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E,‘ H. ‘ ‘ ‘ ImqJnvloWxmluw (P12. rziipifllw F, ‘wfrt; Rxbrffrll-f? ‘ _ ‘ . ‘.rlr‘v. b v >. > H I I‘ u I. m .1H - W I u . v , ‘5E’ ‘ 13 191$ i. immw Suggestions for ‘Legislators of 191 7 THE IjATIONAL SHORT BALLGT ORGANIZATION 383 Fourth Avenue, New York City ‘UK zé4¢ SUMMARY Direct primaries .fail when attached to long ballots (al- though they are completely successful in Commission-gov- erned Short Ballot cities). The State Government should be organized on a closer model of the very simple Short Ballot National government. County Governments are now ridiculously complex and need wholesale reconstruction on simple lines. City Governments should be free to adopt the modern simple commission-manager plan with a Short Ballot. Suggestions to 1917 Legislators Popular and Efficient Government VERYWHERE people are gradually being con- vinced that there is something seriously “out of joint” with American government. It goes back a good many years; to the agitation begun in the early eighties for “civil service reform” and the late ’80s and early ’90s for the Australian ballot system. Then it was the direct primary and the measures for direct legislation—the idea of “directness” held sway in re- form circles for some time. Every one of these “reforms” have displayed conspicu- ous merits. But every one of them is more or less of a device or attachment to the existing forms of government. One of them tends very greatly to complicate government and citizenship. This is the direct primary, which has had the bad fortune to have been tried out under extremely unfavor- able conditions and has nearly everywhere suffered discredit accordingly. It is true that in some states direct primaries, supplemented by powerful organization of independents within the party, such as the Lincoln-Roosevelt League in California, did accomplish the overthrow of the powers in control. But direct primaries have never overcome either the need for organized effort nor the great expense which is at- tached to it. The weaknesses of the system have been par- ticularly apparent with respect to minor and inconspicuous ofiices such as the Secretary of State, State Treasurer, State Engineer and the like. The people have simply refused to get worked up or even mildly interested in them because there was almost never any great public issue involved and the 3 offices have just gone by default to the candidate who hap- pened to have the largest block of votes behind him. Judicial candidates, for instance, rarely command popular attention. The judge who has made a quiet, consistent, faithful record is at a distinct disadvantage with a more noisy person who may have command of more votes but far less judicial ability. In such cases the Direct Primary has merely given the party ranh-and-file an opportunity to express an opinion where they had no opinion to express. An argument for a return to the convention system? Not at all. Only a suggestion that some offices ‘would be badly selected under any elective system, because the voters have shown themselves to be interested only in conspicuous officers who determine important public policies. And this leads us up to the Short Ballot principle of political reconstruction which is founded on the idea of sim- plifying the machinery of government, of adjusting it to the human nature of the citizenship. 7 Within the past ten years the American people have been treated to an experiment in government which REALLY WORKS in actual life. A What Commission Government Teaches The experiment in mind is the commission form of gov- ernment in over four hundred cities. True, it has not yielded all the happy results that its enthusiastic supporters prom- ised. That is principally because, while simplifying in one direction, the framers of the commission plan introduced new complications. They made it easy for the citizen to know what he was doing on election day because there were usually only five men to be chosen, who were all of equal rank and im- portance. But they created a five-headed executive where a one-headed one (in theory at least) grew before. But commission government at least has demonstrated that simplicity is the key to practical democracy. ' As Woodrow Wilson exclaimed in a speech at St. Louis in 1910: “Simplification! Simplification! is the task that awaits us—to reduce the number of persons voted for to the absolute working minimum, knowing whom you have selected, know- ing whom you have trusted, and having so few persons to 4 watch that you can watch them. That is the way we are going to get popular control back in this country and that is the only way we are going to get political control back.” And Charles E. Hughes at about the same time from his vantage point as Governor of New York, said the same thing in a more specific way: “There should be a reduction in the number of elective offices. The ends of democracy will be better attained to the extent that the attention of the voters may be focussed upon comparatively few offices, and the incumbents can be held strictly accountable for administration.” These are but two of the more conspicuous exponents of the idea of simplification. The list of those who subscribe to their views and whose opinion counts as authority would fill a volume. It includes practically every great American states- man of today—governors and ex-governors by the score, in- cluding among the Republicans, Samuel W. McCall of Massa- chusetts, Arthur Capper of Kansas, James Carlson of Colo- rado, Henry D. Hatfield of West Virginia, Charles S. Whit- man of New York, E. M. Byrne of South Dakota, James Withy- combe of Oregon; among the Democrats, Governors Lister of Washington, Woodbridge N. Ferris of Michigan, R. L. Will- iams of Oklahoma, James F. Fielder of New Jersey, Geo. W. P. Hunt of Arizona, Locke Craig of North Carolina, Emmet D. Boyle of Nevada. The list would take in the editor of nearly every influen- ital newspaper and farm journal. As for the men who make a life study of politics, the teachers of political science in our universities and colleges, they are unanimous in the belief that real democracy and the basis of real governmental efficiency can only be established when we shall abandon the doctrine that government must be complex in order to be safe. So much for generalities. The question before the house is: What does simplified government mean in practice? _We shall begin at the top. How Our State Constitutions Deceive Our state constitutions all say in one form or another that the Governor “shall be the chief executive of the state.” The words were put into these constitutions because 5 everybody knows perfectly well that every “going concern” must have a guiding hand and directing head. Not only so, but at the end of every two, three or four years the people of every state in the Union solemnly turn out to meetings, read campaign literature by the ton and finally go to the ballot box to choose that same head of the government. They stake their public welfare on him. The voters do their part. But somehow the governors they choose, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, fail miser- ably. They do not lead. They do not carry out their promises. What’s the answer? ' Those gilded packages which we call our state con- stitutions contradict themselves! Governors cannot lead, they ‘.1 cannot be heads of the government in fact because the con- stitutions, in their fear that a governor, sometime in the dim future, might do something wrong, have robbed the chief executive of control over his official arms and fingers. J e l_. \' “Business” Administration We mean, to speak plainly, that the governor, contrary to what every private business executive would insist upon, cannot appoint the men who are to give him counsel and to execute his orders. Of course, while such is the case, it is just plain non- sense to talk about having “business administration” and “business principles” in the state government, or in any gov- ernment so constructed. And the curse of the whole business is that it is not dem- ocracy. When they failed to let the executive appoint his own subordinates the constitution-makers handed the people a weak, ineffective instrument, thus withholding from them the means of making their will felt. - But that is not the worst of it. The further fact re- mains that these subordinate executives through whom the governor must work are not chosen by the people either. Everyone versed sufficiently in practical politics to get elected to office knows that the great run of voters—and it is they who determine the results of elections—center their attention on Mllelfheadoijmicket.” The rest are hand-picked by the party leaders. And it cannot be otherwise when there may be anywhere between fifteen and fifty sets of oflices to be filled. 6 Many of the candidates are unknown outside home counties - except perhaps vaguely by reputation. It isn’t responsible government when officers like the at- torney-general, the state treasurer and the state auditor and the secretary of state are chosen neither by the people them- selves or by their chosen representative. And out of irrespon- sible government can come anything and everything in the way of bad government from minor inefficiencies to downright graft and corruption. What to Do About It For the conditions which have been set forth there is but a single fundamental remedy within reach. Make the gov- ernor responsible! This means first the Short Ballot. The most carefully prepared proposal for applying this principle to state governments has been worked out by the New York Short Ballot Organization.* The amendment put forth by this organization provides that the governor shall have power to appoint the comptroller, secretary of state, state treasurer, attorney-general and state engineer and surveyor. This is the Short Ballot idea in its strictest sense. In the constitutional convention in 1915, how- ever, it was found that the discussion of the governor’s ap- pointing power opened up the subsidiary question as to how the appointing power should be exercised. The appoint- ing methods employed in the state government were found to be so various and confusing that it soon became evident that some standard method should be determined upon and adopted. In fact, it was realized that some methods of appointment might be even worse than the elective method itself, since they only seemed to give the governor control of his subordi- nates, while actually lodging the power somewhere else. Senate Confirmation Destroys Responsibility This is particularly true of the system, generally in vogue in our state governments, of making the governor’s appoint- ments subject to confirmation by the upper house of the legis- *Write the Secretary for a copy of the text of the proposal, 383 Fourth Ave., New York City. 7 lature. Concerning this the organization's memorial to the convention says: “Our amendment abolishes confirmation by the Senate so far as constitutional oflices are concerned, both on appoint- ments and removals. There is opposition to this from some who imagine that confirmation by the Senate is used to keep unwise Governors from making bad appointments. The con- firmation idea, however, has been amply tried and has been found wanting. It is fundamentally unsound because it con— fuses the gubernatorial responsibility. The governor should have nothing to think about but the efficiency of his proposed appointees. The best check upon gubernatorial appointment will be the knowledge of the governor that he will have nobody to blame but himself if the results of his appointments are not satisfactory. In New York City the mayor makes his appoint- ments without confirmation, and after considerable experience with many types of mayors, that remains one of the most satis- factory features of the charter, and there is not the slightest disposition on the part of the people of the city to undertake to change that system. It‘must be remembered in this connec- tion that the mayor administers a budget several times as large as the governor does. Although in the United States government confirmation by the Senate is nominally required for the President’s cabinet appointments, it has necessarily become the tradition to regard confirmation in this case as a mere formality and to give the President a free hand in the selection of his ‘official family.’ ” This may seem a somewhat new phase of the Short Bal~ lot idea, but it is tremendously important. The Governor’s Financial Responsibility Closely associated with the Short Ballot idea—a logical sequence of it, in fact—is the executive budget. In a private business corporation the board of directors look to the general manager to furnish it with financial de- tails. It expects the manager to frame up a program of ac- tivities, telling him in one way or another, not to go ahead until he has received official permission. Then they meet to- gether and ‘go over the whole business, trimming here and there, holding the manager down where he seems to be too ambitious or too erratic. But the board of directors never gives up its essential control. And it winds up by adopting the manager’s program, as amended. It is the most logical, natural and practical proposition ' 8 in the world. And so is the executive budget idea. The gov- ernor, properly equipped with an investigating staff, and in consultation with his subordinates, and with individual citi- zens and groups of citizens, gets hold of exact information as to the needs of each department. He sits down with his offi- cial family and talks it out. They make compromises and concessions so as to bring the total demands within the finan- cial resources of the state. When the legislature meets the financial program of the year is predigested, but the legisla- ture should have power to shoot questions at both the governor and his subordinates and “smoke them out.” It is the idea of “pitiless publicity” reduced to a practical working basis. After going over the governor’s program in this fash- ion, the legislature would have power to reduce or eliminate any items of appropriation it saw fit. This done, it would have the power to introduce original measures of its own, thus retaining intact its “power of the purse.” Executive Budget Increases Legislature's Power The executive budget system really increases the legis- lature’s financial powers, since it gives to it the “last word” (the governor now has it in most states through his power of veto). The system, instead of curtailing the legislature’s power, simply prescribes an orderly, logical, wide-open pro- cedure. As a matter of fact, no American state has as yet adopted the executive budget idea in anything like a complete sense. The Edge act in New Jersey makes the governor a sort of messenger for the legislature, but does not give him the initiative which the standard budget plan contemplates. For concrete precedents you will have to look to the system in New York City, which puts the Board of Estimate practically in the position of a responsible executive with relation to the legisla- tive body, which in this instance is the Board of Aldermen. What Has Been Done About It What is true of the budget is also true of the Short Bal- lot. There are no Short Ballot states, though several of the states have taken important steps in that direction, as, for example, California, where the state railroad commission, the 9 state printer and the clerk of the supreme court have been taken off the ballot. Ohio got rid of its elective public works commissioner, superintendent of public instruction and dairy and food commissioner and Iowa its elective supreme court clerk. New Jersey has always been “Short Ballot” as to its minor state executives (only the governor is elected) but very “long-ballot” as to the lower house of the legislature, which is elected at large by counties. ‘But numerous states are headed unmistakably toward Short Ballot reorganization through the work of the efliciency and economy commissions. What a Legislative Committee Found One such commission was appointed by the thirty-first Iowa Assembly. We quote at some length from their recom- mendations, indulging in a little italicizing on our own ac- count: “The state is expending many millions annually in main- taining its great interests. The responsibility of governing over two million people is not small and it costs much in effort and in money to adequately perform the functions of govern- ment. N o complaint may be justly made if the right and de- sired result is secured at a minimum cost, but complaint may be justly made by those who pay the bills, if the best results be not obtained at the lowest cost. Iowa as a business concern handles more property, employs more men, pays out more in labor and for property, perhaps, than any other enterprise operating wholly within its boundaries. If, by reorganization, by co-ordination, by efficient business regeneration, the cost may be lowered to the people, or better results be obtained at the same cost, we should give freely of our time and effort in betterment of the state’s business affairs. After careful consideration this Committee believes the present policy of creating a department and then leaving it practically without independent supervision, is unwise. We believe the state will receive better service if, instead of the present diffusion of powers and responsibilities, the‘various departments of the state’s business activities be placed under direct supervision of department heads to be appointed by the governor and to serve subject to his wish,'thus making the governor the real administrative head of the state—the real source of authority and concomitant responsibility. “We believe that in governmental affairs the thing to be most desired is a plan of reorganization comprehensive enough to meet the growing demands of the state. Such a 10 plan must have for its purpose the highest efficiency at the least possible cost. The system or plan must be such that it may expand naturally and symmetrically as necessity de- mands. “We believe that the central idea of government is action coupled with responsibility. The present organization of the State’s business, in the judgment of your Committee, fails to meet these requirements in the fullest possible measure. “There is no plan of co-ordinate organization. Offices have been created and departments established without refer- ence to what had been done before. There is diversity of au- thority and division of responsibility in all the branches and departments of government. “It is the opinion of your Committee that the chief cause for such waste and inefficiency as is apparent in the adminis- tration of the state’s affairs is due to the system under which it is conducted—a system which, in the light of modern busi- ness experience, has become crude and unwieldy, not to say obsolete. For the government of Iowa is only a vast business concern in which the people of the state are the stockholders. Probably no other large business concern in the state is with- out a single administrative head to whom the stockholders look for results and to whom they give credit or censure as the business fares well or ill, either as to its entirety or as to any department thereof. “The constitution provides for the election of an auditor, secretary and treasurer of state, but does not specifically define their duties. Our plan of reorganization contemplates concentration of authority in one head—the governor the state—and to accomplish this end it is necessary that the gov- ernor be vested with authority to appoint the various ofiicials through whom he must carry out his policy. We would, there- fore, leave to the secretary of state the recording part of the state’s affairs, to the auditor, the accounting part of the state’s business, and to the treasurer the handling of the l. state’s revenues, just as was originally contemplated whergi/ the constitution was adopted and before successive legislature placed numerous departments of administration under thes officials. , “We hope and believe that through this system greater efficiency and economy will result by combining certain boards and abolishing others, but have not entered upon a specific dis- cussion of that feature at this time, leaving that field for later consideration. “By this policy we would restore these officials to the status contemplated originally, with the purpose ultimately of abolishing those offices by constitutional amendment, at such time transferring their remaining powers and duties to the officials to be now referred to. This would not only con- 11 centrate authority in the governor as the appointing power, eliminating division of authority at present prevailing, but would shorten a now badly encumbered ballot, thus making for simplified government. “We would divide the various departments of the state’s activities into three great-divisions with a head or chief of each division to be appointed by the Governor, and to have general supervision over the several departments placed under him. Instead of each department being left to pursue its own course, wholly or substantially independent of all other departments, all would be welded together in co-ordinate activity, minor de- partment heads under the great department leader, the three great department leaders laboring together, and all in co-oper- ation with the governor as supreme head; becoming in fact, the cabinet of the governor and responsive to his policies. “We have designated these three divisions as ‘Department of Social Progress,’ ‘Department of Industries’ and ‘Depart- ment of Public Safety.’ We have listed as one of the sub- divisions the railroad commission; and we do this because we believe that the membership of that commission should be ‘ appointed by the governor in furtherance of the Short Ballot and also eflicient concentration of administrative authority and responsibility. The attorney-general should also be ap- pointed by the governor. “While the following scheme of departmental division is not necessarily absolute, perhaps the best interests of the state may be more completely served by further revision, and it is the judgment of the Committee that substantially the follow- ing readjustment will be found most efficient.” 12 MUNICIPALITIES ATHER more simple than the reshaping of the state R government is the legislation that remains to be en- acted for cities. The states in which no city now has had an opportunity to avail itself of simplified government are In- diana, Nevada, Delaware, Vermont and New Hampshire. Most of the other states have either constitutional home rule, which permits the city to draft, adopt and amend its own charter, or an optional city government law, which permits the cities by a local referendum, to adopt one of two or more simplified forms. Ohio permits its cities to follow either course, while New York, Virginia, Massachusetts and Iowa have laws specifically permitting their cities to adopt either the regular commission form or the commission-manager plan. As for the commission-manager plan, astonishing inter- est is being manifested in it all over the country. It was only in 1913 that it got a real start when Dayton and Springfield, Ohio, adopted it. Since that time it has been accepted by over forty cities. Everywhere it is giving satisfaction, and in many of the cities it is producing striking results in the way of economies and better service. Under this plan the city is governed by an elective board, chosen either at large, or by wards, or by a combination of those two methods or by pro- portional representation. Indeed this wide choice of methods is one of its strongest features. The elective body has full control over the city’s affairs but its individual members take no part in administrative details. The actual operation of the city departments is under a single executive, the city manager, who need not be a local resident—and is to be chosen by the governing body solely with reference to his managerial ability. County Government Recall first what we said about the headlessness of our state governments. Then reflect upon the fact that county governments everywhere do not even pretend to have a head or executive! Without knowing anything specific about how county government is succeeding, you can calculate in a gen- 13 . .Q. Q . ‘ . O’. eral way what is going on all over your state. In the bright lexicon of county government there is no such word as “efliciency.” Such investigations as have been made in this field fully confirm the worse suspicions of those who have studied the form of county government and have found that hopelessly bad. It is really very difficult, if not impossible, to do anything with county government without practically tearing it to pieces and rebuilding it from the ground up. That is why California has its county constitutional home rule amendment permitting any county to frame, adopt and amend a charter for its government. The day when counties can all be governed alike and at the same time be governed economic- ally and well, is past. But county government, just like city government, should be just a means for conducting public business. It must have a directing head and proper subordina- tion. In New York the County Government Association has worked out a plan of county government which calls for a small board of supervisors and a county manager. The same remedy has been suggested in several states. But perhaps you are not convinced that county govern- ment in your state needs overhauling. If you have such doubts, why not, in the face of the universal suspicion in which county government is held, set the machinery of investigation in motion? We guarantee that you will turn up many interest- ing things! PRACTICAL AID TO LEGISLATORS E have given the skeleton of simplified government as the leaders of political thought in America conceive it at the present time. If you wish to go into any of the subjects more deeply we shall be glad to put the resources of our office at your service. Our various pamphlets contain a more complete analysis than we can furnish in so brief a compass. We will be able in many cases to suggest the actual forms of measures to be adopted, to put you in touch with people in your state who would give support to a rational program of simplified government, and to give you further suggestions based upon what has actually been done in other localities. 14 PUBLICATIONS (Single copies free on request) THE SHORT BALLOT (32 pp.) THE STORY OF THE SHORT BALLOT CITIES (24 pp.) THE SHORT BALLOT BULLETIN (Bi-monthly. Back numbers available.) THE SHORT BALLOT IN NEW YORK STATE (24 pp.) PROPOSAL. FOR JUDGES BY GOVERNOR'S RECOMMENDATION (Brief and text 12 pp.) PROPOSAL FOR THE STATE SHORT BALLOT (Brief and text 16 pp.) THE OFFICE OF CORONER IN NEW YORK CITY COMMISSION GOVERNMENT WITH A CITY MANAGER (24 pp.) THE COMMISSION-MANAGER PLAN OF MUNICIPAL GOVERN- MEN T (Texts and outlines of charters) THE CITY MANAGERS (A series of ten articles on the actual workings of the commission-manager plan) CERTAIN WEAKNESSES IN THE COMMISSION PLAN OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT (16 pp.) TANGIBLE RESULTS IN DAYTON (under the commission-manager plan) PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE FOR BETTER COUNTY GOVERNMENT (Schenectady, N. Y., Nov. 13-14) RAMSHACKLE COUNTY GOVERNMENT—By Richard S. Childs ‘CI’ . .G i '0 cc: townie ll 0 ' o \'a.".& 15 THE NATIONAL SHORT BALLOT ORGANIZATION President WOODROW WILSON Washington, D. C. Vice-Presidents WINSTON CHURCHILL, Cornish, N. H. BEN E. DEMING, New York, N. Y. BEN B. LINDSEY, Denver, Colo. JOHN MITCHELL, Mt. Vernon, N. Y. _ WILLIAM S. U’REN, Oregon‘ City, Ore. 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