similar style,
and (as Rohde, Rhein. Mus. xxvii.
29, remarks) Apollonius, ibid. 264,
expressly makes mention of the
temple of the Muses, to the build-
ing of which, according to section
50, these discourses of Pythagoras
had given occasion. Apollonius
himself (as is proved by Rohde,
loc. cit. 27 sq. from Iambl. Section
56; cf. Diog. viii. 11; and Just.
xx. 4, sub, fin. ; cf. also Porph.
V. P. 4) seems to have based his
own account on an exposition of
the Timaeus, and to have also made
use of sayings reported by Aris-
toxenus and others; cf. Iambl.
section 37, 40, 47, with Diog. viii.
22, 23 ; Stob. Floril. 44, 21 (ii.
164, Mein.), section 55 with Stob.
74, 53.
* Wide besides what has been
already quoted, the legendary ac-
count of Nicomachus, ap. Porph.
20, and Iambl. 30 ; Diodor. Fragm.
p. 554; Favorin. ap. Diog. viii. 15;
Valer. Max. viii. 15, ext. 1.
* Cf. Alcidamas, ap. Arist.
Rhet. ii. 23, 1398 b, 14: 'Itaxiàrat
IIv6ayópav (ériumaav). Plutarch,
Numa. c. 8, states, on the authority
of Epicharmus, that Pythagoras
was presented by the Romans with
the right of citizenship; but he
has been deceived by a forged
writing, vide Welcker, Klein. Schrif-
ten, i. 350. According to Plutarch,
loc. cit., and Pliny, Hist. Nat.
xxxiv. 6, 26, a pillar was subse-
quently, at the time of the Samnite
war, erected to him in Rome as the
wisest of the Greeks.
* Porph. 22 : trposìx60w 6 airó,
&s pmoiv 'Apiatóševos, kal Aevkavol
kal Megadtriot Kai IIevkériot kai
‘Polualot. The same, without the
appeal to Aristoxenus, is to be
found in Diog. viii. 14: Nic. ap.
Porph, 19 sq.; Iambl. 29 sq., 265
sqq. 127 (where mention is made
of an Etruscan Pythagorean).
* Cf. as to the Pythagorean
women, Diog. 41 sq.; Porph. 19
sq.; Iambl. 30, 54, 132, 267, end.
As to the most celebrated of them,
Theano, who is generally called the
wife, but sometimes the daughter
of Pythagoras, cf. Hermesinax,
ap. Athen. xiii. 599 a ; Diog. 42;
Porph. 19 ; Iambl. 132, 146, 265;
Clem. Strom. 1. 309; C. iv. 522 D;
Plut. Conj. Praec. 31, p. 142; Stob.
Ecl. i. 302; Flor.l. 74, 32, 53, 55;
Floril. Monac. 268-270 (Stob.
Floril. Ed. Mein. iv. 289 sq.). As
to the children of Pythagoras,
Porph. 4 (where there is a state-
ment of Timaeus of Tauromenium
about his daughter, repeated in
Hieron. Adv. Jovin. i. 42); Diog.
42 sq.; Iambl. 146; Schol. in Plat.
p. 420, Bekk. As to his household
economy, Iambl. 170.
342 PYTHAGORAS.
these countries' owned him for their teacher, and by
his influence, order, freedom, civilisation, and law
were re-established in Crotona and all Magna Graecia.”
Even the Druids of Gaul are called his disciples by
later writers.” The Pythagorean school is represented
to us not merely as a scientific association, but also,
and principally, as a religious and political society.T
Entrance into it was only to be obtained by a strict
probation, and on condition of several years' silence."
The members recognised each other by secret signs; "
* Especially Zaleucus and Cha-
rondas, of which this is asserted
by Seneca, Ep. 90, 6, and also by
Posidonius; similarly Diog. viii.
16 (whether this is taken from
Aristoxenus cannot be ascer-
tained); Porph. 21 ; Iambl. 33,
104, 130, 172 (both probably fol-
low Nicomachus): cf. AElian, W.
H. iii. 17; Zaleucus is also men-
tioned in this connection ap. Diodo-
rum, xii. 20. Now Zaleucus was cer-
tainly a hundred years earlier than
Pythagoras, and so probably was
Charondas (cf. Hermann, Griech.
Antiquit. i. section 89); if, on
the other hand, we recognise this
Charondas (vide Diodorus, xii. 11;
Schol. in Plat. p. 419), as the law-
giver of Thurii (445 B.C.), he would
be much too young for a personal
disciple of Pythagoras. The ap-
pearance of such statements, there-
fore, in the above-mentioned writers,
is a fresh proof how little real his-
torical foundation exists, even for
ancient and widely spread accounts
of Pythagoras. Some other Pytha-
gorean lawgivers are named in
Iambl. 130, 172. The story of
Numa's relations with Pythagoras
is discussed in vol. iii. b, 692, se-
cond edition.
* Diog. viii. 3; Porph. 21 sq.,
54; Iambl. 33, 50, 132, 214; Cic.
Tusc. v. 4, 10; Diodor. Fragm. p.
554; Justin. xx. 4; Dio Chrysost.
Or. 49, p. 249 R.; Plut. C. Princ.
Philos. i. 11, p. 776; cf. the sup-
posed conversation of Pythagoras
with Phalaris; Iambl. 215 sqq.
* Wide supra, p. 73, 1 ; cf. p.
330.
* Taurus, ap. Gell. i. 9; Diog.
viii. 10; Apul. Floril. ii. 15;
Clem. Strom. vi. 580, A.; Hippol.
Rafut. i. 2, p. 8, 14; Iambl. 71
sqq. 94; cf. 21 sqq.; Philop. De
An. D, 5; Lucian, Vit. Auct. 3.
The tests themselves, among which
that of physiognomy is mentioned
(Hippolytus called Pythagoras the
discoverer of physiognomy), and
the duration of the silent noviciate,
is variously given. The counte-
nance of the teachers was hidden
from the novices by a curtain, as
in the mysteries. Cf. Diog. 15.
* Iambl. 238. The Pentagon
is said to have been such a sign
(Schol. in Aristoph. ; Clouds, 611,
i. 249, Dind.; Lucian, De Salut. c.
5). Krische, p. 44, thinks the
gnomon also,
THE PPTHAGOPEAN SCHOOL.
343
only a certain number of them were admitted into
the inner circle and initiated into the esoteric doctrines
of the school:" persons not belonging to the society
were kept at a distance,” unworthy members were
excluded with contumely.”
According to later ac-
counts, the Pythagoreans of the higher grade had all
their goods in common," in obedience to a minutely
* Gellius, loc. cit., names three
classes of Pythagorean disciples:
&kovotticol or novices; uaômwarticol,
(pworthcot ; Clem. Strom. v. 575 D;
Hippolyt. Refut. i. 2, p. 8, 14;
Porph. 37; Iambl. V. P. 72, 80
sqq ; 87 sq.; and Willoison's Anecd.
ii. 216—two, the Esoterics and
Exoterics; the former were also
called Mathematicians, and the
latter Acousmaticians; according
to Hippolytus and Iamblichus, the
Esoterics were called Pythagore-
ans, and the exoterics Pythagorists.
The unknown writer, ap. Phot. Cod.
249, distinguishes Sebasti, Politici,
and Mathematici; also Pythago-
rici, Pythagoreans, and Pythago-
rists; calling the personal scholars
of Pythagoras, Pythagorici; the
scholars of these, Pythagoreans; and
the ŠNAws #00ev (mAotal, Pythago-
rists. On these statements (the
recent date of which he does not
consider) Röth (ii. a, 455 sq.; 756
sq.; 823 sqq.; 966 b, 104) grounds
the following assertion. The mem-
bers of the inner Pythagorean
school (he says) were called Pytha-
gorics, and those of the outer cir-
cle Pythagoreans; there was an
important distinction between their
doctrines, all the systems of the
Pythagoreans being founded on the
Zoroastrian dualism, which (ac-
cording to p. 421 sq., it was im-
ported into Crotona by the physi-
cian Democedes) is not to be found
in the conceptions of Pythagoras,
which are genuinely Egyptian.
These were the Pythagoreans, and
these alone (to them belonged Em-
pedocles, Philolaus and Archytas,
and Plato and his followers were
allied to them), to whom the ac-
counts of Aristotle have reference,
and who were generally recognised
by the ancients before the period
of the Ptolemies. Now all the au-
thors who mention such a distinc-
tion call the exoterics Pythagorists,
and the esoterics, the true disciples
of Pythagoras, Pythagoreans; and
the anonymous writer in Photius
applies this name only to the se–
cond generation. But Röth finds
a way out of this difficulty. We
have only to correct the anonymous
writer to the extent of understand-
ing Acousmaticians under Pytha-
goreans; and in respect to Iam-
blichus to substitute “Pythagorici
for Pythagoreans, and Pythagore-
ans for Pythagorists (Röth has
overlooked the passage in Hippo-
lytus), and all will be right.” On
these arbitrary conjectures a the-
ory is built up, which is entirely
to overturn, not only the hitherto
accepted theory of Pythagoreanism,
but the testimony of Philolaus,
Plato, Aristotle, &c.
* Apollon. ap. Iambl. 257.
* Iambl. 73 sq., 246; Clemens,
Strom. v. 574, D.
4 The oldest authorities for

344
PYTHAGORAS.
prescribed rule of life reverenced among them as a
divine ordinance."
This also enjoined linen clothing,”
and entire abstinence from bloody offerings and animal
food,” from beans and some other kinds of nourish-
ment; * even celibacy is said to have been imposed
this are Epicurus (or Diocles) ap.
Diog. x. 11; and Timaeus of Tau-
romenium, ihid. viii. 10; Schol.
in Plat., Phaedr. p. 319, Bekk,
Subsequently, after the appear-
ance of the Neo-Pythagoreans, who
must have taken their notions
chiefly from the ideal Platonic
state, the statement is universal;
vide Diog. viii. 10; Gell. loc. cit.;
Hippol. Refut. i. 2, p. 12; Porph.
20; Iambl. 30, 72, 168, 257, &c.
Phot. Lear. koué, makes Pythago-
goras introduce community of goods
among the Inhabitants of Magna
Graecia, and cites Timaeus as an
authority.
* Porph. 20, 32 sqq.; follow-
ing Nicomachus and Diogenes, the
author of the book of prodigies;
Iambl. 68 sq., 96 sqq., 165, 256.
The latter gives a detailed descrip-
tion of their whole daily life.
* Iambl. 100, 149 ; both as
it would seem (Rohde, Rhein. Mus.
xxvii. 35 sq., 47) originally from
Nicomachus, section 100, indirectly
from Aristoxenus, who, however,
was only speaking of the Pythago-
reans of his own time; Apuleius,
De Magia, c. 56; Philostr. Apollon.
i. 32, 2, who adds to the prescripts
of linen clothing a prohibition to
cut the hair. Others speak only
of white garments, e.g. Ælian,
W. H. xii. 32.
* First attributed to Pythago.
ras himself by Eudoxus, ap. Porph.
V. P. 7, and Onesicritus (about
320 B.C.), Strabo, xv. i. 65, p. 716
Cas.; and to the Pythagoreans
generally by the poets of the Alex-
andrian period, ap. Diog. viii. 37
sq.; Athen. iii. 108 sq.; iv. 161
a, Sqq., 163 d. Later on, the state-
ment became almost universal;
vide Cic. N. D. iii. 36, 88; Rep.
iii. 8; Strabo, vii. 1, 5, p. 298;
Diog. viii. 13, 20, 22; Porph. V. P.
7; De Abstin. i. 15, 23 ; Iambl. 54,
68, 107 sqq., 150 ; Plut. De Esu
Carm. sub init. ; Philostr. loc. cit.;
Sext. Math. ix. 12, 7 sq., and many
others.
* Heracleides (no doubt of Pon-
tus) and Diogenes, ap. Joh. Lyd.
De Mens. iv. 29, p. 76; Callima-
chus, ap. Gell. iv. 11; Diog. viii.
19, 24, 33, following Alexander,
Bolyhistor and others; Cic. Divin.
i. 30, 62; Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 8,
2; Clemens. Strom. iii. 435, D;
Porph. 43 sqq.; Iambl. 109; Hip-
pol. Refut. i. 2, p. 12; Lucian, V.
Auct. 6, etc. According to Her-
mippus and others, ap. Diog. 39
sq., Pythagoras was slain in his
flight, because he would not escape
over a bean field. Neanthes (ap.
Iambl. 189 sqq.) relates the same
of Pythagoreans in the time of
Dionysius the elder. He also tells
a further legend, to be noticed
infra, as to the pertinacity with
which the reason of the bean pro-
hibition was kept secret. This last
with a little alteration is trans-
ferred to Theano, by David, Schol.
#n Arist. 14 a, 30. Pythagoras is
also said to have prohibited wine
THE PPTHAGOREAN SCHOOL.
345
upon them."
Older writers, indeed, who are more to
be trusted, say nothing of the community of goods,”
though they extol the loyalty of the Pythagoreans
towards friends and co-associates.”
The precepts as to
food and clothing (over and above the general principle
of moderation and simplicity “) are reduced by these
writers to a few isolated ordinances * in connection with
(Iambl. 107, 69, and Epiph. Her.
p. 1087 B). The prohibition of
beans is discussed at length by
Bayle, Art. Pythag. Rem. H.
* Ap. Clem. Strom. iii. 435 c
(Clemens himself contradicts it);
cf. Diog. 19 : otitor éºyvá00m
(Pyth.) otre àtaxopóv otte &ºppoët-
oud ſwu offre ueóvorðeſs.
* Wide supra, 343, 4, and
Krische, p. 27 sq., who rightly
finds a reason for this statement in
a misunderstanding of the proverb
ková rà rôv pixov, which was pro-
bably not peculiar to the Pythago-
reans (cf. Aristotle, Eth. N. ix. 8,
1168 b, 6). It is, however, also
ascribed to Pythagoras by Timaeus,
ap. Diog. 10; Cic. Leg. i. 12, 34,
and Ant. Diog. ap. Porph. 33.
* Cf. the well-known story of
Damon and Phintias, Cic. Off. iii.
10, 45; Diodor. Fragm. p. 554;
Borph. 59; Iambl. 233 sq. after
Aristoxenus, to whom Dionysius
himself told the story, and others.
Also other anecdotes, ap. Diodor.
loc. cit.; Iambl. 127 sq., 185, 237
sqq., and the more general state-
ments in Cic. Off. i. 17, 56; Diod.
loc. cit.; Porph. 33, 59; Iambl.
229 sq.; also Krische, p. 40 sq.
These stories, however, for the
most part presuppose the existence
of private property among the
Pythagoreans.
* Aristoxenus and Lyco, ap.
Athen. ii. 46 sq.; x. 418 'e; Porph.
33 sq.; Iambl.97 sq.; Diog. viii. 19.
* Aristoxenus, ap. Athen. x.
418 sq.; Diog. viii. 20; Gell. iv.
11, expressly denies that Pythago-
ras abstained from meat; he only
refused the flesh of ploughing oxen
and bucks (the former probably on
account of their utility, and the lat-
ter on account of their lustfulness).
Plutarch (Gell. loc. cit.; cf. Diog.
viii. 19) quotes the same statement
from Aristotle. According to him,
the Pythagoreans merely abstained
from particular parts of animals
and from certain fishes (so that ap.
Diog. viii. 13, only the remark
about the unbloody altar, and not
the story about Pythagoras, can
have been taken from Aristotle).
Blutarch, Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 1, 3,
and Athen. vii. 308 c, say that
the Pythagoreans eat no fish and
very little meat, chiefly the flesh
of offerings; similarly Alexander,
ap. Diog. viii. 33, speaking of
many prohibitions of food (often
without historical foundation) does
not mention abstinence from flesh.
Even Ant. Diog. (ap. Porph. 34,
36) and Iambl. 98 (in an account
which no doubt is indirectly taken
from Aristoxenus) are agreed on
this point with these writers,
though differing from them on
many others, and Plut. Numa, 8,
says of the Pythagorean offerings
346
P}^THAGORAS.
particular forms of worship; whether these ordinances
originated with the Italian Pythagoreans, or only belong
that they were, for the most part,
bloodless. On the other hand,
Theophrastus must have ascribed
to the Pythagoreans the abstention
from flesh, which is asserted of the
Orphic Pythagorean mysteries of
his time (cf. Pt. ii. a, 29, 1, 3rd
ed. ; Pt. iii. b, 65 sq. 2nd ed.), if all
that we read in Porph. De Abstin.
ii. 28, is taken from him. Bernays,
however (Theoph. v. d. Frömm.
p. 88), thinks, probably with jus-
tice, that the sentences which treat
of the Pythagoreans, 51' 3rep . . .
Tapavouías, are added by Porphyry.
But, even according to this repre-
sentation, they, at least, tasted the
flesh of offerings, so that they
must have had animal sacrifices.
The sacrifice of a bull is ascribed to
Pythagoras on the occasion of the
discovery of the Pythagorean prin-
ciple, and other mathematical dis-
coveries (Apollodor. ap. Athenaeum,
x. 418 sq., and Diog. viii. 12; Cic.
N. D. iii. 36, 88; Plut. Qu. Conv.
viii. 2, 4, 3; N. P. Suav. v. 11. 4,
p. 1094; Procl. in Eucl. 110 u,
426 Fr. Porph. V. P. 36, infers
from this the sacrifice of a graírivos
gods), and he is also said to have
introduced meat diet among the
athletes: vide infra. In regard to
beans, Aristoxenus (ap. Gellius,
loc. cit.) maintains that Pythago-
ras, far from prohibiting them,
particularly recommended this
vegetable. It is, therefore, pro-
bable, that Hippol. Refut. i. 2. p.
12, and Porph. 43 sqq., derived
their absurd account (mentioned
also by Lucian, Vit. Auct. 6) of the
prohibition of beans, not from
Aristoxenus, but from Antonius
Diogenes, from whom Joh. Lydus,
De Mens, iv. 29, p. 76, quotes it in
the same words as Porphyry; and
though the contradiction of Aristox-
enus itself presupposes that such a
prohibition was even at that period
attributed to Pythagoras, it never-
theless shows that it was not ac-
knowledged by those Pythagoreans
whose tradition he followed. Gell.
loc. cit, explains the story of the
beans as a misunderstanding of a
symbolical expression ; the most
probable explanation is that a cus-
tom, which really belonged to the
Orphics, was transferred to the an-
cient Pythagoreans; cf. Krische, p.
35. The statement that the Py-
thagoreans wole only linen clothes
is contradicted by the account in
Diog. viii. 19 (cf. Krische, p. 31),
where he excuses them clumsily
enough for wearing woollen gar-
ments, by asserting that linen at
that time was unknown in Italy.
According to Herod. ii. 81, the
whole matter is reduced to this:
that in the Orphic Pythagorean
mysteries the dead were forbidden
to be buried in woollen clothes.
* As Alexander (Diog. viii. 33)
expressly says : &lréxea.0al Bpatów
6vmoreiðfav Te Kpeãov kal TpixAöv kai
aea avoipov kal 6&v kal Tóv gotókov
(ºwy kal Kváuov kal Tów &AAwy &v
TapakeMečovrai kai oi rās Texerês
év toſs ispoſs étritexotivres, cf. Plut.
Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 3, 15. That the
Pythagoreans had peculiar reli-
gious services and rites, and that
these formed the external bond of
their society, must be presupposed
from Herod. ii. 81. Plato also
(Rep. x. 600 B) speaks of a rv0ayó-
pelos Tpétros toū 8íov, by which the
disciples of Plato were distinguished
from others. Such a distinctive
peculiarity in their mode of life
THE PPTHAGOREAN SCHOOL.
347
would, in itself, lead us to con-
ecture something of a religious
Bharacter; and this appears still
more clearly from such historical
accounts as we possess of the prac-
;ical life of the Pythagoreans, and
‘rom what may be accepted as
genuine of the ceremonial prescripts
n Diog. 10, 33 sqq.; Iambl. 163
sq., 256; also from the early con-
nection of Pythagoreanism with
the Bacchic Orphic mysteries, the
evidence for which is to be found
partly in the above references,
and partly in the forgery of Orphic
writings by Pythagoreans (Clemens,
Strom, i. 333 A.; Lobeck, Aglaoph.
347 sqq.; cf. Ritter, i. 363, 293).
* Wide supra, p. 341, 4, and
usonius, ap. Stob. Floril. 67, 20;
f. Diog. 21.
* It is scarcely necessary to
uote evidence for this, as Arist.
etaph. i. 5. Sub init. (oi kaxoß-
evol IIv0ayópelot tow pagmpidºtov
Jáuevo rpótol taúra trpoſiya-
* * *
ow kal évtpaq'évres év autois
&s roërwv &pxès rêv čvrov
pxãs ºff0mgav sival tróvtov), since
t is sufficiently proved by the
hole character of the Pythagorean
octrine, and by the names of
o the later Orphics of Pythagorean tendencies; whether,
onsequently, they arose from Pythagoreanism or from
he Orphic mysteries, we do not certainly know.
elibacy of the Pythagoreans is so entirely unrecog-
ised even by later writers that they represent Py-
hagoras as married," and cite from him and from his
school numerous precepts concerning conjugal life (vide
ºnfra). Among the Sciences, besides philosophy proper,
£he Pythagoreans chiefly cultivated mathematics, which
Swes to them its first fruitful development.” By ap-
The
Philolaus and Archytas. Even at
a later period Magna Graecia and
Sicily continued to be the principal
seat of mathematical and astrono-
mical studies. Considerable know-
ledge and discoveries in mathema-
tics and astronomy were ascribed
to Pythagoras himself; cf. Aristox.
ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 16, and Diog. viii.
12; Hermesianax and Apollodor.
ap. Athen. xiii. 599 a., x, 418 sq.,
and Diog. i. 25; viii. 12; Cic.
N. D. iii. 36, 88; Plin. Hist. Nat.
ii. 8, 37; Diog. viii. 11, 14; Porph.
V. P. 36; Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 2,
4, 3; N. P. Suav. Vivi. 11, 4, p.
1094; , Plac. ii. 12; Procl. in Eucl.
19 m (where, instead of &Aórywv,
we should doubtless read &vaxá-
ºwv), 110, 111 (65, 426, 428 Fr.);
Stob. Ecl. i. 502 ; Lucian, Vit. Auct.
2: tº 8& uáxtata oióev; &piðum Tikhv,
ãotpovouſav, Tepatetav, Yewpletpiav,
uovo.ukhv, yomtetav, uívriv škpov
BAéreus. Although Pythagoras
unquestionably gave the impulse
to the fruitful development of
mathematics in his school, it is im-
possible, from the fragmentary and
wholly untrustworthy statements
about him, to form any conception
of his mathematical knowledge at

























348 PYTHIAGORAS.
plying mathematics to music they became the founde
of the scientific theory of sound, which enters so deepl
into their system." The practical importance of musi
however, was quite as great among them ; it wa
cultivated partly as a means of moral education, partl
in connection with the art of medicine; * for this, too
~~~
all approximating to historical cer-
tainty. Even the state of mathe-
matical science in the Pythagorean
school, at the time of Philolaus and
Archytas, could only be described
by one accurately acquainted with
ancient mathematics, and by such
a one only with the greatest caution
and reserve. We shall confine our-
selves here to what concerns the
general principles of the number-
theory and harmony, or the concep-
tions of the system of the universe.
Röth (ji a 962 b, 314) quotes
with essential omissions and altera-
tions a passage from Varro, L.
lat. v. 6, to prove that Pythagoras
made a map in Tarentum, of which
Warro says not a word. He is
there speaking of a bronze image of
Europa on the bull which Pytha-
goras (Pythagoras of Rhegium,
the well-known sculptor of the
beginning of the fifth century)
made at Tarentum. Marc Capella,
De Nupt. Philol. vi. 5, p. 197,
Grot., attributes to Pythagoras the
determination of the terrestrial
zones, and not a map.
* According to Nicomachus,
Harm. i. 10; Diog. viii. 12; Iambl.
115 sqq. and others (vide infra).
Pythagoras himself invented har-
mony. What is more certain is,
that it was first developed in his
school, as is shown by the name
and the theories of Philolaus and
Archytas, on which more hereafter.
Plato says in Rep. vii. 530 D, that
Mor. c. 3, p. 441 ;
Iambl. 264.
the Pythagoreans regarded Ha
mony and Astronomy as two sist
SCI eIICeS. -
* Wide Porph. 32; Iambl. 3
64, 110 sqq., 163, 195, 224; Stri
bo, i. 2, 3, p. 16; x. 3, 10, p. 468
Sen. De ira, iii. 9; Quintil. Insti
i. 10, 32; ix. 4, 12; Censorin. D
Nat. 12; AElian, V. H. xiv. 23
Sext. Math. vi. 8; Chamāleo, ap
Athen. xiii. 623 (on Clinias)
These accounts, no doubt, contai
much that is fabulous, but thei
historial foundation is beyond ques
tion. The Harmony of the Pytha
goreans presupposes a diligen
study of music. The moral appli
cation of this art corresponds t
the character of the Doric life and
of the cultus of Apollo; and w
elsewhere find that that cultus wa
connected with music as a medici
mal cure. In accordance with this
the Pythagorean music is repre
sented as grave and quiet, and the
lyre as their chief instrument
Athen. iv. 184 e, however, enume
rates a whole series of Pythagorean
flute-players.
* Diog. viii. 12; Porph. 33
Iambl. 110, 163. Apollon. a
Celsus, De Medic. i
Proºf names Pythagoras amon
the most celebrated physicians. C
what is said further on about Alc
maeon's connection with the Py
thagoreans. .


























THE PPTHAGO REAN SCHOOL. 349
s well as gymnastic," flourished among the Pytha-
foreans. As might be expected, after the proof of
upernatural wisdom related in the myth of the Samian
hilosopher (vide Supra), Pythagoras and his school
re said to have applied themselves to prophecy.” As a
elp to morality, we are told that strict daily self-
xamination was, among other things,” especially en-
oined on the members of the society.” Since, however,
t that period, ethics were inseparable from politics,
we are also told that the Pythagoreans not only occu-
pied themselves zealously with politics” and exercised
the greatest influence on the legislation and administra-
tion of the cities of Magna Graecia,” but also that they
constituted in Crotona and other Italian towns a regular
political confederation," which, by its influence upon the
deliberative assemblies* of these towns, really held the
1. Cf. Iambl. 97; Strabo, vi. 1,
12, p. 263; Justin. xx. 4; also
Diodor. Fragm. p. 554. Milo, the
celebrated athlete, is well known
to have been a Pythagorean. The
statement (Diog. 12 sq., 47; Porph.
V. P. 15; De Abst. i. 26; Iambl.
25) that Pythagoras introduced
meat diet among the athletes,
which is, however, scarcely histo-
rical, seems to refer to Pythagoras
the philosopher.
3 Cic. Divin. i. 3, 5; ii. 58,
119; Diog. 20, 32; Iambl. 93,
106, 147, 149, 163; Clem. Strom.
i. 334 A.; Plut. Plac. v. 1, 3;
Lucian (vide supra, p. 338, 4).
Magical arts were likewise attri-
buted to Pythagoras, Apul. De
Magia, c. 27, p. 504.
* Diodor. Fragm. p. 555.
* Carm. Aur. v. 40 sqq., and
after this source, Cic. Cato, ii. 38;
Diodor, loc. cit.; Diog. viii. 22;
Porph. 40; Iambl. 164 sq., 256.
* According to Iamblichus, 97,
the hours after meals were devoted
to politics, and Varro, vide Augus-
tin. De Ord. ii. 20, maintains that
Pythagoras only communicated his
political doctrines to the ripest of
his scholars.
* Wide supra, p. 341, 5; 342, 1,
and Valer. Max. viii. 15, ext. I;
ibid. c. 7, ext. 2.
* Consisting, in Crotona, of 300
members; according to some ac-
counts, of more.
* In Crotona, these were desig-
nated by the name of oix{Auot (Iam-
blichus, V. P. 45,260, after Apollo-
nius), which is so large a number
for a senate, that it might lead us
rather to suppose that the ruling
portion of the citizens was intended.
Diod. xii. 9, calls them atºykamtos,

350 PYTHAGORAS.
reins of government, and employed their power to pro.
mote an aristocratic organisation of the ancient Dori
type." They no less rigorously maintained the doctrine
of their master, and silenced all opposition with the
famous dictum airós #4a.”
Porph. 18, to róv yepávrov &pxeſov.
Both Diodorus and Iamblichus,
however, speak of the 67aos and
ēkkNmoria, which, according to Iam-
blichus, 260, only had to resolve
upon that which was brought before
it by the xixiot.
* Iambl. 249, after Aristoxenus,
254 sqq.; after Apollonius, Diog.
viii. 3; Justin. xx. 4. Polybius, ii.
39, menticns the Pythagorean avvé-
8pta in the cities of Magna Graecia.
Plut. C. Princ. Philos. i. 11, p. 777,
speaks of the influence of Pytha-
goras on the leading Italiotes, and
Porph. 54 says the Italians handed
over the direction of their states
to the Pythagoreans. In the con-
test between Crotona and Sybaris,
which ended in the destruction of
the latter, it was, according to
Diodorus, respect for Pythagoras
which decided the Crotonians to
refuse to deliver up the fugitive
Sybarite nobles, and to undertake
a war with their more powerful
rival. It was Milo, the Pythago-
rean, who led his countrymen to
the fatal battle on the Traés.
Cicero, indeed (De Orat. iii. 15, 56;
cf. Tusc. v. 23, 66), includes Pytha-
goras with Anaxagoras and Demo-
critus among those who renounced
political activity in order to live
entirely for science; but this does
not destroy the former evidence,
since in the first place it is uncer-
tain whence Cicero derived his in-
formation; and in the second, Py-
thagoras himself held no public
We are told, however, that
office. Still less does it follow
from Plato, Rep. x. 600 C, that
the Pythagoreans abstained from
political activity; though, accord-
ing to this passage, their founder
himself worked, not as a statesman,
but by personal intercourse. The
strictly aristocratic character of
the Pythagorean politics appears
from the charges against them in
Iambl. 260; Athen. v. 213 f (cf.
Diog. viii. 46; Tertull. Apologet.
c. 46), and from the whole
persecution by Cylon. Chaig-
net's theory (i. 54 sq.), however,
that the government of Crotona
was first changed by Pythagoras
from a moderate democracy into
an aristocracy is supported by no
tradition; it is, on the contrary,
contradicted by the passage in
Strabo, viii. 7, i. p. 384 (after
Polybius, ii. 39, 5), where it is said
of the Italians : Heră răv ardouv
Thu trpos toūs IIv6ayopetous rô.
TAeſota rāv vopupiðv werevéykaoréal
tapå rotºrov (the Achaeans, who
had a democratic constitution),
which would not have been neces-
sary if they had only required to
re-establish their own democratic
institutions; while, on the other
hand (vide previous note), the
ékkâmoria decided many things,
even under the Pythagorean ad-
ministration.
* Cic. N. D. i. 5, 10; Diog.
viii. 46; Clemens, Strom. ii. 369
C; Philo. Qu. in Gen. i. 99, p. 70.
THE PM THAGO REAN SCHOOL.
351
this doctrine was carefully kept within the limits of
the school, and that every transgression of these limits
was severely punished."
In order that the doctrine
might be quite incomprehensible to the uninitiated,
the Pythagoreans, and in the first instance the founder
of the school, are said to have employed that symbolical
mode of expression in which are contained most of the
maxims handed down to us as Pythagorean.”
* Aristoxenus, Diog. viii. 15,
says it was a principle of the Py-
thagoreans, whº eival trpos travtas
Trávra Ämté, and, according to
Iambl. 31, Aristotle reckons the
saying about Pythagoras, quoted
.338, 3, among the travu ätrömra
of the school. Later writers (as
Plut. Numa, 22; Aristocles, ap. Eus.
Pr. Ev. xi. 3, 1 ; the Pseudo-Lysis,
ap. Iambl. 75 sqq., and Diog. viii.
42; Clem. Strom. v. 574 D; Iambl.
V. P. 199, 226 sq., 246 sq.; tr. Koiv.
pa6. Étriot ; Willoison, Anecd. ii p.
216 ; Porph. 58; an anonymous
person, ap. Menage, Diog. viii.;
cf. Plato, Ep. ii. 314 A) dilate
much on the strictness and fidelity
with which the Pythagoreans kept
even geometrical and other purely
scientific theorems as secrets of
their fraternity, and on the abhor-
rence and punishment of the gods
which overtook every betrayal of
this mystery. The first proof in
support of this opinion is the asser-
tion (sup. p. 315) of Neanthes about
Empedocles and Philolaus, and in
the legendary narrative of the same
author, as also of Hippobotus, ap.
Iambl. 189 sqq. (considerably more
recent, cf. Diog. viii. 72), according
to which Myllias and Timycha
suffer to the uttermost, the latter
even biting out his own tongue, like
Zeno in Elea, in order not to reveal
to the elder T)ionysius the reason
of Pythagoras's prohibition of
beans. On the other hand, it is a
question whether the statement of
Timaeus, in Diog. viii. 54, on which
that of Neanthes is unquestionably
founded, that Empedocles, and
afterwards Plato, were excluded
from Pythagorean teaching, being
accused of Aoyokaorta—really re-
fers to the publishing of a secret
doctrine, and not to the proclaiming
improperly of Pythagorean doc-
trines as their own. Moreover, we
cannot give much credit to the
testimony of an author, who, in
spite of all chronology, makes
Empedocles (loc. cit.) the personal
pupil of Pythagoras.
* Iamblich. 104 sq., 226 sq.
Collections and interpretations of
Pythagoreansymbols are mentioned
by Aristoxenus in the truða'yoptical
&moſpáoets, and by Alexander Poly-
histor and Anaximander the
younger, ap. Clem. Strom. i. 304,
B. Cyrill. c. Jul. iv. 133 D; Iambl.
V. P. 101, 145; Theol. Arithm, p.
41; Suidas, 'Avačípavöpos (cf.
Krische, p. 74 sq.; Mahne, De
Aristoreno, 94 sqq.; Brandis, i.
498); another work, said to be of
ancient Pythagorean origin, bearing
the name of Androcydes, is dis-
cussed, part iii. b, 88, second edi
tion. Aristotle's work on the Py-
352 PYTHAGORAS.
=zerºzz-rº zºº-- - - - -
How much of these statements may be accepted as
historical it is difficult to determine in detail; we can
only establish approximately certain general results.
We see that so early as the time of Aristotle, Aristoxe-
nus, and Dicaearchus, many miraculous tales respecting
Pythagoras were in circulation ; but whether he himself
appeared in the character of a worker of miracles
cannot be ascertained. The manner in which he is
spoken of by Empedocles and Heracleitus' renders it
probable that, for long after his death, he was merely
esteemed as a man of unusual wisdom, without any super-
matural character. This wisdom seems to have been
Tchiefly of a religious kind, and to have served religious
ends. Pythagoras appears as the founder of a religious
association with its own rites and ceremonies; thus he
may have passed for a seer and a priest, and may have
declared himself as such : this is extremely likely
from the whole character of the Pythagorean legend,
thagoreans seems to have given
many of these symbols (vide Porph.
41 ; Hieron. c. Ruf. iii. 39, T. ii.
565, Wall.; Diog. viii. 34), and va-
rious authors (as Demetrius of
Byzantium mentioned by Athen. x,
452 c) have spoken of them inci-
dentally. From these ancient com-
pilations probably came the greater
part of the sentences ascribed to
12ythagoras and the Pythagoreans
by later writers, as Plutarch (es-
pecially in the ovuºroalakā), Sto-
baeus, Athenaeus, Diogenes, Por-
phyry, and Iamblichus, Hippolytus,
&c. These senteices, however,
cannot be much relied upon as re-
presenting the Ethics and religious
doctrine of the Pythagoreans; for
in the first place their meaning is
very uncertain, and in the second,
what is genuinely Pythagorean is
hard to distinguish from later in-
gredients. In regard to the Py-
thagorean Philosophy, they are of
little importance. Collections of
these sentences are to be found in
Orelli, Opusc. Graec. Vet. Sent. i., 60
sq.; Mullach, Fragm. Philos. i.
504 sqq.; Göttling, Ges. Ahhand.
i. 278 sq., ii. 280 sq., has subjected
them to a thorough criticism. But
his interpretations are often too
artificial, and he is apt to seek
unnecessarily for hidden meanings
in prescripts, which originally
were of a purely ritualistic cha-
racter. Cf. also Rohde, Rh. Mus.
xxvi. 561.
* Wide supra, p. 336, 4; 338, 4.
THE PXTHAGOREAN SCHOOL, 353
and from the existence of Pythagorean orgies in the
fifth century; but that does not make him by any
means the extraordinary phenomenon presupposed by
the later tradition ; he merely stands in the same
category with Epimenides, Onomacritus, and other men
of the sixth and seventh centuries. Further, it seems
certain that the Pythagorean Society distinguished f
itself above all other similar associations by its ethicakſ
tendency; but we can get no true idea of its ethical
aims and institutions from the later untrustworthy
authorities. Pythagoras doubtless entertained the
design of founding a school of piety and morality,
temperance, valour, order, obedience to government
and law, fidelity to friends, and generally for the en-
couragement of all virtues belonging to the Greek, and
particularly to the Doric conception of a good and brave
man; virtues which are particularly insisted on in the
sentences attributed with more or less probability to
Pythagoras. For this purpose he appealed first to the
religious motives which resulted from the belief in the
dominion of the gods, and especially from the doctrine
of transmigration; then he had recourse to the educa-
tional methods and usages of his native country, such
as music and gymnastics. We are assured by the most
trustworthy traditions that these two arts were zealously
practised in the Pythagorean school. With these may
have been also connected (vide Supra) the use of cer-
tain therapeutic and secret remedies. Incantation, song,
and religious music probably played the part attributed
to them in the myths; this is rendered probable by the
whole character of the art of medicine in ancient times,
WOL. I. A A -

354 PYTHAGORAS.
#
{
closely allied as it was with religion, sorcery and music ;
while, on the other hand, the statement that the Pytha-
gorean art of medicine consisted mainly of dietetics' is
confirmed, mot merely by its connection with gymnastic
and by the whole character of the Pythagorean mode of
life, but also by Plato's similar view.” It is probable
too, that the Pythagoreans adopted the practice in their
society of common meals, either daily or at certain
times; * but what later authors have said about their
community of goods is certainly fabulous; and the
peculiarities ascribed to them concerning dress, food,
and other habits of life must be reduced to a few traits
of little importance.” Furthermore, although the politi-
cal character of the Pythagorean society is undemiable,
yet the assertion" that its entire design was of a purely
political kind, and that every other end was subordi-
nated to this, goes far beyond any proofs deducible from
history, and is neither compatible with the physical and
mathematical bent of the Pythagorean science, nor with
" Iambl. 163, 264.
* Rep. iii. 405 C sqq.; Tim.
88 C sqq.
* Cf. on the medical art of the
Pythagoreans and their contempo-
raries, Krische, De Societ, a Pyth.
Cond, 40; Forschungen, &c. 72 sqq.
* As Krische supposes, De
Societ. &c. 86, relying on the muti-
lated passage of Satyrus, ap. Diogº
viii. 40; cf. Iambl. 249; vide the
writers quoted, p. 343, 4, who
throughout presuppose community
of goods.
* Cf. p. 344 sqq. * *
& Krische, 1. c., p. 101, con-
cludes thus: Societatis (Pythagori-
cae) scopus fuit mere politicus, ut
lapsam optimatium potestatem non
modo in pristinum restitueret, sed
firmaret amplificaretgue ; cum sum-
ſmo hoc scopo duo conjuncti fuerunt,
moralis alter, alter ad literas spec-
tans. Discipulos Suos bonos pro-
bosque homines reddere voluit
Pythagoras et ut civitatem mode-
Tantes potestate Sua non abuterentur
ad plebem opprimendam, et ut plebs,
intelligens Stſis commodis consuli,
conditione Sua contenta esset. Quo-
niam vero bonum sapiensque mode-
ramen (non) nisi aprudenteliterisque
ea culto viro easpectari licet, philoso-
phiae studium necessarium durit
Samius is, qui ad civitatis clavum
tenendum se accingerent.
THE PPTHAGO REAN SCHOOL. 355
the fact that the most ancient authorities represent
Pythagoras to us rather as a prophet, a wise man and a
moral reformer, than as a statesman." The alliance of
Pythagoreanism with the Doric aristocracy seems to me
the consequence and not the reason of its general
tendency and view of life, and though the tradition
which bids us recognise in the Pythagorean societies of
Magna Græcia a political combination may in the
main be worthy of credit, yet I find no proof that the
religious, ethical, and scientific character of the Pytha-
goreans was developed from their political bias. The
contrary seems, indeed, more probable. On the other
hand, it is difficult to admit that scientific inquiry was
the root of Pythagoreanism. For the moral, religious,
, and political character of the school cannot be explained
by the theory of numbers and mathematics, in which,
as we shall presently find, the distinguishing pecu-
liarities of the Pythagorean science consisted. Pytha-
goreanism seems rather to have originated in the moral
and religious element, which is most prominent in the
oldest accounts of Pythagoras, and appears in the
early Pythagorean orgies, to which also the sole doctrine
which can with any certainty be ascribed to Pythagoras
himself-i-the doctrine of transmigration—relates. Py-
thagoras desired to effect, chiefly by the aid of religion,
--a reform of the moral, life; but as in Thales, the first
physical speculation had connected itself with ethical
reflection, so here practical ends were united with that
form of scientific theory to which Pythagoras owes his
place in the history of philosophy. Again, in their
* Wide supra, texts quoted pp. 336; 346, 1; 350, 1.
A A 2
356 PYTHIAGORAS.
religious rites alone must we seek for the much talked
of mysteries of the Pythagorean Society. The division
of esoteric and exoteric (if this indeed existed among
the ancient Pythagoreans) was purely a religious dis-
tinction. It resulted from the traditional distinction
between greater and lesser initiations, between com-
plete and preparatory consecrations." That philosophic
doctrines or even mathematical propositions, apart from
their possible religious symbolism, should have been
held secret, is in the highest degree improbable; * Phi-
lolaus at any rate, and the other authorities from whom
Plato and Aristotle derived their knowledge of Pytha-
goreanism, can have known nothing of any ordinance
of this nature.”
The political tendency of the Pythagorean com-
munity was fatal to its material existence and to a
* In regard to the later con-
ception of the importance of this
distinction, I cannot agree with
Rohde (Rh. Mus. xxvi. 560 sq.)
in explaining it from the supposed
fact that after there appeared a
Pythagorean philosophy the adhe-
rents of this, philosophy regarded
the original Pythagoreanism, which
was limited to religious prescripts
and observances, as merely a pre-
paratory stage of the higher know-
ledge; this seems to me to be an
invention of the Neo-Pythagoreans,
who thus attempted to represent
as the opinion of Pythagoras what
they themselves had foisted upon
him. and to explain away the entire
silence of ancient tradition on the
subject. It is only in their writings
that these two classes of Pythago-
reans are recognised; and it is
they who, in the passages discussed
p. 309, 2, declare the celebrated pro-
positions of the Pythagoreans to be
something exoteric, the true mean-
ing of which can only be discovered
by regarding them as symbols of
deeper doctrines kept up as a mys-
tery by the school, and lost from
general tradition. That the true
philosophy of the Pythagoreans
should be represented as an occult
doctrine, only imparted to a select
minority even of the disciples, is
quite in harmony with this ten-
dency, which, indeed, is its most
obvious explanation.
* So also Ritter, Pyth. Phil.
52 sq. &c.
* What Porphyry, 58, and
Iamblichus, 253, 199, say in its de-
fence, carries on the face of it the
stamp of later invention. Cf.
Diog. viii. 55 (supra, p. 315).
THE PIV THAGOREAN SCHOOL. 357
great part of its members. The democratic movement
in opposition to the traditional aristocratic institutions,
which in time invaded most of the Greek States, de-
clared itself with remarkable rapidity and energy in
the populous and independent Italian colonies, in-
habited by a mixed population, excited by ambitious
leaders. The Pythagorean avvéöpua formed the centre
of the aristocratic party: they therefore became the im–
mediate object of a furious persecution which raged
with the utmost violence throughout lower Italy. The
meeting houses of the Pythagoreans were everywhere
burnt; they themselves murdered or banished, and the
aristocratic constitutions overthrown. This continued
until at length, through the intervention of the Achaeans,
an agreement was brought about by which the re-
mainder of the exiles were allowed to return to their
homes." As to the date and more precise details of
this persecution, accounts differ considerably. On the
one hand, Pythagoras himself is stated to have been
killed * in it ; and, on the other, it is said of certain
* So much we can gather from
the detailed accounts presently to
be noticed, and also from the state-
ments of Polybius, ii. 32, who says
(unfortunately only incidentally,and
without any mention of date): ka9.
offs yūp kapoos év rols karū thv
'Iraxtav Tótrous karū thv pleyāAmv
‘EAAdôa tête irposa'yopewouévnv évé-
Tpmaav rô avvéöpia Tău IIv6ayopetov,
perä raúra ös Yuvouévov civiuatos
6Aoaxepods repl r&s troAiretas, Štep
eikös, Ös &v Tóv trptºrov &vöpóv é;
ékdoºrms tróAews oftw trapaxóyws
ôuaq,6apévrov, ovvé8m rās kar’
exeſvous rot's Tótrovs ‘EAAmvikås
TóAels &vatAma 6ival påvov Kal
orráorews ical travrobatrâs rapax.js.
On this rests the assertion that the
Achaeans united Crotona, Sybaris,
and Caulonia in a league and con-
vention, and thus introduced their
constitution into those cities.
* The various accounts are
these : 1st, according to Plut. Stoic.
Hep. 37, 3, p. 1051 ; Athenag.
Supplic. c. 31 ; Hippolyt. Refut.
i. 2, sub fin. ; Arnob, Adv. Gent.
i. 40; Sohol. in Plat. p. 420, Bekk.
and a passage in Tzetz. Chil. xi.
80 sqq., Pythagoras was burned
alive by the Crotoniates. Hippo-
lytus adds that Archippus, Lysis,
and Zamolxis escaped from the
358
PXTHAGORAS.
Pythagoreans of the fourth and fifth centuries that they
had escaped from the persecution.
conflagration, and Plutarch's words
seem to admit the possibility that
he only meant an attempt at
burning, 2. Nearest to this comes
the account of Diog. viii. 39, that
Pythagoras and his people were in
the house of Milo when the enemy
set fire to it; that he escaped in-
deed, but was intercepted in his
flight, and killed; the greater
number of his friends (forty of
them) were also put to death : only
a few, among whom were Archippus
and Lysis, escaped. 3. According
to Porph. 57 and Tzetz. loc. cit.,
others think that Pythagoras him-
self escaped from the attack in Cro-
tona to Metapontum, his disciples
making a bridge through the fire
for him with their bodies; and all,
except Lysis and Archippus, being
destroyed; that he there starved
himself to death, being weary of
life, as Porphyry says; or died of
want, according to Tzetzes. 4.
Accordingtol)icaearchus, ap. Porph.
56 sq., and Diog. viii. 40, Pytha-
goras at the time of the attack on
the forty Pythagoreans, was in the
town, but not in the house; he fled
to the Locrians, and thence to Ta-
rentum, and was rejected by both.
Proceeding to Metapontum, he
there, after forty days' starvation
(āorithaavta, says Diogenes; ev
otrável Tôv &vaykatov Šiauetvavita,
says Porphyry; hence, no doubt,
Tzetzes' theory), died. . This view
is followed by Themist. Orat. xxiii.
p. 285 b ; the account in Justin's
Hist. xx. 4, seems also to have
arisen from it; here sixty Pytha-
goreans are said to have been
destroyed, and the remainder
banished. Dicaearchus also says
Crotona is most
that more than the forty were put
to death. He, like most of the
other authorities, seems to mention
Cylon as the author of the persecu-
tion. As to the sojourn of Pythago-
ras in Tarentum, Röth, ii. a, 962,
refers to Claudian, De Consul. Fl.
Mall. Theod. xvii. 157: At mon,
Pythagora monitus annique silentes
jamosum Oebali; luaum pressere
Tarent: ; but these words appa-
rently only attest the well-known
fact that Tarentum was afterwards
a chief centre of Pythagoreanism.
IRöth moreover makes out of Oeba-
lium Tarentum a Tarentine of the
name of Oebalius, whose luxurious
life Pythagoras vainly attempted
to regulate, which is even a greater
discovery than that about the map
of Europe, which the philosopher is
said to have made in Tarentum
(vide supra, p. 347, 2). 5. Accord-
ing to the mutually complementary
accounts of Neanthes, ap. Porph.
55; of Satyrus and Heracleides
(Lembus), ap. Diog. viii. 40; and
of Nicomachus, ap. Iambl. 251,
Pythagoras at the time of Cylon's
attack was not in Crotona at all,
but in Delos with Pherecydes, to
tend in his illness and bury him;
when on his return he found that
his followers, with the exception
of Archippus and Lysis, had been
burned in Milo's house or slain, he
betook himself to Metapontum,
where (according to Heracleides,
ap. Diogenein) he starved himself
to death. 6. According to the ac-
count of Aristoxenus (ap. Iambl.
248 sqq.), Cylon, a tyrannical and
ambitious man, being angry that
Pythagoras had refused him ad-
mission into his society, commenced
I).EATH OF PIPTHAGORAS.
359
generally named as the place where the first decided
attack was made, and Metapontum as the place where
a violent struggle with the philo-
sopher and his followers during
the last years of Pythagoras's life.
In consequence of this, Pythagoras
himself emigrated to Metapontum,
where he died; but the struggle
continued, and after the Pythago-
reans had maintained themselves
for some time longer at the head
of the states, they were at last
attacked at Crotona during a po-
litical consultation in the house of
Milo, and all, except the two Ta-
rentines, Archippus and Lysis,
were destroyed by fire. Archippus
retired to his native city, and Ly-
sis to Thebes; the rest of the Py-
thagoreans, with the exception of
Archytas, abandoned Italy and
lived together in Rhegium (which,
however, is also in Italy), until the
school, as the political conditions
became worse and worse, gradually
died out. (The confusion at the
end of this account Rohde, Rh.
Mus. xxvi. 565, explains by an
inversion, which commends itself
equally to me. The true mean-
ing is that the Pythagoreans
lived at first together in Rhegium,
but when things became worse,
they, with the exception of Archy-
tas, left Italy.) This was the ac-
count which Diodorus, Fragm. p.
556, had before him, as appears
from a comparison with Iambl.
248, 250. Apollonius, Mirab. c.
6, makes Pythagoras fly to Meta-
pontum before the attack which he
foretold. In Cic. Fin. v. 2, we are
told that the dwelling of Pythago-
ras and the place of his death were
shown in Metapontum; in Valer.
Max. viii. 7, ext. 2, that the whole
city of Metapontum attended the
funeral of the philosopher with
the deepest reverence; in Aristid.
Quint. De Mus. iii. 116 Meib. that
Pythagoras before his death re- .
commended the use of the mono-
chord to his disciples. These ac-
counts agree best with the present
version, as they all presuppose
that the philosopher was not per-
sonally threatened up to the time
of his death, and when Plut. Gen.
Socr. 13, p. 583, speaks of the ex-
pulsion of the Pythagoreans from
various cities, and of the burning
of their house of assembly in Me-
tapontum, on which occasion only
Philolaus and Lysis were saved—
though Metapontum is substituted
for Crotona, and Philolaus for Ar-
chippus—the silence in regard to
Pythagoras himself, and the placing
of the whole persecution in the
period after his death, are both in
accordance with the statements of
Aristoxenus. So Olympiodorus in
Phaed. p. 8 sq. mentions the Pytha-
goreans only, and not Pythagoras,
as having been burned; Philolaus
and Hipparchus (Archippus) alone,
he says, escaped. 7. The account
of Apollonius, ap. Iambl. 254 Sqq.,
resembles that of Aristoxenus.
According to this, the Pythagorean
aristocracy very early excited dis-
satisfaction; after the destruction
of Sybaris and the death of Pytha-
goras (not merely his departure :
étrel 6& 37 exeºtmarev, it is said, and
in connection with étexeſºrmorev, the
previous éreśńuet and ārāA6e are
to be explained), this dissatisfac-
tion was stirred up by Cylon and
other members of noble families
not belonging to the society, and
on the partition of the conquered
360 PYTHAGORAS.
&
Pythagoras died; but there are so many discrepancies
as to details, that a complete reconciliation of the
various statements is impossible. What is most pro-
bable is that the first public outbreak must have taken
place after the death of Pythagoras, though an opposi-
tion to him and his friends may perhaps have arisen
during his lifetime, and caused his migration to Meta-
pontum. The party struggles with the Pythagoreans,
thus begun, may have repeated themselves at different
times in the cities of Magna Graecia, and the varia-
tions in the statements may be partially accounted for
as recollections of these different facts. The burning of
the assembled Pythagoreans in Crotona and the general
assault upon the Pythagorean party most likely did not
take place until the middle of the fifth century; and,
lastly, Pythagoras may have spent the last portion of
his life unmolested in Metapontum.”
lands broke out into open hostility.
The Pythagoreans were dispersed
during one of their assemblies,
then defeated in combat, and after
ruinous disturbances, the whole
Pythagorean party was driven out
of three neighbouring cities by the
judges, who had been corrupted,
and a distribution of lands and re-
mission of debts was decreed. Not
till after many years did the
Achaeans accomplish the return of
the exiles, of whom about sixty
came back; but even these fell in
an unfortunate encounter with the
Thurians. 8. Lastly, Hermippus
(ap. Diog. viii. 40; cf. Schol. in
Plat. loc. cit.), differing from all
other accounts, says that Pythago-
ras was with his friends, fighting
at the head of the Agrigentines
against the Syracusans, and was
killed in flight, while the remainder
of the Pythagoreans, to the numb
of thirty-five, were burned i
Tarentum.
* As is now generally supposed,
according to Bockh. Phi
* The above suppositions are
chiefly based on the following
grounds: Firstly, by far the greater
number, and the most creditable
authorities, maintain that Pytha-
goras died in Metapontum (cf.
Iambl. 248); and even those who
place the burning of the house in
Crotona in his life-time, for the
most part assert that he himself
escaped. Although it is clear
from the contradictoriness of these
latter statements that no univer-
sally accepted tradition existed at
the time, yet the fact itself that
Pythagoras fled to Metapontum


I) ISPERSION OF THE PPTHAGOREANS.
361
It was only after the dispersion of the Italian asso-
ciations, and in consequence of this dispersion that the
must have been pretty firmly es-
tablished, since the most improba-
ble expedients were resorted to by
the authors of these statements to
reconcile it with their other theo-
ries. Other accounts say that he
was put to death in Crotona or
Sicily, but this is no doubt an in
stance of what so often happens in
regard to Pythagoras—that facts
about his school, or a portion of
his school, are transferred to him
personally. Secondly, the occasion
of Pythagoras's retreat to Meta-
pontum could not have been the
incendiary attack on the assembly
at Crotona; the attack must have
occurred many years after his
death. Aristoxenus and Apollo-
nius say this expressly. Aristoxe-
nus, however, is the authority
whom we should most expect to
reproduce the Pythagorean tra-
dition of his time. With what
right Apollonius appeals in section
262 to Tö. Töv Kpotaviatóv Štropavā-
Mata, we do not know. If even
any work that might be so desig-
nated were within his reach, the
designation might apply to any
Crotoniate writing whatsoever.
Roth, however, thinks it manifestly
implies ‘contemporary records,'
and he deduces from them, not
only the somewhat unimportant
point for which they were cited,
but the whole narrative of Apollo-
nius. Moreover, the different ac-
counts assert with singular unani-
mity that only Archippus and Ly-
sis escaped from the massacre; and
as this is maintained even by those
who place that event in the life-
time of Pythagoras, it must, at
any rate, be based on an ancient
and universal tradition. Now
Lysis, at an advanced age, was the
instructor of Epaminondas (Aris-
tox. ap. Iambl. 250; Diodor. loc.
cit.; Neanthes, ap. Porph. 55;
Diog. viii. 7; Plut. Gen. Socr. 13;
Dio Chrysos. Or. 49, p. 248; R.
Corn. Nepos. Epam. c. 1), and the
birth of Epaminondas cannot be
supposed earlier than 418–420
B C.; not only because he fought
vigorously at Mantinea in 362, but
also because Plut. De Lat. Viv. 4,
5, p. 1129, names his fortieth year
as the period at which he began to
be important, and this period (ac-
cording to Vit. Pelop. c. 5, end, c.
12; De Gen. Socr. 3, p. 576) could
not have been before 378 B.C., the
deliverance of Thebes. Supposing
Lysis to have been fifty years older
than his pupil, we thus arrive at
468–470 B.C. as the earliest date of
his birth, and the attack in Crotona
could scarcely, even in that case,
have occurred before 450 B.C. It
is more probable, however, that the
difference between the ages of Ly-
sis and Epaminondas was not so
great (according to Plut. Gen. Socr.
8, 13, Lysis died shortly before the
deliverance of Thebes), and that
the Crotonian massacre must be
placed about 440 B.C., or even later.
The statement of Aristoxenus
abcut Archytas and that of Apol-
lonius—that a portion of the Py-
thagoreans, who had been expelled
from Crotona, returned after the re-
conciliation effected by the Achaeans
—points to some such date. For
although, according to Polyb. ii.
39, 7, the attacks of Dionysius the
Elder (who came to the throne in
406) left the three Italian cities
362
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
Pythagorean philosophy became more widely known in
Greece, although the Pythagorean rites had previously
(Crotona, Sybaris, and Caulonia)
no opportunity for the consolida-
tion and maintenance of the new
institutions borrowed from the
Achaeans some time (uerá rugs
xpóvovs) after the adjustment of
the Pythagorean troubles—yet the
Achaean mediation could scarcely
have occurred earlier than from
ten to fifteen years previous to the
end of the Peloponnesian war; but
Polybius himself seems to assume
that the troubles to which the
burning of the Pythagorean houses
gave the signal, were not very dis-
tant chronologically from the in-
tervention of the Achaeans. It
matters not that the Pythagorean
assembly which was burned is
universally placed in the house
of Milo, and that the authors of
the deed are also called by Aris-
toxenus Cylonians; for Milo's
house may have remained the meet-
ing place of the Pythagoreans after
the death of its owner, as Plato's
garden was that of the Academy;
and “Cylonians’ seems, like Pytha-
goreans, to have been a party name,
which survived the chief from
whom it was derived; cf. Aristox.
loc. cit. 249. Thirdly. It is never-
theless probable that before the
death of Pythagoras, a party ad-
verse to the Pythagoreans was
formed by Cylon in Crotona, which
party may have been strengthened
mainly by the demand for a divi-
sion of the conquered lands, and
by the victorious conflict with the
Sybarites; and that this disturb-
anóe may have determined Pytha-
goras to remove to Metapontum.
This is admitted by Aristoxenus
and Apollonius, though the former
makes the burning of Milo's house
take place an indefinite time after
the death of Pythagoras; and the
latter, instead of the burning, re-
Iates another incident in the time
of Cylon. Even Aristotle (ap.
Diog. ii. 446, cf. viii. 49) inci-
dentally mentions Cylon's enmity
against Pythagoras, which had be-
come proverbial. These earlier
conflicts, however, cannot have oc-
casioned the overthrow of the Py-
thagoreans in Lower Italy. This
can only have happened (even ac-
cording to Polybius) when the
burning of the council house in
Crotona gave the signal for similar
acts in other places, and a universal
storm broke out against the Py-
thagoreans. When, therefore,
Aristoxenus says that the Pythago-
reans kept the lead of public affairs
in the cities of Magna Graecia for
some time after the first attack
upon them, there is every reason for
crediting the statement. Fourthly.
If the first popular movement
against the Pythagoreans was con-
fined to Crotona, and if they finally
maintained themselves there, it is
not probable that Pythagoras, con-
trary to the principles of his school,
should have starved himself to
death, or even have died of hun-
ger. It rather seems as if, even
in Aristotle's time, tradition had
been silent as to the particular
circumstances of his death, and
that the lacuna was subsequently
filled by arbitrary conjectures; so
that Aristoxenus is here most
worthy of credit, when he restricts
himself to the remark: kåke? Aéye-
rai karaatpéthat Töv 8tov. Chaignet
i. 94, objects to the foregoing that
IATER PIV THAGOREA.N.S.
363
gained entrance there," and certain individuals had
turned their attention to the philosophic doctrines of
the school.”
At this period, at all events, we first hear
of Pythagorean writings “and of Pythagoreans who lived
elsewhere than in Italy. The first of these with whom
we are acquainted, is Philolaus.* We know that he
was a contemporary of Socrates and Democritus, and
probably was older than either; that in the last decade
of the fifth century he resided in Thebes,” and that he
if the Pythagoreans had been
banished from Italy for seventy
years, they would not have been
called the Italian philosophers
(vide Supra, p. 338, 1). I know not
with what eyes he can have read
a discussion, which expressly at-
tempts to show that the Pythago-
reans were not expelled till 440,
and returned before 406.
* Wide supra, p. 346, 1.
* Wide the expression of Hera-
cleitus, quoted p. 336, 5, and the
assertions of Thrasyllus, Glaucus,
and Apollodorus, ap. Diog. ix. 38,
according to which Democritus was
acquainted with Philolaus, that he
spoke with admiration of Pythago-
ras in a treatise called after him,
and, in general, had made indus-
trious use of the Pythagorean doc-
trines. Democritus, however, was
certainly younger than Philolaus,
and it is doubtful how far Herac-
leitus had knowledge of Pythagoras
as a philosopher. His words seem
rather to refer to the founder of
the religious association. He
charges Pythagoras with kaicote-
xvin; and the ovyypaſpal, from
which he is said to have gained
his false wisdom, may either mean
Orphic hymns, or the ancient my-
thological poems, of which Hera-
cleitus generally speaks so slight-
ingly; or, at any rate, the writings
of Pherecydes and Anaximander.
The passage concerning Pythagoras
and his universal knowledge per-
haps stood in the same connection
as the polemic against the ancient
poets.
* Wide supra, p. 313.
* For Archippus, who is repre-
sented in Hieron. c. Ruf. iii. 469,
Mart. (vol. ii. 565, Wall.) as teach-
ing with Lysis in Thebes, was a
somewhat younger contemporary
of Lysis. The statement seems to
have arisen from the two names
being elsewhere mentioned to-
gether; for all other authorities
agree that Archippus returned to
Tarentum after the conflagration
in Crotona, and that Lysis went
alone to Thebes. Wide the passa-
ges quoted supra, p. 357, 2.
* Plato, Phaedo, 61 D; Diog.
loc. cit. Diog, viii. 84, names Cro-
tona as the native city of Philo-
laus ; all other authorities, Taren-
tum. Cf. Böckh, Philol. p. 5 sqq.,
where the erroneous statements
that he escaped from the fire in
Crotona (Plut. Gen. Socr. 13, vide
supra, p. 359); that he was the
instructor of Plato (Diog. iii. 6),
and a personal pupil of Pythagoras
364 IATER PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
was the author of the first exposition of the Pythagorean
system." Lysis must also have come to Thebes about
the same time as Philolaus, and probably resided there
up to the second decade of the fourth century.” Plato”
assigns Timaeus the Locrian to the same period, but it
is not certain whether or not this Timaeus was a his—
torical personage. Among the disciples of Philolaus
is mentioned Eurytus,” of Tarentum or Crotona, who
must also be supposed to have spent a part of his life
out of Italy, since those of his pupils who are known
to us came, one of them from Thrace, the others from
Phlius.”
(Iambl. V. P. 104), with others of
a similar kind, are refuted. Ac-
cording to Diog. viii. 84, Philolaus
was put to death in Crotona on
suspicion of aiming at the Tyranny.
He must, therefore, have returned
to Italy, and become implicated in
the final party conflicts with the
Pythagoreans.
* Cf. Supra, pp. 313; 314, 2;
and Böckh, Philol. p. 18 sqq., who
rightly contests the assertion that
the work of Philolaus was first
brought to light by Plato. Preller
(Allg. Encycl. iii. Sect. vol. xxiii.
371), at any rate, does not convince
me of the contrary. The result of
Böckh's enquiry, p. 24 sqq., is, that
the work bore the title tep pigeos,
that it was divided into three
books, and is identical with the
writing to which Proclus gives the
mystical name of 84*.xai.
* Cf. p. 361, and Iambl. V. P.
185; ibid. 75 sqq.; Diog. viii. 42,
a portion of a letter said to be his.
Further details as to the writings
attributed to him, p. 322, Part iii.
Jo, 37, second edition. . . .*
These scholars of Eurytus are called by Aris-
* In the Timaeus and Critias;
•cf. especially Tim. 20 A.
* Iambl. 139, 148, calls him a
scholar of Pythagoras. He also,
in section 148, names Crotona as
his native city; in section 67, how-
ever, agreeing with Diog. viii. 46;
Apul. Dogm. Plat. (sub init.);
Tarentum ; section 266 represents
him, together with a certain Thea-
rides, as living in Metapontum;
this statement, however, stands in
a very doubtful connection. Diog.
iii. 6, and Apul. loc. cit. mention
him among the Italian instructors
of Plato. Some tenets of his will
be mentioned further on. The frag-
ments in Stob. Ecl. i. 210, and Clem.
Strom. v. 559 D, do not belong to
him, but to an imaginary Eurysus,
and are no doubt spurious.
* We know little more of them
than what is said in Diog. viii. 46
(cf. Iambl. Vita Pythag. 251):
rexeuratot yºp yévovºro róv IIv6a-
yopetww offs ſcal 'Aptoráčevos eiðs,
Bevöqtads 6' 6 XaAktöews &trö Opticms
kal pávrov 6 fºuágios kaſ 'Exekpárms
kal Atokańskał IIoMüuvaaros, ºxida-
DIODORUS, CLINIAS.
365
toxenus the last of the Pythagoreans, and he says that
with them the school, as such, became extinct."
The
school, according to this, must have died out in Greece
proper soon after the middle of the fourth century,
though the Bacchic Pythagorean rites may have con-
tinued" to exist some time longer, and may have fur-
nished a pretext to Diodorus of Aspendus,” for desig-
nating his cynicism as Pythagorean Philosophy.
Even in Italy, however, the Pythagorean school was
not annihilated by the blow which destroyed its political
ascendency. Though the
persecution may have ex-
tended to most of the Greek colonies, it can hardly
to kal airoi. 70'av 6’ &kpoatal pixo-
Adov kal Eöpárov Tóv'Tapavrivov. Of
Xenophilus we are told (Plin. Hist.
Naț. vii. 50,168; Valer. Max. viii. 13,
3; Lucian, Macrob. 18) that he at-
tained the age of 105 in perfect
health. The two last authorities
appeal to Aristoxenus, in support
of this statement. Pliny and the
Pseudo-Lucian call Xenophilus the
musician ; according to the lat-
ter, he lived in Athens. Eche-
crates is the same person who is
mentioned in the Phaedo and in the
ninth Platonic letter. Cic. Fin. v.
29, 87, wrongly calls him a Locrian,
cf. Steinhart, Plato's Werke, iv.
558.
* Wide previous note, and
Iambl. loc. cit. : épáxašav učv obv
rd & 3pxis #0m kai Tà uo.6%iuata,
katrol ékAeitroëorms rās aipéaews ws
evre Mós hºpavío.6morav railra uèv ošv
'Aptoráčevos Sumyeºrai. Diodor. xv.
76. The last Pythagorean philo-
sophers lived in the third year of
the 103rd Olympiad (366 B.C.).
* As will be shown later on.
* This Diodorus, who came
from the city of Aspendus, in
Pamphylia, is mentioned by Sosi-
crates, ap. Diog. vi. 13, as the in-
ventor of the Cynic garb, or, as
Athen. iv. 163, more accurately
says, the person who first wore it
among the Pythagoreans. With
this Timaeus, ap. Athen. loc. cit.
agrees. Iambl. 266 calls him a
pupil of Aresas, the Pythagorean;
but this is manifestly false, as
Aresas is said to have escaped from
the persecution of Cylon, and Dio-
dorus, according to Athenaeus, must-
have lived about 300. To the same
period Lyco seems to belong, who is
called by Diog. (v. 69) IIv6ayopukös,
and whose attacks upon Aristotle
are spoken of by Aristocles, Eus.
Pr. Ev. xv.2, 4 sq. The latter says
of him, Atkovos roo Aéryovros sival
IIv6ayopikov Šavrów, and includes
him among those adversaries of
Aristotle who were contemporary
with him, or somewhat later.
(This was overlooked, supra, p.
308, 1.) It is probably the same
person who is called in Iambl. 267
a Tarentine.
ºr
_^
366 LATER PIPTHAGOREA.N.S.
have done so to all, and in certain cities Pythagorean
teachers would seem to have maintained their position
even before the restoration of peace. At all events, if
the sojourn of Philolaus in Heraclea," for instance, be a
historical fact, it perhaps may have occurred previously
to that epoch. In this same town is said to have
lived Clinias the Tarentine,” who in any case was no
doubt a near contemporary of Philolaus.* As to his
philosophical importance, we can decide nothing. Many
proofs have come down to us of the purity, gentleness,
and mobility of his character; * but we possess very few
of his philosophic propositions, and these are by no
means of unquestionable authenticity.” Prorus is men-
tioned as another of his contemporaries in Cyrene," to
which city, if this statement be true, Pythagoreanism
must have spread from its original centre. In the first
half of the fourth century, it even attained, in the person
of Archytas,” to new political importance. We know
1 Iambl. 266, where from the
context the Italian Heraclea can
alone be meant ; this city was a
colony from Tarentum and Thurii,
founded in the fourth year of the
86th Olympiad.
2 Iambl. 266 sq.
* As is presupposed by the
apocryphal story in Diog. ix. 40,
that he and Amyclas restrained
Plato from burning the writings
of Democritus. -
4 Iambl. V. P. 239; cf. 127,
198; Athen. xiii. 623 sq. after
Chameleon; AElian. V. H. xiv. 23;
Basil. De Leg. Graec. libr. Opp. ii.
179 d (Serm. xiii.; Opp. iii. 549
c.); cf. note 3.
5 The two fragments of an
ethical character in Stob. Floril. i.
65 sq. are evidently spurious, as
may be seen from the mode of ex-
pression. So no doubt is the state-
ment about the One in Syrian, on
Metaph. Schol. in Ar. 927 a, 19
Sqq. A small fragment, which we
find in Iambl. Theol. Arithm. 19,
bears no definite mark of being
spurious; but, on the other hand,
its authenticity cannot be demon-
strated. Lastly, Plut. Qu. Conv,
iii. 6, 3, is a passage of small im-
portance, whether genuine or not.
* According to I) iodorus, Fragm.
p. 554, Wess., Clinias, learning
that Prorus had lost his property,
journeyed to Cyrene to the relief
of this brother Pythagorean, who
was personally unknown to him.
* What we know of his life is
ARCHIVTAS. 367
liutle, however, with certainty concerning his scientific
theories; nor can we determine how far a philosophic
impulse was connected with this renewed life of the
school. Soon after the period of Archytas the Pytha-
gorean school, even in Italy, seems to have died out, or
at any rate, to have been represented only by some
isolated followers. Aristoxenus, at least, speaks of it as
an entirely extinct phenomenon," and we have no in-
formation from other sources as to the longer continu-
ance of the school,” although the knowledge of its doc-
trines was not confined to the sages of Greece.”
Besides those Pythagoreans we have spoken of,
limited to a very few statements.
Born in Tarentum (Diog. viii. 79,
&c.), a contemporary of Plato
and of Dionysius the younger
(Aristox ap. Athen. xii. 545 a ;
Diog. loc. cit.; Plato, Ep. vii. 338
c), said to be Plato's instructor
(Cic. Fin. v. 29, 87; Rep. i. 10;
Cato, 12, 41); according to ano-
ther equally untrustworthy account
(vide supra, 320, 4) his pupil—he
was equally great as a statesman
(Strabo, vi. 3, 4, p. 280: trpoéotn
Tâs tróAews troXèv xpóvov; Athen.
loc. cit.; Plut. Praec. Ger. Reip.
28, 5, p. 821; AEI. W. H. iii. 17;
Demosth. Amator. vide Supra, p.
320, 4) and as a general (Aristox.
ap. Diog. viii. 79, 82, vide Supra,
p. 321, 2; AElian, V. H. vii. 14).
He distinguished himself in math-
ematics, mechanics, and harmony
(Diog. viii. 83; Horat. Carm, i.
28; Ptolem. Harm. i. 13; Porph.
in Ptol. Harm. 313; Proclus in
Euc. 19 [66 Friedl. after Eude-
mus]; Apul. Apol. p. 456; Athen.
iv. 184 e), of a noble and well
balanced character (Cic. Tusc. iv.
36, 78; Plut. Ed. Puer. 14, p. 10;
Des. Num. Vind. 5, p. 551; other
particulars ap. Athen. xii. 519 b ;
AEl. xii. 15; xiv. 19; Diog. 79).
His death by drowning is well
known from Horace. As to his
writings, vide supra, p. 320 sqq.,
and Part iii. b, 88 sqq., second
edition.
* Wide supra, p. 364, 4.
* For Nearchus the Tarentine,
to whom Cato (ap. Cic. Cato, 12, 41)
refers the tradition of a discourse
of Archytas against pleasure, is
probably an imaginary person, and
is not even called by Cicero a Py-
thagorean. It is Plutarch who, in
repeating Cicero's statement (Cato
Maj. c. 2) first so describes him.
This discourse, the pendant to the
hedonistic discourse which Aristo-
xenus, ap. Athen. xii. 545 b sqq.,
puts into the mouth of Polyarchus
in the presence of Archytas, no
doubt arose, either directly or in-
directly, out of this passage of Aris-
toxenus. -
* Wide infra, Part iii. b, 68 sq.,
second edition.
368 THE PPTHAGOREAW PHILOSOPHY,
many others are named in the confused and ill-arranged
catalogue of Iamblichus,' and elsewhere. But several
of these names evidently do not belong to the Pytha-
goreans at all; others have possibly been introduced by
subsequent interpolators; and all are worthless for us,
because we know nothing further about the men they
designate. There are, however, some few men who are
connected with the Pythagorean school, but do not
properly belong to it, whom we shall have to notice
later on.
THE PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY : ITS FUNDA-
NUMBER AND THE ELE-
III.
MENTAL CONCEPTIONS ;
MENTS OF NUMBER,
IN order to estimate rightly the philosophy of the
Pythagoreans, it is of the highest importance that we
should distinguish in their doctrines and institutions
that which is philosophical in the narrower sense from
that which has arisen from other sources and motives.
The Pythagoreans constitute primarily not a scientific,
but a moral, religious, and political association; * and
though a definite tendency of philosophic thought was
developed in this association at an early period, and
probably by its very founder, yet its members were not
all philosophers, nor were all the doctrines and opinions
their enemies. This seems to ex-
* Wit. Pyth. 267 sqq.
plain, Aristotle's expression, oi

2 Wide supra, 352 sq. The name
‘Pythagoreans’ or ‘Pythagorici’
seems to have been originally, like
Cylonists or Orphici, a party de-
signation of a political or religious,
rather than a philosophical kind,
bestowed on them, perhaps, by
kaaotuevo IIv6ayópelot (vide supra,
p. 307, 2), cf. Dicaearch. ap. Porph.
56 : IIv6ayópelot 6' ékAhômorav
ovaraqis #maga i ovvakoxov6#aaaa
airró.
AWUMBER. 369
which they entertained the result of philosophic enquiry.
On the contrary, many of these may have arisen inde-
pendently of such enquiry, and may have related to
objects with which the Pythagorean philosophy never
concerned itself. Although, therefore, in considering
these doctrines and opinions, we ought not to lose
sight of their possible connection with the purely
philosophic doctrines, yet we must not reckon all that
is Pythagorean as belonging to the Pythagorean Philo-
sophy. As well might we regard all that is Hellenic
as Greek philosophy, or all that is to be found among
Christia.n peoples as Christian philosophy. We have
consequently to enquire in each particular case how
far any Pythagorean doctrine is philosophic as to its
content, that is, how far it may or may not be ex-
plained by the philosophic character of the school.
The most generally distinctive doctrine of the
Pythagorean philosophy is contained in the proposition
that number is the essence of all things, that every-
thing, in its essence, is number." How we are to under-
* Aristot. Metaph. i. 5: év Šē Tois àpiðuois étafveto Thy pāoriv
toūrous kal trpo rotºtov oilcoxoſpevot
IIv6ayópelot Táv uaômudºtov &bduevot
trpótol ratra trpoſiyayov ſcal évrpa-
q’évres év airois rās toūrov &pxès
Töv čvarov &px&s ºf 9morav sivat
Távrov. čtrel 6& roërwv of &piðuoi
ºtſoel Trpiórou, Év roſs &pifluois
éöökovv 6ewpeiv Šuotápata troXA&
roºs ojos Kai yuyvouévois, uáAAov #
év Tupi kal yń kal iſèatu, 3rt to pièv
Totovöl rôv àpiðuóv trg60s Sukatooriivn,
To 5* rotovë, yuxh kai vois, Érepov
*ē kalpos kal Töv &AAwv &s eitreſv
exagºrov Šuotws' éri 8& Töv špplovuków
év &piðuois àpóvres r& ré0m kal
robs A6/ovs, étreið) rā uév šAAa
WOL. I.
&qoptotôorðal trao av, oi 6 &piðuoi
traorms tºis pºorea's trpátov, rö. Töv
āpuðuðv ortoixeto, rôv Švtov o'rouxeia
travrov eivat 5téA&801, kal Töv ŠAov
oùpavöv špuovíav sival ſcal &piðuóv.
Cf. ibid. iii. 5, 1002 a, 8: oi uèv
troAAo kal of Trpárepov thu oivorſaw
kal to 6 v Govt.0 to orópa eival . . .
of 6' 50-repov ka? oroq &repot Toºrov
elva, 66%avres robs àpiðuoiſs. Cf.
the following note. It seems un-
necessary to add to these Aristo-
telian passages the explanations
of later writers, such as Cicero,
Acad. ii. 37, 118, Plut. Plac. i.
3, 14, &c.
B B
370 THE PYTHIAGOREA.N.S.
stand this formula, however, is a point on which our
authorities are in appearance not fully agreed. On the
one side, Aristotle frequently asserts that, according to
the Pythagorean theory, things consist of numbers,' or
of the elements of numbers; * that numbers are not
merely qualities of a third substance, but immediately,
and in themselves, the substance of things; and form
the essence of things; yet for that very reason, do not
exist apart from things, like the Platonic ideas.” He,
therefore, in considering the relation of the Pytha-
gorean numbers to his four kinds of causes, places
them among the material, as well as the formal causes;
for the Pythagoreans, he says, sought in numbers at
* Wide previous note, and Me-
taph. xiii. 6, 1080 b, 16: kal of
IIv6ayópelot 5’ eva. Tov uaômuatukov
[äpiðubv] TAhv oi kexaptopičvov,
&AA’ &K Tošrov rās aiorémrås oia'tas
ovved-raval qaorfu (or, as in 1. 2:
às ék Töv Špiðuðv évvirapxóvrov
&vra rà airómré). Wgl. c. 8,
1083 b, 11: to 8& rô a 6para é;
āpuðuáv eival ovykeſpeva kal Tov
àpiðubv roſtov eivat p.a6muatikov
ääävaróv čorriv . . . keivot 3& Tov
àpiðubv rà èvra Aéryovoivº Tú yotiv
6eophuara trpoor&m touri roſs atºpiaatu
às ét éketvov čvrov rôv àpiðuóv.
xiv. 3, 1090 a., 20: of 5& IIv6ayó-
petol ātā ºrb épév troAA& rôv àpiðuáv
Trá0m irdpxovira rols aio.6mroſs
ord waoru, elval uév čplēuous érot morav
rå Övra, où xopia robs 6*, &AA’ &
àpiðuðv rà èvra, whence the cen-
sure in 1. 32: trouetv čá čplēuðv rà
qvorikā oréuara, ći, Hºi éxávrov Bápos
am8& Kovºpórnta éxovta coupôrnta
kal Bápos. i. 8,990 b, 21: &piðubv 3’
&AAov um0éva sival trapd Töv &piðubv
roorov, & of ovvéotnicev 6 kóguos.
* Wide previous note, and Me-
taph. i. 5, 987 a, 14: Tooroúrov 8&
rpoo’etré0sorav [of IIv6ayópelot] §
ical touðv éorriv airóv, 3rt to tremepa-
opuévov kal to &reupov kal to evoix
érépas rivās ºf 9morav sival pāorets,
ofov trip 3) yiv # ri rotodrov repov,
&AA’ airb rb &meipov kal airo to èv
oãortav eival rotrav &v karmyopodv-
rat, Šub kal &piðubveivat thvoirotav
âtrávrov. Similarly Phys. iii. 4,
203 a, 3, of the Štreipov alone;
Metaph. i. 6, 987 b, 22; iii. 1,996
a, 5; ibid. c. 4, 1001 a, 9; x. 2
init. of the by and the év.
* Metaph. i. 5 (vide previous
note), c. 6,987 b, 27: 6 uév [IIAá-
tov] robs àpiðuois trapá tê airømtā,
oi [IIv6ayópelot] 3’ &piðuois sivaí
qaqiv air& rà irpáypiata . . . to uèv
ošv to $v kai robs &piðuous trapò rô.
Trpáyuata trothoral ſcal pººl &otep of
IIv6. &c. Aristetle often makes
use of the same distinction to dis-
criminate the Pythagorean doc-
trine from the Platonic; cf. Metaph.
xiii. 6 (vide note 1), c. 8, 1083 b,
8; xiv. 3, 1090 a, 20; Phys. iii. 4,
203 a, 3.
NUMBER.
371
once the matter and the qualities of things." With
this Philolaus in substance agrees; since he not only
describes number as the law of the universe, and that
which holds it together, the power that rules over gods
and men, the condition of all definition and know-
ledge,” but he calls the Limit and the Unlimited, which
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 a, 15 :
qaſvoviral 83 kai of rot Tov &piðubv
vopuigovres àpx?iv eival kal és àAmy
roſs of art kal &s trä0m Te kal éðels.
To this belongs also the passage in
986 b, 6 : éoikaart 6’ &s év šAms etàet
7& a Touxela rărretv' ék rotºrov yap
&s évvirapyávrov ouvearáva kal tre-
TAda:0at (paal thv oia'tav : whether
we refer these words, with Bonitz,
in the first instance, to the ten
oppositions previously enumerated
(vide infra), or directly to the otot-
Xeſa toû dpiðuoi (mentioned, 986 a,
17), the Uneven or Limited, and
the Even or Unlimited; for the ten
opposites are only the ulterior de-
velopment of the fundamental
opposition of the Limited and Un-
limited. Aristotle probably had
in his mind the passage from Phi-
lolaus, quoted p. 372, 1, as has
already been observed, p. 316.
* Fr. 18 (Böckh, 139 sqq.) ap.
Stob. Ecl. i. 8 : 6eapeſv Šeſ rê špya
kal r&v éoaſtav Tó àpt016 ſcattáv
6övauv, &rus évrl év tá Šekdār aeyā-
Aa y&p kal travtex?s kai travtoepyös
kal 6eta, kai oilpavlo 8to kal div6po-
tríva dpx& kal &yepièv . . . &vev 6&
Tai'ras travra &melpa kal &ömAa kal
dq'avī’ vouk& yöp & piſa is rô &pið-
Má, kal &yepovicë, kal Stöaoka Nikā.
Tā ātropovuéva, travros kal &yvoov-
Mévo travtſ. oë yöp is 872 ov oë9evi
où9év táv trpayud row oire airów
troð' air& otºre &AAw mor' &AA0, ei
ph is àpiðubs kal d rotto èqala:
vöv 5& oiros kattøv juxāv špuášov
airóñorel trèvra yuwara kai trotáyopa
&AAáAous katē Yvágovos pūow (cf.
Böckh, l.c.) &tepyáçetal, oroplarów
kal oxiſov toos Aóyovs xaphs ékáq-
Tovs Tāv trpayuátov táv re &reſpov
kal Táv Tepatvövtov. thous āś kai oë
Aévvv čv toſs Saipovious kal 6etois
trpáygaari Täv Tó &pt016 q &giv ka?
Töv Ščvapuv ioxºſovo av, &AA& kal év
Toſs &v6pwiriko’s pyous kal Aó)ous
träori ird vra kal karð ràs Saulovpyías
tàs texvikēs trägas kal karū tav
plovaukáv. peočos 6' oi,6&v 6éxetal &
Tô &pt046 pāoris oièë Špuovía of
ºyap oiretov airo’s évri rās yap
âmețpa kal &vohra (-dra) kal &Aérya,
qºorios to jedöos kal 6 p.66vos évrí,
and similarly afterwards, probably
taken from another place, we read,
theoãos 3& obôapiás és àpiðuby étruirevº.
troAéulov yöp kal éx6pov airá rà
ºpioi & 6’ &Ad.6ela oikeſov kal oriuqv-
Tov rá rà épiðuó yeyeº. Fr. 2
(Böckh, 58) ap. Stob. i. 456: kai
Távra ya Pºv tº yi-yvoorkóueva
āpuðubv čxoviri oi yüp 6ttàv offiv re
où6èvoire vom6%iaev oire yua orðīuev
ãvev toãra. With the above agrees
substantially the assertion of Iam-
blichus, in Nicom. Arithm. p. 11
(ap. Böckh, p. 137), which is re-
peated by Syrian, in Metaph.
(Schol. in Ar. 902 a, 29, 912 b,
17): PixéAaos 6é pnow &piðubv
éival Täs róv kooplików aiwvías
ëlauoviis rhv kpatuatedovoav kal
airoyevº avvoxfiv, but these words
cannot have occurred in a genuine
work of Philolaus.
B B 2
372 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
are the two constituents of numbers, the things from
which all is formed." On the other hand, however,
Aristotle likewise says that the Pythagoreans represent
things as arising from the imitation of numbers, the
manifold similarities of which with things they per-
ceived.” In another place he seems to confine the
immanence of numbers in things to one portion of the
Pythagorean school; * and in later accounts the state- .
ment that all things consist of numbers, is opposed
by the assertion that things are formed, not out of
numbers, but after the pattern of numbers."
* Fr. 4, ap. Stob. i. 458 (Böckh,
62): â wºv ša rē [= oiota] révºſpa-
ºyuárov &fötos égora kai air& uèv &
qºg is 9etav re (Mein. conj. 6éía évt.)
ical of k &v6potſvav čvāéxet at yuágiv
TAéov (Mein. TAdv) ya, h 8tt oix
oiów T’ 7s oi6evl rôv éóvrov kal
'yvyvooricopévov Šd' duðv yuoorðfiaev,
ań śrapxoão as airás [ths àpuovías)
évros róv trpayuárov č &v čvvéota
6 kóogos róv Te repaivévtwv Ical tăv
&reſpov (according to Böckh's cor-
rection). Meineke reads uh Ürap-
xoto as Tās éarońs róv trpayuárev,
and Rothenbücher, System des
Pythag. p. 72, founds upon the ab-
surdity of this merely conjectural
reading, a proof of the unauthen-
ticity of the fragment. In the
commencement of the fragment
the words air& uèv & púa is are not
very good sense, and even Mein-
eke's amendment, uðva è pilots,
does not satisfy me.' I would
sooner (as already observed in
Hermes, x. 188) discard the uév as
a repetition of the words before
érra, but it would be better still
to read &fötos éoroa kal &el éaouéva
qūris: the essence of things, as a
nature which is eternal and which
We are
will always exist, is divine.
* Metaph. i. 6, 987 b, 10, con-
cerning Plato, thv 5è ué9etty (the
participation of things in the
Ideas) tośvoua pāvov ueré8a Nev. of
uèv yöp IIv6ayópelot uphorel to
ëvra (paalu eival rôv &piðuóv, IIA&-
Twy Śē ge6éčel rotºvoua ustaðaxóv.
Aristoxenus, ap. Stob. i. 16: IIv6a–
ºyápas . trāvta rā trpáygara
âtrelká(ov roſs &piðuois. Cf. the
expressions, Óplot&pata and āqo-
plotova 6at in the passage quoted
above from Metaph. i. 5, and the
àpiðu% 8é te tróvt’ étréolkev, ap.
Plut. De An. Procr. 33, 4, p. 1030;
Theo. Mus. c. 38; Sext. Math. iv.
2; vii. 94, 109; Iambl. V. Pyth.
162; Themist. Phys. 32 a (220,
22 Sp.); Simpl. De Caºlo, 259 a,
39 (Schol. in Arist. 511 b, 13).
* De Caelo, iii. 1 sub. fin. : éviol
ºy&p thv púaivé: &piðuóv avvuorrãorty
&otrep rôv IIv6aºyopetov rivés.
* Theano, ap. Stob. Eel. i. 302:
ovXvows uèv ‘EAA#vov tréteigual
voutoral pával IIv6ayópav č; āpiðuoi,
tróvra púea 6al . . . 6 & [so Hee-
ren] oik Šć &ptôuoi, k at & 6, &piðuby
ëAeye travta yin/vegéal, etc. The
pseudo-Pythagoras is represented
NUMBER. 373
also informed that the Pythagoreans distinguished
between numbers and the things numbered, and es-
pecially between Unity and the One.' From this it
has been inferred that they developed their doctrine of
numbers in different directions; one division of the
school holding numbers to be the inherent ground of
things, and another seeing in them merely prototypes.”
Aristotle, however, gives no countenance to such a
theory. In his work on the heavens, indeed, he is only
speaking of a portion of the Pythagoreans when he
says they made the world to consist of numbers; but
it does not follow that the rest of the school explained
the world in a different way. He may very possibly
have expressed himself in this manner, because all
theories of numbers were not developed into a con-
struction of the universe,” or because the name of
Pythagoreans denoted others besides the Pythagorean
philosophers,” or because he himself had access to the
cosmological writings of some only among these philo-
koa uotolias and kpurikov koguoup'yo5
6eoû &pyavov.
* Moderatus, ap. Stob. Eel. i.
20; Theo. Math. c. 4. Further
as saying the same thing in the
iepos Aóyos, vide Iambl. in Nicom.
Arithm. p. 11, and Syrian in Me-
taph. (Schol. in Ar. 902 a, 24),
when he describes number as the
ruler of forms and ideas, the stan-
dard and the artistic faculty by
which the Deity created the world,
the primitive thought of the Deity.
Wide also Hippasus (whose doc-
trine on this point is not opposed
to that of Pythagoras, as was main-
tained after Brandis, in the first
edition of this work, i. 100 ; iii.
515; but is treated as a develop-
ment of it); ap. Iambl. loc. cit.;
Syn. Schol. ºn Ar. 902 a, 31, 912
b, 15; Simpl. Phys. 104 b, when
he calls number trapdbevyua Trpátov
details later on.
* Brandis, Rhein. Mus. v. Nie-
buhr wºud Brandis, ii. 21.1 sqq.;
Gr. Rom. Phil. i. 441 sqq.; Her-
mann, Geschich, und Syst. d. Plat.
i. 167 sq., 286 sq.
* He does not really say that
only a portion of the Pythagoreans
made things to consist of numbers,
but : éviol thy pija w ść dpiðuðv
ovviotăort, or as it stands pre-
viously: é; dpiðuáv ovvt10éagi Tov
oùpavóv.
* Wide supra, p. 369.
374 THE PETHAGOREANS. *
&
sophers.' But he elsewhere attributes both doctrines—
viz., that things consist of numbers, and that they are
copied from numbers—to the Pythagoreans generally ;
and the two statements appear not in widely separated
passages, but in such close juxtaposition, that if they
had been in his opinion irreconcilable, their contradic-
toriness could not possibly have escaped him. Because
the Pythagoreans discovered many similarities between
numbers and things, he says (Metaph. i. 5; xiv. 3)
they held the elements of numbers to be the elements
of things; they perceived in number (he adds in the
same chapter) both the matter and the qualities of
things; and in the same place that he ascribes to them
the doctrine of the imitation of things by numbers,
Metaph. i. 6, he asserts that they differed from Plato
in considering numbers, not as Plato did the ideas as
separate from things, but as the things themselves.
From this it is evident that the two statements “num-
bers are the substance of things,’ and “numbers are the
prototypes of things,’ do not, in Aristotle's opinion, ex-
clude one another;” the Pythagoreans, according to his
* Aristotle is fond of employ- these words that Aristotle believed
ing limitations and guarded ex-
pressions. Thus we continually
find tows and similar words where
he is giving utterance to his most
decided opinions (e.g. Metaph. viii.
4, 1044 b, 7); and the same is the
case with ēviot, when he says, for
instance, De Gen. et Corr. ii. 5 init.:
ei ydp &rri rôv puoruków orwudºrov
#Am, &orrep kal 60ket évious, iſãop kal
&hp kal rô rotavra, or, as in Metaph.
i. 1, 981 b, 2 : T 6 v & J & x a v
ë v i a roleſv učv, oùk eiðóra Śē roleſv
& role. As we cannot infer from
some lifeless things to act with
consciousness, neither does it fol-
low from the passage in De Caelo
that some Pythagoreans made the
world to consist of something other
than numbers.
* Thus in Metaph. i. 5 (to
which Schwegler in his commen-
tary on this passage rightly calls
attention), the conception of the
Öpiofoua itself is transferred to the
corporeal elements, for it is said
the Pythagoreans thought they
observed in numbers many simi-
NUMBER. 375
representation, considered things to be the copies of
numbers, for the very reason that numbers are the
essence of which things consist, and the properties of
which must therefore be cognisable in them. Philolaus
places number in this same relation to things when he
describes it (loc. cit.) as their law and the cause of
their properties and relations; for there is the same
relation between law and its fulfilment as between pro-
totype and copy. Later writers, indeed, conceive the
Pythagorean numbers entirely after the manner of the
Platonic ideas—as models external to things. There
are traces, however, even among those writers of the
contrary opinion.' But we cannot attach much im-
portance to the testimony of persons who are evidently
unable to distinguish earlier theories from later, or the
Pythagorean doctrines from those of the Platonists and
Neo-Pythagoreans.”
The meaning of the Pythagorean fundamental doc-
trime then is this:—All is number, i.e., all consists of
numbers; number is not merely the form by which
the constitution of things is determined, but also the
larities to things, uſixAov h év trup,
fi kal 56&ti, and on the other
hand, Aristotle (Phys. ii. 3, 194 b,
26) calls the Form which he regards
as the immanent essence of things,
trapáčelyua.
* Theo, for example, loc. cit. p.
27, remarks on the relation of the
Monad to the One: ’Apxūras 6&
ical pixóAaos &ötapópws to èv kal
pováða kań000 i kal Tiv pováða #v.
Also Alexander (ad Metaph. i. 5,
985 b, 26, p. 29, 17. Bon.) pre-
supposes the same when he says of
the Pythagoreans: tow votiv uováða
Te kal év čAeyov ; and concerning
the Ideas, Stob. Ecl. i. 326, asserts
that Pythagoras sought them in
numbers and their harmonies, and
in geometric proportions, &x&ptota
Töv goad tww.
* For this reason I consider it
unnecessary to discuss the mani-
festly incorrect statements of Syrian
and Pseudo-Alexander in regard to
Metaph. xiii., xiv., which continu-
ally confuse the Pythagoreans and
Platonists. In Xiii. 1, indeed, they
call the theory of Ideas, as well as
the Xenocratic distinction of the
Mathematical sphere and the Sen-
sible, Pythagorean.
376 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
substance and the matter of which they consist. It is
one of the essential peculiarities of the Pythagorean
standpoint that the distinction of form and matter is
not as yet recognised. We regard numbers only as an
expression for the relation of substances, they directly
seek in them the essence and substance of the real.
The Pythagoreans (as we are told by Aristotle," and
also by Philolaus”) were doubtless led to this theory by
perceiving that all phenomena are ordered according to
numbers; that especially the relations of the heavenly
bodies, and of tones, and, generally speaking, all
mathematical conceptions, are governed by certain
numbers and numerical proportions. This observation
is itself connected with the ancient use of symbolic
round numbers, and with the belief in the occult power
and significance of particular numbers,” which belief
was current among the Greeks as among other nations,
and probably existed from the very commencement in
\
the Pythagorean mysteries.
gave substance to the Idea—as the Eleatics made the
But as Plato subsequently

real, which was at first conceived as a predicate of all
things, the sole and universal substance—so by virtue
of the same realism, which was so natural to antiquity,
the Pythagoreans regarded mathematical, or more ac-
ëurately, arithmetical determinations, not as a form or
* Metaph. i. 5, xiv. 3, vide supra,
p. 369, 1, 370, 1.
* Wide the passages quoted p.
370 sq. Further particulars here-
after. '
* In proof of this we need only
call to mind the importance of the
number seven (so celebrated among
the Pythagoreans), especially in the
cult of Apollo (vide Preller, Mythol.
i. 155); the many triple orders in
the mythology — Hesiod's exact
prescripts concerning lucky and
unlucky days of the year (’Ep. kai
jiu, 763 sqq.); Homer's preference
for certain numbers, and the like,
mentioned in Ps. Plut. V. Hom.
145.
NUMBER. 377
a quality of things, but as their whole essence, and
without any discrimination or restriction, said gene-
rally :-All is number. This is a mode of presentation
which sounds strangely enough to us; if, however, we
consider how great an impression must have been pro-
duced upon the receptive mind by the first perception
of a universal, and unalterable mathematical order in
phenomena, we shall better understand how number
came to be reverenced as the cause of all order and
definiteness; as the ground of all knowledge; as the
divine power that rules in the world; and how thought
accustomed to move, not in the sphere of abstract
conceptions, but in that of intuitions, could hypostasise
number, as the substance of all things.
All numbers are divided into odd and even, to
which, as a third class, the even-odd (áptuottéptoratov)
is added," and every given number can be resolved
either into odd or even elements.” From this the
* Philol. Fr. 2. ap. Stob. i. 456,
&c. & ya aav ćpt0abs Éxei 350 uév
töta etón, Treptororov kal &priov, Tpirov
8è &T' &uſpotépov utx0évrov &ptio-
trépio'a ov. čicatépa Sê rô etöeos
troNAal pop paí. By the &prioré-
purorov we must understand either
the One, which was so called by the
Pythagoreans (vide infra, p. 379, 1),
but which we should scarcely ex-
pect to be described as a separate
species; or those even numbers,
which, when divided by two, give
an uneven result. Wide Iambl. in
Micom. p. 29 : &priorépugolos 6é éotiv
6 kal airbs uév eis 880 to a kai & ro
koivöv 6tapoſuevos, où piévrot ye rà.
pépm étu biatpetd. Xov, &AA’ si60s
ékárepov treptoroºv So in Nikom.
Arithm. Isa.g. i. 9, p. 12; Theo,
Math. i., p. 36; cf. Moderatus ap.
Stob. i. 22: āorte év tá, 6taipeio 6at
5tza troAAoi Tôv àpríaveis repugolois
Thy &váAvoriv Aguſłóvovoruvés à è; ſcal
6éka. This is the true reading.
Gaisford would keep Ščicaíðeka,
which is against the sense; and
Heeren, with whom Meineke agrees,
conjectures, not very happily, Ökta-
katēeka.
* Cf. the words in the passage
from Philolaus ap. Stobaeus, l. 456:
r& uèv yöp airóv čk trepaivávrov
Irepaívovira, rå Ö' éic repaivévrwv te
kal &teipov trepaivovird Te kal oi,
trepaívovira, to 5 # &reſpov &telpa
‘pavéovrat. Among numbers, of
which Philolaus is chiefly thinking,
those which result from uneven
factors only belong to the first
378
THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
Pythagoreans concluded that the odd and the even are
the universal constituents of numbers, and furthermore,
of things.
They identified the uneven with the
limited, and the even with the unlimited, because
the uneven sets a limit to bi-partition, and the even
does not."
class; those which result from even
and uneven factors, to the second ;
those which result from even fac-
tors only, to the third.
* This is the reason given by
the Greek commentators of Aris-
totle. Simpl. Phys. 105 a oirrot
8è to &repov Töv šptuov dpuðubv
ëAeyov, Ště, rb trav pºv šptuov, Šs
q'aqu oi éémyntai, eis fora ötaipoºpºe-
vov &teipov katē thv 6tzotopfav. #
'yūp eis to a kal jutom blaſpeats tr'
&Teipov, to be trepitrov Tposteðev
Trepaivet airb, kaoxtet yap airoi, thu
sis rô to a 5uaipeou, oito pºv oſſºv
of éénymºral (to whom Alexander
doubtless belongs). Similarly,
Philop. Phys. K. 11, ibid. 12:
Tö ačv yöp trepitrov trepatof Kal
Öpigel, rö 8& &priov rās étr' &n'eipov
Topſis atrióv éa riv, &el Tºv Sixoto-
pºſav čexöuevov. Themist. Phys.
32 a, p. 221 Speng. The Pytha-
goreans, declare the Šptios àpiðubs
only as unlimited: Toorov Yap elval
rfis eis rô to a roufis atriov fit is
&re pos. Aristotle himself says,
Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 10: oi uºv (the
Pythagoreans) to &reupov elval to
&priov' rooro yöp ŠvatroAapflavéuevov
(the uneven included) trapéxeiv roſs
ofort Thu ärelpíav. This, indeed,
asserts that the even must be the
eause of unlimitedness, but not
why it should be so ; nor do we
gather this from the additional
words, onjuelov 8 elva toûrov to
ovußaïvov trl rôv àpiðuðv' reputi-
Beuévav yūp rôv yvouðvøv repl rô
Thus they arrived at the proposition that
ev kal xopis 6th pºp &AAo yiver6al
To eiðos, Ště 8& év. These words
were explained by the Greek com-
mentators (Alex, ap. Simpl. 105 b,
Schol. 362 a, 30 sqq. and Sim-
plicius himself; Themist. loc. cit.
Philop. K. 13) unanimously as
follows: A gnomon is a number
which, being added to a square,
gives another square; and as this
is a property of all uneven num-
bers (for 1* + 3 = 2*, 2* + 5 = 3%
3°4-7 = 4” and so on) such num-
bers (as Simpl. 105 a, Philop. K.
13, expressly assert) were called
by the Pythagoreans 'yváuoves. By
the addition of odd numbers to
one, we get only Square numbers
(1 + 3 = 2*; 1 + 3 + 5 = 3° and so
on), and therefore numbers of one
kind; whereas in any other way—
whether by adding together odd
and even numbers (so Philop.
says), or by adding even numbers
only to the one (so say Alexan-
der, Simplicius, and Themist.), we
obtain numbers of the most diffe-
rent sorts, étépouſinesis, tpſyovot,
étr+dºyovoi, &c., and consequently
an unlimited plurality of etón.
This interpretation seems to me
preferable to those of Röth, loc. cit.
and Prantl (Arist. Phys. 489). To
bring them into harmony with the
text of Aristotle was a difficulty,
even to the old commentators. The
most probable supposition appears
to be that the words, which are
obscure, from the excessive con-
I, IMITED AND UNLIMITED.
379
all consists of the Limited and the Unlimited."
ciseness of kal xopls, mean this:
that if on the one hand the yuáploves
be added to the one, there arises
one and the same kind of numbers,
but if, on the other hand, the other
numbers, without the yuáploves,
different kinds. So that kai xopls
would signify: kal trepitiéepwévov
rów Śpiðuðv xopls róv yuapévov.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 5, 986 a,
17: roi, 5è &piðuoß [vouſ ſovoſil
orrotxeſ a ré te àptuov kai to trepit-
tov, rottov Šč to uév tretrepaopiévov
To 5& Wirelpov, to 5’ ev ć; áuporépov
eival rotºrov (kal yèp &priov sival
kai trepitrov), Tov 6’ &piðubv ék too
évös, Öp'9Movs 6*, ka0&mep eſpntal,
tov ŠAov otpavév. Philol. Fr. 1,
ap. Stob. i. 454 : āvāyka rà éóvra
eluev Trävra h repaívovira 3 &trelpa, #
Trepatvovrd Te kal &telpa. This is
probably the commencement of his
work, succeeded by the proof of
this theorem, of which the follow-
ing words only have been preserved
by Stobaeus, &telpa Sê uóvov oir àel
[of ka eſſm Mein.], and these in ad-
dition by Iambl. in Nicom. 7, and
in Willoison, Anecd. ii. 196: āpx&v
7&p oë6è to yuaoroúaevov ča orefrai
Trávrov &reſpov čávrov, vide Böckh,
p. 47 sqq. Schaarschmidt, on the
other hand (Schrift. des Philol. 61),
reproduces the text of Stobaeus
without any mention of the lacunae
in it; and Rothenbücher, Syst. d.
Pyth. 68, makes objections to this
text, which immediately disappear
upon a right apprehension of what
Philolaus really said : étrel rotuvv
qatveral otºr' k repaivávrov travrov
éávra oër’ é; direţpov tróvrov, 67,261,
t’ &pa Śri ék repaivávrov Te Kal
direpov 8 re kóguos kal rà év airó
ovvapuðx0m. SmNo. 68 kal tº €v roſs
&pyois. Tô Hévºyāp, etc., vide previous
note; cf. Plato, Phileb. 16, C : of uév
With
traxalol, Kpeſtroves huôv kal éyyu-
Tépa 6eóv oikoúvres, raûrmy påumv
trapéðoorav, &s é; Évös pºv kal ék
troAAóv čvrov táv čel Aeyouévalv
elval, Trépas 6* ſcal &tepfav čv éauro's
§§uſpvrov čxóvrov. Ibid. 23. C:
Töv Bebu èAéyouév trov to uév &teipov
ãeſ;at rôv Švrov, to 8& répas. The
latter is also called, 23 E, and 26
B, trépas àxov; and the different
kinds of the Limited are (p. 25
D), included under the name trepa-
Toetóēs. Aristotle, like Plato (Me-
taph. i. 8, 990 a, 8 ; xiv. 3, 1091
a, 18), has trépas for what he had
called, Metaph. i. 5, retrapaopºvov.
There is, in fact, no difference be-
tween these various appellations;
they are all intended to denote the
idea of Limitation, which, how-
ever, as a rule, is apprebended,
after the manner of the ancients,
as concrete, and might be expres-
sed either actively or passively,
either as Limiting or Limited, for
that which limits another by its
admixture with it must in itself
be something Limited (cf. Plato,
Tim. 35 A, where the indivisible
substance as such is the binding
and limiting principle). Ritter's
observations, impugning the au-
thenticity of Aristotle's expressions
(Pyth. Phil. 116 sqq.), are, there-
fore, hardly well founded. Nor is
it of any consequence that in the
above quotation sometimes num-
bers, sometimes the constituents of
number (the Limited and Unlim-
ted), and sometimes (as we shall
see further on) the unity of these
elements, Harmony, are mentioned
as the ground and substance of
things; for if all things consist of
numbers, all things must necessa-
rily be composed of the universal
elements of number—the Limited
380 THE PPTHAGO REANS.
this proposition is connected the following observation:
that everything unites in itself opposite characteristics.
These characteristics they tried to reduce to the funda-
mental opposition of the limited and the unlimited,
odd and even. The limited and the uneven was held,
however, by the Pythagoreans, in agreement with the
popular belief, as the better and more perfect, the un-
limited and the even as the imperfect." Wherever,
therefore, they perceived opposite qualities, they re-
garded the better as limited or uneven, and the worse
as unlimited and even. Thus, according to them, all
things were divided into two categories, of which one
was on the side of the limited, and the other on that
of the unlimited.” The number of these categories was
then more precisely fixed by the sacred number ten,
and Unlimited; and as these ele-
ments only constitute number in
their harmonic combination, all
things are likewise Harmony, cf.
p. 369, 1; 370, 2; 384, 1.
Lastly, if Böckh (Philol. 56 sq.)
objects to the exposition of Aris-
totle that odd and even num-
bers must not be confounded with
the Unlimited and the Limited,
because being determined they all
participate in Unity and are limi-
ted; and Brandis, on the other
hand, conjectures (i. 452) that the
Pythagoreans sought for the Limi-
ting principle in uneven numbers,
or gnomic numbers (which are also
uneven numbers) or in the decad,
we may reply that the Even and
the Odd are not the same as odd
and even number; the latter is ne-
cessarily and always determinate;
the former are constituents of all
numbers, whether even or odd, and
so far are identical with the Limi-
ted and Unlimited.
* Wide next note, and Arist.
Eth. N. ii. 5, 1106 b, 29: To Y&p
trakov rod & reſpov, Ös of IIv6ayópelot
ełkaſov, to 6’ &ya6öv too retrepa-
opiévov. It will be shown further
on that among the Greeks and Ro-
mans odd numbers were considered
more lucky than even.
* Arist. Eth. N. i. 4, 1096 b,
5: Tribavòrepov 3’ &oticaa'iy of IIv6a-
'yópelot Aéyely trepi airoß [toi, Évös],
tuffévres év tá ràv &ya6&w orvoroux{g
to Év. Metaph. xiv. 6, 1093 b, 11
(on Pythagoreans and Academics
with Pythagorean tendencies):
ékelvo uévrol totation pavepov, 3rt to
eč Štrápxel Ical rās a voºrouxias Čori
Tâs toū ka?.00 rb trepittöv, to eißt,
to torov, ai Övváuels ēvíov &piðuðv,
not to mention later writers, such
as Ps. Plut. V. Hom. 145.
TABLE OF OPPOSITES.
381
and the ten fundamental oppositions were as follows:–
1. Limited and Unlimited ;
2. Odd and Even ; 3. One
and Many; 4. Right and Left ; 5. Masculine and
Feminine ; 6. Rest and Motion ; 7. Straight and
Crooked ; 8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil;
10. Square and Oblong."
It is true that this classi-
fication belongs only to a portion of the Pythagoreans,
who were probably later members of the school; ” but
* Arist. Metaph. i. 5, 986 a, 22
(directly after the quotation on p.
379, 1): érepot 8& rôv airów roßtov
rås &pxàs 5éka Aéyovoſiv sivat rās
karð ovarotxſav (in two series di-
rectly opposed to one another, the
Good and the Evil) Aeyouévas,
Trépas kal &meipov, trepºrtöv kai
&ptuou, ev kal TA700s, Sešibv Kal
āplatepov, §§§ev kal 07Av, hpspotiv
kal cuotaevov, eiði kal KaputröAov,
q6s kal orkóros, &ya.6bvical kakov, Te-
Tpdywvov kal étépôumices. That the
Pythagoreans derived motion from
the Unlimited is also asserted by
Eudemus, ap. Simpl. Phys. 98 b :
IIA&rov 8& To uéya kal to utkpov
kal to whbv kal To &vápaxov Kal
ãora roſtols étri Tairo (pépet rhy
kivma w Aéyet . . . 8éArtov Šē ałria
[sc. rās Kivägeøs] Aéyetv Tatra
ão Trep Apxötas, kai per’ 6Afyov to
6 &óptorrów, pngi, kaaés étri Thy
kivmarty of IIv6ayópelot kal 6 IIA drov
étudépova'u, &c. Brandis (i. 451;
Rhein. Mus. ii. 221) concludes from
this passage that Archytas referred
motion to the Limiting; but he is
deceived by the expression, airtov,
which, in any case, should be com-
pleted by rās kivhaews, even if we
adopt his reading, airtov Aéyetv
&otrep ’Apxöras. (In the Gesch,
der Entw. der Griech. Phil. i. 169,
he has modified his view of this
passage. He must, however, have
somewhat forgotten his previous
utterances, for he says: ‘That
Archytas referred motion to the
Unlimited I still maintain, in
spite of Zeller's objection.") This
derivation of motion we also find in
Arist. Phys. iii. 2, 201 b, 20 : éviol
étépôtmta Kal &viorátmra kal to uh
bv ºpdorkovtes eival thy kivmoriv,
which Simpl. Phys. 98 a, b, and
Philop. Phys. i. 16, connect with
the Pythagoreans, and Plato agrees
with them, cf. Part ii. a, 808, 1.
There is all the less reason to con-
test the assertion of Eudemus
(with Chaignet, v. 146), since, ac-
cording to Alcmaeon, the gods and
the stars are always moving (vide
infra), and the soul, too, is in con-
stant motion. The ceaselessness
of this motion, the fact that, as
Alcmaeon says, it connects the be-
ginning with the end, might be con-
sidered a perfection, even though
motion itself were an imperfection;
it shows that the heavenly bodies
themselves consist of the Limiting
and Unlimited. Röth's statement
(Philol. Fragm., trepi iluxās, 21)
that in the table of the ten oppo-
sites it is only motion externally
produced, which is placed on the
side of the &meipov, is entirely
groundless.
* Chaignet ii. 50 sq. Questions
this, because, according to Aristo-
382
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
it was universally admitted both by earlier and later
Pythagoreans that things are compounded out of
opposing elements; and ultimately, out of the odd and
the even, or the limited and the unlimited; and there-
fore they must all have reduced the given phenomena
to these and similar opposites."
tle (vide infra $vii.) Alcmaeon had
already admitted the ten opposi-
tions, “tels que mous venoms de les
eaposer.' But Aristotle asserts, as
is quite obvious, not that Alcmaeon
admitted the ten opposites, but
that, in agreement with the Pytha-
goreans, he assumed human life to
be ruled by oppositions; which,
however, he did not like them re-
duce to fixed and definite cate-
gories. Aristotle, in short, asserts
pretty nearly the contrary of what
Chaignet finds in him.
' Wide sup. p. 378 sq. Brandis
thinks he discovers in this a trace
of a different manner of conceiving
the Pythagorean philosophy(Rhein.
Mus. ii. 214, 239 sqq.; Gr. rom.
Phil. i. 445, 502 sqq.). All, how-
ever, that can be inferred from the
words of Aristotle is this: that all
the Pythagoreans did not hold the
decuple table of oppositions, but
some of them held only the funda-
mental opposition of the Odd or
the Limited, and the Even and the
Unlimited. This does not exclude
the possibility that these latter
Bythagoreans may have applied
that fundamental opposition to the
explanation of phenomena, and
may have reduced to it the oppo-
sites which they observed in things.
Such attempts, indeed, were so
directly necessitated by the gene-
ral theory of the school that things
are a combination of the Limited
and the Unlimited, the Odd and
The drawing up of a
the Even, that we can hardly con-
ceive of the one without the other.
How could this doctrine of the
Pythagoreans ever have arisen,
and what importance would it have
had for them had it not been ap-
plied to concrete phenomena?
Granting that Aristotle may, per-
haps, in the passages cited from
the Nicomachaean Ethics, have had
primarily in view the table of the
ten opposites; granting that less
stress is to be laid on Metaph. xiv.
6, because this passage does not
relate merely to the Pythagoreans:
granting that the slight difference
to be found in the enumeration
in Plutarch (1)e Is. c. 48) is to
be regarded as unimportant, and
that the septuple table of Eu-
dorus (ap. Simpl. Phys. 39 a ;
vide infra, p. 388, 1) as well as
the triple table, Diog. viii. 26,
prove little, because these writers
evidently mix up later doctrines;
granting that, for the same reason,
we cannot attach much weight to
the text of Ps. Alex. in Metaph.
xii. 6, 668, 16; and lastly, that the
different arrangement of the seve-
ral members in Simpl. Phys. 98 a,
and Themist. Phys. 30 b, 216, is
immaterial to the present question;
yet it lies in the nature of things
that even those who had not the
decuple table, must have applied
and developed the doctrine of op-
posites; not, indeed, according to
that fixed scheme, but in a freer
TABLE OF OPPOSITES. 383
table of such opposites was nothing more than a formal
development; for the comprehension of the fundamental
doctrines of Pythagoreanism this table is of the less
importance, since in it the separate numbers are not
the result of any deduction according to a definite
principle, but out of all the opposites that are given to
us empirically, certain of the most prominent," chosen
in a somewhat arbitrary manner, are enumerated, until
the number ten is complete. So also the apportion-
ment of the particular concepts to the several series is
to a great extent arbitrary, although generally speaking
we cannot mistake the leading point of view, which
consists in an attempt to assign the uniform, the perfect,
the self-completed, to the Limited; and the opposite
categories of these, to the Unlimited.
According to this theory the primary constituents
of things are of a dissimilar and opposite nature; a
bond was therefore necessary to unite them, and cause
manner. That other oppositions, p. 288 (and similarly De Ei. ap. D.
besides the ten, were observed is
clear from Aristotle, ap. Simpl.
De Coelo, 173 a, 11 ; Schol. in Arist.
492 a, 24, rb of v Šešlov kal &va,
kal épurpoo'6ev &yaôov ékáNovv, to 8&
&ptorrepov Ical kāta, kal &mid-6ev kakov
ëAeyov, &s airbs 'Aptorroréams iotó-
pmarev čv rà rôv IIv0ayopetous (for
which Karsten, clearly unjustifi-
ably, reads, IIv6ayópg), &peakóvrov
oruvayooyń. The prohibition of
placing the left thigh over the
right (Plut. De Vit. pud. 8, p. 532)
is connected with the preference of
right and left.
* As may easily be shown, even
irrespectively of the reasons for
which, e.g. Plutarch, Qu. rom. 102,
c. 8, p. 388) derives the comparison
of the uneven with the male, and
the even with the female, yóvipos
'ydp &ott [6 repurrës àpiðubs] kal
kpateſ roß &priov ovvribéuevos, kal
6taipovuévov eis rās uováðas, 6 uév
&ptios, ka9árep to 0.7xv, x&pav
uetašū keväv évötöwori, too 8& repur-
toū uðptov &et tº Taipes àtroAetre-
Tat. It is said that Pythagoras
designated odd numbers, and espe-
cially the Monad, as male; and
even numbers, especially the Dyad,
as female, vide Ps. Plut. V. Hom.
145; Hippol. Refut. vi. 23, i. 2, p.
10; Alex. ad. Metaph. i. 5, 29, 13;
Bon. Schol. 540 b, 15; Philop.
Phys. K. ii. cf. Sext. Matt. v. 8.
384 THE PPTHAGOREANS,
them to be productive. This bond of the elements is
harmony, which is defined by Philolaus as the unity of
the manifold, and the accord of the discordant.” As
therefore the opposition of the elements is present in
all things, so must harmony be present likewise; and it
may with equal propriety be said that all is number
and that all is harmony,” for every number is a definite
union, or a harmony of the odd and the even. But, as
with the Pythagoreans, the perception of the inherent
contradictions in things primarily connects itself with
the idea of number, so the recognition of the harmony
which reconciles these contradictions is connected with
the idea of musical relations; harmony as conceived by
Philol. ap. Stob. i. 460, in
continuation of the passage quoted
supra, p. 372, 1 : étrel Šá te àpxal
iträpxov oëx époſal oiâ’ 6p16¢vNot
#aaat, #87 &öövarov is &v kal airtats
Kogunghuev, eigh #puovía éreyévero,
Grivi &v rpétrº èyévero. Tà uèv čv
Öuola kal 6164 vºla Špplovías oë6èv
éteåéovro to 8& divouala wºměč
ăuáq.vxa umbè io'otex?) diváyka ºrë.
Towaira àpuovíg ovykelcNeto 6al, ei
puéAAovti év köopaq, karéxea 6&t. The
proposition that contraries only,
and not similar things, require
Harmony is thought so strange by
Rothenbücher (Syst, d. Pyth. 73)
that it seems to him a decided
argument against the authenticity
of the fragment. But this singu-
larity only arises because Rothen-
bücher, manifestly against the
opinion of the author, substitutes
the repaivovira for the Šuota, and
the Štreipa for the divápola. For
the rest, not only do Heracleitus
(vide infra) and others, following
him, maintain that every Harmony
presupposes an Ópposite, but
Aristotle (De An. i. 4) himself
quotes the theory that the soul is
a harmony, kal yèp thv špuovíav
kpāoriv Rai o ºv6eorw évava toy eival
(just so Philolaus, vide following
note), kal Tö orópa ovykeſorðat é;
évavtſov, and Plato puts the same
into the mouth of a pupil of Philo-
laus (Phaedo, 86 B).
* Nicom. Arithm. p. 59 (Böckh,
Philol. 61) śati yüp &pwovía troAvut-
'yáov čva'a is kal 6txà qpovsövtwy
a ſuppaais. This definition is often
quoted as Pythagorean, vide Ast.
ân hoc loc. p. 299. Böckh ascribes
it to Philolaus, with probability,
on the strength of the above pas-
Sage.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 5: Töv 3Aov
oùpavöv špproviav eival kai dpiðuáv.
Cf. Strabo x. 3, 10, p. 468 Cas. :
Movorukhv čkáAege IIAárov kal ºri
Tpôtepov oi IIv6ayópelot Thy pixogo-
‘ptav, kal ka? §puovíav toy káguov
ovvertéval pagi. Athen. xiii. 632
b : IIv6ayápas . . . kal r}v toº
travros ojoſav Ště uovo.ucijs dro-
qaivet ovyketplévmv.
FIARMONY.
385
them is nothing else than the octave," the relations of
which therefore Philolaus proceeds at once to expound,
when he wishes to describe the essential nature of har-
mony.” Strange as this may seem to us, it was natural
enough to those who were not as yet accustomed to
distinguish definitely general concepts from the par-
ticular phenomena, through which they arrived at the
perception of these concepts.
the Pythagoreans recognise the general law of the union—T
In the concord of tones
of opposites: they therefore call every such combination
harmony (as Heracleitus and Empedocles likewise do),”
* “Appovía is the name for the
octave, cf. e.g. Aristox. Mus. ii.
36: Tóv étr+axépôov & KáAovu
āpuovías. Nikom. Harm. Introd.
i. 16: of traXauðrato. . . . &puovtav
pºv kaxoovres thv Ště, traordov, etc.
* Ap. Stobaeus, i. 462 (Nicom.
Harm. i. 17); he thus continues,
immediately after the passage just
quoted: āpuovías Sè uéyeffés évri
ovXAabà (the fourth) kal 6t’ 6éetáv
(the fifth) to 3& St &etáv uéſſov
Tás orvXXabás étroyöóg (a tone = 8
: 9) āori yip &mö itáras €s uégav
ovXAağä, äiro Sé pléo as troti vedraw
6t' 3&etav, &to 8& vedras €s Tpitav
ovXXağä, ärö 8& Tpitas €s Örd raw
6, 6&etav' to 8° àv uéorg wea as ical
rpíras &mdyöoov' & Sé auxA28&
émírpurov, rö 5& 6t’ 6éetáv hutóXtov:
To Stå traorév 8& Sutrāčov (the fourth
= 3: 4, the fifth = 2: 3, the oc-
tave = 2: 4). oitas Špuovía trévre
£iró'yöoa kal 6üo Stéories, 6t' àáetáv Šē
Tpſ &mdyö0a kai 5teoris. auxAagö, Öé
36' tróvãoa kal 8teats (the lesser
semi-tone called afterwards Aetupua
= 243: 256). An explanation of
this passage is given by Böckh,
Philol. 65–89, and after him, by
Brandis, i. 456 sqq. Perhaps the
WOL. I.
passage in Sextus, Math. iv. 6, may
also refer to it; this passage like-
wise correctly explains the mean-
ing of Harmony: Ös y&p top 3Aov
káguov karū āpuovíav Aéyovo. 510t-
keto 6at, oùra kal Tô (gov puxodoréal.
ãoice? §§ 7, TéAetos dpuovía év rpial
ovudovías Aageſv thu ºróa Taoiv,
Tà re 61& Tetrópov kal tº 61& Trévre
kal Tā ātā traordºv. As to the har-
monic system, vide infra.
* Bockh, Philol. 65, has rather
a different interpretation of this.
He says: “Unity is the Limit, but
the Unlimited is indefinite Duality,
which becomes definite Duality
since twice the measure of Unity
is included in it; Limitation is,
therefore, given through the deter-
mination of Duality by means of
Unity; that is, by fixing the pro-
portion, 1 : 2, which is the mathe-
matical proportion of the Octave.
The Octave is, therefore, Harmony
itself, through which the opposite
primitive causes were united.’
What prevents me from adopting
this ingenious view is my inability
absolutely to identify the Limit
and Unlimited with Unity and
Duality.
C C
386 THE PXTHAGOREA.N.S.
and transfer to it the relations of musical harmony,
which they were the first to determine." *
Before we go further, however, it seems necessary
to examine some different opinions concerning the
Pythagorean doctrine of first principles; opinions
founded partly on the statements of ancient authors,
and partly on the conjectures of modern scholars. Ac-
cording to our exposition so far, the Pythagorean system
started from the proposition that all is, in its essence,
number. From this results the doctrine of the primi-
tive opposites; and consequently, the opposition of the
crooked and the straight, the limited and the unlimited
precede all others. The unity likewise of these oppo-
sites was sought in number alone, which was therefore
defined more particularly as harmony. Many of our
authorities, however, represent the matter differently.
They assert that the entire system was founded on the
opposition of unity and duality, which is then reduced
to the opposition of spiritual and corporeal, of form and
substance, of the Deity and matter, and is itself derived
from the Deity as the original Unity. According to
another theory, the starting point of the system was not
the arithmetical conception of number and its constitu-
ents, but the geometrical conception of the limits of
space and of unlimited space. A third opinion bases
the system not on the consideration of number, but on
the distinction of the limited and unlimited. We have
now to enquire how much in all this is in accordance
with historical evidence and internal probability.
The first of the above-mentioned theories is found
* Further details hereafter,
UNITY AND DUALITY. 387
two principles.
soon after the commencement of the first century be-
fore Christ in Alexander Polyhistor. The Pythagoreans,
he tells us, appealing to statements of the Pythagoreans,
regarded Unity as the beginning of all things; from
Unity arose indefinite Duality, which was related to
Unity as matter to the efficient cause; from Unity and
Duality sprang numbers, and from numbers, points, &c."
This view is developed in the extensive excerpts in
Sextus” from a Pythagorean work. According to it,
the Pythagoreans, in a full discussion of the subject,
maintained that the causes of sensible phenomena can
lie neither in what is sensibly perceptible, nor in any-
thing corporeal, nor even in mathematical figures, but
only in Unity and indeterminate Duality, and that all
logical categories are in the end reducible to these
They, therefore, regarded Unity as
efficient cause, and Duality as passive matter, and sup-
posed not merely numbers, but also figures, bodies,
elements, and the world itself, to originate from the
co-operation of the two principles.” These principles
i Diog. viii. 24 sq.; pmol 5’ 6 x. 249–284; vii. 94, 109. It is
'AAé$ov8pos év rais Töv pixogóqov
§taSox.aſs, kal ratra sipmkéval év
IIv0ayopticots intouviuagiv. &px?iv
pºv dirávrov wováða' ék 8& Tās
pová60s &óptorov čváča às &v ŠAmy rfi
powdāl airíq àvri Štrootival ékóē tis
Mová60s kai rās &oplarov čvá60s rows
&piðuois &Köètóvãpiðuðv rô a mueta,
etc. In the same sense the mythical
Zaratas, the instructor of Pythago-
ras, ap. Plut. Procr. An. 2, 2, p.
1012, called the One the father, and
indeterminate Duality the mother
of numbers, cf. p. 389, 3.
.* Pyrrh. iii. 152–157; Math.
evident that these three texts are
based upon the same work.
* Cf. Math. x. 261 : 6 IIv0ayópas
àpx?iv čq morev eival rôv Švrov rhy
wováða, fis katē we'roxhy cagºrov
Töv Švrov čv Aéyéral, kal ºrgårmy
kat' airótmta uév Šavrijs voovuévnv
pováða voeſorbal, étriovvrefleforay 3’
éavrfi ka9 repôtmta ätroteAeſv rhy
kańovuévnv &dplatov Švaña, etc.
Section 276: éé &v yivea'6aſ page
té tº év roſs àpiðuois Év Kal rhv ćirl
Totrous trixiv čváða, &mb uév rºs
trpárms uova 60s to èv, &to 5& rºls
Mováàos kal ris àopfotov Svá60s rê.
%
c c 2
388 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
receive a further interpretation from the Neo-Pytha-
goreans and Neo-Platonists. The Pythagoreans, says
Eudorus," reduced all things ultimately to the One, by
which they understood nothing else than the highest
Deity; they derived from this two principles, the One
and indefinite Duality, God and matter; under the
former they classed everything that is good, under the
latter everything evil. Consequently they used various
names to designate these principles. The One they
called the uneven, the masculine, the ordered. That
which is opposed to unity they called the even, the
feminine, the unordered, &c. Inasmuch, however, as
this second element is derived from the One, the One
alone is to be regarded as first principle in the true
sense of the word. Similarly, Moderatus” asserts that
380° 5's yap to £v Ščo . . . katē.
Tajra (l. Tairã) 58 kal of Aoitrol
&piðwo ºr roßrov &terexévông av,
toū uév čvös àel trepitratobvros, Tās
8& &optotov Švá60s 500 yewv&oms kai
eis &teupov traj00s robs &pt011obs
ékreivočams. 36ev paolv čvtats &pxats
raúrats rov plºv rod Spövtos airtov
Aó)ov ćiréxeuv Thy uovdāa, Tov 6*
Tâs traoxotions iſans thv čváða.
Wide ibid. on the formation of
figures and things from numbers.
! Simpl. Phys. 39 a ypáqel
8& repl rotºrov 6 Eööwpos Táče karð.
Töv &vard to A6'yov patéov rows
IIv0ayopticobs to èv &pxhv Tóu trèv-
Tov Aéyev, karð 8& Töv Šećrepov
A6) ov Şū0 åpx&s róv &roteAovuévov
eival, ré reev kal thv čvavríavtotrºp
qūgiv, Širotégorea'6al 8è travrov ráv
karð evavrfoortvérivoovuévov to uév
&a reſov rá, évl rô 6è qauāov rā trpos
roºro èvavriovuévn pàorei: 5ub uměč
eival to advoxov tatras &px&s karð.
Toys &vãoas' ei yöp # pºv rôvöe, #
ôé Tó, vöe éotiv &px?) oil, eial koual
Trávrov &pxal &a trep to Év. kai trčAuv.
616, pnoſi, kal karū āAAov rpátov
&px?iv čqaorav Tów Trévrov to èv čás
&v kal Täs iſans ical rôv čvrov tróvitov
€è airo5 yeyevmuévov, Tooro Sé eival
Töv Útrepāva 6eóv . . . p.mu) roſvvy
Tovs trepi Tov IIv6ayópav to uév čv
trövtov &px?iv &m oxitreſv kar’ &AAov
8è rpátov Ščo Tö, ävoráto grouxeia
trapeuodyeiv, kaxeſv Šē rô São Taijra
oTouxeta troNAats trpoo`myopiais: rö
pºv Yap airóv Švouáçeoréat retayué-
vov, &piouévov, Yvoortov, &jev,
reputröv, Šešlov, pós, rö 8& évavtſov
Tottº &rakrov etc. &orre &s wel
&px?) To #v Ös 6* or rouxeta to #v ka
# &óplotos Svěs àpxal, Šuqa, §v čvre
tröAlv, kal 67&ov 3rt &AAo uév éat,
év # 3pxh rôv rávrov, &AAo 8& #1
to thºváài èvruceiuevovt. Kai uováčo
ka?\ovoiv.
* Porph. Vita Pythag. 48 sqq.

UNITY AND DUALITY. 389
the Pythagoreans briefly designated by the One the rela-
tion of unity, identity and equality, the ground of all
concord and of all fixed consistency; and by duality,
the principle of all multiplicity, inequality, division,
and change. In agreement with this, we read in the
Plutarchic Placita” that of the two principles of Pytha-
goras, Unity denoted the good, reason, or deity; and
indefinite Duality, evil, matter, and the daemons. Of
these two writers, the former only is at the pains to
tell us that the doctrines he ascribes to the Pythago-
reams were not stated by them in so many words, but are
merely hinted at in their number-theory. Other writers
of later times express themselves to the same effect.”
| Porphyry says himself, sec-
tion 38 : ékáAel yèp Töv &vruketº-
vav čvváueov thv učv Bext{ova
pováša kal pås kal 6eśtov Ical foov
kal uévov kal eiðv, thv 5è xeipova
8vdāa kal orcótos ſcal épio'repov ſcal
repubépès kal pepôuevov.
* i. 3, 14 sq. (Stob. i. 300): IIv-
6ayápas . . . &pxès toūs dpiðuois . . .
TrčAlv 5& Thu uováða kai thu dépuatov
$váða év rais &pxaſs. ortreč6el 5’ attø
Töv dpxöv iſ uév étrº to troumtiköv
ałrtov kal eiðuköv, Štrep earl vows, 6
9ebs, # 3’ et) to tra6m Tuköv kal 5Auköv,
ãortrep early 6 Špatós Káguos. i. 7,
14 (Stob. i. 58; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.
15, 6; Galen. c. 8, p. 251): IIv0a-
ºyápas Tāv àpxöv thu uév uováða
6eov (so Hippolyt. Refut. i. 2, p. 8;
Epiph. Erp. Fid. p. 1087, A) kal
Tâya.00w, # rus égriv h Toà évès
qāorts, airós 6 vows thv 5 déptorov
ãvá6a Satuova kal rô Kakov, trepi àu
garri ºrb 5Atköv TA760s, ott öé kai
à éparös käquos.
* Cf. the Pseudo-Plutarch (per-
haps Porphyry) . Vita Homeri,
145, according to whom Pythagoras
trávra eis &piðuois &vaq’épov . . .
8to tés àvord to 3px3s éAáušave,
thv učv &ptopičvmu uováða, thv 3& &6-
plotov 8vdāa kaaßv. Tºv učv dya%w,
thvöé calcóvoúa'av 3pxiv, because, as
is afterwards explained, everything
good is ovuſpovías oikeſov, and
everything evil arises from discord
and strife. Hippol. Refut. vi. 23:
IIv0. Toivuv dipx?iv Tóv ŠAwy &yev-
vmtov &reqfivato rºw wováða, yew-
vmthv 5è thv Švdāa kal ºrdvras
toūs ūAAous épiðuois. Hai Tàs uév
ðváðos trarépa pnolv eival rhy
uováða, travtov Šē Töv yeyvouévov
untépa Śváða, Yevvmthu Yeuvnróv.
His teacher, Zaratas, also called
Unity, Father, and Duality, Mo-
ther; cf. p. 387, 1 ; Ps. Justin.
Cohort. 19 (cf. ch. 4): thv yöp uováða
āpx?iv &trövtwv Aéyav (sc. IIv6ay.)
kal Tairmv Tów &ya66v dirávrov
airíav elval, 5t' GAA myopias āva
Te kal uávov Stöðakel 9eov eival;
Syrian, ad. Metaph. Sohol. in Arist.
842 a, 8; cf. 931 a, 5:-Most of
the hagoreans call the cause of
all things the Monad and the Dy-
390 THE PIPTHAGOREANS,
The pseudo-Archytas' differs only from this interpre-
tation in making the distinction more prominent
between the primitive essence and the two derived
principles, and in apprehending the latter not in the
Pythagorean, but in the Aristotelian form. He indi-
cates as the most universal principles, form and matter;
form corresponds to the regulated and determinate,
and matter to the unregulated and indeterminate;
form is a beneficent, and matter a destructive nature ;
but he discriminates both from the Deity, which, stand-
ing above them, moves matter towards form, and
moulds it artistically. Lastly, numbers and geometrical
figures are here represented, after the manner of Plato;
as the intermediate link between form and matter.
ad; Pythagoras himself in the ispos
A6)0s calls it Proteus (from Trpátos)
and the Dyad or Chaos. Other
Pseudo-Pythagorean fragments, of
which the contents are similar, are
given in Part iii. b, 99, second
edition.
* In the fragment quoted, ap.
Stobaeum, i. 710 sq. The spurious-
ness of this fragment has been ex-
haustively shown by Ritter (Pythag.
Philos. 67 sq.; Gesch. der Phil. i.
377 sq.) and by Hartenstein (De
Arch. Fragm. 9 sqq.). The only
fault of the latter is his attempt to
save a portion of the fragment.
Petersen's remarks (Zeitschrift
jºir Alterthumsw. 1836, 873 sqq.)
contain nothing weighty enough to
contravene this judgment, in which
Hermann (Plat. Phil. i. 291)rightly
concurs, The Aristotelian and
IPlatonic element in the thoughts
and expressions is so evident that
any further demonstration seems
superfluous; and even the influence
*
It
of Stoicism is betrayed in the
identification of iſam and oivoría,
which is never met with in the
earlier philosophers. Even if Pe-
tersen could succeed in tracing a
part of the questionable termino-
logy in Arist. Metaph. viii. 2, 1043
a, 21, to Archytas (which is impos-
sible if we duly distinguish in this
passage Aristotle's own comments
from his quotations of Archytas);
even if Petersen's conjecture were
well founded that the fragments in
Stobaeus are taken from Aristotle's
excerpts from Archytas (although
the Doric dialect still appears in
them), there would still be grave
reason to doubt the authenticity of
the passage. Archytas did not
separate the motive cause from
the elements of number, as Her-
mann well observes, in citing a text
(vide supra, p. 381, 1), according to
which that philosopher character-
ised inequality and indeterminate-
mess as the cause of motion,


GOD AND MATTER.
39]
is affirmed in more than one place' that the Pytha-
goreans exalted the Deity above the opposition of
principles, and derived the principles from Deity.
Unity as Deity, and antecedent to this opposition, was
called the One.
Unity as opposed to duality, and as
a member of the opposition, was called the Monad.”
Syrian in Met. Schol. 927 a,
19: §§tov Šil totrous à Tê KAeuvíov
Too IIv6ayopetov trapabáAAelv, . .
#vika &v airò [to èv] aspuévov
&px&v eival Tóv čvtov Aéym kai
voatáv uérpov kai &yévntov kai
âtówov Ical uðvov ſcal kupię8es, airb
to (rejected by Usener. I should my-
self prefer airó re) éavro ŠmAoûv h tº
toū befov IIAdºrovos &c. Also ibid.
925 b, 23: ÖAws 5& oëöé àtro Tóv
&aavel ávttkeipićvow oi ävöpes àpxov-
to, &AA& kal Tóv 800 ovoitouxióv
to èrékelva jöeorav, Ös uaprupeſ
‘pix@Aaos Töv 6eov Aéywv trépas kal
âtreuptav Štroorºoral, . . . kai étu
Tpö täv Šio &pxóv Tāv čviatav airíav
Kai Tavrwv čmomuévnu irpoétattov,
%u 'Apxaſvetos (or, according to the
conjecture of Böckh, Philol. 54,
149, in which Hartenstein, Arch.
Fragm. 12, concurs: 'Apxöras, a
reading which Usener had ad-
mitted in the text) uév airíav trpo
airías elvaí pmat, pixóAaos 6& tar
trövtov Špxèv elva, 5uo Xupigetal,
Bpotivos 6& &s roo travros kai oi-
orias 5uvâuel kal trpedºeſq ūrepéxel
(Röth's corrections of this passage
are superfluous and mistaken). Cf.
also ibid. 935 b, 13: éott uèv Štre-
poiſotov trapd re ré IIA&ravi rb év
kai rāya.0öv kal trapë Bpovrtvº ró
IIv6aºyopetº ral trapā tragiv ćis eitreſu
Toºs &mb row $16aoka)\etov rod Tāv
IIv6ayopetov Špºwpievous. Pseudo-
Alex. in Metaph. 800, 32 : oi uév,
&ortrep IIAárov kal Bporivos 6 IIv6a-
Tyópelos, paalv Šti rb &yaôov airo
to €v éoti kai oia'twrai év tá, év eival.
Cf. also the &iólos 6ebs ap. Plut.
Plac. iv. 7, 4 ; Pseudo-Butherus
ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 12 (Unity is the
uncreated, the Supreme cause,
&c.); Theol. Arithm. p. 8, and
Athenag. Suppl. c. 6: Aio is 6é Kal
ūſei ("Opuos cf. Iambl. V. P. 267)
& Hºv diplôubv šáñntov (an irrational
number, here, doubtless an irra-
tional numerical root) 6píſerai Tov
£eov, 6 5& too pierytotov Tóv dpiðuðv.
thv trapö. Töv ćyyvtårov [roß &yºyv-
Táta Štrepox?iv, which Athenagoras.
explains, no doubt correctly, by
saying that the highest number
designates the decade, and the
number nearest to it nine, so that
the whole is only a fanciful cir-
cumlocution for Unity.
* Eudorus, loc. cit. Sup. p. 388,
1; Hippol. Réfut. i. 2, p. 10:..dpububs
7éyove trpátos apx?), btrep &otiv čv,
déptoros dicatáAmmtos, Šxwv év Šavré,
trövtas toūs étr' &neupov Svyapuévous
éA6eiv dpiðuous karū to TAñ60s, táv
ôé àpiðuovápx?lºyé yove kaff inróa ragw
# Tpdºrm uovas, #tus éatl uovas āpany
'yevvöga trarpikós travtas tobs &AAous
āpiśaoiſs. Bettepov Šč i öväs 67Avs
àpiðubs &c. Syrian (in Metaph.
Schol. 917 b, 5) quotes as from
Archytas the following text: śrt
to èv kx, il pověs ovyyevi čávra.
Stapépel &AAhawv, and appeals to
Moderatus and Nicomachus in sup-
port of this distinction. Proclus
in Tim. 54 D sq., The first Being
is, according to the Pythagoreans,
3
9
2
THE PETHAGOREANS.
But although these statements have found much
favour with modern writers, they are not sufficiently
attested to warrant our adopting even their essential
substance. It has already been observed that we can
trust the information of later writers about the Pytha-
gorean philosophy, and especially of Neo-Pythagorean
and Neo-Platonic writers, only to the extent that their
sources are known to us. But these sources are in the
present instance either not mentioned, or else they are
contained in writings the authenticity of which is more
than doubtful. In regard to the long fragment of
Archytas, this has already been shown ; there can
scarcely be any question of it in the case of the quo-
tations from Brotinus, Clinias, and Butherus : " the
the év, which is above all opposi-
tions; the second, the ideal Monad
or the Limit, and indeterminate
duality or the Unlimited. Simi-
larly Damasc. De Princ. c. 43, 46,
p. 115, 122: the év, according to
Pythagoras, precedes the Monad.
On the contrary, Moderatus ap.
Stob. Eel. i. 20, says if these words
belong to him : ruvès Tov &piðuáv
àpx?iv &treqfivavro Thy uovdāa Tów
3& 3plbum Tów to ºv. Theo. Math.
c. 4, also agreeing with this says
in his own name that the Monad
is above the One. Sextus (vide
supra, p. 387, 3), the Cohortatio
of Justin. c. 19, and the anony-
mous author ap. Photius, Cod. 249,
p. 438 b, consider the Monad to be
the highest, when they say that
the Monad is the divinity, and
that it stands above the One: rhy
aëv yöp uováða év toºs vonroſs elval
To 8& £v év rois àpiðuois (Just.)
Röper in the Philol. vii. 546,
thinks that we should substitute
&piðumtois for &piðuois, but this is
the less likely, as Photius has the
same. It is plain that here all is
caprice and confusion. The com-
mentators of Aristotle, such as
Pseudo-Alexander (in Met. 775, 31,
776, 10 Bon.), Simpl. (Phys. 32 b),
are accustomed to consider the doc-
trine of Unity and indeterminate
Duality as Pythagorean.
* In Clinias the spuriousness
is evident even from the expres-
sion puérpov táv vomtöv. In the
fragment given by Brotinus the
proposition that the primitive
essence is superior to Being in
force and dignity is taken word
for word from the Republic of
Plato, vi. 509 B; and when to
Being is added vows, the Aristo-
telian divinity, this addition clearly
proves that this is a writing of the
period of Neo-Pythagoreanism or
Neo-Platonism. The words āti To
&ya.0öv &c., can only belong to
that period. . .
UNITY AND DUALITY. 393
artificial character of the citation in Athenagoras is
a sufficient reason for mistrusting it ; even in the short
saying of Archaenetus (or Archytas) the language and
standpoint of a later period are clearly discernible; "
and lastly, in a passage said to be from Aristotle, a
definition of matter is attributed to Pythagoras him-
self, which, in accordance with the doctrine of the
older academy, presupposes the distinction between
form and matter,” evidently showing either that the
writing is itself a forgery, or that it contains a false
statement. The expositions, too, which Sextus and
Alexander Polyhistor have followed, bear unmistakeable
marks of the eclecticism which after the second half of
the second century before Christ began to blend the
philosophical systems together, and to confuse the
ancient with the recent.”
* The language, for this use of
airía without any particular quali-
fication, is first found in Plato and
Aristotle, and presupposes their
enquiries concerning the idea of
cause: the point of view, for in
the expression airla trpo airias the
divinity is elevated above all cos-
mic principles in a manner never
known before the time of the Neo-
Pythagoreans.
* Damasc. De Princ. Arist.
Fragm. 1514 a, 24: 'AptorotéAms
8è év roſs 'Apxvreious iotope? kal
IIv6ayópav &AAo thv iſºmy kaxeiv
és àevotiv Kal &el &AAo ‘yºyduevov.
Chaignet, ii. 73 sq. takes this as
certain. In my opinion, the cir-
cumstance that Aristotle is here
affirming something about the doc-
trine of Pythagoras, and above all,
the substance of this affirmation,
clearly seems to show either that the
For these reasons the testi-
work on Archytas (of which we do
not possess elsewhere the smallest
fragment) was spurious ; or else
that Damascius had wrongly attri-
buted to Pythagoras what was said
in that work, and was, perhaps,
only known to Damascius at third
hand. What he makes Pythagoras
say could not even have been said
by the Pythagoreans, before Plato.
Aristotle, on the other hand, tells
us (Metaph. xiv. 1087 b, 26) that
certain Platonists opposed to the
ëv the étepov and the #MAo as the
material principle ; and Ps. Alex.
(777, 22 Bon.) applies this asser-
tion to the Pythagoreans. It
would seem that the statement of
Damascius, or of the work used
by him, has occasioned a similar
misunderstanding.
* This is especially evident in
Sextus. Even the dialectic charac-
394
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
monies in question are valueless; and neither the doc-
trime of Unity and indefinite Duality, nor the identifi-
cation of the primal Unity with Deity, and all that
depends upon it, can any longer be attributed to the
ancient Pythagoreans.
Among the later Pythagoreans whose tendencies
were Platonic, Unity and Duality, as we see from what
has been quoted above, play an important part; but
among the earlier philosophers, Plato is the first who
can be proved to have employed them, and the Aristo-
ter of his argument definitely indi-
cates a recent date. Moreover, not
only the Atomists, but Epicurus
and Plato, are mentioned by name,
and allusion is made to their works
(P. iii. 152; M. x. 252, 257, 258).
We find in Math. vii. 107, a very
improbable anecdote of the sculptor
of the Colossus of Rhodes, a pupil
of Lysippus. Contrary to all the
statements of Aristotle, the separa-
tion of numbers from things, and
the participation of things in num-
bers (M. x. 263 sqq., 277; vii. 102),
are attributed not merely to the
Pythagoreans, but to Pythagoras
himself (P. iii. 153; M. x. 261 sq ).
The Pythagoreans are represented
as freely making use of Pytha-
gorean and even of Aristotelian
categories. There is no doubt,
therefore, that this exposition is
of recent date, and quite untrust-
worthy, and that the defence of it,
which Marbach (Gesch. d. Phil. i.
169) has attempted, superficially
enough, is altogether inadmissible.
In the exposition of Alexander
these recent elements are less
striking, but, nevertheless, they
are unmistakeable. At the very
commencement of the extract which
he gives, we find the Stoic and
Aristotelian distinction of matter
and efficient cause. This distinction,
as with the Stoics, enters even into
the One primitive essence. Further
on, we find the Stoic doctrine of
the universal transformation of
matter (tpéreo 6a, 6’ 3Awy), a doc-
trine which is wholly foreign to
the ancient Pythagorean cosmo-
logy, as will presently be shown ;
then the Stoic couceptions of the
eipiappuévn, ot the ideutity of the
Divine with the vital warmth or
aether; its immanence in things
(öuñkeuv), and the kinship of men
with the Divine, which is founded
upon this immanence. We also
find the Stoical notions of the pro-
pagation of Souls, an analogous
opinion to that of the Stoics on
sensation, and the purely Stoical
theory, according to which the
faculties of the soul are resolved
into currents of air (rows A6-yous
juxis &véuous eival). These traits
sufficiently prove the impossibility
of regarding the exposition of
Alexander as an ancient Pytha-
gorean document. Other details
will be given further on.
UNITY AND DUALITY. 395
telian passages which might seem to ascribe them to
the Pythagoreans, and which were constantly explained
in this sense by the ancient commentators, relate entirely
to Plato and the Academy." Neither in Alexander's
excerpts from Aristotle's work on the Good,” in which
the Platonic doctrine of Unity and indefinite Duality
is developed at length, nor in what Porphyry “ says on
the same subject, are the Pythagoreans mentioned; *
and though Theophrastus once alludes to indefinite
Duality, after previously naming the Pythagoreans to-
gether with Plato, the brevity with which he sums up
the doctrines of both prevents our drawing any in-
ference from this allusion. Moreover, according to the
statements of Alexander and Porphyry, Plato places
this doctrine in close connection with the theory of the
Great and Small, which Aristotle declares categori-
* Metaph. xiii. 6, 1080 b, 6,
The commencement of the chapter
shows clearly that there is no
question in this passage of the
Pythagoreans. Aristotle only
speaks of them in the sequel, and
in reference to something else. It
is the same with the passage, c. 7,
1081 a, 14 sqq.; 1082 a, 13. This
whole chapter treats solely of the
Platonic theory of numbers. Lastly,
xiv. 3, 1091 a, 4, also refers to
Plato, and to him only.
* Comment, on Met. i. 6, p. 41, 32
sq. Bon; and Simpl. Phys. 32b; 104b.
* Ap. Simpl. Phys. 104 b.
* Met. (Frag. 12, Wimm.) 33,
p. 322, 14 Brand.: IIAátov Šē kal
oi IIv6ayópelot, Pakpāv thu ätréata-
ow émipupietorðat ye 0éAew &mavta.
kairoi ka0&ntep &lt;6eorív riva troiodori
Tús &opiatou 8váðos kai row évés'
év kal to #mepov kal to &raktov
kai rāora ös eitreſv ćuoppía kað’
aštív. ÖAws 8& oix oióv re &veu
Toºrms thu Tai, ŠAou pågiv [eival],
ãAA’ oiovio ououpeſv tís Érépas à ka)
tàs àpx&s àvarrías. This is the
reading adopted by Brandis. Wim-
mer has: Tâs étépas &c. Perhaps
the right reading of the passage
may be : ionouotpetv T. &px. €vavttas
h kal inspéxelv thu ètépav. Ötö kal
où5& Töv 6ebv, Šarol rig 9eó rhy
airíav čvártoval, 6&vagóal travt’ &ml
To &ptorov &yeiv, &AA’ efirep, p’
ão'ov évôéxeral: táxa 6' oit’ &v
TpoéNott’, strep &vaipeio 6al ovuòji-
aretal Thy đAmvoúatav č évayrtov
ºve kal [éu] evavirious of gav. The
last words, beginning at tdºxa, are
most likely added by Theophrastus
himself, but in the whole text there
is such a mixture of Pythagorean-
ism and Platonism that it seems
impossible to determine from this
passage alone what was peculiar to
each of the two factors.
396 THE PPTHAGO REAWS.
cally to be a conception peculiar to Plato and unknown
to the Pythagoreans. Aristotle and Philolaus always
cite the odd and the even, or the limited and unlimited,
and these alone as elements of number.” Even where
Aristotle speaks of numbers being produced from the
One,” he understands by the One only the number one
and never adds to it duality, which he could not
possibly have omitted if the One were incapable of pro-
ducing number except in combination with duality;
lastly, many authorities expressly deny that the Pytha-
goreans held the theory of Unity and Duality.” It
may be considered almost unquestionable them that
this doctrine did not belong to the ancient Pytha-
goreans.” The subsequent interpretations which iden-
* Metaph. i. 6, 987 b, 25: to
3& àvirl too &tepov &s évos Sváða
trotſioſal kal to &repov čk weyāAov
kal ukpot, toot’ totov (sc. IIAátovt).
Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 10: oi uèv [IIv-
6ayópetol) to &repov eival to &ptuou
. . . IIAgtov Šč 600 rà &melpa, to
Auéya kal to ukpóv; cf. ibid. iii. 6,
206 b, 27. The first of these
passages does not directly assert
that the Pythagoreans were not ac-
quainted with the dyad, that is to
say, the Övös &6puatos, but that they
were unacquainted with the dyad
of the Great and Small.
* Wide supra, p. 377.
* Metaph. i. 5, vide Supra, p.
378, 1. Cf. the lemarks, xiii. 8,
1083 a, 20; xiv. i. 1087 b, 7 ; c,
4, 1091 b, 4, relative to an opinion
similar to that of the Pythago-
reans. It is clear from the text,
xiii. 8, 1083 a, 36 sq., that it is
not the Pythagorean opinion itself.
* Theo. Smyrn.i.4, p. 26: ārāās
bé àpx&s āp.6pºw of uèv šo repôv part
Thu re uovdöa kal Thy 6váða of 6&
âtró IIv6ayópov trgo as karū to £is
T&s róv Špov čk6éoets, 6t’ &v &ptioſ
Te Kal trepitto) vootivtat, oiov Tóv év
aio.6mtois Totòv àpx?iv Thy Tpudôa.
&c. Ps.-Alex. in Metaph. xiv. 1,
p. 775, 29; ibid. 776, 9: rois uév
oùv trepi IIAárova yewvávra oi àpt0-
pºol ék Tös toū āviorov čváö0s, Tó 6è
IIv6ayópg. # yévégis Tów Śpiðuðv
éariv čk roi, TAff00vs. Similarly
Syrian ad h. l. Schol. 926 a, 15.
* Wide Brandis, De perd. Arist.
libr. p. 27; Ritter, Pythag. Phil.
133; Wendt. De rer, princ. sec.
Pyth. 20 sq.; and others. Böckh,
on the contrary, regarded the One
and indeterminate Duality as
belonging to the Pythagorean doc-
trine (Philol. 55); and Schleier-
macher considers those two prin-
ciples as synonymous with God
and matter, the principle deter-
mining and the principle deter-
mined (Geschich, der Phil. p. 56).
GOD AND MATTER. 397
tify the One with Deity, and Duality with matter, are
utterly to be discarded. For this radical distinction
of the corporeal and spiritual, of matter and efficient
force, is quite at variance with the theory which chiefly
determines the character of Pythagoreanism, viz. that
numbers are the essence of which things consist. If
once a discrimination were admitted between matter
and the formal principle, numbers would become, like
the Platonic ideas, mere forms, and could no longer be
considered as the substantial elements of the corporeal.
Such a distinction, however, is only ascribed to the
Bythagoreans by writers to whose evidence, as we have
seen, very limited credence can be given. Aristotle on
the contrary emphatically declares' that Anaxagoras
was the first philosopher who discriminated spirit from
matter, and he on this account includes the Pytha-
goreans among those who recognised only sensible
existence.” But most of the statements that have come
down to us respecting the Pythagorean doctrine of the
divinity are immediately connected with the theory
of Unity and Duality, of spirit and matter. The
divinity seems to have been conceived partly as the
first term of this opposition, and partly as the higher
unity which precedes the opposition, engenders the two
opposing elements as such, and brings about their
union. If, therefore, this discrimination was first
added to Pythagoreanism by the later adherents of the
school, the same must have been the case in regard to
the Pythagorean conception of God; and the question
is whether the idea of God had generally any philo-
* Metaph. i. 3, 984 b, 15. * Wide Supra, p. 189.
398 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
sophic import for the Pythagoreans, and especially,
whether it was involved in their theory of ultimate
causes. This question cannot be answered by an appeal
to the religious character of Pythagoreanism, nor by the
citation of passages, which express, in a religious form,
the dependance of all things on God, the duties of
Divine worship, the greatness, and the attributes of
God; for we are not at present concerned with the
enquiry how far the Pythagorean theology co-existed
side by side with the Pythagorean philosophy, but how
far it had any logical connection with the philosophic
doctrines of the school; whether, in short, the idea of
God was deduced by the Pythagoreans from their
philosophic theory of the universe, or was used by them
to explain it." General as this latter assumption may be,
it appears to me unfounded. The Deity, it is thought
by some, was distinguished by the Pythagoreans as
absolute unity, from unity conceived as in opposition,
or from the limit ; consequently, it was also dis-
tinguished from the world, and exalted above the whole
sphere of opposites.”
* It is no refutation of my
views to say, as Heyde says (Ethices
Pythagorea Vindicia, Erl. 1854, p.
25), that every philosopher borrows
considerably from common opinion.
The opinions which a philosopher
derives from this source are only
to be considered part of his philo-
sophic system if they are in some
way connected with his scientific
views. Apart from these, they are
merely personal opinions, imma-
terial to the system; as, for ex-
ample, the pilgrimage of Descartes
to Loretto is immaterial to Car-
Others say " that the first one,
tesianism. Heyde likewise main-
tains, ibid., that we ought only to
leave out from a philosophic sys-
tem such points as the author of
the system expressly declares not
to belong to it. This would at
once render any discrimination of
the essential and the accidental in
such matters impossible.
* Böckh, Phil. 53 sq.; Brandis,
i. 483 sq.
* Ritter, Pythag. Phil. 113 sq.,
119 sq., 156 sq.; Geschich. d. Phil.
i. 387 sq., 393 sq.; Schleiermacher,
foc. cit.
GOD AND MATTER.
399
or the limited, was at the same time apprehended as
Deity.
This, however, is asserted only by Neo-
Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic authorities, and in
fragments of interpolated writings emanating from the
same circle." Aristotle, in
1 Besides the fragments already
quoted, the fragment of Philolaus,
repl juxiàs, ap. Stob. i. 420 (Böckh,
Philol. 163 sq.), is, in my opinion,
in the same case. It bears so
many marks of a recent origin that
I cannot consider it authentic, nor
can I even adopt as probable
Böckh's theory (defended by
Brandis, Geschich. d. Entw. i. 173
sq ) that the foundation was
authentic, but that something has
been added by one authority in
quoting it. The very commence-
ment recalls the Timaeus of Plato
(33. A sq.; 34, B) and still more
Ocellus Lucanus, c. i. 11. The
words (p. 422), to 3’ & &pidotépov
rotºrwy, too uév čel 9éovros 6etov,
rot, 5è &el we'ro.84MAovros yewvarot,
kóa'aos, remind us in the most
striking manner of the text, c. 2,
sub fin. of Ocellus Lucanus, and
the Cratinus of Plato, 397 C.
To dispose of this coincidence
(Chaignet, ii. 81) by the substitu-
tion of éévros for 9éovros would in
itself be arbitrary and unjustifi-
able, even if the 6etov had not been
designated previously as the Četicſ-
varov, which é; aiovos eis aidºva
repitroxe? (cf. § iv. Cosm.). The
eternity of the world (and not
merely its endless duration, as
Brandis, loc. cit., maintains; the
words are: 7s 66e 6 kóa'aos éé
aiévos kal és aidºva Stauévet), which
is taught in the fragment in ques-
tion, a favourite theme of the Neo-
Pythagoreans, was, according to all
the indications of Aristotle, intro-
the various passages where
duced into Philosophy by Plato's
idea of the world-soul. These two
doctrines were, as we shall pre-
sently see ($ iv. Cosm.), unknown to
the true Pythagoreans; and, in-
deed, what our author says of the
world-soul presents in its details a
decidedly Platonic and Aristotelian
character, while Pythagorean theo-
ries, properly so-called, are wholly
wanting. The discrimination made
by the pseudo-Philolaus between
the world above file moon, which
he calls the épierd 8Xmtov or &eticſ-
wntov, and the world below the
moon, which he calls the pueraßd A-
Aov, or àeutraffès, doubtless resembles
the Pythagorean ideas, but the
manner in which it is apprehended
has greater affinity with Aristotle
(cf. for example, what is quoted
Part ii. b, 331, 3; 338 sq., second
edition), and especially the trea-
tise II. Réopov, c, 2, 392 a, 29 sq.
The influence of the Aristotelian
terminology is unmistakeable in
these words: kóopov fuev čvépystav
&föuov 6eó Te ral yewégios karð.
ovvakoxov6íav tas ueragxagºrukås
qūorios. The opposition of the karð.
To airò ical &gatros éxov and the
'ylvéueva kal (p6eipóueva troAA& does
not belong, it is certain, to the
epoch anterior to Plato: the obser-
vation that by means of generation
the perishable receives its form in
an imperishable manner is found
even in Plato and Aristotle, and
seems to presuppose the distinc-
tion made by both these philoso-
phers between form and matter.
400
THE PYTHAGOREANS.
he expounds the Pythagorean theory of the ultimate
reasons of things, never says a word about their doc-
trine of God."
Lastly, Böckh remarks that the
closing words, tº Yevvioravt. trarépt
ical Smpuoup'yó, are derived from
Timaeus, 37 C.; but we can scarcely
for this reason attribute them to
the person who reports them. Ad-
mitting that some of these coinci-
dences cannot be explained except
on the theory of an interpolation,
it would still be very difficult to
believe in the authenticity of this
work when we consider how much
is united there, which, striking
enough, per se, is inconceivable in
combination, except on the supposi-
tion that the work is of recent date.
Rohr (De Philol. Frag., repl juxās,
Lpz. 1874, p. 12 sq.) thinks that by
sacrificing the last sentences from
the words Ötö kal kaxós éxel, he
can save the rest as a work of
Philolaus ; but this is a vain at-
tempt, as I shall prove, in reference
to the most decisive points—the
eternity of the world and the
world-soul. But if this fragment
is interpolated, there is no reason
to suppose that the fixóñaos év tá,
Tep) juxās, from which it is bor-
rowed, according to Stobaeus, is the
third volume of the known work of
Philolaus. Böckh and Schaar-
schmidt assert this—the former
(loc. cit.) on the pre-supposition
that the fragment is authentic ;
the latter believing that none of
the fragments of Philolaus are so.
It is probable that this treatise was
a separate work, distinct from the
source of the authentic fragments.
Claudianus Mamertus probably had
it before him in his confused state-
ments, De Statu An. ii. 7, quoted
by Böckh, Philol. 29 sqq., and he
Theophrastus even seems to draw an
most likely borrows from it what
we shall cite further on. But this
only proves that the book was
known by this writer of the fifth
century A.D., and regarded by him
as an authentic work of Philolaus ;
and even if, in the manuscript he
was using, it was joined with Philo-
laus' real work, this is no proof of
its authenticity.
* It is said in Metaph. xiii. 8,
1083 a, 20, that numbers are the
primitive element, kal &px?iv airów
eival airb to ºv, but this One is not
designated as the Divinity; and
besides, the passage is not con-
cerned with Pythagoreans, but with
a fraction of the Platonists who
followed the doctrines of Pytha-
goras. Similarly, Metaph. xiv. 4,
1091 b, 13 sqq., when Aristotle
speaks of those who identify the
Absolute One with the Absolute
Good (at to to èv rô &yaôov airb
eivaí bagw), he means the adherents
of the theory of Ideas, as is proved
by the expressions airò To ev, &kſum-
to oia'tal, pºéya kai utkpov (l. 32).
This opinion is the view of the
Platonists; vide Schwegler and
Bonitz ad. h. l. and Zeller, Plaf.
Stud, p. 278. In a third text,
Metaph. i. 5 (vide supra, p. 379, 1 :
cf. xiii. 6, 1080 b, 31 : To £v or rol-
xetov kal &px|v pagu sīval Tów
ãvrov) it is said that the Pytha-
goreans deduce numbers from the
One; but this is the number one
which cannot be the Divinity, be-
cause it must itself result from the
Odd and Even. Ritter (Gesch. d.
Phil. i. 388) makes, in reference
to this point, the following objec-
tion: As number, that is to say,
GOD AWD MATTER.
401
express distinction * between the Pythagoreans and
those who represent the Deity as efficient cause.”
Philolaus indeed calls the one the beginning of all
things,” but he can scarcely mean anything more by
this than what Aristotle says: viz., that the number
one is the root of all numbers, and therefore, since all
things consist of numbers, it is also the principle of
all things.”
the ‘Even and the Odd, only re-
Sults from the One, the One cannot
have resulted from these: the
words éé àpaporépov roſſroov do not
therefore signify derived from both,
but consisting of both. This ob-
jection is based upon a manifest
confusion: the Even and Odd
number is not the Even and the
Odd ; the expression, “that is to
say, is consequently not legiti-
mate, and the only sense which the
words of Aristotle can have, ac-
cording to the context, is the fol-
lowing: first, the One arises out
of the Odd and the Even, and
then the other numbers proceed
from the One. Wide Alexander
ad h. i. Lastly, in Metaph. xiii. 6,
1080 b, 20; xiv. 3, 1091 a, 13,
the first corporeal unity is spoken
of, but it is characterised very dis-
tinctly as derived, for in xiv. 3, we
read, oi uév oëv IIv6ayópelot trórepov
oë rotojo, ) rotočari yéveriv[roń śvös]
où be?6to tdgetv'pavepāsºy&p Aéyovoriv,
&s toū āvos avorra.0évros efºr’ & ‘tri-
tréðav eſt’éic xpotas eſt’ék a trépuaros
eſt’ & &v &topodov eitreiv, eú6ts rô
êyyugara row &treſpov 3rt eißkero kal
&repaivero Šro too réparos. Here,
again, I am obliged to contradict
the remark of Ritter (loc. cit.) 389
that, according to the text, Met.
xiii. 6, this One cannot be anything
derived. But Aristotle in that
WOL. I.
He further describes God as the sole
place simply says: 8tra's to trpárov
ëv ovvéotm éxov uéyé00s &topeſv
éoſkaoiv. In the first place this
does not mean that they regard
the One as not derived, but that
the problem of its derivation puz-
zles them; whence it would rather
follow that this problem is based
upon their other definitions in re-
spect to the One. In the second
place, the question in this passage
is not whether Unity in general is
derived from first principles, but
whether the origin of the first cor-
poreal unity, as such, the formation
of the first body in the midst of
the universe (that is to say, the
central fire), has been explained in
a satisfactory manner.
* In the passage quoted, p.
395, 4.
* Plato and his School. Cf. the
words : 610 kal oë8& row 9ebv &c.,
Tim. 48 A.; Theaet. 176 A. -
* In the fragment ap. Iambl.
in Nicom. 109 (cf. Syrian in Me-
taph. Schol. 926 a, 1 ; vide supra,
p. 391, 2, and Böckh, Philol. 149
sq.), the authenticity of which, in-
deed, is not quite certain, though
there is nothing absolutely against
it : év àpx& travtww.
* It is thus that the biographer
in Photius Cod. 249 a, 19, under-
stands the passage : thv uováða
wdvtwv àpx?iv čAeyov IIv6ayópelot,
D D
402 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
ruler of the universe, exalted above all things," em-
bracing , all things with his care; * but this proves
nothing in respect to the philosophic import of the
concept of God in his system.
For the first of these
propositions, if it really comes from Philolaus,” merely
étrel to pièv or muetov &px?iv čAeyov
ºpappuis, thv 5& étritréðov, to 6* . .
orópatos. Too 5% or muetov trpoetri-
voeirai ji uovºs, Šote àpx?) Tów
orapudºrov ji wovds. If even these
words referred to the Divinity, it
would be necessary to know the
connection in which they stand, in
order to say whether the One is
here designated as the Divinity, or
if the sense is not simply this:
‘One thing is the beginning of all
other things, and this one thing is
the Divinity.” In the first case
only would the passage have a
philosophic bearing; in the second
it would be a religious proposition,
such as we find elsewhere (e.g. in
Terpander, vide Supra, p. 122).
• Philo, mund; opif. 23 A: uap-
Tupel àé uov tá, A6).4 kal PixéAaos
év rotºrous éoth ydp, pnoriv, 6 ye-
Pºv kal &pxov &rdvrov 6ebs eſs, del
&v, uáviſuos, drivntos, airbs airó
âuotos, repos Tów &AAwv. The
Pythagorean conception of God is
similarly expounded in Plut. Numa,
c. 8.
* Athenag. Supplic. c. 6: kal
$1XóAaos 3& àotrep v (ppoupé travra
§tro rot, 6.e00 trepielWiig,0at Aéywy, cf.
Blato, Phaedo, 62 B: the A670s év
&mośńrous Aeyóuevos, dºs év rive
qpoupé, éoplew oi &v6pwrot is hard to
understand, où uévrol d'AA& Tööe
7é got 50ke? . . . et Aéyegbai, rô
6eoës eiva, Śwów toi's étriplexouévows
kal juás robs &v6pótrovs #v táv
termudrav roſs 6eois eival. -
* This is not guaranteed quite
certainly by the assertion of Philo;
for the Jewish and Christian
Alexandrians often avail them-
selves of falsified writings to prove
Monotheism. Böckh also conjec-
tures that the passage may not be a
verbal quotation; but there are no
decisive proofs of its spuriousness,
for I cannot consider the airbs
aúró 3plotos, &c., as ‘Post Platonic
modern categories’ (Schaarschmidt,
Schrift. des Philol. 40). The pro-
position that the universe or the
Divinity is &ei Šuotov, travrm šuotov
is attributed already to Xeno-
phanes. Parmenides calls Being
trav Šuotov (vide infra, Parm.).
Moreover, the opposition of the
aúró &Motos, Érepos Táv &AAwy does
not presuppose more dialectic cul-
ture than the opposition éavré,
trövtoge routov, tº 5’ répq, wh
Twvrov (Parm. v. 117, in relation
to one of Parmenides' elements),
and not nearly so much as the
arguments of Zeno against Multi-
plicity and Motion. If it be ob-
jected that a strict Monotheism is
incompatible with the theological
point of view of the Pythagoreans,
we may fairly enquire whether the
fragment is to be understood in
this sense, and whether the expres-
sion jyeuðv Kal &pxov štávrov 6eos
excludes other gods. It may be
that this fragment only presents to
us that belief in a supreme God
which we find before and contempo-
rary with Philolaus, in AEschylus,
Sophocles, Heracleitus, Empedocles,
and others, and which was not in-
compatible with Polytheism.
GOD AND MATTER, 403
expresses in a religious form a thought which was then
no longer confined to the schools of philosophy, and
which sounds more like the language of Xenophanes
than anything peculiarly Pythagorean. The second
proposition taken from the Orphico-Pythagorean mys-
teries' is entirely of a religious and popular nature.”
Neither one nor the other is employed as the basis of
philosophic definitions. If, lastly, Philolaus asserted
that the Deity brought forth limit and unlimitedness,”
this certainly presupposes that all is to be referred to
the Divine causality; but as no account is given how
God brought forth the first causes, and how he is related
to them, this theorem merely bears the character of a
religious presupposition. From a philosophic point of
view it merely shows that Philolaus knew not how to
explain the origin of the opposition of the Limited and
|Unlimited. He seems to think that they, as he says in
another place of harmony," arose in some way which it
is impossible accurately to define. Even in the time of
Neo-Pythagoreanism the prevailing distinction of the
supra-mundane One from the Monad was not universally
acknowledged.” We cannot but admit, therefore, that
* This clearly appears from pra, p. 389, 3, whose testimony is
Plato, loc. cit.
* Here again it may be ques-
tioned whether Athenagoras exactly
reproduces the words that he quotes,
and if instead of Too 6eod, the
original text may not have con-
tained rôv 9eóv, as in Plato. We
are not even sure whether the
quotation is from the work of
Philolaus at all. It may be merely
a vague reminiscence of the pas-
sage in Plato.
* According to Syrian, vide su-
confirmed by the evidence of Plato
in the Philebus, 23 C (supra, p.
379, 1). On the other hand, Pro-
clus, Plat. Theol. p. 132, only
quotes as coming from Philolaus
the proposition that all consists of
the Limited and Unlimited. The
proposition that God has engen-
dered these elements he gives as
Platonic.
* Wide supra, p. 383, 2.
* Supra, p. 375; cf. p. 391, 2.
D D 2
404 THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
the Pythagoreans believed in gods. It is also probable
that they followed the monotheistic tendency (which
after the time of Xenophanes exercised such an im-
portant influence on Greek philosophy) so far as amidst
the plurality of gods to proclaim, with greater emphasis
than the popular religion, the unity (60sos, Tô 6sſov);'
at the same time, however, the import of the idea of
God in relation to their philosophic system seems to
have been small,” nor does it appear to have been closely
interwoven with their enquiry concerning the first prin-
ciples of things.”
I am consequently the less able to believe that the
Pythagoreans taught a development of God in the
universe, by which He gradually arrived at perfection
through imperfection.* This theory is closely connected
* But certainly in connection
with the popular belief; so that
for them, as for the generality of
people, the 6eſov is identical with
Zeus. Cf. their theories as to the
oversight exercised by Zeus and all
connected with it.
* Böckh, Phil. 148, observes
that without the theory of a
higher Unity, above the Limited
and Unlimited, there would re-
main no trace in the system of
the Pythagoreans, renowned as
they were for their religious ideas,
of the Divinity. This remark does
not prejudice my opinion in the
least. I do not deny that they
reduced everything to the Divinity,
but I contend that in so doing,
they did not proceed in a scientific
manner; and this seems to me the
easier to understand, because by
virtue of their religious character,
this dependance of all things in
respect to the Divinity was for
them an immediate postulate, and
not a scientific problem. Röth (ii.
a, 769 sqq.) himself, repugnant as
this assertion naturally is to him,
is obliged to confess that the
sacredness and inviolability of
Pythagoras' circle of ideas, in re-
gard to religious speculation, left
little room for the free intellectual
development of his school; and
that among the writings (authentic
according to Röth) left to us by
the Pythagoreans, there is none
which has properly a speculative
character; but that they are all
religious and popular works. Is
not this to say, as I do, that the-
ological convictions here appear
primarily as the object of religious
faith, and not of scientific enquiry?
* Cf. what is said in the next
section on the theory that the Py-
thagoreans taught the existence of
a world-soul.
* Ritter, Pyth. Phil, 149 sqq.;
I) EVELOPMENT OF GOD IN THE WORLD. 405
with the statement that they held the One to be the
Deity. For the One is described as the Even-Odd, and
as the Odd is the perfect, and the Even the imperfect,
so, it is argued, they supposed not only the perfect but
the imperfect, and the reason of imperfection, to be in
God, and accordingly held that the perfect good can
only arise from a development of God. I must protest
against such an inference, if only upon the ground that
I dispute the identity of the One with the Deity. But
even irrespectively of this, it could not be true, for
though the number one was called by the Pythagoreans
the even-odd, the One which is opposed as one of the
primitive causes to indefinite Duality is never so called,
and never could he ; and the number one, as that which
is derived from the primitive causes, and compounded
of them, could in no case be identified with the Deity.”
Aristotle certainly says that the Pythagoreans, like
Speusippus, denied that the fairest and best could have
existed from the beginning ; * and as he mentions this
theory in connection with his own doctrine of the eter-
Gesch. d. Phil. 398 sqq., 436; this assertion originally belongs.
2 Cf.
against Ritter, vide Brandis, Rhein.
Mus. of Niebuhr and Brandis, ii.
227 sqq.
* Not even in Theophrastus
(supra, p. 395,4). The statements
of Theophrastus would prove no-
thing in regard to this question,
even if they could as a whole be
considered as applying to the Py-
thagoreans. For it does not follow,
because God is unable to conduct
all things to perfection, that he is,
therefore, himself imperfect. Other-
wise he would be imperfect more
especially with Plato, to whom
p. 400, 1.
* Metaph. xii. 7, 1072 b, 28:
©auèv 8& row 6eby eiwat Øov &fölov
&ptorov . . . §oot 6% froxau5&vov-
oriv, Šotrep of IIv6ayópelot kal Xtreč-
ourtros, rô káNAuorov kal &ptorov
ph Čv àpxfi elval, Ötö. Tö ical rôv
qvröv kai Tºv Ǻwv ràs &pxas alria
pºv eival, to 6* ſca?\öv kal réAetov
év roſs ék rotºrwu, otic àp6ós olovrat.
The ethical interpretation of this
passage, attempted by Schleierma-
cher (Gesch. d. Phil. 52), is not
worth discussing.
406 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
mity of God, it has the appearance of having also been
applied by the Pythagoreans to the motion of Deity.
In the first place, however, it does not at all necessarily
follow from this that the Divinity was at first imperfect,
and afterwards attained to perfection. As Speusippus
concluded from this proposition that the One as the first
principle must be distinct from the good and from the
Deity," so the Pythagoreans may in like manner have
separated them.” But it is also a question whether the
theorem which Aristotle disputes was ever advanced by
the Pythagoreans with respect to the Deity; for Aristotle
does not always quote the definitions of the earlier
philosophers quite in the connection in which their
authors originally stated them, as may be proved by
numerous examples.” We do not know what sense may
have been given to this proposition in the Pythago-
rean system. It may have referred to the development
of the world from a previous state of imperfection, or
to the production of the perfect number (the decad)
from the less perfect; * or to the position of the good
in the table of opposites,” or to some other object. We
* Wide the chapter on Speusip-
pus, Part ii. a, 653 sq. 2 A.
* This is also the opinion which
Aristotle attributes to them when
he says that they did not consider
the One as the Good itself, but as a
certain kind of good. Eth. N. i. 4,
1096 b, 5: Triðavdārepov 6' oikao w
of IIv6ayópelot Aéºyeuv trepi airoij,
rtóévres év tá têvãºya%v avorouxtº:
Tô ev (in the table of the ten con-
tradictories) ois 63 kal Xtrečourtros
étrakoxov670 at Šoke.
* Chaignet, ii. 103, identifies
the Pythagoreans with those theo-
logians who, according to Metaph.
xiv. 4, 1091 a, 29 sqq., maintained
that airò To &ya6öv kai Tô &ptorrow
are 50tepolyevi, and that they only
appeared in the course of the de-
velopment of the cosmos. But it
results from the preceding context,
as well as from the expression
airb &ya3bv, that the Platonists are
here intended (Speusippus). Aristo-
tle explicitly says: trapá ràv 9eo-
Aóryov táv vov two iv.
* As Steinhart says, Plato's
Werke, vi. 227.
* Cf. note 2.
I) EPELOPMENT OF GOD. 407
are not therefore justified by this Aristotelian passage,
in ascribing to the Pythagoreans a doctrine which not
only contradicts Philolaus' representation of the Deity,
but is quite unknown to antiquity;” though, if it had
really existed among the Pythagoreans, it might on
that very account be expected to receive all the more
definite mention from the ancient writers.
Having in the foregoing pages opposed the theolo-
gico-metaphysical interpretation of the Pythagorean
first principles, I must now declare myself no less
strongly against the theory that these principles pri-
marily refer to space-relations, and side by side with
the arithmetical Telement, or instead of it, denote
something geometrical, or even altogether material.
Aristotle says the Pythagoreans treated numbers as
space-magnitudes; * he often mentions the theory that
geometričāTàgúies are the substantial element of
which bodies consist,” and his commentators go further,
* The ancient philosophers, it
is true, frequently maintain that
the world was developed from a
rudimentary and formless state,
but never that the Divinity was
developed The doctrine of Hera-
cleitus and the Stoics contained no
such teaching. For the successive
forms of the T)ivine essence are
something entirely different from
a development of that essence out
of an imperfect state. The primi-
tive fire which, as the germ of the
world, is antecedent to the world,
is here regarded as the most per-
fect existence, the kópos. Lastly,
if the Theogonies represent parti-
cular gods as generated, this doc-
trine cannot be directly transferred
to the Deity, conceived as One.
* Metaph. xiii. 6, 1080 b, 18
sqq. after the quotation on p.
370, 1: Töv yöp 3Aov oipavov ka-
Tao-Keväçovalv čá ápióuðv, TXhv of
plovačuków, &AA& Tàs ſtováðas Štro-
Aapºdvovorty éxely uéyeffos - 6tra's he
to trpátov čv avvéatm éxov ačye60s,
&topeiv čoikaoiv . . . plovačukovs 6*
Tobs &piðuous sival travres rifféaqi
trajv Tów IIv6ayopetov, Šoot to ev
otolyetov kal &pxiiv paolveival tor
àvrav čkéivot 3' xovira Auéyebos.
Cf. next note, and what has been
quoted p. 400, 1, from Metaph.
xiv. 3.
* Metaph. vii. 2, 1028 b, 15:
80ke? 6é riot q & Too ord paros trépara,
ofov Čiriq'dveta kal Ypappuh kal atlyuh
kal uovás, eival oigtai MaxNov, h to
adua kal rô otépedy; iii. 5, 1002
ha- ~,
“sº
&:
*)
zy
- º
**
**-*
.#
fºr
2-tº
408
THE PYTHAGOREANS,
declaring that the Pythagoreans held mathematical
figures to be the principle of the corporeal, and reduced
them to points or units; that they regarded these units
partly as something extended in space, and partly also
as the constituents of numbers ; and consequently
taught that corporeal things consist of numbers."
We
find similar thoughts among other writers of the later
period,” though they do not precisely attribute them
a, 4: &AA& u}v Tó ye oróua ñtrov
oùota t is étruqavetas, kal airm tis
'ypaupils, kal # ypapºpº Tiis pová80s
kai rās arriºuis' roötous yöp &ptotal
to a 6aa, kal r& Mév Švev ord watos
évôéxeoréal boke? eival, rö 5& orówa.
&vev troërov eival &öövarov. 616trep
of uèv troAAol &c. (vide Supra, p.
369, 1), xiv. 3, 1090 a, 30 (supra,
p. 370, 1), ibid. 1090 b, 5: eioſi Bé
rives of éic rod Trépara elval kal
éoxara, thy ortyuhu ſvěv Ypappuis,
Taúrmv 6’ 3ritréðov, Tooro 6% too
a repeod, otovrat eival &váykmv totaú-
tas qigorets eival. De Coelo, iii. 1,
298 b, 33: eior) Sé rives, oi kal trav
orðua yew.vmtöv trotovoi, orvutt0évres
kal 6taxłovres é: étruiréðov kai eis
erſtreča. Aristotle, however, seems
to be thinking only of Plato, and
quotes expressly the Timaeus. At
the end of the chapter, after having
refuted this opinion, he says: rö 8'
airò orvuòalvet kal toſs éé àpuðuðv
oruvrifleſort Töv oipavóv. čviol yèp rºw
pūow éº &piðuáv ovvioraoru, &atrep
róv IIv6ayopetov rivés. Metaph.
xiv. 5, 1092 b, 11, can hardly
refer to this subject. Wide Pseudo-
Alex. ad. h. 1.
1 Alex. in Metaph. i. 6, 987 b,
33; p. 41 Bon. : 3px?s uév táv
ëvrov toos &piðuois IIAárov te kal
oi IIv6ayópetol interíðevro, öti éööket
aëtoſs to trpárov &px?, eival kal to
ào'àv6erov, rôv 8& orandºrov trpóra
r& £rſtreča sival (tà y&p &tx000 repú
re ka) uh ovvavatpot wena trpáta Tij
qūoet) étruiréðwy Śē Ypappai karð rov
oùröv Aóyov, Ypaupiðv 5& ortlywal,
&s of uaômuatikol onweta, airol 3&
Mováðas #Aeyov . . . ai 3& Mováðes
aptówol, of dipté pºol &pa trpárov táv
ãvrov. PS.-Alex. in Metaph. xiii.
6, p. 723 Bon. : kal oi IIv6ayópelot
8è Éva apifluov eival voutſovoi, kal
Tíva roorov ; rôv paômuaruköv, tr}\hv
oi kexaptoruévoy rôv aio.6m rév, &s
of trepl Eevokpármv, où'ěš wovačuköv,
tov'réativ šuep? kal doróparov (uova-
ðuköv Y&p rô &peoës kal &aguarov,
ëvraúða 5mx07), &AA& T&s uováðas
kai ÖmAovári kal rows &piðuois àtro-
Aapſ3&vovites uéyebos éxeiv čk toirwy
rès aiorðmºrås oioſtas kal rôv Štravra.
oùpavöv eſval Aéyovoiv. čxeiv 8& ràs
Mováðas uéyebos Karea ketaſov of
IIv6. Stå rotofºrov twos Aóryov. čAeyov
of v 3rt éretë ic rod trpárov čvös
ağral ovvéormorav, to 8& irpárov ev
uéyebos éxel, àváykm kal air&s ue-
Meyeſ}vapiévas elval. In the other
passages of the Metaphysics which
we have quoted in the preceding
notes, Alexander and his epitomiser
do not speak of the Pythagoreans.
* Nikom. Inst. Arithm. ii. 6,
p. 45; Boeth. Arithm. ii. 4, p.
1328; Nikom. ii. 26, p. 72, does
not relate to this question.
NATURE OF THEIR PRINCIPLES. 409
to the Pythagoreans. Philolaus attempts to derive
sometimes the corporeal in general, and sometimes the
physical fundamental qualities of bodies from figures,
and figures from numbers. From this Ritter concludes,'
and Hermann " and Steinhart” agree with him, that
the Limiting principle of the Pythagoreans was the
unit, or, viewed in regard to space, the point; and the
Unlimited, the interspace or the void; when, therefore,
they said that all things consist of the Limit and the
Unlimited, they meant that all things are composed of
points and empty interspaces, and when they asserted
that all things are number, this was only to express that
these points together form a number. Reinhold * and
Brandis" contest this, not because they maintain more
strongly the arithmetical nature of the Pythagorean
numbers, but because they would have them regarded
as material; for in their judgment, the Pythagoreans
understood by the Unlimited, the material cause of the
corporeal,” and accordingly numbers, of which all things
consist, must have been conceived by them as some-
thing corporeal : number, Reinhold considers, arises
from the determination of the indeterminate matter by
Lnity or Limit, and things are called numbers because
all things consist of a manifold element determined by
Unity. Against this, Ritter rightly urges” that we ought
to distinguish between the Pythagorean doctrines them-
Pyth. Phil. 93 sqq., 137; Metaphysik, p. 28 sq.
Gesch. der Phil. i. 403 sq. * Gr. Rein. Phil. 1, 486.
* Plat. Phil. 164 sqq., 288 sq. * According to Brandis, some-
* Haller. Allg. Literature. 1845, thing similar to breath or fire.
895 sq. Similarly, Chaignet ii. According to Reinhold, indetermi-
33; 36, 1; 39, 1. nate, manifold, unformed matter.
4 Beitrag zur Erl, d. Pyth. . * Gesch. der Phil. i. 405 sq.
410 THE PPTHAGOREANS,
selves and Aristotle's conclusions from them. The ma-
teriality of the Pythagorean numbers was first deduced
by Aristotle from the doctrine that all is number; the
Pythagoreans can never have explained numbers and
their elements as something corporeal; for Aristotle ex-
pressly says that they did not intend, by their concept
of the Limited, the Unlimited and the One, to describe
a substratum of which these concepts were predicated; *
and this would unquestionably have been the case if
the Unlimited had been, in their opinion, merely un-
limited matter. He observes that the number of
which all things consist must, according to their theory,
have been mathematical number, and he charges them
on this account with the contradiction of making bodies
arise from the incorporeal, and the material from the
immaterial.” This conclusion, however, can only be
valid from an Aristotelian or some other later standpoint.
To anyone accustomed to discriminate between corporeal
and incorporeal, it must seem evident that bodies can
* Arist. Metaph. xiii. 6, inter- éoriv, De Carlo, iii. 1, end: the
mingles his own explanations with Pythagorean doctrine, according to
the Pythagorean doctrine, as Ritter which all is number, is as illogical
remarks, loc. cit. This appears in
the use of such expressions as:
p.a6muaticos &piðubs (opposed to the
&p. vonrös), &piðubs oi kexaplopévos,
aiorómral oigtai. This procedure is
very usual with him elsewhere.
* Wide supra, p. 370, 1.
* Metaph. xiii. 8, 1083 b, 8:
68& rôv IIv6aºyopetov Tpétros Tſ wºv
éAdºrrows éxel Svoxepeias rôv troë-
repov eipmuévov tí, ók ióías &répas.
ró uév yöp whyapuatáv troteiu roy
àpiðuðv &qaipeirai troAA& Tóváčvvá-
tov Tó Sé Tó, odºuata éé àpiðuðv
eival avykefueva kal Tov ćpiðubv toū-
tov eiwat waſnuaruków &öövatów
as the Platonic construction of the
elementary bodies: Tâ wév yêp
qvarikā ord plato, paiveral Bápos
#xovra kal coupótºmta, rås 6é uovd-
6as otre oºpa Troteſv oióv re ovvriès-
Mévas otºre Bápos éxeiv. Metaph. i.
8, 990 a, 12, even supposing that
magnitudes could result from the
Limited and the Unlimited, riva
Tpétrov čo Tai Tà uév kotºpa Tè, 5è
Bápos éxovta Tóv orogórav; ibid.
xiv. 3 (vide Supra, p. 370, 1), where
also the Pythagoreans are reckoned
among those who only admitted
mathematical number.
NATURE OF THEIR PRINCIPLES. 411
only be compounded out of bodies, and so it inevitably
follows that numbers and their elements must be some-
thing corporeal if bodies are to consist of them. The
special characteristic of the Pythagorean Philosophy
however lies in this, that such a distinction is as yet
unrecognised, and that, in consequence, number as such
is regarded not only as the form, but as the matter of
the corporeal. Yet number itself is not on that account
necessarily conceived as corporeal; for it is clear that
qualities and relations which no one except the Stoics,
or before their time, ever considered as bodies, were
expressed in the Pythagorean Philosophy by numbers.
The Pythagoreans not only defined man, or plants, or
the earth by numbers, but asserted that two is opinion,
four justice, five marriage, seven the opportune time,
etc." Nor is this simple comparison. The meaning in
both cases is that the specified number is properly and
directly the thing with which it is compared. It is a
confounding of symbol and concept, a mixture of
the accidental and the substantial, which we cannot
discard without mistaking the essential peculiarity of
Pythagorean thought. As we cannot assert that bodies
were regarded as immaterial by the Pythagoreans, be-
cause, according to them, bodies consisted of numbers,
so neither, on the other hand, can we infer that num-
bers must have been something corporeal, because they
could not otherwise have been the elements of bodies.
Bodies meant to them all that presents itself to the
sense-perception; numbers meant that which is appre-
hended by mathematical thought; and the two things
* Wide infra, § iv.
412 THE PPTHAGOREANS,
were directly identified, while the inadmissibility of
such a procedure was unnoticed. For similar reasons,
it is of no avail to prove that the One, the Unlimited
and the Void receive a material signification in the
Pythagorean physics. We read, it is true, that in the
forming of the world, the nearest part of the Un-
limited became attracted and limited by the first One,"
and that outside the world was the Unlimited, from
which the world inhaled empty space and time.” In
this connection the One certainly appears as material
unity, and the Unlimited to some extent as unlimited
space, to some extent also as an infinite mass; but it
by no means follows that the two conceptions have
always the same meaning apart from this order of ideas:
on the contrary, we have here an instance of what we
so often find with the Pythagoreans—that a general
conception receives a special determination from its
application to a particular case, although this determi-
nation does not on that account essentially belong to
the conception, nor exclude other applications of it, in
which it may be used in a different sense. It was only
by the help of such a method that the Pythagoreans
could apply the theory of numbers to concrete phe-
momena. It is possible that in certain cases the One,
the Unlimited, Number, &c., may have been regarded
as corporeal. But we cannot conclude from this that
they were wrviversally conceived as such. We must
remember that numerical determinations are very va-
riously employed by the Pythagoreans, and that the
* Wide supra, p. 400, 1, and Cf. iii. 4, 203 a, 6; Stobaeus, Eel.
p. 407, 2. i. 380; Plut. Plac. ii. 9, 1. Further
* Arist. Phys. iv. 6, 213 b, 22. details, infr. Cosmology.
MATURE OF THEIR PRINCIPLES. 413
unlimited and the limited are of different kinds," which
are not clearly distinguished because the language of
Philosophy was as yet too unformed, and thought too
unpractised in logical deduction and the analysis of
concepts.
For similar reasons I must contest Ritter's theory.
That the Pythagoreans derived bodies from geometrical
figures is true, and will be shown later on ; it is also
true that they reduced figures and space-dimensions to
numbers, the point to Unity, the line to Duality, and so
on, and that they reckoned infinite space, intermediate
space, and the void under the head of the Unlimited.”
But it does not follow from this that by Unity they
understood nothing but the point, by the Unlimited
nothing but empty space; here again all that we have
just said as to the application of their principles to
phenomena holds good. They themselves designate
by the name of the Unity not the point merely, but
the soul; by that of Duality, not the line merely, but
opinion; they make time as well as empty space enter
the world from the Unlimited. It is evident that
the conceptions of the Limit, the Unlimited, Unity,
Number, have a wider compass than those of the point,
the void and figures; figures, at any rate, are expressly
distinguished from the numbers by which they are
| Ritter says (i. 414) that the
Indeterminate as such can have no
species; but in the first place this
expression is in itself incorrect; for
the unlimited in space, the un-
limited in time, qualitative un-
limitedness, &c., are so many kinds
of the Unlimited. And in the
second place it could not possibly
be said of the Pythagorean system.
* Cf. p. 414, 2, and Arist. De
Caelo, ii. 13, 293 a, 30, where it is
spoken of as an opinion of the
Pythagoreans that the limit is
more noble (tipudºrepov) than that
which lies between. From this we
may conclude that the uérači is
closely related to the Unlimited.
414 THE PPTHAGOREANS.
defined; and the void is spoken of in a manner that,
strictly interpreted, must apply to the Limiting, and
not to the Unlimited.” Not much stress, however, can
be laid upon the last-mentioned circumstance, because
the Pythagoreans seem to have here involved themselves
in a contradiction with their other theories.
But the most decisive argument against the in-
terpretations we have been enumerating is derived
from the consideration of the Pythagorean system as a
whole; for its arithmetical character can only be
understood if we suppose that the conception of num-
* Arist. Metaph. vii. 11, 1036
b, 12: &váyoval ºrdvra eis rows
àpiðuot's kal Ypaupis row Aéryov row
rôy 680 elval pagw. Cf. xiv. 5,
1092 b, 10 : &s Eüpvros érarte, Tſs
àpiðubs Tſvos, oiov 66l uèv čv6pótrov,
66, 6& introv. Plato spokein a simi-
lar manner of a number of the
plane and of the solid, but he did
not therefore regard numbers as
extended or corporeal (Arist. De
An. i. 2, 404 b, 21 ; cf. Part ii. a,
636, 4; 807, 2, third edition). In
Metaph. xiii. 9, 1085 a, 7 figures,
from the point of view of Platonists
who favoured Pythagoreanism, are
expressly called rå Öorepov yevn
rod diplôuod, the class which comes
after number (the genitive àpt0400
is governed by datepov, not by
ºyévn; cf. Metaph. i. 9, 992 b, 13).
* The void is considered as se-
parating all things, from each
other. Arist. Phys. iv. 6, 213 b,
22: eiwat 6' pagav kal of IIv6ayópelot
keybv, ical étreloiéval airro tº otpavá,
ëk roß &teſpov rvetuatos (which
Chaignet [ii. 70, 157], as it seems
to me unnecessarily, would have
omitted or changed into trveijua.
Tennemann [Gesch. d. Phil. i. 110]
also prefers truedux) &s dwarvéovri
kal to Kevöv, & Stopfges r&s pūgels
. kal tour' elval trpórov čv Tols
dpuðuois to yop kevöv 8topſgeuv Thy
qāorw airów (which Philop. De
Gen. An. 51 a, develops no doubt
merely according to his own fancy).
Similarly Stobaeus, i. 380. Now
the separating principle as such
is also the limiting principle; for
the assertion of Brandis that the
difference of numbers is derived
from the Unlimited, and their
determination from Unity, is un-
tenable. What constitutes the
distinction of one thing from
another, except its determination
in regard to that other thing? If
then we hold to the proposition
that the void is the principle of
separation, it must itself be placed
on the side of the limiting, and con-
sequently that which is separated
by the void must be placed
on the opposite side. We must,
with Ritter, i. 418 sq., consider the
One as a continuous magnitude
split up by the void. But this
would manifestly be to change each
into its contrary.
NATURE OF THEIR PRINCIPLES. 415
ber formed its point of departure. Had it started
from the consideration of unlimited matter, and of
particles of matter, a system of mechanical physics,
similar to the Atomistic system must have been the
result. Nothing of this kind is to be found in pure
Pythagoreanism. The number-theory, on the other
hand, the most essential and specific part of the system,
could never in that case have arisen: the proportions
of bodies might perhaps have been defined accord-
ing to numbers, but there would have been no pos-
sible reason for regarding numbers as the substance of
things. This, the fundamental conception of the whole
system, can only be accounted for, if the system be
dominated by the idea of numerical relations, if its
original tendency were to regard bodies as numbers,
and not numbers as bodies. We are expressly told that
Ecphantus, a later philosopher, who scarcely can be
Thumbered among the Pythagoreans at all, was the first
to explain the Pythagorean Monads as something
corporeal." The ancient Pythagoreans cannot have
held such an opinion, for in that case they must have
believed the corporeal to have been something original,
instead of deriving it, as we have just shown that they
did, out of mathematical figures.” Nor can they have
1 Stob. Eel. i. 308: "Ekpavros
>upakoëorios eſs rôv IIv6ayopetov
ºrgvrov [äpx&s] tº &ötaipeta ord para
kal to kevöv. (Cf. ibid, p. 448.)
Tàs yop IIvBayopticas wováðas oitos
rpáros &tedſivaro gouattkás. For
further details on this philosopher,
vide § vii. The statement, ap.
Plut. Plac. i. 11, 3 ; Stob. i. 336,
that Pythagoras regarded the first
principles as incorporeal, stands in
connection with other statements of
a very suspicious character, and can-
not, therefore, be made use of here.
* This would still be true, even
if the conjecture of Brandis (i.
487) were well founded—viz., that
besides the attempt already quoted,
other attempts were made by the
Pythagoreans to explain the deri-
416 THE PITHAGOREA.N.S.
originally meant by the Unlimited infinite matter. The
Unlimited must have acquired this import indirectly
in its application to the cosmos; otherwise it is in-
comprehensible how they came to explain the Unlimited
as the Even. The same considerations hold good as
against the theory of Ritter. Since geometrical
figures were derived from numbers, the elements of
figure—that is to say the point and the interspace—
must be posterior to the elements of number, and so
they were unquestionably regarded by the Pythagoreans.
For the odd and the even cannot be derived from the
point and the interspace, whereas it is quite con-
ceivable from the Pythagorean point of view that the
odd and the even should first have been discriminated
as elements of number, that the more general antithesis
of the Limiting and the Unlimited should thence have
been attained, and in the application of this to space re-
lations, that the point should have been regarded as the
first limit of space, and empty space as the unlimited.
Had the Pythagorean philosophy taken' the opposite
course, and proceeded from space dimensions and figures
to numbers, the geometrical element in it must have
predominated over the arithmetical; figure, instead of
number, must have been declared to be the essence of
things; and the system of geometrical figures must
have taken the place of the decuple numerical system.
Even harmony could no longer have had the great
significance that it possessed for the Pythagoreans,
vation of the thing extended; for this point, for the passage in Arist.
the thing extended would remain Metaph. xiv. 3 (vide p. 400) does
in this case something derived; not justify this conclusion; cf.
but we have no certain evidence on Ritter, i. 410 sq.
STARTING-POINT OF THE SYSTEM. 417
since the relations of tones were never reduced by them
to space relations.
Having thus shown the essentially arithmetical
character of the Pythagorean principles, it only re-
mains to enquire how these principles were related to
one another, and wherein lay the specific point of
departure of the system ; whether the Pythagoreans
were led from the proposition that all is number to the
discrimination of the elements of which numbers and
things consist, or conversely from the perception of the
primitive opposites to the doctrine that the essence of
things lies in number. The exposition of Aristotle
tells in favour of the first opinion; for, according to
him, the Pythagoreans first concluded from the simi-
larity of things to numbers, that all things were num-
bers, and afterwards coupled with this proposition the
distinction of the opposite elements of which numbers
consist.' Philolaus, on the contrary, began his work
with the doctrine of the Limit and the Unlimited,”
which might incline us to presuppose that this, or an
analogous definition, contained the proper root of the
Pythagorean system, and that the Pythagoreans had
only reduced all things to number because they thought
they perceived in number the first combination of the
limited and the unlimited, of unity and multiplicity.”
This, however, is not necessarily the case; Philolaus, for
the sake of logical argument, may very likely have placed
* Wide supra, p. 369, 1; 370, 1. Duality, or of Unity and Multi-
* Supra, p. 39, 1. plicity, as the principle of the Py-
* Cf. Marbach, Gesch. d. Phil. thagorean doctrine—e.g. Braniss,
i. 108, Ritter, Pyth. Phil. 134 sq., Gesch. der Phil. S. Kant, i. 110 sq.,
and generally all those who con- 114 sq., &c.
sider the opposition of Unity and
WOL, I. -4 - E E.
418 - THE PYTHAGOREANS,
that last which, historically, was the beginning of the
system. On the other hand, we must certainly consider
the exposition of Aristotle as primarily his own view,
not as direct evidence establishing a fact. Yet there is
every probability that this view is based upon an exact
knowledge of the real interconnection of the Pytha-
gorean ideas. It is, indeed, most likely that the start-
ing point of a system so ancient, and so independent of
any earlier scientific developments, would have been
formed by the simplest and most obvious presentation;
that the thought which was less developed therefore,
and more directly connected with relations sensibly
perceived, the thought that all is number, would have
been prior to the reduction of number to its ele-
ments; and that the arithmetical distinction of the
even and the odd would have preceded the more
abstract logical distinction of the unlimited and the
limited. If we maintain this latter distinction to have
been the fundamental idea from which sprang the
further development of the system, it is hard to see
why it should immediately have taken an arithmetical
turn, instead of a more general and metaphysical
direction. The proposition that all is number, and
composed of the odd and the even, cannot possibly be
derived from the theories concerning the limited and
unlimited; but these might very easily and naturally
have arisen out of that proposition." The exposition,
therefore, of Aristotle, is fully justified. The funda-
mental conception from which the Pythagorean philo-
sophy starts, is contained in the proposition that all is
* Cf. Supra, p. 376 sq.
APPLICATION OF THE WUMBER—THEORY. 419
number; in the next place, the opposite determinations
in number—the odd and the even—were distinguished
and compared, at first indeed very unmethodically,
with other opposites, such as right and left, masculine
and feminine, good and evil; the more abstract ex-
pression of the limited and unlimited, although at a
later time this opposition was placed by Philolaus at
the head of the system, and so appears in the decuple
table of categories, must belong to a more developed
stage of reflection. Thus the principal ideas of this
system are developed simply enough from one thought,
and that thought is of a kind which might easily
occur to the reflecting mind from the observation of
the external world, even in the childhood of science."
IV. THE PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY (continued).
SYSTEMATIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUMBER—THEORY, AND
ITS APPLICATION TO PHYSICS.
IN the further development and application of their
number-theory, the procedure of the Pythagoreans was
for the most part unmethodical and arbitrary. They
sought in things, says Aristotle,” a similarity with
* After the remarks on p. 312, 1;
343, 4, I think it is unnecessary to
append a criticism of the exposition
of the theory of numbers and of the
Pythagoreantheologygiven by Röth
(ii. a, 632 sq., 868 sq.). It is im-
possible to enter on a discussion of
the primitive form of the Pytha-
gorean doctrine with an author who
seeks true Pythagoreanism in the
Orphic fragments, and sees in the
texts of Aristotle and Philolaus only
spurious Pythagoreanism. Such a
discussion becomes absolutely out
of the question when the historian
intermingles in an entirely arbi-
trary manner his own ideas with
the sources he adopts.
* Metaph. i. 5 (cf. p. 369, 1):
ral 3a a sixov ćuoxo'yočwea vöeukvi vat
$v re rois àpt0aois ſcal rats àpuo-
wiats trpos ré, rot, oùpavoi, Trdón ral
is E 2
420 THE PYTHAGOREANS
numbers and numerical relations; and the category of
numbers which in this manner they obtained as an object,
they regarded as the essence of that object. If, however,
in any case reality did not entirely agree with the presup-
posed arithmetical scheme, they resorted to hypotheses
like that of the counter-earth to procure agreement.
Thus they said that justice consisted of the equal multi-
plied by the equal, or in the square number, because it re-
turns equal for equal ; and they therefore identified jus-
tice with four, as the first square number, or nine, as the
first unequal square number. So seven was the critical
time, because in the opinion of the ancients, the
climacteric years were determined by it; five, as the
union of the first masculine with the first feminine
number, was called marriage; one was reason, because
it is unchangeable; two, opinion, because it is variable
and indeterminate.” By further combinations of such
Aépm kal irpos thv ŠAmu 5takéopºmoriv,
in the sequel to make the definition
Tajra ovvdyovres éqipuottov. kāv
of justice also from the inverse
e? Tí trov ŠléAeltre trpoo’eyAixovto
toū avvelpouévnv traorav airtois eival
Thy Trpayuareíav, which is immedi-
ately proved by the example of the
counter-earth.
* They also denominated justice
the &vritretrov66s, Arist. Eth. Nic.
v. 8, sub init. ; M. Mor. i. 34, 1194
a, 28; Alex. in Met. wide next
note. Here, however, not the in-
verse ratio in the mathematical
sense, but simply remuneration,
seems to be intended: for there
results from the judge doing to the
offender what the offender has done
to the offended, not an inverse, but
a direct ratio A: B = B: C. But
it is possible that the expression
&vritrerov6bs led the Pythagoreans
proportion. The same thought of
remuneration is expressed in the
complicated, and evidently later,
definition ap. Iambl. Theol. Arithm.
p. 29 sq.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 5; vide p.
369: ibid. xiii. 4, 1078 b, 21 : oi
ôè IIv6ayópelot trpórepov trepſ twov
ãxt yov (éſàrovv ka0óNov Špigeo (al),
ôv roës A6-yous eis rºs &piðuous
ăvătrov, oiov tí Čorti kalpos ?) to
6tratov 3 yduos. Similarly, ibid.
xiv. 6, 1093 a, 13 sq., where
the Pythagoreans are not named,
but where they are certainly al-
luded to. M. Mor. i. 1, 1182
a, 11, where the definition of
justice as āptôubs iodicus toos is
attributed to Pythagoras. Alex-

APPLICATION OF THE NUMBER—THEORY. 421
analogies, there resulted theorems like these : that this
or that conception had its seat in this or that part of
the world; opinion, for example, in the region of the
earth; the proper time in that of the sun, because
they are both denoted by
ander, in Metaph. i. 5, 985 b, 26,
p. 28, 23 Bon: tíva 6% to Öpotówara
ev toºs &pifluois &Aeyov eival trpos té.
$vta Te kal yivöweva, śājiàoore. Tijs
pºv yūp 5ticaloa tºwns towov ŠtroAgušć-
vovires éival to &vºritretrov6ós Te Kal
to ov, Šv toºs àpiðuo's rooro eipia-
Icovres bv, Šuš Towto kai Töv iodicus
Žorov &piðubv trpárov čAeyov eival St-
Katoo wivny... totrov 8& of wév Töv Téo-
orapa šAeyov (so also Iambl. Th. Ar.
p. 24, from a more complicated rea-
son). . of 8& Töv čvvéa, §s éort trpátos
Terpäyovos. (This is a ‘reading
of Bonitz, instead of ortepebs, as
given by the manuscripts.) ātro
arepittoo toi, Tpía ép' airby yewoué-
vov (cf. Iambl. p. 29) kapov 8&
ard Niv čNeyov Töv čírtá čokeſ y&p rà.
quatic& rows Texeious kalpots to xely
tral yewéorea's kal Texeiðorews karð.
é9öopuděas, Ös én áv6póirov. kai yüp
ríkretal étraumviata, kal 650yroqve?
ºrogovtåv étáv, kal #840 kel treph Thy
Sevrépav č8öopºdóa, ſcal yewetā trepi
Thy Tpírmy kal Töv #Atov Šč, ćitel
airbs attio's eival Töv captröv, p.mol,
ãokeſ, évraú6á pagiviðpü00at ka9'? §
§8öopas àpiðués éa riv (in the seventh
place of the periphery of the
world) by kalpöv Aéryovoriv . . . trel
6è oëre yevvá rivö. Töv čv tí Šeköt
&piðuáv 6 árrà of Te yevvårat āró
rivos airtóv, Šuš Tooro kal 'A6mvāv
ëAeyov airby (cf. Th. Ar. p. 42, 54,
&c.) . . . yduov 8& éAeyov Tov
Trévre, 3rt à pièv yduos oºvoãos
#ffevós éatt Ical 6% Aeos, Štt ö& kat'
airobs &#ffew uèv to trepitrov 678w
6è to &priov, irporos 3& oftos é;
àptſov toº 300 tp%tov kai irpátov
the same number." In a
Too Tpta treptºrtoi, Thy yéveauv čxel
. vojv Šē kal oia'tav čAeyov to év'
Thu yöp (buxhv ćis rôv votiv eitre
(Arist. l. c.). Ötö. Tö p.69ipov 8& kal
To Špotov távrm Rai Tô &pxuköv row
woov uováða re kai év čAeyov (simi-
larly, Th. Ar. p. 8, where further
details will be found. Philolaus,
however [vide infra], assigned
Reason to the number seven) &AA&
kal oia'tav, 3rt trpótov ji oiota. 668av
6é Tó, 600 Suð. To T' &udo we'ra-
BAmriju eival Aeyov 6& kal kivmotiv
aüthy kal étríðeariv (?). But here,
already, especially in the reasons
adduced for the support of the
various designations, many recent
elements seem to be intermingled.
This is still more largely the case
in regard to the other commenta-
tors of the passage in Aristotle
(Schol. in Arist. p. 540 b sqq.)
and such writers as Moderatus ap.
Porph. Wit. Pythag. 49 sqq.; Stob.
i. 18; Nicomachus ap. Phot. Cod.
187; Jambl. Theol. Arithm. 8 sq.;
Theo, Math. c. 3, 40 sqq.; Plut.
De Is. c. 10, 42, 75, p. 354, 367,
381; Porph. De Abstin. ii. 36 &c.
I therefore abstain from making
further citations from these au-
thors, for although in what they
quote there may be many things
really belonging to the ancient
Pythagoreans, yet we can never be
certain on this point. In general,
the text that we have quoted above,
from Aristotle, Met. xiii. 4, should
make us mistrustful of these state-
Inent S. .
1. Cf. on this point what is said
422
THE PPTHAGO REANS.
similar manner, certain numbers,' or certain figures and
further on, of the relation of the
terrestrial region to Olympus, and
Arist. Metaph. i. 8, 990 a, 18.
How is it possible to explain the
celestial phenomena on the Pytha-
gorean hypotheses? §tav yūp év
Tººl wºv tº uépel 66&c. Kal Kapòs
auro's fi, pukpóv Šē &va,6ev h kärw8ev
a jurcía (al. &vurcía, according to
Iambl. Theol. Arithm. p. 28, we
might conjecture &velicía, but Alex.
thinks &vikia more probable, cf. p.
429, 6), kai kpia is à uºus, &tóðelčiv
6è Aéyaoiv, 3rt roſtav pºv čv ékao-
Tov &pt046s éoti, a vpgaivet 8& Katë.
-öv Tótrov To 0 ºr o y # 6 m. TA760s
cival Tów avvuatapévov we’ye6ów 8 i &
ºr 0 rô Trø0m raßTa &rcoxověeiv Tols
rótrous ékáo rous, trórepov oitos é
aúrós éotiv &piðubs 6 &v Tó oëpavó,
§v Šeſ Aabeiv Šti Toitov čkao Tév
éotiv, 3) trapo roorov &AAos. This
passage has never been fully ex-
plained, either by recent commenta-
tors, or by Christ, Stud. in Arist.
libr. metaph. coll. (Berlin, 1853),
p. 23 Sq. The best expedient seems
to be to substitute for Suð. To ‘5ub
(as, perhaps, was done by Alexan-
der), and to insert ‘Tooto’ before
#öm (I formerly conjectured roël,
instead of jöm, but Alexander is in
favour of #5m). The meaning be-
comes then : ‘If the Pythagoreans
place in certain determinate parts
of the heavens opinion, the proper
time, &c., and in support of this
doctrine assert that each of these
concepts is a determinate number
(opinion, for example, is the num-
ber two), and that furthermore,
this or that portion of the universe
comprehends in itself precisely
that number of celestial bodies
(the terrestrial region, for example,
is the place of two, because the
earth occupies the second place in
the series of celestial bodies), and
that consequently these concepts
belong to these regions (opinion to
the earth, and the proper time
[vide preceding note] to the sun):
does it follow from all this that the
corresponding spheres of the uni-
verse are or are not identical with
these concepts? '
* Joh. Lydus, De mens. iv. 44,
p. 208, Röth, buwóAaos thv čváða.
Kpóvov oſtveuvov (Rhea, the Earth,
vide the following note) elval Aéyet
(because the Earth is the second
celestial body counting from the
centre). Moderatus ap. Stob. i.
20: IIv6ayópas . . . Tois 6eois àtrel-
kášov ćiravöuagev [Toys &piðuous],
às 'AtróAAova uév Thy uðvača of gav
(according to the etymology which
he assigns to the name of the god,
a privative and troAffs, and which is
very common among later writers,
cf. vol.iii.a,306, 6, 2nd ed.)"Aprepuy
ôè riv Švača (perhaps because of the
resemblance of "Apreputs and &ptios)
Tºv 8& éčáða yduov kal 'Aq poètºrmv,
Thy đê é8öopadāa kalpöv kal 'A6mvåv.
'Aorq6Atov Šē IIoaetóóva rºw &yö0áða
(the number of the cube ; the cube
[vide infra] is the form of the
Larth, and Poseidon is the yai-
#oxos), kal rºw belcáða IIavréAelav.
The Theol. Arithm. give many
names of this sort for numbers.
The assertions of Moderatus in
respect of the numbers one, two,
seven, and eight, are confirmed by
Blutarch De Is. c. 10, p. 354; in
part also by Alexander (vide the
note before the last). Alexander
says in the same place, c. 75 (cf.
Theol. Arith. p. 9), that the Dyad
was also called Eris aud rôxpm.
On the other hand, Philo, De
Mundi Opif. 22 E, affirms that
the other philosophers compare the
APPLICATION OF THE NUMBER-THEORY. 423
their angles,' were assigned to particular gods; here
number seven to Athene, but that
the Pythagoreans compare it to the
Supreme God, which they do for
the same reason, because it neither
begets nor was begotten. This last
interpretation is manifestly of later
origin. As to the general fact,
that numbers were designated by
the names of the gods, there seems
no doubt.
1 Plut. De Is. c. 75: of 6& IIv6a-
yópelot kal &piðuous kal oxhuata
6eóv ékógumorav trpoo`myopials. To
Aév y&p igóttàewpov rptywyov čkůNovv
'A0mvāv kopupa'yevi, kal Tpitoyévetav,
âtt rpial ka9érois &to róv rpiów
'ywvióv &yopuévals ötaipeirai. Ibid.
c. 30: Aéyoval yèp (oi IIv0.), Évêpt{q,
pérpº errº kai trevrmkoortg'veyovéval
Tuqāva kai trčAw, thv pèv too
Tplºydºvou (se. Yovíav) "Abov Kal
Atovão'ou kal "Apeos eival' rºv 8& rod
Terpayóvov ‘Péas kal 'Appoèttºms kal
Aftwmrpos kal ‘Eortlas kal"Hpas' rhy
8& Too Sobekayóvov Atós' Thy 6è
ēkkaitrevrmkovrayavíou Tuq6vos, &s
Eööoč0s ioTópmkev. Procl. in Eucl.
i. p. 36 (130 Fr.) : kai yüp trapá
toºs IIv0ayopetous eñphorouev &AAas
'yovías &AAous 6eois àvancelpwévas,
$ortrep kal 6 pixóAaos retroimke toſs
aëv rºw rpuyavikhv yovíav roſs Šč
thv retpayovukhv & piepāoras, kal
&AA&s &AAous kal rºw airhv tràefoot
9eois. Ibid. p. 46 (166 f. Fr.):
eikóTws &pa 6 pixóxaos thu Toi Tpt-
'ydºvou yovíav réttapo w &vé6mke
6eois, Kpóvº kal "Aön Kal”Apei kal
Atovágg. Ibid. p. 48 (173 Fr.):
Sokeſ 3& roſs IIv6ayopetous toūro [rb
Terpdºwvov Staqepóvrws rôv rerpa-
TAetºpov eikóva (pépelv 0etas oia'tas
. . kal trpos rotºrous 6 pixóAaos . . .
T}v roß retpayávov yovíav ‘Péas kal
Aftwmrpos kai ‘Earías &trokaxe. Ibid.
p. 174 Fr.: thv učv rplywVikhv
ºyovíav 6 pixóAaos rértapgiv čvākey
[ävé0mke] 6eois Thy đê retpayavikºv
Tptoſiv. Ibid.: thvºyöp rot, 8vočeka-
ºyóvow yovtav Atos éivaí pnow 6 pi-
AóAaos, &s karū uíav Évooru roi, Aubs
6Aov ovvéxovros rov Tijs 5vočekáö0s
àpiðuáv. As to the reasons for
these assertions, tradition tells us
nothing. What Proclus says on
the subject is evidently based on his
own conjectures, springing for the
most part from the sphere of Neo-
Platonic ideas. It would seem the
most probable solution to admit
that the angle must have been con-
secrated to Rhea, Demeter, and
Hestia, as goddesses of the earth;
because the square is the surface
which limits the cube, and the cube,
as we shall see, was, according to
Philolaus, the primitive form of
the earth. But this explanation
does not agree with the names of
the goddesses, Hera and Aphrodite,
mentioned by Plutarch. Was the
acute angle of the triangle conse-
crated in the same sense to Hades,
Dionysos, Ares, and Cronos ? (Per-
haps because the primitive form of
fire is the tetrahedron limited by
four equilateral triangles, and that
in these gods we find the destructive,
and also the warming, nature of
fire.) This is a question we cannot
now discuss. As to the dodecagon,
Böckh (Philol. 157) has already
remarked that it cannot be reduced
to the dodecahedron, which Philc-
laus designates as the primitive
form of Æther and of the celestial
sphere; for the dodecahedron is
limited by regular pentagons.
Nevertheless, the agreement of
these two witnesses, both much
versed in mathematics, leaves no
doubt that they really found this
fact in the source they were con-
sulting. But this difficulty does
424
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
again, only isolated and arbitrary points of comparison
are in question.
It was unavoidable from the capri-
cious irregularity of this whole procedure, that among
all these comparisons there should be numerous contra-
dictions; that the same number or figure should receive
various significations,” and on the other hand, that the
not authorise the modifications of
the text, and the forced interpre-
tations which Röth, ii. b, 285 sq.,
advocates on the ground of common
sense; they could hardly be based
on the Pythagorean mathematics,
from which it is by no means self-
evident that the angle of the triangle
could only have been consecrated
to three deities, and the angle of
the square to four. (Plutarch and
Proclus both have rºw yovíav, and
not tës youtas; and Proclus ex-
pressly adds that the same angle
could be assigned to many gods;
their opinion, therefore, is not that
each of the three angles of the tri-
angle, and each of the four angles
of the square, had its special divi-
Inity.) On the other hand, this
difficulty gives us no right to reject
the whole statement of the his-
toric Philolaus, and to ascribe it
to a Pseudo-Philolaus, author of
the fragments (Schaarschmidt,
Schriftst. d. Philol. 43 sq.). The
truth is that we are ignorant of the
source of these strange assertions:
it does not follow that they may
not have had some foundation
which Philolaus, from his own
point of view, may have thought
sufficient. If we once enter the
region of imagination, it is difficult
to set bounds to arbitrary caprices.
Those we have been considering
were doubtless not so arbitrary as
what Aristotle (wide infra, p. 425, 2)
quotes from Eurytus. Schaar-
Schmidt is especially perplexed by
the attribution of the dodecagon to
Zeus, while the fragments of Phi-
lolaus regard the decad as the
number which rules the universe.
This presents to me no greater
difficulty than to find in the theory
of Philolaus respecting the ele-
ments, the dodecahedron made the
primitive form of Æther, or in the
theory of harmony the octave divi-
ded into six tones instead of ten.
The system of number could not
be directly applied to geometrical
figures. In the same way that,
among solids, the dodecahedron
was attributed to the universal
element, so among plane figures,
bounded by straight lines, the
equilateral dodecagon, easy to con-
struct out of a square by means
of equilateral triangles, taking a
square as point of departure; easy
also to inscribe in a circle—and the
angle of which (= 150 degs.) is equal
to the angle of the square (90 degs.)
and of the equilateral triangle (60
degs.), might have been chosen as
the symbol of the universe and of
the Supreme god who rules the
world as a whole (the twelve gods
of the myth).
* Cf. Arist. Metaph. xiv. 6,
1093 a, 1: ei 3’ &vdºykm trăvra &pið-
woo koivovelv, &váyirm troAA& ovuflat-
velv Tà aird. That which is desig-
nated by the same number must be
similar.
* Compare in this respect with
APPLICATION OF THE WUMBER—THEORY. 425
same object or concept should sometimes be denoted
by one figure and sometimes by another; what whim-
sical vagaries were permitted in regard to this subject
even in the ancient Pythagorean school, we can see from
the example of Eurytus, who attempted to prove the
signification of particular numbers by putting together
the figures of the things they designated out of the
corresponding number of pebbles."
The Pythagoreans, however, did not content them-
selves with this arbitrary application of their principles,
but sought to carry them out methodically by more
precisely defining the numerical proportions according
to which all things are ordered, and applying them to
the different classes of the Real. We cannot indeed
assert that the whole school entered on these discus-
sions, and observed in their procedure the same plan ;
even with regard to the work of Philolaus, which alone
what results from the preceding
notes, the statements that justice
is designated by the number five
(Iambl. Theol. Arith. p. 30, 33) or
three (Plut. Ms. 75); health by the
number seven (Philolaus, ap. Iambl.
Th. Ar. p. 56) or six (ibid. p.
38); marriage by the numbers five,
six, or three (Theol. Arithm. p. 18,
34); the sun by the decad (Th.
Ar. p. 60); light by the number
seven (Philolaus, loc. cit.) and by
the number five (Theol. Ar. 28);
the spirit by the monad, the soul
by the dyad, opinion (66&a) by the
triad, the body or sensation by the
tetrad (Theo of Smyrna, c. 38, p.
152; Asclep. loc. cit. 541 a, 17,
cf. p. 420, 2). It is true that the
last-mentioned passage is certainly
posterior to Plato; and that, as re-
gards the rest, it is impossible to
say what really belonged to the
ancient Pythagoreans.
* According to Aristotle, Me-
taph. xiv. 5, 1092 b, 10 (where the
words, Tóv puróv, l. 13, seem more-
over to involve a fault certainly
very ancient), and Theophr. Me-
taph. p. 312 Br. (Fr. 12, 11); vide
the excellent commentary of Alex-
ander (in this case, the real Alex-
ander) ad. Met. p. 805, Bon. ; cf.
also Syrian in Metaph. Schol. 938
a, 27. I cannot understand how
Chaignet, ii. 125, can deny to me
the opinion that the ancient Pytha-
gorean school ‘avait au moins Semé
le germe d'où est sortie toute cette
symbolique de fantaisie,” in spite of
the preceding demonstrations, cited
by himself (p. 126).
426 THE POYTHIAGOREA.N.S.
could give us any clue on this subject, our knowledge
is too scanty to allow of our determining with certainty
the position which particular enquiries assumed in it.
We shall, however, be adhering pretty closely to the
natural connection of these enquiries if we first con-
sider the number-system as such; next its application
to tones and figures; thirdly, the doctrine of the ele-
mentary bodies and motions about the universe; and
finally, the theories on the terrestrial natures and man.
It would be easy to reduce these divisions to more
general points of view, but this I think ought not to be
done, since we know nothing of any division of the
Pythagorean system of philosophy corresponding with
the later discrimination of three principal parts, or any
other classification of the kind.
In order to reduce numbers themselves to a fixed
schema, the Pythagoreans employed the division of
odd and even, and also the system of decads. The
former has been already alluded to (p. 377); in its
further development various species were discriminated
from the even as well as from the odd ; whether these
species were the same as are enumerated by later
writers' is not quite certain, nor can we be sure how
* Nicom. Inst. Arithm, p. 9
sq. : Theo. Math. i. c. 8 sq. Three
kinds of numbers are here distin-
guished among the even numbers,
the āprudkus &priov (the numbers
that can be divided by even num-
bers down to Unity, like 64); the
Treptororóptuov (the numbers which,
divided by 2, give even numbers,
but which, divided by any even
number higher than 2, give uneven
numbers like 12 and 20); and the
ăpriotrépio'orov (vide supra, p. 377, 1),
Similarly three kinds of numbers
are distinguished in regard to un-
even numbers, the trpárov kal
&aiv6erov (the first numbers); the
Seirepov kai oriv6erov (numbers
which are the product of several
uneven numbers, and are, there-
fore, not divisible merely by unity,
as 9, 15, 21, 25, 27); and lastly,
the numbers divisible separately
by other numbers than unity, but
THE WUMERICAL SYSTEM. 427
many of the other divisions' of numbers which we find
in more recent authors” belong to the ancient Pytha-
gorean doctrine. Many of these ideas, no doubt, really
belonged to the Pythagoreans.” But all these arith-
metical principles, if we except the general distinction
of odd and even, were far less important in regard to
the Pythagorean cosmology than to Greek arithmetic,
which here also followed the direction given to it by
this school. The importance of the decuple system in
relation to the Pythagoreans is much greater. For as
they considered numbers over ten to be only the repe-
tition of the first ten numbers,” all numbers and all
powers of numbers appeared to them to be comprehended
in the decad, which is therefore called by Philolaus,”
great, all-powerful and all-producing, the beginning
and the guide of the divine and heavenly, as of the
terrestrial life.
the relation of which to others is
only to be defined by unities, as 9
and 25.
* On the one hand, Philolaus in
the fragment quoted on p. 377, 1,
speaks of many kinds of even and
odd; on the other, he does not,
like more recent writers, give the
ăpriotrépio'orov as a subdivision of
the even, but as a third kind, side
by side with the odd and the
€V6I1.
* Such as the distinction of
square, oblong, triangular, poly-
gonal, cylindric, spherical, corpo-
real, and superficial numbers, &c.,
together with their numerous sub-
divisions. &piðubs 58waus, kū80s, &c.
Cf. Nicomachus, Theo, Iamblichus,
Boethius, Hippolyt. Refut. i. 2, p.
10, &c.
According to Aristotle," it is the
* For example, the theory of
gnomons (supra, p. 378, 1) of
square and cubic numbers, &piðuol,
Terpáyovoi and étépouſikets, of dia-
gonal numbers (Plato, Rep. viii.
546 B sq.; cf. p. 429, 6).
* Hierocl. in Carm. Aur. p. 166
(Fragm. Phil. i. 464): roi 38 &piðuoi,
to metrepaguévov Štáortmua ñ 6ercás.
6 yap &m tračov &piðueſv é6éAov čva-
káutrel argxiv ćirl to €v. It is for
this reason that Aristotle blames
Plato, and indirectly also the Py-
thagoreans, for only counting num-
bers up to ten. Phys. iii. 6, 206
b, 30; Metaph. xii. 8, 1073 a,
19; xiii. 8, 1084 a, 12: ei uéxpt
Sekdāos é àpiðubs, &otrep Tivés
paoruv.
* Wide supra, p. 371 2.
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 a, 8: éretón
428 THE PITHAGOREA.N.S.
perfect and complete, which includes in itself" the whole
essence of number; and as nothing, generally speaking,
would be knowable without number, so in particular,
we are indebted solely to the decad that knowledge is
possible to us.” Four has a similar importance, not
merely because it is the first square number, but chiefly
because the four first numbers added together produce
the perfect number, tem. In the famous Pythagorean
oath, Pythagoras is therefore celebrated as the revealer
of the quaternary number (Tetractys), and this in its
turn is praised as the source and root of the etermal
nature.”
réAetov i öekäseival Sorce? kal traorav
trepieuxmibéval thvºrów Śpiðuðv púgiv.
Philop. De An. C, 2, u : TéAetos y&p
àpiðubs 66era, Tepiéxel yèp tróvra
dpiðubv évéavré. Whether this is
taken from Aristotle's treatise on
the good, as Brandis, i. 473, con-
jectures, is uncertain.
* Hence the decuple classifica-
tions, in cases where the totality of
the Real is in question ; as in the
table of opposites and the system
of the heavenly bodies.
* Philol, loc. cit.; and doubtless
in regard to this passage, Iambl.
Theol. Ar. p. 61 : triotis ye uživ ka-
Aetral, &rt karð Tov pixóNaov Šeköt
kai roſs airãs uopious repl rôvövtww
où trapépyws kataAapſ3avouévous trfor-
Tuv čxopwev. Cf. what is said in the
same place about the work of
Speusippus, who shared the opinion
of Philolaus. Theo of Smyrna, c.
49, also says that Philolaus spoke
at length of the decad, but we
know nothing of the treatise attri-
buted to Archytas on this subject,
and quoted by Theo.
*"Où uð Tov &pietépg yeveó Tapa-
Later Pythagoreans are fond of arranging all
6óvra retpaktöv, tray&v devãov qi-
otos $1%uar’ (or: Étgapid r’)
ëxova'av. On this oath and the
quaternary number vide Carm.
Aur. v. 47 sq.; Hierocles in Carm.
Aur. v. 166 f. (Fragm. Phil. i. 464
sq.); Theo, Math. c. 38; Lucian, De
Salut. c. 5; V. Auct. 4; Sext. Math.
94 sqq.; iv. 2; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 16;
Iambl. Th. Ar. p. 20; cf. Ast. on
the passage and Müllach in loc. cit.
of the golden poem. The date of
these verses cannot be determined
with certainty. According to the
Theol. Ar., they were found in Em-
pedocles, and from his point of
view the four elements should be
regarded as the four roots of the
universe. Butin this case, instead
of yeweg, it would be necessary to
read with Sextus, iv. 2, and others,
Juxá (cf. Fabricius in loc. cit. of Fa-
bricius), and by the word, trapabows
to understand (with Mosheim, in
Cudworth. Syst. Intell. i. 580) the
Deity. It seems to me more likely
that Pythagoras is here celebrated
as the inventor of the Tetractys.
It is, perhaps, on account of these
THE WUMERICAL SYSTEM. 429
things in series of four: how far this is derived from
the ancient Pythagoreans cannot be determined. But
each of the other numbers has its particular value.
One is the first from which all the other numbers arise,
and in which the opposite qualities of numbers, the
odd and the even, must therefore be united ; * two is the
first even number; three the first that is uneven and
perfect, because in it we first find beginning, middle
and end;” five is the first number which results by
addition from the first even and the first uneven
number." Six is the first number which results from
them by multiplication. Six multiplied by itself gives
a number which again ends in six; all the multiples
of five end either in five or ten ;” three, four, and five,
are the numbers of the most perfect right-angled
triangle, which together form a particular proportion;"
verses that Xenocrates calls his
second principle to &evvaov (cf.
Part. ii. a, 866, 1, third edition).
e.g. Theo and Theol. Arithm. l.c.
* Wide supra, p. 401, and re-
specting the dpriorépto.gov, Theo,
p. 30: 'AptorroréAns be v rá rv0a-
*opulcó to év pnow épºqorépov
peréxelv ris pàorews &priq, wēv Y&p
rpoore&v reputröv troteſ, reputré à
#priov, 6 oik &v jöövaro, ei uh &uſpoºv
Tatv pigeolv uetetxe, a proof which
is as singular as the proposition it
is intended to demonstrate orvuſpé-
peral 3& Totºrous kal’Apxtras. Plu-
tarch gives the same reason. Plut.
De Ei. c. 8, p. 388.
3 Arist. De Coelo, i. 1, 268 a,
10 : ka9ámep yap paal kai oi IIv6a-
yópelot. To trav kal rà ravra rols
Tptolv Šptotal texevrh yāp kal
piéorov Kal &px?) Töv Špiðubv čxel Tov
ro5 travros, raûra öö. Töv Tſis ºrpić60s.
Theo, p. 72: Aéyeral 3& kal 6 rpía
TéAetos, étrelë, trpáros &px?iv kal
pléora kai Trépas àxel. Iambl. Theol.
Arithm. p. 15, gives an improbable
and confused reason, wearóirm'ra kal
āvaao'ytav airiv trpoaryópevov.
* Wide supra, p. 420, 1; 422, 1 ;
Anatol. ap. Iambl. Th. Ar. p. 34 (be-
sides many other properties of the
number 6): éé àptſov kal repuorood
Töv trpátov, Šáševos kal 6% Asos,
ëvváuel kal troAAaTAaqtaaluq, yºveral,
hence it is called ågåev60mAvs and
'yduos. These denominations are
also found loc. cit. p. 18; Plut. De
Ei. c. 8; Theo, Mus. c. 6; Clemens.
Strom. vi. 683 C; Philop. Phys.
R., 11.
* Plut. De El. c. 8, p. 388,
* Iambl. Theol. Arithm. p. 26,
43; Procl. in Eucl. 111 m (428 Fr.),
who attributes to Pythagoras him-
self the construction of this trian-
430 THE PETHAGOREA.N.S.
seven" is the only number within the decad which has
neither factor nor product; this number is moreover
compounded out of three and four, the significance of
which has just been discussed; lastly, to pass over other
things, it is together with four the mean arithmetical
proportion between one and ten.” Eight is the first
cube,” and the great Tetractys is formed out of the
four first uneven and the four first even numbers, the
sum of which (36) equals the sum of the cubes of one,
two, and three.* Nine, as the square of three, and
the last of the units, must have had a special import-
ance.” With the Pythagoreans themselves, of course,
these arithmetical observations were not separated from
their other researches on the significance of numbers;
and, judging from individual examples, we may suppose
that they carried them much farther in a mathematical
gle, according to an uncertain fra-
dition. Cf. Alex. in Metaph. i. 8,
990 a, 23; Philo. De Vit, Contempl.
899 B (41). According to this
passage the perfect right-angled
triangle is that of which the sides
= 3 and 4, and of which conse-
quently the hypothemuse = 5.
This last is called Övvauévn, because
its square is equal to the sum of
the squares of the sides. The sides
are called Övaorévôpieval ; the hy-
pothenuse is also called &vikia (ap.
Alex.); this denomination is pro-
bably more primitive than the
&vetkia of the Pseudo-Megillus, ap.
Iambl. Theol. Arithm. p. 28; this
&veikſa, like yáuos, indicates the
combination of the odd and the
even. The expressions we find in
Plato, Rep. viii. 546 B: aikhosis
8vváueva! re kal fivvao revågsval.
This proves these opinions to be-
long to the ancient Pythagoreans,
' Wide supra, p. 420, 2, and
Iambl. Theol. Arithm. p. 43 sq. Be-
cause the number 7 has no factors,
Philolaus called it & whºrap, ac-
cording to Joh. Lydus, De Mems. ii.
11, p. 72; cf. also Clemens, Strom.
vi. 683 D ; Chalcid. in Tim. 35,
p. 188; Mull. sqq.
* For 1 + 3 = 4, 4 + 3 = 7,
7 + 3 = 10. -
* Widesupra, 422, 1; Iambl. Th.
Ar. p. 54; Clemens, loc. cit, &c.
* Plut. De Is, c, 75; Schol. p.
38; # 88 kaxovuévn terpakros, rö.
& kal TpidKovra, uéytotos ºv Špkos,
às teópúAntal ral kóa'uos &váuaarai,
recordpov učv àptíov táv trpátov,
teoro.dpov 8& róv reptororóv eis ro
aútb ovvre?\ovpuévov &toreAoûuevos.
For further details, cf. De An.
Procr. 30, 4, p. 1027.
* Wide Iambl. Th. Ar. p. 57 sq.
HA RMONY. 431
direction than could be shown in the present exposi-
tion. The later writers, however, give us very little
certain information on this subject. Even what I
have now taken from them very possibly does not
altogether originate with the primitive school, but
there is no doubt that it truly describes the character
of the ancient Pythagorean theory of numbers.
Number and Harmony being with the Pythagoreans
almost equivalent conceptions, their arithmetical system
was closely connected with their system of Harmony."
The different mature of the two spheres however
necessitated for each a separate mode of treatment.
While therefore the numbers were arranged according
to the number ten, the measure of tones is the octave.
The chief divisions of the octave are the fourth and the
fifth : the relation of tones in it is measured according
to the length of the resonant strings, for the fourth
as 3 : 4; for the fifth as 2 : 3; for the whole octave
as 1 : 2.” Other details, such as the variation of par-
* The Pythagoreans called the
harmonic theory ravovirch, accord-
ing to Porphyry, in Ptol. Harm.
(in Wallisii Opp. Math. ii.), p.
207, and Ptolemais of Cyrene, who
is cited by Porphyry. Notwith-
standing, the word, éppovirch, must
also have been in use among them.
Aristoxenus (Harm. Elem. sub
init. ; ibid. p. 8) gives this as the
ordinary designation for the theory
of tones (ä kaxoupévm épuovinch). In
the same way he constantly calls
the adherents of the Pythagorean
theory of āpuovikol, oi kaAoûuevo
āppovikoi; we find even in Archy-
tas the expression, dippovik? &vaxo-
ºyſa, for a certain numerical
relation.
* This arrangement of the tones
in the octave certainly belongs to the
ancient Pythagorean school, vide
the passage from Philolaus, quoted
p. 385, 2. As to the discovery and
measure of the octave, however,
there is much uncertainty. Ac-
cording to one account, which is
found in Nicom. Harm. i. 10 sq.;
Iambl. in Nicom. 171 sq.; Vit. Py-
thag. 115 sq.; Gaudent. Isag. 13
sq.; Macrob. in Somn. Scip. ii. 1;
Censorin, De Die Nat. c. 10; Boeth.
De Mus. i. 10 sq.; it was Pytha-
goras himself who discovered the
harmonic system. He is said to
have observed that the sounds of
the blacksmith's hammer in the
forge produce a fourth, a fifth. and
g’º
432
THE PIV THAGOREANS,
ticular tones; the concords that result from them ; the
an octave. On further examination
he discovered that the weight of
the hammers was in the same pro-
portion as the acuteness of the tones
which they produce. He then, by
means of different weights, extended
strings of the same thickness and
length, and found that the acuteness
of the tones was proportionate to
the weight. To obtain an har-
monic proportion of a fourth be-
tween the most elevated string of
the heptachord, and that of the
fourth (uéorm), a fifth between this
and the lowest (vºirm), and inversely
a fourth between the vitm and the
fifth string from above (trapauéon,
or according to the ancient division
and the ancient denomination,
Tp(rm), a fifth between this and the
highest string, and a tone between
the uéorm and the trapauéoºm (= 8:9),
a weight is required for the Śrātm
of 6, for the uéorm of 8, for the
trapauéon (ºrpºrm) of 9, for the vitm
of 12. Similarly, say Boethius and
Gaudentius, other experiments
have shown that in regard to one
string equally extended (the mono-
chord canon, the invention of which
is attributed to Pythagoras, Diog.
viii. 12), that the height of the
tones is in inverse proportion to
the length of the vibrating string.
Boethius gives some further experi-
ments with bells. In this account
the story of the Smith's hammer is
manifestly a story which is at once
refuted by the physical impossibi-
lity of the fact. It is also singular
that the height 6f the sounds is
given as proportional to the tension
of the strings, or to the weight
which produces this tension, while
in reality it is only proportional to
the square root of the forces of
tension. If then it is true that the
Pythagoreans held this opinion,
they could not have based it upon
experiments; but observing in a
general manner that the height of
the tones increased with the tension
of the strings, they concluded that
both increased in the same propor-
tion. It is also possible, however,
that this hasty conclusion was
drawn by their successors. Lastly,
the opinion that Pythagoras him-
self discovered the arithmetical
proportion of tones had been al-
ready enunciated, according to
Heracleides, ap. Porph. in Ptol.
Harm. (in Wallisii Opp. Math. ii.)
c. 3, p. 213, by Xenocrates; and
whoever this Heracleides may have
been, whether Heracleides Lembus
or the grammarian of that name
who lived at Rome under Claudius
and Nero (Suid. H. c. 1)—Hera-
cleides Ponticus it certainly was
not—we have no reason to doubt
that Xenocrates really said this of
Pythagoras. But the accuracy of
the statement is not better proved
by the testimony of Xenocrates
than by more recent testimony.
We cannot say that the thing is
impossible, but we may well sus-
pect that here, as in many other
instances, a discovery made by the
successors of Pythagoras has been
attributed to himself. The last
assertion is well established. The
Bythagoreans must have started
from observations on the propor-
tion of the length of strings which,
being the same in thickness and
tension, produce sounds of different
acuteness. We gather this from
the testimony of ancient writers,
drawn from the Pythagorean
sources themselves. In no other
way can the indications which we
find in Philolaus respecting the
fourth, the fifth, and the octave, be
explained. It is for this reason
FIG URES.
433
different species and musical modes' I may leave to
the history of musical theories, since these details do
not stand in any close connection with the philosophic
view of the world adopted by the Pythagoreans.”
that among the ancient musicians
the highest number designates the
lowest sound; and that in the
harmonic series (vide the Timaeus
of Plato) the progression is not
from the lower tones to the higher,
but from the higher to the lower.
The number by which a sound is
designated has no relation to the
vibrations of the air of which they
are compounded, but to the length
of the string which creates them.
It is only at this point that we can
form any exact idea of the dis-
coveries of the Pythagoreans con-
cerning sounds. The Pythagoreans
were ignorant of the fact that the
height of sounds depends on the
number of vibrations of the air.
Archytas, for example, in the frag-
ment quoted ap. Porph. l. c. p. 236
sq. (Mullach. Fragm. Phil. i. 564 b),
and in Theo, Mus. p. 94, expressly
says that sounds become higher in
proportion as they move more
rapidly; and the same hypothesis
is the basis of the doctrine of the
spheral harmony, as it is explained
by Plato (Tim. 67 B), Arist., and
much later by Porph. (in Ptol.
Harm. 217, 235 sq.) and the Pla-
tonist AElianus, quoted by Por-
phyry (p. 216 sq.), Dionysius the
musician (p. 219), and many others.
What the Pythagorean theory of
sounds established is merely this:
that all other conditions being
equal, the height of the sounds is
in inverse proportion to the length
of the vibrating strings, and that
the intervals of sound in the octave,
determined by this measure, are
WOL. I.
such as have been given above.
Moreover it had not escaped the
Pythagoreans that the concord of
two sounds is greater in proportion
as the integral numbers expressing
their proportion are small. Porph.
(in Ptol. Harm. 280) gives us a
Pythagorean explanation from Ar-
chytas and Didymus of this prin-
ciple. The artificial character of
this explanation should not make
us doubtful as to its antiquity.
* The species (yevn) depend on
the distribution of strings, the
modes (Tpétrol, &pgovía) depend on
the pitch of the instruments. There
were three kinds—the diatonic,
chromatic, and enharmonic ; and
three modes—the Doric, the Phry-
gian, and the Lydian. Already, in
Plato's time, accessory modes had
been added (Rep. iii. 398 E sqq.).
At a later time they became con-
siderably increased. The distinc-
tion of the yávn, at any rate, belongs
to the Pythagoreans. Ptol. Harm.
i. 13 (cf. Porph. in Ptol. 310, 313
sq.) speaks of this in regard to
Archytas.
* Wide besides the passages
quoted p. 431, 2; 388, 2; and from
Ptol. Harm. i. 13 sq., the explana-
tions of Böckh, Philol. 65 sqq., and
Brandis, Gr. Röm. Philol. i. 454
sq., and particularly on the ancient
theory of sounds; Böckh, Stud.
and Daub and Creuzer, iii. 45 sq.
(Klein. Schrift. iii. 136 sq.); De
Metris Pindari, p. 203 sqq.; and
Martin, Etudes sur le Timée, i. 389
sq.; ii. 1 sq.
F F
434 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
After tones, the number theory was next applied
to geometrical figures, and it is not necessary to be a
Pythagorean to see that the form and relations of
figures are determined by numbers. If, therefore,
the Pythagorean and the Greek mathematicians in
general were accustomed to apply geometrical terms
to numbers,' and to discover arithmetical and har-
monical proportions in figures,” the habit was perfectly
natural. The Pythagoreans, however, did not stop
here, but as they saw in numbers generally the essence
of things, they sought to derive figures and bodies
immediately from definite numbers.
' Wide supra, p. 427, 2, 3.
* We have already found an ex-
ample of this, p. 426, 6, in the Py-
thagorean triangle. The demon-
stration of the harmonic proportion
in the cube is somewhat similar.
By harmonic proportion (āva)\oyia
ëpuovuch, called also Štrevavría) is
understood, as distinguished from
the arithmetical and geometrical
proportion, a proportion between
three quantities so that the diffe-
rence between the middle number
and first is to the first as
the difference between the middle
number and the last is to the last.
This is found when the quantities
are of such a kind §ore 6 &v
Trpätos épos Tá čevrépa štrépéxm
éavrò puépel, Taitº 6 uégos rô Tpital
5tepéxei Tô Tpſtw pºpel (Archyt.
ap. Porph. in Ptol. Harm. p. 267;
Fragm. Phil. ii. 119). A similar
indication is to be found in Nicom.
Inst. Arithm. ii. 25, p. 70, in a de-
tailed explanation of the three
proportions; Iambl. in Nicom.
Arithm. p. 141; Plut. De An. Proor.
15, p. 1019. We find a less exact
notice in Plut. De Mus. 22, p.
Aristotle at any
1138, who sees harmonic propor-
tion in the relation of the numbers
6, 8, 9, 12 a puovukh aegórms is
# Taité uſipet rôv škpav airów
ūrepéxova'a kal inrepexogévm, as
Plato, Tim. 36 A.; cf. Epinom. 991
A, characterises it. This propor-
tion is called harmonic, because
the first numbers between which
they exist (3, 4, 6, or 6, 8, 12) ex-
press the fundamental proportions
of the octave (àpuovía). For, on
the one hand, 8 is greater than 6
by a third of 6, and less than 12
by a third of 12; on the other
hand, 6 : 8 is the fourth, 8: 12
the fifth, 6 : 12 the octave. The
same numbers are to be found in
the cube, which has 6 surfaces, 8
angles, and 12 terminal lines, and
is, therefore, called yeaperpukh
āppovía by Philolaus according
to Nicom, Inst. Arith. ii. 26, p. 72
(cf. Cassiodorus, Earp. in Psalms.
ix. vol. ii. 36 b, Gar. Böckh,
Philol. 87 sq.); Simpl. De An. 18
b; Boëthius, Arith. ii. 49 (cf.
Philop. De An. E 16) also remark
that the cube was sometimes called
āpuovia or harmonia geometrica.
FIG URES. 435
rate tells us that they defined the line as the number
two ; 1 Philolaus we know explained four as the number
of the body;” and Plato seems to have called three and
four “the number of the surface, and ‘the number of
the solid.” Plato furthermore derived the line from
two, the plane from three, and the solid from four ; *
and Alexander ascribes the derivation of solids from
planes, planes from lines, and lines from points or
monads, alike to Plato and the Pythagoreans.” We
may, therefore, certainly assume that the Pythagoreans,
in regard to the derivation of figures, identified one
with the point, two with the line, three with the plane,
* Metaph. vii. 11, 1036 b, 7.
It is often difficult to determine
whether the matter of an object
should, or should not, be included
in its definition; hence ātropoto'ſ
Tives #3m kal étri roo kök?\ov kal too
Tpuyóvov, Ös oë trpoo’ikov Ypappa's
ôpigeo-0at kal rô ovvexe? (as if the
definition that a triangle con-
tained within three lines did not
sufficiently designate the essential
nature of the triangle) . . . ſcal
&váyoval travra eis toūs ūpuðuous,
kal Ypappuis Tov Aóryov Tov Tów 500
eivaſ paoſiv. Tuvès, it is certain,
means the Pythagoreans; the Pla-
tonists are subsequently expressly
distinguished from the Pythago-
I’08, IlS.
* In a passage which we shall
consider further on, Iambl. Th. Ar.
p. 56 : PixóAaos 6* uetà to uaffnua-
tukov pléyé60s Tpixà Staatöv čv
Terpáöl, trolótmta kal Xpógiv ćirtàet-
£auévns tis pàorea's év trevráði,
Jºzooiv Šč év čáöl, votiv 8& kal
à-yetav kal to Ötr' airoi, Aeyóuevov
qºs évé8öopadāl, were railrd pmoly
#para kal biatav kal uitiv kai étri-
votav čv 3-yôodót ovubºval roºs ojaw.
Asclep. Schol. in Arist. p. 541 a,
23: Töv Šē réorgapa &piðuov čAeyov
[of IIv0.] Tö orópa &n Aós, rov 6&
trévre to puorikov ordjua, row 5& éº to
êuyvXov. It is true that a very
improbable reason is given for this,
viz., because 6 = 2 x 3, and that
the even designates the body, and
the uneven the soul.
* Arist. quotes (De An. i. 2,
404 b, 18), as borrowed from
Plato's lectures on philosophy:
votiv pièv to ºv, Štrigrhumv 6é ré, São
. Tov 8& too tritéðov &piðubv
6óław, ałoºmgiv Šē row roi, orépeoû.
* Arist. loc. cit.; Metaph. xiv.
3, 1090 b, 20; Ps.-Alex. in Me-
taph. xiii. 9, p. 756, 14 Bon.: thu
8è katē to Év, pnow épx?iv oix
ôuotws eio fivov &ntavres, dAA’ of uèv
airows tois &piðuous rà etón toſs ple-
'yā6egiv čAeyov Čiriq'épeiv, oiov čváða
pºv Ypaupifi, rpióa 88 €tritréâq, re-
Tpáðaðū arepeg. totaúra yap Év Tots
trepl pixooroºpſas iotopeſ trepi IIAd-
tovos. Cf. Zeller, Plat. Studien,
237 sq.; Brandis, De Perd. Arist.
lib. p. 48 sq.
* Wide p. 408, 1.
F F 2
436 THE PXTHAGO REAWS.
four with the solid; their reason for this being that
the straight line is limited by two points, the first
rectilinear figure by three lines, the simplest regular
body by four surfaces, whereas the point is an indivisible
unity.' But by virtue of their general tendencies they
must necessarily have believed that this derivation of
the figures of bodies involved a similar derivation of
the corporeal itself,” for, as we have before remarked,”
they supposed bodies to consist of the lines and planes
enclosing them, as they supposed lines and figures to
consist of numbers.
According to Philolaus, the elementary nature of
bodies depends upon their form. Of the five regular
bodies, therefore, he assigned the cube to the earth,
the tetrahedron to fire, the octohedron to air, the
icosahedron to water, the
! It is thus that this doctrine is
always explained by the ancients;
cf. p. 407, 3;408, 1; and the passages
quoted by Brandis, l. c. and Gr-
Töm. Phil. i. 471 ; Nikom. Arithm.
ii. 6; Boëth. Arithm. ii. 4, p. 1328;
Theo. Math. 151 sq.; Iambl. Th.
Ar. p. 18 sq.; Speusippus, ibid. p.
64; Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 154; Math.
iv. 4, vii. 99 (x. 278 sqq.); Joh.
Philop. De An, C, 2; Diog. viii. 25.
No doubt these passages imme-
diately apply to the derivation of
geometry, so common after the time
of Plato. But it is probable that
the Platonic doctrine was the same
on this point as the Pythagorean;
for the combination in question
certainly rests on the standpoint
of the theory of numbers.
* As is presupposed in the
passages quoted. Such a construc-
tion of bodies from surfaces is no
dodecahedron” to the fifth
doubt referred to in the question
put by Aristotle to the Pythago-
reans (vide p. 400), viz., Whether
the first body arose from surfaces
or from something else?
* Wide p. 407 sq.
* Ap. Stob. i. 10 (Böckh Philol.
160): kal r& év tá or patpg ord uata
(the five regular bodies) arévre évri.
Tā āv tá orgaípg (the bodies which
are in the world—Heeren and
Meineke would omit these words)
tröp, #8wp ical ya kal &hp kal 6 rās
orgapas àxicas (such is the text of
codex A. Böckh, and others read
& rās a paipas àAkás; Meineke, &
Tás orbatpas kvkÅás; Schaarschmidt,
Fragm. d. Philol. p. 50, 6 rās
orgapas àykos, or even à . . . .
ÖAóras; Heeren, à Tâs orgalpas
8Arcos, which according to him
designated aether as that which
draws and moves the globe of the
THE ELEMENTS. 437
element which embraces all the others; that is to
say, he held that the smallest constituent parts of
these different substances had the supposed form." If
we might assume that Plato, who borrowed these
definitions from Philolaus, also followed him in the
particulars of his construction, we must believe that
Philolaus adopted a somewhat complicated procedure”
in the derivation of the five bodies; but this theory
is not only unsupported by any adequate evidence,”
but even in the exposition of Plato there are consider-
able arguments against it.” Whether this derivation
world. Perhaps we should read:
à T. orb. kūkaos, or to t. a p. 3Aas)
tréatrrow. Plut. Plac. ii. 6, 5 (Stob.
i. 450, Galen. c. 11): IIv6ayópas
Trévre axmudrov čvrov a repeau,
ãmep kaAetral kal waffnuatuca, ćic
pºv roſ, kū8ov prior yeyovéval thu
yºv, Čk & rās rvpapíðos to trip, Ér
8è tod ókraéðpov row &épa, ćic 6&
roj eikogačāpov to $60p, k 8& Too
Sobekaéðpou thu roi, travros aſpalpav.
Cf. Stobaeus, i. 356, where, as in
Diog. viii.25 (Alex. Polyh.), there is
no mention of the fifth element: oi
âtro IIv0ayópov Tov kóo uov orgaipav
karð axiua têvtegorápov grouxetov.
1 In what concerns the four
elements, there can be no doubt
that the words of Philolaus have
this meaning. It is only in regard
to the fifth of the regular bodies,
the dodecahedron, that a question
might be raised. Are we to un-
derstand that the elementary par-
ticles of the substance which, ac-
cording to Philolaus, has formed
the globe of the world (i.e. the
outer shell of the globe) present
this form 2 or is it the globe itself
which does so? There is one cir-
cumstance which favours the first of
these theories, viz. that among the
disciples of Plato all those who in-
cline the most to Pythagoreanism,
so far as our information extends
on this subject, admit the fifth
element, aether, in addition to the
other four. This circumstance
equally contradicts the idea that
the author of the passage in ques-
tion borrowed the fifth body from
Aristotle. Wide p. 317.
* Wide Part ii. a, 675 sq. 3rd
edition.
* For Simpl. De Caelo, 252 b,
43 (Schol. in Arist. 510 a, 41 sq.),
can scarcely have taken his state-
ment from Theophrastus, to whom
he refers merely for his assertion
about Democritus. It is more pro-
bably derived from the pseudo-
Timaeus (De An. Mundi), from
whom he has previously (452 b, 14)
quoted a passage (p. 97 E Sq.).
This is most likely the source of
the statement of Hermias, Irris,
c. 16, which attributes to Pytha-
goras and his school the whole
Platonic construction.
* The Platonic construction of
the elementary bodies by means of
right-angled triangles cannot be
4.38 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
of the elements belonged to the earlier philosophers,
or was originated by Philolaus, and whether in connec-
tion with this the four elements, omitting the fifth, came
from the Pythagoreans to Empedocles, or conversely
with the addition of the fifth, from Empedocles to the
Pythagoreans, is a question that the historical evidence
does not enable us to decide;" there are grounds, how-
ever, for preferring the second of these alternatives.
The theory of Philolaus presupposes too high a develop-
ment of geometrical knowledge to be compatible with
great antiquity, and we shall hereafter find that
Empedocles was the first who introduced the more
accurate conception of the elements, and maintained
that they were four.” This construction, therefore, is
probably to be attributed to Philolaus.
This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the
Pythagoream notions concerning the origin and con-
stitution of the world, so far as we are acquainted with
them, connect themselves with the other presuppositions
of the system, independently of the doctrine of the
applied to the dodecahedron. Con-
sequently, if this construction were
made the point of departure, it
would be impossible to see in the
dodecahedron a specific elementary
form ; and, in fact, Plato sets aside
the dodecahedron, Tim. 55 C, cf.
40 A, in a manner which seems to
imply that this fifth body was
known to him from another source,
but that he was unable to make
use of it in his exposition. Inde-
pendently of the Platonic method
of reducing the elements to certain
figures, there existed a second and
simpler method, as is proved by the
passage in Aristotle, De Caelo, iii.
5, 304 a, 9 sq.
* The celebrated verses of the
Golden Poem are of uncertain
origin, vide p. 428, 3 ; 322. Evi-
dence like that of Vitruvius, viii.
Praef. (cf. Sextus, Math. x. 283;
Diog. viii.25), which attributes the
doctrine of the four elements to Py-
thagoras and Epicharmus, as well
as to Empedocles, cannot, of course,
be taken into account. The frag-
ment of the pseudo-Athamas, ap.
Clem. Strom. vi. 624 D, is cer-
tainly not authentic.
* Wide infra, Emped,
THE ELEMENTS. 439
elements. A fragment of Philolaus,' indeed, in regard
to the origin of the world, maintains that the world
always has been, and always will be; which would
incline us to believe the statement” that the Pythago-
reans in what they said of the formation of the universe
intended only to assert the logical dependence of the
derived in respect to the primitive, and not an origin of
the universe in time.” But as we have before shown
the spuriousness of the passage, and as Stobaeus does
not give us the sources or the reasons for his statement,
no argument can be based on this evidence. On the
other hand, Aristotle distinctly says that mome of the
earlier philosophers held the world to be without begin-
ning, except in the sense of the doctrine which is never
ascribed to the Pythagoreans, viz., that the substance of
the world is eternal and imperishable, but that the world
itself is subject to a constant vicissitude of generation
and destruction; * and what we know of the theories
* Ap. Stob. 1, 420 (vide supra,
p. 399, 1): 7s 65e 6 kóguos é; aiévos
kal eis aidova Staplevel . . . . eis éðv
kal avvexhs ical púa'i Stattveóuevos
kal replayeduevos éé àpxtöío. It is
immaterial in regard to the ques-
tion before us, whether we read
with Meineke, instead of &px16tw,
čičía, or, still better, with Rose
(Arist. lib. ord., p. 35), āpxas &#6tw.
* Stob. i. 450: IIv6ayápas pnal
'yevvmtöv kar’ trivotav Töv kóopov
ow karū xpóvov. That Pythagoras
regarded the world as never having
had a beginning is often affirmed
by later writers, vide inf. p. 440, 2,
e.g. Varro, De re rust. ii. 1, 3, who
ascribes to him the doctrine of the
eternity of the human race; Cen-
sorin. Dr. Nat. 4, 3 ; Tertull.
Apologet. 11; Theophilus, Ad Autol.
iii. 7, 26, who for that reason ac-
cuses Pythagoras of setting the
necessity of nature in the place of
Providence.
* So Ritter thinks, i. 417. But
in maintaining at the same time
(ibid. p. 436, vide supra, p. 404)
that the Pythagoreans held the
gradual development of the world,
he evidently contradicts himself.
Brandis, i. 481 ; Chaignet, ii. 87;
Rohr, De Philol. Fragm. Trepl
Wvx?s, p. 31.
* De Caºlo, i. 10, 279 b, 12:
'yevówevov učv Štravtes eivat £aoiv
[rov otpavöv], &AA& Yevéuevov oi
pºv &#8tov, of 68 pèaptov . . . of 6'
évaAA&E Örè uèv airws à tê 8& &AAws
ëxeiv pºsipópevov, kal tooto &ei öta-

440
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
of his predecessors only confirms this assertion."
The
expedient, also, by which Stobaeus, or rather the Neo-
Pythagorean whom he here follows,” endeavours to save
Texeiv oitos &rarep 'Eutrečokai's 6
'Akpayavtºvos kai ‘Hpdicxettos é
'Eq,éorios. In regard to these last,
it is said, p. 280 a, 11, that their
opinion accords with the theory
which represents the world as eter-
nal, and only subject to a change
of form. Cf. Phys. viii. i. 250 b,
18: &AA 80'ot uév Štreſpovs Te Kóo-
Hous elvaí (paal ral toos pév yºyveo-
6al Tovs 6% pºetpea 6at Táv icóguov,
&et (paariv eival ktvmaſiv . . . Šalou 5’
êva (sc. cóo uov sival), h oùk &el
(=?) &teipov čvrov oik &el rows uév
'ylyveg 6al, etc. the doetrine of Em-
pedocles) kal repl Täs Kivägews
ūtroríðevrai karð Aó'yov.
| Chaignet (i. 249; ii. 84) ap-
peals, in opposition to this opinion,
to the well-known saying of Herae-
leitus (inf. vol. ii. Her.), But as I
have already observed in Hermes,
x. 187, that which Heracleitus here
characterises as uncreated and im-
perishable is not the system of the
world, the eternity of which was
taught by Aristotle and the pseudo-
Philolaus, but only the trip &eigwov,
the primitive substance which, in
developing itself, formed the world,
and into which the world resolves
itself. All the physicists presup-
pose such an uncreated principle,
without deducing from it the eter-
nity of the world, cf. on Xenoph.
The same answer may be given to
Rohr's objection (p. 31), urging
, that in the fragment quoted p. 372,
1, Philolaus called the éorè rôv
Trpaypºtov eternal.
Töv trpayuárov, the Limit and
the Unlimited, may be eternal;
but it does not follow that the
The éorró,
world formed from it is also eter-
nal. Lastly, if Aristotle (Metaph.
xiv. 3, 1091 a, 12) says, against
the Platonic theory of numbers,
&rotrow 5& kal yèveauv troteſv číötav
ëvrov, we cannot conclude from
this passage, as Chaignet does (ii.
87; in his citation he is more than
inaccurate) that the Pythagoreans,
in describing the formation of the
world, did not intend to discuss
a creation of the world in time.
This remark (even if it were cer-
tainly proved to refer to the Py-
thagoreans) is not concerned with
the formation of the world, but
with the origin of numbers from
the Great and Small. Now Aris-
totle, speaking in his own name,
describes numbers as eternal. If
Chaignet thinks he can prove by
the help of the passage (De Caelo,
i. 10; vide preceding note) that
the eternity of the world was
taught before Aristotle, he com-
pletely misunderstands the sense
of the passage; āţătos there means
infinite duration, not the absence
of commencement, which alone is
here in question.
* We have elsewhere shown
(Part iii, b, 114 sq.) how general
the doctrine of the eternity of the
world was among the Neo-Pytha-
goreans. That the statement of
Stobaeus only reproduces their
opinion, is proved by his attri-
buting to Pythagoras, whose doc-
trine is unknown to Aristotle, a
distinction which greatly trans-
cends the standpoint of his epoch,
and in reality is only affirmed by
the Platonic school. Chaignet
FORMATION OF THE WORLD. 441
the eternity of the world for the Pythagorean system,
is attributed by Aristotle to the Platonists' only;
neither he nor his commentators ever mention the
Pythagoreans in that connection. This would surely
have been impossible if he had been acquainted with
an exposition of Philolaus or any other Pythagorean,
which not only maintained that the world was without
beginning or end in the most decided manner, but on
the very grounds brought forward in his own system.
Irrespectively of this objection, however, it is most im-
probable that the ancient Pythagorians should have
conceived the universe as an eternal product of the world-
creating energy. The distinction between the logical
dependence of things on their causes, and their origin
in time, requires a longer practice and a finer develop-
ment of thought than we can suppose possible among
the earliest thinkers. If they enquired into the origin
of the world, it was natural for them to think of its
commencement in time : as we see from the ancient
theogonies and cosmogonies. Not till some time had
elapsed was it necessary to abandon this point of view,
and then on two considerations: 1. That matter must
and Rohr consider that they have
found in the testimony of Stobaeus
sufficient evidence as to the doc-
trine of Pythagoras and the ancient
Pythagoreans. But we cannot
trust writers, whose sources it is
impossible to trace beyond the
Neo-Pythagorean epoch; and least
of all, can we trust so recent a
compiler.
! De Coelo, i. 10, 279 b, 30 : %w
6é rives Božibetav ćtrixelpotori pépew
§avroſs rôv Aeyóvrww &p6aptov pºv
eival yewówevov 8*, oùk éorriv &Améâs.
ðuota's ydp paat roſs rö, äuaypdupara
'ypáqovoſt kal orgas eipnicéval repl ràs
'yevégews, oùx às yewouévov toté,
&AA& Stöarkaxias xàpiv &s uáAAov
ºyvapiévrov, Šotrep to Sidypaupa
ºtyvápºevov 6eagrapévows. It is clear
from what follows that certain
Platonists are hereintended. Sim-
plicius and other writers say that
Xenocrates is alluded to, and also
Speusippus.
442 THE PXTHAGORIEANS.
be without origin, and 2, that the world-forming energy
can never be conceived as inactive. The former idea, as
far as we know, was first enunciated by Parmenides, the
latter by Heracleitus; and the conclusion drawn thence
even by them and their successors was not the eternity
of our universe: Parmenides inferred from his propo-
sition the impossibility of becoming and passing away,
and accordingly he declared the phenomenal world gene-
rally to be illusion and deception. Heracleitus, Empe-
docles, and Democritus maintained, each in his own
way, an infinity of worlds of which every one had had a
beginning in time. Lastly, Anaxagoras, adopting the
ordinary theory of a sole and unique world, supposed this
likewise to have shaped itself at a definite period out of
the unformed primitive matter. On the other hand,
Aristotle never thought of attributing a description of
the origin of the world to the philosophers who main-
tained its etermity so consciously, and on principle, as
the reputed Philolaus. There is, therefore, little reason
to doubt that what is stated concerning the Pythagorean
theory of the formation of the world really refers to a
beginning of the world, in time. In fact, any other
interpretation of the texts is inadmissible. According
to the Pythagoreans, the central fire was first formed
in the heart of the universe; this is also called by
them the One or the Monad, because it is the first body
of the world; the mother of the Gods, because it is this
which engenders the heavenly bodies; they also call it
Hestia, the hearth or the altar of the universe, the
guard, the citadel or the throme of Zeus, because it is
the central point in which the world-sustaining energy

FORMATION OF THE WORLD.
as its seat."
How this beginning of the world itself
ame about, Aristotle (loc. cit.) says they were unable
o explain, and we cannot certainly discover from his
anguage whether they even attempted an explanation.”
After the formation of the central fire, the nearest
portions of the unlimited, which according to the
obscure notions of the Pythagoreans signified at once
infinite space and infinite matter, were constantly being
attracted to this centre, and becoming limited through
* Wide p. 444, 4; 446, 1; Arist.
Metaph. xiv. 3; xiii. 6 (supra, p.
400; 407, 2); Philol. ap. Stob. i.
468: to ºrpátov dippoo 6év to èv év
76 uéog tas a patpas (the sphere of
the world) ‘Earía kaxeſ rai, The
same, ibid. 360: 6 kóo uos eſs éotiv"
#pèaro às yt yueq6al &xpt too uéorov.
The text may be more exact, but
ättö roi, Mérov would certainly be
clearer. Ibid. p. 452; wide infra,
p. 446, 1; Plut. Numa, c. 11 : kóquou
oë piégov of IIv6ayopticol to trip
iöpú00al vouíſovºri, kal rotto 'Eotſav
kaxodori kal uováða. Cf. Iambl.
Th. Arithm. p. 8: Tpos toūrous paal
[of IIv6.] trepi to uéorov táv record-
pov grouxetov ketorðaſ two Évačukov
6tórupov kū8ov. of thv ued 6tmta
Tús 6éas (instead of this word, we
should doubtless read 6égea's) kal
*Oumpov eiðéval Aéryovra (Il. viii. 16).
Therefore, continues the author,
Parmenides, Empedocles, and others
say: rhv uovačukhu púaiv ‘Earías
Tpárov čv uéog iópio 6al kal 6ix to
iorógãorov puxago'eiv Tiju aithw
$6pav. We see from these passages
how the trpárov čv in Aristotle is
to be understood. The central
fire, because of its place and its
importance for the universe, was
called the One in the same sense
that the earth, for example, was
called two, and the sun, seven
(vide supra, p. 421). But how
this determinate part of the world
was related to the number one, or
distinguished from it, was not
stated. Wide p. 410 sq.
* Aristotle says (Metaph. xiv.
3), vide sup. p. 400: Tot, Évos ovo-
Taffévros eſt’ & ‘truméöwy eſt” ex
Xpoiás, which signifies indeed much
the same thing as é; étritréðav ; cf.
Arist. De sensu, 3, 439 a, 30: oi
IIv6ayópelot thv étruq divetav xpoiâu
ékáAovv efºr’ ic airépuatos eit’ & &v
&tropodaruv eitreºv. But we cannot
infer from this (as Brandis does,
i. 487) that the Pythagoreans really
followed all these methods to ex-
plain the formation of the body,
still less that all these modes of
explication had reference to the
Central fire. But Aristotle might
express himself in this way, even
had the Pythagoreans said nothing
as to the manner in which bodies
were formed. Similarly in Metaph.
xiv. 5, 1092 a, 21 sq., he puts the
question to the adherents of the
number-theory—‘how numbers re-
sult from their elements,’ uttei or
a vuòéo et, Ös é; évvrapxóvtwv, or òs
ämö aréouaros, or ös ék Too
éravtſov ;
444 THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
this attraction,' until by the perpetual continuation
and extension of that process (thus we must complete
the accounts) the system of the universe was at last
finished.
The universe was conceived by the Pythagoreans
as a sphere.” In the centre of the whole they placed,
as we have seen, the central fire; around this ten
heavenly bodies” moving from west to east describe
their orbits; * farthest off, the heaven of fixed stars,
next the five planets; then the sun, the moon, the
earth, and tenth, and last, the counter-earth, which the
Pythagoreans invented in order to complete the sacred
number of tem. The extreme limit of the universe was
formed by the fire of the periphery, which corresponded
to the central fire.”
* Arist. loc. cit.; cf. Supra, p.
400, 1. The same doctrine seems to
be the foundation of the conserva-
tion in Plut. Plac. ii. 6, 2: IIv6ayó-
pas àtro Trupos kai rod Trépºrtov
a touxetov [&pèao'0at thv yéveau roi,
kóaptov], only that here the unlimi-
ted is confounded with the tepuéxov
of Aristotle, the AEther.
* Xºpaipa is the usual expression,
p. 442, 1 ; 436, 4.
* The Pythagoreans are said to
have been the first to determine
their order in a precise manner.
Simpl. De Colo, 212 a, 13 (Schol.
497 a, 11): ás Eöönuos ioTopei, rhy
Tús 6éorews ºrdély eis robs IIv6ayo-
pstows trpérous āvatépov.
* As follows as a matter of
course in regard to the earth and
the other bodies of the universe.
For the apparent diurnal motion
of the sun, from east to West, could
not be explained by the motion of
the earth around the central fire,
The stars they believed were
unless that motion was from west
to east. Whether the Pythagoreans,
like Aristotle (cf. Böckh, d. Kosm.
System, p. 112 sq.), understood
this movement from west to east
as a movement from east to east,
or from right to right, and called
the east side the right, because the
movement starts from that side;
as Stobaeus thinks, Eel. i. 358
(Plut. Plac. ii. 10; Galen, c. 11,
p. 269), seems to me doubtful.
* Arist. De Caelo, ii. 13, sub
init.: röv traetortov ćirl rod piéarov
ketorðat Aeyóvarov [thy yīv] . . .
évavríos of trepl rºw 'Iraxſav, cańoiſ-
pevol 6* IIv6ayópelot Aéyov'riv. čarl
pºv yap too uéorov trip elval paat,
thv 5è yńv év táv šarpov oſſo'av
kūkāq, pepopuévnv repl rô uéorov vökra
re kal juépav trouetv. čtv 3’ evavríav
&AAmv tattºn karaokevágovort yºv,
hv &vrix60.ya óvoua kaxojow, où
Tpos to pauvéueva rows A6-yous kal
rès airías (mroovres, &AA& Trpás
SYSTEM OF THE WORLD.
445
fixed in transparent circles or spheres, by the revolu-
tion of which upon their axes they were carried round."
Tuvas A6-yous kal 66&as airév tá.
paiváueva trpoo’éNkovres kal Telpé-
Revol ovykoope?v (which is explained
in the following manner in Metaph.
i. 5, 986 a, 8): étrelë, a €Aetov i öe-
käseival Soiceſ kai rāorav trepieuxmºbé-
vat Thu rôv àpiðuóv pågiv, kal T&
(pepópeva karū tow oilpavov 6éka pučv
eivaí (paalu, üvrov č Švvéa w8vov
rôv pavspöv Ště roßto Šekdtmu thv
ãvrtzôova troloßgiv), Tó yöp tip-to-
Tárq, otoviral trpoofirceiv thu tutotd-
tnv Štrópxeiv x&pav, eival 6& trºp
pºv yis rutórepov, to 68 trépas Tów
perači, rö 6 oxarov ical to uéorov
Trépas . . . &ri 3 of ye IIv6ayópelot
kal Stö. Tö uáAuota trpoofirew puxat-
Teoréal to kvpuétarov too travtós'
to 6% uéorov sival rowbrov' & Aubs
qvXakºv čvouáçoval, to taútmv čxov
thv x&pav trip. Ibid, 293, b, 19 :
[rºv yºv qadi) kiveto flat kūkāq Tepi
To uéorov, où uávov 8& Tatºrmv &AA&
kai Thy &vríx60ya. Stob. Ecl. i.
488: puñóAaos trip Šv pléog trepi to
kévrpov, Štep ‘Eatíav toº travtos
kaAeſ kai Aibs oikov kal Mmtépa
6eóv, 8wpºvtekalovvox?ivical uérpov
qºorea's kal tróAlv trip repov &votá-
to to trepiéxov. Trpárov 6'eival púget
to uéorov, repl 3& rotto 6éka adºplato.
6eia xopečely (hence probably the
xopetal of the stars, ap. Plato, Tim.
40 c) oëpavöv (that is to say, the
heaven of fixed stars; it is clear
from the end of the passage which
will be quoted farther on, that the
expression belongs to the narrator),
traavāras, ueſ ois àAlou, Éq’ & ore-
Aïvny, Öq' fi Thy yiv, Öp' fi thv
&vríx60va, ué6 & oriºuTravta rö Tüp
‘Earías ātri tā kévrpa [ré kévrpg]
tdºw étréxov. Alexander ad Me-
taph. i. 5, p. 20, Bon. (vide supra, p.
402, 2), on the subject of the sun : .
é866 amv yöp at Töv ráču èxely
[paalu of IIv0.] Töv repl rô pléorov
kal Thu ‘Eattav kivovaévov 6éka
orwudravº Kiveto 6al yèp per& rhy
Töv &taavāºw aq’aipav kal r&s arévre
Tès Tāv TAavátov, web' ºv [? 8v)
öyöömy Thy gexívny, kal rºw yūy
évármy, ple6' ºu Thy &vrtkóova.
Böckh has already refuted (Philol.
103 sq.) the anonymous author in
Photius, p. 439 b, Bekk, who at-
tributes to Pythagoras twelve Dia-
cosms and passes over the counter-
earth,the fire of the centre and of the
circumference, and places instead
a circle of fire, a circle of air, and
a circle of water, between the moon
and the earth.
* Alexander treats this opinion
as Pythagorean ; Theo (Astron. p.
212, Mart.) mentions Pythagoras
himself as having been the first to
discover cat’ iótov Tuðv kūkaa v
kal év ióías 5* a patpals (Cod. ió.
6tagopaſs) évôečegeva kai Si' ékeſvow
kivoúueva (sc. Tà TAavépceva) Sokéïv
huív (pépeo:6at Ötö rôi" (w8íov. We
find these ideas in Plato and Par-
menides, which confirms their
antiquity, and proves that the
Pythagoreans, perhaps after the
example of the founder of their
school, were the authors, or, at any
rate, the chief representatives, of
the theory of the spheres, which
was of such importance in Greek
philosophy. It is impossible to
decide whether, in their opinion,
all the heavenly bodies were carried
along by spheres, i.e. by hollow
globes; or whether the fixed stars
alone were fastened to a hollow
globe, and the planets to simple
circles, as Plato supposed. Röth
(ii. a, 808 sq., 244) attributes to the

446 THE PRTHAGOREANS.
Among the bodies of the universe the central fire
occupies the first place, not only from its position, but
because, on account of this position, it is the centre o
gravity and support of the whole, the measure and
bond of the universe,' which indeed sprang solely from
it and through its operation. The Pythagoreans were
accustomed to conceive all such relations not merely
mathematically and mechanically, but at the same
time dynamically; we should therefore have expected
that they would attribute to the central fire an im-
portant influence upon the whole, even if this were not
confirmed by the analogy of their doctrine of the forma-
tion of the world, and their opinions (presently to be
considered) on the origin of the fire of the sun.” Later
accounts, however, in connection with this, assert that
the soul, or the spirit of the universe, was supposed to
Pythagoreans, and even to Pytha-
goras, the theories of eccentric
circles, and epicycles. Not only
are we without sufficient evidence
on this point (for Nicomachus and
Iamblichus ap. Simpl. De Coelo,
227 a, 17; Schot. 503 b, 11, are
not trustworthy), but the theory is
opposed to the whole tenor of an-
cient astronomy. As to the opinion
of Röth (l.c.), according to which
Eudoxus, Callippus, and Aristotle
were acquainted with the theory of
epicycles, it becomes quite untena-
ble after due consideration of the
passages in question in Aristotle
and his commentators. Wide Part
ii. 344 sqq., 2nd ed. -
| Wide p. 441, 1 ; 444, 4 ; also
Stob. i. 452: to 5& iryegovikov [æt-
AóAaos épmoevl v Tó uégaitáriº
trup, Štrep Tpótrea's 8temv trpoère-
8áAAero ris row travtos a paipas, 6
Smutovpyós, where the hyenovikov is
certainly Stoic and the Demiurgus
Platonic ; but the comparison of the
central fire with the keel of the ship
of the universe seems to be truly
Pythagorean. Nicom. (ap. Phot.
Cod. 187, p. 143 a, 32) also, among
many later documents, brings
forward a statement, according to
which the Monad was called by
the Pythagoreans Zavos Túpyos,
which must have come from some
ancient tradition. Proclus, in Tim.
172 B: kal oi IIv6ayópelot 5& Zavos
Tripyov h Zavos puxakhv &rekáAovy
Tö Aégov.
* This is confirmed by the
testimony of Parmenides (the Py-
thagorean origin of this testimony
will be shown in its proper place),
according to which the divinity
that regulates the whole has his
seat in the midst of the universe.
SYSTEM OF THE WORLD.
447
be diffused throughout the whole from the central fire,
or from the circumference; but this is probably a
subsequent expansion and modification of the aneient
doctrine, and the source of this modification must be
sought in the doctrines of Plato and of the Stoics.”
* For example, the Pseudo-
Philolaus ap. Stob. i. 420 (cf. p. 438,
3) éxel 3& kal r&v ãpxãv tas kivſouás
Te kal ueta}oAås 6 kóo uos eis éðv
kal ovvexhs kal púa'i Starveduevos
kai treplayedwevos é àpxás &ötw. Kal
to uév &uetá80Aov (the unchange-
able part of the world) &rö täs to
3Aov replexoto as puxas uéxpt ore-
Advas Trepatotral, to 6% uérabáAAov
&Tö rās areAdvas uéxpt tas yas'
étrel Sé ye kal to kivéov čº aidºvos
eis aiºva trepitoxeſ, to 8& civeówevov,
às to cuvéow &yet, oita, 6tat{6erat,
&väyka rö pºv &eikſvatov (Chaignet,
ii. 81, proposes to substitute &ict-
varov for this word, but the im-
mobility of the kivéov is not to be
proved by alleging that it é: aidºvos
trepitroxeſ), to 8& àeutraffès eluev, Kal
Tö uèv vó kal ºvXàs &várcoua(?)"rāv,
Tö 86 yewégios kal ueta}oxás. Alex.
Polyh. ap. Diog. viii. 25 sqq.: kó0-
pov čupuxov, voepov, agaipoetőfi . .
&v6pétrous eival trpos 6eous ovyyá-
veuav karð Tö uétéxeiv čvápotov
6epwoo, ölö kal trpuvoeſoróat Töv 6eov
ju6v . . . Suákely t” &trö too fixtou
&ktíva 51& rod aidépos Toi Te luxpod
kai Taxéos (air and water) . . .
Taºrmv Šē Thy &krīva kal eis Tó.
Bévôm Šáeoróat kal Stö. Tooro Çavoiroteſy
ird vra eival 3& Thy buxhv
âtróo tragua aiffépos ſcal row bepuot,
kal rod juxpoſ . . &0ávaróv T’ eival
aút?iv, retóñtrep kai to &q’ of &m éo-
traortal &0&varóv éori. Cic. N. D.
i. 11, 27: Pythagoras, gui censuit,
animum esse per naturam rerum
omnem &ntemium et commeantem, ea:
quo nostri animi carperentur. Cato,
21, 78: Audiebam Pythagoram
Pythagoreosque . . nunquam dubi-
tassé, quin ea universa mente divina
delibatos animos haberemus. Plut.
Plac. Qu. viii. 4, 3, p. 1007 :
to the question, ‘What is Time?’
Pythagoras replied, “The Soul of
the World.’ Plac. iv. 7, 1: IIv0.
IIAárov & pôaprov eival Thy juxhv.
étodorav yop eis thv too travros
Wuxhu &vaxopéiv Tpos to Öuoyevés.
Sext. Math. ix. 127: The Pytha-
goreans and Empedocles teach that
men are not only related to each
other and the gods, but also to the
animals, ev Y&p inrápxelv ºrveijua
Tö 61& travros toū Köopov 6tſicov
tºuxſis Tpdrov, to kal évotiv huàs
trpos ékéiva for this reason it is
wrong to kill and eat animals.
Stob. i. 453; Simpl. De Caelo,
229 a, 38 (Schol. in Arist. 505
a, 32) : oi Ös yumorld repov airów
(Tów IIv6ayopticów) wetao Xóvres trip
pºv čv Tó uéo & Aéyova, thv 3mutovp-
ºuchv 5ivagu, Thy đc géorov Trägav
thv yńv ſwo-yovoúa'av kai Tô &repvy-
puévov airfis &va63Xtrovoſav 5ub of
A&v Zavos Túp:/ov airò caxodoriv, &s
airbs év roſs Hvěayopticots ioT6pmaev,
of Śē Aubs puxarchy, &s év Totºrous, oi
8è Aubs 606vov, &s &AAot pagiv. Cod.
Cois!. Schol. 505 a, 9: §to kal TAex-
9%ual r}v rod travtos ºvXºv ék
pléorov trpos Töv čoxarov oipavév.
* In regard to the fragment of
Philolaus and the testimony of
Alexander, it has already been
shown (p. 393, 2; 399, 1) that they
cannot be considered authentic. As
to the question before us, it must,
448
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
Aristotle, in discussing the theories of the ancient
philosophers about the soul," quotes from the Pytha-
goreans only the celebrated assertion that the particles
emanating from the Sun are souls, and he infers from
hence, not without difficulty, that they regarded the
soul as the moving principle. Now it is very improbable
that Aristotle should have confined himself to this
apart from what is said in the text,
at once appear strange that the
Soul (in agreement with Plato and
Aristotle) should be relegated to
the periphery of the world, with-
out mention being made of the
central fire, with which the author
seems wholly unacquainted. It is
equally strange that the soul and
the 6etov should be regarded as the
eternally moved and the eternally
moving (the Pythagoreans con-
sidered the 6eia orópara, or the
constellations, but not the 6etov in
the absolute sense of the word as
subject to movement. On the con-
trary, they placed movement on the
side of the Unlimited, cf. p. 402, 1 ;
381, 1). It is easy to see in this a
reproduction of a passage in Plato
(Crat. 397 c), and of another in
Aristotle (De An. 1, 2, vide infra,
p. 458, 4), on Alcmaeon, the result
of a misunderstanding. Nor can
we fail to recognise the influence of
Platonic and Aristotelian ideas in
the doctrine of the eternal move-
ment of the soul in a circle, and
the language used to express that
doctrine. In the exposition of
Alexander, and in the short state-
‘ment of Sextus, the Stoic element
is equally apparent; witness the
Tveijua Slö. Travros Suffircov, the con-
ception of the human soul origi-
nating from the Divine soul by
emanation, the cosmology, so dif-
ferent from that of the Pythago-
reans, which we shall discuss fur-
ther on, and the number four
applied to the element. Cicero
speaks in quite the same manner;
and it is very possible that this
writer, who did not hesitate to use
the most recent, and the most con-
venient documents in his exposition
of ancient systems, may have in
this instance referred to Alexander
himself. The definition given in
Plutarch does not seem to belong
to the ancient Pythagoreans. The
#yeuovikov of Stobaeus is evidently
Stoic. Simplicius, and the writer
who reproduces his evidence, clearly
did not know how to distinguish
the original doctrines of Pythago-
reanism from the new. Nor can we
mistake the recent origin of a frag-
ment quoted by Clemens, Cohort.47,
c: á uèv 6ebs eis' x' oitos 3& oix, fºs
Tuves àtrovooja tv, Šictos Tás 6takoor-
photos, &AA’ v airá, 3Aos év ŠAq,
Tó kūkāq, trio Kotros Táo as yewéatos,
kpāoris Táv ŠAwv' &el &v kal épy&tas
Töv attoo 6vváuwu kal épyov &trév-
Tov, Šv oëpavó (poorthp kal travrov
trathp, vows kal ºxalais tº 8X4,
kūkāq, (Tó-w-w), travrov kívaois.
(The same in the recension of Po.
Justin, Part iii, b, 102, 1, 2 A.)
The polemic of the Stoic Pantheism
against the Aristotelian Deism is
manifest here.
* De An. i. 2; wide inf. p. 476, 2.
THE WORLD-SOUL.
449
assertion, if such important and fully-developed con-
ceptions as those we have quoted were known to him ;
and it is equally unlikely that conceptions of such
importance should have escaped the notice of anyone
so intimately acquainted as Aristotle was with the
Pythagorean doctrine.'
The second hypothesis is evi-
dently impossible. The first loses
any probability it might seem to
have, if we consider with what care
and completeness Aristotle quotes
everything which his predecessors
have said on the subject of the soul.
At the commencement, and at the
end of the chapter, he expresses his
intention of enumerating all pre-
vious opinions: T&s Töv Tpotépww.
6óżas orvutrapaxapagávely 60'ot tº trept
airfis &me pívavro, and at the end :
ºré učv učv trapaşeāopiéva "repl ºvXīs
. Taijt’ or rív. That which the
pseudo-Philolaus asserts so de-
cidedly, namely, that the soul is
the kuntukov, is precisely what
Aristotle dares not attribute cate-
gorically to the Pythagoreans (404
a, 16: áo t ke 88 ſeal to tropi, Tāv
IIvöayopetov Aeyóuevov thu airhu
#xeiv 61&votav). It would be very
surprising that the Pythagoreans
should not be named among those
who regarded the soul as one of
the elements, if they had really
said what Alexander Polyhistor,
Cicero, and others, attributed to
them. The only thing that might
be objected is that Aristotle was
speaking of the human soul, and
not of the soul of the world. But
this is not the case. He speaks of
the soul in general, and notably of
the soul of the world : the pre-
tended Pythagoreans speak also of
the human soul. Now Aristotle
expressly distinguishes the Pytha-
WOL. I.
We cannot therefore ascribe
goreans from those who considered
the soul as the épxh Tiis kivāorea's
(for example, the pseudo-Philolaus)
when, after describing their ideas
on the soul (404 a, 20), he pro-
ceeds thus, 404 a, 20 : étrº rairb
8è q’épovrat Kal &got Aéyovari rhy
Wuxºv to airò fewoov, &c. He could
not have expressed himself in such
a manner if they had been the ear-
liest precursors of Plato on this
point; cf. Hermes, x. 190. The
objections made by Chaignet and
Rohr have no great weight. The
former says (ii. 176): Since Aris-
totle concludes from the Pythago-
rean conception of solar corpus-
cles that the soul is endowed with
motive force (404 a, 21, €oíkaori
'yūp oirot trèvres insixmpéval rhy
kivmaſiv oikeiôratov eival ri yuxià),
it necessarily follows from this
that he attributes to the Pythago-
reans a World-soul. Rohr speaks
in a similar manner (l. c., p. 21).
But the fact that Aristotle is here
making a simple deduction, of
which he himself is not certain, is
enough to show the impossibility
of his having had in his possession
so precise an explication as that of
our fragment. Chaignet (ii. 84) ap-
peals to the other fact that, accord-
ing to Aristotle (vide infra, Alc-
maon), Alcmaeon also ascribes to .
the stars a soul eternally in motion.
But Aristotle says nothing of the
kind. He merely affirms that, ac-
cording to Alcmaeon, the beſa, the
G. G.
450 THE PPTHAGORE ANS.
the doctrine of the world-soul to the Pythagoreans,
and even if they supposed that heat and vital force
flowed into the universe from the central fire, this
ancient materialistic motion is very different from the
theory of a world-soul conceived as a particular incor-
poreal essence. -
Around the central fire, the earth, and between the
two, the counter-earth, revolve in such a manner, that
the earth always turns the same side to the counter-
earth and the central fire; and for this reason, the rays
of the central fire do not come directly to us, but in-
directly from the sum.
When the earth is on the
same side of the central fire as the sun, we have day;
when it is on the other side, night."
sky and the stars, are in perpetual
movement, which does not at all
imply that this philosopherreduced
all movements to a unique spiritual
principle, distinct from the body of
the world, and diffused throughout
the universe. Lastly, Rohr (l. c.
p. 21) cites Plato's Phaedo, 86 B
sqq., to prove that the opinion
spoken of by Arist, De An. i. 4,
and according to which the Soul is
regarded as the harmony of the
body, belonged to the Pythago-
reans. But I do not see how we
can infer from this that the Pytha-
goreans admitted a soul of the
world (did Aristoxenus and Di-
caearchus admit one 2). We shall
presently see that , we have no
right to attribute such a doctrine to
the Pythagorean school.
1 Arist. De Coelo, ii. 13; vide
supra, p. 444, 4; Simpl. in h. l.
229 a, 16 (Schol. 505 a, 19): of
IIv0ayópeio. . . . v . Hºw tº uégº
Toº travros trip elvaí pagi, trepi 6*
Some accounts,
To uéorov thu &vr£3:00pa (pépearðat
(pool, yºv oſſo av kal airhv, &vríx90wa.
ôè kaxoupévmv Ště to é; ávavrías Tjöe
Tā yñ eival' were 6& Thy &vr£300wa.
# yń #öe, tepouévn kal air? repl ro
puéorov, pietà 5& Thy 'yūv # orexhum
(oiſta, yap attos év tá, répart rôv
IIv6ayoptków io'rope?) rºw 88 yńv &s
ëv Tów &otpov oſſaav Kluovuévny trept
To uéorov karū Thy Trpos Tov #Atov
axéauv vökta kal huépav troleſv" i. 6&
ăvríx0av civovuévn repl rô uéarov ſcal
étouévn rì yī oëx āpārat āq’ huôv
ölö. Tö étruirpoorðeiv juiv &el to Tſis
'yūs orðua. According to this pas-
sage the side of the earth which
we inhabit is always turned away
from the central fire and the
counter-earth. Plut. Plac. iii. 11,
3 (Galen, c. 21): pixóAaos é IIv%a-
'yópelos, to uév trip uéorov' roºro y&p
feval too travros éoºrtav. Sevrépav 6&
Thu ävrix0ova' rptºrmv 6&#v oikoduev
'yāv éč Švavrías kelpºunv Te Ical re-
pitepouévny ti, &vríx0ovi" trap 8 kal
ph 6p300a, Širo róv év Tjöe roºs év
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE.
451
it is true, reject the central fire and the motion of
éketvm. Ibid. 13: oi uév &AAot uévetv
Thy yºv pixóA. §§ 6 IIv6ay. kök}\g
trepiq’épearðat repl to trop katē kū-
k}\ov Aočod ówouotpétros fixiº Kal
orexívn. Stob. i. 530 (similarly
IPlut. Plac. ii. 20, 7; Galen, c. 14, p.
275): pixóAaos é IIv6ayópelos ūa-
Aoetóñ Töv #Atov, Šexóuevov učv too
év tá, kóo wº, trupbs Tºv &vraúyetav,
6tm600vra ö& Trpos juás Tó Te q6s kai
Thy &Aéav, Šare rpárov twä, öurrows
#Aíows yºyveg 6al, ré Te év tá, oùpavó
Trupóðes, kal to &r' airoo trvpoetóēs
Karö. Tö éoottpoetóés' ei aſ Tus kal
Tpírov Aéfet Thy &rb row évôttpov
kar’ &vákNao’iv 8tao trelpopuévnv trpos
huās airyńv. Achill. Tat, in Ar.
Prolegg. c. 19, p. 138 Pet.: pixó-
Aaos 3& (Töv #Atóv pmol) to Tupéâes
kal Suavyès Aap. 8&voura &va,6ew àtrö
Tot, aiéeptov trupós trpès huas tréutretv
Thu airyhv Štá Tivov &patoudrov,
ãorte kar’ attöv Tpura by eival Tov
#Atov, etc. (the sense is the same as
in Stobaeus, but the text appears de-
fective). In considering these state-
ments, the first question that pre-
sents itself is: How did the Pytha-
goreans conceive the position of the
counter-earth in regard to the earth
and the central fire P From the na-
ture of these things in themselves,
two courses seem open. They might
have placed it either between the
earth and the central fire on the
radius of the terrestrial orbit
which goes from one to the other;
or they might have placed it on the
other side of the central fire, at the
extremity of a line going from the
earth through the central fire,
and prolonged as far as the orbit
of the counter-earth. Schaarschmidt
(Schrift. d. Philol. 33) quotes the
évavríav, Šć Čvavrfas of Aristotle
and Simplicius to prove that such,
according to the Pythagoreans,
should in reality be the position of
the counter-earth, but this interpre-
tation seems to me mistaken. We
may very well suppose, with Böckh,
that this expression means that the
earth turns its face from the central
fire, and turns it towards the exte-
rior circumference; and that the
contrary holds good of the counter-
earth. If even we refer this expres–
sion simply to the situation of the
counter-earth in regard to the earth,
it simply implies that it is diametri-
cally opposite to the earth; that is
to say, is on the prolongation of the
earth's axis (not on the side of it);
whether on this side or that of the
central fire is left undetermined.
The opinion of Böckh is confirmed,
not only by the word Étrouévny in
the text of Simplicius, but also by
the whole analogy of the Pytha-
gorean doctrine, according to which
the series of heavenly bodies was
continued without interruption from
the periphery as far as the central
fire, and not terminated on the
other side of the central fire (cf.
Böckh, Kl. Schr. iii. 320 sq.,
where some other objections of
Schaarschmidt against the earlier
exposition of Böckh are refuted).
As to the sun and the solar light,
Achilles Tatius (as well as Stobaeus
and the author from whom he takes
his information) seems to admit
that the solar light is the reflection
of the fire of the circumference.
Böckh (Philol. 124 sq.) thinks
that this opinion is erroneous, and
believes that the central fire is the
luminous source, the rays of which
the sun reflects to us; he afterwards
(Unters. ib. d. kosm. Syst. d. Pla-
ton, 94) gave the preference to the
opinion of Martin (Etudes sur le
Timée, ii. 100), according to which
G G 2
452
THE PPTHAGO REANS,
the earth, and make the counter-earth the moon,' or
the second hemisphere of the earth.”
But this is
an erroneous interpretation of the old Pythagorean
doctrine, from the standpoint of later astronomy. It
is impossible that these accounts can be based upon
any tradition as to the theories of the ancient Pytha-
goreans, or of Pythagoras himself.”
the sun concentrates and reflects,
not only the light of the central
fire, but also that of the external
fire. No doubt the 6tm6eiv would
not exclude a reflection of the
central fire (as Böckh has suf-
ficiently shown, Philol. 127 sq.),
but, on the other hand, the reflec-
tion of the triple sun (a doctrine
which could not have come from
Philolaus himself, cf. p. 316) is
no proof that the solar light is de-
rived from the central fire, and not
from the fire of the periphery.
Only it would seem that if this
latter fire can enlighten the sun,
it must also be visible to us. But
we shall see further on that
the Pythagoreans perhaps really
thought they saw this fire in the
milkyway. This belief accords with
the opinion (contained in all the pas-
sages quoted) that the rays of this
fire, as well as those of the central
fire, are concentrated and sent back
by the sun, as by a sort of burning
glass. It is not stated whether the
Pythagoreans supposed that the
other planets and fixed stars were
foci of the same kind, but less in-
tense, for these rays.
Simpl. l. c. 229 a,37; Schol.
505 a, 32; ital oftw pièv airbs tº
Töv IIv6ayopetov &teåétaro' of 6s
'yvnortórepov airów wetaoxóvres,
etc. (vide sup. p. 447, 1) śarpov 8&
thv yīv čAeyov &s āpyavov Kal
It is only among
airthy xpóvov huspóv ydp &otiv airm
ka) vuktów airſa . . . &vríx60va 6&
Thy gexhumv ékáNovvoi IIv6ayópelot,
àortrep kal aiéeptav yiv, etc. As
the doctrine here given as purely
Pythagorean is expressly distin-
guished from the Aristotelian ex-
position, we are all the more certain
as to the origin of the former.
Clemens (Strom. v. 614 C), even
thinks that the Pythagoreans meant
by the counter-earth, heaven, in the
Christian sense of the word.
* Alex. Polyhistor. ap. Diog.
viii. 25. The Pythagoreans taught
kóa'uov . . . uéormv repléxovra thu
ºyāv kal aithv gºalpoetőfi kal trept-
outcovaévmv. elva. Śē Kal &utſtroëas,
kai Tà juiv kata, Šicetwois &va.
Similarly the anonymous author,
ap. Phot. Cod. 249 (vide p. 444, 4)
says that Pythagoras teaches the
existence of twelve spheres, which
are: the heaven of fixed stars, the
seven planetary spheres (including
sun and moon), the circles of fire,
of air, and of water, and in the
centre the earth. The other de-
tails clearly show Aristotelian
influence.
* As Martin thinks (Et, sur le
Timée, ii. 101 sqq.), and Gruppe
(D. Kosm. Syst, d. Griechen, p. 48
sq.). According to their view, Py-
thagoras and the oldest Pythago-
reans represented the earth as an
immovable sphere in the centre of
CEWTRAL FIRE. COUNTER-EARTH,
453
the Pythagoreans of the fourth century that we find
the doctrine of the earth's revolution on its axis,'
which presupposes that the counter-earth and the
central fire were abandoned as separate parts of the
universe.
It matters little whether they were absolutely
suppressed, or the counter-earth regarded as the western
hemisphere, and the central fire placed in the interior
the universe. The do strine of the
central fire, and the revolution
around this fire, was subsequently
advanced, Gruppe believes, by Hip-
pasus or some other predecessor
of Philolaus, but at first without
the counter-earth; it was only a
corruption of this doctrine which
inserted the counter-earth between
the earth and the central fire. The
groundlessness of these hypotheses,
which Böckh has refuted (l.c. p. 89
sqq.) very effectually, is manifest
when we examine from a critical
point of view the evidence on which
they are based. The doctrines which
Gruppe takes for traces of true
Pythagoreanism are rather indica-
tions of a period which was unable
to place itself at the ancient Py-
thagorean standpoint. Lastly,
when Röth (ii. a, 817 sq. b, 247
sq.) maintains that Pythagoras
and his school understood, by the
counter-earth, the hemisphere op-
posite to ours; that they placed
the earth in the centre of the uni-
verse, and ascribed to it a move-
ment around its axis—this asser-
tion is not worthy of a refutation.
It is now universally recognised
that Copernicus and others were
wrong in attributing to the Pytha-
goreans the doctrine of the rotation
of the earth on its axis, and the
revolution of the earth round the
sun. Wide Tiedemann (Die ersten
Philosophen Griechenlands, p. 448
sq.; Böckh, De Plat. Sysſ. Coel.
Globor. p. xi. sq.; Kl. Schrif. iii.
272); Philol. 121 sq.; Martin,
Etudes, &c. ii. 92 sq.
* According to Cic. Acad. ii.
39, 123, Theophrastus named as
the author of that opinion the Sy-
racusan Hicetas. Later on we find
it in Ecphantus (Hippolyt. Réfut.
i. 15, p. 30; Plut. Plac. iii. 13, 3),
and Heracleides (Part ii. a, 887,
third edition). Martin, l. c. 101,
125, and Gruppe, l. c. 87 sqq.,
think we may attribute also to
Hicetas the central fire and the
planetary movement of the earth
around that fire. Cf. however
Böckh, D. kosm. Syst. Pl. 122 sqq.
He shows that in the passage of
Plutarch, Pac. iii. 9 (where, in-
deed, Eusebius, Pr. Ev. xv. 55,
gives our actual text, but where
Pseudo-Galen. Hist. Phil. 21, p.
293, does not mention the name
of Hicetas), an error has probably
crept in, by the omission of some
words; and that the original text
may have stood thus: “Icérms 6
IIv0ayópeios ut a v, p 1A 6A a os 3 &
6 IIv6 a y 6pe to s 600, etc. Tradi-
tion tells us nothing as to the date
when Hicetas lived; but Böckh's
conjecture (l. c. 126) that he was
the teacher of Ecphantus and
younger than Philolaus seems
probable.
454
THE PV THAGOREA.N.S.
of the earth. To the same period may perhaps belong
the theory that the comet is a separate planet;" this
eighth planet might serve, when the counter-earth had
been discarded, to maintain the number ten in regard
to the heavenly bodies.”
The conjecture may, however,
have emanated from those who were ignorant of the
system of the ten heavenly bodies and the counter-earth,
or rejected it.
considered the shape of the
* Arist. Meteorol. i. 6, 342 b,
29: Tów 6' 'IraNików rives ka?
Kaxovuévay IIv6ayopetov čva Aéyov-
oiv airby (sc. Töv kopfitny) sival
táv waavítwv&otépov. A similar
opinion is said to have been expres-
sed by Hippocrates of Chios (circ.
450), and his disciple, AEschylus.
Also Alex. in h. l. (Arist. Meteor
ed. Idel. i. 180); Plut. Plac. iii.
2, 1 ; Stob. Ecl. i. 576. These
last added that others of the Py-
thagoreans regarded the comet
merely as a luminous reflection.
Olympiodorus (p. 183, Idel.)
transfers to Pythagoras himself
what Aristotle says of ‘some Py-
thagoreans.’ The Scholiast ad
Arat. Diosem. 359 (ap. Idel. l. c.
p. 380 sq.), doubtless through
an error, gives a general appli-
cation to the text relative to the
JPythagoreans, and counts Hippo-
eratus among the philosophers of
that school; and it is probably in
this sense that he is called, ap.
Alex. eſs röv plaffnpatticóv.
* The central fire might still
preserve its significanee, even if it
were conceived as surrounded by
the earth as by a hollow sphere.
* Böckh (Kl. Schr. iii. 335 sq.)
thinks that the Pythagoreans con-
ceived the earth and the counter-
earth as two hemispheres which,
There is no doubt that the Pythagoreans
earth to be spherical:” its
separated by a space more or less
great, turn their plane sides towards
each other. He has been led to
this opinion merely by the presup-
position (l. c. 329 sq.) that the
IPythagoreans arrived at their doc-
trine of the counter-earth by the
partition of the earth into two
hemispheres. He afterwards ad-
mits that Aristotle had no idea of
such an opinion, but represents the
earth and the counter-earth of the
Pythagoreans as two complete
spheres. But there is no ground
at all, in my judgment, for this
supposition of Böckh as to the
origin of the Pythagorean doctrine.
If they once conceived the earth as
a sphere, it was certainly more
natural—in case a tenth heavenly
body seemed necessary—to admit
the counter-earth as a second
sphere than to divide the earth it-
self into two hemispheres. The
analogy of the other stars also
makes it probable that the earth
and the counter-earth were con-
ceived as spheres, as well as the
sun and moon. Lastly, if Aristotle
has represented the matter thus,
we can scarcely give the preference
to any other testimony. Alex. (ap.
Diog. viii. 25 sq.) says that the
Pythagoreans regarded the earth
as spherical, and inhabited in its
SOLAR ECLIPSES. 455
position towards the central fire and the sun was such
that it should turn its western hemisphere to the central
fire." At the same time, they did not overlook the in-
climation of the earth's orbit towards the sun’s ;” this
was necessary in their cosmical system, not merely to
explain the changes in the seasons, but because the
earth would otherwise have every day prevented the
light of the central fire from reaching the sun, by its
passage between them. Solar eclipses were accounted
for by the passing of the moon between the earth and
sum ; and lunar eclipses by the interposition of the
earth or other heavenly bodies between the sun and
moon.” The Pythagoreans
circumference (which implies the
idea of antipodes). Favorinus says
(ap. Diog. viii. 48) that Pythagoras
affirmed it to be round (otpoyºyöAm).
But neither of these assertions
should outweigh the evidence of
Aristotle.
* Gruppe, loc, cit., p. 65 sqq.,
thinks that the earth presented to
the sun the northern hemisphere,
and to the central fire the southern ;
he also thinks that the Pythagoreans
regarded the side turned towards
the central fire as the upper. But
Bockh has completely refuted this
hypothesis (D. kosm. Syst. Pl.
102 sqq.; cf. Kl. Schr. iii. 329).
* Plut. Plac. iii. 13, 2 (Galen,
c. 14, 21) : pixóAaos . . . kūkāq,
trepiq’épea9at [thy yīv] repl to trip
karū kök}\ov Aošov. Ibid. ii. 12, 2
(Stob. i. 502; Galen, c. 12): IIv6a-
'yápas trpátos étruevonkéval Aéyétat
thv Aéoguv too (wèiakov reticAov,
#vruva Oivotiëns 6 Xtos és ičíav étri-
volav gºetepigetat. Cf. c. 23, 6.
According to others, Anaximander
had already made this discovery
held the sun and moon to
(vide Supra, p. 254, 3). According
to Theo (Astron. p. 322 Mart.
end ; Fragm. ed. Spengel, p. 140),
Eudemus attributed it to OEnopides
– if we may read in the fragment
Aóšoortv instead of Šid (waiv. The
assertion of the Placita, that Eu-
demus had taken it from Pythago-
ras, would incline us to suppose
(as Schäfer justly observes) that
Eudemus had claimed it for him-
self (Schäfer, Die Astron. Geogra-
phie der Griechen &c., Gymn. progr.
Flensb. 1873, p. 17). In Diod. i.
98, some Egyptian sages assert
that CEnopides had learned the in-
clination of the ecliptic in Egypt,
which equally presupposes that he
must have been the first to intro-
duce it into Greece. In that case
the Pythagoreans would have de-
rived it from him. According to
Proclus (in Eucl. 19, 66th Fragm.)
CEnopides was a little younger than
Anaxagoras, and a little older than
Philolaus.
* On eclipses of the sun, vide
Stob. i. 526; on those of the moon
456
THE PYTHAGOREANS,
be vitreous spheres,' which reflected back light and
warmth to the earth.”
At the same time we are told
that they conceived the stars as resembling the earth,
and surrounded like the earth by an atmosphere;”
wide Arist. De Caelo, ii. 13, 293 b,
21. He says, after speaking of the
counter-earth: évíows 8& Öoke. Kat
arãeſo orépara totaúta évôéxeoffat
q,épeo:6al repl to uéorov, juiv Šē
&ömāa Suð. Thy trutſpéorèmoivºrºs yús.
6to kal r&s tºs orexhvms ékNetheus
traetovs 3) rās rot fixtov yi-yverbal
qaqiv táv yūp (pepouévov čkaorov
&vtiqpdºttetv airtºv, &AA’ oil uávov
thv yiv. Similarly Stob. Eel. i.
558 (Plac. ii. 29, 4; Galen, c. 15).
Schäfer thinks he has diseovered
the reason of this opinion (l.c. p.
19), independently of the greater
number of lunar eclipses, in the
phenomenon mentioned by Pliny,
H. Nat. ii. 13, 57, and the date of
which we do not know. Pliny
says that the moon was in eclipse
at her setting, while the rising sun
was already visible above the ho-
rizon, a phenomenon explicable by
refraction. We find the same
opinion in Anaxagoras, vide infra,
vol. II.
* Wide p. 450, 1, and Plut. Plac.
ii. 25, 7 (Stob. i. 552): IIv6ayópas
karottpostöès orópa rās o'exhvns.
(Similarly Galen, c. 15.) As re-
gards the form of the sun, the
Placita (ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. xv. 23,
7) describe it as a vitreous disc
(8toricos); but this description is
not found in any other text, and
expressly contradicts what is said
in Stob. i. 526: oi IIv6. org/wipoetőfi
Töv #Atov. Moreover, the Pytha-
goreans must have attributed to
the sun the same shape as to the
moon, the spherical form of which
is never disputed. We must,
therefore, consider the statement
of Eusebius as erroneous.
* Whence came light and heat
to the sun and the moon? We
have already discussed this ques-
tion in regard to the sun (p. 450, 1).
As to the moon there can be no
doubt that her light was supposed
to be derived, not direetly from the
central fire, but from the sun which,
in the time of Philolaus, had long
been regarded as the source of the
moon's light. For if the moon
had received her light from the
central fire, she must always have
been enlightened, since she pre-
sents the same side to the cen-
tral fire as to the earth. Aris-
totle mentions also (vide Supra,
455, 3) the opinion (incompatible
with the assertion of Philolaus of
ten heavenly bodies) that other
bodies besides the earth cause
eclipses of the moon. We cannot
perceive in this, as Böckh does
(Philol. 129) and Martin (Etudes,
99), an interposition of these small
planets between the central fire
and the moon, but the interposition
of these planets between the sun
and the moon. Why the moon is
not enlightened by the central fire,
or is enlightened too faintly to be
visible to us without the light of
the Sun, is not explained by any
document that we possess.
* Stob. i. 514: ‘Hpakaetóns kal
oi IIv6ayópelot exagºrov rôv čo Tépov
kóopov Štröpxely yńv reptéxovta.
&épa re (Plut. Plac. ii. 13, 8;
Galen, c. 13, add: kai aiéépa) év tá,
âtreſpº aiéépu' raúra öö tä 567.pata.
THE STAZS. 457
they attributed to the moon, plants and living beings
far larger and fairer than those on the earth." This
theory was founded, it would seem, partly on the ap-
pearance of the moon’s disc, which resembles the
earth; and partly on the desire to discover a special
abode for the souls who had quitted the earth, and for
the daemons.” Also they thought that the stars, which
like the earth were planets, but which belonged to a
better portion of the universe, must possess everything
that serves to adorn the earth, in a more perfect
manner. Of the planets, the order of which the
Pythagoreans were the first to determine,” Mercury
and Venus, the two which later astronomy places be
tween the sun and the earth, were placed by them
between the sun and Mars.” Pythagoras is said to
év Tols 'Oppiko’s pépetal' kooru.0-
trouotoi Y&p ékaotov Tów &gtépov.
* Plut. Plac. ii. 30, 1 (Galen,
c. 15): oi IIv6ayópelot (Stob. i. 562:
Töv IIv6ayopetov rivés, &v éutt
‘puadaaos) yet'.8m patveq6at thv ore-
Aftwmv. 61& To trepioikeforéal airhy
ka04 rep a hu trap' haiv yiv, pleíſoori
§§ous kai purois RaxAtoo weival yèp
Trevrekaušekatraaortova rā Śr' airfis
(£& Tā āuvâuel uměčv trepitrouattkov
&mokpívovira real thv jiuépav roo attmv
Tó uſiket. Böckh (131 sq.) suspects
with reason some error in the last
statement. For if one terrestrial
day corresponds with one revolu-
tion of the earth around the central
fire, the moon, whose period of
revolution is 29 times and a half
greater, ought to have days as long
as a terrestrial month—that is, in
round numbers, 30 terrestrial days.
The size and strength of the in-
habitants correspond to the length
of the day. But perhaps the ex-
pression may be inexact, and the
author means to say that the dura-
tion of the day light is equal to
15 complete terrestrial days. In
any case, however (as we have ob-
served p. 317), the inaccuracy of
our document proves nothing
against the authenticity of the
work of Philolaus.
* The first remark is to be
found in the passage quoted in the
previous note; the second notion
comes from the Orphic poems, and
the saying ascribed to Pythagoras
by Iambl. V. P. 82: tí Čorriv at
Hakápov viorot; #xios, orexivm.
* Eudemus, ap. Simpl. De Coelo,
212 a, 13; Schol. 497 a, 11.
* Cf. on this subject, besides
the texts cited p. 444, 4; 420, 2,
Plato, Rep. x. 616 E.; Tim. 38 D;
Theo Astron. c. 15, p. 180. Against
these testimonies we have the fol-
lowing: Nicom. Harm. 6, 33 sq.;
Plin. Hist. Nat. ii. 22, 84; Censorin.
458 THE PPTHAGO REANS,
have discovered that Venus is both the morning and the
evening star." The heaven of fixed stars, in common
with the other heavenly bodies, revolves around the
central fire ;” but as its apparent diurnal revolution is
interrupted by the movement of the earth, the Pytha-
goreans must have here conceived a far longer period
of revolution, imperceptible in relation to the daily
revolution of the earth : they seem however to have
been led to this theory not by actual observations, but
merely by dogmatic presuppositions on the nature of
the stars.” They reckoned motion among the essential
qualities of the heavenly bodies, and in the unchange-
able regularity of their courses found the most obvious
proof of the divinity of the stars, in which they believed,
like most of the ancients.” According to the period of
revolution attributed to the fixed stars, they seem to
have determined the universal year, a conception
Di. Nat. 13, 3; Chalcid. in Tim. c.
71, p. 155 (197 Mull.), and other
statements of more recent origin,
which follow the order that was
afterwards adopted. But these
texts have as little authority as the
verses of Alexander of Ephesus
(contemporary of Cicero, as to whom
cf. Martin, in his edition of Theo's
Astronomy, p. 66 sq.; Meineke,
Anal. Alear. 371 sq.; Müller, Hist.
Gr. iii. 240); ap. Theo, loc. cit.
(where they are wrongly attributed
to Alexander the AEtolian); Chal-
cid. loc. cit. (who attributes them
to Alexander of Miletus, the well-
known Polyhistor); Heraclit. Alleg.
Hom. c. 12. Alexander does not
once mention the Pythagoreans.
* Diog. viii. 14; cf. ix. 23;
Plin. ii. 8, 37.
* This certainly results from
the evidence quoted p. 444, 4, Wide
Böckh, D. Kosm. Syst. I’l. p. 99 sq.
(as against Gruppe, l. c. 70 sqq.).
* The precession of the equi-
noxes, of which Böckh is thinking
(loc. cit. p. 93, 99 sqq.; Philol. 118
sq.), was only discovered at a much
later time by Hipparchus, as we
find from other sources.
* Wide (besides Neo-Pythago-
rean writers, such as Onatas, ap.
Stob. i. 96, 100 ; Ocellus, c. 2, and
the Pseudo-Philolaus, ap. Stob. i.
422). Plato, who, especially in the
Phaedrus, 246 E sqq. (Böckh proves
this, Philol. 105 sq. and most wri-
ters have agreed with him), has in-
contestably followed Pythagorean
ideas; and Aristotle, De An. i. 2,
405 a, 29; cf. 455, 1, 3, 4 ; wide
also Supra, p. 444, 4.
THE STARS.
459

hich Plato no doubt borrowed from them." At any
ate it is closely connected in the Platonic philosophy
with the doctrine of metempsychosis, in which he chiefly
followed the Pythagoreans, and is also dominated by the
number ten, in a manner so entirely Pythagorean, that
the supposition has much in its favour.”
* Wide part II. a 684, 4.
* We must, however, distinguish
from this cosmical year the cycle of
59 years, in which were 21 inter-
calary months—that is to say, the
great year invented by Philolaus, or
even as some say, by Pythagoras,
in order to make the solar and
lunar months coincide. Plut. Plac.
ii. 32; Stob. i. 264; Censorin. Di.
Mat. 18, 8; vide for further details,
Böckh, Philol. 133 sqq. The re-
volution of Saturn was also called
the great year; l’hot. Cod. 249, p.
440 a, 20. According to Censo-
rinus, loc. cit., and 19, 2, Philolaus
reckoned the duration of the solar
year at 364 days and a half.
Böckh thinks this incredible, be-
cause the year of 365 days had
then long been known in Egypt,
and he gives an explanation of the
passage in Censorinus, which cer-
tainly does not remove all difficul-
ties. Schaarschmidt, p. 57, natu-
rally sees nothing in this theory
but a proof of ignorance in the
Pseudo-Philolaus. It seems to me
by no means established that the
Egyptian year was known to
Philolaus, and still less, that he
had such decisive reasons for main-
taining the Egyptian reckoning
that no considerations could have in-
duced him to deviate from it. Such
considerations might be found by a
Pythagorean, who placed numbers
and characteristic numerical paral-
lelisms above all things, in this (cf.
Böckh, p. 135); that the 29 and
a half days of the lunar month give
59 half days—i.e., the same number
as the 59 years of the cycle; that
the 59 years and 21 months are
equal to 729 months; and the
364} days of the solar year are
equal to 729 half days; lastly that
729 is the cube of 9 and the square
of 27, or the first cube of an uneven
number (hence the number 729 has
for Plato also—Rep. ix. 587 E—-
an especial significance). However
this may be, I am disposed to think
(as Böckh does) that it is more likely
that some Pythagorean of the fifth
century, whether from his imperfect
knowledge or other causes, may
have reckoned the year at 364;
days, than that a well-informed
writer of the first or second century
B.C., a time when the year of 365
days had become quite usual, should
from ignorance have shortened this
period by half a day. This seems
to me so wholly improbable that if
there were no means of connecting
this computation of 364; days with
Philolaus (which I do not admit),
I should be content with the fol-
lowing conjecture. Censorinus, or
the author whom he follows, must
have arrived at these 364; days
by a calculation founded on state-
ments relative to the great year
of Philolaus. These statements
may have been altered through the
fault of a copyist or in some other
way; and Philolaus, in reality,
460 THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
Compared with the ordinary motions of the ancients,
this theory shows a remarkable progress in astronomy.
For while they, presupposing that the earth was at rest,
derived the changes of day and night and the seasons
exclusively from the sun, an attempt was here first
made to explain day and night, at any rate, by the
motion of the earth; and though the true explanation,
the revolution of the earth on its axis, was not as yet
discovered, yet the Pythagorean doctrine in its imme-
diate astronomical result directly led up to this, and
as soon as the phantastic ideas, which alone resulted
from the speculative presuppositions of Pythagoreanism,
had been given up, the counter-earth as western hemi-
sphere necessarily merged into the earth ; the central
fire was transferred to the earth’s centre, and the move-
ment of the earth around the central fire was changed
into a revolution on its own axis."
The famous harmony of the spheres was a conse-
quence of the movement of the heavenly bodies. For
as every quickly moved body produces a tone, the
Pythagoreans believed it must be the same with the
heavenly bodies. They supposed the acuteness of these
tones to be according to the rapidity of motion, and
this again to be in proportion to the distance of the
several planets, the intervals of the planets corresponded
with the intervals of sounds in the octave. Thus they
arrived at the theory that the heavenly bodies in their
may have made 59 solar years moon, we get for the year 365
equal to 59 lunar years, plus 22 days, as exactly as we get 364}, if
months (instead of 21), and, there- we make 59 years equal to 729
fore to 730 revolutions of the months.
moon ; in which case, if we take * As Böckh well observes,
29; days for the revolution of the Philol. 123.
HARMONY OF THE SPHERES.
461
rotation produce a series of tones,' which together form
an octave, or, which is the same thing, a harmony.”
| Arist. De Caelo, ii. 9, sub
init.: pavepov 3’ ex rotºrov, Šti kal
rö pdvat yived 9at ºpepouévov ſtav
&gtpov] §puovíav, &s ovuqºvov
'ylvouévov ráv jópov, Kouyás ºv
ełpmrat kal reputrós into róv eitróv-
Tov, où why oira's #xei Täxm6és.
ãokeſ ydp rioriv, and farther on,
more precisely : rows IIv6ayopetous
&vaykalov elval, traucotºrww pepopué-
vov orwuátwv yiyveabat póqov, Štrel
Kal rôv trap' juiv oëre rows tºykovs
éxóvrav trous otºre rototrº Téxel
q)spouévov iiNtov Šē kal orexhums, éti
re roo'oùrov to wx760s &otpov real
To uéye 00s (pepowevov tá, taxel
Towattmv popāv, &öövarov whºyfyve-
0.0a ||6 pov &pſixovév two to
Méyé00s. Öroðéuevo, 5è raúra Kal
T&s taxvtſitas Éic Töv &troordiq'eav
ëxeiv toys róv ovudwViðv Aérous,
évapuáviáv paori yived 6al thy povhv
qepopuévov kūkāq, tàv &otpav. Or,
according to the commentary of
Alexander (Ad Metaph. i. 5, p.
29, 6 Bon. 542 a, 5 ; cf. 31
Bon. 542 b, 7): tóv Yap orwud twv
Töv trepi Tô wéorov qepopuévov čv
&vaAoyig ràs àtrogrógeis éxóvray
. trouotvrov 6é ſcal págov ći tº
kiveto 6al rôv učv 8paôvrépov 8aptiv,
Töv 6& Taxvtépov ščüv, toos péqovs
toūrous karū thv Tóv &Tootáaewy
âvaxo'ytav yivouévous évapuávtov Tów
é; airröv fixov troueiv. čírel 6' 3Aoyov
*6ákei rb whº ovvakočeiv huàs ris
qovſis tatt me, airtov Totºrov qaqiv
eival to yewouévous ei60s jirópxely
Töv påqov, Šote už övdānxov sival
trpès rêvévavitſav oriyâv trpos &AAm-
Aa y&p pavis ical orityńs eival rhy
614-yvajoriv, &ote Ka8átrep rois XaA-
korémous 6ta avv^6etav ot,0&v Šoke?
6tapépeiv, kal Tois àv6párous rairo
orvuòaivetv. We shall presently
The
find other proofs which, however,
are hardly necessary, after this
detailed explanation from our
principal authority.
* It has already been observed
(p. 385,1,2) that the Pythagoreans
primarily understand by harmony
the octave. It is also the octave
which is in question in the har-
mony of the spheres In the first
place the name itself indicates this,
and in the second the comparison
of the planets with the seven
strings of the ancient lyre was too
obvious to be overlooked by the
Pythagoreans. It is also clear,
from the evidence of the an-
cients. In the passage just quoted
from Aristotle, the words A6-you rôv
ovuſpovićv can scarcely mean any-
thing else than the relations of the
octave; for, according to Aristox-
enus the Peripatetic (ii. 45) of
the eight symphonies of which the
later theory treats (Aristox. Harm.
i. 20; Euclid. Introd. Harm. p. 12
sq.; Gaudentius, Isag. p. 12), the
harmonists before his time only
employed the first three, called the
Diatessaron, Diapente, and Diapa-
son (fourth, fifth, octave). Simi-
larly in the verses of Alexan-
der of Ephesus (mentioned supra,
p. 457, 4), despite the musical
errors in the further development
of the thought, which Martin
(Theo, Astron. 358 sq.) exposes,
following Adrastus and Theo, the
tones of the Seven planets and
their intervals correspond with
those of the seven-stringed lyre.
Moreover, Nicomachus (Harm. 6, 33
sq.), followed by Boethius (Mus. i.
20, 27), says expressly that the
seven planets correspond exactly
462
THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
fact that we do not hear these tones, they explaimed b
saying that we are in the condition of people who liv
in their distances and their tones
with the strings of the heptachord.
In contrast with the ancient system
(vide p. 457, 4) he places the sun in
the centre; of the seven strings,
the lowest, having at the same time
the highest tone (vitm), corresponds
with the moon ; the highest, but
having the gravest tone (örárm),
corresponds with Saturn. But Ni-
comachus does not forget to re-
mark that his predecessors made
the moon in dºrm (Alex. Ephes. l. c.
says carelessly the Earth), and
thence ascended to Saturn the
vàrn ; this is admitted by Alex.
Aphr. among others(vide preceding
note). From the same ancient
source, as it appears, Aristides
Quint. Mus, iii. 145, derives his
explanation, to Ště tragöv thu rôv
TAavnTöv čupexh kivmaſiv [rpooroºm-
Matveij, and it is likewise from
ancient sources that Emmanuel
Bryennius, Harm. (Oxon. 1699),
Sect. i. 363, explains more particu-
larly which of the planets corre-
sponds with each of the seven
strings as to tone, assigning the
lowest tone to the moon, the high-
est to Saturn, the puéorm to the sun.
Cicero, or an ancient author whom
he takes as guide ( Somn. c. 5), is
manifestly thinking of the hepta-
chord and of the octave when he
says of the eight celestial bodies
endowed with motion, that two of
them, Mercury and Venus, have the
same tone; there are consequently
in all, seven different sounds: quod
docti homines nervis imitati atque
cantibus aperuere sibi reditum in
hunc locum. Only he makes the
heaven of fixed stars take part in
the music; to them he ascribes the
highest sound, and the lowest to
the moon. In Pliny, Hist. Nat. ii.
22, 84, Pythagoras determines, ac-
cording to the same system, the
distance of celestial bodies. The
distance of the moon from the earth
(reckoned by Pythagoras at 126,000
stadia according to c. 21), being
taken as equivalent to one -tone,
that between the sun and moon is
placed at 23 tones, and that be-
tween the heaven of fixed stars
and the sun at 3}: ita septem tomos
effici quam diapason harmoniam
vocant. No doubt this last is a
misunderstanding; but a misun-
derstanding that might easily arise,
if we reflect that the earth, be-
ing immovable, could not produce
any sound; that consequently the
real distance of the sonorous bodies
answers exactly to that of the
chords; for, from the moon to the
sun is a fourth (the sun only takes
this place in the new theory), from
the sun to the heaven of fixed stars
a fifth, and the eight sounds united
form an octave of six tones. The
other calculation (according to
Plut. De An. Procr. 31, 9, 102, 8 sq.,
and Censorin. Di. Nat; c. 13), which
reckons from the earth (placed as the
Tpoo Aaußavópepos one tone lower
than the Štrárm).to the sun three
tones and a half, and from thence
to the heaven of fixed stars, 23–
gives, it is true, the correct number
of tones—six ; but it omits the
muteness of the earth (for we have
nothing to do here with the theory
of Philolaus of the movement of
the earth), and it does not agree
with the division of the octachord
which requires a fifth, from the
Aéorm to the virm. These authors,
PIARMONY OF THE SPHERES,
463
in a smith's forge; from our births we are unceasingly
hearing the same sound, and so are never in a position
to take note of its existence from the contrast of silence.1
like Cicero and Pliny, make the
fixed heaven, the ātrāavés, partici-
pate in the celestial music. On the
other hand, at the commencement
of the chapter, Censorinus restricts
it to the seven planets, which is
correct. The contradiction of this
with what he elsewhere says, is
another proof that he is following
an ancient source, the meaning of
which he does not fully compre-
hend. According to Martin (Etudes
sur le Timée, ii. 37), the sounds of
the octave, being produced simul-
taneously, do not form a symphony.
But the Pythagoreans did not allow
their imaginations to be fettered,
either by this difficulty or by others
we have mentioned, and which are
for the most part examined by Aris-
totle. Macrob. Somn. Scip. ii. 1, sub
fin., reckons the extent of the celes-
tial symphony at four octaves, and a
fifth (departing from the system of
harmonic numbers in the Tºmaus,
ii. 37 by one tone only, vide part II.
a, 653 sq.). Anatolius, ap. Iambli-
chum, Theol. Arithm. 56, distribu-
ting after his manner the tones
among the celestial bodies, makes
it two octaves and a tone. Plu-
tarch, l.c. c. 32, quotes an opinion
afterwards contested by Ptolemy
(Harm. iii. 16), according to which
the sounds of the seven planets
answer to those of the seven inva-
riable chords in the lyre of fifteen
strings; then he quotes another
opinion, according to which the
distances of the planets would be
analogous to the five tetrachords of
the complete system. These ideas
cannot possibly have belonged to
the ancient Pythagoreans, for the
development of the harmonic sys-
tem and the augmentation of the
number of chords which they pre-
Suppose, are of a later date. Ac-
cording to an opinion ascribed to
Pythagoreans by Plutarch (l.c. 31),
each of the ten celestial bodies,
animated by movement, is sepa-
rated from the body below it by a
distance three times as great as
the distance separating this from
the next lowest. This opinion has
nothing to do with the calculation
of tones in the spheral harmony,
and the same remark applies to
what Plato says (Rep. x. 616 C
sqq.; Tºm. 36 D, 38 C sqq.) of the
distancesandvelocity of the planets,
though harmony is mentioned in
the first of these passages. Among
moderns, cf. on this question, first
the classical essay of Böckh in the
Studien v. Daub und Creuzer, iii.
87 sqq. (now K. Schr. iii. 169 sq.),
where the correspondence of the
celestial harmony with the dis-
tances of the heptachord is also
explained in regard to the ancient
system ; and lastly, Martin, Etudes,
ii. 37 sqq.
* This is the opinion of Aris-
totle and Heracleitus, Alleg. Hom.
c. 12, p. 24 Mehl. The latter
adds, as a possible reason, the great
distance of the heavenly bodies.
Simplicius, it is true, De Coelo, 211,
a, 14; Schol. 496 b, 11 sqq. thinks
this too ordinary a reason to be
held by a school, the founder of
which had himself heard the har-
mony of the spheres, and gives
this sublimer reason (also indicated
by Cicero, Somn, c. 5, together
with that of Aristotle) that the

464 THE PYTHIAGOREAAWS,
This notion of the spheral harmony had no connection
originally with the system of the ten heavenly bodies,"
but related only to the planets; for ten tones would
have resulted from the motion of ten bodies; whereas
seven sounds are required for harmony, according to
the ancient harmonic system which is based on the
heptachord; and eight, if the octachord be adopted.
Now one or other of these numbers is always assigned
to the harmony of the spheres by all who discuss
it particularly.” The number must originally have
been seven ; for down to the time of Philolaus, the
Pythagorean theory recognises only the seven notes
of the heptachord.” The testimony of Aristotle + does
not contradict this. It is possible, in the first place,
that he had Plato or certain Platonists in his mind as
music of the heavenly bodies is not
perceptible to the ears of ordinary
mortals. Porphyry expresses this
idea in a physical manner (in Ptol.
Harm, p. 257) when he says that
our ears are too narrow to perceive
these powerful sounds. Archytas
seems to have anticipated him in
this, wide the fragment quoted in
Porph. l. c. and supra, p. 306 sq.
| Perhaps it is for this reason
that Philolaus does not mention it
(so far, at least, as we can discover
from the fragments that remain of
him). What Porph. V. Pyth. 31,
placing himself at the point of
view of the geocentric system, says
of the nine sonorous celestial
bodies, called by Pythagoras the
nine muses, betrays a recent ori-
gin, if only by the un-Pythagorean
interpretation of the Avrixflav.
2. Cf. on this subject (besides
what has been cited. p. 461, 2),
|Plato Rep. x. 616 sq., who re-
fers the celestial harmony to the
heaven of fixed stars and to the
planets; Hippol. Refut. i. 2, p. 8,
who refers it solely to the planets.
Censorin. Di. Nat. c. 13: (Pythag.)
hunc omnem mundum enarmonion
esse ostendit. Qware Dorylaus
scripsit esse mundum organum
Dei : alii addiderunt, esse id Širrd-
Xopbov, quia Septem sint vagae
8tellae, quae plurimum moveantur.
* As Böckh shows, Philol. 70
sq., appealing to the passage of
Philolaus quoted p. 385, 2. Arist.
Probl. xix. 7; Plut. Mus. 19; Ni-
com. Harm. i. 17, ii. 27; cf. Boeth.
Mus. i. 20. The assertion of
Bryennius, Harm. sect. i. p. 365,
that Pythagoras was the discoverer
of the octachord cannot here be
considered.
* Who, it is true, must be also
thinking of the fixed stars when
he uses the expression roo'oùrov 'rb
TA760s &orpov.
FIRE OF THE PERIPHER P. 465
well as the Pythagoreans; and it is a question, in the
second place, whether, supposing him to mean the
Pythagoreans only, he simply reproduces their theory
without any admixture of his own presuppositions.
But the theory of the spheral harmony, though it
primarily related to the planets alone, was based on
a universal thought, the very thought that Aristotle
attributes to the Pythagoreans (Metaph. 1, 5), viz.,
that the whole universe is a harmony. This thought
directly resulted, as we have seen, from the perception
or presentiment of a regular order in the distances and
movements of the heavenly bodies: what the eye sees
in observing the stars, that the ear hears in the concord
of tones." Engrossed with symbols, and little con-
cerned with the precise discrimination of concepts, the
Pythagoreans identified harmony with the octave;
after this it was easy for them to regard the celestial
harmony also as an octave, and the seven planets as
the golden strings of the heavenly heptachord. This
poetical thought doubtless came first ; the intellectual
arguments which, according to Aristotle, were brought
forward to justify it are certainly posterior.
The chief function of the fire of the circumference,
in the Pythagorean theory, was to hold the cosmos
together as a covering embracing the whole, and on
this account they seem to have called it necessity.” It
* Plato, Rep. vii. 430 D : kiv-
8vvetet, æq.mv, &s trpès &otpovopatav
ăupata trémyev, &s trpos évappuéviov
qopāv &ra retrnyéval, kal airal
âAA#Awy &öexpaí tºwes ai étriotăual
elval, is of Te IIv6ayópelot part kai
jueſs, & TAačkov, avyxwpoupev. Cf.
Archytas ap. Porph. in Ptolem,
WOL. I.
Harm. p. 236 (Fragm. Philos. i.
564): Trept re 63) tas rôv &otpov
Taxurāros kai éiritoxãv kal 660 ww.
trapéðakav ćuiv Štáyvoortv; cal repl "
Tauerpías kal &piðuðvical ovX #Riata
trepi uovo.ukås raira yöp tº ua&#-
gara öokoúvri eluev &öexped.
* This appears to me to result
BI H
466
THE PPTHAGORPAWS.
is not improbable also that they derived the light of
the stars from it, and in a certain degree that of the
sun; there are reasons too for supposing that they
believed that this fire, or a radiation from it, was seem
in the milky Way.”
from the mutilated passage ap.
Plut. Plac. i. 25, 2 (Stob. i. 158;
Galen, c. 10, p. 261; Theod. Cur.
Gr. Aff. vi. 13, p. 87): IIv6ayápas.
äväykmu èqm treptireto 6al ºrg Köopaq.
Ritter (Pyth. Phil. 183) finds in
this passage the thought that the
Unlimited in embracing the world
transforms it to something limited,
and subjects it to matural neces-
sity. But according to the Pytha-
gorean doctrine, the Unlimited
cannot be conceived as that which
embraces or limits ; trepaivov and
&trepov are diametrically opposed
to each other. Similarly, the
&vdºkm, by which Plato in the
Timaeus certainly means natural
necessity as distinguished from
the divine activity working to an
end, cannot have had this significa-
tion with the Pythagoreans; for
the idea of this opposition is, as
we have seen (supra, p. 397), alien
to them. Necessity seems rather
to mean, with them, the bond of
the universe; and when they say
that it embraces the world, we
think most naturally of the fire of
the periphery. Plato seems to
confirm this view when (Rep. x.
617 B), inspired with the Pytha-
gorean spirit, he makes the spin-
dle with the circles of the cosmos
turn upon the knees of 'Aváykm,
which consequently here embraces
all the spheres alike. In the same
manner Iambl. writes (Th. Arithm.
p. 61): thy ’Aväykmy of 0soxóryol tſ,
roſ, Travros oëpavoj čotátn &vrvyi
(circle) éirmxoşat. Wendt. (Jahr-
Beyond the circle of fire lay the
batch f wissensch. Krit. 1828, 2,
379) regards 'Avdºyich as synony-
mous with harmony. But although
Diog. says (viii. 85) that, according
to Philolaus all things take place
&váykm kal &puovíq, we must not
conclude from this that Philolaus
identified necessity with harmony;
for it could not be said of harmony
that it envelopes the world.
* Wide p. 450, 1.
* This conjecture, which we
already find in Böckh (Philol. 99),
is founded upon the intimation
which he also gives (Kl. Schr. iii.
297 sq.) that Plato, in speaking of
the light which envelopes the
world (Rep. x. 616 B sq.), as the
âtroſópata of a ship, in all proba-
bility is thinking of the milky way.
Of this light it is said that in its
bosom the circles of heaven unite
—and it is from these circles that
the spindle of 'Aváykm proceeds,
that spindle which (617 B) turns
upon the knees of 'Avdylcm. If we
combine these passages with those
quoted in the preceding note, it
seems probable that the fire of the
periphery, which, as the bond of
the world, was called 'Avâykm, is
the same as the milky way. With
this passage of Plato we may also
connect the statement ap. Stob. Eel.
i. 256: oi ätrö IIv0ayópov toy icóapov
a palpaw . . . uévov 8& To &váratov
trüp covoetőés. According to Böckh,
Plato compares this light to a
column, because the vertical cone
of the milky way would appear so
if seen from some particular point
THE UNLIMITED.
467
Unlimited, or the unlimited air (Tvsåpa), from which
the universe draws its breath."
outside the world. It is a ques-
tion, however, whether the Pytha-
goreans did not rather believe that
the fire of the periphery flamed up
from the northern summit of the
milky way, in a great column rest-
ing on a wide base and terminating
in a point, and whether this opinion
did not influence the exposition of
Plato. I cannot agree with the
alterations in the text próposed by
Erohn (D. Platon. Staat, p. 282
sq.). This doctrine of the fire of
the periphery, or at least of its
identity with the milky way, seems
to have been confined to a part of
the school. For in what concerns
the milky way, Aristotle, although
the fire of the periphery was not
unknown to him (vide De Caelo, ii.
13; the words to 5’ oxarov kal
to uégov Trépas, cited p. 444, 4,
evidently relate to this fire). quotes
(Metereol. i. 8) from the Pythago-
rean school (Töv kańovuévay IIv6a-
yopetov twks) the opinion that the
milky way is the trace or course of
one of the stars that fell in the
catastrophe of Phaeton; or else a
course once traversed by the sun,
but now abandoned. This opinion
is also found in Olymp. and Philo-
ponus ad h. l. (i. 198, 203, Id.),
and in Stob. Fel. i. 574 (Plut. Plac.
iii. 1, 2), without any other indica-
tion of its source. Such opinions
cannot be attributed to Philolaus.
* Arist. Phys. iii. 4, 203 a, 6:
of uév IIv6ayópelot . . . eival to
&a toû oùpavow tºreupov. Ibid. iv.
6; wide supra, p. 414, 2; Stob. i.
380: év Šē ré trepi rās IIv0ayópov
quxoroq (as irpºtº Ypédei ['Aptorro-
téxms], Tov oëpavov sival éva, Éirel-
ordyearðat 6' éic too &reſpou xpóvov
Te Kai Tuohy kal to kevov, & Stopfget
That there must be
ékáortov tás x&pas àeſ. Plut. Plac.
ii. 9 (Galen. c. 11): of uév &mb
IIv6ayópov, Šicros éival roi, kóruov
revöv (cf. next note), eis 8 &vatve?
6 kāquos ical é; oš. But, for the
reason already given, p. 465, 2, we
ought not to identify this Unli-
mited with the fire of the peri-
phery, for it is nowhere described
as being fiery, but as the boundless
air (Arist. Supra, p. 414, 2), from
which the world inhales its Tvoji.
It is true that the passage in Sim-
plicius, which will presently be
cited, makes the heaven of fixed
stars to be immediately bounded
by the &repov; but it is a question
whether Archytas understood by
êoxarov the heaven of fixed stars,
and not the outermost circle of fire.
For the words #yovv rá &rAave?
oùpavó are certainly a gloss of the
historian ; a Pythagorean would
not have called the external part
of the world oëpavós. Röth thinks
(ii. a, 831 sq.; b, 255) that by the
&Teipov placed outside the world
we should understand the primitive
divinity as the infinite spirit. But
this opinion is evidently erroneous,
together with all that depends upon
it—for the Štreipov as compared
with the Limited is, from the Py-
thagorean point of view, something
evil and imperfect; the āvāntov kal
#Aoyov (Philol. ap. Stob. Ecl. i. 10).
In the Pythagorean fragments,
even the most recent, the word
âtelpos is never applied to the
Deity. If Aristotle speaks of the
&Telpop true Jua outside the world.
this does not tell in favour of
Röth's opinion, but against it.
Does Aristotle, or any other
philosopher anterior to the Stoics,
ever call the spirit Tveijua?
H. H. 2
468 THE PETHAGOREANS.
an Infinite of this kind outside the world, Archytas
had proved. From it, time as well as the void had
entered the world.” But this motion is exceedingly
obscure and vague, for which, not only our authorities,
but the Pythagoreans themselves are doubtless respon-
sible. On the one hand, by the void we must under-
stand empty space, which here, as often besides, is not
distinguished from space filled with air; on the other
hand, the void divides all things, even numbers, from
each other. Thus two different meanings of the ex-
pression, the logical and the physical, are confused
together; and with the same confusion of thought, time,
on account of its successive infinity, is said to come
* Simpl. Phys. 108 a 'Apxöras
6é, &s pmolv Eöömpos, oùra's #para
Töv A6)ov. čv Tó éoxárq #yovu ré
&TAavel oipavá yevópevos, Tótepov
écºreſvaul &v thv xeſpa h Tov Ād.66ov
eis rô £a, h oùic &v; to uév oſſºv wh
ékretvelv, &rotrov. ei Šē ékretva,
#To a 6pua ñ rátros to ékrös a rai.
8toloret 5% oièëv, às uab morów.e6a. &el
of v Babie?ral rôv airby rpánov ćirl
Tô &el Aauðavöuevov uépos, kal raû-
rov ćpothaei, kai ei del repov
&rral, ép' 8 h fidgö0s, 5mAovört kal
&repov, ſcal ei ułv gaua, Sébeuktai
Tô trpoketaevow: ei & réiros, art 6?
Tótros rô &v $ 0.6ad a riv # 88wait'
&v eival, rô 5& 5vváuel às by xp?
ru6&val étri Tôv číðtwv, kai oiſºrws &v
ełm gópa &meupov kal tătros. The
explanations of Eudemus are here
added to the demonstration of
Archytas, as is proved by the ex-
pressions 825tetral and épothaei,
and the Aristotelian phrase (Phys.
iii. 4. 203 b, 30; Metaph. ix. 8,
1050 a. 6): to 8vváue Ös àv, &c.,
and as it is precisely on that phrase
that the proof of the corporeal
nature of the Unlimited rests, all
relating to that idea must belong
to Eudemus ; the only thing which
belongs to Archytas is the ques-
tion : év tá, éoxárq — oãk &v; We
find another proof in favour of
empty space in Arist. Phys. iv. 9, a
statement reproduced and com-
mented on by Themist. in h. l. 43
a (302 sq.); Simpl. Phys. 161 a ;
De Coelo, 267 a, 33. According
to him, Xuthus said that without
the Void, there could not be rare-
faction or condensation, and that in
order that there might be move-
ment, some bodies must transcend
the boundaries of the world, to
make room for the bodies in motion.
The world must overflow (kuſtave?
to 8Xov). Simplicius calls this
Xuthus Eot,00s & IIv6ayopticós. But
it is not stated whether he was a
true Pythagorean, or had merely
(vide infra, p. 415), in the manner
of Ecphantus, combined the theory
of atoms with the Pythagorean
doctrine.
* Arist. Phys, iv. 6; Stob. i. 380.
SYSTEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 469
from the Unlimited, that is, from infinite space. In
this we see the fantastic method of the Pythagorean
school, of which we have already had so many proofs.
We have no right to attempt to destroy it by a precise
definition of the concepts, nor to draw from it conclu-
sions, which have no other certain warrant within the
system." For the same reason it ought not to surprise
us that time, which, according to the above representa-
tion, entered the firmament from the Unlimited, should
itself again be identified” with the celestial sphere; the
former doctrine involves the concept of time as without
limit; the latter asserts that the sky is by its motion
the measure of time:* the perfect reconciliation of these
* Cf. p. 411 sq.
* Plut. Plac. i. 21 (Stob. i.
248; Galen. c. 10, p. 25): IIv6ayó-
pas Tov xpóvov thv ordaipav roß
trepiéxovros (Galen. : T. reptéx. juás
oùpavod) gival, a statement which is
confirmed by Aristotle and Sim-
plicius. For Aristotle says, Phys.
iv. 10, 218 a, 33: of pºv yūp thv
roß &Aov kivmarty éivaí paatu [Tov
xpóvov], oi 3& Thy gºalpav aithv,
and Simplicius further remarks, p.
165; of uèv thv too &Aov kivmotiv
ical trepiq'opäu Töv xpóvov sivat
qaau, äs Tov IIAátova vouí(ovoiv Š
Te Eßmuos, k. T. A., oi Śē Thu
oqaipav airthv too oipavoi), ās Tows
IIv6ayopicobs intopovoi Aéyely oi
trapakoúa'avres forws toū ‘ApxöTov
(the categories falsely ascribed to
Archytas ; cf. Pt. iii. b, 113, 2 ed.)
Aéyovros kaflóAou Töv xpóvov čudo-
Tnua Täs too travtos pºorews. In a
similar manner, according to Plut.
De Is. 32, p. 364; Clem. Strom. v.
571 B; Porph. Vit. Pyth. 41, the
sea was spoken of by the Pythago-
reans as the tears of Cronos.
Cronos is the god of the sky whose
tears (the rain) had, as they con-
ceived, formed the sea, vide supra.
p. 91, 2. I cannot recognise my
opinion in the terms employed by
Chaignet, ii. 171 sq., to reproduce
the above remark. Nor can I dis-
cuss either his objections or his
attempt to find the sense of the
Pythagorean definition in Pseudo-
Pythagorean writings.
* Arist. l. c., gives another mo-
tive: â 5& roß &ov orgalpa šāoše
pºv tols eitrova weival 6 xpóvos, Štt
ëv Te T6 xpóvg. trāvra éoºr kal év tá
roß &Aov orgaípg, and the definition
attributed to Archytas in Simpli-
cius may be interpreted in this
sense. But this reason does not
seem to have come from Archytas.
I should rather conjecture it to
have been given after his time.
Cronos must at first have been
with the Pythagoreans, as with
Pherecydes, a symbolical name for
the sky. Wide preceding note.
--
470
THE PITHAGOREANS.
two doctrines was doubtless not attempted by the
Pythagoreans."
This theory necessitated the abandonment of the
original view of the world as a surface vaulted over by
a hemispherical cavity; and the conception of upper
and lower was reduced to that of greater or lesser
distance from the centre;” the lower, or that lying
nearer to the centre, was called by the Pythagoreans the
* I cannot regard them as ac-
cordant, nor can I agree with
Böckh (Philol. 98) that the Py-
thagoreans called Time the sphere
of the embracing, so far as it has
its foundation in the Unlimited.
For, on the one hand, the Unli-
mited could not be designated as
gºalpa toû repuéxovros; and, on
the other, this expression is other-
wise explained in the passage of
Aristotle hitherto overlooked. The
indication of Plutarch (Plat. Qu.
viii. 4, 3, p. 1007), according to
which Pythagoras defined Time as
the soul of the All or of Zeus,
merits no reliance. Cf. p. 466 sq.
* This point, it is true, is not
established by the testimony of
Aristotle, De Caºlo, ii. 2, 285 a, 10.
Aristotle, in considering the ques-
tion whether the heavens have an
'above and a below, a right and a
left, a before and a behind, finds it
strange that the Pythagoreans 680
Móvas Taffras &px&s éAeyov, to Seftov
kai to &ptortepov, rös 6* Tétrapas
trapéAutov oi6év fittov kvpías otolas.
IBut this means to say that in
the table of opposites, vide p. 381,
these two categories alone are
mentioned. In fact, however, the
Above and the Below in the uni-
verse were reduced to the Exterior
and the Interior. Philol. ap. Stob.
Eol. i. 360 (Böckh, Philol. 90 f;
D. kosm. Syst. 120 sq.): ātro Toº
Mégou Tà &va, 61& Tów airów toſs
kdro èotl, Tå &va toû puégou inte-
vavría's ketueva toſs Káro (i.e., the
order of the spheres, from above
to the centre, is the contrary of the
order from the centre to the lowest
point) tois yūp kāta, Tâ katatürw
puéora éotiv Šotrep Tà &vatdºra, ral
Tà &AAa &gattos. Trpos yöp to uégov
Taird, éotiv čkdºtepa, Šo a whº pere-
whvekrai (= trºv Štu pletev ; cf.
Böckh, Philol. 90 sq.; D. kosm.
Syst. 120 sq.). In the words toſs
ºyāp kāra, etc., the text is evidently
corrupt. To correct it, I should
propose, (1) either to strike out
uéga, which is only a conjecture
for uéya, and is entirely wanting
in several manuscripts; so that
the sense would then be : ‘for to
those who are on the under side,
the lowest seems highest ; ' or else
(2), to read roſs Yāp kato (for those
who inhabit the region of the
world, which, according to the or-
dinary opinion is below, and which
from our point of view is on the
other side of the centre) karatáta,
T& Méda éotlv čo Trep Tois &va, kal
tà &AAa &gaútws. The corrections
proposed by leop. Schmidt, Quaest.
Epicharmea, Bonn, 1846, p. 63,
and by Nutzhorn (Philol. xxii.
1865, p. 337), seem to me not very
happy. -
THE UNIVERSE. 471
right side of the world; that which was farther from
the centre, the left; for they regarded the movement
of the heavenly bodies from west to east as a progressive
motion, and accordingly they assigned to the centre,
as befitted its importance in the universe, the place of
honour on the right side of the bodies of the world."
They also held the upper portions of the universe to
be the most perfect, and distinguished the outermost
circle of fire from the circles of the stars, dividing these
again into the circles above and below the moon ;
so that the universe was divided into three regions,
Olympus, Cosmos, and Uranos.”
* Simpl. De Calo, 175 b, 31;
Schol. 492 b, 39 : (of IIv6ayópstol)
às airbs év Tó Öevrépq, Täs ouva-
ºyayyús Tóv IIv6ayopticów ioTopei, too
§Aov otpavoi Tô pièv čva, Aé'yovatv
eival r& 6é kätaw, kal To uév Kára,
toū oãpavoi, Seštěv eival, to 58 &va,
àpigºrepov, kal huas €v Tó Káta,
eival. These words seem to con-
tradict what Aristotle says, De Coelo,
ii. 2, 285 b, 25 : (oi IIv0ay.) huās
&vo Te trototal ſcal év tá, 6ešić wepet,
Toys 5’ exe? kāta, kai év tá, épio tépé.
Böckh, however (d. kasm. Syst.
106 sq.), has shown how the two
assertions are compatible, and how
the objections are to be met, which,
according to Simplicius, loc. cit.,
both he and his predecessor, Alex-
ander, and more recently Gruppe,
d. kosm. Syst. d. Gr. 65 sqq.,
brought forward. The mention
of the avva-ya'yh, in Simplicius,
relates to the division of the Uni-
verse into an upper or external,
and a lower or internal region,
the latter, including the earth and
the counter-earth, is on the right.
The statement of the treatise on
the heavens, on the contrary, refers
Olympus contained
to the opposition of the superior
and inferior hemispheres of the
earth; in regard to this, the Py-
thagoreans maintain, in opposition
to Aristotle, that our hemisphere
is turned towards the periphery of
the world, and is in ordinary lan-
guage the superior hemisphere.
Aristotle, from his standpoint,
called it the right; the Pythago-
reans must have called it the left.
* Wide preceding note and Stob.
i. 488, the continuation of the text
cited p. 444, 4: To uèv of v &votátw
Mépos toū trepiéxovros, év ć rºw eixt-
kivetov eiual Tów a rouxetov *OAvp-
tov kaxeſ [pixóAaos] tº §§ {Trö Thu
Tot; 'OAffairov qop&v, év ć rows trévte
TAavhras ué6’ #xfov kal orexivns -
Teráx6ai, kóguov, to t” Štrb rotºrous
ūtroo’éAmvöv Te Kal treptºyetov uépos,
év ć to tºs (pixoperaßóAov yevéoeos,
oùpavóv. kal trepi uèv tº tetayuéva
Töv wered pou Yiyveabat thv orogºtav
trepi 6& rà yewópeva rās &tašlas Tºv
ãperhu, Texetav A&v éketvmv, &tex?
8è raútmv. Cf. on this point Böckh,
Philol. 94 sq., and supra, p. 316.
The opposition of the terrestrial
and celestial spheres appears also
472 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
the elements in their purity; Cosmos” was the place of
Ordered and uniform motion, Uranos that of Becoming
and Change.” Whether the central fire was included
in Olympus and the heaven of fixed stars in Cosmos, we
do not know; but both conjectures are probable: the
position of the counter-earth is more doubtful; it is
possible that the Pythagoreans, who were chiefly com-
cerned with the opposition of the terrestrial and supra-
terrestrial, never considered this question. Finally, in
the extract of Stobaeus a movement of Olympus is
in the exposition (full of Stoical
opinions) of Diog. viii. 26, and
in the semi-peripatetic exposition,
ap. Phot. 439 b, 27 sqq., but the
tripartite division of Philolaus is
here wanting. It is, on the con-
trary, implied in the Epinomis of
Plato, 978 B, by the words: éðv
ºyāp in Tus ér 6eapíav Šp6%iv rhy
Todèe, eite köopov eite ”OAvutrov
efºre oipavov čv jiàovi, Ta Aéyetv,
precisely because the author dis-
cards it. Parmenides, v. 141, 137
(vide infra, Parm.), calls the outer-
most envelope, Avutros éaxatos;
on the other hand, he calls the
starry heaven, not kóquos, but
oùpavés. We must not, however,
infer from this, as Krische does
(Forsch. 115), that Philolaus can-
.not have used the word oilpavós in
speaking of the lower region; his
terminology is not necessarily
always the same as that of Parme-
nides.
* That is to say it consisted of
the purest substance; for the ter-
restrial elements evidently do not
exist in Olympus; even the word
otolyela is scarcely to be consi–
dered Pythagorean. Or are we to
understand by this expression the
Limited and Unlimited 2 For the
Unlimited only, the Štreipov out-
side the world (vide p. 467, 1),
of which Böckh is thinking, could
not be designated by the plural
artouxeia.
* The Cosmos, that is, in the
narrower sense of the word. For
in general the word Cosmos has
with the Pythagoreans its ordinary
meaning of the universe (e.g. Philol.
Fr. 1, cf. p. 379, 1). It is even said
that Pythagoras was the first to
use this expression (Plut. Plac. ii.
1 ; Stob. i. 450; Galen. c. 11;
Phot. 440 a, 17). What is true
in the statement is probably this,
that the Pythagoreans were fond
of employing the word to designate
the harmonious order of the world.
But even at the time of Xenophon
it was not in general use, as is plain
from Xen. Mem. i. 1, 11; 6 kaxoſ-
Mevos ūtro rāv oroquotöv kóo wos, cf.
Plato, Gorgias, 508 A.
* What Epiph. Erp. fid. p.
1087 B, says, using a later ter-
minology, is not altogether inexact:
ëAeye be (IIv6.) Tă ătro orexívms kāra,
traffnt& elval ºrdvra, rå Ös & repāva,
Tās areaſivms &taff, eival,
THE UNIVERSE. 473
spoken of, but it is uncertain whether he is not here
transferring to Olympus what is applicable only to the
heaven of fixed stars.
This astronomical theory of the universe is con-
nected, as we have seen, with the idea of the respiration
of the world and of its right and left sides. In this
we see the favourite ancient comparison of the world
with a living creature; but, after our previous enquiries
concerning the world-Soul, we cannot allow that this
thought had any important influence on the Pytha-
gorean system. - -
It might be inferred from a passage of the Placita
attributed to Plutarch, that the Pythagoreans, like
Anaximander and Heracleitus, believed in the periodic
generation and destruction of the world. This passage,
however, probably asserts nothing more than that the
vapours into which, by the effect of heat and moisture,
earthly substances are resolved, serve for nourishment
to the world or the stars.” It therefore relates only to
the destruction of individual things: in regard to the
* II. 5, 3: puñóAaos Surrºw elval
T}v q,00pāv, Totè pièv é; ovpavoi,
Tupbs Évévros, Totè 6' é; $6aros
ge?\mutakov trepiot popff too &épos
&Toxv0évros' kal Towrav sival r&s
&vaðvuićgets rpoºpós toū kóguov.
This statement, both here and in
Galen. c. 11, is preceded by the
words tró6ev Tpéq's rat 6 kóagos.
Under the same title Stobaeus says,
Ecl. i. 452: pix8Aaos épmore, rouév
é; otpavot trupos fivévros, to 8& é;
#5atos gexmviakos Treptarpopſ, row
&épos &toxv6évros sivat rās &vaðv-
Aidaeis Tpopås toū kóo wov, whereas
in the chapter on Becoming and
Perishing, i. 418, he cites the words
quxóA.—&m oxv6évros, as they are
cited in the Placita, only after
q,00påv he adds toū kóopov. As
to the sense of the obscure words,
which have perhaps been inexactly
reported, I follow Böckh (Philol.
110 sq.), whose interpretation seems
to me more probable than that of
Chaignet, ii. 159. Chaignet ex-
plains the passage thus: il y a delta:
causes de dépérissement, l'une quand
le feu s'échappe du ciel, l'autre quand
ce few . . . se répand de l'eau de la
tune.
* As was said by Heracleitus
and the Stoics. -
474 THE PPTHAGOREA N.S.
universe generally, it would appear that the Pythago-
reans did not believe in any destruction of the world;
what the Pseudo-Plutarch' tells us on the subject is no
doubt merely derived from Timaeus the Locrian, or
other similar sources. It is clear on the contrary, from
Eudemus, that they thought, as the Stoics did after-
wards, not only that the same persons who had lived in
the world would re-enter it at a later period; but that
they would again do the same actions and live in the
same circumstances;” this is confirmed by a passage in
Porphyry, not in itself of much weight.” This theory
was no doubt connected with the doctrine of Trans-
migration and of the great year of the world : if the
heavenly bodies were to occupy the same place as
before, everything else would return to the same condi-
tion, and consequently the same persons would be
present under the same circumstances. But it is a
question whether this doctrine belonged to the whole
school, or only to a portion of it.
} The Pythagoreans appear to have occupied them-
21–selves very little with the study of terrestrial nature: at
any rate, with the exception of one slight attempt on
the part of Philolaus, tradition is silent on the subject.
* Plac. ii. 4, 1 (Galen. c. 11,
p. 265). -
* In the fragment of his Phy-
sics ap. Simpl. Phys. 173 a, he
enquires whether the same time
which has been, shall be again, or
not ? and the answer is : that
which comes after is only qualita-
tively the same as that which has
gone before : Ei 6é ris trioteñorete
Toſs IIv0ayopetois, és träAuv rá air&
&piðug, Kūyā plv60Aoyàow to Éašátov
ëxov Špiv kaðmuévois oira (this is
the right punctuation), ſcal rô &AAa.
trövta Öuoiws #el, kai Töv xpóvov
stao'yöv éart Tov airov sival.
* V. Pyth, 19. Of the doctrines
of Pythagoras, those of immortality
and the transmigration of souls are
the best known: trpós 5& Toºrous àri
kató, trepióðous Tuvès rê, yewówevá
trote tréAlv yivetal, véov 6' oióēy
âtr?\ós éoti.
TERRESTRIAL WATURE. THE SOUL. 475
In regard to Philolaus, we are told that in the same
way that he derived geometrical determinations (the
point, the line, the surface, the solid) from the first four
numbers, so he derived physical qualities” from five, the
soul from six ; reason, health, and light” from seven ;
love, friendship, prudence, and inventive faculty from
eight. Herein (apart from the number schematism) is
contained the thought that things represent a graduated
scale of increasing perfection ; but we hear nothing of
any attempt to prove this in detail, or to seek out the
characteristics proper to each particular region.”
Nor, in all probability, did the Pythagoreans carry
their enquiries respecting the soul and man very far.
Later writers indeed descant much on the origin of the
soul from the world-soul, and on its ethereal, divinely-
related, eternally-moved, immortal nature. There is
even a fragment of Philolaus which contains these
statements.” I have already shown,” however, that this
fragment can scarcely be considered genuine, and that
" Iambl. Theol. Ar. 56 ; cf. As-
clep. in Metaph. i. 5. These pas-
sages have been quoted, p. 435, 2.
In Theol. Ar. p. 34 sq., it is stated
that six is regarded by the Pytha-
goreans as the number of the soul,
and perhaps, Aristotle may be al-
ready alluding to Philolaus when
he speaks (Metaph. i. 5, quoted on
p. 369, 1) of the assertion: āti to
Totovël (sc. &piðuáv trgºos) juxh Kal
vows.
* Trotórnta kal Xpógiv. The
colour no doubt describes in a
general manner the external nature
(cf. Arist. De Sensu, c. 3, 439 a,
30: of IIv6ayópetol Tºv Čiriq divetav
xpověv ékáNovu), and trouárms, which
does not appear to belong to Philo-
laus, is a later interpretation of
this expression.
* To itſ' airod Aeyóuevov qājs,
therefore not light in the ordinary
sense, but some quality or state of
man; or in general, health, well-
being.
* We find only an isolated trace
of any discussions in regard to
living beings in the passage, Arist.
De Sensu, 5, 445 a, 16, according
to which certain Pythagoreans Sup-
posed some animals lived upon
odours. Wide infra, p. 480, 2, for
other quotations.
* Cf. the texts cited, p. 447, 1.
* Wide pp. 447, sq.; 399, 1 ;
390, 1; 393, 3.
476 THE PPTHAGOREANS.
consequently the theory of his having devoted a special
book of his work to the soul must remain doubtful; I
have also shown that the other authorities are apt to
intermingle the doctrines of the Stoics and Platonists
with the Pythagorean tradition. If we consult our
most trustworthy source, Aristotle, we find him to have
been little acquainted with the Pythagorean psycho-
logy." For in his comprehensive survey of all that his
predecessors had taught on the nature of the soul, he
simply says of the Pythagoreans that some of them held
the solar corpuscles to be souls, and others that which
sets them in motion.” The doctrine that the soul is a
harmony, is alluded to by Aristotle, without mention of
any name,” and in Plato' it is maintained by a pupil of
Philolaus.
* Wide supra, p. 447 sq.
* De An. i. 2, 404 a, 16, after
having mentioned first of all the
Atomists among those who con-
sidered the soul as the motive
principle, and self-moved: éolice Śē
ical to trap& Töv IIv6ayopetov Aeyó-
pºevov Thy at thv čxelv Sudvowav.
ěqaqav yūp rives airów juxhv eival
Tà év rá, éépt £50 para, of 6% to
Taota civoúv, a conception which
Aristotle (most likely it is merely
his own conjecture) derives from
the fact that the solar corpuscles
move, even when the wind is per-
fectly still. I do not understand
the censure which Schlottmann
passes upon me (D. Vergängliche
w. Unvergängliche in d. menschl.
Seele mach Arist. Halle, 1873, p.
30). He says that I misinterpret
this text, and the text cited, p. 448,
in asserting that the definition of
the soul as the moving principle
Macrobius” ascribes it to Philolaus himself,
is only an induction of Aristotle.
But Aristotle himself gives this
as his own induction: he only
quotes, as belonging to the Pytha-
goreans, jux?iv eival to Taora
kivoúv. It is not the same thing
to say: the solar corpuscles are
moved by a soul, and the soul is,
generally, the moving principle.
* De An. i. 4, sub init. : kal
&AAm 6é ris 66&a Trapadéðotal treph
Juxis . . . &pgovíavyáp two airhy
Aéyovoſt' ral yèp thvāpuovtav kpāoriv
kal gºv6eau èvavriov elval, kal to
orðua orvyice to 6a, Čš Čvavríov. Polit.
viii. 5 a 8tb troXAoi qaori rôv
orogów of uév špuovíav sival rhy
juxhv, of 5’ exeiv šppovíav.
4 Phaedo, 85 E sqq.
* Somm. i. 14: Plato diarit ami-
onwm, essentiain se movemtem, Åemo-
crates ºwmérwºn Se moventem, Aris-
toteles évrexéxetc.v, Pythagoras et
Philolaus harmoniam.
THE SOUL. 477
and even to Pythagoras. Philoponus connects with it
the statement also made by Stobaeus, that the soul is
a number." This statement in itself is not at all im-
probable: if everything is number and harmony, the
soul may well be so. But the general proposition that
the soul is harmony or number, says nothing; we only
get a specific determination concerning the essence of
the soul, when it is described as by Plato and Aristotle
(loc. cit.) as the number or harmony of the body to
which it belongs. That it was so defined by the
Pythagoreans we are never told, and such a view would
ill accord with their belief in immortality; * if, there-
fore, it had been found within the school, it would have
been a departure from the primitive doctrine which we
cannot ascribe to Philolaus. It is more likely that he
said what Claudianus Mamertus” quotes from him,
and what may also be deduced from our previous
citations," that the soul is united with the body by
means of number and harmony.” The further assertion,
however," that Pythagoras defined the soul as a self-
1 Philop. De Am, B, 15: ágrep
ošv špuovíav Aéyoutes tºw bux?iv
[of IIv6ayópetoll oil paal Taürmy
Špuovíav rºv čv rais xopägis, etc.
Cf. C, 5, where it is said that
Xenocrates borrowed from Pytha-
goras the idea that the soul is a
number. Stob. Ecl. i. 682 : some Py-
thagoreans call the soul a number.
2 In Plato, at any rate, Sim-
mias only concludes from it that
the soul perishes after the destruc-
tion of the body, as the harmony
ceases after the destruction of the
instrument; and it is difficult to
say how this conclusion can be
evaded; it was also drawn by
Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, cf.
Part II. b, 717 sq. 2nd ed. .
* De Statu An. ii. 7 (ap. Böckh,
Philol. p. 177): ‘Anima inditur
corpori per numerum et immortalem
eandemqite incorporalem convenien-
tiam.’
* Wide supra, p. 475, 1; 431.
* Here again we are uncertain
whether Claudian borrowed his
statement from the true Philolaus;
cf. p. 399, 1.
* Plut. Plac. iv. 2. Nemes.
Nat. hom. p. 44. Theodoret, Cur.
gr. aff, v. 72, with whom Steinhart,
Plato's Werke, iv. 551, in the main
agrees.
478 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
moving number must absolutely be rejected. Aristotle,
who was the first to quote this definition," was evidently,
when he did so, not referring to the Pythagoreans;”
and other writers expressly mention Xenocrates as its
author.” It is likewise improbable that Archytas
defined the soul as the self-moved," though the Pytha-
goreans would certainly appear to have noticed its
continuous motion, and interrupted life;" and the
statements that Pythagoras called it a square, and
Archytas a circle or a sphere, are both equally ques-
tionable."
Lastly, an expression quoted from Archytas
to the effect that the soul is not extended in space, is
no doubt taken from a spurious work.”
* De Aw. i. 2, 4, 404 b, 27;
408 b, 32. Anal. post. ii. 4, 91
a, 37.
2 For (De An. i. 2, 404 a, 20),
he continues, after the text relative
to the Pythagoreans, quoted p. 476,
2 : étrº rairo 5è (pépovrat Ral $got
Aéyovo's Thy jux?iv ro añto kivoßv.
He distinguishes therefore this
opinion from that of the Pytha-
goreans. As to the latter, he
elsewhere expresses himself in a
manner that would have been im-
possible if he had had before him
so exact a definition of the nature
of the soul.
3 Cf. Part II. a, 672, 2, 2nd ed.
* Joh. Lyd. De Mens. 6 (8), S,
21: Juxh &věpátrov, pnaiv 6 IIv6a-
7ópas, éoth retpáyovov eiðuyáviov.
*Apxöras & puxās Tov Špov oik ev
Terpayáve &AA’ v RiſkAº &roötöoot
8t& rooro ºvXà ro airò [l. atrol
rivojv, äväyka 6° to trpárov rivojv,
trökAos 6& rotiro à oðaºpa.’ Accord-
ing to the remark we have just
made, Aristotle can have known
nothing of this definition attributed
to Archytas. The definition of the
soul as airò kivotiv is certainly
taken from Plato (Phaedrus, 245 C),
There too we find the observation
that the self-moving is also in re-
gard to other things triryū kal épx?
Rivāorea's ; in regard to which the
Pseudo-Archytas employs the Aris-
totelian expression trpárov kivoúv.
* Wide the remark of Aristotle
quoted p. 476, 2, and particularly
what he says of Alcmaeon, infra.
* The statement relative to Py-
thagoras is in itself suspicious,
like all the recent information
which we possess as to the per-
sonal opinions of this philosopher.
The statement relative to Archytas
is so, first, because it is in itself
eccentric, and secondly, because it
has an evident connection with Pla-
tomic and Aristotelian ideas.
* Claud. Mam. De Statu An. ii.
7 (cf. Pt. iii. b, 90, 2 Aufl.) quotes
from Archytas: Anima ad even-
plum units composita est, quae sic
itlocaliter dominatur in corpore,
sicut unus in numeris, But to
ANTHROPOLOGY.
479
Concerning the parts of the Soul, various theories are
ascribed to the Pythagoreans by more recent writers
which I cannot admit them to have originally held.
According to some, they were acquainted with the Pla-
tonic distinction of a rational and an irrational soul,
and the analogous distinction of Reason, Courage, and
Desire; together with the Platonic division of the
intellectual faculty into voffs, Šarlo Trium, 8óša, and
ałorémats; * we are told by another writer” that they
divided the soul into Reason, Mind, and Courage (vojs,
ºppéves, 6vpios); Reason and Courage being in men and
prove the authenticity of the writ-
ing from which this passage is
taken, more evidence is required
than the testimony of Claudian ; it
is not in itself probable that Ar-
chytas, or any other Pythagorean,
should have enunciated a doctrine
of which we first hear, not even from
Plato, but from Aristotle, viz., that
the presence of the soul in the
body is not a juxtaposition in
space. The statement ap. Stob.
Eel. i. 790; Theodor. Cur. gr. aff.
v. p. 128, according to which Py-
thagoras makes vows 60paffew eiokpt-
verbai, contains no doubt an
inference drawn from the doctrine
of Metempsychosis. Schlottmann
p. 24 sq. and the treatise cited p.
476) has wrongly made use of it
to prove the improbable and un-
founded conjecture, that Aristotle
borrowed the expression 6&pagev
eiortéval in respect to the union of
the soul with the body from the
Pythagoreans.
1. Cf. Posidonius ap. Galen. De
Hipp. et Plat. iv. 7; v. 6, T. xv.
425. 478 K. ; Iambl. ap. Stob. Eel.
i. 878; Plut. Plac. iv. 4, 1, 5, 13.
On the distinction of the rational
and irrational part, cf. Cicero,
Tusc. iv. 5, 10; Plut. Plac. iv. 7,
4; Galen. Hist. Phil. c. 28. Other
passages taken from Pseudo-Pytha-
gorean fragments will be found in
Part III. b, 112, 2, 2nd edition.
* The Pseudo-Archytasap Stob.
Ecſ. i. 722, 784, 790, and Iambl.
tr. kow. Mað. Tiar. (in Willoison,
Anecd. ii.) p. 199: Brontinus ap.
Iamb. C. C. 198; Theodoret, Cur.
gr. aff, v. 197 Gaisf, who adds, as
a fifth part, the Aristotelian ppó-
vmaris. Plut. Plac. i. 3, 19 sq., in
an extract from an exposition
which is evidently Neo-Platonic,
founded upon the celebrated Pla-
tonic propositions cited by Aristo-
tle, De An. i. 2, 404 b, 21. Photius
gives another and more recent
division, p. 440 b. 27 sqq.; cf.
Part III. b, 120, 8.
* Alex. Polyhistor ap. Diog.
viii. 30. It has already been
shown, pp. 393, 3; 447, 2, that this
exposition is not authentic. The
whole division is confused, and con-
tains many Stoical definitions, for
example, that the senses are emana-
tions from the soul, that the soul
is nourished by the blood, &c.
480 THE PYTHIAGOREANS,
beasts, Mind in men only; Courage having its seat in
the heart, the two other faculties in the brain. There
is more warrant for supposing that Philolaus placed the
seat of Reason in the brain ; of life and sensation in
the heart; of seed and germination in the navel; of
generation in the sexual parts: in the first of these re-
gions, he said, lay the germ of men; in the second, that
of beasts; in the third, that of plants; in the fourth,
that of all creatures." With this, our knowledge of
the philosophic anthropology of the Pythagoreans is
exhausted. What we are further told concerning their
anthropological theories belongs altogether to the sphere
of religious dogmas, the importance of which in the
Pythagorean system we have now to consider.”
1 Iambl. Theol. Arithm. 22 :
Téagapes &pxal too &ov rob Aoyl-
icoſ, Šotrep kai pixóAaos év tá, repl
púaea's Aéyet, Éyképaxos, kapāla,
Öpºpaxos, aiboſov. Keq ax& uév vöw,
kapöta ää juxás kai aid 6%atos,
dupaxos 3& 51%gios kai &vapúaios
Tà trptºtal, aiãotov Šē otépuatos
KaragoNäs Te Kai 'yevuáotos éyké-
qaxos 3& T&v &v0p6tra àpx&v, kap-
6ía 3& rêv Çiğa, Öpºpaxos 3& T&v
qvró, aiāotov Šē tav čvvatrávrov,
travra y&p kal 6&AAovoru Kal 3Åaatá-
vovorty. By the word trävra or
$vvátravra we must understand the
three kinds of living beings, collec-
tively, i.e., men, beasts, and plants.
On the authenticity of the frag-
ment (which commences with the
words kepax& uèv v6o; what goes
before is a preliminary remark of
Iamblichus), cf. p. 317.
* We can only discuss in a sup-
plementary manner certain theories
which have been omitted in the
preceding exposition as not forming
&
an integral part of the physical
system of the Pythagoreans, but
which were either incorporated by
later writers from other sources
into their own doctrine, or stand
isolated without philosophical foun-
dation, and are based merely on
observation. We should regard as
an addition of later writers, for
example, the story given by Alex.
Polyhistor ap. Diog. viii. 25 sqq.
vide Part III, b, 74 sq., 2nd ed.
The same may be said of the Stoic
definition of the body (to oiáv te
traffeiv h Staffeival) attributed to Py-
thagoras by Sextus, Math. ix. 366.
The Placita ascribed to him the
Stoic doctrine : Tperthy Kal &AAow-
Thu kai werc.gxmthu kal fievorrºw
3Amv 6t' àAov thv ŠAmv. The same
treatise i. 24, 3, gives, as coming
from Pythagoras, a proposition
which he could not have expressed
in this form, viz. that on account
of the variation and metamorphosis
of the elements, a Becoming and
IETHICS.
481
V. THE RELIGIOUS AND
ETHICAL DOCTRINES OF
THE PIXTHAG OREANS.
OF all the Pythagorean doctrines, none is better known,
and mone can be traced with greater certainty to the
founder of the school, than that of the Transmigration
of Souls.
It is mentioned by Xenophanes," and later by
Io of Chios;” Philolaus speaks of it, Aristotle describes
it as a Pythagorean fable,” and Plato unmistakably
Perishing in the proper sense of the
word is produced. Lastly, i. 23, 1
(Stob. i. 394), the Placita ascribe
to Pythagoras a definition of move-
ment posterior to Aristotle. We
may also instance what is said
about colours : Placita, i. 15, 2 (cf.
Stob. i. 362; Anon. Phot. Cod. 249,
p. 439 a, cf. Porph. in Ptol. Harm.
c, 3, p. 213; Arist. De Sensu, c, 3,
439, a, 30); on the five zones of
heaven and earth, Plac. ii. 12, 1 ; iii.
14 (Galen. H. ph. c. 12, 21, cf. Theo
Čn Arat. ii. 359) : on sight, and
the reflections of the mirror, Plac.
iv. 14, 3 (Stob. Ecl. i. 502, and in
the extracts of Joh. Damasc.
Parall. p. 1, 17, 15; Stob. Floril.
ed. Mein. iv. 174; Galen, c. 21, p.
296); on the voice, Plac. iv. 20, 1
(G. c. 26); on seed, Plac. v. 3, 2,
4, 2, 5, 1 (G. c. 31); on the five
senses, Stob. Ecl. i. 1104; Phot. 1.
c.; on the rainbow, AElian, V. H.
iv. 17; on the nutrition of animals
by smell, Arist. De Sensu, 5 (vide
supra, p. 475, 4); on the origin of
maladies, Galen. c. 39. If even
these notices really reproduce the
doctrines of the ancient Pytha-
goreans (which can only be sup-
posed in regard to a portion of
them), they have no connection
WOL. I.
with the Pythagorean philosophy.
Similarly the definitions of the
calm of the air and of the sea,
given by Arist. Metaph. viii. 2, ad
fin., as those of Archytas, all of
Small importance; and the state-
ment according to which (Arist.
Probl. xvi. 9) this philosopher
showed that the round form of
certain organs in animals and
plants was the result of the law of
equality which governs natural
movement, stands entirely alone.
As to the pretended logic and
philosophy of language of the
Pythagoreans, vide infra, § vi.
* In the verses quoted Diog.
viii. 36:
kai troté puv otvq?ext{ouévov oköAa-
kos trapuávta.
q'ao iv Štroikreſpat kal Tóðe pda'6at
âtros.
tratoral uměč Šáruſ étreth plaqv &vé-
pos Éoth
juxh, nºw éyvov (p6eyśauévns
&tov.
* In Diog. i. 120, where the
words, efirep IIv6ayópms érüuws 6
goqos repl révrov &v6pótrov yuápas
eiðe kai ééép.a6ev, refer to the beli f
in immortality.
* De An, i. 3, ad fin. : áo nep
I I
482
THE PIV THA GOREANS.
copied his mythical descriptions of the condition of the
soul after death from the Pythagoreans.
As Philolaus
says,' and Plato repeats,” the soul is confined in the body
and buried in it, as a punishment for faults.
The body
is a prison in which it has been placed by God as a
penalty, and from which it consequently has no right
évôexówevov karū toys IIv6ayopticobs
pºiſ00us thv Tuxodoray ºvzhv eis to
Tuxby évööeo-0at oºga.
* Clemens, Strom. iii. 433 A.;
Theod. Cur. gr. aff, v. 14 (Böckh,
Philol. 181) : paptupéoviral 5& kai
of taxatoi 9eoAéryol re kal uávries,
&s 6tá rivas Tuwpías & pv)& ré
ord wart ovvéſevictat kal ka94trep ev
arduart toirº Té0atrºrai. The veins
are called, ap. Diog. viii. 31, the
bonds of the soul. The rest does
not seem to belong to the ancient
Pythagoreans.
* Gorg. 493 A: §trep #6m Tov
êywye kai fikova'a Tów orogów, Ös
vöv hueis Téðvapwev kal to uév oróuá
éortiv hufu qiua, Tâs 5& Juxºis
toūro èv š Čirićvutat eigh rvyxável
by oiov &vatretøeoróat kal wet attarretv
&va, kāra. ital Tooro &pa ris uv60Xo-
vöv koulos &vhp, to as Xuke?\ós tus
# Itaxurbs, trapáyov rá, Övöuatl 6t.
to tru6avóv Te kal Tretoºrucov &vápage
tríðov, Toys 6é àvoñTovs àuvátovs Tāv
8’ &uvīray . . . as retpmuévos elm tri-
60s . . . kal (popotev sistöv Terpmuévov
Tſ60w iſãop érépºp rototrº terpmuévg
kookſvg). It is a question whether
in this text it is merely the com-
parison of the orópa with the oriua,
and the mythus of the punishment
of the āuiſm'rol, that comes from
IPhilolaus or some Pythagorean,
or whether the moralinterpretation
of this myth also comes from him.
This interpretation is attributed to
Philolaus by Böckh (Philol. 183,
186 sq.); Brandis (Gr. Röm. Phil.
i. 497); Susemihl (Genet. Entw. d,
P'at. Phil. i. 107 sq.), and others.
Brandis is less positive in the Gesch.
d. Entw. i. 187. The interpreta-
tion, as a whole, seems to me to
have a purely Platonic character,
and to be out of harmony with the
treatise of Philolaus. Plato does
not say that he borrowed from the
koutpos &vhp the interpretation of
the myth, but the myth itself.
When, connecting this myth with
a popular song, XuceXös koulos
&vhp trot) rāv patépa šqa, Timoc-
reon, Fr. 6 b ; Bergk, Lyr. Gr. p.
941, he makes a mythus, >ticeabs h
'Ira Aukös; he means to say that the
myth of the perforated vessel into
which the unconsecrated were to
put water with a sieve—i.e., the
tradition which extends the
punishment of the Danaids to all
the profane—belongs to the Or-
phico-Pythagorean cycle. In the
Cratylus, 400 B, Plato refers for
the comparison of orópa with a fina
to the Orphics, whom Philolaus
also had in view : kal yèp oriud.
rivés paoſiv airo [to a 6pal sival Tăs
Juxºis, &s Teóaupévms év Tó vov
tapávri . . . Šokoúa'i uévrot wou ud-
Atoºra 6éorðat of &aſp? 'Oppéa rotiro
to $voua, Ös 8th my Stöočams Tās
Juxis &v 8% ºvera ötöwort roorov 8&
treptSoxov čxelv, tva ord'ſ mºral, Öeopa-
Tmptov eikóva.
TRANSMIGRATION OF SouLs. 483
to free itself by a presumptuous act.' So long as the
soul is in the body it requires the body; for through
the body alone can it feel and perceive; separated from
the body it leads an incorporeal life in a higher world.”
This, however, is of course only the case when it has
rendered itself capable and worthy of such happiness;
otherwise it can but look forward to the penance of
material life, or the torments of Tartarus.” The Pytha-
gorean doctrine was therefore, according to these the
most ancient authorities, essentially the same that we
afterwards find associated with other Pythagorean
notions, in Plato;" and which is maintained by Empe-
docles,” viz., that the Soul on account of previous trans-
gressions is sent into the body, and that after death each
soul, according to its deserts, enters the Cosmos or Tar-
1 Plato, Craf. l.c.; Id. Phaedo,
62 B (after having remarked that
Philolaus forbade suicide): 6 pºv
ošv év &rośńrous Aeyóuevos trept
airóv A6-yos, &s év Tuvi (ppoupé £opaev
of &v6potrot kal of Sež ö, äavrov čk
raúrms Aſſelv oiâ’ &roötöpdarketv,
which Cic. (Cato, 20, 73 ; Somn.
Scip. c. 3) reproduces rather inac-
curately, without, however, having
any other authority than this pas-
sage. Clearchus (ap. Athen. iv.
157 c) attributes the same doctrine
to an unknown Pythagorean named
Euxitheus.
* Philol. ap. Claudian. De
Statu An. ii. 7: diligitur corpus ab
anima, quia sine éo non potest uti
sensibus : a quo postguam morte
deducta est agit in mundo (kóoruos
as distinguished from otpavos, sup.
p. 471,2) incorporalem vitam. Carm.
Aur. v. 70 sq. : #v 6' àtroAsſipas
orâua és aidép' éAeë6epov čAëns,
ëageal &0ávaros 6eos #48poros, ob-
Kért 60mtés. Perhaps this is the
origin of the statement of Epipha-
nius (Erp., fid. 1807), according to
which Pythagoras called himself a
god.
* Euxitheus, ap. Athen, l.c.,
threatens those who commit sui-
cide: Stetraoréal row 0eów, &s eigh
Prevodow ém Toºrous, Éas &v čkºv
airois Aſſam, TAéoot kal wet ſociv
éutrea otivtat téte Aſſuats, and ac-
cording to Arist. Anal. Post. ii. 11,
94 b, 32, Pythagoras thought that
thunder frightened sinners in Tar-
tarus. For I agree with Ritter
(Gesch. d. Phil. i. 425) that if the
parallel passage, in Plato, Rep. x.
615 D. f. be duly considered, we
must suppose that the sinners, and
not the Titans, are here meant.
* Cf, Part II. a, 691, 3rd ed.
* Wide infra, vol. ii. Emped.
I I 2
484
THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
tarus, or is destined to fresh wanderings through human
or animal forms."
When, therefore, we meet with such
a representation of the doctrine, among recent writers,”
we have every reason to accept it” as true, without on
that account admitting all that they combine with it.”
The souls, we are told, after departing from the body,
float about in the air ; * and this no doubt is the foun-
dation of the opinion quoted above, that the solar
corpuscles are souls;” an opinion which must not be
* The Pythagoreans are said to
have denominated this return into
the body by the word Taxiſyyeveata.
Serv. Aen. iii. 68 ; Pythagoras non
persuſpáxoov sed traxty'yeveatau esse
dicit, h. e. redire [animam] post
teampus. Vgl. p. 474, 3.
* E. g. Alexander, who seems
here to reproduce the Pythagorean
ideas with less admixture than
usual, ap. Diog. viii. 31 : ékpiq6eto'av
8’ abrºv [thy ºvzhu] tº yīs TA4–
{e06a, 6aotav Tó ord pati (cf. Plato,
Phaedo, 81 C ; Iambl. V. P. 139,
148): Töv 6’ ‘Eppiv tapitav sival Tów
Juxāv kal 61& rooto troutraſov Aéyeo-
6al kal TrvXatov Kal x86vtov, Štreičítep
oiros eiotréutrel &Tö täºv orapid rov
t&s Juxās &tró Te yńs kal ék 9a)\dºt-
tns. Kal &yearðai Tàs uèv ka9ap&s
éri Tôv Špia rov, Tâs 6’ &ka9áptovs
Aft' ékeſvg trexégetv uſit’ &AAñAals,
6eforóat 6' év čášíktois Seguois im’
'Epivyčov. Porph. V. P. 19: Trpá-
Tov učv &0&varov elvaí qmail thv
ºvX}v, eita ueta}d^\ovoraw eis &AAa
'yevn Cºov. Porphyry, it is true,
adds: 8tt travra tº yivéueva èupuxa
ôuoyevſ, bei vouſſeiv. Plut. Plac.
v. 20, 4 (Galen. c. 35) interprets
this to mean that the souls of ani-
mals are indeed rational in them-
selves, but are incapable, on ac-
count of their bodies, of acting
rationally. Plut. Plac. 1.4; Galen.
c. 28; Theodoret, Cur. gr. aff, v.
123, represent only the rational
part of the soul as existing after
death; but these, like the asser-
tions of the equality of the spirit
in men and animals (Sext. M. ix.
127; wide sup. p. 417, 3) are sub-
sequent inferences. The myths
about the personal transmigration
of Pythagoras have been noticed,
p. 340, 1.
° Our exposition will likewise
refute what Gladisch says (Noack's
Jahrb. f. Spek. Philos. 1847, 692
sq.) to prove that Empedocles was
the first philosopher who taught
the doctrine of Metempsychosis.
* For instance, what is said
about the prohibition to kill and
eat animals (vide sup. p. 344, 3).
Only we must not, like Gladisch,
conclude that Pythagoras, there-
fore, could not have admitted the
transmigration of souls. Plato and
others admitted it, and yet ate
meat. Empedocles does not forbid
the eating of plants, although he
held that human souls passed into
plants.
* Alex. ap. Diog. l. c.
p. 484, 1; 487, 3.
* Ritte c(Gesch.d. Phil.i.442 R)
cites in regard to this the passage
Wide
TRANSMIGRATION OF SOULS. 485
regarded as a philosophic doctrine,' but simply as a
Pythagorean superstition.” The belief in subterranean
abodes of the departed was undoubtedly maintained by
the Pythagoreans.” What was their precise conception
of the future state, whether like Plato they supposed
that some of the souls underwent refining punishments in
Hades, and that a definite interval must elapse between
the departure from one body and the entrance into
another; whether they conceived the union of the soul
with the body as conditioned by choice, or by natural
affinity, or only by the will of God, tradition does not
say, and it is a question whether they had any fixed or
in Apuleius De Socr. c. 20: Aris-
totle says that the Pythagoreans
thought it strange for any one to
pretend he had never seen a daemon;
but it, seems to me that apparitions
of the dead in human form are
meant, which, according to Iambli-
chus, V. P. 139, 148, the Pytha-
goreans regarded as perfectly na-
tural.
* As Krische does (Forschungen,
&c. i. 83 sq.). He connects the
texts above quoted with the ideas
of the central fire and the world-
soul by this hypothesis: that, ac-
cording to the Pythagorean doc-
trine, the souls only of the gods
proceeded directly from the world-
soul or central fire, and the souls
of men from the sun, heated by the
central fire. I cannot accept this
combination, for I do not admit
that the world-soul was a conception
of the ancient Pythagoreans. What
is further added, that the souls
were precipitated from the sun
upon the earth, is not affirmed by
any of our witnesses.
* This Pythagorean theory has
great affinity with what Aristotle
(De An. i. 5, 410 b, 27) calls a
Aóryos év tols 'Oppikois Raxoupévois
êtreat : thu Pvxhv čk too &Aov eio té-
vat &varve&va ov, q'epopuévriv Štrö täv
&véuov. If the soul originally
floats in the air, and enters the
body of the newly-born with the
first breath, it escapes equally from
the body of the dying with the last;
and if it does not ascend to a supe-
rior abode, or sink to an inferior
place, it must float about in the
air until it enters another body.
This Qrphic conception itself seems
to be connected with an ancient
popular belief: the invocation in
use at Athens of the Tritopatores,
or gods of the wind, to make mar-
riages fruitful (Suid. Tpitot.; cf.
Lobeck. Aglaoph. 754), presup-
poses that the soul of the child
was brought by the wind, cf. p.
73, 2.
* According to AElian. V. H. .
iv. 17, Pythagoras derived earth-
quakes from the assemblies (Jüvo-
êot) of the dead.
486 THE PPTHAGOREANS.
complete theory at all on the subject. The doctrine
that each soul returned to earthly life under the same
circumstances as previously, once in each cosmical
period, is more distinctly ascribed to them."
Important as the belief in Transmigration un-
doubtedly was to the Pythagoreans,” it seems to have
had little connection with their philosophy. Later
writers seek the point of union in the thought that
souls, as the effluence of the world-soul, are of a divine
and therefore imperishable nature;” but this thought,
as before remarked, can hardly be considered as be-
longing to the ancient Pythagoreans, since in all the
accounts it is bound up with Stoical ideas and ex-
pressions, and neither Aristotle in his treatise on the
soul, nor Plato in the Phaedo, ever allude to it, though
they both had many opportunities for so doing.” Apart
from this theory it would be possible to conceive that
the soul might have been regarded as an imperishable
essence, because it was a number or harmony.” But
as the same holds good of all things generally, it would
involve no special prerogative of the soul above other
essences. If, on the other hand, the soul was in a more
precise manner conceived as the harmony of the body,
all that could be inferred from this is what Simmias
* Cf. p. 474 sq.
* Schleiermacher's notion(Gesch.
d. Phil. 58) that we ought not to
take this literally, but as an ethical
allegory of our affinity with the
animal kingdom, is contrary to all
historical testimony, including that
of Philolaus, Plato, and Aristotle.
* Wide supra, p. 475, 417 sq.
* As has been already shown in
regard to Aristotle. As to the
Phaedo, it is very unlikely that
Plato, who delighted in referring
to Orphic and Pythagorean tradi-
tions (vide p. 61 C, 62 B, 69 C, 70
C), would, in expressing a thought
so similar (79 B, 80 A), have en-
tirely abstained from all allusion
to the Pythagoreans if his doctrine
of immortality had been taken from
them. !
* Wide Supra, p. 477.
IMMORTALITY. DAEMONS, 487
infers in the Phaedo, that the soul must come to an end
with the body of which it is the harmony." It seems
very doubtful, therefore, whether the doctrine of immor-
tality and transmigration was scientifically connected
by the Pythagoreans with their theories of the essential
nature of the soul, or with their number-theory. The
ethical importance of this doctrine is undeniable. But
ethics, as we shall presently See, was equally neglected
by them, so far as any scientific treatment is concerned.
This dogma appears therefore to have been, not an ele-
ment of the Pythagorean philosophy, but a tradition of
the Pythagorean mysteries, originating probably from
more ancient orphic traditions,” and having no scientific
connection with the philosophic principle of the Pytha-
goreans.
The belief in daemons, to which the ancient Pytha-
goreans were much addicted,” must also be included
1. Cf. p. 477,2. Still less can we,
with Hermann (Gesch. d. Plato, i.
684, 616), find proof in Ovid. (Me-
tam. xv. 214 sq.), and in Plut. (De
ei, c. p. 18), that the Pythagoreans
based metempsychosis on the doc-
trine of the flux of all things, and
especially on the change of form
and substance of our bodies. Cf.
Susemihl, Genet. Entw. d. Plat.
Phil. i. 440
* Wide p. 67 sq.
* Already Philolaus, Fr. 18
(supra, p. 371, 2), seems to distin-
guish between daemons and gods. So
does Aristoxenus (ap. Stob. Floril.
79, 45), when he recommends that
we should honour our parents as
well as gods and daemons. The
Golden Poem (v. 1 sqq.) says in a
more definite manner that we
should honour the gods above all;
after them the heroes and the sub-
terranean daemons (katax66wlot
Baiuoves, manes). Later writers,
like Plutarch, De Is. 25, p. 360;
Placita, i. 8, combine the Pytha-
gorean doctrine with the doctrines
of Plato and Xenocrates, but on
this very account they cannot be
considered trustworthy as regards
Pythagoreanism. The testimony
of Alexander ap. Diog. xiii. 32,
touching daemons and their influ-
ence on men seems to come from a
more primitive source: elvaí te
trövta Töv &épa ) vxów épatrāeov"
Ical taútas Satuovás Te kal ipo-
as āvoud ſea 9at Kai útro Toºrov
tréputégéal &věpátrols toſs tº Öv-
etpous kai Tà a mueta v6orov re kal
5)ietas, kai oi Mävov &vöpétrols
488 THE PXTHAGOREA.N.S.
among their mystic doctrines. As far as we know on
the subject, they thought that daemons were bodiless
Souls which dwell, some of them under the earth, and
Some in the air, and which from time to time appear
to men ; but spirits of nature as well as the souls of
the dead seem to have been called by this name.” The
Pythagoreans derived revelations and soothsaying from
the daemons, and connected them with purifications
and expiations:* the high estimation in which they
held soothsaying is frequently attested.* To the class
of daemons belonged also the heroes,” but there appears
to have been nothing particular in the worship accorded
&AA& kal trpoğdrous kai toºs &AAots
kráveaſiv eſs re Tottovs yívea (al
toūs Te ka9apuous kal &motportag-
plots, pavrikāv Te Tao'av Kal KAffö0-
vas kal rà époua. Cf. AElian. iv. 17:
6 troAAdkus épºrtarrow rots &alu fixos
(IIv6ay. (paakev) pavi, Tāv kpelt-
Tövov. How far the famous
Platonic exposition, Symp. 202 E,
is of Pythagorean origin, cannot
be determined.
* Cf. preceding note and pas-
sages quoted, p. 483, 6.
* Cf. the assertion of Porphyry
V. P. 41 : Töv 5' etc XaAkoú kpovo-
Hévou fixov povhv eivaſ Tivos Tów
3alpióvov čvareikmuſiévnu rô XaXkó,
an ancient and fantastic notion
which reminds us of the opinion
of Thales on the soul of the mag-
net. -
* Aristoxenus ap. Stob. Ecl. i.
206: repl 8& Túxms tdö' épaakov:
eival uévrol kal 3alpióvtov uépos
airis, yewégéal yèp étrítvotáv twa
tapå rot, 3alpovíov Tów &v6pátov
évious étrº To BéAtlov h ét) to
xeipov. Brandis (i. 496), in oppo-
sition to Böckh, Philol. 185, thinks
that this higher influence is re-
ferred to by Philolaus ap. Arist.
(Eth. Eud. 6, ad fin.), eivat Twas
Aóyous kpeſtrous juáv. Alex. (l.c.)
attributes revelations and expia-
tions to the daemons and not to the
8aluóviov; but the exclusiveness of
this opinion seems to betray, the
stand-point of a later period, which
would not admit any direct inter-
course between gods and men. We
find besides in Alex. a perceptible
likeness to the text in the Sympo-
sium of Plato, 202 E.
* Wide supra, p. 349, 2. The
greater number add that Pytha-
goras refused to allow the interro-
gation of victims (in Galen. H. ph.
c. 30, p. 320, we should read ac-
cording to the text of the Plac. v.
1, 3, oùx éºykptvet instead of uðvov
to 60tucöv oik &vipel). But this
opinion rests entirely on the sup-
position that he forbade bloody
sacrifices, and in general the killing
of animals, which has no founda-
tion in history.
* Wide supra, p. 487, 3.
IETHICS. 489
to them." The opinion that daemons occupied an inter-
mediate place between gods and men” already existed in
the more ancient popular faith.
If we turn from the daemons to the gods, we find,
as has already been observed,” that the Pythagoreams, in
all probability, brought their theology into no scientific
connection with their philosophical principle. That
the conception of God as a religious idea was of the
highest significance to them, is indubitable ; meverthe-
less, apart from the untrustworthy statements of later
writers, of which we have before spoken, very little has
been handed down to us about their peculiar theological
tenets. Philolaus says that everything is enclosed in
the divinity as in a prison ; he is also said to have called
God the beginning of all things; and in a fragment
the authenticity of which is not certain, he describes him
in the manner of Xenophanes as the one, eternal, un-
changeable, unmoved, self-consistent ruler of all things."
From this it is evident that he had advanced beyond
the ordinary polytheism to that purer conception of
Deity, which we not unfrequently meet with among
philosophers and poets before his time. The story in
the Pythagorean legend,” that Pythagoras when he went
into Hades saw the souls of Homer and Hesiod under-
going severe torments for their sayings about the gods,
is to the same effect. We cannot, however, lay much
stress upon this, as the date of the story is unknown.
* At any rate what Diog. (viii. tie, supra, p. 338, 3.
33) says is the general Greek * Wide p. 387 sq.
opinion; vide Hermann, Gr. Ant. ii. * Supra, p. 402, 1. s
sect. 29 k. * Hieronymus ap. Diog. viii.
* Wide quotation from Aristo- 21, vide supra, p. 340, 2.
490 THE PV THAGOREANS,
Some other particulars are related of Pythagoras and
his school, which are still more uncertain, and the
evidence of which collectively proves nothing more
than we have already admitted, viz., that the Pytha-
goreans indeed purified and spiritualised the popular
belief, and strongly insisted on the Unity of the Divine,
but cannot be said to have consciously attempted to
arrive at any philosophic theory of God. This purifica-
tion, however, was not connected in their case, as in the
case of Xenophanes, with a polemic against the popular
religion; and though they may not have agreed with
everything that Homer and Hesiod said about the gods,
yet the popular religion as a whole formed the basis of
their own theory of the world and of life; in this
respect it is hardly necessary to refer particularly to
their worship of Apollo, their connection with the
Orphics, their predilection for religious symbolism,” and
their myths about the lower world. Consequently, their
theological opinions cannot, strictly speaking, be con-
sidered as part of their philosophy.
The religious belief of the Pythagoreans stood in
close connection with their moral prescripts. Human
life, they were convinced, was not only, like everything
| Such as the expression attri- tion of Pythagoras, e.g., in Plut.
buted to Pythagoras by Themist.
(Or. xv. 192, b) eikóva Tpos 9eby
eival &v0p6trovs, with which the so-
called Eurysus in the fragment ap.
Clem. Strom. v. 559 D, agrees; or
what we find in Stob. (Eel. ii. 66),
Iambl. (V. P. 137), Hierocles (In
Carm. Aur. Præf. p. 417 b, M), on
the destiny of man—to be as like
God as possible. The formula Éirov
66% is often quoted, without men-
De Aud. i. p. 37; Clem. Strom. ii.
39() D.
* Cf. the passages quoted, p.
421, 444, 4 ; 469, 2; also the state-
ment ap. Clem. Stron. v. 571 B;
IPorph. V. P. 41 (after Aristotle), ac-
cording to which the Pythagoreans
called the planets the dogs of Perse-
phone, the two Bears the hands of
Rhea, the Pleiades the lyre of the
Muses, the sea the tears of Cronos.
ETHICS. 491
else, in a general manner under the Divine care and
protection; but was also in a particular sense the road
which leads to the purification of the soul, from which no
one, therefore, has any right to depart of his own choice."
The essential problem of man’s life, consequently, is his
-moral purification and perfection; and if during his
earthly life, he is condemned to imperfect effort; if,
instead of wisdom, virtue
merely, or a struggle for
wisdom, is possible,” the only inference is that in this
struggle man cannot do without the support which the
relation to the Deity offers to him. The Pythagorean
ethical doctrine therefore has a thoroughly religious
character : to follow God and to become like Him is
its highest principle.” But it stands in no closer rela-
tion to their philosophy than their dogmatic doctrine
does. It is of the greatest moment in practical life,
|but its scientific development is confined to the most
elementary attempts. Almost the only thing we know
about it, in this respect, is the definition, already quoted,
of justice as a square number, or as āytutstrov6ós.” But
that is only an arbitrary application of the method,
which elsewhere prevailed in the Pythagorean school—
that of defining the essence
* Wide supra, p. 483, 1; 402, 2.
* So Philolaus, sup. p. 471, 2.
For the same reason, we are told,
IPythagoras repudiated the name of
Sage, and called himself instead
quxóa'ogos. Cie. Tusc. v. 3, 8;
j)iog. i. 12; viii. 8 (after Hera-
clides and Sosicrates); Iambl. 58,
159 ; Clemens, Strom. i. 300 C ;
cf. iv. 477 C; Valer. Max. viii. 7,
2; Plut. Plac. i. 3, 14; Ammon.
of a thing by an analogy
In Qu. v. Porph. 5, b.
* Wide sup. p. 490, 1. We find
the same idea (according to the
exact explanation given, ap. Phot.
p. 439 a., 8), in the saying ascribed
to Pythagoras, and quoted by Plut.
De SuperSt. c. 9, p. 169 ; Def. Orac.
c. 7, p. 413, that the best for us is
to get near to the gods.
* Wide sup. 420, 2.
492 THE PIV THAGO REAAWS,
of number; there is scarcely the most feeble germ of
any Scientific treatment of ethics. The author of the
Magna Moralia says that Pythagoras attempted in-
deed a theory of virtue, but in so doing, did not arrive
at the proper nature of ethical activity.' We must go
farther and say that the stand-point of Pythagoreism
in general was not that of scientific ethics. Nor can
we argue much from the proposition * that Virtue con-
sists in Harmony, for the same definition was applied
by the Pythagoreans to all possible subjects; besides,
the date of the proposition is quite uncertain.” Whether
the moral tendency of the myths about the vessel of the
Damaids, which we find in Plato, is really derived from
Philolaus or any other Pythagorean is doubtful,” and if
it is, no conclusion can be drawn from it. From all
that tradition tells us, it is evident that ethics with the
Bythagoreans, as with the other Pre-Socratic philoso-
phers, never advanced beyond popular reflection; in
regard to any more developed ethical conceptions, they
are only to be found in the untrustworthy statements of
more recent authors,” and in the fragments of writings
* M. Mor. i. 1. 1182 a, 11: 6eóv. Similarly in Iambl. 69, 229,
arpátos pév of v čvexeſpnoe IIv6ayópas
arepi àpetàs eitreºv, oùk épôós 6é.
T&s yöp &perås eis toys &piðuous
&váryov ošic oiketav Tóv àpetóv Tiju
9ewpfav Étoietro of , ºváp éotiv #
5ucatoróvn àpiðubs iodicts toos. The
statement that Pythagoras was the
first to speak of virtue seems to
have arisen from the passage
quoted, p. 420, 2, from Metaph,
xiii. 4.
* Alexander, ap. Diog. viii. 33:
Tāv t” &perºv špplovíav sival kal rhy
$yielav kal to &Yabby &may kal toy
Pythagoras demands that there
should be friendship between the
soul and the body, between reason
and sense, etc.
* For the evidence, as we have
shown, is untrustworthy, and the
silence of Aristotle on the subject,
though it is not decisive, makes it
all the more doubtful.
* Sup. p. 482, 2.
* Among these we must reckon
the assertion of Heracleides of
Pontus (ap. Clem. Strom. ii. 417,
A), that #º defined hap-
JETHICS. 498
which partly by their empty diffusiveness, and partly by
their large use of later theories and expressions, betray
their date too clearly to be worth noticing in this place.”
Of the remaining authorities on the ethics of the
Pythagoreans, the statements of Aristoxenus merit the
greatest attention. Though he may perhaps describe
the principles of the school in his own forms of expres-
sion, and probably not without some admixture of his
own thoughts, yet on the whole the picture which we
get from him is one which agrees with historical prob-
ability, and with the statements of others. The Pytha-
goreans, according to Aristoxenus, required before all
things adoration of the gods and of daemons, and in
the second place reverence to parents and to the laws
of one's country, which ought not to be lightly ex-
changed for foreign laws.” They regarded lawlessness
as the greatest evil; for without authority they believed
the human race could not subsist. Rulers and the
ruled should be united together by love; every citizen
should have his special place assigned to him in the
whole; boys and youths are to be educated for the state,
adults and old men are to be active in its service.3
Loyalty, fidelity, and long-suffering in friendship,
subordination of the young to the old, gratitude to
parents and benefactors are strictly enjoined.* There
piness as éirio Thun täs reaetórntos
Töv šperóv (al. &ptôuðv) Tâs ºvXàs.
Heyder ( Eth. Pyth. Vindic. p. 17)
should not, therefore, have appealed
to this text.
* Wide Part III. b, 123 sqq., se-
cond edition.
* Ap. Stob. Floril. 79, 45.
Similarly the Golden Poem, v. 1
sq.; Porph. V. P. 38; Diog. viii.
23; these latter, no doubt, after
Aristoxenus.
* Ap. Stob. Floril. 43, 49.
* Iambl. V. P. 101 sqq. No
doubt, after Aristotle, for these
prescripts are repeatedly called
Trv6ayopikal &topdorets.
494 THE PYTHAGOREANS,
must be a moderate number of children, but excess in
sensual indulgence, and without marriage, is to be
avoided. He who possesses true love for the beautiful
will not devote himself to outward show, but to moral
activity and science; * conversely, science can only
succeed when it is pursued with love and desire.” In
many things man is dependent on Fortune, but in
many he is himself the lord of his fate.” In the same
spirit are the moral prescripts of the Golden Poem.
Reverence towards the gods and to parents, loyalty to
friends, justice and gentleness to all men, temperance,
self-command, discretion, purity of life, resignation to
fate, regular self-examination, prayer, observance of
consecrating rites, abstinence from impure food, such
are the duties for the performance of which the
Pythagorean book of precepts promises a happy lot
after death. These, and similar virtues, Pythagoras is
said to have enforced, in those parabolic maxims, of
which so many specimens are given us,” but the origin
of which is in individual instances as obscure as their
meaning. He taught, as we are elsewhere informed,”
1 Ap. Stob. Floril. 43, 49, 101,
4, M; cf. the Pythagorean word
quoted, ap. Arist. (OEcon, i. 4 sub
init.), and the statement that Py-
thagoras persuaded the Crotoniats
to send away their concubines.
Iamb. 132.
2 Stob. Floril. 5, 70.
8 Aristox. in the extracts from
Joh. Damasc. ii. 13, 119 (Stob.
Floril. Ed. Mein. iv. 206).
4 Stob. Eel. ii. 206 Sqq.
5 Wide Diog. viii. 17 sq.; Porph.
V. P. 42 : Iambl. 105; Athen. x.
452 D ; Plut. De Educ, Puer, 17,
*jº
p. 12; Qu. Conv. viii. 7, 1, 3, 4, 5;
and supra, p. 340, 4.
• Diog. viii. 23; Porph. V. P.
38 sq. These two texts, by their
agreement, point to a common
source, perhaps Aristoxenus, Diod.
Eac. p. 555 Wess. In the same
passage, Diog. 22 brings forward
the prohibition of the oath, of
bloody sacrifices; but this is cer-
tainly a later addition. As to the
oath, Diodorus, l.c., seems the more
accurate. What Diog. says (viii.
9), following supposed writings of
Pythagoras, as to the time of con-
ETHICS. 495
reverence to parents and the aged, respect for the laws,
faithfulness and disinterestedness in friendship, friendli-
ness to all, moderation and decorum ; commanded that
the gods should be approached in pure garments and
with a pure mind; that men should seldom swear, and
never break their oaths, keep what is entrusted to
them, avoid wanton desire, and not injure useful plants
and animals. The long moral declamations which
Iamblichus puts into his mouth, in many passages of
his work,' for the most part carry out these thoughts:
they are exhortations to piety, to the maintenance of
right, morals and law, to moderation, to simplicity, to
love of country, to respect to parents, to faithfulness in
friendship and marriage, to a harmonious life, full of
moral earnestness. Many more details of this kind
might be added;” in almost every instance, however, the
evidence is too uncertain to allow of any dependence
upon it.
jugal intercourse, appears Scarcely
worthy of credit. The statement
of Diog. 21 is more likely to have
belonged to the ancient Pythago–
I'ê3,IlS.
* In great part following an-
cient writers, cf. with Iambl. 37–
57; Porph. 18; Justin. Hist. xx.
4; and Supra, p. 344, 4.
* E. g. the famous kotua Tö. Töv
‘ptxov (supra, p. 345, 2); the saying
that man should be one, ap. Clem.
Strom. iv. 535 C ; cf. Proclus in
Alcib. iii. 72; Conv. in Parm. iv.
78, 112 (the end of life is, accord-
ing to the Pythagoreans, the évôtms
and pixta); the exhortation to
truthfulness, ap. Stob. Floril. 11,
25, 13, 21 ; the saying as to the
evils of ignorance, intemperance,
But, according to the unanimous testimony
and discord, which Porph. 22,
Iambl. 34 (cf. 171) attributes to
Pythagoras, and which Hieron (c.
Ruf, iii. 39, vol. ii. 565, Wall.) at-
tributes to Archippus and to Lysis;
the apophthegms of Theano on
the duty and position of women;
ap. Stob. Floril. 74, 32, 53, 55;
Iambl. V. P. 55, 132; Clemens,
Strom. iv. 522 D; the utterance of
Clinias, ap. Plut. Qu. Conv. iii. 6,
3; the comparison attributed to
Archytas of the judge and the
altar, ap. Arist Rhet. iii. 11, 1412
a, 12; the sentences given by Plut.
De Audiendo, 13, p. 44; De Easil.
c. 8, p. 602; De Frat. Am. 17 p.
488; Ps. Plut. De Vita Hom.
151,
496 THE PPTHAGOREANS,
of our authorities, and to what has already been said
on the political character of the Pythagorean associa-
tion, we may consider it proved that the school of
Pythagoras, believing in the almighty power of the
gods, and in future retribution, enforced purity of life,
moderation and justice, minute self-examination and
discretion in all actions, and especially discouraged
self-conceit; that it also required unconditional ob-
servance of moral order in the family, in the state, in
friendship, and in general intercourse. Important,
however, as is the place it thereby occupies in the
history of Greek culture, and in that of mankind, yet
the scientific value of these doctrines is altogether
inferior to their practical significance.
VI. RETROSPECTIVE SUMMARY.
CHARACTER, ORIGIN, AND ANTIQUITY OF THE
PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY,
WHAT has been remarked at the close of the last
section, and previously at the beginning of this exposi-
tion, on the difference between the Pythagorean life
and the Pythagorean philosophy, will be confirmed if
we take a general survey of the doctrines of the school.
The Pythagorean association, with its rule of life, its
code of morals, its rites of consecration, and its political
endeavours, doubtless had its origin in ethico-religious-
motives. It has been previously shown (p. 149 sq.) that,
among the gnomic poets of the sixth century, complaints
of the wretchedness of life and the vices of mankind,
on the one hand; and on the other, the demand for
CHARACTER OF PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 497
order and measure in moral and civil life, were more
prominent than with their predecessors; and we recog-
mised in this a deepening of the moral consciousness,
which naturally went hand in hand with the contemporary
revolution in political conditions, and in the intellectual
life of the Greeks. The transformation and spread of
the Orphico-Bacchic mysteries point the same way; for
they at the same period undoubtedly gained much in
religious content and historical importance." To the
same causes in all probability Pythagoreanism owed its
rise. The lively sense of the sorrows and short-comings
inseparable from human existence, in conjunction with
an earnest moral purpose, seems to have begotten in
Pythagoras the idea of an association which should lead
its members by means of religious rites, moral pre-
scripts, and certain special customs, to purity of life
and respect for all moral ordinances. It is, therefore,
quite legitimate to derive Pythagoreanism in its larger
sense—the Pythagorean association and the Pythagorean
life—from the moral interest. But it does not follow
that the Pythagorean philosophy had also a predomi-
\mantly ethical character.” The Ionie naturalistic phi-
losophy sprang, as we have seen, from the Ionic cities
with their agitated political life, and from the circle of
the so-called seven sages. In the same way the Pytha-
gorean association may have had in the beginning a
moral and religious end, and yet may have given birth
to a physical theory, since the object of scientific en-
quiry was at that time the nature of the physical world,
* Wide Sup. p. 61 sq. * As some modern writers have
thought, sup. p. 184, 1.
WOL. I. K K
498 THE PRTHAGOREANS.
and not Ethics. That such was the case must be con-
ceded even by those who regard Pythagoreanism as an
essentially ethical system;" and the passage quoted
above from the Magna Moralia, which, moreover, is far
from having the weight of a genuine testimony of
Aristotle, cannot overthrow this assertion.” The object
of Pythagorean science was, according to all our pre-
vious observations, identical with that of the other
pre-Socratic systems—namely, natural phenomena and”
their causes; Ethics was treated by it only in a
guite isolated and superficial manner.” Against this
no argument can be drawn from the undoubtedly
i Ritter, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 191.
“It is true that the Pythagorean
philosophy is also chiefly occupied
with the reasons of the world and
the physical phenomena of the
universe,' etc. The same author,
p. 450, says: “Those parts of morals
which they (the Pythagoreans) de-
veloped scientifically, seem to have
|been of little importance.' Bran-
dis, i.493: ‘Although the tendency
towards ethics of the Pythago-
reans must be regarded as essen-
tially characteristic of their aims
and efforts, we find only a few iso-
lated fragments of a Pythagorean
doctrine of morality; and these are
not even of such a nature that we
might suppose them to be the re-
mains of a more comprehensive sys-
tem of doctrine now lost to us,” etc.
2 Cf. p. 491, 2. What Brandis
says in Fichte's Zeitschrift, xiii. 132,
in favour of the statement in the
Magna Moralia cannot outweigh
the known spuriousness of this
work, and the fact that Aristotle
nowhere mentions the personal
doctrine of Pythagoras (though he
may sometimes refer some Pytha-
gorean customs to him). This text,
in fact, does not tell us anything
that we have not learned from
other sources.
* This has been already shown,
p. 490 sqq. When, therefore, Hey-
der (Ethic. Pythag. Vindic. p. 10
sq.) appeals in favour of the oppo-
site opinion to Arist. Ethic. N. i. 4;
ii. 5 (vide supra, p. 380, 1, 2), he
attributes far too much importance
to the expression, ovatouxta rôv
ãºyabâv. Aristotle designates by
these words the first of the two
series of ten numbers, the oppo-
sition of which arranged in pairs
constitutes the Pythagorean table
of contraries (the Limited, the
Odd, etc.). But it does not follow
from this that the Pythagoreans
themselves made use of this desig-
nation, or that they understood the
&yaôów and kaków in the ethical
sense, and not in the physical sense
as well. Still less does it follow (as
Heyder says l. c. and p. 18), that
they invented a table of goods and
set up a scientific principle for
ethics, something like that of
|Plato.
CHARACTER OF PETHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY, 499
ethical tendency' of the Pythagorean life, nor from
the great number of Pythagorean moral maxims; for
the question is not how the Pythagoreans lived, and
what they thought right, but whether, and how far, they
sought to understand and to account for moral activities
scientifically.” The conclusion that Pythagoras, in order
to make life moral, must also have given account to
himself of the nature of morality,” is in the highest
degree uncertain ; it does not at all follow from his
practical course of action that he reflected in a scientific
manner upon the general nature of morality, and did
not, like other reformers and law-givers, content himself
with the determination of special and immediate pro-
blems. For the same reason the mythical doctrine of
transmigration, and the theory of life dependent upon
it, cannot here be considered ; these are not scientific
propositions, but religious dogmas, which moreover
were not confined to the Pythagorean school. So far
as the Pythagorean philosophy is concerned, I can only
assent to the judgment of Aristotle,“ that it was entirely
devoted to the investigation of nature. It may be
objected that this was not pursued in a physical manner;
1 On which Schleiermacher re-
lies, Gesch. der Phil. 51 sq.
? Otherwise we must also
reckon, among the representatives
of moral philosophy, Heracleitus
and Democritus, because of the
moral sentences which they have
transmitted to us; and Parmenides
and Zeno, because their manner of
life was like that of the Pythago-
reans; not to speak of Empedocles.
* Brandis, Fichte's Zeitschr. f.
Phil. xiii. 131 sq.
* Metaph. i. 8,989 b, 33: 6ta-
AéYoural uévrot ſcal trpayuarečoviral
Tepl bºoea’s Trávra. Yevvært re yap
top of pavöv kal repl rà rotºrov uépm
kai tā Tá0m kal rà épya Starmpotia.
to ovuòaïvov, kal r&s àpx&s kal r&
attia eis raira katavaxtokovoriv, &s
Ö90Aoyoovtes, etc. (supra, p. 189, 3).
Metaph. xiv. 3, 1091 a, 18: étreſ3}
Koguoroiodori Kal pugikós BoöAovrat
Aéyetv, Šikatov abrovs ééetáſelv ri
Tepl biºgeos ék 5& Tijs vov & pelva,
weóðov. Cf. Part. Anim. i. 1;
Supra, p. 185, 3.
* ~) t (~
}
*
K K 2
500 THE PYTHAGOREANS,
that the object of the Pythagoreans was to enquire how
law and harmony, morally determined by the concepts
of good and evil, lie in the principles of the universe:
that all appeared to them in an ethical light, that the
whole harmony of the world was regulated according to
moral concepts, and that the entire order of the uni-
verse is to them a development of the first principle
into virtue and wisdom." In reply to this view of
Pythagoreanism, much may be said. In itself such a
relation of thought to its object is scarcely conceivable.
Where scientific enquiry proceeds so exclusively from
an ethical interest, as it is supposed to have done in
the case of the Pythagoreans, it must also, as it would
seem, have applied itself to ethical questions, and
produced an independent system of ethics, instead of
an arithmetical metaphysic, and cosmology. But this
hypothesis also contradicts historical fact. Far from
having founded their study of nature on moral con-
siderations, they rather reduced the moral element to
mathematical and metaphysical concepts, which they
originally obtained from their observation of nature—
resolving virtues into numbers, and the opposition of
good and evil” into that of the limited and unlimited.
This is not to treat physics ethically, but ethics
physically. Schleiermacher, indeed, would have us
regard their mathematics as the technical part of their
ethics. He thinks that all virtues and all ethical
relations were expressed by particular numbers; he sees
Ritter, l. c. 191, 454, and numbers should be understood
similarly Heyder, Ethic. Py- symbolically.
thag. Vindic. p. 7 sq.; 13, 31 sq., * As Ritter substantially con-
who thinks that the Pythagorean cedes, Pyth. Phil. 132 sq.
CHARACTER OF PPTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 501
an evidently ethical tendency underlying the table of
opposites." But as these assertions are devoid of all
foundation, it is unnecessary to refute them ; how
arbitrary they are, must have already appeared from
our previous exposition. Ritter observes,” more correctly,
that the mathematics of the Pythagoreans were con-
nected with their ethics by the general idea of order,
which is expressed in the concept of harmony. The
only question is whether this order was apprehended in
their philosophical system as a moral or a natural order.
The answer cannot be doubtful when we reflect that,
so far as scientific determinations are concerned, the
Pythagoreans sought this order anywhere rather than in
the actions of men. For it finds its first and most
immediate expression in tones, next in the universe ;
while, on the other hand, no attempt is made to arrange
moral activities according to harmonical proportions.
Ip cannot, therefore, be said that the Pythagoreans
founded physics and ethics upon a common higher prin-
ciple (that of harmony),” for they do not treat this
principle as equally physical and ethical: it is the in-
terpretation of nature to which it is primarily applied,
and for the sake of which it is required ; it is only
applied to moral life in an accessory manner, and to a
far more limited extent.* Number and harmony have
here an essentially physical import, and when it is said
! Ibid. p. 51, 55, 59. wārisque superius, quod &amen ſloºt
* Gesch. d. Phil. i. 455. appellarint nisi nomine a rebus
* Heyder, l.c. p. 12 sqq. physicis repetito. Why should they
* Heyder himself indirectly have chosen a merely physical de-
confesses this when he says, p. 14: signation, if they had equally in
Et physica et ethica ad principium view the moral element?
eos revocassé utrisqué commune et
502 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
&
that all is number and harmony, the meaning is not
that the order of nature is grounded upon a higher
moral order, it simply expresses the nature of the
physical world itself. Although, therefore, I willingly
admit that the Pythagoreans would not perhaps have
arrived at these definitions if the ethical tendency of
the Pythagorean association had not quickened their
sense of measure and harmony, yet I cannot on that
account regard their science itself as ethical : I must
consider it in its essential content as purely a system of
physics.
Nor can I allow that the Pythagorean philosophy
originally sprang from the problem of the conditions of
knowledge, and not from enquiries concerning the
nature of things: that numbers were regarded by the
Pythagoreans as the principle of all Being, not because
they thought they perceived in numerical proportions
the permanent ground of phenomena, but because,
without number, nothing seemed to them cognisable:
and, because according to the celebrated principle, “like
is known by like, the ground of cognition must also be
the ground of reality.” Philolaus, it is true, urges in
* We must not, however, over- Metaph. p. 79 sq.). This assertion
look the fact that other philosophers
who were famous for their Pytha-
gorean manner of life, as Parme-
nides and Empedocles, as well as
Heracleitus, whose ethics are very
similar to those of Pythagoras,
arrived at perfectly different philo-
sophic conclusions.
2 Brandis Rhein. Mus. ii. 215
sqq.; Gr.-röm. Phil. i. 420 sq., 445;
Fichte's Zeitschr. f. Phil. xiii. 134
sqq.; Gesch. d. Entw. i. 164 sq. (cf.
IReinhold, Beitrag 2. Erl, d. pyth.
is connected with the theory of
which we have just spoken (viz.
that Pythagoreanism was chiefly
ethical in character), by the follow-
ing remark (Zeitschr. f. Phil. 135).
Since the Pythagoreans found the
principle of things in themselves,
and not outside themselves, they
were led to direct their attention
all the more to the purely internal
side of moral activity; or con-
versely. Here, however, strictly
speaking, Brandismakes the general
CHARACTER OF PETHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 503
proof of his theory of numbers, that without number
no knowledge would be possible, that number admits
of no untruth and alone determines and makes cog-
misable the relations of things." But he has also pre-
viously shown,” quite in an objective manner, that
everything must be either limited or unlimited, or
both together, and it is only to prove the necessity of
the limit that he brings forward this fact among others,
that without limit riothing would be knowable. Aris-
totle says” that the Pythagoreans regarded the elements
of numbers as the elements of all things, because they
thought they had discovered a radical similarity between
numbers and things. This observation, however, indi-
cates that their theory started from the problem of the
essence of things, rather than that of the conditions of
knowledge. But the two questions were in fact not
separated in ancient times; it is the distinctive pecu-
liarity of the Pre-Socratic dogmatism that thought
directs itself to the cognition of the real, without in-
vestigating its own relation to the object, or the subjec-
tive forms and conditions of knowledge. Consequently
no distinction is drawn between the grounds of know-
ledge and the grounds of reality; the nature of things
is sought simply in that which is most prominent to
the philosopher in his contemplation of them ; in that
which he cannot separate from them in his thought. The
Pythagoreans in this procedure resemble other Schools,
idea of an internal or idealistic * Fr. 2, 4, 18, Supra, p. 371, 2;
tendency the starting-point of 372, 1.
Pythagoreanism, and not the pre- * Fr. i. supra, p. 379, 1.
cise question of the truth of our * Metaph. i. 5, Supra, p. 369, 1.
knowledge.
504 THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
for example, the Eleatics, whose objective starting-
point Brandis contrasts with the so-called subjective
starting-point of the Pythagoreans. Philolaus says that
all must be number to be cognisable. In the same
way, Parmenides says that only Being exists, for Being
alone is the object of speech and cognition." We can-
not conclude from this that the Eleatics first arrived
at their metaphysic through their theory of know-
ledge; nor is the conclusion admissible in the case of
the Pythagoreans. It eould only be so, if they had
investigated the nature of the faculty of cognition as
such, apart from that of the object of cognition; if
they had based their number-theory upon a theory of
the faculty of knowing. Of this, however, there is no
trace; * for the incidental remark of Philolaus, that
the sensuous perception is only possible by means of
the body,” even if genuine, cannot be regarded as a
fragment of a theory of knowledge, and what later
writers have related as Pythagorean," on the distinc-
tion between reason, Science, opinion, and sensation,
is as untrustworthy as the statement of Sextus,” that

1 W. 39 :—
oëre yāp &v yvoims ré ye u% éov (oi,
7&p équicrów),
oùre ſppda'ats. To Yap airò voeſy to-
riv Te Kal gival.
* Brandis also concedes this,
Zeitschr. f. Phil. xiii. 135, when
he says that the Pythagoreans did
not start from the definite question
of the conditions of knowledge.
Only he has no right to add that
they found the principle of things
in themselves, and not outside
themselves. They found it in
numbers which they sought as
well within themselves as without :
numbers were for them the essence
of things in general.
* Supra, p. 483, 1.
* Supra, p. 479, 3.
* Math. vii. 92 : of 3& IIv0ayo-
puncil Tov A6)ov uév parly ſkpurhplov
eival], oi koués àé, rov & &rö rów
padmuárov trepiyivéuevov, kaflātep
ëAeye ical pixóAaos, beapmºruków Te
ëvta rās rôv ŠAøv påorews éxew
rivă ovyyávelav Trpès Taºrmw. It is
evident that the criterion here is
added by the writer, and that
the whole is taken from the propo-
CHARACTER OF PPTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 505
the Pythagoreans declared mathematical reason to be
the criterion. Had the Pythagorean philosophy started
from the question—What is the unconditionally cer-
tain element in our ideas º instead of the other ques-
tion, What is the permanent and essential element
in things, the cause of their being, and of their quali-
ties?—the whole system, as Ritter observes," would
have had a dialectic character, or at any rate would
have been constructed on some basis involving method-
ology and a theory of knowledge. Instead of this,
Aristotle expressly assures us that the Pythagoreans
restricted their enquiry entirely to cosmological ques-
tions; ” that dialectic and the art of determining the
concept were unknown to them as to all the pre-
Socratics—only some slight attempts in that direction
having been made by them in their numerical ana-
logies.* All that we know of their doctrine can only
serve to confirm this judgment. The Neo-Pytha-
gorean school adopted and elaborated" after their
4, 1078 b, 17 sqq.; Socrates was
the first to define concepts: tów
wév y&p purikóv Čiri Pukpov Amuá-
sitions of Philolaus (quoted above)
on number, as the condition of
knowledge.
* Pyth. Phil. 135 sq.
* Supra, p. 499, 2.
* Metaph. i. 5, 987 a, 20: repl
too ri éo riv #pèavro uév Aéºyeuv kal
ôpigeo-0ai, Atav 6 &txàs étrpayua-
regómoav. čpígovré ré y&p émitro-
Aatos, kal & trpátº Širépéelev 6
Aex9sis àpos, root’ eival thv oùoríav
Too trpáyuatos évépuſov. Ibid. c.
6, 987 b, 32. The difference be-
tween the theory of ideas and the
Pythagorean theory of numbers
results from Plato's occupation with
logical enquiries: of y&p trpárepot
Blakektukſis ov Petetxou, Ibid. xiii.
kpitos #paro piévov . . . oi 8& IIv6a-
'yópelot trpórepov rept twov čAfyov,
&v robs A&yous eis Tobs &piðuous
&vämtov, oiov tí Čori kalpös # ro
6tratov h yduos. It is from this
passage no doubt that the state-
ment of Favorin. is taken, ap. Diog.
viii. 48. [IIv6ayópavl 8pois Xph-
oraoréat 81& ràs piaffnuatukis iſans,
&n tračov 5* >wkpármv. In the
texts, De Part. An. i. 1 (supra, 185,
3), and Phys. ii. 4, 194 a, 20, the
Pythagoreans are not once men-
tioned with Democritus.
* Cf. Part III. b, lll, 2nd ed.
506 THE PYTHIAGOREA.N.S.
manner, among other later doctrines, the Stoico-
Peripatetic logic and the Platonic theory of know-
ledge; but no one will now believe in the authenticity
of writings which put into the mouths of Archytas
and other ancient Pythagoreans theories which are
manifestly derived from Plato, Aristotle or Chrysippus."
What we certainly know of Philolaus and Archytas
gives us no right to suppose that the Pythagoreans
were in advance of the other pre-Socratic philosophers
- in logical practice and the development of the scientific
method.”
And there certainly is not any reason for
attributing the commencement of linguistic enquiries
to Pythagoras.”
1 Röth (ii. a, 593 sq.; 905 sq.;
b, 145 sq.), however, takes the
pseudo-Pythagorean fragments and
the assertions of Iamblichus, V. P.
158, 161, for authentic evidence.
* Philolaus in his discussion of
the Limiting and Unlimited (supra,
p. 379, 1) makes use of a disjunctive
process of reasoning; but this is
no sign of a post-Platonic origin
(as Röthenbücher, Syst. d. Pyth.
68, believes); nor is it even re-
markable in a philosopher of that.
epoch. We find Parmenides em-
ploying the same mode of reason-
ing (v. 62 sqq.), and the demon-
strations of Zeno are much more
artificial than those of Philolaus
above mentioned. In the latter, it
is true the disjunctive major pro-
position is first announced. Then
of the three cases which the author
puts as being possible, two are
excluded. But this detail is of
little importance, and it has a
sufficient parallel in the manner
in which Diogenes (vide Supra, p.
286, 2) at this same epoch first
If, therefore, Aristotle describes the
determines generally the qualities
of the First Being, and then proves
that these qualities belong to the
air. Aristotle (vide sup. p. 480, 2)
quotes from Archytas a few defini-
tions, adding that these definitions
have respect to the matter as well
as the form of the objects in ques-
tion. But in this he is not bring-
ing forward a principle of Archytas,
but making a remark of his own.
Porph. is only reiterating this re-
mark when he says (In Ptol. Harm.
196): The definitions of the con-
cept characterise its object, partly
in form, partly in matter: of 6&
karð to avvauqétepov, oùs uáAtata
6 Apyūras &trečexero. But inde-
pendently of this remark the de-
finitions of Archytas prove very
little.
* Pythagoras, it is said, con-
sidered the wisest man to be he who
first gave their names to things (Cic.
Thisc. i. 25, 62; Iambl. V. P. 56,
82; Procl. in Crat. c. 16; AElian,
V. H. iv. 17; Eac. e scr. Theod. c.
32, at the end of Clemens Al. p. 805,
CHARACTER OF PPTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 507
Pythagoreans as neither dialectical nor ethical philoso-
phers, but purely and simply as Physicists,' we can but
agree in the statement, and approve of the later writers
who have followed him in this particular.”
Accordingly our conception of the origin of the
Pythagorean system must be as follows. From the
spiritual life of the Pythagorean Society arose the
endeavour for an independent pursuit of the enquiry
concerning the causes of things, which had already
been stimulated from another side: this enquiry was
primarily directed by the Pythagoreans to the expla-
nation of nature, and only secondarily to the establish-
ment of moral activity; but as it seemed to them that
law and order were the highest element in human life,
so in mature it was the order and regular course of
phenomena, especially as displayed in the heavenly
bodies, and in the relation of tones which arrested
their attention. They thought they perceived the
ground of all regularity and order in the harmonical
relations of numbers, the scientific investigation of
which was inaugurated by them, but which were
already invested with great power and significance in
the popular belief of the Greeks. Thus by a natural
D, Sylb.). But even were this state-
ment true, we could not infer from
it (as Röth does, ii. a, 592) the ex-
istence of specific enquiries into
language among the Pythagoreans.
The assertion of Simplicius (Categ.
Schol. in Arist. 43 b, 30) that the
Pythagoreans regarded names as
arising pào'ei and not 6éoet, and
recognised for each thing but one
name belonging to it by virtue of
its nature, cannot be considered as
a tradition concerning the ancient
Pythagoreans. It refers, no doubt,
to the categories falsely attributed
to Archytas.
* Metaph. i. 8, wide Supra, p.
189, 3.
* Sext. Math. x. 248, 284;
Themist. Or. xxvi. 317 B; Hip-
polyt. Refut. i. 2, p. 8 ; Eus. Praep.
Ev. xiv. 15, 9; Phot. Cod. 249,
p. 439 a, 33 ; Galen, Hist. Phil.
sub init.
508 THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
sequence of thought they arrived at the theory that all
things, according to their essence, are number and
harmony." This presupposition was then applied by
them to other adjacent spheres; they expressed the
nature of certain phenomena by numbers, and classified
whole series of phenomena according to numbers, and
so there gradually resulted the totality of doctrines,
which we call the Pythagorean system.
This system is therefore, as it stands, the work of
various men and various periods; its authors did not
consciously attempt from the beginning to gain a
whole of scientific propositions mutually supporting
and explaining one another, but as each philosopher
was led by his observation, his calculations, or his
imagination, so the fundamental conceptions of the
Pythagorean theory of the universe were developed,
sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another.
The traces of such an origin are not entirely obliterated
even in our imperfect traditions of the doctrine of the
Pythagoreans. That their principle was apprehended
* Cf. p. 376. Brandis (Gesch.
d. Entw. d, gr. Phil. i. 165) here
makes an objection which I cannot
endorse. ‘The remark,’ he says,
‘that all phenomena are regulated
according to certain numerical re-
lations, presupposes observations
quite foreign to that epoch.” Long
before Pythagoras, it was known
that the revolutions of the sun,
moon, and planets, the succession
of day and night, the seasons, &c.,
take place according to fixed times,
and that they regularly recur after
the lapse of intervals of time
marked by the same number.
Certainly human life was divided
into several ages before Pythagoras.
The Pythagoreans themselves mea-
sured the numerical relations of
tones; and at any rate in the num-
ber of tones and chords, a definite
standard must have been given to
them. It is impossible, moreover,
that they should not have had in
their possession other proofs that
all order is based on measure and
number. Philolaus says so ex-
plicitly, and it is on this ob-
servation that Aristotle founds
the Pythagorean theory of num-
bers (cf. pp. 369, 1; 370, 1; 376
sq.).
CHARACTER OF PYTHIAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 509
in many different ways in the school we cannot indeed
admit ; but the development of it was certainly not
from the same type. The table of the ten oppo-
sites belonged, according to Aristotle, only to some,
who were, it would seem, later Pythagoreans. The
geometric construction of the elements, and the dis-
crimination of four organs and of four vital functions in
man, were introduced by Philolaus; the doctrine of the
ten moving heavenly bodies seems to have been less
ancient than the poetical conception of the spheral
harmony; as to the relation of particular numbers to
concrete phenomena, little agreement is to be found.
So far therefore the question might suggest itself,
whether the Pythagorean system can rightly be spoken
of as a scientific and historical whole, and if this be
conceded on account of the unity of the leading
thoughts, and the recognised inter-connection of the
school, there would still remain the doubt whether the
system originates with the founder of the Pythagorean
association; and therefore, whether the Pythagorean
philosophy is to be classed with the ancient Ionian
physical philosophies, or with later systems." This
doubt, however, must not carry us too far. Our his-
torical authorities indeed allow us to pronounce no de-
finite judgment as to how much of the Pythagorean doc-
trine belonged to Pythagoras himself. Aristotle always
ascribes its authorship to the Pythagoreans, never
to Pythagoras, whose name is not mentioned by him at
* It is for this reason that tem, and that Strümpell (vide sup.
Brandis, for example (i. 421), only p. 209, 1) sees in Pythagoreanism
speaks of Pythagoreanism after an attempt to reconcile Heracleitus
having spoken of the Eleatic sys- with the Eleatics,
510 THE PYTHIA G O REANS.
all except in a very few places." Later writers” are
untrustworthy in proportion as they pretend to a know-
ledge of Pythagoras; and the scanty utterances of
earlier writers are too indefinite to instruct us as to the
share taken by Pythagoras in the philosophy of his
school. Xenophanes alludes to his assertions on trans-
migration as a singularity; * but this belief, of which
Pythagoras can scarcely have been the author, furnishes
no argument as to his philosophy. Heracleitus men-
tions him “ as a man who laboured beyond all others to
amass knowledge,” and who by his evil arts, as he calls
them, gained the reputation of wisdom ; but whether
this wisdom consisted in philosophic theories, or in
empirical knowledge, or in theological doctrines, or in
practical efforts, cannot be gathered from his words.
Nor do we gain any information on this point from
* Among the authentic writings
which have been preserved, the
only passages where Pythagoras is
mentioned are Rhet. ii. 23 (vide
supra, 341, 1) and Metaph i. 5
(vide infra, 510, 5). As to the
works which have been lost, we
should cite besides the texts of
AElian, Apollonius, and Diogenes
(of which we have spoken, supra,
p. 338, 3, 4; 345, 5), the Pythago-
rean traditions we have extracted
(p. 345, 1; 338, 3) from Plutarch
and Iamblichus. But these texts
do not prove that Aristotle him-
self knew anything of Pythagoras.
There is also the statement of
Porph. V. P. 41, which perhaps
ought to be corrected so as to mean
that Aristotle spoke of the symbols
of the Pythagoreans, and not of
Pythagoras. * >
* Even the contemporaries and
disciples of Aristotle, as Eudoxus,
Heracleides, and others, whose as-
sertions concerning Pythagoras
have been already quoted; also the
author of the Magna Moralia, vide
Supra, p. 491, 4. *
* Wide supra, p. 481, 1.
* Wide supra, p. 336, 5, and Fr.
23 ap. Diog. ix. 11 (cf. Procl. in
Tim. 31 F; Clemens, Strom. i. 315
D; Athen. xiii. 610 b): Troxvua-
6 mtm včov of 6,840 kel (cf. on this
reading, Schuster, Heraclif. p. 65,
2). ‘Hatošov yap by éðiðaše kal
IIv6ayópmv, ač0ís te Eevoq &vea kal
‘Ekatafov.
* The words ioTopia and troxv-
wdôsta describe the man who en-
quires from others, and seeks to
learn, in opposition to the man who
forms his opinions himself by his
own reflection.
CHARACTER OF PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 511
Empedocles, when he celebrates the wisdom in which
Pythagoras surpassed all men, and foresaw the distant
future. But though direct evidence fails us yet on
general grounds, it is probable that at any rate the
fundamental thoughts of the system emanated from
Pythagoras himself.” In the first place this furnishes
the best explanation of the fact that the system, so far
as we know, was confined to the adherents of Pytha-
goras, and, among them, was universally disseminated;
and moreover, that all that we are told of the Pytha-
gorean philosophy, in spite of the differences on minor
points, agrees in the main traits. Secondly, the in-
ternal relation of the Pythagorean theory to other
systems gives us reason to suppose that it originated
previously to the beginning of the fifth century.
Among all the later systems, there is none in which
the influence of the Eleatic doubt concerning the
possibility of Becoming does not manifest itself. Leu-
cippus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, however their
views may differ in other respects, are all at one in
admitting the first proposition of Parmenides, viz.,
* In the verses ap. Porph. V. kat re 6ék’ &v6pátrov kal tº eticoaty
P. 30; Iambl. V. P. 67. We are âtdºvecrat.
not, however, absolutely certain
that these verses really relate to
* This opinion is found in the
Pythagoras (cf. p. 338, 4)—
same words, and founded on the
Ży 6é ris év keivotaly &v?ip trepidºgua
eiðbs,
6s 6%) uſiktorov trpatríðwv ékthorato
TAoûtov,
Travrotov re uáAtara orogów Śrthpa-
vos épywv,
àm Tóre yūp tróoratoruv Špéčairo trpa-
tríðeorol,
field, ye róv čvtwv rávrov Aeña geo-
kev ćicagºra,
same proofs, in the 2nd and 3rd
editions of this work. This does
not prevent Chaignet (i. 160) from
saying : Zeller veut, que l'élément
Scientifique, philosophique de la con-
ception pythagoricienne ait été pos-
térieur à Pythagore et étranger &
ses vues personnelles et & Son dessein
primitif, tout pratique, Selon lui.

512 THE P}THAGOREANS,
the impossibility of Becoming, and consequently in
reducing birth and decay to mere change. The Py-
thagoreans might be supposed to be especially open
to the influence of these profound doctrines of their
Eleatic neighbours; but not a trace of this influence
is to be found. Empedocles, who alone, while ad-
hering to the Pythagorean life and theology, is as a
philosopher allied to Parmenides, on this very account
departs from the Pythagorean School, and becomes the
author of an independent theory. This tends to prove
that the Pythagorean philosophy not only did not
arise out of an attempt to reconcile the Heracleitean
and Eleatic doctrines, but that it was not even formed
under the influence of the Eleatic system. On the
| other hand, the Eleatic system seems to presuppose
Pythagoreanism; for the abstraction of reducing the
multitudinous mass of phenomena to the one concept
of being, is so bold that we cannot avoid seeking for
some historical preparation for it ; and no system
adapts itself better to this purpose, as has already been
shown (p. 204), than the Pythagorean, the principle of
which is exactly intermediate between the sensible
intuition of the ancient Ionians, and the pure thought
of the Eleatics. That the Pythagorean cosmology was
known to Parmenides, at any rate, is probable from its
affinity with his own, which will hereafter be noticed.
We have, therefore, every reason to believe that the
Pythagorean theory is earlier than that of Parmenides,
and that in regard to its main outlines Pythagoras is
really its author. We shall also presently find that
Heracleitus owes not a little to the Samian philosopher

ORIGINT OF PYTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 518
of whom he speaks so harshly, if what he says about
the arising of all things from contradictories and from
harmony, is really connected with the analogous doc-
trines of the Pythagoreans. How far the philosophic
development of doctrine was carried by Pythagoras,
cannot of course be discovered ; but if he is to be
regarded as the founder of the Pythagorean system, he
must at least have enunciated in some form the funda-
mental definitions that all is number, that all is
harmony; that the opposition of the perfect and im-
perfect, the straight and the crooked, pervades all
things; and since these definitions themselves can only
have arisen in connection with the Pythagorean arith-
metic and music, we must also refer the beginning of
arithmetic and music to him. Lastly, we shall find
that Parmenides placed the seat of the divinity which
governs the world in the centre of the universe, and
made the different spheres revolve around the centre;
we may therefore suppose that the central fire and the
theory of the spheres had also been early taught by
the Pythagoreans, though the motion of the earth, the
counter-earth, and the precise number of the ten re-
volving spheres were probably of later origin.
Whether Pythagoras himself had teachers from
whom his philosophy either wholly or partially sprang,
and where these are to be sought, is matter of contro-
versy. As is well known, the later ages of antiquity
believed him to have derived his doctrines from the
East." In particular, either Egypt, or Chaldaea and
* Cf. p. 326 sq.
WOL. I. L L
514 THE PETHAGOREANS.
Persia, would soonest occur to the mind; and ancient
writers especially mention these countries when they
speak of the travels of Pythagoras in the East. To me
such an origin of his doctrine seems unlikely. There is,
as has been already shown, an utter absence of all trust-
worthy evidence in its favour, and the internal points
of contact with Persian and Egyptian philosophy,
which may be found in Pythagoreanism, are not nearly
sufficient to prove its dependence upon these foreign
influences. What Herodotus says of the agreement
between Pythagoreans and Egyptians' is confined to
the belief in transmigration, and the custom of in-
terring the dead exclusively in linen garments. But
transmigration is found not merely in Pherecydes,
with whose treatise and opinions Pythagoras may have
been acquainted, if even he were not a scholar of his
in the technical sense ; * it was certainly an older
Orphic tradition,” and the same may very likely be true
of the customs in regard to burial: in no case could we
infer from the appropriation of these religious tra-
ditions the dependence of the Pythagorean philosophy
upon the alleged wisdom of the Egyptian priests. Of
the distinctive principle of this system, the number-
theory, we find no trace among the Egyptians; the
parallels, too, which might be drawn between the
Egyptian and Pythagorean cosmology are much too in-
definite to prove any close historical interconnection
between them : and the same holds good of the Pytha-
gorean symbolism, in which some have also seen traces
* ii. 81, 123. vide p. 69, 3; 327 sq.
* On Pherecydes and his pre- * Wide Supra, p. 67 sq.
tended relations with Pythagoras,
ORIGIN OF PETHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 515
of Egyptian origin." The system of caste and other
social institutions of the Egyptians were not imitated
by the Pythagoreans. We might indeed compare the
zeal of these philosophers for the maintenance and re-
storation of ancient customs and institutions, with the
fixed invariability of the Egyptian character; but
the reasons of this phenomenon lie nearer to hand in
the circumstances and traditions of the colonies of
Magna Graecia; and the difference of the Doric and
Pythagorean element from the Egyptian is, on closer
observation, so important, that there is no warrant for
deriving the one from the other. The same may be
said of the Persian doctrines. The Pythagorean oppo-
sition of the uneven and the even, of the better and
the worse, &c., might find a parallel in the Persian
dualism ; and it is apparently this similarity which
gave occasion, in ancient times, to the theory that the
Magi, or even Zoroaster, were the teachers of Pytha-
goras. But it surely did not require foreign instruc-
tion to observe that good and evil, straight and crooked,
masculine and feminine, right and left, exist in the
world; the specific manner, however, in which the
Pythagoreans designated these opposites; their reduc-
tion to the fundamental oppositions of the uneven and
the even, the limited and unlimited, the decuple classi-
fication, generally speaking, the philosophic and mathe-
matical treatment of the subject, is as foreign to the
doctrine of Zoroaster as the theological dualism of a goo
and evil Deity is foreign to Pythagoreanism. Other
similarities which might be adduced, such as the signifi-
* As Plutarch does, Qu. Conv. viii. 8, 2; De Is. 10, p. 354.
L. L 2
516 . THE PF THAGOREANS,
cance of the number seven, the belief in a future exist-
ence, and many ethical and religious apophthegms collec-
tively, prove so little, and differ from each other so greatly
as to details, that they cannot be discussed in this place.
The life and science of the Pythagoreans are only
really to be understood in connection with the specific
character and conditions of culture of the Greek people
in the sixth century. Pythagoreanism, as an attempt at
ethico-religious reform,' must be classed with other
endeavours which we meet with contemporaneously or
previously in the work of Epimenides and Onomacritus,
in the rise of mysteries, in the wisdom of the so-called
seven wise men, and of the Gnomic poets; and it is
distinguished from all similar phenomena by the
manysidedness and force with which it embraced all
the elements of culture of the time, religious, ethical,
political, and scientific, and at the same time created
for itself, in a close society, a fixed nucleus and aim for
its activity. Its more precise characteristics resulted
lf from its connection with the Doric race and Dorie-
| institutions.” Pythagoras himself, it is true, came from
the Ionian island of Samos, but as we have already seen,
it is probable that his parents, though of Tyrrhene race,
had emigrated thither from Phlius in Peloponnesus,
and the principal theatre of his own activity was in
Doric and Achaean cities. At any rate his work displays
the essential traits of the Doric character. The worship
of the Dorian Apollo,” the aristocratic politics, the
* Wide p. 496, 352. sq.; 392 sq.; Schwegler, Gesch. d.
2 Cf. the excellent remarks of gr. Phil. 53 sq.
O. Müller, Gesch. Hellen. Stämme * Wide Supra, p. 338, 340.
und Stütte, ii. a, 365 sq. b; 178
2- ºr **"
ORIGIN OF PETHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 517
Syssitia, the gymnastics, the ethical music, the prover-
bial wisdom of the Pythagoreans, the participation of
women in the education and Society of men, the strict
and measured moral code, which knows no higher duties
than the subordination of the individual to the whole,
respect for traditional customs and laws, reverence for
parents, for constituted authority, and for old age—all
this plainly shows us how great a share the Doric spirit
had in the origination and development of Pythago-
reanism. That this spirit is also unmistakeable in the
Pythagorean philosophy has already been observed;
but the union in Pythagoras of a scientific effort for
the interpretation of nature, with his moral and religious
activity, is probably due to the influence of the Ionic
physiologists, who could not have been unknown to a
man so erudite and so far beyond all his contemporaries”
in his passion for knowledge. The statement, however,
that Anaximander was his instructor” can scarcely be
more than a conjecture, based on chronological proba-
bility and not on any actual tradition. But it is very
likely that he may have been acquainted with his elder
contemporary, who was so prominent among the earliest
philosophers, whether we suppose the acquaintance to
have been personal, or merely through Anaximander’s
writings. The influence of Anaximander may perhaps
be traced, not only in the general impulse towards the
study of the causes of the universe, but also in the
Pythagorean theory of the spheres (vide p. 445, 1),
which has an immediate connection with the theory of
* P. 502, 507 sq. * Neanthes ap. Porph. Cf. p.
* As Heracleitus says, vide 326, note.
supra, p. 336, 5 ; 510, 4.
518 THE PYTHAGORIEANS.
which Anaximander is supposed to be the author (vide
252, 1). And if the distinction of the limited and un-
limited originally belongs to Pythagoras, Anaximander
may nevertheless have had a share in inspiring it ; only
from Anaximander's conception of the unlimited in
space Pythagoras would have abstracted the general
concept of the unlimited, which is an essential element
of all things, and primarily of number. By Pythagoras
physics or philosophy (for they were identical at that
period) became first transplanted from their most
ancient home in Ionian Asia Minor into Italy, there to
be further developed in a specific manner. That in this
development, side by side with the Hellenic element,
the peculiar character of the Italian races by whom the
birthplace of Pythagoreanism was surrounded, may have
made itself felt, is certainly conceivable; but our his–
torical evidence' in favour of this conjecture is not
sufficient even to render it probable.” If anything was
1. Cf. Schwegler, Röm. Gesch. i.
561 sq., 616. Klausen, AEneas und
die Penaten, ii. 928 sq., 961 sq.;
O. Müller, Etrusker, ii. 139 A, 53,
345 A, 22.
* Even the ancient tradition
that Numa was a disciple of Py-
thagoras (vide Part III. 6, 69, 2nd
edition) seems to presuppose a
certain likeness between the Ro-
man religion and Pythagoreanism.
Plut. (Numa, c. 8, 14) cites the
following points of resemblance
between Numa and Pythagoras.
* Both,” he says, “represented them-
selves as plenipotentiaries of the
gods (which many others have also
done). Both love symbolic pre-
scripts and usages (this also is very
common; but the Roman symbols
are explained by Plutarch in a very
arbitrary manner). As Pythagoras
introduced Éxeptibia, so Numa es-
tablished the worship of the muse
Tacita (who is not a muse, and
has no connection with the pre-
script of silence, vide Schwegler,
p. 562). Pythagoras conceived the
divinity (Plutarch asserts) as a
pure spirit; Numa, from the same
point of view, prohibited images of
the gods. (Pythagoras did not
prohibit them; and if the ancient
Roman cultus was devoid of images,
the reason of this is not to be found
in a purer conception of the Deity,
but, as with the Germani and In-
dians, and other barbarous peoples,
in the absence of plastic arts, and in
the special character of the Roman.
OIZIGIN OF PPTHAGOREAN PHILOSOPHY. 519
contributed from this side to Pythagoreanism, it can
only have consisted in some details of a quite subordi-
religion.) The sacrifices of Numa,
were scarcely any of them bloody;
nor were those of the Pythagoreans.
(This does not seem certain, ac-
cording to our previous observa-
tions, and it would be of little con-
sequence if it were. For the Greeks,
especially in ancient times, had
many unbloody sacrifices, and the
Romans not only sacrificed animals
in great numbers, but had also hu-
man sacrifices.) Lastly, not to men-
tion other insignificant similarities,
Numa placed the fire of Vesta in
a round temple, “to represent the
form of the world and the position
of the central fire in the midst of
it.” (But the ancient Romans cer-
tainly were unacquainted with the
central fire, and it is impossible to
prove that the form of the temple
of Vesta was intended to symbolise
that of the world. At any rate,
the apparent roundness of the ce-
lestial vault was perceptible to every
one by immediate observation, and
on the other hand, if the Pytha-
goreans called their central fire
Hestia, they would naturally be
thinking, not of the Roman Vesta,
but of the Greek Hestia.) It is
the same with certain other analo-
gies between Roman and Italian
customs and those of the Pythago-
reans. Beans were forbidden to the
flamen ſ)ialis, as they were among
the Pythagoreans, according to a
later tradition and custom. But the
Pythagoreans no doubt borrowed
this custom, as well as their asceti-
cism generally, from the Orphic
mysteries. They are said to have
followed the Roman and Etruscan
usage of turning to the right when
they prayed. But it is clear from
Plut, 7. c., that such a custom was
unknown to them. Even were it
otherwise, the coincidence would
prove little. This holds good of
other coincidences, by which Plut.
Qu. Conv. viii. 7, 1, 3, seeks to
prove that Pythagoras was an
Etruscan. The Roman doctrine of
Genii and Lares may in many
respects resemble the Pythagorean
belief in daemons; but the Pytha-
goreans found this belief already in
the Greek religion. This resem-
blance, then, simply points to the
general affinity of the Greek and
Italian peoples. Still less can be
deduced from the circumstance that
the Pythagoreans, like the Romans
(and the Greeks and most nations),
regarded the interment of an un-
buried corpse as a sacred duty;
but what Klausen (p. 362) quotes
to prove traces of Metempsychosis
in the Roman legend is not conclu-
sive. We might, with more reason,
compare the ancient Roman motion
that Jupiter, the prince of spirits,
sends souls into the world and re-
calls them (Macrob. Sat. i. 10),
with the doctrine said to have been
taught by the Pythagoreans, of the
soul proceeding from the world-
soul (supra, p. 447, 1). But first
we may ask whether this doctrine
was really held by the ancient Py-
thagoreans, and next we must re-
member that the belief in the
celestial origin of the soul and its
return to aether was not unknown
to the Greeks (wide supra, p. 69,
1; 70, 4). Some of the Roman
institutions and opinions may also
remind us of the Pythagorean
theory of numbers. But the like-
ness is not so great that we can
520
THE PPTHAGOREA.N.S.
mate importance; for the Greeks of Lower Italy were
as little inclined to adopt philosophic doctrines from
the surrounding barbarians, as the barbarians were in
a condition to impart them.
legitimately regard this theory
merely as the philosophic expres-
sion of the ancient Roman and
Italian superstitions about num-
bers. Among the Romans, as
among the Pythagoreans, uneven
numbers were considered lucky
(vide Schwegler, l. c., 543, 561 ;
Rubino, De Augur. et Pontif ap.
wet. Rome. Num. 1852, p. 6 sq.; , cf.
also Plin. Hist. Nat. xxviii. 2, 23),
and for this reason the Romans
and the Pythagoreans assigned to
the superior deities an uneven
number, and to the inferior deities
an even number, of victims (Plut.
Numa, 14; Porph. v. Pyth. 38;
Serv. Bucol. viii. 75; v. 66). But
this idea and that custom were not
exclusively Pythagorean: they be-
longed to the Greeks in general.
Plato, at any rate, says (Laws, iv.
717 A): Tois X00utois àv Tus 6.e0?s
&ptua kal bettepa kal &plorepò véuov
àp66tara roß rās eice&etas oritoroi,
Tvyxãvot, roºs 3& rotºtov Šva,6ev rà.
trepitté, etc.; and it is not pro-
bable that he is merely following a
Bythagorean tradition. It is much
more likely that in this, as in his
other laws, he is adhering as much
as possible to the customs of his own
country. Lastly, in the division of
the Roman city, we see carried out
a rigorous numerical schematism,
of which the bases are the number
three and the number ten ; and the
religious ritual has in it something
analogous (Schwegler, p. 616). But
this is not peculiar to Rome and
Italy. In Sparta, for example (not
to mention more distant nations,
All the more favourable
like the Chinese or Galatians), the
population was divided according
to the numbers three and ten ;
there were 9,000 Spartans and
30,000 Periaeci. In the nine days’
festival of the Käpueta, they eat in
nine arbours, nine men in each
(Athen. iv. 141 E). Ancient Athens
had four tribes, each tribe three
ºpparpiai (?), each pparpía thirty
gentes, each gens thirty families.
The smallest round number, with
the Greeks as with the Romans,
was three (with the Pythagoreans,
four had a higher value), then came
ten, then 100, then 1,000, then
10,000. One of the highest num-
bers of this kind was Tptorutpuot.
Hesiod had a good deal to say of
the significance of certain numbers
(vide supra, 376, 3). The predi-
lection for numerical schematism
might well exist among different
peoples without being the result of
any direct historical connection
between them. Among the Pythago-
reans, it sprang chiefly from specu-
lative motives; among others, e.g.
the Romans, it arose from the
practical sense of order. I cannot,
therefore, agree with the theory
which attributes to the peoples and
religions of Italy an important in-
fluence on Pythagoreanism. On the
other hand, as we shall see later
on (Part III. b, 69 sq , 2A, 2nd ed.),
and as we have already seen in the
quotation (p. 341, 1), the name of
Pythagoras was known to the Ro-
mans before that of any other Greek
philosopher, and was greatly vene-
rated by them,
ALCMAEON. 521
was the soil which philosophy found in the Magna
Grecian colonies themselves, as is proved by the growth
it there attained, and by all that we know of the
culture of these cities. If further proof, however, be
required, it lies in the fact that, contemporaneously
with the Pythagorean, another branch of Italian philo-
sophy was developed, which also owed its origin to an
Ionian. But before we proceed to examine this systern,
We must direct our attention to certain men who have
a connection with Pythagoreanism, although we cannot
precisely include them in the Pythagorean school.
WII. PYTHAGOREANISM IN COMBINATION WITH OTHER
ELEMENTS. ALCMAEON, HIPPASUS, ECPHANTUS,
EPICHARPM US.
THE physician Alcmaeon,’ of Crotona, is said to have
been a younger contemporary, by some even a disciple,
of Pythagoras.”
Both statements, however, are uncer-
tain,” and the second cannot possibly in the stricter
* Vide, in regard to Alcmaeon:
Philippson, "TAm &v6patrívm, p. 183
sqq.; Unna, De Alcmaeone Crotoni-
ata in the Phil.-Histor. Studien
von Petersen, pp. 41–87, where the
statements of the ancients and the
fragments of Alcmaeon have been
carefully collected. Krische, For-
Schungen, etc., 68–78. We know
nothing of Alcmaeon's life, except
his origin and the name of his
father (IIelp!600s, IIsipiðos or IIé-
piðos). Aristotle wrote against
him, we are told, Diog. v. 25.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 5, 986 a,
27 (after enumerating the ten Py-
thagorean opposites): ávarep rpá-
trov čolice kal 'AAirplatov š Kporović-
Tns intoxafletv ſcal #rot oitos trap'
ékeſvay 3) ékeºvot trapſ, rotºrov trapé-
Aašov Tov Aéryov tootov ical yèp
êyéveto thv jºurcíav’AAkuaſav ćirl
'yepovti IIv6ayópg, &reqfivaro 5& Tra-
paramatos toūrois. Diog. viii. 83 :
IIv6ayópov 6thkovore. Iamblichus,
V. P. 104, reckons him among the
wabnteto avres Tó IIv6ayópg Tpear-
Súrm véo ; and Philop. in Arist. De
An. c. 8, calls him a Pythagorean.
Simplicius, in his remarks on the
same treatise, p. 8, says more cau-
tiously that others call him a Pytha-
gorean, but that Aristotle does not.
* Diogenes and Iamblichus both
no doubt derived their information,
the one directly, the other indi-
rectly, from the passage in Aris-
totle. Now in this passage the
§22 THE PPTHAGORIEANS.
sense be true; for Aristotle (loc. cit.) expressly dis-
criminates Alcmaeon from the Pythagoreans, and his
theories are by no means invariably in agreement with
theirs; yet it is plain, even from the little we know of
him and his writings,' that the Pythagorean doctrine
was not without influence on him. Besides the
anatomical and physiological enquiries, in which his
chief merit seems to have consisted,” we find mention,
words é-yéveto . . . IIv6ayópg, and
the 5& after éteq fivato, which are
wanting in the excellent codex Ab,
are not mentioned by the Greek
commentators: they seem superflu-
ous, and like an interpolation.
Wide Brandis, Gr. Röm. Phil. i.
507 sq.; Gruppe, Fragm. d. Arch.
54 sqq.; Schwegler in h. l. Yet
the first words of the writing of
Alcmaeon, in which he dedicates
his work to Brotinus, Leo, and
Bathyllus, prove that the date as-
signed is approximately correct.
Wide next note, and Unna, p. 43;
Frische, p. 70.
* This work, the beginning of
which is given by Diog. l. c. after
IFavorinus, was entitled, according
to Galen. (in Hipp. de Elem. t. i.
487; in Hºpp. De Nat. Hom. xv. 5
K), repl púaews. Diog. and Clem.
(Strom. i. 308 C) designate it also
as 'pwaukös Aó70s. But Clemens is
wrong in asserting, as he does,
Theodoret, Cur. Gr. Aff. 1, 19,
Gaisf., that Alcmaeon is the first
who wrote on physics, for if even
Xenophanes is not to be regarded
as a Physicist, Anaximander, and
Anaximenes (perhaps also Hera-
cleitus), certainly wrote before Alc-
maeon. But, according to Clemens,
even Anaxagoras had been men-
tioned as the first author of a phy-
sical treatise.
* According to Chalcid. (in Tim.
c. 244, p. 233 Mull.), he was the
first to make dissections, vide
Unna, p. 55 sqq. As to his physi-
ological opinions we learn from
tradition the following particulars.
He taught that the seat of the soul
is in the brain (Plut. Plac. iv. 17,
1), to which all sensations are
transmitted by means of the chan-
nels which lead from the organs of
sense (Theophrast. De Sensu, sec-
tion 26). How he sought to ex-
plain the different senses we are
told by Theophrastus, l.c. 25 sq.;
Plut. Plac. iv. 16, 2; 17, 1 ; 18, 1 ;
wide the parallel passages in the
Pseudo-Galen and Stobaeus. For
this reason the head is first formed
in the embryo (Plac. v. 17, 3).
The seed comes from the brain
(Plac. v. 3, 3). Alcmaeon occupied
himself greatly with the subject of
the embryo, how it is formed and
how nourished (vide Censorinus,
loc. cit. c. 5, 6 ; Plut. Plac. v. 14,
1, 16, 3). He compared puberty
to the florescence of plants, and the
milk of animals to the white of an
egg (Arist. H. Anim. Wii. 1, 581 a,
14; Gener. Anim. iii. 2, 752 b, 23).
He explained sleep by the reple-
tion of the blood-vessels,and waking
by the emptying of them (Plut. Pl.
v. 23, 1). He is also said to have
believed that goats breathe through
ALCMAEON.
523
not only of isolated astronomical' and ethical pro-
positions,” but also of general philosophical theories
which are very closely allied to those of the Pytha-
goreans.
The leading point of view in these theories is,
on the one hand, the opposition between the perfect or
celestial, and the imperfect or terrestrial; and on the
other, the spiritual affinity of man with the eternal.
The heavens and the heavenly bodies are divine, because
they uninterruptedly revolve in a motion that returns
into itself; * the race of
their ears, Arist. H. Anim. i. 11,
sub init. It is possible that Alc-
maeon may be referred to by Alex.
(in Arist. De Sensu, ii. 12, p. 23,
Thur.) in the statement that certain
physicians shared the Pythagorean
opinion, mentioned p. 475, 3 ; but
this conjecture is uncertain. That
of Hirzel (Hermes, xi. 240 sq.), on
the contrary, seems admissible; he
thinks that Plato was referring to
Alcmaeon, when in the Phaedo, 96
B, he speaks of the opinion accord-
ing to which 6 €yképañós éotiv 6
t&s aio 6%gets trapéxov too &Kočeiv
kai épáv kal 60 ppaívea 6al, ék rotºrwy
8è yíºyvoito uvâum kai 66&c., ák 6&
uviums kal 668ms A&60ſons to hpspielv
karð taúra 'yūyveo'6at étriotiumv.
The distinction of étriotăum and
alo 6 morts accords, as Hirzel well ob-
serves, with the text cited p. 524, 3.
What is said at the commencement
of this note agrees with the theory
that the brain is the seat of the
faculty of knowing ; but Alcmaeon
(cf.p.523,3; 524,2) must necessarily
have regarded the soul alone as the
knowing subject. We cannot, how-
ever, be sure that Plato did not add
something of his own to the opin-
ion which he reports; the deriva-
tion of éiriotſium from hpspielv–i.e.,
man, on the contrary, is
the fastening of ideas in the soul,
repeated by Arist. Anal. Post. ii.
19, 100, a 3—is perhaps an addition
of this kind ; cf. Crat. 437 A.;
Meno, 97 E sq.
* According to Plut. Plac. ii.
16, 2; Stob. i. 516, he maintained
that the fixed stars move from
east to west ; the planets (among
which we must suppose the earth,
which revolves around the central
fire) from west to east. According
to Stobaeus, i. 526, 558, he attri-
buted, like the Ionians, to the
sun and moon a plane surface
shaped like a boat, and explained
eclipses of the moon by the shift-
ing round of the Iunar boat.
Simpl. says (De Caºlo, 121 a, Ald.)
that he calculated the interval of
time between the solstices and the
equinoxes; but this is according to
the ancient texts. Ap. Karsten, p.
223 a, 15, and Brandis, Schol. 500
a, 28, we find instead of 'AAkuatovi,
Eükthuovu, which seems more
eXà.Ct.
* Clemens (Strom. viii. 624 B)
cites the following from him :
éx6pöv čvöpa šov pukášaq 0at #
pixov. º
* Arist. De An. i. 2, 405 a,
30: p.mal yèp airthy [thv jux}\vl
524 THE PPTHAGO REANS,
transitory, because we are not in a position to unite the
beginning with the end—to begin a new course' after
the expiration of our period of life. Our soul, however,
is exempt from this transitoriness: it moves etermally,
like the stars, and is therefore immortal.” So also its
knowledge is not limited to the sense-perception—but
it has also understanding and consciousness.” But
everything human is on this account imperfect. The
gods know what is hidden, we can only conjecture it : *
they enjoy a uniform existence; our life moves between
contraries,” and its healthfulness depends on the equi-
&6ávarov etvai Ötö. Tö éolkéval roſs
&6avárots, routo 6’ 3rdpxetv airfi
és àel kivovuévy' kivetotal yèp ka?
Tô Đeta rāvta ovvexós àel, orexhumv,
#Atov, rows ào répas, row oipavov
&Aov. This text is doubtless the
sole foundation for the assertion of
the Epicurean, ap. Cic. N. D. i. 11,
27: Soli et lunae reliquisque sideri-
ôtts animoque praeterea divinitatem
dedit, and of Diog. viii. 83 : kal thv
orexhumv ka9óAov raúrmy (this pas-
sage seems to be mutilated; it may
have originally stood thus : k.t.a.
kal &Nov tow oilpavov) exeiv &tówov
qºotv. Clem. Cohort. 44 A: ‘A.
6eo)s jero robs &a répas eival épºpt-
xovs &vros. Cf. the following note.
* Arist. Probl. xvii. 3, 916 a,
33: Tobs yöp &v0p6trous pnolv 'AA-
!cuatov Ště roºro &nda Avorðau, ätt ot,
8èvaviral rhv Špx.hu ré réAet
Tpoordial. The sense of these
words exactly determined by Phi-
lippson, 185; Unna, 71, is clear
from the whole connexion of the
passage.
* Arist. l. c. and, after him,
Boethius, ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. xi. 28,
5; Diog. viii. 83; Stob. Ecl. i.
796; Theodoret, Cur. gr. aff, v. 17,
and the Greek commentators of
Aristotle, among whom Philoponus
(in De An. i. 2 C, 8) expressly re-
marks that he is not acquainted
with the writings of Alcmaeon, and
knows nothing of him except what
Aristotle says.
* Theophr. De Sensu, 4, 25: táv
8è uh rá, époſq, trotočvrwu Thy ato-
6mauv (as Empedocles did, vide
infra)'AAkuatov učvirpátovãºpoptºel
Thy trpos rô (ºja 5uaq opáv' &vôpotov
ºyáp pmol rôv &AAwy 6taq’épelv Štt
uóvov (l. uévos) £vvimori, rö. 3’ &AAa
aioróðveral uèv of Čuvimori Šć.
* Alcm. ap Diog. viii. 83: trept
Töv &qavéov [trepi Tôv 6vntóv] ora-
‘pivetav učv 6eol āzovti, &s 6* &v6p3-
trous rekuaipeg 6at.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 5 (Sup, p.
521, 2) continues: prior yop eival
São Tà troAA& Tóv &vôpatríva'u, Aéyav
Tès évauruármras oix àortrep oirot
bioptoſuévas &AA& Tès rvxotoras, oiov
Aevkov uéAav, YAvici tukpov, & yabbw
kaköv, utºpov uéya. oitos uév obv
&öloptotos étré65upe trepi Tàu Aottröv,
oi ö& IIv6ayópelot kal tróoral kai Tives
ai évavrićtmºres &reqívavro. Isoe.
says wrongly: tr. &vrtóóo. 268: ‘A.
8è Ščo uáva (pmaly eival tă ăvta).
FIIPPASUS. 525
librium of opposite forces; when, on the contrary, one
of its elements gains a preponderance over the others,
sickness and death are the result." We certainly cannot
consider Alcmaeon a Pythagorean because of these pro-
positions, for we find nothing about the number-theory,
the distinctive doctrine of the Pythagorean system, in
any of our accounts of him. Moreover, his astronomi-
cal opinions, mentioned above, only partially agree with
the Pythagorean cosmology; and we must, therefore,
hold Aristotle to be in the right when he discriminates
him from the Pythagoreans. But the observations of
Alcmaeon on the relation of the eternal and the mortal,
on the oppositions in the world, on the divinity of the
stars, and the immortality of the soul, coincide in
substance almost exactly with the Pythagorean doctrine.
That a contemporary of the Pythagoreans, from their
especial city Crotona, should have arrived at these
theories independently of Pythagoreanism, is incredible.
Although, therefore, Aristotle does not venture to
decide whether the doctrine of opposites came from
the Pythagoreans to Alcmaeon, or vice versá, the former
alternative is much the more probable ; * and we accord-
1 Plut. Plac. v. 30 (Stob. Floril.
101, 2; 100, 25): 'A Tàs uèv Öyetas
eival avvercrukhv thv (so Stob.)
iorovopºtav Tóv Švudueov, Öypov, 6ep-
u00, £mpoo, juxpoſſ, trikpot, yāvkéos
kal Tów Aoutrów. Thu 6' év airois
povapxtav vögov troumrukhvº pºopo-
troubv yöp Šicatépov uovapxſa' cal
vágov airta, Ös pièv šp’ fis, Štrepòox3)
6epuðrntos # puxpótºmºros &s à é
fis, Stå tañ90s (Stob. wrongly:
rxm0. Tpopis)? §vöstav dis 6 y of s,
aiwa Övöéov (Stob.reads preferably:
% Avexöv) # ykéqſaxos (St.--ov).
thv 5è Öystav oriºuſastpov Tóv trouſov
Thy kpāoriv. (Stob. has : yīvea:0ai
6é trore kal imb Tév šša,0ev airlöv,
56&rov totów # x&pas ?) kóTov )
äväyrms htów rotºrous traparamotov.)
Plato, Symp. 106 D, puts the same
thoughts into the mouth of his
Eryxainachus. The mention of
the four Aristotelian causes and of
the Stoic trouot clearly shows that
here we have not Alcmaeon's own
words.
* There is no question here of
the Pythagorean table of the ten
526 THE PPTHAGO REANS.
ingly regard Alcmaeon as a man who was considerably
influenced by the Pythagorean philosophy, without
having actually adopted it in its totality.
Respecting Hippasus and Ecphantus our informa-
tion is still more scanty. As to the former, the ancient
writers themselves seem to have known no more than is
to be found in Aristotle—namely, that, like Heracleitus,
he held fire to be the primitive matter." The farther
statements, that he declared fire to be the Deity;”
that he made derived things arise out of fire by rare-
faction and condensation; * that he thought the soul was
of a fiery nature; * that the world was limited and
eternally moved, and subject to a periodic transforma-
tion : * all these must be mere inferences from the
comparison of him with Heracleitus, since even the
scholars of the Alexandrian epoch possessed no writing
of his.” It was perhaps this approximation to the
Heracleitean doctrine which made later writers call him
a spurious Pythagorean, and the head of the so-called
opposites, but only of the general
principle that everything is full of
opposites.
* Arist. Metaph. i. 3, 984 a,
7 : “Ittraoros 3& Tüp [äpx?iv ráðmou]
6 Meratovtºvos kal ‘Hpdºxettos &
'Eq'éorios. The same is reproduced
by Sext. Pyrrh, iii. 30; Clemens,
Strom. i. 296 B; Theod. Cur. gr.
aff. ii. 10, p. 22; Plut. Plac. i. 3,
25. What the last writer adds in
regard to the metamorphoses of
fire only applies to Heracleitus.
2 Clem. Cohort. 42 C.
* Simpl. Phys. 6 a.
* Theodoret, Cur. gr. aff, v.
20; Tert. De An. c. 5.
* Diog. viii. 84; Simpl. l. c.;
Theod. iv. 5, p. 58, where, however,
instead of &icſvntov & st k i v m r ov
is to be read.
° Diog. l.c. pnal 3' airov Amu'ff-
tpuos év “Ouavčuous ſamāśv kataAlireſv
a tºyypapua. Theo, Mus. c. 12, p.
91, mentions, but only as a report,
the experiments of Lasos of Hermi-
one und Hippasus (or his school)
for determining the relations of
tones. If Iambl. (in Nicom. Arithm.
141, 159, 163 Tennul) attributes
to the mathematicians, Archytas
and Hippasus, the distinction of
arithmetical, geometrical and har-
monic proportions, his assertion is
not based on any writing of Hip-
paSuS.
IECPHANTUS. 527
Acusmatics; elsewhere he is spoken of purely and
simply as a Pythagorean,” and fragments of writings are
adduced which were falsely attributed to him on this
supposition.” If we enquire by what means he could
have been led, as a Pythagorean, to the theory ascribed
to him, it is most obvious to think of the doctrine of
the central fire. According to the Pythagoreans, this
fire was the germ of the universe, to which everything
else had reference ; and Hippasus seems for this reason
to have regarded it as the matter of which all things
consist. There is every probability, however, that he
was also influenced by the example of Heracleitus, and
that his theory thus resulted from a combination of the
Pythagorean and Heracleitean doctrine.
Ecphantus occupies a similar position. He, too, is
included among the Pythagoreans; * but their number-
theory appears to have been too abstract and un-
physical for him, and he therefore sought, like Hippasus,
to complete it with the theories of later physicists;
only that instead of Heracleitus, he chose the Atomistic
philosophy and Anaxagoras, influenced perhaps by the
Pythagorean derivation of space-magnitudes. He
understood by the units, which are the original con-
stituents of numbers, and furthermore of all things,
* Iambl. V. Pyth. 81. Simi-
larly Willoison, Anecd.ii. 216. On
the other hand, Iambl. (in Nicom.
11 b); Stob. Eel. i. 862; and Sy-
rian, in Metaph. xiii. 6, borrow
even from his reputed writings
testimonies concerning the Pytha-
gorean doctrine.
* E. g. by Diog and Theo, l.c.
* Wide sup. p. 372, 1.
* Röth, ii. a, 812, with his usual
recklessness, calls Ecphantus and
Hicetas ‘immediate disciples of
Pythagoras.” Not only is this as-
sertion entirely without proof;
but it seems most probable, from
the texts quoted on p. 491 sq., that
both these philosophers lived after
Philolaus, and at the same time
as Archytas.
528 THE PYTHAGOREA.N.S.
material atoms, differing among themselves in size,
form, and force. The proposition (which we must
understand in the sense of the analogous sayings of
Democritus"), that the essence of things cannot be
known (that is, sensibly perceived), probably refers to
the invisibility of these atoms. To the atoms he added
the void—a conception already recognised in the
ancient Pythagorean doctrine—but this did not appear
to him sufficient as an explanation of phenomena, or
else Pythagorean piety prevented his resting in it;
he therefore assumed, with Anaxagoras, that the move-
ment of the atoms and the shaping of the universe was
produced by mind or the soul. On account of the
unity of this moving cause, he preferred the ordinary
notion of the unity and spherical shape of the world to
the atomistic theory of many worlds.” All this, how-
ever, shows that he must have belonged to the latest
generations of the Pythagoreans, with whom he is also
identified by the statement that, in agreement with
1 For further details, vide infra.
Cf. for the present, Arist. Metaph.
iv. 5; 1009 b, 11 ; Amuákpitós yé
qmoriv, #rot obbèv sival &Am6&s h
juïv y &5mAov.
2 The testimonies on which the
above assertion is founded are as
follows:—Stob. Ecl. i. 308 (8wp., p.
415, 1); ibnd. 448: "Exp. it uév
rów &róuov avverrával tow kóo wov,
Stouceſo 0&t 8& Örö Trpovoſas. Ibid.
496: "Eicq. iva röv káguov. Hip-
polyt. Refut. i. 15, p. 28: "Ekpav-
tós ris Xupakovo tos éqºm wheival
&Amówhy rôv čvrov Aabetv yuáoruv'
Öpf{el 6* &s vopfget tº uév trpára
&öuaípera sival oréuara ſcal trapaRAa-
ºy&s atrów rpets intrópxeiv, uéye60s,
orxāua, Sövapuy, Čš &y tº giorðmrå
ºyſveoréal. elvat 8% to TA;60s airāv
éptoſuévov kal Touro [l. kal oik)
&meipov. Iciveto 6at 8& Tö ordºnata.
uñte ürb Bāpovs wite tram'yūs, &AA’
§tro 6etas Švváuews, v votiv kai
Wvxhv trpoo`ayopsiel. Toi) uév oſſºv
Töv kóo wou eiðéval ióeſu (or as Roper,
Philologus, vii. 6, 20, happily con-
jectures: Tottov učv oſſy T. kógu.
eival ióéav), 31' 3 agaipoetóñ Štrb atās
8vváuews yeyovéval (this after
Plato), thu 88 yūv uéorov (perhaps
év weap) kóopov kiveto 6al trepi to
airis Kévrpov &s trpos àvatoxfiv.
Instead of the last three words
(which, however, are not impossi-
ble) we might conjecture, the rest
of the text being very incorrect:
&mb ðūorews irpos àvaroAhv.
PYTHAGO REANS. 529
Heracleides the Platonist (and with Hicetas), he believed
the earth to rotate upon its axis." He himself reminds
us of Plato in some particulars.”
The celebrated comic poet Epicharmus” is called
by many authors a Pythagorean." It is not improbable
that the Pythagorean doctrine had something more
than a superficial influence on him, and that the incli-
nation to general reflections and apophthegms, which
may be perceived in the fragments of his works,” was
fostered by it. But we are not justified by what we
know of him, in supposing that he had any definite phi-
losophical system. According to Diogenes III., 9 sqq.,
Alcimus" attempted to show that Plato borrowed greatſ
part of his doctrine from Epicharmus. His authorities
are not only insufficient for this purpose, but fail to
prove that Epicharmus was a philosopher at all in the
proper sense.
* Wide sup. p. 453, 1.
* Another trace of Pythagorean
Atomistic doctrines may perhaps
be found in what has been quoted
p. 468, 1, concerning Xuthus.
* Grysar. De Doriens Comodia,
84 sqq.; Leop. Schmidt, Quaest.
Epicharmea, Bonn, 1846; Welcker,
K/eine Schrift. i. 271–356; Lorenz,
L. und Schr. d. Koers Epicharmos,
Berl. 1864. The life of Epicharmus
falls, according to Schmidt, between
the 59th and the 79th Olympiad
(556–460 B.C.). Grysar places his
birth in the 60th Olympiad (540
B.C.), Lorenz, Ol. 60–62. All
that we know with certainty is
that he died shortly after Hiero,
and therefore shortly after the year
467 B.C., at an advanced age. His
age at his death was, according to
Lucian (Macrob. 25), 97; according
WOL. I.
Of the four passages which he quotes,"
to Diog. viii. 78,90. Born at Cos,
he came while still a child to Me-
gara in Sicily. The last half of
his life was passed at Syracuse.
* Diog, viii. 78, calls him even
a disciple of Pythagoras. Plut.
Numa, 8; Clem. Strom. v. 597 C, at
any rate, call him simply a Pytha-
gorean. According to Rambl. V. P.
265, he belonged to the exoteric
school. Schmidt, Op. C. p. 935,
justly censures Ilorenz, pp. 44–52,
for giving unhesitating credence to
the statement of Diogenes.
* Cf. Diog. l. c. : oiros ūrog-
vàuata karaxéAoûrev čv ois pugio-
Ao’ye”, yyapoxoyeſ, iaTpoxo'yeſ, and
dazu Welcker, p. 347 sq.
* Concerning Alcimus, vide the
index to this work, p. 3.
* On the authenticity, text and
interpretation, vide the dissertation
IM M
\
* *
530 THE PM THAGOREA.N.S.
the first" says that the gods are eternal, since the first
being, had it become, must have arisen out of nothing;
and that men are subject to continual change, and
never remain the same.” Another passage says: As
the art is something other than the artist, and as man
only becomes an artist through learning the art, so the
Good is something in itself (Ti Tpāypua kaff attö),” and
man becomes good by learning it. The third con-
cludes from the instinct of animals that all living
creatures possess reason.* The fourth observes that
each creature delights most in itself; as man regards
man as the most beautiful, so does the dog regard the
dog, and the ox the ox, &c. These sayings certainly
give evidence of a thinker, but they do not prove that
the thoughts of the poet had their centre in any philo-
sophic principle. Still less can we infer from them
that this principle was that of the Pythagoreans; the
remark about the eternity of the gods reminds us more
of Xenophanes, to whose verses the fourth quotation also
of Schmidt, Gött. Anz. 1865, 940
sq.; Lorenz, 106 sq.; Bernays in
Rhein. Mus. viii. 1853, 280 sq.;
Steinhart (Plato's Leben, 13 sq.,
264 sq.) says that the two first
passages are , certainly spurious,
that the third is perhaps authentic,
and the fourth undoubtedly so.
1 A dialogue in which one of
the interlocutors represents the
Bleatic point of view, the other
that of Heracleitus.
2 Plato is perhaps thinking of
this passage; at any rate he is
thinking of the opinion expressed
in it, when. in Theaet. 152 E, he
places Epicharmus among those
who maintain that there is no
Being, but only Becoming. It is
in the same text that Chrysippus
(ap. Plut. Comm. notif. 44, p. 1083)
finds the A6 yos añavópºevos.
* The conjecture of Schmidt
(Qu. Epich. 49 sq.), according to
which the verse containing this
proposition should be rejected,
seems to me unnecessary; it is not
connected, any more than the
others, with the theory of Ideas;
the word trpayua is employed in
the same sense as by Plato, Prof.
330 C sq.; 349 B.
* What Lorenz, p. 106, sees in
this passage is not to be found
there.
JEPICHARMUS. 531
bears a striking analogy." What is said about the
vicissitude to which man is subject, alludes no doubt to
the doctrine of Heracleitus,” from whom the theorem
that the character of man is his damom” may likewise
have been borrowed. The utterances of this poet con-
cerning the state after death, on the other hand, indicate
Pythagorean influence ; the body, he says, returns to
the earth, and the spirit to heaven; * a pious life is
man’s best preparation for the journey: * the proposition
about the reason of animals in the third of the above
quotations may have a like origin. All that we can
further gather in regard to Epicharmus either has no
* Cf. infra, notes 4 and 6 on
Xenophanes. That Epicharmus was
acquainted with Xenophanes is
proved by the passage of Arist.
Metaph. iv. 5, 1010 a, 5 (after
enumeration of the philosophers,
who confound the sensible phe-
nomenon with truth): Öto eikóra’s
gºv Aéryovoiv oik &Am07, 6& Aéyovoiv.
ošra, yāp &pgårtet gåAAov siteſv,
% $ortrep 'Ettzapºos eis Eevoq'dumv.
ërt 5& traorav Špávres raútmv ſci-
vovuévny thv påortv, &c. What
Epicharmus wrote about Xeno-
phanes we cannot discover from
this passage. The most natural
conjecture is that he said of some
opinion of this philosopher, that
it might indeed be true, but that it
was not probable. We have no
reason to suppose from the passage
that he wrote against Xenophanes;
still less to conclude, with Lorenz,
p. 122 sq., that Xenophanes attri-
buted a certain value to the percep-
tions of sense, and, for that reason,
was attacked by Epicharmus. Our
text contains nothing of the sort.
As to the awbitrary conjecture of
Karsten (Xenoph. Rell. 186 sq.,
endorsed by Polman-Kruseman,
Epicharmi Fragm. 118): ošta, ye
āppºrtet uáAAov eirely, } ãotrep
'Etréxapºos h Eévoq'. eitrov, Trägay
ôpôvres, &c., it is contrary to the
sense and to the context (cf. 1. 10
sq.), and is rightly rejected by
Schwegler (adh. l.).
* Cf. p. 529, 5, and Bernays,
doc. cit.
* Ap. Stob. Floril. 37, 16: 3
Tpótos évôpárotori Satuov &ya08s,
ois à Kal kakós. Cf. Heraclit. Fr.
57. Schleierm.: #60s yap &v6párq,
§aſuav. &
* Fragm, inc. 23, from Clem.
Strom. iv. 541 C: eige6}s row vojv
trequk&s oi ré6ous y ot,8&v kakov
karðavöv čva, to Tveijua Stauévet
kar’ oioavóv. Fr. 35 ap. Plut.
Consol. ad Apoll. 15, p. 110: kaxós
oëv 6 'Emixapuos, ovvekpt0m, p.mal
kal Stekotóm ical &mix9ev 89ey #x0e
TáAlv, Yā uèv eis Yāv, Tveijua 5’
āva" rí távöe XaAeróv; oióē gy.
* Fr. 46 in Boissonade Anecd.
i. 125: eigeºis 8tos uéyarov eq6-
Stov 6pmroſs Švi.
M. M. 2
532
THE PPTHAGOREAWS.
definite philosophic character," or else leaves us in
uncertainty whether it emanates at all from him,” or
was meant to express his own personal opinion.”
On
the whole we can clearly see that while Epicharmus
was no stranger to the philosophy of his time, he was
* E.g. Fr. 24 in Clem. Strom.
v. 597 C : oëbèv éicqeives to 6etov
rooro yiv6orkelv ore be? airbs orð’
&uáv Štróttas' &övvareſ 5’ obôºv
9eós. Fr. 25 (ibid. vii. 714 A);
ka9apov &v row votiv čxms ārav to
orópa Kabapos ei. Cf. the similar
passage from an anonymous poet
ap. Clem. Strom. iv. 531 C: to 0.
pºl Aoutpá &AA& v64 kaðapós; the
passage so often quoted, vows Śpé
ical vows &kovſet TáNAa Koºpó Ical
a vºxd (vide Polman-Kruseman, l.c.
82 sq.), which certainly contains
nothing contradictory to the ot;\os
ôpá, &c., of Xenophanes, as Welcker
supposes l. c. p. 353; the famous
saying: oiàels ēköv trovmpès (ibid.
p. 10 sq., cf. Arist. Eth. N. iii. 7,
ill 3 b, 14; Plato, Tim. 86 D),
which, moreover (cf. p. 116, 1),
really signifies that no one is volun-
tarily miserable; lastly, the asser-
tion that Epicharmus called the
stars and the elements gods (Me-
nander ap. Stob. Floril. 91, 29).
* This holds good especially of
the verses cited ap. Clem. Strom.
v. 605 A, on the human and divine
A6)0s. For, according to Aristox.
ap. Athen. xiv. 648 d, the work
from which these verses are
taken, the Polity, was foisted upon
Epicharmus by a certain Chryso-
gonus; and Schmidt, Qu. Epicharm.
17, confirms this assertion on
metrical grounds. It is probable
that the commencement only of the
work belongs to Chrysogonus,
where we find Pythagorean ideas,
6 Blos &v6párois Aoytoplot kāo.6400
betral tróvv, etc., the rest, on the
contrary, from the words, si èrt’
&v6pétrº Aoytopads, £ati kal 6eios
Aóryos, looks very like a Jewish or
Alexandrian Christian interpola-
tion. The statement according
to which (Vitruv. De Archit. viii.
pref. 1) Epicharmus held that there
were four elements, as Empedocles
did, is evidently based upon an ac-
cidental juxtaposition, such as we
find elsewhere (e.g. in AEschylus,
Prometh. 88 sq.). This is not
enough to justify our attributing to
Epicharmus the idea of the ele-
ments as conceived by Empedocles.
I know not what can have given
rise to Lorenz's assertion that the
fragments of the Epicharmus of
Ennius must be reckoned among
the most interesting writings that
remain to us of this Epicharmus.
* For example, the doctrine of
the flux of all things, professed by
Heracleitus, is humorously inter-
preted by this poet to mean (as
shown by Bernays, l.c. 286, from
|Plut. De s. mum. wind. c. 15, p.
559) that a man need not pay his
debts because he is not the identical
person who incurred them. It is
perhaps the same with the passage
in Cic. Tusc. i. 8, 15 : Emori molo
sed me esse mortuwm mihil astimo
(Sext. Math. i. 273, has incorrectly,
no doubt, &toflavéiv h rebvávat
oùuot Stapépet). This last propo-
sition, at any rate, seems to accord
very ill with the Pythagorean be-
lief in immortality. Welcker, l.c.
304 sq., well remarks (and Grono-
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC. 533
yet no exclusive adherent of any school,' but freely
appropriated from the opinions of his contemporaries
whatever seemed to him worthy of consideration.
T H E E L E A TIC S.
I. SOURCES. THE TREATISE ON MELISSUS,
AENOPHANES, AND GORGIAS.
THE works of the Eleatic philosophers have only been
handed down to us in isolated fragments.” Beside these,
the statements of Aristotle are our principal source of
information in regard to their doctrines. Then come
the supplementary accounts of more recent authors,
among whom Simplicius, through his personal know-
ledge of the Eleatic writings, and his careful employ-
ment of ancient authorities, ranks first. Full of lacunae
as all these sources are, they yet contain too much ;
and this superabundance has, at least in respect to the
founder of the school, been more prejudicial to a correct
estimate of the Eleatic doctrines than the scarcity of
original documents. We possess a treatise,” under the
vius and Lobeck agree) that the
stars, wind, &c., are called gods
by Epicharmus, not in his own
name, but when he is expounding
the Persian religion.
* Perhaps this is the reason
why Iambl., V. P. 266, reckons him
among the exoteric members of the
school ; but it may also be because
later writers found him deficient
in what they considered true Py-
thagoreanism.
* Those of Xenophanes, Parme-
nides, and Melissus have been col-
lected and annotated by Brandis
(Comment. Eleat.); those of Xeno-
phanes and Parmenides by Kar-
sten, Philosophorum Graec. Reliq.
They are given with a short com-
mentary by Mullach in his edi-
tion of the treatise, De Melisso,
etc.; and in the Fragm. Philos. Gr.
i. 99 Sqq.; 259 sqq.
* According to the usual title,
De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia;
Mullach in his edition, repeated
Fragm. i. 271 sqq., substitutes for
this, De Melisso, Xenophane et
Gorgia. On the text, authenticity,
and contents of this work, cf. F.
534 THE ELEATICS.
name of Aristotle, which expounds and criticises the
doctrines of two Eleatic philosophers, and the similar
arguments of Gorgias. But who these two philoso-
phers are, and what is the historical value of the trea-
tise, there is no certain evidence to show. The greater
number of texts give the title of the work thus: “Con-
cerning Xenophanes, Zeno and Gorgias.” Others have
only the more general title, ‘Concerning the opinions,'
or ‘Concerning the opinions of the philosophers. Of
the particular divisions of this work, the first section
(c. 1, 2) is usually thought to relate to Xenophanes;
but in some of the manuscripts, and especially in the
Leipzig Codex, which is the best, to Zeno; while the
second section (c. 3, 4), to which the name of Zeno is
most frequently attached, is referred by the same
authorities to Xenophanes." There can be no doubt,
however, that the first section treats neither of Xeno-
phanes nor of Zeno, but of Melissus. This is clearly
asserted” in the work itself, and the contents are of
subh a nature that they can relate to no other person.
For as we learn from the express testimony of Aris-
totle,” it was Melissus who first maintained the un-
limitedness of the One Being (c. i. 974 a, 9), whereas
Kern : Quapstionum Xenophanearum
capita duo. Naumb. 1864. Symbolæ
critica ad libell. Arisiot. T. Eevoºp.
etc., Oldenb. 1867. Osoſppdatov tr.
Mexigorov Philologus, vol. xxvi. 271
sqq.; Beitrag 2. Darst, d. Philoso-
phie d. Xenoph. Danzig, 1871.
Ueber 2 enophanes v. Kol. Stettin,
1874.
Cf. the proofs in Bekker and
Mullach. - 3.
* C 4, 977 b, 21 ; cf. c 1, sub
init. and 974 b, 20, c. 2, 975 a,
21 ; c. 6, 979 b, 21 ; cf. c. 1, 974
a, 11 b, 8. In c. 2, 976 a, 32 a.
clear distinction is drawn between
the philosopher whose doctrine had
been expounded in the chapter, and
Xenophanes; and c. 5, 979 a, 22
presupposes that Melissus has pre-
viously been spoken of.
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 18; cf.
Phys, iii. 5, 207 a, 15.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC. 535
Xenophanes gave no opinion on this question, and the
reasons which are here, according to the ordinary theory,
placed in the mouth either of Xenophanes or Zeno,
belong, according to the undoubtedly authentic state-
ments of Aristotle, and the fragments of Melissus which
Simplicius has preserved, to Melissus." For the rest,
this harmony with ancient testimony serves to ratify
the contents of this chapter, if we connect it with
Melissus; and there seems no alternative in that case
but to suppose a wrong title. In the second section,
on the contrary, not only the person to whom it relates,
but also the credibility of the contents, is questionable.
The various texts, as we have seen, connect it some-
times with Zeno,” sometimes with Xenophanes.
* As has been shown by Bran-
dis (Comment. Eleat. 186 sqq., 200
sq.; Gr. Röm. Philos. i. 398 sqq.),
and previously by Spalding (Vindi-
cite Philosoph. Megaricorum Sub-
jecto Commentario in priorem parti
libelli de Xenoph. Zenone, et Gorgia,
Berlin, 1793). Our discussion on
Melissus later on will also make it
clear. Röth, Geschicht. d. Abendl.
Phil. ii. b, 28, sees not the smallest
reason to refer c. 1 sq. to Melissus.
This was to be expected, since he
(ibid. a, 186) contemptuously dis-
misses all doubt as to the authen-
ticity of the work; but it does not
alter the state of the case. His
detailed examination of Xeno-
phanes also (l.c. a, 174–242 b, 22–
42) contains scarcely anything
which is either not already known,
or which is tenable. His chief dis-
covery (a, 188, 216, &c.) that
Xenophanes developed his opinions
in persistent opposition to those of
Anaximander, and formed his
The
theory of God especially, with con
stant reference to Anaximander's
‘viereinigen’ conception of God—
apart from its want of any histori-
cal foundation—is inadmissible,
since it starts from wholly arbi-
trary and wrong notions of Anaxi-
mander. We cannot, however, hope
for much aid in the comprehension
of the writing attributed to Aris-
totle, from a commentary which
can so deal with its text, as to find
(p. 208) in the proposition that
‘nothing is nowhere’ (that is, in
no space) the identity of infinite
space with nothing.
* In the chapter on Gorgias (c.
5, 979, a, 21) we read: āti oilk
ëorrup otte èv oëre troXA&, oùre
&yévvmta otte yevöueva, tº uév &s
MéAlagos r& 5’ &s Zīva v čtrixelpe?
ôelkview weró. Thu tätov attoo &tró-
6etćiv, etc.; c. 6, 979 b, 25: p.m-
6apoi, 5è by oiâèv eival (sc. Topyías
Aapóðvel) kata tou Zhuovos Aóyov
trepi Tàs x&pas; ibid. line 36, ac-
536
THE EI.E.A.TICS.
ty
author himself subsequently alludes to communications
concerning Zeno, which we might suppose to be con-
tained in the third chapter : but his allusions are
much more explicable on the theory that a part of the
work which is now lost related to Zeno; and this
would agree with the fact that in the chapter before us
Zeno is brought forward in a manner that would be im-
possible' if the context directly treated of him.
cording to Mullach's continuation :
Tö yöp &Gróaaróv, pnotiv, où6év, #xau
yvápmy trapatama tav Tó row Zīva wos
Aóryº. That other demonstrations
of Zeno are here meant, which are
not spoken of in our treatise, I
cannot believe. With what right
could the author assume in readers
who had been first instructed by
himself concerning the opinions of
Melissus and Xenophanes—such
intimate acquaintance with the
doctrines of Zeno, that he might
thus refer to them, as to something
they knew perfectly well ? Were
there no better solution, I should
prefer to admit the possibility (as
in the first editions of this work)
that these allusions refer to passa-
ges in the second section, and,
therefore, not to Xenophanes but
to Zeno. The passage from c. 5
would then (with c. 1, 974 a, 2, 11)
have to be referred to c. 3, where
the unity and eternity of God are
proved. Our author indeed says
that Gorgias partly follows Zeno
and partly Melissus, in proving
that Being is neither one nor many,
neither become nor unbecome.
But this is no obstacle ; for neither
Zeno nor Melissus can have ad-
vanced arguments against the
unity and eternity of Being.
Gorgias, therefore, could only have
employed their demonstrations in
Ought
support of the thesis that Being
is not a Plurality and not become;
not to prove that Being is not a
Unity and not underived. Conse-
quently if even the words of our
author assert the latter doctrine,
he must certainly be expressing his
meaning inaccurately. (The objec-
tion of Kern, Qu. Xen. 42 to this
opinion is irrelevant, and is directed
against an interpretation of the
passage for which I am not respon-
sible.) The passages from c. 6
might be referred to c. 3, 977 b,
13: To yap wº) by oiöapu?, sivat ;
these words, however, would not
be sufficient to explain the allu-
Sions, even if we call to our assist-
ance the fundamental proposition
(ibid. l. 5): oiov to whov oik &v sival
Tö jv. It seems to me more likely
that the passages cited from c. 5 sq.
allude to a lost portion of this
work, which treated of Zeno.
Perhaps c. 2, 976 a, 25, also refers
to this lost portion. In Diog. v.
25, a book, trpès rê Zīvovos, is actu-
ally mentioned among the writings
of Aristotle, together with the trea—
tises on Melissus, Gorgias and Xe-
nophanes.
* In his criticism (c. 4, 978 b,
37) of the opinions expounded in
c. 3, the reply which the author
makes to the assertion (977 b, 11
sqq.) that the Deity cannot move,
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC.
537
we then to infer that the author is alluding in this sec-
tion, not to Zeno, but to Xenophanes? In that case it is
somewhat strange that in an exposition of the Eleatic
doctrine the founder of the school should occupy a place
between Melissus and Gorgias.
This, however, may
be explained on the hypothesis that the order in which
the writer discusses the Eleatic philosophers is regu-
lated, not according to their historical connection, but
because all motion presupposes a
plurality of things, of which one
moves into the other (i.e. the place
of the other), is as follows. The
Deity also could move into another
oãauðs yöp Aéyet är i čv ſuávov (so
Yern, Quast. 35, completes the
text), &AA’ 3rt eſs uévos 6ebs ei Šč
kal airbs (instead of this we should
probably read with Bergk, De Arist.
lib. de Xen. Zen. et Gorg. Marb.
1843, p. 36 sq.) si èë kal u% airbs, if
even he himself dots not move into
another—other conjectural reading,
in Kern, l.c. Tí kwxWei eis &AAmAa
kivovuévov ráv wepôv toº . . . kū-
KAq, pe . . . 6eov (here might be
read : T. u. Tod travros [or roß
ãAov] kūkaq, pépeo 6al Tov 0eóv.
FCern, on account of Felician's
translation, quid vetat partes omitia
ambientis Dei in Sese mutuo moveri,
conjectures: T. p. rob travra trepié-
Xovtos 6800; but this translation,
if it be literal, would necessitate a
great alteration in the text; if it
be not so, ambientis may be refer-
red to the KökAq, which is not
otherwise translated) of y&p 6% to
Totoorov, the év čotrep & Zhvav
troAA& eival phael. (So in Cod.
Lips. and elsewhere, the Vulgata is
q)`joret) airbs yúp orópa sival Aéo et Tov
6eóv, etc. In the second edition of
this work I objected to the words,
$grep & Zhvav, because the asser-
tion that the one would become a
multiplicity if it changed its place
(and this assertion can alone be in
question here: the rotoorov čv
would be the kūkāq, pepópevos 6eós)
is to be found in the extract from
Melissus, c. 1, 974 a, 18 sqq., and
is nowhere (not even ap. Themist.
Phys. 18 o, p. 122 Sp.) attributed
to Zeno. I conjectured, therefore,
that àortrep ought to be rejected;
or MéAtooros substituted for Zhvav ;
or still more probably, as it seemed
to me, that the words āoritep 6
Zīvov, which certainly relate to an
earlier passage of the book, had
been added by the person who re-
ferred c. I to Zeno. If, however,
the work originally contained a
discussion on Zeno (vide previous
note), the conjecture is superfluous.
The words would then relate to
that discussion. The particular
meaning of the words is immaterial
in regard to the present enquiry.
Meantime I see no reason to aban-
don my former explanation, ac-
cording to which the words oë 7&p,
etc., assert the following: ‘for our
adversary cannot object, like Zeno,
that such a One revolving in a circle
would not be One at all (more cor-
rectly is not, for there is no àv be-
fore sival), for he himself calls the
Deity spherical.’
538 THE ELEATICS.
from a dogmatic point of view. Just as in a famous
passage of the Metaphysics, Aristotle mentions Par-
menides first, then Melissus, and after them Xeno-
phanes; so, in this work, the author deals first with
those Eleatics who maintain that Being is limited—viz.,
Zeno, and no doubt Parmenides; * next with Melissus,
who also maintains that it is unlimited; next with
Xenophanes, who says that it is neither limited nor un-
limited; and, lastly, with Gorgias, who not only denies
that Being is cognisable, but also denies Being itself. But
if this destroys the theory that Zeno is the philosopher
indicated in the third chapter,” still less can we discover
in the exposition any accurate account of his doctrines."
The philosopher here mentioned is represented as having
denied Becoming and Multiplicity, “ in reference to the
Divinity,’” and he is accordingly made to develope the
* Wide infra, p. 547, 1.
* Philoponus, Phys. B, 9, is the
only authority who says that there
existed a treatise on Parmenides
attributed to Aristotle: pag i ö& Kal
ºyeydq6al airó ibíg 8138tov trpós Tºv
IIappevičov 66&av. The statement,
however, has much in its favour,
as it is scarcely credible that any
one who treated of the Eleatics
would pass over Parmenides. If we
accept it as true, we might refer
c. 2, 976 a., 5 ; c. 4,978 b, 8 of our
treatise to this portion of the work.
Only it must have been lost at a
very early period, for it is not men-
tioned in the catalogue of Diogenes.
3 Cf. Fries. Gesch. d. Phºl. i.
157 sq. 167; Marbach, Gesch. d.
Phil. i. 145 sq.; Schleiermacher,
Gesch. d. Phil. 61 sq.; Ueberweg,
vide next note, and see also the first
edition of the present work.
* This is presupposed by Fries
and Marbach. Schleiermacher l.c.
says more cautiously that we
have here the opinions of Zeno ex-
pressed in the language of Xeno-
phanes, and that the whole is
merely patched together. More
recently Ueberweg, Ueber d, histor.
Werth der Schrift De Melisso, &c.
(Philologus, viii. 104 sqq.) tried to
establish the above-named theory
more firmly. Eventually, however,
he altered his opinion on the sub-
ject, and declared that the author
was probably treating of Xeno-
phanes, but gave no trustworthy
1nformation either of him or of
Zeno (Grundriss, i. section 17).
As he expressly alludes to my
counter-remarks, I cannot well
omit them in the present edition.
* Tooro Aéyov ćirl roß 6eoû, c.
3, Sub init.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC. 539
proof of his assertion primarily in relation to this alone,
although his reasons for the most part admit of a more
general application. No such restriction of Zeno's doc-
trimes is recognised by any of the ancient accounts:
they all agree that Zeno, like Parmenides, denied Be-
coming and Multiplicity in general. Xenophanes alone,
as we shall see, connected his whole polemic against the
ordinary point of view with the theological question;
whereas, with the exception of what we find in the
treatise we are considering, not a single theological pro-
position has been handed down to us as Zemo's. Al-
though, therefore, it is quite conceivable that Zeno
may have called the One Being also God, yet it is not
probable that in his demonstration he limited himself
to proving that the Deity is eternal, sole, &c. On the
contrary, what he aimed at was to show generally that
Plurality and Becoming are nowhere possible." Our
text consequently maintains, in respect of the Eleatic
philosopher it discusses, that which could only be said
of Xenophanes; and the further development of his
propositions is connected with Xenophanes in a manner
which we cannot assume in the case of Zeno.” It is
* As Plato says, Parm. 127 C Fr. 4 (according to Karsten's
S amendments): aiel 5' év tatt & Te
Q.
* In the passage De Mel. c. 3,
977 a, 36, we find this statement:
éva 3’ &vra [Tov 9ebv) &Motov sival
tdvt m, Öpáv Te Kai &kočev tás Te
&AAas aio.6%iorets #xovra travrm, a
manifest imitation of Xenophanes
(Fr. 2): of Aos épé, of Aos 3& voeſ,
očAos 6é T' &kočei. Cf. p. 454, 2;
457, 3; 3rd ed. ; also,977 b, ll: The
Deity is not moved, kiveiròat 8& rà.
traeto èvra évos, Tepov, yāp eis
érepov čeſv kweto 6ai. Cf. Xenoph.
prevew kivoguevov oièëv oběč uétép-
xeo (at utv étutpéret &AAore &AA).
Further, what relates to the proof
of the unity of God, 977 a, 23
sqq., is quite in accordance with
what Plut. (ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i.
8, 5) says of Xenophanes: ätro-
qatveral 3& kal trepi 6eóvá's oièepuās
h'yeptovías €v airgi's oiſorms of y&p
ãotov Šeatrógeq 0aí riva Bečv, for
Xenophanes could only draw from
it the conclusion he did, on the
540 THE ELEATICS.
true that Parmenides and Melissus attribute to Being
the same unity, uniformity, and immobility, that
Xenophanes does to God. But the fact that they attri-
bute these qualities not to God, but to Being, shows
most clearly how great was the advance from Xeno-
phanes to Parmenides. There is no doubt that Zeno
strictly adhered to the doctrine of Parmenides. That
he should have abandoned the metaphysical view of the
fundamental doctrine of the Eleatics, wherein the chief
merit of Parmenides consists, and should have gone back
to the more imperfect theological view, is not probable.
But the manner in which the Deity is here spoken
of is no less surprising. It is described as neither
limited nor unlimited, neither moved nor unmoved; but
although it is without limit, it is said to be spherical in
form. How is this possible? In his critique of ordinary
opinion, Zeno regards as a sufficient proof of its falsity
the fact that it attributes opposite predicates to the
same things at the same time." Is it likely then that
he himself would have attributed such mutually ex-
clusive predicates to the Deity ? Ueberweg thinks
that he did not intend to attribute them, but to deny
them, in order thus to exalt the Deity above the whole
sphere of extension and temporality.” But this inten-
supposition that he did not hold a
plurality of gods. That the Deity
is underived, was also first declared
by Xenophanes. Lastly, the state-
ment that the Deity is neither
limited nor unlimited, neither
moved nor unmoved, must be re-
garded as a misapprehension of
the utterances of Aristotle, and of
Theophrastus concerning Xeno-
phanes; it must, however, be con-
nected with Xenophanes and not
with Zeno, who, as far as we know,
gave no opening for such a state-
ment.
* Plato, loc. cit., other authori-
ties will be cited infra.
* Similarly, on the supposition
that we have here a true report of
Xenophanes, cf. Kern, Qu. Xen.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC. 541
tion is so little shown by our Eleatic philosopher, that
he expressly describes the Deity as globe-shaped; the
historical Zeno, moreover, denies all reality to that
which is not extended." It is incredible that Zeno
should have maintained these theories of his master,
if the idea of God being uncontained in space were
admitted by him; and still more incredible is it that
so acute a thinker should have believed in the spherical
form, while he denied the limitation of the Deity.
Internal contradictions can be discovered in Zeno as
in other philosophers, but they can be recognised as
contradictions only by means of inferences which he
did not himself draw. There is no example in his
doctrines of so palpable and direct a combination of
what is contradictory, as this work imputes to him.”
Nor is this work a trustworthy authority for the
doctrines of Xenophanes.
A guarantee for the authen-
ticity of its exposition is indeed supposed” to be found
11 sqq. But Kern has since
(Beitrag, 17) considerably modified
this opinion. Wide infra, p. 548, 1.
1. Cf. the following note. Fur-
ther details in the chapter on Zeno.
* Ueberweg says that Zeno,
according to Themist. Phys. 18 a
(122 sq.), and Simpl. Phys, 30 a.
declared the Real to be indivisible
and extended, and yet, according
to Arist. Metaph. iii. 4, 1001 b, 7,
maintained that the One could not
be indivisible, for if it were so, it
would not be a quantity, and con-
sequently would be nothing. But
Aristotle does not say that Zeno
actually asserted this ; he only
says that from the presupposition
of Zeno, “that which, being added
to another, does not increase that
other, and being taken from
another, does not make that other
less, is nothing;' it would follow
that the One must be a quantity,
and therefore not indivisible. This
is undoubtedly the meaning of the
Aristotelian passage, as is clear
not only from the words themselves,
but from what Simplicius adduces,
l. c. p. 21. The expression quoted
by Themistins would be irrelevant
here, for it relates to the many
and not to the One. Cf. p. 498, 1,
3rd ed.
* This holds good of the ancient
writers without exception; also of
Steinhart, Pl. W. W. iii. 394, 10,
and Mullach, Praef. xiv. (Fragm.
Philos. Gr. i. 271 sqq., where the
Praefatio of the year 1845 is
542 THE ELEATIOS.
in Theophrastus, from whom the similar statements
of Simplicius and Bessarion as to Xenophanes are said
to be borrowed. But this theory is very improbable.
Bessarion was unmistakeably quoting, not from some
writing of Theophrastus now lost, but solely and entirely
from the passage in Simplicius’ Physics, in which that
commentator, appealing to Theophrastus, expounds the
doctrine of Xenophanes in harmony with the third
chapter of our treatise.” Simplicius, however, is not
indebted to Theophrastus for all that he says about
printed without alteration), though
he doubts the authenticity and
entire credibility of this treatise.
IKern, Beitr. 2; Xenoph. 8; cf. Qu.
Aon. 48 sq., derives the statement
of Simplicius from the Physics of
Theophrastus, and accounts for its
similarity with our writing, by
conjecturing the latter to have
been a sketch of Theophrastus,
which he himself used for that
particular passage in the Physics.
1 C. Calumniat, Plat. ii. 11, p.
32 b (printed in Brandis, Comm.
El. 17 sq.; Mullach, p. xi. of his
separate edition, i. 274 Fragmenta;
Hern. Qu. 44 sq.): [Theophrastus]
Memophanem, quem Parmenides au-
divit aſque secutus est, nequaquam
inter physicos numerandum sedalio
loco constituendum censet. Nomine,
inquit, unius et universi Deum
Aºnophanes appellavit, quod unum
ingenium-immobile aeternum dirit;
ad haec, aliquo quidem mode, neque
#nfinitum megue finitum, alto vero
modo etiam finitum, tum etiam con-
globatum, diversa. Scilicet motitiae
ratione, mentem etiam universum
hoc idem esse affirmavit. t
2 Kern, Qu. Xen. 44 sqq. (in
agreement with Brandis, l, c., Kar-
sten, Xenoph. Rell. 107, and others),
has indeed sought to prove the
contrary, in opposition to Krische,
Forsch. 92 sq., and myself; but he
has now withdrawn this opinion
(Beitr. 6 Ann.). Bessarion's ac-
count of Xenophanes really con-
tains nothing that might not have
been taken from Simplicius, only
that Bessarion seems to have been
careless in the use of his authority.
Even what he adds immediately
after the words quoted above can
only have come from Simplicius
(l. c. and p. 7 b, 15 b), though he
reproduces his statements very in-
accurately when he says: Nee vero
Theophrastus solus haec dia'if; sed
Nicolaus quoque Damascenus et
Alexander Aphrodisiensis eaden de
A'enophane referunt (for the real
state of the case, cf. p. 549, 1),
opusque Melissi de ente et natura
inscriptum dicunt (this is said only
by Simplicius, 15 b). Parmenidis
de veritate et opinatione (this is said
neither by Simplicius, nor the
others; but Simplicius does say,
7, 6: Metex8&v . . . 6 IIappevſöms
. &to &Amfleias, Ös airós (pmoiv,
éri 865&v). In the same way as
Rern has already shown, Qu. 47,
the foregoing is merely a repro-
duction of Simpl. Phys, 7.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC,
543
Xenophanes, but only for an introductory remark, which
tells us nothing more than we find in Aristotle's Meta-
physics."
* His words are, Phys. 5 b:
wſaw ös thy &px?iv firot ev to by Ical
Tràu, kal otre retrepaguévov otte
&trepov, oùre kivotſuevov otte hpe-
padv, Eevoſpávmu Töv KoMoq6vtov Tov
IIappevíðou StădakaAov Štrotíðeorðaſ
qmoriy 6 0eóqpao ros, ÖpioWoryöv čté-
pas sival uáAAov 3) Tâs trepi pāorea's
iorropſas Thy pºvhumv ràs toūtov
66öms. These words may easily be
taken to mean nothing more than
what Aristotle says, Metaph. i. 5,
986 b, 21 : Xenophanes never an-
nounced whether he conceived the
One primitive essence as limited or
unlimited ; Theophrastus adds that
he also never explained whether he
conceived it as at rest or in motion.
Nothing obliges us to conclude
from these statements that Xeno-
phanes expressly taught that the
One was neither limited nor un-
limited, neither at rest nor in
motion. This is certainly asserted
by the treatise, De Melisso. Sim-
plicius, in putting the statement
of Theophrastus into the third
person, may have condensed it
or altered it : this is not at all un-
likely. But even supposing Theo-
phrastus really to have written,
atav 8& Thu &px?iv . . . hpeuotiv E.
6 Koxopóvios é IIappeviñov Štědaka-
Aos ūtrott0etal. I do not see what
hinders us from translating it
thus: “Yenophanes regards the
principle as One, i.e. he regards
the totality of Being as One; and
neither as something limited nor
unlimited, neither as something
moved nor unmoved.” The objec-
tion of Kern, Qw. x.50; Beitr. 4, 6 :
that because the verbal conception
is not denied it must be explained
The rest he brings forward in his own name,
thus: ‘He considers the 8v Ical trav
as neither limited nor unlimited, I
confess I do not understand. In
the sentence, oùre tretrepaguévov
offre &repov in ottòeral, the nega-
tion may as well refer to the firo-
Tíðetal as to the retrepagu. and the
&repov; it may either mean, He
conceives it neither as limited nor
unlimited; ' or, ‘he conceives it as
neither limited nor unlimited.' It
must mean the former, unless Theo-
phrastus is to contradict the state-
ment of Aristotle (vide p. 547, 1).
This is highly improbable, for
Theophrastus, in the very chapter
on Physics from which our frag-
ment is taken, is in close agree-
ment with the first book of
Aristotle's Metaphysics. Wide his
observations on Parmenides and
Anaxagoras (infra, § Parm., and
Sup?'a, p. 233, 1), compared with
Arist. Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 18 sqq.;
c. 8, 989 a, 30 sqq., and his Fr. 48
(ap. Simpl. Phys. 6 b); cf. Arist.
Metaph. i. 6 sub init. It cannot
be urged that, because Xenophanes
(in Fr. 4, quoted p. 539, 2), de-
clared God to be unmoved, he
never could have been said to have
withheld his opinion as to the
movement of the Śv kal trav. Xeno-
phanes, in Fr. 4, is combating the
mythical notions about the wander-
ings of the gods, such as those of
Zeus and Poseidon to AEthiopia,
and maintains as his opinion that
the Deity remains unmoved, év
Taütó; whether the world, the ºv
kal trav is also unmoved, he does
not say. It appears from other
accounts, however, that he was far
from denying movement to the
544
THE ELEATICS.
without saying whence he derives it; but his mode of
expression shows” that it was not from the same source
(namely, the Physics of Theophrastus) as the more
general quotation.
world, and consequently we have
no right to apply to the world
what he says of God (l.c.). If
it be so applied, however, Kern's
explanation of the passage in
Theophrastus is excluded as well
as mine. For, if Xenophanes had
said that the trav remained un-
moved, and for ever in the same
place, or in other words, that it
was not moved, but at rest ; in
that case no one could have said
that Xenophanes declared it to be
neither unmoved nor at rest. g
Simplicius proceeds immedi-
ately after 66;ms, with the direct
narration, to Yap *w toºto ſcal trów,
&c. p. 475. Although it does not
follow that that which comes next
cannot have been borrowed from
Theophrastus, it is, the more cer-
tain, that the exposition of Simpl.
does not justify usin asserting that
it was borrowed from him.
2 It clearly results from the ad-
dition, Öpoxoyöv, &c. (p. 541, 3),
that the previous citation is taken
from Theophrastus, qvourh ia topia,
which, we know from other sources,
contained mention of Xenophanes
and Parmenides, and of most of the
ancient philosophers, vide Diog.
ix. 22; Stob. Ecl. i. 522; Alex.
Aphr. in Metaph. i. 3, 984 b, 1, p.
24 Bon; Simpl. Phys. 25 a, etc.;
in this treatise, however, ac-
cording to his own declaration,
Theophrastus cannot have spoken
very fully of Xenophanes, Kern
(Bär. 3) says that Theophrastus
may have had a reason for his
criticism, and subsequent Omission
The source, it is evident from
of the philosophy of Xenophanes in
his Physics in his having given a
short exposition of it to his readers.
But such a procedure seems to me
improbable, and the analogies
which Kern (l. c.) adduces from
Aristotle, irrelevant. It may be
thought (Brandis, Comm. El. 17;
Rern, Quast. 00; Beitr. 2) that
Simplicius would have said the
same, even if his further state-
ments had not been founded upon
Theophrastus. But it might rather
be expected that he would some-
where have indicated it, if he had
found the same in Theophrastus.
He only says, however, that Theo-
phrastus in his Physics declined
the discussion of Xenophanes'
philosophy. Kern thinks that the
agreement of the account of Xeno-
phanes (to Yap ev, etc.), with the
words previously quoted from Theo-
phrastus, is incomprehensible if
this account be not taken from
Theophrastus. But the question
is whether the words are to be
understood in the same sense as
this account. Kern lastly remarks:
Simplicius not only names Theo-
phrastus before the discussion con-
cerning Xenophanes; but he
names Nicolaus and Alexander
after it. I know not what this re-
mark is intended to show. He
names his sources where he intends
to support his opinion upon their
evidence. But it does not follow
that he supports his opinion on
their evidence when he does not
mention them.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC.
545
the similarity both of the ideas and the language in
the two expositions, can be
1. Cf. the two texts, Simpl.: To
'yūp #v Toºro kal trav row 6eov čAeyev
ô Eevo pávns, 8v čva pºév Šetkvvaty
ék Toi trčvrov kpóttarov eiwat TAeté-
pov ydp, pnoſiv, Üvrov, Öpioios àváy-
km intrópxelv Träori to kpateſv' to 6&
trövtov kpáttoºrov kai &ptorov 66eós.
&yevntov Šē éðeticvvev čk rot be?v to
ºvywówevov h éé àpotov h éé àvouotov
ºyſºyveg 6al &AA& To uév Šuotov &tra-
6és quoruv Štrb roo 6plotov oièëv y&p
uāAAov yeuvâv 3 yevvaa flat trpooikei
Tô 6potov čk row Śpotov. ei 6 &# &vo-
*otov yi-yvouro, #otal to by éic too
wh Övros. kal oitos &yévmtov Kal
&íðtov čeſkvv. kal oire 68 &treupov
oùre retrepaguévov eival: 5tóri &repov
puév to u% ov, &s otte (uſite) &px?iv
ëxov uſive uéorov white téaos, Tepal-
weiv 8& irpos &AAm?\a rā traeto. And a
little further on : &AA’ 3rt pºv otte
&Teipov oëre retrepaguévov airo Set-
icvvoriv, Čk Töv trposipmuévov 67Aov.
"retrepaguévov 8& kal orgapoeiðès airb
61& to travrox60ev Šuotov Aéyet.)
traparamoria's 5è kai civnow & pape?
ical peptav' &cívntov prev Yap eival
To uh Üv oire yūp eis atto èrepov,
oùre airo trpos &AAo èA9etv' kiveto 9at
6é Tó, TAeta toû £vós' repov yūp eis
*repov were 84AA iv. De Xenoph. c.
3: āśāvaróv pnoſiv eival, et Ti čott,
'yevéoréal, Totto Aéyav ćirl too 6600.
. . . ei 3’ &otiv 66eos àtrávrav icpá-
Two row ºva pnoſiv airby irpoofirely
eival. ei yüp São h TAetous elev, oùic
&v éri Kpdºria row kai 8éAtlatov
airby eival tróvrov. čkaa tos yöp &v
Töv troAAóv Šuotas &v totooros eim.
Tooro y&p 6ebv Kal 6.e00 6twauiv
eival, kparetv, &AA& un kpateto 6at,
kai trčvrov kpátiatov sival, etc.
&öövarov-6eoû (vide sup.) &váykm
7&p #To £3 6ſlotov h é; &vouotov
ºyevé00ai to yiyväuevov. Övvarov Šč
WOL. I.
*g
ſº
gº
no other than the work on
où6érepov offre yap &pouov šq’ 6plotov
trpoofikely Tekwoffival páñAov 7) re-
Kvægat Taita yap &mavta roſs ye
tools ical 6potots oix Stépxely trpos
&AAmAa ott' àv é; ávouotov tává-
uotov yevégéal. ei hºp yiyvouro €;
ão 9eveotépou to ioxupérepov, etc.
. . . to by éé oik Švros &vºyevéa 9am,
8trep &öövarov' &tauov pièv obv Ště.
Taira eival Töv 6eóv. . . . &#8tov
6° àvra kal éva kal orgapoeiðfjoir'
&Teipov eival oite tretrepdv6at. &ret-
pov učv to pººl by eival route yāp
oire &px?iv oište uéorov oãre réAos
oiſte §AAo uépos oióèv éxeiv . .
ofov 8& To u}, by oik &v eival ºrb Šv.
Trepaively 8& Tpos &AAmAa ei TAsia,
elm . . . To 5% rotodrov by év . . .
oùre kiveto 6al otre &Kívmtov sivat.
&kivmtov učv yöp sival to ph v.
ošte 'yūp eis airb érºpov, oùr' airb
eis &AAo èA6eiv. Kiveto 6al 6&T& TAetw
ãvra évés' repov yap eis repov beiv
kiveto 6at, etc. This resemblance
in the two accounts cannot be ex-
plained by a common use of the
work of Xenophanes (as Bergk
well observes, Comment, de Arist.
lib. de Xen. 6), for this work,
being a poem, had quite another
form. Our comparison will also
show that there is absolutely
nothing in the account of Simpli-
cius which might not be regarded
as an extract from the so-called
Aristotelian writing. The order
of the arguments is sometimes dif-
ferent, and the expressions are
once or twice altered——but that is
of little consequence; and what
Simplicius adds: śare kal &rav čv
raité uévetv Aéym kai uh kiveforbal
(aiel 5’ &v Taité te pléveuv, etc.)
où karū rºv hpepfav thu ävruketué-
vmy Tä kuſho'el uévely airów pmgiv,
N N
546
THE ELEATICS.
Melissus, &c., which we are considering. We need not
therefore resort to the theory that Simplicius attributed
this work to Theophrastus,' or that the work actually
originated with this Peripatetic philosopher,” in order
to explain his evidence.”
etc., is not an extract, but his own
reflection. But even if it be ad-
mitted that Simplicius has been
dependent upon the work concern-
1ng Melissus, there is not the least
ground for making this direct de-
pendence (Kern, vide sup. p. 541,
1) indirect by conjecturing, that
Simplicius first made use of Theo-
phrastus’ Physics, and that Theo-
phrastus in his Physics made use
of the treatise repl Mex. For, on
the one hand, there is no proof of
Simplicius having used the Physics
of Theophrastus; indeed, the con-
trary may be proved from his own
words; and on the other hand, the
agreement between his exposition
and the treatise trepi MeN. is so
complete, that it can only be fully
explained on the supposition that
Simplicius made direct use of
that treatise, and we have no
right to ignore this most obvious
and simple theory in favour of
some other that is more recondite
and artificial. The contents of the
treatise on Melissus we know; that
Simplicius was acquainted with
this treatise is beyond question;
that it is adequate for the expla–
nation of his account is obvious.
When such a simple result is ob-
tained by reckoning with known
quantities, there can be no possi-
ble inducement or justification for
introducing such unknown and un-
certain elements as the supposed
exposition of Xenophanes in the
Physics of Theophrastus, and the
dependence of that exposition on
His statements merely prove
the treatise tr. Mextorolov —even if
Theophrastus had not expressly
declared that such an exposition
did not belong to the Physics.
And the same holds good against
Teichmüller's theory (Stud. 2.
Gesch. d. Begr. 593 sq.), that Sim-
plicius had before him, besides the
treatise tr. Mea. the same exposi.
tion as the writer of that treatise—
viz., an exposition of Xenophanes'
doctrine, which was composed by
some later Eleatic. His account
contains nothing whatever that
cannot be explained by his having
used the Pseudo-Aristotelian book,
and the verse of Xenophanes,
though not word for word. We
have, therefore, no right to seek
out other sources, traces of which,
had they existed, must somewhere
have been evident in the work.
* As is done by the Vatican
IMS.
* As Brandis (Gr. Röm. Phil.
i. 158; iii. a, 291); Cousin (Fragm.
Philos. i. 25, 7); and more deci-
dedly Kern (sup. p. 544, 2) conjec-
ture. In the Comment. El. 18,
Brandis refuses to admit Aristotle's
authorship of the work, yet he refers
it only indirectly to Theophrastus.
In the Gesch. d. Entw. d. Gr. Phil.
i. 83, he allows the possibility of
its having been written by some
later Peripatetic.
* The objection of Brandis
(Comment. El. 18) that Simplicius
would not have mentioned Theo-
phrastus as his source and omitted
the name of Aristotle, had he at-
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC. 547
that he was acquainted not only with the remark of
Theophrastus in his Physics which he mentions, but
also with the work on Melissus, &c., no matter under
whose name it passed ; that he regarded this work as a
genuine source of history, and that in his copy the
third and fourth chapters referred to Xenophanes.
This precedent, however, cannot, it is plain, furnish
any criterion for us. The contents of the chapter do
not agree with what we know on ancient authority re-
specting Xenophanes. While Xenophanes himself de-
clares the divinity to be unmoved," this work says it is
neither moved nor unmoved; *
tributed the work he was using to
Aristotle, is hardly well founded.
Simplicius tells us much about the
ancient philosophers, which he only
knew from Aristotle, without
naming his authority.
* In Fr. 4, quoted p. 539, 2.
* What Simplicius says (sup.
p. 546), and Kern (Quast. 11)
adopted, but has since, Beitr., p.
17, abandoned, in solution of this
contradiction, explains nothing, and
credits Xenophanes with distinc-
tions of ideas, which are unknown
before the time of Aristotle. Kern,
therefore, has another theory ready,
to which he comes back in Beitr. 4
—viz., that Xenophanes at first
denied motion of the Deity, and
subsequently, rest. Now we cannot
but allow the possibility that this
philosopher may have changed his
opinion. But to establish the
fact of such a change, we must have
distinct signs and evidences of it;
and these are to be found neither
in the verse of Timon, discussed
p. 464, 1, third edition, nor in the
fragment of Xenophanes (on which
cf. p.inf. p. 559). None of our autho-
and while Aristotle
rities in regard to Xenophanes
mention any alteration in his point
of view, nor does the work we are
considering. All, except this work
and the passage in Simplicius,
which depends upon it, assert that
he denied motion, and not rest, to
the Deity (cf. p. 455, 6, third edi-
tion). We have, therefore, no right
to suppose that our authorities
were in possession of utterances to
the contrary. This theory is a
conjecture intended to reconcile
the statements of our treatise with
other evidence; but the conjecture
would only be justifiable, if we
were sure of the accuracy of those
statements. Lastly, Teichmüller,
Stud. 2. Gesch. d. Begr. 619 sq.,
attempts to avoid the contradiction
by remarking that Xenoph. indeed
denied the movement of the uni-
verse, but not movement within
the universe. But this way of
escape is closed by the fact that
the writing on Melissus does not
deny movement and rest to different
subjects—(movement to the uni-
verse; rest to its various parts—
but to one and the same subject—
N N 2
548
T HE ELEATICS.
assures us that Xenophanes gave no opinion as to
the Limitedness or Unlimitedness of the One," both
predicates are here expressly and categorically denied
in respect to it.
This last statement is all the more
strange since it manifestly contradicts itself, and also
the assertion immediately
the év, by row 6eby eival Aéºyei. This
is clear from c. 3, 977 b, 8; c, 4,
978 b, 15, 37.
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 18: IIap-
pºevtåms uév yöp othee roi, karð Tov
Aóryov čvös &m reoréal, Méxiorgos 6&
roo Karā rhv jamv. Ötö Kal 6 ułv
retrepaguévov, 6 6 &melpóv pmoiv
airó. Eevoq'dvms 5& trpáros toūtww
évſoras oë6&v fileo'aqfivuorev, où6é ris
qāorews rotºrwy 056erépas àource 61)etv,
&AA’ eis rov 32Aov oëpavovátogxébas
to św elvaí pmol row 6eóv. This
does not assert merely that Xeno-
phanes left it uncertain whether
he conceived the One as a formal or
a material principle; but that he
refused to define it as limited or
unlimited. Even Parmenides and
Melissus had not said the former;
but Aristotle concludes from what
they said regarding the second
point, that the obôèv Šteoraphviore
can only refer to this. Nor can
we (with Kern, Qu. 49) explain
these words by alleging that Xeno-
phanes was self-contradictory in
his utterances about the deity.
Aristotle might doubtless have
charged him with this contradic-
toriness, but he could not have
said that, in regard to the question
whether the Deity is limited or un-
limited, he was wanting in clear-
ness. How is it possible to express
oneself more clearly than Xeno-
phanes, according to our treatise,
has done? In Kern's more recent
reply (Beitr. 6) these considerations
preceding it,” namely, that
are not brought forward. The
words obôév Šteoraq fivuorev, he says,
cannot relate to the question of the
Limitedness or the Unlimitedness
of the év, for in that case repl
toūrov, or something similar, would
have been added; but the doctrine
of Xenophanes ‘is described as
generally obscure.” But the addi-
tion which he misses is found in
the words: oièë ris pào eas toūrov
où6erépas àouke 61 yeſv, the meaning
of which can only be that Xeno-
phanes did not discuss those ques-
tions on which Parmenides and
Melissus disagree with one another.
Yern further tries to show that
Xenophanes really expressed him-
self contradictorily on the Limited-
ness and Unlimitedness of the One,
because he calls God, ap. Timon
(inf. p. 561, 1), iorov &rdvrm, which
Sext. Pyrr. l. 224, explains by
orq alpoetőfi ; and, on the other
hand, he holds that the roots of
the earth extend to infinity (vide
#nf. p. 565, 5). But the orgalpoetőfi of
Sextus no doubt comes directly or
indirectly from this treatise itself
(c. 3, 977 b, 1 : travrn 8' 8plotov čvna
aqalpoetóſ, eival); in Timon's ionov
&mdvrm there is no allusion to the
shape, it seems rather to relate to
the of Aos épé, &c. As regards the
unlimited extension of the earth,
it will presently be shown that we
have no right to apply this defini-
tion to the Deity.
* Ritter (Gesch. der Phil. i.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC.
549
the Deity is spherical.
Moreover, it is highly impro-
bable that Aristotle should have passed over such a
singular opinion in passages like Metaph. i. 5, Phys.
i. 3. We know that as late as the third century of our
era the most learned commentators of Aristotle were not
agreed whether Xenophanes held the Deity to be limited
or unlimited ; ' and this phenomenon would be incom-
prehensible if they had possessed, in addition to the
work of Aristotle, such definite and detailed explana-
476 sq.) indeed thinks that Xeno-
phanes, in the spherical form which
he attributed to God, meant to
imply the unity of the Limited
and Unlimited ; for the sphere is
self-limited; and when he denied
that God was unmoved he was
merely asserting that God has no
permanent relation to another. The
possibility of such a meaning in
these definitions, however, could
not easily be proved; it is besides
far too subtle for so ancient a
thinker. Kern's interpretation
(Beitr. 17; cf. Xenoph. 10 sqq.) is
equally untenable : * xenophanes
denied Limitedness only within
Being and in opposition to a some-
thing cast out from Being and ex-
ternal to it, and Unlimitedness
only in relation to the One which
is the All.’ He, therefore, con-
ceived his One or God as uninter-
rupted (never finding in itself a
limit), globe-shaped, and filling all
space. In order to distinguish his
Being from Non-Being and from
the Many, and probably in oppo-
sition to the Pythagorean doctrine,
he declined to place it in the cate-
gories of trépas and āmeipov. This
means that the limitedness which
Xenophanes denied of Being is to
be explained as limitedness through
Something else, and is to be re-
stricted to this. Our text, how-
ever, does not say of Being; it is
not limited by another, but also-
lutely (977 b, 3) otºr' &metpov eival
oùre retrepávtal. Thus, according
to the universal meaning of the
word, it is this absolute limiting,
and not the limiting through
another, which is denied of it; and
when in proof of this proposition it
is said: As the Many are limited
each by each, but the One is not
like the Many, so the One must be
unlimited, it does not necessarily
follow that the otre tremapávěat it-
self signifies not limited by another,
and consequently that it is also
denied of the spherical One. Not
one passage has been quoted in
which tretrapáv6al or tretrepaguévov
eival (c. 3) means, without further
addition, “to be limited by some-
thing else.' But the refuting of the
proposition attributed to Xeno-
phanes c. 4, 278 a, 16 Sqq. abun-
dantly shows that the author never
contemplated such a limitation.
* Simpl. Phys. 6 a. NukóAaos
3& 6 Aamaakmvös, Ös &meipov kal &Ki-
vurov Aéryovros airoß rºw &px?iv čv
tfi trepl 9eów &topºv'muovečer 'AAéčav-
àpos 3& és retrepaguévov airo Kal
orgapoeiðés.
B50 THE ELEATICS.
tions from Xenophanes himself as this treatise pre-
supposes. Even had there existed a work of this kind
by Xenophanes, it must have been greatly retouched
and altered in the treatise," otherwise all traces of the
poetical expression and epic form of Xenophanes' work
could never have been so entirely obliterated.” But,
apart from the contents of this exposition, it is unlikely
that there ever was such a work. A dialectical discus-
sion so methodically conducted, and proceeding in so
regular a manner from beginning to end in the scholas-
tic form of a refutation, by means of dilemmas and
deductio ad absurdwm, could not, except in defiance of
all laws of historical analogy,” be ascribed to the prede-
cessor of Parmenides, to the philosopher whom Aristotle
censures “for his want of practice in thought.
* That this may be the case.
even Brandis admits (Gesch.d. Entw.
i. 83), when he says that the author
may have brought together all that
was isolated or loosely connected
in the poem. Cf. Kern, Qu. p. 52,
who says that the words and many
parts of the argument may belong
to the author. Where is our
guarantee that the author has, in
other respects, truly reproduced
the doctrine of Xenophanes? We
shall find no such guarantee in the
author's name, for it is question-
able whether the treatise has any
right to it; nor (vide following
note) in the poetical expressions
on which Brandis bases his view.
* Brandis, l. c. 82, believed he
could point out in this work a
number of forms manifestly poeti-
cal and corresponding with some
in the fragments of Xenophanes.
But Kern, Qu. 52, remarks that of
those he quotes only the word
&Tpepelvis of any importance. An
isolated word like this, however,
can scarcely be taken into consider-
ation, and even the words which
Rern adds, où6% yap oièë rāvta.
8&vaotai &v & BoöAouro (977 a, 35),
do not, for my part, remind me
that ‘the author is giving an ac-
count of a poetical work.’
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 26: The
Eleatics are àqeréot trpós Thy vöv
trapovaav Çfirmauv, oi uły 350 kai
wdutrav, &s Švres unkpov &ypotkó-
Tepot. Eevoq àvms kal Méxiorgos.
* It was principally this diffi-
culty which determined Wendt
(p. 163 of his edition of the first
volume of Tennemann's Gesch. d.
Phil. 18 sq.) in his judgment that
the author of this work was proba-
bly a later philosopher, who in
common with Simplicius was draw-
ing from some indirect source,
and gave the form of conclusion
to the opinions here quoted; that
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC.
, 55.1
For all these reasons it seems most improbable that
the work we are considering was written by Aristotle or
he was not acquainted with the
poem of Xenophanes itself. Rein-
hold (Gesch. d. Phil. i. 63, 3rd
edition, and in the Programm v. J.
1847, De genuina Xenophanis
disciplina) and Vermehren (Autor-
schaft der dem Arist. 2wgeschriebenen
Schrift. tr. Eevop. Jena, 1861, p. 43)
among the reasons they adduce (in
agreement with Bergk, Comment.
de Arist. lib. de Xen. &c., Marb.
1843; Rose, Arist. Libr. Ord. 72
sqq.) for discarding this work,
dwell especially on its dialectical
and unpoetical form. Kern, Qu.
53, says, with some plausibility,
that Melissus was included in
Aristotle's judgment on Xeno-
phanes, and yet we find in his
fragments a purely dialectical ex-
position. I cannot admit that the
discussions of Melissus display the
same amount of logical ability as
those ascribed in this writing to
Xenophanes (cf. Kern, Beitr. 16).
But, even supposing they did, there
would still be a great difference
between Melissus and Xenophanes,
and it would be impossible to say
with Kern: “Cur paullo ante Par-
menidem idem fieri potuisse negan-
dum sit, quod atate Parmenidea
factum esse certissimis testimoniis
constet, non video.' Between the
literary activity of Melissus (who
was not contemporary with Par-
menides, but about thirty years
younger) and that of Xenophanes,
there apparently lies an interval of
at least fifty years; and in this
interval we find not only Hera-
cleitus and the beginning of the
Atomistic philosophy, but also the
energetic activity of Parmenides
and Zeno, through whom the
strictly metaphysical character and
the dialectical method of the Eleatic
school was first established. That
we cannot, indeed, expect at the
commencement of this interval
what we find at the end of it,
that no dialectical method can have
been laid down in the poems of
Xenophanes, surpassing even that
of. Parmenides in its form, but of
which there is no trace in the frag-
ments of Xenophanes' writings,
all this seems to me self-evident.
I am quite ready “to admit the in-
ternal possibility of such profound
philosophising at so early a period,
if only its existence be sufficiently
proved” (Kern, Beitr. 16), but I
cannot admit it when, as in the
present case, there is not sufficient
proof. Not only all historical
analogy, as it seems to me, but the
judgment of all antiquity, is on
my side. Kern is quite logical in
placing Xenophanes as a philoso-
pher above Parmenides, on the
ground of the treatise tr. Mexico ov.
If, however, Xenophanes had really
said all that this treatise ascribes
to him, and in the sense that Kern
supposes, he would not only have
surpassed his successor in dialecti-
cal ability, but he would have
taught, in respect to the Deity and
the world, essentially the same
doctrine that Parmenides taught
concerning Being, thus greatly
diminishing the personal merit of
IParmenides, though he might not
altogether have destroyed it. In
this case it would be difficult to
explain why not only Aristotle
(whom Kern censures for his low
estimate of Xenophanes as com-
pared with Parmenides), but also
552
THE ELEATICS.
Theophrastus."
Moreover, it contains much that it
would be impossible to connect with either of these
philosophers. The assertion that Anaximander supposed
water to be the substance of all things contradicts all
their statements about Anaximander ; * what is said of
Empedocles sounds very unlike Aristotle; * Anaxagoras
Plato (vide infra, § Parm. note 1),
should place Parmenides so far
above all the other Eleatics.
* Mullach, indeed, thinks dif-
ferently. “Aristotle, he remarks,
p. 12 sq. (Fragm. Philos. i. 274) in
opposition to Bergk, ‘in expound-
ing the opinions of others, is often
guilty of contradiction, and says
much that we should hesitate to
ascribe to him.’ Similarly Kern,
Qu. 49. That Aristotle ever so
misrepresented either of his prede-
cessors, or fell into such contradic-
tions in speaking of him, as the
author of this book has done in re-
gard to Xenophanes, I must dis-
pute. The objections brought by
Mullach against his exposition of
Parmenides are groundless, as will
hereafter be shown. Kern urges
that he often arbitrarily reduces
the definitions of his predecessors
to categories of his own system,
and is not always just in his criti-
cism of them. This, however, is
not the same as denying that
Xenophanes expressed his opinion
on a point on which, according to
our treatise, he expressed it fully
and clearly—or, ascribing to him
in that treatise a Dialectic entirely
beyond his point of view. If, how-
ever, we even grant that Aristotle
might really have written what we
find in the treatise on Melissus,
there is no reason to suppose that
this treatise was merely an extract
from larger Aristotelian works;
the theory of Karsten, p. 97, would
be much more probable, viz., that
it was a sketch made by Aristotle
for his own use. §
* Cf. p. 251, 1; 232, 2; 234, 3.
* C. 2, 976, b 22 : áuota's 5&
kal 'Eutrečokx?is kiveto 6at plºv &et
qnot avykpwéueva (so Cod. Lips.
reads instead of ovykivoúp.) rov
âtravra évôexexás xpóvov . . . §tav
ôè eis pºtav wop phy ovykpiófi &s év
elval, où6év pmoſt ré ye keveev tréAet
où'ěe treptororów. If this means that
Empedocles really held the doc-
trine of endless motion, it contra-
dicts the express statements of
Aristotle, who elsewhere attributes
to him an alternation of motion and
rest (infra, vol. ii. § Emp.). On the
other hand, if (with Kern, Symb.
Crit. 25) we take it to mean that
during the coming together of mat-
ter, motion went on uninterrupt-
edly; the words rov Šmavra évôexe-
xós Xpóvov contain a pleonasm very
unlike Aristotle. And it is diffi-
cult to see how the author (in the
&rav 68, etc.), in order to prove
that motion is possible without the
void, can argue that in the agaipos
of Empedocles, there was also no
void, for in the Sphairos motion
has come to Rest. As to the de-
sign of ‘proving that the doc-
trine of Empedoeles can only, to a
certain extent, be employed against
Melissus’ (Kern, Beitr. 13), I can-
not discover any trace either in
words or context.
t TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC.
553
is spoken of as if the author only knew of him by hear-
say;" and among the doctrines discussed and criticised,
side by side with much that is important, we find not a
little that is trivial and unworthy of Aristotle or Theo-
phrastus.”
1 C. 2, 975 b, 17 : &s kal Tov
'Avačayópav p aq t t t ves Aéyetv ć
&el úvrwv kal &metpov rà yuvéueva
ºyſveorðat. No one can believe that
Aristotle or Theophrastus would
either of them use such expressions
about a philosopher with whom
they were so accurately acquainted,
and to whom (as we shall see) they
elsewhere distinctly ascribed this
doctrine. Kern, Beitr. 13, appeals
to Arist. Metaph. iv. 3, 1005 b,
23 : &6övarov yūp Övruvotºv raûrov
ūroxaufléveuv elvat kal whº eival,
ka94mep T : v š s of ov'ral Aéyeuv
‘HpdikAettov. This analogy disap-
pears as soon as we examine the
passage more closely. Aristotle
frequently ascribes to Heracleitus
the proposition that the same
thing at the same time is and is
not; or is at the same time its own
opposite (vide infra, p. 550, third
edition). But he does not believe
that Heracleitus held this in ear-
nest; he reckons it among the 6é-
gets Aóyov čveka Aeyóueval (Phys.
i. 2, 185 a, 5); he supposes that
Heracleitus has not made his
meaning clear, even to himself
(Metaph. xi. 5, 1062 a, 31), and in
order to indicate this he chooses
the expression (Metaph. iv. 3) ruès
ofoviral Aéyeuv. Aéyetv here signi-
fies: to express something as his
opinion, to maintain something,
as is clear from the way in which
Aristotle, l. c., proceeds: oik #orti
ºy&p &vaykalov, & ris Aéyet taúra.
kal iroMaußdvetv. If the ques-
tion were simply, whether the
Thus the judgment which we formed of the
words quoted corresponded to
those of Heracleitus, Aristotle
would merely have said: ka9&mep
‘Hp. Aéyet; as he says instead:
tives otovrat Aéyew, the reason
must be that he does not profess
to be reproducing his own opinion.
On the other hand, there was no
necessity at all for the author of
our treatise, in his remarks on
Anaxagoras, to disclaim his respon-
sibility in regard to them by such
a mode of expression.
* How trivial, for instance, is
the discussion of the question,
whether anything can arise out of
non-Being (c. 1, 975 a, 3 sqq.),
and how little indication there is
here of Aristotle's reply—viz., that
nothing comes from absolute non-
Being, but all things come from
relative non-Being, the Övváuel Šv
How strange is the question in c.
4 sub init. Tt kwāśst wit’ & 6potov
pºſit’ & &vouotov to yiyvöuevov yiyve-
oréat, &AA’ ºr uh wros; and the
objection raised in c. i. 975 a, 7,
that Becoming is frequently sup-
posed to have proceeded from
nothing. Elsewhere neither Aris-
totle nor Theophrastus ever men-
tions, even as a hypothesis, or a
possibility, such an origin from the
a?, 5v without any further definition.
How superfluous and disturbing is
the remark, c. 2, 976 a, 33 sqq.,
that there might be several Infi-
nutes, as Xenophanes presupposed
when he spoke of the Infinity of
the earth beneath and of the air
above, followed by a citation of
554 THE EI, E.4 TICS.
genuineness of this work from its main contents is con-
firmed by these secondary traits; and if neither of
them separately is decisive, yet together they constitute
an amount of circumstantial evidence which cannot be
outweighed by the testimony of manuscripts and later
authors, so often found on the side of undoubtedly
spurious writings.
When and by whom the three treatises were com-
posed is uncertain. That they emanated from the
Peripatetic school is probable, both from their nature
and also from the mention of them in the catalogue of
Diogenes.' They appear to have included two frag-
ments, which have been lost, on Parmenides and Zeno;”
so that the author must have aimed at a complete
representation and criticism of the Eleatic doctrines.
The order adopted in their discussion seems to have
been that indicated in the passage from Aristotle
Quoted above,” except that Zeno and Gorgias are added
to the philosophers there mentioned. The author has
taken their opinions chiefly from their own writings,
and has given the essential content of these cor-
rectly when it presented itself to him in the form of
an argument logically developed, as was the case with
Melissus and Gorgias. In regard to Xenophanes, on
the contrary, he appears to have misapprehended the
statements of Aristotle and Theophrastus,” and to have
started from the presupposition that this philosopher
the verses in which Empedocles a', trpós ra. Eevopdvows a', trpos rà
censures this utterance. Zhvovos a'.
Diogenes mentions among the * Cf. p. 535 sqq.
writings of Aristotle (v. 25): "rpós * Cf. p. 537; 547, 1.
7& Mexíagov a' . . . trpós rā Topytov * Supra, p. 547, 1 ; 542, 1.
TREATISE ON MELISSUS, ETC. 555
expressly denied, in respect to the Deity, limitedness as
well as unlimitedness, and movement as well as rest ;
and then to have developed the proofs of this statement
from the indications which he found, or thought he
found, in the poems of Xenophanes. But it is also
possible that some other author may have anticipated
him in so doing, and that this exposition, and not
Xenophanes himself, may have been his immediate
source. What is really derived from Xenophanes we
can only discover from a comparison of this treatise
with other accounts. Its testimony as to supposed
propositions of his is not sufficient to establish their
authenticity in cases where it stands alone.
The development of the Eleatic philosophy was
completed in three generations of philosophers, whose
activity extended over about a century. Xenophanes,
the founder of the school, first expresses their generai
principle in a theological form. In opposition to Poly-
theism, he declares the Deity to be the One, underived,
all-embracing Being ; and in connection with this, the
universe to be uniform and eternal. At the same time,
however, he recognises the Many and the Mutable as a
reality. Parmenides gives to this principle its meta-
physical basis and purely philosophic expression; he
reduces the opposites of the One and the Many, the
Eternal and the Become, to the fundamental opposite
of the Existent and non-Existent; derives the qualities
of both from their concept, and proves the impossibility
of Becoming, Change and Plurality in a strictly uni-
versal sense. Lastly, Zeno and Melissus maintain the
propositions of Parmenides as against the ordinary
556
XENOPHANES.
opinion; but carry the opposition between them so far
that the inadequacy of the Eleatic principle for the
explanation of phenomena becomes clearly apparent.
II, XENOPHANES. 1
OUR knowledge of the doctrine of Xenophanes is de-
rived from two sources, viz., such fragments as have
* Colophon is universally named
as the native city of Xenophanes;
his father is called by Apollodorus
Orthomenes; by others, Dexius, or
Dexinus (Diog. ix. 18; Lucian,
Macrob. 20; Hippolyt. Refut. i. 14;
Theodoret, Cur. gr. aff. iv. 5, p. 56).
As to his date, Apollodorus says,
ap. Clem. Strom. i. 301 C : karū.
Thu Teorgapakoothv’OAvutridóa yewó-
pºevov trapatetakéval #xpt tow Aa-
peſov re kal Kûpov xpóvov. We
cannot suppose that Eépêous is here
intended for Köpov, or that Aapetov
is to be erased; for Hippolyt. l. c.
also mentions Cyrus. It cannot,
however, be regarded as any proof
of the great age of Xenophanes
(trapaterarcéval sc, rov 8íov), that
having been born in the 40th
Olympiad, he should have been
living in the time of Cyrus. The
peculiarity of placing Darius before
Cyrus is sufficiently explained on
metrical grounds (Apoll. wrote in
trimeter), cf. Diels, Rhein. Mus.
xxxi. 23. On the other hand, the
50th (N) Olymp. must certainly
be substituted for the 40th (M), as
the time of his birth; for (Diels, p.
23) the statement that he flourished
in Ol. 60 (Diog, ix. 20) also origi-
nates with Apollodorus; and the
ăruh is usually placed in the 40th
year of a man's life. But as Sext.
Math. i. 257 also names Ol. 40 as
the time of his birth, the error
must previously have crept into the
text used by Sextus and Clemens.
The date of the ākuh, according to
which Apoll. probably calculated
the year of birth, was determined
by the founding of Elea, sung by
Xenophanes (cf. Diels, l.c.). This
we infer from Diog. l.c. Eusebius
mentions Xenophanes in Ol. 60 and
also in Ol. 56; but that is unim-
portant. He is also mentioned
more indefinitely by Sotion, ap.
Diog. ix. 18, as a contemporary of
Anaximander. Eus. Pr. Ev. x.
14; xiv. 17, 10, says that he was
contemporary with Pythagoras and
Anaxagoras (who is elsewhere
placed too early by Eus.). Iambl.
Theol. Arith. p. 41, names Pytha-
goras only. Hermippus, ap. Diog.
viii. 56 ; cf. ibid. ix. 20, makes him
the teacher of Empedocles, Timaeus,
ap. Clem. l. c.; and Plut. Reg.
Apophth. Hiero, 4, p. 175, the con-
temporary of Hiero and Epichar-
mus, Ps. Lucian, even the disciple
of Archelaus; and the Scholiast in
Aristophanes (Peace, v. 696) as-
cribes to him a saying concerning
Simonides, on which little stress is
to be laid, cf. Karsten, Phil. Graec.
Rell. i. 81 sq. He himself seems to
speak of Pythagoras as deceased,
whereas he (Xenophanes) is named
by Heracleitus as one of his pre-
decessors (vide supra, p. 481, 1 ;
510, 4). He also mentions Epi-
LIFE AND
WRITINGS, 557
been preserved of his works, and the accounts of ancient
writers.
menides after Epimenides' death
(Diog. i. 111; ix. 18). He as-
serts that the beginning of the
conflict between the Ionian colonies
and the Persians took place in his
early life (Fr. 17, ap. Athen. ii.
fi4, e), for when he is asked ºrna {kos
joró', 39' 6 M780s & pinceto, this can-
not of course refer to a recent oc-
currence, but to something long
past (cf. Cousin, Fragm. i. 3 Sqq.;
Karsten, p. 9). This agrees with
the statement in Diog. ix. 20, that
he celebrated the founding of Elea
(Ol. 61) in 2000 hexameters, and
with the anecdote, ap. Plut. De Vit.
Pud. c. 5, p. 530, according to
which he was acquainted with La-
sus of Hermione (about 520–500).
All things considered, the greater
part of his lengthened activity may
most probably be placed in the se-
cond half of the sixth century; his
birth may have occurred in the
third or fourth decad of this cen-
tury; his death must have hap-
pened in the following century; for
it is certain that he died very old.
In the verses, ap. Diog. ix. 18, he
says he has been roaming about
in Greek lands for 67 years—since
he was 25. Lucian, therefore, loc.
cit., errs in giving the length of his
life as 91 years. According to
Censorin. Di. Nat. 15, 3, he was
more than a hundred. As to his
personal history, we are informed
that he was driven out from his
native city to different places, and
resided at various times in Zancle,
Catana and Elea (Diog. ix. 18;
Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, 1400 b, 5;
Karsten, p. 12, 87); that he be-
came very poor (Diog. ix. 20, after
Demetrius and Panaetius; Plut.
These two sources are not always in agree-
Reg. Apophth. 4, p. 175). The
statement of his having been the
disciple of Telanges, the Pythago-
rean (Diog. i. 15), of Boton, an
unknown Athenian, or even of Ar-
chelaus (Diog. ix. 18; Ps. Lucian,
l.c.) deserves no attention. When
Plato (Soph. 242 D) says of the
Eleatic school, &ró Eevoq &vous re
ral éti Tpóo.6ev &pääuevov, he can
scarcely be alluding to any par-
ticular predecessor of Xenophanes.
Cousin (p. 7) thinks he means the
Pythagoreans, but Plato could not
have called them the founders of
the Eleatic doctrine of the Unity of
Being. He is probably speaking in
accordance with the general pre-
supposition that doctrines like his
had been held before his time; it
was then customary to seek the
doctrines of the philosophers in the
ancient poets. Lobeck conjectures
(Aglaoph. i. 613) that he is speci-
ally referring in this passage to the
Orphic Theogony, but with this I
cannot agree. A story of Plu-
tarch's, which involves an Egyptian
journey (Amator. 18, 12, p. 763;
De Is. 70, p. 379, and the same,
without the name of Xenophanes,
ap. Clem. Cohort. 15 B), arbi-
trarily transfers to Egypt, what,
according to Arist. l. c., happened
in Elea. On the other hand, it is
quite possible that even in his own
country he may have been led to
the beginnings of the Ionic natural
philosophy by his passion for en-
quiry. Theophrast, following Diog.
ix. 21, calls him a disciple of
Anaximander, and we have no rea-
son to doubt the assertion ; and the
statement of his having contra-
dicted Thales and Pythagoras
558 A ENOPHANES.
ment with each other; for while in the fragments of
his didactic poem theological opinions are predominant,
and only a few physical theories are introduced, the
ancient writers ascribe to him general metaphysical
statements which closely connect him with his successor
Parmenides. Our view of the relation of these two
representations must chiefly determine our conception
of Xenophanes.
Let us first examine the sayings of Xenophanes
himself which have been handed down by tradition.
In these, his main position seems to be that conflict
with the popular polytheistic belief by which he was
known even in antiquity."
(Diog. ix. 18) may be founded on
the fact that he censures, not only
Pythagoras (p. 481, 1), but Thales.
(Farther details later on.) That
he possessed more than ordinary
knowledge may be inferred from
the remark of Heracleitus (p. 510,
4). To his contemporaries he was
chiefly known through his poems,
which, according to ancient usage,
he recited (Diog. ix. 18) on his
journeys. All kinds of poems
have been ascribed to him by
later writers—Epics, Elegies, and
Iambics (Diog. l. c.; cf. Kern,
Menoph. 18); Tragedies (Eus.
Chron. Ol. 60, 2); Parodies
(Athen. ii. 54 e); a taxoi (Strabo,
xiv. 1, 28, p. 643; Schol. in Aris-
toph. Knights, v. 406; Prokl. in
Hes. Opp. et Di. v. 284; Eustath.
on II.ii.212; Tzetz. in Bernhardy's
edition of the Geograph. Min. p.
1010); or, as Apul. Floril. iv. 20,
says (the manuscripts, however,
read here Xenocrates), satires. Cou-
sin (p. 9) and Karsten, 19 sqq., will
not admit the orix}\ot; but cf.
He opposes his doctrine of
Wachsmuth, De Timoſze Philasio,
29 sq. His philosophic opinions
were contained in a didactic poem
in Epic metre, of which we possess
fragments ; that it bore the title
trepi pºorews is only asserted by the
more recent writers (Stob. Ecl. i.
294; Poll. Onomast. vi. 46), and
their evidence is the more suspi-
cious, as the work itself seems to
have been early lost. Cf. Brandis,
Comm. El. 10 sqq.; Karsten, 26
sqq. (Simplicius, e.g., mentions that
he had not seen it; De Coelo, 233
b, 22; Schol. in Arist. 506 a, 40).
In Diog. i. 16, where, according to
the former reading, Xenophanes
was enumerafed among the most
fruitful of the philosophic writers,
Xenocrates is to be substituted;
cf. Nietzsche, Rh. Mus. xxv. 220
sq. The judgment of Athen. xiv.
632D, on the verses of Xenophanes,
is more favourable than that of
Cicero, Acad. ii. 23, 74.
* Cf. among other texts, Arist.
Poet. 25, 1460 b, 36. The utterances
of the poets are defended on the
POLEMIC AGAINST POLY THEISM.
559
the unity of God to the supposed plurality of gods;
to their origin in time, the etermity of God; to their
variability, his unchangeableness; to their anthropo-
morphic nature, his sublimity; to their physical, intel-
lectual, and moral limitations, his infinite spirituality.
One God rules over gods and men, for the Deity is the
highest, and the highest can be but one."
ground that they represent things
as they are, or as they ought to
be, ei Šē pumöetépas, Šti oiſta paoriv,
ofov tº trepi 6eóv. forws yap oite
BéArtov oira Aéºyeuv, oùr' &Amói,
&AA’ &ruxev Šotrep Eevoq &vms (sc.
Aéyet ; the most recent editors,
however, on account of the Eevo-
q,4vel, or m, of most of the MSS.
read with Ritter: ás rapi, Eevoºd-
vet) &AA’ of pagi. These words
have been unnecessarily altered by
modern authors, and have received
many false interpretations (cf.
Karsten, p. 188). They are trans-
lated quite simply as follows:
‘For it may well be that the usual
notions about the gods are neither
good nor true, but that it is with
the gods as Xenophanes believes,
but the many are of another
opinion.' Ritter thinks that the
whole chapter is a later addition,
but even in this case it must have
been based on something authentic,
and the words we have quoted have
an Aristotelian ring in them.
* Fr. 1 ap. Clem. Strom. v.
601 C :—
eis 6eos #v re 6eotori kal &vôpétrotot
plényiotos,
oùre 6éuas 6Vmtotoiv Šuo'íos otºre
vómua.
Arist. De Melisso, c. 3, 977 a, 23
sqq.: el 5’ to ruv 66ebs trävrww icpá-
This God is
Tuotov, Šva pmolu airby irpooſicely
eival, ei yüp 5üo # TAetovs elev, oùk
&v éti kpóttarov kai BéAttarov airby
eival tróvrov, &c. Plut. ap. Eus. Pr.
Ev. i. 8, Sup. p. 539, 2; cf. 554, where
it is also shown why and in what
sense we can accept the Pseudo-
Aristotelian writing as evidence
concerning Xenophanes. That Xe-
nophanes spoke in his writings of
the Unity of God is clear from
Aristotle's words, quoted p. 539, 2.
The conjecture, however. that he
only became a strict Monotheist
in later life, having previously
believed, not in one God, but in a
supreme God far above the other
deities (Kern, Beitr. 4), finds no
support in this fragment. The
many gods, of whom one is the
highest, need not necessarily be
conceived as real gods. If, accord-
ing to the theory of Xenophanes,
they only existed in human imagi-
nation, the true God might still,
especially in poetical language,
be compared with them, and said
to be greater than they. “The
greatest among gods and men’
must mean the greatest absolutely.
When Heracleitus, for instance
(vide infra, vol. ii.), says none
of the gods nor of human kind
made the world, he only means to
express that it was not made at
all; and even in a Christian hymn
God is called the God of gods.
560 XENOPHANES.
uncreated, for what is created is also perishable, and
the Deity can only be conceived as imperishable." Nor
is he subject to change: what beseems him is to remain
unmoved in one place, and not to wander hither and
thither.” Moreover, what right have we to attribute
to him a human form 2 Each man represents his gods
as he himself is: the negro as black and flat-mosed, the
Thracian as blue-eyed and red-haired ; and if horses
and oxen could paint, no doubt they would make gods
like horses and oxen.” Just so it is with the other
imperfections of human nature, which we transfer to
the gods.
* Fr. 5 ap. Clem. ... c., and,
with some variations, ap. Theod.
Cur. Gr. Aff. iii. 72, p. 49 : &AA&
8potol Sokéouai 6eous yeuvâ06al
. . . . Thy orderépmy 5' 0.0%ra
(Theod. preferably ato 6 mov) exeiv
q,w}v re 6éuas re. Arist. Rhet. ii.
23, 1399 b, 6: E. ÉAeyev, Štt ögotos
&orefloodiv of 'yevéo 6al pºokovtes
rows 9eous rois àtroßavely Aéyovoivº
âuſpotépa's yap ovubaivet u%) eival
Tows 9eoûs trote. Ibid. 1400 b, 5 :
E. 'EAedrals épwtóriv ei 6tagi tì
Aevico8ég kal 6pmvögly, 3) pºi, a vue-
BoöAevev, ei prºv 6eby intoxapºdvoval,
Au% 9pmvely, ei 5’ &vöpwrov, u} 06eiv.
(For the version in Plutarch of
this story, vide infra, p. 557, mote,
De Mel. c. 3, cf. p. 544, 1), where,
however, the demonstration is not
that of Xenophanes. Diog. ix. 19:
Trporás T' &teq fivato, 3rt trav To
'yiváue ov péaptów éott.
* Fr. 4 ap. Simpl. Phys. 6 a.
(vide sup. p. 539, 2). Cf. Arist.
Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 17, where it is
stated of the Eleatics generally:
&kivmtov eivaí pagi (to Év).
* Fr. 1, 5, and Fr. 6 ap. Clem,
Not only the immoral conduct related by
Strom. v. 601 D, Theod. l. c. ;
Eus. Pr. Ev. xiii. 13, 36:—
&AA’ eitol xeipás y eixov Bóes à è
Aéovres,
* Ypéyal xeſpervi kai épya Texeiv
êtrep &vöpes (Sc. eixov),
in not pºév 6' in trouot 86es 6é te Bovorºv
ôuotas (so Theod., the others
ðuotol),
kai ke bećºv ióéas āypaqov kal adºplar'
étrotovy,
Totaú6' oióv trep kaitol 6éuas eixov
§uotov.
For the rest, cf. Theod. l. c. and
Clem. Strom. vii. 711 B. Also
what is said in Diog. ix. 19: oãotav
6eoû a palpoetóñpmööv Šuotov čxovoav
&v0pétrº &Aov 5' 6pāv kal &Aov
âkočeiv, p. 3) u á v to 1 & vair ve?v, if
the last definition is really founded
on some expression of Xenophanes.
That it is aimed against the Py-
thagorean doctrine of the respira-
tion of the world (sup. p. 467, 1),
I do not believe (vide Kern, Beitr.
17; Xenoph. 25).
UNITY OF A LL BEING. b61
Homer and Hesiod,' but all limitation is unworthy
of them. God is as unlike to mortals in mind as
in form. The Deity is all eye, all ear, all thought,
and through his intellect he rules everything without
exertion.” Thus a pure monotheism is here confronted
with the religion of nature and its many gods, while,
at the same time, we should not be justified in ascribing
to this monotheism a strictly philosophic character on
the strength of the assertions we have quoted, taken
alone.”
Other testimonies, indeed, carry us beyond this
point, and apply the utterances of Xenophanes on the
unity and eternity of God in a general manner to the
1 Fr. 7 ap. Sext. Math. ix. 193,
i. 289:—
ºrdvra 6eois &vé6mkav "Oumpós 6'
‘Horto66s re
3ao'a trap' &v6pároto w śvetóea kal
ibó')os éo riv,
o? (this is the reading of Steph.,
the MSS. have às, Karst. and
Wachsm. p. 74, kal),
TrAetorr' épôéyèavro 9eów &6epfortua
épya,
kAérretv, wouxetely re kal &AAñAous
ătrateúeiv.
On account of this hostility to the
poets of the national religion,
Xenophanes is called by Timon ap.
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 224; Diog. ix. 18 :
‘Oumpatárms éturicóttmy (prefer-
ably €trikóttmv) and Diog. l.c. says
of him : yéypaq’s 6* . . . kað’
‘Howdāou kal ‘Oujipov Čirikártov
aúróv rà repl 6eów sipmuéva. The
observation of Aristotle, discussed
sup. p. 558, 1, refers to these and
similar passages.
* Fr. 1, vide sup, p. 559, 1;
WOL. I.
Fr. 2 ap. Sext. ix. 144 (cf. Diog.
ix. 19; Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8,
4) : o3Aos épé, of Aos 3& voet, oùAos
6é T' &koúsi. Fr. 3 ap. Simpl.
Phys. 6 a &AA’ &rdvev6e tróvo
vóov ppevi trčura kpaśaivet. Cf.
Diog. l. c. : atºptravrá tº eival
[Töv 6ebv) votiv kal qpévmauv kal
&fölov. Timon. ap. Sext. Pyrrh. i.
224: éktos &n’ &věpárov (accord-
ing to the emendation of Fabricius;
Wachsmuth, De Tim. 64, reads with
Röper: 6s toy &rd vôpatrov) 6eov
étradarar' forov &mdurm &orkmóñ . . .
woepérepov he vömua (cf. Wachs-
muth, for some attempts to com-
plete the last verse, none of which
commend themselves to me). Fur-
ther details, p. 562, 5. Perhaps
the assertion ap. Diog. has this
same meaning pm bě kal to troAA&
#aaa, vot, eival.
* Among these may also be
reckoned the attack on sooth-
saying which Cic. Divin. i. 3, 5;
Plut. Plac. v. 1, 2, attribute to
Xenophanes.
O O
562 XENOPHANES.
totality of things. Plato includes his theory with that
of his successors in the expression that all is One.' So
also Aristotle calls him the first founder of the doctrine
of the unity of all things, and observes that he brought
forward his propositions concerning the unity of God
with reference to the universe.” In agreement with this,
Theophrastus” alleges that in and with the unity of
the primitive principle he maintained the unity of all
existence, and Timon represents him as saying of him-
self that wheresoever he turned his gaze all things
resolved themselves into one and the same eternal,
homogeneous essence.” We have no right to mis-
trust these unanimous statements of our most trust-
worthy authorities (with whom, moreover, all the later
writers agree),” merely because a pantheism of this
Soph. 242 D: To be trap'
#Liv 'EAeatikov č6vös, Ötro Eevoq'4-
vows re kai éri trpóg 6ev &pgåuevov,
às évos ūvros Tóv tróvtov kańoupé-
wav oita, 6te;épxeral toſs uß60is.
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 10: eia!
8é rives of trepi rod travros és àv
puãs otia ms pūorea's &m eqívavro. In
regard to these persons it is then
said that their uniform primitive
essence is not, like the primitive
matter of the Physicists, a cause
of Becoming, but dictvntov eii aſ
qaqiv . Eevoq àvms 6* ſpätos
toūtav čvioras, &c., vide Supra,
p. 548, 1.
* Ap. Simpl. supra, p. 543, 1.
* Ap. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 224, at-
tributes to him these words:—
— 3rtm y&p Šubv v6ov eipúa'alut
eis $v rairó re trav &veXàeto' trav
' éow aiel
trövtm &veakóuevov putaw eis piſaw
iotaff Öpoſaw.
* Cic. Acad. ii. 37, 118: Xeno-
phanes . . unum esse omnia neque
Žd esse mutabile et id esse Deum,
meque natum unquam et Sempiter-
num, conglobata figura. N. D. i. 11,
28: tum. Xenophanes, qui mente ad-
juncta omne praeterea, quod esset in-
finitum, Deum voluit esse. That the
former passage also is quoted from
the Greek, is proved by Krische,
Forsch. i. 90. There is a Greek
exposition (naturally from a more
ancient source) which pretty nearly
coincides with it, ap. Theod. Cur.
gr. aff. iv. 5, p. 57 Sylb.: E. . . . .
ev elval to trav čºmore, ordaipoetóēs
ical retepaguévov, où yewvmtöv, &AA'
&íðuov kal trautav čkſvntov. Plu-
tarch ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 4: Eev.
3& . . . otºre yéveauv otºre pºopæv
&rońettrel, &AA’ eival Aéyet to trav
&el Šuotov. ei Yêp yiyvouro Tooro,
qºmolv, &vaykalov trpo rotºrov wº
eival' to uh by §§ oik &v yévoiro,
ow8 &v rb pah by trouſ oral ru, ofire Širó
G () D AND THE WORLD. 563
kind is incompatible with the pure theism of Xeno-
phanes." How do we know that his assertions of the
unity, eternity, unlimitedness, and spirituality of God
were intended to be understood in a theistic, and not
in a pantheistic sense ? His own expressions leave this
quite undecided ; but the probabilities, even apart from
the testimony of the ancients, are in favour of the
pantheistic view. For the Greek gods are merely
personified powers of nature and of human life; and,
therefore, it was much more obvious for a philosopher
who objected to their plurality to unite them in
the conception of universal physical force, than in the
idea of a God external to the world. Thus we have
every reason to suppose that Xenophanes, in his pro-
positions concerning the unity of God, intended to
rot, whº Švtos yévolt’ &v ri. Sext.
Pyrrh. i. 225 (cf. iii. 218): éðo-
'yºdºr.Qe 5& 6 E. . . Šv ćival Tô trav
kai rôv 9eów orvpaq v'ſ Toſs traoruv'
elva. Śē orgapoetőfi kal &tra67 kal
ăuerá8Amtov Kai Aoyuków. Hippo'yt.
Refut. i. 14 : Aéyet 8& 6tt ovöèv
ºyiveral oióē (p6eſperat oilà è kiveirat,
kal &ti év rô Tráv čo Tuv šča, uera-
Boxfis. p.mal 6& kai Töv 6eów elval
ăţöuov kal Éva kal &Motov trgutm Kal
Tretrepaguévov kal ordaipoetën Távtm
kal traort rols uopious aio 6 mTukóv. Ga-
len, H. Phil. c. 3, p. 234: Éevoſpaumv
pièv trepi Trévrov htropnkóta, 80) wa-
rto avºra ö& puffvov Tó elva, trøvra ev
kal rooto 5trópxelv 0eov, tretrepao-
Mévov, Aoyukov, &pietà8Amtov. All
these accounts seem to emanate
from the same source. The unity
of all Being is likewise ascribed
to Xenophanes by Alexander Me-
taph. 23, 18 Bon. (934 a. 29):
Aéºyet uév trepl Eevoq àvous kal Me-
Atagov kal IIaouevičov obrot yüp Šv
to trav Štreqfivavro. Ibid. 32, 17
(986 b, 8): Töv čv rô by eival
6epuévay . . . Ös too travros pºtas
ºpéarea's oiſons' &v fiväevoqāvms re kal
Méxiora os kal IIappeviðms. Ibid. 33,
10 (986 b, 17, vide sup. p. 548, 1)
To & ‘Evioras’ forov čari Tig irpáros
eveival to by eitróv.
Cousin, Fragm. Phil. i. 37
sqq.; Karsten, 134 sqq. Similarly
Brandis doubts (Gr. Röm. Phil. i.
365) that Xenophanes taught the
unity of Being, since he could not
have identified the Divided, which
manifests itself in the Becoming,
with the One simple Being ; and
Rrische, Forsch. 94, will not allow
him to have been a Pantheist be-
cause he would only admit Being, as
separated from Becoming, to be the
Deity. But it is a question whether
Xenophanes distinguished between
Being and Becoming so definitely
as this would imply.
o o 2
564 XENOPHANES.
assert at the same time the unity of the world; and
from his point of view it is easy to see how the second
of these assertions would appear to be directly involved
in the first. In his speculations on the cause of all
things, he sought that cause, herein agreeing with the
popular faith, primarily in the rule of the gods. But
he could not reconcile their plurality, restriction, and an-
thropomorphic nature with his concept of Deity. At
the same time, the unity of the world, which even to the
sensible intuition asserts itself in the apparent limita-
tion of the world by the vault of heaven, and which
deeper reflection discerns in the likeness and inter-
connection of phenomena, seemed to him to necessitate
the unity of the force that formed the world,'—which
force he did not conceive as separate from the world.
God and the world are here related to one another as
essence and phenomenon. If God is One, things ac-
cording to their essential nature must be One ; and
conversely the polytheistic religion of nature becomes
a philosophic pantheism.
In connection with his doctrine of the unity of
God, Xenophanes is said to have described the Deity
as homogeneous; in other words, he maintained the
qualitative simplemess (Einfachheit) of the divine
essence simultaneously with
* This is indicated not only by
Timon in the verses quoted above,
but also by Aristotle, l.c., in the
words: eis Tov Šxov oipavov &to-
8Aépas, which primarily only assert
that Xenophanes exclusively re-
garded neither the form nor the
matter of things, but fixed his
attention without further discrimi-
its unity. Although, how-
nation of these aspects on the
world as a whole ; the words, how-
ever, also imply that he arrived at
the Unity of God through the con-
sideration of the world. This is
confirmed by his doctrine of the
eternity of the world, which we
shall shortly discuss.
UNITY OF A LL BEING. 565
ever, this statement is supported by proportionately
ancient testimony,' it is questionable whether it is not
in this form merely an inference from the words used
by Xenophanes in describing the divine knowledge.”
On the other hand, the statement that he called the
Deity spherical and limited, or contrariwise, as others
contend, unlimited and infinite,” contradicts the ex-
press declaration of Aristotle and Theophrastus.” It is
hardly possible, however, that both these statements can
be wholly without foundation. On the one hand, Xeno-
phanes attributes to the world infinite extension—for
he says that the air above, and the roots of the earth
beneath, extend into infinity: * on the other hand, we
hear that he, at the same time, describes the universe as a
1. Cf. the quotations on p. 539,
2; 561, 2; 562, 4; 562, 5; from
the treatise on Melissus, Timon,
and Hippolytus.
2 This conjecture is favoured
by the treatise on Melissus, which
bºth in its exposition and criticis:m
of Xenophanes' doctrine couples
the proposition concerning the
homogeneous nature of God with
the of Aos épév, &c. Cf. c. 8, 977
a. 36 (supra, p. 539, 2); c. 4, 978
a, 3 (after Mull.): éva è? §vta
tróvrm āpāv kal &kočev ovačv trpoof-
ke: . . . &AA’ to as Totto BoöAetal
no ºrdvrm aid 63ved 6al, Öri oiſtws &v
BéAtto ta éxot, Šuotos &v távrm.
Similarly Timon, in the verses
quoted p. 560, 1, connects the igov
àirávºrm with the voepérepov jë
vómpa.
* Wide supra, p. 549. 1; 560, 2;
562, 1. The limitedness of the
primitive essence is ascribed by
|Philop. Phys. A. 5 (ap. Karsten,
p. 126), both to Xenophanes and
Parmenides.
* Supra, p. 548, 1 ; 543, 1.
* He himself, it is true, says
this of the earth; cf. Act. Tat.
Isag, p. 127 E, Pet. :
'yaims uèv Tóðe treſpas &va, Tâ9 toa-
orly Šparat
aiðépt trporträdgov, Tô icóra, 6’ &s
âtepov icóvei.
But Arist. De Coe'o, ii. 12, 294 a,
21, applies to him, when speaking
of those who &Ireupov to káta Tijs
ºyās elvaí (paau, är" &melpovo irºv
é551(300al Aéryovres, Šotrep Eevoq'.,
the censure of Empedocles against
the opinion that &reipova yńs te
Bá9m kal 6alpiños aidiip. Similarly,
De Mel. c. 2, 976 a, 32: ás kai
Eevoqāvms & Teipov tá Te Bá90s Tās
'yńs kal too &épos (pmov eival, &c.
The same is repeated by Plut. ap,
Eus. Pr. Ev. i, 8, 4 ; Plac. iii. 9, 4
(Galen, c. 21); Hippolyt. i. 14;
Kosmas Indicopl. p. 149; Georg.
Pachym. p. 118; vide Brandis,
Comm. E. 48; Karsten, 1.54;
Cousin, 24 sq.
566 XENOPHIA WES.
sphere.' But the very contradiction between these two
sayings proves that they are not scientific propositions,
but incidental utterances which occurred in different
portions of the poems of Xenophanes. He may at one
time have spoken of the spherical form of the heavens,
and at another, of the immeasureable extent of the
world beneath, and of the space of the air above,
without troubling himself about the mutual compati-
bility of these two conceptions. Nor is it probable
that he meant to express by either of them any fixed
conviction in regard to the shape and extension of the
world—still less that they had reference to the Deity.
The statement that he declared the world to be un-
derived, eternal, and imperishable,” may, with more
reason, remind us of the similar definitions of the
Deity. The etermity of the world might seem to him
to be implied in that of God, because God was to him
the immanent cause of the world. But he appears to
have attributed etermity to the world, only in a general
manner, in regard to its substance; and not to have
taught, as a consequence of this, that the wrviverse
in its present condition was underived.” Also the pro-
position that the All remained like to itself” may have
been enunciated by him in regard to the regularity of
the course of the world and the invariableness of the
universe. But that he absolutely denied all genera-
tion and destruction, all change and movement in the
* Wide p. 549, 1; 560, 2. IIappavíðms MéA.) &yévvmtov kal
* Supra, p. 562, 1, and Plut. &fötov kal & pôaptov rov kóquov. Cf.,
Plac. ii. 4, 3 (Stob. i. 416), Eevo- however, p. 570, 1.
oãvns (Stob. has instead MéAlogos; * Cf. p. 570, 1.
in one MS., however, there is writ- * Plut., Cic., Hippol.,and others,
ten in the margin, Eevo pdvms, vide p. 562, 5.
PHYSICS. 567
world, as more recent authors assert," we cannot think
possible. There is no mention of such a denial in
ancient authorities or in the fragments of Xenophanes'
writings;” and, moreover, a number of statements of
a physical nature respecting the origin of individual
things, and the changes of the material earth are
attributed to this philosopher, while no remark is
ever made * in connection with these that, like Parme-
nides in his physics, Xenophanes was speaking of illu-
sory phenomena, and not of the reality. None of
our authorities maintain that he opposed Being to non-
Being in the manner of his successor, or taught that
Being alone was reality.
These physical theories of Xenophanes have scarcely
any connection with the fundamental ideas of his philo-
sophy. They are isolated observations and conjectures,
sometimes pregnant and suggestive, but sometimes of
a rudimentary and child-like kind, such as we might
expect in the commencement of natural science. We
will now, however, shortly state what has been preserved
of them.
According to some, Xenophanes said that earth was
the primitive substance of all things ; according to
others, earth and water.”
* The references, l. c., vide
p. 539, 2.
* Aristotle indeed says of the
Eleatics generally, &kivmtov eivaí
qaqiv, but the subject of &lcívmtov
is not to trav, but to Év.
* As Braniss says (Gesch. d.
Phil. Kant, i. 115), and Ritter i.
477, fancies he sees in Fr. 15, 18.
* Both opinions are mentioned
by Sextus Math. x. 313 f; Hippol.
But the verses on which
Refut. x. 6 sq., p. 498, who each
quotes the verse of Xenophanes
from which they are severally
taken, the one from Fr. 8 : éic
'yaíms yúp tróvra kai eis yºu trèvra
TeXevtá, the other from Fr. 9:
trövtes yao yaims Te Kai úðaros
ékºyevöueoróa. Cf. Fr. 10 : yī kal
#6ap travé àoroa yívoviral hö& púov-
Tai. For the first (cf. Brandis,
Comm. 44 sq.; Karsten, 45 sqq.;
508 ACENOPHANES.
these statements are founded appear to deal only with
terrestrial things,' and, therefore, to assert nothing
but what we find very commonly elsewhere.” Ari-
stotle, in enumerating the elementary primitive sub-
stances of the ancient philosophers, not merely does
not mention Xenophames, but says” that none of those
philosophers who admitted only one primitive sub-
stance, adopted the earth as such. Thus he expressly
excludes the first of the above statements; and we
cannot suppose him to be confirming the second* when
he names the dry and the moist among the primitive
substances;” for he repeatedly designates Parmenides
as the only philosopher of the Eleatics who, side by
side with the One substance, admitted two opposite
elements.” On the other hand, later writers had some
reason for interpreting the verse of Xenophanes in this
sense, since Xenophanes supposed the stars (vide infra)
to originate from the vapours of the earth and water.
The theory that he regarded the earth itself as a com-
bination of air and fire" is certainly incorrect,” and it
146 sqq.) we have Plut. ap. Eus., 150, states), he is right, and
l. c.; Stob. Ecl. i. 294; Hippol. i.
14; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. ii. 10, p.
22; iv. 5, p. 56; for the second,
Sext. Math. ix. 361; Pyrrh. iii. 30;
Porph. ap. Simpl. Phys. 41 a ;
Philop. Phys. D, 2 (Schol. in
Arist. 338 b, 30; 339 a, 5, cf. Sup.
p. 272, 2); Ps.-Plut. (possibly
Porphyry) V. Hom. 93; Eustath.
in Il. vii. 99; Galen, H. Phil. c. 5,
p. 243; Epiph. Earp. fid. p. 1087 B.
* When, therefore, Sabinus ap.
Galen in Hipp. De Nat. Hom. i. p.
25 K, says that Xenophanes de-
clared earth to be the substance of
men (not of all things, as Karsten,
Galen's severe censure is, as Bran-
dis acknowledges, undeserved.
* We need only remember the
words in 1 Mos. 3, 19, or Il. vii. 99 :
iſãop kai yata yévola 6e.
* Metaph. i. 8, 989 a.
* As Porphyry maintains, l.c.
* Phys. i. 5, 188 b, 33: of uév
ºyèp 6epubu kal juxpov of 6' 5"ypov
ical &mpöv (&px&s Aapabávovort).
* Metaph. i. 4, 5, 984 b, 1 ; 986
b, 27 Sqq.
* Plut. Plac. iii. 9 (Galen, c.
21): éé &épos kai Tupos ovutrayā-
!/Cºl.
* Brandis, Gr. Röm. Phil. i.
PHYSICS. 569
may, perhaps, be in consequence of a similar misappre-
hension that the doctrine of the four elements came to
be ascribed to him." It was, no doubt, easy for later
writers to find their four primitive elements in every
cosmology; but this doctrine is distinctly asserted by
Aristotle * to have originated with Empedocles, and its
connection with the metaphysics of Parmenides is too
obvious for us to suppose that a predecessor of Parme-
mides should not merely have mentioned in an inci-
dental manner fire, water, etc., but should have ex-
pressly designated the four elements as the basis of all
compound bodies.
There is, doubtless, more foundation for the theory
that Xenophanes supposed the earth to have passed
from a fluid condition into its present solid state, and
that in time it would again by means of water be
changed into mud. He had observed petrified marine
creatures on land, and even on mountains, and knew
not how to account for this phenomenon except on the
supposition that the world, or at any rate the surface
of the world, was subject to a periodical transition
from the fluid state to the solid, and back to the fluid
state again; in which transition the human race, to-
gether with its dwelling place, must sink into the water
372, conjectures that Xenophanes,
as often elsewhere, is here con-
fused with Xenocrates; but Plut.
Fac. lun. 29, 4, p. 944, does not
countenance this opinion. Karsten,
p. 157, explains the remark by
saying that Xenophanes thought
air and fire, i.e., steam and heat,
were developed out of the earth.
The most probable explanation,
however, seems to me that of
Ritter, i. 479 ; cf. Brandis, Comm
El. 47. According to this, the
words in their original connection
only signify that the earth passed
from a fluid condition to a solid by
the action of air and of fire.
* Diog. ix. 19.
* Metaph. i. 4, 985 a, 31.
570
ACENOPHANES.
and begin afresh at each restoration of the dry land."
He might have brought this theory into connection
| Hippolyt. i. 14: 68& E. użiv
This yūs trpos thv 6&Aaorgav yewéa 6al
80ket kai Tô xpóvg. ātro roi, jºypot,
Aijeg flat, pāorkov touairas #xeiv
&Toàelēets, éti év géan yń kal tipegiv
eūptorkovtat köyxa, kal év Xupakoú-
orals öé év rais Aarouía is Aéyet
eūpā06al rôtov ix600s kal qajków,
év Šē IIápa, Tâtrov &qºms év tá, 849et
Too Atôov, Šv Šē MeXtºrm TAdkas orvu-
Távrov 6axagoríov. (These facts of
palaeontology seem first to have been
observed by Xenophanes; that
they gave matter of reflection to
later writers may be seen from
Herod. ii. 12; Theoph. Fr. 30, 3;
Strabo, i. 3, 4, p. 49 sq.) Taura
6é pmol yewéorèal öre travra étrºX6-
6magv trg)\al, röv 5è titrov čv Tó
wnxó &mpavóñval, &vaipeia:6al 5& rows
âv6pórows travras ātav i y? Icare-
vex0elora eis rºv 64Aago'av trnābs
'yávntal, eira tráAlv &pxeo 6ai Tàs
'yevéorea's kal toiro tróat Tots kóa-
pious yiver6al cataflāAAew (Dunck. :
ſcaragoxhv, perhaps it should be
kataAAñAws). Cf. Plut. ap. Eus.
Pr. Ev. i. 8, 4 : &lroqatveral 6& kal
Tô xpóvº kataqepouévny ovvexós
kai kat' àAt yov Thy yīv eis Tºv
6&Aao'o av xopelv. These statements
seem too explicit to leave room for
Teichmüller's theory that Xeno-
crates believed in man's having
eternally existed on the earth
(Stud. 2. Gesch. d. Begr. 604;
Neue Stud, etc. i. 219) There is
no evidence of such a theory, and
it does not follow from the eternity
of the world, even if Xenophanes
held that doctrine. For Hippolytus
says (and there is no ground for
contradicting him) that Xeno-
phanes supposed the human race
to have, been destroyed at each
periodical submerging of the earth,
and to have begun anew at each
renovation. But even the eternity
of the world is not proved to have
been a doctrine of Xenophanes,
either by the testimony of the
Placita, quoted p. 566, 2, or by
the statements of more recent
authors, quoted p. 562, 5, who
make no distinction between what
the philosopher asserts about God
and what he says of the universe.
At any rate, we cannot, on the
strength of such evidence, charge
Aristotle, who denies that any of
his predecessors held the eternity
of the world (De Caelo, 1, 10,
279 b, 12) with an error, or, as
Teichmüller does, with a malicious
and wilful misunderstanding (vide
Teichmüller, Neue Stud. etc. i.
218, cf. p. 239 and 229 sqq., dis-
cussions which, however, contain
nothing new, and pay no regard to
my explanation in Hermes, x. 186.
sq., nor to that of my present
work, p. 352, 3rd edition). In
reality there is no irreconcilable
contradiction between Aristotle's
assertion and the opinion attri-
buted to Xenophanes. When Aris-
totle speaks of the eternity of the
world, he means not merely eternity
in regard to its matter, but in re-
gard to its form ; the eternity of
this our universe; and he therefore
reckons Heracleitus, in spite of his
famous declaration, among those
who believe the world to have had
a beginning (cf. inf. vol. ii.). It is
impossible that a philosopher like
Xenophanes, who held that the
earth from time to time sank into
the sea, and was periodically
formed anew, and that the Sun
PHYSICS.
571
with his philosophic opinions through the doctrine that
the one divine essence is alone unchangeable, while
everything earthly is subject to perpetual change."
Later writers see in the innumerable formations of the
world an innumerable succession of worlds,” which is
certainly incorrect; yet this statement may have been
due to the theories of Xenophanes about the constella-
tions.
He regarded the sun, moon and stars (as well
as the rainbow * and other celestial phenomena)," as
and stars arose afresh each day
and night, and again disappeared,
could have conceived this world as
having had no beginning. He
might say that the All, i.e., the
collective mass of matter, had no
beginning; but the form assumed
by this matter he must have Sup-
posed to change. Aristotle, there-
fore, could not have ascribed to
him the doctrine of the eternity of
the world in his (Aristotle's) scrise,
any more than to Heracleitus and
Empedocles. Diog. (vide infra,
note 2) and Hippolytus (i.e. the
authors whom they follow) find in
him the theory of many (succes-
sive) worlds.
* We have seen the same in
Ppicharmus, p. 531, 1.
* Diog. ix. 19 : kóopovs 6 &treſ-
povs & TapaxN &ictovs 6é. Instead of
&mapa NA. Karsten reads obic & Tap.,
Cobet trapa NAdictovs. If we read
&rapañAdkrovs, we make Xeno-
phanes to have held that each suc-
cessive world was exactly like its
predecessor, as the Stoics thought
(cf. Pt. iii. a, 141, 2 A); according
to the reading of Karsten and
Cobet, he must have denied this.
Brobably both readings are incor-
rect, and &TrapaxNdiktovs or oik
&TrapaxAdkrovs may have been
evolved out of some unimportant
expression by a later writer who,
when he heard of Xenophanes' in-
numerable worlds, immediately
wished to know how he regarded
the vexed question of their likeness
or unlikeness. Cousin, p. 24,
translates &tapańAdictous as ‘ºm-
'mobile,’ and understands by the
âtelpot kóa plot &trapdx?\arctoi the
immeasurabie substructure of the
earth, which naturally has no con-
cern with either view. Stob. Ecl.
i. 496 (supra, p. 262, 3), and after
the same authority, Theod. Cur.
Gr. Aff. iv. 15, p. 58, class Xeno-
phanes, Anaximander, Anaximenes,
etc., and Democritus and Epicurus
together (without farther distinc-
tion) as adherents of the doctrine
of innumerable worlds.
* Fr. 13 ap. Eustath. in Il. xi.
27, and other Scholiasts:
#v T’’Ipu, kaxéovoſt, vépos ical tooto
tréquke
tropºpúpeov kai pouvºiceov ical XAwpov
iöégéal.
4 Stob. i. 580; Plac. iii. 2, 12
(under the title : trepi kopamtöv kai
6tattévrav Kal rôv Tototrov) : E.
trövta rā rotavra veſpóv Tretupa-
puévav avathuata à Kiväuata (trixhu.
Cf. Plac. ii. 25, 2; Stob. i. 510).
572 XENOPHANES.
aggregations of burning and luminous vapours, in a
word as fiery clouds," which at their setting were extin-
guished like embers, and at their rising were kindled,”
or rather formed, anew ; * this occurred likewise, he
thought, in solar and lunar eclipses.” These masses
of vapour (this is, at any rate, expressly said in regard
to the sun) were not supposed to move in a circle
around the earth, but in an endless straight line above
it ; and if the course appears to us circular, this is
only an optical delusion, as in the case of the other
clouds which, when they approach the Zenith, seem to
our eyes to ascend, and when they go under the horizon,
to sink. It follows from this that new stars must be
continually appearing above our horizon, and that parts
of the earth widely separated from each other must be
enlightened by different sums" and moons.
Concerning lightning and the
Dioscuri, cf. Stob. p. 514, 592;
Plut. Plac. ii. 18; Galen, c. 13.
| Stob. Eel. i. 522: E. &h vegów
Tetrupwaévov eival Töv #Alov . .
©eóppartos év toºs puquico's yéypa-
q'ev (Töv #Atov eival, after Xeno-
phanes) éic truptătov učv Tów avva-
6poiſouévov čk tās inſpås àvaðupid-
orews a vuaôpoićvrav Šē Töv #Atov.
Similarly as to the moon, p. 550.
The same is asserted in Hippol.
l. c.; Plut. ap. Eus. !. c.; Plac. ii.
20, 2, 25, 2; Galen, H. phil. c. 14,
15. Instead of Öypå &vaðuptaois,
Galen has £mpol &tuoi. Cf. on this
point, Karsten, p. 161 sq.
* Achill. Tat. Isag. in Arat. c.
11, p. 133: E. §§ Aéyet toys &a répas
ěk vegóv ovved tâval épatrúpov Kal
or 6évvvoróat kal &vátteorðal
&v6eakas kal &te uév &rtoviral pav-
Taqiau juás éxeiv &vatoxfis, Šte 6&
ãorel -
o Bévvvvrat 550 eas. Somewhat to
the same effect, Stob. i. 512; Plut.
Plac. ii. 13, 7 ; Galen, c. 13, p.
271; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 19,
p. 59; Hippol. l. c. : Töv Šē #Atov
ék wikpóv Tuptătwv &6poiſouévov
'y(vegöal ka0 €káortmu juépav.
* Wide p. 572, 5.
4 Stob. i. 522, 560; Plut. Plac.
ii. 24, 4 ; Galen, c. 14, p. 278;
Schol. ad Plato Rep. 498 A. (p.
409 Bekk.).
* Such is the inference from
Stob. i. 534 (Plac. ii. 24, 7; Galen,
c. 14); E. troXAous eival #Aious ſcal
orexh, as kata. Tä k\{uata Tůs yńs
kai &motouts ical (&vas, karū 6é
Tuva kalpöv čktíttetv Töv Štokov eis
Tuva &trotophy Tās yńs owk oikov-
Mévnv Šq’ huàv, kal oitos éotrepel
revep Satočvra ékAeriptu Ütroºpaíve vº
ô 8' airbs Tov #xtov eis &treupov učv
trpoiéval Solceiv Šē kukAéto 6a, 61& Thy
PHYSICS. 573
As to the rest of the physical propositions attributed
to Xenophanes, some, it is certain, do not belong to
him," and others contain too little that is characteristic
of his doctrine, to require particular mention.”
&méa rariv. Cf. Hippol. l.c. : &lret-
pous jiàious elva, kal areAjivas. That
Xenophanes really entertained
these notions would not be ade-
quately proved by such recent and
untrustworthy evidence, if the
agreement of all these cosmological
indications and their peculiar cha-
racter belonging to the first child-
hood of astronomy did not vouch
for their truth. Even the obvious
suspicion of some confusion with
FIeracleitus must vanish on closer
examination, for the ideas of the
two philosophers, though in many
respects similar, have much that is
essentially distinct. The remark
of Karsten, p. 167, that Xeno-
phanes could not have believed
there were several suns and moons
in the heavens at the same time,
and that consequently this state-
ment must have arisen from a con-
fusion between snccessive suns and
moons, and suns and moons side
by side with one another.—is re-
futed by what has been said in the
text. Teichmüller (Stud. 2. Gesch.
d. Begr. 601, 621) observes that
since the earth, according to Xeno-
phanes, was unlimited in a down-
ward direction, the heavens could
not revolve around it, and conse-
quently Xenophanes must have
denied the rotation of the heavens,
but this is not to the point. The
infinite extent of the earth (con-
ceived as shaped like a cylinder)
downward, did not interfere with
the notion of the stars revolving
around it in orbits which, some-
times rising above the plane of
The
the horizon, sometimes sinking
below it, turn around the earth
laterally, provided only that the
inclination of these orbits in re-
gard to the horizon were not
such as to cause the stars to go
under the earth itself. That the
revolution of the heavens is lateral
was the opinion also of Anaxi-
menes, Anaxagoras, Diogenes, and
Democritus.
* For instance, the statement
of the Pseudo-Galen (H. Phil. c.
13), that Xenophanes believed all
the orbits of the stars to lie in the
same plane ; in regard to a pas-
sage where Stob. i. 514, and Plut.
Plac. ii. 15, have more correctly
Xenocrates instead of Xenophanes,
and the assertion of Cicero, Acad.
ii. 39, 123, repeated by Lactantius,
Instit. iii. 23, and defended by
Cousin, 22, that the moon was said
by Xenophanes to be inhabited.
Brandis, Comm. 54, 56, and Kar-
sten, p. 171, remark that both
these authors confuse Xenophanes
with other philosophers (e.g.
Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Philo-
laus).
* We are told that he attri-
buted the salt taste of sea water
to its mixture with terrestrial
elements (Hippol. l. c.); clouds,
rain, and wind, he thought, arose
from vapours, which the sun's heat
caused to escape from the sea
(Stob. extracts from Joh. Damasc.
Parall. i. 3.; Floril. vol. iv. 151,
Mein. ; Diog. ix. 19); the moon
shines by her own light (Stob. i.
556), and has no influence on the
574 MENOPHANES.
ethical portions of his fragments cannot, strictly speak-
ing, be included in his philosophy, because admirable
and philosophical as is the spirit revealed in them, he
never brought his ethics into scientific connection with
the universal bases of his cosmical theory. The poet
censures the former luxury of his compatriots; he
deplores on the other hand that bodily strength and
agility bring more honour to a man than wisdom, which
is far more valuable to the state;” he disapproves oaths
as a means of proof, because he sees in them a reward
for godlessness.” He advocates cheerful feasts, seasoned
with pious and instructive talk, but he condemns empty
conversation, together with the mythical creations of
the poets.” Although this betrays the friend of science
and the enemy of myths, yet on the whole these say-
ings do not transcend the point of view of the popular
gnomic wisdom. It would be more important, were
the assertion correct, that Xenophames either wholly
denied the possibility of knowledge, or restricted it to
the doctrine of the Deity; or, as others say, that he
recognised the truth of the perception of reason only,
and not of the perception of Sense.”
earth (ibid. 564). The soul, ac-
The expressions,
Wit. Pud. 5, p. 530.
cording to the ancient notion, he
considered to be air (Diog. ix. 19;
cf. Tert. De An. c. 43). Brandis
Comm. El. 37, 57, deduces from
this passage, and Xen. Fr. 3, that
Xenophanes placed vows above the
Juxh, and the ppéves above vows ;
but I can find it neither in Dio-
genes nor Xenophanes, nor can I
consider it to be the real doctrine
of this philosopher.
1 Fr. 20, ap. Athen. xii. 324
b; cf. the anecdotes, ap. Plut. De
* Fr. 19 ; ap. Athen. x. 413.
* Arist. Rhet. i. 15, 1377 a, 19,
of which Karsten most arbitrarily
makes a verse.
* Fr. 17, 21; ap. Athen. ii. 54
e; xi. 462 c. 782 a (1036 Dind.).
* Diog. ix. 20: pmol 5& Xortov
Tpætov airby eitreºv &karáAmirt’ eival
Tà travra, TAavdépevos. Ibid. ix.
72 of the Pyrrhonists: oi, whv &AA&
Ical =evoq'dums, etc., kar’ airobs aſke-
Tikol Tuxávovoiv. Didymus, ap.
Stob. Ecl. ii. 14: Xenophanes first
SCEPTIOISM. B75
however, from which the statement is derived have by
no means this scope and compass. Xenophanes ob-
serves that truth is only discovered by degrees." He
thinks that perfect certainty of knowledge is not pos-
sible; if even a man should hit upon the truth in a .
matter, he is never absolutely certain that he has done
so ; and, therefore, Xenophanes designates his own
views, even on the weightiest questions, merely as pro-
babilities.”
But this modesty of the philosopher ought
not to be mistaken for a sceptical theory, though it
taught that és àpa 6eys usu olös
Thy ax#9elav, Sókos 3' étrl Tägt Té-
rvictat. Sext. Math. vii. 48, f: Kal
8% &veixov učv airò [to Kpltfiptov]
Eevoqāvmste, etc. Similarly Pyrrh.
ii. 18: &v Eevoſp. uèv Kará tipas
eitrov rávra &karáxmirta, etc. Ibid.
110 : Eevoq'. 68 kata tows &s étépa's
airby Émyovuévous . . . baſveta,
ph trägav karáAmply &vaipeiv, &A^&
+}v 3rigºrmuovukáv Telcaláštártotov,
&moxetiret thv Šoćaotiv. According
to this, adds Sextus, he would have
made Aéryos 60&aatös the criterion.
The former theory is adopted by
Hippol. l. c.; oitos épm ſpºros
&karaxmiſtav elva, tróvrov, Epiph.
Erp. Fid. 1087 B: elva. 3. . . .
oščev &Am6és, etc., and Plut, ap.
Eus. l. c. : &lroſpatveral 6* Kal tăs
airò%gets ſevöeſs kal Ka86Nov giv
abraſs kal airby Tov A670V ÖlašáA-
Aet; the second by Proclus in Tin.
78 B. Disagreeing with both,
Timon censures Xenophanes (vide
infra, p. 576, 1) for admitting on
the one hand the incognisability of
things, and on the other the unity
of Being; and the Hist. Phil. of
Galen, c. 3, p. 234, says the same of
him. Aristocles lastly (Eus. Pr.
Fv. xiv. 17, 1) includes his point
of view with that of the other
Eleatics and Megarics in the pro-
position: Öeiv Tâs uév aic:6%aeus kai
tês q'avtaatas katağäAAetv, airtó 5è
uóvov Tó A6).4 Trioſteſſelv. In the
utterance of Aristotle with which
this passage is connected (infra,
§ Melissus) Melissus alone is in
question. It has already been shown
(p. 531, 1 ; 558, 1) that Arist. Me-
taph. iv. 5, Poet. 25 has no connec-
tion with it. -
1 Fr. 16 b ; Stob. Ecl. i. 224 ;
Floril. 39, 41 :—
où to &r' àpxis ºrdvra 6eol 0umroſs
ūréðelčav,
&AA& xpóvá, ºntoâvres éqevpto Kovoſiv
ãueivov.
* Fr. 14, ap. Sext. l. c. :—
kal rô ačv oſſu oraq’s oiſtus &vhp
ºyévet' oi,6é Tus égºral
eióðs, &pſpl 9eóv Te kal &gora Aéyo
Trepl travrov.
ei Y&p kai Tà uðAtata tºxoi Tetexe-
opévov eitröv,
aërës 6aſºs oik olòe 56tcos 3' étri
Trāat térvictat
(to have an opinion is free to all),
ap. Fr. 15; Plut. Qu Conv. ix. 14,
7 : Tajra öeóóšaotai Wěv éotkóta
Toſs étáuouai.
576 XENOPHANES.
arose, no doubt, from a sceptical temperament. For
the uncertainty of knowledge is not here based on a
general enquiry into the intellectual faculty of man, it
is simply maintained as the result of personal experi-
ence; consequently, the philosopher is not hindered, by
the consideration of it, from advancing his theological
and physical propositions with full conviction. Even
the later division of the cognition of reason from the
deceptive perception of sense has not been made as yet
—philosophic theories are placed on an equality with
all other theories; for this division is founded by the
Eleatics on the denial of Becoming and Plurality which
the senses show us ; and to this denial, as we have
already seen, Xenophanes did not proceed."
* This is otherwise explained
by Cousin, p. 48 sq., and by Kern,
Beitr. 4; Xenoph. 13. Cousin
thinks that the verses of Xeno-
phanes refer to the polytheistic
notions of his contemporaries, and
that Xenophanes was only scepti-
cal in regard to these. But his
words seem to have a more general
meaning, and his criticism of poly-
theism cannot be called sceptical,
as his attitude is not uneertain to-
wards it, but hostile. Kern is of
opinion that Xenophanes distinctly
enunciated his doctrine of the One
only in his later life, after having
long contented himself with doubt-
ing the views of others. In sup-
port of this, he appeals to Timon's
verses, ap. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 224, which
represents him as complaining: és
ical éyèv čqe^ov rvicivot v6ov &vti-
Boxforal àuqorepô8Aerros' 30Åſm 6'
636 &amath9qv trpeg Svyev’s éréov
kal &piev6%ptoros (unmindful, proba-
bly) &mdams orkertoovvhs. &ntrm yap,
etc. (vide sup. p. 562, 4). But
Trperflvyevils does not imply that he
first arrived at the theory of the
unity of Being in his old age,
having previously been a sceptic,
but that in spite of his age (or also
from the weakness of age) he had
maintained the standpoint of scep-
ticism. This could not have been
said if he had brought forward his
doctrine of the Unity of Being at
the same time and in the same
poem, as the utterances (quoted
above) which have a sceptical in-
terpretation. He himself, Fr. 14
(vide previous note), in the words
which sound most sceptical, refers
to what he had taught respecting
the gods and the world (for even if
&publ 6eów is primarily to be con-
nected with eið3s, the words ‘con-
cerning the gods, and concerning all
of which I speak,’ imply that he had
also spoken of the gods); we can-
not, therefore, suppose that his
sceptical utterances belong to an
earlier epoch than his dogmatical.
CHARACTER OF HIS DOCTRINE. 577
There is all the less reason for ascribing to him, as
some of the ancient writers do, logical enquiries as well
as physical,' or for classing him with the later Eristics.”
His doctrine is rather Physics in the ancient and more
comprehensive sense, and though it is far removed
from other pwrely physical theories, yet its physical
character comes out so clearly, when we compare it with
the more abstract propositions of Parmenides, that it
has been not inaptly described as the link of transition
from the Ionian enquiry to the completed Eleatic doc-
trime of pure Being.” Xenophanes, according to Theo-
phrastus, was himself a disciple of Anaximander," and
there is nothing against the theory that he was first in-
duced by that philosopher to study the nature and causes
of the world. It is true that he followed his predeces-
sor only in regard to a few comparatively subordinate
points, whereas the main tendency of his thought pur-
sued another course, and led to other results. Like
Anaximander, he supposed the earth and its inhabi-
tants to have originated from the drying up of the
primitive slime;” Anaximander held that the universe
alternately sprang from the primitive matter, and
| Sext. Math. vii. 14 : Töv 6é the system of Xenophanes a union
6tuep? Thy pixooroq tav Štroorma'apaé-
vav E. Lev ć KoMoq &vios to puorukov
ãua kal Aoyukov, &s part Tives,
Hetfipxeto.
* Aristocles, ap. Eus. Pr. Ev.
xi. 3, 1: E. 5è kal of ātr Čketvov
robs épio Tikovs ſcivioravires A6-yovs
troXby uèv évé8&Aov favy You rois
qux006 pois, où pºvěrápuráv yé riva
Boh9elav.
* Brandis, Gr. Röm. Phil. i.
359. The view of Cousin is less
correct (l.c. p. 40, 46). He sees in
WOL. I.
of Ionian and Pythagorean ele-
ments, but the theological doctrines
of Xenophanes are more likely to
have come from him to the Pytha-
goreans than vice versä. The
chronology also is against this
theory, especially if Cousin is right
in placing Xenophanes' birth in
the year 617 B.C.
* Cf. Diog. ix. 21, quoted infra,
Parm, note 1.
* Cf. p. 569, with p. 255, 251, 1.
P P
578 MENOPHANES.
returned to it again, and Xenophanes taught the same
in regard to the earth, which for him is the most im–
portant part of the universe. His opinion that the
heavenly bodies are merely masses of vapour' reminds
us of the earlier doctrine that their fires are nourished
by the exhalations of the earth ; * and the infinite
extension of the earth beneath, and the air above,”
recalls the unlimitedness of Anaximander's primitive
matter. But the theories of Xenophanes about the
universe generally are widely different from the system
of Anaximander. Anaximander makes, at any rate, an
attempt to explain the formation and constitution of
the universe in a physical manner. Of Xenophanes we
are told nothing of the kind, and his conception of the
stars shows clearly how little the naturalistic treatment
of phenomena suited his mental tendency. He enquires,
indeed, concerning the principle of things, but the
enquiry immediately takes a theological turn, leading
him to test the current opinions concerning the beings
in whom the ultimate cause is usually sought, to the
criticism of the belief in gods—and thus to the thought
of the One eternal unchangeable Being who is not to
be compared with any finite thing. His philosophy is
only maturalistic in regard to its point of departure;
in its development it becomes a theological metaphy-
1. Cf. p. 252.
* According to the Plag. ii. 25,
2, Xenophanes thought the moon
was a vépos retrixmuévov, and that
the comets and similar phenomena
were trixhuata vegöv, in the same
way that Anaximander, according
to Stob. Ecl. i. 510, regarded the
stars as triańuara &épos. This seems
to me of little consequence; for we
do not know whether Xenophanes
himself used the expression; and
if he did, his meaning could not
have been the same as Anaximan-
der's. He meant a firm combina-
tion, and Anaximander merely a
loose aggregation.
* Sup. p. 565, 5.
CHARACTER OF HIS DOCTRINE. §79
sic." But since the primitive essence is not apprehended
in a purely metaphysical manner as Being without
further specific determination, but theologically as the
Deity, or as the divine spirit ruling in the universe,
Xenophanes is not obliged to dispute the reality of the
Many and the changeable, or to declare the pheno-
menon to be a deceptive appearance. He says, it is
true, that every thing in its deepest principle is eternal
and One, but he does not deny that, side by side with
the One, there exists a plurality of derived and transitory
things; and he passes over, apparently without observing
it, the difficulty which, from his own point of view, is
involved in this theory and the problem which it pro-
poses for enquiry. Parmenides was the first who recog-
i Teichmüller (Stud. 2. Gesch.
d. Begr. 612) is so far quite right
in his remark that ‘metaphysics
with Xenophanes sprang, not from
the consideration of nature, but
from the conflicts of Reason with
the existing theology.” Only it is
rather inconsistent with this that
we should be told also, in relation
to Xenophanes (ibid. 620, 598),
“If we would understand the meta-
physics of the ancient philosophers,
we must first study their theories
of nature.' Even in itself, as it
seems to me, this proposition is
not universally true of the pre-
Socratics (it is only in a certain
sense that we can ascribe to them
any distinction between metaphy-
sics and natural enquiries at all);
and among those to whom it is in-
applicable, I should name Parme-
nides, Heracleitus, and Xenophanes.
I cannot discover from Teichmül-
ler's exposition in what manner his
theories of the Deity and the unity
of the world can have arisen out of
the very few physical propositions
that have come down to us. Even
Anaximander's &meipov is in no way
connected with them. Teichmüller
(p. 620 sq.) indeed thinks that
Xenophanes denied the movement
of the universe, because the circular
motion ascribed to it by Anaxi-
mander would only be possible if
the earth hung in the midst of the
air, and this seemed to him much
too improbable. The idea appears
to me far-fetched, and it has two
considerations against it—1, that
Xenophanes (as observed on p.
570, 1), though he denied the crea-
tion and destruction of the world,
yet expressly maintained a periodi-
cal change in its conditions; and 2,
that Anaximander (cf. p. 252, 1) did
not believe in a circular movement
of the universe, and the rotation of
the heavens, which, he taught, would
be quite compatible with the un-
limitedness of the subterranean
region of the earth (cf. p. 572, 5).
P P 2
580
PARMENIDEs.
mised this, and who carried out the Eleatic doctrine in
opposition to the popular notions with logical consis-
tency, and regardless of results.
PARMENIDES. I
THE great advance made by the Eleatic philosophy in
.*
_*
| Parmenides of Elea was the
son of Pyres or Pyrrhes, Theo-
phrast, ap. Alex. in Metaph. i. 3,
984 b, 1; Diog. ix. 21; Suid. Sub voc.;
Theod. Cur. Gr. aff, iv. 7, p. 57;
also ap. Diog. ix. 25, where (ac-
eording to the usual reading) he
is called the son of Teleutagoras;
whether, with Cobet, who may or
may not be following the evidence
of MSS., we omit the words IIöpm-
ros rov 6& IIappeviðmu, or with
ECarsten, Phil. Graec. Rell. i. b, 3,
alter their position thus: Závov
'EAedºrms' rootov'AtroAAóöwpós (pmotu
eival év xpoviko’s púa'el uèv Texev-
Tayópov, 0éget 5& IIappevſöov. Tov 6&
IIappeviðmu IIºpmros. He came of
a wealthy and distinguished
family, and we are told first
joined the Pythagoreans. At the
instance of Ameinias, the Pytha-
gorean, he embraced the philoso-
phic life, and conceived such a
veneration for Diochaites, likewise
a Pythagorean, that he erected a
mpgov to him at his death (Sotion
ap. Diog. l. c.). By more recent
authors he is himself called a Py-
thagorean (Strabo, 27, 1, 1, p. 252:
'Exéav . . ; fis IIapuevſöms kal
Závov čºyévovro &vöpes IIv6ayópelot.
Callimachus ap. Procl. in Parm.
t. iv. 5 Cous. ; Iambl. V. P. 267,
cf. 166; Anon. Phot. Cod. 249, p.
439 a, 35), and a Parmenidean life
Parmenides ultimately consists in this, that the unity
is spoken of as synonymous with
the Pythagorean (Cebes, Tab. c.
2: IIv6ayópelów Tuva kal IIappeviðetov
émAwk&s 8tov). In his philosophic
opinions, however, he mostly re-
sembled Xenophanes, whose scholar
and acquaintance he is asserted to
have been, though less decidedly
by Aristotle (Metaph. i. 5, 986 b,
22: 6 yap II. Totºrov AéyeTai plaðm-
ths) than by others: Plut. ap. Eus.
Pr. Ev. i. 8, 5; Eus. ibid. xiv. 17,
10, cf. x. 14, 15 ; Clem. Strom. i.
301 D; Diog. l.c.; Simpl. Phys. 2
a ; Sext. Math. vii. 111 ; Suid.
IIapp.; on the other hand, Theo-
phrast, ap. Alea’, l. c. says only:
toūrq [Eevoſpavel] triyevópevos
IIappa. He could not, however,
have remained altogether unac-
quainted with him, as both lived to—
gether for some time in Elea. The
two assertions are compatible, if we
suppose Parmenides to have been
closely and personally connected
with the Pythagoreans, and to
have learned much from them in
regard to his moral life; but in
regard to his philcsophic convic-
tion, to have been chiefly in-
fluenced by Xenophanes, and, like
Empedocles, to have approved of
the Pythagorean life, but not to
have been an adherent of the Py-
thagorean system. (This is pro-
bably the meaning of Diogenes,
JHIS LIFE.
581
of all Being, the fundamental idea of the Eleatics, was
apprehended by him in a much more definite manner
l. c., when he says: äuws 6' oiv
âkośa as 'cal Eevoq'dvovs oilk hkoxoiſ-
9morew airó, &coxov6eºv designating
here, as also in what follows, inti-
mate and personal relation.) On
the other hand, it is inconsistent
with all that we know as to the
date of the two philosophers, that
Parmenides should have been
taught by Anaximander. When,
therefore, Diog. l. c. says: IIappe-
wièms 5uſikovore Eeloq &vows, routov
Oeóqpaotos év rà éxitoufi 'Avašt-
advöpov pngly &Kotoral, rotºrov must
not be applied to Parmenides, but
to Xenophanes; and when Suidas
says of Parmenides that, according
to Theophrastus, he was a disciple
of Anaximander, he has evidently
misunderstood the passage of Diog.
which he quotes. There is a sur-
prising statement (cf. Marc. Ca-
pella, De Nupt. M. et V. i. 4) by some
scholastics that Parmenides learned
logic and astronomy in Egypt, on
which cf. Brandis, Comm. 172;
Rarsten, p. 11 sq., Notices et Ea:-
traits des Manuscrits, t. xx. b, 12
(from Remigius of Auxerre); cf.
Schol. in Arist. 533 a, 18 sqq. The
time at which–Parmenides lived
is, indeed, known in general, but
to fix "it précisely is difficult.
Diog. ix. 23, places his prime
(doubtless after Apollodorus) in
the 69th Olympiad (504-500 B.C.),
and, therefore, to assign the 79th
(in accordance with Scaliger ap.
Harsten, p. 6; Fülleborn, Beitr. vi.
9 sq.; Stallbaum Plat. Parm. 24
A sq.; Theſet. 183 E. Soph. 217
C) appears to me exceedingly
hazardous. Whether Apollodorus,
however, founds his calculation on
definite data, and not merely (as
Diels thinks (Rh. Mus. xxxi. 34
sq.), on the general synchronism
with Heracleitus, is uncertain. On
the other hand, Plato (Parm, 127
A sq.; Theaet. 183 E: Soph. 217
C) represents Socrates in very
early youth (ordóðpa véos) as meet-
ing Parmenides and Zeno in
Athens; Parmenides being then
about 65, and Zeno about 40: and
on this occasion the dialectic dis-
cussions in the dialogue bearing
his name are placed in the mouth
of Parmenides. Supposing So-
crates at that date to have been
only 15, we should have the year
of Parmenides' birth in 519 or 520
B.c. If, with Grote (Hist. of Gr.
viii. 145 sq., ed. of 1872), we
assign as the date of the dialogue
448 B.C., we should get 513 B.C. If
with Hermann (De Theoria Del. 7;
De Philos. Ion. Ætatt. 11), we ac-
cept the remark of Synesius (Calv.
Encom. c. 17) that Socrates was 25
years old, as historical evidence,
we should get 510 B.C. But there
is nothing to justify our accepting
this Platonic exposition as histori-
cal evidence. Even Athen. ix.
505 sq. and Macrobius, Sat. i. 1,
question its chronological accuracy.
For if the content 3 of the conver-
sations said to have been held be-
tween Socrates and Parmenides
are not historical,—if the gist of
the Platonic story, viz., the definite
scientific influence of Parmenides
upon Socrates, must certainly be
an invention, why should not its
setting, the meeting of the two men,
and the more specific circumstances
of this meeting, to which their
particular ages at that time be-
long, be also an invention ? This

bj82
PARMEN IDES.
than by Xenophanes, and that it was based upon the
concept of Being. Xenophanes, together with the
would not make Plato guilty of a
‘deliberate falsehood’ (Brandis, i.
376) in the one case more than in
the other ; otherwise we must
also condemn the apparent cir-
cumstantiality of the openings
of the Protagoras, Theaetetus, Sym-
posium, and other dialogues as
falsehood. The poetical license is
equally great in both instances.
Alberti (Socrates, p. 16 sq.) is of
opinion that Plato did not so
entirely renounce the laws of pro-
bability as to make his fictions
contain historical impossibilities.
In reply to this, we need only ask,
What, then, are all the numerous
and striking anachronisms in
Plato's dialogues (cf. Zeller, Abh. d.
Berl, Acad. 1873; Hist, Phil. Kl.
79 sqq.) but historical impossi-
bilities? What can be conceived
more improbable than that So-
crates and the Eleatic philosophers
held all the conversations which
Plato puts into their mouths 2
How do we know that Plato and
his disciples were sufficiently ac-
quainted with the precise chrono-
logy of Parmenides to make these
statements, though they may have
been invented, appear impossible to
them ż Why, lastly, should Plato
have hesitated to represent Par-
menides as younger than he really
was, while he makes Solon, in a
similar case, and with the same
appearance of historical exactitude
(Tim. 20 E sqq.), at least twenty
years too young 2 There would be
amply sufficient motive for Plato's
exposition even if, in fact, Par-
menides never met Socrates, or
came to Athens (a point we can-
not decide). To explain to his
disciples the relation of the Eleatic
system to his own, it was necessary
that Socrates should be confronted
with the teachers of the Eleatic
doctrine, and, preferably, with the
head of the school; and if once
this were done, the rest inevitably
follows. (Cf. Steinhart, Plato's
Werke, iii. 24 sqq.; and Zeller;
Abhand'ung, p. 92 sqq.) The histo-
rical accuracy of the Platonic ex-
position was at first defended by
Steinhart, Allg. Enc. v. Ersch. und
Grüber, sect. iii. B, xii. 233 sq.,
and by myself, Plat. Stud. 191. In
its favour, vide Schleiermacher,
Plato's W. W. i. 2, 99; Karsten,
Parm. 4 sq.; Brandis, l. c.; Mul-
laeh, Fragm. Philos. Gr. i. 109;
Schuster, Heraklit. 368, &c.
Cousin, Fragm. Philos. i. 51 sq.,
would, at any rate, hold to the
presence of the two Eleatics in
Athens, though he fixes their date
in Ol. 79, and gives up their con-
versation with Socrates. Schaar-
schmidt does the same, while
contesting the genuineness of the
Parmenides. Perhaps the state-
ments of Eusebius, Chron. Ol.
80, 4, and Syncellus, 254 C, are
traceable to Plato: these place
Parmenides, together with Empe-
docles, Zeno, and Heracleitus, in
the period mentioned. On the
other hand, Eus. Ol. 86, Syric. 257
C, make him even 25 years later,
contemporary with Democritus,
Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias.
We know nothing more of the
life of Parmenides, except that
he gave laws to the Eleans
(Speusippus ap. Diog. ix. 23; cf.
Strabo, l. c.), which they swore
afresh every year to obey (Plut.
JBEING,
583.
\,;
unity of the world-forming force or deity, had also
maintained the unity of the world; but he had not
therefore denied either the plurality or the variability
of particular existences.
Parmenides shows that the
All in itself can only be conceived as One, because all
that exists is in its essence the same.
But for this
reason he will admit nothing besides this One to be a
Adv. Col. 32, 3, p. 1126). It does
not follow, however, from this that
he only applied himself to philo-
sophy in his later life (Steinhart,
A. Enc. l. c. 234), which is not
asserted by any of our authorities.
The opinion of Deutinger (Gesch.
d. Philos, i. a, 358 sqq.), that he
was originally a Physicist, and was
first led to his doctrine of the One
by Anaxagoras, is as contrary to
chronological possibility as to the
internal relation of the two sys-
tems. All antiquity is unanimous
in paying homage to the personal
and philosophical character of Par-
menides. The Eleatic in Plato,
Soph. 237 A, calls him IIapuevſöms
ô uéyas; Socrates says of him in
Theſet. 183 E: II. 6é uot païveral,
Tö tot; 'Oujipov, aiãolós re &ua 6euvós
Te . . . kai pºol épáum 8400s ri éxetv
travrátraort yewvalov ; in Parm. 127
B, he is described as an old man
of noble appearance; and Aristotle,
Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 25, gives him
decidedly the preference scientific-
ally to Xenophanes and Melissus;
not to mention more recent authors.
Parmenides expounded his philo-
sophic opinions in a didactic poem,
fragments of which have been col-
lected and explained by writers
mentioned sup. p. 534, 3, and also
by Theod. Watke, Parm. Vel. Doc-
trina (Berl. 1864), and by H.
Stein, Symb. Philol. Bonnens. 763
sqq. . Callimachus, according to
Diogenes ix. 32, doubted its
genuineness; but that is uncertain
and unimportant for us. The title
trepi pāorews, which cannot with
certainty be deduced from Theoph.
ap. Diog. viii. 55, is ascribed to
the work by Sext. Math. vii. 111;
Simpl. De Caelo, 249 b, 23; Schol.
in Arist. 509 a, 38, and others.
Porph. Antr. Nymph. c. 22, calls it
ºpworthcov; Suidas purioxolyſa ; the
Platonic designation repº Töv Švros
ëvrov (Procl. in Tim. 5 A, cf.
Simpl. Phys. 9 a) refers only to the
first part; the koo woxoyia (Plut.
Amator. 13, 11, p. 756) to the
second. These two parts we shall
discuss further on. The statement
that Parmenides also wrote in
prose (Suidas, sub voc.) is no doubt
based upon a misunderstanding of
what Plato says in Soph. 237 A.
The supposed prose fragment in
Simpl. Phys. 76, is certainly spu-
rious. The ancients recognised only
one work of this philosopher, vide
Diog. Proom. 16; Plato, Parm.
128 A, C; Theophr. ap. Diog. viii.
55; Clemens, Strom. v. 552 C;
Simpl. Phys. 31 a. Opinions as to
the artistic character of the work
are to be found in Cic. Acad. ii.
23, 74; Plut. De Aud. po. c. 2; De
Audiendo, c. 13 (p. 16, 45); Procl.
in Parm. iv. 62 Cous. Further de-
tails respecting the work and its
history are given, ap. Karsten, l, c.
15 sqq. * -
584
PARMENIDES.
reality. Only Being is: non-Being can as little exist
as it can be expressed or conceived; and it is the
greatest mistake, the most incomprehensible error, to
treat Being and non-Being, in spite of their undeniable
difference, as the same."
1 Parm. V. 33 :-
ei ö’ &y éyòv épéo, kópugal 5& ort,
Hobov &Kočoas,
airep 660) woovat Suđoriós eiori voſīoal.
35. ii aev, 3ra's #orriv re kal &s oëk
ëort uh elval,
Tretë00s éorri kéAev60s, &Am6eim yop
- Štrºměe.
# 6’ &s oik torriv re kal &s xpedºv
éort uh elval,
rhv 5é rot pp4(w travareiðéa Šuplev
&Tapiróv'
oùre yöp &v yuoins ró ye pºl éöv, où
7&p équicrov (al. &vvorov),
40. otre (ppáorals' to yap airb voeir
éorriv re kal éival.
That does not mean, however,
‘Thinking and Being are the same; "
the context shows that ēorruy is to
be read, and the translation should
stand thus: “For the same thing
can be thought and can be,” only
that which can be, can be thought.
W. 43: Xph ºrb Aéyetu ºrb voelv ºrb by
ăupreval (So Simpl. Phys. 19 a ;
Mullach prefers Aéyetv re voev r"
éov šup. Stein's reading is still
simpler: xph to Aéryew to vaeiv t”
ébv čupeval. Grauert, ap. Brandis,
i. 379, reads: xpſ, ore Aéyeuvre voeſt,
T', ºbv čupeval, or, xpſ tº Aéyeiv.
It is impossible to decide with cer-
tainty, as we do not know the con-
nection in , which these verses
originally stood).
#orri yüp elval
plmöèv 3 oikelval' ré ré ore ppdged 6al
&voya'
45. Trpárov 'rior3’ & p’ 6600 31ſhortos
elpye vámua, -
This once recognised, every-
airãp Štreit' &mb ris, hy 6% Bporol
eiðóres oběšv -
trädgourai 6trºpavor Šumzavín yöp ºv
aútáv
oth9eoriv ióðvel TAaykrov v6ov. of 83
q}opeſſivrat
kwoboi Špios Tv tº of re reëmiróres,
&kpita púAa,
ois to tréAew re kal oikeival rairov
vevåuto rai
k’ oi rairov, révrwv 3& Traxſurporás
éorri RéAev60s.
V. 52:-
où yöp uhrore rotiro Safis, eival uh
éóvra
(This verse I agree with Mullach
in placing here. His enumeration
differs from that of Karsten by one.
In regard to the reading, rooro Safis
eival seems to me the most proba-
ble, according to Bergk's observa-
tions, Zeitschr, fir Alterthumsw.
1854, p. 438. Stein, l. c. 485, pre-
fers ðapſ.)
&AA& ort rāoró’ &p' 6600 Sºhaios
elpye vómua,
Amöé o' é00s roxbºreupov 66öv karū,
rfivöe 8táo 6a,
55. vouáv šakorov čupa kal hyńeo-
oray &kovºv
kal y\@ooravº kpival 5& Aóryp troA5-
6mplv čAeyxov
ét éué0ev Šmóéura. Lówas 6 &rt uß60s
60ſo
Aeſtretal, &s éotiv.
The fundamental idea in this de-
monstration is expressed by Aris
totle, Phys, i. 3, 187 a, I; cf. 186
BEING. 585
thing else follows by simple inference." Being cannot
begin, or cease to exist. It was not, it will not be, but
it is, in a full undivided Present.” Whence could it
have been derived 2 Out of non-Being 2 But non-
Being does not exist, and cannot produce anything.
Out of Being 2 This could not produce anything ex-
cept itself. And the same holds good of destruction.”
Speaking generally, however, what has been or will be
is not ; but it cannot be said of Being that it is not.”
a, 22 sqq. in the proposition, Ött
Trávra èv, ei Tô by év a muatvel.
Similarly Theophrastus and Eude-
mus, p. 474, 1, third edition.
* Verse 58:—
raúrm 8' étri orhuat' aori
troAA& Max', Ös &yévntov čāv kal
&váAe6póv éorriv,
of Aov, povvoyevés Te Kal &rpepºs má'
&TéAeortov.
2 W. 61 :—
où mor' émy oiâ’ #orral, étrel vov čarriv
Öplot trav
&včvvexés;
$vvexés denotes, as is clear from W.
78 sqq., the undivided; and in this
place, not the undivided in space, but
in time. Being is undivided; there-
fore no part of its existence can lie
in the future or in the past.
8 W. 62 :—
ºrſva yöp yévvmy Suſãoreal airo5;
trfi tróēev atºm6év ; oiſt’ &ic wheóvros
édow
dºdoróat o' oběš voetv' of y&p parby
où6è vomitáv
65. §orriv Štra's obic ēorri' ºrt 6 &v pup
kal xpéos àporev
$orrepov h trpóa'6ev rod uměevös &pid-
Awevov pov’;
oùTws h tréutraw tréAegev xpedºv čotiv
3) oikſ. #
oëöé trot' éic roſ, Šávros éqſhore,
trfortuosio'Xbs
ºyveg (at ri trap' airó. too elvekev
(Preller has this instead of
Totºveicev. Hist. Phil. p. 93)
ofºre yevéorðas
oër’ &AAvorðal &vijke 6them. In W.
66, too umö, äpä, means ‘beginning
from nothing.” (pov I take to be a
contraction of ºptival, governed by
&pgev. Watke, l. c. 49, and appa-
rently Preller, Phil. Gr. Röm. No.
145, make it a participle, which
causes difficulty in the construc-
ºr ly"
êotiv 3 oilº &otiv. itéspiral 3' of v,
ãortrep &váykm,
The pºv čáv &vómrov, &váuvuov, oë
'yūp &Amöhs
éotiv 66bs, rhv 3’ &orre TréAeuy ital
ērārvuoy elvai.
75. Trós 6’ &v Štreita TréAoi to Čáv
trós 6’ &v ice yévotto;
et ye yávour’ oik Šoºr', oiâ’ eſſ tors
MéAAet éore&0&1.
Tös yévsorus uév &méo Seoral real &mi-
orros ūAs8pos.
On account of this denial of Be-
coming, Plato (Theſet. 181 A) calls
586 PARMENIDES.
Being is moreover indivisible; for there is nowhere
anything distinct from it by which its parts might be
divided : all space is filled by Being alone." It is im-
movable, in one place, for itself and identical with
itself; * and since it cannot be incomplete or defective,
it must be limited.” Nor is Thought separate from
Being ; for there is nothing outside Being, and all
* ºf
the Eleatics of roń śAou araguárat ;
and Aristotle, according to Sext.
Math. x. 46, designates them as
a tagldºtas rās púaea's kal &qvorikovs.
Cf. what is cited from Aristotle,
p. 587, 3, and from Theophrastus,
p. 542, 1.
! W. 78 :—
où8& 6tauperóv écriruv, ºre. Trāv éortly
§potov,
où6é ri rii wańAov rá key stpyot utv
Švvéxeoróat
oë5é Ti xeipótepov trav & TAéov
éotiv čávros.
rig $vvexes trav čo Tuv, ºbv y&p éðurt
TreMáſel.
(Cf. Karsten, l.c., as to the reading
of W. 79, which is not improved
by substituting trm for Tú, according
to the suggestion of Mullach.)
This verse I agree with Ritter, i.
493, is to be connected with W. 90:-
Aejarge 6’ 3Mays &meóvra våg
trape&vra Bebaios (considered the
distant as something present)
oi y&p &Toruñáel to €ov Toij čovros
éxeoróat,
oùre orcièvéuevov Trävrm trăvrws karð.
kóquov
oire ovvigºrduevov.
(&troTuftësi is to be taken intransi-
tively, or else we should, with Kar-
sten, substitute for &torp. To '
ãºrotamäeºtal); cf. V. 104 sqq.
, * W. 82 f:—
aütőp &kivmtov ueyāAov čv tetpacri
ôeoplôv
éortly, àvapxov, &tavorov, Šire, yéve-
orus kal &Aeópos
tàAe padā’ TAdyx6morav, &majors Šč
Trío ris &Am3%s"
rwurov 8' év Tavré, re uévov ka?
éavré ré keſtat.
How Parmenides proved the im-
mobility of Being, we are not told.
The passage in Theat. 180 E,
leaves it undecided whether the
reason there given belongs to him,
or primarily to Melissus. Favori-
nus, ap. Diog. ix. 29, ascribes one
of Zeno's arguments to Parme-
mides, vide infra, Zeno.
* V. 86 sqq. :—
oùros éutrečov at 6, Mével' ºpateph
yöp &váyicn
treipatos év Šeapotoriv čxel, Tó pup
àupls éépyet.
(According to Simplicius, 9 a.,
whereas p. 7 a., 31 b, te is sub-
stituted for rö. Other changes are
unnecessary. To refers as a rela-
tive to reſpatos):—
oùvekev oik &TeXeóttirov to éðv 6éuis
eival'
éarl 'yap oilk tidevés, éov 3é (sc.
âtexeſtmrov) ke travros éðeiro.
Further details later on. When
Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1087 C, says of
Parmenides to &tepov čAeyev &px?iv
rów Trávrov, he is confusing him
with Anaximander.
BEING. B87
thought is thought of Being." Being is in a word,
therefore, all that really exists as Unity without be-
coming or passing away, without change of place or of
form: a whole, throughout undivided, homogeneous, on
all sides equally balanced, and in all points equally
perfect. Parmenides therefore compares it to a well-
rounded sphere.” Consequently the unanimous testimony,
therefore, of later writers that according to Parmenides
Being exists and nothing besides, and that the All was
regarded by him as one eternal immovable essence,”
* W. 94 sqq.:—
Twurov 6' éorrl voev re kal oiſvekév
éori vámu.a.
oš yap &vew roñéévros év ć treqaria-
puévov čarly
ešphaels to voeiv. oiâév y&p éotiv #
êorral
&AAo trape; rot, €67tos,
(sup. p. 584, 1).
2 W. 97 : —
érel ré ye uolp' étréðmorev
olov (Simpl. of Aov) &ctvnrów T’
. êueval, & tróvt’ &vou' éotiv,
Šmara 8poro, Karé9evro, tre+010ótes
eival &Amb?,
100. Yºyveo-0aí Te kal &AAvoróat,
eivaí Te kai oilcl,
kal Tóirov &AAáo getv Štá Te xpóa
qavöv &pießeiv.
aërëp étri (Karsten for éire) reſpas
trúpatov Terexeguévov čotl,
ardvtoffew sitcákxov agaipms évaxtºy-
- Klov tºykº,
pleagóðey ionotraxés travrm' to yap
oùre ru ueſſov
105. otºre ri Batórepov areAéval
xpedºv čari Ti, 3) Th.
oùre yap oil, éðv čari ré key train
puv icefor6al
eis Šubv, oùr' éov čorriv Štros eſſm key
éévros (Mull, for: kevöv čávt.)
Cf. W. 43
TÉ uáAAov tº 3’ floorov, emel trav
3.
éotiv &ovXov.
# yöp travró9evio'ov čudºs év treſpaori
Icupet.
* Plato, Parm. 128 A : orb usu
‘yöp v toſs trothytaoiv čv pſis eival
to trav ſcal rotta'v tekuñpuz trapé-
Xet. Theaet. 180. E. : MéAuoroot te
Ical IIapueviðat . . . Štioxupígovtat,
às év Te travra éoºrſ. Kal éortmicev
aúto év airó, oùk éxov x&pav čv fi
kiveirai. Soph. 242 D (sup. p.
523, 2); Arist. Metaph. i. 5, 986 b,
10 (ibid. note 2); ibid. l. 28: trap&
ºyöp to by Tö uh by oi6&v čudºv eival
IIapp., ÉÉ &váykms voteral, eizai to
tiv Kal &AAo oš0év. iii. 4, 1001 a,
31. If Being as such is absolute
substance, how are we to conceive
the Many? to yap Érepov too Švtos
oùk éativ, &ote katē Töv IIappreviðou
Aóryov orvpgaively āvāykm év Štravra.
eival r& Švra kal Tooto eival to $v.
Phys. i. 2, sub init.: äväykm 6’ firot
pitav sival thv &px?iv h TAetovs, kai
ei utav, fitou äktvmtov, &s pmol IIap-
peviðms kai MéNugaos, etc. The
criticism of this opinion, however,
does not properly belong to Phy-
sics, nor yet to the investigation of
first principles: oi, Yêp Éri àpxá
588
PARMENIDES.
is, in fact, correct; but the proposition that the world
is eternal and imperishable cannot, strictly speaking,
be attributed to this philosopher; for if all plurality or
change are denied there can be no question of a world
at all. For the same reason it appears that Parmenides
did not designate Being as the Deity: we give the name
of the Deity" to the primitive essence to distinguish
this from the world; a philosopher who wholly denies
égºriv, si èv puðvov kal off-ros év ča riv
(similarly Metaph i. 5). Ibid. 185
b, 17; and Metaph. l. c. 986 b, 18,
on the Limitedness of Being, with
Parmenides; cf. Simpl. Phys. 25
a, and 29 a és à 'AAéðavöpos io-
Topet, 6 uèv Osóqpaotos oira’s éic-
Tíðetal (sc. Tov IIappevičov Adºyov)
év tá, trpárq, Tâs pugikās in topias'
to trap& To ovoik Öv, to oilk by oiöèv,
#v špa to §v, Eöömuos 3& oita's to
Trap& Tö by oik Öv. &AA& kal uovaxós
Aéyéral rô Šv. čv špa rô $v. Sim-
plicius adds that he did not find
this in the Physics of Eudemus;
but he quotes a passage from that
work which censures Parmenides
for not having distinguished the
different senses in which the con-
cept of Being is employed, and as-
serts that even had it only one
sense, the unity of all Being could
not be demonstrated. This is also
objected by Aristotle, Phys. i. 3,
186 a, 22 sqq., and c, 2. The words
&AA& kal uovaxós Aéyeral rô by are
in any case only an emendation of
Eudemus ; of Parmenides he says
himself, l. c., and Aristotle says,
Phys. l. c., that he did not think
of the various senses of Being, from
which it naturally follows that he
did not expressly discriminate
them. It is unnecessary to quote
the statements of more recent
authors; they are to be found in
Brandis, Comm. El. 136 sqq., and
JKarsten, Parm. 158,168. Concern-
ing a proof of the unity of Being,
wrongly attributed to Parmenides
by Porphyry, we shall speak fur-
ther on.
| Stob. Eel. i. 416; Plut. Plac.
ii. 4, 3 (Sup. p. 565, 3). It is more
correct to call the All, one, eternal,
unbecome, unmoved, etc., as we find
in Plato. Theſet. 181 A (oí too 3Mov
otaguárat); Arist. Metaph. i. 3,
984 a, 28 sqq. (§v pågicovres eival
to trav); Theophr, ap. Alex, in
Metaph. i. 3, 984 b, l; Alex. ibid.
Plut. Plac. i. 24; Hippol. Refut. i.
11 ; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 3, 9; for
Parmenides attributes the predi-
cates, 3Åov and trav, to Being also.
The expression (Arist. l. c.) Thy
qāoriv ŠAmu &kivmtov eival, is less
exact.
* In the fragments of Parme-
nides, this designation is never
found, and whether or not more
recent writers make use of it, is
of little consequence, Stob. Eel. i.
60. Ammon. tr. Épumv. 58 (cf.
Brandis, Comm. 141 ; Gr. Röm.
Phil. i. 382; Karsten, 208; cf.
Parm. v. 61, 75 sq.), Boëth. Consol.
iii. sub fin. The passage in De
Melisso, Zeno et Gorgia, c. 4, 978
b, 7 would prove nothing, even
were the genuineness of that work
more certain than it is.
REING. §89
that the Finite exists side by side with the Eternal
does not require such a term." It might more reason-
ably be asked whether Parmenides really excluded from
his concept of Being all that from our point of view
seems to involve a plurality, and to transfer sensible
determinations to the immaterial essence. This question
we must answer in the negative. Even if the compa-
rison of Being with a globe considered in itself, simply
as a comparison, proves nothing, all that Parmenides
says of the limitedness, homogeneousness, and indivisi-
bility of Being,” shows that he conceived it as extended
in space, and never formed the idea of a Being un-
contained in space. For far from avoiding space-
determinations as inadmissible, he expressly describes
Being as a fixed and homogeneous mass, symmetrically
extended from its centre on all sides—which within its
limits always occupies one and the same place, nowhere
interrupted by non-Being, and at no point contain-
ing more Being than at another. We should be justi-
fied in rejecting this description as metaphorical only
if we could find any indication that Parmenides con-
ceived Being as incorporeal, and if in other parts of his
philosophic discussion he made use of a figurative mode
of expression; but neither is anywhere the case. More-
over, as we shall presently see, Zeno and Melissus
* It is not necessary to assume
that Parmenides was hindered by
religious feelings or considerations
of prudence from declaring himself
as to the relation of Being to the
Deity (Brandis, Comm. El. 178).
The answer is more obvious. He
did not do so because he was a
universal, plastic philosopher, and
his philosophy gave no opportunity
for the statement of theological
definitions.
* Sup. p. 584 sq. What right
Strümpell (Gesch. d. Theor. Phil.
d. Gr. p. 44) has to deduce from
these passages that Being is not
extended in space, I do not see.
*
690 PARMENIDES.
also attribute to Being magnitude in space, and the
Atomists, clearly referring to the doctrine of Par-
menides, identify Being with the body, and non-Being
with empty space; we can therefore scarcely hesitate
to ascribe to this philosopher the opinion which his
own words seem intended to convey. His Being is not
a metaphysical concept, devoid of all sensuous admix-
ture, but a concept that has been developed from an
intuition, and still bears clear traces of this origin.
The Real is to Parmenides the Full (TAéau, that which
fills space. The distinction of the corporeal and incor-
poreal is not only unknown to him, but incompatible
with his whole point of view; for the unity of Being and
Thought, which he maintained as a direct consequence
of his doctrine of Unity, is too realistic to be possible,
except on the presupposition that the corporeal and the
incorporeal had not as yet been discriminated. Ac-
cording to the excellent remark of Aristotle," it is the
substance of the corporeal itself, not a substance dis-
tinct from the corporeal, with which he is concerned;
and when he says “Only Being is, this signifies that
we attain to the true view of things when we abstract
from the separation and variableness of the sensible
phenomenon, in order to maintain its simple, undivided
and unchangeable substratum as the only Reality. This
abstraction is no doubt a bold step ; but in making it,
Parmenides does not so entirely depart from the whole
previous tendency of philosophic enquiries as if he had
started with a purely metaphysical concept, without
any regard to the data of the senses.
* Wide sup. i. 190, 1, 2, and in regard to the above generally, 187 sq.
SENSE AND REASON. 591.
So far, then, as the knowledge of the Real is only
possible by means of this abstraction, the abstract intel-
lectual study of things can alone lay claim to truth:
judgment belongs solely to rational speech (A6)os)—
the senses, on the contrary, which reflect the show or
appearance of plurality and mutability, of generation
and destruction, are the cause of all error. Parmenides
earnestly warns us therefore to trust, not the senses,
but reason alone;" and thus, like Heracleitus, he gives
occasion to a discrimination which in the sequel was
of the highest importance, both for the theory of know-
ledge and for metaphysics generally. In his own sys-
tem, however, it has not this great importance ; it is
there merely a consequence of the material and meta-
physical results, not the foundation of the whole; the
jºk
cognition of sense, and that of reason, are not opposed +.
in respect of their formal characteristics, but solely in
respect of their content; and the psychological investi-
gation of the faculty of knowing is so greatly neglected,
as we shall presently see, that the philosopher ascribes
to Thought the same origin as to Perception, and
derives both from the mixture of material substances.
Although Parmenides so abruptly opposes reality
to the phenomenon, intellectual thought to the decep-
tions of the senses, he cannot forbear pointing out, in
the second part of his didactic poem, what theory of
* Parm. v. 33 sqq., 52 sqq. iv. 234, cf. Arist. Gen. et corr. i.
(supra, p. 584, 1), to which little is 8, 325 b, 13). Many sceptics
added by later writers (e.g. Diog. counted Parmenides as well as his
ix. 22; Sext. Math. vii. 111; Plut. teacher Xenophanes in their ranks
ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 5. Aristocles, (Cic. Acad. ii. 23, 74; Plut. Adv.
ibid, xiv. 17, 1; Joh. Dam. parall. Col. 26, 2); but this is not of much
ii. 25, 23, in Stob. Floril, ed. Mein. importance.
592 PARMENIDES.
the world would result from the standpoint of ordinary
opinion, and how individual phenomena would in that
case have to be explained."
The right view allows us to recognise in all things
but One, Being; ordinary opinion adds to this, non-
Being.” It therefore regards things as compounded of
opposite constituents, to only one of which, in truth,
Reality belongs;” and consequently, to ordinary opinion
(vide supra), the One appears as a plurality, the in-
variable as becoming and changeable. If we place
ourselves therefore at this point of view, we shall have
to admit two elements, of which one corresponds with
Being, and the other with non-Being. Parmenides
calls the former light or fire, and the latter night ;
and in the fragments of his writings which we possess
he describes the former as the rare, and the latter as
the dense and the heavy.” They are also named, by
other authorities, the warm and the cold, or fire and
earth; * and it would seem that Parmenides likewise
* We find this same opinion,
though it is clumsily expressed, in
Plut. ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 6: Happ.
... à étalpos Eevoſpávows àua uév Kal
rów rotºrov Sočáv &vretrothorato, äua
8è kal thv čvavtſav čvexeſpnoe
ordaiv, as appears from the clearer
but imperfect parallel passage ap.
Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 7, p. 57.
* W. 33 sqq., 45 sqq. (supra,
p. 584, 1).
$ W. 113:—
poppès yap karé0evro 500 yuáups
Övoudgetv,
(rāv uíav of xpedºv čariv, Šv $
Tetraavnuévot eio'ív)
&vrta 5’ exptvavro 5éuas ka gåuar’
ë6evro
xwpts &m’ &AA#Aww.
4 W. 116 :—
Tú ačv p^oyös aibépiov trop
#triov čov, wéy àpatov, Šavré, tdv-
Toge tavrov,
Tº 5’ Tépq, whº touróv' &rāp kāiceºvo
kat' airb
&vría vökt’ &öañ truktubv 5éuas
épépt0és re.
5 W. 122 :—
air&p étrelë irávra pdos kal vić
övéuaa tal
kai tā karð orderépas àvváuels ērl
Totoſí Te kal Tois,
tráv TAéov éotiv Šplot, páeos kal
vvktos & pavrov,
łowy &pidotépwv, étrel oiberépºp uéra
wmöév.
Karsten is no doubt right in
PHYSICS.
593
made use of these latter names." Aristotle, however, tells
us that the more abstract expressions, ‘warm and cold,’”
which correspond to his own derivation of the elements,
were first adopted by him in place of the more concrete
explaining the latter, according to
v. 117 sq. thus: Both are homo-
geneous and unmixed. The same
is asserted in the gloss which
Simpl. (Phys. 7, b) found in his
MS. between the verses : étrº Tööé
éorti to &patov kai to 6epubv kai Tô
4,40s kal to pax0aköv kal to coopov,
étrº Sé Tó, tvkvá &vápagºral rô
puxpóv kal to $6 pos kai Tô orkampôv
kal rô Bapt. Taira yöp &tekplôm
éicatépa’s ércátépa.
* Arist. Phys. i. 5, sub init.:
kal yèp II. 6epubu kal juxpów &px&s
trouet, taúra öö trpoaſayopetſet trip Kal
ºyāv. Metaph. i. 5, 986, b, 31,
after the quotation, p. 543, 1: ávay-
kaſáaevos 6’ &coxověeiv roſs paivo-
Aévous kai to Év učv ſcatt, Tov Aéryov
Tr}\eta, 6& karð Thy alo'6motiv ŠtroXau-
Bávov eival, São Tàs airías kal 600
r&s àpx&s td.Alv tíðmori, 9epubv Ical
Juxobv, oiov trip cal yńv Aéyov.
Cf. also, Metaph. i. 3, 984 b, 1 sqq.,
iv. 2, 1004 b, 32. Theophrast ap.
Alex, vide infra, p. 594, 4. Simpl.
Phys. 7 b : Töv učv yeuvntów
&px&s kal airbs atolyetőöels uèv
Thy Tpdºrmy &vt/9ea w ś9ero, #v pås
kaxeſ cal okótos, trip ral yńv, #
Trvkvöv kal &patov, h Taitov ſcal
ërepov (the last is evidently a mis-
conception of v. 117 sq.). Simi-
larly Simpl. Phys. S, 6 b, 38 b ;
Alex. in Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 17;
iv. 2, 1004 b, 29; xii. 1, 1069 a,
26 (33, 21, 217, 34, 643, 19 Bon.).
Ibid. ap. Philop. Gen. et Corr. 64
a ; Philop. Phys. A, 9, C, 11 ;
I’lut. Adv. Col. 13, 6, p. 1114;
where the two elements are called:
to Aguirpov kal orcoreivöv, and De
WOL. I.
An. Procr. 27, 2, p. 1026, where
they are called q6s and orkóros.
This is the foundation of the mis-
take of Clemens, Cohort. 42 C :
II. . . . 6eois eia myſia aro trip kal
ºymv.
* Brandis, Comment. 167; Kar-
sten, p. 222, and other writers
doubt this, partly on account of
the word ofov ap. Arist. Metaph.
l. c. and partly because Simpl.
Phys. 6 b, says: II. Šv roſs trpos
66éav trip kal yńv, uſiXAov 8& pás
ical oricóros (àpx&s tí0mgu); cf.
Alex. inf. p. 594, 1. But the words
of Simplicius and Alexander may
be also interpreted as we have
indicated in the text; and in regard
to oiov, Bonitz has shown (Bonitz
on the Metaphysics, p. 76) that
Aristotle not unfrequently uses it
when he neither intends to express
a comparison nor a doubt. The
words of v, etc., therefore assert
only : “he calls the one fire, the
other earth,’ and are in no way in-
consistent with the plain expres-
sions in the Physics and in the
treatise on generation and decay.
On the other hand, it is quite pos-
sible, judging from Aristotle's usual
procedure in regard to the opinions
of other philosophers, that Parme-
nides may have first called the
dark element earth, in the place
where he was speaking of the for-
mation of the earth; inasmuch as
he asserted that the earth arose out
of darkness. This is borne out by
Plutarch, ap. Eus. i. 8, 7 : Aéyet
8& rºw yiv rod rvkvoo karaśāvévros
&épos yeyovéval. -
Q Q
594 PARMENIDES.
designation. He associated light, we are informed by
Aristotle," with Being, and Night with non-Being, and
this statement is confirmed by the fragments. In these
he declares that truth and reality belong only to one
of the two elements from which things are commonly
derived, and that the existence of the other element,
on the contrary, has been falsely assumed.” Conse-
quently, he regards the one element as existing, the
other as not existing; and for this reason he ascribes to
the fiery element the same characteristics as to Being
in describing it throughout as homogeneous.” He is
further said to have regarded the fiery element as the
active principle, and darkness as the passive or material
principle.* This, however, can scarcely be quite correct.
* Arist. Metaph. l.c. continues:
rońray 5è karð uèv rô by ré 6epubv
rárrel, 64tepov 5& karð rô whº v.
Ibid. Gen. et Corr. i. 3, 318 b, 6 :
&orrep IIapp. Aérye, São, rô by kal to
pº) by eival páorkww, trip kal yńv.
Alexander in Metaph, 986 b, 17,
cannot be received as a separate
testimony, since it is manifestly
taken from Aristotle. So, doubt-
less, Philop. Gen. et Corr. p. 13 a.
The statement of Aristotle is con-
tested by Karsten, p. 223, and still
more decidedly by Mullach on v.
113 (also by Steinhart, Allg. Enc.
sect. iii. vol. xii. 233 sq.; Plato's
Werke, vi. 226), on the ground that
neither of the twd elements of the
perishable can be identified with
the existent. There is no sufficient
foundation for this, as we have.
shown above.
* W. 114. The word kara.0éorðal
must be supplied after the words
Töv wtav of xpedºv čorri. These words
however will not bear the inter-
pretation of Simplicius, Krische
(Forsch. 102), Karsten, Mullach,
Steinhart (Allg. Enc. 240) and
others, which is this: “to admit
only one of which is wrong.” For
it is here brought forward as the
common error of mankind that two
kinds of Reality are assumed by
them ; as in v. 37, it was said to
be the path of deception, to admit
non-Being side by side with Being.
The words rather mean: of which
the one cannot be admitted, be-
cause the theory of it is based on
deception.
* W. 117. Cf. v. 85, 109 (sup.
p. 592, 3; 586, 2; 587, 2).
* Aristotle remarks, Metaph. i.
3, 984 b, 1 : röv učv of v čv pao-
kóvrov sival ºrb träv oë0evl avvé8m
thv totatºrmv [rºv Kºvnrikhvl avvi-
beiv airíav trºv ei Špa IIapuevíðn
kal rotºrq, karū rooroorov 30 ov oë
uóvov čv &AA& kal 850 tra's ríðmariv
airías eival. roſs 5& 8) traeta, rotojo',
paxxov čvāéxetal Aéyeuv, otov roſs
THE LIGHT AND THE DARK. 595.
He may perhaps have attributed a vivifying and forma-
tive influence generally to warmth in the origination of
organic beings, and in the formation of the universe;
but it is self-evident that he can neither have used
these Aristotelian expressions, nor intended to explain
movement universally, as Heracleitus did, from the
warm element as such. For in that case it would have
been unnecessary to assume a particular mythical figure,
by which all combination of substances is brought
about"—the goddess who is enthroned in the centre of
the universe and rules its whole course.”
6epuby kal juxpov h trip kal yńv.
xpavrai yüp &s kivmtikºv *xovri
ró trup, rºv qigoriv. §§art 5& kal
•yfi kal toſs rouotrous roëvavtſov.
Theophrastus, ap. Alex., comment-
ing on this passage, p. 24, 5 Bon.
says more definitely: IIapuevſöns
. . . &m’ &pſporépas àA6e ràs 6800s.
kal yèp &s &tºuév čari rb trav &ro-
qaſverai kal yèveow &modièóval
arelpāral rôv čvrov, oùx Öuoia's
repl &pſporépov Šošáçov, &AA& kar’
&Aftóetav wºv čv to trav ſcal &yévvm-
tov kal orgapoeiðūs ūroxaußdvov,
rară 66%av' & rôv troAAöv eis to
yéveriv &roö00val rôv paivopévov
600 totôy ràs àpx&s trip ral yńv, to
pºv &s iſºmy, to 58 &s airtov Kal
rotojv. This is repeated by the
more recent writers, Cic. Acad. ii.
37, 118: P. ignem qui moveat,
terram quae ab eo formetur. Diog.
ix. 21 : 500 re elval orouxeta, trip
kal yºv, kal to uév 6mutovpyot,
raftiv čxeiv, rhv 5& Wams. Hippol.
Refut. i. 11. indirectly, no doubt,
from Theophrastus, who is also
mentioned by Diogenes: II. §v pºv
To trav Štrorſ6eral &fölöv re kal
&yévvmtov kal orgapoetőés, oëbè
airbs ékpetſywy rºv táv troAAów
The mixture
6óław, trip Aéyav kal yiv ràs roº
travtos àpxás. Thy uév yiv &s 5Amv,
to 8& trip &s atriov kal trolodv. Alex.
ap. Simpl. Phys. 9 a ; katē 8&
Thu rôv troAAóv 66;av kai Tô paivé-
preva ºbvarioMoyáv . . . &px&s róv
Tylvouévov imé9ero trºp kai yiv, thv
pºv yiv ćis iſºmy úroriðels, to 8&
trip &s troumrukov alrlov. kai àvo-
adget, pnal, rb uév trip pås rºv 8&
'yńv aſkóros. Philop. Gen. et Corr.
12 a, o : rºw uév yńv u%) by &vöpia-
aev, &s iſºms A6-yov ćiréxovo av, to
6è trip by, Ös trouotiv kal eiðukó-
repov. Arist. Gen. et Cor. ii. 9,
336 a, 3 sqq., does not seem to be
alluding specially to Parmenides,
but rather to Anaximenes (sup. p.
272, 2) and Diogenes (p. 291).
* As Simpl. Phys. 9 a, remarks
against Alexander.
* W. 128:- -
év 8& uéga-rotºrov (on this point,
cf. p. 600, 3) Aaſuav h ºrdvra
rv8epvá.
trávrm yüp orvyspoto Tókov kal
uíčios &pxh,
tréumovo’ &ffevi 67Av uryūval, évav-
Tſo. 6’ aff6is
&pgév 04Avrépg.
Q & 2
596 IPARMENIDES.
of the light and the dark he represents in a symbolic
manner as a sexual union; describing Eros as the first
creation of the world-ruling goddess,' and these elements
themselves as the masculine and feminine.” He seems
to have introduced other symbolic beings as gods,” be-
sides Eros; but we are not told what part they played
in the formation of the world.
That Parmenides borrowed his doctrine of the two
elements from an older physical theory is not probable;
for in the first place we know of no theory which would
have adapted itself to this purpose; * and, secondly, he
himself says that the ordinary opinion of mankind gene-
rally, is the object of his exposition in the second part
of the poem. Accordingly, this exposition is founded
on a fact which could not well escape observation, viz.,
that the sense perception and common opinion see in
According to Stob. Ecl. i. 482 sq.,
parall. cf. p. 158; Theod. Cur. Gr.
Aff. vi. 13, sect. 87, this goddess of
Parmenides was called kvéepvirus,
kAmpooxos (for which Karsten, p.
241, would substitute kånö00xos),
5them, and &váykm; but other things,
especially the introduction to the
poem, would seem to be brought
inhere. Cf. Krische, Forsch. p. 107.
W. 132 (Plato, Symp. 178 B;
Arist. Metaph.i.4,984 b, 25; trpátia-
rov pièv špara 6eów amrioraro trav-
row). The subject of amriorato is,
according to the express statement
of Simplicius, l.c., the Satuwv, V.
128; Plut. Amator. 13, 11, p. 756,
says instead 'Appoãfrn, but this is
sufficiently explained by the des-
cription of the goddess, and espe-
cially by the circumstance that she
is the parent of Eros.
* This more general interpreta-
tion of v. 130 sq. seems to be re-
quired by the connection of this
verse, and the universal cosmical
significance which manifestly be-
longs to Eros.
* The evidence of Cicero, or
rather that of Philodemus (Cic.
N. D. i. 11, 28), quippe qui bellum,
qui discordian, qui cupiditatem
ceteraque generis ejusdem ad Deum
Tevocat, would not of itself be con-
clusive ; it is a question whether
Parmenides is not here confused
with Empedocles; but the words
trpdºriotov 6eóv tróvrov in Parm. v.
132 show that other gods followed
Eros. Wide Krische, l. c. 111 sq.
* The texts in Aristotle which
were supposed to refer to such
theories, otherwise unknown to us
(supra, p. 594, 1), may be explained
in another way. Further details,
p. 599, 3rd ed.
COSMOLOGY. 597
all things opposite substances and forces united. The
explanation of this fact—the reduction of these oppo-
sites to the fundamental opposite of Being and non-
Being, of light and dark, and the introduction of the
creating divinities—all this is to be regarded as his
own addition. Yet, in the ancient cosmogonies," in the
early Ionian theories of the creation, and in the Pytha-
gorean doctrine of the primitive opposites,” there are
points of similarity which may have had some influence
on his exposition.
In the further development of physical motions,
Parmenides extended his investigation to everything
which occupied the enquiry of that period.”
* Such as the statements in
Hesiod, Acusilaos, and Ibycus on
Eros; the utterances of Acusilaos
on Eros and Night, and the like.
Wide supra, pp. 87, 97.
* Among which, as is well
known, we find that of light and
darkness.
* He himself promises in v.
120 sq. :—
Töv got £y& 5udicoopov čoukóra trávra.
qatiga',
às oi pºſitroté ris ore 8potöv yvápm
trapex.do on.
133 sq. :—
eform 8' aiéept my re (pêorly ré T' év
aiðépu Trôvra
orhpara kai ka9apas eia!yéos hextolo,
Aapatráðos épy’ &föm Na kal étriróðey
éčeyévovro,
épya re kūkaaſtros reign trepiqoura
orexhums
kai pāorivº eiðhorels ö& kal oipavov
&pſpls ēxovira
àv6ev čºv kal &s puv &yovo” ºréðmorev
äväykm
sº
treipar’ xely āorpov,
This por-
140 :—
trós yata kal fixios #88 orexhvn
aidiip re Švvos yd Aa tº oilpdviov kal
&\vutros
êoxaros hô’ &orpov 6eppubv uévos
&ppºſióma'av
ºvíyveg 6al.
Blut. Adv. Col. 13, 6, says of him:
§s ye kai čudicooruov tretrointai, Kal
orotxeſa Mi'yvös, to Aguirpov kai.
okoreivöv, Šic roſtov Tó, paivéueva
trövta kal 61& rotºrwy &roteWei. Kal
'yöp trepi Väs eipnice troAA& kal trept
oùpavoi, kai jatov ſcal orexiivns kal
&growu, kal yéveriv &v0p6trov &@ft-
"mºral kai oiâèv #35mtov . . . tav
kuptov trapſikev. In v. 141, the Py-
thagorean distinction of otpavos
and ÖAvutos is seen, as has been
already observed, p. 471, 2. In
Stobaeus (vide following note), that
part of the sky which lies nearest
to the earth is called oipavas,
whereas, in v. 137, oùpavös is the
extreme limit of the universe.
Stein, p. 798 sq., unnecessarily
refers v. 133–139 to Empedocles.
598
PARMENIDES.
tion of his doctrine, however, has been transmitted to
us in a very imperfect state.
In his description of
the universe, he allies himself with the Pythagorean
system, though he does not invariably follow it.
He
conceives the universe as compounded of several globes
or circles' placed around each other.
The innermost
and outermost of these consist of the dense and dark
element, and form the fixed kernel and external wall of
the universe.
Around the innermost circles, and be-
neath the outermost circle, lie circles of pure fire; in
the intermediate region between them, are circles com-
posed of the dark and the fiery element mixed.”
* It is not clear from the au-
thorities (vide following note),
which of the two is intended. The
“expression a requivn which Parme-
nides uses would point to the idea
of circular bands. But as the
outermost of these circles, the con-
cave vault of heaven, in accordance,
not only with our perceptions, but
with Parmenides' doctrine of Being
(supra, p. 587, 589), must be con-
ceived as spherical (for which rea-
son it is called in v. 137, oùpaves
ºutpls éxwv), and as the earth
(according to 598, 2) must also be
a sphere, it is difficult to say what
the intermediate layers can be
except hollow globes. (Cf., how-
ever, the observations on p. 445, 1.)
* Stob. Eol. i. 482 (the com-
mencement is also ap. Plut. Plac.
ii. 7, 1 ; Galen, c. 11, p. 267): II.
orreqāvas eival trepitretraetypiévas
éraxxâxovs, Thu uév čk roß &paloo
Thy 6% ºr roi tukuot” puktās 6&
#AAas €k poros kal okórous Aeroft,
Totºrwu kal to treptéxov 6é traoras
Teixovs 6themv or repebv Štrépzelv, Üq'
§ trupéðms are påwn, kal to uégatra-
rokéa
By
rov traoráv [sc. or repeow inrápxsw],
trepl $v (l. 6) tróAuv trupéöms. Tov
8è orvupuyáv rhv plea atrármv štáorals
(Davis commenting on
Cic. N. D. i. 11, substitutes this
for re kal; Krische proposes airíav,
in accordance with Parm. v. 129–
vide sup. p. 595, 2—we might con-
jecture instead of &mdo as re kai:
àpx?iv rákov re kal) traorms kivſarea's
ral yewéorews Śrāpyeiv, #vruva kai
Bafuova kal kvéepvitiv kal kxmpouxov
étrovoudget, 6tremu Te Kal &váykmv.
(Cf. 595, 2.) ital ris uév yis rºw
&tókptoriv sival rov &épa, Ötö thu
Bialotépav airms ééarpua 6:vra tri-
Amoru, too 8& trupos &vairvoºjv row
#Atov kal row yaxačíav kūkaov.
orvuſui'yū 5' éé àpiq'oïv sival thv
orexhvny toº r" &épos kal roi, trupés.
treptorrávros & &vardra trávrov
toū aiðépos ūr' airó ro trupóðes
tºrotayfival, roß6 &mep kekańkauev
oëpavöv, Öq' of #6m rò, treptºyeta.
This account (in the interpretation
of which Krische, Forsch. 101 sqq.,
seems to me to have best suc-
ceeded, and to have essentially
improved on that of Brandis,
COSMOLOGY. 599
the outermost of these circles we must understand the
vault of heaven conceived as fixed; by the circle of
fire under this, the circumambient fire of the Pytha-
goreans; the fixed circle in the centre can only be the
earth, which we are elsewhere told Parmenides consi-
dered to be a globe at rest in the midst of the universe.”
According to this, the circle of fire surrounding it must
be the air which, as contrasted with the earth, might
well be described as the rare and the luminous.” Be-
tween these two extreme points is the heaven of fixed
stars.” How the particular spheres were placed in these,
and whether Parmenides departed from the opinion
usually held as to their succession, cannot be determined
Comment. 160 sqq., and Karsten,
241 sqq.) is partially confirmed
by fle confused statement of
Cicero, N. D. i. 11, 28, nam Par-
menides guidem commenticium quid-
dam coronae similitudine efficit :
Stephanen adpellat, continente
ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit,
coelum, quem adpellat Deum (this
is either wholly false, or an entire
misapprehension of some genuine
passage) but especially by v. 126
of Parmenides:—
ai yüp a retvárepai [sc. are påvat]
tretroinviro trupòs ākpitolo,
ai 6' émi rais vuktös, uera 3& p?\oyös
* fetal aiqa.
€v 5è uéorg, &c.
(Supra, p. 595, 2). Cf. v. 113 sqq.,
supra 592, 3.
| arxatos “OAvutros, as it is
called in v. 141,
* Diog. ix. 21: Trpáros 6' oiros
Thy yºv &mépmve orgapoetóñ real év
uéorg ketorðal. Plut. Plac. iii. 15,
7. Parmenides and Democritus
maintain that the earth is kept in
an equilibrium, and does not move,
because it is equidistant from all
parts of the universe. When
Schäfer (Astron. Geogr. d. Griechen,
Flensb. 1873, p. 12 sq.) says, fol-
lowing the precedent of Schaubach
and Forbiger, that Parmenides as-
cribed to the earth the form of a
disc, and not of a sphere, he for-
gets that the statement of Dioge-
nes originates with Theophrastus.
Theophrastus, according to Diog.
viii. 48, asserted of Parmenides:
trpárov čvouáort rºw yiv orpoyyúamv;
orpoyyūany must here mean, as it
does with Plato, Phaedo, 97 D (tré-
repov i yü tractetá čotiv h orpoy-
ºyvan), the spherical form, as Par-
menides was by no means the first
philosopher who thought the earth
was a round dise.
* This especially, and not heat,
appears also in v. 116 sq. (vide
sup, p. 592, 4), as the distinguishing
characteristic of the fire of Parme-
nides; he even calls it #triov.
* Called ap. Stobaeus, l.c., tru-
póðss and otpavés.
300
PARMENIDES.
with certainty."
This is also the case with other astro-
nomical and cosmological theories attributed to him.”
In the midst of the universe” the goddess that rules it
* Stob. i. 518, says: II. Tparov
pºv rártel row ‘Eóov, row airby 5&
wopuçõuevov Štr'airoi, kal “Eotrepov,
év tái aibépi. Me6 by Töv #Atov, Öq’ &
toūs év tá, ruptéðel &a répas, Štrep
oùpavöv kaxeſ (cf. p. 570). If this
representation is correct, we might
suppose that Parmenides had placed
the milky way highest, after the
steadfast arc of heaven, and the
other fixed stars lowest; the pla-
nets, sun and moon, between the
two. It is questionable, however,
whether the informant of Stobaeus
derived his statements from ac-
curate knowledge of Parmenides’
poem, or constructed for himself,
from the verses quoted p. 598, 2, and
from other passages, an astronomi-
cal system, far transcending Par-
menides' own doctrine. Cf. Krische,
p. 115.
* According to Stob. i. 484
(sup. p. 598, 2), 524, he ascribed to
the milky way and to the sun a
fiery nature, and to the moon a
mixed nature; but as all three be-
long to the mixed spheres, there
could only be question of more or
less of the fiery or of the dark ele-
ment. In p. 574 (Plac. iii. 1, 6;
Galen. c. 17, p. 285), Stobaeus says
that the colour of the milky way
arises from the mixture of the
dense and the rare, and he makes
Parmenides (s. 564) account for the
face in the moon from this cause.
According to p. 532, Parmenides
thought the sun and moon were
produced from the milky way—the
Sun from the rarer, the moon from
the denser part of its admixture.
In p. 550 (Plac. ii. 26, parall.) we
find; II, Tupivny [thy geańvnv] ſonv
6é rég ſixtó, kal yöp &m' airod qart-
Georéat (this also ap. Parm. v. 144
sq.), where, however, we must either
omit yap, which is wanting in the
other texts, or we must suppose
that io"my with Parmenides did not
refer to the magnitude, but to the
orbit of the moon. (Karsten, p.
284.) The opinion of Parme-
nides on the nature of the stars
is thus expressed by Stob. i.
510; he regarded them (like He-
racleitus, Xenophanes, Anaximan-
der and others) as trixhuata Twpos,
that is, fiery masses of vapour,
which are nourished by the evapo-
ration from the earth (if this is
truly reported of him). The iden-
tity of the morning and evening
star, on which he certainly must
have given some opinion, was, ac-
cording to some authors, discovered
by him (Diog. ix. 23; cf. viii. 14;
Suidas, "Eatrepos); others ascribe
this discovery to Pythagoras (vide
sup. p. 458, 1). Also the division of
the earth into five zones, the author
of which is sometimes said to be
Parmenides (Posidon. ap. Strabo,
ii. 2, 2, p. 94; Ach. Tat, ad. Arač.
c. 31, p. 157 C ; Plut. Plac. iii.
11, 4), is by others attributed to
the Pythagoreans (Sup, p. 480, 2),
who might indeed have arrived at
it through Parmenides.
* Stob. (sup. p. 598, 2) says, in
the centre of the mixed spheres.
This statement is rightly explained
by Krische, Forsch. 105 sq., as a
misunderstanding of rotºrwy in v.
128, quoted sup. p. 595, 2. Also
Simpl. Phys. 8 a, says of Parme-
nides : troumrukov attlov. . . Šv Kouyov,
rīv év uéoºp mavrww ièpuſ.évny ka?
AWTHROPOLOGY.. " 60i
—the parent of the gods and of all things (vide supra)
—has her dwelling place. She undoubtedly corresponds
to the central fire of the Pythagoreans, the mother of
the gods and former of the world.
Besides these cosmological motions, we have some
anthropological theories handed down to us as those of
Parmenides. He seems to have conceived the begin-
ning of the human race as a development from primitive
slime, brought about by the heat of the sun; and his
opinion on this subject has therefore been identified
with that of Empedocles.” What he says on the differ-
ence of the sexes” and the origin of this difference in
generation is unimportant.” It is of more consequence
trams yewéorea's airfav Šaiuova Tſ6m-
oiv, and similarly Iambl. Theol.
Arithm. p. 8, after a mention of the
central fire: éoíkagi 8& Katd, ye
to dra karmkoWv0mkéval toſs IIv6ayo-
petous of re repl 'EpſtrečokAéa kal
IIappreviðmu . . . p4aevoi Thu uova-
Sukhu pāoriv ‘Earías Tpótrov čv puéorg,
iöpúa'6ai. The opposite view of
Apelt. Parm. et Emp. doctrina de
mund; Structura (Jena, 1857), p.
5 sqq., I cannot agree with.
' Diog. ix.22 says, probably after
Theophrastus : yéveau &věpátrov č
#Atov trpárov yewéo 6al; but instead
of fixtov we should probably read
iXùos, with the Basle edition and
many modern writers; or, accord-
ing to Steinhart's conjecture (Allg.
Enc. l. c. 242), fixiou re kai ixãos.
But even if we accept åAtov, we
need not adopt with Krische, Forsch.
105, the idea of the production of
souls out of the Sun—a conception
which can hardly lie in the words,
and which neither the supposed
precedent of the Pythagoreans
(sup. p. 476, 2), nor the utterance,
ap. Simpl. Phys., 9 a., mentioned p.
448, 2, 3rd ed., can justify us in
attributing to Parmenides. We
must rather understand with Kar-
sten, p. 257, a production by means
of the sun's heat. Plutarch (vide
sup. p. 597, 3) also says that Par-
menides spoke of the origin of men.
* Cens. Di. Nat. 4, 8, after
having quoted the famous opinion
of Empedocles: haec eadem opinio
etiam in Parmenide Veliensi fuit,
pauculis exceptis ab Empedocle dis-
sensis (dissentientibus & cf. on this
subject pp. 256, 296, 569).
* Although he regarded the
fiery element as the nobler, he yet
held that women were of warmer
nature than men: hence their more
sanguine temperament, etc. (Arist.
Part. Anim. ii. 2, 648 a, 28; cf.
Gener. Anim. iv. 1, 765 b, 19).
For this reason, at the first form-
ing of mankind, he represents men
as originating in the north, and
women in the south, Plut. Plac. v.
7, 2; Galen, c. 32, p. 324. -
* According to v. 150, boys
602 PA RMEN IDES.
to us to learn that he derived the phenomena of the
life of the soul, perception and reflection, from the
mixture of substances in the body. He supposed that
each of the two primitive substances is sensible of that
which is akin to it, and that therefore the notions and
thoughts of men are of this or that nature, recollec-
tions remain or are lost, according as the warm or cold
element predominates in the body: he sought the cause
of life and of intelligence in the warm element ; * but
even where this is entirely absent, as in the corpse,
there must still be sensation; only that sensation is
them to be referred, not to light and heat, but to the
cold, dark element.”
proceed from the right side, and
girls from their left of the organs
in both sexes; the statement, ap.
Plut. Plac. v. 11, 2, and Cens. Di.
Naț. 6, 8, that children derived from
the right side resemble their fa-
ther, and those from the left their
mother, is a mere misunderstand-
ing. What Censorinus says, c. 6,
5; cf. 5, 4, is more likely to be
true, viz., that the seed of both
parents struggles for the mastery,
and the child resembles whichever
part is victorious. The verses (a
Latin version, ap. Coel. Aurelian, De
Morb. Chron. iv. 9, p. 545, v. 150
sqq. Karst.) are also to be con-
sidered genuine, which attribute a
right constitution of body to the
harmonious blending of male and
female seed, and malformations and
blemishes to their strife. The
statement in the Plac. v. 7, 4, on
the origin of the difference of the
sexes, is certainly incorrect.
' Stob. Eel. i. 796, therefore
says, adopting later terminology,
IIappeviðms trupéöm (Thy juxiv). He
We see from this that even Par-
also explained sleep and age as re-
sulting from the decline of warmth.
Tert. De An. c. 43; Stob. Floril.
115, 29.
* Parm. v. 146 sqq. :—
és yūp ékáaré, éxel kpāoris ueAéwy
troAvicduirrov,
T&s v6os &věpátroval trapéorrmicev to
ºyàp airb
éortlv Štrep ppovéet plea ov pious
âvôpátrotori
kal traoru kal travrí to yop tràéov
éarl vömua.
The best elucidation of this frag-
ment is given by Theophrastus, De
Sensu, 3 sq. ... IIapp. uèv yöp 3Aws
oùöèv &@dºpticev (he did not treat of
eaeh of the senses separately) &AA&
pºdwov, 3rt 6volv čvrouw ortoixetow
karð to Örep8áAAov čotiv i yuágis’
é&v y&p Örepaipm rò 6eppov. 3) to
tºuxpov, &AAmy yived flat rhv 5udvowv"
geWria, 5è ical ka9apwrépav thu äuä
to 9epuðv' oi, whv &AA & kal raúrmy
8storðaſ rivos orvuuetpias’ &s y&p éká-
atº, pnotív etc. to . yap aio'6&ve-
orðal ſcal to ºppovetv &s rairo Aéyet
ANTHROPOLOGY. 603
menides is still far from discriminating between the
spiritual and the corporeal, and that he does not attempt
to distinguish perception and thought in regard to their
origin and formal character, though he entirely recog-
mises the superiority of the rational assertion to the
sensuous intuition; for that such a view is only enun-
ciated in the second part of his poem is unimportant for
this point. If he had been aware of the distinction, he
would not have passed it over in this place, but would
have sought to explain it from the standpoint of ordi-
nary opinion." But he has instituted no further enquiries
into the nature of opinion, and of the activity of the soul.”
6to kal rºw uviumv kal Thu Añ6my
&mb roëtww yívea 6at 61& ràs kpdaea's.
&v 5’ iméſwort tº uſéet trótepov ša ral
qpovely 3 ot), kal ris i öld.6eoris,
où6èv črt Sidºpticev” 3rt 5& kal T6
évavría, ka0' airb trole? Thy ata'6moriv,
ºpavepov čv ois pnot row verpov (po-
rös ačv kal 6epuot kal povăs owk
aia 6&ved 6a, 61& Tºv čkAetºw roi, Tru-
pos, juxpod 8& kai orioris kal Tów
évavríav aid 6&ved 6at kal &Aws 6&
Trāv rô by éxelv rivă yvågiv. Cf.
Alex. in Metaph. 1009 b, 21, who
concludes his commentary on the
verse with the words (p. 263, 22
Don.): to yap tračov Aéyétat vómua.
às yºp (?) too ppovetv hptmuévov
ths orwuatikis kpáorews kal &el
kará to traéovášov kal étrukparody
év tá orwuattic; 6taðéo et airoo ye-
vouévov. Ritter, i. 495, translates
traéov as the full; Hegel, Gesch. d.
Phil. i. 277, the most ; Brandis, Gr.
Röm. Phil. i. 392, the mightier;
Steinhart, l. c. 243, the prepon-
derant fiery. It rather signifies,
however, as Theophrastus rightly
explains, to irepšáNAov, the pre-
ponderating, and the whole pro-
position asserts that of the two
elements, the one that prepon-
derates and overcomes is thought,
which engenders and determines
opinions. On account of this
theory, Theophrastus reckons
Parmenides among those philo-
sophers who regard perception as
produced by that which is of like
kind.
* Theophrastus says: rö aio 64-
ver6al ſcal to ppovetv. Ös Tairo
Aéyet ; Arist. Metaph. iv. 5, 1009
b, 12, 21, reckons Parmenides
among those who considered ºppé-
vmous to be the same as ała 6ma is ;
and Diog. ix. 22, following Theo-
phrastus, and agreeing with Stob.
i. 790, tells us rhv juxºv ical Tov
votiv rairov eival (II. &mépmve).
This is, as a matter of fact, quite
correct; but we must remember
that he did not observe the dis-
tinction between perception and
thought, and consequently did not
expressly deny it ; and that in v.
148, perception is included under
the word ºppovéet.
* Cf. p. 602, 2. According to
604
PARMENIDES.
Whether in his physics he inculcated the doctrine
of metempsychosis or of pre-existence is uncertain.”
The statement that he believed in a destruction of the
universe * seems to be founded on a misunderstanding.”
What significance Parmenides ascribed to his phy-
Joh. Damasc. Parall. ii. 25, 28.
(Stob. Floril. Ed. Mein. iv. 235),
Parmenides, like Empedocles, ac-
counted for sensation by the theory
of pores in the organs of sense.
The name of Parmenides, how-
ever, is no doubt wrongly placed
in this connection; it is absent ap.
Plut. Plac. iv. 9, 3, and Galen, c.
14, p. 303. Ib. No. 30, we find
IIapp. 'Eutrečok??s éAAeſthet Tpoq’īs
Thu èpečiv, a notice on which, even
if it is true, nothing could be based:
for Karsten's explanation (p. 269)
that desire arises when one of the
elements is present in too small
measure, is very uncertain. Lastly,
Plut. Plac. iv. 5, 5, says: II. ev
8X4, T6 6&pakt (to jºyeuovuköv) kal
'Etríkovpos, but this is evidently a
mere inference from some saying
of Parmenides, and not the saying
itself.
* Simpl. Phys. 9 a. says of
Parmenides' Deity: cal r&s juxās
Tréutely troté pºv ćic roi, Čupavods
eis rô &eiàs, trot & 5& àváraxty
ºpmori. Ritter, i. 510, and Karsten,
p. 272 sqq., understand this to
mean that éuqavès was the light
or aether, and &etőés the dark or
the terrestrial world; and that,
accordingly, Parmenides regarded
birth as a sinking from the higher
world, and death as a return to it.
But the expressions éupavés and
àetö&s do not signify the light and
the dark, but that which is manifest
to us, and that which is hidden;
the one consequently the upper
'world, and the other the lower,
Hades. The words of Simplicius,
therefore, assert that God sends
souls now out of this life, and now
into it. And though these words,
strictly speaking, certainly imply
pre-existence, it is still doubtful
whether we ought so to interpret
them, and not as a poetical mode
of expression. At the same time,
it is quite possible that Parmenides
may have adopted in his exposition
of the ordinary theories the doc-
trine of transmigration. Also the
expression ortuyepès Tókos (Parm.
v. 129, Sup. p. 595, 2) does not
necessarily, as Ritter thinks, ex-
press that it would be better for
men not to be born: it may simply
refer to birth pangs. Trávrm al-
ready carries us beyond our human
world.
2 Hippol. Refut.
kóavov čºpm pºetpea 6al,
11 : row
8è rpétrº,
1.
º
q)
3' ºr
oùic eitrev.
* As the Philosophumena them-
selves say that Parmenides did not
give his opinion particularly on
the destruction of the world, it is
probable that the statement has
no other foundation than the clos-
ing verse of Parmenides' poem:—
oira rot karð 5óšav čqv táöe vöv
Te éaori,
f 5 * * *
kal puerétrelt' &md roße TeXevthorovoſt
Tpaq’évra.
Toſs 5 §vou’ &v6pwtrol
étría muov čkdoºrg.
karé6evrº
These verses, however, seem to
refer to the destruction of indi-
viduals and not of the universe.
PHYSICS. 605
sics is a point on which opinions have been divided
from the earliest times." Some suppose that in them
we have throughout only the standpoint of delusive
opinion, and not the personal convictions of the philo-
sopher. Others think that he did not intend to deny
all truth to the world of phenomena as such, but only
to discriminate its divided and variable Being from the
One and undivided Being of true existence. This second
theory has had many advocates in modern times,” but I
cannot support it. Parmenides himself declares too ex-
plicitly that he acknowledges only the one unchangeable
essence as a reality; that he does not concede a particle
of truth to the ordinary notion which shows us plurality
and change; and that, consequently, in the second part
of his poem he is stating the opinions of others, and not
his own convictions.” Aristotle apprehended his doctrine
* The opinions of the ancients
are given most fully by Brandis,
Comm. El. 149 sqq.; cf. Gr. Röm.
Phil. i. 394 sqq.; and also by Kar-
sten, p. 143 Sqq. I have not
thought it necessary to discuss
them, as the judgment of Aristo-
tle, which we shall presently
examine, must, after all, be con-
clusive for us.
* Schleiermacher, Gesch. d.
Phil. 63. ‘But the truth is that
all this holds good only of abso-
lute Being; and, therefore, the
Plurality is not a plurality of ab-
solute Being,' etc.; Karsten, 145:
ille nec unam amplexus est verita-
tem, nec sprevit omnino opiniones;
neutrum eacelusit, utrigue swum
tribuit locum. Parmenides (cf. p.
149) distinguished the eternal
from the mutable, without exactly
defining the relation of the two
spheres, but it never occurred to
him to regard the Phenomenon as
deceptive appearance. Cf. Ritter,
i. 499 sqq. According to the
Eleatics we can never grasp divine
truth except in a few general pro-
positions; when, according to man's
usual method of thinking, we as-
sume plurality and change, this is
only falsehood and deception of the
senses. On the other hand, we
must acknowledge that even in
what appears as Many and Change
the Divine exists, although veiled
and misapprehended.
* Cf. on this point the quota-
tions Sup. pp. 584, 1; 587, 2; 604,
3; especially the verses with which
the first part of his poem, the doc-
trine of Being, concludes, v. 110
Sqq. :—
év tá orot traúw triarov Aóyov #8&
vánua
606 PARMENIDES.
in this same way; Plato tells us” that in contradict-
ing the ordinary view, Zeno was entirely at one with
his master; and it is entirely beyond question that
Zeno absolutely denied plurality and change. It may
seem strange, on this view of the matter, that Parme-
mides should not only give a detailed account of
opinions which he considers altogether worthless, but
should construct a specific theory from their point of
view; it may also seem unlikely that he should entirely
deny the truth of the sense perception, and that in his
few propositions concerning the One, which are rather
negative than positive, he should believe himself to
have exhausted the whole of the truth.” But what else
could be said, and how could he express himself dif-
ferently on the subject of reality, having once started
from the proposition that only Being is, and that non-
Being is absolutely, and in all respects, non-existent,
when he had not attained to those more precise
dialectical distinctions with which Plato and Aristotle
afterwards opposed his doctrine P. His reason for never-
theless entering at length upon the consideration of the
world of phenomena is sufficiently explained by himself:
ăups &Ambeſms' 36%as 3 &to roße
Bporeſas
Adv6ave, káguov ćuáv čtréav Štratm-
Aovákoúww.
Cf. the passages quoted, Sup.
p. 561, 3; 587, 3; and De Caelo,
iii. i. 298 b, 14 : oi uèv y&p
airóv 32Aws &vetNov yeweariv kai
q,00páv ot,0&v yöp otºre yfyveo'6aſ
qaow otºre pºetpea 6al rôv čvrov.
#AA& uðvov Sokeſv juiv. olov of
repl MéAurorów re ral IIappevièmv.
Similarly, Gen. et Corr. i. 8, 325
a, 2. He then proceeds to mention
the determinations of the world of
phenomena, and praises Parme-
nides for having extended his ob-
servations to that world also
(Metaph. i. 5, Sup. p. 592, 1), but
this is not to the purpose, for
nothing is said by him of the re-
lation in which Parmenides placed
the Phenomenon and Reality.
* Parm. 128 A.
* Ritter, l.c.
PHYSICS. 607
he purposes not to overlook even hostile opinions." The
reader is to have both theories set before him, the true
and the false, in order that he may the more surely de-
cide for the true. The false theory of the universe is not
indeed not represented as it is actually found with any
of the previous philosophers, but as, according to the
opinion of Parmenides, it ought to be expressed. This,
however, we find in other ancient authors. Plato often
corrects the opinions that he combats, both as to their
content and the manner of apprehending them. Thu-
cydides does not put into the mouth of his characters
what they really said, but what he would have said in
their place. Parmenides adopts the same dramatic
procedure; he represents the ordinary view of the world
as he himself would regard it if he placed himself on
that standpoint, but his design is not to expound his
own opinions, but those of others; his whole physical
theory has a merely hypothetical import. It is designed
to show us how the world of phenomena would present
itself to us if we could regard it as a reality. But it
is clear from the exposition that the world of phe-
nomena can only be explained on the theory of two
primitive elements, one corresponding to Being, and
the other to non-Being ; and consequently, that it pre-
supposes at all points the Being of non-Being. And
therefore it is the more evident that the world of phe-
nomena itself, as distinct from the One and eternal
Being, has no claim to Reality. Parmenides, however,
did not attempt that thorough dialectical refutation of
the ordinary mode of presentation, which, we are told

* W. 121 (sup, p. 597, 3).
608 ZENO.
by the most trustworthy testimonies, was the special
achievement of Zeno." When a dialectical procedure
of this kind, therefore, is ascribed to Parmenides by
later writers,” they are confusing him with Zeno; only
the beginnings of such a method can be recognised in
his argument against the Being of non-Being.
ZENO.
BARMENIDEs had developed the Eleatic doctrine to a
point beyond which it could not be materially carried.
It only remained for his successors to defend his views as
opposed to the ordinary presentation, and to establish
them more precisely in their particular details. The
more minutely, however, the relation of the two stand-
points was considered, the more distinctly must their
entire incompatibility, and the inability of the Eleatic
doctrine to explain phenomena, have appeared. On
the other hand, where an understanding with ordinary
opinion was attempted, the purity of the definitions
concerning Being must have immediately suffered. To
have seen this constitutes the merit of Zeno and
Melissus. For the rest, these two philosophers are
agreed both with each other and with Parmenides.
The only difference between them is that Zeno, who
far excelled Melissus in dialectic ability, maintained
* Authorities will be cited be- Favorin. ap. Diog. ix. 23, ascribes
low ; for the present it is sufficient to him the Achilles puzzle, and
to recall Plato, Parm. 128 A sqq. Porph. ap. Simpl. Phys. 30 a (vide
* According to Sext. Math. vii. p. 543), the argument from bi-
5 sq., some wished to reckon him section. We shall find, however,
not only among the Physicists, but that both belong to Zeno. Cf. p.
also among the Dialecticians. 590, 1.
HIS WRITINGS.
609
the standpoint of his master uncompromisingly, and in
sharp opposition to the ordinary view; while Melissus,
with less acuteness of intellect, approached somewhat
more nearly to the ordinary view, and diverged in some
not unimportant respects from the doctrine of Parme-
nides.
Zemo, the intimate friend and disciple of Par-
! Zeno of Elea, the son of Te-
leutagoras (Diog. ix. 25, vide p.
580, I), according to Plato (Parm.
127 B) was twenty-five years
younger than Parmenides, and at
an epoch which must have been
about 455–450 B.C., forty years old.
This would imply that he was born
about 495–490 B.C., and in Ol. 70
or 71. This indication, however,
as already observed (loc. cit.), is
hardly to be regarded as histori-
cally accurate. Suidas places Zeno's
prime in the 78th Ol.; Diog. ix.
29, in the 79th ; Eusebius, in his
Chron., in the 80th Olympiad. But
these statements are not always
very definite, and it is sometimes
questionable whether they are
based upon actual tradition, or are
merely inferences drawn from
JPlato, or derived from a calcula-
tion (Diel's Rhein. Mus. xxxi. 35)
which makes Zeno forty years
younger than his master, whose
&ku?) was placed in Ol. 69. It can
only be stated with certainty, that
Zeno was born about the beginning
of the fifth century, and appeared
as a teacher and author consider-
ably before the middle of that
century. His relation to Parme-
nides is described as very intimate;
Plato, l.c., says he was reported to
have been his favourite (tratăukd).
Athen. xi. 505 sq. takes great of-
fence at this statement; but it
VOL. I.
need not be taken in a bad sense.
According to Apollodor, ap. Diog.
l. c. Zeno had been the adopted son
of Parmenides. Though this is
quite possible in itself, yet Plato's
silence on the matter makes us
suspect that “adopted son’ may
have been substituted for favour-
ite, in order to obviate miscon-
struction of this relationship: and
the misapprehended expression.
Soph. 241 D, may also have related
to this. Zeno shares with Parme-
nides the honourable designation
of an āvīp IIv6ayópelos (Strabo, vi.
1, i. p. 252) and the glory of hav-
ing promoted law and order in
Elea. He is praised in Diog. ix,
28 for having, from attachment to
his home, spent his whole life in
Elea without once visiting Athens
(obic tièmuñoras to trapárav irpos
airoës). But this statement can
hardly be true. For if the First
Alcibiades be too doubtful a source
to guarantee the fact (119 A) that
Pythodorus and Callias each paid
100 minae to Zeno for his instruc-
tions, which Callias must certainly
have received in Athens, Plutarch,
Per. c. 4, c. 5, tells us of a residence
of Zeno in Athens, during which
Pericles associated with him ; and
this fact may have given occasion
to Plato's story of the visit of Par-
menides to that city. Zeno is said
to have displayed great firmness
R R
610
ZEWO.
menides, seems to have agreed with him on all points.
Plato, at any rate, expressly says that he sought in his
under tortures, inflicted on him in
consequence of a rebellion against
a tyrant in which he had been
implicated. The occurrence itself
is abundantly attested: by Herac-
lides, Demetrius, Antisthenes, Her-
mippus and others, ap. Diog. ix.
26 sq.; Diodor. Erc. p. 557; Wess.
Plut. Garrulit. c. 8, p. 505; Sto.
Rep. 37, 3, p. 1051 ; Adv. Col. 32,
10, p. 1126; Philo, Qu. Omn. Pr.
Lib. 881 C f. Hösch. ; Clemens,
Strom. iv. 496 C ; Cic. Tusc. ii.
22, 52; N. D. iii. 33, 82; Wal.
Max. iii. 3, 2 sq.; Tert. Apo-
loget. c. 50; Amm. Marc. xiv. 9;
Philostr. V. Apoll. vii. 2; Suidas,
*EAéa, etc. The more precise
details, however, are variously
given. Most of our authorities
make Elea the scene of the event;
Valerius says Agrigentum, Philo-
stratus, Mysia; Ammianus, con-
founding Zeno with Anaxarchus,
Cyprus. The tyrant is called some-
times Diomedon, sometimes Demy-
lus, sometimes Nearchus; Valerius
names Phalaris; Tertullian, Diony-
sius. Some assert that Zeno gave
up his friends to the tyrant;
others that, in order to betray no
one, he bit out his own tongue;
others that he bit off the tyrant's
ear. As to the manner of his
death also, there is much division
of opinion. According to Diogenes,
the tyrant was killed; according
to Diodorus, Zeno was set free. Wa-
lerius represents the occurrence as
happening twice, first to this Zeno,
and afterwards to a namesake of
his (cf. Bayle, Dict. Zenón d'Elée,
Rem. C). Although therefore the
occurrence seems to be historical,
nothing further can be determined
in regard to it. Whether the
allusion ap. Arist. Rhet. i. 12, 312
b, 3, refers to this event, and what
is the true explanation of it, we do
not know. Plato mentions a work
which Zeno composed in his early
life (Parm. 127 C sqq.) as if it
were his only known work (it is
called simply tº Zhvovos Ypdwuara,
to otºy'ypapºua). Simpl. (Phys. 30
a) also mentions a work (to a tºy-
'ypappa) apparently the same spoken
of by Plato. It was devoted to
a polemic against the ordinary
view, refuting by inference the
presuppositions of that stand-point.
It was divided into several parts
(called A6)ot by Plato), and each
part into different sections (called
by Plato intoffégets, and by Simpl.
étrixelphuata), in each of which one
of the hypotheses of the ordinary
point of view was designed to be
reduced ad absurdum (Proclus in
Parm. iv. 100 Cous., who by
Aóryot understands the several ar-
guments, and by Štro8éosis the
premisses of the several, conclu-
sions; he speaks of 40 Aóyot, and
can hardly have seen Zeno's work.
David, Schol. in Arist. 22 o, 34
sqq., no doubt copies from him).
That the work was in prose, we
know from Plato, and from the
extracts in Simplicius. It is no
doubt identical with the book al-
luded to in Arist. Soph. El. c. 10,
170 b, 22, in the words, kal 6
&n orpwéuevos kal 6 €potöv Zhvov;
for even though there might be
questions and answers in this book,
yet it need not have been on that
account an actual dialogue, and
Zeno need not have been the first
author of the dialogue, as Diog.
PHYSICS. 611
writings to refute the plurality of things, and by this
means to prove indirectly the unity of all Being main-
tained by Parmenides.' Thus his conception of Being
must have been, in general, the same as that of his
master. What we are told of his physical propositions,
also, in part coincides with the hypothetical physics of
Parmenides. As some of these statements, however,
are manifestly untrue, and as our most trustworthy
authorities never quote a single physical theory of
Zeno's, it is most probable that he did not pursue
further this portion of the doctrine of Parmenides.”
iii. 48, asserts with the prefix of
ºpdori. Aristotle himself, if we may
judge from this passage of Diog.
and Athen. xi. 505 c, did not
designate him as such. That
Zeno wrote many books does not
follow from the use of the plural
BigAta ap. Diog. ix. 26, for this
may refer to the several parts of
his one known work. On the
other hand, Suidas names four
writings pièes, éâymoris 'Eutrečok-
Aéovs, trpos toūs ‘pixogóqovs, tr.
qāorews. Of the éthyma is 'Eutrečok-
Aéovs, which, however, is certainly
spurious, we find traces elsewhere,
vide p. 612. The three others,
mentioned only by Eudocia, may
be merely different names for the
book we have already spoken of.
Stallbaum's proposal however(Plut.
Parm. p. 30) to read #ypayev čplēas
Tpos Tovs pixogóqous repl púorews,
in Suidas, not only contradicts the
received text, but disagrees entirely
with the manner in which Suidas
and similar authors generally cite
the titles of books. According to
Simpl. l.c., Alexander and Porphyry
cannot have seen Zeno's work; nor
does Proclus even seem to have
been acquainted with it. Simplicius
himself, however, had probably
something more than extracts from
it, although (vide p. 21 b) he
may not have been quite certain
that his text was complete. At
p. 131 a, he is quoting only from
Eudemus.
Parm. 127 E: ápa toûró
Éotiv BoöAovrat orov of Aðyol, oùk
&AA0 tº # 6tauáxeoréal trapā travta.
Tà Aeyóueva, Ös oil troAAd Éati ; Kal
toūrou airoo olei oroi tekuſpiov eival
ëkaotov táv Aó)wy, $orre Kal jºye7
Toorajra Tekuňpia trapéxeoróat 60 ovs
trep Aóryovs yéypaſpas, Ös oëk éott
troAAd; Oik, &AA&, pdval Töv Zīva wa,
kaxás ovvikas &Aov to Ypduna è
RočAetat. Socrates on this remarks
that Parmenides and Zeno say the
same, the former directly, the
latter indirectly. ov Pºv yip
(Parm.) év toſs trouhuagiv čv pſis
eival to iráv . . . 86e 68 at of troAA&
qmoiv eival, and Zeno practically
concedes it when he explains more
particularly how he came to com-
pose his work (vide p. 613, 1).
* Our information on this point
is confined to a few passages. Diog.
ix. 29, says: âpérket 8 airé réðe.
R R 2
612
ZEWO.
We can only with certainty ascribe to him those de-
monstrations which are intended to defend Parmenides’
doctrine as opposed to the ordinary presentation."
kóopovs sival, kevöv te uži sival'
ºyeyev;0.0at 8& Thy rôv travrov pāoriv
ék 0epuoi, kal juxpoſſ Kai čmpoo ral
à-ypoſ, Aappavóvrwy eis &AAmaa Tºv
perað0A#v. Yévéatv T' &v6pótrov ćic
'yūs elval kal juxºv kpāua, Širdpxetv
ék Töv Tpoetpmºvévov kot & ſimäevös
Toštov Čirikpármoly. Stob. Eel. i.
60 : Méxtoratos kal Závov to èv Kal
Trāv kai uávov &fölov Kal &melpov to
£v kal to pièv év thv čváykmv, iſºmy
8è airtàs r& réorgapa orotxela, etón
8è to veikos kal Thy pixtav. Aéyet
8è kai Tô a rotxela 6eobs, ſcal rô
pſyua toûrwu Töv kóopov, kai trpos
Tajra &vańv6%geral (perhaps Aveo-
0at) to uovoeiðés" (all that is appa-
rently of the same kind, as wood,
meat, flesh, &c., that which Aris–
totle calls ögououepès resolves itself
finally into the four elements) kal
6etas uèv offeral Tês juxás, 6etovs 6*
kai toys ueréxoviras airóv ka9apot's
ka9após. This last exposition re-
minds us so much of Empedocles,
that Heeren (in h. 1.) thought of
substituting the name Empedocles
for the singular words iN my 6é
airms. It seems to me the name
of Empedocles may have dropped
out, either in that place, as Sturz
(Emped. p. 168) supposes, or more
probably (Krische, Forsch. i. 123)
ibefore the words to uévêy, etc. Or
perhaps the whole passage may have
been taken from the ééhymous 'Eu-
arešokAéovs (p. 609, 1, end), ascribed
to Zeno. But this work cannot have
been genuine; it must originally
have borne the name of Zeno the
Stoic. In the first place, it is very
improbable and wholly without
precedent in ancient times, that a
philosopher like Zeno should have
written a commentary on the work
of a contemporary of his own age ;
and next, it is very strange that,
if he did so, he should have selected
not the work of his master, but
one that was so little in harmony
with his own views. Further, it
appears from what has been already
quoted, p. 610, that Zeno wrote
only one book; and the utter silence
of Aristotle and his commentators
as to any physical utterances of
Zeno shows that none were known
to them. Lastly, it is clear that,
in Stobaeus, propositions are as-
cribed to Zeno which are entirely
unknown to him. The same holds
good in part of the statements of
Diogenes, but the greater number
of these are, so far, less improbable,
as they agree with the doctrine of
Parmenides. Parmenides likewise
denied empty space, held the warm
and cold to be elements, and taught
that mankind arose in the first
instance from the earth, and that
souls were compounded from the
elements. The proposition: kóo-
pious eival, however, cannot have
belonged to an Eleatic philosopher,
whether we understand by kóguou
a number of synchronous worlds,
or successive worlds; Zeno the
Eleatic seems to be here confounded
with Zeno the Stoic ; and what is
said of the elements bears evidence
of the Stoic-Aristotelian doctrine.
. There seems also to have been a
confusion between the two Zenos
in Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1087 C : Zhvov
6 °EAeárms à éptorturbs to a ré répg
Zhvavi kal thy yiv &kivmtov Aéyet
Kal uměéva Tótrov kevöv eival.
* Stallbaum, Plat. Parm. 25
DIAL ECTIO. 613
Zeno adopted for this purpose an indirect method.
Parmenides had derived his determinations of Being
directly from the concept of Being. Zemo proves the
same doctrine indirectly by showing that the opposite
theories involve us in difficulties and contradictions,
and that Being does not admit of our regarding it
as a Plurality, as something divisible and changeable.
He seeks to prove the Eleatic doctrine by reducing the
prevalent mode of presentation to absurdity." Because
of this method, which he employed with masterly skill,
Zeno was called by Aristotle the inventor of Dialectic,”
and Plato says that he could make one and the same
appear to his hearers as like and unlike, as one and
many, as in motion and at rest.” Though this Dialectic
afterwards furnished many weapons to the Eristic of
sqq. thinks it was chiefly directed
against Anaxagoras and Leucippus;
but in the demonstrations of Zeno
there is nothing that specially
points to either of these men.
* In the Parm. 25 sqq., Xeno
thus continues: éoºrt 5& Tó ye
&Amóēs 80%6eld ris Taota Tà ypdu-
para Tó IIappreviðov A6).q, trpos toys
étrixelpodytas attöv kopºeiv, &s ei
ev čott toxA& kal yeXota avuòaivet
traorxeiv Tó Aóyº kai évautía airó.
&vti/\éyet 5% of v Tooto Tô Ypduua
trpos toys Tā troAA& Aéryovras ical
&vratroëtöwal taota kal TAeto, Tooto
BovXópevov Šmxotiv, &s éri yeaotótepa
trö0'xoi &v airów i ötróBeats, ei
troAA& éotiv, # h too &v eival, et Tus
incavós éirečíot.
* Diog. viii. 57; ix. 25; Sext.
Math. vii. 7, cf. Timon ap. Diog.
l. c. (Plut. Pericl. c. 4; Simpl. Phys,
236 b):—
āpubotepoyadéogov Te uéya ordévos
oùk &Aatraëvov
Zīva wos trèvrov čtrixáTTopos, hēē
Mexford ov,
troAAów pavrao uáv étávo, traúpov
'ye pºèv efora.
* Phaedr. 261 D : Töv oſſºv
'EAeatucov IIaxapahāmy Aéyovra oilk
to wet, Téxvn Śare paívea 0at Tots
ākočovoi Tà air& Šuota kal &vöuolo,
ical év kal troAA&, uévourd te ań kai
£epóweva. That Zeno is here meant,
and not Alcidamas (as Quintil. iii.
1, 2, thinks), is evident. More-
over, Plato himself says in Parm.
127 E: trós, pdvai & Zhvov, Tooto
Aéysis; ei troAAd €orri Tä, övta, Ös
&pa šeſ air& Šuoud teeival kal &vá-
pola, rotto 8& 83 &öövarov; . . . .
oira, pdval row Zhvava. Similarly,
Isocr. Enc. Hel. Sub init. : Zhuova,
Töv Taiºtă 6Vyat & kal tróAlv &öövara
trelpópevov što paivetv, for these
words no doubt refer, not to any
particular argument, but to Zeno's
antinomistic procedure generally.
614 ZEWO.
the Sophists, it is itself distinguished from that Eristic"
by its positive object; and still less, for the same reason,
can it be identified with Scepticism.” The dialectic
argument with Zeno, though it does not altogether dis-
dain Sophistic applications, is never anything but a
means to establish a metaphysic conviction, the doc-
trine of the unity and invariability of Being.
In particular, the arguments of Zemo, so far as we
are acquainted with them, are concerned with multi-
plicity and motion. The arguments against the multi-
plicity of things which have been transmitted to us
have respect to their magnitude, number, Being in
space, and co-operation. The arguments against motion
are likewise four, which Zeno did not arrange in the
best order, nor according to any fixed principle.
I now proceed to examine these arguments collec-
tively:-
A. The Arguments against Multiplicity.
1. If Being were many, it must be at the same
time infinitely small and infinitely great. Infinitely
small; for as every plurality is a number of unities, but
a true unity alone is indivisible— so each of the Many
must either itself be an indivisible unity, or be made
up of such unities. That which is indivisible, however,
can have no magnitude; for all that has magnitude is
infinitely divisible. The particular parts of which the
* With which it is too closely ºrdinary statement, perhaps, arose
identified by Plut. Per. 4, and ap. from a misunderstanding of some
Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 7; and with passage like that quoted from
which Seneca confuses it, Ep. 88, Aristotle, p. 615, 1.
44 sq., when he attributes to Zeno * Which, according to Diog. ix.
the assertion of Gorgias: Nihil 72, laid claim to it, whereas Timon,
esse ne unum quidem. This extra- l.c., does not.
*
AGAINST MULTIPLICITY.
615
many consists have consequently no magnitude.
If
they are added to anything it will not become greater,
nor if they are taken away will it become less.
But
that which, being added to another, does not make it
greater, and being taken away from another does not
make it less, is nothing. The Many is therefore infinitely
small; for each of its constituent parts is so small that
it is nothing. On the other hand, however, these parts
| Simpl. Phys. 30 a év uévrol
Tô ovyypáupati airod troAA& #xoviri
étrixelpfuata ka0° àicagºrov čeſkvvoruv,
§tt T3 troAA& eival Aéryovri orvuòaivet
Tà évavitſa Aéyetv. čv év éorriv ćirt-
Xeipmua, Év ć Šetkvvoru, 3ri ei troXAd .
éoti kal ueydºa €otl ſcal purpś,
weyāAa uèv šare &relpa to uéyé90s
eival, utºp? §§ oitas, Šare uměčv
ëxeiv uéye60s. v 33 roërg (in the
section which proves that it is in-
finitely small) befkvvaru, ärt of uſire
pléyé60s uſite triºxos pºſite &ykos un-
6eſs é o ru, oiâ’ &v ein rooto oi y&p
ei &AAq àvri, pnori, trpoo’yévouro,
où6èv &v weigov trouſoele, ueyé00vs
'yöp uměevos ūvros, trpoo'yevouévov
8è (this 6* should no doubt be
omitted; it seems to have arisen
from the oibév which follows) oiâèv
ofäv re eis uéyé0os étribooval, kal
oùros &v #öm to trpoo’yuánevov
où6èv etm. (Zeno must have added
here : ‘nor could anything become
smaller, by its being taken away
from it.') ei Šč àtoylvouévov to
#Tepov uměčv čAartóv čarri, uměč aß
Tpoorylvopévov aiºhoretat, SmNovótt
to trpoo'yevópºevov oë6&v ºv, où6ë to
&toyevópºevov. (This part of the
exposition is confirmed by Eude-
mus, vide infra, and by Arist.
Metaph. iii. 4, 1001 b, 7 : étu ei
&ötalpetov airb to èv, karð uèv to
Závavos &éíopia oi6&v &v eſſm. 6 y&p
pañre trpoo ribéuevov uſite & patpotſue-
vov trouet weigov uměš éAartov, ot
qmaiw elval tooto róv čvrov, &s
678 ov Štt övros weyā0ous roß &vros.)
ical raûra oix. To ev &valpóv à Zh-
vov Aéyet, &AA’ 3rt, ei uéyé60s exel
ékao'rov Tóv troAAów ical &treſpov,
où5év čotal &kpı8ós v Ště rºw étr'
&Teipov rouív. čeſ 5& eveivat. §
ôetkvvori, trpoãetëas ātl oièëv éxel
puéyebos, éic too kaatov Tóv troAAów
éavré, Taitov eival kal év. Kai à
Oeuto rios 3& Töv Závovos A6-yov čv
eival to Öv karaokeväſelv pmolv čk
roo ovvexes to (b. Te) airo elval
kal &öuaíperov. ei yöp 6taipoºró,
qmoriv, où6èv čo rat ākpubás &v Ště.
Thy k &lreupov touhy Tāv orwudrav.
êouke 68 waxNov ć Závov Aéyeuv, &s
où6è troAA& #ortal, The passage in
Themist. Phys. 18 a, p. 122 Sp.,
runs thus: Zhvavos, Šs éic too
ovvexés re eival kal &öuaíperov čv
eival to by categicetaſe, Aéyov, &s
ei öuaipeiral oiâé àotal &kpi}^s ºv
61& thv étr' &repov touńv táv orwººd-
tov. From the connection in
which this assertion of Zeno's
stood (according to Simplicius), it
appears that Simplicius' criticism
of Themist. is correct. Zeno is
not speaking primarily of the One
Being; but starting from the pre-
supposition of Multiplicity, he is
telling us how each of the many
things must then be conceived. So
far as he at the same time shows
616
ZEWO.
are also infinitely great.
For since that which has no
magnitude is not, the Many, in order to be, must have
a magnitude : its parts must consequently be sepa-
rated from one another—that is, other parts must lie
between them.
that each thing, in order to be one,
must also be indivisible, his asser-
tion might likewise be applied to
the One Being; this, too, in order
to be one, must be indivisible (Év
ovvexés). Eudemus seems to have
had this argument in view when
he says, ap. Simpl. Phys. 21 a (cf.
30 a, 31 a): Zhvavd. ºpaqi Aéyetv, et
tus airó to Šv &toãoſm tº Troté Éott
Aéčeiv [éotiv, *getvl Tä, övta.
Aéyéiv: htrópel 6* @s éolice (Bran-
dis, i. 416, has this from MSS.
In the printed text these words are
wanting, but they occur p. 30 a.)
ôtà To Töv Pušv aiorêmtöv čkao Tov
Katmyopikós Te troAA& Aévé00al kal
peptopºg, Thu 8& ortlyphy amáš Šv
Tubéval. 6 yap pºſite trpoo Tifféuevov
aúčet uſire & palpodpºevov ueto? oik
Østo Töv čvrov eival. Simpl. 21 b,
observes on this: 6 wºv too Zīva'wos
Aóryos &AAos Tis outcev oftos éival
trap' ékéivov row év BigAiq, pepôuevov
of kal 6 IIA4t ov čv Tó IIapuevtåg
uéuvmtal. Ékeſ utv yöp Šti oil, éart
troAA& 6eſkvvoru . . . Švraúða 6é, és
Eöömuós (pmoi, kal &viſpel to Év. Thu
yöp at typºv &s to èveival Aéyet, tà
8è troXA& eival ovyxopeſ. 6 uévrol
'AAéðavöpos ical évraúða toû Zhvavos
&s to troAA& &vaipoovtos prepavāoróat
Töv Eöömuov offetal. “às yopiatopeſ,
‘pmotv, Eöömpos, Zhvov Ó IIappreviðov
Tyvápipios étrelpâto Öeukvěvat 3rt uh
oiáv re rà èvra troAA& eival, Tô um-
Śēv eival év Tots of guy ev, Tå Ö&
troAA& TA700s eival évôww.” Ical
öti uév oëx &s tº toxXà &vaipoovros
Zhvavos Eöömuos uéuvmtal,viv 87Xov
ěk tās airod Aéews. oiual be uſite
But the same thing holds good of
[umöè] év tá, Závovos Bu63 tº Toudo-
tov Čirixeſpnua pépé00al, otov 6
'AAéčavöpós (pmat. It is clear, how-
ever, from this passage that Alex-
ander correctly apprehended the
meaning of Zeno's proposition, and
no doubt that of Eudemus, and
that Simplicius here makes the
same mistake which he afterwards
himself corrects in Themistius.
Zeno says: In order to know what
things are, we must know what the
smallest parts are out of which
they are compounded; but this
does not imply that since they are
the smallest parts, they are indivi-
sible points, and, as invisible
points, are without magnitude, and
consequently nothing. He wants
to prove (as Philop. Phys. B, lo, 15,
observes, not without some interpo-
lation of his own comments) that
there can be no multiplicity, for
every multiplicity consists of uni-
ties; but among all the things which
present themselves to us as a multi-
plicity, among all ovvex?, nothing
is really One. Brandis, i. 416,
wrongly constructs an independent
demonstration out of what Eude-
mus and Aristotle, l. c., say; and.
Ritter, i. 522, deduces from the
statement of Eudemus the bold
theory that Zeno, like Parmenides,
acknowledged that the full and
true knowledge of the One was not
contained in his definitions of it.
My reasons for disagreeing with
both these opinions will appear in
the course of the present exposi-
tion. -
A GAINST MULTIPLICITY. 617
these parts: they also must have a magnitude, and be
separated from one another, and so on to infinity.
Thus we get an infinite number of magnitudes, or an
infinite magnitude."
2. By the same process, Zeno shows also that the
Many in respect of number must be as much limited
as unlimited. Limited, for it is just so much as it is ;
not more and not less. Unlimited, for two things are
two, only where they are separated ; and in order that
they may be separate, something must be between
them ; similarly between this and each of the two,
and so on ad infinitwm.” As in the first argument,
the determination of infinite magnitude, so here the
determination of infinite number is attained by ap-
prehending plurality as a multiplicity of separate
magnitudes, and by introducing between each two
of these separate magnitudes a third separating mag-
Y] itude.
* Simplicius, l. c. 30 b, after
having discussed the argument from
division, which will be quoted im-
mediately—proceeds thus: Ical oita
pºv to karū to trää90s &teipov ćic
ris Sixotoutas Ščeiše. To be carā To
wéyé90s aſpörepov Katë, Thy at thu
étrixeſpngly. T206et{as Yāp, Öti ei uh
ëxel to by uéye60s oiâ’ &vein, Érd yet.
“ei 3& £ativ, &váykm, kaotov påye66s
ti čxelv kal traxos kal &tréxetu attoo
to repov &tó rod Étépov, kai trepi
toū ſpoëxovros 6 airbs A6-yos' kai
'yāp kelvo £et uéyebos ſcal trpoéget
airoi; tı, Šuotov 83, rooto &raš Te
eitrely kal &ei Aéyeiv. oilà èv y&p airtoi,
Totoorov čoxatov čotal otte érepov
Trpos érepov oint écºral. oitos, ei
troXAá éativ, &váykm air& purpſ; te
eival kal ueydaa.. utºp& Pºv čote wh
The ancients usually designate this portion
éxelv máye60s, aeyāAa 5& &aſte ämelpa
eival.” By Trpoéxov I understand
that which lies before another, and
thereby keeps that other at a dis-
tance from a third.
* Simpl. l. c. 30 b : betkvěs y&p,
§ti ei troXAá éott rà air& tretrepa-
opéva èatl Kal &telpa, Ypdqet Taota
karð Aéâly 6 Závov “ei troAAá, éotiv,
&váykm rogaora, eival 60'a €oti kal
oùre TAetova airóv otre éAdºttova.
ei ö& Tooraúrá čortly 30 a €ortl, Tetépa-
awéva &v etn. Kal triNiv, ei troAAd
éotiv, &relpa Tó, úvra éatív. &ei
ºyap repa usta;v táv čvrov čotl,
ical tróAtv ékeſvov čtepa wetašū, Kal
oiſta's & Telpa rā āvra éotſ.” Kal
ošta, uév, etc. (vide preceding
note).
618
ZEWO.
of Zeno's two arguments as the argument from bi-
section."
3. Since all that exists, exists in space, space must
itself be in a space, and so ad infinitwm.
As this is
inconceivable, the existent generally cannot be in space.”
* Arist. Phys. i. 3, 187 a, 1,
after Parmenides and Melissus’
doctrine of the unity of the one has
been discussed in detail: éviot 6'
(the Atomists) évéðoorav roſs A6-yous
&pſporépous, T6 uèv šta trávra èv, ei
To by év ornuaível, §rt égºr) to pººl ov,
Té à ék Tös 5txotoutas &roua troth-
ogures weye 9m. Simpl. p. 30 a.,
observes on this passage: Töv Šē
8stºrepov Aóryov Tov ćic rās 5uxorouſas
~00Závayos elvaí pmoliv 6’AAéðavöpos
Aéryovros, &s ei uéyé60s Xot rô by
kal 6taipoºro, troAA& Tô by kal oilcért
êv čarea 6al kal &id. Tottou Seikyūvros,
§rt pumöèv Tóv Švrav ča-Tl to Év.
This last is rightly questioned by
Simpl. and the source of the error
is traced to the passage of Eude-
mus, quoted p. 616. Then follow
the statements quoted p. 615, as
to the argument of Zeno, and then,
p. 30 a., this observation: 6 Mévrol
IIoppípios icoi Töv ćic tàs 61%0Topºtas
Aóyov IIapuevíðov pnolveival, év to
by éic taúrms trelpopuévov Seikyūval.
ºpädel 3& oirws: “ repos 6& fiv Aóryos
Tó IIoppeviðm é Ötö täs 5uxotogías,
oiáuevos Seikvåval to ov čveival uávov
ical rooto &uepès Kal &öuaíperov. ei
ºyap elm, p.mail, 5ualperov, Tetuño.6a,
6ixa, kāteira Tów wepºv čkdrepov
6txa kal Toà row &el yivouévov 678-69,
qma'iy, Ös firvi ämtoweve? ruvê ša zara
Meyã0m éA&xiora kal &ropa TAftbel
6é &reipa kal to 8Xov č, ćAaxtotav
TAftöet 88 &treſpov orvoºrhoetal, #
q'poodov čotal kal eis oièëv črt 5uaxv-
0forerai kal ék too uměevös avatāore-
tal, &rep &rotra. oilk &pa Śualpebhore-
tal, &AA& uévet év. kal yèp 3%
étretón Tévrm épouáv čarriv, efirep Stat-
petov Štrápxel révrm épotos éotal
ôtaperov, &AA’ oi Tà uév tá 6' oi.
Simpſorów travtºm. 37Aov of v táAuv, dis
où6év Štropieveſ, &AA’ oral ppoi,60v,
ical eſtep ovathastal ird Alv čk toº
uměevös ovotha'etat. ei yüp Širopteve?
tu, oi,5étra yewhaetal travt m bumpm-
Mévov šare kal éic toirov q'avepāv,
qmoruv, dis &ötaíperóv te kal &pspès Kal
évêa ral to Šv’. . . (the remainder of
the quotation does not belong to
this subject) équotdvely 6é úštov, ei
IIappevſöov kal uh Zīva w8s éotiv 6
Aóyos, &s kal Tó ‘AAešávöp? §oke.
oire yap Év 'rois IIappeviðetous éreat
AéyeTaí ri rowbrov, kal ji traetortm
io Topta Thy Éic tàs buxotouſas ātroptav
eis rôv Závova &vatréutrel, ſcal 63, Kal
év toſs trepi kwho eas A6-yous dis Zh-
valvos &tropavnuoveterat (cf. infra,
the first and second arguments
against motion) kal tí óeſ troAA&
Aéyéiv, Šte ſcal év airó (péperat rô
toū Závovos avypáupati. Selkvěs
7&p, etc. These reasons of Sim-
plicius are quite convincing. Por-
phyry thinks that the argument
from dichotomy must belong to
Parmenides, simply because Aris-
totle, l. c., mentions it in his crit-
ique on the doctrine of Parmenides,
without mentioning Zeno. He
himself is unacquainted with Zeno's
work; what he says about this
argument he derives from other
sources, and he does not give it in
the original acceptation of Zeno.
* Arist. Phys. iv. 3, 210 b, 22:
§ 5& Závay hirópel, à Tu si èoti ri à
róiros, év tív. čarat, Adew oi x2Ae-
AGAINST MOTION. 619
4. A fourth argument is indicated in the statement
that if the shaking out of a bushel of corn produces a
sound, each individual grain and each sub-division of a
grain must likewise produce sound, which seems to
contradict our perceptions." The general question here
is—How is it possible that many things together can
produce an effect which each of them taken separately
does not produce 2
B. The Arguments against Motion.
As the arguments just quoted were directed against
multiplicity in order to prove the unity of Being, the
first main principle of the Eleatic doctrine, so the
next four are directed against motion, in order to
tróv. c. 1, 209 a, 23: # yöp Závayos
âtropia ºnteſ Tuva A6 yov' ei yüp trav
ºrb by év Tótrø, 67Aov Štu kal Too
Tóirov Tótros éotal kal Toºro sis
&melpov trpóstoriv. Eudemus, ap.
Simpl. Phys. 131 a étrº Taitov Šē
ical # Zhvavos &ropta paíveral &yeuv'
āštov [&#107 cf. in what follows: ei
pºv oſſºv čv Tótº #twicev eival Tö.
&vra] yap trav to by troń sival, ei à
6 Tótros Tóv čvrov, troß &velm oikoúv
év &AAq, Tóirq. kākelvos 6%) Šv &AAq,
kai oiſta's eis To trpóga. Simpl.
130 b : 6 Zhvovos Aóryos &vaipeiv
éööket rov rátrov ćpatów oira's ei
êotiv 6 Tótros év tív. čarat; trav yap
bv čv Tuvu' to 6é šu rivi kal év rátrº-
êort at Špa kal 6 rôtros év rátrºp kal
roöto éir' &neupov obk &pa ša riv 6
róiros. Similarly ibid. 124 b.
* Arist. Phys. vii. 5, 250 a, 19:
ătă totro à Závovos A6-yos oëk &Am.
631s, Ös pope; tās kéyxpov Št toºv
uépos. Simpl. in h. l. 255 a, says:
6tà rooro Aſſet kal rov Závovos Toà
'EAéâtov Aóryov Šv #pero IIpwtayópav
Töv Goſptortifivº eitrè ydp uot, Éq.m, à
IIpotaſyópa, śpa Ś eis Kéryxpos kata-
Treoróv påqov trouet, h to uvpiogtov
Too kéxpov; roo 5& eitróvros, uh
troueiv. 6 6& uéöluvos róv kéyxpov
karameo &v trouet péqov 3 ot; ; roo
8è hopeſv eitróvros Tov uéðiplvov, Tí
oßv, *@m 6 Závov, oùic ēoti A670s
toū ue^{uvov Tów kéyxpov trpos Tov
éva kal to uvptootbv rod Évés; too
6é píoſavtos éival: tí of v, *@m 6
Zhvov, oi kal Tóv póqov čoovtat
Aó)ot trpos &AAñAous of arrot ; &s
yöp tº hoſpoëvra kal oi ſãºol. Toitov
6è oitos éxoviros, ei 6 p.éöuvos Too
kéyxpov poq’él pophorel kal 6 eis kéy-
xpos kal to uvptootbv roi, kéyxpov.
(The latter also, p. 256 b.) Ac-
cording to this representation we
cannot suppose that this argument
was to be found in Zeno's book;
and its more complete development
in Simplicius may have belonged
to some later philosopher. But its
essential thought is certified by
Aristotle.
620 ZEWO.
prove the second fundamental basis of the system, the
unchangeableness of Being."
1. The first argument is this:—Before the body
that is moved can arrive at the goal, it must first have
arrived at the middle of the course; before it reaches
this point it must have arrived at the middle of the
first half, and previously to that at the middle of the
first quarter, and so ad infinitwºm. Every body, there-
fore, in order to attain to one point from another, must
pass through infinitely many spaces.
cannot be passed through in a given time.
But the infinite
It is con-
sequently impossible to arrive at one point from another,
and motion is impossible.”
2. The so-called Achilles argument is only another
application of this.” The slowest creature, the tortoise,
* Cf. in regard to these, Ger-
ling, De Zen, paralogismis motum
spectant. Marb. 1825; Wellmann's
Zeno's Beweise gegen die Bewegung
wnd ihre Widerlegungen. Frankf.
1870.
* Arist. Phys. vi. 9, 239 b, 9:
Tétrapes 5’ eigh A6 you trepi kluharews
Závayos of trapéxovres tas Švoicoxias
Toſs Ačovorty. Trpºros pièv 6 trepi 105
a?, civeto 6al Stå To Tpórepov eis to
àuta v. Öeiv &quicéo-0at to pepôuevov #
Tpos to TéAos, repl of Stetxopaev čv
Toſs trpórepov Aóyots, especially c.
2, 233 a, 21, where we read: Ötö
kal 6 Závovos A6-yos pejöos Aguſłóvel
Tô u?) évôéxeoróat T & &melpa Stex0eiv
? &pagflat Töv &treſpov ka9 icagºrov
év tretrepaguévº Xpóvg. Simpl. 236
b (cf. 221 a, 302 a). Themistius
gives a shorter and more obscure
comment (Phys. 55 b, 392 sq.): ei
ëati kivmons, &váykm to kivoúuevov
év tretrepaguévy xpóvº &trelpa 5ue-
Čičval toſſ to 38 &6úvatov: oik Špa
éo Tl ictvmoris. 36 sticvv Šē To avvmuſié-
vov (the hypothetical major pre-
miss) éic toi, to kivoúuevov čudorm-
p.d. tu kiveto 6au, travrösöé Ötao Thuaros
ém’ &reupov čvros Stauperod to kivot-
pºevov &váykm to juov trpárov Štea-
0elv of kivetrat Siao Thuaros kal
Tóte to 3Aov. &AA& kai irpo Tod hut-
Gews toū āNov to éketvou jutov, kal
toūTov trgºw To jutorv. ei of v šTelpa
Tö, äuſan Ötö. Tö Tavros roſ, Amdóév-
tos 6vva Töv eival Tô julov Aabetv, T&
ôè &relpa &öövarov čv retrepagpiāvg
xpévº, 5texéeſv, tooto 8& Ös évapyès
éAduSaveu & Zhvaju, &öövatov Špa.
kivmoiv eival. Arist. Top. viii. 8,
156 b, 7, and Sext. Math. x. 47
refer to this proof.
* Favorinus, ap. Diog. ix. 29,
says that Parmenides had already
employed this argument ; but the
statement is certainly false. All
other evidence ascribes it to Zeno.
Diog. l. c. says expressly that it
was discovered by him; and all
AGAINST MOTION. 621
could never be overtaken by the swiftest, Achilles,
if it had once made a step in advance of him. For
in order to overtake the tortoise, Achilles must first
reach the point where the tortoise was when he started;
next the point to which it had progressed in the
interval, then the point which it attained while he
made this second advance, and so on ad infinitwm.
But if it be impossible that the slower should be over-
taken by the swifter, it is, generally speaking, impos-
sible to reach a given end, and motion is impossible."
The whole argument turns, as in the other case, upon
the assertion that a given space cannot be traversed
unless all its parts are traversed; which is not possible,
because there is an infinite number of these parts.” The
only difference is that this assertion is applied in the
first case to a space with fixed boundaries, and in the
second, to a space with movable boundaries.
3. So long as anything remains in one and the
same space, it is at rest. But the flying arrow is at
every moment in the same space. It rests, therefore,
at every moment of its flight: therefore its motion
that we know of Parmenides (cf.
the often quoted passage, Parm.
128 A) proves that he did not ap-
ply himself in this manner to the
dialectical refutation of the ordi-
nary standpoint.
i Arist. l. c. 239 b, 14: Sevrépos
3° 5 caxočaevos 'Axixxets &ott ö’
ošros, 3rt to 8paôörepov oë5érote
karaxmp6%geral 6éov Šro too taxi-
arov. čuirporðev Yap &vaykalov
éx9e?v to 6tókov, 36ev špumore to
qejyov, &ar' &ei ti "poéxeiv čvary-
kalov to 8paôtrepov. Simpl. 237 a,
and Themist. 56 a, explain this in
the sense given in our text.
* As Aristotle rightly observes
in the words: écriri 6é kal oiros &
airbs Aéryos tº 6txotouelv (the
same as the first argument based
upon bi-partition) 8taq’épel à év tá,
6taipeiv whatxa to trpoo Aap gavópe-
wov uéye60s . . . Šv &pſpotépous yap
ovuòaivet pºl &qukveto 6a, trpos to
trépas àtapovaévov tra's roß Meyā-
00vs’ &AA& Tpéokeitat év roërg, &rt
où6è to rdxtortov retpaygömplév-
ov čv rá čudºkeiv To Bpaôtratov.
Similarly, the commentators.
622
ZENO.
during the whole course is only apparent."
This
argument, too, is based on the same process as the two
previous arguments.
In them, the space to be tra-
versed, and here the time of the movement, is resolved
into its minutest parts; and it is shown upon this pre-
supposition, that no motion is thinkable.
The latter
argument is, as Aristotle acknowledges, quite correct.
* Arist. 239 b, 30 : rpſtos 8' 5
vöv fimbels ári i öiorbs ºpepop.évm
ãormicev. Cf. l. 5: Závay 6é trapa-
Aoyiğeral ei yüp &ei, pnaiv, hpspieſ
Tāv # kiveirai, 8tav fi karð to to ov,
ãort 3’ &el to q'epópºevov čv Tó vov,
ākāvmtov rhy pepopuévnveival éiotóv.
For év tá vov &kiv. others read : év
ºrg vov tº Katë to ov &kivmrov.
Gerling, l.c. p. 16, would substi-
tute § kiveirai for 3 kiveirat. I am
inclined to think that the text,
which in its present form presents
many difficulties, and has not
been, to my mind, satisfactorily
explained even by Prantl., origi-
nally ran thus: ei yáp, pnow,
hpepel trav, 3rav fi karū to forov,
ëa ºri 5’ &el to pepópevov čv rô vov
karū to forov, &kivmtov, &c., from
which would result the meaning
given above. Themistius (p. 55 b,
p. 392 Sp.) likewise seems to pre-
suppose this form of the words,
when he paraphrases them thus:
ei yüp hpeueſ, pngly, Śwavra ötav fi
karū to torov airé àidotnua, Šari 5*
&el tº pepôuevovkarð to torov Šavré
6táortmua, āktvmtov čváykm thv čío-
Töv eival thy pepopuévny. Similarly,
p. 56 a, 394 Sp.: áel Rév yöp era-
arov táv kivoupévov čv tº vov to
forov Šavrò catéxei Šidotmua. Aris-
totle's observation against Zeno,
l. c., that his whole argument is
based upon the false theory of time
being compounded of particular
moments (ék Töv vov táv &ötaipé-
tov) is quite in harmony with this.
On the other hand, Simplicius says,
236 b, agreeing with the text of
our MSS. : 68& Zhvavos A6-yos ºrpo-
Aaflöv, 3rt trav Štav fi karū to torov
ěavrá, 3 kiveirat # hpepei, kal &rt
oë6èv év tá vov kiveirau, kal 3rt rô
ºpepäuevov ćel év tá toº airá čart
ka8 Kaorrow vov, Šºšket ouxAoyſge-
orðat oil ros' to pepôuevov 8éAos év.
travrl vov kata to torov šavté, érriv,
&ote kai év travrl Tó xpóvg. To 6&
év tá, vov karð rô to ov Šavrá, by oi
kivetrat, hpepel àpa, Étretół, wºv čv
t& vov kiveiral, to 6é º kivočuevov
àpeptet, Étretóh trav h kueiral à hpe-
pºet. To Špa pepópºevov 8éAos éas
qéperat hpeuet karð irávra row riis
qopas xpóvov. This deduction has
none of the seeming conclusiveness
which we always find in Zeno's
demonstrations. Simplicius, it is
true, deserves attention because he
was acquainted with Zeno's work;
but, on the other hand, we must
not forget the excellent remark of
Schleiermacher (Ueber Anaximan-
dros, Werke 2. Phil. ii. 180) that
Simplicius in the later books of his
work took no account of the sources
he had used in the earlier books.
I agree with Themistius and Sim-
plicius in understanding sival karð.
to foov to mean, “to be in the same
space’ as previously, not to alter
its place.
AGAINST MOTION. 623
•
In the moment as such, no movement, no change
generally speaking, is possible; if I ask where the
flying arrow is at this moment, the answer cannot be
in the transition from the space A to the space B, or in
other words, in A and B; the answer can only be in
the space A. Consequently, if time is conceived as an
infinite series of successive moments, instead of a fixed
quantity, we necessarily get, instead of the transition
from one space to another, merely a successive Being
in separate spaces: and motion is just as impossible as
if (similarly to the first and second of Zeno's argu-
ments) we suppose, instead of the line to be traversed,
an infinite number of successive and separate points."
The argument before us is therefore not so sophistical
as it appears to be ; at any rate it is not more sophisti-
cal than the others. It starts, like them, from the per-
ception of a philosophic problem in which more recent
thinkers have also found considerable difficulties; and it
stands in the same connections with Zemo's general point
of view. If Unity and Multiplicity be once regarded
in the manner of the Eleatics as absolute contradictories
positively excluding one another, separation in time
and space may easily be looked upon as a plurality
devoid of unity; space and time as an aggregation of
separate points of space and time, and a transition from
one of these points to another, a motion,--becomes
impossible.”
1 That this is really the force
of the argument is also implied by
Aristotle, in his short counter-
observation (vide previous note).
2 There is a reference to the
fundamental thought of this argu-
ment in what is quoted as from
Zeno in Diog. ix. 72 (as Kern,
Xenoph. 26, 74, reminds us): rö
kivočuevov oft' év (; āott Tórg, ki-
ve?ral oit’ &v ć whº fort : for that
it cannot move in the space in
|
624 2ENO.
4. The fallacy in the fourth demonstration is more
apparent. This refers to the relation of the time of
movement to the space which has to be traversed.
According to the laws of motion, spaces of equal size
must be traversed in equal time if the speed be equal.
But two bodies of equal size move past one another
twice as fast if they are both moving at equal speed, as
if one of them is still, and the other with the same
motion passes by it. Hence Zeno ventures to conclude
that in order to traverse the same space,—the space
taken up by each of these two bodies, -at the same
speed, only half the time is necessary in the one case
that is necessary in the other.
Consequently, he thinks,
facts here contradict the laws of motion."
which it is, is proved by the obser-
vation that it is in the same space
in every moment.
1 Arist. 239 b, 33: Térapros 6’ 6
trepi Tôv čv rá, a tačíq, kivovuévov č
évavttas to ov tºykov’ trap' to ous, Tów
pey &ro TéAovs roi, oračíov Tów 5’
&Tö uérov (on the meaning of this
expression vide Prantl, in h, l. p.
516) to q, räxel, év (; orvu}atveiv
ofetal, forov eival xpóvov tá 6ttagoríº
Töv jutoruv. čott 6' 6 trapaxoyto ºbs
£y 16 to wºv trapū Rivoſuevov to 8&
trap' hpeuotiv to taov uéyebos &éloïv
ró forg taxel Töv toov böpea9al
xpóvov toàro à éat, theºdos. That
the argument referred to in these
words has the meaning we have
assigned to it is beyond question;
but the manner in which Zeno
more precisely explained it is
doubtful, partly on account of the
uncertainty of the reading, and
partly because of the extreme
brevity of Aristotle's elucidation.
Simplicius seems to me to give the
best text and the truest explana-
tion of it (p. 237 b sq.), and even
Prantl’s view of the passage, in
other respects satisfactory, may
find its completion here. Accord-
ing to Simplicius, Zeno's argument
runs thus : Let there be in the
* D . . . . . . . E
A1 A2 A3 A4
B4 B3 B2 B1
C1 C2 C3 C4
2 A1 A2 A3 A4
B4 B3 B2 B1
C1 C2 C3 C4

space, or in the course, D . . . E,
three equal rows of equal bodies,
A1 . . ., B1 . . ., C1 . . ., as
shown in figure 1. Let the first
row A1, remain still; while the
two others, with equal velocity,
move past it in a parallel and
opposite direction to it and to one
IMPORT OF HIS ARG UMENTS. 625
The falsity of this conclusion strikes us at once; but
we must not therefore suppose that Zeno was not per-
fectly in earnest regarding it. For the whole fallacy
is based upon this: that the space traversed by one
body is measured according to the size of the bodies
which it passes, whether these be in motion or at rest.
That this is not allowable might well, however, escape
the notice of the first philosopher who studied the laws
of motion generally ; especially if, like Zeno, he were
convinced, to start with, that his enquiry would result
in contradictions. Similar paralogisms have been over-
looked even by modern philosophers in their polemic
against empirical conceptions.
This is not the place to criticise the scientific value
of Zeno's demonstrations, the censures of Aristotle in
regard to them, or the judgments passed by the
moderns' on both. Whatever the absolute worth of
these arguments may be, their historical importance
is, in any case, not to be underrated. On the one hand,
another. C1 will arrive at Al
and B4 at the same moment that
B1 has arrived at A4 and C4 (vide
figure 2). B1 has, therefore, passed
all the Cs, and Cl all the BS in
the same time that each of them
passed the half of the As. Or, as
Zeno seems to have expressed it,
C1 has passed all the Bs in the
same time, in which B1 has passed
half of the As; and B1 has passed
all the Cs in the same time in which
C1 has passed half of the As. But
the row A takes up the same space
as each of the other two rows.
The time in which C1 has passed
through the whole space of the
row A, is consequently the same as
WOL. I.
that in which B1, with equal ve-
locity, has passed through the half
of this space, and vice versá. But
since the velocities being equal, the
times of movement are to one
another as the spaces traversed,
the latter time can be only half as
great as the former ; the whole
time, therefore, is equal to the half.
E.g. Bayle, Bict. Zénon d'Elée
Rem. F.; Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. i.
290 Herbart, Metaphysik,
ii. § 284 sq.; Lehrb. 2. Einl. in d.
Phil. § 139; Strümpell, Gesch, d.
theoret. Phil. b. d. Gr. 53 sq.;
Cousin, Zénon d'Elée Fragm. Phil.
i. 65 sqq.; Gerling, l. c.; and
Wellmann, l. c. 12 sq., and 20 sq.
S S
626
ZENO.
the opposition of the Eleatic doctrine to the ordinary
point of view attains in them its climax; multiplicity
and change are not opposed by Zeno as by Parmenides
with general arguments which might be met by other
general propositions; their impossibility is proved by
these notions themselves; and thus any impression
which might still be left by the exposition of Parme-
nides that side by side with the One Being the many
and the variable may still somehow find place, is en-
tirely done away."
* Cousin, indeed, says exactly
the contrary (l.c., cf. especially p.
65, 70 sqq.) when he maintains
that Zeno meant to dispute not
multiplicity in general, but only
multiplicity devoid of all unity.
But of such a limitation there is
no trace either in Zeno's arguments.
or in the introduction to Plato's
Parmenides. His arguments are
directed quite universally against
the notion of plurality, of motion,
&c., and if, for the purpose of
confuting these notions, pure
separation without continuity, pure
multiplicity without unity, is pre-
supposed, this pre-supposition is
not the point which is attacked, but
the point from which the attack
starts. If plurality generally be
assumed, Zeno thinks the theory
must necessarily lead to the can-
celling of unity, and to contradic-
tions of all kinds; he does not
mean, as Cousin asserts, if a
plurality devoid of all unity be
assumed, no motion, &c., would be
possible. If such had been Zeno's
opinion, he must before all things
have discriminated the plurality
devoid of unity from the plurality
limited by unity. But it is the
unavoidable consequence of the
On the other hand, however, pro-
Eleatic standpoint, that he did not,
and cannot, do this. Unity and
plurality, persistence of Being and
motion, stand, with the Eleatics,
wholly in opposition. Plato first
recognised that these apparently
opposite determinations could be
united, and must be united, in one
and the same subject; and in the
Sophist and Parmenides he argues
this expressly as against the
Eleatic doctrine. Zeno is so far
from a similar conviction that his
arguments are all directed pre-
cisely to the opposite end, to do
away with the confused uncertainty
of the ordinary notion which re-
presents the One as many, and
Being as becoming and variable.
Plurality devoid of unity was
maintained in his time by Leucip-
pus (only, however, in a limited
sense)—but Zeno never alludes to
Leucippus. Heracleitus, whom
Cousin regards as the chief object
of Zeno's attacks, but to whom I
can find no reference in his writ-
ings, is so far from maintaining
plurality without unity that he
emphatically asserts the unity of
all Being. Cousin is, therefore,
wrong in his censure of Aristotle,
l. c., p. 80:-Aristote accuse Zénon
MELISSUS. 627
blems were thus proposed to philosophy in regard to the
explanation of phenomena, the consideration of which
it has never since been able to evade. The apparent
insolubility of these problems afforded welcome support
to the Sophists in their denial of knowledge; but they
afterwards gave a lasting impulse to the most search-
ing enquiries of Plato and Aristotle, and even modern
metaphysics has constantly been forced to return again
and again to the questions first brought under discussion
by Zeno. However unsatisfactory for us may be the
immediate result of his Dialectic, it has therefore been
of the highest importance to science.
V. MELJSSU.S.
MELISSUs resembles Zeno in his attempt to defend
the doctrine of Parmenides against ordinary opinion.
While, however, Zeno had sought to effect this in-
directly by the refutation of the usual theories, and had
thus strained to the utmost the opposition of the two
points of view, Melissus' seeks to show in a direct
de mal raisonner, et lui-même me adversaries' standpoint. This is
raisonne guères mieua et n'est pas
ea empt de paralogisme: car Ses
réponses impliquent toujours l'idée
de l'unité, quand l'argumentation
de Zénon repose sur l'hypothèse ea:-
clusive de la pluralité. It is pre-
cisely the exclusiveness of this pre-
supposition, which Aristotle, with
perfect justice, assails. Like Cousin,
Grote, Plato, i. 103 (who more-
over has misunderstood the pre-
ceding remarks), believes that Zeno
admitted the pre-supposition of
plurality without unity, not in his
own name, but merely from his
in a certain sense true. He desires
to refute his adversaries by draw-
ing contradictory inferences from
their presuppositions. But the
middle terms, which he employs
for this purpose, belong not to
them, but to himself. Their con-
tention is merely: there is a
plurality—a motion; he seeks to
prove that the Many, the Many
being assumed, must consist of
infinitely many parts, and that in
motion, an infinite number of
spaces must be traversed, &c.
| Of the life of Melissus we
s s 2
628
MELISS U.S.
manner that Being can be conceived only as Parme-
mides defined its concept ; and as this direct proof in
order to convince an adversary must be deduced from
pre-suppositions common to both sides, he tries to find
in the representatives of the ordinary mode of thought
points of union with the Eleatic doctrine."
But for
this reason he cannot entirely avoid admitting into the
Eleatic doctrine definitions which imperil its purity.
know little. His father was called
Ithagenes, his native place Wà,S
Samos (Diog. ix. 24). Diogenes,
l. c. (cf. AElian, v. 4, vii. 14) de-
scribes him as a statesman of note,
who had especially distinguished
himself as a navarch. This
elucidates Plutarch's distinct and
reiterated assertion (Pericl. c. 26;
Themist. c. 2, here with an appeal
to Aristotle; Adv. Col. 32, 6, p.
1126; cf. Suid. Méxitos Adpov),
which there is not the slightest
reason to disbelieve, that Melissus
commanded the Samian fleet in the
victory over the Athenians, 442 B C.
(Thuc. i. 117). On this circumstance
is probably founded Apollodorus's
calculation, ap. Diog. l. c., which
places the prime of Melissus in Ol.
84 (444–440 B.C.). He was, con-
sequently, a contemporary, most
likely a younger contemporary, of
Zeno. His doctrine of the unity
and invariability of Being is al-
luded to by the Pseudo-Hippo-
crates (Polybus) De Nat. Hom. c.
1; end vi. 34 ; Littré. Parme-
nides was possibly the teacher of
Melissus, as well as of Zeno; but
this is not established by Diog. l.c.;
Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. iv. 8, p. 57.
The other statements of Diogenes
that Melissus was acquainted with
Heracleitus does not seem abso-
lutely impossible; but he adds that
the Ephesians had their attention
first drawn to their fellow citizen
through his means, which is most
improbable. A treatise of Me-
lissus, doubtless his only work, is
mentioned by Simpl. Phys. 22 b,
simply as to a tºyypapua. Suidas
sub voce Méxmtos calls it repl
toū āuros, Galen, Ad. Hippocr. De
Naț. Hom. i. p. 5; De Elem. Sec.
Hipp. i. 9, p. 487, Kühn; Simpl.
De Caºlo, 249 b, 23; Schol. in Arist.
509 a, 38: Trepl púgeos; Simpl. De
Celo, 249 b, 42; Phys. 15 b : tr.
qāorea's h tr. too Švros ; from the
last passage, Bessarion. Adv. cal.
Plat. ii. 11, seems to have invented
this statement, cf. p. 542, 2. The
somewhat important fragments
contained in Simplicius have been
collected and commented on by
Brandis, Comm. El. 185 sqq.; Mul-
lach. Arist. De Mel. &c. p. 80 sqq.;
Fragm. Phil. i. 259 sqq.
* Simpl. l. c. : toſs yúp rôv
‘puquiców &étéugot Xpma'duevos 6 Mé-
Atagos trept yewéoews kal (p60pās
*pxeral too ovyypáupata's otºrws.
Cf. in Fr. 1, the words ovyxopéeral
'yāp kai tooto Örö rôv purików. The
ical tooto shows that Melissus had
already appealed in the context to
the assent of the physicists.
JBEING. 629
All that has been transmitted to us of Melissus’
doctrine of Being may be reduced to the four deter-
minations of its eternity, its infinity, its unity, and its
invariability.
That which is, is underived and imperishable. For,
were it derived, it must have come either from Being
or from non-Being. Now that which arises from Being
is not derived, but has existed previously; and from
non-Being nothing can be derived; least of all Being
in the absolute sense." Similarly, if it passed away,
it must be resolved either into something existent or
something non-existent; but Being cannot become non-
existent, as all admit ; and if it passed over into a
Being, it could not be said to perish.”
If Being is eternal, it must also, Melissus thinks,
“otre ék uh éðvros oiáv re yi-
ven 6aſ ru, oùre &AAo uèv oëbèv éov
(this is of course intended by Me-
lissus in a purely hypothetical man-
ner, in the sense of ordinary opin-
jon), troXA@ 8& HäAAov to &m A^s éðv.”
* Mel. Fr. 1, ap. Simpl. l. c.
The conclusion of the Fragment is
as follows: ošre pôaphoretal to éóv.
oùre yūp és to pººl éöv of v Te Tb éov
peraßd AAeuv' avyxopéetal yöp kal
rotºro Širo róv puorukóv. oite és
éóv. p.évol yèp &v trgxiu oita, ye kai
où p6eſpotto. oire épa yé yove To
éov otre (p6aphoretal. aiel Špa fiv
re kai čo rai. The first part of the
above argument is given in the
Treatise, De Melisso, c 1, sub init.,
in a somewhat more extended
form : āţătov sivaí braſiv et ri éa riv,
etirep whºvöéxeoréal 'yevéo 6al uměčv
gic uměevás' e?ve yūp &mavra yé yovey
ełre pººl ºrdvra, beiv &uqotépos é;
oùöevös yewéorðat &vain &v yi-yvápleva
(before yºyvöueva, tà ought prob-
ably, as Brandis thinks, to be
inserted: vide Mullach in h. l.)
âtrávrov re yūp yuyvouévov oièëv
trpoiſtrópxelv. ei 3’ &vrov rivāv &el
érepa Trpoo’yſºyvouro, TAéov &v kal
peſ(ov to £v yeyovévai’ & 6), traéov
kal ue^{ov, Tooro yewéorðat &v é;
où6evös' of y&p év tá, éAdºrrovi T
traéov, où6' év tá ulicporépº ro
uéſgow inrápxeiv. This addition
probably is taken from a later
portion of the work, which, accord-
ing to the excellent remark of
Prandis (Comm. 186), seems to
have presented the main ideas and
course of the argument, and then
to have developed particular parts
more accurately. The small Frag-
ment 6, agreeing with a portion
of Fr. 1, belonged probably to the
same later section. It is clear from
p. 585, 3, that in the above doc-
trines, Melissus was closely allied
to Parmenides.
630
MELISSU.S.
be infinite, for what has not been derived and does not
pass away, has neither beginning nor end; and what has
neither beginning nor end, is infinite." This definition,
in which Melissus diverges from Parmenides, has drawn
down upon him the severe censure of Aristotle,” and it
* Fr. 2: &AA' étrető rö 'yev6-
Revov &px?iv čxel, rö uh yewówevov
&px?iv obit #xet, to 6’ 63v oë yé yove,
oök &v éxot &pxñv. čari 8& rô p6elpó-
pºevov rexeutºv čxei, ei 6é rí Čati
àq6aptov, TeXeurºv oik #xel, to €ov
âpa &q6aptov čov TeXevthy ošic xel'
to 6* ſuffre &px?iv čxov uſite Texev-
Thy &melpov rvyxãvel éóv' &ceipov
#pa to éðv. Similarly in Fr. 7, the
conclusion of which, où Yùp aiei
eival &vvorov 8 ru uh trav čott, only
asserts this: if Being were limited
in point of magnitude, it could not
be eternal: but to explain why it
could not, Melissus seems to have
given no other reason than that
already quoted, viz. that the eternal
must be unlimited, because it could
not otherwise be without beginning
or end. Fr. 8 and 9 are apparently
small portions of the same more
complete discussion, to which Fr.
7 belonged. Fr. 8 seems to me to
contain the opening words of the
discussion ; this Fragment ought
properly therefore to be placed
before Fr. 7. Aristotle who fre-
quently refers to this demonstra-
tion of Melissus expresses himself
in regard to it as if he considered
the words étrelë—éxel as the pro-
tasis, and the following words:
rô ah—oëk éxel as the apodosis.
Cf. Soph. E. c. 5, 167 b, 13: otov
6 Mexico'ou A6).os 3rt &repov to
Tāv, Aagöv to pièv Šmav čyévmtov
(ék yöp uh &vros ow8&v &v yewégéal),
Tô 5& yewówevov ć &pxãs yewéobar
ei u% of v yé yovey, &px?iv obic ēxel
[—eiv) to trav, 30t’ &neupov. oint
āvāykm 6% rotiro oup8afvetv' oi, yāp
(for it does not follow that) ei ºrb
ºyevówevov štav &px?iv čxel, ital et ri
āpx?iv čxel yé yover. So c. 28, 181
a, 27: Phys. i. 3, 186 a. 10: 3ri
Aév oëv trapaxo'yſgeral MéAtooros
87Aov' offeral yèp sixmpéval, ei Tô
'yevöue ov čxel àpx?iv &mav, &rt kal
Tö u% yevöpievov oil, éxel. So Eu-
demus, ap. Simpl. Phys. 23 a oë
'yap, ei Tô yevöuevovápxhv čxel, to uh
'yevópevov &px?iv oëk #xel, MaxAov 6&
To pººl #xov &px?iv oin éyévero.
There can be no doubt, and the
parallelism of the next proposition
(éri 3& Tô pöelp etc.) proves it—
that the words Tö pah Yi'y. etc., be-
long to the protasis: “As the Be-
come has a beginning and the
Unbecome none,' etc. Aristotle,
therefore, has either been guilty of
a wrong construction, or he has
presupposed that Melissus con-
cluded that the Unbecome had no
beginning, from the fact that
everything Become has a beginning.
On the other hand, what is said in
Arist. Soph. El. c. 6, 168 b, 35:
às év tá, Mexforgov Aóryg rö airto
Aapſ3ável Tô yeyovéval Ital &px?iv
éxeiv, and also in the treatise, De
Melisso, l. c., agrees with the phi-
losopher's own utterances. The
passages in recent authors in re-
gard to this theory of Melissus
are to be found in Brandis, Comm.
El. 200 sq.
* Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 25: oërol
pºv of v . . . & peréol trpès rºw vºv
BEING. 63}
is evident that it approved itself to Aristotle neither
in itself nor in regard to the arguments on which it is
based. In these, the confusion between infinity in time,
and infinity in space, is apparent. Melissus has proved
that Being must be according to time without begin-
ning or end; and he concludes from thence, that it can
have no limits in space. That this is the sense he gives
to the infinity of Being there can be no doubt." He
supports his statement, however, by the further observa-
tion that Being can only be limited by the void, and
as there is no void, it must be unlimited.” But if
the limited extension which Parmenides attributes to
Being was hard to reconcile with its indivisibility, this
unlimited extension is much harder. Although, there-
fore, Melissus expressly guards himself against the
corporeality of Being,” yet the observation of Aristotle'
that he seems to conceive it as material, is not alto-
gether unjust. We may rather suppose that the Ionian
physics, in spite of his hostility to them, had had some
influence on Melissus, and had given rise to this theory
trapova'av Čármolu, oi uév 600 kal
tráutraw ös Švres ukpov &ypotkóTepot,
Eevoqāvms kal MéAuoroos. Phys. i.
3, sub init. : &piq6tspol yèp épio'Turcós
ovXAoyſ; ovrai, kal MéAtooros ſcal
IIappeviðms' kal yèp ſevöſ, Aap,84-
vovoru kal &avAAórylato! eigtv airóv of
Aó-You. MāAAov 6' 6 Mexico'ov popti-
kös kal oil, éxov &tropiav (he con-
tains nothing difficult, he bases
his doctrines on nothing that really
requires consideration, and he is,
therefore, easy to refute), &AA’ vbs
ărătrov 309&vros rāAAa orvuòaivet'
rooro 6' oi6&v xańetróv.
1 This is clear from Fr. 8: &AA’
&airep £ortl aiel, oita kai to Héya-
60s &neupov aiel xpi elvat, and from
the express and repeated assertions
of Aristotle (vide inf. p. 632, 2, and
Metaph. i. 5, 986 b, 18; Phys. i.
2, 185 a, 32 b, 16 sqq.).
* Wide inf. p. 632, 2.
* Fr. 16: ei ºv čáv čott, 6e?
aúrò &v eival’ ev Šē éöv Šeſ airb
oëua uh éxeuv' si èë Éxot tróxos,
éxoi &v uápia ital oilcéri àv eſſm év.
* Metaph. l. c. vide Sup. p. 548,
1. In criticising this passage, it
should be remembered that the
concept iſ \m is with Aristotle wider
than that of orápa, cf. Part ii. b,
243 sq., second edition.
632 MELISS U.S.
of his, which did not accord with the Eleatic doctrine
of the unity of Being.
It is true that our philosopher directly infers the
unity of Being from its unlimitedness. If there were
several Beings, he says, they would necessarily all be
limited in regard to each other; if Being is unlimited,
it is also one." In his opinion multiplicity also is in
itself inconceivable. For in order to be many, things
must be separated by the void; but there cannot be a
void, for the void would be mothing else than non-
Being. Even if we suppose that the parts of matter
directly touch one another, without having anything
between them, the argument gains nothing. For if
matter were divided at all points and there were con-
sequently no unity, there could also be no multiplicity,
all would be empty space; if, on the other hand, matter
were only divided at certain points, there is no reason
why it should not everywhere be so.
Finally, Melissus also attains
fore, be divided at all.”
Fr. 3: ei 83 &teipov, v' ei y&p
Šáo sºm, oùk &v jūvairo & reſpa sival
&AA’ #x01 &v Trépata trpos &AAmAa:
&reipov. 5% to éðv, oùk Špa TAéw Tö.
éávra ev Špa to éðv. Fr. 10: ei
phév et m, trepavée, trpos &\Ao. Arist.
De Melvsso, i. 974 a, 9.
* Arist. Gen. et Corr. i. 8,
325 a, 2 : évíois yap rôv àpxaſov
ëöoče to by é; āvāykms &v eiva, kal
&rcívmtov" To uéy y&p kevöv oër by,
kivmºval 6' oir àv Šávaoréau whivros
kevoo kexaplowévov, oiâ’ at troAA&
eival whivros roß Stelp yovros. rotto
6' oiáčv Staq’épetv, et Tis offeral mº,
avvex's sival ºrb trav &AA’ &m reordat
Simpmuévov, roi; pgval troAA& kal uh
ev elva. Kal keväv. ei uév Yêp tróvrn
It cannot, there-
5ualperov, où0&y eival ev, &are othè
woxXà (similarly Zeno, sup. p. 615,1)
&AA& kevöv to 3xov ei 8& Tà uèv Tij
6% uh, tre+rxaguévº Tuvl root’ ot-
kéval' Méxpt tróorov Yap ſcal Stå Tí rô
pºv oitos éxei Too $Aov Ital mºmpés
éoºrt, rö 8& 6 ppmuévov; &ri Špiota's
ºpdvai &vaykaiou pº sival rivnoiv. čk
pºv obv roërav Tów A6-yop, Örep8&v-
res thv aforémoiv ral rapióðvres
aúthy &s ré, A6).4, 8 ov &ncoxov6eiv,
ev kal &kſwmtov to trav elvaí page
kal &me pov čvuot to yiep Trépas we-
patvely &v rpès rê Revöv. That
Aristotle in this exposition is
thinking chiefly of Melissus, and
not (as Philop. in h. l. p. 36 a,
supposes, probably from his own
JBEING.
633
the same result in the following manner.
If the so-
called many things really were what they seem to us,
they could never cease to be so.
Since our perception
shows us change and decease, it refutes itself, and con-
sequently deserves no faith in regard to what it says
about the multiplicity of things."
conjecture) of Parmenides, seems
most likely for the following rea-
sons: 1. The last proposition un-
mistakeably refers to the doctrine
of Melissus on the unlimitedness
of Being. 2. What is here said
about motion agrees with what will
presently be quoted (p. 635. 1) from
Melissus' writings. 3. This whole
argument turns upon the theory of
empty space, which Parmenides in-
deed rejected, but to which neither
he nor Zeno, as far as we know,
attributed so much importance for
the criticism of the ordinary point
of view. How little ground there
is for the assertion of Philoponus
we see from the fact that, though
he recognises the relation of the
foregoing demonstration to the
Atomistic philosophy, this does not
prevent his ascribing it to Parme-
nides: Tooro Sé &vaipóv 6 IIappevſöms
qmolu, 3ri Tô oišta’s irroríðeo Bat ow8&v
ôuaq'épet too &Touc, kal Revöveia (pépeiv.
• Fr. 17 (ap. Simpl. De Coelo,
250 a, f : Schol. in Arist. 509 b, 18.
partly also Aristockes ap. Eus. Pr.
Ev. xiv. 17. I here follow Mul-
lach): uéytotov učv čv or muetov oiros
6 Aó)os, Šti čv uóvov čari. &rèp
kai réðe a muera si yüp fiv woxxâ,
Totaúra xpmy air& eival, oiów rep yd3
qºnut To eveival. ei yüp ort yū ka?
iſãop nal oríðmpos real xpvabs kal trip
kai to uév (wov to 8& Teóvmkos cal
AuéAav kal Aevkov kai Tà &AAa trávra.
ãoro'a oi äv6potrot page sival &Am0éa.
ei ö, raûra éoºri kal juées àp0ós
This remark, how-
épéoptev kal &kočouev, eival Xph ºrca-
arov Totodrov, oióv rep Tö tipórov
ëö0ćev juïv, kal whaeratrítrew uměč
'ylver6at étépolov, &AA’ aiei eivat
#kagrov oiáv Trep &otiv. vov 6é (pauev
ôp66s 6pfiv Kal & coiſeu, kal avvuévai’
Šokéet 68 juïv Tó Te 6epubv ºvXpov
'ytved'6at kal to juxpov 6epuby Kal to
orkampov wax0aköv kal rô wax0akov
orkXmpov, ital rô (obv &roëwho sely
kal éic u} @vros yívea 6at, Kai Tatra.
trövta étepowworéal. Kal & Ti ſãv Te
kai & vov čoºri oiâév Šplotoy eival,
&AA’ & ‘re giàmpos okxmpos éðy tº
ãaicrúAq, karatp:Beo'6ai époi Béat,
(so the editions read, Mullach con-
jectures épcot, €62, or preferably
étrapmpdºs; Bergk, De Xen. 30,
ôpovpéov; but none of these amend-
ments satisfy me; perhaps there
may be an io9 in the Öuoß): kai
Xpvoº's kal &XXo 6 ru io'Xupěv Šokées
eival Tráv, é, íðatós re y?, kal Xí60:
'ytved 6al, Šote a vuògive pºſite épfiv
pºſite Tá čávt a yupdgkeiv. oi, Toívvy
Taota &XXàAois àu.0x0)ée" papaévois
'yap sivat troXA& &#6ta (? perhaps we
should read aiel) kaleiðed re kal ioxby
ëxovira trávta érepołowo 9as juiv 80icée.
kal pretatrírrely €x row ékáators
Öpeopévov. 37Aov totvvv 8th eiº &p6ós
épéouev, où8& éketva troAA& 6p6&s
Šokée, eivat. oi, Yêp &v were trante ei
&Am6éa ºv, &AA’ ºv, oidu wep Šâânces
exagºrov, rotoirov' rot, yūp éévros
&Amélyot, repégorov oãév. 3), 6% aera-
tréan. To uév čov & réAeto, to 6% oilk
éov yeyove. oëTws &v ei troXAö ºw
rotatº a Xpſy elval oióv rep to $v.
634 MELISSU.S.
ever, which he himself designates merely as a secondary
proof, encroaches on the ground which Melissus had
already occupied in his polemic against the possibility
of motion and variability in general.
Being cannot move, it can experience no increase,
no change of its condition, no pain; for every move-
ment is a transition to another, a cessation of the old and
the arising of something new. But Being is One, and
there is mone besides; it is eternal, so that it neither
ceases nor arises; it is necessarily, therefore, changeless,
and always like itself; for all change, even the slowest,
must in time lead to an entire cessation of that which
changes." In regard to motion in the narrower sense—
motion in space,—this, Melissus thinks, cannot be con-
ceived without the theory of an empty space. For if a
thing has to move to another place, this place must be
1 Fr. 4: &AA& why ei čv, kal
&ktvmtov" to Yap Év čov čuoſov aiei
£aijró' to 5& àuotov oit’ &v &róAotro,
oùt’ &v uéov yivotto, otte ustakoo-
puéotro, oùre àAyéot, oùre àvićto. ei
‘Yáp tº roſtav ráozot oilk &v év eſſm.
To yūp jvruvaoüy rivnow kiveóuevov
#ic rivos kai és àrepôv Ti pºeta}d^Aet.
oëbèv 8& fiv čtepov trapö. Tö éöv, oëk
&pa rooro kivſio’etat. So Fr. 11 (ap.
Simpl. Phys. 24 a, u; cf. De Coelo,
52 b, 20; Schol. 475 a, 7), with
the corresponding proof: el yèp
Tu Toºray tréaxot, oùk &v ér evetm.
ei yüp Tepotatºral, &váykm rb éov uh
6|aoſov eival, &AA’ &róAAvoróat to
ºrpāq-6ew ébv, to 68 oëk ébu Yívea 6ai.
ei Toivvy rptopuptotori &reat érepozov
7tvouro to trav, ÜAotto èv év tá,
Travrl Xpéve. Fr. 12 then shows
the same in regard to the wetaké-
opºmoris, by which we are to under-
stand each previous change in the
condition of a thing; the words
are: &AA’ oièë uérakoopméïval &vv-
orrávº 6 y&p kóouos (the whole, which
is founded upon a definite arrange-
ment of its parts, the complex) {
trpégéew éðv oix &tróAAvrat, oùre à
an éðv yiveral, etc. Fr. 13 adds to
this what seems to us the very su-
perfluous argument that Being can-
not experience pain or grief, for
what is subject to pain cannot be
eternal, or equal in power to the
healthy, and must necessarily
change, since pain is partly the con-
sequence of some change, and partly
the cessation of health and the
arising of sickness. Evidence at
third hand for the immobility of
matter as held by Melissus (cf.
Arist. Phys. i. 2, sub init. ; Me-
taph. i. 5, 986 b, 10 sqq.) it is
needless to quote.
JBEING, 635
empty in order to receive it. If, on the other hand, it
withdraws into itself, it must become denser than it was
previously, that is to say, it must become less empty,
for rarer means that which contains more empty space,
denser that which contains less. Every movement
presupposes a void; that which can receive another
into itself is void ; that which cannot receive another
is full; that which moves can only do so in the void.
But the void would be the non-existent, and the mom-
existent does not exist. Consequently there is no void,
and therefore no motion. Or, in other words, Being
can move itself neither in Being (that which is full),
for there is no Being besides itself; nor in non-Being
(that which is empty), for non-Being does not exist."
Melissus also expressly shows, as a result of the denial
of multiplicity and motion, that no division of Being
or mixture of substances is possible.” He was, no doubt,
1 Fr. 5: kal kar’ &AAov 5& Tpó-
Troy oi,6&v kevedv čart rod Édvros' Tö
7&p keveev oë9év éori oilk &v &vein
Tó ye uměév. oi klvéeral &v Tö éóv.
itroxophoral yèp ović Šxel oióawn
keveeſ, wheóvros. &AA’ oiáč Šs éovto
orvoraxfivat Suvaróv eim yap &v ośra's
ăpatórepov štovtov cal trvicvárepov.
toūto 6é &öövarov. To yap &patów
&öðvatov Šuota's eival trà?ipes Tó Tru-
kvá, &AA' #öm Tööpatóvºys keved tepov
'ytveral rod Turvoi Tô 5* Revelov oëk
fort. ei 5& TAfipés éati to éov h uh,
kpively xp}. Tá čo 6éxerflat Ti airò
&AAo huñ' ei'yöp pºi éorèéxeral, TX?-
pes, ei 5& éorèéxoltó ru, où TAñpes.
ei čv éorri pºh Revečv, &váykm trañpes
eival. ei 5& Tobro, whº kivéea 6al oix
3rt uh 5vvaröv Ště, trafipeos civéeorðal,
às émil rôv orwudºrww Aéyouer, &AA’
ôrt trav Tó éöv otte és éðv čávarai
kivéeorðal, oi, Y&p £ati r1 trap' airb,
oùre és to pººl éöv, où y&p éott rô pº
éðv. So Fr. 14, in part word for
word. From this and the foregoing
passages is taken the extract, De
Melisso, c. 1, 974 a, 12 sqq., where
the doctrine is specially insisted
on, which Melissus himself advances
in Fr. 4, 11, and which, as it would
appear, he has expressly demon-
strated in a previous passage : that
Being as One is Šplotov rávrm.
Aristotle refers to these same expo-
sitions, Phys. iv. 6, 213 b, 12: Mé-
Auororos ułv oſſu Rai Šetkvvoruv Štt to
Tāv &ktvarov čk Toºrov (from the
impossibility of motion without
empty space) si y&privãoetal, &váy-
km eival (4 mal) kevöv, to 68 revov
où rév távrov.
* Wide, in regard to the mixture,
636 MELISSU.S.
led to this by the doctrine of Empedocles, for Empe-
docles thought he could escape the Eleatic objections
to the possibility of Becoming, by reducing genera-
tion and destruction to mixture and separation. He
may, however, have been referring likewise to Anaxa-
goras if he were acquainted with the writing of that
philosopher. In his arguments against motion, the
proposition that all motion presupposes a void, and
that the void would be non-Being, clearly betrays a
knowledge of the Atomistic doctrine. For it is not
likely that the Atomists borrowed this, their funda-
mental theory, from Melissus (vide infra). On the
other hand, the remark about rarefaction and conden-
sation points to the school of Anaximenes. From this
it is clear that Melissus occupied himself to a consider-
able extent with the doctrines of the physicists.
On the whole, with the exception of the statement
that the One is unlimited, we find that our philosopher
adhered strictly to the doctrine of Parmenides. This
doctrine, however, was not developed further by him,
and though he undertook to defend it against the
physicists, his arguments are unmistakeably inferior to
those of Zeno in acuteness. But they are not wholly
valueless; his observations especially concerning motion
and change give evidence of thought, and bring out
real difficulties. Besides Parmenides and Zeno, he
appears only as a philosopher of the second rank, but
still, considering his date, as a meritorious thinker.
It is obvious that he also agreed with the above-
the extract, De Melisso, l. c. 3, 24 Suffpmra, rb éov, rivéeral, kiveóuevov
$qq.; on the division, Fr. 15: ei Šč oik &v eſſm Šua.
BEING, 637
mentioned philosophers in rejecting the testimony of the
senses, inasmuch as they delude us with the appearance
of multiplicity and change; he probably attempted no
thorough investigation of the faculty of cognition, and
nothing of this kind has been attributed to him.
Some of the ancients ascribe to Melissus physical
propositions. According to Philoponus, he first, like
Parmenides, treated of the right view, or the unity
of all Being ; then of the motions of mankind, and in
his third section he named fire and water as the primi-
tive substances.” Stobaeus ascribes to him, in common
with Zeno, the Empedoclean doctrine of the four ele-
ments and of the two moving forces; and that in a
sense which at once suggests a later origin.” Stobaeus
also says that he maintained the All to be unlimited,
and the world to be limited.* Epiphanius represents
him as having taught that nothing is of a permanent
nature, but all is transient.” These statements, how-
ever, are exceedingly suspicious; first because Aristotle
expressly mentions as characteristic, of Parmenides, in
contradistinction from Xenophanes and Melissus, that
side by side with Being he enquired into the causes of
phenomena; " and secondly, because they are indivi-
* Fr. 17 (sup. p. 633, 1); Arist.
Gen. et Corr. i. 8; sup. p. 632, 2;
De Melisso, c. 1, 974 b, 2.; Aristocl.
ap. Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1 ; cf.
p. 591, 1.
* Phys. B, 6: 6 Méx. év toſs
mpos &A#6elav čv elval Aéywv to by
év roſs trpos Sáčaw öö0 pmolveſval
T&s àpxès rêv čvrov, trop kai
iſãwp.
* Sup. p. 611, 2.
* Ecl. i. 440: Aloyévns kal Mé-
Algoros to uèv trav Štreipov, Tov 6&
kóouov retrepaguévov.
* Erp. Fid. 1087 D.
* Metaph. i. 5, according to the
quotation on p. 626, 1: IIapaevſöns
8è uáAAov 8Aérov čolké Tov Aéyeiv.
Tapi, Yêp to by, etc. (Wide sup. p.
º f 593, 1 ; cf. also c. 4, 984
, 1.
(3:38 THE EI, EATIC PHILOSOPHY.
dually so untrustworthy; we may, therefore, unhesi-
tatingly set them aside. Another statement, that
Melissus avoided all mention of the gods, because we
can know nothing about them,--sounds more probable; *
but here again the evidence is inadequate. If Melissus
really expressed himself thus, he no doubt intended,
not to assert his philosophical conviction of the un-
knowableness of the Divine—which he must have be-
lieved himself to have known in his doctrine of Being,
—but like Plato, in the Timaeus (40 D), to avoid any
dangerous expression concerning the relation of his own
theory to the popular faith.
VI. HISTORICAL POSITION AND CHARACTER OF THE
ELEATIC SCHOOL.
ZENO and Melissus are the last of the Eleatic philo-
sophers of whom we know any particulars. Soon after
them, the school as such appears to have died out ; *
* This has already been shown,
p. 612, in regard to the statement
of Stobaeus, i. 60. The second pas-
sage in Stobaeus attributes to Me-
lissus a definition, for which there
is no foundation whatever in his
system, and which was first intro-
duced by the Stoics (Partiii. a, 174.
1). As Melissus is here named with
Diogenes, we might conjecture that
the statement perhaps arose from
Diogenes the Stoic, in some passage
where he brought forward this doc-
trine, having mentioned the defini-
tion of Melissus and explained it in
the spirit of his school. As regards
Philoponus, he is very untrust-
worthy in respect to the most an-
cient philosophers. In the present,
instance the titles themselves, rà
trpès &Aftóelav, rà rpbs 66tav, prove
that there is a confusion with Par-
menides. The statement of Epi-
phanius is perhaps founded on a
misapprehension of the discussion
quoted p. 632, 2, or perhaps on
some confusion with another philo-
sopher.
* Diog. ix. 24.
* Plato indeed in the introduc-
tion to the Parmenides names a
certain Pythodorus as the disciple
and friend of Zeno; and in the,
Soph. 216 A, 242 D (sup. p. 562, 1}
he speaks of the Eleatic school as
if it were still in existence at the
supposed date of this dialogue, the
latest years of Socrates. Little,
ITS CHARACTER AND POSITION. 639
and what remained of it was lost in Sophistic,” for
which Zeno had already prepared the way, and sub-
sequently through the instrumentality of Sophistic, in
the Socratico-Megarian philosophy. Partly in this
indirect manner, and partly directly, through the
writings of Parmenides and Zeno, the Eleatic School
furnished its quota to the Platonic philosophy of the
concept, and afterwards to the Aristotelian physics and
metaphysics. But previously to this, it had considerably
influenced the development of the pre-Socratic philo-
sophy of nature. Heracleitus seems to have received
impulses, not merely from the Ionians, but also from
Xenophanes; in Empedocles, the Atomists, and Anaxa-
goras, the connection with Parmenides asserts itself
more definitely. All these philosophers pre-suppose the
concept of Being which Parmenides had introduced;
they all admit that the Real is, in the last resort,
etermal and imperishable ; they all deny, for this reason,
its qualitative change, and they are thus forced into
the theory of a multiplicity of unchangeable primitive
substances, and into that mechanical direction which
thenceforward for a long period was predominant in
physics. The conception of the element and the atom,

however, can be inferred from this,
as Plato may have been led to
represent the matter thus from the
form of dialogue which he is using.
Another philosopher, Xeniades of
Corinth, who perhaps came forth
from the Eleatic school, and, like
Gorgias, blended the Eleatic doc-
trine with Scepticism, will be spo-
ken of later on in the chapter on
Sophistic.
* As Plato himself indicates in
the opening of the Parmenides, for
after the Eleatic stranger has been
described as étalpos Táv &pſpl IIap-
paevſömy kai Zhvava, Socrates en-
quires ironically whether he is not
perhaps a 6ebs éAeykrikós; and
Theodorus replies that he is uerpić-
repos róv trepi rās pièas €ortrovčakó-
Tov, which it seems from this that
the Eleatics, as a rule, must then
have been.
64() THIE ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY.
the reduction of change to combination and separation in
space, originated with the Eleatics. The Eleatic doctrine
forms therefore the main turning point in the history of
ancient speculation, and after its completion by Par-
menides, no philosophic system arose which was not
essentially determined by its relation to that doctrine.
This circumstance would alone prevent our separat-
ing the Eleatic doctrine as to its general aim from the
contemporary matural philosophy, and attributing to
it, instead of a physical, a dialectical or metaphysical
character; and a more particular examination will at
once show how far removed its founders were from a
pure philosophy of the concept, or ontology. We have
seen that Xenophanes proposed to himself essentially the
same problem as the physicists, to determine the cause
of matural phenomena, the essence of things; we have
found that even Parmenides and his disciples conceive
Being as extended in space; we have learned the ver-
dict of Aristotle on the Eleatics generally, that their
Being is merely the substance of sensible things. From
a, is it is clear that these philosophers, too, were
originally concerned with the knowledge of nature; that
they also start from the given and actual, and from thence
alone, in their search for its universal cause, attained
their more abstract definitions. We must therefore
regard the Eleatic doctrine in its general tendency, not
as a dialectical system, but a system of natural philo-
sophy.” Zeno, it is true, made use of the dialectic
method in its defence, and was therefore called by
Aristotle the discoverer of dialectics; * but the Eleatic
* Wide sup. p. 100, 1, 2. * Sup. p. 613, 2.
* Cf. with what follows, p. 185 sq.


ITS CHARACTER AND POSITION. 641
philosophy as a whole is still far from being a system
of dialectics. In order to be so, it should be dominated
by a more definite view of the problem and method
of scientific knowledge; its physical and metaphysical
enquiry should be preceded by a theory of knowledge,
and its view of the world should be regulated by the
definition and discrimination of concepts. But all this
is wholly absent. The Eleatics after the time of
Parmenides distinguish the sensible and the rational
contemplation of things, but this distinction has with
them only the same import as with Heracleitus, Em-
pedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus; it is not the
basis, but the consequence, of their metaphysical pro-
positions, and is developed as little into a real theory
of knowledge, as by the other physicists. Of the
principle by which Socrates struck out a new way for
philosophy—viz., that the investigation of concepts
must precede all knowledge of objects—we find no
trace, neither in the explicit declarations of the
Eleatics, nor in their scientific procedure. All that
we know of them tends to confirm the view of Aris-
totle, who regards Socrates as absolutely the first founder
of the philosophy of the concept ; and seeks the imper-
fect germ of that philosophy which can be detected in the
earlier science, not in the Eleatics, but in Democritus,
and to some extent also in the Pythagoreans." In the
1 Part. Anim. i. 1 (Sup. p. 185,3);
Metaph. xiii. 4, 1078 b, 17: Xokpá-
Tovs 6* Trepl r&s hôukås àper&s trpay-
parevouévov kal trepitoötovëpíšegóat
ka968 ov Çnroëvros ºrpdºrov (róv wév
ºyap puoruków Śrī utºpov Amuákpitos
#jaro P.6vov kai éptorató aros to 6ep-
WOL. I.
pov kal to puxpóv' of 8& IIv6ayópelot
Tpórepov trepi rivav čAfyou . . .)
éke?vos súAóryos égºiret to Tº eativ
. . . 6üo yáp éo ruv & ris &v &toãotm
X wrpátel Šikatos, roës ºr émakrikovs
Aóryovs kal ºrb épſed.6at rcabóNov.
Similarly ibid. i. 6, 987 b, 1 ; cf.
T T
642 THE ELEATIC PHILOSOPHY.
Eleatic system it is not the idea of knowing, but the
concept of Being, that dominates the whole ; and this
system forms no exception to the dogmatism of the
pre-Socratic philosophy of nature. We must therefore
speaking generally, class the Eleatics among the
Physicists, as was sometimes done even in ancient
times; " although in their material results they stand
widely apart from the rest of the physical philosophers.
In other respects, the historical position of this school,
and its importance in the development of Greek thought,
have been already considered in the introduction.
xii. 9, 1086 b, 2; Phys. ii. 2, 194, 1 Plut. Pericl. c. 4; Sext. Math.
i, 20, and what is quoted on p. vii. 5, in regard to Parmenides.
550, 3.
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Smith's Carthage and the Carthaginians. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Taylor's Manual of the History of India. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Todd's Parliamentary Government in England. 2 vols. 8vo. 37s.
- *- -* — the British Colonies. 8vo. 218.
Trench's Realities of Irish Life. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
Trevelyan’s Early History of Charles James Fox. 8vo. 18s.
Walpole's History of England, 1815–1841. Wols. I. & II. 8vo. 36s. Wol. III. 18s.
Webb's Civil War in Herefordshire. 2 vols. 8vo. Illustrations, 42s.
London, LONG MANS & CO.

General Lists of New Works. 3
BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS.
Bagehot's Biographical Studies. 1 vol. 8vo.
Burke's Wicissitudes of Families. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 218.
Gleig's Life of the Duke of Wellington. Crown 8vo. 68.
Jerrold’s Life of Napoleon III. Wols. I. to III. 8vo. price 18s. each.
Jones's Life of Admiral Frobisher. Crown 8vo. 63.
Lecky's Leaders of Public Opinion in Ireland. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Life (The) and Letters of Lord Macaulay. By his Nephew, G. Otto Trevelyan,
M.P. Cabinet Edition, 2 vols. post 8vo. 12s. Library Edition, 2 vols. 8vo. 368.
Marshman’s Memoirs of Havelock. Crown 8vo. 38. 6d.
Memoirs of Anna Jameson, by Gerardine Macpherson. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Mendelssohn’s Letters. Translated by Lady Wallace. 2 vols. Cr. 8vo. 5s. each.
Mill's (John Stuart) Autobiography. 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Missionary Secretariat of Henry Venn, B.D. 8ve. Portrait. 18s.
Newman's Apologia pro Vitā Suá. Crown 8vo. 68.
Nohl's Life of Mozart. Translated by Lady Wallace. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 21s.
Spedding's Letters and Life of Francis Bacon. 7 vols. 8vo. £4. 48.
Stephen's Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Stigand's Life, Works &c. of Heinrich Heine. 2 vols. 8vo. 288.
MENTAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
Amos's View of the Science of Jurisprudence. 8vo. 183.
– Fifty Years of the English Constitution, 1830–1880. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
— Primer of the English Constitution. Crown 8vo. 63.
Bacon's Essays, with Annotations by Whately. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
— Works, edited by Spedding. 7 vols. 8vo. 73s.6d.
Bagehot's Economic Studies, edited by Hutton. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Bain’s Logic, Deductive and Inductive. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
PART I. Deduction, 48. | PART II. Induction, 6s. 6d.
Bolland & Lang's Aristotle's Politics. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Brassey’s Foreign Work and English Wages. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Comte's System of Positive Polity, or Treatise upon Sociology, translated:—
VoI. I. General View of Positivism and its Introductory Principles. 8vo. 213.
VOL. II. Social Statics, or the Abstract Laws of Human Order. 14s.
WOL. III. Social Dynamics, or General Laws of Human Progress. 218.
WOL. IV. Theory of the Future of Man; with Early Essays. 24.
Congreve's Politics of Aristotle; Greek Text, English Notes, 8vo. 18s.
Grant's Ethics of Aristotle; Greek Text, English Notes. 2 vols. 8vo. 320.
Griffith's A B C of Philosophy. Crown 8vo. 5s.
Hillebrand's Lectures on German Thought. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Hodgson's Philosophy of Reflection. 2 vols. 8vo. 213.
Ealisch’s Path and Goal. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Lewis on Authority in Matters of Opinion. 8vo. 143.
Leslie's Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Macaulay’s Speeches corrected by Himself. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.
Macleod's Economical Philosophy. Wol. I. 8vo. 15s. Wol. II. Part I. 123.
Mill on Representative Government. Crown 8vo. 2s.
— — Liberty. Post 8vo. 7s.6d. Crown 8vo. 1s. 4d.
Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s.
— Dissertations and Discussions. 4 vols. 8vo. 46s. 6d.
London, LONG MANS & CO.
4. General Lists of New Works,
Mill's Essays on Unsettled Questions of Political Economy. 8vo. 6s. 6d.
– Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy. 8vo. 16s.
– Legic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. 2 vols. 8vo. 25s.
— Principles of Political Economy. 2 vols. 8vo. 30s. 1 vol. crown 8vo. 58.
- Subjection of Women. Crown 8vo. 68.
— Utilitarianism. 8vo. 5s.
Morell’s Philosophical Fragments. Crown 8vo. 5s.
Müller's (Max) Chips from a German Workshop. 4 vols. 8vo. 36s.
* — Hibbert Lectures on Origin and Growth of Religion. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Sandars's Institutes of Justinian, with English Notes. 8vo. 18s.
Swinbourne's Picture Logic. Post 8vo. 5s.
Thomson's Outline of Necessary Laws of Thought. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Tocqueville's Democracy in America, translated by Reeve. 2 vols. crown 8vo, 168.
Twiss's Law of Nations, 8vo. in Time of Peace, 12s. in Time of War, 21s.
Whately’s Elements of Logic, 8vo. 10s. 6d. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.
*- — — Rhetoric. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.
* =- English Synonymes. Fop. 8vo. 3s.
Williams's Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle translated. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
— Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Crown 8vo. 15s.
— Plato and the Older Academy. Crown 8vo. 188.
MiscELLANEOUS AND CRITICAL WORKS.
Arnold's (Dr. Thomas) Miscellaneous Works. 8vo. 7s.6d.
— (T.) Manual of English Literature. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
— English Authors, Poetry and Prose Specimens.
Bain’s Emotions and the Will. 8vo. 15s.
— Mental and Moral Science. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
— Senses and the Intellect. 8vo. 15s.
Becker's Charicles and Gallus, by Metcalfe. Post 8vo. 7s.6d. each.
Blackley's German and English Dictionary. Post 8vo. 7s.6d.
Buckle's Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works. 3 vols. 8vo. 52s. 6d.
Cetshwayo's Dutchman. By C. Wijn. Translated by Bishop Colenso. Cr. 8vo. 5s.
Conington's Miscellaneous Writings. 2 vols. 8vo. 288.
Contanseau's Practical French & English Dictionary. Post 8vo. 7s.6d.
- Pocket French and English Dictionary. Square 18mo. 3s. 6d.
Farrar's Language and Languages. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Froude's Short Studies on Great Subjects. 3 vols. crown 8vo. 18s.
German Home Life, reprinted from Fraser's Magazine. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Gibson’s Cavalier's Note-Book. Small 4to. 14s.
Greville's (Lady Violet) Faiths and Fashions. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Hume's Essays, edited by Green & Grose. 2 vols. 8vo. 28s.
— Treatise on Human Nature, edited by Green & Grose. 2 vols. 8vo. 288.
Latham's Handbook of the English Language. Crown 8vo. 6s.
— English Dictionary. 1 vol. medium 8vo. 248. 4 vols. 4to. £7.
Liddell & Scott's Greek-English Lexicon. Crown 4to. 36s.
— — — Abridged Greek-English Lexicon. Square 12mo. 7s. 6d.
Longman's Pocket German and English Dictionary. 18mo. 5s.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works. 5
Macaulay’s Miscellaneous Writings. 2 vols. 8vo. 213. 1 vol. crown 8vo. 4s. 6d.
Macaulay’s Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Macaulay’s Miscellaneous Writings, Speeches, Lays of Ancient Rome, &c.
Cabinet Edition. 4 vols. crown 8vo. 24s.
Mahaffy's Classical Greek Literature. Crown 8vo. Vol. I. the Poets, 7s.6d.
Vol. II. the Prose Writers, 7s.6d.
Müller's (Max) Lectures on the Science of Language. 2 vols. Crown 8vo. 16s.
Noiré on Max Müller’s Philosophy of Language. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Rich's Dictionary of Roman and Greek Antiquities. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Rogers's Eclipse of Faith. Fop. 8vo. 5s.
— Defence of the Eclipse of Faith Fop. 8vo. 3s. 6d.
Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Savile's Apparitions, a Narrative of Facts. Crown 8vo. 58.
Selections from the Writings of Lord Macaulay. Crown 8vo. 6s.
The Essays and Contributions of A. K. H. B. Crown 8vo.
Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson. 3s. 6d.
Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths. 3s. 6d.
Common-place Philosopher in Town and Country. 3s.6d.
Counsel and Comfort spoken from a City Pulpit. 3s. 6d.
Critical Essays of a Country Paison. 38. 6d.
Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson. Three Series, 3s.6d. each.
Landscapes, Churches, and Moralities. 3s.6d.
Leisure Hours in Town. 3s.6d. Lessons of Middle Age. 3s. 6d.
Present-day Thoughts. 3s.6d.
Recreations of a Country Parson. Three Series, 3s.6d. each.
Seaside Musings on Sundays and Week-Days. 3s. 6d.
Sunday Afternoons in the Parish Church of a University City. 3s.6d.
White & Riddle's Large Latin-English Dictionary. 4to. 21s.
White's College Latin-English Dictionary. Royal 8vo. 12s.
— Junior Student's Lat.-Eng. and Eng.-Lat. Dictionary. Square 12mo, 128.
The English-Latin Diction 53. 6d.
Separately { The #; #;%. ;
Wit and Wisdom of the Rev. Sydney Smith, 16mo. 3s.6d.
Yonge's English-Greek Lexicon. Square 12mo. 8s. 6d. 4to. 218.
ASTRONOMY, METEOROLOGY, POPULAR GEOGRAPHY &c.
Dove's Law of Storms, translated by Stott. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy. Square crown 8vo. 12s.
Keith Johnston's Dictionary of Geography, or General Gazetteer, 8vo. 428.
Neigon’s Work on the Moon. Medium 8vo. 31.s. 6d.
Proctor's Essays on Astronomy. 8vo. 12s. Proctor's Moon. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Larger Star Atlas. Folio, 15s. or Maps only, 12s. 6d.
New Star Atlas. Crown 8vo. 5s. Orbs Around Us. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Other Worlds than Ours. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Saturn and its System. 8vo. 14s. Proctor's Sun. Crown 8vo. 148.
Transits of Venus, Past and Coming. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d.
Treatise on the Cycloid and Cycloidal Curves. Crown 8vo. 108. 6d.
– Universe of Stars. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Schellen's Spectrum Analysis. 8vo. 288.
Smith's Air and Rain, 8vo. 24s.
The Public Schools Atlas of Ancient Geography. Imperial 8vo. 7s.6d.
— — — Atlas of Modern Geography. Imperial 8vo. 5s.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
6 General Lists of New Works,
NATURAL HISTORY & POPULAR SCIENCE,
Arnott's Elements of Physics or Natural Philosophy. Crown 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Brande's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art. 3 vols. medium 8vo. 638.
Buckton's Town and Window Gardening. Crown 8vo. 2s.
Decaisne and Le Maout's General System of Botany. Imperial 8vo. 31.s. 6d.
Dixon's Rural Bird Life. Crown 8vo. Illustrations, 7s.6d.
Ganot's Elementary Treatise on Physics, by Atkinson. Large crown 8vo. 158.
— Natural Philosophy, by Atkinson. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Gore's Art of Scientific Discovery. Crown 8vo. 15s.
Grove's Correlation of Physical Forces. 8vo. 15s.
Hartwig's Aerial World. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Polar World. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
tºº Sea and its Living Wonders. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
* Subterranean World. 8vo. 10s. 6d. Tropical World. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Haughton’s Principles of Animal Mechanics. 8vo. 218.
-- Six Lectures on Physical Geography. 8vo. 15s.
Heer’s Primaeval World of Switzerland. 2 vols. 8vo. 16s.
Helmholtz's Lectures on Scientific Subjects, 2 vols. cr. 8vo. 7s.6d, each.
Helmholtz on the Sensations of Tone, by Ellis. 8vo. 36s.
Hullah's Lectures on the History of Modern Music. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
— Transition Period of Musical History. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Keller's Lake Dwellings of Switzerland, by Lee. 2 vols. royal 8vo. 424.
Kirby and Spence's Introduction to Entomology. Crown 8vo. 58.
Lloyd's Treatise on Magnetism. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
sº º- on the Wave-Theory of Light, 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Loudon's Encyclopædia of Plants. 8vo. 42s.
Lubbock on the Origin of Civilisation & Primitive Condition of Man. 8vo. 18s.
Macalister's Zoology and Morphology of Vertebrate Animals. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Nicols’ Puzzle of Life. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d.
owº ºve Anatomy and Physiology of the Wertebrate Animals. 3 vols.
WO. 738. 6d.
Proctor's Light Science for Leisure Hours. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 7s.6d, each.
Rivers's Orchard House. Sixtebnth Edition. Crown 8vo. 58,
— Rose Amateur’s Guide. Fop. 8vo. 4s. 6d.
Stanley's Familiar History of British Birds. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Text-Books of Science, Mechanical and Physical.
Abney's Photography, 3s.6d.
Anderson's (Sir John) Strength of Materials, 3s.6d.
Armstrong's Organic Chemistry, 3s.6d.
Ball’s Astronomy, 68.
Barry’s Railway Appliances, 3s.6d. Bloxam's Metals, 3s.6d.
Goodeve's Elements of Mechanism, 38. 6d.
— Principles of Mechanics, 3s.6d.
Gore's Electro-Metallurgy, 6s.
Griffin's Algebra and Trigonometry, 3s.6d.
Jenkin's Electricity and Magnetista, 38. 6d.
Maxwell's Theory of Heat, 3s.6d.
Merrifield's Technical Arithmetic and Mensuration, 3s. 6d.
Miller's Inorganic Chemistry, 3s.6d.
Preece & Sivewright's Telegraphy, 3s. 6d.
Rutley's Study of Rocks, 4s. 6d.
Shelley's Workshop Appliances, 3s. 6d.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works. * 7
Text-Books of Science—continued.
Thomé’s Structural and Physiological Botany, 6s.
Therpe's Quantitative Chemical Analysis, 4s. 6d.
Thorpe & Muir's Qualitative Analysis, 3s.6d.
Tilden’s Chemical Philosophy, 3s. 6d.
TJnwin’s Machine Design, 3s. 6d.
Watson's Plane and Solid Geometry, 3s.6d.
Tyndall on Sound. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Contributions to Molecular Physics. 8vo. 163.
Fragments of Science. 2 vols. post 8vo. 16s.
Heat a Mode of Motion, 6th Edition, 13th Thousand. Crown 8vo. 12s.
Notes on Electrical Phenomena. Crown 8vo. 1s. sewed, 1s. 6d. cloth.
Notes of Lectures on Light. Crown 8vo. 1s. Sewed, 1s. 6d. cloth.
Lectures on Light delivered in America. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Lessons in Electricity. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
Won Cotta on Rocks, by Lawrence. Post 8vo. 14s.
Woodward's Geology of England and Wales. Crown 8vo. 14s.
Wood’s Bible Animals. With 112 Vignettes. 8vo. 143.
– Homes Without Hands. 8vo. 14s. Insects Abroad. 8vo. 14s.
— Insects at Home. With 700 Illustrations. 8vo. 14s.
— Out of Doors. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d. Strange Dwellings. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
CHEMISTRY & PHYSIOLOGY.
Auerbach’s Anthracen, translated by W. Crookes, F.R.S. 8vo. 12s.
Buckton's Health in the House, Lectures on Elementary Physiology. Cr. 8vo. 2s.
Crookes's Handbook of Dyeing and Calico Printing. 8vo. 42s.
* Select Methods in Chemical Analysis. Crown 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Kingzett's Animal Chemistry. 8vo. 18s.
-> History, Products and Processes of the Alkali Trade. 8vo. 12s.
Miller’s Elements of Chemistry, Theoretical and Practical. 3 vols. 8vo. Part T.
Chemical Physics, 16s. Part II. Inorganic Chemistry, 243. Part III. Organic
Chemistry, Section I. price 313. 6d.
Thudichum’s Annals of Chemical Medicine. Vol. I. 8vo. 14s.
Tilden’s Practical Chemistry. Fop. 8vo. 1s. 6d.
Watts's Dictionary of Chemistry. 7 vols. medium 8vo. £10. 16s. 6d.
– Third Supplementary Volume, in Two Parts. PART I. 36s.
THE FINE ARTS & ILLUSTRATED EDITIONs.
Bewick's Select Fables of AEsop and others. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d. demy 8vo. 18s.
Toyle's Fairyland; Pictures from the Elf-World. Folio, 15s.
Dresser's Arts and Art Industries of Japan. [In preparation.
Ingelow’s Poems, Illustrated Edition. Fop. 4to. Woodcuts, 21s.
Jameson's Sacred and Legendary Art. 6 vols. square crown 8vo.
Legends of the Madonna. 1 vol. 21s.
— — — Monastic Orders. 1 vol. 21s.
— — — Saints and Martyrs. 2 vols, 31s. 6d.
— — — Saviour. Completed by Lady Eastlake. 2 vols. 42s.
Longman's Three Cathedrals Dedicated to St. Paul. Square crown 8vo. 21s.
Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome. With 90 Illustrations. Fop. 4to. 218.
Macfarren's Lectures on Harmony. 8vo. 12s.
Miniature Edition of Macaulay’s Lays of Ancient Rome. Imp. 16mo. 10s. 6d.
Moore's Irish Melodies. With 161 Plates by D. Maclise, R.A. Super-royal 8vo. 21s.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
s
8 General Lists of New Works.
Moore's Lalla Rookh, illustrated by Tenniel. Square crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Berry on Greek and Roman Sculpture. 8vo [In preparation.
THE USEFUL ARTS, MANUFACTURES &c.
Bourne's Catechism of the Steam Engine. Fop. 8vo. 6s.
— Examples of Steam, Air, and Gas Engines. 4to. 70s.
— Handbook of the Steal Engine. FCp. 8vo. 9s.
— Recent Improvements in the Steam Engine. Fop. 8vo. 63.
— Treatise on the Steam Engine, 4to. 42s.
Cresy’s Encyclopædia of Civil Engineering. 8vo. 25s.
Culley's Handbook of Practical Telegraphy. 8vo. 16s.
Eastlake's Household Taste in Furniture, &c. Square crown 8vo. 14s.
Fairbairn's Useful Information for Engineers. 3 vols. crown 8vo. 31.s. 6d.
- Applications of Cast and Wrought Iron, 8vo, 16s.
- Mills and Millwork. 1 Vol. 8vo. 25s. t
Gwilt's Encyclopædia of Architecture. 8vo. 52s. 6d.
Hobson’s Amateur Mechanic’s Practical Handbook. Crown 8vo. 2s. 6d.
Hoskold's Engineer's Waluing Assistant. 8vo. 31.s. 6d.
Kerl’s Metallurgy, adapted by Crookes and Röhrig. 3 vols. 8vo. £4.19s.
Loudon’s Encyclopædia of Agriculture. 8vo. 21s.
- tº-e – Gardening. 8vo. 21s.
Mitchell’s Manual of Practical Assaying. 8vo. 31.s. 6d.
Northcott's Lathes and Turning, 8vo. 18s.
Payen's Industrial Chemistry Edited by B. H. Paul, Ph.D. 8vo. 42s,
Piesse’s Art of Perfumery. Fourth Edition. Square crown 8vo. 21s.
Stoney's Theory of Strains in Girders. Royal 8vo. 36s.
Thomas on Coal, Mine-Gases and Ventilation. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Ure's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures, & Mines. 4 vols. medium 8vo. £7. 7s.
Wille on Artificial Manures. By Crookes. 8vo. 218.
RELIGIOUS & MORAL WORKS.
Abbey & Overton's English Church in the Eighteenth Century. 2 vols. 8vo. 36s.
Arnold's (Rev. Dr. Thomas) Sermons. 6 vols. crown 8vo. 5s. each.
Bishop Jeremy Taylor's Entire Works. With Life by Bishop Heber. Edited by
the Rev. C. P. Eden. 10 vols. 8vo. £5.5s.
Boultbee's Commentary on the 39 Articles. Crown 8vo. 6s.
- History of the Church of England, Pre-Reformation Period. 8vo. 15s.
Browne's (Bishop) Exposition of the 39 Articles, 8vo. 16s.
Bunsen’s Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, &c. 8vo. 10s 6d.
Colenso’s Lectures on the Pentateuch and the Moabite Stone, 8vo. 12s.
Colenso on the Pentateuch and Book of Joshua. Crown 8vo. 68.
— — PART VII. completion of the larger Work. 8vo. 24s.
Conder’s Handbook of the Bible. Post 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Conybeare & Howson's Life and Letters of St. Paul :—
Library Edition, with all the Original Illustrations, Maps, Landscapes on
Steel, Woodcuts, &c., 2 vols. 4to. 42s.
Intermediate Edition, with a Selection of Maps, Plates, and Woodcuts.
2 vols. Square crown 8vo. 213.
Student's Edition, revised and condensed, with 46 Illustrations and Maps,
I Vol. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Ilondon, LONG MANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works. 9
Drummond's Jewish Messiah. 8vo. 15s.
Ellicott's (Bishop) Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistles. 8vo. Galatians, 8s. 6d.
Ephesians, 8s. 6d. Pastoral Epistles, 10s. 6d. Philippians, Colossians, and
Philemon, 10s. 6d. Thessalonians, 7s.6d.
Ellicott's Lectures on the Life of our Lord. 8vo. 12s.
Ewald's History of Israel, translated by Carpenter. 5 vols. 8vo. 63s.
– Antiquities of Israel, translated by Solly. 8vo. 12s. 6d.
Gospel (The) for the Nineteenth Century. 4th Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Hopkins's Christ the Consoler. Fep. 8vo. 2s. 6d.
Jukes's Types of Genesis. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
- Second Death and the Restitution of all Things. Crown 8vo. 3s.6d.
Kalisch's Bible Studies. PART I. the Prophecies of Balaam. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
*- -º- - PART II. the Book of Jonah. 8vo. 108. 6d.
* Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament; with a
New Translation. Vol. I. Genesis, 8vo. 18s. or adapted for the General
Reader, 12s. Vol. II. Eacodus, 15s. or adapted for the General Reader, 12s.
Vol. III. Leviticus, Part I. 15s. or adapted for the General Reader, 8s.
Vol. IV. Leviticus, Part II. 15s. or adapted for the General Reader, 8s.
Lyra Germanica: Hymns translated by Miss Winkworth. Fop. 8vo. 58.
Manning's Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost. 8vo. 8s. 6d.
Martineau’s Endeavours after the Christian Life. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
- Hymns of Praise and Prayer. Crown 8vo. 4s. 6d. 32mo, 1s. 6d.
- Sermons, Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. 2 vols. 7s.6d. each.
Merivale's (Dean) Lectures on Early Church History. Crown 8vo. 5s.
Mill's Three Essays on Religion. 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Missionary Secretariat of Henry Venn, B.D. 8vo. Portrait. 18s.
Monsell's Spiritual Songs for Sundays and Holidays. Fep. 8vo. 5s. 18mo. 28.
Müller's (Max) Lectures on the Science of Religion. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Newman's Apologia pro Vitā Suá. Crown 8vo. 68.
Passing Thoughts on Religion. By Miss Sewell. FCp. 8vo. 3s.6d.
Sewell's (Miss) Preparation for the Holy Communion. 32mo. 3s.
Smith's Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Supernatural Religion. Complete Edition. 3 vols. 8vo. 36s.
Thoughts for the Age. By Miss Sewell. Fep. 8vo. 3s.6d.
Waughan's Trident, Crescent, and Cross; the Religious History of India. 8vo.9s.6d.
Whately’s Lessons on the Christian Evidences. 18mo. 6d.
White's Four Gospels in Greek, with Greek-English Lexicon. 32mo. 5s.
TRAVELS, VOYAGES &c.
Baker's Rifle and Houndin Ceylon. Crown 8vo.7s.6d.
– Eight Years in Ceylon. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Ball's Alpine Guide. 3 vols.post 8vo. with Maps and Illustrations:—I. Western
Alps, 65. 6d. II. Central Alps, 7s.6d. III. Eastern Alps, 10s. 6d.
Ball on Alpine Travelling, and on the Geology of the Alps, 1s.
Bent's Freak of Freedom, or the Republic of San Marino. Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Brassey's Sunshine and Storm in the East. 8vo. 21s.
– Voyage in the Yacht ‘Sunbeam.” Cr. 8vo. 7s.6d. School Edition, 2s.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
10 General Lists
of New Work,.
Edwards's (A.B.) Thousand Miles up the Nile. Imperial 8vo. 42s.
Hassall's San Remo and the Western Riviera. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Macnamara's Medical Geography of India. 8vo. 21s,
Miller's Wintering in the Riviera.
Post 8vo. Illustrations, 12s. 6d.
Packe's Guide to the Pyrenees, for Mountaineers.
Crown 8vo. 7s.6d.
Rigby’s Letters from France, &c. in 1789. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Shore's Flight of the ‘Lapwing', Sketches in China and Japan. 8vo.
The Alpine Club Map of Switzerland. In Four Sheets. 42s.
WORKS OF FICTION.
Blues and Buffs. By Arthur Mills.
Crown 8vo. 6s.
Hawthorne's (J.) Yellow-Cap and other Fairy Stories.
Crown 8vo. 6s.
The Crookit Meg. By Shirley. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Cabinet Edition of Stories and Tales by Miss Sewell:—
Amy Herbert, 2s. 6d.
Cleve Hall, 2s. 6d.
The Earl's Daughter, 2s. 6d.
Experience of Life, 2s. 6d.
Gertrude, 2s. 6d.
Novels and Tales by the Right Hon. the Earl of Beaconsfield, K.G.
Ivors, 2s. 6d.
Katharine Ashton, 2s. 6d.
Laneton Parsonage, 36, £d.
Margaret Percival, 3s.6d.
Ursula, 38. 6d.
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